J-S64042-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LEONARD O. RILEY, JR

Appellant No. 1972 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 12, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-22-CR-0005291-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD,* J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2017

Appellant, Leonard O. Riley, Jr., appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

judgment of sentence to serve an aggregate thirty-nine to seventy-eight 

months’ imprisonment for delivery of a controlled substance1 and criminal use 

of a communication facility.2 Appellant claims that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain the conviction for criminal use of a communication 

facility, that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence, and that 

the sentence was manifestly excessive. We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the evidence against Appellant as follows:

On May 6, 2014, Harrisburg City Police Detective Sean 

Cornick served as the lead detective in a drug investigation 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a).
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of a person known as “Mac”. In the investigation, Detective 

Cornick utilized a confidential informant (“CI”) who 

previously assisted in investigations which resulted in 

convictions. 

On the afternoon of May 6, 2014, the CI placed a call to Mac 

in the presence of Detective Cornick. Detective Cornick 

heard a male voice on the other end of the conversation. 

The CI arranged to meet Mac at a customary meeting place,

Woodbine and Logan Streets in Harrisburg. The CI ordered 

ten packs of heroin. After the phone call, Detective Cornick 

searched the CI’s person and vehicle to ensure that the CI 

did not possess drugs, drug paraphernalia or money. The 

CI possessed only a cell phone. Detective Cornick provided 

the CI with $70 in Dauphin County Drug Task Force buy 

money.

Harrisburg City Police Detective Nicholas Licata assisted 

with the investigation. Detective Licata and [Office of the 

Attorney General] Agent Henry Giammarco set up 

surveillance in an unmarked vehicle near Woodbine and 

Logan Streets.

Driving his own vehicle, the CI followed Detective Cornick to 

that location and parked south of Cornick’s vehicle. They 

remained in communication. The CI informed Detective 

Cornick that the target was en route to the location driving 

a black 300 Chrysler. The black Chrysler arrived at the area 

and parked north of Detective Cornick’s vehicle. An 

individual exited the Chrysler and walked south toward 

Woodbine Street. At trial, Detective Cornick identified the 

individual as [Appellant]. 

Detective Licata testified regarding his surveillance. 

Detective Licata saw a black male exit the front passenger 

seat of the Chrysler and toward the detectives’ vehicle. At 

trial, Detective Licata also identified that person as 

[Appellant].

Both detectives testified that as [Appellant] walked south on 

Woodbine Street, he observed Detective Cornick. Detective 

Cornick drove away in order to avoid further eye contact 

with [Appellant]. [Appellant] continuously watched as 

Detective Cornick drove away. [Appellant] returned to the 
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black Chrysler and also drove away. Up to this point, no 

one had approached the CI’s vehicle and the CI did not exit 

his vehicle.

Within minutes, the black Chrysler returned and parked 

behind the CI’s vehicle. The CI left his vehicle and entered 

the rear passenger seat of the Chrysler.[3]. . . After the CI 

exited, [Appellant] reached for something in the back seat 

where the CI had been seated. 

Detective Licata maintained constant surveillance of the CI 

after he returned to his vehicle. 

Following the transaction, Detective Cornick instructed the 

CI to follow him to a pre-established secure meeting place. 

The CI followed. At the meeting place, Detective Cornick 

repeated the search as conducted before the transaction. 

The CI handed Detective Cornick ten green glassine bags. 

The CI did not possess any additional drugs or paraphernalia 

and did not have the $70 of Drug Task Force money. 

Pennsylvania State Police Laboratory crime lab testing 

determined that the bags contained a total of .28 grams of 

heroin. (N.T. pp. 23-24). 

Several weeks later, Detective Licata arrested [Appellant] in 

connection with another investigation. In the course of that 

arrest, Detective Licata recovered a phone from [Appellant] 

which contained a series of text messages inquiring about 

the other person’s location at Logan Street and the prices 

for packages of heroin[]. The text message referred to 

[Appellant]’s street names of “Mac” or “Omizz”. The number 

of the phone seized from [Appellant] at that arrest 

contained messages which indicated they were from 

“Omizz” at his new number.

 

3 The trial court further stated that after the CI entered the car, “[Appellant] 

joined the CI in the rear passenger seat. The CI and [Appellant] remained 

there for 30-60 seconds.” Trial Ct. Op., 3/11/17 at 4. However, as discussed 

below that finding is not supported in the record. See N.T., 1/12/16, at 37 

(indicating that Appellant exited the vehicle from the front passenger seat 

after the CI got out, and then went to the back seat and reached toward the 

area where the CI had been). 
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Trial Ct. Op. at 2-4 (record citations omitted). 

On January 12, 2016, Appellant proceeded to a nonjury trial at which 

the trial court found him guilty of delivery of a controlled substance and 

criminal use of a communication facility. Appellant waived the preparation of 

a presentence investigation report, and the court immediately sentenced 

Appellant to consecutive sentences of twenty-seven to fifty-four months’ 

imprisonment for the delivery and twelve to twenty-four months’ for the use 

of communication facility. The trial court directed that the sentences run 

consecutive to a previously imposed sentence.4 On January 21, 2016, 

Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representation indicating 

that Appellant intended to proceed pro se, which the trial court granted on 

January 25, 2016. Meanwhile, Appellant filed several pro se post-sentence 

motions. The trial court denied the pro se post-sentence motions on February 

3, 2016. That same day, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. 

Appellant obtained new counsel, who subsequently discontinued 

Appellant’s pro se appeal and filed a Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

9541-9546, petition seeking reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. On 

September 27, 2016, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition.

 

4 On the day before trial in the instant case, Appellant was convicted and 

sentenced in a separate case docketed in the trial court as “5649-2014.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 9 n.2. According to Appellant, he was sentenced to one 

and one-half to three years’ imprisonment, and he took a separate appeal at 

294 MDA 2017. Id. The current record only contains passing reference to 

5649-2014. 
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On October 6, 2016, Appellant filed post-sentence motions nunc pro 

tunc challenging the weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of 

the sentence. The trial court denied the post-sentence motions on November 

10, 2016. Appellant timely appealed and complied with the trial court’s order 

to file and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. This appeal followed. 

Appellant presents the following questions for review: 

I. Was not the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction 

for the offense defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512 (criminal use 

of a communication facility)?

II. Did not the [trial] court abuse its discretion by failing to 

grant [Appellant] a new trial on the basis that the guilty 

verdicts were against the weight of the evidence?

III. Was the imposition of an aggregate sentence of three 

years, three months, to six years, six months, clearly 

unreasonable, so manifestly excessive as to constitute an 

abuse of discretion, and inconsistent with the protection of 

the public, the gravity of the offenses, and [Appellant]’s 

rehabilitative needs where the court imposed consecutive 

jail sentences[?] 

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (capitalization omitted).

Appellant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove he used 

a communication facility to engage in a drug transaction. He notes that the 

cellular phone seized from him at the time of the arrest bore a different 

number than the one used by CI to contact “Mac” and arrange the transaction 

on May 6, 2014. He emphasizes that the Commonwealth “offered no proof 

that [he] was the owner of a cell phone account with the particular number . 

. . that the CI called on May 6, 2014” or that any other person called him at 
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that number. Appellant’s Brief at 24. Moreover, he notes that Corporal 

Cornick only “gave a threadbare description of the actual telephone 

communication between the CI and ‘Mac’ on May 6, 2014.” Id. No relief is 

due. 

Our review of Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 

governed by the following precepts:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, 

we note that the facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may 

be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means 

of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the 

above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe 

all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Storey, 167 A.3d 750, 757 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). 

Section 7512 of the Crimes Codes defines criminal use of communication 

facility, in part, as follows: 

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the 

third degree if that person uses a communication facility to 
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commit, cause or facilitate the commission or the attempt 

thereof of any crime which constitutes a felony under this 

title or under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64),

known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and 

Cosmetic Act. . . . . 

18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a) (footnote omitted). The offense requires the 

Commonwealth to prove “(1) [the defendant] knowingly and intentionally 

used a communication facility; (2) [the defendant] knowingly, intentionally,

or recklessly facilitated an underlying felony; and (3) the underlying felony 

occurred.” Commonwealth v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 382 (Pa. Super. 2004)

Instantly, the record, when read in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, contains adequate circumstantial evidence that Appellant 

used a communication facility to facilitate a drug transaction. On May 6, 2014, 

the CI indicated he was calling “Mac” to purchase heroin and dialed a number. 

Corporal Cornick overheard what he believed was a male voice talking to the 

CI. “Mac” was known to operate a black Chrysler 300 with temporary tags. 

Corporal Cornick testified that he instructed the CI to keep his normal routine 

when dealing with “Mac.” The CI informed the officer that the transaction was 

to take place at the intersection of Logan and Woodbine Streets. Appellant 

appeared at the designated meeting place as a passenger in a black Chrysler 

300 with temporary tags. The CI, who had been searched for contraband 

before meeting with Appellant, returned with ten packets of heroin after 

meeting with Appellant. 
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Less than a month later, at the time of his arrest on June 4, 2014, 

Appellant was in possession of a cellphone. Although that phone’s number 

was different than the number used by the CI to contact “Mac,” a search of 

the phone indicated that Appellant changed phone numbers and using his 

known nickname of “Omizz,” alerted his contacts of his new phone number on

May 24, 2014. The cellphone also contained outgoing text messages referring 

to the sender as “Mac” and arranging meetings at the intersection of Logan 

and Woodbine. 

Thus, although there was no direct evidence that the CI was in contact 

with Appellant to arrange the May 6, 2014 sale, the circumstantial evidence 

established that Appellant was the individual identified by the CI as “Mac” on 

May 6, 2014. Moreover, because the CI contacted “Mac” and Appellant 

appeared at the designated meeting place, the Commonwealth adduced 

sufficient circumstantial proof that the Appellant used a communication facility 

to facilitate that transaction. See Storey, 167 A.3d at 757. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s first claim fails.

Appellant next claims that the verdicts were against the weight of the 

evidence. In support, Appellant sets forth four overlapping arguments. First, 

Appellant emphasizes that there was inconsistent testimony regarding the 

delivery. Appellant’s Brief at 28. He notes Detective Licata testified that the 

exchange occurred in Appellant’s vehicle, while Corporal Cornick believed the 

exchange occurred in the CI’s vehicle, and there was no video recording of the 
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exchange despite Corporal Cornick’s belief that video surveillance was 

conducted. Id. 

Second, Appellant notes there was no direct evidence of an exchange 

between him and the CI. He observes that the CI did not testify, none of the 

surveilling officers could see a hand-to-hand transaction through the tinted 

windows of Appellant’s vehicle, and the CI was not equipped with audio 

recording capabilities. Id. at 27-28. 

Third, Appellant challenges the quality of the circumstantial evidence 

supporting the allegation he personally delivered the subject heroin. He 

emphasizes that the search of the CI’s clothing and vehicle before and after 

the search was perfunctory and did not exclude the possibility that the CI hid

contraband before the transaction or kept the pre-recorded buy money after 

the transaction. Id. at 27. He further notes that none of the pre-recorded 

buy money was recovered when he was arrested nearly one month after the 

controlled purchase. Id. Additionally, Appellant observes that a third 

person, the driver of Appellant’s vehicle, was in the vehicle at the time of the 

transaction. Id. at 13. He also observes there was no evidence introduced 

to show he owned the cellular phone contacted by the CI. Id. at 28. 

Fourth, Appellant contends that the text messages recovered from the 

cellphone found in his possession at the time of his arrest were wholly 

unreliable, because the Commonwealth did not establish he authored the text 
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messages, and his counsel failed to object to the authenticity of the messages. 

For the reasons that follow, we conclude Appellant’s claim lacks merit. 

The principles governing our review of a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence are well settled. 

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the 

discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be 

granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or 

because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at 

a different conclusion. Rather, “the role of the trial judge is 

to determine that ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts 

are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to 

give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.’” 

It has often been stated that “a new trial should be awarded 

when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is 

imperative so that right may be given another opportunity 

to prevail.” 

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with 

a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard 

of review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, 

an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

One of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that 

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the 

interest of justice.

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the 

trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial 
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based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is 

unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court's 

discretion, we have explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of 

judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a 

dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the 

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving 

effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be 

exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to 

prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 

actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, 

but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted). 

The trial court here opined that the evidence against Appellant was 

overwhelming: to /and during ; 

We found that [Appellant] delivered a controlled substance 

based upon the following credible evidence: police gave the 

CI Task Force funds; the CI called [Appellant] to . . . 

arrange the purchase of ten bags of heroin at Woodbine and 

Logan Streets; [Appellant] arrived and appeared concerned 

by the presence of the detective’s vehicle and drove away; 

[Appellant] returned to complete the transaction with the CI 

in the back seat of [Appellant]’s vehicle; detectives 

maintained constant surveillance of the CI; no one other 

than [Appellant] interacted with the CI during that time 

after the transaction[;] the CI had no funds and possessed 

ten bags of heroin.

***

[Appellant] challenges this conclusion solely upon the lack 

of observation of a hand-to hand exchange. The veracity of 

our finding is undiminished by the lack of such evidence in 
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that the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

[the delivery] by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

Trial Ct. Op. at 6. 

Appellant’s first two arguments, which focus on the inconsistencies 

between Detective Licata’s and Corporal Cornick’s testimony and the absence 

of direct evidence that Appellant delivered heroin to the CI, do not establish 

an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of his motion for a new trial. 

Corporal Cornick did not have a direct view of the transaction, but Detective 

Licata did. Thus, the trial court, as finder of fact, was well within its authority 

to credit Detective Licata’s testimony that the exchange occurred in 

Appellant’s vehicle. Moreover, the trial court correctly observed that 

Appellant’s convictions could be sustained by circumstantial evidence. Cf.

Storey, 167 A.3d at 757. Therefore, Appellant’s first and second weight of 

the evidence arguments fail. 

As to Appellant’s third argument, which challenges the quality of the 

circumstantial evidence, the perceived inadequacy of the search of the CI and 

the CI’s vehicle for contraband before the alleged exchange does not warrant

relief. Instantly, Corporal Cornick testified that he followed protocols when 

searching the CI, possibly having the CI shake out their undergarments, and 

examining the interior of the CI’s car. Although the Corporal did not conduct 

a cavity search or exhaust all possible hiding spots in the CI’s vehicle, 

Appellant’s arguments rests on speculation that the CI secreted the heroin 

before the sale or the recorded buy money after the sale. However, any doubt 
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as to Appellant’s conviction must be reasonable, and reasonable doubt does 

not require the Commonwealth to prove Appellant’s guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Cf. Storey, 167 A.3d at 757. Thus, we discern no basis to disturb 

the trial court’s conclusion that there was ample evidence that the CI obtained 

the subject heroin during the meeting inside Appellant’s car, and its finding in 

this regard did not shock one’s sense of justice. See Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 

1054-55. 

As noted earlier, however, the record does not support the court’s 

suggestion that Appellant was observed getting into the backseat of his vehicle 

with the CI. See supra, note 3. Rather, the delivery that occurred inside 

Appellant’s vehicle took place between the CI and either Appellant, who was 

in the front passenger seat at the time of the alleged transaction, or the driver 

of the vehicle. See N.T., 1/12/16, at 37. Nevertheless, the absence of 

evidence regarding which party delivered the heroin to the CI does not warrant 

relief. 

The term “‘[d]eliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual, constructive, or 

attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, 

other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency relationship.” 

35 P.S. § 780-102(b). This Court has noted that an actual delivery “means 

‘[t]o convey or remove from one . . . person to another; pass or hand over 

from one to another.’” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1030 

(Pa. Super. 2002). A “constructive transfer” 
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requires that a person making a constructive transfer of a 

controlled substance, the transferor, must have ownership 

of the controlled substance; i.e., the controlled substance 

must belong to the person, or the person must have 

dominion and control over it. The constructive transfer of 

the controlled substance occurs, then, whenever it is given 

to another by a third person who is acting at the transferor’s 

direction or command.

Id. at 1031-32.

Instantly, as set forth above, there was ample evidence that the CI 

contacted “Mac” to purchase heroin, and that Appellant appeared at the 

prearranged location in his own vehicle. Appellant, moreover, appeared to 

conduct “counter surveillance” before the meeting and had his driver take him 

around the block before engaging with the CI. Later, after the CI exited 

Appellant’s vehicle, Appellant exited the car, rummaged in the area where the 

CI had been seated, returned to the front passenger seat, and left the scene. 

Under these circumstances, we find adequate support that Appellant either 

directly, or through a third person under his command, transferred the heroin 

to the CI. Therefore, no relief is due. 

Fourth, although Appellant asserts that the text messages from the 

cellular phone recovered at time of his arrest were insufficiently authenticated, 

the record belies Appellant’s argument. Rather, the record reveals that 

Appellant was known as “Mac” or “Omizz,” that the outgoing messages used 

those nicknames, and that these messages also referred to purported 

transactions at the same location as Appellant’s sale to the CI. See In re 

F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. Super. 2005) (circumstantial evidence which “will 
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support a finding that the writing is genuine will suffice to authenticate the 

writing” (citations omitted)). Therefore, we find no merit to Appellant’s 

assertions that the messages were not entitled to any weight for the limited 

purposes of identifying him as the individual known as “Mac” called by the CI. 

Moreover, because none of Appellant’s arguments in support of his weight of 

the evidence claim show reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 

his motion for a new trial. See Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 

Appellant, in his final claim, asserts that the trial court’s sentence was 

manifestly excessive. Appellant acknowledges that he was sentenced in the 

standard range for each offense but argues that the application of the 

guidelines was clearly unreasonable in light of his history and background. 

Appellant’s Brief at 19, 34 He further challenges the decision of the court to 

run the two sentences in this case consecutively and consecutive to his 

previously imposed sentence. Id. at 19, 33. We conclude Appellant has failed 

to raise a substantial question warranting review. 

This Court has stated that the

discretionary aspects of [an appellant’s] sentence [ ] are not 

appealable as of right. Rather, an appellant challenging the 

sentencing court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test. 

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, 

see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was 

properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 
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substantial question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some 

citations omitted). 

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc requesting that 

the sentences in this case run concurrently to each other and the previously 

imposed sentence, and that the sentence was too severe in light of his 

rehabilitative needs. Appellant perfected this appeal by filing an appeal nunc 

pro tunc, and he preserved his sentencing claim in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. Appellant has included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) statement. 

Therefore, we proceed to consider whether Appellant raised a substantial 

question. 

It is well settled that

[t]he determination of what constitutes a substantial 

question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. “A 

substantial question exi[s]ts only when the appellant 

advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision 

of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court 

discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or 

consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same 

time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to the 

exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a 

substantial question.” In fact, this Court has recognized 

“the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, 

sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most 

extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate 

sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the 
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crimes and the length of imprisonment.” That is “in our 

view, the key to resolving the preliminary substantial 

question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence 

consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what 

appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the 

criminal conduct at issue in the case.” 

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808-09 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

omitted). 

Appellant presents boilerplate assertions that the trial court failed to 

consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors and focused solely on 

the gravity of the offense.5 However, considering the nature of the crimes we 

do not find the individual sentences or the aggregate sentence of thirty-nine 

to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment to be so severe a punishment 

constituting an extreme circumstance under which the aggregate sentence is

unduly harsh. Similarly, Appellant presents no further facts to conclude that 

the decision to run the sentences in this case consecutive to the sentence of 

sixteen to thirty-six months’ imprisonment in his prior case was excessive in 

light of the criminal conduct at issue. See Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 

A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) (reiterating principle that defendants are 

not entitled to “volume discounts” for multiple criminal acts). Therefore, we 

find no substantial question and decline to proceed to review of Appellant’s 

sentencing claim. 

 

5 We note that Appellant does not specify any mitigating circumstances. We 

further note that during allocution, Appellant merely invoked his constitutional 

rights to confront and cross-examine his accusers. N.T. at 57.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2017