## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Suprem e Court

In re Marriage of Earlywin e , 2013 IL 114779

Caption in S upreme Court: In re MARRI AGE OF J OHN J

. EARL YWI NE, Petitioner, and J ESSI CA A. EARL YWINE
, Respondent (Thomas H. J ames, ContemnorAppellant).

Docke t No. 114779

Filed October 3, 2013

Held ( Note : Thi s sy ll abus

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by t h e Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Statutory provisions for “leve ling the playing field” in marria g e dissoluti on proce eding s p er m i tted an order for the turnover of interim

a tt o r n e y f e e s d e s p it e an “adva

nce pay ment reta iner” ag ree ment purp o r ti n g to make funds provided by family members of the husband the proper ty of his counsel.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Appellate C o urt for the Second District; hear d in that
court on appea l from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County
, the Hon. There sa L . Ursin, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Appellate c ourt judg ment aff irmed. Circuit court judg ment aff irmed in part a

nd vacated in part.Counsel on

Appea l Thomas H. James, of For reston, appe llant pro se

.

No appe ara

nce f or appe llee.

Paul L

. Fe instein and Michae l G. DiDomenico, of Chicag o, amici curiae

.

J ustices J USTI CE BURKE de livered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
Chief Ju s ti c e Kilb r id e a

n d Ju s tices Fr eema

n, Thomas, Gar

man, Kar meier, and The is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 I n the course of dissoluti on of marria g e proce eding s, responde nt, J essica A. Early wine, filed a petitio n fo r i n terim attorney fee s pursuant to the “leve ling of the play ing field”
p ro v i s ions in the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act (Ac t). See 750 I L C S 5/501(c-1) (West 2010). The circ uit court of Stephenson County fo u n d t h at neither responde nt nor petitioner, J ohn J

. Early wine, had the fi n an ci al ability or resour ces to pay their respe ctive attorney fee s and costs. Pursuant to section 501(c- 1)(3) of the Act, the court order ed petitioner’s attorney , Thom as J ames, to turn over, or disgor g e, to responde nt’s attorney half the fee s previously paid to him. The court held J ames in “fr iendly ” contempt at hi s reque st so that he could appea l the t urnover order

. On appeal, J am es arg ued that the fee s wer e not subject to disgor g ement beca use they wer e held in an advanc e pay ment reta iner and beca me his proper

ty upon pay

ment. The ap pellate court reje cted J ames’ argument, aff irmed the turnove r orde r, and vaca ted the orde r of c ontempt. 2012 I LApp (2d) 110730. We now aff

irm the appe llate cour

t.

¶ 2 Ba ckg round ¶ 3 Petitioner filed his pe tition for dissoluti on of marria g e on Aug ust 24, 2010. The pa rties had one son born of the marria g e who was three y ear s old at the time of filing. On November 1, 2010, responde nt, throug h her attorney Richard Haime, filed a petition reque sting interim attorney fee s in the amount of $5,000. Respondent asked the court to order petitioner to pay her fee s or to order disgor g ement of fee s previously paid to petitioner’s attorney

. I n her aff idavit acc ompany

ing the petition, responde nt stated that she was unemploy ed and had no assets or cash to pay her attorney fee s. I n response , petitioner s t at ed that he had been unemploy ed for some time, had no money to reta in counsel, and that his pare nts had paid his leg al bills. ¶ 4 Both parties submitt ed financ ial discl o s u re af fi d avits. Respondent stated that she had

-2-ear ned $300 fr om employ

ment in 2010 and owed $4,600 on a car . Petitioner stated that he

was employ ed sporadica lly and had rec eive d s o me u n e mp lo y me nt p a y me nts. Petitioner listed debts totaling more than $66,000. He stated further that he owed his pare nts $8,750 for leg al fee s paid to his attorney

on his behalf. ¶ 5 Following a hear ing, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order on April 26, 2011. The court found that there we re s u bstantial debts from the marria g e which neither party was able to pay

. The court further found that responde nt’s reque sted interim fee s wer e

rea sonable due to the anticipated complex ity of the case , including a custody evaluation. Pursuant to section 501(c- 1)(3) of the Act, the court found that neither party had the financ ial ability or acc ess to assets or income to pay their respe ctive attorney fee s, nor was petitioner able to pay any of responde nt’s fee s. Acc ording ly
, the court order ed J ames to turn over to Haime a portion of the fe es paid to him by petitioner’s pa

rents, in the amount of $4,000. ¶ 6 Petitioner filed a motion to rec onsider the disgor g ement order
, arguing that beca use the attorney fee s wer e place d in an advanc e pay ment reta iner, they wer e n o t s u b j ec t to a d i s go rgement order by the trial court. Attache d to the motion was a copy of the attorney

client agr eeme nt betwee n J ames and petitioner, which indicates that petitioner agree d that all fee s paid to J ames would be considere d an advanc e pay ment reta iner, as that term is used in Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc.
, 226 I ll. 2d 277 (2007). The ag ree ment sets forth the require ments of the advanc e pay ment reta iner in compliance with Rule 1.15 of the I llinois Rules of P ro fe ssional Conduct of 2010 (ef f. J an. 1, 2010). R eleva

nt to this appea l, the ag ree ment identifies the “spec ial purpose” for the advanc e pay ment reta iner as follows: “(1) the specia l purpose for the advanc e pay ment reta iner and an explanation why it is advanta g eous to the client: In the case of family l aw wi t h o bligor s or putative obligor s, reg ar d le s s of the source of obligation, the [I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act] can cause a court order to issue which will divide attorney rete ntion funds which are held in an attorney ’s trust acc ount beca use such funds are owned by
t he client and thus are part of the marital estate. This division or alloca t i o n i s i n a judge ’s discretion that provides the authority to allocate all of said funds should such fac t s p ortend such a result. The use of the ‘adva nce pay ment reta iner’ avoids the problem of having to pay y our counsel twice due to a fee allocation order albeit a C o u rt m ay still order such a pay ment from the client direc tly

. The benef it of t h e advanc ed pay

ment reta iner is that it avoids what can at times be the financ ial adver sity with the attorney which y ou have hired due to a fee al l o ca t i o n order ’s mandating allocation fr om an attorne y ’s trust acc ount to the pa rty on the other side of the law suit.” ¶ 7 I n support o f t h e m o t i o n t o re co nsider, petitioner’s mother, J oy ce M. Early wine, submitt ed an aff

idavit stating that she, her fianc é, petitioner’s fathe r, and petitioner’s fathe r’s wife ha d paid all of the attorney fee s to petitioner’s attorne y on his behalf. ¶ 8 The trial c ourt issued a memora ndum opinion and order on Ma y 25, 2011, denying the motion to reconsider the turnover or der. The court made the following finding s:

“The s t ated policy of 501(c- 1)(3) is to achie ve ‘substantial parity betwee n the parties.’ That section further expressly desig nates ‘re tainers *** previously paid’ as

-3-a source for disgor g ement ***. Public policy allowing divorce litigants to participa te equally should overr ide t he advance pay ment re tainer device of protec ting the fee s

o f one side. To allow J ohn to shelter the fee s paid on his behalf as an advance
pay ment reta iner defe ats the purpose o f t h e ‘substantial parity ’ provisions of the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act. Divorce court is a court of equity
, in which the court has a s u b s t an tial amount of discretion ***. This court does not find that the finding s of Dowling
, as cited by J ohn, apply or wer e meant to a pply to divorce case s.” ¶ 9 J ames filed a motion for an entry of friendly co n t em p t i n co n n ec t ion with the fe e disgor g ement order

. On J une 21, 2011, th e trial court g rante d the motion and fined J ames $50. J ames subseque ntly

filed his notice of a

ppeal. ¶ 10 The appellate court aff irmed t h e trial court’s turnover order and vacated the contempt order

. 2012 I L App (2d) 110730. The court held that the plain l an gu age o f section 501(c- 1)(3) of the Act allows a trial court to order disgor g ement of reta iners previously paid
to an attorney in the event that the court finds that both parties lack the financ ial ability and

resour ces to pay rea sonable attorney fee s and costs. Id. ¶¶ 19-21. The leg islature’s use of the
g ener al term “re tainers,” in the court’s opinion, encompa ssed an advanc e pay ment reta iner. Id. ¶ 21. The court further held that allowinga par

ty to avoid disgor g ement throug h use of

an advanc e pay

ment reta iner would defe at the purpose of the “leve ling t h e p l ay i n g field” provisions in section 501(c-1)

. Id. ¶¶ 15, 22. ¶ 11 This court allowed J ames’ petition for leave to appea l pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (ef

f. Fe b. 26, 2010). We g rante d leave to matrimonial lawy ers Paul L

. Fe instein and Michae l G. DiDomenico to f ile a brief amicus curiae in suppor t of J ames. See I ll. S. Ct. R. 345 (ef f. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 12 Analy sis ¶ 13 At t h e o u t s et, we note t hat no appellee ’s brief has been filed i n this case . Nonethele ss,

we will addre ss the merits o f t h i s appea l under the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.
, 63 I ll. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (in the absenc e of an appellee ’s brief, a re v i ew i n g co u rt should addre ss an appeal on the m erits where the

rec ord is simple and the cla imed err ors ar e such that the court may easily decide the issues raised by the appe llant). ¶ 14 At issue is whether the trial court had di s cr et i o n t o order J ames to turn over to Haime fu n d s h eld in an advanc e pay ment reta iner. J ames contends that beca use the funds in t h e advanc e pay

ment reta iner beca

me his proper

ty upon pay

ment and wer e place d in his g ener al

acc ount, they wer e not subject to disgor gem en t u n d er the leveling of the playing field provisions in the Act. ¶ 15 This court first rec og nized advanc e paym en t re t ai n er s i n Dowling
, which involved a judgme nt cre ditor who soug ht to satisfy a judg ment by acc essing funds held in an a dvance
pay ment reta iner by the debtor’s attorney

. Dowling
, 226 I ll. 2d 277. We held that the reta iner

was not subject to turnover to the judgme nt cre ditor beca use it wa s the proper

ty of the debtor’s attorney

. Id. at 298. Prior to Dowling
, only two ty pes of reta iners wer e expli cit ly

-4-allowed in I llinois

. Id. at 292. The first ty pe, a “g ener al,” “true ,” or “cla ssic” reta iner, is paid
to a lawy er to secur e his or her availability during a specifie d time or for a specifie d matter. Such a re t ai ner is ear

ned when paid and immediately become s the proper ty of the lawy er, whether or not the lawyer ever perf orms any service s. Id. at 286. The second ty pe of reta iner is a secur ity reta iner, which rema ins the property of t he client until the l awy er applies it to

c h a r g e s for service s actua lly rende red. Pursuant to the I llinois Rules of Professional Conduct,

a secur ity reta iner must be deposited in a client tru s t ac co u n t and kept separ ate from the lawy er’ s own funds. Id. (citing I ll. R. P rof. Conduct R. 1.15(a )). ¶ 16 I n contra st to a g ener al re t ai n er o r a s ec u ri ty reta iner, an advanc e pay ment reta iner “consists of a prese nt pay

ment to the lawy er in exchang e for the commitment to provide leg al service s in the future.” Dowling
, 226 I ll. 2d at 287. Owner ship of an advanc e p aym en t retainer passes to the lawy er immediately upon pay ment. Acc ording ly
, the funds m u s t b e deposited in the lawy er’ s g ener al ac count and may not be place d in a client’s trust ac count due to the prohibition ag ainst commingling funds. Id. ¶ 17 Altho u gh t h i s co u rt re cognized advanc e pay ment reta iners as one of three reta iners available to lawy ers and clients in I llinois
, we cautioned that such reta iners “should be used only sparing ly
, when nece ssary to acc omplish some p u rp o s e fo r the client that cannot be

acc omplished by using a secur ity reta iner.” Dowling
, 226 I ll. 2d at 293. As we explained, in
most cases a

secur ity reta iner is the best ve hicle to protec t the client’s funds: “The g uiding principle, howeve r, should be the protec tion of the client’s interests. I n the vast majority of ca ses, this will dictate that funds paid to r etain a lawy er will be considere d a security reta iner and place d in a client trust account, pursuant to Rule 1.15. Separating a client’s funds from those of the lawy er protec ts the client’s reta iner from the lawy er’ s cre ditors. [C itation.] Commi ng ling of a lawyer’ s funds with those of a client has often been the first step toward conver sion of a cl i en t ’s funds. I n addition, commingling of a client’s and the lawy er’ s funds prese nts a risk of loss in the eve nt of the lawy er’ s death. [Cit ation.]” Id. at 292-93. ¶ 18 Ex amples of appropr iate uses of advance p ay ment reta iners include the circ umstances in Dowling
, in which a debtor hired counsel to repr esent him in p ro cee dings ag ainst a judgme nt cre ditor; a criminal defe ndant whose proper ty rema ins subject to forf

eiture; and a debtor in a bankruptc y case

. Id. at 288-89, 293. In eac h of these examples, a secur ity reta iner would disadvantag e the client beca use the funds rema in the client’s proper ty and are subject
to the claims of the client’s cre ditors. Thus, the client may have difficulty hiring leg al counsel if the attorney fee s cannot be shielded from those with leg al claims to the client’s proper ty

. Id. ¶ 19 Subsequent to our dec ision in Dowling , this court repe aled the f ormer I llinois Rules of Professional Conduct and repla ced them with the I llinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 (ef f. J an. 1, 2010). Subsection (c) of R u l e 1

. 15 of the new rules sets forth the require ments for advanc e pay ment reta iners consistent with those presc ribed in Dowling

. I ll. R. Prof. Conduct (2010) R. 1.15(c) (ef f. Jan. 1, 2010). ¶ 20 Rely ing on Dowling and I llinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15, J ames contends that the public policy of I llinois is to rec og nize the fre edom of a client to contra ct for an advanc e

-5-pay ment reta iner if it is for the client’s benef it. The benef

it of an advanc e pay

ment reta iner in this context, acc ording to J ames, is to avoid exposure of the client’s funds to the “oblig ee” spouse and her counsel. He arg ues t hat di vorce and fa

mily law ca ses ar e similar to debtorcr editor case s, in that the “leve ling of the playing field” rules in the Marr iag e Act make i t d i ff i cu l t for a client to secur e leg al repr esentation in the absenc e of an advanc e pay m en t reta iner. Thus, J ames contends that a party to a dis solution case ough t t o be able to use an advanc e pay

ment reta iner to shield attorney fee s from being turned over to opposing counsel. For the following rea sons, we disag ree

. ¶ 21 First, J ames’ use of an ad v an ce p aym en t reta iner to “prote ct” his client’s funds from
turnover u ndermines the purpose of the leveling of the playing field rules in the Act and rende rs these rules a nullity

. On J une 1, 1997, the leg islature amende d the Act, substantially

rew riting the rules with reg ard to attorney fee s in marria g e and custody case s. See Pub. Act 89-712 (ef

f. J une 1, 1997); In re Marriage of Bey er , 324 I ll. App. 3d 305, 310 (2001). These amendments are commo nly ref err ed to as the “leve ling of the playing field” rules. See A Gene ral Explanation of the “Leveling of the Playing Field” in Divorce L i t i g ation A mendments
, 11 CBA Rec. 32 (1997). Among other things, the amendments added a separ ate provision, section 501(c- 1), g overning “tempora ry ” or “interim” fe e aw ards. Id. “[I ]nt erim attorney ’s fee s and costs” are define d by the statute as “attorne y ’s fee s and costs assessed from time to time while a case is pending
, in favor of the petitioning party ’s curr ent counsel, for rea sonable fe es and c osts either alre ady incurre d or t o be incurred.” 750 I L CS 5/501(c-1) (West 2010). ¶ 22 The statute allows a court, afte r consideration of rele vant fac tors, to order a party to pay the petitioning party ’s interim attorney fee s “in an amount nece ssary to enable the petitioning party to participate adequa tely in the litigation.” 750 I L CS 5/501(c-1) (3) (West 2010). Prior
to doing so, the court must find that the petitioning party lacks sufficie nt acc ess to assets or income to pay rea sonable attorney fee s, and that the other party has the ability to pay the fee s of the pe titioni ngparty

. Id. ¶ 23 Where, as in this case , the court finds that both parties lack the financ ial ability or acc ess to assets or income to pay rea sonable attorney fee s an d costs, the court may order disgor g ement of fee s alre ady paid to an attorney

. Specifica lly
, “the court (or hear ing office r) shall enter an order that allocate s available funds for eac h par ty ’ s c o u n sel, including retainers or i nterim pay

ments, or bot h, previously paid, i n a m an ner that achie ves subs tantial parity betwee n the parties.” (E m p h as is added.) Id. The order terminates at the time the final judgme nt is entered. 750 I L CS 5/ 501(d)( 3) (West 2010). ¶ 24 Whether funds held in a n advanc e pay

ment reta iner are subject to disg org ement as par t of an interim fee awa

rd is an issu e of law, which is subject to de novo revie w. See In re Marr i a g e of Nash
, 2012 I L App (1st) 113724, ¶ 15 (quoting In re Marriage of Bey er , 324 I ll. App. 3d 305, 309 (2001))

. Our primary g oal in construing a statute is to g ive eff ect to the intention of the leg islature. People v. Colli ns , 214 I ll. 2d 206, 214 (2005). To asce rtain that intent, “ ‘we may proper ly consider not only the lang uag e of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, and e vils sought to be re medied, and g oals to be ac hieved.’ ” Id. (quoting People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns
, 203 I ll. 2d 264, 280 (2003))

. The statutory lang uag e is the best indicator of the leg islative intent. Id.

-6-¶ 25 I n enac ting section 501(c- 1), the leg islature did not specify wh at t y p es of “r etainer s” previously paid to an attorney are subject to disgor g ement. Howeve r, the policy underlying the interim fee provisions was clea rly spelled out by the leg islature. As part of the “leve ling of the playing fi el d ” am en dments, the following italicized languag e was added to the underlying pur

poses of the A ct: “This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly ing purposes, which ar e to: * * * (5 ) make reasona

ble provisi on for spouses and mi nor children during and after litigation, including provision for tim e ly awards of

interim fees to achiev e substantial parity in parties’ acce

ss to funds for litigat ion costs [.] ” (Emphasis added.) 750 I L CS 5/102(5) (West 2010). ¶ 26 Other courts and commentators have expanded on the purposes and g oals of the interim fee provisions in the Act. “In enac ting section 501(c- 1), t he l egi s l ature’s g oal was to level the playing field by equalizi ng the parties’ litigation resour ces wher e it is shown that one party can pay and the other cannot.” In re Marriage of Bey er , 324 I ll. App. 3d 305, 315 (2001) (cit i n g In re Marriage of DeLarco
, 313 I ll. App. 3d 107, 113 (2000))

. “[The] new interim fee sy stem was an attempt to addre ss the proble m o f the ‘ec onomically disadvantag ed spouse,’ wher e one spouse uses his or her g reater control of assets or income as a litigation tool, making it d i ff

i cult for the disadvantag ed spouse to participate adequately in the litigation.” In re Minor Child Stella
, 353 I ll. App. 3d 415, 419 (2004) (citing A Gene ral Explanation of the “Leveling of the Playing Field” in Divorce Liti gation Amendme nts , 11 CBA Rec. 32 (1997))

. Prior to the amendments, “[divorce] case s fre quently entailed
strenuous eff

orts to ‘block’ acc ess by the other side to funds for litigation.” Id. All too fre quently
, the “e conomically advanta g ed spouse” would apply his or her g reater acc ess to income or assets as a tool, making it difficult for the disadvantag ed spouse to reta in counsel or otherw ise participate in litigation. Id. Thus, the new inter im fee sy stem was desig ned to ameliorate this proble m by streamlining the proce ss f or obtaining interim attorney fee s. Id. ¶ 27 I t i s clea

r from the attorney -client ag ree ment that the advanc e pay ment reta iner in thi s

case was set up specific ally to c ircumvent the “leve ling of the play ing field” rules set for

th in the Act. To allow attorney fee s to be shielded in this manner would direc tly undermine the policies set forth above and would strip the statute of its power

. I f we wer e to acc ept J ames’
argument, an economica lly advanta g ed spouse could obtain an unfair advanta g e in any dissoluti on case simply

by stockpiling funds in a

n advanc e pay

ment reta iner held by

his or her attorney

. ¶ 28 Fur

thermore
, the rea sons expressed in Dowling for allowing advanc e pay ment reta iners

are not pertinent to a dissoluti on case in which one or both parties lacks the financ ial ability

or acc ess to funds to pay their attorney s. I n Dowling
, we held that advanc e pay ment reta iners should be used “spar ingly ” and only when nece ssary to acc omplish a specia l purpose for the client which could not be acc omplished with a secur ity reta iner. Dowling
, 226 I ll. 2d at 293. I n bankruptc y and forf

eiture case s, for example, a client may have d i ff i cu l t y hiring leg al counsel if the funds for attorney fee s are subject to the cla ims of the client’s creditors. S ee

-7-Dowling , 226 I ll. 2d at 293.

¶ 29 I n divorce case s, howeve r, there are two cli en t s , b oth of whom require acc ess to leg al counsel. Shielding assets so that one spouse may easily hire an attorney has the direc t eff ect of making it difficult for the other spouse to hire his or her own attorney

. This would defe at the purpose and g oals of the Act, which is to enable parties to hav e eq u i t ab le acc ess to repr esentation. See Alison G. Turoff
, Rec overing Attorney

Fee s From the Opposing Party in Illinois Divorce Cases
, 92 I ll. B.J. 462, 463 (2004) (the interim fee provision “supplies a valuable tool for the attorney contemplati n g repr esenting a client who individually would have difficulty paying the fee s for a divorce but whose marital estate or spouse could aff ord such fee s”)

. Ac co rding ly
, we hold that advanc e pay ment reta iners in dissoluti on case s are subject to disgor g ement pursuant to section 501(c- 1)(3) of the Act. To hold otherwise would defe at the express purpose of the Act and rende r the “leve ling of the playing field” provisions
power less. ¶ 30 To the extent that J am es ar gu es that the funds in his advanc e pay ment reta iner we re obtained from J ohn’s pare nts and are not marital proper ty , we note that the statute does not distinguish betw een marital proper ty and nonmarital proper ty for the purpose of disgor g ement of attorney fee s. The statute contemplates that reta iners paid “on behalf of” a spouse may be disgor g ed. See 750 I L CS 5/501(c- 1)(1) (West 2010) (a responsive pleading by the nonpetitioning party m u s t s et out the amount of “ea ch reta iner or other pay ment or pay ments, or both, pr eviously paid to the responding party ’s counsel by or on behalf of the respondingparty” (emphasis added) ). Furthermore
, the statute’s re peate d ref ere nces to the parties’ “ac cess” to funds for litigation i mplies that funds m ay come from any source

. See 750 I L CS 5/ 102(5), 501( c-1) (1)( A), (3) (West 2010). ¶ 31 We note, too, that one fac tor to be considere d by the trial court in making an i n t er i m

awa rd is the “alleg ed non-marital proper ty within acc ess to a party .” (Emphasis added.) 750 I L CS 5/501(c-1) (1)( A) (West 2010). Thus, we find it irrele vant for purposes of interim fee 1

awa rds whethe r the funds f

or attorne y

fee s derived f

rom marital or nonma

rital proper

ty

. 2

See al so Bey er , 324 I ll

. App. 3d at 319 (in te ri m fe es pur sua nt to sec ti on 501( c- 1) app ly to 1

m ar it al and nonmari ta l pro per ty); David H. Hopkins
, “Lev el ing t he Pla yi ng Fie ld” in Div orc e: Ques ti ons and Answe rs Abou t the New Law
, 85 Il l

. B

. J

. 4 1 0
, 413 (19 97) (“ Ques ti ons abo ut dis gorgem ent can al so ar is e if a thi rd par ty—a par ent , for exa m ple —i s fun din g the divor ce li ti gatio n for one of the par ti es. Cons is te nt wit h the bas ic pri nci ple s of the se re for m s, at tor ney’s fe es pai d by
par ent s for one spo use m ight someti m es be ord er ed dis gorged in fa vor of the oth er spo use ’s cou nse l
at an int er im fe e award hea ri ng. Wh en tha t poss ibi li ty exi st s, it shou ld be c ons ide re d at th e ou ts et , and per hap s t he i nit ia l r et ai ner sho uld be higher th an u sua l t o ac cou nt for th is ri sk.”).

I t is import ant to not e tha t int er im fe es ar e, by def ini ti on, te m

por ar y. As suc h, the y m ay be 2

acc ount ed f

o r , a s d e b t s or oth er wis e, upon the fi nal divis ion of the m ar it al est at e. See 750 I LCS 5/5 01( c- 1)( 2) (W est 2010 ) (“ [a ]ny ass ess m ent of an int er im a war d *** sha ll be wit hout pre j udi ce to any fi nal al loc at ion and wit hout pre j udi ce as to any cl ai m or ri ght of ei the r part y or any coun sel of re cor d at the ti m e of the awar d”) ; 750 I LCS 5/5 08 (W est 2010 ); In re Ma rri age of Joh nso n , 351 I ll

. App. 3d 88, 97 (20 04) (“ By def ini ti on, a dis gorgem ent ord er is never a fi nal adj udi cat ion of the
at tor ney’s ri ght to fe es— it m er el y con tr ols the ti m ing of paym ent , wit h no ef fe ct on whet her
, or how

-8-¶ 32 Al t er n at i v ely
, J ames argues that section 501(c- 1)’s provision for d i s go rge m en t o f

attorney fee s irrec oncilably conflicts with Rule 1.15 of the I llinois Rules o f Professional Conduct. He argues that this alleg ed conflict must be resolved in favor of the supreme court rule, pursuant to the separ ation of power s doctrine established in article I I
, section 1, of the I l l i n ois Constit ution of 1970. We are unpersua ded by this argument. Article I I
, section 1
, provides: “The leg islative, executive and judicial b ra n ches are separ ate. No branc h shall exercise powers properly belong ing to another .” I ll. Const. 1970, art. I I
, § 1

. “[T] his court possesses rulemaking authority to regulate the trial of case s.” Strukoff v. Strukoff
, 76 I ll. 2d 53, 58 (1979). Where a statute conflicts with a s u p re m e co urt rule, it infring es upon the
power of the judiciary
, and the rule must prevai l

. McAlister v. Schick
, 147 I ll. 2d 84, 94 (1992); People v. Joseph
, 113 I ll. 2d 36, 45 (1986). Howeve r, “[t] his court h as repe atedly

rec og nized that the leg islature may impose r e a s o n a b le li mi ta tions and conditions upon acc ess to the courts.” McAlister
, 147 I ll. 2d at 9 5

. T h e l egis lature has broad power s to regulate attorney fee s and the attorney -client relationship, so long as a statute does not purport to limit the scope of a court’s autho ri t y o ver those matters. Bernier v. Burris
, 113 I ll. 2d 219, 250 (1986). ¶ 33 Upon examination of both Rule 1.15 and section 501(c- 1) of the Act, we find no conflict betwee n the rule and the statute. Rule 1.15, which incorporates the Dowling decision, sets forth the require ments for advanc e pay ment reta iners. T h e rule provides that the attorney

cl i ent ag ree ment must state a specia l purpose and explain why this ty pe of re t ai n er i s advanta g eous to the client. I ll. R. Prof. Conduct (2010) R. 1.15(c) (ef f. J an. 1, 2010). Section 501(c- 1), on the other hand, provides for awa rds of in t er i m attorney fee s and costs in
proce eding s arising under the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act and sets forth the proce dures to be followed by the parties and the court. The statute does not infring e upon the court’s authority to regulate court matters. Rather, it leave s to the discretion of the
court whether
, and in what amount, interim attorney fee s may be awa rded. We see no direc t conflict betwee n the statute and the rule and, thus, no violation of the separ ation of power s clause in the I llinois Constit ution. ¶ 34 Finally , J ames arg ues t hat t he dis g org ement orde r violates the f irst amendment, in that it infring es upon a client’s acc ess to the courts and the rig ht to reta in counsel. Howeve r, we find that J ames lacks standing to make this argum en t beca use he is not the person whose rig hts are alleg edly being infring ed. See Mem bers of t h e C i t y C ouncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent
, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984) (“c onstitut ional ad j u d i ca tion require s a revie w of the application of a statute to the conduct of the party befor e the Court”); People ex rel. Shockle y

v. Hoyle
, 338 I ll. App. 3d 1046, 1055 (2003) (a party lacks standing to ass ert the alleg ed deprivation of another individual’s c onstitut ional rig hts).

mu ch, the at tor ney is ent it le d to col le ct at the con cl usi on of his ser vices .”) ; Att or n e y F e e s i n Domes ti c Rel ati ons Case s: The 2009 Amen d ment s to “Lev el ing of the Pla

yi ng Fie ld, ” 98 I ll

. B.J

. 136, 137 (20 10) (“ Les s j udi ci al cau ti on was app rop ri at e for grant ing int er im fe e s i n p re

- dec re e divor ce cas es bec aus e the t ri al cou rt cou ld adj ust (o r ‘tr ue up’) the ult imate divis ion of the m ar it al
est at e a t t he e nd o f t he c ase to ac cou nt for at tor ney fe e pa ym ent s by ea ch p ar ty.”)

.
-9-¶ 35 Conclusion

¶ 36 For the foreg oing rea sons, we affirm the ju d gm en t o f the appellate court aff irming the circ uit c ourt’s turnover order

. We also aff irm the vac ation of the contempt order

. See In re Marriage of Bey er , 324 I ll. App. 3d 305, 321-22 (2001) (whe re a ref usal to comply

with a court’s order constitutes a g ood-fa ith eff ort t o s ecur e an interpre tation of an issue without direc t prec edent, it is appropr iate to vac ate a contempt orde r on appe al).

¶ 37 Appellate c ourt judg ment aff irmed. ¶ 38 Circuit court judg ment aff irmed in part a

nd vacated in part.

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