The H onor abl e St ef an R
. U nder hi l l , of

t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C our t f or t he D i s t r i ct of

C onne ct i cut , s i t t i ng * by des i gn at i on. 1 09- 2349- ag A b reu v. H ol

d er UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT 

## SUMMA RY ORDER Rulin gs by su m m ary orderdo not h ave prec edential eff ect . Citation to a sum m ary order filed on or a f

te r J a nuary 1, 2007, is p erm itted and is governed by Feder al Rule of App e lla te P r oc e dur e 32 .1 and t his c our t’ s Lo c al Rul e 32 .1 .1 . Whe n c it ing a s um m ar y o r de r in a do c um e ntfile d wit h th is co ur t, a pa r tym ustc it e e it he r th e F e de r al A ppe ndix oran e le c tr oni c database (wi th the notation “summ ary order ”). A p a rt y citin g a summ ary orderm ust serve a c opyof iton a ny pa r tynotr e pr e se nt e d by c ouns e l. Ata st at edte r mof

th e U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t o f Ap pe al s f or th e S eco nd

Cir cu it , h el d a t th e D an ie l P at r ic k Mo yn ih anUn it edSt at es Co ur th ou se, 500 P ear l S tr eet , i n t he Cit

y o f N ew York, on th e 24 day of May, two thou sand and ten. th PR E SE NT: J OS É A. C AB R ANES , B A R R I NGT ON D. P AR KER ,

Circuit Jud ges , S T EF A N R. U ND ERHI LL ,

District Judge .*

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x R OB ER T O C AR D E N AS A B R EU ,

Petitioner ,
v. No . 09 -2 349 -ag E RI C H. H OLDER , J R ., U ni te d S tat es At to r ney Gen er al, Responden t.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x F OR P ETIT ION ER: S UN I TA P AT EL (D ar iu s Charney

andRache l M eer op ol , on the brief

), T he Ce nt er

fo r Con s ti tu ti on al Rights, New Y ork, NY2

F OR RES P ON DE N T: P AT RI CK J. G L EN , Tr ial A ttorney, Office of Immigration Litigation (T ony We st, Ass istant Attorney General, E mily Anne Ra dford, Ass istant Di r ect or , O ff

ice o f I mmigr ati onLi tigat

io n, o n th e brief ), Civil D ivi s io n, U.S . D epar tm ent of J us ti ce, Wa shington, DC UPON CONSIDERAT ION of th e pe ti ti onfo r

r evi ew o f aB oar d o f I mmigr ati onApp eals decision, IT IS H ERE BY O RD ERE D, ADJU DG ED , AN D D ECREED that the petition for re vi ewis GRAN TED . Th e o rde r of t he Boa rd o f Imm ig ra ti on Ap pe als i s VACAT ED and the ca use is REMAN DE D for f urther pr ocee dings consist ent with this order. Pe ti ti on er Rob er to Car den as Abr eu ( “pe ti ti on er ” or “Ab r eu”) s eeks r evi ew o f aM ay 4, 200 9 decision of the Board of I mmigration Appea ls (“B IA”) affirming the decision of an immigration ju dge (“ I J ”) th at d eni ed p et

it io ner ’s mo ti onto r eop en his r emo val pr oce edi ngs . T he I

J or der ed pet it io ner r emo vedpu r s uan t t o 8 U.S .C. § 122 7(a)( 2) (A )( iii ) u po n co ncl udin g that

he h ad b een convicte d of an agg ravated felony . Petitioner subs equently move d for an extension of time for appea ling that convi ction in New Y ork st ate court pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.3 0, the
mo ti onwas gr ant ed, andhi s app eal r emain s pen di ng. Pe ti ti on er s ought to r eop en his r emo val proceedings on the basis of that appeal, arguing that his convic tion had not yet bec ome final. The IJ denied the motion a nd the BIA, s itting as an en ba nc cou r t, af fi r medina pr eced ent

ial op inio n. In re Ca rdenas Ab reu , 24 I. & N. Dec. 79 5 (B.I .A. 2009 ). We a ss ume the parties’ familiarity with the
r emainin g f

actual andpr oce du r al his to ry of th e cas e. Prior to its amendment in 1996, the Immigration and Naturaliz ation Ac t (“INA”) did not define the term “convic tion,” although c ourts had long unde rs tood it to r equire some degree of fi nal it y, i ncl udin g ex hau s ti onof

di r ect app ell ate r evi ew. See, e.g. , Marino v. INS, 53 7 F .2d686 , 69 1 (2 d Ci r . 19 76) (“ [A] n al

ienis no t d eem ed t o h ave b een‘co nv ict ed’ of a cr im e un der th e [I NA] ” un til “direct appe llate revie w of the convic tion (as contrast ed with col lateral a ttack) has been e xhausted or waiv ed.” (relying

on Pino v. Land

on , 34 9 U. S. 9 01 ( 195 5) ). I n 1 996 , Co ngr es s enac te d the I lle gal3

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Sta t. 300 9- 546 , whichdef

in es con vic ti on , inr elev ant

par t, as “a f

or mal ju dgm ent of guilt of th e ali en entered by a court.” 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a )(48)(A). Pe ti ti on er argue s th at the I I RI RA’s def init io n o f c onvic ti ondi d n ot

di s tu r b the I NA’ s lo ngs tan di ng f

in ali ty r equ ir eme nt , an d al s o that

th e B I A er r ed i n h ol di ng that hi s lat e- r ein s tat ed di r ect app eal h ad n o ef

fe ct onth e f in ali ty of hi s con vic ti on . T he g ov er nm ent ’s po s it io n i s un clea r . Befor e the BIA, the government argued tha t the II RIRA abolished any finality requirement for
con vic ti on s . In re Cardena s Abreu , 24 I. & N. Dec. a t 797 (noting that the Department of Homeland Security a rgued “that eve n if [Abreu] had filed a di rect appea l within 30 da ys of his conviction, the
con vic ti onwoulds till b e val

idfo r im migr ati onpu rpo s es ”)
. In its brief to this Court, the government takes inconsistent posit ions, arguing at one point that the statutory definition of conviction is unambig uous, “extends to all formal judgments of guilt entered by the court, and mak es no r ef

er enc e t o the av ail abilit

y of fu r th er pr oce edi ngs , i.e. , appea ls, following this initial entry of judgment,” Re spondent’s B r. 28, while a rguing elsewhe re that the question of f inality i s not bef or e ou r Cou r t, id. at 46. At a rgument, the government declined to take a position on whether the
statutor y definition of convic tion embodies some form of a finality requirement. In interpr eting the statutory definition of conviction, the BIA recognize d that, “[i]nitially , [it] must determine whe ther the langua ge a t iss ue has a pla in and una mbiguous meaning with regard to th e par ti cul ar

di s pu te inth e cas e.” In re Cardena s Abreu , 24 I. & N. Dec. a t 796 (internal quotation marks omitt ed). It noted both the government’s view that the IIRIRA’s definition of conviction unambiguously a bolished any fina lity requirement, and pe titioner’s argument that the s tatutory langua ge is ambiguous when viewe d in the context of ca se law that prece ded the passage of the I I RI RA. Id

. at 7 97. I t d ecli ned , h owe ver , t o ad op t e ither argum ent , h ol di ng i ns te ad that pet it io ner ’sI n o r der to app eal p ur s uan t t o § 4 60. 30, a def end ant mu s t s ho w that

he f ail ed t o t im ely f ile 1 a direct a ppeal a s-of

-right under § 460.10 due to: (a) improper conduct of a public servant or improper conduct, death or disability of the def end ant 's att orney , o r

(b ) i nab ili ty

of th e de fe nd a nt and hi s att orney to hav e communi c a te d , in person or by mail, conce rning whether an a ppeal should be ta ken, pr io r to th e exp ir ati onof

th e t im e withi n whichto tak e an a pp eal d ue t o d ef end ant 's incarce ration in an institution and through no lack of due dilig ence or fault of the att orney or def end ant . N. Y. Cr im . P r oc. La

w § 46 0.3 0( 1) . Anapp eal under § 460.30 must be f iled no more than one y ear afte r the e x piration of the thirty -day filing de adline set for

th in § 460.10. 4 lat e- r ein s tat ed ap peal

couldbe dis ti ngu

is hedfr om a ti mel

y app eal, andth at alat e- r ein s tat ed ap peal do es no t u nd er mi ne the f

in ali ty of a con vic ti on . Id

. at 7 99- 802
. I n at te mp ti ng t o dis ti ngu

is h p et it io ner ’s lat e- r ein s tat ed ap peal fr om a ti mel

y f ile d dir ect appea l, the BIA misint erpreted New York law and therefore abused its discretion. Ass uming arg ue ndo th at the f in ali ty r equ ir eme nt r emain s inef

fe ct af te r th e pas s age o f the I I RI RA, anapp eal reinstated purs uant to N.Y. C rim. Pr oc. Law § 460.30 is equiva lent to any other direct a ppeal for the pu rpo s es of

fi nal it y. As th e New Yor k Ap pellat e Di vis io n s tat ed i n i ts or der

gr ant in g pe ti ti on er ’s motion for

an exte nsion of t

ime to file his appea l, petitioner’s moving papers, once grante d, were “de eme d t o co ns ti tu te a ti mel y no ti ce o f a pp eal. ” J oi nt

App ’x 2 49. The government has not dem on s tr ate d that

New Yor k co ur ts tr eat

app eals r ein s tat ed p ur s uan t t o § 4 60. 30 a ny dif fe r ent ly th an ap peal s as -o f- r

igh t f ile d wi thinthir ty

days pu r s uan t t o § 4 60. 10. I nd eed , n othi ng i n § 4 60,
ent it led“Ap peal s ,” e venmen ti on s a “la te ” or “un ti mel y” ap peal ; in s te ad, § 46 0.3 0 p r ov id es an “e xt en sio n o f ti me ” t o fi le in sel ec t c a ses, a s it s ti tl e i nd ic a te s. 1 The BI A held tha t the “procedure” for filing an appe al under § 46 0.30 “introduces a la yer of

un cer tai nt y anddel ay f

ar bey on d that

of a tr adi ti on al ap peal .” In re Cardena s Abreu , 24I . & N . D ec. at 8 01. T he B I A, h owe ver , was no t as kedwhe th er th e pr oce du r e f

or filing a m ot

io n u nd er § 46 0.3 05

implica ted the finality rule. Instead, the que stion befor e the BIA was whether once such a motion has bee n gr ant ed an d a p et it io ner has a lat e- r ein s tat ed dir ect app eal p endin g, that

app eal i s di s ti ngu is hab le f r om an ap peal

un der § 46 0.1 0. A s we h ave e xp lai ned , it is no t. T hi s cas e is therefore dist

inguishable from In

re Po lanc o , 20 I . & N . D ec. 8 94 (

B .I .A. 199 4) , inwhi ch ther e was “no evide nce” tha t the petitioner’s application to reinstate his appea l had ye t been ac cepted by the New J er s ey co ur ts pu r s uan t t o a N ew J er s ey s tatut e s im ila r to § 46 0.3 0. Id

. at 8 98. In t he se c irc um sta nc es, we thi nk are ma nd is a pp rop ria te for t he BIA to a dd re ss, i n th e f irst instance, whe ther the II RIRA ’s definition of conviction is ambiguous with respect to the finality requirement. Although the BIA properly recognize d this as t he first step of its inquiry, it decli ned to address ambiguity and instead de nied petitioner’s motion to reopen based on an erroneous in te rpr et ati onof

§ 46 0.3 0. T he B I A mu s t n ow d et er mi ne o n r ema ndwhe th er a con vic ti onis

s uf fi cien tl y f in al t o warr ant

r emo val whe n a p et

it io ner has a di r ect

app eal p endin g. We i ntimate no viewon whether the statute is, in fact, ambiguous. We recognize , moreover, th at w e ow e no def

er enc e t o the ag enc y’s po s it io n o n thi s qu es ti on . See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Coun cil, Inc. , 467 U.S. 8 37, 843 n.9 (198 4) (“The judiciary is the final a uthority on iss ues of s tatutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to cl ea r c on gre ssio na l i nte nt. ”) . N ev er the le ss, e ve n w he n o ur re vi ewof a qu estio n i s de novo , the agen cy’s views can b e he lp ful an d o ft en p er s uas ive
. Cf. Au licino v. N.Y. Ci ty Dep’t of Homeless

Servs
. , 58 0 F. 3d 73 , 8 5 (2d C ir. 20 09 ) (e xp la in in g t ha t, a lt ho ugh o ur re vi ewof su mma ry ju dg me nt i s de novo , “[ w]e ar e en ti tl ed t o the b ene fi t o f the dis tr ict cou r t’ s ju dgm ent , whichis alway s helpf ul andus ually per s uas ive ” ( qu ot

in g Be ck fo rd v . Po rt uo ndo , 23 4 F .3d128 , 13 0 (

2dCir . 20 00) ). Acco r di ngl y, we thin k a remand is appropriate to permit the B IA to express its views on this question. We hope that, on remand, the BIA will hav e the bene fit of a more coherent position f rom the government.6 CONCLUSI ON

For t he fore go in g re a son s, the pe ti ti on for r evie w i s GRAN TED . The order of the Board of Im mi gra ti on Ap pe a ls i s VACAT ED a nd the ca use is REMAN DE D fo r fu r th er pr oce edi ngs consistent with this order. In the eve nt of a subs equent appe al in this case, the ma tter will be

as s ign ed t o thi s pan el. FOR THE C OU R

T, Ca therine O’Haga n Wolfe, C lerk of Court