[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13887

____________________

PATRICIA BENTON LEE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 7:20-cv-00222-HL

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13887

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

LUCK, Circuit Judge:

The bankruptcy code allows debtors to modify or restructure their debts. Yet this grace has its limits. One of those limits is 

the anti-modification provision in chapter 11. Under the anti-modification provision, a chapter 11 reorganization plan may not “modify the rights of holders of . . . a claim secured only by a security 

interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” 

11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). This case asks us to decide the requirements 

that must be met before a bankruptcy court can apply the 

anti-modification provision. We hold that there are three. “[F]irst, 

the security interest must be in real property; second, the real property must be the only security for the debt; and third, the real property must be the debtor’s principal residence.” In re Wages, 508 B.R. 

161, 165 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014). Because the mortgage U.S. Bank 

held on Patricia Lee’s real property met these three requirements, 

the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that the anti-modification provision applied to the bank’s secured claim. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code

Under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, the debtor may 

file for bankruptcy in the hopes of reorganizing her debts. See

11 U.S.C. § 301. To start the process on a voluntary basis, the

debtor must file a petition with the bankruptcy court. See id. Along 

with the petition, the debtor must include several schedules that 

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spell out her assets, liabilities, income, and expenditures. Fed. R. 

Bankr. P. 1007(b)(1), (c). And the debtor must also list her home 

address. 

“Filing for bankruptcy under [c]hapter 11 . . . automatically 

creates ‘the estate,’ which . . . . consists of essentially all the 

debtor’s property and rights to property.” Auriga Polymers Inc. v. 

PMCM2, LLC ex rel. Beaulieu Liquidating Tr., 40 F.4th 1273, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2022). Once the debtor files a voluntary petition under chapter 

11, she “enjoys an automatic stay against actions to enforce, collect, 

assess or recover claims against the debtor or against property of 

the estate.” United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 

2006).

This automatic stay prevents creditors from taking actions 

to enforce debts owed to them, and “actions taken in violation of 

the automatic stay are void and without effect.” See id. (alteration 

adopted) (quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 

1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 1982)). That includes foreclosure actions to 

enforce secured claims against real property. See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 362(a)(3)– (5). “Section 362(c)(1) provides that the stay of an act 

against the property of the estate continues until such property is 

no longer property of the estate.” White, 466 F.3d at 1244.

But to lift the automatic stay and enforce debts they hold, 

creditors may apply for relief so that they can take actions that 

would otherwise be voided by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. 

§ 362(d). For example, a bankruptcy court may grant relief from 

the automatic stay “for cause, including the lack of adequate 

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protection of an interest in property of such party in interest.” Id.

§ 362(d)(1). And the court may grant relief “with respect to a stay 

of an act against property” if “the debtor does not have an equity 

in such property” and the “property is not necessary to an effective 

reorganization.” Id. § 362(d)(2).

A debtor “does not have an equity” in the property when 

“the creditor is undersecured” by the value of the property. See 

United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 

365, 375 (1988). And “property is not necessary to an effective reorganization” unless it is “essential for an effective reorganization” 

and the reorganization is “in prospect”—in other words, there must 

be “a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a 

reasonable time.” Id. at 375–76 (quotations omitted).

Ideally, the end of the chapter 11 process is a judicially approved “plan” that restructures the debtor’s obligations. 11 U.S.C.

§§ 1123, 1129. But not every obligation of the debtor can be restructured by the bankruptcy court under chapter 11. A plan, for 

example, can “modify the rights of holders of secured claims,” but, 

under the anti-modification provision, it cannot modify those 

rights if a creditor’s claim is “secured only by a security interest in 

real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” Id.

§ 1123(b)(5).

Patricia Lee’s Mortgage

In 2007, Patricia Lee mortgaged her property—a forty-threeacre tract of land in rural Georgia. As part of the mortgage, Lee 

signed a note that was secured by a deed on the property. The 

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security deed required Lee to occupy, establish, and use the property as her principal residence and gave the lender, Quicken Loans, 

the power to foreclose on the property if Lee defaulted on the note. 

The mortgage was later assigned to U.S. Bank. 

Lee, as she was required to do, used the property as her principal residence. She lived in a small brick house on two and 

one-half acres on the western edge of the property. The rest she 

leased to a farming company, and that portion of her land was continuously farmed. 

Eventually, Lee defaulted on the mortgage. By August 2020, 

she owed 110 payments on the note for a total amount of

$253,070.25. Instead of paying, Lee filed a chapter 11 voluntary 

bankruptcy petition to restructure her debts. The petition listed 

her property as her residence with an estimated value of $138,000. 

And the voluntary petition triggered the automatic stay. See 11 

U.S.C. § 362(a).

Then, two things happened. First, Lee filed a proposed reorganization plan to restructure her debts, including the money she 

owed U.S. Bank under the mortgage. Lee’s plan called for payments of $1,000 per month for six months followed by a balloon 

payment of $138,000 on the seventh month “in full satisfaction of ”

U.S. Bank’s claim. 

Second, U.S. Bank moved under 11 U.S.C. section 362(d) for 

relief from the automatic stay so that it could foreclose on Lee’s 

property. In support, U.S. Bank argued that: its claim was not adequately protected because there was little or no equity in the 

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property; the anti-modification provision prevented the bankruptcy court from approving a chapter 11 reorganization plan that

modified U.S. Bank’s claim; and the bank’s claim was undersecured 

by Lee’s property and Lee could not establish the property was necessary for an effective reorganization. 

The bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing on U.S. 

Bank’s motion. Lee’s son testified that Lee lived on two and onehalf acres of the property and that the remaining land had always 

been farmed. Lee also introduced an aerial photograph that confirmed her house took up only a small portion of the land on the 

western edge of the property, and she introduced tax documents 

that described all but two acres of the property as either timberland

or agricultural land. 

In closing arguments, U.S. Bank asserted that the “plain language” of the anti-modification provision applied to any property 

a debtor used as a principal residence, whether or not the debtor 

also used the property for some other purpose. Lee countered that 

section 1123(b)(5)’s anti-modification provision applied to a claim 

“secured only by the [d]ebtor’s principal residence” and her property wasn’t subject to the provision because, “from an acreage 

standpoint,” it was “primarily farmland.” 

The bankruptcy court agreed with U.S. Bank that the plain 

language of section 1123(b)(5) did not require that Lee use the 

property exclusively as her principal residence. And, because it was

undisputed that the property was Lee’s principal residence, section 

1123(b)(5) applied to Lee’s mortgage. The bankruptcy court

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therefore found that it could not confirm Lee’s proposed plan and 

that Lee failed to establish a prospect of reorganization. Thus, the 

bankruptcy court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for relief from the 

automatic stay.

Lee appealed the bankruptcy court’s order to the district 

court. She argued that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding 

that section 1123(b)(5)’s anti-modification provision applied to U.S. 

Bank’s secured claim because the anti-modification provision “does 

not apply to mixed-use properties where the debtor resides in part 

of the property and derives busines[s] income from other parts of 

the property.” U.S. Bank responded that the bankruptcy court 

properly relied on section 1123(b)(5)’s plain language, which it argued did not require Lee to use the property only or exclusively as 

her principal residence. The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court and affirmed the order granting relief from the automatic stay. Lee timely appealed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When we review an order of a district court entered in its 

role as an appellate court reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision, 

we independently examine the bankruptcy court’s factual and legal 

determinations, applying the same standards of review as the district court.” In re Walter Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d 1121, 1135 (11th Cir. 

2018). “We review de novo conclusions of law whether by the 

bankruptcy court or the district court.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 

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And “[w]e review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings under the 

clearly erroneous standard.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Like the district court, we take up the same question the 

bankruptcy court answered. What requirements did U.S. Bank 

have to meet for the anti-modification provision to apply to its secured claim on Lee’s real property?

We begin, where we always must, with the text of the statute. In re BFW Liquidation, LLC, 899 F.3d 1178, 1188 (11th Cir. 2018). 

Under section 1123(b)(5)’s anti-modification provision, a chapter 11 

reorganization plan may not “modify the rights of holders of . . . a 

claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the 

debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). Congress clarified the meaning of “debtor’s principal residence” in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,

Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. A “debtor’s principal residence” is

“a residential structure if used as the principal residence by the 

debtor, including incidental property, without regard to whether 

that structure is attached to real property.” 11 U.S.C. 

§ 101(13A)(A). “[I]ncidental property,” in turn, means

with respect to a debtor’s principal residence—

(A) property commonly conveyed with a 

principal residence in the area where the real 

property is located;

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(B) all easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral rights, oil or gas 

rights or profits, water rights, escrow funds, or 

insurance proceeds; and

(C) all replacements or additions.

Id. § 101(27B).

Read together, section 1123(b)(5) has “three distinct requirements.” Wages, 508 B.R. at 165. “[F]irst, the security interest must 

be in real property; second, the real property must be the only security for the debt; and third, the real property must be the debtor’s 

principal residence.” Id.; see also In re Davis, 386 B.R. 182, 185–86

(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (same);1 In re Brooks, 550 B.R. 19, 25 (Bankr. 

W.D.N.Y. 2016) (same); In re Snowden, 546 B.R. 39, 44 (Bankr. E.D. 

Ky. 2016) (same).

As the bankruptcy court found, the three requirements of 

section 1123(b)(5) were met here. U.S. Bank’s claim was secured by 

Lee’s real property, so the first requirement was met. The second 

requirement was satisfied because Lee’s property was the only security for U.S. Bank’s claim. And Lee’s real property hit the third 

requirement because she used it as her principal residence. Lee obtained, and mortgaged, her house and land together. The security 

1

 Because section 1123(b)(5) is identical to section 1322(b)(2)—the anti-modification provision in chapter 13—we consider the decisions interpreting the 

chapter 13 anti-modification provision as persuasive in reading the chapter 11 

anti-modification provision. See Wages, 508 B.R. at 165 n.6.

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deed that secured U.S. Bank’s claim required her to establish the 

property as her principal residence. Her son testified at the bankruptcy court’s evidentiary hearing that Lee lived on the property. 

And Lee identified the property as her residence in her voluntary 

petition. 

Pushing back on this conclusion, Lee argues that we (and the 

bankruptcy court) are misreading the requirements for section 

1123(b)(5). She urges us, instead, to adopt two other approaches

courts have taken in applying the anti-modification provision. But 

the other approaches miss the mark.

Under the first approach, commonly known as the Scarborough approach, some courts have read the anti-modification provision to require that the debtor use her real property only or exclusively as her principal residence and for no other purpose. The First 

Circuit, after finding chapter 13’s identical anti-modification provision ambiguous, reached this result by looking to the legislative history of section 1123(b)(5) for guidance. Lomas Mortg., Inc. v. Louis, 

82 F.3d 1, 4–7 (1st Cir. 1996). The First Circuit read the legislative 

history as a “clear expression of congressional intent” that the antimodification provision did “not reach . . . multi-unit properties”— that is, real property that is the debtor’s principal residence

but also has other residential units that are not the debtor’s residence. Id. at 7.

Although few courts have followed Lomas, the Third Circuit 

reached the same result by “focus[ing] on” the anti-modification 

provision’s “plain language.” In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 411 (3d 

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Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). In Scarborough, the Third Circuit 

reasoned that “[b]y using the word ‘is’ in the phrase ‘real property 

that is the debtor’s principal residence,’ Congress equated the 

terms ‘real property’ and ‘principal residence.’” Id. By focusing on 

the “is,” the Scarborough court concluded that “[a] claim secured by 

real property that is, even in part, not the debtor’s principal residence does not fall under the terms of ” the anti-modification provision. Id. (emphasis omitted). In other words, the anti-modification provision required that the debtor’s real property had to be 

used only or exclusively as her principal residence. See id.

We disagree with the Scarborough approach’s reading of the 

anti-modification provision. First, unlike the First Circuit, we need

not rely on legislative history to understand section 1123(b)(5) because its text is unambiguous. See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 

Co., 839 F.3d 958, 969 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e do not consider legislative history when the text [of a statute] is clear.”).

Second, the average speaker of American English would not 

understand “is,” as used in section 1123(b)(5)—“real property that 

is the debtor’s principal residence”—to mean only or exclusively and 

nothing else. See United States v. Pate, 84 F.4th 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 

2023) (en banc) (“[W]e ask whether that phrase—as used here, and 

in context—would be understood by the average speaker of American English to include former officers or employees of the United 

States.”); see also Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 

235, 237 (11th Cir. 1995) (“When interpreting the text, we give undefined terms their plain, ordinary, and most natural meaning.”). 

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For example, let’s say we told the average man on the street that 

Atlanta is the capital of Georgia. The man wouldn’t understand 

our statement to mean that Atlanta is only or exclusively Georgia’s 

capital and nothing else. Rather, he would understand that Atlanta 

is other things as well, like the transportation hub of the Southeast, 

the seat of Fulton County, and our court’s home base. 

By the same token, the average man would understand that 

“real property that is the debtor’s principal residence” does not 

mean that the real property is only or exclusively the debtor’s residence and nothing else. He would understand that the property 

could also be the principal residence of the debtor’s roommate, the

place where the debtor has her weekend lemonade stand, and the 

spot where she farms honey from her beehive.

Dictionary definitions from around when the anti-modification provision was enacted also bear out that “is” does not mean 

only or exclusively. “Is” is a conjugated form of the verb “be.” See 

Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 645 (1994); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1197 (1993). And “be” is 

defined by contemporaneous dictionaries to mean “[t]o belong to 

a given class or group” or “[t]o have or exhibit a given quality or 

characteristic.” Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 

159; see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 189 (defining “be” in relevant part as “to have a meaning that includes or 

implies the meaning of ” and to “have a (specified) qualification or 

characterization”). But to have a quality does not mean the thing 

being described only or exclusively has that quality and no other 

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qualities. A debtor’s real property may have as one of its qualities 

that it is her principal residence. But it can also have other qualities, 

like having a lemonade stand or a beehive.

2

The Scarborough court and the dissenting opinion point to a

different definition. “Is,” they say, means to “equate[].” See Scarborough, 461 F.3d at 411 (finding that Congress used “is” to “equate[] 

the terms ‘real property’ and ‘principal residence’”); see also Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 159 (also defining 

“be” to mean “[t]o equal in meaning or identity”); Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary 189 (also defining “be” to mean “to 

equal in meaning,” to “have the same connotation . . . as,” and “to 

constitute the same idea or object as”). But, again, to have equal 

meaning or identity does not mean the thing being described only

or exclusively has that meaning or identity and no other. Atlanta 

may be equal in meaning to the Georgia state capital. But it is also 

equal in meaning to the seat of Fulton County and the home of 

the Eleventh Circuit.

3

2

The dissenting opinion oddly claims that we’ve substituted the word “includes” for “is.” But we haven’t. What we’ve done is define “is” as it was 

understood when section 1123(b)(5) was enacted—to have a given quality or 

characteristic. No more or less.

3

The dissenting opinion then goes on to say that is-as-equates means “the same 

thing, with the same boundaries.” But that’s not how the average man on the 

street would understand “is.” To use the same example, our courthouse takes 

up only one block of downtown Atlanta. Yet the average Atlantean would 

understand that “Atlanta is the home of the Eleventh Circuit” does not mean 

that Atlanta and our courthouse are the same thing with the same boundaries. 

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The Scarborough approach—reading “is” to mean only or exclusively—is even further off the mark after the 2005 amendments 

to the bankruptcy code. In the 2005 amendments, Congress defined “debtor’s principal residence” to include “incidental property,” which can itself include other property interests in addition 

to the debtor’s residence.4

 See Wissel, 619 B.R. at 312– 13 (“These 

additions represent a clear [c]ongressional statement that ‘real 

property’ and ‘debtor’s principal residence’ are no longer coterminous.”); see also, e.g., Wages, 508 B.R. at 166 (rejecting this interpretation because the bankruptcy code “does not equate the term ‘real 

property’ with ‘debtor’s principal residence’”). The “debtor’s principal residence” can now include, for example, “[e]scrow funds, 

And even if the average Atlantean would understand “is” that way, it wouldn’t 

help Lee. The bankruptcy court found that Lee “use[d] the property”—not 

just two acres of it—“as her principal residence”, and that finding is supported 

by the record. Lee mortgaged the entire parcel and agreed to establish it as 

her “principal residence”; she gave the property’s address as the place she 

“live[d]” when filing for bankruptcy; and she described the entire property her

mortgage covered as the “[d]ebtor’s residence” on her schedule of liabilities. 

4

 Indeed, the Scarborough court acknowledged that its holding reflected an interpretation of the bankruptcy code as it existed before 2005. Because the 

bankruptcy petition in that case was filed before the 2005 amendments became 

effective, the court emphasized that it would “leave for another day the question of whether, or how, [the amendments] altered the scope of the anti-modification provision.” Scarborough, 461 F.3d at 412 n.2. While the Third Circuit 

has not revisited Scarborough since then, a bankruptcy court in the Third Circuit has found that Scarborough’s reading of the anti-modification provision 

was abrogated by the 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy code. See In re Wissel, 619 B.R. 299, 312–13 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2020).

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insurance proceeds, and miscellaneous proceeds.” See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 99 (4th Cir. 2017). And it can now include the rent

the debtor makes from leasing the property, the profits from oil 

and gas extracted from the property, and the rights to minerals and 

water on the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B); see also In re 

Shull, 493 B.R. 453, 459–60 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that the 

anti-modification provision applied to a security interest in “fixtures” because under section 101(27B)(B) a debtor’s principal residence includes fixtures as incidental property).

5

Turning away from the meaning of “is,” Lee pivots by arguing that the term “only” as used in section 1123(b)(5) modifies how 

the real property must be used so that the property only or exclusively serves as “the debtor’s principal residence” and nothing else. 

But in the anti-modification provision “‘only’ is an adverb modifying ‘secured.’” See In re Macaluso, 254 B.R. 799, 800 (Bankr. 

W.D.N.Y. 2000). “The word ‘only’ does not modify any other 

word,” In re Hock, 571 B.R. 891, 895 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017), and 

“[t]here simply is no second ‘only’ in the statutory language of [section] 1123(b)(5), nor any way to read the one usage of that term to 

limit the use of the property rather than limiting the extent of the 

5

The dissenting opinion suggests that our reading of section 1123(b)(5) renders the new definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in the 2005 amendments “largely pointless.” But this ignores the other sections of the bankruptcy code, outside of section 1123(b)(5), where the new definition applies. 

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)–(2).

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collateral for the secured debt,” Wages, 508 B.R. at 167 (quoting In 

re Schayes, 483 B.R. 209, 215 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2012)). 

In the end, Lee and the dissenting opinion’s reading of the 

anti-modification provision would have us insert language that 

Congress didn’t put in the statute. See Hock, 571 B.R. at 897 (“To 

apply the principal-residence-only bright line approach, the [c]ourt 

would have to unilaterally add the word ‘only’ or ‘exclusively’ to 

the text of [section] 1123(b)(5) . . . .”); see also Schayes, 483 B.R. at

215 (emphasizing that “[t]here simply is no second ‘only’ in the statutory language of [section] 1123(b)(5)”). Specifically, the dissenting 

opinion (quoting from a bankruptcy treatise) reads the anti-modification provision as applying “only if the real estate mortgage covers . . . the principal residence and no other property.” Dissenting 

Op. at 7 (omission in original) (parenthetically quoting 7 Collier on 

Bankruptcy ¶ 1123.02[5] (16th ed. 2024)). But this reading moves the 

“only” to modify a different term, switches “covers” for “is,” and 

adds the italicized words that are not in section 1123(b)(5). Needless to say, “we are not allowed to add or subtract words from a 

statute,” Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 

1210, 1224 (11th Cir. 2009), and “[w]e are not at liberty to rewrite 

the statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable,” Ali v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228 (2008). 

If we don’t adopt the Scarborough approach, as a fallback, Lee 

cites a second, case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances approach 

that focuses heavily on the parties’ subjective intentions and was 

first set out in In re Brunson, 201 B.R. 351 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996), 

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by a bankruptcy court in the Western District of New York. Some 

courts have described this case-by-case approach as looking to 

whether the property is used “for significant commercial purposes”

rather than as the debtor’s principal residence. Hock, 571 B.R. at 

897 (quotation and emphasis omitted); Wages, 508 B.R. at 167 (quotation and emphasis omitted). This approach looks to the totality 

of the circumstances to determine the “predominant character of 

the transaction[] and what the lender bargained to be within the 

scope of its lien” so that the court may classify the property as 

“‘commercial’ property” or “real property used as the debtor’s residence.” See Brunson, 201 B.R. at 354. If the bankruptcy court determines that “the transaction was predominantly viewed by the 

parties as a loan transaction to provide the borrower with a residence, then the anti[-]modification provision” applies. Id. “If, on 

the other hand, the transaction was viewed by the parties as predominantly a commercial loan transaction,” then it doesn’t. Id. 

We reject this approach as well because “[r]eweighing the 

totality of the circumstances is ordinarily not a preferable way to 

approach a question of law.” Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc., 4 

F.4th 1149, 1158 (11th Cir. 2021). “Basing a decision on the totality 

of the circumstances is ‘an empty incantation—a mere conjurer’s 

trick that serves to hide’ the court’s real reasons for its decision.” Id. at 1159 (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 943–44 (1994) 

(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). “The rule of law demands more.” Id.

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That’s because the totality-of-the-circumstances approach 

isn’t grounded in the language of section 1123(b)(5). Instead, to 

apply this approach we would have to modify section 1123(b)(5) “so 

that [it] would effectively read: a chapter 11 debtor may ‘modify 

the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured 

only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence unless the debtor also uses the property for significant [or 

predominant] commercial purposes’” and would “then have to devise 

a standard for what constitutes a ‘significant’” or predominant 

commercial purpose. Hock, 571 B.R. at 897–98. Of course, the

anti-modification provision gives “no indication of where an appropriate line between ‘principal residence’ and ‘commercial [purposes]’ would be.” Id. at 897 (quoting In re Wages, 479 B.R. 575, 581

(Bankr. D. Idaho 2012)). Nor does it indicate that, “once the additional commercial use of the property extends beyond some magical tipping point, the property ceases to be the debtor’s principal 

residence.” See Schayes, 483 B.R. at 216; see also Wages, 508 B.R. at 

167.

6

 Indeed, the anti-modification provision only requires us to 

determine whether Lee’s mortgage is secured by real property that 

is her principal residence.

7

6

 Even other bankruptcy courts in the Western District of New York have 

rejected the totality-of-the-circumstances approach in favor of our reading of 

the statute. See Brooks, 550 B.R. at 24–25; Macaluso, 254 B.R. at 800.

7

 Lee finally argues that our reading of the anti-modification provision could 

lead to “absurd results.” While Lee is right that “a court may look beyond the 

plain language of a statute if applying the plain language would produce an 

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21-13887 Opinion of the Court 19

CONCLUSION

In short, we hold that section 1123(b)(5) is unambiguous and 

has three requirements: “first, the security interest must be in real 

property; second, the real property must be the only security for 

the debt; and third, the real property must be the debtor’s principal 

residence.” Wages, 508 B.R. at 165. Because U.S. Bank holds a claim 

that is secured only by a security interest in real property that Lee 

uses as her principal residence, the anti-modification provision applies to U.S. Bank’s security interest and the bank was entitled to 

relief from the automatic stay. Like the district court, we affirm 

the bankruptcy court’s order granting relief from the stay.

AFFIRMED. 

absurd result,” In re Lehman, 205 F.3d 1255, 1256 (11th Cir. 2000), we will do 

so only “under rare and exceptional circumstances,” Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 

U.S. 55, 60 (1930). These rare and exceptional circumstances only come up 

“where a rational Congress could not conceivably have intended the literal 

meaning to apply.” Pate, 84 F.4th at 1205 n.3 (quotation omitted). That’s not 

the case with section 1123(b)(5). A rational Congress could conceivably intend 

for “favorable treatment of residential mortgagees” to “encourage the flow of 

capital into the home lending market.” Cf. In re Bozeman, 57 F.4th 895, 906

(11th Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bateman, 331 F.3d 821, 826 (11th Cir. 2003)). So 

applying the plain language of the anti-modification provision is not absurd. 

And even if a judge believes the “language” Congress “used may sweep too 

broadly in some respects” and “too narrowly in other respects” that belief does 

not make the language absurd. CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 

1217, 1229 (11th Cir. 2001). “[T]hat is the nature of a political process and of 

all worldly endeavors. Imperfection is not absurdity, but is inherent in humankind and all of our works.” Id. 

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21-13887 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 1

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, Dissenting:

This appeal requires us to decide what “is” means. The antimodification provision of the Bankruptcy Code forbids a chapter 

11 reorganization plan from modifying a creditor’s rights in a claim 

that is secured only by an interest in “real property that is the 

debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (emphasis 

added). If the debtor resides on only part of the real property that 

secures the interest, “is” the real property the debtor’s principal residence? Mistaking “is” for “includes,” the majority says yes. I would 

say no. The anti-modification provision applies only if the entirety 

of the real property “is”—meaning, is equal to—the debtor’s principal residence, whether or not the property is also used for other 

purposes. So I respectfully dissent. 

In 2007, Patricia Lee mortgaged her 43-acre tract of land in 

southern Georgia. Lee uses only a small fraction of the tract as her 

principal residence: her 1,595-square-foot house and driveway sit 

on a two-and-a-half-acre yard on the edge of the land. She leases 

the remaining 40.5 acres to a third-party farmer who uses the land 

exclusively for commercial farming:

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2 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 21-13887

So “from an acreage standpoint,” the tract is “primarily 

farmland.” Although Lee inherited the home and adjoining farmland together and mortgaged them as a single tract, the record contains no evidence that personal residences and adjoining commercial farmlands are “commonly” conveyed together in this part of 

Georgia. See id. § 101(27B)(A). 

Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court ruled that the anti-modification provision of the Bankruptcy Code prevented the modification of mortgagee U.S. Bank’s interest in Lee’s property. The 

anti-modification provision prohibits a chapter 11 plan from modifying creditors’ rights in “a claim secured only by a security interest 

in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” Id.

§ 1123(b)(5). The “debtor’s principal residence” is “a residential 

structure if used as the principal residence by the debtor, including 

incidental property,” id. § 101(13A)(A), and “incidental property” 

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21-13887 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 3

includes “property commonly conveyed with a principal residence 

in the area where the real property is located,” id. § 101(27B)(A). 

The bankruptcy court concluded that the anti-modification 

provision applied because U.S. Bank’s security interest is in Lee’s 

real property; Lee’s real property is the only security for the claim; 

and the real property “is” Lee’s principal residence because the real 

property “contains” Lee’s principal residence. The bankruptcy 

court reasoned that it was immaterial that most of the secured parcel was used exclusively for commercial farming, and not as Lee’s 

principal residence, because the anti-modification provision does 

not require that the property be used “only” as the debtor’s principal residence. And even if the statute did require that the debtor 

use the property exclusively as her principal residence, the bankruptcy court ruled that the provision would still apply because the 

adjoining farmland constitutes “incidental property” under the definition of “debtor’s principal residence.” See 11 U.S.C 

§ 101(13A)(A), (27B)(A). The bankruptcy court reasoned that the 

farmland “is real property”; is “attached to the residence”; “is located at the same address as [Lee’s] principal residence”; and was 

“conveyed to her together” with her home and yard. The district 

court affirmed. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 

Our decision should begin and end with the text of the statute, Heyman v. Cooper, 31 F.4th 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022), by giving the text its “plain, ordinary, and most natural meaning,” Boca 

Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 237 (11th Cir. 

1995). The anti-modification provision bars a chapter 11 

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4 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 21-13887

reorganization plan from modifying creditors’ rights in “a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s 

principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). The Bankruptcy Code 

defines “debtor’s principal residence” as “a residential structure if 

used as the principal residence by the debtor, including incidental 

property.” Id. § 101(13A)(A). And “incidental property” of the 

debtor’s principal residence is “property commonly conveyed with 

a principal residence in the area where the real property is located”; 

“all easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, 

mineral rights, oil or gas rights or profits, water rights, escrow 

funds, or insurance proceeds”; and “all replacements or additions.” 

Id. § 101(27B). 

The majority and I agree about several matters. I agree with 

the majority that these provisions of the Code are “unambiguous” 

and yield three requirements for anti-modification protection: first, 

the security interest must be in real property; second, the real property must be the only security for the debt; and third, the real property must be the debtor’s principal residence. Maj. Op. at 19. And I 

agree that the first two requirements are satisfied here: Lee does 

not dispute that U.S. Bank’s claim is secured by her real property 

or that her real property is the only security for the claim. 

But I disagree with the majority that the anti-modification 

provision’s third requirement is satisfied. That requirement turns 

on the meaning of the word “is”: the statute applies only to “real 

property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. 

§ 1123(b)(5) (emphasis added). I would hold that real property “is” 

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21-13887 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 5

the debtor’s principal residence only if the real property “is, in its 

entirety, the debtor’s principal residence,” In re Abrego, 506 B.R. 509, 

516 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (emphasis added)—meaning, “a residential structure” that the debtor “use[s] as [her] principal residence” 

and “incidental property,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A). Because Lee 

uses only part of her 43-acre property as her principal residence, the 

anti-modification provision is inapplicable unless the remainder of 

Lee’s property is “incidental property.” See id. And because the 

bankruptcy court misunderstood that question, I would remand 

for the bankruptcy court to reconsider it using the proper analysis. 

The term “is”—the third-person singular present tense of 

the verb “to be,” see Is, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d 

ed. 1992)—has at least two ordinary meanings, see Advance Tr. & 

Life Escrow Servs., LTA v. Protective Life Ins., 93 F.4th 1315, 1330 n.4 

(11th Cir. 2024) (“‘Many words have more than one ordinary 

meaning.’” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 6, at 70 (2012)). The first is 

the descriptive “is.” This “is” links a subject and predicate so as to 

signify that the subject “ha[s] . . . a specified quality or characteristic” or that it “belong[s] to a specified class or group.” Be, THE 

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992). The sentence, 

“The ocean is vast,” uses a predicate adjective, “vast,” to describe a 

quality possessed by the subject, “the ocean.” Similarly, the sentence, “A dog is a mammal,” uses a predicate nominative, “mammal,” to describe a class to which the subject, “a dog,” belongs. But 

there is also the “is” of equivalence. This “is” links a subject and a 

predicate so as to signify that the two are “equal in identity.” Id.

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6 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 21-13887

The majority’s example, “Atlanta is the capital city of Georgia,” 

uses “is” this way. Maj. Op. at 12. The objective English-reader 

would understand that this sentence uses “is” to equate the subject, 

“Atlanta,” with the predicate nominative, “the capital city of Georgia.” English-readers would likewise know that “two plus two is 

four” means the same thing as “two plus two equals four.” In both 

examples, “is” designates that the subject and predicate are the same 

thing, with the same boundaries. 

The surrounding text makes plain that the anti-modification 

provision uses the “is” of equivalence. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 

88, 101 (2004) (applying the “cardinal rule” that a word “gathers 

meaning from the words around it” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The provision sandwiches “is” between two 

key determinants of meaning: “that” and “the.” See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 1123(b)(5) (“real property that is the debtor’s principal residence” 

(emphasis added)). “That” is a relative pronoun used “to introduce 

a restrictive (or ‘defining’) relative clause, which serves to identify 

the entity being talked about.” That, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 

DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis added). In the anti-modification provision, “that” introduces “the debtor’s principal residence” 

to identify the aforementioned “real property.” And “the,” the definite article, appears before nouns “that denote particular, specified 

persons or things.” The, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d 

ed. 1992); see The, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (“An article which particularizes the subject spoken of.”). The use of the 

definite article before the noun phrase “the debtor’s principal residence” clarifies that the description refers to one specific object. 

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21-13887 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 7

If a creditor’s claim is secured by any property that is not the 

debtor’s principal residence—i.e., any property that is not either 

the debtor’s “residential structure” or “incidental property,” see 11 

U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A)—the anti-modification provision does not apply. See, e.g., 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1123.02[5] (16th ed. 2024) 

(the anti-modification provision “applies only if the real estate

mortgage covers . . . the principal residence and no other property” 

(emphasis added)). The real property and the debtor’s principal residence must be, in other words, equal to one another—the “is” of 

equivalence at work. See In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 

2006) (“By using the word ‘is’ in the phrase ‘real property that is the 

debtor’s principal residence,’ Congress equated the terms ‘real 

property’ and ‘principal residence.’”). 

The majority purports to be applying the descriptive “is” to 

the anti-modification provision, see Maj. Op. at 12–13, but it, in fact, 

substitutes a different word entirely: only by mistaking “is” for “includes” can the majority construe the statute to reach Lee’s property. The difference is dispositive. To “include” means “to take in 

or contain one or more things as part of something larger.” Include, 

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1982). No question, 

Lee’s 43-acre tract contains (i.e., “includes”) her principal residence. 

But most of Lee’s property is commercial farmland that, both parties agree, Lee does not use as her principal residence. So unless the 

farmland is “incidental property,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A), the 

real property “is” not Lee’s principal residence, because only a small 

fraction of the 43-acre tract is equal to Lee’s principal residence (the 

“is” of equivalence) or has the quality or characteristic of being Lee’s 

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8 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 21-13887

principal residence (the descriptive “is”). See, e.g., Scarborough, 461 

F.3d at 411 (“[The anti-modification provision] ‘protects claims secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s 

principal residence, not real property that includes or contains the 

debtor’s principal residence, and not real property on which the 

debtor resides.’” (quoting In re Adebanjo, 165 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. D. 

Conn. 1994))); see also In re Reinhardt, 563 F.3d 558, 563 (6th Cir. 

2009) (“Vanderbilt argues that a ‘logical reading of [the anti-modification provision] . . . is that to get the benefit of [the provision] a 

creditor must have a security interest in real property that contains 

the debtor’s principal residence.’ That Vanderbilt has to adjust the 

wording of the statute to reach its desired result shows the error of 

its interpretation.” (alterations adopted) (citation omitted)). 

Indeed, simple examples prove why neither sense of “is” 

could support the majority’s interpretation. Consider the descriptive “is”—the ordinary meaning of “is” that the majority says the 

statute employs. That variant conveys that a predicate describes a 

quality or characteristic possessed by a subject or a class to which 

the subject belongs. The descriptive “is” does not narrow the predicate’s descriptive scope—the predicate properly describes a quality 

possessed by the entire subject. Cf. United States v. Masino, 869 F.3d 

1301, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that because the federal 

gambling statute “applies only to a gambling business that ‘is a violation of the law,’. . . ‘the government must prove more than a 

violation of some state law by a gambling business. The gambling 

business itself must be illegal.’” (citation omitted) (first quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i); and then quoting United States v. Bala, 489 

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21-13887 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 9

F.3d 334, 340–41 (8th Cir. 2007)). The sentence, “Hawaii is an island,” clearly means that all of Hawaii is an island. But it is inaccurate to say that “Florida is an island,” even though Florida includes 

several islands. Nor, when a bride sews a blue patch on her white 

wedding gown as a symbol of love and fidelity, would guests say 

that “the bride’s wedding gown is blue,” even though a small portion of the dress possesses the quality and characteristic of being 

blue. 

Now consider the “is” of equivalence—the ordinary meaning that the statute actually employs. That sense of “is” designates 

that a subject and predicate are equal to one another. When the 

majority says that “Atlanta is the capital city of Georgia,” the majority is clearly saying that Atlanta and the capital city of Georgia 

are the same thing, with the same boundaries. But, as explained, 

Lee’s real property does not have the same boundaries as her principal residence (unless the non-residential portion is “incidental 

property”)—Lee’s property instead only includes her principal residence. So the majority’s interpretation of the anti-modification 

provision is more like saying, “Georgia is Atlanta.” Most United 

States citizens would immediately spot the error: Georgia includes 

Atlanta, but it is not Atlanta. 

I do agree with the majority that neither ordinary meaning 

of “is” requires exclusivity. See Maj. Op. at 12–13. A subject can be 

equal to, or possess the quality or characteristic of, more than one 

predicate. Four “is” two plus two, but it “is” also three plus one. A 

dog “is” a mammal, but it “is” also man’s best friend. The same 

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10 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 21-13887

logic applies to the subject “real property” of the anti-modification 

provision. To fall within the statute, secured property need not be 

used “only or exclusively” as the debtor’s principal residence and 

nothing else—it may also be “the principal residence of the debtor’s 

roommate, the place where the debtor has her weekend lemonade 

stand, and the spot where she farms honey from her beehive.” Maj. 

Op. at 12. 

To satisfy the statute’s requirements, the entire property 

must also be the debtor’s principal residence—meaning, the 

debtor’s “residential structure” and “incidental property.” 11 

U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A); see Abrego, 506 B.R. at 514 (“[T]he statute 

does not state that it protects real property that is exclusively the 

debtor’s principal residence, [but] neither does it state that it protects real property that is partially the debtor’s principal residence.”). The secured property can have any number of uses without forfeiting anti-modification protection, so long as one of those 

uses is the debtor’s principal residence. If Lee’s farmland disqualifies U.S. Bank’s interest from anti-modification protection, it is not 

because that land was used for commercial farming; it is because it 

was not used as Lee’s principal residence. Cf. Scarborough, 461 F.3d 

at 411 (“[A] creditor does not receive anti-modification protection 

for a claim secured by real property that includes both the debtor’s 

principal residence and other rental property that is not the debtor’s 

principal residence.” (emphasis added)).

Of course, some property uses are incompatible with residency by the debtor, meaning that their presence on the property 

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21-13887 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 11

will necessarily negate the conclusion that the debtor uses the entire property as her principal residence. Renting a discrete portion 

of the property to another tenant would be an example, absent a 

lease provision granting concurrent possessory rights to the debtorlandlord See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 469 (2024) (the 

“implied covenant of quiet enjoyment” protects the “tenant’s right 

to exclusive possession” of the premises (emphasis added)); see also, 

e.g., Abrego, 506 B.R. at 511 (explaining that “[t]he majority of courts 

to have considered this question” have held that the anti-modification provision is inapplicable if the secured property “is a multi-unit 

property and the debtor resides in only one unit”). In such a case, 

the property should be excluded from anti-modification protection 

unless the leased portion constitutes “incidental property” within 

the Code’s definition of “debtor’s principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. 

§ 101(13A)(A), (27B). Some fact patterns will present closer calls, 

but these questions can be resolved during an evidentiary hearing, 

as the Code contemplates. See id. § 362(d) (bankruptcy court may 

grant relief from the automatic stay only “after notice and a hearing”). 

The Code’s definition of “debtor’s principal residence” does 

not undermine my interpretation. See Maj. Op. at 14–15. In 2005 

and 2010, Congress expanded the definition of “debtor’s principal 

residence.” See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109–8, § 306(c), 119 Stat. 23, 80–81 (2005); 

Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 111–327, § 2, 

124 Stat. 3557, 3557 (2010). A principal residence is no longer limited only to the debtor’s brick-and-mortar home, but also includes 

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12 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 21-13887

“incidental property,” which is “property commonly conveyed 

with a principal residence in the area where the real property is located”; “all easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral rights, oil or gas rights or profits, water rights, escrow 

funds, or insurance proceeds”; and “all replacements or additions.” 

11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A), (27B). These definitions apply to the entire 

Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 101. 

Some bankruptcy courts have reasoned that because the 

Code defines “debtor’s principal residence” to include property interests that are not “real property” (like escrow funds, insurance 

proceeds, and mobile homes), the anti-modification provision cannot be read to “equate the term ‘real property’ with ‘debtor’s principal residence.’” In re Wages, 508 B.R. 161, 166 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 

2014); accord In re Wissel, 619 B.R. 299, 312–13 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2020). 

But our sister circuits have correctly rejected that line of reasoning. 

See In re Ennis, 558 F.3d 343, 344–46 (4th Cir. 2009); Reinhardt, 563 

F.3d at 561–63. The operative statute prevents a plan from modifying a mortgage secured only by “real property that is the debtor’s 

principal residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). 

This language “plainly contains two requirements”: first, the 

secured property must “be real property,” and second, the secured 

property must “be the debtor’s principal residence.” Reinhardt, 563 

F.3d at 562; accord Ennis, 558 F.3d at 345–46. The Code’s expansion 

of the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” affected only the 

second requirement; it did not nullify the first requirement that the 

property be “real property.” Ennis, 558 F.3d at 346; see Reinhardt, 

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21-13887 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 13

563 F.3d at 563 (“[N]o matter how broad the definition of ‘debtor’s 

principal residence,’ it still must also be ‘real property’ for the antimodification provision to apply.”). Because the operative provision 

limits its scope to “real property,” it excludes some “incidental 

property.” Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5), with id. § 1322(c)(1) (referring to a “debtor’s principal residence” without a real-property 

limitation). 

The statutory definitions support my interpretation. If the 

anti-modification provision covered any real property that merely 

includes a debtor’s principal residence, there would be little need for 

Congress to define a debtor’s principal residence as including, for 

instance, “property commonly conveyed with a principal residence 

in the area where the real property is located.” Seeid. § 101(27B)(A). 

Under the majority’s interpretation of the anti-modification provision, that property would almost always be covered anyway, making the addition largely pointless. See United States v. Forey-Quintero, 

626 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A basic premise of statutory 

construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words 

shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, because “incidental property” includes any real “property 

commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area,” 11 

U.S.C. § 101(27B)(A), my interpretation does not limit anti-modification protection “to claims secured by the structure a debtor uses 

as his or her principal residence (i.e., the house),” see In re Wages, 

479 B.R. 575, 580 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012), aff’d, 508 B.R. 161. So the 

concern expressed by some courts that equating “real property” 

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14 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 21-13887

with the “debtor’s principal residence” would exclude “most residential mortgage loans, which are typically secured not only by a 

residential structure, but also by the real property on which the 

structure sits,” id., is unwarranted. As Congress made clear, the “incidental property” on which a house sits is “commonly conveyed 

with a principal residence” in every area. See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 101(27B)(A).

Because the majority incorrectly holds that Lee’s 40.5 acres 

of commercial farmland need not be her “principal residence” for 

the anti-modification provision to apply, it does not address 

whether the farmland constitutes “incidental property” to Lee’s 

principal residence. See id. § 101(13A). The bankruptcy and district 

courts held that the farmland was incidental property because the 

farmland and Lee’s house “were conveyed to her together.” That 

analysis is flawed. 

The question under the statute is not whether the property 

and residence were actually conveyed together. Property is “incidental property” to a debtor’s principal residence if it is “property 

commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area where the 

real property is located.” Id. § 101(27B)(A) (emphasis added). The 

record contains no evidence about whether a commercial farm is 

“commonly conveyed with a principal residence” where Lee lives, 

and neither court addressed the issue. I would remand that question for the bankruptcy court to consider in the first instance. 

For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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