Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-60536

Summary Calendar

CHARLOTTE V WOODS

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 2:07-CV-137

Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Charlotte V. Woods seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on

appeal from the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of her civil suit

involving a social security matter. The district court dismissed her action

because she failed to obey its orders that she pay the filing fee and that, after she

paid the fee, she effectuate process on the defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)

and 41(b).

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 11, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-60536

2

Woods has shown that she is a pauper for purposes of this appeal. See

Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). We dispense, however, with

further briefing and, for the reasons noted below, affirm the district court’s

judgment.

Dismissals pursuant to Rules 4 and 41 are reviewed for abuse of

discretion. See Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 879 (5th Cir. 1996); Fournier v.

Textron Inc., 776 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1985). If the effect of a dismissal

without prejudice prevents or arguably may prevent the plaintiff from again

raising the dismissed claims because of the applicability of a statute of

limitations, the dismissal may operate as a dismissal with prejudice. Long, 77

F.3d at 880. It appears that the district court’s dismissal of Woods’s suit

operates as a dismissal with prejudice. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

We will affirm dismissals with prejudice only when (1) there is a clear

record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, and (2) the district court

has expressly determined that lesser sanctions would not prompt diligent

prosecution, or the record shows that the district court employed lesser sanctions

that proved to be futile. Long, 77 F.3d at 880. This court has explained that

providing the plaintiff with second and third chances to comply with an order

counts as a lesser sanction. See Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep’t, 757

F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Husley v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168,

171 (5th Cir. 1991).

In this case, Woods twice failed to obey the district court’s order to pay the

filing fee. Although she is a pro se plaintiff, she concedes that she is well

educated, and there is no reason to believe that she did not understand the

court’s orders or warning that her case would be dismissed if she did not pay the

fee. Moreover, four months passed after the district court’s last order that

Woods pay the filing fee, and Woods filed nothing with the district court. The

information available to the district court at the time that it dismissed Woods’s

action was that she was choosing to go to school instead of pursuing gainful
No. 08-60536

3

employment and that she had unencumbered property worth $25,000 (her home)

and $17,000 (her car). Although Woods was given the opportunity to correct any

incorrect information in her IFP motions and affidavits and to correct any

incorrect assumptions made by the district court with respect to her financial

situation, she did not do so. Accordingly, given the information known to the

district court at the time it dismissed her suit, its dismissal was not an abuse of

discretion.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.