Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org October 29, 2014

Via e-filing on www.regulations.gov

OSWER Docket, Attn: Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 EPA Docket Center, Mail Code 2822-1T, Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20460

RE : Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328

Dear Docket Clerk:

On July 31, 2014, in response to Executive Orde r 13650, the U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a request for information (RFI) relate d to potential revisions to its Risk Management Plan (RMP) regulation. In this RFI, EPA asks fo r information and data on specific rulemaking and policy options.

The Gas Processors Association (GPA) has serve d the U.S. energy industry since 1921 as an incorporated non-profit trade association. GPA is com posed of 130 corporate members that are engaged in the gathering and processing of natural gas into merchantable pipeline gas, commonly referred to in the industry as "midstream activities." Such processi ng includes the removal of impurities from the raw gas stream produced at the wellhead, as well as th e extraction for sale of natural gas liquid products (NGLs) such as ethane, propane, butane and natural gasoline. GPA members a ccount for more than 90percent of the NGLs produced in the United States from natural gas processing. GPA membercompanies fully share EPA’s commitment to workplace and community safety and support its efforts to identify revisions to its regulations which are “ necessary to meet the goal of preventing major chemical

accidents. ”

In the RFI, EPA requested detailed responses to que stions covering several topics. GPA is providing responses to certain questions applicable to our member’s activities and operations

.

II. Discussion and Request for Data

C. Items in OSHA’s RFI Relevant in EPA’s RMP Regulation

2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements

b. Would expanding the scope of the RMP reg ulation to require additional managementsystem elements, or expanding the scope of existing RMP management-system elements, improve the protection of human health and th e environment? Should EPA require safety culture assessments, job safety analyses, or any of the other new management system elements described above? If so, please describe the elements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with expanding the scope of the RMP regulation in this way, and any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider. WouldGPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 2 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org current staff at a facility be able to implement these additional elements or would new staff

need to be hired?

The GPA, in support of processing risk mitigati on, supports the enforcement of the current RMP rule as a first step. GPA does not believe additi onal elements need to be added to the current RMP regulation. The current regulation adequ ately covers the risks associated with gas processing and the midstream industry in general and are effective in driving industry performance. Since its inception, the existing RM P regulation has been effective in meeting its stated purpose of preventing catastrophic releases at subject midstream facilities. The proposed changes would be redundant to actions already taken by industry and could inadvertently undermine the flexibility the current rules allow for implementation at individual facilities. If the EPA is able to show through sufficient indust ry data that the proposed new elements are necessary to prevent or mitigate accidents, then GPA recommends the EPA work with industry to propose only non-prescriptive, performance-orient ed requirements allowing the appropriate flexibility for companies to address local needs and conditions.

c. In systems using management and metrics, how do facilities develop useful leading indicators? Do you track the frequency of events such as process upsets, accidental releases, and “near miss” incidents? Does tracking su ch events allow managers and employees to make changes that prevent accidental releases? What other metrics and indicators do you use, and how do they help prevent releases?

The development and tracking of leading process safety performance indicators would differ across the midstream industry as some ha ve adopted API Recommended Practice 754 and others use company-specific criteria. The size of the fa cility, resources available, and local conditions dictate what is meaningful for that organization to drive a culture of safety. The use of leading indicators to drive action are best left for site-by- site interpretation and implementation. It is not appropriate to require use of specific leading indi cators because they may not be relevant across the wide variety of RMP-regulated facilities. Each RMP-subject facility should be able to utilize facility-specific indicators to gauge the perform ance of their RMP program. Further, defining specific leading indicators could have the reverse ef fect of increasing risk by discouraging the facility to track and analyze meaningful data that keep safety awareness high and employees engaged.

e. Would expansion of the RMP employee part icipation provision to include requirements such as the SEMS II stop-work authority, or other efforts to involve employees in all management-system elements, e nhance protection of human health and the environment?

GPA member companies have programs in place which address stop work authority. Employees are already involved in the implementation of a facility’s RMP program el ements as required by the Employee Participation element in 40 C.F. R. § 68.83. GPA believes the current employee participation requirements and all other RMP elements are appropriate for preventing catastrophic releases and protecting human health and the environment. Lastly, because RMPsubject facilities are already obligated to provide a safe facility that minimizes the consequences of accidental releases as required by EPA’s Gen eral Duty Clause [112(r)(1)], adding a stop-work authority or any of the other management-system elements would be duplicative and unnecessary to protect human health and the environment.

f. Are there any other management-system elements in the existing RMP regulation that EPA should expand or clarify (e.g., a new requi rement that facilities perform a root-cause analysis for incidents under § 68.81, clarify PHA and hazard review requirements, require more frequent PHA and hazard review updates, strengthen contractor requirements, or require pre-startup reviews prior to all process startups)? If so, please describe theGPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 3 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org additional requirements, the safety benefi ts, any economic impacts associated with expanding the RMP regulation in this way, and any special circumstances involving small

entities that EPA should consider.

The existing RMP regulation is a performance-bas ed program, which currently has appropriate elements including incident investigation. The GPA member companies believe that the current RMP elements are effective and have driven pro cess improvements to organizations as they have been implemented and engrained in their opera ting cultures. Expanding the existing elements with additional, specific requirements, would di minish the flexibility of a performance-based standard and would deter the ability for organizations to continually modernize and enhance their processes as safety cultures evolve and technologies improve.

3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally

Accepted Good Engineering Practices

a. What does your facility use as a definition for RAGAGEP? Would adding a definition for RAGAGEP to the RMP rule improve understa nding of RMP requirements and prevent accidental releases? If so, what specific definition for RAGAGEP should EPA add to the RMP rule? What would be the economic impacts of adding such a definition?

GPA member companies do not support defining th e term RAGAGEP becau se it would take away the performance based intent of the rule and b ecome prescriptive. The rule must be flexible enough to allow industry to identify and select the most appropriate standards and practices for their covered process(es). RAG EGEP is widely accepted as industry consensus, industry guidance, and company specific internal operating standards. It is a flexible concept that must allow for each facility to det ermine its own site specific re quirements through learnings and experiences to help prevent accidental releases.

4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements to Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment

a. Should EPA amend the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP rule to explicitly cover all safety critical process equipment? If so, what type(s) of equipment? Did you identify safety critical equipment not explicit ly covered under § 68.73 that is critical to process safety? If so, how did your facility dete rmine that the equipment was safety critical, and does your facility treat the equipment as if it were RMP-covered for safety or other reasons? Did you identify the equipment as sa fety-critical through an RMP process hazard analysis?

EPA should not amend the mechanical integrity (M I) provisions to explicitly cover all safety critical process equipment. GPA members curren tly implement mechanical integrity programs to ensure equipment is maintained appropriately and suitable for service, including safety critical equipment. There are existing industry st andards/recommended practices on mechanical integrity, thus the RMP scope/list as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 does not need to be expanded. Member companies already use engineering analyses and RAGAGEP when considering their individual MI programs. GPA believes that e quipment integrity, including equipment that is critical to protecting human health and the envi ronment, is adequately managed by companies implementing existing MI prevention program requirements.

b. Please provide any data or information on accidental releases, near misses, or other safety-related incidents related to the mechanic al integrity of safety-critical equipment not covered under § 68.73.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 4 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org No comment. GPA is a trade association rep resenting multiple companies and cannot respond to a facility-specific question.

c. Would expanding the scope of § 68.73 to ex plicitly cover the integrity of all equipment critical to process safety make it more likely to prevent accidental releases?

Currently 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 provides a well-de fined scope of equipment whose mechanical integrity is essential to prevent loss of primary c ontainment. Expanding this well-defined scope by adding a performance requirement to include all equipment identified as “critical to process safety” without formally defining this term c ould result in significant economic impacts without a corresponding reduction in risk. GPA believes the ex isting mechanical integrity requirements are appropriate for preventing accidental releases and protecting human health and the environment.

5. Require Owners and Operators to Manage Organizational Changes

a. What do you consider to be an organizationa l change within the context of process safety management practices? For example, would you consider the following, or similar, changes to be organizational changes: reducing the num ber of operators in a shift; changing from 5- day to 7-day operations; changing from 8-hour to 12-hour operator shifts; replacing a unit manager; reducing the facility operations or maintenance budget; relocating a technical group to a remote corporate location; changing a supervisory or compensation structure; or hiring contractors to do the work formerl y performed by employees of the regulated facility? Are there other examples of organizatio nal changes that may be relevant to safety management practices?

GPA believes the existing language already supports the concept t hat organizational changes that affect covered processes fall within the scope of the M anage Organizational Changes (MOC) element for PSM-covered facilities. In a March 31, 2009, standard interpretation letter from Richard E. Fairfax, the Director of Enfo rcement Programs at OSHA, OSHA stated that organization changes, where they relate to a facility ’s process, process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures, are part of the MOC process.

c. Would clarifying § 68.75 with an explicit requirement that employers manage organizational changes prevent worker injuries and fatalities? What would be the economic impact of such a clarification? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with respect to this option?

GPA believes the existing language already supports the concept t hat organizational changes that affect covered processes fall within the scope of the MOC element for PS M-covered facilities.

e. What do you consider to be the best safety practices concerning management of organizational change?

No comment. GPA is a trade association rep resenting multiple companies and cannot respond to a facility-specific question.

f. Please provide any data or information on a ccidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving the failure to manage organizational change. Would following management-of-change procedures und er § 68.75 prevent these incidents?

No comment. GPA is a trade association rep resenting multiple companies and cannot respond to a facility-specific question.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 5 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org 6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits

c. Would revising § 68.58 and § 68.79 to re quire owners and operators of RMP-regulated facilities to use a third party for compliance au dits help prevent accidental releases? What would be the economic impacts of revising § 68.58 and 68.79 in this way (e.g., typical consultant fees, additional work hours re quired, special circumstances involving small entities, etc.)?

GPA does not support requiring third-party auditors to conduct compliance audits. GPA believes the performance aspect of complying with 40 C.F.R. § 68.58 and § 68.79 provide flexibility to member companies to conduct audits using either internal or external resources. One of the benefits of this flexibility is the use of company personnel in audits to develop an employee’s RMP knowledge and promote best practices across the company’s RMP-covered processes. Use of competent company auditors, who have both technical and firsthand working knowledge of a company’s operations and are independent from the RMP-covered process being audited, will result in a more comp rehensive, effective, and meaningful audit than using a third party.

In addition, there are an insufficient number of competent third-party auditors available to conduct audits at all RMP-covered processes. Requiring third-party auditors could impact a RMP-covered facility’s ability to meet § 68.58 and § 68.79 requirements. Also, requiring a competent third-party auditor would result in sign ificant cost to the regulated entity.

d. Should EPA revise § 68.58 and § 68.79 to require owners and operators to use compliance auditors (internal or third party) with certain minimum credentials or certifications? If so, what minimum credentials or certifications should the Agency require?

EPA should not require certain minimum credentials or certifications for RMP compliance auditors. Requiring a “certified” auditor does not necessarily mean an auditor has the requisite knowledge and experience to conduct a RMP compliance audit. Many GPA member company’s RMP auditors have significant exp erience in RMP, operations, engineering, maintenance/reliability, and process control automa tion in the gas processing industry. In addition, many GPA member companies will use subject matter experts to focus on specific areas of the RMP program to evaluate compliance.

e. How should owners/operators of RMP-regula ted facilities address the findings of the third-party auditor? Should EPA amend th e RMP rule to require owners/operators to document how they addressed each of the fi ndings of the third-party auditor? Should a timeframe for addressing those findings be in cluded in the RMP regulation? Should EPA include a procedure for how an owner/operator may appeal the findings of the third-party

auditor?

GPA does not support use of third-party auditors as stated in response above to question “d.”

D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information

1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis

a. Should EPA require a safer alternatives opti ons analysis either as a new prevention program element, as part of the existing PHA/ Hazard Review element, or as a separate new requirement under CAA section 112(r)?

GPA member companies and the midstream industry, in general, have a strong safety performance record. This can be attributed to complying with existing hazard evaluationGPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 6 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org requirements. EPA should not require an additional “options” analysis to consider safer alternatives, but rather should allow companies to apply existing hazard evaluation methods as appropriate to their RMP-covered process to pr event accidental relea ses. Inherently safer approaches to midstream industry processes have b een, and will continue to be, considered by facilities as a matter of course, and the facility operators are in the best position to understand the full ramifications of implementing I nherently Safer Technology (IST). GPA advocates continued enforcement of current hazard evaluation processes as required by existing regulations rather than implementing additional requirements for evaluating ISTs.

b. How should safer alternatives be define d if it were to be a requirement under CAA section 112(r) regulations? What specifically sh ould a safer alternatives analysis require and how would this differ from what is already required under other provisions of the

RMP?

As described in the response to question “a” above, GPA advocates continued enforcement of current hazard evaluation processes as required by existing regulations rather than implementing additional requirements for evaluating inherently safer technologies.

c. How should industries determine if a safer al ternative exists for their particular process?

What safer alternative chemicals are availa ble for the listed RMP chemicals and for

ammonium nitrate?

Gas processing plant technology has been consiste nt over the past several decades. GPA member companies consider alternatives as needed to ensu re safe and efficient operations. The solvents and solids used in gas processing are already i nherently safe and are not on the EPA list of RMP regulated toxic and flammable materials. Th e actual products and by products themselves (natural gas, NGL’s and Hydroge n Sulfide) from gas processing are hazardous and are covered by the RMP regulation. Process Hazard Analyses are required for EPA RMP Program 3 compliance and RMP-subject facilities have made th e currently used pro cesses safer through a rigorous hazard analysis review. GPA urges the EPA to enforce existing RMP elements rather than add additional requirements to evaluate and implement IST.

d. What should facilities consider when determ ining if such technologies, when identified, are effective, available, and economically justif ied for their particular process or facility? Can the RMP national database, Lessons Lear ned Information System or other federal databases be structured to promote the exchan ge of information both within industry and with other stakeholders on potentially safer technologies?

GPA is a trade association representing multip le companies and cannot respond to a facilityspecific question. However, GPA does not endo rse using national databases or other systems to openly share potentially proprietary technology or trade secrets.

e. If EPA were to require facilities to undertake an evaluation of the potential to incorporate safer alternatives, what minimum criteria should this evaluation be required to meet? How would the evaluation determine if a particular alternative is feasible, cost effective and results in less risk? What requirements or incentives, if any, should there be for implementation of identified safer alternat ives? How should any such requirements be

structured and enforced?

GPA is a trade association representing multip le companies and cannot respond to a facilityspecific question.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 7 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org f. Should EPA require facilities to use a safer alternatives evaluation method such as the CCPS Inherently Safer Technology Checklist?

GPA agrees the CCPS IST checklist is a good to ol for RMP-subject facilities to use when considering safer alternatives. However, EPA shoul d not require facilities to use a specific safer alternatives evaluation method. Companies and/ or trade organizations may develop other tools for specific plants or industries to use. As such, owners/operators are in the best position to develop and/or use tools appropriate for their RM P-covered process. Furthermore, requiring a specific checklist could diminish innovation and continuous improvement in developing and using

evaluation tools and resources.

g. How should EPA and facilities address the ri sk tradeoffs that could result when changing a process to incorporate safer alternatives?

GPA urges the EPA to not specify how a com pany would evaluate risk and benefits when evaluating safer alternatives due to the broad nat ure of RMP-covered pro cesses and operations.

h. Should EPA consider requirements similar to those used by the State of New Jersey or Contra Costa County, California, and if so, why? What have been the benefits of such programs in risk reduction or process sa fety for the facilities covered under these requirements? What have been the limitations or drawbacks of these programs?

The GPA has no comment on these questions.

i. If EPA were to develop regulatory requireme nts for safer alternatives, which facilities should be subject to those requirements? Sho uld all RMP facilities be subject to such requirements, or only ‘‘high risk’’ facilities, such as refineries and large chemical plants? How would ‘‘high risk’’ be defined? Are there particular processes or chemicals that should be targeted or prioritized for implementation of such requirements?

As described in the response to question “a” above, GPA advocates continued enforcement of current hazard evaluation processes as required by existing regulations rather than implementing additional requirements for evaluating ISTs. An overwhelming majority of gas processing facilities are remotely located, reducing the possi ble exposure of potentia l offsite receptors. Further, for those facilities removing toxic Hydroge n Sulfide, this gas is either burned to Sulfur

Dioxide or recovered as elemen tal Sulfur onsite in these remote locations to comply with EPA emission regulations.

j. What barriers exist for industry to adopt saf er alternatives? What incentives can be used by government to have facilities implement safer alternatives? Should the Agency provide special recognition to companies that implement safer alternatives?

The GPA has no comment on these questions.

k. What are other options (other than regulator y requirements) exist to encourage facilities to investigate, develop or implement saf er alternatives and how can EPA further these

efforts?

Inherently safer approaches to midstream indust ry processes have been, and will continue to be, considered by facilities as a matter of course, and the facility operators are in the best position to investigate, develop, or implement IST without government agency intervention.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 8 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org l. If RMP facilities are required to perf orm safer alternative options analyses and implementation plans, should EPA require that the analyses and/or implementation plans be submitted to the Agency? Should EPA have any role in approving such analyses or plans? In lieu of an approval, can EPA promot e safer alternatives through reporting and the dissemination of information on potentially applicable practices?

As described in the response to question “a” above, GPA advocates continued enforcement of current hazard evaluation processes as required by existing regulations rather than implementing additional requirements for evaluating ISTs. GPA is concerned that the high number of analyses submitted to the agency for approval would be overwhelming and could compromise safety by lengthy delays in the approval process. Therefor e, GPA urges EPA to not include a requirement to submit an options analysis to the agency for approval. GPA member companies are committed to operating safely and preventing accidental releases of flammable products.

m. If RMP facilities are required to consider saf er alternative options, what role should local communities have in these analyses? Should fac ilities be required to disclose these analyses or recommendations resulting from such analyses to local authorities or the public prior to the selection of options? Are there any other disclosure options that will ensure that decisions on implementing safer technologies are made with transparency? Are there any means of oversight other than disclosure that would ensure that safer alternatives analyses are thorough and implementation decisions are appropriate?

As described in the response to question “a” above, GPA advocates continued enforcement of current hazard evaluation processes as required by existing regulations rather than implementing additional requirements for evaluating ISTs. Deci sions regarding safer alternatives are typically confidential business decisions involving experi enced operations, engineering, safety, and management personnel. Disclosing options analysi s information to third-parties, including the public, would be difficult because those individuals may not understand the context underlying any decisions that were made.

n. What would be the economic impacts of req uiring facilities to analyze safer alternative options? Are there any special circumstance s involving small entities that EPA should

consider?

GPA urges EPA to not require an options analysis. There is a potentially significant cost in performing formal options analyses and this could be excessively burdensome to smaller entities. Inherently safer approaches to midstream indust ry processes have been, and will continue to be, considered by facilities as a matter of course, and the facility operators are in the best position to understand the full ramifications of implementing IST. GPA advocates continued enforcement of current hazard evaluation processes as required by existing regulations rather than implementing additional requirements for evaluating ISTs.

3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances

a. Should facilities be required to install monito ring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMP regulated substances, or the conditions that could lead to such a release? Should the systems provide for continuous detectio n and monitoring? How should any such requirements be crafted to provide ap propriate site-specific flexibility?

GPA does not agree that facilities should be explicitl y required to install monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMP regulated s ubstances. Rather, inst allation of monitoring equipment/sensors should be and are made by exp erienced personnel based on the facility’s risk assessment from process hazard analysis (PHA) wh ich considers factors such as quantity ofGPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 9 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org flammable products that could be released, pr oximity of off-site receptors, and emergency response capabilities.

c. Should an automated mechanism to noti fy, alert and warn th e local responders and surrounding public of an incident be considered as part of any detection and monitoring system requirement? If so, how should the pote ntial for false alarms be addressed within such a requirement?

GPA urges EPA to not require an automated mec hanism to notify, alert, and warn the local responders and surrounding public. The existing RMP Prevention Program elements are effective in driving industry performance and s hould be supported by prop er site implementation and competent enforcement. Automated notific ation of alarms/sensor activation could inadvertently cause numerous false alarms and responses and take away resources from where they may be needed in the event of a real emergency. GPA member companies use emergency procedures as required by § 68.95 to notify the local responders when an actual emergency exists.

d. How can a requirement for automated de tection and monitoring systems be best coordinated with the community emergency response plan? What are the advantages/disadvantages between continuous monitoring conducted by automated systems in contrast to third-party alarm agencies?

As discussed in the response to question “c,” GPA urges EPA to not require an automated mechanism to notify, alert, and warn the local responders and surrounding public.

f. How would the significance and appropriate protective response action of the alarms/alerts be best communicated to respond ers and the public (including shelter-in-place and evacuations)?

As discussed in the response to question “c,” GPA member companies currently use emergency procedures as required by § 68.95 to notify the local responders when an actual emergency exists. In addition, these emergency plans are shared with local first responders wh ere they act as the primary responder to an emergency.

g. What involvement should LEPCs and SERCs have in the development of the emergency response plan, particularly with respect to what actions are to be taken in the event of an

incident where and alarm/alert is activated?

Currently, as required by § 68.95(c), LEPCs ma y request the emergency response plan developed under paragraph § 68.95(a)(1). The LEPC is directed to update the community emergency response plan with information from the facility emergency response plan. In addition, the owner or operator must promptly provide to the local emergency response officials, information necessary for developing and implementing the co mmunity emergency response plan when requested to do so. GPA member companies do not agree that any additional regulatory amendments are required to the RMP rule.

4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements

a. Would additional specifics on stationary source siting and occupancy siting under the RMP minimize the impacts of chemical accide nts to local communities? How should RMP stationary source siting requirements relate to OSHA PSM and other industry standards?

No, EPA is already clear on stationary source siti ng considerations as stat ed on pages 7-6 of EPA’s General Guidance for Risk Management Programs (40 C.F.R. Part 68). In that guidance,GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 10 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org EPA points out that “...there should be few inst ances where the scenarios considered for OSHA fail to address offsite impacts. A well-done PHA should identify all failure scenarios that could lead to significant exposure of workers, the pub lic, or the environment.” The GPA agrees with EPA’s view that existing PHA requirements a re appropriate for considering offsite impacts.

In addition, with respect to the midstream indus try, many GPA member companies operate RMPsubject facilities in remote areas near the gas produc tion source(s). The natural benefit of this is that any hazardous impacts to hum an health and the environment are minimized in the event of a loss of containment or release.

The primary hazard associated with the mids tream and LPG industry is the formation of a flammable hydrocarbon vapor cloud c aused by a release. Theref ore, OSHA requires a facility siting evaluation be performed during the facility’s process hazard analysis, which is essentially a stationary source siting evaluation. API RP 75 2 and 753 are the standards used to manage hazard risks to on-site facility personnel in a PSM regulated facility. Any additional EPA stationary source requirements should not duplic ate OSHA’s PSM standard requirements or API

RP 752 and 753 standards.

c. What information should EPA consider in th e development of stationary source buffer or

setback zones for different risks? How should EPA address siting when limited space is

available?

GPA recommends using consequence results from the site-specific facility sitings study to determine if any off-site receptors could be aff ected and whether a setback zone is necessary. GPA urges the EPA to not use the RMP*Comp anal ysis data for the Worst Case Scenario (WCS) because the results are overly conservative and present unrealistic impacts. An independent facility siting study presents a more realistic si mulation of an explosion, fire, and toxic release

hazards based on the same criteria used in the RMP*Comp equation, resulting in a practical safe radius, which could be used in determining buffer zones.

Regarding limited siting space, EPA should give consideration for the pro-active measures companies employ to minimize the risk and consequences of a catastrophic event. GPA points out that member companies focus heavily on reduci ng the likelihood of a catastrophic event from occurring, as well as, attempting to reduce the severity of a potential incident. Several of the proactive measures member companies employ are:

 Limiting on-site quantities and types of hazardous materials, where practical;

 Contain and control measures such as mechanical integrity programs, operating procedures, and operator training;

 Change management processes including pre-startup reviews;

 Emergency response training and equipment; and

 Installing appropriate safeguards to re duce the risk of a catastrophic event.

d. What administrative processes and controls sh ould be incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?

GPA urges EPA to not add any additional administr ative processes or controls to the stationary source siting requirements. There are several existing requirements in both the OSHA PSM and EPA RMP regulations that affect stationary source siting. For example, a stationary source’s initial process hazard analysis typically accounts for stationary source siting with respect to identified hazards and risks. Re-validation PHAs which are required every five (5) years per theGPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 11 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org current OSHA PSM standard and EPA’s RMP standard, study any modifications and/or incidents that occurred within the 5-year time period. Additionally, both operating and maintenance procedures and training help minimize potentia l human error during normal operations, start-up operations, start-up after turn-around operations, and maintenance operations. Also, a stationary source’s mechanical integrity program identifies all critical equipment and piping systems necessary to contain the hazard(s) while requiring specific inspection, testing, and preventative maintenance as recommended by the manufacturer or the owner/operator. EPA has not shown that the existing requirements listed above are inadequate for stationary source siting

considerations and that additional administra tive processes and controls are needed.

e. What safety and process devices, instrument s and controls should be incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?

GPA recommends that EPA not mandate specific safety and process devices, instruments and controls into stationary source siting requirem ents. GPA points out that member companies, and the midstream industry in general, already incor porate necessary safety devi ces, instruments, and controls at facilities based on site-specific cond itions through the hazard evaluation process. For example, gas, fire, and smoke detection and alarm sy stems provide early warning of any potential hazards. A stationary source’s relief and vent system protects against an unscheduled loss of containment. Instrumentation allows for contin uous monitoring of safety design limits and can provide early warning to operators of a process upset, and ultimately function independently to prevent the upset condition and loss of containm ent. Combining these systems with safety interlock systems (e.g., Emergency Shutdown Syst ems), which isolate areas where a loss of containment is suspected to minimize the hazard and risk to human health and the environment. Therefore, companies should be allowed to determ ine which devices, instruments, and controls are necessary for their specific facilities and should not be exp licitly specified in the RMP rule.

f. What criteria are appropriate for siting of occupancies (such as offices, control rooms, cafeterias, etc.) near an RMP-regulated process?

In regards to onsite siting requirements, these criteria are already considered under OSHA’s PSM Standard [29 C.F.R. §1910.119(e)]. Theref ore, GPA recommends EPA stay within its jurisdiction, which is off-site siting consid erations and default to OSHA’s PSM standard for onsite siting requirements.

g. How often should statio nary source siting be ev aluated for effectiveness? What criteria

should be used?

Prescribed scheduled evaluations are already a requirement under § 68.67(c)(5) for revalidation of a PHA and are also considered for significant modifications under the management of change element. GPA recommends EPA not make a separat e requirement for evaluating stationary siting on an interval different than for PHA revalidations . The criteria for cu rrent evaluations takes into account the follo wing considerations:

 A process modification which involves remo ving any structure or equipment which originally provided a barrier between the building(s) and the process in the event of an explosion or fire.

 An expansion which encroaches closer to the occupied building(s).

 An occupied building modification which ma y impact the structural integrity of the building set forth in API RP 752.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 12 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org h. What documentation should be required for evaluating stationary source siting

determinations?

GPA recommends that EPA not add additional docum entation requirements. The existing process safety information requirements for stationary source siting as part of a PHA is appropriate.

i. Is it appropriate to reflect the environm ental burden of the surrounding community in siting criteria for either new facilities or expansio ns within an existing site? Is it appropriate to consider chronic burdens or only burden s associated with accidental releases?

The EPA should not consider chronic burden to co mmunities in the RMP regulation, as there are other successful EPA regulations that cover chronic burdens.

j. What challenges would the agency face in sp ecifying uniform siting requirements for the wide variety of covered sites?

The EPA should not specify uniform siting requirements that would overstep state and local zoning processes, which is the purview of lo cal, state, or tribal organizations.

k. If EPA mandated siting criteria, how shou ld EPA account for local zoning codes when establishing such criteria? Would setting fe deral requirements overstep into the normal state and local zoning processes, or would it act as a supplemental measure ensuring minimal safety standards across the country?

The EPA should not be involved with zoning issues, wh ich is the purview of local, state, or tribal organizations.

l. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional siting requirements? Are there any special circumstances involving sma ll entities that EPA should consider with respect to siting requirements?

Requiring additional siting requirements for both new and existing facilities could result in significant cost to the regulated entity.

6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements

a. Are the RMP incident investigation requirements too narrowly focused? Would identifying a broader range of incidents requiring investigation (e.g., near misses) help prevent additional accidental releases? Pl ease provide specific examples where possible. EPA requests information on alternative definition s or incident classifications that could be included within the rule’s incident investigation requirements.

The incident investigation requirements are ap propriate and no additional requirements are needed. GPA interprets the existing criteria for conducting an investigation as including near misses. In § 68.60, an owner/op erator must “investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic relea se.” [emphasis added]. However, GPA does not recommend expanding the criteria to include proce ss upsets. Many process upsets affect product specification requirements or opera tional efficiencies but do not rise to the level of a catastrophic release near miss. While GPA member compani es generally perform investigations of process upsets, requiring a formal incident investigation under § 68.60 would require significant resources and provide little additional value than th e investigation practices already performed. In addition, there are already existing local, state, and federal reporting requirements for reporting process upsets depending upon the en vironmental media that is affected.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 13 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org b. Are there any data or information on process upsets, near misses or other incidents that were not required to be investigated, but wh ere an investigation and resulting changes in management systems might p revent accidental releases?

GPA is a trade association representing multip le companies and cannot respond to a facilityspecific question.

d. Would a specific time frame for incident in vestigations to be completed benefit overall safety? What should be the basis for establis hing an appropriate timeframe requirement for an incident investigation to be completed? What are the challenges and limitations to completing an incident investigation within a specified timeframe?

GPA does not endorse requiring specific time frames for completing incident investigations. A limitation to this specified timeline approach woul d require companies to focus on complying with defined timelines rather than performing an investi gation using a level of rigor commensurate

with the incident risk.

e. Are there benefits from requiring that investigations must be performed even in cases where the owner/operator elects to decommission the process involved, where the process is destroyed in the incident, or where a facility de termines there were no actual or potential off-site consequences?

GPA member companies acknowledge there is bene fit to conducting investigations on incidents meeting the criteria in § 68.60. GPA does not recommend changing the criteria nor revising the RMP rule to add additional investigation requirements.

g. Would a modification of the accident history reporting requirements to reflect a broader range of incidents being investigated assist in disseminating lessons learned across industry?

The accident history reporting requirement s are appropriate and broadening the reporting criteria would be burdensome and unnecessary. While many GPA member companies develop lessons learned documents from investigations and disseminate them internally across the company, there is limited value gained from sharin g across industry. Many lessons learned are associated with company-specific processes, procedures, and tasks and are not necessarily transferrable to other companies within the same industry. GPA does acknowledge that lessons learned from infrequent catastrophic incident s may have broader application to other companies in the same industry and there may be value in sharing these learnings. However, these are typically unique, catastrophic incidents and the approach to sharing l essons learned on less

severe incidents does not have the same value or applicability, especia lly across different industry

segments.

h. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses to conduct a full compliance audit under § 68.58 and § 68.79?

GPA does not recommend conducting a full compli ance audit for RMP-reportable incidents and near misses. The incident investigation requirem ents in § 68.60 require facilities to determine “the factors that contributed to the incident” and develop “any recommendations resulting from the investigation.” The investigation will identify if any RMP program elemen ts were deficient or contributed to the incident and the facility will develop recommendations to correct those deficiencies or strengthen the program elements . Requiring a compliance audit would provide no benefit and be duplicative to the incident investigation process.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 14 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org i. Is it appropriate for faciliti es to share the results of accident investigations with the local community or alternatively a summary of the accident, and its root cause? Is there an appropriate role for the local communi ty in conducting investigations?

GPA does not recommend sharing the results of acci dent investigations with local communities. Many investigation reports ar e written using industry and engin eering terminology and concepts and may be misunderstood by non-technical persons . GPA cannot identify a role for the local community in conducting investigations. Howe ver, GPA member companies do incorporate any lessons learned from investigations into thei r emergency response plans which are shared with local responders for their planning purposes.

j. What would be the economic impact of broadening the RMP incident investigation requirements to require root cause investigat ions of near misses? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider? Would small businesses have the capacity to investigate near miss incidents?

GPA does not recommend conducting a root cause investigation for all near misses. Like incidents, near misses can range from minor (i mproperly torqued flange bolts) to significant (closing an isolation valve on PSV). Requiring a root cause analysis (RCA) for minor near misses would be burdensome and costly. RCA typically involves a defined methodology or approach with trained and qualified facilitators and are more appropriate for significant incidents and near misses rather than minor ones. Also, requiri ng RCA for all near misses could discourage employees and contractors from reporting near misses because of the burden of conducting a rigorous investigation involving RCA. Lastly, small businesses would be especially burdened by this requirement because of the cost of formal trai ning, minimal internal staffing, or use of thirdparty investigators.

8. Public Disclosure of Information to Pr omote Regulatory Compliance and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks

a. Should EPA amend the RMP regulation to require RMP-regulated facilities to post chemical hazard-related information on their Web sites (if they have one) such as RMP chemical names, chemical quantities, execu tive summaries, links to LEPCs, community emergency plans, Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for hazardous chemicals present on site, EPCRA Tier 2 reports, release notification reports, a ccident history and cause and other similar information? What requirements should be cons idered for facilities that do not have a Web

site?

GPA recommends EPA not require RMP-regulated fa cilities to post RMP-related information on their websites. Currently, GPA member com panies prepare and submit annually, chemical hazard-related information in compliance with Emergency Preparedness Community Right to Know Act, which provides similar information to Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC), Emergency Responders, Law Enforcement and local fire departments. GPA is confident this distribution is more appropriate than adding add itional duplicative requirements in the RMP

rule.

Also, there is already facility-specific RMP info rmation on EPA’s website that can be used for facilities that do not have their own website.

b. Would requiring facilities to make this information available on the company Web site promote improved regulatory compliance? What additional economic burden would be associated with such a requirement?GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 15 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org As stated in the response to question “a,” GPA recommends EPA not require RMP-regulated facilities to post RMP-related information on thei r websites. There is no additional benefit from posting duplicative information and would not enhance compliance.

c. Do RMP-regulated facility owners/ operators have any safety or security concerns with posting the executive summary from the RMP, or linking to EPCRA reports and community response plans on the company Web sites? Please explain any concerns regarding specific elements of this information.

GPA supports providing emergency responders and security personnel with the necessary information to perform their function. Howev er, considerations should be made to safeguard critical information that may show facility vu lnerabilities and responses to incidents. Posting critical information on a public website c ould pose an unnecessary safety and security risk.

d. Would posting the RMP executive summary on a Web site cause facility owner/operators to remove important information from the executive summary? Does EPA need to better

define the contents of an executive summa ry in order to allay security concerns?

Posting critical information on a public webs ite could pose an unnecessary safety and security

risk.

e. Is there other information (web based or oth erwise) that would assist local communities, emergency planners, and responders in understandi ng facility risks that should be made publicly available? For example, would disclosur e of the facility’s PHA or compliance audit

to local authorities such as th e LEPC result in improved safety?

GPA does not recommend posting sensitive facility do cuments such as a process hazard analysis (PHA) or compliance audit on a public website. PHAs contain specific deviation scenarios, safeguards, and consequences. This informatio n is considered safety sensitive and could potentially expose vulnerabilities.

f. Does your facility interact with community gr oups (e.g., a citizen advisory panel)? If so, what information do you provide to such groups?

GPA is a trade association representing multip le companies and cannot respond to a facilityspecific question.

g. Are there other activities or measures that RMP-facility owner/ operators can use to ensure that communities, planners, and respond ers have access to appropriate information?

Currently, GPA member companies prepare and submit annually, chemical hazard-related information in compliance with Emergency Pre paredness Community Right to Know Act, which provides similar information to Local Emer gency Planning Committees (LEPC), Emergency Responders, Law Enforcement and local fire departments. GPA is confident this distribution is more appropriate than adding additional duplicative requirements in the RMP rule.

h. Can the use of social media or other forms of community outreach be incorporated into hazard assessment, prevention, and response to leverage community involvement in oversight? For example, would increased public disclosure of RMP-related information, such as accidental releases, near misses, a nd subsequent safety enhancements, or increased community involvement in facility emergency response planning, lead to improvements in facility safety? Please identify aspects of the RMP rule where there are opportunities for community involvement.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 16 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org GPA does not recommend incorporating social medi a or other community outreach into hazard assessment, prevention, or response requirements. Most RMP-related information contains industry and engineering terminology and concep ts and may be misunderstood by non-technical persons. At this time, GPA cannot identify a role for the local community in emergency response planning. However, many GPA member compani es do share their emergency response plans with local responders for their planning purposes.

11. The ‘‘Safety Case’’ Regulatory Model

General Response: It is understandable and reas onable to expect high-risk facilities to design, operate, and manage their facilities with engin eering and administrative controls in place to minimize risk. The purpose of the PHA is to ev aluate and rank the hazards associated with PSM and RMP regulated facilities. The PHA criteria prescribed by OSHA’s 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(e) standard and RMP 40 C.F.R. § 68.67 require experi enced engineers and operators to participate in the PHA. These experienced personnel are essen tial in the hazard evaluation, and ensure that a facility is equipped with the necessary devices and procedures to minimize ri sks within the facility process, with the ultimate goal to maintain a sa fe facility by reducing the risks to an acceptable level based on the hazard’s risk ranking.

The EPA’s proposal requiring regulated facilities to submit their PHA for approval could have significant ramifications for the midstream indust ry. The timeframe required for the EPA to review and comment on a PHA could potentially add several months on a project before all EPA questions are answered satisfactorily. Furthermore, the manpower which would be required by the EPA to review the volume of PHAs would be significan t due the numerous facilities currently being planned, constructed, or expanded.

Before the EPA considers implementing additional re gulations with regard to the safety case in high-risk facilities, consider that the majority of chemical and petroleum facility catastrophic incidents occur when “starting-up” a system w ithin the facility. The Bhopal and BP Texas City incidents are prime examples of catastrophes wh ich have occurred during start-up of a process system. The PSM and RMP requirement for op erating procedures (§ 1910.119(f)), maintenance procedures (§ 1910.119(j)(2)), and the Mechani cal Integrity (§ 1910. 119(j)) program were established to minimize the risk associated with start-ups.

b. The CSB Draft Regulatory Report on the Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire highlights the NRC as a U.S. regulator th at has established a safety case for licensing and oversight of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. The NRC oversees approximately 100 nuclear reactor and 3,000 nucl ear materials faciliti es in the U.S.; the NRC has nearly 4,000 employees and an annual budget of over $1 billion. What additional resources would be required by EPA and OSHA in order to establish and oversee a safety case regulatory regime for RMP a nd PSM-covered facilities?

As discussed in the General Comments above, the EPA and OSHA would require a significant increase in manpower, or resources, to address th e existing regulated facilities and the future facilities, especially relating to the natural gas midstream industry and the natural gas liquids industry. Considering the NRC maintains approximately 4,000 employees to oversee 3,100 facilities, the EPA and OSHA would have to add a significant number of employees to oversee the approximately 12,000+ RM P-subject facilities.

c. Is the safety case approach suitable for all RMP and PSM covered facilities, or, if adopted, should it be limited to only the most high-risk facilities, such as petroleum refineries and other high risk chemical processing facilities?GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 17 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org No, the safety case approach is not appropriate for all RMP and PSM covered facilities. The oil and gas midstream industry has a strong safety p erformance record and should not be considered a high-risk industry. Midstream natural gas processing plants process wellhead gas to produce marketable dry natural gas. Before the natural gas is processed, it must be treated to remove

corrosive containments such as H 2 S, CO 2 , and H 2 O. Both natural gas treating facilities and natural gas processing plants continue to utilize th e same technologies used for many years. The hazards associated with these types of faciliti es are accounted for by implementing appropriate engineering standards and complying with OSHA’s and EPA’s existing standards (PSM & RMP).

Also, Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) fractionation facilities should not be considered high-risk. These facilities utilize a distillation process to produce the pure hydroc arbons ethane, propane, and butane, or liquid petroleum gases (LPGs). In addition to the required PHA, NGL fractionation plants often incorporate additional engineering studies to ensure the facility has reduced risks as low as reasonably practicable. These studies typically include a Layer of Protection Analysis, or LOPA, and Safety Integrity Level analysis, or SIL.

d. What would be the economic impacts of movi ng to a safety case ba sed regulatory regime for chemical facility safety? Are there any sp ecial circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider with resp ect to safety case based approach?

GPA does not recommend moving from the current RMP rule to a safety case regulatory regime. The RMP rule has provided significant benefit to improving chemical facility safety since its promulgation. However, there could be si gnificant economic and resource impact both for industry and EPA and OSHA by moving to a safety case regime. From th e midstream industry, there could be a potential loss in production due to resource constraints caused by the requirement to “demonstrate” their facility ’s risks level have been reduced to ALARP.

12. Streamlining RMP Requirements

a. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the process of determining whether the RMP rule applies to particular facilities? Are th ere other potential revisio ns to the rule that would make it easier for regulated enti ties to comply with its provisions?

The RMP applicability is developed to allow co mpanies to self-determine based on established criteria which are well defined and appropriate . There are no additional steps needed or revisions necessary.

b. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the RMP submission process? For example, are there advances in electronic repor ting or information technology that EPA

could use in order to make RMP submissions easier?

The rollout of the 2009 electronic submi ssion and resubmit process was a significant improvement over the previous CD mail-in pro cess and is simple for end-users to use including certification, it is not necessary to simplify the current processs.

c. Should EPA require that RMP submissions be certified by a senior corporate official, such as the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Fi nancial Officer, Chief Operations Officer, or the equivalent to ensure corporate-wide awareness and accountability in the RMP

submission?

The current certification process allows for compani es to certify by an owner or operator of a stationary source; no changes recommended.GPA Comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 Page 18 of 18

Gas Processors Association • 6526 E. 60 th St. • Tulsa, OK 74145 Phone (918) 493-3872 • Fax (918) 493-3875 gpa@GPAglobal.org • www.GPAglobal.org d. Is the three-tiered program level structure of the RMP regulation appropriate, or should EPA consider simplifying the rule to make on ly two program tiers, or only a single prevention program applicable to all facilities?

Current process of three program levels is appropr iate to address the oil and gas industry.

e. Are the accident prevention program el ements clearly defined? Should EPA further clarify any of the existing elements?

The accident prevention program elements are appr opriately defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.48 and § 68.65 and applicable for the oil and gas industry with no need for additional clarification.

f. Are the regulatory terms and definitions co ntained in section 68.3 sufficiently clear? Are

there additional terms that EPA should define in this section?

The list of terms and definitions contained in 40 C.F.R. § 68.3 are complete and appropriate for the oil and gas industry.

Respectfully Submitted,

Johnny Dreyer

Sr. VP and Corporate Secretary

Gas Processors Association