UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GERALD D. FORREST, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 03-2239

TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF CHARLOTTE,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.

(CA-03-347-3-MU)

Submitted: February 25, 2004

Decided: April 7, 2004

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Gerald D. Forrest, Appellant Pro Se. John Brem Smith, MCNAIR

LAW FIRM, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Gerald D. Forrest appeals from the order of the district court dismissing his complaint. Having concluded that the district court lacked

original jurisdiction to consider Forrest’s claims, we vacate the order

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

In July 2003, Forrest filed suit in the Mecklenburg County Superior

Court of North Carolina alleging wrongful termination and unlawful

employment discrimination by his employer, Transit Management of

Charlotte, Inc. (hereinafter "Transit"). His complaint did not invoke

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -

2000e-17 (2000). Transit thereafter filed a notice of removal in the

district court alleging federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 (2000). The district court accepted the removal, and Transit,

reversing its position on the question of jurisdiction, moved to dismiss

on the basis that Forrest could not proceed under Title VII because

he had failed to obtain a right-to-sue letter. Accordingly, Transit

argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Forrest’s

claims. The district court accepted Transit’s argument and granted the

motion to dismiss, stating: "In the absence of a right-to-sue letter, this

court does not yet have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Title VII claims."

(R. 9). Forrest filed a timely notice of appeal. 

In order to remove a matter from state court to federal court, the

moving party must allege that federal subject matter jurisdiction

obtains on account of diversity jurisdiction or because the complaint

implicates a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b) (2000) (referencing the original jurisdiction of the district courts conferred under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), & 1332 (diversity of citizenship) (2000)). In other words, an action filed in state court may be

removed to federal court "only if it might have been brought in federal court originally." Darcangelo v. Verizon Comm., 292 F.3d 181,

186 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting 14b Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction, § 3721, at 292 (3d ed. 1998)).

Thus, a claim that could not have originally been brought in federal

court cannot be removed to federal court. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

2 FORREST v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF CHARLOTTE
Likewise, a federal court may not assume jurisdiction over an

action arising under Title VII unless the claimant has (1) exhausted

his administrative remedies, and (2) attempted to seek redress under

any applicable state or local remedies. See Davis v. North Carolina

Dep’t of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1995). In Davis, we concluded that a district court could not accept the removal of a state

complaint alleging employment discrimination under the guise of

Title VII, unless "the EEOC has investigated the claim, made a determination as to the claim’s merit, and issued a right-to-sue notice."

Davis, 48 F.3d at 138. Absent that determination or a similar finding

under state or local law, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and thus, lacks jurisdiction to accept removal. Id.

Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Forrest’s

claims, Transit’s notice of removal was improper. Accordingly, we

vacate the order of the district court and remand with instructions to

remand Forrest’s complaint to the Superior Court of Mecklenburg

County. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

FORREST v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF CHARLOTTE 3