2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-20-2012

Edward Sistrunk v. Gerald Rozum

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 09-2495

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 09-2495

_____________

EDWARD SISTRUNK,

Appellant

v.

GERALD ROZUM;

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE

COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA;

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:06-cv-05630)

District Judge: Hon. John R. Padova

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 28, 2011

Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, 

Circuit Judges.
2

(Filed: March 20, 2012)

Teri B. Himebaugh, Esq.

220 Stallion Lane

Schwenksville, PA 19473

Attorney for Appellant

Molly Selzer Lorber, Assistant District Attorney

Thomas W. Dolgenos, Chief, Federal Litigation

Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Law Division

Joseph E. McGettigan, III, First Assistant District Attorney

R. Seth Williams, District Attorney

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office

Three South Penn Square

Philadelphia, PA 19107-3499

Attorneys for Appellees

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

This appeal seeks review of a denial of a petition for 

habeas corpus by Edward Sistrunk, an inmate in 

Respondents’ custody. After pursuing and exhausting his 

state court avenues for appeal, Sistrunk sought habeas relief 

from the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania on the basis of newly discovered evidence of 

his “actual innocence.” The District Court concluded that the 

Pennsylvania state courts’ disposition of Sistrunk’s appeal 
3

was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law, and denied his petition. We 

will affirm.

The certificate of appealability (“COA”) limits our 

review to a single issue: whether Sistrunk’s habeas petition 

was timely filed according to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). By 

sheer counting of calendar days, it is undisputed that 

Sistrunk’s petition was filed long after his one-year timeliness 

period expired. But because the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides several avenues for 

petitioners to satisfy timeliness, Sistrunk’s argument requires 

us to determine whether he is entitled to statutory tolling or 

different types of equitable tolling that might save his claim. 

Specifically, Sistrunk contends that he is entitled to: (1) 

statutory tolling on the basis of uncovering new, exculpatory 

evidence; (2) equitable tolling due to government witness 

tampering; or (3) equitable tolling because he is actually

innocent. 

We conclude that Sistrunk does not qualify for these 

tolling exceptions. Sistrunk’s delays are inexcusable, his 

evidence is not “new,” and even if we permitted equitable 

tolling for actual innocence, Sistrunk’s proofs of “actual 

innocence” fall short. We will, therefore, affirm the District 

Court’s judgment. 

I.

A.

In the early morning hours of July 23, 1993, Edward 

Sistrunk used his automobile horn and headlamps to harass a

car driven by Julmaine Moody on a residential road in 
4

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.1 Both cars pulled over. An 

altercation between the cars’ occupants broke out, but ceased 

abruptly when a passenger in Moody’s car recognized a 

passenger in Sistrunk’s car as an acquaintance. All reentered 

their respective vehicles, and the cars returned to the 

roadway. Sistrunk then positioned his moving car alongside 

Moody’s, drew a revolver, aimed at a passenger in Moody’s 

car with whom he had had a heated exchange, and fired. 

Missing its intended mark, the bullet struck the unarmed and 

pregnant Moody in the head, killing her.

Sistrunk evaded capture for three months until his 

arrest in North Carolina. Multiple witnesses identified 

Sistrunk as the shooter, including Sistrunk’s intended victim, 

David Snyder. Out of the many people who implicated 

Sistrunk in the murder, one witness of particular significance 

here, Gregory Anderson, gave a statement to police and 

testified at a preliminary hearing on January 6, 1994, that he 

was in Sistrunk’s car at the time of the murder and that

Sistrunk was the murderer. Anderson disappeared before trial 

and therefore did not testify, but Sistrunk’s defense counsel 

successfully argued to admit Anderson’s hearing testimony at 

trial. The trial court found as a fact that all witnesses agreed 

Sistrunk was the shooter. 

On May 18, 1995, the court sentenced Sistrunk to life 

imprisonment for murdering Moody. In addition, the court 

 1 AEDPA requires us to presume that the state courts’ factual 

findings are valid and binding, absent clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We thus 

relate the relevant facts as found by the Pennsylvania state 

courts.
5

sentenced Sistrunk to concurrent imprisonment terms for 

possession of an instrument of crime, reckless endangerment, 

and simple assault. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed 

Sistrunk’s sentence on July 19, 1996. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court then denied Sistrunk’s petition for allowance 

of appeal on December 11, 1996. His conviction became final 

on March 11, 1997, when Sistrunk’s deadline for filing a 

petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court 

passed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c); Kapral v. United States, 166 

F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999).

B.

Sistrunk filed a petition for relief under the 

Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-9546, on December 11, 1997, 

contending that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The 

PCRA court dismissed Sistrunk’s petition because Sistrunk 

had already litigated the issues on direct appeal. The 

Pennsylvania Superior Court then affirmed this dismissal on 

June 19, 2000. 

Sistrunk filed a second PCRA petition on June 26, 

2002, contending that newly discovered evidence entitled him 

to a new trial or evidentiary hearing. Sistrunk alleged that he 

had uncovered evidence proving that another person had 

confessed to shooting Moody. Sistrunk claimed to have first 

heard on April 29, 2002, that Damon Rodriguez—now 

deceased—had told Manuel Rodriguez in 1993 that Damon 

had driven the car on the night of the murder and had shot 

Moody. The PCRA court dismissed this petition as untimely 

on July 9, 2003. The Superior Court affirmed this dismissal 

on January 26, 2005. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then 
6

denied Sistrunk’s petition for allowance of appeal on October 

4, 2005. 

On August 18, 2006, Sistrunk filed a third PCRA 

petition, asking the PCRA court to vacate his conviction 

based on more newly discovered evidence of his actual 

innocence. In this petition, Sistrunk alleged that his attorney 

received a letter from Gregory Anderson—Sistrunk’s 

cousin—on June 22, 2006, admitting to perjuring himself at 

Sistrunk’s preliminary hearing by testifying that Sistrunk was 

the shooter. Anderson further claimed that police 

investigators coerced him into giving false testimony,

specifically against Sistrunk, by threatening to charge 

Anderson with conspiracy. After testifying to Sistrunk’s 

detriment at the preliminary hearing and then failing to appear 

at trial, Sistrunk claimed that Anderson felt the need to finally 

clear his conscience. 

C.

This third PCRA petition pended in Pennsylvania state 

court when Sistrunk filed his federal petition, on December 

22, 2006. In it, Sistrunk raised two claims for relief based on 

newly discovered evidence of innocence: (1) the Damon 

Rodriguez confession, which Sistrunk learned about on April 

29, 2002; and (2) the Gregory Anderson letter, which Sistrunk 

received on June 22, 2006. On July 5, 2007, Magistrate Judge 

Hey issued a Report and Recommendation, advising

dismissal of both claims. In an Order-Memorandum filed on

October 31, 2007, the District Court for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania adopted the Recommendation to dismiss 

Sistrunk’s Rodriguez claim, but, because Sistrunk’s third 

PCRA petition still pended, the District Court stayed the 

Anderson claim. On October 30, 2008, the District Court 
7

recommitted the claim to Magistrate Judge Hey for a 

Supplemental Report and Recommendation. 

On February 24, 2009, Magistrate Judge Hey 

recommended that Sistrunk’s Anderson claim be dismissed as 

time-barred. The magistrate judge concluded that: Sistrunk’s 

conviction became final on March 11, 1997; Sistrunk’s 

federal petition was filed on December 22, 2006, seven years 

past AEDPA’s time limit, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); the 

Anderson letter was not “newly discovered evidence” under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), and thus did not create a new one-year 

limitations period; Sistrunk’s third PCRA petition did not toll 

the AEDPA limitations period; Sistrunk was not entitled to 

equitable tolling; and no COA should issue. 

Sistrunk filed his objections with the District Court on 

March 5, 2009. The District Court concluded that none of 

Sistrunk’s objections had merit, affirmed the magistrate 

judge’s denial of a COA, and dismissed Sistrunk’s habeas 

petition with prejudice on April 21, 2009. Sistrunk then filed 

an application for a COA with this Court under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1), which we granted on March 7, 2011. 

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). As discussed below in Part III, we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c). 

We apply a mixed standard of review. We scrutinize 

jurisdictional questions and legal conclusions under a plenary 

standard of review. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 

231 (3d Cir. 2004). On the merits, however, “a federal court 

is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 

Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. 
8

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). “[A] state court’s 

interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in 

habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Under AEDPA, moreover, we must deny the writ unless the 

petitioner shows that the state court conviction unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law, was contrary to 

clearly established federal law, or was based on an 

“objectively unreasonable” determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 409-410 (2000).

III.

Before turning to Sistrunk’s substantive arguments, we 

address briefly—and ultimately dismiss—the government’s 

contention that we lack jurisdiction because Sistrunk’s habeas 

petition does not state a constitutional claim. This argument 

attacks our jurisdiction on two levels. First, the government 

contends that the absence of a constitutional claim renders the 

COA defective, barring us from considering Sistrunk’s 

claims. Second, the government argues that Sistrunk’s 

petition points only to his imprisonment-while-actuallyinnocent as a constitutional harm. Because, in the 

government’s view, a freestanding claim of innocence is not a 

proper “basis for federal habeas relief absent an independent 

constitutional violation occurring in the state trial,” Albrecht 

v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 121 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Herrera v. 

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993)), Sistrunk’s petition—even 

if it were timely—would lack the requisite underlying 

“independent constitutional violation” needed for our 

jurisdiction.

We conclude that our exercise of jurisdiction is proper.

First, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez 
9

v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012), destroys the government’s

attack on the COA. Even a defective COA does not thwart 

our jurisdiction. Rather, “[o]nce a judge has made the 

determination that a COA is warranted”—which has 

happened here—“the COA has fulfilled [its] gatekeeping 

function.” Id. at 650. No further scrutiny of the COA is 

necessary. See id. at 652 (“[Section] 2253(c)(3) is a 

nonjurisdictional rule . . . .”). 

Second, we need not address whether a freestanding 

claim of actual innocence would be cognizable on federal 

habeas review because that is not all that Sistrunk’s petition 

offers.2

 2 Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that 

a freestanding claim of innocence merits habeas relief. See, 

e.g., Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 n.5 (3d Cir. 

2012) (reserving the issue expressly while permitting the 

petitioner’s claim to proceed on due process grounds); United 

States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182, 191 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005)

(highlighting without ruling on the petitioner’s actual 

innocence claim). Other courts have discussed the issue and 

reached divergent conclusions. See, e.g., Souter v. Jones, 395 

F.3d 577, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) (permitting equitable tolling for 

a “credible showing of actual innocence”); Cousin v. Lensing, 

310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an actual 

innocence equitable tolling claim). Indeed, the Supreme Court 

noted in discussing whether actual innocence implicates the 

Constitution that “[w]hether such a federal right exists is an 

open question. [Courts] have struggled with it over the years, 

in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also 

noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the 

high standard any claimant would have to meet.” Dist. Att’ys 

Sistrunk’s claims of innocence, rather, expressly 
10

incorporate separate constitutional violations. Sistrunk states 

in his petition that he “was denied his Fourteenth and Sixth 

Amendment rights,” not only because he is allegedly 

innocent, but also because newly discovered evidence shows 

that witnesses colluded to keep the identity of the real 

murderer a secret and one witness—Gregory Anderson—

perjured himself due to government coercion. These claims 

are probative of innocence, to be sure, but they also implicate 

sufficiently Sistrunk’s right to due process. Indeed, “a

conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to 

be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 

269 (1959); see Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d 

Cir. 2004) (stating that the government may not knowingly 

use perjured testimony at trial). “The same result obtains 

when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows 

it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; 

see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“[T]he 

Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the 

knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair.”); 

Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 506 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting 

habeas relief based on an actual innocence claim for a 

conviction stemming in part from perjured testimony). 

Moreover, the teachings of Brady v. Maryland

 

Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 

2308, 2321 (2009) (citations omitted).

, 373 U.S. 83, 

87 (1963), require prosecutors to disclose any benefits that 

are given to a witness, including any possible lenient 

treatment in a given case. Although the veracity of Sistrunk’s 

allegations may be in question, the constitutional violations 

they encompass comprise an integral and unavoidable part of 

Sistrunk’s new-evidence-of-innocence claims: on the way to 
11

demonstrating his innocence, Sistrunk’s new evidence would 

show also that the government violated Sistrunk’s due 

process rights. Such a showing would unquestionably 

establish one or more “independent constitutional violations”

and therefore would grant us jurisdiction to review the merits 

of Sistrunk’s petition if—and only if—it is timely.3 We turn 

now to address that question.

IV.

There can be no dispute that Sistrunk’s petition would 

be time-barred without AEDPA’s tolling exceptions.

Sistrunk’s conviction became final on March 11, 1997. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). He had until one year from that date

to file a habeas petition. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Sistrunk did not 

file his federal petition, however, until December 22, 2006, 

many years too tardy. Sistrunk then rushed to raise three 

tolling arguments, any one of which would salvage his 

otherwise-barred petition. He contends that he is entitled to: 

(1) statutory tolling of his entire petition under § 2244(d)(2) 

for the time during which his state postconviction review 

pended; (2) equitable tolling because of the discovery of new 

evidence; or (3) equitable tolling because he is actually 

innocent. We ultimately reject each, and will affirm the 

District Court’s judgment.

A.

Sistrunk contends first that his petition is subject to 

AEDPA’s express statutory tolling provision, which permits 

tolling for the time during which a properly filed application 

 3 As discussed infra, because we conclude that Sistrunk’s 

petition is not timely, we do not reach the merits of his claims 

to determine whether such a violation actually occurred.
12

for state postconviction review is pending in state courts. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420 

(3d Cir. 2000). Sistrunk’s application was indeed 

“pending”—he filed a new petition for review in the state 

PCRA court within 60 days of receiving the letter. The issue 

here is whether the application was “properly filed.” 

Although AEDPA permits a tardy state court filing upon the 

discovery of new evidence, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), 

Sistrunk’s contention depends on whether the Anderson letter 

fits within AEDPA’s definition of “new” evidence: the date 

on which the “factual predicate” of the evidence was known. 

We hold that it does not.

The District Court concluded that Sistrunk’s petition 

for state review was not properly filed because the Anderson 

letter did not constitute newly discovered evidence under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Rather, the District Court held, Sistrunk 

knew of Anderson’s perjury no later than January 1994, over 

a decade before he supposedly uncovered this evidence.

Sistrunk contends that this holding was in error, 

because he did not learn of the factual predicate underlying 

Anderson’s letter until June 22, 2006, when his attorney 

received it. His knowledge of his own innocence 

notwithstanding, Sistrunk insists that he could not have 

introduced evidence about Anderson’s initial reticence to 

come forward, the perjury of a key witness, police 

misconduct, or witness tampering until his receipt of 

Anderson’s revelations.

4

 4 Assuming Anderson’s letter succeeds in tolling Sistrunk’s 

time to file, Sistrunk also contends that this letter permits him 

to bootstrap the Rodriguez claim into his petition. See Sweger 

The government responds that the 
13

“facts” of Sistrunk’s innocence and Anderson’s perjury were

long ago determined, and the appearance of a new witness to 

testify to that fact does not restart the limitations period.

Because the Anderson letter does not fit within 

AEDPA’s definition of “new” evidence, we agree with the 

District Court that Sistrunk’s petition was improperly filed, 

and thus, cannot toll AEDPA’s limitations period. Evidence 

becomes “known” on “the date on which the factual predicate 

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Here, the PCRA court found that Sistrunk 

not only could have known, but actually did know of the vital 

facts underlying both the Anderson letter and Rodriguez 

affidavit—i.e., Damon Rodriguez was the real shooter and 

Gregory Anderson perjured himself—long before the filing of 

his habeas petition. See App. 00092. This finding by the state 

court binds us. See Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 136 (3d 

Cir. 2005) (“‘[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court 

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.’” (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68)). Because 

evidence that is “previously known, but only newly available” 

does not constitute “newly discovered evidence,” United 

States v. Jasin

 

v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that 

tolling applies to the entire petition so long as the state 

proceeding attacks the same judgment as the habeas petition 

does). Because we deny Sistrunk’s tolling claim related to the 

Anderson letter, his attempt to revive his barred contentions 

concerning the Rodriguez affidavit also fails.

, 280 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2002), we will not 

construe the evidence of innocence Sistrunk offers as “new.” 

Similarly, to the extent that the Anderson letter introduced 
14

new evidence of the reasons behind Anderson’s perjury, 

“evidence known but unavailable at trial does not constitute 

‘newly discovered evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 33.” 

Id.

B.

Sistrunk next contends that the government’s attempt 

to actively mislead him with respect to his Rodriguez 

affidavit claim entitles him to equitable tolling. Because 

Sistrunk cannot show both (1) extraordinarily burdensome 

circumstances as well as (2) reasonable diligence in 

investigating the claim, see Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 

78 (3d Cir. 2004), we hold that he cannot avail himself of 

equitable tolling. 

The District Court rejected this contention because 

Sistrunk knew of Rodriguez’s guilt and Anderson’s perjury 

and yet did nothing about these facts for twelve years, placing 

his case far outside the bounds of “reasonable diligence.”

Sistrunk, seeking to construct an unstated declaration 

of what the court meant but did not say, contends that he was 

“actively misled” by the PCRA court. According to Sistrunk, 

although the PCRA court dismissed his entire petition as 

untimely, it did not mean to affix the label “untimely” to all

of the claims within the petition, but meant instead to dismiss 

his affidavit claim on the merits. Because the court’s alleged 

misstating led Sistrunk to believe his claim was dismissed as

untimely, he had thought that a federal habeas petition would 

be futile. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). 

After discovering the “error” in 2006, Sistrunk then 

“diligently” filed his federal petition. 
15

The government responds that reinventing language in

a judicial opinion—assuming arguendo that the opinion was 

mistaken—provides no grounds for equitable tolling.5 The 

government contends, moreover, that reasonable diligence 

cannot mean that a habeas petitioner may “sit quietly by, 

knowing there are multiple witnesses to his version of events, 

and do nothing to present this evidence to any court for years 

on end.” Gov’t Br. at 39; cf. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

332 (1995) (holding that courts “may consider how the timing 

of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear 

on the probable reliability of that evidence” when considering 

claims of innocence). 

Both the Supreme Court and this Court agree with the 

District Court that Sistrunk’s claims do not qualify for 

equitable tolling. AEDPA does not provide additional 

justifications for tolling its one-year time limit beyond the 

specific instances listed in § 2244(d). Although we have

recognized rare situations in which equity permits tolling, see

Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (holding that 

AEDPA’s time limitations are “subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases”); Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 

F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling 

may only occur when a petitioner has been extraordinarily 

prevented from asserting his rights), this is not one of those 

situations.

As we have explained, “[t]here are no bright lines in 

determining whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given 

 5 The government is correct that the PCRA court indeed 

rejected Sistrunk’s Rodriguez claim as untimely. See App.

00026. 
16

case.” Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011). 

Nevertheless, “courts must be sparing in their use of equitable 

tolling,” Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 165 

F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999), and should do so “only when 

the principles of equity would make the rigid application of a 

limitation period unfair.” Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court 

has provided guidance as to when the “principles of equity” 

permit equitable tolling: “[A] petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562-2563 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). This conjunctive standard requires 

showing both elements before we will permit tolling. See

Schlueter, 384 F.3d at 78. 

Here, it is readily apparent that Sistrunk cannot meet 

the Holland standard, as he has shown neither diligence nor 

extraordinarily burdensome circumstances. As for diligence, 

Sistrunk was in the car on the night of the shooting with three 

other people, one of whom—Damon Rodriguez—was the 

supposed killer. One passenger, Gregory Anderson, testified 

against Sistrunk. In the intervening years, Sistrunk made no 

effort to get Anderson to recant his testimony or to get the 

other passengers to testify. As the PCRA court concluded, 

Sistrunk (a) knew of both Rodriguez’s guilt and Anderson’s 

perjury and (b) did nothing about either for 12 years. When a 

petitioner has knowledge of his innocence and of witnesses 

who might testify to it, “[m]ere excusable neglect is not 

sufficient” to show diligence. Miller, 145 F.3d at 619. 

Sistrunk waited far too long to possibly claim that he has 

diligently pursued this claim. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-419 
17

(holding that a five-month delay demonstrated a lack of 

diligence).

Moreover, even if we held that Sistrunk were diligent, 

he has not been extraordinarily burdened or prevented from 

pressing his claim. We have a high standard for 

“extraordinary circumstances.” See, e.g., Pabon, 654 F.3d at 

400 (holding that a defendant’s inability to speak English and 

the lack of Spanish language legal materials or interpreters 

constituted extraordinary circumstances). Even assuming that

the PCRA court dismissed Sistrunk’s claim on the merits, and 

not for timeliness reasons, misreading a court opinion is not 

an “extraordinary circumstance [that] stood in his way and 

prevented timely filing.” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562-2563 

(citations omitted). 

Sistrunk needed to show both diligence and 

extraordinary circumstances to succeed on his equitable 

tolling argument. He can show neither. As a result, we 

conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed Sistrunk’s 

first equitable tolling claim.

III.

Finally, Sistrunk contends that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling on the separate ground that he is introducing 

evidence of “actual innocence,” a claim that should permit 

him to clear any procedural hurdles to obtaining a new 

evidentiary hearing on his innocence. We disagree. 

Regardless of whether we adopt the contention that Sistrunk’s 

actual innocence might permit equitable tolling, we hold that 

Sistrunk has not shown that the evidence he seeks to submit 
18

demonstrates that he is actually innocent. We therefore will 

affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Sistrunk’s petition.6

Sistrunk contends that the evidence he now offers—the 

Anderson letter and the Rodriguez affidavit—satisfies the 

Supreme Court’s standard for actual innocence: that no 

reasonable juror would have voted to find Sistrunk guilty had 

these pieces of evidence been available at trial. See Bousley 

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“‘Actual 

innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal 

insufficiency.” (citation omitted)). Sistrunk then argues that 

this evidence of innocence entitles him to equitable tolling. 

The government responds that, even if we were to hold that a 

legitimate actual innocence claim could permit equitable 

tolling, Sistrunk’s case falls far short of “actual innocence.” 

We conclude that Sistrunk is not entitled to equitable 

tolling for actual innocence because he cannot show that he 

is, in fact, innocent.

7 Proving actual innocence based on new 

evidence requires the petitioner to demonstrate (1) new 

evidence (2) that is reliable and (3) so probative of innocence 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner. 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327; see also House v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518, 536-537 (2006). All three Schlup

 6 The District Court dismissed this claim entirely on the 

ground that Sistrunk has not been diligent. Because Sistrunk’s 

claim, as he crafts it, would trump the diligence requirement 

from above, we proceed to discuss it in greater detail.

factors are 

7 We do not decide whether a petitioner’s actual innocence 

might permit equitable tolling because, even if it could,

Sistrunk does not meet the preliminary requirement of 

demonstrating his innocence. 
19

necessary for Sistrunk to prevail. See House, 547 U.S. at 536-

537. He fails each. 

First, as discussed, Sistrunk’s evidence is not “new.” 

Second, even if it were, it is not reliable. The Pennsylvania

PCRA court’s factual finding that Rodriguez’s affidavit is 

unreliable binds us, and Sistrunk has not shown clear and 

convincing evidence to the contrary. See Werts v. Vaughn, 

228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000). The Anderson letter, too, is 

not reliable—it comes nearly a decade too tardy from another 

prisoner, who is related to Sistrunk and admits to having lied 

once before. Cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988) 

(“It is . . . reasonable to presume that there is something 

suspect about a defense witness who is not identified until 

after the 11th hour has passed.”); Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 

U.S. 1231, 1233-1234 (1984) (“Recantation testimony is 

properly viewed with great suspicion. It . . . is very often 

unreliable . . . , and most often serves merely to impeach 

cumulative evidence rather than to undermine confidence in 

the accuracy of the conviction.”); Landano v. Rafferty, 856 

F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Courts have historically 

viewed recantation testimony with great suspicion.”). Third, 

Sistrunk’s new evidence simply cannot be evaluated as so 

probative of his innocence that no reasonable juror could have 

convicted him. Schlup sets a supremely high bar. Neither the 

recantation of a witness who did not even testify at trial nor

the second-hand retelling of a jailhouse confession can clear

it. There were several eyewitnesses to the crime, all of whom

implicated Sistrunk at trial. Adding Sistrunk’s offered 

evidence into the mix would still permit a reasonable juror to 

vote to convict. Sistrunk thus cannot meet Schlup’s standard 

for actual innocence and cannot avail himself of equitable 

tolling on that basis. 
20

V.

We hold that Sistrunk’s petition is time-barred, and is 

subject to neither statutory nor equitable tolling. We will 

therefore AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment.