PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

Nos. 21-1729 & 21-3325

____________

ARCKANGE SAINT FORD,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A209-873-543)

Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal 

 

 

Argued on April 13, 2022

Before: AMBRO, BIBAS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed May 16, 2022)
2

Robert A. Painter (ARGUED)

American Friends Service Committee

Immigration Rights Program

570 Broad Street

Suite 1001

Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for Petitioner

Christina R. Ziedan (ARGUED)

Mona M. Yousif

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878 

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

The need for effective assistance of counsel applies in 

immigration law just as it does in criminal law. Aliens, many 

of whom do not speak English and some of whom are detained 

before their immigration hearings, can be particularly 

susceptible to the consequences of ineffective lawyers. 
3

Petitioner Arckange Saint Ford paid a lawyer to represent him 

in removal proceedings, but Saint Ford’s requests for relief 

from deportation were denied after the lawyer failed to present 

important and easily available evidence going to the heart of 

Saint Ford’s claims. Saint Ford retained new counsel, and his 

new lawyer asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen 

his case because of his former attorney’s ineffective assistance. 

The Board declined to do so. Because Saint Ford presents a 

meritorious ineffective-assistance claim, we will vacate the 

Board’s decision and remand.

I. Background1

Saint Ford, a Haitian national, became involved in 

Haitian national politics in 2012 by joining the opposition 

political party, Platform Petit Dessalines (PPD). He believed 

the ruling political party in Haiti, the Haitian Tet Kale Party 

(PHTK), and its leader, then-President Joseph Martelly, were 

corrupt and involved in human rights abuses. Between June 

2013 and June 2014, Saint Ford received anonymous telephone 

calls threatening that he would become a “victim” if he did not 

leave the PPD and join the PHTK.2 Although Saint Ford did 

not know the identity of the callers, he testified that they told 

him he should join the PHTK, “and that’s how [he] knew that 

1 The factual background is drawn from the transcript of Saint 

Ford’s individual removal hearing before the Immigration 

Judge, the Immigration Judge’s and Board of Immigration 

Appeals’ decisions, and evidentiary attachments to Saint 

Ford’s administrative filings. Citations to the Administrative 

Record refer to the record Saint Ford submitted in support of 

his second appeal, No. 21-3325. 

2 AR 146 at ¶¶ 8, 10; 604–05.
4

they were members of the PHTK Party.”3

In July 2014, armed men encircled Saint Ford’s home 

and began shooting into it. They then set it on fire and burned 

it down. Saint Ford was not in the house during the assault; he 

had fled a few days earlier, fearing for his safety. He reported 

the attack to Haitian authorities, and investigators came to his 

home the next day. Investigators confirmed that Saint Ford’s 

home “was completely burnet [sic] out” and interviewed Saint 

Ford’s neighbor who witnessed the attack.4 Haitian authorities 

never determined who attacked Saint Ford’s home. After the 

attack, Saint Ford’s neighbor “advised him to leave the area in 

order to save his life and that of his family.”5

Saint Ford fled Haiti a few weeks later: first to the 

Dominican Republic, then to Brazil, and finally to the United 

States. Later the United States began removal proceedings 

against Saint Ford, claiming he was in the country without a 

valid travel or entry document. 

Saint Ford hired an attorney to represent him at his 

removal hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ). Through 

that attorney, he conceded removability. However, the 

attorney prepared and submitted a Form I-589 application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT). After preparing the Form 

I-589, Saint Ford and the attorney had little contact. Saint Ford 

stated former counsel “never reviewed the application with me 

or told me what it said.”6 Saint Ford also stated the attorney 

3 AR 604.

4 AR 743.

5 AR 637.

6 AR 203 at ¶ 14.
5

“never prepared me for my final hearing” before the IJ.7

The attorney provided scant documentary evidence to 

support Saint Ford’s application: a few letters from Saint 

Ford’s neighbors, a one-page police report memorializing the 

investigation into the attack on Saint Ford’s home, his PPD 

membership card, and an attestation confirming his PPD 

membership. Shortly before the IJ hearing, the attorney 

submitted the Haiti 2019 Human Rights Report. That 2019 

State Department Human Rights Report contained no mention 

of either the PPD or the PHTK.

During Saint Ford’s hearing, the IJ repeatedly asked the 

attorney about record evidence related to the PPD. The IJ 

specifically asked the attorney if he had submitted any 

documents attesting to the history and existence of PPD as a 

political party and PPD’s platform. The IJ explained to the 

attorney that Saint Ford’s PPD membership card was “not 

sufficient to establish that there is such a party in existence,” 

and continued to ask if former counsel had “any literature about 

the party[.] When it was formed, the leaders and whether – and 

the, the status of the party in Haiti, whether it’s still in 

existence.”8 Eventually, the attorney admitted he did not 

submit any documents about the PPD.

The IJ denied relief on all claims.9 Although she found 

7 AR at 204 at ¶ 22.

8 AR 609–10.

9 The IJ concluded Saint Ford was statutorily ineligible to apply 

for asylum because he filed his asylum application outside the 
6

that Saint Ford was credible and that he had provided sufficient 

documentary evidence to corroborate his testimony, the IJ 

concluded that Saint Ford “submitted no objective evidence” 

to help meet his burden in proving that he was harassed or 

persecuted on account of his political opinion by members of 

the PHTK.10 The IJ determined that “the record does not 

support [Saint Ford’s] conclusion” that he would be killed in 

Haiti because the PHTK was still in power, as “[t]here was no 

evidence presented in the record that members of the political 

party of Petit Desalin are systematically targeted and 

persecuted in Haiti on account of their membership [i]n said 

party.”11 Further, the IJ found that there was no evidence 

presented that Saint Ford’s fear of persecution upon his return 

to Haiti was reasonable.

After the IJ denied Saint Ford’s claims, Saint Ford 

retained new counsel and appealed to the Board of Immigration 

Appeals. The Board affirmed the IJ’s decision. Saint Ford 

appealed to the Court of Appeals,12 and then moved the Board 

to reopen his case because, among other reasons, his former 

counsel provided ineffective assistance. Saint Ford argued that 

his former counsel “failed to submit the necessary country 

condition information to corroborate and support” his claims, 

“did not include in [Saint Ford’s] application for relief or elicit 

during testimony critical information regarding the targeting of 

Mr. Saint Ford’s family members in Haiti, and failed to prepare 

one-year deadline and did not present argument or evidence 

demonstrating changed or extraordinary circumstances. 

10 AR 523.

11 AR 524–25.

12 That appeal was docketed at No. 21-1729. We consolidated 

those appeals.
7

[Saint Ford] for his individual hearing.”13

The Board denied Saint Ford’s motion to reopen. It first 

reasoned that former counsel denied Saint Ford’s allegations. 

Next, the Board concluded that the evidence Saint Ford 

proffered in support of his motion to reopen did not establish 

that former counsel had failed to acquire and submit easily 

obtainable documentary evidence related to the PPD. Then, 

assuming Saint Ford had established that former counsel 

provided ineffective assistance, the Board concluded that he 

did not show he suffered prejudice. It reasoned that “there is 

no indication that any additional evidence submitted or 

solicited by [Saint Ford’s] former counsel would have enabled 

[Saint Ford] to establish a clear probability that his life or 

freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground 

in Haiti or that he would be tortured upon his return to Haiti 

with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.”14 

Saint Ford petitioned for us to review the Board’s denial 

of his motion to reopen.15 He contends, among other things, 

that the Board erred in finding that former counsel did not 

provide ineffective assistance.

13 AR 110.

14 AR 5.

15 Saint Ford’s first appeal, No. 21-1729, is also before us. 

Because we will grant relief based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel, we need not address Saint Ford’s underlying claims 

related to the merits of the IJ’s opinion.
8

II. Analysis16

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Ineffective assistance of counsel can deny an alien due 

process if it prevents the alien from reasonably presenting his 

case.17 We apply a two-part test to evaluate error and 

prejudice: (1) would competent counsel have acted otherwise, 

and, if so, (2) whether the alien was prejudiced by counsel’s 

performance.18 The first prong, ineffectiveness, requires the 

alien to demonstrate that his counsel’s conduct was not an 

“objectively reasonable tactical decision.”19 The second 

prong, prejudice, requires the alien to demonstrate that there 

was a “‘reasonable probability’ that ‘the IJ would not have 

entered an order of removal absent counsel’s errors.’”20 The 

16 The Board had jurisdiction over Saint Ford’s motion to 

reopen proceedings in a case in which the Board had rendered 

a decision under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(2)(i). We have 

jurisdiction over his petition for review under 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1252(a)(1), (b)(6).

17 See, e.g., Rranci v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 540 F.3d 165, 175 (3d 

Cir. 2008).

18 Id. An alien must also meet certain procedural requirements 

set forth by the Board, but the government does not dispute that 

Saint Ford satisfied those requirements here.

19 Mena-Flores v. Holder, 776 F.3d 1152, 1169 (10th Cir. 

2015).

20 Calderon-Rosas v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 957 F.3d 378, 387 (3d 

Cir. 2020) (quoting Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 

159 (3d Cir. 2007)).
9

alien need not show his counsel’s performance did, in fact, alter 

the outcome of the earlier proceeding, or even that a different

outcome was “more likely than not”; we have explained that 

“reasonable probability” means merely “a ‘significant 

possibility.’”21

i. Ineffectiveness

The Attorney General assumes Saint Ford’s former 

counsel provided ineffective assistance to Saint Ford. That 

was wise. An “attorney’s failure to produce easily available 

evidence supporting a claim for immigration relief falls below 

the constitutionally required standard of performance.”22 Saint 

Ford’s former counsel failed to produce sufficient country 

condition information to support Saint Ford’s claims, including 

any documentation about the PPD (Saint Ford’s political party) 

or the PHTK (Haiti’s ruling political party). That information 

is easily available online; it is conveniently located on the 

PPD’s website, among other places. Saint Ford’s former 

counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to 

submit readily accessible, objective information related to the 

political parties at the heart of Saint Ford’s claims.

21 Id. (quoting United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 193 n.5 

(3d Cir. 2019)).

22 Calderon-Rosas, 957 F.3d at 388 (citing Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 

162). We have explained that in “formal removal proceedings, 

the Fifth Amendment and the immigration laws provide aliens 

with the right to counsel.” Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 87, 91 

(3d Cir. 2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4); Leslie v. Att’y 

Gen. of U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2010)).
10

The Board erred in crediting Saint Ford’s former 

counsel’s denials of wrongdoing.23 We have explained that 

facts “presented in the motion to reopen are ‘accepted as true 

unless inherently unbelievable.’”24 There is nothing inherently 

unbelievable about Saint Ford’s contentions that his former 

counsel provided ineffective assistance. In fact, his 

contentions are buttressed by the IJ’s hearing transcript, which 

shows Saint Ford’s former counsel failed to include relevant 

country condition information in the record. The Board’s 

choice to credit former counsel’s denials of his own 

deficiencies was error.

Former counsel’s failure to provide any objective 

evidence about the PPD, the PHTK, and Haiti’s political 

conditions cannot reasonably be viewed as a tactical decision. 

Saint Ford has thus shown that his former counsel did not act 

in an objectively reasonable manner. Because former counsel 

provided ineffective assistance, we must now determine 

23 In the criminal law ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arena, 

we have recognized that a lawyer cannot be expected to argue 

his own ineffective assistance. See, e.g., United States v. 

Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1996). Our sister circuits 

agree. See, e.g., Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 303 (2d 

Cir. 1995); United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th 

Cir. 1996); Harris v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Corr., 874 F.3d 682, 

690 (11th Cir. 2017). It is just as reasonable that in the 

immigration-law ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context, a 

lawyer cannot be expected to argue his own ineffective 

assistance.

24 Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 

2007) (quoting Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 

2005)).
11

whether Saint Ford suffered prejudice. 

ii. Prejudice

The “familiar standard for prejudice in an ineffectiveassistance claim is whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ 

that ‘the IJ would not have entered an order of removal absent 

counsel’s errors.’”25 This “reasonable probability” standard 

“does not require a petitioner to show counsel’s deficient 

performance did, in fact, affect the outcome of the case, or even 

that a different outcome was ‘more likely than not’; instead, we 

have cautioned, ‘reasonable probability’ means merely a 

‘significant possibility.’”26 To be sure, the Board “need not 

‘write an exegesis on every contention,’” but “it must ‘consider 

the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient 

to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and 

thought and not merely reacted.’”27

Here, the Board failed to do so, and its application of 

our “reasonable probability” standard was wrong. The Board 

concluded there was “no indication that any additional 

evidence submitted or solicited by [Saint Ford’s] former 

counsel would have enabled [Saint Ford] to establish a clear 

probability that his life or freedom would be threatened on 

account of a protected ground in Haiti or that he would be 

tortured upon his return to Haiti with the consent or 

25 Calderon-Rosas, 957 F.3d at 387 (quoting Fadiga, 488 F.3d 

at 159).

26 Id. (quoting Payano, 930 F.3d at 193 n.5).

27 Id. (quoting Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir. 

2006)).
12

acquiescence of a public official.”28 As in Calderon-Rosas and 

Filja, nothing in the Board’s prejudice analysis suggests it 

sufficiently reviewed Saint Ford’s argument. Like CalderonRosas, the Board incorrectly applied our “reasonable 

probability” standard. In support of his motion to reopen, Saint 

Ford submitted extensive evidence about the PPD, including a 

summary of the PPD’s political agenda, the participation of the 

PPD’s leader, Haitian Senator Jean-Charles Moise, in 

opposition activities, and the murder and targeting of PPD 

members in Haiti. The Board never mentioned this new 

evidence—evidence at the core of Saint Ford’s claims, and 

evidence that the IJ repeatedly highlighted as missing both 

during Saint Ford’s hearing and in her decision denying Saint 

Ford’s claims.

Constitutionally adequate counsel would have 

introduced this readily available evidence. Given the IJ’s focus 

on the lack of information about the PPD, there is a reasonable 

probability that, if this readily available evidence had been 

presented, the IJ would have granted protection from removal 

to Haiti. For this reason, Saint Ford is entitled to a new hearing 

on his application.

B. Changed Country Conditions

Saint Ford also argued that the Board abused its 

discretion in finding that there was not a sufficient change in 

country conditions in Haiti since his individual hearing. 

Specifically, he contends the Board ignored the “rapidly 

deteriorating political, security and human rights situation in 

28 AR 5.
13

the country.”29

The Board “has ‘a duty to explicitly consider any 

country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that 

materially bears on his claim.’”30 “This duty is heightened for 

motions to reopen based on changed country conditions.”31 

The Board must meaningfully evaluate the evidence submitted 

in support of the motion to reopen and “may not ignore 

evidence favorable to the alien, particularly when, as here, the 

alien’s administrative brief expressly calls the [Board’s] 

attention to it.”32

Here, Saint Ford submitted the following changed 

country condition information:

• A January 2021 executive decree 

scheduling a constitutional referendum 

expressly forbidden by the Haitian 

constitution;

• Executive decrees issued between 

November 2020 and May 2021 that 

redefined domestic terrorism to include 

protest actions, permitted Haiti’s military 

29 Pet. Br. at 29.

30 Liem v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 921 F.3d 388, 396 (3d Cir. 2020) 

(quoting Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d 

Cir. 2008)).

31 Id.

32 Huang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(citing Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 607 F.3d 101, 

107 (3d Cir. 2010)).
14

to operate domestically, and created a 

new state-run security apparatus;

• A July 2021 rejection of the acting 

Haitian president Ariel Henry by Haitian 

opposition leaders following the 

assassination of the Haitian president; 

and,

• Arrest warrants issued in July and August 

2021 targeting political opponents after 

the president’s assassination.

These developments preceded and followed the assassination 

of Haiti’s president, Jovenel Moïse, in July 2021. The Board, 

without discussing any of Saint Ford’s newly adduced

evidence, concluded that these developments were merely “an 

incremental increase in political unrest and violence in 

Haiti.”33 It is unclear to us what, exactly, the Board would 

consider an adequate change in country conditions if the 

assassination of the country’s leader is simply an “incremental 

increase” in unrest. This cannot be. We conclude that the 

Board erred because it failed to explicitly consider the evidence 

of changed country conditions that Saint Ford submitted, 

including the assassination of Haiti’s president and the 

resulting crackdown on political opponents and general 

political chaos. 

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we will reverse the Board’s denial of 

Saint Ford’s motion to reopen. We will remand this matter to 

33 AR 5.
15

the Board to grant the motion to reopen and remand to the IJ 

for a new hearing on Saint Ford’s application for withholding

of removal, eligibility for asylum, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture.34

34 The government urges that, on remand, the IJ should be permitted

to hear only Saint Ford’s application for withholding of removal and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing Saint 

Ford himself excluded eligibility for asylum from his motion to the 

Board because it was barred by the one-year filing deadline for such 

claims. We disagree. Barring an explicit restriction, IJs have broad 

jurisdiction on remand to consider “any matters pertinent to that case 

under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its 

implementing regulations.” See Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen. of United 

States, 872 F.3d 188, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Johnson v. 

Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 702–03 (3d Cir. 2002); Matter of Patel, 16 

I. & N. Dec. 600, 600 (BIA 1978) (“[U]nless the Board qualifies or 

limits it for a specific purpose, remand is effective for the stated 

purpose and for consideration of any and all matters which the [IJ]

deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or 

which are brought to his attention in compliance with the 

appropriate regulations.”). Here, as Saint Ford notes in his response, 

8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(D) sets forth an exception to the one-year filing 

deadline for asylum claims based on the existence of changed 

circumstances – an exception for which Saint Ford could 

conceivably argue he qualifies, considering the evidence he has 

submitted on this issue. Accordingly, we conclude that the IJ here 

should not be barred from considering Saint Ford’s eligibility for 

asylum. 
1

Arckange Saint Ford v. Attorney General of the United States 

of America

Nos. 21-1729 & 21-3325

AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring

Arckange Saint Ford will get a second shot at seeking 

withholding of removal—that’s what matters. The majority is 

remanding because of his former counsel’s deficient 

performance at Saint Ford’s removal hearing. I agree with that

and concur in full. 

But former counsel was not the only one who made 

significant missteps at the hearing. The Immigration Judge did 

as well. I therefore would have granted Saint Ford’s initial 

petition for review and remanded on that basis. I write 

separately to explain these errors in the hope that similar ones 

will not be made at Saint Ford’s new hearing. 

* * *

An applicant seeking withholding of removal bears the 

burden of proving it is “more likely than not that his life or 

freedom would be threatened if returned to his country” 

because of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion.” Serrano-Alberto 

v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2017) (alterations 

adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). He is rebuttably presumed to satisfy that 

burden by showing he was persecuted in the past if he 
2

demonstrates (1) “he was targeted for mistreatment on account 

of one of the statutorily-protected grounds,” (2) “that the 

incident, or incidents of mistreatment rise to the level of 

persecution,” and (3) the “persecution was committed by the 

government or forces the government is either unable or 

unwilling to control.” Thayalan v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 132,

138 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 214. As the majority opinion 

explains, the IJ found Saint Ford didn’t make that showing 

here.

But where did he fall short? The IJ identified two flaws. 

First, Saint Ford submitted “no objective evidence to 

corroborate his claim that he was harassed or persecuted on 

account of his political opinion.” A.R. at 176. And second, he 

did not support his suspicion that he was threatened by 

“members of the current government party.” Id. 

Compare those findings with the hearing transcript. 

Here are just a few soundbites:

Saint Ford: “The government that was in place 

at the time [was] trying to kill me.” Id. at 580.

Saint Ford: “I received threatening calls by 

going against [the government].” Id. at 585.

Saint Ford: “[T]he first call, the person didn’t 

give their name, but they said if I didn’t leave the 

political party that I was in and join[] their party, 

that I would become a victim.” Id. at 586.
3

Saint Ford: “[T]he members of the government, 

they wanted to kill me because they realized that 

they can lose power.” Id. at 597.

Government Attorney: “[Y]ou told the Court 

that you really don’t know who the individuals 

are who were harassing you. Correct?”

Saint Ford: “I don’t know their names because 

they never told me who they were. I only know 

that they would tell me that I should join the 

PHTK Party and that’s how I knew that they 

were members of the PHTK Party.” Id. at 604.

Government Attorney: “Okay. So . . . it would 

be a fair statement to say that the people who 

harassed you and burned down your house could 

be members supporting their political party like 

yourself. Isn’t that true?” 

Saint Ford: “No, they were members that were 

part of the party, like, government members in 

the party.” Id. at 605–06.

The transcript thus shows Saint Ford testified that 

(1) “government members in the [PHTK] party” harassed him 

and burned down his house, and (2) they were threatening him 

because they wanted him to “leave the political party that [he] 

was in and join[] their party.” Id. at 586, 604–06. 

And an applicant’s testimony is evidence. See Saravia 

v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 735 (3d Cir. 2018). So, logically,

it would be incorrect to say that Saint Ford presented no 

evidence that he was threatened by government members for 

his political activity. The IJ, it seems, ruled against Saint Ford 

not because of an absence of evidence in the record, but a lack 
4

of corroborating evidence supporting Saint Ford’s own

testimony.

Before diving into whether the IJ was correct to hold 

Saint Ford at fault for his lack of corroborating evidence, I first 

note that doing so was—at the very least—internally 

inconsistent. The IJ’s opinion began by finding Saint Ford’s 

testimony credible and stating that he “provided the Court with 

[a] sufficient amount of documentary evidence to corroborate 

his testimony.” A.R. at 175. Yet on the very next page the IJ 

contradicted her finding of sufficient corroboration when she 

denied his application for withholding of removal because he 

“submitted no objective evidence to corroborate his claim that 

he was harassed or persecuted on account of his political 

opinion by members of the current government party.” Id. at 

176 (emphasis added). She went on to cite his lack of 

“objective” or “supporting” evidence three more times as a 

reason for denying his application. Id. at 176, 179. So, no 

matter what she said at the outset, even a cursory look at the 

opinion shows the IJ didn’t believe Saint Ford actually 

“corroborate[d] his testimony.” Id. at 175.

The next question, then, is whether the IJ was right to 

find Saint Ford needed to present “objective” or “supporting” 

evidence to corroborate his credible testimony. Perhaps. 

Congress has said that “[t]he testimony of the applicant may be 

sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without 

corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact 

that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and 

refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the 

applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis 

added); id. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (extending § 1158(b)(1)(B) to 

applications for withholding of removal). Though the IJ found 
5

Saint Ford’s testimony credible, his statements about the 

identity and motives of his harassers might be read as

unspecific. For example, though Saint Ford insisted that 

“government members in the [ruling] party” burned down his 

house, A.R. at 606, he was not an eyewitness to that event and 

offered no other basis for this assertion. The IJ was thus not 

off base to “determine[] that the applicant should provide 

evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

But the IJ was wrong to stop there and jump straight to 

denying Saint Ford’s application. Congress has recognized 

corroborating evidence may not always be available to a 

refugee. Id. So when the IJ determines the applicant should 

corroborate his credible testimony, he must do so “unless the 

applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably 

obtain the evidence.” Id. To ensure applicants are not required 

to provide corroboration when there is none to be offered, our

Circuit has adopted a three-step inquiry, known as the “Abdulai 

inquiry,” that an IJ must conduct before requiring 

corroboration. See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d 

Cir. 2001). The IJ must “(1) identify the facts for which it is 

reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) inquire as to whether 

the applicant has provided information corroborating the 

relevant facts; and, if he or she has not, (3) analyze whether the 

applicant has adequately explained his or her failure to do so.”1 

Luziga v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2019)

1 Though we decided Abdulai before the REAL ID Act of 2005 

amended 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), we have later confirmed

that the Abdulai inquiry continues to apply in our Circuit. See 

Saravia, 905 F.3d at 737; Luziga, 937 F.3d at 255; Blanco v. 

Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2020).
6

(alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This 

inquiry must occur before the IJ rules on the application so that 

the applicant has both notice of the need for corroboration and 

an opportunity to provide it or explain its unavailability. 

Saravia, 905 F.3d at 737–38.

We “strictly enforce this rule.” Luziga, 937 F.3d at 255. 

Otherwise the applicant is not given a “meaningful opportunity 

to establish his or her claim.”2 Saravia, 905 F.3d at 738

(quoting Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 136 (3d Cir. 

2003)). So whenever an IJ fails to develop an applicant’s 

testimony under the Abdulai inquiry and “holds the lack of 

corroboration against the applicant, we vacate and remand.” 

Luziga, 937 F.3d at 255 (alterations adopted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, though it was reasonable to request Saint Ford 

corroborate his testimony about the identity and motive of his 

harassers, the IJ did not tell him what corroboration she needed

or give him a chance to present that evidence. There is no 

indication she engaged in the Abdulai inquiry as required 

2 Failure to conduct this analysis also complicates our review. 

Congress has instructed that once the IJ rules on the availability 

of corroborating evidence, we may not reverse unless “a 

reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such 

corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). 

But without the IJ walking through the Abdulai analysis, it is 

“impossible for us to determine whether a reasonable trier of 

fact would be compelled to conclude such corroborating 

evidence is unavailable.” Saravia, 905 F.3d at 739 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). There would be nothing in the 

record to inform our review.
7

before skipping straight to “hold[ing] the lack of corroboration 

against [Saint Ford].” Id. (alterations adopted). She went from 

first to third across the pitcher’s mound. Our Abdulai inquiry 

is there to ensure these important corners aren’t cut. 

I believe the IJ erred. I thus would have “strictly 

enforce[d]” our Abdulai rule, see Luziga, 937 F.3d at 255,

granted Saint Ford’s initial petition for review, and remanded 

on that basis.