*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 27, 2006*

Decided October 2, 2006

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 06-1256

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DEBORAH HOOKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division

No. 03-CR-1188

Ronald A Guzmán, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Deborah Hooker was accused of misappropriating approximately $1.6 million

from CDI Network, Inc., and Computer Documents, Inc., two related companies

where she had been employed as a bookkeeper. She was charged with four counts

of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, five counts of transporting forged securities in

interstate commerce, id. § 2314, and two counts of possessing and uttering forged

securities, id. § 513(a). As an accomplice in her scheme, Hooker’s husband was also

charged with two counts of transporting forged securities in interstate commerce,

id. § 2314, and two counts of possessing and uttering forged securities, id. § 513(a).

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 06-1256 Page 2

At trial Walter Schenk, the owner and manager of the companies, and Larry

Kwiat, their outside auditor, testified that they discovered that Hooker had written

unauthorized checks on corporate accounts to her own creditors as well as to her

cousin, Cliff Meredith. Schenk stated that the checks purporting to bear his

signature were forged and that he recognized the handwriting as Hooker’s. Kwiat

recounted that when he confronted Hooker about the checks she admitted taking

money belonging to the companies and agreed to repay it. In addition, one of

Hooker’s co-workers testified that she saw Hooker receive packages full of banded

stacks of money that Hooker explained came from Meredith, who lived in Kentucky. 

Finally, two investigators for the FBI testified that Hooker had forged 153 checks

totaling $1,819,931.62 and that the checks at issue were sent back and forth

between Hooker and Meredith via Federal Express. 

The jury deliberated for two hours before finding Hooker guilty on all counts,

and the district court sentenced her to the highest end of the guidelines

imprisonment range——51 months—— because of the “casualness” with which she

committed the crimes and because she showed “no hint of remorse.” The court also

ordered Hooker to pay approximately $1.1 million in restitution, an amount agreed

upon by the parties. Hooker filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed counsel has

moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he is

unable to find a nonfrivolous basis for appeal. We informed Hooker that she could

respond to counsel’s motion, see Cir. R. 51(b), but she has not done so. Our review

is thus limited to the points discussed in counsel’s facially adequate brief. See

United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel first considers whether Hooker might argue that the jury did not

properly consider the evidence or discharge its duties because it deliberated for only

two hours. We will consider the length of the deliberations only where we have

reason to suspect that the jury disregarded its instructions or otherwise failed in its

duty, United States v. Cunningham, 108 F.3d 120, 124 (7th Cir. 1997), and we agree

with counsel that there is nothing in the record suggesting improper conduct on the

part of the jurors.

Counsel next considers whether Hooker might argue that the district court

erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 29. A district court should deny such a motion unless there is

insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. United States v. Hausmann, 345

F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 2003). 

To prevail on the mail-fraud charges under § 1341, the government was

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hooker 1) participated in a scheme

to defraud, 2) intended to defraud, and 3) used the United States mail or a private

carrier to further her scheme. United States v. Vincent, 416 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir.
No. 06-1256 Page 3

2005). To convict Hooker of transporting securities in interstate commerce in

violation of § 2314, the government had to prove that 1) she or others acting at her

direction transported securities——in this case checks drawn on company

accounts——in interstate commerce, 2) the checks were forged when they were

transported, 3) Hooker knew the checks were forged when they were transported,

and 4) she acted with unlawful or fraudulent intent. United States v. Jaderany, 221

F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 2000). Finally, to prevail on the charges that Hooker

possessed and uttered forged checks in violation of § 513(a), the government had to

prove that 1) Hooker possessed or uttered a forged check drawn on a corporate

account, and 2) she did so with the intent to deceive a person or organization. 

United States v. Lee, 439 F.3d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 2006). The government presented

evidence that Hooker forged 153 company checks and sent them out of state where

they were either used to pay her debts or were cashed and mailed back to her in the

form of currency. Given this overwhelming evidence, we agree with counsel that an

appeal based on the denial of Hooker’s motion for judgment of acquittal would be

frivolous. 

Counsel also considers whether Hooker might argue about the length of her

sentence or the amount of restitution she was ordered to pay. First, we note that

because Hooker agreed to the amount of restitution that the court ultimately

ordered, any argument concerning the restitution amount would be frivolous. See 18

U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3); United States v. Peterson, 268 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that restitution is limited to losses caused by counts of conviction, unless

defendant agrees to pay more). Regarding the length of Hooker’s sentence, we have

held that any sentence that falls within a correctly calculated guidelines range is

presumptively reasonable. United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.

2005). Although Hooker argued that she deserved a sentence at the low end of the

guidelines range because she had “done a lot of good things in her life,” nothing in

the record suggests that the district court failed to consider this contention in

weighing all of the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court fully

explained its reasoning before sentencing Hooker within the properly calculated

guidelines range, and thus we agree with counsel that any argument regarding the

reasonableness of her sentence would also be frivolous. See United States v. Laufle,

433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006).

Counsel next considers whether Hooker could argue that her sentence at the

highest end of her guidelines range is too severe relative to that of her husband and

co-defendant, who was sentenced at the lowest end of his guidelines range. Besides

the obvious flaw in comparing the sentences of two defendants who were found

guilty of a different number of counts, we have repeatedly stated that “a disparity

among co-defendants' sentences is not a valid basis to challenge a guideline sentence

otherwise correctly calculated.” United States v. White, 406 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir.
No. 06-1256 Page 4

2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted); accord United States v. Mendoza, 457

F.3d 726, 730-31 (7th Cir. 2006).

Counsel lastly considers whether Hooker might argue that she was deprived

of the effective assistance of trial counsel, but such a claim is better reserved for a

collateral proceeding where the record may be fully developed. See Massaro v.

United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003); United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 445

(7th Cir. 2003).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.