UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JACK JIM CLARK, Defendant - Appellant. No. 19-5099 (D.C. Nos. 4:19-CV-00226-CVE-JFJ & 4:15-CR-00126-CVE-1) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING A CERTIF ICATE OF APPEALABIITY *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , PHILLIPS , and EID , Circuit Judges.

_____ ______________ ______________ Defendant Jack Clark seeks a certificat e of appealability (COA) to appeal the dismissal by the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma of his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring a COA to appeal denial of a § 2255 motion). We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. On July 9, 2015, a grand jury indicted Defendant on seven counts of false claims for refunds of federal gasoline excise tax. The final indictment—the third superseding indictment—charged Defendant with 21 counts of false claims, see 18 U.S.C. § 287, and 20 counts of mail fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341. On August 25, 2017, Defendant pleaded

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32. 1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 2, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 guilty to two counts of the th ird superseding indi ctment—one false-cl aim count and one mail-fraud count. He was sentenced to conc urrent terms of 60 months’ imprisonment on each count and ordered to pay restitution of $10, 042.098.42. He did not appeal. On May 1, 2019, Defendant filed his § 2255 motion. The district court denied the motion and denied a COA. A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should ha ve been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (interna l quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant mu st show that the district cour t’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either “debatable or wrong.” Id.
Defendant’s brief in this court asserts: (1) the Assistant Un ited States Attorney representing the government was not prop erly appointed, making Defendant’s indictment, judgment, and co mmitment unconstitutional; (2) the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; and (3) his coun sel was ineffective in several respects. To begin with, Defendant contends that counsel who represented the United States in the underlying pro ceedings, Assistant United States A ttorney Charles M. McLoughlin, was not properly appointed under th e Constitution’s Appointments Clause, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, a nd other constitutio nal provisions, see id . art. II, § 3; art. VI, cl.3 3. But, as explained by the district court, a ssistant United States attorneys are “inferior officers” not subject to Senate confirmation. On appeal, Defendant does not contest this conclusion. Instead, he claims that McLo ughlin’s lack of a presidential commission renders the appointment improper. Pres idential commissions are necessary, however, only for principal officers. See Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Rich ard Murphy, 3 Admin. L. & Prac. § 7:34[1] (3d ed.). And insofar as Defendant is arguing that McLoughlin was required to swear an oath to support the Const itution, the record incl udes an oath of office signed by him on January 22, 1992—t he date of his appointment. Defendant next argues that the district c ourt lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because jurisdiction “based upon 28 U.S.C. § 116(a) . . . viol at[es] . . . the Treaties of 1832, 1833, 1856, and 1866, between the United States and the Creek Nation. 28 U.S.C. § 547, does not apply inside the Creek Natio n[’]s boundaries and bot h 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 1341 do[] not apply to anyone’s conduc t inside the Creek Nation’s boundaries.” Aplt. Br. at 4. He relies on our decision in Murphy v. Royal , 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), to support what appears to be the thrust of this ar gument—that the federal court had no jurisdiction over his alleged cr imes in the Creek Nation. In Murphy we held that Oklahoma state courts were without jurisdic tion to hear a murder charge brought against a member of the Creek Nation as the crim e occurred in Indian Country, within the boundaries of the Nation’s reserv ation. 875 F.3d at 904, 966. The district court correctly concluded that Murphy is inapplicable and Defendant’s jurisdictional argument otherwise unavailing because Defe ndant was prosecuted for crimes against the United States, rendering the status of the land where hi s alleged crimes took place irrelevant.4 Defendant’s remaining arguments concern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel’s performance was defici ent—“that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘coun sel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”—and that “the deficient pe rformance prejudiced [his] defense.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (19 84). In conducting this analysis, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, th e defendant must over come the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenge d action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks om itted). Further, to establish that a defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficien t performance, he “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. “Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or suffi cient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added). If an ineffectiveness claim is premised on defense counsel’s alleged failure to raise an issue, we reject the claim if the issue is meritless. See Hawkins v. Hannigan , 185 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). First, Defendant maintains that defense counsel should have determined whether the third superseding indictment related back to the first three indictments and if not, should have moved to dism iss all charged counts for be ing outside the five-year limitations period for his alleged offenses. See United States v. Tolliver , 730 F.3d 1216,5 1225 (10th Cir. 2013) (five-year limitations period for mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341); United States v. Benjamin , 995 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1993) (fi ve-year limitations period for false claims, 18 U.S.C. § 287). But “[a] s uperseding indictment filed while the first indictment is validly pending is not barred by the statute of limitations unless it broadens or substantially amends the charges in the first indictment.” United States v. Davis , 953 F.2d 1482, 1491 (10th Cir. 1 992). Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts in the third superseding indictment—one fa lse-claim count, which was iden tical to count three in the initial indictment, and one mail-fraud count, whic h was identical to count nine in the first superseding indictment. Because the initia l indictment and th e first superseding indictment were both filed w ithin the limitations period, th e district court properly determined the charges in the third supersed ing indictment were not time-barred and that counsel was therefore not ineffective fo r failing to move for dismissal. Defendant also alleges that his counsel was ineffective for “(1) failing to know the law; (2) failing to investigate the district court[’]s jurisdiction and judicial power; (3) failing to determine and argue the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; and (4) failing to dismiss the case for lack of an Artic le III live case or controversy.” Aplt. Br. at 3. Defendant does not, however, provide any sp ecificity regarding wh at law his counsel failed to know, what problems should have been uncovered regarding the district court’s jurisdiction and judicial power, why the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, or why his case did not presen t a live case or controversy. Hence, we can only assume that he is complaining about his attorney’s failure to raise the claims that he has raised in the first two issues addressed and rejected above. Because the claims are meritless, the6 district court properly ruled that counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate and raise them. No reasonable jurist could debate the di strict court’s resolution of Defendant’s claims.

We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge