[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13978

Non-Argument Calendar

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JAY GOODLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CHARLES M. GREENE, 

individually and in his official capacity as 

a Justice of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit 

Court of Broward County Florida, 

Defendant-Appellee.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13978

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cv-61284-RAR

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Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Jay Goodley, proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action against 

Charles Greene, a judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court 

of Broward County, Florida.1 The district court determined that 

Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Greene was barred by absolute judicial immunity. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a probate case in Florida state court 

concerning the guardianship of Plaintiff’s mother: a case in which 

Plaintiff was a litigant. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Greene was assigned initially to the case but recused himself in February 2018. 

Despite the recusal, Judge Greene continued to participate 

1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See 

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

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21-13978 Opinion of the Court 3

intermittently in the probate case, including by performing these 

acts: (1) holding a telephonic hearing on 6 March 2018; (2) holding 

an in-person hearing on 25 April 2018; (3) entering orders in the 

probate case on 8 March 2018, 26 February 2020, and on 27 February 2020; and (4) purportedly conferring about the probate case 

with the presiding judge during an October 2018 hearing.

In June 2021, Plaintiff filed this section 1983 complaint 

against Judge Greene in his individual capacity. Plaintiff alleged 

that Judge Greene violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment when Judge Greene participated in the probate case 

in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. As a result, Plaintiff said he 

suffered financial losses and pain and suffering. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. 

The district court granted Judge Greene’s motion to dismiss. 

In pertinent part, the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s claim 

was barred by absolute judicial immunity.2 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss, accepting all properly alleged facts as true and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 

610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). “We review de novo a district 

2 The district court also concluded that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing. 

Construing liberally Plaintiff’s complaint -- and viewing all factual allegations 

and inferences in Plaintiff’s favor -- we cannot conclude as a matter of law that 

Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered an injury-infact as a result of the alleged constitutional violation. 

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court’s grant of judicial immunity.” Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 

1325 (11th Cir. 2000). 

“Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for 

those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Sibley v. 

Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). “This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in 

excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. In determining whether a 

judge acted within his judicial capacity, we consider whether the 

act (1) “constituted a normal judicial function;” (2) “occurred in the 

judge’s chambers or in open court;” (3) “involved a case pending 

before the judge;” and (4) “arose immediately out of a visit to the 

judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. In assessing whether an act is 

one normally performed by a judge, “we look only to the nature 

and function of the act, not the act itself.” Stevens v. Osuna, 877 

F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). 

Here, Judge Greene acted clearly within his judicial capacity. 

The nature and function of the complained-of acts -- conducting 

hearings, issuing written orders, and conferring with fellow judges 

-- are acts performed normally by judges. Each of the alleged 

events occurred in open court or in the judge’s chambers, related 

to a case pending before the court, and arose out of interactions 

with Judge Greene in his judicial capacity. 

We next address whether Judge Greene acted “in the clear 

absence of all jurisdiction.” Whether a state judge acted in the absence of jurisdiction is a question of state law. Sibley, 437 F.3d at 

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21-13978 Opinion of the Court 5

1071. Under Florida law, “[j]urisdiction is vested in the court itself, 

and not in any individual judge of the court.” See Kalmanson v. 

Lockett, 848 So. 2d 374, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). In Kalmanson, the state court determined that a state judge who performed 

judicial acts in a case after recusing himself was still entitled to judicial immunity even if his conduct likely violated Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(f). See id. at 380-81. Because the judge’s recusal “did 

not diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit court over th[e] case,” 

the state court concluded that the judge’s acts were not “taken in 

clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See id.

Like the judge in Kalmanson, Plaintiff alleges that Judge 

Greene exceeded his authority -- and violated Rule 2.160(f) -- by 

participating in the probate case after recusing himself. Nevertheless, because the state court retained jurisdiction over the case, we 

cannot conclude that Judge Greene acted “in the clear absence of 

all jurisdiction.” See Kalmanson, 848 So. 2d at 380-81. That Judge 

Greene might have exceeded his own authority is not enough to 

strip him of judicial immunity. See Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070.

The district court committed no error in concluding that 

Judge Greene was entitled to judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim. Plaintiff’s complaint was thus subject to dismissal 

with prejudice. 

AFFIRMED.

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