[Cite as State v. Ragland, 2011-Ohio-2245.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

 STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsMAKI RAGLAND 

 

 Defendant-Appellant 

: JUDGES: 

: Julie A. Edwards, P.J. 

: William B. Hoffman, J. 

: Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: 

: Case No. 2010CA00023 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from Stark County 

 Court of Common Pleas Case No. 

 2009-CR-1028(B) 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 9, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JOHN D. FERRERO WAYNE E. GRAHAM, JR. 

Prosecuting Attorney Suite 300 Renaissance Centre 

Stark County, Ohio 4580 Stephen Circle, N.W. 

 Canton, Ohio 44718 

BY: RONALD MARK CALDWELL 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Appellate Section 

110 Central Plaza, South – Suite 510 

Canton, Ohio 44702-1413 

 
[Cite as State v. Ragland, 2011-Ohio-2245.]

Edwards, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Maki Ragland, appeals his conviction and sentence 

from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas on one count of murder with a firearm 

specification, one count of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification, four counts 

of aggravated robbery with firearm specifications, one count of felonious assault with a 

firearm specification, and one count of having weapons while under disability. Plaintiffappellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On August 27, 2009, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted appellant on 

one count of murder (Count One) in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), one count of 

aggravated burglary (Count Two) in violation of R.C. 2911.11 (A)(1) or (A)(2), a felony 

of the first degree, four counts of aggravated robbery (Counts Three, Four, Five and 

Six) in violation of R.C. 2911.001(A)(1) or (A)(3), felonies of the first degree, one count 

of felonious assault (Count Seven) in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) or (A)(2), a felony 

of the second degree, and one count of having weapons while under disability (Count 

Eight) in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) or (A)(3), felonies of the third degree. All of the 

counts, with the exception of the having weapons while under disability count, were 

accompanied by firearm specifications. At his arraignment on August 28, 2009, 

appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. 

{¶3} Subsequently, a jury trial commenced on December 14, 2009, on all 

counts except Count Eight (having weapons while under disability), which was severed. 

The following testimony was adduced at trial. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 3 

{¶4} In July of 2009, Daniel Sankey was living at a house on 14th Street, N.E. in 

the City of Canton along with his daughter, Danielle, and her daughter, Harmoney, who 

was two years old. On July 2, 2009, Daniel Sankey, Danielle Sankey, Harmoney 

Sankey, Marlo Morales, who is Daniel Sankey’s girlfriend, and Jason Nelson, who is 

Danielle’s friend, were at the address. Daniel Sankey was in the process of changing 

his tracheotomy and was about to play a game of dominos when someone came to the 

door. Daniel Sankey testified that he was expecting a friend to come by with a video 

disc recorder. According to Daniel Sankey, when he asked who was at the door, 

“someone hollered out Nardo, which is Ms. Morales’ son.” Transcript at 166. Marlo 

Morales told appellant that it could not be her son because he had just called her and 

told her he was leaving town and going back to Akron. 

{¶5} When Morales opened the door, she let the two black males at the door, 

who were wearing hoodies, into the house under the belief that Daniel Sankey was 

waiting for them. While one of the men remained in the front of the house, the other 

approached Daniel Sankey, who was sitting at a table. Sankey testified that he did not 

pay much attention to the man because he thought it was the person who was bringing 

the video to him. The following testimony was adduced when Sankey was asked what 

the man said to him: 

{¶6} “A. Well, first he said what’s up. I said hey, what’s up, still not looking at 

him. And he said something like - - trying to be precise word for word. What’s up. He 

was like well, you know what this is. I said what is this, you know. And then he 

proceeded to say something else and I thought he was playing a game, joking around 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 4 

because I thought it was the person I was looking for, and he said I think you need to 

get up. 

{¶7} “Q. Now, before you said that did you see anything on him? 

{¶8} “A. When he said I think you need to get up he nudged me with a gun. 

{¶9} “Q. What did the gun look like? 

{¶10} “A. It was long, had the round barrel, had the holes in it and dark in color, 

but it still looked like it could be a toy to me. And then I said how long are you going to 

carry this game, play this game? I’m still thinking he is playing around not serious 

because he wasn’t real aggressive with what his demand was. So I am not thinking it’s 

a robbery.” Transcript at 170-171. 

{¶11} After the man hit Sankey in the head with the gun, Sankey jumped up and 

the man stepped back and shot Sankey. 

{¶12} At the time Daniel Sankey was shot, Harmoney, his granddaughter, had 

just walked past him heading towards a bedroom. Daniel Sankey testified that after the 

man shot him, the two men went towards the front door as if they were leaving. Sankey 

then stepped into the bedroom, closed the door and told Marla Morales to grab 

Harmoney so that they could leave. At the time, Sankey did not see anything wrong 

with Harmoney, who had asked Morales to pick her up. After fleeing his house via a 

side door off of his bedroom, Sankey, who did not realize that he had been shot in the 

leg and who was bleeding heavily from a head wound, went to a neighbor’s house. The 

neighbor called 911. 

{¶13} At trial, Daniel Sankey testified that when he went outside of his 

neighbor’s house, he saw his daughter, Danielle, walking around hysterically and saw 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 5 

Marlo Morales in a bloody shirt. Sankey then learned that Harmoney had been hit and 

was being taken to the hospital. Harmoney later died. Sankey received stitches for his 

head injury and was treated for the gunshot wound to his leg. 

{¶14} At trial Danielle Sankey testified she was sitting on the couch watching a 

movie with Jason Nelson in the living room when there was a knock on the door. 

According to Danielle, the person at the door said their name was Nardo. The following 

testimony was adduced when Danielle Sankey was asked whether she heard anything 

going on in the kitchen or the dining room area: 

{¶15} “A. I heard my dad say what do you want, what are you here for. And the 

guy said you know what I am here for. Quit playing around. My dad is like I don’t know 

what you are talking about. And then I heard some scuffles and I heard a gunshot. I 

heard Marlo yell heard the baby. 

{¶16} “Q. Back you up for a second. After you heard a gunshot, that would be 

the first one, did anything - - did you see anyone come into the living room? 

{¶17} “A. After I heard the gunshot a few minutes later he was coming out. The 

first guy had left after the shooting had started. And then I heard another gunshot and 

the shell from the second gunshot gun came into the living room. So I seen the shell to 

the second gunshot. And then he stopped in the living room before he left out and 

asked us if we had anything, if we had anything to give him. I think he was talking 

mostly to Jason. I didn’t see his face or anything, then he left.” Transcript at 236-237. 

The man left after the two had nothing to give him. 

{¶18} Marlo Morales, Daniel Sankey’s girlfriend, testified that on June 16, 2009, 

she had celebrated her daughter Regina’s birthday at Daniel Sankey’s house. At the 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 6 

time, Regina was dating Isaiah Thomas who brought a man known as “Beans” with him 

to the party. Morales testified that, on July 2, 2009, her son Renaldo had been at Daniel 

Sankey’s house but had left. After he left, they were getting ready to play dominos and 

Morales was smoking marijuana when someone came to the door. Morales, who 

testified that she did not hear the person at the door identify himself, opened the door 

after Daniel Sankey told her that “Nardo” was at the door. Morales testified that she 

opened the door and then walked away and never looked to see whether Nardo was at 

the door. She indicated that she could not say how many people came into the house 

because she was not paying attention and was going to turn music on in a bedroom. 

Morales later became concerned when she noticed that the two men had their hoodies 

on and that one had a gun. Morales testified that, at some point, she recognized the 

man who did not have a gun and who was standing by the door. The following 

testimony was adduced when she was asked how she recognized him: 

{¶19} “A. The gentleman that was wearing the peanut butter coat told him to go 

to the bedroom and he came into the bedroom. When he stepped into the bedroom 

there is a landing there as you are coming in. He wasn’t paying attention to it and he 

slipped and that mirror that sits right there by the door, his hoody slid off and at that 

point I seen his face and knew who he was. 

{¶20} “Q. Who did you know him to be? 

{¶21} “A. Beans. 

{¶22} “Q. When you noticed it was Beans did that cause you to do anything? 

{¶23} “A. Made me more nervous.” Transcript at 305. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 7 

{¶24} Morales also testified that when she picked up Harmoney while in the 

bedroom, she did not notice anything wrong with her. She testified that while she was in 

the bedroom, the man who had fired the gun approached her and asked her where 

Daniel Sankey had gone. The same man subsequently asked her “where the shit at.” 

Transcript at 309. Morales then told the man that she did not know what he was talking 

about. According to Morales, the man took items off of a table and took $27.00 out of 

her pocket. The man then left the house. 

{¶25} Shortly after the incident, Morales went to the police station where she 

gave a statement to the police and also picked “Beans” aka William Ferguson out of a 

photo array. She also picked appellant out of another array and identified him as the 

shooter. Daniel Sankey, Danielle Sankey and Jason Nelson were unable to pick anyone 

out of the photo arrays. 

{¶26} William Ferguson testified at appellant’s trial. Ferguson testified that he 

had pleaded guilty to complicity to aggravated robbery, complicity to aggravated 

assault, felonious assault and complicity to aggravated burglary and to three firearm 

specifications and that he had agreed to testify against appellant in exchange for a nine 

year sentence. Ferguson testified that he had met Marlo Morales at Daniel Sankey’s 

house approximately four or five months before the incident in this case either to 

purchase marijuana or because he was with someone who was purchasing marijuana. 

He testified that at such time, Regina Morales’ birthday was celebrated. 

{¶27} Ferguson testified that, on July 2, 2009, he met Isaiah Thomas earlier in 

the day. The two were near Aultman Hospital when Ferguson’s car overheated. 

Ferguson and Thomas then met up with appellant who, at the time, had a nine 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 8 

millimeter gun on him. The three later went to a house on Walnut N.E. where they 

smoked marijuana and fired a gun out of the back of a building. After their attempt to 

purchase marijuana at another location was unsuccessful, they went to the Sankey 

home in an attempt to purchase marijuana. 

{¶28} Ferguson testified that appellant, after one of them knocked on the 

Sankey door, identified himself as “Nardo.” After the shooting, Ferguson fled to Elyria 

but then turned himself in on July 3, 2009, after he heard that a little girl had died. At 

police headquarters, Ferguson gave a statement to police and picked appellant out of a 

photo array. Ferguson also told the police that the shooter was “Ragland.” Transcript at 

275. 

{¶29} At the conclusion of the evidence and the end of deliberations, the jury, on 

December 18, 2009, found appellant guilty of all of the charges except for having 

weapons while under disability. The trial court found appellant guilty of such charge. 

{¶30} As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on January 22, 2010. 

Appellant was sentenced to fifteen (15) years to life on the murder charge, to ten (10) 

years on the aggravated burglary charge and to ten (10) years on each of the four 

counts of aggravated robbery. Appellant also was sentenced to five (5) years on the 

charge of felonious assault and to five (5) years on the charge of having weapons while 

under disability. Appellant also was ordered to serve a three (3) year prison term for the 

firearm specifications. Counts One through Five were ordered to run consecutively to 

each other and to the firearm specification. Counts Six through Eight were ordered to 

run concurrently to each other and concurrently to Counts One through Five, for an 

aggregate prison sentence of 58 years to life. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 9 

{¶31} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal: 

{¶32} “I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 

CONVICTION, AND THE JURY’S VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT 

OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶33} “II. THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN IMPOSING MAXIMUM 

PRISON TERMS FOR APPELLANT’S SEPARATE CONVICTIONS. 

{¶34} “III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT 

ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCED THE APPELLANT ON 

ALLIED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT IN VIOLATION OF O.R.C. 2941.25 AND 

ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE 

IMPOSITION OF MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS AS SET FORTH IN THE DOUBLE 

JEOPARDY CLAUSE, IN ADDITION TO FAILING TO SATISFY THE STATUTORY 

REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.” 

I 

{¶35} Appellant, in his first assignment of error, argues that his convictions for 

aggravated burglary, felonious assault, murder, and aggravated robbery were against 

the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶36} In State v. Jenks (1981), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, the Ohio 

Supreme Court set forth the standard of review when a claim of insufficiency of the 

evidence is made. The Ohio Supreme Court held: “An appellate court's function when 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine 

the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would 

convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 10 

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶37} On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire 

record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the 

witnesses and determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment 

must be reversed. The discretionary power to grant a new hearing should be exercised 

only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

judgment.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N .E.2d 

541, citing State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Because 

the trier of fact is in a better position to observe the witnesses' demeanor and weigh 

their credibility, the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are 

primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 

212, syllabus 1. 

{¶38} Appellant initially argues that his conviction for aggravated burglary in 

violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) or (A)(2) was against the manifest weight and sufficiency 

of the evidence because either there was no evidence, or there was legally insufficient 

evidence, regarding trespass. 

{¶39} R.C. 2911.11 states, in relevant part, as follows: “(A) No person, by force, 

stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured 

or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person other 

than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 11 

in the separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal 

offense, if any of the following apply: 

{¶40} “(1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict physical harm 

on another; 

{¶41} “(2) The offender has a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or 

about the offender's person or under the offender's control.” 

{¶42} Appellant, in support of his argument, argues that there was no evidence 

that either appellant or William Ferguson identified themselves as Marlo Morales’ son, 

that Morales opened the door to them, and that there was no indication that they were 

ever requested to leave. 

{¶43} However, although appellant may have had consent to enter Sankey’s 

home, once he committed an act of violence against Sankey or other inhabitants of the 

home, the consent was revoked and appellant became a trespasser. See State v. 

Cutts, Stark App. No. 2008 CA 000079, 2009-Ohio-3563 at paragraph 181. Where a 

defendant commits an offense against a person in the person's private dwelling, the 

defendant forfeits any privilege, becomes a trespasser and can be culpable for 

aggravated burglary. See, e.g., State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 115, 509 

N.E.2d 383. Moreover, we note that Daniel Sankey and Denielle Sankey testified that 

someone identified himself as “Nardo”, which is the name of Morale’s son while William 

Ferguson testified that appellant was the one who identified himself as “Nardo.” Thus, 

there was testimony that appellant used deception to enter the Sankey home. 

{¶44} We find, therefore, that appellant’s conviction for aggravated burglary is 

not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 12 

{¶45} Appellant further argues that there “is no indication that there was any 

purpose involved in the discharge of the firearm necessary to support the Felonious 

Assault charge or the Murder conviction that followed the secondary gunshot wound to 

Harmoney Sankey.” Appellant notes that Daniel Sankey testified that the gun “went off” 

after Sankey jumped up and contends that the firing was not purposeful. 

{¶46} R.C. 2901.22(A) states as follows: 

{¶47} “A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain 

result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain 

nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific 

intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” 

{¶48} Contrary to appellant’s implication that the gun accidentally went off, we 

note that at trial, Daniel Sankey testified that after he jumped up after appellant hit him 

in the head with a gun, appellant “stepped back and shot me.” Transcript at 172. We 

find, therefore, that there was evidence that appellant purposefully shot appellant. 

There was evidence that appellant intended to discharge the firearm and did so. 

{¶49} Finally, appellant, with respect to his convictions for aggravated robbery, 

argues that the evidence does not support the same because Daniel Sankey indicated 

that he believed the activity in the house on July 2, 2009 was a game and was not 

thinking that it was a robbery. 

{¶50} Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 

2911.01(A)(1) or (A)(3). R.C. 2911.01 states, in relevant part, as follows: “(A) No 

person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the 

Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 13 

following:” (1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the 

offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender 

possesses it, or use it;...(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on 

another.” 

{¶51} As is stated above in the statement of facts, testimony was adduced at 

trial that appellant, after using deception to gain entrance to the Sankey house, 

approached Daniel Sankey and demanded money and drugs from him and then hit 

Sankey in the back of the head with a 9mm caliber handgun and shot him in the leg. As 

a result of shooting Sankey, appellant shot and killed Harmoney Sankey. Testimony 

also was adduced that appellant, while armed with a 9mm caliber gun, demanded 

money from Marlo Morales and took $27.00 from her and that he also unsuccessfully 

demanded money from Danielle Sankey and Jason Nelson. 

{¶52} Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s convictions for 

aggravated robbery were not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence. 

{¶53} In short, we find that, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty of 

aggravated burglary, felonious assault, murder, and aggravated robbery. We further find 

that the jury did not lose its way in convicting appellant of such offenses. 

{¶54} Appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

II 

{¶55} Appellant, in his second assignment of error, argues that the trial court’s 

imposition of maximum prison terms on appellant for one count of aggravated burglary 

with a firearm specification, four counts of aggravated robbery with firearm 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 14 

specifications and one count of having weapons while under disability was “without 

basis or justification.”1

{¶56} R.C. 2929.14(C) provides in pertinent part: “[T]he court imposing a 

sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose the longest prison term authorized 

for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section only upon offenders who 

committed the worst forms of the offense, upon offenders who pose the greatest 

likelihood of committing future crimes, upon certain major drug offenders under division 

(D)(3) of this section, and upon certain repeat violent offenders in accordance with 

division (D)(2) of this section.” 

{¶57} R.C. 2929.14(C)'s requirement that the trial court make specific findings in 

support of a maximum sentence was found unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court 

in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 63-64. In State 

v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, the Ohio Supreme 

Court reviewed its decision in Foster as it relates to the remaining sentencing statutes 

and appellate review of felony sentencing. 

{¶58} In Kalish, the court discussed the affect of the Foster decision on felony 

sentencing. The Court stated that, in Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court severed the 

judicial fact-finding portions of R.C. 2929.14, holding that “trial courts have full discretion 

to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to 

make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than 

the minimum sentences.” Kalish at paragraphs 1 and 11, citing Foster at paragraph 100, 

See also, State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306. “Thus, 

 

1

 Appellant in his brief, states that he was sentenced to the maximum on all counts except the felonious 

assault count. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 15 

a record after Foster may be silent as to the judicial findings that appellate courts were 

originally meant to review under 2953.08(G)(2).” Kalish at paragraph 12. However, 

although Foster eliminated mandatory judicial fact finding, it left intact R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12, and the trial court must still consider these statutes. Kalish at paragraph 13. 

See also State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1.2 

{¶59} “Thus, despite the fact that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) refers to the excised 

judicial fact-finding portions of the sentencing scheme, an appellate court remains 

precluded from using an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when initially reviewing 

a defendant's sentence. Instead, the appellate court must ensure that the trial court has 

adhered to all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence. As a purely legal 

question, this is subject to review only to determine whether it is clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law, the standard found in R.C. 2953.08(G).” Kalish at 

paragraph 14. 

{¶60} Therefore, Kalish holds that, in reviewing felony sentences and applying 

Foster to the remaining sentencing statutes, the appellate courts must use a two-step 

approach. “First, they must examine the sentencing court's compliance with all 

applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the 

sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the 

trial court's decision in imposing the term of imprisonment shall be reviewed under an 

 

2

 “[P]ursuant to R.C. 2929.11(A), a trial court must be guided by the overriding purposes of felony 

sentencing, which are ‘to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the 

offender. The court must also consider the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12.” State 

v. Murray, Lake App. No. 2007-L-098, 2007-Ohio-6733, paragraph 18, citing R.C. 2929.11(A). 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 16 

abuse of discretion standard.” Kalish at paragraph 4, State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 

2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. 

{¶61} The sentences that appellant received, in the case sub judice, were within 

the permissible statutory range, and the court stated in its judgment that it had 

considered the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and 

balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. We further note 

that appellant does not allege that he was not properly advised of post-release control in 

this case. The sentences were not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. 

{¶62} Furthermore, appellant has not demonstrated that the court abused its 

discretion in imposing the maximum sentences. The record shows that appellant had a 

prior criminal history. Appellant had been adjudicated a delinquent child in 2006 by 

virtue of having committed the offenses of felonious assault and possession of cocaine.3

 

At the sentencing hearing on December 22, 2009, appellant blamed the incident on 

Daniel Sankey and the inhabitants of the Sankey house, stating that “if the people were 

so worried about Harmoney, they wouldn’t be selling drugs out the house she was living 

in.” Transcript of Sentencing hearing at 11. Appellant also blamed his convictions on 

“being young and black” and contended that he was guilty of being “around the wrong 

people.” Transcript of Sentencing hearing at 11-12. The trial court, in sentencing 

appellant, also noted that appellant attempted to flee from the police once they came for 

him. 

 

3

 The Magistrate’s Decision that was filed in Stark County Juvenile Division Case No. CR9-30-2821, 

which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 47, indicates that appellant was supposed to be on probation but 

had never had the chance to meet with his probation officer because of the new felony charges in such 

case. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 17 

{¶63} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing the maximum sentences on appellant for aggravated burglary 

with a firearm specification, aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and having 

weapons while under disability. The trial court’s decision was not arbitrary, 

unconscionable or unreasonable. 

{¶64} Appellant’s second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

III 

{¶65} Appellant, in his third assignment of error, argues that the trial court 

committed plain error when it failed to merge the offenses of aggravated burglary, 

aggravated robbery, felonious assault and felony murder. Appellant alleged that the 

offenses of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and felonious assault were the 

underlying predicate offenses for the felony murder charge and that, therefore, they are 

allied offenses of similar import to felony murder. 

{¶66} R.C. 2941.25 states as follows: “(A) Where the same conduct by 

defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, 

the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the 

defendant may be convicted of only one. 

{¶67} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of 

dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or 

similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 18 

or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 

convicted of all of them.” 

{¶68} Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 

1405, 2010-Ohio-6314, - - - N.E.2d - - -, modified the test for determining whether 

offenses are allied offenses of similar import. In Johnson, the Ohio Supreme Court 

directed us to look at the elements of the offenses in question and determine whether or 

not it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other with the same conduct. If 

the answer to such question is in the affirmative, the court must then determine whether 

or not the offenses were committed by the same conduct. If the answer to the above 

two questions is yes, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and will be 

merged. If, however, the court determines that commission of one offense will never 

result in the commission of the other, or if there is a separate animus for each offense, 

then the offenses will not merge according to Johnson, supra. 

{¶69} In the case sub judice, appellant was convicted of felony murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). R.C. 2903.02(B) states as follows: “(B) No person shall 

cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or 

attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree 

and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code.” The 

indictment in the case sub judice lists the offenses of violence as aggravated burglary in 

violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) or (A)(2), aggravated robbery in violation or R.C. 

2911.01(A)(1) or (A)(3) and felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) or (A)(2). 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 19 

{¶70} In addition, appellant was separately indicted on aggravated burglary, 

aggravated robbery (4 counts) and felonious assault. And, he was convicted of each of 

those. 

{¶71} The prosecution can elect any of the above three felonies as charged as 

the predicate offense.4 Appellant was convicted of Count Three, which was aggravated 

robbery with Daniel Sankey as the victim. The evidence at trial demonstrated that after 

Daniel Sankey did not comply with appellant’s demands appellant hit him in the head 

with a gun and then shot him in the leg. As a result of shooting Daniel Sankey, appellant 

shot and killed Harmoney Sankey. Thus, there were separate victims with respect to the 

aggravated robbery and the felony murder. While Daniel Sankey was the victim of the 

aggravated robbery, Harmoney Sankey was the victim with respect to the felony 

murder. Because there were two separate victims, appellant’s conduct constituted two 

offenses of dissimilar import. See State v. Maddern, Stark App. No. 1999CA00273, 

2000 WL 700307, citing to State v. Jones (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 116, 480 N.E.2d 408. In 

Jones, two passengers in the defendant's automobile were killed as a result of 

defendant's reckless operation of his vehicle. The Supreme Court found the defendant's 

conduct constituted two offensives of dissimilar import. The “import” being each person 

killed. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded, the defendant was lawfully convicted 

and sentenced on both counts. 

 

4 See State v. Kinney, (Aug.21, 1998), Lake App. No. 97-L-034, 1998 WL 637515. The appellant, in such 

case, was convicted of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12. Such statute prohibits the entry of an 

occupied structure by force, stealth or deception. On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient 

because no force was shown. The Court of Appeals said that the state could prove the charge with 

evidence as to any of the three concepts and that the appellant had not asked the Court to order the state 

to elect a theory upon which to proceed at trial 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 20 

{¶72} Based on the foregoing, we find that the predicate offense of aggravated 

robbery was not an allied offense in relation to felony murder. Because aggravated 

burglary and felonious assault were not the predicate offenses to felony murder, in the 

case sub judice they are not subject to merger with the felony murder charge. 

{¶73} As is stated above, appellant was convicted of four counts of aggravated 

robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) or (A)(3). We find that such offenses are not 

allied offenses of similar import because they were not committed by the same conduct. 

All of the aggravated robbery counts involved different victims and different conduct. 

Testimony was adduced at trial that appellant initially approached Daniel Sankey and 

made demands and that he later separately approached Marlo Morales, Danielle 

Sankey and Jason Nelson demanding money. Thus, the four counts of aggravated 

robbery are not allied offenses of similar import because each was committed with a 

separate animus. 

{¶74} The next issue for determination is whether or not the offenses of 

aggravated burglary and felonious assault are allied offenses of similar import. 

Appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) or 

(A)(2). Such section states as follows: “A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, 

shall trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately 

occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than an 

accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in the 

separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense, 

if any of the following apply: 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 21 

{¶75} “(1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict physical harm 

on another; 

{¶76} “(2) The offender has a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or 

about the offender's person or under the offender's control.” 

{¶77} Appellant also was convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1) or (A)(2). Such section states as follows: “A) No person shall knowingly 

do either of the following: 

{¶78} “(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another's unborn; 

{¶79} “(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another's 

unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” 

{¶80} We find that the aggravated burglary and felonious assault offenses are 

not allied offenses of similar import because the offenses were committed separately 

with a separate animus. The aggravated burglary was committed when appellant, under 

the guise of being “Nardo”, used deception to gain entrance to appellant’s home with 

the intent to commit a robbery and while having a deadly weapon under his control. The 

felonious assault did not occur until later when appellant hit Daniel Sankey in the head 

after demanding money and drugs and then shot Daniel Sankey in the leg. The 

aggravated burglary, therefore, was complete before the felonious assault took place. 

The two, therefore, involved separate conduct and a separate animus and are not allied 

offenses of similar import. 

{¶81} We further find that aggravated robbery and felonious assault are not 

allied offenses of similar import. Appellant committed the felonious assault when he 

knowingly caused serious physical harm to Daniel and/or Harmoney Sankey or when he 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 22 

caused or attempted to cause physical harm to either of them by means of a firearm. 

He committed the offense of aggravated robbery when he approached his victims and 

demanded money while displaying his handgun. We find that the offenses were 

committed with a separate animus. 

{¶82} Finally, the question that must be addressed is whether or not aggravated 

burglary and aggravated robbery are allied offenses of similar import. Appellant was 

convicted of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) or (A)(2). R.C. 

2911.11(A) states, in relevant part, as follows: “(A) No person, by force, stealth, or 

deception, shall trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or 

separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than 

an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in 

the separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal 

offense, if any of the following apply: 

{¶83} “(1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict physical harm 

on another; 

{¶84} “(2) The offender has a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or 

about the offender's person or under the offender's control.” 

{¶85} In order to commit the offense of aggravated burglary, one does not have 

to actually commit any criminal offense. Rather, one has to trespass with purpose to 

commit a criminal offense. Thus, appellant committed aggravated burglary when he 

used deception to gain entry into appellant’s home with the purpose to commit a 

criminal offense therein while having a deadly weapon under his control. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 23 

{¶86} In contrast, R.C. 2911.01, the aggravated robbery statute, states as 

follows: “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 

section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or 

offense, shall do any of the following: 

{¶87} “(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the 

offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender 

possesses it, or use it;... 

{¶88} “(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another.” 

{¶89} In the case sub judice, appellant committed the aggravated robberies 

when he approached the four separate victims individually and demanded money 

and/or drugs. The aggravated burglary and the aggravated robbery involved separate 

conduct. 

{¶90} Based on the foregoing, we find that aggravated burglary and aggravated 

robbery are not allied offenses of similar import. 
Stark County App. Case No. 2010CA00023 24 

{¶91} In short, we find that the trial court did not err in sentencing appellant 

because the offenses were not allied offenses of similar import. 

{¶92} Appellant’s third assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

{¶93} Accordingly, the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

By: Edwards, P.J. 

Hoffman, J. and 

Delaney, J. concur 

______________________________ 

______________________________ 

______________________________ 

 JUDGES 

JAE/d1013 
[Cite as State v. Ragland, 2011-Ohio-2245.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

MAKI RAGLAND : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2010CA00023 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the 

judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed to 

appellant. 

 _________________________________ 

 _________________________________ 

 _________________________________ 

 JUDGES