alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2022311EN.01002301.xml

| 16.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/23

---

Action brought on 4 July 2022 — Crédit agricole and Others v SRB

(Case T-410/22)

(2022/C 311/27)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Crédit agricole SA (Montrouge, France) and the 48 other applicants (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul Decision SRB/ES/2022/18 of 11 April 2022 on the calculation of 2022 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul Decision SRB/ES/2022/18 of 11 April 2022 on the calculation of 2022 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, (1) the Implementing Regulation (2) and the Delegated Regulation (3) inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, (1) the Implementing Regulation (2) and the Delegated Regulation (3) inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Articles 4(2), 5,6, 7 and 20 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 4(2), 5,6, 7 and 20 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay all the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on eight pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-391/22, Société générale and Others v SRB.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 255, p. 1).

(2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 of 19 December 2014 specifying uniform conditions of application of Regulation No 806/2014 with regard to ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (OJ 2015 L 15, p. 1).

(3)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59 with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44).

---
ex_258919.htm


Exhibit 10.40


 


 


 


INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT


 


This Indemnification Agreement (the “Agreement”) is made by and between Leslie Bocskor (the “Director”) and GB Sciences, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) (jointly the “Parties”).


 


Recitals


 


	 	
			A.

				
			The Director is or was a member of the board of directors (the “Board”) of the Company.

			



 


 


	 	
			B.

				
			The Company does not at this time and has not at prior times during the Director’s service, had directors and officers and insurance (“D&O Insurance”).

			



 


Now therefore, in consideration of the obligations and promises made herein, the Parties agree as follows:


 


Agreement


 


	 	
			1.

				
			Willingness to Serve. The Director has been willing to serve on the Board, even in the absence of D&O Insurance, in exchange for the rights of indemnification set forth herein.

			



 


 


	 	
			2.

				
			Indemnification. The Company hereby indemnifies the Director against any loss, damage, cost or expense, including without limitation, legal fees, court costs, judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement, actually and reasonably incurred by the Director, by reason of the fact he or she was a director, officer or agent of the Company, to the fullest extent allowed under Nevada law. For this right of indemnification to be effective with regard to any suit, action or proceeding, the Director must notify the Company within five calendar days of any suit, action or proceeding brought against the Director, and the Company must be allowed to defend or co-defend the suit, action or proceeding. In order for the Company to indemnify the Director against the payment of the settlement of any claim, the Company must have been given the opportunity to help negotiate and approve the settlement.

			



 


 


	 	
			3.

				
			Efforts to obtain Insurance. The Company agrees to continue to try to obtain D&O Insurance as finances and circumstances allow.

			



 


 


 


 


 


Dated: 11/12/2020                                  /s/   John Poss


GB SCIENCES, INC.


By: John Poss


Its: Chief Executive Officer


 


 


Dated: 11/16/2020                                   /s/ Leslie Bocskor


                                           Leslie Bocskor, Individual
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 9060 

To amend section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States to 

clarify that States are persons for purposes of liability under that section, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 31, 2020 

Mr. KENNEDY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United 

States to clarify that States are persons for purposes 

of liability under that section, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS. 

4 Congress finds the following: 

5 (1) The United States Supreme Court has held 

6 that the Eleventh Amendment grants sovereign im7 munity to States in Federal court absent a waiver 

8 by the State or congressional action. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 9060 IH

1 (2) The United States Supreme Court has fur2 ther held that a lawsuit brought under section 1979 

3 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 

4 U.S.C. 1983) against a government official for ac5 tions taken in their official capacity is to be treated 

6 as a lawsuit against the entity of which the officer 

7 is an agent. 

8 (3) Due to sovereign immunity, lawsuits for ac9 tions brought under such section may be filed 

10 against a State government official in their personal 

11 capacity but not in their official capacity. 

12 (4) This Act does not increase liability for gov13 ernment officials in personal capacity cases in any 

14 way, but helps to ensure equitable and monetary re15 lief for victims of civil rights violations. 

16 SEC. 2. LIABILITY OF STATES FOR ACTIONS UNDER COLOR 

17 OF LAW. 

18 Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United 

19 States (42 U.S.C. 1983) is amended by adding at the end 

20 the following: ‘‘For purposes of this section, the term ‘per21 son’ includes a State or Commonwealth, and a depart22 ment, office, or officer acting in their official capacity, 

23 thereof.’’ 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed February 

14, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-00100-CR

NO. 14-12-00101-CR

____________

IN RE WENDIYA KINCHIN, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

56th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 11CR3371 & 11CR3372

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On February 3, 2012, relator Wendiya Kinchin filed a petition for writ of mandamus 

in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. Relator

complains that the presiding judge of the 56th District Court of Galveston County has not 

set a hearing on two applications for writs of habeas corpus.

To be entitled to mandamus relief in a criminal case, a relator must show that he has 

no adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm, and that what he seeks to compel is 
2

a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young v. 

Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007) (orig. proceeding). When a trial judge refuses to issue a writ of habeas corpus or 

denies a hearing on the merits, the applicant may either present the application to another 

judge having jurisdiction, or “under proper circumstances” seek a writ of mandamus. Ex 

parte Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d 391, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus 

shall be granted without delay by the judge or court receiving the petition, unless it [is] 

manifest from the petition itself, or some documents annexed to it, that the party is entitled 

to no relief whatever.” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.15. Relator has not provided this 

court with copies of the applications for writs of habeas corpus on which a hearing is 

requested. Accordingly, this court is unable to determine whether the trial court may have 

properly determined from the applications that relator was not entitled to relief. Relator 

also has not established that the applications were properly filed and brought to the trial 

court’s attention. It is relator’s burden to provide this court with a record sufficient to 

establish his right to relief. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992); Tex. R. 

App. P. 52.3(k), 52.7(a). 

Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Jamison and McCally.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
# C_2022418EN.01005201.xml

| 31.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 418/52 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 418/52

---

Action brought on 14 September 2022 — ATPN v Commission

(Case T-567/22)

(2022/C 418/67)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Association Trinationale de Protection Nucléaire (ATPN) (Basel, Switzerland) (represented by: C. Lepage, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare the present application admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the present application admissible and well founded;

| — | annul Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1214 of 9 March 2022 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 as regards economic activities in certain energy sectors and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 as regards specific public disclosures for those economic activities (1); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1214 of 9 March 2022 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 as regards economic activities in certain energy sectors and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 as regards specific public disclosures for those economic activities (1);

| — | order the Commission to pay the amount of EUR 3 000 to the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the amount of EUR 3 000 to the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging irregularity of the procedure in that it infringed the provisions of Regulation No 2020/852 of 18 June 2020. (2) |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging irregularity of the procedure in that it infringed the provisions of Regulation No 2020/852 of 18 June 2020. (2)

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rules of taxonomy. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rules of taxonomy.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the provisions of Article 19 of Regulation No 2020/852 of 18 June 2020 were infringed and that the objectives were insufficiently ambitious. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the provisions of Article 19 of Regulation No 2020/852 of 18 June 2020 were infringed and that the objectives were insufficiently ambitious.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the general criteria of Community law. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the general criteria of Community law.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging incompatibility between investments in nuclear energy and green investments with regard to financial information. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging incompatibility between investments in nuclear energy and green investments with regard to financial information.

---

(1)  OJ 2022 L 188, p. 1.

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ 2020 L 198, p. 13).

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL PRECIOUS METALS CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         522,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  588,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,110,000
<PP&E>                                         874,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                  63,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              40,162,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,635,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                  (37,426,000)
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                40,162,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               621,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (687,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (687,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.03)
        

</TABLE>
Northern Regional Office * 4800 Enterprise Way * Mo desto, California 95356-8718 * (209) 557-6400 * FA X (209) 557-6475

Central Regional Office * 1990 East Gettysburg Aven ue * Fresno, California 93726-0244 * (559) 230-590 0 * FAX (559) 230-6061

Southern Regional Office * 34946 Flyover Court * Ba kersfield, California 93308 * (661) 392-5500 * FAX (661) 392-5585

CMP-0

Revised: January 2009 

### San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District



### CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES PLAN APPLICATION

General Information

A Conservation Management Practices (CMP) plan is a requirement for all agricultural operation sites a s

specified in Section 5.0 of District Rule 4550. Th e goal of this CMP plan is to reduce sources of PM 10 emissions from agricultural operations. Note: The CMPs chosen in this plan must be implemented by Jul y

1, 2004.

Name of Facility:

Facility Location:

Total Farm Acreage:

City/State/Zip Code:

Mailing Address:

City/State/Zip code:

Phone: Fax:

Other (Cell):

Person Responsible: Title:

Signature: Date:



### Please list the following information for the perso ns responsible for :



### Plan Preparation: Plan Implementation:

Same as Person Responsible Above? Same as Person Responsible Above?

Name: Name:

Title: Title:

Address: Address:

City/State/Zip code: City/State/Zip code:

Phone: Phone:

Fax: Fax:

Other (Cell): Other (Cell):

FOR CMP PLAN EVALUATOR USE ONLY

This CMP plan application has been verified to cont ain all supporting information required by the APCO to evaluate the

application. Checklist attached.

Name: Title: Office Location:

Signature: Date: Phone #: CMP

0
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1


                          SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY



Edge Petroleum Exploration Company (a Delaware corporation)

Edge Petroleum Operating Company, Inc. (a Texas corporation)
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 50 (Friday, March 14, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12161-12162]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-6441]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. CP97-275-000]


Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation; Notice of Request Under 
Blanket Authorization

March 10, 1997.
    Take notice that on March 4, 1997, Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corporation (Columbia Gas), 1700 MacCorkle Avenue S.E., Charleston, 
West Virginia 25314-1599, filed in Docket No. CP97-275-000 a request 
pursuant to Sections 157.205 and 157.211 of the Commission's 
Regulations under the Natural Gas Act (18 CFR 157.205 and 157.211) for 
authorization to construct and operate a new point of delivery in 
McKean County, Pennsylvania, so that interruptible volumes can be 
delivered to Minard Run Oil Company (MRO). Columbia Gas makes such 
request under its blanket certificate issued in Docket No. CP83-76-000 
pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, all as more fully set 
forth in the request on file with the Commission and open to public 
inspection.
    Specifically, Columbia Gas indicates its intent to render the 
interconnecting delivery facility operational by making use of an 
existing 4-inch tap, installing a 4-inch turbo meter setting and an 8-
inch filter separator. It is averred that the delivery facility will be 
used to provide up to 950 Mcf of natural daily to MRO for industrial 
use, and up to 346,750 Mcf annually. Columbia Gas states that the 
interruptible transportation service will be provided to MRO pursuant 
to Columbia Gas'

[[Page 12162]]

blanket authority, issued under Part 284 of the Regulations. It is 
further stated that the interruptible volumes to be delivered to MRO, 
will be within MRO's certificated entitlements. Columbia Gas does not 
anticipate that the interruptible service that it will provide through 
the proposed delivery facility, will detrimentally impact it's existing 
customers.
    Columbia Gas estimates the new delivery facility to cost 
approximately $38,398. It is indicated that MRO will reimburse Columbia 
Gas' total facility cost.
    Any person or the Commission's staff may, within 45 days after 
issuance of the instant notice by the Commission, file pursuant to Rule 
214 of the Commission's Procedural Rules (18 CFR 385.214) a motion to 
intervene or notice of intervention and pursuant to Section 157.205 of 
the Regulations under the Natural Gas Act (18 CFR 157.205) a protest to 
the request. If no protest is filed within the time allowed therefor, 
the proposed activity shall be deemed to be authorized effective the 
day after the time allowed for filing a protest. If a protest is filed 
and not withdrawn within 30 days after the time allowed for filing a 
protest, the instant request shall be treated as an application for 
authorization pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-6441 Filed 3-13-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Docket No: FAA-2015-4813 Dir ID: 2013-NM-161-AD

Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed? 

Organization Person Contacted Date Response 

National Business Aircraft Association Eli Cotti 8/9/13

Regional Airline Association 8/9/13

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman 8/9/13

ATA M Lopez 8/9/13
#### Muneefa ABDULLAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The WALT DISNEY COMPANY; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55888

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 8, 2018 * Pasadena, California

Filed March 8, 2018

Robert Lawrence Levi, Senior Litigating Attorney, Robert L. Levi, P.C., West Bloomfield, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Erin J. Cox, Jordan Dentler Segall, Attorneys, Munger, Tolies *&*Olson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Kelly M. Klaus, Esquire, Attorney, Munger Tolies & Olson, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and BATAILLON,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Muneefa Abdullah appeals from the district court’s judgment in favor of The Walt Disney Company in this copyright action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. *759§ 1291. After a careful examination of each alleged similarity between *The Snow Princess*and *Frozen,*the district court concluded that the two works are not substantially similar under the extrinsic, test as a matter of law. We agree and therefore affirm for the reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned decision granting The Walt Disney Company’s motion to dismiss.1

AFFIRMED.

***

 xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. For the first time on appeal, Abdullah contends that the witch is the princess’s subconscious. Even if that were apparent from the text of *The Snow Princess,*which it is not, the outcome is the same because it is an entirely different expression of the idea of a princess with ice powers than presented in *Frozen. See Funky Films, Inc.*v. *Time Warner Entm't Co.,*462 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting appellants’ "attempt to link up” the main characters in the works because the expression of the generic traits of those characters was different).