COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Ch afin and Senior Judge Haley

JASMINE HARPER MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2237-14-4 PER CURIAM JUNE 23, 2015 ALEXANDRIA DEPA RTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA James C. Clark, Judge (Sameena Sabir, on brief), for appellant. (Jonathan D. Westreich, Spec ial Counsel to the Alexandria Department of Community and Human Services; James L. Banks, Jr., City Attorn ey; Jill A. Schaub, Senior Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. (Isabel Kaldenbach, on brief), Guardian ad litem for the minor children.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication. Jasmine Harper, mother, appeals a decision of the trial court terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Y. H, and M.N., pursuant to Code § 16 .1-283(B)(2) and 16.1 -283(C)(2). On appeal, mother contends the tr ial court erred in finding (1) the Alexandria Department of Community and Human Services (D CHS) provided reasonable servic es to her; (2 ) “the children were better off in foster care th an at home or with relatives;” (3 ) there were no available relative placements; and (4) DCHS provided appropriate serv ices to her. Upon re viewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude this appeal is without merit. Accordin gly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - On appeal, we view the evidence in the “‘ light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasonable infere nces fairly deducible therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover De p’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S. E.2d 765, 767 (2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va . App. 123, 12 8, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the circuit court “‘thoroughly weighed all th e evidence, considered the statut ory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Id. at 265-66, 616 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard or e tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 266, 616 S.E.2d at 769 (q uoting Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 40 9 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). “In its capacity as factfi nder, therefore, the circuit court retains ‘broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 32 8, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)). The evidence showed the children were remove d from mother’s custody in June 2013 on the basis that one of the children had several injuries, mother was alleged to have brandished a knife in the home, and there were allegations of substance abuse in the home. The children were twenty-two months and eleven months old at the time of the removal. On June 28, 2013, the juvenile and domestic relations district court (the JDR court) found both childr en were abused and neglected. Evidence was presented that mother had threatened to “f-up” one of the ch ildren, she brandished a knife and threatened to ki ll the children, and she caused a severe fr iction burn to one of the children. When they were removed from the home, both children had such severe diaper rash they required medical treatment.- 3 - On October 29, 2013, a Diagno stic Family Assessment (the DFA) was conducted. During the DFA, mother often deferred to her mother, Lilly Grant. Mother frequ ently did not answer questions directed to her or she repeated what Gr ant said. The DFA identifie d mother’s in ability to exercise independent decision making and her in ability to consistently un derstand the safety needs of the children. The DF A further showed mother had intellectual instab ility, generali zed anxiety disorder, and a depressive feature. She had limi ted insight into her own cognitive impairment. A psychologist testified it would be “very difficult” for he r to independently pare nt the children. He stated mother had a high probability of developing substance dependence. DCHS offered mother numerous services, including counseling, family engagement services, parenting classes, and mental health evaluations. Acco rding to the initial foster care service plan, in order to accomplish the goal of return to home, mother was required to obtain employment, demonstrate an understanding of the needs of the ch ildren, attend medical appointments and su pervised visitatio n, demonstrate an ability to keep the children from harm, address her mental health issues, remain substanc e free, and demonstrate an ability to i ndependently parent the children. On February 20, 2014 , the JDR court held a hearing to assess mother’s progress toward accomplishing a goal of returning the children to the home. Al though mother had attended parenting classes and was compliant with serv ices, she was still not able to demons trate independent parenting skills. A social worker testified mother “had a lot of trouble maintaining emotional stability” and she was “eas ily overwhelmed” at the visitation s with the children. She was unable to maintain control over the ch ildren or keep the childre n safe for the brief supervised visitation time periods. Mother occasion ally demonstrated a lack of control during the visits and inappropriately shouted at the children.- 4 - Mother asserts the trial cour t erred in finding DCHS provide d reasonable and appropriate services to her. See C ode § 16.1-283(C)(2). She also contends the trial co urt erred in terminating her parental rights where she co mpleted all designated services. As stated above, mother pa rticipated in many of the services recommended by DCHS, including attending supervised visitation with the children. However, the termination of parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283( C) “requires the court to determ ine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services.” Toms, 46 Va. Ap p. at 271, 616 S.E.2d at 772. By November 5, 2014 , the date of the trial court hearing and seventeen months since the children were removed fr om the home, mother wa s unemployed and she s till had not shown an ability to parent the chil dren. A social worker testified mother had impr oved with her weekly one-hour visits with the children, however, she had not demonstrat ed a capability to parent the children for longer than one hour. Mother has co gnitive limitations and emo tional instability issues that had not improved. She was also pregnant wi th a third child, and evidence was presented that this child was “medically fragile” and would require surgery at birth. Mo ther also continued to reside with her own mother, Grant. The social wo rker testified Grant did not feel mother has any issues and Grant did not appear to recognize mother’s inability to safely parent the children. The evidence showed that mother threatened tocommit suicide in the fall of 2014 and she demonstrated a lack of impulse control. When as ked why the children went in to foster care, mother replied, “They said that . . . I neglected my kids and I couldn’t meet my kids’ needs.” She then stated she had learned to pay close attention to what the children we re doing. Mother testified that when she made the video record ing of herself holding a knife infront of the children she was feeling “very frustrated dealing” wi th the father of one of the children. A psycho logist testified that- 5 - mother’s cognitive limitati ons, combined with her psychological cond ition, made it difficult for her to put into practice the skills needed to safely parent the children. The children had been in foster care for seve nteen months at the ti me of the trial court hearing. They were only two and thre e years old. “It is clearly not inthe best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find ou t when, or even if, a pa rent will be capable of resuming his or [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywo od v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’ t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S. E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Although mo ther participated in the services offered by DCHS, she did not demons trate an ability to sa fely parent the children. Thus, from the evidence presented, the trial court could concludemother had been unwilli ng or unable to remedy the problems that re sulted in the removal of the children. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating mother’s pare ntal rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Mother argues the trial court erred in failing to find that termination wa s in the best interests of the children. However, the No vember 5, 2014 trial court orders terminating mother’s parental rights state that the termination is in the best interests of the children. A trial court speaks through its orders. Davis v. Mu llins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996). In determining what is inthe best interests of a child, this Court has stated: a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the child or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests of the child or children. Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 66 2, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). Both children suffered from numerous medical conditions at the time of removal. They also had developmental delays, and one ch ild had a facial injury . A social worker te stified the children were initially “totally uncontrollabl e” and they have been placed in three diff erent foster homes.- 6 - However, at the time of the tria l court hearing, the children were doing well in fost er care. One child attends pre-school. One of the children has markedly impr oved in speech therapy and is learning well. The other child has become moreverbal and outgoing. A Court Appointed Child Advocate (CASA) testified the struct ure and discipline of the foster hom e is having a positive effect on his behavior. Both children had sometimes regr essed at visitation with mother. CASA reported that one child had extensive therapy and was making progress with his temper tantrums. The evidence showed mother is unable to provide the childre n with a stable home and the care necessary to meet their needs. The children are doing well in foster care. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding termination of her pa rental rights was in the best interests of the children. Mother asserts the trial court erred in finding there were no suitable relative placements for the children. The reco rd shows DCHS first inquired about placing the children with a maternal aunt. However, the aunt failed to follow through with the soci al worker and she did not attend any of the court hearings on the matte r. A social worker testified th at no other relatives had been identified or come forward. DCHS also investigated th e possibility of placi ng the children wi th the maternal grandmother, Grant, with whom th e children resided before their re moval and during the time when they suffered from neglect and abuse. DCHS offered Grant pare ntal training and offered to complete a home study rega rding her residence. However, Gr ant did not comple te the requisite home study paperwork for three months. DCHS eventually completed th e home study, and it recommended against placing the children in Grant’s home. Th e DFA indicated Grant did not accept mother’s intellectual limitati ons and her inability to safely pare nt the children. Grant testified she did not have any concerns abou t mother’s ability to ca re for the children. She testified mother “seems to take care of them very well. The onl y thing that is going onwith her now is being- 7 - pregnant.” Grant stated the only thing that was different in the home since the removal of the children was mother’s pregnancy and that mother planned to relo cate when the baby is born. Furthermore, Grant minimi zed the injuries mother caused to the children. The evidence showed DCHS investigated re lative placement and found no suitable relative placement for the children. DCHS does not have the duty “in every ca se to investigate the home of every relative of the children, however remote, as a potential placement.” Sauer v. Franklin Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 18 Va. App. 769, 771, 446 S.E. 2d 640, 642 (1994). The duty to investigate is a rule of reason dependent upon the particular fact s and circumstance s of each individual case. “As long as evidence in the record su pports the trial court’s ruling and the trial court has not abused its discretion, its ruling must be af firmed on appeal.” Brown v. Br own, 30 Va. App. 532, 538, 518 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1 999). Accordingly, mother’s argument is wi thout merit. In her conclusion, mother also asserts the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B). When a trial court’s ju dgment is made on a lternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the circuit court, and if so, we need not address the other grounds. See Fields , 46 Va. App. at 8, 614 S.E.2d at 659 (termination of parental rights upheld under one subsectio n of Code § 16.1-283 forecloses need to consider termination under al ternative subsections). Therefore, we will not consider whether the trial court e rred in terminating moth er’s parental rights to the children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B). Clear and convincing evidence pr oved that terminatio n of mother’s parent al rights was in the best interests of the children. Therefore, we summarily affirm the deci sion of the trial court. Affirmed.