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IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

MULDER V. MULDER

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

SAMANTHA A. MULDER, NOW KNOWN AS SAMANTHA A. KENNEDY,

APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT,

V.

GREGORY D. MULDER, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE.

Filed April 2, 2013. No. A-12-355.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: GARY B. RANDALL, Judge. Affirmed 

in part, and in part reversed and remanded with directions.

Amy Sherman, of Sherman & Gilner, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

John A. Kinney and Jill M. Mason, of Kinney Law, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.

IRWIN, MOORE, and PIRTLE, Judges.

PIRTLE, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Gregory D. Mulder appeals from an order of the district court for Douglas County, which 

denied his application to modify custody and granted the countercomplaint of Samantha A. 

Mulder, now known as Samantha A. Kennedy, for permission to remove the parties’ child from 

Nebraska to Iowa. Samantha cross-appeals, challenging the court’s use of a joint custody 

worksheet to recalculate child support. We affirm the court’s ruling concerning the motion for 

removal and the ruling concerning Gregory’s request to modify custody. We reverse the court’s 

determination of child support and remand the matter of child support to the district court.

II. BACKGROUND

The parties were married in February 2005. The minor child of the parties, John Christian 

Morrissey-Mulder, was born in December of that year, after the parties had separated and after 

Samantha had filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage. On May 24, 2007, the trial court 
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entered a decree of dissolution approving the property settlement of the parties and the stipulated 

parenting plan. Under the parenting plan, the parties agreed to joint legal custody of John and to 

Samantha’s having primary physical custody, subject to Gregory’s right to reasonable and liberal 

visitation. Gregory’s parenting time consisted of every other weekend from Friday at 5 p.m. 

through Sunday at 5 p.m.; Tuesday overnights from 5 p.m. to Wednesday at 8:30 a.m.; and 

Thursday overnights from 5 p.m. to Friday at 8:30 a.m., when there is not weekend visitation. 

Gregory was also allowed 10 days of summer visitation, as well as alternating holidays. Gregory 

was ordered to pay $850 per month in child support.

On June 4, 2010, Gregory filed an application to modify, asking the court to award him 

joint physical custody of John and to modify child support. Samantha subsequently filed an 

answer and a countercomplaint to modify. She alleged that a material change in circumstances 

had occurred since the entry of the decree in that she was engaged to be married on December 31 

and that her fiance lived and worked in the Des Moines, Iowa, area. She sought permission to 

move with John to Iowa, as well as a modification of parenting time and a modification of child 

support.

Trial was held in July 2011. The evidence showed that Samantha met her current 

husband, Sean Kennedy, in July 2009. Sean was living in St. Charles, Iowa, near Des Moines, 

and was employed in a longstanding career as an executive vice president of a company in West 

Des Moines, Iowa. Sean had lived in St. Charles for 17 years and has three children from a 

previous marriage, and he and his ex-wife share joint custody of their children. After Gregory 

filed his application to modify, but before Samantha filed her answer and countercomplaint, 

Samantha and Sean got engaged. They were married on December 31, 2010, as Samantha had 

alleged in her answer and countercomplaint. In January 2011, Samantha gave up her full-time 

job as an elementary school teacher in favor of a more flexible schedule as a substitute teacher. 

Samantha also sold her home during the pendency of this action, and she and Sean purchased a 

new home in St. Charles. Samantha and John were living with her parents in Omaha, Nebraska, 

while this case was pending.

The evidence also showed that before Gregory filed his application to modify the decree 

in June 2010, the parties were able to cooperate and work well together for the most part in 

coparenting John. Gregory testified that Samantha had agreed to parenting time in addition to 

that set forth in the parenting plan and that they had made decisions involving John jointly. 

However, after Gregory filed his application to modify, the parties experienced difficulty getting 

along with each other and communicating with each other. For instance, Gregory testified that on 

many occasions Samantha did not tell him where to pick up John for his parenting time and had 

to drive to multiple places to find him.

Additional evidence will be discussed as necessary in the analysis section below. The 

trial court entered an order on April 23, 2012, granting Samantha’s countercomplaint for 

removal, finding that she had a legitimate reason to leave the state and that removal was in 

John’s best interests. The court denied Gregory’s application to modify custody. Further, the 

court modified Gregory’s child support obligation from $850 per month to $470.48 per month 

based on a joint custody calculation.
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III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Gregory assigns, restated, that the trial court erred in (1) allowing Samantha to remove 

John from the jurisdiction and (2) failing to award him joint physical custody of John.

On cross-appeal, Samantha assigns that the trial court erred in using a joint custody child 

support calculation, thereby reducing Gregory’s child support obligation.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Child custody and visitation determinations are matters initially entrusted to the 

discretion of the trial court, and although reviewed de novo on the record, the trial court’s 

determination will normally be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. Colling v. Colling, 20 

Neb. App. 98, 818 N.W.2d 637 (2012). A judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge, within 

the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects to act or refrains from acting, and the 

selected option results in a decision which is untenable and unfairly deprives a litigant of a 

substantial right or a just result in matters submitted for disposition through a judicial system. Id.

Modification of child support payments is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion, and 

although, on appeal, the issue is reviewed de novo on the record, the decision of the trial court 

will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. Gartner v. Hume, 12 Neb. App. 741, 686 N.W.2d 

58 (2004).

V. ANALYSIS

1. REMOVAL OF JOHN FROM NEBRASKA

Gregory first assigns that the trial court erred in granting Samantha’s request to 

permanently remove John from Nebraska. In order to prevail on a motion to remove a minor 

child to another jurisdiction, the custodial parent must first satisfy the court that he or she has a 

legitimate reason for leaving the state. Colling v. Colling, supra. After clearing that threshold, 

the custodial parent must next demonstrate that it is in the child’s best interests to continue living 

with him or her. Id.

(a) Legitimate Reason to Leave State

The threshold question in removal cases is whether the parent wishing to remove the 

child from the state has a legitimate reason for leaving. See Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 257 Neb. 

242, 597 N.W.2d 592 (1999). Samantha’s reason for wanting to remove John from Nebraska to 

Iowa at the time her countercomplaint was filed was because her fiance, Sean, lived and worked 

near Des Moines, and they planned to get married on December 31, 2010. At the time of trial, 

Samantha and Sean were married and Sean was still living and working near Des Moines.

Remarriage is commonly found to be a legitimate reason for a move in removal cases. 

Colling v. Colling, supra. And the Nebraska Supreme Court has determined that a move to reside 

with a custodial parent’s new spouse who is employed and resides in another state may constitute 

a legitimate reason for removal. Id.

We conclude in this case that Samantha’s desire to relocate to Iowa in order to live with 

her new spouse is a legitimate reason to leave Nebraska.
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(b) Child’s Best Interests

After clearing the threshold of demonstrating a legitimate reason for leaving the state and 

removing a minor child to another state, a custodial parent must demonstrate that it is in the 

child’s best interests to continue living with him or her. Rosloniec v. Rosloniec, 18 Neb. App. 1, 

773 N.W.2d 174 (2009). In determining whether removal to another jurisdiction is in the child’s 

best interests, the trial court considers (1) each parent’s motives for seeking or opposing the 

move; (2) the potential that the move holds for enhancing the quality of life for the child and the 

custodial parent; and (3) the impact such a move will have on contact between the child and the 

noncustodial parent, when viewed in the light of reasonable visitation. Id.

(i) Each Parent’s Motives

The ultimate question in evaluating the parties’ motives is whether either party has 

elected or resisted a removal in an effort to frustrate or manipulate the other party. Colling v. 

Colling, 20 Neb. App. 98, 818 N.W.2d 637 (2012). Samantha sought removal because she was 

engaged to and subsequently married a resident of Iowa and wished to live with him there. On 

the other hand, Gregory opposed the move because he wished to continue having frequent 

parenting time with John. There is no evidence that either party has acted in bad faith. Samantha 

had a compelling motive to seek the move, and Gregory had an equally compelling motive to 

resist the move. We conclude, as the trial court did, that the parties’ motives are equally balanced 

and that this factor does not weigh in favor of or against the relocation.

(ii) Quality of Life

In determining the potential that the removal to another jurisdiction holds for enhancing 

the quality of life of the parent seeking removal and of the child, a court should consider the 

following factors: (1) the emotional, physical, and developmental needs of the child; (2) the 

child’s opinion or preference as to where to live; (3) the extent to which the relocating parent’s 

income or employment will be enhanced; (4) the degree to which housing or living conditions 

would be improved; (5) the existence of educational advantages; (6) the quality of the 

relationship between the child and each parent; (7) the strength of the child’s ties to the present 

community and extended family there; (8) the likelihood that allowing or denying the move 

would antagonize hostilities between the two parties; and (9) the living conditions and 

employment opportunities for the relocating parent because the best interests of the child are 

interwoven with the well-being of the custodial parent. Colling v. Colling, supra. We will 

consider each factor in turn.

Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor or combination of 

factors may be variously weighted. Id. And while custody is not to be interpreted as a sentence to 

immobility, it is important in contemplating a move such as this one to give due consideration to 

whether such move indeed will improve the children’s lives, or merely maintain the status quo, 

only in a new location. Id.
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a. Child’s Emotional, Physical, 

and Developmental Needs

We first consider the impact on the child’s emotional, physical, and developmental needs 

in assessing the extent to which the move could enhance the child’s life. The evidence shows that 

John is bonded to both parents and that both parents meet his emotional, physical, and 

developmental needs. However, Samantha has been primarily responsible for John’s physical 

and emotional needs from the time he was born due to the fact that the parties were already 

separated when John was born.

Further, Samantha has been more involved with John’s educational development. As a 

teacher, she was worried about his readiness for kindergarten, so she had been working with him 

at home to get him ready for school. She also had John evaluated at a school in Omaha to see if 

he was ready for kindergarten. Samantha also testified that if allowed to move, she planned to be 

a stay-at-home mother which would allow her to take John to and pick him up from school and 

to have more time to spend with him.

Samantha has another son from a previous relationship that John has been growing up 

with and that he spends a lot of time with. Samantha testified that her sons have a very close 

relationship and are best friends. She also testified that when she talks to John on the telephone 

when he is at Gregory’s house, John will ask to talk to his brother.

The evidence also revealed that Gregory believes John has an eating disorder because he 

eats a very limited number of foods. There was some evidence to support Gregory’s belief. For 

instance, in December 2010, John’s preschool teacher suggested that Samantha take John to a 

doctor for a physical because she was concerned that his eating habits were affecting his ability 

to concentrate and learn. Samantha denies that John has an eating disorder or that there is a 

problem with his diet. At the time of trial, Gregory had been working with John about trying new 

foods and the variety of foods he ate was expanding.

When all the evidence is considered, however, this factor weighs in favor of removal.

b. Child’s Preference as to Where to Live

Both parties agree that given John’s age, he is too young to express a preference as to 

where he wants to live. This factor is not given any weight.

c. Enhancement of Income or Employment

Another factor to consider is whether Samantha’s income or employment will be 

enhanced if allowed to relocate. Samantha left her full-time teaching position and has been 

substitute teaching. She has indicated that if allowed to relocate, she intends to be a stay-at-home 

mother and not work outside the home. Therefore, Samantha has not established that her income 

will increase or her employment will be enhanced if allowed to move. However, a custodial 

parent’s income can be enhanced because of a new spouse’s career opportunities, for purposes of 

determining the potential that removal of children to another jurisdiction holds for enhancing the 

quality of life of the parent seeking removal and of the children. Maranville v. Dworak, 17 Neb. 

App. 245, 758 N.W.2d 70 (2008). The evidence showed that in the last 2 years, Sean earned 

$165,000 annually plus annual bonuses of $25,000 one year and $55,000 the other year. In 2010, 

when Samantha was teaching full time, she earned $42,000. Based on Samantha’s husband’s 
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career and income, her household income will increase and her standard of living will be 

improved, and as such, John’s standard of living will be enhanced through relocation. Therefore, 

this factor weighs in favor of removal.

d. Improvement of Housing 

or Living Conditions

There is evidence that the housing and living conditions for John would improve if 

Samantha was allowed to move. At the time of trial, Samantha was living with her parents 

pending a decision by the trial court as to removal. She testified that if she was not allowed to 

move to Iowa, she would rent an apartment in Omaha. Prior to moving in with her parents, 

Samantha had a three-bedroom, split-entry house, which she listed for sale at $120,000.

If allowed to move to Iowa, she and John will live in a house in St. Charles that Samantha 

and Sean have purchased. The home is a 2,500-square-foot, two-story house valued at $350,000. 

It has five bedrooms and sits on 20 acres of land. There is an above-ground swimming pool in 

the backyard and an outbuilding for the children to play in, which includes a “foosball” table, a 

“ping-pong” table, a basketball hoop, and a batting cage. Samantha testified that the house in St. 

Charles would be an improvement over the house she sold in Omaha because of the additional 

space inside and outside the house and because of the activities for the children.

The house near Des Moines would be an improvement in the housing conditions over the 

house Samantha owned in Omaha and over any apartment that she would move into if not 

allowed to relocate. This factor weighs in favor of removal.

e. Existence of Educational Advantages

Another factor to consider is whether Iowa offers educational advantages. This factor 

receives little or no weight when the custodial parent fails to prove that the new schools are 

superior. Maranville v. Dworak, supra.

We note that at the time of trial, John was not in school yet and the parties agreed that 

John should be enrolled in a prekindergarten program for the next school year because he was 

not ready for kindergarten. Samantha presented some evidence about the prekindergarten 

program that John would attend if living in St. Charles and some evidence about the 

prekindergarten program he would likely attend if he stayed in Omaha. She testified that the 

Iowa school John would attend had an all-day prekindergarten class, specifically for students 

who could go to kindergarten based on their age, but for whatever reason were not ready for 

kindergarten. She testified that she was unaware of any similar program in the Omaha area. The 

school in Omaha that John would likely attend had a prekindergarten program that was half days, 

3 days a week. Samantha was worried that the Omaha program would not be sufficient 

instruction for John.

Samantha also presented some evidence in general about the school districts in St. 

Charles and Omaha, including average class size. However, the evidence presented regarding 

each school’s scholastic opportunities does not establish any particular advantage of one over the 

other. Although the prekindergarten program in St. Charles may be more beneficial to John over 

the one in Omaha, the evidence does not support educational advantages in St. Charles beyond 

the prekindergarten year.
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The trial court did find, however, that the existence of educational advantages factor 

weighed in favor of Samantha because of the social and familial benefits of John attending the 

same school as his stepsiblings who will live with him, as well as Samantha’s availability before 

and after school and Sean’s involvement in the sports programs in the St. Charles community. 

We agree. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of relocation.

f. Quality of Relationship Between 

Children and Parents

This factor does not weigh in favor of or against the move to Iowa. John seems to have a 

good relationship with both parents. Samantha, as the custodial parent, has been the primary 

caregiver. Gregory, however, has maintained a close relationship with John, spending as much 

time with him as he can.

g. Ties to Community and Extended Family

Given John’s young age, he does not have any significant ties to the community. He has 

not established close-knit friendships, has no tie to a school, and has not been involved in 

community activities or sports teams, with the exception of playing T-ball one year. As far as 

extended family, Samantha’s parents live in Omaha and she also has a sibling that has children 

that live in or near Omaha. Gregory does not have any relatives in Omaha. John’s minimal ties 

and limited extended family in Omaha results in this factor weighing in favor of removal.

h. Likelihood of Antagonizing Hostilities

Prior to the present litigation being filed, the parties had been able to communicate and 

work together in the best interests of John. After the present litigation was filed, the parties’ 

hostility toward one another increased. However, both parties are devoted parents and both have 

indicated that they would be able to successfully communicate and coparent once the litigation at 

issue was resolved. It appears that the parents will act in the best interests of John whether 

removal is granted or not. Thus, the evidence did not establish the likelihood that allowing or 

denying the move would antagonize hostilities between the parties. We conclude that this factor 

does not weigh either in favor of or against the move.

i. Conclusion Regarding Quality of Life

After considering all of the quality of life factors, we conclude upon our de novo review 

that Samantha did establish that removal would enhance the quality of life for John or her. 

Although this is a close case, the scale is tipped in favor of removal when analyzing the quality 

of life factors.

(iii) Impact on Noncustodial 

Parent’s Visitation

The third factor for our consideration in the best interests analysis, which the trial court 

failed to include in its analysis, is the impact the move will have on Gregory’s parenting time. 

This consideration focuses on the ability of the court to fashion a reasonable visitation schedule 

that will allow the noncustodial parent to maintain a meaningful parent-child relationship. See 

Maranville v. Dworak, 17 Neb. App. 245, 758 N.W.2d 70 (2008). Generally, a reasonable 
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visitation schedule is one that provides a satisfactory basis for preserving and fostering a child’s 

relationship with the noncustodial parent. Id. The frequency and the total number of days of 

visitation and the distance traveled and expense incurred go into the calculus of determining 

reasonableness. Id. Indications of the custodial parent’s willingness to comply with a modified 

visitation schedule also have a place in this analysis. Id.

The drive time between Omaha and Des Moines or St. Charles is not significant, only 

about 2 hours. Samantha indicated a willingness to comply with a new parenting schedule if she 

was allowed to move and indicated that she knew it was important for John to maintain his 

relationship with Gregory. Samantha even suggested that if Gregory was able to travel to Des 

Moines during the week to visit John, he was welcome to stay at her home. Further, Samantha 

was asked if she had any concerns about how the summer would work out if John was playing 

baseball, and Samantha stated that it would be more important for John to spend time with 

Gregory than to worry about missing baseball. Samantha suggested that exchanges take place in 

Adair, Iowa, which is about halfway between Des Moines and Omaha.

In allowing Samantha to move, the court awarded Gregory parenting time every other 

weekend and in the summer from the time school gets out until July 31. The court also gave 

Gregory parenting time with John on extended weekends that occur during the school year, as 

well as time over Christmas break and alternating holidays. Gregory estimated that his total 

parenting time would be about 110 overnights per year, which were about 20 less overnights than 

what he had under the initial parenting plan.

We conclude that Gregory’s parenting time will not be substantially impacted by the 

move in terms of the overall number of days he has with John. The weekends will remain the 

same, and the weekday parenting time was replaced by holidays, school breaks, and substantial 

parenting time in the summer. Gregory will still be able to maintain a meaningful relationship 

with John. This factor weighs in favor of removal.

(c) Removal Conclusion

We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Samantha’s desire to live 

with her new husband in Iowa was a legitimate reason to leave Nebraska. We further conclude, 

after considering all the factors involved in the best interests analysis, that the trial court did not 

err in finding that removing John to Iowa was in his best interests. We affirm the court’s decision 

allowing Samantha to remove John from Nebraska to Iowa.

2. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY

Gregory also assigns that the trial court erred in denying his application to modify 

custody and award him joint physical custody. Ordinarily, a request for change of custody will 

not be granted unless there has been a material change in circumstances showing that the 

custodial parent is unfit or that the best interests of the child require such action. Rosloniec v. 

Rosloniec, 18 Neb. App. 1, 773 N.W.2d 174 (2009). The party seeking modification of child 

custody bears the burden of showing such a change in circumstances. Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb. 

1030, 637 N.W.2d 611 (2002). We conclude that Gregory has not proved a material change in 

circumstances showing that Samantha is unfit or that the best interests of John require such 

action. Therefore, Gregory’s assignment of error is without merit.
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3. MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT

On cross-appeal, Samantha assigns that the trial court erred in using a joint custody 

calculation to determine Gregory’s child support obligation. The original child support was

calculated using the sole custody worksheet, see Nebraska Child Support Guidelines, worksheet 

1, and set Gregory’s child support at $850 per month. Both parties sought a modification of child 

support. Specifically, Gregory alleged that the parties’ earnings had increased and that the 

Nebraska Child Support Guidelines had changed since the entry of the decree, resulting in a 

10-percent or greater change in the child support payment. Samantha alleged that Gregory’s 

income had increased, resulting in an increase of 10 percent or more of the current child support 

amount.

A party seeking to modify a child support order must show a material change of 

circumstances which occurred subsequent to the entry of the original decree or a previous 

modification and which was not contemplated when the prior order was entered. Elsome v. 

Elsome, 257 Neb. 889, 601 N.W.2d 537 (1999). Evidence of a material change in circumstances 

warranting modification must be proved at trial and contained in the record on appeal. Id.

The trial court found that both parties had requested a modification of child support and 

that the incomes of the parties had changed materially and substantially since the entry of the 

decree. The court then found that

based on a joint custody calculation identifying that the minor child will be in the 

possession of the mother approximately 225 days and the father approximately 140 days 

each year [Gregory’s] child support obligation to [Samantha] should be reduced from 

$850.00 per month to $470.48 per month effective September 1, 2011.

The court’s calculation for joint physical custody, see Nebraska Child Support Guidelines, 

worksheet 3, is attached to the court’s order.

Samantha argues that the use of a joint custody calculation, worksheet 3, does not 

comport with the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines. The Nebraska Child Support Guidelines 

set forth under what circumstances worksheet 3 is to be used in calculating child support:

When a specific provision for joint physical custody is ordered and each party’s 

parenting time exceeds 142 days per year, it is a rebuttable presumption that support shall 

be calculated using worksheet 3. When a specific provision for joint physical custody is 

ordered and one party’s parenting time is 109 to 142 days per year, the use of worksheet 

3 to calculate support is at the discretion of the court.

Neb. Ct. R. § 4-212 (rev. 2011).

In the instant case, there is no “specific provision for joint physical custody.” However, 

this does not necessarily preclude the use of a joint physical custody child support calculation. 

Both the Nebraska Supreme Court and this court have recognized that if trial evidence 

establishes an actual joint physical custody arrangement, courts will so construe it, regardless of 

how prior dissolution decrees or court orders have characterized the arrangement. Elsome v. 

Elsome, supra; Patton v. Patton, 20 Neb. App. 51, 818 N.W.2d 624 (2012). Where a party 

proves that joint physical child custody exists, it is error for a trial court to refuse to use a joint 

custody calculation to determine child support. Id. In Elsome, there was a detailed shared 

custody arrangement which generally provided that the children spend 4 days every week with 
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the mother and 3 days every week with the father. Although there was not a specific provision 

for joint physical custody, the court found that the actual parenting arrangement amounted to 

joint physical custody.

Pursuant to the modification order in the present case, the court allowed Samantha to 

move to Iowa with John and, in doing so, it allowed Samantha to continue having primary 

physical custody of John, as she did in the initial decree. Gregory’s parenting time was revised 

from that in the initial decree, but he continues to have rather typical weekend, holiday, and 

summer visitation. Specifically, he was awarded parenting time every other weekend, more than 

2 months in the summer, extended weekends during the school year, time over Christmas break, 

and alternating holidays. The trial court found that this would amount to approximately 140 days 

of parenting time per year for Gregory. Gregory, however, estimates that his modified parenting 

time amounts to 110 days per year, which he states is about 20 less days than he had under the 

initial parenting plan.

Although the exact number of days of Gregory’s parenting time is uncertain, it will be 

between 109 and 142 days per year as referenced in § 4-212. However, his parenting time does 

not amount to a joint physical custody arrangement. Rather, the arrangement is clearly one of 

Samantha having primary physical custody and Gregory having parenting time, just as it was 

under the initial decree. Accordingly, there has been no material change in circumstances in the 

custody arrangement to justify shifting the child support calculation to one based on joint 

physical custody.

Thus, the trial court erred in using the joint custody worksheet to calculate Gregory’s 

child support obligation. We reverse the trial court’s child support calculation and remand the 

matter to the trial court with directions to recalculate Gregory’s child support obligation using 

the parties’ current incomes and the sole physical custody worksheet, worksheet 1.

VI. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Samantha permission to remove 

the parties’ child from Nebraska to Iowa and did not err in denying Gregory’s complaint to 

modify custody. Those portions of the trial court’s order are affirmed. We further conclude that 

the trial court erred in using a joint physical custody calculation, worksheet 3, to determine 

Gregory’s child support obligation. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s child support 

calculation and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to recalculate child support 

using the parties’ current incomes and the sole physical custody worksheet, worksheet 1.

AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED

AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.