ELECTION

MANAGEMENT 

GUIDELINES

WWW.EAC.GOV
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 5

CHAPTER 1 

Elections Office Administration 6

CHAPTER 2

Contingency Planning 17

CHAPTER 3

Accessibility 23

CHAPTER 4

Building Community Partnerships 29

CHAPTER 5

Communicating with the Public 34

CHAPTER 6

System Security 42

CHAPTER 7

Physical Security 47

CHAPTER 8

Voting System Certification 56

CHAPTER 9

Acceptance Testing 60
CHAPTER 10 

Ballot Building 68

CHAPTER 11

Pre-Election Testing 73

CHAPTER 12

Absentee Voting and Vote-by-Mail 76

CHAPTER 13

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 87

CHAPTER 14

Voting Location Management 91

CHAPTER 15

Provisional Ballots 106

CHAPTER 16

Documentation and Audit Trail 118

CHAPTER 17

Post-Election Audits 124

CHAPTER 18

Canvassing and Certifying an Election 127

CHAPTER 19

Recounts 133
EAC Commissioners

ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

Second Edition 2023

Thomas Hicks

COMMISSIONER

Christy McCormick

CHAIRWOMAN

Benjamin Hovland

VICE CHAIR

Donald Palmer

COMMISSIONER
Introduction

Following the passage of VVSG 1.0 in 2005, the U.S. 

Election Assistance Commission (EAC) set out to draft 

a series of election management guidelines “to assist 

State and local election officials in effectively managing 

and administering elections.” The original Election 

Management Guidelines (EMG) covered 11 areas relevant 

to all election officials, no matter the jurisdiction. Over 

time, the EMG grew to 19 chapters with input from 

local and state election officials and other election 

administration stakeholders.

Now, over 15 years later, the EAC and election 

administration have changed in significant ways. For the 

EAC’s part, the re-establishment of a quorum of EAC 

Commissioners and increased funding have enabled 

the agency to modernize the Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines (VVSG) and increase staffing levels necessary 

to carry out the agency’s critical mission. Election security 

has long been a priority for election officials. Since the 

designation of elections as critical infrastructure in 2017, 

the physical security, cybersecurity, and continuity of 

operations in the event of a disaster have become essential 

components of national security. State election laws and 

regulations, election technologies, and best practices are 

constantly evolving to meet the needs of resilient and 

secure election systems. Thus, the EAC has updated the 

EMG with a new EAC Clearinghouse team staffed with 

election and accessibility subject matter experts.

Many of the concepts outlined in the original EMG remain 

relevant today. The updated EMG maintains most of 

the original topics with a few additions and incorporates 

references to many of the latest Clearinghouse resources. 

One significant change was the addition of a chapter 

dedicated to Post-Election Audits. The original EMG 

included a paragraph on audits in the Recounts chapter. 

However, the updated EMG needed to expand upon the 

topic due to the increased public focus on audit types 

and procedures. Conversely, the Technology in Elections 

chapter was eliminated. Instead, relevant technologies are 

discussed throughout the updated EMG based on the area 

the technology supports.

As with the original EMG, providing detailed guidance 

officials can employ in every elections office remains 

challenging. However, the EMG’s goal is to familiarize 

election officials with election processes and challenges 

they will likely encounter during their tenure. New 

election officials and office staff members can use the 

EMG as an introduction to unfamiliar aspects of election 

administration. For experienced officials, the concepts 

covered are likely familiar; however, they may find ways to 

update or improve their procedures. There is something for 

everyone in the EMG. 

5
CHAPTER 1

Elections Office Administration

The elections office is often the smallest agency in local 

government until Election Day, when it becomes the 

largest. The public might perceive election officials as “only 

working on one day of the year,” but managing an elections 

office is a full-time job with some of the most complex 

responsibilities expected of a public servant. The Election 

Administrator Competencies wheel shown in Figure 1 

captures the wide range of election officials’ responsibilities.

In addition to the increased responsibilities during 

“election mode,” an elections office handles tasks similar 

to those of other governmental agencies, including data 

entry, processing incoming and outgoing mail, responding 

to requests for information, accounting and payroll duties, 

staff recruitment, training, etc. As Election Day nears and 

the workload increases, however, the available resources do 

not always increase correspondingly.

In many elections offices, administering elections is 

only one of the offices’ many responsibilities and duties. 

Many election officials are also their jurisdiction’s clerks, 

recorders, auditors, or treasurers. These multifunction 

“elections” offices face additional burdens because they 

tend to exist in small jurisdictions with few full-time staff 

members and tight budgets. Elections offices in small 

jurisdictions still must meet all federal, state, and local 

requirements for conducting an election.

The logistics of managing internal office processes, 

facilities and equipment, staffing, budgeting, and 

administering an election are unique in public 

administration. Moreover, the programmatic expectations 

and budget vary yearly based on the number of elections 

in the jurisdiction. This chapter provides an overview of an 

election official’s typical management responsibilities and 

common technologies used in elections offices.

Election Administrator Competencies

Figure 1: Election Assistance Commission’s Election 

Administrator Competencies Wheel

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Managing Internal Processes

Election officials shoulder all the responsibilities of a typical 

public servant and coordinate complex jurisdiction-wide 

events multiple times a year. Whether the chief election 

official has responsibilities outside the elections process, it 

is essential to operate under clear and detailed policies and 

procedures to ensure accuracy and uniformity of service. 

The following sections discuss guidelines for election officials 

as they manage their office and prepare for an election.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

Election officials should develop SOPs for every function 

of the elections office. SOPs are the office’s foundation for 

day-to-day functions and the integrity of each election. The 

Election Management Guidelines and Quick Start Guides 

cover many topics to address in SOPs. The Quick Start 

Guide: Standard Operating Procedures includes several tips 

for developing and revising SOPs.1

SOPs provide both staff and the public with a greater 

understanding of the election process. For election officials, 

following written procedures ensures all staff members and 

seasonal workers follow the same steps when carrying out 

responsibilities. Additionally, providing the public with the 

procedures followed increases transparency and helps create 

an understanding of the work election officials do to ensure 

the integrity of the election. For example, adopting a written 

procedure for signature checking on candidate petitions 

guides staff in completing the task and sets expectations for 

candidates and the media.

Most election officials conduct post-election tabulation 

audits; however, elections are more than just the final 

results. SOPs can guide election officials in auditing the 

procedural aspects of an election to ensure office staff and 

poll workers follow procedures throughout the election 

cycle. SOPs address critical components of the election 

process like chain of custody, absentee ballot processing, 

and voting location procedures. After each election, election 

officials should review their office’s SOPs and revise them as 

necessary if procedures are not followed or have gaps.

Workflow diagrams based on the written SOPs illustrate 

the processes for all internal and external activities. Some 

election officials encourage staff to develop these diagrams 

and then allow staff members from one division to review 

proposed workflows for staff members of another division. 

This collaborative opportunity allows all staff members to 

understand how their work affects the entire organization’s 

mission and provides a chance for staff to work together to 

achieve efficiency in fulfilling their responsibilities.

Project Management

Election officials use different processes to track staff’s work 

and deadlines. For example, some officials automate staff 

responsibilities with project management software. When an 

employee comes into the office, the software lists tasks and 

due dates. Critical events or tasks are highlighted, and staff 

and supervisors can provide updates and feedback on each 

task. If staff does not complete tasks on time, the software 

notifies the supervisor. 

Election project management becomes more intense during 

the weeks leading up to early voting and Election Day. Staff 

members often work long hours to accomplish required 

tasks. Many elections offices use statistical data to monitor 

workflow, review the number of absentee and early voters, 

and respond to staff and voter needs. The need to reach key 

milestones may translate into a need for additional seasonal 

employees. Seasonal staff can perform data entry, answer 

phones, manage incoming and outgoing absentee ballots, etc.

Finally, all election preparation should include contingencies 

in the event of a natural disaster or other disruption to 

election activities. Election officials plan responses to 

possible scenarios that might occur during the election to 

prepare staff well in advance. Conceivable challenges include 

a shortage of ballots at the polls, voting locations that are 

inaccessible on Election Day, poll workers who fail to arrive 

on time, power failures, road closures, and sudden changes 

in weather conditions. See Chapter 2 of the Election 

Management Guidelines on Contingency Planning for a 

complete description of contingency planning.

CHAPTER 1: ELECTIONS OFFICE ADMINISTRATION

1 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/SOPs_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf
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Budgeting

Funding sources for election administration vary across 

the country. Some states provide funding in certain 

circumstances, while in other jurisdictions, elections are 

funded entirely at the local level. Elections are just one part 

of the overall budget for election officials who also serve 

as the local Clerk or Recorder. Too often, election officials 

must find creative ways to implement new, expensive 

policies without a corresponding increase in funding.

Funding needs vary depending on the type of election 

year. Many election officials view their budgets as based 

on a four-year election cycle. While most governmental 

agency budgets are compared year-to-year, election 

officials need to compare similar election years. The budget 

for a Presidential election year should be compared to the 

previous Presidential election year. Consider any relevant 

policy changes or trends from the intervening years and 

make necessary adjustments. The following are typical 

items included in an elections office’s budget each year:

• Salaries – for full-time, part-time, and seasonal or 

temporary staffing

• Poll Workers – pay for training, Election Day, and 

mileage (if applicable)

• Polling Locations – rent for Election Day and 

early voting locations (if applicable), including any 

maintenance or cleaning fees

• Ballot Production – cost of programming the ballot, 

programming electronic voting equipment, and printing 

mail and in-person ballots

• Advertising – required legal notices, voter outreach, and 

public communication

• Postage – bulk mail permit, business reply mail, and 

general postage for mailing notices and ballots

• Vendor Fees – licensing and maintenance fees for 

voting equipment, election software, and general office 

software and equipment

• List Maintenance – cost of use of NCOA vendor, if 

applicable, to identify voters who have moved, office 

personnel expenses, and necessary paper and postage 

costs for list maintenance mailings.

The budget needed to cover these items may vary by the 

type of election year. Additionally, many offices have 

jurisdiction-specific costs associated with running an office. 

For example, some elections offices may contract for facility 

maintenance or IT services.

When the county or municipality funds an election, 

election officials may have the chance to present a 

budget proposal and provide underlying data to justify 

the budget proposal. Election officials should provide 

written documentation (e.g., quotes or estimates from 

vendors) of what the office is asking for and the reasoning 

for changes from previous requests, such as an electionyear budget. If the elections office must implement a 

new program or procedure due to a law or policy change, 

include information on the change and how the requested 

funds fulfill the new requirement.

Finally, election officials should communicate potential 

contingencies or long-term expenses with the budget 

authority. If there is a possibility of a special election that 

may require funding but is not included in the budget 

proposal, make sure it is at least mentioned. Similarly, 

communicate any significant expenses that are on the 

horizon. If voting equipment is nearing the end of its life, 

start discussing funding for replacement years in advance. 

Providing notice allows everyone involved to plan for 

contingencies and large purchases.

Procurement, Retention, and Disposal of Records

As with all other public administrators, election officials must 

acquire, maintain, replace, and dispose of various records 

and pieces of technology. Election officials should include 

the procurement and retention schedules in their SOPs so 

that all elections office staff understand the process and their 

responsibility to retain records. Election officials should review 

state statutes and regulations concerning access to public 

information. Include the procedure for facilitating or denying 

requests for access to election materials in the SOPs.
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Procurement

Local election officials are often responsible for acquiring 

or replacing significant technological resources, including 

software, hardware, and entire voting systems. Election 

officials may need to go through a bidding process for 

services like ballot printing and absentee ballot mailing, 

depending on the jurisdiction. Following state and local 

requirements, election officials should include the 

procurement process in the SOPs.

No piece of technology lasts forever—inevitably computers 

and voting systems will need to be replaced and will be one 

of the elections office’s most significant expenses. Planning 

is essential. The EAC has compiled tips on issuing a Request 

for Proposal specifically for voting equipment.2

Retention 

The elections office should adopt a retention policy and 

include it in the SOPs. The policy should cover the retention 

schedule, storage and tracking practices, and destruction 

procedures. Additionally, the policy must follow federal, 

state, and local retention laws and regulations. While state 

and local laws may vary across the country, all elections 

offices must retain federal election records for 22 months.3

The retention schedule describes the various types of 

records the elections office handles. The categories should 

include election-specific records (e.g., used and unused 

ballots, candidate and issue filings, absentee ballot envelopes, 

etc.) and administrative records (e.g., email correspondence, 

payroll records, meeting notices and minutes, etc.). Each 

category should be defined, given a unique code, and include 

the length of retention. Include the citation if a law or 

regulation sets the category’s retention timeline.

Given the volume of records elections offices accumulate, 

tracking is essential. For each type of record, track 

the following:

• Record category – use the category’s unique code 

as the identifier

• Election date – for election specific records, including 

the election date, so they can easily be found in the event 

they need to be reviewed or are subject to legal action

• Brief description of the record

• Storage location – include a box number for paper records

• Retention length

• Date of disposal – include if the disposal is routine 

and open to the public

Large offices may use specialized software, while small offices 

may track retention with a simple spreadsheet. Before placing 

an item in storage, label it with the same information recorded 

in the software or spreadsheet. 

Disposal

A written retention policy is essential, but it is only effective 

if followed. Retention software may provide notice when 

records are ready for disposal. Still, the retention policy 

should include a monthly review to check if records are up 

for disposal. Occasionally, a court order may require holding 

records past their retention date. Election officials should 

note any court-ordered hold in the retention schedule, 

on the record’s label, and update the destruction date to 

‘pending.’ Otherwise, it is important to consistently dispose 

of records when they reach the end of their retention period. 

Selectively adhering to the retention schedule might give 

the appearance of impropriety. Additionally, timely disposing 

of records serves the practical purpose of ensuring the 

elections office has sufficient storage space.

Election officials have different options for destroying records 

per the records retention schedule. Some counties maintain 

centralized records facilities that may store the materials and 

notify the elections office when records are due for disposal. 

Records center employees or elections office staff may 

dispose of the records. Election officials may contract with a 

third-party shredding company or burn facility to dispose of 

records at the office’s storage facility. If non-elections office 

staff or a third-party dispose of records, elections office staff 

may be required to oversee the process, as directed by statute.

CHAPTER 1: ELECTIONS OFFICE ADMINISTRATION

2 The Process of Procuring and Implementing Voting Systems: RFP Best Practices 

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_equipment/EACProcuringImplementingRFPbestpractices.pdf 3 52 U.S.C. § 20701.
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Whether the elections office staff is responsible for disposal of 

materials or if another entity carries out disposal, record the 

disposal date. Just as election officials have security procedures 

for printing, storing, distributing, and retrieving ballots, election 

officials will benefit from a record of disposal, noting that the 

material was destroyed according to the records retention 

schedule. A ballot’s chain of custody does not end until its 

disposal after it has reached the end of its retention period.

Election records often contain voters’ personally 

identifying information, and election officials must ensure 

the information is kept private. Officials should consider 

the physical security of storage facilities in the elections 

office’s security plan, especially for records stored in 

another county or municipal facility. For more information 

on physical security, see Chapter 7 - Physical Security.

Facilities Management

Election officials are generally responsible for the facilities that 

house election operations and the equipment necessary to run 

elections. Depending on the jurisdiction, election facilities might 

include the central (and perhaps satellite) elections office, a 

warehouse for voting equipment, and numerous voting locations 

during early voting and Election Day. At these facilities, election 

officials may be responsible for staffing, contracting for janitorial 

services and utilities, providing equipment and security, and 

planning for continuity of operations.

Election officials must maintain the chain of custody of 

equipment and supplies at all facilities. They may use paperbased checklists, a barcoding system, or GPS and RFID chips. 

No matter the specific system, officials must track materials at 

all stages of the election process. For more information on chain 

of custody, see the EAC’s Best Practices: Chain of Custody.

4

Barcode tagging and asset management software efficiently 

track the location and status of office and voting equipment. 

Additionally, election officials can use the software to 

monitor inventory. SOPs should include information on 

all facilities housing election equipment and the security 

protocols in place to protect it. In the case of election 

technology, election officials can indicate which areas of 

their facilities are climate controlled and, thus, suitable for 

the storage of the voting system.

SOPs should include layouts for facilities used for poll 

worker training, polling places, early voting, canvassing, 

auditing, etc. The layouts should show the most efficient 

setup for the room in each configuration so staff understand 

how to organize the area. Review the layouts after each 

election cycle to make necessary modifications. It is helpful 

to diagram the following facilities and to update them to 

achieve the most efficient configurations:

• Early and Election Day voting locations, including 

equipment setup, check-in areas, voter staging areas, 

secure voting area, entrance and exit, location of all 

signs, etc.

• Poll worker supply check out and election night 

check-in areas

• Staging area for logic and accuracy testing, recounts, 

canvassing, provisional ballots, audits, etc., including the 

workflow diagram for each task

• Outgoing and incoming mail ballot processing areas

Preparing for an Election

Election officials retain full responsibility for effectively 

managing a government agency on top of the unique task 

of coordinating a jurisdiction-wide event with many moving 

parts. The responsibilities and needs of the elections office 

vary from year to year based on several factors, many 

of which are outside the control of election officials. For 

example, an elections office may administer three elections 

one year and only one election the following year. Special 

elections usually occur with little warning or time for 

preparation. To handle this varying schedule of elections, 

most elections offices use an election calendar and manage 

a sizeable staff of seasonal employees.

Election Calendar

An election calendar includes all deadlines for the tasks 

and responsibilities that make up the election cycle. A 

comprehensive election calendar can serve multiple purposes 

for election officials. It keeps an office on track, serves as 

a checklist so no task is forgotten, and can create public 

awareness of the immense effort to ensure the integrity of 

4 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/chain-custody-best-practices
every election. Many states issue election calendars that 

include deadlines set by state law with a description of the 

activity and citation. Local election officials can use the state 

calendar as a starting point for their calendars.

In addition to statutory deadlines, election officials should 

include all tasks necessary to the election on their offices’ 

calendars. The calendar should start with the earliest task or 

deadline for the election and continue through Election Day 

to the last deadline for election contests. For example, the 

calendar may start with the first candidate filing deadline and 

end with the deadline for requesting a recount or contesting 

the election. In between, officials should include start dates 

and deadlines for activities like ballot building, proofing, 

testing, poll worker training, UOCAVA mailing, early voting, 

absentee ballot application deadline and cure periods, 

posting legal notices, post-election audits, and certification. 

Assign each task on the calendar to two staff members to 

ensure they complete it on time. Building in redundancy avoids 

tasks falling through the cracks, especially if one staff member 

is unexpectedly out of the office. Many tasks on the calendar 

are contingent upon one another. For example, officials cannot 

send UOCAVA ballots before the ballot is programmed and 

proofed. Note contingencies on the calendar—where different 

staff members are involved in each task, the calendar can help 

them understand how their work affects other processes. 

The calendar should include deadlines for the elections office 

and deadlines that affect third parties. Many states have 

deadlines for protests of petition filings, observer filings, etc. 

While these deadlines do not necessarily require action by 

election officials, it keeps staff and the public informed of 

when the deadlines have passed.

Sharing the election calendar with the public provides notice 

of deadlines that may affect them and insight into the election 

process. Most voters’ experience with the election process only 

includes casting a ballot and seeing unofficial results on election 

night. Election officials’ efforts to facilitate secure elections 

largely go unnoticed. Sharing the elections calendar is one small, 

simple way to provide access to the larger election process.

Staffing

Jurisdictions choose their election officials in different ways 

throughout the country—some are elected, appointed 

by political parties, or hired by a board of elections or 

county supervisors. The size of the elections office varies 

significantly from one or two full-time staff members who 

handle all election functions to offices with hundreds of fulltime staff with separate departments dedicated to particular 

parts of the elections process. In any configuration, election 

officials need to hire, train, manage, and retain a mixture 

of full-time, part-time, and seasonal staff (not to mention 

hundreds or thousands of poll workers) to administer 

elections successfully.

Recruiting Staff

Working in elections is dynamic, challenging, and 

rewarding. No other public position is as central to 

American democracy. While often subject to public 

scrutiny, prior to the 2020 Presidential Election, election 

officials reported high levels of job satisfaction.5 The field 

is ripe for individuals who embrace change, like creative 

problem solving, and are eager to serve every segment of 

the voting-age population. While recruiting, highlight these 

benefits and look for committed or willing individuals to 

commit themselves to public service.

Election work is not a traditional 9 to 5 undertaking. In the 

months before and after Election Day, election officials 

work weekends and nights to facilitate and complete the 

election process. Include this information in job postings and 

be transparent about periods of long hours. Elections offices 

across the country run elections throughout the year; tell 

candidates about periods of restricted leave. 

Many candidates may not be aware of the physical demands 

of election work. In addition to the long hours, election 

officials often move heavy equipment and supplies. If 

election officials expect the candidate to help with physically 

demanding tasks, include that in the job description.

CHAPTER 1: ELECTIONS OFFICE ADMINISTRATION

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Succession Planning

Succession planning is one of the main reasons to create 

detailed SOPs. Many jurisdictions elect their chief election 

official, leading to staff turnover when an incumbent is 

defeated or chooses not to run for re-election. Additionally, 

while rewarding, election work is high stress, and turnover 

in elections offices is all too common. To avoid losing 

institutional memory when an experienced staff member 

leaves, election officials must ensure clear job descriptions 

and SOPs exist.

Include an organizational chart in the SOPs and train 

multiple team members to handle each task. Cross-training 

is essential to mitigate the potential harm of the departure 

or even absence due to the routine illness of an experienced 

staff member.

Managing Staff

Having a common goal is the first step to managing a 

motivated staff. With input from staff, many election officials 

develop a mission statement and a list of core values for the 

office. The mission statement and values typically reflect 

the office’s view of its role in facilitating the voting process. 

Additionally, both can serve to guide staff in completing 

their work. For example, emphasizing open communication 

among staff from all departments encourages departments 

to coordinate their work.

Develop a functional statement for each staff member’s 

role. A functional statement is similar to a job description; 

however, it provides a detailed listing of specific 

responsibilities for the role. The functional statement should 

overview the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for 

an employee to succeed. Necessary knowledge includes 

understanding election laws and regulations, data entry 

software, and SOPs. The skills and abilities section might 

include working well with others and providing superior 

customer service to the voting public. Responsibilities 

relate to the specific job requirements such as inputting 

registration information, answering phones, maintaining the 

voting systems, etc.

Finally, because of limited staff resources, the best way to 

maximize staff output in the elections office is to encourage 

employees to learn all of the different aspects of managing 

an election. Election officials might develop an office 

organizational chart to distribute to all employees that 

outlines the chain of command in the office. This chart 

helps employees see which employee has responsibility for 

different areas of administering elections and where their 

help might be most appreciated.

Seasonal Employees

As Election Day approaches, the local elections office 

typically requires additional staffing to assist with the 

increased workload. Election officials should use the 

election calendar to determine when they will need 

additional help for things like processing absentee ballots 

and in-person early voters. The calendar should account 

for the recruitment, training, and managing of seasonal 

workers and Election Day poll workers. Seasonal staff only 

have limited access to sensitive data and the voting system 

as required to fulfill their duties. Additional information on 

providing access to election technologies can be found in 

Chapter 6 – System Security. 

Some election officials use temp agencies to fill part-time 

job slots. These part-time employees generally perform 

data entry tasks associated with voter registration, process 

absentee ballots, and answer the voter information hotline 

as Election Day nears. One benefit of using a temp agency 

to hire part-time staff includes reduced training costs, 

especially if the agency repeatedly assigns the same temp 

employees to the elections office.

Offering flexibility to seasonal workers will attract a larger 

pool of potential workers. Jurisdictions typically have longtime poll workers who may also be interested in working in 

the elections office in the build-up to Election Day. Assisting 

with early voting, logic and accuracy testing, or absentee 

ballot processing increases their knowledge of election 

processes. This knowledge is helpful in assisting voters and 

following procedures on Election Day.

5 See https://electionline.org/electionline-weekly/2020/09-10/#tab-3
Voting Technology

Technology has led to greater efficiency in maintaining 

voter information, tracking candidate files, defining 

ballot styles, etc., but it also requires maintenance and 

oversight. Maintaining and securing the voter registration 

database, voting system, electronic poll books, and the 

elections office’s computer network is a full-time job. This 

responsibility falls on election officials in small elections 

offices or those without dedicated IT help. Chapters 6 – 

System Security and 7 – Physical Security provide more 

information on securing these systems.

Voter Registration

Voter registration can affect an elections office’s staff 

resources. Data entry consumes much of the time 

involved in adding new registrations or updating existing 

records. Elections office staff must transfer the data 

from handwritten paper records to the voter registration 

database to compare the data for eligibility. Many states 

and local jurisdictions have begun automatically transferring 

registration data directly from other state databases to ease 

the burden of processing paper records. 

Automatic data transfers can result in three significant 

efficiencies: reliability, time, and accuracy. First, automatic 

data transfers can be more reliable than paper data transfers. 

Instead of waiting for external offices that collect voter 

registration forms to deliver paper records, the elections 

office receives the data electronically. By removing the need 

to transport paper records, election officials can track the 

record’s chain of custody to its source. Election officials can 

either make the transfers in real-time or in batches. Realtime transfers occur when the data is sent immediately. 

The more common batch transfer occurs at a set time on a 

regular schedule. For instance, if the batch transfer occurs 

after the close of business, the registration data accumulates 

during the day into a ‘suspense queue’. Then all of the data in 

the suspense queue is transferred to the elections office in 

one transaction.

The second efficiency is the reduced staff time required 

for data entry. If a motor vehicle agency sends the 

registration information, the data entered is in a usable, 

validated, electronic format for inclusion in the statewide 

voter registration database. Since the transferring agency 

completed the initial data entry, elections office staff can 

focus on their other responsibilities to serve voters.

The third efficiency in automatic data transfer is accuracy. 

At times, elections office staff have difficulty understanding 

handwritten registration forms. Any data delivered to the 

elections office in an electronic format could improve the 

accuracy of the voter registration database and reduce the 

number of errors when staff manually reenters the data from 

handwritten forms.

Arizona started offering online voter registration in 2003 

and now most states offer their citizens the opportunity to 

register to vote online. Online voter registration systems 

generally share standard requirements. The individual who 

is registering must have a valid driver’s license or non-driver 

state-issued identification card from the state in which they 

are registering. The digital signature provided by the registrant 

to the state when the voter applies for a license or state-issued 

identification card automatically transfers into the statewide 

voter registration database. The potential online registrant 

affirms their identity and authorizes the use of their digital 

signature. These signatures may serve as the signature for 

matching purposes on mailed and provisional ballots. Many 

states provide the registrant with confirmation at the end of 

the registration process as proof of the transaction.

Accessible Voter Registration

Accessible voting typically focuses on the act of casting 

a ballot; however, election officials must ensure the 

entire election process is accessible—including voter 

registration. Accessible voter registration includes 

providing instructions in plain language, providing forms 

in non-English languages, providing accessible online 

registration, and more. In developing registration forms and 

websites, election officials should work with people with 

disabilities and minority language speakers. The EAC’s Best 

Practices: Accessible Voter Registration report provides 

a checklist for election officials to use to ensure their 

voter registration is accessible to voters with disabilities.6

Additionally, the EAC’s National Mail Voter Registration 

Form is available in 21 languages.7

CHAPTER 1: ELECTIONS OFFICE ADMINISTRATION

6 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Accessibility_Checklist_Voter_Registration.pdf 7 https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form

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Election Databases

Election officials manage employees, recruit thousands of 

poll workers, and coordinate all activities required to facilitate 

elections and voting. Creating efficiencies in the management 

process can result in an improvement of services for voters. 

Election databases help election officials manage all workflows 

in the elections office. In managing workflows, inexpensive 

solutions can maximize staff effectiveness.

Election databases can contain information on voters, polling 

places, candidates, poll workers, provisional ballots, absentee 

ballots, early voting, and more. The voter registration database 

may provide modules that house this data, or election officials 

may maintain separate databases for each type of information. 

Typically, these databases are designed to do the following:

1. Allow elections office staff to contribute to and share 

stored data

2. Control the information each elections office staff 

member can view or edit

3. Aid in easy storage and retrieval of data

4. Reduce duplicate input

5. Improve the ease of report writing

6. Improve communication among office staff 

Databases can be built in-house, purchased off the shelf, 

or contracted out to a vendor depending on the staff 

and monetary resources available in the elections office. 

Whether a jurisdiction decides to contract out for an 

election database or builds one in-house, elections officials 

evaluate the system’s security to protect personally 

identifying information (PII) and protect the system from 

cybersecurity and physical exploitations.

Voting Systems

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) defines voting systems 

as the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, 

or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, 

and documentation required to program, control, and 

support the equipment) used—

• to define ballots

• to cast and count votes

• to report or display election results

• to maintain and produce any audit trail information

Voting systems are more than voting machines. A system is a 

collection of unified components that consist of subsystems, 

such as scanners, election management systems, and other 

equipment necessary to tabulate vote results and produce 

vote tally reports. Voting systems also interface with other 

systems in elections offices. A voting system is the core 

technology that drives and integrates the election system.

Most states require federal certification or state certification 

of voting systems. The EAC is responsible for testing and 

certifying voting systems at the federal level, and HAVA 

mandates that EAC accredit voting system test laboratories 

and certify voting equipment. State participation in EAC’s 

certification program is voluntary. 

The EAC publishes Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 

for testing and certifying voting. A complete copy of 

the current guidelines, a list of certified voting systems, 

and additional information about the EAC’s testing and 

certification program are available at www.eac.gov.

State-level tests generally are designed to ensure that the 

voting system complies with state laws and regulations. 

Generally, the state elections office provides local 

jurisdictions with a list of voting systems that are certified for 

use in the state.

In addition to federal and state certification requirements, 

jurisdictions conduct acceptance testing on newly acquired 

voting systems and components. However, election 

officials should note that acceptance testing is only one 

of the types of testing that they can conduct on their 

voting machines. An acceptance test is performed on an 

individual unit of a voting system to verify that the unit is 

physically, electronically, mechanically, and functionally 

correct. Correct means that the unit is identical to the 

system certified for use in the jurisdiction, including the 

software and firmware.
15

Acceptance testing assures election officials that the voting 

system is functioning correctly, that the voting system 

complies with the conditions of the product acquisition 

document, and that the voting system is correctly 

configured for use in an election. For a complete description 

of acceptance testing, see Chapter 9 - Acceptance Testing.

Election Night Reporting

Typically, after the polls close, local elections offices tabulate 

results and periodically report them to the state elections 

office. The state accumulates results and displays unofficial 

results for statewide races and ballot questions. Localities 

also share their jurisdictions unofficial results.

There are many ways to display election results on websites. 

Posting election results in PDF reports with cumulative data 

for an entire jurisdiction is a common practice. However, 

it is not always useful or accessible for election analysts, 

candidates, voters, and the media. Election officials can 

use technology to visually display downloadable election 

results by voting precincts, contests, or other geopolitical 

boundaries, to help better analyze election data. Additionally, 

election officials should clarify that election night results are 

not official and provide information on outstanding ballots 

yet to be counted. See the EAC’s Best Practices: Election 

Results Reporting and Checklist for Securing Election Night 

Reporting Systems for more information about displaying and 

securing election night reporting tools.8

The National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) published the Election Results Reporting 

Common Data Format Specification Revision 2 in 

March 2020 to assist election officials with standard 

methods for election results reporting. These formats 

will increase transparency and reduce costs to election 

jurisdictions by reducing the complexity in election 

management. Read more at https://pages.nist.gov/

ElectionResultsReporting/.

Electronic Poll Books (E-Poll Books)

When voters go into a voting location, a poll worker 

confirms their identity against voter registration information 

contained in poll books to ensure they are registered to vote 

and did not already receive or cast a ballot. These poll books 

can be paper-based and printed before the election, or they 

can be electronic. E-poll books are becoming more common. 

According to the EAC’s 2020 EAVS report, 17 states use 

e-poll books in all jurisdictions, and 40 states use them in 

some capacity.

E-poll books in use across the country include some or all of 

the following features: 

• Complete access to the statewide 

voter registration database

• Contain precinct or jurisdiction-wide

voter registration data

• Ability to credit a voter for having cast a ballot

• Identification card swipe or barcode scanning capacity 

for easy sign-in

• Print a ballot on-demand or program a ballot activation 

card for touchscreen voting machines

• Provide real-time voter turnout and wait time data

Election officials can also use e-poll books to collect data 

about election administration at the polls, such as the length 

of time it takes a poll worker to verify a voter during the 

check-in process and the times during the day when most 

people vote. These data can help election officials more 

effectively allocate their resources in future elections.

E-poll books can include the entire statewide voter 

registration database or just the jurisdiction-specific 

information depending on the jurisdiction’s needs. 

Most e-poll books can search the jurisdiction’s voter 

registration list, and some also search the statewide voter 

registration database if the voter is not registered in the 

local jurisdiction.

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8 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-results-canvass-and-certification#Election_Results_Reporting 

https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/10/23/checklist-for-securing-election-night-reporting-systems-data-election-administration-security 
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Some e-poll books include peripherals such as signature 

pads, identification card swipe or barcode scanning of a 

driver’s license, state-issued non-driver identification card, 

or coded voter registration card to facilitate the check-in 

process. This technology helps to ensure that the correct 

voter is marked as having signed in and voted and eliminates 

the potential problem of giving credit for voting by mistake 

to a voter with the same name or a similar name.

Cost and Replacement

All technology has an expected lifespan. The cost of new 

technology, software upgrades, maintenance, storage, and 

replacement necessitate constant planning. It can be crucial 

to discuss the long-term plans with the elections office’s 

budget authority because voting systems will not last forever. 

Once funding is secured, the next step is often advertising 

a Request for Proposal (RFP). Election officials can learn 

from each other’s experiences when writing an RFP for the 

first time. See the EAC’s voting procurement website for 

examples from several states.9

Election officials will need to develop a transition plan to 

migrate to a new voting system with minimum disruption. 

Election officials will need to evaluate new space, security 

requirements, and operating requirements of the new 

system. They will also need to plan for delivery, acceptance 

testing, and training on the new system.

Election officials must use caution and follow legal and 

security requirements when disposing of old voting 

systems, including election data and media. Many old 

systems will have archived election data stored internally 

or on media. Most vendors will not permit the sale of used 

equipment that contains their proprietary or licensed 

software. For more information about managing aging 

voting systems, see the EAC’s guide Ten Things to Know 

about Managing Aging Voting Systems.

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Conclusion

No matter the size of their jurisdiction, election officials 

throughout the country face similar challenges. Large and 

small elections offices can benefit from written SOPs and an 

organized project management system. Election technology, 

including the voter registration system and supporting 

databases, can enhance the elections office’s efficiency and 

accuracy. Building and maintaining a strong elections office 

staff allows election officials to meet and overcome new 

challenges in the ever-evolving field of elections.

9 https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voting-technology-procurement 10 https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/10/14/ten-things-to-know-about-managing-aging-voting-systems-voting-technology-voting-systems-cybersecurity
CHAPTER 2

Contingency Planning

Elections are important events that must continue 

even during extreme challenges. Through Continuity of 

Operations Plans (COOP), election officials can plan to 

address how critical election operations will continue under 

a broad range of circumstances. The planning process 

fosters recovery and survival in and after emergencies. A 

COOP handles emergencies from an all-hazards approach. 

It establishes policies and guidance to ensure critical 

election functions continue and personnel and resources are 

relocated to an alternate facility in emergencies. A COOP 

should develop procedures for:

• Alerting, notifying, activating, and deploying employees

• Identifying critical business functions

• Establishing an alternate facility

• Developing a roster of personnel with authority and 

knowledge of agency functions

The first step to creating a contingency plan is to identify the 

critical operations of elections offices that must continue in 

the face of emergency situations. Below is a specific example 

and five steps to consider when contingency planning:

1. Set a goal – What is the intended result of implementing 

the contingency plan? 

Example: If there is a flood in the elections warehouse, 

all voting equipment will be free of damage and moved 

temporarily to a new secure facility.

2. Define the purpose – What is the scope of the plan? 

Example: Establish policies and procedures to reduce 

the impact of flooding on voting systems. In the case of a 

flood, these procedures could be to regularly inspect the 

condition of the facility, store all sensitive materials off 

the ground, and establish a secure backup location that is 

unlikely to be affected by the same flooding event. 

3. Specify objectives – What are the specific outcomes of 

the plan that support the overall goal? 

Example: To mitigate any damage caused by flooding to 

voting equipment:

a. Store all voting equipment at least one foot off 

the ground. 

b. Inspect the roof of the storage facility every six months 

or immediately following an extreme weather event.

c. Check the floors, walls, and ceilings for evidence of 

water damage. 

d. Identify and reserve a secure location that can store all 

voting equipment that is unlikely to be affected by a 

similar event (for example, a room above ground level 

or in a different location). 

4. Develop an action plan – What are the specific actions 

and resources required to meet each objective? 

Example: Objective 1 – Store all voting equipment at 

least one foot off the ground.

a. Facilities: Does the warehouse have the room to store 

equipment off the ground? 

b. Budget: What materials will need to be purchased to 

accomplish this objective (shelving, carts, forklifts, etc.)?

c. Staff: Who is responsible for this task? 

d. Training needs: What does staff need to know to meet 

this objective successfully? 

5. Implement action plan – How will the organization 

follow through on the action plan and evaluate the plan 

for success? 

Example: Evaluate the current status of the warehouse. 

Assign tasks to staff to implement mitigation strategies—

budget for any materials that need to be purchased 

to implement the plan. Develop an evaluation for the 

overall contingency plan and determine which areas were 

successful and which need improvement or revision.

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Threats

The example above is for one specific type of emergency. Many variables go into conducting an election, and there are many 

opportunities for problems to arise. While it is essential to think through likely emergencies for your community, here is a quick 

guide of the types of issues that may require the activation of a contingency plan:

Identifying Possible Emergencies

NATURAL DISASTERS MAN-MADE DISASTERS CYBERSECURITY AND 

TECHNOLOGY DISASTERS ELECTION-SPECIFIC DISASTERS

Droughts Active Shooter Power Outages Ballot or Supplies Shortages 

Dust Storms Bomb Scares Equipment Failure Changes in Polling Hours

Earthquakes Explosions Malware Communications Failures

Extreme Cold Fires Phishing Polling Location Access Issues

Extreme Heat Hazardous Material Spills Ransomware Poll Worker Shortage

Flooding Structural Failures Denial-of-Service 

(DOS) Attack Relocating a Polling Place 

Hurricanes Terrorism SQL Injections

Landslides Traffic Accidents Zero-Day Exploit

Lightning Violence

Pandemic

Snow/Ice

Tornados

Volcanoes

Wildfires

Once election officials have identified the most likely disasters to affect their community, it is helpful to conduct simulations 

or tabletop exercises (TTX) to work through the possible outcomes of these emergency scenarios. These discussions can help 

validate plans and procedures already in place or assess the types of plans that need to be created. CISA has developed several 

tabletop exercise packages specifically for election officials.1

1 https://www.cisa.gov/cisa-tabletop-exercise-packages
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CHAPTER 2: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Goals

Thinking through likely disaster scenarios is just the first 

step of creating a contingency plan. The plan should have 

goals—the result you would like the contingency plan to 

achieve. State goals broadly and align them with the critical 

operations of your agency. 

Begin setting goals by thinking about the desired outcome 

for each emergency. For example:

Threat: Poll workers do not show up at their assigned polling place.

• Goal: Ensure polling places are fully staffed throughout 

Election Day.

The emergency in this example is that poll workers cannot staff 

their assigned locations on Election Day. The goal is not about 

this specific emergency—instead, the goal is a broad statement 

that should be true about the election in general. In this case, 

that every polling location should be fully staffed. 

Purpose

After setting a general goal, define the purpose. The purpose 

refers to the scope (i.e., parameters, authority). It gives the plan 

a specific framework to operate, giving it focus. For example:

Threat: Poll workers do not show up at their assigned polling place.

• Goal: Ensure polling places are fully staffed throughout 

Election Day.

• Purpose: Establish procedures for ensuring adequate staff 

members are present at all polling locations throughout 

the day to ensure the polling place can remain in operation 

during polling hours. 

The example above focuses on addressing the issue of a poll 

worker shortage on Election Day. The plan aims to develop 

procedures to handle a poll worker shortage at a polling 

location and how to keep the site in operation. 

Objectives

Objectives refer to the specific outcomes that support and 

help achieve the goals of the contingency plan; these should 

be clear, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely. The 

objectives further narrow the plan into individual, more 

easily accomplished pieces. And since these objectives 

are measurable, election officials can assess whether the 

contingency plan adequately meets these objectives. 

Threat: Poll workers do not show up at their assigned polling place.

• Goal: Ensure polling places are fully staffed throughout 

Election Day.

• Purpose: Establish procedures for ensuring adequate staff 

members are present at all polling locations throughout 

the day to ensure the polling place can remain in operation 

during polling hours. 

• Objectives:

1. Maintain operation of the polling location during 

polling hours. 

2. Identify the minimum number of staff members 

needed in each location to maintain operations. 

3. Hire and deploy an adequate number of poll workers 

for each polling location.

4. Develop a waitlist of backup poll workers trained and 

able to fill a last-minute vacancy. 

5. Cross-train poll workers so that they can fill in if a 

vacancy occurs in any position.

These steps are clear and direct. The polling place must remain 

open during polling hours. Each polling place should have a 

minimum staffing level. Enough poll workers should be hired 

to fill these vacancies, and additional staff should be on hand 

in case of emergencies. Finally, cross-training poll workers can 

give polling place managers greater flexibility when staffing 

polling locations. Theoretically, any properly trained staff 

member in a polling location can fill in for any other staff 

member, at least temporarily. Cross-training will help the 

polling location maintain operations throughout election day, 

even if there is a temporary decrease in poll workers. 

Action Plan

Election officials can develop an action plan after establishing a 

goal, purpose, and objectives. The action plan consists of steps 
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that relate directly to a particular objective. The plan should also 

include the staff, budget, time, training, and resources needed to 

execute the plan successfully and achieve the overall goal. 

Threat: Poll workers do not show up at their assigned polling place.

• Goal: Ensure polling places are fully staffed throughout 

Election Day.

• Purpose: Establish procedures for ensuring adequate staff 

members are present at all polling locations throughout 

the day to ensure the polling place can remain in operation 

during polling hours. 

• Objectives:

1. Maintain operation of the polling location during 

polling hours. 

2. Identify the minimum number of staff members 

needed in each location to maintain operations. 

3. Hire and deploy an adequate number of poll workers 

for each polling location.

4. Develop a waitlist of backup poll workers trained and 

able to fill a last-minute vacancy. 

5. Cross-train poll workers so that they can fill in if a 

vacancy occurs in any position.

• Action steps:

1. At least 75 days before each election, identify the 

minimum and maximum number of poll workers 

needed to staff each polling location. (Objective #2)

2. At least 60 days before each election, assign poll 

workers to polling locations. (Objective #3)

3. At least 20 days before each election, fill all poll 

worker vacancies and develop a waitlist for backup poll 

workers. (Objective #4)

4. At least 15 days before each election, create final 

polling place assignments and assign backup poll 

workers. (Objective #1)

5. At least 15 days before each election, create a triage plan 

for covering essential polling place operations in the event 

of a temporary staffing shortage. (Objective #1)

6. At least 14 days before each election, begin training 

poll workers. Provide enough time to cover all essential 

polling place operations. (Objective #5)

Each of the steps in the action plan corresponds to one or 

more objectives. This provides clear, measurable, and timely 

targets for implementing your contingency plan. 

Putting It All Together

Once the action plan is complete, election officials can start 

the work of implementing the plan. To do this, identify the 

resources (time, budget, staff) needed to complete each 

action step. Election officials can organize the contingency 

plan into a simple document to use for planning purposes. 

The example at the end of the chapter is for the poll worker 

shortage example used throughout this chapter. A sample 

template that election officials can use to start the process of 

contingency planning is also included.

Depending on the critical operations the COOP covers, election 

officials can also engage relevant third parties as they develop 

and implement the plan. For example, election officials should 

consult local law enforcement and emergency management 

agencies while developing plans applicable to natural and manmade disasters. The third parties may be able to identify available 

resources of which election officials are unaware. Additionally, 

engaging those who may be necessary to the response early in 

the planning process opens lines of communication and creates a 

better understanding of the COOP.

Conclusion

Election officials routinely deal with changing circumstances 

in election administration. Contingency planning anticipates 

and mitigates potential negative consequences of all types 

of emergencies. The plan organizes office staff and ensures 

everyone knows their role and responsibilities in highstress situations. After an elections office has implemented 

a contingency plan, election officials should evaluate its 

effectiveness and make necessary revisions.
21

CHAPTER 2: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Example Contingency Plan Worksheet

Threat Poll workers do not show up at their assigned polling place.

Goal Ensure polling places are fully staffed throughout Election Day.

Purpose Establish procedures for ensuring an adequate number of staff members are present at all polling locations 

throughout the day to ensure the polling place can remain in operation during polling hours.

Objectives Action Steps Timeframe Resources Assessment

Maintain operation 

of the polling location 

during polling hours.

At least 15 days before each 

election, create final polling 

place assignments and assign 

backup poll workers.

15 days before 

Election Day

Backup poll workers

Poll Workers

Poll Worker Database

Staff Time

If a vacancy occurred, 

were backup workers 

available and deployed? 

At least 15 days before each 

election, create a triage plan for 

covering essential polling place 

operations in the event of a 

temporary staffing shortage.

15 days before 

Election Day

Training materials

Staff time

Did the polling place 

operate with normal 

staffing levels for the 

whole day? 

Identify the minimum 

number of staff members 

needed in each location 

to maintain operations.

At least 75 days before each 

election, identify the minimum 

and maximum number of poll 

workers needed to staff each 

polling location. 

75 days before 

Election Day

Backup poll workers

Poll Workers

Poll Worker Database

Staff Time

Did each polling location 

have a minimum and 

maximum number 

of worker positions 

assigned? 

Hire and deploy an 

adequate number of 

poll workers for each 

polling location.

At least 60 days before each 

election, assign poll workers to 

polling locations. 

60 days before 

Election Day

Poll Workers

Poll Worker Database

Staff Time

Were enough poll 

workers hired to cover 

at least the minimum 

staffing levels determined 

by Objective #2?

Develop a waitlist of 

backup poll workers who 

are trained and able to fill 

a last-minute vacancy.

At least 20 days before each 

election, fill all poll worker 

vacancies and develop a waitlist 

for backup poll workers. 

20 days before 

Election Day

Backup poll workers

Poll Worker Database

Staff Time

Were all open poll worker 

positions filled? 

Was a backup list of poll 

workers developed?

Cross-train poll workers 

to fill in if a vacancy 

occurs in any position.

At least 14 days before each 

election, begin training poll 

workers. Provide enough time 

to cover all essential polling 

place operations. 

14 days before 

Election Day

Training materials

Staff time

Were all workers trained 

in all critical polling 

location functions?

Were poll workers able 

to cover all tasks if a 

temporary vacancy 

occurred? 
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Contingency Plan Worksheet template

Threat

Goal

Purpose

Objectives Action Steps Timeframe Resources Assessment
CHAPTER 3

Accessibility

Election officials work every day to make elections more 

accessible to the public. “Accessibility” in the elections 

office means removing barriers that make it difficult or 

impossible for voters to vote. It can refer to the built 

environment (for example, the voting location), technology 

(e.g., the voting systems), or language access. By providing 

accessibility in election administration, election officials 

ensure that voters with disabilities or who speak non-English 

languages can participate independently in the electoral 

process. Accessibility supports democracy, civil rights, the 

guiding principle of non-discrimination and privacy and 

independence in voting.

Federal laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA), Voting Rights Act (VRA), and the Help America 

Vote Act (HAVA) ensure that the physical voting location, 

voting materials and information, and voting systems are 

accessible. When available, EAC grant funds can be used by 

states and units of local government to ensure access to the 

polls for individuals with disabilities.1 State laws may impose 

additional requirements on election officials. For example, 

some state laws govern information technology accessibility 

and ensure elections offices’ websites are accessible for 

everyone regardless of disability.

Accessibility covers all aspects of running an elections 

office—registering to vote, accessing a website, recruiting 

and training poll workers, entering an accessible voting 

location, operational accessible voting machines and 

independent ways to cast a secret ballot. Accessibility needs 

are far-reaching and covered throughout the Election 

Management Guideline's chapters and the Quick Start 

Guides. This chapter on accessibility provides many examples 

of ways to improve accessibility and incorporate these good 

practices into all aspects of election administration.

Managing an Accessible Elections Office

Every aspect of election administration can incorporate 

accessibility accommodations. This section will focus on the 

areas of election administration that occur outside the physical 

voting location. These programmatic aspects include training, 

accountability, outreach, and information and communications 

technology. Chapter 14 – Voting Location Management addresses 

the accessibility of in-person voting locations.

Staff and Poll Worker Training

First, election officials should review all training materials 

for full and part-time staff and poll workers to evaluate 

accessibility accommodations. Elections office staff and 

poll workers are the public faces of the elections office, and 

a staff well trained on accessibility will improve the voting 

process for all voters. Knowing some basic tenets of disability 

etiquette will help election officials, staff members, and poll 

workers interact with voters with disabilities more effectively. 

The basics include:

1. Do not make assumptions.

2. Ask before helping.

3. Do not initiate physical contact.

4. Provide contact information for staff focused 

on accessibility.

For example, it is better to offer an arm when leading a 

voter who is blind to a voting station rather than grabbing 

the voter's arm and pulling the voter. Service animals, such 

as guide dogs, are allowed in the voting location. Election 

officials should emphasize during training sessions that it is 

not appropriate to pet these service animals while they are 

working. Election officials should include etiquette tips in 

poll worker training materials. Several disability etiquette 

resources are included at the end of the chapter.

Poll workers do not always understand when and how to 

provide accommodations for voters with disabilities. Election 

officials should clearly outline the assistance poll workers 

Poll workers should face people instead of 

looking down at the poll book when talking to 

them. Poll workers should also address the voter 

with a disability rather than the person they 

brought to assist them.

1 52 U.S.C. § 20901.

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can provide to voters with disabilities who are in the process 

of voting. Good communications skills ensure that all voters 

can understand staff and poll workers. Election officials can 

add training modules about interacting with voters with 

disabilities to poll worker training programs. For the basics in 

building a sound system for managing poll workers, election 

officials can review the EAC's Successful Practices for Poll 

Worker Recruitment, Training, and Retention.

2

Voters with disabilities may not be aware of available 

accommodations. For example, a voter may report difficulty 

seeing where to sign at the check-in table. A poll worker trained 

in disability awareness and etiquette might offer a magnifying 

glass for the signature sheet. Such an offer could also serve as 

an opportunity to explain information about voting systems with 

screen magnification options. Identifying an inaccessible sign is 

also an opportunity to increase accessibility by modifying the 

font, color contrast, or providing auditory signage. 

Election officials do not have to create training modules 

from scratch or by themselves. Disability organizations may 

welcome an invitation to present a component of poll worker 

training on sensitivity to disability issues. Election officials 

can find many free, governmental resources online that they 

can adapt to their jurisdictions, including several identified at 

the end of this chapter.

Contra Costa County, California, developed its 

"A Simple (Accessible) Path for All" initiative to 

promote accessibility. The initiative included an 

Accessible Polling Place Location and Equipment 

(APPLE) class, which provided instruction on 

establishing and maintaining accessible polling 

places. Since its launch in January 2018, more 

than 700 election workers have taken APPLE 

training—nearly half of the county's total 

Election Day volunteers.

Accountability

Elections offices should implement a procedure for receiving 

and responding to inquiries and complaints from the public 

about accessibility. Election officials may not always proactively 

provide accessible accommodations in all aspects of the voting 

experience. However, voters who may have encountered an 

unexpected obstacle are often willing to share these experiences 

in the hope that election officials will resolve the issue.

If staff levels allow, election offices can benefit from one 

staff member assuming responsibility for all disability issues 

during election administration in the jurisdiction. This 

staffer would be responsible for receiving and responding 

to inquiries and complaints and ensuring that voters with 

disabilities have all the information they need to register to 

vote and use the accessibility features of voting systems.

Disability Outreach

Election officials can leverage many types of outreach to 

improve the accessibility programs they implement. They might 

review all printed material available to the public and make sure 

to offer it in alternative formats, such as large print, audio, and 

in various languages. For example, some jurisdictions provide 

large print sample ballots for voters with vision impairments at 

the polls. If a document can be made available electronically on 

a website, it will allow voters to familiarize themselves with the 

process before going to the voting location.

State and local jurisdictions might partner with disability 

groups to pool resources and develop accessibility solutions. 

From poll worker accessibility training to checklists for 

inspecting voting locations for accessibility, election officials 

can take advantage of many existing resources. Election 

officials can tailor most of these solutions to fit the needs 

of just about any jurisdiction. For more information about 

partnerships that election officials might pursue, refer 

to Chapter 4 - Building Community Partnerships.

Outreach to Voters

Election officials should develop an outreach plan to raise 

awareness among voters with disabilities about accessible voting 

locations and accessible election programs in the jurisdiction.

The outreach might address the following issues: 

• Do voters with disabilities know how to—

o Register to vote?

o Use the accessible voting system?

2 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/poll-worker-resources
25

CHAPTER 3: ACCESSIBILITY

• Do voters with disabilities know about various available 

accommodations, such as—

o Information in large print on paper?

o Are the documents and other information viewable in 

advance on an election website?

• Do voters with disabilities know to whom to complain if 

they have a problem?

Election officials should raise awareness among language 

minority communities of the availability of in-language materials 

and assistance. Promote available assistance and resources 

online and through the media and prominently display resources 

at voting locations to foster increased awareness. 

Languages Access outreach may include:

• Making announcements over the language community’s 

radio or television stations and social media

• Publishing notices in language community newspapers 

• Partnering with community organizations to conduct 

voter outreach at community events

Outreach to Government

Election officials have many governmental resources at 

their disposal. For example, many states have a Governor’s 

Commission on Disability that advises the state government 

on disability issues. Additionally, state elections offices often 

have staff members dedicated to accessibility. Local election 

officials can utilize these state-level resources to improve 

accessibility in the elections process.

Moreover, many counties have local commissions on people 

with disabilities. These organizations may help local election 

officials reach those individuals in the community who need 

information on the various accessibility accommodations. 

In jurisdictions without a local commission, election officials 

can establish an accessibility advisory board or create a 

committee that focuses on election administration. Election 

officials can schedule regular meetings to solicit input 

and gather suggestions and ideas about making the voting 

process and voting locations more accessible to individuals 

with disabilities.

EXAMPLE

The Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) 

established an Accessibility Advisory Committee 

to address accessibility concerns and continue their 

strong commitment to serving voters with disabilities. 

The WEC regularly hosts forums and meets with the 

Wisconsin Disability Coalition to provide updates, solicit 

input, and address concerns. One notable success from 

this collaborative partnership was a webinar for municipal 

clerks on accessible polling place setup. 

Outreach to Nonprofits

The local disability community is another potential partner 

for election officials looking to promote the awareness of 

accessibility accommodations. Disability organizations may 

provide assistance or advice about marketing strategies, 

usability testing, material reviews, or training. Election 

officials can give the organizations materials on voter 

registration and accessible voting options to distribute. 

Additionally, the organizations are an excellent resource 

for recruiting poll workers with disabilities and can more 

effectively perform outreach than elections office staff.

Disability organizations can help evaluate voting systems 

as part of the procurement process. If no governmental 

commission is advising agencies about disability issues, 

election officials can reach out directly to the disability 

community to assist with selecting appropriate equipment. 

After purchasing equipment and before each election, the 

disability community may help election officials with the 

ballot's design and audio ballot testing.

Staff or volunteers at disability organizations may also review 

draft documents from an accessibility perspective. These 

materials might include marketing materials, emergency 

evacuation procedures, voting instructions (including audio 

ballots), or public service announcements.

Finally, disability organizations may welcome an invitation to 

review or to help with a component of poll worker training on 

sensitivity to disability issues.
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Information and Communications Technology

Technology related to election administration includes 

telephones, websites, voting systems, and electronic 

documents (such as an online voter registration application). 

Accessibility guidelines and standards help vendors and 

election officials design and purchase technologies that 

people with disabilities can use. For example, the Voluntary 

Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) allow voting system 

vendors to develop HAVA-compliant voting systems.

To make websites more accessible, elections office web 

designers may use the Electronic and Information Technology 

Accessibility Standards issued by the U.S. Access Board and 

Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) developed 

by the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative. Web designers 

sometimes use web accessibility tools to make their jobs easier.

Web accessibility evaluation tools are software programs 

or online services that help determine if a website meets 

accessibility standards and guidelines. Although web 

accessibility evaluation tools can significantly reduce the 

time and effort needed to evaluate websites, no tool can 

automatically determine the accessibility of a website. 

Officials can use a combination of these tools to address 

specific aspects of the evaluation process.

Election officials can find a list of web 

accessibility evaluation tools at the W3C Web 

Accessibility Initiative website: 

http://www.w3.org/WAI/RC/tools/.

When posting information on a website, election officials 

should provide accessible materials in a word processorformatted document or HTML. Voters with impaired vision 

who use a text-to-audio screen reader can read documents 

in these formats more easily. 

Use alt-tags for graphics, such as illustrations, caption 

audio information, and visual descriptions of videos.

Providing an Accessible Voting Experience

Election officials can also provide accessible accommodations 

during the voting experience. Physical access to the voting 

location, voting technology, check-in procedures, and even the 

shortest lines can present challenges for voters with disabilities 

and older people.3 Some voters with language needs may not 

be comfortable interacting with poll workers with whom they 

are unfamiliar. In such cases, language minority voters should be 

allowed to bring an assistant of their choice (with the exception 

of an employer or union representative) into the voting booth, 

per Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. States and localities 

have come up with myriad ways to enhance the accessibility of 

in-person voting locations, voting by mail, and serving voters in 

long-term care facilities. 

Election officials can provide language assistance that 

supports voting in written and oral forms, including: 

• Multilingual signage at the polls, election offices, 

registration locations, and other sites that indicate 

language assistance is available 

• Translated ballots and voting materials, both paper 

and electronic

• Interactions with bilingual poll workers 

• Telephone helplines

In-Person Voting

Whether voting in-person early or on Election Day, election 

officials must provide all voters with an independent and private 

voting experience. All voting systems have some accessibility 

features to enhance usability. HAVA requires accessible 

voting systems for voters with disabilities in all voting locations: 

"The voting system shall... be accessible for individuals with 

disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind 

and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same 

opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and 

independence) as for other voters...."4 The EAC publishes the 

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), which guide 

voting system manufacturers in designing voting systems to 

meet HAVA's requirements. HAVA requires that all in-person 

voting locations include at least one accessible voting device. 

3 Additional information on providing an accessible in-person voting, refer to the EAC’s Best Practices: Accessible In-Person Voting at https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/

files/Accessibility_Checklist_In_Person_Voting_1.pdf. 4 52 U.S.C. §21081(a)(3)
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CHAPTER 3: ACCESSIBILITY

Election officials should be proactive in providing an accessible 

voting device and facilitating its use for those who may need 

it. Early voting staff and Election Day poll workers must be 

comfortable offering the accessible device to voters. Staff 

and poll worker training should include setting up and using 

the device and how to assist voters in using it. Assistance may 

include demonstrating how to use the device and its accessibility 

features to the voter. Training should also familiarize workers 

with common assistive technologies voters may use in addition 

to the accessible voting device, including hearing aids, neck 

loops, mobility aids, switches, and magnifiers.

In addition to providing accessible voting equipment, some 

elections offices allow voters who cannot enter the voting 

location to vote from their vehicles if state law allows. 

Frequently called curbside voting, election officials designate 

curbside parking spaces at each voting location. Depending on 

the jurisdiction, the voter may ring a buzzer or call a dedicated 

phone number to alert poll workers they are ready to vote. 

Teams of two poll workers (preferably bipartisan) then take 

all necessary materials to the voter at the vehicle. The Quick 

Start Guide – Curbside Voting provides several best practices 

election to facilitate effective curbside voting.5

Chapter 14 – Voting Location Management provides more 

accessibility and in-person voting information.

Poll Workers

Election officials should recruit individuals with disabilities and 

bilingual individuals to be poll workers. For some voters, the 

presence of a poll worker with a disability or who speaks their 

language can make the voting experience more comfortable 

and increase the likelihood that they will be receptive to offers 

of assistance. Disability organizations are great places to look 

for potential poll workers with disabilities.

Election officials should consider the following practices to 

improve conditions for poll workers with disabilities:

• Split shifts—Some poll workers with disabilities would 

benefit from having the option to reduce their time at 

the polls to a shift with more manageable hours.

• Environmental sensitivities—Some poll workers may be 

sensitive to substances, such as perfumes and air fresheners.

• Simple adaptive technologies—Poll workers may have 

problems with dexterity or be visually impaired. These 

individuals would benefit from soft-grip tools and 

magnifying strips at the polls.

Key considerations for bilingual poll worker recruitment 

and training:

• Actively engage your language communities. 

Encouraging involvement, outreach, and engagement 

with language communities can make poll worker 

recruitment more sustainable.

• Prioritize recruitment of bilingual poll workers. Bilingual 

poll workers can serve both English-speaking individuals 

and those who speak another language. 

• Incorporate cultural sensitivity training into the training 

programs for all poll workers. Awareness of the challenges 

other cultures and language communities may experience 

to voting promotes a more accessible elections process. 

After the election, election officials can survey poll workers 

to identify ways to improve the accessibility of future 

elections. Poll workers may see issues election officials 

cannot, and they can provide ideas and solutions for 

addressing accessibility needs on the next Election Day.

Voting by Mail

Traditionally, voting by mail meant that a voter completed a 

paper ballot and mailed it back to the local election official 

via the United States Postal Service. For many voters with 

disabilities, their inability to perform the physical act of 

filling out the ballot makes it impossible to vote by mail 

independently. These individuals may have to compromise 

their privacy to vote by mail. The EAC’s Best Practices: 

Accessibility for Voting By Mail outlines best practices 

and provides checklists for election officials to ensure the 

accessibility of voting by mail.6

Some states are experimenting with new mail voting 

technology. One alternative to mailing a traditional paper 

ballot is to provide voters with an electronic ballot that 

can be read and marked using assistive technology. Voters 

with disabilities can complete the ballot on their home 

5 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Curbside_Voting_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf 6 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Accessibility_for_Voting_by_Mail_Part_III_Accessibility_Checklist.pdf
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computer, print it, and mail it to the local elections office 

or drop it off at the elections office, a ballot drop box, or 

other designated site as allowed in the jurisdiction. Vote by 

mail voters do not have the opportunity to ask poll workers 

for clarifications, so the voting packets need to include the 

necessary instructions and materials in a concise, organized 

design. A clearly indicated helpline phone number or email 

with language assistance can also be helpful. 

Voting in Long-Term Care Facilities and Mobile Polling

Election officials can develop and implement policies and 

practices that facilitate registration and voting processes 

for residents of nursing homes, assisted-living facilities, 

and long-term care facilities, and especially for people with 

cognitive and other brain impairments. It is essential that 

residents understand and can exercise their right to vote. 

Election officials may work with a designated staff member 

at the facilities to coordinate voter registration and voting. 

Election officials can share the elections calendar with 

important deadlines with staff for display at their facilities. 

In some jurisdictions, election officials may conduct voter 

registration for new residents or remind staff that new 

residents need to update their registration before any voter 

registration deadline. Depending on state law and local 

practices, election officials may send teams (preferably 

bipartisan) of staff or poll workers to the facility to assist with 

voting. Alternatively, voters may opt to mail their ballot, or 

the facility may arrange transportation for residents to the 

in-person voting location.

Conclusion

Election administration is primarily a customer service 

function, and election officials must ensure accessibility is 

considered in every aspect of the process to serve all voters. 

Election officials should promote a culture that promotes 

accessibility starting with staff and poll worker training. 

Working with community organizations and soliciting 

feedback from voters will help election officials to improve 

service to voters with disabilities and voters from language 

minority communities.

ADDITIONAL ACCESSIBILITY RESOURCES

• American Association of People with Disabilities 

http://www.aapd.com

• American Bar Association Commission on Law and Aging 

Voting and Cognitive Impairments 

http://new.abanet.org/aging/Pages/voting.aspx 

• Disability and Business Technical Assistance Centers 

(DBTACs) http://www.votingaccess.org/

• The Election Center http://www.electioncenter.org

• National Federation of the Blind (Nonvisual Election 

Technology) http://www.nfb.org/nfb/HAVA_intro.asp

• National Institute of Standards and Technology 

http://vote.nist.gov

• United States Access Board http://www.access-board.gov

• United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 

Disability Rights Section 

http://www.justice.gov/crt/drs/drshome.php 

• Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) http://www.w3.org/WAI/

DISABILITY ETIQUETTE RESOURCES

• United Spinal’s 

https://www.unitedspinal.org/pdf/DisabilityEtiquette.pdf

• Eastern Paralyzed Veteran Association 

https://ds.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/

disability-etiquette-epva.pdf

• Respectability https://www.respectability.org/inclusiontoolkits/etiquette-interacting-with-people-with-disabilities/

• New York City Board of Elections Accessibility Videos 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFJcBNFYxuE

• Disability Rights Texas 

https://www.disabilityrightstx.org/en/asl-videos/voting/
CHAPTER 4

Building Community Partnerships

The success of an election is directly impacted by the 

engagement of the community. Before Election Day, an 

operation that usually consists of one central office with a 

small staff can grow to hundreds or thousands of poll workers 

spread across the entire geographic area of the jurisdiction, 

stretching already limited resources and capacities. Election 

officials may reach out to community organizations and 

other governmental agencies to help augment the elections 

office’s limited resources. 

Election Day is a community-wide event. State and local 

election officials have a lot of responsibility for making 

Election Day a success, but they do not have to do it alone. 

Throughout the country, election officials use community 

resources, civic commitment, and intergovernmental 

partnerships to make elections work better for everyone.

Intergovernmental Partnerships

The challenges in election administration continue to 

become more complex and often require collaboration 

and resource sharing. Election officials must be creative to 

meet the needs of their voters, plan for contingencies, and 

stretch resources. Internal brainstorming sessions can lead to 

innovation, but it also may be helpful to reach out to other 

election officials and governmental agencies for ideas. 

The EAC serves as a clearinghouse for election 

administration best practices and resources.1 Additionally, 

the EAC’s four Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 

boards, including the Standards Board, Board of Advisors, 

Local Leadership Council, and Technical Guidelines 

and Development Committee, and CISA’s Election 

Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council 

(EIS GCC) bring together federal partners, state and 

local election officials, stakeholders, experts, and vendors. 

Statewide election organizations offer opportunities for 

election officials in the state to network and collaborate. 

National organizations, like the Election Center, the 

International Association of Government Officials (IGO), 

National Association of Counties (NACo), and the 

International Institute of Municipal Clerks (IIMC), also 

connect election officials across the United States. 

Intergovernmental partnerships between elections offices 

can be advantageous for all parties involved. Within states, 

collaboration may include: 

• Coordinating media messages and advertisements

• Collaborating poll worker recruitment efforts

• Coordinating purchases of voting systems or other 

major purchases

• Combining efforts when ballot programming and proofing

• Sharing materials for poll worker training or voter education

These partnerships are typically informal. Election officials 

are typically eager to share materials they believe will 

assist their colleagues in other jurisdictions. However, 

it may be beneficial to formalize any partnerships that 

involve significant costs or third-party vendors. For 

example, if two or more jurisdictions are sharing ballot 

production services, there should be a clear agreement 

regarding the responsibilities of each party involved. (Who 

is responsible for ballot production? When will ballot data 

be available? Who is responsible for ballot proofing?) Each 

jurisdiction’s legal counsel should review the specifics of any 

intergovernmental agreement. 

Election officials can also establish partnerships with city, 

county, and state government entities. For example, local 

election officials may need to partner with their county or 

local emergency management agencies to respond to natural 

disasters or other disruptive events. These organizations can 

assist election officials with contingency planning (see Chapter 

2 - Contingency Planning for more information) and provide 

critical emergency support for essential elections operations. 

1 The latest clearinghouse resources for election officials can be found at https://www.eac.gov/election-officials.

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Election officials can also leverage an emergency 

management agency's existing relationships to respond 

to emergencies. For example, emergency management 

agencies may have arrangements with local school districts 

or other community organizations that can host a polling 

place in case of an emergency. These agencies may also 

have transportation plans with local road commissions or 

transportation departments that could ensure polling places 

remain accessible during extreme weather events. 

Some state and local governments provide their staff with 

paid leave if they serve as poll workers during an election. 

If allowable by law, these individuals may receive their 

regular salary and a poll worker stipend for their work. This 

arrangement can be particularly beneficial for elections offices 

since local government employees may already be familiar 

with certain aspects of serving as a poll worker, including the 

location of polling places and the IT systems poll workers use. 

Local government and schools may be a valuable resource in 

recruiting poll workers and bilingual poll translators.

Community Partnerships

When seeking community assistance, local election officials 

may find willing partners who are also enthusiastic supporters 

of the election process but may not be sure of how they can 

be of assistance. Partnering with community organizations can 

bring tangible benefits to elections offices. These partnerships 

allow election officials to strategically use resources to fulfill 

otherwise unmet needs. Moreover, the partnering organizations 

benefit from increased visibility and the opportunity to serve 

their community. Election officials may form partnerships with 

a variety of community organizations, including:

• Nonprofit, religious, and charitable organizations

• Businesses and trade groups

• High schools, community colleges, and universities

• County and local government agencies

• Local political parties and voting rights organizations

Election officials should form partnerships based on their 

community’s unique needs. Some communities rely on 

their political parties to recruit poll workers from both 

parties, while some communities recruit only nonpartisan 

poll workers. Communities with local universities will find 

challenges and benefits in serving student voters on campus. 

Election officials can tailor their efforts to the needs of their 

communities to better serve voters. 

Civic Organizations

Election officials often partner with area civic organizations to 

recruit poll workers. These groups have regular meetings, and 

election officials can inquire if there are opportunities to speak 

at one of these events. Civic organizations may send regular 

newsletters or email communication to their members. Election 

officials can ask these organizations to include information 

about serving as a poll worker in these communications. 

Civic organizations can also benefit directly from recruiting 

poll workers among their membership. Since 1998, the 

Orange County, Florida, Supervisor of Elections has hosted 

an Adopt-A-Precinct program. Local organizations “adopt” 

a precinct by providing poll workers. Instead of paying poll 

workers for their service, the Supervisor of Elections provides 

these funds to the adopting organization. According to their 

website, the Orange County elections office provided over 

$464,000 to local community organizations participating 

in this program across three countywide elections in 2020. 

More information about this program can be found on the 

Orange County Supervisor of Elections website.

2

High Schools

When authorized by state law, many election officials rely 

on high school students to serve as poll workers. Students 

may earn credit for community service requirements in 

addition to earning a poll worker stipend. Election officials 

can connect with civics teachers and school administrators 

to give presentations to high school classes and provide 

information about how students can serve as poll workers in 

their community. 

Election officials have collaborated with community 

organizations and local high schools to bring together poll 

workers of different generations and backgrounds. For 

example, election officials have worked with local nonprofits 

focused on civic engagement to recruit high school 

students and veterans to serve as poll workers together. 

2 https://www.ocfelections.com/adopt-precinct.
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CHAPTER 4: BUILDING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS

Such programs can bring together groups who would not 

traditionally interact, benefiting all involved, including the 

jurisdiction's elections office and voters.3

Language Minority Communities

Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions 

with more than 10,000 or over 5 percent of the total 

voting-age citizens in a single political subdivision (typically 

a county or a municipality) who are members of a single 

language minority group to provide registration and voting 

materials in the applicable language, as well as in English. 

However, local election officials do not have to be covered 

by Section 203 to partner with their local language minority 

communities. Local election officials can collaborate with 

language minority communities to recruit poll workers and 

disseminate voter education materials. 

Establishing working relationships with language minority 

communities through active engagement and outreach can 

help local election officials develop language programs and 

ease implementation.4 Election officials can do the following:

• Early on, conduct outreach to gauge the level of 

assistance your language minority communities need and 

better understand their specific challenges. 

• Throughout the development of language assistance 

processes and resources, engage language groups to build 

buy-in and establish trusting relationships. Members of 

the language community can help review new materials or 

even provide translation assistance. 

• Even after language assistance processes and resources 

are in place, continue to engage your language minority 

communities. Continued engagement can ease bilingual 

poll worker recruitment efforts and make the language 

program more sustainable. 

• Seek opportunities to be physically present and visible 

in areas with a large concentration of language minority 

voters, like organizing a voter registration table at relevant 

community events. 

Some election officials have realized the benefits of 

collaborating with their local language minority communities. 

Specifically, election officials have successfully recruited 

bilingual high school students to serve as poll workers. 

Officials identified the language needs of their communities 

and sought out bilingual high school students who could 

serve in precincts with language needs.5

Local election officials have also reached out to their local 

language minority communities to create I Voted stickers 

featuring local artists and a variety of languages. For the 

2020 election, the Alaska Division of Elections featured I 

Voted stickers that Alaskan artist Barbara Lavallee designed 

and were available in English, Spanish, Koyukon, Gwich’in, 

Aleut, Tagalog, Alutiiq, Northern Inupiaq, Nunivak Cup’ig, 

and Yup'ik. 

Figure 1: Alaskan "I Voted" Sticker in the Yup'ik language

3 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/the-city-of-ely-mn-2018-clearinghouse-award-winner. 4 All of the EAC’s language access resources are available at https://www.eac.gov/election-officials#Language%20Access. 5 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/minneapolis-minnesota-clearinghouse-award-2017.
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Disability Community

Election officials must comply with state and federal 

regulations regarding serving voters with disabilities. However, 

election officials can go beyond these regulations and work 

closely with their local disability communities to ensure that all 

voters can cast a ballot privately and independently. 

Election officials can partner with nonprofit or community 

organizations to gather ideas and input from organizations 

dedicated to serving their jurisdiction’s disabled community. 

Such partnerships may even lead to more formal advisory 

committees to assist the elections office in addressing 

accessibility concerns. An advisory committee focused on 

the rights of voters with disabilities can ensure accessibility 

remains a priority.6 Additionally, local election officials can 

coordinate with these groups to conduct mock elections to 

demonstrate how to use accessible voting equipment, train 

poll workers on serving voters with disabilities, and use their 

facilities as an accessible polling place.7

Additionally, the EAC created a voter rights guide for voters 

with disabilities.8 The guide outlines voters with disabilities’ 

federal voting rights. State and local election officials 

can request copies of the guide to provide to voters and 

community partners.

Establishing Polling Places and Vote Centers

Election officials commonly struggle to find polling places 

before each election. While many communities have longstanding partnerships with the organizations that host their 

polling places, it can be challenging to find new locations that 

meet all the legal and operational requirements of a polling 

place. Building strong community partnerships can help 

election officials establish polling places that serve voters and 

remain consistent for years to come. 

When establishing new polling locations, election officials 

need to review all relevant state laws and ensure formal 

agreements address legal requirements. In most instances, 

electioneering and campaign activities must not occur 

within 100 feet of a polling place. Election officials should 

notify any organization hosting a polling location of such 

requirements and how workers will address any violations. 

Other items that election officials may need to incorporate 

in an official agreement include: 

• Any requirements of the property owner for opening the 

building, including odd hours and weekends

• Specific times and dates when the facility will be available 

for setting up and breaking down voting equipment

• Contact information for building maintenance, utility 

providers, and other essential emergency contacts

• Designated parking spaces for voters to use during the 

hours the polls are open

For more information about polling places and vote centers, 

see Chapter 14 – Voting Location Management.

Managing Partnerships

All partnerships are unique, but election officials can employ 

best practices to manage their established community 

partnerships. Below are a few ways election officials can 

maintain and foster their partnerships:

• Collaborate with the other partnering organizations to 

establish a mission statement and goals for the partnership.

• Decide on a leadership structure. Discuss whether one 

person will be in charge or if all decisions will be made 

democratically. Creating a leadership team or joint 

advisory board empowered to make key decisions might 

be necessary.

• Define how the elections office staff will interact with the 

partnering organization(s). Decide if one staff member 

will be the single point of contact, acting as a liaison, or if 

the responsibility will fall on each staffer as they conduct 

daily tasks.

• Encourage communication and cooperation in the 

partnership so members of each group can learn from 

each other. It might be helpful to provide training 

on each organization's work or offer job-shadowing 

opportunities or other trust-building activities.

• Create a budget for the partnership and a clear strategy 

for cost-sharing, if appropriate.

6 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/wisconsin-elections-commission-2020-clearinghouse-award-winner. 7 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/el-paso-colorado-clearinghouse-award-2017. 8 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/voting-accessibility.
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CHAPTER 4: BUILDING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS

• Build on each partner’s strengths to maximize effectiveness.

• Brainstorm relevant stakeholders and, from the first day, 

involve them in the partnership planning process.

• Seek out media-friendly champions for the partnership 

to increase visibility and investment in the partnership's 

programs. Set clear timelines and responsibilities for all 

participants in the partnership.

• Publicize the goals and accomplishments of the 

partnership through appropriate media outlets.

Recognizing Partners

Everyone who participates in election administration 

works hard and is a dedicated team member. Partnering 

organizations and volunteers are no exception. Consider 

creating an award for outstanding service to recognize the 

important work that these individuals have accomplished. 

While not every individual or organization wants to be 

recognized publicly, a small gesture will help partnering 

organizations feel like valued members of the election team 

and inspire future collaborations. 

Conclusion

Election officials can take advantage of the benefits 

establishing partnerships create. Collaborating with other 

election officials can develop efficiencies and allow sharing 

of best practices in election administration. Engaging groups 

with different purposes and serving diverse populations 

provides elections offices with perspectives they otherwise 

may lack. Not only does this engagement inform the 

elections office's work, but it also gives the partners valuable 

insight into the elections process. 
CHAPTER 5

Communicating with the Public

Elections are in the spotlight more than ever, and the 

public receives information about the election process 

from multiple outlets. The public needs a credible, accurate 

resource on which they can rely for everything from the 

most basic election administration information—such as 

where, when, and how to vote—to more complex issues 

such as eligibility. Elections are highly local, decentralized 

activities, with varying laws and rules in every state. 

Election officials throughout the nation continue to be the 

ultimate authority on the election administration process 

to ensure that voters and candidates can successfully 

participate. However, news sources are primarily national, 

and social media platforms have made it more difficult for 

local election officials to compete for voters’ attention in 

this informational environment. 

Election officials’ efforts to educate and communicate 

with the public directly affects voters' chances of having 

a successful election experience. Election officials need 

to understand where voters are getting most of their 

information and use that knowledge to inform the elections 

office’s communication plan. Next, election officials need to 

collect voters' most common questions. These questions and 

answers begin a communication strategy targeted at election 

officials’ specific communities.

Preparing a communication strategy ahead of time will 

increase efficiency and save resources. Election officials 

always expect the unexpected and should be prepared 

to communicate about developing situations or other 

unforeseen circumstances. Being prepared helps keep the 

public informed and minimizes interruptions during the 

election cycle.

This chapter aims to help election officials craft an effective 

communication plan and develop and distribute information 

to voters. It is important to remember that every community 

has different needs and operates under different laws. 

Local election officials should work with their local boards, 

where applicable, and state elections offices to ensure 

that their communication plans align with local and state 

communications requirements. 

Planning a Communication Strategy

Election officials' first step in formulating a communication 

strategy is to define the audiences. Most election officials have 

two primary audiences: voters and candidates. The media may 

also inform the public on a mass scale, but it is primarily the 

responsibility of elections offices to act as the official resource 

for accurate and timely election information.

To begin, election officials should determine the kind of 

information voters and candidates want and the best ways to 

disseminate that information. One of the biggest challenges 

election officials face is presenting and organizing a large 

amount of information logically and intuitively so that people 

can easily find the information they seek. One approach 

categorizes all the available information into topic areas and 

then implements it across multiple platforms.

When creating informational materials, election officials should 

produce them in accessible formats that are compliant with 

Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act1 (discussed later in this 

chapter). Also, election officials in jurisdictions covered by 

Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act2 will need to ensure they 

translate all information available in English into other required 

languages for individuals with limited English proficiency.

Creating an Effective Communications 

Plan (What to Communicate) 

The best place to start creating an effective communication 

plan is to create a calendar with every important date and 

deadline for an election. Start with a particular deadline, 

and then work backward from that date to determine what 

information will be relevant to convey to the public and 

when. For example, if a candidate filing deadline is 15 weeks 

before an election, consider how long it takes for candidates 

to complete the required paperwork:

• Do candidates need to file petition signatures? 

• How long does the signature-gathering process take? 

• How long does it take the elections office to review 

these signatures? 

1 29 U.S.C. § 794d. 2 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a.

34 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
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In this example, it may take several weeks to gather signatures 

and several days more for the elections office to verify 

them. Elections offices should communicate candidate filing 

deadlines early enough to provide candidates adequate time to 

file for office and for the elections office to notify candidates 

of any potential filing issues before the deadline if permitted. 

After election officials determine dates and deadlines and set 

target communication dates, consider what information the 

public will need to participate in each step of the elections 

process. For example:

What information and materials will candidates need to file 

for office successfully? 

• Do candidates need access to official filing affidavits or 

petition forms?

• How many signatures need to be gathered for a 

particular office?

• Is there a filing fee?

It may also be helpful to provide candidates with district 

boundary maps and information about local campaign 

finance filing requirements. 

The next step of the elections office’s communications plan 

should link the elections office’s audience to someone who 

can directly provide customer service. Using candidate filing 

as an example, this may include: 

• Hours and locations where candidate filing materials can 

be accepted 

• Contact information for staff members who can answer 

questions about candidate filing materials 

• Links to other offices or agencies which can provide more 

details on a given office (for example, if a candidate is 

filing for an office that points at the state level) 

Distributing Communication Materials 

(How to Communicate)

Election officials should understand how voters in 

their jurisdictions consume information and tailor their 

distribution strategy to those patterns. One of the most 

critical ways election officials communicate with voters is 

through direct mail. Election officials send voter registration 

cards, voter information guides, ballot applications (where 

required), official ballots, and official notices. Elections 

offices may also mail newsletters or postcards with critical 

communications to every residence in a community. 

Depending on when election materials are mailed, it may be 

important to include additional relevant voting information. 

For example, a voter registration card may include contact 

information for the elections office, social media links, 

upcoming election dates, or other helpful information in 

addition to what is legally required. 

Working with the News Media 

The public expects election officials to provide timely and 

accurate information, and the traditional news media plays 

a vital role in helping to meet this responsibility. Because 

election officials and the media have many common goals—

they both want to inform the public, explain the process, 

and report developments before, during, and after Election 

Day—their partnership is natural. 

Election officials should understand what the media might 

need and get the information they want to disseminate to 

the public. Building relationships with print, radio, television, 

and online journalists can help election officials communicate 

with the broader community. Election officials should 

understand how to communicate with the media to share 

election information with the public broadly. One way to 

accomplish this goal is by writing press releases in a format 

that is clear and easy to read. For example: 

• Title the press release with an engaging headline: 

CHAPTER 5: COMMUNICATING WITH THE PUBLIC

County Elections Office Providing Information on 

Election Security
36 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

• Tell the reader where they can find more information: 

In addition to disseminating press releases for individual events, 

consider preparing a media kit for reporters. Some essential 

information that may be helpful for reporters includes: 

• Total number of registered voters 

• Total number of absentee voters 

• Total number of military and overseas voters

• Historical voter turnout data

• Historical election results 

• Important voting dates and deadlines 

• Official candidate listings 

• Sample ballots 

• Polling place information 

• Start the press release with a clear hook that tells the 

reader what happened: 

The new election security page provides voters with 

information about how the county ensures that each 

election is secure. It includes procedures for handling 

official election materials, securing voter information, 

and conducting post-election audits. 

• Provide the reader with additional information about the 

product or service being launched: 

For more information on this service, contact [Name], 

Director of Elections for Sample County, at [phone 

number] or [email]. To stay up to date on news from 

Sample County Board of Elections, follow us on 

[social media platform] @SampleCountyElections. 

The media kit should also include contact information for 

the elections office’s designated spokesperson(s). This 

information should be forwarded to reporters and made 

available on the elections office website. 

It is also important to remember that different media outlets 

may require different information or resources from the 

elections office. Some reporters may need a place to record 

an interview, and television journalists may request live shots 

or b-roll footage. If providing television reporters access 

to the elections office, consider what information may 

be in view of the camera. If the elections office processes 

documents with personal information, ensure that those 

materials are stored securely to protect individual privacy. 

If a reporter has requested access to film inside a polling 

location, ensure they follow all state legal requirements and 

cannot see any voted ballots. Election officials must always 

maintain a balance between voter privacy and transparency. 

Reporters do not have much time to dedicate to a story, so 

information the elections office provides them should be 

concise. Election officials should do their best to educate 

reporters well before Election Day. The official might 

consider inviting reporters to observe the pre-election 

voting system testing and setup. Many jurisdictions hold a 

pre-Election Day media briefing, which includes providing 

information about the laws for media at voting locations and 

the contact information of elections office staff. 

Election officials should readily admit when they do not 

know the answer to a press question. Speculating about 

rapidly developing situations often does more harm than 

good. Election officials should acknowledge that an event 

(such as extreme weather or a power outage) happened and 

that elections office staff will keep the public updated as 

more information becomes available. 

Other helpful tips for interacting with the media include 

the following:

• Be honest and friendly.

• Turn off phones and devices before an interview. 

• Always try to accommodate reporters on deadline. 

• If a mistake or inaccurate statement is made, admit it, 

correct it, and move on.

The County Board of Elections has launched a new 

website with information for the public about election 

security, www.SampleCounty.gov/ElectionSecurity. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMMUNICATING WITH THE PUBLIC

• Never be defensive, even if the reporter is. 

• Anything e-mailed could end up in the newspaper or on 

the internet.

• Do not try to provide an answer you do not have. 

• Remember to speak to the voters, not the reporter. 

• Remember the top priority: always inform voters.

Developing Internal Procedures for Staff

Election officials deliver a large amount of information 

to the public. Sometimes, facts change, unforeseen 

circumstances arise, and courts make decisions that affect 

voters. Election officials need to respond by quickly 

distributing updated information. To manage rapidly 

changing conditions, election officials should formalize 

staff roles and establish internal procedures. 

Before making any statements to the public, elections 

offices should develop a strict hierarchy of who is authorized 

to make official statements. Larger jurisdictions may have 

professional communication staff that handles all press 

inquiries. Small and medium-sized jurisdictions may not 

have communications staff, and in these instances, the local 

election official themselves may be the most appropriate 

individual to respond to media requests. 

Election officials might find it necessary to create a formal 

decision hierarchy, including an approval process for information 

released to the public to ensure that the message is accurate 

and current. In such a hierarchy, election officials may designate 

one or more high-level members of the staff to issue the final 

approval for all documents. This structure fosters consistency 

and minimizes inaccuracies.

To ensure that all spokespeople have the same information, 

the elections office should hold pre-election training sessions 

covering poll worker duties, voting equipment, and other 

basics of election administration. Additionally, the staff 

member in charge of communication should develop a 

logistics and staffing plan for communicating in the weeks 

leading up to and after Election Day. This plan may include: 

• Roles and responsibilities for all department staff 

• Times when information is scheduled to be released to 

the media 

• Locations where the media may gather for press conferences 

• Contact information for appropriate staff members 

To help disseminate material to the public, election officials may 

consider giving reporters direct access to office staff and timely 

information. Elections officials should aim to be the ultimate 

resource of election information in the jurisdiction, which often 

means being responsive on short notice. As it gets closer to 

Election Day, election officials may need to be available outside 

regular business hours to answer press requests.

Finally, the elections office should consider creating a 

communication contingency plan that addresses how 

communication with the public and the media will continue 

in situations such as loss of power, bad weather, and any 

other disruptions. If there is an emergency during a critical 

juncture on Election Day, make sure that the staff member 

assigned to respond to press inquiries is available to focus 

on executing the crisis communication plan. While this 

may not be possible for smaller offices, it is essential to 

account for crisis communication (and any associated 

staffing shortages) as part of the office’s more extensive 

contingency plans. For more information about creating 

contingency plans, see Chapter 2 - Contingency Planning.

Official Websites 

When voters need information about registering to 

vote or to view a sample ballot, they often turn to the 

internet. Even if voters do not know to go directly to 

their state’s election website, they may be directed to 

this site by several other online sources. Having a website 

that is easy to navigate, and provides critical services to 

voters, is one of the best ways to communicate with voters 

effectively. An easy-to-navigate elections website may 

have the added benefit of reducing the number of calls or 

in-person visits received by state and local elections offices 

during high-traffic periods of the election cycle. 
38 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

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Many states already offer several online services for 

voters, including: 

• Finding voter’s polling places 

• Viewing sample ballots 

• Checking a voter’s registration status 

• Tracking a voter’s mailed ballot 

• Tracking ballots for Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 

Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) voters 

One example of a simple, easy-to-navigate local election 

website is shown in the template below and is available by third 

parties or vendors.3 The elections office’s website should use 

simple graphics and language to direct voters. Office contact 

information should be readily available at the bottom of the page. 

A website should answer common voter questions, including:

• How do I register to vote?

• What’s on the ballot? 

• Where do I vote?

• How do I request a mailed ballot?

• Where can I track my ballot? 

Additionally, election officials should ask the following 

questions to determine if their website contains voterfriendly design elements: 

• Is the elections office’s website URL easy to remember? 

• Is the elections office’s website easy to navigate? 

• Is the elections office’s website accessible and Section 

508 Compliant?

• If the jurisdiction is subject to the language provisions of 

the Voting Rights Act, is the elections office’s website 

Section 203 compliant? 

• Does the elections office’s website provide voters with 

the tools they need? For example, can voters:

o Check their registration status

o View a sample ballot

o Check the status of their mailed, UOCAVA, or 

provisional ballots

o Find their polling locations

o Request a mailed or absentee ballot

o Find contact information for their local elections office 

• Does the elections office’s website use plain language? 

• Does the elections office’s website show upcoming 

election dates? 

• Does the elections office’s website provide transparency? 

For example, does it help voters find:

o Official election results

o Audit reports

o Meeting minutes

o Candidate information

o Campaign finance reports 

When designing official elections office websites, election 

officials should ensure the design will enable all voters to 

participate independently in the elections process. All 

federal agencies must make their websites Section 508 

compliant for users who have disabilities. Although mandates 

similar to the Federal 508 requirements vary among states, 

3 https://www.usdigitalresponse.org/our-projects/county-elections-website-template/
39

CHAPTER 5: COMMUNICATING WITH THE PUBLIC

the U.S. Access Board — a federal agency committed to 

accessible design for people with disabilities — has extensive 

information about meeting the standards on its website.4

Finally, election officials must secure all communication 

channels to avoid unauthorized access to websites. 

Elections office websites use two-factor authentication 

and .gov domains to further secure government accounts. 

Utilizing a .gov domain assures voters that the site is an 

official government website. Registration is free and can 

be completed at https://home.dotgov.gov/registration/. 

Information needed for registration includes:

• Desired domain name

• DNS hosting information

• An authorization letter5

• Name server addresses

Election officials can also work with their IT support to 

develop a vulnerability disclosure policy. Vulnerability 

disclosure policies provide guidelines to researchers on 

conducting vulnerability discovery activities and how to 

notify the jurisdiction of any vulnerabilities found. The 

policy allows the jurisdiction to mitigate vulnerabilities 

before bad actors can exploit them. For example, the EAC’s 

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy can be found at https://www.

eac.gov/vulnerability-disclosure-policy. The EAC’s policy 

applies to vulnerabilities that may be found on the EAC’s 

website or any subdomain of EAC.gov. It provides clear 

limits on which systems researchers can test and the test 

methods authorized.

Social Media 

Social media can serve as a powerful tool to drive voters to 

official sources of information, including tools and resources 

available on official state or local election websites. 

Social media is also a source of misinformation—unintentionally 

bad information—or disinformation—intentionally meant 

to deceive voters. Providing proactive, accurate, and local 

information to voters via social media can help direct voters to 

official sources of information.

Social media also offers state and local election officials 

the opportunity to be more transparent than ever before. 

Some election officials have shared online election worker 

training videos and live-streamed voting equipment testing 

and auditing. These activities are excellent sources of voter 

information and can demonstrate election officials' steps 

to ensure integrity in elections. Election officials should 

plan social media content well in advance and focus on the 

public’s needs. 

When planning social media activity, election officials 

consider the following:

• Pick the right platform(s). Election officials should 

focus on the platforms the public is most familiar or 

comfortable with. There are always new and emerging 

technologies, but these may not be the best avenues to 

reach voters. If an elections office has an existing social 

media presence, they can use their built-in following to 

grow audiences on new platforms as they gain popularity. 

• Verify the elections office’s social media accounts. State 

and local election officials are the most trusted sources 

of election information, and their official social media 

accounts should be authenticated. When an account 

is verified, it confirms that voters can rely on the 

information as accurate. Also, social media accounts 

should include official seals and have contact information 

prominently displayed. 

• Provide the information that the elections office’s audience 

needs to know. Before deploying facts, election officials 

should evaluate if the information is relevant to voters. 

Posts should be concise and focused on a single topic. 

• Provide timely information. Post information about voting 

dates and deadlines with enough time for voters to act 

on the information. It may take a few days for elections 

information to circulate to followers and local communities. 

• Create a community of trusted voices. Social media 

offers election officials the opportunity to engage across 

jurisdictional boundaries. Cross-jurisdictional engagement 

can be a valuable tool to collaborate on voter education, 

poll worker recruitment, and other critical functions of 

the elections office. 

4 http://www.access-board.gov 5 Template authorization letters are provided at https://home.dotgov.gov/registration/authorization-templates/
40 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

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Communicating Effectively During a Crisis

Unexpected events happen during elections. If there is an 

emergency or voting is interrupted, the media and public will 

likely press election officials for facts and information about 

what will happen next. The elections office should prepare 

answers for any possible situations and consider how best to 

communicate with every segment of the public, even those 

without access to typical means of communication. 

Several months before Election Day, election officials should 

share the communication contingency plans with anyone 

who plays a role on Election Day, including individuals or 

agencies outside the elections office who can distribute critical 

information to the public. Some agencies and organizations that 

can partner with elections offices include law enforcement, local 

fire departments, school districts, tribal communities, utility 

companies, and emergency management agencies. The elections 

office's communication contingency plan should coordinate with 

the local government’s continuity of operations plan.

When a crisis occurs, an election official will not have time to 

reread the laws and consider the wording of a press release 

or public statement. The elections office should consider 

the following recommendations to prepare elements of a 

contingency plan that anticipate disruptions: 

• Educate staff about state laws that may affect elections, 

such as who has the authority to reschedule or cancel 

an election.

• Develop scripte messages for front-line staff. 

• Develop separate messages for threats of violence, 

extreme weather, or other disasters. 

• Develop draft press releases and e-mails to distribute in 

the event of a disruption. To disseminate the information 

quickly, have all contact information for media members, 

poll workers, and other stakeholders readily available.

• Contact utility companies to notify them of Election Day 

activities, including a complete list of voting locations. 

Request that they limit activities that could disrupt power. 

• Provide law enforcement and emergency management 

officials with a complete list of all voting locations, 

including the number of registered voters at each site.

In addition to these communication channels, election 

officials should use social media to communicate alerts 

directly to voters. Social media is a great way of alerting 

voters to last-minute voting location changes or courtordered changes in voting hours. 

Evaluating Communication Efforts

After Election Day, it is vital to assess the success of the 

elections office’s outreach activities. To make changes for 

the future, election officials need to know what worked and 

what did not. One way to assess the effectiveness of public 

communication efforts is to review website analytics. Some 

data points to look for may include: 

• Which pages of the website received the most views? 

• How much time did the average user spend on the site? 

• Which external websites brought in the most traffic 

(Google, Facebook, local news organizations, etc.)? 

Social media platforms provide helpful analytics that show 

which messages received the greatest number of views or 

the most public engagement. These data points give election 

officials information about which materials made the most 

impact in their communities. 

Finally, election officials can review election stories from 

traditional and news media to improve their communications 

efforts in the future. When reviewing news stories, consider 

the following questions: 

• Were voters' needs met in a timely and proactive way? 

• Did communications adequately support the mission of 

the elections office? 

• Were the media provided sufficient information to report 

on elections issues clearly and accurately? 

• Were voters able to find the resources that they needed 

to vote successfully? 

• Were there areas where elections office staff needed to 

provide better information? 
41

CHAPTER 5: COMMUNICATING WITH THE PUBLIC

Creating a communications plan is an essential undertaking 

for every elections office. While these efforts take time and 

resources, an effective communications plan will save voters 

and election officials time during critical points in the election 

cycle. This efficiency provides voters with better customer 

service and helps voters to participate in the electoral process. 

Conclusion

Election officials have many tools to communicate with 

voters. Developing a communication strategy for each tool 

well before Election Day streamlines the communications 

process. Additionally, communicating information based on 

anticipated voter needs and questions can preempt voter 

calls and emails, freeing up election office staff time. 
CHAPTER 6

System Security

There is no “one size fits all” for voting system security. 

Appropriate policies and procedures for a large elections office 

with over a dozen staff members may be overly burdensome 

for a small, two-person elections office. However, there are 

four factors working together in concert that will enhance the 

overall security of any computer-based voting system:

1. Use of software should be limited to the very basic 

functions required to perform the voting system’s 

processes. In addition, the software should provide audit 

logging to track the sequence of events that occur on 

the system and, to the extent possible, identify the 

person(s) who initiated the events. The software should 

also employ a sufficient level of encryption or validation 

protocols to prevent changes made without proper 

authorization.

2. Use well-defined policies and procedures to control 

access to the voting system, the circumstances under 

which users can access the system, and the functions 

users are allowed to perform. Develop a plan to ensure 

that all policies and procedures are strictly enforced. 

3. Maintain strong physical custody of all equipment, 

software, and key or control materials at all times. 

This includes using physical security and access logs 

and using fences, walls, doors, locks, and seals to 

control and limit access to the system.

4. Use a two-person accountability and control system. 

Access, control, and custody should always involve 

two or more personnel. 

The following sections provide guidelines for implementing 

these four factors within the election environment. A range 

of acceptable procedures is presented where possible.

Software Security

Initial Installation

The first step in securing voting system software is ensuring 

that the software installed on the system is the exact software 

version that has been certified by the state or the Election 

Assistance Commission’s (EAC) federal certification program, 

as required by state law. This starts with obtaining the 

software from a trusted source, such as directly from the state 

elections office or a Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) 

that performed the tests for EAC certification.

Once installed, voting system software should be validated 

using a cryptographic hash provided by the same trusted 

source that supplied the software. Instructions for 

performing hash validation vary from system to system. The 

voting system manufacturer should provide instructions for 

hash validation as part of the documentation they deliver 

with the system. Election officials should reach out to their 

state certification authority or the EAC, if they are unsure 

about the process for completing hash validation.

Although it is important for the voting system software 

to be complete and correct, installing only the certified 

voting system software on the voting system components 

is equally important. Do not allow any software installation 

on the voting system components except for the certified 

voting system software itself. Specifically, do not allow office 

automation software such as Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, 

Excel, or networking software such as e-mail, network 

browsers, or other utilities unless it is certified, is specifically 

authorized by the manufacturer, and is provided with the 

trusted build or otherwise obtained from a trusted source.

Trusted Installers

As a final step in the testing and certification process, a VSTL 

produces a “final build” or “trusted build” of the system. The 

output of this final build is removable media that contains the 

system source code, the object code, and various documents 

that are delivered to the state, the EAC, or placed in escrow 

42 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
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for access in the event the manufacturer goes out of business. 

In addition, the VSTL also produces installers to load the 

system on the various voting system components.

A copy of the trusted installers is required to reinstall the 

system. If the state elections office does not have the 

software, it can request the voting system manufacturer 

authorize the test lab that performed the certification tests 

to send the disk to the state office or directly to the local 

elections office. State elections office staff should be able to 

assist local elections officials in reinstalling the software. 

The installers load the election management system on the 

central election computer and other system components. If 

the firmware for the voting stations or ballot scanners needs 

to be reinstalled, election officials should ask the voting system 

manufacturer to provide guidance on what is necessary from 

the state elections office or the test lab to complete the 

installation as specialized equipment may be required. 

Networking

The possibility of fraudulently altering voting system software 

is based on the assumption that hackers have access to the 

system. Election officials can mitigate this type of attack 

by never connecting the voting system to a network that 

is not under the officials’ complete control. Such networks 

include the internet and any local network, unless it is wholly 

contained within the elections office, controlled by a trusted 

organization, and segregated from all other networks.

Modem Transmission of Unofficial Results

Jurisdictions may authorize the use of modems to transmit 

results on election night. Caution must be exercised if they 

are to be used. While compromising these communications 

or the devices connected to them is not trivial, sophisticated 

malicious actors such as nation-states have these capabilities 

and present a credible threat. These modems should not 

be connected or enabled until all other operations on 

the voting device have been completed, such as closing 

polls and printing results from each device. Delaying the 

connection can help ensure that election officials can 

compare the original results reports from each device with 

the transmitted results as part of an audit process. Election 

officials should always compute the official results from the 

media that poll workers physically transport from the polling 

place to the central office.

Audit Data

A voting system has several different audit logs. These logs 

record each event that occurs on the system from the time 

used to initially begin an election until the final vote tally 

and the devices are shut down. Audit logs on precinct-based 

voting equipment begin when the election media is inserted 

into the device until the election is closed and the equipment 

is shut down.

Election officials should review the audit log documentation 

or obtain a complete description of audit log codes or 

descriptions from the voting system manufacturer for 

the audit logs available on the voting system. Election 

officials should become familiar with the content of these 

logs and learn how to print them out. Familiarization will help 

officials recognize events that look anomalous or that they 

do not belong.

Never connect a voting system component to 

any network that is not under the elections office's 

direct control. Election officials should seal all 

unused connections on the system, precluding 

unapproved network, modem, USB, parallel, or 

other port connectivity.

Wireless networking capabilities (Wi-Fi) should 

be disabled to the greatest extent possible such as 

removing drivers, disabling Wi-Fi networking, and 

ensuring only system administrators have access to 

enable any Wi-Fi functionality.

If modems are used to transmit polling place 

results to the central office, consider these results 

unofficial, and always verify them against the results 

on the media that is physically transported to the 

central office.

CHAPTER 6: SYSTEM SECURITY
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Election officials should print and examine these audit logs as 

part of pre- and post-election activities.

Policies and Procedures

Elections offices should have policies outlining who can 

access the voting system and only permit the minimum 

access needed to fulfill their job duties. Each staff member 

with access to the system should have unique login 

credentials. Additionally, the policy should address vendor 

access to the system. For more information on physical 

security and access to the voting system, see Chapter 7 - 

Physical Security. 

Election officials should develop equally specific procedures 

for each person who has access to the voting system, 

including elections office staff and vendor personnel. Policies 

and procedures for accessing voting systems should include 

the following:

• Require positive identification of each person that 

requests access to the voting system.

• Keep a log of everyone that accesses the voting system. 

The log should include the person’s name, the date and 

time the access begins, the purpose of the access, and 

the time the access ends.

• Someone other than the person accessing the system 

should write the access log entries. The entries in this log 

must be complete and detailed. For example, “System 

Maintenance” is not an acceptable entry. The entry 

should state the exact maintenance performed and why it 

was performed.

• Contactless card reader systems that require users to 

enter and exit a secured area are a good solution but 

will only log the time and date that someone with the 

card (not necessarily the authorized individual) entered 

and exited an area. Where these systems are used, it 

is a good practice also to utilize cameras that can help 

identify the person.

It is not uncommon to find an elections office in which the 

voting system has been installed for a considerable length of 

time. If an election official is unsure if anyone has had access 

to the system unsupervised by election officials, they should 

consider the following recommendations:

• If election officials suspect someone has modified the 

voting system software, archive all existing data, wipe the 

drive, and reinstall the voting system software with a copy 

obtained directly from a trusted source.

• If election officials maintain strong physical custody of 

the system but seek assurance that the correct software 

is loaded, performing a hash validation of the installed 

software allows officials to maintain the existing data 

without wiping and reinstalling the system software.

Elections Office Staff

Elections office staff should only be allowed the level of 

access to the voting system necessary to perform specific 

tasks related to their job description. Staff members should 

not be issued a credential that will allow them to perform 

functions on the voting system that they are not authorized 

to perform. It is highly recommended that whenever 

possible, elections staff work in pairs. This procedure will 

greatly reduce the potential for accidental errors and 

virtually eliminate any opportunity for deliberate mischief 

or fraud.

Vendor Personnel

There is no such thing as “routine system maintenance.” 

A vendor can void a voting system’s certification by making 

a change to the system that the state or the EAC has 

not approved.

Election officials should never allow vendor personnel 

access to the voting system unless it is certain the state 

and the EAC, as necessary, have approved the change, 

upgrade, or maintenance they intend to perform. All 

approved modifications or upgrades to an EAC-certified 

voting system are documented with a certificate or other 

supporting documentation, such as an Engineering Change 
45

CHAPTER 6: SYSTEM SECURITY

Order (ECO). If the vendor cannot produce a copy of this 

certificate or documentation, do not allow them to access 

the voting system. Election officials should call the state 

elections office or the EAC for clarification when in doubt.

Election officials should never allow vendor personnel to 

access the voting system unless a member of the election 

staff is present. Election officials should emphasize to the 

vendor that this requirement is as much for their protection 

as it is for the elections office.

Everyone else

There is absolutely no reason, or circumstance, to ever allow 

anyone other than elections office staff or vendor personnel 

access to the election management system (EMS). A 

consultant working under contract to the elections office is 

considered elections office staff; however, consultants should 

be monitored as closely as vendor personnel. Elections office 

policy should outline that access to sensitive data and the 

voting system are limited to only those who need access to 

perform their duties. 

User Access

Effective use of user permissions and roles is essential to the 

overall security of a voting system. The first step in managing 

user access is to know what capabilities are available on 

the voting system for assigning users to roles. The EAC 

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Section 7.2.1 General 

Access Control Policies states, “...the vendor shall provide a 

description of recommended policies for effective password 

management.” Obtain this description from the vendor and 

provide a copy to every employee authorized to access the 

voting system.

The following sections provide guidelines for effective 

user management.

User Administrator – Election officials should designate 

someone in the elections office as the user administrator, 

either the Chief Election Officer or a senior member of the 

staff. The user administrator’s duties are as follows:

• Define and assign users to groups or roles

• Issue passwords

• Maintain a master list of all user credentials issued

• Reissue passwords periodically

• Monitor access

Defining and Assigning Roles – Election officials should 

assign users to roles utilizing the concept of least privilege. 

In other words, users should only be given the access they 

need to complete the tasks that are necessary for their work. 

Where possible, limit access to applications or functionality 

that isn’t required for a particular user to complete their 

work. Users may be organized by group or role depending 

on the system design. Each of these is similar and typically 

consists of a very small group of administrators with other 

groups specific to each role they fulfill, such as a tally 

operator, adjudication user, or someone creating election 

definitions. If the system does not allow for granular role 

definition, election officials may give users limited access to 

applications within the system.

Issuing Passwords – Passwords issued to employees should 

only be used to grant initial access, with the employee 

changing the password during their initial login. The user 

administrator should control passwords issued to temporary 

personnel or contractors. Passwords should use passphrases 

of random words that are at least 20 characters in length.1 

If this is not possible, passwords should have the following 

alternative characteristics:

• Passwords should be at least six characters long, 

preferably eight.

• At least one character should be an uppercase letter.

• At least one character should be a lowercase letter.

• At least one character should be numeral.

• At least one character should be a special symbol. 

Remember that passwords are case sensitive. 

For example, ABC*123# and Abc*123# are 

different passwords.

Passwords should be easy to remember (so there will be no 

need to write them down) yet sufficiently vague that they 

cannot be easily guessed. It is best to avoid using personal 

information (name, date of birth, anniversaries, pet’s names, 

etc.) and using single words (certain technology enables 

individuals trying to predict passwords the capability of 

trying every word in the dictionary). It is best to use a 

randomly generated mix of different words containing 4 or 5 

words and at least 20 characters.
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Election officials should never issue a system password to 

anyone other than an elections office employee, not even 

vendor representatives. If someone other than an election 

official needs to access the system, either have an election 

official login for them or create a one-time use password 

and then delete it as soon as the session is over. (Remember, 

someone from the elections office staff should monitor all 

vendor and consultant access to the system and log this 

activity, including date, time, names, and reason for access.)

Maintaining a Master List of User Credentials Issued – It 

is okay to allow individual employees to make up their own 

passwords; however, the user administrator must manage all 

user credentials (usernames, user tokens/keys). The voting 

system should verify that the passwords comply with the 

requirements above. Election officials should keep a printed 

copy of a user list in a safe and secure place and only use it in 

the event of an office emergency. Only the Chief Election 

Official and the user administrator should use the list even in 

an emergency.

“Safe” and “secure” do not mean the same thing. A fireproof 

filing cabinet may be safe, but it is not secure unless it is 

locked and only the Chief Election Official and the password 

administrator have access to the key. Similarly, an encrypted 

file as a backup on a disk drive may be secure, but it is not 

safe. Disk drives can fail.

Reissuing Passwords on a Periodic Basis – Election officials 

must change all voting system passwords periodically. A 

recommended period is one election cycle or at least once 

a year. Election officials should also consider using multifactor authentication if their system supports it. 

Monitoring Access – Election employees’ system access 

should be monitored and periodically audited. Devise 

monitoring activities that are appropriate for the elections 

office, but election officials should consider the following:

• Watch for passwords on post-it notes posted on the side 

of monitors or in desk drawers. To avoid this, choose 

passwords that are easy to remember. Remind staff that 

if they forget their password, they can have it reset by 

the user administrator.

• Review audit logs to verify that employees work only 

within their assigned responsibilities.

Conclusion

Ensuring the security of the voting system is a critical 

responsibility for election officials. Local officials can 

implement practical policies like two-person accountability 

and physical security and access logging to promote the 

system’s security. Additionally, limiting user access to the 

least privilege necessary and periodically reviewing audit 

logs can further mitigate risks to the voting system. Trusted 

partners, like state elections offices, can assist with more 

complex procedures like verifying software versions and, if 

necessary, installing trusted builds. 

1 https://www.eff.org/dice
The physical security of elections consists of standards, 

procedures, and actions taken to protect voting systems 

and related facilities and equipment from natural and 

environmental hazards, tampering, vandalism, and theft. 

Physical security safeguards are required for voting systems 

while in storage, in transit, in the polling place, and in use 

on Election Day through the post-election canvass and 

certification process. Beyond the voting system, election 

officials must also secure numerous physical locations, the 

elections office, personnel, and office equipment. 

Documentation of the election process, from ballot proofing 

to post-election audits, is the foundation for security in 

elections. Elections office staff document actions taken 

throughout the election cycle, and poll workers do the 

same on Election Day to form an audit trail for the election 

and establish proof that all components of the election are 

secure at all times. The audit trail may even serve as evidence 

of the election’s integrity in the event of a recount or 

contested election. 

This chapter identifies important factors for conducting 

a security review and details guidelines for personnel 

security, elections office security, and physical security 

during the election cycle. Election officials should review 

these guidelines and consider incorporating them into 

their processes.

Conducting a Security Review

One of the most important proactive steps election 

officials can take is to conduct an election security 

review. Walking through procedures, performing physical 

inspections, and considering all aspects of security can 

identify possible threats and vulnerabilities. An election 

security review identifies key areas where election officials 

should take steps to ensure the security and integrity of 

election administration. 

The following activities should be part of an election 

security review: 

• Perform an election administration risk assessment. 

o Identify potential steps in the election administration 

process where election security and integrity are 

vulnerable to destruction, disruption, tampering, 

or corruption from internal or external sources. 

Examples include fire, power failure, after-hours theft, 

malfunctioning sprinkler system, bomb scares or 

terrorist acts, disruptions by voters or poll watchers, 

and other similar scenarios. 

o List the potential security exposure and the impact 

on the election from each threat. 

o Consider whether the likelihood of each threat 

is high, medium, or low, and develop plans to 

mitigate or eliminate each threat starting with 

those considered high. 

• Review overall policies to ensure proper separation of job 

duties throughout the election administration process. 

• Review the audit trail from the last election in its 

entirety. Analyze whether sufficient documentation 

exists to validate the integrity of the election. Create or 

update the master election audit trail checklist with all 

documents necessary to complete the trail and ensure all 

steps require two-person (preferably bipartisan) sign-off. 

• Inventory the list of procedures used throughout the 

election administration process. Evaluate each procedure 

to determine whether it needs to be updated based on 

the security review. 

• Perform a physical security review to evaluate access 

controls of all office and storage facilities. Consider the 

relative security of other agencies sharing the facilities. 

• Review work areas to ensure office space is 

appropriately isolated and undetected unauthorized 

access is impossible. 

• Review the list of personnel who have keys to elections 

office work areas and voting equipment storage to ensure 

all keys are accounted for and only authorized personnel 

has keys. 

• Review chain-of-custody procedures, the use of 

tamper-evident seals, and inventory control/asset 

management processes to ensure voting machines 

and associated equipment are securely and adequately 

controlled and accounted for throughout the election 

administration process. 

CHAPTER 7

Physical Security

47
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48

During any review, follow the general principle that 

no person should review their own work—objectivity 

and independence enhance the review's integrity. A 

minimum of two people (preferably bipartisan) should 

conduct the reviews. 

Federal Resources

The EAC provides several resources for election officials 

to assist with improving security and addressing incidents. 

Importantly, the EAC administers and provides guidance on 

the use of HAVA Section 101 funds for election security. 

Prior to 2022, HAVA funds distributed to state and local 

election officials to primarily improve election cybersecurity 

defenses and the physical security of election equipment 

and facilities. In response to concerns for the physical safety 

of election officials, the EAC provided further guidance

outlining the permissible use of funds for physical security 

services and social media threat monitoring.1 Information and 

guidance on election security funds can be found at https://

www.eac.gov/payments-and-grants/election-security-funds. 

In addition to grants, the EAC also creates and maintains 

resources for state and local election officials to assist 

with improving physical security. The Election Official 

Security resource focuses on the physical security of 

election officials and outlines how to report threats to the 

FBI’s Election Crimes Taskforce, what to do if officials 

receive threats, and guidance on removing personal 

information from internet searches.2 Information on the 

security of election processes and technology is available on 

the Election Security section of the EAC’s Clearinghouse 

Resources for Election Officials.3

Since the designation of election systems as critical 

infrastructure in early 2017, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and Cybersecurity & Infrastructure 

Security Agency (CISA) have partnered with the EAC 

and state and local election officials to offer additional 

services to assess and mitigate both physical and 

cybersecurity risks. These services can be especially 

helpful to smaller offices without dedicated IT support 

and sometimes without more than one or two full-time 

employees. CISA provides Protective Security Advisors 

who can assist elections offices in evaluating their facilities 

and developing security and response plans.4 More 

information on CISA’s services can be found in the Election 

Infrastructure Security Resource Guide.

5

Personnel Security

Another important factor in determining the vulnerability 

of a system is the people involved; they must implement 

security policies and procedures and defend against 

any attacks. 

• Perform background checks on all employees. Adopt 

policies and provide training to mitigate risk of insider 

threats—CISA’s Election Infrastructure Insider Threat 

Mitigation Guide provides helpful information on insider 

threat mitigation.6

• Determine who can operate and administer (e.g., create 

databases, define ballots, test and maintain equipment) 

the voting system and only give users the minimum 

access level needed to complete their job. 

• Custodians of voting machines must be fully competent, 

thoroughly trained, and sworn to perform their duties 

honestly and faithfully. 

• Develop a detailed “Rules of Security Behavior” and 

provide training for all levels of personnel responsible for 

using the voting system (election director, poll workers, 

rovers, field technicians, etc.). 

• Establish policies and procedures for visitors and 

observers. Use a sign-in/sign-out log, provide visitors 

with a numbered visitor badge to wear, provide different 

colored vests for visitors and observers for easy 

identification, and require a staff member to accompany 

them at all times. 

1 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/paymentgrants/Allowable_Use_

of_Funds_Physical_Security_Services_and_Social_Media_Threat_Monitoring_EAC.pdf

2 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-official-security 3 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-official-security

4 https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/physical-security-of-voting-location-election-facilities_v2_508.pdf

5 https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa_election-security-resources-guide-Sept-2020_1.pdf

6 https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_insider_threat_mitigation_guide_508_0.pdf
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CHAPTER 7: PHYSICAL SECURITY

7 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/Personal_Security_for_Election_Officials.pdf

8 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-official-security#document-everything

Election officials entrust critical steps of the election 

process to hundreds, if not thousands, of poll workers. 

When staffing polling places, consider the following: 

• Ensure there are enough workers at each polling place to 

enforce security procedures. 

• Incorporate two-person integrity security measures into 

polling place procedures and cover security measures in 

poll worker training. 

• Provide administrative access to voting equipment 

only to staff specifically trained to address voting 

equipment issues. 

In addition to ensuring personnel are trustworthy and 

follow security procedures, election officials must also 

consider the physical safety of their staff and poll workers. 

Staff frequently work into the night and on weekends 

when otherwise fully occupied government buildings are 

vacant. The EAC’s Personal Security for Election Officials

checklist outlines many steps election officials can take 

to coordinate with law enforcement, protect themselves 

online, document threats, and ensure their mental health.7

Consider the following in developing plans to ensure the 

physical security of elections office staff: 

• Ensure the exterior of the elections office, walkways, and 

the parking lot are well lit and monitored, if possible. 

• Ensure workers leave the office together when 

working late. 

• Partner with local law enforcement and: 

o Notify them of dates when staff may be working late 

during the election cycle and ask them to patrol the 

area more frequently. 

o Ask for training for staff on personal security, 

including de-escalation techniques and steps to take 

if de-escalation does not work. 

o Provide them with plans for election equipment 

delivery (including routes) and all drop box and polling 

place information. 

Election officials are encouraged to report threats or violent 

acts to the FBI at 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324) (prompt 

1, and then prompt 3) or go to tips.fbi.gov. The Election 

Official Security resource details how to document and 

report threats or incidents.8

Security of the Elections Office

Elections are more than voting equipment. The elections 

office as a whole requires careful attention to security 

to maintain the integrity of the entire voting process. 

In general, election officials must develop and follow 

procedures to ensure the security of all components of 

the election process—from voter registration through final 

certification. In developing security procedures, consider: 

• Who needs access to each area of the office? 

• Who may visit, and how will they be tracked? Remember 

to consider vendor representatives, maintenance and 

janitorial staff, members of the public, etc. 

• Do you have staff that work from home? What steps 

are taken to ensure the security of their laptops, mobile 

devices, etc.? 

• Do you utilize drop boxes outside of your office? 

• Do you store records outside your office (e.g., records on 

retention)? If so, how are those spaces secured? 

When it comes to voting equipment: 

• What procedures are in place to assure the physical 

security of voting machines and paper ballots before 

an election? 

• How and where are equipment, ballots, and ballot 

stock stored? How is the facility secured against theft, 

tampering, and vandalism? 

• What protections are in place to assure access is 

permitted only for authorized personnel? 

• Who installs equipment upgrades, a county official 

or a vendor? 
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• Do vendors ever handle voting equipment? 

• If vendors can handle voting equipment pre-election, are 

local officials required to be present? 

While specific areas of concern are addressed below, the 

security plan should take the following into account for the 

overall security of the elections office: 

• Control access based on each employee's role. Only 

allow employees to access spaces and systems necessary 

to complete their work. Election officials can physically 

restrict access with unique locks and keys or an electronic 

keypad tied to a security system. 

o Establish sign-in/sign-out procedures for secured 

areas if access is not automatically logged. 

• Utilize video monitoring for critical spaces and motion 

and glass break detection for after-hours security. 

o Routinely test the security system to ensure it 

is functioning. 

• Maintain an inventory of general office equipment 

(voting system inventory is discussed below) and supplies, 

including office computers not tied to the voting system. 

o Blank ballot stock must be tracked before, during, and 

after each election. 

• Establish procedures for onboarding and offboarding 

personnel. When offboarding an employee, cut off access 

to facilities and IT systems, including changing physical 

locks, if necessary. 

Voting Equipment Storage and Inventory Control

The election administration security risks associated with 

voting systems equipment go beyond the obvious concerns 

of theft and destruction. Everything from building security, 

access control, and configuration management of the voting 

system equipment is an important component in overall 

election security. 

• Maintain a key control list of all personnel with keys and 

access to the facilities. Maintain an access log including 

sign-in and sign-out dates and times for all personnel and 

visitors specific to the storage facility/area. 

• Implement two-person (preferably bipartisan) integrity 

security measures when setting up the voting system 

equipment for an election. Never allow a voting system 

vendor or employee to have uncontrolled access to 

election equipment storage and maintenance facilities 

and ensure staff always accompany vendors. 

• Take into consideration long-term storage and security 

needs when designing storage and workspace. 

• Implement an effective asset management and inventory 

control system for all voting system components. 

Consider testing procedures, and verify all equipment 

returned from the vendor after maintenance to ensure 

proper hardware, software, and firmware versions. The 

EAC’s Voting System Security Measures covers common 

security measures election officials employ to secure 

storage facilities and the voting system throughout the 

election cycle.9

Maintain physical security of all voting system equipment 

and peripheral devices at all times. The security measures 

should include the following: 

• Maintain complete and accurate inventory of all voting 

system equipment, including voting machines, optical 

scanners, communication equipment, supervisor or 

administrator devices, ballot activation devices, and 

storage media. 

• Assign personnel the responsibility of maintaining 

accurate inventory. Inventory should track: 

o Equipment – maintain a list of equipment, serial 

numbers, and quantity in the storage facility 

o Machine Checkout – inventory control should track 

equipment when it is (1) being released and returned 

for an election, (2) released and returned for a 

demonstration, and (3) accepted from or returned to 

the vendor for maintenance or repair 

9 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/security/Voting_System_Security_Measures_508_EAC.pdf
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CHAPTER 7: PHYSICAL SECURITY

o Usage History – maintain a history of elections for 

which each piece of equipment has been used 

o Repair History – maintain a history of repairs to 

individual devices 

• Provide physical access control to the storage facility 

only to authorized personnel. The following is a list of 

recommendations: 

o Make sure all personnel have signed security 

agreements on file. 

o Track all staff members, vendors, and visitors' 

entry and exit. Staff members should always wear 

identification badges. 

o Authenticate all visitors, vendors, and maintenance 

personnel using appointments and identification 

checks to access the voting system equipment. 

o Before a vendor is permitted to conduct maintenance 

on any voting equipment, verify who is scheduled to 

perform the work and check identification when the 

vendor representatives appear. 

• If the elections office uses surveillance cameras, schedule 

regular checks to verify they are fully operational, and 

keep in mind that it may take time for tampering to be 

discovered, ensure the system saves the video for an 

appropriate amount of time. 

• Change keys or combinations on locks as necessary for 

each election. 

Explore using a barcoding system to track the location of 

voting system equipment. All electronic storage media 

should be permanently identified with a unique serial 

number. Record the serial numbers as part of the internal 

inventory audit trail. 

Security During the Election Cycle

Paper Ballots

Protecting the security of paper ballots is also a 

component of providing physical security. Election 

administrators should have a documented plan in place 

to provide for the management of optical scan or paper 

ballots, ballot-on-demand ballots, and all ballot stock. This 

plan should include details about the audit trail and chain of 

custody for the ballots with strict control over the ballots 

and ballot stock at all times. 

• The security of paper ballots includes security in the 

elections office facility and at the polling place on 

Election Day. At least two election officials (preferably 

bipartisan) should oversee all processes, including 

transferring ballots and other election materials from the 

central office to the polling place and vice versa. 

• Two or more staff members (preferably bipartisan) should 

receive the ballot order and verify the accuracy and 

quantity of ballots against the ballot order request. Once 

validated, store the ballots in a secure area with restricted 

access. 

• Ballot-on-demand is often used to supplement printed 

ballot stock. If used, election officials should implement 

internal controls to safeguard ballot stock from 

fraudulent or inappropriate use. For example: 

o Two or more election officials (preferably bipartisan) 

should monitor, record, and balance daily ballot-ondemand activity. 

o Election officials should reconcile the number of blank 

ballot stock received from the vendor to the number 

of printed, spoiled, and unused stock. 

Transporting Equipment

Elections offices use multiple methods to get voting 

equipment and supplies to each polling place before 

the opening of the polls. Volunteers, county/municipal 

maintenance departments, or private delivery companies 

may deliver voting equipment with poll workers picking 

up supplies in the days before the election. No matter 

how delivery is accomplished, security of the equipment 

and supplies during delivery and while at the polling place 

is essential. 

Consider the following questions when forming a plan for 

equipment and supply delivery: 

• Who will transport voting equipment and ballots? County 

officials or poll workers? Will a delivery vendor assist? 
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• How and when are voting equipment and ballots 

transported to the polling places? How and when will it be 

returned to the elections office? 

• If poll workers transport voting equipment and ballots, 

when do they receive the equipment and ballots? If poll 

workers receive the voting equipment and ballots before 

Election Day, how and where are the materials stored 

until polls open? 

• Are detailed logs kept of who takes custody of equipment 

and ballots with their contact information? 

• How are voting equipment and ballots secured 

from tampering from the time they leave elections 

office custody to the time they are delivered to the 

polling places? 

• Are serial numbers or other secure, tamper-evident 

devices or seals placed on all ports where memory cards 

are inserted? 

Below are a few guidelines for developing a physical security 

plan for voting equipment delivery: 

• If voting equipment must be delivered before Election 

Day, meet with a representative from each polling 

place and develop a plan to secure the equipment at the 

location in an area with restricted access. 

• Develop an operational plan defining what will be 

delivered, where, by whom, and when. Even if using third 

parties to assist with delivery, elections office staff should 

oversee the entire process. 

• Create a checklist for delivery at each polling place to 

track the delivery of each device. Include the device 

serial number and the serial number of all tamper-evident 

seals used to secure the equipment. Provide a duplicate 

checklist to the lead poll worker at the location to verify 

delivery of the correct equipment and the condition of 

the seals. Some elections offices use Radio Frequency 

Identification (RFID) or Bluetooth tracking technology 

to monitor equipment delivery. 

• It is recommended that the auxiliary voting equipment 

and supplies (ballot activation devices, administrator 

devices, communication equipment, seals for poll closing, 

etc.) remain in possession of election officials until 

election morning. If the voting equipment is delivered to 

the polling place before Election Day, it must be secured 

(e.g., cabled together and locked or secured in a locked 

room). Any other equipment or supplies should also be 

secured. Designated poll manager(s) should verify receipt 

and sign-off on the delivery of voting equipment and 

necessary election supplies. 

• Election officials should move voting systems in a 

controlled transportation mode. In other words, the 

equipment should be locked and sealed in the vehicle or 

container before transport and unsealed at the delivery 

point. Sealing and unsealing should be logged and 

completed only by election officials. 

Equipment Security During Early Voting and on 

Election Day 

One challenge with securing voting equipment during early 

voting and on Election Day is that elections offices must rely 

on temporary staff and poll workers to carry out security 

procedures. Below are some guidelines for developing plans 

for equipment security during voting. Officials should also 

consider how they will train their workers to follow the plan 

and provide guidance on what to do in the event of a breach. 

Consider the following questions: 

• Are all paper ballots and electronic storage media in 

the possession of at least two election officials or poll 

workers (preferably bipartisan and using the two-person 

accountability principle) during its transport to the 

central or remote count locations? 

• What physical security measures are in place for the 

room containing the computer running the tabulation 

software? 

• Are printed result tapes and a backup copy of the 

tabulations in locked storage in a secure location? 

• Is there a complete chain of custody with two-person 

integrity security measures for all election materials? 
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CHAPTER 7: PHYSICAL SECURITY

Below are a few general guidelines for securing voting 

equipment during voting periods: 

• During early voting: 

o The electronic storage media and paper ballots should 

be secured each night in a tamper-proof location, 

preferably within the elections office. 

o Voting equipment should be closed, sealed, and 

secured at the end of each day. Record the number 

on all protective seals and public counters. In addition, 

verify seals and counters before the voting equipment 

is used the following day. 

o Every evening, any mobile unit containing voting 

equipment should be returned to the elections office 

and stored within a secure facility. 

• If voting equipment and election supplies are delivered 

to the polling place by anyone other than poll managers, 

the poll manager(s) should verify the serial numbers of all 

voting equipment and necessary election supplies (ballot 

activation devices, administrator devices, communication 

equipment, closing seals, etc.). 

• Voting equipment setup should be as follows: 

o Access to the voting equipment’s power control, 

counter controls, and electronic storage media 

must be controlled within the voting machine and 

inaccessible to the voter. 

o Voting equipment should be in plain view of the poll 

managers at all times. 

• On Election Day, a team of two poll workers (preferably 

bipartisan) should: 

o Verify the serial number and seal number on each 

voting machine and look for signs of tampering. 

o Activate the machine and verify the date, time, and 

public count. 

o On machines with a voter-verified paper audit trail, 

verify that it functions. 

o Sign-off on paperwork indicating all procedures 

were followed. 

 Throughout the voting day, train workers to implement 

the following procedures to promote the security of the 

voting process: 

• The area around the voting equipment must be secure at 

all times. Only poll workers, legally authorized personnel, 

and registered voters should be allowed in the voting 

machine or voting booth area. A voter should not be 

allowed to enter this area until a voting machine or booth 

is available for their use. 

• Each poll worker should have a clearly defined role, 

so voters can identify them and their particular 

responsibilities as they move through the polling place. 

• Poll workers should direct provisional voters to a separate 

check-in table or area to ensure provisional ballots are 

handled uniformly and establish ballot accountability for 

auditing purposes. 

DROP BOX SECURITY

Election officials must include ballot drop boxes in 

their security plans. The Quick Start Guide: Ballot 

Drop Boxes highlights several tips for ensuring the 

security of the drop box and collection procedures.

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/

electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Ballot_Drop_

Boxes_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf

Additionally, the EAC chaired the Elections 

Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council and 

Sector Coordinating Council’s Join COVID Working 

Group and developed guidance on drop box security 

that addresses placement, security, and collection 

practices. 

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/

electionofficials/vbm/Ballot_Drop_Box.pdf
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• Poll workers should periodically inspect the voting 

machines for any damage or tampering and ensure the 

machine is powered by electricity. 

• Poll managers should periodically balance the 

number of voters checked in to the number of votes 

recorded (public counter) on the voting machines or 

precinct scanners. 

After all voters have cast their ballots at the close of polls, 

poll workers must secure all voting equipment and ballots. If 

poll workers tally the votes at the polling place, the closing 

process must include the tallying procedure. 

• Poll managers should validate that the equipment and 

supplies issued to the polling place are collected and 

secured for return to the elections office. 

• The voting equipment should be secured using the 

numbered closing seal. Poll managers should return the 

signed validation to the elections office with the number 

of the closing seal, voting equipment identifier, the 

number on the public and protective counter, and the 

voting precinct recorded. 

Securing the Voting Equipment After Polls Close

• Print out end-of-day vote totals from each voting 

machine or optical scanner and deliver the printed tapes 

to the elections office in a secure manner. 

• Electronic storage media from all voting machines 

or optical scanners within the polling place should be 

accounted for and reconciled. 

• Electronic storage media and printed tape(s) should be 

secured in a numbered, sealed pouch and transported 

from the polling place to the elections office or 

designated collection point. 

• Secure paper ballots (including provisional ballots) and 

VVPATs with tamper-evident seals. 

• Establish procedures to securely transport election results 

from optical scanners to vote tabulation computers if the 

optical scanners are in a different location from where the 

vote tabulation takes place. 

Securing the Voting Equipment During Tabulation at the 

Elections Office

• If paper ballots are centrally counted, verify the 

numbered seals before removing the ballots from their 

containers, immediately restore them to the container 

after scanning, and secure them with another tamperevident seal. 

• The tabulation location must be secure. Do not allow 

unauthorized or unescorted personnel to be in contact 

with the tabulation equipment. Only authorized election 

officials should be allowed in the tabulation room. 

• Consider the use of video monitoring to secure the vote 

tabulation area. 

• Consider uniformed security or police officers to secure 

the ballot room and voting equipment. 

• Verify the seal numbers on the pouch containing storage 

media and the serial numbers of storage media match 

those recorded in the audit trail documents before 

inserting them into the tabulation computer. After 

uploading the data into the tabulation computer, reseal 

storage media and store in a secured location. 

Securing the Voting Equipment Post-Election 

• Only designated personnel should transport voting 

equipment to the storage facility. Custodians of 

the equipment should verify receipt of all devices, 

confirm that the equipment has not been tampered 

with during transport, and sign-off on the receipt of the 

voting equipment. 

• Only designated personnel should transport election 

supplies (administrator devices, ballot activation devices, 

communication equipment, etc.) to the elections office. 

Local election officials should verify receipt and sign-off 

on the delivery of the election supplies. 

• Conduct a debriefing to identify lessons learned about 

issues and problems encountered during the election 

cycle. This activity should become a regular part of 

closing out every election and include reviewing the audit 

trail to identify any deficiencies. 
55

CHAPTER 7: PHYSICAL SECURITY

• Local election officials should maintain an inventory 

of election materials and securely store them until 

the period of a potential election contest has ended. 

Following the contest period, items should be stored and 

destroyed per the jurisdiction's retention policy.10

o Election materials include, but are not limited to, 

the following: 

◊ Voting equipment (including memory cards 

where applicable) 

◊ Ballots (used and unused) 

◊ Administrator and ballot activation devices 

◊ Seal envelopes 

◊ Voter registration (poll) lists 

◊ Election result tapes and printouts 

◊ Field supervisor and rover reports 

◊ Poll worker daily logs 

◊ Reconciliation reports 

◊ Audit data 

◊ Voting Equipment Delivery Sheets 

Conclusion

Conducting a security review enables election officials 

to assess current policies and practices and identify any 

deficiencies. But election officials cannot rest on having 

thorough procedures. Election officials must adequately train 

staff to comply with and document security procedures. 

Documenting steps taken to ensure the physical security of 

voting equipment, ballots, and the elections office provides 

evidence of the integrity of the election process. 

10 Federal law requires election officials to retain records relating to any “act requisite to voting” in a federal election for 22 months.
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) adopted the first 

formal set of voluntary federal standards for computerbased voting systems in January 1990, but there was 

no national program or organization to test and certify 

such systems to these standards. However, in 1994, the 

National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) 

stepped up to fill this void. NASED is an independent, 

nongovernmental organization of state election officials. This 

organization formed the country’s first national program 

to test and qualify voting systems to the new federal 

standards. On a strictly voluntary basis, the organization 

worked for more than a decade to help ensure the reliability, 

consistency, and accuracy of voting systems fielded in the 

United States. In late 2002, Congress passed the Help 

America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which created the 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and assigned 

it the responsibility for setting voting system standards 

and providing for the testing and certification of voting 

systems. This mandate represented the first time the federal 

government provided for the voluntary testing, certification, 

and decertification of voting systems nationwide. In response 

to this HAVA requirement, the EAC developed the Voting 

System Testing and Certification Program (the Program).

HAVA requires that the EAC certify and decertify voting 

systems. Section 231(a)(1) of HAVA specifically requires 

the EAC to “... provide for the testing, certification, 

decertification, and recertification of voting system 

hardware and software by accredited laboratories.”1 The 

EAC has the sole authority to grant certification or 

withdraw certification at the Federal level, including the 

authority to grant, maintain, extend, suspend, and withdraw 

the right to retain or use any certificates, marks, or other 

indicators of certification. Since elections are decentralized 

throughout the country, the Program administers the only 

uniform federal requirements for voting systems. Therefore, 

voluntarily participating in the Program is a foundational 

tool for ensuring that federally certified voting systems are 

accessible, secure, and reliable across the United States. 

Pursuant to the authority granted under HAVA, the 

EAC has developed and promulgated the EAC Voting 

System Testing and Certification Program Manual, which 

provides the procedural requirements of the Program. 

Although participation in the program is voluntary, 

adherence to the program’s procedural requirements is 

mandatory for all participants.

The primary purpose of the EAC Testing and Certification 

Program Manual is to provide clear procedures to voting 

system manufacturers for the testing and certification of 

voting systems to specified federal standards consistent with 

the requirements of HAVA Section 231(a)(1). The program, 

however, also serves to do the following:

• Support state certification programs

• Support local election officials with acceptance 

testing, pre-election system verification, or logic an 

accuracy testing 

• Increase quality control in voting system manufacturing

• Increase voter confidence in the use of voting systems

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) are a set 

of requirements that voting systems, including voting 

devices and software, must meet to receive a certification 

from the EAC. 

The VVSG covers pre-voting, voting, and post-voting 

operations consistent with the definition of a voting system 

in HAVA Section 301, which defines a voting system as 

“the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or 

electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and 

documentation required to program, control, and support 

the equipment), that is used to define ballots; to cast and 

count votes; to report or display election results; and to 

maintain and produce any audit trail information.”2

The VVSG includes guidance regarding design, quality, 

security, transparency, interoperability (VVSG 2.0), 

accessibility, privacy, usability, auditability, secrecy, 

access control, physical security, data protection, system 

integration, detection, and monitoring of voting systems.

1 52 U.S.C. 20971(a)(1). 2 52 U.S.C. 21081(b).

CHAPTER 8

Voting System Certification

56 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
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Since 2005, the EAC has adopted three versions of 

VVSG, with the latest iteration VVSG 2.0 adopted by the 

EAC Commissioners on February 10, 2021. All versions, 

drafts, and supporting documentation of the VVSG are on 

the EAC website.

3

The Program has developed a VVSG lifecycle policy that 

facilitates migration to new VVSG standards by providing 

guidance on the types of version changes, Voting System 

Test Laboratory (VSTL) accreditation, deprecation of 

obsolete major standards, and establishing a periodic 

review timeline for new standards going forward. The policy 

defines changes that may be made to systems certified to 

deprecated standards and describes the process for updating 

the standards as defined in the Help America Vote Act.

EAC Testing and Certification 

Program Manual

The Testing and Certification Program Manual is a 

comprehensive set of policies and procedures for the 

Program. It is intended to establish all the program’s 

administrative requirements.4 

The contents of the manual serve as an overview of the 

program itself and contain the following chapters:

• Manufacturer Registration - Before a voting system 

manufacturer can apply to have a voting system certified 

by the EAC, the manufacturer must be registered. This 

chapter contains information about the manufacturer 

registration process, which is essential to participate in 

the Program. 

• When Voting Systems Must Be Submitted for Testing 

and Certification - An EAC certification signifies that 

a voting system has been successfully tested to the 

identified voting system standards adopted by the EAC. 

Only the EAC can issue a federal certification. Systems 

must be submitted for testing and certification under 

the Program to receive this certification. Manufacturers 

usually submit systems when they are new to the 

marketplace, have not previously been EAC certified, 

are modified, or the manufacturer wishes to test a 

previously certified system to a different (newer) 

standard. This chapter also discusses the submission of 

de minimis changes, which may not require additional 

testing and certification, and provisional, pre-election 

emergency modifications, which provide for pre-election 

emergency waivers.

• Certification Testing and Technical Review - This 

chapter discusses the procedural requirements for 

submitting a voting system to the EAC for testing 

and review. The testing and review process requires an 

application, selection of an EAC-accredited testing 

laboratory, and technical analysis of the laboratory test 

report by the EAC.

• Grant of Certification - The grant of certification is the 

formal process through which the EAC acknowledges 

that a voting system has successfully completed 

conformance testing to an appropriate set of standards or 

guidelines. This chapter explains the steps required for a 

manufacturer to receive a grant of certification.

• Denial of Certification - If a manufacturer is denied 

certification, the manufacturer has certain rights 

and responsibilities. This chapter explains the process 

a manufacturer can follow to request an opportunity 

to cure any defects identified or initiate an appeal of 

the denial.

• Decertification - Decertification is the process by which 

the EAC revokes a certification previously granted to 

a voting system. It is an important part of the Program 

because it ensures that the program requirements are 

followed and that certified voting systems fielded for use 

in federal elections maintain the same level of quality as 

those presented for testing. Decertification is a serious 

matter and significantly affects manufacturers, state and 

local governments, the public, and the administration 

of elections. As such, the process for decertification is 

complex. This chapter details the process when the EAC 

receives information that a voting system may not be 

compliant with applicable voting system standards or 

procedural requirements. 

3 https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines

4 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/Cert%20Manual%207%208%2015%20FINAL.pdf

CHAPTER 8: VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION
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• Quality Monitoring Program - The quality of any 

product, including a voting system, depends on two 

specific elements: (1) the design of the product 

or system and (2) the care and consistency of the 

manufacturing process. After a system is certified, 

the manufacturer assumes primary responsibility for 

the compliance of the products produced. This level 

of compliance is accomplished by the manufacturer’s 

configuration management and quality control 

processes. This 

chapter provides information about how the EAC’s 

Certification Quality Monitoring Program enables the 

EAC to monitor continued compliance of fielded voting 

systems independently.

• Requests for Interpretations - A Request for 

Interpretation is a means by which a registered 

manufacturer or Voting System Test Laboratory 

(VSTL) may seek clarification on a specific EAC voting 

system standard, requirement, or testing procedure. 

This chapter outlines the policies, requirements, and 

procedures for submitting a Request for Interpretation.

• Release of Program Information - Manufacturers 

participating in the Program are required to provide 

various documents to the EAC. Generally, these 

documents are released to the public. Moreover, in many 

cases, the information provided is affirmatively published 

by the EAC. However, in limited cases, documents may 

not be released if they include trade secrets, confidential 

commercial information, or personal information. This 

chapter discusses EAC’s general policy on releasing 

information and provides manufacturers with standards, 

procedures, and requirements for identifying documents 

as trade secrets or confidential commercial information.

Program Methodology

The Program is but one part of the overall conformity 

assessment process; the Program includes companion 

efforts at the state and local levels. The process to ensure 

that voting equipment meets technical requirements is 

a distributed, cooperative effort by federal, state, and 

local officials in the United States. Working with voting 

equipment manufacturers, these officials each have a unique 

responsibility for ensuring that the equipment a voter uses 

on Election Day meets specific requirements.

Federal Role

The EAC was primarily tasked with the responsibility 

to adopt VVSG; however, the Board of Advisors, 

the Standards Board, and the Technical Guidelines 

Development Committee (TGDC) are all chartered 

pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 

to provide recommendations on voluntary standards and 

guidelines related to voting equipment and technologies.5 6 

7

 HAVA also gave the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) a key role in helping to realize nationwide 

improvements in voting systems.8 Working together, these 

federal organizations are responsible for developing and 

maintaining the process governing the federal certification 

of voting systems. 

State and Local Role

State officials are responsible for testing voting systems to 

ensure that they meet the specific requirements of each 

state. States may use EAC VSTLs to perform testing of 

voting system features that are unique to state requirements 

while the systems are being tested to federal standards. 

The EAC will not certify voting systems to state 

requirements but may assist with testing against state 

requirements as an extension of the Program if requested to 

do so by state officials.

State or local officials are responsible for making the final 

acquisition choice of voting equipment. They are responsible 

for deciding which system offers the best fit and total value 

for their specific state or local jurisdiction. State or local 

officials are also responsible for acceptance testing to ensure 

that the equipment delivered is identical to the equipment 

certified at the federal and state levels, is fully operational, 

and meets the contractual requirements of the purchase. 

Election officials can find more information on acceptance 

testing in Chapter 9 – Acceptance Testing.

5 https://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/board_of_advisors 6 https://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/standards_board

7 https://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/technical_guidelines_development_committee

8 https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting
59

CHAPTER 8: VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION

Conformity Assessment

Conformity assessment is a method used to ensure that a 

product or service meets the requirements that apply to 

it. Many conformity assessment programs exist to protect 

quality and ensure compliance with the requirements of 

products and services. All conformity assessment programs 

attempt to answer the following questions:

• What are the requirements of an acceptable system? 

For voting systems, the EAC VVSG addresses this 

issue. States and local jurisdictions also have 

supplementing standards.

• How are systems tested against required specifications? 

The Program is a central element of the larger conformity 

assessment program. As set forth in its manuals, the 

Program provides the testing and certification of 

voting systems to identified versions of the VVSG. 

The Program’s purpose is to ensure that state and local 

jurisdictions receive voting systems that meet the 

requirements of the VVSG.

• Are the testing authorities qualified to make an 

accurate evaluation? The EAC accredits VSTLs, after 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 

(NIST) National Voluntary Lab Accreditation Program 

(NVLAP) has reviewed their technical competence and 

lab practices to ensure these test authorities are fully 

qualified. Furthermore, EAC technical experts review 

all test reports from accredited laboratories to ensure an 

accurate and complete evaluation. Many states provide 

similar reviews of laboratory reports.

• Will manufacturers deliver units within manufacturing 

tolerances to those tested? The VVSG and its program 

manuals require that manufacturers have appropriate 

change management and quality control processes to 

control the quality and configuration of their products. 

The Program provides mechanisms for the EAC to 

verify manufacturer quality processes through field 

system testing and manufacturing site visits. States 

have implemented policies for the acceptance of 

delivered units.

Conclusion

Election officials must understand federal and state 

requirements for their voting systems. When purchasing, 

or leasing, and accepting a new voting system, election 

officials must ensure the selected system meets all those 

requirements. Additionally, election officials must be able to 

explain testing requirements and procedures to voters. While 

not all states require voting systems to be federally certified, 

the VVSG still impacts state standards and the systems 

offered by voting system manufacturers.
Acceptance testing of voting systems is one of the most 

important functions that election officials undertake to 

ensure their voting equipment's accuracy, integrity, and 

security. Acceptance tests must be conducted under the 

strict control of the chief election official of the jurisdiction 

and in accordance with applicable state laws and procedures. 

Acceptance testing is the examination of and verification 

that a voting system, and all its components, meet the 

requirements set out in the contract between the elections 

office and the voting system manufacturer. Election officials 

typically conduct acceptance testing upon the delivery of 

the voting system equipment to the elections office. 

Acceptance testing assures that the voting system is 

functioning correctly and that the voting system complies 

with the conditions set out in the contract. Once testing 

is complete, and any issues have been rectified, test 

documentation becomes a part of the record for the 

components of the voting system. 

If later, a component of the voting system leaves the 

election authority’s direct control for any reason (i.e., 

repair, upgrade, etc.), election officials must repeat the 

initial acceptance to re-establish the chain of custody 

for the component. 

Election officials must also maintain a complete record of 

every acceptance test conducted on every voting system 

component. Records often take the form of a checklist and 

should contain, at a minimum, the following information:

• The component’s unique identifier (For example, the 

serial number or asset number) 

• The hardware, software, or firmware version(s)

• Date of test

• Name of tester(s) 

• Test results 

• Notes (if needed) 

If the component passes the test, no further information is 

necessary. If the component fails the acceptance test, then 

test documentation should contain a detailed description 

in the notes section of the reason for the failure. If election 

officials return a failed component to the manufacturer for 

repair, they should return a copy of the test documentation.

Maintaining up-to-date documentation on every component 

of the voting system in a single, easily accessible place can 

aid management decisions. Ideally, election officials should 

build a database that can track the components of the voting 

system throughout their life cycle. The database should 

store the results from every acceptance test conducted, 

all election-related performance data, chain-of-custody 

data, and any other relevant data associated with the voting 

system. This database becomes a single place to track each 

voting system component.

Request for Proposal and 

Contract Considerations

Planning for acceptance testing begins with developing the 

Request for Proposal (RFP). The RFP should require the 

manufacturers’ bid proposals to include a recommended 

acceptance test script for each proposed component. There 

should also be an acceptance script for an end-to-end test of 

the complete voting system.

The RFP should specify that the proposed scripts must apply 

equally to all components of a specific type. For example, 

if the script is for a precinct-based optical scanner, it must 

apply uniformly to all precinct-based optical scanners. A 

script that calls for a rigorous test of some subset of the 

voting system and only a cursory inspection of other parts 

should be rejected. The manufacturer’s proposed acceptance 

test scripts may not be entirely satisfactory. They may not 

meet all the applicable laws, regulations, or policies, but they 

will provide election officials with a solid basis for developing 

their own scripts. 

Contracts for voting systems often include a progressive 

payment schedule that calls for the contract's total value 

to be paid in a series of payments based on measurable 

deliverables, such as hardware delivery, software installation, 

and successful testing. One of these payments should be 

based on successful acceptance testing of all components 

that make up the voting system and a successful acceptance 

test of the complete system.

CHAPTER 9

Acceptance Testing 

60 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
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Acceptance Tests

There are generally three distinct parts to an 

acceptance test: 

• A test for physical integrity 

• A diagnostic test of the various hardware features

• A test for functional characteristics

Acceptance tests must be conducted on every component 

of a voting system every time that component leaves the 

elections authority’s control. For example, if the authority 

sends a particular unit of the voting system out for repair, 

that unit must be acceptance tested upon return. Note that 

this does not include components that remain under the 

control of the elections office's staff. If the elections office 

has a voting system with many devices, this may be a tedious 

and time-consuming task. Fortunately, acceptance testing 

usually proceeds more quickly as the testers gain experience 

with the voting system. In some instances, an experienced 

tester can perform an acceptance test on an individual 

device in around fifteen minutes.

During an acceptance test, the tester may experience 

problems that they can easily correct, such as a poorly 

calibrated touch screen. This is not a cause for terminating 

the test. The tester should correct the problem and continue 

the test in these cases. However, the tester should note the 

issue in the unit documentation.

Physical Integrity Test: Election officials should perform a 

physical analysis to ensure the voting unit is not physically 

damaged and that all physical components are present and 

are working properly. The specific tests will vary based on the 

type of component and the voting system; however, some 

typical items will include:

• Examine the outer shell or case for any sign of damage, 

such as dents or cracks.

• A check that the top and bottom of the shell mate easily, 

that all doors open and shut easily, etc.

• An inspection of all latches and hinges. Latches should 

open and shut without binding. Hinges should operate 

smoothly, and hinge pins should not be easy to remove.

• All locks should open and close without binding.

• Verify that the hardware model is correct.

• An inspection of electrical wires and connectors for 

damage or signs of wear.

• A verification that all ancillary components are present, 

for instance electrical cables, headphones, keys, etc.

• A verification that casters on any ballot boxes move 

freely and brakes may be applied.

• A verification that any screens are not scratched.

Diagnostic Analysis: Election officials should perform a 

diagnostic analysis to ensure that all the mechanical and 

electronic components of the voting unit are operating 

correctly. Again, the specific tests will vary based on the 

type of component and the voting system; however, some 

typical items will include:

• Test all input and output devices, including any voter card 

readers, printers, memory device slots, etc.

• Test the connections that support any accessibility 

devices, such as headphone jacks and keypad ports. 

• Test all accessibility devices, such as headphones and 

keypads.

• Verify that the ballot feed path is set correctly and that 

ballots will feed without binding on ballot scanners.

• Verify that the screen is calibrated correctly on devices 

with touch screen functionality.

• If there are controls that the voter can use to change 

contrast or font size, verify that these controls are 

working properly.

• If the device is a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 

computer, verify that the USB ports, CD/DVD drives, 

memory card slots, etc., are functioning correctly.

• Verify that the date, time, and time zone are correct. 

Ensure that AM or PM is correct.

CHAPTER 9: ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
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62

Functional Analysis: Election officials perform functional 

analysis to ensure that the correct federal and state-certified 

version(s) of the software and firmware is installed on all 

system components and will perform correctly during an 

election. This test consists of loading a mock election onto 

the device, marking and casting a known pattern of votes, 

closing the election, printing results on tabulation devices, 

and comparing the test results with the known vote pattern.

The following sections provide a generic outline for 

developing an acceptance test for the most common 

devices found in a voting system. Election officials need to 

set up a mock election for each test described below. This 

mock election does not need to be long; however, it should 

exercise all the tested components' features. 

The mock election should also be typical of the jurisdiction. 

For instance, if straight-party voting is permitted in 

the jurisdiction, it must be tested. If there are multiple 

representative districts (i.e., vote for n of m), the mock 

election should include these contests. The mock election 

should have a few districts (e.g., congressional, state 

representative, local) and separate precincts. 

Acceptance Test for Optical Scanners

This section describes an acceptance test for standalone 

ballot scanners--both precinct-based and centrally 

located. Some jurisdictions may use bulk or high-speed 

scanners. Election officials should set up the scanner for this 

test the way it will be set up for use in a voting location or 

central counting.

Materials Required: In addition to the following, election 

officials must know the version of the operating system and 

firmware that was certified for each type of ballot scanner.

• A memory card or other device used to configure the 

scanner for an election—this device must contain the 

election definition for the mock election that will be used 

to test the scanner.

• A memory card or other device to store tabulated results.

• The password or authentication device used to gain 

supervisory or administrative privilege on the scanner.

• A test deck of pre-marked optical scan ballots for 

the mock election—this test deck often contains one 

ballot with a vote for the first candidate in each contest, 

two ballots with votes for the second candidate, three 

ballots with votes for the third candidate, and so on. 

Although most ballot printers can supply election officials 

with this test deck, these ballots should be hand-marked 

using the device specified by the system manufacturer in 

their documentation.

• If the jurisdiction uses a ballot marking device, then 

ballots marked by this device should also be included to 

test the ballot scanner.

Physical Analysis: Election officials should conduct the 

physical analysis with the scanner turned off.

• Examine the case or cover for cracks or dents.

• Inspect latches, hinges, carrying case, wheels, etc.

• Examine the legs or stand. The legs or stand must operate 

smoothly without binding.

• Inspect the power cord and plug for any frayed insulation 

or damaged connectors.

• Verify that there is sufficient paper in the printer to 

complete the test.

• If there is a ballot box, ensure it is empty.

Diagnostic Analysis: Election officials should conduct 

the diagnostic analysis with the scanner turned on. 

Some of these tests may require supervisory or 

administrative privilege.

1. Turn on the ballot scanner and, as it boots up, verify 

that the correct version of the operating system and 

software is installed. Jurisdictions may wish to verify 

the hash values of installation media and oversee 

software installation.

2. Verify that the date and time set in the scanner are 

correct and, if not, correct them. Be aware of time 

changes due to daylight savings time and verify the 

time zone.

3. Perform a printer test to verify that the printer 

is operating correctly. If a scanner cannot print a 

test pattern, the printer can be tested during the 

Functional Analysis.
63

CHAPTER 9: ACCEPTANCE TESTING 

4. Verify that the battery is charging when the scanner 

is plugged in. Some bulk/high-speed scanners do not 

have batteries and rely on uninterruptible power 

supplies (UPS).

5. Unplug the ballot scanner and verify that it will operate 

on a battery. Consider completing the test while on 

battery power.

6. Test all ports and memory device slots. 

Functional Analysis: This analysis should be conducted 

with the scanner loaded with the mock election and set for 

election mode. Turn the scanner on, load the mock election, 

and then set the scanner in election mode.

1. Be sure all vote totals are set to zero and print a report 

showing zero votes in every contest.

2. Use a pre-marked test deck to tabulate a significant 

number of ballots (at least 25) on the scanner.

3. End the election on the ballot scanner and print the 

results report.

4. Verify that the vote counts on the result report match 

the known results of the test deck.

5. Unload the election from the scanner or set the 

vote counters back to zero. Remove the test deck 

from the scanner.

6. Apply tamper-evident security seals to the scanner.

Documentation: If the scanner experiences a failure during 

any of the above steps that the tester cannot correct, the 

test should be terminated. The tester should document the 

scanner's serial number, the persons conducting the tests, 

the date, and a description of the failure. Election officials 

should make two copies of this documentation; one copy for 

their permanent record and another copy that stays with the 

scanner to assist the persons making any required repairs. 

All printouts should be attached to the copy retained for the 

permanent record.

If the scanner passes all the above tests, election officials 

should prepare documentation for their permanent 

record that lists the serial number of the scanner, the 

persons conducting the tests, the date, and the tamperevident seal number(s). All printouts should be attached to 

this documentation.

Acceptance Test for Ballot 

Marking Device (BMD)

This section describes a typical acceptance test for a Ballot 

Marking Device (BMD). Election officials should set up the 

BMD for this test the way it will be set up for use in a voting 

location. If the BMD does not tabulate the ballots, then the 

test should be performed jointly with an optical scanner to 

verify ballots marked by the BMD can be accurately read 

and tabulated. 

Material Required: Election officials will need the following 

materials to conduct an acceptance test. They will also need 

to know the versions of the operating system, software, and 

firmware on the BMD.

• A memory device containing the mock election definition 

to load onto the BMD.

• A card or other device required to activate the BMD 

for a voter.

• The password or authentication device used to gain 

supervisory or administrative privilege on the BMD.

• Any accessibility equipment used with the BMD.

• Ballot stock to mark ballots. Ballot stock for BMDs may 

differ from stock used for hand-marked ballots.

Physical Analysis: Election officials should conduct the 

physical analysis with the BMD turned off.

1. Examine the case or cover for cracks or dents.

2. Inspect latches, hinges, carrying case, wheels, etc.

3. Examine the legs or stand. The legs or stand must 

operate smoothly without binding.

4. Inspect the power cord and plug for any frayed 

insulation or damaged connectors.

5. If there is a printer, verify that there is sufficient paper in 

the printer to complete the test.
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Diagnostic Analysis: Election officials should conduct 

the diagnostic analysis with the voting machine turned 

on. Some parts of the test may require manager or 

administrator privilege.

1. Turn the BMD on. Once it is booted up, verify that the 

correct version of the operating system, software, and 

firmware is installed. 

2. Verify that the date and time are correct and correct 

them if necessary. Be careful of AM and PM settings 

and any daylight savings time settings and verify the 

time zone. 

3. Check the calibration on the screen and re-calibrate the 

screen if necessary.

4. If there is a printer, run a print test to verify that it is 

operating correctly. 

5. Verify that the battery is charging when the BMD is 

plugged into the electrical socket.

6. Unplug the BMD and verify that it will operate on 

a battery. Consider completing the test while on 

battery power.

7. Test all ports and memory device slots.

Functional Analysis: Election officials should ensure the 

BMD is on and load the mock election to conduct the 

functional analysis.

1. Verify that the mock election is correctly loaded, 

that all ballot styles are present, and contain all contests 

and candidates.

2. Set the BMD in election mode.

3. If the BMD tabulates ballots, print a report showing zero 

votes in every contest.

4. Insert a ballot card and verify the correct ballot style is 

shown on the screen. The tester may need to select the 

ballot style or precinct.

5. Vote the ballot and print it. Verify contest selections are 

correct. All ballot styles should have at least one ballot 

marked and printed. 

6. Manually vote audio ballots to test that the audio 

function and all associated equipment (e.g., headphones, 

controllers, etc.) is working properly. Test all accessibility 

functions (e.g., large text, high contrast, hidden screen, 

etc.)

7. If the BMD tabulates ballots, close the election and 

prints results. Verify that the printed results match the 

known number of votes cast for each candidate.

8. Unload the mock election from the BMD.

9. Apply tamper-evident seals to the voting machine.

Documentation: If the BMD experiences a failure that 

the tester cannot correct during any of the above steps, 

the test should be terminated. The tester should prepare 

documentation that lists the serial number of the BMD, the 

persons conducting the tests, the date, and a description 

of the failure. Election officials should make two copies of 

this documentation; one copy for their permanent record 

and another copy that stays with the BMD to assist those 

making any required repairs. Any printouts should be 

attached to the copy retained for the permanent record. 

If the BMD passes all the above tests, election officials 

should prepare documentation for their permanent record 

that lists the serial number of the voting machine, the 

persons conducting the tests, the date, and the tamperevident seal number. All printouts should be attached to 

this documentation.

Acceptance Test for Direct Record 

Electronic (DRE) Voting Units

This section describes a typical acceptance test for a DRE 

voting device. Election officials should set up the DRE for 

this test the way it will be set up for use in a voting location. 

Material Required: Election officials will need the following 

materials to conduct an acceptance test. They will also need 

to know the versions of the operating system, software, and 

firmware on the DRE.

• A memory device containing the mock election definition 

to load onto the DRE.

• A card or other device required to activate the DRE 

for a voter.
65

• The password or authentication device used to gain 

supervisory or administrative privilege on the DRE.

• All accessibility equipment used with the DRE.

Physical Analysis: Election officials should conduct the 

physical analysis with the DRE turned off.

1. Examine the case or cover for cracks or dents.

2. Inspect latches, hinges, carrying case, wheels, etc.

3. Examine the legs or stand. The legs or stand must 

operate smoothly without binding.

4. Inspect the power cord and plug for any frayed 

insulation or damaged connectors.

5. If there is a printer(s), verify that sufficient paper is in 

the printer(s) to complete the test.

Diagnostic Analysis: Election officials should conduct the 

diagnostic analysis with the DRE turned on. Some parts of 

the test may require supervisory or administrator privileges.

1. Turn the DRE on. Once it is booted up, verify that 

the correct version of the operating system and 

firmware is installed. 

2. Verify that the date and time are correct and 

correct them if necessary. Be careful of AM and PM 

settings, any daylight savings time settings and verify 

the time zone. 

3. Check the calibration on the screen and re-calibrate the 

screen if necessary.

4. If there is a printer, run a print test to verify that it is 

operating correctly. 

5. Verify that the battery is charging when the DRE is 

plugged into the electrical socket.

6. Unplug the DRE and verify that it will operate on 

a battery. Consider completing the test while on 

battery power.

7. Test all ports and memory device slots.

Functional Analysis: Election officials should ensure the 

DRE is on and load the mock election to conduct the 

functional analysis.

1. Verify that the mock election loaded correctly and 

that all ballot styles are present, containing all contests 

and candidates.

2. Set the DRE in election mode.

3. Print a report that shows there are zero votes in 

every contest.

4. Activate a ballot and verify the correct ballot style is 

shown on the screen. The tester may need to select the 

ballot style or precinct.

5. Vote the ballot. Verify contest selections are correct. 

All ballot styles should have at least one ballot voted 

and verified. 

6. Manually vote audio ballots to test that the audio 

function and all associated equipment (e.g., headphones, 

controllers, etc.) are working properly. Test all 

accessibility functions (e.g., large text, high contrast, 

hidden screen, etc.)

7. Close the election and print results. Verify that the 

printed results match the known number of votes cast 

for each candidate.

8. Unload the mock election from the DRE.

9. Apply tamper-evident seals to the voting machine.

Documentation: If the DRE experiences a failure that 

the tester cannot correct during any of the above steps, 

the test should be terminated. The tester should prepare 

documentation that lists the serial number of the DRE, the 

persons conducting the tests, the date, and a description of 

the failure. Election officials should make two copies of this 

documentation; one copy for the permanent record and 

another copy that stays with the DRE to assist those making 

any required repairs. Any printouts should be attached to 

the copy retained for the permanent record. 

If the DRE passes all the above tests, election officials 

should prepare documentation for the permanent record 

that lists the serial number of the voting machine, the 

persons conducting the tests, the date, and the tamperevident seal number. All printouts should be attached to 

this documentation.

CHAPTER 9: ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
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End-to-End Voting System 

Acceptance Test

The end-to-end test is sometimes referred to as a test of the 

election management system (EMS). It tests the election 

management system itself and tests the ability of the EMS 

to interface with all the types of components. It also verifies 

that the EMS correctly tabulates votes and prints reports. 

Election officials should conduct this test on all newly 

acquired voting systems and after any event that could have 

altered the voting system, such as a system upgrade or if 

the EMS hardware leaves the custody and control of the 

election authority.

Materials Required: Election officials must know the correct 

versions of the operating systems and EMS software. In 

addition, the testers will need the following:

• A complete election management system with all 

required election management system software installed.

• If Ballot Marking Devices are used:

o At least one BMD,

o One blank memory device used to load the election 

definition onto the BMD(s),

o The password or authentication device used to gain 

supervisory or administrative privilege on the BMD.

o A card or other device required to activate the BMD 

for a voter.

o Accessible equipment for use with BMD.

• If Optical Scanners are used:

o At least one ballot scanner. If different types are used 

(e.g., precinct-based for polling locations and bulk/

high-speed for central counting), then at least one of 

each type will be needed. 

o One blank memory device used to load the election 

definition onto the ballot scanner(s),

o A memory device for each scanner to store tabulated 

results and Cast Vote Records. 

o At least one set of pre-marked optical scan test ballots 

with known results. This can be the same 

test deck used to conduct acceptance tests on 

the ballot scanners.

o All communications cables and devices necessary 

to connect ballot scanners to the election 

management system.

• At least one memory device used by the system to record 

and store the election results.

• One disk or other memory device containing the mock 

acceptance test election definition to load onto the EMS.

Prerequisite: The EMS must be set up before beginning this 

acceptance test.

All ballot scanners and BMDs should have already 

successfully completed acceptance testing. If not, complete 

acceptance testing on these units before beginning this test.

Verify Correct Hardware and Election Management 

Software versions.

1. Turn on the EMS computer(s). The system may consist 

of more than one computer, and there may be a server 

and workstations. There may be a specific order in which 

the computers should be powered on. 

2. After the boot-up is complete, verify that the correct 

operating system and election management system 

software is installed. Ensure that any third-party 

software used by the system is also installed. Election 

officials should compare the hash values of the installed 

voting system software with the hash values maintained 

by the EAC, if their voting systems are certified by 

the EAC. 

3. Verify that all ancillary components (e.g., 

printers, communication devices, etc.) of the 

election management system are turned on and 

functioning correctly.

Verify Voting System Functionality 

The end-to-end functionality analysis will verify that the 

complete voting system is functioning correctly. It will 

verify that the election definition on the EMS will create 

ballot styles and provide election data for optical scanners, 

ballot marking devices, and other voting equipment. It will 

also verify that votes cast and other election data can be 

uploaded to the election management system and that these 

votes will be tabulated correctly.
67

1. Load the mock election database onto the election 

management system.

2. Verify that the election management system will 

program the ballot marking device or other accessible 

components.

a. Use the election management system to prepare the 

memory device used to load the mock election into 

the BMD.

b. Load the mock election onto the BMD.

c. Open the election on the device.

d. Manually vote ballots in a recognizable pattern. 

e. Manually vote audio ballots to test that the audio 

function and all associated equipment (e.g., 

headphones, controllers, etc.) are working properly. 

Test all accessibility functions (e.g., large text, high 

contrast, hidden screen, etc.)

f. If the BMD tabulates ballots, close the election and 

print results. Verify that the printed results match the 

known number of votes cast for each candidate.

g. If the BMD tabulates ballots, transfer the results to 

the election management system according to the 

system’s documentation.

3. Verify that the election management system will program 

the ballot scanner(s) and tabulate results.

a. Use the election management system to prepare the 

memory device used to load the mock election onto 

the ballot scanner.

b. Load the mock election into the ballot scanner.

c. Open the election on the ballot scanner.

d. Use the pre-marked optical scan test ballots to cast 

votes on the ballot scanner.

e. Close the election on the ballot scanner and 

print results.

f. According to the system's documentation, transfer 

the results to the election management system.

4. Verify Printed Outputs.

a. Load election results onto the election management 

system.

b. Print the results and any other reports that contain 

the vote totals.

c. Compare the election management system results 

with those printed on optical scanners and other 

components that tabulate ballots.

Documentation: If any component of the voting system 

experiences a failure during any of the above steps that the 

tester cannot correct, the test should be terminated. The 

tester should prepare documentation that lists the serial 

number of the election computer and the serial number 

or other identifying information for any other component 

that failed, the persons conducting the tests, the date, and a 

description of the failure. 

Election officials should make two copies of this 

documentation; one copy for the permanent record and 

another copy that stays with the failed component of the 

voting system to assist those making any required repairs. 

All printouts should be attached to the copy retained for the 

permanent record. 

If the voting system passes all the above tests, election 

officials should prepare documentation for the permanent 

record, including the names of those conducting the tests 

and the date. All printouts should be attached to this 

documentation.

Conclusion

Acceptance testing on each component delivered to an 

elections office by a manufacturer is a critical step in 

ensuring that electronic voting units will function as intended 

on Election Day. Although each manufacturer has internal 

quality control procedures, and the contract between the 

manufacturer and the elections authority should guarantee 

quality control, election officials need to ensure that the 

voting system meets their requirements, as stated in the 

RFP and contract. 

CHAPTER 9: ACCEPTANCE TESTING 
Ballots are the centerpiece of every election. Whether paper 

or digital, each ballot symbolizes a voter’s voice. Building a 

well-designed and accurate ballot ensures that each voter 

has an equal opportunity to cast his or her vote. This chapter 

consists of three pieces of the ballot building process: data, 

design, and distribution. Ballot data tells 

voters which contests are part of the election, who is running 

for each office, and which districts are required on each 

ballot style. 

Ballot design, meanwhile, ensures that voters will 

understand how to complete their ballots and that any 

tabulation equipment will count votes accurately. Finally, 

ballot distribution is the method by which voters receive 

their ballots. 

Ballot building is a complex process that requires keen 

attention to detail, knowledge of state laws, and an 

understanding of design best practices. If these requirements 

are fulfilled, it is possible to create a ballot that allows every 

voter an opportunity to cast a ballot that is simple to mark 

and easy to understand.

Ballot Data

Every election contains a unique set of data. Before building 

the ballot, identify the following: 

• Ballot design requirements

State ballot design requirements, ballot instructions, 

contest order, political party order, candidate name 

rotation requirements. 

• Contest information

The total number of candidates to be elected, the term 

length for each office, and whether the election is for a full 

or partial term. 

• District information

The total number of contests to be elected and the total 

number of precincts within each district. 

• Candidate filing information

Name, office sought, party affiliation (if applicable), 

incumbency status (if applicable), and any other candidate 

information that is legally required to appear on the ballot. 

CHAPTER 10

Ballot Building 

Each piece of data changes from election to election, and 

virtually no two elections are alike. For example, members of 

Congress appear on the ballot every two years, but members 

of the U.S. Senate appear on the ballot every six years. 

Judges, school board members, and other local officials may 

appear on the ballot at other intervals. Additionally, district 

boundaries for many offices change when new Census data is 

available every ten years. 

Election officials may rely on statewide databases, local 

records, or official election results from past elections to 

determine which contests should appear on the ballot. 

Additionally, election officials may use Geographic 

Information System Mapping (GIS) or other mapping 

systems to identify how district boundaries overlap with 

voting precinct boundaries. However, even the most 

meticulously maintained databases may not be able to 

account for every variation in a given election. Special 

elections, vacancies, and other one-time events may affect 

the number of districts or contests required to appear 

on the ballot. To account for these variations, be sure to 

communicate candidate listings and ballot information with 

any relevant stakeholders to ensure that every required 

contest is included on the official ballot. Any districts 

participating in an election should verify: 

1. The total number of contests on the ballot; 

2. The number of officers to be elected; 

3. The term length for each contest; and 

4. Any special circumstances, such as an unexpected 

vacancy, that may result in an additional contest 

appearing on the ballot. 

After gathering all election data, election officials enter it 

into ballot production software, often referred to as the 

Election Management System (EMS). Election officials 

should take great care when entering data. Thoroughly 

proofreading each ballot style before the ballot is finalized is 

an essential best practice to help local election officials avoid 

errors downstream in the election process. 

68 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
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Remember that the ballot data process starts well before 

entering any data into the EMS. In some states, candidates 

may file for office a year or more before the election. 

Candidate filings should be reviewed for accuracy at the 

time of filing and reviewed again prior to the candidate filing 

deadline for that office. This provides an extra verification 

that the data on the ballot is accurate while also providing 

additional customer service to candidates who may need to 

make corrections on their official filings if permitted. Once 

candidate filings have been submitted and reviewed, they 

should be filed in an organized way that allows them to be 

easily retrieved for data entry and ballot proofing. 

Ballot Design 

Paper Ballot Layout 

Election officials should balance state ballot layout 

requirements with best practices for ballot design. If done 

correctly, the ballot will be simple to read, and voters 

will make fewer mistakes when completing their ballots. 

Additionally, some states utilize features like watermarks and 

detachable stubs for security. 

As a prerequisite to building a ballot, election officials must 

familiarize themselves with the ballot production software 

in the EMS. Each system produces ballots differently, with 

some software platforms allowing more flexibility than 

others. Before programming an official ballot for the first 

time, election officials should build a mock election ballot 

to learn how the ballot design software works. This allows 

election officials the opportunity to add contests, candidates, 

ballot headers, section headings, and other text to the ballot 

to understand how each design element affects the design of 

the rest of the ballot. 

Official ballots will typically include multiple ballot styles. 

A ballot style is a ballot with a specific set of contests and 

candidates for a particular precinct. Ballot styles vary based 

on geographic districts, or in the case of closed primary 

elections, a voter’s political party affiliation. Election officials 

need to be mindful of where contests fall on the ballot in 

every ballot style. For example, a contest may fall on the 

front of the ballot on some ballot styles and the back for 

others. Additionally, election officials should ensure that 

all headings and other design elements on the ballot fall in 

the correct locations. If possible, contest headings, titles, 

and candidates should not fall in different columns or on 

different sides of the ballot. 

Ballot Instructions 

Many states require printing ballot marking instructions on 

the ballot. These instructions should be stated clearly and 

use plain language. Some best practices for writing ballot 

instructions include: 

• When an instruction is based on a condition, state the 

condition first and then the action to be performed. For 

instance, use “To change your vote, do X,” rather than 

“Do X, in order to change your vote.” 

• Use familiar, common words and avoid technical 

or specialized terms that voters are not likely to 

understand. For instance, “... there are more contests and 

races on the other side ...” or “... vote both sides of the 

ballot ...” rather than “...additional contests are presented 

on the reverse ...” 

• Issue instructions on the correct way to perform actions, 

rather than telling voters what not to do. For example, 

“Fill in the oval for your write-in vote to count,” rather 

than “If the oval is not marked, your write-in vote cannot 

be counted.” 

CHAPTER 10: BALLOT BUILDING  
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Address the voter directly rather than use passive voice 

constructions. For example, “remove and retain this ballot 

stub” rather than “this ballot stub must be removed and 

retained by the voter.” 

Avoid the use of gender-based pronouns. For example, “...

write in your choice directly on the ballot...” rather than “... 

write in his name directly on the ballot...” 

Display instructions near where they are needed. For 

instance, only general instructions should be grouped at the 

beginning of the ballot; those about specific situations should 

be presented where and when required. 

The EAC has published design recommendations for 

election administration in the report Effective Designs 

for the Administration of Federal Elections.1 This report 

includes best practices and examples of effective designs for 

ballot instructions. 

Ballot Layout

State laws often require contests and candidates to fall 

on the ballot in a certain order. In some states, candidates 

for partisan office must be on the ballot in party order. In 

other states, all candidate names may rotate alphabetically. 

However, some design elements may not be listed in statute 

but may be important to include so the ballot is as clear as 

possible for voters. Some of these design elements include: 

• Whenever possible, do not visually present a single 

contest spread over two pages or two columns. Voters 

may misread one contest as two or fail to see additional 

choices. If a contest has a large number of candidates, it 

may have to fall into multiple columns. 

• Clearly indicate the number of candidates to be elected 

in each contest. 

• The name of a candidate and the target area on the ballot 

used to vote for that candidate should be consistent. For 

example, the target area must not be located to the left 

of some candidates’ names and the right of others. 

• Each choice on the ballot should be presented equitably. 

Certain differences in presentation may be mandated 

by state law, including the order in which candidates’ 

names are placed on the ballot. However, comparable 

characteristics, such as font size or audio quality, must be 

the same for all choices. 

Additionally, the most important information on the ballot 

should be bold and easy to read. Ballots should use sans 

serif fonts, and ballot text should be at least 12-point font. 

Any ballot text, just like ballot instructions, should be simple 

to understand. 

Several states have incorporated these and other best 

practices into their ballot design. Two examples can be 

found below: 

• Michigan Ballot Production Standards: 

https://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/

BallotStandards_517320_7.pdf?x=1 

• Virginia Ballot Standards: 

https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/

formswarehouse/election-management/ballots/2019-

07-25-SBE-Ballot-Standards-and-VerificationProcedures.pdf

Digital Ballot Design 

Just like paper ballots, digital ballots should have clear 

instructions, including those for any assistive technology 

input and output devices such as ‘sip-and-puff,’ paddles, 

etc. Provide voters unambiguous instructions for marking, 

verifying, and casting the ballot. Ballot contents can use 

color to distinguish among different elements on the ballot. 

If a touch screen voting station does not allow the voter to 

return to the instruction page, these instructions should 

be printed and posted on the voting station in addition to 

providing the instructions on the touch screen. If possible, 

candidates in each contest should be listed in a single column 

on a single page. Whenever practical, limit each screen to a 

single contest. 

Audio Ballot Considerations 

Digital ballots should include an audio version to improve the 

accessibility of the ballot. As much as possible, audio ballots 

should be presented in the same voice, and each option 

on the ballot should be presented at the same speed and 

volume. Many electronic ballot marking devices allow voters 

to adjust the speed and volume of the audio ballot in addition 

to other available accessibility features. 
71

CHAPTER 10: BALLOT BUILDING  

All voting systems certified by the EAC must meet the 

audio standards included in the Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines (VVSG).2 Some voting systems have a provision 

for using synthesized voices. Select between natural voices 

and synthesized voices based on the preference of the 

disabled or language community. Election officials can 

partner with disability and language minority groups to assess 

which audio voice would best suit the needs of voters. If 

officials use natural voices, consider using voice actors, radio 

announcers, or members of the target community to record 

the audio version of the ballot. 

Partnering with language minority communities can be 

exceptionally beneficial for providing audio ballots in 

languages other than English. Election officials who prepare 

audio ballots in one or more languages other than English 

must make every effort to use persons for whom the 

language(s) are their first language. If possible, make the 

audio dialect neutral; however, if a language has more than 

one dialect, election officials should work with their local 

communities to determine the appropriate dialect to use. 

Additionally, translations from English to another language 

should maintain the spirit of the original text, particularly 

when there is no literal translation available. 

Ballot Distribution

Paper Ballot Considerations

Selecting a ballot printer is an integral part of the ballot 

building process. Voting system vendors may certify certain 

print vendors to produce ballots for their systems. However, 

election officials often work with their voting system 

manufacturers to determine specific printing specifications, 

even if the manufacturer does not have a particular 

certification system in place. Additionally, before printing 

the complete set of ballots for an election, it is a best 

practice to test a sample of printed ballots to make sure they 

will tabulate properly on the ballot tabulation equipment. 

Some election officials can produce ballots in their offices 

that they can use to test the logic and accuracy of their 

ballot scanners, while others rely on their printers to produce 

a small set of test ballots for this purpose. See Chapter 11 

– Pre-Election Testing for more information on logic and 

accuracy testing. 

To track the total number of ballots delivered to the 

office, the ballots are often shrink wrapped in quantities 

small enough to easily verify (100 or fewer per pack is 

recommended). The ballots in each pack should be reviewed 

to assess for any printing errors. Election officials should 

not assume that because one (or several) packet of ballots 

is correct that all the other packets are correct. When 

reviewing paper ballots, check for: 

• Proper timing mark positions 

• Ink bleed through 

• Poor print quality 

• Ink density 

• Smudging 

• Correct paper weight 

• Paper opaqueness 

• Any text, timing marks, or target areas that appear over a 

fold or crease in the ballot. 

Ballot-on-demand systems may have other considerations. 

All ballots should be tested before the election to ensure 

they print correctly. 

Review All Ballots 

Every ballot style should be compared to the official ballot 

certification documents for ballot proofing. This is also true 

for each format in which the ballot is available (print, digital, 

audio, etc.). This final review should be completed before 

sending the ballots to the ballot printer. 

It is a best practice to have a two-person team review the 

ballot. One person should read the information from the 

official ballot certification document. The second person 

should verify that the information is identical on the touch 

screen, the optical scan ballot, and the audio ballot. When 

testing the audio ballot, it is recommended that the ballot be 

played on a speaker so that both reviewers can listen to the 

audio ballot. 

If possible, election officials should partner with their local 

disability communities and minority language communities 

to ensure that the accessible versions of the ballot are 

accurate and easy to use. 
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Conclusion

Ballots are complex documents that must be accurate yet 

easy to use. Election officials should take great care when 

considering ballot data, design, and distribution. Each of 

these pieces of the ballot building process is essential for 

making the voting process as simple as possible for voters. 

Election officials should plan and identify all requirements 

and resources available to build a well-designed ballot to 

accomplish this goal. Finally, every ballot element should 

be designed with the voter in mind to empower every voter 

to cast their ballot successfully. Before finalizing the ballot, 

election officials should consult with community partners, 

including those serving voters with disabilities and language 

minority communities, to ensure the usability and accuracy 

of paper, digital, and audio ballots.
Pre-election testing, also called Logic and Accuracy 

(L&A) testing, is the act of testing every ballot style and 

every component of the voting system before use in an 

election. Election officials test to ensure ballot activation 

devices generate the correct ballot, touchscreen devices 

function as expected, optical scanners tabulate ballots as 

marked, and central count computers count and aggregate 

totals accurately. If an election official represents a large 

jurisdiction with thousands of polling locations and ballot 

styles, this is a daunting task. However, documenting preelection testing is a critical component of the election’s 

audit trail, ensuring the election was administered in a fair, 

accurate, and transparent manner. Robust pre-election 

testing procedures provide the foundation for the integrity 

of the voting system during the election cycle.

Pre-Test Planning 

Ideally, on the election calendar, L&A testing starts after 

ballots are finalized and concludes before voting begins. 

Once the testing dates are identified, election officials can 

finalize the testing plan. Planning should include identifying 

where the test will take place, who will conduct the test, and 

how much time is needed. Plans should also cover the layout 

of the testing facility, whether it is a conference room or a 

dedicated equipment warehouse. If observers are permitted, 

designate an area where they can view all aspects of the test 

but not interfere.

The general steps for pre-election testing include:

• setting up the voting system for each of your precincts 

and early voting locations,

• loading the election definition,

• casting a known vote pattern on every ballot style,

• printing the vote totals for each voting or tabulation 

device, and

• comparing the printed vote totals with the known pattern 

of votes.

In short, you are going to set up and test your 

entire election.

CHAPTER 11

Pre-Election Testing 

Time constraints and limited staff may require seasonal 

help or contractors to assist with pre-election testing. 

Still, a member of the election staff should lead the test 

and supervise the testing teams. Teams of two should carry 

out testing of each component—some jurisdictions may 

require bipartisan teams. Additionally, before beginning 

the test, staff should instruct testers on testing procedures, 

including how to complete documentation and what to do if 

issues arise. 

Prepare a list of all equipment to be tested (including backup 

devices) and list the location or precinct to which it will be 

deployed. Develop a checklist for each type of equipment 

included in the test. Depending on the jurisdiction’s voting 

system, the test may include:

• Electronic pollbooks,

• Ballot activation devices,

• Ballot-on-demand printers,

• Ballot marking devices (BMD),

• Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines,

• Precinct scanners, and

• Central count scanners

Each type of equipment has unique features that require 

testing. Providing a checklist for each type ensures each 

feature is tested. The checklist should include all steps 

covered in the test ending with securing the equipment for 

Election Day or early voting use. For example, a checklist for 

BMDs may include:

• Inspecting the physical condition of the BMD and all 

accessibility devices,

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 

The testing procedure will typically remain the 

same from election to election and should be 

included in the elections office’s standard operating 

procedures. After testing, evaluate the adequacy 

of the written procedures and make any necessary 

changes before the next election.

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• Loading the election definition file and verifying 

the version,

• Setting date and time (taking Daylight Savings Time into 

account, as necessary),

• Testing backup battery,

• Verifying functionality of audio ballots and 

accessible features,

• Voting the test pattern and printing the ballots,

• Scanning the ballots and verifying the results are as 

expected, and

• Setting for Election Day (or early voting) and securing 

with tamper-evident seals

Prepare test scripts with the vote pattern for each ballot 

style. Some states provide the vote pattern, which local 

election officials must use for L&A testing. However, 

election officials in states that do not provide the test script 

must ensure each script includes at least one vote for each 

candidate on the ballot and one ‘yes’ and one ‘no’ vote for 

each issue or question on the ballot. Additionally, the pattern 

should vary the number of votes rather than just voting one 

time for each choice. For example, officials commonly vote a 

one, two, three pattern, where the first position receives one 

vote, the second position two, etc. This variation is important 

to detect programming errors. Jurisdictions utilizing handmarked paper ballots may order a preprinted test deck; 

however, election officials should include actual handmarked ballots with various marks in the test. Test ballots 

from all potential sources (e.g., vendor printed, printed 

in-house, on-demand, or from a BMD). Once the pattern is 

determined, calculate the total number of ballots to be cast 

for each precinct or location.

Finally, many jurisdictions require election officials to open 

pre-election testing to the public. Even if not required, it is 

a good opportunity for election officials to provide insight 

into a critical election process. Review state and local 

requirements as they relate to open access to the preelection tests. Provide notice of testing and invite the public 

and media to attend. 

Conducting the Test

Determine which precinct or location to test first and, using 

the equipment list, gather all required equipment, supplies, 

and test deck (if applicable). Focus on one polling place at a 

time. Finish testing on all the selected location’s equipment 

before moving on to another. For any observers or media 

present, explain the procedure and assign a staff member to 

answer questions throughout the process.

Follow the checklist for each piece of equipment. Use a 

separate copy of the checklist for every piece of equipment, 

so the testing team can verify every step performed and 

note any issues. Whether testing DREs, precinct scanners, 

or central count scanners, testers can quickly verify the 

correct number of ballots that have been tabulated based 

on the predetermined ballot count. Jurisdictions using 

BMDs or DREs will have to manually enter the testing 

pattern on each machine. If it is not feasible to manually 

vote the test script on every machine, vote every ballot style 

on at least one machine and visually inspect every ballot style 

on all others.

For precinct and central count scanners, run the test deck 

for every ballot style the scanner could possibly count during 

the election. If precinct scanners are used in a vote center 

where voters from any precinct can vote, every ballot style 

should be run. Similarly, run all ballot styles on the central 

scanner if the jurisdiction counts all absentee or Election 

Day ballots centrally. After all ballots are scanned or all 

DREs have been manually voted, close the session and run 

the totals tapes. Testers should clear the results, ready the 

equipment for early voting or Election Day, and secure 

each machine with tamper-evident seals. Both testers verify 

completion of all steps on the checklist, record the seal 

information, and sign the documentation. The test deck should include ballots with writeins, overvotes, undervotes, and no selections 

made. Additionally, use a variety of instruments to 

mark the hand-marked deck to test the scanner’s 

sensitivity and potential bleed through.

NOTE

In larger jurisdictions with several testing teams, 

time constraints may require each team to focus on 

assigned polling places resulting in multiple locations 

being tested at once. 
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CHAPTER 11: PRE-ELECTION TESTING

Review the Results

After testing is complete for a location, review the 

results and compare them with the anticipated outcome. 

Each DRE, precinct scanner, or central scanner should 

generate a totals tape or report at the close of testing. In 

addition to reviewing the totals tapes for accuracy, upload 

the storage media to the voting system. Both the totals 

tapes and voting system aggregate results should match the 

predetermined pattern.

If the results are as expected, the equipment is clear for 

use in the election. After all equipment is tested, 

remember to zero out the voting system in addition to 

tabulating equipment.

If results are not as expected, investigate the source of the 

discrepancy. Looking at totals tapes from each machine may 

narrow down where the issue occurred. For example, during 

manual voting on a DRE, it is not uncommon for a tester 

to mis-vote. If that is the case, document the error. If you 

cannot guarantee a mis-vote or other human error caused 

the problem, remove the affected piece of equipment from 

service and escalate the investigation. 

After all testing is complete, consider publishing the results 

of the test and store the testing materials. Ensure all test 

deck ballots are clearly labeled and stored separately from 

actual live ballots. 

Always review a precinct-level results report when 

verifying testing results. If the tested location has 

more than one precinct, an error in one precinct 

could offset an error in another precinct, and a 

summary level report would not show it.

Conclusion

The best way to detect a potential problem with the voting 

system before it occurs is with comprehensive L&A testing. 

Documenting every step of the testing process is tedious but 

essential. Election officials can open testing to the public and 

publish the test results to demonstrate the voting equipment 

works properly before voting even begins. 
CHAPTER 12

Absentee Voting and Vote-by-Mail 

All states offer some form of absentee voting or vote-bymail, but they vary significantly in how voters request, 

receive, and return their mailed ballots. Some states require 

voters to provide a reason for requesting a mailed ballot, 

a witness signature, or other documentation before being 

issued a ballot. Other states require voters to specifically 

request in writing that a ballot be sent to them, while others 

automatically mail ballots directly to every registered voter 

before every election. These latter states, commonly called 

vote-by-mail states, still typically offer voters an in-person 

voting option. Nearly all voters in vote-by-mail states vote 

by returning their mailed ballot through the postal system, 

via a drop box, or personal delivery to an elections office 

or voting location, depending on state law. Generally, mail 

voting breaks down into four categories:

• Excuse Required Absentee - requires voters to certify 

that they meet certain criteria, e.g., absent from the 

jurisdiction on Election Day, temporarily ill or disabled, 

etc. Some states require voters to have a witness 

signature or other documentation. 

• No-Excuse Absentee - any voter can request an absentee 

ballot by mail. The request may be valid for one or 

more years or just one election depending on the state. 

In some states, voters may sign up for a permanent 

absentee application list, so they receive an application 

for every election. 

• Permanent Absentee - in some states, voters may sign up 

for the permanent absentee ballot list and automatically 

receive a ballot in the mail for every election. Some 

state laws require periodic review of the "permanent" 

status, specifically if the voter does not cast a ballot 

after several elections. 

• Vote-by-Mail - eligible voters are automatically mailed 

ballots and voter instructions by the local jurisdiction. 

Depending on state law, voters can return their marked 

ballots by mail, to a voting location, or in drop boxes. 

Technology yields several benefits for tracking and 

processing mailed ballots. Elections offices track the 

inventory of mailed ballots, including maintaining a record of 

which voters have been issued a ballot by mail, when election 

officials received it, and whether it is accepted for counting. 

Some election officials also offer mailed ballot tracking 

services online so that voters and officials can track the 

status of mailed ballots through the U.S. postal system. This 

chapter will discuss different methods for preparing, mailing, 

tracking, verifying, and tabulating mailed ballots. 

Ballot Preparation and Mailing

One of the first steps in preparing to issue ballots by mail is 

determining facility, staffing, and supply needs.

Facility Needs

Election officials should review the elections office's facilities 

before every election to ensure they are secure and there is 

enough space for packaging outgoing ballot envelopes. This 

space should have adequate shelving to handle all mailing 

needs, although the size of this space may change based on 

the expected quantity of ballots to be processed. Election 

officials should maintain a log of staff members with access 

to this facility. 

Sorting undeliverable ballots requires additional space since 

staff must review these ballots immediately. Processing 

returned voted ballots also requires space for:

• Signature Verification

• Challenged Ballots

• Envelopes

• Separating Ballots from Envelopes

• Duplication, if required

Staffing Needs

If staff performs ballot insertion in-house, assign teams of 

two (preferably bipartisan) to manage each workflow stage. 

Set up teams to help control the flow of materials and 

expedite the overall procedures. Staff must adhere to all 

security and chain of custody procedures to ensure voters 

are mailed the correct ballots.

Statutory requirements for absentee and voteby-mail vary significantly across states. Election 

officials must review state law and regulations 

before developing internal policies and procedures.

76 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
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• Delivery date for printed ballots

• Logic and accuracy testing

• Deadline for mailing of military and overseas ballots

• Date for initial mailing of absentee ballots

• Close of registration

• Last date that absentee ballots can be mailed or received

• Last day for receipt of voted mail ballots

Once election officials develop the timeline, they can 

incorporate staff assignments and internal deadlines.

Determining the number of ballots to order is often 

stipulated by state law or administrative policies and 

procedures. If not, election officials can use a simple 

spreadsheet to determine the number of ballots needed. 

In the spreadsheet, multiply the number of voters in 

each precinct by the percentage of ballots expected to 

be requested, considering prior like-election turnout 

by precinct. 

Before meeting with the ballot printer, election officials 

should consider the following:

• Quantities and ballot styles

• Weight limitations (printing instructions back-to-back 

will reduce the amount of paper and overall weight of 

the mail)

• Colors for different ballot types or districts

• State requirements for ballots (i.e., numbered, detachable 

stubs on each ballot)

• Required statutory information per ballot type

Number of non-affiliated voters for primary elections 

(consider buffering ballot quantities to accommodate party 

changes or parties opening their primary)

It is important to include extra ballots in the 

ballot order to ensure there are enough for logic 

and accuracy testing and provisional, spoiled, and 

replacement ballots.

For returned ballots, election officials should determine 

whether state law requires a sworn election worker board 

to oversee the process or whether supervisors can be 

regular staff, whose only duty is to oversee the process. It is 

important to plan for peak periods that may require either 

more personnel, staggered shifts, or overtime.

Equipment and Supplies

Election officials must also evaluate equipment and supply 

needs related to space needs. These may include:

• Ability to run labels/data exports for mailing companies

• Software that provides CASS certification (postal 

barcode)

• Insertion, folding, and sealing machines

• Printers

• Postage meter

• Automatic letter openers

• Computers and bar code scanners

• Storage shelves

• Mail trays

• File storage boxes

• Tamper-evident seals

Ballot Preparation and Printing

The first step in preparation for printing and distributing 

ballots is developing a timeline detailing each step in the 

process. Examples of dates to be included on a timeline are:

• Filing deadline

• Deadline for public review of ballot design and content

• Developing the ballot order and finalizing contract 

negotiation with the ballot printer

• Date that ballot file is due at the printer

If outgoing mail ballot preparations are to be done offsite at a mailing house, elections office staff supervision 

or prior facility inspection is recommended.

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Before every election, election officials should also contact 

the local post office to review all policies and procedures 

relating to mailing, tracking, and receiving the ballots. If 

using an outside mail service, election officials should also 

include a review of elections office internal policies and 

procedures and contract requirements with their mail 

service vendor. Listed below are possible items to review 

and consider:

• Identify timelines and scheduling (allow for 

possible delays)

• Identify staffing needs at all stages of the process (on-site 

supervision may be required)

• Identify staging requirements (work areas for barcoding, 

tray assembly, zipping/sorting, etc.)

• Consider quality control and security issues. Outline 

ballot transportation security requirements (i.e., from 

office or vendor to mailing house or mailing house to 

post office)

• Specify various quality control issues (tracking and 

audit trails)

• Establish a method for addressing/labeling envelopes

• If inserts are required, check with the vendor on insert 

capability. Examples of inserts include:

o Secrecy envelopes

o Return envelopes

o Ballot (one or more in jurisdictions with 

open primaries)

o Local Voters’ Pamphlet, if applicable

o Drop box locations, if applicable 

Review all outgoing and return ballot envelopes before 

placing new orders. Changes to state law regarding ballot 

envelope design may require updating the envelope. 

Election officials should consult with print vendors on the 

availability of envelopes before making changes to the size, 

type, or design. Additionally, redesigning ballot envelopes 

to accommodate new technology and postal policies and 

procedures can improve the management of packing 

outgoing envelopes and receiving voted ballots.

The U.S. Postal Service can review or help election officials 

design outgoing and return envelopes to ensure they meet 

postal standards for automated handling. A Mailpiece Design 

Analyst can ensure the proper wording and placement of 

endorsements.1 The postal service also provides a cameraready copy of the front side of both outgoing and return 

envelopes for the printer, including an 11-digit barcode for 

the elections office's return address on the return envelope. 

If election officials are using Postal Service Intelligent 

Barcode tracking for the first time, they must set up 

proper accounts and have pre-approval of envelope design 

before printing ballot envelopes. Additional information on 

election mail is available at https://about.usps.com/what/

government-services/election-mail/.

Election officials should discuss options for the return 

mailing address for voted ballots with their local post office, 

such as:

• The election office address and zip plus 4

• Having the post office assign a special “plus 4” for the 

elections office only

• Establishing a specific post office box for returned 

ballot envelopes

Additional examples of efficiencies election officials have 

realized in envelope design include:

• Eliminating labels by printing voter names directly onto 

the outgoing ballot envelope.

Note: Printing these envelopes in ballot order instead of 

alphabetically can improve accuracy and efficiency when 

pulling and inserting ballots into outgoing envelopes.

• Implementing bar code technology to easily update voter 

history when elections office staff receive return ballot 

envelopes for counting.

• Utilizing the official election postal indicia on all 

outgoing and return ballot envelopes. Local postal 

authorities should review any envelope design changes. 

Election officials should retain written records of approval 

on any changes.

1 For more information on mailpiece design review, election officials can contact the Mailing and Shipping Solutions Center (MSSC) via email at MSSCAdmin@usps.gov.
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CHAPTER 12: ABSENTEE VOTING AND VOTE-BY-MAIL

Ballot Mailing

Election officials must track both the numbers of envelopes 

printed and voter records updated as having been sent 

ballots each day, and the numbers must match. Election 

officials often print master listings of voters issued absentee 

ballots as a part of the audit trail for each election. Each day 

that staff print envelopes, a master listing of voter names 

should also be printed and balanced to the number 

of envelopes printed, ballots inserted, and delivered to the 

post office. This audit trail will also track and verify printed 

ballot inventory.

Election officials should coordinate the delivery of 

outgoing ballots with the postal facility handling the mailing. 

The local post office can schedule a time frame that allows 

for the most efficient distribution of ballots. Larger post 

offices sometimes require delivery to a specific dock area. 

If delivery is by truck, the post office may require weighing 

the truck before the mailing is loaded and before off-loading 

the ballots.

Remote Absentee Voting

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 

Act (UOCAVA) guarantees absent uniformed services 

voters and overseas voters the right to register to vote 

and to cast absentee ballots for federal offices. Updates to 

the act require jurisdictions to send ballots to UOCAVA 

voters at least 45 days before Election Day and allow 

voters to request and receive their ballot electronically to 

allow sufficient time to return their voted ballot. Chapter 

13 - Uniformed and Overseas Citizens provides more 

information on serving UOCAVA voters.

States have implemented different ways to transmit 

voting materials electronically. Initially, election officials 

sent and received election materials via fax transmission. 

Many jurisdictions now use secure online systems to send 

voting materials and blank ballots. An online system may 

allow voters to access the ballot online via a secured portal, 

ensuring the security and confidentiality of the ballot.

Some jurisdictions have extended the ability to receive 

ballots electronically to voters with disabilities or disaster 

workers unexpectedly away from home on Election Day. 

These systems allow voters with disabilities to mark their 

selections using their own compatible technology to vote 

independently and privately in the comfort of their own 

homes. And, for disaster workers, expedites ballot delivery.

Ballot Return

The most common return ballot delivery method is by 

mail. Election officials can coordinate mail pick up with the 

local post office. Even if the return address is the elections 

office, election officials can arrange with the post office 

to pick up the returned voted ballots each day, allowing 

for earlier ballot processing. If ballots are returned to a 

P.O. Box, election officials should consider establishing 

a written procedure for collecting the ballot envelopes. 

Take the return ballot envelope package (containing 

the return ballot and all inserts) to the post office 

to confirm the return postage amount. Include this 

information with the voter’s instructions.

As soon as printed ballots are delivered, election officials 

should conduct routine logic and accuracy testing 

on all ballot styles. Logic and accuracy tests should 

be completed before mailing or issuing any ballots to 

voters. Chapter 11 – Pre-Election Testing provides more 

information on logic and accuracy testing.

Election officials should coordinate with the post 

office for the latest pick-up time for last-minute 

returns on Election Night.
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There are a significant number of states that authorize 

the return of mail or electronically transmitted ballots by 

email, fax, or other electronic means such as an upload to 

a portal.  Security procedures, chain of custody, and ballot 

duplication procedures in offices are determined by state law 

and guidance.

Drop Boxes

Election officials should review state law and regulations 

before using ballot drop boxes. When locating drop boxes, 

election officials consider population, geographic areas, 

security, and available funding. Election officials should 

consider using city and county facilities, public assistance 

offices, senior and community centers, locations in areas 

with significant minority or traditionally disenfranchised 

communities as drop box locations when applicable.

When determining locations and drop box placement, 

consider the following factors:

• Access for voters with disabilities

• Security

• Voter convenience

• Parking

Election officials should be sure to inform voters of the 

location and hours of operation for all drop boxes in their 

jurisdiction. The EAC’s Ballot Drop Boxes Quick Start 

Guide provides additional information on locating and 

securing drop boxes.2 The Quick Start Guide and the EAC’s 

Best Practices: Chain of Custody include guidelines for 

developing robust chain of custody procedures applicable 

to emptying drop boxes.3 Additionally, the Making Voting 

Accessible Quick Start Guide outlines general accessibility 

considerations for ballot drop boxes.4

Ballot drop boxes must be locked and secure at all times. 

They should be placed in monitored areas or under video 

surveillance, whether indoor or outdoor. The drop boxes 

should be accessible only by a unique key, and two staff 

members (preferably bipartisan) should access the box to 

collect ballots. 

Election officials should establish a predetermined 

collection schedule. A team of two election workers 

(preferably bipartisan) should transfer the voted ballots to 

a locked or sealed ballot box, bag, or pouch and deliver it 

to the elections office. On Election Day, election workers 

should monitor the drop box locations until the close of the 

polls or the deadline for ballot receipt. Two election workers 

(preferably bipartisan) should be assigned to lock each drop 

box location, collect all remaining ballots, and ensure the 

drop box is removed or cannot accept any additional ballots 

after the deadline.

In-Person Voting Locations

If state law allows the voter to drop off voted absentee 

ballots at in-person voting locations, election officials 

must include instructions and procedures for poll workers 

to use in returning these voted ballots to the central 

elections office. Depending on the jurisdiction, mail ballots 

returned to a voting location may either be scanned at the 

location or centrally scanned at the elections office. Poll 

workers must understand how to document receipt of mail 

ballots and track tabulation, if applicable, and return to the 

elections office.

Returned Ballot Audit Trail

Elections office staff must create an audit trail throughout 

the ballot reception process. Election officials should 

maintain logs for processing the ballots through each step. 

All statistical information must be maintained for each batch 

of ballots processed, including:

• Number of ballots received

• Number of ballots counted

• Name, team number, or persons involved

• Date and time processed

• Number of challenged ballots

• Number of write-ins and duplicated ballots

• Number of envelopes that do not contain a ballot

• Number of envelopes containing more than one ballot

2 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Ballot_Drop_Boxes_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf 3 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Chain_of_Custody_Best_Practices.pdf 4 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Making_Voting_Accessible_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf
81

The audit trail begins when election officials receive the first 

ballot envelopes from voters. Daily, elections office staff 

count and log the number of:

• Ballots returned via the post office

• Ballots received over the counter

• Ballots received from drop box locations, if applicable

• Ballots forwarded to other jurisdictions

• Ballots returned undeliverable

Chapter 16 – Developing an Audit Trail provides more 

information on developing and maintaining audit trails 

throughout the election cycle.

Initial Envelope Sort

After receipt, staff sorts mailed ballots into categories. 

Some elections offices with high rates of by-mail voting use 

ballot sorting machines to aid the verification and sorting 

processes. The ballot sorter takes a picture of each by-mail 

ballot return envelope processed through the machine and 

groups them by ballot style for counting. The returned ballot 

is either recorded as returned by the voter or flagged for 

further review if the voter had previously returned a ballot 

to the elections office. The ballot groupings expedite the 

counting of the many ballot styles.

Examples of categories ballots are sorted into include:

• Signature and address match

• Challenged Ballots

o No signature on ballot envelope

o Address or name does not match voter record

o Signature does not match signature on file

o Voter already returned ballot 

Based on state law, elections offices establish internal 

procedures for managing returned mailed ballots with no 

signatures or if the signature does not match the signature 

on file. Many states rely on ballot curing to give voters a 

chance to fix or cure problems on their ballot envelope 

before rejecting their ballot. These options may include 

automatically mailing (if time permits) a notice to 

the voter notifying them that the ballot cannot be processed 

unless they correct the error by the statutory deadline. 

Depending on state law, the voter may have several options, 

including:

• Requesting a replacement ballot be mailed 

(if time permits)

• Signing the return identification ballot envelope at the 

elections office

• Providing a signature in another method authorized 

by law

Election officials compare digitized records or digital 

signatures to signatures on mailed ballots to verify the 

eligibility of absentee voters. Many jurisdictions utilize 

automated signature matching. This low-tech matching 

process can create efficiencies and uniformity in the 

signature verification process. If the elections office 

manually verifies signatures, election officials need to receive 

proper signature verification training. Training should include 

a section on how physical and cognitive impairments may 

cause signatures not to match. All rejected signatures 

should be subject to further review. Election officials should 

consider utilizing the following criteria as an example when 

comparing to the signature on file:

• Capital letters match

• Letters tail off alike

• Letter spacing is the same

• Space between signature and the line is the same

• Points where the signature begins and ends

A sample Signature Verification Workflow diagram 

is included at the end of the chapter. Workflow 

diagrams can help staff and voters understand 

the elections office’s processes. Election officials 

should consider including workflow diagrams 

in their procedures and make them available to 

the public. 

Election officials should review state law and 

regulations regarding signatures of voters who are, 

physically or otherwise, unable to sign their name.

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• Beginning and ending of signature and the slant are 

consistent

• Unique letters match

• Overall appearances match

If it is determined that the signature does not match the 

voter registration card or digitized signature, election officials 

will notify the voter and take other action as allowable or 

required by state law.

Data Entry of Returned Mailed Ballots

For all mailed ballots that fall into the "signature and address 

match" category, the ballot is recorded as “returned” for that 

voter. Election officials should record the number of mailed 

ballots in this category on a data entry log daily. This number 

should equal the number of mailed ballots stored and flagged 

as "ready to open and process." For auditing purposes, 

election officials often bundle returned mailed ballots in their 

return envelopes into batches, number the batches, and label 

the bundles. 

Replacement Ballots (if permitted by state law)

A replacement ballot is issued when a voter indicates 

that the original ballot was destroyed, spoiled, lost, or not 

received. Some jurisdictions require voters to complete 

and sign a replacement ballot request form. Once election 

officials receive a request for a replacement ballot:

• Verify that the voter has not voted another ballot or spoil 

the voter's previously submitted ballot if allowed

• Update the voter's record to reflect the issuance of a 

replacement ballot

• Issue the replacement ballot by mail or other means

Ballot Processing

Based on state law and local policies and procedures, 

mailed ballots are opened and separated from their 

envelopes through a series of processes before they can be 

scanned and tallied. Separate, two-person teams of election 

workers (preferably bipartisan) typically complete each stage 

of the process. 

• The first stage is counting the ballot envelopes and 

verifying that the batch contains the number of ballots 

in their return envelopes, as noted on the data entry 

log strip. The opening team must ensure ballots remain 

separated by batch through the opening process. 

• The second stage is separating the ballot from the 

envelope. During this stage, staff pulls the ballots from 

the envelopes and immediately places the envelopes into 

storage containers. In jurisdictions that use a secrecy 

sleeve, the ballot must also be removed from the sleeve.

• The third stage is the review stage (depending upon state 

law). During the review stage, staff reviews each ballot for 

possible duplication or adjudication (i.e., damaged ballots, 

identifying marks, write-ins, overvotes, etc.). The review 

team should record the number of ballots requiring 

duplication or adjudication on the log strip for each batch.

• The fourth stage is scanning. The ballots are scanned, 

often on central count scanners, and staff compares the 

total number of ballots scanned to the number expected 

based on the data entry log strip. After scanning, staff 

keep the ballots in their original batches and store them 

in secured containers.

• The last stage is tabulation. Election officials upload the 

scanned batches to the election management system 

tabulating the results. Election officials verify the results 

reflect the total number of ballots scanned. 

Election officials should completely finish processing opened 

envelopes each day and securely store them at the end 

of the day. This ensures no envelopes in a batch are left 

unopened and forgotten about the next day.

Ballot Review Process

Ballot review teams determine whether ballots should 

be counted, rejected, adjudicated, or duplicated. Ballot 

Election officials should should double-check 

that all envelopes are empty before storing 

ballot envelopes.
83

review aims to ensure that all ballots are machine-readable, 

enabling the scanner to record the voter's choices accurately. 

If the ballot has damage or defects that would cause 

problems in tallying, election officials may duplicate the 

ballot if state law permits.

Election officials must follow state law in developing the 

elections office's process for determining voter intent. The 

process may occur before or after attempted tabulation, 

depending on the state. It is common for teams of at least 

two, often of differing political party affiliation per state law, 

to work together to determine voter intent.

Election officials should train the ballot review teams to 

check for questionable marks and write-in votes during the 

inspection. Questionable marks are:

• Marks that the ballot counting equipment cannot read

• A checkmark or an “X” in the voting area

• Voting area completed too lightly

• Voter’s choice not marked in the voting area, such as a 

write-in with an unmarked arrow or circle

• Marks that could identify the voter

• Marks indicating the voter’s change of mind 

• Comments marked in the voting area

Determining Voter Intent

If the inspection board agrees on the voter's intent, 

responsible staff members should adjudicate or duplicate the 

ballot to reflect the voter's intent and count the ballot. If the 

inspection board does not agree on the voter's intent, 

the ballot should be challenged and forwarded to the 

canvass board.

Common scenarios requiring determination of voter 

intent include:

• Arrow or oval has been completed for one response, and 

a dot or partially completed arrow or oval is marked for 

the other

• Arrow or oval has not been marked, but the response 

is circled

• Arrow or oval has not been marked, but there is a 

connective line between the response and the arrow or 

oval to indicate the vote

• More than one arrow or oval has been completed, but a 

word or mark is used to indicate the correct vote

• A word has been used to indicate the vote instead of 

completing the arrow or the oval

Regardless of the vote tally system used, the duplication 

board will process ballots requiring duplication, making a 

duplicate ballot that is machine-readable and reflects the 

voter's intent. Duplicating and proofing must be done by 

at least two election personnel, often with different party 

affiliations if required by law. Each worker should initial both 

ballots and complete a duplicate ballot log indicating the 

batch number, ballot style, unique duplicate number, reason 

duplicated, staff initials, and date. Staff assigns a unique 

duplicate number to each ballot duplicated for tracking and 

auditing purposes and marks the original ballot with the same 

number as its duplicate. 

Ballot Scanning and Tabulation

When the review teams have verified ballots for scanning, 

they should complete a batch form for each batch ready to 

be scanned. The form should include the originally assigned 

batch number and the number of ballots sent to the scanner, 

including any exceptions. Types of exceptions include: (1) 

no ballot in the envelope; (2) more than one ballot in the 

envelope; (3) ballot from the wrong election in the envelope, 

etc. By developing and maintaining an audit trail, the audit 

team can verify that all ballots returned are accounted for—

and have been either challenged or scanned.

Staff should handle centrally counted ballots in batches, 

with each batch validated to the cumulative counter on the 

scanner. Election officials should maintain a central scanner 

log detailing the batch numbers and the number of ballots 

scanned per batch. If the scanner uses a memory card, the 

memory card should be appropriately labeled and identified 

on the scanner log sheet. 

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Managing Absentee Ballots at the Polls 

on Election Day

Depending upon state law, election officials must establish 

internal procedures for managing the return of absentee 

ballots delivered to the polls on Election Day and procedures 

for poll workers handling the ballots. Poll worker training 

must incorporate these procedures. Additionally, election 

officials can prepare flow charts detailing the steps to follow 

based on the specific voter scenario to assist poll workers on 

Election Day.

Storage and Security

All ballots and empty ballot envelopes should be boxed and 

sealed in tamper-evident containers. All other records—

ballot return logs, duplicate logs, scanner logs, etc.—are 

stored according to federal and state retention rules. All 

challenged and provisional ballots that are not eligible to be 

counted should be stored separately.

Election officials should prepare written security plans on the 

processing of absentee or vote-by-mail ballots. These plans 

should include the following details:

• Security at the printing facility

• Security for periods of ballot transportation (e.g., from 

the print shop to location of insertion; from mailing house 

to Post Office and from Post Office to election office 

other than regular mail delivery)

• Security for ballots during processing

• Security for ballot drop box locations

• Guidelines for security involving observers

• Security for election office work areas, buildings, 

and ballot storage (alarms, cameras, unique keys, 

limited keys)

• Security for vote tally systems, computer access security, 

and off-site storage for system backups.

At all times, election officials must maintain ballots in a 

secure location per written security plans and provide 

adequate supervision during all processing activities. Each 

elections office should maintain a log of who has access 

(keys, electronic codes, etc.) to secure areas. Election 

officials should consider installing secondary locks accessible 

only to authorized officials on election-specific dates to 

prevent unauthorized access.

Voter Education

Election officials must ensure all voters can access absentee 

and vote-by-mail information. The elections office’s website 

and informational materials should address how mail voting 

works in the jurisdiction, answer frequently asked questions, 

and provide contact information for the office. Important 

information to address includes:

• How to request a mail ballot (if necessary) with a link to 

the printable or online request form

• Deadlines for requesting, mailing, and returning the ballot

• Locations where voters can return ballots (e.g., drop 

boxes, elections office, in-person voting locations, etc.)

• How to confirm and update voter registration status and 

information with a link for online updates (if permitted)

• Elections office procedures for issuing, validating, and 

counting ballots

• How the elections office reports the results from 

absentee voting

Information online must also be available in other forms 

for voters without access to the internet. For jurisdictions 

covered under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 

information should be available in all languages required in 

the jurisdiction. The U.S. Access Board provides resources 

on developing accessible printed materials and websites. 

Consider storing ballots by precinct for auditing 

and recount purposes.

Motion detectors, video cameras, alarm systems, 

and other technology can supplement locks, alert 

election officials to after-hours entry, and can aid in 

identifying who has accessed the facility.
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Election officials can find more information at https://www.

access-board.gov/ict/ or they can contact the Access Board 

at 800.872.2253 (v), 800.993.2822 (TTY), or 508@

access-board.gov. Additionally, the U.S. Department of 

Justice issued guidance on website accessibility at http://

www.ada.gov/websites2.htm.

Election officials can share materials with community 

partners and candidates to promote wider distribution. 

Candidates should be encouraged to provide information 

to voters about how to vote absentee by mail. Election 

officials can provide a scripted handout to all candidates 

and encourage them to use it for all campaign literature to 

ensure accuracy. Community partners, local high schools, 

community colleges, universities, and other governmental 

agencies can share information with their communities, 

students, and customers.

When mailing a voter’s ballot, election officials should 

include concise instructions for the voter. Instructions 

should cover marking the ballot, completing necessary 

information (signing the return envelope, witness signature, 

or any other information the voter must provide), and 

returning the ballot to ensure it is counted. Simple visual 

aids can demonstrate how to fill in the oval or connect the 

lines to indicate selections on the ballot. If authorized by 

state law, the outside of the ballot envelope should contain a 

quick checklist and instructions to remind voters of common 

problems encountered (i.e., "Signature is required to count 

your ballot,” postage amount required, etc.).

Conclusion

As voting by mail becomes more common, with more states 

opting to mail every registered voter a ballot or voters 

choosing to request a mail ballot, election officials respond 

with creative and innovative solutions to make the process 

efficient, accessible, and secure. Every elections office 

should have a documented procedure for sending, receiving, 

and counting mail ballots. The written procedure not only 

ensures uniform handling but can also inform the public of 

the steps election officials take to verify and secure mail 

ballots. After each election, election officials should review 

and update these policies and procedures as necessary.

CHAPTER 12: ABSENTEE VOTING AND VOTE-BY-MAIL
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Sample Signature Verification Workflow Diagram
CHAPTER 13

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 

Act (UOCAVA) of 1986 ensures the rights of Uniformed 

Services members, their families, and overseas citizens to 

register to vote and cast absentee ballots for federal offices. 

The Director of the Federal Voting Assistance Program 

(FVAP) administers UOCAVA on behalf of the Secretary of 

Defense in providing information on registration and voting 

resources to service members. FVAP serves approximately 5 

million potential UOCAVA voters, including nearly 3 million 

overseas civilians; 1.4 million military members; 1.3 million 

military family members; and 100,000 Federal civilian 

overseas employees.1 Additionally, FVAP provides state 

and local election officials with resources to enable them to 

better serve UOCAVA voters.

Updates to UOCAVA

Since 1986, Congress has passed several amendments 

to UOCAVA to address common obstacles UOCAVA 

voters face when applying for, receiving, and returning 

their ballots. While UOCAVA sought to protect the right 

to vote in federal elections, state laws and regulations and 

mailing delays proved challenging for many UOCAVA 

voters. Amendments to UOCAVA outlined new reporting 

requirements and rules to ensure UOCAVA voters receive 

their ballots in a timely manner. 

Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002

HAVA amended UOCAVA and requires each state and 

unit of local government which administered the election 

to submit a report to the EAC on the combined number 

of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters for 

the election and the number of such ballots that were 

returned and counted in the election. States must report the 

data no later than 90 days after each regularly scheduled 

general election for federal office. The amendment also 

prohibits states from refusing to process registration or 

absentee ballot requests from UOCAVA voters because 

they submitted the form too early during the election year. 

Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment 

Act (MOVE Act) of 2009 

The MOVE Act amended UOCAVA requiring states to: 

• Allow UOCAVA voters to request and receive blank 

absentee ballots by electronic transmission, 

• Transmit requested ballots no later than 45 days before 

an election for federal office (when a valid request has 

been received by that date), 

• Accept the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB) 

for all elections for federal office (including run-off and 

special elections), 

• Accept registrations, absentee ballot applications, voted 

ballots, or FWABs that do not otherwise meet state 

notarization, paper, or envelope requirements, and 

• Provide a free access system for UOCAVA voters to 

track receipt of their voted ballots at the elections office. 

Frequently Asked UOCAVA Questions

Who is a Uniformed Services voter? A Uniformed 

Services voter is: 

• A member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 

Corps, Space Force, Coast Guard, the commissioned 

corps of the Public Health Service, and the commissioned 

corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration who, by reason of active duty, is absent 

from the place of residence where the member is 

otherwise qualified to vote.2

• A member of the Merchant Marine who, by reason 

of service in the Merchant Marine, is absent from the 

place of residence where the member is otherwise 

qualified to vote. 

• A spouse or dependent of a Uniformed Services member 

who, by reason of the active duty or service of the 

member, is absent from the place of residence where the 

spouse or dependent is otherwise qualified to vote. 

1 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey Report (EAVS) at p. 172 available at https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_

Report_Final_508c.pdf; 2020 Overseas Citizen Population Analysis Report (September 2021) FVAP available at https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/OCPA2020-Final-Report.pdf. 2 Additionally, some states and territories extend UOCAVA to Nation Guard members who are activated on state or territorial orders. More information can be found in 

Chapter 2 of FVAP’s Voting Assistance Guide available at https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/States/eVAG.pdf.

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What ballots will UOCAVA voters receive? UOCAVA 

requires states and territories to allow Uniformed Service 

members, their families, and overseas citizens to register 

and vote absentee ballots in elections for federal office. 

In addition, laws in many states and territories also allow 

citizens covered by UOCAVA to register and vote absentee 

ballots in state and local elections. 

How can UOCAVA voters register to vote and request 

an absentee ballot? UOCAVA voters can use the Federal 

Post Card Application (FPCA). UOCAVA dictates the 

FPCA is a single postcard that simultaneously serves as both 

an absentee voter registration application and an absentee 

ballot request. UOCAVA voters can complete the form 

in hardcopy or online using state-specific instructions in 

FVAP’s online assistant.

3

 At a minimum under UOCAVA 

the FPCA will be valid for all elections for federal office 

during the calendar year it is submitted. 

What is a Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot or FWAB?

A FWAB is an emergency or “back-up” ballot available for 

citizens covered under UOCAVA. It is used to vote in any 

election for federal offices and as otherwise permitted by 

state law. UOCAVA requires voters to meet the following 

criteria to use a FWAB: 

• The citizen must be a member of the Uniformed Services 

or Merchant Marine (or eligible family member), or a 

United States citizen overseas who is absent from their 

place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to 

vote, and 

• apply for a regular absentee ballot, using the FPCA, or 

another form as permitted by the state, early enough so 

that the local election official receives the request at least 

30 days before the election or before the state’s ballot 

request deadline, whichever is later, and 

• not have received the requested regular absentee ballot 

from the state. 

UOCAVA stipulates that voters may also return a regular 

absentee ballot after returning the FWAB, as the state 

ballot may offer other offices or referenda. Only one ballot is 

counted for each voter.

What is the legal state of residence for a Uniformed 

Services member? The state where the Uniformed 

Services member has, or has had, physical presence and 

where there is the intent to remain or return. This is true 

even if many years have elapsed and the voter maintains no 

residence in the state or territory. Each state determines 

eligibility to vote and residency requirements. 

Who is an overseas citizen? An overseas citizen is a 

person who resides outside the United States and, but 

for such residence, would be qualified to vote in the last 

place in which the person was domiciled before leaving the 

United States. Each state determines eligibility to vote and 

residency requirements.

What is the legal state of residence for an 

overseas citizen? The state or territory where the voter 

last resided immediately before departure from the United 

States, even if many years have elapsed, the voter maintains 

no residence in the state or territory, and the voter’s intent 

to return to that state or territory may not be certain. 

Below are some questions that may help determine a voter’s 

legal state of residence: 

• Where was the voter registered to vote? 

• What state issued the voter a driver’s license? 

• Where is the voter’s automobile registered? 

• Where does the voter’s family live? 

• Where does the voter own property? 

As of November 2022, 39 states and the District 

of Columbia allow eligable U.S. citizens who have 

never resided in the United States to register and 

vote where a U.S. citizen parent would be eligible to 

vote. Find additional information at https://www.

fvap.gov/citizen-voter/reside.

3 https://www.fvap.gov/r3/fpca/state
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CHAPTER 13: UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS

Communication with UOCAVA Voters

Military and overseas voters face unique challenges 

in registering to vote, requesting and receiving their 

blank ballots, and returning their voted ballots. Efficient 

communication is essential to ensure these voters can 

participate in the democratic process. The best mode of 

communications for many UOCAVA voters is via email, 

which they often provide on the FPCA. Use email to 

acknowledge receipt and communicate any problems with 

the voter’s ballot application or registration. 

If a UOCAVA absentee ballot is returned undeliverable, take 

every step possible to obtain the correct mailing address for 

the voter.

• Double-check the mailing address on the return envelope 

and compare it to the address provided by the voter on 

the absentee ballot request. 

• Contact a local family member of the voter for possible 

updated information. 

• Request an updated address, for active duty service 

members only, through FVAP’s Department of Defense 

database. Election officials can send an email to vote@

fvap.gov with the subject “Address Update” and include 

the voter’s name, date of birth, and if possible, the last 

four digits of their Social Security Number. 

• Utilize telephone, fax, or email contact information 

provided on the FPCA. FVAP provides a no-cost fax 

service for election officials to send and receive election 

materials for voters who can ONLY receive materials 

by fax. Election officials can email materials to FVAP at 

fax@fvap.gov, and FVAP will fax the materials to the 

UOCAVA voter.

Ensure elections office websites are up-to-date with 

accurate information for UOCAVA voters. Create a 

page dedicated to UOCAVA voting information and include 

the following: 

• Provide a link to the Federal Voting Assistance Program4

website and direct links to the FPCA,

5

 the FWAB,

6

postage-paid envelope templates,

7

 and the cover page8

(including secrecy waiver) for voters who choose to 

submit their FPCA or FWAB electronically. 

• Display information on state-specific rules and 

regulations for UOCAVA voters. 

• Provide contact information including email and, if 

possible, a toll-free phone number. 

• Provide an online voter status search tool for UOCAVA 

voters, allowing them to verify their voter registration 

status. If ballot tracking for UOCAVA voters is 

maintained at the state level, include a link so UOCAVA 

voters can easily track their ballots. 

• Provide a link to a list of candidates for the election, 

particularly as a resource for voters who need to use 

the FWAB.

Additional Resources for 

Local Election Officials

The EAC has been involved in developing best practices and 

reporting information on UOCAVA voting since the passage 

of HAVA. Every two years, the EAC collects information 

from all states and territories regarding policies affecting 

UOCAVA voters in addition to information on how many 

UOCAVA voters apply for ballots and ultimately have them 

counted. In response to challenges presented ahead of the 

FVAP offers a communications toolkit for election 

officials. The toolkit includes graphics, template 

emails, and suggestions for timing communications. 

Find the toolkit at https://www.fvap.gov/eo/

overview/communicating-voters.

4 https://www.fvap.gov/ 5 https://www.fvap.gov/fpca-privacy-notice 6 https://www.fvap.gov/fwab-privacy-notice 7 https://www.fvap.gov/eo/overview/materials/forms 8 https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Forms/coversheet.pdf 9 https://www.eac.gov/events/2020/08/19/roundtable-discussion-uocava-and-accessibility-issues-during-covid-19-pandemic 
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2020 Presidential Election, the EAC hosted a roundtable

with state and local election officials and federal partners on 

serving UOCAVA voters and voters with disabilities during 

the Covid-19 pandemic.9 FVAP maintains a specific page at 

https://www.fvap.gov/covid-19 to provide updates and links 

to state specific election impacts and up-to-date US Postal 

Service and US Department of State operations status. 

FVAP’s Voting Assistance Guide is the official and primary 

source of UOCAVA absentee voting information.10 The 

Guide includes state specific instructions and guidelines and 

provides information about FVAP products and services. 

While the Guide provides information for Voting Assistance 

Officers, it can also help local election officials understand 

the state approved information provided to military and 

overseas voters. 

FVAP offers election officials an online training module on 

the basics of serving UOCAVA voters. Training is available 

at https://www.fvap.gov/eo/training. FVAP staff can also 

provide in-person training for local election offices at statewide trainings, meetings, and conferences. FVAP publishes 

a periodic newsletter specifically for state and local election 

officials which can be subscribed to at https://public.

govdelivery.com/accounts/USFVAP/subscribers/new. 

Conclusion

UOCAVA safeguards the right to vote for military 

members, their families, and overseas citizens through 

specific requirements for state and local election officials. 

In addition to adhering to these requirements, election 

officials can provide clear information and utilize efficient 

forms of communication to better serve UOCAVA voters. 

Further, election officials should leverage FVAP resources 

to increase communication with and reduce barriers for 

UOCAVA voters.

10 https://www.fvap.gov/guide 
CHAPTER 14

Voting Location Management

Depending upon state law, every registered voter 

can participate in democracy by voting in person before 

or on Election Day. Election officials are responsible for 

following state law when determining the number of voting 

locations, hours of operation, and which precincts to assign 

to each location. This chapter provides information about 

in-person voting, including selecting voting locations, 

evaluating accessibility, and setting up voting locations to 

best serve voters. 

In-Person Voting Locations

On Election Day, most voters must vote at their 

precinct-based polling place. However, the use of advanced/

early voting or Election Day vote centers are on the rise 

across the country. In November 2020, 21 states used 

vote centers, four more than in 2018. Image 1 shows which 

states provide vote centers. Among these states, eight 

required vote centers in all jurisdictions, and 13 allowed vote 

centers in certain jurisdictions or allowed jurisdictions to 

opt into this voting method. The main categories of voting 

locations include:

• Election Day Precinct-Specific Polling Places – Each 

voting precinct is assigned to its own polling place. 

• Election Day Consolidated Precinct Polling Places – Two 

or more voting precincts are assigned to the same polling 

place. Consolidation is often based on several factors, 

including the number of voters in each precinct, the 

size and location of the polling place facilities, and the 

expected voter turnout for each polling place. 

• Election Day Voter Center (jurisdiction-wide) – One or 

more vote centers strategically located throughout the 

jurisdiction where any voter in the entire jurisdiction can 

vote on Election Day. 

• Early Voting Vote Center (jurisdiction-wide) – One 

or more early voting vote centers strategically located 

throughout the jurisdiction where any voter in the 

entire jurisdiction can vote during the designated early 

voting period.

Image 1

Locating Polling Places and Vote Centers

Election officials rely on various resources to select suitable 

locations as polling places or vote centers. First, election 

officials should review state law for any legal requirements 

for voting locations. Some states limit the use of privately 

owned facilities, allow consolidating multiple precincts into 

one polling place, or permit jurisdiction-wide vote centers. 

Additionally, elections officials should consider the following 

factors when identifying potential voting locations: 

• Accessibility requirements 

• Expected voter turnout 

• Building occupancy limits and parking availability 

• Proximity of building location to voters being served 

• Proximity to public transportation 

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• County GIS and Mapping Department—election officials 

can partner with department staff to build a layer of data, 

including potential voting locations, parking, ingress and 

egress, contact information, etc. 

• Area Chamber of Commerce—election officials can 

partner with local Chambers to develop outreach 

programs to all area businesses. Many businesses have 

large meeting rooms suitable for hosting voters on 

Election Day. 

• Disability community organizations—can assist 

election officials in identifying and securing accessible 

voting locations. 

Between elections, officials should continue to build upon 

the database of possible voting locations. In the event of 

last-minute emergency location changes, the database 

can provide alternative locations. Chapter 4 – Building 

Community Partnerships provides more information on 

establishing community partnerships for voting locations.

Once a potential location is identified, election officials 

must make initial contact with the property owner to gauge 

interest in hosting a voting location and request to visit 

the facility. The first meeting or phone call provides an 

opportunity for elections office staff to begin to develop a 

long-term commitment and relationship with each property 

owner to help ensure that voting locations stay as consistent 

as possible. 

At the initial meeting, election officials should provide 

detailed information about the extent of the commitment 

required to host a voting location. Election officials should 

clearly communicate the number of days the facility will 

need to commit for each election. For example, most voting 

locations receive equipment and supplies the day before the 

election, must be open all day on Election Day, and store 

equipment and supplies until picked up the day after the 

election. Officials must ensure facility owners understand 

the three or more-day commitment. Additionally, election 

officials should provide: 

• Security requirements 

• Estimated voter and traffic volume 

• Pre- and post-Election Day delivery and 

pickup procedures 

• Election Day hours of operation 

• Accessibility needs 

Election officials should select voting locations to serve 

heavily populated urban cities and rural areas within the 

elections office’s jurisdiction. Ideally, voting locations will 

remain constant from election to election. However, when 

election officials need to find new locations, they must 

evaluate several factors. Generally, election officials look for 

traditional polling places based on the neighborhoods the 

polling place will serve. Vote centers are typically located 

near heavy traffic areas, large residential areas, major 

employers, and public transportation routes in urban areas. 

In rural areas, vote centers in easily recognized civic centers 

within the community are ideal. 

Types of buildings to consider using as voting 

locations include: 

• Community Centers 

• Large meeting rooms, i.e., public library, city/county 

government buildings, etc. 

• Gymnasiums 

• Sports stadiums 

• Shopping malls 

• Auto dealerships 

• Grocery stores 

• Church activity and community rooms 

• School meeting rooms 

• VFW, American Legion, and Masonic Lodge 

activity rooms 

• Apartment clubhouses 

• Country club meeting rooms 

• National Guard and other training centers 

• Retirement building meeting rooms 

• Area business meeting rooms 

• Individual homes—often garages are used 

Election officials often rely on community support to provide 

much-needed space. Officials can establish partnerships 

within local governments and the community to build a 

database of all possible voting locations. Resources and 

potential partners include, but are not limited to: 

• City and County Planning and Building Departments—

election officials can contact the staff and request to be 

placed on any email list notifying recipients of any new 

permits issued for large buildings in their jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER 14: VOTING LOCATION MANAGEMENT

All requirements can be summarized in a fact sheet and 

given to the owner. If the facility owner gives permission to 

use the location and it fulfills all other requirements, election 

officials should consult with legal counsel to develop a 

contract and formalize the commitment.

Special Considerations for Vote Centers

Many of the locations that traditionally make good precinctbased polling places will also work for vote centers; however, 

there are some additional factors to consider that may 

influence election officials when selecting vote center 

locations. Typically, jurisdictions utilizing vote centers offer 

fewer locations, which means each vote center typically 

serves more voters than a precinct-based polling place. 

• Additional requirements for a vote center model include: 

• Secure real-time communication line between the 

vote center(s) and the elections office’s voter 

registration database 

• Ability to display all ballot styles on ballot marking devices 

and DRE equipment, ability to print all ballot styles on 

demand, or ability to store and secure large quantities of 

paper ballots for every ballot style 

• A team of skilled, trained, computer savvy poll workers 

• Large, centrally located facilities equipped to handle 

many voters 

• Sufficient parking area with easy ingress and egress 

• Cooperative agreement with area law enforcement 

agencies to provide traffic control during peak 

voting hours

Accessibility Check 

Before finalizing any building for use as a voting location, 

election officials must conduct an accessibility survey and 

needs assessment. The following information includes typical 

accessibility challenges for in-person voting locations. The 

examples can help election officials determine whether a 

polling place has basic accessible features most voters with 

disabilities need. Additionally, election officials can use the 

proposed temporary and permanent solutions to get ideas 

for improving accessibility at voting locations.

Getting Started

An evaluation of voting location accessibility should focus 

on those areas of a facility that are important to voting. In 

addition to the voting area, election officials must evaluate 

parking for voters, drop off or loading areas, the entrance to 

the polling place, and the pedestrian routes (both exterior 

and interior) that voters use to get to the voter check-in and 

voting area.

Image 2: Sample of effective polling place accessibility signage.

Before evaluating a voting location, elections office staff 

responsible for the evaluation should review instructions for 

completing the facility checklist and become familiar with its 

questions. It is also helpful to practice taking measurements 

and recording information before beginning the evaluation. 

Typically, the evaluation begins outside. Staff can assess 

the parking area, including locating accessible parking 

(if provided), a curbside voting area or drop box site (if 

permitted by law), and an accessible route to the entrance. 

At new voting locations, staff should look for areas that 

provide the best accessibility, where simple modifications 

may provide accessibility, or where it may be easiest to 

improve accessibility with temporary features. 

Portions of the following information are excerpts 

from the Department of Justice's ADA Checklist 

for Polling Places, dated June 2016. https://www.

ada.gov/votingchecklist.pdf
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Using the Polling Place Checklist

• A few simple tools are needed to measure the sizes and 

the slope of specific elements and spaces: 

• Tape measure at least 15 feet long 

• Level with a bubble measure or a digital measure at least 

24 inches long for measuring slope 

• One copy of the checklist for each location 

to be evaluated 

• Extra paper for drawing the location layout

One staff member can complete a survey of a voting 

location, but it is often quicker and easier for two people 

to work together. One can be responsible for taking the 

measurements and the other for recording the information 

and taking any photographs. 

Taking Measurements 

Sloped Surfaces 

One way to measure slope is to use a 24-inch level with 

leveling bubble and a tape measure. Place the level on the 

incline in the direction to be measured. Rest one end of the 

level at the highest point of the sloped surface and lift the 

other end (as shown in the illustration) until the bubble is in 

the middle of the tube. This is the "level" position. While in 

the level position, measure the distance between the end of 

the level and the sloped surface below. If the distance is 2 

inches or less, the slope is 1:12 or less. When the distance is 

greater than 2 inches, record the distance on the checklist so 

staff can calculate the exact slope later if needed.

Image 3: Measuring a slope using a 24-inch level and tape measure.

Slopes may also be measured using a digital level. The digital 

display replaces the bubble and typically gives a reading 

shown as a digital bubble, degrees, or a percent. Many digital 

levels require calibration before every use. If the digital 

display can display percent or degrees, the maximum slope 

generally allowed is 8.33% or 4.76 degrees (for a 1:12 slope).

Using the Tape Measure

When using the tape measure, ensure it is not sagging or 

bending, so the measurement is accurate. If the tape is not 

straight, try to support it in the middle or pull it tight and 

retake the measurement.

Image 4: Using a tape measure to measure the width of a 

parking space.

Take photos of the facility and draw a floorplan of 

the voting area, including any access areas. Election 

officials can use the photos and floor plan for later 

review and planning voting location layouts.
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Measuring Door Openings

Measuring the clear opening of an accessible door requires 

special care. To measure the opening of a standard hinged 

door, open the door to 90 degrees. Place the end of the 

tape measure on the side of the door frame next to the 

clear opening (as shown). Stretch the tape across the door 

opening to the face of the door. This measurement equals 

the clear open width of the door, which is typically less than 

the width of the door.

Image 5: Measuring the clear opening from the face of the doorstop on 

the frame to the face of the open door.

Completing the Checklist

Many states provide local election officials comprehensive 

voting location checklists to ensure locations throughout 

the state comply with federal accessibility requirements. 

Additionally, officials can refer to the Department of 

Justice’s ADA Checklist for Polling Places.

1

 Each item 

on the checklist includes a reference to the technical 

requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations to assist 

users in looking up the requirement when necessary. An 

electronic copy of the Standards is available on the ADA 

Website at www.ada.gov.

Completed voting location checklists provide election 

officials information needed to determine which locations 

are accessible and which can be made accessible with 

permanent or temporary modifications. Checklists where 

most answers are "yes" will usually indicate an accessible 

voting location. Others, where some answers are "no," may 

become accessible if officials utilize permanent or temporary 

modifications to remove barriers. Voting locations in older 

buildings may have few accessible features. Still, some of 

these older facilities may be able to be made accessible with 

temporary modifications, such as portable ramps at the 

entrance and accessible parking spaces marked off by traffic 

cones. Some sites cannot be made accessible, and officials 

will need to either offer accessible voting in some other way 

or consider another location.

Typical Accessibility Issues at Voting Locations

The DOJ’s accessibility checklist identifies common issues 

election officials may encounter in evaluating potential 

voting locations. These common issues are described below 

with recommendations on temporary solutions.

Getting to the Voting Location

When a voting location provides parking for voters, staff, 

and volunteers, it must include accessible parking for people 

with disabilities. Voters with disabilities arriving by car need 

an accessible parking space close to an accessible entrance. 

An accessible parking space has an adjacent access aisle 

that provides needed room for a person to open the car 

door fully and then stand with the aid of a walker, transfer 

to a wheelchair, or lower a wheelchair lift. The access aisle 

connects directly to an accessible route that leads to an 

accessible building entrance. The access aisle must be 

relatively level, clear of gravel or mud, and the surface 

must be in good condition without wide cracks or broken 

pavement. 

The ADA Compliance Brief: Restriping Parking 

Spaces provides information about the features 

of accessible car and van parking places and 

how many accessible spaces are required when 

restriping parking facilities. https://www.ada.gov/

restriping_parking/restriping2015.html 
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An accessible route must connect the access aisle of each 

accessible parking space with the accessible entrance to 

the location. The route must include a curb ramp when the 

accessible route crosses a curb. A marked crosswalk should 

be provided on the vehicular route if the accessible route 

connects the access aisle to the accessible entrance using 

the parking lot surface.

Image 6: Van-accessible parking spaces serve both cars and vans. A 

wide access aisle is needed so a wheelchair lift may be lowered from the 

van onto the level surface.

Image 7: Accessible route from the parking lot to the voting location.

Temporary Solutions for Parking

Problem One: Parking is available, but no accessible parking 

is provided, or there is not enough accessible parking or vanaccessible spaces.

Suggestion: Find a relatively level parking area near 

the accessible entrance and then designate the area for 

accessible parking spaces and adjacent access aisles. Use 

three parking spaces to make two accessible parking spaces 

with an access aisle. Traffic cones or other temporary 

elements may mark the spaces and access aisles. Provide 

a sign designating each accessible parking space and make 

sure the access aisle of each space connects to the accessible 

route to the accessible entrance.

Problem Two: No sign with the international symbol of 

accessibility is installed at each accessible parking space.

Suggestion: Provide a temporary sign in front of each 

accessible parking space.

Image 8: Three standard parking spaces are converted into an 

accessible parking space with an access aisle. Cones mark the access 

aisle, and a temporary curb ramp with edge protection connects to an 

accessible route to the voting location.

Problem Three: Accessible parking is provided, but it does 

not have a marked access aisle next to each accessible space.

1 https://www.ada.gov/votingchecklist.pdf
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CHAPTER 14: VOTING LOCATION MANAGEMENT

Suggestion: Restripe the accessible parking spaces to 

provide an access aisle. As a temporary solution for Election 

Day, use traffic cones to mark off the access aisle and curb 

ramp area. The first accessible parking space should be a 

van-accessible parking space with an access aisle at least 96 

inches wide.

Problem Four: Accessible parking spaces or access aisles are 

on a sloped surface.

Suggestion: Find a parking area close to the accessible 

entrance that is more level. Provide accessible parking spaces 

and access aisles in that area. Ensure the accessible parking 

spaces connect to an accessible route to the entrance. 

Provide a sign designating each accessible parking space.

Image 10: By placing an orange cone in the adjacent parking stall, this 

polling place now meets van accessibility parking requirements.

Temporary Solutions for Passenger Drop-Off Areas

Problem One: A passenger drop-off and loading zone is 

provided, but there is no curb ramp between the vehicle area 

and the sidewalk leading to the accessible entrance.

Suggestion: Provide a portable ramp with edge protection in 

an area where the vehicle area and the sidewalk are relatively 

level. The curb ramp must connect to an accessible route to 

the entrance.

If the drop-off and loading zone is not relatively level, 

consider relocating the accessible drop-off area and using 

one parking space next to the area where accessible parking 

is located to provide an accessible drop-off and loading zone. 

Cones or another temporary barrier may be needed to keep 

the parking space clear.

Sidewalks and Walkways

There must be at least one exterior accessible route that 

connects accessible passenger drop-off areas, accessible 

parking spaces, and other accessible elements, for example, a 

route from a bus stop to an accessible building entrance. The 

accessible route is essential for people who have difficulty 

walking or use wheelchairs or other mobility aids to get to 

the voting location's accessible entrance.

An accessible route is at least 36 inches wide and may 

narrow briefly to 32 inches wide where there are utility 

poles, post-mounted signs, furniture, and doorways along 

an accessible route. Abrupt level changes, steps, or steeply 

sloped sidewalks cannot be part of an accessible route. If 

the route includes a ramp, it cannot be steeper than 1:12. 

Ramps with a vertical rise of more than six inches must 

have handrails on both sides. Ramps must also have edge 

protection to stop wheelchairs from falling off the sides and 

level landings at the top and bottom of each segment and 

where a ramp changes direction.

Temporary Solutions for Sidewalks and Walkways

Image 11: An accessible entrance to a voting location with accessible 

parking and an accessible drop-off area. 1 – Accessible route. 2 – 

Accessible drop-off area. 3 – Accessible parking with van-accessible 

parking space. 4 – Accessible entrance to the voting location.
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Problem One: The sidewalk connecting parking to the 

polling place entrance is too steep to be accessible.

Suggestion: Check if another sidewalk provides an accessible 

route to the accessible entrance. Sometimes, a less direct 

route can serve as the accessible route.

Problem Two: The accessible route crosses a curb, and there 

is no curb ramp.

Suggestion: Install a portable ramp with edge protection.

Image 12: A portable ramp with edge protection is installed over a curb 

to provide an accessible route.

Building Entrances

An accessible voting location must have at least one 

accessible entrance. An accessible route must connect 

the accessible entrance to the voting area. An accessible 

entrance must provide at least one accessible door with 

maneuvering space, accessible door hardware, and enough 

clear width to allow people who use crutches, a cane, walker, 

scooter, or wheelchair to use it.

If the accessible entrance is not the main entrance to 

the voting location, signs must be located at inaccessible 

entrances to direct voters to the accessible entrance. The 

accessible entrance must remain open when the voting 

location is open.

Image 13: Example of a voting location.

Temporary Solutions for Accessible Entrances

Problem One: One or two steps at the entrance prevent 

access.

Suggestion: If another entrance is accessible and on an 

accessible route from accessible parking, designate it as the 

accessible entrance and install a directional sign at the main 

entrance directing voters to the accessible entrance. Keep 

the accessible entrance unlocked during voting hours. 

If another accessible entrance is not available, install a 

temporary ramp with edge protection and handrails.

Image 14: EAC sample of effective voting location entrance signage.
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CHAPTER 14: VOTING LOCATION MANAGEMENT

Problem Two: There is a small step at the entrance.

Suggestion: Install a short temporary ramp to provide a 

smooth transition.

Image 15: Example of a voting location entryway made accessible by 

placing a wooden ramp over the entry threshold.

Problem Three: Entrance door threshold has an abrupt 

change in level of more than 1/4 inch and no beveled sides.

Suggestion: If the threshold is not more than 3/4 inches 

high, add beveled surfaces to both sides of the threshold or 

replace it with a new threshold that is no more than 1/2 inch 

high and has beveled sides.

Image 16: A portable ramp with handrails and edge protection is 

installed over a step(s) at the entrance of a voting location.

Problem Four: Entrance door to the building is heavy and 

difficult to open.

Suggestion: Keep the door propped open or station 

volunteers near the door to open it for voters.

Image 17: Include a doorstop inside the poll worker ADA supply kits to 

prop open the doorway to the voting location

Problem Five: Door handle or latch at the entry door is 

not accessible.

Suggestion: These are three typical solutions: add an 

accessible pull or handle to the outside of the door and leave 

the door unlatched, install an accessible door handle and 

hardware, or leave the door propped in an open position.

Image 18: Include duct tape in the poll worker ADA supply kit. Instruct 

poll workers to use the tape on the door plunger on the outside door.
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Voting Area

The accessible voting area must be on an accessible route, 

have an accessible entrance, and have adequate circulation 

and maneuvering space for voters who use wheelchairs or 

scooters or walk with mobility aids.

Image 19: Example of the accessible interior voting area.

An accessible route must connect the accessible building 

entrance to the accessible voting area, including voter 

check-in, the location of the accessible voting machines, 

and an accessible exit. The survey should also identify any 

protruding objects (wall-mounted or overhead) along the 

circulation route to voter check-in and the voting area.

Image 20: Voting area accessibility. 1 – Accessible route connects the 

building entrance with the voting area, including voter check-in and 

accessible voting machines. 2 – Accessible door or doorway to the 

voting area. 3 – Turning space at the accessible voting machine. 4 – 

Blinds closed behind check-in so voters who read lips can communicate 

with the voting staff.

GIS and Voting Locations

GIS is a software system for capturing, storing, and 

displaying data in interactive maps. In simple terms, GIS 

can combine different datasets such as addresses, streets, 

buildings, aerial photos, voting precincts, and district 

boundaries into a single digital map. GIS can yield great 

benefits by applying data visualization to assist with selecting 

voting and drop box locations, creating voter-specific lookup tools, displaying detailed election results and, more. 

GIS can also be used to increase the accuracy of voter 

registration systems.

Geocoding

For accuracy, election officials can overlay several GIS 

datasets to examine addresses, precincts, and districts 

boundaries. A process known as geocoding will assign a point 

on the map for every address in a street file. Election officials 

can compare the points to other information, including 

precinct and district boundaries, in the GIS workspace to 

identify discrepancies. The comparison can be a useful tool 

to validate changes made to precinct and district boundaries 

in election management systems. See the EAC's Local 

Election Officials' Guide to Redistricting for additional 

information.2 

Selecting Polling and Drop Box Locations

GIS databases are a great tool to create efficiencies when 

managing voting locations. Election officials can use GIS data 

such as population demographics and public transportation 

routes to strategically locate voting locations and drop 

boxes in areas that are accessible to voters. Potential voting 

locations can also be pre-assessed by examining aerial photos 

of parking lots and accessible paths of travel before traveling 

to locations to confirm they meet accessibility requirements. 

Voting Location Look-up Tools

Helping people find their voting location is an essential part 

of election administration. Election officials can use GIS to 

create address-specific look-up tools like other familiar map 

applications. The look-up tool’s configuration can include 

2 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/LEO_Guide_to_Redistricting.pdf 
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location-finding features, such as displaying how far the 

voting location is from a current location and guidance on 

reaching the voting location on foot, by vehicle, or with 

public transportation.

Voting Location Management

Voting location management incorporates all facets 

of operating a business that provides a service to the 

general public. As in every business operation, success 

depends upon:

• Having the right location

• Easy and accessible entrance and exit to the building and 

parking area

• Signage that is easy to read and identifies the building as 

a voting location

• Plenty of nearby parking

• Friendly, courteous, and well-trained poll workers and 

support staff

• Easy to follow voter instructions

• Sufficient supplies (i.e., ballots, pens, envelopes, etc.)

• Line management techniques

• Easy access to information

• Appreciation for participating in the voting process

• Opportunities to provide feedback and recommendations 

to improve the process

Election Day voting location management is a unique 

business because locations are spread throughout the 

jurisdiction and are open for a 12 to 13-hour period. On all 

other days of the year, the buildings serve other purposes. 

Voters (customers) can choose to vote at any time during 

the 12–13 hour period.

However, there is typically a peak voter turnout period in the 

early morning and again in the early evening hours—before 

and after work in most jurisdictions.

Jurisdiction-wide vote center management incorporates all 

the techniques used to manage Election Day polling places 

and more. Locations where any voter in the jurisdiction can 

vote at any time require proper planning to ensure that 

voters do not encounter traffic congestion, lack of parking, 

and long wait times. Vote centers require an electronic 

connection with the voter registration database so voters’ 

check-ins are automatically updated in real-time, ensuring 

that no voter can vote twice in an election.

Voting Location Setup

The internal layout of the voting area is critical to the success 

of the voting location. It is important to consider several 

factors when developing the layout of each vote location:

• Number and size of rooms to be used

• Accessibility

• Electrical outlet availability and capacity

• Cellular phone connectivity

• Computer network capacity (for vote centers)

• Number of staging areas required for voter processing 

(e.g., areas for completion of forms, computer check-in, 

ballot distribution, voting area, and exit area)

• Security measures

• Voter privacy

Some elections offices provide interior layout diagrams 

for each voting location. The diagrams help poll workers 

set up the location as officials have planned. Election Day 

technicians or rovers can also verify that all voting locations 

are open to the public and set up according to elections 

office policies and procedures. Election officials can provide a 

checklist for each location and ask the rover to complete the 

checklist and return it to the elections office. The checklists 

become a part of the official election audit trail.

Election officials should take steps to protect 

all personal identifying voter information when 

creating a public GIS database. For example, the 

only fields necessary for voting location and drop box 

look-up tools are residential addresses and associated 

location information.
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Election officials should develop checklists for opening and 

closing the polls. Train poll workers to always work in teams 

of two (preferably bipartisan) to complete the opening 

and closing procedures and when managing the voting 

equipment and distributing ballots throughout Election 

Day. Poll workers need to understand the importance of 

each policy and procedure election officials need them to 

implement. During training sessions, election officials should 

explain why each procedure is in place. For example, if voters 

cannot return absentee ballots to the voting location on 

Election Day, be sure the poll workers understand that this is 

a state law and how they should advise voters to return their 

absentee ballots.

Programmatic Accommodations and Acoustics

In addition to the built environment's accessibility, 

programmatic accommodations can make the voting 

experience easier for voters with disabilities. Election officials 

can seek inexpensive, tangible solutions, such as providing 

chairs for individuals who have difficulty standing in a line 

at the voting location. Similarly, election officials can place 

a chair near the accessible voting system. Poll workers can 

post voting instructions in large print and other languages. 

Intangible accommodations might include assisting a voter at 

a voting station if requested.

Loud environments can increase the stress level for 

everyone, but it is especially stressful to voters who are 

hard of hearing. Individuals who depend on hearing an 

audible ballot may need the accessible voting system 

placed in a quiet area. Election officials can use inexpensive, 

portable assistive listening devices. These devices may help 

voters and poll workers with hearing loss understand speech 

in noisy situations.

Exterior and Interior Signage

All voting locations must be visible and easily identifiable 

from the street. The EAC has compiled types and examples 

for effective sign design at https://www.eac.gov/electionofficials/designing-polling-place-materials. Examples of 

exterior and interior signage include:

Image 21: EAC’s sample of exterior signage.

Image 22: EAC’s sample interior signage.

Flow charts can help poll workers when processing 

voters. Consider providing flow charts with 

information on how to process all types of voters 

poll workers may assist on Election Day.

Simple solutions can reduce echo and audio 

reflection, such as cloth table covers, framing and 

draperies, rugs on the floor, etc.
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Managing Parking and Traffic Control

Vote center locations are selected based on easy access 

and sufficient parking. Developing a contingency plan for 

managing peak voter turnout days and times is essential. 

For example, the days preceding a Presidential election are 

peak voting days at vote center locations. Management of 

voter traffic and parking and internal line management are all 

factors leading to a successful election.

A contingency plan for managing these peak turnout days 

would include:

• Additional staff or poll workers;

• Parking attendants; and

• Traffic control officers.

Image 23: Adequate interior signage and ballot box security 

are required.

GIS on Election Day

Some jurisdictions track the opening and closing of the 

polls through GIS on Election Day. For example, election 

officials can task each precinct lead poll worker with updating 

the elections office after the polling place has opened 

on Election Day. At the central elections office, election 

officials can use this information to track if polls are having 

difficulties allowing them to take remedial action to fix the 

problem as soon as possible.

Additionally, election officials can use GIS to track how long 

it takes to vote at each location and use the information 

for resource allocation decisions. Poll workers must collect 

data and upload the information into a centralized database. 

Election officials can share the data with voters in realtime on web apps accessible during voting hours or store 

and analyze the data after the election to inform resource 

allocation or site selections in future elections.

Preparation and Distribution of 

Supplies and Equipment

Equipment and supply delivery is handled in various ways, 

depending upon state law and local practices and procedures. 

Elections office staff, a delivery company, or poll workers 

may deliver voting supplies and equipment to Election Day 

voting locations Chapter 16 – Developing an Audit Trail 

provides more information on distributing and tracking 

voting supplies and equipment.

Polling place supplies include everything from the precinct 

registration list to pencils, pens, ballot boxes, portable 

booths, outdoor and indoor signage, and "I Voted" stickers. 

Election officials should equip every location with supplies to 

assist voters with disabilities, which commonly include: 

• Voting supplies – Election officials should provide pen and 

pencil attachments to make the writing utensils easier to 

grasp. Print all voting instructions in large type. Provide 

magnifying glasses for voters with visual impairments, 

and modify at least one voting booth for voters who use 

wheelchairs or prefer to sit while voting.

• Facility Modification Supplies – Election officials should 

provide temporary equipment and materials (e.g., 

threshold ramp, curb ramp, etc.) to make entrances 

accessible as needed.

• Signage – Election officials should provide “Accessible 

Parking” signs to voting locations to reserve parking 

for disabled voters, as needed. Poll workers should 

strategically place directional signs to indicate the 

location of these parking spaces for maximum visibility. 

Voting location setup instructions should direct poll 

workers to post “Accessible Entrance” signs to direct 

voters to an alternate entrance when the main entrance is 

not accessible.
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• Accessible parking – If needed, provide large orange 

cones to designate a van-accessible parking spot. Instruct 

poll workers to identify the closest parking to the voting 

location entrance on an accessible route of travel and 

block off the space to the right with cones to create 

an access aisle and place a sign in front of the parking, 

designating it as "Accessible Parking."

• Accessible path of travel – If needed, rubber mats should 

be provided to cover gratings along the path of travel that 

may be hazardous to voters with disabilities.

• Accessible entrances – If needed, doorstops should be 

provided to hold the doors open and mitigate potential 

barriers. Include instructions on temporarily resolving 

inaccessible door hardware such as round knobs or 

thumb latches.

Election officials may distribute some supplies to poll 

workers in the days leading up to Election Day. In contrast, 

other generic supplies are often delivered to the voting 

location with the voting equipment. Poll worker training 

should incorporate specific guidelines on confirming receipt 

of correct supplies and what to do if something is missing.

Methods used for packaging the supplies can impact the 

successful setup of a voting location. For example, some 

jurisdictions package the supplies based on the area to be 

set up:

• Supplies for the registration check-in table are 

packaged in one container

• Supplies for the provisional ballot table are 

packaged together

• Indoor and outdoor signage is packaged separately, etc.

Packing by area allows the poll workers to separate supplies 

and set up the location efficiently before polls open. Color 

coding helps poll workers quickly identify which supplies 

need to be delivered back to election headquarters on 

election night. Laminated reminders packaged within the 

supplies also serve as visual aids for poll workers. Officials 

should consider strategically placing these reminders in areas 

of critical importance.

Tracking Equipment

Many jurisdictions use vendors or other governmental 

agencies to deploy and retrieve voting equipment during 

early voting and on Election Day. Election officials typically 

use checklists to track outgoing and incoming voting 

equipment. However, even with checklists tracking 

voting equipment can be a daunting task. Some election 

officials use Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) or 

Bluetooth tracking technology instead of equipment 

checklists. Election officials who use RFID tracking install 

readers through which all equipment passes and embed 

a unique RFID chip in each piece of equipment. The 

RFID readers recognize the chip in the equipment and 

electronically record outgoing and incoming information. 

This technology makes it easier for election officials to know 

which polling places have not returned their materials and 

address the problem.

The security of the voting technology is of great concern, 

and election officials take significant steps to secure all 

equipment. When deployed, the Global Positioning System 

(GPS) technology allows election officials to track and 

maintain the chain of custody of the voting systems. GPS 

technology can also track drivers as they deliver equipment 

and supplies. Like RFID chips, GPS tracking information 

allows election officials to document the time at which 

voting equipment left the elections office, when it arrived 

at the voting location, and when it was returned. Drivers 

follow specific routes and, using GPS technology, any 

deviation from the predetermined path alerts the elections 

office. All chain of custody information can be recorded and 

maintained as part of the election audit trail. Strong chain of 

custody documentation can prove particularly important in 

the event of a contested election.
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Command Center Staffing, Training, and Support

In addition to hiring hundreds or thousands of poll workers 

to run Election Day voting locations, election officials must 

provide adequate support staff to troubleshoot issues that 

arise throughout Election Day and respond to voter calls. 

Elections offices become formal or informal command 

centers supporting voting locations. Support for Election 

Day activities begins in the early morning hours before 

polls open. It continues until polls close, poll workers shut 

down the voting locations, and they return election materials 

to the elections office. Rovers provide a link between 

the command center and voting locations—traveling 

between locations to deliver needed equipment or supplies 

and fix problems. 

Rovers and command center staff both require extensive 

training in their roles. Training must include troubleshooting 

common issues with voting equipment, facilities, and opening 

and closing procedures for rovers. Typically, rovers cover 

multiple voting locations in a geographical area. Election 

officials should prepare contact information for each rover, 

including phone numbers for the facilities and the lead poll 

worker at each location in their area. Command center staff 

require training on the phone system, any software used 

to track inquiries and dispatch rovers, and how to answer 

frequent poll worker and voter questions. Election officials 

can use software to categorize and track issues and their 

resolution, providing important data for post-election review.

The elections office may employ a dedicated phone line 

for poll workers and a separate line for the public. Election 

officials should review the capacity of the phone system 

before each election. Providing voter look-up tools on the 

elections office’s website may relieve the number of calls 

from voters. The website should address frequently asked 

questions and allow voters to check their registration status, 

find their voting location, and review their sample ballot.

Conclusion

Whether using precinct-based polling places or jurisdictionwide vote centers, selecting voting locations is critical 

to the election. Most election officials prefer to use the 

same locations from election to election. However, if it is 

necessary to change or add a new location, election officials 

have many resources to assess the desirability of any given 

facility. Providing a positive in-person voting experience goes 

beyond choosing ideal physical spaces. Additionally, election 

officials must ensure voting locations are adequately supplied 

and staffed with competent poll workers.
CHAPTER 15

Provisional Ballots

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 established 

the federal requirement for providing provisional ballots 

in federal elections.1 Provisional ballots are ballots cast by 

voters whose eligibility cannot be determined at the time of 

voting. Before HAVA, 17 states and the District of Columbia 

provided provisional ballots. After HAVA, 49 states, 

territories, and the District of Columbia allow voters to cast 

provisional ballots.2

Voters cast provisional ballots for a variety of reasons, and 

many states have created various additional applications 

for fail-safe ballots. For federal elections, however, HAVA 

outlines the two circumstances under which states must 

provide provisional ballots: (1) if the voter’s name does not 

appear on the list of eligible voters or an election official 

asserts the voter is not eligible and (2) if a judge extends 

polling place hours, all voters casting ballots during the 

extension must cast provisional ballots. Election officials 

must plan to facilitate provisional voting, including training 

poll workers, staff, and canvassing boards; allocating 

provisional ballots and supplies to polling places; and securing 

the ballots for the post-election canvass.

HAVA and State Requirements

First, states must make provisional ballots available to voters 

if “the name of the individual does not appear on the official 

list of eligible voters for the polling place or an election 

official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote...”3 As 

long as the voter signs an affirmation that they are registered 

in the jurisdiction and eligible to vote, they can cast a 

provisional ballot. 

Although HAVA requires that voters attest to their 

eligibility to vote within a jurisdiction, it is left to the states 

to outline the meaning of “jurisdiction.” In some states, a 

voter may cast a provisional ballot in any precinct in the 

state, regardless of the locality in which the individual 

is registered, and have that provisional ballot counted, 

assuming the voter meets all other eligibility requirements. 

These states authorize local election officials to count the 

votes on the portion of the ballot that the provisional voter 

would have been eligible to vote had they cast a ballot in 

their home precinct. In other states, a voter must cast the 

provisional ballot in the precinct in which they are eligible to 

vote for the provisional ballot to count.

Second, HAVA requires that provisional ballots be available 

when, during a federal election, a federal or state judge 

extends polling place hours.4 All voters who cast ballots 

during the extended hours must cast provisional ballots, 

and poll workers must keep them separate from provisional 

ballots cast during regular voting hours. This requirement 

allows a judge to determine, after Election Day, the validity 

of the order to extend polling place hours and allows election 

officials to easily identify the cast ballots as part of the order.

HAVA mandates that voters can check the status of their 

provisional ballot after it is cast. State or local election 

officials must establish a free access system through which 

a voter “will be able to ascertain...whether the vote was 

counted, and, if the vote was not counted, the reason that 

the vote was not counted,”5 if the provisional ballot was cast 

pursuant to HAVA. Federal law also requires that voters 

be provided written information regarding this free access 

system when they cast their provisional ballot, provided 

the provisional ballot was cast for one of the two federally 

mandated reasons.

States use provisional ballots in additional instances as 

provided by state law. The following examples illustrate some 

state-mandated reasons for using a provisional ballot:

• A voter’s name does not appear on the official list of 

eligible voters at the polling place on Election Day during 

a non-federal election

• A voter changes his or her name or moves within the 

jurisdiction and fails to update his or her registration 

before the election

1 See 52 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. 2 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) at p. 16 available at https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_

Final_508c.pdf. Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, and Puerto Rico do not offer provisional ballots. 3 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a).

4 52 U.S.C. § 21082(c). 5 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(5)(B).

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SOPs can further include guidelines for issuing and 

counting provisional ballots. Issuing provisional ballots can 

create confusion and delays, especially on Election Day. 

Election officials can develop clear guidelines and use them 

for training poll workers and office staff who will process 

provisional ballots after Election Day. The SOPs should 

include samples of the instructions that poll workers will use. 

Finally, include procedures for the post-election review 

and canvass of provisional ballots. Procedures for curing, 

reviewing, and counting provisional ballots vary significantly 

across states. SOPs should include the jurisdiction’s 

processes for researching the eligibility of every provisional 

ballot cast. Often this research is completed by teams 

(preferably bipartisan) of office staff who then make 

recommendations for counting or rejecting the ballots to a 

canvass board. 

Many states have developed statewide standards and rules 

for processing provisional ballots to ensure local election 

officials or canvass boards count provisional ballots in a 

uniform manner. Local election officials must incorporate 

state-issued guidelines into internal office policies and 

procedures for administering provisional ballots. An example 

of the Kansas Secretary of State's guidance to local election 

officials on determining whether to count provisional ballots 

is included at the end of the chapter.

Poll Worker Training

Election officials must train poll workers to identify 

provisional voters, provide the correct ballot style, assist 

with completing necessary forms or affidavits, and maintain 

the chain of custody of provisional ballots. In addition 

to providing step-by-step instructions on Election Day, 

election officials should review the process with poll workers 

during training. Training should cover:

• Posting required information on the right to vote a 

provisional ballot for federal contests6 and a polling place 

map at the entrance to all locations

• Another person challenges a voter’s qualifications, and 

the poll worker cannot resolve the challenge

• A voter does not have proper identification

• A voter was issued an absentee ballot, chooses to vote 

on Election Day instead, and does not have the ballot to 

surrender to poll workers

• A voter is not a resident of the precinct in which he or 

she is attempting to vote

• A voter has been convicted of a felony, and the 

jurisdiction has no record of the restoration of 

voting rights

• A same day registration voter

Additionally, some states allow unregistered voters to cast 

provisional ballots. The wide variation in uses for provisional 

ballots leads to wide variations in the number of provisional 

ballots issued, and ultimately counted, in each state during 

an election cycle.

Procedures and Training

Federal and state requirements inform the procedures 

election officials develop to guide supplying, issuing, 

tracking, and canvassing provisional ballots. The elections 

office’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) should 

address the handling of provisional ballots from plans to 

supply the ballots through retaining provisional ballots and 

envelopes after certification. Many states provide the form 

for provisional envelopes and affidavits and set requirements 

for the number of provisional ballots to send to Election 

Day polling places. Local election officials may have internal 

policies to round up the supplies and ballots sent out on 

Election Day. Additionally, election officials can use the 

information gathered to estimate ballot and supply quantities 

to determine staffing needs. Elections that tend to produce 

more provisional ballots will also require more poll workers 

and office staff to handle Election Day and post-election 

administration. SOPs should reflect the policies 

the elections office follows in allocating ballots, supplies, 

and staffing.

6 52 U.S.C. § 21082(b).

CHAPTER 15: PROVISIONAL BALLOTS
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

108

• Checking in provisional voters, identifying their precinct, 

and providing the correct ballot style

• Finding the correct polling place for voters who appear at 

the wrong location

• Completing voter registration forms or affidavits as 

required in the jurisdiction

• Providing information to the provisional voter on the 

jurisdiction’s free access system

• Tracking and securing voted and unused 

provisional ballots

In jurisdictions that use traditional precinct polling places, 

poll workers should be trained to determine whether the 

voter is in the correct polling place and, if not, to direct the 

voter to the correct location. Poll workers should make every 

effort to direct a voter to the correct polling place, especially 

in jurisdictions that count only those provisional ballots cast 

in the proper precinct. Election officials can require poll 

workers to post a map of all polling places in the jurisdiction 

at each polling place entrance. For jurisdictions that provide 

information in multiple languages, the map should be 

available in the alternative languages. In addition, election 

officials may require Election Day greeters to explain the 

map to voters as they enter the polling place. This proactive 

approach may help voters determine if they are in the 

correct polling place.

Election officials provide different methods for poll workers 

to find a voter’s correct polling place. In jurisdictions using 

electronic pollbooks, poll workers can often look up any 

address in the jurisdiction and find the correct precinct and 

polling place. Others may provide a laptop or countywide 

paper street indexes with the same information. Election 

officials should include training on how to look up polling 

places. If poll workers cannot identify the proper location, 

election officials should encourage poll workers to call 

the elections office or Election Day command center for 

additional assistance.

Voters can cast provisional votes on hand-marked paper 

ballots, ballot marking devices (BMD), or on direct 

recording electronic (DRE) voting machines as allowed 

by law. Election officials train poll workers on the process 

to cast a provisional ballot, as applicable. If the jurisdiction 

is using paper provisional ballots or BMDs, poll workers 

should instruct voters to seal their provisional ballots into 

the completed ballot envelopes. Voters cast the ballots by 

placing them into a secured ballot box. If the provisional 

ballots are being cast due to a court-ordered extension 

of polling place hours, train poll workers to keep these 

provisional ballots separate from the provisional ballots cast 

for other reasons.

Voters can also cast provisional ballots on DREs. In 

jurisdictions using DREs, election officials should train poll 

workers on how to operate the DRE for provisional balloting 

and record the provisional ballot number on the electronic 

voting machine screen. Poll workers can instruct provisional 

voters using electronic voting machines to complete all 

necessary paperwork and return it to the poll worker before 

casting their provisional ballots.

Poll workers need to understand the forms provisional 

voters must complete. Failure to complete a provisional 

affidavit may result in the rejection of the provisional ballot. 

At training, election officials should review the necessary 

forms and information the provisional voter must complete 

and provide poll workers samples of properly completed 

forms on Election Day. Encourage poll workers to look over 

provisional voters’ forms to ensure completeness. 

Throughout Election Day and after polls close, poll workers 

must secure all provisional ballots cast and account for their 

chain of custody. When training poll workers on provisional 

ballot procedures, election officials must emphasize the 

methods of securing and returning provisional ballots to 

the elections office. Training should include actual forms 

election officials expect poll workers to complete on Election 

Day, including forms reconciling the number of provisional 

Consider posting a jurisdiction-wide map of all 

polling places with a shaded portion indicating 

which voters are eligible to vote in the polling 

place. Include the tagline, “If you live in this area, 

you VOTE HERE.”
109

CHAPTER 15: PROVISIONAL BALLOTS

ballots cast with the provisional voters checked in. Some 

jurisdictions will use a separate provisional ballot envelope 

to separate from regular ballots and maintain custody of 

provisional ballots with a provisional ballot log.

Finally, election officials need to train poll workers on how 

to discuss provisional voting with voters. Most provisional 

ballots cast are counted in official results, but many voters 

believe voting provisionally means their ballots will not 

count. Election officials should educate poll workers on the 

provisional process, so they can respond to provisional voters’ 

concerns with accurate information. Poll workers can provide 

information on the post-election provisional canvassing 

process and how to check the status of provisional ballots 

using the free access system.

Early Voting and 

Election Day Administration

Providing a dedicated check-in station for provisional voters 

decreases wait times and ensures consistency and efficiency 

in administering provisional voting at every polling place. If 

early voting staff or Election Day poll workers cannot locate 

a voter’s registration or other conditions for provisional 

voting are met, they direct the voter to a separate check-in 

table where staff or poll workers facilitate the provisional 

voting process. Because provisional voters tend to take 

longer to check-in, a separate table allows the regular 

check-in line to flow normally for voters while ensuring that 

provisional voters are processed efficiently. 

Jurisdictions that typically offer hand-marked paper 

ballots for provisional voters should also prepare to use 

the accessible ballot marking device for provisional voting. 

Additionally, election officials need to consider the 

accessibility of provisional voting envelopes and affidavits. 

Write instructions in plain language and, if possible, provide 

large font and braille versions of any forms the voter needs 

to complete or review.

Tracking Provisional Ballots

Election officials need to know how many provisional ballots 

have been cast throughout an election cycle and provide 

for their secure storage. In jurisdictions that allow in-person 

early voters to cast provisional ballots, election officials must 

track the number of provisional ballots cast each day of early 

voting and secure them in a limited-access location for postelection review. Similarly, after the polls close on Election 

Day, poll workers must reconcile the number of provisional 

ballots cast and secure the ballots or memory devices for 

their return to the elections office.

The tabulation of provisional ballots will not occur on 

Election Day and, thus, will not show up in the unofficial 

results released to the public on election night. However, 

many states require elections offices to publicize the number 

of provisional ballots cast. This information is especially 

important in close races when the number of uncounted 

provisional ballots exceeds the margin of victory reflected in 

the unofficial results.

Election officials account for provisional ballots separately 

from regular ballots since their validity needs to be 

confirmed by verifying the voter’s eligibility before being 

counted. During early voting, staff should complete a 

transmittal sheet at the end of each day with the number 

of provisional ballots cast and provisional voters signed in. 

Poll workers should follow the same process at each 

polling place on Election Day. Detailed audit trails are 

critical. Election officials must ensure the documented 

chain of custody reflects that (1) poll workers returned all 

provisional ballots and (2) elections office staff stored them 

in a secure environment. 
110 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

Canvassing Provisional Ballots

After Election Day, election officials must review every 

provisional ballot cast to determine whether it will count in 

the official results. Election officials should be transparent 

with all aspects of provisional ballot verification and counting. 

Transparency includes proactive information sharing with 

the public about the administrative complaint procedures 

available to those voters who believe that election officials 

wrongly rejected their provisional ballots. Election officials 

should inform the public of the timelines for counting 

provisional ballots, including any period during which 

provisional voters can present additional identification to 

validate their ballots.

Election officials typically take the following steps in 

reviewing provisional ballots: (1) determine voter eligibility, 

(2) document reasons for rejections, and (3) aggregate 

eligible votes.7 In jurisdictions that use electronic voting 

machines for provisional voting and counting, the 

aggregation of valid provisional votes requires reviewing the 

report produced by the voting machine. In paper provisional 

ballot jurisdictions, election officials can count paper 

provisional ballots using the same policies and procedures for 

centrally counting paper ballots.

Elections office staff often conducts a preliminary review of 

each provisional ballot. The review includes determining the 

accuracy and completeness of necessary forms or affidavits 

and reviewing circumstances unique to each provisional 

ballot. For example, if a jurisdiction permits voters who 

moved within a county to vote provisionally, elections office 

staff may need to verify the voter did not cast a ballot in 

their prior precinct before counting the provisional ballot. 

Reviewing provisional ballots requires teams of elections 

office staff and is a time-consuming post-election process.

As noted above, many states’ laws or regulations outline how 

to determine whether to count a provisional ballot. Election 

officials or the provisional ballot canvass board should refer 

to state rules in examining each provisional ballot. With any 

additional information gathered by elections office staff, 

election officials or the canvass board can apply the rules to 

each provisional ballot and determine how many ballots are 

eligible to count.

Finally, election officials should perform a precinct-byprecinct accounting of the provisional ballots cast. The 

number of provisional ballots accepted for counting plus 

the number rejected must equal the number of provisional 

voters checked in in each precinct. Each provisional ballot 

envelope should include identifying information about the 

polling place and precinct in which it was cast. 

The official election results must include all eligible 

provisional ballots. Before the results are certified, election 

officials should ensure the number of provisional ballots 

tallied matches the number accepted for counting. After the 

election is certified, provisional ballots and related materials 

should be securely stored during the retention period.8

Communications and Statistics

For many voters, the idea of casting a provisional ballot is a 

negative. There is an assumption that provisional ballots do 

not count or only count if a race is close. However, this is 

untrue. Provisional ballots allow voters who are eligible, but 

for whatever reason unable to cast a regular ballot, to vote. 

After the 2020 presidential election, states reported that 

78.3% of provisional ballots cast counted in full or part.9 In 

addition to providing a free access system to allow voters to 

check their provisional ballots' status, election officials should 

educate voters on provisional voting in their jurisdictions. 

Election officials should share with voters the efforts to 

review and approve provisional ballots post-election and the 

acceptance rate of provisional ballots. 

After certification, election officials should publish statistics 

on provisional voting with the final election results. The 

number of provisional ballots counted and rejected is an 

important part of the story of the election. The statistics 

can also inform voter education topics. For example, if an 

7 Note – for provisional ballots cast during court-ordered extended voting hours, election officials must wait for the final disposition of court proceedings to determine 

whether the provisional ballots will count. 

8 Federal election materials must be retained for 22 months. 52 U.S.C. § 20701. State and local laws or regulations may address retention for non-federal elections. 9 EAVS at p. 17.

ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
elections office sees an influx of provisional ballots cast by 

voters in the wrong precinct, it may indicate voters were 

confused about where to vote. Election officials can then 

focus efforts toward educating voters on how to find their 

polling place.

Election officials should also review any issues with 

provisional voting administration. Review the completeness 

of the chain of custody and reconciliation documents. If 

election officials find any gaps, they can revise procedures or 

poll worker training as necessary.

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) also 

compiles provisional voting data in its biennial Election 

Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS).10 While 

provisional ballot usage varies widely across the country, 

election officials at the local, state, and federal levels can 

use the results of this survey to identify successes, potential 

improvements in election administration, and to learn from 

other states’ best practices.

Conclusion

Provisional ballots protect eligible voters' right to vote. 

Before every election where provisional ballots are offered, 

election officials must adequately prepare their staff and poll 

workers to administer provisional voting. Officials can also 

educate the public about the most common reasons voters 

must vote provisionally to reduce the number of provisional 

ballots cast. However, it is important to remember that 

every provisional ballot counted represents a voter who 

may have been turned away before the implementation of 

HAVA's provisional ballot requirements.

CHAPTER 15: PROVISIONAL BALLOTS

10 To read details about election data, see the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) on the EAC Web site at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/studiesand-reports.

111
A VOTER REGISTRATION

1

Voter registered in office before 

books closed and advance 

voted during the next few days 

before the CEO processed the 

registration application.

YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1122

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2311

If voter’s notice of disposition 

was not returned by mail before 

canvass day.

2

Voter registered at CEO office 

after books closed or at the polling 

place on election day and voted at 

the same time.

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2311 (a)(6)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2311 (c)

Law requires that a voter 

must register by the 21st day 

before election.

3

Registered voter had different 

name than on poll book due 

to marriage, divorce or legal 

proceeding and completed a new 

voter registration application.

YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-409

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2316c(a)

Name changes and address 

changes are the two major 

reasons for provisional ballots as 

outlined in federal law (NVRA). 

Such ballots count unless invalid 

for another reason.

4

Registered voter had different 

name than on poll book and did 

not complete a new voter 

registration application.

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-409

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2316c(a)

The law requires a provisional 

voter to complete a voter 

registration application in 

order to receive a provisional 

ballot. This process updates the 

voter’s registration information 

and eliminates the need for 

provisional ballots in future 

elections.

5

Voter was registered but voted 

in wrong precinct, but within 

the county, due to CEO error, 

board worker error, voter error, or 

insistence by voter.

YES 

(PARTIAL BALLOT)

Kan. Stat. Ann.

§ 25-3002(b)(3)

Law requires counting of 

partial provisional ballots—

count races and questions that 

are identical when comparing 

provisional ballot to correct 

ballot for voter’s precinct.

6 Voter was not registered. NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-215

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2302

Kansas laws require registration 

before voting.

7

Voter claimed to have registered 

at DMV, post office, state fair or 

NVRA registration outpost and 

CEO had no registration.

NO

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-215

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2302

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2421a

Unless CEO verifies DMV or 

CEO error.

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B VOTER MOVES

MOVES WITHIN COUNTY

1

Registered voter moved within 

county within 30 days of election. 

Voted at former precinct.

YES

KS Const. Art. 5

Sec. 1;

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3702

KS Constitution allows 

this so ballot not required 

to be provisional. Voter 

must complete Form FP1 

before voting.

2

Registered voter moved within 

county within 30 days of election. 

Voted at either new precinct or 

central location.

YES Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2353

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-409

Must complete new 

registration card before voting 

provisional ballot.

3

Registered voter moved 

anywhere in county and voted at 

new precinct.

YES Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2316c(b) Voter must complete a new 

voter registration application.

4

Registered voter moved within 

county at any time before election. 

Voted at either new precinct or 

central location.

YES Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2353

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-409

Must complete new 

registration card before voting 

provisional ballot. No time limit 

on date of move.

5

Registered voter moved within the 

county at any time and completed 

a new voter registration card.

YES Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2353 If voted at new precinct or 

central location.

6

Registered voter moved 

within county within 30 days 

before election. Voted ballot at 

wrong precinct.

YES

(PARTIAL BALLOT)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3702

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3002

(b)(3)

Entire ballot valid if voted at 

former precinct. Partial ballot 

valid if voted ballot at precinct 

where not registered.

7

Registered voter moved within 

county more than 30 days before 

election. Voted at former precinct.

YES

(PARTIAL BALLOT)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3702

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3002

(b)(3)

Partial ballot valid if voted 

ballot at precinct where not 

currently registered.

8

Registered voter moved within 

the county but refused to fill 

out a new voter registration card 

before voting.

YES

(PARTIAL BALLOT)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-409(a)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3002

(b)(3)

Law requires counting of partial 

provisional ballot—count races 

and questions that are identical 

when comparing provisional 

ballot to correct ballot for 

voter’s precinct.

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113
MOVES OUT OF COUNTY, WITHIN STATE

9

Registered voter moved anywhere 

in state within 30 days of election. 

Voted at former precinct.

YES Kan. Const. Art. 5 Sec. 1,

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3702

KS Constitution allows 

this, so ballot not required 

to be provisional. Voter 

must complete Form FP1 

before voting.

10

Registered voter moved out of 

county but within state within 30 

days before election. Voted in new 

precinct without re-registering.

NO

Kan. Const. Art. 5 Sec. 1,

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3702

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2316c(b)

Fail safe (provisional) voting 

only covers in-county moves. 

Former precinct voting only 

allows voting in precinct of 

former residence.

11

Registered voter moved out of 

county but within state more than 

30 days before election.

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3702 Not protected by law. Needed 

to re-register at new address.

C ADVANCE VOTING

1

Registered voter requested 

advance ballot, did not receive 

ballot and voted at polls.

YES Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2908c If CEO verifies that voter did 

not cast multiple ballots.

2 Registered voter voted in advance, 

then voted at the polling place. NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2416(b) Election crime.

3 Registered voter returned advance 

ballot in unsigned envelope.

NO, UNLESS 

VOTER CALLS Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1124(b)

CEO must attempt to contact 

voter to sign envelope. If voter 

signs envelope, count ballot. If 

voter does not sign envelope, do 

not count ballot.

4 Voter signed another 

voter’s envelope. NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1120

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1124

Law requires voter to sign 

statement on voter’s own 

envelope unless another 

person signs for voter at voter’s 

direction due to disability.

5

Two voters voted in advance. Ballot 

envelopes switched, signed by the 

wrong voter in same household. 

Both are eligible voters and 

signatures match.

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-110

Law requires voter to 

sign declaration on 

envelope containing the 

voter’s own ballot.

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6 Voter signed envelope but did not 

fill in address line. YES AG Op. 2012-26 Technical error that, by itself, does not invalidate ballot.

7

Voter submitted an advance 

voting ballot with ballot envelope 

not sealed.

YES

Technical irregularity 

unless CDO finds evidence 

of tampering.

8

Voter applied for an advance 

voting ballot after deadline 

for application.

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1122(f)

Kansas law set application 

deadlines to allow time for 

transmission of ballots and 

conclusion of advance voting 

before election.

9

Voter used power of attorney to 

obtain advance voting ballot and 

used attorney to vote.

NO AG letter to SOS, Sept. 16, 1997

Power of attorney has no effect 

in voting. Laws provide for 

assisted voting if affidavit of 

assistance is filed.

10

Voter casts advance ballot, then 

dies before election day. Election 

board makes ballot provisional 

pursuant to KSA 25-1136(c).

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1136(c)

AG Opinion 2002-15

“Persons who are deceased on 

election day are not qualified 

electors and do not enjoy a 

constitutional right to vote.”

D OTHER

1 Registered voter’s name was found 

by CEO elsewhere in poll book. YES Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2908(c) NVRA fail safe voting.

2 Voter needed assistance – should 

not have been challenged. YES Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2909 No voter error.

3 Voter voted provisional ballot, only 

one board worker signed envelope. YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3002(b)(1)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-702(b) 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-716(a)

Technical irregularity. No 

voter error.

4

In primary election, registered 

voter requested and received a 

different party’s ballot than the 

one registered for.

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3301(c)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3304(b)

If voter received ballot of 

party other than party of 

affiliation, ballot does not count. 

Unaffiliated voter may affiliate 

with a party and vote.

5

Registered voter dies after 

casting ballot and ballot was 

not provisional.

YES AG Opinion 2002-15

Non-provisional ballots are 

commingled with others are 

thus irretrievable and impossible 

to not count.

115
6 Registered voter returned a 

ballot after polls closed. NO

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-106

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1132 

(advanced)

Unless advance mail 

ballot returned 

postmarked on or before 

Election Day and received 

by the Friday after the 

election. Ballot then is 

eligible for counting.

7

Voter accidentally 

presses “Submit vote” 

on DRE before he/she is 

finished. Voter completes 

provisional ballot.

NO Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

2908(c)(5)

Voter cannot vote twice. 

If ballot cast on DRE 

cannot be retrieved, it has 

been cast and included 

with the other votes, 

regardless of how many 

races voter had completed.

E FEDERAL SERVICES VOTING

1

Federal services voter who 

was absent applied for ballot 

by noon the day before 

election day by completing a 

standard FPCA (Form 76).

YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1215

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1216(b)

May vote by fax or 

email. Not required to 

be registered.

2

Registered voter 

(nonmilitary) moved out 

of state but in the U.S. at 

any time before election 

(See Presidential Situations 

for exception.)

NO

Not protected by law. 

Voter should check with 

new state for laws.

3

U.S. citizen eligible to vote in 

the election district moved 

out of U.S. and applied by 

noon the day before election 

day by completing a standard 

FPCA (Form 76).

YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-2314

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1216(b)

May vote by fax or 

email. Not required to 

be registered.

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F PRESIDENTIAL SITUATIONS

1

New voter moved to KS 

within 45 days before 

election. Filed form PN by 

noon the day before election.

YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1801(b)(1)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1802(a)

New resident may 

vote only on U.S. 

president race.

2

Registered voter moved 

out of KS within 45 days 

before election. Filed form 

PF in county of former 

residence in KS by noon the 

day before election.

YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1801(b)(2)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1802(b)

Former resident may 

vote only on U.S. 

president race.

3

Registered voter moved 

anywhere within KS not 

more than 20 days before 

election. Filed Form PR in 

county of new residence by 

noon the day before election.

YES

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1801(b)(3)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

1802(c)

Relocated resident 

may vote only on U.S. 

president race.

G VOTER IDENTIFICATION

1

Voter in the county fails to 

provide valid identification, 

votes provisional ballot.

NO

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

2908(c)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

3002(b)(8)

The law requires voter to 

provide ID in order to have 

ballot counted. However, 

if voter provides valid 

identification to CEO 

after voting provisional 

ballot and before county 

canvass, ballot counts.

# SITUATION SHOULD BALLOT 

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117
CHAPTER 16

Documentation and Audit Trail

Ensuring elections are fair, accurate, transparent, 

and efficient requires documenting each step of the 

elections process. These steps include all pre-election, 

Election Day, and post-election activities; examples include, 

but are not limited to, candidate filings, voter registration 

rosters, voting system testing, poll worker training, etc. 

Documentation of these processes may prove the accuracy 

of an election in court and resolve questions regarding the 

integrity of the election.

Furthermore, developing an audit trail is an essential tool 

for election officials to evaluate the strengths and 

weaknesses of the processes utilized to conduct an election. 

Therefore, it is important to establish procedures for 

documenting and reviewing an election’s audit trail. This 

chapter focuses on developing documentation of elections 

processes at all stages of the election cycle. See Chapter 

17 – Post-Election Audits for more information on postelection tabulation audits.

In the business of election administration, there is no such 

thing as too much documentation. From written standard 

operating procedures to workflow diagrams and supply and 

equipment checklists, the documentation supporting an 

election's conduct can resolve questions regarding separation 

of duties, two-person integrity, and chain of custody. 

Election officials can review the audit trail to improve the 

election processes and inspire confidence in election results.

Types of Documentation

While elections offices generate documents to form an 

audit trail, they also receive forms, applications, and other 

filings from outside sources (e.g., Secretary of State’s 

office, county and municipal agencies, vendors, candidates, 

voters, etc.). Election officials must review all the paperwork 

received and determine its significance. Documentation and 

records (audit trails) can be categorized as follows:

• Nonessential/inactive records—are routine and 

discarded within a designated period or when no 

longer of administrative use. Examples include routine 

correspondence and memorandums, etc.

• Active records—those mandated by federal or state 

law to be retained for a specific period. Examples 

include signed contracts, voted ballots, candidate filing 

forms, etc.

• Archival records—are stored on a permanent basis. 

Examples include voting district maps, election 

results, etc.

Federal, state, and local records retention laws regulate 

each of the above categories. While state and local laws 

may vary across the country, all elections offices must 

retain federal election records for 22 months.1 Election 

officials should verify these retention requirements before 

developing retention policies and procedures. For more 

information on records retention, see Chapter 1 – Elections 

Office Administration.

EXAMPLE

Each voter record has its own unique audit trail. 

Election officials create a record when citizens 

register to vote for the first time. Think of each 

voter's record as a legal file folder containing 

their history—when they registered to vote, 

changed their address, or updated their party 

affiliation (if applicable); whether they voted and 

by what method in a given election; if they voted 

a provisional ballot, whether that ballot counted; 

whether they have run for office; whether they 

have served as a poll worker and if so, at which 

polling place and in what position. Each voter’s 

record contains all of this information and more. 

Therefore, the voter record audit trail is essential 

for determining a voter's eligibility and provides 

documentation for processing and qualifying 

provisional ballots.

1 52 U.S.C. § 20701.

118 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
119

• Poll worker assignment forms and oath of office

• Employee timesheets and payroll documentation

• Election Day opening and closing certifications

• Rosters used for voter check-in

• Tabulation logs

• All chain of custody documentation

• Election results reports and tapes from voting equipment

• Post-election reconciliation forms

• Post-election audit procedures and forms

Before the Election

The start of a new election cycle provides an opportunity to 

catalog the documents generated from beginning to end. 

Elections office staff can develop a master list of documents 

received, collected, and created during the election 

cycle. The list should include whether the documents are 

nonessential, active, or archival. If such a list already exists, 

continue evaluating its items and adding new documents 

as needed. Staff members completing the master list will 

better understand election management. The list will allow 

staff to quickly categorize and store the documents in future 

elections. Should the need arise, an elections office will be 

ready to provide the documents in response to a records 

request or legal action.

Election Management and Voting Systems

Most election management and voter registration software 

systems include internal audit logs automatically generated 

when a record is changed. To maintain a proper audit trail 

within electronic systems, assign unique log-in credentials to 

track who has updated records within the software. Database 

administrators should only grant system administrator access 

to the parts of a system users need to perform their roles 

effectively. Examples of questions that inform what level of 

access rights to grant users should include:

• What are the essential job duties of the user? 

• What user roles does an employee need to work within 

the system?

• Are there areas of the system where employee access 

should be restricted?

This documentation, i.e., records/audit trail, represents the 

records of the business of elections. Whether each record or 

document is of short-term, long-term, or archival value, it 

contains useful and sometimes essential information. Think 

of each document managed in an elections office as the 

office’s official documentation—it can contain legally binding 

decisions, ranging from contracts and purchase agreements 

to voted paper ballots. Election officials also must consider 

storage requirements for documents in retention. Storage 

space may be a factor in whether the documentation is 

stored electronically or on paper.

These records also provide historical data for the elections 

office—how many voters were registered ten years ago 

compared to today; what type of voting system was used 

then and now; what was the cost of managing elections then 

compared to now? Further, records in an elections office 

document one of a citizen’s most important rights—their 

right to vote.

Election officials also have a responsibility to comply with 

open records laws and regulations. Documents involved in 

election administration may be subject to state and local 

Open Records Request or Freedom of Information laws. 

Through the availability of information, the general public 

can understand the administration of elections and perhaps 

become more involved in the democratic process.

Examples of types of documentation maintained to 

document each election include, but are not limited to:

• Candidate filing forms

• Ballot proposal language and petitions

• District and precinct boundary maps

• Voter registration applications 

• Absentee ballot applications

• Publications and legal notices

• Equipment inventory and acceptance testing forms

• Ballots (in-person, absentee, provisional, spoiled, 

unused, etc.)

• Logic and accuracy testing documentation

• Equipment and supply checklists

• Poll worker training materials

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Election management and voting systems should also use 

multi-factor authentication to verify users’ identities. 

Chapter 6 – System Security provides more information on 

password management and voting system access.

Election Set-up

One of the first documented processes of an election is 

candidate and issue filing. The filing forms represent some 

of the first documents the elections office receives in the 

election cycle. The candidate filing forms for each race must 

meet state or local requirements to qualify for placement 

on the ballot. Therefore, each form becomes a part of the 

records for each election. 

The candidate filing forms and any questions certified for the 

ballot are the official documents used to set up the election 

and proof ballots. Make a listing of all documents that rely on 

the original candidate and question filing forms. This listing 

may include:

• Election set up/ballot generation software 

candidate report

• Legal candidate publications

• Candidate listing for public distribution

• All official correspondence with candidates

A minimum of two staff members (preferably bipartisan)—

who were not responsible for data entry—should proof 

each document against the original filing forms. The staff 

members should sign off on the proofing documentation. 

Once the staff has processed all filing forms and associated 

documentation and proofed the data entry, the next step is 

to verify the correct races, candidates, and issues appear on 

each ballot style. Again, staff should document this check 

once complete. Chapter 10 – Ballot Building provides more 

information on ballot building and proofing.

Election officials should maintain ballot proofing 

documentation with the election file. Additionally, for 

pre-printed paper ballots, staff should verify and document 

the number of each ballot style received from the printer 

along with any blank ballot stock. All of the ballot building, 

proofing, and quantity documentation becomes a part of 

the audit trail and is essential to account for the distribution 

of ballots. 

Pre-Election Logic and Accuracy Testing

Election officials or vendors may program voting tabulation 

software depending on the voting system used. No matter 

who programs the software, logic and accuracy (L&A) 

testing is performed before every election to confirm 

the accuracy of the election set-up and the tabulation 

equipment. All checklists and printouts relating to the 

L&A testing are key components of the election audit trail. 

Examples of L&A documentation include:

• Opening L&A reports (voting machine printouts 

showing no votes cast) from all voting equipment 

and optical scanners

• L&A marked ballot test decks and 

associated documentation

• Checklists generated for each piece of equipment tested

• Closing L&A tapes and printouts from all equipment and 

optical scanners

• Final L&A results report

All of the above documentation should be signed by at least 

two people (or as state law requires) and stored as part of the 

election documentation.

Absentee and Early Voting

Elections offices in jurisdictions with early voting must be 

ready to process voters before Election Day based on state 

law. In some instances, voters can vote either in person or 

by mail. In other jurisdictions, voters are only allowed to 

vote early based on special requirements or circumstances 

IMPORTANT

Ballot generation and voter registration software 

must be backed up and stored off-site at each point 

of the proofing and archiving of the pre-election audit 

trail. Each of these steps marks a "lockdown" point in 

preparing for an election.
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CHAPTER 16: DOCUMENTATION AND AUDIT TRAIL

(e.g., voters with disabilities or out of the jurisdiction on 

Election Day). No matter the form of early voting available, 

its documentation becomes another component of the audit 

trail for each election.

Early voting or absentee voting by mail usually begins with 

an application form completed by the voter. Upon receipt, 

staff should date stamp each form. Staff should follow the 

elections office’s procedures for verifying, documenting, 

and validating the voter’s right to receive a ballot. Typically, 

election officials utilize voter registration software or 

election management software to manage this process and 

track the issuing of absentee ballots to ensure voters only 

vote once. The application forms and voter registration 

software, in turn, become a part of the official audit trail for 

each election.

Election officials must plan how to track replacement ballots. 

When writing procedures for issuing replacement ballots, 

officials should consider:

• How does the voter registration software control issuance 

of replacement ballots?

• What to do if both the original and replacement ballots 

are returned—which is counted?

• How are user rights restricted for issuing 

absentee ballots? 

• If a user has a data entry error, how is the error corrected 

and tracked?

Typically, staff balances the number of applications 

processed with the number of ballots sent. Staff must know 

how many sent ballots are replacements as they could lead 

to more ballots being sent than applications processed. 

The daily logs and documentation of ballots issued become 

another key component of the election’s audit trail.

Applications Processed = Ballots Issued = Envelopes/Labels 

Printed = Envelopes Stuffed and Sealed = Total Envelopes 

Delivered to the Post Office Each Day.

Elections office staff should manage the returned ballot logs 

and documentation the same way as the outgoing ballot 

audit trail. Election officials track returned ballots in the 

voter registration or election management software. Once 

staff updates the voter's record with the returned ballot, 

that voter cannot vote again in that election. It is critical to 

understand user rights to the software and confirm the voter 

history data fields cannot be changed unless authorized. 

Election officials must document any need to correct a user's 

mistake in recording voter history.

All ballot envelopes returned must be stored in a secure, 

controlled environment with restricted access. Log sheets—

used to track batches of returned ballot envelopes—should 

be updated daily. This process assures that all ballots are 

accounted for and processed throughout the election.

The final audit trail for absentee and early voting should 

support and validate that:

• Total number of ballot envelopes returned = the total 

voters with voter history recorded

• Total ballot envelopes returned MINUS ballots 

challenged = ballot envelopes authorized to be opened

• Total ballot envelopes authorized to be opened = total 

ballots scanned for unofficial results

Two staff members (preferably bipartisan) should record, 

balance, and initial each step of the outgoing and incoming 

absentee/early voting process.

Polling Place Supplies and Equipment

Election Day voting requires election officials to prepare, 

distribute, and track supplies and equipment at numerous 

polling places or vote centers. Preparing for voting on 

Election Day at locations spread throughout a jurisdiction 

requires paperwork to support and verify that the proper 

supplies and equipment have been prepared and distributed 

to the correct location.

TIP

Retain an alphabetical list of all applications 

processed for each election.
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Election officials prepare and deliver supplies in various ways 

throughout the country. Before Election Day, elections 

office staff may deliver all supplies and equipment to polling 

places, or a supervisory poll worker may pick up all or part 

of their polling place’s supplies and equipment. Regardless 

of the distribution method, packaging the right supplies 

and equipment is critical. Elections office staff should pack 

each polling place supply kit according to a supply checklist. 

At least two staff members (preferably bipartisan) should 

verify the contents and sign off on the checklist. Senior 

staff should verify mission-critical supplies, such as paper 

ballots and voter registration lists. Each of these supply bag 

checklists becomes part of the election audit trail.

Similarly, the elections office should use an equipment 

checklist with serial numbers, protective count numbers, 

and tamper-evident seal numbers to deliver each piece. The 

checklist should be verified and signed by elections office 

staff who complete the information, delivery drivers, and poll 

workers on election morning. Additionally, if the equipment 

prints a report showing the number of votes tabulated, two 

poll workers (preferably bipartisan) should print and sign the 

report before voting begins. These documents build the audit 

trail for each polling place on Election Day.

Throughout Election Day, poll workers can confirm the 

number of voters checked in equals the number of ballots 

scanned or recorded on public counters on all voting 

equipment. When the polls close, poll workers complete 

closing verification forms. Documentation may include the 

protective and public counter numbers on touchscreen 

voting equipment and tamper-evident seals securing 

the equipment and memory devices. Two poll workers 

(preferably bipartisan) can generate and sign end-of-day 

result tapes from tabulators. The total number of ballots cast 

should balance with the number of total voters processed at 

each polling place. No less than two people should document 

all supplies and equipment upon handoff to delivery drivers 

and return to the elections office. 

Canvass and Post-Election 

Review of Supplies

Before certifying election results, election officials will 

aggregate vote totals and confirm the results include every 

valid ballot cast, including absentee, early voting, Election 

Day, provisional, challenged, and uniformed and overseas 

citizen. This process is referred to as the canvass. Election 

officials must document every step in this process. See 

Chapter 18 - Canvassing and Certifying an Election for 

more information on the canvass and certification process.

In addition to verifying vote totals, elections office staff 

should examine all supplies and documentation from each 

polling place. The purpose of conducting a post-election 

review of supplies is twofold:

• First, to ensure that all supplies have been accounted for 

and returned from each polling place.

• Second, to review the paperwork completed by the poll 

workers to verify they completed it correctly.

NOTE

A post-election audit can be accomplished in many 

different ways and is often required based on state 

law. Chapter 17 – Post-election Audits describes 

common procedures to audit election results. 

This Chapter will address the auditing of supplies, 

documents, and procedures..
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CHAPTER 16: DOCUMENTATION AND AUDIT TRAIL

Assign staff to work in teams of two (preferably bipartisan), 

with each team assigned a separate work area and table. Staff 

should use the checklist completed to prepare supply bags 

to account for each polling place's returned supplies. The 

teams should ensure poll workers returned all supplies and 

properly completed all paperwork. When the teams account 

for all forms and supplies, finalize the post-election review 

by organizing and filing all documents in the same order 

for each polling place. As the law requires, election officials 

should retain the forms with the election documentation.

Conclusion

A robust audit trail is essential to evidence-based elections. 

Election officials take numerous steps to ensure the 

accuracy of elections, and the audit trail is documentary 

proof that elections office staff and poll workers followed 

these steps. Whether in a court of law or public opinion, 

election officials can bolster confidence in the elections 

process by clearly outlining procedures and documenting 

adherence to them. The end of each election cycle presents 

the opportunity to review and evaluate the documentation 

for any gaps or other shortcomings.
CHAPTER 17

Post-Election Audits

Post-election audits ensure voting systems operated 

accurately, that election officials complied with regulations 

or internal procedures, and identify and resolve discrepancies 

to promote voter confidence in the election administration 

process. There is no national auditing standard, and methods 

can vary from procedural, traditional, risk-limiting, or any 

combination thereof. A post-election tabulation audit usually 

involves manually recounting a randomly selected portion of 

ballots, although some states allow for an automated process. 

A procedural audit determines if elections office staff and 

poll workers followed election procedures. State law or policy 

often sets post-election audits' time, manner, and place. 

Post-election audits are an essential component of the 

elections process. The ultimate goal of verifying the accuracy 

and integrity of elections is the same in all jurisdictions, 

regardless of the type of post-election audit utilized. This 

chapter will give a basic overview of items election officials 

need to consider when planning and conducting postelection audits. For more comprehensive information about 

election audits, see the EAC’s report Election Audits Across 

the United States.

1

Types of Post-Election Audits

Typically, state law creates the framework for post-election 

audits, including when they must occur and the method to 

use. Still, the state’s chief election official likely will create 

and administer rules for the audits. Generally, states require 

local election officials, state personnel, or independent 

auditors to conduct the audit. Election audits often require a 

bipartisan board or team to transport and count the ballots, 

and election officials must maintain strict chain of custody 

protocols at all times. For best practices on maintaining 

a secure chain of custody, see the EAC’s Best Practices: 

Chain of Custody.

2 

Traditional Post-Election Audits

Traditional audits look at a predetermined number of 

ballots, voting precincts, or devices and compare reported 

results from the voting system to the paper ballot records. 

States use various methods to determine the sample size 

for traditional audits. State law or the chief election official 

may set a percentage of ballots or precincts to audit. Local 

election officials then randomly select precincts, devices, or 

batches of ballots to audit. 

Once officials identify the specific ballots, elections office 

staff or an audit board tabulates the selected ballots, 

comparing the results to the reports issued by the voting 

system. If there is a discrepancy between the two, a state 

may require local officials to audit additional ballots. The 

audit is complete if there are minimal or no discrepancies, 

and election officials are satisfied that voting systems 

accurately tabulated ballots. 

Traditional post-election audits are usually conducted by 

hand tallying a sample of paper records and comparing the 

results to electronic reports produced by voting systems. 

However, hand counting can be expensive, time-consuming, 

error-prone, and labor-intensive. Some states allow 

the audit to be conducted electronically by rescanning 

ballots or reuploading memory devices to create efficiencies 

in the process. 

The contests included in traditional post-election audits 

vary widely. Most states require election officials to audit 

some statewide contests and at least one other type of 

contest, such as a local office or ballot measure. Other states 

require election officials to audit every contest on the ballots 

selected for the audit. 

Risk-Limiting Audits 

Recently, states have started instituting risk-limiting audits 

(RLA). A risk-limiting tabulation audit uses a statistically 

significant sample of ballots to determine that the reported 

outcome of the election is correct within a predetermined 

risk limit. There are two primary methods of conducting a 

risk-limiting audit: 

• Ballot Comparison – Ballot comparison audits review 

physical paper ballots and compares those ballots to the 

votes recorded by the vote tabulation system – known 

as the cast vote record. This method provides accuracy 

1 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-audits-across-united-states 2 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Chain_of_Custody_Best_Practices.pdf

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Training

Election officials should conduct training sessions for all 

audit staff. Training is often done in the short time available 

after Election Day and before the beginning of the audit. 

The training session should be comprehensive regarding audit 

policies and procedures and provide information about the 

rules for observers, media, and candidates. 

Election officials can start the training session by explaining 

the strict requirements for every step in the process, 

including the chain of custody of ballots and materials. If 

required by law, election officials should administer the 

oath of office and go over security procedures in detail. For 

example, items like cellphones and recording devices may 

be prohibited (by law in some jurisdictions) from the site to 

ensure the integrity of the process. Election officials should 

make training materials available before the audit and upon 

public request. 

Supplies and Templates

Election officials should ensure they have proper supplies 

and materials for post-election audits. Traditional audits will 

typically need adequate space, extra container seals, and 

tally sheets at a minimum. Risk limiting audits may need 

additional supplies such as ten-sided dice, sticky notes, and 

an overhead projector. Election officials may also need to 

set up partitions in the counting room to separate counting 

teams. 

Election officials can prepare templates long before the 

post-election audit. Because the timeframe to conduct 

audits can be relatively short, election officials can prepare 

press releases and legal notices ahead of time. In addition, 

officials can ensure that the various tally sheets—by batch, 

by precinct, by ballot type (absentee, early voting, Election 

Day, provisional)—are ready well before the audit is 

scheduled to begin. 

Finally, election officials should consider the security of 

materials throughout the audit process and have security 

staff on-site, if needed.

because the ballot is compared directly to how the voting 

system counted that particular ballot. However, this 

method requires voting equipment and procedures that 

can match ballots with their corresponding electronic cast 

vote record. 

• Ballot Polling – Ballot polling audits review a scientific 

sample of the ballots in each precinct and compare 

those "polled" ballots to the overall reported outcome 

of the election. The method cannot verify the system 

correctly tabulated an individual ballot. Like water quality 

testing, it provides a scientific approach to understanding 

the composition of the voted ballots in an election. 

Officials can compare the sample to the reported 

outcome of the election. 

Additional information about Risk Limiting Audits can 

be found on the EAC’s website: Risk-Limiting Audits – 

Practical Application.

3

Procedural Audits

Election officials conduct procedural audits (also known as 

performance, process, or compliance audits) to determine 

if elections office staff and poll workers followed election 

procedures. These audits include ensuring that staff and poll 

workers completed required documentation, vote tabulation 

equipment was tested, ballot materials were securely 

sealed, and the custody of critical election materials was 

documented. Some jurisdictions reconcile voter registration 

records and associated voting credit with the number of 

ballots cast as a part of their procedural audit.

Timelines

Elections offices should develop an elections calendar with 

all the important dates and deadlines for each election 

cycle. This comprehensive timeline should include postelection audit activities, certification dates, and when newly 

elected candidates get sworn into office. When considering 

the post-Election Day timeline, election officials should 

include enough time to conduct a post-election audit and 

certification of results before candidates take office. Most 

states have laws governing when post-election audits can 

begin and end. 

3 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Risk-Limiting_Audits_-_Practical_Application_Jerome_Lovato.pdf

CHAPTER 17: POST-ELECTION AUDITS
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Cost

The jurisdiction responsible for certifying the election results 

typically pays for the post-election audit and factors the cost 

into the overall election budget. Some costs election officials 

should consider when budgeting for post-election audits 

include:

• Full-time staff salaries and benefits and overtime hours

• Part-time staff salaries

• Location rental (if the jurisdiction does not have room in 

the elections office)

• Tables and chairs rental (if necessary) 

• Legal expenses

• Vendor support

• Risk-Limiting Audit software (if necessary)

• Security

• Additional security seals and other supplies 

Election officials should understand their jurisdiction’s 

policies and procedures regarding tracking costs for 

justification with the local budget department. 

Transparency

Transparency is key to building confidence in election 

outcomes. A lack of confidence in election outcomes creates 

significant tangible and intangible costs. Audits provide an 

opportunity for transparency and to increase confidence. 

Many states allow the public, third parties, or candidate 

representatives to observe the audit. On the first day of the 

audit, election officials should provide an overview of how the 

audit will be conducted and discuss the rules for observers. 

Election officials should explain the method of selecting 

ballots to be audited and the process for validating election 

results. The explanation should include what happens if 

the audit reveals discrepancies. Election officials may also 

distribute election results reports and other materials to 

allow observers to independently verify audit results. 

Election officials may require all elections office staff and 

temporary employees to sign in and wear nametags. After 

the audit teams sign in, staff can direct observers to the 

areas where they can observe the process. 

The elections office’s website should include a “Frequently 

Asked Questions” with answers to questions such as the 

following:

• Are audits mandatory? 

• How is the audit conducted (e.g., traditional, automated, 

procedural, risk-limiting, etc.)? 

• How is the sample of ballots selected to be audited?

• What are the chain of custody procedures for the audit?

• Can the public view the audit?

• What happens if there is a discrepancy between the 

original election results and the audit results?

Finalizing Post-Election Audits

Election officials should collect and organize all audit 

documentation—tally sheets, batch sheets, and ballots— 

including detailed documentation of each decision made and 

action taken during the audit process. After elections results 

are certified, election officials should repackage and seal the 

audit documentation for archival storage. Officials can then 

itemize these documents by type and location in preparation 

for future requests for public records or potential lawsuits. 

Under federal law, election officials must retain all federal 

election materials for 22 months.4

After the audit, elections office staff should prepare a 

summary report analyzing the process. The summary 

report can serve as a guide for improving the policies and 

procedures during future audits and should include the final 

outcomes and any discrepancies discovered during the audit. 

Election officials can distribute the report to the media and 

make it available on the elections office's website.

Conclusion

Election officials take several steps to ensure voting 

equipment accurately counts votes on Election Day. 

Post-election audits are an essential process to verify the 

accuracy of the election results and promote confidence in 

an election’s outcome. Additionally, election officials can 

use procedural audits to evaluate performance, demonstrate 

chain of custody procedures, and mitigate any identified 

weaknesses in procedures. If law permits, opening the audit 

process to the public and publicizing results can foster a 

4 better understanding of the elections process. 52 U.S.C. § 20701.
CHAPTER 18

Canvassing and Certifying an Election

Many voters believe the election results they see on 

television on election night are the final results. In fact, the 

election outcome is not official until the completion of the 

canvass1 of votes and certification of results, which may not 

be available until several weeks after Election Day.

The purpose of the canvass is to account for every ballot 

cast and ensure that the official results include each valid 

vote. For election officials, the canvass means aggregating 

or confirming every valid ballot cast and counted—absentee, 

early voting, Election Day, provisional, challenged, and 

uniformed and overseas citizen. The canvass enables election 

officials to resolve discrepancies, correct errors, and take 

any remedial actions necessary to ensure completeness and 

accuracy before certifying the election.

Laws and regulations for conducting the canvass vary 

by state and, at times, by local jurisdiction. These laws 

and regulations cover all aspects of the canvass, including 

the following:

• Who is responsible for the canvass

• Who may participate in the canvass 

• When the canvass can start

• When the canvass must be completed 

• What information must be contained in the canvass

• Which portions of the canvass process are open to 

the public

Election officials create internal elections office 

procedures for conducting a successful canvass of votes 

and an accurate certification of results. The EAC’s Election 

Results, Canvass, and Certification resource includes best 

practices, practical guidance, and a video summary on 

displaying unofficial election results and the canvass and 

certification processes.2

Policies and Procedures

Election officials plan for the canvass of votes and 

certification of results from the very beginning of the 

election cycle. State law or regulation often dictates when 

the canvass must begin and end. Election officials should 

include canvass deadlines on the election calendar,3 which 

consists of all start and end dates for various tasks for the 

election cycle. Then, election officials can assign the tasks 

outlined on the calendar to appropriate staff members—

working ahead lightens election officials’ load during the busy 

election period.

Because all aspects of election administration affect the 

accurate counting of ballots, election officials should ensure 

all necessary policies and procedures for canvassing and 

certifying an election are in place and documented in the 

office’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) before voting 

begins.4 The first step in developing canvass procedures is 

to review state and local laws related to canvassing votes 

and certifying results. Along with relevant regulations 

or guidance, these laws provide the legal and procedural 

framework for conducting the canvass. Generally, the 

procedures should include:

• Description of the canvass board and any sub-canvass 

boards, including rules regarding how members are 

selected, actions they can and must take, and procedures 

they must follow

• Voter intent guidelines

• Write-in vote guidelines

• Ballot duplication procedures

• Procedures for resolving exceptions and issues

Election officials can use the procedures to train staff and 

any canvass board members, as well as educate observers and 

the public on the canvass process.

1 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-audits-across-united-states 2 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Chain_of_Custody_Best_Practices.pdf 3 https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Risk-Limiting_Audits_-_Practical_Application_Jerome_Lovato.pdf 4 See Chapter 1 and Quick Start Guide: Standard Operating Procedures for more information on developing SOPs.

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As soon as election officials define the canvass board and 

any ballot-specific boards, they can recruit members to fill 

the positions. The composition of the boards and the rules 

for participating on the boards vary by jurisdiction. If new 

legislation or regulations affect canvass board composition or 

procedures, communicate the changes to stakeholders and 

the public. If state law permits, election officials can assign a 

member from the elections office staff to each canvass board 

to work as a liaison.

Observers

In many cases, observers with a stake in the election 

outcome want to be present for the canvass of votes. 

Election officials should provide written rules of conduct 

for observers. The rules should clearly identify the observer’s 

rights as prescribed by state and local laws and regulations. 

Even if staff briefs observers before the canvass, election 

officials should still make the rules of conduct visible 

and available at entrance points to the observation 

room. Election officials may also post the rules on the 

jurisdiction’s website.

Observer rules of conduct typically specify where 

observers are allowed to be during the canvass. In some 

states, observers must stay within predetermined “observer 

sites.” Some jurisdictions physically separate the observers 

from the canvass board and elections staff by having the 

observers a certain distance away but still in the canvass 

room. Still, other jurisdictions use webcams to livestream the 

canvass of votes.

The rules of conduct also outline how an observer can 

interact with the canvass boards. In some states, the public 

cannot talk to the canvass board members while they are 

working and must direct all inquiries to the individual in 

charge—sometimes called the election superintendent. 

Other jurisdictions provide observers with a form to use if 

they want to challenge or discuss an issue they witnessed 

during the canvass of votes. This form helps election officials 

manage the canvass of votes and provides documentation of 

the issue raised.

Types of Canvass Boards

A canvass board will likely conduct the canvass of votes after 

an election, but election officials may have some discretion 

to convene ballot-specific sub-canvass boards. Each 

jurisdiction’s laws dictate who can serve on a canvass board—

often, the boards must be bipartisan. Additional sub-canvass 

boards may include:

• Write-in ballot board

• Provisional and challenged ballot board

• Ballot duplication board

• Exceptions and issues board

The sub-canvass boards review all ballots falling into their 

respective categories and make recommendations or 

decisions on ballots as permitted by law. The overall canvass 

board often reviews the various ballot-specific boards’ 

recommendations or decisions and approves the final 

certification of the results.

In almost every election, canvass boards must resolve 

exceptions and issues that arise during voting. An 

“exceptions and issues board” can be used to examine and 

answer questions about these ballots. The board should 

review any ballots falling into the categories described below 

following the pre-defined procedures:

• Exceptions include signature mismatches on absentee 

ballot envelopes or poll books, damaged ballots, overvoted 

ballots, and voter intent issues. With each exception, the 

board should physically review the ballot and decide how 

the ballot should be processed.

• Issues include ballots counted incorrectly, counted in 

error, or not counted at all. Examples may be ballots cast 

in the wrong precinct, missing ballots, misplaced ballots 

or other materials, items left at the polling place, memory 

cards not reading correctly, and other discrepancies. 
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CHAPTER 18: CANVASSING AND CERTIFYING AN ELECTION

In some jurisdictions, election officials have the right to 

eject from the canvass room any disruptive observers. 

Election officials can craft a detailed security protocol, 

including hiring of security guards, if necessary, to ensure 

that observers do not interfere with the canvass process. A 

sample ‘Election Observers Rules of Conduct’ is provided at 

the end of the chapter.

Preparing for the Canvass of Votes

Setting up the room where the canvass will take place 

is an essential task for election officials. The room must 

accommodate the canvass board, any sub-canvass boards, 

and observers. Arrange the room so that the observer sites 

are situated close enough to the processing areas to see the 

canvassing activities but not so close that the observers can 

touch or interfere with the election materials or the canvass 

board members. Ensure the canvass location is accessible 

and the layout of any tables or equipment is in line with 

accessibility standards.

To complete its tasks, the canvass board will need various 

materials from the elections office. The materials required 

may include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Rosters, signature cards, etc., from all precincts, vote 

centers, and early voting locations

• Electronic media and printouts (paper rolls) from all 

voting equipment used in the election

• Early voting ballots

• Absentee ballots

• Provisional ballots 

• Challenged ballots

• Overseas and military ballots

• Spoiled ballots

• Results of any post-election audits, if applicable

Remember to ensure the chain of custody for all materials 

involved in the canvass. Train ballot boards and staff on the 

canvass procedures and include information on how the 

chain of custody will be verified and preserved.

In some jurisdictions, the law may require election officials 

to provide public notice of the dates for canvass activities. 

Additionally, election officials can provide notice of the 

canvass to key stakeholders, including the local media, 

political parties, civic organizations, and advocacy 

groups. If possible, election officials can livestream the 

canvass to increase transparency and allow the public 

to view the process. 

Conducting the Canvass of Votes

At the start of the canvass, election officials should provide 

a brief overview of the process. Introduce the canvass board 

or boards, elections office staff, and registered observers, 

and remind the public about the observer rules of conduct. 

Assign staff members from the elections office staff to assist 

each canvass board and liaise with any observers.

Election officials should have all observers and canvass 

board members sign into the canvassing room. The sign-in 

form documents their presence at the canvass of votes, 

which state or local law may require. Because documenting 

the process at all stages is essential to the canvass process, 

election officials may assign an elections office staff member 

to record every action that the canvass board takes, 

including any votes by board members.

Canvassing means different things in different jurisdictions. 

In some states, the activities outlined in the following 

paragraphs will occur as part of the canvass of votes. In 

other jurisdictions, the tasks are completed before the 

official start of the canvass. And still, in other jurisdictions, 

the tasks are not completed as individual steps and are 

accomplished in some other manner or order. The Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC) does not endorse one 

method over another. The following paragraphs present 

election officials with potential ways of accounting for votes 

following an election. As always, election officials should be 

sure to review state and local laws and regulations before 

adopting any practice.
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Inspecting Returns—In some jurisdictions, the accounting 

of votes begins with an inspection of the returns from voting 

sites—early voting sites, polling places, vote centers, or any 

combination thereof. The election official or canvass board 

compares the number of ballots tallied with the number of 

voters who cast ballots at one of the locations mentioned 

above. If the election official or the board finds discrepancies 

in the number of ballots cast and the number of voters 

who officially signed in, state and local law dictates how to 

remedy the problem, sometimes through an “exceptions and 

issues” sub-canvass board.

Many jurisdictions have a procedure by which the chief 

poll worker in a polling place can record any problems on 

Election Day. This documentation might include signature 

mismatches, overvotes, damaged ballots, and other errors. 

The canvass board usually resolves these discrepancies and 

others not enumerated here by the end of the canvass.

Duplicating Ballots—Duplication is necessary if a paper 

ballot is damaged, so it cannot be counted in the usual 

manner via an electronic ballot counter. For example, the 

canvass board or a dedicated ballot duplication sub-canvass 

board might review all ballots that must be duplicated before 

processing. For duplicated ballots, both the “original” and the 

“duplicate” must be marked with the same unique identifier 

so election officials can verify the duplicated ballot if a 

recount becomes necessary.

Reviewing Rejected Ballots—The canvass board may review 

rejected ballots. It is a best practice to have at least two 

board members (preferably bipartisan) assigned to examine 

each rejected ballot and confirm the rejection.

Reconciling Ballots Cast Outside the Polling Place—By 

the end of the canvass of votes, the canvass board will have 

reconciled all ballots cast outside the polling place and 

precinct. These ballots include regular absentee ballots and 

ballots issued under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen 

Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). When allowed by state 

law, election officials notify voters when their absentee 

ballots require curing throughout the election cycle. Election 

officials often make extra effort to notify voters when their 

ballots are rejected, although the actual accounting of the 

ballots will not change during the canvass. The canvass board 

may also account for any Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots5

received and document whether it counts the FWAB or the 

original ballot.

Processing Provisional and Challenged Ballots—The canvass 

board processes the provisional and challenged ballots in 

some jurisdictions. The number of accepted and rejected 

provisional ballots, when added up, should be equal to the 

total number of provisional ballots cast. The number of 

accepted and rejected challenged ballots, when totaled, 

must be equal to the total number of challenged ballots cast. 

If these counts do not balance, the chief poll workers from 

the various polling places often provide a report explaining 

the discrepancies.

The Help America Vote Act requires election officials to 

(1) establish a free access system through which provisional 

voters can check the status of their ballots and (2) notify 

voters about the existence of such a system at the time they 

cast a provisional ballot.6

If required under state or local law, election officials 

may need to send a written notification to voters whose 

provisional or challenged ballots are rejected and provide 

the reason for the rejection. If the canvass board rejects 

a provisional ballot because the voter was not registered, 

election officials should send the voter a registration form 

with the written notification. Similarly, a registration form 

could be made available through the federally mandated 

free access system. In some jurisdictions, the provisional 

ballot affidavit also serves as a registration form for future 

elections, eliminating the need to mail any forms to the 

voter after the election.

Documenting the Canvass

Thoroughly documenting the canvass allows election officials 

to explain any exceptions and issues that occurred during 

the election and any remedial action taken to correct 

the problems. The final report of the canvass board often 

consists of at least three parts: returns, informational 

statistics, and a narrative.

Returns—Returns are the tally of all valid ballots cast 

in the election. The canvass board presents the results 

from the election management system (EMS) with no 

explanation or analysis. The EMS typically provides (1) 

a summary results report showing each contest and the 

number of votes for each candidate or issue and (2) a 

precinct-level report showing the vote totals for each 

contest and issue by precinct.

5 A FWAB is a backup ballot that can be cast by UOCAVA voters who make a timely request for, but do not receive, a UOCAVA absentee ballot. 6 52 U.S.C. § 21082.
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CHAPTER 18: CANVASSING AND CERTIFYING AN ELECTION

Informational Statistics—The informational statistics are the 

election data: the number of ballots cast by category (e.g., 

in-person, absentee, provisional, challenged), the number of 

ballots counted, the number of ballots rejected, the number 

of absentee ballots sent out, the number of absentee ballots 

returned, and the number of absentee ballots counted. With 

this data, election officials provide an election overview and 

information about the administration of a specific election 

to the media and the public. Local election officials may 

also report this data to the EAC through the Election 

Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). EAVS data going 

back to 2012, including county-level statistics, can be found 

on the EAC’s website.7

Narrative—The narrative details the issues encountered 

during the canvass process. The canvass board or election 

official adds context to the raw data and describes any 

procedural audits performed in the narrative. It might also 

include a discussion and rationale of any corrective actions 

taken to remedy issues during the canvass. In general, the 

narrative tells the story of the election to instill confidence 

in the accuracy of the election results.

Certifying the Results of an Election

The canvass board may be responsible for releasing the 

certification of election results after reconciling the 

results from precincts, early voting sites, absentee voting, 

provisional and challenged ballots, and uniformed and 

overseas citizen ballots. In some jurisdictions, the report 

that the canvass board releases is the official certification 

of the election.

The certification of results often includes information about 

the following:

• Reconciled precinct totals, including provisional and 

challenged ballots

• Reconciled vote center totals, including provisional and 

challenged ballots

• Reconciled write-in totals, including provisional and 

challenged ballots

• Reconciled UOCAVA ballot totals

• All duplicated ballots

• All replacement ballots issued at the polling place after a 

ballot was spoiled

• All rejected ballots

• Documentation of the canvass board’s activities

The certification of results might occur during the final 

meeting of the canvass board or separately, as specified 

in state and local law. Just as election officials do with 

other parts of the canvassing and certification processes, 

they should reach out to the public and key stakeholders, 

especially the media, encouraging them to attend the 

certification meeting. At the meeting, election officials 

can publicly review all the documentation from the 

canvassing process, including the certified returns, 

statistics, and narrative.

In some jurisdictions, the certification meeting is an 

open meeting with specific requirements for public notice 

and recording minutes. Even if not required, election 

officials should prepare detailed minutes of the certification 

meeting, to include a record of the meeting in a 

documentation package.

If required by state or local law, election officials may need 

to provide their state’s chief election official, each candidate, 

and each political subdivision with an issue on the ballot 

with a notice of the certification of the election. Post all 

documentation of the canvass and certification of results to 

the jurisdiction’s website for public review.

Conclusion

The canvass and certification processes are essential to 

the integrity of every election. Election officials can share 

their procedures and invite the public to view the canvass 

process to promote trust in the election results. The EAC’s 

Communicating Election and Post-Election Processes

Toolkit is available for all election officials to customize and 

use to explain their post-election procedures.8 Additionally, 

election officials can use the data and documentation 

compiled during the canvass to tell the story of their 

elections. Laws and regulations vary across the country, but 

all election officials should have the canvass in mind from the 

outset of the election cycle.

7 https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys 8 https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/communicating-election-and-post-election-processes-toolkit
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9 Jurisdictions should review State and local laws and regulations when creating their own election observers’ rules for conduct and behavior.

OFFICIAL CANVASS

ELECTION OBSERVER RULES OF CONDUCT (SAMPLE9)

Observers have the right to view all canvass operations.

1. All observers must report and sign in daily at the check-in desk.

2. Observers will be issued a badge, which must be worn at all times. The observer’s 

name and who they are representing (candidate/organization/campaign) will be written 

on the badge.

3. A staff member will escort observers to the viewing area. Observers are not permitted to 

enter any area except the viewing area.

4. When leaving for the day, observers must return the badge to the check-in desk.

5. Observers are not allowed smoking, food, or beverages in the viewing area. Observers are 

not permitted in the canvass work areas, except when permitted and escorted by staff.

6. Observers must set cell phones to vibrate or “all sound off” mode while observing the 

canvass. They must make all telephone calls outside the canvassing room.

7. The observer’s function is to observe procedures. Observers cannot assist in operations. 

They cannot touch or handle any ballots or other election-related materials.

8. Observers will address all questions concerning a procedure to the staff supervisor and 

may not direct questions to the canvass board members conducting the canvass.

9. No more than one (1) observer per candidate/organization/campaign is allowed to observe 

the canvass board work. 

10.Observers must avoid physical contact with canvass board members.

11. Observers will hold discussions and conversations outside the designated viewing area.

12.Observers will be allowed into the viewing area only when canvass board members are 

performing canvass operations. Observers and canvass board members must leave the 

work and viewing areas during breaks and lunch periods so that the areas remain secure.

13.Operations will continue as scheduled whether an observer is present.

14.BALLOT SECURITY IS A PRIMARY CONCERN. Violation of security by an observer 

will result in expulsion from the canvass location.
CHAPTER 19

Recounts 

Especially in local contests, it is common for a handful of 

votes to determine the outcome of the election. In close 

elections, a recount is an additional count of the votes cast 

to ensure that ballots cast were counted accurately and that 

the correct candidates or ballot issues won. Depending on 

local laws and procedures, this process may be conducted 

using ballot tabulation equipment or by hand.

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires that 

voting systems “produce a permanent paper record with 

a manual audit capacity ... [which] shall be available as an 

official record for any recount conducted with respect 

to any election.”1

 Additionally, each state has specific 

laws for conducting recounts, including when they occur, 

methodology, and scope.

Recounts are generally initiated automatically or by 

an individual, such as a candidate in the contest to be 

recounted. Some states require an automatic recount 

when the margin of victory between candidates falls within 

a predetermined percentage, such as 0.5 or 1 percent. 

As allowed by state law, voters or groups of individuals 

with standing may also initiate a recount. These recounts 

usually require the initiator to pay the recount cost 

whereas the state or locality typically covers the cost 

of an automatic recount.

Election officials should implement these voluntary practices 

only after reviewing state and local laws and regulations.

Policies and Procedures

As with every aspect of election administration, election 

officials begin planning for possible recounts long before 

Election Day. The policies and procedures for conducting 

recounts and election contests are tied closely to the specific 

ballot media and design. As jurisdictions can use handmarked paper ballots, ballot marking devices, or DRE voting 

machines created by different companies, it can be difficult 

to determine one standard best practice for all recounts 

and election contests across the country. Election officials 

develop and maintain comprehensive internal policies and 

procedures consistent with state laws, so no confusion arises 

about completing tasks after an election. 

Election officials consider timelines, staff, training, supplies 

and templates, locations, and cost when planning ahead.

Timelines

Although no federal requirements exist for recounts, 

election officials need to be aware of statutory deadlines 

for candidates taking office. For example, in Presidential 

elections, Congress created the safe-harbor deadline for 

resolving all election disputes over Presidential votes before 

the meeting of the Electoral College. If a state has not 

certified election results and concluded all recounts by that 

point, they risk having Electoral College votes decided by 

Congress.

For non-Presidential contests, state statutes impose 

timeframes on local election officials to certify results and 

conduct recounts. Any internal office timelines must fit into 

the statutory window.

Election officials plan for potential recounts from the 

beginning of the election cycle. State law or regulation often 

dictates when the recount must begin and end. Election 

officials should include recount deadlines on the election 

calendar,2 which consists of all start and end dates for 

various tasks for the election cycle. When considering the 

post-Election Day timeline, election officials should include 

enough time to conduct a recount after the certification 

of results and before candidates are sworn into office. 

If a recount is initiated, election officials can assign the 

tasks already outlined on the calendar to appropriate staff 

members—working ahead lightens election officials’ load.

TIP

Develop internal office timelines as a checklist. 

Update the checklist after every election and 

adjust as needed to refine the process.

1 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(2)(B). 2 See Chapter [x] Elections Office Administration and Quick Start Guide: Elections Calendar for more information on creating an Elections Calendar.

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• Tally Boards, which usually are bipartisan, to conduct the 

actual counting.

• Team Leaders to monitor the recount boards. 

• Runners to bring ballots to the recount boards.

• Data Entry Personnel to collect the tally sheets from the 

recount boards and input data for final totals. 

• Observer Coordinator to oversee members of the public 

who view the recount process.

• Security Personnel to maintain the orderly conduct of 

recount activities.

The number of individuals needed for conducting a recount 

depends on a few factors, including the number of ballots, 

the type of voting system, the timeframe, the recount 

method, and the budget. If election officials hire temporary 

election workers to assist, they might consider recruiting 

stand-by staff in the event of cancellations during the 

recount process.

Training

A recount procedure is not always a normal part of the 

pre-election training process. Thus, election officials will 

likely need to conduct a special training session for all 

recount board staff. Training must take place in the short 

time available after election results are certified and before 

the beginning of the recount. The training sessions should 

be comprehensive regarding the policies and procedures for 

conducting the recount and provide information about the 

rules for observers, media, and candidates.

Election officials can start the training session by explaining 

the strict requirements for every step in the process, 

including the chain of custody of ballots and materials. 

Election officials should administer the oath of office 

that each person must take, if required by law, and review 

security procedures in detail. For example, taking photos or 

video may be prohibited (by law in some jurisdictions) from 

a recount site to ensure the integrity of the process. All 

training materials should be made available in advance of the 

recount and be available to the public upon request. 

Staff

The recount method affects the type and number of staff 

election officials need to recruit and train to conduct 

a recount. Recounts of paper ballots, for example, can 

sometimes be conducted by retabulating ballots through 

electronic scanners. However, more staff will be necessary 

if the jurisdiction conducts a hand recount. Adjudication, 

or determining voter intent, requires additional training to 

ensure uniformity of decisions when manually tallying votes 

during the recount.

Elections office staff usually manage the recount process, 

often with the help of a recount board or temporary election 

workers. Usually, the first step is to determine the roles, 

responsibilities, and availability of elections office staff who 

will help with the recount process. It is important to have 

contact information for information technology support, 

legal counsel, and vendor support to assist if needed. In 

addition, because the security of the ballots is essential, 

election officials must follow strict physical and cybersecurity protocols.

Some jurisdictions require recounts to be conducted only 

with full-time elections office staff. Other states require 

bipartisan recount boards or allow temporary election 

workers to participate in the process. Whether using staff or 

temporary workers, bipartisan teams are preferable. Policy 

and procedure manuals should include a staffing plan with 

detailed job descriptions. Although jurisdictions may use 

different terminology, election officials may need to fill jobs 

equivalent to many of the ones in the following list:

• Facilities Coordinator to supervise the recount area. 

• Ballot Sorting Coordinator to distribute all ballots or 

electronic memory cards with votes to be recounted.

• Poll Ballot Sorting Teams to bundle and prepare all the 

ballots cast on paper or electronically at polling places, 

including provisional ballots, for recounting.

• Absentee Ballot and Early Voting Sorting Teams to 

bundle and prepare all absentee ballots cast in person on 

paper or electronically and by mail.
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CHAPTER 19: RECOUNTS 

Election officials should also ensure that recount staff knows 

their jobs' administrative aspects, such as how to complete 

their timesheets and when to expect to be paid for their 

services. Election officials should explain the procedures 

for taking breaks during the workday. For example, there 

could be requirements for a certain number of recount staff 

members to be present during all aspects of the process. In 

some jurisdictions, staff members cannot leave the room 

without authorization from the recount coordinator. By 

limiting the number of people entering and exiting the room 

during the recount and having all participants take breaks 

simultaneously, the facilities coordinator can ensure that the 

room remains secure throughout the process.

Supplies and Templates

Election officials should have access to certain supplies 

and materials in the event of a recount. Depending on the 

number of ballots to be re-tabulated, election officials may 

need to adjust quantities of supplies, including security 

seals, chain of custody logs, tally sheets, envelopes, paper, 

and pens. In addition, adjustments to the location may need 

to be made, such as setting up partitions in the counting 

room to separate the recount teams or to mark off areas for 

observers. Some jurisdictions may need parking permits for 

the recount board members and any additional staff.

Election officials can also prepare templates for potential 

recounts long before Election Day. Because the timeframe 

in which to conduct recounts can be relatively short, 

election officials can add details to press release templates 

and legal notices that may be required. In addition, election 

officials can ensure that the various tally sheets—by batch, 

by precinct, by ballot type (absentee, early voting, 

Election Day, provisional)—are prepared for easy printing 

before a recount.

Location

Many jurisdictions can conduct a recount from within the 

elections office. However, state laws or regulations may 

require an election official to make specific accommodations 

to allow for additional transparency of the recount process. 

In some states, election officials will record or live stream 

the proceedings of the recount process. If many observers 

are expected to attend, election officials may need to move 

the recount to a larger space. Wherever the recount is held, 

election officials must secure the recount room and all 

materials throughout the recount process and have security 

staff on-site, if needed.

Cost

In states with automatic recounts, the state or locality 

typically covers the cost of an automatic recount. However, 

recounts initiated by request are often billed to the initiator 

or requestor of the recount. Depending on state law, the 

requestor may not be billed or may be reimbursed if the 

recount changes the result of the election. Recount costs 

are not usually included in pre-budget planning because 

it can be difficult to estimate the exact cost of a potential 

recount without knowing the scope or likelihood of 

occurrence. Consider the following costs when developing 

a budget:

• Full-time staff salaries and benefits, with overtime hours

• Part-time staff salaries

• Location rental (if the jurisdiction does not have room in 

the elections office)

• Tables and chairs rental (if necessary) 

• Legal expenses

• Vendor support

• Security

• Additional printing, storage boxes, security seals, and 

other supplies used in the jurisdiction for the recount.
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Election officials should understand their jurisdiction’s 

policies and procedures for collecting funds when a recount 

is requested. Election officials may need to request initial 

funding from the local budget department for the recount, 

pending reimbursement from the candidates or other 

parties, if provided by law. In other jurisdictions, election 

officials must notify recount-requesters about the need to 

post a bond before commencing the recount. In the event 

of an automatic recount, state law should outline how the 

process will be funded.

Materials for the Public

Election officials’ standard operating procedures (SOPs) are 

mainly for the actual administration of the elections process. 

However, the candidates, media, and public may also use the 

SOPs to understand the recount process. Election officials 

should develop materials describing their procedures in plain 

language to benefit individuals who are less familiar with 

election procedures.

Election officials can tailor materials for the public for each 

election. However, a few overall items will help the public 

observe a recount in progress. Election officials should make 

the public aware of the timeline, methodology, scope, and 

effect on final outcomes of election results if the recount 

reveals discrepancies between original and recounted 

election results.

Election officials should prepare recount materials that 

address the ‘who, what, and when’ of the recount process. 

The materials should include information for individuals 

and groups that intend to initiate a recount. Include the 

deadlines for requesting a recount, where to acquire the 

form needed to file for a recount, and information on costs 

or deposits, if applicable. Some recount requests must be 

filed with the state elections office and others with the local 

elections office. The timeframe and scope vary widely by 

state and local elections offices, which can be confusing if 

the recount covers multiple jurisdictions. When a recount 

spans multiple jurisdictions, it is sometimes necessary to file 

a unique recount request form in each jurisdiction. While 

preparing materials for the public, be aware of any specific 

rules or state laws requiring written notice of the recount's 

dates, times, and location.

Election officials can include a “Frequently Asked 

Questions” page on the elections office’s website with 

questions such as:

• Are recounts mandatory? 

• Who can call for a recount?

• Will the recount establish a definite winner? 

• How long does the recount last?

• How much does a recount cost? 

• Who pays for a recount?

• Who can handle the ballots or electronic memory cards?

• Who can transport the ballots or electronic 

memory cards?

• How are the ballots or electronic memory cards secured?

• Can the public view a recount?

• Under what conditions can the results of a recount 

be challenged?

Election officials may want to include the recount policies 

and procedures manual in media and candidate packets as 

a routine procedure. In addition to the FAQs, the elections 

office’s website can also provide the SOPs in an easy-to-use 

and accessible format.

Conducting the Recount

Election officials will likely have a short window to 

complete a recount. After a recount is formally requested 

or automatically initiated, election officials can distribute 

the recount policies and procedures manual to all parties 

involved to help them understand the process. They might 

also consider including inserts about the contests to be 

recounted and the number of ballots/precincts/counties 

included in the recount.

TIP

If the jurisdiction is operating in an extremely short 

timeframe, election officials could implement a 

staggered work schedule so that counting can 

continue for longer periods in the same location.
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CHAPTER 19: RECOUNTS 

Transparency is key to building confidence in election 

outcomes. On the first day of the recount, election officials 

may conduct an informational briefing and orientation 

session. The briefing provides election officials an excellent 

opportunity to review the policies and procedures they will 

use to conduct the recount. They can also use this time to 

discuss the rules for observers and explain when the public 

can expect periodic updates.

During the briefing, election officials often explain the 

security of the physical location and the chain of custody 

procedures, which is especially important if the recount 

is conducted away from the elections office. In this 

discussion, election officials could review when breaks 

will be allowed and list any prohibited materials. Election 

officials can conclude the briefing with a tour of the location, 

allowing everyone to walk through and ask final questions 

about the process.

Election officials may require all elections office staff and 

temporary employees to sign in and wear a nametag. After 

the recount teams sign in, election officials can direct the 

public to the areas where they can observe the process. 

State and local law will determine if items such as cell 

phones, electronic devices, writing utensils, food, or 

beverages will be allowed in the recount area. Election 

officials can then remind the recount team to refrain from 

extended discussions with any observers who may be in the 

room. As observers arrive, election officials (or designated 

personnel) should direct them to the observer coordinator, 

who will ask them to adhere to observers’ rules of conduct 

and behavior.

Election officials should be mindful of the tedious and 

monotonous nature of the recount team’s work, regardless 

of the recount method that the team uses. Because the 

workers may not be regular elections office employees, 

consider reminding the facilities coordinator to review and 

monitor the temporary employees' working hours and allow 

for a lunch break and other frequently scheduled breaks.

Election officials should be aware of possible disruptions 

to the workflow by legal challenges posed by candidates, 

parties, or other organizations. Although election officials 

hope for a smooth recount, they should be prepared 

to secure the ballots throughout any legal challenges 

surrounding the conduct of the recount.

As the recount nears completion, election officials should 

consider contacting the candidates, media, and other 

interested parties to notify them of the date, time, and 

location for the issuance of the recount announcement.

Example: Hand-Recounting Ballots

The following paragraph describes how to conduct a recount 

when hand-recounting paper ballots. It serves only as an 

example; election officials follow the laws and regulations of 

their jurisdictions when conducting a recount.

During the recount, three or four-person teams receive 

ballots. For each ballot, one team member reads aloud 

the candidate's name receiving the vote. Another team 

member records the vote on a tally sheet. The third and 

fourth members (if applicable) verify both of the other 

team members’ work. When the team finishes recounting 

an entire bundle of ballots, the totals from the tally sheet 

are recorded on a batch sheet and attached to the bundle 

of voted ballots. To ensure accuracy, election officials can 

require team members to switch roles and count each 

bundle of ballots twice before attaching the batch sheet 

to the ballots.

Example: Electronically Recounting Ballots

Although the above example relates to the hand-recounting 

of paper ballots, many recounts are conducted electronically 

by rescanning optical scan ballots through a ballot tabulator, 

reloading cartridges on digital recording electronic (DRE) 

voting machines, or some blend of these methods. When 

reviewing the ballots electronically, it is possible that new 

logic and accuracy testing may need to be performed on 

the recount machines to ensure their integrity for use in 

the recount.

TIP

If time, budget, and staffing resources allow, 

consider limiting each recount member to no more 

than six working hours per day to ensure accuracy.
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Base the workflow for counting on the criteria for 

balancing election returns. For example, to recount ballots 

cast at polling places, team members will recount the 

ballots to balance to the precinct optical scanner or DRE 

memory cards at the end-of-day tally report from each 

corresponding scanner and polling place. For ballots counted 

at a central count location, team members will recount the 

batches corresponding to the reported election returns for 

those particular batches.

These balancing criteria enable election officials to construct 

the recount totals in the same way the votes were originally 

collected and counted. After the teams recount each batch 

or precinct, they aggregate the totals to determine the total 

for the recount. Depending on the recounted contest, the 

teams will continue to aggregate the results until they have 

reanalyzed all ballots cast for the contest.

The recount teams use the same processes previously 

described to recount absentee, early voting, provisional, and 

all other categories of valid ballots. After the teams recount 

all ballots, they add together the tally sheets. The results 

from the totaled tally sheets become the recounted totals 

for the contest.

Finalizing the Recount

Election officials should collect and organize all recount 

documentation—tally sheets, batch sheets, and ballots. 

The recount results can be challenged in court; therefore, 

election officials should keep detailed records of each 

decision made and action taken during the recount process.

After elections results are certified and all legal challenges 

are resolved, election officials should repackage and seal the 

documentation for archival storage. Election officials can 

itemize all balloting and recounting materials by type and 

location in preparation for future requests for public records 

or potential lawsuits. Under federal law, all election materials 

must be stored for 22 months after a federal election.3

After the recount, elections office staff should prepare 

a summary report analyzing the recount process. The 

summary report can serve as a guide for improving the 

policies and procedures for future recounts. This summary 

can include the number of staff, ballots recounted, and 

hours dedicated to the process. The summary should also 

include the final outcomes and any discrepancies discovered 

between the original results tallies and recount tallies. If a 

specific aspect of the process did not work well, election 

officials should assess the reasons for the failure and then 

suggest changes to the recount policies and procedures 

manuals. In addition, elections office staff and temporary 

recount board members who completed the recount may 

have valuable suggestions for improving the recount process, 

and election officials should solicit their input.

If the jurisdiction pays for the recount cost, election officials 

will distribute this information to the jurisdiction’s budget 

department. Alternatively, election officials may need to 

prepare an invoice to send to the party, candidate, or voter 

responsible for the cost of the recount.

Conclusion

Recounts must be completed in tight timeframes, so 

election officials must be prepared to conduct one well 

before the final results are tallied. Election officials must 

ensure they are prepared to recruit and train recount board 

members quickly. Even though not every election requires 

a recount, procedures must be up to date and ready to 

distribute to interested parties. Setting realistic timeframes 

and providing regular updates to the public can preempt 

questions and enhance engagement in the process.

3 52 U.S.C. § 20701.
139

CHAPTER 19: RECOUNTS 

Sample Tally Sheet