1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________ ) DAVID J. MARCK, et al. , ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action N o. 15-10 (RMC) ) DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) HUMAN SERVICES, et al. , ) ) Defendants. )

_________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION David Marck and Sills Cummis & G ross, P.C. (collectively, Mr. M arck) sue the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Food and Drug Ad ministration (FDA), Department of Justice (DOJ), a nd Federal Bureau of Investigatio n (FBI) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S .C. § 552 (2012), challenging the adequacy of those agencies’ response to its FOIA requests . All claims against HHS and FDA were previously dismissed and the parties have narrowed the r emaining issues to six pages of records redacted or withheld by FBI, a constituent agency of DOJ . FBI now moves for summary ju dgment and Mr. Marck requests in camera review of the six pages so the Court can determine the proprie ty of the redactions. The Court will gran t FBI’s motion for summary judg ment and deny Mr. Marck’s motion for in camera review.
I. BACKGROUND Mr. Marck is an attorney former ly of the law firm Sills Cummis & Gross, P.C. Pls.’ Opp’n to the Gov’t’s Mot . for Summ. J. (Opp’n) [Dkt. 26] at 4. On April 16, 2014, Mr. Marck filed the underlying FOIA requests with FBI on behalf of his client Mark Cocchiola and2 his wife, Anne Cocchiola. Id . On April 17, 2014, he supplemented the request. Id .; see also Ex. A, Decl. of David M. Hardy, Apr il 16, 2014 FOIA Request (April 16 FOIA Req.) [Dkt. 24-1] at 29; Ex. B, Decl. of David M. H ardy, April 17, 2014 FOIA Request (April 17 FOIA Req.) [Dkt. 24-1] at 32. 1 Collectively, the FOIA requests asked for records pertaining to the following persons and entities: Individuals 1. Mark Cocchiola 2. Jack Gaglio 3. Paul Lauriero 4. Robert Quattrone 5. George Vieira 6. Paul Zambas 7. Arthur Christensen 8. Lawrence Fransen 9. John Van Sickell 10. Steven Venechanos 11. Chris Lotito 12. Chester Destefano 13. Steven Fawcett Entities 1. Suprema Specialties 2. Whitehall Specialties 3. A&J Foods, Inc. 4. Hidden Valley Ranch 5. Noble JG Cheese 6. California Goldfield 7. West Coast Commodities 8. California Milk Market 9. Wall Street Cheese 10. LNN Enterprises 11. A&J Cheese Company 12. Lotito Foods 13. Mrs. Mazzula’s Foods 14. Destefano Foods 15. Roma Foods 16. Piancone Food Service, Inc. 17. Capri Foods 18. Marlboro Foods

See April 17 FOIA Req. at 32-33. On April 23, 2014, FBI acknowledged rece ipt of Mr. Marck’s FOIA requests for records pertaining to third-par ty individuals, assigned it FOIA request number 1260681-000, and notified Mr. Marck that further information was required before third-party records could be

1 All page-number references to the Hardy Declaration Exhibits, FBI’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and FBI’s Reply in Suppo rt of its Motion for Summary Judgment are to the electronic case filing (ECF) page number.3 processed. Decl. of David M. Har dy (Hardy Decl.) [Dkt. 29-1] ¶6. 2 On May 7, 2014, FBI acknowledged receipt of Mr. Marck’s FOIA requests for informati on pertaining to the nonperson entities Suprema Special ties, Whitehall Specialties, A&J Foods, Inc., Hidden Valley Ranch, Noble JG Cheese, Californi a Goldfield, West Coast Commod ities, California Milk Market, Wall Street Cheese, LNN En terprises, A&J Cheese Company , Lotito Foods, Mrs. Mazzula’s Foods, Destefano Foods, Roma Foods, Piancone Food Service, Inc., Capri Foods, and Marlboro Foods and assigned them, r espectively, FOIA request nu mbers 1264018-000, 1263861-000, 1264075-000, 1263859-000, 1264153-000, 1263885-000 , 1264033-000, 1263871- 000, 1263825-000, 1263865-000, 1263838-000, 1263852-000, 126377 2-000, and 1321143-000.
Id . ¶¶ 5, 7; see also id . at 3 n.3. 3 In late May 2014, FOIA request number 1260681-000, pertaining to the individuals, w as administratively closed because Mr. Marck failed to provide the necessary additional informa tion to justify the disclosure of third-party information. Id . ¶ 8. On January 5, 2015, Mr. Marck filed this lawsuit “stating that no records had been received from the FBI regarding any individua l or entity listed in his FOIA r equest[s].” Id . ¶ 10; see also Compl. [Dkt. 1]. Since the beginning of this litig ation, FBI has “processed a to tal of 6,674 responsive pages and releas ed . . . a total of 2,278 pages” to Mr. Marck. Hardy Decl. ¶ 4. FBI released the records in twelve productions between March 26, 20 15 and June 9, 2017. Id . ¶¶ 13- 26. Mr. Marck now only challenges the legitimacy of redactions made on six pages of records:

2 In order to receive records pertaining to a third-party indivi dual, the requester “must provide one of the following: (1) an aut horization and consent from th e individual; (2) proof of death; or (3) a justification that the pub lic interest in disclosure outw eighs personal privacy.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 6.

3 Destefano Foods, Roma Foods, Piancone Food Service, Inc., Capr i Foods, and Marlboro Foods were all assigned FOIA request number 1321143-000. Id . ¶ 5.4 Bates numbers Marck 76-79 and 101-102. Id . ¶ 27. Those pages “comprise a Form FD-302 dated February 4, 2002” and “an Elect ronic Communication (“EC”) dated February 4, 2002, generated by a Special Agent (“SA” ) from the La Crosse ResidentAgency sent to the Newark Field Office (“FO”).” Mot. for S umm. J. [Dkt. 24] at 7 (citing Hardy Decl. ¶ 4). FBI withheld and redacted information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C) , and 7(D) because that information included grand jury mat erial and “records generated during an investigation that, if released, would needlessly violat e the privacy interests of FBI Special Agents, third parties merely mentioned in investigativ e files, and third parties who provided information to the FBI under an expectation of confidentia lity.” FBI’s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J. (Reply) [Dkt. 27] at 1. On August 31, 2017, FBI moved for summary judgment. See Mot. Mr. Marck opposed, see Opp’n, and FBI replied. See Reply.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is the typical vehicle to resolve an action br ought under
FOIA. See McLaughlin v. DOJ , 530 F. Supp. 2d 210, 212 (D.D.C. 2008). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judg ment is appropriate if the p leadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and a ny affidavits show that ther e is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party seeking summary j udgment bears th e initial burd en of demonstrati ng the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Tao v. Freeh , 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In considering whether there is a triable issue of fact, a cour t must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 4775 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party opposi ng a motion for summary judgment, however, “may not rest upon the mere allegations o r denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id . at 248.
B. FOIA FOIA requires federal agencies to release government records to the public upon request, subject to nin e listed exceptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); Wolf v. CIA , 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007). FOIA cases typic ally and appropr iately are d ecided on motions for summary judgment. See Wolf , 473 F.3d at 374; Rushford v. Civiletti , 485 F. Supp. 477, 481 n.13 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Rushford v. Smith , 656 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In a FOIA case, a court may award summary judgment sol ely on the basis of information p rovided by the department or agency in affidavits or declarat ions when the affidavits or dec larations describe “the documents and the justifications for nondisc losure with reasonably specif ic detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically f alls within the claimed exempti on, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in t he record nor by evidence of agenc y bad faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). “[A]gency declarations g enerally are entitled to a presumption of good faith, and therefore, to succ essfully challenge an agency’s showing that it complied with the F OIA, the plaintiff must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a ge nuine issue with respect to whe ther the agency has improperly withheld extant agency records.” Ahuruonye v. Dep’t of Interior , 239 F. Supp. 3d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal citations omitted). A defending agency in a FOIA case must show that its search for responsive records was adequate, that any e xemptions claimed actually appl y, and that any reasonably segregable non-exempt parts of r ecords have been disclosed afte r redaction of exempt6 information. See Sanders v. Obama , 729 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Sanders v. DOJ , No. 10-5273, 2011 WL 1769099 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 21, 2011).
III. ANALYSIS As Mr. Marck does not challenge t he adequacy of FBI’s search an d only contests FBI’s failure to release six page s of records without redaction s, the Court will assume the adequacy of the search and evaluate the exemptions claimed for the six pages at issue.
A. Objections to Withholdings from Records In a FOIA action, a defendant mus t demonstrate that any informa tion withheld from disclosure is exempt and that the agency segregated non-ex empt materials. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b). An agency may satisfy this burden by prov iding “a relatively detailed justification through the subm ission of an index of documents, known as a Vaughn Index, sufficiently detailed affidavits or declarations, or both.” Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative , 237 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2002) (internal quotations omi tted); see also Vaughn v. Rosen , 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Mr. Marck challenges the reda ctions on four pages (76, 79, 101, and 102) and t he complete withholdi ng of two pages (77 and 78).
See Ex. U, Hardy Decl., Bates numbe rs Marck 76-79 and 101-02 [Dkt. 24-1] at 108-112. FBI applied Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), and 7 (D) to redactions and withh olding made throughout those
pages. 1. Exemption (3) Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), an agency must withhold records or information that is: specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than se ction 552b of this title), if that statute— (A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no di scretion on the issue; or7 (ii) establishes particular cri teria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). FBI justifie s withholding i n their entir ety pages 77 and 78 and all but three redactions in the remaining pages under Exemption 3 because the information is related to grand jury proceedings and protected by Rul e 6(e) of the Federal Rule s of Criminal Procedure. 4 “Rule 6(e) applies if the di sclosed material would ‘tend to reveal so me secret aspect of the grand jury’s investigation,’ incl uding ‘the identities of witnesses or juror s, the substance of testimony, the strategy or direction of the inves tigation,’ or ‘the deliberati ons or questions of jurors.’” Hodge v.
FBI , 703 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v.
DOJ , 823 F.2d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). FBI explains that the informa tion redacted or withheld under Ex emption 3 contains the name and identif ying information of “a third party individual who . . . received a Federal Grand Jury subpoena” and t hat “[d]isclosure would revea l the private, inner workings of this Federal Grand Jury by disclo sing who the Federal Grand Jur y targeted as being likely to have relevant information.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 36. Additionally, t he information identifies the third party individual’s role in rela tion to the crime being investig ated and, if disclosed, would allow Mr. Marck to identify the individual. Id . Mr. Marck challenges FBI’s argument that revealing the redacted information would di sclose the private, inner work ings of the federal grand jury,

4 “[A]lthough a rule is not gene rally considered to be a statute , [Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] qualifies as one under FOIA because the Con gress has enacted it into positive law.” Murphy v. Exec. Office for United States Attorney , 789 F.3d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv. , 656 F.2d 856, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2(a), 91 Sta t. 319 (1977) (enacting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) into positive law).8 arguing that FBI’s contention tha t the documents “were produced or created as the result of a grand jury proceeding” is insufficient to justify withholding u nder Exemption 3. Opp’n at 8. He further argues that because he and his clients can predict the name of the individual whose interview is the subject of th e redacted documents, withholding is not justified because the identity of the indivi dual “is no secret.” Id . at 9. Exemption 3 protects grand jury in formation when the material w ould “tend to reveal some secret aspect of t he grand jury’s investigation, in cluding the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of t estimony, the strategy or directio n of the investig ation, or the deliberations or questions of jurors.” Hodge , 703 F.3d at 580 (internal quotations omitted); see also Fund for Constitutional Gov’t , 656 F.2d at 869-70 (“Potential witnesses and potential documentary exhibits [in a gra nd jury proceeding], while less c learly within the r ule, if disclosed would reveal the direction and s trategy of the investigation.”) ; Boehm v. FBI , 983 F. Supp. 2d 154, 157-60 (D.D.C. 2013). FBI explai ned that the withheld inf ormation includes the identity of a subpoenaed witness, as well as the information provided by th at witness, which would enable others to identify him or her a nd disclose the substance of the testimony that individual gave or intended to give the grand jury. Therefore, the withholding of pages 77 and 78, and the redactions made under Exempti on 3, constitute grand jury inform ation that must be excluded from FOIA release. The fact tha t Mr. Marck believes he already knows the name of the thirdparty individual whose identi ty is being protected does not rem ove the mandatory protections provided to grand jury informa tion. FBI has adequately shown t hat its withholdings and redactions under Exemption 3 were appropriate. Mr. Marck has p roduced no evidence of bad faith which might call FBI’s arguments into question.9 2. Exemptions 6 and 7(C) Exemption 6 protects from disclo sure “personnel and medical fil es and similar files the disclosure of whic h would constitute a clearly unwarr anted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). “ The term ‘similar files’ is broadly interpreted, such that Exemption 6 protects from disclo sure all information that ‘appl ies to a particular individual’ in the absence of a public int erest in disclosure.” Lardner v. DOJ , 638 F. Supp. 2d 14, 23 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co. , 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982)). The threshold is “fairly minimal,” and “[a]ll information which applies to a particular individual is covered by Exemption 6, regardless of the t ype of file in which it is cont ained.” Washington Post Co. v.
HHS , 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting State v. Washington Post , 456 U.S. at 602) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exemption 6 requires “a balanci ng of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976); see also DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press , 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989). The pr ivacy interest at stake belongs to the individual, not the agency. See Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 763-65; Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner , 879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting an individual’s significant privacy interest “in avoiding the unli mited disclosure of his or her name and address”). It is the request er’s obligation t o articulate a significant public interest sufficient to outweigh an individual’ s privacy interest. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish , 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). Similarly, Exemption 7(C) protects from disclosure information in law enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected to const itute an unwarra nted invasion of10 personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). 5 Courts apply a balancing test to determine whether personal information is exempt under 7(C). Courts “balance the privacy interests that would be compromised by disclosure against the public interest in releas e of the requested information.”
Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv. , 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). FBI claims that the three rem aining redactions are justified under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) because they include the “names and identifying inform ation of FBI Special Agents.” 6 Hardy Decl. ¶ 43. FBI further expl ains that the special agents were responsible for “conducting interviews, coordinating with othe r law enforcement officials, and compiling the resulting information, as well as reporti ng on the status of the investig ation”; and “[p]ublicity . . . regarding any particular investig ation to which they have been assigned may seriously prejudice their effectiveness” or “resultin reasonable but nonetheless s erious disturbances to . . . their lives.” Id . ¶¶ 43-44. Mr. Marck argues that balancing the privacy intere sts against the “public interest in free and open inform ation about potential Governmen t misconduct” requires disclosure. Opp’n at 10. Courts routinely permit law enforcement agencies to redact the names and identifying information of their agents. See, e.g. , Lesar v. DOJ , 636 F.2d 472, 487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ford v. DOJ , 208 F. Supp. 3d 237, 250-51 (D.D.C. 2016). The only relevant public

5 Law enforcement records include both criminal and civil invest igatory and non-investigatory materials. See Tax Analysts v. IRS , 294 F.3d 71, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2002); North v. Walsh , 881 F.2d 1088, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The inves tigation at issue in thi s case was conducted by FBI into potential fraud and, therefore, w as conducted for law enforceme nt purposes. See Jefferson v. DOJ , 284 F.3d 172, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

6 Due to the similarity between the standards for Exemption 6 an d 7(C), the Court will consider them together. If the redactions satisfy the Exemption 7(C) te st, there is no need to independently consider Exemption 6.11 interest for purposes of Exemp tion 7(C) is that of shedding lig ht on the agency’s performance of its statutory duties. Davis v. DOJ , 968 F.2d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Reporters
Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773). To obtain disclos ure of private informatio n, a FOIA requester must at a minimum “produce evidence th at would warrant a belief by a re asonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Favish , 541 U.S. at 174; see also
Blackwell v. FBI , 646 F.3d 37, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Otherwise, the balancing r equirement simply does not come into play. Favish , 541 U.S. at 175. “Unsubstantiated assertions of government wrongdoing . . . do not estab lish a meaningful evide ntiary showing.” Boyd v. Criminal Div. of the Dep’t of Justice , 475 F.3d 381, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Favish , 541 U.S. at 175). Mr. Marck argues that the privac y interests at issue are outwei ghed by the “public interest in uncovering Government misconduct; specifically that , contrary to information repeated throughout Mr. Cocchiola ’s trial, the government was i nvestigating Suprema [Mr. Cocchiola’s company] long before . . . December 2001.” Opp’n a t 11. Mr. Marck contends that the redacted pages “relate[] to M r. [Steven] Fawcett’s cooperat ion with the government prior to December 19, 2001” and that from those documents “it can . . . be inferred that Mr. Fawcett traded information about Suprema—tr uthful or otherwise—for leni ent treatment by the Government with respect to [hi s] own fraudulent scheme.” Id . Mr. Marck speculates that, through a suspicious deal with M r. Fawcett, government miscondu ct occurred in the investigation and prosecution of M r. Cocchiola, but provides no evidence that “warrant[s] a belief by a reasonable person” t hat any misconduct occurred. Favish , 541 U.S. at 174. His assumption that the redacted documents will show that Mr. Fawce tt cooperated with the government prior to the date its investigation began is just th at, an assumption. Additionally,12 Mr. Marck provides no reason to be lieve that even if the docume nt does show that Mr. Fawcett was interviewed prior to December 2001, it leads to the conclus ion that FBI engaged in misconduct. Because “[u]nsubstantiated assertions of governmen t wrongdoing . . . do not establish a meaningful evidentia ry showing” sufficient to overc ome the privacy interests protected by Exemption 7(C), Boyd , 475 F.3d at 388, Mr. Marck has not raised a sufficient challenge to the privacy interes ts at issue here and FBI’s with holdings and redactions under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) are justified. FBI also redacted information t o protect the names and/or ident ities of third parties who “came into contact wit h the subjects of the investi gations,” including third parties merely mentioned, third parties who provided information to the FBI, and commercial institution personnel. Mot. at 16; see also Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 31, 45-48. These i ndividuals “were not of investigative interest to the F BI”; therefore, FBI argued that “[d]isclosure of these third parties’ names and identifying informati on in connection with the FBI’s investigation of criminal activities carries an extreme ly negative connotation.” Mot. at 16. Because this information is also covered by Exemption 3, the Court’s analysis will be brief . Third parties involved in law enforcement investigations have a strong privacy interest. See, e.g. , Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773 (holding that public inte rest is “not fostered by disclo sure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct”); Comput. Prof’ls for Social Respons ibility v. U.S. Secret Serv. , 72 F.3d 897, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Mack v. Dep’t of Navy , 259 F. Supp. 2d 99, 106-08 (D.D.C. 2003). Mr. Marck fails to provide m ore than a speculative publ ic interest and, therefore, cannot overcome the privacy interest of the third parties and commerci al institution personnel.13 3. Exemption 7(D) 7 Exemption 7(D) protects from disc losure those records or inform ation compiled for law enforcement purposes that: could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . [who] furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enfor cement authority in the course of a criminal investigation . . . , information furnished by a confi dential source. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). A source’s confiden tiality is determi ned on a case-by-case basis, and a court must determine “whether the particular source spoke with an understanding that the communication would remain confidential.” DOJ v. Landano , 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993). “A source is confidential withi n the meaning of exemption 7(D) if the source provided information under an express assurance of c onfidentiality or in circumstanc es from which such an assurance could be reasonably inferred.” Williams v. FBI , 69 F.3d 1155, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The nature of the investigation and the informant’s relation to it are the most important factors in determining whether implied confidentiality exists. Landano , 508 U.S. at 179-80. FBI redacted the “name, ident ifying information about, and info rmation provided by a third party” who “provided accurate and reliable informati on concerning the activities of subjects who were of investigativ e interest to the FBI or other law enforcement agencies.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 52. FBI “inferred th at the individual provided i nformation to the FBI only because they believed their cooperation with, and the informati on they provided, would remain confidential.” Id . Based on the individua l’s relationship to the targets, FBI a rgues that “[t]he

7 All of the information protect ed by FBI under Exemption 7(D) w as also protected under Exemptions 3, 6, and 7(C). Therefore, even if Exemption 7(D) w ere found not to apply, all of the information was properly withheld under another exemption.14 disclosure of the id entity of this source and the information p rovided could have disastrous consequences because disclosure could subject the third party, as well as their family, to embarrassment, humiliation, and/or physical or mental harm.” Id . Mr. Marck argues that Exemption 7(D) only applies if FBI demonstrates that the source was provided an express grant of confidentiality, or provide s “evidence supporting a determin ation that the particular source spoke with an understanding that the communication would remain confidential.” Opp’n at 13 (internal citation omitted). Inferring that the source believe d the information was protected, Mr. Marck states, is not sufficient. Mr. Marck correctly argues that an agency must do more than sim ply state that a source provided informati on on a confidential basis. See Citizens for Respons ibility & Ethics in Washington v. DOJ , 746 F.3d 1082, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2014). However, implied or in ferred assurances of confidentiality a re also recognized by the D.C. C ircuit. See Williams , 69 F.3d at 1159. If an agency does not “presen t probative evidence that t he source did in fact receive an express grant of confidentiality,” then it must “point to more narrowly defined circumstances that support the inference of confidentiality.” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington , 746 F.3d at 1101. Courts in this Circ uit consider four factors in assessing implied assurances of confidentiality: the character of the crime at issue, the source’s relation to t he crime, whether the source received payment, and whether the source has an ongoing relationship with the law enforcement agency and typica lly communicates with the agency only at locations and under conditions which assure the contact will not be noticed. Roth v. DOJ , 642 F.3d 1161, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The crimes at issue included c onspiracy to defraud the United S tates; bank fraud; fraud by wire, radio, or televisi on; and securities violations. See Ex. A, Opp’n [Dkt. 26-3] at 3. The investigation resulted in c riminal convictions and a senten ce for Mr. Cocchiola of 18015 months’ incarceration. See Opp’n at 3. The seriousness of the offense and the resulting punishment weigh in favor of fi nding cooperator c onfidentiality . Additionally, Mr. Hardy’s declaration specifically describ es the close relationship betwe en the source and the target, explaining that the source was “in a position to have ready acc ess to and/or knowledge about targets and others involved in f raudulent activities.” Hardy D ecl. ¶ 52. Finally, the source was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury, which supports a f inding of implied confidentiality to the pre-subpoena informati on he gave to FBI. The Court, the refore, finds that the information was properly withheld under Exemption 7(D).
B. Segregability If a record contains information t hat is exempt from disclosure , any reasonably segregable information must be r eleased after deleting the exempt portions, unless the nonexempt portions are inextricably i ntertwined with exempt portio ns. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Trans-Pacific Policing Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv. , 177 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A court errs if it “simply a pprove[s] the withholding of an ent ire document without entering a finding on segregability, or the lack thereof.” Powell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons , 927 F.2d 1239, 1242 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Dep’t of the Army , 611 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1979)). To demonstr ate that all reasonably segregable mater ial has been released, the agency must provide a detailed justification rath er than conclusory statements. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Mr. Marck argues that the exten t of the redactions on pages 76- 79 and 101-102 demonstrate that FBI failed to s egregate non-exempt information . He points specifically to pages 77 and 78, which were withheld in full. See Opp’n at 14. FBI res ponds that it “took seriously its obligation to segr egate material that could be re leased from material that must be withheld under the applicable Exemptions.” Reply at 2-3.16 To enable a court to perform a re view of segregability the agen cy must provide “not only a detailed justificat ion of the reasons for withholdi ng information, but also a description of the document from which the information was reda cted.” Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 677 F. Supp. 2d 101, 109 (D.D.C. 2009); see also
Mead Data Cent. , 566 F.2d at 260-61. In his declar ation, Mr. Hardy describes how the six pages were processed to determine if non- exempt information were segr egable from that protected by an exemption. For the pages red acted in part, he explains that the “pages comprise a mixture of material that would be segregate d for release and material that was withheld as release would trigger foreseeable harm to one or more interests protected by the cited FOIA exemptions.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 54(A). As to the t wo pages withheld in full, he explains that any “non-exempt information on these pages was so i ntertwined with exempt mater ial, that no information could be reasonably segregated for re lease” and that “[a]ny further s egregation of this intertwined material would employ finite re sources only to produce disjoint ed words, phrases, or sentences, that taken separately or togeth er, would have minimal or no inf ormational content.” Id . ¶ 54(B). “FOIA requires only separation of w hat is reasonably segregable , permitting the agency to avoid committing significant time and resources to the separation of disjointed words, phrases, or even sentences which taken separatel y or together have minimal or no information content.” Wadelton v. Dep’t of State , 106 F. Supp. 3d 139, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2015). While Mr. Marck m ay desire fewer redactions, the Cour t finds that FBI has adequatel y explained that all segregable information has been provided and only exempt information was r edacted.
C. In Camera Review Trial courts are afforded broad discretion to “examine the cont ents of” requested records “in camera to determine whether such records or any par t thereof shall be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Spirko v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 147 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1998).17 However, “‘[i]f the affidavits p rovide specific information suf ficient to place the documents within the exemption category, if this information is not contr adicted in the reco rd, and if there is no evidence in the record of age ncy bad faith, then summary jud gment is appropriate without in

camera review of the documents.’” Quiñon v. FBI , 86 F.3d 1222, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv. , 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Mr. Marck asks the Court to review in camera the six pages of records at issue to determine if FBI properly applied the FOIA exemptions and if th ere is non-exempt information that should be released. Because this case is not one where th e agency’s declarations are “‘insufficiently detailed to permit meaningful review of exempt ion claims,’” in camera review is
unnecessary. Plunkett v. DOJ , No. 11-341, 2015 WL 5159489, at *12 ( D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2015) (quoting Quiñon , 86 F.3d at 1228) (declining in camera review because agency’s affidavits sufficiently explained its reas ons for redacting information un der FOIA exemptions).
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the C ourt will grant FBI’s motion fo r summary judgment and deny Mr. Marck’s motion for in camera review. A memor ializing Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date: June 5, 2018 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge