RENDERED: APRIL 1, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-1615-MR

JEWELL HALL APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CR-00563

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Appellant Jewell Hall appeals the trial court’s order 

denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle following an 

encounter with police. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we 

affirm the trial court.
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FACTS

On May 10, 2019, Paducah Police Department Officer Justin Canup 

(“Canup”) was on patrol. At approximately 6:00 a.m., Canup was dispatched to 

respond to a report of a black SUV being stationary in the middle of a street with 

the lights on and the engine running. According to a citizen report, the SUV was 

impeding traffic flow and had been idling there for at least two hours.

When Canup arrived on the scene, he parked behind a work van 

which had parked behind the black SUV, ostensibly because the van could not 

proceed down the street due to the SUV blocking the road. Canup, without 

activating his emergency lights, parked his cruiser behind the van and got out. He 

walked around the rear of the work van and as he did so, the brake lights on the 

SUV engaged and the SUV pulled away. The SUV had tinted windows, so Canup 

had been unable to determine if anyone was inside prior to it pulling away.

Canup got back in his cruiser and followed the SUV. The SUV pulled 

into the parking lot of a nearby apartment complex and Canup pulled up behind the 

SUV with his lights now engaged. The Appellant, Jewell Hall (“Hall”), alit from 

the driver’s side of the vehicle with his hands above his head. He followed 

Canup’s instructions to walk backwards towards Canup, with his arms raised. Hall

complied when he was instructed to lift his t-shirt from his waist so Canup could 

ensure he had no weapon tucked in his waistband. When backup arrived, Hall was 
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handcuffed and officers approached the SUV to ensure no one else was inside. 

They then determined that Hall had been alone in the vehicle.

Canup spoke with Hall. Hall admitted that he had been drinking the 

evening before and fell asleep, leaving the vehicle running in the street while 

waiting for a friend. Canup then conducted field sobriety tests and determined 

Hall was impaired. Hall was handcuffed and placed under arrest. The officers 

then searched the SUV and a handgun was found by police in the center console. 

Hall was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs, first offense, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. 

Hall filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the stop of his vehicle 

and the search of his person were improper.

1 Following a suppression hearing, his 

motion was denied. The trial court found that Hall was challenging only the stop 

of the vehicle and the seizure of his person and that the stop was supported by 

reasonable suspicion that Hall was engaged in criminal activity, to wit, the failure 

to have a license plate on the vehicle.

2 The court also cited the fact the SUV was 

impeding traffic and was reported to have been doing so for a couple of hours, as 

well as Hall’s act of pulling away as Canup was approaching the vehicle.

 

1 The motion to suppress filed in McCracken Circuit Court summarily alleges that “reasonable 

suspicion to detain him did not exist” and “probable cause to search and arrest him did not exist.” 

The motion does not allege that the search of the vehicle was illegal.

2 Canup could not see the temporary tag in the rear window at the time he was approaching the 

vehicle when it was stopped in the middle of the road because of the tinted windows.
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The charge of operating a motor while under the influence was later 

dismissed. Hall was tried by a jury on the remaining handgun charge and was 

found guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven (7) years. He 

now appeals, arguing that the trial court wrongfully denied his motion to dismiss. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 

evidence, the reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact 

unless found to be clearly erroneous and will review the application of the law to 

those factual findings de novo. “When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion 

to suppress, we utilize a clear error standard of review for factual findings and a de 

novo standard of review for conclusions of law.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 

S.W.3d 300, 305 (Ky. 2006) (citing Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 

409 (Ky. 2004)).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Hall continues the challenge only to the stop of his vehicle, 

arguing that it was improper. Hall argues that as the officer did not activate his 

emergency equipment at first approach when he was parked in the middle of the 

street with his engine running, he did nothing wrong in pulling away. Therefore, 

he argues, his act of pulling away as the officer approached on foot could not be 

the basis for the officer following him and activating his lights to effectuate an 
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actual stop of his vehicle after he pulled away. Hall further argues that the fact the 

vehicle he was driving did not have a license plate in the frame, but rather had a 

temporary tag in the back window of the vehicle, which was difficult for the officer 

to see as the window was tinted, was not a legitimate reason for an encounter with 

a citizen. We disagree.

First, we hold that when Canup first approached Hall’s vehicle when 

it was parked on the street, he did not “stop” the vehicle. As the parties point out, 

“[p]olice officers are free to approach anyone in public areas for any reason.” 

Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349-50 (Ky. 2001). As the vehicle was 

already parked when Canup attempted to approach it before it pulled away, such 

was not a “stop.”3

As he walked towards the vehicle, Canup did not see a license plate 

on the SUV and the vehicle suddenly drove off as he was walking towards it, so 

 

3

 A police officer may approach a person, identify himself as a police officer and 

ask a few questions without implicating the Fourth Amendment. A “seizure” 

occurs when the police detain an individual under circumstances where a 

reasonable person would feel that he or she is not at liberty to leave. Where a 

seizure has occurred, “if police have a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific 

and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in 

connection with a completed felony,” then they may make a Terry [v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)] stop to investigate that 

suspicion. Evaluation of the legitimacy of an investigative stop involves a twopart analysis. First, whether there is a proper basis for the stop based on the 

police officer’s awareness of specific and articulable facts giving rise to 

reasonable suspicion. Second, whether the degree of intrusion was reasonably 

related in scope to the justification for the stop.

Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 537-38 (Ky. App. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Canup returned to his cruiser and then activated his emergency equipment. We 

hold these facts, coupled with the report that the vehicle had been situated blocking 

the street for quite a while, formed a reasonable suspicion to support Canup 

following the vehicle with lights engaged and then stopping the vehicle.4 After 

activating his lights and following the SUV, Canup only then effectuated a stop of 

the vehicle. Only then did he note that there was a temporary tag in the rear 

window.

We are not holding that Canup did not have sufficient reasonable 

suspicion to effectuate a stop on the idling car, as those facts are not before us. 

Rather we are holding that when Canup did effectuate a stop, he had reasonable 

suspicion5to do so based upon the factual findings of the trial court, which we find 

were supported by substantial evidence.

6

 

4

“One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this 

interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances 

and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal 

behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. 

Ct. at 1880.

5

“Based on the officer’s testimony, we find that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

findings.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011). Canup’s testimony at the 

suppression hearing was not contested by Hall and formed a solid basis for the trial court’s 

findings. 

6 A “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes occurs only when an individual is detained under 

circumstances that would induce a reasonable person to believe that he or she is not at liberty to 

leave. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Ky. App. 2005) (citing Terry, 392 U.S.

1, 88 S. Ct. 1868).
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Canup was responding to the report of a car idling for a couple of 

hours while parked, blocking a city street. During the initial response he observed 

that there was no license plate in the rear frame. When added to the citizen pulling 

away as the officer approached the vehicle on foot, while not rising to the level of 

the criminal offense of fleeing or evading police,

7

is sufficient to form reasonable 

suspicion to effectuate a stop. The trial court’s findings were not clearly 

erroneous, and its order is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The trial court properly overruled Hall’s motion to suppress. The trial 

court properly applied the law to its factual findings, following a suppression 

hearing. The factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and the denial of 

suppression was proper. We affirm.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Wade

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Mark D. Barry

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky

 

7 KRS 520.095 – fleeing or evading police in the first degree; KRS 520.100 – fleeing or evading 

police in the second degree.