2016 IL App (1st) 153101

No. 1-15-3101 

Opinion filed September 13, 2016 

Second Division

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

KRISTINA PEREZ, 

Platiniff-Appellant, 

v. 

THE CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County. 

No. 14 L 5302 

 The Honorable 

Eileen M. Brewer, 

Judge, presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Pierce and Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff Kristina Perez sued the Chicago Park District after she was severely and 

permanently injured while at Chicago’s West Lawn Park when two men illegally set off 

fireworks that exploded next to her. The trial court granted the Park District’s motion to dismiss 

under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 

10/1-101 et seq. (West 2014)) and denied Perez’s oral request to file a fourth amended 

complaint.
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¶ 2 We affirm. Perez failed to plead a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct because 

(i) the fireworks were not a “condition” of the Park District’s property under section 3-106 of the 

Act, (ii) the Park District never “undertook to supervise” the fireworks under section 3-108(a), 

(iii) the Park District had no common-law duty to supervise the two men under section 3-108(b), 

and (iv) the hazardous fireworks display was not “conducted” by the Park District under section 

3-109. And, an amended complaint could not cure these defects. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On July 4, 2013, Kristina Perez went to West Lawn Park to celebrate Independence Day. 

The Park District prohibits the use of fireworks on public property without a permit but that did 

not stop Thomas Lagowski and Krzysztoff Gros from illegally igniting fireworks, one of which 

exploded next to Perez. She suffered injuries, causing amputation of her right foot and part of her 

lower leg.

¶ 5 Perez sued the Park District, Lagowski, Gros, and the City of Chicago. The Park District 

moved to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 

(West 2014)), arguing that the Act barred any claim against it. Before the motion was fully 

briefed, Perez amended her complaint twice more. Perez’s third amended complaint, as to the 

Park District, pled negligence (count I), willful and wanton conduct (count II), willful and 

wanton conduct as owner-occupier (count III), and strict liability for hazardous activity (count 

IV). (After filing her third amended complaint, Perez voluntarily dismissed the City of Chicago 

and settled with Lagowski and Gros.) The Park District did not file a new motion to dismiss but 

relied on its original motion. The trial court dismissed the third amended complaint with

prejudice. Perez then made an oral motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, which 

the trial court denied. 
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¶ 6 ANALYSIS

¶ 7 As an initial matter, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342(a) requires an appellant’s brief 

include “as an appendix, *** a complete table of contents, with page references, of the record on 

appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005). The table of contents to Perez’s brief does not 

comply with Rule 342(a). Perez’s appellant brief does not contain a table of contents to the 

record on appeal, but instead a one-page table of contents with references to the pages of the 

appendix attached to her appellant brief. 

¶ 8 We remind counsel that our supreme court rules are not advisory suggestion. See, e.g., In 

re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57. If counsel is unsure about how to 

prepare a formal brief, it is better to seek clarification than forgiveness. When a brief fails to 

follow the requirements set forth in Rule 342(a), we may dismiss the appeal. Fender v. Town of 

Cicero, 347 Ill. App. 3d 46, 51 (2004). But, the argument section of Perez’s appellant brief 

provides references to the volume and pages of the record on appeal, as required by Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008), so that we are able to assess whether the facts 

Perez presents are accurate and a fair portrayal. Thus, we choose to exercise our discretion and 

address the issues she claims on their merit.

¶ 9 Motion to Dismiss

¶ 10 A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code admits the legal sufficiency of the 

complaint and raises defects, defenses, or other affirmative matters that appear on the face of the 

complaint or are established by external submissions that act to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. 

Neppl v. Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 581, 584 (2000). In addition, “it is well established that a 

cause of action should not be dismissed with prejudice unless it is clear that no set of facts can be 

proved under the pleadings which would entitle plaintiffs to relief.” Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. 
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Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 488 (2008). For a section 2-619 dismissal, our standard review is de 

novo. Neppl, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 583. 

¶ 11 The trial court in granting the motion to dismiss did not state reasons for the dismissal.

We can affirm “on any basis present in the record.” Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long 

Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 261 (2004). Also, Perez argues two additional sections of the Act for the 

first time in her appellate brief—maintaining dangerous conditions on its property and failing to 

supervise Lagowski and Gros. See 745 ILCS 10/3-106, 3-108 (West 2014). While we may 

consider issues not raised in the trial court waived, waiver is not a limitation on the reviewing 

court and we will consider Perez’s arguments. See Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 

389 (1996). 

¶ 12 In its motion to dismiss, the Park District argued it had absolute immunity for any failure 

to follow its laws and enactments, to inspect property other than its own for hazards, to provide 

police protection, and to make arrests. See 745 ILCS 10/2-103, 2-205, 4-102, 4-107 (West 2014). 

The parties dispute whether the Act’s immunities with explicit willful and wanton exceptions 

override the immunities without explicit willful and wanton exceptions. Perez maintains that 

sections 3-106, 3-108, and 3-109 of the Act apply specifically to parks and recreational activities, 

contain exceptions for willful and wanton conduct, and override the more general immunities 

relied on by the Park District. 

¶ 13 For support, Perez cites Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374 (1994), where our supreme 

court held an implicit, general exception for willful and wanton conduct applies to all the Act’s 

immunities. The Park District correctly notes that the supreme court reversed course in Reis v. 

City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205 (2011), finding that there is no implied willful and wanton 

exception to every immunity in the Act.
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¶ 14 Perez, however, is not arguing a general exception to the Park District’s immunities but 

points to specific immunities within the Act that explicitly state a cause of action for willful and 

wanton conduct and argues that those specific sections override general exceptions. While the 

court in Reis found no general willful and wanton exception, “Where the legislature has chosen 

to limit an immunity to cover only negligence, it has unambiguously done so.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 223. For our purposes, the Park District still prevails regardless 

of whether the immunities with explicit willful and wanton exceptions override the immunities 

without explicit willful and wanton exceptions. 

¶ 15 Section 3-106 

¶ 16 Perez first asserts that section 3-106 permits her to sue the Park District. Section 3-106 

states that a public entity is not liable “based on the existence of a condition of any public 

property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including *** parks *** 

unless such local entity *** is guilty of willful and wanton conduct proximately causing such 

injury.” 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2014). Perez argues that the Park District committed willful 

and wanton conduct by knowingly allowing dangerous fireworks on its property. 

¶ 17 There is a difference between a condition and an activity under section 3-106. Moore v. 

Chicago Park District, 2012 IL 112788, ¶ 15. Perez can only claim the willful and wanton 

exception under section 3-106 if her injury was caused by a condition of the Park District’s 

property, not an activity conducted on it. In Moore, the plaintiff fell due to snow and ice in a 

public parking lot. Id. ¶ 3. Applying section 3-106, the Illinois Supreme Court held, “[T]he 

relevant inquiry in determining whether something is a ‘condition’ within the meaning of section 

3-106 is whether a plaintiff’s injury was caused by the property itself or by an activity conducted 

on the property.” Id. ¶ 15. The court explained that activities conducted on the property are not 
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“conditions” of the property for purposes of section 3-106. Id. Because the snow and ice that 

injured the plaintiff in Moore were conditions of the property, section 3-106 applied. Id. ¶ 17. 

¶ 18 The court’s ruling in Moore echoes its ruling in McCuen v. Peoria Park District, 163 Ill. 

2d 125 (1994), where a runaway mule hauling a hayrack dragged the plaintiff across park 

property. The court considered whether the hayrack was a condition of the property or an activity 

conducted on the property. Id. at 127. The court refused to apply section 3-106 because the 

hayrack was an activity conducted on the property, not a condition of the property itself. Id. The 

Court reasoned that the plaintiff was injured due to misuse of the property, not its condition. Id.

“If otherwise safe property is misused so that it is no longer safe, but the property itself remains 

unchanged, any danger presented by the property is due to the misuse of the property and not to 

the condition of the property.” Id. at 129. 

¶ 19 Regarding Perez’s injuries, lighting fireworks on public property may be a dangerous 

activity, but it is not a dangerous condition. The condition of the property itself did not cause 

Perez’s injuries; rather, a dangerous activity conducted on the property was the cause. Perez 

argues that the property was temporarily misused by Lagowski and Gros, not that the property 

was inherently unsafe. Therefore, following the supreme court’s guidance in Moore and 

McCuen, we hold that section 3-106 does not apply. 

¶ 20 Section 3-108(a) 

¶ 21 Next, Perez argues that under section 3-108(a), the Park District is liable for failing to 

properly supervise Lagowski and Gros. Section 3-108(a) states that, “a local public entity *** 

who undertakes to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property” is not liable for an 

injury “unless the local public entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct 

in its supervision proximately causing such injury.” 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 2014). 
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¶ 22 Perez does not state a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct under section 3-

108(a). Perez does not allege that the Park District undertook to supervise Lagowski and Gros, 

but the opposite: the Park District was liable for failure to supervise them.

¶ 23 The Park District also maintains that section 3-108(b) applies only if the public entity had 

a duty “imposed by common law, statute, ordinance, code or regulation” to supervise the 

activity. Id. The Park District argues it had no duty. In response, Perez contends that the Park 

District had a common-law duty to supervise Lagowski and Gros. Perez cannot support this 

argument.

¶ 24 Perez cites Deerhake v. DuQuoin State Fair Ass’n, 185 Ill. App. 3d 374 (1999). The court 

in Deerhake held that the defendant had a duty to protect invitees from open and obvious dangers 

associated with unauthorized drag racing. Id. at 381. The court addressed the common-law duty 

to protect, not the common-law duty to supervise. Id. at 381-82; see Brooks v. McLean County 

Unit District No. 5, 2014 IL App (4th) 130503, ¶ 35 (court distinguished between duty to protect 

and duty to supervise in determining whether section 3-108(b) applied to plaintiff who was 

struck in stomach by fellow student). The term “supervision” never appears in Deerhake; Perez 

confuses the duty to protect with the duty to supervise. Accordingly, Deerhake does not support 

Perez’s argument.

¶ 25 Also, generally, public landowners have no duty to supervise tortious behavior by third 

parties. See Geimer v. Chicago Park District, 272 Ill. App. 3d 629, 634 (1995) (park district had 

no common-law duty to supervise student who hit plaintiff over the head with hockey stick

(citing Thornburg v. Crystal Lake Park District, 171 Ill. App. 3d 329, 333 (1988))). 

¶ 26 Section 3-109 
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¶ 27 Section 3-109 states that a public entity is not liable to any spectator who is injured due to 

a hazardous recreational activity unless the public entity failed “to guard or warn of a dangerous 

condition of which it has actual or constructive notice and of which the participant does not have 

nor can be reasonably expected to have had notice” or engaged in “willful and wanton conduct 

*** which is a proximate cause of the injury.” 745 ILCS 10/3-109(c)(1), (2) (West 2014). 

¶ 28 Perez argues that she states a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct under 

section 3-109. Perez argues that a hazardous activity is “a recreational activity conducted on 

property of a local public entity which creates a substantial *** risk of injury to a participant or a 

spectator.” 745 ILCS 10/3-109(b) (West 2014). Perez then points to section 3-109(b)(3), which 

contains a laundry list of hazardous activities, including “rocketeering.” 745 ILCS 10/3-

109(b)(3) (West 2014). In response, the Park District argues that “rocketeering” and “setting off 

fireworks” are not the same thing. We do not need to delve into the intricacies of pyrotechnics. 

Perez’s claim does not stand or fall on the definition of “rocketeering” but, rather, on whether the 

hazardous activity was “conducted” by the Park District.

¶ 29 If the hazardous activity that caused the injury was not conducted by a public entity or 

public employee, section 3-109 does not apply. Choice v. YMCA of McHenry County, 2012 IL 

App (1st) 102877. In Choice, campers drowned in the Fox River during their final night at Camp 

Algonquin, a weeklong program supervised by the defendant. Id. ¶ 6. The campers drowned after 

sneaking out of their bunkhouse and setting off down the Fox River in the camp’s paddle-boats. 

Id. ¶ 9. One of the paddle-boats was missing its drain plugs, filled with water, and sank, claiming 

the lives of the three campers. Id. The campers’ estates sued under section 3-109, arguing that 

paddle-boating was a hazardous activity conducted on public property, thereby subjecting the 

defendant to a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct. 
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¶ 30 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. The court held that, “the paddleboat excursion that 

led to the Choice plaintiffs’ deaths was not ‘conducted’ by the school defendants within the 

meaning of section 3-109(b), since it was not in any way done at the direction of the school 

defendants.” Id. ¶ 36; see also Grandalski v. Lyons Township High School District 204, 305 Ill. 

App. 3d 1, 11-12 (1988) (under section 3-109, school district was not liable to student who 

spontaneously performed a “flip-flop” during a gymnastics class without prompting from school 

faculty).

¶ 31 Even if we assume that setting off fireworks is a hazardous activity under the Act, Perez 

cannot prevail under section 3-109 because the Park District did not “conduct,” sanction, or 

license that hazardous activity undertaken by Lagowski and Gros. The Park District forbade the 

use of fireworks on its property without a permit. Following the Illinois Supreme Court’s 

decisions in Choice and Grandalski, we find that the Park District is not subject to liability for 

willful and wanton conduct under section 3-109. 

¶ 32 Fourth Amended Complaint 

¶ 33 Perez claims that the trial court improperly denied her oral motion to file a fourth 

amended complaint. Perez has not included a proposed amended complaint in the record on 

appeal. Our supreme court held in Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 

507, 521 (1987), that when a plaintiff fails to make a proposed amended complaint part of the 

record, he or she waives the right to have this court review the trial court’s denial of the motion. 

By failing to include the amended complaint in the record on appeal, Perez has forfeited her right 

to have this court review the trial court’s denial of her motion for leave to amend her complaint. 

Moreover, the record contains no transcript of the proceedings on Perez’s oral motion to amend; 

thus, we cannot review the trial court’s findings to determine whether error occurred. Without a 
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record of the proceeding, we must presume that the trial court had a sufficient factual basis for its 

determination and that it conforms with the law. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 

(1984). 

¶ 34 Even if Perez preserved a record of her amended appeal, the amendments she proposes in 

her brief would not cure the defects in her complaint. Because her proposed amendments would 

not cure the defects, the trial court did not err in denying her motion to amend. See Keefe-Shea 

Joint Venture v. City of Evanston, 364 Ill. App. 3d 48, 62 (2005) (if proposed amendments would 

fail to cure defects in pleadings, other factors need not be considered). In her brief, Perez says 

her fourth amended complaint would “include only those allegations that were discussed in this 

appeal.” Allowing her to amend her complaint to include claims we have already found lacking 

would not cure any defects. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.