FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-1305

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HEARTLAND EXPRESS, INC. OF 

IOWA, a foreign corporation,

Appellant,

v.

MARK FARBER, as limited 

guardian of the property of Juan 

Torres,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Karen Cole, Judge.

December 18, 2018

WINOKUR, J.

Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa (Heartland) challenges the 

trial court’s order finding that post-judgment interest began to 

accrue on the date of its original Final Judgment rather than 

when it issued an Amended Final Judgment. We agree with the 

trial court and affirm the ruling below.

I.

Juan Torres sought damages for injuries suffered as a result 

of a highway collision in Alabama involving an employee of 

Heartland. Both parties stipulated to the transfer of the case to 
2

Duval County, Florida, and to the application of Alabama 

substantive law.1 The trial court later substituted Mark Farber,

as limited guardian of the property of Torres, as party plaintiff 

due to Torres’ incapacitation.

The case proceeded to trial on the issues of proximate cause, 

compensatory damages, wantonness on the part of Heartland’s 

employee, and punitive damages based on the employee’s alleged 

wantonness. After a twelve-day trial, the jury found that 

Heartland’s negligence was the proximate cause of Torres’ 

injuries and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of 

$888,417.57. The jury, however, did not find that the employee’s 

conduct was wanton and, as a result, made no finding as to 

punitive damages.

Farber then moved for new trial on the issue of wantonness 

and punitive damages. The trial court granted Farber’s motion, 

and in December 2014 entered a Final Judgment in the amount 

of $888,417.57.

Heartland appealed both the trial court’s order granting a 

new trial and the Final Judgment. This Court found that Farber 

was “not entitled to a new trial on the issues of wantonness and 

punitive damages” and reversed the new-trial order. Heartland 

Express, Inc. of Iowa v. Farber, 230 So. 3d 146, 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2017). The case was remanded to the trial court “for the 

reinstatement of the jury’s verdict on the issue of wantonness.” 

Id. at 153.

Both parties agreed that a new entry of final judgment was 

needed in light of the appellate decision, but Farber argued that 

he was entitled to post-judgment interest running from the entry 

of the December 2014 Final Judgment. Heartland argued that 

 1 Florida law provides that post-judgment interest runs from 

the date of judgment. § 55.03(3), Fla. Stat.; Amerace Corp. v. 

Stallings, 823 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2002). Because neither party 

claimed that Alabama law controls the computation of postjudgment interest, we do not consider the issue.
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Farber was only entitled to post-judgment interest from the entry

of an amended final judgment after remand.

In February 2018, the trial court ruled that this Court’s 

remand “d[id] not affect or alter the underlying Final Judgment 

entered by this Court on December 23, 2014.” Therefore, the 

court found that the post-judgment interest would accrue from 

the date of the December 2014 Final Judgment. Accordingly, the 

trial court entered an Amended Final Judgment finding that 

Farber was entitled to collect $888,417.57 from Heartland “with 

post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of interest running 

from December 23, 2014, for which sum let execution issue.”

II.

A trial court’s ruling regarding judgment interest is subject 

to de novo review. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Evers, 232 So. 3d 

457, 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Florida law provides that interest 

on a money judgment begins to accrue on the date the judgment 

is obtained. § 55.03(3), Fla. Stat.

III.

Heartland argues that Farber is only entitled to postjudgment interest from the date of the trial court’s entry of its 

Amended Final Judgment. Heartland’s argument hinges on its 

assertion that the order granting Farber’s motion for new trial 

had the effect of vacating the December 2014 Final Judgment 

and, thus, rendering it a non-final order. 

Heartland primarily relies on two cases for the proposition 

that an order granting new trial renders a final judgment a nonfinal order. In the first case, the Florida Supreme Court held that 

the granting of a motion for a new trial “ha[s] the effect of 

vacating any final judgment theretofore entered and completely 

revitaliz[es] the entire cause for further proceedings in the form 

of a new trial.” Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834, 

840 (Fla. 1956). In the second case, this Court held that “when a 

new trial is granted on less than all issues in the case, the order 

which either expressly or impliedly withdraws from jury 

consideration on a retrial of the cause a part of the issues is in 
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the nature of a partial summary judgment.” Johnson v. City of 

Pensacola, 164 So. 2d 844, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). Boone does 

not apply in this case because the trial court in Boone granted a 

new trial as to the entire verdict. 85 So. 2d at 838. As for 

Johnson, the trial court “specifically vacated and set aside” the 

jury verdict even though a new trial was only granted on the 

issue of damages. 164 So. 2d at 845. 

In this case, the trial court took no comparable action. In its 

order granting new trial, the court specifically stated that the 

new trial was solely on the issue of wantonness and punitive 

damages. Additionally, the order did not vacate or set aside the 

jury verdict as to compensatory damages. In short, whether a 

final judgment is rendered a non-final order depends not just on 

the entry of an order for a new trial, but rather whether the order 

expressly or implicitly vacates and sets aside the final judgment. 

The trial court’s order granting a new trial here only 

addressed the issue of wantonness and punitive damages and left 

the awarded compensatory damages intact. Furthermore, this 

Court remanded the case solely “for the reinstatement of the 

jury's verdict on the issue of wantonness.” Farber, 230 So. 3d at 

153 (emphasis added). Such a statement necessarily implies that 

the Final Judgment’s award of compensatory damages was not 

vacated by the granting of the new trial. Accordingly, the 

December 2014 Final Judgment is a judgment for purposes of 

section 55.03(3), Florida Statutes (providing for post-judgment 

interest).

More importantly, both Boone and Johnson dealt with the 

effect of an order for new trial on a party’s right to seek appellate 

review from a final judgment. On appeal, the final judgments 

were seen as interlocutory orders due to the entry of an order for 

a new trial and, as a result, there was no right to seek appellate 

review.2 As a result, these cases did not reach the issue in this 

 2 See Johnson, 164 So. 2d at 847 (dismissing appellee’s crossappeal because the order granting a new trial rendered the final 

judgment a “partial summary judgment [and] no appeal may be 

taken from a partial summary judgment entered in a law 

action”); Boone, 85 So. 2d at 839 (noting that “where a new trial 
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case: the proper starting point of the administrative calculation of 

post-judgment interest. 

In Haskell v. Forest Land & Timber Co., Inc., this Court 

recognized the general rule that interest on a judgment runs from 

the date that the judgment is entered. 426 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 

1st DCA 1983). This Court also reiterated that “[t]he general rule 

regarding the commencement of interest does not apply where a 

trial court judgment is overturned by an appellate court on 

grounds that it was improper or excessive.” Id. at 1253-54. 

The Fourth District addressed this issue in St. Cloud 

Utilities v. Moore, 355 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). In Moore, 

an earlier appeal resulted in the court “remand[ing] the case for 

the sole purpose of having the trial judge reapportion the 

damages which he did by way of an amended final judgment.” Id. 

at 447. The trial court subsequently ruled that “interest on a 

judgment modified by appellate decision commences from the 

date of the original jury verdict.” Id. Back on appeal, the Fourth 

District reversed the trial court and held that “the interest should 

run from the date of the original judgment entered” reasoning 

that “[n]o further judicial labor was required and the act 

mandated was purely ministerial.” Id. 

In other words, if an appellate court leaves an underlying 

final judgment intact then interest begins to accrue from the date 

of the final judgment even if the trial court on remand entered an 

 

has been granted and the entire case is re-opened, there is no 

order from which an appeal can be taken”). It should be noted

that both Boone and Johnson were overruled on this issue. Bowen 

v. Willard, 340 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla. 1976) (holding that “appeals 

taken from new trial orders shall be treated as appeals from final 

judgments to the extent possible, and that the appellate courts 

have the authority to deal with other appealable issues”). Bowen

has been codified in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(h).

This holding of Bowen, however, does not affect our analysis in 

this case.
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amended final judgment. In this case, the December 2014 Final 

Judgment was not overturned on appeal for being improper or 

excessive. Additionally, this Court did not modify the 

compensatory damages awarded. This Court simply reversed the 

trial court’s granting of a new trial and “affirm[ed] the final 

judgment without further comment.” Farber, 230 So. 3d at 148. 

Accordingly, no further judicial labor was required and the 

subsequent Amended Final Judgment constitutes a purely 

ministerial act. Therefore, post-judgment interest began to accrue 

when the trial court issued its initial Final Judgment.

IV.

In conclusion, Farber obtained a Final Judgment on 

compensatory damages that was affirmed on appeal where this 

Court only reversed the order granting a new trial on the discrete 

issue of wantonness and punitive damages. The trial court’s 

subsequent Amended Final Judgment simply affirmed this 

Court’s mandate and reinstated the jury’s original finding as it 

related to punitive damages. As a result, the trial court correctly 

concluded that post-judgment interest began to accrue when it 

issued its December 2014 Final Judgment.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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James H. Wyman of Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, Coral Gables, 

for Appellant.

Dennis R. Schutt and Jeffrey D. Devonchik of Schutt, Schmidt & 

Noey, Jacksonville, for Appellee.