I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 9032 

To direct the Sergeants at Arms of the House of Representatives and the 

Senate to develop an interagency plan to identify certain congressional 

employees with connections to the Chinese Communist Party and intent 

to engage in certain unlawful activities, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 18, 2020 

Mr. MURPHY of North Carolina (for himself, Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota, 

Mr. BANKS, and Mr. ABRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on House Administration 

A BILL 

To direct the Sergeants at Arms of the House of Representatives and the Senate to develop an interagency plan 

to identify certain congressional employees with connections to the Chinese Communist Party and intent to 

engage in certain unlawful activities, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop China’s Heinous 

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1 sional Access Act’’ or the ‘‘SCHEME Against Congres2 sional Access Act’’. 

3 SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL EMPLOYEES WITH CHINESE COM4 MUNIST PARTY CONNECTIONS AND INTENT 

5 TO ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES. 

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

7 (1) The Chinese Communist Party has an ex8 plicit and subversive interest in gaining access to 

9 and influence over U.S. political activity. 

10 (2) In a July 2020 speech, Director of the Fed11 eral Bureau of Investigations Chris Wray said that 

12 ‘‘Beijing is engaged in a highly sophisticated malign 

13 foreign influence campaign’’ with efforts that involve 

14 ‘‘subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive at15 tempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our 

16 country’s public discourse, and undermine con17 fidence in our democratic processes and values’’. 

18 (3) There have been several instances and in19 vestigations of Chinese operatives developing exten20 sive ties and employment with U.S. elected officials, 

21 both senior and junior. 

22 (4) These same operatives, mostly Chinese na23 tionals, have been deployed to infiltrate political op24 erations by the main civilian spy agency of their 

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1 cision-makers and gain access to classified informa2 tion. 

3 (5) These instances demonstrate a devoted 

4 strategy of China that takes years, or sometimes 

5 decades, to knowingly gain access, influence, or in6 formation. 

7 (6) To protect classified information and pre8 vent seditious influence over elected officials, Con9 gress must act to develop stronger oversight with re10 spect to the foreign involvement of covered individ11 uals. 

12 (b) PLAN FOR BACKGROUND ASSESSMENTS.—Not 

13 later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 

14 Act, the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives 

15 and the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate shall jointly— 

16 (1) consult with the Director of National Intel17 ligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves18 tigation, and the Secretary of State regarding poten19 tial unlawful activity engaged in by covered individ20 uals to the advantage of the Chinese Communist 

21 Party; and 

22 (2) in consultation with the Directors and Sec23 retary specified in paragraph (1), develop an inter24 agency plan to assess the background of each cov25 ered individual to determine whether— 


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1 (A) the covered individual has a connection 

2 to the Chinese Communist Party or any ele3 ment thereof (including connections resulting 

4 from citizenship, military service, or personal 

5 travel); and 

6 (B) the covered individual intends to en7 gage in unlawful activity to the advantage of 

8 the Chinese Communist Party. 

9 (c) ASSESSMENT OUTCOMES.— 

10 (1) NOTIFICATION.—If, as the result of an as11 sessment conducted pursuant to the plan developed 

12 under subsection (b)(2), the Sergeant at Arms con13 cerned determines that a covered individual meets 

14 both of the criteria specified in such subsection, the 

15 Sergeant at Arms concerned shall notify the head of 

16 the employing office for the covered individual. 

17 (2) OUTCOME.—Upon receipt of a notification 

18 under paragraph (1), the head of the employing of19 fice for the covered individual shall— 

20 (A) immediately terminate the employment 

21 of the covered individual; and 

22 (B) if the covered individual is not under 

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1 vidual to such Director for appropriate inves2 tigation. 

3 (d) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 

4 on which the plan under subsection (b)(2) is developed, 

5 and annually thereafter, the Sergeant at Arms of the 

6 House of Representatives and the Sergeant at Arms of 

7 the Senate shall jointly submit to the President and the 

8 congressional intelligence committees a report on any im9 provements to such plan made during the year covered by 

10 the report. 

11 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

12 (1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMIT13 TEES.—The term ‘‘congressional intelligence com14 mittees’’ has the meaning given such term in section 

15 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 

16 3003). 

17 (2) COVERED EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘covered 

18 employee’’ means an employee of the House of Rep19 resentatives or an employee of the Senate, as such 

20 terms are defined in subsection (a) of section 101 of 

21 the Congressional Accountability Act (2 U.S.C. 

22 1301). 

23 (3) EMPLOYING OFFICE.—The term ‘‘employing 

24 office’’ has the meaning given such term in sub25 section (a) of section 101 of the Congressional AcVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:39 Jan 05, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H9032.IH H9032

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1 countability Act (2 U.S.C. 1301), except such term 

2 does not include the entities listed in subparagraphs 

3 (D) or (E) of paragraph (9) of such subsection. 

4 (4) SERGEANT AT ARMS CONCERNED.—The 

5 term ‘‘Sergeant at Arms concerned’’ means— 

6 (A) the Sergeant at Arms of the House of 

7 Representatives, with respect to assessments 

8 concerning an employee of the House of Rep9 resentatives; and 

10 (B) the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, 

11 with respect to assessments concerning an em12 ployee of the Senate. 

Æ 


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