* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60328 Summary Calendar

BRIAN H NEELY; KAREN NEELY Plaintiffs - Appellants v. REGIONS BANK INC, also known as Regions Mortgage Inc; PIERCE LEDYARD; TONDA BURKE; HELEN F-J JOYCE; JANE DOE, paralegal for Pierce Ledyard; JOHN 1-20, attorney Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 4:04-CV-106
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Brian and Karen Neely, husband and wife, filed suit after their mortgage company foreclosed on property they owned. The district court dismissed the case and sanctioned the Neelys. The Neelys now appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D January 25, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-60328

2 1. The Neelys first contend that the district court erred in granting judgment in favor of Regions Bank. The district court both granted Regionssummaryjudgment and simultaneously dismissed the case against it as frivolous. We reviewgrantsofsummaryjudgment de novo, applying the
same legal standards as the district court. Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper when the undisputed material facts establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The Neelys seem to make two arguments to establish that Regions was not entitled to summary judgment. First, the Neelys argue that they were not behind in their mortgage payments. The Neelys contend that after Regions sent notice in early February 2003 that they were behind $4,220.07 on their mortgage, they sent Regions three checks in early March 2003 totaling that very amount. While the Neelys claim that they mailed the checks, Regions claims it never received them. But even assuming that the Neelys mailed the checks as they claim, since another month had gone by, the Neelys would have owed another month’s mortgage payment in addition to the $4,220.07. Thus, even crediting the Neelys’ story, they were still behind in their mortgage and Regions could foreclose on the property. The Neelys next argue that Regions was not entitled to summary judgment in light of Temple-Inl and Mortgage Corp. v. Jones, 749So. 2d 1161 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). There, Temple-Inland sent the mortgagor a series ofletters telling him that hewas behind
on his mortgage and informing him of the amount of theNo. 07-60328

3 del inquency. I d. at 1163–64. After Temple-Inland threatened to foreclose, the mortgagor brought suit several months later, alleging that Temple-Inland was trying to wrongfully foreclose on his property. Id. at 1164. I n determining what duties Temple-Inland had to its mortgagor, the court quoted an earlier Mississippi Supreme Court case that held that the mortgagee in that case was “‘estopped from exercising the right conferred upon him in the mortgage contract to declare the entire amount ofthe indebtedness due prior to its maturity without first rendering to . . . [the mortgagor] a true and correct account o f the amounts received by him, and the balance due on the indebtedness, and giving [the mortgagor] a reasonable opportunity to pay the past due interest and taxes

. . . .’” I d. at 1167 (quoting Johnson v. Gore , 80So. 2d 731, 737 (Miss. 1955)). With that standard as i ts guide, the court held that to the extent that Mississippi law placed a duty on TempleInland “to provide an accounting of the indebtedness necessary to avoid a foreclosure before the mortgagee can proceed with a foreclosure sale,” it had complied with its obligations. Id. at 1168. The Neelys contend that there are disputes o f material fact with respect towhether Regions has complied with its duties under Temple-Inland

. But the undisputed evidence establishes that the facts of this case are materially indistinguishable from TempleInland. Regions sent several letters to the Neelys informing them of their delinquency, as was the case in T emple-Inland; while the Neelys claim not to have received some ofthese letters, Mississippi law presumes that an i ndividual receives a letter sent in the mail unless that individual can come forward with evidence to the contrary—a statement by a party that he or she did not receive theNo. 07-60328

4 mail, as is the case here, is insufficient as a matter of law to
overcomethe presumption. H oltv. Miss. EmploymentSec. Comm’n, 724 So. 2d 466, 471 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). Moreover, as in T empleInland, the Neelys had sufficient opportunity to cure their delinquency; indeed, they had an opportunity in March 2003 when they chose to send checks that failed to properly cure their delinquency. Accordingly, Regions did not violate its duties to the Neelys and Regions was entitled to summary judgment. 2. The Neelys next contend that the district court should not have granted the Pierce Ledyard lawfirm, and itsemployee, Helen Joyce, summary judgment. Regions hired Pierce Ledyard to stand in as trustee on the deed of trust securing the promissory note on the Neelys’ property. The firm was hired to initiate foreclosure proceedings against the Neelys because of their perpetual delinquency on their mortgage. Under Mississippi law, a deed of trust is only superficially analogous toa conventional trust and is “little more than a common law mortgage with a power to convey in the event of default.” Wansley v. First Nat’l Bank of Vicksburg, 566 So. 2d 1218, 1223 (Miss. 1990). Thus, Pierce Ledyard and its employees did not have the typical duties associated with a trustee; instead they owed the Neelys no duties “until called upon to foreclose,” at which point the duties were “limited to c onducting a fair and impartial sale according to law and the contract between the parties.” K.F. B OAKLE , MISS

. R EAL E STATE F ORECLOSURE L AW § 2:3 (2d ed. 2006). In other words, the scope of Pierce Ledyard’s duties did not extend beyond the foreclosure sale.No. 07-60328

5 The Neelys concede that Pierce Ledyard, acting through Joyce, did notviolate any dutieswith respect to the foreclosure sale. Instead, they cite cases, such as Temple-Inland (discussed above), that delineate the duties of a mortgagee—i.e., Regions’s duties to the Neelys. But those cases have nothing to do with the duties Pierce Ledyard, acting as trustee , owed the Neelys. And because there is no dispute that Pierce Ledyard and Joyc e did not violate their trustee duties with respect to their conduct of the foreclosure sale, they were properly granted summary judgment. 3. The Neelysalsoargue that they should not have been ordered topay some of the attorneys fees of Regions as a sanction. We review the district court’s decision to sanction the Neelys for an abuse of discretion. J ackson MarineCorp. v. Harvey Barge Repair, Inc., 794 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1986). Thedistrict court sanctioned Mr. Neely approximately $6,000 for violating 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The district court awarded Regions attorney fees to reimburse it for the fees associated with the March 2006 motion for contempt hearing. Mr. Neely, a licensed attorney who by March 2006was representing himselfand his wife, failed to appear for the hearing. Mr. Neely claims he never received notice of the hearing even though the district court sent Mr. Neely both mail and electronicnotice. But even if Mr. Neely did not receive the mailed notice, he had been required since January 2006 to register with the electronic notice system because he was acting as his own attorney. Thus, if Mr. Neely did not receive notice, it was his own fault. The Neelys also argue that since 28 U.S.C. § 1927 allows only attorneys, not litigants, to be sanctioned, the provision is inapplicable since they were represented by counsel. But thisNo. 07-60328

6 ignores that Ms. Neely was expressly not sanctioned under this provision and Mr. Neely was sanctioned only for his conduct when he was acting as an attorney in this litigation. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Regions fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion i n determining that the billing records of Regions in support of its attorney-fee request were specific enough to sustain an award. The district court also sanctioned the Neelys approximately $6,000 for violating Rule 11(b)(3) o f the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Regions was awarded fees for this violation to compensate it for the Neelys making a frivolous factual contention—that they were no longer behind on their mortgage when they mailed three checks in March 2003. The Neelys contend that their factual contention was not frivolous, but as explained above, even assuming they did in fact mail checks to Regions, they
w ould still have been behind in their mortgage payment—a fact they ignored before the district court. The Neelys also state that they cannot besanctioned becausethey were represented by counsel during the suit. But litigants can be sanctioned under Rule 11 even ifthey are represented. SeeF ED

. R. C IV

. PROC

. 11(c)(1) (stating that “the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any . .

. party”). Thus, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by determining the suit was frivolous and sanctionable. Finally, the district court sanctioned the Neelys approximately $8,000 for violating Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Regions was awarded fees under Rule 37 to compensate it for the Neelys numerous and flagrant discoveryNo. 07-60328

7 violations. The district court also awarded Regions approximately $3,500 in costs. The Neelys make no argument that the district court abused its discretion with respect to either award and therefore any complaint they might have is waived. United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 611 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000). 4. Finally, the Neelys assert that the district court and magistrate judgesshould have recused themselves. The Neelys, however, make
no argument, cite no legal authority (including identifying the control ling standard), or point to any evidence supporting their position. Accordingly, they have waived the issue for lack of adequate briefing. Id. AFFIRMED.