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PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF

THE TOWN OF MONROE ET AL. v.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

COMMISSION ET AL.

(SC 19263)

(SC 19264)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa,

Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued October 23, 2014—officially released March 24, 2015

Victor R. Perpetua, principal attorney, with whom

were Clifton A. Leonhardt, chief counsel, and, on the

brief, Colleen M. Murphy, general counsel, forthe appellant-appellee in SC 19263 and the appellee in SC 19264

(named defendant).

Ian Angus Cole, for the appellants in SC 19264 and

the appellees in SC 19263 (defendant Handsome, Inc.,

et al.).

Assaf Z. Ben-Atar, with whom were Edward P.

McCreery III, and, on the brief, John H. Van Lenten,

for the appellees-appellants in SC 19263 and the appellees in SC 19264 (plaintiffs).
Opinion

ZARELLA, J. Connecticut’s Freedom of Information

Act1

(act) allows public agencies to convene executive

sessions, as an exception to the general rule that meetings must be open to the public, to discuss ‘‘strategy and

negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending

litigation to which the public agency . . . is a party

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 1-200 (6) (B). The dispositive

issue in these appeals is whether an executive session

held by the named plaintiff, the Planning and Zoning

Commission of the Town of Monroe (zoning commission),2

fell within the purview of the act’s ‘‘pending

claims or pending litigation’’ exception. The named

defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission

(FOIC), initially determined that the zoning commission’s executive session was unlawful under the act.

The zoning commission appealed from the FOIC’s decision to the trial court, which reversed the FOIC’s decision, concluding that the zoning commission’s executive session was permissible under the act’s pending

claims or pending litigation exception. The FOIC now

appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming

that the executive session violated the act.3 The defendant Handsome, Inc. (Handsome), and its principal officers, the defendants Todd Cascella and Mona Cascella,

who were seeking approval of a zoning permit extension

by the zoning commission when it convened the executive session in question, also appeal from the judgment

of the trial court, claiming that the executive session

was unlawful.4 We conclude that the zoning commission’s executive session was not justified under the

pending claims or pending litigation exception of the

act and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the

trial court.5

The record reveals the following facts. In 2003, the

zoning commission issued Handsome a special exception permit, authorizing itto excavate land at 125 Garder

Road in the town of Monroe to construct a new industrial building, subject to certain conditions enumerated

in the permit. In 2008, one month before the permit

was set to expire, Handsome filed an application with

the zoning commission for a five year extension. The

zoning commission denied the application on the

ground that Handsome had failed to comply with the

conditions of the original permit. Handsome and the

Cascellas appealed to the Superior Court, which determined that the zoning commission improperly had

denied the application to extend the permit and that

‘‘the [zoning] commission had no option but to approve

the . . . request for an extension.’’ Handsome subsequently requested by letter that the zoning commission

extend the permit. In response, the zoning commission

put the request on the agenda for its May 5, 2011 regular meeting.

Specifically, the agenda for that meeting provided in
relevant part: ‘‘3. RECESS REGULAR MEETING and

CONVENE to EXECUTIVE SESSION. Review of

enforcement procedures with Town Engineer/Acting

Clerk of the [Zoning] Commission, First Selectman,

Land Use Attorney and Zoning Enforcement Officer.

‘‘4. RECONVENE REGULAR MEETING

* * *

‘‘15. OTHER BUSINESS

‘‘16. ENFORCEMENT. 125 Garder Road—activity

without permits.

* * *

‘‘22. LEGAL ISSUES. 125 Garder Road—compliance

with extension of approval.’’

At the start of the May 5, 2011 meeting, the zoning

commission immediately convened an executive session to discuss what it described as legal matters regarding general zoning enforcement. Following the executive session, which lasted approximately fifty minutes,

the zoning commission reconvened and extended Handsome’s permit to 2013.6 After the zoning commission’s

meeting, Handsome and the Cascellas filed a complaint

with the FOIC, claiming that the zoning commission’s

executive session violated the act.7

The FOIC held a hearing at which itreceived evidence

and heard testimony from witnesses and arguments

from counsel. The FOIC found that, during the executive session, the members of the zoning commission

had discussed two topics that potentially warranted

convening an executive session: (1) how to respond to

the prior decision of the Superior Court overruling the

zoning commission’s denial of Handsome’s application

to extend its permit; and (2) how to address Handsome’s

noncompliance with the conditions of the original permit. With respect to the second topic, the FOIC further

found that, although the zoning commission members

had discussed potential options for addressing Handsome’s alleged permit violations, they had not discussed

initiating a zoning enforcement action against Handsome or filing an action against it in court or another

forum for those alleged permit violations.

On the basis of these findings, the FOIC concluded

that neither of the two topics the zoning commission

had discussed warranted convening an executive session under the pending claims or pending litigation

exception in § 1-200 (6) (B). With respect to the first

topic, the prior court decision regarding the permit

extension, the FOIC determined that the pending claims

or pending litigation exception did not apply because

that prior case had been ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ before

the executive session and, thus, was no longer pending.

With respect to the second topic, the alleged permit

violations, the FOIC ruled that the exception in § 1-200

(6) (B) did not apply because, at the time of the execu-
tive session, there was no pending claim or litigation

relating to those alleged permit violations, and the zoning commission had not considered during the executive session filing an action against Handsome for those

violations. Consequently, the FOIC ruled that the zoning

commission had violated the act’s open meetings

requirement, as provided in General Statutes § 1-225

(a), by convening the executive session. The zoning

commission thereafter appealed from the FOIC’s final

decision to the trial court.

The trial court reversed the FOIC’s decision and held

that the zoning commission properly convened its executive session.8 Although the trial court agreed with the

FOIC that the prior Superior Court case concerning the

permit extension had been finally adjudicated and, thus,

did not justify convening the executive session, the trial

court disagreed with the FOIC regarding the zoning

commission’s discussion of the alleged permit violations. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the zoning commission was justified in convening the executive

session to discuss the alleged permit violations because

that constituted ‘‘consideration of action to enforce or

implement legal relief or a legal right,’’ which fell within

the purview of the pending claims or pending litigation

exception. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The

FOIC, Handsome, and the Cascellas appealed from the

judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and

we transferred their appeals to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal, the FOIC claims that the zoning commission could not have convened the executive session

pursuant to the pending claims or pending litigation

exception to discuss the alleged permit violations

because the zoning commission was not a party to any

pending or prospective litigation relating to Handsome’s

permit at that time. The zoning commission responds

that the pending claims or pending litigation exception

is not so narrow but, rather, allows public agencies to

convene executive sessions to consider taking actions

to ‘‘enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right’’

short of litigation. General Statutes § 1-200 (9) (C). The

zoning commission also claims that, even if its executive session was not warranted by virtue of its discussions regarding the alleged permit violations, the trial

court’s judgment should be affirmed on the alternative

ground that the zoning commission properly convened

the executive session underthe pending claims or pending litigation exception to discuss how to respond to

the prior Superior Court decision regarding the permit

extension. We conclude that the trial court’s judgment

must be reversed because the zoning commission was

not justified in convening the executive session under

the pending claims or pending litigation exception to

discuss Handsome’s alleged permit violations. We further conclude that the zoning commission’s alternative

ground for affirmance has no merit.9
We review the trial court’s judgment pursuant to the

Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. See, e.g., Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of

Information Commission, 310 Conn. 276, 281, 77 A.3d

121 (2013). When a case presents only questions of law,

an administrative agency’s legal determinations are not

entitled to any special deference, unless they previously

have been subject to judicial review or to a governmental agency’s time-tested interpretation. See, e.g., Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information

Commission, 301 Conn. 323, 336–37, 21 A.3d 737 (2011).

Thus, because this case presents an issue of statutory

construction that never has been subject to judicial

scrutiny and lacks an agency’s time-tested interpretation, the FOIC’s determination that the zoning commission’s executive session was not permissible under § 1-

200 (6) (B) and (9) (C) is not entitled to any special deference.

‘‘Instead, [w]ell settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review. . . . Because statutory

interpretation is a question of law, our review is de

novo. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to

determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs

us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . .

The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute,

when read in context, is susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation. . . . When a statute is not

plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive

guidance to the legislative history and circumstances

surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it

was designed to implement, and to its relationship to

existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 337–38. We turn now to

the relevant statutes to determine whether the pending

claims or pending litigation exception applied to the

zoning commission’s executive session.

The act provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he meetings

of all public agencies, except executive sessions . . .

shall be open to the public. . . .’’ General Statutes § 1-

225 (a). The term ‘‘ ‘[e]xecutive sessions’ ’’ is defined

as ‘‘a meeting of a public agency at which the public

is excluded for one or more of [five specified] purposes

. . . .’’10 General Statutes § 1-200 (6). ‘‘We recognize

that the basic policy of the [act] supports limiting the

exceptions to open meetings. This court has said that

it will construe the act to favor disclosure and that
exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed.

. . . The burden of establishing the applicability of an

exception rests upon the party claiming it. . . . We

have not, however, hesitated to apply an exception

where the party seeking it has met the burden of establishing that it applies.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Furhman v. Freedom of

Information Commission, 243 Conn. 427, 432, 703 A.2d

624 (1997).

The specific exception at issue in the present case

is set forth in § 1-200 (6) (B), which allows public agencies to convene in executive session for the purpose

of ‘‘strategy and negotiations with respect to pending

claims or pending litigation to which the public agency

. . . is a party until such litigation or claim has been

finally adjudicated or otherwise settled . . . .’’ The act

further defines a pending claim11 and pending litigation12

in § 1-200 (8) and (9), respectively. The parties in this

case dispute the meaning of the term ‘‘pending litigation,’’ as it is used in § 1-200 (6) (B) and defined in § 1-

200 (9) (C).

The FOIC claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that the zoning commission’s discussion in executive session about Handsome’s alleged permit violations, and what zoning enforcement options the zoning

commission could take in response to those alleged

violations, constituted discussion concerning pending

litigation under § 1-200 (6) (B) and (9) (C). The FOIC

further argues that the term ‘‘pending litigation’’ in § 1-

200 (6) (B) allows a public agency to convene an executive session only if there is a pending or prospective

legal proceeding to which the agency is or will be a

party. In contrast, the zoning commission claims that

there is no such requirement in § 1-200 (6) (B). In support of its position, the zoning commission points to

the fact that § 1-200 (9) (C) defines ‘‘pending litigation’’

as including ‘‘the agency’s consideration of action to

enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right.’’

According to the zoning commission, a public agency

may therefore convene an executive session to generally ‘‘[consider] action to enforce or implement legal

relief or a legal right’’ regardless of whether there is a

certain pending or prospective legal proceeding to

which the agency is or will be a party. The zoning

commission thus asserts that, because its members’

discussion of their zoning enforcement options against

Handsome constituted ‘‘consideration of action to

enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right’’; General Statutes § 1-200 (9) (C); its executive session fell

within the scope of the pending claims or pending litigation exception of § 1-200 (6) (B). We reject the zoning

commission’s interpretation of § 1-200 (6) (B) and (9)

(C) and agree with the FOIC that a public agency may

convene an executive session under the pending claims

or pending litigation exception only to discuss matters

that are in connection with a prospective or pending
lawsuit or legal proceeding.

Having reviewed the language of § 1-200 (6) (B) and

(9) (C), we conclude that the statute is plain and unambiguous. Although § 1-200 (9) (C) does not expressly

tie a public agency’s ‘‘consideration of action to enforce

or implement legal relief or a legal right’’ to a certain

pending or prospective legal proceeding, that does not

end our inquiry. Section 1-200 (9) (C) must be read in

conjunction with § 1-200 (6) (B), as ‘‘[i]t is a basic tenet

of statutory construction that [w]e construe a statute

as a whole and read its subsections concurrently in

order to reach a reasonable overall interpretation.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality

Steel Products, Inc., 280 Conn. 1, 9, 905 A.2d 55 (2006).

Section 1-200 (6) (B), which contains the pending

claims or pending litigation exception itself, allows a

public agency to convene an executive session only to

discuss ‘‘pending litigation’’ to which the agency is ‘‘a

party . . . .’’ We recently interpreted the term ‘‘party’’

in § 1-200 (6) (B) according to the definition of ‘‘party’’

in Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines that term in

relevant part as ‘‘[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit

is brought . . . .’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.

2009) p. 1232; accord Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 310 Conn. 288. Thus, in order for § 1-

200 (6) (B) to apply, the public agency either must be

bringing or defending a prospective or pending lawsuit

in court or some other legal action in an adjudicatory

forum. See Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 153, 161, 585 A.2d 82

(1991) (‘‘pending’’ claim or litigation includes claim or

litigation ‘‘already in existence and in progress,’’ as well

as imminent, threatened litigation not yet filed). To

interpret § 1-200 (6) (B) otherwise would render the

term ‘‘a party’’ superfluous. See Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc., 296 Conn. 426, 433, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010)

(‘‘[b]ecause [e]very word and phrase [of a statute] is

presumed to have meaning . . . [a statute] must be

construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or

word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Turning to the facts of the present case, we conclude

that the zoning commission was not justified in convening an executive session under § 1-200 (6)(B) to discuss

its zoning enforcement options with respect to Handsome’s original permit because, at that time, there was

no pending litigation regarding the permit to which the

zoning commission was a party. It is clear there was no

pending or prospective litigation regarding Handsome’s

alleged permit violations. The FOIC specifically found

that the zoning commission did not discuss in the executive session bringing a ‘‘ ‘zoning enforcement action’ ’’

or ‘‘an action . . . in court or in another forum’’ against

Handsome. Even if the zoning commission members
had considered initiating a zoning enforcement action,

§ 1-200 (6) (B) still would not have applied because

the zoning commission cannot be a party to its own

regulatory proceeding. Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information

Commission, supra, 310 Conn. 288 n.12 (when agency

serves as decision-making body in proceeding, it is not

‘‘a party’’ to such proceeding); see also General Statutes

§ 8-3 (e) (‘‘[t]he zoning commission shall provide for

the manner in which the zoning regulations shall be

enforced’’); Board of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, Superior Court, judicial district

of New Britain, Docket No. CV-01-0506448-S (November

20, 2001) (board of public safety not justified in convening executive session under § 1-200 [6] [B] and [9] [C] to

consider disciplinary action against employee because

board could not be ‘‘a party’’ to its own disciplinary

proceeding). Thus, we conclude that the zoning commission’s discussion of Handsome’s alleged permit violations did not warrant convening an executive session

pursuant to § 1-200 (6) (B).

In reaching its conclusion to the contrary, the trial

court relied on Furhman v. Freedom of Information

Commission, supra, 243 Conn. 427, in which this court

decided that the actions a public agency may consider

taking under § 1-200 (9) (C) to ‘‘enforce or implement

legal relief or a legal right’’ are not limited to judicial

actions, such as filing a lawsuit in court. See Furhman

v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, supra, 432–34.

In applying Furhman to the present case, the trial court

listed a number of actions to enforce the conditions of

the original permit, short of filing a suit against Handsome, for which the zoning commission could have

convened an executive session under § 1-200 (6) (B)

and (9) (C) to discuss, including issuing a cease and

desist order and more closely monitoring Handsome’s

grading activities. We disagree that Furhman resolves

the present case.

In Furhman, this court indeed held that a public

agency may convene an executive session to consider

nonjudicial actions to enforce or implement legal relief

or a legal right. See id. We did not hold, however, that

a public agency may convene an executive session to

consider taking such nonjudicial actions in the absence

of a pending or prospective proceeding in a court or

forum other than the agency itself. In Furhman, the

New Milford town council convened an executive session to discuss actions it could take to defeat a permit

application that was pending before the Department of

Environmental Protection that, if allowed, would have

permitted a waste management company to dump

150,000 tons of dredged waste sediments in the New

Milford landfill. Id., 428–29. The New Milford town

council convened an executive session to consider taking judicial action, including filing a declaratory judgment action and filing a lawsuit against the department,
and nonjudicial action, including hiring a lobbyist. Id.,

429. Thus, in Furhman, the public agency in question

was not only considering taking nonjudicial action in

connection with a legal matter that already was pending before a different administrative agency, namely,

the department, but also was considering filing a lawsuit. Thus, there was no question in Furhman that the

New Milford town council convened its executive session to discuss a pending claim or pending litigation.

In contrast, in the present case, the zoning commission convened its executive session to discuss taking

nonjudicial action in connection with a matter that was

not pending in any court or forum other than the zoning

commission itself. As we previously noted, the zoning

commission did not consider filing a lawsuit against

Handsome for its alleged permit violations, and there

was no prospective or pending proceeding relating to

those alleged violations in another forum. Although

Furhman allows public agencies to consider taking

nonjudicial action in executive session pursuant to § 1-

200 (6) (B) and (9) (C), such as the nonjudicial zoning

enforcement options that the zoning commission considered in its executive session, Furhman does not

allow agencies to consider taking such action in executive session when the action would not be taken in

connection with a pending or prospective proceeding

in court or another forum. Consequently, Furhman

does not resolve the issue in the present case.

Having decided that the zoning commission’s discussion of the alleged permit violations did not come within

the purview of § 1-200 (6) (B), we now must address the

zoning commission’s alternative ground for affirmance.

The zoning commission claims that, contrary to the trial

court’s conclusion, its discussion during the executive

session regarding how to respond to the prior Superior

Court decision regarding Handsome’s application to

extend its permit warranted convening an executive

session under § 1-200 (6) (B). Specifically, the zoning

commission argues that the adverse Superior Court

decision constituted ‘‘pending litigation’’ that was not

yet ‘‘finally adjudicated or otherwise settled’’ under § 1-

200 (6)(B) because the Superior Courtretained jurisdiction over the matter until the zoning commission complied with the court’s order. Thus, the zoning commission asks us to reverse the trial court’s judgment with

respect to that justification for the executive session

and to conclude that the executive session was lawful

under the act. In response, the FOIC argues that

whether a claim or litigation is ‘‘finally adjudicated’’

under § 1-200 (6) (B) does not turn on a court’s continuing jurisdiction to enter postjudgment orders and that

the prior Superior Court case that the zoning commission discussed was finally adjudicated. We agree with

the FOIC and conclude that the prior Superior Court

case regarding the zoning commission’s denial of the

permit extension was finally adjudicated within the
meaning of § 1-200 (6) (B) before the zoning commission’s executive session.

We begin by reviewing the language of the statute at

issue. As we previously discussed, § 1-200 (6)(B) allows

public agencies to convene an executive session to discuss pending claims or pending litigation to which it is

a party ‘‘until such litigation or claim has been finally

adjudicated or otherwise settled . . . .’’ Because the

term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ is not defined in the act, we

are guided by the principle that ‘‘terms in a statute are

to be assigned their ordinary meaning, unless context

dictates otherwise . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 293 Conn. 363, 372–73, 977 A.2d 650 (2009). The

verb ‘‘adjudicate’’ is commonly defined as: ‘‘to settle

finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court

case) on the merits of issues raised . . . .’’ Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary (2002) p. 27. The

adjective ‘‘final’’ is commonly defined as: ‘‘not to be

altered or undone . . . .’’ Id., p. 851. Reading these

definitions together, we conclude that the statute is

plain and unambiguous and that the term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ refers to the point at which a court has decided

the matter in question, and that decision cannot be

altered or modified on appeal.13 Thus, a matteris ‘‘finally

adjudicated’’ under § 1-200 (6) (B) either upon completion of an appeal to the highest possible tribunal or

upon expiration of a party’s right to appeal.

Applying this interpretation of § 1-200 (6) (B) to the

present case, we conclude that the prior Superior Court

case regarding the permit extension was finally adjudicated before the zoning commission’s executive session. The court in that administrative appeal reversed

the zoning commission’s decision on September 9, 2010,

concluding that the zoning commission improperly had

denied Handsome’s application to extend the permit.

In so concluding, the court determined on the merits

the issues raised in that administrative appeal. Thus,

the case had been adjudicated within the meaning of

§ 1-200 (6) (B). There is no doubt that, at the time of

the zoning commission’s May 5, 2011 executive session,

approximately eight months after the court’s decision,

the case had been finally adjudicated within the meaning of § 1-200 (6) (B) because the twenty day period

during which the zoning commission had the right to

appeal the court’s decision already had expired. See

Practice Book § 63-1 (a). Accordingly, the zoning commission’s discussion of the prior Superior Court decision did not warrant convening an executive session

under § 1-200 (6) (B).

In reaching this conclusion, we reject the zoning commission’s claim that, because the Superior Court continued to have jurisdiction over the matter, the administrative appeal involving the permit extension was not

yet finally adjudicated when the zoning commission
convened its executive session. The zoning commission

asserts that the case involving the permit extension was

not finally adjudicated until the zoning commission fully

complied with the judgmentregarding the permit extension. The zoning commission reasons that the case

could not have been finally adjudicated by the court

deciding the administrative appeal because that court

still could have held the zoning commission in contempt

if it had not complied with the court’s order.14 This

interpretation of‘‘finally adjudicated,’’ however, ignores

the fact that, as we previously discussed, adjudication

fundamentally pertains to legal issues being resolved

and decided. Moreover, interpreting ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ as hinging on the possibility of postjudgment

litigation would effectively remove the temporal limitation in § 1-200 (6) (B) and make the pending claims or

pending litigation exception apply indefinitely to certain

litigation.15 Such an interpretation would undermine the

basic policy of limiting the exceptions to the act’s open

meeting requirement. See, e.g., Furhman v. Freedom

of Information Commission, supra, 243 Conn. 432.

Accordingly, we reject the zoning commission’s interpretation of ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ in § 1-200 (6) (B).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to render judgment denying the appeal.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.

2 The town of Monroe also was named as a plaintiff in the present case.

In the interest of simplicity, we refer only to the zoning commission throughout this opinion.

3 The zoning commission also filed a cross appeal in which it claims that

the trial court improperly remanded the case to the FOIC to determine

whether the zoning commission violated General Statutes § 1-231 (a) by

having a zoning enforcement officer attend the executive session in question.

4 Todd Cascella is the president and Mona Cascella is the secretary of

Handsome, and we refer to them collectively as the Cascellas.

On appeal, Handsome and the Cascellas first claim that there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that the zoning

commission discussed options other than litigation to enforce the conditions

of the original permit, the basis on which the trial court decided that the

executive session was justified underthe pending claims or pending litigation

exception of the act. Additionally, Handsome and the Cascellas claim that

the executive session violated the act because the zoning commission’s

review of its enforcement options and general legal issues is not a valid

reason for convening an executive session under the act.

5 Because we are reversing the judgment of the trial court, we need not

reach the zoning commission’s claim in its cross appeal. Likewise, our

resolution of the FOIC’s appeal resolves the appeal brought by Handsome

and the Cascellas, as they, too, are entitled to reversal of the trial court’s

judgment.

6 The zoning commission extended the permit five years from the date

the original permit expired but a mere two years from the date of the

meeting. The zoning commission also granted the extension request subject

to the posting of a bond and adherence to five ‘‘requirements’’ in addition

to the conditions of the original permit.

7 At the same time, Handsome and the Cascellas appealed from the zoning

commission’s decision to the Superior Court, challenging the imposition of

conditions that they allege were not part of the original permit, the extension

of the permit from the date of expiration of the original permit instead of

from the date of the May 5, 2011 meeting, and the convening of the executive

session, which they claimed violated the act. The trial court sustained this

separate administrative appeal, and the zoning commission appealed from

the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court. That appeal was thereafter
transferred to this court. See Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, Docket No. SC 19262 (Conn.) (pending appeal filed August 9, 2013).

8 The trial court rendered judgment after initially remanding the matter

to the FOIC for clarification on four of the FOIC’s findings and conclusions.

After the FOIC issued a revised final decision clarifying those four findings

and conclusions, the trial court rendered judgment sustaining the zoning

commission’s administrative appeal.

9 As we previously discussed, our resolution of the FOIC’s appeal resolves

the separate appeal filed by Handsome and the Cascellas and makes it

unnecessary for us to reach the zoning commission’s claim in its cross

appeal. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

10 General Statutes § 1-200 (6) provides in its entirety: ‘‘ ‘Executive sessions’ means a meeting of a public agency at which the public is excluded

for one or more of the following purposes: (A) Discussion concerning the

appointment, employment, performance, evaluation, health or dismissal of

a public officer or employee, provided that such individual may require that

discussion be held at an open meeting; (B) strategy and negotiations with

respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency

or a member thereof, because of the member’s conduct as a member of such

agency, is a party until such litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or

otherwise settled; (C) matters concerning security strategy or the deployment of security personnel, or devices affecting public security; (D) discussion of the selection of a site or the lease, sale or purchase of real estate

by the state or a political subdivision of the state when publicity regarding

such site, lease, sale, purchase or construction would adversely impact the

price of such site, lease, sale, purchase or construction until such time as

all of the property has been acquired or all proceedings or transactions

concerning same have been terminated or abandoned; and (E) discussion

of any matter which would result in the disclosure of public records or the

information contained therein described in subsection (b) of section 1-210.’’

11 General Statutes § 1-200 (8) defines ‘‘ ‘[p]ending claim’ ’’ as: ‘‘a written

notice to an agency which sets forth a demand forlegalrelief or which asserts

a legalright stating the intention to institute an action in an appropriate forum

if such relief or right is not granted.’’

12 General Statutes § 1-200 (9) defines ‘‘ ‘[p]ending litigation’ ’’ as: ‘‘(A) a

written notice to an agency which sets forth a demand for legal relief or

which asserts a legal right stating the intention to institute an action before

a court if such relief or right is not granted by the agency; (B) the service

of a complaint against an agency returnable to a court which seeks to enforce

or implement legal relief or a legal right; or (C) the agency’s consideration of

action to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right.’’

13 Although it is possible to imagine alternative interpretations of the term

‘‘finally adjudicated,’’ none would be reasonable in the context of the act.

For instance, the term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ could be interpreted as referring

to the point at which a court simply renders judgment because such a

judgment would be ‘‘final’’ insofar as a party could appeal from it. Such an

interpretation, however, would not comport with the ordinary meaning of

the term ‘‘final,’’ which, as we previously noted, describes something that

is ‘‘not to be altered or undone . . . .’’ Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary, supra, p. 851. The term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ therefore cannot

reasonably be interpreted as referring to the point at which a court merely

renders judgment because, although a matter is adjudicated upon a court’s

rendering judgment, it is not necessarily finally adjudicated, as the judgment

could be subject to a motion to reconsider or to open.

In theory, the term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ also could be interpreted as

referring to the point at which a party seeks leave to appeal after its right

to appeal has expired, and the appeal is either heard or dismissed. Such an

interpretation is theoretically possible because the general appeal period

in Connecticut is set by the rules of practice, and, thus, the period is not

jurisdictional, and appellate courts have discretion to hear a late appeal. C.

Tait & E. Prescott, Connecticut Appellate Practice and Procedure (4th Ed.

2014) § 4-2:1, p. 222. This interpretation too, however, would belie common

sense. The term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ cannot reasonably be interpreted as

referring to the point at which a party seeks leave to appeal because it is

possible that a party never will do so. Because the term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’

is used in § 1-200 (6) (B) to establish a temporal limitation on when a public

agency may convene an executive session, it would not be reasonable to

interpret that term as referring to an event that never may occur.

Thus, neither of these alternative interpretations of the term ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ would be reasonable in the context of the act. The only reasonable
interpretation of ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ is that it refers to the point at which

a party has exhausted its right to appeal from the judgment in question or

the point at which that right has expired.

14 In support of this claim, the zoning commission relies on AvalonBay

Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 246, 796

A.2d 1164 (2002) (AvalonBay Communities), in which this court held that

a trial court that decided an administrative appeal had continuing jurisdiction

to enter postjudgment orders when a public agency fails to comply with its

ruling. While the Superior Court undoubtedly has such authority, the principle announced in AvalonBay Communities does not address what constitutes litigation that has been ‘‘finally adjudicated’’ under § 1-200 (6) (B).

Thus, AvalonBay Communities does not resolve the issue presented in the

zoning commission’s alternative ground for affirmance.

15 For instance, if a trial court rendered judgment awarding money to one

party, the underlying litigation would not be ‘‘finally adjudicated,’’ according

to the zoning commission, until the losing party has satisfied the judgment.

The temporal limits of § 1-200 (6) (B) cannot depend on a party’s satisfying

a trial court’s judgment because that could allow a public agency to intentionally avoid satisfying a judgment in order to continue meeting in executive

session.