alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2023296EN.01000901.xml

| 21.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 296/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 296/9

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 6 July 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) — Ireland) — Hellfire Massy Residents Association v An Bord Pleanála, Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage, Ireland, Attorney General

(Case C-166/22, (1) Hellfire Massy Residents Association)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Directive 92/43/EEC - Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora - Article 12 - System of strict protection for certain animal species - Article 16 - Derogation - Procedure for granting such a derogation - Right of public participation)

(2023/C 296/09)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court (Ireland)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hellfire Massy Residents Association

Respondents: An Bord Pleanála, Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage, Ireland, Attorney General

Other parties: South Dublin County Council, An Taisce — The National Trust for Ireland, Save Our Bride Otters

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 12 and 16 of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora

must be interpreted as meaning that a piece of national legislation intended to transpose those provisions into national law cannot be regarded as contrary to that directive on the ground that that piece of national legislation does not provide for (i) a development consent procedure which involves a decision by a competent authority determining whether it is necessary to apply for a derogation under Article 16 of the abovementioned directive because of matters identified following the grant of development consent to a project and/or whether surveys are required to that end or (ii) public participation in that derogation procedure.

---

(1)  OJ C 198, 16.5.2022.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997             MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                          13,751                  11,827
<SECURITIES>                                    11,862                  19,403
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,480                  25,820
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                51,655                  56,129
<PP&E>                                          26,474                  24,201
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 143,585                 145,099
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,384                  15,910
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                           438                     439
<OTHER-SE>                                      90,582                  92,294
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   143,585                 145,099
<SALES>                                              0                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                24,899                  13,719
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                17,432                   9,805
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (358)                   (568)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,825                   4,482
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,052                   1,748
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,773                   2,734
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,773                   2,734
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .11                     .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .11                     .06
        

</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 15, 2014

No. 04-14-00316-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.F., MINOR CHILD,

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-PA-02694

Honorable John D. Gabriel, Jr., Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The appellant’s brief was originally due to be filed in this appeal on June 9, 2014. On 

June 9, 2014, appellant’s attorney filed a motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief, 

noting the underlying cause was a ten-day jury trial resulting in an extensive appellate record 

which counsel needed additional time to review. The motion was granted, extending the 

deadline to file the brief to June 29, 2014. The order stated, “Because this is an accelerated 

appeal from an order terminating appellant’s parental rights, no further extensions of time will be 

granted.”

On June 29, 2014, appellant’s attorney filed a second motion for extension of time to file 

appellant’s brief, again noting the underlying cause was a ten-day jury trial and counsel needed 

additional time to review the record. The motion was granted, extending the deadline to file the 

brief to July 6, 2014. The order stated, “No further extensions of time will be considered or 

granted.”

On July 7, 2014, appellant’s attorney filed a third motion for extension of time to file 

appellant’s brief, noting for the first time that the clerk’s record did not contain the jury charge or 

the jury’s verdict. Appellant’s attorney requested that this court order the trial court clerk to file 

a supplemental clerk’s record and to re-set the deadline for the filing of appellant’s brief because 

the record was incomplete. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5(c)(1) (setting forth proper procedure for 

requesting supplemental clerk’s record).

On July 14, 2014, a supplemental clerk’s record was filed in this appeal containing the 

jury charge and jury verdict. As has been noted in prior orders, because this is an accelerated 

appeal of the trial court’s order terminating appellants’ parental rights, Rule 6.2 of the Texas 

Rules of Judicial Administration mandates that this appeal be brought to final disposition within 

180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed. TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2. This mandated 

deadline cannot be re-set or extended by this court. 
Appellant’s attorney, Mr. James B. Peplinski, is ORDERED to file appellant’s brief in 

this court no later than July 21, 2014. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF TIME WILL BE 

GRANTED OR CONSIDERED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE. If appellant’s brief is 

not filed by the deadline stated in this order, the matter will be referred to a panel of this court to 

consider whether contempt charges should be brought against Mr. Peplinski for failing to comply 

with this court’s orders.

_________________________________

Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 15th day of July, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
**Exhibit
32.1**
 **CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO**
 **18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**
 **OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
  
 In
connection with the Annual Report of Puget Energy, Inc. and Puget Sound Energy,
Inc. (the "Companies") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Form 10-K"), I, Stephen P. Reynolds, the President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Companies, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to
§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
  (1)  The Form
10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)  The
information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Companies.
 
 
 
 Date:
      March 1, 2005/s/Stephen
      P. ReynoldsStephen
      P. ReynoldsPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer
# C_2023035EN.01002701.xml

| 30.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/27

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Gelderland (Netherlands) lodged on 12 October 2022 — Stichting BPL Pensioen v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Utrecht

(Case C-643/22)

(2023/C 35/32)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Gelderland

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Stichting BPL Pensioen

Defendant: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Utrecht

Question referred

Must Article 135(1)(g) of the VAT Directive (1) be interpreted as meaning that unit-holders in a pension fund such as the one at issue in the main proceedings can be regarded as bearing investment risk, and does this mean that the pension fund constitutes a ‘special investment fund’ within the meaning of that provision? Is it relevant in that regard:

| — | whether unit-holders bear an individual investment risk or is it sufficient that unit-holders as a collective — and no one else — bear the consequences of the investment results? |
| --- | --- |

—

whether unit-holders bear an individual investment risk or is it sufficient that unit-holders as a collective — and no one else — bear the consequences of the investment results?

| — | what the magnitude of the collective or individual risk is? |
| --- | --- |

—

what the magnitude of the collective or individual risk is?

| — | to what extent the amount of the pension benefit depends also on other factors, such as the number of years of pension accrual, salary level and the actuarial interest rate? |
| --- | --- |

—

to what extent the amount of the pension benefit depends also on other factors, such as the number of years of pension accrual, salary level and the actuarial interest rate?

---

(1)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).

---
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MAY 7, 2021

NO. 03-21-00115-CR

Julian Ortega, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, TRIANA, AND KELLY

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION-- OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLY

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed 

the record, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Therefore, the Court 

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay 

costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 48 (Wednesday, March 12, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 11522]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-6205]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service


Financial Management Service; Surety Companies Acceptable on 
Federal Bonds, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company

SUMMARY: (Dept. Circ. 570, 1996 Rev., Supp. No. 10.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Surety Bond Branch, (202) 874-7102.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A Certificate of Authority as an acceptable 
surety on Federal bonds is hereby issued to the following Company under 
Sections 9304 to 9308, Title 31, of the United States Code. Federal 
bond-approving officers should annotate their reference copies of the 
Treasury Circular 570, 1996 Revision, on page 34297, to reflect this 
addition:

    Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company. Business address: 175 
Berkeley Street, Boston, MA 02117. Phone: (617) 357-9500. 
Underwriting limitation b/: $51,386,000. Surety licenses c/: AL, AK, 
AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, 
ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, 
OK, OR, PA, PR, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI, WY. 
Incorporated in: Massachusetts.

    Certificates of Authority expire on June 30 each year, unless 
revoked prior to that date. The Certificates are subject to subsequent 
annual renewal as long as the companies remain qualified (31 CFR, Part 
223). A list of qualified companies is published annually as of July 1 
in Treasury Department Circular 570, with details as to underwriting 
limitations, areas in which licensed to transact surety business and 
other information.
    The Circular may be viewed and downloaded through the Internet 
(http://www.fms.treas.gov/c570.html) or through our computerized public 
bulletin board system (FMS Inside Line) at (202) 874-6887. A hard copy 
may be purchased from the Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, 
DC, telephone (202) 512-1800. When ordering the Circular from GPO, use 
the following stock number: 048-000-00499-7.
    Questions concerning this Notice may be directed to the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, Funds 
Management Division, Surety Bond Branch, 3700 East-West Highway, Room 
6F04, Hyattsville, MD 20782, telephone (202) 874-7102.

    Dated: March 3, 1997.
Charles F. Schwan III,
Director, Funds Management Division, Financial Management Service.
[FR Doc. 97-6205 Filed 3-11-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-35-M
# C_2023024EN.01003101.xml

| 23.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 24/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 24/31

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 8 November 2022 — M.S. and S.S. v Stadt Krefeld

(Case C-686/22)

(2023/C 24/41)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: M.S., S.S.

Defendant: Stadt Krefeld

Questions referred

| 1. | Does Article 20 TFEU preclude a provision under which, in the case of voluntary acquisition of (non-privileged) nationality of a third country, nationality of the Member State and thus citizenship of the Union are lost ex lege where an individual examination of the consequences of the loss is conducted only if the foreign national concerned previously made an application for a retention permit and that application was approved prior to acquisition of the foreign nationality? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does Article 20 TFEU preclude a provision under which, in the case of voluntary acquisition of (non-privileged) nationality of a third country, nationality of the Member State and thus citizenship of the Union are lost ex lege where an individual examination of the consequences of the loss is conducted only if the foreign national concerned previously made an application for a retention permit and that application was approved prior to acquisition of the foreign nationality?

| 2. | If the first question is to be answered in the negative: Is Article 20 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that, in the procedure for the grant of the retention permit, no conditions may be laid down as a result of which an individual assessment of the situation of the person concerned and that of his or her family with regard to the consequences of the loss of citizenship of the Union does not take place or is superseded by other requirements? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the first question is to be answered in the negative: Is Article 20 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that, in the procedure for the grant of the retention permit, no conditions may be laid down as a result of which an individual assessment of the situation of the person concerned and that of his or her family with regard to the consequences of the loss of citizenship of the Union does not take place or is superseded by other requirements?

---
Submitted September 2,

reversed December 7, 2016

#### In the Matter of A. J. E., a Person Alleged to have a Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, *Respondent, v.*A. J. E., *Appellant.*

Marion County Circuit Court

16CC01273; A161617

389 P3d 1175

Joseph DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Shorr, Judge.

*722PER CURIAM

Appellant seeks reversal of an order that committed him to the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, ORS 426.130(l)(a)(C), based on the trial court’s determination that, because of a mental disorder, he was a danger to himself and others and not able to provide for his basic needs, ORS 426.005(l)(f). He contends, and the state concedes, that the evidence is legally insufficient to support that determination and that the order should be reversed. We agree, accept the state’s concession, and reverse the commitment order.

Reversed.
Exhibit 10.1


 


Description of the $550 million Fourth
Amended and Restated

Revolving Credit Agreement Extension


 


June 29, 2021


 


Pursuant to the terms of the $550 million Fourth Amended and Restated
Revolving Credit Agreement, dated as of June 5, 2018, among CMS Energy Corporation, the financial institutions named therein and Barclays
Bank PLC, as Agent, the parties have all agreed, effective June 30, 2021, to extend the Termination Date (as defined therein) for
a period of one year to June 5, 2024.
No. 11-10551.

#### Ortiz-Varela *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
# C_2022148EN.01001601.xml

| 4.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/16

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 28 January 2022 — PL v État belge

(Case C-56/22)

(2022/C 148/22)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PL

Defendant: État belge

Question referred

Does EU law, essentially the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive 2008/115/EC, (1) apply to a practice of a Member State allowing it to regularise in situ a foreign national staying there illegally? If it does, must Articles 5, 6 and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC, read in accordance with [recitals 6 and 24] thereof, and Articles 1, 7, 14, 20, 21, 24 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State is considering granting an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to a third-country national staying illegally on its territory, it is entitled to: (i) require that national, first of all, to prove that it is impossible to make his or her application in his or her country of origin; and (ii) not set out in its legislation the, a fortiori objective, conditions and criteria for proving those compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons (whether as far as admissibility is concerned, by requiring that exceptional circumstances be demonstrated but not defining them, or as far as substance is concerned, by failing to lay down any objective criteria for defining the, inter alia humanitarian, reasons justifying a residence authorisation), thereby rendering the response to such an application unpredictable, or even arbitrary? If it is permissible for those criteria not to be laid down by legislation, in the event of a refusal, is the right to an effective remedy not undermined by the fact that the only remedy provided is based on strict legality, excluding any considerations of appropriateness?

---

(1)  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

---
Submitted December 21, 2016,

affirmed February 23, 2017

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Plaintiff-Respondent, v.*WESLEY LEE POSTON, *Defendant-Appellant.*

Washington County Circuit Court

D140866M; A159467

389 P3d 417

Ernest G, Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Keith L. Kutler, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Lagesen, Judge.

*896PER CURIAM

In this criminal appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of $416 in court-appointed attorney fees. He asserts that the court erred because it imposed fees without “facts in the record” showing that defendant “is or may be able to pay” the costs of his defense. *See*ORS 151.505(3) (“The court may not require a person to pay costs under this section unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs.”); ORS 161.665(4) (“The court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs under this section unless the defendant is or may be able to pay them.”); *see State v. Coverstone,*260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (holding that a trial court commits plain error by imposing court-appointed attorney fees where the record is silent as to the defendant’s ability to pay the fees ordered). The state argues that defendant failed to preserve that assignment of error and that any error by the trial court was not plain given that there was evidence in the record that defendant was receiving disability income.

We agree with the state that defendant failed to preserve the argument he makes on appeal. We also agree that, given that there was evidence in the record that defendant was receiving disability income, there is no plain error. *See State v. Eshaia,*253 Or App 676, 680, 291 P3d 805 (2012) (evidence in the record that the defendant received disability income was sufficient to support the imposition of $400 in court-appointed attorney fees).

Affirmed.