alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 95 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 95

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To amend title 38, United States Code, to ensure that children of 
  homeless veterans are included in the calculation of the amounts of 
                        certain per diem grants.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Homeless Veteran Families Act''.

SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF CALCULATION OF AMOUNTS OF PER DIEM GRANTS.

    Section 2012(a)(2)(B) of title 38, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in clause (i), by inserting ``or (iii)'' after ``clause 
        (ii)''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new clause:
            ``(iii) With respect to a homeless veteran who has care of 
        a minor dependent while receiving services from the grant 
        recipient or eligible entity, the daily cost of care shall be 
        the sum of the daily cost of care determined under subparagraph 
        (A) plus, for each such minor dependent, an amount that equals 
        50 percent of such daily cost of care.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives October 15, 2019.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
116th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                H. R. 95

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

   To amend title 38, United States Code, to ensure that children of 
  homeless veterans are included in the calculation of the amounts of 
                        certain per diem grants.
```
Exhibit 99.1

 

CERTIFICATION

 

	Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, the undersigned officer of Harold's Stores, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies that the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended August 3, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:	September 17, 2002				/s/ Clark J. Hinkley			
Name: Clark J. Hinkley

Title:	Chief Executive Officer

 

 

	The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350.
EXHIBIT 32

|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                    
|---------------------------------------------
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                      
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                       
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of ILX Resorts Incorporated (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the nine months ending September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I (We), Joseph P. Martori, Chief Executive Officer, and Margaret M. Eardley, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company./s/ Joseph P. Martori_____________________

Joseph P. Martori
Chief Executive Officer
November 12, 2004



/s/ Margaret M. Eardley___________________Margaret M. Eardley
Chief Financial Officer
November 12, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE NINE
MONTHS ENDED 9-30-00 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND NOTES THERETO CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY'S QUARTERLY
REPORT ON FORM 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000818813
<NAME> BITSTREAM, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> USD

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           7,477
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,091
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,447
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                10,216
<PP&E>                                           3,505
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,863
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  13,074
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,067
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               78
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      10,901
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    13,074
<SALES>                                          6,894
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,894
<CGS>                                            1,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,069)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       171
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,240)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,240)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.29)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.29)


</TABLE>
#### Oscar Leonardo PORTILLO, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 17-60004 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed March 8, 2018

Michael Milone Prestí, Esq., Prestí Law Firm, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner

Jesse David Lorenz, Esq., Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigra*426tion Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Oscar Leonardo Portillo, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). He challenges the decision to pretermit his application for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents. According to Portillo, the Immigration Judge improperly pretermitted his application due to his multiple criminal offenses with an aggregate sentence to confinement of five years or more. *See*8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B), 1229b(b)(l)(C).

In part, Portillo’s challenge is foreclosed by our court’s ruling in *Pina-Galindo v. Lynch,*803 F.3d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir. 2015). There, a panel determined that the BIA had reasonably rejected the argument that the statutory reference to a singular “offense under § 1182(a)(2)(B)” did not “limit ineligibility for cancellation of removal to offenses under § 1182(a)(2)(A).” *Pina-Galindo,*803 F.3d at 194-95. To the extent that Portillo argues that we should revisit the issue in *Pina-Galindo,*803 F.3d at 194-95, we are prohibited from doing so here. *Mercado v. Lynch,*823 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[0]ne panel of our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en banc court.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

As for Portillo’s remaining argument that the Immigration Judge prematurely pretermitted his application for relief, the argument is unexhausted. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. *See Omari v. Holder,*562 F.3d 314, 319-21 (5th Cir. 2009).

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jorge Walter BARRIOS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50354

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 21, 2018

Jarad E. Hodes, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Emily J. Keifer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Richard A. Viczorek, Law Office of Richard A. Viczorek, Dana Point, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges,

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jorge Walter Barrios, Jr., appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 94-month custodial sentence and five-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for importation of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Barrios argues that the district court procedurally erred by choosing a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and by failing to provide an adequate explanation for imposing an above-Guidelines term of supervised release. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court’s statements regarding Barrios’s criminal history were not “illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” *United States v. Graf,*610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010); *see also United States v. Hilgers,*560 F.3d 944, 948 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court may treat as true any factual assertion in the presentence report to which the defendant does not object). Further, the record reflects that the district court adequately explained its reasons for selecting an above-Guidelines term of supervised release. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (adequate explanation may be inferred from the record as a whole).

Barrios also contends that the five-year term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion. *See Gall v. United States, 552*U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The above-Guidelines term is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Jan Van DUSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Catherine D. PURCELL, Presiding Judge of the State Bar Court, San Francisco; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16983

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 22, 2018

Jan Van Dusen, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jan Van Dusen, an attorney, appeals pro se from the magistrate judge’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising out of her interim suspension from the practice of law in the State of California. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court. *Allen v. Meyer,*755 F.3d 866, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2014). We vacate and remand.

Van Dusen consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. *See*28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate judge then screened and dismissed Van Dusen’s action before the named defendants had been served. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because all parties, including unserved defendants, must consent to proceed before the magistrate judge for jurisdiction to vest, *Williams v.*King, 875 F.3d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 2017), we vacate the magistrate judge’s order and remand for further proceedings.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1
                   
                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


   As Independent Public Accountants we hereby consent to the use of our reports
(and to the reference to our Firm) included or incorporated by reference in this
amendment to the registration statement.


                                       ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

    
New Orleans, Louisiana
October 8, 1997
<PAGE>   1


                                                                    Exhibit 11.0




                              NATIONAL REALTY, L.P.
                         A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
                        Computation of Earnings Per Unit





<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                               For the Three Months         For the Nine Months
                                                Ended September 30,         Ended September 30,
                                              ------------------------    ------------------------
                                                 1998          1997          1998          1997
                                              ----------    ----------    ----------    ----------
                                                    (dollars in thousands, except per unit)
<S>                                           <C>           <C>           <C>           <C>       
Net income ...............................    $    3,651    $    2,219    $   26,300    $    5,293

   Less - General Partners'
      1.99% Interest .....................            73            44           523           105
                                              ----------    ----------    ----------    ----------

Net income allocable to
   Limited Partner .......................    $    3,578    $    2,175    $   25,777    $    5,188
                                              ==========    ==========    ==========    ==========


Earnings Per Unit

   Net income ............................    $      .57    $      .34    $     4.08    $      .82
                                              ==========    ==========    ==========    ==========


Weighted average units of
   limited partner interest
   used in computing earnings
   per unit ..............................     6,323,785     6,328,916     6,324,690     6,326,916
                                              ==========    ==========    ==========    ==========
</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.1











CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
Section #1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q (“Form 10-Q”) of Galaxy
Nutritional Foods, Inc. (the "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2008 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Michael
E. Broll, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:





(1)           The
Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.











/s/ Michael E.
Broll


Michael
E. Broll


Chief
Executive Officer


August
13, 2008
# C_2023223EN.01000701.xml

| 26.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 223/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 223/7

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 April 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Ministero della Giustizia v SP

(Case C-495/22, (1) Ministero della Giustizia (Competition for notarial posts))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Articles 53 and 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Article 267 TFEU - Scope of the obligation on national courts or tribunals of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling - Exceptions to that obligation - Criteria - Situations in which the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt - Condition related to the national court or tribunal of last instance being convinced that the matter would be equally obvious to the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and to the Court of Justice)

(2023/C 223/09)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ministero della Giustizia

Defendant: SP

Operative part of the order

Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The question whether such a possibility exists must be assessed on the basis of the characteristic features of EU law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union.

That national court or tribunal is not required to establish in detail that the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and the Court would give the same interpretation, but must have obtained the conviction, according to an assessment which takes account of those factors, that the matter would be equally obvious to those other national courts or tribunals and to the Court.

---

(1)  Date of filing: 22.7.2022.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Guadalupe ZEPEDA-RAMIREZ, AKA Jose Guadalupe Zepeda Ramirez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50369

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2018 Pasadena, California

Filed March 13, 2018

L. Ashley Aull, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cassie D. Palme|*, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Shaun Khojayan, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Law Offices of Shaun Khojayan & Assoc., Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: REINHARDT and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Appellant Jose Guadalupe Zepeda-Ra-mirez appeals the jury’s verdict and the district court’s order denying his motion for acquittal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. We review the district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. *United States v. Mincoff,*574 F.3d 1186, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In reviewing the motion and the. jury’s verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.*at 1192 (citation omitted). Here, Zepeda-Ramirez and one other person traveled to the United States from Mexico on a small boat (“panga”) filled with 1,664 kilograms of marijuana. Zepeda-Ramirez knew the cargo was marijuana and he helped steer the boat to the United States. Experienced law enforcement officers testified that drug smuggling operations from Mexico to the *804United States by panga require at least two people, and the panga Zepeda-Ra-mirez arrived in contained equipment typically used by smugglers to coordinate with partners to pick up the cargo after making landfall. A conversation between Zepeda-Ramirez and the other occupant of the boat was covertly recorded after they were arrested, in which Zepeda-Ramirez made statements from which the jury could have inferred that he was involved in the smuggling operation and trying to concoct the best possible exculpatory story. This evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict Zepeda-Ramirez for both conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# C_2022418EN.01003602.xml

| 31.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 418/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 418/36

---

Order of the General Court of 6 September 2022 — Farco-Pharma v EUIPO — Infarco (FARCO)

(Case T-179/22) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the opposition - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 418/50)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Farco-Pharma GmbH (Cologne, Germany) (represented by: V. Schoene, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Schäfer and M. Eberl, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Infarco, SA (Madrid, Spain)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 17 January 2022 (Case R 172/2021-4).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | Farco-Pharma GmbH shall bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Farco-Pharma GmbH shall bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

---

(1)  OJ C 207, 23.5.2022.

---
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report of Metrologic Instruments, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, C. Harry Knowles, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                           
|-----------------------------------------------------------
|                                                           
|/s/    C. HARRY KNOWLES                                    
|                                                           
|C. Harry Knowles Chief Executive Officer September 23, 2003