alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8914 

To amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

Act to permit certain non-designated clearinghouses access to a deposit 

account at a Federal reserve bank, to apply certain risk management 

standards to non-designated clearinghouses receiving certain services 

from a Federal reserve bank, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 9, 2020 

Mr. CLEAVER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to permit certain non-designated 

clearinghouses access to a deposit account at a Federal 

reserve bank, to apply certain risk management standards to non-designated clearinghouses receiving certain 

services from a Federal reserve bank, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Risk Management for 

5 Derivatives Clearing Organizations Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8914 IH

1 SEC. 2. ACCESS TO FEDERAL RESERVE BANK ACCOUNTS 

2 AND SERVICES. 

3 Section 806 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 

4 and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5465) is amend5 ed— 

6 (1) in subsection (a)— 

7 (A) by striking ‘‘a designated financial 

8 market utility and’’ and inserting ‘‘a designated 

9 financial market utility, a derivatives clearing 

10 organization registered with the Commodity Fu11 tures Trading Commission under the Com12 modity Exchange Act that has been approved to 

13 hold such an account by the Commodity Fu14 tures Trading Commission, or a clearing agency 

15 registered with the Commission under the Secu16 rities Exchange Act of 1934 that has been ap17 proved to hold such an account by the Commis18 sion, and’’; 

19 (B) by striking ‘‘designated financial mar20 ket utility that’’ and inserting ‘‘financial market 

21 utility that’’; and 

22 (C) by inserting after ‘‘by the Board of 

23 Governors’’ the following: ‘‘, as well as any ap24 plicable rules, orders, standards, or guidelines, 

25 including, in particular, liquidity requirements, 

26 prescribed by the financial market utility’s priVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:16 Dec 21, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8914.IH H8914

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 8914 IH

1 mary financial regulatory agency. Access to dis2 count and borrowing privileges may only be pro3 vided to a financial market utility in accordance 

4 with subsection (b)’’; 

5 (2) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘designated fi6 nancial market utility’’ and inserting ‘‘financial mar7 ket utility’’; and 

8 (3) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘designated fi9 nancial market utility’’ each place such term appears 

10 and inserting ‘‘financial market utility’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
No. 10-7405.

#### Mitchell *v.*Maine.

Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Blink Logic Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 (the Form 10-K) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Form 10-K.



|Dated: April 23, 2009 |  | /s/Larry Bruce
Larry Bruce
Chief Financial Officer, Secretary & Treasurer
|--------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------



The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-K pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-B and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-K for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
EXHIBIT 32.2



     CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350


I, Howard L. Flanders, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
All American Semiconductor, Inc., hereby certify, to my knowledge:

         (1)      that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of All American
                  Semiconductor, Inc. for the quarterly period ended on March
                  31, 2004 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
                  the date hereof at File No. 0-16207 (the "Report") fully
                  complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
                  applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      that the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
                  in all material respects, the financial condition and results
                  of operations of All American Semiconductor, Inc.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document.




Date:  May 14, 2004                           /s/ HOWARD L. FLANDERS
                                              ----------------------------------
                                              Howard L. Flanders
                                              Executive Vice President and
                                              Chief Financial Officer
# C_2021490EN.01004901.xml

| 6.12.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 490/49 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.12.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 490/49

---

Action brought on 29 September 2021 — Tequila Revolución v EUIPO — Horizons Group (London) (Revolution Vodka)

(Case T-628/21)

(2021/C 490/59)

Language in which the application was lodged: French

Parties

Applicant: Tequila Revolución (Mexico City, Mexico) (represented by: M. Pomares Caballero, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Horizons Group (London) Ltd (Reading, United Kingdom)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for the EU word mark Revolution Vodka — Application for registration No 17 948 886

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 July 2021 in Case R 2266/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | find that the contested decision unfounded; |
| --- | --- |

—

find that the contested decision unfounded;

| — | find that the contested decision must be annulled and that the use of the applicant’s trade mark is real and sufficient; |
| --- | --- |

—

find that the contested decision must be annulled and that the use of the applicant’s trade mark is real and sufficient;

| — | where appropriate, find that the opposition to the trade mark Revolution Vodka is well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

where appropriate, find that the opposition to the trade mark Revolution Vodka is well founded;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(a) and (b) in conjunction with Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(a) and (b) in conjunction with Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
# C_2023007EN.01001501.xml

| 9.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 7/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 7/15

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 29 September 2022 — Koninklijke Nederlandse Lawn Tennisbond v Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens

(Case C-621/22)

(2023/C 7/18)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Koninklijke Nederlandse Lawn Tennisbond

Respondent: Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens

Questions referred

| 1. | How should the District Court interpret the term ‘legitimate interest’? |
| --- | --- |

1.

How should the District Court interpret the term ‘legitimate interest’?

| 2. | Should the term be interpreted as the respondent interprets it? Are these interests which exclusively pertain to the law, constitute law, are enshrined in a law? Or; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Should the term be interpreted as the respondent interprets it? Are these interests which exclusively pertain to the law, constitute law, are enshrined in a law? Or;

| 3. | Can any interest be a legitimate interest, provided that interest is not in breach of the law? More specifically: should a purely commercial interest, such as the interest at issue here, the provision of personal data in return for payment without the consent of the data subject concerned, be regarded as a legitimate interest under certain circumstances? If so, what circumstances determine whether a purely commercial interest is a legitimate interest? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Can any interest be a legitimate interest, provided that interest is not in breach of the law? More specifically: should a purely commercial interest, such as the interest at issue here, the provision of personal data in return for payment without the consent of the data subject concerned, be regarded as a legitimate interest under certain circumstances? If so, what circumstances determine whether a purely commercial interest is a legitimate interest?

---
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350*


In connection with the Annual Report of PGI Incorporated (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Laurence A.
Schiffer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:


(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
     the Company.



/s/ Laurence A. Schiffer
-------------------------------------
    Laurence A. Schiffer
    Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)       March 31, 2009

<FN>
*A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company
 and will be retained by the Company and will be furnished to the Securities
 and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
# C_2022424EN.01001901.xml

| 7.11.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 424/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.11.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 424/19

---

Appeal brought on 12 May 2022 by the airscreen company GmbH & Co. KG against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 7 March 2022 in Case T-382/21, the airscreen company GmbH & Co. KG v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-320/22 P)

(2022/C 424/22)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: the airscreen company GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: O. Spieker, D. Mienert and J. Selbmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Moviescreens Rental GmbH

By order of 28 September 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.

---
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Exhibit 31.1
 Certification of Principal Executive Officer
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of The Immune Response Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respect the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
 (a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent functions):
 (a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely
to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and(b)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.
  /s/ Joseph F. ONeillJoseph F. ONeillChief Executive Officer
#### Marlon Ernesto GARCIA, AKA Pedro Antonio Castro, AKA Pablo Escobar, AKA Marlon Ernest Garcia, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72020

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 22, 2018

Grace White, Esquire, Law Office of Grace White, Woodland Hills, CA, for Peti- • tioner

Neelam Ihsanullah, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Colette Jabes Winston, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Grace White, Esquire, Law Office of Grace White, Woodland Hills, CA, Chief Counsel. ICE, Office of the.Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Marlon Ernesto Garcia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Garcia’s request for humanitarian asylum relief because he failed to raise it to the agency. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).

In his opening brief, Garcia does not challenge the agency’s dispositive denial of asylum as time-barred. *See Corro-Barragan v. Holder,*718 F.3d 1174, 1177 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to contest issue in opening brief resulted in waiver). Thus, we deny the petition as to Garcia’s asylum claim.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Garcia failed to establish past persecution. *See Al-Harbi v. INS,*242 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Punishment on account of desertion generally does not *582support refugee status, unless it can be shown that such punishment is based on political opinion or another statutorily-protected ground.”)- Further, the BIA did not err by declining to consider Garcia’s arguments regarding the punishment for desertion in El Salvador. *See Matter of J-Y-C-,*24 I. *&*N. Dec. 260, 261 n.1 (BIA 2007) (issues not raised to the IJ are not properly before the BIA on appeal). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Garcia failed to establish it is more likely than not he would be persecuted if returned to El Salvador. *See Fakhry v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence did not compel a finding that it is more likely than not petitioner would be persecuted upon his return to Senegal). Thus, Garcia’s withholding of removal claim fails.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Bernard CASTRO and Eric A. Dupree, Attorney for Claimant Bernard Castro, Petitioners, v. SSA TERMINALS, LLC; et al., Respondents.

No. 16-73170

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 15, 2018 San Francisco, California

Filed March 5, 2018

Lara Merrigan, Merrigan Legal, San Rafael, CA, Joshua Thomas Gillelan, II, Esquire, Attorney, Longshore Claimants’ National Law Center, Washington, DC, for Petitioners

Judith Ann Leichtnam, Attorney, Bru-yneel & Leichtnam, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Alan Chang, Attorney, Bruyneel Law Firm LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents SSA Terminals, LLC, Home-port Insurance Co.

Mark A. Reinhalter, Counsel, Sarah Hurley, Esquire, LABR—U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC, for Respondent Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Program

Before: SCHROEDER, TORRUELLA,* and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The Honorable Juan R. Torruella, United States Circuit Judge for the First Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Eric Dupree appeals from the Benefits Review Board’s (“BRB”) denial of his petition for attorney’s fees under the Long-shore and Harborworkers’ Compensation Act (“Longshore Act”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), and we DENY the petition for review.

“The decision of the BRB is reviewed for substantial evidence and errors of law.” *Van Skike v. Dir., OWCP,*557 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009). Factual findings are supported by substantial evidence if “a reasonable mind might accept [such evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion.” *E.P. Paup Co. v. Dir., OWCP,*999 F.2d 1341, 1353 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting *Lockheed Shipbldg. v. Dir., OWCP,*951 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Here, the BRB’s decision that Bernard Castro did not successfully prosecute his Longshore Act claim as required by 33 U.S.C. § 928(a) was based on factual determinations that are supported by substantial evidence. First, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the parties did not intend for a Section 3(e) credit to offset any liability imposed under the Longshore Act, *see*33 U.S.C. § 903(e), because the settlement agreement stated that Castro was to receive “a lump sum payment of $0.00 under the [Longshore Act].” In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that the settlement did not impose any liability under the Longshore Act against which a Section 3(e) credit could apply.

Second, given that Castro received no payment under the Longshore Act, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the parties did not intend for the $4,000 payment to serve as consideration *747for the release of Castro’s Longshore Act claim. Even if the parties structured the agreement to avoid fees under the Act, such a structure is permissible after *Evans v. Jeff D.,*475 U.S. 717, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986).

Petition for review DENIED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### COM. v. COOLEY, D.

386 WDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

09/29/2017

CP-25-CR-0001836-2014 (Erie)

Vaeated/Remanded
# C_2023104EN.01003101.xml

| 20.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/31

---

Judgment of the General Court of 1 February 2023 — Krematorium am Waldfriedhof Schwäbisch Hall v EUIPO (aquamation)

(Case T-319/22) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for the EU word mark aquamation - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2023/C 104/48)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Krematorium am Waldfriedhof Schwäbisch Hall GmbH & Co. KG (Schwäbisch Hall, Germany) (represented by: F. Dehn, L. Maritzen and C. Kleiner, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Stoyanova-Valchanova and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 29 March 2022 (Case: R 2154/2021-1).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the parties to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the parties to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 276, 18.7.2022.

---