United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-50869

Summary Calendar

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Scott Coalwell,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:17-CR-746-1

Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Scott Coalwell on three counts 

of mailing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). 

Coalwell was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of sixty months on Count 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 12, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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One, sixty months on Count Two, and seventy months on Count Three. He 

timely appealed.

Section 876(c) proscribes: (1) knowingly depositing in the mail or 

causing to be delivered by the Postal Service (2) a communication addressed 

to any other person (3) that contains “any threat to injure” the person of the 

addressee or of another. See United States v. Stoker, 706 F.3d 643, 647 (5th 

Cir. 2013). Coalwell maintains that there was insufficient evidence to prove 

that the letters underlying his convictions on Counts Two and Three

contained any threats. We have defined the term “threat” as “a serious 

statement expressing an intention to inflict bodily injury upon someone.” 

United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The threat element focuses on whether a 

reasonable recipient, familiar with the context of the communication, would 

interpret the language in the communication as a threat. United States v. 

Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1995). Whether the language in 

a communication constitutes a “threat” is a factual issue for the jury to 

decide, and the subjective reaction of the recipient is probative of the issue.

Id.

Coalwell appears to concede that the language in his letters could be 

taken as a threat by a reasonable person, but he contends it is equally plausible 

that another reasonable person would not have construed his letters as 

containing threats. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we 

presume that the trier of fact resolved the conflict in favor of the verdict and

defer to that resolution. United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 301 

(5th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Our review is limited to considering “whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

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Applying that standard, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient 

to support Coalwell’s convictions on Counts Two and Three.

Coalwell also challenges the district court’s application, over his 

objection, of a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1). That 

enhancement applies when “the offense involved any conduct evidencing an 

intent to carry out such threat.” Id. The district court committed clear error 

when it found the enhancement applicable based only on language in the 

letters themselves and a conversation with an investigator indicating 

Coalwell’s intent to carry out his threats. United States v. Jordan, 851 F.3d 

393, 401 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Goynes, 175 F.3d 350, 353, 355 (5th 

Cir. 1999). It is conduct that triggers the enhancement, and, despite the 

Government’s assertion to the contrary, the record does not reveal any overt 

act by Coalwell that would allow us to uphold the enhancement on an 

alternative ground. Goynes, 175 F.3d at 355. Furthermore, the Government 

fails to establish that the error was harmless. See United States v. Juarez, 866 

F.3d 622, 633-34 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 

713-14 (5th Cir. 2010).

Coalwell’s convictions are AFFIRMED. His sentence is 

VACATED and the case REMANDED for resentencing, consistent with 

this opinion.

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