COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

MILTON NORRIS TURNER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2907-95-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 NOVEMBER 26, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY 

Joseph E. Spruill, Jr., Judge 

 George W. Townsend, III, for appellant. 

 Monica S. McElyea, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Milton Norris Turner was convicted of distribution of 

cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248. He appeals on the 

grounds that the Commonwealth did not adequately prove that the 

substance in question was in fact cocaine. For the reasons that 

follow, we reverse the conviction. 

 The Commonwealth had no physical evidence of the substance 

procured from Turner, and therefore was not able to conduct any 

laboratory analysis. Their only evidence concerning the nature 

of the substance consisted of the testimony of Cynthia Douglas. 

Douglas testified that she had given some stolen beer to Turner 

in exchange for crack cocaine. To establish that it was cocaine, 

the Commonwealth asked Douglas how long she had used cocaine, how 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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often, the manner of use, what it looked like, and what effect it 

had on her. Then she was asked her opinion on what the substance 

was that she had traded for beer. 

 Turner argues that this is insufficient to prove that the 

substance was in fact cocaine. We agree. An addict or user may 

identify a substance through circumstantial evidence. This 

evidence may include: 

 [E]vidence of the physical appearance of the 

substance involved in the transaction, 

evidence that the substance produced the 

expected effects when sampled by someone 

familiar with the illicit drug, evidence that 

the substance was used in the same manner as 

the illicit drug, testimony that a high price 

was paid in cash for the substance, evidence 

that the transactions involving the substance 

were carried on with secrecy or deviousness, 

and evidence that the substance was called by 

the name of the illegal narcotic by the 

defendant or others in his presence. 

Hill v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 60, 63, 379 S.E.2d 134, 136 

(1989) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 

1221 (4th Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 

43, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 21, 

25-26, 205 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1974). Douglas did not testify at 
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all as to the characteristics of the substance in this case. She 

did not describe the substance, nor whether its appearance was 

consistent with that of cocaine. She did not describe whether 

she used it, nor its effect, if any, and whether the effect was 

consistent with that of cocaine. This testimony is insufficient 

to prove that the substance was cocaine. See Hinton v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 64, 66, 421 S.E.2d 35, 37 (1992). 

Furthermore, no corroborating evidence was presented to support 

Douglas' opinion. See id.; see also Hill, 8 Va. App. at 65, 379 

S.E.2d at 137; Myrick v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 333, 340, 412 

S.E.2d 176, 180 (1991). 

 Because the Commonwealth's evidence failed to prove a 

distribution of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse. 

 Reversed and dismissed.