* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 28 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. FRANCO ANTHONY SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. No. 98-6003 (D.C. No. 97-CR-115) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T herefore, the case is ordered submitted without oral argument. Defendant Franco Anthony Smith appeals his convicti on for possession with intent to distribute approximately thirteen po unds of crack cocaine, in-2-

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We affirm. Smith was traveling westbound on Interstate 44 in O klahoma City when the police stopped his vehicle for speeding. Smith didnot have a driver’s license or proof of insurance, and the police determined he wa s not the owner of the vehicle. He was arrested. While preparing to have the vehic le impounded, the police observed “inconsistencies” around the passenger sid e air bag in the dash of the vehicle. The police lifted the cover over the air bag and observed what they believed to be contraband. The vehicle was transpo rted to police headquarters and the police conducted a complete search of the v ehicle. Approximately thirteen pounds of crack cocaine was discovered in the passenger air bag compartment. As his sole issue on appeal, and for the first time in the litigation, Smith contends the evidence seized from the vehicle shoul d have been suppressed because it was the result of an illegal search. Mo re specifically, he asserts the scope of the search at police headquarters exceededthe scope of a permissible inventory search. Since Smith did not present this issue to the district court, we review it for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). “We may correct an error not raised at trial . . . if there is (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Smith , 131 F.3d 1392, 1397 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1109 (1998). “If these three elements are present we may-3-

exercise our discretion to notice forfeited error, ‘but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States , 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997)). Assuming, arguendo, that Smith had a sufficient pos sessory interest in the vehicle to afford him standing to challenge the search, see generally United States v. Shareef , 100 F.3d 1491, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1996), we fin d no error arising from the search or the district court’s subsequent admission of evidence obtained from the search. Given the suspicious circumstance s surrounding Smith’s arrest (no driver’s license or proof of insurance and his evasive answers to police questions) and discovery of the hidden compartment in the vehicle, we conclude the police had probable cause to search the entire vehicle for contraband. See California v. Acevedo , 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“police may search an automobile . . . where they have probable cause to believe contraband . . . is contained”); United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982) (probable cause justifies the “search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, . . . that may conceal the object of the search”); United States v. Anderson , 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997) (discovery of evidence of hid den compartment in vehicle, together with other suspicious factors, constitutes probable cause to conduct thorough search of vehicle). The fact that the search was not completed until after the vehicle was transported to police headquarters did not eliminate-4-

justification for the search. “[W]hen police offic ers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile th at has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless searchof the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody.” Michigan v. Thomas , 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982).
AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge