[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-2048.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

v.

KAVON JACKSON

Appellant

C.A. No. 30607

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE No. CR-2021-09-3273

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 29, 2024

STEVENSON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Kavon Jackson, appeals from the judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mr. Jackson was seventeen years old when he was charged with the following 

crimes in juvenile court: aggravated murder with a firearm specification, felonious assault with a 

firearm specification, carrying a concealed weapon, obstructing official business, and misconduct 

involving public transportation. The juvenile court conducted a probable cause hearing and found 

probable cause to support the aggravated murder and felonious assault counts. Due to Mr. 

Jackson’s age and the nature of his offenses, the juvenile court transferred his case to the common 

pleas court.

{¶3} Following Mr. Jackson’s bindover, a grand jury issued an indictment for aggravated 

murder with a firearm specification, murder with a firearm specification, felony murder with a 
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firearm specification, felonious assault with a firearm specification, and carrying a concealed 

weapon. Mr. Jackson moved to dismiss any charges that had not been explicitly bound over from 

juvenile court based upon a finding of probable cause. Relevant to this appeal, he moved to dismiss 

the firearm specifications linked to his counts of aggravated murder and felonious assault. The 

State filed a brief in opposition and requested a hearing. 

{¶4} At the motion hearing, the State informed the trial court that it had reviewed the 

transcript from the probable cause hearing. According to the State, the transcript clearly showed 

that the juvenile court had made a probable cause finding regarding Mr. Jackson’s use of a firearm 

during the commission of his offenses for aggravated murder and felonious assault. The State 

indicated that it had asked the juvenile court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry to address its probable 

cause determination. The trial court agreed to defer its ruling on those two specifications until that 

entry could be filed. As to the remaining counts, the court granted Mr. Jackson’s motion to dismiss 

the charges of murder with a firearm specification, felony murder with a firearm specification, and 

carrying a concealed weapon. 

{¶5} After the State provided the trial court with a nunc pro tunc entry from the juvenile 

court, the trial court held another hearing. Mr. Jackson contested the validity of the juvenile court’s 

entry, but the trial court rejected his argument. The court declined to dismiss the firearm 

specifications linked to the charges of aggravated murder and felonious assault. The court set the 

matter for trial.

{¶6} Mr. Jackson subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State. He agreed 

to plead guilty to an amended count of murder with a firearm specification. In return, the State 

agreed to dismiss his remaining count of felonious assault with a firearm specification. The trial 

court accepted the plea and sentenced Mr. Jackson to a total of eighteen years to life in prison.
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{¶7} Mr. Jackson now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and raises two 

assignments of error for review. 

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

[MR. JACKSON’S] STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE 

VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS CONVICTED ON A CHARGE THAT WAS 

NEVER PROPERLY TRANSFERRED TO THE [SUMMIT] COUNTY COURT 

OF COMMON PLEAS. FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 

U.S. CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION; R.C. 2152.12; R.C. 2152.022(A-1).

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Jackson argues his statutory and constitutional 

rights were violated when he was convicted of a three-year firearm specification. He claims the 

common pleas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that specification because it was never 

properly transferred from the juvenile court based on a finding of probable cause. We do not agree.

{¶9} “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time* * 

*.” Falah v. Falah, 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0039-M, 2017-Ohio-1087, ¶ 15. “Generally, issues 

related to subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.” Weber v. Devanney, 9th Dist. Summit 

Nos. 28876, 28938, 2018-Ohio-4012, ¶ 11. “A de novo review requires an independent review of 

the trial court’s decision without any deference to the trial court’s determination.” State v. 

Consilio, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22761, 2006-Ohio-649, ¶ 4.

{¶10} “A person who was a juvenile when he committed a felony offense may be bound 

over to adult court for acts for which the juvenile court found probable cause * * *.” State v. 

Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1433, ¶ 19. The adult court then may “hear and determine 

the case in the same manner as if the case originally had been commenced in that court * * *.” 

Former R.C. 2151.23(H). 
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{¶11} Mr. Jackson’s argument is predicated upon the assumption that the juvenile court 

did not bind over the firearm specifications linked to his charges of aggravated murder and 

felonious assault. He argues that the lack of a specific probable cause determination on those 

specifications resulted in a jurisdictional defect. He dedicates much of his argument to legislative 

analysis and urges this Court to take notice of statutory changes that were not yet in effect at the 

time of his bindover proceeding. Upon review, we need not address those arguments. 

{¶12} Mr. Jackson’s complaint for aggravated murder in the juvenile court included a 

firearm specification. Likewise, his complaint for felonious assault included a firearm 

specification. The juvenile court labeled the aggravated murder count as count one and the 

felonious assault count as count two. In setting forth its probable cause determination and ordering 

a transfer to the common pleas court, the juvenile court wrote the following:

The Court finds probable cause for Counts 1 and 2. The balance of the charges are 

misdemeanors and will be transferred to the General Division with the felonies. 

Due to the nature of the offense and the fact that [Mr. Jackson] was 17 years old at 

the time of the alleged offense, transfer to the General Division is mandatory.

The juvenile court later issued another judgment entry at the request of the State. That second 

entry followed Mr. Jackson’s motion to dismiss his firearm specifications in the common pleas 

court. In its second entry, the juvenile court wrote:

Upon Motion of the State of Ohio, the Court hereby clarifies its [bindover] Order * 

* * to indicate that the Court made a finding of probable cause on both charges as 

set forth in the complaints. Those complaints included a firearm specification 

[alleging] that the youth [] had a firearm on or about his person or under his control 

at the time of the offense and/or that he brandished or used the firearm in the 

commission of the offense and a second specification that alleged that he had a 

firearm on or about his person or under his control at the time of the alleged offense.

Thus, the juvenile court clarified that the firearm specifications were included in its probable cause 

determination when it bound over counts one and two.
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{¶13} Mr. Jackson argues the juvenile court’s second entry is invalid because it exceeded 

the scope of a nunc pro tunc entry. He also argues the State should not be allowed to rely on the 

second entry because, when the State initially responded to his motion to dismiss, it conceded that 

the juvenile court’s bindover entry did not address the firearm specifications at issue. Even setting 

aside the second entry, however, we cannot conclude that the common pleas court lacked 

jurisdiction over the firearm specifications. 

{¶14} The juvenile court’s bindover entry included a probable cause finding on counts 1 

and 2 of Mr. Jackson’s complaint. Both of those counts included a firearm specification. Had the 

juvenile court wished to transfer the aggravated murder and felonious assault charges without their 

attendant firearm specifications, it easily could have done so. The juvenile court never indicated 

that its probable cause ruling was limited to the aggravated murder and felonious assault charges. 

Nor did it find that the specifications were not supported by probable cause. Compare State v. 

Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, ¶ 10, 43 (concluding that adult court lacked 

jurisdiction over firearm specifications when the juvenile court had specifically found they were 

not supported by probable cause). Upon review, Mr. Jackson has not shown that the juvenile court 

failed to bindover his firearm specifications such that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction 

over those specifications. His first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT ACCEPTED 

AN UNKNOWING, UNINTELLIGENT, AND INVOLUNTARY GUILTY 

PLEA, IN VIOLATION OF CRIM.R. 11(C); THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF 

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

{¶15} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Jackson argues the trial court erred when it 

accepted his guilty plea. He claims he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his 
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plea because the trial court failed to properly advise him of the maximum penalty he might receive. 

We do not agree.

{¶16} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “[T]he 

right to be informed of the maximum penalty for a crime is a nonconstitutional right * * *.” State 

v. Callaghan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29431, 2021-Ohio-1047, ¶ 8. See also Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). 

“[T]rial courts must substantially comply with the Crim.R. 11 notification requirements for 

nonconstitutional rights.” State v. Lee, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 16AP0060, 2018-Ohio-3418, ¶ 6. 

“Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the 

totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications 

of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 

239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).

{¶17} Mr. Jackson signed a written plea of guilt along with his attorney. The written 

agreement provided that the maximum stated prison term for his murder charge was fifteen years 

to life and the maximum stated prison term for his firearm specification was three years. The 

written agreement also provided that “[n]o promises have been made except as part of this plea 

agreement stated entirely as follows: sentence of 18 to life[.]”

{¶18} At the plea hearing, the prosecutor indicated that the State anticipated Mr. Jackson 

would be receiving a sentence of eighteen years to life in prison. The trial court then addressed 

Mr. Jackson, and the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: As amended, Count 1 would read on or about the 18th day of May, 

2021 in Summit County, you did commit the crime of murder, an unclassified 

felony, which carries a minimum of 15 to a maximum of life incarceration in the 

Ohio Department of Corrections; do you understand?

[MR. JACKSON]: Yes, ma’am.
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THE COURT: Specification One to Count 1 is the firearm specification in that you 

did have under your control while committing the offense, displayed the firearm, 

brandished it, indicated you possessed it, or used it to facilitate the offense.

As that specification indicates, it’s a three-year firearm specification which means 

the three years are mandatory and must be served consecutive and prior to the 15-

to-life on the murder; do you understand?

[MR. JACKSON]: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: So the total sentence would be 18-to-life and those first three would 

be the mandatory firearm specification; do you understand?

[MR. JACKSON]: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Furthermore, upon your release from the penitentiary after you 

serve the minimum of the three years on the gun spec and 15 years on the murder, 

the decision on whether or not to parole will be left completely up to the Ohio parole 

board; do you understand that?

[MR. JACKSON]: Yes, ma’am.

(Emphasis added.) The trial court later asked Mr. Jackson whether he had any questions about the 

potential penalties he faced, and Mr. Jackson stated that he did not. The trial court then accepted 

his guilty plea.

{¶19} Mr. Jackson argues his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

entered because the trial court failed to substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 when informing him 

of the maximum penalty he faced. According to Mr. Jackson, the trial court never made it clear 

that he was facing a potential lifetime of incarceration. He claims that, when the trial court used 

the language italicized above, it conveyed the message that he was guaranteed release from prison 

in 18 years. Because the court failed to differentiate between a lifetime of monitoring under parole 

and a lifetime in prison, Mr. Jackson argues, he did not subjectively understand the implications 

of his plea.

{¶20} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court failed to 

substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 when informing Mr. Jackson of the maximum penalty he 
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faced. Although the court used the language “upon your release[,]” that portion of its statement 

cannot be taken out of context. The court specifically told Mr. Jackson that the parole board would 

decide whether he received parole. If his parole was guaranteed, there would be no reason for the 

parole board to decide his parole eligibility. Moreover, the court told Mr. Jackson his aggravated 

murder charge carried a maximum penalty of life in prison, his three-year firearm sentence would 

be served before his fifteen-year-to-life murder sentence, and his total sentence would be eighteen 

years to life. Mr. Jackson indicated that he understood his sentence and did not have any questions 

about the potential penalties he faced. Further, the court’s explanation was consistent with the 

written plea of guilt Mr. Jackson signed, indicating his sentence would be eighteen years to life in 

prison. Mr. Jackson has not shown that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter 

his plea. Accordingly, his second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶21} Mr. Jackson’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 
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for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

SCOT STEVENSON

FOR THE COURT

CARR, J.

SUTTON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

VICTORIA FERRY, Assistant State Public Defender, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.