NO. 03-14-00774-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AUSTIN 

__________________________________________________________________ 

TEXAS STATE BOARD OF VETERINARY MEDICAL EXAMINERS 

AND NICOLE ORIA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Appellant, 

V. 

ELLEN JEFFERSON, D.V.M. 

Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________ 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________ 

BRIEF OF APPELLEE ELLEN JEFFERSON, D.V.M. 

DAVID F. BROWN

State Bar No. 03108700 

dbrown@ebblaw.com 

DAVID P. BLANKE

State Bar No. 02453600 

dblanke@ebblaw.com

EWELL, BROWN & BLANKE, LLP 

111 Congress Ave., 28th Floor 

Austin, TX 78701 

Ph: (512) 457-0233 

RYAN CLINTON

State Bar No. 24027934 

rdclinton@dgclaw.com

DAVIS, GERALD & CREMER, P.C. 

111 Congress Ave., Suite 1660 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Ph: (512) 537-9938 

Fax: (432) 687-1735 

Counsel for Appellee Ellen Jefferson, D.V.M. 

Oral Argument Requested 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00774-CV

6829376

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

9/8/2015 3:05:55 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/8/2015 3:05:55 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
i 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES

Appellants/Defendants: 

Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (“TBVME”) and Nicole Oria, 

In Her Official Capacity as Executive Director 

Counsel for Defendants: 

Andrew Lutostanski 

State Bar No. 24072217 

andrew.lutostanski@texasattorneygeneral.gov 

Ted A. Ross 

State Bar No. 24008890 

ted.ross@texasattorneygeneral.gov 

Office of the Attorney General of Texas 

Administrative Law Division 

P. O. Box 12548 

Austin, TX 78711 

(512) 475-4200 
ii 

Appellee/Plaintiff: 

Ellen Jefferson, D.V.M. (“Dr. Jefferson”) 

Counsel for Dr. Jefferson: 

Trial & Appellate Counsel: 

David F. Brown 

State Bar No. 03108700 

dbrown@ebblaw.com 

David P. Blanke 

State Bar No. 02453600 

dblanke@ebblaw.com 

Ewell, Brown & Blanke, LLP 

111 Congress Ave., 28th Floor 

Austin, TX 78701 

Ph: (512) 457-0233 

Appellate Counsel: 

Ryan Clinton 

State Bar No. 24027934 

rdclinton@dgclaw.com 

Davis, Gerald & Cremer, P.C. 

111 Congress Ave., Suite 1660 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Ph: (512) 537-9938 

Fax: (432) 687-1735 
iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES .................................................................................................. i

APPENDIX .................................................................................................................. iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... viii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................................... x

ISSUES PRESENTED .................................................................................................... xi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................................... 3

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................. 8

I. Board Rules Inconsistent With the Owner Exemption Are 

Facially Invalid and May Not Be Applied to Dr. Jefferson. ................. 8

A. The Analytical Framework for Determining the 

Invalidity of the Board’s Rules .................................................. 8

B. The Purposes of Chapter 801 and the “Owner 

Exemption” .............................................................................. 11

C. Each of the Challenged Rules Is Invalid .................................. 14

1. Board Rule § 573.72, Employment by Nonprofit or 

Municipal Corporations, Is Invalid. ................................ 17

2. Board Rule § 573.80(2), Defining the Statutory 

Term “Designated Caretaker,” Is Invalid. ...................... 22

PRAYER ..................................................................................................................... 29

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 31

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................................. 32
iv 

APPENDIX

22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 573.72 ......................................................................... TAB A 

22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 573.80(2) .................................................................... TAB B 

Trial Court Judgment ........................................................................................ TAB C 
v 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 

209 S.W.3d 644, 651-52 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................... 9 

City of Corpus Christi v. Public Util. Comm’n, 

51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001)................................................................................. 22 

City of Rockwall v Hughes,

246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008) ................................................................. 10 

Employees Ret. Sys. of Tex. v. Jones, 

58 S.W.3d 148, 154 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) ...................................... 9 

Gulf Coast Coalition of Cities v. PUC, 

161 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) ...................................... 9, 10 

Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., v. Tex. HHS Comm’n, 

452 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. filed) ...............................passim

Physician Assistants Business Alliance of Texas, LLC v. Texas 

Medical Board, 

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1492 (February 13, 2015) ......................... 8, 9, 22, 25, 26 

PUC of Texas v. City Public Service Board of San Antonio, 

53 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2000)................................................................................... 9 

Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 

844 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tex. 1992) ...................................................................... 10 

State v. Shumake, 

99 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) .......................................................................... 8 

In re State Bd. for Educator Certification, 

452 S.W.3d 802, 808-09 (Tex. 2014) ................................................................. 17 

Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 

453 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. filed) ............................ 8, 16, 17 
vi 

Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 

375 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. filed) ...................... 9, 10, 20, 28 

Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Public Util. Comm’n of 

Texas 

131 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 004, pet. denied) ............................... 9 

Texas Orthopaedic Ass’n v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 

254 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) ................................... 10 

Statutes 

Act of March 16, 1911, § 13 (Chapter 76, General Laws) (“Act of

March 16, 1911”) .......................................................................................... 12, 13 

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011 .................................................................................... 28 

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038 ...........................................................................ix, 2, 8 

TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.002(5) ................................................................................. 13 

TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.002(7) ................................................................................. 13 

TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.004 ...............................................................................passim 

TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.151 .......................................................................... 11, 14, 16 

TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.251 ...................................................................................... 11 

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7465a (1953) ......................................................... 13 

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7465a § 3 (1987) ................................................... 13 

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8890 § 3 (1993) ..................................................... 13 

Other Authorities 

22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 571.61 ............................................................................... 23 

22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 573.72 ........................................................................passim 

22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 573.80(2) ...................................................................passim 

20 TEX. REG. 6580 (August 25, 1995) ............................................................... 18, 23 
vii 

20 TEX. REG. 8905 (October 27, 1995) .............................................................. 18, 23 

31 TEX. REG. 5538 (July 14, 2006) .......................................................................... 18 

31 TEX. REG. 9033 (November 3, 2006) .................................................................. 18 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/designate; 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caretaker (last visited 

September 1, 2015) ....................................................................................... 27. 28 

http://www.veterinary.texas.gov/agency.php .......................................................... 14 
viii 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is a challenge to certain rules promulgated by the 

Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners that 

interfere with an express, legislative exception to 

TBVME’s regulatory authority. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 

§ 573.72, entitled “Employment by Nonprofit or 

Municipal Corporations,” and § 573.80(2), the definition 

of “designated caretaker,” expressly interfere with the 

right the Texas Legislature bestowed under TEX. OCC.

CODE § 801.004(1) that permits owners, their employees, 

or their designees to treat or care for the owner’s animals 

in any manner without regulation. 

Trial Court: The Honorable Gisela D. Triana, sitting in the 250th 

Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas 

Trial Court Disposition: Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the trial court 

held a combined plea-to-the-jurisdiction hearing and trial 

on the merits on August 4, 2014. 2.RR.7-226. Following 

the trial, the trial court issued a letter ruling, 1.CR.852-

54, followed by a judgment, 1.CR.855-57. The trial 

court also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

2.CR.36-38.1

In relevant part, the trial court’s judgment: 

• denies TBVME’s plea to the jurisdiction with 

respect to Dr. Jefferson’s challenges to TBVME 

rules under TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038, 

1.CR.855-56; and 

• declares that 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 573.72 and 

573.80(2) are “contrary to Section 801.004(1) of 

the Veterinary Practice Act and therefore invalid,” 

1.CR.856-57. 

 

1

 The trial court clerk issued two volumes of the Clerk’s Record but mistakenly labeled 

both “Volume 1 of 1.” This brief will refer to the volume filed on December 17, 2014 as 

Volume 1, and the volume filed on January 13, 2015 as Volume 2. Citations to the Clerk’s 

Record herein will be in the form [Volume].CR.[Page]. Likewise, citations to the Reporter’s 

Record will be in the form [Volume].RR.[Page] or, if the citation is to a page of an exhibit, 

[Volume].RR.[Exhibit:Page]. 
ix 

Defendants and Dr. Jefferson timely filed notices of 

appeal. 1.CR.866-67 (Defendants’ Notice); 1.CR.871-72 

(Dr. Jefferson’s Notice). 
x 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Because those parts of the trial court’s judgment in favor of Dr. Jefferson are 

consistent with the unambiguous terms of the Occupations Code and binding 

precedent from this Court and the Texas Supreme Court, this Court may deem it 

unnecessary to hear oral argument before affirming the trial court’s judgment with 

respect to Dr. Jefferson’s rules challenges. Nonetheless, the Court may consider 

oral argument beneficial given the number of issues involved in this appeal. 

Accordingly, Dr. Jefferson respectfully requests the opportunity to participate in 

oral argument. 
xi 

ISSUES PRESENTED

Did the trial court err in finding that 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 573.72 and 

573.80(2) are inconsistent with Section 801.004(1) of the Texas Occupations Code, 

the “Owner Exemption” to the Veterinary Licensing Act? 
1 

INTRODUCTION

For decades, the Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners has had no 

authority to regulate “the treatment or care of an animal in any manner by the 

owner of the animal, an employee of the owner, or a designated caretaker of the 

animal, unless the ownership, employment, or designation is established with the 

intent to violate this chapter.” TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.004(1) (the “Owner 

Exemption”). Despite this unambiguous limitation on the TBVME’s authority, the 

agency has attempted over the years to chip away at the express statutory limitation 

of the Owner Exemption through the adoption of rules that contravene specific 

terms of the Veterinary Licensing Act (the “Act”), run counter to the general 

objectives of the statute, and impose burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess 

of or inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions, including the Owner 

Exemption. The Board Rules challenged in this case are instruments by which the 

TBVME neuters the Owner Exemption. 

Notwithstanding its recognition in its official publication in 2012 that animal 

shelters like San Antonio Pets Alive! (“SAPA”), one of Ellen Jefferson, D.V.M.’s 

(“Dr. Jefferson’s”) organizations, may provide treatment and care to animals 

owned by the shelters without regard to the agency’s rules and regulations because 

shelters are “exempt” from the TBVME’s jurisdiction as a matter of law, the 

TBVME brought charges against Dr. Jefferson contending that her treatment or 
2 

care of the animals SAPA owned, and the treatment or care provided by other 

employees or designated caretakers of SAPA, was subject to discipline under the 

Act and its rules. Dr. Jefferson challenged both the TBVME’s ultra vires

prosecution and certain rules under which that action was prosecuted. 

After a combined plea hearing and trial on the merits, which included a 

hearing on the validity of the TBVME’s rules, the trial court agreed that certain 

TBVME administrative rules contradicted or unduly burdened the legislative 

Owner Exemption and found those rules to be invalid. For each of the reasons 

presented in this brief, this Court should affirm the trial court’s judgment under 

Section 2001.038 of the Texas Government Code invalidating 22 TEX. ADMIN.

CODE §§ 573.72 and 573.80(2) and hold, pursuant to Texas law, that the TBVME’s 

rules that conflict with the Owner Exemption are invalid and may not be enforced. 
3 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal arises out of the TBVME’s use of certain administrative rules in 

its ultra vires prosecution of Dr. Jefferson for activities excepted from the 

TBVME’s jurisdiction by the Owner Exemption. The statement of facts set forth 

in Dr. Jefferson’s appellant’s brief is useful to an understanding of the extent to 

which the TBVME’s adoption, application, and enforcement of the rules 

challenged herein interfere with or impair, or threaten to interfere with or impair, 

Dr. Jefferson’s legal rights or privileges. Dr. Jefferson will not, however, burden 

the record with a redundant explication of the facts that give rise to this case, but 

respectfully refers the Court to her appellant’s brief. 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

At the trial court, Dr. Jefferson challenged several TBVME rules, 

contending that they were facially invalid because they squarely contradict the 

terms and policy of Section 801.004(1) of the Texas Occupations Code, the 

“Owner Exemption” to the Veterinary Licensing Act. After a trial on the merits, 

the trial court found two TBVME rules, 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 573.72 and 

573.80(2) to be invalid. The TBVME appeals that determination.

The challenged rules are invalid because they contravene specific statutory 

language, run counter to the general objectives of the statute from which they arise, 

or impose burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the 
4 

relevant statutory provisions. Where, as here, the words of the statutory provisions 

in issue are not defined by the Legislature and have no technical or acquired 

meaning, this Court must construe the words according to their plain and common 

meaning unless a contrary intent is apparent from the context. Because the Owner 

Exemption is unambiguous, the TBVME is owed no deference in its interpretation. 

The TBVME has shown through the adoption of the challenged rules its 

disdain for the Legislature’s recognition of the property rights of animal owners 

through the repeated enactment of the Owner Exemption. That the Board has a 

concern that the Owner Exemption may be abused if its rules are not upheld does 

not excuse the Board’s adoption of provisions intended to give the Board itself 

authority the Legislature reserved to animal owners under the Owner Exemption. 

The Legislature did not grant the agency authority to restrict the exemption, and it 

may not grant itself new authority it thinks expedient. 

Board Rules §§ 573.72 and 573.80(2) are facially invalid and void for the 

following reasons: 

1. Board Rule § 573.72, “Employment by Nonprofit or Municipal 

Corporation.” 

a. Board Rule § 573.72(b) and (c) each make persons to whom the

Act “does not apply” subject to it. In contrast to the terms of 

the Owner Exemption, under Board Rule § 573.72, owners, 

employees of owners, and designated caretakers are “not 
5 

exempt” but “shall be liable” for any violation of the Act or 

TBVME rules. This rule, therefore, directly contradicts the 

Owner Exemption whenever a veterinarian is employed by or 

designated to care for the animals of a nonprofit or municipal 

corporation. 

b. Board Rule § 573.72(c) improperly extends liability to 

veterinarians employed by nonprofit or municipal corporations 

for the actions of others, even though those persons are 

themselves exempt from the Act as employees or designees. 

This rule places a burden upon the Owner Exemption by 

making an exempt veterinarian liable for violations of the Act 

or Board rules resulting from the otherwise exempt activities of 

anyone, including an employee or volunteer of a nonprofit or 

municipal corporation, in treating or caring for an animal the 

nonprofit or municipal corporation owns. 

Board Rule § 573.72, therefore, contradicts the express terms of the Act and 

extends TBVME authority where the Legislature has determined that people 

should be free from agency regulation. Board Rule § 573.72 is invalid. 
6 

2. Board Rule § 573.80, Definition of “Designated Caretaker.” 

a. Abandoning the plain meaning of the term “designated 

caretaker” in the Owner Exemption, the TBVME contradicts 

the Legislature’s recognition of the property rights of animal 

owners in lieu of a scheme of regulation that usurps the Owner 

Exemption for caretakers an owner lawfully designates. 

b. In contrast to the position of the TBMVE, it is the Legislature 

that has the power to decide the scope of its authorizing 

statutes, not the agency. Yet the TBVME definition negates the

exemption where the designated caretaker “engag[es] in any 

aspect of the practice of veterinary medicine (including 

alternate therapies),” regardless of capacity, circumstances, or 

intent. As this Court has held on numerous occasions, a rule is 

void where it conflicts with the plain language of a statute. A 

rule may not narrow the scope of a legislatively mandated 

exemption. 

c. Further, the TBVME definition of “designated caretaker” 

improperly burdens the right of an owner, or a caretaker the 

owner designates, to the express statutory benefits of the Owner 

Exemption. Board Rule § 573.80(2) establishes a presumption 
7 

that a designated caretaker of an animal intends to violate the

Act if she “treats an animal for a condition that the animal was 

known or suspected of having prior to the person being named a 

designated caretaker . . .,” unless she obtains veterinary 

supervision. 

Through the challenged rules, the TBVME transparently imposes burdens, 

conditions, or restrictions upon the Owner Exemption that contravene the 

unambiguous terms of the Act. The TBVME’s enforcement of Chapter 801 and its 

rules where the Owner Exemption is applicable is an illegitimate exercise of a 

power contradictory to its enabling Act, interfering with or impairing the legal 

rights of owners, employees of owners, or the owners’ designees to be free of 

regulation. The challenged rules contravene specific statutory language, run 

counter to the general objectives of the statute, and impose additional burdens, 

conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the relevant statutory 

provision. The Court should affirm the trial court’s finding that the challenged 

rules are invalid. 
8 

ARGUMENT

I. BOARD RULES INCONSISTENT WITH THE OWNER EXEMPTION ARE 

FACIALLY INVALID AND MAY NOT BE APPLIED TO DR. JEFFERSON. 

A. The Analytical Framework for Determining the Invalidity of the 

Board’s Rules 

Section 2001.038(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 2001, 

Texas Government Code, provides a court with the jurisdiction to hear a challenge 

to the validity or applicability of an administrative rule when it is alleged that “the 

rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere 

with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff.”2

 The Administrative 

Procedure Act authorizes Texas courts to “render a declaratory judgment without 

regard to whether the [plaintiff first] requests the state agency to rule on the 

validity or applicability of the rule in question.”3

 The challenged Board Rules 

§§ 573.72 and 573.80(2) interfere with the right of animal owners to treat or care 

for the animals they own under the Owner Exemption. 

The issues in this case involve the construction of TBVME’s authorizing 

statute and its rules; accordingly, this Court reviews the trial court’s conclusions de 

novo.4

 A rules-validity challenge under Section 2001.038 of the Texas 

 

2

 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038(a). 

3

 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.038(d). 

4

 Physician Assistants Business Alliance of Texas, LLC v. Texas Medical Board, 2015 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 1492 at *5 (February 13, 2015) (citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 

(Tex. 2006)); Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 453 S.W.3d 606, 614 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, 

pet. filed). 
9 

Government Code tests a rule on procedural and constitutional grounds, and 

specifically, on the question of whether the agency “acted contrary to statute.”5

 A 

rule is presumed valid, and Dr. Jefferson has the burden of demonstrating its 

invalidity.6

 “To establish the rule’s facial invalidity,” Dr. Jefferson “must show 

that the rule: (a) contravenes specific statutory language; (b) runs counter to the 

general objectives of the statute; or (c) imposes burdens, conditions, or restrictions 

in excess of or inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions.”7

 

Looking first to the plain language of the statute to ascertain and give effect 

to legislative intent, the court looks no further than the literal text if the language is 

unambiguous.8

 Where the words of the statute in issue are not defined by the 

Legislature and have no technical or acquired meaning, the Court must “construe 

the words according to their plain and common meaning unless a contrary intent is 

apparent from the context.”9

 

 

5

 Gulf Coast Coalition of Cities v. PUC, 161 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, 

no pet.) (citing State of Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Public Util. Comm’n of Texas, 

131 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied)); see also PUC of Texas v. City 

Public Service Board of San Antonio, 53 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2000). 

6

 Gulf Coast Coalition, 161 S.W.3d at 712. 

7

 Id. See also Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 375 S.W.3d 464, 

474 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. filed). 

8

 Physicians Assistants, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS at *5 (citing Employees Ret. Sys. of Tex. v. 

Jones, 58 S.W.3d 148, 154 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., 

L.P., v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651-52 (Tex. 2006)). 

9

 Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 375 S.W.3d at 474 (citing City of Rockwall v. 

Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008)). 
10 

If a statute is ambiguous, an agency is given some deference in interpreting 

its enabling statute where the agency’s interpretation is both reasonable and does 

not contradict the plain language of the statute,10 but no deference is given to the 

agency’s interpretation where the statute is unambiguous.11 In this context, “[t]he 

determining factor in deciding whether an administrative agency has exceeded its 

rule-making authority is whether the rules are ‘in harmony’ with the general 

objectives of the legislation involved.”12 An administrative rule may be “in 

harmony” with legislative objectives only if it does not impose additional burdens, 

conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with relevant statutory 

provisions.13 At bottom, the law prohibits an agency from exercising what is 

effectively a new power or a power contradictory to its enabling statute based on 

the claim that the power is expedient for administrative purposes.14 Instead, an 

agency’s rules must comport with the agency’s authorizing statute. Unless an 

 

10 Texas Orthopaedic Ass’n v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 254 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied). 

11 Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 375 S.W.3d at 475. 

12 Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., v. Tex. HHS Comm’n, 452 S.W.3d 479, 486 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2014, pet. filed) (citing Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 

S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tex. 1992); Gulf Coast Coal. of Cities, 161 S.W.3d at 711). 

13 Id. (citing Gulf Coast Coal., 161 S.W.3d at 712). 

14 Id. at 482. 
11 

agency rule is adopted pursuant to specific or implied statutory authority, it is 

void.15 

B. The Purposes of Chapter 801 and the “Owner Exemption” 

Chapter 801 of the Texas Occupations Code provides the TBVME with 

authority to regulate veterinary medicine.16 Within the bounds of Chapter 801, the 

TBVME may regulate the licensure and practice of veterinary medicine, adopt 

rules consistent with its legislative grant of authority, and enforce both the Act and 

its rules.17 The TBVME is subject, however, to the restrictions to its authority set 

out in Chapter 801 and in iterations of the law over the more than 100 years in 

which a version of the Veterinary Licensing Act has been in force. Particularly 

relevant here are the exceptions to the TBVME’s authority set forth in Section 

801.004(1), the “Owner Exemption.” Section 801.004(1), like the remainder of 

Section 801.004, is an express exemption to the TBVME’s authority to regulate an 

individual’s right to practice veterinary medicine.18

 

15 Id. 

16 See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.151. Chapter 801 of the Texas Occupations Code, the 

Veterinary Licensing Act, will be referenced herein as “the Act.” 

17 See id.

18 TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.251 provides: 

LICENSE REQUIRED FOR PRACTICE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE. 

Except as provided in Section 801.004, a person may not practice, or offer or attempt to 

practice, veterinary medicine unless the person holds a license to practice veterinary 

medicine issued under this chapter. 

Id. (emphasis added). 
12 

From its inception in 1911, the Act has always included exemptions from 

regulation for livestock practices and care by owners, among other enumerated 

exemptions. What has evolved into a panoply of exemptions—circumstances in 

which the Act “does not apply”—was founded in the principle that those who were 

in the business of veterinary medicine, treating or caring for animals “for 

compensation, either directly or indirectly,” should be regulated; others providing 

such care, should not.19 “Persons gratuitously treating animals” were exempted 

from the Act.20 Likewise, the Act exempted persons performing a variety of 

common livestock practices that otherwise would constitute the practice of 

veterinary medicine,21 such as “‘dehorning,’ ‘castrating,’ and ‘spaying’” cattle—

 

19 Act of March 16, 1911, § 13 (Chapter 76, General Laws) (“Act of March 16, 1911”). 

20 Id. 

21 Section 801.002 of the Act contains the following relevant definitions pertaining to the 

practice of veterinary medicine: 

(5) "Practice of veterinary medicine" means: 

(A) the diagnosis, treatment, correction, change, manipulation, relief, or 

prevention of animal disease, deformity, defect, injury, or other physical 

condition, including the prescription or administration of a drug, biologic, 

anesthetic, apparatus, or other therapeutic or diagnostic substance or technique; 

(B) the representation of an ability and willingness to perform an act listed in 

Paragraph (A); 

(C) the use of a title, a word, or letters to induce the belief that a person is legally 

authorized and qualified to perform an act listed in Paragraph (A); or 

(D) the receipt of compensation for performing an act listed in Paragraph (A). 

* * * 

(7) "Veterinary medicine" includes veterinary surgery, reproduction and obstetrics, 

dentistry, ophthalmology, dermatology, cardiology, and any other discipline or specialty 

of veterinary medicine. 
13 

practices generally undertaken by the owners of livestock, their employees, and 

their neighbors.22 

Over the years, the Owner Exemption has evolved: 

 In 1953, the Legislature exempted the “[t]reatment or caring for 

animals in any manner personally by the owner thereof, or by any 

employee of the owner thereof.” 23 

 In 1987, the Legislature added a proviso for circumstances where 

“the ownership or employment ha[d] been established with the 

intent of circumventing this Act.”24 

 In 1993, the Legislature added any “designated caretaker” to the 

classes of persons eligible for the Owner Exemption.25 

 In 1999, the Act was re-codified as Chapter 801 of the Occupations 

Code without any substantive revisions to the Owner Exemption, 

retaining it in its entirety.26 

The Act’s history underscores issues pertinent to the TBVME’s appeal. 

Specifically, the concern of the Act has always been traditional clinical 

veterinarian practice. The TBVME’s enforcement powers have, therefore, been in 

 

TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 801.002(5), (7). 

22 Act of March 16, 1911, § 13. 

23 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7465a (1953); see also id., § 3(2)-(7)(“male castration on 

domestic animals, or docking or earmarking of domestic animals,” “dehorning cattle, or the 

spaying of large animals, or operation in aid of the birth process in large animals,” “drenching 

and spraying of domestic animals for internal or external parasites, or vaccination for black-leg, 

shipping fever, or sore mouth,” “[r]ecommendation by a retail distributor of a medicine, remedy 

or insecticide which is adequately labeled and has been duly registered with the Texas State 

Department of Health as required by the Texas Livestock Remedy Act when the retail distributor 

is advised by the customer of the type of ailment which he wishes to treat,” “[t]reatment and 

caring for poultry and rabbits,” and “[b]randing animals in any manner”). 

24 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7465a § 3 (1987). 

25 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8890 § 3 (1993). 

26 See TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.004, enacted in H.B. 3155, 76th Leg. R.S. (1999). 
14 

the nature of consumer protection. Indeed, the TBVME has recognized as much in 

reporting to the Sunset Advisory Committee in its last Sunset Review: “The 

protection of Texas consumers who are animal owners is the primary focus of the 

[TBVME’s] enforcement program.”27 On its website, the TBVME reiterates that 

its mission “is to establish and enforce policies to ensure the best possible quality 

of veterinary and equine dental provider services for the people of Texas.”28 The 

Legislature has not empowered TBVME to interfere with the right of animal 

owners, their employees, or their designees to treat or care for their animals in any 

manner, unless they undertake their capacity with the intent to violate the Act. 

C. Each of the Challenged Rules Is Invalid 

Section 801.151 of the Act permits the TBVME to adopt rules “as necessary 

to administer [the Act],” including rules to “protect the public.”29 These rules must 

 

27 Self-Evaluation Report Submitted to the Sunset Advisory Commission, Texas State 

Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners at 22 (August 18, 2003) (“Self-Evaluation Report); see 

also id. at 28 (“Through regulation, the public is assured that those who are entrusted with the 

care of their animals follow guidelines that protect the patient and protect the health and welfare 

of the public. Regulation also provides consumers with an avenue that allows their concerns to 

be addressed. The Board, through its Enforcement Division, provides these services to the 

public.”). 

28 Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, Home Page (emphasis added), 

http://www.veterinary.texas.gov/agency.php (emphasis added)(last visited September 3, 2015); 

see also id. (TBVME’s home page also recites that “[t]he purpose of the Board is to protect the 

public by ensuring that persons entering the profession meet minimum academic and 

examination requirements,” and “[t]he Board also establishes and enforces policies to ensure the 

best possible quality of veterinary services for the citizens of Texas”) (emphasis added). 

29 TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.151. See also §§ 801.151(f) (restrictions on rules unreasonably 

restricting owner or caretaker’s selection of equine dental provider); 801.153 (prohibiting rules 

restricting truthful advertising or competitive bidding). 
15 

be evaluated, however, in the context of the statute on which they are based and 

with which they may not conflict.30 The TBVME simply may not regulate where 

the Legislature has unambiguously stated that Chapter 801 “does not apply.”31 

Specifically, the Act provides in pertinent part that: 

This chapter does not apply to: 

(1) the treatment or care of an animal in any manner by the owner of the 

animal, an employee of the owner, or a designated caretaker of the animal, 

unless the ownership, employment, or designation is established with the 

intent to violate this chapter . . . .32

The Owner Exemption to the applicability of the Act—the entire Act—is clear, and 

the Legislature has limited it in only one way: the ownership, employment, or 

designation may not be undertaken “with the intent to violate [the Act].”33 

Accordingly, where certain conditions exist—in this instance, where the activities 

in issue are the treatment or care of an animal by its owner, an employee of the 

owner, or the owner’s designee—the Legislature has denied the TBVME authority 

to regulate. Whether the agency thinks that adopting new rules or interpreting old 

 

30 Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., 452 S.W.3d at 481-82. 

31 TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.004. Dr. Jefferson does not contend that she is exempt, as a 

TBVME licensee, from regulations pertaining to her activities as a licensee, such as registration 

and fee-payment requirements; continuing education obligations; or the practice of veterinary 

medicine, should it occur, for animals that are not owned by the organizations for which she is an 

officer, employee, or designated caretaker. However, Occupations Code Chapter 801 and the 

TBVME’s rules “do not apply” to her activities appurtenant to the treatment or care of animals 

her organizations own. 

32 TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.004(1). 

33 Id. 
16 

ones in ways that invade the Owner Exemption is a good idea or expedient, it may 

not do so.34 And, because the TBVME’s rulemaking authority arises solely by 

means of Section 801.151, which “does not apply” where these conditions exist, 

the TBVME’s rules do not apply to these activities. 

The agency attempts to justify its contradiction of the Act by contending that 

without the challenged rules, it cannot “protect the public from the unsafe practice 

of veterinary medicine.”35 But as this court recently wrote in Teladoc, Inc. v. 

Texas Medical Board: 

[W]here, as here, an agency’s legal or policy pronouncements seek to 

control the conduct of a free people through the assertion or threatened 

assertion of State power, agency “impotence” is hardly the relevant concern 

under our Constitution and laws. Rather, it is the risk that agencies—whose 

legitimate authority and very existence must derive from law and not merely 

perceived “expediency”—will stray from their legal limitations (perhaps 

with the best of individual intentions, but exceeding them nevertheless) 

through what federal courts have aptly termed a “tyranny of small decisions” 

that substantively assert Executive or Legislative power over the citizenry 

through forms calculated to avoid the meaningful checks and balances the 

Framers intended the Judiciary to provide.36 

The tyranny the TBVME visits upon animal owners, their employees, and their 

designees, particularly in the life-saving, animal shelter context, arises from rules 

contradicting the relevant statutory language. The TBVME transparently imposes 

burdens, conditions, or restrictions upon the Owner Exemption that are 

 

34 Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., 452 S.W.3d at 482. 

35 Pet. Br. at 6. 

36 453 S.W.3d at 622 (citing In re State Bd. for Educator Certification, 452 S.W.3d 802, 
17 

inconsistent with the unambiguous terms of the Act. Further, the TBVME’s 

enforcement of Chapter 801 and its rules where the Owner Exemption is applicable 

is an illegitimate exercise of a power contradictory to its enabling Act, interfering 

with or impairing the legal rights of owners, employees of owners, or the owners’ 

designees to be free of regulation. The challenged rules contravene specific 

statutory language; run counter to the general objectives of the statute; or impose 

additional burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the 

relevant statutory provision. These rules contravene the legislative language and 

intent and are invalid.37

1. Board Rule § 573.72, Employment by Nonprofit or 

Municipal Corporations, Is Invalid. 

Board Rule § 573.7238 was originally adopted in 1995 in response to an 

opinion of the Attorney General determining that statutory corporate practice of 

 

808-09 (Tex. 2014)). 

37 Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., 452 S.W.3d at 481-82. 

38 Board Rule § 573.72 states: 

§573.72 EMPLOYMENT BY NONPROFIT OR MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 

(a) A nonprofit or municipal corporation may employ or contract with a veterinarian to 

provide veterinary services in connection with sheltering, sterilization, vaccination, or 

other medical care and treatment of animals. 

(b) Employment by or contractual service to a nonprofit or municipal corporation does 

not exempt the veterinarian from any of the provisions of the Veterinary Licensing Act or 

the Board's rules. 

(c) Veterinarians employed by, or contracted to, nonprofit or municipal corporations shall 

be liable for any violations of the Act or rules occurring as a result of the practice of 

veterinary medicine or any veterinary services provided by the nonprofit or municipal 
18 

veterinary medicine prohibitions do not apply to a veterinarian’s employment by a 

non-profit or municipal corporation.39 The plain language of subsection (a) of the 

Board Rule § 573.72 resolves the conflict between TBMVE policy and the Act that 

the Attorney General identified. Nothing more is needed to correct the TBVME’s 

previous interference with the operations of nonprofit or municipal corporations in 

employing veterinarians but to recognize, as Board Rule § 573.72(a) does, that 

there is no risk of the corporate practice of veterinary medicine in the context of a 

nonprofit or municipal corporation. 

Petitioner claims that Board Rule § 573.72 is merely a mechanism for 

“prevent[ing] a licensed vet from hiding behind the veil of a non-profit or 

municipal corporation in establishing one of the [Owner E]xemption criteria . . ..”40 

The Board further claims that “the rule would obviously not apply” to veterinarians 

who fall under the Owner Exemption, as long as they “d[o] not intend to 

 

corporation, including those occurring due to the acts or omissions of non-licensed 

employees of, or volunteers for, the nonprofit or municipal corporation. 

22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 573.72. Board Rule § 573.72 was numbered Board Rule § 573.71 at the 

time of its original adoption. As it was originally adopted (then Board Rule § 573.71), and as it is 

now expressed, Rule § 573.72(c) “stipulates that [doctors of veterinary medicine] employed by 

[nonprofit or municipal] corporations are liable for violations of the Act or [TBVME] rules, as 

well as acts or omissions of non-licensed employees and volunteers.” 20 TEX. REG. 6580, 6581 

(August 25, 1995); see also 20 TEX. REG. 8908 (October 27, 1995) (adopting the original rule). 

39 See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-003 (1995); see also 20 TEX. REG. 6581, 6581-82 (August 25, 

1995)(Proposed Rules); 20 TEX. REG. 8908 (October 27, 1995) (Order Adopting Rules); 31 TEX.

REG. 5538 (July 14, 2006)(Proposed Rules); 31 TEX. REG. 9033 (November 3, 2006) (Order 

Adopting Rules)(nonsubstantive revisions from the 1995 version). 

40 Pet. Br. at 8. 
19 

circumvent the provisions of the Act.”41 The TBVME’s post-hoc justifications do 

not pass muster. Instead, the remaining subsections of the rule unambiguously and 

unlawfully reject and restrict the terms of the Owner Exemption. 

Specifically, Board Rule § 573.72(b) and (c) each make persons to whom 

the Act “does not apply” subject to it—under the rule, they are “not exempt” and 

“shall be liable.” Still worse, Board Rule § 573.72(c) extends liability to 

veterinarians employed by nonprofit or municipal corporations for the actions of 

others who are themselves exempt from the Act as employees or designees. Board 

Rule § 573.72, therefore, contradicts the express terms of the Act and extends 

TBVME authority where the Legislature has determined that people should be free 

from agency regulation.42 Each of these rules exceeds the TBVME’s authority 

under the Act. 

Contrary to the speculative claims of the TBVME, there is no risk in 

upholding the trial court’s invalidation of the rule. First, the TBVME’s concern 

that a veterinarian would use employment by a nonprofit or municipal corporation 

as a “veil” fails to recognize that the Legislature has already dealt with this issue: 

the Owner Exemption is not applicable where the ownership, employment, or 

designation has been undertaken with intent to violate the Act. The rule’s blanket 

 

41 Pet. Br. at 8. 

42 See, e.g., Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., 452 S.W.3d at 481-82. 
20 

disqualification of veterinarians employed in the nonprofit or municipal corporate 

context from eligibility under the Owner Exemption simply contradicts the intent 

of the Legislature, which put no other limitations on the Owner Exemption; and 

further, it imposes burdens, conditions, or restrictions that the Legislature did not 

expressly authorize or necessarily imply.43 In all instances, the statutory right of a 

veterinarian or any other person to treat or care for an animal she owns, her 

employer owns, or for whom she has been designated a caretaker, is negated if the 

capacity of ownership, employment, or designation is undertaken with the purpose 

of violating the Act. 

Second, the TBVME’s contention that the Court should ignore Board Rule 

§ 573.72’s restrictions because they “obviously” do not apply to a veterinarian in 

the Owner Exemption context is nonsense—and contradicts the terms of the rule 

itself. Nothing in the rule suggests, much less states, that the statutory Owner 

Exemption trumps the rule’s requirements, whether in the context of a nonprofit or 

municipal corporation or otherwise. To the contrary, the express terms of the rule 

state unambiguously that the Act and the Board’s rules apply to veterinarians 

employed by a nonprofit or municipal corporation for all their activities—

necessarily including the treatment or care of the corporation’s animals.44

 

43 Id. at 485-86. 

44 See Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 375 S.W.3d at 474-75. 
21 

Finally, while the Board evidently concedes now that Dr. Jefferson is not 

affected by the restrictions of Board Rule § 573.72(b) or (c) in the context of her 

work for SAPA or other nonprofit or municipal corporations,45 the actions of the 

TBMVE in conducting its prosecution are telling. In the amended notice of 

hearing that precipitated this case, the TBVME used Board Rule § 573.72 as an 

express ground for enforcement against Dr. Jefferson or her nonprofit work with 

SAPA, including the alleged acts of employees or volunteers of SAPA.46 In citing 

Board Rule § 573.72 in its allegations against Dr. Jefferson, the TBVME used its 

rule as a “sword” to create jurisdiction, rather than as a “shield” to protect its 

statutory authority. The TBVME may not, however, confer jurisdiction upon itself 

where the Legislature has expressly denied it. 

In summary, Board Rule § 573.72 interferes with the Legislature’s statement 

of the Owner Exemption in two ways. First, subsection (b) directly contradicts 

Section 801.004(1) whenever a veterinarian is employed by or designated to care 

for the animals of a nonprofit or municipal corporation. Rather than being exempt 

from the Act for the treatment or care of animals the nonprofit or municipal 

corporation owns, under Board Rule § 573.72 employees and designees who are 

 

45 “The rule is not intended to apply to veterinarians who fall under the Owner . . . 

Exception . . ..” Pet. Br. at 8. 

46 See, e.g., 1.CR.256-57 (Amended Notice of Hearing, SOAH Docket No. 578-14-1546, at 

7-8)(“Board Rule 573.72 makes it clear that veterinarians who work for a non-profit or 

municipal corporation are subject to the Act and the Board Rules and are also responsible for the 
22 

veterinarians are “not exempt” from the Act or Board Rules but “shall be liable” 

for such violations. Id. Second, subsection (c) places a burden upon the Owner 

Exemption by making an exempt veterinarian liable for violations of the Act or 

Board rules resulting from the otherwise exempt activities of anyone, including an 

employee or volunteer of a nonprofit or municipal corporation, in treating or caring 

for an animal the nonprofit or municipal corporation owns. Board Rule § 573.72 is 

invalid. 47

2. Board Rule § 573.80(2), Defining the Statutory Term 

“Designated Caretaker,” Is Invalid. 

Nowhere in the Act is the term “designated caretaker” used, except in the 

Legislature’s statement of the Owner Exemption. The express terms of the Owner 

Exemption permit animal owners and those they hire or designate to treat or care 

for those animals without regard to the restrictions on the practice of veterinary 

medicine that the Act ordinarily imposes on others. The Legislative grant of this 

freedom is subject only to the condition that the ownership, employment, or 

designation not be undertaken with intent to violate the Act.48 

 

actions of any non-veterinarians who practice veterinary medicine in those corporations.”). 

47 See City of Corpus Christi v. Public Util. Comm’n, 51 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tex. 2001); see 

also Physicians Assistants Bus. Alliance of Texas, LLC, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1492, *6-*7. 

48 TEX. OCC. CODE § 801.004(1). 
23 

In attempting to justify its proviso-filled rule defining the terms for which 

there is no specialized or technical meaning,49 the Board contends that, in contrast 

to the express terms of the Owner Exemption itself, “[t]he intent of [Board Rule 

§ 573.80(2)] is to ensure that non-veterinarians practicing veterinary medicine 

without a license cannot be exempt from the Act.”50 The Board justifies this 

position by asserting that “[i]f the rule is invalidated, then anyone caught practicing 

veterinary medicine without a license could evade responsibility by simply 

claiming that he or she is a ‘designated caretaker.’”51 Patently hostile to the 

 

49 § 573.80(2) DEFINITIONS

(2) Designated caretaker--a person to whom the owner of an animal has given specific 

authority to care for the animal and who has not been designated, by using the pretext of 

being a designated caretaker, to circumvent the Veterinary Licensing Act (Chapter 801, 

Texas Occupations Code) by engaging in any aspect of the practice of veterinary 

medicine (including alternate therapies). A designated caretaker who treats an animal for 

a condition that the animal was known or suspected of having prior to the person being 

named a designated caretaker, is presumed to be attempting to circumvent the Veterinary 

Licensing Act unless the designated caretaker is following the instruction of a 

veterinarian and is under the appropriate level of supervision per board rules. In this 

situation, the designated caretaker may present evidence to rebut the presumption. 

22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 573.72. 

50 Pet. Br. at 9. 

51 Id. Ironically, in other contexts, the TBVME has recognized that the Owner Exemption 

permits the practice of veterinary medicine without a license. Specifically, Board Rule § 

571.61(b)(1) restricts veterinarians “whose licenses are on inactive status” from engaging “in the 

practice of veterinary medicine or otherwise provid[ing] treatment” to animals in the State 

“[e]xcept as provided in § 801.004, Texas Occupations Code.” Id. (emphasis added). See also

20 TEX. REG. 6580, 6580-81 (August 25, 1995)(Proposed Rules); 20 TEX. REG. 8905, 8905-06 

(October 27, 1995) (Order Adopting Rules) (explaining adoption of both Board Rule §§ 573.61 

and 573.71 (now 573.72), under the pre-Occupations Code codification of the Owner Exemption, 

§ 3(a)(1) of the Act). Board Rule § 571.61, therefore, expressly acknowledges the Owner 

Exemption trumps the general prohibition of an inactively licensed veterinarian “engag[ing] in 

the practice of veterinary medicine or otherwise provid[ing] treatment to any animal in the State 

of Texas.” In contrast to Board Rule § 573.72, Board Rule § 571.61 expressly recognizes the 
24 

statutory Owner Exemption, the TBVME simply exalts its own scheme in place of 

the judgment of the Legislature. Contrary to the TBVME’s rationalization, the 

definition in Board Rule § 573.80(2) contravenes the plain language of the Owner 

Exemption, fails to harmonize with the objectives of the Act, and adds burdens, 

conditions, and restrictions inconsistent with the Owner Exemption. The rule is 

invalid.52 

First, the plain terms of Board Rule § 573.80(2) are unlimited. In contrast to 

the Owner Exemption, the rule expressly presumes “persons” are circumventing 

the Act by being designated a caretaker if they “engag[e] in any aspect of the 

practice of veterinary medicine.” Id. As such, the rule applies to veterinarians and 

lay persons alike, all persons who might at the insistence of an animal’s owner 

provide treatment or care to the animals, including actions that otherwise would 

constitute the practice of veterinary medicine. By acknowledging in its brief that 

Board Rule § 573.80(2) deprives any owner, her employee, or her designee the 

right to treat or care for an animal free of TBVME regulation, the TBVME 

effectively admits that its intent in adopting the rule is to abrogate the Legislature’s 

judgment that an owner’s rights in property are reserved to her. In contrast to the 

position of the TBMVE, it is the Legislature, not the agency, that has the power to 

 

Owner Exemption for inactive veterinarian-owners, employees, and designated caretakers. 

52 Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C., 452 S.W.3d at 481-82. 
25 

decide the scope of its authorizing statutes. In this case, the Legislature has 

decided that owners, employees, and designees are categorically exempt from the 

Act, provided only that they are not undertaking their capacity with the intent to 

violate the Act. The TBVME may not overrule the Legislature. 

Second, beyond the TBVME’s clear intent to promote its regulatory 

authority over the Legislature’s century of preserving animal owners’ property 

rights, there are several reasons why Board Rule § 573.80(2) is invalid. 

Specifically, the terms of Board Rule § 573.80(2) conflict with the Owner 

Exemption. The Owner Exemption is an express exemption to the Act’s general 

prohibition on the unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine. The Owner 

Exemption expressly permits owners, employees of owners, and designated 

caretakers who do not undertake that capacity with the intent to violate the Act to 

treat or care for their animals in any manner. In contrast, the TBVME definition 

negates the exemption where the designated caretaker “engag[es] in any aspect of 

the practice of veterinary medicine (including alternate therapies),” regardless of 

capacity, circumstances, or intent. As this Court has held on numerous occasions, 

“A rule is void where it conflicts with the plain language of a statute, and a rule 

may not narrow the scope of a legislatively mandated exception.”53 The TBVME 

 

53 See Physicians Assistants Bus., 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1492, *6-*7. 
26 

definition improperly narrows the Owner Exemption for designated caretakers and 

is, therefore, invalid. 

In addition, the TBVME definition of “designated caretaker” improperly 

burdens the right of an owner, or a caretaker the owner designates, to the express 

statutory benefits of the Owner Exemption. Board Rule § 573.80(2) establishes a 

presumption that a designated caretaker of an animal intends to violate the Act if 

she “treats an animal for a condition that the animal was known or suspected of 

having prior to the person being named a designated caretaker . . .,” unless she 

obtains veterinary supervision. Id. This rules-based limitation on the Owner 

Exemption for ill animals constitutes a substantive limitation on the scope of the 

exemption that the Legislature did not authorize and is contrary to expressed 

legislative intent. Moreover, in an enforcement action, Board Rule § 573.80(2) 

shifts the burden of proving the designated caretaker’s intent in undertaking her 

capacity from the prosecuting agency to the owner or the designated caretaker 

herself, again placing a burden upon the Legislature’s express exception. Nothing 

in the Act authorizes either the imposition of the TBVME’s condition or the shift 

in the burden of proof.54 

Third, despite the inescapable and unlawful consequences of applying the 

TBVME’s rule defining “designated caretaker,” the agency simply abandons the 

 

54 See id. at *6-*7. 
27 

common meaning of the term, complaining that to use the words of the Legislature 

would lead to “absurd” results.55 When it actually addresses the words used in the 

Owner Exemption, however, the agency relies upon a simplistic, unsourced, and 

out-of-context deconstruction of the terms “designated” and “care” to excuse its 

definition.56 

The agency’s deconstruction, however, fails to acknowledge that the term 

has a unique context in the Act. Again, the statutory term “designated caretaker” is 

used solely in the Owner Exemption and derives its essence by reference to the 

property rights of an animal’s owner. As the TBVME inadvertently acknowledges, 

an owner of personal property, including an animal, is entitled to appoint any 

person she desires as a “caretaker” of her property. But by refusing to recognize 

the designee’s relationship to the owner, the TBVME’s analysis abandons the 

substance of the term. A “designated” “caretaker” is, indeed, a person “officially 

cho[sen] . . . to do or be something,” with that “something” in this context being to 

“give[] physical . . . care and support” to the animal or animals in issue.57 But in 

extension of the common definition of “care,” the common dictionary meaning of 

“caretaker” also carries an element of substitute authority. Specifically, the 

 

55 Pet. Br. at 9-10. 

56 Pet. Br. at 10. 

57 See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/designate; http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/caretaker (last visited September 1, 2015). 
28 

common definition of designated caretaker implies more than the casual handing 

off of an animal for the performance of services (even veterinary services), but 

requires something akin to agency or dominion—being or acting on behalf of the 

owner herself.58 

Finally, while an owner has the right to designate anyone, including a 

veterinarian, to be a “designated caretaker” for her animals under the Owner 

Exemption, the TBVME’s claim that such a construction “would vitiate the entire 

Act and would create an absurd result which [sic] the legislature never intended” is 

a non sequitur. It simply does not follow that use of the plain meaning of the 

undefined term “designated caretaker” in the context of the clear terms of the 

Owner Exemption will lead to regulatory chaos. To the contrary, where, as here, 

the statute is unambiguous, ascertaining the “ordinary or common meaning” or 

“plain meaning” is the first resource for determining the drafters’ intent, and 

should guide this Court. The TBMVE definition conflicts with both the express 

terms of the Owner Exemption and the overall purposes of the Act and is invalid.59 

 

58 E.g., “one that takes care of the house or land of an owner who may be absent” or “one 

temporarily fulfilling the function of an office.” http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/caretaker.

59 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011; see also Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 375 

S.W.3d at 474-75. 

In reality, it is the application of the Board Rule § 573.80(2) definition of “designated 

caretaker” that would lead to an “absurd result” that “vitiates the entire Act.” Pet. Br. at 10. In 

real life, the agency’s definition provides that the daughter of a dairy farmer whose cattle need 

medicine each day is “presumed to be attempting to circumvent the [Act],” unless the farmer 

hires a vet to supervise her daughter according to Board rules. Just for doing her chores, the 
29 

This Board Rule is, therefore, inconsistent with the conception that an owner 

and his or her employees or designees are entitled to perform acts of veterinary 

medicine free from the restrictions of the Act or the Board Rules. Because Board 

Rule § 573.80(2), the Board’s contrived definition of “designated caretaker,” 

contravenes the specific statutory language of the Owner Exemption, runs counter 

to the general objectives of the statute, and imposes burdens, conditions, or 

restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the Owner Exemption, it is invalid. 

PRAYER

For these reasons, Dr. Jefferson respectfully requests that this Court affirm 

that part of the trial court’s judgment invalidating the TBVME’s rules. 

 

daughter is subjected to TBVME prosecution and must prove that she did not take the job in 

order to circumvent the Act. 
30 

Respectfully submitted, 

/ s / David F. Brown 

Ryan Clinton 

State Bar No. 24027934 

rdclinton@dgclaw.com

DAVIS, GERALD & CREMER, P.C. 

111 Congress Ave., Suite 2800 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Ph: (512) 537-9938 

Fax: (432) 687-1735 

David F. Brown 

State Bar No. 03108700 

dbrown@ebblaw.com 

David P. Blanke 

State Bar No. 02453600 

dblanke@ebblaw.com

EWELL, BROWN & BLANKE, LLP 

111 Congress Ave., 28th Floor 

Austin, TX 78701 

Ph: (512) 457-0233 
31 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent this 

8th day of September, 2015 as follows: 

VIA EFSP & EMAIL 

Mr. Andrew Lutostanski 

andrew.lutostanski@texasattorneygeneral.gov

Mr. Ted A. Ross 

tex.ross@texasattorneygeneral.gov

Office of the Attorney General of Texas 

Administrative Law Division 

P. O. Box 12548 

Austin, TX 78711 

/s/ David F. Brown 

David F. Brown 
32 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Relying on the word count function in the word processing software used to 

produce this document (Microsoft Word), I certify that the number of words in this 

brief (excluding the identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral 

argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement 

of issues presented, signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of 

compliance, and appendix) is 5,222 and that the text of the document is in 14-pt. 

font. The text of all footnotes is 12-pt.font. 

/s/ David F. Brown 

David F. Brown 
TAB A
22 TAC § 573.72

This document reflects all regulations in effect as of August 31, 2015

Texas Administrative Code > TITLE 22. EXAMINING BOARDS > PART 24. TEXAS BOARD OF

VETERINARY MEDICAL EXAMINERS > CHAPTER 573. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

> SUBCHAPTER G. OTHER PROVISIONS

§ 573.72. Employment by Nonprofit or Municipal Corporations

(a) A nonprofit or municipal corporation may employ or contract with a veterinarian to provide

veterinary services in connection with sheltering, sterilization, vaccination, or other medical

care and treatment of animals.

(b) Employment by or contractual service to a nonprofit or municipal corporation does not exempt

the veterinarian from any of the provisions of the Veterinary Licensing Act or the Board’s rules.

(c) Veterinarians employed by, or contracted to, nonprofit or municipal corporations shall be liable

for any violations of the Act or rules occurring as a result of the practice of veterinary medicine

or any veterinary services provided by the nonprofit or municipal corporation, including those

occurring due to the acts or omissions of non-licensed employees of, or volunteers for, the

nonprofit or municipal corporation.

History

SOURCE:

The provisions of this § 573.72 adopted to be effective June 14, 2012, 37 TexReg 4229

TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TAB B
22 TAC § 573.80

This document reflects all regulations in effect as of August 31, 2015

Texas Administrative Code > TITLE 22. EXAMINING BOARDS > PART 24. TEXAS BOARD OF

VETERINARY MEDICAL EXAMINERS > CHAPTER 573. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

> SUBCHAPTER G. OTHER PROVISIONS

§ 573.80. Definitions

The following words and terms, when used in the Veterinary Licensing Act (Chapter 801, Texas

Occupations Code) or the Rules of the Board (Texas Administrative Code, Title 22, Part 24,

Chapters 571, 573, 575, and 577) shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly

indicates otherwise:

(1) Accepted livestock management practices--those practices involving animals raised or

produced primarily for food, fiber, or other products for human consumption, and may

include the following:

(A) branding, tattooing, ear tags or identifying marks of any kind;

(B) tail docking, except cosmetic tail docking that is performed for appearance purposes

only;

(C) earmarking;

(D) routine dehorning, except cosmetic dehorning that reshapes or alters the poll area for

appearance purposes;

(E) castration;

(F) non-surgical assistance with birthing;

(G) implantation with approved implant products;

(H) administration of a biologic, except where restricted by law to administration by a

veterinarian, and not including deworming by use of stomach tubing;

(I) artificial insemination;

(J) shoeing and trimming hooves; and

(K) application or administration of parasiticides, except where restricted by law.

(2) Designated caretaker--a person to whom the owner of an animal has given specific authority

to care for the animal and who has not been designated, by using the pretext of being a

designated caretaker, to circumvent the Veterinary Licensing Act (Chapter 801, Texas

Occupations Code) by engaging in any aspect of the practice of veterinary medicine

(including alternate therapies). A designated caretaker who treats an animal for a condition

that the animal was known or suspected of having prior to the person being named a

designated caretaker, is presumed to be attempting to circumvent the Veterinary Licensing

Act unless the designated caretaker is following the instruction of a veterinarian and is

under the appropriate level of supervision per board rules. In this situation, the designated

caretaker may present evidence to rebut the presumption.
(3) Food production animals--any mammalians, poultry, fowl, fish or other animals that are

raised primarily for human food consumption.

(4) Biologic--any serum, vaccine, antitoxin, or antigen used in the prevention or treatment of

disease.

(5) Pregnancy testing--the diagnosis of the physical condition of pregnancy by any method

other than the gross visual observation of the animal.

(6) Invasive dentistry or invasive dental procedures--exposing of the dental pulp, or performing

extractions.

(7) Consultation--the act of rendering professional advice (diagnosis and prognosis) about a

specific veterinary medical case, but does not include treatment or surgery.

(8) General Supervision--a veterinarian required to generally supervise a non-veterinarian must

be readily available to communicate with the person under supervision.

(9) Direct Supervision--a veterinarian required to directly supervise a non-veterinarian must be

physically present on the same premises as the person under supervision.

(10) Immediate Supervision--a veterinarian required to immediately supervise a non-veterinarian

must be within audible and visual range of both the animal patient and the person under

supervision.

(11) Official Health Documents--any certificate attesting to the health, vaccination status,

physical condition and/or soundness of an animal.

(12) Specialist--a veterinarian that is a Board Certified Diplomate of a specialty organization

recognized by the American Veterinary Medical Association.

(13) Non-veterinarian employee--an individual paid directly by a veterinarian for work

involving the practice of veterinary medicine, as defined in the Veterinary Licensing Act,

Texas Occupations Code, § 801.002(5), regardless of the defined status of the employment

relationship between the individual and the veterinarian under Internal Revenue Service

regulations.

(14) Herd--a group of animals of the same species, managed as a group and confined to a

specific geographic location. A herd may not include dogs, cats, any animal in individual

training, or any animal that competes as an individual.

History

SOURCE:

The provisions of this § 573.80 adopted to be effective June 14, 2012, 37 TexReg 4229; amended to

be effective December 25, 2012, 37 TexReg 9937; amended to be effective August 29, 2013, 38 TexReg

5490

22 TAC § 573.80

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Annotations

Research References & Practice Aids

CROSS-REFERENCES:

This Section cited in 22 TAC § 573.19, (relating to Dentistry).

TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

22 TAC § 573.80

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TAB C