multiple claims, including breach of the partnership agreement. The 

district court in Nevada determined that, pursuant to the partnership 

agreement, the parties intended to submit to binding arbitration and 

ordered the claims in the action to be arbitrated in Nevada. Subsequently, 

respondents filed their answer, counterclaims, and cross-claims with the 

arbitrator. 

Eventually, the arbitrator entered a default against appellant 

for failure to answer respondents' counterclaims. Over four months later, 

facing an application for a default judgment against her, appellant filed an 

opposition to the application and a motion to set aside the default 

On October 7, 2009, the arbitrator issued a lengthy written 

decision in favor of respondents. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion in 

district court to confirm the arbitration award, which the district court 

granted. On December 7, 2009, the notice of entry of this order was served 

on appellant by mail. 

On January 6, 2010, appellant filed a voluntary petition for 

bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 301, initiating a bankruptcy stay. 

Thereafter, on May 16, 2013, the stay was terminated by joint stipulation. 

On June 13, 2013, appellant filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, appellant contends that the district court erred by 

exceeding the scope of the arbitration provision in the partnership 

agreement and that the arbitrator erred by refusing to set aside the 

default. Respondents disagree and separately argue that this court lacks 

jurisdiction to review this appeal. We determine that, while this court has 

jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, appellant's arguments are untimely 

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and therefore waived. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order 

confirming the arbitration award. 

Jurisdiction 

We review jurisdictional questions de novo. See Deja Vu 

Showgirls v. State, Dep't of Tax., 130 Nev., Adv, Op. 73, 334 P.3d 392, 397 

(2014). As we explained in Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 950, 840 

P.2d 1232, 1233 (1992), "fain untimely notice of appeal fails to vest 

jurisdiction in this court." NRAP 4(a)(1) generally requires a party to file 

a notice of appeal "no later than 30 days after the date that written notice 

of entry of the judgment or order appealed from is served," but also 

recognizes that "[ilf an applicable statute provides that a noticeS of appeal 

must be filed within a different time period, the notice of appeal . . . must 

be filed within the time period established by the statute." 

Here, written notice of the district court's order was served on 

appellant by mail on December 7, 2009. NRAP 26(c) provides a party 

three additional days for filing a notice of appeal when receiving service of 

the entry of the order by mail. Because respondents served appellant with 

notice of the district court's order by mail, appellant was entitled to three 

additional days to file her appeal. 

On January 6, 2010, before the deadline for filing her appeal 

passed, appellant filed a voluntary notice of bankruptcy pursuant to 11 

U.S.C. § 301. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), "a petition filed under section 

301 .. . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-- (1) the 

commencement or continuation. . . of a judicial . . . action or proceeding 

against the debtor." Although respondents claim that appellant's appeal 

does not qualify as an action against the debtor, we disagree. "[Sjection 

362 should be read to stay all appeals in proceedings that were originally 

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brought against the debtor, regardless of whether the debtor is the 

appellant or the appellee." Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 

1995) (internal quotation omitted). Because a single case can include 

more than one action or proceeding for purposes of the application of the 

automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), multiple claims "must be 

disaggregated so that particular claims, counterclaims, cross claims and 

third-party claims are treated independently when determining which of 

their respective proceedings are subject to the bankruptcy stay." Id. at 

1137 (internal quotation omitted). Although appellant initiated the action 

below by filing her complaint, respondents filed counterclaims. Those 

counterclaims qualify as claims originally brought against the debtor 

under Section 362(a)(1). See Koolik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567, 568 (2d 

Cir. 1994). Therefore, appellant's appeal related to respondents' 

counterclaims triggered the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l.). 

Having concluded that an automatic stay took effect, we must 

determine whether, after the termination of the stay, appellant timely 

filed her appeal. Section 108(c) of U.S.C. chapter 11 provides: 

Rif applicable nonbankruptcy law. . . fixes a 

period for commencing or continuing a civil action 

in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a 

claim against the debtor. . and such period has 

not expired before the date of the filing of the 

petition, then such period does not expire until the 

later of-- 

(1) the end of such period, including any 

suspension of such period occurring on or after 

the commencement of the case; or 

(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or 

expiration of the stay under section 

362. . with respect to such claim. 

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Pursuant to section 108(c), because appellant filed her 

voluntary petition for bankruptcy initiating the stay under section 362 

before the deadline to appeal the district court's decision expired, 

appellant had 30 days after the expiration of the stay to file her appeal. 

Here, the stay ended on May 16, 2013, and appellant filed her notice of 

appeal within 30 days on June 13, 2013. Accordingly, this court has 

jurisdiction to hear this appeal under NRAP 4(a)(1). 

Waiver 

"We review a district court's confirmation of an arbitration 

award de novo," considering the strong public policy in favor of arbitration 

and applying a clear and convincing evidence standard when a party seeks 

to vacate such an award. Sylver v. Regents Bank, N.A., 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 

30, 300 P.3d 718, 721 (2013). A court may vacate an arbitration award by 

statute or common law. See id. However, a party's failure to timely move 

the district court for such relief equates to waiver. See Casey v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 290 P.3d 265, 268 (2012). A 

party seeking to vacate an arbitration award by statute has 90 days after 

receiving notice of the arbitration award to file a motion. NRS 38.241(2). 

And, although we have acknowledged that "[s]ome courts have suggested 

that a non-statutory basis for vacatur . . . may be articulated even after the 

three-month limitations period . . . has expired," we have not adopted that 

principle, and therefore do not apply it here. 

Here, appellant failed to file a motion for vacatur or make any 

other challenge within the required time period after receiving notice of 

the arbitration award. This constituted waiver. Accordingly, we decline to 

consider appellant's substantive arguments that were not raised before 

the district court. 

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Based on the foregoing, we ORDER the judgment of the 

district court AFFIRMED. 

Qin)ta"%ss.19. Parraguirre 

J. 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge 

Stephen E. Haberfeld, Settlement Judge 

Law Offices of P. Sterling Kerr 

Fennemore Craig Jones Vargas/Las Vegas 

Fennemore Craig Jones Vargas/Reno 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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