1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 09 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### B E R G H U I S , WARD EN v . SMITH CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 08–1 40 2. Ar g u ed Janu a r y20, 2010 —Dec ided M a r c h30, 2010 Cr imin al defe n d an ts h av ea Six t hAm endment r i gh t to tr ial by an im

pa rt ia l j u ry dr a w n fromaf a ir cros s s e ct ion of t h e com m unit y . S ee Taylorv. Lo ui siana , 419 U. S. 522. To es t abli s ha pr im a fac i e v i ola

t i on of t h e fair-cros s - s e ct ion req u ir ement, a defendant mus tpr ov e th at: (1) a gr ou p qu alify i n g as “di s tin c tiv e ” (2) is n o t fai r lyan d r e a s o nab l y repres ent e d in j u ry venires , and (3) “sy s te ma ticex c l usion” in the jury-selection process account s for the underrep r esentation. Dure nv. M i ssou r i , 439 U. S. 357, 36 4. At voir direi nthe Kent C o unty Circ uit Court tria l of res p ondent S m ith, a nAfr i ca n-America n , the venire p a nel included b e tween 6 0 an d 100 in div i du als, on ly3 of wh om, at most, wer eAfr i c a n - Amer ic an . At that time, Afr i c a n-Americ ans c o nstituted 7.28% of the County ’ s jury-eligible population, and6% of the poo lfrom which potentialju

rors we re dra w n. Thecou r trej e ct ed S m it h’s obj e ct ion t ot h e pa nel’s ra cia lcom p os it ion, a na ll-w h it e j u ry convict e d himof second-degree murder a n d f e lony firea r m pos s e ss ion, a n d the co urt s e ntenced him to life in prison with the pos s ibi lity of parole.

On orde r of th e Michigan Cour t of Appeals, the tr ialc o ur t c o n duct ed a nevi d ent i a r y hea r ing on S m it h’ s fa ir-cros s - s e ct ion cla i m . The evidence at the hearing showed, in t er alia, t h a tun der t h e j u ror assignment order in effect when Smith ’ s ju r yw a s em pan e led, th e Count y a s s i gn ed pros pect ive j u rors firs t t o loca l dist rict court s , a n d, only after filling local needs, made remaini n g persons available to the countyw ide Circuit Court, whichhea r d felony ca s e s like S m ith’s

. Smith ca lls th is procedure “sipho ning.” The month a f ter S m ith’s voi r dire , howe ver, t h e Count y revers ed cou r s ea n d a d opted aCircuit

Cour t-fir s t as sig n ment or der

. It did so b a sed on the b e lief thatthe dis t rictcourt s t ook m o s tof t h e m i norit yj u rors , leav in gt h e Circuit2 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Sy llabu s Cour t with a j u r ypool that did not r e pr esent the entir eCounty

. The tr ial c o ur t not e d two means of meas uring the unde rrepre s entation of Africa n-Am erica n s on CircuitCourtvenires

. Firs t , the courtde

scribed the “absolute disp arity” te st, under which the p e rcentage of African-Americans in the jury pool(6%) i s subtracted f r om the per

cent a g e of Af rica n-Am erica n s in t h e lo cal, jury-eligible population (7 .2 8 %). According t ot h is m e a s ure, Africa n-Am erica n s were under

r e pr esen ted by1.28%. Next, th e c o ur t set out the “c ompar a tiv edis

par i ty” te st, u n derwhich the ab solute d i s p ar ity(1.2 8%) is div i ded by the percentage of African-Americans in t h e jury-eligible populat i on (7.28%). Thequotient (18%) indi c a ted th at, onav erag e, Afr i c a n Amer ic an s wer e18% les s l i k ely , wh en co mpared to the overall jury

eligible popul a tion, to be o nthe ju ry -serv i c elist. In the 11 months a f

t e r KentCount y dis c ont i nued t h e dis t rict -cou rt -firs ta s s i gnm e n t policy, the co mparat ive dis p arity, on average, droppedfrom 18% to 15.1%. Th e h e ar in gc o n v i n ced th e tr ia l c o u r t th at Afr i c a n - Amer ic an s were u n derre pres ent e d on CircuitCourtvenires

. ButS m it h’s evi

dence, the trial court held, was in suffic i e n t to pr ov e that the jur o r assignment order, or any other part of the jury-selecti on process, had systematical ly excluded African-Am ericans. The court therefore re

j e ct ed S m it h’s fa ir-cros s - s e ct ion cla i m .

The state inte rmediate ap pe llatecourtrev e rs ed a n d ordered anew tr ial with jur o r s selec t ed underthe Cir c uit-Cour t-fir s tassig n ment order. Reve r s ing in t u rn , t h e Michiga n S u prem e Courtconcl u ded tha tSmith had not es tab l ished a prima f a cie Sixth Amendment vio

lation. This Cour t, the state HighCourt observed, hasspecified no preferred method for measu r ing whether representation of a di stinc

tive group in the jury pool is fa iran d r e ason ab le. Th e c o u r t n o ted that lowerfeder a l c o ur ts ha d applied thr ee tests: the abso l ute an d c o mpar ativ e d i spar ity test s an d a stan d a r ddev i ation te st. A d optin g aca s e -b y-ca s e a pproa ch a llowing co nsideration of all three means o f mea s uring underrepres enta tion, the court found tha tS m ith ha d failed to es tab lish alegally signif ic an t dis p ar ityu n d eran ymeasu r e ment. Nevertheles s giving S m ith the b e nefit of the doub t on under

r e pr esentation, the c o ur t deter m inedtha t he ha d not s h own s y s t em atic exclusion.

Smithth enfil e d a feder a l h abea s peti tion

. The Antiter r o r i sm and Effec t iv e DeathPen a ltyAc t of 1996 (A E D PA) pr oh ibit s feder a l h a beas r e lief u n l ess th e st ate c o u r t’ s ad judication “resulted in a decision th at was c o n t r a r yto, orinv o lv ed anunr eason able ap plic ationof, clea rly es t ab l is hed Federa l la w, a s de termined by the Su preme Court of th e Un ited Sta t es,” 2 8U. S. C. §2254(d) (1), or“r esu l ted ina dec i

sion that w a s basedon an unreason able d e termination of the facts i n light of the evidence pres ented in the State court proceeding,”3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Sy llabu s §2254(d)(2). Finding no infirmit y in the Michigan Sup r eme Court’s dec i sionw h en asse ssed u n d erAED PA’ s st an dar d s, th e D i str i c tCou r t dismi ssedSmi t h’s peti tion. The Sixth Circ uit reversed. The Court of Appea l s ruled, firs t , t h a tcourt s should use the comparati v e disparity testto mea s ur e under r e pr es entation where, as here, the allegedly ex

cluded gro u p i s s m all. The c o urt then held tha tS m ith’s compa r a t ive dispar i t yst ati s tic s demon s t r ated that Af rican-Americans’ represen

t a t i on in Count y CircuitCou r tvenires wa s unfa i r a n du n rea s onab l e. It next s t ated tha tSmith had s h own s y s t em a t ic exclus ion. In a c cord with the M i c h ig an inter m ediate ap pe lla te c o ur t, the Six th Cir c u it be

lieved t h a t t h e dis t rict -court -firs tas signm e ntorder s i gnifica n t l y re du c e d th e n u mberof Afr i c a n - Amer ic an s av ail able for Cir c u it Cou r t venires

. S m it h wa s ent i t l ed t orelief, t h e S i xt h Circuitconcluded, b e ca us e no im port a n ts t a t e interes ts u pport ed t h e dist rict -court -firs ta l

loc a tionsy ste m . Held: The Sixth Circuit erred in rulin g that the Michigan Supreme

Court’s decision “involv[ed] an unr easonable application o[f] clearly establi s h e d Fe der a l law,” § 2 254(d)( 1 ). Durenha rdly es tab l is hes

—no less “clearly” s o—that Smithwas de nied his S i xth Amendment right t oa nim pa rtia l j u ry dra w nfromafa ir cros s s e ct ion of t h e com m u n i ty
. Pp. 10–1 6.

(a) The Du ren defendant r e adilymet a ll t h r ee par t s of the Cour t’ s prima facie test when he complain ed of the dearth of women in a count y ’ s j u ry pool. Firs t , he s h ow ed thatwomen in the c o untywer e both“n u m er ou s an d dist in c tfr om men . ” 439 U. S., at 364. Sec o n d , to establ ish underrepresent a tion, he proved that wome n were 54% of the jury-eligib le popula tion , bu t ac c o u n t ed foron l y26.7% of th ose s u m m o ned for j u ry s e rvice, a n d only14.5% of those on the postsum

m o ns weekly venires fromwhich j u ro rs were dra w n. I d ., at 364–3 66

. Finally , to show the “sy s tematic ” cause of the underrepresentation, he pointed to M i ssour i’ s lawper m itt i nganywoman to op t out of jur y s e rvice a n d t othe ma nnerin whi c h thecounty a d minis t ered that law. This Cour t noted that “appr opr i atelytailor e d” har d ship ex emp tions would li kely survive a fair-cro ss-sect ion challenge if justif ied by animpor t an t sta t e in ter e st, id., at 370, b u t c o n c lu ded th at n osu c h interest could justify the exe m ption for e a ch and every woman, id., at 369 –3 70. Pp. 10– 11.

(b) Neither Du renno r any other decision of this Court sp ecifies the method ortest c o ur ts must use to me asur e underrepr esentation

. Each of the three methods employed or identified by the courts be

low—absolu t e dispar ity , c o mpar at iv e dis p ar ity , an d st an dar ddev i a tion—is impe r f ec t. Absolu te dispar i t yan d c o mpar ativ e dispar it y measur ements c a n be misle a dingwher e, as her e , member s of the dis

tinc tiv egr oup c o mpose only a sm al l percentage of the community’s4 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Sy llabu s jury-eligible population. And it ap pear s t h at n oc o u r t has r e lied ex

c l u s iv elyon a stan dar ddev i ationan aly s i s . Ev en absen t AEDPA’ s cons tra i nt, this Court would have no ca us e to ta ke s i des here on the appropriate method or methods fo r measuring unde rrep r esentation. Although the Michigan Sup r eme Cour t concluded that S m ith’s s t at is

tical evidence failed to es tab lish a legally significant dis p arity under either the absolute or co mpar ativ e dispar i t ytests, the c o ur t nev e r t he

less gave Smi t h the benefit of the doubt on underrepre s entation in order to reach the issue ulti mately di sposi t ive in Dure n : To the extent under r e p r esentation ex is ted , was it due to “sy s tema tic ex c l usion”? See Dure n , 43 9 U. S., at 364

. Pp. 11–13.

(c) Smith’s evidence gavethe Mi chigan Supreme Court little reaso n t oconclude th a tt h e dist rict -court -firs ta s signm e ntorder ha d a n y significant effect on the rep r esenta tion of African-Americans on Cir

c u it Cour t v e nir e s. Altho u ghthe r e c o r destabli s hed thatso me County officia l s believed that the a ssig n ment or dercr eated r a c i a l dispari t ies, an d the County reversed the order in response, the belie f wa s not s u b s ta ntia ted b ySmith’s evidence. He introd uced no e v i

dence t h a tAfrica n-Am erica n s were underrepresented o nthe Circuit C o urt ’ s venire s in s i gnifica n t l y higherper c ent a ges t h a non t h e Dis

trict Court for Gra n d Ra pids , whic h ha d th e County’s la r g es t Africa nAmerican pop u lation. He di d not address whether Grand Rap i ds had m o re need fo r j u rors per ca pit at h a nany ot her dis t rictin Kent County. And he did not compa r e the African-American representa

tion levels on Circuit Court venires with those on the Fe deral District Cour t v e ni r e s forthe same r e gi on. See Dure n , 439 U. S., at 367, n. 25. Smith’s best evidenceof systematic exclusion wa s the decline in comparativ e underrep r esentation, from 18 to 15.1%, after Kent Count y reve rs ed it s a s signm e ntorder. Butt h a tevidence indica t e d n olar g e c h ang ean d was, inan yev ent, insuffic i ent to p r ov e that the or igin al ass i g n men tor derh a d a sig n ific an tlyadv e r s e impac ton th e representation of African-Am erican s on CircuitCourtvenires

. Pp. 13– 14.

(d) In a ddition to renewin g his “s iphoning” a r gument, S m ith urges that alaundry list of factors—e.g., the Co unty’s practice of excusing prospective jurors without adequate proof of alleged h a rdship, and t h e refus a l of Count y police t oenforce ord e rs for pros pect ive j u rors to appear—combined to reduce system at ica l ly t h e num b e r of Africa nAmer ic an s ap pear in gon jury lists. No “ c learly estab l i s hed” prece

dent of this Court s u pports S m ith’s claim. S m ith urges tha tone s e n tence in Du re n, 439 U. S., at 3 6 8–36 9, pl ac es th e bu r d enof pr ov ing causation on the State. But Smith clippe d that sentence from its con

text: The s e nt ence does not conce r n the demonstr ation of a pr ima fac e c a se; in stead, it speak s towhat the State might show toreb utthe de

-5 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Sy llabu s fen d an t’ s pr ima fac i e c a se. Th e Michigan Supreme Court was ther e fore far from “unreasonable , ” §2 254(d)(1), in concluding that Duren fir s t andfor e mostr e quir ed Smith hi mself to show thatt h e under r e p resentation co mplainedof was due to s y stema t ic exclusion. This Court, furthe rmore, ha s never “clea r l yes tab l is hed” tha tj u ry selection-process features of the kind onS m ith ’ s li st c a ngiv er i se to a fa ir-cros s - s e ct ion cla i m . Ra ther, t h e Taylo rCourt “recognized broad dis cret i on in t h e S t a t es” t o“pres crib erele va ntq u a lifica t ions for t h eir ju r o r s an d to pr ov ide r e ason able ex emp t i o n s .” 4 19 U. S., at 53 7–5 38

. And in Du re n , the Court understood that hardship exemptions re

sembl i n gth ose Smithas sa il s migh t w e ll “su rv iv ea fair -c r o ss-sec t ion c h allen g e.” 439 U. S., at 370

. Pp. 14–16. 543 F. 3d 32 6, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

G IN SB U R G , J ., delivered the opinion for a una nimous Court. T HOMAS , J., filed a concurring opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 08–1 40 2 

### MARY B E R G HUIS, WARDEN, P E TITION E R v. DIAP OLIS SMITH ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [M ar c h30, 2010] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### delivered the opinion of th e Court. The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right t o be tried by an imp a rtial jurydrawnfro m sources reflecting a fair cross sect ion of the community. See Taylor v. Louisian a , 419 U. S. 522 (1975)

. The qu es tion presented in this case is whether that right was ac corded to re spondent Diapolis Smith, an Africa n-American convicted of second-degree murd er by an all- white jury in Kent County, Michigan in 1993. At the tim e of Smith’s trial, Afri can-Americans constituted 7.28% of Ke nt County’s jury-eligible population , and 6% of the pool fro m which pote ntial jurors were drawn

. In Durenv. Missouri , 439 U. S. 3 57 (1979), this Court described three showings a criminal defendant must ma ke to establisha prima f a cie violation of the Sixth Amend

ment’s fair-cross-section requirement. He or she mus t show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a‘dis

tinctive’ gro u p in the c o mmunity; (2) thatthe representa

tion of this group in venires from which jurie s are select ed is not fair and reason able in relation to the number of such persons in the c o mmunity; and (3) tha tthis unde r -2 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### representation is due t o systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Id., at 364. Th e first show

ing is, in most cases, easily made; the second and third a r e more likely to gene rate controversy
. The defendant in Du re n readily m e t all three measures. H e complained of thedearth of women in the Jack s on County, Mi ssouri, jury pool. To establish un derrepresen

tation, he proved that women were 54% of the jury-eligible population, but accounted for on ly 26.7% of the person s summoned for jury service, and only 14.5% of the persons on the po s t summons week ly venires from which jurors were drawn

. To show t h e “systematic” cause of the under

representation, Duren pointed to Missouri’s law exempt

ing women from jury service, and to the manner in which Jackson Co unty admin i stered the exemption. Concluding that no sign ificant state inte rest could justify Missouri’s explicitly gender-base dexem ption, this Court held the law, as implemented in Jack s on County, vio l ative of the Sixth Amen dment’s fair -cross-section requirement. We herere view the de cision of th e United States Court of Appeals for the Sixt h Circu it holding that Smith “sat

isf[ied] the prima facie test established by Duren ,” and granting him habeas corpus relief, i.e., release from im

prisonment absent a new trial com m enced within 180 days of the Court of Appeals’ orde r. 54 3 F. 3d 326 , 336 (2008). Despite mark ed diffe rences between Smith’s case and Duren’s, and a cogent Michigan Supreme Court decision holding that Smith “ha [ d] not shown .

. . systematic exclu

sion,” People v. Smith , 463 Mich. 199, 205, 61 5 N. W. 2d 1, 3 (2000), the Sixth Circuit found the matter settled. Cog

nizant of the restrictions Congress placed on federal ha

beas review of state- court convi ctions, the Court of Ap peals considered that a decisi on contrary to its own would “involv[e] an unreasonable application o[f] clearly estab

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the Unit ed States,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). 543 F. 3d,3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### at 335. The Sixth Circuit er red in so ruling. No decision of this Court “clea rly establishe[s]” Smith’s entitlement to fed

eral-court r e lief. According to th e Sixth Cir c uit, Smith had demonstrated tha ta Kent County pros pective-juro r assignment procedure , which Smith calls “siphoning,” “systematic [ ally] exclu[ded]” Af ric an-Americans. Under this procedure, Kent County assigned prospective jurors first to local district courts, and, only after filling local needs, mad e remainin g persons available t o the county

wide Circui tCourt, wh ich heard felony cases like Smith’s. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, had rejected Smith’s “siphoning” plea for lack of proof that the assign

ment procedure caused underrepresentation. Smith , 4 63 Mich., at 205, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. As that determination was not a tall unreasonable, the SixthCircuit had no warran tto disturb it. See §2254(d)(2). In addition to renewal of his “s iphoning” argument, Smith here urges that a host of factors combined to reduc e systematica lly the number of African-Ameri c ans appear ing on Kent County jury lists, for example, the Kent County court’s pra ctic e of excusing people without ad e quate proof of alleged hardship, a n d the refu sal of Kent County poli ce to enfor c e orders f o r prospect ive jurors t o appear. Bri e f for Respondent 53–54. Our deci sions do not address factors of the kind Smithurges. We have cau

tioned, however, tha t“[t]he fai r -cross-secti on principle must have much leeway in application.” Taylor , 419 U. S., at 537–538; see id., at 537 (Cou rt’s holding that Sixth Amendment is violate dby syste m atic exclusion of wo men from jury s e rvice “does not augur or authorize the fashion

ing of detail ed jury-selectioncodes by federal courts.”). I A On Novem b er 7, 1991, Christoph e r Rumbley was sho t4 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### and killed during a bar brawl in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The bar was crowded a tthe time of the brawl, with 200-to

300 people on the premises. All patrons of the bar were African-Am erican. T h e State charged Sm ith with the murder in Kent Count y Circuit Court. Voir direfor Smith’s trial took pla c e in September 1993. The venire panel inclu d ed between 60 and 100 individuals. The parties agree that, at most, three venire members were Africa n-American

. Smith unsuccessfully objected to the composi t ion of the venire panel. Smith’s cas e proceeded to trial before an all-white jury

. The case for the prosecution turned on the i d entity of the man who shot Rumbley. Thirty-seven witnesses from the bar, including Smith, testified at t h e trial. O f those, two testified that Smith fi red the gun

. Five testi f ied that th e shooter was not Smith, and the re mainder made no identi

fications of the shooter. The jury convicted Smith of sec

ond-degree murder an d possession of a firearm during a felony, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. B On first ap peal, the Michigan Court of Appe als ordered the trial c o urt to co nduct an evidentiaryhearing on Smith’s fair -cross-section claim. The hearing occu rred in early 1998. Smith ’ s e vidence showed tha t Grand Ra pids, the largest city in Kent County, was home to roughly 37 % of Kent Co unty’s popu lation, and to 85% of its Africa nAmerican residents. Felony charges inKent County were tried in a sole Circuit Court. Misdemeanors were prose cuted in 12 district courts, ea ch covering a discrete geo

graphical a r ea. To fil lthe courts’ venires, Kent Count y sent questionnaires to prospective jurors. The Circui t Court Admi nistrator testified that about 5% of the forms were returned as und eliverable, and another 15 to 20 % were not a n swered. App. 13a. From the pool of prospec

-5 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### tive jurors who com p leted questionnaires, the Coun ty granted req u ests for hardship exemptions, e.g., for lack of transportat i on or child care. Id. , at 21a. Kent County then assigned nonexe mpt prospe ctive jurors to their local district cou rts’ venires. Afte r filling the district cour ts’ needs, the County a ssigned the remaining prospecti ve jurors to th e Circuit Co urt’s panels. Id., at 20a , 22a. The month after voir direfor Smith’s trial, Kent County reversed th e assignment order. It did so, according to th e Circuit Cou rt Administ rator, based on “[t]he belief .

. . that the respect i ve district s essent iall y swallowe d up most of the minority jurors,” leaving the C i rcuit Courtwith a jury pool that “d id not repre s ent the entire county.” Id., at 22a

. The Jury Minority Representation Committee, its co-chair testified, held the same view concerning the impact of choosing district cour tjurors first and not returning un

used persons to the p ool available for Circui tCourtselec

tions. Id., a t64a–65a. The trial court considered two means of measuring the extent of underrepre s entation of African-A m ericans on Circuit Cou rt venires: “absolute disparity” an d “compara

tive dispar ity.” “Abs olute disparity” is de termined by subtractingthe percentage of African-Ame r icans in the jury pool (here, 6% in the six months leading up to Smith ’ s trial) from the percentage of African-Ame r icans in the local, jury-eligible popu lation (here, 7.28%). By an abso

lute disparity measure, therefore, African-Americans were underrepre s ented by 1.28%. “C omparative disparity” is determined by dividing the absolute disp arity (here, 1.28% ) by the group’s representation in the jury-eligible population (here, 7.28% ). The quotient (here, 18% ), showed that, in the six months prior to Smith’s trial, African-Am ericans were, onaverage, 18% les s likely, when compared to the overall jury-e ligible population, to be on the jury-service list. App. to Pet. for Cert. 215a. Isolating the month Smith’s jury was selected, Smith’s6 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### statistics expert estim a ted thatt h e compara t ive dispari t y was 34.8%. App. 181 a. In the 11 months after Ken t County discontinued the district -court-firstassignment policy, the comparative dispar ity, on average, dropped from 18% to 15.1%. Id., at 102a–103a, 113a. Smith also introducedthe testimony of an expert i n demographics and economics, who tied the underrepresen

tation to so cial and eco n omic facto rs. In KentCounty, th e expert expl ained, these forces made African-American s less likely than whites to receive or return juror-eligibilit y questionnaires, and m o re likely t o assert a hardship ex

cuse. Id., a t79a–80a. The hearing convince d the trial court tha tAfricanAmericans were under represented in Circuit Court veni

res. App. to Pet. for Cert. 210a. But Smith’s evidence was insufficient, that cour t held, to prove tha tthe juror

assignment order, or any other part of the jury-selection process, had systematically ex cluded Africa n-American s. Id., at 210a–212a. The court th erefore rejected Smith ’ s fair-cross-section claim. C The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the juror

allocation system in pl ace at the relevant time did result in the underrepresenta tion of African-Americ ans. Id., at 182a–183a. Reversin g the trial court’s ju dgment, th e intermediate appellate cou rt ord e red a new trial, wit h jurors selected under the Ci rcuit -Court-firstassignment order installed shortly after the vo ir dire in Smith’s case. Ibid. ; see supra, at 5. The Michigan Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, co ncluding that Smith “ha[d] not established a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement.” Smith , 463 Mich., at 207, 615 N. W. 2d, at 4. The Michigan High Court observed, first, that this Court has specified “[no]7 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### preferred method for measurin g whether representation of a distinctive group in the jury pool is fair and reasonable. ” Id., at 203, 615 N. W. 2d, at 2. Th e court the nnoted tha t lower federal courts h a d app lied three different methods to measure fair and reasonable r e presentation: the abs o lute and co mparative disparity tests, describ e d supra, at 5, and “the standard devi ation test.” 1 

### Recognizingthatno single test was entirely sa tisfactory , the Michigan Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case approach a llowing consideration of all three means of measuring underrepre s entation. Smith , 46 3 Mich., a t 204, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. Smith’s statistical evidence, the court found, “failed to establish alegally s i gnificant dis

parity unde reither the absolute or comparati v e disparity tests.” Id., at 204–205, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. (The parties had presented no expert testimony regardin gapplication of the stan dard deviation test. Id., at 204, n. 1, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3, n. 1; supra, at 5–6.) Nevertheless “grant[ing] [Smi th] the benefit of the doubt on unfair and unreasonable un derrepresentation,” th e Michigan S u preme Court ultimat e ly determined that “h e ha[d] not shown systematic exclusion.” Smith , 463 Mich ., at 203, 205 , 615 N. W. 2d, at 2, 3

. Smith ’ s e vidence, th e court said, did not show “how the alleged siphoningof African A m erican ju rors to dis trict courts affected t h e circuit cour t jur ypool.” Id., at 205 , 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. In particular, the courtobserved, “[t ] he record does not dis

close whether the district cou rt jur ypools cont ained more, fewer, or approximate l y the sam e percentage of min o ri ty jurors as the circuit court jury poo l .” Ibid. The court also ruled that “the influen c e of social and economic factors o n

——————

1 Stan dar ddev i ationan aly s i s seeks to dete r m in e th e pr obabi lityth at th e dispar itybetweena gr ou p’ s ju r y -e ligible populationand the group’s percentage in the qualifiedj u ry pool is at t r ibu t able to r a n d om c h an c e . See People v. Smith, 46 3 M i c h . 199, 21 9–2 20, 615 N. W. 2d 1, 9– 1 0 (200 0) (Cav an agh , J., c o nc urr i n g).8 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### juror participation does not demonstrate a systematic exclusion.” Id., at 206, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. D In February 2003, Smith filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Co urt for the Western Dis

trict of Mic h igan, reasserting his fair-cross-section claim. Because Smith is “in custody pu rsuant to th e judgment of a State co urt,” the Antiterro ris m and Eff e ctive Deat h Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), §22 54, governed the Distri ct Court’s revi ew of his application for federal habeas corpus relief. Under the controlling provision of AEDPA, codified in §2254(d) , a state p r isoner’s a pplication may not be granted as to “any claim .

. . a d judicated

. . . in State court” unless the state court’s adjud i cation “(1) resulted in a deci sion that was contrar yto, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or “(2) resulted in a decision that wa s based on an un

reasonable determination of the f a cts in ligh tof the evidence presented in t h e State court proceeding.” Applyingt h ese standards, the DistrictCo urt dismissed Smith’s hab eas petition

. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a–42a. The Court of Appeals revers ed. Where, a s here, the allegedly ex cluded group is small, the Sixth C i rcuit ruled, courts should use the comparative disparity test to meas

ure underrepresentation. 543 F. 3d, at 3 38. In that court’s view, Smith ’ s comparati v e disparit y statistics sufficed “to demonstrate that the r e presentation of African American veniremen in Kent Co unty .
. . was unfair a n d unreasonab le.” Ibid. As to system atic exclusion, the Sixth Circuit, in accord withthe Michig an intermediate appel

late court, believed that th e ju ror-assignment order i n effect when Smith’s jury was empaneledsignificantly9 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### reduced th e number of African-Americans available for Circuit Court venires. Id., at 342. Smith wa s entitled to relief, the court concl u ded, because no important sta t e interest supported that allocation system. Id., at 345. 2 

### The State petitioned for certiorar i attackingthe Sixth Circuit’s d e cision on two p r inci pal ground s: First, t h e State cha r ged thatt h e federal appellate court erred in adopting the comparative di sparity test t o determine whether a distinctive group was underrepre s ented in the jury pool. Pet. for Cert. ii. Second, the State urged that , in any event, “there was no . . . systematic exclusion of African Am ericans from juries in Kent County, Michigan ,” id ., at 25, a n d no warrant for the Sixth Circu it’s contra ry determination. 3

### We granted review, 557 U. S. ____ (2009), and now reverse the Sixth Circuit’s judgment. Accordin g t o the Sixth Circuit, the Michigan Supreme Court’s rej e ction of S m ith’s Sixt h Amendment plea “in

volved an u n reasonable applicat ion o[f] clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this Court in Duren ].”

——————

2 The S i xth Circuit a l s o found tha tthe Michiga nS u preme Court ha d unrea s o nab l y a pplied Durenv. M i sso uri, 439 U. S. 35 7 (197 9), wh enit dec l ar ed th at soc i al an d ec o n omicfa ct ors could notes t ablish sys t em at ic ex c l u s ion

. 54 3 F. 3d, a t 34 1–3 42. Bec a u s e su c hfac t or s di spr o por t io n a t ely a ffectAfrica n-Am eric a n s , t h e S i xt h Circuits a id, KentCount y’s rout ine gra n t s of cert a i n ha rds h ip exempt ions “ p rodu ced s y s t em at ic exclusion within the meanin g of Dure n .” Ibi d

. The S i xth Circuit held, howev e r , that the har d ship e x emptio ns could not es tab l ish afa ir-cros s sec t ionc l aim bec a u s e th e St ate “h a s a s i g n ific an t in ter e st [in] av oidin g u n d u ebur d ens onin div i du als” byallow i n gsu c hex cu ses. Id., at 345.

3 Althoughthe questionpresented by the State homes in on the proper measu r e for underre presentati on, it init ial l y and more compre

hensively inquires whethe r S m it hwa s denied his right t oa j u ry dra w n fromafa ir cro s s s e ct ion of the com m unit y . S ee Pet

. for Cert . ii (a s k in g “[w]hetherthe U. S. Cour t of Appe als forthe Six t h Cir c u it er r e d in concludin gt h a tt h e Michig a nS u pr eme Court failed t oapply ‘clearly establi s hed’ Supreme Court preceden t u n der28 U. S. C

. §225 4 onth e issue of the f a ir cross-secti o n requireme n t under Du re n. . . .”). W e therefore address that overarching issue.10 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### §2254(d)(1); see 543 F. 3d, at 345. We disagr ee. As ex

plained below, our Durendecision hardly establishes—no less “clearl y” so—tha t Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury dra w n from a fair cross section of the community. II To establis h a prima facie violation of the fair-cross

section requirement, this Court’s pathmar k ing decision in Dureninstructs, a defe ndant must prove tha t : (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is n o t fairly an d reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury- s election process accounts for the underrepre

sentation. 439 U. S., at 364; see supra, at 1– 2. The defendant in D u ren successfully challenged Jackson County’s a d ministration of a Missouri exemption permit

ting any woman to opt out of jury service. 439 U. S., at 360. The Court explai ned why it was plain that defendant Duren had established a prima facie case. First, women in Jackson County were both “numerous and distinct from men.” Id., at 364 (q uoting Taylor , 419 U. S., at 531). Second, Du ren’s “stati stical presentation” showed gross underrepre s entation: Women were over half the jury

eligible pop u lation; in stark contrast, they accounted fo r less than 15 % of jury venires. 439 U. S. , at 36 4–366. Duren also demonstrated systematic exclusion with particularit y . He p r ov ed that wo men’s underrepresenta

tion was persistent—oc c urring in every weekly venire fo r almost a year—and h e identi fied the two stages of the jury-selection process “when .

. . the systematic exclusio n tookplace.” Id., at 366. First, questionnaires for prospec

tive jurors stated conspicuou sly that women could opt ou t of jury service. Less than 30% of those summoned were female, suggesting tha twomen inlarge num bers claimed the exemption at the questionnaire stage. Ibid. “More

over, at the summons s t age women were . . . given anothe r11 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### opportunityto [opt out].” Id., at 366–367. And if a woman ignored the summons, she was de emed to have opted ou t; no further inquiry was made. Id., at 367. Atthis “final, venire, stage,” women’s repr esentation plummeted to 14.5%. Ibid. In the Federal District Cour t serving t h e same territory, the Court no ted, despite a women-onl y childcare exemption, women accounted for nearly 40% of those actually serving on juries. See ibid. , n. 25. The “disproportionate and consistent exclusion of women from the [Jackson County] jury wheel and at the venire stag e,” the Cou rt concluded, “ w as qui te obviously due to the system b y which jurie s were selected.” Id., at 367. “[A]ppropriately tailored” hardship exe m ptions, the Court add e d, would likely survive a fair-cross-section challenge if justified b yan import ant state interest. Id ., at 370. But no such interest, the Court held, could justify Missouri’s exemption for each a n d every woman—the altogether evident explanatio n for the underrepresenta

tion. Id., at369–370. III A As the Mic h igan Supr eme Court correctlyobserved, see supra, at 6, neither D u rennor any other decision of this Court specifies the method or test courts must use to measure th e represent a tion of dis t inctive gro u ps in jury pools. The courts below and the parties noted three meth

ods employ ed or identi fied in lowe r federal court decisions: absolute disparity, co mparat ive disparity, a n d standard deviation. See Smith , 463 Mich., at 204–20 5, 615 N. W. 2d, at 2–3; Brief for Pe titioner 3; Brief for Re spondent 26; supra, at 6– 7. Each test is imperfect. Absolute disparity andcompara tive disparity measurements, courts have recognized, can be misleading when, a s here, “members of the distinctiv e group comp[ose] [on l y] a smallpercentage of those eligibl e12 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### for jury service.” Smith , 463 Mich., at 203–204, 615 N. W. 2d, at 2–3. And to our knowledge, “[n]o court .

. . has accepted [a standard de viation analysis] alone as determi

native in Sixth Amen dment chal lenges to jury selection systems.” United S t a t es v. Rioux , 97 F. 3d 6 48, 655 (CA2 1996). On direct r e view, as earlier stated, the Michigan Su

preme Court chose no singlemethod “to measur[e] whether re presentation was fair and reasonable.” Smith , 463 Mich., at 204, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3; see supra, at 7

. Instead, it “adopt[ed] a case-by-case approach.” Smith , 463 Mich., at 204, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. “Provided that th e parties pro ffer sufficient evidence ,” thatcou rt said, “th e results of a l l of the test s [shouldbeconsidered]

. ” Ibid

. I n contrast, t h e Sixth Circuit dec l ared that “[w]here th e distinctive group alleged to have been underrepresented is small, as is the case here, th e com p arative disparity test is the more a p propriate measure of underrepresentation.” 543 F. 3d, at 338. Even in the absence of AEDPA’s constraint, see supra , at 8, we would have no cause to take sides today on the method or methods by which underrepresentation is ap propriately measured. 4

### Althou gh the Michig an Sup r eme Court concl u ded that “ [ Smith’s] st atistical evidence failed to establisha legally si gnificant di sparity under either the absolute or comparative disparity tests,” Smith , 463 Mich., at 204–205, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3, 5

### that court nevertheless

——————

4 The State a s k s us to “ a do pt the ab solute-disp a r i tys t andar dfor measu r in gfai ran d r e ason ab le r e pr es entation” and to “requir[e] proof that the ab so l u te dispar i t yex c eeds 10%” t omake out a pr ima fac i e f a i r c r o ss-sec t ionviolat ion

. Br ief forPetition er 45–4 6. Un derth e r u le th e State propose s , “the Sixth Amendment offers no rem e dy for com p let e exclusion of di stinct groups in comm unities where the po pulation of the distinct group falls below th e 10 perce nt threshold.” Brief for Respon

dent 35. We n eed not reach that iss u e.

5 For similar co nclusions, see, for example, United Stat es v. Ora n ge , 447 F. 3d 79 2 , 798– 79 9, an d n

. 7 (CA10 200 6) (ab s olu t e dispar i t yofCite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) 13 Opinion of theCourt 

### gave Smith“the benefit of the doubt on underrepresenta

tion,” id., a t205, 615 N. W. 2d, a t3. It did so inorder to reach the issue ultimately dispositive in D u ren : To the extent underrepresenta tion existed, was it due to “system

atic exclusion”? Ibid. ; see Duren , 439 U. S., at 364. B Addressing the ground on wh ich th e Sixth Circ uit reste d its decision, Smith submits thatthe district-court -firs t assignment order systematically excluded AfricanAmericans from Kent County Ci r c uit Court venires. Brief for Respondent 46–48. But as the Michigan Suprem e Court not at all un re asonably concluded, Smith , 463 Mich., at 20 5, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3, Smith’s evidence scarcely shows that the assignment order he targets caused under

representation. Although the record esta blished that some officia l s and others in Kent County beli eved tha tt h e assignment order created racial disparities, and the County rev e rsed the order in response, supra, at 5, th e belief was n o t substantiated by Smi t h’s evidence. Evidence t hat Africa n-American s were underrepre

sented on the CircuitCourt’s v e nires in significantly higher perc entages th an on the Grand Rap i ds District Court’s cou l d have indicated that the assign ment order made a crit i cal difference. But, a s the Michigan Sup r eme Court note d, Smitha dduced no evidence to that effec t
. See Smith , 463 Mich., at 205, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. Nor di d Smith address whether Grand Rapids, wh ich had th e County’s la rgest Af rica n-Americanpopulation, “ha[d] mor e

—————— 3.57%; c o mpa r ativ e disp ar i t ies “r an g [in g] fr om 38.1 7 % to 5 1 .22% ” ) ; Un it e dSt at es v. Royal , 17 4 F. 3d 1, 1 0 (CA1 1 9 9 9 ) ( 2 .97% ab solu t e dispar i t y ; 61.1% c o mpar ati v e dispar ity) ; United States v. Rioux , 9 7 F. 3d 648, 65 7–6 58 ( CA2 1 996) ( 2

. 08% ab solu te d i sp ar ity ; 29% c o m pa ra t ive dis p arit y); State v. Gibbs , 254Co n n . 578, 5 91– 593, 75 8 A. 2 d 327, 3 37– 33 8(2000) ( 2 .49 % absolu t e dispar i t y ; 37% c o mpar ativ e dispari t y).14BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### need for jurors per capita t han [any other district in Kent County].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26; id., at 18, 37. Furthermore, Smith did not endeavor to compare the African-American representation levels in Circu it C o urt venires with those in the Federal Distric tCourt venires for the same region. See id., at 46–47; Dure n , 439 U. S., at 367, n. 25. Smith’s best evidence of systematic exclusion was of

fered by hi s statistics expert, who reporteda decline in comparative underrepresentation, from 18 to 15.1%, afte r Kent County reversed the assignm e nt order. See supra, at 5. This evidence—p articularly in view of AEDPA’s i n struction, §2254(d)(2)—is insufficient to su pport Smith’s claim that the assignment order caused the underrepre

sentation. As Smith’s counsel recognized at oral argu

ment, this decrease could not fa irly be descri bed as “a big change.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 51; se e ibid. (t h e d r o p w a s “ a step in the right direc t ion”). In short, Smith’s evidence gave the Michigan Sup r eme Court little reason to conclude that the district- court-f i rst assignment order had a signifi

cantly adverse impacton the representation of Africa nAmericans on Circuit Court venir e s. C To establis h systematic exclusion, Smith contends, the defendant must show only that the underrepresentation i s persistent and “produce d by the method or ‘system’ used to select [jurors],” rather than by ch ance. Brief for Respon

dent 38, 40. In this regard, Smith catalogs a laundry list of factors in addition to the alleg e d “siphoning” that, h e urges, ran kas “sys tematic” causes of underre presentation of African-Americans in Kent County’s ju ry pool. Id., at 53–54. Sm ith’s list in cludes the County’s practice of ex

cusing people who merely alleg e d hardship or simply failed to show up for jury servi c e, its reliance on mail notices, its failure to f o llow up on nonrespons es, its u s e of residential addresses at least 15 months old, and the15 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### refusal of Kent County police to enforce court orders for the appearance of prospective jurors. Ibid. No “clearly established” precedent of this Court supports Smith’s cla i m that he can make out a prima facie case merely by pointing to ahost of fact ors that, individually or in combinat ion, might contribute to a group’s underrepre

sentation. Smith recites a sentence in our Durenopinion that, he says, placed the burden of proving causation on the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 35. The sentence reads: “Assuming, arguendo , that the exemptions mentioned by the court below [those for person s over 65, t e achers, and government workers] would justify failure to ac hieve a fair communitycross secti on on jury venires, the State mu st demonstrate that these exemptions [rather than th e women’s exemption] caused the underrepresentation complained of.” 439 U. S., at 3 68–369. That sentence appears after the Court had already assigned to Duren

— and found he had carried—the burden of proving that the underrepre s entation “was due to [women’s] systematic exclusion in the jury-selection process.” Id., at 366. The Court’s comment, wh ich Smith clipped fro m its conte x t, does not concern the d e monstration of a p r ima face case. Instead, it addresses what the State might show to reb ut the defendant’s prima facie case. The Michigan Suprem e Court was therefore far from “un r easonable,” §2254(d)(1), in concluding that Duren first and foremost required Smith himself to show that the underrepresentation com

plained of was “due to systematic exclusion.” Id., at 364; see Smith , 463 Mich., at 205, 615 N. W. 2d, at 3. This Court, furthermor e , has never “clearly es tablished” that jury-se l ection-process feat ures of the k i ndon Smith’s list can giv e rise to a fair-cross-section claim. In Taylor , we “reco gnized broad discretion in the S t ates” to “ p re scribe relev ant qualific ations for t h eir jurors and to pro

vide reasonable exemptions.” 419 U. S., at 5 37–538. And in Duren , the Court understood that hardship exemptions16 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH Opinion of theCourt 

### resembling those Smith assails m i ght well “survive a fair

cross-section challenge,” 439 U. S. , at 370. 6

### I ns u m , t h e Michigan S u preme Court’s decision rejectingSmith’s fair

cross-section claim is consistent with Dur e n an d“ i nv olv e d [no] unreasonable ap plication o[f] clearly established Federal law,” §2254(d)(1). * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with th is opinion. It is so orde red.

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6 We have a l s o never “clea r ly” decided, a n d have no needto cons ider here, whethe r the impact of social and economic factors can support a fa ir-cros s - s e ct ion cla i m . Com p a r e Smith , 463 M i c h ., at 206, 6 15 N. W

. 2d, at 3 (“[T]h e influence of social and eco n omic factors on juror partici

pation does n o t demonstrate a system ati cexcl usion of [a distinctive gr ou p].”), with543 F. 3d 32 6 , 341 (C A6 20 08) (c ase belo w) (“[T]h e Six t h Amendment i s concerned with socialoreconomic factors when the particular syst em of s e lect in g j u rors m a kes s u ch fa ct ors releva ntt owho is placed on t h e qualifying list and who is ultim a tely called to or ex

cused from service on a veni re panel.”)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) T HOMAS , J

. , co ncu rrin g 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 08–1 40 2 

### MARY B E R G HUIS, WARDEN, P E TITION E R v. DIAP OLIS SMITH ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [M ar c h30, 2010] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### , concurring. The text of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by “an impartial jury.” Historically, juries did not include a sampling of persons from all levels of society or even from both sexes. See, e.g. , Alschuler & Deiss, A Brief H i story of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 877 (1994) (In 1791, “[e]very sta t e limited jury service to men; every state except Vermo n t restricted j u ry service to propert yowners o rtax p ayers ; three states permitted only whites to serve; and one state, Maryland, disqualifiedatheists”); Taylor v. Louis i a n a , 419 U. S. 522, 533, n. 13 (1 975) (“In this country women were disqualifiedby state law to sit as jurors until the end of the 19th century”). The Court h a s nonetheless concluded that the Si xth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to aj u ry tha tre presents “afair cross s e ction” of t h e community. Ante , at 1 (citing Taylor , supra). In my view, that conclusion rests less onthe Sixth Amendment than on a n“amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Dur e nv. Missouri , 439 U. S. 357, 372 (197 9) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and seems diffic u lt to square with the S i xth Amen dment’s te xt andhist ory. Accor d

ingly, in an appropriate caseI wo uld be willing to recon sider our precedents articulating the “fair cr oss section”2 BERGHUIS v. SM ITH T HOMAS , J

. , co ncu rrin g 

### requirement. But neit her part y a s ks us to do so here, an d the only question before us is whether the state court’s disposition was contra ry to, or an unreason able applica

tion of, our precedents. See ante , at 2
− 3, 8
− 10; 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). I concur in th e Court’s answer to that question.