alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2022424EN.01002602.xml

| 7.11.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 424/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.11.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 424/26

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 28 July 2022 — Romaqua Group SA v Societatea Națională a Apelor Minerale and Agenția Națională pentru Resurse Minerale

(Case C-510/22)

(2022/C 424/34)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Romaqua Group SA

Respondents: Societatea Națională a Apelor Minerale and Agenția Națională pentru Resurse Minerale

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 106(1) TFEU to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national legislation, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which maintain the direct, original and non-competitive award, to a company whose capital is wholly owned by the State, of licences for the exploitation of mineral water springs by means of successive and unlimited extensions of exclusive licences (available to the state-owned company)? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 106(1) TFEU to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national legislation, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which maintain the direct, original and non-competitive award, to a company whose capital is wholly owned by the State, of licences for the exploitation of mineral water springs by means of successive and unlimited extensions of exclusive licences (available to the state-owned company)?

| 2. | Are Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 49 and 119 TFEU, and Article 3 of Directive 2009/54/EC on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters (1) to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national legislation, such as those at issue in the main proceedings and mentioned above, which introduce an unjustified restriction on the freedom to conduct a business, including the freedom of establishment? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Are Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 49 and 119 TFEU, and Article 3 of Directive 2009/54/EC on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters (1) to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national legislation, such as those at issue in the main proceedings and mentioned above, which introduce an unjustified restriction on the freedom to conduct a business, including the freedom of establishment?

---

(1)  Directive 2009/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters (OJ 2009 L 164, p. 45).

---
# C_2023271EN.01003001.xml

| 31.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 271/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 271/30

---

Order of the General Court of 6 June 2023 — Spreewood Distillers v EUIPO — Radgonske gorice (STORK)

(Case T-433/22) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark STORK - Earlier national word mark GOLDEN STORK - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2023/C 271/43)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Spreewood Distillers GmbH (Schlepzig, Germany) (represented by: O. Spieker and D. Mienert, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: N. Lamsters and T. Frydendahl, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Radgonske gorice d.o.o. (Gornja Radgona, Slovenia)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 10 May 2022 (Case R 1782/2021-5).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Each party shall bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 326, 29.8.2022.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1998
<CASH>                                         508,506
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,900,197
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (51,322)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,708,763
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,229,696
<PP&E>                                         609,800
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,077,443
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,868,013
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        43,541
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,077,443
<SALES>                                      5,422,660
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,501,811
<CGS>                                        3,915,590
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,017,001
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,521,232
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,297
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (40,719)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (5,012)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (35,707)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (35,707)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-19-0000049 31-JAN-2019 08:35 AM
# C_2023271EN.01002701.xml

| 31.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 271/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 271/27

---

Judgment of the General Court of 21 June 2023 — Rauch Furnace Technology v EUIPO — Musto et Bureau (melting crucible)

(Case T-347/22) (1)

(Community design - Invalidity proceedings - Community design representing a melting crucible - Prior design - Ground for invalidity - Lack of individual character - No different overall impression - Disclosure of prior design - Articles 6, 7 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 - Evidence filed in a language other than the language of the proceedings - Article 29(1) and (5), and Article 81(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2245/2002 - Facts or evidence relied on for the first time before the Board of Appeal - Article 63 of Regulation No 6/2002)

(2023/C 271/39)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Rauch Furnace Technology GmbH (Gmunden, Austria) (represented by: M. Traxler, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: E. Nicolás Gómez and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Musto et Bureau Srl (Osteria Grande, Italy) (represented by: F. De Sanzuane, lawyer)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 29 March 2022 (Case R 1697/2021-3).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Rauch Furnace Technology GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Musto et Bureau Srl; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Rauch Furnace Technology GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Musto et Bureau Srl;

| 3. | Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 294, 1.8.2022.

---
Exhibit 99.1

 

CERTIFICATION

 

	Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned officer of Harold's Stores, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies that the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended May 3, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:	June 17, 2003					/s/ Clark J. Hinkley			
Name: Clark J. Hinkley

Title:	Chief Executive Officer

 

 

	The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.
# C_2023155EN.01005402.xml

| 2.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 155/54 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 155/54

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 March 2023 — Ramazani Shadary v Council

(Case T-93/22) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Change of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2023/C 155/70)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Lejeune and B. Driessen, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2181 of 9 December 2021 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2021 L 443, p. 75) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2177 of 9 December 2021, implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2021 L 443, p. 3), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2181 of 9 December 2021 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2177 of 9 December 2021, implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in so far as those acts concern Mr Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2181 of 9 December 2021 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2177 of 9 December 2021, implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in so far as those acts concern Mr Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary;

| 2. | Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 148, 4.4.2022.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8651 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8651

     To acknowledge the crime of lynching, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 23, 2020

  Mr. Amash introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To acknowledge the crime of lynching, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITING LYNCHING.

    Section 249(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
            (2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
            ``(4) Offenses involving lynching.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Whoever, acting with one or more 
                individuals, engages in conduct described in paragraph 
                (1) or (2) that results in death, shall be subject to 
                the same penalties as prescribed in those paragraphs.
                    ``(B) Limitation on prosecution.--A person who is 
                prosecuted for unlawful conduct under this paragraph 
                may not be prosecuted for the same conduct under 
                paragraph (1) or (2).''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 23, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-41680 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LEONEL ESTRADA-ZAMORA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:04-CR-612-ALL

-------------------- Before GARZA, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Leonel Estrada-Zamora (Estrada) appeals his 46-month sentence following his guilty plea conviction of illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Estrada argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in imposing a sentence under a mandatory guideline scheme, in violation of United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Assuming arguendo that the written plea agreement does not foreclose review of this argument, we review it for plain error. See United States v.No. 04-41680 -2- Valenzuela-Quevedo , 407 F.3d 728, 732-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 267 (2005); United States v. Mares , 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). Estrada concedes that he cannot demonstrate that the district court would likely have sentenced him differently under an advisory sentencing scheme. His argument that this error is structural, or at least presumptively prejudicial, is foreclosed, see United States v. Martinez-Lugo , 411 F.3d 597, 600-01 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 464 (2005), and his argument that we require proof by a preponderance of the evidence that this error affected his substantial rights lacks merit. See Mares , 402 F.3d at 521; Martinez-Lugo , 411 F.3d at 601. Estrada’s constitutional challenge to § 1326 is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Estrada contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Estrada properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 31.01**

 

## **CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Wayne H. Brunetti,certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed thisannual report on Form 10-K of Public Service Company of Colorado;

 

2. Based on my knowledge,this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge,the financial statements, and other financial information included in thisannual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this annual report;

 

4. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

 

a)         designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

 

b)        evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c)         disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;

 

5. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent function):

 

a)         all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial data; and

 

b)        any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.

 
|                | /s/ WAYNE H. BRUNETTI                 |   |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|                | Wayne H. Brunetti                     |
|                | Chairman and Chief  Executive Officer |
|                |
| Date: March 3, 2005 |

 

1

----
No. 11-10730.

#### Moses *v.*Virginia.

Sup.‘ Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
# C_2022389EN.01000201.xml

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/2

---

Order of the Court of 16 August 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — flightright GmbH v Brussels Airlines SA/NV

(Case C-465/22) (1)

(Air transport - Compensation of air passengers in the event of long delay of flights - Connecting flight - Delay in the first flight - No contractual relationship between the passenger and the Community air carrier which operated the second flight - Action for damages against the air carrier which operated the second flight)

(2022/C 389/02)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: flightright GmbH

Defendant: Brussels Airlines SA/NV

Operative part of the order

Case C-465/22 is removed from the Register of the Court.

---

(1)  Date lodged: 12.7.2022.

---
## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S NO. WR-85,083-01

EX P ARTE CHRISTO P HER ERIC ROHRMAN, Applicant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 1272457-A IN THE 183RD DISTRICT COURT

F ROM HARRIS COUNTY

Y E A R Y , J . , f

i l e d a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n .

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N I d i s s e n t f

o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d i n m y d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n i n E x p a r t e F o u r n i e r , 4 7 3 S

. W
. 3 d 7 8 9 ( T e x . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 1 5 )

.

F I L E D : J u n e 8 , 2 0 1 6 D O N O T P U B L I S H
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-14-00385-CR

Chico Warn-Her DYKE,

Appellant

v.

The State of 

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CR1065

Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 23, 2014

DISMISSED

Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, appellant pled nolo contendere to assault and was 

sentenced to four years in prison in accordance with the terms of his plea-bargain agreement. On

May 14, 2014, the trial court signed a certification of defendant’s right to appeal stating that this 

“is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

After appellant filed a notice of appeal, the trial court clerk sent copies of the certification and 

notice of appeal to this court. See id. 25.2(e). The clerk’s record, which includes the trial court’s 

Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification, has been filed. See id. 25.2(d). 
04-14-00385-CR

“In a plea bargain case . . . a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised 

by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to 

appeal.” Id. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record, which contains a written plea bargain, establishes the 

punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor 

and agreed to by the defendant. See id. The clerk’s record does not include a written motion filed 

and ruled upon before trial; nor does it indicate that the trial court gave appellant permission to 

appeal. See id. The trial court’s certification, therefore, appears to accurately reflect that this is a 

plea-bargain case and that appellant does not have a right to appeal. We must dismiss an appeal 

“if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the 

record.” Id. 25.2(d). 

We, therefore, warned appellant that this appeal would be dismissed pursuant to Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d), unless an amended trial court certification showing that 

appellant had the right to appeal was made part of the appellate record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d), 

37.1; Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, order). No such amended 

trial court certification has been filed. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d). 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

- 2 -