June 10, 1977

State Jurisdiction to Regulate Pollutant Emissions

77-36 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE

ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL, FEDERAL

ENERGY ADMINISTRATION

This is in reply to your letter concerning the proposed oil tanker 

terminal that a major oil company seeks to operate at Long Beach, 

Calif. A major question that has arisen in a California Air Resources 

Board administrative proceeding, is whether the State would have 

“jurisdiction and authority to regulate pollutant emissions from oil 

tankers using the proposed terminal, while such tankers are operating 

beyond the 3-mile territorial limit of the State but are . . . within the 

South Coast Air Basin . . . [that is, within an area extending up to 12 

miles from shore].”

1. Introduction and Summary

Preliminarily, it is necessary to distinguish between (1) the general 

question of the extent of California’s authority or jurisdiction over 

tankers using the proposed terminal, and (2) the question of the validity 

of particular emission-control requirements which the State might seek 

to impose. We shall consider the former, but not the latter.1 Our views 

may be summarized as follows: Regarding operations in the contiguous 

zone (i . e the area extending up to 12 miles from the shore) of Ships 

using the proposed terminal, California would have some authority to 

prescribe and enforce air pollution controls. However, the State’s authority would not be unlimited. The validity of a particular requirement 

or enforcement action would depend upon several factors. One requirement is that there be a sufficient connection between the regulated 

activity and air quality within the State’s geographic limits. Other 

pertinent factors include feasibility and practical consequences (e.g.,

cost), the relationship to Federal standards (e.g., safety standards promulgated by the Coast Guard), and, in particular, action taken by the

1 O ur discussion does touch upon certain of the conditions proposed by the oil com pany, but we do not attempt to assess their validity. Issues concerning the various means of 

enforcing the pollution-control requirements are also significant, but we do not discuss 

them.

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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding the proposed 

terminal.

2. Factual Background

The main purpose of the proposed terminal would be to accommodate tankers transporting crude oil from the North Slope of Alaska. 

The bulk of the oil received at the terminal would then be sent, via 

pipeline systems, to refineries in the Midwest and on the Gulf Coast.

The Los Angeles-Long Beach area, where the terminal would be 

built, has severe air pollution problems. Before the project can proceed, 

it must be approved by State environmental authorities and by EPA.

Now pending before the California Air Resources Board is the oil 

company’s request for a construction permit. This proceeding is based 

upon State law. To date, EPA has not approved California’s procedures for review, under the Clean Air Act, of new stationary sources of 

emissions. Such approval may be granted in the future, but, if it is not, 

the oil company’s ability to go forward will depend upon issuance of a 

permit by EPA,2 as well as a State permit. Issuance of a permit by 

EPA will not occur until after issuance of a permit by the State; it is 

possible that the terms and conditions of the EPA permit would simply 

follow those of the State permit.

In connection with the proceeding before the State agency, the oil 

company has proposed a set of conditions to deal with the problem of 

air pollution from the tankers. Some of the conditions pertain to vessel 

design or equipment, e.g., ballast capacity (§ 1) and inert gas systems 

(§ 4). Others relate solely to tanker operations occurring within the 

port, e.g., unloading procedures (§§ 3, 6). A third category consists of 

conditions which apply to operations occurring not only within the 3- 

mile limit but also within an area extending as much as 12 miles from 

the coast, e.g., ballasting operations (§ 1), prohibition on expulsion of 

hydrocarbon vapors (§ 2), and use of low sulfur fuel (§ 7).

The California authorities are reluctant to agree to the permit conditions proposed by the oil company unless the State is assured that it 

would have authority to enforce them with respect to activities beyond 

the 3-mile limit. Presumably, the State’s concern relates only to the 

third category of conditions. The terminal will be within the territory 

of California so the extraterritorial issue is not raised by the rules 

concerning unloading or other activities at the terminal itself. In addition, to the extent that the rules involve vessel characteristics or equipment (as opposed to operations), the extraterritorial question appears to 

be irrelevant.

3. Discussion

There are several types of conditions that may raise certain legal 

questions. For example, one of the conditions would require that the

’ F o r the E P A regulation concerning the granting of such permits in California, see 40 

C F R 52.233.

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tankers have ballast capacity of a certain type (§ 1); another would 

require the vessels to have an inert gas system or comparable equipment (§ 4). Each of these matters is now addressed in Coast Guard 

regulations.3 Clearly, the issues of preemption and burdens on commerce apply generally to the proposed conditions.

Another point that should be mentioned is that pertinent laws are in 

a process of change. Amendments to the Clean Air Act are now being 

considered in Congress.4

In March, President Carter sent to Congress a message concerning 

oil pollution of the oceans. 13 Weekly Compilation of Presidential 

Documents 408 (1977). He pointed out that he had directed the Secretary of Transportation to develop new regulations concerning oil tanker 

standards, including the matters of segregated ballast and inert gas 

systems. Proposed rules to this effect have been published in the Federal Register.5

Another pertinent bill, S. 682, the Tanker and Vessel Safety Act, was 

recently passed by the Senate. See 123 Cong. Rec. S. 8823 (daily ed., 

May 27, 1977). The bill deals, in part, with design and operating 

standards for all tankers entering U.S. ports. Probable jurisdiction was 

noted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 S. Ct. 1172 (1977), a case 

now pending before the Supreme Court, which involves the preemptive 

effect of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Relevant changes in 

international law may result from the Law of the Sea Conference.

The developments mentioned above are pertinent because their outcome may affect California’s authority to regulate tanker operations.

The subjects we have addressed are solely issues of Federal law. We 

did not look into questions of California law, e.g., the extent of the 

authority of the State regulatory bodies, or into the possible significance of contract or real estate law (Le., reliance on conditions set forth 

by the Port of Long Beach in its lease with the company, in addition to 

use of the State’s police power).

Although we did not give separate attention to the existence of 

Federal authority to regulate the tanker operations in question, it is 

important to note that certain possible Federal limits upon the State’s 

authority—for example, preemption—have no application to the Federal Government. A related matter that could become significant is the 

possibility of State enforcement of federally prescribed pollution control requirements. See, e.g., § 304 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42

5 See 46 C F R 32.53 (inert gas system); 33 C F R 157.09 (segregated ballast). See also

proposed amendments to the Coast G uard regulations set forth in 42 Fed. Reg. 24868 

(segregated ballast) and 24874 (inert gas system).

4 Recently, an amendment bearing directly upon the present issues was introduced in 

the House o f Representatives, debated, and then w ithdraw n. See 123 Cong. Rec. H 5067- 

72 (daily ed., May 25, 1977). T he sponsor stated that a similar amendm ent m ight be 

offered in the future. 123 Cong. Rec. H 5072 (daily ed., May 25, 1977) (Remarks of 

Representative Miller).

5 See footnote 3, supra.

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U.S.C. 1857h-2, which authorizes the bringing of certain types of 

“citizen suits.”

a. Preemption

(1) The Clean Air Act

One question is whether the Clean Air Act furnishes a basis for 

regulating emissions from vessels. Your Office and EPA have taken the 

position that it does, and we agree. See, Texas v. EPA, 499 F. 2d 289, 

316-317 (5th Cir. 1974).

Under the Clean Air Act, EPA sets national ambient air quality 

standards for widespread pollutants, such as hydrocarbons. § 109, 42 

U.S.C. 1857c-4. The basic means of achieving compliance with standards is a State implementation plan. § 110, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5. The Act 

expressly provides that “primary responsibility for assuring air quality 

within . . . [its] geographic area” belongs to each State. § 107, 42 

U.S.C. 1857c-2. If a State plan is inadequate in some respects, EPA is 

required to cure the deficiency by issuing its own regulation. As noted 

previously, EPA has not approved California’s procedure for review of 

new sources and has promulgated a regulation providing for review by 

EPA.

It is clear that, with limited exceptions not pertinent here, the Clean 

Air Act does not preempt State authority, i.e., use of the State’s police 

power to impose standards regarding air pollution. The Act contains a 

provision, § 116, 42 U.S.C. 1957d— 1 (1975 Supp.), which provides that 

there is no such preemption, so long as the standard based upon State 

law is not less stringent than standards set forth in the Act.

According to your memorandum, EPA has stated that the conditions 

proposed by the oil company are not less stringent than standards EPA 

would impose in connection with its review of the terminal. Of course, 

the action ultimately taken by EPA will be highly significant. One 

possibility would be that, after issuance of a permit by the California 

agency, EPA would issue a permit setting forth the same conditions. 

Such action by EPA would lend substantial support to the action taken 

by the State agency. On the other hand, a finding by EPA that one or 

more of the State’s conditions would not be sufficiently strict would 

probably mean that any such condition would be revised.

(2) Ports and Waterways Safety Act

Title I of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) 

authorizes the Coast Guard to establish vessel traffic control systems 

and to regulate certain types of vessel operations, in order to prevent 

damage to vessels, bridges, and other structures and to protect the 

navigable waters from environmental harm. 33 U.S.C 1221 (1975 

Supp.). More pertinent here is Title II, 46 U.S.C. 391a (1975 Supp.), 

which directs the Coast Guard to establish regulations concerning the 

design and operations of certain kinds of vessels, including oil tankers, 

in order to protect the navigable waters of the United States and the

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resources of those waters and adjoining land. Such regulations have 

been issued. See 33 CFR 157.

The District Court in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, a case now 

pending in the Supreme Court,8 held that the PWSA preempted the 

field so as to render invalid Washington statutes regulating the size and 

design of oil tankers operating in Puget Sound. We believe that even 

assuming the District Court correctly decided the Atlantic Richfield

case, the facts differ significantly from the present situation.

Here, if a California permit containing the oil company’s conditions is 

ratified by EPA, the issue will not be preemption by the PWSA, but 

the relationship between that statute and the Clean Air Act. C f, Texas

v. EPA, supra. In the event of conflict or inconsistency between the 

California (or EPA) conditions and Coast Guard regulations, the result 

will depend upon the specific facts. The task will be to reconcile the 

two statutes, bearing in mind that a basic objective of the Clean Air 

Act is to preserve the primary role of the States with respect to control 

of air pollution. C f, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 

(1960).

To summarize, it does not appear that the subject in question— 

controlling air pollution caused by oil tankers—is preempted by the 

PWSA or any other Federal law.7 Still, depending upon the particular 

facts, the PWSA or Coast Guard regulations issued under it might have 

the effect of overriding certain requirements imposed by California.

b. Burden on Commerce; Foreign Relations

The Huron Portland Cement Co., supra, case and others that deal with 

the question whether State laws impose an unconstitutional burden on 

interstate commerce support the view that the proposed California 

standards would not be invalid on this ground. However, depending 

upon the factual record, certain of the requirements might be vulnerable. Congress has indicated its view that, with regard to control of air 

pollution, variation from State to State is permissible. Even if the 

California standards were to impose requirements going beyond Coast 

Guard regulations and entailing substantial expense {e.g., additional 

equipment or changes in the vessels), California could assert that the 

seriousness of its air pollution problem justifies the measures it has 

adopted.

The next matter to be discussed is the possible impairment of the 

foreign relations of the United States, resulting from the application of 

the California standards to foreign ships. In this regard, the decision in 

Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) should not be given much 

weight. That case involved an Oregon statute relating to the ability of

•T he decision of the District Court, No. C -75-648-M (W .D. W ash. Sept. 23, 1976), is 

not reported.

7 A num ber of other statutes deal with aspect of oil tanker operations. See, e.g., the Oil 

Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1002. T here are also international conventions relating to the 

subject, e.g.. the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 16 U.S.T. 185.

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nonresident aliens to inherit Oregon property; its provisions were such 

that the State courts passed judgment upon the laws and practices of 

the foreign country and the credibility of foreign officials. It was this 

kind of inquiry that caused the Supreme Court to find an unconsitutional intrusion by the State into the realm of foreign affairs. Here, in 

contrast, the question would be one of applying to foreign ships State 

regulations of general applicability. No question of discrimination 

against foreign ships would be presented.

In general, the police power of a State extends to foreign persons 

within its jurisdiction.8 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in 

Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459. An added factor here is that the California 

requirements might have the imprimatur of EPA. Thus, we question 

whether the Zschernig issue indicates the need for exemption or special 

treatment of foreign ships.

c. Operations Outside the 3-Mile Limit

It is our opinion that with respect to tankers using the proposed 

terminal, California has authority to regulate operations taking place 

beyond the 3-mile limit. This assumes, of course, that there is a proper 

nexus between those operatiofts and the quality of the air over the 

State’s territory.

It is significant that the proposed conditions are limited to ships using 

the terminal; the State does not seek to regulate all vessels coming 

within the contiguous zone.

It seems clear that Congress has the power to reach conduct occurring in the contiguous zone, but one issue is whether the Clean Air Act 

was intended to have that effect. A general rule of statutory construction is that “the legislation of Congress will not extend beyond the 

boundaries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent 

appears.” Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952).

The view that the Clean Air Act has extraterritorial effect (at least to 

the extent involved here) rests upon the purpose of the statute, rather 

than any specific provision or legislative history. Your Office and EPA 

have concluded that the A ct does have that effect. We are in accord 

with your view. Because the purpose of the State’s requirements concerning operations in the 12-mile zone would be to protect the air over 

the State’s territory, not the air over the high seas. This would seem to 

be a reasonable means of implementing the Act.9

In addition, as pointed out above, the States retain the authority to 

exercise independent police power to deal with air pollution. If the 

requisite nexus exists, that authority could be used to reach conduct in

8 A nother pertinent consideration may be w hether a foreign-flag ship is ow ned or 

controlled by U nited States persons. C f, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).

9 Clearly, the present situation differs from one in w hich State A sought to regulate, on 

the basis o f the Clean A ir Act, activities in State B. But see, Illinois.v. City o f Milwaukee,

406 U.S. 91, 103-108 (1972) (w ater pollution suit based on Federal comm on law of 

nuisance).

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the contiguous zone. C f, Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941). 

This is another area where the issue of jurisdiction over foreign ships is 

raised. In our opinion, California possesses some regulatory authority 

over such ships.

The Federal Government may impose reasonable conditions upon 

foreign ships using its ports. C f, Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 

U.S. 100, 124 (1923) (application of prohibition law). Such conditions 

may relate to conduct beyond the 3-mile limit.

For purposes of international law, the authority to impose such 

conditions may be exercised not only by the Federal Government, but 

also by a State government. Therefore, assuming there is no conflict 

with an applicable treaty (or Federal statute or regulation), California 

would have authority to regulate foreign ships, as well as United States 

ships, using the proposed terminal.

J o h n M . H a r m o n

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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