J-S38036-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

RONDELLE CHRISTIAN MIDDLETON, :

:

Appellant : No. 1761 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on September 12, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-22-CR-0000012-2014

BEFORE: WECHT, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015

Rondelle Christian Middleton (“Middleton”) appeals from the judgment 

of sentence imposed after he was convicted of possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, and 

possession of drug paraphernalia.1 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the procedural history and relevant facts 

underlying this appeal in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, which we incorporate 

herein for purposes of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/18/15, at 1-5.

On appeal, Middleton presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in denying [Middleton’s] 

Suppression Motion where police officers conducted a 

suspicionless Terry[FN] frisk and a coerced consent search of 

[Middleton], in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the 

 

1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (16), and (32).
J-S38036-15

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Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution?

[FN] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Brief for Appellant at 5 (footnote in original).

In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, 

our role is to determine whether the record supports the 

suppression court’s factual findings and the legitimacy of the 

inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In 

making this determination, we may consider only the evidence of 

the prosecution’s witnesses and so much of the defense as, fairly 

read in the context of the record as a whole, remains 

uncontradicted. When the evidence supports the factual findings 

of the suppression court, we may reverse only if there is an error 

in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings. As a 

reviewing court, we are therefore not bound by the legal 

conclusions of the suppression court and must reverse that 

court’s determination if the conclusions are in error or the law is 

misapplied.

Commonwealth v. Page, 59 A.3d 1118, 1131 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

and brackets omitted).

Middleton argues on appeal that the Terry frisk of his person was 

unlawful, as it was not supported by reasonable suspicion that he was armed 

and dangerous.2 See Brief for Appellant at 12-15 (citing, inter alia, 

Commonwealth v. E.M., 735 A.2d 654, 659 (Pa. 1999) (stating that “[i]n 

order to justify a frisk under Terry, the officer must be able to point to 

particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was 

 

2 We observe that Middleton does not dispute that the initial stop of the 

vehicle driven by King was lawful, nor does he challenge that the police 

possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion/probable cause to conduct a 

Terry frisk of King and/or arrest him.
J-S38036-15

- 3 -

armed and dangerous.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also 

Brief for Appellant at 13 (asserting that “Officer Henry was unable to point to 

any fact from which he reasonably inferred that [Middleton] was armed and 

dangerous. Indeed, Officer Henry conceded that his basis to search 

[Middleton] was what he didn’t know, not what he did know[.]” (emphasis in 

original)). Importantly, Middleton never raised this claim before the trial 

court;3accordingly, we must rule that it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(stating that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); see 

also Commonwealth v. Miller, 80 A.3d 806, 811 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(stating that “[b]y requiring that an issue be considered waived if raised for 

the first time on appeal, our [appellate C]ourts ensure that the trial court 

that initially hears a dispute has had an opportunity to consider the issue. 

This jurisprudential mandate is also grounded upon the principle that a trial 

court must be given the opportunity to correct its errors as early as 

possible.”) (citation and ellipses omitted);4see also Commonwealth v. 

Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 891 (Pa. 2010) (stating that “[w]here the parties 

 

3

In his Motion to Suppress and supporting Memorandum of Law, Middleton 

challenged only the validity of his consent to the search of his person 

(performed after the Terry frisk), and the allegedly coercive atmosphere in 

which he consented to the search.

4 The trial court in the instant case correctly observed in its Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) Opinion that “[u]pon review of the suppression hearing transcript 

and Memoranda of Law submitted by the parties, it appears that both parties 

agree that the Terry frisk performed by Officer Henry [on Middleton] was a 

lawful investigative detention[,] and the encounter is not being challenged 

as illegal.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/18/15, at 6. 
J-S38036-15

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fail to preserve an issue for appeal, the Superior Court may not address that 

issue sua sponte.”) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, Middleton did not specifically challenge the Terry frisk in his 

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement. Instead, he raised only 

a general challenge to the trial court’s denial of his suppression Motion.5 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) & (vii) (providing, respectively, that “[t]he 

Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant 

intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for 

the judge[,]” and that “[i]ssues not included in the Statement and/or not 

raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are 

waived.”) (emphasis added).

Next, we address Middleton’s challenge to the legality of the search of 

his person that occurred after the Terry frisk, and whether his consent to 

this search was voluntarily given. According to Middleton, his “alleged 

consent to Officer Hammer’s search of his person was coerced and the 

product of deception.” Brief for Appellant at 23. Middleton avers that he

did not ... voluntarily consent to the search[,] since he was 

continuously and illegally subjected to the will and control of 

Officer Henry. Officer Henry had previously pulled out his gun, 

pointed it at [Middleton], and gave [him] numerous orders[,] 

which [he] obeyed. [Middleton] testified that he thought he 

would get in trouble if he disobeyed.

 

5 Middleton raised the following claim in his Concise Statement: “The trial 

court erred when it denied [Middleton’s M]otion to suppress evidence and 

statements in the above captioned case.” Concise Statement, 10/24/14. 
J-S38036-15

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Id. at 24. Middleton emphasizes that the police did not inform him that he 

was under no obligation to consent to the search of his person. Id. at 26. 

Moreover, Middleton contends that “[t]hough Officer Henry testified that he 

told [Middleton] he was ‘good to go’ after determining that there were no 

warrants for [Middleton], Officer Henry did not mention this anywhere in his 

detailed and chronological police report.” Id. at 24.

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court thoroughly addressed 

Middleton’s claims, set forth the applicable law, and determined that it 

properly denied Middleton’s suppression Motion because, inter alia, (1) 

“Officer Henry’s detention for a pat-down [search] was lawful”; (2) “Officer 

Hammer’s ID check was lawful”; and (3) Middleton voluntarily gave his 

consent to the subsequent search of his person, during a “constitutionally 

sound encounter” under the totality of the circumstances. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 2/18/15, at 6-8, 9-13. Our review confirms that the trial court’s 

thorough and cogent analysis is supported by the record and the law. 

Therefore, we affirm on this basis in concluding that the trial court properly 

denied Middleton’s Motion to suppress. See id.6

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 

6 As an addendum, to the extent that Middleton challenges the credibility of 

Officer Henry’s trial testimony that he had informed Middleton, after the 

Terry frisk, that he was “good to go,” it was the sole province of the trial 

court, as the fact-finder, to evaluate Officer Henry’s credibility and 

determine whether there were any conflicts between his testimony and his 

police report. See Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (stating that “[a]s an appellate court, we do not assess 

credibility nor do we assign weight to any of the testimony of record.”).
J-S38036-15

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/16/2015
1 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(30). 

2 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(16). 

3 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(32). 

incarceration at Count Two (2),consecutive to Count One (1 ), and a six (6) to twelve 

after the necessary waiver colloquy was conducted on the record. Appellant was found 

guilty on all counts and sentenced to /thirty (30) to sixty (60) months term of 

incarceration at Count One (1 ), a sixteen (16) to thirty-two (32) months term of 

21, 2014. On September 3, 2014, Appellant elected to proceed with a non-jury trial 

filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence which this Court denied on July 

I 

Possession of a Controlled Substance,2 and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.3 He 

In January 2013, Appellant, Rondelle C. Middleton1was arrested and charged 

with one count each of Possession With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, 1 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

1925(a). 

sentence entered on September 12, 2014 .. This opinion is written pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

Rondelle C. Middleton ("Appellant" or "Middleton") is appealing his judgment of 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

RONDELLE C. MIDDLETON 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

DOCKET NO. 0012 CR 2014 

: (1761 MDA 2014) 

v. 

..J-5 3B03(o-l~ 

.: ORIGINAL , . T Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
2 

4 Hereinafter "N.T." 

resembling a picture of Vernon King. (N.T. at 7-8). While following the vehicle, Cpl. 

Streets, Harrisburg City. (N.T. at 7). Cpl. Meik could see two males in the vehicle, one 

a blue Chrysler Pacifica automobile as it pulled out of a gas station at Sixth and Maclay 

Acting on information obtained from a confidential informant, Cpl. Meik began following 

Harrisburg Bureau of Police ("HBP") was searching for Vernon King, a fugitive wanted 

on an outstanding drug charge. (Notes of Testimony, Suppression 6/5/14 at 6-7).4 

On Jan. 10, 2013 around 11 :30 p.m., Corporal Tyron Meik ("Cpl. Meik") of the 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

without merit as his Suppression Motion was properly denied. 

1. The trial court erred when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress 

evidence and statements in the above captioned case. 

For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that Appellant's claim of error is 

raising the following issues: 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Court of Pennsylvania. In compliance with an October 24, 2014 Order, Appellant filed a 

On October 17, 2014, Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior 

sentence. 

reconsideration as requested by the Commonwealth,this Court reinstated the original 

(2) would run concurrent with the sentence at Count One (1 ). However, upon 

requested relief by modifying his sentence so that term of incarceration at Count Two 

Upon consideration of Appellant's Motion to Modify Sentence, this Court granted his 

(12) months term of incarceration at Count Three (3) concurrent to Count Two (2). 

) 

( Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1969). 

3 

responsibility for any further investigation. (N.T. at 36). Since Officer Henry was with 

Hammer were on the HBP Street Crimes Unit, Officer Henry handed over the 

Officer Hammer arrived shortly after Officer Henry. As both Cpl. Meik and Officer 

interacted with Mr. King. (N.T. at 40). 

ca~ so Officer Henry holstered his weapon and conducted a pat-down. (N.T. at 34-35; 

38-30). Appellant remained with Officer Henry by the police vehicle while Cpl. Meik 

conducted Terry frisk5 for weapons. (N.T. at 32-33). Appellant placed his hands on the 

cruiser and ordered Appellant at gunpoint to put his hands on the car while he 

As he did not know which individual was the fugitive, Officer Henry exited his police 

Henry, a patrol Officer with the HBP, saw Appellant get out of the car that was stopped. 

for assistance in arresting a wanted fugitive he had located. (N.T. at 12; 32). Officer 

and Officer Yost ("Officer Yost") arrived at the scene based on Cpl. Meik's radio request 

Officer Brian Henry ("Officer Henry"), Officer Joshua Hammer ("Officer Hammer") 

Mr. King and took him into custody. (N.T. at 9-11; 21). 

the stopped vehicle,at which time Appellant immediately exited from the passenger 

side. (N.T. at 9-10). Appellant stayed in his general location while Cpl. Meik spoke with 

18-19). Cpl. Meik exited his vehicle with his K-9 partner and proceeded to the front of 

The vehicle stopped in the 1500 block of Swatara Stree~where Cpl. Meik passed 

it, shined his spotlight into the car and observed Mr. King in the driver's seat. (N.T. at 9; 

for was in the vehicle. (N.T. at 8). 

Meik radioed other units with his location and his belief that the fugitive he was looking 

r 

{.-· I Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 684 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 

4 

Once Mr. King was detained based on the outstanding warrant, he was also 

seated in the police unit while Cpl. Meik conducted an inventory search of the vehicle:, as 

it was going to be forfeited to the drug task force. (N.T. at 15). During that search, 

pieces of crack cocaine were discovered underneath the passenger side seat,which 

prompted Meik to return to the police unit, read Mr. King his Miranda rights and also tell 

Officer Hammer then asked for permission to search Appellant and he responded 

by nodding his head yes and putting his hands in the air. (N.T. at 43-44). Officer 

Hammer recovered two white capsules in the right front quarter pocket of Appellant's 

pants. (N.T. at 44). Officer Hammer reported to Cpl. Meik what he had recovered 

during the search of Appellant. (N.T. at 13). Cpl. Meik again made contact with 

Appellant as he detained him, read him his Miranda6 rights and handcuffed him. (N.T. at 

13; 45). Appellant confirmed that he understood his rights and proceeded to tell Cpl. 

Meik that the pills were Ecstasy, so he was placed in the back of a police unit. (N.T. at 

13-14). 

Appellant, Officer Hammer asked Cpl. Meik for further instructions regarding the crime 

investigation. Cpl. Meik requested that Officer Hammer run Defendant's name through 

NCIC to determine whether he was wanted on any outstanding warrants or detainers,as 

Meik knew he was on state parole. (N.T. at 12-13; 42). Appellant complied with Officer 

Hammer by supplying his OLN card and driver's license. (N.T. at 42). Appellant was not 

wanted by the police for anything,so Officer Hammer told Appellant he was "good to 

go"; however, Appellant stayed and continued to ask questions about his friend, Mr. 

King. (N.T. at 42-43). 

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5 

At the suppression hearing, Appellant argued that the evidence and statements 

obtained subsequent to Officer Hammer's search were illegally obtained in violation of 

his constitutional rights,as the consent provided was not voluntary. The Commonwealth 

countered this position by arguing that Officer Henry's initial encounter with Appellant 

was a lawful investigative detention and based on the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the subsequent interaction between Officer Hammer and Appellant, 

voluntary consent to search was indeed provided. 

DISCUSSION 

Cpl. Meik was very familiar with Appellant from prior police interactions. (N.T. at 

16). Meik knew from his past encounters with Appellant that he had transported illegal 

narcotics in his groin or buttocks area at least once before. (J.Q.) Based on the drugs he 

found in the car, Meik instructed Officer Yost to pull out Appellant's pants and look down 

the back of them. (J.Q.) As Cpl. Meik and Officer Hammer were in close proximity, 

Officer Yost pulled the back of Defendant's pants out, reached in and pulled out a 

baggie containing crack cocaine. (N.T. at 16-17; 45). This took place on the street with 

no clothing removed. (N.T. at 45-46). Once Appellant and Mr. King were transported to 

the booking center, both men were strip searched by Officer Hammer,at which time 

another baggie of crack cocaine fell from Appellant's pants. (N.T. at 46-47). 

Appellant that he will face charges related to the crack cocaine. (N.T. at 15-16). This 

prompted Mr. King to tell Meik that the crack cocaine was his. (J..g_.) A scale was also 

found in the driver's side door. (J.Q.) 

l Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
6 

The first is a mere encounter, which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion. The second is an investigative detention, which must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion. This interaction subjects a suspect to 

interaction to be lawful: 

between police and individuals which require differing levels of suspicion in order for the 

In Pennsylvania it is well established that there are three levels of interaction 

surrounding Officer Hammer's interaction with Appellant. 

detention. Therefore, the focus of our analysis is on the nature of and circumstances 

specific and voluntary under the circumstances so it did not validate the otherwise illegal 

invalid. Appellant more specifically argues that the consent given was not unequivocal, 

without reasonable suspicion despite Appellant's consent because the consent was 

interaction with Officer Hammer was an unlawful warrantless investigatory detention 

being challenged as illegal. However, Appellant contends that the subsequent 

performed by Officer Henry was a lawful investigative detention and the encounter is not 

submitted by the parties, it appears that both parties agree that the Terry frisk 

Upon review of the suppression hearing transcript and Memoranda of Law 

In considering the denial of a suppression motion, our standard of review 

is well-settled. We must "determine whether the record supports the 

suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences 

and legal conclusions drawn from these findings." Commonwealth v. 

Ayala, 791 A.2d 1202, 1207 (Pa.Super. 2002). In doing so, we "may 

consider only the prosecution's [evidence]" and the defendant's evidence 

to the extent it is not contradictory. Id., 791 A.2d at 1207. If the evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing supports these findings of fact, we 

may not reverse the lower court unless its accompanying legal 

conclusions are in error. See Commonwealth v. Lohr, 715 A.2d 459, 461 

(Pa.Super.1998). Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1254 (2002). 

challenged on appeal, the Superior Court applies the following standard of review: 

When a trial court denies a defendant's suppression motion and the ruling is 

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7 

7 Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884 (2000). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from 

unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby ensuring the "right of each 

individual to be let alone." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 

93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 

Pa.Super. 207, 575 A.2d 593, 596 (1990). Specifically, police officers may 

not conduct a warrantless search or seizure unless one of several 

recognized exceptions applies. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 

S.Ct. 2041; Blair, 575 A.2d at 596-97. One such exception is a search 

conducted pursuant to consent voluntarily given. See Blair, 575 A.2d at 

597 (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment inquiries in consent cases 

entail a two-prong assessment: first, the constitutional validity of the 

citizen/police encounter giving rise to the consent and, second, the 

voluntariness of said consent. See Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 

presented by Appellant: 

succinctly explains the necessary inquiry which governs the resolution of the issue 

When applying the principles espoused in Strickler, the Superior Court 

by both parties as guidance for the Court's analysis in this matter. 

interaction at issue is a "post-detention interaction." The issue presented to this Court 

is very similar to the scenario discussed in Commonwealth v. Strickler,7 a case cited 

detention prior to the disputed consensual search that uncovered two illegal pills, the 

driver of the vehicle that was stopped. However, as he was subject to a lawful 

following a traffic stop is somewhat complicated in this matter as Appellant was not the 

a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive 

conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. The third 

category, a custodial detention, must be supported by probable cause. 

The police have probable cause where the facts and circumstances within 

the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 

caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. 

Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 127 (2012) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Application of the constitutional precepts controlling a consensual search 

Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
8 

pat-down. The two men stepped behind the vehicle Mr. King had been driving and 

that Appellant was unarmed, he immediately holstered his weapon and completed the 

Although Officer Henry's encounter began with his gun drawn, once he determined 

The events were unfolding quickly because Appellant immediately exited the vehicle. 

arrived, neither knew who was the fugitive or what level of danger they were facing. 

sitting in the car. Therefore, when Officer Henry and, subsequently, Officer Hammer 

wanted by police, for what offense the person was wanted, or where the individual was 

When Cpl. Meik radioed for assistance he did not specify which individual was 

also knew that he was on state parole. 

side. Cpl. Meik knew Appellant well due to multiple previous police encounters and 

stopped, Cpl. Meik saw Appellant immediately exit as he was approaching the driver's 

he was following, which vehicle also housed a passenger. Once the vehicle was 

wanted fugitive, Mr. King. Cpl. Meik had identified Mr. King as the driver of the vehicle 

based upon Cpl. Meik's radio call requesting assistance in the apprehension of a 

place as follows: Officers Henry and Hammer responded to the scene of the incident 

suppression hearing, this Court finds that the police encounter with Appellant took 

47, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (2000) (citation omitted). Where the underlying 

encounter is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the exclusive 

focus. See id., 757 A.2d at 889 (citation omitted). If a defendant's initial 

detention violates the Fourth Amendment, then any evidence seized 

during that stop must be excluded as fruit of an unlawful detention absent 

a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal 

chain between the illegal detention and the seizure of evidence, thus 

assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of 

voluntariness. See id., 757 A.2d at 889 (citation omitted). 

Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d at 1254-55 (2002). 

Based upon the credible testimony presented by the Commonwealth at the 

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9 

In addition to the documentation that the police are permitted to obtain 

from the driver, during a routine traffic stop, a police officer may request a 

driver to step out of the vehicle as a matter of course. Pennsylvania v. 

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); 

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa.Super. 252, 609 A.2d 177 (1992). In 

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 

(1997), the Court extended this rule to passengers in a stopped vehicle. 

The Supreme Court found that the interest in officer safety outweighs the 

Campbell, 862 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. Super. 2004). The Superior Court has stated: 

requires that the passengers exit a vehicle as well as the driver. Commonwealth v. 

routine traffic stop, it is not a violation of an individual's right to privacy when an officer 

protections of the Fourth Amendment, the Superior Court has found that during a 

that, while acknowledging that the forcible stop of an automobile implicates the 

for warrants}o determine whether the consent provided later was valid. It is notable 

Based on Strickler and 12.Y referenced above, we must first examine the 

circumstances surrounding Officer Hammer's interaction with Appellant when he checkeJ 

requested Appellant's identification cards1which he willingly provided. 

determine if there were any outstanding warrants for his arrest. Officer Hammer 

Because Cpl. Meik knew Appellant was on parole, he directed Officer Hammer to 

Henry speaking with Appellant, so he checked with Cpl. Meik for his instructions. 

Around the same time, Officer Hammer arrived on scene and observed Officer 

a "Terry frisk" to assure officer safety and dispel any suspicions. (See Caban, supra.) 

suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity and, thus properly conducted 

to that point, it is clear that Officer Henry possessed a reasonable and articulable 

happening to King. Based on well-established legal principles and the circumstances 

casually leaned on the police cruiser while Appellant asked questions about what was 

Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
10 

and to request identification in much less serious circumstances, this Court finds that 

precarious as they were pursuing a wanted fugitive) not conducting a routine traffic stop. 

As the courts have deemed it permissible for police to require passengers to exit a car 

encountered in this case, as compared to Campbell and Durr, were much more 

for identification. Of great import though, is that the circumstances which the officers 

was stopped, the officer could have lawfully requested him to exit the vehicle and asked 

According to the Campbell and Durr, if Appellant had remained in the vehicle when it 

identification and determine if he is wanted based upon a violation of his parole. 

principles espoused validate Cpl. Meik's request that Officer Hammer obtain Appellant's 

Although the instant case is not factually identical to Campbell and Durr, the 

once again, no compulsion is present during the interaction. Durr, 32 A.3d at 786. 

active arrest warrant is outstanding, no Fifth Amendment rights are implicated because, 

mere encounter and is subsequently arrested because the officer determines that an 

A.3d 781, 786. However, if that person complies with the officer's request during a 

mere encounter, a person may rightfully refuse identification. Commonwealth v. Durr, 32 

determined that when such a valid request is made by an officer in the context of a 

interaction with the driver. lg_. at 665. Applying Campbell, the Superior Court later 

passengers identify themselves while the officer who initiated the stop continued his 

constitutional violation was not committed when a second officer requested that the 

minor intrusion on passengers who are "already stopped by virtue of the 

stop of the vehicle." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 439 Pa.Super. 

516, 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 642, 664 A.2d 

972 (1995) (police officer may request both drivers and their passengers 

to alight from lawfully stopped vehicles regardless of whether the police 

officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot). 

Campbell, 862 A.2d at 663-64 (Footnote omitted). 

Further, the Court in Campbell went on to also find that a Fourth Amendment 

Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
11 

The timeframe critical to the analysis of the issue presented by Appellant is 

from the beginning of Officer Hammer's interaction with him up to the search of his 

person. We have already determined that Officer Henry's detention for a pat-down 

was lawful and Officer Hammer's ID check was lawful. Therefore, the remaining issue 

is whether Officer Hammer's subsequent request to search was a constitutionally 

sound encounter and thus, lawful consent was given. Appellant argues that it was not 

consensual and the Commonwealth argues that it was. Review of caselaw instructs 

Officer Hammer then asked Appellant if he had anything on him,meaning 

contraband or weapons. Appellant said no.and Officer Hammer followed up by asking 

permission to search him. Appellant responded by nodding his head, facing his body 

to the officer and putting his hands in the air. The search uncovered two pills in a front 

pants pocket.which Appellant later admitted were Ecstasy, an illegal controlled 

substance. 

Officer Hammer's search took only a few minutes at which time he returned the 

identification to Appellant and informed him that no outstanding warrants were found 

and that he should inform his parole officer about his police contact. Officer Hammer 

told Appellant he was "good to go." However, Appellant did not leave; instead he 

remained and continued to ask questions and express concern about his friend's 

circumstances. 

the actions taken by Officer Hammer in requesting identification to check for warrants 

under uncertain and potentially dangerous circumstances were certainly constitutional 

and did not rise to an unlawful or coercive detention. 

Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
12 

Officer Hammer and appellant; however, appellant did not leave. Therefore the focus of 

"good to go". At this point in time there was a clear break in the interaction between 

We've already found that Ofc. Hammer's encounter with appellan~during which 

he requested identification to check for outstanding warrants, was lawful. Officer 

Hammer then returned appellant's identification and specifically told him that he was 

to the discovery of illegal drugs. 

Officer Hammer, and he provided valid consent to search his person which ultimately led 

review of the totality of the circumstances, appellant was not unlawfully seized by 

Turning to the factual scenario presented by this case, this court finds that, upon 

footnotes omitted). 

Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 72-73, 757 A.2d 884, 897-98 (2000)(internal citations and 

Various courts and commentators have frequently set forth non-exclusive 

lists of factors deemed relevant to the determination of whether a seizure 

has been effected. For example, the presence or absence of police 

excesses has played a particularly significant role in United States 

Supreme Court jurisprudence. Physical contact or police direction of a 

citizen-subject's movements has also been regarded as a central 

consideration. This Court has also stressed more subtle factors, for 

example, the demeanor of the police officer, the location of the 

confrontation, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing 

the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements. 

search when requested by police. To analyze the issue, the court noted that: 

assessment of the totality of the circumstances could give consent to a subsequent 

encounter following a traffic stop or similar detention" and whether an individual upon an 

The court in Strickler conducted a detailed analysis of "the possibility of a mere 

the circumstances. See Strickler; .!2_y; supra. 

this Court that the resolution of this issue requires a multi-part analysis of the totality of 

Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
13 

Therefore, in conclusion, this Court finds that Appellant's claim is without merit as 

he provided Officer Hammer valid consent to search his person. 

Other weighty factors indicating appellant's voluntary, unequivocal consent 

include: Appellant was not handcuffed, the parties were located on a public street, the 

casual nature of the conversation between appellant and the officers, the numerous 

previous encounters with police that provided Appellant with the knowledge that he was 

free to refuse consent and an awareness of his constitutional rights. An even more 

persuasive fact considered by this court is appellant's actions when asked by Ofc. 

Hammer if he could search appellant's person. Appellant calmly responded by nodding 

his head "yes~ putting his hands in the air. This factor,coupled with the others discussed 

above.clearly support this court's finding that appellant voluntarily consented to the 

search by Ofc. Hammer and, therefore, the search which uncovered the illegal drugs 

was lawfully conducted. 

The testimony presented at the suppression hearing establish that Ofc. Hammer 

clearly told appellant that he was "good to go." Appellant initially exited the stopped 

vehicle on his own.and once Officer Henry conducted the "Terry frisk," Appellant's focus 

was obtaining information to allay his concern for Mr. King. The casual nature of the 

interaction between appellant and Officer Hen~ as well as the interaction between 

appellant and Officer Hammer after his identification was returned>clearly indicates 

there was no excessive imposition of authority by police. 

the analysis becomes the remaining interaction between Officer Hammer and appellant 

leading up to the request for consent to search. 

Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM
14 

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DISTRIBUTION: },,./8-/6 @ //).-60/rlt'L 

Kristie Falbo, Esq., Deputy District Attorney d o 

Paul W. Muller, Esq., Chief Deputy Public Defender ; Io 

Clerk of Courts ~(_, X Superior Court Prothonotary m ~ i J 

Court Adm in. - Criminal ; / D 

FILE - Judge Lewis ,j D 

Memorandum date: 

February _ _._/_1--'---' 2015 

( Circulated 06/16/2015 03:19 PM