Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed April 19, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-0594

Lower Tribunal No. 09-41811

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Maria Isabel Saad, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

Charbel Abud,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Veronica 

Diaz, Judge.

Law Office of Alexis Gonzalez, P.A., and Alejandro F. Hoyos, and 

Alberto H. Orizondo, for appellants.

Shahady & Wurtenberger, P.A., and John J. Shahady (Fort 

Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ. 

FERNANDEZ, C.J.
2

Maria Isabel Saad and Alexis Gonzalez, Saad’s trial counsel, appeal 

the trial court’s orders pertaining to the final judgment on the motion for

sanctions entered against them and the denial of the motion to disqualify. 

Because the trial court failed to include the factual findings necessary to 

support its legal conclusion that the issues are so inextricably intertwined 

that allocation of time spent on establishing an enforceable contract was not 

possible, we reverse and remand the sanctions judgment with instructions. 

We affirm as to all other issues.

In the context of a breach of contract action, Charbel Abud filed a 

motion for sanctions pursuant to section 57.105(4), Florida Statutes (2012),

seeking fees to be paid by the appellants for the unnecessary time spent 

preparing and litigating the appellants’ affirmative defense that asserted that 

the contract at issue was unenforceable. The trial court, which had previously 

held that the contract was enforceable, determined that appellants knew or 

should have known that the affirmative defense was not supported by the 

material facts or was not supported by the application of then existing law to 

those material facts. As a result, the trial court granted the motion for 

sanctions.

After an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of fees, the trial 

court entered the final judgment on the motion for sanctions. In the order, the 
3

trial court named Abud’s attorneys who testified “that establishing an 

enforceable contract, being the central issue in this case, was so inextricably 

intertwined with the other issues that allocation of the fees expended solely 

in establishing an enforceable contract is not possible, practical or feasible.” 

The trial court also named Abud’s fee expert who affirmed the same. The 

court summarily concluded that “the record evidence presented during this

hearing, a review of the docket entries, and the testimony of [Abud’s 

attorneys and expert]” satisfied the trial court that the issues were indeed 

inextricably intertwined. The trial court cited to Lubkey v. Compuvac 

Systems, Inc., 857 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), which states that it 

is the burden of the party seeking attorneys’ fees to allocate the fees to the 

issues or to show that the issues are so intertwined rendering allocation 

unfeasible. Commenting on Saad’s fee expert’s testimony, the trial court

stated that the testimony was “not accurate nor feasible based on the 

evidence presented.” The trial court then broke down the hourly rates for 

each of Abud’s attorneys and the hours expended by each attorney. On this 

basis, the trial court found the cumulative lodestar amount owed to Abud to 

be $94,310.00.
4

Appellate courts are to review the issue of “whether the multiple claims 

are separate or intertwined under the de novo standard of review.” Crown 

Custom Homes, Inc. v. Sabatino, 18 So. 3d 738, 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

We find that the trial court committed reversable error by failing to 

include in the final judgment on the motion for sanctions specific factual 

findings to support its legal conclusion that the issues are so inextricably 

intertwined that allocation of time spent solely on establish an enforceable 

contract was not possible. See Id. at 741 (“Here the trial court made no 

factual findings to support its legal conclusion that the counts were 

so intertwined as to make individual allocation of fees unfeasible. 

Additionally, the limited record before this court does not enable us to resolve 

that issue despite the scope of our review.”); Joyce v. Federated Nat'l Ins. 

Co., 228 So. 3d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 2017) (“The trial court must set forth 

‘specific findings’ as to its determination of the number of hours, the hourly 

rate, and any reduction or enhancement factors.”); Haines v. Sophia, 711 

So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“It is an exceedingly painstaking and 

time consuming task to sort through, as here, numerous time sheet entries 

and assess their context and amounts. It is, however, a necessary evil that 

trial judges make the effort.”).
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For the reasons stated, we reverse and remand the final judgment on 

the motion for sanctions with instructions for the trial court to make factual 

findings to support its legal conclusion that the issues are so inextricably 

intertwined that allocation of time spent solely on establishing an enforceable 

contract was not practical, feasible, or possible. We recognize that the judge 

who issued the order has since recused herself from this case. To the extent 

that the successor judge is unable to make the requisite findings based on a 

review of the existing record, the trial judge is free to order a new evidentiary 

hearing and come to his or her own legal conclusions based on the evidence 

presented. We affirm as to all other issues.

Affirmed in part; Reversed and remanded in part with instructions.