IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DEUTSCHE BANK AG,

Plaintiff,

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v.

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C.A. No. 2017-0822-SG

DEVON PARK BIOVENTURES, L.P., 

DEVON PARK ASSOCIATES, L.P., 

SEBASTIAN HOLDINGS, INC., and 

UNIVERSAL LOGISTIC MATTERS, 

S.A.,

Defendants.

DEVON PARK BIOVENTURES, L.P.,

Counterclaim 

Plaintiff,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK AG,

Counterclaim 

Defendant,

and

SEBASTIAN HOLDINGS, INC. and 

UNIVERSAL LOGISTIC MATTERS, 

S.A.,

Cross-Claim 

Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: July 31, 2023

Date Decided: October 31, 2023

Stephen C. Norman and Aaron R. Sims, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, 

Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: David G. Januszewski and Sheila C. 

Ramesh, CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys 

for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Deutsche Bank AG.

Edwin J. Harron, James M. Yoch, Jr., and Kevin P. Rickert, YOUNG CONAWAY 

STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Kevin C. 

Maclay, Todd E. Phillips, Quincy M. Crawford, and Nathaniel R. Miller, CAPLIN & 

DRYSDALE, CHARTERED, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Defendant, 

Counterclaim Plaintiff, and Cross-Claim Plaintiff Devon Park Bioventures, L.P. and 

Defendant Devon Park Associates, L.P.

William M. Kelleher, Neil R. Lapinski, and Phillip A. Giordano, GORDON,

FOURNARIS & MAMMARELLA, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: 

Ira S. Zaroff and Richard M. Zaroff, ZAROFF & ZAROFF LLP, Garden City, New 

York, Attorneys for Defendant Sebastian Holdings, Inc.

P. Clarkson Collins, Jr., K. Tyler O’Connell, Albert J. Carroll, and R. Eric Hacker, 

MORRIS JAMES LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant CPR 

Management, S.A., f.k.a. Universal Logistic Matters, S.A.

GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
1

This is essentially a collection action, in which Plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG 

(“Deutsche”) is attempting to vindicate a portion of a judgment awarded in an 

English Court in 2013 against Defendant Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (“Sebastian”). 

Sebastian is a citizen of the Turks and Caicos Islands. Among its assets was a limited 

partnership interest in a Delaware limited partnership, Devon Park Bioventures, LP

(“Devon LP”). Sebastian assigned its limited partnership interest (the “Devon 

Interest”), post judgment, to Defendant CPR Management, S.A. (“CPR”), a 

Panamanian entity. Both these Defendants are associated with (per the complaint) 

a Norwegian billionaire, Alexander Vik (“Vik Jr.”), or his father.

Devon LP is ending the end of its fund life and, as of March 2015, has been 

distributing exited investments to its limited partners. It is holding a sum 

representing the former Sebastian limited partnership interest, the Devon Interest, in 

a bank account in Pennsylvania, Devon LP’s principal place of business. Deutsche 

sought a judgment in this litigation that the transfer of the Devon Interest from 

Sebastian to CPR was fraudulent, done simply to frustrate collection of the judgment 

in favor of Deutsche. I was unable to reach that question, because I found that I had 

jurisdiction over neither Sebastian nor CPR.1

1 Deutsche Bank AG v. Devon Park Bioventures, L.P., 2021 WL 2711472, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 

30, 2021) (“Deutsche Bank I”). 
2

Deutsche has shifted ground. It now seeks to proceed in rem. It contends that 

the Devon Interest is an intangible piece of personal property constructively located 

in Delaware, where Devon LP was created. It seeks a charging order against the 

current holder of the Devon Interest. Although this Court does not have personal 

jurisdiction over Sebastian, Deutsche asserts that an in rem action over the Devon 

Interest does not offend due process, in part because it already has a judgment against 

Sebastian, which had the opportunity to litigate the underlying indebtedness.

Sebastian and CPR (the “Jurisdictional Defendants”) have moved to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(2). They argue that, as intangible personal property, the Devon 

Interest resides with the holder of the Devon Interest, that is, in Panama or the Turks 

and Caicos Islands. If so, there is no res in this state to provide in rem jurisdiction. 

I need not resolve this question, however. That is because, even if the Devon Interest 

is here, determining the ownership thereof would be predicate to the charging order

that Deutsche seeks. In turn, that would require haling CPR into this jurisdiction to 

defend on the issue of fraudulent transfer.2 But I have already determined that I have 

no jurisdiction over CPR for that purpose. This is simply a backdoor way of 

obtaining jurisdiction over CPR in the substantive fraud litigation, which I have 

2 Deutsche also seeks a finding that CPR is the alter ego of Vik, Jr., who is the alter ego of 

Sebastian. See Tr. 7-31-2023 Tel. Suppl. Oral Argument re Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss 50:14–51:2

(“Oral Arg. Tr.”). Adjudication of this theory would also require in personam jurisdiction that is 

lacking here. 
3

already determined is not supported by due process. CPR is the record holder of the 

Devon Interest; Deutsche has a judgment against Sebastian, not CPR. Under our 

statute, any court with jurisdiction may issue a charging order; Deutsche will have 

to seek such order in a court with jurisdiction over CPR.

Likewise, Devon LP seeks to interplead the sum representing the Devon

Interest in this Court, then let Sebastian and CPR litigate over the ownership. But 

CPR is the record holder of the Devon Interest, per Devon LP. This is not a dispute 

between CPR and Sebastian as to who owns the Devon Interest. It seems that Devon 

LP foresees the interpleader action as setting up a forum for Deutsche to prove its 

fraud claim against the Jurisdictional Defendants in Delaware.3 But again, I lack 

personal jurisdiction over Sebastian or CPR. As I noted in my June 30, 2021, 

Memorandum Opinion, Deutsche is undoubtedly frustrated by what it sees as Vik

Jr.’s egregious evasion of Deutsche’s judgment rights. This litigation, however, “is 

about nothing more than an allegedly fraudulent transfer of equity in a Delaware 

entity between two foreign citizens, to frustrate a judgment debt obtained by a third 

foreign entity in a foreign jurisdiction. Accordingly, due process dictates that this 

Court must stand aside.”4 Recasting this fraud claim as in rem, under the facts here, 

does not change that result.

3

I note that Deutsche is pursuing its claims in this matter in other fora as well.

4 Deutsche Bank I, 2021 WL 2711472, at *11.
4

A final observation is warranted. Deutsche seeks a charging order against 

distribution of the “Devon Interest,” which, per the complaint, would constitute a 

lien against Sebastian and/or CPR. In other words, it seeks to charge the “Interest,” 

whoever may hold it; further, it seeks a declaration that Sebastian “is the owner of 

the Devon. . . Interest[.]” Accordingly, I have not considered whether a conditional 

charging order against the limited partnership interest of Sebastian alone, if any, is 

permissible under Delaware law, or whether such an order would satisfy due process 

given the fact that Deutsche has obtained a judgment against Sebastian in a 

jurisdiction where Sebastian appeared and opposed.

My rationale is below.

I. BACKGROUND 5

A. The Parties and Relevant Non-Parties

Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Deutsche Bank (“Deutsche”) is a 

corporation organized under the laws of Germany.6 Deutsche maintains a branch 

office in New York, New York, and has consented to personal jurisdiction.7

5 This memorandum opinion includes a brief recitation of facts and incorporates only those 

necessary to my analysis. A fuller explanation of the facts is laid out in Deutsche Bank I.

6 Verified Am. Compl. ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 326 (“Am. Compl.”).

7

See id.
5

Defendant Devon LP is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal 

office in Pennsylvania.8 Devon LP has also filed counterclaims and cross-claims for 

interpleader in this action.9

Defendant Devon Park Associates, L.P. (“Devon GP”) is a Delaware limited 

partnership and the general partner of Devon LP.10

Defendant Sebastian is a corporation organized under the laws of the Turks 

and Caicos Islands.11 It is an exempted company, which cannot do business in the 

Turks and Caicos Islands beyond a de minimis level.12

The Defendant CPR is a corporation organized under the laws of Panama.13

CPR formally changed its name from Universal Logistic Matters, S.A. to CPR 

Management, S.A. in 2015.14

Non-party Vik Jr. is a Norwegian billionaire.15 He was, at all relevant times, 

the sole shareholder and director of Defendant Sebastian.16

8

Id. ¶ 9. 

9

See Def. Devon Park Bioventures, L.P.’s Answer and Verified Countercls.–Cross-Cls. for 

Interpleader, Dkt. No. 15 (“Interpleader”).

10 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 20.

11 Id. ¶ 11.

12 Id.

13 Id. ¶ 12.

14 Id. CPR appears to have been formerly known as both Universal Logistic Matters, S.A. and 

Universal Logistics Matters, S.A. Id. ¶ 5.

15 Id. ¶¶ 2, 13.

16 Id. ¶ 11.
6

Non-party VBI Corporation (“VBI”) is a corporation organized under the laws 

of the Turks and Caicos Islands whose sole shareholder is, and was at all relevant 

times, Alexander Vik, Sr., Vik Jr.’s father.17 VBI is an exempted Turks and Caicos 

company, which cannot do business in the Turks and Caicos Islands beyond a de 

minimis level.18

B. Factual Background

In 2008, Sebastian failed to satisfy margin calls Deutsche made to recoup 

losses it incurred trading on Sebastian’s behalf.19 Deutsche filed suit against 

Sebastian in an English Court in 2009 (the “English Action”) seeking amounts owed 

in connection with those unpaid margin calls, as well as interest and costs.20

Deutsche prevailed in that action, obtaining a judgment for $235,646,345 in 

November 2013 (“English Judgment”).21 Sebastian has not paid Deutsche any 

portion of the amount due under the English Judgment.22 Deutsche seeks to satisfy 

the English Judgment from Sebastian’s remaining assets—in particular the Devon 

Interest.23

17 Id. ¶ 14.

18 Id.

19 Id. ¶¶ 2, 36.

20 Id. ¶¶ 3, 44. The English Action is captioned Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 

Claim No. 2009 Folio 83. Id.

21 Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 49–51.

22 See id. ¶ 53.

23 Id. ¶¶ 228–29. 
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In 2012, during the English Action and another related action, Sebastian 

purported to transfer the majority of its remaining non-cash assets to non-party VBI, 

including the Devon Interest.24 The transfer of the Devon Interest was never 

approved by Devon LP’s general partner, Devon GP, as would have been required 

by Devon LP’s Partnership Agreement.25 In 2014, Sebastian purported to transfer 

the Devon Interest to CPR via an “assignment and assumption agreement.”

26

Deutsche did not learn of this transfer until 2016, in connection with another lawsuit 

seeking to collect amounts owed under the English Judgment.27 

In 2017, CPR initiated an arbitration proceeding against Devon LP in 

Pennsylvania in which CPR prevailed as the holder of the Devon Interest.

28

 This 

arbitration award was affirmed by the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania and, subsequently, the Third Circuit.29 However, a 

subsequent decision of an English Court concluded that Sebastian is the rightful 

owner of the Devon Interest.30 Neither of these decisions involved all parties who 

claim ownership of the Devon Interest, therefore the parties’ conflicting contentions 

24 Id. ¶¶ 83–85, 90.

25 Id. ¶¶ 90–94, 102–103.

26 Id. ¶¶ 133, 241.

27 Id. ¶¶ 112–13.

28 Id. ¶ 119.

29 See CPR Mgmt., S.A. v. Devon Park Bioventures, L.P., 19 F.4th 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2021). For 

procedural reasons not pertinent here, Deutsche was not able to participate in the arbitration. 

30 See Letter to Hon. Sam Glasscock III Ex. A, Dkt. No. 400 (the “English Decision”).
8

have not yet been heard by a court of competent jurisdiction that can afford all parties 

their due process rights.

After prevailing in the English Action, Deutsche attempted to collect on the 

English Judgment with a series of actions in various courts, which are now either 

pending or stayed.31 

C. Procedural History

Deutsche initiated this action on November 16, 2017, asserting claims for (1) 

recognition and (2) enforcement of the English Judgment against Sebastian, (3) a 

charging order against the Devon Interest pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 17-703, and (4) 

fraud and (5) conspiracy against all defendants.32 Most pertinent to this decision are

Deutsche’s requests for charging orders against the Devon Interest. Deutsche claims 

it is “entitled to charge the limited partnership interests in Devon [LP] owned by 

judgment debtor [Sebastian] and/or its alleged assignee, CPR in order to satisfy the 

English Judgment. [Deutsche] thereby ha[s] the right to receive any distribution or 

distributions from Devon [LP] to which [Sebastian] or its purported assignee, CPR, 

would otherwise have been entitled in respect of such limited partnership 

interests.”33 To accomplish this, Deutsche further states that “this Court should 

31 See Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik et al., Index No. 161257/2013 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.); Deutsche Bank 

AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc. and Alexander Vik, Docket No. X08-FST-CV13-5014167-S (Conn. 

Super. Ct.), amongst others. 

32 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 212–59 (asserting same causes of action as the original complaint); see Verified 

Compl. ¶¶ 151–97, Dkt. No. 1.

33 Am. Compl. ¶ 232.
9

exercise its broad power and declare that [Sebastian] is the owner of the Devon [ ] 

Interest.”34 In its prayer for relief, Deutsche specifically requests that this “Court 

enter an Order: . . . entering a Charging Order pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 17-703 against 

[Sebastian’s] limited partnership interest in Devon [LP];” “entering a Charging 

Order pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 17-703 against CPR’s limited partnership interest in 

Devon [LP];” and “declaring that such charging Orders constitute liens on 

[Sebastian’s] and CPR’s partnership interests in Devon [LP.]”35

Devon LP answered the complaint on December 21, 2017, and asserted 

counter- and cross-claims for interpleader against Deutsche, Sebastian, and CPR, 

requesting this Court determine the rightful owner of the Devon Interest and the 

distributions associated with it.36 This Court entered a temporary restraining order 

on January 29, 2018, to prevent Devon LP from making any distributions associated 

with the Devon Interest during the pendency of this action.

37

On June 30, 2021, I granted motions to dismiss filed by Sebastian and CPR, 

which challenged the jurisdictional basis under the Delaware long-arm statute and 

jurisdiction under the conspiracy theory.38 In that Memorandum Opinion, I held that 

the Jurisdictional Defendants did not subject themselves to Delaware long-arm 

34 Id. ¶ 233.

35 Id. at 78–79 (emphasis added).

36 Interpleader ¶¶ 65–69.

37 Tr. of Jan. 29, 2018 Arg. on Pl.’s Mot. for TRO and Rulings of the Court 101:23–112:13, Dkt. 

No. 96.

38 See Deutsche Bank I, 2021 WL 2711472, at *7–11.
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service and did not have sufficient minimum contacts with this state to satisfy due 

process in exercise of jurisdiction over them.39

My holding stemmed from the fact that while the asset in question was equity 

in a Delaware entity, transfer of that interest between foreign parties did not equate 

to an injury in Delaware, nor, without more, to doing business in Delaware.40

Because Sebastian and CPR were not alleged to have taken any actions in Delaware 

that gave rise to the claims against them, the long-arm statute did not support 

exercising jurisdiction.41 Further, Deutsche and Devon LP neither alleged a 

substantial act nor substantial effect in furtherance of the conspiracy that occurred 

in Delaware, and no basis existed to extend jurisdiction over Sebastian and CPR 

under the conspiracy theory.42

On September 22, 2021, I directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing 

to address only the jurisdictional issues regarding Deutsche’s request for a charging 

order or Devon LP’s interpleader claim, which were characterized as in rem or quasi 

in rem and supported by statutory jurisdiction.43 I heard oral argument on April 25, 

2022, and took the matter under advisement.

44

 

39 Id. at *8, 10–11.

40 Id. at *11.

41 Id. at *8.

42 Id. at *8–9.

43 Granted Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Regarding Suppl. Br., Dkt. No. 377.

44 Judicial Action Form re Dismissal Post Trial before Vice Chancellor Glasscock dated Apr. 25, 

2022, Dkt. No. 389. 
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Shortly thereafter, on June 27, 2022, litigation in England progressed, and 

Deutsche submitted a letter to this Court that attached a decision and order from the 

English Court providing inter alia that the purported transfer of the Devon Interest 

from Sebastian to CPR was a pretense because Sebastian retained beneficial 

ownership of the Devon Interest at all times.

45 As a result, I directed the parties to 

submit supplemental memorandums of law addressing the effect of the English 

Court’s decision on the Jurisdictional Defendants’ remaining motions relating to in 

rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction regarding Deutsche’s request for a charging order, 

Devon LP’s interpleader claim, and motions to dismiss.46

This Memorandum Opinion addresses the motions of the Jurisdictional 

Defendants to dismiss for lack of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.

II. ANALYSIS

A court may assert in rem jurisdiction “to adjudicate the rights to a given piece 

of property, including the power to seize and hold it.”47 The purpose of asserting in 

rem jurisdiction is to “determin[e] the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of 

persons generally with respect to that thing[,]” while quasi in rem jurisdiction 

involves “determining the rights of a person having an interest in property located 

45See English Decision.

46 Tr. of 9.27.22 Tel. Status Conf. on Pl.’s Mot. Suppl. Compl. 5:20–6:3, Dkt. No. 421.

47 Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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within the court’s jurisdiction.”48 To determine whether this Court can assert in rem 

or quasi in rem jurisdiction, the Court must determine whether (1) the property at 

issue is located within its jurisdiction and (2) asserting such jurisdiction “satif[ies] 

the same minimum contacts test as required for [i]n personam jurisdiction under 

International Shoe. . . in order to comport with constitutional due process.”49

In other words, the analysis is akin to that regarding personal jurisdiction in 

general, with the presence of the resin Delaware substituting for the long-arm statute 

as a jurisdictional hook, followed by a due process analysis.

A. The Charging Order

With the English Judgment in hand, Deutsche seeks to enforce its rights as a 

judgment creditor against Sebastian by requesting that this Court grant it a charging 

order against the Devon Interest pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 17-703.50 Under 6 Del. C.

§ 17-703, “[o]n application by a judgment creditor of a partner or of a partner’s 

assignee, a court having jurisdiction may charge the partnership interest of the 

judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment.”51 While the statute grants the Court of 

Chancery “jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter relating to any such 

charging order[,]”52 pace Deutsche the statute does not provide the Court with 

48 In rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

49 Grynberg v. Burke, 388 A.2d 443, 445 (Del. Ch. 1978).

50 See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 230–33.

51 6 Del. C. § 17-703(a).

52 6 Del. C. § 17-703(f).
13

universal or exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought under this statute. The 

statute, as I read it, merely gives the Court of Chancery subject matter jurisdiction

over charging orders, but it does not, and cannot purport to, expand the Court’s 

jurisdiction in such a manner that would allow the Court to violate the due process 

rights of the parties against whom the charging order is sought.53 Therefore, this

Court must first be satisfied that it can assert jurisdiction over all parties necessary

to the action, before proceeding.

1. 6 Del. C. § 17-703 Does Not Grant Jurisdiction Over CPR

Our courts have not opined on where a limited partnership interest resides 

when that interest is owned by a partner who is foreign to Delaware. The parties 

have put forward, at length, their respective positions on how the Delaware Revised 

Uniform Limited Partnership Act should be interpreted.54 

53 See id.

54 Under 6 Del. C. § 17-701, “[a] partnership interest is personal property.” The meaning of 

“personal property” in this statute for purposes of determining the situs of a limited partnership 

interest has not yet been interpreted by this Court or any other state court in Delaware. 

The Jurisdictional Defendants submit that the limited partnership interest should be 

considered intangible personal property, and, as such, request that this Court follow the common 

law rule to conclude that the situs of intangible property follows the domicile of the owner, which 

is either Panama or the Turks and Caicos in this instance. SHI’s Opening Br. Addressing Issues 

Relating In Rem and Quasi In Rem 5, 7–8, Dkt. No. 378; Def. CPR Mgmt., S.A.’s Suppl. Opening 

Br. Supp. Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 15–16, Dkt. No. 379 (citing Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 

490, 503 (1993)) (“CPR’s Opening Br.”). As further evidence supporting this contention, CPR 

compares the lack of a stated situs in 6 Del. C. § 17-701 to the analogous section in the Delaware 

General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. § 169, that specifies that the situs of corporate stock of 

Delaware corporations “shall be regarded as in this State[,]” to argue that the General Assembly 

knew how to write a statute specifying the situs of intangible property and its failure to do so in 6 

Del. C. § 17-701 indicates that the common law rule for intangible personal property applies. 

CPR’s Opening Br. 14–16. Deutsche retorts that such an interpretation would render 6 Del. C. § 
14

I need not reach the issue of where the Devon Interest has its situs, as Deutsche 

is seeking a charging order against the Devon Interest, the record holder of which is 

CPR, a non-party to the English Judgment upon which Deutsche now relies. While 

Deutsche asserts that the Court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true, 

including that the Devon Interest is held by Sebastian,55 the Court is not so required 

when determining a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction.56 That is especially pertinent here, where there are competing judicial 

decisions with respect to the owner of the Devon Interest.57 The basis for Deutsche’s 

17-703 meaningless by limiting judgment creditors’ ability to seek charging orders from this Court 

to the atypical situation where all entities claiming ownership of the limited partnership interest 

are subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware because, according to Deutsche, the Delaware 

Courts have exclusive jurisdiction under 6 Del. C. § 17-703. Deutsche Bank AG’s Suppl. Br. 

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss 17–20, Dkt. No. 382 (“Deutsche’s Opp’n Br.”). But I have 

rejected this argument, above.

Deutsche posits that this Court should analyze practical and equitable considerations to 

identify the situs of a limited partnership interest. Deutsche’s Opp’n Br. 14–16 (collecting cases 

from other jurisdictions that have found, for the purpose of entering a post-judgment charging 

order, the situs of the limited partnership interest to be the same as where the limited partnership 

was formed). Similarly, Devon LP directs this Court’s attention to federal case law that 

demonstrates the federal courts will exercise in rem jurisdiction over property even where the 

courts otherwise lack personal jurisdiction over an entity with an interest in the property. 

Counterclaim Pl. Devon Park’s Suppl. Br. Supp. Finding In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction 

Over Devon Park’s Interpleader Claims 7–8, Dkt. No. 383 (collecting cases) (“Devon LP’s Opp’n 

Br.”). In further support of this argument, Devon LP relies on the reasoning in Koh v. Inno-Pacific 

Holdings, Ltd., which resulted in a Washington state court granting a charging order against a 

limited partnership interest held in a limited partnership formed under the laws of Washington

even though the interest was held by a Singaporean corporation over whom the court otherwise 

lacked personal jurisdiction. Id. at 4–6 (citing Koh, 54 P.3d 1270, 1271–72, 1274 (Wash. Ct. App. 

2002)). Unlike here, the party over which the charging order was sought in Koh was a judgment 

debtor who was given the opportunity to defend itself in the action that resulted in the judgment 

upon which the judgment creditor relied. Koh, 54 P.3d at 1271.

55 See Deutsche’s Opp’n Br. 13.

56 See Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 265 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, 

the court may consider the pleadings, affidavits, and any discovery of record.”).

57 See supra, Section I.B.
15

requested charging order is the English Judgment resulting from the English Action,

an action to which CPR was not a party. CPR is not a judgment debtor of Deutsche, 

therefore. 

Although Deutsche has failed to have this Court exercise jurisdiction over its 

fraud claims,

58 Deutsche now argues that the language of 6 Del. C. § 17-703 gives 

Deutsche status as a judgment creditor of CPR. Namely, Deutsche asserts that 

because the English Judgment gave Deutsche status as judgment creditor of 

Sebastian, Sebastian’s subsequent transfer of the Devon Interest to CPR does not 

prevent Deutsche from enforcing the English Judgment against CPR, Sebastian’s 

alleged assignee, based on the statutory language.

59 A charging order against a 

partnership requires an “application by a judgment creditor of a partner or of a 

partner’s assignee[.]”60 That is, the right to obtain a charging order inheres in a 

judgment creditor of a partner, or a judgment creditor of an assignee of a partner. 

The purpose is to allow judgment creditors to vindicate judgments against holders 

of partnership interest, without invading the partnership itself. I find Deutsche’s 

alternative reading—that a judgment creditor of a partner may attach the interest of 

the partner’s assignee—untenable. A good faith transferee of an interest is surely 

not subject to a subsequent judgment against the transferor, and the remedy for any 

58 See Deutsche Bank I, 2021 WL 2711472, at *11.

59 Deutsche’s Opp’n Br. 32.

60 6 Del. C. § 17-703(a) (emphasis added).
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fraudulent transfer lies in the fraudulent transfer statute.61 The plain reading of 6 

Del. C. § 17-703 requires that the applicant be a judgment creditor of a partner or a

judgment creditor of a partner’s assignee, it does not allow a judgment creditor of a 

partner to apply for a charging order against the partner’s assignee who is not the 

judgment debtor. This reading corresponds to the language succeeding sentence that 

states, “the judgment creditor has only the right to receive any distribution or 

distributions which the judgment debtor would otherwise have been entitled in 

respect of such partnership interest.”62 Therefore, I find that Deutsche cannot use 

the English Judgment it obtained against Sebastian as a predicate to assert 

jurisdiction under 6 Del. C. § 17-703 over CPR, even assuming that the Devon 

Interest is resident in Delaware.

63

61 See Del. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, 6 Del. C. § 1301, et seq.

62 6 Del. C. § 17-703(a) (emphases added); see also General Elec. Cap. Corp. v. JLT Aircraft Hldg. 

Co., LLC, 2010 WL 3023316 (D. Minn. July 28, 2010) (explaining that a charging order obtained 

under the nearly identical language of Delaware’s Limited Liability Company Act, 6 Del. C. § 18-

703, “permits the judgment creditor to receive distributions from the partnership or limited liability 

company to which the judgment debtor is entitled to receive as a partner, limited partner, or 

member.” (emphasis added)).

63 At oral argument on July 31, 2023, Deutsche also argued that the English Judgment was 

dispositive of an alter ego theory among Sebastian, Vik, Jr., and CPR. Again, CPR was not party 

to that litigation, and Deutsche’s argument is not res judicata, but instead that the English 

Judgment should persuade me to take note that these are alter egos. See Oral Arg. Tr. 17:4–22. 

But I lack personal jurisdiction to cause CPR to litigate the issue.
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2. CPR Lacks Minimum Contacts with Delaware Necessary to 

Comport with Due Process

“All assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the 

standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”

64 A court “may exercise 

jurisdiction over an absent defendant only if the defendant has certain minimum 

contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”65 To comport with due 

process, the minimum contacts must be sufficient to place the nonresident defendant 

on notice such that she can reasonably foresee having to litigate and defend herself 

in Delaware.66 While “the fact that the presence of property in a State may bear on 

the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the 

defendant, and the litigation[,]”67“mere ownership of [an interest in a partnership] 

is not enough, on its own, to justify exercising jurisdiction over”68 the owner of a 

limited partnership interest.

I have previously concluded in Deutsche Bank I that this Court lacks in 

personam jurisdiction over CPR and to assert such jurisdiction over CPR would 

offend due process.

69

 However, for completeness, I will quickly address the issue 

64 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).

65 Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 

(1945)) (quotations and alterations omitted).

66 Eagle Forces Hldgs., LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1228 (Del. 2018).

67 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.

68 OneScreen, Inc. v. Hudgens, 2010 WL 1223937, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2010).

69 See Deutsche Bank I, 2021 WL 2711472, at *6.
18

again here. CPR is a Panamanian entity that received an interest in an entity 

conducting business in Pennsylvania via a transfer from an entity based in the Turks 

and Caicos Islands. The fact that the Devon Interest was that of a Delaware limited 

partner, by itself, is insufficient to put CPR on notice that it could potentially be 

required to defend the validity of the transfer in a Delaware court.

In its amended complaint, Deutsche seeks relief in the form of “a Charging 

Order pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 17-703 against [Sebastian’s] limited partnership 

interest in Devon [LP];” “a Charging Order pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 17-703 against 

CPR’s limited partnership interest in Devon [LP];” and a “declar[ation] that such 

charging Orders constitute liens on [Sebastian’s] and CPR’s partnership interests in 

Devon [LP.]”70 While Deutsche has reframed its already-dismissed fraudulent 

transfer claim to appear as though it centers around the Devon Interest itself, my 

conclusion in Deutsche Bank I, in my view, still rings true: “due process dictates that 

this Court must stand aside.”71

This conclusion comports with the United States Supreme Court’s explanation 

of when a court may assert in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant over 

whom the court otherwise lacks in personam jurisdiction.72 In Shaffer, a nonresident 

stockholder of a Delaware corporation brought suit in the Court of Chancery against 

70 Am. Compl. at 78–79.

71 Deutsche Bank I, 2021 WL 2711472, at *11.

72 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186.
19

a corporation, its officers, and its directors for breach of fiduciary duties.73 As part 

of the lawsuit, the plaintiff-stockholder sought a sequestration of the corporate stock

owned by the nonresident individual defendants.74 The Court of Chancery 

determined it could assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over the nonresident individual

defendants’ corporate stock because the corporate stock’s situs was statutorily 

defined as being in Delaware.75 The United States Supreme Court concluded that 

while “[t]he presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction 

by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation[,]” 

where such property “serves as the basis for state-court jurisdiction [and] is 

completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action[,] . . . the presence of the

property alone, would not support the State’s jurisdiction.”76 Therefore, the 

nonresident individual defendants’ holdings of corporate stock that were neither the 

subject of, nor related to the claims in, the lawsuit brought in the Court of Chancery

were, by themselves, insufficient to provide Delaware state courts jurisdictions over 

the nonresident individual residents.77 

Subsequently, the Court of Chancery interpreted Shaffer’s holding to mean 

that ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation, by itself, does not satisfy the 

73 Id. at 189–90.

74 Id. at 190–92.

75 Id. at 193–94.

76 Id. at 207–08.

77 Id. at 213.
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minimum contacts requirement for purposes of due process.78 The Delaware 

Supreme Court explained that Shaffer and its progeny apply to “all assertions of state 

court jurisdiction[]” and held that, “in and of itself, mere ownership in the forum of 

property related to the litigation is not necessarily sufficient” for a state court to 

assert quasi in rem jurisdiction.79 In the forty years since Isituto Bancario, Delaware 

courts have consistently refused to assert in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over

lawsuits related to allegedly fraudulent transfers of interests in Delaware entities.80

3. CPR is an Indispensable Party That Cannot Feasibly be Joined

A party is deemed to be required if, for instance, “in that person’s absence, 

the Court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties[.]”81 Where this 

Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a required party, “the Court must determine 

whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the 

existing parties or should be dismissed.”82 In making this determination, the Court 

considers, among other things, “whether a judgment rendered in the [required 

78 See Arden-Mayfair, Inc. v. Louart Corp., 385 A.2d 3 (Del. Ch. 1978); Tuckman v. Aerosonic 

Corp., 394 A.2d 226 (Del. Ch. 1978); Bolger v. Northern Lumber Co., 1978 WL 2492 (Del. Ch. 

Apr. 13, 1978).

79 Istituto Bancario Italiano SpA v. Hunter Eng’g Co., Inc., 449 A.2d 210, 221–22 (Del. 1982). 

80 See, e.g., Germaninvestments AG v. Allotmet Corp., 2020 WL 6870459, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 

20, 2020) (concerning the transfer of stock); OneScreen Inc. v. Hudgens, 2010 WL 1223937, at 

*3–6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2010) (same); Hart Hldg. Co. Inc. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 1992 

WL 127567, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. May 28, 1992) (same).

81 Ct. Ch. R. 19(a)(1)(A).

82 Ct. Ch. R. 19(b).
21

party’s] absence would be adequate[.]”83 The Court will dismiss the action under 

Rule 12(b)(7) if the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over an indispensable party, 

such as a party who is the present owner of the asset underlying plaintiff’s request 

to rescind the transaction that caused the asset to come into the indispensable party’s 

possession.84

CPR, according to the Pennsylvania arbitration85 and as evidenced by its 

admission as a limited partner of Devon LP,

86 has a cognizable claim to ownership 

of the Devon Interest against which Deutsche seeks a charging order. Having 

concluded that this Court lacks jurisdiction over CPR and determined that CPR

should be dismissed from this action, this Court is unable to provide Deutsche the 

remedy it seeks. Moreover, this Court is unable to craft a judgment consistent with 

the pleadings that would adequately remedy the harm Deutsche alleges without 

CPR’s presence. Thus, to the extent Deutsche seeks a charging order against the

Devon Interest held by CPR, Deutsche’s operative complaint against Sebastian, 

83 Ct. Ch. R. 19(b)(3). 

84 See Sergerson v. Del. Tr. Co., 1979 WL 174436 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 1979) (dismissing a complaint 

under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(7) after concluding the Court lacked personal jurisdiction 

over an indispensable party, the current owner of a stock certificate, the transfer of which the 

plaintiff sought to rescind).

85 See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 119, 121.

86 See id. ¶ 133 (acknowledging that CPR was to be admitted as a limited partner of Devon LP); 

see also Def. CPR Mgmt., S.A.’s Suppl. Opening Br. Supp. Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 24, Dkt. 

No. 379 (“CPR’s Opening Br.”).
22

CPR, Devon LP, and Devon GP is dismissed in its entirety as CPR is an 

indispensable party over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.

B. The Interpleader Cross-Claim

While I have concluded that I must dismiss Deutsche’s operative complaint 

because this Court lacks jurisdiction over CPR, “dismissal of the original complaint 

as to one of the defendants named therein does not operate as a dismissal of a crossclaim filed against such defendant by a co-defendant.”87

 As such, I turn my attention 

next to whether this Court may exercise in rem jurisdiction over Devon LP’s crossclaim against Sebastian and CPR.

Faced with the competing conclusions of who is the rightful owner of the 

Devon Interest contained in the English Judgment and the Pennsylvanian 

arbitration’s resolution, Devon LP requests that this Court assert in rem jurisdiction 

over the Devon Interest to adjudicate once and for all to whom Devon LP should 

distribute the Devon Interest and corresponding proceeds. 88 

For purposes of considering Devon LP’s interpleader claim, I assume, without 

deciding, that the Devon Interest has its situs in Delaware.89 Even so, I still find that 

87 Samoluk v. Basco, Inc., 1979 WL 135703, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 1989) (interpreting the 

application of Delaware Superior Court Rule 13(g), with similar language to Delaware Court of 

Chancery Rule 13(g), by relying on federal case law interpreting the federal equivalent).

88 Interpleader ¶¶ 61–64; see also Counterclaim Pl. Devon Park’s Suppl. Br. Supp. Finding In Rem 

and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Over Devon Park’s Interpleader Claims 1, Dkt. No. 383 (“Devon 

LP’s Opp’n Br.”).

89 There remains an open question, not yet adjudicated in Delaware, what the meaning of “personal 

property” is for purposes of determining the situs of a limited partnership interest under 6 Del. C.
23

it would offend due process to hale CPR, a Panamanian entity, and Sebastian, a 

Turks and Caicos entity, into a Delaware court to adjudicate what is still, at its heart, 

a fraudulent transfer claim. The resulting litigation would pit Deutsche (also a party 

to the interpleader claim) against CPR, arguing theories of fraudulent transfer or 

veil-piercing. As previously explained in Deutsche Bank I, there are no allegations 

that the purported fraudulent transfer was negotiated in Delaware, nor any 

allegations that Sebastian and CPR, in causing the transfer, were “purposefully 

avail[ing] themselves of Delaware’s benefits and protections.”90 While Devon LP

believes this Court can exercise in rem jurisdiction over the Devon Interest merely 

because the limited partnership was formed in Delaware, due process would not 

satisfied in these circumstances.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I conclude that this Court lacks in rem 

jurisdiction over CPR for purposes of issuing Deutsche’s requested charging order 

against the Devon Interest. However, I have not found that Deutsche lacks 

jurisdiction to seek a conditional charging order against any interest held by 

Sebastian in Devon LP. Nor have I considered whether the statute permits such an 

order, or whether procedural defenses would prevent its assertion here.

§ 17-701. While I appreciate the parties’ arguments related to this issue, as laid out supra in note 

53, I decline to tackle that matter of first impression as it is not necessary to my conclusion.

90 Deutsche Bank I, 2021 WL 2711472, at *11.
24

With respect to Devon LP’s interpleader claim, this Court concludes that 

asserting in rem jurisdiction over the two foreign entities would offend due process. 

Therefore, Sebastian and CPR’s motions to dismiss the cross-claim under Court of 

Chancery Rule 12(b)(2) are GRANTED. 

The parties should promptly notify the Court if they intend to make additional 

submissions with respect to Devon LP’s motion to dismiss Deutsche’s claim. 

Otherwise, I will consider the matter fully submitted and take the matter under 

advisement.

Finally, the parties should inform me whether the order restraining 

distributions should remain in place.

The parties should submit an appropriate form of order.