COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

HARVEY E. LONG 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1807-97-3 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 MAY 19, 1998 

VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 

 Raphael B. Hartley, III (Dorsey & Hartley, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Patricia H. Quillen, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; 

Michael K. Jackson, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Harvey E. Long (Long) appeals an order of the trial court 

which affirmed a decision by the Virginia Retirement System (VRS) 

denying his claim for permanent disability retirement benefits. 

Finding no error, we affirm the order. 

 The parties are conversant with the record and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to 

disposition of the appeal. 

 In accordance with well established principles, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

below, the VRS in this instance. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1990). 

 After 24 years of employment in the Poultry Science 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Department at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 

University, Long was transferred to the Animal Science 

Department, with an attendant change in job responsibilities. 

Following the transfer, Long became depressed and was diagnosed 

with "major depression, melancholia" while hospitalized at the 

Lewis-Gale Psychiatric Center from February 28 to March 9, 1992. 

 Upon release from the hospital, however, Long returned to his 

employment and discontinued medication, despite persistent 

depression and related difficulties. 

 During February 1994, Long resumed psychiatric treatment. 

Although the professional care and treatment regimen improved 

Long's "anxiety and sleeping patterns," he continued to suffer 

depression and deficiencies in his job performance and retired in 

February of 1995, applying for permanent disability benefits from 

the VRS in March 1995. 

 Three psychiatrists evaluated Long incidental to his 

disability claim. On May 9, 1995, Dr. Neil Dubner, Long's 

treating psychiatrist, opined that Long was "permanently disabled 

as a result of a chronic Major Depressive state" and was an 

unsuitable candidate for "Electraconvulsive Therapy" (ECT). 

However, Dr. Pamila Herrington, a resident in psychiatric 

medicine at the University of Virginia, concluded that 

 [g]iven his partial response to pharmacologic 

treatment, [Long] may continue to show 

improvement with further medical management, 

or ECT may be a further consideration. The 

patient, however, is very vested in seeking 

disability and may be resistant to pursuing 

other treatment options. 
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 At this time, there is no evidence that 

the patient will be rendered permanently 

disabled secondary to his mental illness. 

Dr. Debra J. Hockett also evaluated Long and supported 

Dr. Dubner, finding Long "permanently disabled" by "chronic 

depression along with an early onset dementia" which precluded 

ECT treatment. 

 After the VRS Medical Board had reviewed Long's claim 

pursuant to Code § 51.1-124.23 and recommended denial of relief 

on these occasions, the VRS designated attorney R. Louis 

Harrison, Jr. to conduct an "informal fact-finding hearing" and 

report his findings and recommendations to the VRS. In a written 

decision, dated May 22, 1996, Harrison reviewed the record in 

detail and determined "that Mr. Long is not likely to be 

permanently disabled," a finding that the VRS adopted in its 

"final case decision" on June 21, 1996. In affirming the VRS 

action on appeal, the trial court ruled that "substantial 

evidence" supported the ruling. 

 Upon judicial review of agency action in accordance with the 

Administrative Process Act (APA), the court must examine the 

entire record to "ascertain[] whether there was substantial 

evidence . . . upon which the agency as the trier of the facts 

could reasonably find them to be as it did." Code § 9-6.14:17. 

"Cases subject to the standard of review outlined in Code 

§ 9-6.14:17 cannot be considered a trial de novo since the 

factual issues on appeal are controlled solely by the agency 
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record." School Bd. of County of York v. Nicely, 12 Va. App. 

1051, 1062, 408 S.E.2d 545, 551 (1991). "Therefore, . . . the 

circuit court's role in an appeal from an agency decision is 

equivalent to an appellate court's role in an appeal from a trial 

court." Id.

 "The 'substantial evidence' standard, adopted by the General 

Assembly, is designed to give great stability and finality to the 

fact-findings of an administrative agency. The phrase 

'substantial evidence' refers to 'such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.'" Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 

269, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1983) (citation omitted). 

 Here, although each of three psychiatrists agreed that Long 

suffered major depression, opinions differed with respect to 

appropriate treatment and the permanency of the illness. 

Significantly, Dr. Herrington noted that all treatment options 

had not been exhausted and that a finding of permanency was 

premature. Guided by the "substantial evidence" standard of 

review, we find that Dr. Herrington's opinion, when considered 

with the entire record, constituted "relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Thus, the court correctly affirmed the denial of 

disability benefits to Long. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.