EL HAM SATAKI ,

Plaintif f , v. BROAD CASTI

NG B OARD OF GOVERNORS, et al. , Defendants
. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action No. 10-00534 ( CKK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION (De cembe r 21, 2010) Presently befor e the Court is Plaintiff’s [79] Motion for Reconsider ation, pursuant to which Plaintiff see ks rec onsideration of this Court’s [77] Orde r (the “ Dismissal Order” ) g ranting

in-part a nd denying- in-part De fenda nts’ dispositi ve motion and dismissi ngthe ac tion. For the
rea sons set forth below, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Rec onsideration. I. BACKG ROUND Despite be ing of

rela tively rec ent vintag e, this action has be en the subjec t of a number of prior dec isions by

this Court. The Court her e assumes f amiliarity with those decisions, which 1 set forth in deta il the history of this case , and shall there fore addre ss only the fa ctual and proce dural ba ckg round nec essar y for r esolution of the motion now before the Court.

See Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL2195799 (D.D.C. 1 J une 1, 2010); Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL2679893 (D.D.C. J uly 7, 2010); Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL2679901 (D.D.C. J uly 7, 2010); Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2010 WL3999088 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2010); Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , Slip C opy , 2010 WL 4260197 (D.D.C. Oc t. 22, 2010).A. Plaintif f’s Amende d Complaint This action stems from alleg ations that Plainti ff wa s sexually hara ssed and a ssaulted by a
co-w orker

at the Persian N ews Ne twork and tha t her e mploy er, the Br oadca sting B oard of Gover nors (the “ BB G”) , as we ll as sever al member s and employ ees of the B BG , unlawfully fac ilitated the alleg ed sexual hara ssment, actively attempted to cove r up the incide nts of hara ssment, interfer ed with the investig ation of her administrative complaint, and r etaliated ag ainst her f

or complainingabout her co-w orker ’s har assing conduct a s well as for criticizing BB G’s mana g ement and mission. I n her A mended Complaint, Plainti ff a sserted se ven sepa rate claims. See Am. Compl., Docket No. [35] . Those cla ims may be brie fly

summarized as follows:

• C

O U N T I

– F

I R S T A M

E N D M E N T C L A I M . Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts infring ed her r ight to fr ee spe ech in violation of the F irst Amendment by reta liating a g ainst her f or her persona l politi cal view s, her c riticism of Voice of Americ a manag ement and f

ailure to a dhere to its m ission to promot e fr eedom in Iran, a nd other unspec ified spee ch (the “F irst Amendment Claim”). Id. ¶¶ 10- 12. 2

• C

O U N T II

– F

I F T H A M E N D M E N T C L A I M . Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts violated her

Fifth Ame ndment rig ht to due proce ss by “cove ring up and deny [i ng ] her r elief f

or sexual hara ssment,” “r etaliatingag ainst her to try and kee p her quie t, destroy her me ntally

and phy sically

and to forc e her

out,” and by

tampering

with, intimi dating , and obstructingmateria l witnesses to the alleg ed sexual hara ssment (the “ Fifth Ame ndment Claim”). Id. ¶¶ 13- 15.

• C

O U N T III

– F

O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T C L A I M . Plaintiff alleg es that Def endants impermissibly

discriminated ag ainst her on the ba sis of her g ender and national orig in, fac ilitated the acts of se x ual har assment, and r etaliated a g ainst her for e x erc ising he r constitutional rig hts in viol ation of the F ourtee nth Amendment’s Equa l Protection Clause (the “ Four teenth Amendme nt Claim”). Id. ¶¶ 16- 18.

• C

O U N T IV

– F

O U R T H A M E N D M E N T C L A I M . Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts violated her

Four th Amendment rig ht to be secur e in her person a nd proper ty by Although misnumbere d, the Court shall ref er to the pa

rag raph numbe rs used in the 2 Amended Complaint. 2allowing her c o-worke r to assault and se x ually hara ss her a

nd by unlawfully “conf iscating ” her

paychec ks (the “F ourth Amendment Claim”). Id. ¶¶ 19- 22.

• C

O U N T V

– R E

H A B I L I T A T I O N A C T C

L A I M . Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts denied he r re quest for a

rea sonable medic al ac commodation to be detailed to the Voice of Americ a L os Ang eles off ice in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq . (the “ Rehabilitation Act Claim”). Id. ¶¶ 23- 28.

• C

O U N T V I

– P R I V A C Y A C T C

L A I M . Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts failed to timely produce rec ords she re quested in violation of the Privac y Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (the “Priva cy Act Claim”). Id. ¶¶ 28- 31.

• C

O U N T V II

– W A G N E R I

N J U N C T I V E R E L I E F . Plaintiff alleg es that she is entitled to interim injunctive relief dur ing the pendenc y of an a dminist rative pr ocee ding and this liti g ation under W agner v. Taylor , 836 F.2d 566 ( D.C. Cir. 1987) (the
“ W agner I njunctive Relief” ). Id. ¶¶ 31- 33. B. Plaintif

f’s Claim for Wagne r InjunctiveRelief Early in this action, Pl aintiff filed a Motion for a Te mporary

RestrainingOrde r and/or Preliminary

I njunction. SeeDocke t No. [11] . On J une 1, 2010, this Court denied Plaintiff’s reque st for a te mporary

restra ining or der. See Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 2195799 (D.D.C. June 1, 2010). On J uly 7, 2010, the Court also denied Plaintiff’s reque st for a pr eliminary

injunction. See Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 2679901 (D.D.C. Jul y 7, 2010). In the cour se of r ender ing the se two dec isions, the Court held, inter alia , that Plaintiff was not entitled to W agner I njunctive Relief be cause she failed to show irr epar able ha rm, a substantial likelihood of succ ess on the mer its, or the balanc e of the e quities in her favor, and be cause the re lief she sought would in fact a lter, rather than prese rve, the status quo . Id. at *15-24. Plaintiff did not appea l the Court’s decision deny ing he r reque st for pre liminary

relief
.

3C. Defendants’ D ispositi ve M otion On J une 15, 2010, De fenda nts moved to dismi ss five of the se ven cla ims in t his action pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (1) a nd (b)( 6); Def

endants simultaneously 3 moved for summar

y judgme nt on a six th claim – i.e. , Plaintiff’s Privacy Act Claim (Count VI ). See Def s.’ Notice of

Mot. to Dismi ss or in the Alternative for Summ. J ., Docke t No. [45] , at 1-2. Wit h respe ct to the Privacy Act Claim, Defe ndants asser ted that Plaintiff could not rec over unde r the Privacy

Act bec ause she failed to e x haust her a dminist rative r emedies by bring ing suit prior to a final de termination and without first filing an administrative a ppeal. SeeDef

s.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dism iss or in the Alternative f or Summ. J ., Docke t No. [45] , at 17-18. Def endants a lso argued that Plaintiff’s re quest for c erta in rec ords ac tually fell under

the Fr eedom of Information Ac t, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq. , and Plaintiff fa iled to exhaust her administrative
reme dies under that statute as well. See id. at 18-21. On J uly 14, 2010, Plaintiff moved for a two-we ek extension of time to respond to Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss. SeePl.’s Mot. for Ex tension, Docke t No. [64] . By Minute Orde r, Plaintiff was g rante d an extension to and including July 28, 2010 to file her opposition paper s. See Min. Order

(Jul y 27, 2010). Instead of f

iling an opposition to Defe ndants’ Motion to Dismiss, P laintiff voluntarily dismiss ed without prejudice five of the seven c laims asserted in the Amended Complaint. SeePl.’s Notice of Voluntar y Dismissal of Certain Counts W ithout Prejudice, D ocket No. [67]; P l.’s Erra ta to Correc t Notice of V oluntary Dismissal, Docket No.
Specifica lly , Def

endants moved to dismiss Pl aintiff’s F irst Amendment Claim (Count 3 I ), F ifth Amendment Claim (Count I I ), F ourtee nth Amendment Claim (Count I I I ), and F ourth Amendment Claim (Count I V). See Def s.’ Notice of

Mot. to Dismi ss or in the Alternative for Summ. J ., Docke t No. [45]
. 4[68] . Specifica lly , Plaintiff dismi ssed her First Amendme nt Claim (Count I ), her Fifth Amendment Claim (Count I I ), her Four teenth Amendme nt Claim (Count I I I ), her Four th Amendment Claim (Count I V), a nd her Reha

bilitation Act Cl aim (Count V), leaving a s open “cla ims” in this action only Plaintiff’s Privacy

Act Claim (Count VI ) and he r re quest for W agner I njunctive Relief ( Count VI I ). Id. 4 D. The Court’s Dismissal Order On Octobe r 22, 2010, noting that Plaintiff, who is repre sented by counsel in this action, failed to file a

ny response to Defe ndants’ dispositive motion by J uly 28, 2010, or at a

ny time in the three months thereaf

ter, g rante d-in-par

t and denied- in-part De fenda nts’ dispositi ve motion as
conce ded. SeeOrde r (Oc t. 22, 2010), Docke t No. [77] . Specifica lly , the Court g rante d Def endants’ motion insofar

as it relate d to Plainti ffs’ Priva cy Act Claim (Count VI ), dismissing that claim without prejudice , and denie d Def endants’ motion as moot in all other re spects. Id. There being no viable cla ims remaining in the case , the Court dismiss ed the a ction in its entirety
. Id. On Octobe r 31, 2010, Plaintiff filed the pr esent Motion for Rec onsideration. SeePl.’s Mot. to Reconsider Court’s Dismissal Order of Oc tober 22, 2010 (“ Pl.’s Mem.”), Doc ket No. [79] . On Novembe r 24, 2010, De fenda nts filed an opposition. SeeDef s.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsidera tion (“De f.’s Opp’ n”), D ocket No. [81]. P laintiff filed a reply on Dec ember

17, 2010. SeePl.’s Reply to Opp’n to Mot. for Rec onsideration (“ Pl.’s Reply ”),
Plaintiff’s orig inal Notice of Voluntary

Dismissal, dated J uly

28, 2010, also included 4 Plaintiff’s Privacy

Act Claim (Count VI ), but Plaintiff subsequently filed an Er

rata with the Court indicating that the claim was only “inadve rtently ” included. See Pl.’s Errata to Correc t Notice of Voluntary

Dismissal, Docket No. [68]
. 5Docke t No. [84] . On Dec ember 20, 2010, without first seekingthe Court’s leave , Plaintiff filed a second r eply

to Defe ndants’ opposition. SeePl.’s Suppl . to Pl.’s R eply to Opp’n to Mot. to Reconsider , Docke t No. [85] . The matter is now fully

briefe d and ripe for a djudication. II. LEGAL STANDARD Although Plaintiff doe s not identify the basis for the relief

soug ht, where , as her e, a motion for rec onsideration is filed within twenty -eig ht day s of the cha lleng ed orde r, cour ts treat the motion as orig inating unde r F ed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Marbury Law Grp., PLLC v. Carl , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 W L2977872, at *3 (D.D .C. J uly 27, 2010). Rule 59(e ) per mits a party

to file a motion to alter or a

mend a judg ment. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 59(e) . The disposition of a motion orig inating unde r Rule 59(e ) is entrusted to the district cour t’s discretion, and “ need not be g rante d unless the district court finds ther e is an interve ning c hang e of c ontrolling law , the availability

of newevidenc e, or the need to c orre ct a c lear err or or pr event manif

est injustice.’” Cirals ky v . Cent. IntelligenceAgenc y , 355 F.3d 661, 671 ( D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone , 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 ( D.C. Cir. 1996)). Althoug h courts have “conside rable discretion in ruling on a

Rule 59(e) motion,” Piper v. U.S. D ep’t of Justice , 312 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D .C. 2004), such motions are “disfavor ed and r elief f rom judg ment is gr anted only when the moving party establishes extraordinar

y circ umstances,” Niedermeie r v. Office of Bauc us , 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C.2001). III. DISCUSS ION I n support of her

Motion for Reconsider ation, Plaintiff ascribe s four e rror s to the Court’s Dismissal Order. Pls.’ Mem. ¶¶ 1-4. The Court a ddresse s eac h in turn. Plaintiff’s first ascr ibed er ror is that the Court “f

alsely and inac curately ” stated tha t she
6conce ded the dismissal of Count VI Iof the Complaint, pursuant to which Plaintiff alleg ed an

entitlement to W

agner I njunctive Relief. Pl.’s Mem. ¶ 1. Plaintiff re asons as follows: a r eview of De fenda

nts’ dispositi ve motion reve als that they never moved to dismiss the count; there fore , the Court err ed in conc luding that the Count should be dismissed as conc eded. Id. Plaintiff simply misreads the Court’s de cision, which is unambig uous in dismi ssing a single count as
conce ded. That count was not Plaintiff’s claim for W

agner I njunctive Relief ( Count VI I ), but rathe r Plaintiff’s Privacy

Act Claim (Count VI ). SeeOrde r (Oc t. 22, 2010), Docke t No. [77] , at 1; see also Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , 2010 WL 4260197, at *3 (D.D .C. Oct. 22, 2010). Plaintiff’s second a scribed e rror is that the Court’s dismis sal of Plaintiff’s Privac y Act Claim (Count VI ) wa s “base d on a fa lse premise.” Pl.’s Mem. ¶ 2. The “ false pr emise,” so f ar a s the Court can te ll, is t he assumption that Plaintiff had voluntarily dismiss ed Count VI
. Id. The Court made no such a ssumption, and in fact expressly noted that Plaintiff had not dismiss ed her Privacy Act Claim. Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , 2010 WL 4260197, at *3 (D.D .C. Oct. 22, 2010). Indeed, the contra ry assumption— i.e. , that Plaintiff’s claim was still “open”—was a
nece ssary premise of

the Court’s dec ision to di smiss t hat claim as c oncede d. Plaintiff’s third ascr ibed er ror is base d on the timing of the Court’s decision. Plaintiff contends that the D ismiss al Orde r wa s “appa rently hastily draf ted and sig ned just one day afte r Plaintiff had noticed de positions i n this case.” Pl.’s Mem. ¶ 3. Plaintiff takes the timing of the decision as a

further indication of the Court’s a lleg ed “pr ejudicial and othe r misconduct in this
case ,” sug g esting it “raises a strong infere nce tha

t counsel for

[Defenda nts] called or

contac ted chambe rs ex-parte a

nd reque sted this dism issal order a nd the cour

t complied.” Id. Def

endants, for their part, de scribe Plaintiff’ s alleg ations as “f ancif ul and g roundless,” a

nd disclaim ever
7discussing the deposition notices with the Court or havingany other ex partecontac ts with the undersig ned or he r staff

. Def .’s Opp’n at 3. Plainti ff’ s spurious alleg ations are , unfortunate ly , par f or the c ourse, see ge nerally Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2010 WL 3999088 (D.D.C. Oc t. 13, 2010), and mer it lit tle response . The a lleg ations are both false a nd unsupported. Plaintiff’s fourth asc ribed e rror is related. Plaintiff a sserts that the “e ntire seque nce of events fur ther supports the a

ppear ance and ac tual exis tence of extra-judicial bias in this case ,” and maintains that the a

bove-de scribed “ err ors” we re “ intentional, wanton and malicious a nd desig ned to furthe r har

m Plainti ff a

nd her c ounsel.” Pl.’s Mem. ¶ 4. Ag ain, Plaintiffs alleg ations
are both false a

nd unsupported. The y

have be en addr essed in multiple prior orde r of this Court,
see, e .g. , Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2010 WL3999088 (D.D.C. Oc t. 13, 2010), and the Court shall not revisit them here. I n her r eply

paper s, Plainti ff a lso raises a f ifth alleg ed er

ror. Spec ifically , Plaintiff (appa rently ) conte nds that the Court err ed in dismissi ng the ac tion in it s entirety beca use she still had a via ble ca use of a ction for W

agner I njunctive Relief. Pls.’ Reply ¶¶ 1- 4. There are at least two problems with this arg ument. First, bec ause it wa s raised f or the fir st tim e on re ply , the Court shall disreg ard the argument. See Baloch v. Norton , 517 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348 n.2 (“ I f the movant raises a

rguments for the f

irst time in his reply

to the non-movant’s opposition, the court [m ay ] either ignor e those a rguments . . . or provide the non-movant with an opportunity to respond.” ), aff’d , 550 F.3d 1191 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). Second, eve n if the Court wer e to consider 5 Plaintiff attempts to sty le her reply as a r esponse to an a

rgument raised by

Def endants 5 in their opposition papers, Pl.’s Reply ¶ 1, but no rea sonable re adingof De fenda nts’ opposition would support Plaintiff’s interpre tation. SeeDef s.’ Opp’n at 2-3. 8the ar g ument, it would not warra nt a diffe rent re sult. The Court denied Plaintiff’s re quest for a temporar y restra ining or der on June 1, 2010, Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 2195799 (D.D.C. June 1, 2010), and denie d her r equest for a pre liminary

injunction on J uly 7, 2010, Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL2679901 (D.D.C. Jul y

7, 2010). I

n both instances, the Court held that Plaintiff wa s not entitled to W agner I njunctive Relief. Plaintiff, it seems, is laboringunder a misapprehe nsion as to the nature of her “cla im” for W

agner I njunctive Relief whic h, strictly speaking , is not a claim at all. Rather , pursuant to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appea l’s decision in W agner v. Taylor , 836 F.2d 566. 570, (D.C. Cir. 1987), “f

eder al cour

ts are a uthorized to afford interim injunctive relief ag ainst reta liatory

transfe rs and other

acts of r eprisal while the administrative and judicial pr ocesse s are ong oing” (empha sis added). The relief is, by definition, preliminary . By denying Plaintiff’ s reque st for such r elief, Plaintiff’s “ claim,” to the e x tent it may be cha rac terized as such, w as eff ectively exti ng uished. Acc ording ly , in rende ring the Dismissal Order , the Court corr ectly noted that, bec ause that relief ha d alre ady been de nied, there wer e no viable c laims remaining in the ac tion. Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Gov ernors , Slip C opy , 2010 WL 4260197, at *3 (D.D .C. Oct. 22, 2010). Ther efor e, the Court did not err in dismi ssing this ac tion in it s entirety
. IV. CONCLUSION Upon consider ation of the a lleg ed er rors identified by

Plaintiff, the Court concludes tha t Plaintiff has failed to discha rg e her burden of

establishing the “extraordinar y circ umstances” require d to justi fy

relief from judg ment. Niedermeie r , 153 F. Supp. 2d at 28. I n addition, althoug h the foundation of the Court’s Dismissal Order—which treated Def endants’ dispositive motion, as it related to Plaintiff’s Privacy Act Claim, as conc eded ba sed upon Plaintiff’s fa ilure
9to oppose the motion in the tim e pre scribed by L ocal Rule L CvR 7(b)—is left conspicuously unaddre ssed in Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsider ation, the Court observe s that district courts routinely deny rec onsideration under

simil ar c ircumstance s. See, e .g. , Ficke n v. Golden , 696 F. Supp. 2d 21, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2010). F or the for eg oing r easons, the Court sha ll DENY Plaintiff’s [79] Motion for Reconsider ation. An appr opriate O rder acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: Dec ember

21, 2010 /s/ COLLE EN KOLLAR-K OTEL LY United States District J udg e

10