alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8853 

To direct the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the 

Federal Aviation Administration to provide to the appropriate committees 

of Congress advance notice of certain meeting announcements. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 3, 2020 

Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana (for himself and Mr. LARSEN of Washington) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to provide 

to the appropriate committees of Congress advance notice 

of certain meeting announcements. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN 

4 MEETING ANNOUNCEMENTS. 

5 Section 106(p) of title 49, United States Code, is 

6 amended— 

7 (1) by redesignating paragraph (8) as para8 graph (9); and 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8853 IH

1 (2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the fol2 lowing: 

3 ‘‘(8) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIRE4 MENT.— 

5 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary or the 

6 Administrator shall provide to the appropriate 

7 committees of Congress notice of an announce8 ment regarding a meeting of the Council, the 

9 Air Traffic Services Committee, any advisory 

10 committee established by the Secretary or Ad11 ministrator, or any rulemaking committee re12 ferred to in paragraph (5) at least 3 full busi13 ness days before the announcement of any such 

14 meeting is published in the Federal Register. 

15 ‘‘(B) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COM16 MITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this paragraph, 

17 the term ‘appropriate committees of Congress’ 

18 means the Committee on Transportation and 

19 Infrastructure of the House of Representatives 

20 and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

21 Transportation of the Senate.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2022 EAVS Data Brief: Kentucky EAVS Jurisdictions:

120 

 Voter Registration 

Active Reg. Voters as of Nov. 8, 20221 

3,137,031 

Reg. Forms Received2* 

1,332,191 

Total Confirmation Notices Sent3* 

379,501 

Voters Removed from Reg. Rolls4* 

131,260 

Source of Registration Applications5 

Motor Vehicle Dept. 63.8% 

Online 16.8% 

In Person 10.7% 

Other 7.1% 

Mail, Email, Fax 1.6% 

 Voting and Turnout 

Voters Participating By Mode6 

7 Turnout 

44.1% In-Person 

Election Day 

1,150,303 

76.7% 

Mail 

72,663 

4.8% 

In-Person 

Early 

269,572 

18.0% 

Other 

7,881 

0.5% 

Total Voting Locations8: 1,540 

Total Poll Workers9: 11,478 

Election Technology 

Percentage of Jurisdictions Using...10 

100.0% 

Electronic 

Poll 

Books 

95.8% 

Scanners

70.8% 

Ballot 

Marking 

Devices 

29.2% 

DREs with 

VVPAT 

9.2% 

DREs w/o

VVPAT 

5.0% 

Hand 

Counting 

 Mail Ballots 

• 83,454 mail ballots transmitted11 

• 90.0% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters12 

• 96.7% of returned mail ballots counted13 

• 3.3% of returned mail ballots rejected14 

• Did not conduct all-mail election15 

• Allowed drop boxes16 

• Allowed ballot curing17 

 Election Audits18 

-- Access audit 

-- Ballot design audit 

✔ Ballot reconciliation 

audit 

-- Compliance/ 

procedural audit 

-- Eligibility audit 

-- Legal audit 

✔ Logic and accuracy 

testing 

-- Post-election 

tabulation audit 

✔ Other 

Notes 

EAVS data and reports may be downloaded at www.eac.gov 

/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys. 

Responses of “Does not apply,” “Data not available,” and “Valid 

skip” are shown as zeroes or dashes. Percentages may not sum 

to 100% because of missing data or rounding. 

* Close of registration for 2020 

general election to close of 

registration for 2022 general 

election. 

1 A1b of EAVS. 

2 A3a of EAVS. 

3 A8a of EAVS. 

4 A9a of EAVS. 

5 Mail, Email, Fax is A4a/A3a. 

In Person is A4b/A3a. Online is 

A4c/A3a. Motor Vehicle Dept. is 

A4d/A3a. Other is the sum of 

A4e–A4l/A3a. May not sum to 

100% because of missing data. 

6 In-Person Election Day is F1b. 

Mail is F1d+F1g. In-Person Early 

is F1f. Other is F1c+F1e+F1h. 

7 F1a of EAVS divided by citizen 

voting age population (CVAP). 

8 D2a of EAVS. 

9 D7a of EAVS. 

10 F3a–f, F5a–F9a of EAVS; 

number of jurisdictions that 

responded “Yes” divided by

number of jurisdictions in 

state/territory. 

11 C1a of EAVS. 

12 C1b/C1a of EAVS. 

13 C8a/C1b of EAVS. 

14 C9a/C1b of EAVS. 

15 Q17 and Q17a of Policy 

Survey. 

16 Q19 of Policy Survey. 

17 Q20 of Policy Survey. 

18 Q36 of Policy Survey. See 

survey questionnaire for full 

definitions of each type of 

audit.
EAC Decision on Request for Interpretation 2008-09

(Safety Testing)

2002 VSS Vol. I, Section, 3.4.8 

2005 VVSG Vol. I, Section 4.3.8 

Date: 

August 25, 2008 

Question: 

How should voting systems be tested to ensure that they meet the safety standards 

required in both the 2002 VSS and the 2005 VVSG? 

Section of Standards or Guidelines: 

2002 VSS Vol. I, Section 3.4.8, Safety 

2005 VVSG Vol. I Section 4.3.8, Safety 

Background: 

Several voting system manufacturers have requested guidance on how to best meet the 

requirements related to safety testing which state: 

2002 VSS Vol. I, Section 3.4.8, Safety , 2005 VVSG Vol. I Section 4.3.8, Safety 

“All voting systems shall meet the following requirements for safety: 

a. All voting systems and their components shall be designed to eliminate hazards 

to personnel or to the equipment itself 

b. Defects in design and construction that can result in personal injury or 

equipment damage must be detected and corrected before voting systems and 

components are placed into service 

c. Equipment design for personnel safety shall be equal to or better than the 

appropriate requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, Code of 

Federal Regulations, Title 29, Part 1910.” 

Conclusion: 

In order to meet the safety requirements of the 2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG, voting system 

manufacturers shall submit their systems for review to a Nationally Recognized Testing 

Laboratory (NRTL.) NRTL laboratories are specifically accredited by OSHA to identify 

relevant safety standards for a product and to conduct testing that ensures specific 

products meet the requirements of the product safety standards identified. Although 

neither the 2002 VSS nor the 2005 VVSG require that a voting system carry a Product 

Safety Listing (Label), voting system manufacturers may voluntarily choose to 
implement such labeling in order to meet such requirements implemented by State or 

local election jurisdictions. 

EAC accredited VSTLs remain responsible for non-core testing performed by third party 

laboratories as noted in Section 2.10.4.3 of the EAC Voting System Test Laboratory 

Program Manual, Version 1.0

Below is the current list of NRTLs: 

Canadian Standards Association (CSA)

(also known as CSA International) 

Communication Certification Laboratory, Inc. (CCL)

Curtis-Straus LLC (CSL)

FM Approvals LLC (FM)

(formerly Factory Mutual Research Corporation) 

Intertek Testing Services NA, Inc. (ITSNA)

(formerly ETL) 

MET Laboratories, Inc. (MET)

NSF International (NSF)

National Technical Systems, Inc. (NTS)

SGS U.S. Testing Company, Inc. (SGSUS)

(formerly UST-CA) 

Southwest Research Institute (SWRI)

TUV America, Inc. (TUVAM)

TUV Product Services GmbH (TUVPSG)

TUV Rheinland of North America, Inc. (TUV)

Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL)

Wyle Laboratories, Inc. (WL)

Effective Date: 

Immediate- for all voting systems test plan submitted after the date of publication. 

2
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I,
the undersigned officer of the Cabinet Acquisition
Corporation (the "Company"), hereby certify to my
knowledge that:

The Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31,
2006 of the Company fully complies, in all material
respects, with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
information contained in the Report fairly represents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                             /s/ James M. Cassidy
                                 President and Director and
                                 Chief Executivie Officer,
                                 Chief Financial Officer and
                                 Principal Accounting Officer

Date: May 11, 2006
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 03-1972

ROY HILLSTROM,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

BEST WESTERN TLC HOTEL,

Defendant, Appellee.

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on December 31, 2003 is

amended as follows:

On page 2, line 3, "April 2002" should be replaced with

"April 2000"

On page 8, after the colon on line 2, the portion of the

sentence reading "usually the availability of a mixed-motive

analysis depends" should be revised to read "the rule that

usually the availability of a mixed-motive analysis depended"
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 12

                            LYONDELL CHEMICAL COMPANY
                STATEMENT SETTING FORTH DETAIL FOR COMPUTATION OF
                       RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

                              (Millions of dollars)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                              Year Ended December 31,
                                                                     -----------------------------------------
                                                                      2002     2001     2000    1999     1998
                                                                      ----     ----     ----    ----     ----
<S>                                                                  <C>      <C>      <C>     <C>      <C>
Income (loss) from continuing operations before income taxes ......  $ (191)  $ (221)  $  693  $ (104)  $   89
Fixed charges:
    Interest expense, gross .......................................     508      495      627     717      385
    Portion of rentals representative of interest .................      51       44       46      53       35
                                                                     -----------------------------------------
         Total fixed charges before capitalized interest ..........     559      539      673     770      420
    Capitalized interest ..........................................      10        3       --      --       --
                                                                     -----------------------------------------
         Total fixed charges including capitalized interest .......     569      542      673     770      420
                                                                     -----------------------------------------
Earnings before fixed charges .....................................  $  368   $  318   $1,366  $  666   $  509
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges (a) ............................      --       --      2.0      --      1.2
                                                                     =========================================
</TABLE>

(a) In 2002, 2001 and 1999, earnings were insufficient to cover fixed charges by
    $201 million, $224 million and $104 million, respectively.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CARL R. CHALMERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW J. WINSTON, individually

and in his official capacity as  No. 00-6943

Chairman of the Board of

Corrections; RONALD ANGELONE,

Director of the Virginia Department

of Corrections,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

T.S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CA-98-1714)

Submitted: January 19, 2001

Decided: March 6, 2001

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion. 

COUNSEL

Carl R. Chalmers, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Carl R. Chalmers appeals the district court’s orders denying relief

on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) complaint and denying

his motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

A motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) shall be filed

no later than ten days after entry of the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e). Because Chalmers’ motion was not filed within ten days of

the entry of judgment, the district court properly considered it as a

Rule 60(b) motion, rather than a Rule 59(e) motion. See In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). A Rule 60(b) motion

does not bring up for review the merits of the underlying substantive

judgment, nor does it toll the period for filing an appeal of the underlying judgment. See Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434

U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). 

Because Chalmers did not file his Rule 59(e) motion within ten

days of the district court’s order dismissing his § 1983 complaint,

entered on May 5, 2000, the time period for filing his appeal of that

order was not tolled. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Therefore, Chalmers’ appeal is only timely as to the district court’s denial of his subsequent motion for reconsideration. This Court reviews a denial of a

Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See NOW v. Operation

Rescue, 47 F.3d 667, 669 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court’s

denial of Chalmers’ motion for reconsideration did not constitute an

abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we dismiss Chalmers’ appeal of the

district court’s order dismissing his § 1983 complaint for lack of jurisdiction because Chalmers’ notice of appeal was untimely as to that

order. We deny Chalmers’ motion to consolidate as moot and affirm

the district court’s denial of Chalmers’ motion for reconsideration,

particularly in light of our recent decision in Washlefske v. Winston,

2 CHALMERS v. WINSTON
234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

CHALMERS v. WINSTON 3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL ANTONIO DE JESUS

CHAVEZ-RIVERA,

Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 14-72910

Agency No. A098-896-326

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 14, 2016** 

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

Manuel Antonio de Jesus Chavez-Rivera, a native and citizen of El

Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction

is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a

FILED

DEC 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
motion to reopen, and review de novo constitutional claims. Mohammed v.

Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in

part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chavez-Rivera’s second

motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where Chavez-Rivera has not

established that any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing limitations

applies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (setting forth

exceptions to the filing limitations for motions to reopen). 

Chavez-Rivera’s contentions that the BIA failed to consider relevant factors

or evidence, applied an incorrect legal standard, or otherwise failed to sufficiently

articulate its reasons for denying his motion are unsupported by the record. See

Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Accordingly, Chavez-Rivera’s due process claims fail. See Lata v. INS, 204

F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on due

process claim).

To the extent Chavez-Rivera now contends he is eligible for cancellation of

removal, we lack jurisdiction to consider this unexhausted contention. See Tijani

v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review

2 14-72910
legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the

BIA.”). 

To the extent Chavez-Rivera challenges the BIA’s decision not to invoke its

sua sponte authority to reopen, we lack jurisdiction over that contention. See

Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011); cf. Bonilla v.

Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider Chavez-Rivera’s request for

prosecutorial discretion. See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir.

2012) (order).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part. 

3 14-72910
# C_2021357EN.01003301.xml

| 6.9.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 357/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.9.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 357/33

---

Action brought on 20 July 2021 — Anglofranchise v EUIPO — Bugrey (BOY LONDON)

(Case T-439/21)

(2021/C 357/50)

Language in which the application was lodged: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Anglofranchise Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: P. Roncaglia, F. Rossi, N. Parrotta, R. Perotti, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Yuliya Bugrey (Milan, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark BOY LONDON –European Union trade mark No 11 708 773

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 April 2021 in Case R 459/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the present proceedings, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the present proceedings, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal;

| — | Order Yuliya Bugrey to pay the applicant’s costs of the present proceedings, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order Yuliya Bugrey to pay the applicant’s costs of the present proceedings, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 45 (Friday, March 7, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10543-10544]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-5637]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Notice of Decision on Application 
for Duty-Free Entry of Scientific Instrument

    This decision is made pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Materials Importation Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89-
651, 80 Stat. 897; 15 CFR part 301). Related records can be viewed 
between 8:30 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. in Room 4211, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 14th and

[[Page 10544]]

Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
    Docket Number: 96-122. Applicant: University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 
Lincoln, NE 68588-0304. Instrument: Diamond Anvil Cells, Model Diacell. 
Manufacturer: Diacell, United Kingdom. Intended Use: See notice at 62 
FR 979, January 7, 1997.
    Comments: None received. Decision: Approved. No instrument of 
equivalent scientific value to the foreign instrument, for such 
purposes as it is intended to be used, is being manufactured in the 
United States. Reasons: The foreign instrument provides: (1) high 
pressure capability to 750 kbar, (2) metal membrane drive for precise 
control and (3) hemispherically movable diamond cups for superior 
alignment. A domestic manufacturer of similar equipment advised on 
February 3, 1997 that (1) these capabilities are pertinent to the 
applicant's intended purpose and (2) it knows of no domestic instrument 
or apparatus of equivalent scientific value to the foreign instrument 
for the applicant's intended use.
    We know of no other instrument or apparatus of equivalent 
scientific value to the foreign instrument which is being manufactured 
in the United States.
Frank W. Creel,
Director, Statutory Import Programs Staff.
[FR Doc. 97-5637 Filed 3-6-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
NUMBER 13-19-00533-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG ____________________________________________________________

ALLEN MICHAEL CANALES, Appellant,

v.

ERIKA LEE RODRIGUEZ, Appellee. 

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 28th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

On December 6, 2019, the Clerk of the Court notified appellant via certified letter 

that his notice of appeal was defective. On January 2, 2020, the letter was returned 

“unclaimed, unable to forward.” On January 3, 2020, the Clerk of the Court sent a letter 

via regular mail requesting the defect be corrected. To date, no response nor 

communication has been received from appellant.
2

Rule 42.3 permits an appellate court, on its own initiative after giving ten days' 

notice to all parties, to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution or for failure to comply 

with a requirement of the appellate rules. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c). Rule 2 authorizes 

an appellate court to suspend a rule's operation in a particular case to expedite a decision. 

Id. R. 2. Given the length of inactivity in this appeal and this Court's inability to give 

effective notice to appellant, we suspend Rule 42.3's requirement of ten days' notice to 

all parties and dismiss the appeal on our own motion. See id. R. 42.3(a), (c).

Appellant has failed to correct or reasonably explain his failure to correct the notice 

of appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. 

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Delivered and filed the

20th day of February, 2020.