alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit23.01**

# **CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTEREDPUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference inRegistration Statement No. 333-104504 on Form S-3; and Registration StatementNo. 333-106011 on Form S-4 of our report dated February 22, 2007 (which reportexpresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relatingto the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, “Employers’Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans”),appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for Public Service Company ofColorado for the year ended December 31, 2006.
| /S/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP |   |
|-------------------------------|--------|
| Minneapolis, Minnesota        |   |
| February 22, 2007             |   |

 

----
# C_2022257EN.01003802.xml

| 4.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/38

---

Action brought on 13 May 2022 — mBank v EUIPO — European Merchant Bank (EMBANK European Merchant Bank)

(Case T-261/22)

(2022/C 257/50)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: mBank S.A. (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: E. Skrzydło-Tefelska and M. Stępkowski, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: European Merchant Bank UAB (Vilnius, Lithuania)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark EMBANK European Merchant Bank — European Union trade mark No 18 048 966

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 February 2022 in Case R 1845/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | alter the contested decision and uphold the application for a declaration of invalidity in its entirety; |
| --- | --- |

—

alter the contested decision and uphold the application for a declaration of invalidity in its entirety;

| — | order EUIPO and the intervener to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicant, including those incurred in the proceedings before EUIPO. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the intervener to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicant, including those incurred in the proceedings before EUIPO.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) and 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) and 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

| — | Infringement of Article 95(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council in conjunction with Article 27(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 95(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council in conjunction with Article 27(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625.

---
# C_2023007EN.01003701.xml

| 9.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 7/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 7/37

---

Action brought on 31 October 2022 — Claro v EUIPO — Claranet Europe (Claro)

(Case T-661/22)

(2023/C 7/45)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Claro SA (São Paulo, Brazil) (represented by: J. Ferreira Sardinha, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Claranet Europe Ltd (St Helier, Jersey)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark in red and white Claro — European Union trade mark No 16 172 934

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 August 2022 in Case R 1674/2021-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision. |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 60(1)a read together with Article 8(1)b of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 60(1)a read together with Article 8(1)b of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 60(1)a read together with Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 60(1)a read together with Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Blink Logic Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 (the Form 10-K) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Form 10-K.



|                      |  |                                                                 
|--------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: April 15, 2009 |  | /s/David Morris
David Morris
President & Chief Executive Officer





The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-K pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-B and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-K for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.



















---
# C_2022326EN.01002101.xml

| 29.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/21

---

Action brought on 21 June 2022 — Izuzquiza and Others v Parliament

(Case T-375/22)

(2022/C 326/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Luisa Izuzquiza (Berlin, Germany), Arne Semsrott (Berlin), Stefan Wehrmeyer (Berlin) (represented by: J. Pobjoy, Barrister-at-Law)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the final decision of the European Parliament, reference A(2021)10718C, dated 8 April 2022, insofar as the European Parliament concluded that it was entitled to rely upon (i) Article 4(1)(b) and/or (ii) Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1),to justify full and/or partial non-disclosure of the documents requested by the applicants in their confirmatory application dated 28 February 2022; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the final decision of the European Parliament, reference A(2021)10718C, dated 8 April 2022, insofar as the European Parliament concluded that it was entitled to rely upon (i) Article 4(1)(b) and/or (ii) Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1),to justify full and/or partial non-disclosure of the documents requested by the applicants in their confirmatory application dated 28 February 2022; and

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the European Parliament has infringed Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the European Parliament has infringed Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the European Parliament has infringed Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the European Parliament has infringed Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).

---
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER 

Appellate case name: Claudia Kristine Esquivel v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-16-00301-CR

Trial court case number: 14CR1878

Trial court: 212th District Court of Galveston County

Date motion filed: January 29, 2018

Party filing motion: Appellant

Appellant’s motion to the en banc court requesting publication of the September 7, 2017 

panel opinion in this case is DENIED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Michael Massengale 

 Acting Individually Acting for the Court

En banc court consists of: Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings, Keyes, Higley, Bland, 

Massengale, Brown, Lloyd, and Caughey

Date: March 1, 2018
#### James M. KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; et al. Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15489

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*633Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 23, 2018

James M. Kelley, Pro Se

John M. Sorich, PIB Law, Costa Mesa, CA, Heather Stern, Parker Ibrahim *&*Berg, LLC, Costa Mesa, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

James M. Kelley appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment in Kelley’s adversary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo. *Suncrest Healthcare Ctr. LLC v. Omega Healthcare Inv’rs, Inc. (In re Raintree Healthcare Corp.),*431 F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment because Kelley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIR-REA”). *See*12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(10) (setting forth FIRREA’s administrative claims process); *Rundgren v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA,*760 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2014) (§ 1821(d)(13)(D) strips courts of jurisdiction over claims against certain failed banks when such claims have not been exhausted through FIRREA’s claims process); *Benson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,*673 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] claim asserted against a purchasing bank based on the conduct of a failed bank must be exhausted under FIRREA”). Because a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be without prejudice, *Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc.,*377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004), we remand to the bankruptcy court with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect that the dismissal of claims barred by FIRREA is without prejudice.

We reject as without merit Kelley’s contentions that he properly rescinded under the Truth in Lending Act and his contentions in support of his objections to defendants’ proof of claims.

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED with instructions to amend the judgment.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE RESTATED
9/30/98 RALSTON PURINA COMPANY BALANCE SHEET AND STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000

<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          40,500<F1>
<SECURITIES>                                         0<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                                  220,900<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,200<F1>
<INVENTORY>                                    123,100<F1>
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               433,500<F1>
<PP&E>                                       1,103,100<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                                 536,200<F1>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,886,600<F1>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,041,500<F1>
<BONDS>                                      1,793,600<F1>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          256,100
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        32,600
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,056,500
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,886,600<F1>
<SALES>                                      2,550,600<F1>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,550,600<F1>
<CGS>                                        1,172,800<F1>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,172,800<F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               925,400<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   500<F1>
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             181,600<F1>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                270,300<F1>
<INCOME-TAX>                                    38,700<F1>
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            270,300<F1>
<DISCONTINUED>                                 835,400<F1><F2>
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,105,700
<EPS-BASIC>                                       3.59
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     3.38
<FN>
<F1>RESTATED TO REFLECT THE EFFECT OF ENERGIZER HOLDINGS, INC. SPIN-OFF on 4-1-00.
<F2>INCLUDES A 705,100 GAIN ON SALE OF DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS.
</FN>



</TABLE>
# C_2023015EN.01003402.xml

| 16.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 15/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 15/34

---

Order of the President of the Court of 13 September 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Research Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa), C.I.S.A. SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the same association (Research-Cisa), Debar Costruzioni SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted with Consorzio Stabile COM Scarl, C.N. Costruzioni Generali SpA and Edil.Co. Srl, Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa v Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa, Debar Costruzioni SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted with Consorzio Stabile COM Scarl, C.N. Costruzioni Generali SpA and Edil.Co. Srl, Research Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa), C.I.S.A. SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the same association (Research-Cisa), intervening party: Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa

(Case C-215/22) (1)

(2023/C 15/44)

Language of the case: Italian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 244, 27.6.2022.

---
Exhibit 23

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of Directors

Publix Super Markets, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in
the registration statements (No. 033-55867, No. 333-62705, No. 333-63544 and No. 333-147049) on Form S-8 of Publix Super Markets, Inc. of our reports dated February 23, 2009, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of
Publix Super Markets, Inc. as of December 27, 2008 and December 29, 2007, and the related consolidated statements of earnings, comprehensive earnings, stockholders equity and cash flows for each of the fiscal years in the three-year
period ended December 27, 2008, and the related financial statement schedule and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 27, 2008, which reports appear in the December 27, 2008 Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Publix Super Markets, Inc.

Our report refers to the adoption of Financial Accounting Standard Board Interpretation No. 48, Accounting
for Uncertainty in Income Taxes  an Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, as of December 31, 2006. The Company adopted the recognition provision and the measurement provision of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
No. 158, Employers Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, as of December 30, 2006 and December 30, 2007, respectively. The Company adopted Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
No. 157, Fair Value Measurement,for its available-for-sale securities as of December 30, 2007.



|                            
|----------------------------
|KPMG LLP                    
|                            
|February 23, 2009           
|Tampa, Florida              
|Certified Public Accountants
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-10-00390-CV

Shawn Sprinkel, Appellant

v.

Geico General Insurance Company, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BURNET COUNTY, 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 35,904, HONORABLE GUILFORD L. JONES III, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On September 21, 2010, this Court notified appellant that the clerk’s record in

the above cause was overdue. This Court requested that appellant make arrangements for the record

and submit a status report regarding this appeal on or before October 1, 2010. This Court further

informed appellant that failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this appeal for want of

prosecution. The deadline has passed, and we have received no response from appellant.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). 

__________________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Puryear and Pemberton

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: December 9, 2010
#### Elizabeth Cox, *et al.,*v. L. L. Stuckey, *et al.*

153 So. 898.

Opinion Filed April 4, 1934.

*Edwin T. Osteen*and *Sidney J. Catts, Jr.,*for Appellants ;

*C. D. Blackwell,*for Appellees.

Per Curiam.

— The appeal here is from a decree dismissing a bill of complaint which sought to vacate a final decree theretofore entered in a chancery cause upon the ground that the defendant had not been served with process. Return of the sheriff showed legal service. No fraud or collusion participated in by the complainant in the original suit is averred.

The decree should be affirmed on (authority of the opinion and judgment in Lewter v. Hadley, 68 Fla. 131, 66 Sou. 567; Allison v. Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 106 Fla. 274, 143 Sou. 263.

It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

*489Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis and Buford, J. J., concur.

Davis, C. J.

(concurring). — Complainant should not have proceeded by separate bill but should have filed appropriate petition in the same suit. If jurisdiction in first suit was not in fact obtained, the decree never became final, but in such cases only clearest showing will warrant vacating a final decree bas'ed upon a return showing service, although the return is false. A false return can be ratified by acquiescence or the right to challenge it lost by estoppel.
#### YONGJUN TANG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-73646

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*617Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 22, 2018

Yongjun Tang, Pro Se

Jeffery R. Leist, Trial Attorney, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Yongjun Tang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act, *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies within Tang’s testimony and between Tang’s testimony and documentary evidence as to his residence in the U.S., and the dates of his marriages and divorce, Tang’s demeanor during the hearing, and the implausibility of Tang’s claimed fear of calling his wife. *See id.*at 1048 (adverse credibility determination was reasonable under the “totality of the circumstances”). Tang’s explanations do not compel a contrary result. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). In the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Tang’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Further, Tang’s CAT claim also fails because it is based on the same testimony the agency found not credible, and the record does not otherwise compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to China. *See id.*at 1156-57.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.