United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 19-1941

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSÉ MULERO-VARGAS, t/n José Angel Mulero-Vargas,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Howard, Chief Judge,

Selya and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.

José B. Vélez Goveo and Vélez & Vélez Law Office on brief for 

appellant.

W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. BauzáAlmonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate 

Division, and Robert P. Coleman III, Assistant United States 

Attorney, on brief for appellee.

February 2, 2022
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. Following the discovery of a trove 

of firearms (including two machineguns), ammunition, and drugs, 

defendant-appellant José Mulero-Vargas (Mulero) and a confederate, 

Luis Merced-García, were jointly indicted for, inter alia, aiding 

and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drugtrafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and aiding and 

abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, see

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). After some preliminary skirmishing, not 

relevant here, both men entered guilty pleas to these counts. 

The district court sentenced Merced-García to a withinguidelines eighteen-month term of immurement on the drugtrafficking count and a consecutive upwardly variant 144-month 

term of immurement on the firearms count. Merced-García appealed, 

and we affirmed his sentence. See United States v. Merced-García, 

___ F.4th ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2022) [No. 19-2033, slip op. at 12]. 

We assume the reader's familiarity with that opinion. 

For his part, Mulero was sentenced to a withinguidelines twenty-four-month term of immurement on the drugtrafficking count and a consecutive upwardly variant 144-month 

term of immurement on the firearms count. Like Merced-García, 

Mulero appealed his sentence. He argues that his sentence on the 

firearms count is procedurally infirm and that his aggregate 

sentence is substantively unreasonable. We address these 

arguments in turn. 
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In his most loudly bruited plaint, Mulero says (in 

effect) that he only was responsible for one machinegun. Building 

on this foundation, Mulero asserts that the district court 

committed procedural error by predicating the upwardly variant

portion of his aggregate sentence, in material part, on his 

responsibility for two machineguns. 

Mulero's claim that the district court erred by holding 

him responsible for two machineguns was not raised below. 

Therefore, our review is for plain error. See United States v. 

Rabb, 5 F.4th 95, 101 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Duarte, 

246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). Plain-error review "entails four 

showings: (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or 

obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial 

rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, 

or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Duarte, 246 F.3d 

at 60. As the proponent of plain error, Mulero "must carry the 

devoir of persuasion as to all four of these elements." United 

States v. Pinkham, 896 F.3d 133, 136-37 (1st Cir. 2018). 

The record confers a patina of plausibility on Mulero's 

plaint. The presentence investigation report states in one section 

that, after searching the residence shared by Mulero and MercedGarcía, Puerto Rico police officers discovered a stockpile of 

firearms and ammunition, including one machinegun. The officers 

then requested and received permission to search Merced-García's 
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automobile, presumably parked outside the residence, and 

discovered the second machinegun within the vehicle. Citing this 

discrepancy, Mulero argues that the district court erred in holding 

him responsible for the second machinegun. 

But there is more to the story. The district court 

conducted a joint change-of-plea hearing for Mulero and MercedGarcía. During the ensuing colloquy, the court noted that both 

men were charged "with possession of a firearm in furtherance of 

a drug trafficking crime in that, about May 3, 2017, here in Puerto 

Rico, both of you, aiding and abetting each other knowingly 

possessed" seven listed weapons — a list that included both

machineguns. The court then asked, "[I]s that what you did?" 

Mulero replied with an unequivocal "Yes." And at another point, 

he indicated his assent to the prosecutor's assertion that both 

machineguns were found "[i]n the living room, bathroom, and 

bedroom" of the dwelling. 

Viewed against this backdrop, Mulero stumbles over the 

first and second steps of the plain-error test: we cannot find 

that the sentencing court committed error, much less a clear or 

obvious error.1 We explain briefly. 

1 Courts typically describe this second step in the 

disjunctive: "clear or obvious." See, e.g., United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993); Rabb, 5 F.4th at 101. A few

courts, though, phrase this step in the conjunctive: "clear and 

obvious." See, e.g., United States v. Mendez, 802 F.3d 93, 98 

(1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Sebastian, 612 F.3d 47, 50 (1st 
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To constitute clear or obvious error, the claimed "error 

must be 'indisputable' in light of controlling law." Rabb, 5 F.4th 

at 101 (quoting United States v. Jones, 748 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 

2014)). The putative error here is far from indisputable. 

Although there is an inconsistency in the record as to the 

whereabouts of the second machinegun, there is no room for doubt 

that Mulero possessed it. Even if we assume — favorably to Mulero 

— that the second machinegun was nestled in the vehicle, our case 

law makes pellucid "that possession can be either actual or 

constructive." United States v. Nuñez, 852 F.3d 141, 145 (1st 

Cir. 2017).

Constructive possession is present "when a person 

knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise 

dominion and control over an object, either directly or through 

others." United States v. Williams, 717 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 

2013) (quoting United States v. Ocampo-Guarin, 968 F.2d 1406, 1409 

(1st Cir. 1992)). "[T]he requisite knowledge and intention can be 

inferred from the circumstances." United States v. Ridolfi, 768 

F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Here, both Mulero and Merced-García were, by their own 

admission, aiding and abetting each other in the distribution of 

Cir. 2010). This variation makes no practical difference: an 

error that is "clear" is "obvious," and an error that is "obvious" 

is "clear." See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (noting the equivalency of 

the terms). 
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cocaine. So, too, both men admitted that they aided and abetted 

each other in the possession of firearms to further their cocainedistribution venture. It follows, we think, that the district 

court had a solid basis for concluding that the two men were 

jointly in possession of the whole stockpile of guns, ammunition, 

and drugs (including the second machinegun, whether or not that 

machinegun was located in Merced-García's vehicle). Put another 

way, the district court — on these facts — was entitled to draw a 

reasonable inference that Mulero, at the very least,

constructively possessed the second machinegun. Accordingly, 

there was no error, let alone a clear or obvious one.

This leaves Mulero's claim that his 168-month aggregate 

sentence is substantively unreasonable. The main thrust of this 

claim is that the court "plac[ed] too much weight on the nature 

and circumstances of the case and an insufficient amount of weight 

[on his] history and characteristics." Our review of this claim 

of error is for abuse of discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. 

United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020); United States v. BrunoCampos, 978 F.3d 801, 808 (1st Cir. 2020). 

A sentence is substantively reasonable as long as the 

sentencing rationale is plausible and the result is defensible. 

See United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011); 

United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008). Here, 

the district court cogently articulated its sentencing rationale. 
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After establishing the guideline sentencing ranges for each count, 

the court proceeded to consider the sentencing factors limned in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court discussed Mulero's age, family 

circumstances, education, lack of prior employment, and the like. 

It then recounted the facts of the offenses of conviction, 

describing the seven firearms, the cache of ammunition (more than 

1,600 rounds), and the significant quantity of drugs involved in 

the offenses. The court took particular note of the fact that two 

of the firearms were machineguns and commented that "machine guns 

are highly dangerous and unusual weapons that are not typically 

possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes." Having 

weighed all the aggravating and mitigating factors, the court 

determined that an aggregate sentence of 168 months adequately 

"reflect[ed] the seriousness of the offense, promote[d] respect 

for the law, protect[ed] the public from further crimes by Mr. 

Mulero, and address[ed] the issues of deterrence and punishment." 

This rationale easily clears the plausibility hurdle. 

And Mulero's "disagreement with the district court's balancing of 

the [relevant sentencing] factors does not constitute a valid 

ground for appeal." Merced-García, ___ F.4th at ___ [No. 19-2033, 

slip op. at 9]; see United States v. Ruperto-Rivera, 16 F.4th 1, 

6 (1st Cir. 2021). 

The challenged sentence also represents a defensible 

result. As we stated in Merced-García, the offenses of conviction 
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were serious. See ___ F.4th at ___ [No. 19-2033, slip op. at 11]. 

Mulero, aiding and abetting Merced-García, possessed seven 

firearms, including two machineguns, over 1,600 rounds of 

ammunition, and more than 200 grams of cocaine. Given the gravity 

of the offenses, the sentencing outcome falls well within the 

"broad universe" of defensible sentences. United States v. RiveraMorales, 961 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020). 

There is one loose end. The plea agreement set certain 

parameters for sentencing recommendations. At the disposition 

hearing, the parties — acting within those parameters — offered 

their sentencing recommendations: the government asked for an 

aggregate incarcerative term of 144 months and Mulero asked for an 

aggregate incarcerative term of 114 months. The district court 

spurned both recommendations and imposed an aggregate 

incarcerative term of 168 months. 

On appeal, Mulero makes a conclusory argument that his 

aggregate sentence is substantively unreasonable because the 

sentencing court disregarded the sentencing recommendations 

adumbrated in the plea agreement and subsequently advocated by the 

parties. Mulero, though, is milking a spent cow. The plea 

agreement's sentence recommendations were merely precatory. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B). In such circumstances, we repeatedly 

have stated that when imposing a sentence, a "district court [i]s 
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not bound by the parties' [sentencing] recommendations." United 

States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 294 (1st Cir. 2017); see

United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 2020). So 

it is here. 

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

the challenged sentence is 

Affirmed.