1 In cases involving minors, we generally refrain from revealing

the minor’s last name. We make an exception here because

this opinion is being issued in tandem with a companion case,

Ross v. Board of Education of Township High School District 211

(“Ross II ”), No. 06-2060, in which Lindsey Ross is identified by

her full name for the simple reason that Ross II was filed after

Lindsey had reached the age of majority. Because Lindsey’s full

name is made public in Ross II, we see no harm in using her last

name here as well. We therefore do so for the sake of clarity

and consistency.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-3700

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOWNSHIP

HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 211,

Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

MICHAEL and DIANE ROSS, individually and

as next friends of LINDSEY ROSS, a minor,1

Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. ____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 02 C 6098—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

______________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 21, 2006—DECIDED MAY 11, 2007

____________
2 No. 05-3700

Before BAUER, CUDAHY, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. This case is about the responsibility of a public school district to provide an education to

a student afflicted with Rett syndrome, which is a

“neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by normal

early development followed by loss of purposeful use of

the hands, distinctive hand movements, slowed brain and

head growth, gait abnormalities, seizures, and mental

retardation.” See National Institute of Neurological

Disorders and Stroke, Rett Syndrome Fact Sheet, http://

www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/rett/detail_rett.htm?css=

print (visited April 9, 2007) (“Rett Syndrome Fact Sheet”).

The student’s parents, Michael and Diane Ross, believed

that High School District No. 211 failed to provide their

daughter, Lindsey, who suffers from Rett syndrome, with

the free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment to which she is entitled under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20

U.S.C. § 1414. An independent hearing officer held a

lengthy hearing and upheld the District’s placement of

Lindsey. Both the District and Lindsey’s parents then

turned to the district court, which granted summary

judgment to the District on all counts.

Shortly after the district court issued its opinion in this

case, Lindsey and her parents filed a second lawsuit

against the District and its Director for Special Education.

As we explain in the companion opinion issued today in

Ross II, the district court dismissed most of the claims in

the second case on the basis of claim preclusion; it dismissed some supplemental state claims without prejudice.

While we appreciate that Lindsey’s parents sincerely

believe that her best interests would have been served

better under a different plan, we conclude that the district court in both cases correctly held in favor of the

school authorities and we therefore affirm.
No. 05-3700 3

I

In approaching this kind of case, a district court must

take as the basis of its decision the administrative record

that the independent hearing officer compiled; it then has

the discretion to admit additional evidence to supplement the record. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). Once the record

is complete, the court is to base its decision on “the

preponderance of the evidence” and to grant “such relief

as [it] determines is appropriate.” Id. The Supreme Court

has interpreted this to require the initial reviewing

court—that is, the district court—to make an independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence.

See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.

v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). At the same time, the

court must give “due weight” to the determinations made

during the state administrative process. Id. The Rowley

Court emphasized that “the provision that a reviewing

court base its decision on the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for

those of the school authorities which they review.” Id. See

Patricia P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 203 F.3d 462, 466

(7th Cir. 2000).

Rowley described the reviewing court’s task as follows:

[A] court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e)(2)

is twofold. First, has the State complied with the

procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the

individualized educational program developed through

the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable

the child to receive educational benefits? If these

requirements are met, the State has complied with the

obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can

require no more.

458 U.S. at 206-07. We have interpreted this to mean that

we should review the administrative record and the
4 No. 05-3700

district court’s findings of fact deferentially. We will

reverse only if those findings are clearly erroneous. See

Heather S. v. State of Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1053 (7th

Cir. 1997). We review questions of law, as usual, de novo.

Like the district court, we must refrain from imposing

our own notions of sound educational policy for those of

the responsible school authorities. Id. at 1052-53. We note

as well that at the administrative level, the Supreme

Court has held that the burden of proof in a hearing

challenging an educational placement decision is on the

party seeking relief. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,

126 S.Ct. 528, 531 (2005). In this case, the parties seeking

relief (in the form of a different placement for Lindsey)

were Lindsey and her parents; under Schaffer, they had

the burden of proof.

II

Victims of Rett syndrome are almost all female, because

it is caused by mutations on a gene found on the X

chromosome—males with the damaged gene usually die

shortly after birth. See Rett Syndrome Fact Sheet. The

severity of any given person’s disease varies. The district

court described Lindsey’s condition as follows:

Lindsey is nonverbal and suffers from apraxia, an

inconsistent ability to control the body and limbs. She

has, however, a higher level of motor functioning than

the majority of girls with Rett Syndrome; among

other things, Lindsey can swim, ski, and ride a horse.

Lindsey also has a higher level of cognitive functioning

than most girls with Rett Syndrome. Though the

average mental age of girls afflicted with Rett Syndrome is estimated to be eight to ten months, doctors

estimate Lindsey’s cognition to be between the seven

and twelve year old equivalency. . . . It should be

noted, however, that because girls with Rett Syndrome
No. 05-3700 5

are nonverbal and have poor motor control, it is quite

difficult to measure their cognitive ability accurately.

Among the many effects of Rett Syndrome are that

Lindsey’s hands get locked together, and she needs

assistance in unlocking them. In addition, and perhaps

significantly for purposes of this case, Lindsey engages in vocalizations, which can be loud and last for

anywhere from a few seconds to over a minute. The

cause and meaning of the vocalizations is not known

with any certainty. Rett Syndrome also causes Lindsey

to engage in self-injurious behaviors, which include

hitting herself on the chin or head, the cause of which

is also unknown. Lindsey also sometimes strikes

others, usually by butting them with her head.

Until she entered high school, Lindsey attended regular

public schools in her neighborhood—in educational jargon,

she was “mainstreamed.” In the fall of 2001, she entered

James B. Conant High School, in Hoffman Estates, Illinois;

Conant is one of the five high schools within District 211.

That year, she was placed in five regular education classes;

she received extensive assistance from her own special

education teacher and teacher’s aide, who accompanied her

throughout the day. They provided whatever academic or

physical services she required, including behavioral

interventions, calming measures, assistance with hygienic

needs, and help with communication devices. Conant

provided a work room for her private use, for times when

she needed individualized instruction or she had to be

separated from the other students. Occasionally, separation became necessary. For example, in May of her freshman year, she head-butted two staff members, causing

nasal fractures in both. Following these incidents, she

was removed from Conant. Over the summer, her parents

had her evaluated by a specialist in Alabama, who recommended continued monitoring. At approximately the

same time, the District arranged for a multidisciplinary
6 No. 05-3700

review of Lindsey’s case to be conducted by Dr. Bennett

Leventhal and Dr. Marrea Winnega of the University of

Chicago Developmental Disorders Clinic. This review

concluded that Lindsey’s behavior was interfering with her

ability to make educational progress and recommended

that she be taken out of Conant and placed in a special

education setting.

On August 23, 2002, the District held a meeting for the

purpose of reviewing Lindsey’s “Individualized Education

Plan” (IEP) for her upcoming sophomore year. The District

recommended special placement, but Lindsey’s parents

strongly maintained that she would be better off remaining at Conant. They requested an administrative hearing

and indicated that they wanted to exercise the “stay put”

provision of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), under which

an eligible student remains in her current school or

program during the pendency of an administrative hearing. Litigation erupted at that point: the District filed suit

in the federal district court, asking it to prohibit the

parents from invoking the “stay put” provision. The court

granted a temporary restraining order, but matters

calmed down somewhat when the parents decided to keep

Lindsey at home rather than put her in the special education setting.

Under a compromise memorialized in an agreement

dated November 5, 2002, the parties agreed that Lindsey

was to be returned to Conant as soon as possible. The

parties also agreed to submit the question of Lindsey’s

placement to a panel of three experts, Dr. Leventhal,

Victor Morris (a specialist in educational and behavioral

programming for students with autism spectrum disorders, including Rett syndrome), and Alice Belgrade (a

behavioral specialist with teaching experience). The panel

members did not work well together. Nonetheless, they

were able to agree that Lindsey could return to Conant

in the spring of 2003. She did so effective April 21, with a
No. 05-3700 7

shortened schedule of three periods (lunch, physical

education, and English). As before, she had a special

education teacher and a teacher’s aide to assist her.

Lindsey attended school for 35 days under that arrangement. Logs kept by her special education teacher reflected the fact that she spent most of her time in her

private work room, rather than in the classroom, because

her self-injurious behavior or disruptive vocalizations

often required her to leave the other students. Her academic progress was limited, but she improved various

functional skills such as using a spoon, sorting, and

responding to personal greetings. According to her parents, more could have been accomplished if the District

had kept its word in other respects. They accuse the

District of failing to provide some of the aids and services

that it had promised, such as the creation of a special

“Circle of Friends” to facilitate peer interaction, occupational therapy, and a properly fitting weighted vest (which

was used to help calm her). She completed her sophomore

year in June 2003. Over the summer, her special education

teacher decided not to return to District 211, and the

District decided not to rehire the teacher’s aide. It hired

replacements for both. Lindsey’s parents believe that the

departure of the teacher and the aide was a blow to

Lindsey’s progress, since she had developed an excellent

rapport with them.

In August 2003 the IEP team met to decide how to

structure Lindsey’s junior year. The team initially included Lindsey’s parents, their attorney, the assistant

director of special education for the District, the District’s

attorney, two members of the expert panel, Lindsey’s

English teacher, and her physical therapist. Morris, one of

the panel members, resigned because of his disagreements

with the others over the best course of action for Lindsey.

The result of these meetings was the District’s acquiescence in the plan proposed by Lindsey’s parents, under
8 No. 05-3700

which she was to return to Conant in the fall and take a

full day of classes.

Soon after the 2003-04 school year began, it became

apparent that Lindsey was having problems. She was

often tardy to class; her classroom behavior deteriorated;

she suffered from medical problems; perhaps because of

those complications she was fatigued and unsteady on her

feet; and her motor skills seemed worse. The net result

was that she was in school for the full six periods on only

five days during September and October. The new teacher

and teacher’s aide did not respond to these problems as

effectively as the parents believed they should, nor did

they try hard enough (in the parents’ opinion) to win

Lindsey’s trust. The District decided to convene a meeting of the IEP team on November 5, 2003. Opinions

differed on the question whether Lindsey should stay at

Conant or be moved to a special education setting. At the

end of that meeting, the District decided to change her

placement to a “multiple needs” program; it recommended

the one provided by Lake Park High School, which is

run by the North DuPage Special Education Cooperative.

Lindsey’s parents opposed that recommendation, but the

District evidently thought—at least by the end of that

meeting—that the time for discussion was over. Indeed,

the parents assert that the November 5 meeting itself

was a sham and that the District had already decided to

take Lindsey out of Conant. As proof, they point to the

fact that the District had “stationed its attorney at the

federal courthouse with instructions to file a previously

prepared lawsuit against the parents” in case they did not

acquiesce in its decision. In fact, that suit was filed and

the District sought an emergency motion to permit it to

move Lindsey. (This is why the District appears in this

litigation as the plaintiff and the parents as defendants.)

Not long afterwards, Lindsey’s parents filed a request

for administrative review, as they were entitled to do
No. 05-3700 9

under federal and state law. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6);

105 ILCS 5/14-8.02.

The independent hearing officer, Carolyn Smaron, heard

testimony for 42 days, making Lindsey’s the longest

special education due process hearing in Illinois history,

according to the district court. The hearing officer issued

a 61-page decision in which she concluded that the District’s placement decision was appropriate. Lindsey’s

parents appealed that decision to the district court

under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In addition to asking for

various forms of relief against the District, the parents

also filed a cross-claim against the Illinois State Board of

Education (ISBE), in which they alleged that ISBE violated the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by failing to ensure that the

District educate Lindsey at Conant. As noted earlier, the

district court took some additional testimony before

rendering its decision. On cross-motions for summary

judgment, it denied the parents’ motion and granted the

District’s motion. It also found that its ruling in the

District’s favor required judgment in ISBE’s favor on the

third-party claim. Lindsey’s parents now appeal to this

court.

III

The IDEA guarantees disabled children the right to a

free appropriate public education in the least restrictive

environment. In order to implement that promise, § 1414

of the Act requires a school district to assess the child’s

educational needs and to develop an IEP based on that

assessment. Rowley makes clear that the statute imposes both a procedural obligation and a substantive

obligation on the state. 458 U.S. at 207-08. Lindsey’s

parents, on their own and her behalf, argue that the
10 No. 05-3700

District failed to satisfy the statute in either respect. We

address their arguments in turn.

A. Procedural Compliance

The parents claim that the meetings that the District

held—especially, but not only, the meeting of November 5,

2003—were nothing but an elaborate effort to ratify a

decision that the District had already made without their

input. If this were true, then it would violate the IDEA.

The central tool that the statute uses for the development

of a proper educational program for each disabled child

is the IEP, which is defined as “a written statement for

each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed,

and revised in accordance with section 1414(d) of this

title.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14). The IDEA lays out an elaborate set of procedures that govern the process of developing an IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)-(c). Throughout, the

statute assures the parents an active and meaningful

role in the development or modification of their child’s

IEP. If a school district were to change a student’s placement without observing those rules, it would violate the

procedural obligations under the statute to which Rowley

referred. See Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392

F.3d 840, 857 (6th Cir. 2004); Spielberg ex rel. Spielberg v.

Henrico County Pub. Schs, 853 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1988)

(construing Education of All Handicapped Children Act,

predecessor to IDEA).

While we can appreciate the frustration that Lindsey’s

parents felt at the conclusion of the November 5 hearing,

we cannot say that the district court clearly erred when

it found that they had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the development and review of Lindsey’s IEP.

The parents point to three pieces of evidence that contradict this finding, in their opinion. First, during the August
No. 05-3700 11

2003 IEP meeting, district officials left the room and

drafted an addendum to the plan that read as follows:

By the end of her ninth grade year . . . staff members

who worked closely with Lindsey sincerely believed she

was receiving virtually no educational benefit in the

mainstream. Based on these beliefs, public school

personnel recommended a placement at a separate

school designed to appropriately meet Lindsey’s needs.

. . .

[T]he belief among District 211 staff that Lindsey is

not being appropriately served in the mainstream still

exists. . . . However, staff is also advised by legal

counsel that the settlement agreement continues to

control and therefore they will in good faith implement

whatever IEP is agreed upon today. Were it not for

the settlement agreement, as a matter of conscience,

public school personnel would continue to recommend

an appropriate public or private self-contained setting.

The parents concede that this language did not effect a

change in Lindsey’s plan. The district court should have

used it, they believe, as evidence that District 211 had

predetermined Lindsey’s placement at some time prior

to the November 5 meeting. While it may be possible to

view the addendum that way, it is certainly just as

reasonable (if not more so) to take it, as the district court

did, at face value: a sincere expression of concern on the

part of staff, a staff recommendation, and a commitment

to abide by whatever plan was “agreed upon today.”

Second, the parents claim that Dr. Malito, the District

superintendent, told them at an October 2003 meeting

that District 211 had made up its mind to remove Lindsey

from Conant and change her placement to a special needs

program after the November 5 meeting. Dr. Malito,

however, later testified that he did not make any

such statement at the October meeting and that he did
12 No. 05-3700

not predetermine Lindsey’s placement before the November meeting. Dr. Daniel Cates, the Director of Special

Education for District 211, was present at the October

meeting and testified that no decisions regarding placement were made then. The state independent hearing

officer credited Dr. Cates’s testimony, and the district

court saw no reason to question her credibility determination.

Finally, the parents regard the fact that the District

had already drafted the legal papers necessary for seeking

an injunction against the “stay put” obligation as of the

day of the November 5 meeting, and that it had an attorney poised to file those papers, as unequivocal evidence

that the meeting was a sham. Once again, while this may

be one way of looking at the evidence, it is not the only

way, and most importantly, it is not the way that the

hearing officer saw it. The District had no reason to

contemplate litigation against itself if the parents’ views

had prevailed at the end of the meeting. In that event,

presumably it would have notified the attorney to go

home. If at the end of the meeting the consensus was

to change Lindsey’s placement, however, the District

well knew that the parents were likely to oppose that

outcome. The hearing officer, and the district court, were

not required to read anything nefarious into its decision

to be ready for the latter alternative.

In fact, the hearing officer thought that the evidence

was “overwhelming that the parents were maximally

involved in the IEP process, its implementations and

modifications.” The district court agreed with that assessment. District 211, in its view, had done nothing more

than prepare for the various IEP meetings—a step it

was entitled to take. The court also noted that the District’s decision to file the lawsuit was made by Dr. Cates

and that the members of Lindsey’s IEP team had no

knowledge of the plan to sue if consensus was not
No. 05-3700 13

reached at the November meeting. The record reflects

that the parties conducted a comprehensive review of

Lindsey’s situation at that meeting; the review was

memorialized in a 32-page conference summary report that

reflects discussion among the expert panel members,

consultants, psychologists, Lindsey’s case manager, her

parents, and her parents’ attorney. This is a far cry from

W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, in

which the Ninth Circuit found that the record supported

the district court’s finding that the school authorities

had independently developed the IEP that it presented to

the parents without either their participation or that

of certain other critical parties. 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th

Cir. 1992).

B. Substantive Compliance

The parents raise three principal arguments with

respect to the substance of Lindsey’s IEP: first, that the

District violated the IDEA by failing to include a transition plan for her; second, that it failed to consider all

supplementary aids and services that could be used at

Conant, and thus failed to educate Lindsey in the least

restrictive environment; and third, that the District

also violated Lindsey’s rights under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act.

1. Transition Plan

The IDEA requires every IEP, beginning no later than

the one that will be in effect when the child is 16 years old,

to include “appropriate measurable postsecondary goals

based on age appropriate transition assessments related

to training, education, employment, and, where appropriate, independent living skills,” and to describe the “transition services (including courses of study) needed to
14 No. 05-3700

assist the child in reaching those goals.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa)-(bb). Nothing in the statute

indicates that the District has discretion whether to

include a transition plan in the IEP. See Yankton Sch.

Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1376 (8th Cir. 1996) (“If

a student is eligible under IDEA, appropriate services,

including transition benefits, shall be provided.”).

In Lindsey’s case, this means that transition measures

should have been discussed in the IEP prepared for her

sophomore year in August 2002. The district court essentially conceded that this had not happened. Instead, the

record reflected that her transition plan was “deferred,”

without explaining where the authority to take that step

came from. The District had explained that it followed a

practice of deferring the drafting of transition provisions

where the student was not ready to move along, and

the district court found that “it was reasonable for the

District to determine that Lindsey has not yet progressed

to the point at which a transition plan is necessary.” The

August 2003 IEP was not much better. It said, “Transition

goals will be determined after Lindsey completes a vocational assessment. Until this point, transition planning

will be addressed through IEP goals in the areas of selfhelp and functional academics. A district representative

will meet with the family in order to address the

various domain areas of transition.” Another document

indicates that meetings about transition were taking

place and that the parents had received some literature

about transition. In the November 2003 IEP, the plan

reverted to a statement that transition planning was

being “deferred.”

It appears that the District thought that what Lindsey

needed was the very basic skills that were already included in her IEP, and thus that there was no material

difference between her transition needs and her current

needs. Even if that were true, however, the statute says
No. 05-3700 15

that it should have explained this in the IEP and addressed the subject more fully. The failure of the plan to

discuss transition is, however, a procedural flaw, not a

substantive one: no one would be complaining about the

language of the plan if the District had in fact been

providing transitional services to Lindsey. The important

question is therefore whether the District failed to give

Lindsey something to which she was entitled. As we

noted in a similar case, “Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a [free appropriate public education]. However, procedural inadequacies

that result in the loss of educational opportunity . . .

clearly result in the denial of a [free appropriate public

education].” Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1059. See also Deal,

392 F.3d at 855.

The record as a whole shows that Lindsey was not in a

position to benefit from an elaborate transition plan

including advanced vocational or educational skills. This

explains why the District was deferring a plan with

anything more elaborate than what it was already

doing, and it explains why both the hearing officer and

the district court found this course of action acceptable.

We conclude that the District erred when it failed to

include more specific transition plans in Lindsey’s IEPs,

but that this procedural flaw did not result in the denial

of a free appropriate public education for her.

2. Least Restrictive Environment

The hearing officer and the district court devoted a great

deal of attention to this argument. Under the IDEA and

its implementing regulations, a child is entitled to receive a free appropriate public education, and it must be

delivered in the least restrictive environment. This part of

the IDEA requires the District to educate Lindsey with her

nondisabled peers—known as “mainstreaming” her—to the
16 No. 05-3700

“greatest extent appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).

The statute specifies that “special classes, separate

schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities

from the regular educational environment [may] occur[ ]

only when the nature or severity of the disability of a

child is such that education in regular classes with the

use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved

satisfactorily.” Id. Lindsey’s parents argue that District

211 failed to comply with this obligation, both by its

inadequate support of Lindsey while she was at Conant

and by its ultimate decision to move her out of the mainstream school. This court has declined to adopt any sort of

multi-factor test for assessing whether a child may remain in a regular school. See Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d

493, 499 (7th Cir. 2002). We did hold, however, that it is

not enough to show that a student is obtaining some

benefit, no matter how minimal, at the mainstream

school in order to prove that the District’s removal of

Lindsey violated the “least restrictive environment”

requirement. Instead, giving due deference to the administrative findings and the conclusions of the district court,

we ask whether the education in the conventional school

was satisfactory and, if not, whether reasonable measures

would have made it so. If the mainstream environment

was satisfactory, the District violated the statute by

removing Lindsey. Id. at 499. If it was not and could not

reasonably be made so, the District satisfied the statute

if its recommended placement kept Lindsey with her

nondisabled peers to the maximum appropriate extent. Id.

The district court, relying heavily on the hearing officer’s

decision, found the measures that District 211 used to

facilitate Lindsey’s education to be sufficient; it also

found the District’s decision ultimately to move her to be

consistent with the statute. Rather than repeat everything from the district court’s thoughtful analysis, we

mention only a few examples of the evidence that supported this finding.
No. 05-3700 17

Lindsey, the district court found, was not making

meaningful progress at Conant. To the extent that she

was successful during the spring of 2003, she was meeting her goals through work done in her private room

with instruction from her special education teacher, not

through work done in the mainstream classroom. School

records reflect that she spent little time in the regular

classroom throughout 2003. During the spring of 2003, for

example, there were only two days in which she was

able to stay in her English class for the full 50 minutes,

and there were many days when she could not go at all or

she went for only about 10 minutes. Her ability to interact

with her peers was also minimal, and her behavior was

disruptive. Even though her cognitive ability is fortunately

higher than that of many Rett’s sufferers, this does not

answer the question where her intellectual development

could be fostered most effectively. The record is full of

evidence that outside experts, the District 211 teachers,

and district specialists all thought that she could not

learn satisfactorily in the environment of Conant. Moreover, several experts, the hearing officer, and the district

court concluded that Lake Park High School, the recommended placement school, presented “reverse mainstream opportunities,” which allow for integration into

the regular education environment and periodic interaction with nondisabled students. If this evidence is credited,

it is easy to conclude that the District met its obligations

to provide Lindsey a free appropriate public education

in the least restrictive environment she could handle. Her

parents obviously disagree with this, but we cannot

undertake an independent assessment of Lindsey’s case.

We can only decide whether the hearing officer and the

district court came to a rational conclusion, and we find

that they did.
18 No. 05-3700

3. ADA and Rehabilitation Act

The district court held that its decision to reject the

challenge by Lindsey and her parents based on the IDEA

necessarily meant that their case under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act also had to be rejected. They argue that

this fails to recognize important differences between the

statutes and ignores the savings clause in the IDEA, which

says that nothing in that act “shall be construed to

restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies

available under . . . the [ADA], Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, [or other laws].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)

(citations omitted); see also Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of

Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). The

IDEA is limited, we held in Charlie F., to “any matter

relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational

placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” 98 F.3d at 991.

The parents read this to mean that the possibility of a

different remedy (specifically, damages) under the ADA or

the Rehabilitation Act opens up the possibility of their use

here. They state that they are seeking redress for “acts of

hostility and discrimination for which monetary relief is

the only salve.” We agree with her parents this far: insofar

as claims under these two statutes are concerned, the

district court was required to apply the ordinary standard

for summary judgment, not the special IDEA variant. That

means also that our review is de novo on this part of the

case, as it ordinarily is on appeals from summary judgments.

In our view, the district court was aware of this and

applied the correct standard. It found, for example, that

no reasonable trier of fact could find that District 211

intentionally discriminated against Lindsey. Nothing in

the court’s language suggests that it was deferring to

anyone or that it was resolving disputed issues of material
No. 05-3700 19

fact. Moreover, this conclusion is unassailable. Lindsey

and her parents are complaining that the level of special

services she received was not high enough; nothing

whatever suggests that the school was treating her

differently from the other students in an adverse way,

intentionally or otherwise. If the question were whether

it was making reasonable accommodations to help her

participate in its programs, that too cannot be disputed on

this record. What is in dispute, as the district court

recognized, is whether the extra efforts required by the

IDEA were satisfactory. That does not mean, however,

that the disputed issues of fact to which the court referred are material for an ADA or a Rehabilitation Act

theory. We add, for the sake of completeness, that we are

not rejecting this argument just because Lindsey’s parents

did not specify the monetary damages that they were

seeking under these alternative theories. As they correctly

note in their reply brief, FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) entitles them

to whatever relief may be justified by the proof. We

conclude, however, that the District was entitled on the

merits to summary judgment under these two theories.

IV

Last, we turn to the third-party claim against the Illinois

State Board of Education, in which Lindsey’s parents

accused it of violating the IDEA, the ADA, and section 504

of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to ensure that District

211 complied with the “least restrictive environment”

command of the IDEA and by failing to provide a fair

administrative process. We agree with the district court

that these claims necessarily fail as a result of our rejection of the primary claims against the District.

* * *

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
20 No. 05-3700

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-11-07