Cite as 2024 Ark. 114

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CV-23-693

LATONYA AUSTIN HONORABLE, FIFTH 

DIVISION CIRCUIT JUDGE; J. LEON 

JOHNSON, FIRST DIVISION CIRCUIT 

JUDGE; AND HERBERT THOMAS 

WRIGHT, FOURTH DIVISION CIRCUIT 

JUDGE

APPELLANTS

V.

BARRY HYDE, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS COUNTY JUDGE; MIKE 

HUTCHENS, IN HIS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS COMPTROLLER; 

CHASTITY SCIFRES, IN HER OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS HUMAN RESOURCES 

DIRECTOR; AND PULASKI COUNTY, 

ARKANSAS EX REL. BARRY HYDE, 

COUNTY JUDGE

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered: June 13, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH 

DIVISION

[NO. 60CV-22-8206]

HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS 

FOX, JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-13-1412 and 16-13-1414 collectively mandate 

the creation of certain county-funded employee positions to serve a total of three of the 

seventeen judicial-district divisions within the Sixth Judicial Circuit serving Pulaski and Perry 

Counties. Funding for some of these positions was initially part of the 2023 budget, authorized 

by Pulaski County Ordinance No. 22-OR-45, which allocated funds for, among other things, 

probation officers in the Fifth Division. See Pulaski Cnty, Ark., Ordinance 22-OR-45 (Nov. 
2

29, 2023). Pulaski County Judge Barry Hyde later announced his decision not to fill some of 

the vacant positions within the Fifth Division. Subsequently, then-sitting Fifth Division Circuit 

Judge Wendell Griffen and his successor in office, Judge-elect LaTonya Austin Honorable, sued

Judge Hyde, seeking a judicial remedy to mandate the filling of these positions as appropriated

in the 2023 budget. Judge Hyde contended that the two statutes in question are

unconstitutional as special and local legislation under amendment 14 of the Arkansas 

Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of Judge Hyde, declaring the statutes 

unconstitutional because they apply only to specific divisions rather than all divisions in the 

Sixth Judicial Circuit. Additionally, the court dismissed arguments of estoppel raised by Judgeelect Honorable, finding that Pulaski County’s (the County’s) previous funding of these 

positions did not preclude it from now challenging the constitutionality of the statutes. We 

affirm the circuit court’s order finding that both statutes violate amendment 14 and that the 

County was not estopped from bringing its constitutional challenge.

I. Background

In 2022, the Pulaski County Quorum Court Budget Committee approved the County’s 

budget for 2023, which became Pulaski County Ordinance No. 22-OR-45. The budget 

provided funds for a chief probation officer, three deputy probation officers, a presentence 

officer, and an intake officer. The roles of chief probation officer, one deputy probation officer, 

and presentence officer are required by Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-13-1412 and 16-

13-1414, respectively. The intake officer and the remaining two deputy probation officers 

listed in the budget were established separately by the Quorum Court.

Judge Hyde sent an email on October 14, 2022, to the county comptroller and humanresources director informing them that he would not be filling four vacant county-created 
3

positions for the Fifth Division.1 Following the Quorum Court’s adoption of the 2023 budget, 

Judge Hyde publicly announced that he would be phasing out the vacant positions. 

On December 1, 2022, Griffen and Judge-elect Honorable filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus, motion for temporary restraining order, and motion for preliminary injunction in 

the Sixth Division of the Pulaski County Circuit Court, seeking an order compelling Judge 

Hyde to fill the vacant probation-officer positions for the Fifth Division, as appropriated by the 

Quorum Court’s 2023 budget. In response, Judge Hyde filed a counterclaim for declaratory 

judgment, alleging that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-1412, which created the 

positions of chief probation officer and deputy probation officer for the First and Fifth Divisions 

of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, and Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-13-1414, which created 

the position of presentence officer for the First, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial 

Circuit, violate amendment 14.

Along with Judge Honorable, First Division Circuit Judge Leon Johnson and Fourth 

Division Circuit Judge Herbert Wright were joined as counter-defendants.2 However, because

a presentence officer was not appointed to the Fourth Division, as it is not presently assigned a 

criminal docket, Judge Wright filed a notice disclaiming all rights and interests in the matter. 

Judge Honorable filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim asserting that the County 

was barred from challenging the constitutionality of sections 16-13-1412 and 16-13-1414 under 

the doctrines of estoppel, laches, waiver, and statute of limitations. After a final hearing, the 

circuit court entered an order in favor of Judge Hyde and the County. It found that sections 

1

Judge Hyde later clarified that only three positions would go unfilled.

2

Judge Griffen was not joined as a counter-defendant as he had already left office. He 

was subsequently dismissed as a party to this litigation.
4

16-13-1412 and 16-13-1414 are unconstitutional as local and special legislation in violation of 

amendment 14, reasoning that the statutes do not apply to all divisions in the Sixth Judicial 

Circuit. 

Because it found that the statutes mandating the positions are unconstitutional, the 

circuit court concluded that the employee positions at issue are county employees created by 

the Quorum Court’s discretionary and constitutional authority. Moreover, the circuit court 

found that under amendment 55, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution, these employment 

positions fall under the authority of the county judge, who has the right to hire, fire, and 

supervise each of them. Consequently, the circuit court denied Judge Honorable’s petition for 

writ of mandamus, motion for temporary restraining order, and motion for preliminary 

injunction. The circuit court also denied Judge Honorable’s affirmative defenses of estoppel, 

laches, waiver, and statute of limitations. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

The central issue in this case is whether Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-13-1412 

and 16-13-1414 are unconstitutional under amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution. 

As a threshold matter, we will look to the language of amendment 14, which provides 

the cornerstone of our analysis. Amendment 14 states that “[t]he General Assembly shall not 

pass any local or special act.” Ark. Const. amend. 14. A legislative act is special if, by some 

inherent limitation or classification, it separates some person, place, or thing from those upon 

which, but for separation, it would operate. Foster v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 328 

Ark. 223, 944 S.W.2d 93 (1997). An act is local if it applies to any division or subdivision of 

the state less than the whole. Id. 
5

“Where the class employed to limit the application of an act consists of a single county, 

city, or district, this Court has often concluded that the act is special or local within the meaning 

of Amendment 14.” Littleton v. Blanton, 281 Ark. 395, 399, 665 S.W.2d 239, 241 (1996). 

Littleton references and provides history for an administration-of-justice exception for special 

acts found first in Waterman v. Hawkins, 75 Ark 120, 86 S.W. 844 (1905), and then notes that 

“while the Waterman case has frequently been cited as authority for the rule that acts relating to 

the administration of justice are neither local nor special within the meaning of the Constitution,

this Court has never been comfortable with the rule so broadly stated nor consistent in its 

application.” Id. at 401, 665 S.W. at 242 (citation omitted). “With respect to the so-called 

administration of justice exception, we announce that statutes relating to the administration of 

justice will no longer be held per se to be neither local or [sic] special within the meaning of 

Amendment 14. Of all areas of legislation, the administration of justice above all should be 

immune to the evils of discriminatory laws and pork-barreling which Amendment 14 was 

designed to end. While the Legislature has authority to establish courts within the limits 

prescribed by the Constitution, it should strive to create a judicial system throughout the State 

which is as uniform as practical.” Id. at 405, 665 S.W. at 244.

Here, Judge Hyde’s refusal to fill the vacant positions as required by sections 16-13-1412 

and 16-13-1414 is analogous to the situation in Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 

11 (1980). In Beaumont, Pulaski County Circuit Judge Richard B. Adkisson ordered County 

Judge William E. Beaumont to pay salaries for certain court employees under Act 629 of 

1979. Beaumont refused, leading to a dispute regarding the constitutionality of Act 629, which 

applied only to employees of only one out of five divisions of the Sixth Judicial Circuit. In 
6

Beaumont, we found Act 629 to be unconstitutional under amendment 14 because it was a 

special act.

Similarly, in the present case, sections 16-13-1412 and 16-13-1414 are unconstitutional 

because they arbitrarily apply specifically to the employment of certain personnel for the First, 

Fourth, and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial Circuit rather than uniformly across the district 

or the state. The statutes at issue here and in Beaumont demonstrate the type of special legislation 

that amendment 14 was designed to prevent. Additionally, just as Beaumont could not be 

compelled to act under an unconstitutional statute, Judge Hyde’s refusal to fill the positions at 

issue here is similarly protected.

Although seventeen divisions comprise the Sixth Judicial Circuit, the statutes at issue

allow for only three divisions to appoint certain court personnel. Section 16-13-1412 states 

that “[t]he circuit judges of the First and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial District may 

appoint a chief probation officer and a deputy probation officer.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-

1412(a) (Supp. 2023). Additionally, section 16-13-1414 states that “[t]he circuit judges of the 

First, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint one (1) presentence 

officer.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-1414(a) (Repl. 2010). 

We hold that both statutes violate amendment 14’s prohibition on local and special acts.

Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling that sections 16-13-1412 and 16-13-1414 are unconstitutional,

which is consistent with our precedent in Beaumont.

We will next move to the issue of estoppel. Judge Honorable argues that the County 

should be estopped from eliminating the positions at issue because it had funded probation 

officers for the Fifth Division from 1982 to 2022 without objection. In 40 Retail Corp. v. City 

of Clarksville, we acknowledged the trend of courts supporting relaxation of the estoppel 
7

doctrine in favor of reaching the merits of constitutional issues so as not to insulate mandatory 

legislation from attack. 2012 Ark. 422, 424 S.W.3d 823. Sections 16-13-1412 and 16-13-1414 

are exactly the sort of mandatory legislation that should not be insulated from constitutional 

challenge. These statutes permit the Fifth Division to appoint court personnel and require the

County to fund the salaries. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-1412(c), 16-13-1414(c). The County, 

therefore, had no choice but to fund the Fifth Division positions pursuant to two presumably 

constitutional statutes until the law was successfully challenged. Thus, the County should not 

now be punished for its previous compliance with the law and should not be estopped from 

bringing this constitutional challenge.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., concurs.

Terrence Cain, for appellant LaTonya Austin Honorable.

Adam Fogelman, Hamilton Kemp, Dominique Lane, and Jennifer Link, Pulaski County 

Attorney’s Office; LaPorte-Jenner Law, PLLC, by: Frank LaPorte-Jenner and Kelli LaPorte-Jenner, 

for appellees.