PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 21-1276, 21-1277, 21-1289

___________

CRYSTALLEX INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

v.

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION; PDV HOLDING, 

INC.; PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., 

(Intervenors in D.C.)

Citgo Petroleum Corporation and PDV Holding, Inc., 

Appellants in No. 21-1276 

Petróleos De Venezuela, S.A.,

Appellant in No. 21-1277

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Appellant in No. 21-1289

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 1-17-mc-00151)
2

District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark

____________

Argued: December 7, 2021

Before: SHWARTZ, PORTER, and FISHER, 

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 18, 2022 )

____________

Nathan P. Eimer

Lisa S. Meyer

Gregory M. Schweizer

Eimer Stahl LLP

224 South Michigan Avenue

Suite 1100

Chicago, IL 60604

Robert E. Dunn

Eimer Stahl LLP

99 South Almaden Blvd.

Suite 642

San Jose, CA 95113

Counsel for Intervenor-Appellants CITGO Petroleum

Corporation and PDV Holding, Inc.

Joseph D. Pizzurro

Kevin A. Meehan

Julia Mosse

Juan O. Perla

Curtis Mallet-Prevost Colt & Mosle
3

101 Park Avenue

35th floor

New York, NY 10178

Counsel for Intervenor-Appellant Petróleos de 

Venezuela, S.A.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. [ARGUED]

Brendan B. Gants

Elaine J. Goldenberg

Ginger D. Anders

Munger Tolles & Olson

601 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Suite 500

Washington, D.C. 20001

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Bolivarian Republic 

of Venezuela

Robert L. Weigel

Rahim Moloo

Jason W. Myatt

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166

Miguel A. Estrada [ARGUED]

Lucas C. Townsend

Matthew S. Rozen

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
4

Travis S. Hunter 

Jeffrey L. Moye

Richards Layton & Finger 

920 North King Street

One Rodney Square 

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee Crystallex International 

Corporation

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

In these consolidated appeals, the Bolivarian Republic 

of Venezuela (“Venezuela”) and other appellants ask us to 

intervene for a second time in ongoing execution proceedings 

against Venezuela. Our jurisdiction to hear the appeals turns 

on whether the District Court has reached a final decision. 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. It has not, so we lack jurisdiction over these

appeals. 

I

A decade ago, Venezuela expropriated valuable mining

rights owned by Crystallex International Corporation 

(“Crystallex”), a Canadian mining company. Crystallex Int’l 

Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 932 F.3d 126, 132 

(3d Cir. 2019). After prevailing in an arbitration proceeding, 

Crystallex asked a federal district court to confirm the award 

and obtained a $1.4 billion judgment. Id. at 133. Crystallex has 

since been trying to collect. Id. at 133–35.
5

In the execution action before the District Court, 

Crystallex seeks to auction shares owned by Venezuela’s stateowned energy company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 

(“PDVSA”), to satisfy its judgment against Venezuela. Id. at 

134. At stake are PDVSA’s shares in PDV Holding, Inc. 

(“PDVH”), a Delaware holding company that owns CITGO 

Petroleum Corporation (“CITGO”), a U.S. petroleum refiner.

Id. at 132.1 Venezuela and PDVSA oppose the auction, as a 

sale would end PDVSA’s control over CITGO, one of 

PDVSA’s most important assets in the United States.

A

In an earlier round of proceedings, Crystallex sought to

seize PDVH’s shares through a “writ of attachment” under

Delaware law, as allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

69(a). Id. at 134. PDVSA intervened and resisted the attachment on grounds of sovereign immunity. Id. 

The District Court rejected PDVSA’s defenses after 

careful consideration. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian 

Republic of Venezuela, 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 406, 418 (D. Del. 

2018), aff’d and remanded, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2019).

Among other things, the District Court held that it had ancillary 

jurisdiction to enforce the judgment against Venezuela in this

execution proceeding, and that PDVSA could not assert its 

own sovereign immunity as a defense because PDVSA was 

Venezuela’s alter ego under federal common law. Crystallex 

1 PDVSA, a Venezuelan corporation, wholly owns PDVH, a 

Delaware holding corporation, which wholly owns CITGO 

Holding, Inc., which wholly owns CITGO Petroleum.
6

Int’l Corp., 333 F. Supp. 3d at 399, 406. In other words, while 

PDVSA, not Venezuela, is the nominal owner of the PDVH

shares, the District Court concluded that given Venezuela’s 

history of extensive control over PDVSA, PDVSA is

Venezuela for purposes of this suit. Id. at 393, 399. Some days 

later, the District Court issued the writ of attachment, ordering 

PDVH’s registered agent to retain the stock until further order. 

PDVSA appealed, and Venezuela intervened. 

Crystallex Int’l Corp., 932 F.3d at 134. In that earlier appeal, 

we agreed with the District Court’s reasoning, rejected all of 

PDVSA’s immunity defenses, and affirmed the District 

Court’s orders, including the writ of attachment. Id. at 151–52. 

The Supreme Court denied certiorari, and the case returned to 

District Court. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Crystallex 

Int’l Corp., 140 S. Ct. 2762 (2020).

B

While the case was pending on appeal, political conditions in Venezuela changed. In January 2019, following a 

fraudulent reelection bid a year earlier, Nicolás Maduro tried 

to install himself as President of Venezuela for a second term. 

The Venezuelan National Assembly, an elected body, invoked 

Venezuela’s constitution and declared Juan Guaidó interim 

president. The United States recognized Juan Guaidó as the 

legitimate interim President of Venezuela, but Maduro still 

clings to power. 

“[I]n light of the continued usurpation of power by 

Nicolas Maduro,” then-President Trump broadened existing 

economic sanctions against Venezuela and blocked any transfer or dealing in PDVSA’s property. Exec. Order No. 13,884, 
7

§§ 1, 6 (Aug. 5, 2019), 84 Fed. Reg. 38,843 (Aug. 7, 2019). 

Implementing this order, the Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(“OFAC”), an agency that administers U.S. economic sanctions, published the following rule:

[T]he entry into a settlement agreement or the 

enforcement of any lien, judgment, arbitral 

award, decree, or other order through execution, 

garnishment, or other judicial process purporting 

to transfer or otherwise alter or affect property or 

interests in property blocked pursuant to [regulation], is prohibited unless authorized pursuant to 

a specific license issued by OFAC.

84 Fed. Reg. 64,415, 64,417 (Nov. 22, 2019), codified at 31 

C.F.R. § 591.407. OFAC’s rule looms large in this case.

C

On remand, PDVSA, now joined by PDVH as the garnishee and CITGO as an intervenor, asked the District Court to

quash the writ of attachment. In an argument that raised the 

District Court’s sense of déjà vu, they sought to litigate the alter 

ego status of PDVSA once again, arguing this time that

Delaware alter ego law controlled.

2 Delaware law requires 

showing fraud—not just extensive control—to seize the prop2 Before it lost its prior appeal to this Court, PDVSA conceded 

that “the legal standard for alter-ego . . . applied in this case [is]

federal common law.” J.A. 144; see also First Nat’l City Bank 

v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 

622 n.11 (1983) (holding that federal common law, not state 

law, governs the alter ego status of foreign instrumentalities).
8

erty of a non-debtor like PDVSA. See Crosse v. BCBSD, Inc., 

836 A.2d 492, 497 (Del. 2003) (“To state a ‘veil-piercing 

claim,’ the plaintiff must plead facts supporting an inference 

that the corporation, through its alter-ego, has created a sham 

entity designed to defraud investors and creditors.”). And 

Crystallex, they argued, has not made that showing.

Crystallex, on the other hand, viewed the attachment’s 

validity as a settled matter and moved for a contingent auction

of PDVSA’s shares pending a license from OFAC. Venezuela, 

PDVSA, and PDVH opposed, arguing that OFAC’s regulations prohibit a contingent sale and urging the District Court to 

stay sale proceedings until Crystallex obtains an OFAC 

license.

D

On the eve of the District Court’s hearing on the pending motions, the United States filed a statement of interest urging the District Court not to authorize a contingent sale of the 

shares. Elliot Abrams, the U.S. Special Representative for 

Venezuela at the time, filed a letter asserting that “immediate 

steps toward a conditional sale” of CITGO would damage the 

legitimacy of the Guaidó government. J.A. 309. Abrams 

explained that CITGO’s “loss through a forced sale in a U.S. 

court would be a great political victory for the Maduro 

regime,” as Maduro could blame the Guaidó government for 

the loss of PDVSA assets on U.S. soil. J.A. 309. This, Abrams

said, would “greatly” harm U.S. foreign policy interests. 

J.A. 309.

The United States, through OFAC, separately argued 

that “U.S. sanctions involving Venezuela require a license for 
9

any sale of PDVH shares.” J.A. 300. The United States noted 

that OFAC was then considering Crystallex’s specific license 

application and asked the District Court to “refrain from 

authorizing an auction and sale of Venezuela’s largest and 

most important foreign asset while Crystallex’s licensing 

application is pending before OFAC.” J.A. 304.3

At the hearing on the pending motions, the United 

States clarified its position in response to the District Court’s 

questions. It assured the District Court that “the United States 

[w]asn’t tak[ing] the position that [the District Court was] 

blocked from moving forward” and that “the Court can do 

whatever it wants.” J.A. 523. It also clarified, though, that 

“Crystallex might well be in violation of OFAC regulations if 

it takes these proposed steps.” J.A. 523.

E

On January 14, 2021, the District Court acted on the 

pending motions. The District Court refused to quash the 

attachment. In the District Court’s view, it had already decided

the alter ego issue and issued the attachment, and we had 

affirmed, so (1) issue preclusion prevented PDVSA and its 

subsidiaries from relitigating the validity of the attachment 

under Delaware law, and, in any event, (2) the state-law challenge was untimely because PDVSA and its subsidiaries had

failed to preserve the issue after an adequate opportunity to do 

so. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 

3 While these appeals were pending OFAC denied Crystallex’s 

license application, without prejudice if foreign policy 

considerations change. 
10

No. 17-mc-151-LPS, 2021 WL 129803, at *8–11, *12–15 (D. 

Del. Jan. 14, 2021).

The District Court also granted Crystallex’s motion in 

part. The District Court decided “to set up the sales procedures 

and then to follow them to the maximum extent that can be 

accomplished without a specific license from OFAC.” Id. at 

*16. The District Court noted, however, that “[a]ll parties agree 

that, under current law and policy, a sale of PDVH shares cannot be completed without a specific OFAC license.” Id. With 

that understanding, the District Court decided that “all the preparatory steps that can be taken without such a license can, and 

should, be taken.” Id. The District Court also “set out some of 

the contours of the sales procedures that it will follow”—

including appointing a special master to aid the District Court 

in designing procedures for an eventual judicial sale. Id. at 

*17–18.

Venezuela, PDVSA, PDVH, and CITGO appealed the 

order.

II

We have “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions 

of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision ends 

the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 

do but execute the judgment.” Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 

1123–24 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). 

The Venezuela appellants seek review of two decisions. 

They first ask us to review the District Court’s refusal to quash 

the attachment, arguing that the attachment must be quashed 

because it conflicts with Delaware alter ego law. They also ask 
11

us to review the District Court’s decision to determine final 

sale procedures in the future, arguing that it conflicts with 

OFAC regulations and disregards U.S. foreign policy interests. 

Neither decision is final, so we lack authority to entertain these 

arguments.

A

We first address whether the District Court’s refusal to 

quash the attachment is a final decision. We consider—and 

reject—Crystallex’s argument that refusals to quash postjudgment attachments are never final. We hold instead that an 

attachment in aid of execution, or a refusal to quash one, is 

final when “all that remains is for a non-judicial officer to take 

and dispose of the defendant’s property.” United States v. 

Parker, 927 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2019). We lack jurisdiction 

over the refusal to quash under that practical test because the

litigation remains ongoing. The District Court must, at the very 

least, still rule on pending legal objections to the special 

master’s recommended judicial sale procedures. The District 

Court’s judicial involvement is ongoing, so the refusal to quash 

the attachment is interlocutory. Venezuela and other appellants 

will have an adequate opportunity to appeal the refusal to quash 

the attachment at a later stage, so there is no practical finality.

1

a

“The archetypal final decision is one that triggers the 

entry of judgment.” Hall, 138 S. Ct. at 1124 (quotation marks 

and alterations omitted). When a party files an appeal from a 

final decision disposing of all claims, our jurisdiction 
12

ordinarily presents no difficult question. Id. Orders that

precede a final disposition of claims are, on the other hand,

usually interlocutory and unappealable unless Congress says 

otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292. “The general rule [is] that a 

party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final 

judgment has been entered.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop 

Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (citation omitted). Faithful adherence to the single appeal rule promotes clear jurisdictional rules, allows district judges room to manage complex litigation, and avoids the costs of piecemeal appeals.

The single appeal rule prevents appellate review of 

many important litigation decisions that affect property rights. 

That includes prejudgment attachments or similar remedies

under Rule 64 “to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a) (emphasis added). A prejudgment 

“[a]ttachment is an ancillary remedy by which a plaintiff 

acquires a lien upon the property of a defendant in order to 

obtain satisfaction of a judgment that the plaintiff may ultimately obtain at the conclusion of the litigation.” Mitsubishi 

Int’l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507, 1521 

(11th Cir. 1994). These kinds of remedies are “intended to preserve the subject-matter in dispute from waste or dilapidation, 

and to keep it within control of the court until the rights of the 

parties concerned can be adjudicated by a final decree.” 

Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204–05 (1848). They 

are necessarily “interlocutory,” as they merely allow litigation 

to continue toward a final decision. Id. at 204.

For this reason, orders granting or refusing to vacate

prejudgment attachments have long been held unappealable. In 

Cushing v. Laird, the Supreme Court held that a foreign attachment on a vessel was not final, as an “attachment is auxiliary 
13

and incidental to the principal cause,” which was yet to be litigated. 107 U.S. 69, 76 (1883).4

“Neither the principal defendant nor the garnishees can appeal until after a final decree 

against them.” Id. The Supreme Court later cited Cushing with 

approval, noting that unlike in a case denying an attachment,

“where an attachment is upheld pending determination of the 

principal claim . . . the rights of all the parties can be adequately protected while the litigation on the main claim proceeds.” Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del 

Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 689 (1950).

Appeals from prejudgment attachments and similar 

remedies have “shatter[ed] on the rock” of these Supreme 

Court precedents. West v. Zurhorst, 425 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 

1970) (Friendly, J.). In United States v. Pearce’s Estate, for 

example, we held a “sequestration order” seizing stock—a 

device we said was “analogous to foreign attachment at law”—

unappealable. 498 F.2d 847, 849 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). We 

found no finality because liability was still to be adjudicated 

and “[i]n essence, all that ha[d] happened to date is that shares 

of stock ha[d] been seized.” Id. at 850. In Petroleos Mexicanos 

Refinacion v. M/T King A (Ex-Tbilisi), we similarly held a 

refusal to vacate a “warrant of arrest” for a vessel—another 

device analogous to attachment—not final, because “the arrest 

itself is not the immediate precursor to execution of a judgment.” 377 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2004). The refusal to vacate

the warrant of arrest was also unappealable under the 

collateral-order doctrine, we held, based on “our long4 The purposes of a foreign attachment are “to secure a 

respondent’s appearance and to assure satisfaction in case the 

suit is successful.” Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania 

Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 693 (1950).
14

established precedent from an analogous area”—cases involving “prejudgment attachments.” Id. at 336 (emphasis added).

Thus, orders granting or refusing to vacate Rule 64 remedies

are not final decisions and immediate appeals are barred unless 

the law allows an interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(b).

Crystallex asks us to extend these prejudgment precedents to post-judgment attachments in aid of execution under 

Rule 69(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). But post-judgment attachments are different. Post-judgment attachments are used to satisfy a final judgment by seizing and selling property. They 

come after, not before, an archetypal final decision. So they do 

not lend themselves to the single appeal rule we usually apply 

to property seizures that precede a final decision on liability, 

including prejudgment attachments under Rule 64. In an execution proceeding, there has already been at least one opportunity to appeal the final decision on the merits. There cannot 

be just one “final decision.”

The better analogy is not attachments under Rule 64, but

other execution process awarded under Rule 69 or Rule 70, like 

a writ of execution directing “the marshal to not only levy but 

also to sell the property.” Parker, 927 F.3d at 380. Like a writ

of execution and unlike a prejudgment attachment, a postjudgment attachment may sometimes be “the immediate precursor to execution of a judgment.” Petroleos Mexicanos, 377 

F.3d at 334. When an execution sale immediately follows an

attachment, the district court’s judicial involvement in the civil 

action is over, and all that is left is a ministerial superintending 

of the sale. These kinds of post-judgment decisions are “often 

appealable” under our precedent. Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs., 

Inc. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1993).
15

b

Crystallex argues, however, that nineteenth-century 

Supreme Court precedent requires us to hold that refusals to 

quash attachments are never final. Crystallex’s reading of precedent is anachronistic, so we decline to follow that path.

Crystallex’s main authority is Boyle v. Zacharie (Boyle 

II), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648 (1832) (Story, J.). In Boyle, the U.S. 

circuit court for the district of Maryland—a trial court in diversity cases—entered a money judgment for Louisiana creditors 

against Hugh Boyle, a Baltimore merchant. Boyle v. Zacharie

(Boyle I), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635, 641–42 (1832) (Story, J.).5 The 

court ordered an attachment, and the U.S. marshal seized 

Boyle’s ship, the General Smith. Id. at 642. The court later 

issued “a writ of venditioni exponas”—an order requiring the 

U.S. marshal to sell the General Smith. Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 655. 

Boyle moved to quash the sale order, arguing that a pending 

proceeding in equity required staying any sale, but the court 

denied Boyle’s motion to quash. Id. Boyle then took his case 

to the Supreme Court under section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 

1789, authorizing a “writ of error” from “final judgments and 

decrees.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84; see 

also Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 656. 

The Supreme Court addressed “whether a writ of error” 

could be brought to review the refusal to quash the sale “upon 

mere motion.” Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 656. “In modern times,” 

Justice Story noted, “courts of law will often interfere by sum5 Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, U.S. circuit courts had 

original jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases like Boyle. 

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
16

mary proceedings on motion, and quash an execution erroneously awarded,” instead of correcting a judgment through formal post-judgment writs. Id. But quashing execution by summary motion was a matter of judicial “discretion,” not a legal

“judgment.” Id. at 657. As Justice Story explained:

We consider all motions of this sort to quash 

executions, as addressed to the sound discretion 

of the court; and as a summary relief, which the 

court is not compellable to allow. The party is 

deprived of no right by the refusal; and he is at 

full liberty to redress his grievance by writ of 

error [coram nobis], or audita querela; or other 

remedy known to the common law. The refusal 

to quash, is not in the sense of the common law 

a judgment, much less a final judgment. It is a 

mere interlocutory order.

Id.6 Boyle, properly understood, was tied to review by writ of 

error. The writ of error was far more limited than the civil

appeal. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, the primary author of 

the Judiciary Act, explained it this way: “An appeal is a process 

of civil law origin, and removes a cause entirely; subjecting the 

6 An audita querela was a suit by a judgment debtor to present 

a defense to a judgment that could not have been raised earlier, 

and coram nobis was similar. See James Wm. Moore & 

Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 

55 Yale L.J. 623, 659–74 (1946) (explaining the writs). The

appellate writ of error should not be confused with the postjudgment writ of error coram nobis, as coram nobis was a writ 

asking a court to set aside its own judgment because of an error 

of fact. Id. at 669.
17

fact as well as the law, to a review and re-trial: but a writ of 

error is a process of common law origin, and it removes nothing for re-examination but the law.” Wiscart v. D’Auchy, 3 U.S. 

(1 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796). One of the writ of error’s settled limitations was that it could not be used to review discretionary

orders. See Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 657 (citing cases). As Chancellor James Kent put it, “[t]here seems to be no position more 

uniformly admitted, than that [a writ of] error will not lie on a 

matter resting in discretion.” Clason v. Shotwell, 12 Johns. 31, 

49 (N.Y. 1814); see also Alfred Conkling, A Treatise on the 

Organization and Practice of the Courts of the United States

672 (3d ed. 1856) (“A writ of error will not . . . lie for an 

alleged error in deciding upon an application addressed to the 

discretion of the court . . .”).

By the time Boyle was decided, the New York Supreme 

Court had already concluded that orders on motions to quash 

execution were discretionary and so unreviewable by writ of 

error. Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. 484, 486–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 

1820). Justice Story agreed. Under the forms of action, “summary proceedings on motion” to quash execution are decided

“in the exercise of [] sound discretion,” not as of matter of legal 

right. Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 656. At the time, “it [was] by no 

means uncommon for the court to refuse to interfere upon 

motion,” even “where the [execution] proceedings [were]

clearly erroneous,” and require the filing of a post-judgment 

writ. Id.

Courts had good reason to refuse meritorious motions

to quash. Unlike post-judgment writs, orders on motion to 

quash execution did not vacate judgments and had little finality. McCargo v. Chapman, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 555, 556 (1857). 

Because orders on motions to quash execution did not have 
18

preclusive effect on future executions, review of these orders 

by writ of error would not settle legal rights with finality. Id. at 

556–57. Boyle must be understood in this procedural context.

Having placed Boyle in its proper procedural context, 

we now address Crystallex’s reading of Boyle. Crystallex’s 

argument that Boyle and its progeny hold that refusals to quash 

attachments are unappealable has no basis in Boyle. Boyle, for 

starters, involved a sale order, not an attachment. Boyle II, 31 

U.S. at 655 (“[N]o error is assigned on the original judgment, 

or on the award of the [attachment.]”). The other authority cited 

by Crystallex is Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U.S. 580 (1893). But 

Loeber merely applied Boyle’s rule that “an order overruling a 

motion to quash an execution”—in that case a post-judgment 

attachment—was not a judgment reviewable by writ of error. 

Id. at 584–85 (citing Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 657); see also Toland 

v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 331–32 (1838) (same). So 

Loeber adds nothing to Boyle.

Moreover, contrary to Crystallex’s suggestion, nothing 

in Boyle or Loeber turned on the outcome being a refusal to 

quash. In McCargo, for example, the Supreme Court had no 

difficulty applying Boyle’s holding to dismiss a writ of error 

brought from an order quashing a post-judgment attachment. 

McCargo, 61 U.S. at 557 (“In this case, the Circuit Court 

quashed the execution.”). Nor did Boyle categorically forbid a 

writ of error. Boyle said courts could review an “erroneous”

execution award. See Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 656 (“If, therefore, 

there is an erroneous award of execution, not warranted by the 

judgment, or erroneous proceedings under the execution, a writ 

of error will lie to redress the grievance.”); see also Johnson v. 

Harvey, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 483, 484 (1808) (providing examples of when a writ of error could be brought against execu-
19

tion). Neither Boyle nor Loeber involved a situation where, as 

here, a party complains that execution was erroneously 

awarded against the wrong party, and Crystallex cited no analogous caselaw. This alone distinguishes those cases.

Boyle and Loeber, in short, turned on the limited scope

of the writ of error. But Congress “abolished” the writ of error 

in 1928 and replaced it with the appeal. Act of Jan. 31, 1928,

ch. 14, 45 Stat. 54 (“That the writ or error in cases, civil and 

criminal, is abolished. All relief which heretofore could be 

obtained by writ of error shall hereafter be obtainable by 

appeal.”); Erwin C. Surrency, History of the Federal Courts 

305 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the demise of distinctions between 

the writ of error and the appeal). Appeals were not new. Before 

1928, appeals were common on the equity side of federal 

courts and allowed for broad review of “facts as well as law”

on appeal from a final decree. Buessel v. United States, 258 F. 

811, 814 (2d Cir. 1919). Post-judgment decrees in equity were 

reviewable for abuse even if they were discretionary. In re

Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 129 U.S. 206, 215–16 (1889). 

Whatever substantive distinction remained between 

appeals in equity and law after 1928 ended in 1938. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged law and equity by replacing the forms of action and bills with “one form of action—the 

civil action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 2. And the post-judgment writs 

referenced in Boyle were “abolished” by Rule 60 a few years 

later. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(e). Civil actions and motions, not writs

“shrouded in ancient lore and mystery,” are now the exclusive 

way to seek relief from execution proceedings in federal district court. Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civ. Proc., Report of 

the Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the 

District Courts of the United States (1946), reprinted in 5 
20

F.R.D. 433, 476. While rules of procedure cannot alter our 

jurisdiction, “many of the procedural rules of the district courts 

unquestionably affect [our] jurisdiction” by altering when district court orders can be considered final decisions. Bendix 

Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1952) (en 

banc) (upholding Rule 54(b)).

Crystallex does not explain why Boyle and Loeber have

continued relevance under modern civil procedure. As 

Crystallex acknowledges, courts of appeals often hear appeals 

from final sale orders—like the order at issue in Boyle. “[P]ostjudgment orders are often appealable,” we have said. Sharp 

Props., 998 F.2d at 149. Or as the Fifth Circuit recently 

explained, “[o]rders permitting enforcement of judgments or 

requiring defendants to transfer property to plaintiffs might not 

take the form of judgments, but they certainly dispose of claims 

to that property. And these types of orders have long been 

treated as final and appealable.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 

Quanta Storage, Inc., 961 F.3d 731, 741–42 (5th Cir. 2020)

(citing cases, including Boyle II, 31 U.S. at 656).

Given the merger of law and equity and the abolition of

the forms of action, our appellate jurisdiction is not limited to

those “judgments” that would have been reviewable by writ of 

error in the law courts of Westminster. We have allowed 

appeals from many orders that likely would not have been 

“judgments” under the technical rules of the writ of error. In 

Sharp Properties, for example, we held that a writ of assistance 

ejecting a non-party tenant under Rule 70 was an appealable

final decision, not an unappealable “ministerial or administrative act.” 998 F.2d at 151. Even more telling, the Supreme 

Court now allows appeals from orders vacating prejudgment 

attachments by motion, which may well have been 
21

unreviewable by writ of error at common law. Compare 

Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. at 688–89

(allowing appeal from an order vacating foreign attachment by 

motion), with McCargo, 61 U.S. at 558 (rejecting a writ of 

error from an order quashing attachment by motion). And as 

we have explained, Boyle merely applied the general rule that

discretionary orders were unreviewable by writ of error. 

Clason, 12 Johns. at 49. But the federal reporters are chockfull of appeals reviewing orders for abuse of discretion. Those 

precedents sit uneasily with Boyle and Loeber.

By contrast, there are no well-reasoned decisions 

applying Boyle and Loeber to reject an appeal after 1938. See 

15B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 3916 n.8 (2d ed. 1992) (“Wright & Miller”)

(characterizing Boyle as the “old view” of the appealability of 

execution orders). The few decisions that apply Boyle or 

Loeber to dismiss appeals are perfunctory. See, e.g., United 

States v. Moore, 878 F.2d 331, 331 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)

(relying on Loeber to dismiss without explanation); Steccone 

v. Morse-Starrett Prods. Co., 191 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1951)

(same). This silence speaks volumes. Supreme Court decisions 

under the First Judiciary Act are binding and relevant, but we 

see no persuasive reason why Boyle’s understanding of the writ 

of error and the discretionary nature of motions to quash execution under the forms of action compels dismissal of these 

appeals, and Crystallex offers none. In the contest between the 

writ of error and the civil appeal, as in other areas, “[t]he war 

between law and equity is over. Equity won.” Douglas 

Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs.

53, 53 (1993).
22

2

We apply our “practical finality” approach to these

post-judgment orders. Sharp Properties, 998 F.2d at 150. Practical finality, however, does not mean piecemeal review of 

every post-judgment order en route to a final sale. “Appeal 

ordinarily should not be available as to any particular postjudgment proceeding before the trial court has reached its final 

disposition.” Wright & Miller § 3916. Generally, the “dispositive question, then, is whether there is anything left for the district court to do with respect to execution of the judgment.” 

Parker, 927 F.3d at 380. An execution proceeding is final when 

“all that remains is for a non-judicial officer to take and dispose 

of the defendant’s property.” Id. Or as we said in Sharp 

Properties, a post-judgment order is final when it “leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend, ministerially, 

the execution of the decree.” 998 F.2d at 150 (quoting In Re 

Moody, 825 F.2d 81, 85 n.5 (5th Cir. 1987)). The key word is 

“ministerially.” This practical test requires us to determine 

whether the District Court’s judicial role is over.

Applying our test, the District Court’s judicial role in 

this civil action is far from over. The District Court is proceeding through a judicial sale, not an execution sale, and the sale 

process raises several legal questions. To decide judicial sale 

procedures, for example, the District Court first needs to rule 

on objections to the special master’s proposed judicial sale procedures. The parties have raised multiple legal objections to 

this proposal and continue to brief legal issues. Venezuela, for 

example, submitted a district court brief a day after we held 

oral argument in this appeal arguing that a contingent auction

pending an OFAC license would violate sanctions regulations.

That is a legal objection calling for the District Court’s judg-
23

ment, not just its ministerial superintendence. More appeals 

will likely follow the final order on sale procedures. 

Appellants raise several pragmatic arguments for finality, but none are persuasive.

Appellants first argue that the pending judicial proceedings are irrelevant to finality because they involve the sale process. The refusal to quash, they say, settled the sole remaining 

threshold objection to the sale of PDVSA’s property as a nonparty to the money judgment. In their view, there is no practical 

reason to defer review of this separate threshold objection. But 

preventing the “harassment and cost of a succession of separate 

appeals”—as the law requires—is a fine practical reason to 

defer review. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 

(1940). Threshold affirmative dispositive defenses to liability 

(like a statute of limitations) are often rejected in interlocutory 

orders, but their rejection is not immediately appealable. 

Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 873. Disappointed litigants 

who lose on threshold affirmative defenses must ordinarily 

wait “until the end of proceedings before gaining appellate 

review.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524 

(1988). So too here.

Appellants also argue that further proceedings would be 

wasteful if we later hold the attachment invalid. Perhaps. “But 

the possibility that a ruling may be erroneous and may impose 

additional litigation expense is not sufficient to set aside the 

finality requirement imposed by Congress.” RichardsonMerrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985). This rule is 

sensible, as we affirm district courts far more often than we 

reverse them.
24

Appellants’ core argument, however, is that we should 

discount ordinary principles of finality because post-judgment 

decisions are more permissive of piecemeal appeals. Sharp

Properties and other decisions of our Court lend some support 

to this argument. We have said that “when supplementary postjudgment orders are involved . . . the policy against . . . avoiding piecemeal review [is] less likely to be decisive.” Sharp 

Properties, 998 F.2d at 150 (quoting Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., 

Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986)). And in Ohntrup, we 

held a post-judgment denial of a motion to withdraw as counsel 

immediately appealable even though discovery proceedings in 

aid of execution remained pending before the District Court. 

Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 678. But critically, we granted review in 

that case only because if the lawyers involved had to wait until 

the execution proceedings were over, they “would . . . be 

effectively denied meaningful review” of their motion to withdraw. Id.

Unlike in Ohntrup, Appellants have not shown they will 

be denied meaningful appellate review unless we intervene 

now. Appellants argue that unless we intervene now, they will 

be irreparably injured by a fire sale. But that injury will only 

materialize if a contingent auction takes place and they ultimately lose on appeal, so they have not shown an effective 

denial of appellate review. If we allowed piecemeal appeals to 

prevent the risk of mere financial loss occasioned by litigation 

decisions, “Congress’s final decision rule would end up a 

pretty puny one.” Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 872.

The risk of a fire sale is also speculative. We do not yet 

know whether the District Court will order a contingent auction 

pending OFAC approval (an issue Venezuela continues to vigorously litigate before the District Court), so we have no basis 
25

to assume that a contingent auction will happen anytime soon. 

Far from it, the special master has recommended against commencing the marketing and bidding process until OFAC’s 

position materially changes. Even if the District Court rejects 

this recommendation and orders a contingent auction, the 

District Court appears to agree that OFAC’s approval would 

be necessary to complete the transaction and transfer title. 

Nor are appellants without a proper remedy: Once the 

District Court enters a final decision, they may seek a stay of 

execution pending appeal, preventing an auction from going 

forward. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b), (e); Fed. R. App. P. 8. Stays, 

not judge-made equitable or foreign-policy exceptions to the

jurisdictional requirement of finality, are the proper way to 

protect appellants from irreparable injury while they raise their 

legal challenges on appeal.

3

In a conclusory footnote, appellants also argue that the 

refusal to quash is appealable as a collateral order. This argument lacks merit for the same reason as their finality argument:

appellants have not shown that refusals to quash an attachment 

are effectively unreviewable on appeal later. See Mohawk 

Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108–09 (2009) (an 

appellant must show that “deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing 

immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders”).

The refusal to quash is not a final decision. 
26

B

Venezuela separately appeals the District Court’s decision to “set up the sales procedures and then to follow them to 

the maximum extent that can be accomplished without a specific license from OFAC.” Crystallex Int’l Corp., 2021 WL 

129803, at *16. This preliminary order—a decision to 

determine sale procedures in the future with the advice of a 

special master—is interlocutory and unappealable. 

1

Before addressing our jurisdiction, we pause to explain 

what the District Court did not decide. Appellants say that the 

preliminary decision on sale procedures “contemplates a contingent auction” without prior OFAC approval. Appellants’ 

Opening Br. 44 (emphasis added); see also Oral Argument at 

14:10–14:44 (asserting the decision requires steps toward a 

contingent auction). But saying that an order contemplates a 

contingent auction is an admission that the order is tentative 

and not final on at least that disputed issue. The District Court 

docket confirms this. In its briefing before the District Court, 

Venezuela continues to litigate the legality of a contingent auction and insists that the District Court has yet to decide whether 

to approve a contingent auction.

Our own review of the January 2021 order confirms that 

the District Court has not approved a contingent auction. The 

District Court said it would go only as far as OFAC’s regulations allow and acknowledged that OFAC’s approval will be 

needed to complete a sale. The final sale procedures order, not 

the preliminary decision on appeal, will govern if, when, and 
27

how, a sale can begin and end.7 To be sure, the District Court 

did not foreclose the possibility of a contingent auction pending OFAC’s approval. But neither did it endorse that possibility. That issue will be decided in the final sale procedures 

order, with the benefit of the special master’s recommendations after further briefing. Venezuela’s assertion that a contingent auction would violate OFAC’s regulations is therefore

unripe for resolution in this appeal. Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162–63 (1967). We reject Venezuela’s 

attempt to inject this premature issue into this appeal.

2

The only decision before us, then, is the District Court’s 

decision to begin the process for deciding sale procedures. 

Venezuela argues that we have jurisdiction to review this decision under the collateral-order doctrine. We do not.

7 Appellants read a contingent-sale requirement into the 

District Court’s decision to allow “[t]he winning bidder . . . a 

reasonable amount of time to pursue any necessary and 

desirable regulatory approvals.” Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. 

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. 17-mc-151-LPS, 2021 

WL 129803, at *17 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2021). But this part of the 

order refers to regulatory approvals generally, not OFAC 

approvals. OFAC is far from the only regulator in Washington,

D.C. As Crystallex explained, a winning bidder may need

merger approval from the Federal Trade Commission and the 

Department of Justice before closing the acquisition. See 15 

U.S.C. § 18a. Similarly, bidders from outside the United States 

may need approval from the Committee on Foreign Investment 

in the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565.
28

The collateral-order doctrine is a narrow exception from

the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal.

Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868. It allows appeals from a 

“small class” of orders “which finally determine claims of right 

separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, 

too important to be denied review.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). “That small category 

includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve 

important questions separate from the merits, and that are 

effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in 

the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 

U.S. 35, 42 (1995). 

Orders that “substantially overlap” or are intertwined 

with the “factual and legal issues of the underlying dispute” are 

not separate from the merits under Cohen, “making such determinations unsuited for immediate appeal as of right under 

§ 1291.” Biard, 486 U.S. at 529. The District Court’s preliminary order is not separate from the merits of the pending proceedings. The preliminary order is but a “tentative, informal, 

[and] incomplete” step on the issue of how far the District 

Court can go toward a final sale. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. The 

District Court will decide how far is too far in the forthcoming 

order on sale procedures, after further briefing. Crystallex Int’l 

Corp., 2021 WL 129803, at *16–17. Venezuela’s claim that 

this preliminary decision to determine sale procedures goes too 

far will substantially overlap with and merge into the merits of 

the forthcoming final decision on sale procedures, so it is not 

collateral to the pending proceedings.

* * *
29

We lack jurisdiction over the appeals, so we will dismiss them. In doing so, we express no opinion on the merits, 

as they are not before us. Venezuela or other appellants may

raise their arguments in a future appeal from a final decision, 

and we will consider their arguments then.