Filed 4/6/23 In re H.A. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re H.A. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

___________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADRIAN P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B319152

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05625B, C)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mary Kelly, Judge. Affirmed in part and 

reversed in part with directions.

William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn Harrison, County 

Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. 

Mitchell, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳

Adrian P. (father) appeals from a disposition order 

concerning his children H.A. (born in May 2019) and Princess R. 

(born in December 2021). He contends the juvenile court erred in 

denying him presumed father status pursuant to Family Code1

section 7611, subdivision (d), and the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to 

adequately investigate the children’s possible Indian ancestry as 

required by California law implementing the Indian Child 

Welfare Act (ICWA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). We

conclude that father is entitled to presumed father status as to 

both children, and the ICWA issue is moot because the juvenile 

court has already ordered DCFS to conduct a further ICWA 

inquiry. We therefore will direct the juvenile court to amend the 

disposition order to give father presumed father status as to both 

children, and we will affirm the disposition order as amended.

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 

the Family Code.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background.

Nancy A. (mother) and father are the parents of H. and 

Princess.

2 Mother gave birth to Princess at home in early 

December 2021. Princess and mother were transported to the 

hospital, where both tested positive for amphetamines and 

methamphetamines. Mother said she had found out she was 

pregnant just three months before giving birth and had not had 

any prenatal care. She admitted smoking methamphetamine 

four days before Princess was born, but otherwise denied using 

methamphetamines during the prior five years. 

Mother said she and father had been together for 15 years, 

and he was H.’s and Princess’s father. Father had not been at 

the hospital after Princess’s birth because he was not vaccinated

against Covid-19, but he had visited virtually with mother and 

Princess. 

Father contacted DCFS two days after Princess’s birth. He 

said he had lost his parental rights to an older child and did not 

want to go through that again. He was not certain whether he 

could care for Princess, but he said he would talk to paternal 

grandmother about helping him. 

The parents gave inconsistent reports about where they 

were living immediately prior to Princess’s birth. Mother said 

she, father, and H. lived with maternal grandmother, father’s 

sister, and mother’s two brothers. Father initially said he was 

living with friends; he later clarified that he and mother wanted 

2 The children’s half-sibling, Jaiden, who has a different 

father, is not a subject of this appeal.
4

to live together, but the maternal grandmother had “issues” with 

him and so he would “sneak in the house.”

The paternal grandmother said she had found out about 

mother’s pregnancy three months earlier and had offered to take 

mother to the doctor. Father’s belongings were at the paternal 

grandmother’s house, but father was “a wanderer.”

II. Petition and detention.

On December 10, 2021, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and 

(j) alleging that H. and Princess were at substantial risk of 

serious physical harm because Princess tested positive for 

amphetamines and methamphetamines at birth (count b-1); 

mother had a history of substance abuse, used

methamphetamines during her pregnancy with Princess, and had 

a positive toxicology screen for amphetamines and 

methamphetamines the day of Princess’s birth (count b-2); and 

father had a history of substance abuse and a criminal history, 

including convictions for driving under the influence and 

possession of a controlled substance, and had failed to protect the 

children from mother’s substance abuse (counts b-3, j-1). 

Both parents appeared remotely at the December 16, 2021 

detention hearing and requested that the children be released to 

them. The same day, mother submitted Parentage 

Questionnaires in which she stated that father was H.’s and 

Princess’s father; he had not been present at the birth of either 

child; he had signed Princess’s birth certificate, but not H.’s; the 

parents were unmarried but had been living together at the time 

of the children’s conception and birth; father had held himself out 

as the father of both children; and father had lived with mother 

and H. since H.’s birth and had helped to support H. financially. 
5

Father submitted a Statement Regarding Parentage (JV-505) in 

which he stated that he believed he was the children’s father, had 

held himself out as the children’s father to family and friends,

had lived with the children from their birth until “recently,” had 

participated in “all parental activities,” and had supported the 

children financially. He requested that the court enter a 

judgment of parentage as to both children.3

The juvenile court detained the children from both parents,

finding that the children would be at substantial risk of harm in 

the parents’ custody. As to father’s status in the proceedings, the 

court said that because father “sign[ed] the birth certificate,” 

there was a rebuttable presumption that he was the presumed 

father. No party objected, and the court therefore designated

father the presumed father of both children.

III. Jurisdiction and disposition.

In January 2022, mother told a children’s social worker 

that she and father had known each other 15 years and had been 

high school sweethearts. They took a break from their 

relationship when father went to jail five or six years earlier, but

had been in a committed relationship since H. was born. Before 

the children were detained, father had gone “back and forth 

between” mother’s home and the paternal grandmother’s home, 

but he had moved in with mother after the children were 

detained to support her. 

Father said he had been in mother’s life for 15 years. He 

had not been living with mother when the children were detained 

3 The parentage forms were unsigned, presumably because 

the detention hearing took place remotely.
6

because her mother (the maternal grandmother) “ha[d] issues 

with” him, but “now because this happened [the maternal

grandmother] is okay with me being there.” Father said he had 

submitted to an on-demand drug test and was participating in a 

parenting program. His goal for the future was “to be able to 

provide a home for my kids and [mother].”

DCFS reported that mother and father were visiting the 

children together three times per week, monitored by the 

children’s caregiver.

The court held a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing 

on February 18, 2022. Mother’s and father’s attorneys requested 

that the petition be dismissed and the children returned to the 

parents’ custody; DCFS and children’s counsel urged that the 

petition be sustained.

The court sustained the petition as amended. It then 

addressed father’s status in the proceedings, stating that its 

finding on presumed father status “was based on facts that were 

not true.” The court continued: “It was represented to me that 

father had gone back and signed the birth certificate. And the 

birth certificate is produced and there’s no father on the birth

certificate. And father wasn’t present at the birth and whatever 

the reason he wasn’t there, whether it was Covid or not, I think 

it’s premature to say he is presumed at this point. So I’m 

changing his status to bio based on the birth certificates.”

The court then asked whether mother and father had been

living together since H.’s birth. Mother’s counsel said mother 

and father moved in together around H.’s second birthday, in 

about May 2021. The court repeated that it was finding that 

father was a biological father as to both H. and Princess. The 

following colloquy ensued:
7

“[Father’s counsel]: Your Honor, the prior finding was 

presumed, and looked like it was [on a Family Code section] 

7611(d) basis.

“The Court: Yes, but that was based on inaccurate 

information. . . . Mother misrepresented the facts to me. I was 

led to believe he was on the birth certificate and he’s not.

“[Father’s counsel]: . . . I looked at his declaration. He 

never stated that that was the case himself. But he did live with 

the child—the children for that extended period and held himself 

out and supported.

“The Court: He lived with the children from the age of two. 

The child turned two and then he started living with the child. 

So he’s lived with the child . . . for six months.

“[Father’s counsel]: So, Your Honor, I’m just trying to 

clarify. Is the court reversing that decision?

“The Court: I am reversing that decision because I based 

my decision on the fact that the father was on the birth

certificate.

“[Father’s counsel]: I’ll just lodge my objection.

“The Court: The father is not on the birth certificate and I 

have been told that father did not start living with [H.] until after 

her second birthday.

“[Mother’s counsel]: I am looking at the paternity 

questionnaire. Mother did not say that he signed the paternity 

questionnaire for [H.]. She did say that he has held himself out 

as [H.’s] father and acted like her father and that they were 

living together for a period of time. So I think he would qualify 

under [Family Code section] 7611(d). [¶] . . . [¶] 

“The Court: . . . I relied primarily on mother’s assertion. I 

can revisit my finding. I don’t believe it was accurate. He’s not 
8

on the birth certificate. They weren’t married. And he was not—

he lived with the child for six months. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . So I 

don’t believe the length of time that he’s been with mother 

suffices for presumed status. He’s not on either of the children’s 

birth certificates. And—but mother is maintaining that he is the 

biological father for both children. [¶] In any event, I don’t 

think—I think now that I have the birth certificates and I’ve 

reconsidered the facts, I don’t think that a presumed father 

status is warranted.”

With regard to disposition, the court ordered the children 

removed from the parents and granted mother and father 

reunification services. Father was ordered to drug test and 

participate in a 12-step program, take a parenting class, and 

comply with all criminal court orders. Mother was ordered to 

complete a full drug program with random or on-demand drug 

testing. Both parents were granted monitored visits with the 

children three times per week.

Father timely appealed from the February 18, 2022 

disposition order.

IV. Additional facts relevant to the Indian Child Welfare 

Act.

On December 14, 2021, mother and father submitted 

ICWA-020 forms in which they stated that neither they nor the 

children were members of or eligible for membership in a 

federally recognized Indian tribe or possessed Indian 

identification cards; none of their ancestors was a member of a 

federally recognized Indian tribe; neither they nor the children 

were domiciled on a reservation; and the children had not been 

wards of a tribal court. The court noted that the parents were 

unable to sign the ICWA-020 forms because appearances were 
9

remote, but the parents’ forms “indicat[ed] that no factors apply 

to [them] that would cause the court to know.” 

In response to the court’s questions regarding ICWA, 

mother’s counsel said both of her parents were from Guadalajara 

and she did not believe she had any Native American ancestry. 

Father said he had spoken to his parents and he did not have any 

Native American ancestry. The court therefore found there was 

no reason to believe that ICWA applied to the children. 

While this appeal was pending, on January 23, 2023, the 

court ordered DCFS to interview or attempt to interview all 

extended family members about whether the children are, or may 

be, Indian children, and to document those efforts and submit a 

written report.4

DISCUSSION

I. Father is a presumed father pursuant to section 

7611, subdivision (d).

Father contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to 

find that he qualified for presumed father status under section 

7611, subdivision (d).5 For the reasons that follow, we agree. 

A. Legal standards.

Dependency law distinguishes between “alleged,”

“biological,” and “presumed” fathers, which determines the extent 

to which a father may participate in dependency proceedings and 

4 The court grants DCFS’s January 31, 2023 request for 

judicial notice of the juvenile court’s January 23, 2023 order. 

5 On January 31, 2023, DCFS filed a letter with the court 

indicating it had not taken a position below on the presumed 

parentage issue and would not do so on appeal.
10

be entitled to certain rights. (In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 

792, 806.) An alleged father is a man who may be a child’s father 

but has not yet established either presumed father status or 

biological paternity, and who therefore is not entitled to custody, 

reunification services, or visitation. (In re A.H. (2022) 

84 Cal.App.5th 340, 350.) A biological father is a man “ ‘who has 

established his paternity but has not established his qualification 

as a presumed parent.’ ” (Ibid., quoting In re J.W.-P. (2020) 

54 Cal.App.5th 298, 301.) A court may order reunification 

services for biological fathers “ ‘if they are in the child’s best

interest.’ ” (In re A.H., at p. 350.) Finally, a presumed father is 

one entitled to a presumption of paternity pursuant to 

section 7611, and who therefore is entitled to “ ‘all the rights 

afforded to parents in dependency proceedings, including 

standing, the appointment of counsel, and reunification 

services.’ ” (In re A.H., at p. 349, quoting Seiser & Kumli, Cal. 

Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2022) § 2.60[2][a], pp. 2-

129.) 

Section 7611 sets out the requirements for presumed 

parent status. Two aspects of section 7611 are relevant here. 

First, a person “is presumed to be the natural parent of a child” if

he or she “meets the conditions provided in . . . Chapter 3 

(commencing with Section 7570)”—that is, if he “sign[s] a 

voluntary declaration of parentage to establish the parentage of 

the child” (§ 7573, subd. (a)). A voluntary declaration of 

parentage “is equivalent to a judgment of parentage of the child 

and confers on the declarant all rights and duties of a parent” 

unless the declaration is void, rescinded, or challenged. (§§ 7573, 

subd. (d), 7573.5–7580.) 
11

Second, a person is presumed to be a child’s parent if he or 

she “receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out 

the child as their natural child.” (§ 7611, subd. (d).) The 

presumption that arises under section 7611, subdivision (d) “is a 

rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be 

rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing 

evidence.” (§ 7612, subd. (a).) 

A man who claims entitlement to presumed father status 

has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the 

evidence the facts supporting his entitlement. (In re E.T. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 426, 437; In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 

1210.) On appeal, we review a trial court’s finding of presumed 

parent status for substantial evidence. (County of Orange v. Cole

(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 504, 509.) Under this standard, because 

father had the burden of proof below, we may reverse only if “ ‘the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of 

law.’ ” (Estate of Herzog (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 894, 904, citing In 

re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1528, disapproved of 

on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 

1010, fn. 7.)

B. Analysis.

As discussed above, the juvenile court found that father 

was not entitled to presumed father status because his name did 

not appear on the children’s birth certificates. That ruling was in 

error. As relevant here, Health and Safety Code section 102425, 

subdivision (a)(4)(C) provides that if a child’s parents are not 

married to each other, the father shall not be listed on the birth

certificate unless the mother and father sign a voluntary 

declaration of parentage or a court has issued a judgment of 

paternity. Accordingly, the fact that an unmarried father 
12

appears on a birth certificate is persuasive evidence that he 

signed a voluntary declaration of parentage and, thus, is entitled 

to presumed father status. (E.g., In re Raphael P. (2002) 

97 Cal.App.4th 716, 738 [evidence that man’s name was on the 

birth certificate was prima facie proof that he signed a voluntary 

declaration of paternity].) The inverse is not true, however: 

Evidence that a man’s name is not on a child’s birth certificate is 

not dispositive of his presumed father status because a man may 

be a presumed father under section 7611 either because he 

executed a voluntary declaration of paternity or because he 

received a child into his home and held her out as his own. 

There are no specific factors that a trial court must 

consider to determine that a parent has received a child into the 

home and has established a parental relationship, and “there is 

no requirement that a child live with a parent for the parent to 

achieve presumed parent status.” (W.S. v. S.T. (2018) 

20 Cal.App.5th 132, 144; see also In re L.L. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 

1302, 1314 [father “was not required to live with [child] in order 

for him to receive her into his home within the meaning of section 

7611, subdivision (d)”]; E.C. v. J.V. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1076, 

1086 [“nothing in section 7611(d) requires [mother’s former

girlfriend] to have received the minor into her home immediately 

after the minor’s birth” to obtain presumed parent status].) 

Instead, a parent seeking presumed parent status must “show 

the existence of a parent-child relationship based on assuming 

parental responsibilities, demonstrating commitment to the child, 

and providing support.” (W.S. v. S.T., at pp. 147–148; see also 

In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 493 [§ 7611(d) 

“requires the person seeking presumed parent status to 

demonstrate an established parental relationship with the minor 
13

and commitment to the minor’s well-being”]; E.C. v. J.V., at 

p. 1087 [inquiry is whether “through his or her conduct, an 

alleged parent has demonstrated a commitment to the minor 

child and the minor child’s well-being, thereby distinguishing the 

alleged parent as someone who has entered into a familial 

relationship with the child from someone who has not”].) In other 

words, a presumed parent must demonstrate “ ‘a full commitment 

to his paternal responsibilities—emotional, financial, and 

otherwise[.]’ ” (In re Jovanni B. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1482, 

1489–1490; see also In re L.L., at p. 1310 [“ ‘[T]he core issues are 

the person’s established relationship with and demonstrated 

commitment to the child’ ”].)

Applying this analysis here, we conclude that father is H.’s 

presumed father as a matter of law. It is undisputed that mother 

and father have been in an exclusive relationship since H.’s birth

in May 2019 and lived together for some portion of H.’s life.

6

Significantly, both parents stated that father supported H. 

financially and held her out as his child to family and friends, 

6 It is not clear from the record exactly when mother and 

father lived together. During mother’s first interview with a 

social worker, mother said she, father, and H. were living 

together at the maternal grandmother’s home; and mother stated 

in her December 16, 2021 Parentage Questionnaires that she and 

father had lived together at the time of H.’s and Princess’s 

conception and birth. At the disposition hearing, however, 

mother’s counsel said mother and father began living together at 

about the time of H.’s second birthday. Father stated in his JV505 that he had lived with H. from “birth” to “recently;” he 

subsequently told a social worker that he and mother were not 

living together when Princess was born because the maternal 

grandmother had “issues” with him, but that he would “sneak in 

the house.”
14

and father further stated that he had participated in “[a]ll 

parental activities” with regard to H. There is no evidence to the 

contrary. Accordingly, as to H., father is entitled to a 

presumption of parentage under section 7611, subdivision (d).

The analysis is somewhat different as to Princess. Because 

Princess was detained immediately after her birth, father was 

not able to “receive [her] into his home” within the meaning of 

section 7611, subdivision (d). Accordingly, our analysis is guided 

by Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849, in which our 

Supreme Court considered whether a man who had been 

prevented from receiving a child into his home could attain 

presumed father status. The court held that in such a 

circumstance, a man could not constitutionally be denied 

presumed father status if he “promptly comes forward and 

demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities—

emotional, financial, and otherwise.” (Ibid.) The court explained: 

“A court should consider all factors relevant to that 

determination. The father’s conduct both before and after the 

child’s birth must be considered. Once the father knows or 

reasonably should know of the pregnancy, he must promptly 

attempt to assume his parental responsibilities as fully as the 

mother will allow and his circumstances permit. In particular, 

the father must demonstrate ‘a willingness himself to assume full 

custody of the child—not merely to block adoption by others.’ 

[Citation.] A court should also consider the father’s public 

acknowledgement of paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth

expenses commensurate with his ability to do so, and prompt 

legal action to seek custody of the child.” (Ibid.)

In the present case, it is undisputed that father lived with 

mother during at least a portion of her pregnancy with Princess 
15

and provided financial support for the family. Father publicly 

acknowledged that he was Princess’s father, both during mother’s 

pregnancy and immediately after Princess’s birth. Although he 

was unable to visit mother and Princess in the hospital because 

he was unvaccinated, he visited virtually through FaceTime. He 

requested at the detention hearing that Princess be placed with 

him, and he participated actively in the dependency case, 

contacting a social worker immediately after she was detained, 

drug testing and attending parenting classes even before he was 

ordered to do so, and regularly visiting Princess and H.

Accordingly, father is entitled to a presumption of parentage as to 

Princess. 

II. ICWA.

Father contends that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate 

inquiry into the children’s possible Indian ancestry because it did 

not inquire of the children’s extended family members. DCFS 

has filed a partial motion to dismiss this appeal, asserting that 

father’s assertions as to ICWA are moot.

We conclude that father’s ICWA claim has been rendered 

moot by the January 23, 2023 order directing DCFS to conduct a 

further ICWA inquiry. Our Supreme Court has explained that a

case becomes moot “when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a] 

court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant 

him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 

276.) Here, the juvenile court has already granted father the 

relief he seeks on appeal by ordering DCFS to conduct a further 

ICWA inquiry. Accordingly, we will deny as moot father’s 
16

request that we conditionally affirm the disposition order and 

order a further ICWA inquiry.7

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court is directed to amend the disposition 

order to give father presumed father status as to both children. 

As amended, the disposition order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

NGUYEN (KIM), J.*

7 Having so concluded, we deny DCFS’s request for partial 

dismissal of the appeal as moot.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.