NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0662n.06 

 No. 17-1424 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

MARCUS M. BRIM, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DOUG WELTON, Inspector, 

 Defendant, 

and 

SHERRY ALEXANDER, Arus/Officer, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN 

 BEFORE: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges. 

 PER CURIAM. Marcus M. Brim appeals the district court’s orders granting summary 

judgment to one defendant and denying Brim’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. 

 Brim filed a complaint against Sherry Alexander, who was an assistant resident unit 

supervisor at Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Michigan, and Douglas 

Welton, who was an inspector at the same facility. Brim alleged that, while he was a prisoner at 

IBC, defendants failed to adequately protect him after he informed them that he was in danger 

from another prisoner. Brim sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. 
No. 17-1424, Brim v. Welton

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 Defendants moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge recommended denying 

the motion as to Welton but granting it as to Alexander on the basis that Brim failed to properly 

exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not adequately identify Alexander in the first 

step of the applicable three-step prison grievance procedure. Over Brim’s objections, the district 

court adopted the recommendation and dismissed without prejudice Brim’s claims against 

Alexander. The court denied Brim’s motion for reconsideration and subsequently dismissed 

Brim’s action after accepting a stipulation to dismiss the claims against Welton. 

On appeal, Brim argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to 

Alexander because he had adequately identified her in his administrative grievance proceedings. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. 

Court, 628 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 

759–60. A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable juror could return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. Id. at 759. 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a state prisoner, prior to filing suit in 

federal court, must exhaust his administrative remedies by complying with the grievance 

procedures set forth by his correctional institution. Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590 (6th 

Cir. 2017). Here, the relevant grievance procedure is set forth in Michigan Department of 

Corrections Policy Directive 03.02.130. That directive requires prisoners to briefly and 

concisely state the issues and to provide the facts relevant to the issues being grieved, including 

dates, times, places, and names of all those involved. Id. Generally, a prisoner fails to properly 

exhaust his administrative remedies under Policy Directive 03.02.130 when he fails to specify 
No. 17-1424, Brim v. Welton

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the names of each person from whom he seeks relief, but prison officials waive any procedural 

irregularities in a grievance when they address the grievance on the merits. Id. at 591. 

In his step one grievance, Brim alleged that, when he first arrived at IBC, he went to the 

assistant resident unit supervisor in Unit 7 and told her that he could not be around a particular 

prisoner who was also in the unit. Cell usage records show that Brim arrived at IBC on 

October 11, 2012, and Alexander’s affidavit states that she was an assistant resident unit 

supervisor in Unit 7 until November 24, 2012. After Brim’s step one grievance was denied on 

the merits, he appealed the decision to step two, and he identified Alexander as the supervisor 

whom he had spoken to about the other prisoner. The step two grievance was denied on the 

merits, and Brim appealed to step three, again identifying Alexander as the relevant supervisor. 

The step three grievance was denied on the merits. 

The district court erred by granting summary judgment to Alexander on the basis that 

Brim failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Because prison authorities denied 

Brim’s grievance on the merits at all three steps rather than invoking a procedural bar, he 

properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to Alexander. See Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 

603 F.3d 322, 323–24, 326 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a prisoner properly exhausted his claim 

despite failing to name a single individual in his initial grievance because he invoked one 

complete round of the relevant grievance procedure, and the Michigan Department of 

Corrections denied the grievance on the merits at each step rather than invoking a procedural 

bar). And, in any case, given that Brim identified an unnamed assistant resident unit supervisor 

in Unit 7 in his step-one grievance and clarified in his step-two appeal that Alexander was that 

supervisor, “a reasonable jury could find that this information was sufficient under the 

circumstances presented here” to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. See Mattox, 
No. 17-1424, Brim v. Welton

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851 F.3d at 597 (concluding that summary judgment based on failure to properly exhaust 

administrative remedies was improper where a step one grievance stated that an unnamed 

medical officer violated the plaintiff’s rights and the step two appeal named the medical officer 

in question). 

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary judgment to 

Alexander and REMAND for further proceedings.