This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-1901

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Anthony Otto Boyum, 

Appellant.

Filed September 15, 2014

Affirmed

Bjorkman, Judge

Waseca County District Court

File No. 81-CR-12-669

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Paul Dressler, Waseca County Attorney, Rachel Cornelius, Assistant County Attorney, 

Waseca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Toussaint, Judge.



 



 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges his controlled-substance conviction, arguing that the 

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the district court abused its 

discretion by declining to instruct the jury that a confession must be corroborated by 

independent evidence. We affirm.

FACTS

On July 21, 2012, Janesville Police Officer Mark Vanderwilt stopped appellant 

Anthony Otto Boyum’s vehicle because Boyum, the sole occupant, was not wearing his 

seatbelt. Officer Vanderwilt asked Boyum if there was anything he should know about in 

the vehicle. Boyum responded no, and Officer Vanderwilt searched the vehicle, finding a 

zip-lock bag containing 70 pills in the center console.1 Boyum said that he found the 

pills on his property and was taking them to the sheriff’s office. Boyum lives in Waseca, 

which has a sheriff’s office. The stop occurred in Janesville. 

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Boyum with fifth-degree possession of a 

controlled substance. At trial, a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension agent 

testified that she tested one of the 70 pills found in Boyum’s vehicle, and determined the 

pill contained amphetamine. Officer Vanderwilt could not recall if Boyum indicated 

whether he knew what substance the pills contained. 

Boyum requested an instruction advising the jury that the state must provide 

evidence independent of his confession establishing that the charged crime occurred. The 

 

1 Boyum does not challenge the basis for the search.
3

district court denied Boyum’s request, determining that Boyum’s statement was not a 

confession under Minn. Stat. § 634.03, and that even if it was, there was independent 

evidence that the crime occurred. The jury found Boyum guilty as charged, and Boyum 

appeals.

D E C I S I O N

Boyum argues that his statement to the officer about finding the pills on his

property and taking them to the sheriff’s office is a confession, and the district court was 

required to instruct the jury that a confession is not sufficient evidence to convict without 

independent evidence that the offense was committed. He also argues that the evidence 

is insufficient as to the knowledge element of the offense. We address each argument in 

turn.

I. The district court did not commit reversible error by declining to instruct the 

jury that it must find evidence that the charged crime took place, 

independent of Boyum’s statement, to find him guilty. 

A district court has broad discretion in determining how to instruct a jury, and we 

will not reverse where jury instructions “‘overall fairly and correctly state the applicable 

law.’” Gulbertson v. State, 843 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Stewart v. 

Koenig, 783 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 2010)). A party is entitled to a specific instruction 

“if evidence exists at trial to support the instruction.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 

559 (Minn. 2009). Failure to give a requested instruction requires a new trial only if the 

error had a significant impact on the verdict. State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 559 

(Minn. 2001).
4

Section 634.03 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] confession of the defendant 

shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that the offense charged has 

been committed.” For purposes of this statute, “confession” means “a statement made 

after the commission of the offense in which the defendant implicitly or explicitly 

acknowledges guilt.” State v. Heiges, 806 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2011). Statements that 

are admissions of fact which in themselves are innocent and involve no criminal intent

are not confessions. State v. Smith, 264 Minn. 307, 313, 119 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1962).

Boyum characterizes his statement as a confession because the state used it at trial to 

argue his guilt. But we need not determine whether Boyum’s statement was a confession 

because we are not persuaded that the district court’s failure to give a corroboration 

instruction is reversible error.

Section 634.03 codifies the common-law doctrine of corpus delicti—that a 

defendant’s confession alone is not sufficient to establish that a crime took place. State v. 

Heiges, 779 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. App. 2010), aff’d, 806 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2011). 

Corroboration that the offense occurred is necessary to “protect[] against the risk of 

conviction for a crime that never occurred,” In re Welfare of C.M.A., 671 N.W.2d 597, 

601 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted), and to discourage convictions based on 

confessions obtained by coercive law-enforcement techniques, Heiges, 779 N.W.2d at 

909. The statute does not require independent corroboration of the defendant’s 

confession; rather, it “requires corroboration of the corpus delicti independent of the 

confession.” C.M.A., 671 N.W.2d at 602. That requirement is satisfied when there is 

independent evidence that a crime was committed.
5

Boyum cites no Minnesota caselaw requiring a corroboration instruction whenever 

a confession is admitted. Our supreme court has held that a corroboration instruction is 

not required when the defendant stipulates that a crime has been committed. State v. 

Weber, 272 Minn. 243, 247, 137 N.W.2d 527, 530-31 (1965). In Weber, the defendant 

was charged with second-degree assault. Id. at 245, 137 N.W.2d at 529. He stipulated 

that the victim had been assaulted and suffered grievous bodily harm, but denied that he 

inflicted the harm. Id. at 246, 137 N.W.2d at 530. The supreme court held a 

corroboration instruction was not required because of the defendant’s stipulation; “once a 

corpus delicti is established, defendant can be convicted on his own admission.” Id. at 

247, 137 N.W.2d at 531.

Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly reasoned that when the state 

establishes the corpus delicti independently of the defendant’s confession, no 

corroboration instruction is necessary. In Aguilera v. State, for example, the defendant 

appealed his theft conviction. 425 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). During a 

police interview, Aguilera admitted his involvement in the thefts. Id. at 452. The trial 

court denied his request for a corroboration instruction. Id. at 458. On appeal, the court 

determined that the record contained evidence other than the defendant’s confession that 

a theft occurred, and held that “[b]ecause the corpus delicti rule was satisfied by the 

evidence . . . the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on corroboration.” Id. at 

459.2 Likewise, the officer’s discovery of a controlled substance in Boyum’s vehicle is 

 

2 Other courts have similarly concluded that a corroboration instruction is not required if 

there is sufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti absent the defendant’s confession. 
6

proof that a crime was committed. See State v. Solomon, 870 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Wash. Ct. 

App. 1994) (“[I]n a possession [of controlled substance] case, it is clear that a crime 

occurred if drugs are in the possession of someone.”). Boyum’s statement to the officer 

is not necessary to prove the corpus delicti of drug possession, so no corroboration 

instruction is required. 

Boyum likens a defendant’s confession to the testimony of an accomplice, which 

requires a corroboration instruction. See Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2010). This argument 

does not persuade us. First, the two corroboration requirements are located in different 

statutes, which serve different purposes. Compare Minn. Stat. § 634.03 (establishing 

when a confession is sufficient to convict, and when admissible), with Minn. Stat. 

§ 634.04 (barring conviction based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony). As noted 

above, section 634.03 serves to discourage coercively acquired confessions and protect 

against the “risk of conviction for a crime that never occurred.” See C.M.A., 671 N.W.2d 

at 601 (quotation omitted); see also Heiges, 779 N.W.2d at 911 (stating that “the main 

concern behind the corroboration rule is that an accused will feel coerced or induced 

when he or she is under the pressure of a police investigation and make a false 

 

See United States v. McDowell, 687 F.3d 904, 912 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. State, 908 

So.2d 273, 295 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); People v. Rosario, 519 N.E.2d 1020, 1028 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 1988); State v. Webb, 31 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Iowa 1948); Allen v. 

Commonwealth, 997 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Riggins v. State, 843 A.2d 

115, 145 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 72 n.15 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 55 (Va. 1989) (“[W]here 

the court has made a threshold determination that sufficient corroboration of the corpus 

delicti has been adduced, independent of a confession, to permit the confession to go to 

the jury, an instruction submitting the issue of corroboration to the jury is 

inappropriate.”).
7

confession” (quotation omitted)). In contrast, Minn. Stat. § 634.04 addresses the concern 

that an accomplice might testify falsely to implicate the defendant and to minimize his 

own guilt, and then “a jury might discredit all testimony except the accomplice 

testimony.” State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Minn. 2012). An instruction that an 

accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated by other evidence assists the jury in 

evaluating the credibility of such “inherently untrustworthy” witnesses. See State v. 

Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 877 (Minn. 2008). 

Second, corroboration of the corpus delicti has traditionally been a matter for the 

court, not a jury. See Minn. Stat. § 634.03 (referring to admissibility); C.M.A, 671 

N.W.2d at 601 (explaining that Minn. Stat. § 634.03 “may also be used, in an appropriate 

case, by a trial judge when deciding whether there is sufficient evidence for a case to go 

to the jury”); accord State v. Sweat, 727 S.E.2d 691, 697 (N.C. 2012) (“Whether a 

confession is sufficiently corroborated under the corpus delicti doctrine is a legal question 

of admissibility to be determined by the trial judge.”); State v. Weller, 644 A.2d 839, 841 

(Vt. 1994) (holding that no jury instruction is required because the issue of corroboration 

is a “legal question to be decided by the trial court alone and should not be submitted to 

the jury for redetermination”); Watkins, 385 S.E.2d at 55 (holding that district court was 

not required to instruct the jury that a conviction may not be based on an uncorroborated 

confession because the court denied the instruction after the court determined as a 

threshold matter that the corpus delicti was sufficiently corroborated so no instruction 

was necessary).
8

Finally, the subject of the corroboration is different under each statute. The 

accomplice statute requires corroboration of the defendant’s criminal act whereas the 

confession statute requires independent evidence that a crime was committed. Compare 

Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (requiring corroboration “by such other evidence as tends to convict 

the defendant of the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if 

it merely shows the commission of the offense” (emphasis added)), with Minn. Stat. 

§ 634.03 (“A confession of the defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction 

without evidence that the offense charged has been committed . . . .” (emphasis added)). 

In sum, we are not persuaded that a corroboration instruction is required for a confession. 

Even if the district court erred by declining to give a corroboration instruction, we 

discern no prejudice. Evidence corroborating a confession need not address every 

element of the charged offense; the elements of the offense may be “sufficiently 

substantiated by independent evidence of attending facts or circumstances from which the 

jury may infer the trustworthiness of the confession.” Heiges, 779 N.W.2d at 912 

(quotation omitted). Boyum was the owner and sole occupant of the vehicle in which the 

70 amphetamine pills were found. The presence of the controlled substance and evidence 

that he was driving away from—not towards—the sheriff’s office, tend to show that he 

unlawfully possessed a controlled substance and corroborates that the offense charged 

was committed independently from Boyum’s statement to police.

II. Sufficient evidence supports Boyum’s conviction.

When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we carefully examine 

the evidence in the record to determine whether the fact-finder could reasonably find the 
9

defendant guilty of the charged offense. State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn.

2012). When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-step 

analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the 

circumstances proved and defer to the jury’s acceptance or rejection of evidence in 

support of those circumstances. State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011). 

Second, we independently examine the reasonableness of the inferences the jury could 

draw from those circumstances, including inferences that support a hypothesis other than 

guilt. Id. To uphold a verdict, the circumstances proved must be consistent with the 

hypothesis that the defendant is guilty and inconsistent with any other rational 

hypotheses. Id. 

A person is guilty of a controlled-substance crime in the fifth degree if he 

“unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified

in Schedule I, II, III, or IV.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2010). The state must 

prove that the defendant (1) consciously possessed a controlled substance, either directly 

or constructively, and (2) knew that the material was a controlled substance. State v. 

Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975). To satisfy the knowledge 

element, the state must prove that the defendant “had actual knowledge of the nature of 

the substance.” Id. Knowledge is customarily proved by circumstantial evidence, and 

must be inferred from the evidence. See id.; see also State v. Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914, 919 

(Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 2010). Generally, knowledge that a 

substance is illegal is sufficient mens rea for drug-possession crimes. See Ali, 775 

N.W.2d at 919 (affirming conviction for possession of controlled substance based on 
10

circumstantial evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant knew that the 

substance he possessed contained an illegal drug).

Boyum argues that the evidence is not sufficient to prove he knowingly possessed 

a controlled substance. The state proved the following facts. Boyum was driving his 

vehicle in Janesville and was pulled over by Officer Vanderwilt. Officer Vanderwilt 

discovered a zip-lock bag with 70 loose pills in the center console. Boyum was the sole 

occupant of the vehicle and told Officer Vanderwilt that he found the pills on his property 

and was bringing them to the sheriff’s office. There is a sheriff’s department in Waseca, 

where Boyum lives. Boyum did not tell the officer about the pills when he was pulled 

over, or after the officer asked him if he had anything in his vehicle. The state tested one 

pill and determined it contained amphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. See 

Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(3)(a) (2010). 

These circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that Boyum had 

constructive possession of a controlled substance. See Florine, 303 Minn. at 104-05, 226 

N.W.2d at 610 (stating that constructive possession exists when an item is found in a 

place under a defendant’s control to which no other person normally had access). 

Because the pills were found in Boyum’s vehicle, it is permissible to infer that they were 

present with his knowledge. See State v. Siirila, 292 Minn. 1, 10, 193 N.W.2d 467, 473 

(1971) (“[T]he inference is permissible that, marijuana having been found in a jacket 

shown to belong to defendant and to have been worn by him, whatever was in the jacket 

was there with his knowledge.”).
11

In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to show knowing possession, Boyum 

cites his statement to the officer that he found the pills and was taking them to the 

sheriff’s office as evidence that he suspected, but did not know, the pills contained a 

controlled substance. But this hypothesis is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict. By 

finding Boyum guilty, the jury rejected his theory that he found the pills and was taking 

them to the sheriff’s office, and likewise rejected his argument that his statement proves 

he lacked knowledge that the pills contained a controlled substance. Boyum’s suggested 

inference—that he did not knowingly possess a controlled substance—is not a reasonable 

one. “[W]e will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis 

of mere conjecture.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 330 (Minn. 2010) (quotation 

omitted). On this record, the circumstantial evidence is inconsistent with any other 

rational hypothesis except guilt, and is sufficient to support Boyum’s conviction.

Affirmed.