P HY LLIS JON ES, p ar e ntand ne xtfri e nd

of A.J., a minor, P la in t if f,
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendan ts. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 08 -01 43 4 (H HK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Phy llis J ones, as pa

rent a nd next friend of A.J., a minor, brings this ac tion ag ainst the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

and Mic he lle Rhe e , c ha

nc e llo r o f t

he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Pub lic Sc ho ols (“D CPS ”), in he r off

icial ca pacity (collec tively , “the District” ), alleg ing violations of the Individuals with Disabilit ies Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2006) ( “I DEA” ). Jones alleg es the District of Columbia denie d A.J . the fre e and a ppropriate public education gua rante ed by the I DE A whe n D CPS f

a ile d to c onve ne a

mul ti- dis c ipl ina

ry te am me e tin gto b e g in t o evaluate and de termine a

n appropr iate plac ement for A.J . J ones also alleg es that, at the administrative hea

ring , Hea ringOffic er Woods err ed by (1) f ailing to a ddress the issue r aised by the administrative complaint and ( 2) holding that under D istrict of Columbia law, home-schoole d children a re not e ntitled to special educ ation benef its under the I DEA. Be fore the Court are J ones’ a nd the District’s cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt [ ## 9, 12]. Upon consideration of the motions, the opposition thereto, and the rec ord of this ca se, the Court c on c lud e s th at th e Di str ic t’ s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt m

us t be g ra nte d, and Jone s’“State” inc ludes the District of Columbia. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(31). 1 B e ne fi ts a

re a lso pr ov ide d to stu de nts pla c e d b y a g ov e rnme nt a g e nc y

in a pr ivate 2 school. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)( 10)(B ). 2 motion for summary

judgme nt must be denied.

I. BACKG ROUND A. St at ut or y Ba c kgr ound Con g re ss e na c te d th e I DE A t o “ e ns ur e that a ll c hil dr e n w ithdis a bil iti e s h ave ava ila

ble to them a fr ee a

ppropriate public education that emphasizes special educ ation and re lated ser vices desig ned to meet their

unique nee ds.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (A). States rec eivingg rants under 1 the I DEA must ensure that all children w ith disabili ties of a c erta in ag e have acc ess to a “f ree appropr iate public educ ation,” and pr ovide ea ch disabled student with an individual educ ation prog ram (“ I EP”), deta iling educ ational servic es tailored to the ne eds of that student. Id. at § 14 14 (d )( 2) (A ). An

“ I EP T e am” (r e fe rr e d to a s a mul ti- dis c ipl ina

ry te am ( “ MD T” ); see, e .g. , Brown v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 5 68 F . Su

pp . 2 d 4 4, 47 (D .D .C. 20 08 )) that in c lud e s p are nts , educators, and other

specia lists, develops eac h I EP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B ). I DEA ser vices a re pr ovided to students in public schools, id. at § 1412(a )(1) (A), a nd, under c erta in circumstanc es, students place d by their par ents in private sc hools, id. at § 14 12 (a )( 10 ). Pare nta lly -p la c e d p ri vate sc ho ol s tud e nts qu a lif y fo r s e rv ic e s und e r t

he I DE A o nly 2 if the school mee ts the state’s def inition of “elementa

ry” or “ seconda

ry” school. 34 C.F.R. § 300.130 (2009). I f that def inition does not i nclude home- school, a home- schooled student in that state is not entitled to I DEA be nefits. Ho ok s v . Clar k Cou nty Sc h. Di st. , 228 F.3d 1036, 1039- 41 (9th Cir. 2000).3

Finally , under the I DEA, pa rents have the rig ht to an administrative hea ringon a
c omp la int “ wi th r e sp e c t to any

matte r r e latin gto . . . the pr ov isi on of a fr e e a pp ro pr iate pu

bli c education” to their child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), ( f)( 1). The he aringoffice r’s de termination on that matter may

be cha lleng ed in fe dera l district court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)
. B. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound As a re sult of a serious a ccide nt and subsequent surg erie s beg inning in the f irst gr ade, A.J . missed a sig nificant amount of school and wa s classified a s learningdisabled in J anuar y 2007. At that time, A.J . lived in the District of Columbia, and an I EP for one c alende r y ear was de ve lop e d f

or A. J. by Ki mba ll E le me nta

ry Sc ho ol. In M arc h 2 00 7, Jone s a nd A. J. mov e d to Virg inia, wher e A.J. attended Tria ng le Elementa

ry School in Prince Wil liam County for pa rt of the school y ear . Prince Willi am County Public Schools’ re-e valuations in J anuar y 2008 showed that A.J .’s ac ademic pe rfor mance continued to be much lowe r than that of his pe ers. J ones and A .J . moved bac k to the District of Columbia in March 2008. On Ma rch 28, 2008, J ones re g istered he r son at Winston Educational Center ( “Winston”) as a home -schooled student. The same day , she sent a le tter throug h counsel to Winston requesting a MDT meeting

“ to r e vie w e va luatio ns , d e ve lop I EP, and de te rm ine a

pp ro pr iate pla c e me nt f

or [A. J.]” ( Com

pl. Ex . K at 2). It was Jones’ wish to have her son in “an a

ppropriate educational placeme nt” by the beg inning of

the 2008-2009 school year and for A.J . to be home-sc hooled until that placement was made . (Compl. Ex . B at 4-5 (Admin. Compl.)) On April 22, 2008, twenty -five da y s after the re quest for a

MDT meeting , J ones filed a n administrative hea

ringcomplaint alleg ing that DCPS denied A.J. a fre e appr opriate public e ducation by failingto hold the reque sted meeting
. At the he ari ng , D CPS mo ve d to dis mis s th e c la im o n th e g ro un ds that D CPS is no t r e qu ir e d to4

provide a home-schoole d student with acc ess to a fr ee a nd appropr iate public educ ation. The hear ing of

fice r g rante d the motion to dis miss, holdi ngthat J ones “[f]ailed to present a ny evidenc e about why

the I DEIA re quires DCPS to provide their home-sc hooled child with a [free and appropr iate public educ ation].” (Compl. Ex . A at 8 (A dmin. Decision)). Jones then filed a complaint seekingjudicial revie w by this Court. II. AN AL YSI S A. Legal Stand ard Whe n r e vie wi nga

he ari ngof

fi c e r’ s d e te rm inatio n in

an I DE A c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt , ba se d “ on the pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e , s ha ll gra

nt s uc h r e lie f a s th e c ourt de te rm ine s is appropr iate.” 20 U .S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The court doe s not conduct a de novo revie w of the hear ing, but g ives “due weig ht” to the hea ringoffice r’s c on c lus ion s. Bd. of Educ. of Hendric k Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). Thoug h less defe rential than the “substantial evidenc e” r eview of most ag ency

actions, Sc orah v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 3 22 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (D.D.C. 2004), the he aringoffice r’s de termination should not be upset so long a s her c onclusion is supported by “suff iciently rea soned, spec ific finding s,” Kerkam v

. Superintendent, D.C. Publ. Sch. , 931 F.2d 84, 87- 88 (D.C. Cir. 1991). On a motion for summary judgme nt, the court de cides the c ase on the basis of those finding s, the administrative re cord, a nd any additional evidenc e pre sented to the c ourt. See, e .g. , O.O. ex rel. Pabo v. District of Colum bia , 573 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45-46 (D .D.C. 2008). B. A.J. Was Entitled to a MDT Me eting, but Jones’ Adm inis trat ive Com plain t Was P rem ature J ones ar g ues that DCPS was require d to hold a MDT meeting , that the administrativeBe cause the complaint was pr emature , the Court does not addre ss the question of 3 wh e the r o r n ot h ome -s c ho ol i s “ e le me nta ry” or “ se c on da ry” sc ho ol u

nd e r D ist ri c t of Col umb ia law. 5 hear ing of

fice r fa iled to addre ss the basis of the a dminist rative c omplaint, and that homeschooled students ar e entitled to I DEA be nefits under District of Columbia law. The D istrict responds that it is not required to hold a MD T meetingfor a home-schoole d student such as A.J. Both a rguments miss t he point: A.J ., a re sident of the District of Columbia, is entitled to an
e va luatio n, but un de r D istri c t of Col umb ia

law D CPS w a s p e rm itt e d to take mor e tha n 2 5 d ay s to conduct the e valuation. States rec eivingI DEA g rants must ensure that “[ a ] ll c hil dr e n w ithdis a

bil iti e s residing

in the State . . . a

re ide nti fi e d, loc ate d, and e va luate d. ” 20 U. S.C. § 1 41 2( a )( 3) (A ) ( e mph a sis
a dd e d) . T he pla in l angua g e of the statut e re qu ir e s th e state to e va luate A. J. so l on ga s h e is a
re sid e nt o f t

he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , r e g ard le ss o f whe the r h e is i n a pu bli c sc ho ol, a

pr ivate school, or no school at all. Se e Ha wk ins e xre l. D .C. v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 539 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 8 , 1 1 3 -1 1 4 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Re id e xre l. R e id v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 401 F.3d 516, 519 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 5) ); D. C. M un . Re g s. tit . 5 , § 30 02 . I n o rd e r t o c on du c t th at e va luatio n, DC PS neede d to hold a MDT meeting
. See20 U.S.C. § 1414(c) (pla cingresponsibility for e valuations on “the I EP Team and othe r qualified pr ofessionals”) . DCPS was infor med that A.J. m ight be disabled on Mar ch 28, 2008, whe n J ones re quested a MDT meeting
. Jone s’ c omp la int , h ow e ve r, wa s p re matur e : D CPS h a d 1 20 da y s to e va luate A. J. D. C. Code § 38-2561.02. DCPS sti ll had 95 day s left on April 22, 2008 whe n J ones filed he r administrative ac tion. Theref ore, Jones’ administrative complaint wa s prematur e, and this Court
a ff ir ms that c omp la int ’s dis mis sa l, a lbe it o n d if fe re nt gro un ds
. 36 III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court c oncludes Jones’ motion for summary judgme nt must be denied, a

nd the District’s motion for summary judgme nt must be gr anted. An appropr iate orde r ac companies this memora ndum opinion.

Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge