NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK NA, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

TINEE ANTOINITA CARRAKER, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0587

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2017-004996

The Honorable Kerstin G. LeMaire, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL

Tinee Antoinita Carraker, Buckeye

Defendant/Appellant

Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix

By Michael J. Plati, Michael R. Scheurich, Holly Zoe

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

FILED 4-26-2018
JP MORGAN v. CARRAKER

Decision of the Court

2

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Tinee Carraker appeals the trial court’s entry of summary 

judgment in favor of JP Morgan Chase Bank NA (“Chase”), in which the 

court declared Carraker’s UCC Form 1 Financing Statement (“UCC–1”) 

void ab initio, permanently enjoined Carraker from attempting to dispose of 

Chase’s assets, and awarded Chase $500 in damages under A.R.S. § 47–

9527(A). For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In May 2016, Carraker gave a “promissory note” to Chase’s 

branch in Buckeye, Arizona. The note was payable by Carraker to Chase in 

the amount of $42 billion dollars. The note stated that Chase may collect 

$200 per month from Carraker or sell the note. She asserted that Chase had 

accepted her note by remaining silent or not returning it to her after 14 days 

had passed. Carraker claimed that through her delivery of the note to 

Chase, Chase became obligated to either accept the terms of the note or 

return the note to her. When Chase did neither, Carraker claimed that she 

was entitled to file a UCC–1 showing that she had a lien on Chase’s assets.

¶3 Thereafter, Carraker filed a UCC–1 in Washington asserting

that she held a lien against Chase’s assets for $3 trillion dollars. She then 

emailed Chase’s executive office to notify it of her intent to dispose of 

Chase’s assets to satisfy the lien. In response, Chase filed its “Verified 

Complaint” and “Application for Preliminary Injunction and Order to 

Show Cause” seeking to enjoin Carraker from attempting to sell Chase’s 

assets. Chase further sought a declaration that Carraker’s UCC–1 was void 

ab initio because Chase never authorized the filing under A.R.S. § 47–9509. 

The court issued an order to show cause and granted Chase a preliminary 

injunction after a hearing, finding that Chase would suffer irreparable harm

if Carraker was allowed to proceed as she had threatened. 

¶4 During this time, Carraker filed numerous papers with titles 

such as, “Defendant Statement of Facts Court Should Know These Facts” 

and “Defendant See the Problem Soon You Will Too,” but never filed an 

answer to Chase’s complaint or asserted a counterclaim.1 She then moved 

for summary judgment asking the court to find that Chase lost or destroyed 

her note, which made her lien and UCC–1 on Chase’s assets valid. Chase 

 

1 The court declared Carraker a vexatious litigant after she filed 

numerous papers and motions throughout the pendency of litigation that 

did not address the claims raised by Chase’s complaint. 
JP MORGAN v. CARRAKER

Decision of the Court

3

responded and cross-moved for summary judgment. Chase’s Vice 

President of Operations provided an affidavit stating that Chase did not 

accept Carraker’s note, did not owe Carraker money, and had no open 

agreements or deposit relationships with Carraker.

¶5 Thereafter, the court granted summary judgment in Chase’s 

favor, declared Carraker’s UCC–1 filing void ab initio, and permanently 

enjoined Carraker from attempting to dispose of Chase’s assets. Regarding 

the UCC–1 filing, the court found that A.R.S. §§ 47–1101–10101 permitted 

the filing of a financing statement only where the debtor authorized the 

filing in an authenticated record or agreed to be bound by a security 

agreement. It further found that Chase and Carraker had no agreement and 

that she had no security interest in Chase’s assets. Pertaining to the 

injunction, the court found that Chase had shown that (1) it had suffered an 

irreparable injury, (2) the remedies available at law were inadequate to 

compensate for that injury, (3) the balance of hardships favored Chase, and 

(4) a permanent injunction would serve the public interest. The court also 

awarded Chase $500 under A.R.S. § 47–9527(A).

¶6 Carraker appealed before the entry of final judgment. This

Court stayed the appeal pending the trial court’s entry of final judgment. 

The trial court then entered its “Final Judgment” and Carraker’s appeal was 

reinstated.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Carraker claims that the court erred by granting Chase 

summary judgment, thereby declaring her UCC–1 on Chase’s assets void 

ab initio and permanently enjoining her from disposing of Chase’s assets.

Specifically, she argues that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s 

order. The grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 

Jackson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 228 Ariz. 197, 199 ¶ 8 (App. 2011). An 

order granting an injunction is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. 

LaFaro v. Cahill, 203 Ariz. 482, 485 ¶ 10 (App. 2002).

1. UCC–1 Void Ab Initio

¶8 Under Arizona’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code, 

A.R.S. § 47–1101–10101, a person may file a financing statement only if the 

debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated record or agrees to be bound 

by a security agreement. A.R.S. § 47–9509(A), (B). Here, Chase presented an 

affidavit from its Vice President of Operations stating that Chase had not 

entered into any agreements with Carraker. Carraker presented no 

authenticated record or other agreement showing that Chase had 
JP MORGAN v. CARRAKER

Decision of the Court

4

authorized the UCC–1 filing, and her claim that Chase failed to return the 

note is legally insufficient to prove authorization. Thus, sufficient evidence 

supported the court’s determination that Carraker had no security interest 

in Chase’s assets and that the UCC–1 was void ab initio.

2

2. Statutory Damages Award

¶9 Under A.R.S. § 47–9527(A), a person who causes a record to 

be filed and “who knows or has reason to know that the record is 

unauthorized under § 47–9509” is liable to a debtor affected by the record. 

The person is liable “for the sum of at least five hundred dollars or for treble 

the actual damages caused by the record, whichever is more, and 

reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action, if the person . . . wilfully 

refuses to terminate or correct the record . . . .” A.R.S. § 47–9527(A). Here, 

Carraker did not present evidence that Chase authorized the UCC–1 or that 

they agreed to be bound by a security agreement. After Chase denied that 

it had accepted her note, Carraker then had reason to know that the UCC–

1 was unauthorized, but did not retract it. As such, sufficient evidence 

supported the trial court’s award of statutory damages to Chase.

3. Carraker’s Additional Arguments on Appeal

¶10 Carraker also claims that the trial court erred by not including 

facts in its order for summary judgment. The court, however, was not 

required to state findings when ruling on a Rule 56 motion. See Ariz. R. Civ. 

P. 52(a)(3). She further claims that the court (1) erred by not calling the 

“Buckeye Arizona Police Department, FDIC, Federal Reserve, OCC or the 

White House records department” to obtain more evidence and that (2) the 

Federal Reserve Act supported her assertion that Chase’s loss or 

destruction of her note entitled her to assert a lien on Chase’s assets and file 

the UCC–1. These arguments are insufficiently briefed and deemed waived. 

See In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64 ¶ 6 (2013).

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶11 Chase requests attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on appeal 

under A.R.S. §§ 12–341, –341.01(A), –342, 47–9527(A), and Arizona Rule of 

Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 21. As this action arises out of 

purported contracts between Carraker and Chase, we award Chase its 

 

2 Because the court found that the UCC–1 was void ab initio, the 

permanent injunction preventing Carraker from enforcing the UCC–1 was 

unnecessary. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the court’s summary 

judgment order.
JP MORGAN v. CARRAKER

Decision of the Court

5

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12–341.01(A) upon its 

compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in 

part.