Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 12, 2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00822-CR

JIMMY DERRICK HICKS, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 149th District Court 

Brazoria County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 75474 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant pleaded guilty to a felony family-violence assault, and the trial 

court placed appellant on community supervision probation. The State moved to 

revoke appellant’s probation, alleging twenty-four violations. The trial court found 

twenty of the allegations “true,” revoked probation, and sentenced appellant to four 

years’ confinement. In two issues, appellant contends that the evidence is 
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insufficient to support the trial court’s revocation of probation and that the sentence 

was excessive and disproportionate to the crime committed. 

We affirm. 

I. Sufficient Evidence 

To revoke community supervision probation, the State must prove a violation 

of a condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Hacker v. State, 389 

S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A preponderance of the evidence is 

met if the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the 

defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 865. Evidence is sufficient to 

revoke probation if there is more than a scintilla of evidence. Id. The trial court is 

the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their 

testimony. Id. Proof of a single violation of the terms of probation will support the 

trial court’s decision to revoke. See Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2012); Bessard v. State, 464 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). 

We review the trial court’s ruling to revoke probation for an abuse of 

discretion. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. A trial court does not abuse its discretion 

if the ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Burch v. State, 541 

S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). 

One of the conditions of appellant’s probation required him to “totally abstain 

from the use or consumption of alcoholic beverages of any kind.” Of the twenty 

violations of the conditions of probation that the trial court found “true,” two 

concerned appellant’s use of alcohol on separate occasions. Appellant’s probation 

officer testified that appellant admitted to using alcohol on those dates. The officer 

also testified that appellant’s urine tested positive for alcohol. Appellant testified at 
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the revocation hearing and admitted to drinking alcohol while on probation. 

Appellant’s argument that “these two minor infractions are hardly worthy of the 

adjudication of his guilt and the imposition of a prison sentence” is something 

beyond this court’s scope of review on sufficiency of the evidence. 

Accordingly, there is more than a scintilla of evidence—and proof by a 

preponderance of the evidence—that appellant violated at least one term of the

conditions of community supervision probation. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by revoking probation. See Cunningham v. State, 488 S.W.2d 117, 121–

22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (no abuse of discretion to revoke probation when the 

probationer told the probation officer that the probationer used narcotics); see also

Barajas v. State, 682 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.—Waco 1984, no pet.) (“An oral 

admission of a violation of probation terms, made by probationer to his probation 

officer is sufficient to revoke probation.”). 

Because the evidence is sufficient and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by revoking probation, we do not address appellant’s contentions on 

appeal about the eighteen other violations. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Bessard, 464 S.W.2d at 429. 

Appellant’s first issue is overruled. 

II. Punishment 

In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court violated his rights 

under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 

13 of the Constitution of the State of Texas because the court assessed an excessive 

and disproportionate sentence. 

Generally, an appellant must preserve error for a complaint that a sentence is 

unconstitutionally excessive or disproportionate under the federal or Texas 
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constitution. See Battle v. State, 348 S.W.3d 29, 30–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see also Quick v. State, 557 S.W.3d 775, 788 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. filed). Appellant did not object to the imposition of 

his sentence or otherwise raise his appellate complaints in the trial court. And, 

appellant does not make a status-based or individualized-sentencing claim under 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), for which error preservation is not required. 

See Garza v. State, 435 S.W.3d 258, 262–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (regarding 

automatic imposition of sentence of life without parole for a juvenile). Accordingly, 

no error is preserved. See Quick, 557 S.W.3d at 788; Battle, 348 S.W.3d at 30–31. 

Appellant’s second issue is overruled. 

III. Conclusion 

Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

 

 /s/ Ken Wise

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Spain.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).