2007 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-13-2007

Anderson v. Keim

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 06-3880

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Recommended Citation

"Anderson v. Keim" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 440.

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1

BLD-341 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 06-3880

________________

RICKY ANDERSON

 v.

 

AMY L. KEIM

Ricky Samuel Anderson, 

 Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-00863)

District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone

_______________________________________

Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

August 9, 2007

Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES

(Filed: September 13, 2007)

_______________________

OPINION

_______________________

PER CURIAM

Ricky Anderson appeals from the District Court’s grant of judgment on the
2

pleadings in favor of Appellee Amy L. Keim. Because we determine that the appeal lacks

arguable legal merit, we will dismiss it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

While detained in a state facility, Anderson initiated this action in the District

Court against Keim, his former criminal defense attorney, seeking recovery under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that Keim’s “misrepresentation” and “neglect[]” led to him

being refused bond, and asserts that Keim has violated his rights and the rights of his

child. (Compl. at 3.) He seeks an order awarding him ten million dollars, and requests

that Keim’s representation of him be terminated and that two judges involved with his

case before the state courts be “contact[ed] . . . about bond.” (Id. at 4.) Keim filed a

motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that Anderson did not allege that she had

acted under color of state law as required to state a cause of action under § 1983. (Mot.

for J. on the Pleadings at 3.)

The District Court agreed with Keim and the magistrate judge to whom the case

had been referred, and entered judgment for Keim on the pleadings on the ground that

Keim did not act under color of state law. (Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation at 1; District Court’s Mem. Order at 2.) Anderson filed a timely notice

of appeal.

His appeal is clearly meritless. A plaintiff cannot state a viable claim under § 1983

without alleging that the violation of federal rights of which he complains “was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” See Harvey v. Plains Twp.

Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005). State-appointed criminal defense
attorneys such as Keim do not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 319-25 (1981)(function of defense lawyer is “essentially . . . private” and

performed without “state office and authority,” even though lawyer is licensed by

government and even if he is employed by government as public defender).

“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a

lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at

325. Anderson does not allege that Keim’s actions went beyond these traditional

functions, or that Keim had any connection with the state sufficient to show that she acted

under color of state law.

Indisputably, Anderson’s § 1983 claim will not lie against Keim. Therefore, we

will dismiss this appeal under § 1915(e)(2).