IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1446

Filed June 21, 2017

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LISA ANNE DUFFY

AND MICHAEL J. DUFFY

Upon the Petition of

LISA ANNE DUFFY, n/k/a LISA ANNE MORRISON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning

MICHAEL J. DUFFY,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Robert E. Sosalla, 

Judge.

Petitioner appeals from the provisions of the dissolution decree dividing 

the parties’ property, awarding spousal support, and awarding attorney fees. 

Petitioner also appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for new trial. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Laura E. Bergus of Hayek, Moreland, Smith & Bergus, L.L.P., Iowa City, 

for appellant.

Rebecca A. Feiereisen of Arenson Law Group, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for 

appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.

Lisa Duffy appeals the property provisions of the dissolution decree and 

the denial of her motion for new trial. She claims the trial court erred in dividing 

the property, awarding attorney fees, and determining the amount of spousal 

support. We affirm the district court’s property division and award of attorney 

fees, but we modify the equalization payment from $69,817.30 to $74,439.83. 

We affirm the trial court’s denial of Lisa’s motion for new trial. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Lisa and Michael Duffy were married in 1992. At the time of trial, Lisa was 

forty-five and Michael was forty-six years old. Four children were born of the 

marriage, but the children reached the age of eighteen before the time of trial. 

Michael earned a bachelor’s degree. After college, Michael worked 

multiple jobs to support the family. Eventually, Michael and Lisa purchased 

Match Play Tennis Centers (Match Play) for five dollars. At the time of trial, 

Michael was a fifty percent owner1in Match Play, where he also worked full-time

and received a salary of $85,819.76. He also received a management fee of 

$32,500. Michael’s income was based on a management agreement between 

Match Play and Rockwell Collins, which requires Match Play to furnish recreation 

services to Rockwell’s employees. Michael also entered into a buy-sell 

agreement with the other Match Play owner in which each owner agreed to a 

buyout price of $86.67 per share. It is unclear how the owners came up with the 

valuation. Match Play has no other management or service agreements. 

 

1 An unrelated individual owns the remaining fifty percentof Match Play. 
3

Lisa also earned her bachelor’s degree. The parties both decided that 

Lisa would care for the house and children. Beginning in1998, Lisa worked for 

United Parcel Service (UPS) for approximately five years. She also worked at 

Coe College for approximately three months in 2007. Lisa was not employed at 

the time of trial. 

Lisa suffers from multiple health-related issues, including arthritis, chronic 

sinusitis, recurring MRSA infections, ADHD, hypothyroidism, Steven Johnson 

syndrome, depression, and anxiety. Lisa applied for social security disability 

benefits based on her medical conditions. The request was initially rejected and 

Lisa’s appeal was pending during trial. After the trial ended and the decree had 

been filed, Lisa received a notice of award letter granting Lisa’s appeal, in which 

it was determined she became disabled on April 13, 2007. 

On January 22, 2014, Lisa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. At 

trial, the court heard contradicting testimony about multiple assets and liabilities. 

The parties disagreed about the value of the home, whether $25,000 from 

Michael’s mother was a loan, and whether the Match Play credit card balance 

was marital debt. 

The court also heard testimony from Denny Redmond, Match Play’s 

accountant. Redmond testified that Match Play had no value. His opinion was 

based on Match Play’s status as an S-corporation, which passes all the net 

income and expenses through to the shareholders based on a pro-rated share of 

the stock ownership. Redmond confirmed the business had no assets other than 

a contract that paid the owners a management fee. The contract could be 
4

terminated at any time with sixty days’ notice. Redmond also testified that 

owners’ salaries should not not used to determine a corporation’s value. 

On June 27, 2016, the court issued its decree dividing the parties’ assets 

equally, awarding attorney fees, and requiring an equalization payment from 

Michael to Lisa. The court determined the $25,000 from Michael’s mother was a 

loan and assigned the debt to Michael. The court also determined the Match 

Play credit card balance was marital debt and assigned the debt to Michael. 

Based on its valuation of the assets, the court concluded Michael should pay Lisa 

an equalization amount of $74,439.83. However, the court’s order instructed 

Michael to pay only $69,817.30. The court also awarded Lisa $5000 in attorney 

fees. 

Based in part on the discrepancy between the equalization payment

amounts in the decree, Lisa filed a motion to reconsider, amend, and enlarge the

trial courts filings. She also filed a motion for new trial arguing the “newly 

discovered” disability award would have changed the results of the trial. The trial 

court denied both motions. Lisa appealed. 

II. Standard of Review.

An action for the dissolution of marriage is an equitable proceeding. Iowa 

Code § 598.3 (2014). Therefore, our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; 

In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Iowa 2012). Although we 

give weight to the factual determinations of the trial court, especially regarding 

credibility determinations, its findings are not binding upon us. Iowa R. App. P. 

6.904(3)(g); In re Marriage of Brown, 776 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Iowa 2009). We 

examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly 
5

presented. In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). 

We give the trial court considerable discretion in awarding spousal support and 

will disturb its award only when the decree fails to do equity. In re Marriage of 

Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998).

We review the trial court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of 

discretion. See In re Marriage of Grady-Woods, 577 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 1998).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial on the grounds of 

newly discovered evidence for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Wagner, 

604 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Iowa 2000).

III. Discussion.

a. Property Division.

Lisa claims the trial court erred in dividing the parties’ property. She 

argues the trial court undervalued the marital home, undervalued Match Play, 

and made a mathematical error in determining the equalization payment. She 

also argues $25,000 received from Michael’s mother and the credit-card debt 

related to Match Play are not marital debt. 

1. Property Valuation. Lisa claims the court undervalued Michael’s 

business, Match Play. She argues the trial court should not value the business 

at zero dollars, but she does not suggest an appropriate valuation. She also 

argues the stock price in the buy/sell agreement suggests the business has 

value. 

At trial, an accountant testified that Match Play had no value. The opinion 

was based on the structure of Match Play as an S-corporation, which passes its 
6

net income and expenses to Michael and the other owner. The expert stated the 

business has no assets. Moreover, the $86.67 per share stock price is based on 

the owners’ salaries and it does not reflect a current market value. The trial

court’s valuation matched the expert’s valuation. Generally, valuations within the 

permissible range of the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. See In re 

Marriage of Steele, 502 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); see also In re 

Marriage of Alexander, 478 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). We also note 

the income received from Michael’s management of Match Play was accounted 

for in other areas of the decree. 

Lisa also claims the trial court undervalued the marital home. She argues 

a number of improvements—such as a new roof, gutters, furnace, water heater, 

and air conditioner—warrant a larger home valuation. 

Based on evidence introduced at trial, the Linn County Assessor’s website

reflected the marital home’s assessed value at $166,400. Lisa testified the home 

was worth $186,000. Lisa’s opinion was based on her knowledge of the real 

estate market and various improvements made to the house. She also 

introduced multiple real-estate websites estimating the value of the home 

between $192,300 and $206,436. Michael testified recent flood damage reduced

the value of the home to $150,000. The court valued the home at $166,400 in its 

decree. The court’s determination is within the permissible range of evidence 

introduced at trial. See In re Marriage of Bare, 203 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Iowa 1973)

(“The [real-estate] valuation found by [the] trial court was well within the 

permissible range of the evidence, and we are not inclined to disturb it.”); see 

also In re Marriage of Swartz, 512 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) 
7

(affirming trial court’s $127,500 real-estate valuation where assessed value was 

$119,000 and appellant’s valuation was $215,000).

2. Marital Debts. Lisa next claims the trial court should not have 

categorized the $25,000 received from Michael’s mother and the business debt 

on a joint credit card as marital debt.2 

“[T]he allocation of marital debts inheres in the property division.” In re 

Marriage of Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 1980). “Even though a debt 

may have been incurred by a party for family expenses, it is not inequitable to 

order that party to be responsible for the entire amount of the debt as long as the 

overall property distribution is equitable.” In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 

242, 251 (Iowa 2006). “Debts of the parties normally become debts of the 

marriage, for which either party may be required to assume the responsibility to 

pay.” Id.

Lisa argues the money provided by Michael’s mother was never intended 

to be a loan. Intra-family loans are assigned as marital debts when the record 

suggests the funds were intended to be repaid. See In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 

N.W.2d 420, 427 (Iowa 1984) (holding the word “loan” written on the check 

supported a finding that the monies received were marital debts); see also In re 

Marriage of Morrissey, 669 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003) (“In this case, there 

 

2

Lisa also claims, “The amount owed on the Chevrolet Blazer is not marital debt.” 

However, based on the parties’ financial affidavits, there is no debt on the Chevrolet 

Blazer. It appears Lisa would like us to modify the district court’s decision applying the 

proceeds of the sale of the Blazer to the debt to Michael’s mother, but the parties 

stipulated the sale proceeds would go to Michael’s mother. Lisa fails to cite any 

authority or develop her argument that a stipulation from the parties should be reversed 

on appeal. Therefore, we decline to address her claim on appeal. See Midwest Auto. 

III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 431 n.2 (Iowa 2002) (holding random 

mention of issue, without elaboration or supporting authority, is insufficient to merit 

appellate consideration).
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is nothing in the record to suggest that the moneys were to be repaid other than 

Sean and his mother’s testimony.”). Here, Michael’s mother testified that she 

intended the money to be a loan and Lisa was aware of the loan. Michael also 

testified the money was intended to be a loan. The record shows the parties 

repaid approximately $6600 of the loan to Michael’s mother, which also suggests 

it was intended to be a loan. We decline to upset the trial court’s determination 

that the money from Michael’s mother was marital debt. See Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 

at 251 (“The district court found the evidence did not support [appellant’s] claim, 

and we decline to disturb the district court’s credibility judgment.”). 

Similarly, the credit card debt from Michael’s company was properly 

allocated as a marital debt. Lisa argues the debt was incurred in the course of 

Michael’s business dealings. However, the record suggests the parties used the 

credit card for personal and business expenses. Items charged to the credit card 

for business expenses were reimbursed by Match Play, and the reimbursement 

proceeds were often transferred into the parties’ personal accounts. Thus, much 

of the debt incurred in the course of Michael’s business activity was later 

“converted” to marital debt when the reimbursement proceeds were used for 

marital expenses. The trial court properly included the credit card as marital 

debt. 

3. Equalization Payment. Lisa claims the trial court made an error in the 

provisions of the decree ordering Michael to pay a $69,817.30 equalization 

payment while the trial court’s distribution chart showed a $74,439.83 

equalization payment. Michael argues the court intended to order an 
9

equalization payment of $69,817.30, although in his response to Lisa’s post-trial 

motion he conceded the district court intended the $74,439.83 amount. 

Iowa is an equitable distribution state. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 

N.W.2d 671, 678 (Iowa 2013). Under section 598.21, all of the parties’ property, 

except inherited property or gifts, should be equitably divided between the 

parties. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247. Equitable distribution depends upon the 

circumstances of each case, and it does not necessarily mean equal distribution.

In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa 2007). “Equality is, 

however, most often equitable.” McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 682. 

We agree with the trial court, a “close to fifty-fifty allocation of [the parties’] 

assets” is equitable. However, the ordered equalization payment does not equal 

the property division valuation in the decree. In its order, the court assigned

Michael $144,257.13 in assets net of the assigned debt. The court assigned Lisa 

negative $4622.53 in assets net of the assigned debt. The difference in the 

parties’ assets is $148,879. To equalize the property discrepancy, the court 

ordered Michael to pay Lisa $74,439.83 under the “Property Division” section of 

the decree. However, under the “Property Equalization” section the court 

ordered a $69,817.30 payment from Michael to Lisa. A $74,439.83 equalization 

payment results in a fifty-fifty allocation of the parties’ assets based on the trial 

court’s net-asset determination. Accordingly, Michael must pay a $74,439.83

equalization payment to Lisa.
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b. Spousal Support.

Lisa claims the spousal-support award of $3000 per month for thirty 

months3is insufficient because the support should continue until Lisa’s death and 

not decrease over time. She also claims the type of support is incorrect. 

As a preliminary matter, we note Iowa law recognizes three forms of 

alimony—traditional, rehabilitative, and reimbursement. See In re Marriage of 

Probasco, 676 N.W.2d 179, 184 (Iowa 2004). However, we are not required to 

award any one type of alimony, and our focus is whether the award is equitable 

under the facts of each case. See In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 

827 (Iowa 2008) (“[T]here is nothing in our case law that requires us, or any other 

court in this state, to award only one type of support.”).

In determining the amount of spousal support, we utilize the following 

statutory factors: (1) the length of marriage; (2) the age and emotional and 

physical health of the parties; (3) the property distribution; (4) the educational 

level of the parties at the time of marriage and when the dissolution action is 

commenced; (5) the earning capacity of the party seeking alimony, including 

educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, and length 

of absence from the job market; and (6) the feasibility of the alimony seeking 

party to become self-supporting with a reasonably comparable standard of living 

to that enjoyed during the marriage. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1); see also Hansen, 

733 N.W.2d at 704. Spousal support is not an absolute right, and an award 

 

3 After thirty months, the spousal-support obligation decreases from $3000 per month to 

$1500 per month until “such time as Lisa qualifies to receive social security retirement 

benefits.” At that time, Michael’s support obligation is $750 per month until Lisa’s death. 
11

depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Schenkelberg, 824 

N.W.2d at 486.

The parties were married for twenty-four years, and Lisa is approaching 

retirement in poor health. At the time of trial, Lisa was forty-five and Michael was 

forty-six years old. Both parties made significant contributions to the marriage, 

and Lisa has limited earning capacity due to her health and limited workforce 

experience. These factors weigh in favor of a spousal support award. See In re 

Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 410 (Iowa 2015) (holding marriages lasting 

twenty or more years “merit serious consideration for traditional spousal 

support”). Under the decree, Michael is also required to pay the remaining 

$16,796 debt to his mother, two credit card balances totaling $21,684.93, and 

various unpaid medical bills. The trial court determined Michael’s disposable 

income is $8000 per month and his monthly expenses are approximately $4678 

before the spousal-support obligation. Any additional support over $3000 per 

month is unreasonable based on the parties’ monthly expenses compared to 

their respective incomes. See In re Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 351 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1983); see also In re Marriage of Shepperd, No. 14-1766, 2015 

WL 7075750, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015) (“The amount of spousal 

support awarded should not destroy the right of the party providing the support to 

also enjoy a comparable standard of living.”). We agree with the trial court’s 

spousal-support determination. 
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c. Attorney Fees.

Lisa claims the trial court abused its discretion in awarding her $5000 in 

attorney fees. She argues Michael has the ability to pay additional funds, but she 

does not state how much. 

Trial courts are given considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees. In 

re Marriage of Giles, 338 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). “Trial courts 

are familiar with the value of services in dissolution matters. Most of the services 

for which compensation was allowed were rendered during trial before the judge 

who made the award. Trial courts have considerable discretion in fixing fees.” In 

re Marriage of Willcoxson, 250 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1977). 

Lisa cites In re Marriage of Mugge to support her argument. No. 07-0079, 

2008 WL 4525839 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2008). In Mugge, however, the trial 

court awarded $20,000 in attorney fees based, in part, on the appellee’s failure to 

disclose certain assets, which required the appellant “to incur unnecessary 

amounts of attorney fees.” Id. at *5. Here, no such nefarious activity exists in the 

record to require an increase in Lisa’s attorney-fee award. Furthermore, the trial 

court accounted for Michael’s increased ability to pay attorney fees when it 

awarded Lisa $5000 in attorney fees. The trial court outlined Michael’s increased 

monthly expenses based on the $3000 per month spousal-support obligation. 

Michael was also issued the majority of the marital debt, which increased his 

monthly expenses. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

requiring Michael to pay Lisa $5000 in attorney fees. 
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d. Motion for New Trial. 

Lisa claims she should be granted a new trial because she was unable to 

reasonably obtain or produce a notice of decision awarding her social security 

disability benefits, which, she argues, would have changed the outcome of the 

spousal support order in this case. Michael, on the other hand, argues the 

information was not available at trial, and the trial court was aware of Lisa’s 

appeal 

Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(7), a new trial may be granted 

if “[m]aterial evidence, newly discovered, which could not with reasonable 

diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial.” Additionally, 

[t]rial courts have broad but not unlimited discretion in ruling on 

motions for new trials. We do not favor motions for new trial based 

on newly discovered evidence. We will not disturb the trial court’s 

ruling unless the evidence clearly shows the court has abused its 

discretion. We will only find an abuse of discretion if the trial court 

clearly exercised its discretion on untenable grounds or acted 

unreasonably. 

Benson v. Richardson, 537 N.W.2d 748, 762 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted). 

Lisa must demonstrate three prongs to succeed on her claim: “(1) the evidence is 

newly discovered and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been 

discovered prior to the conclusion of the trial; (2) the evidence is material and not 

merely cumulative or impeaching; and (3) the evidence will probably change the 

result if a new trial is granted.” Id. 

We are not convinced this is an extraordinary case in which a new trial 

should be granted. “Newly discovered evidence” must exist at the time of trial. 

Id. at 763. Here, the trial ended on March 17, 2016. Although the disability 

appeal decision is dated March 11, 2016, the Social Security Administration did 
14

not send the letter until April 16, 2016. The evidence did not exist at the time of 

trial; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lisa’s motion for new 

trial. 

IV. Conclusion. 

We hold the division of the parties’ assets and debts is equitable, and we 

decline to alter the trial court’s award of trial attorney fees. Based on the courts 

valuation of the parties’ net assets, we modify the equalization payment from 

$69,817.30 to $74,439.83. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the motion for new trial. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.