alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lena L. YOUNG, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Arthur Green, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF TAMPA, Officer Anthony Portman, Tampa Police Department, Corporal Matthew Smith, Tampa Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-11471

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(February 20, 2018)

Paul William Rebein, Rebein Brothers, PA, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Ursula Danese Richardson, Office of the Tampa City Attorney, Tampa, FL, for Defendants-Appellees

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, NEWSOM, and SILER,* Circuit Judges.

*

 Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr„ United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Lena Young, as the personal representative of the Estate of Arthur Green, Jr., filed this action against the City of Tampa and two of its police officers. She alleged that the City failed to train its police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and that it violated state law. She also brought excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims against the officers. The district court dismissed the federal claims against the City for failure to state plausible claims for relief, granted qualified immunity to the officers, and dismissed the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction.1

We affirm for the reasons stated in the court’s order dismissing Young’s amended complaint, with the exception of one sentence. In that sentence, the court stated that: “Even assuming the Officers’ restraint in that two minute interim was more than necessary or grossly negligent, as it certainly appears that it was from the allegations of the Amended Complaint, it does not amount to the level of force that in character and substance meets the high threshold needed to sustain a claim of *987excessive force.” Doc. 37 at 20. That sentence is not necessary to the court’s decision, and we do not imply any position about whether it is correct.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Young contends that granting qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage is inappropriate. To the contrary, that defense “may be ... raised and considered on a motion to dismiss.” St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] valid defense based upon [qualified immunity] must be recognized as soon as possible, preferably at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage of the litigation.”).
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8925 

To amend the Help America Vote of 2002 to require States to complete 

prior to the date of an election for Federal office the tabulation of 

ballots for the election which were cast or received prior to the date 

of the election, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 9, 2020 

Mr. HALL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on House Administration 

A BILL 

To amend the Help America Vote of 2002 to require States 

to complete prior to the date of an election for Federal 

office the tabulation of ballots for the election which 

were cast or received prior to the date of the election, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘John Lewis Prompt 

5 and Accurate Reporting of Elections Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8925 IH

1 SEC. 2. DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF TABULATION OF 

2 BALLOTS CAST OR RECEIVED BEFORE DATE 

3 OF ELECTION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Title III of the Help America 

5 Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended— 

6 (1) by redesignating sections 304 and 305 as 

7 sections 305 and 306; and 

8 (2) by inserting after section 303 the following 

9 new section: 

10 ‘‘SEC. 304. DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF TABULATION 

11 OF BALLOTS CAST OR RECEIVED BEFORE 

12 DATE OF ELECTION. 

13 ‘‘(a) DEADLINE DESCRIBED.—Each State shall en14 sure that all valid ballots in an election for Federal office 

15 which are cast prior to the date of the election, or which 

16 are received by mail by the appropriate election official 

17 prior to the date of the election, are tabulated prior to 

18 the date of the election. 

19 ‘‘(b) NO REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLICATION OF TAB20 ULATION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to 

21 require a State to publish the results of the tabulation of 

22 ballots under subsection (a) prior to the closing of the 

23 polls on the date of the election.’’. 

24 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT RELATING TO EN25 FORCEMENT.—Section 401 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 8925 IH

1 is amended by striking ‘‘and 303’’ and inserting ‘‘303, and 

2 304’’. 

3 (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents 

4 of such Act is amended— 

5 (1) by redesignating the items relating to sec6 tions 304 and 305 as relating to sections 305 and 

7 306; and 

8 (2) by inserting after the item relating to sec9 tion 303 the following new item: 

‘‘Sec. 304. Deadline for completion of tabulation of ballots cast or received before date of election.’’. 

10 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

11 this Act shall apply with respect to any election for Fed12 eral office held after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
# C_2022171EN.01004402.xml

| 25.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 171/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 171/44

---

Action brought on 7 March 2022 — Biologische Heilmittel Heel v EUIPO — Esi (TRAUMGEL)

(Case T-130/22)

(2022/C 171/61)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Biologische Heilmittel Heel GmbH (Baden-Baden, Germany) (represented by: J. Künzel, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Esi Srl (Albisola Superiore, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark TRAUMGEL — Application for registration No 16 289 712

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 December 2021 in Case R 813/2021-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the order No. 3 of the contested decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal — R 813/2021-4 of 20 December 2021; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the order No. 3 of the contested decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal — R 813/2021-4 of 20 December 2021;

| — | alter the order No. 1 of the contested decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal -R 813/2021-4 of 20 December 2021; |
| --- | --- |

—

alter the order No. 1 of the contested decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal -R 813/2021-4 of 20 December 2021;

| — | annul the decision of the Opposition Division of 6 April 2021 beyond the goods contained in the order No. 1 insofar as the opposition was rejected for goods in Class 3; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Opposition Division of 6 April 2021 beyond the goods contained in the order No. 1 insofar as the opposition was rejected for goods in Class 3;

| — | order the other party to the proceedings before EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the other party to the proceedings before EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### Francisco Alberto RAMIREZ-FERRUFINO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-73632

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 6, 2018 * Pasadena, California

Filed March 13, 2018

Mario Acosta, Jr., Esquire, Attorney, Law Office of Mario Acosta, Jr., Los Ange-les, CA, for Petitioner

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Lyle Davis Jentzer, Esquire, Attorney, Paul F. Stone, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: REINHARDT, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM *

Francisco Alberto Ramirez-Ferrufino petitions, for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of. removal, Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief, and special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.

1. Ramirez-Ferrufino concedes that he is ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and NACARA cancellation of removal under the persecutor bar if the adverse credibility finding is proper. *See*8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(a). Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. *See Joseph v. Holder,*600 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Credibility determination are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.”). “The inconsistencies in [petitioner's story are not minor; rather, they go to the heart of [his] asylum application” and the applicability of the persecutor bar. *See Pal v. INS,*204 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2000). Though the IJ improperly applied the REAL ID Act to Ramirez-Ferrufino’s pre-May 11, 2005 application, this error was rendered harmless by the BIA’s “application of the correct legal standard.” *Singh v. Holder,*591 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting *790*Ghaly v. INS,*58 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)).

2. Ramirez-Ferrufino argues that the BIA erred by affirming the denial of his request for relief under the CAT. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that he failed to meet his burden of showing that he will likely be tortured in El Salvador “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official” because of his former military membership. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); *see also Owino v. Holder,*771 F.3d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Denial of CAT relief is reviewed for substantial evidence!.]”).

DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# C_2023104EN.01002202.xml

| 20.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/22

---

Order of the President of the Court of 17 November 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad — Bulgaria) — Criminal proceedings against NE

(Case C-373/22, (1) NE)

(2023/C 104/33)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 359, 19.9.2022.

---
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM PUBLIC
SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                    3,480,712
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                     24,282
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         468,587
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                       380,714
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<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                      680,315
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<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>               1,343,645
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           41,289
<PREFERRED>                                    140,008
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                         1,195,553
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                              45,800
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                 242,250
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                   82,836
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                        2,576
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                     53,702
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                 9,776
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>               1,260,338
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                4,354,295
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                    2,110,601
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            95,357
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     350,093
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                   1,788,851
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                        321,750
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               1,012
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                 322,762
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       143,906
<NET-INCOME>                                   178,856
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                     11,963
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                  166,893
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                       128,587
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       85,832
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                         385,699
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.65
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</TABLE>
#### IN RE: Albert S. AN and Lauri I. An, Debtors. *772Albert S. An and Lauri I. An, Appellants, v. II Yoon Kwon and Coastal Asset Management, LLC, Appellees.

No. 16-60071

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 6, 2018 *

Filed February 8, 2018

James Alexander Dumas, Jr., Esquire, Senior Attorney, Christian T. Kim, Attorney, Dumas & Kim, APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Appellants

Robert Huttenhoff, Ryan Daniel O’Dea, Leonard M. Shulman, Attorneys, Shulman Hodges & Bastían LLP, Irvine, CA, for Appellees

Before: GRABER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and MARBLEY,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Albert S. and Lauri I, An, husband and wife, appeal a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) decision affirming in part the bankruptcy court’s holding that a state-court judgment was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(6) as to Albert, but reversing that determination as to Lauri. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and affirm,

1. The Ans argue that 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(6) does not apply, because the judgment was the result of a landlord-tenant dispute that “sounded in contract.” But the ejectment, action that gave rise to the judgment arose “out of alleged unlawful possession by the defendants], and sounds in tort.” *Zettle v. Gillmeister,*64 Cal.App. 669, 222 P. 645, 646 (1923); *see also Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich),*238 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts arising from *“tortious*conduct” (quoting *Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso),*978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992))).

2. The BAP did not err in concluding that the judgment was not dischargeable against Albert. The bankruptcy court reasonably determined that the injury to Kwon was “willful and malicious.” *See*11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Substantial evidence supported the court’s determination that the injury was willful because Albert “did not believe that there was an oral agreement to own an interest in the property,” and “his intention .,. was ... to continue riding the gravy train for as long as possible at Mr, Kwon’s expense.” *See In re Jercich,*238 F.3d at 1208 (holding that “the willful injury requirement ... is met when it is shown either that the debtor had a subjective motive to inflict the injury *or*that the debtor believed that injury was substantially certain to occur”). The Ans do not “specifically and distinctly” contest on appeal that the injury was malicious, so we deem that issue waived. *Miller v. Fair**773*child Indus., Inc.,*797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986).1

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. The Ans also argue that the bankruptcy court erred in finding the judgment non-dis-chargeable as to Lauri. But the BAP reversed that portion of the bankruptcy court’s order, and there is no cross-appeal.
#### Ronald A. WELCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bill LATOUR, Esquire, Real-party-in-interest-Appellee, and Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-56544

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 7, 2018 * Pasadena, California

Filed March 09, 2018

*767Ronald A. Welch, Pro Se

Bill LaTour, Esquire, Law Offices of Bill LaTour, Colton, CA, for Real-party-in-interest-Appellee

Jeffrey Chen, Attorney, Jeffrey Chen, Attorney, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GRABER, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiff Ronald Welch timely appeals the district court’s order awarding attorney fees to real-party-in-interest Bill LaT-our, Plaintiff’s lawyer in an underlying Social Security benefits case. We vacate the judgment and remand.

The district court correctly identified the legal standard for determining the amount of fees to award under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for representing a Social Security claimant in court: The district court must conclude that the fees granted are reasonable under the standards set forth in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), and in Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). But the district court did not comply with Crawford’s requirement that the court “provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” 586 F.3d at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A clear explanation is particularly important here, in light of the unusual circumstances of this case. Counsel misplaced Plaintiffs case file, which may have affected the duration of the case. Moreover, counsel worked disproportionally few hours compared to the large fee awarded. On remand, the district court shall enunciate how those and other relevant circumstances affect the calculation of a reasonable fee.

VACATED and REMANDED. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.