alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
2022 EAVS Data Brief: Illinois EAVS Jurisdictions:

108 

 Voter Registration 

Active Reg. Voters as of Nov. 8, 20221 

7,899,591 

Reg. Forms Received2* 

1,906,637 

Total Confirmation Notices Sent3* 

2,710,102 

Voters Removed from Reg. Rolls4* 

692,003 

Source of Registration Applications5 

Motor Vehicle Dept. 28.1% 

Other 19.2% 

Mail, Email, Fax 14.8% 

Online 11.2% 

In Person 3.3% 

 Voting and Turnout 

Voters Participating By Mode6 

7 Turnout 

46.0% In-Person 

Election Day 

1,926,270 

46.1% 

Mail 

568,728 

13.6% 

In-Person 

Early 

605,992 

14.5% 

Other 

5,356 

0.1% 

Total Voting Locations8: 6,293 

Total Poll Workers9: 28,785 

Election Technology 

Percentage of Jurisdictions Using...10 

77.8% 

Ballot 

Marking 

Devices 

68.5% 

Scanners 

28.7% 

Electronic 

Poll 

Books 

23.1% 

DREs with 

VVPAT 

3.7% 

DREs w/o 

VVPAT 

0.0% 

Hand 

Counting 

 Mail Ballots 

• 1,302,195 mail ballots transmitted11 

• 77.9% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters12 

• 57.5% of returned mail ballots counted13 

• 0.9% of returned mail ballots rejected14 

• Did not conduct all-mail election15 

• Allowed drop boxes16 

• Allowed ballot curing17 

 Election Audits18 

-- Access audit 

-- Ballot design audit 

-- Ballot reconciliation 

audit 

-- Compliance/ 

procedural audit 

-- Eligibility audit 

-- Legal audit 

✔ Logic and accuracy 

testing 

✔ Post-election 

tabulation audit 

-- Other 

Notes 

EAVS data and reports may be downloaded at www.eac.gov 

/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys. 

Responses of “Does not apply,” “Data not available,” and “Valid 

skip” are shown as zeroes or dashes. Percentages may not sum 

to 100% because of missing data or rounding. 

* Close of registration for 2020 

general election to close of 

registration for 2022 general 

election. 

1 A1b of EAVS. 

2 A3a of EAVS. 

3 A8a of EAVS. 

4 A9a of EAVS. 

5 Mail, Email, Fax is A4a/A3a. 

In Person is A4b/A3a. Online is 

A4c/A3a. Motor Vehicle Dept. is 

A4d/A3a. Other is the sum of 

A4e–A4l/A3a. May not sum to 

100% because of missing data. 

6 In-Person Election Day is F1b. 

Mail is F1d+F1g. In-Person Early 

is F1f. Other is F1c+F1e+F1h. 

7 F1a of EAVS divided by citizen 

voting age population (CVAP). 

8 D2a of EAVS. 

9 D7a of EAVS. 

10 F3a–f, F5a–F9a of EAVS; 

number of jurisdictions that 

responded “Yes” divided by

number of jurisdictions in 

state/territory. 

11 C1a of EAVS. 

12 C1b/C1a of EAVS. 

13 C8a/C1b of EAVS. 

14 C9a/C1b of EAVS. 

15 Q17 and Q17a of Policy 

Survey. 

16 Q19 of Policy Survey. 

17 Q20 of Policy Survey. 

18 Q36 of Policy Survey. See 

survey questionnaire for full 

definitions of each type of 

audit.
#### Tigran SARGSYAN and Nadia Khudanyan, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-71347

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 22, 2018

Sassoun Nalbandian, Attorney, Nalban-dian Law, A Professional Corporation, Glendale, CA, for Petitioners

Jeffrey Ronald Meyer, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Tigran Sargsyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, and Nadia Khudanyan, a native of Iran and citizen of Armenia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen. *Toufighi v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen, where they failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief. *See id.*at 996.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Donald CATHERINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLEAR RECON CORPORATION; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15687

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed March 6, 2018

Donald Catherine, Pro Se

Genail M. Anderson, Pite Duncan, LLP, San Diego, CA, Laurel I. Handley, Al-dridge Pite, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Clear Recon Corporation

D. Dennis La, Esquire, Attorney, Robert Collings Little, Esquire, Attorney, Jeremy E. Shulman, Attorney, Anglin Fle-welling Rasmussen Campbell <& Trytten, LLP, Pasadena, CA, for Defendant-Appel-lee

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P, 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Donald Catherine appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. *Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Catherine’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim because Catherine failed to allege facts sufficient to show that either defendant was a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA); *Ho v. Recon-Trust Co., NA,*858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Ajctions taken to facilitate a nonjudicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); *Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA,*720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) (complaint “must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Catherine’s FDCPA and dual tracking claims without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. *See Cervantes,*656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We reject as without merit Catherine’s contention that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to rule on non-disposi-tive matters and to issue findings and recommendations to the district court judge. *749*See*28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Catherine’s request for leave to add new claims, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# C_2022109EN.01003001.xml

| 7.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 109/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 109/30

---

Action brought on 13 January 2022 — CIMV v Commission

(Case T-26/22)

(2022/C 109/39)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Compagnie industrielle de la matière végétale (CIMV) (Neuilly sur-Seine, France) (represented by: B. Le Bret, R. Rard and P. Renié, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Declare the present action admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare the present action admissible and well founded;

| — | Annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the contested decision;

| — | In the alternative, annul Article 3 of the contested decision in so far as it provides for enforcement; |
| --- | --- |

—

In the alternative, annul Article 3 of the contested decision in so far as it provides for enforcement;

| — | Order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action against Decision C(2021) 7932 final of the European Commission of 28 October 2021, concerning the recovery of a sum of EUR 5 888 214,59, plus interest, owed by the CIMV, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging a clear substantive error resulting from the failure to take into account the schedule proposed by the CIMV and failure to state adequate reasons for the contested decision. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging a clear substantive error resulting from the failure to take into account the schedule proposed by the CIMV and failure to state adequate reasons for the contested decision.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, the right to be heard and the principle of sound administration. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, the right to be heard and the principle of sound administration.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and failure to have regard for the aim of effective protection of the financial interests of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and failure to have regard for the aim of effective protection of the financial interests of the European Union.

---
ex10a.htm
















Exhibit 10(a)

















Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm












We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Post-Effective Amendment No. 29 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-138190) pertaining to Lincoln Life Variable Annuity Account N, which is incorporated by reference into Post-Effective Amendment No. 61 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-36304) and Amendment No. 391 to the 1940 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-08517), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) April 1, 2014, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company and (b) April 1, 2014, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life Variable Annuity Account N for the registration of interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.








/s/ Ernst & Young LLP












Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


April 1, 2014
<PAGE>
 
    
     [LETTERHEAD FOR NAIL MCKINNEY PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION APPEARS HERE]


                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2

Pontotoc BancShares Corp.
P.O. Box 29
Pontotoc, Mississippi 38863

    
                                                                   July 23, 1997

We consent to the use of the audited financial statements for the years ended 
December 31, 1996 and 1995, the compiled financial statements for the quarters 
ended March 31, 1997 and 1996, and the pro forma financial statements for the 
year ended December 31, 1996 together with our reports thereon in Amendment 
No. 3 to the registration statement on Form S-4 of Pontotoc BancShares Corp.
     

Very truly yours,

/s/ JAMES RAY DAVIS, JR.

James Ray Davis, Jr.
Certified Public Accountant
# C_2022398EN.01001302.xml

| 17.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 398/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 398/13

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 22 July 2022 — EI v SC Brink’s Cash Solutions SRL

(Case C-496/22)

(2022/C 398/17)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel București

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: EI

Respondent: SC Brink’s Cash Solutions SRL

Questions referred

| 1. | Do [the first subparagraph of] Article 1[(1)(b)] and Article 6 of Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, (1) read in the light of recitals 2 and 6 of the preamble to that directive, preclude national legislation which allows an employer not to consult the workers affected by a collective redundancy procedure since they have neither appointed representatives nor a legal obligation to appoint them? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Do [the first subparagraph of] Article 1[(1)(b)] and Article 6 of Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, (1) read in the light of recitals 2 and 6 of the preamble to that directive, preclude national legislation which allows an employer not to consult the workers affected by a collective redundancy procedure since they have neither appointed representatives nor a legal obligation to appoint them?

| 2. | Are [the first subparagraph of] Article 1[(1)(b)] and Article 6 of Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, read in the light of recitals 2 and 6 of the preamble to that directive, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the circumstances described above, the employer is required to inform and consult all the employees affected by the collective redundancy procedure? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Are [the first subparagraph of] Article 1[(1)(b)] and Article 6 of Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, read in the light of recitals 2 and 6 of the preamble to that directive, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the circumstances described above, the employer is required to inform and consult all the employees affected by the collective redundancy procedure?

---

(1)  Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (OJ 1998 L 225, p. 16, Special edition in Romanian: Chapter 05 Volume 005 P. 95).

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY TO SUCH FORM 10-Q.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                       3,098,267
<SECURITIES>                                   300,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,563,139
<ALLOWANCES>                                    52,655
<INVENTORY>                                    739,183
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,765,751
<PP&E>                                       3,256,941
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,565,348
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,582,345
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,547,478
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       489,421
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,379,533
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,582,345
<SALES>                                      9,220,772
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             9,220,772
<CGS>                                        5,664,717
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,664,717
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,647,835
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                (2,671)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              47,995
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (3,506,199)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (3,517,799)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (3,517,799)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     0.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.08


</TABLE>
#### J.R. v. DHS (Sealed)

61 CD 2017

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

10/05/2017

Department of Human Services, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, 21-13-1042

Affirmed
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-1966

In Re: JOHN T. COPLEY, Debtor.

JOHN T. COPLEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; WANDA COPLEY; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; H. LYNDEN GRAHAM, JR.; JANET SMITH-HOLBROOK, former Chapter 7 Trustee; DAVID KONRAD, former counsel to Chapter 7 Trustee; JAMES M. PIERSON, former Chapter 13 bankruptcy attorney, Parties in Interest - Appellees, and DEBRA A. WERTMAN; ALFRED SINES, JR., former divorce attorney; JAMES W. LANE, JR., former counsel for the debtor; R. SCOTT CLARKE; SHAWN D. BAYLISS; STEPHEN L. THOMPSON, Parties in Interest.2Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Joseph Robert Goodwin, District Judge. (CA-99-1054-3, BK-97-30131) Submitted: May 24, 2001 Decided: June 18, 2001 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John T. Copley, Appellant Pro Se. Arden John Curry, II, PAULEY, CURRY, STURGEON & VANDERFORD, Charleston, West Virginia; Gary L. Call, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia; Lynn B. Pollard, HAMILTON, BURGESS, YOUNG & POLLARD, P.L.L.C., Fayetteville, West Virginia; Janet Smith-Holbrook, David Konrad,HUDDLESTON, BOLEN, BEATTY, PORTER & COPEN, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: John T. Copley appeals from the district court’s orders affirming numerous orders of the bankruptcy court and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the lower courts’ opinions and orders and find no reversible error. Accordingly, while we grant Copley’s motion to file a supplementalbrief and have considered the issues therein, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Copley v. State Auto. Mut. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , Nos. CA-99-1054-3; BK-97-30131 (S.D.W. Va. June 12 & July 6, 2000). In light of the resolution of this appeal, the stay pending appeal entered on October 16, 2000, is terminated. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# C_2023216EN.01002301.xml

| 19.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 216/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 216/23

---

Appeal brought on 8 May 2022 by Nigar Kirimova against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 9 March 2022 in Case T-727/20, Kirimova v EUIPO

(Case C-306/22 P)

(2023/C 216/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Nigar Kirimova (represented by: A. Parassina, avvocato, A. García López, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 21 April 2023, the Court of Justice held that the order of the General Court of the European Union of 9 March 2022, Kirimova v EUIPO (T-727/20), was set aside and Case T 727/20 was referred back to the General Court. The costs were reserved.

---
September 20, 2012

No. 11-10337.

#### Williams et al. *v.*Hobbs, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.
#### COM. v. JACKSON, E.

172 MDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

09/12/2017

CP-35-CR-0002549-2016 (Lackawanna)

Affirmed — Application to Withdraw as Counsel Granted
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Sunday Quincy USOH, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40730 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed March 14, 2018

*470Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Sunday Quincy Usoh, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Sunday Quincy Usoh has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Usoh has filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Usoh’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.