United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-30144

Paul Belton, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

GEO Group, Incorporated, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC 1:19-CV-133

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

This case concerns whether the district court properly dismissed the 

appellant’s claims for racial discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 

and Louisiana state law. The district court properly held that Appellant’s 

Title VII and Louisiana state law claims were time barred and that Appellant 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 8, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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could not make a prima facie case of racial discrimination as required by 

§ 1981. We affirm. 

I. 

Paul Belton, a black male correctional officer working for GEO Group, 

was fired on August 7, 2017. On March 28, 2017, Sergeant Tammy Roberts, 

a white female employee of GEO, accused Belton of sexual harassment and 

assault at the LeSalle Detention Facility in Jena, Louisiana, where they both 

worked. Roberts reported this incident and the Jena Police Department was 

called; Officer Joseph Spence of the Jena Police Department spoke with 

Roberts that day. The following day, written statements were taken from 

both Roberts and Belton.

According to Roberts, at approximately 5:15 pm on March 28, 2017, 

Belton followed her into the Lieutenants’ office and walked up behind her.

As she turned around, Belton leaned in, attempted to kiss her, and grabbed 

her between her legs in the “crotch area.” Roberts reported that she said 

“no” and told him to “stop” but he “leaned in again to attempt to kiss her.” 

Roberts also reported that two “similar incidents” had occurred two weeks 

earlier, but she did not report those instances “thinking he would leave [her] 

alone but he did not.”

The next day, Belton was placed on unpaid administrative leave 

pending an investigation into the allegations. On April 10, Belton was charged 

with misdemeanor sexual battery under Louisiana Revised Statute 

§ 14:35.14; during plea negotiations the charges were increased to a felony. 

On August 7, 2017, while the criminal charges were still pending, 

Belton was fired. Included with the termination letter was a disciplinary 

action form stating that Belton had been fired for violating GEO policy 3.2.10, 

“Sexual and Workplace Harassment.”

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On November 28, 2017, Belton received Roberts’s personnel file and 

discovered that Roberts had also been accused of sexual harassment and 

violating GEO policy 3.2.10. Roberts had received a final reprimand and had 

been required to participate in a retraining on sexual harassment. In addition, 

Roberts had four disciplinary violations on attendance related matters, while 

Belton had none.

On July 31, 2018, nearly a year later, the charges against Belton were 

dismissed. The same day, Belton filed a charge of discrimination with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had 

been subject to racial discrimination in the form of a hostile environment and 

disparate treatment regarding his termination. On September 12, 2018, the 

EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Belton.

On December 12, 2018, Belton brought suit in Louisiana state court, 

alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

1981, Louisiana’s Employment Discrimination Law (LEDL), and Louisiana

tort law. GEO removed the suit to federal court.1 GEO moved for summary 

judgment, seeking dismissal of all claims. The district court granted summary 

judgment, finding that Belton’s Title VII, LEDL, and state law tort claims 

were time barred. The district court also found that Belton failed to establish 

a prima facie case of discrimination as necessary for a § 1981 claim. The 

district court dismissed Belton’s claims with prejudice. Belton timely 

appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 

viewing all evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the non1 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

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moving party.2 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.”3 “A fact is material if it might affect the 

outcome of the suit and a factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”4

“This court may affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 

any ground supported by the record and presented to the district court.”5

III.

The district court dismissed Belton’s Title VII, LEDL, and Louisiana

tort law claims as time barred. We affirm.

A. 

A plaintiff alleging discrimination claims must exhaust administrative 

remedies before filing suit.6 In a deferral state, such as Louisiana, the time to 

file an EEOC charge is extended by state discrimination law, so a plaintiff has 

2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 

948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020). 

3 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).

4 Harville v. City of Hous., 945 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

5 Salinas v. R.A. Rogers, Inc., 952 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

6 Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Jones 

v. City of Hous., 756 F. App’x 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1))

(per curiam).

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300 days from the discriminatory act to file the charge with the EEOC.

7 Any 

claims filed later than 300 days later are time barred.8

Belton contends that the EEOC filing period should not have started

accruing until November 2017, when he became aware of how Roberts was 

treated after a complaint of sexual harassment was made against her. Belton 

alleges that he was unaware that he had been discriminated against until he 

learned that Roberts had also had a sexual harassment complaint levied 

against her, but that she had not been fired. However, “it is clearly 

established that the limitations period starts running when the plaintiff knows 

of the discriminatory act, not when the plaintiff perceives a discriminatory 

motive behind the act.”9 And “[t]o allow plaintiffs to raise employment 

discrimination claims whenever they begin to suspect that their employers 

had illicit motives would effectively eviscerate the time limits prescribed for 

filing such complaints.”10

Here, the allegedly discriminatory act occurred on August 7, 2017,

when GEO fired Belton. The discriminatory act is not Belton’s discovery of 

7 Although generally one has 180 days from a discriminatory act to file a charge 

with the EEOC, in a deferral state “[t]he 180 calendar day filing deadline is extended to 

300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment 

discrimination on the same basis.” Time Limits for Filing a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP.

COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/time-limits-filing-charge (last visited Dec. 3, 2021). 

8 Mennor v. Fort Hood Nat’l Bank, 829 F.2d 553, 555–56 (5th Cir. 1987).

9 Miller v. Potter, 359 F. App’x 535, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing 

Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1217 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992)); Abels v. Braithwaite, 

832 F. App’x 335, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (This Court has “consistently focused 

on the date that plaintiff knew of the discriminatory act.”); Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 865 So. 

2d 49, 54 (La. 2004) (“In both Ricks and Chardon, the United States Supreme Court 

determined that suits brought more than one year from the date of notice of the termination 

are time barred as the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act not the point at 

which the consequences of the act become painful.” (cleaned up)).

10 Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 1992). 

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how Roberts was treated, it is his termination. He did not file his EEOC 

Charge until July 31, 2018. This was 358 days after the discriminatory act at 

issue—the 300-day filing period had thus expired. The district court did not 

err when it found that Belton’s Title VII claim was time barred.

Alternatively, Belton argued that the filing period should have been 

tolled while GEO’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigation 

was pending. Although we do not consider this argument as it was raised for 

this first time on appeal, this argument would also fail.

11

B.

The district court dismissed Belton’s LEDL claims because they were 

filed after the prescriptive period expired. Discrimination claims brought 

under LEDL are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.12 As with the Title 

VII claims, “[t]his one-year prescriptive period commences to run from the 

day injury or damage is sustained.”13 Thus, the one-year prescriptive period 

began to run on August 7, 2017, when GEO terminated Belton. 

11 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[T]he 

plaintiffs may not advance on appeal new theories or raise new issues not properly before 

the district court to obtain reversal of the summary judgment.”); see also Buchanan v. 

CCA/Tallahatchie Cnty. Corr. Facility, 704 F. App’x 307, 308–09 (5th Cir. 2017) (per 

curiam) (“The mere pendency of her grievance, however, is an insufficient basis to find the 

district court abused its discretion in declining to apply equitable tolling.”); West v. Miss. 

Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 37 F. App’x 712, 712 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[T]he pendency 

of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does 

not toll the running of the limitations period.” (quotation omitted)).

12 LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:303(D) (2008).

13 King v. Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., 743 So. 2d 181, 187 (La. 1999); see also Eastin v. 

Entergy Corp., 865 So. 2d 49, 53–54 (La. 2004) (“[I]t is well settled that the damage is 

sustained in any employment discrimination case at the earlier of the date the employee is 

informed of his termination or his actual separation from employment.”). 

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The one-year prescriptive period for LEDL claims is suspended 

during any pending administrative review or investigation by the EEOC.14

The suspension period does not apply to GEO’s internal OPR investigation, 

only to investigations by the EEOC or the Louisiana Commission on Human 

Rights.15 Thus, the one-year prescriptive period was suspended from when 

Belton filed his EEOC charge, on July 31, 2018, until the EEOC issued its 

right-to-sue letter, 43 days later, on September 12, 2018.16 However, the oneyear prescriptive period had already run for 358 days when it was suspended 

by Belton filing his EEOC charge. After the suspension ended, Belton would 

only have had seven days to timely file suit. Belton did not file his LEDL 

claims until December 12, 2018, well after the one-year prescriptive period

had elapsed.17 Belton’s LEDL claims were prescribed. 

C.

The district court also found that Belton’s state law tort claims for 

“negligent and/or intentional infliction of mental distress” were time barred. 

These tort claims are also subject to a one-year prescriptive period.18 Belton 

was terminated on August 7, 2017; he has not alleged that any discriminatory 

conduct or harassment occurred after that date. Thus the prescription period 

14 LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:303(D) (2008) (although no suspension “shall last longer 

than six months”); Ikossi-Anastasiou v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 

552 (5th Cir. 2009). 

15 LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:303(D) (2008).

16 See Briggs v. Fla. Pars. Juv. Just. Comm’n., 244 So. 3d 438, 440 (La. Ct. App. 1st 

Cir., 2018) (finding that the suspended prescriptive period commenced to run on the date 

the employee received the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC). 

17 The 90-day deadline to sue from receipt of the EEOC letter applies only to 

federal claims; it does not apply to Belton’s state law claims. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 

23:303(D) (2008). 

18 LA. CIV.CODE ANN. art. 3492 (1984). 

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for Belton’s tort law claims began, at the latest, on August 7, 2017. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err when it found that Belton’s state 

law tort claims were prescribed before he filed suit on December 12, 2018, 

more than 16 months after his termination. 

IV.

A.

Belton also sued GEO under § 1981. GEO does not contest that this 

claim is timely. Section 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations; for 

actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, courts 

apply a catchall four-year statute of limitations.19 Section 1981 was originally 

enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. At that time it only protected 

against discrimination at the time of contract formation.

20 However, “§ 1981 

was later amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to create a new cause of 

action for discriminatory and retaliatory conduct occurring after the 

formation of the contract.”21 Where the claim is only available under the 

amended § 1981, the cause of action is said to arise under the Civil Rights Act 

of 1991.

22 Here, the alleged racial discrimination occurred during Belton’s 

employment. This is discrimination during the contract period rather than at 

the time of contract formation. Therefore, his claims arose under the Civil 

19 28 U.S.C. § 1658. 

20 Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 373 (2004) (citing Patterson v. 

McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179 (1989)). 

21 Culbert v. Cleco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d 886, 891 (W.D. La. 2013). 

22 See id. (citing Jones, 541 U.S. at 382).

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Rights Act of 1991 and the four-year statute of limitations applies.23 Belton’s 

§ 1981 claims were not time barred.

B.

Racial discrimination claims under § 1981 are analyzed under the same 

standard as Title VII claims.

24 Where, as here, there is no direct evidence, 

this Court uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.25 First, 

the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Then, the 

defendant must offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.26

The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the stated reasons and 

show that they are “merely pretextual.”27 Here, the district court found that 

Belton did not make a prima facie case. Viewing all evidence in favor of 

Belton, we agree. 

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by 

showing that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified for the 

position at issue; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) 

he was replaced by someone outside the protected class or treated less 

favorably than someone outside the protected class.28 The first three 

requirements are not at issue here. To satisfy the fourth element, Belton must 

23 See Jones, 541 U.S. at 382; see also Balakrishnan v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State 

Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., No. 08-4315, 2009 WL 2175974, at *6–7 (E.D. La. July 21,

2009). 

24 DeCorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2007). 

25 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Turner v. Kan.City S. Ry. 

Co., 675 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 2012). 

26 Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007). 

27 Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010).

28 Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020); Russell v. McKinney 

Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 223–24 (5th Cir. 2000).

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show either that he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class or 

that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated comparator outside 

the protected class.

29 Here, Belton alleges he was treated less favorably by 

GEO than Roberts was in response to the sexual harassment allegations 

brought against each of them.

This Court requires that a plaintiff proffering a comparator must 

“demonstrate that the employment actions at issue were taken under nearly 

identical circumstances.”30 Although the district court took issue with 

Belton’s comparator, Roberts, because they had different supervisors, we do 

not “interpret nearly identical as synonymous with identical.”31 The 

“ultimate decisionmaker as to employees’ continued employment” was the 

same, and thus Roberts could have been a valid comparator.32

Belton argues that he was discriminated against because although both 

he and Roberts received disciplinary sanctions for sexual harassment, he was

fired, while she was not. However, to make a prima facie showing on racial

discrimination, Belton must show that “he was treated less 

favorably . . . under nearly identical circumstances.”33 Belton and Roberts

did not face nearly identical circumstances. The criminal charges against 

Belton were still pending when he was fired. We must evaluate GEO’s 

decision at the time it was made, without the advantage of knowing that the 

29 Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009).

30 Id. (citation omitted).

31 Id. at 260; see also Turner, 675 F.3d at 896 (employees with different job 

responsibilities could still be comparators where the person responsible for ultimate 

decisions like termination and suspension was the same). 

32 Lee, 574 F.3d at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted).

33 Id. at 259.

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charges were later dismissed.34 There is no evidence that Roberts was ever 

criminally charged regarding the sexual harassment complaints made against 

her. Given the difference in circumstances surrounding Belton and Roberts, 

Roberts is not a valid comparator and Belton has not made a prima facie 

showing that he was racially discriminated against under § 1981.35

V.

Belton’s Title VII, LEDL, and state tort claims were time barred. 

Further, Belton failed to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination 

under § 1981. We AFFIRM the ruling of the district court.

34 Turner, 675 F.3d at 896 (“[T]he relevant perspective is that of the employer at 

the time of the adverse employment decision.”); see Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 

621, 624 (5th Cir. 1997) (Title VII does not protect against unfair business decisions).

35 Lee, 574 F.3d at 259.

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