[Cite as State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 125 Ohio 

St.3d 427, 2010-Ohio-1873.] 

THE STATE EX REL. LUCAS COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY EXECUTIVE 

COMMITTEE v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. 

Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 427, 2010-Ohio-1873.] 

Elections — Mandamus — County boards of elections — R.C. 3501.07 — Party’s 

recommendation of new member of county board of elections to secretary 

of state — R.C. 3517.05 — State party’s executive committee has duty to 

resolve dispute between entities when both claim to be rightful county 

executive committee — Writ to compel secretary of state to appoint person 

recommended by one of two competing entities claiming to be county 

executive committee — Secretary of state lacks authority to appoint 

recommended appointee when entity making recommendation has not 

been certified by state central committee as rightful executive committee 

for county — Secretary of state, in absence of state committee’s resolution 

of dispute or final judicial determination, shall make appointment — Writ 

denied. 

(No. 2010-0435 — Submitted April 27, 2010 — Decided April 30, 2010.) 

IN MANDAMUS. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel 

respondent, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, to appoint Jon Stainbrook to the 

Lucas County Board of Elections as recommended by relator, one of two 

competing groups claiming to be the Lucas County Republican Party Executive 

Committee. Because the secretary of state did not abuse her discretion or clearly 
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disregard applicable law in rejecting the recommendations of the two competing 

groups, we deny the writ. 

Facts 

{¶ 2} On January 9, 2010, the faction that claims to be the Lucas County 

Republican Party Executive Committee with Jon Stainbrook as its chairperson 

(“Stainbrook faction”) recommended that Secretary of State Brunner appoint 

Stainbrook to the Lucas County Board of Elections for the four-year term 

beginning March 1, 2010. The secretary of state received the recommendation on 

January 11. 

{¶ 3} On January 15, 2010, the faction with Jeffrey Simpson as its 

chairperson that also claims to be the Lucas County Republican Party Executive 

Committee (“Simpson faction”) recommended that Secretary of State Brunner 

appoint David W. Dmytryka to the Lucas County Board of Elections for the same 

four-year term. The secretary of state received this recommendation on January 

19. 

{¶ 4} By letter dated January 25, the Stainbrook faction requested that 

the secretary of state respond to certain legal questions concerning the two 

factions and stated that the secretary could not permit the board of elections to 

continue acknowledging the Simpson faction as a lawfully organized group. An 

elections counsel for the secretary of state replied that the secretary would not 

give an advisory opinion because R.C. 3517.05 places the duty on the state central 

committee of the Ohio Republican Party to resolve the dispute between the two 

rival factions, and the issue was the subject of litigation pending in the Lucas 

County Court of Common Pleas. The board of elections had certified to the Ohio 

Republican Party Central Committee the lists of the officers and members of the 

rival factions on January 12. 

{¶ 5} On February 18, 2010, in Gallagher v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

Lucas C.P. No. CI-0201001192-00, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas 
January Term, 2010 

3 

held that neither competing group had complied with the applicable requirements 

of R.C. 3517.04 for organizing and ordered the state central committee to resolve 

the matter. 

{¶ 6} On March 1, the secretary of state rejected both factions’ 

recommended appointees for the board of elections. The secretary of state 

determined that she was unable to accept either recommendation “[u]ntil either 

the Lucas County Republican Central and Executive Committee is able to 

organize according to law, or until one of the factions or some other configuration 

of members is recognized by either a court or the Ohio Republican Party State 

Central Committee as the duly organized committee.” The secretary of state 

specified that she took no position on which faction was the rightful committee 

because by statute, that was the responsibility of the Ohio Republican Party State 

Central Committee. On that same date, the secretary of state appointed Benjamin 

F. Marsh to the board of elections for the four-year term beginning that day. 

{¶ 7} On March 9, the Stainbrook faction filed this action for a writ of 

mandamus to compel the secretary of state to appoint Stainbrook to the board of 

elections and for a writ of prohibition to invalidate the secretary’s appointment of 

Marsh to the board. The Stainbrook faction also requested a peremptory other 

writ, including an emergency other writ, precluding the appointment of Marsh. A 

few days later, we granted an alternative writ on the mandamus claim, dismissed 

the prohibition claim, and denied the requests for an emergency other writ and 

emergency alternative writ. State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive 

Commt. v. Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2010-Ohio-930, 923 N.E.2d 156. The 

secretary of state filed an answer, and the parties submitted evidence and briefs. 

{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 

merits. 

Legal Analysis 
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{¶ 9} The Stainbrook faction requests a writ of mandamus to compel the 

secretary of state to appoint Stainbrook to the board of elections. “To be entitled 

to the requested relief, relator[] must establish a clear legal right to the requested 

relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the secretary of state to 

provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” 

State ex rel. Heffelfinger v. Brunner, 116 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-Ohio-5838, 876 

N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 13. In extraordinary-writ actions challenging a decision of the 

secretary of state, the standard is whether the secretary engaged in fraud, 

corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable law. 

State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 130, 2010-Ohio-1374, 926 N.E.2d 

617, ¶ 26. There is no evidence or argument of fraud or corruption here, so the 

dispositive issue is whether the secretary of state abused her discretion or clearly 

disregarded applicable law by rejecting the Stainbrook faction’s recommended 

appointee and appointing her own selection. 

{¶ 10} The Stainbrook faction asserts that the secretary of state abused her 

discretion and clearly disregarded R.C. 3501.07 by rejecting its recommended 

appointee, Stainbrook, for the four-year term on the board of elections 

commencing March 1, 2010. The pertinent portions of the relevant statutes, R.C. 

3501.07 and 3517.05, provide: 

{¶ 11} “At a meeting held not more than sixty nor less than fifteen days 

before the expiration date of the term of office of a member of the board of 

elections, or within fifteen days after a vacancy occurs in the board, the county 

executive committee of the major political party entitled to the appointment may 

make and file a recommendation with the secretary of state for the appointment of 

a qualified elector. The secretary of state shall appoint such elector, unless he 

has reason to believe that the elector would not be a competent member of such 

board. In such cases the secretary of state shall so state in writing to the chairman 

of such county executive committee, with the reasons therefor, and such 
January Term, 2010 

5 

committee may either recommend another elector or may apply for a writ of 

mandamus to the supreme court to compel the secretary of state to appoint the 

elector so recommended. In such action the burden of proof to show the 

qualifications of the person so recommended shall be on the committee making 

the recommendation. If no such recommendation is made, the secretary of state 

shall make the appointment.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3501.07. 

{¶ 12} “All party committees, the selection of which is provided for in 

sections 3517.02 and 3517.03 of the Revised Code, shall, except as otherwise 

provided in this section, serve until the date of the organizational meeting 

provided for in section 3517.04 of the Revised Code. * * * 

{¶ 13} “If more than one organized group claims to be the rightful county 

central or executive committee, each such group shall file a list of its officers and 

members as provided in section 3517.06 of the Revised Code, and the board of 

elections with which such lists are filed shall certify them to the state central 

committee of the party concerned. The state central committee shall meet within 

thirty days after receipt of such certification and forthwith determine and certify 

which committee shall be recognized as the rightful county central or executive 

committee.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3517.05. 

{¶ 14} “Our paramount concern in construing statutes is legislative 

intent.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace, 123 Ohio St.3d 471, 2009-

Ohio-5934, 918 N.E.2d 135, ¶ 25. “To discern this intent, we must ‘read words 

and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.’ ” 

State ex rel. Mager v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 123 Ohio St.3d 

195, 2009-Ohio-4908, 915 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 

103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 23. Under the standard 

for construing statutes in pari materia, statutes relating to the same subject matter 

must be construed together to give full effect to the provisions. State ex rel. 

Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 46. 
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{¶ 15} “The statutory framework [governing appointments to county 

boards of elections] establishes a bipartisan composition of the state’s boards of 

elections, which provides county executive committees of the two major political 

parties with the right to recommend appointees who shall be appointed by the 

secretary of state. [Under R.C. 3501.07,] [t]he Secretary may reject the 

recommended appointee if she has reason to believe that an elector would not be a 

competent member of the board.” State ex rel. Summit Cty. Republican Party 

Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 118 Ohio St.3d 515, 2008-Ohio-2824, 890 N.E.2d 

888, ¶ 2. 

{¶ 16} The Stainbrook faction claims that because its recommended 

appointee was not rejected for incompetence, the secretary of state had a duty 

under R.C. 3501.07 to appoint Stainbrook. But this claim ignores R.C. 3517.05, 

which must be read in pari materia with R.C. 3501.07 in cases where, as here, the 

secretary of state receives conflicting recommendations from rival organized 

groups claiming to be the rightful county executive committee of the major 

political party entitled to the appointment. Upon so construing the statutes, we 

conclude that the General Assembly manifestly intended that the state central 

committee of the applicable major political party determine the issue. See R.C. 

3517.05. There is nothing in R.C. 3501.07 and 3517.05 that imposes any duty on 

the secretary of state to make this determination. 

{¶ 17} We reached a similar conclusion in State ex rel. O’Neil v. Griffith

(1940), 136 Ohio St. 526, 17 O.O. 160, 27 N.E.2d 142, paragraph two of the 

syllabus, in which we construed different, predecessor versions of R.C. 3501.07 

and 3517.05. We held that “when conflicting recommendations are made by 

more than one committee, each claiming to be the rightful executive committee, * 

* * the Secretary of State is authorized and required to call upon the state central 

committee of such party to determine and certify which is the rightful county 

executive committee of such party.” In O’Neil, the applicable version of the 
January Term, 2010 

7 

predecessor statute to R.C. 3501.07 included the following language, which is no 

longer in the statute: 

{¶ 18} “If recommendations are made by more than one committee, each 

claiming to be the rightful executive committee, the secretary of state, before 

making any such appointment, shall notify the chairman of the state central 

committee of such political party, which state central committee shall certify 

which is the rightful committee of such party, and such committee so certified 

shall be recognized by the secretary of state. If the state central committee fails to 

make such certification within ten days after the giving of such notice, the 

Secretary of State shall determine which of the contesting committees is the 

rightful executive committee, and shall make the appointments as provided in the 

preceding section.” (Emphasis added.) G.C. 4785-9, 118 Ohio Laws 223. 

{¶ 19} This entire paragraph was deleted from the statute in 1941. 119 

Ohio Laws 741, 741-742. But the state central committee retains the authority 

granted in the predecessor to R.C. 3517.05 to determine which of the competing 

groups shall be recognized as the rightful county executive committee. The 

secretary of state’s authority to make that determination was eliminated long ago. 

“ ‘It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the legal duty that 

a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative branch of 

government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty.’ ” State ex rel. 

Gessner v. Vore, 123 Ohio St.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-4150, 914 N.E.2d 376, ¶ 4, 

quoting State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 

2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18. Without any specific authorization for 

the secretary of state to make this determination and the express imposition of the 

duty on the state central committee to do so, the Stainbrook faction cannot 

establish that the secretary owed any duty to resolve the matter when confronted 

with conflicting recommendations from more than one faction of the Lucas 

County Republican Party Executive Committee. 
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{¶ 20} We will not adopt the construction advocated by the Stainbrook 

faction, which would allow the secretary of state to usurp the state central 

committee’s authority to resolve the conflicting claims. Instead, as the Stainbrook 

faction itself readily acknowledges, “[t]he Secretary of State is not concerned with 

the affairs of any political party or organization and has no part as such official in 

the political management or control of any party. [The secretary] is concerned 

only in the functions to be performed by them through their duly constituted 

committees pursuant to the provisions of the statute in relation to the election 

machinery of the state.” (Emphasis added.) O’Neil, 136 Ohio St. at 530, 17 O.O. 

160, 27 N.E.2d 142. It was unclear which, if any, of the rival executive 

committees was duly established at the time the secretary had to appoint a person 

to the board of elections. 

{¶ 21} Moreover, when the secretary of state rejected the two competing 

groups’ recommended appointees, the common pleas court had expressly held 

that neither group had complied with the applicable requirements of R.C. 3517.04 

and ordered the state central committee to resolve the matter. Notwithstanding 

the court order and the board’s certification of each group’s list of officers and 

members to the state central committee, there is no evidence that the state central 

committee resolved the dispute before March 1, when the secretary of state had a 

duty to appoint a qualifying elector to the board of elections for the four-year term 

beginning on that date. See R.C. 3501.06. 

{¶ 22} Therefore, the secretary of state was authorized to select a different 

person than those recommended by the competing groups, and she exercised this 

authority by appointing Marsh to the board of elections. See R.C. 3501.07 (“If no 

such recommendation is made, the secretary of state shall make the 

appointment”). The conflicting recommendations, which the secretary of state 

lacked authority to resolve, in effect left the secretary with no viable 
January Term, 2010 

9 

recommendation in the absence of either a resolution of the dispute by the state 

central committee or a final judicial determination. 

{¶ 23} Finally, insofar as the Stainbrook faction claims that the secretary 

of state had a duty to appoint Stainbrook because it is the de facto executive 

committee of the Lucas County Republican Party, it cites no pertinent authority 

for this proposition. Instead, it relies primarily on those cases in which the 

secretary of state was not confronted with conflicting recommendations from 

competing groups. See Summit Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt., 118 

Ohio St.3d 515, 2008-Ohio-2824, 890 N.E.2d 888. At a minimum, the secretary’s 

interpretation of the pertinent provisions – R.C. 3501.07, 3517.05, and 3501.06 – 

is a reasonable one and is thus entitled to judicial deference. See State ex rel. 

Skaggs v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-6333, 900 N.E.2d 982, ¶ 56, 

quoting Colvin, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 57 (“ 

‘The secretary of state’s construction is reasonably supported by the pertinent 

provisions, and in accordance with well-settled precedent, the court must defer to 

that reasonable interpretation’ ”). 

{¶ 24} Therefore, based on the plain language of the pertinent statutes and 

the applicable precedent, the secretary of state neither abused her discretion nor 

clearly disregarded applicable law by denying the Stainbrook faction’s 

recommended appointment of Stainbrook and by appointing Marsh to the board 

of elections. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 25} The Stainbrook faction has not established its entitlement to the 

requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. Moreover, insofar as it still requests 

relief in the form of an other writ, this relief is inappropriate, and we have 

previously denied it. See State ex rel. Scioto Downs, Inc. v. Brunner, 123 Ohio 

St.3d 24, 2009-Ohio-3761, 913 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 24 (denying request for an other 

writ under R.C. 2503.40 when requested as a substitute for a writ of mandamus); 
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Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt., 124 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2010-

Ohio-930, 923 N.E.2d 156. Therefore, we deny the writ. 

Writ denied. 

 PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, FARMER, O’DONNELL,

FRENCH, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 SHEILA G. FARMER, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for 

O’CONNOR, J. 

 JUDITH L. FRENCH, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 

LANZINGER, J. 

 The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 

decision in this case. 

__________________ 

 Anthony J. DeGidio; and Ciolek Ltd. and Scott A. Ciolek, for relator. 

 Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Aaron D. Epstein, Richard N. 

Coglianese, Damian W. Sikora, Pearl M. Chin, Erick D. Gale, and Michael J. 

Schuler, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent. 

______________________