IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0303

Filed November 26, 2014

JOHN LEMKE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

MANDI LEMKE,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Paul L. Macek, 

Judge.

John Lemke appeals from the district court’s award of physical care of the 

parties’ children in its modification of the decree dissolving his marriage to Mandi 

Lemke. AFFIRMED.

Joel Walker, Davenport, for appellant.

Michael J. McCarthy of McCarthy, Lammers & Hines, Davenport, for 

appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2

POTTERFIELD, J.

John Lemke appeals from the district court’s modification of the decree 

dissolving his marriage to Mandi Lemke. The parties were married in 2004. 

They divorced in 2007 but did not separate. In 2008, after they separated, John 

persuaded Mandi to join his petition to modify the joint physical care provision in 

their dissolution decree to award John physical care of their four children. Both 

parents have shared joint legal custody since the dissolution. The parties agree 

that the children have spent approximately half of their time with each parent 

since the parties separated.

Mandi petitioned the district court for modification of the physical care 

provisions of the modified decree on April 1, 2013. After trial, the court issued a 

modification order on January 27, 2014. The order grants physical care to Mandi 

but leaves joint legal custody unchanged. It establishes a physical care schedule 

in which the care of the children alternates between the parents each week.

1

John appeals.

“We review an order modifying a decree for dissolution of marriage de 

novo.” In re Marriage of Sisson, 843 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2014). Though they 

are not binding on us, we give weight to the factual findings of the district court.

Id. We give particular weight to its findings regarding the credibility of witnesses. 

Id. We will affirm the district court unless it has failed to do equity. Id.

 

1

The modification also changed the child support arrangement. Previously John had 

been awarded child support from Mandi in a default order in September 2010. The 

district court’s modification order now requires John to pay Mandi $50 per month in child 

support.
3

John first argues Mandi did not demonstrate a substantial and material 

change in circumstances to support her request for modification of physical care.

See In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Iowa 2005) (“[C]ourts 

should only modify the custodial terms of a dissolution decree if it has been 

established that conditions since the decree have so materially and substantially 

changed that the children’s best interests make it expedient to make the 

requested change.”). We agree with the district court that Mandi has shown such 

a change in circumstances.

Many of the troubling issues between Mandi and John predate the 2008 

modification granting John physical care, and those issues—of which Mandi 

certainly had prior knowledge—may not serve as a basis for Mandi’s proposed 

modification. However, between the 2008 modification and this present 

modification action, John’s cooperation with Mandi in managing her visitation 

rights degenerated to such a degree that the children have been affected, and 

Mandi has therefore proved a change in circumstances. The precipitous decline

of John’s ability to work civilly together with Mandi to balance physical care and 

visitation rights could “not have been contemplated by the court when the decree 

was entered.” In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983).

The district court cites to a litany of John’s statements from early 20132

demonstrating the level of aggression with which John now tries to control Mandi 

 

2 The district court specifically noted several statements—primarily derived from text 

messages—John made to Mandi in February and March of 2013, which were the 

impetus of her petition to modify. The statements indicate John’s unwillingness to work 

together with Mandi and to control her visitation rights. Some of his statements include: 

“Shut up now or your [sic] not going to have them tomorrow. Shut up.” “Stop now or you 

won’t have them tomorrow.I [sic] told you what would happen but u [sic] couldn’t shut up, 

now its donepush [sic] me some more.” “Ur [sic] an idiot. . . . I don’t care about ur [sic] 
4

and his children. That heightened animosity, including name-calling, renders it 

contrary to the children’s best interests for him to retain physical care.

In 2013, he attempted to create trouble for Mandi by reporting her to the 

department of human services (DHS) for allowing the children access to a gun. 

Mandi fully cooperated with the investigation, and DHS found the accusation was 

baseless. Additionally, John had prior knowledge of the gun in Mandi’s house, 

which indicates his complaint may have been strategically timed to interfere with 

Mandi’s relationship with the children rather than to protect them. Credible 

testimony before the district court indicates that John manipulated his children 

into providing false statements to DHS in order to cast Mandi in a bad light with 

investigators. His recent interference with the children’s ability to maintain 

healthy relationships with both parents is evident from the record.

These developments have occurred since the 2008 modification awarding 

John physical care. They constitute a substantial and material change in the 

circumstances of the children’s physical care that supports the district court’s 

modification.

John also claims Mandi has not shown “she can parent more effectively” 

than he can. We agree with the district court that Mandi has established she has 

“an ability to minister more effectively to the children’s well[-]being.” Id. The 

record demonstrates John’s manipulation of the children to make falsified 

statements to DHS, heavy student loan debt, bankruptcies, and lack of gainful 

 

diatribe.” “Pray I don’t hear you were saying stupid shit.” “If u [sic] say anything to her 

remotely stupid . . . About me [ . . . ] or anyone one you won’t like what happens. 

Consider yourself warned.” These excerpts are from only a one-week period between 

February 22 and 28, 2013. Similar statements continue throughout March of that year.
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employment render him unable to provide superior care to that provided by 

Mandi. While John argues Mandi’s balance of unpaid child support and changes 

of residence disqualify her from providing superior care, his own financial and 

emotional instability have created a hostile environment for the children in the 

recent past. Mandi has shown she can minister more effectively to the children.

John lastly claims the best interests of the children, which are “[t]he first 

and governing consideration,” were not satisfactorily considered by the trial court.

In re Marriage of Melton, 256 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 1977). However, the trial 

court’s order was primarily driven by the best interests of the children. In fact, the 

trial court found that Mandi, in her petition for modification, “place[d] the needs of 

the children above any understandable impulse to retaliate” against John, whose 

behavior the district court criticized. The district court stated, “Life for the children 

and the parties would be enhanced if the visitation arrangement was simple and 

predictable.” It issued an order creating just such an arrangement. The district 

court properly considered the best interests of the children.

AFFIRMED.