2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

9-20-2004 

# Mi l le r Y a ch t S ales v . S mith

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 02-3304

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

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THE UNI TED ST ATES C OURT OF AP PEA LS F OR TH E TH IRD CIR CU IT

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No. 02-3304

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M ILL ER YA CH T S AL ES , IN C.,
Appellant

v.

ST EV EN SM IT H , in di vi du all y; M AR IN ER YA CH T S AL ES , IN C.; IV A N B O G A C H O FF , in di vi du all y; ISLAND YA CHT BRO KERS; AB C C OR PO RA TIO NS 1-1 0, names being fictitious; JOH N D OE S, (1-10), names being fi ctit

ious

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APPEAL FROM THE U NITED STATE S DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DISTRI CT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. No. 02-cv- 00402) Dist ri ctJudg e: The Hono rab le Anne E.

Thompson

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ARG UED OCTO BER 28, 2003

BE FO RE : SC IRI CA , Chief Judge , NY GA AR D, a nd A M BR O,

Circu it Judges

. (Fil ed September 20, 2004) ___________ Chryss a Yaccarino, Esq. (Argued) Villani& DeL uca 703 Richmond Avenue Point Pl easant Beach, NJ 08742 Counsel for Appell ant
Ivan Bogachoff, Esq. (Argued) Bogachoff & Associates 450 0 Ne w Hamp sh ire Av en ue , N W Suite B Washington, DC 20011 Counsel for Appell ees

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OPINI ON OF THE COURT

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NY GA AR D, Circu it Judge

. T he Distri ct Court di smissed Mil ler Yacht S ales’ s uit for trade- dres s infring eme nt, stat

utoryand common law unf air com pet iti on, and t orti ou s interference with prosp ective econ om ic advantage, beca use it co nclud ed tha t it lacked pers onal ju risdictio n ove r Ap pel lees. Because we conclude that Appellees have suff icient co ntacts w ith New Jersey, we will reve rse.

I.
To defeat Appellee’s motion to dismiss for l ac k of personaljuri sdiction, Mil ler Yacht was requir ed to pres ent a pr ima facie case that jurisdi ctionexis ted. Mellon Bank (East) PSFS Nat’l Ass ’n v. Fari no , 960 F.2d 12 17, 1223 (3 d Ci r. 19 92)

. Miller Yacht is a New Jers ey cor po rat ion wi th it s prin ci paloff

ic es in Sout

h Toms River, New Jersey. Miller Yacht designs,2

manufactur es, markets and sells boats. Spe cific to thi s acti on, Mill er Yach t has designed, m anufactur ed, marketed and sold 34' and 38 ' Mari ne T rader D oub le Ca bin and Sed an Y ach ts. Appellee s al so sell and market boats, bu t are not New Jersey residents o r corporations. Beginni n g in 1998, Mil ler Yacht and A pp elle es began negotiati ng a deal that was i ntended t o allow the Appellees to become excl usive market ing repres entatives and dealer s for some of Miller Yacht’s boats, includi ng the Marine Trader Yac hts. 1 During thes e

1. Appellees s tres s thei r argument t hat theywere each acti ng in their indi vidual corporate or pers onal capaci ties and that their contact s with New Jerseyshould be analyzed separa tely. While they are correct that, in general, a court must analy ze questi ons of persona l jurisdi ction

on adef end ant -s pec if

ic and cl ai mspe cific bas is, Calder v. Jones , Ap pellee s’ relianc e on th is gen eral rule ignores substant

ial por tions of Miller Yacht’s al legations and t he evidence sub mitte d to sup por t tho se a llega tion s. 465 U.S. 783, 790 ( 1984). Mill er Yacht alle ges that

Steven Smith and Ivan Bo gach off w ere ac ting as p artners wh ile they neg otiated with M iller Ya cht. In its complaint, Miller Yacht alleges, “D efe nda nt Iv an B oga cho ff . . . was a partner with Stev en S mith a nd at a ll releva nt ti mes hereto and, upon info rma tion and belie f, had express, imp lied, an d/or a ppa rent a utho rity to (co ntin ued ...) 1. (.. .continued)

engage in t ransacti ons on behalf of Steven Smit

h an d h im se lf, in di vi du all y, for the pur

pose of ente ring i nto a business agreement wherei n Bogachoff would become a broker dea ler, along with his part

ner , of Marine Trade r yacht s.” Appell ant’s App. at 13 (emp hasis a dded ). This a llegation is supp orted b y Don ald M iller’s aff idavit in which he states that

Smith and Bogachoff acted t ogether during rel evant negotiations and that

on a parti cular occasion in Februa ry, 2000 “[M iller] personal ly saw Defendants Smith and Bog ac hof

f wo rk in g i n a [b oa t s how ] boo th so licitin g N ew Jers ey Cu stom ers. The re, [M iller] wa s introd uced to Defendant Bogachoff as the partne r of Defendant Smith. ” Appellant ’s App. at 48. Miller Yacht

has all eged that Bogachoff and Smith were partners and that t hey were ea ch also representing one of the appel lee companie s and has supported these allegations w ith a sworn affidavi t. We view the se all egati ons and their supporti ng evidence in a light most favorabl e to Mill er Yacht and, theref ore, infer apartner ship between Bogachoff and Sm ith. See Pinker v. Roche Holdi ngs LTD , 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002) (holdi ng that i n ruli ng on a Ru le 12(b )(2) m otion w e mu st acce pt all of the pl ainti ff’s al legations as t rue and construct dis puted fact s in favor of the plaint iff. ) We disagree with Appelle es

(co ntin ued ...)3

negotiations, Appellee s mad e pho ne ca lls from their

offices out side New Jersey to M ill e r Y ac ht ’s o ff ice s in N ew Je rse y. A dditi on all y, Ap pellee s transm itte d facsimi les into New Jerse y, includi ng proposed lice nsing agr eements for the trade names relevant to the negotiati ons. Appellees also t

ravele d t o Miller Y acht’s offices in N ew Je rse y. During one of these trips, Do nald M iller, th e presi dent of Miller Yacht, provi ded Stev en S mith with

a co py of M iller Y ach t’s sa les b roc hur e. That brochure i ncluded phot ographs and floor p lans of the Marine Trader Yach ts. Miller Yacht also a llege s that it ar ranged and paid for Smit

h to travelto Ch ina to observe the manufacturi ng process f or the Marine Trader Yachts and meet Mille r Yach t’s business conta cts relevant to those yachts. Miller

Yacht clai ms that Appell ees sentfacsimile tr ansmiss i ons to Do nald Miller as part of the pl anning activities for Smith’s tri p to China.
Ev en tu all y, the negotiati ons between the partie s r eached a st andsti ll and t hey fail ed to reac h an a greem ent. Miller Yacht

alle ges that

Appellees misappropriate d the photographs and fl oo r plans conta ined in Miller Yach t’s sa les br ochure, a s well as

o ther inte llec tual propertyowned by Mille r Ya cht, and used it

to produce and market boats that are ident

ical to the Mari ne TraderYa chts . I t fur ther al leges t hat Appellees engag ed M iller Y acht’ s business conta cts in C hina to manu facture the boat s, and th ereby inte rfered with Miller Ya cht’ s busin ess rela tionsh ip w ith those contacts.
Based on t hes e alle gatio ns, M i lle r Ya cht sued Appellees for trade-dress infring eme nt, stat

utoryand common law unf air com pet iti on, and t orti ou s interference with prosp ective econ om ic advantage. Appellees moved t o d ism iss Miller Yacht’s complaint bas ed on lack of personaljuri sdiction and improper venue

. Th e Distri ct Court, without hol ding a n evidentiary hearing, granted Appellees’ motions to dis miss for l ack of personal juri sdiction. Thi s appeal f ollowed.
II.
The Distri ct Court ha d subject matter juri sdiction over th is acti on under 28 U.S .C. §§ 1331, 1332 and 1367. We have appe llate juri sdiction ove r the Dist rict Cou rt’s fina l ord er u nde r 28 U.S .C. § 1291 and review the Distri ct Court’ s decis ion de

novo

. Pinker , 292 F.3 d at 3 68.
A f ederal court s itting in New Jerse y has juri sdiction over par ties to the e xtent providedund er N ew Jers ey state law

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e ); see also Carteret , 954 F.2d at 144 . New Jersey’s lo ng-a rm 1. (.. .continued) that the se alleg ations a nd af fidav its fall short of alle ging a rel ations hip between the pa rties fro m w hich w e mu st attribute the cont act of anyone indivi dual Ap pelle e to a ll of t he A ppe llees

. Carteret Sav. Bank, F. A. v. Shus han , 954 F.2d 141, 145 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1992) (observi ng that “ [a] partnershi p and each partner is held liable fo r the act of ev ery other par tner, executed i n the usualway of carrying on the bus iness of the partnership”).4

statute provides for jurisdi ction c oex tensi ve with the d ue proces s requi re men ts of the Un ited Sta te s Constit ution. N.J. Co urt Ru le 4:4-4 (c); see Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp. , 508 A.2 d 11 27, 1 131 (N .J . 1 986). Thu s, parties w ho h ave c onstitu tionally suffici ent “mi ni mum c ont ac ts ” wi th New Jersey are s ubj ect to suit th ere. See Carteret , 954 F.2 d at 1 49.
Miller Yach t c la ims th at the Distri ct Co u rt had specif

ic jurisdi ction ove r Appellees base d on their co ntacts w ith New Je rse y. 2 Miller Yacht con ced es that Appellees do not have the “consis tent and sys temati c” conta cts with New Jerseythat

wo uld subject

them to gener al jurisdi ction in th atforum. See Pinker , 292 F.3d at 368 n.1.
In analyzin g M iller Ya cht’s sp ecific juri sdiction a rgument, we must “examine the relat ionshi p among the [Appel lees], th e fo r um, and the l iti gation. ” Id. at 368. Spe cific juri sdiction over a de fen da nt exists wh en tha t defe ndan t h a s “pur pose fully directe d his a ctivi ties at reside nts of the fo ru m a nd the li tigat ion results from all eged inj uries that arise out of or relate t o those act

ivities. ” Burger King Corp. v. Rudze wicz , 471 U.S. 462, 472 (198 5) (inte rn al quotations and cit atio n omitt ed). A si ngle cont act that creat es a substant

ial c onnecti on with the forum can be suffi cien t to support t he exercise of person al jurisdiction over a def end ant. Id. at 47 5 n.1 8.
If these “p urposefulavail ment” and “relations hip” requirements are me t, a court may exer cise per sonal j urisdi ction

over a defendantso long as t he exerci se of that jurisdict ion “comport[s] with fai r play and substant

ial j usti ce.” Id. at 476 (internal quotati ons and citations omitted). To defe at jurisdic tion ba sed o n th i s fairness inq uiry, a defendant must “present

a compelli ng case that the presence of

so m e other cons iderat

ions would re nder juri sdiction unreasonabl e. ” Id. at 477. The Supreme Court has i ndi c ated that lower cour ts addressing the fairness questi on may consi der “the burden on the defe ndan t, the forum S tate’s inte rest in adjudic a tin g the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtai ning the most eff ic ient resol ution of controversies, and the shared interest of the seve ral St ates i n furt hering fundamental sub stan tive s ocia l po licies .” Id. (internal quotations o mitted).
To surviv e a m otion to dismis s forlack of persona l j urisdiction, a plaintiff bears t he burden of est ablis hing the c ou rt’ s 2. Miller Yacht

also al leges Appell ees were subject

to pers onal jurisdi ction under the “ effects test .” See Calder , 465 U.S . at 789 . Un der tha t test, a par ty is subje ct to pe rsona l jurisdictio n in a s tate whe n his or her tortious a ctions we re intent ionall y di recte d at that st ate and tho se a ction s ca use d ha rm in that s tate. Because we find that

Appellees ha ve suffici ent cont acts wit

h New Jersey under the more tradi tionalpersonal juri sdiction anal ysi s, we need not reach the question of whether the appel lees would also be s ubject

to jurisdi ction und er the e ffec ts test.5

juri sdiction over the mov ing defendants. Pinker , 292 F.3 d at 3 68. H owever, when the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the moti on to d ismis s, the plaintif f need only estab lish a pr ima f acie

case of p erson al j ur isdi ction and the plai ntiff is entitl ed to have i ts al legations taken as tr

ue an d a llfa ctua l d is putes dr awn in its fa vor

. I

d.; see also Ca rtere t, 954 F.2 d at 1 42 n .1.
The Distri ct Court di d not hold an evi dentiary hearing but did dete rmine, based on the parti es’ submis sions and arguments, that Mil ler Yacht fa iled to sati sfy it s burd en be caus e the c ontac ts it present ed di d no t s how th at Ap pel lees purp osef ully availed themselves of New Jersey’s l aw s. We disagr ee based on three important

contacts and the context of those contacts.
III.

A.
Tra de-d ress In fring em ent a nd U nfair

Compe ti ti on Cl ai ms First, Mil le r Ya cht alle ges that Appellees mad e trips to New Jersey as part of their neg otiat ion s. Mil le r Ya cht cl ai ms that durin g on e of th ese trip s Smi th came to New Jersey

and recei ved Miller Y acht’s sales broc hure . The receip t of this sales brochure was App ellees’ first step toward t he misappropriati on of Miller Yacht ’ s trade -dress, pho tos an d floo r plans . This misappropriati on is not only related , but is

esse ntial, to M ill er Yacht’s unfai r competition and t rade-dr ess inf ringement claims. Thu s, Ap pellee s cam e to N ew Jersey alle gedlyto rece ive the prop erty th at theyeventual ly misappropriate d and used to injure M iller Ya cht. Second, Miller Yacht allege s Ap pelle e s pl a ced the misappropriated photos and floorplans i n adv er tis ements in boating magazines circula ted in New Jersey and in at least one brochure t

hat was sent

directly to a potential c ustomer i n New Je rse y. Intentio nally and dir ectl y t ransmitting t

he misappropriate d p roperty that Appell ees initially obtain ed in N ew Jersey ba ck into New Jersey

is a very st

rong contac t b etween them and the St ate. It i s also a second essential elemen t of M iller Yacht’s infri ngement and unfair competition claims. 3

Miller Yacht also all eges that, at least before Ap pellee s misa ppro priated its intel lectual property, Appe llees were

3. The re is no ques tion tha t this con tact is sufficient to sub ject Island Ya cht Brok ers and Mariner Yacht Sal es to j urisdi ction in New Jersey . We attribute t his cont act to Appelle es because Mil ler Yacht spec ifically allege d that S teven Sm ith was the indi vidual responsibl e for Is land Yacht Brokers’ “‘[advert isi ng and brochure pr oducing] ef

forts and acti viti es’” Appell ants’ App. at 41 (quoti ng affidavi t of Steve n Smith) (brack ets in or iginal). A s desc ribed in footnote 1, Mill er Yacht has a lso al leged that Smi th and Bogachoff were acting as par t ne r s d uri ng al l r el ev an t pe r i od s. We accept t hese all egati ons as tr

ue and, theref ore, attrib ute this c ontac t to all Appellees.6

directly engaged in the mark eting o f bo ats in New J er se y . T he y atte nde d tra de sh ows in New Jersey and a djoini ng states and advert ise d in regi onal boating magazines that were distributed in New Jersey. These pre-m isapp ropria ti o n contact s and the continue d adverti sements i n New Jersey provide a nexus b etween Appellee s and New Jersey , and l ogical ly explai n why at leas t o ne N ew Jersey resid ent w ould request Appellees’ sales brochure. Wh ile

we do not base our

holding on th ese premisappropriati on contact s (the y ar e not among the thre e co nt ac ts on w hi ch we rely), theyare rel ev ant to s how that the request for sales m ateri al t hat Appell ees recei ved from a New Jersey resi dent wa s not a random or fort uitous occurrenc e upon wh ich jurisd iction m ay not pro perly lie. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 295- 99 (1980) (holdi ng that one fortui tous act connecti ng
a def endant with a state with which i t has

no other ties i s not suff

icie nt to s upport t

he exercise of p erson al jurisdic ti on over that defend ant in that state).
The contacts a lle ged by Mill er Yacht

are suffici ent to s atis fy the “purpos eful availm ent” and “rel atedness ” r equirement s of due pr ocess with res pect t o Miller Yach t’s trade- dress i nfringement and unfair competition clai ms.

B.
To rtiou s Inte rfere nce C laim
Miller Yacht also alleges tha t Appellees had substantialand repeat ed contact w i th New Jerseyduring t he

ne gotiat ions between the part ies

. Although these neg o tiations a re on ly indi rec tly related to Mill er Yacht’s tradedress infri ngement and unfair c ompetition claims, th ey a re di re ctl y rela ted to its tortious interfere nce clai m and are the third contact

upon which we re ly . Mill er Yacht specifi call y al leges t hat Appell ees sentf acs imil e trans missi ons int o New Jersey in order

to ar rang e for S mith to travelto China to visit t he Chinese

com panie s t hat manufactured the Mari ne TraderYa chts f or Miller Yacht. Mill er Yacht furthe r alle ges that, sub sequ ent to this tri p, Appell ees unlawful ly eng a ged these Ch inese c om panie s to produce “striking ly similar yac hts

. . . accordi ng to the interior and exterior pla ns and specifi cati ons own ed by [M iller Yacht], using t he m olds u sed to cons truct said yach ts.” Appellant ’s App. at 28. Mill er Yacht alle ges that

Appellees’ engagement of these compani es t o produce the “striking ly similar” yach ts interfe red w ith Miller Yach t ’s pros pectiv e eco nom ic adv antage fl owi ng f ro m i ts ow n relat ion ship wit h th ese com pan ies.
We conclude that Appell ees ’ c ontac ts with New Jersey i n setting up their trip t o China, coup led w ith the c ontac ts we found suffici ent to support

the exercise of personaljuri sd icti on over Appelle es on Miller Yacht’s other claims, are suffici ent to supp ort t

he exerci se of jurisdi ction on the tor tious interference wit h prospective

econ om ic adv antag e claim as w ell.
We disagr ee with the ar gument that these conta cts do not su ppo rt ju ri sdiction

over this claim . First, we do not agree that

we must apply

an immediat e or prox imate7

cause s tan dard to determ ine wh ether a cl aim a rises ou t of a d efen dant’s conta cts with a forum state and we do not read Pinker , Vetrotex Cert a intee d Corp. v. ConsolidatedFiber Glass Produc ts Co. , 75 F.3d 14 7 (3d C ir. 1996), or Remick v. Manfredy , 238 F .3d 248, 25 5-56 (3d Cir. 2001), as stan ding for such a pr oposition. In Pinker , we had to dete rmine whe ther a foreign issuer

and spo ns or of American Depo sitary Receip ts (“ ADR s”) was subjec t t o p ersonaljuri sdiction in t his count ry on cl ai ms that it misrepr esentedmate rial facts

re l evantto those ADR s. 4 We concluded that because the fore ign issue r “sponsor[e d] an ADR facility [in America, it] purp osely avail ed its elf of the privi lege of cond ucting activities in the A meric a n securi ties market, and thereby establ ished the requis ite mi nimum contact s with the United States .” Pinke r , 292 F.3d at 371 (int ernal quotati on omitted). Im po rta nt ly,

we di d n ot ap pl y a proximate cause test to dete r mine personaljuri sdiction. I nstead, bas ed solely on th e def enda nt’ s spon sorsh ip of th e A D R fa cil ity a t is sue,
an acti on that was ce r tai nly not the prox im ate cause of t he fraudu lent misrepr esentat

ion, we foun d that t he defendanthad the re quisi te mini mum conta cts to estab lish jurisd iction w ith reg ard to th e pla intif f’s c laim s. Id.
Vetrotex involved c ont r act cl aims and “there are d ifferen t cons ideratio ns in analy zing juri sdiction overcon tr act cl ai ms and ove r cer tain t ort c laim s.” Remick , 238 F.3d at 25 5-5 6. Further , in c ontract cl ai ms
we analy ze t he t otality of th e circu mst ances surrou ndin g a co ntract to determi ne w hether t he exerci se o f j urisdi ction over the de fendan t is proper. Id. at 256. We do not con side r this totality of the ci rcumstance s testto be the equival ent of a re q uirement that t he defendants’ conta cts w ith the forum be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s claims.
Remick also d oes n ot sup port a prox imate ca use stan dar d. Remick was a breach of c ont ract c ase , but involved various tort

clai ms a s w ell. Id. at 256. With respect

to thos e tort cl ai ms, we applie d the effect s test

to dete rmine if

the defendantwas subject

to j uris diction in Pennsyl vania. Id. at 258. Similar l y, in I MO Ind ust ri es, Inc . v . Ki eke rt AG , w e applie d the effects test

to analy ze whether the defendantwa s sub ject to jur isdiction in New Jersey on th e pl ainti ff’s i ntenti onal tort claim s. 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 19 98 ). The focu s on th e eff ects test in both these c ases c onv inces u s that the ir requirement that t

he tort ious actions of t

he defendanthave a f oru m-d irected purpose is no t applic able i n the more t raditional spec ific juri sdiction anal ysi s. As pointed out in Note 2 supra , the effects test expres sl y requires that “the defendant expr essly aimed it s tort

ious conduct

at the forum, and thereb y made the fo ru m the 4. In Pinker , the Court was confronted with a st atute that authori zed nati onwide servi ce of process and, therefore, needed to dete rmine if

the defendant

had suffici ent cont acts wit

h the Unite d States to su ppo rt juris dicti on. Pinker , 292 F.2d at 369.8

focal point of t

he tortious activit

y. ” Id. at 265. This requirement is reas onab le with in t he effects test

because i t ins ures that t he defendant, who may not have any actualcon tac t with t

he forum state, have suff iciently directed his t orti ous conduct at the st ate t o render hi m subject to pers onal ju risdi ctionther e. See id. at 265 . Un li k e this express requirement in the effe cts test, the tradition al spec ific jurisd iction a nalysis si mp ly re qui re s that

th e pl ai nt if

f’ s c la ims

“ ari se out of or relate to” the defen dant’s forum con tacts

. BurgerKing , 471 U.S. at 472 (interna l quo ta tions omitt ed). We do not agree with the argu m ent tha t this tradi tionalrequir ement is t he equival ent of the more d emanding r elat ednes s requ ireme nt of th e eff ects test.
We recogniz e that

our conclus ion that

a de fendant’ s contact s with a forum ne e d not ha ve be en the proxi mate cause of t he plaint iff’s injuries i n a tort

case begs t

he ques tion of w hat lev el of re lationsh ip is necessary under the “arise out of or relate to” requir ement. We need notaddr ess this questi on that ha s plagued feder al Courts of Ap peals and has res ulted i n dive rg ent rules. We have not la id do wn a spe cific rule because we ha ve a pproached each

c ase individually

and taken a “realisti c approach” to anal yzi ng a defend ant’s conta cts with a fo rum

. M ellon B ank (E ast) PSFS, Nat’l Ass ’n v. Farino , 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d C ir. 1992)(i nternal quotati on om itted); s ee also Pen nzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs . Inc. , 149 F .3d 197 , 203 (3d Cir. 1998 ) (acknowledgi ng the dif f icu lty o f formulating bright -li ne rules in the pe rsonal jurisdictio n analy sis an d indicating the fact- sensit ive nature of that

ana lysis).
This is the approach we take he re, and conclude that App ellees’ c on tacts w ith New Je rs ey are suffici ent to s ubject them to juri sdiction on Mille r Yacht’s tortious in terf erence clai m. Firs t, Mil ler Yacht alle ges that Appel lees s e n t communicati ons int o New Jersey in order to set up their

tri p to China. We have been clear that suc h com mu nicati ons may be fact or ed into the minim um conta cts

ana lys is. Gran d Entm ’t Group, Ltd. v. Star M edia Sales, Inc. , 988 F.2d 476, 482- 83 (3d Cir . 199 3). S ec ond, we cannot ignore the fact

that M ill er Yacht al leges Appellees’ tortious i nter fe rence re sult ed from their en gagin g the C hin es e
com panie s to build t

he veryboats t

hat Miller Yacht all eges Appel lees are usi ng misappropriate d photos and floor pl ans to adverti se. As describe d abov e , those photos and f lo or pl ans w ere ob tained in Ne w J erseyand were sent ba ck into New Je rse y, after

having been misappropriate d,

as p art of A ppelle es’ sale s effo rts. It is only in sel ling t

he boats t

hat Mill er Yacht or Appellee s could expect to get any ki nd of economic advant age from the bui lding agreementwith th e C hinese companies. Thus, these s ales ef

forts , and the ir N ew Je r sey -rel ated acti viti es, are vita l part s of Miller Yach t’s tort ious i nterfe ren ce cl ai ms

. The su m o f these conta cts is suf ficien t to subject Appellees to personaljuri sdiction in Ne w Je rsey on M iller Ya cht’s to rti ous in te rf er enc e cl ai m.9 III.
We easil y conclude that juri sdiction

over Appellees i s con sistent w it h tradi tionalnotions of f air pl ay and substant ial justic e. There is no c ompelli ng evidence of rec ord w hy it wo uld b e unf air

or unjust for Appel lees to litiga te this dispu te in New Jersey . Withou t such compelli ng evide nce, th ey cann ot a v oid the Distr ict Court’s a ppropri at e juri sdiction.
For these r easo ns, w e w ill re verse the Distri c t Court’s order dis missi ng Miller Yach t’s complaint

and remand the case to the D istrict Co urt.

SCI RIC A, Chief Judge , concurri ng in part, dissen ting in p art.
I write s epara tely because I would fi nd spec ific juri sdiction only as to M ill er Yach t’s unfair c ompetition and trade dress infri ngement claim s aga in s t appel lees Isla nd Y ach t and MarinerYacht

. Nevertheless, because appel lant’ s clai m s
so u nd in tort, Iwould remand for the Distri ct Cou rt to consider ap pelle es’ forum conta cts und er th e “e ffe cts te st.” Se e I MO Ind us., Inc . v . Ki eke rt

AG , 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 199 8).

I.
Personal juri sdiction over a nonresi dent defendant maybe as ser ted under general or specifi c theori es of juri sdiction. See Helicopt

eros Nacionale s de Colombia, S.A. v. Ha ll , 466 U.S . 408 , 414 & n.9 (1 984). Because ther e are no al legation s that appellees’ co ntacts with the f orum a re
so “conti nuous and sys temati c” as to give rise to gen eral jurisd iction, o ur inq uiry is limi ted to spe cific jur isdiction . Spec ific juri sdiction permits the exer cise of personaljuri sdiction over non- resi dent defendantonly if t he p la in ti ff’ s c la ims

“ arise out of or r elat e to” the defendan t’ s for um con tacts

. Burger King Corp. v. Ru dz ewicz , 471 U .S. 462, 472 (1985). C on se qu en tly, t he specif ic jurisdi ction determi nationis bo th cla im-s pec ific, see Remick v. Manfredy , 238 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir . 2 001) (anal yzi ng specifi c juri sdiction over tort and con t ra ctcl ai ms separately); Gehling v. St. George’ s Sch. of M ed., Ltd. , 773 F.2d 539, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1985) ( finding per sonal j urisdi ction ove r fraudule n t misrepr esentat ion an d emotiona l di stre ss cla ims, but no t neglige nce and brea ch of co ntract claims), and defendant- specifi c, s ee Rusk v. Savchuk , 444 U.S. 320, 332 ( 1980) (“The requ ireme nts of Inter

national Shoe

. . . must be m et as to each d efenda nt.”). 5

5. Due process re quires that non- resi dent defendants have “minimum contacts” with the f

orum such that

the exer cise of personaljuri sdiction does not offend “tradi tionalnotions of fair pl ay and substant ial j usti ce.” Inter

national Shoe Co. v. Washingt

on , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (c iti ng Milli ken v. Meyer , 311 U.S. 45 7, 463 (19 40)). The d efenda nt’s contact s with the forum state must have a basis i n some act bywhich the defendant (co ntin ued ...)10 II.
Wh ile acknowledging t he clai m- and defe ndan t-spec ific na tu re of th e spe cific jurisdic tion inquiry, the majori ty conclude s the alle gations in the complaint require us to attribute t

he forum contact s of

“any one indiv idual Appellee to all of th e Ap pelle es.” The m ajo rity reache s this conclusi on by i nferri ng the exi stenc e of a “partne rship” based up on M iller Yacht’s alle gations that

Sm ith and Bogachoff “act[ed] as partners” i n their negotiations with M iller Y ach t, i n which they repres ented Island Yacht and Mariner Y acht, respectively . Although we ac cep t all alle gations in the c omplaint as true and construe all di sp uted fact s in favor of the plaint iff on a motion t o dismis s under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(2) , I do not b elieve it is

reaso nable to infe r the appe llee s engaged in a “ par tner ship .” 6 T here is no averment in the complai n t

or in the s upporti ng affidavi ts that ap pe ll ee s—t wo non-resi dent pers ons and two out -of-state corpora tions —ar e collec tively or ga ni ze d a s apa rtne rs hi p. As I read th e com plaint, th e al legation that Sm ith and Bogachof f “act[ed] as partners”

5. (.. .continued) “purposeful ly avail s it self of t he privileg e of c ond ucting activities w ithin the forum State, thus i nvoking the benefit s and prot ecti ons of it s laws. ” Ha nsen v. De nckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The “minimum contacts” analy sis as sesses the “re lati onship among the defendant , the forum, and the litigati on.” Shaffer

v. Heit ner , 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977).

6. In acknowledgi ng the proce dural distincti ons between a Rule 12( b)(6) motio n a nd a

Rul e 1 2( b) (2 ) mo ti on, we have explai ned: (co ntin ued ...) 6. (.. .continued) A R ule 1 2(b )(2) m otio n . . . is i nherentl y a matter which requires resolution of factualissues outsi de the plead ings, i.e. w hethe r in personam jurisdi ction actual ly lies . Once the defense has bee n rais ed, then the plainti ff must sustai n its burden of proof in est ablis hing juri sdictional f

acts t hrough sworn affidavi ts or ot

her

com pete nt ev iden ce. . . . [A ]t n o p oi nt m ay a plaintiff rely on the bare plead ings a lone in orde r to withstand a defend ant’s Ru le 12(b )(2) m otion to dism iss for la ck of in per son am juris dicti on. Once the motion i s made, plaintiff mu st respo nd w ith actual proof s, not mere allegati ons. Patt ers on v. FBI , 893 F.2d 595, 603-604 (3d Cir. 1990) (ci ting Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlant ic Resort s, Lt d. , 735 F .2d 61, 67 n .9 (3d Cir. 198 4)) (inte rna l citati ons om itted ).11

mere ly suggests some level of coordinated cond uct. 7 Of cour se, this re lationsh ip ultima tely may prove rel evant t o the juri sdictional ana lysis. See Rusk , 444 U. S. at 332 ( “[ T]he parties’ r elation ships w ith each othermay be si gnific ant in eval uating the ir tie s to the forum.”) . But on the alle gations an d aff idav its pr ese nted , I cannotinfer t

he existence of

a partn ership that wo uld provide t

he basis for att

ributing the jurisd ictiona l conta cts of one appell ee to them all. 8 Aggregating appellees’ contact s obscures impo rtant d ifferenc es in the ir indivi dual forum acti viti es and the al leged conductgiving rise to the c laims as sert ed. For example, Smit

h’s cont acts wit

h New Jersey in arranging his tri p t o C hina d id not involve Bogachoff or Mariner Yac ht

. Moreov er, as M iller Ya cht’s a ffida vit states, the China t

rip it self “w as in further ance of negoti ations that took place between

. . . Smith, Island Y acht Bro kers and Miller Yacht ” relating to Island Yacht becoming an exclusi ve dealer of “Marine Trad er” and “ Trad e W ind” yac hts in Maryland. Appellant App. 41. These negotiations did notinvolve Bogachoff or Mariner Ya cht. Si milarly, the primary forum contact

reli ed upon by t he

m ajori ty —receipt of the M iller Ya cht sale s brochu re in N ew Jersey— is app arently attributa ble only to S mith in his capacity as agentfor Isl and Yacht. Even ass uming Bogachoff

had impli ed autho ri ty to act as Smi th’s agent duri ng the broker -deale r 7. The allegations do support an infere nce that Sm ith and Bo gach off a cted a s age nts for Isl and Yacht Brokers a nd Mariner Trader re specti vely , and their for um conta cts as a gents may be attribute d to the a ppe llee c orp ora tion s ac cor din gly. Gra nd E ntm ’t Gro up v. S tar M edia Sal es, In c., 988 F .2d 476, 48 3 (3d C ir. 1993) (“[A]ctivities of a party ’s agent may co unt tow ard the minim um conta cts necessary to supp ort jurisdiction.”).

8. Some courts have i mputed juri sdictional contact s to for eign defendant s in the absence of a partners hip or ot her lega l entity based upon the consp iracy theory of ju risdi ction

. See, e. g., J ungquist v. Sheikh Sul tan Bin Khali fa Al Nahyan , 115 F.3d 1020, 1031 ( D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the consp iracy theory of personaljuri sdiction requires pl ainti ff to plea d with particularity “t he

cons piracy as w ell as the over t acts within t he forum taken i n further ance of the consp iracy”) (citation omitted); Texto r v. Bd . of Re gents , 711 F.2d 1387, (co ntin ued ...) 8. (.. .continued)

1392-93 (7th Cir. 1983) (apply ing

cons piracy the ory of jur isdiction to Ill inois long-arm statute). That said, “[w]hether pe rsonal juri sdiction can be obtain ed un der a s tate lon g-arm statute on a conspiracy rati onale at all i s a questi on of state law.” Stauff acher v. Ben nett , 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1992). Whil e it i s unclear whether New Jersey even recogni zes the c onspira cy theoryof juri sdiction, we need not address t his i ssue becaus e Miller Yacht ha s n ot all eg ed an ac tio na bl e c on sp ira cy.12

negotiations with Miller Yach t, t his agency relation ship should not

provide a basis for imputi ng forum con ta cts by Sm ith to Bo gach off o r M ariner Y acht.
I recog nize th e Su prem e Co urt ha s rejec ted over ly “mec hanic al o r quantit ative ” tests of juri sdic tion

. Int’l Shoe , 326 U.S. at

319 . But e ven a realistic approach to speci fic j urisdi ction mu st comp ort with due proce ss, a nd due process requir es that we cons id er the f orum conta cts of ea c h def enda nt inde pend ently accordi ng to the s pecifi c clai ms asserted.

III.
Even if the alle g ed forum-rel ated conta cts could be attri buted to a ll appe llee s
en mas se, M ill er Yacht’s clai ms do not

nece ssarily “aris e out of or relate to” t hose contacts. See Burger King , 471 U.S. at 472. The courts of

appeals ha ve adopted divergent

inter pretat ions of “aris e out of or relate to” as th at p hras e relates t o the spec ific juris dicti on a nalysis

. See United Elec. Radi o & Mach . Wor ker s of Am

. v. 163 Ple asant St. Corp ., 960 F. 2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992) (desc ribin g
unce rtainty amon g the circuits); s ee gene rally Mar k M . M alon ey, Spec ific PersonalJurisdi ction and the “Arise f rom or Relate to” Requirement

... What Does It Mean? , 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev

. 1265 (Summer 1993). The di sti nctions between t he se inter

pretat ions ar e not without consti tuti onal significance, as t he “arise out of or rel ate t o” requirement est ablis hes

a due process limi tati on on th e degree of perm issible atte n uation be tween “the defe ndan t, the f oru m, a nd t he lit igati on.” Shaffer , 433 U.S. at 204.
At one end of the s pec trum , the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has he ld t ha t with res pect t o a tort clai m, a nonresi dent defendant’ s forum c ontacts must provide the “cau se in fact” and “l egal cause” for the p laint iff’ s inju ry. Mass. Sch. of La w, Inc. v. A m. B ar A sso c., 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st C ir. 1998 ); s e e also Marine v. Hyatt Corp ., 793 F. 2d 427, 430 (1stCir. 1986) (holdi ng that forum-rel ated conta cts must fo rm a “materi al element of proof” in orde r for th e cau se of action to “arise from or rel ate t o” the forum contacts). At the othe r end of th e spe ctru m, the C ou rts of Appeals for t

he Fifth and N inth Circuits form ulate a mo re expansive inter

pretat ion of “arise out

of or relate t o,” under which a non-resident defend ant’s foru m co ntacts a re suf ficien t i f t hey provide a “ but for” c ause for plaintiff’s injury. See Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc ., 652 F. 2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981) (no ti ng that “ contrac tual contacts” may provide “b ut for” causati on for a claim soun ding in tort); Doe v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross , 112 F.3d 1048, 1051 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T ]he ‘b ut for’ test is still employe d in dete r m ining w hether a plaintiff’s injuries ar ose ou t of a defend ant’s foru m-re lated a ctiviti e s.”). Un d er this stan dard , a plaintif f’s claim “aris es out o f or rel ates to” a forei gn defend ant’s conta cts w ith the forum i f the defend ant’s forum acti viti es provi de a li nk in the c ausal chain which ulti matelyleads to pl ain tif f’ s in ju ry.13

Still o th er court s have navigated a

course betw een th ese p osit ions . For example, in Chew v. Dietri ch , 143 F.3d 24 (2d Ci r. 1998), t

he Court of Appeals for Second Circuit

has suggested a sli ding scale approach t o e val uating th e “relatedness” of s p ecifi c juri sdiction contacts, wh ic h more closely resembles the “but for” st andard in i ts pot ent ial ly expansive s cope: [T]he relatedness test is but a part of a generalinquiry whi ch is designedto dete r mine whether t he exercise of p erson al jurisdic tion in

a parti cular c ase does or does not offend “traditio nal no tions o f fair pla y and sub stan tial ju stice .” . . . Wh ere the de fend ant ha s had only limi ted cont acts with the state it may be ap prop riate to say that he will b e subje ct to suit in that state only if the plaint

iff’ s injury was prox imate ly cause d by thos e contacts. W her e the defe ndant’s conta cts with the j urisdi ction t hat rel ate to the c ause of action ar e
more subs tantial, ho we ver, it is not

unre ason able to say that t he defendantis subject

to pers onal juri sdiction even thou gh th e acts with in t he state are not the prox imate cause of the plaintiff’s in ju ry.
143 F .3d at 29 (citations om itted). By c ontras t, t

he Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circ uit has rejec ted this sort of “hybrid” juri sdictional analy sis which effecti velyblends t he concepts of

general and specif

ic jurisdi ction:
We cann ot sim ply aggre gate all of

a defe ndan t’s con tacts w ith a state—no matte r how dissim ilar in te rms of geography , ti me, or substanc e—as evi de nce of the consti tuti onally

required minimum conta cts

. . . [W]hen conducting business with a forum i n one cont ext, potenti al defen dant s shou ld not have t o wonder whether

som e aggregation of othe r past and fut ure forum contact s will render th em l iable to suit

there. Unless their conta cts are c ontin uo us and syst ema tic enough to ri se to t he le vel of ge neral j urisdi ction , individ uals a n d corporations must be able to cond uct inte rstate business conf ident t h at tr ansacti ons i n one context

will not come back to haun t them unex pecte dly in another. RAR, Inc. v. Turner

Diesel, Ltd. , 107 F.3d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir . 1997) ( citat ion s omitted). The Suprem e Court has ye t to defin itively r es olve the appropri ate scope of the “ aris e out of or relat e to”

re quir eme nt. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shu te , 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991 ) (decli ning to r each the s cope of the relatedness requirement de s pite ha ving certified it for review ). Although we h ave no t expre s sly arti culat ed our view on the “arise out of or relate to” req uirem ent, our c ases im plicitly apply an immediate or proximate cause14

standar d. I n analy zing jurisdi ctiona l conta cts on a claim -by-c l ai m ba si s, we have been caref

ul to note that

forum contac ts supporting a contract claim are not nece ssaril y releva nt to es tabli shing jur isdi ctionove r a to rt cla im. F o r
exa m ple, in Remick , we no ted “there are differe nt consi d erati ons in anal yzi ng juri sdiction overcontrac t claims and over certain tort claim s .” 238 F.3d at 255-56. In that c ase, we separ ate ly analy zed the forum contact s supporting jurisdi ction

over plaint

iff’s breach of

contrac t, torti ous int erferenc e with contr act , mi sappropri ation of im age, ci vi l conspir acy and de famation claims. In findin g specifi c juri sdiction over t he breach of co ntract c lai m, we noted the contra ct had been soli cite d, negotiate d, consummated and performed i n the forum. At the same time how ever , we found insuffi cient

contact s to suppo rt jurisdicti on
over plaintiff ’s def ama tio n an d misappropriati on clai ms notwiths tanding

an express co ntractual re lationsh ip between plaintiff and d efen dant c learly situated in the f orum . In find ing sp ecific ju r isdi ction over plai ntiff ’s intentiona l interference with contr actcl ai m, we reasoned that a lthough t he clai m sounded in tort , it was “necessarily related to the contra ct” that w as th e subject of the alleg ed to rtiou s inte rfer enc e. Id . at 26 0. Likewise, in Vetrotex CertainTee d Corp. v. Consolidated Fiber Glass Prods. Co. , 7 5 F. 3d 1 47, 153 (3 d Ci r. 199 5) , w e concluded that onl y “dea lings between the parti es in rega rd to the dispu ted co ntr act , not deali ngs unrel ated t o the cause o f actio n,” are rel ev ant to the mi nimum conta cts ana lysis. Ve trotex involved a breach of contra ct dis pute o ver p aymen ts due under a 1992 suppl y agr eement between Vetrot ex and Consolidated Fiber Gl ass. The district c ourt di smissed t he complaint

for lac k of specifi c juri sdiction. We affirmed no ti ng v arious contra cts between Vetrot ex and Consolidated Fiber Glass over the previous ten years were not

su fficiently related to the clai ms based upon the cont ested s up p ly agreem ent to give rise to jur is d ict io n. T he cla im -b yclaim partitioning of juri sdict ional contact s evid ent in Rem ick and Vetro te x de mon strates that f

orum contact s which

mere ly pro vid e a generalcontext for the parties’ relat

ions h ip are in suff iciently related to a cla im to s upp ort spe cific juris dicti on.
Moreover , our holdi ng in Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd. , 292 F.3d 361 ( 3d Cir

. 2002), s upports application of t he prox imate cause st andard. I n Pinker , investors file d a s ecurities fraud class acti on alle ging forei gn defendant Roche made materi al misrepresent ations and misleading s tate ments in press rel eases an d repo rts file d with the Sec urities and Exchange C om missi on which caused plaint iffs to payarti fici ally

high prices for Roche AD Rs

. The district c ourt di smissed the com plaint for lack of per sonal juri sdiction and w e aff irmed . The majo rity holds we based our dis missal“solel y on the d ef en da nt ’s sp ons or sh ip of th e ADR facility at is sue, an ac tion t hat c ertainly

was not the proximate caus e of the fraudule nt misrepr esent a tion. ” But the15

misrepresentat

ion claim was n ot predi cated

on sp ons or sh ip of

th e AD Rs per se, but rather on the al legedl y fr au dulen t inform ati on Roche filed wit h securi ties reg ulators i n connecti on with tha t sponsorship. In finding Roche establ ished minimum conta cts by pu rpose full y direc ting it s a ct iv itie s t owar ds t he f or um, the court noted that

“a foreign corporation that has created an American mark et for its securi ties can f airly expect that that market will rely on report s an d media rel eases issuedby the corporat ion.” Id . at

372. The forum contact

in Pinker

—reporting incorr ector fra udu lent inf orm ation to fed er al regu lators— wa s the p roxim ate

c a u s e of plai ntiff s’ fra udulen t mis re pr es ent at io n cl ai m.

IV

. A.
The majo rity finds spec ific juri sdiction

over appell ees based on “th ree import ant contacts, and th e con text o f th ose
con tacts .” The first con tact c on cerns Miller Yac ht’s a llegation t hat Smith and Isl and Ya cht ca me to Ne w Je rsey to recei ve one of its sales bro c hures. Because recei pt of the broc hure repres ents the “first step” to w a rds th e misap prop riati on of M iller Ya cht’ s pho to grap hs, floor plans and trade dress, the m ajori ty concludes t his cont act provides a suf ficien t jurisdictio nal ba sis for appel lant’ s common law and statutory unf air competition and trade dress infri ngement clai ms

. I have a di fferent vi ew. M ill er Yacht’s unfair competi tion a n d trad e dr ess inf ringem ent cla ims re late to misuse of its inte llectual p rope rty, not to the mere acquis iti on or posses sion of t hat pr op er ty. 9 For exam ple, the L anha m A ct, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a ), on which Mil ler Yach t’s infr ing ement of tr ade dress (Count I) and federalunf a ir

comp et itio n cl ai ms (Count II) are based, pr ohibit s the “ use [] in commerce” of an y false de scripti ons or designations of o rig in wh ich are likely to

cause confusi on regardi ng the ori gin of goods or serv ices of a not her

. Id

. (emp hasis adde d). Lik ew is e, the New Jersey Unf air Com petition Act (C ounts III and IV) prohibi ts a p erson fro m appr opriating “for his or thei r own us e a name, brand, t

rade-mark, reput ati on or goo dwi ll of any maker in whose product such merc hant, firm or cor porati on dea ls.” N.J. Stat. § 5 6: 4-1

. A c laim f or un fair competition under New Jerseycommon law (Count V) is subs tantially si milar. American T

el & Tel. Co. v. Winback & C onserve Program, Inc ., 42 F. 3d 1421 , 143 3 (3 d C ir. 19 94)

. Although recei pt of the sales brochu re by Smith and Is land Y acht i n New Jersey may have prov ided th e “firs t st ep” for Miller Yacht’s unfair competi tion and trade dress in fringe men t claims , this contact at most mi ght supply the “but fo r”

9. The re are n o alleg ations th at Sm ith imprope rly acquired the broch ure. It appe ars M iller Ya cht vo luntarily provided t

he brochure to Smith duri ng negotiations over the t

rademark l icensi ng and exclusive dealership agreements.16

causati on for thes e cl aim s. The conduct which provides the immed ia te cause of in jury relates to t

he subsequent

improper

use of the material c ontaine d in the brochure. Applying the proximate cause standar d, Miller Yac ht’s unf ai r competition and tra de dr ess in fringement

c la ims again st Sm ith and Island Ya cht d o not “aris e out of orrelate to” re ceipt of the sales brochure.
B.
The majo rity observ es th a t “pla c[ing] the misappropriate d photos and fl oor plans in boating mag azi nes cir culat ed in New Jersey and in at least

one brochure t

hat was sentdirectly to a pote ntialcus tome r in New Jersey ” provides a “stro ng co ntact” in support of ap pellan t’s unf air com peti t ion

a nd t rade dres s infringement cl aims. The record rev eals that these a lleged ly impropertrans missi ons int o t he forum actua lly invo lve: (1) th e use of alle gedly misappropriate d photographs and floor plans in Isl and Yac ht adv ertisem ents which appear i n trade publ ications distribu ted in New Jersey; and (2) the use of all egedlymisappropriate d photographs by Mariner Yach t in a sa les brochu re dist ribut ed to a sing le Ne w Je rsey reside nt. See JA 44, 4 7-4 8. T hese c ontac ts shou ld be evaluat ed s eparat elyto dete rmine whether theyprovide a s uffici ent basi s for exerci sing spec ific juri sdiction.
Advertis ing in a tr ade pub lication t hat

re aches the forum gener ally does no t , withoutmore , p rovid e a su fficien t basis for exercising spe cific jurisdiction over a f oreign def end ant. See, e .g., M esali c v

. Fi ber float Co rp., 897 F.2d 696, 700 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1990) (noti ng that non- resi dent defend ant’s marketi ng strategy , inc luding advert i sing in nati onal publi cati on s dist ributed in th e foru m, pro vided only tangential support f

or speci fic per sonal jurisdiction); Gehling , 773 F.2d at 542 (holdi ng that advertising in ne wspa pers whi ch reach the fo rum are ins uffic ient t o est ablish “minimum contacts”). Mo reover, there is no eviden ce in the record regardi ng the frequencywith which Is land Yacht adverti sed in t

hese publi cati ons, the number of New Jersey resident s reac he d,

or whether Is land Yacht had any knowledge or co ntrol ov er the e xtent to which they target ed New Jerse y
c o nsumers. Neverthel ess, the ext ent or frequencyof

adverti sing i n the forum may be less s ignifi cant whe re, a s here, the pl ai ntiff’s unfair c ompetition and tr ade dress infring eme nt claim s arose directly out of the imp roper use o f M iller Yacht’s photographs, plans and trade d ress in

com me rce. Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476 n.18 (“So long as it cre ates a ‘ substant ial connecti on’ with the forum, even a sing le actcan support

juri sdiction.” ). Iagree with the majority

that t he all eg at ions relat ing to Is la nd Y a cht’ s publi cati on of

ce rta in adve rtiseme nts in trad e journ als that reach ed Ne w Je rsey are su fficien tly relat ed to Miller Yacht ’s unfai r competition and trade dres s claim s as to provi d e specifi c juri sdiction over I sland Ya cht w ith re spe ct to t hos e cla ims

. But there are no all egat ion s or any evidence in the record that appel lee Sm ith

was involved i n th is advertis ing effort or17

othe rwi se w as engaged i n conduct that

wo uld permit imp uting Island Y acht’s forum con tacts to h im. Nicholas v. Sa u l Stone & Co. LL C , 224 F.3d 179, 184 ( 3d Cir. 2000) (“[J ]uri sdiction over

. . . [indiv idual] defendants does not exist simp ly because they are ag ents or employe es of organiz at ions w hic h pres um ably are ame nable to juri sdiction.”). Likewise, for reas ons stated, I wou ld no t impu te this contact

to appell ees Bogachoff or M arin er Y ach t.
The second conta ct invol ves the maili ng of a MarinerY acht broch ure alle gedl y containing M iller Y acht’s photographs to a si ngle New Jersey reside nt. This conta ct is i n s om e w ays
mor e significant for j urisdi ctional purpose s t han advertising in a reg ional tra d e publication beca use it sp ecifica lly targets

a resi dent of the fo ru m. And, here agai n, plaintiff’s un fa ir competiti on and trade dr ess infri ng ement clai ms arisedirectly out of th e al le ged lyimp ro per use of Mill er Yach t’s photographs , pla ns and trade dress in the sal es brochur e. As such, I agree with the m ajority th at t his cont act gi ves rise to speci fic j urisdi ction ove r Mariner Yacht on the unfai r competi tion and t rade dr e ss infringem ent claims. H owe ver, because there i s no all ega tion that Bogachoff

or S mit h w ere inv olved in

se n ding the sal es brochur e into New Jerse y, there is n o bas is for im puting this

con ta ctto th em. C.
The majori ty o bserves t hat the precontrac tual negotiations i n New Je r sey providedappell ees the opportuni ty to deal with two Chines e companies with which Miller Yach t apparently had pre exi sti ng business relat

ionshi ps to desi gn and build 34' and 38' double cabin and sedan yachts. The majo rity concludes these negotiations provide a jurisdict

ional basi s fo r Miller Yach t’s tortio us interfe rence wit h pr osp ect iv e ec ono mic adv ant age cl ai m.
To establish a claim for tor tio u s interference with prosp ective econ om ic advantage, a p lain tiff must show (1) unlaw ful, intent

ional interference with the prospe ct of, or reasonable expectation of,

econ om ic advantage, and (2) a reaso nable prob ability tha t the plainti ff would have recei ved the anticipated econ om ic ben efits had there be en no inte rfer en ce. See Harp er-Lawrence, In c. v. U nite d Merchant s & Mfrs., Inc ., 619 A. 2d 623, 630 (N .J. Su per . Ct. A pp. D iv. 1 993 ). Wh ile t he pre-cont

ractual negotiations ma y have provide d appell ees with names and contact informat ion, there are n o alle gations that a ppel lees s ol icite d business from or negotiated a business relation ship with the Chi nese boat manufa cture rs while in N ew Jerse y. If anyt hing, it would appe ar that these acti viti es took plac e in China or from appellees’ pr inc iple places of business outsi de the fo rum . Wh il e t he effect or injury res ulti ng fr om appellees ’ inter acti ons with these Chinese firms ultima tely may hav e be en felt by Mill er Yacht in N ew Jersey, I fin d no f orum conta cts wh ich pro vide a basis for sp ecific ju r isdi ction on the tor tious interference cl ai m.18 D.
Fi na lly, in addition to appell ees’ discre te forum contact s, the m ajority sugg ests that appelle es’ unre lat ed premisap prop riati on conduct i n New Jersey provides a “nexus” between appellee s and the foru m. Fo r exam ple , the majo rity notes th at

ap pe ll ee s a tten de d tra de sh ows in Ne w J erse y “an d in adjo inin g sta tes,” and adve rtised in m agaz ines d istributed in New Jersey . But the re ar e no all egati ons tha t th is con duc t r el at es to th e cl ai ms asserte d. W hile stating these con tacts are not “essential to this litigation” and are only “ ind irectly related to M illar Yacht’s trade dress and unfa ir co mp etitio n cla ims ,” the majo rity con cludes the “sum of these conta cts sho ws that Appellees purp osef ull y
ava iled t hem selv es o f N ew Jers ey.”
A forum con tact that

might otherwise prove juri sdictionall y i nsuffici ent under a spec ific juri sdiction anal ysi s may appear
more conv incing wh en sw addle d in the

more exte nsiv e, ye t unrel ated, forum conta cts of a forei gn defendant . A n d the conta cts upon which the major it y reli es—attendance at tr ad e s how s , negotiating in the f

orum—m ay wellgo toward estab l ishi ng New Jersey’ s general juri sdiction over appell ees. But the part ies agree th atapp el le es ’ f

or um c ontacts are not so “conti nuous and sy stemati c” to give rise to g ene ral ju risdi ction

. As su ch, I

wo uld no t consider

appell ees’ pr emisappropriati on and unrelated forum contact as p art of the spec ific juri sdiction analysi s. “W e can not sim ply aggre gate a ll of a defen dant’s conta cts w ith a state—no matter how dissimi lar i n terms of ge og ra ph y, time , o r subst ance—a s evidence of the const

itutionall y r equired minimum contact s.” RAR , 107 F.3d at 1277. Rath er, spec ific jurisd iction w ill lie

over a forei gn defe ndan t wh en the claim asserted “ aris es out of or r elat es to” t he foreign defendant’ s contact s with the forum. Burger King , 461 U.S. at 472. Emphasizing contact s un r elat ed to the

asse rt ed causes of act ion blur s the fu nd amental distinctio n betw een s pecif ic and generaljuri sdiction.

V.
In su m, I wo uld fi nd that onl y I sland Yacht and Mariner Yacht hav e consti tuti on ally suf

fi ci ent “mi ni mu m contacts” with New Jerseyto sup po rt spec ific jurisdictio n as to plaintiff ’s unf air competition and trade dress i nfr i ngement claims. I w ould not fin d spe cific juri sdiction over anyof the appe llees w ith respect to the tortious i nter feren ce w ith prospective economic adv ant age claim . I

wo uld not end the jurisdictional inquiry here, how ever. Wh ere a non-reside nt defend ant’s conta cts with the f orum a lone are insuffi cient

to establish specific p ers o nal juri sdiction, “we must consider whether the applic a tion of Calder v. Jones , can change the outc ome.” IMO Indus. , 15 5 F.3d at 25 9-6 0 (c itatio n om itted ). I n Calder v. Jones , 465 U.S. 783 ( 1984), t he Supreme Court set

forth an “effects te st” for determi ning pers onal juri sdiction over non-resi dent d e fend ants w ho co mm it inte ntionaltort s with effec ts i nside t he forum. “[U]n der Calder an intentional tort19

directed at the plaint iff and havi ng suffici ent impact upon it in the forum may suffice to enhance ot

herwise i nsuffici ent conta cts with the f

orum such that

the ‘minimum contact s’ prong of t he Due Process test is satis fied .” I MO Indus. , 155 F.3d at 260. 10 Becau se M iller Yacht’s cl ai ms soun d in tort, 11 I would remand for the Distri ct Court to consider whether the effe cts of appell ees ’ non-forum conduct give rise to sp ecific juri sdiction under the Calder framework.

10. In IMO Industries , we h eld tha t to establish jurisdictio n un der the “eff ects test ,” pl ainti ff must show: ( 1) defendant committed a n intent

ional tort; (2) plaint iff fel t the br

unt of the harm in the foru m su ch tha t the fo rum can b e said to be the focalpoint of t

he harm suffere d by the plainti ff as a res ult of t hat tor t; and (3) de fend ant ex pressly aim ed his tortious conduct

at the forum such that the forum can be s aid to be the focal poi nt o f the tortio us a ctivi ty. Id . at 265- 66. W e reco gnize d that th is “conservat

ive rea ding of Calder may significantl y li mit the types of business tort cases that willsati sfy the req uire me nts o f pe rson al jur isdic tion ,” but ad ded th at Calder did not “c arve out a specia l intentiona l torts except ion to t he traditi onal specific juri sdiction analy sis, so tha t a plain tiff co uld alw ays sue in his or her home st ate. ” Id

.

11. We have desc ribed “ unf air competition,” and causes of ac tion under the Lanham A ct as intentional business torts

. See Granite St

ate Ins . Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc ., 57 F. 3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Lanham Act is deriv ed ge nerally an d pu rpose fully (co ntin ued ...) 11. (.. .continued)

from the co mm on law tort of u nfair

com petition , and its la ngu age p arallels the protecti ons afforded by state common law and stat

utorytort s.”) (cit ation

om itted). To rtious in terfere nce w ith prospective economic a dvantage similarly sou nds in tort, and other c ircuits have recogni zed copy right infri ngement

as a n in tenti ona l tort. See, e. g., Bucklew v. Hawki ns, Ash, Bap ti e & Co. , LLP , 329 F.3d 923, 931 ( 7th Cir. 2003) (“Copyright i nfringement

. . . is an intentional tort.”).