alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### COMMON CAUSE, Georgia State Conference of the NAACP, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Brian KEMP, individually and in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Georgia, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-11315

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(March 12, 2018)

Emmet J. Bondurant, II, Jason J. Carter, Chad Lennon, Benjamin Williams Thorpe, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Cristina Maria Correia, Julia B. Anderson, Christopher Michael Carr, Josiah Benjamin Heidt, Attorney General’s Office, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee

Sophia Lin Latón, Dale E. Ho, Sean J. Young, ACLU of Georgia, Atlanta, GA, Naila S. Awan, Demos, New York, NY, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

Paul Orfanedes, Judicial Watch, Inc., Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc., Allied Educational Foundation

Before WILSON, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,* Judge.

*

 Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

*991PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs/Appellants, Common Cause (“CC”) and Georgia State Conference of the NAACP (“NAACP”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”), appeal the district court’s order granting the Secretary of State’s (“Secretary of State” or “State”), motion to dismiss their claims challenging Georgia Code § 21-2-2B4 (“Section 234”), which codifies a program for removing ineligible voters from the voter registration rolls. Plaintiffs contend that the program violates federal voting rights law, specifically the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (“NVRA”), and the Help America Vote Act,' 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (“HAVA”), and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

I.ISSUES

1. Whether Section 234 violates the National Voters Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act.

2. Whether Section 234 violates the First Amendment.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews de novo the district court’s order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim. *Blevins v. Aksut,*849 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (11th Cir. 2017).

This court also reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation. *Burlison v. McDonald’s Corp.,*455 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006).

III.DISCUSSION

After reviewing the record, reading the parties’ briefs and having the benefit of oral argument, we vacate the district court’s order of dismissal and remand this case to the district court to consider in the first instance the United States Supreme Court’s pending disposition in *A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted,*838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016), *cert. granted,*— U.S. —, 137. S.Ct. 2188, 198 L.Ed.2d 254 (2017) (argued January 10, 2018).

On remand, the district court should also conduct a more detailed analysis of the First Amendment question.

VACATED and REMANDED with directions.1

1

. On remand, nothing precludes the Plaintiffs from moving the district court for a preliminary injunction to restore those removed voters from the voter registration rolls pending a ruling from the Supreme Court.
##### 



EXHIBIT 12.1 ARCHSTONE-SMITH OPERATING TRUST
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
 

(Dollar amounts in thousands) Years Ended December 31,2004(1)
    
    
    2003(1)
    
    
    2002(1)
    
    
    2001(1)
    
    
    2000(1)Earnings from operations
    
    $
    131,797
    
    
    $
    116,932
    
    
    $
    137,947
    
    
    $
    100,078
    
    
    $
    101,887Add:Interest Expense
    
    
    175,249
    
    
    
    160,871
    
    
    
    149,538
    
    
    
    34,223
    
    
    
    53,781Earnings as adjusted
    
    $
    307,046
    
    
    $
    277,803
    
    
    $
    287,485
    
    
    $
    134,301
    
    
    $
    155,668Fixed Charges:Interest expense
    
    $
    175,249
    
    
    $
    160,871
    
    
    $
    149,538
    
    
    $
    34,223
    
    
    $
    53,781Capitalized interest
    
    
    23,572
    
    
    
    26,854
    
    
    
    32,377
    
    
    
    29,186
    
    
    
    37,079Total fixed charges
    
    $
    198,821
    
    
    $
    187,725
    
    
    $
    181,915
    
    
    $
    63,409
    
    
    $
    90,860Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
    
    
    1.5
    
    
    
    1.5
    
    
    
    1.6
    
    
    
    2.1
    
    
    
    1.7
  (1)
    Net earnings from discontinued operations have been reclassified for all periods presented.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 7 (Friday, January 10, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 1456]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-613]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

[FEMA-3122-EM]


Hawaii; Amendment to Notice of a Presidential Declaration of an 
Emergency

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of the Presidential declaration 
of an emergency for the State of Hawaii (FEMA-3122-EM), dated November 
18, 1996, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 11, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Magda Ruiz, Response and Recovery 
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, 
(202) 646-3260.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that the incident 
period for this emergency is closed effective December 9, 1996.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance No. 83.516, Disaster 
Assistance)
Lacy E. Suiter,
Executive Associate Director, Response and Recovery Directorate.
[FR Doc. 97-613 Filed 1-9-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-02-P
Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANTTO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of
Puget Energy, Inc. and Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (the Companies) on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-K), I, Stephen P.
Reynolds, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Companies, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

| | (1) | The
Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (2) | The
information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Companies.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|                      | 
|--------------------- | 
|Dated: March 10, 2003 | 

| |                                      
| | -------------------------------------
| | /s/ Stephen P. Reynolds              
| |                                      
| | Stephen P. Reynolds                  
| | President and Chief Executive Officer
No. 11-10540.

#### Lacour *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
| **                         PNM RESOURCES, INC. AND  SUBSIDIARIES** | **Exhibit 12.2** |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| **Ratio of Earnings to Combined  Fixed Charges and Preferred Stock Dividends**                                                                                                             |
| **(1,000'S)**                                                                                                                                                                              |
|                                                                                                                                                                                            |                  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Line                                                                                                                                                                                       |                  |  |  |  |  | Year Ended December 31, |
| No.                                                                                                                                                                                        |                  |  |  | 12/31/04
12/31/03
12/31/02
12/31/01
12/31/00
Fixed  charges, as defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission:

1

Interest  on Long-term Debt

 $  46,702

 $   59,429

 $   56,409

 $   62,716

 $    62,823

2

Amortization  of Debt Premium, Discount and Expenses
2,697
2,838

2,302

2,346 

2,037 

3

Other  Interest
2,319
5,423

2,859
(42) 

752 

4

Estimated  Interest Factor of Lease Rental Charges

19,617

20,452

23,233
22,856 

19,716 

5

      Total Fixed Charges

71,335

88,142

84,803

87,876 

85,328 

6

Preferred  dividend requirements

572

586

586

586 

586 

7
Total  Fixed Charges and Preferred dividend  requirements

 $  71,907

 $   88,728

 $    85,389

 $  	88,462 

 $    85,914 

Earnings,  as defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission:

8

Consolidated  Net Earnings from Continuing Operations

 $  88,258 

 $  59,138 

 $  	64,272 

 $150,433 

 $   100,946 

9

Income  Taxes

49,247 

27,889 

33,032 

81,063 

74,345 

10

Add Fixed  Charges as Above

71,335 

88,142 

84,803 

87,876 

85,328 

11

Earnings  Available for Fixed Charges

 $ 208,840 

 $  175,169 

 $  182,107 

 $ 319,372 

 $ 	260,619 

12

Ratio for  Earnings to Fixed Charges

2.90 

1.97 

2.13 

3.61 

3.03 |
No. 11-10424.

#### Hill *v.*Cate, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C., Appellant v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Amazon Web Services, LLC, Appellees

2016-2606

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 13, 2018

Stephen Schreiner, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by William M. Jay, Jennifer A. Albert, Ce Li¡ David Zimmer, Douglas J. Kline, Boston, MA.

Colin B. Heideman, Knobbe, Martens, Olson <& Bear, LLP, Seattle, WA, argued for appellees. Also represented by Joseph R. re, Jeremy Angus Anapol, Brenton R. Babcock, Joseph S. Cianfrani, Irvine, CA.

(Lourie, Dyk, and Hughes, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
# C_2023329EN.01004302.xml

| 18.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 329/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 329/43

---

Order of the General Court of 14 July 2023 — Colombani v EEAS

(Case T-414/22) (1)

(2023/C 329/62)

Language of the case: French

The President of the Fifth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 318, 22.8.2022, p. 45.

---
Exhibit 31.2  I, Dempsey Mork, certify that:  1.           I have reviewed this quarterly report for the period ended Sept. 30, 2009 on Form 10-Q of Knickerbocker Capital Corp.;  2.           Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.           Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4.           The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  a)           Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b)           Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c)           Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5.           The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a)           All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b)           Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.  Nov. 19, 2009   /s/ Dempsey Mork Dempsey Mork Chief Financial Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amando Villareal HEREDIA, a.k.a. Gordo, a.k.a. Gordo Villareal, a.k.a. Amando Villareal Heredia, a.k.a. Armando Villareal Heredia, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50202

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*679Submitted February 18, 2018 *

Filed February 16, 2018

Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Michael Emerson Lasater, Esquire, U.S. Attorney, Todd W. Robinson, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee

Amando Villarreal Heredia, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Amando Villareal Heredia appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, *see United States v. Leniear,*574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2009), we vacate and remand.

Heredia contends that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782, which increased the quantity of actual methamphetamine required to trigger the maximum base offense level from 1.5 kilograms to 4.5 kilograms. *See*U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2014). He argues that he no longer qualifies for the maximum level because he admitted to conspiring to distribute only 1.5 kilograms. Contrary to this contention, the plea agreement reflects that Heredia admitted to conspiring to distribute “more than 1.5 kilograms of actual methamphetamine.” The district court did not need to, and did not, make a more specific quantity determination at sentencing. Under these circumstances, the district court properly attempted to determine the total drug quantity attributable to Heredia in order to determine his eligibility for a sentence reduction. *See United States v. Mercado-Moreno,*869 F.3d 942, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2017).

Nevertheless, we vacate the district court’s order denying Heredia’s motion and remand for the court to reconsider its quantity determination in light of *Merea-do-Moreno,*which was decided after the district court’s decision. While the district court observed that at least 100 pounds of methamphetamine were seized by investigators, it did not determine what portion of that quantity, if any, was the result of Heredia’s direct involvement or reasonably foreseeable to him as within the scope of the conspiracy in which he participated. *See*U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1), cmt. n.2 (2014); *Mercado-Moreno,*869 F.3d at 959-60. Upon remand, the court shall determine whether it is more likely than not that Heredia is responsible for the new quantity threshold of 4.5 kilograms of actual methamphetamine or 45 kilograms of methamphetamine mixture, *see Mercado-Moreno,*869 F.3d at 957, and assess Here-dia’s eligibility for a sentence reduction accordingly.

In light of this disposition, we do not reach Heredia’s remaining claims.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Malcolm B. McDonald v. Vivian J. Stone, *et vir.*

154 So. 327.

Opinion Filed April 26, 1934.

*Miller, McKay, Dixon & DeJarnette,*for Plaintiff in Error;

S. *J. Barco,*for Defendant in Error.

Per Curiam.

— This was an action for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), to which writ of error was prosecuted.

It is first contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff may recover from the defendant if the latter was shown to be negligent, without further charging that the negligence of the defendant must have proximately contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.

This Court has repeatedly held that the charges of the court must be considered as a whole and not in fragments. When so considered and found to be free from error, an assignment based on any portion of them must fail. In *609the light of this rule, we are not convinced that error was committed in the charge.

The second and only additional assignment is predicated on the alleged excessiveness of the verdict and judgment.

■ The record discloses that the plaintiff was accomplished in music and journalism, that she performed for her own pleasure and that of her family, that she suffered severe shock from the accident, that her arm was broken and carried in a cast for six or eight weeks, and that it was dressed and bandaged for three or four months, and that her wrist was permanently restricted and impaired.

The question of damages in such cases is one lodged in the sound discretion of the jury within reasonable bounds. In the instant case, the jury heard the evidence, observed the plaintiff and in view of all the facts as recited, we are unable to say that their discretion was unreasonably exercised.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
No. 11-10559.

#### Tarpley *v.*United States.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000818257
<NAME> JOHN HANCOCK REALTY INCOME FUND-II LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                       3,701,235
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  134,802
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,836,037
<PP&E>                                      19,258,208
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,467,524
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              28,335,660
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          454,703
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<OTHER-SE>                                  27,880,957
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                28,335,660
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               809,926
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  146,437
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               173,824
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                489,665
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            489,665
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   489,665
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.19
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.19
        

</TABLE>
# C_2021128EN.01004701.xml

| 12.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 128/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 128/47

---

Action brought on 19 February 2021 — Mutondo v Council

(Case T-109/21)

(2021/C 128/58)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Kalev Mutondo (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020, in so far as the applicant remains at No 11 in the annex to that decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020, in so far as the applicant remains at No 11 in the annex to that decision;

| — | annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020, in so far as the applicant remains at No 11 in the annex to that regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020, in so far as the applicant remains at No 11 in the annex to that regulation;

| — | order the Council to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law, which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-103/21, Boshab v Council.

---