If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

KURT GRIGGS-SWANSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

May 30, 2024

v No. 364134

Oakland Circuit Court

BEAUMONT HOSPITAL FARMINGTON HILLS, 

BOTSFORD GENERAL HOSPITAL, and JOHN 

DOE EMPLOYEE #1,

LC No. 2021-186548-NO

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SWARTZLE and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of 

defendants, Beaumont Hospital Farmington Hills, formerly Botsford General Hospital (“the 

Hospital”), and an unnamed security officer, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and thereby 

dismissing plaintiff’s claims for assault and battery against the unnamed officer and negligence 

and respondeat-superior liability against the Hospital. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from events at the Hospital on March 31, 2020, during the early onset 

of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff alleges that he was experiencing symptoms consistent with 

the COVID-19 virus. Because his condition was getting worse, he called 911 and was transported 

by ambulance to the Hospital, which had set up an outside tent to screen patients for the virus. 

Patients were screened either individually inside the tent or while remaining inside their vehicles. 

Plaintiff was evaluated by a nurse and doctor. Although plaintiff had symptoms consistent with 

COVID-19, because his vital signs and condition were deemed stable, resources were limited, and 

plaintiff was not deemed critically ill, he was not tested for the COVIV-19 virus or admitted to the 

Hospital. Instead, he was prescribed a medication and informed that he was being discharged. 

Because plaintiff had been transported to the hospital by ambulance, he did not initially know how 

to leave or know where to go. He had been living with his sister and her family, but he explained 
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that he did not want to expose them to the virus. He complained to Hospital staff that he had 

nowhere to go and asked to speak to a social worker, but he was told that a social worker was not 

available. 

Before going to the Hospital, plaintiff called a coworker and he remained on his phone 

with two coworkers during the duration of his time at the Hospital. Plaintiff remained in the tent 

area at the Hospital for approximately two hours after he was discharged. Eventually, because 

plaintiff would not leave, security was contacted. When security officers arrived, they initially 

spoke to plaintiff and encouraged him to leave voluntarily. Plaintiff admitted that he was told that 

he was not going to be admitted and had been discharged, and he knew that he had to leave the 

tent, but he said that he did not know where he could go. Eventually, the officers began to remove 

plaintiff from the tent. Plaintiff agreed that he required the physical assistance of the security 

officers to leave the tent and that two officers helped him get up to walk out of the tent. However, 

according to plaintiff, he was forcefully removed from the tent by the security officers. 

Upon leaving the tent, plaintiff fell down just outside the tent. Defendants’ witnesses 

described plaintiff as intentionally flopping down on the ground, while plaintiff described losing 

his balance and falling after the officers removed their hands from him because he could not stand 

without their assistance. Plaintiff admitted that after falling to the ground, he needed help getting 

up. Plaintiff claimed that the officers yelled at him to get up on his own and then intervened when 

he was unable to do so. According to plaintiff, the officers twisted and pushed his wrist and leg,

causing him pain, and dragged him approximately 20 feet along the concrete, causing injuries to 

his back and side. Plaintiff, who weighed approximately 300 pounds, admitted that he could not 

assist the officers in getting himself off the ground and that he was “dead weight.” He agreed that 

the officers were trying to lift him off the ground, which was not easy to do. Although the officers 

claimed that they moved plaintiff a short distance because he was near a line of cars waiting for 

COVID-19 screening, plaintiff denied that he was in any danger from the cars. In any event, after 

plaintiff was moved, officers assisted him in getting into a wheelchair and plaintiff was then taken 

to an indoor lobby at the Hospital. Plaintiff’s coworker contacted his mother who eventually 

arrived to pick plaintiff up from the Hospital lobby and plaintiff’s work supervisor arranged for 

plaintiff to stay in a hotel. Plaintiff was admitted to another hospital approximately four days later 

with COVID-19.

Plaintiff filed this action, asserting a claim for assault and battery against an unnamed 

security officer, and asserting that the Hospital was liable for the officer’s conduct under a theory 

of respondeat superior. Plaintiff also asserted claims against the Hospital for the negligent hiring, 

retention, and supervision of its security staff, and for its negligent training of its security 

personnel. 

The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(10), first ruling that the Hospital could not be held liable for any negligence by its 

security officers related to plaintiff’s removal from the tent because of the immunity granted by 

the Pandemic Health Care Immunity Act (PHCIA), MCL 691.1471 et seq. The court further held, 

however, that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the Hospital could 

not be vicariously liable for the officers’ conduct because there was no evidence to support a 

finding that the officers’ actions were unreasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, the 

court found that plaintiff failed to establish factual support for his claim that the Hospital was 
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negligent in its hiring, retention, and supervision of its security staff because there was no evidence 

that the Hospital had knowledge of any facts that would indicate that any of the involved officers 

were not competent or qualified to deal with the public. The court also found that the Hospital had 

presented evidence demonstrating that its security officers received appropriate training, both 

when beginning employment and regularly thereafter, and plaintiff had not presented evidence to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact whether the training that was provided deviated from an 

appropriate standard of care for the security industry. Accordingly, the court dismissed plaintiff’s 

negligent-training claim. Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff’s assault and battery claim, ruling 

that there was no genuine issue of material fact whether any physical touching of plaintiff was 

done with an intent to cause injury, and that, even viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the 

evidence established that the officers’ touching of plaintiff was done for the legitimate purpose of 

facilitating plaintiff’s removal from the tent and getting him off the ground and out of harm’s way.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. ElKhalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). The trial court 

dismissed all claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the 

factual support for a claim. Innovation Ventures v Liquid Mfg, 499 Mich 491, 507; 885 NW2d 

861 (2016). When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), “a trial court considers 

affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties . . . in 

the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. Summary disposition is appropriate 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when, viewing the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion, “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of law.” Id. 

III. THE HOSPITAL’S VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF ITS 

SECURITY OFFICERS

Plaintiff alleged that the Hospital was vicariously liable for the conduct of its security 

officers under a theory of respondeat superior. The trial court dismissed this claim in part on the 

basis of its determination that the Hospital was entitled to immunity under § 5 of the PHCIA, MCL 

691.1475, which provides: 

A health care provider or health care facility that provides health care 

services in support of this state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is not liable 

for an injury, including death, sustained by an individual by reason of those 

services, regardless of how, under what circumstances, or by what cause those 

injuries are sustained, unless it is established that the provision of the services 

constituted willful misconduct, gross negligence, intentional and willful criminal 

misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm by the health care provider or health 

care facility. 

Although the PHCIA was adopted by 2020 PA 240, effective October 22, 2020, the act provides 

that “[t]he liability protection provided by this act applies retroactively, and applies on or after 

March 29, 2020 and before July 14, 2020.” MCL 691.1477. The conduct in this case occurred on 

March 31, 2020, within the statutory timeframe. 
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Plaintiff disputes that the PHCIA applies to the conduct at issue in this case. In Hmeidan 

v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 326 Mich App 467, 478; 928 NW2d 258 (2018), this Court 

explained:

The overall goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of 

the Legislature. Garfield Mart, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 320 Mich App 628, 643; 

907 NW2d 880 (2017). “The best indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary 

language used.” Id. “In construing a statute, the Court must read the language as 

a whole, giving meaning to each word in the context of the statute.” Id. “If the 

language is unambiguous, then the language must be applied as written.” Id.

It is undisputed that plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred while he was at the Hospital for 

the purpose of obtaining treatment for suspected COVID-19. Although plaintiff argues that the 

security staff was not providing medical care or treatment, MCL 691.1475 broadly applies to a 

health care provider or health care facility that provides health care services in support of this 

state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and it is undisputed that plaintiff’s presence at the 

Hospital was related to its provision of healthcare services for the COVID-19 pandemic, that 

plaintiff’s interaction with the security staff occurred while he was in the tent area that was 

specifically set up by the Hospital in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the reason for 

security’s presence was that plaintiff was dissatisfied with the evaluation he had received for his 

suspected COVID-19 condition and he refused to leave the tent after being advised that he was 

being discharged. Moreover, MCL 691.1475 broadly applies to any injury “by reason of those 

services, regardless of how, under what circumstances, or by what cause those injuries are 

sustained,” unless the provision of services constituted willful misconduct, gross negligence, or 

intentional and willful criminal misconduct or intentional infliction of harm. Accordingly, we 

reject plaintiff’s argument that the act cannot apply to actions of the security officers.

The only exception to immunity that plaintiff discusses in his brief on appeal is gross 

negligence. The PHCIA defines “gross negligence” as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a 

substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1473(a). Plaintiff 

acknowledges that he did not plead gross negligence in his complaint, but argues that because 

defendants did not raise their immunity argument in their original motion for summary disposition, 

he did not have an opportunity to request that he be allowed to amend his complaint to plead gross 

negligence, and therefore, this Court should allow him to do so. MCR 2.116(I)(5) provides that 

when a party moves for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court “shall give the 

parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence 

then before the court shows that amendment would not be justified.” MCR 2.118(A)(2) provides 

that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Ordinarily, a motion to amend 

should be granted, and should be denied only for particularized reasons such as “(1) undue delay, 

(2) bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies 

by amendments previously allowed, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 

allowance of the amendment, or (5) futility of the amendment.” VHS of Mich, Inc v State Farm 

Mut Auto Ins Co, 337 Mich App 360, 373; 976 NW2d 109 (2021), quoting Lane v KinderCare 

Learning Ctrs, Inc, 231 Mich App 689, 697; 588 NW2d 715 (1998). 

Although plaintiff requests an opportunity to amend his complaint to plead gross 

negligence, he does not identify any facts that he believes would support an allegation of gross 
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negligence. “A party may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or reject 

its position.” Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 424; 576 

NW2d 667 (1998). Because plaintiff fails to explain what facts would support a claim of gross 

negligence, he has not demonstrated that amendment of his complaint to plead gross negligence is 

justified. 

Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the negligent 

acts of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment. Laster v Henry Ford 

Health Sys, 316 Mich App 726, 734; 892 NW2d 442 (2016). In order to prove a claim for 

negligence, the plaintiff must show (1) a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) 

damages. Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 552; 739 NW2d 313 (2007). 

Plaintiff agreed that he was required to leave the Hospital after he was told that he was 

discharged. At that time, the Hospital was facing a global healthcare crisis caused by the COVID19 pandemic and was not admitting patients who did not require critical care. Although plaintiff 

was experiencing symptoms consistent with COVID-19, his condition was considered stable. 

Plaintiff did not have a ride readily available to transport him from the hospital, but he was allowed 

to remain in the tent for approximately two hours to arrange for a ride. 

Plaintiff agreed that he had been discharged and was not going to be admitted to the 

Hospital, and that the officers initially spoke to him and encouraged him to leave. Indeed, plaintiff 

admitted that the officers seemed understanding, but told him there was nothing they could do. 

Although plaintiff claimed that the officers forcefully removed him, he also stated that he was not 

able to physically walk out of the tent on his own because of his symptoms and he felt weak. 

Plaintiff also agreed that there was a line of cars, maybe 20, waiting to be screened when he was 

being removed. Plaintiff explained that he fell when, once outside the tent, the officers who were 

assisting him let go and he lost his balance. Plaintiff admitted that the officers instructed him to 

get up, but he did not do so, explaining that he was unable to get up on his own, and after remaining 

on the ground for 15 to 20 seconds, some officers grabbed and forcefully moved him. Plaintiff 

agreed that he was “dead weight” when the officers dragged him because he could not assist them.

Although there was conflicting testimony regarding plaintiff’s demeanor and conduct, 

whether plaintiff was able to walk on his own, whether plaintiff deliberately fell to the ground to 

impede the officers’ efforts to remove him, and the manner and distance that plaintiff was moved 

after he fell to the ground, plaintiff’s own testimony indicated that he was aware that he was not 

permitted to remain in the tent and that the officers verbally encouraged him to leave voluntarily 

prior to physically removing him. Plaintiff’s testimony that he was too weak to walk on his own 

also indicates that the officers were justified in assisting plaintiff in leaving the tent. Plaintiff also 

admitted that the officers initially asked him to get up on his own and it was only after he remained 

on the ground for 15 to 20 second that the officers moved him. Plaintiff, who weighed 

approximately 300 pounds, also admitted that he was “dead weight” and unable to help the officers 

move him to a chair. Although the parties disputed the distance that plaintiff was moved and 

disputed whether plaintiff was in danger from the nearby line of cars of people waiting to be 

evaluated for COVID-19, even accepting plaintiff’s claim that he was moved a distance of 

approximately 20 feet, it is undisputed that plaintiff was moved to a location where he could be 

placed in a wheelchair and that the officers assisted him in getting into the chair, and he was then 

taken to a hospital lobby where he was allowed to wait for his ride. Defendants submitted an 
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affidavit from a security expert, Nick Radu, who opined that the officers responded appropriately 

by attempting to first verbally deescalate the situation to gain compliance, and that their use of 

physical force was necessary and appropriate under the circumstances. These facts do not support 

a reasonable jury finding that the officers were negligent.

As the trial court observed, plaintiff did not provide any evidence to refute Radu’s opinions. 

Instead, plaintiff argues that it was improper to consider Radu’s affidavit because he did not have 

sufficient notice of what testimony Radu intended to offer at trial because defendants did not 

properly respond to his interrogatories. However, Radu was named as defendants’ security expert 

on its witness list filed on December 21, 2021, and defendants’ motion for summary disposition 

was not filed until October 2022. Therefore, plaintiff had plenty of notice of defendants’ intent to 

offer a security expert. Plaintiff attempts to expand the record on appeal by submitting 

interrogatories and responses from defendants to argue that defendants did not reveal Radu’s 

proposed opinions during discovery, and improperly waited until they moved for summary 

disposition to reveal the substance of Radu’s proposed testimony. However, these materials were 

not submitted in the trial court, they may not be considered on appeal. This Court’s review is 

limited to the record developed in the trial court and a party may not expand the record on appeal. 

Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56; 649 NW2d 783 (2002). Further, plaintiff 

never challenged Radu’s affidavit in the trial court and he may not raise this issue for the first time 

on appeal. This Court has no obligation to consider an issue that was not raised in the trial court. 

Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d 

___ (2023) (Docket No. 359090); slip op at 2. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s appellate 

challenge to Radu’s affidavit. 

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims asserting that 

the Hospital is liable for the security officers’ conduct under a theory of respondeat superior. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION, AND SUPERVISION CLAIM

To the extent that plaintiff asserted a direct claim against the Hospital for negligence in its 

hiring, supervision, or retention of the involved officers, we agree that the trial court did not err by 

dismissing this claim. 

An employer may also be held directly liable for its own negligence in hiring, training, and 

supervising its employees. Zsigo v Hurley Med Ctr, 475 Mich 215, 227; 716 NW2d 220 (2006). 

A claim of negligent hiring or retention requires actual or constructive knowledge by the employer 

that would make the specific wrongful conduct perpetrated by the employee predictable. Peterson 

Estate v Brannigan Bros Restaurants & Taverns, LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 575; 918 NW2d 545 

(2018). 

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does not support a conclusion 

that the Hospital knew or should have known that its security officers would unnecessarily cause 

harm to plaintiff when trying to remove him from the premises because plaintiff did not offer any 

evidence that the Hospital had a reason to know that any of the officers involved were unqualified 

or likely to engage in wrongful conduct with patients who refused to leave upon being discharged. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s claim premised on the Hospital’s 

alleged negligence in the hiring, supervision, or retention of the involved officers. 
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V. PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENT-TRAINING CLAIM

Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his claim that the Hospital was 

negligent by failing to properly train its security staff on how to perform their job without unduly 

injuring plaintiff. 

The trial court dismissed this claim because defendants submitted evidence showing that 

the Hospital’s security officers were provided with training, which included training on how to 

deescalate situations involving disruptive or uncooperative patients, both when beginning 

employment and annually thereafter, which defendants’ expert concluded was appropriate, and 

plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence to show that the training that was provided deviated from 

the standard of practice in the security industry. Plaintiff does not dispute the trial court’s 

determination that he failed to demonstrate factual support for his negligent-training claim, but he 

argues instead that summary disposition of this claim was improper because he was prevented 

from supporting this claim because defendants failed to comply with his requests for discovery of 

training materials, personnel files and records, employee handbooks and policies, including 

disciplinary policies, and other relevant information. To the extent that plaintiff challenges the 

trial court’s rulings on discovery requests, a trial court’s decision on a motion to compel discovery 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cabrera v Ekema, 265 Mich App 402, 406; 695 NW2d 78 

(2005). 

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is generally premature if 

discovery has not been completed, unless there is no fair likelihood that further discovery will 

produce support for the nonmoving party’s position. Kern v Kern-Koskela, 320 Mich App 212, 

227; 905 NW2d 453 (2017). But a nonmoving party who opposes a motion for summary 

disposition cannot simply state that the motion is premature because discovery has not been 

completed; he must identify a disputed issue and support that issue with independent evidence, 

such as submitting affidavits to show the probable testimony in support of a position. Marilyn 

Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 292-293; 

769 NW2d 234 (2009). The court rules allow for broad, open discovery and parties are permitted 

to obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of 

the lawsuit, MCR 2.302(B)(1). Cabrera, 265 Mich App at 406-407. 

The record discloses that plaintiff was afforded extensive discovery, which included 

multiple depositions and the production of information related to the training of the Hospital’s 

security officers, including more than 100 pages of training materials. Although plaintiff 

complains that defendants failed to comply with his many requests for discovery of other relevant 

information that could have supported his negligent-training claim, the record discloses that 

plaintiff’s other discovery requests were the subjects of motions to compel that were addressed 

and decided by the trial court. In particular, the trial court directed the parties to submit 

supplemental briefs addressing plaintiff’s requests for discovery of the Hospital’s employee 

handbook or policies, including discipline policies, applicable to both the security officers and 

medical staff who were present on March 31, 2020. Further, the court agreed to conduct an in 

camera inspection of personnel files of the involved officers, including any discipline and 

complaints received from third parties. The court also agreed to conduct an in camera inspection 

of any information defendants had regarding the doctor who evaluated plaintiff on March 31, 2020, 

despite that she was not a Hospital employee. The court also ordered the Hospital to provide any 
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training materials, including materials from a third party, subject to a protective order. 

Additionally, the court ordered the Hospital to provide documentation of which security officers 

were on duty at the relevant time on March 31, 2020, an organizational chart of the chain of 

command for Cody Moore, the supervisorial officer on duty on that date, and any photographs or 

diagrams of the tent where the incident occurred. The court also permitted plaintiff to depose the 

Hospital’s security director, William Leavens, a second time to further question him regarding the 

training materials that were provided to plaintiff. 

In sum, contrary to plaintiff’s claim on appeal that the trial court denied him basic discovery 

that prejudiced his ability to establish factual support for his negligent-training claim, the record 

discloses that the trial court ordered defendants to provide various requested information, allowed 

plaintiff to redepose Security Director Leavens after plaintiff received copies of training materials, 

agreed to conduct in camera reviews of other requested information, provided plaintiff access to 

third-party materials pursuant to a protective order, and permitted plaintiff to further address some 

of his discovery requests in supplemental briefing. Plaintiff does not address the trial court’s 

discovery rulings or indicate whether he revisited some of his discovery requests in supplemental 

briefing as permitted by the trial court. Accordingly, he has not demonstrated that he was 

improperly foreclosed from discovering relevant information. Therefore, we reject plaintiff’s 

claim that summary disposition of his negligent-training claim was improper because he was 

denied discovery of relevant information. 

VI. ASSAULT AND BATTERY

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for assault and battery. 

In civil law, an assault is “any intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another 

person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under circumstances 

which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present 

ability to accomplish the contact.” Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119; 472 NW2d 16 

(1991). “A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results 

from an act intended to cause such a contact.” Id.; see also Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich 396, 401; 

295 NW 201 (1940), and M Civ JI 115.02 (defining a battery as “the willful or intentional touching 

of a person against that person’s will [by another/by an object or substance put in motion by 

another person]”). The intent necessary to prove battery is the intent to cause a harmful or 

offensive contact with another person, or knowing, with substantial certainty, that such contact 

would result. Boumelhem v Bic Corp, 211 Mich App 175, 184; 535 NW2d 574 (1995). The 

standard jury instructions for battery provide that the “[p]laintiff has the burden of proving that 

[defendant willfully and intentionally touched the plaintiff against the plaintiff’s will / defendant 

put in motion an object or substance that touched the plaintiff against the plaintiff’s will.]” See M 

Civ JI 115.21.

Here, the evidence does not support a claim for assault and battery based on plaintiff’s 

testimony. According to plaintiff, he was intentionally touched by the officers when they initially 

removed him from the chair in the tent. At that time, plaintiff knew that he had been discharged 

and he agreed that he was required to leave, although he had nowhere to go. While plaintiff 

claimed that he was forcefully removed, he admitted that he was required to leave and that he 

needed assistance and was unable to walk on his own. Accordingly, the officers’ physical touching 
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could not support a claim for assault and battery because it was done to assist plaintiff. While the 

officers intentionally touched plaintiff, it was not against plaintiff’s will. 

Again, solely according to plaintiff, after he left the tent, he fell when the officers removed 

their hands. Once on the ground, he told the officers that he could not get up. While the parties 

differ on what the officers did to move plaintiff after he fell, plaintiff agreed that the officers 

intervened after first instructing him to get up on his own and he was unable to do so. Plaintiff 

claimed that he was dragged across concrete and injured as he apparently was lifted by the officers 

into a wheelchair, and he denied that he was near any cars at that time. Even viewing the facts in 

the light most favorable to plaintiff, they do not support plaintiff’s claim that the officers assaulted 

or battered him with an intent to cause him harm. The facts demonstrated that the officers assisted 

plaintiff by moving him from the tent area when he required assistance. After his fall, plaintiff 

was unable to move on his own. Whether the officers moved him to get him out of the way of 

traffic or because he was on the ground and unable to get up on his own, there is no evidence that 

the officers intended to harm plaintiff. There is no evidence that the officers dragged plaintiff for 

any reason other than to facilitate his removal from the area, whether to remove him from the 

property or to get him out of the way of those waiting in the vehicle line to receive COVID-19 

screenings. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by ruling that there was no genuine issue of 

material fact to support plaintiff’s claim of assault and battery. 

Affirmed. Defendant having prevailed may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle 

/s/ Adrienne N. Young