alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6973

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

KEVIN LAMONT WALKER,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith, 

District Judge. (4:05-cr-00005-RBS-JEB-1)

Submitted: October 13, 2011 Decided: October 18, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kevin Lamont Walker, Appellant Pro Se. Howard Jacob Zlotnick, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Kevin Lamont Walker appeals the district court’s order 

denying his motion to reconsider the denial of his 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion for a sentence reduction. We have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# C_2023063EN.01005301.xml

| 20.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 63/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 63/53

---

Order of the General Court of 9 December 2022 — AMO Development v EUIPO (Medical instruments)

(Case T-311/22) (1)

(Community designs - Community designs representing medical instruments - No application for renewal - Cancellation of the designs on expiry of the registration - Application for restitutio in integrum - Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 - Duty to take due care - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2023/C 63/70)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: AMO Development LLC (Santa Ana, California, United States) (represented by: J. Day, Solicitor, and T. de Haan, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: T. Klee and E. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, AMO Development LLC, seeks annulment of the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 15 March 2022 (Case R 1433/2021-3).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

| 2. | AMO Development LLC shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

AMO Development LLC shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 276, 18.7.2022.

---
Exhibit 35.1

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-1 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, (the Report), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Santander Consumer USA Inc. (the Servicer), does hereby certify and
represent that:



| | 1. | A review of the activities and performance of the Servicer under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of
February 25, 2015, among Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, Santander Consumer USA Inc., Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-1 and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (the
Agreement) during the period that is the subject of the Report has been made under my supervision.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the
Agreement in all material respects throughout the period that is the subject of the Report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.By:

/s/ Sandra M. BroderickName:

Sandra M. BroderickTitle:

EVP Head of OperationsDate:

March 29, 2019By:

/s/ Andrew KangName:

Andrew KangTitle:

TreasurerDate:

March 29, 2019
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Prospectus
constituting part of this Registration Statement on Form S-3 of our report dated
September 13, 1996, except as to the poolings of interests with the Acquired
Entities which is as of January 30, 1997, relating to the consolidated financial
statements of PMT Services, Inc., which appears on page 1 of Exhibit 5.1 of the
Current Report on Form 8-K of PMT Services, Inc. filed on April 8, 1997. We also
consent to the application of such report to the Financial Statement Schedule
for the three years ended July 31, 1996 which appears on page 1 of Exhibit 5.2
of such Current Report on Form 8-K when such schedule is read in conjunction
with the financial statements referred to in our report. The audit referred to
in such report also included this schedule. We also consent to the reference to
us under the heading "Experts" in such Prospectus.


/s/ PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP


Nashville, Tennessee
    
April 29, 1997
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8326 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8326

   To amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to 
      require eligible recipients of certain grants to develop a 
comprehensive economic development strategy that directly or indirectly 
increases the accessibility of affordable, quality child care, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 21, 2020

Ms. Finkenauer (for herself and Mr. Hagedorn) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, 
for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case 
for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of 
                        the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to 
      require eligible recipients of certain grants to develop a 
comprehensive economic development strategy that directly or indirectly 
increases the accessibility of affordable, quality child care, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Child Care is Economic Development 
Act of 2020'' or the ``CED Act''.

SEC. 2. COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES.

    (a) In General.--Section 302(a)(3)(A) of the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3162(a)(3)(A)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' before ``balances resources''; and
            (2) by inserting ``, and directly or indirectly increases 
        the accessibility of affordable, quality child care'' after 
        ``sound management of development''.
    (b) Guidance.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services, shall issue guidance on implementing the 
amendments made by subsection (a) to include the accessibility of 
affordable, quality child care in a comprehensive economic development 
strategy developed under section 302 of the Public Works and Economic 
Development Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3162).
                                 <all>
```
#### Glenn Elliott LEONARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of OREGON; Frankie, Superintendent, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-35225

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 9, 2018 * Portland, Oregon

Filed March 13, 2018

Craig Eliot Weinerman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDOR—Federal Public Defender’s Office (Eugene), Eugene, OR, for Petitioner-Appellant

Peenesh Shah, AGOR—Office of the Oregon Attorney General (Salem), Salem, OR, for Respondents-Appellees

Before: N.R. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Glenn Leonard, an Oregon state inmate, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

1. Leonard failed to exhaust his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the state PCR proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Thus, for a federal court to address this claim in a § 2254 proceeding, Leonard must establish both “cause” for that failure to exhaust ánd “prejudice” from the alleged constitutional violation. *See Coleman v. Thompson,*501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Leonard asserts that the cause of his failure to exhaust was PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness. In *Davila v, Davis,*however, the Supreme Court held that PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness provides cause for failure to exhaust only a narrow type of claim: ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2062-63, 198 L.Ed.2d 603 (2017).

2. Leonard also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a witness’s testimony. The claim rests on *State v. Southard,*347 Or. 127, 218 P.3d 104 (2009), decided by the Oregon Su*802preme Court after Leonard’s trial. Before *Southard,*Oregon law was unsettled on whether the testimony at issue was admissible under Oregon’s expert witness evidence rule. *Compare State v. Middleton,*294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983), *with State v. Sanchez-Cruz,*177 Or.App. 332, 33 P.3d 1037, 1038-39, 1045 (2001). The state PCR court’s ruling that trial counsel was not ineffective was therefore not unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); *Lowry v. Lewis,*21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that counsel “cannot be required to anticipate our decision in this later case, because his conduct must be evaluated for purposes of the performance standard of *Strickland*as of the time of counsel’s conduct”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Samuel W. SWOOPES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles L. RYAN, Warden; et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-15506

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 16, 2018 San Francisco, California

Filed March 2, 2018

*733Lee Tucker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDAZ—Federal Public Defender’s Office (Tucson), Tucson, AZ, for Petitioner-Appellant

William S. Simon, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondents-Appel-lees

Before: KLEINFELD and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Stephen J. Murphy, III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Samuel Swoopes (“Petitioner”) appeals the district court’s denial, on remand from our court, of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his jury conviction for robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault. We granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due process and a fair trial by giving a misleading response to a jury question without consulting with Petitioner or his counsel; and (2) whether the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due process by admitting unduly suggestive and unreliable victim identifications. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and we affirm.

1. Petitioner argues that the trial court made an ex parte response to a mid-deliberation jury question and thus violated his right to due process and a fair trial. We defer to the factual finding of the Arizona Court of Appeals that the response was not ex parte. *See Rhoades v. Henry,*598 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim fails because he was not deprived of counsel. *See Musladin v. Lamarque,*555 F.3d 830, 842 (9th Cir. 2009).

2. The trial court did not err by admitting the three eyewitness identifications. The identifications by Randy Diana and Mark Hatoon “were not arranged by law enforcement officers” and, accordingly, the pre-trial screening for reliability does not apply. *See Perry v. New Hampshire,*565 U.S. 228, 232, 132 S.Ct. 716, 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012). In addition, under the factors outlined in *Neil v. Biggers,*409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), Linda Diana’s line-up identification of Petitioner was not unduly suggestive or unreliable. Linda’s description of her attacker, the opportunity she had to view Petitioner during the crimes, and her degree of certainty, outweigh the unreliability stemming from the year and a half between the crime and the identification, and the inherent problems in cross-racial identifications. *See United States v. Jernigan,*492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In balancing these factors, we find that the trial court did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights by admitting the identifications.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

Before GASTON, HOUTZ, and MYERS Appellate Military Judges

_________________________ 

### UNITED STATES Appellee

v. Randal M. NELSON Staff Sergeant (E

- 6 ), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant
No. 20 2 100329

_________________________ Decided: 18 April 2022
Appeal from the United States Navy

- Marine Corps Trial Judiciary
Military Judge :

Eric A. Catto
Sentence adjudged 5 August 2021 by a general court

- martial convened at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, consisting of a military judge sitting al one
. Sentence approved by the convening authority: reduction to E

- 1, confinement for 9 months , and a bad

conduct discharge.
For Appellant: Commander Michael E. Maffei , JAGC, USNUnited States v. Nelson , NMCCA No. 20 2100329 Opinion of the Court

2 _________________________ This opinion does not serve as binding precedent under NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2 (a)

.

_________________________
PER CURIAM : After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of error, we have determined that the findings and sen tence are correct in law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. 1 T he findings and sentence are AFFIRMED

.

FOR THE COURT:

RODGER A. DREW, JR. Clerk of Court

1 Articles 59 & 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859, 866.
Total Polling Locations:

Election Day:7 17,169 

Early Voting:8 2,515 

Mail Ballots Transmitted10 Mail Ballots Returned11

2,233,578 2,013,990 (90.2% of 

transmitted) 

Mail Ballots Counted12 Mail Ballots Rejected13

1,986,445 (98.6% of 

returned)

33,853 (1.7% of 

returned) 

Mail Voting Policies 

No excuse is required for mail voting14

Does not conduct all-mail elections15

No permanent absentee voting list16

EAVS Jurisdictions

108 

Total Registered Voters as of 

Nov. 3, 20201

9,789,893 

 

Registration Forms Received2*

1,240,995 

Total Confirmation Notices Sent3*

5,106,813 

2020 EAVS Data Brief: Illinois

 Voter Registration

14.9%

21.5%

33.1%

52.2%

96.4%

In-Person

Other

Mail, Email, Fax

Motor Vehicle Dept.

Online

Source of Registration Applications4

 Voter Turnout  Election Technology

In-Person 

Election 

Day Voters 

2,049,927

33.3%

Mail Voters 

2,037,583

33.1%

In-Person 

Early Voters 

2,005,711

32.6%

Other Mode 

66,300

1.1%

Voters Participating By Mode5

108

75

34

25

0 0

Scanner Ballot

Marking

Device

DRE with

VVPAT

Electronic

Poll

Books

DRE w/o

VVPAT

Hand

Count

Technology Used by Jurisdictions9

 Mail Balloting

Notes 

EAVS data and reports may be downloaded at www.eac.gov. 

The data shown are certified as final by state election authorities. 

Responses of “Does not apply,” “Data not available, ” and “Valid 

skip” are shown as zeroes or dashes. Percentages may not sum 

to 100% because of missing data or rounding. 

* Close of registration for 2018 

general election to close of 

registration for 2020 general 

election. 

1 A1a of EAVS. 

2 A3a of EAVS. 

3 A8a of EAVS. 

4 Mail, Email, Fax is A4a. InPerson is A4b. Online is A4c. 

Motor Vehicle Dept. is A4d. 

Other is the sum of A4e–A4l. 

Denominator is A3a. 

5 In-Person Election Day Voters 

is F1b. Mail Voters is F1d+F1g. 

In-Person Early Voters is F1f. 

Other Mode is F1c+F1e+F1h. 

Denominator is sum of F1b–

F1h. 

6 F1a of EAVS. Denominator 

is citizen voting age 

population (CVAP). 

7 D3a of EAVS. 

8 D4a of EAVS. 

9 F3a–d, F5a, F6a, F7a, F8a, 

and F11a of EAVS. 

10 C1a of EAVS. 

11 C1b of EAVS. 

12 C3a of EAVS. 

13 C4a of EAVS. 

14 Q17 of Policy Survey. 

15 Q18 and Q18a of Policy 

Survey. 

16 Q19 of Policy Survey. 

Turnout 

67.6%

6
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 915 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to extend the coverage of the Federal 

prohibition against stalking in order to provide protection to friends 

and co-workers, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 30, 2019 

Ms. MENG (for herself, Ms. CLARKE of New York, Ms. DELBENE, Mrs. DINGELL, Miss GONZA ́LEZ-COLO ́N of Puerto Rico, Mr. HASTINGS, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. KEATING, Ms. KELLY of Illinois, Mr. KHANNA, Mr. KILMER, Ms. KUSTER of New Hampshire, Mr. MCNERNEY, Mr. MEEKS, Ms. 

MOORE, Ms. NORTON, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. 

SUOZZI, Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, and Ms. WILSON of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to extend the coverage of the Federal prohibition against stalking in order 

to provide protection to friends and co-workers, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Expanded Stalking 

5 Protections Act of 2019’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 915 IH

1 SEC. 2. STALKING. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2261A of title 18, United 

3 States Code, is amended— 

4 (1) by striking ‘‘Whoever’’ and inserting ‘‘(a) 

5 IN GENERAL.—Whoever’’; 

6 (2) in paragraph (1)(A)(ii), by striking ‘‘or’’; 

7 (3) in paragraph (1)(A)(iii), by striking ‘‘or’’ 

8 after the semicolon; 

9 (4) by adding at the end of paragraph (1)(A) 

10 the following: 

11 ‘‘(iv) a friend of that person; or 

12 ‘‘(v) a co-worker of that person; or’’; 

13 and 

14 (5) by adding at the end of the following: 

15 ‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

16 ‘‘(1) CO-WORKER.—The term ‘co-worker’ means 

17 a person with whom one has a work relationship, 

18 without regard to any hierarchy within the organiza19 tion. 

20 ‘‘(2) FRIEND.—The term ‘friend’ means a per21 son with whom one has a bond of mutual affection, 

22 exclusive of intimate or family relations.’’. 

23 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 2261A, as 

24 amended by subsection (a), is further amended— 

25 (1) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ‘‘or (iii)’’ 

26 and inserting ‘‘(iii), (iv), or (v)’’; 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 915 IH

1 (2) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ‘‘or (iii)’’ 

2 and inserting ‘‘(iii), (iv), or (v)’’; and 

3 (3) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ‘‘or (iii)’’ 

4 and inserting ‘‘(iii), (iv), or (v)’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
No. 11-10649.

#### Goains *v.*Texas.

Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist. Certiorari denied.
#### David R. GELINAS; Karen M. Gelinas, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. U.S. BANK, as Trustee FOR LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35292

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 23, 2018

David R. Gelinas, Pro Se

Karen M. Gelinas, Pro Se

Kathleen Stetsko, Attorney, Perkins Coie LLP, Chicago, IL, Tina R. Thomas, Esquire, Attorney, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees U.S. Bank, Caliber Home Loans, Inc.

Joseph W. McIntosh, McCarthy & Hol-thus LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Quality Loan Service Corporation

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

David R. Gelinas and Karen M. Gelinas appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to file an amended complaint their action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a pending foreclosure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *Al-Torki v. Kaempen,*78 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.

In the opening brief, plaintiffs fail to address how the district court erred in dismissing their action for failure to prosecute. As a result, plaintiffs have waived their challenge to the district court’s order. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.