F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P O R A T I O N , a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

C I T Y O F S A

N D I E G O ; C I T Y C O U

N C I L
O F T H E C I T Y O F S A

N D I E G O ; D E V E L O P M E

N T S E R V I C E S D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E C I T Y O F S A N D I E G O , Defendants-Appellants

. N o. 11-56766

D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00399- B EN-W VG

A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P O R A T I O N , a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

C I T Y O F S A

N D I E G O , Defendant-Appellant

,

and

C I T Y C O U

N C I L O F T H E C I T Y O F S A N D I E G O ; D E V E L O P M E

N T S E R V I C E S D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E C I T Y O F S A N D I E G O , Defendants

. N o. 11-56767

D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00399- B EN-W VGA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P O R A T I O N , a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

C I T Y O F S A

N D I E G O ; C I T Y C O U

N C I L
O F T H E C I T Y O F S A

N D I E G O ; D E V E L O P M E

N T S E R V I C E S D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E C I T Y O F S A N D I E G O , Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 11-56861

D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00399- B EN-W VG

A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P O R A T I O N , a Delaware corporation; T-M O B I L E W E S T C O R

P O R A T I O N , a Delaware corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v

.

C I T Y O F S A

N D I E G O , Defendant-Appellee

,

and

C I T Y C O U

N C I L O F T H E C I T Y O F S A N D I E G O ; D E V E L O P M E

N T S E R V I C E S D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E C I T Y O F S A N D I E G O , Defendants

. N o. 11-56862

D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00399- B EN-W VG

OPI NI ONA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Rog er T. B enitez , District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted April 10, 2013—Pasadena, California

F iled Aug ust 14, 2014

B efore: F erdinand F . F ernandez

, J ohnnie B . Rawlinson,

and J ay S. B y bee, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e B y bee

SUMMARY *

Telecom m unictions Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary j u d gm e n t on claims that the City o f San Dieg o’s denial of cont inual use p ermit applications for telecommunications facilities v iolated the California Permit Streamlining Act, the federal Telecommunications Act, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, a n d t he E q ual Protection Clause.

Reversing the district court’s summary judg ment in favor of the plaintiff on its claim that the City violated t h e t i me limits of the Permit Streamlining Act, the panel concluded

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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that the p ermit applications were not d eemed approved before the City denied them because “ the p u b lic notice required b y law” did not “occur.”

The panel affirmed the d istrict court’s summary judg ment in favor of the City

on the other claims. The panel held that und e r the Telecommunications Act, the City ’s decision to deny the permit application s was supported by substantial evidence, and the City di d not misapply its L a nd Development Code. T he permit d e n ial did not constit ute unreasonable discrimination am ong functionally equivalent service providers because the plaintiff and the City were not functionally equivalent providers. The permit denial did not constitute an effective p r o hibition of personal wireless services because the plaintiff did not demonstrate tha t its proposals were the least in t ru s i v e means of filling a sig nificant g a

p in coverag e.

The panel held that the plaintiff coul d n o t p r evail under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5 because it did n o t have a fundamental vested rig ht to the continued use of its f a cilities.

The panel held that the permit denial did not violate equal protection because it was r ationally related to the City ’s leg itimate interest in minimiz ing the aesthe t i c impact o f wireless facilities and in provi d i n g public communications services.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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COUNSEL

Christine M. L eone ( arg ued), Chief Deputy City A t t o r ney , J an I

. Goldsmith, City A ttorney , D onald R. Worley

, Assistant City Attorney
, Alex is L

. J o d l owski, D eputy City Attorney
, Office of the City Attorney
, San D i ego, California, for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Robert J y s t ad (arg

ued), J ulian Quattlebaum I I I (arg ued), J amie T

. Hall, and Charles J

. McL urkin, Channel L aw Group, L L P, L ong B each, California, for Plaintiff-Appe l l e e/CrossAppellant.

Kara L

. Az o car, A l e x andria, Virg inia, for Amicus Curiae PCI A —The W ireless I nfrastructure Association.

Amrit S. Kulkarni, J ulia L

. B ond, a n d F rank R. Petrilli, Mey ers, Nave, Riback, Silver & W ilson, Oakland, California, for A mici Curiae L eag ue of California Cities and California State Association of Counties.

OP INION

B YB EE, Circuit J udg e:

American T ower Corporation (ATC) i s a leading owner and operator of telecommunication f acilities, some of which

are located in the City of San Dieg o. I n 2007, the City denied ATC’s Conditional Use Permit (CUP) applications for three of its San Dieg o facilities. Disappointed with the City ’ s decision, A T C filed suit in federal district court, r aising claims under, among

other provisions, the California Permit Streamlining A ct (PSA), the F e deral Telecommunicati o nsA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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Act (TCA), California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, a nd the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court g ranted summary judg ment in favor of ATC

on the PSA claim and in favor o f the City on the other claims. ATC and the City

now appeal.

W e reverse the d istrict court’s g ra n t of summary judg ment in favor of ATC on the PSA claim beca u s e we conclude that the CUP applications we r e not deemed approved before the City denied them. F inding no violation of the T CA, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, o r the E q u a l Protection Clause, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judg ment in favor of the City o n the remaining claims.

I

. F ACTS AND PROCEDURAL HI STORY

ATC owns and operates cell tower facilit ies around the world. Three such towers—the Verus, B order

, a n d Mission Valley F acilities—are located in San Dieg o. The City g ranted

a CUP for the Verus F acility o n J uly 27, 1 9 9 5
, the B order F acility on October 3, 1995, and the Mission Valley F a cility

on September 12, 1 996. Each CUP stated that it would ex pire
ten y ears from its date of approval, absent renewal, and that the permitte e w as required to return the site to its orig inal condition at the time of ex p iration or denial of renewal.

The Verus F acility c onsists o f a ninety

- foot monopole with nine antennas and a 200 square-foot equipment shelter,

on industrial property in Otay Mesa. The site is prominently visible from I nterstate-5, which serves as a major north-south transportation corridor in the City

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The B order F acility consists of a ninety -foot monopole with twenty -one antennas and approx imately 440 square feet of equipment shelters, o n low-medium density residentialz oned property in San Ysidro. The h eig ht limit for this z o ne is thirty feet, and the site is visible from I nterstate-805, g oing north and south, and the surrounding residential area.

The Mission Valley F acility consists of an approx imately 177-foot lattice tower with a number of antenna s and an equipment building

, o n industrial property in Mission Valley

. The site is located on the top of a prominent s l o p e a n d is visi ble in the Mission V alley n eig h borhood from I nterstate805.

After the orig inal CUPs ex pired by their terms, ATC filed

a new CUP application for the Verus and B order F acilities on December 1, 2005, and the Mission Valley Fa ci lity on F ebruary 15, 2007. I n response, the City publ i s h e d a Notice

o f Application for the Verus a nd B order F acilities on December 1 6
, 2005, and the Mission Valley F acility on March 14, 2007. The City then issued an A s s e s s ment L etter reg arding each facility

, identify ing concerns f or ATC to address before the City ’s p lanning staff could reco m m e n d approval of th e CUP applications. Most o f the City ’s

concerns r elated to the siz e and visual impact of the f a cilities. The C i t y then deemed the CUP applications for the Verus, B order, and Mission Valley F acilities to be ex empt from the Ca l i fornia Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) on J anuary 13, 2006, F ebruary 13, 2007, and J uly 2, 2007, respectively

.

Under the PSA, th e C ity was required to approve o r disapprove the CUP applica tions within six ty day s from the date o f its determination that the facilities were ex empt from the CEQA. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65950(a)(4). The City failed toA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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act on any of the CUP a pplications within t h i s six ty -day window. I nstead, over an ex tended period, the City and ATC continu ed to have discussions reg arding the CUP applications and what would be required for ATC to obtain the CUPs.

The City published a Notice of Public Heari n g f or the Verus F acility on March 2 0, 2007. At the hearing on A pril 4, 2007, t h e City denied the Verus F acility CUP a pplication because t h e project d id not comply to the max imum ex tent feasible w ith the City ’s L a nd Development Code. See S a n Dieg o Mun. Code § 141.0405 ( 2 0 0 1 )

. ATC did not offer siting or desig n solutions to a ddress the planning staff’s

c o ncerns, other than ag reeing to add additional landscaping and screening

for the facility ’s equipment shelter.

The City published a Notice o f Public Hearing for the B order F acility on J uly 18, 2007. At the h earing on A ug ust 8, 2007, the planning staff recommended den i a l o f the CUP

a pplication because the p roject did not comply to the

max imum ex tent feasible with the City ’s L and Development Code. See id

. T he Hearing Officer continued the hearing a nd requested that ATC p rovide a site-sp ec i f i c analy sis of h ow wireless coverag e would be affected if the heig ht of the tower

were r educed. At a second hearing on September 12, 200 7, the City denied t h e C U P application because ATC had not provided sufficient information to allow the Hearing Officer
to make the finding s required b y t h e City ’s L a nd Development Code.

The City also published a Notice of Public Hearing for the Missio n V a l l e y F acility o n J uly 18, 2007. At the hearing on Aug ust 8, 2007, ATC offered to minimiz e the visual impact of the facility by p ainti n g t h e tower, adding additional landscaping

, and removing unused mounting arms. The CityA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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planning staff recommended d enial of the C U P a pplication because A TC refused to consider other, less visually intrusive desig n a lternatives, such as using architectural features to integ rate the f

acility wi t h its surrounding s. The Hearing Officer continued the hearing to al l ow both sides the opportunity to supplement t he record. The City denied the CUP a pplication on September 1 2, 2007, because the project did n ot comply to the ma x i m u m e x tent feasible with the City ’ s L a nd Development Code.

ATC appealed al l t h ree CUP denials to the City ’s Planning Commission. The Planning Commission denied the appeals, finding that the information presented on desig n a nd siting solutions was insufficient to meet the requirements o f the City ’s L and Development Code.

I n response to the City ’s denial of the CUP applications, ATC filed s u i t i n federal district court, raising claims under the PSA, th e TCA, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1 0 9 4 .5, and the E qual Protection Clause, among other provisi o n s

. B oth sides moved for summary judg ment. The district court g ranted summary judg ment in favor of A TC on its PSA claim, reasoning that the CUP applications were deemed approved when the City failed to make its decisions within the six ty -day window e stablished by § 6 5950(a)(4). The district court g ranted summary judg ment in favor of the City on t h e o ther claims. B oth sides timely appealed the district court’s adverse ruling s.

I I . STANDARD OF REVI EW

W e review de novo the district court’s g rant of summary judg ment. O

swalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc.
, 642 F .3d 8 5 6, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). “W e determine, viewing the evidence in theA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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l i ght most f

avorable to the n onmoving party , whether ther e

are any g e nu i n e i ssues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” W allis v. Princess Cruises, Inc.
, 306 F .3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2002). We do not “weig h the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determine[ ] whether there is a g enuine issue for trial. ” Balint v. Carson City
, 1 80 F .3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). W hen parties file cross-motions for
summary j u d g m e n t, we consider each motion on its merits. Fair Hous. Council o

f Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. R iverside Two
, 249 F .3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). “W e may affirm a g rant of summary judg ment on a n y basis the record s u p p o rts, including one the district c ourt d id not reach.” Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v

. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas
, 257 F .3d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 2001).

I I I . DI SCUSSI ON

There are f

o u r claims before us on appeal. F irst, we consider whether ATC’s CUP applications were deemed approved as a matter of law pursuant to the PSA. Second, we address A TC’s claims under the TCA: (1) whether the City ’s decision to deny the CUP applications was supported b y substantial evidence, (2) whether the City ’s decision to deny the CUP applicati o n s c o n s t i t u t e d u n r e asonable discrimination
among functionally equivalent service providers, a nd (3) whether the City ’s decision to deny the CUP applications constituted an effective prohibition of persona l wireless services. Third, we ex amine whether ATC has a fundamental vested rig ht to the continued use of its faciliti e s under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5. F ourth, we take up ATC’s Equal Protection Clause claim.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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A. The California Permit Streamlining Act Claim

ATC c laims that the City violated the time limi ts of the PSA and that, as a resu l t , ATC’s CUP applications must be deemed approved as a matter of law. The City counters that A T C ’ s C U P a

p plications cannot be deemed approved because the City did not provide public n otice of the PSA’s deemed approval p r ovision, a s required by the statute. Resolution o f this claim requires us to d etermine when a CUP a p p l i cation
may be deemed approved under Californi a ’s laby rinthine PSA.

The PSA states that a CUP application may be de em e d approved “only if t h e public notice required by law has occurred.” Cal. Gov’t C o d e § 65956(b). W e conclude that “the p ublic notice required by law” requires reasonable notice of a public hearing

. B ecause such n o t i c e did not “occur” before the City denied ATC’s CUP a pplications, the CUP application s were not deemed approved, a nd ATC’s PSA claim must fail.

1. The Statutory

F ramework

The PSA was enacted in an effort to “ ens u r e cl e ar understanding of t

h e s pecific requirements which must be met in connection with the approval of development p rojects a nd
to ex pe d i t e d ecisions on such projects.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 65921. B ecause the Verus, B order, and Mission Valley F acilities q

ualify as development projects, the City ’s decisions on ATC’s CUP applications are subject to the PSA. Id . §§ 65921, 65928, 65927.

Section 6 5950 of the PSA states in re l e v a n t part: “Any public a ge n c y that is the lead ag ency for a developmentA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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project shall app r ove or disapprove the project within

. . . [ s] ix ty d ay s from the d eterminatio n b y the lead ag ency that the project is ex empt from the [ CEQA] .” 1 Id. § 65950(a)(4). This is a mandatory time lim i t

. See P almer v. City o f Ojai
, 223 Cal. Rptr. 542, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“W e conclude that the Scheme created a mandatory , rather than a directory duty .”). D espite the six ty -day time limit’s mandatory nature, however, § 65950 provides for an ex tension “pursuant to § 65957.” Id. § 6 5 9 5 0 (b). Section 65957, in turn, p ermits a sing le ex tension of § 65950’s time lim i t , u p on written
ag reeme n t o f the parties, f or a period not to ex ceed n inety day s from the date of t h e e x t ension. 2 “ No other ex tension, conti n u a n ce, o r waiver of [ § 65950’s] time limit[ ] ” is permitted, ex cept in limited c ircumstances not relevant h ere. Id. § 65957; see also id. § 65950.1 (providing an ex ception to § 65957’s strict one-time ex tension of tim e limit rule “to

1 T h e C ity is th e “ le a d a g e n cy ” in th is case. Cal. Go v ’ t Co d e § 6 5 9 2 9 (“ ‘ L ead ag en cy ’ m ean s th e p u b lic ag en cy w

h ich h as t

h e p rin cip al
resp on s ib ility

f o r carry in g o u t

o r ap p ro v in g a p ro

j ect.”).

2 Sectio n 6 5 9 5 7 p ro v id es:

T h e t im e lim i ts estab lish ed b y Sectio n s 6 5 9 50
, 6 5 9 5 0 .1
, 6 5 9 5 1 , an d 6 5 9 52 m ay

b e ex t en ded o n ce u

p on m u tu al

w ritten ag reem en t o f th e pro j ect ap plican t an d th e p u b lic ag en cy

f o r a p erio d n o t

to ex ceed 9 0 d ay s f

ro m th e d ate o f th e ex ten sio n

. No o th er ex ten sio n , co n t in u an ce, o r w aiv er o f th ese tim e lim its eith er b y th e p ro j ect ap p lican t o r th e lead ag en cy sh all b e p erm itted

, ex cep t as p ro v id ed in t

h is sectio n an d S ectio n 6 5 9 5 0 .1

. Failu re o f th e l ead ag en cy to act w i th in th ese tim e lim its m ay resu lt in th e p ro j ect b ein g d eem ed ap pro v ed
p u rsu an t to th e pro v isio n s of su b d iv isio n (b ) o f Sectio n 6 5 9 5 6

.

Cal. Go v ’ t Co d e § 6 5 95 7

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complet e a nd certify the environmental impact report”). Section 65957 also cautions that t h e “ [ f ] ailure o f the lead
ag ency to a ct within these time limits may resu l t i n t h e project being deemed approved pursuant to the provisions o f subdivision (b) of Section 65956.”

S e ction 65956 provides enforcement for § 65950’s tim e limit. 3 A s a g eneral rule, § 65956 state s that if the lead

3 Sectio n 6 5 9 5 6 p ro v id es:

(a) If an y p ro v i sio n o f law req u ires th e lead ag en cy or resp o n s ib le ag en cy to p ro v id e p u b lic n o tice o f th e d ev elo pm en t p ro

j ect o r t o h o l d a p u

b lic h earin g , or b o th

, o n th e dev elo p m en t p r o j ect an d th e ag en cy h as

n o t p ro v id ed t

h e p u b lic n o tice o r h eld th e h e a r i n g , or b o th

, at least 6 0 d ay s p rio r to t h e ex p iratio n o f th e tim e lim it s estab lish ed b y Sectio n s 6 5 9 5 0 an d 6 5 9 5 2
, th e ap plican t o r h is o r h er rep resen tativ e m ay f ile an actio n p u rsu an t to Sectio n 1 0 8 5 o f t h e C o d e o f Civ i l P ro ced u re to co m

p e l th e ag en cy t o p ro v id e t h e pu b l ic

n o tice o r h o ld th e h earin g , or b o th

, an d th e co urt sh all
g iv e th e p ro ceed in g s p ref eren ce o v er all o th er civ i l actio n s o r p ro ceed i n g s, ex cep t o l d er m atters o f th e sam e ch aracter.

(b ) In th e ev en t th at a lead a g en cy o r a resp o n s ib le
ag en cy f ails to ac t t o ap p ro v e or to d isap p ro v e a d ev elo pm en t p ro

j ect w ith in th e tim e lim its req u i red b y th is article, th e f

ailu re to act sh all b e d eem ed ap p ro v al

o f th e perm it ap p l icatio n f o r t h e d ev elo p m en t p ro

j ect. Ho w ev er, th e p erm it sh all b e d eem ed ap p ro v ed o n ly if th e p u b l ic n o tice req u ired b y law h as o ccu rre d

. I f th e ap plican t h as p ro v i d ed s ev en day s ad v an ce n o tice to th e p erm i ttin g ag en cy o f th e in ten t to p ro v id e p u b lic n o tice, th en n o earlier th an 6 0 d ay s f ro m t h e ex p iratio n

o f th e tim e l im its estab lish ed b y Sectio n s 6 5 9 5 0 an d 6 5 9 5 2
, an ap p lican t m ay p ro v id e th e req u ired p u b lic n o t i ceA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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a ge n c y fails to act to a

pprove or disapprove a developmen t project within § 65950’s time limit, “the f ailure to act shall be deemed approval of the per m i t application f or the development project.” Id. § 65956(b). B ut there’s a ca t c h : “[ T] he permit shall be d e emed approved o nly if the public notice required b

y law h a s occurred.” Id

. (emphasis added). Thus, the lead ag ency ’s inaction will be deemed approval o f

u sin g t h e d istrib u

tio n in f o rm atio n pro v id ed p u rsu an t to Secti o n 6 5 9 4 1 .5

. If th e ap plican t ch o o ses to p ro v id e p u b lic n otice, th at n o tice sh all in clu d e a d escrip tio n o f th e p ro p o sed dev elo p m en t su b stan tially sim ilar to th e d escrip tio n s w

h ich are co m

m o n ly u sed i n p u

b lic n otices b y th e p erm ittin g ag en cy , th e l o catio n o f th e p ro p o s ed d ev elo pm en t, th e p erm it ap plicatio n n u m b er, th e n am e

a n d ad dress o f t

h e p erm ittin g ag en cy , an d a state m e n t th at th e p ro

j ect sh all be d eem ed ap p ro v ed if th e p erm i ttin g ag en cy h as n o t acted w ith in 6 0 d ay s. If th e ap plican t h as p ro v id ed th e p u b lic n o tice req u ired b y th is sectio n , th e tim e lim it fo r actio n b y th e perm ittin g ag en cy s h all b e ex ten d ed t o 6 0 d ay s af ter th e pu b l ic

n o tice is p ro v id ed

. If th e ap p lican t pro v id es n o t i ce p u rsu an t to th is sectio n , th e p erm ittin g ag en cy sh all ref u n d to th e ap p l ican t an y f ees w h ich w ere co llected f o r p ro v id in g n o tice an d w h i ch w ere n ot u sed f

o r th at p u rp o s e.

(c) Failu re o f a n ap p lican t to s u b m it co m

p lete or ad eq u ate in f

orm atio n p u r s u an t to Sectio n s 6 5 9 4 3 to 6 5 9 4 4
, in clu siv e, m ay co n s titu te g ro u n d s f o r d isap pro v in g a d ev elo p m en t p ro j ect.

(d ) N o t h in g in th is sectio n sh all d im i n ish th e perm ittin g ag en cy ' s l eg al resp o n sib ility to p ro v id e, w h ere ap plicab le, p u

b lic n o t i c e an d h earin g b ef o re actin g on a p erm it ap p licatio n

.

Cal. Go v ’ t Co d e § 6 5 95 6

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a development project o nly if two conditions coincide: (1) the
ag ency fails to take action—i.e., a p prove or disapprove the project—within § 65950’s time limit, and (2) the “ public notice required by

law has occurred.”

Section 65956 also provides an applicant with two f orms of self help. F irst, the a

pplicant may file an action to compel the le a d a g ency to c o mply with its leg al d uty to provide public n otice of a d evelopment project or hold a p u b l i c hearing

. Id

. § 65956(a). S e cond, six ty day s after the

ex p iration of § 65950’s time limit for approving o r disapproving the project, if the applicant provides seven day s advance notice to the lead ag ency o f the applicant’s intent to provide public notice, the “applicant may provide the required public notice.” Id

. § 659 5 6 ( b ). I f the applicant provides public notice, the applicant’s pu blic notice must include (1) “ a description of the p r oposed development substantially similar to the descriptions which are commonly used in public notices by the permitting ag ency ,” (2) “the location of the proposed d evelopment,” (3) “ the permit application number, ” ( 4) “the name a nd address of the permitting ag ency ,” and ( 5) “a statement that the project shall be deemed approved if the permitting ag enc y h a s not acted within 60 day s.” Id. F urthe r m o r e , if the applicant provides public notice, “the time limit for action by the permitting
ag ency shall be ex tended to [ an additional] 60 day s after the public notice is provided.” Id

. S e ction 65956(b), however, does not a l t e r the lead ag ency ’ s leg al responsibility to provide, where required, public notice and a hea r i n g. Id

. § 65956(d).

I n other words, if the lead ag e ncy provides “the pub l ic

n otice required b y law,” the permit application is d e em e d approved six ty day s after the development project is deemedA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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to be ex e mpt from the CEQA, unless the parties ag ree in

w r i t i ng to a one-time ex tension for up to ninety day s. I d

. §§ 65950(a)(4), 65956(b), 65957. I n contrast, if the applicant provides public notice, the permit application is d e e med approved, at the earlies t , 180 d ay s a fter the development project is deemed to b e e x e m p t from the CEQA. 4 Id

. § 65956(b).

2. “The Public Notice Required by L aw”

The parties do not dispute (1) that the City published a Notice o f A pplication for each facility ; ( 2) that t h e fa cilities were later deemed ex empt from the CEQA; (3) that the City failed to h o ld a hearing or act on the CUP applications within six ty day s from the d ate th a t the facilities were deemed

ex e mpt from the CEQA, as required b y § 65950(a)(4); (4) that the City subsequently published a Notic e o f Public Hearing a nd held a hearing for each facility ; and (5) that ATC did not publish its own public notice pursuant to the self-help
p rovision of § 65956(b). Thus, the merits of ATC’s PSA claim turn on the definition of the phra s e “ p u blic notice required by law” in § 65956(b). I f the public notice required

4 T o illu strate th is co m

p lex p ro v isio n , w e o f

f er th e f o llo w in g ex am

p le. T h e Veru s Facility w as d eem ed to b e ex em p t f ro m th e CEQA o n Jan u ary 1 3
, 2 0 0 6

. T h eref

o re, u n d er § 6 5 95 0 (a)(4 ), th e City h ad six ty d ay s (ab sen t

a o n e- tim e ex t e n s io n f

o r u p t o n in ety d ay s p u rsu an t to § 6 5 9 57 )—u n t i l March 1 4
, 2 0 0 6—to g iv e an y ap p ro p riate n o t ices, co n d u ct an y h earin g s,

a n d ap p ro v e o r d isap p ro v e th e CUP ap p licatio n

. If

, h o w ev er, th e Ci t y f ailed to p ro v id e “ th e p u

b lic n o tice req u ired b y law ,” an d A T C h ad w an ted
to ex ercise its self

- h elp rig h ts, A T C co u ld h av e g iv en p u b lic n o tice af

ter

an ad d itio n al six ty d ay s—o n May 1 3
, 2 0 0 6—p ro v id ed th at A T C g av e th e City sev en d ay s ’ n o tice o f its i n ten t to d o so

. Cal. Go v ’ t Co d e § 6 5 9 5 6 (b ). T h e City th en w o u ld h av e h ad an ad d i tio n al six ty d ay s—u n til Ju l y 1 2
, 2 0 0 6 —to act o n

th e CUP ap p licatio n b ef

o re it w o u ld h av e b een d eem ed
ap p ro v ed

. Id . J u ly

1 2 , 2 0 06 , is 1 8 0 d ay s af

ter J an u ary

1 3 , 2 0 0 6

.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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by law “occurred” b e f

ore the City d enied ATC’s CUP applications, the CUP a

pplications must be deemed approved

as a matter of law. I

d

. § 65956 ( b ). I f, h owever, the public notice required by law did n ot “occur” before the City denied ATC ’ s C U P applications, the CUP applications c annot be deemed approved, and ATC’s PSA claim must be d e nied. Id

.

ATC co n t ends that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Bickel v. City of Piedmont

, 946 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1997), superseded by statute as recognized in Riverwatch v. Cnty. of San Diego
, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 328–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 999), controls the d efinition of “public notice r equired by law.” I n B ickel

, the California Supreme Court held that an applicant could waive its rig ht to deemed approval b y cooperating with a lead ag ency ’s leng thy pr o c e ssing of its application. 5 Id

. a t 433–34. Alth o u g h the c ourt did not directl y a d d ress the definition of “ p u blic notice required b y law” under § 65956, it did include the following footnote:

Under section 65956, an a pplicant can compel

a n agency to g ive public n otice of a development project or to hold a public h e aring

, or both, and the statute provides a means for the applicant to g ive public notice. Because in this case the c ity gave public notice and held public h earings, these statutory provisions are not in issue here

.

Id. at 430 n.2 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). B ased on this footnote, ATC arg ues that the California Supreme Court has held that § 65956(b)’s n o tice requirement is satisfied

5 In resp on se, th e l eg islatu re am en ded § 6 5 9 5 7 to p reclu d e th is k i n d o f

w aiv er. Riverwa tch , 9 1 Cal. Rp t r. 2 d at 3 2 8– 2 9

.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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wherever the lead a g ency g ives any form of public notice for

a public hearing

. B ec a use the City g ave public notice a nd failed to act within six ty d ay s a f t e r ATC’s facilities were deemed ex emp t f

r o m the CEQA, ATC contends that its permit applications must be deemed approved.

I f ATC were correct, we would be bound to follow Bickel and conclude that the public notice here w a s sufficient. See Reinkemeyer v. SAFECO I ns. Co. of Am.
, 166 F .3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1999) (per c uriam) (“[ W ] e ar e b o u n d by state supreme c ourt interpretations o f state law.”). B ut A TC is mist a k en

. The adequacy of public notice was not at issue in Bickel

. According ly

, the California Supreme Court had no

o c c a sion to interpret the phrase “public notice required b y law” under § 65956(b), a

nd the Bickel footnote is too thin to control our analy sis in this case. G a l a m v. Carmel ( In re Larry’s Apartment, L.L.C.)

, 249 F

. 3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2 001) (“[ Q] u estions which merely lurk in the record, neither broug ht to the a ttention o f the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having so decided a s to constitute precedents.” (internal quotation marks and citation o mitted)).

I n oppo s i tion to A TC’s position, the City contends that the California Court of A ppeal’s decision in Mahon v. County

o f S a n Mateo
, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 2 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), controls the definition of “public notice required by law.” I n Mahon

, the court hel d t h at such notice must contain a statement that the permit will be deemed approved if the lead
ag ency d oes not act w ithin § 65950’s time limits, reg ardless of whethe r t h e n o t ice is provided by the lead ag ency or the applicant. Id

. at 243. T he court a c knowledg ed that § 65956(b) requires this warning only when the applicant g ives public notice, but it could find “no reason why the L eg islature would require an applicant to send out any thing more than ‘pub l icA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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notice required by l a w. ’ ” Id

. at 242. I n effect, the court said that the lead ag ency must warn the public that its own failure
to act will result in the appli c a tion being deemed approved

an d t h a t i f the lead ag ency does not include such a warning

, the lead ag ency has failed to g ive “ the public notice r equired by law.” T he court thu s c onstrued the lead ag ency ’s duty to provide public notice to include at least those disclosures that § 65956(b) speci f

i c a lly r equires o f the applicant. The City
arg ue s that because it f ailed to include the “deemed approved” lang uag e in its public notice, the public notice was ineffective to trig g er § 6 5956’s automatic approval provision.

I f the City were correct that Mahon controlled o u r interpretation of the phrase “public n otice required by law,”

we would be compelled to conclude t h a t “the public notice required by law” did n ot “occur” here, since the City ’s notice did not contain a statement that A TC’s CUP applications would be deemed approved if the City d i d not a ct within § 65950’s time limit. B ut like ATC, the City is mistaken. “An intermediate state a

p pellate court deci s i o n is a ‘datum for ascertaining state law which is not t o b e disreg arded by a federal court unless it is convin c e d by other persuasive data that the h ig hest court of t h e state w ould decide otherwise.’” Estrella v

. Brandt

, 682 F .2d 814, 817 (9th Cir

. 1 9 82) (emphasis added) (quoting W est v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.
, 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)); see also H ayes v. Cnty. of San Diego
, 6 58 F .3d 867, 871–72 (9th Cir. 2 011). Mahon doe s n o t control o ur interpretation of § 65956(b), altho u gh it may afford g u i d ance as to how the California Supreme Court would interpret that provision.

Her e , t h e t ex t of the statute is “persuasive data” that the Ca l i f ornia Court o f Appeal misinterpreted § 65956(b) in Mahon

. Section 65956(b) d oes n ot define the phrase “ publicA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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notice r equired by law.” I t simply states that such notice must have “ occurred” before the lead ag ency ’s failure to act may be deemed approval of a permit application. Cal. Gov’t Code § 6 5956(b). Section 65956(b) then chang es track to spe c i f y the c ontent of the public notice the applicant is required to provide in order to ex ercise self help:

If the applicant chooses to provide public notice, that notice shall include a desc r i p tion of the pro p osed development substantially sim i l a r to the descriptions which a re commonly used in public notices by the permittin g ag ency , the location of the proposed development, the permit application number, the n am e and address of the permitting ag ency , a nd a statement that the
pro j e c t shall b e deemed approved if the permitting ag ency has not ac t ed within 60 day s.

Id

. (emphasis added). As the qualify ing phras e “[ i] f the applicant chooses to provide publ i c n o tice” sug g ests, these requirements apply only to applicants. Despite this q ualify ing phrase, the California Court of Appeal imposed § 65956(b)’s requirements o n the lead a gency as well, reasoning that the inclusion of such a qualify ing phrase does not sug g est that the leg islature intended a different standard for the notice provided by the lead ag ency

. Mahon

, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 242. B y reading ou t the qualify ing phrase “[ i] f the applicant chooses to provide public no t i c e,” the California Court o f Appeal violated the “funda mental canon of statutory construction that a statute should not be c o n strued so as to render any o f its provisions mere surplusag e.” United States

v. W enner , 351 F .3d 969, 975 ( 9th Cir. 2003) ; s ee alsoA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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Bowsher v. Merck & Co.
, 460 U.S. 824, 833 (1983) (restating “the settled principle of statutory construction th at we must g ive effect

. . . to every w ord o f t h e s t atute”). W e do not believe the California Supreme Court would do the same a nd therefore reject Mahon ’s interpretation of “public notice required by law.”

Our d isag reement with Mahon ’s u ltimate interpretation notwithstanding

, we ag ree with the California Court o f Appeal tha t because § 65956(b) places no restriction on the word “law,” “the public notice r e q u i red by law” must be a function of statutory a

n d constitutional law. Mahon

, 43 Cal. R p t r

. 3 d at 241–42. W e b eg in w ith the PSA. As we have

a l r e a d y indicated, § 6 5956 does not spell out what the le a d
ag ency must include in its public notice. Nor does any other provision of the PSA. I ndeed, the only g ui d a n c e we have in the PSA is § 65956(d), which stat e s t h a t “[ n] othing in [ § 6 5956] shall diminish the permitting a ge n cy ’s leg al responsibility to provide, where applicable, public n otice a nd hearing before acting on a permit a pplication.” A c cording ly

, we must look bey o nd the PSA for relevant provisions— statutory and c onstitutional—tha t require public notice or a hearing b efore acting o n a permit a p plicat i o n under these circumstances.

W e find relevant statutory provisions in the San Dieg o Municipal Code, which imposes c ertain notice requirements

on the City before it may appr o v e p ermit applications. The City classified the Verus, B order, and M ission Valley F acilities as Major Telecommunication F acilities. Section 141.0405(f) requires that CUP applicati o n s for Major Tel e c o m m

unication F acilities b e “decided in accordance with Process Three.” San Dieg o Mun. Code § 141.0405(f) (2001). Process Three, in turn, requires (1) that Notice of ApplicationA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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be sent pursuant t o § 112.0302(b) no later than ten business day s af t e r the date on which an application is deemed complete, 6 (2) that Notice o f Public Hearing b e provi d e d
p u rsuant to § 112.0301(c), 7 (3) that Notice by M a i l b e provided p ursuant to § 112.0302, and (4) that Published N o t ice be provided pursuant to § 112.0303. Conspicuously absent from all o f these p rovisions is a r equirement that the City provide notice that the CUP applications shall be deemed approved if the City h a s n o t acted within the time limits of t h e P S A

. W hat is more, the parties do not dispute that the City has complied w i t h t he notice provisions o f the San Dieg o Municipa l C o d e. W e therefore conclude that the

6 T h e No tice o f A

p plicatio n m

u st in clu d e (1 ) a g en eral d escrip tio n of th e p ro p osed d ev elo pm en t ; (2 ) th e lo catio n an d size o f th e p ro p erty th at is th e

su b j ect o f th e ap p licatio n ; (3 ) th e co m m u n i ty p l an n in g area in w

h i ch th e p ro p osed d ev elo p m en t is lo cated an d th e n am e o f th e co m m u n ity p l an n in g g ro u p ’ s d esig n ated co n t a c t p erso n , i f an y ; (4 ) th e n am e an d telep h on e

n u m b er o f th e City staf

f perso n to co n tact f

o r ad d itio n al in f

o rm atio n ; an d (5 ) th e n am e o f th e ap p l i c a n t a n d

, w ith t h e co n s en t o f th e ap p lican t, th e ap p lican t’ s a d d r e ss an d t elep h o n e n u m b er. S an Dieg o Mu n

. Co d e § 1 1 2 .0 3 0 1 (a)(1 ) (2 0 0 1 ).

7 T h e No t ice o f P u

b lic Hearin g m

u st in clu d e (1 ) th e g en eral su b j ect o f th e p u b lic h earin g , in clu d in g th e ty p e o f d ev elo p m en t perm it an d th e n am e

o f th e p ro p o sed dev elo p m en t; (2 ) th e lo catio n an d size o f th e pro p erty th at is th e su b j ect o f th e ap p l icatio n ; (3 ) th e co m m u n ity p lan n in g area in w

h ich th e p ro po sed d e v e l o p m en t is lo cated ; (4 ) a g en eral d escrip tio n o f th e p ro p osed d ev elo p m en t; (5 ) th e n am e o f th e ap p lican t an d

, w ith th e co n sen t

o f th e ap p l i c an t, th e ap p l ican t’ s ad dress an d telep h o n e n u m ber; (6 ) th e id en tity o f th e d ecisio n m ak er h o ld in g th e p u b l i c h earin g ; (7 ) th e d ate, tim e, an d p lace o f th e pu

b l ic h earin g ; (8 ) a b rief d escrip tio n of th e g en eral
p ro ced u res co n cern in g th e co n d u ct o f th e h earin g an d t h e req u irem en ts f

or f ilin g an ap peal; (9 ) th e d ef in itio n o f an in terested p erso n f o r p u rp o ses of
ap p eal; an d (1 0 ) th e n am e an d telep h o n e n u m b er o f t h e City staf

f p erso n t o c o n tact f

o r ad d itio n al in f

o rm atio n

. San Dieg o Mu n

. Co d e § 1 1 2 .0 3 0 1 (c)(1 ) (2 0 0 1 ).A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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City satisfied the statutory component of “ p u b lic notice required by law.”

Nex t, we e x amine the co n s t i tutional principles underly ing that phrase. The California Supreme Court’s decision in Horn

v. County of Ventura
, 5 96 P.2d 1134 (Cal. 1979), g uides our

ana l y s is. There, the court considered whether a property

owner was entitl e d t o n o tice and an opportunity to be heard before the County o f Ventura approved a subdivision map on

an adjacent lot. Id

. at 1136. The court h eld that when adjudicatory land use d ecis ions constitute “a substantial o r sig nificant d eprivation of the property rig hts of other landowners, the affected persons are e ntitled to a reasonable notice and an opportunity to be h e a rd before the approval occurs.” Id

. a t 1140. T he property o w n e r alleg ed that the proposed subdivision would detrimentally affect his interests by hindering access to his property and g enerati n g traffic, parking cong estion, and air pollution. Id

. at 1136, 1139. The
court f ound these alleg ations sufficiently “ substantial” to trig g er procedural due process protections. Id . at 1139.

The Horn court did n ot ex plicitly g round its ana l y sis in either A rticle I
, Section 7
, o f the California Constitution o r the F ourteenth Amendment to the U nited States Constitution. Rather, the court cited both its own precede n t a n d United States Supreme Court precedent in describing what it referred
to as “[ t] h e g eneral application of due process principles.” Id

. at 1140. Despite this ambig uit y , we view Horn ’s holding a s rooted in the due process protections of the California Constitution for two reaso n s

. First, the court did not cite o r app l y Mathews v. Eldridge

, 424 U .S. 319 (1976), which established the n ow-familiar framework for evaluati ng the sufficiency of administra t i ve procedures under the federal Constitution. Id

. at 334–35. H orn was decided in 1 979, threeA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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y ears after Mathews

. I f the California Supreme Court were reaching the federal c onstitutional issue—rather than merely looking to a federal analog ue for g u idance— we think it unlikely the court wou l d have omitted such an important citation. T he fact that the California Supreme Court had cited Mathews and had applied its f ramework prior to Horn streng thens our conclusion. See, e

. g. , Civil Serv. A ss’n v. City & Cnty. of S.F. , 586 P.2d 162, 167–68 (Cal. 1978).

S e c o nd, althoug h California “ha[ s] looked to the Uni t e d States Supreme C o u r t’s precedents for g uidance in interpreting the contours of [ its] own due process clause a nd ha[ s] treated t h e state clause’s prescriptions as substantially overlapping t h o se o f the federal Constitution,” California’s due p rocess protections are, at ti m e s , broader than those imposed by the F ourteenth Amendment. Today’s Fresh S tart, Inc. v

. L.A. Cnty. Office of Educ. , 303 P.3d 1140, 1 149 (Cal. 2013). F or ex ample, when e valuating the sufficiency o f administrative procedures under the state constitution, California c ourts may consider “the dign i t a r y interest in informing individuals of the nature, gr o u n ds, a nd
consequences of the action and in en abling them to present their s ide of the story before a responsible g overnment official.” Id

. at 1 1 5 0 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, b ecause the Horn court did not a pply the Mathews framework and t he federal and state due process clauses a re not coex tensive, we c o n s t rue Horn to hold that California due process protections require reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before a lead ag ency makes an adjudicatory land use decision that constitutes a substantial o rA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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sig nificant d eprivation of other landowners’ property rig h ts. 8 Horn , 596 P.2d at 1140.

The questio n then becomes whether the automatic approval of ATC’s CUP applications w o u l d constitute a substantial or sig nifi c a n t deprivation of other landowners’ property interes t s , s u ch that the denial of reasonable notice and a hearing would violate due process. ATC c laims that the
autom at ic approval of its CUP a pplications would not constitute a s u bstantial or sig nificant deprivation for two

reasons. F irst, ATC arg u es that because the fac i l i t ies a re already in ex istence, their continued presence cannot possibly deprive adjacent land o w n e r s of any property rig hts. This
arg ument ig nores A TC’s oblig ation to return the sites to their orig inal c ondition now that the orig inal CU P s have ex pired by their terms. Althoug h as a practical matter, ATC seeks to continue the use of its facilities, a s a leg al matter, ATC seeks to alter the status quo rather than maintain it.

Second, ATC c ontends t h a t t he facilities c an have no cog niz able impact on other landowners because a l l o f the adjacent properties are either freeway s, vacant land, o r industrial f

acilities. ATC’s contention is inconsistent with the record, which reveals t hat the B order F acility is located on low-medium density residential-z o n ed property and that the Mission Valley F acility is adjacent to multi-family residential property

. F urthermore, even if all of the adjacent properties

were as ATC contends, ATC’s facilities would st i l l h a ve a sig nificant impact o n them. Doz ens of antennas p e r ched on hundreds of feet of towers along side hundreds of square feet of equipment shelters may not seem like a cog niz able impact

8 W e ex p ress n o o pin io n o n t h e req u irem en ts of th e Du e P ro cess Clau s e

o f th e Fo u rteen th

A m en d m en t h ere.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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to ATC, but w e believe most landowners would beg to differ. A TC’s point is better directed to whether other landowne rs will likely object to the renewal of ATC’s applications, not to whether A TC h as a leg al oblig a tion to g ive them notice o f the proposed action.

According ly

, w e have little trouble finding that the automatic approval of A TC’s CUP applications would constitute a substantial or sig nifica n t d eprivation of other landowne r s ’ property interests a nd that due process protections therefore apply

. These protection s include reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id . And as
t h e California Supreme Court made clear in Horn
, t h e “[ n] otice must, of course, occur sufficiently p r i o r to a final decision to permit a meaning ful pr e d ep r ivation hearing to affected landowners.” Id

. at 1141 (internal quotati on marks omitted).

I n sum, we hold that “the public notice required by law” in this case includes the statutory provisions of the San Dieg o Municipal Code and the due process p r o t e c t i ons set f orth in Horn

. 9 A lthoug h the statutory p rov isions do not compel a statement that the CUP a p p l i cations shall be deemed

9 W ere it n o t f

o r th e p ro tectio n s o f d u e p ro cess, § 6 5 9 5 6 w ou ld create th e p o ssib ility o f co llu s io n b etw een th e ap p lican t an d th e lead ag en cy

. A s

w e h av e in d icated

, § 6 5 9 56 in co rp o rates th e n o tice req u irem en ts im po s ed b y lo cal law

. Cal. Go v ’ t Co d e § 6 5 9 56 (d ). If “ th e p u b lic n o t i ce req u ired b y law ” w ere l im i ted to th ese p ro v i sio n s, th e lead ag en cy m ig h t b e ab le to p ro v id e th e req u ired n o tice, ch o o se n o t to h o ld a pu b lic h earin g , an d allo w th e p erm i t a p plicatio n s to b e deem ed ap p ro v ed w ith o u t an y op p ortu n ity f o r in p u t f ro m af f ected lan d o w

n ers. Du e pro cess in terv en es to rem ov e th e p o ssib ility o f co l lu sio n ag ain st th ese af f ected lan d o w

n ers b y g u aran teein g th em reaso n ab le n o tice an d an o p p o rtu n ity to b e h eard b ef o re t h e ap p ro v al

o ccu rs. Ho rn , 5 9 6 P .2 d at 1 1 4 0

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approved if the C i t y h a s not acted within the time limits o f the PSA, due process requires reasonable notice to “occur” in time for affected landowners to p articipate in a meaning f ul pre-deprivation hearing

. 1 0

3. I nsufficient Public Notice

I n lig ht of the foreg oing

, it is clear that “the public notice required by law” did not “occur” before the Cit y denied

1 0 W e o f ten sp eak o f an i n d iv id u al or en tity “ g i v in g ” n otice. A s a resu lt,

w e u su ally th in k o f n otice as a d iscrete ev en t at a sp ecif ic tim e. Here, h o w ev er, w e h av e sp o k en o f n o tice “ o ccu rrin g .” W e h av e d o n e so f or tw o

re aso n s. First, th e relev an t s t atu te f o r ou r an aly sis, § 6 5 9 56 (b ), u ses th e

v erb “ o ccu r.” Cal. Go v ’ t Co d e § 6 5 9 5 6 (b ) (“ [T ]h e p erm it sh all b e d eem ed

a p p r o v e d o nly if th e p u b lic n o t i c e r e q u i r e d b y l a w h a s

o ccu rred .”(em

p h asis ad d ed )). Sec o n d

, in Ho rn , th e Calif o rn ia S u p rem e Co u rt u sed th e v erb “ o ccu r” t o d e f in e th e du e pro cess req u irem en ts f or

n o tice in th is v ery co n tex t. 5 9 6 P .2 d at 11 4 1 (“ No tice m u st, o f co u rse,

o ccu r su f

f icien t ly p rio r to a f

i n al d ecisio n to p erm it a m ean i n g f u l
p red ep riv atio n h earin g to af f ected lan d o w

n ers.” (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s

o m itted )). T h e d if

f eren ce b etw een th e activ e co n stru ctio n —an i n d iv id u al

o r en tity “ g iv in g ” n o tice—an d th e p assiv e c o n s tru ctio n h ere—n otice

“ occu rrin g ”—is s ig n if

i can t

. Un d er Ho rn , o n ce th e p ro tectio n s o f du e p ro cess are trig g ered

, w e see a f am iliar seq u en ce: (1 ) p u b licatio n of

n o tice, (2 ) h earin g , an d (3 ) f in al d ecisio n

. B u

t cu rio u sly

, H

o rn teth ers th e tim in g o f th e “ o ccu rren ce” of n o tice to th e d ecisio n o n

th e m erits, n o t to th e h earin g : th e n o tice m

u st “ o ccu r” s u f

f icien t ly p rio r to th e f

in al d ecisio n to perm it a m ean in g f

u l p red ep riv atio n h earin g to af f ected lan d o w

n ers. Ho rn th u s u s es th e co n cep t of n o tice, to g eth er w ith a seq u en t i al relatio n sh ip b etw een th e “ o ccu rren ce” o f n o tice an d th e f in al d ecisio n , to

secu re a m ean in g f

u l p red ep riv atio n h ear i n g , n ot j u s t to n o tif y af f ected lan do w n ers of p o ten tial ag en cy actio n

. Un d er Ho rn , th eref o re, n o tice is an

ex ten d ed co n cep t th at b e g i n s w ith p u b l icatio n an d can n o t be co m plete b ef o re a m ean i n g f

u l p red ep riv atio n

h earin g f o r af f ected lan d o w

n ers.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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A TC’s CUP applications. 1 1 The City published a Notice o f Public Hearing for the Verus F a cility on March 20, 2007, a nd the B order and Mission Valley F acilities on J uly 18, 2007. 1 2 The City then denied each permit shortly thereafter at a public

11 Mu ch of t

h e co n f u s io n su rro u n d in g § 6 59 5 6 (b ) arises f ro m th is
p assiv e co n stru ctio n , w

h ich d isg u ises th e au th or o f th e n o tice. A t f irst b lu sh , th is co n stru ctio n

su g g ests th at “ t

h e p u b lic n o tice req u ired b y

law ” is th e s am e reg ard less o f w h eth er th e au th o r is th e lead ag en cy o r th e ap p l ican t. Dig g i n g a little d eep er, w e see th at th is can n o t b e t h e case. Sectio n 65 9 5 6 m ak es clear th at o n l y th e lead ag en cy h as a leg al o blig atio n to g iv e pu

b lic n o t ice. Cal. Go v ’ t C o d e § § 6 5 9 5 6 (b ), (d ). Sectio n 6 5 9 5 6
, h o w ev er, d o es n o t actu ally d ictate th e co n t en t o f th i s p u b l i c n o tice. In stead

, as w e h av e d iscu ssed

, § 6 5 9 56 in co rp o rates s tatu t o ry an d

co n stitu tio n al p ro v i s i o n s

— “ t

h e p u blic n o t ice req u ired by law ”—in clu d in g th e n o tice req u irem en ts o f lo cal law an d th e p ro tectio n s o f

d u e p ro cess.

In co n trast to th e lead ag en cy , th e ap p lican t h as n o l eg al o b lig atio n to g iv e, f o r ex am p l e, th e pu

b lic n o tice req u ired by th e San Dieg o Mu n icip al Co d e o r th e Calif

o rn ia Co n stitu

tio n

. Sectio n 6 5 9 5 6 ( b ) s i m p ly g iv es th e ap p lican t th e op tio n to ex ercise s elf h elp

. O n ly if th e ap p lican t ch o o ses to

ex ercise th is o p tio n do es § 6 5 9 5 6(b ) s p ell o u t th e co n ten t o f th e n o tice th at th e ap p l ican t m

u s t g iv e in o rd er to d o so

. T h is n o tice is en tirely d istin ct f ro m t h at req u i red o f th e lead ag en cy , p artially i n reco g n itio n o f t h e f act th at af f ected lan d o w

n ers m ay n o t ap p re ciate th e sig n if ican ce o f p u

b l ic

n o tice p ro v i d ed b y a p r iv ate p arty

. T o th at en d

, § 6 5 9 5 6 (b ) req u ires th e ap p lican t to w arn a ffe c t e d lan d o w n ers th at th e p ro

j ect sh all b e d eem ed
ap p ro v ed i f th e lead ag en cy h as n o t acted w ith in six ty d ay s. W e th u s rej ect th e n o tio n th at § 6 5 9 5 6 (b )’ s p assiv e co n stru ctio n req u ires th e sam e p u b l ic

n o tice f ro m th e lead ag en cy

an d th e ap plican t.

12 W e n ote th at th e City p u b lish ed a No tice o f A

p p licatio n f

o r th e Veru s

an d B o rd er Facilities o n Decem b er 1 6, 2 00 5
, a n d t h e Missio n V alley Facility o n March 1 4
, 2 0 0 7. B u t u n d er H o rn , th e relev an t p u

b l ic n o tice f

or p u rp o s es o f d u e pro cess is th e n o tice o f a h ea rin g , n o t m erely n o tice th at

an a p p lica tio n h as b een f

iled . 5 96 P .2 d at 1 1 41

.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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hearing

. 1 3 As the California Supreme Court held in Horn
, the due process component of “the public notice required by law”
p r o t e c t s a ff

e c t e d l a n d o w n e r s ’ r i gh t t o m e a n i n gf u l participation at a public he a r i n g, meaning that such notice
cannot be c o mplete before the hearing itself. Id

. Consequently

, ATC’s CUP applications were not deemed approved under § 6 5 956(b), and the City is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law on ATC’s PSA claim.

This is not to say that a p p licants hav e to put up with unreasonable delay

. W e recog niz e that “ the L e g islature

enac t ed the [ PSA] to relieve applicants from protracted a nd unjustified g overnmental delay s in processing their p ermit applications

. ” B i ckel

, 9 46 P.2d at 4 29. To that end, § 65956 provides an a

pplicant with two a ve n u e s o f self help. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65956. An applicant may file an action in court to compel the lead ag ency to provide p ublic noti c e and hold

a p u b l ic hearing

. Id

. § 65956(a). A lternatively

, an applicant
may provide its own public notice of the proposed action. Id

. § 65956(b). ATC did neither.

I n summary , a lead ag ency must act on a CUP a pplication within the time limits provided in the PSA, and if it does not act, the CUP application is deemed approved. B ut when other landowners are affected, such deeme d approval would be improper u nless the lead ag ency holds a p roperly n oticed hearing

— i.e., a hearing that complies with the requirements of d ue p r ocess. As the PSA itself indicates, the CUP

13 T h e h earin g f

o r t h e V e r us F a cility w as h eld o n A p ril 4
, 20 0 7, o n ly f if teen d ay s af

ter th e No tice o f P u

b lic Hear i ng w a s p u

b lish ed

. T h e h earin g s f o r th e B o rd er an d Missio n V alley Facilities w ere h eld o n A u g u st 8
, 2 0 0 7
, an d Sep tem

b er 1 2
, 2 0 0 7
, th e latter o n ly f if ty

- six d ay s af

ter th e No tices o f

P u b l ic Hearin g w ere p u

b lish ed

.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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application is not deemed approved in t hat instance. Once a properly noticed hearing is held, the lead ag ency can actually decide the issue. I f the lead ag ency then denie s t h e C U P application, that is an e nd t o application p rocess, and the applicant can pursue any other available remedies. I f the lead
ag ency a ct u a l l y approves the CUP application after the hearing

, an ag g rieved p arty can pursue available remedies at that point. I f, after the hearing

, the lead ag ency does nothing

, the CUP application will be d eemed approved at some point. Here, w e need not decide at w h a t p recise point that would happen, or at w h at p oint an ag g r ieved party could pursue available r emedies r e g arding the d e e med approval. I n the

case before us, the City denied the CUP applications during the hearing s, a

nd therefore the CUP applications c ould not be deemed approved. According ly

, we disag ree with the district court and reverse the judg ment for ATC on this g round.

B

. The Federal Telecommunications Act Claims

ATC advances three claims under the T C A. F irst, ATC claims that the City ’s decision to deny the CUP applications

was not supported by substantial evi d e n c e because the City misappl ied its own L and Development Code. See 47 U .S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B )(iii). Second, ATC claims that the City ’ s denial

o f t h e C U P a p p l i c a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d u n r e a s o n a b l e discrimination among providers of f unctionally equivalent services. See id

. § 332(c)(7)(B ) (i)(I ). And third, ATC c laims that the City ’s denial of the CUP applications constituted an

e f f ective prohibition of personal wireless services. See i d

. § 332(c)(7)(B )(i)(I I ). We a f f irm the district court’s g rant o f
summary judg ment in favor o f t h e City on all three claims. The City e valuated the C UP a pplications under the proper provision o f the L and Development Code and supported its decision to d eny the CUP applications with substantialA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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. C I T Y O F S A

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evidence. I n addition

, t h e City did not unreasonably discriminate am ong providers of functionally equivalent services because A TC a n d the City are not f

u n c t i o nally equivalent providers. F inally

, ATC’s effective prohibi t ion claim fails b e c au s e A TC did n ot demonstrate that its proposals were the least intrusive means of f i l l i ng a sig nificant g a

p in coverag e.

1. “Substantial Evidence”

Under the TCA, “ [a] ny decision by a State or local
g overnment or instrumentality thereof to deny a r e quest to place, c onstruct, or modify personal w ireless service facilities shall be

. . . supported by substantial evidence c ontained in a written record.” Id

. § 332(c)(7)(B )(iii). W e have held that “this lang uag e is meant to trig g e r the traditional standard used for judicial r eview of ag e n cy decisions.” MetroP C S

, Inc. v

. City & Cnty. of S.F.
, 400 F

. 3d 715, 7 2 3 ( 9 th Cir. 2 005) (internal quotation marks and citations o m i tted). However, the substantial evidence inquiry does n ot incorporate the substantive federal standards imposed by the TCA. Id

. I nstead, this inquiry requires u s t o determine “whether the

z oning decision at issue is supported by substantial evidence in the contex t of applicable state and loca l l a w

. ” Id

. at 723–24. “I n other words, we must take applicable state a nd local reg ulations as w e find them and evaluate the City decisio n ’s evidentiary support (or lack thereof) relative to those reg ulations.” I

d

. at 724. T h e substantial evidence inquiry is d e f

erential: “[ we] may not overturn the [ City ’s] decision on ‘substantial evidence’ g rounds if that decision is authoriz ed by applicable local r eg ulations and [ is] supported by a r easonable amount of evidence (i.e., more than a ‘scintilla’ but not necessarily a preponderance).” Id . at 725.A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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. C I T Y O F S A

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Here, local law p rohibited the City from approving ATC’s CUP applications unless the facilities “[ would] comply to the

max imum e x tent feasible with the reg ulations of t h e L a nd De v e l o pment Code.” San Dieg o Mun. Code § 126.0305(c) (2001). B ecause the City could not make this finding for any of ATC’s f

acilities, it denied ATC’s CUP a pplications. Spe c i fically

, the City classified the V erus, B order, a nd Mission Valley F acilities as Major Telecommuni c ation F acilities under the L and Development Code. “Major telecommunication f

aciliti e s [ must] be desig ned to be minimally invasive throug h the use of a rchitecture, landscape architecture, and siting solutions.” Id

. § 141.0405(f)(2) (2001). The City was unable to find that ATC had complied with this requirement “to the max imum ex tent feasible,” i d

. § 126.0305(c) (2001), and thus could not approve ATC’s CUP applications.

ATC’s sole contention o n a p peal is that the City ’s decision to deny

the CUP applications was not supported by substantial e vidence because the City applied t h e w r ong desig n standard. T hat is, accordi n g to ATC, the City erroneously applied the desig n standard for Minor Telecommunication F acilities r ather than the desig n standard for Major Telecommunication F acilities. As proof, ATC cites the desig n standard for Minor Telecommunication F a cilities, which states that “[ a] n antenna f acility will be considered a minor telecommunication facility if the facili t y

. . . is concealed from public view or integ r ated into the architecture

or surrounding environment.” Id

. § 141.0405(e)(1 ) (2001). Thus, in ATC’s view, the k ey distinction between Major a nd Minor Telec o m m u n i c at i o n Fa c i lities is that Minor Telecommunication F acilities can be c oncealed from p u b l ic view or integ rated in t o their surrounding s, and Major Telecommunication F acilities c a n not. Despite this keyA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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. C I T Y O F S A

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distinction, however, the City repeatedly sug g ested that ATC needed to “conceal” or “integ rate” its facilities in order to obtain the desired C U P s

. B e c ause the City alleg edly evaluated the CUP applications u nder the desig n standard for Minor Telecommunication F ac ilities, ATC a rg ues that the City ’ s d e nials could n o t h a ve been supported by substantial evidence, and the judg ment of the d istrict court in favor o f the City must be reversed.

A T C misinterprets the law and mischaracteriz e s the record. The line of d emarcation b e t w een Major a nd Minor T elecommunication F acilit ies is not the possibility of concealment or integ ration, as ATC sug g ests. On the contrary , the L and Development Code ex pressly

r e q u i r e s c o n c e a l m e n t o r i n t e g r a t i o n o f M a j o r Telecommunication F acilities under ce rtain circumstances. Id

. § 1 4 1.0405(f)(1)(C) (2001) (stating that Major Telecommunication F acilities are not per m i t ted “[ w] ithin 1⁄2 mile of another major telecommunication facility

, unless the proposed f

a cility will be concealed from public view o r integ rated into the a

r chitecture or surroundi n g e n v i r onment”). W h at is more, the record makes it perfectly clear that the City properly evaluated the CUP applications under the d esig n

s tandard for Major Telecommunication F acilities. I n ea c h

w ritten decision, the Hearing Officer set out the desig n standards for both Major a nd Minor T e l e communication F acilities. She then s t i p ulated that the relevant CUP
ap p lication w as for a Major Telecommunication F a cility and found th at the proposed facility d id not conform to the L and Development Code’s requirement that Major Telecommunication F acilities “be desig ned to be minimally visible throug h the use of a r chitecture, lands c a

pe architecture,

a nd siting solutions.” Id

. § 1 41.0405(f)(2) (2001). B ecause the Hearing Officer could no t find that ATC’s facilitiesA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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. C I T Y O F S A

N D I E G O 34

complied to the max imum ex tent feasible w i t h this requirement, she denied the CUP applications. There was no leg al error.

F urthermore, on the merit s , t he City supported its decision
to deny the CUP applications with substantial evidence. F rom the time ATC filed its CUP applications to the time the City denied t h e m, the City continually e x pressed its concerns

re ga r d ing the visual impact o f the facilities. These concerns

arose o ut of the City ’ s d

uty to find that the facilities complied
to the max imum ex tent feasible with the reg ulat i ons o f the L and D evelopment Code, including the require m en t that Major Telecommunication F a cilities b e m i n imally invasive. 1 4 Id

. §§ 1 2 6

. 0305(c) (2001), 141.0405(f)(2) (2001). I n response, ATC consistently refused to c o n sider modifications th at involved r eduction in heig ht or redesig n of the towers. B ased on this record, we f ind that the Ci t y ’ s decision was authoriz ed by

the relevant reg u lations and was supported b y

a “reasonable amount” of evidence in the r e c o r d, i.e., more than a sci n t i l la but not necessarily a preponderance. MetroPCS, Inc.
, 400 F .3d at 725. According ly

, t he City ’s decision was supported by “substanti a l e v idence” under the TCA
, a nd the district court p roperly g ranted summary judg ment in favor of the City on this claim. Id

.

2. “Unreasonable Discrimination”

The TCA provides that “[ t] he reg ulation of the placement, construction

, a nd modification of personal wireless service facilities b y any State or local g overnment or instrumentality

1 4 W e h av e h eld th at aesth etic co n cern s m ay b e a v alid b asis f o r zo n in g d ecisio n s. T-Mo b i le US

A, In c. v. C

ity o f An a co rtes , 5 7 2 F.3 d 9 8 7
, 9 9 4 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ).A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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. C I T Y O F S A

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thereof

. . . shall not unreasonably discriminate a mong providers of function a lly equivalent services.” 47 U .S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B )(i)(I ). “[ P] roviders a lleg ing unr easonable di s crimination must show that they have been treated differently from other providers w hose facilities a re similarly situated in terms of t h e s t r u c ture, placement or cumulative impact as the f

acilities in q

uestion.” MetroPCS, Inc.
, 4 0 0 F .3d
at 727 (internal q u o t a tion marks a nd citation omitted). The
ag g r ieved p r oviders must then show that the discr imination

w as, in fact, unreasonable. Id

. (“[ S] ome discriminat i o n among providers of functionally equivalent se r v ices is allowed. A ny discrimination need only be reasonable.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

ATC identifies o nly o n e alleg edly “similarly situated” provider: the City

. ATC claims that the Ci t y i s “ similarly situated” because ATC and the City both operate telecommunication facilities, provide similar services, a nd collect sig nificant r evenue from their operatio n s

. F o r

ex a mple, A T C emphasiz es that ATC and the City provide both commercial and emerg ency communicat i o n s services. I n addition, ATC points o ut that the City has g enerated substantial revenue from its c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e t w o r k throug h private leases, as does ATC.

These relevant similarities notwithstanding

, ATC a nd the City are n ot “ similarly situated” providers. I n contrast to AT C ’ s telecommunication operations, which are entirely commercial, the City ’ s telecommunicat i on operations a re primarily public in nature. The City provides commun i c a t i ons services to its water, fire, and police departments, as well a s other g overnment a g encies. B y providing these servi c e s in house, the City produces an important public benefit without private-sector c ost. And althoug h the City does g enerate someA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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revenue throug h private leases, it does not advertise available
space to wireless carriers, which d emonstrates the minimal d e gr e e to which the City is eng ag e d in any form o f competition with ATC. This record simply cannot support a finding that A TC and the City provide functionally equivalent services. As a result, we conclude that ATC and the City a re not “similarly

situated” providers for purposes of the TCA.

Moreover, even if ATC and the City we r e “ similarly situated” p roviders, the City ’s discrimination would b e reasonable. The City denied th e C U P applications based on aesthetic concerns. As we have recog niz ed, “ t h e s e a re leg itimate c o n c e rns f

or a locality .” City o

f Anacortes
, 572 F .3d at 994. ATC contends that it was un r e a s onable for the City to deny its CUP a pplications because the City ’s telecommunication facilities were a s v isually invasive a s ATC’s. W e are in no position to eval u a te this f actual contention. B ut even if the City ’s facilities were e y e s o r es, aesthetic concerns are not absolute. The City was free to take other factors into consideration w hen a u t h o riz ing its o wn facilities. B ecause ATC and the City are not “simila r ly situated” providers and the City ’ s d i s crimination ag ainst ATC

was not unreasonable, the u nreasonable discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

3. “Effective Prohibition”

The TCA mandates that “ [ t] he reg ulation of the placement, construction, a nd modification of personal wireless service facilities by a ny State or local g overnment o r instrumentality thereof

. . . shall not p rohibi t or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B )(i)(I I ). A locality violates
t h i s provision “if it prevent[ s] a wireless provider f r o mA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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closing a ‘sig nifica n t g ap’ in service coverag e.” City of Anacortes
, 572 F .3d at 995 (citation omitted). W e have

a d o pted a two-prong ed analy sis, “requiring (1) the show i n g of a ‘sig nificant g ap’ i n service c o v erag e a nd (2) some inq uiry into the feasibility of alternative f acilities or site l o c a t i o n s

. ” Id

. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The sig nificant g ap p r ong is satisfied “whenever a provider is prevented from filling a sig nifican t g a p in its own service
coverag e.” M

etroPCS, Inc.
, 400 F .3d at 733. W e evaluate the feasibilit y prong under a “least intrusive means” standard, which “requires that the provi d e r s how that the manner in which it proposes to fill the sig nificant g ap in services is the least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve

. ” City of Anacortes
, 572 F .3d at 995 (internal q uotation marks and citation omitted).

B e cause the district court assum ed a sig nificant g ap in service coverag e, we limit our review to the feasibility p rong

. I n d etermining whether ATC met its burden of d emonstrating that its facilities were the “least intrus i v e m e ans,” we

ex a mine the City ’s stated g round for concluding otherwise. Id

. at 996. As discussed previously

, the City denied the CUP applications because it was unable to find that the facilities complied to the max imum ex tent feasible with the reg ulations of the L and Devel o p m e n t Code, including the r equirement that Major Telecommunication F acilit i e s be minimally invasive. San Dieg o Mun. Code § § 126.0305(c) (2 0 0 1 ), 141.0405(f)(2) ( 2 001). To prevail on this claim, therefore, ATC must sho w t h a t its facilities were the “least intrusive means” in lig ht of the aesth e t i c v a lues that motivated the City ’ s decision to deny

the CUP applications.

ATC has not borne its burden. D uring the review process, ATC rejected relocation of the facilities or modifications thatA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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involved reduction in h eig h t or redesig n of the towers. ATC essentially insisted that the City accept ATC ’s conclusion that the ex isting facilitie s were the “least intrusive means,” without offe ring a feasibility analy sis of alternative desig ns

or sites for the City to reach i t s o w n conclusion. I n effect, ATC would make the applic a n t —rather than the locality

—the arbiter of feasibility a

nd intrusiveness, g utti n g the “least intrusive means” standard w ith predict a b l e , a p p l i c a n t

- f r i e ndly results.

As w e ex plained in MetroPCS
, Inc.
, the “least intrusive means” standard “ a llows for a meaning ful comparison o f alternative sites

. . . [ and] g ives p r o v i d e rs an incentive to choose th e l e a s t intrusive [ means] in their f irst [ ] application[ ] .” 400 F.3d at 734–35. To achieve these objectives, the applicant must make a prima facie showing o f effective prohibition, which the locality may th e n r ebut b y demonstrating the ex istence o f a potenti a l l y available a nd technically feasible alternative. City of Anacortes
, 5 72 F .3d
at 996–99. A T C did not adduce evidence allowing for a meaning ful c omparison o f a lternative desig ns or sites, and the City was n ot required to take ATC’s word that these w ere the best op t ions. Consequently

, ATC failed to show that its facilities were the least intrusive means of filling a sig nificant
g ap in service coverag e , and the City is entitled to judg ment

a s a m a t ter of law on the effective prohibition claim. Cf. id.

a t 9 8 9
, 996–99 ( finding a violation of § 332(c)(7)(B ) (i)(I I ) where the provider made a prim a f a c i e showing o f effective prohibition, incl u d i n g a

n a naly sis of e ig hteen alternative sites, and the locality failed to rebut the p ri ma facie showing with evidence of available alternative sites).A M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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C. California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 Claim

ATC claims that the district court erred in evaluating the Ci t y ’ s decision to deny the CUP applications for substantial evi d e nce because ATC had a fundamental vested rig h t to

c o n tinue its operation of the Verus, B order, and Mission Valley F acilities. “The g rant or denial of a conditional use permit is a

n adm i n i strative o r quasi-judicial act. J udicial review must be in accordance with [ California] Code of Civil Procedure section 1 094.5.” Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa
, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 388 (Cal. Ct. A pp. 1992) (internal citations omitted). “I f [an administrative ] decision does not substantially affect a fundamental vested rig ht, the trial court consider s o nly whether the finding s are supported b y substantial evidence in lig ht o f the whole r ecord.” Id

. I f, ho we ver, “an administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested rig ht, the trial court must ex ercise its independent judg ment on the evidence a n d f i nd an abuse o f discretion if the finding s are n o t supported by the weig ht o f the evidence.” Id

.

“The term ‘ves t e d ’ in the sense of ‘fundamental vested rig hts’ to determine the sc o p e o f judicial review

. . . is not sy nony mous w i t h its use in the ‘ vested rig hts’ doctrine relating to land use and development.” W haler’s Village Club

v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n
, 220 Cal. R p t r. 2, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). “ W hether an administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested rig ht must be decided on a caseby -case basis.” 301 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd.

, 279 Cal. Rptr. 6 3 6, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). “[ N] o ex a ct f

o r m ula ex ists by which to make this determinatio n , [ b ut] c ourts are less sensitive to the preservation of purely economic interests.” Id

. (internal

c itation omitted). “[ T] he issue in e ach case is w hether t h eA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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affected rig ht is deemed to be of sufficient sig nificance to preclude its ex tinction or a bridg ment by a body lacking judicial power.” Id. (internal quotatio n m a r k s , alterations, a

nd citation omitted).

ATC doe s n o t have a fundamental vested rig ht to the continued operation of the Verus, B order, and Mission Valley F acilities. The orig inal CUP f or each facility contained an

ex p ress provision stating that the CUP would ex p ire ten y ears from the date of its approval, a b s ent renewal. Additionally

, the orig inal CUP for each facility declared that the permittee

was required to return the site to its o rig inal condition a t the time o f ex piration or d enial of renewal. ATC allowed the orig inal CUPs to ex pire by their terms. As the permittee, ATC had a leg al oblig ation to remove the f a c i l i ties and return the sites to their orig inal condition. B y failing to ob t a in new CUPs before the orig inals ex pired, ATC abandoned any rig ht it had to continue operating the faci l i t i e s ; it could not reasonably

rely on the CUPs’ renewal.

Despite the e x piration of the orig inal CUPs, ATC contends that it had a reasonable ex p e ctation of r e n e w al because the City issued “ex tension o f time ” p r ovisions on CUPs for similar facilities; the City g rant e d c ollocation permits on the Ve r u s, B order, and Mission Valley sites; these facilities are integ ral components of ATC’s telecommunication network; and ATC would suffer financial loss if its CUP applications we r e d e nied. W e disag ree. The City ’ s conduct with third p arties cann o t affect ATC’s reasonable ex pectations in the face of the plain lan guag e o f the orig inal CUPs. Moreover, the importance of the V e rus, B o r d e r , a n d M i s s i o n V a l l e y Fa c i l i t i e s t o A T C ’ s telecommunication network and the f inancial loss ATC would suffer if its CUP applications w ere denied are purelyA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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e c o n omic interests that do not rise to the level of a fundamental vested rig h t under California law. See
, e.g. , San Marcos Mobilehome Pa r k O wners’ Ass’n v. City of San Ma r c o s , 238 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 ( Cal. Ct. App. 1 987) (deny ing rent increase in rent controlled building di d n o t implicate a fundamental v e s ted rig h t as a purely economic interest); Mobil Oil Corp. v

. Superior Court
, 130 Cal. Rptr. 814, 8 1 8, 823–24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (requiring installation of vapor recovery

sy stems at g a s stations did not implicate a fundamental vested rig

ht as a purely

economic interest).

ATC relies on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Goat Hill Tavern to arg ue that we should disreg ard the

ex p iration of the orig inal CUPs. There, the owner o f a tavern that had been in ex istence for thirty

- fi v e y e ars applied for a

new CUP to accommodate a $1.75 million refurbishment o f the tavern. Goat Hill Tavern
, 8 Cal. R ptr. 2d at 390. The
tavern owner obtained a CUP that ex p i r e d just six months later. Id

. at 386. The city subsequentl y d e n i ed the tavern owner’s application to renew the six -month CUP. Id

. a t 387. The tavern owner then sued the c ity f or a w r i t of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5. Id

. at 388. The trial court found that the tavern o wner had a fundamental vested rig ht and that the city ’s decision was not supported b y t h e e v idence. Id

. at 391. I n a f firming the trial court’s decision, the California Court o f Appeal reasoned that it was “utterly implausible that [ the tavern owner] knowing ly g ave up all rig hts to c o ntinue operat i n g G oat Hill T avern in

ex c h a ng e for the opportunity to keep his g ame room

ex p ansion open for six months.” Id . at 391 n.4.

Goat H ill Tavern is readily disting uishable from the case before us. I n Goat Hill T a v e rn , the CUP was necessary to accommodate a major e x pansion y et it ex pired only sixA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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months later. The CUP was thus issued with the understanding that it would be renewed. Here, in contrast, the orig inal CUPs e x plicit l y required ceasing all activity at ATC’s facilities and returning the sites to their origi n al condition ten y ears after the permit was issued if ne w CUP applications were not timely submitted and u l t i mately approved.

W e find a far bet ter analog ue in Metropolitan Outdoor Advertising Corp. v. City of S anta Ana
, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). There, a b illboard o wner soug h t a CUP
to c ontinue operation of a billboard. Id. at 665. After the city denied the CUP application, the billboard owner sued the city for a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, claiming that it possessed a fundamental vested rig ht in the c ontinued u s e an d maintenance of the billboard. Id

. T he California Court of Appeal re j e c t e d this claim because the billboard owner had ag reed to be bound b y the CUP’s terms, including removal of t h e s i gn a fter the CUP’s ex piration. Id

. at 666. The c ourt also e mphasiz ed that the billboard owner would be required to remove o nly one o f its many sig ns and that, because the billboard o w n er h ad
ag reed to the CUP’s terms, it “knew it would h a ve to remove the billboard.” Id

. Th e same is true here. ATC ag reed to the orig inal CUP’s terms, so ATC knew it would have to remove its faciliti e s if it did not renew the CUPs after ten y ears. Moreover, the Verus, B order, an d M ission Valley F acilities are only three of ATC’s many telecommunication facilities.

According ly

, w e conclude that ATC does not h ave a fundamental vested rig ht to the continued use of its f a cilities, and

, as d iscussed above, substantial evidence in the record supports the City ’s decision to d eny the CUP applications. A s

a r esult, the district court properly g ranted summary judg mentA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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in favor of the City on A TC’s C a l ifornia Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 claim.

D. The Equal Protection Clause Claim

ATC contends that the d istrict court erred in a pply ing rational b asis scrutiny to its Equal Protection Clause claim because this claim alleg edl y i m p licates fundamental F irst Amendment rig hts. Alternatively

, A TC arg ues that e ven if

r a t ional basis scrutiny applies, the City ’s denial of th e C U P applications v iolated the Equa l Protection Clause because ATC a nd the City are similarly situated service providers, a nd there was no rational basis for treating the two differently

. Municipal decisions like those a t issue h ere “are presumptively constitutional and, therefore, need only be rationa l ly related to a leg itimate state interest, unless the distinctive treatment of the party involves either a fundamental rig ht or a suspect classif i c ation.” Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey
, 920 F

. 2d 1496, 1508 ( 9th Cir. 1990); see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes

, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“States are accorded wide latitude in the reg ulation of their l ocal economies under their police
powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially

less than mathematical ex actitude.”). Althoug h the freedom of speech, secured by the F irs t A m endment, certainly qualifies as fundamental, Thornhill v

. Alabama

, 310 U.S. 8 8, 95 (1940), it is n ot implicated in this case. ATC does n ot ass e rt i ts rig ht to eng ag e in speech. I nstead, ATC
asserts its rig ht to sell tower space to wireless providers, a nd this rig ht d oes not trig g er h e ig h tened scrutiny

. See Bench Bil l b o a r d Co. v. City o

f Cincinnati
, 675 F .3d 974, 986 (6th Cir. 2012). ATC describes in lofty te r m s the sig nificance o f wireless communication in modern American society

, bu t i tA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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has adduced no e vidence that the c iti zens of San Dieg o will be denied coverag e b ecause the City r ej e cted ATC’s CUP applications. Consequently , because no fundamental rig ht is at issue, heig htened scrutiny is not warranted here.

Apply ing rational basis scrutiny

, we find the City ’s d e c ision to deny the CUPs unobjectionable. As we hav e discussed, ATC and the City are not similarly situated service providers. Moreover, even if ATC and the City were similarly situated providers, t he City ’s decision was rationally r elated
to leg itimate state interests: min imiz ing the aesthetic impact of wireless facilities o n the community and p r o v iding communications servic es for its various departments at a reduced cost. I n view of these leg itimate interests, we cannot say that the City ’s decision to deny the CUPs was irrational. According ly

, ATC’s Equal Protection Clause claim must f ail.

I V. CONCL U SI O N

W e reverse the d istrict court’s g rant of s ummary judg ment in favor o f A T C o n the PSA claim. The CUP applications were n ot d eemed approved bec ause “the public notice re q u ired by law” did not “occur” before the City denied them. W e affirm the district court’s g rant of summary judg ment in favor of the City on the remaining claims. There

was n o violation of th e T C A

. The City evaluated the CUP applications u nder the pr o p er provision of the L a nd Development Code and supported its decision to deny them with substant i a l evidence. The City did not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functional l y equivalent services because ATC and the City are n o t “ similarly situated” pr o v i d ers. ATC has failed to show effective prohibition because it has not demonstrated that its p roposals

were the least intrusive means of filling a sig nific a n t g ap inA M E R I C A N T O W E R C O R P

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coverag e. A TC cannot p revail under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 be ca u s e it does not have a fundamental vested rig ht to the continued u s e o f the Verus, B order, a nd Mission Valley F acilities. F inally

, t here was n o violation o f the Equal Protection Clause because the City ’s d ecision to deny the CUP applications was rationally related to the City ’s leg itimate interest in min i m i z ing the aesthetic impact o f wireless facilities and in providing public commun i c a tions services.

REVERSED IN P ART, AF F IRMED IN P ART.