### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 13, 200 4

AA RON MC FA RLA ND v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -26220 Jam es C. Beasley, Jr ., Judge

No. W2003-01797-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Jun e 8, 2004

The pe titioner, Aaron Mc Fa rland, a p p eals the judg ment of the Shelby CountyCriminal Court denying his pe tition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for

fi rs t d eg ree murder. T he petitioner conte nds that he wa s denied eff ective assistance of counsel. Upon r eview of the re cord
a ndthepa

rt ie s’ brie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.
Charles W. Gilchrist, J r., Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Aar on McF arla nd.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd R ep o rter; Richa rd H. Duna vant, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam L . Gibbons, Distric t At torney Gene ral; and Paul Ha g erma n, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On J uly 10, 1998, the petit ioner was convicted by a juryin the Shelby CountyCriminal Court of themur de r of Te rr e ll De on B ull ard . He wa s se nte nc e d to lif e wi th the po ssi bil ity

of pa ro le . St a te v. Aar on McF ar l and, No. W 1999-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1154612 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, A ug . 4, 2000), perm. to appeal d enied, ( Tenn. Mar . 12, 2001). On Mar ch 11, 2002, the petitioner filed a

pro se pe tition s eeking post-conviction re lief. I n his petition, t he petitioner a lleg ed that he rec eived inef

fec tive assistance of counse l. Specifica lly , the petitioner a lleg ed that his trial
c ou ns e l f ai l e d t o a d e q u a te ly

inv e sti g a te wh e the r the pe tit ion e r w a s p ro pe rl y tr a ns fe rr e d f

ro m ju ve nil e c ou rt to c ri min a l c ou rt

fo r t ri a l, t ri a l c ou ns e l f

a ile d to int e rv ie w w itn e sse s, tria l c ou ns e l’ s f a ilu re to p ro p er l y ev aluate the streng th of the State’s c ase r esulted in improper tria l strateg y , trial counselT he al l ega t i on t hat t r i al coun s el f ai l ed t o f i l e a mo t i on t o s uppres s t he pet i t i oner ’ s conf es s i on was aban do ned 1
fo llo w ing tes tim o n y a t t h e e v id e n tiar y he a rin g tha t a su p p re ssio n he a rin g w a s h e ld p rio r to trial.
-2- faile d to a de qu a te ly

c on fe r w iththepe tit ion e r a bo ut the c a se , a ndtria l c ou ns e l f a ile d to pr op erly develop the pe titioner’s defe nse. Subsequently , t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ap p o i n t ed co u n s el fo r t h e p et i t i o n er , an d an amende d petition was filed. The amended petiti on raised additional claims reg arding ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l. Specifica lly , the petition alleg ed that trial counsel failed t o file a motion to s uppress the petitioner’s c onfession, trial counse l did not properly cross-e x amine the State’ s witnesses, and tria l counsel failed to “ use the fac t that a g un powder residue test was done on [ t h e] [ p ] eti tioner immediately

afte r the shooting .” 1

At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner testified that he was twe nty -one y ear s old and had le ft sc ho ol d uring the se ve nth g ra de

. He sa id that he c ou ld r e a d “ a lit tle bit ” a ndha d s ome on e he lp pr e pa rehis po st- c on vic tio n pe tit ion

. He c ou ld not re me mbe r his tr ia l cou ns e l’ s nam e bu t wa s a ble to identify

her in the c ourtroom. As to his claim reg arding trial counsel’ s ineffe ctiveness, the petitioner stated,

Onmy gun tes t, it sa id m y g un te st h a d g ot l os t. I

thi nk sh e c ou ld have did a littl e more , y ou know what I ’m saying, te lling them that - - te lli ng me a

lit tle mor e abo ut andsa y ing a lit tle mor e abo ut h ow did it ge t lost? How did it come up to g et lost? How could it g et messed up?

Es se nti a lly , th e pe tit ion e r c omp la ine d that tr ia l c ou ns e l sh ou ld ha ve e mph a size d that the te st wa s lo st
a ndthat th e re su lts of

thete st w ou ld h a ve be e n b e ne fi c ia l to him

. Th e pe tit ion e r f

urthe r c omp la ine d th a t tria l c ou ns e l di d no t ta lk w ithwi tne sse s a ndfaile d to adequa tely cr o s s -e x am i n e w i t n es s es re gar d i n g i n co n s i s t en ci es i n t h ei r s t at em en t s and their te stimony at trial. Howe ver, he was una ble to reme mber whic h witnesses we re not a dequate ly cross-e x amined. Th e pe tit ion e r r e c a lle d th a t tria l c ou ns e l sp e nt a bo ut “ fi ve ho ur s to ta l” dis c us sin g the c a se wi th h im. They did not discuss trial strateg y or any potential defe nses. The petiti oner alleg ed that trial counsel could have prese nted the cir cumstance s surrounding his confession in a more favor able way

. Trial counse l te stified that she was a ppointed to repre sent the petitioner. At the time of her appointment, she had been with the Public De fende r’s Offic e for approximately ten y ear s. She had been involved in numer ous trials, including fifteen to twenty murder trials. Trial counse l rec alled that she visited the petitioner seven times in jail and numerous times be fore court. Additionally , she met with the petitioner and his g randpa rent s . They

also communicate d throug h letters and by telephone.-3-

Trial counse l discussed with the petitioner the St ate’ s proof a nd possible defe nses. The petitioner had c onfesse d to police that he had committed the murder. H e explained that he a g ree d t o co n fe s s u p o n t h e ad v i ce o f h i s gra n d p ar en t s an d b ec au s e h e t h o u gh t h e wo u l d b e a l l o we d t o go home.

Acc ording ly , trial counsel f iled a motion to suppress the p et i tioner’s c onfession. The petitioner and his gr andparents testified at the he aring on the motion, recounting the circ umstances surrounding the conf

ession. T he trial c ourt denied the petitioner’s motion and allowe d the confe ssion to be ad m i t t ed at tria l. As a re sult of the trial court’ s decision, trial counse l and the petitioner d ec i ded that the pe titioner should testify at trial in order

to expl ain the re asons for the confe ssion.
The g unpowder

residue te sts results were critica l to the petitioner’s de fense strateg y . Trial counsel wa s told that the TennesseeBur eau of I nvestig ation was una

bl e to t est for g unpowder residue be cause of conta mination. There fore , at trial, counse l called the of fice r who attempted the testing to e x plain the proc edure and why he wa s unable to test fo r g unpowder residue in the petitioner’s c ase. Trial counsel’s strateg y was to e mphasize the problems with the testing and “le t the jury make their

determination hoping that they would see [it] in the l i gh t favora ble to [t he petitioner] . . . .”

Trial counse l rec alled that ther e we re se ven witnesses to the offe nse. Four of the witnesses saw the shooting , and the other three witnesses saw a person dresse d simil arly to the petit ioner. Trial
c ou ns e l r e vie we d th e ir

state me nts to p oli c e , a nd he r inv e sti g a tor sp ok e wi th the wi tne sse s. At tr ia l,
sever al witnesses g ave te stimony inconsistent with their initi al statements. Tria l counsel pointed out the i nconsistencies to the j ury during her cross-e x amination of t he witnesses. Trial counse l rec alled that the petitioner na med another individual a s the shooter and asked that this i ndividual be ca lled to testify . The individual had a n alibi and denied hewas involved. Trial counsel d i d not call the ind ivi du a l, f

e ari ng that hi s te sti mon y

wo uldbe mor e da ma g ing than b e ne fi c ia l.

Trial cou ns el st a te d th a t th e pe tit ion e r’ s d e fe ns e wa s th re e -f old . F ir st, sh e a tte mpt e d to disparag e the c onfession. Afte r the motion to suppress was d en i ed , t h e strateg y shifted to an emphasis on the conta minated g unshot residue testing in an attempt to cast doubt on t h e poli ce department. Finally , she foc used on the inconsistencies in the initial stateme nts of the witnesses a nd the ir te sti mon y

a t tria l.

At the conc lusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court made finding s of fa ct and conc lusions of law and e ntere d an order deny ing the petitioner relief. The post-c onviction court ref ere nced the inconsistencies in the testimony of the pe titioner and trial couns el , ac cr edit ing the testimonyof trial counsel. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel f ully investigated the petitioner’s c ase and was pre pare d for tria l. A dditionally , the post-conviction court found that trial counsel thoroug hly examined the witnesses and c ommunicated with the petitioner r eg arding trial strateg y and the de fense s available to him. The post-c onviction court conc luded that trial counse l had provide d eff

ective r epre sentation, noting that “the fa cts in t h e case a re w hat caused [the-4-

pe tit ion e r] t o b e c on vic te d a ndthat [tria l c ou ns e l] di d e ve rythi ng sh e c ou ld t o a de qu a te ly de fe ndhim under the g uidelines of the law .”

II. Ana lys is

To be succ essful i n his claim for post-c onviction relief, the petitioner must prove a ll factua l alleg ations contained in his post-conviction petition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). “‘ Clear a nd convincing evidenc e means evidenc e in which ther e is no serious or substantial doubt about the c orre ctness of the conclusions d ra wn fr o m the evidenc e.’” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Hodge s v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n.2 (Tenn. 1992)). I ssues reg arding the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be a ccor ded their te stimony , and t h e factual que stions raised by the evidenc e ar e to be resolved by

the post-conviction court as the trier of fa ct. Henle y

v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997) . There fore , we aff ord the post-conviction court’s finding s of fa ct the we ight of a jury verdic t, w i t h such finding s being conclusive on a ppeal a bsent a showing that the evidenc e in the
rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst those finding s. I d. at 578.

A claim of ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel is a mix ed question o f l aw an d fac t. State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We w ill re view the post-conviction court’s finding s of fa ct de novo with a pr esumpti o n t h at t h ose finding s are corr ect. F ields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) . Howeve r, we will review the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law purely de novo. I d.

“To e stablish ineffec tive assistance of couns el, the petitioner be ars the bur den of pr oving both that counsel’s pe rformance was deficient and that the def iciency prejudice d the def

ense.” Goad v. State, 9 3 8 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 2064 (1984)) . I n evaluating whether the petitioner has met this burden, this court must determine whe ther c ounsel’s performanc e wa s within the r an ge of compe tence require d of attorney s in criminal case s. See B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)

.
I nitially , we note that Rule 27 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e provide s that
[t ]h e brief of the a

ppellant shall contain . . . [a]n arg ument, which may be pre cede d by

a summary

of ar g ument, sett i ng forth the contentions of the a

ppellant with respe ct to the issues prese nted, and the re asons there fo r, i ncluding the re asons why the contentions require ap p el l ate r eview, w ith citations to t he authorities and
app ro pria te re fe re nc e s to the re c or d (w hic h may be qu ote d v e rb a tim ) relied on.

Tenn. R. App. P. 27 (a) (7). “ I ssues which a re not supporte d by

arg ument, citation to authorities, or appropriate ref

ere nces to the rec ord will be treated as wa ived in this court.” Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b). I n the instant c ase, the petitioner’s arg ument consists of three g ener al alleg ations reg arding-5-

trial counsel’ s ineffe ctiveness but includes no explanation of how counse l was ineff ective or how thepe tit ion e r w a s p re

jud ic e d b y

c ou ns e l’ s a c tio ns . T he bri ef is in a de qu a te a ndthi s c ou rt c ou ld consider those issues waived. Neve rtheless, we see no r eason to disturb the post-c onviction court’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e pe tit ion e r w a s a ff or de d e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l.
The petiti oner complains that trial counsel failed t o adequately investigate and prepa re f or tria l, faile d to in te rv ie w w itn e sse s, didno t pr op e rl y e va luate theState ’s c a se , a ndfaile d to me e t w ith the petitioner to develop a defe nse. First, we note t hat when a petitioner c ontends that trial counse l faile d to dis c ov e r, int e rv ie w, or pr e sent witne sse s in su pp ort of his de fe ns e , th e pe tit ion e r s ho uld pr e se nt the se wi tne sse s at the e vid e nti ary he ari ng . B la c k v . St a te , 7 94 S.W. 2d75 2, 75 7 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1990). A petitioner is not entitled to relief on this g round “unle ss he can producea material witness who (a ) could ha ve bee n found by a rea sonable investigation and (b) would ha ve testified favor ably in support of his defe nse if ca lled.” I d. at 758. At the evidentiar y hearing, the petitioner faile d to pr od uc e a ny

wi tne sse s insu pp ort of

his c la im.
The pe titioner had the burden t o prove the fac tual alleg ations set forth in his petition byclea r and convinc ing e vidence

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f). On appe al, we a re bound by

the trial
c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t un le ss the evi den ce in the re c or d p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 578.
The post-c onviction court found that trial counsel ha d fully investigated the petitioner’ s case , adequately

prepa red f or trial, and communicated with the pe titioner reg arding trial strateg y and de fe ns e s. Th e re c or d d oe s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s.

III. Conclusi on

I n consideration of the fore g oing and the rec ord as a whole, we aff irm the judg ment of the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE