IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-14-00197-CR

No. 10-14-00198-CR

No. 10-14-00199-CR

BRODERICK JERMAINE GRBA,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 21st District Court

Burleson County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 14,293, 14,294 and 14,295

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In three indictments, Broderick Jermaine Grba was charged with the felony 

offenses of murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and burglary of a 

habitation (to which Grba pled guilty). The cases were consolidated and tried together, 

and a jury found him guilty and assessed a life sentence and a $10,000 fine on the murder 

charge. The jury assessed twenty-year sentences and $10,000 fines on each of the other 
Grba v. State Page 2

two charges. Grba raises three issues in the murder case; the second and third of those 

issues are identically raised in the other two cases. We will affirm.

In the murder case, Grba’s first issue asserts that the trial court erred in failing to 

include a “sudden passion” instruction in the punishment charge over Grba’s objection. 

The evidence shows that Anthony Allen, Grba’s friend, had a long-running dispute with 

Marcus Carroll, the murder victim, and that Grba had been involved in some of the 

altercations between Allen and Carroll. On the evening in question, Carroll and Antwon 

Heslip, his cousin and close friend, and Jovan Jefferson, another friend, met at the Cotton 

Village apartments in Snook and then went to a party at the Legion Hall in Somerville,

with Carroll driving separately. Jefferson said that Allen was at the party and walked up 

to Carroll and said to him, “I’m going to kill you tonight.” He later saw Allen 

aggressively approach Carroll in the hall’s parking lot. Heslip said that when they were 

in the parking lot, Allen very aggressively approached Carroll but Heslip was able to get 

between them and separate them. Heslip’s group then went back into the party until the 

hall closed. Heslip did not see Grba at the party in Somerville. Latisha McKee, Carroll’s 

girlfriend, testified that Carroll called her from the party and told her that he and Allen 

had “got into it.”

McKee later looked out her window and saw Allen approach and knock on the 

door of the apartment of Grba, who lived across the parking lot. She looked later again 

and saw Heslip pulling into a parking spot in front of her apartment and Allen and Grba 

walking toward Heslip. She went outside and told Allen and Grba, “Don’t y’all start this 

shit.” Heslip then got out of his car as Carroll was driving into the parking lot. McKee 
Grba v. State Page 3

testified that Grba then said to Heslip, “What’s up, nigger?”, immediately pulled a gun 

from his pocket, and began shooting Heslip. McKee then ran to Carroll and told him to 

run, but he replied, “I’m tired of this shit.” McKee then ran into her apartment and heard 

more shots being fired. She then helped the wounded Heslip into her apartment, and 9-

1-1 was called. 

After EMS arrived and were attending to Heslip, McKee went outside and behind 

the apartment building, where she discovered an unresponsive Carroll lying on the 

ground. Carroll had been shot. DPS trooper John Anderson was the first lawenforcement officer to arrive, and he found Heslip bleeding severely from the leg in one 

apartment and Allen with a gunshot wound to his leg in another apartment. He also 

discovered Carroll’s body behind the apartment building with a 9 mm. Glock handgun 

on the ground next to Carroll, who had been shot once in the upper back. Caldwell police 

officer Tim Davis responded to the crime scene and determined that all of the rounds in 

the Glock had been fired. Texas Ranger Steven Jeter found a Browning .380 handgun on 

the ground near the back of Grba’s apartment. That .380 handgun had been stolen in a 

burglary of Carroll and McKee’s apartment (the burglary that Grba pled guilty to), and 

ballistics testing later determined that the bullet that killed Carroll was shot from that

.380 handgun. Grba was found in his apartment and taken into custody for questioning.

Tristan Merida, Carroll and Heslip’s cousin, had seen them in Somerville after the 

party and decided to come to the apartments in Snook. As he arrived, he parked next to 

Heslip’s car and soon saw Allen and Grba walking toward them. At that same time,

Merida saw Carroll driving into the parking lot. Merida then saw Grba pull out a gun 
Grba v. State Page 4

and start shooting. Merida ran to the back of the apartment complex and saw Carroll 

ducking down between two cars. As Merida continued to run, he heard more shots being 

fired.

Heslip testified that, after leaving the party and getting gas, his car arrived first at 

the apartments in Snook. He parked near Carroll and McKee’s apartment, and Jefferson 

got out first and began walking away. About a minute later, Heslip, who was unarmed, 

began to get out his car and saw a shirtless Allen walking across the parking lot toward 

him with Grba walking close behind Allen. That was the first time that evening that 

Heslip saw Grba. Allen said something to Heslip, but Heslip said nothing to Allen, and 

then Grba pulled out a gun and started shooting Heslip several times. Heslip went down, 

and Allen and Grba walked away. Heslip, who was shot four times, struggled into 

McKee and Carroll’s apartment. He suffered serious injuries, including the loss of a leg. 

The charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon pertained to Grba’s shooting 

Heslip.

After Grba was taken into custody for investigation later that morning, Jeter 

conducted a recorded interview with him. Grba initially denied any involvement in the 

shootings, but eventually said that Allen got him out of bed to provide back up because

he was going to fight Carroll. Grba said that the conflict was between Carroll and Allen 

and that he was not personally mad at Carroll. Because he “was scared for [his] life,” 

Grba got his gun. As they were walking across the parking lot, Carroll shot at them and 

hit Allen in the leg. Grba said he shot at Heslip because Carroll had shot first, but Grba 
Grba v. State Page 5

said that he fired only toward the ground at Heslip. He said he could not remember 

shooting at Carroll.

A few days later, Grba asked to talk to Burleson County Deputy Sheriff Gene 

Hermes. In a video-recorded interview that was played for the jury, Grba said that he 

and his girlfriend were asleep in bed when Allen woke him up by knocking on the front 

door. Allen told Grba that Heslip had said at the party in Somerville that he intended “to 

do something to him [Allen]” and that Allen needed Grba as a back up to give him 

protection. Grba’s girlfriend asked him not to go with Allen.

Three weeks before, Grba had gotten into an altercation with Carroll where Carroll 

scratched Grba’s face and told Grba that he intended to kill him. Two weeks before, Grba 

and another person broke into Carroll and McKee’s apartment and stole marijuana and 

a gun—the .380 that he used to shoot Heslip and Carroll. 

Grba said that he and Allen went to the parking lot and sat in Allen’s car. Grba 

was rolling a blunt when Heslip and Carroll arrived and parked. Grba walked with Allen 

toward Heslip to make sure that Allen did not get jumped, and Grba saw Carroll standing 

beside Carroll’s car to their side. Before they got to Heslip, Allen exclaimed that he was 

shot in the leg. Grba said that Carroll shot first, and then he said he pulled out his gun 

and starting shooting in the directions of Heslip and Carroll. Grba said he fired his gun 

as “a reaction thing” and “out of fear” when he heard shots from Carroll’s direction and 

Allen got hit. After first shooting at Heslip and Carroll, he ran after Carroll, who was 

running around the apartment building. When Grba got to the corner of the building, he 

fired more shots in Carroll’s direction.
Grba v. State Page 6

After the shooting was over, Grba helped Allen into Allen’s mother’s apartment. 

Grba then went to his own apartment, hid the gun in the back on the ground by the steps, 

and went inside and fell asleep.

The charge included instructions on self-defense, deadly force in defense of 

person, and defense of third person. The jury found Grba guilty of murder. Over Grba’s 

objection, the trial court did not include a “sudden passion” instruction in the 

punishment charge.

In Wooten v. State, a remarkably similar murder case, the Court of Criminal 

Appeals addressed the trial court’s rejection of a sudden-passion instruction in the 

punishment charge after the jury had already found the defendant guilty of murder 

despite his self-defense claim, which the jury had been instructed on. 400 S.W.3d 601, 

603-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Under the current statutory scheme, the question of whether a defendant 

killed while under the immediate influence of sudden passion is a 

punishment issue.

Currently, a murder committed under the “immediate influence of 

sudden passion arising from an adequate cause” is a second-degree felony 

carrying a maximum punishment of twenty years’ imprisonment. Sudden 

passion is “passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the 

individual killed” which arises at the time of the murder. Adequate cause 

is a “cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, 

resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the 

mind incapable of cool reflection.” The defendant has the burden of 

production and persuasion with respect to the issue of sudden passion. To 

justify a jury instruction on the issue of sudden passion at the punishment 

phase, the record must at least minimally support an inference: 1) that the 

defendant in fact acted under the immediate influence of a passion such as 

terror, anger, rage, or resentment; 2) that his sudden passion was in fact 

induced by some provocation by the deceased or another acting with him, 

which provocation would commonly produce such a passion in a person of 
Grba v. State Page 7

ordinary temper; 3) that he committed the murder before regaining his

capacity for cool reflection; and 4) that a causal connection existed “between 

the provocation, passion, and homicide.” It does not matter that the 

evidence supporting the submission of a sudden passion instruction may 

be weak, impeached, contradicted, or unbelievable. If the evidence thus 

raises the issue from any source, during either phase of trial, then the 

defendant has satisfied his burden of production, and the trial court must 

submit the issue in the jury charge—at least if the defendant requests it.

When an appellant protests that the trial court erred not to grant his 

request to charge the jury regarding sudden passion, a reviewing court 

must first determine whether the complained-of error exists. If the 

reviewing court agrees that a trial court erred by failing to submit a sudden 

passion instruction, it then analyzes whether the error harmed the 

appellant. Harm does not emanate from the mere failure to include the 

requested instruction. A reviewing court undertakes a harm analysis by 

following the standards as set out in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

Article 36.19. If the error is preserved, the record must demonstrate that 

the appellant has suffered “some harm.” In an Almanza harm analysis, 

“burdens of proof or persuasion have no place[.]” Harm must be evaluated 

in light of the complete jury charge, the arguments of counsel, the entirety 

of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of the probative 

evidence, and any other relevant factors revealed by the record as a whole. 

To assay harm, we focus on the evidence and record to determine the 

likelihood that a jury would have believed that the appellant acted out of 

sudden passion had it been given the instruction.

Id. at 605-06 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Grba’s argument for a “sudden-passion” instruction relies on the recorded 

statements where he said that he shot Carroll (and Heslip) out of fear after Carroll had 

first shot Allen in the leg.1 In Wooten, the court addressed the same argument, as the 

defendant had testified that he shot the victim out of fear because the victim had shot at 

him first. Id. at 603, 606-07.

 

1 Grba’s brief also suggests that he could have been reacting out of anger at him and Allen being shot at, 

but in his statements, Grba never claimed to have actually acted out of anger. See Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 

607 n.33. To the extent Grba premises error on this account, the trial court did not err because the record 

does not at least minimally support that inference. See id.
Grba v. State Page 8

Relying on Daniels v. State, the State argues that the trial court did 

not err by failing to include a sudden passion instruction because the 

appellant’s assertion of a “bare claim of fear” at the trial level did not rise 

to the level of terror necessary to trigger a sudden passion instruction. In 

Daniels, we explained that “a bare claim of” fear will not necessarily support 

a claim of sudden passion, but that fear that “rises to the level of ‘terror’”

will suffice (if the cause is adequate) to invoke an instruction on the issue. 

The appellant counters that, taking his “bare claim” of fear in context of the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the confrontation between the 

two men, a jury could reasonably infer both that the appellant experienced 

sufficient fear to cause him to lose the capacity for cool reflection, and that 

Johnson’s conduct was adequate to induce such an emotional state in a man 

of ordinary temperament. According to the appellant, because there was 

some evidence to support the appellant’s contention that he “was in the 

grip of ‘passion’” when he shot Johnson, the trial court should have given 

the instruction. We conclude that, in any event, whatever error the trial 

court may have committed by failing to charge the jury with respect to 

sudden passion did not harm the appellant. Finding our harm analysis thus 

dispositive, we need not address whether the trial court did, in fact, err not 

to include the instruction.

Id. at 606-07 (footnotes and citations omitted).

We likewise find our harm analysis dispositive; therefore, we also need not 

address whether the trial court erred in excluding the sudden-passion instruction.

As was done in Wooten, we examine the state of the evidence and the record as a 

whole, “with an eye toward determining the likelihood that the jury would have accepted 

the appellant’s sudden passion claim.” Id. at 608 n.38. Like Wooten, Grba’s “self-defense 

claim boiled down to whether the jury would accept that, when he shot at [Carroll], he 

reasonably believed that deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself from 

[Carroll’s] use of deadly force.” Id. at 609. Wooten involved a mutual gun battle. Id. In 

this case, it is not disputed that Carroll shot and wounded Allen in the leg with Grba 

standing near Allen and that Carroll emptied the clip in his Glock 9 mm. handgun. But 
Grba v. State Page 9

in rejecting Grba’s self-defense claim, “the jury simply did not believe his claim that he 

reasonably believed deadly force was immediately necessary.” Id.

To reach this conclusion, the jury must have rejected the inference ... 

that [Carroll], not [Grba], fired first. This is because, had the jury in fact 

believed that [Carroll] fired first, as [Grba] contended, there would have 

been no impediment to a finding that [Grba] reasonably believed it was 

immediately necessary to meet [Carroll’s] deadly force with justifiable 

deadly force of his own. Under these circumstances, the jury would almost 

certainly have acquitted [Grba] based on his self-defense claim. But it did 

not.

It is highly unlikely that a jury that had already rejected [Grba’s]

claim that he reasonably believed that deadly force was immediately 

necessary to defend himself would nevertheless find in his favor on the 

issue of sudden passion. To prove sudden passion, [Grba] would have had 

to establish, inter alia, 1) that he actually acted under the influence of a fear 

so great that it caused him to lose his capacity for cool reflection, and 2) that 

[Carroll’s] actions were adequate to produce such a degree of fear in a man 

of ordinary temperament. But a jury that had already discredited [Grba’s]

claim that he reasonably believed deadly force to be immediately necessary 

would be unlikely to believe that, at the time [Grba] first fired, he was 

actually experiencing a level of fear that caused him to lose control. 

Moreover, even had the jury believed that [Grba] subjectively experienced 

such a level of fear, it would not likely have found that [Carroll’s] behavior 

presented a provocation adequate to produce such a degree of fear in a man 

of ordinary temperament. Based on the record and evidence before us, it is 

exceedingly unlikely that [Grba] suffered “some harm” as a result of the 

trial court’s failure to give the jury a sudden passion instruction based on 

[Grba’s] assertion that terror or fear controlled his actions.

Id. at 609-10 (footnotes and citations omitted). We therefore overrule issue one in the 

murder case.

Issue two in the murder case and issue one in the other two cases identically assert 

that the trial court abused its discretion in the punishment phase by overruling Grba’s 

objections to the admission of extraneous-offense evidence, which was that Grba had 

committed the uncharged offenses of kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault in 2007. 
Grba v. State Page 10

Grba’s objections in the trial court were that he was being denied his confrontation right 

because the alleged victim was not going to testify and that the probative value of the 

evidence was outweighed by its unfair prejudice (Rule of Evidence 403).

Section 3(a) of Article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants trial courts 

broad discretion to admit evidence of extraneous crimes or bad acts during the 

punishment phase. The relevant statutory language is:

[E]vidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court 

deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal 

record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding 

his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and, 

notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, any other evidence 

of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by 

evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for which he could be held 

criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously been charged with 

or finally convicted of the crime or act.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (West Supp. 2014).

Grba’s specific complaint on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion 

because the State’s extraneous-offense evidence was insufficient for the trial court to infer 

that Grba was criminally responsible for the extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Huizar v. State, 12 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“at punishment the 

reasonable-doubt standard is applicable in deciding whether or not to consider certain 

evidence in assessing the sentence (a statutory requirement)”). The State correctly points 

out that Grba’s complaint on appeal does not comport with his objections in the trial 

court. 

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a complaining party must make a 

timely and specific objection in the trial court. See TEX.R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Wilson v. State, 
Grba v. State Page 11

71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The complaint on appeal must correspond or 

comport with objections and arguments made at trial. Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2005, pet. ref’d). “Where a trial objection does not comport with the issue raised on 

appeal, the appellant has preserved nothing for review.” Wright, 154 S.W.3d at 241; see 

Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that an issue was 

not preserved for appellate review because appellant’s trial objection “does not comport 

with” the issue he raised on appeal); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1999) (same). 

Grba’s complaint in these three appeals (issue two in the murder case and issue 

one in the other two cases) about the extraneous-offense evidence not meeting the 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was not made in the trial court. These three issues 

present nothing for review and are thus overruled.

Issue three in the murder case and issue two in the other two cases allege that 

Grba’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a hearsay objection in the 

punishment phase when the State offered evidence pertaining to the above-referenced 

extraneous offenses. Specifically, no hearsay objection was made when the State elicited 

testimony from a sheriff’s department investigator that the alleged victim had told her 

that more than one person had been involved in the alleged offenses of kidnapping and 

aggravated sexual assault.

The United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and article 1.051 of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure guarantee an accused the right to reasonably effective 
Grba v. State Page 12

assistance of counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (West Supp. 2010); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Grba must show that: (1) 

trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, based 

on the prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for trial counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-69; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 

735, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Whether this test has been met is to be judged on appeal 

by the totality of the representation, not by isolated acts or omissions. Rodriguez v. State, 

899 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Grba has the burden of proving ineffective 

assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 

808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1984)).

Our review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and we will find 

ineffective assistance only if Grba overcomes the strong presumption that his counsel’s 

conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The right to “reasonably effective assistance of counsel” 

does not guarantee errorless counsel or counsel whose competency is judged by perfect 

hindsight. Saylor v. State, 660 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Moreover, the acts 

and omissions that form the basis of Grba’s claims of ineffective assistance must be 

supported by the record. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. A silent record that provides no 
Grba v. State Page 13

explanation for counsel’s actions usually will not overcome the strong presumption of 

reasonable assistance. Id. at 813-14. To warrant reversal without affording counsel an 

opportunity to explain his actions, “the challenged conduct must be ‘so outrageous that 

no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 533 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005)).

Here, Grba did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his motions 

for new trial. Thus, his trial counsel was not afforded an opportunity to explain his trial 

strategy or address the complaint that Grba makes on appeal. In situations where trial 

counsel has not been afforded an opportunity to explain his actions, an appellate court 

will usually reject the complaint in a summary fashion. See Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 

503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Hervey v. State, 131 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex. App.—Waco 

2004, no pet.) (“[T]rial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain 

the actions taken or not taken, as the case may be, before being condemned as 

unprofessional and incompetent.”). Because the record is silent as to trial counsel’s trial 

strategy and because Grba has not adequately explained how trial counsel’s actions were 

so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in them, we cannot say 

that the record supports a finding that trial counsel was ineffective. See Roberts, 220 

S.W.3d at 533. We overrule Grba’s third issue in the murder case and his second issue in 

the other two cases.
Grba v. State Page 14

Having overruled all of the issues in each appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment in each case.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

(Chief Justice Gray concurs with a note)*

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 27, 2015

Do not publish

[CRPM]

*(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the Court’s judgments to the extent they affirm the trial 

court’s judgments. A separate opinion will not issue.)