No. 14706 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1979 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

RUTH CHARLOTTE HAMILTON, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

RICHARD DALE HAMILTON, 

Respondent and Defendant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 

District, 

Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Stanton, Hovland and Torske, Hardin, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Gary E. Wilcox, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on briefs: August 1, 1979 

~ecided: FEB 11 1980 -- - 

Filed: "LC A - 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

The wife appeals from that portion of a marriage dissolution decree of the Yellowstone County District Court 

which distributed the marital estate upon the dissolution 

of the marriage. Because the required findings were not entered, 

however, we cannot review the case on the merits, and therefore 

must remand it to the District Court. 

The findings are totally inadequate in relation to the 

valuation of the marital estate, and the failure to decide 

whether the husband's dental office and the real estate upon 

which it is situated, is part of the marital estate. 

In seeking to arrive at a valuation of the net marital 

estate, three financial statements were introduced at trial, but 

we cannot determine from the court's findings which, if any, 

were used in arriving at the valuations. In the case of In 

Re Marriage of Kramer (1978), Mont. , 580 P.2d 439, 

443, 35 St.Rep. 700, 704-705, we held that if a financial statement is used to establish net worth, it must be one that was 

prepared at or near the time of the dissolution, for that would 

most clearly reflect the status of the property at the time of 

trial. The trial was held on September 7, 1978, and findings, 

conclusions, and judgment were filed and entered on December 8, 

1978. The wife's financial statement was dated January 20, 1978 

which listed total assets of $411,505.75 and total liabilities of 

$49,200. The husband, on the other hand, introduced two 

financial statements, one dated June 28, 1977 which listed total 

assets of $282,000 and total liabilities of $50,700, and the 

second, dated August 13, 1978 listed total assets of $281,000 

and total liabilities of $72,898. There is obviously a great 

disparity between the financial statement introduced by the wife 

and those introduced by the husband. But the trial court did 

not indicate which, if any, it used in arriving at the net 

marital estate. 
In apportioning the property, the trial court awarded 

the wife the family h6;r.e, twenty acres of land together with 

the buildings located on the land--for a total value of $85,000. 

In addition she received household furnishings value at $8,000 

and a 1973 Buick automobile. 

The husband, on the other hand, was awarded a total of 

sixty acres of land valued at $132,000, Arabian horses valued at 

$30,000, dental equipment and furnishings valued at $5,000, 

and a 1973 Dodge pickup. The husband was also ordered to assume 

sole responsibility for a mortgage on real property in the 

amount of $39,000. 

Before the hearing, the wife was awarded $500 per month 

as temporary maintenance and temporary child support for one 

child. At the hearing the wife declared that she was abandoning 

her claim to maintenance. Although the wife now contends that 

she is entitled to maintenance. This assertion flies in the 

face of her declaration at trial. The trial court awarded 

custody of the child to the husband, and therefore terminated 

the temporary child support ordered to be paid by the husband. 

We cannot tell how the trial court arrived at the valuations 

of the marital estate in reaching the property division. It is 

equally clear that it left dangling the questions of the number 

of Arabian horses which comprise the marital estate, and whether 

or not the husband's dental office and land upon which it is 

situated is part of the marital estate. 

The trial court awarded the Arabian horses to the husband 

and set their value at $30,000. We have no way of telling how 

it arrived at this figure. axperts for both sides testified 

concerning the value of the horses, and needless to say, the 

testimony is exceedingly disparate. The problem is further 

complicated because the record discloses that not all the horses 

were appraised, and that the parties' children had a property 

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interest in the horses. The trial court made no findings 

as to the number of horses belonging in the marital estate; 

nor did it enter any findings as to the property interest 

the children had in any or all of the horses. Indeed, the 

findings are silent as to the total number of horses that are 

involved; certainly a necessity if a valuation is to be placed 

on them. It is, therefore, impossible to determine how the 

trial court arrived at the $30,000 figure for the horses. 

The findings, moreover, fail to mention the real estate 

upon which the husband's dental building is located. The parties 

were in sharp conflict as to whether it constituted a marital 

asset. The wife contends that the dental property was an asset 

acquired during the marriage, but the husband contends that 

his father owns the property. Although the husband testified 

that he had not made any payments toward the purchase of the 

property, the trial record reveals that the husband depreciated 

the property on his personal income tax returns since the year 

he first executed the contract for deed, and that he paid the 

taxes upon the property and deducted the same from his income 

on his personal income tax returns, and that he had been in 

continuous possession of the property. Notwithstanding the 

issue squarely presented to the trial court, no determination 

was ever made as to whether it was includable in the parties' 

marital estate. 

It is clear, therefore, that there was never a determination 

made of the net worth of the marital estate, and we have previously stated that without such determination there is no basis 

upon which the estate can be equitably apportioned, nor any 

basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review. Robertson 

v. Robertson (1978), Mon t . , 590 P.2d 113, 116, 35 

St.Rep. 1889, 1893. The findings here are patently deficient. 

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Although we could otherwise decide that the wife has 

waived her right to ask for maintenance, in light of our 

decision compelling a remand, we belive it to be in the 

interests of justice to leave this issue open so that the 

trial court can consider maintenance if the situation warrants 

it. 

Because of the nature of the property involved, we do 

not believe that the simple entry of legally sufficient findings 

of fact in support of whatever judgment might be entered, would 

be sufficient. For all concerned, it is best that there be 

a full hearing before another judgment is entered. 

The judgment of the District Court is vacated and this 

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

We Concur: 

CMef Justice 

Justices