J-S26039-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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MARVIN O. JOHNSON,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 531 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 30, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0603361-2006

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2016

Marvin O. Johnson (Appellant) appeals from the January 30, 2015 

order that denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court offered the following summary of the facts underlying 

Appellant’s conviction.

On May 25, 2006, in the city and county of Philadelphia, 

the victim, Randall Boyd, went out for dinner and decided to stop 

at a convenience store on 13th and Spruce Streets. As he 

proceeded towards it on South Camac Street, [Appellant] 

approached the victim near the intersection of Manning and 

South Camac Street. [Appellant] asked him, “Do you want to 

suck some cock, baby?” The victim glanced back and replied, 

“No, thank you, sir.” As the victim was walking away from the 

convenience store, [Appellant] grabbed him from behind and 

said, “Let’s see how much cash you have on you.” [Appellant] 

placed his left arm underneath the victim’s left arm and covered 

the victim’s eyes and mouth. [Appellant] placed his right arm 

under the victim’s right arm so that both of the victim’s arms 
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were in the air. While the victim was restrained by [Appellant], 

two other people punched the victim five to seven times between 

his eyes, searched his pockets, and they all fled. The victim 

collected himself and then ran to a nearby hotel, so that he could 

clean his wounds and contact the police. The victim left to call 

the police at a nearby pay phone. On his way to the phone, he 

saw a police car coming down Camac Street, which he flagged 

down. 

Philadelphia Police Officer Beverly Duncan received a radio 

call alerting her to the area around the 200 block of South 

Camac Street. Upon arrival, the victim gave Officer Duncan a 

description of the person who grabbed him, and Officer Duncan 

relayed that description over the police radio. Together, the 

victim, Officer Duncan and her partner Officer Gary Burrell drove 

to examine the scene of the incident on the 200 block of South 

Camac Street. Meanwhile, Officer Craig Sweeney received 

information from Officer Duncan about the robbery and went to 

survey the area. Officer Sweeney observed [Appellant] together 

with the two other individuals on the corner of 13th and 

Lombard Streets. He stopped all three individuals at the 1200 

block of Kater Street, but [Appellant] ran northbound on 12th 

Street while his two co-conspirators fled eastbound on Kater 

Street. Officers Kramer and Brenda McLaughlin responded to 

Officer Sweeney’s radio alert of the foot chase and apprehended 

[Appellant] on 12th Street. Officers located and apprehended 

the two co-conspirators in a parking lot on the 1100 block of 

Kater Street. Officers Duncan and Burrell escorted the victim to 

12th and South Street, where the victim identified [Appellant].

* * *

On May 26, 2008, after a seven day jury trial, the 

Honorable Amanda Cooperman of the Court of Common Pleas 

declared a mistrial and [Appellant]’s case was scheduled to be 

re-tried. On May 1, 2009, a jury sitting in front of the Honorable 

Denis P. Cohen found [Appellant] guilty of robbery-inflicting 

bodily injury, simple assault, and conspiracy-robbery. 

[Appellant] was represented by [Alex] Turner, Esq. On June 23, 

2009, [Appellant] was sentenced to nine years and four months 

to eighteen years and eight months imprisonment. [Appellant] 

filed a Notice of Appeal on July 15, 2009. On August 11, 2010, 

the Superior Court remanded the case to [the trial court] for 
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resentencing. On May 20, 2011, [the trial court] imposed a new 

sentence of fifty to one hundred months imprisonment for 

robbery-inflicting bodily injury and fifty to one hundred months 

imprisonment for conspiracy-robbery, with both sentences to run 

consecutive to each other for a total sentence of one hundred to 

two hundred months [of] incarceration.

On May 27, 2011, the defendant filed a [PCRA] petition. 

On November 28, 2011, David Rudenstein, Esq., was appointed 

to represent [Appellant]. On August 21, 2012, [Appellant] filed 

a motion to proceed pro se. On September 28, 2012, Mr. 

Rudenstein filed an amended PCRA petition. On February 28, 

2014, [the PCRA court] held a Grazier[1] hearing, at which 

[Appellant] decided to allow Mr. Rudenstein to continue 

representing [him]. On January 30, 2015, [the PCRA court] 

formally dismissed [Appellant]’s PCRA petition. On February 23, 

2015, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/30/2015, at 3-5, 1-2 (citations, footnotes, 

unnecessary capitalization, and repetition of amounts in numeral form 

omitted). Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in failing to hold 

an evidentiary hearing, and to grant PCRA relief in the form of a new trial, 

on the following four claims:

a. Ineffectiveness of counsel where counsel actually and 

deliberately failed to meet with [Appellant] prior to trial 

because it was going to be too much trouble and where 

the attorney was completely unprepared to provide a 

defense for [Appellant] and where [Appellant] was 

constructively denied counsel.

b. Ineffective assistance of counsel wherein counsel 

completely confused [Appellant] (and anyone else 

listening) when he attempted to explain to [Appellant] that 

 

1 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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[Appellant] had a right to a “no adverse inference” charge 

regarding his choice not to testify; the advice given to 

[Appellant] on the record by defense counsel was 

incomprehensible.

c. Trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to ask for a 

Kloiber[2][i]nstruction.

d. Trial counsel was ineffective by inexplicably resting in front 

of the jury prior to consulting with his client and prior to 

[Appellant] being questioned by the [trial court] as to his 

decision regarding giving testimony and where the 

announcement of counsel all but precluded [Appellant] 

from testifying.

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (reordered for ease of disposition). 

The standard of review for an order denying postconviction relief is limited to whether the record supports the 

PCRA court’s determination, and whether that decision is free of 

legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed 

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

Furthermore, a petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a 

matter of right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if 

there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and the 

petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and 

no purpose would be served by any further proceedings.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1040 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted).

[I]n order to obtain relief based on [an ineffective 

assistance of counsel] claim, a petitioner must 

establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable 

merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s 

actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s error such that 

there is a reasonable probability that the result of 

the proceeding would have been different absent 

such error. 

 

2 Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954).
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Trial counsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner 

bears the burden of pleading and proving each of the three 

factors by a preponderance of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 831 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(internal citations omitted).

Appellant first contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to meet 

with him before trial. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant’s argument is as 

follows:

On April 15, 2009, Alex Turner, Esquire, Assistant 

Defender wrote to [Appellant], who was housed at SCI 

Graterford[,] and in pertinent part stated: “I regret that I will not 

be able to meet with you prior to your trial, but if there is 

anything you want to tell me that is not included in your file or 

any prior correspondence with The Defender Association - all of 

which I have reviewed - then please feel free to write me at the 

above address.”

It is sometimes difficult to meet with clients. However, Mr. 

Turner had the benefit of not being a sole practitioner but 

working with an organization that employs dozens and dozens of 

attorneys, not to mention a large paralegal staff and private 

investigators. It is almost inconceivable that no attorney from 

The Defender Association could have met with [Appellant] prior 

to trial. It is simply inconceivable. ...

* * *

... [Appellant] basically walked into a Courtroom, met his trial 

attorney and then went to trial. This simply cannot be tolerated. 

For instance, and even if no one from The Defenders had the 

time to go to Graterford, a phone call could have been arranged 

by and between Mr. Turner and a Prison Counselor, so that 

[Appellant] could have “met” with his attorney, discussed the 

case and have been prepared for trial.

Id. at 12-13.
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This argument utterly ignores that Appellant in fact did have extensive 

contact with another attorney from the Defender Association before the trial 

at issue, including during the seven days of his initial trial. As the 

Commonwealth aptly summarized: “The circumstances here showed that 

[Appellant] at a minimum had prior meetings with the attorney from his first 

trial, that [Mr. Turner] was aware of the events from [Appellant’s] first trial, 

and that [Mr. Turner] was willing to consider any new ideas that [Appellant] 

could communicate in correspondence.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. 

Appellant offers no explanation how Mr. Turner’s method gathering of 

information was any less effective than Appellant’s suggested alternative of 

another attorney from the office meeting with Appellant before the retrial 

and relaying the gleaned information to Mr. Turner in some fashion. 

Moreover, Appellant gives no indication of how he was prejudiced; he 

fails to identify any information Mr. Turner or Appellant would have obtained 

from a pre-retrial meeting that would have changed the outcome of the 

proceedings. Rather, he “urges this Court to presume prejudice as the result 

of the total denial of counsel....” Appellant’s Brief at 13. This Court has 

rejected a presumption of prejudice in these circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Britt, 83 A.3d 198, 203 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that 

a petitioner seeking to establish counsel was ineffective in failing to meet 

with him or her must show actual prejudice). Without even an allegation of 
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prejudice before it, the PCRA court properly determined that Appellant’s first 

claim warranted no relief. 

Appellant next complains of Mr. Turner’s counselling concerning 

whether to ask for the no-adverse-inference instruction regarding Appellant’s 

choice not to testify.3 Appellant’s argument consists of his taking issue with 

Mr. Turner’s diction and posing rhetorical questions. Appellant’s Brief at 14-

16. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Turner’s explanation was 

deficient, Appellant’s claim fails for lack of prejudice. 

Although Appellant asserts that, had the instruction been explained to 

him better, he would have requested that it be given to the jury, notably 

absent from Appellant’s argument is any discussion of how the outcome of 

the trial would have been different. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly 

rejected Appellant’s claim. Commonwealth v. Howard, 719 A.2d 233, 241 

(Pa. 1998) (rejecting for lack of actual prejudice claim that counsel was 

 

3 This “no-adverse-inference” instruction, so called, is contained in 

the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions 

and provides as follows:

3.10A (Crim) DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO 

TESTIFY NOT EVIDENCE OF GUILT

It is entirely up to the defendant in every criminal 

trial whether or not to testify. He has an absolute 

right founded on the Constitution to remain silent. 

You must not draw any inference of guilt from the 

fact that the defendant did not testify.

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 598 A.2d 975, 978 n.4 (Pa. 1991).
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ineffective in failing to request the no-adverse-inference charge); 

Commonwealth v. Howard, 645 A.2d 1300, 1308 (Pa. 1994) (same). 

Next, Appellant contends that Mr. Turner was ineffective for failing to 

request a Kloiber instruction. “A Kloiber instruction informs the jury that 

an eyewitness identification should be viewed with caution when either the 

witness did not have an opportunity to view the defendant clearly, 

equivocated on the identification of the defendant, or has had difficulties 

identifying the defendant on prior occasions.” Commonwealth v. Sanders, 

42 A.3d 325, 332 (Pa. Super. 2012). Appellant argues that the victim in the 

instant case “could not possibly have had a good opportunity to observe his 

assailant as he was approached from behind, bloodied, punched, and never 

gave a description of the person other than he was a black male with a red 

shirt.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. 

The PCRA court disagreed, finding that a Kloiber charge was not 

warranted by the facts at hand:

In the instant case, the victim stated during both direct and 

cross examination that immediately prior to the attack, he 

turned to his right and looked at [Appellant]. The victim never 

wavered in his consistent identification of [Appellant], and in fact 

positively identified [Appellant] at trial and during a post-incident 

identification after the robbery.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/30/2015, at 9-10 (citations and footnotes omitted). 

The PCRA court’s finding is supported by the record. See, e.g., N.T., 

4/29/2009, at 68 (“I turned to the right and I saw his face and I saw him.”); 
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id. at 68-69 (“He was wearing a red and white jersey and he had a very 

large beard and clean shaven head on the top.”); id. at 90-91 (same 

testimony on cross-examination). Because the victim testified that he was 

able to see his attacker clearly, and he never wavered in his identification of 

Appellant, the PCRA court properly determined that Appellant’s Kloiberbased claim lacks arguable merit.

Finally, Appellant claims that Mr. Turner provided ineffective assistance 

of counsel in indicating that the defense rested before the court held an onthe-record colloquy regarding Appellant’s decision not to testify. He argues 

as follows:

If [Appellant] had wished to testify, he certainly was put in 

a more than awkward position after both his attorney and the 

[trial c]ourt had closed the case. If he had then chosen to 

testify, [Appellant] would have then been in the position of the 

[c]ourt having to instruct the jury that [Appellant] now wished to 

testify even though the case was closed! What would the jury 

then have thought? This is simply not the way that it should 

have been handled. Did this prejudice [Appellant]? Of course it 

did. [Appellant] was put in the position of giving up his right to 

testify because it was foreclosed by his very own attorney and 

then, perhaps inadvertently, followed up on by the [trial c]ourt. 

[Appellant] never had a full and fair opportunity to decide 

whether he wished to testify.

Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

Appellant’s claim is utterly devoid of merit. As the PCRA court 

explained:

“[T]here is no express requirement that a trial court conduct a 

colloquy with regards to [a] defendant’s right to testify.” 

Commonwealth v. Todd, 820 A.2d 707, 712 (Pa. Super. 
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2003). The colloquy, though not necessary, was requested by 

the [trial c]ourt, in an abundance of caution, to ensure that 

[Appellant] was fully aware of his right not to testify. 

[Appellant] made it clear that Mr. Turner had already advised 

him of his right and he had time to consider if he wished to 

testify. Had [Appellant] expressed a desire to testify during the 

colloquy, [the trial c]ourt would have allowed [Appellant] to 

reopen his case. In any event, [Appellant] has not alleged that 

he was prejudiced by having the colloquy after the defense 

rested. Indeed, as [Appellant] has not even asserted that he 

wanted to testify, let alone explain what his testimony would 

have been, he cannot establish that but for counsel’s alleged 

error, the outcome of the trial would have been any different. 

As such, [Appellant’s] claim is meritless.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/30/2015, at 9. We discern no error or abuse of 

discretion in the PCRA court’s analysis. 

Because it was evident from the record that Appellant was not entitled 

to PCRA relief on any of his claims, and no purpose would have been served 

by any further proceedings, the PCRA court did not err in denying Appellant’s 

petition without a hearing. Taylor, 933 A.2d at 1040. Thus, Appellant is 

entitled to no relief from this Court.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/16/2016