alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
J-A16002-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cour t. NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee

v. MOLLY HLUBIN, Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 951 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 21, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003205-2014 BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED: October 6, 2016 First, the Majority concludes that because Robinso n Township enacted

a resolution instead of an ordinance to enter into an agreement pursuant to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (ICA) for cre ating the DUI Task Force, the DUI checkpoint was not valid under the A ct. I agree with this

conclusion. The Majority then goes on to analyze whether the s top at this DUI checkpoint was valid under the Municipal Police Jur isdictions Act (MPJA), and concludes that the MPJA did indeed make the stop la wful. Because I disagree with this conclusion, I dissent and offer the following analysis. “[T]he [MPJA] does not fall within the classes of statutes which are to be strictly construed.... [and], therefore, [it] m ust be liberally construed toJ-A16001-16

- 2 -

effect its objects and to promote justice. The gen eral purpose of the statute is to restrict the jurisdiction of police to their own municipalities, on the one hand, while allowing certain practical and policy e xceptions to the general

rule on the other hand.” Commonwealth v. Fetsick , 572 A.2d 793, 794-95 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citations and quotation marks om itted). According to the Majority, the following provision of the MPJA governs

the situation at issue here: “Where the officer has been requested to aid or assist any local, State or Federal law enforcement officer or park police officer or otherwise has probable cause to believe that the other officer is in need of aid or assistance.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(3) . In other words, the Majority holds that the MPJA, not the ICA, controls in this case. However, if that were the case, then there would h ave been no need for an agreement among the municipalities in the fi rst place. Instead, those municipalities would simply have been able to engag e in an informal process

to create the DUI Task Force at issue. That cannot be the case. While the MPJA governs police authority, the DUI Task Force w as a creation of these municipalities, not the police departments within t hem. Accordingly, the ICA governs in this case, and because the agreement und er the ICA was not entered into by an ordinance, the DUI Task Force wa s acting without jurisdiction, and Appellant’s stop was unlawful.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

                   CERTIFICATE OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year
ended December 31, 2002 (the "Periodic Report"), I, Dan F. Smith, President and
Chief Executive Officer of Lyondell Chemical Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1)  the Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78m or
     78o(d)); and

(2)  the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
     Lyondell Chemical Company.

Date: March 11, 2003                          /s/ DAN F. SMITH
                                           ------------------------------------
                                           Dan F. Smith
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1470

JEROME JULIUS BROWN, SR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Tax Court.

(Tax Ct. No. 028061-13)

Submitted: October 9, 2014 Decided: October 20, 2014

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jerome Julius Brown, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Michael J. Haungs, 

Laurie Allyn Snyder, Tax Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jerome Julius Brown, Sr. appeals the tax court’s order 

dismissing his case for lack of jurisdiction. We have reviewed 

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 

for the reasons stated by the tax court. See Brown v. Comm’r, 

No. 028061-13 (U.S.T.C. Apr. 17, 2014). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Argued and submitted December 1, 2016,

reversed and remanded January 5,

petition for review allowed May 11, 2017 (361 Or 486)

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Plaintiff-Respondent, v.*NATHAN RUSSELL SHOLEDICE, *Defendant-Appellant.*

Lincoln County Circuit Court

141765; A158781

386 P3d 701

George W. Kelly argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the answering brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General. With him on the supplemental answering brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and Garrett, Judge, and Wollheim, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM

Reversed and remanded. *State v. Barnthouse,*271 Or App 312, 350 P3d 536 (2015), *aff’d on other grounds,*360 Or 403, 380 P3d 952 (2016) (holding that, for purposes of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, law enforcement illegally seized a package by removing it from the stream of mail and submitting it to a dog sniff).
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 30, 2015

a1027 

# Order

Clerk October 30, 2015

150119

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 150119

COA: 317054

Ingham CC: 13

- 000161

- FH

FATEEN ROHN MUHAMMAD,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On October 15, 2015, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to

appeal the July 29, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the

application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal,

we VACATE the Court of Appeals judgment and REMAND this case to that court for

reconsideration. The Court of Appeals erred by applying harmle ss error analysis without

first determining whether the trial court’s order dismissing the habitual offender notice

was erroneous. See MCR 2.613(A) (stating that a judgment or order of the court may not

be vacated, modified, or otherwise disturbed “unless refusal to take this action appears to

the court inconsistent with substantial justice”). The prosecutor has conceded that it did

not timely serve the habitual offender notice under MCL 769.13. On remand, we direct

the Court of Appeals to determine whet her the trial court erred by concluding that the

proper remedy for the prosecutor’s statutory violation was dismissal of the habitual

offender notice. See In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond , 496 Mich 320 (2014).

We do not retain jurisdiction.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 Certification Pursuant To Section 1350 Of Chapter 63 Of 18 U.S.C.
As Adopted Pursuant To Section 906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(b)
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Dated: May 15, 2006
    
    /s/ Joseph F. ONeillJoseph F. ONeillChief Executive Officer
# C_2023329EN.01004401.xml

| 18.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 329/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 329/44

---

Corrigendum to notice in the Official Journal in Case C-720/22 P

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 278 of 7 August 2023
  )

(2023/C 329/64)

The text of the notice in Case C-720/22 P, QN / Commission, is to be replaced by the following text:

Appeal brought on 23 November 2022 by QN against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 14 September 2022 in Case T-179/21, QN v Commission

(Case C-720/22 P)

(2023/C 278/17)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: QN (represented by: N. Flandin and L. Levi, avocates)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 22 June 2023, the Court of Justice (Eight Chamber) held that the appeal is dismissed as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and that QN shall bear his own costs.

---
# C_2022119EN.01002701.xml

| 14.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 119/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 119/27

---

Appeal brought on 4 January 2022 by RQ against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 17 November 2021 in Case T-147/17, Anastassopoulos and Others v Council and Commission

(Case C-7/22 P)

(2022/C 119/35)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: RQ (represented by: M. Meng-Papantoni, H. Tagaras, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

| — | Allow the appeal and set aside the judgment under appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

Allow the appeal and set aside the judgment under appeal;

| — | decide on the further course of action as a matter of right; |
| --- | --- |

—

decide on the further course of action as a matter of right;

| — | order the defendants to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendants to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In the first place, the appellant submits that the General Court distorted the appellant’s application as regards the act adversely affecting it.

In the second place, the appellant submits that the General Court made several errors of law:

As regards, first, the liability of the European Union for unlawful conduct, the General Court disregarded the principles of the rule of law and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by holding that the acts and omissions of the Eurogroup could not, in any event, give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union. The General Court also failed to have regard to the principle of equal treatment by holding that the mere acquisition of bonds, subsequently discounted, by natural and legal persons, was sufficient to consider them to be in an identical or comparable situation within the meaning of the case-law.

Next, the General Court made errors of law concerning strict liability. First, according to the appellant, the General Court wrongly excluded the very existence of strict liability. Second, the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the ‘abnormal’ nature of the damage.

---
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 45 (Friday, March 7, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 10588]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-5844]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

PAROLE COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meeting

Public Announcement
Pursuant To The Government In the Sunshine Act (Public Law 94-409) [5 
U.S.C. Section 552b]
AGENCY HOLDING MEETING: Department of Justice, United States Parole 
Commission.

DATE AND TIME: 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, March 11, 1997.

PLACE: 5550 Friendship Boulevard, Suite 400, Chevy Chase, Maryland 
20815.

STATUS: Closed--Meeting.

MATTERS CONSIDERED: The following matter will be considered during the 
closed portion of the Commission's Business Meeting:
    Appeal to the Commission involving approximately three cases 
decided by the National Commissioners pursuant to a reference under 28 
C.F.R. 2.27. These cases were originally heard by an examiner panel 
wherein inmates of Federal prisons have applied for parole or are 
contesting revocation of parole or mandatory release.

AGENCY CONTACT: Tom Kowalski, Case Operations, United States Parole 
Commission, (301) 492-5962.

    Dated: March 4, 1997.
Michael A. Stover,
General Counsel, U.S. Parole Commission.
[FR Doc. 97-5844 Filed 3-5-97; 1:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4410-01-M
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 67 (Thursday, April 7, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20403-20404]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-07331]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Notice of Termination of Receiverships

    The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC or Receiver), as 
Receiver for each of the following insured depository institutions, was 
charged with the duty of winding up the affairs of the former 
institutions and liquidating all related assets. The Receiver has 
fulfilled its obligations and made all dividend distributions required 
by law.

[[Page 20404]]



                                     Notice of Termination of Receiverships
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Termination
              Fund                  Receivership name             City                State            date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10430..........................  Covenant Bank and       Rock Spring..........  GA                    04/01/2022
                                  Trust.
10444..........................  Waccamaw Bank.........  Whiteville...........  NC                    04/01/2022
10467..........................  Community Bank of the   Sunrise Beach........  MO                    04/01/2022
                                  Ozarks.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Receiver has further irrevocably authorized and appointed FDIC-
Corporate as its attorney-in-fact to execute and file any and all 
documents that may be required to be executed by the Receiver which 
FDIC-Corporate, in its sole discretion, deems necessary, including but 
not limited to releases, discharges, satisfactions, endorsements, 
assignments, and deeds. Effective on the termination dates listed 
above, the Receiverships have been terminated, the Receiver has been 
discharged, and the Receiverships have ceased to exist as legal 
entities.

(Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1819)

    Dated at Washington, DC, on April 1, 2022.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
James P. Sheesley,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-07331 Filed 4-6-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
# C_2022222EN.01001202.xml

| 7.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 222/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 222/12

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Niederösterreich (Austria) lodged on 3 March 2022 — RE v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Lilienfeld

(Case C-155/22)

(2022/C 222/21)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Niederösterreich

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: RE

Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Lilienfeld

Other party to the proceedings: Arbeitsinspektorat NÖ Wald- und Mostviertel

Question referred

Is EU law to be interpreted as being compatible with a national provision that allows persons who are criminally liable for a transport undertaking to transfer their liability for very serious infringements of Community provisions on driving time and rest periods for drivers to a natural person by mutually acceptable agreement, if such transfer precludes the assessment of good repute within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009, (1) which is provided for under national law only when a punishment is being imposed on the persons transferring criminal liability?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC (OJ 2009 L 300, p. 51).

---
# C_2022207EN.01001501.xml

| 23.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 207/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 207/15

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 15 February 2022 — Xella Magyarország Építőanyagipari Kft. v Innovációs és Technológiai Miniszter

(Case C-106/22)

(2022/C 207/21)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Xella Magyarország Építőanyagipari Kft.

Defendant: Innovációs és Technológiai Miniszter

Questions referred

| 1. | Having regard to recitals 4 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (1) establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union and to Article 4(2) TEU, must Article 65(1)(b) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that it permits the laying down of rules such as those in Paragraph 85 of veszélyhelyzet megszűnésével összefüggő átmeneti szabályokról és a járványügyi készültségről szóló 2020. évi LVIII. törvény (Law LVIII of 2020 on transitional provisions relating to the end of the state of emergency and to the pandemic crisis), and in particular those in Paragraph 276(1) and (2)(a) and Paragraph 283(1)(b) of that law? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Having regard to recitals 4 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (1) establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union and to Article 4(2) TEU, must Article 65(1)(b) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that it permits the laying down of rules such as those in Paragraph 85 of veszélyhelyzet megszűnésével összefüggő átmeneti szabályokról és a járványügyi készültségről szóló 2020. évi LVIII. törvény (Law LVIII of 2020 on transitional provisions relating to the end of the state of emergency and to the pandemic crisis), and in particular those in Paragraph 276(1) and (2)(a) and Paragraph 283(1)(b) of that law?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does the mere fact that the Commission has conducted a merger control procedure, exercised its powers and authorised a concentration affecting the chain of ownership of a foreign indirect investor preclude the exercise of the decision-making power under the applicable law of the Member State? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does the mere fact that the Commission has conducted a merger control procedure, exercised its powers and authorised a concentration affecting the chain of ownership of a foreign indirect investor preclude the exercise of the decision-making power under the applicable law of the Member State?

---

(1)  OJ 2019 L 79I, p. 1.

---
#### Patsy N. SAKUMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF THE TROPICS AT WAIKELE, an incorporated association, by its board of directors; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16791

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 21, 2017

Patsy N. Sakuma, Pro Se

Matt Tsukazaki, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Li & Tsukazaki, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellee Association of Apartment Owners of the Tropics at Waikele

Janelle Mae Fong Lau, Esquire, Attorney, Motooka *&*Rosenberg, LLLC, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants-Appellees Milton M. Motooka, Motooka Yamamoto *&*Revere, LLP

*907Christopher Tanega Goodin, Esquire, Attorney, Peter William Olson, Attorney, Cades Schutte LLP, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellee Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP

Robyn B. Chun, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGHI — -Office of the Hawaii Attorney General, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellee James S. Ko-metani

Jonathan W. Y. Lai, Esquire, Attorney, Watanabe Ing LLP, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants-Appellees First Hawaiian Bank, Watanabe Ing, LLP

Leta Huang Price, Legal Counsel, Title Guaranty of Hawaii, Inc., Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellee Title Guaranty Escrow Services, Inc.

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P, 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Patsy N. Sakuma appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine. *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, *Thompson v. Paul,*547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

Dismissal of Sakuma’s action was proper because Sakuma failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible RICO claim. *See Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); *Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,*431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005) (elements of a civil RICO claim).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Sakuma’s motion to file supplemental excerpts of record (Docket Entry No. 40) is granted and the docket reflects that the supplemental excerpts of record have been filed. All other pending requests and motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,