A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLANT A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Steve Carter James H. Voyles, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Cynthia L. Ploughe Annie Fierek Deputy Attorney General Brownsburg, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

A TTORNEY FOR A MICUS C URIAE I NDIANAPOLIS M ETROPOLITAN P OLICE D EPARTMENT Lakshmi Hasanadka Indianapolis, Indiana 

# In the 

# Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________
No. 49S00-0710-CR-396

S TATE OF I NDIANA , Appellant (Plaintiff below),

v.

C HERYL O DDI -S MITH , Appellee (Defendant below)

.



### _________________________________ Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court, No. 49F18-0701-FD-6788 The Honorable Reuben B. Hill, Judge

_________________________________ On Petition to Transfer Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 56(A)

_________________________________ January 9, 2008

Shepard, Chief Justice.

The trial court suppressed all the eviden ce from appellee Cheryl Oddi-Smith’s drunk driving arrest. It held that the arresting offi cer had no law enforcement authority because he had
not been re-sworn after the cons olidation of the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) and theMarion County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD). We hold that all sworn officers of the IPD or
MCSD at the time of consolidation satisfied the oa th requirement for officers in the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD).

Facts and Procedural History

A section of the article on Unigov in Indian apolis, Ind. Code § 36-3-1-5.1, authorizes the city-county legislative body to consolidate the c ity police department and the county sheriff’s department. On December 19, 2005, the City-County Council of the City of Indianapolis and Marion County passed General Ordinance No. 110. It established the IMPD and directed that
the IPD and MCSD “shall coordinate their fi nancial and purchasing operations through the [IMPD]” and “may collaborate regarding info rmation technology, personnel and administration as they deem appropriate and beneficial to the public” effective January 1, 2006. Indianapolis/Marion County, Ind., Rev. Code of the Consolidated City and County § 279-102(b) (2007).

The IMPD officially assumed responsibility for providing law enforcement services in Marion County on January 1, 2007. Id. § 279-102(c). On that date, all IPD and MCSD officers automatically became officers of the IMPD. Id. § 279-103(a). The sh eriff and other highranking officers attended a voluntary swearing-in ceremony the next day, but most officers were not in attendance. (Mot. Supress Hr’g Tr. at 4, 6, June 19, 2007.)

On January 15, 2007, Cheryl Oddi-Smith was involved in a three-car accident. Shortly after arriving at the scene, officers began a DUI investigation. Due to unfavorable road conditions, they transported Oddi-Smith to the police department, where Officer William Bueckers subsequently arrested her for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Officer Bueckers had been sworn as an IPD officer in August 2001, but had not been re-sworn as an officer for the
IMPD.



### 2The State charged Oddi-Smith with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Oddi-Smith filed a motion to suppress evidence from her tr affic stop and arrest contending that Officer Bueckers lacked authority to perform her arrest. The trial court granted Oddi-Smith’s motion to suppress and sua sponte dismissed the charges against her, finding that Officer Bueckers was not statutorily or constitutionally empowered to enforce the laws of Indiana. The State appealed, and we authorized a direct appeal to this Court. Ind. Appellate Rule 56(A).

Oath Requirement for Law Enforcement Officers

We begin by examining whether Indiana law re quires law enforcement officers to take an oath before beginning official duties. A porti on of the Indiana Code governing state and local government administration provides that “every o fficer and every deputy, before entering on the officer’s or deputy’s official duties, shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Indian a, and that the officer or deputy will faithfully discharge the duties of such office.” Ind. Code Ann. § 5-4-1-1(a) (West 2007).

The inclusion of law enforcement officers in this requirement of oaths seems plain enough, as does the purpose of such a mandate. 1 Law enforcement officers hold positions of substantial public responsibility. As with the oath s we require of witnesses and jurors, the oaths
of officers bind the conscience of the affiant a nd emphasize the solemnity of the duty at hand.
See Ind. Const. art. I, § 8; Ind. Code Ann. § 34-45-1-2 (West 2007); cf. Modesitt v. State , 578 N.E.2d 649, 653 (Ind. 1991); Sides v. State , 693 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Ind. 1998) (abrogated on other grounds). We also observe that department s have believed for as long as anyone can recall that the carefully recruited and trained individuals appointed to the force needed to be “sworn
officers.” We think this is correct.

1 At oral argument, the State contended that law enforcement officers are not covered by Ind. Code § 5-4-1-1 because they are “employees” rather th an “officers.” The authority cited fo r this proposition is case law examining whether law enforcement officers hold an “office” within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against holding two “lucrative offices.” See Ind. Const. art. II, § 9; Thompson v. Hays , 867 N.E.2d 654, 658-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Gaskin v. Beier , 622 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). We think these cases do not dispose of the present, statutory question.



### 3Legislative Intent Regarding the Consolidation

We now turn to the issue at hand: whether I ndiana law requires an officer to be re-sworn upon consolidation of a city police department a nd a county sheriff’s department or whether the
officer’s sworn status carries forward to this ne wly consolidated entity. We first look to Indiana statute for guidance.

The primary purpose in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Hendrix v. State , 759 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. 2001). The best evidence of that intent is the language of the statute itself, and we strive to give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. A statute should be examined as a whole, avoiding excessive reliance upon a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words. Sales v. State , 723 N.E.2d 416 (Ind. 2000). The Court presumes that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and goals. B.K.C. v. State , 781 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

The legislature’s enactment authorizing co mbination of the two departments leaves substantial flexibility to the local legislative body. As respects the eligibility of officers in the consolidated entity, Ind. Code § 36-3-1-5.1(e)(2) provides only that the consolidating ordinance “must specify which law enforcement officer s of the police department and which law enforcement officers of the county sheriff’s depart ment shall be law enforcement officers of the consolidated law enforcement department.” The statute does not impose any additional requirements on officers, such as passing a new ex amination or re-swearing. Rather, the statute dictates that the officers selected by the city-county council “shall be” officers of the consolidated organization, contemplating an automatic transition into active law enforcement duty.

Moreover, the statute provides that former o fficers of the sheriff’s department or city police department who continue service after consolidation must retain their accrued pension



### 4fund or trust benefits and service credits ear ned during employment. Ind. Code Ann. § 36-3-1- 5.1(e)(4)-(5) (West 2007). This mandatory con tinuing accrual of benefits from employment under their former organization to employment under the consolidated entity is consistent with the interpretation that the General Assembly inte nded that officers make a seamless transition to the consolidated entity. The statute may permit the city-county council to impose additional requirements upon officers before they begin serving the consolidated entity, but the consolidating statute itself does not contain any such mandate.

Next we turn to the General Ordinance creating the IMPD to determine whether it contained a requirement to re-swear the officer s transitioning into the IMPD. The Ordinance provided that IPD and MCSD would cease to exist after December 31, 2006, and that IMPD would become the legal successor in interest thereafter. Indianapolis/Marion County, Ind., Rev.
Code of the Consolidated C ity and County § 279-102(c), 103 (2007). It declared that all members of the IPD and MCSD automatically became members of the IMPD. Id. § 279-103. It specifically granted each IMPD officer genera l police power and power to arrest, making no mention of a re-swearing requirement. Id. § 279-223 (stating that members of the IMPD have all the powers set forth in Ind. Code §§ 36-8-3-6, - 10-9). It set forth specific age, training, experience, and examination requirements for members joining the IMPD after December 31, 2006, but excepted from such requirements officers who became members of IMPD automatically. Id. § 279-234(b). An officer’s length of se rvice with the IPD or MCSD must be included when calculating the officer’s length of service with the IMPD. Id. § 279-103(c). Similarly, officers must retain a ll pension fund or pension trust benefits and service credits that accrued prior to January 1, 2007. Id. Nothing in the Ordinan ce indicates that officers transitioning from the IPD and MCSD needed to be re-sworn.

Finally, Oddi-Smith relies on an internal IMPD directive, General Order 1.1.1, which provides: “All persons employed by the [IMPD] as a merit or reserve police officer, prior to assuming sworn status, must meet with the Chief of Police or Sheriff to receive the oath of office for this department.” (Appellee’s Br. at 2 n.1.) As with the state statute and the local ordinance, we view this directive as aimed at personnel ne w to law enforcement, not as requiring a second
oath for officers who had been sworn before the consolidation.



### 5

### 6 Conclusion

There might well be other grounds on which th e arrest of Oddi-Smith was valid, like the
“de facto officer” doctrine. We think it sufficient grounds to say that the arresting officer was recruited, trained, and sworn as an IPD officer and that he took all that with him to the IMPD.

We reverse the trial court’s suppression and dismissal and remand for further proceedings on the merits of the charges against Oddi-Smith.

Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.