FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT April 2, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 07- 1237 3

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 06-00449 -CV -H -S PE GG Y T YL ER , Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant,
ve rs us AIG LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, De fendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ A ppe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A pr il 2, 200 8) Before AN DE RSO N and BLA CK, Circuit Judges, and HO DG ES District Judge. ,* HO DG ES , D istrict Judg e:

* Honora ble Wm. Terre ll Hodge s, United States Distri ct J u d ge for the Middle District of Florida , sitti ng by

desig nation.There is a fac tual dispute about the exact spee d of the c ar, but the pa rti es agr ee t h at i t was 1 moving no f

aster tha n 20 to 25 miles per hour. The dist rict cour t found that this issue did not m atter; it was enoug h that the vehicle was moving fast enoug h to cause the injuries sustained. Neither of the insura

nce policie s contain a de finition of the term “a ccide nt.” 2 Be cause the ca se is g overne d by ERI SA, a nd beca use the pa rties ag ree that AI G did not have 3 discretion to deter

mine elig ibilit y

for be nefits or to construe the terms of the plan, the dist ri ct court proper ly held that it should review de novo the denial of benef its
. Fire stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. B ru c h, 48 9 U .S. 10 1, 10 9 (1 98 9) ; Willi a ms v. B e lls ou th Te le c omm s. , I nc ., 37 3 F
. 3d 11 32 , 1 13 7 ( 11 th Cir
. 20 04 ); Sha

w v. Conn. Ge n. L if

e I ns . Co. , 35 3 F
. 3d 12 76 , 12 82 (1 1th Cir
. 20 03 ); HC A Heal th 2 O n Apr il 18, 2004 , Sh ir le y Ba ile y ope ne d the pa sse nge r door a nd j um pe d f ro m
a m ovin g vehicle being driven by her boy friend with whom she had been having an argum ent. T he vehicle, a Ford E xplo rer, wa s “ m ovin g slowly ” at the tim e, no m ore th an 20 t o 25 m ile s pe r hour
. B ai le y suf fe re d ahe ad

w ound tha t c au se d he r de ath 1 two day s later. T here is no e vidence that the door opened unexpectedly , that she was threatened or pushed, th at s he wa s under the influence of any drug or alcohol, or that she w as de pr es se d or

sui ci da l. S he sim

ply ope ne d th e door

and j um pe d ou t. Pe ggy T y le r w as the be ne fi ci ar

y of tw o acc ide nta l de ath a nd d ism em be rm en t policies covering Bailey
. The insurer, AI G L ife Insu rance Com pany , r efused to pay because, it contended, the deceased had not suffere d an injury caused by

an

“ ac ci de nt” a s r equir ed

by the pol ic ie s. T y le r sue d unde r the E m plo y ee Re tir em en t 2 In co m e Se cu ri ty A ct (“ E RI SA ”) , 29 U
. S. C. § 10 01 et se q. The district court decided t h e c a s e o n c r o s s mo t i o n s f o r s u mm a ry ju d g men t , f

i n d i n g f o r t h e i n s u r a n c e c o mp a n y. T y le r ap pe al s. W e va ca te the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r an d r em an d. 3Se rv s. of Ge or g ia , I nc . v. Em

plo y e rs He a lth I ns . Co. , 24 0 F
. 3d 98 2, 99 3 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 1) . Si mil arl y the district court judg ment is subject to de novo revie w here on appea l. Doy le v. L iberty L ife Assur. Co. of Boston, 511 F . 3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir 2008); Wil liams, 373 F. 3d at 1134. 3 Be ca use the te rm

“ acci de nt” is not

spe ci fi ca lly

de fi ne d by

the pol ic ie s, the dis tr ic t cour

t appr opr ia te ly re sorte d to A la ba m a la w as supp ly ing the ru le of de ci sio n sin ce the pol ic ie s w er e de liv er ed in A la ba m a, th e loss oc cu rr ed

in A la ba m a, a nd be ca use the c ourt f

ound no c onf li ct be tw ee n A la

ba m a la w a nd e ith er

E RI SAor federa l com

m on law on this definiti onal legal issu e. See Buce v. Al l i an z Life Insurance Co. , 247 F. 3d 11 33, 1148-49 (11th Cir. 2001 ). T hus, the c as e ca m e dow n to thi s: If A la ba m a la w appl ie s apur el y sub j ec tiv e te st t o de te rm ine w he the r the fa ta l ac t of the ins ur ed w as int en tio na l or

a cc ide nta l, the cl ai m an t w ins be ca

use the de ce de nt’ s de at

h w as pr es um ed by la w to be acciden ta l, see H earn v. Southern Life & H eal t h In s u ra n ce Co. , 454 So. 2d 93 2 (Ala . 1984); O ’ Ba r v . S o u t h e rn L i f

e & H e a l t h I n s . C o . , 1 6 8 S o . 2 d 5 8 0 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ; H an na v. Ri ggs, 333 S o. 2d 5 63 ( A la
. 197 6) , a nd the ins ur an ce c om pa ny c an not pr ove tha t sh e intended to take her ow n life or that she had a basis f or believing th at serious injury
or de ath w oul d be avi rtu al c er ta inty by j um pin g ou t of

the ve hic le und er

the circum sta nc e s pr e se nt e d. I f , h ow e ve r , a s t he d i str i c tc ou rth e l d, A l aba m alaw inc lud es both asub

j ec tiv e an d a n ob

j ec tiv e te st f

or de te rm ini ng w he the r the
c on se qu e nc e s of

ag i ve n a c ta r e “ a c c i de nt a l , ” t he n t he r e su l tr e a c he d by t he d i str i ctI n addition to her fatal head w ound, an autopsy reve aled widely scatter ed bruises a nd a scr ape 4 on her le ft flank. As w ill b e s ee n , i n fr a, the subjective test require s evidenc e that the de cede nt believed se rious injury

or death to be a “vir

tual cer tainty ” in orde r to establish the re quisite intent and rule out an a ccide nt. An objective test would mer ely require fore seea

bility to a reasonable pe rson that serious injury

or death would likely

occur , a standa

rd that would be me t here as the d i s t ri ct court conclude d. 4 co urt w as c or

re ct be ca use , obj ect ive ly , se ri ous inj ur y or de ath w oul d c le ar ly

be fo re se ea ble to an y

r ea sona ble pe rs on w ith out

pr ote ct ive he ad ge ar conte m pla tin g a leap onto a paved street from a m ovin g vehicle goin g fast eno ugh to cause the injuries Ba ile y suf fe re d. 4 T he de ba te about

A la ba m a la w c en te rs on H earnv. S out he rnL if e & He al th Insurance Co. , 454 So. 2 d 932 (Ala. 1984 ). T he district court interpreted He arn as ad opt ing ar

ule tha t c as es suc h a s th is o ne sho uld be de ci de d by ap ply ing ate st h av ing bot h su bj ec tiv e an d ob

j ec tiv e co m

pone nts
. Jud gm en t f

or A IG f oll ow ed
. Af ter careful review , we conclude that the dis tingu ished dis trict j udge m isread Hearn
. I. T he H earnD ec isi on Si nc e 1936 , the st ab le la w of A la ba m a ha s in cl ude d th e fo llo w ing te st f or determ ining whether

a death is acc idental for purposes of ins urance cover age: T o c onst itu te an ac ci de nta l de ath, it m ust ha ve r es ult ed

f ro m som ethin g unf or es ee n, une xpe ct ed , a nd u nusu al
. . . or ‘whi ch ha ppe ns a s by ch an ce , o r w h i c h d o e s n o t t a k e p l a c e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e u s u a l c o u rs e of t h i n g s , ’ o r

‘w i t h o u tf

o r e s i g h to r

e x p e c t a t i o n s ’ o r

‘b y r e a s o n o f

s o me5

vio le nc e, c as ua lty , or

vis m aj or

to the a ssu re d, w ith out

his de sig n or co n s en to r v o l u n t ar y co o p er at i o n .’ O’ Bar v . Sou th ern Life & Heal th Ins . Co., 1 68 So . 58 0, 5 82 (Ala . 19 36 ). Betw een 1936 and 1984, the Alabam a courts largely applied this test in cases
w he re the ins ur ed

a ssa ult ed a not he r pe rs on, the re by

tr igg er ing a n a lte rc at ione ndi ng i n t h e i n s u r e d ’s d e a t h
. I tw a s n o tu n t i l t h e H e a rn c a s e a r o s e i n 1 9 8 4 t h a tt h e A l ab a ma Suprem e Court confronted a fa ct pattern n ot invo lving a third party wher e an insured
vo lu nt ari ly eng ag edin ris ky con du ct bu t d id no t s pe ci fic al ly int en d h is or h er o wn de at h. InH earn , the ins ur ed

w as dr ivi ng a

pic kup tr uc k a nd b ec am e inv olv ed in a hig h speed c ha se by a po l i c e of f i c e r a t sp e e ds i n e xc e ss of 70 a nd 80 m i l e s pe r hour. S h o rt l y a f t e r t h e p o l i c e o f

f i c e r ab a n d o n e d p u r s u i t , t h e i n s u r e d c r a s h e d i n t o ag u l l e y. He wa s pinn ed in his truck and died from sm oke inhalation due to a fire that engulfed the ve hic le
. A t the ti m e of his de ath, his blo od a lc ohol level w as . 11 p er ce nt. T he ins ur er r ef use d to pa y

de ath be ne fi ts u nde r thr ee pol ic ie s on the ba sis tha t the de ath
wa s no t “ a c c i de nt a l ” a s t he po l i c i e s r e qu i r e d f or c ov e r a ge t o a t t a c h. 45 4 So. 2d at 932. T he H earnCo ur

t be ga n it s a na ly sis by

c iti ng o ne of

it s pr ior de ci sio ns inv olv ing a n a ssa

ult by a n in sur ed , expla ini ng tha t the “ [f ] or es ee ab ili ty

of de athThe Hea rn Court a lso note d with a pproval lang uag e in A etna L ife I ns. Co. v. Bea sley , 130 So. 5 2d 178 (1961), another insured assault case, which “re asoned that a death may be caused by acc idental means, e v e n

w h e r e th a t m e an s is v o lu n ta r il y r e n d e r e d , if

, in th e p r e c ip it a ti n g a c t, s o me thing unfore seen, unusua l, or unexpected oc curs to produc e the r esultant injury .” 454 So. 2d at 934. Hea rn a lso qu ote d Pr ov ide nt L if e & Ac c ide nt I

ns. Co
. v. Hanna , 3 11 So. 2d 29 4 ( 19 75 ), wh ic h s tate d, in pertinent pa

rt: “[a]n accident is an oc cur re n ce that is not t o be expected or anticipated in lig ht of common exp e r ie n c e an d o f e xis ti n g c ir c u ms ta n c e s , an d s u c h d e te r

mi n a ti o n is ma d e f

r o m the standpoint of the insured.” 6 re sul tin g f

ro m a n in sur ed ’ s volu nt ary

a ct ion s must be tested from the subjective vi ew poi nt of the ins ure d hi m se lf
. ” 454 So
. 2d a t 93 4 ( ci tin g H an nav. Ri ggs, 333 S o. 2d 5 63 ( A la
. 197 6)) ( em

pha sis a dde d)
. T he Co urt the n c onsi de re d f our de ci sio ns 5 fr om oth er j ur isd ic tio ns inv olv ing ac ci de nta l de ath pol ic ie s tha t w er e int er pr et ed a nd ap pli ed in an al ogou s fa ct

ua l situ at ion s. 454 S o. 2d a t 93 5- 36. I n e ac h of the se c as es , the de ci din g c ourt c onc lud ed tha t althoug h the ins ur ed ’ s a ct ion s e xpos ing him se lf to
a ri sk o f ha rm

m ay ha ve be en vol unt ar

y an d inte nti ona l, the ins ur ed did not e xpr es sly in t e n d t o d i e , s o t h a t d e a t h w a s b y “ a c c i d e n t a l m e a n s ” a n d c o v e r e d b y t h e pol ic ie s. See O’ Toole v. Ne w Y ork Life Ins. C o., 671 F. 2d 913 (5th Cir. 1983 ) (holding th at
w hil e th e i n s u r e d “ i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n j e c t e d h i m s e l f w i t h c o c a i n e , h e d i d n o t i n t e nd t o cause nor did he anticipate that this inj ection would cause his death.”); Me tropolit an Lif e Ins. Co. v. He nkel, 234 F. 2d 69 (4th Cir. 1956 ) (a ffirm i n g ju dgm ent of trial
co urt tha t dea th of ins ur ed w as ca use d by “ ac ci de nta l m eans” w he re ins ur ed die d in
a car cr as h f

oll ow ing ar ec kle ss hig h sp eed chas e w ithpol ic e) ; R odge rs v. Re se rv e L if e In s. Co
. , 132 N
. E
. 2d 6 92 ( 1956 ) (i nsur ed ’ s de ath is a cc ide nta l e ve n w he re he7

vol unt ar ily

e xpos es him se lf to unne ce ssary da nge r) ; Do ole y v. Me tr opol itan Li fe I ns. Co
. , 250 A
. 2d 1 68, 170 ( N
. J. 196 9) ( dr ive r’ s ne gli ge nt f ai lur e to n eg oti at e a c urve in the r o a d , w h i c h c au s e dc a r a c c i d e n tr e s u l t i n g i n h i s d e a t h w a s “ a n u n e x p ec te d, unforeseen and unus ual event constit uting accidental m eans . . . .” ). The A labam a Suprem e Court then held in H earn that the evidence supported
an inference of fact that the insured’s dea th was an a ccident, and it th eref ore re versed the t r i a l c ou rt ’ s di r e c t e d ve r di c t i n f a vo r of t he i ns ur a nc e c om pany . T he Court specifically

noted that a jury

could easily

have rej ected the theory that the insured int en de d to die f

ro m sm oke inh al at ionw hil e pin ne d inhis tr uc k. A t no ti m e did

the He arn Court analy ze the evidence in ter m s of a “ reaso nable m an” or any other obj ec tiv e standa rd ; r athe r, it s f oc us r em ai ne d onthe spe ci fi c int en t of the ins ur ed
. II
. T he D istri ct

Co urt’ s A na ly sis T he dis tr ic t c ourt r ea d He ar n to es ta bli sh a tes t tha t i nc lud es both a n ob j ec tiv e
an d su bj ec tiv e co m

pone nt i n de te rm ini ng w he the r a given de ath is a cc ide nta l o r intentio nal. T he district court focused on a lone sentence in the NewJersey Dooley de ci sio n ci te d in H earn , sta tin g th at “ re co ve ry

is onl y pr ec lud ed

w he re the re is a reasonable basis for his belief that his condu ct m akes serious inj ury or death a virtual cert ai nt y .” Hearn , 45 4 S o. 2 d a t 9 35 (qu ot in g Do ol ey , 25 0 A. 2 d a t 1 70 ).8

T ha t sta te m en t, how ev er , a nd s ta te m en ts l ike it in the oth er

r el ev an t de ci sio ns, uniform ly

relate to the qu es t ion of whether the f actual circ um stances under review
w oul d m ak e se ri ous inj ur y or de ath avir

tua l c er ta inty to the de ce de nt. I n no ne of the Alab am a ca se s, inc lud ing H earn , doe s th e co urt a ct ua lly appl y a n ob j ec tiv e te st o r
an al y sis – ar ea sona

ble pe rs on inquir

y – i n a ddi tio n to the de te rm ina tio n of w ha t the de ce de nt p er sona lly

int en de d – a

pur el y sub j ec tiv e te st a lbe it ai de d by a n obj ec tiv e
r e v i e w o f t h e f a c t s . We c o n c l u d e , t h e r e f o r e , u n l i k e t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt , t h a tA l ab a ma law requires application of a su bje ctive test in this case; and the qu estion is whether the decedent had a re asonable basis to believe that her conduct m ade serious injury
or de at h avir tua l c er ta inty . A n ob

j ec tiv e te st i nqui ri ng a s to the f or es ee ability

of
se ri ous inj ur

y or de at h to ar ea sona

ble pe rs on i n th e sa m e ci rc um stanc es is not ap pr opr ia te
. A nd, in thi s c as e, giv enthe slo w spe ed of the m ov ing ve hic le a t the tim e, it c an not be sa id tha t se riou s in

j ur y or de ath w as avir

tua l c er ta inty to the decedent. She could reasonably have concluded that so m e inj ury wa s likely but th at
se ri ous inj ur

y or de ath w as not
. O the r de ci sio ns f

ro m both A la ba m a an d th is C ir cu it supp ort this c onc lus ion ab out A la ba m a la w . I n Hairs to n v. Li be rty N at ion al L if

e In s. Co
. , 584 S o. 2d 8 07 (A la
. 199 1) , the in su red die d a s ar es ult of a cu te e thanol poi soni ng a ft er anig ht o f he av y dr ink ing
. T he ins ur er de nie d co ve ra ge , co nte ndi ng tha t the de ath w as not byTh is C ourt ha s a lso ha d th e op po rt

un ity to c on sid e r the de fi nit ion of “ a c c ide nt” in A la

bama 6 for insura nce pur poses. In discussing w hether an insured’ s death foll o wi n g surg ery constituted an “ac cident” f

or purpose s of cove rag e under an ac cidental de ath insuranc e policy , a pane l of this Court c ite d H a irst on and Hea

rn fo r t he pr op os iti on

that “ re c ov e ry

is p re c lud e d o nly

wh e re ‘t he re is a reas o n ab l e basis for [the insured’s] belief that his conduct makes se rious injury or death a virtual cer tainty .’” Tate v. Government Employ ees I ns. Co., 997 F. 2d 1433, 1437 (11th Cir. 1993). Ther e was no mention of a

ny objective or

“re asonable man” standa rd. 9 “ accidental m eans.” Citing He arn, the Ha irston court concluded that the trial court
erre d in ho lding that, a s m atter of law, the death wa s not an “ accident.” Th e court spe ci fi ca lly

not ed tha t A j ury could find th at the death, w hile a result of the in sured’ s volu ntary actions, w as som ething unforeseen, unexpected and un usual, or that, as w a s t he cas e in Hearn , supr a , t he i ns ur e d di e d a s a r e su l t of a m isc al cu la tio n of

his c ap ab ili tie s. 584 So
. 2d at

809
. 6 A cc or din gly , w e fi nd tha t A la ba m a de te rm ine s w he the r a de ath is “ ac ci de nta l” fo r ins ur an ce pur

pose s ba se d so le ly

on the sub

j ec tiv e int en t of

the ins ur ed
. III .A labam a L aw and ER ISA Inaf oot not e, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld th at if A la ba m a co urts a

ppl y apur el y subj ec tiv e te st t o de te rm ine wh ethe r a de ath is a cc ide nta l, A la ba m a la w w oul d be inc onsi ste nt w iththe pr inc ipl es of E RI SAa nd f

ed er al c om m on l aw– w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt i nte rp re te d to appl y both a n obj ec tiv e an d subj ec tiv e co m pone nt – a nd therefore inapplicable. W e disagree.Geor g ia law disting uishes betwee n the terms “a ccide ntal injury ” and “ injuries resulting from 7 acc idental means.” Under the “a ccide ntal means” analy si s , “[ t ] he foc us is on the occur renc e or happeningwhich produc es the re sult, not t he re sult it self.” 247 F . 3d at 1139. 10 It is undi sput ed

tha t f ed er al c om

m on l awappl ie s bo th an ob j ec tiv e an d subj ect iv e test to d et er

m ine the m eanin g of

the te rm “ ac ci de nt” f

or pur pose s of ins ur an ce c ove ra ge . B uc e, 247 F. 3d at 114 6- 47 ( ci tin g W ic km anv. N W
. N at ’ l I ns. Co
. , 908 F
. 2d 1 077 (1 st C ir
. 199 0) ). H ow ev er , thi s is no t th e en d of the a na ly sis be ca use , in thi s c as e, ac hoi ce of la w pr ovi sio n e xis ts i n bo th i nsur an ce pol ic ie s. A nd,
as thi s C ourt pr ev iou sly

he ld, “ [t ] he pe rt inent qu es tion is w he the r the pr inc ipl es of lia bil ity a gr ee d up on b y

the pa rt ie s a re inc onsi st ent w iththe la ngua ge of E RI SAor the policies that in form

the statute and anim ate the comm on law of the statute.” I d. at 1148
. InBu ce , thi s Co ur t was f ac ed w ithave ry

sim ilar co nundru m : w he the r to fo llo w the fe de ra l com

m on law an d a

ppl y both a n ob

j ec tiv e an d su

bj ec tiv e an al y sis to determ ine whether an insured’ s death wa s accidental, or follow the choice of law pr ovi sio n c ont ai ne d in the ins ur an ce pol ic y a nd a ppl y G eo rg iala w w hic h ut ili ze d a
m uch-criticized “ accidental m eans” analy sis. 247 F. 3d at 1 146-48
. The Buce Court 7 de te rm ine d that the pa rt ie s’ ag re em en t to appl y G eo rg iala w - e ve n th ough it did not coincide with feder al com m on law - governed in t h e absence of any evidence that11

Ge orgia’ s “ accidental m eans” test was unrea sonable or fundam entally unfair. Id. at 1148 -4 9. As in Buce, AI G has not pointed to any language in ER ISA ’ s statuto ry schem e,
nor to an y c as es fo rmul at ing the c om m on l awof

E RI SA , sug ge sti ng tha t the ag re em en t of the pa rt ie s to ap ply A la ba m a la w to the se ins ur an ce pol ic ie s w oul d be subv er siv e of E RI SA
. T o th e co ntr ar y , appl y ing A la

ba m a’ s pu re ly

sub j ec tiv e te st t o the se ins ur an ce pol ic ie s w oul d op er at e to pr ovi de m or e co ve ra ge a nd p ro te ct ionto be ne fi ci ar ie s, a n e xpr es s pur pose of E RI SA
. H orton v. Re lianc e St an da rd L if e In s. Co
. , 141 4 F
. 3d 1 038, 104 1 (11th Cir
. 1998 ) (n oti ng tha t one of the pr im ar y goa ls o f E RI SAis the pr ot ect io n of the int er es ts o f em

plo y ee s a nd the ir

be ne fi ci ar ie s in
em ploy ee benefit plans); ac cord 29 U. S. C. § 100 1. As s t at ed in Buce, “ [w ] here a ch oic e of la w is m ad e bya n E RI SAc ont ra ct , it sho uld be f oll ow ed , if

not
unr ea sona

ble or f unda m en ta lly

unf ai r. ” Bu ce , 247 F
. 3d at 114 9 ( quot ing W an g Lab or at or ie s, I nc . v. K ag an , 990 F
. 2d 1126 , 112 8- 29 ( 9th Ci r. 199 3) ). I t w oul d be em inentlyrea sonable to ap p l y Alabam a lawto interpret two insurance policies iss ue d inA la

ba m a, inv olv ing a n A la

ba m a em plo y ee , a n A la

ba m a be ne fi ci ar

y , a nd a loss th at occur re d in Alabam a. W e theref ore find that the Alabam a choice of law pr ovi sio n inthe ins ur an ce pol ic ie s a t i ssu e is n ot u nreasona ble or f unda m en ta llyAI G ar g ues that B uce dir ectly conflicts with Seamon v. Vaug han, 921 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 8 19 91 ), wh ic h AI G read s as a br ig ht- lin e ru le that E RI SA p re e mpt s a ll c ho ic e of law p ro vis ion s. Pursuant to the “prior panel rule,” AI G t here fore argues t hat Buce should not apply to this case. See Cohen v. Off

ice De pot, I nc., 204 F. 3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Where prior panel de cisions conflict, we are bound to f ollow the oldest one.”)
. Simpl y put, A I G is w rong . I n Seamon, the choice of l aw provision direc tly contra dicted ERI SA’s statutory allowanc e of attorney s’ fees t o a pre vailing plaintiff, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g ). In this case, no suc h conflictingstatutory provision exi sts. I n no way c an Se a mon

be re a d s o b ro a dly

to m e an th a t a ll c ho ic e of

law p ro vis ion s in

ERI SA i ns ur anc e c on tr a c ts are to b e a uto matic a lly

pr e e mpt e d; r a the r, on ly

c ho ic e of law pr ov isi on s whi c h dir e c tly c on fl ic t w ith the ERI SA s tatut e its e lf

are su bje c t to pr e e mpt ion
. Se a mon , 92 1 F .2 d a t 12 19
. Ac c or din g ly , th e re is n o c o n f l i c tan d t h e “ p r i o r

p an e l r u l e ” d o e s n o ta

p p l y. Th e e xclu sio n is sim ila

r i n b oth po lic ie s. I n o ne , c ov e ra g e is e xclu de d a s f oll ow s: 9 No cove rag e shall be provided unde r the Policy and no pay

ment shall be made for a

ny loss resulting in whole or in part fr om, or contributed to by , or as a natura l and probable conseque nce of

any of t he following excluded risks eve n if the proximate or prec ipitating ca

use of the loss is an a ccide ntal bodily injury : (1) suicide or any

attempt at suicide or intentionally self-inflicte d injury

or any attempt at intent ionally

selfinflicted injury

or auto-e roticism . . . . The other policy provides that it “does not c ov er an y l o s s cause d in whole or in par t by , or re su lti ngin who le or

in p art fr om, the fo llo wi ng : ( 1) su ic ide or any a tte mpt a t su ic ide or int e nti on a lly self-inflicte d injury

or any attempt at self- inflicted injury . . . .” 12 unf ai r an d do es no t c onf

lic t w ithE RI SA
. A cc or din gly , it is ap pr opr ia te to ap ply A la ba m a’ s pu re ly

sub j ec tiv e te st t o in te rp re t the pol ic ie s. 8 IV
. In te nti ona l S el f- In fl ic te d I nj ur y E xc lus ion As an a lternative rationale for deny ing coverage, the district court determ ined that Bailey ’ s death fell w ithin the policies’ exclusion for “ intentio nally self-inflicted i n j u r i e s . ” I n p a rt i c u l a r , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rth e l dt h a t“t h e c h o i c e o f j u mp i n g f

r o m a 9

m ov in g v eh ic le ne ces sa ril y res ul ts in in

jury.”13

L ike the te rm

“ ac ci de nt, ” the te rm “ in tenti ona lly se lf -i nf lic te d in j ur y ” is
now he re de fi ne d ine ith er pol ic y . H ow ev er , th ere is no di sput e fr om asub j ec tiv e standpo int

tha t B ai le y

did not int en d to ha rm or kil l her se lf w he n she j um pe d ou t of th e m ovi ng v eh ic le
. A cc or din gly , f or the sa m e re as ons tha t w e fi nd B ai le y ’ s de ath t o h a v e b e e n a n “ a c c i d e n t , ” w e f i n d t h a tt h e “ i n t e n t i o n a l l y s e l f

- i n f l i c t e di n ju ry” exclusion s do no t apply
. This i s the sam e re sult reached in He arn on the sam e issue. Se e 454 So
. 2d a t 93 3. C on cl us ion T he or de r of the dis tr ic t cour t granti ng s um

m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of A IG a nd de ny ing sum

m ar y j udgm en t in favo r of

T y le r is V A CA T E D
. T he c as e is RE MA N D E D to the dis tr ic t co ur t fo r the e ntr y of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of Ty ler and to conduct any

further proce eding s ne c e ss ar y and appropriate in accordance
w iththi s op ini on.