# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 6, 2019 *

Decided February 7, 2019

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2038

IN RE: JOHN V. NORRIS, Appeal from the United States District Appellant . Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 18 C 2073

Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge

.

* We have agreed to decide the case wi thout oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and le gal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 18-2038 Page 2

O R D E R

John Norris, a frequent filer of meritle ss litigation who was also found to have disrupted courtroom proceedings, appeals from two orders of the Executive Committee

of the U.S. District Court for the Northern Di strict of Illinois. The first order requires

that the Marshals Service escort Norris whenev er he is inside the federal courthouses in
the Northern District of Illinois; the second requires that Norris obtain leave of court before filing new civil suits. Be cause the first order is not appealable and the second is a permissible response to Norris’s litigious be havior, we dismiss in part and affirm in
part.

Norris’s removal from a federal courthouse prompted the first order. When Norris went to the courtroom of Judge Robe rt Dow, Jr., in March 2018 for a motion hearing in a pending case, the court’s deputy told Norris that the judge had already
denied the motion. Dissatisfied, Norris insi sted that the judge hold another hearing. Eventually, the judge had courtroom securi ty escort Norris out of the courthouse. Norris later responded by filing a judicial misconduct complaint, arguing that Judge Dow and the courtroom deputy should not have had him removed.

Over the next month, the Executive Co mmittee issued its two orders. The first, entered just days after Norris’s removal from the courthouse, recounts those events. The order notes that Norris became “loud” and “argumentative” with the courtroom deputy and “demanded” to speak with the judge. His “inappropriate conduct,” the order says, raised safety concerns among the court, the Marshals Service, and the Clerk’s Office. The order requires that Norris sign in with security if he returns to the Dirksen or

Roszkowski federal courthouses and that th e Marshals Service accompany him while in either building. The second order came thr ee weeks later. It states that most of the 14 cases that Norris had previously filed in th e district court were terminated because he had failed to state a claim, follow court orders, or prosecute the cases. The order requires Norris to seek leave from the Executive Committee to file any new civil complaint by certifying under oath that he has not previously litigated his proposed claims. This screening process does not cover criminal cases, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, other extraordinary writs, or appeals. Norris timely appealed both orders. (About three weeks later, the Committee denied Norris’s request to vacate these two orders, but Norris has not appealed that ruling.)

We first consider our jurisdiction over this appeal. The appe alability of an order

from an Executive Committee de pends on whether it is ju dicial or administrative.No. 18-2038 Page 3

See In re Chapman , 328 F.3d 903, 904 (7th Cir. 2003). We have jurisdiction only over appeals from judicial actions of the Execut ive Committee; administrative actions are not appealable to this court, but only to this circuit’s Judicial Council. See id

.

The Committee’s first order—requiring Norris to sign in upon his arrival at the

federal courthouses and to remain with se curity while there—is administrative, so we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See In re Long , 475 F.3d 880, 880–81 (7th Cir. 2007). In In re Long , we ruled that an Executive Committee’s order that barred a litigant from the courthouse’s library after he defied the librar y’s rules was administrative. We explained that the Committee was acting in a “proprie tary capacity, just like a restaurant that expels an unruly customer and forbids him to return.” Id . Similarly, the Committee administratively restricted Norris from mo ving unescorted with in the courthouse because he was thought to be unruly. In ad dition, this order does not impinge on any constitutionally significant interest because it does not prevent his access to the courts. Therefore, we dismiss Norris’s appeal from the first order.

We have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Committee’s second order

because an order that restricts one’ s ability to file suit is judicial. See In re Chapman

, 328 F.3d at 904–05. Norris argues that the Commi ttee violated his due-process rights because it deprived him of his liberty intere st in access to the courts without first providing him notice of the charges against him and a hearing in wh ich to respond. But Norris is not deprived of meaningful access to the courts, which is the only legal interest that he may invoke. See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); In re Chapman , 328 F.3d at 905. The order prevents him from filing new civil actions that are “legally frivolous or are merely duplicative of matters already litigated.” See In re Chapman , 328 F.3d at 905. The right to meaningful access to the courts does not include a right to file these cases.

Id. And the order expressly leaves unhampered Norris’s ability to defend himself in criminal court, to seek writs, or to appeal . These restrictions are consistent with the broad authority federal courts may use to curb abusive filing practices. See In re Chapman , 328 F.3d at 905; Support Sys. Int'l v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995); In re
Davis, 878 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1989).

Norris has three replies, but each is unavailing. First, he argues that the Committee should have granted him discove ry under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before restricting his filings. But ev en if we assume that those rules apply to disciplinary proceedings, Norris does not say what discovery might have revealed or how he was prejudiced without it. Second, he argues that the Committee’s restrictions were “retaliation” for his judicial misconduct co mplaint. This assertion is irrelevant toNo. 18-2038 Page 4

the filing misconduct recounted in the order. Because that misconduct justified the filing restriction, see In re Chapman, 328 F.3d at 905, any alleged retaliation “had no effect” on the discipline. See Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2011). Finally, Norris argues that Judge Dow and the courtroom deputy violated the judicial code of conduct when they had him removed from the courthouse. But a challenge to the outcome of his judicial complaint must pr oceed before the Judicial Council of this

circuit. See Guide to Judiciary Policy , Vol. 2, Pt. E. § 320, Art. V.

AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part