### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CY A PPE L L A T E PA N E L OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: PA U L A . MO R

A BITO , Deb to r. EDW A R D BA Y U K ; SN O W

SHO E PR O PER TIES, LLC , A p pellants, v. W ILLIA M A . LEO N A R D, JR ., C hapter 7 Trustee, A p pellee. BA P N o . N V-19-1267-GTaB Bk. N o . 3:13-b

k-51237-GW

Z A dv. N o . 3:16-ap-05041-GW Z

M E M ORA ND U M *

A ppeal fro

m the U nited States Bankruptc y C o urt fo r the Distric

t o f N evada Gregg W

. Z ive, Bankruptc

y Judge, Presiding Befo r e: GA N , TA Y LO R , and BR A N D, Bankruptc

y Judges.

INT ROD U CT I ON A ppellants Edward Bayuk (“Bayuk”) and Sno wsho e Pro perties, LLC (“Sno wsho e” and to

gether “A ppellants”) appeal the b ankruptc y c o urt’s 

# FIL ED
SEP 29 2020 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. B KCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T

* Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appropr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er

per suasi v e v alue i t may hav e, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no precedenti al v alue, see

9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.o

rder granting c

hapter 7

1 trustee W

illiam A . Leo nard, Jr.’s (“Trustee”)
m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm

ent o n his adversary c

o m plaint to rec o ver a preferenc

e. Trustee asserted that prepetitio n, Bayuk o

wed deb to r Paul A

. Mo rab ito (“Deb to r”) $1,617,050 and, in partial satisfac tio n o f that deb

t, Bayuk paid $732,124 to Bank o f A m eric a, N .A ., (“Bo

fA ”) to satisfy Deb

to r’s
o b ligatio n. The paym

ent extinguished the guaranty liab ility o f Sno wsho e, whic h was who

lly o wned b y Bayuk thro

ugh his trust. Trustee alleged that Bayuk’s paym

ent to Bo fA was a transfer o

f Deb to r ’s interest in pro

p erty whic h benefitted insiders Sno wsho e and Bayuk. Trustee argued that fac tual findings m

ade b y the N evada state c

o urt in related fraudulent transfer litigatio n were prec

lusive o f issues asserted in the preferenc

e litigatio

n. A ppellants did no

t dispute the fac

t s alleged b

y Trustee b

ut instead argued that the b ankruptc y c o urt sho uld no t give prec lusive effec

t to the state c

o urt findings. A p pellants have no t dem o nstrated that the b

ankruptc y c o u rt erred b

y granting sum

m ary judgm ent. W e A FFIR M. FA CT S A
. Prepetition E v ents In Septem

b er 2010, the N evada state c o urt rendered o

ral findings o

f

1 Unless speci fi ed other wi se, all chapter

and secti on r eferences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” r eferences ar

e to the Feder a

l Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all “Civ i l Rule” references ar e to the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e. 2fac

t and c o nc lusio ns o f law, finding Deb

to r and C o nso lidated N evada C o rpo ratio n (“C N C ”) liab

le to JH, Inc , Jerry Herb

st, and Berry-Hinc

kley Industries (the “Herb

st Parties”) in the am

o u nt o f $85,871,364.75. A fter further proc

eedings o

n c laim s fo r punitive dam

ages and atto

rneys’ fees, the state c o urt entered final judgm ent against Deb

to r and C N C in the am

o unt o f $149,444,777.80. Im

m ediately after the o

ral ruling in the state c

o urt c ase, Deb to r engaged in a series o

f transac tio ns to divest m

o st o f his assets. Prio r to the o ral ruling, Deb

to r and Bayuk eac

h o wned a 50% interest in a real estate ho

lding c o m pany c a lled Baruk Pro

perties, LLC . In O c

to ber 2010, Deb

to r transferred his 50% interest in Baruk Pro p erties to

Bayuk pursuant to

a Mem b ership Interest Transfer A greem ent (“Transfer A greem ent”). Baruk Pro

perties held fo

ur real pro

perties, inc

luding a
c o m m erc ial pro perty loc a t ed at 570 Glenneyre, Laguna Beac h, C A (“570 Glenneyre”). Based o

n the appraised values o f the fo u r pro p erties, Deb

to r’s 50% interest in Baruk Pro perties had a value o

f at least $1,654,550. A fter the transfer, Bayuk m

erged Baruk Pro

perties into

Sno wsho e whic h was who

lly
o wned b y the Edward W

illiam Bayuk Living Trust (the “Bayuk Trust”). U nder the term

s o f the Transfer A greem

ent, Bayuk was required to deliver a pro

m isso ry no te to Deb to r in the princ

ipal am o unt o f $1,617,050 (the “Baruk N o

te”). There was no

evidenc e that Bayuk m

ade any paym

ents ac c o r ding to the term s o f the Baruk N o

te. In Septem

b er 2012, Deb

to r and Bo fA entered into

a settlem

ent 3agreem

ent to reso lve Deb to r ’s defaults under a 2009 lo an agreem

ent. A s part o f the settlem

ent agreement, Sno

wsho e exec uted a lim

ited guaranty,
sec ured b y a first po

sitio n deed o f trust o n 570 Glenneyre. In Dec em ber 2012, Bayuk paid Bo fA $732,124.75 to

satisfy Deb

to r’s
o b ligatio ns under the Bo

fA settlem

ent agreement and to

reso lve Sno wsho e’s liab ility under the lim

ited guaranty. Bayuk treated the paym ent to Bo fA as a paym

ent o n the Baruk N o

te and Deb

to r adm itted that the paym

ent to Bo fA reduc ed his c laim against Bayuk o

n the Baruk N o te b y $732,124.75. B. T he Bankruptc

y and T he SuperPum

per A c tion In June 2013, the Herb

st Parties c

o m m enc ed an invo

luntary b ankruptc y petitio n against Deb

to r. The b ankruptc y c o urt denied Deb

to r ’s
m o tio n to dism iss the petitio

n and in Dec

em ber 2014 granted sum

m ary judgm ent against Deb

to r, adjudic

ating him a c

hapter 7 deb

to r. A n interim trustee was appo

inted in Dec

em ber 2014 and, in January 2015, Trustee was elec ted. In Dec em ber 2013, the Herb

s t Parties filed a fraudulent c o nveyanc e ac tio n in state c

o urt against SuperPum

per, Inc ., Deb to r , Bayuk, Salvato

re Mo rab ito , and Sno

w sho e Petro leum , Inc

. (the “SuperPum

per A c tio n”). The Herb s t Parties so

ught to avo id several transfers inc

luding the transfer o

f Deb to r’s o wnership interest in Baruk Pro perties. In May 2015, the parties in the SuperPum per A c tio n stipulated to
4rem

o ve the Herb

st Parties and sub

stitute Trustee as plaintiff. The parties also stipulated to

rem o ve Deb to r as a defendant. Trustee then filed an
am ended c o m p laint o n b ehalf o f the ba nkruptc y estate. The state c

o urt c o nduc ted a six-day b

enc h trial and entered its findings o f fac t and
c o nc lusio ns o f law in Marc

h 2019. A s part o

f the judgm

ent, the state c

o urt avo ided the transfer o

f Deb to r’s interest in Baruk Pro perties and awarded dam ages to the estate and against Bayuk in the am o unt o f $1,654,550. The c

o urt held that Deb

to r transferred his interest in Baruk Pro perties with ac

tual intent to

hinder, delay, o r defraud c

r edito rs. In finding ac

tual intent, the c

o urt relied o

n m ultiple “b

adges o f fraud,” inc

luding the c

o urt’s determ

inatio n that Bayuk was an insider o

f Deb to r. The state c

o urt determ

ined that the transfer was no t fo r reaso nab ly equivalent value bec

a use the Baruk N o

te was “illuso

ry, and c ertainly did
no t result in tangib

le assets availab

le fo r [Deb to r ’s] c redito rs.” C. T he Preferenc

e A c tion In Dec em ber 2016, Trustee filed an adversary c o m plaint alleging
avo idab le preferenc

es to A ppellants resulting fro m Bayuk’s paym

ent to Bo fA

. In January 2017, Bayuk filed a m o tio n to dism iss. The parties stipulated to

allo w Trustee to

file an am

ended c o m plaint, whic

h he filed in June 2017. A ppellants then filed a m o tio n to dism

iss the am

ended c o m p laint. 5They asserted that Trustee had no t alleged suffic

ient fac ts to state a prim

a fac ie c ase and that neither Bayuk no r Sno wsho e were insiders. A ppellants’ atto rney withdrew as c

o unsel o f rec o rd, and in Marc

h 2019, sub

stitute
c o u nsel filed an am

ended m o tio n to dism iss o n behalf o

f A ppellants. In the
am ended m o t io n to dism iss, A ppellants argued that b ec ause Bayuk had an
o b ligatio n to Deb to r under the Baruk N o

te, he did no

t ac quire any indem nific atio n rights b

y m aking the Bo

fA paym ent and neither Bayuk no r Sno wsho e were insiders. In A pril 2019, Trustee filed a m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm

ent. Trustee pro vided a statem

ent o f fac ts whic h inc luded stipulated fac

ts fro m related pro c eedings and the state c

o urt’s findings and c

o nc lusio ns in the SuperPum

per A c tio n. Trustee also

o ppo sed the am

ended m o tio n to dism iss and argued that the state c o urt’s findings c

o nc lusively dec

ided the issue o

f insider status. Trustee also argued that b

ec ause the state c

o urt fo und that the Baruk N o

te was a sham

, Bayuk had rec

o urse rights against Deb t o r. A ppellants o

p po sed the m

o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm

ent and, fo

r the first tim e, argued that the b

ankruptc y c o u rt lac ked c o nstitutio nal autho

rity to enter a final o

rder o n the preferenc

e ac t io n under S tern v. M a

rsha ll , 564 U .S. 462 (2011). A ppellants reiterated their argum ents that they were no

t insiders and that Bayuk lac ked rec o urse against Deb

to r , and additio

nally argued that there was a m aterial issue o

f fac t regarding whether Bo fA
rec eived m o re than it wo

u ld have under a hypo thetic al c hapter 7. 6A ppellants did no t dispute any o

f the fac t s asserted b

y Trustee in the statem ent o f fac ts. Instead, they argued that the fac tual findings m

ade b y the state c

o urt in the SuperPum

per A c tio n were no

t prec lusive under Gruntz v. C o unty o f Lo s Angeles (In re Gruntz

) , 202 F.3d 1074 (9th C ir. 2000) and that the state c

o urt judgm

ent was entered witho

u t jurisdic

tio n and in vio latio n o f the auto

m a tic stay. They pro

vided a dec

laratio n o f their atto rney whic

h stated that there was a questio n o f fac t ab o ut whether Bo

fA
rec eived m o re than it wo

u ld have under a hypo thetic al c hapter 7. Ho wever, A ppellants did no t pro vide any testim

o ny o r do c um entary evidenc e to dem o nstrate a genuine dispute o f m aterial fac

t o n this issue o

r any o ther. A fter a hearing, the b ankruptc y c o urt denied the am

ended m o tio n to dism iss and granted the m

o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm

ent. The b

a nkruptc y c o u rt entered written findings o f fac t and c o nc lusio ns o f law in A ugust 2019 in whic

h it determ

ined that issue prec

lusio n applied to

issues dec

ided in the SuperPum

per A c tio n. The b ankruptc y c o urt c o nc luded that the state
c o u rt had jurisdic

tio n o ver the SuperPum

per A c tio n and its o

rder did no

t vio late the auto

m atic stay. Based o

n the findings in the SuperPum per A c t io n and Trustee’s statem

ent o f fac ts, the b ankruptc y c o urt c o nc luded that Trustee had estab

lished A p pellants were no n-statuto ry insiders, and bec ause the Baruk N o

te was illuso

ry, Bayuk m

aintained a right o

f indem nific atio n fro m Deb to r. The b a nkruptc y c o urt entered a written 7judgm

ent o n N o vem ber 1, 2019. A ppellants tim ely appealed. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptc y c o urt had jurisdic

tio n under 28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(F). W

e have jurisdic

tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158(a). 2 ISSU E W hether the b a

nkruptc y c o urt erred b

y granting Trustee’s sum m ary judgm ent m o tio n. ST A ND A RD OF RE V I E W W e review the b a

nkruptc y c o urt’s grant o

f sum m ary judgm

ent de
no vo . Lewis v. K a

elin (In re C r

esta Tech. C o rp.) , 583 B.R . 224, 227 (9th C ir. BA P 2018). W e also review questio

ns o f issue prec

lusio n de no vo . Pik e v. H ester

,

2 Appellants i ni ti ally ar

gued that the bankr

uptcy cour

t lacked consti tuti onal author i ty to enter

a fi nal or d er

under Stern v. Marshall , 564 U.S . 462 (2011). If the preference acti on was a Stern clai m and Appellants di d not consent to entr y of fi nal or d er s by the bankr

uptcy cour

t, we would lack j ur

i s di cti on under

28 U.S .C. § 158(b). See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison , 573 U.S . 25, 36 (2014) ( Stern clai ms ar

e tr eated as non-core matter

s); 28 U.S

. C. § 157(c) (unless par ti es consent to entr

y of fi n al or der s, bankr uptcy cour

t may only enter

proposed fi ndi ngs of fact and conclusi ons of law on non-core matter

s wi th any fi n

al or der to be enter ed by the di str i ct cour t after d e nov o rev i ew). Appellants ar

guably consented to the bankr uptcy cour

t’s entr y of fi n al or der s by fai li n g to r ai se the i ssue i n thei r moti ons to di smi ss as r equi red by Local Rule 7012(b). See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S
. Ct. 1932, 1949 (2015) (bankr uptcy cour t has consti tuti onal author i ty to enter

fi nal or der

s wi th the expr ess or

i mpli ed consent of all par

ti es)

. Fur ther mor e, by electi ng to hav e thi s Panel hear the appeal, Appellants li kely wai v ed any r i ght to r ev i ew by an Ar ti cle III cour

t. See id. at 1944 (“The enti tlement to an Ar

ti cle III adj udi cator

i s a ‘per sonal r i ght’ and thus or d i n

ar i ly ‘subj ect to wai v er .’”) (quoti ng Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor , 478 U.S
. 833, 848 (1986)). Any questi on i n thi s regar d was r

esolv ed at or al ar

gument when Appellants expr essly wai

ved the Stern i ssue. 8891 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th C ir. 2018). U nder a de no vo review, we loo

k at the
m atter anew, giving no deferenc e to the bankruptc

y c o urt’s determ

inatio ns. In re C resta

Tech. C o r p. , 583 B.R . at 227.

D ISCU SSION A ppellants argue that the b ankruptc y c o urt erred b

y granting
sum m ary judgm

ent bec ause the b

ankruptc y c o urt im pro perly applied issue prec

lusio n, and there were m

aterial issues o

f fac t. A
. T he Bankruptc

y Court D id Not E rr By Giv ing Prec lus iv e E ffec

t T o State Court Finding

s “A b ankruptc y c o u rt m ay rely o n the issue prec

lusive effec

t o f an existing state c

o urt judgm

ent as the b

asis fo r granting sum

m a ry judgm ent.” Plya

m v. Precisio

n D ev., LLC (In re Plya

m ) , 530 B.R . 456, 462 (9th C ir. BA P 2015). In determ ining the issue-prec

lusive effec

t o f a state c

o urt judgm ent, the bankruptc

y c o urt m ust apply the law o

f the c o urt that rendered judgm

ent. Pik e , 891 F.3d at 1138. Bec

ause the judgm

ent was entered b

y the N evada state c

o urt, we apply N evada law. U nder N evada law, issue prec lusio n requires that (1) an issue b e identic al; (2) the initial ruling was o n the m erits and final; (3) “the party against who

m the judgm

ent is asserted” was a party in the prio r c ase, o r in privity with a party in the prio r c ase; and (4) the issue was ac tually and
nec essarily litigated. F ive S ta r C a pita l C o rp. v. R uby , 194 P.3d 709, 713 (N ev. 2008).
9Fo

r prec lusio n purpo ses, it is no

t relevant that the prio

r dec isio n was appealed, Edwa

rds v. Gha

ndo ur , 159 P.3d 1086, 1090 (N ev. 2007) a bro ga ted o n o ther gro unds by F ive S ta

r C a pita l C o rp. , 194 P.3d 709, o

r wro ngly dec ided. H o l t v. R eg’l Tr. S ervs. C o

rp. , 266 P.3d 602, 608 (N ev. 2011). Issue prec lusio n applies to

b o t h issues o

f law and fac

t. U niv. o f N ev. v. Ta

rk a nia n , 879 P.2d 1180, 1191 (N ev. 1994). A ppellants do

no t dispute that the requisite elem ents o f issue prec lusio n were present in this c ase. Instead, they argue that the findings
are no t b inding b ec

ause the state c

o urt lac ked sub j ec t m atter jurisdic

tio n and Trustee lac

ked standing to

pursue the c

laim s. They also

argue that the b ankruptc y c o urt failed to

c o nduc t the nec essary prec

lusio n analysis. 1. T he State Court Had Juris dic tion A ppellants argue that the state c o urt findings are no

t b inding o n the b ankruptc y c o urt under the ho

lding o f In re Gruntz , 202 F.3d 1074. In Gruntz , the N inth C irc

uit held that a state c

o urt judgm

ent entered in vio latio n o f the auto

m a tic stay was no

t b inding o n the bankruptc

y c o urt bec ause the state c

o urt did no

t have the po

wer to m o d ify o r disso lve the auto m atic stay. Id. at 1087. General prec lusio n rules do

no t apply to

state c o u rt judgm

ents invo

lving m atters that c

o m e within the b ankruptc y c o urt’s
exc lusive jurisdic

tio n. O dd-Bjo

rn H use v. H use-S po

rsem , A.S . (In re Birting F isheries, Inc.) , 300 B.R
. 489, 498 (9th C ir. BA P 2003). In the SuperPum

per A c tio n, Trustee asserted fraudulent transfer 10c

laim s under N evada law. These c laim s were no

t within the exc

lusive jurisdic tio n o f the bankruptc

y c o urt, and the state c

o urt’s jurisdic

tio n o ver state law c

laim s was no t preem p ted b y C o ngress’s grant o

f “o riginal b ut no t exc lusive jurisdic

tio n” to the bankruptc

y c o urt. S ee 28 U .S.C . § 1334(b

); H o p k ins v. Pla nt Insula tio n C o . , 349 B.R . 805, 812 (N .D. C al. 2006) (ho lding that state c

o urts retain c

o nc u rrent jurisdic

tio n o ver c laim s b ro ught pursuant to

§ 544(b )). The state c

o urt had sub

jec t m atter jurisdic

tio n o ver the state law fraudulent transfer c laim s. A ppellants have no

t pro vided any c

redib le argum ent that Trustee lac ked standing to

pursue the fraudulent transfer c laim s . A p pellants’ relianc e o n W illia m s v. C a lifo rnia 1st Ba nk , 859 F.2d 664 (9th C ir. 1988) is
m isplac ed. The W

illia m s c o urt held that a b

ankruptc y trustee do

es no t have standing to

assert general c

auses o f ac tio n o n behalf o

f individual c

redito rs. Id. at 667. Here, Trustee asserted the fraudulent transfer c laim s, no t o n behalf o f individual c

redito r s, b ut o n behalf o

f the estate. Sec

tio n 544(b )
em po w ers Trustee to

assert state law avo

idanc e ac tio ns o n b ehalf o f the estate, and § 541(a)(3) pro vides that rec

o very o n suc h c laim s b ec o m es pro perty o f the estate. A ltho ugh the Herb

st parties initiated the SuperPum per A c tio n, o nc e Trustee was appo

inted, he intervened as the plaintiff and filed an amended
c o m p laint asserting c

laim s o n behalf o

f the estate. A ppellants did no t o b jec t to Trustee’s standing and instead stipulated to sub stitutio n o f Trustee as
11plaintiff. Therefo re, they waived the issue. S ee C o ntra i l Lea sing Pa rtners, Ltd. v. Exec. S erv. C o

rp., 688 P.2d 765, 767 n.2 (N ev. 1984) (lac k o f standing m

ust be affirm

atively pleaded and failure to do so c o nstitutes waiver). 2. T he Bankruptc

y Court Properly A pplied Is s ue Prec lus ion A ppellants argue that the b ankruptc y c o urt im pro perly applied “o ffensive” issue prec

lusio n and failed to

c o nduc t the analysis required b y W eddell v. S ha

rp , 350 P.3d 80 (N ev. 2015), where the parties in the present
ac tio n were no

t identic al to tho se in the SuperPum

per A c tio n. O ffensive issue prec

lusio n “o c c urs when the plaintiff seeks to fo rec lo se the defendant fro

m litigating an issue the defendant has previo usly litigated unsuc

c essfully in an ac

t io n with ano

ther party.” Pa rk la ne H o siery C o ., Inc. v. S ho

re , 439 U
. S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979). The b ankruptc y c o urt did no

t apply o ffensive issue prec

lusio n here b ec

ause Trustee was the plaintiff in b o th ac tio ns. To the extent that A ppellants argue issue prec lusio n c an o nly b e used as a defense under N evada law, we disagree. O ther than the W eddell c o urt’s disc ussio n o f the “defenses” o

f c laim prec lusio n and issue prec

lusio n, A ppellants c

ite no autho rity to suppo rt their po

sitio n. C o ntrary to A ppellants’ argum

ent, the N inth C irc

uit, applying N evada law, has held that issue prec

lusio n m ay b e asserted b

y a plaintiff. S ee Pik

e , 891 F.3d at 1138. A ppellants’ argum ent that the b

ankruptc y c o urt was required to
12c

o nduc t a “W eddell analysis” is equally inappo site. In W

eddell , the N evada Suprem e C o urt m o d ified N evada law to

allo w no n-m utual c laim prec lusio n where a defendant was no t a party o

r in privity with a defendant in the prio

r ac tio n. 350 P.3d at 85. U nder the ho lding o f W eddell , a defendant who

was no t a party o

r in privity with a party in a prio r suit
c an still use c

laim prec lusio n to b ar sub sequent litigatio

n if it c an sho w that it sho uld have b

een inc luded as a defendant in the prio r suit and the plaintiff fails to

pro vide a go

o d reaso n fo r no t having do

ne so . Id

. The analysis required b y W eddell is no t applic ab le here b ec

ause A ppellants were parties, o r in privity with parties, in the SuperPum per A c t io n. N evada law “lim

it[s] the applic

atio n o f issue prec

lusio n to tho s e who were a party in the prio r c ase o r who were in privity with a party in the prio r c a se.” Bo wer v. H a rra h’s La ughlin, Inc. , 215 P.3d 709, 717 (N ev. 2009) (c iting Pa ra dise Pa lm s C m ty. Ass’n v. Pa

ra d ise H o m e s , 505 P.2d 596, 598-99 (N ev. 1973)). “To

b e in privity, the perso

n m ust have ‘ac

quired an interest in the sub

jec t m atter affec

ted b y the judgm

ent thro ugh . . . o

ne o f the parties, as b

y inheritanc

e, suc c essio n, o r purc hase.’” Id. at 718 (quo

ting Pa ra dise Pa lm s C m ty. Ass’n , 505 P.2d at 599). Bayuk and the Bayuk Trust were parties in the SuperPum per A c tio n. Sno wsho e ac quired an interest in the sub jec t m atter affec

ted b y the judgm ent thro ugh Bayuk and the Bayuk Trust, and therefo r e was in privity 13with tho

se parties under N evada law. The b ankruptc y c o urt did no

t err in its applic

atio n o f issue prec

lusio n. B. T he Bankruptc

y Court D id Not E rr By Granting Sum mary Judg ment C ivil R ule 56(a), m

a d e applic

ab le b y R ule 7056, pro

vides that
sum m ary judgm

ent is appro

priate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fac

t and the m

o vant is entitled to judgm ent as a m

atter o f law.” W e m u s t view the evidenc

e in the light m o

st favo rab le to the
no n-m o ving party and draw all justifiab le inferenc

es in favo

r o f the
no n-m o ving party. F resno M o

to rs, LLC v. M ercedes Benz U S A, LLC , 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th C ir. 2014) (c iting C ty. o

f Tuo lum ne v. S o no ra C m ty. H o sp. , 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th C ir. 2001); Anderso n v. Liberty Lo

bby, Inc. , 477 U .S. 242, 255 (1986)). “A fac

t is ‘m aterial’ o nly if it m

ight affec

t the o utc o m e o f the
c ase, and a dispute is ‘genuine’ o nly if a reaso

nab le trier o f fac t c o uld
reso lve the issue in the no

n-m o vant’s favo

r.” F resno

M o to rs , 771 F.3d at 1125. A ppellants argue that there were disputed m aterial fac

ts ab o ut whether Bo

fA rec eived m o re than it wo

uld have under a hypo thetic al
c hapter 7, and whether Bayuk’s o b ligatio n under the Baruk N o

te prevented his preferenc

e liab ility under the ho

lding o f S ta hl v. S im o n (In re Ada

m so n Appa r el, Inc.) , 785 F.3d 1285 (9th C ir. 2015). A ltho ugh the questio

n o f whether Bo

fA rec eived m o re than it wo

uld

14have under a liquidatio n is a questio

n o f fac t , A ppellants did no

t pro vide any evidenc

e to dem o nstrate a genuine dispute. The “m ere existenc

e o f
s om e alleged fac

tual dispute b

etween the parties will no t defeat an
o therwise pro

p erly suppo

rted m o t io n fo r sum m ary judgm

ent.” Anderso

n , 477 U .S. at 247-48. A ppellants were required to pro vide “suffic

ient evidenc e favo ring the nonm

o ving party fo

r a jury to return a verdic

t fo r that party.” Id. at 249. W itho ut pro viding so

m e evidenc

e to c o ntravene Trustee’s fac

tual assertio

ns, A ppellants did no

t dem o nstrate a genuine issue o f m aterial fac

t o n the questio

n o f whether Bo

fA rec eived m o re than it
wo uld have under a hypo t hetic al liquidatio

n. A dditio nally, the bankruptc

y c o urt rejec ted A ppellants’ argum ent that the Baruk N o

te prevented liab

ility under Ada

m so n Appa rel b y giving prec lusive effec

t to the state c

o urt’s determ

inatio n that the Baruk N o

te was illuso ry. Bec ause the b

ankruptc y c o urt pro perly applied issue prec lusio n o n this issue, there was no genuine dispute o f m aterial fac

t. CONCL U SION Fo r the reaso

ns set fo rth ab o ve, we A FFIR M the b

ankruptc y c o urt’s entry o f sum m ary judgm

ent against A ppellants.

15