alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### William T. HENDRICKSON, Patricia Hendrickson, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee

2017-1996

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 9, 2018

Stephen G. Schwarz, Faraci Lange, LLP, Rochester, NY, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.

Mollie Lenore Finnan, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Chad A. Readler, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Deborah A. Bynum.

(O'Malley, Schall, and Wallach, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark Anthony SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10047

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 20, 2017

*882Erica McCallum, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU-Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mark Anthony Simmons, Pro Se

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Mark Anthony Simmons appeals from the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 8582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct, 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Simmons’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Simmons the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
##### 



EXHIBIT 12.1
  ARCHSTONE-SMITH
    OPERATING TRUST
  COMPUTATION
    OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
 (Dollar
    amounts in thousands)
  Years Ended
    December 31,2005(1)


2004(1)


2003(1)


2002(1)


2001(1)Earnings from operations

$
134,378


$
116,701


$
114,244


$
117,336


$
95,723Add:Interest Expense


187,982



144,500



121,671



123,506



56,332Earnings as adjusted

$
322,360


$
261,201


$
235,915


$
240,842


$
152,055Fixed Charges:Interest expense

$
187,982


$
144,500


$
121,671


$
123,506


$
56,332Capitalized interest


39,111



23,572



26,854



32,377



29,186Total fixed charges

$
227,093


$
168,072


$
148,525


$
155,883


$
85,518Ratio of earnings to fixed charges


1.4



1.6



1.6



1.5



1.8     (1)
    
    Net earnings from discontinued operations have been reclassified
    for all periods presented.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6048

MUHAMMAD ABD SALEEM EURY, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CA-01-208) Submitted: June 12, 2003 Decided: June 17, 2003 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Muhammad Abd Saleem Eury, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Muhammad Eury appeals the district court’s order accepting a magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2254 petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Eury has not made the requisite showing. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
May 10, 2015
John R. Soard 38 Delsie Street Clarksville, AR 72830 (479) 739-5512 Cathy S. Lusk, Clerk Katrina McClenny, Deputy Clerk Twelfth Court ofAppeals 1517 West Front Street Suite 354 Tyler, Texas 75702 

## FILED IN COURT OF APPEALS 12thCourt ofAppeals District

CATHY S. LUSK, CI

RE: Case Number: 12-14-00211-CV
Trial Court Case Number: 3-42003; PerJudge Joe Clayton's Order on 1/9/2014; Case Nos. 3-XXXXX were rolled into this one number Style: John R. Soard V. Terry R. Thorn, Sheila Smith, Mary Page plus other defendants in the above Cases Ms. Cathy S. Lusk Twelfth Court ofAppeals: 

### No effort appears to have been made for about half the records that Irequested in my DESIGNATION OF RECORDS, (Clerk's Record pg. 29) Filed February 18, 2014) No mention has been made concerning my appeal ofthe summaryjudgment for the dismissal of B.Jeffery Doran for accepting a bribe, changing Circuit records and extortion of 

### property by allowing John R. Soard only $37.00 per month for all his separate livingexpenses. No mention has been made for the appeal ofthe consolidation of all cases with no reason being given. (PG 28, Clerk's record) 

### Inyour letter dated January 8, 2015, you allowed me only 10 days to provide specific items under the provisions of Requests for additional Items; how can this be when all the items requested were identified in my identification of records filed on February 18, 2014, almost 15 

### months ago? Inthis designation of records the reason was given; the judge ordered, with no known reason, that all cases be consolidated. In addition, this judge refused to put the parties in any hearing under oath thus giving all lawyers permission to lie at will and not commit perjury.

### Although you gave the Court Reporter, 30days to respond, Ihavereceived nothing from Misty McAdams 

## The 12* Court ofAppeals has already refused toallow tome supplementtheReporter's Record. It is imperative that Iuse these records to file a brief. 

### Ibelieveyoufurnished the attorney forTerry Thorn copies of records from yourfiles. Ifyou will afford me the same privilege, please call or write the cost for both volumes ofthe reporter's record filed by reporter McAdams on 11/24/14. Anotice on the Anderson County Clerk's Bulletin Board states, "IT IS A CRIMETO INTENTALLY OR KNOWUNGLY FILE A FRAUDENTINSTRUMENT WITH THE DISTRICTCLERK. 

### Noone inthe Clerk'sOffice has been able to tell me who Ishould report this crime to. 

### Ifyou can identifythe enforcing authority, please do or you need additional information from me please call (4790 739-5512.

CC: Ms. Janice Staples Anderson County Circuit Clerk 500 N. Church Street, Room 18 Palestine, TX75801 Ms. Misty McAdams Official Court Reporter 2100 F.M. 1817 Elkhart, Texas 75839 ruly yours, r\ , 

# aj^A John R. Soard
No. 12A141 (12-5375).

#### Cornick *v.*Byong Yu.

C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>




<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONATINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
BALANCE SHEET AS OF MARCH 31, 1997 AND FROM THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          65,967
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   53,619
<ALLOWANCES>                                       377
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                       1,088,028
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0<F2>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,552,337
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                      3,711,645
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,545,357)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,552,337
<SALES>                                        189,412
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               190,035
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  122,480
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              76,943
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (33,977)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (33,977)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (33,977)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>THE PARTNERSHIP HAS AN UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET; THEREFORE, THE VALUE IS $0.
<F2>THIS INFORMATION IS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE PARTNERSHIP'S FORM 10-Q FILING.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 18, 2014

No. 04-14-00300-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.J.M. AND H.J.M., CHILDREN,

From the 83rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas

Trial Court No. 29724

Honorable Sergio J. Gonzalez, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellant’s brief is currently due July 23, 2014. On July 15, 2014, appellant filed a motion for 

extension of time to file the brief. The basis for the motion is the assertion that the reporter’s record, 

which was filed in this court by Ms. Patricia Abeyta, is incomplete and/or defective. Appellant provided 

Ms. Abeyta with a letter pointing out those portions of the record that are missing. Appellant has 

requested that the reporter file a corrected reporter’s record that includes all of the testimony and 

exhibits. We have reviewed the reporter’s record and find appellant is correct – the reporter’s record is 

incomplete. Accordingly, we ORDER the court reporter, Ms. Patricia Abeyta, to file a complete, proper 

reporter’s record with this court on or before August 18, 2014. The reporter is advised that no 

extensions of time to file the record will be granted absent written proof of extraordinary circumstances.

As for appellant’s brief, we DENY AS MOOT the motion to extend time to file appellant’s brief.

Because the complete reporter’s record has not been filed, appellant’s brief is not yet due. Appellant’s 

brief will be due thirty days after the date the reporter filed the complete reporter’s record in this court.

We strongly urge the reporter to ensure the record is complete and accurate, and we suggest that appellant 

review the record when it is filed to ensure it is complete.

 We order the clerk of this court to serve this order on all counsel, the court reporter – Patricia 

Abeyta, and the trial court.

___________________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on 

this 18th day of July, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
EX-4.68



 Exhibit 4.68 

Supplementary Agreement to the Amended and Restated Loan Agreement 

This Supplementary Agreement to the Amended and Restated Loan Agreement (the “Agreement”) is entered into as of March 1, 2014 in Beijing by the
following parties: 
 Party A: Baidu Online Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. 

Address: 3/F, Baidu Campus, No. 10 Shangdi 10th Street, Haidian District, Beijing 100085, The People’s Republic of China 

Party B: Robin Yanhong Li 
 ID number: *** 

Party C: Zhan Wang 
 ID number: *** 

(each a “Party” and collectively, the “Parties”) 

Whereas: 
 Pursuant to an Amended and Restated Loan Agreement
(the “Original Agreement”) entered into as of March 22, 2005 by Party A, Party B and Eric Yong Xu ( the “Original Party C”), Party A provides a RMB1,500,000 and a RMB500,000 interest-free loan to Party B and
the Original Party C respectively for their investment to Baidu Netcom Science Technology Co., Ltd. (“Baidu Netcom”) and the term of loans ended after ten (10) years commencing from the date the borrowers receive the loans. The
term of loans may be extended by a written consent of the parties to the Original Agreement. 
 Party A and Party B entered into an Additional Loan
Agreement in May 2008, pursuant to which the interest-free loan provided by Party A to Party B for his investment to Baidu Netcom be increased to RMB 99,500,000. 

Party A, Party B and Party C entered into a Renewal Agreement to the Amended and Restated Loan Agreement, pursuant to which, Party C replaces the Original
Party C as a Party to the Original Agreement and undertakes all the rights and obligations of the Original Party C under the Original Agreement (including but not limited to the obligation of repayment of the Original Party C’s loan under the
Original Agreement) and shall be referred to as “Party C” going forward. 
 The Parties intend to extend the term of loans under the Original
Agreement. 
 As a consensus reached by the Parties, the Parties agree: 

Upon the expiry of the term of loans under the Original Agreement, the term of loans shall be extended for additional ten (10) years. 

This Agreement shall be executed in three originals, each party holding one original. This Agreement is an integral part of the Original Agreement. All the
originals shall have the same legal effect. 
 [Signature page follows] 







 (No content on this page) 

Party A: Baidu Online Network Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. 

Legal representative/Authorized Signatory: /s/ Zhan Wang 

Party B: /s/ Robin Yanhong Li 
 Party C: /s/ Zhan Wang


  
 2
# Puerto Rico

- U.S. Department of Education Supports Government of Puerto Rico's Move to Decentralize the Puerto Rico Department of Education Today, the U.S. Department of Education (the Department) expressed its support for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's decision and commitment to decentralize the Puerto Rico Department of Education (PRDE).
- U.S. Department of Education Approves Puerto Rico’s Plan for Use of American Rescue Plan Funds to Support K-12 Schools and Students, Distributes Remaining $990 Million to Puerto Rico Today, the U.S. Department of Education (Department) announced the  approval of Puerto Rico’s American Rescue Plan Elementary and Secondary School  Emergency Relief (ARP ESSER) plan and distributed remaining ARP ESSER funds to  them.
#### Norma RIVERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC, DBA Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15932

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 26, 2018

Norma Rivera, Pro Se

William Habdas, Attorney, Ariel Edward Stern, Esquire, Attorney, Akerman LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Ap-pellee

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Norma Rivera appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. *See Kwan v. SanMedica Int'l,*854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

*684The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l) because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the alleged communications were attempts to collect a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA. *See Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858*F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Actions’ taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); *Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC,*852 F.3d 964, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity, it does so *only*through Section 1692f(6)”); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain suffi-’ cient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claim under § 1692g because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she made a timely debt validation request or that defendant’s response failed to comply with the requirements of § 1692g. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1692g; *Iqbal,*556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claims under §§ 1692d, 1692j, and 1692i because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. *See*15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692j and 1692i; *Iqbal,*556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
No. 11-10789.

#### VanderZwaag *v.*United States.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 *


In connection with the Annual Report of PGI Incorporated (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Laurence A. Schiffer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbones-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
         of the Company.



/s/ Laurence A. Schiffer
---------------------------------------
    Laurence A. Schiffer
    Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)        March 30, 2007


<FN>
*A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company
 and will be retained by the Company and will be furnished to the Securities
 and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 32.2


     CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350


I, Howard L. Flanders, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
All American Semiconductor, Inc., hereby certify, to my knowledge:

         (1)      that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of All American
                  Semiconductor, Inc. for the quarterly period ended on June 30,
                  2004 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
                  date hereof at File No. 0-16207 (the "Report") fully complies
                  with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
                  applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      that the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
                  in all material respects, the financial condition and results
                  of operations of All American Semiconductor, Inc.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document.




Date:  August 13, 2004      /s/ HOWARD L. FLANDERS
                            ----------------------------------------------------
                            Howard L. Flanders
                            Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
# C_2023173EN.01001102.xml

| 15.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 173/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 173/11

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 22 December 2022 — M.C.S. v Banco Santander, S.A.

(Case C-779/22, Banco Santander)

(2023/C 173/17)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: M.C.S.

Respondent: Banco Santander, S.A.

Question referred

Must the provisions of Article 34(1)(a) and (b), read together with those of Article 53(1) and (3) and Article 60(2), first subparagraph, points (b) and (c), of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 May 2014, (1) be interpreted as meaning that the possible claim or right that arises from a judgment against the successor entity to Banco Popular Español, S.A., as a consequence of the nullity of the purchase of a capital instrument (preference shares) which was ultimately converted into ordinary shares before the measures for the resolution of Banco Popular were adopted (7 June 2017), could be considered a liability affected by the write-down provision of Article 53(3) of Directive 2014/59, in as much as it relates to ‘unaccrued’ obligations or claims, such that it would be discharged and would not be enforceable against Banco Santander, as the successor entity to Banco Popular, where the claim from which that obligation arises was brought after the procedure for the resolution of the bank had been concluded?

Or, conversely, must those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the abovementioned claim or right constitutes an ‘accrued’ obligation (Article 53(3) of the Directive) or ‘liability already accrued’ at the time of the resolution of the bank (Article 60(2)(b)) — and, as such, excluded from the effects of the discharge or cancellation of those obligations or claims, even if the ordinary shares had been written off and cancelled — and, consequently, [that the abovementioned claim or right] is enforceable against Banco Santander, as the successor to Banco Popular, even where the claim from which that judgment ordering payment of compensation arises was brought after the procedure for the resolution of the bank had been concluded?

---

(1)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).

---