96-594

 No. 96-594

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

LINDIA GROOMS,

 Petitioner and Appellant,

 v.

PONDEROSA INN,

 Employer,

STATE COMPENSATION MUTUAL

INSURANCE FUND

 and

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY,

 Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, State of Montana

 The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Don Edgar Burris, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana

 For Respondents:

 Ann E. Clark, State Compensation Insurance Fund, Helena, Montana

 Robert J. Campbell, Department of Labor & Industry, Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: March 13, 1997

 Decided: July 15, 1997

Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Lindia Grooms (Grooms) appeals from the order and judgment entered by the

Workers' Compensation Court which rejected her constitutional challenges to certain

Occupational Disease Act statutes and dismissed her petition. We affirm.

 We address the following issues on appeal:

 1. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms' right to

due process was not violated when the State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund

determined that her claim should be processed under the Occupational Disease Act of

Montana?

 2. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms' right to

choose her treating physician was not violated by the statute permitting the 

Department

of Labor and Industry to select an occupational disease medical panel physician to

examine her for the purpose of determining whether she was suffering from an

occupational disease? 

 3. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms' right to

equal protection of the laws was not violated by the statutory requirement that a 

claimant

requesting a second examination by a panel physician pay for the examination?

 4. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms was not

deprived of the right to legal redress?

 BACKGROUND

 Grooms filed a workers' compensation claim with the State Compensation Mutual

Insurance Fund (State Fund), her employer's workers' compensation insurer. She 

alleged

she was suffering from dermatitis, a skin allergy condition. The State Fund denied

liability under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) and, pursuant to the Occupational

Disease Act of Montana (ODA), requested the Department of Labor and Industry (the

Department) to schedule an examination of Grooms by a member of the occupational

disease medical panel. Grooms objected to the first physician designated and the

Department subsequently designated Dr. Stephen Behlmer (Behlmer), a Helena

dermatologist, as the examining physician. Grooms did not pursue the workers'

compensation claim after the State Fund denied it.

 Behlmer diagnosed Grooms as suffering from "atopic dermatitis," a condition

which is largely hereditary but which also has environmental components. He stated 

that

household products, such as soap and ammonia, may trigger the condition and that he

could not determine whether Grooms' condition was aggravated by her work. Based on

Behlmer's report, the Department issued an "Order Referring Copy of Medical Reports

To Parties" (Order) which informed Grooms and the State Fund of its preliminary

determination that Grooms' claim would be denied and she would not be entitled to

occupational disease benefits. The Order also notified the parties that either of 

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them

could request a second examination by a medical panel physician, at their own 

expense,

and that either party could request a hearing. Grooms requested a second examination

and the Department scheduled it. Grooms then submitted an affidavit to proceed in 

forma

pauperis and requested the Department to pay for the second examination. The

Department denied Grooms' request and the second examination did not take place. 

 Grooms subsequently petitioned for a hearing with the Department's hearings 

unit,

advancing various constitutional challenges. She then moved to dismiss her petition 

on

the basis that the Department did not have jurisdiction to determine her 

constitutional

issues. The Department agreed that it was without jurisdiction and dismissed the 

petition. 

Grooms appealed the Department's dismissal order to the Workers' Compensation Court. 

 The Workers' Compensation Court deemed Grooms' action a petition for

declaratory judgment, rather than an appeal. Following consideration of the parties'

briefs, the court concluded that (1) the statutes permitting the State Fund to 

determine that

a claim should be processed under the ODA did not violate Grooms' due process rights;

(2) the Department's designation of an examining physician from the occupational 

disease

panel for the purpose of determining whether a claimant is suffering from an 

occupational

disease did not violate Grooms' right to choose her own treating physician; (3) the

requirement that a claimant requesting a second examination by a panel physician pay 

for

the examination did not violate Grooms' right to equal protection; and (4) Grooms was

not deprived of the right to legal redress. The Workers' Compensation Court entered 

its

order and judgment dismissing Grooms' petition and Grooms appeals.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Grooms asserts error with regard to the Workers' Compensation Court's legal

conclusions. We review the court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are

correct. Turjan v. Valley View Estates (1995), 272 Mont. 386, 390, 901 P.2d 76, 79

(citing Caekaert v. State Compensation Mutual Ins. Fund (1994), 268 Mont. 105, 111,

885 P.2d 495, 498). DISCUSSION

 1. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms' right to

due process was not violated when the State Fund determined that her claim should be

processed under the Occupational Disease Act of Montana?

 Grooms argued in the Workers' Compensation Court--and argues on appeal--that

her right to due process was denied by the State Fund's unilateral determinations 

that she

had not suffered an "injury" as defined in the WCA and that her claim should be

processed pursuant to the ODA. According to Grooms, the State Fund's decisions

deprived her of the notice and opportunity to be heard on her workers' compensation

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claim which due process requires. 

 The Workers' Compensation Court concluded that, when the State Fund denied

Grooms' workers' compensation claim, she retained statutory rights to request 

mediation

of the dispute before a Department mediator and to petition the Workers' Compensation

Court to determine that she had suffered a compensable injury. On that basis, it 

rejected

Grooms' assertion that the State Fund had effectively deprived her of a claim under 

the

WCA without affording her notice and an opportunity to be heard and concluded that

Grooms had not been deprived of her right to due process.

 Grooms argues that the court erred as a matter of law. The only authorities she

advances, however, reiterate general due process concepts too well-established to 

need

repeating. Grooms cites to no authority under which the State Fund itself would be

required to hold a hearing in advance of denying her workers' compensation claim. 

Nor

does she address the Montana statutes which clearly provide procedures under which

workers' compensation claimants can have their claims determined after denial by the

insurer.

 Section 39-71-2401(1), MCA, provides that, when a dispute arises concerning

benefits under the WCA, the parties involved in the dispute must bring the matter 

before

a Department mediator. In the event mediation does not resolve the dispute, either 

party

may petition the Workers' Compensation Court for a resolution. Section 39-71-2401

(1),

MCA. Section 39-71-2905, MCA, mirrors 39-71-2401(1), MCA, by providing that,

after satisfying the statutory dispute resolution requirements, either a claimant or 

an

insurer may petition the Workers' Compensation Court for a determination of a dispute

concerning benefits under the WCA. 

 Grooms did not avail herself of the available statutory procedures for 

resolution

of her dispute with the State Fund over her asserted entitlement to workers' 

compensation

benefits; indeed, she took no further action on her workers' compensation claim 

after the

State Fund denied it. Nonetheless, those statutory procedures were available to her 

and

the State Fund's decisions to deny her workers' compensation claim and to process it

pursuant to the ODA did not deprive her of the opportunity to be heard on that 

claim. 

Grooms simply failed to take advantage of the due process afforded her under the 

WCA. 

We hold, therefore, that the Workers' Compensation Court correctly concluded that

Grooms' right to due process was not denied. 

 2. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms' right to

choose her treating physician was not violated by the statute permitting the 

Department

to select an occupational disease medical panel physician to examine her for the 

purpose

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of determining whether she was suffering from an occupational disease? 

 When the State Fund denied Grooms' workers' compensation claim, it requested

the Department to schedule, pursuant to 39-72-602, MCA, an examination of Grooms

by a medical panel physician. The Department did so and Grooms was examined by

Behlmer. Grooms contended that the statutory procedures for an examination by a 

panel

physician deprived her of her right under 33-22-111, MCA, to select her own 

treating

physician. 

 The Workers' Compensation Court determined that the 33-22-111, MCA, right

to select a physician is limited to selection of a treating physician and that 

examinations

by panel physicians are in the nature of independent medical examinations used only 

for

the purpose of assessing whether the claimant suffers from an occupational disease. 

The

court further determined that an ODA claimant is not required to undergo treatment by

the panel physician who conducts the examination. On that basis, the Workers'

Compensation Court concluded that the examination required by 39-72-602(2)(a),

MCA, did not infringe on Grooms' right to choose her treating physician. We agree.

 Section 33-22-111, MCA, provides, in pertinent part, that

 [a]ll policies of disability insurance . . . must provide that the insured has

 full freedom of choice in the selection of any licensed physician . . . for

 treatment of any illness or injury within the scope and limitations of the

 person's practice.

This statute clearly provides an insured the freedom to choose a treating physician; 

it does

not require, however, that an insured be allowed to choose any and all physicians who

may be utilized during the determination of an ODA claim. Section 39-72-602, MCA,

on the other hand, authorizes the Department to select a panel physician to 

independently

examine the claimant to assist in determining whether the claimant suffers from an

occupational disease. This examination is separate from, and in addition to, any

examination and treatment a claimant may choose to pursue. There is no requirement 

in

 39-72-602, MCA, that the claimant proceed with treatment from the panel physician

selected to conduct the examination. 

 Grooms also argues that her right to choose a treating physician is violated by 

the

operation of 39-72-602(2)(b), MCA, which provides that either the insurer or the

claimant may request an additional examination by a second panel physician. She

contends that, inherent in her right to choose her treating physician, is the right 

to have

her chosen physician suggest or designate a qualified expert to conduct the second

examination and that it is impermissible to limit her selection to those physicians 

who are

members of the occupational disease medical panel. Grooms cites to Stordalen v. 

Ricci's

Food Farm (1993), 261 Mont. 256, 862 P.2d 393, for the proposition that the State 

Fund

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cannot unreasonably deny a claimant's request to be examined by a physician of her

choice and argues that, as a result, the Department also should not be able to deny 

her

the choice of a physician for her second examination. 

 In Stordalen, the Workers' Compensation Court determined that the State Fund

unreasonably denied Stordalen's request pursuant to Rule 24.29.1403(3), ARM, for a

neurological consultation with a physician of her choice; the issue on appeal was 

whether

the State Fund's denial of the request was unreasonable for purposes of imposing a

penalty and attorney fees. Stordalen, 862 P.2d at 394-95. Stordalen involved 

neither 

39-72-602(2)(b), MCA, nor an ODA examination by a medical panel physician at the

Department's request. Thus, it has no application to the case presently before us.

 We hold that the Workers' Compensation Court correctly concluded that Grooms' 

right to choose her treating physician was not violated by the statute permitting the

Department to select a medical panel physician to examine her for the purpose of

determining if she was suffering from an occupational disease. 

 3. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms' right

to equal protection of the laws was not violated by the statutory requirement that a

claimant requesting a second examination by a panel physician pay for the 

examination?

 The Workers' Compensation Court determined that Grooms' ability to seek or

receive benefits under the ODA was not impeded by the requirement that she pay for a

second examination if she requested one. The court noted that Grooms was entitled to

one examination under the ODA for which she was not required to pay and that she was

also entitled to a hearing on her claim before the Department at which she could 

present

her own evidence to support her claim. The Workers' Compensation Court concluded

that a second examination, at Grooms' expense, was not a prerequisite to pursuit of

Grooms' claim and, therefore, the requirement that she pay for a second examination 

if

she requested one did not violate equal protection.

 Grooms' argument in this regard appears to be twofold. First, she contends that

requiring her to pay for the second examination she requested under the ODA violates

equal protection because she would not have been required to pay for such an

examination had her claim remained under the WCA. Second, Grooms contends that 

39-72-602, MCA, violates equal protection because it requires a mandatory physical

examination without providing for a waiver of the costs of the examination for an 

indigent

claimant.

 Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Heisler v. Hines 

Motor

Co. (Mont. 1997), 937 P.2d 45, 50, 54 St.Rep. 345, 348 (citations omitted). The 

party

challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a

reasonable doubt and, if any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the 

statute. 

Heisler, 937 P.2d at 50. 

 The equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution require that all 

persons

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be treated alike under like circumstances. Heisler, 937 P.2d at 50 (citations 

omitted). 

We apply the rational relationship test to equal protection challenges to workers'

compensation statutes. Heisler, 937 P.2d at 50 (quoting Stratemeyer v. Lincoln 

County

(1993), 259 Mont. 147, 151, 855 P.2d 506, 509 (citation omitted)). In order to pass 

the

"rational relationship" or "rational basis" test, a challenged legislative enactment 

" 'must

implicate legitimate goals, and the means chosen by the legislature must bear a 

rational

relationship to those goals.' " Heisler, 937 P.2d at 50 (quoting Lyng v. Automobile

Workers (1988), 485 U.S. 360, 375, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 1194, 99 L.Ed.2d 380, 394

(Marshall, J., dissenting)). Grooms' equal protection challenges to certain ODA 

statutes

and procedures are premised on the rational basis test.

 Grooms first argues that her equal protection guarantees are infringed by the

requirement that, if she requests a second examination pursuant to 39-72-602(2)(b),

MCA, she must pay the costs of that examination, whereas if her claim had proceeded

under the WCA, 39-71-605, MCA, would require the insurer or the Department to pay

those costs. Grooms misreads 39-71-605, MCA.

 Section 39-71-605(1)(a), MCA, provides that an insurer or the Department may

require a workers' compensation claimant submit to physical examinations from time to

time at the insurer's or Department's cost. It does not authorize a workers' 

compensation

claimant to request and obtain an examination and require the insurer to pay for it. 

Similarly, the Department may require an independent examination of a workers'

compensation claimant on the request of either the claimant or the insurer. Section 

39-

71-605(2), MCA. In such a case, the party requesting the examination must pay the 

cost

of the examination. Section 39-71-605(2), MCA. Thus, 39-71-605, MCA, does not

allow a workers' compensation claimant to request and obtain an examination at the

insurer's expense. As a result, no disparate treatment of claimants exists between 

the

WCA and the ODA in this regard and the premise underlying this portion of Grooms'

equal protection argument fails. 

 Grooms also argues that the ODA violates equal protection by requiring a

mandatory physical examination without providing for a waiver of costs for those

examinations for indigent claimants. On this basis, she contends that indigent 

claimants,

as a class, are discriminated against under the ODA. Again, however, Grooms

mischaracterizes the controlling statute and, as a result, the premise underlying 

this

portion of her equal protection argument also fails.

 When an insurer has not accepted liability for an ODA claim, the Department must

designate a medical panel physician to examine the claimant and determine whether she

is suffering from an occupational disease. Section 39-72-602(2)(a), MCA. The 

expense

of this examination is borne by the insurer. Section 39-72-608, MCA. Thus, while it

is mandatory that an ODA claimant submit to an examination for the purpose of 

assessing

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the compensability of the claim, the claimant is not required to pay for the 

examination. 

In the event either the claimant or the insurer is dissatisfied with the result of 

the first

examination, that party may request a second examination. Section 39-72-602(2), 

MCA. 

The party requesting the second examination must pay for it. Section 39-72-608, MCA.

 Sections 39-72-602 and 39-72-608, MCA, simply do not mandate an examination

at the claimant's expense under any circumstance. While a claimant may be required 

to

submit to two physical examinations thereunder, the claimant never pays for the 

first and

pays for the second only when she initiates the request for it. When a claimant 

requests

the examination, that examination cannot be characterized as a mandatory 

examination. 

As a result, the ODA does not require an examination at the claimant's cost which 

could

violate equal protection.

 We hold that the Workers' Compensation Court correctly concluded that Grooms'

right to equal protection of the laws was not violated by the statutory requirement 

that the

party requesting a second examination by an occupational disease panel physician pay 

for

the examination. 

 4. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Grooms was not

deprived of the right to legal redress?

 The Workers' Compensation Court rejected Grooms' argument that her asserted

inability to pay for a second examination by a medical panel physician denied her 

access

to a forum for resolving her ODA claim in violation of Article II, Section 16 of the

Montana Constitution. Observing that Grooms could have requested, and obtained, a

hearing before the Department pursuant to 39-72-611, MCA, at which she would have

been entitled to present evidence, the Workers' Compensation Court concluded that

Grooms had not been precluded from litigating her ODA claim on the basis of her

asserted inability to pay for a second examination, or on any other basis.

 The Department's Order stated that, on the basis of the examining physician's

report, the Department's determination would be to deny Grooms' ODA claim. The

Order also outlined the parties' rights to request a second examination pursuant 

to 39-

72-602, MCA, and to request a hearing pursuant to 39-72-611, MCA, before the

Department issued its final determination on Grooms' entitlement to occupational 

disease

benefits. 

 Grooms contends on appeal that she could not afford to pay for a second

examination to rebut the findings of the physician who conducted the first 

examination. 

As a result, she asserts that she was effectively denied the ability to pursue her 

claim. 

Grooms mischaracterizes the purpose of the second examination available under 39-

72-

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602(2), MCA, and ignores her statutory rights under the ODA. 

 Under 39-72-602(2), MCA, the Department selects a medical panel physician to

conduct an independent examination of an ODA claimant; the physician is not 

affiliated

with either the insurer or the claimant. A second examination under 39-72-602(2),

MCA, is an additional independent examination by a physician not affiliated with 

either

party. It is not conducted to provide the party requesting the examination with 

evidence

to "rebut" the findings of the first examining physician, but rather to provide a 

second

objective report regarding a claimant's physical condition vis-a-vis entitlement to

occupational disease benefits. 

 Moreover, 39-72-611, MCA, permits an ODA claimant to request a hearing on

her claim before the Department issues its final decision; if a hearing is 

requested, it must

be held. Sections 39-72-611 and 39-72-612, MCA. Entitlement to a hearing is

unqualified; that is, a second examination, at the expense of the requesting party, 

is not

a prerequisite to entitlement to a hearing. Thus, even assuming Grooms could not 

afford

a second examination pursuant to 39-72-602(2)(b), MCA, she could have requested a

hearing and presented evidence such as the testimony and records of her treating

physician in support of her asserted entitlement to occupational disease benefits. 

That

Grooms did not request a hearing does not negate the availability of the hearing and 

the

opportunity to establish the compensability of her occupational disease claim.

 In essence, Grooms' argument here is that her right to legal redress requires 

the

State Fund--and, indirectly, her employer--or the Department--and, indirectly, 

Montana

taxpayers--to finance her efforts to establish her occupational disease claim. She 

cites to

no authority for such a proposition and we know of none.

 We hold that the Workers' Compensation Court did not err in concluding that

Grooms was not deprived of her right to full legal redress by the application of 

39-72-

608, MCA.

 Affirmed.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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