Presidential Documents

11589

Federal Register

Vol. 62, No. 48

Wednesday, March 12, 1997

Title 3—

The President

Presidential Determination No. 97–18 of February 28, 1997

Certification for Major Narcotics Producing and Transit

Countries

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (‘‘the Act’’), I hereby determine and

certify that the following major drug producing and/or major drug transit

countries/dependent territories have cooperated fully with the United States,

or taken adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance with

the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against

Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:

Aruba, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Dominican

Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica,

Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand,

Venezuela, and Vietnam.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 490(b)(1)(B) of the Act,

I hereby determine that it is in the vital national interests of the United

States to certify the following major illicit drug producing and/or transit

countries:

Belize, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

Analysis of the relevant U.S. vital national interests, as required under

section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is attached. I have determined that the following

major illicit drug producing and/or major transit countries do not meet

the standards set forth in section 490(b) for certification:

Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria.

In making these determinations, I have considered the factors set forth

in section 490 of the Act, based on the information contained in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1997. Because the performance

of each of these countries/dependent territories has differed, I have attached

an explanatory statement for each of the countries/dependent territories

subject to this determination.

You are hereby authorized and directed to report this determination to

the Congress immediately and to publish it in the 

œ–

Federal Register.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, February 28, 1997.
11590 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents

STATEMENTS OF EXPLANATION

Aruba

Aruba is a major trafficking and staging point for international narcotics

trafficking organizations which transship cocaine and heroin from Colombia,

Venezuela and Suriname to the United States and Europe. Its key position

near the Venezuelan coast with air and sea links to South America, Europe,

Puerto Rico and other Caribbean locations makes it a prime transshipment

point. Drug shipments are made primarily via containerized cargo, but commercial airlines and cruise ships are also used. Although USG law enforcement agencies estimate that about 155 mt of cocaine are transshipped through

the Caribbean to the United States annually, and that more than 100 international trafficking organizations operate in that region, Aruba seized only

about 170 kg of cocaine and about 21⁄2 kg of heroin in 1996.

Money laundering organizations use legitimate companies as fronts to

invest in land development and other construction projects. The Government

of Aruba’s (GOA) Free Trade Zone (FTZ), casinos and resort complexes

are reported to be attractive venues for money laundering and smuggling.

A joint Dutch-Aruban Commission in 1996 issued recommendations to improve regulation of the FTZ, and invited a U.S. Customs technical expert

to help implement those recommendations. Legislation on the FTZ, casinos

and off-shore corporations is pending.

Aruba is a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (GON), and has independent decision-making ability in many drug policy areas. The Kingdom

of the Netherlands (GON), a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, has

not yet extended it to Aruba. The Aruban legislature is in the final stages

of considering comprehensive criminal law reform, expected to be adopted

in 1997. The law would create a basis for the Kingdom’s extension of

the 1988 UN Drug Convention, for expanded investigative powers for local

law enforcement, as well as for extradition of nationals subject to service

of sentences in Aruba.

The GOA participated with the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles

in the establishment of a joint Kingdom-Caribbean Coast Guard, designed

to patrol the Kingdom’s Caribbean coastal waters to interdict drug shipments.

The GOA established money transaction monitoring entities to review unusual transactions in the banking sector. Aruban law enforcement officials

participated in USG-sponsored training courses for drug enforcement during

1996. The GOA has taken limited steps to punish corrupt officials, and

replaced senior police and justice officials in Aruba.

Corruption is a problem that hinders effective efforts against international

narcotics traffickers. A joint Netherlands Antilles and Aruba court denied

a USG extradition request for a Colombian narcotics trafficker in 1996.

Despite these problems, Aruba generally cooperated with the USG to meet

the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The Bahamas

Over the past ten years, successful combined U.S./Bahamian

counternarcotics efforts have dramatically reduced the amount of cocaine

and marijuana transiting The Bahamas en route to the United States. This

downward trend has continued over the last several years. Nevertheless,

significant quantities of illicit drugs continue to pass through The Bahamas.

The Bahamas is also a dynamic financial services center and a tax haven

with bank secrecy laws, which are both factors conducive to money laundering. Some marijuana is grown in The Bahamas, but the country is not

a major drug producer.

The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GCOB) vigorously

strives to combat drug trafficking and is extraordinarily cooperative with

USG counterdrug efforts. The first country to ratify the 1988 UN Drug

Convention, The Bahamas took further steps during 1996 to implement
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it. Strong anti-money laundering legislation and implementing regulations

entered into force in 1996. During the year, the GCOB continued its successful

efforts to strengthen its justice system, with assistance from the USG. U.S.

and Bahamian law enforcement officials continued to work closely together

to apprehend drug traffickers. Domestic drug abuse remains a problem,

but the number of new drug users has declined notably since the mid1980s. Over the past several years, The Bahamas has prosecuted and convicted some middle and low-level officials on charges of narcotics corruption.

The GCOB is also making some headway in its efforts to forfeit and dispose

of trafficker assets.

Although enormous progress has been made, more can be done. In coming

years, The Bahamas should continue to improve the effectiveness with which

its justice system handles drug cases, further emphasize forfeiture of trafficker

assets and effectively enforce its new anti-money laundering controls.

Bolivia

The Government of Bolivia sustained an intense counternarcotics effort

again in 1996, cooperating fully with the USG, and took adequate steps

toward full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug

Convention.

Bolivia’s coca crop is the third largest in the world, behind Peru and

Colombia, but the high yield of Bolivian coca makes Bolivia second only

to Peru in terms of the production of cocaine alkaloid. The vast majority

of the coca for cocaine production is cultivated in Bolivia’s Chapare region.

Coca growers produce cocaine base in rudimentary laboratories, then sell

it to more sophisticated organizations which convert cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride. Bolivia is believed to be the world’s second leading

producer of refined cocaine hydrochloride.

During 1996, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) eradicated over 7,500 hectares of coca in the Chapare—the highest level of eradication since 1990.

Despite the GOB’s commitment to this program, eradication reduced Bolivia’s

coca crop by only one percent, as new coca cultivation, both within and

outside of the Chapare, almost offset eradication. Total potential cocaine

production in 1996 declined by an estimated 10 percent, however, from

240 metric tons in 1995 to some 215 metric tons of cocaine HCl. New

coca does not become harvestable—and capable of producing the cocaine

alkaloid—for two years.

In order to confront the problem of new planting, the government launched

late in 1996 an expanded campaign to detect and destroy new coca and

seedbeds. For the first time, the GOB also fully applied the letter of its

own law, arresting several peasants for planting new coca.

The Minister of Justice produced a package of legislative reforms, designed

to modernize Bolivia’s criminal justice sector. Among the reforms were

strong anti-money laundering provisions. The government presented the

package to the Bolivian Congress in January 1997, and is seeking passage

before the June 1997 presidential elections. In addition, a new extradition

treaty between the United States and Bolivia, which allows for the extradition

of Bolivian nationals, entered into force in November 1996.

Overall cocaine base and HCl seizures increased in 1996 compared to

1995, and HCl seizures in the second half of the year increased dramatically.

The government established a Chemical Control Directorate. Meanwhile,

an expanded and increasingly effective Chemical Police Unit, aided by

counterdrug forces in the Chapare, made chemical seizures well above 1995

levels. The government’s Seized Asset Directorate, created in December 1995,

began operations, while asset seizures increased by some 36 percent over

1995.

In the coming year, the GOB must work to eliminate and prevent new

coca cultivation, fully applying the Law 1008 prohibition on new planting,

and reduce coca cultivation in the Chapare by at least 10 percent. The
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GOB should press for the passage and rapid implementation of a money

laundering law along with a revised Code of Criminal Procedures. Faced

with an increasingly sophisticated group of Bolivian trafficking organizations,

the GOB’s enforcement strategy must more effectively target cocaine HCl

processing and trafficking organizations, as well as Chapare-based cocaine

base laboratories. In addition, we expect the GOB to ensure that the Blue

Devils Riverine Task Force can fully exercise its drug enforcement authority

and product results consistent with its resources.

Brazil

International narcotics traffickers use Brazil to transship cocaine primarily

from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia to the United States and Europe. Brazil

serves as an increasingly significant transit route for air shipments of cocaine

base from Peru to cocaine labs in Colombia. Cocaine also transits the country

by river and overland routes. Law enforcement agencies estimate that ten

to twenty mt of cocaine transit Brazil annually, of which Brazilian authorities

seized about three mt of cocaine in 1996, a decline from last year’s almost

six mt. Despite the decline, Brazil fully cooperated with the USG to advance

the goals of bilateral agreements and the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

In 1996, the area of Brazil bordering Peru was heavily used as a staging

area for air shipments of cocaine destined for the United States. Brazilian

trafficking organizations reportedly provided fuel and airstrips for illicit

trafficking purposes.

To address this threat, Brazilian authorities destroyed several airstrips,

and commendably repeated operations when traffickers rebuilt those cratered

airstrips. In a strong commitment to regional cooperation, Brazilian police

cooperated with Peruvian and Colombian police to deter trafficking in the

tri-border area between their respective countries.

Focussing on the maritime trafficking problems in Brazil’s major seaports,

which function as conduits for cocaine shipped to the United States, Brazil

participated in one U.S. Customs port assessment visit to the major ports

of Rio de Janeiro and nearby Santos. Brazil also tightened enforcement

over its chemical companies.

Brazil entered into an agreement with the USG to train police-prosecutorjudge task forces to bolster the Government of Brazil’s (GOB) counternarcotics

effort and to enhance coordination between judges, prosecutors and police.

Corruption is a problem in mid and lower levels of the DPF that hinders

effective enforcement efforts to control drug trafficking through Brazil.

Authorities disrupted the Saavedra-Shapiama Organization, which trafficked cocaine from the Amazon region to the United States. With USG

assistance, Brazilian authorities in good faith continue to investigate this

and other narcotics trafficking organizations in the Amazon region. In May

1996, the Brazilian Senate approved the Amazon Surveillance System

(SIVAM). SIVAM is a detection and monitoring system that will be used

to protect the Amazon region, in part against illicit narcotics trafficking.

Although the Brazilian government did not sign a Letter of Agreement

(LOA) that would have renewed counternarcotics cooperation with the USG

in 1996, the GOB has demonstrated a strong interest in continuing its

counternarcotics relationship with the USG. The almost $1 million of 1996

counternarcotics funding meant for Brazil instead funded the Organization

of American States Anti-Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD).

In addition to demonstrating a commitment to cooperate further with the

USG on counternarcotics, Brazil participated in important multilateral

counternarcotics initiatives, including an OAS/CICAD meeting in Uruguay.

Other efforts point of Brazil’s achievements in 1996. It proposed a National

Drug Enforcement Plan in 1996. It also hosted several meetings of the

of the mini-Dublin Group in Brasilia to coordinate counternarcotics assistance

from major donors, primarily European nations. Demand reduction and other

multilateral efforts have successfully raised the profile of the danger of
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drug trafficking and abuse in Brazil. Although bank secrecy remained a

formidable obstacle in the battle against money laundering, and money

laundering occurred in Brazil’s banks and exchange houses, in 1996 the

congress initiated debate on a bill to counter money laundering.

Cambodia

In 1996, Cambodia made significant efforts toward addressing drug trafficking and transit problems, which the Royal Government of Cambodia has

acknowledged. There is a significant flow of heroin transiting Cambodia

which affects the U.S. and other countries. The National Assembly passed

a comprehensive counternarcotics law on December 3, 1996. The statute,

drafted with UNDCP assistance and advice, includes tough anti-money laundering provisions and commits the government to becoming a party to

the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Other measures taken by the RGC, either separately or in cooperation

with the U.S. and other governments and international organizations, include

reorganizing its ill-trained and equipped 900-person National Anti-Narcotics

Unit into a more effective 40-person National Anti-Drug Unit, participating

in UNDCP conferences, and seeking other avenues to broaden cooperation

with surrounding countries and the international community. Cambodian

drug interdiction efforts resulted in the seizure of 40 kilograms of heroin

and the arrest of 12 heroin couriers working for Nigerian trafficking organizations. The RGC also continued a program of marijuana eradication.

The skeletal nature of Cambodia’s law enforcement infrastructure, coupled

with an impoverished economy, continues to impede efforts as assembling

comprehensive information about the drug trade in and through the country.

These weaknesses have also made the task of providing appropriate assistance

more critical and, at the same time, more difficult. The single most important

issue Cambodia faces with regard to its drug trafficking problem, however,

is the issue of drug-related corruption. After the publication in 1995 of

allegations tying key political and business figures to the drug trade, the

RGC publicly called for information which would aid in the prosecution

of any such person. There have, however, been no results yet reported

in connection with these charges. The U.S. will be looking for efforts to

deal vigorously with drug-related corruption, which would otherwise eventually undermine Cambodia’s credibility on the issue of narcotics control.

USG efforts to assist Cambodia in building stronger law enforcement and

judicial institutions are based on the premise that the upper levels of the

RGC will thus have available the appropriate means for dealing with the

issue.

China

China continues to play a key role as a major transit route for Southeast

Asian heroin destined for the U.S. and other Western markets. Addiction

and violent crime associated with China’s proximity to the Golden Triangle

and its flow of narcotics continue to engage the attention of Chinese authorities. In April 1996, China’s Ministry of Public Security began a nationwide

anti-crime campaign called ‘‘Strike Hard,’’ which placed special emphasis

on drug interdiction efforts: opium seizures in the first ten months of 1996

were up 26 percent over all of 1995, and heroin seizures in the first ten

months of 1996 were up 47 percent over the entire amount seized in 1995.

China continues to be an active participant in the United Nations Drug

Control Program and in 1996 signed mutual legal assistance treaties, with

specific attention to narcotics trafficking, with Russia, Mexico and Pakistan.

It is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Counternarcotics and law enforcement cooperation with the United States

continues to be uneven, although senior U.S. and Chinese officials have

publicly recognized the common interest in enhanced cooperation. Lower

level officials continue to express a desire to expand cooperation, and working-level dialogue and information sharing have improved and expanded

in some respects. Chinese officials participated in a two-week regional cooperation
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seminar in Bangkok conducted by DEA and in a program to help

law enforcement officials detect and prevent illegal transshipments of precursor chemicals. U.S. Customs representatives also taught interdiction techniques to Chinese officials in Sichuan Province. But China in 1996 also

denied, ‘‘for now,’’ a USG request to be allowed to open a joint DEA/

FBI office at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

China’s continued strong stand against crime and official corruption has

been widely publicized. Chinese leaders and law enforcement authorities

have recognized that rapid economic growth has contributed to the spread

of corruption, including among lower level officials. Penalties for such transgressions are severe and include execution.

China is a major chemical producer. The interest PRC officials have shown

in techniques for controlling sales and shipments of chemical precursors

indicates growing recognition of China’s role as a target for criminals seeking

to illegally procure or divert such chemicals. China’s recognition of its

susceptibility to money laundering also appears to be growing, but domestic

mechanisms for assessing and addressing the problem are only beginning

to catch up to the challenge.

Dominican Republic

In 1996, the Dominican Republic’s attention was focused on election year

politics. As a result, although the out-going government cooperated with

counternarcotics operations, it has left the new administration with unresolved, long-term narcotics-related issues and an environment of public concern about corruption. Despite the absence of a master plan, the Government

of the Dominican Republic (GODR) remains deeply committed to the war

against narcotics trafficking and consumption.

Following its installation in August 1996, the Fernandez administration

made an anti-corruption agenda and judicial reform high priorities of the

GODR. However, the GODR lacks effective enforcement mechanisms to eliminate the corruption which undermines the country’s fragile democratic institutions. Additionally, the country’s largely unpatrolled coast, its porous

border with Haiti, and poorly paid and under-equipped police and military

make it attractive to Dominican and Colombian drug transshipment organizations and domestic drug traffickers. The majority of Dominicans condemn

the use of illegal drugs and support GODR efforts to combat narcotics trafficking; drug consumption levels are considered low.

The Government of the Dominican Republic cooperated fully with the

United States Government on counternarcotics objectives and goals. Among

the GODR’s accomplishments was the arrest of the Cali cartel’s Rolando

Florian-Feliz, the DR’s most wanted narcotics trafficker.

Due to the absence of effective government supervision of exchange houses

or remittance operations and the presence of large cash flows which could

hide money laundering activity, it is believed that narcotics money continues

to be laundered in the Dominican Republic. Money laundering is not likely

to diminish until the GODR aggressively implements the money laundering

legislation. Many Dominicans who have committed serious crimes in the

United States continue to find refuge in the Dominican Republic, since

local law bars extradition of nationals. While 1996 negotiations for a new

extradition treaty with the former government did not reach a successful

conclusion, the USG is currently assessing a resumption of talks with the

Fernandez administration.

Neither the GODR itself nor senior government officials encourage, facilitate, or engage in drug trafficking or money laundering as a matter of

government policy. No evidence exists that senior government officials are

involved in drug distribution or money laundering. No senior government

official has been indicted for drug-related corruption in 1996.
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Ecuador

International narcotics traffickers from Colombia and Peru intensified their

efforts to transship cocaine and coca base through Ecuador. Trafficking organizations ship about 20–40 metric tons (mt) of coca base from Peru through

Ecuador to Colombia for refining into finished cocaine, and about 30–50

mt of cocaine through Ecuador to the United States and Europe. Ecuador

seized almost nine mt of cocaine in 1996.

Traffickers continued to transship cocaine overland and by river, and

to smuggle chemicals into Ecuador via the Pan American Highway and

Ecuador’s extensive river network, sometimes committing armed robberies

of truck drivers transporting chemicals from petroleum companies in Ecuador’s jungle region.

Ecuadoran authorities responded commendably to counter traffickers, placing emphasis on Guayaquil as a favored cocaine transshipment point. Authorities made a nearly seven mt seizure of cocaine from a fishing vessel,

the Don Celso, and had it returned from international waters to search

it in Guayaquil. Traffickers had loaded the cocaine into the fuel tanks

of the 150-ft. fishing vessel.

The Ecuador National Policy (ENP), with USG assistance, identified a

major cocaine processing facility just west of Quito in a town called Santo

Domingo de los Colorados. Authorities dismantled the lab, but many said

it demonstrated a shift in trafficker activity from neighboring countries to

Ecuador.

The Government of Ecuador (GOE) demonstrated its commitment to regional counternarcotics cooperation efforts. In an unprecedented law enforcement cooperation effort with Peru, Ecuadoran police deported to Peru Willer

Alvarado Linares, a.k.a. ‘‘Champa,’’ a Peruvian drug kingpin with close

ties to the Cali Cartel. With USG assistance, the ENP dismantled a major

drug trafficking organization in Ecuador reportedly run by a Cali-connected

trafficker, Jose Castrillon Henao. Ecuadoran authorities continued the prosecution of Jorge Hugo Reyes Torres, a jailed drug kingpin, also tied to

Cali.

Although police-military cooperation, maritime cooperation, and inadequate money laundering legislation remained problems, GOE officials made

a good faith effort to resolve these issues. The GOE participated in drug

enforcement and customs training courses, continued some informationsharing efforts, and attended a money laundering seminar.

The Ecuadoran Supreme Court entered into an agreement with the USG

on administration of justice. The USG bought five computers and a laser

printer in support of Ecuador’s ambitious judicial reform effort. Allegations

of corruption in the judiciary and in other branches of the government

plagued the former Bacaram administration, and now plague the current

administration of interim President Alarcon, hindering effective

counternarcotics efforts.

Despite these problems, Ecuadoran government officials demonstrate continued interest in working with the USG to address more effectively narcotics

trafficking problems that threaten to erode democratic institutions. Ecuador

is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has bilateral agreements

with the USG. Ecuador has fully cooperated with the USG to advance

the goals and objectives of these agreements.

Guatemala

Despite the political distractions of the ongoing peace process, Guatemala

continued to cooperate fully with U.S. counternarcotics goals and objectives.

Law enforcement cooperation between Guatemala and the United States

has been excellent. With USG support, Guatemalan government (GOG)

counternarcotics officials seized almost four metric tons of cocaine, a significant increase over previous years.
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GOG experts estimate that at least one out of four Guatemalan adults

suffers from some sort of chemical dependency, principally alcohol abuse.

Illicit drug use has not been effectively documented, but GOG officials

believe it has increased steadily since 1990 and contributes to the extremely

high level of violence in the country, especially in the capital city.

The Department of Anti-Narcotics Operations (DOAN), the country’s principal counternarcotics organization, fully cooperated with USG agencies on

information-sharing, joint operations, and special investigations targeting

international drug trafficking networks. Also in 1996, a major corruption

ring centered on customs tax evasion and extortion was uncovered, giving

the GOG further impetus to criminalize money laundering and develop

the capability to investigate suspect financial transactions.

Recent information indicates that significant quantities of precursor chemicals, mostly ephedrine, are being diverted through Guatemala to Mexico

and the United States. The government has not yet taken steps to halt

that traffic, which is not currently illegal in Guatemala. The GOG has,

however, requested and will receive USG technical assistance on how to

combat this illicit trafficking. In early 1997, Guatemala hosted a regional

seminar to address the problem of the control and regulation of precursor

chemicals.

The GOG does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate

illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. In addition, no senior government official facilitates or encourages

the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances or the

laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

Haiti

Haiti continues to cooperate with U.S. counternarcotics goals and objectives. The Government of Haiti (GOH) confronts a staggering array of issues

that compete for the attention of its already stretched professional and

managerial talent and consequently impedes rapid progress on

counternarcotics issues. Despite these obstacles, the GOH made definite

progress in counternarcotics issues in 1996.

The GOH began to reform its existing narcotics laws and to develop

a national narcotics plan and money laundering legislation. With USG support, a Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) unit was established; a Counternarcotics

Unit (CNU) was trained; and new chiefs for both units were installed.

The changeover in leadership of the CNU proved particularly time-consuming

and, despite sincere efforts, the CNU was not functioning in its permanent

quarters at the airport by the end of 1996. Nevertheless, the commitment

of the Haitian National Police (HNP) leadership to maintain high standards

of performance within these two units is notable.

The HCG began operating in August 1996 and scored two major cocaine

seizures amounting to 938 kgs. in its first two months of operation. The

interdiction and maritime boarding experience in these two operations represented a training opportunity that contributed to the HCG’s ability to

eventually conduct independent operations.

The USG has made a strong commitment to assist Haiti in establishing

stable democratic institutions. As a part of this effort, the USG intends

to work with the GOH towards conclusion of a bilateral maritime agreement,

and to continue its efforts to assist the GOH with its narcotics-related agenda

and legal reform programs. The USG will also assist the HNP in establishing

regional law enforcement contacts and continue to provide support for both

the HCG and the CNU.

In 1996, the GOH continued to give USG officials high-level assurances

of its commitment to drug control, and those assurances have been supported

by concrete progress in establishing Haitian counter-drug institutions. However,
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Haiti still has a number of major goals to achieve before it will be

able to take significant, independent action in counternarcotics.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s role as a money laundering base for the international drug

trade continues to grow, while its role as a transit point for drugs appears

to have lessened. There were no drug seizures in the United States in

the first 10 months of 1996 unequivocally linking Hong Kong to the U.S.

as a transit point for drugs. The overall pattern of drug trafficking in the

region, however, continues to point to Hong Kong as a key transshipment

point for drugs destined for the U.S. and other Western markets.

Hong Kong authorities continued to strengthen the legislative framework

for combatting narcotics trafficking. They extended licensing controls to

an additional 21 precursor chemicals, introduced implementing legislation

for bilateral extradition agreements and proposed legislation establishing

heavier sentences for drug traffickers who target the young. On December

20, 1996, the U.S. and Hong Kong signed an agreement for the surrender

of fugitive offenders (an extradition agreement) and the two sides have

initialled a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement that will expand the basis

for mutual legal assistance over a wide range of criminal activity, including

that currently covered by a Bilateral Narcotics Agreement, which will be

terminated by its terms on June 30, 1997.

Hong Kong’s mature and experienced law enforcement structure is characterized by dedication and no reported narcotics-related corruption among

senior officials. Cooperation between the United States and Hong Kong

on matters relating to drug trafficking and money laundering continues

to be excellent.

India

India is the sole producer of licit opium gum for the pharmaceutical

industry, a significant cultivator of opium poppies in remote regions of

northwest and northeast India and a transit country for opiates from both

Southwest and Southeast Asia. Controls over the licit opium industry have

been continuously tightened for the past five years but, due to the method

of production, some diversion probably continues. The well-developed transportation infrastructure in India, combined with porous borders from neighboring source countries, has made India an attractive transit country for

traffickers.

As a licit producer of opium, India must meet an additional certification

requirement. In accordance with Section 490(c) of the Foreign Assistance

Act, it must maintain licit production and stockpiles at levels no higher

than those consistent with licit market demand and take adequate steps

to prevent significant diversion of its licit cultivation and production into

illicit markets and to prevent illicit cultivation and production.

In 1996, India continued to take steps to curtail diversion of licit opium,

which remains a concern. The minimum qualifying yield (MQY) for relicensing to cultivate opium poppy was raised from 46 to 48 kilograms per

hectare in most growing areas, and offenses related to cultivation and embezzlement of opium are now on par with other trafficking crimes. Sentences

of up to 20 years’ imprisonment can be imposed.

Although the Government of India (GOI) did not agree to direct USG

participation in the 1996 opium yield survey, it did allow U.S. scientists

to observe the survey and to work with Indian scientists to include new

parameters in future opium yield surveys. A comprehensive opium yield

survey verifies data on crop yields, establishes practicable levels of MQY,

and better quantifies diversion.

Indian opium gum, a principal source of the baine and other alkaloids

essential to certain pharmaceuticals, is in demand by U.S. and other pharmaceutical firms. India once again increased opium poppy cultivation because

of the pharmaceutical demand and a desire to establish once again a stockpile
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against a crop disaster. Opium production rose to 849 mt in 1996 from

833 mt in 1995 (all measures at ten percent moisture).

India has illicit opium poppy cultivation, primarily in areas such as Jammu

and Kashmir, where GOI control is challenged by insurgent groups. USG

remote sensing in 1996 indicated illicit cultivation on 3,400 hectares, with

a theoretical yield of 47 metric tons of opium, a decrease from the previous

year’s estimate. However, despite efforts by the GOI based on suspect coordinates provided by the USG, it was able to find only small areas of poppy

cultivation.

The GOI continues to make progress in controlling the production and

export of precursor chemicals. The GOI has a cooperative relationship with

the DEA, especially on precursor chemical issues, and has agreed not to

allow any shipment unless DEA issues a letter of non-objection. Trafficking

in illegally produced methaqualone (mandrax), a popular drug in Africa,

is still believed to be a major problem, although seizures fell in 1996.

Authorities have had limited success in prosecuting major narcotics trafficking organizations because of the lack of enforcement funding and weaknesses in the investigations infrastructure. The GOI stresses cooperation

among law enforcement entities. India cooperates in ‘‘controlled deliveries’’

that have resulted in arrests in six countries.

The USG receives reports of narcotics-linked corruption, but cannot independently verify the extent. No senior-level politician or bureaucrat has

been accused of narcotics-related corruption.

India is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and Indian officials

state that it is drafting legislation needed on asset seizures and money

laundering. In the meantime, its law enforcement agencies are without the

tools to achieve fully the Convention’s goals and objectives.

India fulfilled the requirements of FAA Section 490(c) to maintain licit

production and stockpiles at levels no higher than consistent with market

demand. It also continued to take steps to reduce diversion from the licit

crop, although not agreeing to use a crop yield survey as the basis for

setting the minimum qualifying yield for license renewal. The GOI, upon

receipt of information on suspected illicit crops, acted promptly to seek

out and destroy the plots. For 1996, India’s efforts meet the additional

certification requirements of FAA Section 490(c). The United States continues

to work with the GOI in the following areas: taking effective action against

major narcotics trafficking syndicates and kingpins; implementing effective

measures on money laundering and asset seizure; permitting U.S. participation in opium crop surveys; and eradicating illicit poppy cultivation.

Jamaica

Jamaica produces marijuana and is a significant cocaine transit country.

The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) made some progress during 1996 to achieve

the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to which it

became a party in December 1995. In December 1996, the Jamaican parliament

passed a money laundering law, which, although somewhat limited in scope

in that it criminalizes only the laundering of the proceeds of drug-related

crime, is the beginning of a money laundering control regime. Although

the GOJ has yet to prosecute asset forfeiture cases under the relevant 1994

act, it did establish a special unit which is currently investigating two

such cases. Action on drafting a precursor chemical bill was deferred to

1997. GOJ–USG negotiations on a maritime counternarcotics cooperation

agreement, which commenced in 1996, had been impeded by Jamaica’s

declaration of exclusive law enforcement authority in its exclusive economic

zone (EEZ). In December 1996, the GOJ withdrew its EEZ declaration, and

negotiations resumed in February 1997, in a spirit of cooperation and willingness to conclude an agreement. Although the rate of extraditions declined

markedly, from six in 1995 to one (under a waiver of extradition) in 1996,

partly attributable to new Jamaican legal procedures regarding appeals, the

GOJ expelled or deported to the U.S. eight U.S.-citizen fugitives during
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1996. However, a sizeable number of extradition requests to the GOJ remain

open.

According to DEA, Jamaican police counternarcotics cooperation in 1996

remained at the high levels of 1995, but drug arrests, cocaine seizures,

and cannabis eradication fell somewhat below the goals and objectives of

our bilateral letter of agreement (LOA). Signed by the GOJ and USG, the

1996 LOA set an objective of significantly increasing drug arrests and cocaine

and heroin seizures. Drug-related arrests in 1996 (3,263) were down slightly

from the 1995 level (3,705). Cocaine seizures in 1996 (236 kg) were also

reduced from the 1995 level (571 kg). Heroin seizures increased slightly

in 1996 (1 kg) compared to 1995 (zero kg). Marijuana seizures, on the

other hand, increased significantly (52.99 mt in 1996, compared to 37.20

mt in 1995), bolstered by one very large seizure late in 1996. The 1996

LOA set an eradication goal of 800 hectares of cannabis. During 1996,

473 hectares were eradicated, compared to 695 hectares in 1995, with the

area under cultivation estimated to be the same both years. U.S.-provided

helicopters used to assist eradication efforts were grounded for safety reasons

for part of the year.

Jamaica’s National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA) continued its demand

reduction efforts, becoming increasingly self-reliant and prominent. Jamaica’s

national drug control strategy has been drafted and is awaiting government

approval for implementation. The GOJ has not formally charged any senior

government official with drug-related activity, but several Jamaican policemen and court employees have been arrested and charged on drug and

drug-related charges. The Jamaican media continues to report allegations

of drug-related corruption among public officials including the police.

In 1997, in order to fully carry out the goals and objectives of the 1988

UN Drug Convention, the GOJ needs to strengthen its money laundering

control law, pass a chemical control law, and continue to modernize its

full range of drug control laws and penalties. Jamaica’s greatest challenge

will be decisive implementation of such laws. The GOJ also needs to conclude

a maritime cooperation agreement, intensify its effort to respond to U.S.

extradition requests, prosecute asset forfeiture cases, and increases the conviction rate of those arrested for drug-related crimes. On the bilateral level,

in order to make better use of U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance,

Jamaica needs to intensify its drug law enforcement and marijuana eradication efforts, tighten the security of its export shipments to keep drugs

out of them, and participate fully in combined maritime counterdrug operations. In addition, the GOJ needs to formally approve its national drug

control strategy and systematically implement it. The GOJ should take decisive measures to root out drug-related corruption among public officials

which undermines drug control efforts.

Laos

Laos is still a distant third, after Burma and Afghanistan, in world production of illicit opium. The 1995/96 growing cycle saw an estimated increase

of 11% in opium production over the 1994/95 level; this was a little over

50% of the record level set in 1989. Regions of Laos covered by USGand UNDCP-funded crop substitution projects, however, saw only low levels

of poppy cultivation. In May, the Lao Government passed an amendment

to its existing drug control law which banned opium production and increased penalties for trafficking. It believes, however, that rigorous enforcement of the provision outlawing opium production requires adequate programs to provide alternative sources of income to farmers and continues

to press its case for adequate assistance from the international community

to enable it to fully implement its anti-narcotics action plan.

Reservations about its ability to enforce the legislation banning opium

production notwithstanding, the Government of Laos continued to participate

actively in regional counternarcotics efforts. It signed a UNDCP-sponsored

project document on regional law enforcement cooperation and hosted a

regional working level conference on the trafficking of precursor chemicals
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and the involvement of West African drug traffickers in Southeast Asia.

Bilateral cooperation with the United States, however, remained at the center

of Laos’ counternarcotics endeavors. USG funding of the Houaphan crop

control project continued, and the Lao formed two additional Special

Counternarcotics Units, one in Savannakhet and one in Bokeo, with USG

assistance. In November, the Lao Government approved the assignment of

a DEA representative to the American Embassy in Vientiane. Overall Lao

cooperation with the USG on counternarcotics matters remains excellent;

while low-level corruption is assumed to exist, there is little to indicate

high-level or systematic drug-related corruption in the Lao government. Laos’

vigorous enforcement over the coming year of its newly enacted laws outlawing opium production and increasing the penalties for drug trafficking will

be an important signal of its long-term commitment to controlling its drug

problem.

Malaysia

Malaysia is a transit country for heroin bound for the U.S., Europe and

other destinations. Malaysia’s anti-trafficking laws include a mandatory death

sentence for convicted traffickers. Law enforcement authorities are pressing

for enactment of a conspiracy law to enable prosecution of traffickers who

escape prosecution under existing criminal statutes. In addition, the Government of Malaysia has instituted a number of bureaucratic measures, including

the establishment of a new interagency group headed by the Prime Minister,

to bolster enforcement and demand reduction activities. Malaysia is also

a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Cooperation between Malaysian law enforcement officials and DEA continued to expand in 1996. Negotiation of a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance

Treaty between Malaysia and the U.S. is proceeding smoothly. Both governments hope to conclude the treaty in 1997. Malaysia and the United States

also cooperated on drug abuse prevention (demand reduction) programs,

many of them directed at rehabilitation center inmates. These programs

are of particular concern to the Malaysian Government in view of rising

addiction rates. Existing rehabilitation centers have also been a focal point

of the lower-level narcotics-related corruption which is known to exist:

guard and treatment center employees have sold narcotics to inmates. The

Malaysian Government has proposed an amendment to the Dangerous Drugs

Act to strengthen the penalty for such activities.

Malaysia is also beginning to look toward money laundering as a vulnerable

point in its overall legal and institutional structure. Senior government officials have publicly expressed concern about possible misuse of Malaysia’s

offshore financial center, Labuan, to launder money. Malaysia has now endorsed the Commonwealth Secretariat’s efforts to produce model anti-money

laundering legislation.

Mexico

The Government of Mexico’s (GOM) 1996 counter-drug effort produced

encouraging results and notable progress in bilateral cooperation. President

Zedillo has declared the major drug trafficking organizations, and the corruption they foster within governmental structures, to be Mexico’s principal

national security threat. He has intensified the country’s counter-drug effort,

in keeping with international human rights norms, both through legal reforms

and operationally, through the expanded participation of the nation’s military

services.

Drug seizures and arrests increased in 1996. Mexican authorities seized

23.8 mt of cocaine, 383 kgs of heroin, 1015 mt of marijuana, 171.7 kgs

of methamphetamine and 6.7 mt of ephedrine (its chemical precursor), and

destroyed 20 drug labs. Police arrested 11,283 suspects on drug-related

charges. Authorities arrested a several major traffickers: Juan Garcia Abrego,

Gulf cartel leader and one of the FBI’s ‘‘Ten Most Wanted’’ fugitive; Jose

Luis Pereira Salas, linked to the Cali and Juarez cartels; and Manuel Rodriguez

Lopez, linked to the Castrillon maritime smuggling organization.
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The Mexican Congress passed two critical pieces of legislation which

have armed the GOM with a whole new arsenal of weapons to use to

combat money laundering, chemical diversion and organized crime. The

GOM established organized crime task forces in key locations in northern

and western Mexico in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement. In an effort

to confront widespread corruption within the nation’s law enforcement agencies, former Attorney General Lozano dismissed over 1250 federal police

officers and technical personnel for corruption or incompetence, although

some have been rehired, and the GOM indicted two former senior GOM

officials and a current Undersecretary of Tourism. He also sought to expand

cooperation with the United States and other governments.

The United States and Mexico established the High-Level Contact Group

on Narcotics Control (HLCG) to explore joint solutions to the shared drug

threat and to coordinate bilateral anti-drug efforts. The HLCG met three

times during 1996 and its technical working groups met throughout the

year. Under the aegis of the HLCG, the two governments developed a joint

assessment of the narcotics threat posed to both countries which will be

used as the basis for a joint counter-drug strategy.

U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation on drug law enforcement continued

to improve in 1996, particularly in the areas of money laundering, mutual

legal assistance, and criminal investigations. The USG provided training,

technical, and material support to personnel of the Office of the Mexican

Attorney General (PGR), the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD),

the Mexican Treasury, and the Mexican armed forces. The Government

of Mexico established the important precedent of extraditing Mexican nationals to the United States under the provision of Mexico’s extradition law

permitting this in ‘‘exceptional circumstances.’’ This paves the way for further

advances in bringing fugitives to justice. Both governments returned record

numbers of fugitives in 1996.

Even with positive results, and good cooperation with the U.S. and other

governments, the problems which Mexico faces remain daunting. The Zedillo

Administration has taken important beginning steps against the major drug

cartels in Mexico, and towards more effective cooperation with the United

States and other international partners, but the strongest groups, such as

the Juarez and Tijuana cartels, have yet to be effectively confronted. The

level of narcotics corruption is very serious, reaching into the very senior

levels of Mexico’s drug law enforcement forces, as witnessed by the February

1997 arrest of the recently-appointed national counternarcotics coordinator.

President Zedillo acted courageously to remove him as soon as the internal

Mexican investigation revealed the problem, but this has been a set-back

for Mexico’s anti-drug effort, and for bilateral cooperation.

Mexican police, military personnel, prosecutors, and the courts need additional resources, training and other support to perform the important and

dangerous tasks ahead of them. Progress in establishing controls on money

laundering and chemical diversion must be further enhanced and implemented. New capabilities need to be institutionalized. Above all, the GOM

will have to take system-wide action against corruption and other abuses

of official authority through enhanced screening personnel in sensitive positions and putting into place ongoing integrity controls.

While there are still serious problems, and a number of areas in which

the USG would like to see further progress, the two governments have

agreed on the parameters of a joint approach to combat the narcotics threat,

and are at work on developing this strategy. The drug issue will remain

one of the top issues in the bilateral agenda and will be one of the main

issues discussed during President Clinton’s planned visit to Mexico in April.

Panama

Panama continued to cooperate with the United States to achieve our

counternarcotics goals and objectives in 1996. The Government of Panama’s

(GOP) achievements in 1996 included an eradication campaign which resulted
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in the elimination of the country’s fledgling coca cultivation and significant damage to marijuana cultivation, aggressive and effective prevention

and education campaigns, and the first-ever conviction of a major money

launderer from the Colon Free Zone. In one of the region’s most significant

arrests, the GOP captured the Cali cartel’s primary maritime smuggler, Jose

Castrillon Henao, who is scheduled for trial in 1997. The USG provided

six helicopters to the GOP in late 1996, for the express purpose of combatting

narcotics.

Following up on full congressional certification for the past two years,

and spurred on by last year’s legislation tightening money laundering regulations, the Government of Panama made Latin America’s first financial analysis unit operational, resulting in the presentation of patterns of money laundering to the GOP’s National Security Council for eventual prosecution.

Panama continues to be a major financial and commercial center ideally

positioned for narcotics smuggling and illicit financial transactions. Money

laundering remains the primary problem in Panama. Local factors facilitating

money laundering include bank secrecy, the Colon Free Zone, inadequate

controls on cash and commodity imports/exports, lax incorporation regulations, and a dollar-based economy. The GOP has taken definite steps to

address these problems, including the start-up of a financial analysis unit

and the establishment of computerized data bases for tracking financial

movements in the Colon Free Zone. The GOP also established a financial

investigative unit which will prepare cases of money laundering for prosecution. Armed with more effective legal, policy, and institutional

underpinnings, the GOP expects to counter money laundering activities more

successfully in 1997.

The GOP needs to continue to crack down on both money laundering

and drug trafficking, follow through on reports of suspicious transactions

by arresting and convicting major money launderers, improve interdiction

capabilities, and make effective use of the financial analysis unit.

Paraguay

The government of Juan Carlos Wasmosy cooperated fully with the United

States in 1996. Government of Paraguay (GOP) anti-drug efforts improved

substantially, and the government took adequate measures to further its

compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Scarce resources, public corruption, and an only partially-reformed legal

system remain obstacles to more effective counternarcotics action, but the

GOP has demonstrated its commitment to combatting the drug trade.

President Wasmosy appointed an activist Director to the National Antidrug Executive Secretariat (SENAD) in June, who immediately sought a

closer, more productive relationship with the United States and with Paraguay’s neighbors. Assuming the post with a reputation for honesty, Carlos

Ayala made cocaine trafficking groups the SENAD’s top priority. He has

removed anti-drug officers implicated in corrupt practices, and focused Paraguay’s investigative resources on Paraguay’s top traffickers. Under Ayala’s

leadership, SENAD developed a comprehensive national anti-drug strategy,

which President Wasmosy presented to the nation in late fall. Ayala also

launched a new approach to combat drug abuse.

The Paraguayan Congress, with strong support from the executive branch,

in December enacted an anti-money laundering law consistent with international standards. SENAD Chief Ayala initiated a revision of Paraguay’s

anti-narcotics statute which would explicitly authorize undercover operations

and controlled deliveries. The GOP is pushing for congressional approval

of the amendment early in 1997.

The SENAD continued large-scale marijuana eradication operations,

worked closely with DEA on training and equipping the Anti-narcotics Police

(DINAR) Special Intelligence and Investigative Unit, and assessed the threat

of precursor chemical trafficking and diversion in Paraguay. Meanwhile,

on the international front, the GOP signed agreements with Brazil and Argentina
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to cooperate in combatting trans-border criminal activity, including drug

trafficking, and Paraguayan officials initiated working-level coordination

meetings with counterparts in these countries. The SENAD also agreed with

Bolivian counterparts to share intelligence and to conduct joint operations.

In 1997, the GOP should secure passage of a strengthened anti-drug law

and begin to forcefully implement its new money laundering statute. The

USG will assist the GOP in creating an interagency financial crimes investigative unit. Paraguay also must improve its ability to investigate drug and

other organized crime groups in the tri-border area, particularly in the cities

of Pedro Juan Caballero and Ciudad del Este, and we expect the GOP

to pursue key drug trafficking and corruption cases in the coming year.

Peru

Peru is the world’s largest coca producer. The USG has consistently urged

the Government of Peru (GOP) to fulfill its signatory obligations under

the 1961 Single Convention and the 1988 UN Drug Convention, particularly

with regard to reducing its coca production. In 1996, the GOP cooperated

fully with the United States in efforts to achieve the goals and objectives

of the UN drug conventions. Last year, total coca cultivation decreased

by 18 percent, from 115,300 hectares in 1995 to 94,400 hectares in 1996.

The level of cultivation in Peru was the lowest since 1986.

Contributing to the reduction was widespread abandonment of coca fields

by farmers due to depressed cocaine base prices. Cocaine base prices were

held below the break-even point by Peruvian National Police and Peruvian

Air Force actions against the narcotics trafficking transportation infrastructure. During 1996, the joint USG–GOP alternative development program

established a foothold to begin economic restructuring in coca cultivating

areas. Some 226 communities signed agreements to reduce illicit coca cultivation by approximately 15,000 hectares over the next five years, in exchange

for assistance to increase productivity and income from licit alternative

crops.

Peruvian National Police operations seized greater amounts of cocaine

base and coca leaf, but less cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) than in 1995.

Efforts to arrest and prosecute major Peruvian traffickers maintained the

GOP’s stiff narcotics policy, and contributed to disarray among major trafficking organizations. Still, there was strong evidence that Peruvian traffickers

continued to refine cocaine hydrochloride and ship it directly to Mexico

for distribution in the United States. President Fujimori continued to take

a tough public stance against narcotics corruption, and in 1996 created

a special drug court system to handle drug offenses. The U.S. Embassy

reported that incidents of military and police drug corruption were quickly

addressed by the GOP.

In April 1996, the GOP passed Law 824, which established a civilian

drug council (CONTRADROGAS). CONTRADROGAS was created to coordinate the efforts of the various GOP agencies involved in counternarcotics

efforts, and to implement the Peruvian National Drug Strategy announced

in 1994.

In 1997, the GOP must mount an aggressive effort to attract additional

donor funding to expand alternative development efforts while coca farmers

are still receptive to licit economic alternatives. The GOP must also ensure

that the narcotics law enforcement effort which has suppressed cocaine

base prices is intensified to address riverborne narcotics traffic and sustain

the existing aerial intercept effort.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s geographical location relative to the Golden Triangle and its

importance as an advanced regional transportation and shipping center make

it a major transit point for drugs destined for the U.S. and other markets.

Taiwan authorities dispute this assessment, citing reduced seizures and arrests as a signal of the deterrent effect of their considerable counternarcotics
11604 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents

efforts. The pattern of trafficking in the region, however, suggests that because

of its geographic location and its ports, Taiwan will remain a target for

drug traffickers. Taiwan law enforcement authorities, in fact, recently expressed concern that Hong Kong-based drug traffickers may be collaborating

with Taiwan organized crime groups to transfer their base of operations

to Taiwan before Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty in July of 1997,

and their cooperation with the U.S. on counternarcotics efforts continues

to be good.

Taiwan’s law enforcement cooperation with DEA (under the auspices of

the American Institute in Taiwan) and other U.S. agencies expanded in

1996. Taiwan is setting up a new National Drug Intelligence Center; we

envisage increased cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies resulting

from this. The American Institute in Taiwan and the Taiwan Economic

and Cultural Representative Office continue to negotiate a Memorandum

of Understanding to provide a framework for even broader counternarcotics

cooperation. Taiwan has been conducting an aggressive anti-crime campaign

on other fronts, as well, including prosecuting cases of public corruption.

There are, however, no known cases of official involvement in narcotics

trafficking.

In 1996, Taiwan also passed money laundering legislation meant to bring

it into closer conformity with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN

Drug Convention. While the law enhances the ability of law enforcement

officials to deal with the problem, it requires a number of revisions to

enable Taiwan to meet international standards.

Thailand

Thailand remains a major transit route for drugs destined for the U.S.

and other markets and produces about one per cent of Southeast Asia’s

opiates. It continues to serve as a model for the region as a result of

its successful efforts to control opium production and its commitment to

prosecuting drug producers and traffickers. Opium production in the 1995/

96 growing season increased from an estimated 25 metric tons in the previous

season to 30 metric tons. The upsurge in opium and heroin prices shortly

after the destabilization of Khun Sa’s trafficking operations in Burma was

largely responsible for more widespread opium cultivation. Thailand’s actions

to close off sections of the Thai border with Burma, however, had helped

create the conditions leading to Khun Sa’s decision to reach a settlement

with the SLORC.

In January of 1996, Thailand extradited a former Member of Parliament

to the United States for prosecution on drug trafficking charges. Two ‘‘Operation Tiger Trap’’ defendants (part of drug lord Khun Sa’s trafficking operation) were also extradited to the U.S. later in the year. Thirteen individuals

have been arrested thus far in connection with this major ‘‘sweep.’’

Thai cooperation with U.S. law enforcement officials remains excellent.

Thailand’s Office of the Narcotics Control Board and the Police Narcotics

Suppression Bureau continue to exhibit a high degree of professionalism.

Corruption continues to be a problem in the Police Department, which

lacks an effective internal security apparatus to hold officers accountable

for wrongdoing. Elements of the Royal Thai Army and Thai Customs have

also been publicly accused of corruption. The Royal Thai Government as

a whole, however, supports a policy of active measures against drug production and trafficking.

Thailand is vulnerable to money laundering. A bill to enact legislation

has been stalled for a number of years. In late November, the newly-elected

Prime Minister promised the President that the legislation would be given

special handling to hasten its passage. Passage of appropriate anti-money

laundering legislation would enable Thailand to become a party to the

1988 UN Drug Convention.

Like other countries in the region, Thailand may find itself becoming

an even larger market for the region’s opium, heroin and amphetamine
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production as the region’s economic expansion continues. We will be urging

Thailand to enact a conspiracy law to further enhance its ability to mount

effective counternarcotics efforts and to establish an amplified crop control

program.

Venezuela

Venezuela continued to be a major transit country for cocaine shipped

from Colombia to the United States, and for chemicals transhipped through

Venezuelan ports, as well as a money laundering center. Law enforcement

agencies estimate that between 100–200 metric tons (mt) of cocaine are

shipped through Venezuela to the United States and Europe. The Government

of Venezuela (GOV) seized only about six mt of cocaine, almost identical

to the amount it seized in 1995. Heroin seizures declined by 27 percent,

from 96 kilograms (kg) in 1995 to 70 kg in 1996.

A significant decision this year was President Caldera’s appointment of

a politically powerful drug czar and elevation of this position to a cabinet

rank. However, the GOV must produce more concrete counternarcotics results

to match this demonstration of political will during the next year.

Venezuela’s main port, Puerto Cabello, is a favored point for illicit smuggling by narcotics trafficking syndicates. The same is true of other ports

along Venezuela’s long coastline. Venezuela’s airspace offers further opportunities for trafficking. Traffickers transport cocaine by small aircraft primarily

to Venezuela’s border states of Tachira and Apure. Traffickers risk little

by transporting cocaine through Venezuela due to weak and ineffectual

law enforcement interdiction efforts.

The United States designated Venezuela as a recipient of more than $12

million worth of USG drawdown defense equipment. The Venezuelan Armed

Forces adopted a counterdrug strategy, which defines its role as supporting

the National Guard (GN) and police forces. The GOV is working with the

United States to create a Joint Police/Military Counternarcotics Intelligence

Center. However, much more needs to be done to improve communication

and coordination between the GN and the Navy, Air Force and Army to

implement the strategy.

Maritime cooperation was disrupted by GOV denials of four USG requests

from United States Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments from third

country vessels to board suspected Venezuelan narcotics trafficking vessels

in international waters. However, USG and GOV authorities are currently

seeking to broker a maritime agreement.

Although the GOV lacks effective controls over certain precursor chemicals,

it made significant seizures of chemicals at Puerto Cabello. The GOV also

continued to make significant progress against illicit cultivation. Venezuelan

authorities identified replantings of about 500 hectares (ha) of coca and

opium poppy fields in the Sierra de Perija region on the border with Colombia. With USG assistance, those replantings were eradicated. Since 1994,

joint efforts have reduced estimated illicit plantings from 1,000 ha to 200

ha.

The GOV permitted the basing of United States military assets and personnel in Venezuela in an effort to cooperate on Operation Laser Strike, a

United States Southern Command regional air interdiction operation.

Money laundering in Venezuela continued in its financial network of

banks and non-bank institutions because of weak banking supervision and

regulatory authority. Although Venezuela passed a drug law in 1993 that

included provisions on money laundering, key provisions are lacking, including one on conspiracy.

Allegations of corruption plague the judicial branch and some elements

of the GN. Law enforcement agencies believe that corruption in the GN

is a problem, hobbling the effectiveness of counternarcotics efforts. These

shortfalls have raised the USG’s concern about trafficking through Venezuela

to the United States. Venezuela must move swiftly to reform its judicial
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branch, whose corruption threatens to prevent Venezuela from combatting

its drug problem and from protecting its democratic institutions and national

territory from international drug traffickers.

Despite such problems, eradication efforts, the elevated rank of the drug

czar, Venezuela’s first national epidemiological survey, and other

counternarcotics efforts reflect the GOV’s spirit of cooperation to advance

the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention and bilateral

agreements with the United States. However, the USG will scrutinize Venezuela’s efforts in the coming year and will expect the GOV to be vigorously

engaged in increased cooperation on drug interdiction, money laundering,

chemical control, anti-corruption efforts and conclusion of a comprehensive

bilateral maritime cooperation agreement.

Vietnam

Vietnam’s increased trade and tourism have opened new routes for Southeast Asian heroin shipments to such consumer markets as Australia, North

America and Europe. The SRV continues to battle against narcotics trafficking

but has yet to overcome problems of corruption within the military and

police. The SRV does, nonetheless, appear to be actively engaged on the

counternarcotics issue, conducting a demand reduction media campaign

as well as police operations and crop eradication programs. SRV statistics

reflect cultivation of 1800 hectares of opium poppy during 1995/96. USG

estimates, however, place the cultivation level at 3,150 hectares.

Vietnam created a Drug Control Master Plan in 1995 which calls for

the eradication of opium cultivation by the year 2000. In October of 1996,

the SRV promulgated implementing regulations for articles of the criminal

code related to narcotics. The new regulations permit asset seizures in

narcotics cases. Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Drug Control Cooperation Program in 1996. Vietnam has also stated that

it expects to ratify the 1988 UN Drug Convention in 1997. It is currently

drafting a comprehensive narcotics control law, based on the tenets of the

1988 Convention, which is expected to go before the National Assembly

in 1997. The law will include statutes related to the control of chemical

precursors and provide for controlled shipments as an investigative technique.

SRV interdiction efforts resulted in 6,000 narcotics-related arrests in 1996,

twice as many as in 1995. SRV law enforcement agencies are working

with the UNDCP to create special counternarcotics squads across the country.

U.S.–SRV cooperation on narcotics issues expanded throughout 1996. Training initiatives included DEA training for Ministry of Interior narcotics control

teams in Hanoi and U.S. Customs Service training for Vietnamese customs

officers in Ho Chi Minh City. Several senior Vietnamese narcotics officers

also traveled to the United States for consultations with U.S. counterparts.

The U.S. hopes to increase the level of its assistance to Vietnam. To that

end, it plans to engage the SRV in drafting a Memorandum of Understanding

on counternarcotics cooperation; a successful outcome, however, will depend

to a great extent on the SRV’s coming to grips with the conditionality

involved in any expanded U.S. assistance.

VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS JUSTIFICATIONS

Belize

Because of a significant increase in the detected activities of Colombian

drug trafficking organizations in Belize in 1995, Belize was added to the

list of major drug producing and transit countries for 1996. Belizean traffickers are also working with Mexican groups to move the Colombian cocaine

north to the United States. These criminal activities continued throughout

1996, but the ability of the Government of Belize (GOB) to combat them

was severely undermined by deeply-entrenched corruption, which reaches

into senior levels of government.
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The GOB’s accomplishments weighed against those areas where progress

was lacking have led to a decision to consider denial of certification of

Belize. The GOB’s accomplishments in 1996, such as its recent accession

to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and passage of money laundering legislation,

were achieved only after the United States and other countries exerted

intense, coordinated pressure. Belizean cocaine seizures were down 36 percent and marijuana eradication decreased by 4 percent from 1995. Finally,

the record of arrests and convictions of major drug dealers was, likewise,

disappointing. During 1996, the GOB took no meaningful steps to uncover

or punish official corruption.

Bungled investigations, along with several high-profile trials ending in

acquittal, including the prosecution of the Home Minister’s son-in-law for

running an illegal airstrip and two immigration officials fired from their

jobs and accused of corruption in an alien smuggling case, have, at a minimum, demonstrated the GOB’s deficiencies in its efforts.

The USG urged the GOB to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with

the United States in achieving reasonable counternarcotics goals and objectives. The GOB, however, is not fully cooperating or taking adequate steps

to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, especially

promises made by the GOB toward the end of the year to complete a

new extradition treaty and a mutual legal assistance treaty. The GOB has

been operating under a US–UK extradition treaty.

Denial of certification would be contrary to U.S. vital national interests

because it would require the U.S. to vote against multilateral development

bank funding for Belize, an important element in supporting our long-term

democracy and economic development goals for the country. Such multilateral support reinforces U.S. counternarcotics assistance which is designed

to help Belize develop strong, independent and credible institutions capable

of bringing traffickers to justice, stemming the flow of narcotics through

the country and better guarding its own borders.

Although Belize’s counternarcotics efforts fell short of full cooperation

during 1996, the GOB did take steps which demonstrated an effort to work

with the USG. It is in the vital national interests of the United States

to improve the GOB’s counternarcotics efforts and ensure that they are

given the attention required.

Lebanon

Lebanon appears to have succeeded in the struggle against illicit crop

cultivation due to the joint Lebanese-Syrian eradication efforts since 1992.

There appears to be no cultivation of opium and the cannabis cultivation

(for hashish production) also has all but disappeared. There are some small

farms in the Baalbek-Hermel region which are still engaged in illicit cultivation, but they appear to be few in number. When such farms are discovered,

arrests are made immediately and the crops are eradicated. Lebanese Internal

Security Forces (LISF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), with assistance

from the Syrian Army, reported eradication of approximately 70,000 square

meters of cannabis in the Baalbek-Hermel region of the Bekaa Valley during

June and July. There were no other reported eradication efforts during the

year.

However, Lebanon remains a significant transit country for the purposes

of re-export of cocaine, and many small ‘‘home’’-type labs for processing

opium into heroin are still reported to operate in the Bekaa Valley. Several

areas of the Bekaa Valley are not under the effective control the Government

of Lebanon (GOL), and these areas are vulnerable to the establishment of

illegal labs.

Although local authorities deny money laundering is a serious problem,

Lebanon still presents itself to narcotics traffickers as a venue for money

laundering due to bank secrecy laws, which do not allow for official discovery. Corruption remains endemic through all levels of Lebanese society,

reportedly including law enforcement bodies.
11608 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents

In March 1996, the GOL acceded to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but

with formal reservations regarding certain provisions of the Convention,

including those which relate to bank secrecy. The United States has already

indicated its intention to formally object to these reservations if Lebanon

does not withdraw them. Parliament is studying a draft anti-drug code,

which would make money laundering a crime.

The GOL has displayed a willingness to cooperate with USG agencies

during 1996. Unfortunately, Lebanon’s reservations to some of the provisions

of the 1988 UN Drug Convention suggest that the political will is not

yet sufficient to comply fully with world standards.

Lebanese trafficking continues to pose a threat to U.S. citizens and interests.

On the other hand, the United States considers the provision of assistance

which encourages the continued development of Lebanon’s economy and

infrastructure as critical to peace and stability in the Middle East, which

is also of vital importance to U.S. interests and stability. These factors,

combined with Lebanon’s sustained positive performance in eradication and

other anti-narcotics efforts, outweigh the threat posed by drug trafficking

through Lebanon to the United States.

Pakistan

Pakistan is an important transit country for opiates from Afghanistan,

a source country for approximately 75 metric tons of opium, and a processing

country for domestic opium and opium from Afghanistan. Most opium poppy

cultivation and most laboratory production of morphine base and heroin

in Pakistan takes place in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), which

borders Afghanistan. Pakistan has a bilateral agreement with the United

States that provides funding for law enforcement, roads and crop substitution

in the NWFP, and demand reduction activities.

Under the government of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s counternarcotics efforts

from January through October 1996 were seriously deficient. However, the

interim government of Meraj Khalid, which replaced the Bhutto government

in November, took a number of significant counternarcotics actions in accordance with the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral agreement and the 1988 UN Drug

Convention.

The primary counternarcotics achievement of the Bhutto government was

a reduction in the cultivation of opium poppy. USG estimates of land

used for opium poppy decreased 51 percent to 3,400 hectares and the

estimate of production decreased 52 percent to 75 metric tons from the

previous year. The Bhutto government also extradited Sialek Jan, wanted

by the USG on narcotics trafficking charges in March. However, under

Bhutto, Pakistani authorities failed to act on DEA information on specific

cases of trafficking, severely cut the budget of the Pakistani Anti Narcotics

Force (ANF), failed to act on recommendations of the UN Drug Control

Programs (UNDCP) for improvements to the Narcotics Substances Act, and

failed to interdict trafficking caravans in Baluchistan Province. During

Bhutto’s tenure, corruption was a significant problem, with ANF officials

suspected of perpetrating a hoax seizure of opium base in June, and subsequently covering up their actions.

Pakistani President Leghari November 5 dismissed the Bhutto government

for corruption and mismanagement, an act subsequently upheld by the Pakistani Supreme Court. Corruption is a severe and chronic problem in the

Pakistani government, including the ANF, which has no bureaucratic system,

such as an internal affairs section for identifying, investigating and recommending action against corrupt officers. No one in a policy-making position in either the Bhutto or interim government has been accused of narcoticsrelated corruption. Sufficient legislation exists to control and punish public

corruption but it is seldom enforced. The interim government in November

initiated a comprehensive process for holding public officials accountable

for corrupt practices.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents 11609

The interim government in November and December 1996 promulgated

changes to the Narcotics Substances Act as suggested by UNDCP, restored

some funds to the ANF, conducted two major raids on heroin laboratories

in NWFP, extradited to the United States accused trafficker Nasrullah

Henjrah, and arrested another individual on the U.S. extradition request

list, Nasir Ali Khan.

During the course of the year, the Government of Pakistan froze $3.5

million in assets from 21 traffickers and seized 5.4 metric tons of opium

and 2.0 metric tons of heroin. These figures represent declines from those

of 1995.

Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which it ratified

in October 1991, but implementing legislation on money laundering has

not yet been drafted. The revisions to the Narcotic Substances Act approved

by the interim government bring asset seizure and controlled delivery standards to the levels demanded by the Convention.

Vital U.S. national interests could be damaged if Pakistan, under the

newly-elected government of Nawaz Sharif, were to be denied certification.

Pakistan is a moderate Islamic state with a nuclear weapons capability.

Pakistan is the largest contributor of troops for UN peacekeeping operations

and has provided key cooperation in the international fight against terrorism.

Denial of certification would be viewed in Pakistan as abandonment of

a loyal ally and would endanger U.S.-Pakistani dialogue on vital issues.

Denial of certification could also bring to a halt the counternarcotics momentum started in November by the caretaker government, and could negatively

prejudice the newly elected government against counternarcotics cooperation

with the United States.

Denial of certification would further endanger U.S. interests by requiring

the United States to vote against Pakistan in multilateral development banks

(MDBs). The United States has an interest in seeing that the MDBs continue

their support of activities such as the GOP’s Social Action Program and

its Financial Sector Reform Project, which are essential to Pakistan’s human

and economic development. Pakistan is one of the largest beneficiaries of

World Bank and Asian Development Bank programs.

These risks to vital U.S. interests outweigh any potential gain from denying

certification to Pakistan. Pakistan is a primary conduit for opium and morphine base from Afghanistan, the second largest opium producer in the

world. With continuing conflict and no central government in Afghanistan,

Pakistan’s cooperation is particularly important in stopping Southwest Asian

drugs.

During the period of vital national interests certification, the United States

will strive to work with senior officials of the new government to achieve

the goals of the UN Drug Convention.

STATEMENTS OF EXPLANATION

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is second only to Burma as a producer of illicit opium,

producing approximately 30 percent of the world illicit supply. Production

flattened in 1996, after steep annual increases earlier in the decade. U.S.

satellite surveys indicated a very small decrease in both cultivation and

production, to 37,950 hectares and 1230 metric tons, respectively.

Civil war not only continued but intensified in Afghanistan during 1996.

Between September and December, the Taliban, a movement started by

religious students, expanded the territory it controls. The Taliban now control

90 percent of the land on which opium poppy is cultivated. The Taliban

have now controlled the province producing the greatest quantity of opium

for over two years. Both USG and UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP)

surveys indicate that there were no concerted eradication efforts in 1996.
11610 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents

Law enforcement actions were virtually non-existent. None of the factions

controlling territory made a serious attempt to disrupt narcotics trafficking.

Granted that none of the factions has an effective law enforcement bureaucracy, the ease with which narcotics caravans and refineries continued open

operations was nevertheless remarkable. In the few instances the USG knows

of where arrests were made, most suspects were released upon payment

of a bribe.

Taliban leaders, in particular, expressed a desire to cooperate on

counternarcotics with U.S. and UNDCP officials. However, the major opium

refining operations are located in Taliban-controlled territory, and the Taliban

appear to have done nothing to date to discourage cultivation of opium

poppy. The leaders state they cannot do so until international donors provide

crop substitution and other assistance.

Many sources have reported that all major factions require farmers to

pay a tax on their opium production. Some reports also indicate that deeper

involvement in trafficking is also common among Afghan leaders.

The USG strongly promotes the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan’s

efforts to develop a broad-based national government that can address the

problems of narcotics, terrorism and humanitarian concerns. We assist the

peoples of Afghanistan, subject to resource availability, primarily through

UN programs aimed at humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and

counternarcotics.

Inasmuch as legislation makes special allowance for continuation of such

assistance generally and of assistance for Afghanistan specifically, notwithstanding any other provision of law, denying certification to Afghanistan

would have minimal effect in terms of implementation of this policy.

The continued large-scale cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan, combined with the failure to initiate law enforcement actions, preclude a determination that Afghanistan has taken adequate counternarcotics steps on

its own or that it has sufficiently cooperated with the USG in counternarcotics

efforts, although Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Accordingly, denial of certification is appropriate.

Burma

Burma produced 84% of the opium cultivated in Asia in 1996 and remains

the world’s largest producer of opium and heroin. Continuing lack of resources and commitment to effective drug control policies led to near record

levels of opium cultivation, totaling 163,000 hectares with a potential yield

of 2,560 metric tons of opium gum, or enough to produce 250 tons of

heroin. While the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) claimed

an improvement in its record with regard to drug and precursor chemical

seizures, these efforts were marginal, both in terms of results and in view

of the overall level of opium production and trafficking in Burma. The

drug lord Khun Sa continues to be exempt from prosecution or extradition.

Ethnic drug trafficking armies such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA)

and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), having

negotiated ceasefires with the SLORC which permit them limited autonomy,

remain armed and heavily involved in the heroin trade. Their leaders have

used their relationship with Rangoon to increase their wealth, but prosperity

has not filtered down to the ordinary people in the areas they control.

Lack of enforcement against money laundering and an underdeveloped banking system have created an economic environment increasingly conducive

to the use of drug profits in legitimate commerce. While there is no evidence

that the government per se encourages or is involved in the drug trade,

drug money is beginning to permeate the economy.

The SLORC announced no new drug control policy initiatives in 1996.

It did conduct some counternarcotics activities in areas controlled by the

Kachin Defense Army, the Kokang Army, the MNDAA and the UWSA,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents 11611

seizing a total of 493 kilos of heroin, over three tons of ephedrine, 5,677,525

amphetamine tablets and 2668.4 gallons of acetic anhydride. These actions

did not seriously threaten the drug trafficking activities of the organizations

in question. The unprecedented chemical precursor and amphetamine seizures, however, have alarmed Burmese authorities because they signal a

possible future stimulants problem for the Burmese.

Negotiations involving the Burmese Government, UNDCP, and Wa leaders

on the ‘‘Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region of Shan State’’

project concluded in November. The goal is to bring about a gradual reduction

of opium cultivation in the Wa area. The Burmese Cabinet has not yet

formally approved the project. While the project is designed to incorporate

a monitoring and evaluation component, donors have concerns about implementation.

USG engagement of the Burmese government on counternarcotics issues

remains limited. DEA maintains a liaison operation with Burmese police

and military units involved in drug enforcement activities. The Burmese

have also invited USG participation in a third joint opium yield survey

in the Shan State. The U.S. will consider further assistance only upon

the Burmese Government’s demonstration of a strong commitment to narcotics control, the rule of law and significant political reform.

Colombia

In 1996, as in previous years, Colombia remained the world’s leading

producer and distributor of cocaine and an important supplier of heroin

and marijuana. In the same year, coca cultivation in the country increased

by approximately 30 percent.

As in 1995, the Colombian Government made only limited progress in

1996 against the pervasive, narcotics-related corruption from which it suffers.

In a process which can only be described as flawed, President Samper

was exonerated of charges of corruption by the Colombian Congress. Moreover, Samper remained unwilling to confront fully the drug interests that

contributed heavily to his Presidential campaign.

President Samper pledged to push for stricter sentencing laws in 1994,

but there was only limited progress in 1996 to advance Congressional passage

of legislation which would increase sentences for traffickers and money

launderers. As an apparent consequence, the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers—

the notorious Cali drug leaders—received very light prison sentences which

were not commensurate with their crimes. The Colombian government did

not respond to the USG’s request for extradition of four major drug traffickers

and for most of the year it took no action in response to reliable USG

information that narcotics traffickers continue to run their operations from

prison. Troubling also was Samper’s promotion and public praise for a

drug-tainted military general—behavior which reinforces USG concern about

the credibility of his stated commitment to serious narcotics control for

Colombia.

On the eradication front, the Colombian Government’s strong opposition

to testing more than one granular herbicide—in an effort to replace less

effective liquid herbicides—is especially problematic in light of the significant expansion in coca cultivation.

On the positive side, the serious work on the part of the Colombian

National Police (CNP) as well as select elements of the military to confront

drug trafficking must be highlighted. Government agreement to expand coca

and opium eradication was taken on with determination by the CNP despite

significant challenges including physical threats and lack of proper resources.

In this regard, the USG was encouraged by evidence of increased cooperation

from the Colombian military for the CNP in support of illegal crop eradication. The CNP and military also worked closely to counter narco- and

guerrilla-sponsored public demonstrations against eradication.
11612 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents

There were signs that newly appointed members of the cabinet are determined and committed to advance important counternarcotics objectives. A

noteworthy achievement—pushed also by private Colombian citizens—was

pressure on the Congress which resulted in passage, with retroactivity, of

an asset forfeiture law. However, its constitutionality is already being challenged by those who would be affected by its implementation. In November,

bilateral agreement was reached to expedite shipboarding procedures and

a maritime agreement was signed in February 1997. The CNP and the Prosecutor General continued their efforts against corruption by firing corrupt police

and prosecutors and by continuing investigations targetted against official

corruption. However, without determined and committed leadership, muchneeded legal reform and a supportive political environment, real drug control

successes by the CNP and other entities will be thwarted.

Progress observed in some areas holds promise for serious drug control

efforts in Colombia in the future. Nevertheless, because of high-level corruption, the privileged treatment accorded to major traffickers currently in jail,

light sentencing of traffickers and the government’s continued stand against

extradition, the USG cannot certify Columbia as fully cooperating with the

United States on drug control, or as having taken adequate steps on its

own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Iran

Iran remains an important transit country for opiates from Afghanistan

and Pakistan destined primarily for processing in Turkey. The USG has

no recent surveys of opium poppy cultivation in Iran, but other sources

believe cultivation has decreased, possibly as a result of the influx of cheap

Afghan opium.

The Government of Iran (GOI) has ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention,

but the USG remains unaware of the passage of implementing legislation

that would bring Iran into compliance with the requirements of the Convention. According to UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and International

Narcotics Control Board (INCB) missions that have visited the country, and

reports received from countries with embassies in Iran, the GOI is attempting

to meet at least some of the goals and objectives of the Convention. The

USG cannot evaluate Iranian claims as we do not have diplomatic relations.

There is no bilateral narcotics agreement or cooperation and Iran’s performance is measured solely against the standards of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOI has, according to reports by other nations, begun reaching out

to Western countries in a very tentative fashion, seeking to establish a

working counternarcotics relationship. There are, however, countervailing

pressures and we know of no working law enforcement relationship. The

GOI, Pakistan and UNDCP participate in a tripartite UNDCP law enforcement

project, to which Iran contributes important resources according to UNDCP.

In 1995, the latest year on which Iran reported, it claims to have seized

126 mt of opium, 2 mt of heroin and 11 mt of morphine, as well as

lost 133 citizens in battles against traffickers. The USG cannot verify these

claims. The level of narcotics arriving in Turkey does not appear to have

diminished according to USG sources.

Credible reports have been received that corruption remains a problem.

There have been accusations of corruption against individuals with access

to very high levels of power. Low-level corruption remains a problem judging

by the number of caravans that successfully evade massive physical barriers

at Iran’s eastern border. We do not know how extensively or how equitably

Iran administers its anti-corruption program.

Sentences imposed for narcotics trafficking are very harsh and 1,000 people

have been executed for trafficking since 1989.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents 11613

Nigeria

Nigeria is the focal point of West African narcotics trafficking. Narcotics

producing and trafficking organizations in Asia, South America and, increasingly, Nigeria itself either use Nigeria as a transshipment point or rely

on Nigerian courier networks to transport Asian heroin and South American

cocaine destined for U.S. or European markets. Nigerian trafficking organizations are among the leading carriers of Southeast and Southwest Asian

heroin into the United States. In addition, Nigerian traffickers ship cannabis—

the only illicit drug produced in Nigeria—to Europe and other West African

countries. The Government of Nigeria (GON) has failed to address corruption

adequately among law enforcement and other government agencies, hindering

counternarcotics efforts.

Although the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the one

positive internal agency working against drug trafficking in Nigeria, has

attempted to combat trafficking and corruption, the GON has left it woefully

underfunded. Lack of coordination among police, intelligence and other

law enforcement agencies also prevents effective progress against narcotraffickers.

Nigerian trafficking organizations operate sophisticated money laundering

operations in addition to controlling courier networks. These organizations

have been quick to adapt in response to vigorous international law enforcement, as well as to efforts made by the NDLEA within Nigeria. They have

found new ways to evade detection and to alter and expand their narcotics

smuggling routes and markets; as GON counternarcotics efforts have effectively reduced the amount of drugs shipped through international airports

within Nigeria, courier networks have increasingly relied on overland shipments to transport narcotics. Nigerian trafficking organizations actively recruit

couriers of diverse nationalities, backgrounds and ages.

Perhaps the most glaring omission by the GON is its failure to provide

funding for its law enforcement employees, thus making them ever more

vulnerable to bribery and related forms of corruption, and to provide funding

for implementation of its laws and strategies. Most law enforcement employees are paid far less than is sufficient to feed, clothe and house their

families. In addition, the GON has taken no meaningful steps towards cooperation with the United States on extraditions, information sharing or

prosecution of arrested fraud suspects; nor has it moved significantly towards

meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Syria

For several years, Syria has been an important transit country for drugs

flowing into and out of Lebanon and, in many cases, on to Europe and

the United States. The increase in seizures in 1996 over 1995 (especially

of hashish) points to increased vigilance by Syrian authorities, but could

imply as well that the total flow of drugs across Syria is increasing. Additionally, the presence of approximately 25,000 Syrian troops in the Lebanese

Bekaa Valley makes Syrian cooperation with Lebanese officials a substantial

element in the fight against drug production and trafficking there. Allegations

of corruption against Syrian military officials stationed in Lebanon continued

in 1996.

The Government of Syria (SARG) restructured its Syrian National Police

force in 1996, thus creating a separate and independent Counter-Narcotics

Division. The SARG continued to assist anti-narcotics efforts in Lebanon

during 1996, donating more than a million fruit trees for the Lebanese

crop substitution program. Though widespread reports claim that Syrian

military and security personnel continue to profit from the drug trade,

the SARG neither initiated corruption investigations nor brought anti-narcotics charges against any of these individuals in 1996.

Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Though Syria made

significant progress in some anti-narcotics efforts in 1996, including more

aggressive seizures of hashish and various types of amphetamines, it did
11614 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 / Presidential Documents

not meet some of the other goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug

Convention; specifically, the SARG did not move aggressively enough against

narcotics transiting Syrian territory, especially to and from Lebanon, it did

not take sufficient action towards locating and dismantling drug laboratories

in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, and it ignored serious allegations

against Syrian officials of involvement with drug traffickers. Syria does

not have a bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States. [FR Doc. 97–6231

Filed 3–11–97; 8:45 am]

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