alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                          OF CORPORATE GENERAL PARTNER

            PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The  undersigned,  Robert A. Bourne,  the  President and Treasurer of CNL Realty
Corporation,  the  corporate  general  partner of CNL Income Fund III, Ltd. (the
"Partnership"),  has executed this  certification  in connection with the filing
with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  of the  Partnership's  Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  June 30,  2004 (the  "Report").  The
undersigned hereby certifies that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

Date:  August 9, 2004                /s/ Robert A. Bourne
                                    --------------------------------------------
                                     Name:  Robert A. Bourne
                                     Title: President and Treasurer

                                    A signed original of this written  statement
                                    required by Section 906 has been provided to
                                    CNL  Income  Fund  III,  Ltd.  and  will  be
                                    retained  by CNL Income Fund III,  Ltd.  and
                                    furnished  to the  Securities  and  Exchange
                                    Commission or its staff upon request.
No. 11-10621.

#### Donahue *v.*United States.

C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### James A. POWELL; William Baggett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Paul G. BUTLER, Jr.; Mary Stevens; Van Frizzelle, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-7354

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 13, 2018

Decided: March 16, 2018

James A. Powell and William Baggett, Appellants Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

James A. Powell and William Baggett appeal the district court’s order dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny their motions to appoint counsel and to hold an evidentiary hearing and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Powell v.*
      *315
      *Butler,*No. 5:16-ct-03296-FL (E.D.N.C. July 25, 2017 & Oct. 10, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
# C_2023054EN.01001701.xml

| 13.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 54/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 54/17

---

Action brought on 20 December 2022 — European Commission v Slovak Republic

(Case C-773/22)

(2023/C 54/20)

Language of the case: Slovak

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: L. Armati, R. Lindenthal and M. Mataija, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Slovak Republic

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that, by failing to transpose correctly into its legal order Article 2(3), the first subparagraph of Article 6(b), Articles7(4), 14(1) and (4), 35(3), 41(1)(c), 42(2)(a), (c), (f) and (j), 50(1), read in conjunction with Annex VII, point 1(d), and Article 55a(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, the Slovak Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under those provisions of the directive, |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, by failing to transpose correctly into its legal order Article 2(3), the first subparagraph of Article 6(b), Articles7(4), 14(1) and (4), 35(3), 41(1)(c), 42(2)(a), (c), (f) and (j), 50(1), read in conjunction with Annex VII, point 1(d), and Article 55a(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, the Slovak Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under those provisions of the directive,

| — | order the Slovak Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Slovak Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The deadline for transposition of Directive 2005/36/EC expired on 20 October 2007 and the deadline for transposition of Directive 2013/55/EU (2) amending Directive 2005/36/EC expired on 18 January 2016. The Slovak Republic has incorrectly transposed or failed to transpose Article 2(3); the first subparagraph of Article 6(b); Article 7(4); Article 14(1) and (4); Article 35(3); Article 41(1)(c); Article 42(2); Article 50(1), read in conjunction with Annex VII, point 1(d) and Article 55a(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC.

---

(1)  OJ 2005 L 255, p. 22.

(2)  Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (OJ 2013 L 354, p. 132).

---
#### IN RE: S&B SURGERY CENTER, Debtor, *929LFMG-S&B, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company, Appellant, v. Buchalter Nemer, a California Professional Law; Benjamin S. Seigel, Appellees.

No. 16-55879

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 13, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed December 21, 2017

Herbert Dodell, Esquire, The Dodell Law Corporation, Woodland Hills, CA, Michael Eugene Reznick, Law Offices of Michael E. Reznick, Oak Park, CA, for Appellant

Daniel Joseph McCarthy, Esquire, Attorney, William Alexander Meyers, Attorney, Hill, Farrer & Burrill, LLP, Los An-geles, CA, for Appellees

Before: KOZINSKI,* HAWKINS and PARKER,** Circuit Judges.

*

 Prior to his retirement, Judge Kozinski folly participated in this case and concurred in this disposition after deliberations were complete.

**

 The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for foe Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

1. In California, legal malpractice claims may be assigned only under narrow circumstances. See White Mountains Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Borton Petrini, LLP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 890, 892, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 (2013). LFMG’s acquisition didn’t include other “assets, rights, obligations, [or] liabilities,” so the malpractice claim wasn’t assigned as an “incidental part of a larger commercial transfer.” Id. The transfer was also functionally “analogous to the assignment of a bare [malpractice] cause of action” because the claims against Fortress were time-barred. Id. at 909, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 912. The original client was not an insurance company. Id. at 892, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 912. Nor did Buchalter and the Trust communicate through third parties. Id. The assignment here comes nowhere close to satisfying the White Mountains test.

2. The district court didn’t err in affirming the bankruptcy court’s refusal to grant leave .to amend. Even if LFMG were a third-party beneficiary, the statute of limitations would have run on the malpractice claim. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.6(a).

AFFIRMED.

***

 xhis disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

MICHAEL HARDY

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 940

[ January 14, 2021 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County ; Michael A. Usan , Judge; L.T. Case No. 04

- 9136 CF10A

.

Michael Hardy, Miami, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber,

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

M AY

, D AMOORGIAN a nd F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
EXHIBIT 10.7(f)


 


FIFTH AMENDMENT TO


CONSULTING AGREEMENT


DATED AS OF JULY 2, 2012 BETWEEN


NTN BUZZTIME, INC. AND JABAM, INC.


 


 


The following amendment to the above-referenced Agreement between
NTN BUZZTIME, INC. and JABAM INC. are made and effective as of January 1, 2014.


 


	A.	Section 2.1 is amended to read, in its entirety, as follows:



 


The term of this Agreement shall commence on January
1, 2014 (the "Effective Date") and, unless earlier terminated in accordance with Section ‎7 shall expire on March
31, 2014.


 





	NTN
    BUZZTIME, INC.	 	JABAM,
    INC.
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:
    	/s/
    Jenna Zdanowski	 	By:	/s/
    Jeffrey A. Berg
	 	Authorized
    Signature	 	 	Authorized
    Signature
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	Jenna
    Zdanowski	 	 	Jeffrey
    A. Berg
	 	Print
    Name	 	 	Print
    Name
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	VP
    Human Resources	 	 	Chairman
	 	Title	 	 	Title
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	December
    19, 2013	 	 	December
    17, 2013
	 	Date	 	 	Date
#### City of Winter Haven, *et al.,*v. State *ex rel.*Eloise Groves. (Two Cases.)

153 So. 92.

Division A.

Opinion Filed February 27, 1934.

*94
      *Henry L. Jollay,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*A.*Summerlin, for Defendant in Error.

Per Curiam.

— In the two cases above mentioned the parties are the same and the questions of law presented by each writ of error are identical, the only difference between, the two cases being in the number and designation of the bond involved. From two adverse judgments for relator in mandamus in the court below, the respondent has sued out writ of error and the point presented for reversal is whether or not the issuance of a peremptory writ commanding the levy of a tax to pay certain defaulted bonds, was authorized by the pleadings and proceedings had.

While good form requires a proper recital of all of the-salient facts in an alternative writ of mandamus, it cannot be said on writ of error to a final judgment otherwise properly rendered, awarding a peremptory writ, that the preliminary issuance of an alternative writ in terms and language which by reference definitely makes the allegations, of the petition a part of the alternative writ issued instead of reciting in the alternative writ the allegations of the-petition, is such harmful error as to work reversal of the final judgment, where it conclusively appears as in this case, that no prejudice therefrom has resulted to the complaining *95party. This is true notwithstanding the fact that we would undoubtedly affirm a ruling quashing an alternative writ of so material departure from the accepted forms as to involve a complete omission from such alternative writ of recitals of the essential facts set forth in the allegations of the petition, in lieu of referring to and nfaking the petition itself a part of the alternative writ by mere reference thereto. However, a failure to comply with matters of form may be considered as harmless error for which no reversal will be ordered when it affirmatively appears that no prejudice could have resulted to the complaining party.

Other propositions relied on have been examined and considered, but are overruled on the authority of what was said in Humphreys v. State, 108 Fla. 92, 145 Sou. Rep. 858, and cases cited.

Affirmed as to both judgments.

Davis, C. J., and Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
# C_2022441EN.01000401.xml

| 21.11.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 441/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.11.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 441/4

---

Appeal brought on 2 March 2022 by FZ and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 15 December 2021 in Case T-618/20, FZ and Others v Commission

(Case C-172/22 P)

(2022/C 441/07)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: FZ and Others (represented by: J.-N. Louis, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 5 October 2022, the Court (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.

---
No. 11-10472.

#### Ravenel *v.*Baden, Warden.

Super. Ct. Bar-tow County, Ga. Certiorari denied.
#### Alejandro Pena CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-71701

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 21, 2017

Aaron T. Keesler, Keesler Immigration Law, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner

OIL,'Victor Matthew Lawrence, I, Esquire, Assistant Director, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alejandro Pena Castillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, *Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008), and wé deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the threat of harm Pena Castillo experienced in Mexico did not rise to the level of persecution. *See Lim v. INS,*224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also Prasad v. INS,*47 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although a reasonable factfinder *could*have found this incident sufficient to establish past persecution, we do not believe that a factfinder would be compelled to do so.”) (emphasis in original). As to his fear of future harm, Pena Castillo does not contest the agency’s con-*927elusion that he failed to demonstrate it would be unreasonable for him to relocate within Mexico. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived). Thus, we deny the petition as to Pena Castillo’s withhold of removal claim.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because Pena Castillo failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Mexican government. *See Zheng v. Holder,*644 F.3d 829, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that petitioner’s claims of possible torture were speculative and therefore did not compel reversal).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
No. 12A260.

#### Libertarian Party of Michigan et al. *v.*Johnson, Secretary of State of Michigan, et al.

C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay and injunction, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court, denied.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of National Housing Trust Limited Partnership (the
Partnership) for the period ending June 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Susan E. Basting, Chief Financial Officer of NHT, Inc., general partner of the
Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Partnership.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |  |  |    |  |                      |  |                                           
|------------------ |  |  |  | -- |  | -------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------
|                   |  |  | 
|Date: June 5, 2008 |  |  |  | By |  | /s/ Susan E. Basting
|                   |  |  |  |    |  |                      |  | Susan E. Basting, Treasurer               
|                   |  |  |  |    |  |                      |  | and Chief Financial Officer               
|                   |  |  |  |    |  |                      |  | NHT, Inc., General Partner for            
|                   |  |  |  |    |  |                      |  | National Housing Trust Limited Partnership
#### COM. v. ALEXANDER, G.

232 MDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

09/20/2017

CP-35-CR-0001238-2014

(Lackawanna)

Affirmed
#### W. B. Brown v. George Oehler and J. H. Therrell, as Liquidator for Biscayne Trust Company.

152 So. 862.

Opinion Filed February 21, 1934.

*58
      *Richard H. Hunt,*for Appellant;

*Howard W. McKay*and *Marshall F. Sanders,*for Appellees.

Per Curiam.

— This is an application by W. B. Brown for permission to apply to the Circuit Court for permission to file a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, the final decree in the cause having been heretofore brought to this Court by an appeal and here affirmed. See Brown v. Oehler, 111 Fla. 564, 149 Sou. Rep. 521.

A supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review (now permissible in the form of a petition under the. 1931 Chancery Act) is the appropriate method of accomplishing in equity that which at law can be duly accomplished by a writ of error *coram nobis.*In equity such a proceding as is here invoked is the proper method of attacking for purpose of correction, a decree in equity which, it is alleged, was rendered on account of some error in fact which, if it had been known to the chancellor, would have prevented the entry of the decree attacked.

*59Like a writ of error' *coram nobis,*a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, may be employed to revoke the jurisdiction of a court of chancery to recall one of its own adjudications made while some fact existed which, if before the court, would have prevented the rendition of the final decree, and which, without any fault or negligence of the party presenting it, was not earlier presented to the chancellor. It cannot, however, after the decree to which it is addressed has been affirmed by the appellate court, be entertained without permission duly applied for and given by the appellate court which affirmed the decree. So the object of the present petition is to obtain such permission in the present case to re-open the final decree heretofore affirmed by this Court on July 17, 1932.

Our conclusion is that the returns to the rule to show cause why permission to proceed should not be given as prayed, constitute a sufficient showing of cause why the permission in this case should not be granted. The case was finally disposed of here on the 6th day of September, 1933. The present petition was not filed until January 30, 1934, which was during a subsequent term of the Supreme Court.

Assuming that delaying the application beyond the term did not oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant the permission prayed for, it nevertheless amounted to such laches as requires a denial of the permission sought, in the absence of some very strong showing of excuse for applicant’s' apparent, tardiness in the matter. Such excuse has not been made to appear in this case, so the permission to file a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review to attack the decree of the Circuit Court as affirmed by this Court will be denied.

*60Permission for further proceedings in Circuit Court denied.

Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell and Buford, J. J.r ' concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8911 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8911

       To amend the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide public benefits to citizens of 
         the freely associated states, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 9, 2020

Mr. Case (for himself, Mr. Womack, Mr. San Nicolas, Mrs. Radewagen, Mr. 
  Smith of Washington, and Mr. Sablan) introduced the following bill; 
      which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To amend the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide public benefits to citizens of 
         the freely associated states, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Compact Impact Fairness Act of 
2020''.

SEC. 2. PUBLIC BENEFITS FOR CITIZENS OF FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES.

    Section 431(b) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1641(b)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (6), by striking ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(8) a citizen of a freely associated state, if section 
        141 of the applicable compact of free association approved in 
        Public Law 99-239 or 99-658 (or a successor provision) is in 
        effect.''.

SEC. 3. APPLICATION.

    (a) In General.--Subtitle D of title IV of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (8 
U.S.C. 1641 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 437. SPECIAL RULE FOR CITIZENS OF FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES.

    ``In the case of an alien described in paragraph (8) of section 
431(b), any otherwise applicable residency requirement related to 
eligibility for benefits shall not apply.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 is 
amended by inserting after the item related to section 436 the 
following:

``437. Special rule for citizens of freely associated states.''.
                                 <all>
```
No. 11-10512.

#### Walker *v.*Wisconsin.

Ct. App. Wis. Certio-rari denied.