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Filed 9/29/15 P. v. Bond CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM ANTHONY BOND,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A143773

 (Lake County Super. Ct.

 No. CR935117)

Appellant William Anthony Bond, was on June 19, 2014, charged by information 

with transportation of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for sale, and 

possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379, subd. (a), 11378, 

11377, subd. (a).)1 The information also alleged appellant had served two prior prison 

terms. On July 8, 2014 appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 

On September 24, 2014, after appellant’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained 

during a traffic stop had been denied, appellant pled no contest to transporting 

methamphetamine in violation of section 11379, subdivision (a), and admitted one prior 

prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The 

remaining counts and enhancements were dismissed. 

On December 6, 2014, the court sentenced appellant to the upper term of four 

years, plus a one-year enhancement for the prior prison term, for a total sentence of five 

years. The clerk’s minute order dated December 9, 2014, states that appellant was 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Health and Safety 

Code.
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directed to comply with the narcotic offender registration requirement authorized by 

section 11590, although no such requirement was orally imposed at the sentencing 

hearing. 

The minute order also erroneously stated that appellant pled guilty to violation of 

subdivision (a) of section 11397, rather than section 11379, which describes the offense 

to which he actually pled guilty. Additionally, the clerk’s minutes attributed the total 516 

days of presentence credits awarded appellant only to custody and conduct credits, 

erroneously failing to attribute 129 days of the total 516 days to work credit. 

Timely notice of this appeal was filed on December 12, 2014. 

Appellant, who does not challenge the validity of his plea, raises two related issues 

pertaining only to the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea: namely, that 

(1) the narcotic offender registration requirement must be stricken because it is not 

applicable to violation of section 11379, subdivision (a), even apart from the fact the trial 

court did not orally impose that requirement at sentencing, and (2) the court’s minute 

order must be corrected to indicate appellant was convicted of violation of section 11379, 

subdivision (a), and accurately set forth the calculation of presentence credits. 

The Attorney General agrees with both contentions, as we do, and we shall 

therefore affirm the judgment with the necessary modifications.

Because the issues presented are unrelated to the facts of the case—which were 

elicited only in connection with the motion to suppress, because there was no preliminary 

hearing or trial—it is unnecessary to describe them at length. It suffices to note that 

when the court asked for a factual basis for the plea, the prosecutor stated, and appellant 

agreed, to the following representation: “On March 27, 2014, law enforcement deputy 

sheriff Aaron Clark conducted a traffic stop of . . . the vehicle the defendant was driving, 

on Highway 29. That was in Lake County. The defendant had approximately 20 grams 

of methamphetamine on his person. The methamphetamine being transported was for 

purposes of sale and was in a usable amount of methamphetamine.” 
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DISCUSSION

The first paragraph of subdivision (a) of section 11590 requires persons convicted 

of specified violations of the Health and Safety Code to “register with the chief of police 

of the city in which he or she resides or the sheriff of the county in which he or she 

resides in an unincorporated area.” The second paragraph provides that “For persons 

convicted of an offense defined in Section 11379 or 11379.5, this subdivision shall not 

apply if the conviction was for transporting, offering to transport, or attempting to 

transport a controlled substance.” 

The odd factor in this case is that, as the parties agree and the record demonstrates, 

appellant was convicted of “transportation, offering to transport, or attempting to 

transport a controlled substance” in violation of section 11379, subdivision (a), which 

statute defines “transport” as “transport for sale” (id. subd. (c), italics added), though the 

charge of possession of a controlled substance for sale, in violation of section 11378, was 

dismissed as part of the plea bargain. Moreover, as earlier noted, in response to the trial 

court’s request for a representation as to the factual basis for appellant’s plea, the district 

attorney represented, among other things, that “[t]he methamphetamine being transported 

was for purposes of sale . . . .” 

The anomaly is that appellant was convicted of the offense of transporting 

methamphetamine for sale, for which registration is not required, but the charge of 

possessing methamphetamine for sale, for which registration would be required, was 

dismissed.

Appellant maintains that “ ‘[b]ecause registration is an onerous burden that may 

result in a separate misdemeanor offense for noncompliance, a registration requirement 

may not be imposed upon persons not specifically described in the [registration] statute.’ 

(People v. Martinez (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 753, 760.)” Thus where, like here, the trial 

court imposes a narcotics registration for an offense specifically exempted from 

registration, it has imposed an unauthorized sentence that must be stricken on appeal.

(See People v. Brun (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 951, 954 [“Even though defendant accepted 
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the [registration as a] condition of probation, he [could] challenge it in [the Court of 

Appeal] on the ground imposition exceed[ed] the statutory authority of the trial court”].) 

The Attorney General agrees the registration requirement was statutorily 

unauthorized. As she states, because appellant was convicted of transporting 

methamphetamine, “[t]he narcotics offender registration requirement of . . . section 

11590 does not, by its terms, apply to him. The narcotics offender registration 

requirement should, therefore, be stricken from the clerk’s minute order.” (See In re 

Luisa Z. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 978; People v. Brun, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 953-

955.)

The parties are correct that imposition on appellant of the registration requirement 

specified by section 11590 is unauthorized by that statute.

We also agree with the parties that where, as here, the record of oral 

pronouncement of a sentence conflicts with the clerk’s minutes, the oral pronouncement 

controls. (People v. Farrell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.) Any such conflict is 

presumed to be a clerical error in the clerk’s transcript, and a court possesses the 

authority to correct clerical errors at any time. (Ibid.; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 181, 185-187.) 

Because the registration requirement of section 11590 does not apply to appellant 

and was never orally imposed on him by the court, the statement in the December 9, 2014 

clerk’s minutes that it was imposed constitutes clerical error. The minutes must be 

corrected by striking the statement that appellant was ordered to comply with the narcotic 

offender registration requirement pursuant to section 11590.

Appellant contends the clerk’s minutes also contain two additional clerical errors

that must also be corrected. First, appellant pled guilty to violation of section 11379, 

subdivision (a), not section 11397, subdivision (a), as stated in the clerk’s minutes. 

Second, the court awarded appellant 258 days of credit for time served pursuant to Penal 

Code section 2900.5, as well as 129 days of work credits pursuant to Penal Code section 

4019, subdivision (c), and 129 days of conduct credits pursuant to Penal Code section 

4019, subdivision (c), for a total of 516 days. While the minute order correctly lists the 
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total number of credits as 516 days, it indicates that they consist only of credits for time 

served and conduct credits, erroneously omitting the fact that the total also includes 129 

days of work credits. 

The Attorney General agrees with appellant, as we do, that the foregoing errors are

also clerical, and the minute order should also be corrected by stating (1) that appellant 

was convicted of violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a), and 

(2) that appellant was awarded 258 days of credit for time served pursuant to Penal Code 

section 2900.5, 129 days of work credit pursuant to Penal Code section 4019, subdivision 

(c), and an additional 129 days of conduct credit also pursuant to Penal Code section 

4019, subdivision (c).

DISPOSITION

The trial court is ordered to amend the clerk’s minutes of its December 9, 2014 

sentencing hearing so that it conforms to the directives of this opinion.

In addition, the court is ordered to prepare an amended abstract of judgment 

stating that appellant is entitled to 258 days credit for time served pursuant to Penal Code 

section 2900.5, plus 129 days of work credit pursuant to Penal Code section 4019, 

subdivision (c), plus 129 days of conduct credit also pursuant to Penal Code section 4019, 

subdivision (c). The amended abstract of judgment shall be sent to the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation.

In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Richman, J.

_________________________

Miller, J.