J-A35018-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ANDRE BRANCH SAMUELS, 

 Appellant No. 1426 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 30, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0017274-2013 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2016 

 Appellant, Andre Branch Samuels, appeals from the July 30, 2014 

judgment of sentence entered following his conviction at a bench trial of 

possession of a firearm with altered manufacturer’s number, firearm not be 

carried without a license, and person not to possess a firearm. Following our 

careful review, we affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the facts of the crimes as follows: 

 On the evening of October 28, 2013, Officers [Gary] 

Messer, [Michael] Coleman, and [Santino] Achille of the City of 

Pittsburgh Police Department were patrolling Sandusky Court, a 

housing development located on the North Side of the City of 

Pittsburgh. The officers were targeting this particular area 

because they had received, within the ten (10) days previous, 

“numerous citizen complaints from residents concerning large 

amounts of open air drug trafficking” taking place there, 

specifically around building 1634. Sandusky Court was 

considered to be an “extremely high crime area,” and Officer 
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Messer had made nearly fifty (50) arrests there for firearm and 

narcotics offenses within the last year alone. 

 At approximately 8:00 p.m. that evening, the officers 

entered Sandusky Court and drove towards building 1634. The 

officers were in an undercover vehicle and wore plainclothes 

instead of uniforms, but they had their badges displayed on their 

chests. As they pulled into the circle on which building 1634 is 

located, they observed a group of five (5) to seven (7) men 

standing in front of that building. Officer Messer, who was in the 

front passenger seat, recognized [Appellant] within the group. 

Officer Messer knew [Appellant] from a previous gun arrest that 

[Appellant] had within six (6) months to one (1) year prior. He 

also knew that [Appellant] did not reside in Sandusky Court, and 

he knew that [Appellant] lived in an area that was a five (5) 

minute drive away. 

 The officers drove into the circle, towards the group of 

men, but they did not stop or attempt to initiate any contact 

with anyone in the group. Upon seeing their vehicle approach, 

[Appellant] “appeared to quickly look side to side” and then 

“separated from the group.” As the vehicle crested the 

turnaround of the circle, [Appellant] ran or quickly moved into 

building 1634. Officer Messer then observed [Appellant] turn 

around and take both hands to pull the door closed behind him. 

The officers were still in their vehicles when [Appellant] left the 

group and fled into the building. After they had turned around in 

the circle and were again in front of building 1634, Officer 

Messer observed [Appellant] peering out through a window on 

the second landing of building 1634. Although [Appellant] could 

only be seen from his neck up, Officer Messer was able to 

observe [Appellant] moving from “left to right repeatedly in a 

frantic manner” at least three (3) to four (4) times within a five 

(5) to ten (10) second span. Upon seeing this behavior, Officers 

Messer and Coleman exited their vehicle to investigate the 

situation because [Appellant] “just took off for no reason” and 

then appeared to be “trying the doors”of the apartments, a fact 

that the officers were able to surmise because they knew that 

there were units on the left and right side of the building and 

they didn’t know what else he could have been doing. 

 Officers Messer and Coleman exited their vehicles and 

jogged into the building with their badges displayed. As the 

officers entered building 1634, they heard [Appellant] running 
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up the stairs to the third floor. The officers also were able to see 

[Appellant] running as they approached the second floor landing. 

The officers identified themselves as Pittsburgh Police and 

ordered [Appellant] to stop, which he failed to do. As Officer 

Messer continued running up the stairs, he observed [Appellant] 

enter Apartment 209 . . . and close the door behind him. When 

Officer Messer reached the third floor landing, he heard the door 

to that apartment lock. Officer Messer did not hear [Appellant] 

knock, bang or request that he be let into the apartment prior to 

his entry. The officers then heard arguing, yelling and 

screaming coming from inside of the apartment, at which time 

they knocked on the door repeatedly, identifying themselves as 

Pittsburgh police. Within a few seconds, Marie Murrell, the 

resident of the apartment, answered the door while still yelling 

and arguing with someone in her apartment. She told the 

officers that a man she did not know had forced his way into her 

apartment and that she wanted him out. Ms. Murrell quite 

clearly conveyed to the officers that [Appellant] was not wanted 

in her apartment and that she wanted him removed from her 

residence. 

 As Ms. Murrell opened the door wider, Officer Messer was 

able to see [Appellant] standing in her apartment. Officer 

Messer immediately noticed a “bulge” in [Appellant’s] front jeans 

pocket. Based on Ms. Murrell’s statements that [Appellant] was 

not authorized to be in her home, [Appellant] was then detained 

and handcuffed by Officer Coleman. Officer Coleman conducted 

a pat-down of [Appellant’s] outer clothing and immediately 

recognized what he felt to be a firearm in [Appellant’s] right 

pocket. Officer Coleman retrieved a firearm from [Appellant’s] 

front right jeans pocket. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/15, at 4–7 (internal citations to the record 

omitted). 

 Appellant was charged with an eight-count information on October 28, 

2013; five of the charges were withdrawn by the Commonwealth at the 

preliminary hearing. Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion on March 

19, 2014, seeking the suppression of evidence. The trial court held a 
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hearing on the motion on April 22, 2014, and following the submission of 

briefs, denied the motion to suppress on July 25, 2014. Appellant waived a 

jury trial, and the trial court convicted Appellant of the described charges on 

July 30, 2014. Appellant waived a presentence report and was sentenced to 

eighteen to thirty-six months of imprisonment for possession of a firearm 

with altered manufacturer’s number, with credit of six months for time 

served and a recommendation for boot camp, followed by a consecutive 

term of two years of probation. 

 Trial counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw on August 1, 2014, 

which the trial court granted on August 5, 2014. The trial court appointed 

the public defender’s office to represent Appellant, and new counsel filed a 

notice of appeal on August 29, 2014. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal: 

I. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant suppression 

of the gun because, as soon as the police officers identified 

themselves as law enforcement and ordered [Appellant] to 

stop, he was seized as a matter of law but, at the precise 

moment of seizure, the police officers did not have

reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable 

facts, to believe that [Appellant] was engaged in criminal 

activity? 

II. Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict 

[Appellant] of Possession of Firearm With Altered 

Manufacturer’s Number because this [is] not a strict 

liability crime but, rather, has a mens rea requirement, 

and the Commonwealth failed to prove, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that [Appellant] acted with the requisite 

guilty knowledge or criminal intent? 
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Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

 When an appellant raises both a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue and 

a suppression issue, we address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the conviction first, and we do so without a diminished record: 

We are called upon to consider all of the testimony that was 

presented to the jury during the trial, without consideration as to 

the admissibility of that evidence. The question of sufficiency 

is not assessed upon a diminished record. Where improperly 

admitted evidence has been allowed to be considered by the 

jury, its subsequent deletion does not justify a finding of 

insufficient evidence. The remedy in such a case is the grant of 

a new trial. 

Commonwealth v. Stanford, 863 A.2d 428, 431–432 (Pa. 2004) 

(emphasis in original). Thus, we address Appellant’s issues in reverse order 

and begin by addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, as “[t]he Double 

Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after a defendant’s conviction has been 

overturned because of insufficient evidence.” Commonwealth v. Mullins, 

918 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). 

 In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “we must decide whether the 

evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 

favor of the Commonwealth, as verdict winner,” are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731, 746 

(Pa. 2015). The trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, is free to believe 

some, all, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 

1025 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792–793 (Pa. 
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Super. 2015). Moreover, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proof by wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 

A.2d 873 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717 (Pa. 

Super. 2014), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate 

court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Rogal, 120 A.3d 994 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). 

 Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 

possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer’s number. The 

relevant statute provides as follows: 

(a) General rule.--No person shall possess a firearm which has 

had the manufacturer’s number integral to the frame or receiver 

altered, changed, removed or obliterated. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a). “Where a case involves the proper construction of a 

statute, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. T.J.W., 114 A.3d 1098, 1103 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (citing Octave ex rel. Octave v. Walker, 103 A.3d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 

2014)). 

 Appellant avers that the crime has a mens rea requirement, although 

he acknowledges that section 6110.2(a) “does not express a mens rea

element.” Appellant’s Brief at 44. Rather, he posits that he was prosecuted 

and convicted as though this firearm offense is a strict liability crime. He 

contends there was insufficient evidence presented to prove beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that he acted with the requisite guilty knowledge or 

criminal intent. Id. at 49. 

 The Commonwealth submits that there is no mens rea requirement in 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a). Rather, it maintains that it was required to prove 

only that Appellant possessed a firearm, which had an altered, changed, 

removed, or obliterated manufacturer’s number, and it did so. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 31. 

 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that omission of 

any mention of criminal intent from a criminal statute should not be read as 

dispensing with it. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 

(1952). Indeed: 

[t]his rule of construction reflects the basic principle that 

“wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.” [Morissette,] 

at 252, 72 S.Ct. 240. As Justice Jackson explained, this principle 

is “as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief 

in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty 

of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” Id., 

at 250, 72 S.Ct. 240. The “central thought” is that a defendant 

must be “blameworthy in mind” before he can be found guilty, a 

concept courts have expressed over time through various terms 

such as mens rea, scienter, malice aforethought, guilty 

knowledge, and the like. Id., at 252, 72 S.Ct. 240; 1 W. 

LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1, pp. 332–333 (2d ed. 

2003). Although there are exceptions, the “general rule” is that 

a guilty mind is “a necessary element in the indictment and proof 

of every crime.” United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251, 

42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). We therefore generally 

“interpret criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter 

requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not 

contain them.” United States v. X–Citement Video, Inc., 513 

U.S. 64, 70, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994).
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Elonis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015). Our 

state law parallels these precepts. This Court recently reitereated: 

Although the statute does not contain an express culpability 

requirement, this does not mean the legislature intended to 

dispense with the element of criminal intent. See 

Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 592 Pa. 262, 924 A.2d 636, 

638–39 (2007) (mere absence of express mens rea requirement 

in statutory crime is not indicative of legislative intent to impose 

strict liability (citations omitted)). Rather, “there is a longstanding tradition, which is reflected in the plain language of § 

302, that criminal liability is not to be imposed absent some level 

of culpability.” Id. at 639. 

Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 1149 (Pa. 2014)). 

 Appellant argued at trial and maintains on appeal that the 

Commonwealth was required to prove that he “had some knowledge that the 

serial number was obliterated.” Appellant’s Brief at 42; N.T., 7/30/14, at 

12. We hearken back to Elonis, where the High Court stated: 

This is not to say that a defendant must know that his conduct is 

illegal before he may be found guilty. The familiar maxim 

“ignorance of the law is no excuse” typically holds true. Instead, 

our cases have explained that a defendant generally must “know 

the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense,” 

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 608, n. 3, 114 S.Ct. 

1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), even if he does not know that 

those facts give rise to a crime. 

Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2009. 

 The trial court held that the statute clearly lacks an intent 

requirement. The court cited the laboratory report entered into evidence at 

trial that the firearm was in good working condition and that the serial 
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number had been obliterated from the pistol’s frame. Trial Court Opinion, 

2/27/15, at 19. The trial court stated that the gun was concealed in 

Appellant’s front pocket, “and the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] was at least reckless in possessing a firearm with an 

altered manufacturer’s number.” Id. at 20. 

 Section 6110.2 does not specify the degree of culpability, or mens rea, 

required to sustain a conviction. Section 302 of the Crimes Code, however, 

provides the following guidance: 

Culpability required unless otherwise provided.--When the 

culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense 

is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person 

acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c) (emphasis added). Intentionally, knowingly, and 

recklessly, in turn, are defined as follows: 

(b) Kinds of culpability defined.-- 

(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a 

material element of an offense when: 

(i) if the element involves the nature of his 

conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious 

object to engage in conduct of that nature or 

to cause such a result; and 

(ii) if the element involves the attendant 

circumstances, he is aware of the existence of 

such circumstances or he believes or hopes 

that they exist. 

(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material 

element of an offense when: 
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(i) if the element involves the nature of his 

conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is 

aware that his conduct is of that nature or that 

such circumstances exist; and 

(ii) if the element involves a result of his 

conduct, he is aware that it is practically 

certain that his conduct will cause such a 

result. 

(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material 

element of an offense when he consciously disregards a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element 

exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 

such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and 

intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known 

to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the 

standard of conduct that a reasonable person would 

observe in the actor’s situation. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(1–3). 

 We find that the evidence was sufficient. The Crimes Code required 

the Commonwealth to establish culpability to sustain a conviction for 

possession of a firearm with an altered, changed, removed, or obliterated 

manufacturer’s number. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2. The Crimes Code also 

required that the Commonwealth demonstrate that Appellant acted 

intentionally, knowingly, or1 recklessly with respect to the altered 

manufacturer’s number on the firearm. Here, the testimony from the 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The word “or” is given its normal disjunctive meaning unless it produces 

an unreasonable result. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 663 A.2d 746 (Pa. 

Super. 1995); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). Thus, the Commonwealth had to show 

that Appellant’s actions were either intentional, knowing, or reckless. 
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suppression hearing was incorporated at trial. N.T., 7/30/14, at 9. That 

testimony by Officers Messer and Coleman established that Appellant ran 

from police and refused to stop upon direction to do so. N.T., 4/22/14, at 

13, 29. Appellant continued to run from police after he fled into an 

apartment building and entered a third party’s apartment against her will. 

Id. at 13–16. In the ensuing pat-down, police detected a firearm concealed 

in Appellant’s right front jeans pocket. N.T., 4/22/14, at 45–46, 57–58. At 

trial, the Commonwealth admitted, without objection by Appellant, the 

laboratory report confirming that the serial number, in fact, had been 

obliterated from the frame of the gun.2 N.T., 7/30/14, at 9. As noted by 

the trial court, the inferences from these facts established that Appellant 

illegally secreted a weapon with an obliterated manufacturer’s number in his 

pants pocket. Thus, we agree that Appellant was “at least reckless” in 

possessing a firearm with an altered manufacturer’s number. Trial Court 

Opinion, 2/27/15, at 20. Therefore, we find the evidence sufficient to 

sustain the conviction. 

 Appellant’s second issue asserts that the trial court erred in failing to 

grant suppression of the gun. 

In evaluating a suppression ruling, we consider the evidence of 

the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and any 

____________________________________________ 

2

 The laboratory report also indicated that serial number grinding 

restoration techniques revealed the original serial number. N.T., 7/30/14, at 

9. 
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evidence of the defendant that is uncontradicted when examined 

in the context of the record. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 

A.3d 325, 330 (Pa. Super. 2012). This Court is bound by the 

factual findings of the suppression court where the record 

supports those findings and may only reverse when the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Id. 

Commonwealth v. Haynes, 116 A.3d 640, 644 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Moreover, our Supreme Court in In re L.G., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013), 

clarified that the scope of review of orders granting or denying motions to 

suppress is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 

Here, the suppression hearing post-dates the filing date of L.G., which was 

held to be prospective; thus, L.G. applies to this case. Commonwealth v. 

Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

 Appellant maintains that as soon as police officers identified 

themselves as law enforcement and ordered Appellant to stop, he was seized 

as a matter of law. Appellant’s Brief at 22. He contends police did not have 

reasonable suspicion to stop him because they lacked specific and articulable 

facts to believe that he was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 23. Further, 

Appellant contends that a number of the trial court’s factual findings are not 

supported by the record. First, he challenges the trial court’s statement that 

the building Appellant subsequently entered was the very building that the 

police officers were investigating for drug activity. Appellant’s Brief at 27. 

Instead, Appellant avers that Officer Messer testified that although the 

housing project of Sandusky Court was the subject of his investigation, his 

commander “never specified a particular building.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. 
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 Second, Appellant refers to the trial court’s claim that Appellant “ran 

into the building after leaving his companions.” Appellant’s Brief at 27 

(citing Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/15, at 12). Rather, he suggests this is 

belied by Officer Messer’s testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 27–28 (citing N.T., 

4/22/14, at 29). 

 Third, Appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that Appellant 

separated himself from his companions and quickly entered the apartment 

building in response to police presence in the area. Appellant’s Brief at 28. 

Instead, Appellant cites cases that he alleges support his claim that where 

the incident was at night, police were in plain clothes in an unmarked car, 

without sirens or lights, and in a high crime area, a seizure is not supported 

by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Appellant’s Brief at 28–29. 

 The Commonwealth maintains that it is well settled that a police 

officer’s observation of an individual in a high crime area, coupled with that 

person’s flight upon observing the officer, combine to establish reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Commonwealth’s Brief at 17–18. In 

addition, the Commonwealth points out that Appellant failed to acknowledge 

that Officer Messer testified at the suppression hearing that he yelled, 

“Pittsburgh Police, stop!” but Appellant continued to run away. Id. at 15. 

Moreover, the Commonwealth disagreed that whether police had reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity at the moment they yelled “stop” is not the 

critical issue, as suggested by Appellant. Id. at 17; Appellant’s Brief at 23. 
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 The Commonwealth contends that even before Officer Messer knocked 

on the door to Apartment 209, he heard yelling inside and confirmed that 

Appellant had forced his way inside; thus, police had probable cause to 

believe that Appellant had committed an unlawful entry. Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 20. The Commonwealth asserts that Appellant’s motion to suppress 

the firearm recovered during the pat-down search following his arrest was 

properly denied, regardless of whether it constituted an illegal seizure for 

Officer Messer to identify himself as a police officer and order Appellant to 

stop as Appellant ran up the internal stairs of the building. Id. at 21. Thus, 

the Commonwealth avers that the motion to suppress was properly denied, 

albeit on a basis other than that found by the suppression court. 

Alternatively, the Commonwealth alleges that the suppression court properly 

concluded that the police action did not constitute an illegal seizure. 

 The trial court held that there was no evidence in the record to support 

a finding that Appellant “was seized at any moment prior to the time that 

the officers ordered him to stop in the stairwell of the building.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 2/27/15, at 11. The court found that the officers did not exit their 

vehicle until observing Appellant “behaving suspiciously in the window of the 

second landing of the building.” Id. The trial court stated, “[T]here was 

absolutely no interaction between [Appellant] and the officers until the 

moment Officers Messer and Coleman entered the building and yelled 

‘Pittsburgh Police, stop’ in the stairwell.” Id. Thus, it rejected Appellant’s 
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claim that he was pursued at any point prior to when he entered the 

stairwell. 

 As to Appellant’s assertion that he was unlawfully seized because 

police had no justification to stop him, the trial court stated that under the 

totality of the circumstances, police had reasonable suspicion to stop him. 

In support, the trial court cited the following: 1) Appellant was in an 

extremely high crime area, 2) he stood in front of the very building that was 

the subject of numerous recent drug-trafficking complaints from residents, 

3) Officer Messer immediately recognized Appellant as having had a recent 

gun arrest, 4) the officer knew Appellant did not reside in Sandusky Court, 

5) Appellant was the only person in the group to act nervously and separate 

himself, and 6) Appellant ran or moved quickly into the building. Trial Court 

Opinion, 2/27/15, at 12. 

 The trial court stated that while there may not have been direct 

evidence that Appellant recognized the undercover vehicle as a police 

vehicle, “the totality of the circumstances, as well as the reasonable 

inferences drawn from the evidence, strongly demonstrate” that Appellant 

was aware that the vehicle was occupied by police. Trial Court Opinion, 

2/27/15, at 13. The trial court held that police did not have a mere “hunch” 

that criminal activity was afoot; rather, they had specific and articulable 

facts. Id. at 14. In the alternative, assuming arguendo that Appellant was 

subjected to an unlawful frisk, the trial court held that “at the point when 
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[Appellant] was frisked and the firearm recovered, the officers had probable 

cause to arrest [Appellant] for criminal trespass, if not burglary, and the gun 

inevitably would have been discovered . . . .” Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/15, 

at 15. 

 Interactions between citizens and police officers in the realm of search 

and seizure law require different levels of justification “depending upon the 

nature of the interaction and whether or not the citizen is detained.” 

Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 2000). The 

three levels of interaction are: mere encounter, investigative detention, and 

custodial detention. Id. 

 A mere encounter can be any formal or 

informal interaction between an officer and a citizen, 

but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a

citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that it 

carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. 

 In contrast, an investigative detention, by 

implication, carries an official compulsion to stop and 

respond, but the detention is temporary, unless it 

results in the formation of probable cause for arrest, 

and does not possess the coercive conditions 

consistent with a formal arrest. Since this 

interaction has elements of official compulsion it 

requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. In 

further contrast, a custodial detention occurs when

the nature, duration and conditions of an 

investigative detention become so coercive as to be, 

practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an 

arrest. 

[Dehart] (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is 

able to articulate specific observations which, in 
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conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from

those observations, led him reasonably to conclude,

in light of his experience, that criminal activity was 

afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in 

that activity. Therefore, this Court must make an 

objective inquiry, namely, whether the facts 

available to the officer at the moment of the 

intrusion warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 

belief that the action taken was appropriate. 

Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916, 922 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 “To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level 

of an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a 

matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person 

involved.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 

(Pa. Super. 2002). 

To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court 

must consider all the circumstances surrounding the

encounter to determine whether the demeanor and 

conduct of the police would have communicated to a 

reasonable person that he or she was not free to 

decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate 

the encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry 

must be whether, considering the circumstances 

surrounding the incident, a reasonable [person] 

innocent of any crime, would have thought he was 

being restrained had he been in the defendant’s 

shoes. 

Id. at 1201-1202 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Tam Thanh Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657, 664–665 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). 

 We conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to 

suppress. In assessing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to 

justify an investigatory detention, we must consider the totality of the 
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circumstances. Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 893 (Pa. Super. 

2012). While mere flight is not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion, 

Commonwealth v. Martinez, 588 A.2d 513, 514 (Pa. Super. 1991), fleeing 

from an officer may constitute the basis for reasonable suspicion in certain 

instances, as a “combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may 

warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Commonwealth v. 

Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 772 (Pa. Super. 2014). Additionally, the court must 

afford weight to an officer’s perception of the circumstances in light of the 

officer’s experience. Id. at 773. 

 In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), the United States 

Supreme Court held that a police officer is justified in reasonably suspecting 

that an individual is involved in criminal activity when that individual: (1) is 

present in a high crime area, as here, and (2) engages in unprovoked, 

headlong flight after noticing the police. Id. at 124–125.3 Accordingly, 

based upon the foregoing, we reject Appellant’s claim that the suppression 

court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The totality of the 

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3

 In Wardlow, a four-car police caravan was investigating drug activity in 

an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Wardlow, 528 

U.S. at 121. One of the officers observed the defendant holding an opaque 

bag but none of the officers observed any specific indications that the 

defendant was in possession of contraband. When the defendant saw the 

police, he immediately fled. Id. at 122. The police apprehended him and 

during a pat-down search for weapons, recovered a gun. The Supreme 

Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, reversing 

the decisions to the contrary by the Illinois courts. Id. at 122–124. 
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circumstances demonstrates that the police officers, in fact, had reasonable 

suspicion to believe that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity when 

they began their pursuit of him following his flight in a high crime area. Id. 

At the time Appellant fled into the apartment, Officer Messer knew Appellant 

did not live in the area and testified that he believed Appellant was 

attempting to enter other apartments before entering Apartment 209. N.T., 

4/22/14, at 11–12. 

 Pittsburgh Police Officer Messer testified that at approximately 8:00 

p.m. on October 28, 2013, he and his two partners were patrolling Sandusky 

Court because police had received numerous complaints from residents 

within the preceding ten days that open-air drug trafficking was taking place 

in the area, specifically in front of building 1634. N.T., 4/22/14, at 4-5, 21-

24, 31. As they entered Sandusky Court in their unmarked vehicle,4 Officer 

Messer observed a group of five to seven men, including Appellant, standing 

in front of building 1634. Id. at 5–7, 20, 26–27, 51. Officer Messer testified 

that he had previous dealings with Appellant and knew that he had a prior 

firearm arrest and did not live on Sandusky Court; rather, Appellant resided 

in the Marshall-Shadeland area of Pittsburgh, which was five minutes away. 

Id. at 5, 26–27, 37, 50–51. As the officers drove by at a slow speed, 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Officer Messer admitted that the black Chevy Impala lacked police decals 

or markings, but he explained that given its regular presence in the area, 

many residents in the community were aware that it was a police car. N.T., 

4/22/14, at 6, 21, 24–25. 
J-A35018-15 

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Appellant looked quickly from side to side upon noticing the car and then 

separated himself from the other males in the group. Id. at 5–6, 21, 27, 

29, 51. He then ran into building 1634 and closed the door behind him. Id. 

at 6–8, 29. Officer Messer testified that he could see Appellant on the 

second-floor landing through the window above the front door, moving “from 

left to right repeatedly in a frantic manner.” Id. at 9-12, 31, 36–37. 

Appellant was peering out of the window at police. Id. at 8–10. 

 Officers Messer and Coleman exited their vehicle and upon seeing 

Appellant fleeing up the stairs yelled, “Pittsburgh Police, stop!” N.T., 

4/22/14, at 12, 37, 39–41. Instead, Appellant entered Apartment 209 and 

locked it, and police heard yelling from inside the apartment. Id. at 13, 52. 

When police knocked on the door, it was opened by Marie Murrell, who was 

screaming at Appellant to leave her apartment. Id. at 42. Officer Messer 

observed a bulge in Appellant’s right jeans pocket, and “based on [the 

officer’s] training and experience from previous firearms arrests,” he 

believed the bulge was a firearm. Id. at 46. 

 Thus, in the alternative, even if Officer Messer did not have reasonable 

suspicion to believe that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity at the 

time the officer entered building 1634 and ordered Appellant to stop, 

Appellant’s subsequent actions of unlawfully entering an apartment gave 

Officer Messer probable cause to arrest Appellant, at the very least, for 
J-A35018-15 

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criminal trespass.5 Our Supreme Court’s analysis in Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 924 A.2d 618 (Pa. 2007), is instructive. In Jackson, a police 

officer approached the defendant on suspicion that he was gambling, in 

violation of the city code. Id. at 619. The defendant fled, despite the 

officer’s order to stop, and the officer pursued him. Id. When the officer 

caught up with him, the defendant assaulted the officer, and the defendant 

fled a second time. Id. at 620. While the Supreme Court determined that 

the initial pursuit by the police officer was not lawful, it reasoned that where 

a suspect commits a crime in the course of fleeing from an unlawful arrest, 

the pursuing officer has probable cause for an arrest for that crime: 

The initial illegality does not give the arrestee a free pass to 

commit new offenses without responsibility. Neither does that 

initial illegality “poison the tree,” preventing lawful police 

conduct thereafter—the new crimes are new trees, planted by 

[the arrestee], and the fruit that grows from them is not 

automatically tainted by the initial lack of probable cause. 

Id. at 621. For all of these reasons, we conclude the trial court properly 

denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Officer Messer testified that Appellant was going to be placed under arrest 

regardless of the presence of the gun in his pocket, due to his actions of 

forcing his way into Ms. Murrell’s apartment and locking the door. N.T., 

4/22/14, at 19, 54. Indeed, Appellant initially was charged, inter alia, with 

burglary. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/25/2016