# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 16-940V

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

PAULETTE STUART,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * TO BE PUBLISHED

Special Master Katherine E. Oler

Filed: January 5, 2022

Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Amber D. Wilson , Wilson Science Law, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Camille M. Collett , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 1

On August 4, 2016, Paulette Stuart filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq

. 2 (the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”) alleging that she suffered from pain, upper and lower extremity burning, numbness, and difficulty ambulating as a result of the influenza vaccination she received on October 25, 2013. Pet. at 1, ECF No. 1. At the time, Petitioner was represented by Ms. Amber Wilson of Maglio,

1 This Decision will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the

internet. As provided by 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B), however, the parties may object to the decision’s

inclusion of certain kinds of confidential informa tion. Specifically, under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen days within which to request redaction “o f any information furnished by that party: (1) that is

a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of wh ich would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the Decision in its present form will be available. Id.

2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the Nati onal Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–34 (2012)) (hereinafter “Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All subsequent refere nces to sections of the Vaccine Act shall be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.2 Christopher, & Toale. 3

On May 3, 2021, Petitioner filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and costs, totaling $143,267.47. 4 Fees Reply. at 5, ECF No. 84. On August 10, 2021, Respondent filed a response stating it is with in my discretion to award interim atto rneys’ fees and costs. Fees Resp., ECF No. 103. Respondent “defers to [me] to deter mine whether or not petitioner here has met the legal standard for interi m fees and costs award.” Id. at 2.

For the reasons discussed below, I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s application and

award a total of $138,809.51 5 in interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Legal Standard

A. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Cloer , the Federal Circuit noted that “Congres s [has] made clear that denying interim attorney s' fees under the Vaccine Act is contrary to an und erlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs. , 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera , 515 F.3d at 1352. Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hard ship and there exists a good fait h basis for the claim, it is proper for the special master to award interim attorneys' fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. Avera did not, however, define when inte rim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special

masters discretion. See Avera , 515 F.3d; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 08-241V, 2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs. , No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Even though it has been argued that a peti tioner must meet the three Avera criteria -- prot racted proceedings, costly expert testimony, and undue hardship -- speci al masters have instea d treated these criteria as possible factors in a flexible balancing test. Avera , 515 F.3d at 1352; see Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

3 At the time, Ms. Wilson was employed by the law firm of Maglio, Christopher and Toale. Ms. Wilson is now employed by Wilson Science Law.

4 Petitioner requests $23,811.90 in fees and $2,175.22 in co sts to be paid to her current firm, Wilson Science Law. Petitioner requests $80,615.20 in fees and $36,665.15 in costs to be paid to her former firm, Maglio, Christopher, and Toale.

5 This amount is broken down into $25,559.92 in interim fees and costs for Wilson Science Law, and $113,249.59 for Maglio, Christopher and Toale.3 A petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if the special master finds that a peti tioner has brought her petition in good faith and with a reasonable basis. §15(e)(1); Avera , 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw , 609 F.3d at 1372; Woods v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs , 105 Fed. Cl. 148 (2012), at 154; Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 94 Fed. Cl. 323, 334 (2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of He alth & Hum. Servs. , 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (2009); Bear

, 2013 WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 97-588V, 2012 WL 1450520, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 28, 2012). The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner; it also looks at any money expended by a petitioner’s counsel. Kirk , 2009 WL 775396, at *2. Referring to Avera , former Chief Special

Master Golkiewicz in Kirk found that “the general principle underlying an award of interim fees [is] clear: avoid working a s ubstantial financial hardship on petitioners and their counsel.” Id

.

B. Good Faith

The good faith requirement is me t through a subjective inquiry. Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs. , No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993). Such a requirement is a “sub jective standard that focuses upon wh ether petitioner hone stly believed he had a legitimate clai m for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 99-544V, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). Without evidence of bad faith, “petitioners are entitled to a presumption of good faith.” Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.

, 36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). Thus, so long as Petiti oner had an honest belief that her claim could succeed, the good faith requi rement is satisfied. See Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 09-276V, 2011 WL 2036976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Di Roma , 1993 WL 496981, at *1); Turner , 2007 WL 4410030, at *5.

C. Reasonable Basis

Unlike the good-faith inquiry, an analysis of reasonable basis requires more than just a petitioner’s belief in her claim. Turner , 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-7. Instead, the claim must at least be supported by objective evidence -- medical records or medical opinion. Sharp-Roundtree v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 14-804V, 2015 WL 12600336, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 3, 2015).

While the statute does not define the quantum of proof needed to establish reasonable basis, it is “something less than the pr eponderant evidence u ltimately required to prevail on one’s vaccine-injury claim.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283 (2014). The Court of

Federal Claims affirmed in Chuisano that “[a]t the most basic leve l, a petitioner who submits no

evidence would not be found to have reasonable basis....” Id. at 286. The Court in Chuisano found that a petition which relies on temporal proximity and a petitioner’s affidavit is not sufficient to

establish reasonable basis. Id. at 290; see also Turpin v. Sec'y Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 99-564V, 2005 WL 1026714, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2005) (finding no reas onable basis when petitioner submitted an affi davit and no other records); Brown v. Sec'y Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 99-539V, 2005 WL 1026713, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis when petitioner presented only e- mails between her and her attorn ey). The Federal Circuit has

affirmed that “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof could provide sufficient grounds for a special mast er to find reasonable basis.” Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health &4 Hum. Servs. , No. 2019-1596, 971 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2020) (finding Petitioner submitted objective evidence s upporting causation when she subm itted medical records and a vaccine package insert); see also James-Cornelius v. S ec'y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 984 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that “the lack of an express medical opinion on causation did not by itself negate the cla im's reasonable basis.”).

Temporal proximity between vaccination and on set of symptoms is a necessary component in establishing causation in non-Ta ble cases, but without more, tempor al proximity alone “fails to

establish a reasonable basis for a vaccine claim.” Chuisano , 116 Fed. Cl. at 291.

The Federal Circuit has stated that reasonable basis “is an objective inquiry” and concluded that “counsel may not use [an] imp ending statute of limitations d eadline to establish a reasonable basis for [appellant’s] claim.” Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 875 F.3d 632, 636 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Further, an impending st atute of limitations should not ev en be one of several factors the special master considers in her reasonable basis analysis. “[T]he Fe deral Circuit forbade, altogether, the consideration of statutory limitati ons deadlines—and all conduct of counsel—in determining whether there was a reasonable basis for a claim.” Amankwaa v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs. , 138 Fed. Cl. 282, 289 (2018).

“[I]n deciding reasonable basis the [s]pecial [m]aster needs to focus on the requirements for a petition under the Vaccine Act to determine if the elements have been asserted with sufficient

evidence to make a feasib le claim for recovery.” Santacroce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 15-555V, 2018 WL 405121, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 2018). Special masters cannot award compensation “based on the claims of petitioner alone, unsubstanti ated by medical records or by medical opinion.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1). Special masters and judges of the Court of Federal Claims have interpreted this provision to mean that petitioners must submit medical records or expert medical opinion in suppor t of causation-in-fact claims. See Waterman v. Sec'y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 123 Fed. Cl. 564, 574 (2015) (citing Dickerson v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs ., 35 Fed. Cl. 593, 599 (1996) (stating that medical opinion evidence is required to support an on-Table theory where medical records fail to establish a Table injury).

When determining if a reasona ble basis exists, ma ny special masters an d judges consider a myriad of factors. The factors to be considered may include “the factual basis of the claim, the medical and scientific support for the claim, the novelty of the v accine, and the novelty of the theory of causation.” Amankwaa

, 138 Fed. Cl. at 289. This approach allows the special master to look at each application fo r attorneys’ fees and costs on a case-by-case basis. Hamrick v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 99-683V, 2007 WL 4793152, at *4 (F ed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19, 2007).

II. Discussion

A. Undue Financial Hardship

The partie s are in the midst of informal settlement negotiations. Petitioner is currently awaiting her Social Security Disabi lity file from the Social Secu rity Administration. Petitioner and her counsel have been litigating this claim for mo re than five years and have incurred over one5 hundred thousand dollars in attorneys’ fees and cost s. Thus, I find it reason able to award interim fees and costs at this juncture to avoid any undue financial hardship.

B. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis

Respondent has not raised any specific objection to the good fa ith or reasonable basis for

this claim and leaves such a determination to my discretion. See Fees Resp. I find that the petition was filed in good faith.

As discussed above, the threshold for reasonable basis is a much lower standard than the burden to prove entitlem ent to compensation by preponderant evidence. In making a reasonable basis determination, I must look at a totality of the circumstances, taking into account the factual

basis for the claim and the medical and scientif ic support offered. Petiti oner has filed extensive

medical records in this case. See Exs. 1-28. Petitioner has also file d three expert reports. ECF Nos. 42, 64, 77. I find that Petitioner had a reas onable basis to file her claim.

As there is no other reason to deny the award of interim attorn eys’ fees and costs, I will

award Petitioner’s reasonable fees and costs in this instance.

C. Attorneys’ Fees related to Wilson Science Law

Petitioner requests a total of $23,811.90 in attorneys’ fees. See Fees App. Ex. A at 7.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is defined as the ra te “prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably compar able skill, experience and reputation.” Avera , 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum , 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is ba sed on “the forum rate for

the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of [P]etitioner's attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera , 515 F. 3d at 1349).

McCulloch provides the framework for determini ng the appropriate compensation for attorneys' fees based upon the attorneys' experience. See McCulloch v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.

Servs. , No. 09–293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for subsequent years. 6

6 The 2015–2016 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Atto rneys-Forum-Rate-Fee-Schedule2015-2016.pdf.

The 2017 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/A ttorneys-Forum-Rate-Fee-Schedule-2017.pdf.

The 2018 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ Attorneys%27%20Forum%20R ate%20Fee%20Schedule %202018.pdf.6 Ms. Wilson requests to be compensated at a rate of $345.00 per hour for work performed in 2019 and $378.00 per hour for work performed in 2020. See Fees App. at 4. These rates are

consistent with the Fee Schedule and with what Ms. Wilson has been awarded in the past. See Blender v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 16-1308V, 2021 U.S. Claims LEXIS 2716 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 22, 2021). I find the requested ra tes to be reasonable and that no adjustment

is warranted.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Attorneys' fees are awarded for the “num ber of hours reasona bly expended on the litigation.” Avera , 515 F.3d at 1348. Ultimately, it is “well within the Special Master's discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] expe rience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work

done.” Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec' y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 3 F.3d 1517, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In exercising that discretion, special master s may reduce the number of hours sub mitted by a percentage of the amount charged. See Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs ., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 728-29 (2011) (affirming the special master's reduction of a ttorney and paralegal hours); Guy v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs ., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (s ame). While attorneys may be compensated for non-attorney-le vel work, the rate must be comp arable to what would be paid for a paralegal or secretary. See O'Neill v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 08–243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). Cl erical and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them. See, e.g.

, McCulloch , 2015 WL 5634323, at *26.

Petitioner’s counsel has provided a breakdown of hours billed and costs incurred. Fees App. Ex A. I find the hours to be largely reas onable, however I find a small reduction is appropriate for time billed by Ms. Wilson for ad ministrative tasks, such as reviewing CM/ECF

notifications and comm unicating scheduling deadlines. Billing for administrative tasks is not appropriate. See Rochester v. United States , 18 Cl. Ct. 379, 387 (1989) (sta ting that services that are “primarily of a secretarial or clerical nature ... should be cons idered as normal overhead office

costs included within the attorneys' fee rates”); see also Mostovoy v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.

Servs. , No. 02-10, 2016 WL 720969, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2016) (citing “reviewing invoices, setting up meetings, a nd making travel arrangements” as examples of administrative tasks); Macrelli v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 98–103, 2002 WL 229811, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 30, 2002) (stating that “time spent pe rforming secretarial task s is to be subsumed in the overhead costs of practici ng law and is not reimbursable”); Isom v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 94–770, 2001 WL 101459, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 17, 2001) (agreeing with respondent that tasks such as filing and photoc opying are subsumed under overhead expenses).

The entries of an administrative nature from 2020 occur on 4/ 28/2020 (0.1 hours), 4/29/2020 (four entries totali ng 0.4 hours), 5/4/2020 (0.1 hours) , 7/10/2020 (0.1 hours), and 9/4/2020 (0.1 hours), for a total of 0.8 hours, resulting in a reduction of $276.00.

The entries of an administrative nature from 2021 occur on 1/ 15/2021 (0.1 hours), 1/18/2021 (0.1 hours), 1/19/2021 (0.1 hours) and 4/ 21/2021 (0.1 hours), for a total of 0.4 hours, resulting in a reduction of $151.20.

. Total attorneys’ fe es to be awarded: $23,384.70.7 D. Reasonable Costs related to Wilson Science Law

Petitioner requests a total of $2,175.22 in costs, which includes obtaining medical records, medical literature, postage costs, and expe rt witness fees. Fees App. Ex. A. at 8.

1. Petitioner’s expert costs

Petitioner requests $2,000.00 for work performed by Dr. Eric Gershwin. Fees App, Ex. A at 18. Petitioner requests Dr. Gershwin be compensated at $500.00 per hour. Dr. Gershwin has previously been awarded his requested rate a nd I see no reason to disturb such a request. See A.S. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 15-520V, 2020 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1196 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 4, 2020); Hoskins v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 934 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 12, 2017). Dr. Gershwin spent a total of four hours reviewing medical literature and Respondent’s expert report. I find this to be reasonable and accordingly award Dr. Gershwin’s expert fees in full. 7

2. Miscellaneous costs

I have reviewed Petitioner’s miscellaneous costs and supporting documentation and find

these costs to be reasonable. I therefore award them in full.

Total costs to be awarded: $2,175.22.

E. Attorneys’ Fees related to Maglio, Christopher, and Toale

Petitioner requests a total of $80,615.20 in attorneys’ fees. See Fees App. Ex. B at 43.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Petitioner’s attorneys request the following rates for work performed from 2016-2020:

Attorne y 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Amber Wilson $275.00 $290.00 $308.00 $323.00 $345.00

Alton Ma g lio X $362.00 X X X
Anne Toale X X X $420.00 X
D. Stadelnikas $359.00 X X X X

Parale g al $105.00 $145.00 $148.00 $154.00 $160.00

Medical Records Parale g al X X $140.00 $145.00 X

7 Dr. Gershwin’s bill states “to review Exhibits 36, 93, A, C, D, and report of Dr. Bakshi...as a courtesy claim 4 hrs only.” Fees App. Ex. A at 18. While I have not deducted Dr. Gershwin’s fees on this occasion, in the future, Dr. Gershwin is encouraged to refrain from block billing in this manner so that he may be compensated fairly for the work he has performed. Future instances of block billing will result in deferral and/or reductions of expert fees.8 These rates are consistent with the Fee Sche dule and with what attorneys and paralegals from Maglio, Christopher and Toale has been awarded in the past. See Blender v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs. , No. 16-1308V, 2020 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1618 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 5, 2020). I find the requested rates to be reasonable and that no adjustme nt is warranted.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Petitioner’s counsel has provided a breakdown of hours billed and costs incurred. Fees App. Ex B. I find the hours to be largely reasonable, however I fi nd a reduction is appropriate for

time billed for administrative tasks 8 and overstaffing. 9 See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs

., 86 Fed. Cl. 201. 214-15 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (affirming a special master's reduction of fees for overstaffing where three attorneys from two different firms worked on the same case); Van Vessem v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.

, No. 11-132V, 2018 U.S. Claims LEXIS 955, 2018 WL 3989517, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 3, 2018) (find ing that "it is not r easonable for both an attorney and a paralegal to bill for reviewing each filing in the case"). I therefore will reduce the fees awarded to Maglio, Christopher and Toale by 5%, for a reduction of $4,030.76.

Total attorneys’ fe es to be awarded: $76,584.44.

F. Reasonable Costs related to Maglio, Christopher & Toale

Petitioner requests $36,665.15 in costs, which includes obtaining medical records, medical literature, postage costs, travel expenses, the Court’s filing fee, and expert witness fees. Fees App.

Ex. B at 47.

8 See e.g. , billing entries on 4/24/2017 (0.2 hours) and 4/25 /2017 (0.2 hours) coordinating an in-person meeting and travel to Petitioner; billing entry of 7/10/2018 (0.5 hours) by timekeeper ADW preparing exhibits for filing; see also billing entry of 12/7/2018 (0.3 hours) by timekeeper EKM researching copying fees and speaking to hospitals about duplicate MRI images; three billing entries on 8/9/2016 totaling 0.6 hours for drafting notices of filing; billing entri es by timekeeper ADW on 8/11/2016 (0.2 hours), and 8/12/2016 (0.3 hours) for reviewing and editing f iling notices; billing entries by timekeeper ADW on 12/20/2016 (0.1 hours), 3/29/2017 (0.1 hours) a nd 5/31/2017 (0.1 hours) for reviewing CM/ECF notifications, and billing entries from timekeeper KA D on 11/22/2016 (0.1 hours), 12/20/2016 (0.1 hours), 5/30/2017 (0.1 hours) for reviewing CM/ECF entries. This list does not include all instances of billing for administrative/secretarial tasks, but is a representa tive sample of numerous instances throughout the fee application.

9 See, e.g. , billing entry on May 29, 2019 from timekeeper ADW stating “Review court scheduling order re Petitioner status report deadline on proceeding” and billing entry from timekeeper EKM on the same date stating “Review and analyze scheduling order for action needed. Update deadlines accordingly.” It is inefficient for both an attorney and parale gal to review the same scheduling order. See Blender, 2020 U.S

Claims LEXIS 1618 at *7. See also billing entries from timekeeper KAD on 10/4/2016 (0.2 hours) and 10/10/2016 (two entries totaling 0.4 hours) and billing entries from timekeeper ADW on 10/10/2016 (two entries totaling 0.4 hours), 10/17/2016 (0.2 hours) and 10/18/2016 (0.3 hours) all consisting of entries to determine “subpoena status” or “review” subpoenas. F ees App. Ex. B at 10. This list does not include all instances of duplicate billing, but is a representa tive sample of numerous instances throughout the fee application.9 1. Petitioner’s expert costs

Petitioner requests $11,000.00 for work performed by Dr. Eric Gershwin. Fees App, Ex. B at 128. Petitioner requests Dr. Gershwin be compensated at $500.00 per hour. Dr. Gershwin has previously been awarded his requested rate a nd I see no reason to disturb such a request. See A.S. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 15-520V, 2020 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1196 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 4, 2020); Hoskins v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 934 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 12, 2017). Dr. Gershwin spent a total of 22 hours reviewing medical records and preparing an expert report. As previously note d, in the future I will reduce Dr. Gershwin’s costs if he continues to engage in block billing, I find this amount of time spent overall reviewing medical records and writing his report to be reasonable a nd accordingly award Dr. Gershwin’s expert fees

in full.

Petitioner also requests $21,750 for work perfo rmed by Dr. Kazim Sheikh. Fees App. Ex. B at 36, 153. Petitioner requests Dr. Sheikh be compensated at $500.00 per hour. Dr. Sheikh has previously been awarded his requested rate and I see no reason to disturb such a request. See Shinskey v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 15-713V, 2019 U.S. Claims LEXIS 482, 2019 WL 2064558, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 9, 2019); St. Pierre v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1315V, 2019 U.S. Claims LEXIS 35, 2019 WL 410599, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 11, 2019); Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , No. 16-262V, 2020 U.S. Claims LEXIS 234 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 6, 2020).

Dr. Sheikh produced two expert reports in this case. Exs. 36, 93. He spent 33 hours writing his first report, and 10.5 hours pr oducing his second. I find Dr. Shei kh’s billing entries are adequate to sufficiently explain how he spent his time, and I find the time spent producing these reports to be reasonable. Accordingly, I will award his costs in full.

2. Miscellaneous costs

I have reviewed Petitioner’s miscellaneous costs and supporting documentation and find

these costs reasonable. I therefore award them in full.

Total costs to be awarded: $36,665.15.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, in the exercise of the discretion a fforded to me in determining the propriety of interim fee and cost awards, and based on the foregoing, I GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s application, as follows:

A sum in the amount of $25,559.92 , representing reimburseme nt of Ms. Amber Wilson’s interim fees and costs, in the form of a check jointly payable to Petitioner and Wilson

Science Law.10 A sum in the amount of $113,249.59 , representing reimbursement of Petitioner’s interim fees and costs, in the form of a check jointly payable to Petitioner and Maglio, Christopher,

and Toale.

In the absence of a motion for review file d pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of

Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision. 10

Any questions regarding this Or der may be directed to my law clerk, Neil Bhargava, by telephone at 202-357-6351, or by email at neil_bhargava@cfc.uscourts.gov.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Katherine E. Oler

Katherine E. Oler Special Master

10 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment is expedited by the parties’ joint filing of a notice renouncing the right to seek review.