alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 12 (A)
                     PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

               COMPUTATION OF RATIOS OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                          YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
                                                  1995     1996     1997     1998     1999
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------

Earnings as Defined in Regulation S-K (A):

<S>                                              <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>
Net Income (B)                                   $  617   $  535   $  528   $  602   $  653
Income Taxes (C)                                    326      268      256      404      510
Fixed Charges                                       419      438      450      446      450
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
Earnings                                         $1,362   $1,241   $1,234   $1,452   $1,613
                                                 ======   ======   ======   ======   ======

Fixed Charges as Defined in Regulation S-K(D):

Total Interest Expense                           $  407   $  399   $  395   $  390   $  394
Interest Factor in Rentals                           12       11       11       11       10
Subsidiaries' Preferred Securities Dividend
    Requirements                                     --       28       44       45       46
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
Total Fixed Charges                              $  419   $  438   $  450   $  446   $  450
                                                 ======   ======   ======   ======   ======

Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges                 3.25     2.83     2.74     3.27     3.58
                                                 ======   ======   ======   ======   ======
</TABLE>

Notes:

(A)   The term "earnings" shall be defined as pre-tax income from continuing
      operations. Add to pre-tax income the amount of fixed charges adjusted to
      exclude (a) the amount of any interest capitalized during the period and
      (b) the actual amount of any preferred stock dividend requirements of
      majority-owned subsidiaries which were included in such fixed charges
      amount but not deducted in the determination of pre-tax income.

(B)   Excludes extraordinary item.

(C)   Includes State income taxes and Federal income taxes for other income and
      excludes taxes applicable to extraordinary item.

(D)   Fixed Charges represent (a) interest, whether expensed or capitalized, (b)
      amortization of debt discount, premium and expense, (c) an estimate of
      interest implicit in rentals, and (d) Preferred Securities Dividend
      Requirements of subsidiaries.
Total Polling Locations:

Election Day:7 664 

Early Voting:8 219 

Mail Ballots Transmitted10 Mail Ballots Returned11

373,548 339,906 (91.0% of 

transmitted) 

Mail Ballots Counted12 Mail Ballots Rejected13

328,631 (96.7% of 

returned)

17,008 (5.0% of 

returned) 

Mail Voting Policies 

No excuse is required for mail voting14

Does not conduct all-mail elections15

No permanent absentee voting list16

EAVS Jurisdictions

33 

Total Registered Voters as of 

Nov. 3, 20201

1,360,871 

Registration Forms Received2*

570,254 

Total Confirmation Notices Sent3*

136,426 

2020 EAVS Data Brief: New Mexico

 Voter Registration

2.3%

9.5%

23.8%

28.3%

36.1%

Other

In-Person

Mail, Email, Fax

Motor Vehicle Dept.

Online

Source of Registration Applications4

 Voter Turnout  Election Technology

In-Person 

Election 

Day Voters 

142,470

15.3%

Mail Voters 

323,661

34.9%

In-Person 

Early Voters 

456,280

49.1%

Other Mode 

6,103

0.7%

Voters Participating By Mode5

33 33 33

0 0 0

Scanner Hand

Count

Electronic

Poll

Books

DRE w/o

VVPAT

DRE with

VVPAT

Ballot

Marking

Device

Technology Used by Jurisdictions9

 Mail Balloting

Notes 

EAVS data and reports may be downloaded at www.eac.gov. 

The data shown are certified as final by state election authorities

Responses of “Does not apply,” “Data not available, ” and “Valid 

skip” are shown as zeroes or dashes. Percentages may not sum 

to 100% because of missing data or rounding. 

. 

* Close of registration for 2018 

general election to close of 

registration for 2020 general 

election. 

1 A1a of EAVS. 

2 A3a of EAVS. 

3 A8a of EAVS. 

4 Mail, Email, Fax is A4a. InPerson is A4b. Online is A4c. 

Motor Vehicle Dept. is A4d. 

Other is the sum of A4e–A4l. 

Denominator is A3a. 

5 In-Person Election Day Voters 

is F1b. Mail Voters is F1d+F1g. 

In-Person Early Voters is F1f. 

Other Mode is F1c+F1e+F1h. 

Denominator is sum of F1b–

F1h. 

6 F1a of EAVS. Denominator 

is citizen voting age 

population (CVAP). 

7 D3a of EAVS. 

8 D4a of EAVS. 

9 F3a–d, F5a, F6a, F7a, F8a, 

and F11a of EAVS. 

10 C1a of EAVS. 

11 C1b of EAVS. 

12 C3a of EAVS. 

13 C4a of EAVS. 

14Q17 of Policy Survey. 

15 Q18 and Q18a of Policy 

Survey. 

16 Q19 of Policy Survey. 

Turnout 

61.0%

6
Exhibit 31.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302(A) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



I, Pierric Senay, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form
10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Hyundai Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A
(the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);



2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken
as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and
other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act
periodic reports;



4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required
in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has
fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and



5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act
Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material
instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.



In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably
relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: Citibank, N.A.



|Date: March 18, 2016 |     |                                                              
|-------------------- | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |     |                                                              
|                     | By: | /s/ Pierric Senay                                            
|                     |     | Name: Pierric Senay                                          
|                     |     | Title:  President and Secretary                              
|                     |     | (senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. AB R AHAM SALAM ANC A, De fe nda n t-Appe l la

nt. No. 16-30187

D.C . No. 2:09-c r-02074-LR S
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of W a shington Lonny R . Suko, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d M ay

8, 2017 ** B e fore : R EINHAR

DT, LEAVY, a

nd NGUYEN, C i rc uit Judge s. Abraham Sa lam anc a

a ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt a n d
c ha lle nge s the 30-m onth te rm of supe rvise d re le a s e im

pose d upon re voc ation of supe rvise d re le a se . W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a nd we a ffirm
. 

# F IL ED MAY11 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).Sa lam anc a c onte nds tha

t his supe rvise d re le a se te rm is substa n tive ly
unre a s ona

ble in light of his le

ngthy pe riod of c om

p lia nc e during his prior te

rm of supe rvise d re le a se and be c a use it will not prom

ote his re ha

bilita tion. Thedistric t c ourt did not a

buse its disc re t ion. Se e Gall v . Unite d State s , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The te rm

of supe rvise d

re le a se is substa

ntive ly re a s ona ble in light of the 18 U.S.C . § 3583(e ) se nte n c ing fa c tors a nd the tota lity

of the c irc um sta

nc e s , inc l uding Sa lam anc a ’ s re pe at e d viola tions. Se e Gall , 552 U.S. a t 51. Furthe rm ore , c ontra ry to Sa lam a

nc a ’ s c onte ntion, there c ord re fle c ts tha t the distric t c ourt c onside re d only

prope r se nte nc ing fa c tors. Se e Unite d State s v . Miqbe l , 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th C ir. 2006). AFFIRM E D.

1 6
- 3 0 1 8 7 2
No. 11-1252.

#### Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., dba Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan *v.*Oubre et al., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated.

Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.
CERTIFICATIONDecember6,2012IherebycertifythatapublichearingwasheldOctober23,2012,onproposedamendmentstotheStateofDelawareStateImplementationPlan(SIP).TheStateofDelawarerequeststhattheUnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(U.S.EPA)redesignatetheDelawareportionofthePhiladelphia-Wilmington,PA-NJ-DEnonattainmentarea(PhiladelphiaNAA)toattainment,underthe1997annualand2006dailyfineparticulate(PMz.s)NationalAmbientAirQualityStandards(NAAQS),andapprovetheassociatedmaintenanceplansasStateImplementationPlans(SIP)revisions.TheeffectivedateoftheseSIPrevisionsisNovember27,2012.IfurthercertifythatthehearingwasheldinaccordancewiththenoticerequiredbySubsection51.102of40CFR51.AliMirzakhalili,P.E.DirectorDivisionofAirQuality9)-.1Lr¿*rn,i,V.,orl.n.*.\u..r.<...r{n¡,*nu{autr..t¡r.*!
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5


<S>                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>           DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>              JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                            5,073
<SECURITIES>                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                   102,963
<ALLOWANCES>                          0
<INVENTORY>                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                143,036
<PP&E>                          238,556
<DEPRECIATION>                  166,761
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  579,260
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           187,752
<BONDS>                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                          70
<COMMON>                          5,714
<OTHER-SE>                      317,328
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    579,260
<SALES>                         336,420
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                336,420
<CGS>                               849
<TOTAL-COSTS>                       849
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               (708,614)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                1,952
<INCOME-PRETAX>                (374,995)
<INCOME-TAX>                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            (374,995)
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                   (374,995)
<EPS-BASIC>                           0
<EPS-DILUTED>                         0



</TABLE>
Opinion issued October 13, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-16-00343-CR

———————————

JAMES ARTHUR JORDAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 183rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1303251

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On April 5, 2016, appellant James Arthur Jordan filed a notice of appeal from 

the trial court’s October 10, 2012 judgment adjudicating guilt and sentencing 

appellant to six years’ incarceration for the offense of aggravated robbery with a 

deadly weapon. We dismiss the appeal.
2

In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal is due within thirty days after 

sentence is imposed in open court or the trial court enters an appealable 

order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). The deadline to file a notice of appeal is 

extended to ninety days after the sentence is imposed if the defendant timely files a 

motion for new trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(2). The time for filing a notice of 

appeal may be further extended if, within fifteen days of deadline for filing the notice 

of appeal, appellant files the notice of appeal and a motion complying with Rule 

10.5(b). TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3.

The trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt and sentencing appellant to six 

years’ imprisonment for the offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon 

was signed on October 10, 2012. Appellant’s notice of appeal filed on April 5, 2016, 

almost three-and-a-half years after the judgment was signed, is untimely. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 26.2. This Court has no authority to allow the late filing of a notice of 

appeal except as provided by Rule 26.3. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If an appeal is not timely perfected, a court of appeals does 

not obtain jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and can take no action 

other than to dismiss the appeal. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1998).

Because appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, we have no basis for 

jurisdiction over this appeal. See Slaton, 981 S.W.2d at 210; Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 
3

522. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP. P. 

42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Lloyd.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
No. 11-10469.

#### Rivera-Pinon *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     EXHIBIT 5.1
                                                                     -----------

                 [LETTERHEAD FOR VINSON & ELKINS APPEARS HERE]



                                  May 28, 1997

Southwest Bancorporation of Texas, Inc.
4400 Post Oak Parkway
Houston, Texas 77027

Ladies and Gentlemen:

    We have acted as counsel to Southwest Bancorporation of Texas, Inc., a Texas
corporation (the "Company"), in connection with the preparation of the Company's
Registration Statement on Form S-8  as filed by the Company with the Securities
and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the
"Registration Statement"), which Registration Statement relates to (i) an
aggregate of up to 250,000 shares of the Company's common stock, $1.00 par value
(the "Shares"), which are purchasable by employees of the Company pursuant to
the Southwest Bank of Texas 401(k) Savings Plan (the "Plan"), and (ii) the
interests of participants in the Plan (the "Interests").  In such connection, we
are passing on certain legal matters in connection with the sale of the Shares
and the Interests.  At your request, this opinion is being furnished to you for
filing as an exhibit to the Registration Statement.

    In connection with rendering this opinion, we have examined such
certificates, instruments and documents and reviewed such questions of law as we
have considered necessary or appropriate for the purposes of this opinion.  In
addition, we have relied as to factual matters on certificates of certain public
officials and officers of the Company.

    Based upon the foregoing examination and review, we are of the opinion that
the Shares and the Interests have been duly authorized for issuance and, when
the Registration Statement has been declared effective and the Shares and the
Interests are issued in accordance with the provisions of the Plan, the Shares
and the Interests will be validly issued, fully paid and non-assessable.

    This opinion is rendered as of the effective date of the Registration
Statement.  We hereby consent to the filing of this opinion as an exhibit to the
Registration Statement and to the reference to our name in the Registration
Statement.  In giving this consent, however, we do not hereby admit that we are
within the category of persons whose consent is required under Section 7 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the rules and regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission thereunder.

                                        Very truly yours,



                                        VINSON & ELKINS L.L.P.




     HOUSTON  DALLAS  WASHINGTON, D.C.  AUSTIN  MOSCOW  LONDON  SINGAPORE
#### E. L. Mickle, as Liquidator, Merchants Bank & Trust Co., Ernest Amos, as Comptroller, and W. V. Knott, as Treasurer, v. Ormond Beach Bond, Mortgage & Guaranty Co.

152 So. 852.

Division A.

Opinion Filed February 19, 1934.

*Hull, Landis & Whitehair,*for Appellants;

*H. E. Couchman*and *Selden, Hodgden & Couchman,*for .Appellee.

Terrell, J.

— On July 10, 1929, appellee drew its check for $2,500.00 on the Franklin Fourth Street National Bank •of Philadelphia, payable to the order of Merchants Bank & Trust Company of Daytona Beach, and deposited it with the latter bank in the usual course of business for collection and credit to appellee’s account. The Merchants Bank & Trust Company dosed and went into liquidation at the •close of business July 11, 1929.

In due course appellee filed its claim with appellant as liquidator and asked that it be allowed as a preferred claim against the assets of said bank. This request was denied .and in October, 1931, appellee as complainant filed its bill *28of complaint in the Circuit Court seeking to impress a trust on the assets of said bank for the payment of its claim in full, the bill of complaint being grounded on the theory that the bank was hopelessly insolvent and was known to be so or should have been known to be so by its officers at the time the check was accepted for deposit and collection. A motion to dismiss the bill of complaint was overruled and this appeal is from that decree.

In essence the sole question brought here for our determination is whether or not the bill of complaint states facts sufficient to make a case on the ground of hopeless insolvency, the law being well settled that deposits should not be accepted under such circumstances if known or should have been known to its officers.

Appellants by counsel have offered a very full and thorough brief in support of the alleged insufficiency of the bill, citing the governing rule supported by authority from many jurisdictions. Appellee rests its case in reliance on Walker v. McNeil, *et al.,*68 Fla. 181, 66 So. 994.

We have examined the bill of complaint and briefs of counsel and it is our conclusion that the allegations of the bill are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. The law and rule as to hopeless insolvency in its relation to this case were discussed and approved by this Court in the recent case of Garrett v. Tunnicliffe, 107 Fla. 393, 145 So. 213. Further discussion of it here would serve no useful purpose.

The judgment below is accordingly affirmed on authority of Walker v. McNeil and Garrett v. Tunnicliffe, *supra.*(

Affirmed.

Davis, C. J., and Ellis, J., concur.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
# C_2021338EN.01002501.xml

| 23.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 338/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 338/25

---

Action brought on 25 June 2021 — Hotel Cipriani v EUIPO — Altunis (CIPRIANI FOOD)

(Case T-358/21)

(2021/C 338/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Hotel Cipriani (Venice, Italy) (represented by: M. Rieger-Jansen, D. Op de Beeck and W. Pors, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Altunis-Trading, Gestão e Serviços, Lda (Funchal, Portugal)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark CIPRIANI FOOD — European Union trade mark No 683 250

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 April 2021 in Case R 1599/2020-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision in its entirety; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision in its entirety;

| — | uphold the cancellation action in full and revoke the contested European Union trade mark; |
| --- | --- |

—

uphold the cancellation action in full and revoke the contested European Union trade mark;

| — | order EUIPO and any intervener who chooses to intervene to bear their own costs of the proceedings and to pay those of the cancellation applicant. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and any intervener who chooses to intervene to bear their own costs of the proceedings and to pay those of the cancellation applicant.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009;

| — | The Board erred by holding that ‘preparations made from cereals’ could not be suitably subdivided. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Board erred by holding that ‘preparations made from cereals’ could not be suitably subdivided.

---
No. 11-10216.

#### Nesbitt *v.*Williams.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.
Solo

Altitude Limit

Always fly at appropriate altitudes for your flying location and local regulations. Solo 

cannot avoid obstacles on its own, so always select altitudes that avoid any obstacles, 

such as trees, buildings, and power lines.

Solo includes a safety fence enabled by default at 150 ft. (46 m). This altitude reflects 

current FAA regulations to avoid potential conflicts with manned aircraft and 

represents a safe line-of-sight altitude. If Solo reaches the altitude limit, Solo will stop 

ascending and limit throttle input to stay below the altitude limit.