### No. 14706 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979

IN

### RE THEMARRIAGE OF RUTH CHARLOTTE HAMILTON, Petitioner and Appellant, and RICHARD DALE HAMILTON, Respondent and Defendant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judgepresiding. Counsel of Record: ForAppellant: Stanton,Hovland and Torske,Hardin,Montana For Respondent: Gary E. Wilcox, Billings,Montana
Submitted on briefs: August 1, 1979 ~ecided:

# FEB111980

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### Filed: "LCA -Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Thewife appeals from thatportion of amarriage dissolution decree of the Yellowstone County District Court which distributed themarital estate upon the dissolution of themarriage. Because the required findingswere not entered, however,we cannot review the case on the merits, and therefore must remand it to the DistrictCourt. The findingsare totally inadequate in relation to the valuation of themarital estate,and the failure to decide whether the husband's dental office and the real estate upon which it is situated, ispart of the marital estate. In seeking to arrive at a valuation of the net marital estate, three financial statementswere introduced at trial,but
we cannotdetermine from the court's findings which, if any, were used in arriving at the valuations. In the case of In Re Marriage of Kramer (1978), Mont. 

### , 580 P.2d 439, 443, 35 St.Rep. 700, 704-705,we held that if a financial statement is used to establish net worth, itmust be one that was prepared at or near the time of the dissolution, for thatwould most clearly reflect the status of theproperty at the time of trial. The trial was held on September 7, 1978,and findings, conclusions,and judgment were filed and entered on December 8, 1978. The wife's financial statementwas dated January 20, 1978 which listed total assets of $411,505.75 and total liabilities of $49,200. The husband, on the other hand, introduced two financial statements,one dated June 28, 1977which listed total assets of $282,000 and total liabilities of $50,700,and the second,dated August 13, 1978 listed total assets of $281,000 and total liabilities of $72,898. There is obviously a great disparity between the financial statement introducedby the wife and those introduced by the husband. But the trial court did not indicatewhich, if any, it used in arriving at the net marital estate.In apportioning the property, the trial court awarded the wife the family h6;r.e, twenty acres of land together with the buildings located on the land--for a total value of $85,000. In addition she received household furnishings value at $8,000 and a 1973 Buick automobile. The husband, on the other hand,was awarded a total of sixty acres of land valued at $132,000, Arabian horses valued at $30,000,dental equipment and furnishingsvalued at $5,000, and a 1973 Dodge pickup. The husband was also ordered to assume sole responsibility for a mortgage on real property in the amount of $39,000. Before the hearing, the wife was awarded $500per month
as temporary maintenance and temporary child support for one child. At the hearing the wife declared that shewas abandoning her claim tomaintenance. Although the wife now contends that she is entitled to maintenance. This assertion flies in the face of her declaration at trial. The trial court awarded custody of the child to the husband, and therefore terminated the temporary child support ordered to be paid by the husband. We cannot tell how the trial court arrived at the valuations of themarital estate in reaching the property division. It is equally clear that it left dangling the questions of the number of Arabian horses which comprise themarital estate, and whether or not the husband's dental office and land upon which it is situated ispart of the marital estate. The trial court awarded the Arabian horses to the husband and set their value at $30,000. We have no way of telling how it arrived at this figure. axperts for both sides testified concerning the value of the horses, and needless to say, the testimony is exceedingly disparate. The problem is further complicated because the record discloses that not all the horses were appraised, and that the parties' childrenhad a property -3-interest in thehorses. The trial courtmade no findings
as to the number of horses belonging in themarital estate;
nor did it enter any findings as to the property interest the childrenhad in any or all of the horses. Indeed, the findings are silentas to the total number of horses that are involved; certainly a necessity if a valuation is to be placed
on them. It is, therefore, impossible to determine how the trial court arrived at the $30,000 figure for the horses. The findings, moreover, fail to mention the real estate upon which the husband's dentalbuilding is located. The parties
were in sharp conflict as to whether it constituted a marital asset. Thewife contends that the dentalproperty was an asset acquired during the marriage, but the husband contends that his father owns the property. Although the husband testified that he had not made any payments toward the purchase of the property, the trial record reveals that the husband depreciated theproperty on his personal income tax returns since the year he first executed the contract for deed, and that he paid the taxes upon the property and deducted the same from his income
on his personal income tax returns,and that he had been in continuouspossession of the property. Notwithstanding the issue squarely presented to the trial court, no determination
was evermade as towhether it was includable in the parties' marital estate. It is clear, therefore, that there was never a determination made of the net worth of the marital estate, and we have previously stated that without such determination there is no basis upon which the estate can be equitably apportioned,nor any basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review. Robertson
v. Robertson (1978), Mont

# . , 590 P.2d 113, 116, 35 St.Rep. 1889, 1893. The findingshere are patently deficient. -4-

### Although we could otherwise decide that the wife has waived her right to ask formaintenance, in light of our decision compelling a remand,we belive it to be in the interests of justice to leave this issue open so that the trial court can consider maintenance if the situationwarrants it. Because of the nature of the property involved,we do not believe that the simple entry of legally sufficient findings of fact in support of whatever judgmentmight be entered,would be sufficient. For all concerned, it is best that therebe a fullhearing before another judgment is entered. The judgment of the District Court isvacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistentwith this opinion.

We Concur:

CMefJustice

Justices