alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8906 

AN ACT 

To amend title XXIX of the Public Health Service Act 

to reauthorize the program under such title relating to 

lifespan respite care. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 8906 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Lifespan Respite Care 

3 Reauthorization Act of 2020’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF LIFESPAN RESPITE CARE 

5 PROGRAM. 

6 (a) DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING.—Section 

7 2904 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300ii– 

8 3) is amended to read as follows: 

9 ‘‘SEC. 2904. DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING. 

10 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Each State agency awarded a 

11 grant or cooperative agreement under section 2902 shall 

12 report such data, information, and metrics as the Sec13 retary may require for purposes of— 

14 ‘‘(1) evaluating State programs and activities 

15 funded pursuant to such grant or cooperative agree16 ment, including any results pursuant to section 

17 2902(d)(2)(B)(xii); and 

18 ‘‘(2) identifying effective programs and activi19 ties funded pursuant to section 2902. 

20 ‘‘(b) REPORT.—Not later than October 1, 2023, the 

21 Secretary shall submit a report to the Committee on 

22 Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate and 

23 the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 

24 of Representatives regarding the outcomes of the pro25 grams and activities funded pursuant to section 2902, in26 cluding any effective programs and activities identified.’’. 
3 

•HR 8906 EH

1 (b) FUNDING.—Section 2905 of the Public Health 

2 Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300ii–4) is amended by striking 

3 ‘‘title’’ and all that follows through the period and insert4 ing ‘‘title, $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 

5 through fiscal year 2024.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 10, 

2020. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8906 

AN ACT 

To amend title XXIX of the Public Health Service 

relating to lifespan respite care. Act to reauthorize the program under such title
Submitted April 26;

remanded for resentencing, otherwise affirmed June 1, 2017

#### STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, *v.*KELLY RAY CHAPMAN, *Defendant-Appellant.*

Umatilla County Circuit Court

CF150138; A159653

395 P3d 84

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Ingrid MacFarlane, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Sercombe, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Haselton, Senior Judge.

*877PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for coercion, ORS 163.275, and menacing, ORS 163.190. On the coercion charge, the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 months’ imprisonment and 60 months of post-prison supervision “minus time actually served pursuant to ORS 144.103.” On appeal, defendant raises two assignments of error with respect to his sentence. In his first assignment, he contends that the court “erred in imposing a departure sentence based on the aggravating factor that he committed another crime in order to evade criminal sanctions.” In his second assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error by imposing the post-prison supervision term on the coercion conviction. *See*ORAP 5.45(1); see *also*OAR 213-005-0002(4).

As to defendant’s second assignment of error, the state concedes that “ORS 144.103 does not apply to coercion offenses, and defendant’s post-prison supervision term was unlawfully indeterminate and resulted in a sentence that was excessive on its face.” We agree, and accept the state’s concession. *See State v. Mitchell,*236 Or App 248, 235 P3d 725 (2010). Furthermore, the state agrees that, as a result of that error, we should remand the case for resentencing. In light of the gravity of the error and the interests of justice, we conclude that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to correct the error and, accordingly, we agree that the case must be remanded for resentencing. *See Mitchell,*236 Or App at 256 (exercising discretion to correct similar error).

Because we must remand the entire case for resen-tencing as a result of our disposition of defendant’s second assignment of error, *see*ORS 138.222(5)(a), we need not address his first assignment.

Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-26-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-28-1999
<CASH>                                          14,278
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,153
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<INVENTORY>                                     44,402
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                85,930
<PP&E>                                          70,250
<DEPRECIATION>                                  33,060
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 136,045
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           23,546
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   136,045
<SALES>                                         64,616
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                64,616
<CGS>                                           33,841
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   72,021
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 103
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (6,766)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (2,503)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (4,263)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                    (4,263)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.46)
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</TABLE>
# C_2023094EN.01001701.xml

| 13.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 94/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 94/17

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 24 November 2022 — Coral Srl v Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli

(Case C-730/22)

(2023/C 94/18)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Coral Srl

Defendants: Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli

Question referred

‘Does Directive 2014/23/EU, (1) where it is considered to be applicable and, in any event, the general principles deriving from Articles 26, 49, 56 and 63 TFEU as interpreted and applied by the case-law of the Court of Justice, in particular in the light of the principle of non-discrimination, the principle of proportionality and the protection of competition and the free movement of services and capital, preclude the application of national rules under which the national legislature or the public administration may, during the so-called “technical extension” renewed several times in the last decade in the sector of gaming concessions, unilaterally affect ongoing relations, introducing the obligation to pay fees for the concessions, which were originally not due, and subsequently increasing the fees on several occasions, and always setting them as a fixed amount for all concessionaires irrespective of turnover, as well as imposing further constraints on the activities of concessionaires such as prohibiting the transfer of premises and making participation in the future procedure for the re-award of concessions subject to participation by the operators in the extension?’

---

(1)  Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 1).

---
# C_2022148EN.01004201.xml

| 4.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/42

---

Action brought on 21 February 2022 — Ruhorimbere v Council

(Case T-91/22)

(2022/C 148/55)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Éric Ruhorimbere (Mbuji-Mayi, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should

| — | annul Council decision (CFSP) 2021/2181 of 9 December 2021 (1) in so far as the applicant remains at No 8 in the annex to that decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council decision (CFSP) 2021/2181 of 9 December 2021 (1) in so far as the applicant remains at No 8 in the annex to that decision;

| — | annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2177 of 9 December 2021 (2) in so far as the applicant remains at No 8 in Annex I to that regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2177 of 9 December 2021 (2) in so far as the applicant remains at No 8 in Annex I to that regulation;

| — | order the Council to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law, which are, in essence, identical or similar to those relied on in Case T-90/22, Kande Mupompa v Council.

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2181 of 9 December 2021, amending decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2021 L 443, p. 75).

(2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2181 of 9 December 2021 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo (OJ 2021 L 443, p. 3).

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET OF WINDSOR PARK PROPERTIES 5 AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND THE RELATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND OF CASH FLOWS FOR THE NINE MONTHS THEN ENDED AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                         506,500
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       3,580,500
<DEPRECIATION>                                 828,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,552,700
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                      1,097,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,364,400<F1>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,552,700
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               428,700
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  217,900
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               148,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              76,500
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (13,700)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (13,700)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (13,700)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.06)<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1> Limited and general partners equity.
<F2> Net loss per limited partnership unit.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
# C_2023173EN.01001003.xml

| 15.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 173/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 173/10

---

Appeal brought on 29 November 2022 by Primagran sp. z o.o. against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 22 September 2022 in Case T-624/21, Primagran v EUIPO — Primagaz (prımagran)

(Case C-735/22 P)

(2023/C 173/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Primagran sp. z o.o. (represented by: E. Jaroszyńska-Kozłowska, radca prawny)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Compagnie des gaz de pétrole Primagaz

By order of 24 March 2023, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Primagran sp. z o.o. should bear its own costs.

---
Exhibit 32.2

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Annual Report of Puget Energy, Inc. and Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (the Companies) on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-K), I, Stephen P.
Reynolds, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Companies, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

| | (1) | The Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
               Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material
               respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Companies.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|                    |                               
|------------------- | ------------------------------
|Date: March 9, 2004 |                               
|                    |                               
|                    | /s/ Bertrand A. Valdman       
|                    |                               
|                    | Bertrand A. Valdman           
|                    | Sr. Vice President Finance and
|                    | Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAY-01-1999
<CASH>                                         10,281
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  29,133
<ALLOWANCES>                                   3,241
<INVENTORY>                                    160,212
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               201,188
<PP&E>                                         59,194
<DEPRECIATION>                                 34,479
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 259,295
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          62,868
<BONDS>                                        35,061
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       3
<OTHER-SE>                                     160,321
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   259,295
<SALES>                                        87,660
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               87,660
<CGS>                                          65,396
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  65,396
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               24,418<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               201
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             561
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,707)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   138
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,845)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,845)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.10)

<FN>
Other expenses consists of all operating costs and excludes interest,
non-operating income and income taxes.
</FN>

</TABLE>
No. 11-10594.

#### Jones *v.*Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-rari denied.
#### Gregory GARMONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEVADA SUPREME COURT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15715

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed February 23, 2018

*657Gregory Garmong, Pro Se

Brandon R. Price, Attorney, AGNV— Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Reno), Reno, NY, for Defendants-Appel-lees

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *657*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Garmong's request for oral argument, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.

MEMORANDUM **

Gregory Garmong appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine. *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Garmong’s action as barred by the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine because Garmong’s action is a “de facto appeal” of prior state court judgments, and raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. *See Cooper v. Ramos,*704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) *(Rooker-Feldman*doctrine barred claim that was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision); *Henrichs v. Valley View Dev.,*474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) *(Rooker-Feld-man*doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
No. 11-1026.

#### M. H. *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 11-10942.

#### Whitmore *v.*Miller, Warden.

C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 11-10640.

#### McGee *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
# C_2022311EN.01000401.xml

| 16.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/4

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Brně (Czech Republic) lodged on 9 May 2022 — CROSS Zlín a.s. v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže

(Case C-303/22)

(2022/C 311/06)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Krajský soud v Brně

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CROSS Zlín a.s.

Defendant: Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže

Question referred

Is it compatible with Articles 2(3) and 2a(2) of Directive 89/665/EEC, (1) interpreted in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, for Czech legislation to permit a contracting authority to conclude a public contract before an action is brought before a court competent to review the legality of a second-instance decision of the Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (Office for the Protection of Competition) to exclude a tenderer?

---

(1)  Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33).

---
Submitted February 3,

reversed and remanded May 3, 2017

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Plaintiff-Respondent, v.*ART C. MURPHY, II, *Defendant-Appellant.*

Josephine County Circuit Court

14CR0832; A161058

393 P3d 745

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Sara F. Werboff, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Lagesen, Judge.

*339PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals a judgment convicting him of felon in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894. He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the police search of his camp trailer exceeded the scope of the search warrant under which the police conducted their search.1 The state concedes the error, acknowledging that the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to “establish a nexus between the objects sought and the place to be searched.” *State v. Tidyman,*54 Or App 640, 643-44, 635 P2d 1355 (1981), *rev den,*292 Or 722 (1982); *see State v. Thibodeaux,*173 Or App 353, 357, 22 P3d 248 (2001) (“When * * * the building or vehicle is owned or occupied by persons other than those suspected of criminal activity, more is required than proximity [to the suspect’s home].”). We agree with the state, accept the state’s concession that the motion to suppress should have been granted, and reverse and remand the judgment.

Reversed and remanded.

1

 Defendant also raises other assignments of error. Given our disposition, we need not reach those assignments.