UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ AMANDA ELLSWORTH; BRAEDEN WALLING, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. CITY OF BROKEN ARROW, OKLAHOMA, a municipal corporation; JOSH ZOLLER, individually; RODNEY GARNER, individually, Defendants - Appellees. No. 20-5032 (D.C. No. 4:19-CV -00034-TCK-FHM) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , Circuit Judge, LUCERO , Senior Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ Plaintiffs Amanda Ellsworth and Braed en Walling appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in fa vor of Defendants City of Broken Arrow (“the City”) and Officers Jo sh Zoller and Rodney Garner of the Broken Arrow Police

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 18, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Department (“BAPD”) on Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ action arose fro m a traffic stop of a car dr iven by Ms. Ellsworth. On August 1, 2018, the BAPD dispatch re ported that the Tulsa Police Department (“TPD”) was following a black Ford Mustang involved in an arme d robbery, that the robbery involved a gun, and that a TPD helicopter was the only unit following the vehicle. Shortly after dispatch descri bed the vehicle’s location, BAPD Officer Marque Baldwin saw a black car traveling at the specified locati on. Officer Josh Zoller, who also saw the black vehicle, stated it looked like a Ford Mustang, but Officer Baldwin responded it looked more like a Dodge Charger. After dispatch updated the vehicle’s location and noted there were two handguns in the vehicle, Of ficer Zoller asked dispatch if TPD had provided a license plate number. Dispatch stated that TPD had not given that in formation, at which point Officer Zoller provided the license plate number of the black car and asked dispatch to confirm with the helicopter that they were behind the correct vehicle. The helicopter—which was “right above” O fficer Zoller, Aplee. Supp. App. at 50— confirmed directly over the radio that he was behind the suspect vehicle. BAPD dispatch also indicated that the car was not reported as stolen. The BAPD officers then act ivated their lights and sire ns and pursued the black Charger driven by Ms. Ellsworth. Her seve nteen-year-old daughter , plaintiff Braeden Walling, was the front seat passenger, and th ree young children were in the back seat.3 After traveling an additional half mile ove r the course of one minute, Ms. Ellsworth pulled her vehicle over. It was approximately 7:15 p.m. Officer Zoller parked behind Ms. Ellsworth; Officers Garner a nd Baldwin parked be hind Officer Zoller; and BAPD Sergeant Bryan Bandy stopped tra ffic further up the road. Around this time, TPD reported the suspects were two Hispanic males. The officers exited their vehicles, pointed their firearms at Plaintiffs’ vehicle, and directed the occupants to put their hands up. Officer Zoller first ordered Ms. Ellsworth, who is not Hispanic, out of the vehicle and directed her to walk backwards toward his vehicle. Meanwhile, Officer Garner put his rifle in Officer Zoller’s vehicle and waited for Ms. Ellsworth to get close so that he could handcuff her. When she reached Offi cer Zoller’s vehicle, Officer Zoller directed her to go to her knees, and Officer Garner, using one arm, grabbed her le ft arm, forced her to the ground, and handcuffed her. In the proces s, Ms. Ellsworth sustained a bruise on her arm from the grab and bruising on her ankle from striking the curb . Officer Garner then helped her back up and pushed her in to the backseat of his vehicle. While Officer Garner wa s securing Ms. Ellsworth, Officer Zoller ordered Ms. Walling, who also is not Hispanic, out of the vehicl e and directed her to walk backwards. According to Plaintiffs, Ms . Walling was handcuffed as well. The TPD helicopter then reported that Plaintiffs were not the su spects, at which point the BAPD officers holstered their weapons, removed the handcuffs, and released Plaintiffs. Sergeant Bandy ex plained to Ms. Ellsworth th at they were looking for4 robbery suspects, and she said she understood . He asked if she was okay and if she needed an ambulance, and she stat ed she just wanted to go home. Plaintiffs filed suit in st ate court against the City, which removed the action to federal court. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint, adding Officers Zoller and Garner as defendants and alle ging false arrest and excessi ve force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false arrest in violation of state law, and as sault and battery in violation of state law. The parties file d cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court denied Plaintiffs’ mo tion and granted Defenda nts’ motion. The court concluded, inter alia : (1) Plaintiffs’ detenti on was supported by reasonable suspicion and did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) the use of force was reasonable and did not violat e the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the state-law claims failed for the same reasons as the constitutional claims. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION Plaintiffs argue the dist rict court erred in granti ng summary judgment on their § 1983 claims for false arrest and excessi ve force in favor of Officers Zoller and Garner. We disagree and affirm the district court’s judgment. 1

1 Plaintiffs fail to argue their state-law claims, so those claims are waived. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Fou nd. for Apologetic Info. & Rsch. , 527 F.3d 1045, 1049 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Arguments in adequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.”). Plaintiffs al so fail to adequately brief their § 1983 claims against the City. They argue BAPD has a “policy of arrest first a nd ask questions and investigate later,” which “should have caused [Defendants’] summary judgment motions to be denied and [Plaintiffs’] moti on to be granted.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. But they offer no citation for such a proposition. Instead, for municipality liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) a “policy or custom” (2) “that caused the injury” and (3) “was enac ted or maintained with de liberate indifference to an5 I. Standard of Review “We review a grant of summary judgm ent de novo, draw ing all reasonable inferences and resolving all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party.” DePaula v. Easter Seals El Mirador , 859 F.3d 957, 968 (10t h Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Summary judg ment shall be granted if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “Only disputes over facts that might affect th e outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entr y of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a factua l dispute must be based on more than “[u]nsubstantiated allegations ” or “mere speculation, c onjecture, or surmise.” Self v.
Crum , 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

almost inevitable cons titutional injury.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t , 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the analysis is even more exacting with “a claim against a munici pality for failure to train its police officers in the use of force.” Carr v. Castle , 337 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (listi ng five factors a plaintiff must show). Plaintiffs allege BAPD’s po licy is “unconstitutiona l,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 17, and “directly caused” their claim, id. at 29. But they do not cite, let alone apply, authority relevant to municipality liability, and their cont entions regarding the City are too conclusory to merit review, see Acosta v. Foreclosure Connection, Inc. , 903 F.3d 1132, 1136 n.1 (10th Cir. 2018). In any event, their claims against the City fail for the same reasons noted below: the failure to s how a constitutional violation.6 II. False Arrest Plaintiffs first contend they were arre sted without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We conclude the undisputed facts show their seizure was not an arrest but a lawful investigative detention. In evaluating a seizure, “we must ba lance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendm ent interests agains t the importance of the governmental interests allege d to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Windom , 863 F.3d 1322, 1327 (10th Ci r. 2017) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Although a seizure generally re quires probable cause, the Supreme Court
in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “recognized the narrow authority of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited in trusions on an individual’s personal security . . . based on less than probable cause.” Windom , 863 F.3d at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Terry , an investigative detention only requires reasonable suspicion. See Cortez v. McCauley , 478 F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). But “if a police-citizen encounter exceed s the limits of

a Terry stop, the detention becomes an arrest that must be supported by probable
cause.” United States v. Chavez , 660 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10t h Cir. 2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingl y, we consider: (1) “whether the stop was justified at its inception” ; and (2) “whether the office rs’ actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances whic h justified the interf erence in the first place.” Windom , 863 F.3d at 1328 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).7 A. The Initial Stop of Plaintiffs’ Vehicle “An investigatory detention is justifie d at its inception if the specific and articulable facts and rationa l inferences drawn from thos e facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person ha s or is committing a crime.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The undisput ed facts show that the initia l stop of Plaintiffs’ vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion. Officers Zoller and Garner were told that TPD was pursuing a “black Ford Mustang that was involved in an armed r obbery in [Tulsa],” that a TPD helicopter was the only TPD unit following the vehicle, and that there were “two handguns in the vehicle.” Aplt. App. at 93-94. Afte r TPD relayed the vehicle’s location, the BAPD officers saw a black vehi cle at that location. O fficer Zoller thought it looked like a Ford Mustang, but Officer Baldwi n believed it looked more like a Dodge Charger. Although Plaintiffs suggest the officer s dismissed this discrepancy, Officer Zoller sought further information specifica lly “to ensure that [he] was going to initiate a traffic stop on the correct car.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 48. 2 He first asked dispatch if TPD had provided a license plat e number. And when dispatch said TPD had not given that information, he provi ded Plaintiffs’ license plate number and asked for the helicopter to confirm he was following the right car.

2 Plaintiffs also note TPD described th e suspect vehicle as having “rust on it” and that their car had “no rust .” Aplt. Opening Br . at 2-3. But it is undisputed the officers were not told th is detail until after Plai ntiffs were released. See Aplee. Supp. App. at 49 (Officer Zoller’s deposition); id. at 77 (Officer Garner’s deposition); id. at 153 (computer-aided dispatch report). A nd even if they knew of this discrepancy prior to the stop, TPD still confirmed Plai ntiffs’ vehicle was th e suspect vehicle.8 Once the TPD helicopter confirmed the officers were following the suspect vehicle, they were entitled to rely on that information. See Oliver v. Woods , 209 F.3d 1179, 1190-91 (10t h Cir. 2000) (noting that “officer s, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross- examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information” a nd, instead, may “rely upon info rmation relayed to them by other officers in determini ng whether there is reasonabl e suspicion to justify an investigative detention” (internal quotati on marks omitted)). And the officers’ reliance on TPD’s information, albe it mistaken, was reasonable. United States v. Shareef , 100 F.3d 1491, 1505 (10t h Cir. 1996) (“A mistak en premise can furnish grounds for a Terry stop, if the officers do not know that it is mistaken and are reasonable in acting upon it.” (int ernal quotation marks omitted)). Although Plaintiffs were “admittedly innocent,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 2, “ Terry accepts the risk that office rs may stop innocent people,” Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000) . We hold Plaintiffs’ Terry stop was justified at its inception.
B. The Officers’ Conduct After St opping Plaintiffs’ Vehicle We next consider “whether the offi cers’ conduct was su ch as to place the seizure within the general rule requiring probable cause for a seizure or within Terry ’s exception to that rule.” Windom , 863 F.3d at 1328 (brackets, ellipsis, emphasis and internal quotation marks omitte d). Plaintiffs cont end that by pointing guns at them and their car, forcing Ms. Ellsworth to th e ground, and placing them in9 handcuffs, 3 all pursuant to a “point guns/arrest first/ask questi ons later policy,” 4 Aplt. Opening Br. at 26, the officers’ cond uct converted the seizure into an arrest requiring probable cause. We conclude the undisputed facts show the officers’ actions after stopping the vehicle were reasonable and did not convert the seizure into an arrest. First, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he use of firearms and handcuffs is an arrest, not an investigative detention

. ” Id. at 25. But the cases they cite do not support such a blanket proposition. See Cortez , 478 F.3d at 1115-16 (“The use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques generally exceed the scope of an investigative detention and enter the realm of an arrest.” (br ackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)); United States v. Melendez-Garcia , 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding the displa y of weapons and use of handcuffs exceeded the scope of the Terry stop because, inter alia , there was no

3 Although Defendants insist Ms. Walling was never ha ndcuffed, and Plaintiffs have not identified which officer allegedly ha ndcuffed her, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. We therefore accept, solely for purposes of our analysis, that both Plaintiffs were handcuffed.

4 Plaintiffs appear to mi scharacterize testimony from Captain Greg Sipes, who testified that BAPD officers are taught “ [t]here are times ” when they “could be on a scene where everyone needs to be handcuffed for officer safety.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 129 (emphasis added); see also id. (acknowledging that, “ [d]epending on the circumstances ,” BAPD “officers are taught that if they come upon a scene where they think . . . a crime occurred and they’ve got a bunch of people ther e that they don’t know what they’ve done . . . they can handcuff them first and sort th e facts out later” (emphasis added))

. Captain Sipes clarified “[t]ha t doesn’t mean those people are under arrest,” only that “the y’re detained so an office r can control the scene and make sure they’re safe and to further the investigation.” Id. There is simply no evidence of an “‘arrest first and investigate facts later’ policy,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 2, let alone a “shoot first a nd ask questions later policy,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 15.10 information “the suspects were armed or vi olent”). Instead of “rigid criteria,” “common sense and ordinary human experience” guide our analysis of the reasonableness of Terry stops. Windom , 863 F.3d at 1329 (i nternal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “under certain ci rcumstances, the steps officers may permissibly take to protect their safety include drawing their weapons, placing a suspect in handcuffs, or forci ng a suspect to the ground.” Id. at 1329-30 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1330 (collecting cases); Shareef , 100 F.3d at 1506 (holding such measures did not convert a Terry stop into an arrest). 5 Here, the BAPD “officers’ use of high-risk stop techniques was reasonable under the circumstances.” Windom , 863 F.3d at 1328. With the information relayed by dispatch and provided directly by the TPD helicopter, the officers reasonably believed the black vehicle they were follo wing (1) was involved in an armed robbery,

5 Plaintiffs dismiss the issue of office r safety, stating Offi cer Zoller’s concern about not “want[ing] to get shot and just want[ing] to get home to his family” does not factor into the analysis. Aplt. Opening Br. at 26. Bu t “police officers need not take unnecessary risks in the line of duty” and “may take precautionary measures”— including felony-takedown proce dures, as used here—“that are reasonably necessary to safeguard their personal safety, and to maintain the status quo, during a Terry stop.” United States v. Copening , 506 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Windom , 863 F.3d at 1331 (“[W]hen an officer has a reasonable belief that a suspect he is investigating at close range is armed, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether th e person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical ha rm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).11 and (2) contained two suspects and two hand guns. The officers thus were fully justified in pointing their guns at Plaintif fs’ vehicle and ordering the occupants out. Plaintiffs however insist th at once they exited the vehi cle, if not before when they placed their hands outside the vehicl e’s windows, BAPD officers should have been able to tell th ey were not Hispanic males and, therefore, not the armed robbery suspects. Plaintiffs also ar gue they were cooperative dur ing the stop and at all times compliant with the officers’ directions. Plaintiffs thus contend the objective facts caused any suspicion supporting the stop to “dissipate.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. The undisputed facts show that Plaintif fs were compliant a nd that the officers immediately saw Ms. Ellsworth “w as not a Hispanic male.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 85. But it is also undisputed the officers could not determine either what Plaintiffs had been “doing inside the vehicle” immediately prior to the stop, id. at 84, or whether Plaintiffs were unarmed solely based on thei r appearance. Both o fficers testified they could not confirm whether Plaintiffs we re unarmed until they were physically secured and placed in custody

. Id. at 66, 82. The officers also could not tell whether the suspects—two Hispanic males—were hi ding in the backseat . Officer Zoller testified he “could not tell who the occ upants were when [he] made the stop,” id. at 66, and “couldn’t even see the children,” id. at 53. And according to Ms. Walling, one officer specifically asked her whether there were “any Hispan ics in the car” and “seemed shocked” when she sa id there were three children in the backseat. Aplt.12 App. at 74. Another officer then walked to over the vehicle and confirmed there were “kids in the back.” Id. 6 Having been told the vehicle containe d two armed robbery suspects and two handguns, the officers kept their firear ms trained on the vehicle as they began removing the occupants one at a time, pl acing them in handcuffs, and separating them so that the officers could secure the scene and investigate further. See Shareef , 100 F.3d at 1507 (“The use of handcuffs wa s justified until all six defendants were secured, and for a reasonable time thereafter , while the officers conducted protective sweeps of the cars and asse ssed the situation.”); see also Muehler v. Mena , 544 U.S. 93, 100 (2005) (permitting handc uffs in high-risk situati ons and noting generally the increased risk in stopping a vehicle with multip le occupants). Plaintiffs were not told they were under arrest or advised of their Miranda rights. See Cortez , 478 F.3d at 1123 (referencing the lack of Miranda rights, among other factors, in determining a seizure was a Terry stop and not an arrest). And th ey were released as soon as TPD said they were not the susp ects, with the entir e encounter lasting about three minutes.

6 The parties dispute whether the officer s learned the suspects were Hispanic males before the stop—according to Plainti ffs—or after the stop and while Plaintiffs were being handcuffed—according to the office rs and as found by the district court. This dispute is not material. The office rs either did not know the suspects’ gender and ethnicity prior to the stop—in which case they could have believed Plaintiffs were the suspects—or they knew Plaintiffs did not match the suspects’ description— in which case they could still have believe d the suspects were hiding in the car. Either way, the officers ’ actions “were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the [stop] in the first place.” Windom , 863 F.3d at 1328 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).13 To the extent Plaintiffs contend Offi cer Garner’s use of force transformed the “ Terry detention into an arrest requiring probable cause,” id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted), their argument is factually and le gally unsupported. Although they allege Officer Garner sla mmed Ms. Ellsworth to the concrete after handcuffing her, the undisputed evidence s hows that he forced her onto her knees and then handcuffed her. 7 And although Plaintiffs al lege Officer Garner “picked [Ms. Ellsworth] up and threw her into the b ack seat of one of the police cars,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 10, she testified he did not pick her up and, instead, “pushed” her into the car. Aplt. App. at 62. Plaintiffs have not cited any authorit y showing such force altered the character of the Terry stop, and mindful of the high-risk nature of this stop, we conclude such force did not render the detention an arrest. See generally Marquez v. City of Albuquerque , 399 F.3d 1216, 1222 ( 10th Cir. 2005) (noting officers need not “use the l east intrusive means” during an investigative detention)

.

7 Regarding the order of events, Ms. Ellsworth testified she was handcuffed afterbeing forced to the ground. See Aplt. App. at 62. Offi cer Garner also testified she was “[o]n her knees” when he handcuffe d her. Aplee. Supp. App. at 87. Although Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that O fficer Garner “jamm[ed] her down on the curb afte r she was handcuffed,” id. at 23, the complaint was not verified and is not competent evidence for summary-judgment purposes, see United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff , 548 F.3d 931, 958 (10th Cir. 2008). As for the amount of force that Officer Garner used, Ms. Ellsworth testifie d he “slam[med]” her to her knees and “slammed [her] down to where [her] a nkle hit the curb.” Aplt. App. at 62. But she also testified he gr abbed her with only one arm a nd “just forced [her] down.” Id. We need not finely parse her words becau se even in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, such use of physical force did no t transform the deten tion into an arrest.14 Although Plaintiffs’ detention “was undoubtedly more in trusive than an ordinary Terry stop, the precautionary measures of force employed by the officers were reasonable under the circumstances.” Windom , 863 F.3d at 1333 (internal quotation marks omitted). And because “the officers’ acti ons were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the [stop] in the first place,” the stop did not develop into an arrest. 8 Id. at 1328 (brackets a nd internal quotations marks omitted). The district court properl y granted summary judgment to Officers Zoller and Garner on Plaintif fs’ false-arrest claim.
III. Excessive Force Plaintiffs next contend the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Officers Zoller and Garner on their ex cessive-force claim. We conclude the undisputed facts show the officers used reasonable force under the circumstances. The authority to conduct a Terry stop “necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Cortez , 478 F.3d at 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted). A nd that force need not be “the least intrusive.” Marquez , 399 F.3d at 1222 (internal quota tion marks omitted). Rather, we assess the force for “ objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (int ernal quotation marks omitted.

8 Although Plaintiffs also point to te stimony from Officer Zoller indicating he believed the use of handcuffs m eant Ms. Ellsworth was arrested, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 9, Officer Garner testified she “w as being detained” and “wasn’t arrested,” Aplee. Supp. App. at 85. In any event, their “subjective beliefs are irrelevant” for deciding whether Plainti ffs were arrested. Cortez , 478 F.3d at 1117 n.8.15 This standard recognizes “that police offi cers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tens e, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necess ary in a particular situation.” Id. at 397. Thus, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it ma y later seem unnecessa ry in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 396 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, we must consider, from the perspective “of a reasonable officer on the scene,” whether th e force was reasonable in light of “the alleged crime’s severity, the degree of potential threat that the suspect poses to an officer’s safety and to othe rs’ safety, and the suspect’s efforts to resi st or evade
arrest.” Marquez , 399 F.3d at 1220 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs base their clai m on the evidence that: (1) the officers pointed their firearms at them and their vehicle; (2) Officer Garner grabbed, with one arm, Ms. Ellsworth’s arm and forced or “slammed” her down to her knees; (3) the officers handcuffed Plaintiffs; and (4) Officer Garn er pushed Ms. Ellsworth into the police car. But as we held above, these actions were reasonably warranted in furtherance of the investigative detention under the circumstances. See also Windom , 863 F.3d at 1329-30 (noting that, depending on the circumstances, officers may protect themselves during a Terry stop by “drawing their weapons, placing a suspect in handcuffs, or forcing a suspect to the gr ound” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thompson v. City of Lawrence , 58 F.3d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding the officers did not use excessive force by “sh oving [an innocent bystander] to the floor, drawing a weapon on her, and handcuffing her” (brackets and internal quotation16 marks omitted)); United States v. Perdue , 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding it was reasonabl e for officers conducting a Terry stop to have their weapons drawn and to order the suspect onto the ground where they reasonably believed he was armed and da ngerous, noting an “officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed,” only reasonably justif ied in being concerned for his safety or the safety of others (internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, we conclude the force wa s not excessive when considering “the alleged crime’s severity, the degree of potential threat that the suspect poses to an officer’s safety and to othe rs’ safety, and the suspect’s efforts to resi st or evade
arrest.” Marquez , 399 F.3d at 1220. The third factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor, as the undisputed facts show they were cooperative and did not resist the officers. But the other two factors plainly weigh in th e officers’ favor—an armed robbery is a severe offense, and the possibility of multiple armed robbery suspects and multiple handguns posed a significant risk to the officers’ safety . The force therefore was reasonable, particularly given the “tense, un certain, and rapidly e volving” situation. Graham , 490 U.S. at 397. Thus, the dist rict court properly granted summary judgment to Officers Zoller and Garner on Plaintiffs’ excessive-force claim. 9

9 Plaintiffs’ excessive-force claim base d on the handcuffing also fails due to the lack of a “non-de mi nimis actual injury.” Donahue v. Wihongi , 948 F.3d 1177, 1196 (10th Cir. 2020) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Ms. Walling suffered no injury from the handcuffs, and Ms. Ellswo rth sustained only minor abrasions or bruises, which is insuffici ent as a matter of law, see id. (collecting cases).17 CONCLUSION The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge