UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6820

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PATRICK SMITH, a/k/a Pee,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-7020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PATRICK SMITH, a/k/a Pee,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Ellen Lipton Hollander, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cr-00017-ELH-1; 1:20-cv-02609-

ELH)

Submitted: October 27, 2023 Decided: May 14, 2024

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Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

No. 22-6820, dismissed; No. 22-7020, vacated and remanded with instructions by 

unpublished per curiam opinion.

Patrick Smith, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Patrick Smith seeks to appeal the district court’s 

orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and denying his motion for recusal, 

denying his postjudgment motions to amend his § 2255 motion, and denying on the merits 

his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the court’s prior order denying his § 2255 

motion. The order denying relief on Smith’s § 2255 motion is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable 

jurists could find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115-17 (2017). When the district court denies 

relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of 

a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

Limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in Smith’s informal briefs, we

conclude that Smith has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also 

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important 

document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that 

brief.”). Moreover, the claims Smith raised in his postjudgment motions to amend 

challenged the validity of his conviction, and, thus, the motions should have been construed 

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as successive § 2255 motions. See Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1704-11 (2020). 

Similarly, Smith’s allegation in his Rule 60(b) motion that an attorney representing him 

made a mistake in transcribing an affidavit that Smith previously submitted to the court in 

support of his § 2255 claims did not challenge a defect in the proceeding, “but in effect 

ask[ed] for a second chance to have the merits determined favorably.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 

545 U.S. 524, 532 n.5 (2005). Therefore, Smith’s motion was not a true Rule 60(b) motion, 

but a successive § 2255 motion. See id. at 531-32; see also United States v. McRae, 793 

F.3d 392, 397-99 (4th Cir. 2015). Absent prefiling authorization from this court, the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Smith’s successive § 2255 motions. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2244(b)(3), 2255(h). 

Smith also challenges the district court judge’s refusal to recuse. We review a 

district court judge’s recusal decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Stone, 866 

F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir. 2017). Here, Smith’s asserted grounds for recusal amounted to 

mere dissatisfaction with the district court’s rulings, which is not a sufficient basis for 

recusal. See Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 572-74 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing valid 

bases for bias or partiality motion); see also United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th 

Cir. 2008) (“The presiding judge is not ... required to recuse h[er]self simply because of 

unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The district court judge therefore did not abuse her discretion in declining Smith’s request 

for recusal. 

Accordingly, in No. 22-6820, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

Smith’s appeal of the district court’s orders denying relief on his § 2255 motion and 

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denying his motions to amend. In No. 22-7020, we vacate the district court’s order denying 

Smith’s Rule 60(b) motion and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.

*

 See Bixby v. Stirling, 90 F.4th 140, 155 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding, when

Rule 60(b) movant seeks “permission to raise new and revised claims in a second or 

successive” habeas motion, district court should “dismiss[]—not den[y]—the motion”). 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

No. 22-6820, DISMISSED;

No. 22-7020, VACATED AND REMANDED 

WITH INSTRUCTIONS

* A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the district court’s order 

denying a Rule 60(b) motion that is in substance a successive § 2255 motion. See McRae, 

793 F.3d at 400.

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