2021 UT App 110

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TAYLOR LYNN SCOTT,

Appellee,

v.

SARAH CATHERINE BENSON,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20210280-CA

Filed October 21, 2021

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Richard D. McKelvie

No. 194903038

G. Clayton Randle, Benjamin Lusty, Julie J. Nelson, 

and Alexandra Mareschal, Attorneys for Appellant

Jeremy G. Jones and Jeffrey C. Jensen, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JILL M. POHLMAN

concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 In this case, we must consider whether Taylor Lynn Scott 

has parental rights, pursuant to the terms of the Utah Uniform 

Parentage Act (the Act), with respect to a child (Child) with 

whom he shares no biological connection. Under the rather 

unique circumstances of this case, the district court determined 

that he does, despite being party to an admittedly fraudulent 

voluntary declaration of paternity. Sarah Catherine Benson,1

 

1. The appellant has since married and, in the record, is referred 

to variously by both her current and former surnames. For ease 

(continued...)
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Child’s biological mother, appeals that determination. For the 

reasons discussed herein, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND2

¶2 Scott and Benson began dating in late 2011. At that time, 

Benson was already pregnant with Child, and Scott was aware 

of that when he and Benson began their relationship. It is 

therefore undisputed that Scott is not Child’s biological father. 

¶3 Over the next few months, the couple’s relationship 

deepened, and they moved in together and became engaged to 

be married. When Benson gave birth to Child in the spring of 

2012, Scott attended the delivery, helped care for Benson and 

Child at the hospital, and then upon discharge transported 

Benson and Child to the couple’s joint residence. Child’s 

biological father passed away shortly after Child’s birth, and 

Scott assumed a paternal role thereafter in many meaningful 

ways, at least for the first few years of Child’s life.

¶4 Later in 2012, Benson became pregnant with Scott’s 

biological child (Sibling), who was born in 2013. About a month 

prior to Sibling’s birth, Scott and Benson ended their 

relationship. After the birth, Benson initiated a paternity action 

 

(...continued)

of reference, and intending no disrespect, we refer to the 

appellant as Benson, in a manner consistent with the case 

caption.

2. In this case, which comes to us after an evidentiary hearing to 

the bench, “we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

[district] court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent 

with that standard.” See Linebaugh v. Gibson, 2020 UT App 108, 

¶ 3 n.5, 471 P.3d 835 (quotation simplified).
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regarding Sibling (but not Child), in which she sought to 

establish that Scott was Sibling’s father and to require him to pay 

child support. The parties eventually reached an agreement to 

resolve that action; as part of the settlement, Scott and Benson 

both executed a voluntary declaration of paternity regarding 

Sibling. Under the agreement, which was reflected in a court 

order, Scott enjoyed significant parent-time with Sibling, starting 

with six out of every fourteen overnights but eventually 

transitioning into an equal parent-time arrangement. At least 

according to Scott (whose account was to some extent disputed 

by Benson), the parties often proceeded as though both children 

were subject to the same custody arrangement, even though the 

existing court order applied only to Sibling. That is, for a period 

of several years, Scott often cared for Child on similar terms as 

he cared for Sibling, and this informal arrangement continued 

even after Scott married someone else in 2015.

¶5 In December 2017, Benson was arrested and charged with 

driving under the influence of alcohol. She eventually entered a 

guilty plea, and as a result her driving privileges were 

suspended for a time. In the wake of these events, Benson asked 

Scott to temporarily take primary custody of Child and Sibling 

and, for the next several months, Scott and his spouse acted as 

the primary caregivers to both children. During this time, 

Benson struggled with depression and suicidal thoughts, and 

began to consider what would happen to the children should she 

no longer be able to care for them. The parties discussed the 

possibility of signing a voluntary declaration of paternity 

regarding Child as they had for Sibling, and eventually they 

agreed to do so. In March 2018, they both executed such a 

declaration (the VDP), therein making certain representations 

“under penalty of perjury.” In that document, Benson checked a 

box averring that she “believe[d]” Scott was “the biological 

father” of Child, and Scott checked a box averring that he 

“believe[d]” he was “the biological father” of Child. These 
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averments were factually incorrect when made, and both parties 

knew it.

¶6 For about a year after executing the VDP, the parties 

continued their informal co-parenting arrangement with regard 

to both children. But in March 2019, Benson—who had since 

married and whose spouse apparently wanted to adopt Child—

began denying Scott access to Child. Just a few weeks later, Scott 

filed the instant paternity action, seeking among other things a 

judicial declaration that he was Child’s legal father and an order 

granting him joint legal and physical custody over Child. In 

response, Benson not only opposed Scott’s petition, but also filed 

a counter-petition challenging Scott’s paternity, specifically 

alleging that the VDP was fraudulent.

¶7 Soon after filing her counter-petition, Benson filed a 

motion asking the court to compel Scott to submit to genetic 

testing, which she asserted would conclusively demonstrate that 

Scott was not Child’s biological father. Scott responded by 

conceding that he was not Child’s biological father, but 

nevertheless asked the court to disregard that fact pursuant to a 

specific provision of the Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-608 

(LexisNexis 2018) (herein referred to as “Section 608”), and apply 

principles of estoppel and equity to prevent Benson from 

contesting his status as Child’s legal father. At a hearing 

regarding Benson’s motion for genetic testing, the parties 

stipulated that Scott was not Child’s biological father, thereby 

obviating the need for formal genetic testing.

¶8 Later, Benson filed a motion for summary judgment 

asking the court to set aside the VDP because the parties had

made a “material mistake of fact,” a term that in this context is 

statutorily defined to include a situation in which “genetic test 

results . . . exclude a declarant father.” See id. § 78B-15-307(5). 

The court denied the motion by relying on the “normal and 

usual application and definition” of mistake: “a conscious choice 
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made on incorrect information or an unconscious choice.” In the 

court’s view, there could not have been a “mistake” of fact, 

because the parties knew that Scott was not Child’s biological

father at the time they signed the VDP.

¶9 Following denial of Benson’s summary judgment motion, 

the court held a three-day evidentiary hearing to consider 

Benson’s challenge to the validity of the VDP, and to consider 

Scott’s request for application of Section 608. In support of his 

position, Scott called seven witnesses, including himself as well 

as various family members and care providers. In brief 

summary, Scott’s witnesses testified that Scott was, for all intents 

and purposes, Child’s father, that he and Child had a strong 

bond of attachment, and that Scott was an attentive and 

involved father who had shared roughly equal custody of Child 

over the preceding years. Scott also admitted to falsely executing 

the VDP.

¶10 In support of her position, Benson called six witnesses, 

including herself, her spouse, various family members, and a 

child psychologist. In brief summary, Benson’s witnesses 

acknowledged that Scott had played some role in caring for 

Child, but downplayed the scope of that role, offering their view 

that Scott was inconsistent in his supporting role and that he was 

not a father figure to Child. Benson acknowledged that she had 

voluntarily and fraudulently signed the VDP, but explained that 

she did so during one of the “lowest parts” of her life, a time 

when she “honestly believed that [she] was going to end [her] 

life,” and was concerned that Child would in that event be 

placed into foster care and be separated from Sibling. She 

testified that she no longer wanted Scott to play a part in Child’s 

life, and that she believed that outcome to be in Child’s best 

interest.

¶11 After the hearing concluded, the court took the matter 

under advisement, and later issued a written ruling. The court 
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accepted the parties’ stipulation that Scott was not Child’s 

biological father, and found that the parties knew that fact when 

they signed the VDP; as a consequence, the court found that the 

VDP suffered from two infirmities. First, the court partially 

reconsidered its summary judgment ruling and concluded that, 

given the statutory definition of “material mistake of fact,” see 

id., the parties had been operating under such a mistake when 

they signed the VDP. Second, the court found that both parties 

signed the VDP voluntarily, without coercion or duress, and 

therefore could not have defrauded each other, but nevertheless 

found that the VDP “was based on fraud” because its effect was 

to commit a “fraud against the Utah State Division of Vital 

Statistics.”

¶12 On those two independent bases, the court sustained 

Benson’s challenge to the VDP. In its next sentence, the court 

stated: “Given those restrictions, the Court must conclude and 

does conclude that the [VDP] is void ab initio, and has no legal 

force or effect.” The court offered no reasoning or explanation 

for its conclusion that the consequence of Benson’s successful 

challenge was that the VDP was void from its inception.

¶13 Despite concluding that the VDP was void, the court then 

proceeded to analyze Scott’s request—made pursuant to Section 

608—that the court ignore the genetic evidence in the case, based 

on principles of estoppel, equity, and Child’s best interest, and 

nevertheless declare Scott to be Child’s legal father. On this 

score, the court found in Scott’s favor, making extensive factual 

findings in support of its determination. First, the court found 

Scott to be “particularly credible,” especially his “description of 

his relationship with” Child; the court stated that it had “no 

reservations regarding the genuine nature of [Scott’s] 

relationship with and affection for” Child. And while the court 

found Benson to be “generally credible,” the court did “not 

accept . . . her characterization of [Scott’s] early relationship 

with” Child, finding that Benson’s account was “against the 
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weight of other testimony.” Based largely on those credibility 

assessments, the court found that Scott “exclusively played [the] 

role” of father “for the first 7 years” of Child’s life, and that 

Benson “intended [Scott] to play [that] role,” even “turn[ing] the 

primary care of both children over” to Scott after her DUI. 

Second, the court “reject[ed] . . . in its entirety” the testimony of 

Benson’s spouse, finding that his “testimony was crafted in 

whatever way he believed it would be most helpful to [Benson], 

regardless of its truth.” Third, the court “reject[ed]” Benson’s 

claim that she signed the VDP under duress, or that Scott forced 

her to sign it, and specifically found that Benson signed the VDP 

because she “was concerned about [Child’s] future in the event 

something happened to her, and she wanted to make sure 

[Child] had someone who would care for him,” and that Scott 

had “willingly filled that role.” Fourth, the court found that 

Benson had “removed” Child from Scott’s life in 2019 “simply 

because it suited her interests to do so,” rather than out of any 

concern about Child’s best interest.

¶14 Based on these factual findings, the court concluded that 

Benson’s conduct “estop[ped] [her] from denying the parentage 

of [Scott],” and that “[i]t would be inequitable to disrupt the 

father-child relationship between [Child] and [Scott], the 

declarant father.” The court then analyzed a long list of factors—

including the strong bond between Scott and Child, the fact that 

Child’s biological father had passed away, and the fact that Scott 

and Benson have another child together—and concluded that “it 

is in the best interest[] of [Child] that [Scott] be legally 

established as his father.” On that basis, the court ordered that 

the stipulated genetic facts—that Scott was not Child’s biological 

father—“are disregarded,” and declared Scott “to be the legal 

father of [Child].” The court left for another day the questions of 

custody, parent-time, and child support.

¶15 Later, the district court certified its parentage order as 

final and reviewable pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure. Benson then appealed from that order, and this 

court—due to questions regarding the propriety of the rule 54(b) 

certification—considered Benson’s appeal to be a petition for 

permission to appeal an interlocutory order, and granted that 

petition. See Utah R. App. P. 5(a).

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 Benson’s appellate challenge is limited. In particular, 

Benson mounts no challenge to any of the district court’s factual 

findings. Instead, Benson challenges only the court’s 

interpretation of Utah’s paternity statutes, asserting that, because 

the VDP was procured by fraud, and because the court 

concluded that the VDP was void ab initio, Scott could not have 

been considered a “declarant father” and therefore Section 608 

has no application. Questions of statutory interpretation are 

questions of law; we review a district court’s statutory 

interpretation decisions for correctness, affording them no 

deference. See State v. Outzen, 2017 UT 30, ¶ 5, 408 P.3d 334.

ANALYSIS

¶17 We begin our analysis with a general discussion of the 

Act, and in particular its provisions governing both the 

establishment of, and challenges to, parental rights by 

declaration of paternity. Following this general discussion, we 

address the two specific arguments Benson raises in her 

challenge to the district court’s parentage order: that Scott was 

not a “declarant father” under the Act, and that the court’s 

declaration that the VDP was “void ab initio” operated to erase 

Scott’s status as a parent. For the reasons discussed, we find 

Benson’s arguments unpersuasive. 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 9 2021 UT App 110

A

¶18 Parents’ rights to raise their children are fundamental, 

and constitute some of the most important rights our society 

observes. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The 

liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of 

their children [] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 

interests recognized by this Court.”); see also In re adoption of J.S., 

2014 UT 51, ¶ 57, 358 P.3d 1009 (stating that “parental rights are 

significant and traditionally respected”). But before such rights 

are entitled to respect, they must first be established. There are a 

number of different ways for a parent to establish a recognized 

parent-child relationship, many of which are based on the notion 

that parents should generally have parental rights regarding 

their biological children. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256–

57 (1983) (recognizing “[t]he intangible fibers that connect parent 

and child”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding 

that a biological father’s interest “in the children he has sired 

and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a 

powerful countervailing interest,” constitutional protection). 

¶19 In most cases, parental status is established, based on an 

assumed biological connection, simply by presumption of 

circumstance. For instance, a mother-child relationship is 

established whenever a woman not party to a valid gestational 

agreement gives birth to a child, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-

201(1)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2018), and a father-child relationship is 

established by statutory presumption whenever a child is born 

during a marriage, see id. §§ 78B-15-201(2)(a), -204(1)(a). Even 

outside a marriage, a father’s “biological connection” to his child 

offers him “an opportunity that no other male possesses to 

develop a relationship with his offspring.” See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 

262; see also In re Baby Girl T, 2012 UT 78, ¶ 18, 298 P.3d 1251

(stating that “an unwed biological father” may acquire parental 

rights if he “demonstrates a full commitment to the 
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20210280-CA 10 2021 UT App 110

responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate 

in the rearing of his child” (quotation simplified)). 

¶20 But there are ways, under the law, for individuals to 

acquire parental rights even without any biological connection to 

the child. Adoption is the most obvious example. See Utah Code 

Ann. § 78B-15-201(1)(a)(iii), -201(2)(d). Section 608—although it 

is not as commonly invoked as the adoption process—provides 

another example. See generally id. § 78B-15-608. That statutory 

section gives district courts the opportunity, in two specific 

factual situations, to disregard genetic facts and apply principles 

of estoppel, equity, and best interest to leave an established 

parental relationship intact—even if challenged—despite the 

established absence of any genetic connection.3 The first 

situation—involving a man who is married to a woman at the 

time of the child’s birth, and is thus presumed to be the child’s 

father, but is later proved not to be the child’s genetic father—is 

not present in this case, and therefore not at issue in this appeal. 

See id. §§ 78B-15-607, -608. 

¶21 The second situation—the one at issue here—involves 

“declarant fathers”: men who establish parental rights through 

the execution of a voluntary “declaration of paternity.” See id.

 

3. Not all states that have enacted a version of the Uniform 

Parentage Act have included a provision like Section 608 in their 

statute. As of 2013, and “[c]ounting the states that have adopted 

the provisions of the 2002 [Uniform Parentage Act], eighteen 

allow courts to refuse to set aside a . . . [declaration of paternity] 

based on estoppel or the child’s best interests, or both, but the 

remainder do not.” See Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Paternity 

Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class Inequality, 2013 Mich. St. 

L. Rev. 1295, 1324–25 (2013). Our legislature’s decision to include 

Section 608 in the Act, even when some other state legislatures 

have determined not to, is of significance here. 
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§§ 78B-15-301, -302. Acquiring parental rights in this way 

requires the consent of the child’s mother; both the mother and 

the declarant father must sign a declaration, under penalty of 

perjury and in front of witnesses, and must make several 

representations. See id. § 78B-15-302(1). Specifically, they must 

aver that the child in question has no other adjudicated, 

declarant, or presumed father, and that the man’s claim of 

paternity is not inconsistent with any completed genetic testing. 

Id. § 78B-15-302(1)(d), (e). If a “valid” and “effective” declaration 

of paternity is filed with the Office of Vital Records, then a 

“father-child relationship is established” between the child and 

the declarant father, and “all of the rights and duties of a parent” 

are “confer[red] upon the declarant father.” Id. §§ 78B-15-

201(2)(b), -304(3), -305(1). “For the purposes of establishing 

paternity, a voluntary declaration of paternity, duly signed and 

filed, has the same effect as a judicial determination of 

paternity.” In re S.H., 2005 UT App 324, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d 309.

¶22 The facts before us establish that the VDP Scott and 

Benson filed with the Office of Vital Records in March 2018 met 

all the basic statutory requirements, and was therefore “valid” 

and “effective” when submitted.4 The VDP was executed by both 

 

4. Benson asserts that the VDP was not “valid” or “effective,” 

even though it met the basic statutory requirements, because the 

court declared it to be void ab initio and because Scott did not 

meet the definition of “declarant father.” We address—and 

reject—the merits of those arguments below, see infra Part B, but 

more to the point, those arguments do not necessarily go to 

whether a declaration of paternity is “valid” or “effective” at the 

time it is filed. A declaration is valid and effective if it meets all 

the basic statutory requirements and is accepted by the Office of 

Vital Records. Of course, any such declaration may later be 

challenged under any one of several statutory avenues. See, e.g., 

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-15-302(3), -306, -307 (LexisNexis 2018). 

(continued...)
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Scott and Benson, under penalty of perjury and in front of 

witnesses. Scott and Benson both represented that Child had no 

other adjudicated, presumed, or declarant father. Most 

importantly for present purposes, both claimed—falsely, as it 

turned out—that they “believe[d]” Scott was Child’s biological 

father. And they filed the document in the proper place with the 

proper state agency. Thus, the VDP was valid and effective, and 

Scott’s status as Child’s parent, with all its concomitant rights 

and duties, was established in or about March 2018. Soon 

thereafter, Scott and Benson amended Child’s birth certificate to 

list Scott as Child’s father, and they operated under that 

arrangement—with Scott as Child’s established legal father—for 

approximately a year.

¶23 Voluntary declarations of paternity are, however, subject 

to challenge. Within the first sixty days, either signatory to a 

declaration of paternity may rescind it, without specifying any 

reason. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-306 (LexisNexis 2018). 

After the rescission period has ended, however, a signatory may 

challenge a declaration of paternity “only on the basis of fraud, 

duress, or material mistake of fact.” Id. § 78B-15-307(1) (herein 

referred to as “Section 307”). Benson’s challenge was raised more 

than a year after the VDP was filed, and thus was brought under 

Section 307. The district court sustained that challenge, finding 

both fraud and material mistake of fact in the execution of the 

VDP. Scott does not contest those findings here, and for the 

purposes of this appeal we consider it established that the VDP 

was indeed infirm for the reasons found by the district court. 

 

(...continued)

But it does not necessarily follow, merely from a successful later 

challenge, that a declaration was not “valid” or “effective” when 

submitted. 
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¶24 Nevertheless, after sustaining Benson’s challenge to the 

VDP, the district court proceeded, at Scott’s request, to apply the 

analysis set forth in Section 608. That statutory section states 

that, “[i]n a proceeding to . . . challenge the paternity of a child 

having a declarant father, the [court] may . . . disregard genetic 

test results that exclude the . . . declarant father if the [court]” 

makes three independent factual determinations. See id. § 78B15-608(1).5 First, the court must determine that “the conduct of” 

one of the signatories to the declaration (here, Benson) “estops 

that party from denying parentage.” Id. § 78B-15-608(1)(a). 

Second, the court must determine that “it would be inequitable 

to disrupt the father-child relationship between the child and the 

. . . declarant father.” Id. § 78B-15-608(1)(b). Third, the court must 

find that disregarding the genetic facts is in “the best interest of 

the child.” Id. § 78B-15-608(2). If the court makes the necessary 

findings, and determines to disregard the genetic facts, “it shall 

issue an order adjudicating the . . . declarant father to be the 

father of the child.” Id. § 78B-15-608(3). As noted, the court made 

the necessary findings, disregarded the genetic facts, and 

declared Scott to be Child’s legal father. Benson does not 

challenge any of the court’s factual findings. 

¶25 Because Scott does not challenge the district court’s 

findings regarding fraud and mutual mistake of fact, and 

because Benson does not challenge the court’s findings 

regarding estoppel, equity, or best interest, the question raised in 

this appeal is a narrow legal one: was the district court correct to 

 

5. In this case, there were no “genetic test results,” because the 

parties stipulated—after the filing of Benson’s motion seeking to 

compel Scott to submit to genetic testing—that Scott was not 

Child’s biological father. Like the district court, we consider 

Section 608’s reference to “genetic test results” to be broad 

enough to include genetic facts that are arrived at by stipulation; 

neither party asks us to adopt a contrary interpretation. 
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even proceed to apply Section 608, after sustaining Benson’s 

Section 307 challenge? 

¶26 Benson asserts that Section 608 has no application here, 

and that the court erred by proceeding to engage with its 

principles after sustaining her Section 307 challenge. In support 

of her position, Benson makes two arguments. First, she asserts 

that Scott was not a “declarant father” under the statutory 

definition of that term, and therefore Section 608—which applies 

only to cases involving “presumed fathers” or “declarant 

fathers”—does not apply. Second, she notes that the district 

court declared the VDP to be “void ab initio,” and asserts that 

this declaration rendered the VDP null and void from the outset, 

erasing Scott’s status—if he ever had such status—as a declarant 

father. We address each of Benson’s arguments, in turn.

B

¶27 The Act provides a statutory definition of “declarant 

father,” proclaiming that the term, as used in the statute, “means 

a male who, along with the biological mother claims to be the 

genetic father of a child, and signs a voluntary declaration of 

paternity to establish the man’s paternity.” Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78B-15-102(8) (LexisNexis 2018). Benson acknowledges that she 

and Scott both signed a voluntary declaration of paternity. But 

she contends that Scott does not meet the statutory definition of 

“declarant father” because, in her view, he does not “claim[] to 

be the genetic father” of Child. In support of this position, 

Benson makes two arguments. 

¶28 First, she contends that, because Scott stipulated during 

this case that he was not Child’s genetic father, and because he 

knew all along that he was not Child’s genetic father, Scott does 

not “claim[]” to be Child’s genetic father. But the statute does 

not require Scott to have always claimed he was Child’s genetic 

father; indeed, many (if not most) Section 307 challenges will 

involve situations in which the putative declarant father, at the 
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time the litigation is ongoing, has come to realize that he is not 

actually the genetic father of the child in question. In this case, 

Scott undoubtedly made at least one formal claim—at the time of 

the filing of the VDP—that he was Child’s genetic father. In that 

document, he averred under penalty of perjury that he 

“believe[d]” he was “the biological father of” Child. In our view, 

a man has “claimed” to be the genetic father of a child, for 

purposes of the statutory definition of “declarant father,” if the 

man files a declaration of paternity in which he avers that he 

believes himself to be the genetic father. 

¶29 Second, Benson asserts that the word “claim,” as used in 

the statutory definition of “declarant father,” means that the man 

needed to have made a good-faith claim—rather than a 

knowingly fraudulent claim—of genetic paternity. The paternity 

statute does not provide a definition of “claim.” See generally id. 

§ 78B-15-102. Where a statute does not provide an internal 

definition of a term, we “interpret the statutory language 

according to the plain meaning of its text.” See O’Hearon v. 

Hansen, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 24, 409 P.3d 85 (quotation 

simplified); see also In re adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 15, 

266 P.3d 702 (instructing courts to “assume the legislative body 

used each term . . . in accordance with its ordinary meaning” 

(quotation simplified)). “A starting point for a court’s assessment 

of ordinary meaning is the dictionary.” O’Hearon, 2017 UT App 

214, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified). Benson supplies us with a 

dictionary definition of the word “claim,” but that definition 

does not support her position. See Claim, Cambridge Dictionary, 

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/claim

[https://perma.cc/J5P7-MHWG] (stating that “claim” means “to 

say something is true or is a fact, although you cannot prove it 

and other people might not believe it”). And other dictionaries 

we have consulted likewise do not define the word “claim” to 

necessarily include a good-faith state of mind. See, e.g., Claim, 

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 414 (2002) (defining 

“claim” as follows: “to assert especially with conviction and in 
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20210280-CA 16 2021 UT App 110

the face of possible contradiction or doubt”); Claim, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A statement that something yet to be 

proved is true.”). In our view, the word “claim”—as generally 

used in common parlance—includes both good-faith claims and 

bad-faith claims. If our legislature had intended a specialized 

definition of the term “claim” that incorporated only good-faith 

claims, it could have so indicated. Cf. Belnap v. Howard, 2019 UT 

9, ¶¶ 10–11, 437 P.3d 355 (declining to read a bad-faith exception 

into a rule of civil procedure when the rule’s language was clear 

and did not include one). We therefore reject Benson’s assertion 

that the word “claim,” as used in the Act’s definition of 

“declarant father,” refers only to good-faith claims.6

 

6. Finally, and in a related vein, Benson asserts that the overall 

statutory scheme—and not just the use of the word “claim” in 

the definition of “declarant father”—set out in the Act indicates 

legislative intent to cabin that definition to exclude men who 

knowingly lied in executing a declaration of paternity. She 

points to requirements specifying that only a “valid” and 

“effective” declaration of paternity operates to give a man 

parental rights, but she overlooks the fact—discussed supra ¶ 22 

and note 4—that the VDP in this case was valid and effective, for 

about a year, because it met all statutory requirements and was 

filed properly. And she speculates that Scott’s interpretation of 

“declarant father” would operate to “circumvent” Utah adoption 

law, but we consider that speculation overheated. See infra ¶ 41. 

In short, we are aware of no provision in the Act that indicates 

legislative intent to limit the term “declarant father” to only 

those men who make a good-faith (as opposed to bad-faith) 

claim of genetic paternity. As discussed elsewhere herein, had 

our legislature intended that result, it could have used a 

different definition of “claim,” or it could have expanded the 

bases upon which a declaration of paternity is considered void. 

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-15-102(8), -302(3). It did not do so, 

(continued...)
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 17 2021 UT App 110

¶30 Thus, because he claimed to be Child’s genetic father, and 

executed a valid declaration of paternity to that effect, Scott met 

the Act’s definition of “declarant father.” See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78B-15-102(8). 

C

¶31 Second, Benson asserts that, even if Scott could be 

considered a “declarant father,” pursuant to the statutory 

definition of that term, at the time the VDP was filed, any such 

status was effectively erased when the district court declared the 

VDP to be void ab initio for fraud. We take Benson’s point and 

acknowledge that, if the VDP actually were void ab initio, her 

argument would perhaps have merit; indeed, a father whose 

declaration of paternity never took effect, and who is by court 

order placed back into his pre-declaration position, cannot be 

considered to have acquired parental rights under the Act. But in 

our view the court had no basis to declare the VDP void, and 

used the term “void ab initio” ill-advisedly. As we interpret the 

Act, a declaration of paternity that is successfully challenged 

only under Section 307, without invoking the other statutory 

grounds for voidness or rescission, is not void ab initio but, 

instead, is subject to being declared ineffective on a forwardlooking basis.

 

(...continued)

even though it has, in other contexts, indicated an ability and 

willingness to distinguish between good-faith and bad-faith 

claims. See, e.g., id. § 63A-5b-606(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) 

(setting forth penalties for “fraudulent” or “bad faith claim[s]” in 

procurement cases); id. § 78B-5-825 (2018) (allowing an award of 

attorney fees to the prevailing party “if the court determines that 

the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 

brought or asserted in good faith”). 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 18 2021 UT App 110

¶32 We begin our analysis by examining the Act as a whole, 

and by discussing the various ways in which a declaration of 

paternity can be challenged. We find it significant that the 

drafters of the Act specified certain circumstances—and only 

those circumstances—in which a declaration of paternity can be 

considered “void” or subject to “rescission.” See Utah Code Ann. 

§§ 78B-15-302(3), -306. When we view those statutory provisions 

in tandem with Section 307, we conclude that there is no 

statutory basis for concluding that a declaration of paternity is 

void simply because a Section 307 challenge is successful. 

¶33 The Act specifies that a “declaration of paternity is void 

if” any one of three circumstances is present. See id. § 78B-15-

302(3) (herein referred to as “Section 302(3)”). First, a declaration 

is void if it states that another man—other than the male 

signatory—is a presumed father, unless that other man has filed 

a valid denial of paternity. Id. § 78B-15-302(3)(a). Second, a 

declaration is void if it states that “another man is a declarant or 

adjudicated father.” Id. § 78B-15-302(3)(b). Third, a declaration is 

void if it “falsely denies the existence of a presumed, declarant, 

or adjudicated father.” Id. § 78B-15-302(3)(c). These are the only 

circumstances in which the Act commands that a declaration be 

considered void. No other circumstances are listed.7 And none of 

the listed circumstances are present in this case. Child’s 

biological father passed away soon after his birth, and there is no 

other adjudicated, presumed, or declarant father with regard to 

Child. Presumably for these reasons, Benson has not argued—

either before the district court or on appeal—that the VDP 

should be considered void under Section 302(3). 

 

7. We note that, if our legislature had intended for declarations 

of paternity to be considered void in which one of the signatories 

made a knowingly false claim regarding genetic paternity, it 

could have easily added a fourth circumstance to Section 302(3). 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 19 2021 UT App 110

¶34 Another section of the Act (Section 306) provides 

signatories the opportunity to seek rescission of declarations of 

paternity, for no reason or any reason, as long as they do so 

within a certain specified time period. See id. § 78B-15-306(1). The 

specified time period is short, ending no later than sixty days 

after the declaration’s effective date. See id. As with the word 

“claim,” the Act does not provide a specialized definition of 

“rescission,” so we apply the usual and ordinary meaning of the 

word. See O’Hearon, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 24. As customarily 

used, the term “rescission” means that parties to a contract are 

put “back into the positions they would have held had no 

contract ever existed.” See Howard O. Hunter, Modern Law of 

Contracts § 12:18 (2021); see also Rescission, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (stating that rescission is the 

“unmaking of a contract” and its effect is to “restor[e] the 

parties to their precontractual positions”); 17A Am. Jur. 2d 

Contracts § 536 (2021) (stating that rescission “has the effect of 

voiding a contract from its inception, as if it never existed”). 

Thus, Section 306, by its purposeful use of the term “rescission,” 

provides an additional avenue, over and above the 

circumstances set forth in Section 302(3), for declaring a 

declaration of paternity invalid from its inception. But Benson 

missed the deadline for availing herself of Section 306’s remedy; 

she did not seek rescission within sixty days of the VDP’s 

effective date in March 2018. Presumably for this reason, Benson 

has not argued—either before the district court or on appeal—

that she has a right to seek rescission of the VDP pursuant to 

Section 306. 

¶35 A party to whom Section 302(3) does not apply and for 

whom the Section 306 deadline has passed must look to Section 

307 for grounds to challenge a declaration of paternity. See Utah 

Code Ann. § 78B-15-307(1) (stating that, “[a]fter the period for 

rescission under [Section 306] has expired, a signatory of a 

declaration of paternity . . . may commence a proceeding to

challenge the declaration . . . only on the basis of fraud, duress, 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 20 2021 UT App 110

or material mistake of fact”). Section 307 is the provision Benson 

invoked in her counter-petition, and the provision the court 

applied in evaluating that counter-petition. As noted, the court 

concluded that Benson’s Section 307 challenge had merit because 

the VDP was entered into fraudulently and subject to a material 

mistake of fact. Scott does not challenge that determination; 

therefore, for our purposes, there is no question that Benson’s 

challenge to the VDP under Section 307 was successful. 

¶36 The central question presented here concerns the 

consequence of a successful Section 307 challenge. The district 

court, upon sustaining Benson’s challenge, proclaimed the VDP 

to be “void ab initio” and without “legal force or effect,” but 

offered no explanation supporting this declaration; the court 

appeared to simply assume that the consequence of a successful 

Section 307 challenge was that the VDP would be declared void. 

The parties offer divergent views regarding the court’s 

declaration. Benson centers her argument around it, and asserts 

that the effect of the declaration is to erase any “declarant father” 

status Scott may at one point have enjoyed. But Benson does not 

offer any basis for the court’s declaration that the VDP was void; 

Scott, for his part, asserts that the court should not have declared 

the VDP void. After examining the Act as a whole, we see no 

basis for the court to have declared the VDP void ab initio. 

¶37 As a starting point, we note that no provision anywhere 

in the Act dictates that a VDP subject to a successful Section 307 

challenge is void ab initio. See generally id. §§ 78B-15-301 to -313, 

601 to -623.8 Certainly, Section 307 itself is silent regarding the 

 

8. We are also unaware of any case law, in Utah or elsewhere, 

interpreting the language of Section 307 in this way. In her brief, 

Benson cites two cases from other jurisdictions that she asserts 

stand for this proposition, but they do not. See McGee v. Gonyo, 

2016 VT 8, 201 Vt. 216, 140 A.3d 162; Alvarado v. Thomson, 375 

(continued...)
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 21 2021 UT App 110

consequences of a successful challenge. See id. § 78B-15-307. The 

extent of specific statutory guidance on this point comes from 

the next section, which mandates that, “[a]t the conclusion of a 

proceeding to rescind or challenge a declaration of paternity . . . , 

the [court] shall order the Office of Vital Records to amend the 

birth record of the child, if appropriate.” Id. § 78B-15-308(5). 

¶38 But the Act’s silence on this point must be viewed in 

tandem with the specific instructions given for successful 

challenges pursuant to Section 302(3) or Section 306. See Bryner v. 

Cardon Outreach, LLC, 2018 UT 52, ¶ 10, 428 P.3d 1096 (stating 

that appellate courts “read the plain language of [a] statute as a 

whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other 

statutes in the same chapter and related chapters” (quotation 

simplified)).9 As noted, our legislature set forth only three 

 

(...continued)

P.3d 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). Those cases stand merely for the 

proposition that a declaration of paternity in which both 

signatories participate in the fraud can still be set aside for fraud, 

even though the signatories did not defraud each other. In those 

cases, however, the courts simply set aside the fraudulent 

declarations and did not deem them void. See McGee, 2016 VT 8, 

¶ 19; Alvarado, 375 P.3d at 80. Thus, neither of those cases takes 

the extra step Benson is asking us to take here, namely, to hold 

that a fraudulent declaration of paternity renders the declaration 

void ab initio and prevents any further evaluation of parentage 

based on equity, estoppel, and best interest. 

9. Most of Benson’s assertions that other sections of the Act 

support her position are unpersuasive. But one of Benson’s 

arguments is more intriguing. She points out that section 78B-15-

617 of the Utah Code (Section 617), which sets forth “[r]ules for 

adjudication of paternity,” has a provision stating as follows: 

“Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other 

(continued...)
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 22 2021 UT App 110

specific situations in which a declaration of paternity is to be 

considered “void,” none of which applies here. See id. § 78B-15-

302(3). And our legislature set forth an additional set of 

circumstances in which signatories may rescind a declaration of 

paternity, an eventuality which renders the declaration void 

from its inception. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-306. Thus, our 

 

(...continued)

results of genetic testing, a man properly excluded as the father 

of a child by genetic testing must be adjudicated not to be the 

father of the child.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-617(4) 

(LexisNexis 2018). And she also points out that another 

subsection of Section 617 contains similar language, but 

expressly references Section 608 as a potential exception to its 

rule: “Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut 

other results of genetic testing, a man identified as the father of a 

child under Section 78B-15-505 must be adjudicated the father of 

the child, unless an exception is granted under [Section 608].” Id.

§ 78B-15-617(2) (emphasis added). Benson asserts that the 

legislature’s inclusion of a potential Section 608 exception in 

subsection (2), coupled with its omission of a similar potential 

exception in subsection (4), means that a father who is excluded 

by genetic testing can never be adjudicated to be the legal father 

of a child. In our view, however, Benson’s argument proves too 

much; if it were correct, Section 608—which exists only to give 

courts an opportunity to disregard genetic evidence in 

appropriate circumstances—would be effectively excised from 

the Act. We acknowledge the apparent inconsistency between 

subsections (2) and (4) of Section 617, but we do not perceive 

therein a legislative intent to abrogate Section 608. However, 

because our conclusions on this point—as well as on other points 

elsewhere in this opinion—are based on statutory interpretation, 

our legislature is of course free to express disagreement with our 

conclusions, by legislative amendment, in the event it believes 

we have not correctly perceived its intent. 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 23 2021 UT App 110

legislature took pains to specify certain circumstances in which a 

declaration of paternity is to be considered void, and it elected 

not to so specify with regard to Section 307 challenges. When 

interpreting a statute, we “seek to give effect to omissions in 

statutory language by presuming all omissions to be 

purposeful.” Belnap, 2019 UT 9, ¶ 27 (quotation simplified); see 

also McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 37 (stating that “the 

expression of one term should be interpreted as the exclusion of 

another” (quotation simplified)). Here, we must assume the 

legislature’s choice—not to proclaim as “void” those 

declarations of paternity that have been successfully challenged 

under Section 307 alone—to have been purposeful, especially 

given the legislature’s specificity, in other sections of the Act, 

regarding circumstances in which declarations should be 

considered void. 

¶39 Moreover, if the effect of a successful Section 307 

challenge were to render a declaration of paternity void ab initio, 

the reach of Section 608 would be extremely limited. Section 608 

applies whenever (i) there exists a presumed or declarant father, 

and (ii) a party challenges the paternity rights of the presumed 

or declarant father based on genetic facts that “exclude the 

presumed or declarant father.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-

608(1). Many successful Section 307 challenges—including 

challenges that are successful on grounds of mutual mistake of 

fact—will fit these criteria. But if Benson’s argument were 

correct—and the consequence of any successful Section 307 

challenge were determined to be that the declaration of paternity 

were void ab initio—many situations that fit Section 608’s simple 

criteria would not be eligible for consideration under Section 

608, because the declaration would be void from the outset. In 

short, Benson’s argument sweeps too broadly. 

¶40 On this basis, although we affirm the district court’s 

ultimate conclusions, we conclude that its use of the term “void 

ab initio” was unsupported by statute, and was in this context 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 24 2021 UT App 110

ill-advised.10 The consequence of a successful Section 307 

challenge—at least one that does not invoke Section 302(3) or 

Section 306—is not that the declaration of paternity is rendered 

void from its inception; instead, under the statutory scheme 

viewed holistically, the consequence of such a challenge is that a 

declaration will be set aside, on a going-forward basis, so long as 

Section 608 does not counsel otherwise. See Leslie Joan Harris, 

Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class 

Inequality, 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1295, 1323–24 (2013) (analyzing 

Utah’s version of the Uniform Parentage Act, comparing it with 

other states’ versions, and stating that, under Utah’s law, 

“genetic test results that exclude a man who signed” a 

declaration of paternity “allow” that declaration “to be set aside 

. . . because the man is not the biological father unless the court 

invokes the estoppel and best-interests principles”); see also 

G.R.B. v. L.J.B., 260 So. 3d 833 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018) (applying 

Alabama’s version of Section 608 to reverse a trial court’s 

determination disestablishing paternity for a declarant father 

who willingly filed a fraudulent declaration of paternity and 

operated as father for ten years, and remanding for evaluation of 

whether to disregard genetic testing using Section 608’s equity, 

estoppel, and best interest factors). 

¶41 And although we view this result as driven by the 

statutory text, we briefly discuss—and reject as unpersuasive—

the policy considerations Benson advances. In her view, the 

result we reach here today will encourage fraud, and will allow 

scheming parties to circumvent Utah’s adoption statutes. As 

Benson sees it, our interpretation of the Act would allow “a man 

 

10. Indeed, we wonder whether the court intended to use the 

term in the same way Benson now advocates, given that the 

court did not believe that the effect of its use of the term was to 

foreclose review under Section 608. After all, immediately after 

using the term, the court proceeded to engage with Section 608. 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 25 2021 UT App 110

who knows he is not the genetic father” to “collude with the 

mother to fraudulently sign” a declaration of paternity and 

thereby “conceal the child’s existence from the genetic father 

long enough to establish a parental relationship with the child, 

and then use [S]ection 608 to prevent the genetic father from 

replacing him.” But Benson ignores the fact that Section 302(3) 

already accounts for this scenario, at least to some extent, 

making plain that any declaration that “falsely denies the 

existence of a presumed, declarant, or adjudicated father” is 

“void.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-302(3)(c). And in any event, 

we have a hard time believing that courts asked to apply Section 

608 would find—absent truly extraordinary circumstances—that 

the equities tip in a man’s favor in cases where a true genetic 

father exists and the man tried to conceal the child from the 

genetic father. 

¶42 Moreover, as at least one other jurist has pointed out, the 

equitable and policy considerations surrounding Section 608 

start to look different if one envisions a different factual 

circumstance: a situation in which a declarant father who 

executed a knowingly fraudulent declaration of paternity later 

attempts to use Section 307 to escape his established parental 

obligations—as opposed to, as here, use Section 608 to retain his 

established parental rights—when he, for instance, comes into a 

large amount of money and no longer wishes to pay child 

support. See McGee v. Gonyo, 2016 VT 8, ¶ 25, 201 Vt. 216, 140 

A.3d 162 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (discussing a scenario in 

which a “putative father had held himself out to the world as the 

child’s parent for years, but then sought to sever his legal 

obligations because he won the lottery and wanted to avoid 

paying increased child support”); see also G.R.B., 260 So. 3d at 

833 (applying Alabama’s version of Section 608 to potentially 

hold a father to the parental obligations he voluntarily assumed 

in a fraudulently executed declaration of paternity). For reasons 

best known to itself, our legislature chose to adopt Section 608 as 

part of the Act, even when many other state legislatures opted 
Scott v. Benson

20210280-CA 26 2021 UT App 110

not to; with this factual situation in mind, we can envision sound 

policy reasons that might have motivated that choice. And in 

any event, our task is not to second-guess that choice, but rather 

to give voice to that choice by interpreting the Act according to 

the ordinary meaning of its text. 

CONCLUSION

¶43 In this case, other than using the term “void ab initio” 

when it shouldn’t have, the district court acted in a procedurally 

appropriate manner, and interpreted the Act correctly. The court 

properly began its analysis by assessing whether the VDP was 

subject to challenge under Section 307, and determined that it 

was, for both mutual mistake of fact and for fraud. After 

sustaining Benson’s Section 307 challenge, the court then 

correctly transitioned into an analysis—at Scott’s request—under 

Section 608, to assess whether to ignore the genetic facts of the 

case based on principles of estoppel, equity, and best interest. 

And as noted, the court’s factual findings in that regard are 

unchallenged.

¶44 For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s parentage 

order, and remand the case for further proceedings regarding, 

among other things, custody, parent-time, and child support.