Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

OPINION

Nos. 04-20-00197-CR, 04-20-00198-CR & 04-20-00199-CR

Rosalinda OLALDE,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 2019CR2149, 2019CR2151, 2019CR2152

Honorable Jennifer Pena, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 18, 2021

AFFIRMED

Rosalinda Olalde appeals her convictions for intoxication manslaughter and intoxication 

assault. Her sole point of error challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her 

convictions. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2018, Olalde was driving a Ford Expedition that collided with a Chevrolet 

Malibu on an access road running parallel to Texas State Highway Loop 1604, resulting in the 

death of the Chevrolet’s driver and injuries to his four passengers. After the collision, Olalde’s 
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blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) was tested twice and measured 0.18 and 0.14 grams of 

alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. The State charged Olalde with criminal offenses in four

separate cases. The amended indictments contained five total charges: one charge of intoxication 

manslaughter and four charges of intoxication assault. Each charge alleged Olalde operated a 

vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and did so by reason of such intoxication cause the harm 

alleged—death or serious bodily injury—by accident or mistake, by driving her motor vehicle into 

another motor vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 49.07-.08.

The State consolidated the charges for trial. The jury acquitted Olalde of one of the 

intoxication assault charges but convicted her of the remaining charges. The jury sentenced Olalde 

to six years in prison for intoxication manslaughter, to four years for one of the intoxication assault

convictions, and to six years’ confinement, suspended in favor of community supervision, for the 

two remaining intoxication assault convictions.

Olalde timely appeals her convictions.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Olalde contends the evidence was legally insufficient to prove intoxication manslaughter 

and intoxication assault because the State failed to prove her intoxication was the cause of the 

collision and resulting harm, and she argues the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution 

requires this court to reverse the convictions. We disagree.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process requires that no person be 

convicted of a criminal offense except upon sufficient evidence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

316 (1979); Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In reviewing the 

evidence to determine whether it is legally sufficient to support a conviction, we consider all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether, based on that 

evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In considering the evidence, it is the 

jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, make credibility determinations, weigh 

the evidence, and make any necessary reasonable inferences from it. Nowlin v. State, 473 S.W.3d 

312, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the 

jury resolved conflicts in favor of the prosecution. Id. If the inferences made by the factfinder are 

reasonable in light of the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence, we will uphold the 

conviction. Id.; see Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

To present legally sufficient evidence to support the convictions, the State was required to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offenses of intoxication manslaughter and 

intoxication assault. A person commits intoxication manslaughter if the person operates a motor 

vehicle in a public place, is intoxicated, and by reason of that intoxication causes the death of 

another, by accident or mistake. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.08(a). A person commits intoxication 

assault if the person, by accident or mistake, while operating a motor vehicle in a public place 

while intoxicated, by reason of that intoxication, causes serious bodily injury to another. 

Id. § 49.07(a)(1). A person is “intoxicated” if the person has a BAC of 0.08 or higher. Id. 

§ 49.01(2)(B). 

Olalde’s only contention is the evidence was legally insufficient to prove her intoxication

caused the decedent’s death and the harm to his passengers. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 49.07(a)(1), 

49.08(a)(2). Olalde concedes the State presented evidence showing she drove a Ford Expedition

on the Loop 1604 access road while intoxicated with a BAC of 0.18 and she collided with the

Chevrolet Malibu, killing the driver and injuring his passengers. 

However, Olalde argues two factors, when viewed “in combination,” acted as a concurrent 

cause of the accident and resulting harm, thereby making her intoxication a clearly insufficient 
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cause of the harm. Olalde first contends that a silver Dodge Charger collided with her Ford 

Expedition while she was driving on the Loop 1604 access road, forcing her vehicle to move from 

the far left lane of the access road to the right lane and onto the sidewalk that paralleled the right 

lane. She then contends the driver of the Chevrolet Malibu failed to stop or yield before it moved

onto the Loop 1604 access road from a private driveway. Olalde contends the accident occurred 

when the Chevrolet’s driver failed to yield the right of way as Olalde was passing the driveway.

The evidence shows Olalde drove the Ford Expedition from the right lane of the Loop 1604 

access road onto the sidewalk that paralleled the access road, before returning the vehicle, or at 

least the front of the vehicle, to the right lane just prior to impact. Olalde’s expert at trial, Dr. Eric 

Moody, explained Olalde had been traveling on the sidewalk for approximately 140 feet “and was 

reentering the outside travel lane” at the moment of impact.1

In support of her theory that a silver Dodge Charger collided with her Ford Expedition,

Olalde points to her separate statements to Detective Richard C. Conrad and Officer Jorge 

Coronado that a gray vehicle collided with hers, causing her to lose control of the Ford Expedition

and drive onto the sidewalk. Beyond Olalde’s statements to law enforcement, nothing in the record 

shows any vehicles anywhere near Olalde’s Ford Expedition on the Loop 1604 access road 

immediately before the accident. Detective Conrad testified Olalde, who he said smelled of

intoxicants, told him the accident occurred as she exited Loop 1604. However, Detective Patrick 

Davis testified the Loop 1604 exit located before the scene of the accident, where Olalde’s Ford 

Expedition arguably could have been hit, was “quite a distance” and more than a block from the 

Loop 1604 access road crash site. 

1 Olalde does not dispute the State presented sufficient evidence of the “public place” element of Texas Penal Code, 

sections 49.07 and 49.08.
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Olalde also relies on the testimony of a witness who stated her friend captured the scene in 

a Snapchat video moments after the accident occurred. The witness took screenshots of that video. 

The screenshots show the passenger side of a silver vehicle, with no apparent damage, on the 

access road after the accident. One of the images, because of its angle, provides a partial view of 

the Ford Expedition. The witness called 911 twice and mentioned a silver Charger and a white 

Charger in one of the calls. The witness further testified she and her friend agreed they saw a third 

car, but they did not know what had happened, and they did not witness the accident. 

Detective Davis testified paint transfer between colliding vehicles may occur in even minor 

collisions. He saw no silver/gray paint transfer on the Ford Expedition, but he stated any paint 

transfer from a collision with a gray vehicle could have been removed by pavement when the Ford 

Expedition rolled over after colliding with the Chevrolet Malibu. Detective Davis reviewed a 

nearby Verizon store surveillance video played before the jury and testified he saw no other 

vehicles around Olalde’s vehicle on the access road. He also testified the video depicted a couple 

of vehicles pulling onto the Loop 1604 access road from a perpendicular side road seconds after 

the crash, and he identified one of those vehicles as a silver Dodge based on the vehicle’s lights, 

but he was not sure if the model was a Charger. The video, which was admitted into evidence, 

confirms Detective Davis’s testimony. Detective Davis further testified he knew a Dodge Charger 

had stopped at the scene after the Ford Expedition-Chevrolet Malibu collision. Detective Conrad 

testified he did not see any evidence indicating the Ford Expedition collided with a silver Dodge 

Charger before the Chevrolet Malibu collision. Olalde’s expert agreed the video showed no 

vehicles on the Loop 1604 access road, other than Olalde’s Expedition, from the time the 

Expedition first appears on the video and for some time thereafter. 

Olalde also contends the decedent drove the Chevrolet Malibu from the private driveway

into the right lane of the Loop 1604 access road without stopping or yielding the right of way to 
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her Ford Expedition. She theorizes that traffic violation caused the collision between the two 

vehicles. Detective Davis, who conducted an accident reconstruction investigation, testified his 

review of the Chevrolet Malibu’s crash data report (CDR) software recorded the Malibu’s speed 

at zero miles per hour two seconds prior to the collision. He was unable to determine whether the 

Chevrolet Malibu stopped behind the stop bar on the private driveway and was not sure whether

that would have prevented the cars from colliding. Detective Davis further testified the Chevrolet 

Malibu yielded the right of way to cars on the access road. However, the Ford Expedition was 

traveling on the sidewalk and only returning to the right lane at the point of impact, and while the 

front end of the vehicle entered the access road at the time of the collision, the back end of the 

vehicle had not yet returned to the access road. 

The CDR software from the Chevrolet Malibu recorded the Malibu’s speed as 11 miles per 

hour just before it stopped recording because of the collision. Detective Davis determined the Ford 

Expedition was traveling at a speed of between 74 and 75 miles per hour at the time of the 

collision—more than 20 miles per hour above the 50 mile-per-hour speed limit.

2 He further 

testified the distance required for a driver to react to a road hazard and bring her vehicle to a 

complete stop increases with vehicle speed and an intoxicated person would require an even greater 

distance to stop her vehicle. Detective Davis’s opinion based on his accident reconstruction 

investigation was that a lack of control of the Ford Expedition caused the collision and this lack of 

control was caused by Olalde’s intoxication.

Olalde’s expert found the Chevrolet Malibu’s CDR data reliable as to the vehicle’s speed. 

He disagreed with Detective Davis’s estimate as to the Ford Expedition’s speed; he testified the 

vehicle was traveling between 56 and 60 miles per hour at the time of impact. He further testified 

2 SAPD was unable to obtain CDR data from the Ford Expedition.
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the collision would not have occurred if the Chevrolet Malibu had remained stopped behind the 

stop bar. However, Olalde’s expert also testified nothing suggested Olalde drove onto the sidewalk 

to avoid a collision with the Chevrolet Malibu. But it was possible the decedent drove the 

Chevrolet Malibu out of the private driveway and onto the access road to avoid a collision with 

Olalde’s Ford Expedition, which was traveling at a high rate of speed on the sidewalk toward the 

decedent’s vehicle. He also acknowledged a driver requiring more time to stop her vehicle would 

have traveled a greater distance to bring it to a stop. 

Olalde argues these factors establish a concurrent cause of the collision and, because they 

are a concurrent cause, her intoxication was clearly insufficient to cause the collision. The 

existence or nonexistence of a causal connection is normally a question for the jury. Martin v.

State, No. 04-13-00483-CR, 2014 WL 2802912, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 18, 2014, 

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Hale v. State, 194 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2006, no pet.). Under the Texas Penal Code, “a person is criminally responsible if the 

result would not have occurred but for [that person’s] conduct, operating either alone or 

concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the 

result and the conduct of the actor [was] clearly insufficient.” Id. § 6.04(a) (emphasis added). In 

other words, if a concurrent cause is present, “two possible combinations exist to satisfy the ‘but 

for’ requirement: (1) the defendant’s conduct may be sufficient by itself to have caused the harm, 

regardless of the existence of a concurrent cause; or (2) the defendant’s conduct and the other

cause together may be sufficient to have caused the harm.” Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). However, “[i]f the additional cause, other than the defendant’s conduct, 

is clearly sufficient, by itself, to produce the result and the defendant’s conduct, by itself, is clearly 

insufficient, then the defendant cannot be convicted.” Id.; Walter v. State, 581 S.W.3d 957, 971 
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(Tex. App. —Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (holding if injuries caused by defendant contributed to 

death of deceased, he is responsible even though other contributing causes existed).3

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and assuming the jury 

resolved any conflicts in the evidence in the verdict’s favor, the jury could have reasonably found

Olalde’s alcohol intoxication—well above the legal limit—caused the death and injuries, alone or 

concurrently with another cause because she was too impaired to operate her Ford Expedition on 

a public road, causing her to lose control of the vehicle and collide with the Chevrolet Malibu 

driven by the decedent. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.04(a), 49.07(a), 49.08; Pena v. State, 522 

S.W.3d 617, 624-25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding state proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s negligence caused victim’s death and jury could have 

reasonably concluded defendant’s conduct was alone sufficient to have caused death, regardless 

of whether concurrent cause existed, or jury might have reasonably believed defendant’s conduct 

and victim’s alleged conduct together were sufficient to have caused victim’s death); Martin, 2014 

WL 2802912, at *2 (holding evidence legally sufficient to prove causation by intoxication because 

evidence showed appellant speeding while intoxicated with BAC over legal limit even if other 

driver’s actions in some way caused collision); see also Martinez v. State, 66 S.W.3d 467, 469-70 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet ref’d) (“Appellant’s conduct, namely, his intoxication 

combined with the act of driving an 18–wheeler on a public highway above the legal speed limit, 

cannot possibly be characterized as being insufficient conduct to cause the accident.”).

Based on the evidence presented at trial and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 

the jury could have reasonably concluded Olalde’s alleged concurrent cause was not clearly 

sufficient to have caused the accident. See Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351. The evidence showed 

3 The trial court’s jury charge tracked the causation language in Texas Penal Code § 6.04(a).
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Olalde’s vehicle was not struck by a Dodge Charger (or any other vehicle), and it was her 

intoxication that caused her to move from the far left lane of the access road to the right lane and 

ultimately onto the sidewalk, while driving in excess of 20 miles per hour over the speed limit. 

The evidence also showed the Ford Expedition veered to the right lane because Olalde was 

intoxicated and not in full command of her mental and physical faculties, and lost control of the 

vehicle, drove the vehicle onto the sidewalk, and returned the front end of the vehicle to the right 

lane of the access road just prior to making impact with the Chevrolet Malibu. Olalde’s intoxication 

also lessened her reaction time and prevented her ability to avoid the collision. See Matamoros v. 

State, 500 S.W.3d 58, 64-65 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016, no pet.) (concluding 

reasonable factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s intoxication 

caused death where appellant admitted he made too wide of a turn and had collision running into 

bus stop, officer testified someone in full command of mental and physical faculties while driving 

within speed limit would have been able to navigate turn, and introduction of alcohol into driver’s 

system was primary factor in causing accident, even if appellant suggested slippery roads caused 

accident); Martin, 2014 WL 2802912, at *2; Martinez, 66 S.W.3d at 469-70.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder 

could have reasonably concluded Olalde’s intoxication caused the decedent’s death and the 

injuries to his passengers. Olalde’s lone point of error is therefore overruled.4

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgments.

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

PUBLISH

4 Olalde also asserts article 1, § 13 of the Texas Constitution requires this court reverse her convictions because the 

State’s evidence is insufficient to support them. Olalde cites no relevant authorities and offers no other discussion or 

analysis in support of this assertion and thus presents nothing for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).