In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-3243

JASON M. SENNE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF PALATINE,

ILLINOIS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:10-cv-05434—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

REARGUED EN BAN C FEBRUARY 9, 2012—DECIDED AUGUST 6, 2012

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER, FLAUM,

RIPPLE, KANNE, ROVNER, WOOD, WILLIAMS, SYKES, TINDER

and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Jason Senne’s vehicle was parked

overnight on a public way in the Village of Palatine,

Illinois (the “Village”), where such parking was prohibited by ordinance. Village authorities placed a parking

citation on his windshield. Various pieces of personal
2 No. 10-3243

The district court’s jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C. 1

§ 1331 and 18 U.S.C. § 2724.

information, obtained by the Village from a database

originating with the Illinois Department of Motor

Vehicles, were printed on the citation. Mr. Senne subsequently brought this action on behalf of himself and

a class of others similarly situated against the Village.

1

He claimed that the Village’s practice of printing personal information obtained from motor vehicle records

on parking tickets was a violation of the Driver’s

Privacy Protection Act (the “Act” or the “DPPA”), 18

U.S.C. §§ 2721-25. Under the DPPA, state departments

of motor vehicles (“DMVs”) are restricted in their

ability to disclose certain personal information contained in motor vehicle records; authorized recipients

are further restricted in redisclosing information obtained from those records. See id. § 2721. Injured persons

are provided with a private right of action. See id. § 2724.

The Village moved to dismiss Mr. Senne’s claim

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It contended that

issuing a parking citation was not a disclosure under

the statute and that, even if it were, it fell within a specifically permitted purpose identified in the statute. The

district court agreed and granted the Village’s motion. A

panel of this court affirmed, Senne v. Vill. of Palatine,

Illinois, 645 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2011), and the full court
No. 10-3243 3

Our jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2

Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934 3

(7th Cir. 2012).

granted rehearing en banc. Mr. Senne’s appeal requires

2

that we examine the scope of the DPPA’s protection

of personal information contained in motor vehicle

records and the reach of its statutory exceptions. We

now conclude that the parking ticket at issue here did

constitute a disclosure regulated by the DPPA, and we

further agree with Mr. Senne that, at this stage of the

litigation, the facts as alleged are sufficient to state

a claim that the disclosure on his parking ticket exceeded that permitted by the statute. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgment of the district court and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Mr. Senne’s complaint, which we must accept for

present purposes as true, alleges that, on August 20, 3

2010, his vehicle was parked on a public way in violation

of the Village’s overnight parking ban. At 1:35 a.m., a

Palatine police officer placed a parking citation under

a windshield wiper blade of the vehicle. The citation

remained on the windshield, in public view on a public

way, until Mr. Senne retrieved it some five hours later.
4 No. 10-3243

The ticket had been printed electronically on a preexisting form. The printed information included a date

and time stamp, the officer’s name and badge number

and the parking offense, which was the basis for the

citation. It also included various information about the

vehicle, including the make, model, color, year, license

number and vehicle identification number (“VIN”). In

addition, and most relevant to the present case, the citation included personal data about Mr. Senne, whom

motor vehicle records showed to be the owner of the

illegally parked vehicle. Specifically, the citation included his full name, address, driver’s license number,

date of birth, sex, height and weight.

The citation doubled as an envelope to remit payment

of the fine, which, if used as intended, would have displayed the printed personal information on its exterior

when mailed. It instructed Mr. Senne that he could

either pay the $20 fine in person, mail a check or money

order using the ticket as an envelope or request a

hearing to contest the citation.

B. District Court Proceedings

After receiving the citation, Mr. Senne brought this

action in the district court. He alleged that the parking

ticket amounted to a disclosure of protected personal

information by the Village in violation of the DPPA. His

complaint requested, for himself and a putative class,

statutory liquidated damages and injunctive relief. He

also requested limited, expedited discovery relating to

the total number of parking citations issued by the
No. 10-3243 5

R.37 at 4. 4

Village in the relevant period. Shortly thereafter, he

moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting the Village from

printing any personal information, as defined by the

DPPA, on its parking citations.

In response, the Village filed a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). It contended that the parking ticket was a permitted disclosure

under three separate categories in the statute: It was

a disclosure (1) “[f]or use by a[] government agency,

including a[] . . . law enforcement agency, in carrying

out its functions,” as permitted by § 2721(b)(1); (2) “[f]or

use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or

driver safety,” as permitted by § 2721(b)(2); and (3)

“[f]or use in connection with any civil[] . . . [or] administrative[] . . . proceeding . . ., including the service of process,” as permitted by § 2721(b)(4). The Village later

clarified that it did not concede that any disclosure

had occurred, other than to the plaintiff, who was the

subject of the record.

In a brief oral ruling, the district court agreed with the

Village and dismissed the case. The court specifically

held that the parking ticket did not fall within the

ambit of the statute because its issuance did not constitute a disclosure. In the district court’s view, “what

the statute is talking about is what people would commonly call a disclosure, which is turning something over

to somebody else.” Although the court found this basis 4

sufficient and concluded that reaching the statutory
6 No. 10-3243

Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 492 (7th Cir. 2011). 5

Id. at 492-93. 6

The parties raise no issue with respect to the adequacy of the 7

allegations in the complaint under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009).

exceptions was unnecessary, it also held that § 2721(b)(1),

relating to a law enforcement agency carrying out its

functions, would exempt any disclosure made through

the parking citation. Mr. Senne timely appealed.

II

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s entry of judgment on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.5

We must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and must draw all reasonable

inferences in his favor. Taking the facts of the complaint 6

as true, the Village contends that the DPPA provides

no basis for relief.

7

The Village contends that the district court’s judgment

ought to be affirmed for two reasons. First, it submits

that the printing of Mr. Senne’s personal information on

the citation and the placement of that citation on his

windshield did not constitute a disclosure under the

Act. Second, it submits that, in any event, the action

specifically was permitted by the exceptions to the

general limitation on disclosure in the statute. We shall

address each argument in turn.
No. 10-3243 7

Section 2725(3) of title 18 defines “personal information” as 8

information that identifies an individual, including an

individual’s photograph, social security number, driver

identification number, name, address (but not the

5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or

(continued...)

A. Whether the Ticket is a Disclosure Regulated by

the DPPA

“As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis

begins with the language of the statute.” Hughes Aircraft

Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, we begin by looking

broadly at the structure of the statute to acquire an understanding of the activity that it regulates. “Interpretation

of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole

statutory text, considering the purpose and context of

the statute[] . . . .” Dolan v. United States Postal Serv.,

546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).

Section 2721 contains the substantive prohibitions

and relevant exceptions that principally concern us. It

begins with a general restriction on the release of information by a state DMV:

(a) In general.--A State department of motor

vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose

or otherwise make available to any person or

entity:

(1) personal information, as defined in 18

U.S.C. 2725(3),[ ] about any individual 8
8 No. 10-3243

(...continued) 8

disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and

driver’s status.

“[H]ighly restricted personal information,” as defined in 9

18 U.S.C. § 2725(4), “means an individual’s photograph or

image, social security number, [and] medical or disability

information.” The parties are in agreement that this category

of information, and the restrictions applicable to it, are not

at issue in the present case.

obtained by the department in connection

with a motor vehicle record, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section; or 

(2) highly restricted personal information,

as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2725(4),[ ] about 9

any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle

record, without the express consent of

the person to whom such information applies, except uses permitted in subsections (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(6), and (b)(9):

Provided, That subsection (a)(2) shall not in

any way affect the use of organ donation

information on an individual’s driver’s

license or affect the administration of organ donation initiatives in the States.

18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). Subsection (b) defines various exceptions, to which we shall return in some detail. If an

exception in subsection (b) permits disclosure by a

state DMV to a specific second party, subsection (c) then
No. 10-3243 9

Subsections (d) and (e) relate to waivers of the statute’s 10

restrictions by the subject of the record, and limitations by

which the State may obtain such waivers; neither is claimed

to be in issue in the present case.

regulates the separate activity that occurs when the

recipient of a record from the DMV is responsible for a

secondary disclosure to a third party. Specifically, subsection (c) allows for authorized recipients to “resell or

redisclose the information only for a use permitted under

subsection (b),” with further exceptions and requirements that need not detain us. Both subsection (a) and (c), 10

therefore, regulate a particular kind of disclosure

and direct the details of that regulation to subsection (b).

Our examination of the statute’s structure brings

into focus the precise context in which the present case

arises. The initial disclosure by the Illinois DMV to the

police department, or some other agency through

which the police department obtained its record, is governed by subsections (a) and (b); we discern no claim

in this case that this transaction violated the statute.

Instead, we are concerned with the secondary act of

the Village’s police department in placing the citation,

which included Mr. Senne’s personal information, on the

windshield. With that clarification, we turn to the first

question presented: whether the parking citation constituted a disclosure that the statute regulates.

The statute does not define a disclosure, but it does

provide us, in context, with sufficient information to

discern the meaning of the term. Smith v. Zachary, 255

F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he meaning of statutory
10 No. 10-3243

language, plain or not, depends on context. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of

a statute must be read in their context and with a view

to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” (internal

quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). The term

“disclose” is first used in subsection (a), in the statutory prohibition on initial disclosures. In that section, the

statute forbids a state DMV from “knowingly disclos[ing]

or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity”

protected personal information. In our view, attaching

the terms “or otherwise make available” to the term

“disclose” leaves little doubt about the breadth of the

transactions Congress intended to regulate. Furthermore,

we believe it appropriate to read the statute’s later use

of the term “disclose” and of “redisclose” as shorthanded references back to subsection (a) and the broad

language employed there. So read, it is clear that Congress intended to include within the statute’s reach

the kind of publication of information that occurred

here, namely, the placement of the printed citation on

Mr. Senne’s windshield.

The Village nevertheless maintains that placing the

ticket on the windshield did not effect a “disclos[ur]e”

within the meaning of the statute, principally because

Mr. Senne has failed to allege that anyone other than he,

the subject of the record, actually saw it. We are not

persuaded by this argument. First, such an interpretation ignores the broad language employed by Congress

to define and regulate disclosures. Second, such a

reading turns the statutory structure on its head. The

default rule of the statute is that the DMV, and any

person or entity authorized to view its records, is
No. 10-3243 11

prohibited from sharing the information. The statute

then authorizes specific disclosures—each of which, as we

shortly shall examine, has a limited object and a limited

class of recipients. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). To suggest

that the meaning of the term “disclose” is so limited as

to take the act of publication of protected information

outside the statute’s reach because no specific recipient

is proven simply misunderstands the textual scheme

that Congress has forged. The action alleged here,

placing the information on the windshield of the vehicle

in plain view on a public way, is certainly sufficient

to come within the activity regulated by the statute regardless of whether another person viewed the information or whether law enforcement intended it to be

viewed only by Mr. Senne himself. The real effect of the

placement of the ticket was to make available Mr. Senne’s

motor vehicle record to any passer-by. This sort of publication is certainly forbidden by the statute.

The Village also makes a final, related argument that,

in order to form the basis for liability, any disclosure

must have been made knowingly. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a)

(“A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses

personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for

a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be

liable to the individual to whom the information pertains[] . . . .”). According to the Village, because the officer

who placed the ticket on the windshield did not know that

anyone other than Mr. Senne would view it, there can be

no liability. This argument does not persuade us for two

reasons. First, it rests on the Village’s erroneous notion

that, in order for a disclosure to occur, there must be an

identified recipient. Second, it fundamentally misunder-
12 No. 10-3243

stands the term “knowingly.” Voluntary action, not

knowledge of illegality or potential consequences, is

sufficient to satisfy the mens rea element of the DPPA. See

Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 396-97 (3d Cir. 2008)

(discussing the term “knowingly” as it is used in the civil

liability provisions of the DPPA and finding that knowledge of illegality is not an element).

B. Whether the Statute Authorized the Disclosure 

1.

Having determined that there was a disclosure, we

now turn to whether the police department’s disclosure

of Mr. Senne’s motor vehicle record violated the statute.

This task also is basically one of statutory construction.

We focus on the language of the statute, turning

to § 2721(b), which contains the universe of required

and permissible disclosures:

(b) Permissible uses.--Personal information referred to in subsection (a) shall be disclosed for

use in connection with matters of motor vehicle

or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls,

or advisories, performance monitoring of motor

vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from

the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and

IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1231

et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.),
No. 10-3243 13

and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49,

and, subject to subsection (a)(2), may be disclosed

as follows:

(1) For use by any government agency,

including any court or law enforcement

agency, in carrying out its functions, or any

private person or entity acting on behalf

of a Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions.

(2) For use in connection with matters of

motor vehicle or driver safety and theft;

motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle

product alterations, recalls, or advisories;

performance monitoring of motor vehicles,

motor vehicle parts and dealers; motor

vehicle market research activities, including survey research; and removal of

non-owner records from the original owner

records of motor vehicle manufacturers.

(3) For use in the normal course of business

by a legitimate business or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only--

(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the

individual to the business or its

agents, employees, or contractors;

and

(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer

correct, to obtain the correct infor-
14 No. 10-3243

mation, but only for the purposes

of preventing fraud by, pursuing

legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest

against, the individual. 

(4) For use in connection with any civil,

criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court

or agency or before any self-regulatory

body, including the service of process,

investigation in anticipation of litigation,

and the execution or enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order

of a Federal, State, or local court.

(5) For use in research activities, and for

use in producing statistical reports, so long

as the personal information is not published, redisclosed, or used to contact

individuals.

(6) For use by any insurer or insurance

support organization, or by a self-insured

entity, or its agents, employees, or contractors, in connection with claims investigation activities, antifraud activities, rating or

underwriting.

(7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles.

(8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service

for any purpose permitted under this

subsection.
No. 10-3243 15

(9) For use by an employer or its agent or

insurer to obtain or verify information

relating to a holder of a commercial

driver’s license that is required under

chapter 313 of title 49.

(10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities.

(11) For any other use in response to requests for individual motor vehicle records

if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal

information pertains.

(12) For bulk distribution for surveys,

marketing or solicitations if the State has

obtained the express consent of the person

to whom such personal information pertains.

(13) For use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates it has obtained the

written consent of the individual to whom

the information pertains.

(14) For any other use specifically authorized under the law of the State that holds

the record, if such use is related to the

operation of a motor vehicle or public

safety. 

18 U.S.C. § 2721(b).

Against the backdrop of the general rule prohibiting

disclosures in subsection (a), subsection (b) provides
16 No. 10-3243

On appeal, the Village no longer asserts that any dis- 11

closure was permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(2).

both a category of mandatory disclosures and several

categories of permissive disclosures. See Graczyk v. West

Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2011) (identifying

the statute’s “countervailing purpose” as “allow[ing]

legitimate users to access the records”). The permissive

disclosures number fourteen in total and cover a range

of purposes and recipients including public entities,

insurers, licensed private investigators and certain commercial users such as bulk marketers.

On appeal, the Village contends that the placement of

the citation on Mr. Senne’s windshield was permitted

under the statute either because the disclosure was

“[f]or use by a[] . . . law enforcement agency[] in

carrying out its functions,” id. § 2721(b)(1), or “[f]or use

in connection with any civil[] . . . [or] administrative[] . . .

proceeding . . ., including the service of process,” id.

§ 2721(b)(4). The Village does not describe in any 11

length how all the information printed on the ticket

served either purpose; instead, it maintains, in effect,

that the statute does not require that analysis. In the

Village’s view, as long as it can identify a subsection of

the law under which some disclosure is permitted, any

disclosure of information otherwise protected by the

statute is exempt, whether it serves an identified purpose or not.

We cannot accept the Village’s position. As we already

have explained, it is necessary to view each provision

in context, with an eye toward its contribution to the
No. 10-3243 17

“overall statutory scheme.” See Smith, 255 F.3d at 448

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the statute’s

purpose, clear from its language alone, is to prevent all

but a limited range of authorized disclosures of information contained in individual motor vehicle records.

It is necessary that we respect this textually explicit

purpose as we evaluate the coverage of the exceptions

within the statute’s broad mandate.

Both of the exceptions that the Village identifies, along

with most of the other exceptions in the statute, begin

with the phrase “[f]or use.” In the Village’s view, these

words supply no meaning to the statutory text other

than to link grammatically the “may be disclosed” language in the introductory paragraph of § 2721(b) to

the specific purposes and recipients identified in its

subsections. We believe that this explanation is unsatisfactory. A basic canon of construction requires us to

give meaning to every word of a statute. See Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). Moreover, and especially

in light of the particular statutory structure here that

sets forth such a broad prohibition against disclosure,

the exceptions should not be read to eviscerate the

rule they modify. The words “[f]or use” perform a

critical function in the statute and contain the necessary limiting principle that preserves the force of the

general prohibition while permitting the disclosures

compatible with that prohibition.

Specifically, when the statutory language says that a

disclosure is authorized “[f]or use by a[] . . . law enforcement agency[] in carrying out its functions,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 2721(b)(1) (emphasis added), that language means
18 No. 10-3243

that the actual information disclosed—i.e., the disclosure as it existed in fact—must be information that is

used for the identified purpose. When a particular piece

of disclosed information is not used to effectuate that

purpose in any way, the exception provides no protection for the disclosing party. In short, an authorized

recipient, faced with a general prohibition against

further disclosure, can disclose the information only

in a manner that does not exceed the scope of the

authorized statutory exception. The disclosure actually

made under the exception must be compatible with

the purpose of the exception. Otherwise, the statute’s

purpose of safeguarding information for security and

safety reasons, contained in the general prohibition

against disclosure, is frustrated.

Another part of the statutory language supports our

conclusion. As we have noted, the statute provides

even greater protection to a special class of data

referred to as “highly restricted personal information.”

18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2). Such information includes an individual’s social security number, photograph and

medical or disability information. Id. § 2725(4). For

this class of information, the statute allows for access

under only four of the listed fourteen exceptions,

including both the government function exception and

the court process exception at issue in this case. Id.

§ 2721(a)(2) (listing as permissible uses those described

in § 2721(b)(1) and (4)). Clearly, this section recognizes the government’s legitimate need for broader

access to personal information than the statute

otherwise provides. Nevertheless, it does not provide

unlimited authority for law enforcement to access or
No. 10-3243 19

We pause to emphasize that we do not read “use” to mean 12

“necessary use,” nor do we require the Village to adopt

some form of “best practices” not commanded by the statute.

disseminate the information. Instead, the statute merely

allows that certain entities, including law enforcement,

may both need and use more kinds of information

than other authorized users, within the limitations of the

existing exceptions.

The fact that the statute maintains for highly restricted

personal information the existing exceptions for use

and dissemination provides further support for the

view that the exceptions must be read narrowly. If,

instead, we were to read the exceptions as broadly as

the Village asserts, the effect of the “highly restricted

personal information” section would be that the officer

could have printed Mr. Senne’s photograph and social

security number on the citation and left it open to public

view. We decline to read this statute, with a chief aim

of privacy protection, to allow such a dangerous result.

See City of Chicago v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury,

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 423 F.3d 777, 781

(7th Cir. 2005) (noting that we will not read a statute

to thwart Congress’s manifest intent).

We conclude that the text of the statute limits the

content of authorized disclosures of protected information in motor vehicle records through its requirement,

clear on its face, that any such disclosure be made

“[f]or use” in effecting a particular purpose exempted

by the Act.12
20 No. 10-3243

See, e.g., The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1993: Hearing on 13

H.R. 3365 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights

of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (“Hearing on H.R. 3365”), 103d

Cong., 2d Sess., 1994 WL 212698 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement of

Rep. James P. Moran); Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212813

(Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Janlori Goldman, Director, Privacy

and Technology Project, American Civil Liberties Union).

2.

Although an analysis of the statutory text provides

us with a clear answer to our inquiry, we note that the

limited legislative history provides significant support

for our conclusion. Specifically, it is clear that safety and

security concerns associated with excessive disclosures

of personal information held by the State in motor

vehicle records were the primary issue to be remedied

by the legislation. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. H2526 (daily

ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Porter Goss)

(“The intent of this legislation is simple--to protect the

personal privacy and safety of all American licensed

drivers.”). In hearings held in the House Subcommittee

on Civil and Constitutional Rights, numerous witnesses

testified regarding the grave consequences of open

access to government records of personal information.

Not surprisingly, many witnesses mentioned the

murder of an actress, Rebecca Schaeffer, by a stalker who

had obtained her unlisted home address through the

California DMV, a crime that was viewed as a catalyst

for both state law privacy protections and the DPPA

itself. Other witnesses testified about the impact of the 13

availability of DMV records on the safety of domestic
No. 10-3243 21

Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212822 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement

14

of David Beatty, Director of Public Affairs, National Victim

Center).

Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212833 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement

15

of Donald L. Cahill, Legislative Chairman, Fraternal Order

of Police).

Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212698 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement

16

of Rep. James P. Moran); see also, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 3365,

1994 WL 212701 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement of David F. Snyder,

Assistant General Counsel, American Insurance Association)

(“We support this legislation because it may, at least to some

extent, prevent violent crime.”); 139 Cong. Rec. S15,762 (daily

ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer)

(citing similar incidents).

violence victims and law enforcement officers and

14

their families targeted for retribution. Also mentioned, 15

however, were more random acts of violence, including

a crime spree of home invasion robberies in Iowa

that began when teenagers took down license numbers

of expensive vehicles and then obtained the registered

owners’ home addresses from DMV records. The bill, 16

it seems, was viewed predominantly as a public safety

measure.

Not surprisingly, the Act’s expanded authority for

law enforcement was an important part of the same

narrative. Providing law enforcement with records as a

tool in carrying out their mission was viewed as an appropriate piece of the crime-control strategy the bill
22 No. 10-3243

Looking at all of the available history, there is no question that 17

the exception for law enforcement access to records was

viewed as a critical element in the bill’s attempt to “balance . . .

the legitimate governmental and business needs for this information[] and the fundamental right of our people to

privacy and safety.” 139 Cong. Rec. S15,763 (daily ed. Nov. 16,

1993) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer). The existence of an

exception related to law enforcement functions was mentioned by numerous supporters of the bill. See, e.g., 140 Cong.

Rec. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep.

James Moran).

would create. Speaking on the Senate floor in support 17

of the bill, Senator Harkin noted that the bill allowed

not only access to information by law enforcement

but, “[i]n appropriate circumstances,” disclosure “to a

citizen or group of citizens [that] will assist in carrying

out the function of the agency,” such as a neighborhood watch organization. 139 Cong. Rec. S15,962 (daily

ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. Harkin). However,

he qualified that the exception for law enforcement use

“is not a gaping loophole in this law.” Id. The exception

“provides law enforcement agencies with latitude in

receiving and disseminating this personal information,”

when it is done “for the purpose of deterring or preventing

crime or other legitimate law enforcement functions.” Id.

(emphasis added); see also 139 Cong. Rec. S15,764 (daily

ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. John Warner)

(“There are specific exceptions of course for law enforcement individuals and other areas where proven experience shows that this information should flow. But in
No. 10-3243 23

those instances we have to presume it is somewhat protected.”

(emphasis added)).

The legislative history confirms what a careful and

thorough reading of the statute already has revealed:

Congress did not intend that the statutory exceptions

be divorced, logically or practically, from the purpose

of the statute. With respect to the law enforcement-related exceptions in particular, there is support

in the legislative history for the view that the exceptions not only were compatible with the overall

purpose, but indeed supported it. Consistent with the

textual interpretation that we already have made, the

legislative history reflects the view that law enforcement has a legitimate need for information contained

in state records and the authority to use that information to effectuate the purposes identified in the Act

without fear of liability.

C. The Effect of the DPPA on the Village’s Parking

Citation

With this understanding of the statute firmly in mind,

we turn to the particulars of this case in its current posture. Certainly, the complaint before us plausibly alleges

that the information actually disclosed by the parking

citation was not “[f]or use by a[] . . . law enforcement

agency[] in carrying out its functions,” or “[f]or

use in connection with any civil[] . . . [or] administrative[] . . . proceeding . . ., including the service of process.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), (4).
24 No. 10-3243

See 625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(b)(3) (authorizing municipalities 18

to effect service for parking violations by placing notice on the

vehicle); Palatine, Illinois, Code of Ordinances § 2-707(b)(3)

(allowing complaints to be affixed to “the property where

the violation is found”).

The citation provided to Mr. Senne did constitute

service of process in the administrative proceeding regarding the parking violation. Further, the issuance of 18

a parking citation is part of the function of the Village’s

police department. However, the complaint does put in

issue whether all of the disclosed information actually

was used in effectuating either of these purposes. The

otherwise protected information actually disclosed here

included Mr. Senne’s full name, address, driver’s

license number, date of birth, sex, height and weight. It

is not at all clear that either of the statutory exceptions

at issue implicated the release of all of this information.

With respect to some of that information, it is difficult

to conceive, even on a theoretical level, how such information could play a role in the excepted law enforcement purposes. That issue cannot be resolved on review

of the entry of judgment on a motion to dismiss by

the Village.

Further proceedings will permit the parties to explore

this question. There are very real safety and security

concerns at stake here. For example, an individual

seeking to stalk or rape can go down a street where

overnight parking is banned and collect the home

address and personal information of women whose

vehicles have been tagged. He can ascertain the name,
No. 10-3243 25

See Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212833 (Feb. 3, 1994) 19

(statement of Donald L. Cahill, Legislative Chairman,

Fraternal Order of Police).

The issue of the allocation of the burden of proof with respect 20

to the exceptions, see Thomas v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer,

Johnstone, King, & Stevens, P.A., 525 F.3d 1107, 1110-14 (11th

Cir. 2008), is premature at this stage of the proceeding. We

express no opinion on the matter. We also note that our

holding today makes any discussion of the appropriate

measure of damages under the statute premature. We therefore pretermit any discussion of the matter.

exact address including the apartment number and

even other information such as sex, age, height and

weight pertinent to his nefarious intent. Similarly, a

public official, having gone to great lengths to protect

himself and his family from the threat of violence

that unfortunately every public official faces, bears the

risk that an expired parking meter violation might

provide an opportunity for an individual intent on

causing the official or his family bodily harm or death.

Indeed, in the original hearing on the DPPA, law enforcement agents themselves expressed concerns about their

personal safety and the safety of their families because

of information that otherwise could be obtained from

the records associated with their personal vehicles. The 19

possibilities for identity theft are obvious. Given the

concern of Congress for these safety and security issues,

the disclosed information actually must be used for the

purpose stated in the exception.20
26 No. 10-3243

Conclusion

We hold that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure

of personal information held in motor vehicle records

and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must

inform a proper understanding of the other provisions

of the statute. Accordingly, we hold that any disclosure

must comply with those legitimate uses of information

identified in the statutory exceptions. With these

principles in mind, we hold that the Village’s placement

of protected personal information in view of the public

constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute,

regardless of whether Mr. Senne can establish that

anyone actually viewed it. Furthermore, because

Mr. Senne has articulated a plausible claim that the Village’s actions failed to fulfill its statutory duties, the

case should not have been dismissed. 

REVERSED and REMANDED

POSNER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. If federal courts

followed the well-known precept of medical ethics

primum non nocere (first, do no harm), the Village

of Palatine, the defendant in this suit under the Driver’s

Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 et seq., would
No. 10-3243 27

win; and likewise if the Act were interpreted literally.

I am not a fan of literal interpretation. But it is the

proper default rule when it has reasonable consequences

and there is no indication that the legislature stumbled

in trying to translate legislative purpose into words.

The majority’s free interpretation of the Act is not

needed to avoid absurd results or achieve the legislature’s purpose; it is unlikely to do any good; it is bound

to do harm.

By incorporation of the definition of “personal information” found in 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3)—“information

that identifies an individual, including an individual’s

photograph, social security number, driver identification

number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code),

telephone number, and medical or disability information”—the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act forbids “a

State department of motor vehicles, and any officer,

employee, or contractor thereof . . . [to] knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or

entity . . . personal information . . . about any individual

obtained by the department in connection with a motor

vehicle record, except as provided in subsection (b).”

§ 2721(a)(1). The Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles,

and its employees and contractors, are not defendants

in this suit, but “an authorized recipient of personal

information” from the department is—the municipal

police department that ticketed the plaintiff; and it

“may resell or redisclose personal information only

for a use permitted under subsection (b).” § 2721(c).
28 No. 10-3243

So one goes to subsection (b) and finds in (b)(4) that

“disclosure” of personal information is permitted “for

use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or

local court or agency or before any self-regulatory

body, including the service of process, investigation in

anticipation of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order

of a Federal, State, or local court.” A proceeding for the

imposition of a parking fine is an administrative proceeding, and personal information on the parking

ticket placed on the windshield of the alleged violator’s

vehicle is “for use in connection with” an “administrative . . . proceeding” in a “local court,” and specifically

the “service of process” phase of the proceeding. The

ticket is process; placing it on the windshield is the conventional method of serving process for parking violations; and so a literal interpretation is that the police

can place personal information on the ticket.

There is no indication that without being able to

express its intention in words Congress intended to

forbid police to place personal information on a parking

ticket. The Act does not limit disclosure that falls

within one of its exceptions to what is “reasonable” or

“necessary,” or authorize judges to impose such a requirement. The concern that gave rise to the statute

was with stalkers who went to motor vehicle bureaus to

obtain the home addresses of their intended victims,

more than 30 states having made such information available to members of the public for a small fee as a means
No. 10-3243 29

of enhancing state revenues. A television actress was

murdered in 1989 by a stalker whose private investigator

had lawfully obtained her unlisted address from the

California Department of Motor Vehicles. That unfortunate incident was a catalyst of the Driver’s Privacy

Protection Act. Taylor v. Acxiom Corp., 612 F.3d 325, 336

and n. 9 (5th Cir. 2010); Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380,

400 (3d Cir. 2008) (dissenting opinion).

Palatine’s printing of drivers’ names and addresses on

parking tickets that are then placed on violators’ windshields does not encourage or facilitate stalking. Only

with difficulty can one imagine a stalker who, noticing

a woman he’d like to stalk get into her car and drive

off, follows her and when she parks lurks behind her car

in the hope that it will be ticketed and that if that

happens he’ll be able without being observed to peek at

the ticket and discover the owner’s name and address.

Has this ever happened? The plaintiff’s lawyer admitted

at oral argument never having heard of such a thing. A

far more plausible strategy for a stalker who had come

across his intended victim’s vehicle would be to follow

her home, without having to rely on her parking illegally

and the police coming along and writing a ticket rich

in personal information.

Why bend the statute to solve a nonexistent problem? Stalkers are not the only invaders of privacy, but

who are the non-stalkers who peek at tickets on windshields and write down the information they find

there? Are there any such? Is it wise to dislocate a

statute in order to solve a problem that so far as any-
30 No. 10-3243

one knows or can guess has never arisen and will

never arise?

The majority opinion regards the placing of the name

and address of the owner of the ticketed vehicle on the

parking ticket as a gratuitous act that, harmless or not,

serves no law enforcement purpose and therefore can’t

be for a permitted use. Many, perhaps most, police

don’t have time to place personal information on a

parking ticket, because they would have to look up the

information in the database of the motor vehicle bureau

and write it on the ticket. Yet placing the information

on the ticket serves a modest error-correction function,

which presumably is why some police departments

do place such information on parking tickets. Suppose

the name or address of the vehicle’s owner is listed incorrectly in the motor vehicle bureau’s database, or the

police copy the wrong name or address in writing the

ticket. Or suppose the name and address are correct but

the date of birth, the weight, or the height listed on the

ticket is not that of the named person, thus indicating

that there has been a mistake. The discovery of an error

in the ticket may impel the owner to respond to the

summons by informing the court that he is not the

person named in it or that his true address and other

personal information are different from what is written on the ticket; for he will worry that unless the

mistakes are corrected he won’t receive any future

communications from the motor vehicle bureau and

other state and local agencies that rely on it for personal

information.
No. 10-3243 31

This perhaps is small beer but on the other side is a

nonexistent risk, whether of stalking or of some other

harmful breach of privacy. And even if listing height

and weight on a ticket is gratuitous, the majority’s decision is apt to entangle the courts in closer questions of

the legitimacy of including particular personal information on a parking ticket, questions that will generate

costly and time-consuming litigation and pointless

wealth transfers from taxpayers to violators of the

parking laws. The majority opinion does reserve the

possibility that it might be permissible to write the

owner’s name on the ticket. But it is a faint possibility,

since the recipient will know who the owner is—himself,

or a family member, or whomever he borrowed the

car from—and so the inclusion of his name won’t be

strictly necessary.

Because the statute does not place Palatine or any

other community on notice that including personal information on a parking ticket is prohibited, every police

department in the Seventh Circuit that has done such a

thing within the four-year statute of limitation for private

suits (see 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a); Hurst v. State Farm Mutual

Auto Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 10-1001-GMS, 2012 WL

426018, at *9 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2012)) faces, as a result of

today’s decision, liability for “actual damages, but not

less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500.”

18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1). So little Palatine (its population

roughly one-fortieth that of Chicago) faces, in this class

action suit filed on behalf of everyone who has received a

parking ticket in the Village within the period of the

statute of limitations, a potential liability of some $80
32 No. 10-3243

million in liquidated damages—more than $1,000 per

resident.

The Village can obtain no succor from our decision in

Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 538

(7th Cir. 2012), which held that a claim for liquidated

damages based on identical language in the Video Privacy

Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710, required proof of injury

in the form of an actual invasion of privacy. The

defendant in Sterk had failed in its statutory duty to

destroy lawfully obtained documents containing personal information, but there was no indication that any of

the documents had been disclosed to anyone before

they were destroyed. In contrast, personal information

is “disclosed” in a letter even if, because the letter was

destroyed en route to the addressee, no invasion of

privacy results. Similarly, if a city posted parking violators’ names and addresses on a publicly accessible website, the act of posting would be disclosure even if

no one visited the website. So I don’t quarrel with the

statement in the majority opinion that publicly posting

information is “disclosure” whether or not anyone

ever reads it or is likely to do so. But this just underscores the magnitude of the liability that the opinion

fixes on Palatine.

The opinion states that it is “premature” to think about

damages at this point. That is short sighted. Before

creating a new cause of action, a court should consider

the consequences.

And who will benefit most from the class actions that the

majority opinion endorses and invites? Why, scofflaws,
No. 10-3243 33

of course, because they have the most tickets, each now

worth $2,500. From now until the statute is amended

(unless today’s decision is reversed by the Supreme

Court first), only a sucker would park legally in the

Village of Palatine.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge, with whom EASTERBROOK, Chief

Judge, and POSNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion

that the posting of personal information on a parking

citation constitutes a disclosure within the meaning of

the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C.

§ 2721, et seq., I am unable to agree with the majority’s

conclusion that permissible disclosures are limited to

such information as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statutory exceptions. Neither the text nor

the legislative history conveys Congress’s intent to limit

the information that may be disclosed in connection

with a particular exception.

The present dispute turns on the meaning of the DPPA,

or, more specifically, on the meaning of the exceptions

that permit the disclosure of personal information. Our

goal is to ascertain Congress’s purpose in enacting the

legislation. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, ___ U.S. ___,
34 No. 10-3243

131 S. Ct. 1259, 1264 (2011) (citing Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar

Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)); United States v.

N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942).

Generally, the plain language of a statute is the best

evidence of legislative intent. United States v. Clintwood

Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 11 (2008) (“The strong

presumption that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in rare

and exceptional circumstances.” (quotation marks and

alterations omitted)); United States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411,

414-15 (7th Cir. 2009). In looking to the language of the

DPPA, we are mindful that statutory interpretation is a

“holistic endeavor,” which requires courts to look at

words and their meaning not in isolation but in the

context of the statutory scheme in which they appear.

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004)

(quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood

Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).

Title 18, Section 2721(b), of the United States Code, lists

fourteen “permissible uses” of personal information

that do not violate the DPPA. Relevant to the practice

challenged in this case, Section 2721(b) provides: “Personal

information referred to in subsection (a) . . . may be

disclosed . . . (4) [f]or use in connection with any civil,

criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any . . .

court or agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the service of process . . . .” Under Illinois law

and by municipal ordinance, the parking citation that

Senne received constitutes service of legal process. See

625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(b)(3) (authorizing municipalities to
No. 10-3243 35

The en banc majority also determines that the exception found 1

in subsection 2721(b)(1) applies because the issuance of the

citation is one of the functions of the Village’s police department. See Op. at 24. The initial panel majority found it unnecessary to reach this issue after concluding that the personal

information was properly disclosed under the (b)(4) exception.

See Senne v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 645 F.3d 919, 923-24 (7th

Cir. 2011) (majority opinion). There is similarly no need to

address the (b)(1) exception here since the disputed phrase

“for use” applies in the same way to both exceptions.

serve process for parking violations by means of affixing

the notice to the vehicle); Village of Palatine Ordinance

2-707(b)(3) (service of complaint in administrative proceedings may be effected by affixing complaint to

the property where the violation is found). Indeed, the

majority recognizes that the parking citation constitutes

service of process. See Op. at 24 & n.18. In my view, 1

because a municipality falls outside the DPPA’s proscriptions when it discloses personal information as part

of serving legal process, the Village’s disclosure of information in the parking citation does not violate the

DPPA. The DPPA does not ask whether the service of

process reveals no more information than necessary to

effect service, and so neither should we.

In determining that subsection 2721(b)(4) permits the

disclosure of all personal information, not just that which

is reasonably necessary, I adhere to the basic canon of

statutory interpretation of giving meaning to every

word. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The
36 No. 10-3243

words “for use,” which introduce each subsection of

Section 2721(b)’s list of exceptions, indicate that personal

information can be disclosed when it is used for one of

the enumerated purposes. This interpretation does not

read “for use” out of the DPPA, nor does it limit the

phrase’s function to linking grammatically the “may be

disclosed” language in the introductory paragraph

of Section 2721(b) to the purposes and recipients listed

in the subsections. The express terms of the statute

permit the disclosure of information when one of Section 2721(b)’s exceptions applies. All of the information

to which Senne objects was used in the parking citation,

and its disclosure was therefore proper under subsection 2721(b)(4).

The majority interprets “for use” as expressing a

limiting principle for what information may be

disclosed under a particular exception. By restricting the

scope of the exceptions, the majority essentially inserts a

qualifier, such as “appropriate” or “reasonable” or “necessary,” into the phrase “for use.” Subsection 2721(a)(1)

of the DPPA prohibits states from disclosing personal

information “except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section,” but the DPPA does not contain any language

that limits disclosure to information that complies with

the purposes of Section 2721(b) or that is actually used

to carry out an enumerated purpose. Some of the exceptions listed in Section 2721(b) limit how the information can be used, but subsection 2721(b)(4)’s exception

for service of process does not contain any words of
No. 10-3243 37

Similarly, Congress limited permissible disclosures by 2

requiring express consent for the disclosure of “highly restricted

personal information.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2). Notably,

although Congress applied this restriction to ten of Section

2721(b)’s exceptions, Congress did not apply this heightened

restriction to subsection 2721(b)(4).

limitation. Thus, the DPPA’s text makes clear that Con- 2

gress intended to leave states with considerable leeway.

Congress could have included a qualifier for disclosures, but it did not do so. Congress of course remains

at liberty to amend the statute, and, for the policy

reasons advanced by the majority, it may well see the

need to do so. However, the current text does not

support the majority’s view.

The majority’s interpretation of “for use” is informed

by its understanding of Congress’s intent in enacting the

DPPA. The majority asserts that “the statute’s purpose

of safeguarding information for security and safety reasons, contained in the general prohibition against disclosure” would be “frustrated” if “for use” were construed to allow any information to be disclosed as part

of an exception. Op. at 18. But the legislative history

does not convey an intent to eliminate any and all

dangers that can be traced back to the disclosure of information from motor vehicle records.

The legislative history reveals that Congress enacted

the DPPA as a crime-fighting measure in response

to specific concerns. The murder of actress Rebecca

Schaeffer by a stalker who acquired her address from a
38 No. 10-3243

motor vehicle department is widely recognized as the

catalyst for the DPPA. See Taylor v. Acxiom Corp., 612

F.3d 325, 336 (5th Cir. 2010). Similarly, Senator Barbara

Boxer, one of the DPPA’s sponsors, emphasized that “[i]n

34 States, someone can walk into a State Motor Vehicle

Department with your license plate number and a few

dollars and walk out with your name and home address.” 139 Cong. Rec. S15,762 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993); see

also 140 Cong. Rec. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Moran, a sponsor of the DPPA) (“A total

stranger can obtain personal information about you

without knowing anything more about you than your

license plate number and you are helpless to stop it.”).

The legislative history also contains statements about

the need to protect domestic violence victims and

law enforcement officers from retaliatory attacks. See

Op. at 20-21 & nn. 14-15. Rather than evincing the intent

to guard against all imaginable dangers, the legislative

history emphasizes Congress’s intent to prevent the

specific danger that arises when individuals are able

to obtain personal information upon request from state

motor vehicle records. See, e.g., 139 Cong. Rec. S15,765

(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“This

amendment closes a loophole in the law that permits

stalkers to obtain—on demand—private, personal information about their potential victims. . . . Thus, potential

criminals are able to obtain private, personal information about their victims simply by making a request.”).

The majority is concerned that interpreting “for use” to

allow the disclosure of information that is not strictly
No. 10-3243 39

necessary for the exception creates safety risks, such as

a stalker stumbling upon a parking citation containing

information about his or her target, or a miscreant

selecting a target based on the information provided in

a citation. While recognizing the possibility of such

chance crimes, I conclude that these crimes were not

the types of crimes that motivated Congress to enact the

DPPA. Though individual legislators might well favor

placing greater restrictions on what state motor vehicle

departments can disclose, it is not evident that Congress

as a whole would wish to do so. It is not uncommon

for Congress, out of respect for our federal system, to

limit its response to legitimate policy challenges—even

those with apparent (and perhaps appealing) solutions.

Congress may have decided not to qualify “for use” so

as to limit the exercise of judicial discretion. Under my

interpretation of “for use,” the role of the judiciary is

confined to determining how the public agency was

using the information. If the agency was using the information in connection with one of Section 2721(b)’s permissible uses, then the agency’s disclosure of information

is valid; otherwise, the agency’s disclosure violates

the DPPA. This categorical approach may end up overor under-inclusive at times, but it has the virtue of

being straightforward, predictable, and less costly to

administer. By contrast, under the majority’s interpretation of “for use,” the judiciary is tasked with determining what pieces of information are needed in order

to carry out the purpose of the applicable exception. The

statute offers no guidance to the judges, lawyers, and
40 No. 10-3243

public actors who will inevitably struggle to distinguish

between necessary and extraneous information. By

calling on judges to ban seemingly unnecessary disclosures, the majority makes the statute less straightforward, less predictable, and more costly to administer

(due to the litigation expenses associated with determining the propriety or necessity of each disclosure).

The majority’s interpretation of “for use” thereby

exposes municipalities to substantial penalties (possibly

$80 million for Palatine) for failing to predict what disclosures a judge will find to be appropriate. It is not

our responsibility to evaluate the two approaches and

determine which constitutes better policy; rather, our

responsibility is to determine which approach

Congress incorporated into the DPPA. See Pac. Operators

Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 680, 690

(2012) (“[I]f Congress’ coverage decisions are mistaken

as a matter of policy, it is for Congress to change them.

We should not legislate for them.” (quoting Herb’s

Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 427 (1985))). Far from

frustrating Congress’s intent, my interpretation defers

to the intent expressed by Congress when it included

the phrase “for use” without any qualifier or any

limiting guidelines.

Because the text contains no qualifier, the majority

struggles to articulate the substance of the qualifier that

it reads into the phrase “for use.” In certain parts

of its opinion, the majority describes the standard for

evaluating disclosures in broad, conclusory terms that

express policy objectives but shed little light on how
No. 10-3243 41

to distinguish proper from improper disclosures. See, e.g.,

Op. at 17 (“The words ‘[f]or use’ . . . contain the necessary limiting principle that preserves the force of the

general prohibition while permitting the disclosures

compatible with that prohibition.”); Op. at 23 (“Congress

did not intend that the statutory exceptions be divorced,

logically or practically, from the purpose of the statute.”). In other parts of its opinion, the majority states

that any disclosure “must be compatible with the

purpose of the exception,” Op. at 18, must “effect[]

a particular purpose exempted by the Act,” Op. at 19,

and “must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions,” Op. at 26.

This language appears slightly more concrete, but it

still falls short of providing actual guidance. Reasonable minds will disagree as to what disclosures are

compatible with the purpose of the exception, while

arguably extraneous disclosures might still be viewed

as compatible. The majority defines “for use” as permitting “an authorized recipient” to “disclose the information only in a manner that does not exceed the scope of

the authorized statutory exception,” Op. at 18 (emphasis in original), but the majority does not provide any

definitions, tests, or tools for determining the scope.

By construing “for use” to contain a limiting principle

without articulating its substance, the majority effectively calls on judges to determine whether a particular

disclosure is “appropriate” or “reasonable” or “necessary”

for carrying out the exception. The majority states that

it does not read “use” as signifying “necessary use,” see
42 No. 10-3243

Op. at 19 n.12, but it provides no alternative definition.

The majority also asserts that it does not read a “best

practices” requirement into the statute, see id., but it

does not explain what distinguishes “legitimate” or

“compatible” uses, which are apparently mandated by

the statute, from best practices, which are not. The

dissent to the initial panel opinion had interpreted

the DPPA as limiting disclosures to “the personal information reasonably necessary to effectuate the governmental purpose set forth in the exception.” Senne v. Village

of Palatine, Ill., 645 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2011) (Ripple, J.,

dissenting); see also id. (“[T]he information disclosed

under an exception must have a reasonable relationship

to the purpose of the exception.”). Though the en banc

opinion does not adopt the “reasonably necessary” standard, it supplies no clear standard in its place.

Finally, certain parts of the majority’s opinion define

“for use” as requiring that “the disclosed information

actually must be used for the purpose stated in the exception.” Op. at 25 (emphasis added); see also Op. at 17-18

(“[T]hat language means that the actual information

disclosed—i.e., the disclosure as it existed in fact—must

be information that is used for the identified purpose.”

(emphasis in original)); Op. at 24 (“[T]he complaint does

put in issue whether all of the disclosed information

actually was used in effectuating either of these purposes.”

(emphasis in original)). This approach does help judges

by allowing them to evaluate ex post whether the information was actually used to carry out the purpose of

the exception. This approach does not, however, help
No. 10-3243 43

Although the majority insists that permissible disclosures 3

are not limited to those that are “necessary” to effectuate the

exception, see Op. at 19 n.12, a “necessary” standard may be

the only way to determine in advance what information will

ultimately be used.

municipalities to determine ex ante whether a particular

disclosure violates the DPPA. The determination of

what information will actually be used to carry out an

exception cannot always be made in advance. Further, 3

as Judge Posner discusses, there are hypothetical

uses for all of the information disclosed by Palatine.

Municipalities might seek to disclose more information

than strictly necessary to account for the risk that the

core information is erroneous or outdated.

The text of the DPPA simply does not contain the

“actual use” limitation that the majority reads into it. Cf.

Howard v. Criminal Info. Servs., 654 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir.

2011) (“There is . . . no problem with Defendants

obtaining the personal information for potential future

use, even if they may never use it. The DPPA does not

contain a temporal requirement for when the information obtained must be used for the permitted purpose.

Nor is there a requirement that once the information

is obtained for a permitted purpose that it actually be

used at all. The DPPA only requires that Defendants

obtained the information for a permitted purpose.”). In

conflict with Congress’s intent to preserve the ability

of law enforcement and municipalities to carry out their

functions, the majority’s interpretation opens municipali-
44 No. 10-3243

ties up to substantial liability for incorrectly predicting

exactly what information will be used in the course

of carrying out an exception.

Contrary to the view of my colleagues in the majority,

I do not construe Section 2721(b) as permitting only

the disclosure of information that is necessary to carry

out the purpose of an exception. Congress has the authority to amend the DPPA to restrict disclosures to those

that are “for a necessary use” or “for an appropriate

use,” but the existing text and legislative history do not

evince Congress’s intent to do so. Therefore, while

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the Village’s

action constitutes a disclosure, I respectfully dissent

from its conclusion that the disclosure violates the

DPPA. In my judgment, because Senne’s information

was used in the parking citation and the citation constitutes service of process, the Village’s disclosure does not

violate the DPPA.

8-6-12