F-IAROLD C. BRODE 

DNA 6323F 

OPERATIONS 

MANDREL &GROMMET 

EVENTS 

MINUTE STEAK, DIESEL TRAIN, DIANA MIST, 

MINT LEAF, HUDSON MOON, DIAGONAL LINE, 

and MISTY NORTH 

12 September 1969 to 2 May 1972 

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies 

and their contractors: Critical Technology, 29 August 

1986. Other requests for this document shall be referred 

to Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC 

203051000. 

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is 

restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Section 

2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of these export 

laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. 

United States Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Prepared by Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: 

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4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 

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Reynolds Electric and Engineer- (If applirable) 

ing Co., Inc. I 

6~. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIPCode) 

P.O. Box 14400 

Las Vegas, NV 89114-4400 

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DNA 6323F 

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Field Command 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 

FCLS (MAJ J.A. Stinson) 

Kirtland AFB, NM 87115-5000 

9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 

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PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT 

ELEMENT NO NO NO ACCESSION NO 

OPERATIONS MANDREL AND GROMMET EVENTS MINUTE STEAK, DIESEL TRAIN, DIANA MIST, MINT LEAF, 

HUDSON MOON, DIAGONAL LINE, AND MISTY NORTH-12 September 1969 to 2 May 1972 

12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) 

Horton, Karen K.; Eubank, Bernard F.; and Brady, William J. 

13a TYPE OF REPORT 

Technical 

13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month. Da,‘) 15 PAGE COUNT 

FROM 690912 TO 720502 870130 

16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Contmue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) 

FIELD GROUP SUE-GROUP Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review (UNTPR) 

18 3 Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA) 

6 18 Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) 

19 ABSTRACT (Contmue on revene jf necessary and identify by block number) 

mis report is a personnel-oriented history of DOD participation in underground nuclear 

weapons testing during OPERATIONS MANDREL and GROMMET, test events MINUTE STEAK, DIESEL 

TRAIN, DIANA MIST, MINT LEAF, HUDSON MOON, DIAGONAL LINE, and MISTY NORTH, 12 September 1969 

to 2 May 1972 and is the fourth in a series of historical reports which will include all DOD 

underground nuclear weapons tests and all DOE underground nuclear weapons tests with significant distribution from 1962 forward. In addition to these historical volumes, a restricted 

distribution volume will identify all DOD participants (military, civilian and DOD contractors) and will list their radiation dosimetry data. 

20 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

0 UNCLASSIFIEDIUNLIMITED pf SAME AS RPT 0 DTIC USERS UNCLASSIFIED 

:2a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 

Maior Joe A. Stinson 

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(505) 844-9186 FCDNA/FCLS 

DD FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APRedltlon may be used until exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

All other edItIons are obsolete 

UNCLASSIFIED 

i 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

3. 

18. 

DTSTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT (Continued) 

Technology, 29 August 1986. Other requests for this document shall be referred to 

Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC 20305-1000. 

SUBJECT TERMS (Continued) 

Nevada Test Site (NTS) MINUTE STEAK DIESEL TRAIN 

Underground Test (UGT) DIANA MIST MINT LEAF 

HUDSON MOON DIAGONAL LINE MISTY NORTH 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

UNCLASSIFIED 

ii 
SUMMARY 

Seven Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored underground test 

events were conducted from 12 September 1969 to 2 May 1972 to 

study weapons effects. Two were shaft-type and five were tunneltype nuclear tests. The following table summarizes data on these 

events: 

r OPERATION 

TEST EVENT 

DATE 

LOCqL TIME (hours) 

NTS LOCATION 

TYPE 

DEPTH (feet) 

YIELD+ 

MANDREL 

1 Feb 7C 

116 PSl 

lJ12n.oe 

TUllllel 

1.319 

LOW 

6 May 7c 

1030 PO1 

Ul2l.OI 

Tunnel 

1.330 

LOW 

GROMMET 

p” cs 

bg 

2 

216 PDT 

Ul2n.05 

1.234 

LOW 

1 

* LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 

iii 
Releases of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere were detected both onsite and offsite after MINT LEAF, a tunnel-type 

event and DIAGONAL LINE, a shaft-type event. Releases of radioactive effluent were detected only within the confines of the 

Nevada Test Site (NTS) after the HUDSON MOON and MINUTE STEAK 

events. No release of radioactive effluent was detected onsite 

or offsite after the DIESEL TRAIN, DIANA MIST, and MISTY NORTH 

test events. 

As recorded on Area Access Registers, 9,480 individual entries to radiation exclusion areas were made after the above DOD 

test events. Of this number, 1,692 were by DOD-affiliated 

personnel (including military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor). 

The remainder were United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)*, 

other government agency, and other contractor personnel. 

The average gamma radiation exposure per entry for all participants was 20 mR. The average gamma radiation exposure per 

entry for DOD-affiliated participants was 27 mR. The maximum exposure of a non-DOD participant during an entry was 715 mR. The 

maximum exposure of a DOD-affiliated participant was 545 mR. 

These maximum exposures occurred on 12 October 1970 and 3 

December 1970, respectively, after the HUDSON MOON event. 

* The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission became the U.S. 

Research and Development Administration (ERDA) on 19 

1975. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) succeeded 

October 1977. 

Energy 

January 

ERDA in 

iv 
PREFACE 

The United States Government conducted 194 nuclear device 

tests from 1945 through 1958 during atmospheric test series at 

sites in the United States and in the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. The United States Army's Manhattan Engineer District 

(MED) implemented the testing program in 1945, and its successor 

agency, the AEC, administered the program from 1947 until testing 

was suspended by the United States on 1 November 1958. 

Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for 

weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An additional 22 nuclear experiments were conducted 

from December 1954 to February 1956 in Nevada. These experiments 

were physics studies using small quantities of fissionable material and conventional explosives. 

President Eisenhower had proposed that test ban negotiations 

begin on 31 October 1958, and had pledged a one-year moratorium 

on United States testing to commence after the negotiations 

began. The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests 

began at Geneva on 31 October 1958, the U.S. moratorium began on 

1 November, and the AEC detected the final Soviet nuclear test of 

their fall series on 3 November 1958. Negotiations continued until May 1960 without final agreement. No nuclear tests were conducted by either nation until 1 September 1961 when the Soviet 

Union resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The United 

States began a series of underground tests in Nevada on 15 September 1961, and U.S. atmospheric tests were resumed on 25 April 

1962 in the Pacific. 

V 
The United States conducted several atmospheric tests in 

Nevada during July 1962, and the last United States atmospheric 

nuclear test was in the Pacific on 4 November 1962. The Limited 

Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in 

outer space, and underwater, was signed in Moscow on 5 August 

1963. From resumption of United States atmospheric testing on 25 

April 1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 

weapons related and weapons effects tests were conducted as part 

of Pacific and Nevada atmospheric test operations. Underground 

tests, resumed on 15 September 1961, have continued on a 

year-round basis through the present time. 

In 1977, 15 years after atmospheric testing stopped, the 

Center for Disease Control (CDC)* noted a possible leukemia 

cluster within the group of soldiers who were present at the 

SMOKY test event, one of the Nevada tests in the 1957 PLUMBBOB 

test series. After that CDC report, the Veterans Administration 

(VA) received a number of claims for medical benefits filed by 

former military personnel who believed their health may have been 

affected by their participation in the nuclear weapons testing 

program. 

In late 1977, DOD began a study to provide data for both the 

CDC and the VA on radiation exposures of DOD military and 

civilian participants in atmospheric testing. Early in 1978 

during hearings by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee 

on Health and Environment, the DOD agreed to give top priority to 

gathering and providing those data. Those efforts have progressed to the point where a number of volumes describing DOD 

*The Center for Disease Control was part of the U.S. Department 

of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services). It was renamed The Centers for Disease Control on 1 October 1980. 

vi 
participation in atmospheric tests have been published by the 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) as the executive agency for DOD. 

On 20 June 1979, the United States Senate Committee on 

Veterans' Affairs began hearings on Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing. In addition to requesting and receiving information on DOD personnel participation and 

radiation exposures during atmospheric testing, the Chairman of 

the Senate Committee expressed concern regarding exposures of DOD 

participants in DOD-sponsored and DOE underground test events. 

The Chairman requested and received information from the 

Director, DNA, in an exchange of letters through 15 October 1979 

regarding research on underground testing radiation exposures. In 

early 1980, DNA initiated a program to acquire and consolidate 

underground testing radiation exposure data in a set of published 

volumes similar to the program under way on atmospheric testing 

data. This volume is the fourth of several volumes regarding 

participation and radiation exposures of DOD military and civilian participants in underground nuclear test events. 

SERIES OF VOLUMES 

Most volumes in this series discuss DOD-sponsored underground test events, in chronological order, after presenting introductory and general information. These volumes cover all 

except one category of underground test events identified as 

DOD-sponsored in Announced United States Nuclear Tests, published 

each year by the DOE Nevada Operations Office, Office of Public 

Affairs. The category of events not covered was conducted as 

nuclear test detection experiments in a program named VELA 

Uniform. Generally, significant exposure (above the 30 mR 

minimum detectable amount for film badges) of participants to 

radiation did not occur during tests in this category. 

vii 
An additional volume discusses general.participation of DOD 

personnel in DOE-sponsored underground test events, with specific 

information on those events which released radioactive effluent 

to the atmosphere and where exposures of DOD personnel were 

involved. 

A separate set of books comprising one volume is a census of 

DOD personnel and their radiation exposure data. Distribution of 

this volume necessarily is limited by provisions of the Privacy 

Act. 

METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THE VOLUMES 

Information for these volumes was obtained from several 

locations. Security-classified documents were researched at 

Headquarters, DNA, Washington, DC. Additional documents were 

researched at Field Command (FC), DNA, the Air Force Weapons 

Laboratory (AFWL) Technical Library, and Sandia National 

Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Most of the 

radiation measurement data were obtained at the DOE, Nevada 

Operations Office (DOE/NV), and its support contractor, the 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc. (REECo), in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

Unclassified records were used to document underground testing activities when possible, but, when necessary, unclassified 

information was extracted from security-classified documents. 

Both unclassified and classified documents are cited in the List 

of References at the end of each volume. Locations of the reference documents also are shown. Copies of most of the unclassified references have been entered in the records of the Coordination and Information Center (CIC), a DOE facility located in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

viii 
Radiation measurements, exposure data, event data, and offsite reports generally are maintained as hard copy or microfilm 

at the REECo facilities adjacent to the CIC, or as original hard 

copy at the Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna Niguel, 

California. The Master File of all available personnel exposure 

data for nuclear testing programs on the continent and in the 

Pacific from 1945 to the present also is maintained by REECo for 

DOD and DOE. 

ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME 

A Summary of this test event volume appears before this 

Preface and includes general objectives of test events, characteristics of each test event, and data regarding DOD 

participants and their radiation exposures. 

An Introduction following this Preface discusses reasons for 

conducting nuclear test events underground, the testing organization, the NTS, and locations of NTS underground testing areas. 

A chapter titled Underground Testing Procedures explains the 

basic mechanics of underground testing, purposes of effects 

experiments, containment features and early containment problems, 

tunnel and shaft area access requirements, industrial safety and 

radiological safety procedures, telemetered radiation exposure 

rate measurements, and air support for underground tests. 

A chapter on each test event covered by this volume follows 

iN chronological order. Each test event chapter contains an 

event summary, a discussion of preparations and event operations, 

an explanation of safety procedures implemented, and listings of 

monitoring, sampling, and exposure results. 

ix 
Following the event chapters are a Reference List and appendices to the text including a Glossary of Terms and a List of 

Abbreviations and Acronyms. 
CONVERSION TABLE 

CONVERSION FACTORS FOR U.S. CUSTOMARY 

TO METRIC (SI) UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 

MULTIPLY 

> BY > TO GET 

TO GET < BY < 

DIVIDE 

curie (C) 

degree (angle) 

degree Fahrenheit 

foot 

gallon (U.S. liquid) 

inch 

kilotons (kt) 

mile (international) 

ounce 

rad (radiation 

absorbed dose) 

roentgen (R) 

3.700 000 X E+l 

1.745 329 X E-2 

tK=(t"f+459.67)/1.8 

3.048 000 X E-l 

3.785 412 X E-3 

2.540 000 X E-2 

4.183 

1.609 344 X E+3 

2.834 952 X E-2 

*giga becquerel (GBq) 

radian (rad) 

degree kelvin (K) 

meter (m) 

meter3 (m3) 

meter (m) 

terajoules 

meter (m) 

kilogram (kg) 

1.000 000 X E-2 **Gray (Gy) 

2.579 760 X E-4 coulomb/kilogram 

(c/kg) 

*The becquerel (Bq) is the SI unit of radioactivity; 1 Bq = 1 

event/s. 

**The Gray (Gy) is the SI unit of absorbed radiation. 

xi 
xii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

SUMMARY......................... 

PREFACE......................... 

Series of Volumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Methods and Sources Used to Prepare the Volumes . . . 

Organization of this Volume. 

Conversion Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

LIST OF 

LIST OF 

CHAPTER 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

CHAPTER 

2.1 

ILLUSTRATIONS .................. 

TABLES ..................... 

ONE - INTRODUCTION ............... 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .............. 

UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES ......... 

DOD TESTING ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES . 

1.3.1 Defense Nuclear Agency .......... 

1.3.2 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support . 

1.3.3 AEC-DOD Relationships .......... 

AEC ORGANIZATIONS, CONTRACTORS, AND 

RESPONSIBILITIES ................ 

1.4.1 Atomic Energy Commission ......... 

1.4.2 Programmatic and detonation Approvals . . 

1.4.3 Nevada Test Site Organization ...... 

1.4.4 NTSO Radiological Safety ......... 

1.4.5 NTS Scientific Users ........... 

1.4.6 Test Support Organizations ........ 

THE NEVADA TEST SITE ............... 

TWO - UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES ...... 

CONTAINMENT, PROBLEMS, AND PROCEDURES ...... 

2.1.1 Shaft Event Containment. ......... 

2.1.2 Tunnel Event Containment ......... 

2.1.3 Containment Evaluation Panel ....... 

2.1.4 Test Manager's Advisory Panel ...... 

iii 

V 

vii 

viii 

xi 

xxi 

xxiii 

1 

1 

2 

4 

4 

7 

10 

14 

14 

15 

16 

17 

19 

20 

22 

27 

27 

28 

30 

32 

34 

xiii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.1.5 Effluent Release Procedures ....... 

EMPLACEMENT TYPES ................ 

2.2.1 Vertical Shaft-Type Emplacement ..... 

2.2.2 Tunnel-Type Emplacement ......... 

DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES .............. 

2.3.1 Radiation Measurements .......... 

2.3.2 Radiochemical Measurements ........ 

EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS ............... 

TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS . . 

2.6 

2.7 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control .......... 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control ....... 

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS ........ 

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES ......... 

37 

40 

40 

45 

47 

47 

48 

49 

49 

50 

51 

52 

55 

2.7.1 

2.7.2 

2.7.3 

2.7.4 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada 

Test Site Organization - Standard 

Operating Procedure (NTSO-SOP), Chapter 

0524, Radiological Safety . . . . . . . . 

Standard Operatinq Procedures for the 

Radioloqical Sciences Department, REECo . 

Implementation of radiological procedures; required equipment, devices and 

capabilities for monitoring radiation 

levels in the environment and monitoring 

external and internal exposures of 

personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Portable Radiation Detection 

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

55 

56 

56 

B. Air Samplinq Equipment . . . . . . . . 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability . . . . 

D. Monitorinq of Personnel Exposures . . 

Additional Methods Used for Control 

56 

57 

57 

57 

of Radex Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 60 

xiv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS . . 

2.8.1 Telemetry Systems inUse......... 

A. Remote Area Monitoring System (RAMS) . 

B. Diqital Data System ......... 

C. Well Logqing Unit .......... 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection 

Monitoring Support ............ 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ............ 

2.9.1 Changes In Air Support Requirements ... 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs AFAF . 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters ..... 

CHAPTER THREE - MINUTE STEAK EVENT ........... 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

3.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

B. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support . . 

C. Security Coveraqe .......... 

D. Air Support ............. 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

3.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 

3.3.1 Test Area Monitoring and Radioactive 

Effluent Release Situations ....... 

3.3.2 Aerial Monitoring ............ 

A. U-3B Trackinq Mission ........ 

B. Veqas 8 Samplinq Mission ....... 

3.3.3 Initial Radiation Survey and Experiment 

Recovery Activities ........... 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

3.4.1 Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

3.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 

61 

62 

62 

65 

65 

66 

69 

69 

70 

70 

73 

73 

73 

73 

75 

75 

76 

79 

79 

79 

80 

80 

81 

81 

82 

83 

85 

85 

85 

XV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

3.5 

CHAPTER 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

3.4.3 Industrial Safety .......... 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ........... 

FOUR - DIESEL TRAIN EVENT .......... 

EVENT SUMMARY ................ 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............. 

4.2.1 Responsibilities ........... 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations ...... 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction . . 

B. Radioloqical Safety Support ... 

c. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

D. Security Coveraqe ........ 

E. Air Support ........... 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ....... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES ............ 

4.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ......... 

4.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Experiment Recovery Activities .... 

A. Mesa Trailer Park Survey . . l . l 

B. Portal Survey .......... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............ 

4.4.1 Initial Tunnel Reentry ........ 

4.4.2 Experiment Recovery Operations .... 

4.4.3 Industrial Safety .......... 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ........... 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. l 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

85 

86 

89 

89 

89 

89 

91 

91 

91 

92 

98 

98 

99 

99 

100 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

100 

100 

101 

101 

101 

103 

104 

105 

107 

107 

107 

107 

109 

109 

109 

110 

CHAPTER FIVE - DIANA MIST EVENT . l . . . . . . . . . . . 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5.2.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction . . . . 

B. Radioloqical Safety Support . . . , . 

C. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support . . 

xvi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

5.3 

5.4 

5.5 

CHAPTER 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

6.4 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

5.2.3 Late Pre-event Activities. ........ 

EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ...... 

5.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

5.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES . . 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and 

Activities . . . . 

5.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

5.4.3 Industrial Safety 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . 

SIX - MINT LEAF EVENT . . 

EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . 

6.2.1 Responsibilities . 

.* . ..* . . ..a. 

Experiment Recovery 

............ 

............ 

............ 

............ 

............ 

............ 

............ 

............ 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . 

A. Radioloqical Safety Support . . . 

B. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

C. Security Coveraqe . . . . . . . . 

D. Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.2.3 Late Pre-event Activities. . . . . . . 

EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES . . . . . 

6.3.1 Test Area Monitoring . . . . . . . . . 

6.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

. . 129 

. . 129 

. . 130 

. . 135 

. . 136 

. . 136 

. . 136 

. . 137 

Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

6.3.3 Aerial Monitoring ............ 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

6.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Activities ................ 

6.4.2 Postevent Drilling . . . . . . . . . . . . 

114 

114 

114 

115 

115 

116 

117 

117 

122 

123 

124 

127 

127 

127 

127 

139 

140 

140 

140 

143 

xvii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

6.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

CHAPTER SEVEN - HUDSON MOON EVENT ............ 

143 

144 

147 

147 

147 

147 

149 

149 

151 

152 

152 

157 

157 

158 

158 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

7.4 

7.5 

CHAPTER 

8.1 

8.2 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

7.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction .... 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

C. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support . . 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

7.2.3 Late Pre-event Activities. ........ 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

7.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

7.3.2 Initial Rainier Mesa Trailer Park and 

Portal Trailer Park Radiation Surveys 

and Data Recovery Activities ....... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Activities ................ 

7.4.2 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

EIGHT - DIAGONAL LINE EVENT ........... 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

8.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

8. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support . . 

C. Security Coveraqe .......... 

D. Air Support ............. 

159 

160 

160 

167 

168 

171 

171 

171 

171 

174 

174 

175 

175 

178 

xviii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

8.3 

8.4 

8.5 

CHAPTER 

9.1 

9.2 

9.3 

8.2.3 Construction and Experiment Readiness . . 

A. Satellite Drill Hole ......... 

B. Mobile Tower ............. 

C. Emplacement Hole Preparations .... 

8.2.4 Late Pre-event Activities. ........ 

EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 

8.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

8.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Experiment 

Recovery Activities ........... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

8.4.1 Environmental Protection Agency Offsite 

Surveillance Activities ......... 

8.4.2 Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

8.4.3 Crater Survey .............. 

8.4.4 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

NINE - MISTY NORTH EVENT ............ 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PRE-EVENT ACTIVITIES. .............. 

9.2.1 

9.2.2 

9.2.3 

Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction l . . . 

B. Radiological Safety Support . . . . . 

C. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support . . 

D. Security Coveraqe . . . . . . . . . . 

E. Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Late he-event Activities. . . . . . . . . 

EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 

9.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

9.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

178 

178 

178 

179 

183 

183 

184 

185 

186 

186 

189 

189 

191 

192 

195 

195 

195 

195 

197 

197 

199 

200 

200 

205 

205 

205 

206 

206 

xix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 

CHAPTER 

9.4 

9.5 

LIST OF 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

9.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Activities ................ 

9.4.2 Postevent Mining and Experiment Recovery 

Activities ................ 

9.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

REFERENCES. ................... 

APPENDICES 

A. Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

B. Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . 

C. General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department 

of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Nuclear Tests . 

D. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0524 - Radiological Safety . . 

E. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0101 - The Nevada Test Site 

Organization (NTSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

PAGE 

207 

207 

210 

210 

211 

213 

217 

245 

249 

263 

285 

xx 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FIGURE PAGE 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

Federal government structure for continental 

nuclear tests (in 1972). . . . . . . . . . . 

Partial organization chart of Field Command, 

Defense Nuclear Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Nevada Test Site Organization .......... 

Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada . . l l 

The Nevada Test Site .............. 

A typical subsidence crater ........... 

Vertical LOS pipe configuration ......... 

Horizontal LOS pipe configuration ........ 

Portal of a typical DOD tunnel complex ..... 

NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security 

credential holder ................ 

Neher-White RAMS probe ............. 

RAMS readout console .............. 

Typical remote radiation detection monitoring 

system for shaft-type emplacement site ..... 

Typical permanently-established remote radiation 

detector stations operated continuously throughout 

theNTS ..................... 

MINUTE STEAK Event trailer park layout ..... 

MINUTE STEAK Event RAMS unit and air sampler 

locations .................... 

DIESEL TRAIN Event tunnel layout ........ 

DIESEL TRAIN Event surface RAMS unit locations . 

DIESEL TRAIN Event underground RAMS unit 

locations .................... 

DIANA MIST Event tunnel layout ......... 

DIANA MIST Event surface and underground RAMS 

unit locations ................. 

DIANA MIST Event LOS pipe layout ........ 

MINT LEAF Event tunnel layout .......... 

5 

8 

18 

23 

24 

42 

44 

46 

54 

59 

63 

64 

67 

68 

74 

78 

90 

95 

96 

108 

* 

113 

119 

128 

xxi 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Concluded) 

FIGURE PAGE 

24 MINT LEAF Event surface RAMS unit locations . . . 

25 MINT LEAF Event underground RAMS unit locations . 

26 HUDSON MOON Event tunnel layout . . . . . . . . . 

27 HUDSON MOON Event surface RAMS unit locations . . 

28 HUDSON MOON Event underground RAMS unit 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

133 

134 

148 

155 

locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HUDSON MOON Event postevent reentry tunnel 

layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DIAGONAL LINE Event trailer park . . . . . . . . 

DIAGONAL LINE Event trailer park photo . . . . . 

DIAGONAL LINE Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . 

MISTY NORTH Event tunnel layout . . . . . . . . . 

MISTY NORTH Event surface RAMS unit locations . . 

MISTY NORTH Event underground RAMS unit 

156 

163 

172 

173 

177 

196 

203 

locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 

MISTY NORTH Event LOS and bypass drifts . . . . . 209 

xxii 
LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE 

1 DOD Events - 12 September 1969 thru 2 May 1972 . 

2 MINUTE STEAK Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . 

3 MINUTE STEAK Event initial radiation survey 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +. l l 

DIESEL TRAIN Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . 

DIESEL TRAIN Event air sampling unit locations . 

DIANA MIST Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . . 

MINT LEAF Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . . . 

HUDSON MOON Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . . 

DIAGONAL LINE Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . 

Air particulate filter and charcoal cartridge 

sample result locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Roads monitored by EPA personnel . . . . . . . . 

EPA survey instrument reading locations . . . . . 

MISTY NORTH Event RAMS unit locations . . . . . . 

PAGE 

41 

77 

84 

93 

97 

111 

131 

153 

176 

187 

188 

190 

201 

xxiii 
xxiv 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The first United States nuclear detonation designed to be 

fully contained underground was the RAINIER tunnel event conducted by the University of California Radiation Laboratory 

(UCRL) for the AEC in Nevada on 19 September 1957. This was a 

weapons related experiment with a relatively low yield of 1.7 

kilotons (kt). The second tunnel event with a significant 

nuclear yield was a safety experiment on 22 February 1958 also 

conducted in Nevada by UCRL for AEC. This experiment, the VENUS 

event, resulted in a yield of less than one ton. These two 

tunnel events, and five additional underground safety experiments 

with zero or only slight yields, were the beginning of the United 

States underground nuclear testing program, currently the only 

type of nuclear detonation testing permitted by treaty. The 

first DOD-sponsored underground nuclear weapons effects test was 

the 5.7 kt HARD HAT event conducted by the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA) on 15 February 1962 in Nevada. 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

While technical conferences between the United States and 

the Soviet Union on banning nuclear detonation tests continued, 

and concern regarding further increases in worldwide fallout 

mounted, a number of nuclear tests were conducted underground 

during 1958 in Nevada. Prior to the United States testing moratorium, six safety experiments in shafts, five safety experiments 

in tunnels, and four weapons-related tests in tunnels were 

conducted by user laboratories. Radioactive products from several of these tests were not completely contained underground. 

Containment of nuclear detonations was a new engineering chal1 
lenge. Understanding and solving the majority of containment 

problems would require years of underground testing experience. 

When the United States resumed testing on 15 September 1961, 

the first 32 test events were underground, including a cratering 

experiment with the device emplaced 110 feet below the surface. 

The DOMINIC I test series in the Pacific and the DOMINIC II test 

series in Nevada (also called Operation SUNBEAM by DOD) during 

1962 were the last atmospheric nuclear detonation tests by the 

United States. 

The commitment of the United States to reduce levels of 

worldwide fallout by refraining from conducting nuclear tests in 

the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater was finalized when 

the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 

5 August 1963. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES 

The majority of United States underground tests have been 

for weapons related purposes. New designs were tested to improve 

efficiency and deliverability characteristics of nuclear explosive devices before they entered the military stockpile as components of nuclear weapons. 

Safety experiments with nuclear devices also were conducted 

by user laboratories in addition to weapons related tests. These 

experiments tested nuclear devices by simulating detonation of 

the conventional high explosives in a manner which might occur in 

an accident during transportation or storage of weapons. 

Weapons effects tests, sponsored by the DOD, were conducted 

to determine the vulnerability or survivability of military 

systems or components when exposed to one or more of the effects 
of a nuclear detonation. The nuclear devices for these tests 

were provided by the AEC weapons development laboratories and 

were designed to be similar to nuclear components used in nuclear 

weapons. Actual weapon configurations were used in a few test 

events. Military systems, structures, materials, electronic 

experiments, and other related experiments were provided by DOD 

and AEC agencies. Many of these tests were very complex and 

involved greater numbers of participants than other categories of 

tests previously mentioned. Personnel from DASA, other government organizations, and DOD contractor agencies, as well as 

personnel from user laboratories and contractors, were involved. 

Some tests were designed to study the response of hardened 

structures or geologic formations to shock waves generated by 

nuclear detonations. Many tests were designed to study the 

response of military components to effects of radiation produced 

by nuclear weapons. Such tests required a direct line of sight 

between the nuclear device and the experiments. Many of the radiation effects tests required the simulation of high altitude (up 

to exoatmospheric) conditions. These tests involved installation 

of experiments inside large steel line-of-sight (LOS) pipes 

hundreds of feet in length, with maximum diameters of several 

feet. Large vacuum pumps were utilized to reduce pressure inside 

the pipes to the desired level. 

DOD weapons effects tests MINUTE STEAK, 12 September 1969, 

to MISTY NORTH, 2 May 1972, conducted during Operation MANDREL 

and Operation GROMMET are discussed in this volume. No DOD tests 

were executed during Operation EMERY (1 July 1970 to 30 June 

1971) although field operations were in process in Nevada during 

this period for the two tests which were actually executed during 

Operation GROMMET. 

3 
1.3 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Administering the underground nuclear testing program was a 

joint AEC-DOD responsibility. The similar nature of the AEC-DOD 

organizational structure is shown in Figure 1. 

1.3.1 Defense Nuclear Agency 

Headquarters of the Defense Nuclear Agency is located near 

Washington, D.C., and is composed of personnel from each of the 

Armed Services and civilian DOD employees. It was originally 

established as the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) 

to assume residual functions of the MED, through issuance of a 

joint Army-Navy memorandum, dated 29 January 1947, which was 

retroactive to 1 January 1947 (when the AEC was activated). The 

responsibility for DOD nuclear weapons effects testing was 

assigned to AFSWP. The National Security Act of 1947 had become 

law when the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on 21 

October 1947 to the three Service Secretaries confirming the 

previous directive of 29 January, and thus, AFSWP officially 

represented all of them. AFSWP was charged with providing 

nuclear weapons support to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As 

originally chartered, AFSWP was directly responsible to each of 

the three Service Chiefs. In 1951, the Air Force Special Weapons 

Center (AFSWC) located at Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB), 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, was assigned by DOD the responsibility 

to provide specific support to the AEC for continental nuclear 

testing (see Section 1.3.2). This command was not directly 

related to AFSWP; however, the two organizations coordinated 

several support tasks. 

By issuance of General Order No. 2, Headquarters, DASA, 

dated 6 May 1959, AFSWP was redesignated the Defense Atomic 

Support Agency. Under its new charter, DASA was responsible to 

4 
PRESIDENT 

COMMISSIONERS 

MILITARY 

LIAISON 

COMMITTEE 

----------- I SECRETARY 

OF 

DEFENSE 

1 

I 

1. 

AEC JOINT 

GENERAL 

CHIEFS 

MANAGER OF 

STAFF 

DIRECTOR 

DIVISION OF DIRECTOR, 

-------_--___ 

MILITARY DNA 

APPLICATION 

MANAGER, 

NEVADA 

OPERATIONS 

OFFICE 

1 

----------- 

- COMMAND 

- - - LIAISON AND COORDINATION 

AEC 

TEST MANAGER 

(MANAGER, 

NVOO) 

I 

I 

FIELD 

COMMAND 

1 

LI 

t 

1 I 

I 

I 

--__-_ _I 

Figure 1. Federal government structure for continental nuclear 

tests (in 1972) 

5 
the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

DASA's five major areas of responsibility for the DOD included: 

1. staff assistance to the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

2. research in weapons effects; 

3. atomic tests; 

4. weapons related tests: and 

5. assistance to the Services. 

Responsibilities of Headquarters, DASA (HQ/DASA) included 

providing consolidated management and direction for the DOD 

nuclear weapons effects testing programs, while technical direction and management of field operations of DOD nuclear weapons 

effects testing activities were delegated to Field Command, DASA 

(FC/DASA), located at Sandia Base (now part of RAFB) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. From 6 May 1959 until 1 July 1964 the Weapons 

Effects Tests Group (WETG) of FC/DASA was responsible for nuclear 

weapons effects testing and seismic detection research responsibilities (VELA UNIFORM) for the Director, DASA. This organization maintained close liaison with the AEC/Nevada Operations 

Office (AEC/NVOO). Personnel from FC/DASA became the military 

members of the joint AEC-DOD testing organization at the Nevada 

Test Site (NTS) and at other continental United States test 

locations. Participation of DOD agencies and their contractors 

in nuclear field tests was coordinated and supported by FC/DASA. 

On 1 July 1964 the testing organization in Albuquerque was 

designated as Weapons Test Division (WTD), a division of HQ/DASA. 

On 1 August 1966, WTD was changed to Test Command (TC/DASA), a 

separate command under HQ/DASA, but it remained in Albuquerque. 

The responsibilities for technical direction and management of 

6 
field operations for nuclear weapons effects tests remained in 

effect during these changes in organization. During this period, 

WTD and TC maintained an engineering and support branch 

(designated Nevada Branch) at the NTS and a liaison office at 

AEC/NVOO. The Nevada Branch maintained liaison with AEC/NVOO and 

supervised FC/DASA activities at NTS. On 12 May 1970, the 

Commander, FC/DASA assumed additional command of TC/DASA. 

On 29 March 1971 (effective 1 July 19711, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense directed the reorganization of DASA as a 

result of cutbacks recommended by the "Blue Ribbon Panel" survey 

of agency activities. In his Executive Memorandum, DASA was 

retained as a defense agency under the new title, "Defense 

Nuclear Agency." On 1 July 1971, FC/DASA was redesignated as 

FC/DNA and TC/DASA became TC/DNA. While the responsibilities and 

manning levels at Field Command were reduced during this transition, Test Command remained essentially the same. 

On 1 January 1972, TC/DNA was disestablished and personnel 

were transferred to FC/DNA. The responsibilities for technical 

direction and management of field operations for nuclear weapons 

effects tests were transferred to the newly-formed Test Directorate (Field Command Test-FCT) of FC/DNA. The Nevada Branch of TC 

was changed to the Test Construction Division of Test Directorate 

(FCTC) and the responsibility for the liaison office at AEC/NVOO 

was transferred to FCTC (see Figure 2). 

1.3.2 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support 

The commander of AFSWC was requested to provide air support 

to the Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) during nuclear tests 

at NTS. Direct support was provided by the Nuclear Test 

Directorate, the Special Projects Division, and the 4900th Air 

Base Group of AFSWC. The 4900th Air Base Group provided aircraft 

for shuttle service between KAFB, New Mexico, and Indian Springs 

7 
ccl 

DIRECTOR 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

WASHINGTON. DC AREA 

I 

COMMANDER 

FIELD COMMAND, DNA 

KlRTLAND AFB. NM 

4 

INSPECTIONS DIRECTORATE 

KAFB 

LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE TEST DIRECTORATE PLANS 6 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL &ADMINISTRATION 

KAFE KIRTLAND AFB. NM DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE 

KAFB KAFB 

, 

PLANS & ANALYSIS 

DIVISION 

KAFB 

ENGINEERING TEST CONSTRUCTION TECHNICAL DIRECTORS 

DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION 

KAFB 

’ 

NEVADA TEST SITE 

1 , 

LIAISON OFFICE 

DOE, NV00 

LAS VEGAS, NV 

; 1 TEST;k;;lONS 1 

KAFB 

Figure 2. Partial organization chart of Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

(in 1972) 
Air Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF) in Nevada. The 4900th also 

provided aircraft and crews to perform low-altitude cloud tracking, radio relay support, and courier missions. 

Other Air Force organizations providing support to the NTSO 

under AFSWC control on a temporary basis were as follows: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Elements of the 1211th Test Squadron (Sampling), Military Airlift Command, McClellan AFB, were detached to 

ISAFAF. Their primary task was cloud sampling. Personnel from this unit also assisted NTSO radiological 

safety personnel in providing support at ISAFAF, including decontamination of crews, equipment, and aircraft. 

Elements of the 4520th Combat Crew Training Wing, Tactical Air Command, Nellis AFB, Nevada, provided support 

functions, such as housing, feeding, and logistics, to 

the units operating from ISAFAF and Nellis AFB. In addition, they conducted security sweep flights over NTS 

and control tower operations, fire-fighting, and crash 

rescue services at ISAFAF. They also maintained and 

provided equipment for the helicopter pad at the NTS 

Control Point (CP) and other helicopter pads at each 

Forward Control Point (FCP). 

The 55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Military Airlift Command, McClellan AFB, provided one aircraft and 

crew to perform cloud tracking. 

The Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems 

Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, provided aircraft and 

crews to perform technical projects. 

9 
1.3.3 AEC-DOD Relationships 

DOD was responsible for establishing criteria for nuclear 

weapons, developing and producing delivery systems, developing 

nuclear weapons plans and forces, providing defense against 

nuclear attack, and obtaining nuclear weapons effects data 

through DNA. The AEC was responsible for research and development, production, and supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed 

Forces in quantities and types specified by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. Quantities and types of weapons were described in the 

Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum signed jointly by the 

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy 

Commission and approved by the President. The AEC, in 

association with DOD, also was responsible for providing field 

nuclear test facilities in the continental United States and 

overseas. 

The principal points of field coordination between the AEC 

and the DOD were at AEC/NVOO in Las Vegas and at NTS. From the 

beginning of the DOD underground nuclear weapons effects test 

program (first test was HARD HAT in February 1962) until the 

present, Field Command (or Test Command) was the fielding agency 

for DOD/DNA and served as primary point of contact with AEC/NVOO. 

AEC/NVOO and its predecessors represented AEC in the field for 

all continental tests. The AEC nuclear weapons development 

laboratories fielded underground tests as part of the weapons 

development program; DNA fielded underground tests at NTS to 

obtain weapons effects data. Since the NTS was an AEC installation, the Manager, AEC/NVOO was responsible for all operations 

there. 

For each DOD-sponsored test, HQ/DNA coordinated requirements 

with the military services. Requirements for testing to determine the nuclear vulnerability or hardening of military systems 

or components were submitted by these organizations. As part of 

10 
long range underground nuclear weapons effects test planning, 

HQ/DNA developed a schedule of specific events designed to 

satisfy military requirements. One or more of the DOD agencies 

were cosponsors and, usually, active participants in each DOD 

underground test. The initial approval of DOD experiments and 

the selection of the nuclear source (device) for each test was 

accomplished at the HQ/DNA level. A request for the appropriate 

nuclear device and associated support was forwarded by HQ/DNA to 

the Director, Division of Military Application, AEC. The AEC assigned one or more of the weapons development laboratories to 

provide the device support. 

Following initial planning, the responsibility for detailed 

planning, engineering, fielding, execution, and reporting was assigned to FC/DNA. Field Command formed a test group staff for 

each test. The technical director (normally a military officer 

assigned to FC/DNA or AFWL) was appointed by HQ/DNA. The test 

group director and other members of the staff were appointed by 

FC/DNA. The test group engineer normally was selected from FCTC, 

Nevada Branch. 

The test group staff developed detailed test plans and 

schedules. Engineering and construction plans were developed by 

Nevada Branch and coordinated with NTSO. Final engineering designs were developed by AEC contractors at NTS - Holmes & Narver, 

Inc. (H&N) and/ or Fenix & Scisson, Inc. (F&S). Engineering 

drawings were approved by FCTC and NTSO prior to actual construction. Construction was performed by the principal AEC support 

contractor - REECo. FCTC and members of the test group staff 

monitored construction activities. The FC/DNA test group staff 

coordinated development of technical experiments and initiated 

action to obtain required support equipment (e.g., steel LOS pipe 

and mechanical closures). The test group staff reviewed the 

technical support requirements submitted by experimenter agencies 

and transmitted consolidated requirements to Nevada Branch which, 

11 
in turn, advised the NTSO of future requirements. 

During the construction phase, Nevada Branch began collecting containment-related information. During drilling or mining 

operations, rock cores were tested and analyzed for bulk density, 

moisture content, grain density, porosity (determined by the 

difference between bulk and grain densities), unconfined 

compressive strength, triaxial compression (for a variety of 

confining pressures), ultrasonic shear and compressive wave 

velocities, carbon dioxide content, presence of clay which could 

swell, and other features. Testing was done for DNA primarily by 

the H&N Testing Lab at NTS (Mercury) and TerraTek, a DNA 

contractor located at Salt Lake City, as part of the DNA 

containment research program. 

As construction progressed, geologic features of the tunnels 

were examined and mapped, usually by an AEC contractor. Several 

months prior to planned event execution, FC/DNA prepared a 

document which contained a general description of the test, site 

geologic information, types and locations of mechanical closures, 

details of concrete plugs, summary of analytical calculations, 

and other related test history. This document was reviewed by 

Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP) members (see Section 2.1.3) 

and formally presented by FC/DNA to the CEP for categorization 

and recommendation for test execution. 

The FC/DNA test group staff normally moved to NTS a few 

months prior to the planned event execution date (3 to 6 months 

depending upon the complexity of the test). Prior to arrival of 

DOD experimenter personnel, Nevada Branch made arrangements to 

provide required instrumentation and recording facilities, office 

space and equipment, communications equipment, vehicles, photography and other support items. Housing and food services for DOD 

personnel at NTS were provided by REECo. Upon arrival at NTS, 

DOD personnel were briefed on safety and security by the test 

12 
group staff and other DOD and AEC personnel. Experimenter 

agencies were provided with copies of FC/DNA security and safety 

plans. These briefings included radiation safety control policies, procedures and equipment. 

Under the supervision of the test group staff, experimenter 

personnel installed experiments and checked out instrumentation 

cables and recording systems. A series of electrical dry runs 

were conducted from the user laboratory control room and DNA 

monitor room at the Control Point complex to determine that all 

signals and remotely-controlled equipment were functioning 

properly. After all systems were declared ready, permission was 

requested from the AEC to install the nuclear device. Installation and check out were conducted by the participating device 

development laboratory with AEC security safeguarding the device 

and other classified materials. The next activities consisted of 

placing stemming materials in preplanned locations and checking 

all containment features. 

When the test facility was ready for event execution, control of the entire test and experiment area was transferred to 

the AEC/NVOO Test Controller and his staff. When the Test 

Controller was satisfied that all conditions were satisfactory to 

execute the event, he gave permission to the user laboratory to 

arm the device and initiated the final countdown. 

The Test Controller and his staff at the CP monitored the 

countdown, detonation, and postevent response of remotelycontrolled monitoring equipment. When released by the Test 

Controller, REECo Radiological Safety (Radsafe) teams entered the 

area t.o monitor for radiation and other safety hazards. After 

assurance that reentry could be accomplished, the Test Controller 

released experimenters to collect recorded data from surface 

areas. All of these operations were conducted in accordance with 

plans developed pre-event by the AEC/NVOO Test Controller staff, 

13 
the DOD test group staff, and Nevada Branch personnel, unless 

postevent conditions required modifications. 

For tunnel events, initial reentry into the tunnel was 

authorized by the AEC Test Controller after he determined that 

conditions were safe for reentry operations. Tunnel reentry was 

controlled by Nevada Branch personnel with assistance from Sandia 

Laboratories, Albuquerque (SLA) health physicists, REECo Radsafe 

personnel, and REECo construction personnel. After the tunnel 

was declared safe for experiment recovery, the test group staff 

assumed control of the area. Based on REECo Radsafe monitoring 

data FC/DNA personnel determined when it was safe to remove 

tunnel experiments and data. Experimenters then removed experiments and data for analysis and documentation of results. 

1.4 AEC ORGANIZATIONS, CONTRACTORS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

1.4.1 Atomic Energy Commission 

The AEC was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 in 

July, the same month the Joint Chiefs of Staff were conducting 

Operation CROSSROADS with assistance from the U.S. Army's 

Manhattan Engineer District. MED was disestablished and the AEC 

and AFSWP assumed MED functions on 1 January 1947. The Atomic 

Energy Act was revised in 1954 and has been amended extensively 

since. 

The AEC established headquarters (AEC/HQ) offices in Washington, D.C., and operations offices in areas which were centers 

of AEC operations. In areas of lesser activity, area offices, 

branch offices, and field offices were established. The Director of DMA in AEC/HQ was delegated responsibility for the nuclear 

weapons development and testing program. The Director of DMA 

always was a flag officer of one of the armed forces, as speci14 
fied by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and he was an Assistant 

General Manager in the AEC organization. 

In 1951, he designated and delegated his responsibility for 

conduct of on-continent tests to the Test Manager who also was 

Manager of the Santa Fe Operations Office (SFOO), near Los Alamos 

Scientific Laboratory (LASL). Later in 1951, SF00 was moved to 

Albuquerque. With delegated authority from the Director of DMA, 

the SF00 Manager designated Test Managers for On-Continent tests* 

The same authority applied when SF00 became the Albuquerque 

Operations Office (ALOO) in 1956. The AEC Las Vegas Field Office 

(LVFO), established in 1951, managed the Nevada Test Site (called 

the Nevada Proving Ground from 1952 to 1955) for the Test 

Manager. LVFO became a branch office in 1955, an Area Office in 

1960, and the Nevada Operations Office in 1962, with the NV00 

Manager or his representative designated as Test Manager. In 

1972, the Test Manager became the Test Controller. 

1.4.2 Programmatic and Device Detonation Approvals 

The Director of DMA (Division of Military Application was 

changed in 1977 to Office of Military Application) initiated the 

chain of authority and approval for detonating each nuclear 

device by requesting each user laboratory and DNA to submit 

proposed test programs to DMA. This request was made in the 

spring of each year Eor tests to be conducted in the next fiscal 

year. DMA consolidated proposed test programs, developed a test 

program proposal while consulting with DOD, and generated a 

program approval request. DMA then presented the proposed test 

program to the National Security Council (NSC) Ad Hoc Committee 

on Nuclear Testing. Chaired by the NSC, this Committee included 

representatives of DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of 

State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management 

and Budget, Office of Science and Technology, and Central 

Intelligence Agency. After incorporating informal Committee 

15 
comments, DMA forwarded the proposed program from the Secretary 

of Energy to the President through the NSC. The NSC solicited 

and incorporated formal comments in its recommendation to the 

President. 

Test program approvals were requested at six-month 

intervals. Approval of tests for the first six months was 

received at the beginning of each fiscal year. The process was 

repeated six months later for tests in the last half of the 

fiscal year. Presidential approvals were signed by the Assistant 

to the President for National Security Affairs. Subsequently, 

test program authority messages were sent from the Director of 

DMA to the user laboratories, DNA, and AEC/NVOO. 

Authority to detonate each nuclear device was handled 

separately and individually. Technical content of detonation 

authority requests originated in presentations to the TEP by the 

user laboratory or DNA. After recommendations by the TEP, the 

AEC/NVOO Manager requested detonation authority from DMA. 

Required information in each request included statements on 

compliance with treaties, environmental impact, public 

announcement plans, test program authority, and any particularly 

noteworthy aspects of the test. After DMA and additional AX 

reviews, the AEC/NVOO Manager was notified of detonation 

authority approval. 

1.4.3 Nevada Test Site Organization 

As stated in Chapter 0101 of the Nevada Test Site Organization Standard Operating Procedure NTSO-0101-01 (Appendix E), 

the NTSO included, AEC, DOD, other user laboratory and contractor 

personnel who participated in or provided support for test 

operations at the NTS. The Manager, AEC/NVOO, headed the NTSO 

(Figure 3). The NTSO was a continuing task organization whose 

composition could be readily changed in response to the needs and 

16 
technical objectives of each test. The Continental Test Organization (CTO) was part of the original NTSO; however, it was disestablished on 1 August 1962 with its responsibilities (e.g., 

Military Deputy to the Manager, NVOO) being assumed by FC/DASA, 

WETG and subsequently by FC/DNA, Test Directorate. The Military 

Deputy to the Test Manager, as shown in Figure 3, was from 

Field Command and was responsible for coordinating DOD programs 

and support to NTSO. 

1.4.4 NTSO Radiological Safety 

The Test Controller was responsible for protection of participating personnel and offsite population from radiation hazards 

associated with activities conducted at NTS. By mutual agreement 

between the Test Controller and a scientific user (see Section 

1.4.51, control of radiation safety within the area assigned for 

a particular activity was delegated to the user's Test Group 

Director during the period of time when such control could have 

had a direct bearing of the success or failure of the scientific 

program. 

The onsite radiological safety support contractor (Radsafe) 

was responsible to the Test Controller for both routine and test 

event radiological safety onsite as detailed in Appendix D, USAEC 

NTSO SOP Chapter 0524, "Radiological Safety." During test 

events, as shown in Figure I of Appendix D and as discussed 

above, the Test Manager delegated control of radiation safety in 

the immediate test area to the user Test Group Director when he 

requested control. When this occurred, Radsafe was responsible 

to the Test Group Director through his radiological safety 

organization for support in his test area. 

17 
NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

OFFICE OF THE SITE MANAGER - 

1 

Figure 3. Nevada Test Site Organization (in 1972). 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)* was responsible to the Test Controller for operation of the offsite 

radiological safety program in accordance with procedures listed 

in Appendix D. 

1.4.5 NTS Scientific Users 

The NTS scientific users were DNA (for nuclear weapons 

effects) and the development laboratories: LASL, Lawrence 

Livermore Laboratory (LLL), and SLA. LASL and LLL were primarily 

involved in weapons related testing while SLA conducted a limited 

number of weapons effects tests and supported weapons related 

tests. A brief description of these laboratories follows: 

A. LASL was established early in 1943 as Los Alamos, 

Project Y, of the MED for the specific purpose of developing an atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists supervised the test detonation of the world's first atomic 

weapon in July 1945 at the TRINITY site in New Mexico. 

Los Alamos became LASL in January 1947, when the AEC and 

AFSWP were activated to replace the MED. The Laboratory's continuing assignment was to conceive, design, 

test, and develop nuclear components of atomic weapons. 

The contract under which LASL performed work for the AEC 

was first administered by the AEC Santa Fe Operations 

Office and later by the AEC Albuquerque Operations 

Office. The Laboratory was operated by the University 

of California. 

*The U.S. EPA was established in 1971, and the Las Vegas, Nevada 

office of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) became a part 

of the EPA. 

19 
B. LLL (originally UCRL and then Lawrence Radiation 

Laboratory) was established as a second AEC weapons 

laboratory at Livermore, California, in 1952. The 

Laboratory's responsibilities essentially were parallel 

to those of LASL. Devices developed by LLL first were 

tested in Nevada in 1953, and LLL-developed devices have 

been tested in each continental and Pacific series 

since. The contract under which LLL performed work for 

the AEC was administered by the AEC San Francisco 

Operations Office. This Laboratory also was operated by 

the University of California. 

c. SLA (originally Sandia Laboratory) at Sandia Base (now 

KAFB), Albuquerque, New Mexico, was the AEC's other 

weapons laboratory. It was established in 1946 as a 

branch of Los Alamos, but in 1949 assumed its identity 

as a full-fledged weapons research institution operated 

by the Sandia Corporation, a non-profit subsidiary of 

Western Electric. SLA's role was to conceive, design, 

test, and develop the non-nuclear phases of atomic 

weapons and to do other work in related fields. In 

1956, a Livermore Branch of Sandia Laboratories (SL) was 

established to provide closer support to developmental 

work of LLL. SL also operated ballistic test facilities 

for the AEC at the Tonopah Ballistics Range (now Tonopah 

Test Range) near Tonopah, Nevada. 

1.4.6 Test Support Organizations 

In keeping with its policy, AEC used private contractors for 

maintenance, operations, and construction (including military and 

civil defense construction) at the NTS. AEC/NVOO personnel 

administered all housekeeping, construction, and related services 

activity, but performance was by contractors. Major support 

contractors were the following: 

20 
Reynolds was the 

principal AK operational and support contractor for the 

NTS, providing electrical and architectural engineering, 

state-of-the-art large diameter and conventional shaft drilling, heavy duty construction and excavation, mining and 

tunneling, occupational safety and fire protection, radiological safety, toxic gas and explosive mixture monitoring, 

communications and electronics, power distribution, occupational medicine, and other support functions. REECo maintained offices in Las Vegas and extensive facilities 

necessary to operate NTS. 

Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., of Boston, Massachusetts, was the principal technical contractor, providing 

control point functions, such as timing and firing, and 

diagnostic functions, such as scientific photography and 

measurement of detonation characteristics. In addition, 

EG&G personnel manned the DOD monitor room. EG&G support 

facilities were maintained in Las Vegas and at NTS. 

Holmes & Narver, Inc., performed architect-engineer services 

for the NTS and was the principal support contractor for AEC 

off-continent operations. H&N had a home office in the Los 

Angeles area and also maintained offices in Las Vegas and at 

NTS. 

Since 1963, Fenix & Scisson, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma, was a 

consultant architect-engineer for drilling and mining operations in connection with underground nuclear testing. The 

company was involved in design of many underground structures, and in the field of deep, large-diameter, hole drilling. Las Vegas Branch activity was conducted from offices 

in Las Vegas and Mercury, Nevada. 

21 
Numerous other contractors, selected on the basis of lumpsum competitive bids, performed various construction and other 

support functions for AEC and DOD. 

1.5 THE NEVADA TEST SITE 

An on-continent location was selected for conducting nuclear 

weapons tests: construction began at what was called the Nevada 

Test Site in December 1950, and testing began in January 1951. 

The name was changed to the Nevada Proving Ground (NPG) in March 

of 1952 and again changed to the Nevada Test Site in 1955. 

The original boundaries were expanded as new testing areas 

and projects were added. Figure 4 shows the present NTS location 

bounded on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Range. The area 

of NTS was about 1,350 square miles in 1987. This testing location was selected for both safety and security reasons. The arid 

climate, lack of industrialization, and exclusion of the public 

from the Nellis Air Force Range combined to result in a very low 

population density in the area around NTS. 

The only paved roads within the NTS and Nellis Air Force 

Range complex were those constructed by the government for access 

purposes. NTS testing areas were physically protected by surrounding rugged topography. The few mountain passes and dry 

washes where four-wheel drive vehicles might enter were posted 

with warning signs and barricades. NTS security force personnel 

patrolled perimeter and barricade areas in aircraft and vehicles. 

Thus, unauthorized entry to NTS was difficult, and the possibility of a member of the public inadvertently entering an NTS testing area was extremely remote. 

Figure 5 shows the NTS, its various area designations, and 

the locations of the seven test events covered by this volume. 

22 


Generally, the "U" means an unaerground location, the number the 

area, and the "a" the first test location in an area; in addition, for tunnels, the "t.01" indicates the first drift from the 

main "t" tunnel, as Ul2t.01 in Figure 5. 

A low mountain range separated the base camp, Mercury, from 

the location of early AEC and DOD atmospheric tests at Frenchman 

Flat in Area 5. This area was later used for DOD underground 

testing. The elevation of Frenchman Dry Lake in the middle of 

the Flat is about 3,100 feet. 

A mountain pass separates Frenchman Flat from Yucca Flat 

testing areas. The pass overlooks both Frenchman and Yucca Flats 

and contains the CP complex of buildings including Control Point 

Building 1 (CP-1) where timing and firing for most atmospheric 

tests was performed, and Control Point Building 2 (CP-2) where 

radiological safety support was based. 

Yucca Flat testing areas include Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 

and 10. Underground tests were conducted in most of these areas 

and generally were shaft emplacement types. The elevation of 

Yucca Dry Lake at the south end of Yucca Flat is about 4,300 

feet. To the west of Yucca Flat, in another basin, is the Area 

ia testing location. Some DOD atmospheric tests were conducted 

in Area 18, and one DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted 

on Buckboard Mesa in this area at an elevation of about 5,500 

feet. Area 16 is in the mountains west of Yucca Flat toward Area 

ia. The single Area 16 tunnel complex at an elevation of about 

5,400 feet was a DOD underground testing location. 

Rainier Mesa is in Area 12 northwest of Yucca Flat, and the 

top of the Mesa is at an elevation of about 7,500 feet. All DOD 

tunnel-emplacement type events on NTS that were not in the Area 

16 tunnel complex or the Area 15 shaft and tunnel complex were in 

Rainier Mesa and the adjoining Pahute Mesa (parts of T Tunnel 

25 
were constructed in the adjoining Pahute Mesa). The major 

Rainier Mesa tunnel complexes were B, E, G, N, and T tunnels. 

Area 15 is in the foothills at the north end of Yucca Flat. 

The deepest of two access shafts drops 1,500 feet below the surface elevation of 5,100 feet. There were three events conducted 

in Area 15, all sponsored by DOD. HARD HAT and TINY TOT were 

discussed in Report DNA 6320F, Operations NOUGAT and WHETSTONE 

while PILE DRIVER was discussed Report DNA 6321F, Operations 

FLINTLOCK and LATCHKEY. 

26 
CHAPTER 2 

UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

Underground tests conducted at the NTS prior to 1962 

primarily were weapons related or were safety tests. These tests 

were controlled by the AEC and conducted by LASL or UCRL. 

Experience gained during these tests, in the area of containment 

of radioactivity underground, provided basic concepts to aid 

development of containment plans for DOD/DNA sponsored underground nuclear weapons effects tests which followed. These DOD 

tests generally were more complex than earlier AEC tests and required the development of new containment concepts and hardware. 

A primary consideration in all underground tests was the 

safety of test participants and the general public, especially 

regarding exposure to radioactive materials. This chapter 

discusses, in general terms, the basic mechanics of underground 

testing, containment and procedures, types of emplacement, 

diagnostic techniques, area access requirements, industrial and 

radiological safety, and radiation measuring systems. 

2.1 CONTAINMENT, PROBLEMS, AND PROCEDURES 

Completely containing radioactive material underground while 

accomplishing diagnostic measurements and effects experiments 

proved to be a major engineering challenge. Original efforts 

considered only detonation containment in competent rock formations. It was necessary to modify the original efforts to consider zones of weakness in rock caused by faults, and containment 

failures resulting from diagnostic and experiment structures. 

Under certain conditions, particularly the presence of clay or 

higher water content in rock near the detonation point, greater 

27 
than normal stresses could be generated, which could adversely 

affect containment. Some containment failures were partially 

attributable to additional overpressure from secondary gas 

expansion or, in other words, steam pressure. The major containment features and problems that evolved are discussed below. 

2.1.1 Shaft Event Containment 

Some of the first shaft-type safety experiments were in 

unstemmed shafts with concrete plugs penetrated by cable and 

instrumentation holes. When nuclear yields were produced, these 

emplacements did not completely contain the radioactive debris. 

The first method used to fully contain nuclear detonations in 

shafts was stemming, or filling the shaft with aggregate and sand 

after device emplacement. 

Keyed concrete plugs at different depths in the shaft stemming sometimes were used. The shaft diameter was enlarged at the 

plug construction location so the poured concrete plug would key 

into the ground surrounding the shaft and provide more strength 

against containment failure. Combinations of concrete and epoxy 

were used later, and epoxy replaced concrete as a plug material 

for some shaft-type emplacements. 

Radiochemical sampling pipes, LOS pipes, and other openings 

in stemming and plug containment features had to be closed 

rapidly after the detonation to prevent venting of radioactive 

effluent to the atmosphere. Closure systems driven by high 

explosives or compressed air were developed to seal the openings. 

After some of these early systems did not prevent releases of 

effluent to the atmosphere, use of openings to the surface for 

diagnostic or experiment purposes was discontinued for several 

years until technology improved. 

Scientific and other cables from the device emplacement to 

28 
the surface were another source of containment problems. While 

cables could be embedded in concrete and epoxy, which helped 

prevent leakage along the outside of the cables, radioactive 

gases under high pressure traveled along the inside of cables as 

a conduit to the surface. This problem was solved by embedding 

the inner components of cables in epoxy at appropriate locations 

or intervals, such as in epoxy or concrete plugs, in a technique 

called gas blocking. 

The most serious containment problems were caused by unanticipated geologic and hydrologic conditions at particular test locations. Even careful and rigorous calculations, engineering, 

construction, and preparations were inadequate when the presence 

of a geologic zone of weakness near the detonation point toward 

the surface was unknown. 

Another similar problem was the presence of higher water 

content than anticipated in rock formations surrounding or near 

the detonation point. This problem caused greater shock transmission plus secondary gas expansion when the water turned to 

steam. In addition, presence of sufficient iron in the test 

configuration caused disassociation of water with subsequent 

greater secondary gas expansion from hydrogen gas. A result was 

much higher and longer-sustained pressure from the detonation 

point toward the surface, and possible subsequent failure of 

geologic or constructed containment mechanisms. 

Recognizing and understanding geologic and hydrologic conditions at each test location was necessary before these containment problems could be solved. As additional information became 

available through drilling and intensive geologic studies, these 

problems were lessened by investigations of proposed detonation 

locations and application of detailed site selection criteria. 

29 
2.1.2 Tunnel Event Containment 

As with shaft-type detonations, containment methods used for 

tunnel events were designed using basic characteristics of the 

nuclear detonation. Tunnel configurations were constructed with 

device emplacements strategically located to cause sealing of the 

access tunnel by force of the detonation. Additional containment 

features were used to contain radioactive debris. 

One of the original user laboratory stemming configurations 

consisted of one or more sandbag plugs installed a short distance 

from the projected self-sealing location toward the tunnel entrance (portal). Two plugs, each about 60 feet in length, were a 

typical installation. The sandbag plugs later were changed to 

solid sand backfill plugs several hundreds of feet long from the 

device location. In many cases, the sand stemming had short sections of air voids between the plugs. Farther toward the portal, 

a keyed concrete plug with a metal blast door was constructed. 

The blast door was designed to contain any gases, with pressures 

up to 75 pounds per square inch (psi), that might penetrate the 

sandbag plugs. 

Also as with shaft-type detonations, the unknown presence of 

undesirable geologic and hydrologic conditions sometimes caused 

venting of radioactive effluent either through the overburden 

(ground above the tunnel) to the surface, through fissures opened 

between the detonation point and the main tunnel, or through the 

plugs and blast door to the main tunnel vent holes and portal. 

More substantial containment features evolved as containment 

problems became better understood and tunnel events became more 

complex. 

The first DOD tunnel test was MARSHMALLOW (1962). Stemming 

for that event consisted of four sandbag plugs extending out to a 

distance of a few hundred feet from the nuclear device (similar 

30 
to earlier AEC-sponsored events). A gas seal door (blast door) 

was installed in the main access drift. The next DOD tunnel test 

(GUMDROP, 1965) used sand backfill, with a few air gaps, out to a 

few hundred feet. As DOD tunnel testing continued, sand plugs 

gradually were replaced with various grout mixtures. Some grout 

mixtures were designed to match the strength and shock propagation of the native tunnel material (usually ash-fall tuff) while 

other grout mixtures were designed to be weaker and to form a 

solid stemming plug shortly after device detonation. 

Also, as tunnel testing continued, the gas seal (blast) door 

no longer was used as a containment device and was replaced by 

strong concrete plugs 10 to 20 feet long. These plugs were keyed 

into the tunnel wall and were designed to withstand overpressures 

up to 1000 psi. A small access hatch was constructed, and some 

of the plugs were penetrated with electrical cables and steel 

pipes. All of these penetrations were gas sealed, or capped, to 

provide protection against possible gas seepage through the plug. 

Use of horizontal line-of-sight (HLOS).pipes in tunnel 

events necessitated development of additional closure systems. 

The HLOS pipe tunnel and its access tunnels generally were separated from the main tunnel by one or more concrete plugs. These 

closure systems primarily were for protection of the experiments 

inside the HLOS pipe but also were considered useful features for 

the formation of a stemming plug. 

The tunnel volume outside of the pipe was filled by stemming 

or grouting, while the experiments inside the HLOS pipe were protected by mechanical closure systems. Various closure systems 

were used, including compressed air or explosive-driven gates and 

doors which closed off the HLOS pipe from the detonation within a 

small fraction of a second after detonation time. One of these 

mechanical closures was the tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS) unit, 

31 
first used on the DOOR MIST event. The TAPS was a heavy steel 

door that was released at shot time and fell to the closed 

position in less than one second. 

Gas blocking techniques similar to those used in shaft 

events were used to prevent leakage of radioactive gases along or 

through cables from the diagnostic and experiment locations to 

the surface. Additionally, a gas seal door usually was installed 

in the main drift nearer the portal than the concrete plug. 

Utility pipes, such as for compressed air, that passed through 

stemming and plugs also were sealed by closure systems. 

2.1.3 Containment Evaluation Panel 

When containment problems were particularly difficult, the 

AEC began to change its emphasis on conditions under which 

nuclear detonations should be conducted. 

The Manager, AEC/NVOO, had primary responsibility for taking 

all reasonable steps to assure that each test was successfully 

contained and carried out in accordance with AEC policies. Containment of DOD tests was a joint effort on the part of AK, DOD, 

and contractor scientists and engineers. To carry out this responsibility, AEC/NVOO established a Test Evaluation Panel (TEP) 

on 17 December 1963 to review plans presented by user testing 

organizations (LASL, LLL, SL, and FC/DNA) for each test program. 

The chairman of this panel represented the Manager, AEC/NVOO and 

membership consisted of two representatives (one voting member 

plus an alternate) from each of the user testing organizations, 

plus specialists from contractor and other government 

organizations (such as the U.S. Geological Survey). Other 

AK/NV00 contractor personnel were available to present 

information in their areas of expertise (e.g., mining and drilling operations). The primary concern of this panel was the 

underground containment of radioactive material. 

32 
On 19 March 1971 while testing was suspended because containment failure had caused serious venting of a laboratory test 

(BANEBERRY Event), the TEP was changed to the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP). The CEP was instructed to give increased 

emphasis to containment of radioactive material and the membership of the panel was enlarged to include contractors and 

consultants representing additional areas of expertise. Each 

underground testing organization was represented as before. 

Prior to a formal meeting of the CEP, each user planning a 

nuclear test prepared a written containment prospectus which was 

submitted to each panel member for review. This information was 

then presented to the CEP by the individual users, generally at 

the next meeting (meetings were held about ten times a year). 

Details of the containment plan and comparisons to previous 

successful experiences were reviewed by the panel. Each member 

(or alternate) was requested to submit a written statement 

describing the details considered favorable or unfavorable to 

successful containment and to vote a Category A, Category B, or 

Category C. 

Successful containment was defined as containment such that 

a test resulted in no radioactivity detectable offsite as 

measured by normal monitoring equipment and no unanticipated 

release of radioactivity onsite. Anticipated releases were 

designed to conform to specific guidance from AEC/DMA. Category 

A was defined as "considering all containment features and 

appropriate historical, empirical, and analytical data, the 

judgment of the member indicates a high confidence in successful 

containment." Category B was defined as "considering all 

containment features and appropriate historical, empirical, and 

analytical data, the best judgment of the member indicates a 

lesser, but still adequate, degree of confidence in successful 

containment." Category C was defined as "considering all 

containment features and appropriate historical, empirical, and 

33 
analytical data, the best judgment of the member indicates some 

doubt that successful containment will be achieved." A written 

report of the CEP meeting, containing the containment prospectus, 

the record of all discussion and the vote of each member or 

independent consultant, was forwarded to Headquarters, AEC, for 

review and recommendation for approval to execute the event. 

2.1.4 Test Manager's Advisory Panel 

Careful consideration of each test event by the CEP to avoid 

releases of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere was followed 

by additional precautions prior to test event execution. If an 

unanticipated release of effluent from an underground detonation 

occurred, it was necessary to assure protection of onsite participants and the offsite population. The Test Manager's Advisory 

Panel was composed of a Scientific Advisor and representatives 

from each organization which could contribute information to this 

protection goal. 

This Panel met at readiness briefings in advance of each 

event and in the Control Room prior to and during execution of 

each event. Panel members briefed the Test Manager's representative, later named the Test Controller (who replaced the Test 

Manager in 1972), on aspects of containment, seismic shock, 

possible radiation releases, weather, and area control plans 

pertinent to that particular test. Information presented was 

then evaluated by each Advisory Panel member and a recommendation 

to proceed with the test or to delay for more favorable conditions was made. 

Meteorological conditions were considered in detail. 

National weather data were coupled with local wind data (obtained 

from weather balloons released and tracked from stations on and 

around NTS) both preceeding and during each test to predict where 

an unanticipated release of effluent might be transported off NTS 

34 
and what the levels of radiation might be -in the predicted effluent cloud directions. These meteorological data also were 

used with appropriate release models to calculate potential 

external gamma exposures and thyroid doses at offsite locations. 

Locations of population centers, each dairy cow, and 

people at ranches and mines in the projected effluent cloud 

directions were presented and evaluated. EPA personnel in the 

offsite areas notified mining people to be above ground for 

safety purposes at the anticipated detonation time of tests which 

might cause a ground shock hazard. This information and numbers 

of people who might need to be advised to stay under cover or be 

evacuated were presented for consideration. EPA personnel 

started offsite air samplers and placed radiation dosimeters in 

offsite locations before detonation time. Readiness information 

included capability for advising state officials to institute a 

milk diversion program if cattle feed or milk might become contaminated, and to replace milk and dry feed for family dairy 

cows. 

Status of standby aircraft for effluent cloud sampling and 

tracking capability was presented. Communications between offsite weather stations and EPA personnel were checked to assure 

proper operation. 

Radsafe personnel onsite assured that remote radiation monitoring stations in the test area and in other NTS areas were 

functional. Data from these stations, the weather stations, offsite EPA personnel, and personnel clearing the test area were 

displayed in the Control Room for continued visual examination by 

the Test Controller and the Advisory Panel. In addition, closedcircuit television cameras were operational in the test area on 

the ground and in helicopters to detect any visual indications of 

possible effluent release and alert the Test Controller and the 

Advisory Panel members. 

35 
If the Test Controller decided that a projected effluent 

direction was close to populated areas, or weather conditions 

were not stable enough to determine the direction of any released 

effluent after detonation, the decision was not given to arm and 

detonate and the test was either postponed for another day or 

placed on hold until conditions were favorable. 

Conditions were considered favorable when projected effluent 

direction was toward sparsely populated areas, weather conditions 

were relatively stable, EPA personnel could contact the few 

residents in the projected effluent direction and advise them of 

protective actions to be taken, and impact on milk supply from 

dairy cattle would be minimal. In addition, all essential 

equipment, personnel, and procedures were required to be in 

readiness status or initiated before permission to arm and 

detonate was given. 

Permission to arm usually was given at least two hours before detonation to allow time for arming, securing of the test 

configuration and containment systems, and departure of the arming party from the test area. The detonation, however, could be 

delayed at any moment up to detonation time, or postponed until 

another day when conditions were favorable. 

The Test Controller and the Advisory Panel received information, watched visible displays, and communicated with their 

field personnel up to detonation and after the test for a sufficient time to assure that venting had not occurred. Remote 

radiation detection instrument readings and closed-circuit television of the test area were monitored to detect any indication 

of effluent release. 

When all other indications of venting were negative, and the 

Test Controller determined personnel could reenter the test location, (e.g., subsidence craters had formed for shaft-type detona36 
tions, and cavity collapse had occurred for tunnel-type emplacements, as indicated by geophones) initial radiation survey teams 

entered the test area to confirm that radioactive effluent had 

not been released and that any radiation levels were low enough 

for experiment data recovery to begin. For tunnel emplacementtype tests, reentry of the tunnel itself, after initial survey of 

the surface areas and recovery of data, was a matter for separate 

and careful consideration by the Test Group Director and 

radiological safety personnel. 

2.1.5 Effluent Release Procedures 

If radioactive effluent was released from an underground 

test event, established procedures were initiated in accordance 

with the intent of NTSO-0524, "Radiological Safety (Appendix D): 

protection of participating personnel and off-site population 

from radiation hazards associated with activities conducted at 

the NTS." Immediately upon detection of possible venting and 

effluent release after a detonation, the following procedures 

were to be initiated: 

A. For some tests, Radsafe survey teams were at manned 

stations in the test area. These teams or those at 

check points were released to make radiation measurements to be used in determining direction and radiation 

levels of radioactive effluent. 

B. Aircraft were standing by to sample and track the 

effluent. Data reported were used to further refine 

information on effluent direction and radioactivity 

concentrations. 

c. EPA monitors in offsite areas, previously stationed in 

the projected path of any released effluent, were advised of actual effluent direction and radioactivity 

37 
measurement data and directed to move sampling and 

dosimeter equipment, perform ground radiation surveys, 

and notify residents and workers in the effluent path of 

any necessary precautionary measures, such as remaining 

in buildings or evacuating the area temporarily. 

D. Capabilities were held in readiness to advise state officials to implement a milk diversion program. If this 

was necessary, Nevada and neighboring state officials 

could be advised to impound and replace milk supplies 

possibly contaminated through the cattle feed pathway, 

and hold impounded milk for decay of the probable contaminants, radioiodines, before using it for other purposes. On a localized basis, EPA personnel were ready 

to replace family dairy cow milk with fresh milk, and 

analyze milk for concentrations of specific radionuelides. Dry feed supplies also could be replaced for 

family dairy cattle if required. 

E. Capabilities were in readiness for thyroid monitoring of 

offsite individuals possibly exposed to radioiodines in 

the effluent. These mobile monitoring stations could be 

used in the offsite areas for screening measurements to 

determine if any offsite residents or workers exhibited 

thyroid radioactivity and should be transported to Las 

Vegas facilities for more precise thyroid measurements 

and dose assignment. 

Each of the above procedures was established to avoid or 

minimize exposure of the offsite population and maintain any such 

exposures below the radiation protection standards for individuals and population groups in uncontrolled areas, as established 

in NTSO-0524, "Radiological Safety" (see Appendix D). 

While the above procedures were to be initiated, additional 

38 
onsite procedures were to be implemented. Radsafe survey teams, 

when released by the Test Controller, were to survey the test 

area in sufficient detail to plot gamma radiation isointensity 

lines on NTS maps and provide specific intensity measurements at 

experiment stations on the surface and at other locations of 

interest. These data could be used by the Test Controller in 

releasing personnel to enter radiation areas in the controlled 

area, and by the Test Group Director in determining when surveys 

of his immediate test area and recoveries of experiment data 

could be accomplished. These decisions included calculations of 

personnel gamma radiation doses based on survey data, radiation 

intensities at recovery locations, and estimated times in area, 

and assurance that exposures would be limited only to those 

necessary and below the standards established in NTSO-0524. 

Some tunnel-type emplacement tests that did not result in 

venting of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere did result in 

failure of containment systems within the tunnels. High radiation levels then existed in locations where reentry personnel 

needed to enter for data recovery purposes. Procedures developed 

to minimize exposures of reentry and recovery personnel included 

remote radiation detectors located at strategic tunnel complex 

locations, remote tunnel atmosphere samplers that removed tunnel 

air to locations outside the tunnel for analysis, and tunnel 

filtration systems that allowed controlled ventilation of tunnels 

before reentry, with only gaseous radionuclides released to the 

atmosphere. 

The remote monitoring and sampling equipment provided information on radiation levels, toxic gases, and explosive mixtures 

necessary to determine whether tunnel ventilation should be accomplished before reentry. Tunnel filtration systems stopped 

particulate radioactivity, and activated charcoal in the filter 

system absorbed most of the radioiodines, thus allowing primarily 

only radionuclides of the noble gases, such as xenon, to be 

39 
released to the atmosphere. Exposure to radionuclides of the 

noble gases is far less hazardous than exposure to the other 

fission products. Release of this radioactive material to the 

atmosphere in a gradual, controlled manner during tunnel ventilation always was subject to approval by the Test Controller. 

2.2 EMPLACEMENT TYPES 

The DOD conducted seven underground nuclear tests which are 

covered in this report period, and two VELA UNIFORM tests which 

are not covered (see Preface) during this report period. Table 1 

lists the seven events and pertinent data. There were two shaft 

and five tunnel-type tests during Operations MANDREL and GROMMET. 

These emplacement types are discussed in this section. An emplacement type not discussed in this volume is one that results 

in excavating or ejecting material from the ground surface to 

form a crater (see Crater Experiment in the Glossary of Terms). 

A DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted in 1962 during 

Operation NOUGAT. 

2.2.1 Vertical Shaft-Type Emplacement 

A shaft-type nuclear detonation was intended to be contained 

underground. A vertical shaft was usually drilled, but sometimes 

mined, and it may have been lined with a steel casing or have 

been uncased. The nuclear device was emplaced at a depth established to contain the explosion. At detonation time, a cavity 

formed by vaporized rock under pressure held surrounding broken 

rock in place until the cavity cooled sufficiently to decrease 

pressure. As broken rock fell into the cavity formed by the 

detonation, a chimney was formed. If the chimney of falling rock 

reached the surface, a subsidence crater was formed. Figure 6 

shows a typical subsidence crater. 

40 
Table 1. DOD Events - 12 September 1969 thru 2 May 1972. 

OPERATION MANDREL GROMMET 

TEST EVENT 

DATE 12 Sep 69 6 Dee 69 11 Feb 70 6 May 70 26 May 70 24 Nov 71 2 May 72 

LOCqL TIME (hours) 

NTS LOCATION 

TYPE 

DEPTH (feet) 

YIELD* 

1102 PDT 0900 PST1116 PST 0830 PDT 0716 PDT1216 PST 1216 PDT 

Ullf Ul2e.11 U12n.06 Ul21.01 Ul2e.12 Ullg UlPn.06 

Shaft Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Shaft Tunnel 

867 1,386 1.319 1,330 1,386 807 1.234 

Low Low Low Low Low LOW Low 

+ LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 

If a device was emplaced too deeply in the alluvium of 

Frenchman or Yucca Flat for the detonation yield, or the depth 

was correct but the yield was much less than anticipated, a 

subsidence crater might not form: that is, the chimney might not 

reach the surface. This was a problem during early years of 

underground testing when it was necessary to move drill rigs into 

subsidence craters soon after tests for cavity sample recovery 

purposes. If a subsidence crater did not form, drill rigs could 

not be moved to surface ground zero (SGZ). When directional 

drilling from outside the crater was implemented, lack of a subsidence crater in alluvium became less of a problem. Experience 

gained with depth of device burial also reduced the chance of 

subsidence craters not forming in alluvium. 

The two vertical shaft-type underground tests conducted by 

DOD during the period covered by this volume each included a 

vertical line-of-sight (VLOS) pipe system to the surface and a 

mobile tower on the surface that contained the weapons effects 

experiments (see Figure 7). The VLOS pipe system contained 

several mechanical closures designed to prevent the release of 

radioactivity into the atmosphere. These closures were open at 

the time of detonation but closed within milliseconds to stop the 

flow of material up the pipe. The open volume between the VLOS 

pipe and the wall of the drill hole was filled with sand and 

other materials. One or more non-porous material plugs were 

placed around the pipe. Electrical cables which went downhole 

were gas blocked to prevent gas seepage to the surface. Effects 

experiments were contained in a mobile tower on the surface that 

was moved away from the hole after device detonation, but before 

surface collapse (formation of subsidence crater). One potential 

problem was the possibility of seepage after surface collapse if 

some pathway to the surface developed. Some radioactive effluent 

was released into the atmosphere after several previous VLOS-pipe 

system tests not covered in this report. 

43 
SURFACE 

EFFECTS 

EXPERIMENT 

IN MOBILE TOWER I 

WALL OF DRILL HOLE 

AND VLOS PIPE) 

NOTE: 

NOT TO SCALE 

+VERTICAL-LINE-OF-SIGHT 

.. 

. ...’ .* PIPE SYSTEM 

$% MECHANICAL CLOSURES 

e 

;;:j$- 

WALL OF DRILL HOLE 

(USUALLY STEELICINED) 

m MECHANICAL CLOSURES 

Figure 7. Vertical LOS pipe configuration. 

44 
2.2.2 Tunnel-Type Emplacement 

Tunnel-type nuclear detonations were intended to be completely contained. The nuclear device was emplaced in a mined 

drift (tunnel) at a depth designed to contain the detonation. 

The native material at tunnel elevation for events covered in 

this report was ash-fall tuff. Chimneying of broken rock to the 

surface was rare for Rainier Mesa tunnel events, primarily 

because there was a layer of welded rhyolitic ash-flow tuff at 

and below the surface of Rainier Mesa. This tuff has a higher 

density than ash-fall tuff and is more competent (has more 

strength) than the alluvial material in Frenchman and Yucca 

Flats. Tunnel-type emplacements were in one of several 

configurations: at the end of a single horizontal tunnel into a 

mountain or mesa, at the end of a drift (tunnel) within a tunnel 

complex, at the end of a horizontal tunnel driven from a vertical 

shaft, or in a cavity mined from a horizontal tunnel or vertical 

shaft. 

During the period covered by this report, the five tunneltype emplacements included HLOS pipe systems placed in horizontal 

drifts in tunnel complexes (see Figure 8). Each device was 

placed close to the end of a drift inside a tunnel complex. An 

HLOS pipe system, including several mechanical closures and one 

or more test chambers (which contained effects experiments), were 

installed in the drift. The void space between the tunnel walls 

and the HLOS pipe was filled (stemmed) with different mixtures of 

grout as plugs and/or sand plugs out to a distance of several 

hundred feet from the device location. Two or more concrete 

plugs were keyed into the tunnel walls between the test chamber 

and the main tunnel of the complex entrance. The primary 

containment system was the closure of the tunnel in the stemmed 

area. Ground shock and expansion of gaseous cavity material 

exerted pressure on the tunnel walls and stemming materials to 

form a stemming plug (closing the tunnel and HLOS pipe). All 

electrical cables and other penetrations within the stemmed area 

45 
. 

46 
were gas blocked carefully to prevent or minimize seepage of 

radioactive gas through the stemming plug. The mechanical 

closures were designed primarily to protect effects experiments; 

however, they also had some effect on formation of the stemming 

plug. Concrete plugs were backup containment features. In the 

event the stemming plug did not contain radioactive gases, concrete plugs were designed to withstand the maximum expected pressure and temperature. 

FC/DNA has led in development of tunnel containment systems 

and has maintained continuing research and development programs 

to improve containment of tunnel events. 

2.3 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES 

The transition from atmospheric to underground testing substantially reduced release of radioactive materials to the 

atmosphere and also required development of new device diagnostic 

techniques. On atmospheric tests, high speed photography 

recorded fireball growth and aircraft collected samples from the 

radioactive cloud for diagnostic measurement analyses. Because 

such systems could not be used on underground tests, several new 

diagnostic techniques were developed (some of which are discussed 

in the following subsections). 

2.3.1 Radiation Measurements 

Measurements of radiation from an underground detonation 

were made possible by developing a system of remote detectors and 

cabling to send signals to recording facilities located on the 

surface. Detectors utilizing various physical characteristics of 

the radiations to be measured were installed near the nuclear 

device. High-specification coaxial cable and connectors carried 

measurement signals to the surface where electronic equipment, 

47 
film, and magnetic tape recorded the signals. 

Detector signals were on the way to recording equipment in 

billionths of a second after a detonation, before detectors were 

destroyed. These measurement systems required the most advanced 

electronic technology available. Indeed, considerable research 

and development were necessary to acquire and refine these 

capabilities. 

2.3.2 Radiochemical Measurements 

Because clouds from atmospheric detonations no longer were 

available to sample for diagnostic purposes, techniques were 

developed to obtain samples of debris from underground detonations for radiochemical analyses and subsequent yield determinations. The first systems were radiochemical sampling pipes 

leading directly from the device emplacements to filtering equipment on the surface. These pipes required closure systems to 

prevent overpressure from venting radioactive effluent into the 

atmosphere after samples were collected. 

While these systems functioned as intended for most detonations, the systems did not function properly during all tests, 

and some radioactive effluent was released into the atmosphere. 

Subsequently, regular use of radiochemical sampling pipes to the 

surface was discontinued for a time until technology improved. 

A major radiochemistry sampling method which continued in 

use for shaft detonations was postevent core drilling. The 

objective of this drilling was to obtain samples of solidified 

radioactive debris, which had collected in a molten pool at the 

bottom of the cavity produced by the detonation. This method 

required and resulted in development of precise directional 

drilling techniques and several advancements in the science of 

core drilling. 

48 
2.4 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS 

DOD/DNA events were conducted primarily to obtain nuclear 

weapons effects data. The effects of blast and shock, thermal 

radiation and nuclear radiation had been investigated earlier 

during atmospheric and underwater tests. Military equipment, 

structures, and materials had been exposed to various nuclear 

effects. The transition to underground testing required development of new test techniques. One important new technology was 

simulation of high altitude (to exoatmospheric) conditions for 

radiation effects experiments. 

This simulation technique involved placing experiments inside test chambers and providing a low pressure atmospheric condition from the nuclear device to the experiments. This was 

achieved by using large vacuum pumps to reduce pressure inside 

the steel LOS pipe to match the pressure of the desired altitude. 

Experiments were passive or active. Passive experiments involved placing experiment equipment in the test chambers, exposing it to the desired nuclear environment, removing equipment, 

and analyzing it to obtain effects results. Active experiments 

utilized various sensors and high speed electronic recording 

equipment to obtain data. Many active (diagnostic) experiments 

also involved recovery and analysis to obtain effects results. 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 

Access to underground workings and drilling sites was controlled for a number of reasons. During construction, safety of 

both workers and visitors in these locations could have been 

jeopardized by carelessness or seemingly harmless activities of 

untrained and uncontrolled workers or visitors. When securityclassified materials were in these locations, only personnel with 

49 
appropriate security clearances were permitted access. The 

presence, or anticipated presence, of radioactive material in 

these locations required access control for radiological safety 

purposes. Access requirements established for the above purposes 

are discussed below. 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control 

During construction and preparations for a DOD event in a 

tunnel or other underground working, the tunnel superintendent 

was responsible to the REECo project manager for safety of personnel underground. From 1962 forward, Radsafe log books and 

tunnel log books usually were used to record names and radiation 

exposure information for only those persons entering a tunnel 

during postevent reentry and recovery operations. In the early 

197os, as a result of the Mine Safety and Health Act, tunnel log 

books were expanded to list all persons entering the tunnels 

(i.e., mining, drilling, Radsafe, etc.). Visitors and other 

personnel not assigned to work in the tunnel obtained permission 

for entry from the superintendent, or his representative, and 

were apprised of tunnel conditions and safety regulations. In 

the event of an accident or other emergency condition.underground, the log book provided information on numbers of personnel 

and their locations underground. 

When classified material was in the tunnel prior to a test 

event, and during initial reentry after an event, the DOD Test 

Group Director, or his representative, was responsible for entry 

and safety of personnel underground. Security personnel checked 

for proper security and entry clearances, and maintained records 

of all personnel entering the tunnel, and safeguarded classified 

material and the device. The check point was often well inside 

the portal thus allowing several activities to be conducted 

simultaneously. 

50 
Control of tunnel access reverted to tunnel management personnel after tunnel reentry and recoveries. Entry procedures and 

use of the tunnel log book, if appropriate, were then as discussed above. 

Additional access controls were instituted for radiological 

safety purposes after an event or during construction and event 

preparations when radioactivity from a previous event could be 

encountered. Part or all of a tunnel complex could be established as a radiation exclusion (radex) area. 

All persons entering radex areas were logged on Area Access 

Registers. Names and organizations represented were listed. 

Radiation exposures from reports for the year and quarter were 

listed upon entry. Self-reading pocket dosimeter measurements 

were added upon exit. This was to assure that personnel 

approaching radiation exposure guide limits would not be allowed 

to enter radex areas when they could accumulate exposures above 

guide amounts. 

Before entry, personnel were dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection as needed for the particular 

radiological conditions in the tunnel. Upon exit, anticontamination clothing was removed, personnel were monitored for radioactive contamination, and decontamination was accomplished, if 

necessary. 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control 

Access to drilling areas was controlled by the drilling 

superintendent and the DOD Test Group Director for the same 

reasons as controlling access to underground workings. During 

drilling of an emplacement shaft, and during postevent drillback 

operations to recover radioactive core samples, personnel safety 

and compliance with safety regulations were emphasized continuously. 

51 
During pre-event drilling activities, all visitors were required to contact the drilling superintendent before entry to the 

drilling site. Names of visitors and purposes of visits were 

entered in the daily drilling report, and it was assured that 

visitors had hard hats and understood safety regulations. 

The laboratory which provided the device controlled access 

to the area, assisted by security force personnel when classified 

materials (including the nuclear device) were brought into the 

area for emplacement, as in similar tunnel operations. After the 

event, when the drill site was a radex area, during classified 

material removal, or during postevent drilling, both security and 

radiological safety access controls were in effect as discussed 

under "Tunnel Access Control." 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 

Implementation of an effective industrial.safety program was 

an important part of any heavy construction operation. Mining 

and drilling operations had a particularly high accident potential. These operations at the NTS involved additional safety 

problems resulting from detonation-induced unstable ground conditions and potential for encountering toxic gases, explosive mixtures, and radioactivity. 

Miles of underground workings were constructed. More depth 

of big holes (three-foot diameter or larger) were drilled than 

the known total drilled in the rest of the world. Directional 

and core drilling to recover radioactive debris samples after 

underground nuclear detonations advanced the science of these 

drilling techniques. These operations often were accomplished 

under unusual conditions with accompanying difficult safety problems. 

52 
However, the lost-time accident frequency for the NTS support contractor employing most of the NTS personnel (REECo) was 

only one-tenth of the frequency for the heavy construction industry at large (as determined by annual surveys and reports for 

300 heavy construction corporations). This excellent safety 

record was attained by continuing attention to indoctrinating and 

training NTS personnel, investigating and determining causes of 

accidents at NTS, implementing and enforcing safety regulations, 

and, most important, maintaining the safety awareness of NTS 

personnel. 

This was a joint effort by the DOE and DNA, and their 

predecessors, and by the many other government agencies and 

contractors at NTS. Administered by REECo, the safety program 

enjoined all NTS personnel to conduct operations safely, and was 

exemplified by signs on the portal of a typical DOD tunnel 

complex as shown in Figure 9, which includes "Safety With 

Production Is Our Goal." 

The safety procedures for all NTS operations are voluminous 

and cannot be included in this report. Appendix C of this report 

is an example of pertinent safety procedures: General Tunnel 

Reentry Procedures for Department of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Tests. As these procedures indicate, several aspects of 

industrial safety are interrelated. Information on monitoring 

levels of radioactivity and personnel exposures to radiation is 

presented in the next section. 

Monitoring of toxic gases and explosive mixtures was an 

important aspect of safety in underground workings, on drill 

rigs, and in drillhole cellars (enlarged first part of drillhole 

for valving and other equipment). Toxic gases and explosive mixtures were created by both the nuclear detonations and the mining 

and drilling operations. Draeger multi-gas detectors and MSA 

explosimeters were used to detect such gases. Fyrite or J&W 

53 

oxygen indicators were used to determine o.xygen content of the 

working atmosphere. Requirements were that tunnel and drill rig 

breathing atmosphere contain at least 19.5 percent oxygen. 

During the period covered by this volume, it was required that 

the breathing atmosphere contain less than the following levels 

of toxic gases and explosive mixtures: 

Gases 

Carbon monoxide, CO 

Carbon dioxide, CO2 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen 

dioxide, NO + NO2 

Nitrogen dioxide, NO2 

Explosive mixtures 

Maximum Concentration 

50 PPm 

5000 ppm 

25 PPm 

5 ppm 

10% of LEL (lower 

explosive limit) 

Procedures for controlling explosive mixtures and toxic 

gases after each test event are discussed in event chapters as 

appropriate. 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES 

Procedures were developed in an effort to evaluate radiological, toxic, and other hazards, and protect workers and the 

public from unnecessary exposures. The following were the 

primary written procedures and implementation methods used at the 

NTS from 1969 through 1972. 

2.7.1 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Test Site Organization - Standard Operating Procedure (NTSO-SOP), Chapter 

0524, Radiological Safety. 

Chapter 0524, which appears as Appendix D to this volume, 

defined responsibility and established criteria and general pro55 
cedures for radiological safety associated with NTS programs. 

Some but not all of the major areas discussed are film badge 

procedures, radiation surveys, entry into controlled areas, and 

radiation exposure guides. Roles of the onsite REECo Radiological Sciences Department and the offsite EPA are defined in 

NTSO-SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.2 Standard Operating Procedures for the Radioloqical 

Sciences Department, REECo. 

These procedures were prepared and updated annually to 

address in more detail the radiological safety aspects discussed 

in the latest revision of NTSO-SOP Chapter 0524. The same major 

areas were discussed; but in a more specific manner. 

2.7.3 Implementation of radiological procedures; required equipment, devices, and capabilities for monitoring radiation levels 

in the environment; and monitoring external and internal exposures of personnel. 

Equipment and devices used 

capabilities, were as follows: 

for these purposes and necessary 

A. Portable Radiation Detection Equipment 

- Eberline PAC 4G (alpha) 

- Eberline PAC 1SA (alpha) 

- Jordan AGB-SOOB-SR Radector (gamma) 

- Jordan AGB-lOK-SR Radgun (beta and gamma) 

- Eberline E-500B Survey Meter (beta and gamma) 

- Technical Associates and Hanford Cutie Pie 

Survey Meter (beta and gamma) 

- Technical Associates Juno Survey Meter (alpha, beta, 

and gamma) 

- Precision Model P-111 Scintillator (gamma) 

56 
8. Air Sampling Equipment 

- Model 102 semi-portable sampler 

- Satellite sampler 

- Hurricane high volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

- Vacuum pump low volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

c. Laboratory Analysis Capability 

The Radiological Sciences Laboratory analyzed air, soil, 

water, surface swipe, nasal swab, urine, and wound swab 

samples for some or all of the following activities: 

gross alpha and beta, gross fission products, tritium, 

strontium-90, plutonium-239, and spectrographic analysis 

of specific gamma-emitting radionuclides. The laboratory also analyzed some of the above samples for nonradioactive materials, such as beryllium, through use of an 

emission spectrograph and by wet chemistry procedures. 

A spectrophotometer was used to analyze for other materials. 

D. Monitorinq of Personnel Exposures 

The NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security 

credential holder was placed in use in 1966 to provide 

increased personnel dosimetry capability necessary to 

meet the radiation exposure problems associated with 

nuclear rocket testing and underground nuclear 

detonations. The holder, designed to accommodate a 

DuPont type 556 film packet, a fast neutron packet, and 

identification plate, criticality accident components, 

the security credential, and a snap-type clip, had 

capabilities for determining beta, gamma, x-ray, thermal 

neutron, fast neutron, high range gamma, and high range 

neutron doses. Components for criticality accidents 

57 
(unintentional or accidental nuclear fissioning of 

device critical materials) included materials which 

could detect and measure neutron and gamma radiation 

exposures above the ranges of the film packets. The 

DuPont 556 film packet contained two component films, 

type 519 (low range) and type 834 (high range). Gamma 

exposure ranges of the two components were 30 mR to 10 R 

and 10 R to 800 R, respectively. The NTS combination 

personnel dosimeter and security credential holder is 

shown in Figure 10. 

Film badges were exchanged routinely each month for all 

individuals, and upon exit from a radex area when it was 

suspected that an individual had received 100 mR or more 

of exposure. 

Personnel entering radex areas also were issued selfreading pocket dosimeters which indicated accumulated 

exposure. Upon exit, pocket dosimeter readings were 

entered on Area Access Registers and added to the yearly 

and quarterly accumulated exposures from the automated 

daily NTS radiation exposure report for use until results of film packet processing were included. Pocket 

dosimeter readings only were estimates because such 

readings were less accurate than the doses of record 

determined after processing film packets. 

This use of Area Access Registers helped to maintain 

personnel exposures below the whole-body exposure guides 

in Chapter 0524: 3000 mrem per quarter and 5000 mrem 

per year. Personnel with exposures from the report plus 

any pocket dosimeter reading since the report in excess 

of 2500 mrem per quarter or 4500 mrem per year were 

advised not to enter radex areas, and their supervisory 

personnel were so notified. 

58 

2.7.4 Additional methods used for control of radex areas and to 

prevent spread of contamination to uncontrolled areas were 

as follows: 

A daily log book was maintained by Radsafe monitors for 

each radex area location. These logs were used to record 

the following information: 

A. Work accomplished: Where people worked and what work 

was accomplished were briefly described. Any unusual 

conditions, such as equipment failure and operational 

difficulties, were listed. 

B. Visitors: First and last names of visitors were 

entered. Their destination and reason for their visit 

were included where possible. Time they entered and 

exited the area and results of personnel monitoring 

were recorded. 

C. Unusual occurrences: Any unusual events which occurred during the shift were recorded. Included in this 

entry were accidents, high-volume water seepage, or 

any other occurrence of an unusual nature. 

D. Surveys and samples: Information collected was recorded as follows: 

Survey type - Routine or Special* 

Sample type - Routine or Special* 

*Indicate req uester's name for Special type. 

E. Date and siqnature: The date and shift were entered 

at the beginning of the work period and the log book 

was signed before leaving the shift. 

60 
Personnel leaving radex areas removed anticontamination 

clothing and equipment and placed them in special containers for 

later laundering or disposal at the designated NTS burial site. 

Personnel then were monitored to assure radiation levels were 

below those listed in Part I of Appendix D, AEC NTSO-SOP Chapter 

0524, "Radiological Safety." Personnel decontamination was 

accomplished if radiation levels were above specified limits. 

Decontamination usually was accomplished by vacuuming, removing 

radioactive particles with masking tape patches, washing hands or 

localized skin areas with soap and water, or showering with soap 

and water. 

Vehicles and equipment removed from radex areas were 

monitored to assure that they met acceptable radiation levels for 

release on the NTS (25 mrad/h beta plus gamma at contact and 250 

cpm non-swipeable alpha). Limits for release of vehicles and 

equipment off the NTS were 0.3 mrad/h beta plus gamma radiation 

at contact and no detectable alpha activity. Vehicles and 

equipment normally were decontaminated by vacuuming and steam 

cleaning with water or detergent solutions. 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS 

Beginning in the early 1960's, various applications of 

radiation measurement telemetry were developed at the NTS to 

determine radiation levels at critical underground and surface 

areas following nuclear detonations. Multi-detector systems with 

range capabilities from 0.5 mR/h to 500 R/h and from 10 mR/h to 

10,000 R/h continuously monitored locations of concern after 

being emplaced and calibrated prior to each test event. Ion 

chamber detectors were hard-wire-linked by telephone trunk lines 

to exposure rate meters at a central console in CP-2. Detector 

locations were as far as thirty-five miles from this console. 

61 
These remote radiation monitoring systems provided data for 

reentry personnel participating in radiation surveys and recovery 

operations after a nuclear device detonation. The systems aided 

in substantially reducing exposure of personnel involved in reentry programs and were useful in detecting any venting or leaking of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere from an underground 

detonation. 

2.8.1 Telemetry Systems in Use 

The radiation telemetry systems developed and used had 

specific applications depending upon distance, terrain, environment, and operational needs. The detection units, systems, and 

components being studied and developed or in use in 1969 were the 

following: 

A. Remote Area Monitoring System (RAMS) 

The principal piece of equipment used to form a RAMS was 

the RAMP-4. The RAMP-4 was a multi-channel, hard-wirelinked, remote area gamma radiation monitoring (telemetry) system, designed and modified by Radsafe and produced by Victoreen Instrument Corporation. It consisted 

of a probe (Figure 11) which used a Neher-White radiation sensing element, hardwire communication to the 

readout console (Figure 12) (up to 35 miles), and components of Victoreen Radector instruments with recorders 

for readout. 

The readout covered six logarithmic decades (two threedecade scales) to provide a usual range of 1 mR/h to 

1,000 R/h with a relative accuracy of + 15 percent over 

the temperature range of -lOoF to 150°F. 

62 


A permanent array of 21 telemetry stations throughout 

the NTS, as designated by the AEC, was maintained and 

operated continuously. Temporary telemetry arrays for 

DOD events varied between 20 and 50 stations depending 

upon the area or tunnel event location. 

B. Diqital Data System 

The Digital Data System was a multi-channel, radiolinked, remote gamma radiation monitoring system. The 

detection unit and communications consisted of a RAMP-4 

probe hard-wire-linked to a field trailer where signal 

data were digitized and transmitted via UHF to a trailer 

at the CP. The readout consisted of a typewriter, a 

punched tape, and a digital printer, and all three 

operated simultaneously to provide current operational 

data, permanent records, and the capability for reproduction of data at any future time. 

This system was used primarily in remote areas where 

hard-wire communication did not exist. Communications 

between the field trailer and the CP were accomplished 

via NTS radio net 3 and a UHF net assigned prior to each 

event for use during installation and check-out, in 

addition to use during and after each event. 

c. Well Loqqinq Unit 

This unit was a Jordan ion chamber gamma detector with a 

glass-head thermister capable of obtaining gamma radiation or temperature measurements either separately or 

simultaneously. It was used at drill sites for postevent hole radiation and temperature measurements. Radiation detection ranges were from 0.5 mR/h to 500 R/h 

and temperature measurement ranges were from O°F to 

350OF. 

65 
2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring Support 

Approximately two hundred remote radiation detector channels 

were available to continuously monitor radiological conditions 

and assess exposure rates before the test area was entered after 

detonation. Approximately 20 detector units were positioned in 

the test area before a shaft-type event. Detectors were placed 

in circular arrays at specified distances and azimuths from SGZ 

which varied with device yield and predicted wind direction (See 

Figure 13). Variable numbers of detectors (between 20 and 50) 

were used aboveground and underground during tunnel-type events. 

An additional 20 to 35 permanently established remote radiation 

detector stations operated continuously at living areas, work 

areas, and other designated locations throughout NTS (Figure 14). 

The large number of remaining channels was available as required 

at additional detector locations, for other test events in preparation, an/or substitute channels. Event-related telemetry 

detectors operated from zero time until it was determined that 

release of radioactivity probably would not occur, or until any 

released radioactivity had decayed to safe or near-background 

levels at the telemetry stations. For some events, readout 

locations were positioned near the forward control point (FCP) or 

at locations where telephone lines were available. 

Radiation telemetry data were supplemented with information 

collected through a mobile air sampling program. Model 102 air 

sampling units were used to obtain samples of any radioactive 

effluent released at event time or during the postevent drilling 

operations. Test groups used an average of 21 units during each 

test event. Prior to each nuclear detonation experiment, these 

samplers were placed at specified locations around the test area 

and remained in position until drillback operations were 

completed or the Test Group Director authorized removal of the 

units. 

66 
-- 

---- 

Figure 13. Typical remote radiation detection monitoring system 

for shaft-type emplacement site. 

67 
Fi 

0 PERMANENT TELEMETRY 

gure 14. Typical permanently-established remote radiation 

detector stations operated continuously throughout 

68 

NTS. 
2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 

Direct support was provided to NTSO by AFSWC for DOD underground tests, and other Air Force organizations provided support 

under AFSWC control as described in Section 1.3.2 of this report. 

Less air support was required, however, as the probability of 

venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased with development of more effective containment techniques. 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements 

After atmospheric testing ended in 1962, use of Air Force 

cloud sampling aircraft to obtain cloud samples for yield 

determinations was only feasible for AEC cratering events where 

radioactive effluent clouds were anticipated. Passage of the 

radioactive effluent through variable amounts and temperatures of 

rock and other media selectively retained some radionuclides 

underground, and changed known ratios of fission products 

previously used during analysis of atmospheric detonation cloud 

samples. The value of analyzing particulate and gaseous cloud 

samples to determine characteristics of a detonation decreased. 

The first change in cloud sampling and tracking support was 

to a lighter Air Force aircraft, the U-3A, with an Air Force 

pilot and EPA monitor. The EPA monitor also performed aerial 

monitoring of selected locations near surface ground zero and 

along the path of any effluent cloud. This air support later was 

performed by EPA and contractor personnel in their own aircraft. 

Perimeter sweeps continued to be conducted daily by Air 

Force and Security personnel, during reasonable flying weather, 

to assure that unauthorized vehicles were not entering the NTS 

over rough terrain or around security barricades on secondary 

roads. L-20 aircraft used prior to 1968 were replaced with helicopters and other aircraft thereafter. Air security sweeps of 

69 
the immediate test area were conducted for a few hours before 

each detonation to assist in clearing the test area and to assure 

that unauthorized vehicles were not approaching it from directions not controlled by manned security stations. 

Air support for photography missions during test events and 

initial radiation surveys after each event did not change. Helicopters with Air Force pilots generally were used with contractor 

and military photographers and Radsafe monitors. 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary 

Field (ISAFAF) 

Radsafe support facilities had been established at Indian 

Springs Air Force Base (ISAFB), about 20 miles southeast of 

Mercury, during atmospheric nuclear device testing series. 

During 1962 tests, and subsequent DOD underground tests requiring 

support aircraft staged from ISAFB (which became ISAFAF in 19681, 

REECo provided all radsafe support functions available at the 

NTS. This included monitors stationed at the ISAFAF radsafe 

quonset facility and a complete stock of film dosimeters 

(badges), radiation detection instruments, and anticontamination 

clothing and equipment for use by aircrews and ground crews. 

Radsafe monitors issued and exchanged film dosimeters 

(badges), issued self-reading pocket dosimeters, provided anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment, monitored aircraft and personnel after events, decontaminated personnel, and assisted ground crew personnel with decontamination 

of aircraft. 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters 

Although ISAFAF radsafe support extended to all participating aircraft, special helicopter radsafe procedures were im70 
plemented because these aircraft landed at NTS and staged from 

helicopter pads located east of Mercury Highway at the CP area 

and near a Test Controller's FCP established for a particular 

underground event. Helicopter pilots usually landed at these 

locations, and were briefed at the CP or particular FCP regarding 

their scheduled missions or other operational missions. 

If the mission involved possible contamination of the aircraft, Radsafe monitors lined the floor of the aircraft with 

plastic, or kraft paper, and masking tape to facilitate decontamination. Pilots and crew members were dressed in anticontamination clothing and provided with film badges, pocket dosimeters, 

and respiratory protection equipment if airborne radioactive 

material was anticipated and oxygen masks were not worn. 

Upon completion of missions, helicopters returned to the 

landing pads where they were decontaminated by Radsafe monitors. 

Pilots and crew members were decontaminated at an adjacent forward Radsafe base station, or at CP-2, where the pocket dosimeters were collected and read and film badges were exchanged if 

exposures of 100 mR or more were indicated by pocket dosimeters. 

71 
72 
CHAPTER 3 

MINUTE STEAK EVENT 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The MINUTE STEAK event was conducted at 1102 hours Pacific 

Daylight Time (PDT) on 12 September 1969 with a yield less than 

20 kt. The device, which was fielded by LRL, was emplaced 867 

feet beneath the surface in a 66-inch diameter cased hole (Ullf). 

Figure 15 shows the trailer park layout for this event. An LOS 

pipe to the surface was used for this event. The test objective 

was to expose materials and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment in order to determine response characteristics. Government agencies and contractors conducted 22 projects to obtain 

the desired information. 

Radioactive effluent began to seep from the SGZ area at H+5 

minutes. Twenty-three minutes after detonation, a subsidence 

crater formed and seepage of radioactive effluent through fissures began. Cal-Seal was used to fill the SGZ pit and one fissure, and dirt was used to cover the other fissure. No radioactive effluent was detected offsite. 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all MINUTE STEAK event activities in Area 11, subject to controls and procedures established by the Test Manager and NTSO. 

AEC and AEC contractor responsibilities were in accordance with 

established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate 

73 
i 

i 

i ’ i i i 

i 

i / 

. ., _._._,-._.-.-.-.-.-.-.---- 

A 

IS’ fOWER 

D,-.-.-._.-._._ 

r 

.-.-. 

SECURlT” STATION 

0 i 

CCT” “AN i 

I 

- 

I i 

- I 

Figure 15. MINUTE STEAK Event trailer park layout. 
action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations 

Office. Reentry and recovery programs were conducted by Sandia 

Laboratories, Albuquerque (SLA). 

The LRL Test Group Director was responsible to the Test 

Manager for radiological safety within a 3,000-foot radius of 

SGZ. This responsibility was in effect from the time the device 

was moved to the zero site until device detonation. After device 

detonation, the Test Manager relieved the LRL Test Group Director 

of responsibility which then was delegated to the DOD Test Group 

Director. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

A "Detailed MINUTE STEAK Support Plan" was prepared and 

issued for implementation to participating agencies prior to the event. Procedures for radiation exposure and 

contamination control were in accordance with requirements of responsible DOD and SLA personnel. Radsafe 

provided monitoring and equipment support, air sampling, 

and telemetry. Test area maps showing appropriate reference points were prepared. Reentry routes into the 

test area were established during "dry runs." Party 

monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, sample 

recovery, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

A geophone system was used to monitor postevent seismic 

disturbances. Signals were routed to CP-1 for audible 

and recorded readout. 

A mobile issue facility stocked with anticontamination 

clothing, respiratory protection equipment, and dosi75 
metric devices was positioned, prior to the event, at 

the security barricades near the FCP. A personnel and 

vehicle decontamination facility was established adjacent to the mobile issue facility. All personnel at 

manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and Radsafe monitors 

were in attendance. Anticontamination equipment and materials available included coveralls, head coversl shoe 

covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, plastic bags, and masking 

tape. 

One base station with a team of Radsafe monitors was 

positioned at the FCP. This station was used to "suit 

u p I' the surface reentry and recovery parties before 

their departure from the FCP. If contamination was encountered, this station would be used to monitor and 

decontaminate personnel and equipment as they returned 

from the controlled area. 

B. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

RAMS units for the MINUTE STEAK event were located as 

shown in Table 2. Figure 16 shows locations relative to 

SGZ of stations 1 through 13 and 18. 

Twelve air sampling units were placed at 30-degree intervals on a l,OOO-foot radius from SGZ beginning at 0" 

azimuth. 

PHS personnel had positioned air sampling units at 98 

routine offsite locations, and ten personnel were on 

duty for surveillance activities. 

76 
Table 2. MINUTE STEAK Event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location (from SGZ) 

1 Near SGZ 

2 SGZ experimental tower 

3 600 feet at 0' azimuth 

4 600 feet at 45" azimuth 

5 600 feet at 90' azimuth 

6 600 feet at 135' azimuth 

7 800 feet at 168" azimuth 

8 800 feet at 178" azimuth 

9 800 feet at 191O azimuth 

10 800 feet at 203O azimuth 

11 600 feet at 225" azimuth 

12 550 feet at 270° azimuth 

13 600 feet at 315O azimuth 

14 2,000 feet at 0" azimuth 

15 2,000 feet at 90' azimuth 

16 2,000 feet at 180' azimuth 

17 2,000 feet at 270" azimuth 

18 250 feet at 0" azimuth 

77 
+ 

4 

6-5 Erllvtll 3s 

% 

78 
C. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures were in accordance with AEC 

Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Deto,lations." All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area were required to stop at muster or control stations for issue 

of stay-in badges, or issue and return of muster badges. 

After area control was established, all through traffic 

was diverted by use of screening stations. 

D. Air Support 

Two USAF UH-1F helicopters and crews were available. 

One was used for security sweeps and the other for aerial photography. In addition, the USAF provided a U-3B 

and crew for cloud tracking, and the PHS provided a 

Turbo Beech for cloud sampling. The EG&G/NATS aircraft 

was on standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Button up activities were performed by personnel representing DASA, Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Lockheed Missile and 

Space Corp. (LMSC), General Atomic (GA), Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), EG&G, 

Moleculon Research Corp. (MRC), LRL, Naval Ordnance Laboratory 

(NGL), and SLA. A test execution time of 0700 hours on 12 September was proposed at a readiness briefing held at 1430 hours on 

11 September. The date and time were initially acceptable; however, the time was later revised to 1000 hours. The next readiness briefing was scheduled for 0600 hours on 12 September. 

Security sweeps of the closed area began at 2200 hours on 11 

September. 

79 
3.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

The final readiness briefing was conducted as scheduled at 

0600 hours on 12 September. At that time, conditions were confirmed to be good for the planned zero time of 1000 hours. Permission to arm the device was requested and granted at 0806 

hours. After performing the arming function, the team exited the 

area and the countdown began. A delay in countdown occurred due 

to cable problems. 

MINUTE STEAK zero time was 1102 hours on 12 September 1969. 

3.3.1 Test Area Monitoring and Radioactive Effluent Release 

Situations 

Telemetry measurements began at 1103 hours on D-day. The 

maximum gamma radiation reading (60 R/h) for this event was 

measured by RAMS unit No. 2 at 1103 hours on D-day. This unit 

was located inside the experimental tower and readings occurring 

between zero time and H+5 minutes were as expected due to 

activation products. 

The first seepage of radioactive effluent occurred through a 

leak at surface ground zero at H+5 minutes. At H+23 minutes, 

crater subsidence occurred creating two fissures, one on the 

northeast edge and one on the southwest edge of the crater, which 

released radioactive effluent. Leakage at SGZ was stopped at 

approximately H+4 hours by pouring Cal-Seal in and around the SGZ 

pit. The maximum gamma radiation reading obtained at the fissure 

on the northeast edge was 2 R/h at 1940 hours. By 1950 hours, 

the fissure had been covered with dirt and readings had decreased 

to 5 mR/h. The fissure on the southwest side of the crater read 

400 mR/h at 1945 hours before it was filled with Cal-Seal. Another reading was taken at 2100 hours after the Cal-Sealing operation was completed and a measurement of 45 mR/h was obtained. 

80 
With the exception of RAMS units Nos. 2 and 18, all units 

had decreased to background radiation levels by 1903 hours on Dday. RAMS unit No. 18 returned to background at 0333 hours on 15 

September; but in the case of unit No. 2, although readings were 

steadily decreasing, 1.6 mR/h was the final measurement (due to 

activation) when telemetry coverage was discontinued on 16 September at 1230 hours. 

Analysis of air samples collected from zero time to H+4.5 

hours indicated the presence of radioiodines, xenon-133, xenon135, and xenon-138. 

3.3.2 Aerial Monitoring 

Aerial monitoring was performed by two PHS monitors in an 

Air Force U-3B. A PHS Turbo Beech (Vegas 8) was used to perform 

additional monitoring and sample the release. 

A. U-3B Tracking Mission 

The U-3B entered the area at 1110 hours and began tracking the radioactive effluent cloud. At 1230 hours, the 

cloud was located over Papoose Lake area and a reading 

of 0.3 mR/h was obtained. A track, starting at 1240 

hours, did not detect any radioactive effluent along the 

Mercury Highway and along a heading east from mid-Groom 

Lake and south to Emigrant Valley. A subsequent search 

east and north of Papoose Lake produced no reading above 

background. At that time, it appeared that the cloud 

was entirely over Papoose Lake and was stationary. The 

mission was terminated at 1213 hours after making a 

final pass over SGZ at 5500 feet MSL. 

81 
B. Vegas 8 Sampling Mission 

Vegas 8 entered the area at 1112 hours and made several 


passes north of SGZ to determine the direction of cloud 


movement. It was subsequently determined that the cloud 


was moving through Nye Canyon in a northeasterly direc­


tion toward Papoose Lake. At ·1140 hours, a pass two 


miles from SGZ and normal to cloud trajectory indicated 


that the leading edge had passed that location. A spi­


ral descent performed four miles north of SGZ on a 30° 


azimuth revealed the cloud top to be at 10,000 feet MSL 


with activity extending to ground elevation (approxi­


mately 5,000 feet). At 1154 hours, a reading of 6.0 


mR/h was obtained at 6,300 feet MSL. 


A sampling path was next established at 6,300 feet MSL 

one mile south of Papoose Lake (12 miles northeast from 

SGZ) and normal to cloud trajectory. The leading edge 

of the cloud, which was moving at a speed of approximately 12 miles per hour, crossed the sampling path at 

1202 hours. A peak reading of 0.1 mR/h was recorded for 

this pass~ A second pass at 1206 hours indicated a 

cloud width of 1. 5 miles and a peak· reading of 0.14 mR/h 

at 30° azimuth. Measurements obtained during a third 

pass at 1216 hours indicated the cloud was 2.5 miles 

wide, and the peak radiation level was 0.4 mR/h. 

Between 1221 hours and 1248 hours, several passes were 

-made across the cloud. The peak reading on each pass was 

0.5 mR/h. Reports from the U-3B tracking mission indi­


cated the cloud had not moved north of the Papoose Lake 


area. Therefore, based on this information, it was as­


sumed the cloud had stopped or the transport speed was 


very low. 


82 
Due to fuel considerations, Vegas 8 deviated from the 

sampling path to locate the trailing edge of the cloud. 

At 1252 hours, a sampling pass parallel to, and two 

miles south of, the original path was performed. A peak 

reading of 0.15 mR/h was obtained on a 30° azimuth. Another pass parallel to, and four miles south of, the 

original sampling path was performed at 1258 hours. A 

peak reading of 0.1 mR/h was obtained six miles south Of 

Papoose Lake on a 30" azimuth. A pass at 1300 hours five 

miles south of, and parallel to, the original sampling 

path indicated no activity. The trailing edge was assumed to be between five and six miles south of Papoose 

Lake (7-8 miles from SGZ) at 1300 hours. 

Cloud sampling indicated the MINUTE STEAK event released 

inert gases and their daughter products. The cloud moved 

northeast to the Papoose Lake area where it apparently 

stopped. Because of the slow cloud transport speeds and 

relatively short half-lives of the radionuclides involved, it was concluded that detectable concentrations 

would not reach the offsite area. 

3.3.3 Initial Radiation Survey and Experiment Recovery Activities 

The initial radiation survey began at 1151 hours and was 

completed at 1235 hours on D-day. All team members were dressed 

in anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment. The maximum radiation reading obtained during this survey 

was 300 mR/h at the perimeter fence northeast of the crater at 

1210 hours. Table 3 shows results of the initial survey. No 

alpha radiation was detected. 

Film recovery teams (dressed in anticontamination clothing) 

entered the trailer park at 1240 hours. They were followed at 

83 
Table 3. MINUTE STEAK Event initial radiation survey data. 

Time 

(PDT) Location (from SGZ) 

Gamma 

Exposure Rate 

1 mR/h 1 

1151 

1152 

1153 

1154 

1154 

1155 

1156 

1157 

1200 

1201 

1204 

1204 

1205 

1207 

1210 

1210 

1210 

1212 

1215 

1218 

1220 

1230 

1235 

Road 5Y Stake 12 (3.31 miles SW) 

Road 5Y Stake 15 (2.6 miles SW) 

Road 5Y Stake 18 (1.89 miles SW) 

Watsonville (Area 5) 

Road 11B Stake 1 (0.95 miles SW) 

Road 11B Stake 2 (0.71 miles W) 

l/4 mile east of Stake llB-2 (0.46 miles W) 

Entrance to trailer park 

Trailer park 

West trailer 

Perimeter fence west of tower 

Perimeter fence west of crater 

East trailer 

Perimeter fence northwest of crater 

Perimeter fence north of crater 

Five cable trays 

Perimeter fence northeast of crater 

Perimeter fence east of crater 

Perimeter fence east of tower 

Closed circuit television No. 2 

Base of tower (east) 

West Cal-Seal line 

West Cal-Seal line 

0.03 

0.03 

0.03 

0.03 

0.03 

0.03 

1.5 

2.0 

0.7 

1.0 

8.0 

8.0 

0.7 

12.0 

80.0 

1.7 

300.0 

20.0 

7.0 

0.4 

50.0 

2.0 

0.8 

84 
1445 hours by the tower recovery team. These team members (also 

"dressed out") entered the tower to perform damage and hazards 

evaluation. When this had been successfully completed, experiment recovery was authorized. Personnel representing NOL, LMSC, 

NRL, LRL, GA, and Nuclear Defense Laboratory (NDL) recovered 

their respective experiments until 2136 hours when Radsafe personnel secured the area for the night. 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.4.1 Experiment Recovery Activities 

Experiment recoveries were conducted routinely from 12 to 24 

September. There was no increase in radiation levels; the maximum concentration of toxic gas detected was 100 ppm carbon monoxide on 23 September during removal of a closure system; and no 

explosive mixtures were detected. The Radsafe base station was 

deactivated and the MINUTE STEAK operation was completed on 24 

September 1969. 

3.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

No postevent drilling was performed on this event. 

3.4.3 Industrial Safety 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224) 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site 

85 
3. Individual Safe Operating Procedu,res (by experimenter 

organization) 

4. MINUTE STEAK Safety Regulations 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

The area enclosed by the Ullf fence was designated a hard 

hat area. Hard hats were required to be worn and foot protection 

in the form of safety boots, safety shoes, or toe guards was 

strongly recommended. 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving explosives, toxic material, radioactive material, or any other operation with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved in the project was required to be 

knowledgeable of the contents of the procedure. 

Checks were made during each shift for toxic gases and explosive mixtures. These measurements were recorded in the monitors' log book. Industrial safety codes, including specific 

codes for drilling, were established by REECo and were emphasized 

during all operations. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1103 hours on 12 September 

1969 and ended on 16 September at 1230 hours. The maximum gamma 

exposure reading detected was 60 R/h at RAMS unit No. 2, located 

at SGZ on the experiment building at 1103 hours on 12 September. 

86 
The initial survey began at 1151 hours and ended at 1235 

hours on 12 September. The maximum gamma exposure rate detected 

was 300 mR/h at a location northeast of SGZ at the perimeter 

fence. No alpha radiation was detected. The maximum gamma exposure rate detected was 2 R/h at fissures at the northeast edge 

of SGZ at 1940 hours on 12 September. 

The maximum concentration of toxic gas detected in the entire operation was 100 ppm carbon monoxide on 23 September during 

removal of a closure system. No explosive mixtures were detected. 

No whole body external or internal organ exposures were 

received which exceeded the established limits. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the MINUTE STEAK event from 12 September 1969 to 23 September 

1969 are summarized below. The average exposure is from selfreading pocket dosimeter readings as recorded on Area Access 

Registers. The maximum exposure is from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 383 275 9 

DOD Participants 148 230 6 

No radioactivity above background levels was detected offsite by ground and aerial monitoring teams or by ground-based 

exposure rate recorders either after the detonation or during 

subsequent sample re-covery operations. 

It was the opinion of the PHS that no radioactive contamination of the offsite area resulted from this event. 

87 
88 
CHAPTER 4 

DIESEL TRAIN EVENT 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

DIESEL TRAIN was detonated at 0900 hours Pacific Standard 

Time (PST) on 5 December 1969. The LASL-furnished device, which 

had a yield less than 20 kt, was emplaced in tunnel U12e.11 at a 

vertical depth of 1,386 feet (Figure 17). This event was a 

weapons effects test designed to study the response of equipment 

and materials exposed to a nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and contractors conducted 19 projects to obtain 

the desired information. The event was successfully contained. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all DIESEL TRAIN project activities in Area 

12 was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments, or delivering them to the installation contractor for subsequent placement. After the event, 

these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing 

instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

89 
W 

0 

U12e PORTAL 

Ul2es PORTAL 

Figure 17. DIESEL TRAIN Event tunnel layout. 
In accordance with provisions of NTSO-SOP Chapter 0524, 

"Radiological Safety," the LASL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of 

ground zero (GZ). This responsibility was in effect from device 

emplacement until device detonation. At that time, the Test 

Manager relieved the LASL Test Group Director of responsibility 

and delegated responsibility to the DOD Test Group Director. 

Device safety and security procedures in the GZ area were in 

accordance with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

The U12e.11 drift originally had been mined for DIANA 

MIST, which was postponed. No drift modifications were 

required for DIESEL TRAIN except for mining a few new 

alcoves adjacent to the test chambers. Alcoves in the 

U12e.11 drift were employed for power supplies, signal 

conditioning equipment, vacuum pumps, and working space. 

DIESEL TRAIN was the first event to use a multiplex system designed to control and monitor the reentry ventilation valves and fans and the portal and tunnel electrical power distribution system. Previously, these functions were performed using numerous timing signal pairs 

to the manned forward monitor station where a monitor 

and control panel were installed. 

B. Radioloqical Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with requests 

of responsible DOD and SLA representatives. Radsafe 

91 
provided required monitoring and equipment support, air 

sampling, and telemetry arrays. 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans ("DIESEL 

TRAIN Reentry Plan") were prepared and issued for implementation to participating agencies prior to the test. 

Reference markers and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed 

regarding surface reentry, manned stations, and security 

station requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial surface radiation surveysI 

perform aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in 

reentry parties, as needed. Radsafe personnel also were 

standing by at the FCP prior to detonation to perform 

surveys and provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, 

portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

c. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

Forty-eight RAMS units provided surface and underground 

coverage for the DIESEL TRAIN event as shown in Table 4 

and Figures 18 and 19. 

Four M-102 air sampling units were located as shown in 

Table 5. 

92 
Table 4. DIESEL TRAIN Event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location 

SURFACE 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

At e portal 

At es portal 

300 feet at 337" azimuth from e portal 

250 feet at 25" azimuth from e portal 

425 feet at 90" azimuth from e portal 

225 feet at 340' azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 250' azimuth from e portal 

245 feet at 303' azimuth from e portal 

125 feet at 45" azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 102' azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 180° azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 237O azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 286" azimuth from es portal 

Between filters 

On the west blower stack 

On the east blower stack 

2,250 feet at 63" azimuth from station No. 6 

2,500 feet at 102.5' azimuth from station No. 

6 

1,100 feet at 128' azimuth from station No. 6 

1,655 feet at 254" azimuth from station No. 6 

2,500 feet at 329O azimuth from station No. 6 

200 feet at 180° azimuth from e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

220 feet at 90° azimuth from e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

On e.10 cable hole No. 2 

225 feet at 270° azimuth from e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

93 
Table 4. (Concluded) 

Station Location 

SURFACE (Concluded) 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 560 feet into the U12e.11 drift 

31 156 feet into the U12e.11 drift 

32 605 feet into the U12e.06 drift 

33AT" 

34AT* 

35 

:67 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43AT* 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

605 feet (buried) into the U12e.06 drift 

495 feet (buried) into the U12e.06 drift 

495 feet into the U12e.06 drift 

900 feet into the U12e.12 drift 

240 feet into the U12e.10 drift 

800 feet into the U12e.06 drift 

150 feet into the U12e.06 drift 

4,100 feet into the main drift 

150 feet into the U12e.04 drift 

3,475 feet into the main drift 

3,475 feet (buried) into the main drift 

3,425 feet into the main drift 

2,885 feet into the bypass drift 

1,850 feet into the bypass drift 

50 feet into the es drift 

50 feet into the main drift 

250 feet at 0' azimuth from e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

570 feet at 180° azimuth from SGZ 

700 feet at 80" azimuth from SGZ 

430 feet at 330° azimuth from SGZ 

UNDERGROUND 

*Buried 

94 
\ 

/ 

1 

3 

B 

5 

s 

/ 

/ I- 

/ 

95 
96 
Table 5. DIESEL TRAIN Air sampling unit locations. 

Station Location 

75 feet northeast from U12es portal 

50 feet northeast from Ul2e portal 

220 feet at 90" azimuth from U12e cable hole 

No. 2 

180 feet at 315" azimuth from U12e cable hole 

No. 2 

97 
The Pagoda sampling trailer was used to sample the vent 

lines. Eight sampling heads were used, with four samplers located before the filter boxes and four located 

after the filter boxes. All of the cartridges were of 

the standard activated charcoal type. 

Air samplers were positioned at 101 routine PHS stations 

in the offsite area. 

D. Security Coveraqe 

Device security coverage was in accordance with AEC 

Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." All persons entering or exiting the controlled area were required to stop at muster or control stations for issue 

of stay-in badges, or issue and return of muster badges. 

After area control was established, all through traffic 

was diverted by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Manager's Operations Plan," 

contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not 

connected with this event out of the controlled area 

before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

The U.S. Air Force provided two UH-1F helicopters with 

crews. One helicopter was used to perform preevent 

security sweeps and event photography, and the other was 

used for aerial photography or in support of the Test 

Manager, if needed. The USAF also provided a U-3B 

aircraft and crew to be used by PHS personnel for cloud 

tracking. An additional cloud-tracking aircraft, the 

EG&G/NATS Martin 404, was on standby at McCarran Airport 

98 
in Las Vegas. The PHS provided two Turbo Beech aircraft 

for cloud sampling; however, only one was airborne at 

event detonation time. The other was on standby at 

McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

A final dry run was held on 3 December in preparation for a 

scheduled zero time of 0900 hours on 4 December. At the 143Ohour readiness briefing on 3 December, winds were blowing toward 

Las Vegas which indicated that unless wind direction changed 

there would be little chance of meeting the scheduled 0900-hour 

zero time. On 4 December at 0435 hours, a power decrease on the 

Mesa occurred, causing all trailers run by electric motor generators to lose power. It was subsequently decided at a readiness 

briefing held at 0500 hours that the combination of power loss 

and increasingly poor weather conditions were cause for rescheduling DIESEL TRAIN for 5 December at 0900 hours. An additional 

readiness briefing was held at 1430 hours on 4 December and 

conditions appeared favorable to meet scheduled test execution. 

Routine security sweeps and experimenter button up activities again were performed. 

4.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

Security sweeps were conducted between 0100 and 0450 hours. 

The final readiness briefing was held at 0500 hours with no 

change in scheduled test execution. Upon approval by the Test 

Manager, the device was armed and the arming party exited the 

area at 0630 hours. A security sweep at 0700 hours confirmed 

that the closed area was clear of all unauthorized personnel. 

At about 0815 hours, an Air Force helicopter crashed near 

99 
Desert Rock Air Strip. No personnel were seriously injured and 

only photo coverage capability for the Test Manager was affected. 

DIESEL TRAIN zero time was 0900 hours on 5 December 1969. 

4.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry coverage began at 0901 hours with all surface RAMS 

units reading background initially and with no increases thereafter. The maximum initial underground RAMS unit reading was 

also the maximum reading for all telemetry coverage during this 

event. RAMS unit No. 31 measured 350 R/h at 0901 hours on D-day. 

Only three underground units (Nos. 30, 31, and 32) detected radiation levels above background, and these levels had decreased to 

19 mR/h, 27 mR/h, and background, respectively, by the time telemetry coverage was discontinued at 1315 hours 

4.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Activities 

A. Mesa Trailer Park Survev 

on 7 December 1969. 

Experiment Recovery 

Initial survey teams Nos. 1 and 2 departed the FCP at 

1045 hours. Team No. 1 arrived at the trailer park at 

1115 hours, having obtained only background radiation 

readings. Team No. 2 reached the trailer park at 1120 

hours and also obtained only background measurements. 

While performing a survey at the muck pile near the U12e 

portal, the maximum radiation reading of 0.08 mR/h was 

obtained. At 1200 hours, Mesa experiment recovery teams 

were permitted to enter the area. They performed their 

tasks and exited the area at 1300 hours. All remaining 

personnel departed the Mesa at 1415 hours. 

100 
B. Portal Survey 

Radsafe survey teams Nos. 3 and 4 departed the FCP at 

1245, completing their survey at 1310 hours after obtaining only background radiation readings. An afternoon reentry to the portal area was made to obtain remote gas samples. Sampling was complete at 1430 hours. 

Results of samples taken from 

1. the portal side of the gas seal door, 

2. the zero point side of the gas seal door, 

3. the portal side of the overburden plug, and 

4. the U12e main drift vent line. 

indicated only normal air after being analyzed using a 

gas chromatograph. Only a sample taken from the zero 

point side of the overburden plug at 1401 hours showed 

any toxic gas, with a concentration of 500 ppm carbon 

monoxide being detected. 

Tunnel ventilation began at 1545 hours, and the Radsafe 

base station and associated equipment were moved to the 

portal area at 1635 hours. 

No reentries beyond the portal were made on D-day. 

4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.4.1 Initial Tunnel Reentry 

Because gas chromatograph sampling on 6 December at 0800 

hours indicated that toxic gas concentrations were only trace 

amounts in the tunnel, and radiation levels in most tunnel areas 

were background, initial tunnel reentry team No. 1 personnel 

101 
boarded the train and entered the U12e tunnel main drift at 0905 

hours. Team members were dressed in anticontamination clothing 

and equipment. The tunnel was in good condition and the team 

arrived at the gas seal door at 0940 hours. After checking radiation, toxic gas, and explosive mixtures (with negative results) 

they opened and chained open the manway door in the gas seal 

door, and proceeded to the overburden plug. No radiological or 

toxic gas problems were encountered. The overburden plug door 

was prepared for opening, after which team No. 1 exited the 

tunnel at 1206 hours. No contamination was detected on their 

clothing. 

Team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1225 hours to repair a communications line at the overburden plug. Repairs were completed 

and they exited the tunnel at 1307 hours. 

Teams Nos. 3 and 4 entered the tunnel at 1330 hours to finish opening the overburden plug door and remove sandbags, and attempt to improve communications before other tunnel entries were 

made. The overburden plug door was opened at 1345 hours. No 

water was on the tunnel floor and no radiation problems were encountered. Team No. 4 exited the tunnel at 1405 hours, and team 

No. 3 exited the tunnel at 1432 hours. 

The scientific assessment team (team No. 5) entered the tunnel at 1500 hours and traveled to test chamber No. 1. No toxic 

gases or explosive mixtures were detected; however, the gamma radiation intensity at the door measured 34 mR/h. They continued 

toward the zero point, obtaining a reading of 600 ppm carbon monoxide at 1534 hours at a break in the LOS pipe. By 1610 hours, 

they had arrived at test chamber No. 2. The maximum gamma radiation detected at this location was 70 mR/h. The door to test 

chamber No. 2 was opened and radiation readings again were taken. 

In addition to a radiation reading of 70 mR/h, a measurement of 

500 ppm carbon monoxide was obtained. The tunnel had collapsed 

102 
between test chambers Nos. 2 and 3; however, access to test 

chamber No. 3 was gained by crawling on top of the LOS pipe. 

Team No. 5 exited the tunnel at 1640 hours. No alpha radiation 

was detected. The tunnel was secured at 1715 hours. 

4.4.2 Experiment Recovery Operations 

On 7 December, two reentry teams entered the tunnel. One 

team entered at 0835 hours, recovered magnetic tape, and exited 

the tunnel at 0920 hours. The second team entered the tunnel at 

0952 and traveled to the overburden plug where they put on ScottDraeger breathing units before continuing toward scientific station No. 2. The team entered the LOS pipe at test chamber No. 2, 

at 1130 hours, and began to walk-out the LOS pipe. The maximum 

radiation reading was 400 mR/h at the location of main experiments. No toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected. 

After checking the TAPS, which appeared to have sealed properly, 

the team exited the tunnel at 1220 hours. Air Force Weapons 

Laboratory (AFWL), LMSC, SLA, and DASA personnel were underground 

performing recovery tasks from 1320 hours to 1500 hours. NO 

anticontamination clothing was required from the portal to the 

overburden plug: beyond the overburden plug, full anticontamination clothing was required. By 1600 hours, all personnel had 

exited the tunnel and it was secured. 

From 8 December 1969 to 16 January 1970, the major portions 

of experiment recoveries were conducted by personnel representing 

SLA, DASA, LMSC, General Electric (GE), LRL, LASL, GA, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and Space and Missile Systems Organization 

(SAMSO). No radiation problems were encountered. A maximum toxic gas concentration of 18,000 ppm carbon monoxide was measured 

around the TAPS seal on 9 December. The explosive mixture maximum reading of 20 percent LEL was measured at this same location 

during the same survey. The maximum concentration of carbon 

monoxide to which personnel inside the LOS pipe were exposed was 

103 
75 ppm. Toxic gas problems were remedied by increasing ventilation and removing personnel from the area until concentrations 

decreased. 

From 17 January to 6 March, reentry activities included additional experiment recoveries from the SLA and LASL alcoves and 

inspection and removal of selected experiment protection devices. 

4.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Toxic gases and explosive mixtures were continuously monitored and recorded in the monitors' log book. Maximum readings 

in the tunnel complex were 18,000 ppm carbon monoxide at the TAPS 

on 9 December at 1610 hours: 20% LEL of explosive mixtures on the 

same day and at the same location; and only traces of NO+N02 at 

various times and dates during recovery operations. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for mining and drilling were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. A written standard operating procedure was required for each operation 

involving explosives, toxic materials, radioactive material, or 

any other operation with the potential for personal injury. Each 

individual involved in the project was required to be knowledgeable of the contents of these procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection areas. Each participating agency provided 

its own industrial safety apparel. All personnel on the initial 

tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the McCaa 2- 

hour breathing apparatus and had used the Scott-Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and practices, as spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were 

observed. 

104 
All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224) 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organizations) 

4. DIESEL TRAIN Safety Regulations 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 0901 hours on 5 December 

1969. The maximum gamma intensity detected was 350 R/h at 0901 

hours on 5 December at telemetry station No. 31, located 156 feet 

inside of the U12e.11 drift. 

The initial surface reentry survey into the area began at 

1045 hours and ended at 1415 hours on 5 December 1969, after 

initial recoveries had been made. The maximum exposure rate was 

0.08 mR/h at the muck pile near the U12e portal. No alpha radiation was detected. 

The initial tunnel reentry began at 0905 hours on 6 December 

and was completed at 1206 hours. The maximum radiation reading 

of 400 mR/h was obtained at 1130 hours during a walk-out of the 

LOS pipe on 7 December. No alpha radiation was detected during 

reentries on 6 and 7 December. 

105 
The maximum concentrations of toxic gases and explosive mixtures measured during the entire operation were 18,000 ppm carbon 

monoxide and 20 percent LEL, respectively. These concentrations 

were detected during a survey conducted on 9 December 1969 at the 

TAPS. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DIESEL TRAIN radex areas from 5 December 1969 to 6 March 1970 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Ebb+ EG;;;elm R) 

All Participants 1,253 85 1 

DOD Participants 384 125 1 

106 
CHAPTER 5 

DIANA MIST EVENT 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The DIANA MIST event was conducted at 1115 hours PST on 11 

February 1970, with a device yield less than 20 kt. Emplacement 

of the LASL-provided device was at a vertical depth of 1,319 feet 

in tunnel U12n.06 (Figures 20 and 21). Government agencies and 

contractors participated in 18 projects as a part of this event, 

which was a weapons effects test to study the response of equipment and materials to a nuclear detonation environment. DIANA 

MIST was a successfully contained event. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all DIANA MIST event activities in Area 12, subject to controls and procedures established by the Test Manager and the 

NTSO. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were 

in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the 

subject of separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the 

AEC Nevada Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments, or delivering them to an installation contractor for subsequent placement. After the event, 

these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing 

instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

107 
OdO 

SCALE: 1 INCH c 1.000 FEET (APPROX.) 

PORTAL 

Figure 20. DIANA MIST Event tunnel layout. 
Because LASL fielded the device, the LASL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 5,000-foot 

radius of SGZ. This responsibility was in effect from device 

emplacement until device detonation. At that time, the Test 

Manager relieved the LASL Test Group Director of responsibility 

and delegated responsibility to the DOD Test Group Director. 

Device safety and security procedures in the GZ area and the 

timing and firing control room were in accordance with AEC Manual 

Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized 

Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

Mining of the U12n.06 drift began in February 1969. 

Access to the DIANA MIST drift via the Ul2n main drift 

required passage through the remains of the HUDSON SEAL 

overburden plug located 2,840 feet from the portal. Six 

alcoves were mined in both sides of the test drift; four 

on the right rib for test chamber access and two on the 

left for vacuum pumping equipment. Installation of the 

LOS pipe began on 5 September 1969 with subsequent installation of internal experiments conducted between 10 

December 1969 and 4 February 1970. External experiment 

installation began on 16 December 1969 and was finished 

on 24 January 1970. Instrumentation trailers were installed and shock-mounted during November and December. 

B. Radioloqical Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with requirements of responsible DOD and SLA representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support, air sampling, and telemetry. 

109 
Detailed radiological safety reentry plans ("DIANA MIST 

Reentry Plan") were prepared and issued to participating 

agencies for implementation prior to the test. Reference markers and air sampling equipment were positioned 

in the test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial surface radiation surveys, 

perform aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in 

reentry parties, as needed. Radsafe personnel also were 

standing by at the FCP prior to detonation to perform 

surveys and provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, 

portable instruments and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

c. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

Forty-four RAMS units provided surface and underground 

coverage for the DIANA MIST event as described in Table 

6 and shown in Figure 21. 

One portal air sampling unit (M-102) was positioned at 

the U12n portal and activated prior to zero time. 

PHS personnel operated 103 air sampling stations and 29 

gamma rate recorder stations in the offsite area. Twenty-four personnel were fielded for offsite surveillance. 

110 
Table 6. DIANA MIST Event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location 

SURFACE 

4 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Portal 

530 feet at 330° azimuth from the portal 

530 feet at 330' azimuth from the portal (No. 

1 vent line) 

530 feet at 330" azimuth from the portal (No. 

2 vent line) 

400 feet at 16" azimuth from the portal 

275 feet at 89' azimuth from the portal 

363 feet at 164" azimuth from the portal 

482 feet at 192' azimuth from the portal 

558 feet at 192O azimuth from the portal 

416 feet at 192O azimuth from the portal 

648 feet at 192O azimuth from the portal 

1,316 feet at 192O azimuth from the portal 

1,368 feet at 192" azimuth from the portal 

2,773 feet at 192O azimuth from the portal 

2,776 feet at 192' azimuth from the portal 

3,086 feet at 192" azimuth from the portal 

3,110 feet at the downhole building from the 

portal on the vent line 

3,350 feet at 192O azimuth from the portal 

3,240 feet at the downhole building from the 

portal 

3,130 feet at 192" azimuth from the portal 

3,300 feet at 192' azimuth from the portal 

3,490 feet at 192O azimuth from the portal 

500 feet at 0' azimuth from SGZ 

500 feet at 115O azimuth from SGZ 

111 
Table 6. (Concluded) 

Station Location 

SURFACE (Concluded) 

26 500 feet at 240" azimuth from SGZ 

UNDERGROUND 

29 85 feet into the 04 drift 

30 1,025 feet into the 06 drift 

31 886 feet into the 06 drift 

32 675 feet into the 06 drift 

32AT* 640 feet into the 06 drift 

33 422 feet into the 06 drift 

34 500 feet into the 02 drift 

35 141 feet into the 02 drift 

36 3,002 feet into the main drift 

36AT* 3,023 feet into the main drift 

37 2,546 feet into the main drift 

38 300 feet into the 01 drift 

39 50 feet into the 01 drift 

40 1,700 feet into the main drift 

40AT* 1,617 feet into the main drift 

41 1,475 feet into the main drift 

42 900 feet into the main drift 

43 50 feet into the main drift at the vent line 

44 200 feet into the main drift 

*Buried 

112 
l 4 

7 

\ 

\ 

\ _ _ -_ 

\ 

I 

/ 

/ 

/ 

_---_A 

, 

/ 

113 
D. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at muster or control stations for 

issue of stay-in badges, or issue and return of muster 

badges. After area control was established, all through 

traffic was diverted around the controlled area by use 

of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Manager's Operations Plan," 

contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not 

connected with this event out of the closed area before 

the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

One UH-1F helicopter with USAF crew performed preevent 

security sweeps and then was used for DOD event photography. An additional UH-1F with USAF crew was used for 

aerial closed circuit television coverage. The USAF 

provided a U-3B and crew to support PHS personnel for 

cloud tracking, a Turbo Beech for cloud sampling, and a 

Turbo Beech on standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas 

for additional cloud sampling support, if needed. The 

EG&G/NATS aircraft, a Martin 404, also was on standby at 

McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. 

5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

On 5 February, the event was rescheduled from 10 to 11 

February to reduce pressure on experimenters making final preparations and to allow more time for button up. 

114 
Button up activities were performed by personnel representing SLA, LASL, EG&G, Physics International (PI), Philco-Ford, 

Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory (LPARL), LMSC, AVCO Corporation (AVCO), AFWL, and GA, and a successful dry run was completed on 10 February. A readiness briefing followed at 1430 

hours. At that meeting, a tentative zero time of 0900 hours on 

11 February was selected. Between 2100 and 2210 hours, roadblocks were established and the first security sweep was conducted. 

5.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

After several security sweeps had been conducted, the closed 

area was declared clear for arming at 0519 hours. Permiss ion to 

arm was granted at 0525 and by 0555 hours the device was armed. 

At 0805 hours, test execution was put on indefinite hold due to 

technical problems. These were subsequently resolved and a new 

detonation time of 1115 hours was scheduled. 

DIANA MIST zero time was 1115 hours PST on 11 February 1970. 

5.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry measurements began at 1116 hours on 11 February 

1970. The maximum gamma reading obtained was 400 R/h at RAMS 

unit No. 31 (underground) at 1116 hours on 11 February. With the 

exception of RAMS unit No. 26, surface units showed background 

radiation levels from zero time plus one minute until they were 

secured. Unit No. 26 increased from background at 1116 hours to 

a maximum of 6 mR/h at 1121 hours: then steadily decreased to 

background again at 1140 hours. This unit was visually checked 

during initial surface reentry by Radsafe monitors who found that 

the cable had been smashed by a falling rock. The location was 

surveyed with hand-held radiation detection instruments, and no 

115 
readings above background were detected. RAMS unit No. 26 continued to indicate background readings until it was secured at 

1615 hours on 11 February. All underground units which originally measured radiation levels above background showed continuous 

decreases until they were secured. RAMS unit Nos. 12 through 25 

were secured at 0720 hours on 12 February: Nos. 36AT, 37, 39, 

40AT, and 42 were secured at 0745 hours that same day; the remaining units were secured at 1315 hours on 13 February. 

5.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Experiment Recovery 

Activities 

Initial surface radiation survey teams Nos. 1 and 2 were 

released to survey Rainier Mesa trailer park at 1210 hours on Dday. In addition to their normal duties, team No. 1 checked RAMS 

unit No. 26 which had shown an unexplained increase in readings 

(see 5.3.1), and confirmed that the u'nit was non-operational. 

The Mesa survey was completed at 1242 hours, and all radiation 

readings were background for that area. Initial experiment recovery teams were authorized into the Mesa trailer park at 1310 

hours. At 1328 hours, while recovery operations were in progress 

on the Mesa, initial portal survey teams (Nos. 3 and 4) were 

authorized to proceed with their surveys. Initial portal surveys 

were completed at 1500 hours with no radiation readings above 

background being detected. Recovery operations continued until 

1735 hours when all initial survey teams and experiment recovery 

parties exited the controlled area. No tunnel reentries or 

experiment recoveries were conducted on D-day. 

After event detonation, air sampling lines, connected to a 

valve system and vacuum pump which had been installed preevent, 

were used to draw air from selected locations. This procedure 

was performed remotely (starting at 1604 hours) by means of a 

control panel located outside the portal near a trailer housing a 

gas chromatograph. After air samples were collected, the gas 

116 
chromatograph was used to analyze them for the presence of toxic 

and explosive gases. Results of these analyses were one of the 

factors used to determine when initial tunnel reentry operations 

could safely begin. Analyses results for DIANA MIST indicated 

that maximum gas concentrations detected inside the tunnel were 5 

percent hydrogen and 0.8 percent carbon monoxide. Because the 

hydrogen concentration was above the LEL, ventilation of the 

tunnel complex was required, and it was authorized to begin at 

1704 hours on D-day. 

At 1930 hours, Radsafe personnel began moving the base 

station to the portal area and preparing for a planned tunnel reentry on D+l if tunnel ventilation was successful. 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery Activities 

At 0800 hours on 12 February, results obtained from additional gas chromatograph samples indicated that no toxic gases or 

explosive mixtures were currently present in the tunnel atmosphere. After evaluating all pertinent factors, the decision was 

made to begin initial tunnel reentry operations. Members of initial tunnel reentry team No. 1 donned anticontamination clothing, 

boarded the man-train, and entered the tunnel at 0945 hours. 

They encountered no tunnel damage other than very minor rock 

spalling as they traveled toward the gas seal door. Respiratory 

protection equipment was put on when they reached the gas seal 

door as a precautionary measure during the opening of the small 

manway door. However, it turned out that no toxic gases, explosive mixtures, or radiation problems were encountered during the 

performance of this task. After the small manway door was 

opened, conditions were judged to be favorable for opening the 

large gas seal door. This effort was completed by 1048 hours. 

117 
At 1115 hours, the team left the gas seal door and continued on 

into the tunnel, checking the 02, 03, and 04 drifts before returning to the U12n.06 drift. All areas checked were found to be 

in good condition. 

Team members began to walk-out the 06 drift at 1202 hours. 

After checking both vent lines and finding them to be in good 

condition, they continued into the drift observing only minor 

spalling along the way until they reached the overburden plug 

face at 1208 hours (Figure 22). Radiation levels at the overburden plug were monitored and found to be background. After 

performing preliminary work which would assist a subsequent 

reentry team in opening the overburden plug door, team No. 1 

exited the tunnel at 1255 hours. 

Team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1325 hours on 12 February 

and traveled to the overburden plug where they began removing the 

final bolts from the overburden plug door. All team members were 

wearing Scott-Draeger self-contained breathing units and anticontamination clothing. By 1400 hours, the door was opened and 

team members began removing sandbags to permit access farther into the drift. No toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected 

and radiation levels were background at the overburden plug. 

When sufficient sandbags had been removed to allow access, team 

members continued into the drift, again observing only minor 

spalling as they traveled. Radiation levels increased from 0.03 

mR/h to 0.3 mR/h just beyond the sandbag plug. The decision was 

made to travel no farther and team No. 2 exited the tunnel at 

1425 hours. 

Team No. 3, along with a rescue team (all dressed in anticontamination clothing for reentry), entered the tunnel at 1452 

hours and proceeded to the overburden plug where they established 

a fresh air station and established communications. At 1500 

hours, team No. 3 passed through the overburden plug and pro118 
. 

119 
ceeded to walk-out the exterior of the LOS,pipe and inspect test 

chamber Nos. 2, 3, and 4 (Figure 22). Upon reaching test 

chamber No. 4, they noted some spalling and the concrete floor 

was badly broken. The team exited the area at 1549 hours and no 

other reentry activities were conducted on 12 February. The maximum reading detected at test chamber Nos. 1, 3, and 4 was 150 

mR/h during this survey. 

On 13 February at 0815 hours, team No. 3 and a rescue team 

began suiting up for tunnel reentry. Both teams entered the 

tunnel complex at 0930 hours, but the rescue team remained at the 

overburden plug. Reentry team No. 3 departed the overburden plug 

at 0946 hours, wearing full anticontamination clothing and ScottDraeger self-contained breathing apparatus, and proceeded to 

inspect the LOS pipe drift. Gas chromatograph analysis had indicated 5,000 ppm methane and 9,500 ppm ethane inside the LOS pipe 

at 0920 hours. Since the 06 drift had previously been determined 

to be in good condition, team members traveled to test chamber 

No. 4 first, and worked their way back out of the drift, checking 

each individual test chamber as they progressed. They reached 

test chamber No. 4 at 1002 hours and began checking for radioactivity, toxic gases, and explosive mixtures. A reading greater 

than 3,000 ppm carbon monoxide was detected at the top outside of 

the door. When the door was opened, readings of 30 percent LEL 

of explosive mixtures and 70 mR/h were obtained. Team members 

connected the vent line into this test chamber in an effort to 

facilitate experiment recovery operations before advancing to 

test chamber No. 3 at 1028 hours. Test chamber No. 3 door was 

opened so samples could be taken. No explosive mixtures were 

detected, and a measurement of 600-700 ppm carbon monoxide was 

obtained at the back of the door. The team next checked test 

chamber No. 2. A measurement of 100 ppm carbon monoxide was 

obtained and no explosive mixtures were detected. By 1056 hours, 

the team had reached test chamber No. 1 where they obtained readings of 100 ppm carbon monoxide and 2 percent LEL of explosive 

120 
mixtures. They continued toward the portal passing through the 

overburden plug at 1106 hours. 

After team No. 3 exited the tunnel, teams were allowed to 

enter and prepare for pipe ventilation. A limited amount of experiment recovery work was performed in test chamber No. 3 during 

this time. The team exited the tunnel at 1503 hours and no 

further reentries or recovery operations were performed on 13, 

14, or 15 February. 

A walk-out of the LOS pipe was performed on 16 February beginning at approximately 1025 hours and ending at 1124 hours. 

Readings obtained were as follows: 

Test Chamber No. 1: No explosive mixtures 

No carbon monoxide 

7 mR/h 

Test Chamber No. 2: 

Test Chamber No. 3: 

Test Chamber No. 4: 

Trace explosive mixtures 

No carbon monoxide 

4 mR/h 

No explosive mixtures 

No carbon monoxide 

5 mR/h 

No explosive mixtures 

No carbon monoxide 

3 mR/h 

Because it had a larger area for neutron activation than 

each of the other three test chambers, readings were slightly 

higher at test chamber no. 1, even though it was a greater distance from the zero point than the other chambers. After performing this survey, team members exited the tunnel at 1240 

hours. 

121 
Anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment requirements were suspended for areas outside the LOS pipe, 

except when recovery items were being handled. Requirements 

inside the pipe called for wearing a single anticontamination 

suit with an Acme full-face mask. The radex area was moved so 

that it began at the 06 drift instead of the portal. 

Major experiment recovery operations were conducted between 

17 and 20 February. Additional recovery entries continued until 

2 March, and other entries continued until 18 March 1970. No radiation, toxic gas, or explosive mixture problems were experienced during recovery operations. 

5.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling operations were not performed until 16 

November 1973, when drilling into the U12n.06 chimney and cavity 

began. 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

The objectives were to 

evaluate the characteristics of the tuff surrounding and 

within 200 feet of the DIANA MIST cavity and chimney, 

evaluate the permeability and porosity of the collapsed 

tuff within the DIANA MIST chimney, 

obtain data points for estimating the size and shape of 

the DIANA MIST chimney, and 

evaluate the competency of the tuff above the DIANA MIST 

chimney. 

Fifty-one core samples were obtained during operations conducted from 19 to 29 November 1973. No radiation readings above 

background levels were measured on the core samples or in the 

drill rig area. Operations were completed on 7 December 1973. 

122 
5.4.3 Industrial Safety 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, miner's 

boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency provided its 

own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the McCaa 2-hour breathing 

apparatus and had used the Scott-Draeger self-contained breathing 

apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as spelled out 

in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

Checks were made on each shift for toxic gases and explosive 

mixtures. These measurements were recorded in the Radsafe monitors' log book. Industrial safety codes, including specific 

codes for mining and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224) 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization) 

4. DIANA MIST Safety Regulations 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. A written standard operating procedure 

was required for each operation involving explosives, toxic 

material, or any other operation with the potential for personal 

123 
injury. Each individual involved in the project was required to 

be knowledgeable of the contents of this procedure. 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1116 hours on 11 February 

1970. The maximum gamma exposure rate was 400 R/h at RAMS unit 

No. 31, located 886 feet inside the U12n.06 drift at 1116 hours 

on 11 February 1970. Telemetry station No. 26 (located 500 feet 

from SGZ) went off-line at 1146 hours on 11 February 1970 (see 

5.3.1 for explanation). Remaining surface telemetry stations reported no radiation above background for DIANA MIST. All telemetry was discontinued at 1315 hours on 13 February. 

Initial surface radiation surveys on Rainier Mesa were 

conducted between 1210 and 1242 hours on D-day. Portal surveys 

were conducted between 1335 and 1500 hours on D-day. No readings 

above background levels were detected during these surveys. 

Initial tunnel surveys were conducted on D+l. The maximum 

reading obtained was 0.3 mR/h just beyond the overburden plug. A 

walkout of the outside of the LOS pipe conducted between 1452 and 

1549 hours on D+l produced a maximum reading of 150 mR/h at test 

chambers Nos. 1, 3, and 4. 

The maximum concentration of hydrogen gas detected by gas 

chromatograph was five percent by volume in the LOS pipe at 1604 

hours on 11 February 1970. This was greater than 100 percent of 

the LEL for hydrogen gas in standard air. The maximum concentration of toxic gases was 20,000 ppm carbon monoxide at test chamber No. 4 at 1530 hours on 12 February. 

Experiment recovery operations ended successfully on 2 March 

1970. There were no whole body external or internal organ exposures which exceeded the established guides. 

124 
Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the DIANA MIST event from 11 February 1970 to 18 March 1970 are 

summarized below. The average exposure is from self-reading 

pocket dosimeter readings as recorded on Area Access Registers. 

The maximum exposure is from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (ml?) 

All Participants 417 70 1 

DOD Participants 178 0" 0 

*Minimum detectable gamma exposure with NTS film dosimeter is 30 

mR per film packet worn. 

125 
126 
CHAPTER 6 

MINT LEAF EVENT 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The MINT LEAF device was detonated at 0830 hours PDT on 5 

May 1970 with a yield less than 20 kt. LRL provided the device 

which was emplaced in tunnel U12t.01 at a vertical depth of 1,330 

feet (Figure 23). The purpose of this test was to obtain weapons 

effects information by exposing equipment and materials to a 

nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies, weapons 

laboratories, and DOD contractors conducted 25 projects to obtain 

the desired information. Containment was normal until 34 minutes 

after the detonation when seepage of gaseous radioactive material 

from the end of stemming toward the portal began. This seepage 

continued until the cavity collapsed 62 hours and 14 minutes 

after the detonation. Minor levels of radioactive effluent were 

detected offsite after the MINT LEAF event. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all MINT LEAF event activities in Area 12, subject to controls 

and procedures established by the Test Manager and NTSO. AEC and 

AEC contractor responsibilities were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action 

between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations Office. 

Reentry and recovery programs were conducted by Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque. 

127 
OVERBURDEN 

ZERO POINT 

\ 

GAS SEAL DO0 

O”9” 

SCALE: 1 INCH = 600 FEET (APPROX.) 

Figure 23. MINT LEAF Event tunnel layout. 
The LRL Test Group Director was responsible to the Test 

Manager for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of GZ. 

This responsibility was in effect from the time the device was 

moved to the zero point until device detonation. After device 

detonation, the Test Manager relieved the LRL Test Group Director 

of responsibility and delegated it to the DOD Test Group Director. 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation was contracted to 

provide design, fabrication, and operation of the MINT LEAF experiment test bed facility and for technical monitoring of facility installation. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments, or delivering them to an installation contractor for subsequent placement. After the event, 

these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing 

instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Radioloqical Safety SuPPOrt 

Radsafe personnel were stationed at the DOD Test Group 

Director's reentry staging area to perform emergency 

rescue and provide radiological support; provide anticontamination equipment, portable radiation sensing instruments, and dosimetric devices; provide personnel, 

vehicle, and equipment decontamination; operate sample 

collection stations: and provide laboratory counting 

facilities. 

In the event of any emergency situation, Radsafe personnel who were stationed at the Mesa reentry and portal 

129 
reentry points would assist, as directed by the Test 

Group Director, in a controlled evacuation of personnel 

from the test area. 

Radsafe provided a sufficient number of certified, U.S. 

Bureau of Mines rescue-qualified, radiation monitoring 

personnel to accompany each initial postevent reentry 

team, and stand by for the rescue team as directed by 

the Sandia health physicist. These monitors also would 

perform radiation surveys and obtain samples, as requested. 

Prior to their attempting scientific experiment recoveries, scientific personnel were briefed regarding radiation intensities, contamination levels, tunnel atmosphere, anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment requirements, and time-in-area limits 

imposed by radiation levels. Available anticontamination clothing and equipment included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, plastic bags, gloves and 

masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Forty-five RAMS units provided surface and underground 

coverage for the MINT LEAF event as shown in Figures 24 

and 25, and Table 7. 

Two air samplers (M-102s) were placed as follows: 

l- U12t portal 

l- U12t splice shack 

The Pagoda a ir samp ling trailer was used to samp le the 

130 
Table 7. MINT LEAF Event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

SURFACE 

Portal 

On filter system 

On filter system 

On filter system 

270 feet at 22O45' azimuth from portal 

345 feet at 68"19' azimuth from portal 

289 feet at 104O21' azimuth from portal 

388 feet at 171O13' azimuth from portal 

324 feet at 223"02' azimuth from portal 

265 feet at 273O40' azimuth from portal 

200 feet at 327OO9' azimuth from portal 

3,110 feet at 67"47' azimuth from portal 

2,777 feet at 92"52' azimuth from portal 

1,714 feet at 123'45' azimuth from portal 

1,671 feet at 213"31' azimuth from portal 

2,840 feet at 241'0' azimuth from portal 

1,470 feet at 271OO7' azimuth from portal 

1,368 feet at 323O23' azimuth from portal 

2,498 feet at 32O28' azimuth from portal 

Between cable holes 1 and 2 

242 feet at 6"20' azimuth from cable hole 

1 

No. 

487 feet at 71'25' azimuth from cable hole No. 

1 

169 feet at 186'0' azimuth from cable hole No. 

1 

131 
Table 7. (Concluded) 

Station Location 

SURFACE (Concluded) 

24 168 feet at 271"30' azimuth from cable hole 

No. 1 

25 680 feet at 169O53' azimuth from SGZ 

26 1,671 feet at 316O18' azimuth from SGZ 

27 831 feet at 35"45' azimuth from SGZ 

UNDERGROUND 

28 300 feet into the 02 work drift 

29 700 feet into the 02 drift 

3OAT" 1,190 feet into the 01 drift 

31 820 feet into the 01 drift 

32 650 feet into the 01 work drift 

33 145 feet into the 01 work drift 

34 311 feet into the 01 drift 

35 165 feet into the 01 drift 

36AT* 195 feet into the 01 drift 

37 80 feet into the 01 drift 

38 150 feet into the CA drift 

39 3,085 feet into the main drift 

40 2,500 feet into the main drift 

41 1,770 feet into the main drift 

42AT* 1,770 feet into the main drift 

43 1,670 feet into the main drift 

44 900 feet into the main drift 

45 100 feet into the main drift 

*Buried 

132 
133 
0 200 400 600 FEET 

- - 

Figure 25. MINT LEAF Event underground RAMS unit locations. 
C. 

vent lines. Four heads were used, with two samplers before the filter boxes and two after the filter boxes. 

All of the cartridges used were of the standard activated charcoal type. 

Detectors of a multi-channel geophone system were installed in the tunnel to monitor postevent seismic 

disturbances. 

The PHS operated 101 air sampling stations and 32 gamma 

rate recorder stations in the offsite area. Twenty-two 

personnel were fielded for offsite surveillance activities. 

Security Coverage 

Specific sc;urity procedures for the MINT LEAF event 

were delineated in "MINT LEAF-01 5200.16, Security Operating Instructions." Device security procedures in 

the zero point area and the timing and firing control 

room were in accordance with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, 

"Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear 

Explosive Detonations." 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at muster or control stations for 

issue of stay-in badges, or issue and return of muster 

badges. After area control was established, all through 

traffic was diverted around the controlled area by use 

of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Manager's Operations Plan," 

contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not 

connected with this event out of the closed area before 

the final security sweep began. 

135 
D. Air Support 

One UH-1F helicopter with USAF crew performed preevent 

security sweeps and then was put on standby for the Test 

Manager's use if needed. An additional UH-1F helicopter 

with USAF crew was used for DOD aerial photography. A 

USAF U-3B aircraft with USAF crew and PHS monitoring 

personnel on board was used for cloud tracking. The PHS 

used one Turbo Beech aircraft for cloud sampling, while 

one PHS Turbo Beech remained on standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. The NATS Martin 404 aircraft also 

was on standby at McCarran Airport to be used for cloud 

tracking purposes if needed. 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Final inspection and button up activities were performed on 

23 April in anticipation of scheduled test execution on 28 April. 

Button up activities were performed by personnel representing 

SLA, Bendix Corporation, EG&G, LMSC, PI, Effects Technology Inc. 

(ETI), Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL), McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp. (MDAC), Stanford Research Institute (SRI), LRL, GA, 

and MIT. Preevent readiness briefings were held on 27 April and 

30 April: however, unfavorable weather conditions prevailed and 

the event finally was scheduled for 5 May 1970 at 0730 hours. A 

readiness briefing was held at 1430 hours on 4 May, at which time 

weather conditions were favorable. 

The first security sweep of the closed area was performed 

between 1945 and 2200 hours on 4 May, and the second sweep began 

at 2225 hours. 

6.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

The second security sweep was completed at 0020 hours on 

136 
D-day. At 0230 hours, the arming party entered the area. A 

readiness briefing was held at 0400 hours. Because weather 

conditions remained favorable, permission to arm the device was 

granted at 0442 hours. At 0640 hours, a one-hour hold was called 

and zero time was rescheduled for 0830. 

MINT LEAF was detonated at 0830 hours PDT on 5 May 1970. 

6.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry measurements began at 0831 hours. Four RAMS units 

in the surface array were lost at zero time. All other units 

functioned properly. 

RAMS units located in the LOS drift (Nos. 30AT, 31, 34, 35, 

and 36AT) indicated zero time activation of the test chambers as 

expected. These readings decreased exponentially with time until 

H+34 minutes when units on the zero point side of the overburden 

plug began to show increases which were attributed to gas leakage. Temperatures and pressures in the tunnel were closely 

monitored. The lack of change in the temperature and pressure 

indicated the gas leakage volume was small compared to test drift 

volume. 

At H+2 hours, some radioactivity was measured in the cable 

alcove on the portal side of the overburden plug, but still on 

the zero point side of the gas seal door located in the main 

drift. 

Remote sampling of the radioactive gases on the zero point 

side of the overburden plug began at approximately 1305 hours. 

Release of these gases to the atmosphere was controlled through a 

ventilation filter system which consisted of a prefilter, filter, 

and one-half ton of activated charcoal. RAMS unit Nos. 2, 3, and 

4, located at the ventilation filters, detected levels ranging 

137 
from zero at 1300 hours to a maximum of 750 mR/h at 1335 hours. 

The maximum telemetry measurement was 700 R/h at 1320 hours on Dday at unit No. 31 located 820 feet from the zero point. Radioactive effluent not retained by the filters consisted primarily 

of xenon-135 and about one percent of the activity was krypton85m. At this point, the decision was made to delay tunnel 

ventilation until D+l. 

A controlled venting through the filter system began at 0830 

hours on 6 May (D+l). Since the winds were very favorable, tunnel ventilation was carried out during most of the day, but was 

discontinued at 1530 hours PDT because there was reason to believe the winds would soon shift to an unfavorable direction. 

The maximum reading measured during this controlled release was 

35 R/h at unit No. 2 at 1130 hours. Readings on the portal side 

of the overburden plug peaked at 22 R/h at approximately 0930 

hours (H+25 hours). The maximum reading on the zero point side 

of the gas seal door was 3.2 R/h at the same time. 

The decay of radiation in the LOS drift, even after this 

initial ventilation effort, did not consistently follow a gross 

fission product decay curve, indicating that the seepage of 

radioactive material was continuing. Late on 7 May (D+2), a 

strong indication of cavity collapse was detected by the geophones. After collapse, radiation levels in the tunnel followed 

the expected decay curve. 

The ventilation system was turned on for a third time at 

0647 hours on 12 May (D+7). Documentation of the radioactive 

effluent continued until radiation levels measured by RAMS unit 

Nos. 2, 3, and 4, located on the vent lines, indicated essentially background. The maximum reading of 500 mR/h was detected by 

unit No. 2 at 1515 hours. Continuous samples of the effluent 

indicated that less than one curie of radioactive iodine was 

released to the atmosphere. 

138 
All telemetry was secured at 1115 hours on 2 June 1970. 

6.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Experiment Recovery 

Activities 

Radsafe survey teams Nos. 3 and 4 were released to survey 

the Holmes Road and Mesa trailer park at 0930 hours on D-day. 

This survey was completed at 1130 hours and monitors obtained 

only background readings. No alpha radiation was detected. At 

0937 hours, the trailer park recovery teams and cable disconnect 

team were released from the Test Manager's Barricade, reaching 

the trailer park at 1010 hours. Recovery operations at the 

trailer park were completed at 1100 hours. 

Radsafe survey teams Nos. 1 and 2 were released to survey 

the East Mesa Road and the U12t tunnel portal at 0935 hours. 

This survey was completed at 1015 hours and all readings were 

background. No alpha radiation was detected. Initial portal recovery teams entered the portal trailer park at 0951 hours and 

recovery operations were completed at 1018 hours. 

At 1212 hours, a Radsafe survey team accompanied the gas 

chromatograph sampling team into the portal area. Gas samples 

taken from the zero point side of the overburden plug read 1.5 

mR/h. The exposure rate in the gas chromatograph trailer was 80 

mR/h and at contact with the gas chromatograph line in the trailer it was 200 mR/h. Gas samples from outside of test chamber No. 

3 indicated 3,400 ppm hydrogen, 600-1,000 ppm methane, and 250 

ppm carbon monoxide. Gas chromatograph samples taken at 1340 

hours from inside the overburden plug indicated 900 ppm hydrogen, 

100 ppm methane, and 120 ppm carbon monoxide. The exposure rate 

in the gas chromatograph trailer had increased to 2 R/h and the 

team left the area. No further reentries were made on D-day. 

139 
6.3.3 Aerial Monitoring 

The USAF U-3B aircraft began performing its tracking mission 

at 0838 hours on D-day. After repeated passes over SGZ with no 

readings above background detected, the mission was terminated at 

0904 hours. The PHS Turbo Beech also was airborne for a short 

time on D-day. No readings above background were obtained, and 

no samples were taken. 

The Turbo Beech aircraft was airborne again on D+l day. 

Sampling was conducted between 1005 and 1055 hours. 

At 1130 hours on D+l day, at the request of the Test Manager, Vegas 5 (the NATS plane) began a cloud tracking operation. 

At 1235, the Vegas 5 crew reported that they were detecting only 

xenon-135. It was shown by the tracking information that the 

cloud had blown due north, and at 1400 hours the leading edge was 

100 miles from the U12t portal. This was 5.5 hours after the 

initiation of tunnel ventilation. 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery Activities 

Tunnel reentry began at 1015 hours on 13 May 1970 when team 

No. 1 entered the tunnel. All reentry and experiment recovery 

teams were dressed in anticontamination clothing and ScottDraeger self-contained breathing apparatus. Team No. 1 exited 

the tunnel at 1140 hours. Team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1155 

hours, opened the gas seal door, and began reinstalling the 

railroad tracks. They exited the tunnel at 1245 hours. From 

1325 hours to 1425 hours, team No. 3 entered the tunnel and 

completed reinstallation of the tracks. Team No. 4 performed the 

last reentry of the day. They entered the tunnel at 1445 hours, 

140 
checked the containment assessment drift, and exited the tunnel 

at 1615 hours. 

On 14 May, three reentries into the tunnel complex were performed. Team No. 1 entered at 0820 to install sump pumps at the 

overburden plug. This was accomplished, and the team exited the 

tunnel at 0940 hours. Team No. 2 performed its assigned tasks 

from 0955 to 1200 hours. Team No. 3 entered the tunnel at 1215 

hours. Unexpectedly, the exposure rate at the overburden plug 

had increased from 200 mR/h at 1230 hours to 1 R/h at 1245 hours. 

Reentry personnel were immediately evacuated from the area. The 

increase was believed to be caused by contaminated water which 

was running along the railroad tracks. A pump was installed to 

remove some of the water and sandbags were brought in to contain 

the rest. Team No. 3 exited the tunnel at 1415 hours. 

Five reentry teams were used on 15 May 1970. Their objective was to open the overburden plug door and check out the tunnel condition beyond that point. This was successfully accomplished between 0925 and 1600 hours. The maximum reading obtained was 1 R/h on the zero point side of the overburden plug. No 

toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected. 

Reentry parties checked test chamber Nos. 1, 2, and 3 between 0835 and 1555 hours on 18 May. Test chamber No. 1 was 

found to be in good condition with no structural damage. Test 

chamber No. 2 was in the same general condition except that there 

was water on the floor. Test chamber No. 3 had sand, rock, and 

sandbags on the floor. Approximately 50 feet beyond test chamber 

No. 3, an exposure rate of 5 R/h was encountered by team No. 2. 

Later, when team No. 2 was in the tunnel, they walked to within 

30 feet of the TAPS where they encountered an exposure rate of 10 

R/h. All reentry teams were dressed in anticontamination clothing and wore Scott-Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus. 

141 
From 19 May to 17 June 1970 experiment recovery activities 

were performed by personnel representing LRL, PI, DASA, LMSC, 

Kaman Nuclear (KN), EG&G, SLA, and AFWL. 

On two later occasions, during routine operations, the presence of hydrogen sulfide was detected in the tunnel complex. The 

first occurrence was on 25 June when personnel reentered the tunnel and attempted to open the TAPS drain to draw water and air 

samples. When the plug was removed, a spout of water indicated 

that a larger amount of water probably existed behind the TAPS. 

Strong odors of hydrogen sulfide from the drain water were noticed. The hydrogen sulfide odor dissipated rather rapidly as 

the water was drained. The second occurrence was on 21 September 

1970 at 0930 hours when a trace of hydrogen sulfide was detected 

in the drain sump just above the water's surface. A waist-high 

measurement however, indicated no presence of hydrogen sulfide. 

There was no further record of hydrogen sulfide being detected 

during this operation. 

Little reentry work was performed between 1 July and 1 

October 1970 due to a labor union dispute. Some work was accomplished using supervisory personnel. By mid-December, manpower 

levels were approaching normalcy. On 18 December, the DOE 

BANEBERRY test (in Area 8) vented, causing a shutdown of Area 12 

until 1 February 1971. After some careful cleanup of the U12t 

portal area, skeleton crews were allowed to work in the tunnel 

because it was considered to be a clean area. Stringent anticontamination procedures were followed for personnel commuting between the check point and U12t tunnel. Hardware recovery was 

conducted between 1 February and 26 April 1971. On 26 April, the 

Test Command, Site Development Directorate, Chief Engineer determined that further effort was inadvisable and the drift would be 

closed on 7 May 1971. From 1 to 7 May, miners retrieved their 

equipment and several tours were taken through the 01 drift. On 

7 May 1971, the 01 drift was officially closed. 

142 
6.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

No postevent drilling was performed. 

6.4.3 Industrial Safety 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, miner's 

boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency provided its 

own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the McCaa 2-hour breathing 

apparatus and had used the Scott-Draeger self-contained breathing 

apparatus. All standard safety rules and practices as spelled 

out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual" were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224) 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organizations) 

4. MINT LEAF Safety Regulations 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving explosives, toxic materials, radioactive materials, or any other operation with the potential for personal 

143 
injury. Each individual involved in the project was required to 

be knowledgeable of the contents of the procedure. 

Checks were made during each shift for toxic gases and explosive mixtures. The maximum concentrations of explosive gases 

were 18,000 ppm hydrogen and 1,800 ppm methane as sampled remotely and analyzed by gas chromatograph. These samples were taken 

remotely from behind the overburden plug on 7 May 1970, and then 

recorded in the monitors' log book. Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for mining and drilling, were established 

by REECo and were emphasized during all operations. 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

At H+l minute on 5 May 1970, RAMS unit Nos. 26, 30AT, 31, 

32, 33, 34, 35, and 36 showed positive signs of radiation which 

was due to experiment activation. The maximum reading obtained 

was 700 R/h at 1320 hours on D-day at unit No. 31 located 820 

feet from the zero point. This reading occurred during a release 

of gases into the tunnel complex. All telemetry was secured at 

1115 hours on 2 June 1970. 

Initial radiation surveys of the Rainier Mesa trailer park 

were conducted between 0930 and 1130 hours on D-day. All readings were background. Initial portal radiation surveys were 

conducted between 0935 and 1015 hours on D-day. All readings 

again were background. No alpha radiation was detected. 

The maximum concentration of toxic gases and explosive mixtures detected was 18,000 ppm hydrogen and 1,800 ppm methane by 

gas chromatograph sample from behind the overburden plug on 7 May 

1970. 

During reentries into the 01 drift for experiment recover144 
ies, a maximum gamma exposure rate of 10 R/h was measured 30 feet 

from the TAPS door on 18 May 1970. 

There were no whole body external or internal organ exposures which exceeded the established guides. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the MINT LEAF event from 5 May 1970 to 30 April 1971, when the 

U12t.01 drift was no longer a radex area, are summarized below. 

The average exposure is from self-reading pocket dosimeter readings as recorded on Area Access Registers. The maximum exposure 

is from film dosimeter records. 

All Participants 

DOD Participants 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

2,213 350 24 

390 350 14 

145 
146 
CHAPTER 7 

HUDSON MOON EVENT 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

HUDSON MOON was a DOD underground test detonated at 0716 

hours PDT on 26 May 1970 with a yield less than 20 kt. The LRLprovided device was emplaced in tunnel U12e.12 at a vertical 

depth of 1,386 feet (Figure 26). The objective of this test was 

to evaluate and measure responses of material and equipment to 

the environment of a nuclear detonation. Government agencies and 

contractors conducted 26 projects to obtain the desired information. Severe conditions existed in the experiment tunnel soon 

after detonation. However, essentially all radioactive effluent 

was contained within the tunnel complex until it was released to 

the atmosphere using the ventilation system and filters. Minor 

levels of radioactive effluent were detected onsite, and no 

radioactive effluent was detected offsite. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all HUDSON MOON activities in Area 12, subject to controls and 

procedures established by the Test Manager and the NTSO. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of 

separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada 

Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

147 
SCALE 

m 

Figure 26. HUDSON MOON Event tunnel layout. 
and installing their experiments, or delivering them to an installation contractor for subsequent placement. After the event, 

these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing 

instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on 

experiment results. 

Because LRL fielded the device, the LRL Test Group Director 

was responsible for radiological safety within a l,oOO-foot 

radius of SGZ, a l,OOO-foot radius of the new portal, the trailer 

park, and the tunnel from the portal to GZ. This responsibility 

was in effect from device emplacement until device detonation. 

At that time, the Test Manager relieved the LRL Test Group 

Director of responsibility and delegated responsibility to the 

DOD Test Group Director. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

Mining of the U12e.12 drift began on 1 April 1969 and 

was conducted concurrently with construction operations 

for DIESEL TRAIN in the U12e.11 drift. The turnout of 

the U12e.12 drift began 306 feet into the U12e.10 

(DORSAL FIN) drift. A lo-foot by lo-foot bypass drift 

was mined around the U12e.lO/e.12 intersection where 

DIESEL TRAIN instrumentation was located. Mining of the 

drift was completed on 19 September 1969. HUDSON MOON 

construction activity during October and November 1969 

consisted of alcove hardening, instrument hole drilling, 

and building pads for the LOS pipe components which were 

installed after DIESEL TRAIN test execution. 

Installation of the LOS pipe began on 17 December 1969. 

The LOS pipe was 1,300 feet long and contained three 

test chambers. Only one TAPS unit was installed. It 

149 
was located on the portal side of the sample protection 

system boxes. 

Penetrations through the overburden plug consisted of a 

6-foot 6-inch high manway, two 24-inch vent lines, four 

l/2-inch reentry gas sampling lines, two 2-inch chiller 

lines (for vacuum pumps), and a 12-inch drain line. 

Facilities constructed for DIESEL TRAIN and other prior 

events which were reused for HUDSON MOON included the 

gas seal door, downhole cable alcove, and the portal and 

Mesa trailer parks. The pipe and tunnel configuration 

for HUDSON MOON were designed to provide containment of 

the weapons debris and energy within the first few 

hundred feet of the LOS pipe. The stemming design was 

based on successful designs employed on several previous 

events and was scaled to the HUDSON MOON anticipated 

yield. 

Event readiness was set for June 1970. In late September 1969, based upon anticipated labor difficulties at 

the NTS, the event date was advanced to 19 May 1970. 

Zero room installation was completed in mid-December after the DIESEL TRAIN event was executed. By 30 January 

1970, the LOS pipe was installed, and the first vacuum 

check was successfully completed on 13 February. The 

entire LOS pipe was installed, pressure checked, and 

vacuum checked by 23 March. From 22 March to 29 April, 

experimenters installed their experiments in the three 

test chambers. 

Advance warning indicated that the skilled labor workers 

were planning to go on strike at some date after the 

first of June 1970, requiring that a large number of 

events be executed before that date. This fact had com150 
pressed six major events into the month of May. Consequent demands on facilities, instrumentation, and personnel to handle the workload made the readiness dates 

of later events dependent upon the execution dates of 

the earlier ones. The planned mandatory full participation dry run date and event date for HUDSON MOON were 

set back one week when MINT LEAF was delayed by bad 

weather for seven days. 

The mandatory full participation (MFP) dry run was attempted three times on 12 May. Problems appeared in 

several experiments, mostly as a result of the demands 

made on experimenters from other test events. There 

were three more attempts made on 13 May and late in the 

evening the MFP was considered successful. The following day, a successful full-power, full-frequency (FPFF) 

dry run was completed. 

B. Radioloqical Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with requirements of responsible DOD and SLA representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support, air sampling, and telemetry. 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans ("HUDSON MOON 

Reentry Plan") were prepared and issued for implementation to participating agencies prior to the test. Reference markers and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, manned stations, and security 

station requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

151 
provided to perform initial surface radiation surveys 

and aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry parties, as needed. Radsafe personnel also were 

standing by at the FCP prior to detonation to perform 

surveys and provide emergency support as directed: provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, 

portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations: and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

RAMS units for the HUDSON MOON event were located as 

shown in Table 8, Figure 27 and Figure 28. 

Two air sampling units (M-102s) were positioned, one at 

the U12e portal and one at the U12es portal. 

PHS personnel had positioned 99 air sampling units and 

30 gamma rate recorder stations in the offsite area, and 

fielded 28 personnel for surveillance activities. 

The Pagoda sampling trailer was used to sample the vent 

lines. Four heads were used with two samplers before 

the filter boxes and two after the filter boxes. All 

the cartridges used were the standard activated charcoal 

type. 

D. Security Coveraqe 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

152 
Table 8. HUDSON MOON Event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location 

SURFACE 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

Directly above e portal 

Directly above es portal 

300 feet at 337O azimuth from e portal 

250 feet at 25O azimuth from e portal 

300 feet at 90" azimuth from e portal 

225 feet at 340° azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 250° azimuth from e portal 

245 feet at 303' azimuth from e portal 

125 feet at 45" azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 102" azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 180' azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 237" azimuth from es portal 

300 feet at 286O azimuth from es portal 

On the filter system and the blower stacks 

On the filter system and the blower stacks 

On the filter system and the blower stacks 

2,250 feet at 60" azimuth from RAMS station 

No. 6 

2,500 feet at 102.5' azimuth from RAMS station 

No. 6 

1,100 feet at 128O azimuth from RAMS station 

No. 6 

1,655 feet at 254' azimuth from RAMS station 

No. 6 

2,500 feet at 329O azimuth from RAMS station 

No. 6 

200 feet at 180° azimuth from cable hole No. 2 

220 feet at 90" azimuth from cable hole No. 2 

153 
Table 8. (Concluded) 

Station Location 

SURFACE (Concluded) 

24 At cable hole No. 2 

25 225 feet at 270' azimuth from cable hole No. 2 

26 250 feet at 0' azimuth from cable hole No. 2 

27 700 feet at 30° azimuth from SGZ 

28 670 feet at 135O azimuth from SGZ 

29 700 feet at 300" azimuth from SGZ 

UNDERGROUND 

30 1,075 feet into U12e.12 experiment drift 

31 525 feet into U12e.12 experiment drift 

31AT* 400 feet into U12e.12 experiment drift 

32 260 feet into U12e.12 experiment drift 

34 250 feet into U12e.10 drift 

35 605 feet into U12e.06 drift 

36 150 feet into U12e.06 drift 

36AT* 150 feet into U12e.06 drift 

37 3,475 feet into U12e main drift 

38 3,425 feet into U12e main drift 

39 2,885 feet into U12e bypass drift 

40 1,850 feet into U12e bypass drift 

41 50 feet into main drift from e portal 

42 95 feet into main drift from es portal 

*Buried 

154 
TRAILER PARK 

TRAILER PARK 

Figure 27. HUDSON MOON Event surface RAMS unit locations. 
\ 

N 

156 
the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at muster or control stations for 

issue of stay-in badges, or issue and return of muster 

badges. After area control was established, all through 

traffic was diverted by use of screening stations. 

E. Air Support 

A USAF UH-1F helicopter with crew performed aerial 

photography. Two UH-1N helicopters and crews were provided by the Air Force: one was used to perform security 

sweeps, and the other was for cloud tracking and Test 

Manager's standby use. The USPHS provided PHS monitoring personnel for one USAF U-3B aircraft with military 

crew to perform cloud tracking: a Turbo Beech aircraft 

for cloud sampling: and a Turbo Beech aircraft on 

standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas to perform 

cloud sampling, if needed. A Martin 404 also was on 

standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas for cloud 

tracking, if needed. Geotronics personnel in a Cessna 

180 provided postevent photography coverage. 

7.2.3 Late Pre-event Activities 

The tunnel button up for the final dry run was completed at 

approximately 0830 hours on 25 May 1970. The final dry run was 

started at 1300 hours but was held for false monitor indications 

several times. By 1500 hours, the final dry run was successfully 

completed. The 1430-hour readiness briefing indicated favorable 

weather conditions for test execution on 26 May 1970. 

157 
Button up activities were performed by personnel representing DOD, LMSC, SLA, LRL, SRI, EG&G, LASL, ETI, AFWL, PI, NOL, 

MRC, GA, and KN. The manway door in the overburden plug was 

closed and sealed after completion of button up activities by the 

experimenters. 

Security sweeps of the closed area were performed. 

7.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

At 0318 hours on D-day, permission to arm the device was 

granted. The first manually sent signal was activated at 0600 

hours. At 0645 hours, the fifteen minute countdown began. All 

systems functioned until minus five minutes, at which time an LRL 

experiment failed to come on. The countdown was held for eight 

minutes while the problem was analyzed, then backed up to minus 

10 minutes and restarted. 

HUDSON MOON was detonated at 0716 hours PDT on 26 May 1970. 

7.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Shortly after test execution, readings greater than 1,000 

R/h were measured on the zero point side of the overburden plug. 

RAMS units outside the overburden plug indicated gas leakage 

through the plug at about 0719 hours. At 0725 hours, readings 

greater than 1000 R/h were detected by RAMS unit No. 32 on the 

portal side of the overburden plug, and radioactive effluent had 

begun to leak through the gas seal door. By 0746 hours, RAMS 

units (Nos. 30, 31, and 31AT) on the zero point side of the 

overburden plug ceased functioning. Some units located between 

the overburden plug and the gas seal door detected levels greater 

than 1,000 R/h at this time. Readings in this area of the tunnel 

complex began steadily decreasing after 1006 hours. 

158 
At 0924 hours, RAMS units on the filter system indicated a 

buildup of activity on the filters. At 0936 hours, the radioactive gas had percolated through the filter system and was being 

released to the atmosphere. Although the ventilation system was 

not being operated at the time, activity was drawn out of the 

tunnel through the vent line. This was apparently due to natural 

ventilation, which had been observed preevent while the filters 

were being installed in the system. The natural ventilation 

continued through the night and the estimated total release for 

the first 24 hours was 2,270 curies. Twelve hours after the 

filtered effluent was released, this activity would have decayed 

to 790 curies. 

At 0835 hours on D+l, with the permission of the Test 

Manager, the ventilation system was turned on and the tunnel was 

ventilated from the portal to the gas seal door to insure that 

the activity which leaked through the gas seal door was filtered 

before release to the atmosphere. The system was operated for 68 

minutes during which time an estimated 500 curies of gaseous 

activity were released. At release plus 12 hours, radioactive 

decay would have reduced this activity to 325 curies. 

Telemetry measurements were discontinued at 1126 hours on 18 

July 1970. 

7.3.2 Initial Rainier Mesa Trailer Park and Portal Trailer Park 

Radiation Surveys and Data Recovery Activities 

Initial Radsafe survey teams, along with data recovery 

teams, entered the Mesa trailer park at 0912 hours. A survey of 

the trailer park resulted in a maximum reading of 1 mR/h at the 

cable hole. 

Between 1150 and 1308 hours a gas chromatograph team sampled 

the tunnel atmosphere from the HP-2 trailer located at the por159 
tal. The maximum exposure rate during this .time was 200 mR/h at 

1245 hours at the pump outside the HP-2 trailer. An LRL data 

recovery team, accompanied by a Radsafe monitor, performed recovery operations at the portal trailer park between 1325 and 

1447 hours. 

Surface data recoveries were completed and all personnel 

exited the area by 1500 hours. 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery Activities 

On 27 May at 0835 hours, the ventilation system was turned 

on and the tunnel was ventilated from the portal to the gas seal 

door. Maximum readings were 1,000 ppm methane; 2,100 ppm hydrogen; 5,000 ppm carbon dioxide; and 4,000 ppm carbon monoxide. 

This ventilation effort, which had been approved by the Test 

Manager, continued for approximately one hour with all effluent 

being passed through a filter system before release to the 

atmosphere. The labor strike which began on 31 May 1970 caused 

recovery operations to be stopped after the initial surveys. The 

tunnel complex was then closed, except for remote gas sampling, 

for more than a month to allow radiation levels to decrease. 

On 7 July at 0900 hours, the volume between the gas seal 

door and the overburden plug was ventilated for four to five 

hours before the overburden plug valves were opened. A PHS 

sampling aircraft made several passes over the portal area and 

the areas downwind from the portal while ventilation was in 

progress. All readings were background. On 8 July, a PHS 

aircraft circled the portal area and collected one mass air 

sample, one cryogenic sample, and three grab samples. All 

samples indicated background radiation levels. Ventilation of 

160 
the entire tunnel continued for approximately one week. During 

this time, approval was received for reentry to begin on 14 July. 

On 14 July, initial tunnel reentry began at 0938 hours. 

Team No. 1, dressed in anticontamination clothing and ScottDraeger self-contained breathing apparatus, checked the tunnel to 

the gas seal door. The gas seal door, which was inspected and 

found to have no leaks, was subsequently opened. No toxic gases 

or explosive mixtures were detected and a 3 mR/h exposure rate 

was measured. An air pump for tunnel dewatering was established 

with a discharge to a drain line in the trench inside the gas 

seal door. Team No. 1 then returned to the portal. Team No. 2 

entered the tunnel at 1205 hours and established railroad tracks 

through the gas seal door. The team then walked-out the tunnel 

to the U12e.12 bypass drift. The maximum radiation reading 

obtained was 6 mR/h at the junction of the bypass drift and the 

U12e.12 'Y'. Team No. 2 exited the tunnel at 1330 hours. 

Two teams reentered the tunnel on 15 July. The first team 

entered at 0925 hours, established a compressed air line at the 

gas seal door, and proceeded to walk-out U12e.06 and U12e.10; 

check out the cable alcove plug; and walk-out Ul2e.12 to the 

overburden plug. Gas samples were taken through the overburden 

plug and the team began removing bolts from the door. After 

completing this task, the team exited the tunnel at approximately 

1330 hours. The maximum exposure rate of 400 mR/h was detected 

inside the manway of the OBP. 

Efforts between 16 and 21 July were concentrated on removing 

sandbags from the overburden plug manway door. The exposure rate 

in this work area was 40 mR/h; no toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected. After the sandbags were removed, crews were 

sent in to clean up the area on the portal side of the overburden 

Plug* Teams were using full-face masks with Acme canisters, 

based on results from samples previously taken. It also was 

161 
necessary to repair the vent line on the portal side of the overburden plug. Teams worked in two-hour shifts in an effort to 

keep exposure levels low. An additional team surveyed the tunnel 

and obtained air samples to see if a fresh air station could be 

established underground. 

The staging area (fresh air station) for test chamber No. 1 

reentry teams was on the portal side of the overburden plug. A 

rescue team also was staged at this location. The rescue team 

had McCaa self-conained breathing apparatus available, if needed. 

Team No. 1 departed the overburden plug at 1018 hours on 22 July 

with radiation readings increasing from 1.5 R/h just past the 

thermal shield to 3.5 R/h as they reached the test chamber door. 

After opening the test chamber door, radiation levels remained 

the same, and no toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected. 

The team returned to the fresh air station at 1045 hours. Subsequently, a scientific assessment team entered the test chamber to 

evaluate the condition of the experiments and take photos. After 

review by the scientific assessment team, it was decided, for 

safety reasons, that recovery would be accomplished through a 

parallel drift to be mined 50 feet from the left rib of the experiment drift; Figure 29 shows the parallel drift at completion 

of recovery operations. 

On 5 August 1970, REECo began mining a lo-foot by lo-foot 

reentry drift in the left rib of the U12e.12 project drift. The 

reentry drift was stopped on 25 August and a lo-foot by lo-foot 

crosscut (crosscut No. 1) was started toward test chamber No. 1. 

The floor of crosscut No. 1 was graveled and sandbagged, and ribs 

were sandbagged to provide a shielded walkway to the LOS pipe. 

Two gas sampling holes were drilled into the test chamber. No 

toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected. 

After being made aware of a potential toxic gas problem, the 

necessary materials were prepared and specific checks were made 

162 

for hydrogen cyanide, which was a potential breakdown product 

from materials used in the experiment, by drilling holes through 

the pipe at two locations. None was detected. An unsuccessful 

attempt also was made to siphon a water sample from one of the 

drilled holes. After these tests were conducted, a three-foot by 

six-foot doorway was cut in the wall of test chamber No. 1. The 

torch operator wore an MSA all-purpose mask with canister while 

performing this operation, in addition to the required anticontamination clothing. A reentry team entered the test chamber 

on 28 August. Their instruments detected no carbon monoxide, 

toxic gases, or explosive mixtures. They did detect 500 to 1,000 

ppm carbon dioxide. Ventilation appeared to be adequate in the 

pipe. Gamma radiation readings were 700 to 1,000 mR/h in the 

test chamber. About six to eight inches of water was on the test 

chamber floor, along with some experimental debris. Part of this 

water was pumped out through the original test chamber door to 

the floor of the LOS drift. 

On 31 August, closer examination of experiments by scientific personnel led to a decision to radiograph primary experiments 

in place to see if there was internal damage. This delayed 

experiment recovery for several days. Lagging was placed in the 

bottom of test chamber No. 1 to improve the footing and prepare 

it for radiography. By 2 September, radiography had been conducted and the results analyzed by LRL personnel, who made the 

decision to go ahead and remove the experiments from the test 

chamber. The day was spent in preparing a runway to move the 

experiments out of the pipe. On 3 September, all primary experiments had been moved to the U12e.06 drift for additional radiography. No problems were encountered while moving the experiments. Personnel most heavily involved in this effort received 

approximately 800 to 900 mrem exposure as estimated by pocket 

dosimeters. Radiography continued through 9 September, at which 

time all other experimenters were allowed to begin removing their 

experiments from the test chamber. The exposure rate in the test 

164 
chamber during experiment recovery activities was generally 300 

to 400 mR/h. All major experiments were recovered from this test 

chamber by the end of the day on 11 September. 

From 12 September to 1 October, mining toward test chamber 

No. 2 was conducted. Crosscut No. 2 toward test chamber No. 2 

was completed by 5 October. The gamma radiation measurement two 

feet from the test chamber and four to five feet above the floor 

was 2 R/h. Radiation levels inside the test chamber were estimated to be 4-5 R/h. The floor and ribs of crosscut No. 2 were 

shielded with sandbags as was done at test chamber No. 1. This 

reduced radiation levels to 300-500 mR/h. A test hole was 

drilled into test chamber No. 2 for sampling purposes. No toxic 

gases or explosive mixtures were detected. 

On 6 October, a 2 by 3-foot hole (port) was cut into test 

chamber No. 2, and the chamber entered by a team dressed in 

double anticontamination suits, hoods, booties, and gloves, and 

wearing a full-face mask. Initial observations revealed no gross 

disorientation of any experiments. The entire test chamber was 

covered with deep (12-inch) layers of fine dust or ash, gray in 

color. There were no indications of debris damage, although the 

dust would have masked it. Just above the test chamber door 

(opposite the recovery access port) a view port with its transparent material missing created an opening from the test chamber 

to the drift, and some rocks were lodged in the short stub leading to the port. Radiation levels during reentry ranged from 6 

R/h at the access port to 25 R/h at contact with the ash on the 

floor. 

The first attempt at removing the dust from the test chamber 

involved a slurry technique. Water was added to the dust and the 

resulting mixture was pumped out of the test chamber and into the 

experimental drift. This technique was employed carefully so 

that water was not sprayed on any of the experiments. As areas 

165 
in the test chamber were cleared, sandbags and lagging were 

placed where possible to further reduce radiation levels. A 

brief attempt to vacuum the experiments was made as decided by 

the test group staff, but was discontinued when it was decided 

that this should be left to the experimenters. The radiation 

measurement in the test chamber was originally 3 R/h; however, 

after cleanup efforts, this was reduced to 450 mR/h. To further 

reduce individual exposures, mining personnel assignments also 

were rotated. All personnel were dressed in full anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment for work in 

the test chamber area. 

By 12 October, the access port had been enlarged, the area 

had been sandbagged, and a plywood walkway prepared into the test 

chamber. This allowed experiment recovery operations to begin on 

13 October. Exposure rates to recovery personnel varied from 300 

to 750 mR/h, depending on the work location. Experiment recovery 

operations were performed by personnel representing LRL, SLA, 

LMSC, and DOD. These operations continued through 16 October. 

Between 5 and 10 November 1970, attempts were made to reenter the LRL alcove to recover experiments. Personnel dressedout in anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection 

equipment and attempted to enter the alcove: however, recovery 

operations were cancelled due to exposure rates of 1 to 2 R/h in 

the main drift. The crosscut was sealed, and all personnel 

exited the drift. 

In an effort to gather data on containment problems incurred 

during this event, reentry mining was continued, although no 

further experiment recoveries were performed. Crosscut No. 3 was 

driven to intersect the LOS pipe approximately 20 feet on the 

portal side of the TAPS door, and an opening was cut into the 

pipe on 9 December 1970. Crosscut No. 4 was driven on the zero 

point side of the TAPS and was completed on 15 February 1971. 

166 
From 16 February until 12 March 1971, the LOS pipe was cut and 

the stemming material was removed. Crosscut No 5 was driven to 

intersect test chamber No. 3, but on holing through, the pipe 

drift was found to be two-thirds full of rock rubble and radiation levels reaching 30 R/h discouraged further excavation at 

this location. Crosscut No. 5A was driven from crosscut No. 5 to 

intersect the pipe within the high-strength grout on the zero 

point side of test chamber No. 3. High radiation levels at 

crosscut No. 5A prevented extensive investigation. Crosscut No. 

6 was driven through to the LOS pipe drift and completed during 

the week of 26 July 1971. Crosscut No. 7 was driven to intersect 

the LOS pipe drift and crosscut No. 8 was driven to the left rib 

of the pipe drift. 

7.4.2 Industrial Safety 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. A written standard 

operating procedure was required for each operation involving 

explosives, toxic materials, radioactive materials, or any other 

operation with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved in the project was required to be knowledgeable 

of the contents of this procedure. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224) 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization) 

4. HUDSON MOON Safety Regulations 

167 
All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, miner's 

boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency provided its 

own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of McCaa 2-hour breathing 

apparatus and had used the Scott-Draeger self-contained breathing 

apparatus. All standard safety rules and practices as spelled 

out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual" were observed. 

Checks were made on each shift for toxic gases and explosive 

mixtures. These measurements were recorded in the Radsafe monitors' log book. Industrial safety codes including specific codes 

for mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. 

Maximum concentrations of gases detected were 1,000 ppm 

methane, 2,100 ppm hydrogen, 5,000 ppm carbon dioxide, and 4,000 

ppm carbon monoxide. These readings were remotely detected from 

the zero point side of the overburden plug on 27 May 1970. 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 0717 hours on 26 May 1970. 

Immediately, RAMS unit Nos. 30 and 31 were off scale at greater 

than 1,000 R/h. RAMS unit No. 31AT went off line at 0720 hours. 

All telemetry was secured at 1126 hours on 18 July 1970. 

The initial surface survey and recovery teams entered the 

168 
area and took measurements from 0912 to 1500 hours on 26 May 

1970. The labor strike which began on 31 May 1970 caused recovery operations to be stopped after the initial surveys. 

Initial reentry and recovery operations into the tunnel 

began at 0938 hours on 14 July and were completed on 10 November 

1970. The maximum radiation reading was 25 R/h in test chamber 

No. 2 on 6 October. Maximum concentrations of gas detected were 

1,000 ppm methane: 2,100 ppm hydrogen: 5,000 ppm carbon dioxide; 

and 4,000 ppm carbon monoxide. 

There were no whole body external or internal organ exposures which exceeded the established guides. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the HUDSON MOON event from 26 May to 18 December 1970 when use of 

Area Access Registers was discontinued, are summarized below. 

The average exposure is from self-reading pocket dosimeter readings as recorded on Area Access Registers. The maximum exposure 

is from film dosimeter records. 

All Participants 4,559 715 27 

DOD Participants 427 545 89 

No. of Entries 

Loqqed 

Maximum Average 

Exposure Exposure 

(mR) (mR) 

169 
170 
CHAPTER 8 

DIAGONAL LINE EVENT 

8.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The DIAGONAL LINE device was detonated with a yield less 

than 20 kt at 1215 hours PST on 24 November 1971. LLL provided 

the device, which was emplaced in a 66-inch diameter cased hole 

at a depth of 867 feet at shaft site Ullg (Figures 30 and 31). 

Also, a satellite hole was drilled 22 feet west of Ullg to obtain 

geology, ground motion, and containment-related data. The objective of this weapons effects test was to evaluate the response of 

materials and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment. 

Government agencies and contractors conducted 19 projects to obtain the desired weapons effects information. 

A subsidence crater formed 14 minutes and 30 seconds after 

zero time. Data recovery was completed at H+2.5. About three 

hours and 15 minutes after detonation, seepage of radioactive 

gases was detected in the vicinity of the crater. Release of 

radioactive gases continued sporadically throughout the night. 

All readings in the vicinity of SGZ returned to background by 

early morning. Radioactive effluent slightly above background 

was detected offsite on 25 November by aircraft only. 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all DIAGONAL LINE activities in Area 11. Responsibilities of 

AEC and AEC-contractor personnel were in accordance with estab171 
172 

lished AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action 

between Field Command, DNA, and the AEC Nevada Operations Office. 

The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent 

removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. The 

LLL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety 

within a 3,000-foot radius of SGZ. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A "DIAGONAL LINE Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to assure safe and economical 

reentry. Radsafe personnel were provided with "Detailed Initial 

Reentry Procedures" for reentry and recovery operations. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were prepared 

and issued to participating agencies for implementation 

prior to the event. Test area maps which showed the 

locations of reference markers, RAMS units, and air 

sampling equipment were prepared. Party monitors were 

briefed regarding their responsibilities at manned stations and security stations, and during reentry and 

sample recovery operations. All personnel at manned 

stations were provided with anticontamination clothing 

and respiratory protection equipment, and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. Available clothing and equipment included coveralls, head and shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

gloves, plastic bags and masking tape. 

A mobile issue facility stocked with anticontamination 

clothing, respiratory protection equipment, and dosimetric devices was positioned, prior to the event, at the 

security barricades near the FCP. A personnel and vehi174 
cle decontamination facility was established adjacent to 

the mobile issue facility. 

B. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

Eighteen RAMS units were installed for this event (Table 

9 and Figure 32). All telemetry stations were to remain 

active until the Test Controller authorized deactivation. 

Four air sampling units (M-102) were placed at the following locations: 

1 - 600 feet due north of SGZ 

1 - 600 feet at 45O azimuth from SGZ 

1 - 600 feet at 60° azimuth from SGZ 

1 - 600 feet at 330° azimuth from SGZ 

The Environmental Protection Agency fielded 29 personnel 

to perform surveillance activities. 

C. Security Coveraqe 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Muster and control stations were established. All personnel were required to have proper security clearances 

for the area. Control of the area was maintained by 

using roadblocks, access authorizations, and the "Test 

Manager's Operations Plan -- DIAGONAL LINE." WSI security guards were responsible for activating roadblocks 

and directing traffic flow. 

175 
Table 9. DIAGONAL LINE Event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location (from SGZ) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

On SGZ experimental tower 

At SGZ 

300 feet at 0' azimuth 

600 feet at 0' azimuth 

600 feet at 45" azimuth 

600 feet at 90° azimuth 

600 feet at 135" azimuth 

600 feet at 180' azimuth 

600 feet at 225O azimuth 

800 feet at 255' azimuth 

800 feet at 265" azimuth 

800 feet at 285" azimuth 

800 feet at 300' azimuth 

600 feet at 330' azimuth 

2,000 feet at 0' azimuth 

2,000 feet at 90° azimuth 

2,000 feet at 180° azimuth 

2,000 feet at 270' azimuth 

176 
177 
D. Air Support 

One UH-1N helicopter and one UH-1F helicopter with crews 

were provided by the U.S. Air Force to perform security 

sweeps and provide closed circuit television coverage. 

The USAF also provided a U-3B aircraft and crew to support Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cloud tracking efforts. The EPA fielded two Turbo Beech aircraft 

for cloud sampling. A Martin 404 (the NATS cloud tracking aircraft) was on standby at McCarran Airport in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

8.2.3 Construction and Experiment Readiness 

A. Satellite Drill Hole 

Early in the planning phase, during May 1970, a proposal 

was made to drill and instrument a satellite hole located 22 feet west of the Ullg emplacement hole. It was 

proposed that, during drilling operations, measurements 

be made to determine the density, porosity, water content, sound velocity, and chemical composition of cores 

taken at depths of 660-670, 835-845, and 860-870 feet. 

Upon completion of drilling, it was planned to measure 

density, sound velocity, and resistivity (for water content) in the hole. It also was proposed that instrumentation be placed in the satellite hole to determine 

ground shock pressure-time history following device detonation. Drilling began on 23 June and was completed on 

10 July 1970. No problems were encountered. 

B. Mobile Tower 

The majority of the experiments were housed on a mobile 

tower. One experiment fielded by LLL was installed in a 

178 
skid adjacent to the tower, and a limited number of experiments were installed in a diagnostics spool located 

in the LOS pipe. The tractor tread base of the mobile 

tower was first used on NEW POINT (Operation LATCHKEY) 

with a multi-story tower installed. For MILK SHAKE 

(Operation CROSSTIE), the tower was removed and a new 

experiment room (house) was installed on the base. This 

house, with slight modifications, was used on MINUTE 

STEAK and DIAGONAL LINE. A diagnostics tower was 

mounted on top of the house. In order to move the tower 

away from SGZ after zero time, but before subsidence 

crater formation, two winches were located 605 feet west 

of SGZ and were connected by two steel cables to the 

base of the mobile tower. It was planned to start the 

winches at H+lO seconds and to move the mobile tower 300 

feet to the west within three minutes. The Test Group 

Director controlled activation of the winches from CP-1, 

by means of either microwave or hardware communications. 

c. Emplacement Hole Preparations 

The Ullg preemplacement hole was drilled during the 

latter part of 1968 as part of a program to economically 

provide drill holes for future tests. It was not specifically drilled for the DIAGONAL LINE event. Site preparation began 24 September 1968 and drilling started 15 

November 1968. The preemplacement hole was completed 

including casing, grouting, measurements, and surveys on 

20 December 1968. 

The Ullg drill hole was formally selected for DIAGONAL 

LINE in early 1970. Site construction began in May 1970. 

In November 1970, the concrete was poured for the pit. 

On 9 November 1970, the "Containment Plan for DIAGONAL 

LINE" was forwarded to AX/NV00 for consideration by the 

179 
Test Evaluation Panel (TEP). On 23 November 1970, LLL 

made available to Test Command an internal LLL memorandum dated 23 December 1969 which impacted the planned 

downhole operations markedly. This memorandum de-rated 

all NTS cranes to two-thirds the manufacturer's rated 

capacity when handling LLL nuclear devices. This automatically prohibited use of the 4600 Manitowoc crane in 

the manner in which it was scheduled to be used for 

final downhole operations. There appeared three options 

available to Test Command for a crane "suitable" to meet 

LLL criteria: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Modify the already completed SGZ pit and the already 

delivered three top sections of pipe to permit the 

originally scheduled crane to be used: 

Use the one 4600 Manitowoc, "Ringer" crane which had 

been modified to lift heavier loads; or 

Obtain the use of an "offsite" rental crane capable 

of handling the device canister and VLOS pipe with 

LLL's de-rated criteria. 

Option 3 was selected since Option 1 presented an unacceptable delay to modify the VLOS pipe, and the crane 

cited in Option 2 was already scheduled for an LLL event 

during the period it would be required for DIAGONAL 

LINE. 

The planned VLOS downhole dry run was delayed from 4 to 

11 January 1971 to allow for the installation and testing of a "dead man" switch on the rental crane. This 

requirement, by REECo Industrial Safety, was generated 

after the crane was rented without such a switch. Downhole operations were further delayed until 13 January 

180 
1971 because the H&N inspectors were not present to certify testing of the switch under full load on the first 

test. It was noted at that time that the rented crane 

did not have a power down capability, a feature LLL 

required of all cranes handling their devices in downhole operations. It was planned to use the crane "as 

configured" for the dry run, then reconfigure it with 

the power down capability between the conclusion of the 

uphole operations and the final downhole run. 

On 13 January 1971, the VLOS pipe system downhole dry 

run began. The downhole operation was completed on 16 

January and the mobile tower was moved over the emplacement hole. After alignment checks were completed, the 

mobile tower was pulled from its position over the hole 

to a position 300 feet west of SGZ as a dry run of the 

winch system. 

On 17 January, a drill rig was moved over the satellite 

hole and water was bailed from the hole to a depth of 

873 feet. Diagnostic instrumentation packages were attached to a fiberglass pipe and lowered into position in 

the satellite hole. Following instrumentation installation, the hole was stemmed. 

During the period 21-26 January, the closures in the LOS 

pipe were tested and the pipe sections were removed from 

the hole and placed in readiness for the final downhole 

operation. Also during this period, 698 instrumentation 

cables were turned over to the experimenters. There 

were 22 instrument trailers in the park located 830 feet 

west of SGZ. These trailers were equipped with tape 

recorders and oscilloscopes with cameras for recording 

data. Instrumentation in the trailers was designed to 

be remotely activated by timing signals from the control 

room at CP-1. 

181 
In March, information was received that the performance 

of the BANEBERRY event had necessitated revisions in the 

review procedures by the AEC TEP and that execution authority for DIAGONAL LINE would be delayed. The site 

was placed in standby status on 12 March. On 17 March 

1971, Test Command submitted an addendum to the containment plan previously submitted. This addendum provided 

for an additional cable gas block. 

On 1 April, the AK/NV00 Containment Evaluation Panel 

(the TEP had been revised in membership and renamed) requested additional geological information. In order to 

obtain this information, an exploratory drill hole had 

to be drilled. Drilling operations began on 19 April and 

were completed on 21 May. Based on all available information, DNA forwarded the final containment plan to AEC/ 

NV00 for use by the CEP at the 21 May meeting. The plan 

was accepted as presented. The hole was stemmed to the 

surface in late July. 

On 23 August, the site was reactivated. Experimenters 

and construction personnel returned to work. Signal dry 

runs were conducted and a successful mandatory full participation dry run was conducted on 8 September. LOS 

pipe downhole operations began the following day and 

were completed on 20 September. An alignment check of 

the DIAGONAL LINE LOS pipe system was conducted on 20 

September 1971, and alignment of the system was found to 

be satisfactory. Vacuum pumps were activated and the 

vacuum integrity of the LOS pipe system below the fast 

gate was verified. The emplacement hole was stemmed 

during the period 21 to 30 September. The closure 

system, slide valve, and LLL diagnostics spool were 

installed in early October. The mobile tower was moved 

over the LOS pipe and aligned. At this point the event 

182 
was placed in a hold status from 8 October until 1 

November awaiting test execution authority. After 

receiving test execution authority, event execution was 

further delayed from 15 to 22 November due to 

unfavorable wind conditions. 

8.2.4 Late Pre-event Activities 

DIAGONAL LINE was originally scheduled for 16 November 1971. 

On 14 November, the event was at D-2 readiness posture. From 15 

November to 23 November, the event was maintained at D-l readiness level due to high winds. 

Following the readiness briefing 1430 hours on 23 November, 

the decision was made to button up the test area and try for 

execution on 24 November. The mobile tower and instrumentation 

trailer park were secured in accordance with a button up check 

list prepared and rehearsed earlier. A readiness briefing was 

conducted at 2100 hours. Predicted winds appeared to be favorable for a 24 November test execution. Security sweeps were 

conducted. 

8.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

A readiness briefing was conducted at CP-1 at 0730 hours. 

Winds were still predicted to be from the southwest and a scheduled detonation time of 1000 hours was set. Shortly before 1000 

hours, a one-hour hold was called to deal with a technical 

problem, and to wait for southerly winds. At 1030 hours, 

scheduled detonation was delayed until 1130 hours, again due to 

unfavorable winds. 

The DIAGONAL LINE device was detonated at 1215 hours PST on 

24 November 1971. 

183 
8.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry measurements began at 1216 hours. All RAMS 

units in the array indicated radioactivity which was attributed 

to activation of materials contained in the tower. The maximum 

reading detected was 40 R/h at H+l minute by unit No. 2 (located 

at SGZ) which then went off line at H+l5 minutes when the crater 

formation began. Crater formation did not occur in a typically 

uniform rapid collapse. It proceeded in stages or steps taking 

about three minutes to reach its full shape. In the collapse 

process, the SGZ pit was rotated and came to rest at a point 25 

feet inside the east wall. Closed circuit television monitors 

showed that the crater was not symmetrical around SGZ and that it 

was steep-walled. It was elliptical in shape, measuring 180 feet 

by 210 feet, and the axis was oriented on a northeast-southwest 

line. The crater was estimated to be 56 feet deep at its deepest 

point. RAMS units showed normal LOS activation product decay 

until about 1530 hours when a seepage of radioactive effluent 

from the SGZ pit began: readings from unit No. 5 to the northeast 

of SGZ began to increase, reaching a maximum of 90 mR/h at about 

1630 hours. By 1630 hours, all initial trailer park surveys, 

recovery operations, and crater surveys had been completed. For 

further discussion on these activities, see section 8.3.2. 

Following reentry and recovery operations, an attempt was 

made to confine the radioactive effluent by pumping 1,200 cubic 

feet of Cal-Seal into the SGZ pit. This was unsuccessful because 

the sealant flowed out of the northwest corner of the inclined 

pit. Because Cal-Seal could not be placed near SGZ due to the 

sloping ground surface, further attempts to seal the slow seep 

were discontinued. Although low level seepage in the immediate 

area of the SGZ pit was detectable for several days, the release 

associated with DIAGONAL LINE was essentially complete by H+20 

hours. 

184 
At about 1700 hours, a reading of 150 mR/h was recorded on 

unit No. 7 to the southeast of SGZ. This was the highest reading 

recorded until shortly after midnight when unit No. 9, located 

southwest of SGZ also recorded a reading of 150 mR/h. A permanent RAMS unit at well 5B (5 miles south of SGZ) indicated 6.6 

mR/h at about 2230 hours returning soon thereafter to background. 

From shortly after midnight on, the overall readings declined. 

By 1000 hours on 25 November all perimeter RAMS were reading less 

than 1 mR/h. The effluent was rare gases and radioiodines. Calculated total curies at time of release was 21,000 and at H+l2 

was 6,800. Transport of the released gas was generally toward 

the northeast about 5 miles per hour from the beginning of release until approximately 1630 hours when it shifted toward the 

east and then toward the south by about 1800 hours. Transport 

remained generally toward the south during the night, but there 

were periods when local SGZ winds became variable. At times, 

nearly all RAMS units indicated some radioactivity. Telemetry 

was secured at 1516 hours on 3 December 1971. Air samplers were 

secured at the same time. 

8.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Experiment Recovery Activities 

Initial radiation survey teams dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection equipment were released to 

enter the controlled area by the Test Manager at 1316 hours. The 

survey was completed at 1415 hours with a maximum reading of 6 

mR/h being obtained approximately 25 feet from the tower at 1326 

hours. No alpha radiation was detected. 

After the trailer park was determined to be safe for reentry, experimenters (also dressed out) were allowed to enter the 

area at 1350 hours to recover data, film, and magnetic tapes. 

The maximum reading obtained during these data recovery operations was 1.3 R/h inside the tower at 1543 hours on 24 November. 

185 
All cleanup and photography personnel were out of the tower at 

1530 hours, and this data recovery was completed at 1630 hours. 

The initial crater survey was performed at about 1445 hours 

and was negative for both carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. 

Additional scheduled surveys around the crater on D-day were 

cancelled by the Test Manager because of the steep sides and 

asymmetry of the crater. Radiation surveys were reestablished on 

D+l and were conducted twice per shift until 30 November. All 

measurements for carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide were 

negative. 

8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.4.1 Environmental Protection Agency Offsite Surveillance Activities 

The Western Environmental Research Laboratory/EPA was notified of the radioactive effluent seepage at 0745 hours on 25 

November, and also was notified that an EG&G aircraft had detected the radioactive effluent offsite that morning in the Lathrop 

Wells and Ash Meadows area. EPA monitors were then deployed to 

areas southwest of the NTS. Charcoal cartridges were added at 

the EPA Air Surveillance Network (ASN) stations at Pahrump, 

Nevada: and Shoshone, and Furnace Creek, California. In addition, the standby ASN stations at Spring Meadows Farms and the 

Amargosa Farm area, Nevada, were activated. For EPA analysis, 

air particulate filter and charcoal cartridge samples were collected from the following stations and times with no results 

above background and returned to the EPA for analysis as shown in 

Table 10. 

On 25 November, Monitoring personnel took survey instrument 

readings along the roads shown in Table 11. 

186 
Table 10. Air particulate filter and charcoal cartridge 

sample result locations. 

Location 

Date Sampling Period Sample PF Count 

Collected Day/Time Day/Time Type* Time/Date 

Indian 11/25/71 

Springs, NV 11/26/71 

Lathrop Wells, NV 11/26/71 

25/0700 25/1345 PF, CC 1508 11/25 

25/1345 26/0600 PF, CC 1037 11/26 

25/0630 26/0700 PF, CC 1047 11/26 

Pahrump, NV 11/25/71 24/1350 25/1100 PF, CC 1823 11/25 

11/26/71 25/1110 26/0630 PF, CC 1050 11/26 

Shoshone, CA 11/25/71 25/0925 25/1615 PF, CC 1817 11/25 

11/26/71 25/1620 26/0710 PF, CC 1056 11/26 

Furnace Creek, CA 11/26/71 25/1000 25/1620 PF, CC 1449 11/26 

Death Valley 11,'25/71 

Junction, CA 11/26/71 

Spring Meadows** 11/26/71 

Amargosa Farms** 11/26/71 

25/0915 25/1530 PF, CC 1812 11/25 

25/1530 26/0715 PF, CC 1045 11/26 

25,'1320 26/0800 PF, CC 1053 11/26 

25/1430 26/0830 PF, CC 1039 11/26 

*PF = Particulate filter 

CC = Charcoal cartridge 

**Standby Air Surveillance Network Station 

187 
__ - 

Table 11. Roads monitored by EPA personnel. 

Roads Monitored 

Highway 95; Indian Springs, NV, to 10 miles NW 

of Lathrop Wells, NV 

Time 

1000 to 1515 

Highway 52; Pahrump, NV, to Ash Meadows turnoff 

Ash Meadows turnoff to Ash Meadows, NV 

Ash Meadows, NV, to Springs Meadows Farms, NV 

Springs Meadows Farms, NV, to Highway 29 turnoff 

Highway 29; Amargosa Farm Area, NV, to Shoshone, 

CA 

1130 to 1150 

1150 to 1300 

1300 to 1320 

1335 to 1345 

1345 to 1600 

188 
No radioactivity above normal background levels was detected 

by the gamma rate recorder network. No air particulate samples 

contained gross beta activity above normal background levels, and 

no event-related activity was detected on air particulate filters 

or charcoal cartridges. No special water, milk, or other environmental samples were collected for this event. 

8.4.2 Experiment Recovery Activities 

The trailer park and tower were opened for additional experiment recoveries on 29 November, after approximately 125 smears 

had been taken by Radsafe personnel: all showed negative results. 

These recoveries were performed without anticontamination clothing or respiratory protection equipment being worn. 

From 29 November to 2 December, experiment recovery operations proceeded at a rapid pace. By 2 December, a majority of 

the experiments had been removed, packaged, and shipped to the 

parent organizations. 

In addition, on 26 November, monitoring personnel took 

survey instrument readings all of which were background at the 

locations shown in Table 12. 

8.4.3 Crater Survey 

On 7 December, a road was prepared which permitted access 

into the crater so that a survey could be performed. This survey 

disclosed a 3-l/2 to 4-inch diameter hole next to the pit, almost 

due west of SGZ. Radiation readings in the hole were 0.7 mR/h. 

The Sandia health physicist requested carbon monoxide and carbon 

dioxide samples, and a soil sample from inside the hole. Soil 

sample analysis indicated the presence of iodine-133 and xenon133. Gas sampling inside the hole indicated xenon-133 and -133m; 

and Draeger tubes measured 400 ppm carbon monoxide and no carbon 

dioxide. 

189 
Table 12. EPA survey instrument reading locations. 

Location 

Indian Springs, NV 0600 

Highway 95; Mercury turnoff 0630 

Lathrop Wells, NV 071s 

Junction Highway 29/Springs Meadows Road 0745 

Spring Meadows, NV 0800 

Junction Highway 29/Amargosa Farm Road 0820 

Dansby Ranch, Amargosa Farm Area, NV 0830 

Pahrump, NV OS50 

Shoshone, CA 0630 

Death Valley Junction, CA 0730 

Furnace Creek, CA 114s 

Time 

190 
Recovery of the instrumentation spool, slide valve, closure 

system and vacuum pump from the SGZ pit was performed without 

incident between 13 and 17 December 1971. The site was returned 

to the AEC Test Manager on 6 January 1972. 

8.4.4 Industrial Safety 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic materials, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organizations). 

4. DIAGONAL LINE Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of these operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

The area enclosed by the Ullg fence was designated a hard 

hat area. Hard hats were required to be worn and foot protection 

in the form of safety boots, safety shoes, or toe guards was 

strongly recommended. 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving materials or any operation with potential for 

personal injury. Each individual involved in a project was 

required to be knowledgeable regarding applicable procedures for 

their project. 

191 
Checks were made on each shift for radiation levels, toxic 

gases, and explosive mixtures. These measurements were then 

recorded in the monitors' log book. The maximum concentrations 

of toxic gases detected during DIAGONAL LINE operations were: 

1. 400 ppm carbon monoxide on 7 December as a result of gas 

sampling (Draeger tubes) inside the hole next to the SC2 

pit. 

2. 400 ppm carbon monoxide on 7 December on the east side 

of the SGZ pit under the concrete overhang. 

3. 400 ppm carbon dioxide on 20 December inside the LOS 

pipe. 

No explosive mixtures were detected. 

Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for drilling, were established by REECo and were emphasized during all 

operations. 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1216 hours on 24 November 

1971. The maximum exposure rate detected was 40 R/h at RAMS unit 

No. 2 located at SGZ. This measurement was obtained at H+l 

minute on D-day and was due to experiment activation. RAMS unit 

No. 2 went off line at H+15 minutes on 24 November 1971. The 

first indication of seepage was detected by RAMS units NOS. 3, 5, 

and 6 at 1414 hours on D-day. Telemetry was secured at 1516 

hours on 3 December 1971. 

The initial reentry survey began at 1316 hours and ended at 

1415 hours on D-day. The maximum gamma exposure rate detected 

192 
was 6 mR/h at approximately 25 feet from the tower. No alpha 

radiation was detected. The maximum gamma exposure rate detected 

during recovery operations was 1.3 R/h inside the tower in the 

main area at 1543 hours on 24 November 1971. A drillback was not 

performed. 

The maximum concentrations of carbon monoxide detected during the entire operation were 400 ppm on 7 December 1971 on the 

east side of the SGZ pit under the concrete overhang; and 400 ppm 

on 7 December as a result of gas sampling inside the hole next to 

the SGZ pit. A reading of 400 ppm carbon dioxide was detected 

inside the LOS pipe at 0915 hours on 20 December 1971. No 

explosive mixtures were detected. 

There were no whole body external or internal organ exposures which exceeded the guides. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the DIAGONAL LINE event from 24 November 1971 to 28 November 1971 

when Area Access Registers were discontinued are summarized below. The average exposure is from self-reading pocket dosimeter 

readings as recorded on Area Access Registers. The maximum exposure is from film dosimeter records. 

No. of Entries 

Logqed 

All Participants 163 

DOD Participants 55 

Maximum Average 

Exposure Exposure 

(mR) (mR) 

30* 0 

0 0 

*Minimum detectable gamma exposure with NTS film dosimeter is 30 

mR per film pocket worn. 

193 
194 
CHAPTER 9 

MISTY NORTH EVENT 

9.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The MISTY NORTH device was detonated with a yield less than 

20 kt at 1215 hours PDT on 2 May 1972. The LASL-provided device 

was emplaced in tunnel U12n.05 at a vertical depth of 1,234 feet 

(Figure 33). The objective of this weapons effects detonation 

was to investigate the response of materials and equipment to a 

nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and contractors conducted 45 projects to obtain the desired information. 

Containment of the MISTY NORTH event was complete. 

9.2 PRE-EVENT ACTIVITIES 

9.2.1 Responsibilities 

AEC and AEC contractor responsibilities were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Test Directorate, FC/DNA and the AEC Nevada 

Operations Office. Reentry and recovery safety programs were 

conducted by SLA. 

The LASL Test Group Director was responsible to the Test 

Manager for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of 

SGZ. This responsibility was in effect from the time the device 

was moved to the emplacement site until device detonation. At 

that time, the LASL Test Group Director was relieved of responsibility and it was delegated to the DNA Test Group Director. 

195 
196 
9.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

Preparation of the portal and Mesa facilities and mining 

of the 05 drift began on 1 December 1970 and was virtually completed by early November 1971. Early in the 

mining program some interference was experienced due to 

the necessity for all personnel entering Area 12 to 

dress out in full radex gear because of radioactive effluent produced when the BANEBERRY event vented to the 

atmosphere on 18 December 1970. Another outcome of the 

BANEBERRY event was the initiation of more extensive 

area clearing procedures. These new procedures required 

all personnel to be cleared from all forward areas prior 

to each event. Prior to BANEBERRY, Area 12 mining personnel were allowed to travel through the west portion 

of Yucca Flat to their work location, while east portions of the Yucca Test area were cleared and events 

were executed in those locations. 

Mining of the 05 drift allowed many facilities previously installed for MIDI MIST, HUDSON SEAL, and DIANA MIST 

to be reused. Among these facilities were the gas seal 

door, the downhole cable alcove, three downhole cable 

runs from the Mesa trailer park to the cable alcove, and 

the trailer park and portal facilities. Additional 

facilities required for MISTY NORTH were the 2,600-foot 

experimental and bypass drifts, the overburden plug, a 

gas seal plug between the overburden plug and the gas 

seal door, a red shack, and concrete gas blocking plugs 

on the Mesa for cables in each of the three downhole 

cable runs. This was the first time gas blocks were 

used in the overburden plug. 

197 
A bypass drift and crosscuts were mined to (1) allow 

early initiation of pipe installation (prior to completion of mining in the experiment drift), (2) reduce the 

tunnel traffic in the experiment drift, (3) provide a 

suitable location and easy installation of instrument 

cables, and (4) allow late-time installation of the 

Sandia Auxiliary Closure (SAC). Crosscuts between the 

experiment drift and bypass drift at the experiment 

stations provided alcove space which was used by experimenters for housing power supplies, signal conditioning equipment, and experiment preparation working 

space. 

As on previous events, countdown functions for the unmanned trailer park and tunnel were controlled from CP1. These signals were routed via microwave and hardwire 

to a timing and firing trailer in the Mesa trailer park. 

Critical functions in the tunnel and instrumentation 

trailers were monitored at CP-1 in the LASL control room 

(device functions) and the DOD monitor room (experiment 

functions). 

A multiplex system was installed to control and monitor 

reentry ventilation valves, fans, and electrical power 

distribution systems. This system employed two similar 

control panels, one at the tunnel portal and one at the 

DOD monitor room at CP-1. A gas sampling system was installed so that samples could be drawn remotely from inside the gas seal door or from the zero point side of 

the gas seal plug and overburden plug. The gases could 

be analyzed for radioactivity and explosive mixtures, 

and then returned inside the gas seal plug if required. 

The gas sampling system also was capable of being 

operated manually at all points during manned tunnel 

reentry. 

198 

equipment and materials available included coveralls, 

headcovers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air 

breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, plastic 

bags, and masking tape. 

One base station with a team of Radsafe monitors was 

positioned at the FCP. This station was used to "suit 

u p " the surface reentry and recovery parties before 

their departure from the FCP. If contamination was encountered, this station would then be used to monitor 

and decontaminate personnel and equipment as they returned from the controlled area. 

C. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support 

RAMS units for the MISTY NORTH event were located as 

shown in Table 13 and Figures 34, 35. Underground units 

were installed on 27 April and calibrated on 28 April. 

Surface units were installed on 29 April and calibrated 

on 30 April. The MISTY NORTH telemetry system was 

event-ready on 2 May. 

D. Security Coverage 

Device security coverage was in accordance with AEC 

Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." All persons entering or exiting the controlled area were required to stop at muster or control stations for issue 

of stay-in badges, or issue and return of muster badges. 

After area control was established, all through traffic 

was diverted by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Manager's Operations Plan," 

contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not 

200 
Table 13. MISTY NORTH Event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location 

SURFACE 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

At portal 

Vent line filter system 

Vent line filter system 

Vent line filter system 

64 feet at S 28" E azimuth from portal 

400 feet at N 16" E azimuth from portal 

275 feet at N 89' E azimuth from portal 

363 feet at S 16" E azimuth from portal 

482 feet at S 12' W azimuth from portal 

558 feet at S 48' W azimuth from portal 

416 feet at N 69O W azimuth from portal 

648 feet at N 27O W azimuth from portal 

1,316 feet at N 20" E azimuth from portal 

1,368 feet at S 43" E azimuth from portal 

2,773 feet at S 54O W azimuth from portal 

2,766 feet at N 44' W azimuth from portal 

At downhole cable hole 

180 feet at N 45" E azimuth from downhole 

cable hole 

145 feet at S 35" E azimuth from downhole 

cable hole 

336 feet at S 13" E azimuth from downhole 

cable hole 

670 feet at S 28" W azimuth from downhole 

cable hole 

370 feet at S 30° W azimuth from downhole 

cable hole 

70 feet at N 88" W azimuth from downhole cable 

hole 

201 
Table 13. (Concluded) 

Station Location 

24 280 feet at N 04" W azimuth from SGZ 

25 405 feet at S 34O E azimuth from SGZ 

26 560 feet at S 41' W azimuth from SGZ 

31 1,800 feet into the U12n.05 main drift 

32 1,480 feet into the U12n.05 bypass drift 

33 1,496 feet into the U12n.05 main drift 

34 1,040 feet into the U12n.05 bypass drift 

35 1,043 feet into the U12n.05 main drift 

36ER* 675 feet into the U12n.05 main drift 

37 675 feet into the U12n.05 main drift 

38 522 feet into the U12n.05 main drift 

39 3,280 feet into the U12n main drift 

40 3,004 feet into the U12n main drift 

41 2,546 feet into the U12n main drift 

42ER* 1,617 feet into the U12n main drift 

43 1,617 feet into the U12n main drift 

44 1,475 feet into the U12n main drift 

45 900 feet into the U12n main drift 

46 50 feet at vent line rise 

47 200 feet into the U12n main drift 

SURFACE (Continued) 

UNDERGROUND 

*Extended range 

202 
24 

0 

til 

0 

w 

’ LLIVRl 

21 \ 2A4 ' 

U12n’PORTAL 

0 200 100 600 FEET 

- - 

Figure 34. MISTY NORTH surface RAMS unit locations. 
ZERO 

U12n.04 q_ 

600 FEET 

“a 

1~1217 PORTAL 

Figure 35. MISTY NORTH underground RAMS unit locations. 
connected with this event out of the controlled area 

before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

One UH-1N helicopter and one UH-1F helicopter with crews 

were provided by the U.S. Air Force for security sweeps 

and closed circuit television coverage support needed by 

Aerospace Audio Visual Services (AAVS) personnel. Another USAF UH-1N helicopter and crew were provided to 

perform cloud tracking if needed; otherwise it was on 

standby for the Test Controller. The EPA fielded a 

Turbo Beech aircraft for cloud sampling and had another 

Turbo Beech on standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas, 

Nevada. A Martin 404 (the NATS cloud tracking aircraft) 

also was on standby at McCarran Airport. 

9.2.3 Late Pre-event Activities 

Button up activities were performed by personnel representing SLA, EG&G, Kaman Sciences Corporation (KSC), PI, Systems 

Science and Software (SSS), ETI, GA, AVCO, AFWL, LASL, Boeing, 

LMSC, and the Navy. The first security sweeps began during the 

late evening hours. 

9.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

Security sweeps were conducted as scheduled from 0045 until 

0800 hours. The muster station was relocated to Gate 300 at 0500 

hours and the closed area was clear of all personnel except for 

the arming party, its support crew, and authorized manned station 

personnel. Any other personnel requiring access were required to 

have specific approval from the Test Manager and concurrence from 

the Test Group Director. Following favorable recommendations at 

205 
the readiness briefing at 0500 hours, permission to arm the 

device was given at 0730 hours. Final security sweeps which had 

been going on simultaneously with the readiness briefing were 

completed at 0800 hours. At that time, confirmation was received 

from all manned stations that all personnel were at their 

stations and accounted for and that communication and transportation were sufficient. This confirmation process was repeated at 

0830 hours. 

A detonation time of 1000 hours had been agreed upon at the 

readiness briefing at 0500 hours. All predetonation activities 

proceeded as scheduled until 0945 hours when a one-hour delay was 

called due to technical problems. Another technical problem at 

1051 hours caused an additional delay. This problem was resolved, and the fifteen-minute countdown began at 1200 hours. 

MISTY NORTH was detonated at 1215 hours PDT on 2 May 1972. 

9.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry measurements began at 1216 hours. All units were 

operational except for unit No. 31 which was off line due to 

cable loss at zero time. Unit No. 33 measured 3.5 R/h at H+l 

minute. This was the maximum reading for this event. RAMS units 

detected normal neutron activation radioactivity which decayed 

rapidly to background levels. Telemetry was discontinued at 1600 

hours on 10 May 1972. 

9.3.2 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Experiment Recovery 

Activities 

At 1316 hours, the initial surface radiation survey party 

was cleared to go as far as 8-01 Road (4.1 miles southeast of the 

U12n portal) where WSI was to activate a roadblock. At 1415 

hours, team Nos. 1 and 2 were cleared to proceed to the Mesa 

206 
trailer park and team Nos. 3 and 4 proceeded to the portal area. 

The portal survey was completed at 1443 hours and the Mesa survey 

at 1520 hours. Only background radiation levels were measured. 

Experimenters began operations to recover data from the 

trailer park at about 1527 hours. All experimenters had departed 

the controlled area at 1915 hours. 

The tunnel ventilation system was turned on at 1745 to ventilate the tunnel on the portal side of the gas seal door. 

9.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

9.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery Activities 

An initial tunnel reentry team (dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and Scott-Draeger respiratory protection equipment) entered the portal at 1005 hours and reached the gas seal door at 

1012 hours on 3 May 1972. Some minor rock spalling was noted 

along the track, but no problems were encountered. The manway 

through the gas seal door was opened at 1026 hours, as well as 

the portal side drain valve. No toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected. The team continued on into the tunnel, 

reaching the 300 psi plug at 1040 hours. The radiation level 

detected through the plug was 0.1 mR/h. By 1230 hours, the large 

gas seal door was opened. The team returned to the portal at 

1320 hours. Another team entered the tunnel at 1350 hours to 

establish communications at the gas seal door, complete vent line 

work, and establish a compressed air line through the 300 psi 

Plug* In addition, the team installed the railroad tracks 

through the gas seal door. This team exited the tunnel at 1551 

hours. 

On 4 May, gas sampling on the zero point side of the over207 
burden plug indicated that tunnel atmosphere conditions were 

good. However, the vent line was later found to be broken allowing outside air to be sampled rather than the tunnel atmosphere. 

Reentry activities proceeded routinely and, at 0940 hours, the 

team boarded the train to check out the remainder of the tunnel 

complex. The team returned to the portal at 1150 hours. 

Reentry team members left the portal at 0906 hours on 5 May 

and proceeded to the gas seal door where team members established 

communications. They then departed by train, reporting that 03 

and 04 drifts were in good condition. Team members reached the 

overburden plug at 1039 hours; there was good air flow through 

the overburden plug manway. Only background radiation readings 

were obtained, and no water was apparent through the plug. Continuing into the bypass drift (Figure 361, crosscut No. ES-1 was 

in good condition; consequently, team members removed the sandbags, checked the radiation level (background), and entered the 

LOS pipe drift to check test chamber No. 1. Team members exited 

the pipe drift at 1215 and were back at the portal at 1244 hours. 

A second team departed the portal for the overburden plug at 

1330 hours. Team members continued on to the LOS pipe drift and 

checked out crosscut No. 2, which did not appear to be safe for 

reentry. They did remove the sandbags, however. The team went 

on and checked out the pipe toward ES-3, test chamber No. 2, and 

AES-1. It was evident to team members that the entire drift 

beyond crosscut No. 2 was in bad shape. They exited the tunnel 

complex at 1615 hours and reentries were subsequently terminated 

for the day. All readings inside and outside the LOS pipe were 

background. 

On 8 May, a reentry team entered the tunnel complex and 

traveled to AES-1 (not shown on Figure 36 1, ES-l, and ES-2. The 

vent line was in good condition up to ES-2. After this walkthrough, the Scientific Assessment Team entered the tunnel 

208 
2

N 

L 

‘ 

cm2 

I 

r 

1 

3 

E 

t 

SAC 
complex to assess the condition of experiments and perform 

station photography at AES-1, ES-l, and ES-2. 

9.4.2 Postevent Mining and Experiment Recovery Activities 

Mining through the gas seal plug and overburden plug began 

on 10 May. This operation was successfully completed the same 

day. The tunnel was opened for experiment recovery on 11 May. 

Experiments from ES-l, ES-2, AES-1, and AES-3 were all recovered 

by 12 May. A reentry drift for experiment recovery into ES-3 and 

ES-4 was started on 15 May. After mining 114 feet of this drift, 

the ground became so unstable that reentry drift mining was 

abandoned and rehabilitation of the 05 bypass drift was initiated 

as the new reentry path. Rehabilitation was completed on 1 June. 

Examination of the LOS pipe between ES-3 and ES-4 revealed 

that it was safe to recover experiments from ES-4 by walking 

through the pipe. All personnel performing experiment recovery 

operations inside the LOS pipe were dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection equipment. All experiments 

from ES-3 and ES-4 were recovered by 5 and 6 June, respectively. 

Work to reach the SAC (for purposes of evaluation only) 

began on 7 June and was successfully concluded on 1 August 1972. 

9.4.3 Industrial Safety 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection areas. Each participating agency provided 

its own industrial safety equipment. All personnel on the 

initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the 

McCaa 2-hour breathing apparatus and had used the Scott-Draeger 

self-contained breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and 

practices, as spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," 

were observed. 

210 
All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224) 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization) 

4. MISTY NORTH Safety Regulations 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOE Safety Coordinator. 

Checks were made during each shift for toxic gases and 

explosive mixtures. These measurements were recorded in the 

monitor's log book. Industrial safety codes, including specific 

codes for mining and drilling, were established by REECo and were 

emphasized during all operations. 

9.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements were taken between 1216 hours on Dday and 1600 hours on 10 May 1972. The maximum reading of 3.5 

R/h was measured at underground station No. 33 at 1217 hours on 

D-day. 

Both portal and Mesa surveys were conducted between 1415 and 

1520 hours on D-day. Only background radiation levels were measured. 

211 
An initial tunnel reentry was conducted between 1005 and 

1320 hours on 3 May 1972. The maximum radiation reading measured 

was 0.1 mR/h at 1040 hours at the gas seal door. 

Postevent mining to recover experiments and evaluate the 

Sandia Auxiliary Closure was conducted between 10 May and 1 

August 1972. No radiation, toxic gas, or explosive mixture 

problems were encountered. 

No whole body external or internal organ exposures in excess 

of exposure guides were received during MISTY NORTH operations. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the MISTY NORTH event from 2 May 1972 to 12 July 1972 when Area 

Access Registers were no longer maintained are summarized below. 

The average exposure is from self-reading pocket dosimeter readings as recorded on Area Access Registers. The maximum exposure 

is from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Loqqed (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 492 145 0.63 

DOD Participants 110 0* 1 

*Minimum detectable gamma exposure with NTS film dosimeter is 30 

mR per film packet worn. 

212 
LIST OF REFERENCES 

References are not indicated within the text of this report, 

but are included in this list by chapter or part. Most references are available for review at or through the DOE/NV Coordination and Information Center (CIC). Security-classified references are located at the DNA/HQ Technical Library in Alexandria, 

Virginia, but are available only to persons with appropriate security clearances and a need for classified information contained 

in the references. 

The CIC is operated by REECo, the custodian of nuclear testing dosimetry and other radiological safety records for DOE/NV, 

and the custodian for DNA of reference documents for reports on 

DOD participation in atmospheric, oceanic, and underground nuclear weapons testing events and series. Arrangements may be 

made to review available references for this report at the CIC by 

contacting one of the following: 

Health Physics Division 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Nevada Operations Office 

2753 South Highland Avenue 

Post Office Box 14100 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: 

FTS: 

(702) ;;;-;W;; 

Manager, Coordination and Information Center 

Reynolds Electrical t Engineering Co., Inc. 

Post Office Box 14400 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 295-0748 

FTS: 575-0748 

213 
Major source documents also are available through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) and may be purchased 

from NTIS at the address and telephone number listed below: 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road 

Springfield, VA 22161 

Commercial: (703) 487-4650 

(Sales Office) 

References available through public bookstores and libraries, through the U.S. Government Printing Office, and only at the 

CIC are listed without asterisks. Asterisks after references or 

groups of references indicate availability as follows: 

* 

** 

*** 

PREFACE 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Available through the NTIS and also located at the CIC. 

Located in the REECo Technical Information Office adjacent to the CIC, available through the CIC, and may be 

subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

Located in the DNA/HQ Technical Library, and subject to 

security clearance requirements. 

Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Operations Office, "Announced United States Nuclear Tests," 

NVO-209 (Rev. 4), January 1985* 

Devine, Robert A., Blowinq on the Wind: The Nuclear Test 

Ban Debate, Oxford University Press, NY, 1978 

Harris, P.S., et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

PLUMBBOB, DNA 6005F, 15 September 1981, 

214 
4. U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Veterans' 

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing," U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1979 

Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION 

5. 

6. 

7. 

DOE/NV, "Announced Nuclear Tests," (n. 1). 

Devine, "Nuclear Test Ban Debate," (n. 21. 

Weapons Effects Test Group, Field Command, Defense Atomic 

Support Agency, wOrientation, Nevada Test Site," January 

1962 

Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," revised 15 August 1964 

Ponton, Jean, et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

DOMINIC II, DNA 6027F, 31 January 1983* 

Chapter 2, UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

8. 

9. 

Liverman, James L., Energy Research & Development Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Nevada Test 

Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA - 1551, September 1977* 

Butkovich, Theodore R., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Effects of Water Saturation on Underground Nuclear Detonations, UCRL-51110, 9 September 1971* 

Committee on Veterans Affairs, "Claims for Disabilities," 

(n. 41, on venting. 

215 
10. Radiological Sciences Department, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc., "Standard Operating Procedures," January 1961-1968 

EVENT SUMMARIES AND EACH EVENT CHAPTER 

11. 

12. 

13. 

Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, NV00 

Completion Report, Operation Mandrel, 1 July 1969 through 30 

June 1970, NVO-94, August 1971, Unpublished. 

Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, NV00 

Completion Report, Operation Grommet, 1 July 1971 through 30 

June 1972, NVO-122, April 1973, Unpublished. 

REECo Environmental Sciences Department field record archives are maintained chronologically and by test event and include the following: 

a. 

b. 

c. 

d. 

Procedures, Reentry Plans, Radsafe Plans, and Schedules of Events. ** 

Correspondence. ** 

Reports, including onsite Radsafe and offsite PHS 

event reports. ** 

Exposure reports, Radsafe log books, Area Access 

Registers, radiation survey forms, telemetry forms, 

and other sampling and dosimetry forms. ** 

216 
APPENDIX A 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Activation Products 

Advisory Panel 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

Air Support 

Nuclides made radioactive by neutrons 

from a nuclear detonation interacting 

with usually nonradioactive nuclides. 

Also called induced activity. 

A group of experts formed to advise the 

Test Manager/Test Controller concerning 

operational factors afEecting a test 

detonation. 

The Air Force Special Weapons Center, 

located at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. AFSWC provided 

air support to the AEC Test Manager for 

NTS testing activities. 

The Armed Forces Special Weapons PrOject was activated on 1 January 1947, 

when the AEC was activated, to assume 

residual functions of the U.S. Army 

Manhattan Engineer District (see DASA). 

Aircraft, facilities, and personnel required for various support functions 

during testing, such as cloud sampling, 

cloud tracking, radiation monitoring, 

photography, and personnel and equipment transport. 

217 
Alpha Particle 

Anticontamination 

Clothing 

Atmospheric Test 

Series 

Attenuation 

A particle emitted spontaneously from 

the nucleus of the radionuclide, primarily heavy radionuclides. The particle is identical with the nucleus of 

a helium atom, having an atomic mass of 

four units and an electric charge of 

two positive units. 

Outer clothing worn to prevent contamination of personal clothing and the 

body, and the spread of contamination 

to uncontrolled areas. 

Each of several series of U.S. tests 

conducted from 1945 through 1962, when 

nuclear device detonations and experiments were conducted primarily in the 

atmosphere. 

The process by which photons or particles from radioactive material are 

reduced in number or energy on passing 

through some medium. 

Background Radiation 1) Natural environmental radiation. 

2) The radiations of man's natural 

environment, consisting of cosmic 

rays and those radiations which 

come from the naturally radioactive 

atoms of the earth, including those 

within man's body. 

218 
Ball Valve 

Beta Particle 

BJY 

Bulkhead 

3) The term also may mean radiation 

extraneous to an experiment. 

Rotating spool valve designed to close 

off and provide a gas seal in an LOS 

pipe in less than one second. Can be 

pneumatic, hydraulic, or spring driven. 

A negatively charged particle of very 

small mass emitted from the nucleus of 

a radionuclide, particularly from the 

fission product radionuclides from nuclear detonations. Except for origin, 

the beta particle is identical with a 

high speed electron. Also may be a 

positively charged particle of the same 

very small mass called a positron. 

The intersection of Mercury Highway 

with roads originally constructed for 

the BUSTER-JANGLE 1951 atmospheric test 

series, located at the NW corner of 

Area 3 on the NTS. Previously called 

the "Y." 

A wall or embankment constructed in a 

mine or tunnel to protect against earth 

slides, fire, water, or gas. 

Button up Activities A procedure which consists primarily of 

completing the stemming, accomplishing 

the electrical checklist of tunnel portal and trailer park facilities, closing the OBP, gas seal plug, and gas 

seal door inside the tunnel, clearing 

219 
Cable Drift 

Cal-Seal 

Cassette 

Ceiling Limit 

Cellar 

Chamber 

the controlled area, and preparing command post and monitoring stations for 

the actual nuclear detonation. 

A passageway tunnel, usually parallel 

to the LOS drift, also known as the access bypass or work drift, in which 

cables from various experiments in the 

LOS pipe were installed toward a cable 

alcove and then through a sealed shaft 

to the surface. 

A commercial sealant that is high density, quick-drying, high strength, and 

resilient concrete. 

A holder or container for a sample, an 

experiment, or a group of experiments. 

There are certain substances for which 

use of a Threshold Limit Value is inappropriate. These are substances which 

are predominantly fast acting and whose 

threshole limit is more appropriately 

based on this response. The ceiling 

limit places a definite boundary which 

concentration should not be permitted 

to exceed. 

The larger diameter, first part of a 

drilled hole where valving and other 

equipment are located. 

A natural or man-made enclosed space or 

cavity. 

220 
Check Points or 

Check Stations 

Chimney 

Chromatograph 

Cloud Sampling 

Cloud Tracking 

Collar 

Console 

Geographic locations established and 

staffed to control entry into restricted areas. 

The volume of broken rock above an underground detonation cavity that falls 

downward when decreasing cavity gas 

pressure can no longer support the column of broken rock. 

A piece of equipment used to separate 

and analyze mixtures of chemical substances by chromatographic absorption. 

The process of collecting particulate 

and gaseous samples of an effluent 

cloud to determine the amount of airborne radioactivity, and/or for subsequent analysis of detonation characteristics. Sampling usually was accomplished by specially equipped aircraft. 

The process of monitoring and determining the drift and movement of an 

effluent cloud, either by radar or by 

radiation monitoring and visual sighting from aircraft. 

See "Shaft Collar" 

A cabinet or panel containing instrumentation for monitoring or controlling 

electronic or mechanical devices. 

221 
Containment 

Containment 

Assessment Drift 

Contamination 

Crater 

The act of preventing any release of 

radioactive material into the environment. Used in reference to the stemming 

plug area, or at the TAPS, OBP, or gas 

seal plug. An event is said to have 

"contained" if no radioactive material 

is released beyond the stemmed portion 

of the tunnel. 

Another name for reentry drift. 

1) 

2) 

Radioactive material in an undesirable location, usually fission and 

activation products of a nuclear 

detonation, or fissionable material 

from a device, incorporated with 

particles of dust or device debris. 

The process of depositing radioactive material on, or spreading it 

to, an undesirable location, such 

as personnel, structures, equipment, and other surfaces outside a 

controlled area. 

The depression formed on the earth's 

surface by a near-surface, surface, or 

underground detonation. Crater formation can occur by the scouring effect 

of airblast, by throw-out of broken 

surface material, or by surface subsidence resulting from underground cavity 

formation and subsequent rock fall, or 

chimneying to the surface. 

222 
Crater Experiment 

Dance Hall 

DASA 

D-Day 

D+l 

Decontamination 

Device 

A test designed to breach and excavate 

the ground surface, thereby forming an 

ejecta crater; as opposed to a sink or 

subsidence crater. 

A large alcove used for data recording 

equipment. 

After 1959, AFSWP became the Defense 

Atomic Support Agency. See AFSWP. 

The term used to designate the day on 

which a test takes place. 

The first day after a test event. 

The reduction of amount or removal of 

contaminating radioactive material from 

a structure, area, object, or person. 

Decontamination may be accomplished by 

(1) treating the surface to remove or 

decrease the contamination; (2) letting 

the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of 

natural decay; or (3) fixing and covering the contamination to attenuate the 

radiation emitted. 

Nuclear fission or fission and fusion 

materials together with the arming, 

fusing, firing, high explosive, canister, and diagnostic measurement equipment, that have not reached the development status of an operational weapon. 

223 
DNA 

DOD 

Dose 

Dose Rate 

Dosimeter 

dpm 

Draeger Multi-Gas 

Detector 

Defense Nuclear Agency. Successor to 

DASA. 

The U.S. Department of Defense. The 

federal executive agency responsible 

for the defense of the United States. 

Includes the military services and special joint defense agencies. 

A quantity (measured or accumulated) of 

ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy 

absorbed by a medium, including a person. 

As a general rule, the amount of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy that 

an individual or material would absorb 

per unit of time. Dose rate is usually 

expressed as rads (or rems) per hour or 

multiples or divisions of these units. 

An instrument or device used to indicate the total accumulated dose of (or 

exposure to) ionizing radiation. Instruments or devices worn or carried by 

individuals are called personnel dosimeters. 

Disintegrations per minute; a measure 

of radioactivity. Literally, atoms 

disintegrating per minute. 

An instrument used to detect toxic gases, such that a sample of the ambient 

224 
Dressed-Out 

Drift 

atmosphere is drawn through a selected 

chemical reagent tube which indicates 

the concentration of a toxic gas. 

Dressed in anticontamination clothing 

and associated equipment. 

A horizontal passageway excavated underground with one access opening. It 

is used interchangeably with tunnel at 

the NTS. 

Drillhole Designations PS-1v: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 - 

vertical 

PS-1D: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 - 

directional 

PS-1A: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 - 

angle 

Each 'S' added after any of the above 

notations indicates a "sidetrack" or 

change of direction in the drillhole. 

Dry Run A simulation of the functions occurring 

in the minutes before, during, and after the event. All timing and firing 

signals are sent in the proper sequence 

from the Control Room at CP-1. Each 

run begins with the first required timing and firing signal (normally minus 

15 minutes) and ends with the firing 

signal. The audio countdown is transmitted over Net 1 (DNA) and on other 

225 
nets as agreed upon with appropriate 

agencies. There are various types of 

dry runs depending on the degree of 

participation required of the agencies 

involved. 

Effects Experiments Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

Exoatmospheric 

Explosimeter 

Exposure 

Outside the gaseous mass which envelopes the earth. 

A battery-operated detector calibrated 

to indicate the concentration in the 

ambient atmosphere of explosive gases 

and vapors as percent of the lower 

explosive limit (LEL) of methane gas. 

A measure expressed in roentgens (R) of 

the ionization produced by gamma rays 

(or x-rays) in air [or divisions of R; 

l/1000 R = 1 milliroentgen (mR)]. The 

exposure rate is the exposure per unit 

of time, usually per hour but sometimes 

smaller or larger units (e.g., R/min, 

mR/h, R/day 1. 

226 
Film Badge 

Fission 

Fission Products 

Fissionable Material 

Used for the indirect measurement of 

exposure to ionizing radiation. Generally contains 2 or 3 films of differing sensitivity. Films are wrapped 

in paper (or other thin material) that 

blocks light but is readily penetrated 

by radiations or secondary charged particles resulting from radiations to be 

measured. The films are developed and 

the degree of darkening (or density) 

measured indicates the radiation exposure. Film dosimeters commonly are used 

to indicate gamma and x-ray exposures, 

and also can be designed to determine 

beta and neutron doses. 

The process whereby the nucleus of a 

particular heavy element splits into 

(generally) two nuclei of lighter elements, with an accompanying release of 

energy. The most important fissionable, or fissile, materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission is 

caused by the absorption of a neutron. 

A general term used for the complex 

mixture of radioactive nuclides (see 

Radionuclides) produced as a result of 

nuclear fission. 

A synonym for fissile material, also 

extended to include material that can 

be fissioned by fast neutrons only, 

such as uranium-238. Used in reactor 

operations to mean reactor fuel. 

227 
Forward Control Point A geographic location in the forward 

test area, usually adjacent to the 

closed (or secured) test area. 

Full Power Full 

Frequency Dry Run 

Fusion 

Gamma Rays 

Similar in intent to Mandatory Full 

Participation dry run. The FPFF is 

sometimes combined with the Hot Dry Run 

(HDR). This run is optional with the 

device engineer. When conducted, the 

pipe will be under vacuum, telephones 

and intercoms disconnected, and tunnel 

utility and instrumentation power operated in event-day configuration. All 

instrumentation will be hooked up and 

operated in event-day configuration. 

Simulators will not be used. 

The combination of two very light nuclei (of atoms) to form a relatively 

heavier nucleus, with an accompanying 

release of energy. Also called thermonuclear fusion. 

Electromagnetic radiations of high energy emitted from the nuclei of radionuclides, or bundles of energy called 

photons, which usually accompany other 

nuclear reactions, such as fission, 

neutron capture, and beta particle 

emission. Gamma rays, or photons, are 

identical with x-rays of the same energy, except that x-rays result from 

orbital electron reactions and are not 

produced in the nucleus. 

228 
Gamma Shine 

Gas Seal Door 

Gas Seal Plug 

Measurable gamma radiation intensity 

from an approaching radioactive cloud 

or passing cloud, as opposed to measurements from or in gamma emitting 

fallout. Also gamma radiation scattered by air molecules, as opposed to 

direct radiation from a gamma source. 

A steel door on the portal side of the 

gas seal plug. It is closed during 

button up with about a 10 psi gas pressure applied between the gas seal plug 

and the gas seal door as additional reassurance against low pressure leaks. 

A containment feature within the tunnel 

complex; generally designed for 500' F 

and 500 psi. Sometimes called hasty 

plug. Similar to a lower level overburden plug, but is close to the portal 

and seals the entire tunnel complex. 

Geiger-Mueller Counter An instrument consisting of a Geiger 

tube and associated electronic equipment used to detect and measure (and 

sometimes record) nuclear radiation. 

Geophone An instrument used to detect vibrations 

in rock or soil. At NTS, used to detect remotely rock falls, earth movement, and cavity collapse underground 

giving audible signal and visual display data. 

229 
Ground Zero 

H-Hour 

The point in a test bed configuration 

where the device is located. 

Time zero or exact time of detonation 

to the minute, second, or fraction of a 

second: as opposed to H + 1 which implies one hour after detonation, unless 

time units of seconds or minutes are 

listed. 

Horizontal Line-of-Sight General term used to refer to a family 

of events conducted in a horizontal 

tunnel. Sometimes used to refer to the 

pipe and vacuum system for such events. 

Hot Line 

Ion 

Ionizing Radiation 

A location on the edge of a radex area 

where exiting personnel remove anticontamination clothing and equipment and 

are monitored for contamination and decontaminated as necessary before release. Also used to denote the centerline of a fallout pattern. 

An atomic particle or part of a molecule bearing an electric charge, usually a positively charged ion and a negatively charged ion are formed as a pair 

(e-g., A negatively charged electron 

displaced from its positively charged 

remaining atom). 

Any particulate or electromagnetic radiation capable of producing ions, directly or indirectly, in its passage 

through air or matter. Alpha and beta 

230 
Isotopes 

Keyed Concrete Plug 

Leukemia Cluster 

Long Line 

LOS Pipe 

particles produce all ion pairs directly, while the electrons of initial ion 

pairs produced by gamma rays and x-rays 

in turn produce secondary ionization in 

their paths. 

Different types of atoms within the 

same element, all reacting approximately the same chemically, but differing 

in atomic weight and nuclear stability. 

For example, the element hydrogen has 

three isotopes; normal hydrogen is the 

most abundant, heavy hydrogen is called 

deuterium, and radioactive hydrogen is 

the radioisotope called tritium. 

A concrete plug of greater diameter 

than the shaft or tunnel cross section, 

such that the concrete is poured into 

the surrounding rock, providing greater 

strength against overpressure from the 

nuclear detonation. 

An apparent but unexpected or extraordinary group of leukemia cases within 

some number or group of persons. 

The longest sampling line into the tunnel which does not connect to the LOS 

pipe. 

An evacuated pipe that extends from the 

device to the test chambers. The part 

of the vacuum system may be either horizontal or vertical, and it may connect 

231 
containment experiment protection and 

experiment hardware. 

Mandating Full 

Participation Full Run This is a dry run peculiar to DOD 

events. Its purpose is threefold: 

first, to check all experiments with 

the event site electrical system in its 

shot configuration; second, to check 

for crosstalk between experiments; and 

third, to operate all recording, timing, and monitoring equipment as close 

to shot configuration as is possible. 

The pipe will be under vacuum and the 

tunnel and portal instrumentation 

trailers will be cleared of personnel. 

After a successful MFP dry run, all 

interconnections necessary to place experiments into shot configuration from 

the MFP configuration will be made. 

Timing, firing, and monitoring system 

junction boxes will be locked and no 

changes will be made except with the 

express approval of device systems personnel and the Technical Director. 

Manhattan Engineer 

District 

Manned Stations 

The U.S. Army predecessor organization 

to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 

Locations inside the closed and secured 

area which are occupied by authorized 

personnel during an event. 

232 
McCaa a-Hour 

Breathing Apparatus 

mR 

Mucking 

Noble Gases 

Nuclear Device 

(vs. weapon or bomb) 

A self-contained respiratory device 

that supplies two hours of breathing 

oxygen. 

A radiation exposure term (see Exposure). 

Removal of loose rock from drilling and 

mining operations. 

Those inert gases which do not react 

with other elements at normal temperature and pressure (i.e., helium, neon, 

argon, krypton, xenon and sometimes 

radon). 

A device in which most of the energy 

released in a detonation results from 

reactions of atomic nuclei, either fission, or fission and fusion. A device 

under development (see Device) is not 

considered a weapon or bomb. Both A- 

(or atomic) bombs and H- (or hydrogen) 

bombs could be called atomic weapons 

because both involve reactions of atomic nuclei. However, it has become customary to call weapons A-bombs if the 

energy comes from fission, and H-bombs 

if most of the energy comes from fusion 

(of the isotopes of hydrogen - see definition). A developmental nuclear device is not a weapon or weapon component until it can be mated to a delivery system. 

233 
Nuclear Device Tests Tests carried out to supply information 

required for the design, improvement, 

or safety aspects of nuclear weapons, 

and to study the phenomena and effects 

associated with nuclear explosions. 

Nuclear Weapon Tests Tests to provide development and weapons effects information, which may or 

may not utilize a deliverable nuclear 

weapon. 

Offsite 

Onsite 

Overburden Plug 

Party Monitors 

The detection of radioactivity offsite 

is defined as detected outside the Test 

Range Complex, an area that includes 

both the Nevada Test Site and the adjacent Nellis Air Force Range. 

A notation that radioactivity was detected onsite only is made for tests 

from which there was an unplanned release of radioactivity into the atmosphere that was not detectable beyond 

the boundaries of the Test Range Complex. 

A containment feature within the tunnel 

complex. It is a high-strength concrete blockage of the tunnel near the 

test area and is generally designed for 

1000° F and 1000 psi. 

Radiation monitors assigned to reentry 

and recovery parties or groups. 

234 
Privacy Act 

rad 

Radex Area 

Radiation Exposure 

The Privacy Act of 1974. Public Law 

93-579. An Act to amend Title 5, U.S. 

Code, by adding Section 552a to safeguard individual privacy from the misuse of Federal Records, to provide that 

individuals be granted access to records concerning them which are maintained by federal agencies, to establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. 

Abbreviation for radiation absorbed 

dose. A unit of absorbed dose of 

radiation representing the absorption 

of 100 ergs of ionizing radiation per 

gram of absorbing material, including 

body tissue. 

An acronym for radiation exclusion area. A radex area is any area which is 

controlled for the purpose of protecting individuals from exposure to radiation and/or radioactive material. 

Exposure to radiation may be described 

and modified by a number of terms. The 

type of radiation is important: external exposure is to beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays and X-rays; internal 

exposure is from radionuclides deposited within the body emitting alpha, beta, gamma or x-radiation and irradiating various body organs. (see Dose and 

Exposure). 

235 
Radioactive Effluent The radioactive material, steam, smoke, 

dust, and other particulate debris released to the atmosphere from an underground nuclear detonation. 

Radioactive or Fission 

Products A general term for the complex mixture 

of radionuclides produced as a result 

of nuclear fission (see Activation Products). 

Radionuclides A collective term for all types of radioactive atoms of elements as opposed 

to stable nuclides (see Isotopes). 

Recovery Operations Process of finding and removing experiments, by-products, or data from the 

test area after a test event. 

Red Shack 

rem 

roentgen 

An underground (usually) intermediate 

point provided for the device laboratory's use in checking out and exercising the arming and firing system. 

A special unit of biological radiation 

dose equivalent; the name is derived 

from the initial letters of the term 

"roentgen equivalent man or mammal." 

The number of rem of radiation dose is 

equal to the number of rads multiplied 

by the quality factor (QF) and other 

factors of the given radiation. 

A special unit of exposure to gamma (or 

x-) radiation. It is defined precisely 

236 
Safety Experiments 

Sandbag Plugs 

Sandia Auxiliary 

Closure (SAC) 

Scientific Station 

as the quantity of gamma (or x-1 rays 

that, when completely stopped, in air, 

will produce positive and negative ions 

with a total charge of 2.58x10 -4 

coulomb in one kilogram of dry air under 

standard conditions. 

Device tests conducted to determine the 

safety of nuclear weapons during transportation and storage. Elements of the 

conventional high explosive portions of 

the devices were detonated to simulate 

accidental damage and to determine the 

potential for such simulated damage to 

result in significant nuclear yield. 

Data gained from the tests were used to 

develop devices that could withstand 

shock, blast, fire, and other accident 

conditions without producing a nuclear 

detonation. 

Barriers used in tunnels, constructed 

of sandbags, to help contain underground detonations and minimize damage 

to underground workings. 

A device used to seal the HLOS pipe 

after the nuclear detonation. 

Distance in feet along the HLOS pipe 

measured from the zero point. These 

distances are generally expressed in 

whole numbers or to the nearest complete hundredths of feet if fractional. 

237 
Scientific Station 650 is expressed as 

SS650; Scientific Station 390.65 is expressed as SS390.65. 

Scott-Draeger Selfcontained Breathing 

Apparatus Self-contained recirculating unit, complete with "full view" facepiece, compressed oxygen cylinder, breathing bag, 

carbon dioxide absorber, and pressure 

demand regulator is used when an extended exposure to an extremely hazardous or oxygen deficient atmosphere, or 

both, is required. This unit is capable of sustaining the wearer, under 

normal usage, for four to four and onehalf hours: however, pertinent approved 

schedules limit NTS use to 2 hours. 

Seismic Motion 

Shaft 

Shaft Collar 

Shielding Walls 

Earth movement caused by an underground 

nuclear detonation, similar to a minor 

earthquake. 

A long narrow passage sunk into the 

earth. Shafts for device emplacement, 

ventilation, or access to underground 

workings may be drilled or mined. 

The area immediately around the shaft 

at ground level, usually cemented, 

which supports the headframe and other 

equipment. 

Walls or barriers used to protect 

equipment or instrumentation from heat, 

blast, and radioactivity. 

238 
Slushing Operations 

Spalling 

Stemming 

Surface Ground Zero 

Test Chamber 

The process of moving broken rock with 

a scraper or scraper bucket. May be 

used on the surface or underground, 

where ore or waste rock is slushed into 

hoppers or other locations for removal. 

Rock disintegration by flaking, chipping, peeling, or loosening of layers 

on the outside edges. May be caused 

immediately by rock stressing in proximity to a detonation point. Also results later, after continued stressing 

from temperature change expansion and 

contraction. Spalling also may result 

or begin when rock containing moisture 

is raised to a high temperature, and 

expanding vapor creates fractures. May 

also occur as a result of the rock. 

The materials used to back-fill or plug 

the emplacement shaft, drift, or LOS 

drift to contain overpressure and radioactive material from a nuclear detonation. 

The location on the ground surface directly above an underground zero point 

or directly below an airburst. 

A section of the LOS pipe in which experiments are placed. It may or may not 

be enlarged, depending upon the test 

design. 

239 
Test Controller 

Test Event 

A DOE official designated by the Manager? Nevada Operations Office, to assume responsibility for the field operations involved in conducting a nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. 

The immediately preceeding preparations 

for, including arming and firing, and 

the testing of a nuclear device, including the detonation and concurrent 

measurements and effects. 

Testing Organizations Organizations conducting nuclear tests 

at the NTS (see DOD, DASA, LASL, LRL 

and SL). 

Tonopah Test Range 

Trailer Park 

Tunnel 

Tunnel Access 

Located in the northwest corner of 

Nellis Air Force Range near Tonopah, 

Nevada. 

Area near the portal or on the mesa 

where instrumentation or instrumentation support trailers are parked. 

At NTS, a horizontal underground excavation driven on a predetermined line 

and grade to some specific target. 

Entry to a tunnel or tunnel complex upon approval of the Test Director during 

test operations, or upon approval of 

the Tunnel Superintendent during routine operations. 

240 
Tunnel and Pipe Seal (TAPS) An experiment protection feature 

along the LOS pipe which allows the experiments to be exposed to the desired 

levels of radiation while being protected from debris. It contains a 

massive steel door which closes after 

ground shock passes to form a 1000° F 

and 1000 psi seal. 

Tunnel Complex 

Tunnel Walk-Out 

The complete set of drifts and support 

equipment comprising one tunnel. 

A visual, walking inspection of the 

tunnel or tunnel complex, usually as a 

part of the initial reentry after a 

detonation, to check for hazards of any 

and all kinds prior to allowing general 

access to the underground workings. 

Underground Structures 

Program The construction and fabrication of 

test structures underground for the 

purpose of detonation effects evaluation. 

User 

Vela-Uniform 

Venting 

An organization conducting tests at the 

NTS (See Testing Organizations). 

Department of Defense (DOD) program designed to improve the capability to detect, identify, and locate underground 

nuclear explosions. 

Release of radioactive material, steam, 

smoke, dust and other particulate de241 
Weapons Effects 

Experiments 

Weather Briefings 

Workings 

x-rays 

bris through a zone of weakness from 

the detonation-formed cavity into the 

atmosphere. 

Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

A part of the Readiness Briefings which 

are meetings of test-associated administrators, advisors, and other technical 

personnel prior to each test event to 

evaluate weather conditions and forecasts on event day, and make decisions 

on any necessary operational schedule 

changes. 

An excavation or group of excavations 

made in mining, quarrying, or tunneling, used chiefly in the plural, such 

as "the workings extended for miles 

underground." 

Electromagnetic radiations produced by 

electron reactions, as opposed to emission of gamma rays by nuclei. Otherwise high energy x-rays are identical 

with gamma rays of the same energy. 

242 
Yield 

Zero Point 

The total effective energy released by 

a nuclear detonation. It is usually 

expressed in terms of the equivalent 

tonnage of TNT required to produce the 

same energy release in an explosion. 

The total energy yield is manifested as 

nuclear radiation (including residual 

radiation), thermal radiation, and 

blast and shock energy; the actual distribution depending on the medium in 

which the explosion occurs and also 

upon the type of weapon. 

The location of a center of a burst of 

a nuclear weapon or device at the instant of detonation. The zero point may 

be above or below the surface of ground 

or water or otherwise offset. 

243 
244 
APPENDIX B 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The abbreviations and acronyms in the following list are 

used in the fourth volume of DOD underground testing reports. 

Additional information and definitions may be found in the text 

and in the Glossary of Terms. 

AAVS 

AEC 

AES 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

AFWL 

AMC 

ASN 

AVCO 

BAC 

Bkg 

BJY 

BTL 

cc 

CCTV 

CDC 

CEP 

CETO 

CIC 

CP-1 

CP-2 

CT0 

D-Day 

DASA 

DF 

DNA 

DOD 

DOE 

dpm 

EG&G 

EPA 

ERDA 

ES 

ET1 

FCDASA 

FCDNA 

FCP 

Aerospace Audio Visual Services 

Atomic Energy Commission 

Auxiliary Experiment Station 

Air Force Special Weapons Center 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

Army Materiel Command 

Air Surveillance Network 

AVCO Corporation 

Boeing Aircraft Corporation 

Background Radiation Measurement 

BUSTER-JANGLE roads intersection 

Bell Telephone Laboratories 

Crosscut 

Closed Circuit Television 

Centers for Disease Control 

Containment Evaluation Panel 

Civil Effects Test Organization 

Coordination and Information Center 

Control Point Building 1 

Control Point Building 2 

Continental Test Organization 

The day a nuclear detonation takes place 

Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Distribution Factor 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Disintegrations per minute 

EG&G, Inc. (formerly Edgerton, Germeshausen, & 

Grier) 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Energy Research and Development Administration 

Experiment Station 

Effects Technology, Inc. 

Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

Forward Control Point 

245 
F&S 

FPFF 

GA 

GE 

GM 

GZ 

HDL 

HE 

H&N 

ISAFAF 

ISAFB 

JCS 

KN 

KSC 

kt 

LANL 

LASL 

LEL 

LLL 

LLNL 

LMSC 

LOS 

LPARL 

LRL 

MDAC 

MFP 

MIT 

MPC 

MRC 

mrem/qt 

mrem/yr 

mR/h 

MSA 

MSL 

NATS 

NDL 

NOL 

NO 

NOsN02 

NPG 

NRDS 

NRL 

NSC 

NTS 

NTSO 

NV00 

OBP 

PDT 

PHS 

Fenix & Scisson, Inc. 

Full Power Full Frequency 

General Atomic Corporation 

General Electric Corporation 

Geiger-Mueller 

Ground Zero 

Harry Diamond Laboratories 

High explosives (conventional) 

Holmes & Narver, Inc. 

Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (formerly 

ISAFB) 

Indian Springs Air Force Base 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Kaman Nuclear 

Kaman Sciences, Corp. (formerly Kaman Nuclear) 

Kilotons 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos 

National Laboratory) 

Lower explosive limit 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (formerly LRL) 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

Line-of-sight 

Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory) 

McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp. 

Mandatory Full Participation 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Maximum permissible concentration 

Moleculon Research Corporation 

Millirem per quarter 

Millirem per year 

Milliroentgens per hour 

Mine Safety Appliance 

Mean sea level 

Nevada Aerial Tracking System 

Army Chemical Corps Nuclear Defense Laboratory 

Naval Ordnance Laboratory 

Nitrogen dioxide 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen dioxide 

Nevada Proving Ground 

Nuclear Rocket Development Station 

Naval Research Laboratory 

National Security Council 

Nevada Test Site 

Nevada Test Site Organization 

Nevada Operations Office 

Overburden Plug 

Pacific Daylight Time 

United States Public Health Service (now 

Environmental Protection Agency 

246 
PI 

ppm 

psi 

PST 

QF 

Radex Area 

rad/h 

Radsafe 

radsafe 

RAMS 

RCG 

REECo 

rem 

R/h 

RPG 

SAC 

SAMSO 

SC 

SGZ 

SLA 

SNL 

SOP 

SRI 

sss 

TAPS 

TC 

TCDASA 

TEP 

TGD 

TGS 

TNT 

TTR 

USAF 

USGS 

VA 

VLOS 

WSI 

Physics International 

Parts per million 

Pounds per square inch 

Pacific Standard Time 

Quality Factor 

Radiation Exclusion Area 

Radiation absorbed dose per hour 

Radiological Sciences Department (formerly 

Radiological Safety Department), REECo 

Radiological Safety, in general 

Remote area monitoring system 

Radioactivity concentration guide 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, 

Incorporated 

Roentgen equivalent man or mammal 

Roentgens per hour 

Radiation protection guide 

Sandia Auxiliary Closure 

Space and Missile Systems Organization 

Sandia Corporation (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Surface Ground Zero 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque (now Sandia 

National Laboratories) 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Standard operating procedures 

Stanford Research Institute 

Systems, Science and Software 

Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

Test Chamber 

Test Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Test Evaluation Panel 

Test Group Director 

Test Group Staff 

High explosive chemical (trinitrotoluene) 

Tonopah Test Range 

United States Air Force 

U.S. Geological Survey 

Veterans Administration 

Vertical line-of-sight 

Wackenhut Services, Incorporated 

247 
248 
APPENDIX C 

SC-N-66-227 

GESER,\L TU?JNEL REESTRY PROCEDURES FOR 

DEP:\RTIlENT OF DEFEXE AND S.\NDL\ LABORATORY NUCLEAR TESTS 

George R. Wenz 

Harold L. Rarrick 

Health Physics Division, 3312 

Sandia Laboratory. Albuquerque 

April 1968 

ABSTRACT 

This document describes preshot preparations and postshot procedures for safe and economlcal reentry into a tunnel arca after a nuclear detonation. Associated responsibilities. possible 

hazards. reentry ground rules. prcshot preparations. communications, reentry parties and equipment, initial tunnel rcentrics. and recovery of scientific experiments are esplamed. 

249 
Issued by Sandia Corporation, 

a prime contractor to the 

United States Atomic Energy Commission 

LEGAL NOTICE 

This report was prepared as an account of Government sponsored work. 

Neither the United States, nor the Commission, nor any person acting on 

behalf of the Commission: 

A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, 

with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in the report may not 

infringe privately owned rights; or 

B. Assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for 

damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, 

or process disclosed in this report. 

As used in the above, "person acting on behalf of the Commission" 

includes any employee or contractor of the Commission or employee of 

such contractor, to the extent that such employee or contractor of 

the Commission, or employee of such contractor prepares, disseminates, 

or provides access to, any information pursuant to his employement or 

contract with the Commission, or his employment with such contractor. 

250 
ACKNOWLEDCXIENTS 

Significant contributions on tunnel reentry procedures have been made by W. D. Burnett, 

P. 0. Matthews. and T. R. Crites of Sandia Laboratory and by C. R. Penwell and his staff of 

Reynolds Electric and Engineering Co. (REECo), Mercury, Nevada. Significant contributions in 

explosive and toxic gas monitoring and ventilation have been made by D. R. Parker, Sandia Laboratory and R. W. Viet, REECo. Mr. L. W. Brewer pioneered the use of a gas chromatograph in 

severe environments and D. J . Coleman and J. D. Ashworth greatly improved the radiation detector 

installation and contributed the remote explosimeter. Mr. G. W. Dwyer is largely responsible for 

the present iilter system. Mr. W. P. Bennett, LRL-Livermore, gave us valuable assistance during 

our initial efforts. The continued support of Col. J. J. Neuer. USAF, and the advice and guidance 

of W. II. Kingsley are gratefully acknowledged: 

Specifically commended are G. A. Clayton, H. D. Edwards, F. J. Solacgui and their initial 

reentry teams who hu\.e periormcd these duties in very severe environments. 

251 
TABLEOFCONTENTS 

Introduction 

Rcsponslbllftics 

Possible Hazards 

Reentry Ground Rules 

Summary of Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

Communications 

Reentry Parties and Equipment 

Initial Tunnel Rcentrics 

Tunnel Scicntiiic Rccovcries from the Espcrimcntal Chamber 

lU> 

205 

101 

101 

109 

109 

210 

III 

a0 

252 
GESER.IL TL?XEL REESTRY PROCDDURES FOR 

DDP.‘RTMEST OF DEFENSE ASD SXSDI.4 LXEORATORY NUCLIXR TESTS 

Introduction 

The Health Physics DiL-ision began rut-me! reentries in 1067. The procedures tha: ire 

given in this document rcnrcscnr a compilation oi a series oi tunnel reentry procedures t:,:: 

have been continually Improved based upon csperiencc and better instrumentation. The TOC?IT: 

plan presented describes prcshot preparations and postshot procedures ior safe and ecor.o.m:c-1 

reentry and scientific rccovcry ln a tunnel arca. 

Rrsponsibiiitlcs for safe and cconorntcJ1 tunnel reentry proccdurcs after n nuclear :c:onation lndlcatcd hereIn for :\EC or :\EC contractor (L.C.. Sandi Laboratory) pcrsonncl :.:‘I :‘: 

accord lvtth cstablisllcd ARC/DOD agrccmcnt or arc tlrc subject oi separate action bct::ce.l 

TC,‘DXS,\ and NVOO. 

a. XEC-SVOO 

(1) 

(3) 

The Test l:anagcr is responsible to the AEC for the safety oi all the 

participating personnel at sites under the )urisdiction of NV00 and 

has approval authority over decisions effecting the safety of these 

personnel. (Ref: NTSO Draft 05?4-013a.j 

The NV00 Operational Safety Division will advise the DOD Test 

Group Director (TGD) and the Reentry Control Group on all problems 

pertaining to health and safety. 

b. Sandis Laboratory 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

The Sandia LAoratory tlcnlth Physics Di\.ision has three rcsnorrsibilitics: I: specifics tlrc ncccssary mcasurinq dcticcs and cr!uill:::cnt 

to tndic;ltc t!w posts!iot condition oi !hc tunnel; it ;Iro:,idcs tl:c I:i:chtr:: 

Conlrol Croup; and tt documents .:r.-. rc!cnsc ni t.adioactivc tl;:1tc~1’!:tl. 

TilC C!tic; ui the liccntry Control (;~~oup v:iIl :Ict as :ul;.isor 10 t!lc 

TCD 011 sur:‘:Icc 2nd lufincl f-ccntry snl’c1.v until t!:c tunnel h:ts lwcrt 

clcarcd ior ::ormal opcrntiorr. 

T!lc flfcn!ry (:ontrnl CI.OII!) will !)ro\idc consuitants 1.9. ho trill :tdvisc 

on ttI:l:lctl rrcnrry prnccdt:rcs. Ti:crc consultants xi11 IIC t’nm~Ii.;r 
with the experimental setup and with possible postshot tunnel 

conditions and hazards. 

(4) The Reentry Control Group will arrange the necessary support 

for reentry and recovery, e.g., it will provide mine rescue trained 

personnel, Rad-Safe support (see Annex AI, Industrial Hygiene 

Support, etc. 

c. TC/DAS_A or Sandia Laboratory Test Group Director 

(1) The TCD is responsible for the safe conduct of all activities in the 

tunnel area. He will authorize and initiate both a tunnel condition 

survey and reentry and recovery operations with the concurrence 

of the Test Manager. 

(2) The TCD will be responsible for initiating all action for the preshot 

installation and postshot removal of equipment and services required 

for Test Group support activities except those items covered as AEC 

responsibilities in the AEC/DOD agreement. 

3. Possible Hazards 

a. Radiation. Radiation in tunnel reentry areas may result from any one of 

the iollowing: 

(1) Leak of radioactive gases or materials through fissures or iractures 

from ground zero. 

(2) Failure of the tunnel stemming. 

(3) Activation and/or dispersion of samples in the experimental chamber. 

b. Explosive or toxic gases. Various explosive and toxic gases released as 

direct or secondary products of the detonation may be present in concentrations dangerous to personnel. 

c. Explosives. Undetonated HE may remain either intact or scattered in 

the tunnel. 

d. Toxic materials. Rcryllium may pose a toxic probicm to personnel 

particularly if it becomes dispersed in the air and/or dcpositcd on 

recovery samples. 

e. Tunnel damage. Damage IO rhc tunnel may result from the dcvicc 

generated shock wave. 

(11 Collapse of the tunnel would not normally be espccted beyond the 

stemming: however, partial or to131 collapse may occur at greater 

distances irom ground zero. Reentry through collapse zones must be 

prcccdcd by mining throcqh broken ground or by driving a nc:v parsllcl driit. 

254 
(2) Heave of the tunnel floor may cause slabbing or spnllation of the 

rock and failure oi utility lines, railroad track, tunnel sets, and 

lagging. This damage will create safety hazards which must be 

removed prior to experimental recoveries. 

f. High pressure gas. High pressure (2200 psi) gas cylinders normally 

exist within the tunnel complex. 

4. Reentrv Ground Rules 

a. Initial reentry and each subsequent phase will be initiated upon authorization of the TGD with concurrence of the Test Manager. and control 

will be retained by the TGD tintil aU recovery operations are completed 

and tunnel access is returned to XEC control. Only those personnel 

authorized by the TCD and the Chief of the Reentry Control Group vcill 

be permitted in the portal arca and tunnel. 

b. Tunnel communications will be by a hard wire portable phone system. 

c. Tunnel parties will be controlled by the Chiei of the Reentry Controi 

Group who IS located at the tunnel portal, Tunnel parties may be 

recalled at his direction. Only one team :vill be in the tunnel at any 

single time unless directed otherwise by ttrc Chief of the Reentry Control Group. 

d. A tunnel party will return to t!te portal under any oi the iollotving 

conditions: 

(1) 

(2) 

(31 

Upon decision of the Team Chief. 

When any member of Teams 1, 2. 3. and 4*’ show a McCaa osygen 

supply less than 30 atmospheres or a Draeger pressure less than 

450 psi. 

Upon loss oi communications with the Reentry Control Group at 

the portal. 

e. Team 4 (Rescue Team) will be dispatched upon direction oi the Chief 

o: the Reentry Control Group, the Team Chici in the tunnel. or :i 

commun*ications should hc lost with any team In The tunnel (sllowlnC 

a rcasonuhlc tiinc for the warn to rstt .71'ier ioss 0l communic:l:ionSl. 

f. ;\il ohservatlons during reentry will be communicated throaqh the 

C!:icr’ oi P:irry IO the Cllic( 01’ rhc Rcentr; CJnIrol GIlm!, 3rd fTcordctl 

ior iuturc rcI’crcnce. 

See P:~ra~roph 7. “Rccnrry Pnrtics nnd Equipment. ” for n dcscrintion oi the pcrsonn”! 

ftlnctlon. nnd rquinmenr oI’rach team. 

255 
g. Personnel radiation exposure limits are those set by NTS SOP 

Chapter 0524. The radiation dose limit for the operation is 3 Rem 

per calendar quarter. A person’s exposure, however. will be terminated when his pocket dosimeter reaches 2.0 Rem, assuming his exposure history would allow 3 Rem during this operation. 

h. Tunnel reentry will not be made before the tunnel ventilation has been 

turned on and samples of the air monitored at the portal. Evaluation 

of the sample must indicate that reentry can be made within the limi. 

tations of this procedure. 

i. Reentry will not be made beyond ventilation, lOR/hr. 1000 ppm CO, or 10 

percent of the lower explosive limit of explosive gas mixtures. Teams 1, 

2. 3, and 4 may be exempted from these requirements under extenuating 

circumstances by mutual decision of the Chief of the Reentry Control 

Group and the Chief of the Party. 

j. The Rescue Team will always be stationed near the portal with a train 

for immediate dispatch. 

5. Summarv of Preshot Preoarations for Reentrv 

a. Stemming should provide fireball containment and should reduce radioactivity and explosive gas in the reentry area. The overburden plug 

should contain any debris that may pass the stemming. The gas seal 

door should contain any gases that penetrate the overburden plug. 

b. Remote radiation sensing instruments will provide knowledge of tunnel 

radiation levels, while tunnel condition indicators (geophones. pressure 

and temperature gages, and explosimeters) remotely monitor the tunnel. 

c. Air sampling lines for gas chromatography are normally installed through 

both the gas seal door and the overburden plug. Each installation is provided with suitable remotely operated valves. Samples may be drawn 

from the inside of the gas seal door, from both sides OT the overburden 

plug. and from near the stemming. Sampling from these lines will help 

determine the explosive and tosic gas concentrations in the tunnel prior 

to reentry. 

d. Valves are normally installed in the vent lines and makeup ports in the 

gas seal door and overburden plug. An axial vane fan is located on the 

makeup valves to reduce negative pressure. The valves and Tan are 

remotely operated from a manned location and \rill have position monitors to indicate whether they are fully open or iully closed. The position 

monitors will JISO show whether the ian power is on or off. 

256 
e. The following items ordinarily have power turned on through and after 

zero time: 

(1) Tunnel utilities and instrumentation. Power to these items will be 

turned off near zero time. 

(2) Geophone transmitter trailer. This supplies power to the geophone 

and the pressure and temperature amplifiers which must be left on 

to monitor for cavity collapse and pressure changes. 

(3) Ventilation fans. Power will be controlIed remotely. 

(4) Radiation detectors. 

(5) Explosimeters. 

(6) Ventilation and gas sampling valves. Power Till be controlled 

remotely. 

f. The Sutorbilt fans will be installed so they will pull air through the vent 

line filter system before it is released to the atmosphere. One Sutorbilt 

fan will be used for a back-up in case the other fan fails. 

g. Ventilation. 

(1) The ventilation system is installed so that all areas of the tunnel 

that are not closed off are swept with fresh air from the portal. 

(2) After zero time and when the TGD gives his approval (with the consent of the Test Manager), the tunnel ventilation system will be 

turned on, exhaust and makeup air will be supplied from the portal 

through valves in the gas se& door and, if possible, the overburden 

plug. There will be valves that can be remotely operated in both 

vent lines at the gas seal door and, if possible, at the overburden 

plug. Vent line samples will be taken to monitor for radioactive. 

explosive, and/or toxic effluents. 

6. Communications 

A communication system with the necessary wire on a portable reel will be used during 

initial reentry. A back-up reel will be available. All convcrsntion between the reentry pztrty 

and reentry control will be recorded. 

257 
7. Rcentrv Parties and Pouinmcnt 

The reentry parties will consist of the personnel and equipment described in the 

following table: 

Party Name Equipment 

a. Teams 1, 2, and 3 - Tunnel Reentry Party Full Radex clothing 

(11 Chief of Party Bureau of Mines approved 

(2) Rad-Safe monitor 

2-hour self-contained 

oxygen breathing apparatus 

(3) Industrial Hygiene monitor (May be Radiation detectors 

performed by Rad-Science personnel) 

(4) Tunnel safety 

Explosive gas meter 

(5) Scientific Advisor (as required) 

Toxic gas detectors 

Osygen percent meter 

Hard wire communications 

b. Team 4 - Tunnel Rescue Party Full Radex clothing 

(1) Chief of Party Bureau of Mints approved 

(2) Three to six REE Co. Mine Rescue 

2-hour self-contained 

oxygen breathing apparatus 

(3) Two monitors for Rnd-Saie and 

Industrial Hygiene 

Radiation detectors 

Tdsic gas detectors 

Explosive gas meters 

Wire litters 

Hard wit-c communications 

c. Team 5 - Tunnel Scientific Assessment Team Full Radex clothing 

(as required) Respiratory protection (as 

(1) Chief of Party required) 

(2) Rad-Safe and Industrial Hygiene monitors Radiation detectors 

(31 Scientific Advisors Toxic gas detectors 

(41 Mine support Explosive gas meter 

Hard wire communications 

d. Team 6 - Tunnel Work Party Full Racks clothing 

(11 Chief of Party Respiratory protection (as 

(21 Rad-Safe and Industrial Ilygicnc monitors 

required) 

(3) REE Co. .\liners Radiation detectors 

Toxic gas detectors 

e. Tcam 7 - Tunnel Scientific Rccoverics to Full Izadcs clothing 

Espcrimcntal Chamber (see 

Para. 3 for details) Respiratory protection Ins 

rcquircdl 

i. Team 6 - IIE Disposal Croup Full Rntlcs clothing 

(as rcquircdl 

Respiratory prqtcction (as 

rcquircd) 

%. ‘I’cam I, - 1lwlical Support Necessary mcclical cquipmcrrt 

hl. D. and medical tcchnici:m Ambulance 

258 
8. Initial Tunnel Reentries 

a, .4ftcr the event the TGD will review radiation and tunnel condition 

monitors: When he determines that it is safe, and with the agreement 

of the Test Manager, the tunnel ventilation system will be turned on 

ESH.4UST. Makeup air will be supplied from the portal through the 

valves in the plugs. 

b. Prior to entry into the tunnel, all esperimental cables and all electrical and telephone lines going into the tunnel through the portal will 

be either locked open or disconnected. All other cables going into the 

tunnel will be disconnected and taped or cut and grouted as necessary. 

Along with the pressure, temperature, and geophone instruments, the 

remote radiation monitoring system and the remote explosimeters will 

be left connected. No circuit into lhe tunnel or into the instrumentation 

trailers will be closed when personnel are either in the tunnel or directly 

in front of the portal (including an area extending 50 feet on either side of 

the portal). 

The Chief of the Reentry Control Group will advise the TCD on tunnel 

conditions by reviewing surface conditions, exhaust gas iniormstion. 

tunnel radiation. tunnel condition indicators, and seismic information. 

This review will determine when tunnel reentry may actually begin. 

When cleared by the TCD and the Test n2mager and when all surface 

recoveries and power checks are complete. Team 1 will be allowed to 

make the initial tunnel reentry. There will be no change in the tunnel 

ventilation setup or in utilities while Teams 1 through 5 are underground. 

The number of people in the portal area and trailer parks will be held to 

a minimum. 

c. Team 1 will be the first group to reenter and will proceed to the gas 

seal door. A train may be used to supply transportation to the gas 

seal door, conditions permitting. Team 1 will continuously monitor 

for radioactivity and ior toxic and explosive gases. Pressure gages at 

the gas seal door will be checked. and ii no pressure is observed, a 

sample will be taken through the door to determine the environmc:tt on 

the other side oi the door. Under saie conditions, Team 1 will :hcn 

open the gas seal door. They will inspect the tunnel to the ovcrburdcn 

plug. T!le pressure gages at the overburden plug will be checked and 

if no pressure IS observed. a sample will bc taken through the p1u.g to 

dctcrminc the cnvironmcnt on the other side of the plug. Team 1 will then 

withdraw to the portal area. Ii remote ventilation has not been established 

previously behind the overburden plug, the work party (Team 6) will then 

reenter and tnkc the necessary steps to establish venti!ation through the 

259 
plug. They will then exit the tunnel, and samples will be taken from the 

vent line to verify earlier remote samplinq. A second work party may be 

required to open the overburden plug door and remove the material from 

the manway. 

Team 2 will reenter with an engine and car containing the necessary 

equipment to open the overburden plug door. This group w-ill take in 

the reel of communication wire and connect it up to the esisting communication line jack at the overburden plug to reestablish communications with 

the reentry control group at the portal. Team 2 will open the manway door 

and will continuously monitor for radioactivity and for toxic and explosive 

gases. They will then withdraw to the portal with the engine. 

Team 3 will reenter to the overburden plug and reestablish communications 

using the reel connected to the communication line jack. The team will v:alk 

out the remaining drift continuously monitoring for radioactivity and ior 

toxic and explosive gases. They will also observe the vent lines to assure 

themselves that the lines are intact. Team 3 will proceed to the stemming, 

if possible. zoting tunnel and pipe conditions. They will then return to the 

end of the experimental pipe and establish ventilation in the pipe if time 

and conditions permit. Swipes will be taken on the .vent port of the test 

chamber and checked for contamination. These will be later analyzed ior 

Be and isotope identification. 

The mission of Teams I, 2. and 3 is to verify that the tunnel comples 

is within acceptable levels for toxic and radioactive gases and to check 

the condition of the pipe and tunnel. 

d. If Teams 1. 2. and 3 determine that tunnel rehabilitation may be safely 

conducted, they will leave the tunnel and Team 6 will make temporary 

repairs as needed to the vent line or tunnel. A Rad-Safe monitor will 

remain with Team 6 while in the tunnel and continue to monitor for 

radiation and toxic gases. 

e. The object of Teams 1 and 3 will be to explore as much of the tunnel 

on one reentry as possible. Previous cspericnce has shown that 

IICCXI or Draeger Tczms can explore up to 43OCJ ieet in I-l/:! hours 

with a l/2 hour safety margin. If an additional initial rcentr:: IS 

required to iu?ly explore the tunnel, Team 4 (with Rnd-Saie! nnd 

Industrial Ilygiene monitors) will cornplctc the runncl csplorntlon 

with Team 1 standing by as Tunnel Rcscuc. 

260 
9. T::nnel Scientific Recoveries from the Esnerimental Chamber 

a. Scientific recoveries in the tunnel will not be permitted until Tcan. 1. 

2, or 3 has searched all drifts and verlficd that the tunnel is clear of 

dangerous amounts of toxic. explosive, and radioactive gases. 

b. Beiore scientific recoveries may begin, repair of the tunnel along the 

recovery route to the experimental chamber must be complete. This 

activity may include repairing broken lagging and removing hazardous 

obstacles as well as repairing railroad track and vent lines. The tunnel 

lights will be turned on before all scientific recoveries except film 

recoveries begin. All cabling extending into a crushed zone will be cut. 

c. Team 5 will conduct a technical survey and perform rhe necessary 

actions to begin scientific recoveries. 

d. Team 7 will then be permitted to proceed to the experimental chamber 

and begin the removal of samples in order of pr’iority. A Rad-Safe/ 

Industrial Safety monitor will bc present at all times. This monitor 

will advise the Chief of the Reentry Control Group, who is responsible 

for terminating scientific recovery, whenever the tunnel environment 

becomes dangerous. .4 Rad-Safe check station will be established at 

each Scientific Station to control contamination. 

261 
262 
APPENDIX D 

u. s. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-0524-01 

Chapter 0524 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

0524-01 Radioloqical Safety 

011 Purpose 

The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure is to define responsibility and to establish criteria and general procedures for 

radiological safety associated with NTS programs. Additional operational instructions relating to radiological safety for particular activities may be published as a part of the Test Manager's 

Operational Plan. 

012 Responsibilities 

a. Manager, NVOO. The Manager, NVOO, is the AEC official to whom 

the NTSO reports. The Manager, NVOO, as a Test Manager, is 

responsible for administering, preparing, and executing all 

programs and projects. The Test Manager may delegate operational control of the NTSO to specifically-identified Deputy 

Test Managers for the execution of approved programs, projects, and experiments. Only the Test Manager or the Deputy 

Test Manager is authorized to approve or disapprove the field 

execution of approved programs, projects or experiments. 

b. Test Manager. The Test Manager is responsible for the protection of participating personnel and off-site population from radiation hazards associated with activities conducted at the NTS. By mutual agreement between the lkst 

Manager and a scientific user, control of radiological safety 

within the area assigned for a particular activity may be 

delegated to the user's Test Group Director during the period 

of time when such control could have a direct bearing on the 

success or failure of the scientific program. The provisions 

of AEC Manual Chapter 8401 shall apply to reactor tests or 

sustained reactor operations. 

C. Test Group Director. Whenever operational radiological safety 

control is delegated to a Test Group Director under provisions 

of 012a above, he is responsible to the Test Manager for establishment and implementation of radiological safety criteria 

within the assigned area. He will be responsible for submitting a detailed radiological safety operational plan to the 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

263 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

d. 

e. 

f. 

gTest Manager for review and concurrence. This plan shall be 

submitted as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to cover all 

routine operations. Variances from the SOP for non-routine 

operations shall be presented to the Test Manager for review 

and concurrence. Upon termination of need for the Test Group 

Director to retain radiological safety control within an 

assigned area, the Test Group Director will be relieved of 

radiological safety responsibility. 

Director, Nevada Test Site Support Office (NTSSO). Supervises 

the approved NTS on-site radiological safety programs, except 

for those periods in which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others (i.e., Test Manager, Test 

Group Directors, etc.). 

Radiological Safety Advisor. The NTSO Radiological Safety 

Advisor is responsible to the Test Manager for staff supervision of radiological safety policies and procedures at the 

NTS. Monitoring of the radiological safety policies and direction of procedures at NTS, during non-operational periods, 

rests with the Director, NTSSO. 

Chief, Safety Branch (SB), NTSSO. The Chief, Safety Branch, 

NTSSO, will be responsible to the Director, NTSSO, for conducting field inspections at the NTS to assure that NTS contractors execute safety programs in accordance with approved 

safety procedures and plans as well as with AEC and NV00 

directives. Recommends corrective actions where necessary. 

Assures that radioactive waste management and disposal are 

accomplished in accordance with approved procedures. Coordinates and administers NTS activities relative to the Radiological Assistance Program. Provides day-by-day coordination 

and monitoring of NTS radiological safety activities, except for 

those periods during which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others. 

Director, Safety Evaluation Division (SED), NVOO. Provides 

for staff development of safety programs of NV00 for use at 

NTS. Develops safety programs which are coordinated with 

NTSSO and site user agencies and organizations to meet public 

and operational safety requirements for the conduct of nuclear 

detonations, reactor test programs, chemical explosives tests, 

or other NV00 activities. Arranges for radiological studies as 

may be appropriate. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

264 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

h. Chief, Radiological Safety Branch (RSB), NVOO. Provides staff 

assistance in all matters relating to radiological safety. Reviews and evaluates for technical adequacy radiological safety 

procedures and operational plans submitted by user organizations. 

Acts as Radiological Safety Advisor (or provides a representative) 

to the Test Manager during all NV00 activities requiring such 

coverage. 

1. Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer. The Director, Southwestern 

Radiological Health Laboratory, CJ. S. Public Health Service, or 

his representative, will be designated as the Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer and its responsible to the Test Manager 

for the operation of the off-site radiological safety program. 

30 User Organizations. The official in charge of each agency or 

organizational group participating in NTS field activities or 

using NTS facilities is responsible for compliance by his personnel with established radiological safety policies, procedures and controls. Each official in charge of a participating 

group is also responsible at all times to his parent organization for the radiological safety of personnel under his supervision. Operational safety plans will be submitted by the user 

organization to the Test Manager for review and approval, with 

a copy to the Director, NTSSO. 

k. Operations Coordination Center (OCC). Shipment of radioactive 

materials, radioactive waste disposal, and access to areas contaminated with radioactive debris require prior coordination 

through the Operations Coordination Center, CP-1, telephone 

Mercury 986-2781. 

1. On-Site Radiological Organization. On-site radiological safety 

support services for user organizations and the routine operation of NTS will be provided by the on-site radiological safety 

support contractor as directed by the NTSSO. Routine radiological safety support services at NTS will be requested in 

writing by the user organization through the Director, NTSSO. 

The on-site radiological safety support contractor is responsible to the Test Manager, through the Director, NTSSO, for the 

following routine on-NTS radiological safety support. 

1. Providing radiological safety support, including certified 

monitors to user organizations. 

2. Making radiological surveys, documenting radiation levels 

from events on the NTS, mapping and properly marking all 

contaminated areas, and furnishing this survey information 

for distribution by the Chief, Safety Branch, NTSSO. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

265 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

3. Conducting a personnel radiation dosimetry program and disseminating the results of the program to respective organizations covered under this program, and as appropriate 

under AEC Manual Chapter 0525 and Appendix. This program 

to include providing and maintaining a repository for records and source documents pertaining to personnel dosimetry 

for all NV00 activities requiring such dosimetry. 

4. Maintaining and calibrating radiation detection equipment. 

5. 

6. 

Procuring, issuing, and decontaminating protective clothing, supplies, and equipment. 

Providing radioactive materials and waste disposal control 

(including receiving, storage, on-site movement and shipping). 

7. Maintaining and operating personnel and equipment decontamination facilities. 

8. Providing advice and assistance in matters pertaining to 

radiological safety. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

Conducting an on-site environmental surveillance program. 

Providing necessary support services for the off-site 

radiological safety program. 

Conducting radiological safety training courses. 

Preparing final on-site reports following each test operational period, interim reports for each event, special 

reports and detailed operational plans for each future 

program. 

Providing Radiological Assistance Teams to respond to 

radiation incidents. 

Conducting analysis of samples for radioactivity and for 

certain toxic materials. 

Providing and maintaining a current manual containing the 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for providing radiological safety support, as outlined above, to users and 

contractors at the NTS. 

Revised February 9, 1968 

266 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

m. Other. Other responsibilities as well as more detailed versions of the above, are spelled out in NTSO-0103. 

0524-02 Organization 

The chart showing the organizational relationship of the NTS radiological safety activities is shown in Figure 1 on the following page. 

0524-03 Definitions 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g* 

h. 

1. 

k. 

Radiological Safety. The protection of personnel, population 

groups, and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation. 

Ionizing Radiation. Electromagnetic radiation (consisting of 

photons) or particulate radiation (consisting of electrons, 

neutrons, protons, etc.) usually of high energy, but in any 

case capable of ionizing air, directly or indirectly. 

NTS. The Nevada Test Site. 

On-Site. Areas within the NTS boundaries, including Mercury. 

Certified Monitor. Any person certified to the Test Manager 

or his designated representative as a qualified monitor by a 

Test Group Director or the Radiological Safety Representative 

of the radiological safety services. 

Radiation Exclusion Area (Radex). A limited access area designated and posted for radiological safety purposes. 

Controlled Area. Any area to which access is controlled by 

the AEC or AEC contractors. 

User. Any organization or test participant having a NVOOapproved technical program for conduct at the NTS. 

Radiation Incident. Any alleged radiation accident, which if 

true, could result in property damage or loss, injury, over 

exposure, or excessive release of radioactive materials. 

Roentgen. A unit of exposure to X or gamma radiation. 1 mR 

(one milliRoentgen) is one-one thousandth of one Roentgen. 

Rad. A unit of absorbed dose equivalent to 100 ergs/gram. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

267 
Atsat, Hnm@s 

for Optratlonl 

Director, 

Safety Evaluation 

Divlrion 

I 

Chief, 

Radiological 

Safety Branch 

1 I 

Radiological 

Safety 

Advisor 

I I 

I I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I I User 

RadlologicaI 

Or~Mt i oh 

I 

I (A) 

I 

Director, 

NTSSO 

b 1 1 

ChiCr”, 

Safety Branch 

1 

Chief 

Radiological 

Safety Section 

I 

I 

1 

t 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I I I USPIIC Off-Si”e I I- __ - . _ - a Radiological Safety 

I Organization 

I I I f 

I Medical Veterlne&y 

! 

Llaleon Officer -------A&inlstratlve & Technical 

Netwoik I Direct ion 

I -1 (A) When requested by User 

------__-- _-______-- 

Figure J. Organization Chart 

Radiological Safety Activitiee 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-04 

1. Rem. A unit of dose equivalent. It is a unit found convenient 

in practice to express exposures to different types of ionizing 

radiation in terms that combine both the magnitude of the 

absorbed dose and its biological effectiveness. The dose equivalent is numerically equal to the dose in rads multiplied by 

the appropriate modifying factors. 

m. Exposure Rate or Dose Rate. The time rate at which exposure or 

dose is measured or administered, i.e., dose or exposure per 

unit time, such as R/hr, rem/min, rad/hr, R/set, etc. 

0524-04 Radiation Protection Standards 

041 Coverage. These standards shall govern ionizing radiation exposure 

to AEC and AEC contractor personnel and to other individuals who 

may be exposed to ionizing radiation from operations of the AEC and 

AEC contractors. These standards do not apply to radiation exposures resulting from natural radiation, medical and dental procedures, nor do they apply to the general population when the activities involved are essential to national security, such as nuclear 

weapons testing. The latter types of activities are covered by 

separate criteria. Safety criteria for each Plowshare event will 

be considered separately until such time as over-all policy for 

the Plowshare program is established. No operation shall be conducted until the radiological hazard has been evaluated and it 

has been determined to the satisfaction of the Test Manager, or 

the Test Group Director (when he has been delegated the radiological safety responsibility for the operation) that radiation 

exposures should not exceed the radiation protection standards 

established in AEC Manual Chapter 0524 (repeated below). Except 

for emergencies, written requests to expose personnel in excess 

of these limits should be directed to the Test Manager. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

269 
PART I 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

1. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS IN CONTROLLED AREAS' 

A. Radiation from sources external to the body 

Type of Exposure 

Whole body, head and trunk. 

active blood-forming organs 

gonads, or lens of eye. 

Skin of whole body and 

thyroid 

Hands, and forearms, feet 

and ankles 

Period of Time 

Accumulated dose 

Calendar quarter3 

Year 

Calendar quarter3 

Year 

Calendar quarter3 

B. Radiation from emitters internal to the averaged 

body secutive 

1. Except as provided in 2. below, the 

radiation protection standards for 

airborne radioactivity specified in 

annex I. table I, shall be followed. 

The concentration standards are 2. 

based upon continuous exposure to 

the concentrations specified for 

forty hours per week (a "week" being 

seven consecutive days). For the 

purpose of applying these standards, 

radioactivity concentrations may be 

Dose (rem) 

5 (N-18)2 

34 

30 

104 

75 

254 

over periods up to 13 conweeks provided work areas _ 

are appropriately monitored and exposure histories are maintained for 

each individual working in such 

areas. 

If it is not feasible to govern exposures to internal emitters by applying airborne radioactivity concentration standards, the following 

radiation protection standards shall 

apply: 

Dose 

Type of Exposure rem/year 

Whole body, active blood- 5 

forming organs, gonads. 

Thyroid 30 

Bone Body burden of 0.1 

microgram of radium226 or its 

equivalent5 

biological 

Other organs 15 

The calculation of organ dose shall be ternational 

based on methods recommended by the Protection. 

Federal Radiation Council and the Inrem/quarter 

3 

10 

5 

Commission on Radiological 

IAn individual under age 18 shall not be em- the year, but 

ployed in or allowed to enter controlled areas in 

such manner that he will receive doses of radiation in amounts exceeding the standards applicable 

to individuals in uncontrolled areas. Exposures to 

individuals under age 18 may be averaged over periods not to exceed one calendar quarter. 

2N equals the age in years at last birthday. 

An individual employed at age 18 or an individual 

beyond age 18 who had no accrued unused exposure 

shall not be exposed during the ensuing year to 

doses exceeding (a) 1.25 rem for the first calendar quarter, (b) 2.5 rem total for the first two 

calendar quarters, (c) 3.75 rem total for the 

first three calendar quarters and (d) 5 rem for 

in no case will exposure be more 

than 3 rem per quarter. 

3A calendar quarter may be taken as a predetermined period of 13 consecutive weeks or 

any predetermined quarter year based on the 

calendar. 

'Personnel monitoring equipment shall be 

provided each individual who receives or is 

likely to receive a dose in any calendar quarter in excess of 10% of these values. 

sExposure must be governed such that the 

individual's body burden does not exceed this 

value (a) when averaged over any period of 12 

consecutive months and (b) after 50 years of 

occupational exposure. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

270 
PART II 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

II. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND POPULATION GROUPS IN 

UNCONTROLLED AREAS 

A. Radiation dose standards for external and internal exposure 

Dose (rem/year) 

Type of Exposure 

Whole body, gonads or 

bone marrow 

Thyroid or bone 

Bone (alternate standard) 

Based on an average 

Based on exposure to a suitexposure to able population 

individuals sample 

0.5 0.1 

1.5 0.5 

Body burden of Body burden of 

0.003ug of radium O.OOlug of radium 

226 or its biolog- 226 or its biological equivalent. ical equivalent. 

a. Radioactivity in effluents released to 

uncontrolled areas (b) individuals are not exposed 

excess of annex I, table 

1. Except as provided in 2. below, standards, or 

radioactivity in effluents released 

to uncontrolled areas shall not ex- * . 

in 

II 

teed the radiation protection standards specified in annex I, table II. 

The point of release of such effluents shall be considered to be the 

point at which the effluents pass 

beyond the site boundary. Where such 

effluents are discharged through a 

conduit such as a stack or pipe, the 

point of release may be considered 

to be the conduit discharge. For the 

purpose of applying these standards, 

radioactivity concentrations in effluents may be averaged over periods 

up to one year. 

(c) the average exposure ot a suitable sample of an exposed population group is not in excess of 

one-third of annex I, table II 

standards. Radioactivity concentrations in the environment may 

be averaged over periods up to 

one year. 

2. Radioactivity in effluents may be 

released to uncontrolled areas in 

excess of the radiation protection 

standards specified in annex I, 

table II, provided it is reasonably 

demonstrated that in uncontrolled 

areas: 

(a) individuals are not exposed in 

excess of the standards specified in A. above, 

3. In any situation in which the contribution to radioactivity in the environment from effluents discharged 

by one or more activities of the 

AEC or AEC contractors is likely 

to result in exposures in excess of 

the standards specified in 1I.A. and 

B. above, lower effluent concentration limits may be set for these 

Operations. In such cases, the manager of the field office may take the 

necessary corrective action if all 

activities concerned are within his 

area of responsibility. Otherwise, 

each case will be referred to the 

Director, Division of Operational 

Safety, for appropriate action. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

271 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(nCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (PCi/ml) 

Actinium (89) 

Americium (95 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC 227 . . . . 

AC 228 . . . . 

1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Am 241 ..,. 

Am 242m ,.. 

Am 242 . . . . 

Am 243 . . . . 

Am 244 . . . . 

Antimony ..*.............,.. Sb 122 . . . . 

Sb 124 . . . . 

Sb 125 . . . . 

Argon (18) ................. A 37 ...... 

A 41 ...... 

Arsenic (33) ............... As 73 ..... 

As 74 . . . . . 

As 76 . . . . . 

As 77 . . . . . 

Astatine (85) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . At 211 . . . . 

Barium (56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ba 131 . . . . 

Ba 140 . . . . 

Berkelium (97) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bk 249 . . . . 

Bk 250 . . . . 

Beryllium (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Be 7 . . . . . . 

Bismuth (83) .*.......,..... Bi 206 . . . . 

Bi 207 . . . . 

S 

: 

: 

: 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

: 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Sub2 

Sub 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

I 

2x10-12 

3x10-'! 

8x10- * 

2x10-8 

;::;;'o' 

;::;z 

4x10-a 

5x10-8 

6x10-12 

1x10-‘0 

4x10- 6 

2x10- 5 

2x10-7 

1x10- ’ 

2x10- 7 

‘,:;,“r ; 

3x10- 8 

6x10- 3 

2x10- 6 

2x10-6 

4x10- 7 

3x10- 7 

1x10- ’ 

1x10- 7 

1x10- 7 

5x10- 7 

4x10- 7 

7x10- 9 

3x10- 8 

1x10- 6 

4x10- 7 

1x10- 7 

ES” 0 

1x10--7 

1x10- 7 

1 x10- 6 

6~10-~ 

1x10- 6 

2x10-7 

1x10-7 

2x10- 1 

1x10- * 

6x10 - 5 

9x10 -3 

3x10- 3 

3x10 -3 

1x10-4 

8x10-’ 

1x10- 4 

3x10-j 

4x10- 3 

4x10-3 

1x10- 4 

8x10- 4 

1x10-l 

1x10- 1 

8x10-4 

8x10- 4 

7x10- 4 

7x10- 4 

3x10- 3 

3x10- 3 

. . . . 

. . . . 

1x10-2 

1x10-2 

2x10- 3 

2~10-3 

6~10-~ 

6x10- 4 

2x10- 3 

::;;r : 

g:;-: 

5x101- 3 

8x10- 4 

7x10-4 

2x10- 2 

2x10- 2 

6xlO- 3 

6x10- 3 

5x10- * 

5x10 -2 

1x10--3 

1x10-3 

2x10-3 

2x10-3 

3x10- 9 

6x10J” 

2x10-” 

4x10-12 

2x1&‘3 

9x10-‘2 

1x10- 9 

2x10- 9 

2xlOJ3 

4xlO”z 

1x10- 7 

8x10- 7 

6~10-~ 

:;;; -i 

7x10~10 

2x10- * 

9x10-‘0 

1x10- 4 

4x10 - 8 

7x10 -8 

1x10-e 

1x10-9 

4x10 - 9 

;,“:;r ,’ 

2x10-9 

1x10-9 

2xlO-‘O 

1x10- 9 

4x10- B 

1x10- * 

4x10- 9 

1x10-9 

3x10-’ 1 

4x10-9 

5x10-9 

4x10-8 

2x10-7 

4x10-9 

6x10- 9 

5x10-9 

6x10-9 

5x10~0 

2x10-6 

3x10-Q 

9x10-5 

9x10-5 

4x10- 6 

3x10- 5 

4x10-6 

9x10- 5 

1x10-’ 

1x10-” 

4x10-6 

3x10- 5 

5x10 - 3 

5x10- 3 

3x10 - 5 

3x10 - 5 

2x10-5 

%- s -4 

1x10 -4 

. . . . 

. . . . 

5x10- 4 

5x10 - 4 

5x10 - 5 

5x10- 5 

2x10-5 

2x10 - 5 

8x10 -5 

8x10- 5 

:z- 6 -5 

2x10-4 

2x10-4 

3x10- 5 

2x10-5 

6x10-4 

6x10-’ 

2x10- 4 

2x10 - 4 

2x10- 3 

2x10-3 

4x10-5 

4x10-5 

6x10-5 

6x10-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

272 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCl/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

Bi 210 . . . . s 

Bi 212 . . . . : 

Bromine (35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Br 82 . . . . . : 

Cadmium (48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cd 109 . . . . : 

Cd 115m . . . : 

Cd 115 . . . . I 

i 

Calcium (20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ca 45 . . . . . S 

1 

Ca 47 . . . . . 5 f 

Callfornlum (98) . . . . . . . . . . . Cf 249 . . . . ; 

Cf 250 . . . . 

Cf 251 . . . . 

Cf 252 . . . . 

Cf 253 . . . . 

Cf 254 .*.. 

Carbon (6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c 14 

(co,,'::::: 

Cerlum (58) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ce 141 . . . . 

Ce 143 . . . . 

Ce 144 . . . . 

Cesium (55) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cs 131 . . . . 

Cs 134m . . . 

cs 134 ..,. 

cs 135 . . . . 

Cs 136 . . . . 

: 

I 

:ub 

S 

: 

I 

Kg -9 

1x10-7 

2x10- 7 

1x10- 6 

‘,::r ’ ,e 

7x10- 8 

4x10- 8 

4xlrk * 

2x10- 7 

2x10- 7 

::t: e 7 

2x10- 7 

2x10-' 

2x10-12 

lxl~l0 

5x10-12 

lxlW0 

2x10-12 

lxl*lO 

6xlP12 

3x1* 11 

8x19 10 

8x1@” 

;;:::: 

4x10- 6 

5x10- 5 

4x10- 7 

;;:;r : 

2x101 7 

1x1& 8 

;:t: : 

3x10-6 

",::",c: 

;::," 8" 

5x10:7 

;::Oc: 

2x10- 7 

1x10 - 3 

1x10-3 

l~lD-~ 

1x10-2 

8x10 - 3 

:::: : 

%- 3 -4 

7x10- 4 

1x10- 3 

1x10- 3 

3x10- 4 

5x10- 3 

1x10- 3 

1x10- 3 

1x10- 4 

7x10- 4 

4x101 4 

7x10- 4 

1x10-s 

g::,“-: 

2x1& 4 

;::“,r : 

4x10- 6 

4x10- 6 

2x1* 2 

. . . . 

3x10- 3 

:;:: : 

1x1* 3 

3x10- 4 

3x1* 4 

7x10- 2 

",::O; : 

",::: 2 

1x10--: 

3x10- 3 

:;;;r : 

2x10- 3 

2xlOdO 

2x10.‘0 

3x10 - 9 

7x10-9 

;::;r : 

2x10- 9 

3x1* 9 

1x10- 9 

1x10- 9 

8~10-~ 

;::: : 

4x10- 9 

6x10- 9 

6x10-9 

5x10-14 

3x10-12 

2x10-13 

3x10-12 

6x1044 

3x10-12 

:;g.z 

;gi: 

g:::: 

IxlD- 7 

1x1@- 6 

g::E: 

9x10- 9 

7x10- 9 

3xlWO 

2x10-10 

4xlD- 7 

1x10- 7 

1x1* 6 

:;:z: 

4x10-10 

2x10- 8 

3x10- 9 

1x10- 8 

6x10- 9 

4x10-5 

4x10-s 

4x10-4 

4x10-b 

3x10-4 

4x10-s 

2x10-4 

2x10- 4 

3x10- 5 

3x1* s 

3x10-5 

4x10-s 

9x10- 6 

2x1& 4 

5xlD-s 

3x10-5 

4x10-6 

2x10-5 

1x10-s 

3x10- s 

4x10-6 

::::-' -6 

:%- 6 -4 

1x10- 4 

IxlD- 7 

1x10- ‘I 

8x10- 4 

. . . . 

9x10-s 

9x10--s 

4x10- 5 

4x10- 5 

:;:: : 

2x10- 3 

‘,g : 

1x10- 3 

9x10- 6 

4x10- s 

IXID- 4 

2x10- 4 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

273 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) (pCi/ml) (&i/ml) 

cs 137 . . . . 

Chlorine (17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cl 36 . . . . . 

Cl 38 . . . . . 

Chromium (24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cr 51 . . . . . 

Cobalt (27) .*.............. co 57 ..*.. 

Co 58m . . . . 

Co 58 . . . . . 

Co 60 . . . . . 

Copper (29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cu 64 .a... 

Curium (96) . . . . . . . . . . . . ...* Cm 242 . . . . 

Cm 243 . . . . 

Cm 244 . . . . 

Cm 245 . . . . 

Cm 246 . . . . 

Cm 247 . . . . 

Cm 248 . . . . 

Cm 249 . . . . 

Dysprosium (66) . . . . . . . . . . . . Dy 165 . . . . 

Dy 166 ..a. 

Einsteinium (99) . ..*....... Es 253 . . . . 

Es 254m . . . 

Es 254 . . . . 

Es 255 . . . . 

S 

: 

: 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

1 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

I 

S 

I 

6x10- a 

1x10- a 

4x1& 7 

2x10- a 

3x10- 6 

:::: : 

2x10- 6 

3x10- 6 

2x10- t 

2x10- s 

9x10- 6 

8x10- 1 

5x10- a 

3x10- ’ 

9x10- s 

2x10- 6 

1x10- 6 

lxl@‘O 

2x10-‘0 

;;;;:: 

9x10-1* 

1xlCUO 

5x10-12 

1x1~10 

5x1&1* 

1x1&10 

5x1&12 

1 x10-‘0 

;:;,“:: 

lxltk s 

1X10- s 

3x10- 6 

2x10- 6 

2x10- ‘1 

2x10- 7 

8~10-1~ 

6xlOJa 

5x10- 9 

6x10- 9 

2xlW 1 

1x10-10 

5x10-10 

4x10-10 

4x10- 4 

1x1* 3 

2x10- 3 

2x1& 3 

1x1& 2 

1x10- 2 

5x10- 2 

5x10- 2 

:;;g : 

8x1& 2 

6x1& 2 

4x1& 3 

3x10- 3 

1x10- 3 

1x10- 3 

1x1& 2 

6X10* 3 

7x10- 4 

7x10- 4 

1X10- 4 

7x10- 4 

2x10- 4 

8x10- 4 

1x10- 4 

8x10- 4 

1x10- 4 

8x10. 4 

1x10- 4 

6x1& 4 

1x1& s 

4x1& s 

6x10- 2 

6x10- 2 

1x10- 2 

1x10- 2 

1x10- 3 

::::- 3 -4 

7x10- 4 

5x10- 4 

5x10- 4 

4x10-4 

4x10- 4 

8x10- 4 

8x10- 4 

2x10-9 

5x1*10 

1x10- * 

8~1D-‘~ 

9x1& a 

7x1& a 

4x10. ’ 

8x10s a 

1x10- 1 

6x1& 9 

;::t : 

3xlcL a 

2x1& 9 

1x10- a 

3x1&10 

7x10- a 

4xlL a 

;g:: 

2x10-13 

;;:::: 

3X1&I* 

2x10-13 

4x10,1* 

2xlOJ3 

;:;::: 

4xloc’2 

2xlOJ4 

4xlOJ3 

4xlL I 

4x10* ” 

9x10- a 

7x10- a 

8x10- g 

7x10- 9 

3x10-” 

2xlO_‘l 

2x1030 

2xlOJO 

6x103 3 

4x10-‘* 

2x10-” 

1 x10-1 ’ 

2x10- 5 

4xlP 5 

8x10- 5 

6x1& 5 

4x10- 4 

4x10- 4 

2x10- 3 

2x10- 3 

5x10- 4 

4x10- 4 

3x10- 3 

2x1* 3 

1x10- 4 

9x10- s 

5x10- 5 

3x10- 5 

3x10- 4 

2x10- c 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

5x10- 6 

2x10- 5 

7x10- 6 

3x10- 5 

4x10-6 

3x10- 5 

4xlD- 6 

3x10- 5 

4x10- 6 

2x10- 5 

4x10- 1 

1x10-s 

2x10- 3 

2x10- 3 

4x10- 4 

4x10- 4 

4x10- s 

4x10- s 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

1x10- 5 

1x10- 5 

3x10- 5 

3x10- 5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

274 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(PCi/ml) (PCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) 

Erbium (68) ................ 

Europium (63) .............. 

Fermium ( 

Fluorine 

00) .............. 

9) ............... 

Gadolinium (I 

Gallium (31) 

64) ............ 

............... 

Germanium (32) ............. 

Gold (79) .................. 

Hafnium (72) ............... 

Holmium (67) ............... 

Hydrogen (1) ............... 

Indium (49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Er 169 . . . . S 

I 

Er 171 . . . . S 

I 

Eu 152 . . . . S 

(T/2=9.2 hrs) I 

Eu 152 a... S 

(T/2=13 yrs) I 

Eu 154 . . . . S 

Eu 155 . . . . : 

Fm 254 . . . . : 

I 

Fm 255 . . . . S 

I 

Fm 256 . . . . S 

I 

F 18 . . ..a. ; 

I 

Gd 153 . . . . S 

Gd 159 . . . . : 

Ga 72 . . . . . : 

. 

Ge 71 . . . . . : 

I 

Au 196 . . . . S f 

Au 198 . . . . ; 

Au 199 . . . . : 

I 

Hf 181 . . . . S 

Ho 166 . . . . : 

1 

H3 . . . . . . . . ; 

I 

Sub 

In 113m . . . S 

1 

In 114m . . . t 

I 

In 115m . . . S 

6x10- ‘I 

4x10, ‘I 

7x10, ” 

6x10- ‘1 

4x10- ‘I 

3x10- 7 

1x10- 8 

2x10- 8 

4x10- 9 

7xlQ 9 

9x1& 8 

7x10- 8 

6x10- * 

7x10- 8 

2x10 - 8 

1x10- 6 

3x10- 9 

2x10- 9 

5x10 -6 

3x10- 6 

2x10- 7 

9x10- 8 

5x10 - 1 

4x10- 7 

2x10- 7 

2x10- ‘f 

1x10-5 

6z-” -6 

E- f 

2x10-C: 

1x10-6 

8x10 -” 

4x10-e 

7x10-a 

2x10-' 

:"x:;-: 

5x10:s 

2x10- 3 

8x10 -6 

7x10-6 

1x10 -7 

2x10-a 

2x10 - 6 

2x10 -6 

3x10- 3 

:::“,r : 

;:;;I : 

2x10-3 

2x10-3 

2x10-3 

6~10-~ 

6x10, 4 

6x10-3 

6x10- 3 

4x10 -3 

4x10-3 

1x10-3 

1X10-3 

3x10-s 

3x10- 5 

2x10-2 

1x10-2 

6x10-3 

6x10-3 

2x10- 3 

2x10- 3 

1x10-J 

1x10-J 

5x10 -2 

5x10-2 

5x10 -3 

4x10-3 

2x10-3 

1x10 -3 

5x10-3 

4x10-3 

2x10-3 

2x10- 3 

9x10-4 

9x10-4 

1x10-' 

1x10-1 

. . . . 

44:::: 

5x10-4 

5x10-4 

1x10-2 

1x10- 2 

2x10 - 8 

1x10 - 8 

2x10- 8 

2x10- 8 

1x10- 8 

1x10- 8 

4x10-10 

6x10-I o 

1x10-‘0 

2xlOJQ 

3x10-9 

3x10-9 

2x10- 9 

2x10- 9 

6xlOJo 

4xlOJO 

1x10J0 

6x10-1 1 

2x10- 1 

9x10- 8 

;::;rg’ 

2x10- 8 

1 x10 -8 

8x10- g 

6x10 -g 

4x10 - ’ 

2x10- 1 

4x10-8 

2x10-8 

1x10- 8 

8x10-9 

4x10 - 8 

3x10 -8 

1x10--3 

:;:;r:: 

;::“,-; 

2x1017 

4x10-5 

;::;-: 

4x10::s 

7x1o-lo 

8x10-e 

6x10-a 

9x10 -5 

9x10 -5 

1x10- 4 

1x10 -4 

6x10- 5 

6x10 as 

8~10-~ 

~xIO-~ 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

3x10 -5 

;;;,” ;’ 

9x10 -’ 

8x10 -4 

5x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

8x10 -s 

8x10 -5 

4x10 -5 

4x10 2 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

5x10 -5 

5x10 -5 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

7x10-s 

7x10 -s 

3x10-s 

',::; -: 

3x10 3 

::;; -: - 

2x10 J 

2x10 -5 

4x10 -4 

4x10-4 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

275 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (&i/ml) (uCi/ml) 

In 115 . . . . S 

I 

Iodine (53) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 125 . . . . . s 

I 

I 126 . . . . . S 

I 129 . . . . . : 

I 131 . . . . . : 

I 

I 132 . . . . . 5 

I 133 . . . . . : I 

I 134 . . . . . ; 

I 135 . . . . . s 

Irididum (77) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ir 190 . . . . : 

Ir 192 . . . . : 

Ir 194 . . . . : 

I 

Iron (26) . . . ..*............ Fe 55 . . . . . S 

I 

Fe 59 . . . . . S 

I 

Krypton (36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kr 85m . . . . Sub 

Kr 85 . . . . . Sub 

Kr 87 . . . . . Sub 

Kr 88 . . . . . Sub 

Lanthanum (57) *............ La 140 . . . . 5 

I 

Lead (82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pb 203 . . . . S 

I 

Pb 210 . . . . S 

I 

Pb 212 . . . . S 

I 

Lutetium (71) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lu 177 . . . . s 

I 

Manganese (25) ,............ Mn 52 . . . . . S 

I 

Mn 54 . . . . . S 

I 

2x10-7 

3x10-a 

5x10- 9 

2x10-' 

8x10- 9 

3x10-7 

2x10-s 

7x10-a 

9x10- 9 

3x10- ) 

2x10- 7 

9x10- I 

3x10- 8 

2x10- j 

5x10- 7 

3x1& 6 

1x10- ’ 

4x10- t 

1x10- 6 

4x10- ? 

1x1& ) 

3x10-8 

2x10- I 

2x10- 7 

z::- -6 7 

1x10-7 

5x10. e 

6~10-~ 

1x10- 5 

1x10- 6 

1x10-‘j 

2x10- f 

1x10- ? 

3x10 -6 

:x,:;;: 

2x10 $0 

2x10- 8 

2x10- 8 

6x10- 1 

5x10- 7 

2x10- J 

1x10- ? 

4x10 - ) 

4x10-8 

3x10-9 

3x10-3 

4x10- s 

6x10. 3 

5x10-5 

3x10-3 

1x10- 5 

6x10- 3 

6x10-s 

2x10- 3 

::;",- : 

2x1014 

1x10-3 

4x10- 3 

2x10 -2 

7x10 -* 

2x10 -3 

6x10 -3 

5x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10-3 

1x10- 3 

9x10 -4 

2x10 -2 

7x10 -2 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

7x10-4 

7x10-* 

1x10- 2 

1x10- 2 

4x10-6 

5x10- 3 

6x10- * 

5x10-4 

3x10- 3 

3x10 -3 

1x10- 3 

9x10- 4 

4x10-3 

3x10- 3 

9x10’ 9 

1x10~ 9 

gg--‘: 

9x10-’ 1 

1x10- 8 

2x10-1’ 

2x10- 9 

1x10-10 

1x10- 8 

3x10- 9 

3x10- 8 

4x10-‘0 

7x10- 9 

6x10- g 

1x10- ’ 

1x10- 9 

1x10-8 

4x10 - 8 

1x10- 8 

4x10-9 

9x10-‘0 

8x10- 9 

5x10- 9 

3x10 - 8 

3x10-* 

5x10- 9 

2x10- 9 

1x10- 7 

3x10- 1 

2x10- 0 

2x10- 8 

5x10- 9 

4x10- 9 

9x10- * 

:;;;-1; c 

8x10-‘* 

6x10-10 

7x1040 

;:;z ,” 

7x10- 9 

5x10- g 

1x10- a 

1x10- 9 

9x10- 5 

9x10-5 

2x10- I 

2x10- 4 

3x10 -I 

9x10- 5 

6x10- * 

2x10- IA 

3x10- I 

6x10- 5 

8x10- 6 

2x10- !+ 

1x10-6 

4x10-- 

2x10- 5 

6x10- J+ 

4x10-6 

7x10-5 

2x10-Q 

2x10-4 

4x10-5 

4x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

8x10-’ 

2x10 -3 

6x10-5 

5x10 -5 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

4x10- Ir 

4x10- 4 

1x10-I 

2x1o-b 

2x10-5 

2x10- s 

1x10--4 

1x1o-s 

3x10- 5 

3x10-5 

1x10--’ 

1x10--4 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

276 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (PCi/ml) 

Mercury (80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Molybdenum (42) ............ 

Neodymium (60) ............. 

Neptunium (93) ............. 

Nickel (28) ................ 

Niobium (Columbium) (41) . . . 

Osmium (76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Palladium (46) ............. 

Phosphorus (15) ............ 

Mn 56 . . . . . 

Hg 197m ,.. 

Hg 197 . . . . 

Hg 203 . . . . 

MO 99 . . . . . 

Nd 144 . . . . 

Nd 147 . . . . 

Nd 149 . . . . 

Np 237 . . . . 

Np 239 . . . . 

Ni 59 . . . . . 

Ni 63 . . . . . 

Ni 65 . . . . . 

Nb 93m . . . . 

Nb 95 . . . . . 

Nb 97 . . . . . 

OS 185 . . . . 

0s 191m . . . 

OS 191 . . . . 

OS 193 . . . . 

Pd 103 . . . . 

Pd 109 ..a. 

P 32 . . . . . . 

S 

I 

S 

: 

I 

S 

I 

: 

S 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

i 

k 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

: 

: 

: 

1 

S 

1 

8x10 - J 

5x10 w 7 

7x10 - 7 

8x10. 7 

1x10-6 

3x10 -6 

7x10-e 

1x10 -7 

7x10-J 

2x10 -’ 

;::“,r: i 

4x10 -’ 

2x10 -f 

2x10 -6 

1x10- 6 

;;;“,‘:i 

8x10- J 

7x10- J 

5x10- J 

8x10- ? 

6~10-~ 

3x10- 7 

9x10- ‘J 

5x10- 7 

1x10- 7 

2x10- 7 

5x10- ‘J 

1x10-J 

6x10-6 

5x10-6 

5x10-7 

5x10-8 

2x10-5 

9x10-6 

1x10 -6 

4x10-J 

4x10- 1 

3x10- ’ 

1x10-6 

7x10 -J 

6x10-’ 

4x10 -‘/ 

7x10 -8 

8x10 -8 

4x10-s 

3x10-3 

6~10-~ 

5x10-s 

9x10- 3 

1x10- 2 

5x10- 4 

3x10- 3 

5x10- 3 

1x10- 3 

2x10-3 

2x10- 3 

2x10- 3 

2x10- 3 

8x10- 3 

8x10- 3 

9x10 -s 

9x10-4 

4x10-3 

4x10- 3 

6x10 -3 

6x10-* 

8x10- 4 

2x10- 2 

4x10-3 

3x10-3 

1x10 -2 

1x10 -2 

3x10-3 

3x10-3 

3x10 -2 

3x10- 2 

2x10 -3 

2x10- 3 

7x10- 2 

7x10-2 

5x10-3 

5x10-3 

2x10 -3 

2x10 - 3 

1x10-2 

8x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

2x10-3 

5x10 -4 

7x10 -4 

3x10-8 

2x10 - 8 

3x10-8 

3x10 - * 

4X10--B 

9x10 -8 

2x10 -9 

4x10- 9 

3x10-8 

7x10- 9 

:x,:$ 

1x10 -8 

8x10~~ 

6~10-~ 

5x10 -8 

lx10-‘3 

4xlOJ2 

3x10 -0 

2x10 -8 

2x10 -8 

3x10-9 

2x10-9 

1x10 -8 

3x10 -8 

2x10 -8 

4x10 -9 

5x10 -9 

2x10 -8 

3x10 -9 

2x10 -J 

2x10 _’ 

2x10 -8 

2x10 -9 

6x10 c ’ 

3x10 _’ 

4x10 -8 

1x10 -8 

1x10 -8 

9x10 -9 

5x10 2 

3x10 -8 

2x10 -8 

1x10-8 

2x10 -9 

3x10 -9 

1x10 -4 

1x10 v4 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

3x10-4 

5x10 -4 

2x10 -5 

1x10 -4 

2x10 e-4 

4x10 -5 

7x10 -5 

8x10 - 5 

6x10 -5 

6x10 ws 

3x10 -4 

3x10 -4 

3x10 -6 

3x10 -5 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -3 

3x10 -5 

7x10 -4 

1x10 v4 

1x10 -4 

4x10 w4 

4x10 v4 

1x10 es 

1x10 -4 

9x10 -4 

9x10 -4 

7x10 -s 

7x10 -5 

3x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

6x10 -5 

5x10 -s 

3x10 -4 

3x10 -4 

9x10 -5 

7x10 -s 

2x10 -5 

2x10 LJ 

See footnotes at end of table. 

277 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

El ement ( atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) 

Platinum (78) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Plutonium (94) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Polonium (84) .............. 

Potassium (19) ............. 

Praseodynium (59) .......... 

Promethium (61) ............ 

Protoactinium (91) ......... 

Radium (88) ................ 

Pt 191 . ..* 

Pt 193m . . . 

Pt 193 . ..* 

Pt 197m . . . 

Pt 197 . . . . 

Pu 238 . . . . 

Pu 239 . . . . 

Pu 240 . . . . 

Pu 241 . . . . 

Pu 242 . . . . 

Pu 243 . . . . 

Pu 244 . . . . 

PO 210 . . . . 

K42 . . . . . . . 

Pr 142 . . . . 

Pr 143 . . . . 

Pm 147 . . . . 

Pm 149 . . . . 

Pa 230 . . . . 

Pa 231 . . . . 

Pa 233 . . . . 

Ra 223 . . . . 

Ra 224 . . . . 

5 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

I 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

: 

: 

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5 

: 

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5 

: 

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8x10 *I 

6x10 - t 

7x10 -6 

5x10 -6 

1x10 -6 

3x10- t 

6x10 -6 

5x10 -6 

8x10 - I 

6x10 - ’ 

2x10-‘* 

3x10-I’ 

::;$f 

2x10-‘* 

;;;;r:: 

4x10- 5 

2x10-12 

4x10-11 

2x10- 6 

2x10- 6 

2x10-‘* 

3x10-l’ 

5xlOJO 

2xlOJO 

2x10- 6 

1x10- ’ 

2x10- ’ 

2x10- ’ 

3x10- ’ 

2x10- ) 

6x10-a 

1x10- ’ 

3x10- ’ 

2x10- ’ 

2x10- 9 

8x10 A0 

1x10-‘* 

lxlOJ0 

6x10- ) 

2x10 - I 

2x10- 9 

2xlO-'O 

5x10- 9 

7x10-'0 

4x10- 3 

3x10-3 

3x10-2 

3x10- 2 

:xX:;:22 

3x10- 2 

3x10-2 

4x10-3 

3x10-3 

1x10- 4 

8x10- 4 

1x10- 4 

8x10- 4 

1x10- 4 

8x10-” 

7x10- 3 

4x10- 2 

1x10-’ 

9x10- 4 

1x10- 2 

1x10-2 

1x10-4 

3x10- 4 

2x10- 5 

8x10- 4 

9x10- 3 

6x10- 4 

9x10-- 4 

9x10- 4 

1x10-3 

1x10- 3 

;::; r: 

1~10-3 

1x10- 3 

7x10 -3 

7x10 -3 

3x10 -5 

8x10 v4 

4x10 -3 

3x10-3 

2x10 -5 

1x10-+ 

7x10 - 5 

2x10 F4 

3x10-a 

2x10-a 

2x10-' 

2x10-I 

4x10-e 

1x10- a 

2x10 - j 

2x10 -’ 

3x10-a 

2x10 -a 

;:;;;‘: 

E-:” 2 

6~10-1~ 

1x10-L* 

3x10-12 

1x10- 9 

6x10 J4 

1x1032 

E:“,-” ,a 

6~10-1~ 

1x10 J* 

2x10-” 

7x10-‘* 

7x10 -a 

4x10 -9 

7x10- 9 

5x10 -9 

1x10 -a 

6x10 -9 

:;:; 1: 

1x10 -a 

8x10 -9 

6x10 31 

“,::“,f 4 

4xlOJ2 

2x10 -a 

6~10-~ 

6xlOJ’ 

;:;;<: 

2x10-” 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

1x10 - 3 

1x10- 3 

9x10 -4 

2x10-3 

1x10 -3 

9x10 -4 

1x10-4 

1x10-4 

5x10 -6 

3x10 - 5 

5x10 -6 

3x10-5 

5x10 -6 

3x10 -s 

2x10 -4 

1x10 -3 

5x10 -6 

3x10 -5 

3x10 -4 

3x10 -9 

4x10-6 

1x10 -5 

7x10 - ’ 

3x10 -5 

3x10 -* 

2x10 -5 

3x10 -5 

3x10 -5 

5x10 -s 

5x10 -s 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

4x10 -s 

4x10-s 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

9x10 -' 

2x10 -5 

1x1o-4 

1x10 -4 

7x10 -I 

4x10 -6 

2x10 -6 

5x10 -6 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revi sed: February 9, 1968 

378 
STANDARDS FOR RAOIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS INAIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(PCi/ml) (PCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (PCi/ml) 

Radon (86) ................. 

Rhenium (75) ............... 

Rhodium (45) ............... 

Rubidium (37) .............. 

Ruthenium (44) ............. 

Samarium (62) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Scandium (21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Selenium (34) .............. 

Silicon (14) ............... 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Ra 226 . . . . S 

Ra 228 . . . . : 

I 

Rn 220 . . . . S 

Rn 2223 

Re 183 . . . . S 

1 

Re 186 . . . . S 

Re 187 . . . . : 

I 

Re 188 . . . . S 

I 

Rh 103m . . . S 

I 

Rh 105 . . . . S 

Rb 86 . . . . . : 

Rb 87 . . . . . : 

Ru 97 . . . . . : 

I 

Ru 103 . . . . S 

I 

Ru 105 . . . . S 

I 

Ru 106 . . . . S 

I 

Sm 147 . . . . S 

I 

Sm 151 . . . . S 

I 

Sm 153 . . . . S 

I 

SC 46 . . . . . S 

I 

SC 47 . . . . . s 

1 

SC 48 . . . . . S 

I 

Se 75 . . . . . S 

I 

Si 31 . . . . . S 

I 

3xlOJ' 

;g;::: 

4x10-1' 

3x10-j 

3x10-8 

3x10-s 

2x10- 1 

6x10-! 

2x10-' 

9x10-s 

5x10-' 

4x10-' 

2x10 - ’ 

8~10-~ 

6~10-~ 

8x10-l 

5x10-' 

3x10-l 

7x10-a 

5x10- ' 

7x10-a 

2x10-6 

2x10-6 

5x10-r 

8x10-s 

7x10- 

5x10- 1 

8x10- a 

F:$iT 

3xlO-lO 

6l:::-" ,I 

5x10-f 

4x10-' 

;g-: 

y;z; 

2x10-1 

1x10-’ 

lxlOc6 

1x10- f 

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279 

4x10-j 

9x10- 4 

8x10-' 

7x10-4 

. . . . 

. ..* 

2x10-2 

8x10-) 

3x10-3 

1x10 -3 

7x10-2 

4x10 3 

2x10 -3 

9x10 -4 

4x10 -1 

3x10 -1 

4x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

7x10 -4 

::g r: 

1x10 -2 

1x10 -2 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

3x10-s 

4x10-4 

3x10-4 

2x10- 3 

2x10-3 

:"x:;s 

;"x:;-: 

1x10 :3 

1x10-3 

3x10 -3 

3x10-3 

8x10 -* 

8x10 -Q 

;g r: 

3x10 -2 

6x10 -3 

2x10-)2 

1x10-12 

1x1o-e 

3x1o-g 

9x10- 8 

5x10-9 

2x10-8 

8~10-~ 

3x10-’ 

2x10-e 

1x10-a 

6x10 -g 

3x10 -6 

2x10 -6 

3x10 -8 

2x10 -8 

1x10 -8 

2x10 -9 

2x10 -8 

2x10 -9 

8x10 -* 

6x10 -8 

2x10 -8 

3x10 -9 

2x10 -8 

2x10 -8 

:x,g _ ,,’ 

2xlOJ2 

9x10-12 

;:;;:s9 

2x10 -8 

1x10 -8 

8x10 - 9 

8x10-10 

;;:;r: 

6x10 -9 

5x10 -9 

4x10 c 8 

4x10-9 

2x10 -f 

3x10- 8 

3x10-e 

3x10 -5 

3x10 -8 

3x10 -5 

6~10-~ 

3x10 -Ir 

9x10 -5 

5x10-5 

3x10-3 

2x10 -3 

6x10 -5 

3x10 -5 

1x10 -2 

1x10 -2 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

7x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

1x10 m4 

2x10 -4 

4x10 -4 

3x10 -4 

8x10 -5 

8x10 3 

1x10 -4 

1x10--” 

1x10 -5 

1x10 -5 

“,::,” -i: 

4x10 -4 

4x10-4 

“,::; z: 

4x10 -5 

4x10 -5 

9x10 -s 

9x10 -s 

3x10-5 

3x10-s 

3x10-4 

3x10 -4 

9x10 -4 

2x10-4 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) (&i/ml) (pCi/ml) 

Silver (47) . . . . . . . . . ..a.... Ag 105 . . . . 

Ag 1lOm . . . 

Ag 111 . . . . 

Sodium (11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Na 22 . . . . . 

Na 24 . . . . . 

Strontium (38) ..*....a.*... Sr 85m . . . . 

Sr 85 . . . . . 

Sr 89 . . . . . 

Sr 90 . . . . . 

Sr 91 . . . . . 

Sr 92 . . . . . 

Sulfur (16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s 35 . . . . . . 

Tantalum (73) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ta 182 . . . . 

Technetium (43) .*.......... Tc 96m . . . . 

Tc 96 . . . . . 

Tc 97m . . . . 

Tc 97 . . . . . 

Tc 99m . . . . 

Tc 99 . . . . . 

Tellurium (52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Te 125m . . . 

Te 127m . . . 

Te 127 . . . . 

Te 129m . . . 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

: 

I 

S 

I 

S 

1 

I 

S 

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I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

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: 

: 

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6x10 -’ 3x10 -3 

8x10 - * 3x10-3 

2x10 -’ 9x10 -4 

1x10 -8 9x10-4 

3x10 -’ 1x10 -3 

2x10-’ 1x10 -3 

2x10 -7 1x13-3 

9x10 -9 9x10-4 

1x10- 6 6x10 -3 

1x10 -f 8~10-~ 

4x10 -5 2x10 - ’ 

3x10-5 2x10 -1 

2x10 -1 3x10 -3 

1x10 -1 5x10 -3 

3x10-8 3x10 -I, 

4x10 --8 8x10-’ 

1x10 -9 1x10 -5 

5x10--9 1x10-3 

4x10- ’ 2x10 -3 

3x10- ’ 1x10-3 

4x10-’ 2x10 -3 

3x10 -I 2x10 -3 

3x10- t 2x10 -3 

3x10 - t 8x10 a 

4x10-8 1x10 -3 

2x10- * 1x10 -3 

8~10-~ 4x10 -1 

3x10-5 3x10 - 1 

6x10 -’ 3x10 -3 

2x10- ’ 1x10 -3 

2x10 -6 1x10 -2 

2x10- 1 5x10 --3 

1x10’ 5 5x10 -2 

3x10 --I 2x10-2 

4x10-5 2x10 9’ 

1x10-5 8x10 -2 

2x10 -6 1x10 -2 

6~10~~ 5x10 -3 

4x10 -‘/ 5x10 -3 

1x10- 3x10 -3 

1x10 -I 2x10 -3 

4x10 --8 2x10 -3 

2x10 -6 8x10 -3 

9x10 -1 5x10 -3 

8x10 - 8 1x10 a 

3x10 - * 6x10 -4 

2x10 -6 

3x10 -9 

7x10 -9 

3xlOJO 

1x10 -8 

8x10 -9 

6x10 -q 

3xlOJO 

4x10 -8 

5x10 -9 

1x10 -6 

1x10-6 

8x10 -9 

4x10 -9 

3x1010 

1x10 -9 

3x10-‘1 

2x10 JO 

2x10 -8 

9x10 -3 

2x10 -8 

1x10 -8 

9x10 -9 

9x10 -9 

1x10 -9 

7x10-‘0 

3x10 -6 

1x10 -6 

2x10 -8 

8x10--9 

8x10 -* 

5x10 -3 

4x10 -1 

1x10 -8 

1x10 -6 

5x10 -I 

7x10 -8 

2x10 -3 

1x10 -8 

4x10 -9 

5x10 -9 

1x10 -9 

6x10 -8 

3x10 -8 

1x10 e4 

1x10 -4 

3x10 - 5 

3x10 -5 

4x10 - 5 

4x10- 5 

4x10 -5 

3x10 -5 

2x10 -4 

3x10 -5 

7x10 -3 

7x10 -3 

1x10 -4 

2x10 .-4 

3x10 -6 

3x10 -5 

3x10 -1 

4x10-s 

7x10 -s 

::::-' -5 

6x10 MS 

6x10 -5 

3x10 w4 

4x10 -5 

4x10 -5 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -2 

1x10 v4 

5x10 -5 

4x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -3 

8x10 -4 

6x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

3x10 -4 

2x10-4 

2x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

6x10 -s 

5x10 -5 

3x10-4 

2x10 -4 

3x10-5 

2x10 -5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

280 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

Terbium (65) ............... 

Thallium (81) .............. 

Thorium (90) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Thulium (69) ............... 

Tin (50) ................... 

Tungsten (Wolfram) (74) .... 

Uranium (92) ............... 

Te 129 . . . . 

Te 131m . . . 

Te 132 . . . . 

Tb 160 . . . . 

Tl 200 . . . . 

Tl 201 . . . . 

Tl 202 . . . . 

Tl 204 ,... 

Th 227 . . . . 

Th 228 . . . . 

Th 230 . . . . 

Th 231 . . . . 

Th 232 . . . . 

Th natural 

Th 234 . . . . 

Tm 170 . . . . 

Tm 171 . . . . 

Sn 113 . . . . 

Sn 125 . . . . 

W 181 . . . . . 

W 185 . . . . . 

W 187 . . . . . 

U 230 . . . . . 

S 

: 

: 

t 

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1 

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1 

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I 

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5x10-6 

4x10 -6 

4x10-' 

2x10-7 

2x10-' 

1x10-f 

1x10- 1 

3x10-e 

3x10 -6 

1x10-s 

2x10 -6 

9x10-' 

8x10-' 

2x10-t 

6x10 -' 

:z:iii 

2xlOJO 

9xlOJ2 

6x102* 

2x10-'* 

10-11 

1x10-6 

:;:;;: 

3xlO-ll 

6x10-l) 

6~10~' 

6x10-e 

3x10 -a 

4x10-a 

3x10-s 

1x10 -'/ 

2x10-f 

4x10 -' 

5x10-e 

1x10- 

;;;",:: 

1x10 -1 

8x10-' 

1x10-7 

4x10-f 

::;;_;: 

lxlOA0 

2x10 -2 

2x10-2 

2x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

9x10 -4 

6x10 - 4 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -2 

7x10 -3 

9x10 -3 

5x10 -3 

4x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

:%I -3 -4 

5x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

4x10 4 

5x10 -5 

9x10 -* 

7x10 -3 

7x10 -3 

5x10 -5 

1x10 -3 

6x10 -5 

6x10 -4 

5x10 -4 

5x10 -4 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -2 

1x10-2 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

5x10 -4 

5x10 -4 

1x10 -2 

1x10 -2 

4x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

2x10-3 

2x10 - 3 

1x10-4 

1x10 -4 

2x10- ‘I 

1x10- ’ 

1x10-8 

;:;;ri 

4x10 -9 

3x10 -9 

1 x10 -9 

9x10-8 

4x10-8 

7x10-8 

3x10- 8 

3x10-e 

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9x10-10 

1x10-” 

6x1&‘* 

3x10-13 

2x10-13 

8x10J4 

3xlOJ3 

5x10-8 

4x10- 8 

lxlO-‘2 

1 x10-‘* 

2x10-12 

2x10-‘* 

2x10-9 

1x10- 9 

1x10--9 

1x10- 9 

4x10- 9 

8x10-9 

1x10- * 

g;:;r i 

;:;“,z i 

4x10-9 

3x10-8 

4x10-9 

:::;-_i 

1x10_’ 1 

4x10-12 

8~10-~ 

8x10- 4 

6~10-~ 

4x10- 5 

3x10 -5 

2x10- 5 

4x10- 5 

4x10- 5 

4x10-4 

2x10-4 

3x10-4 

2x10 -4 

1x10-4 

7x10-5 

1x10--4 

6x10-5 

2x10- 5 

2x10-5 

7x10 -6 

10 -5 

2x10 -6 

3x10 -5 

2x10 -4 

2x10-4 

2x10 -6 

4x10 -5 

2x10 -6 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

5x10 -5 

5x10 -5 

5x10 -4 

5x10-4 

9x10 -5 

8x10 -5 

;::; r: 

4x10 -b 

3x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

7x10 -5 

6x10 -5 

5x10 -6 

5x10 -6 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

281 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) (&i/ml) 

Vanadium (23) .............. 

Xenon (54) ................. 

Ytterbium (70) ............. 

Yttrium (39) ............... 

Zinc (30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Zirconium (40) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

U 232 . . . . . 

U 233 . . . . . 

U 234 a.... 

U 235 . . . . . 

U 236 . . . . . 

U 238 . . . . . 

U 240 . . . . . 

U-natural . 

V 48 . . . . . . 

Xe 131m . . . 

Xe 133 . . . . 

Xe 133m . . . 

Xe 135 . . . . 

Yb 175 . . . . 

Y 90 . . . . . . 

Y 91m . . . . . 

Y 91 . ..*.. 

Y 92 . . . . . . 

Y 93 . . . . . . 

Zn 65 . . . . . 

Zn 69m . . . . 

Zn 69 . . . . . 

Zr 93 . . . . . 

Zr 95 . . . . . 

S 

I 

S 

L 

ih 

: 

:+ 

: 

:+ 

I 

S 

I 

Sub 

Sub 

Sub 

Sub 

S 

: 

: 

I 

S 

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I 

S 

: 

I 

S 

; 

: 

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1x10-‘0 

3x10-” 

5x10-‘0 

1x10-‘0 

;:g:o” 

5x10-‘0 

;;;;r:: 

;;:::: 

1 x10-‘0 

2x10- J 

2x10 - 1 

1X10’‘0 

lxlOl’0 

2x10- ’ 

6x10- 8 

2x10- 5 

1x10- 5 

1x10- 5 

4x10- 6 

7x10- ’ 

6x10- j 

1x10- ’ 

1x10- ’ 

2x10- 5 

2x10 -5 

4x10 -8 

3x10 -* 

4x10 -1 

3x10-1 

2x10 - ,I 

:%-’ ,I 

8%” -1 

3x10- ’ 

7x10 - 6 

9x10- 6 

1x10- ’ 

3x10-’ 

1x10 -’ 

3x10 -8 

8x10-” 

8x10 -4 

9x10 -4 

9x10 -@ 

9x10 -4 

9x10 -4 

8x10 -I( 

8x10 -I( 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10 3 

1 x10 -3 

1x10-3 

1x10 -3 

9X10’ 4 

8x10 -4 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

3x10 - 3 

3x10 -3 

6x10 -4 

6x10- 4 

1x10-’ 

1x10 -1 

8~10-~ 

8x10- 4 

2x10 -3 

E- 3 

8~10~: 

3x10-3 

5x104 

2x10-3 

2x10-3 

5x10 -2 

5x10 -2 

2X10” 2 

2x10-2 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

3x10 J2 

9x10 33 

2x10-l 1 

4xlOJ2 

2x1&’ 1 

;:;“,-:: 

;;;::: 

“,g::: 

5xlO-L2 

8x10 -g 

6x10 -9 

5xlOJ2 

5x10-‘2 

~xIO-~ 

2x10 -9 

4x10- 1 

3x10 - ’ 

3x10 - ’ 

1x10-’ 

2x10 - 8 

2x10- 8 

4x10- 9 

3x10 - 9 

8x10- I 

6x10- ’ 

1x10- 9 

1x10-9 

1x10- 8 

1x10- 8 

6x10- 9 

5x10- 9 

4x10- 9 

:;;;:i 

1x10 -* 

2x10 -1 

3x10- 1 

4x10-9 

1x10 -8 

4x10 -9 

1x10 -9 

3~1D-~ 

3x10 -5 

3x10-s 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-s 

3x10-5 

3x10-s 

3x10-s 

3x10-s 

4x10-5 

4x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-s 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

3x10 -3 

3x10-3 

3x10 - 5 

3x10 -5 

6x10 -5 

6x10 -f~ 

3x10 -5 

3x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

:;;; ,: 

6x10 -5 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

8x10 -4 

8x10 -4 

6x10 -5 

6x10 -s 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

282 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (&i/ml) (&i/ml) (uCi/ml) 

Zr 97 . . . . . S 1x10- f 5x10 - 4 4x10 -9 2x10 -5 

I 9x10-8 5x10 - 4 3x10-9 2x10 -5 

lSoluble (S); Insoluble (I). 

"'Sub" means that values given are for submersion in an infinite cloud of gaseous material. 

NOTE: In any case where there is a mixture 

in air or water of more than one radionuclide, 

the limiting values for purposes of this Annex 

should be determined as follows: 

1. If the identity and concentration of 

each radionuclide in the mixture are known, the 

limiting values should be derived as follows: 

Determine, for each radionuclide mixture, the 

ratio between the quantity present in the mixture and the limit otherwise established in 

Annex I for the specific radionuclide when not 

in a mixture. The sum of such ratios for all 

the radionuclides in the mixture may not exceed 

'1' (i.e., "unity"). 

EXAMPLE: If radionuclides A, B, and C are 

present in concentrations CA, CB, and CC, and 

if the applicable MPC's, are MPCA, and MPCB and 

MPCC respectively, then the concentrations 

shall be limited so that the following relationship exists: 

C 

A + cB + cC 

p[pcA MPCB Mm;C 

$1 

2. If either the identity or the concentration of any radionuclide in the mixture is not 

known, the limiting values for purposes of 

Annex I shall be: 

a. For purposes of Table I, Col. l-1 X 

10'12 

b. For purposes of Table I, Col. 2-3 X 10s7 

c. For purposes of Table II, Col. l-4 X 

IO-l4 

d. For purposes of Table II, Col. 2-l X 

10-S 

3. If any of the conditions specified below 

are met, the corresponding values specified below may be used in lieu of those specified in 

paragraph 2 above. 

a. If the identity of each radionuclide in 

the mixture is known but the concentration of 

one or more of the radionuclides in the mixture 

is not known, the concentration limit for the 

mixture is the limit specified in Annex I for 

the radionuclide in the mixture having the lowest concentration limit; or 

b. If the identity of each radionuclide in 

the mixture is not known, but it is known that 

certain radionuclides specified in Annex I are 

not present in the mixture, the concentration 

limit for the mixture is the lowest concentration limit specified in Annex I for any radionuclide which is not known to be absent from 

the mixture; or 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

283 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

Table I Table II 

c. Element (atomic number) and isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

If it is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, 

PO 210, At 211, Ra 223, Ra 224, Ra 226, 

AC 227, Ra 228. Th 230, Pa 231, Th 232, 

and Th-nat, are not present. 

If it is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, 

PO 210 Ra 223, Ra 226, Ra 228, Ra 231, 

and Th-nat, are not present. 

If it is known that Sr 90, Pb 210, Ra 226, 

Ra 228, are not present. 

If it is known Ra 226 and Ra‘228, are 

not present. 

If it is known that alpha-emitters and Sr 90, 

I 129, Pb 210, AC 227, Ra 228, Pa 230, 

Pu 241, and Bk 249 are not present. 

If it is known that alpha-emitters and 

dPb 210, AC 227, Ra 228 and Pu 241, 

are not present. 

If it is known that alpha-emitters and 

AC 227, are not present. 

If it is known that AC 227, Th 230. Pa 231, 

Pu 238, Pu 239, Pu 240, Pu 242, and 

Cf 249 -are not present. 

If Pa 231, Pu 239, Pu 240, Pu 242 and 

Cf 249 are not present. 

4. If the mixture of radionuclides consists 

of uranium and its daughter products in ore 

dust prior to chemical processing of the uranium ore, the values specified below may be used 

in lieu of those determined in accordance with 

paragraph 1 above or those specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. 

a. For purposes of Table I, Col. l-l~lO-~~ 

uc/ml gross alpha activity; or 2.5x10-11 uc/ml 

natural uranium; or 75 micrograms per cubic 

meter of air natural uranium. 

b. For purposes of Table 1.1, Col. 1-3x 

lo-11 uc/ml gross alpha activity or 8~10-1s 

uc/ml natural uranium; or 3 micrograms per 

cubic meter of air natural uranium. 

5. For purposes of this note, a radionuclide may be considered as not present in a mix- 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

3x10- 9 

3x10-‘0 

3x10-1 l 

3x10-‘* 

2x10-12 

9x10-5 . . . . 

6~10-~ . . . . 

2x10- 5 . . . . 

3x10-6 . . . . 

. . . . 1xlOJO 

. . . . 1x10-” 

. . . . 1x10-‘* 

. . . . lxlOJ3 

. . . . 7x10-14 

3x10 -6 

2x10-s 

6x10-' 

1x10 - t 

,... 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

ture if (a) the ratio of the concentration of 

that radionuclide in the mixture (CA) to the 

concentration limit for that radionuclide specified in Table II of Annex I (MPCA) does not 

exceed l/10, 

i.e. 'A <' 

MPCA =iG 

and (b) the sum of such ratios 

dionuclides considered as not 

mixture does not exceed l/4. 

i.e. 'A + 'Fj t 

MPCA MPCB 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

for all the rapresent in the 

284 
APPENDIX E 

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-0101-01 

CHAPTER 0101 THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTSO) 

0101-01 

011 

General 

The Nevada Test Site 

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is a facility provided by the Atomic 

Energy Cmission and managed by the AEC Nevada Operations Office 

(NV). The NTS supports the field test programs of the AEC and its 

contractors, the Department of Defense, and others authorized to be 

conducted at the NTS. 

012 The Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) 

The Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) includes AEC, DOD, 

Laboratory, contractor, agency and organizational personnel who 

participate in, or provide support for, test operations at the 

Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Manager, NV, as the Site Manager, heads 

the NTSO (see Appendix "A"). 

0101-02 

021 

Organizational Concept and Policies 

Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) 

The Nevada Test Site Organization is a continuing task organization 

whose composition may be readily changed in response to the needs 

and technical objectives of the test program. 

022 The NV staff, for the Manager, provides for the approval and 

coordination of program proposals, approvals for project support, 

funding and/or authority for financial agreement, legal counsel, 

contract authority and administration, engineering, accounting, 

classification and security policy and guidance, safety policy and 

guidance, environmental safety analyses, industrial relations, and 

public information policy to the NTSO. 

023 Test execution shall conform to statutory, regulatory, and other 

responsibilities in accordance with delegations to the Manager, NV, 

by the General Manager of the Atomic Energy Cormnission. 

024 Technical users are allowed maximum technical latitude in the 

conduct of their scientific programs and are responsible for their 

technical readiness. 

Revised: March 30, 1972 

HT020 

285 
THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTSO) NTSO-0101-025 

025 

026 

0101-03 

031 

032 

033 

034 

035 

036 

037 

User groups may be assigned areas in which to conduct their operations and exercise technical control subject to operational site 

coordination and control exercised by the Site Manager or, during a 

Test Execution Period, the Test Controller. 

The Site Manager, NTS, has the authority to approve or disapprove 

the field execution of tests that have been approved by Headquarters 

AEC. During the Test Execution Period, authority to proceed with or 

postpone the field execution of approved activities or tests is 

delegated to the Test Controller in accordance with his Delegation 

of Authority from the Manager, NV. 

Responsibilities 

The Site Manager is responsible for administering the NTS, for all 

preparations required for the safe execution of programs and 

projects at the NTS and for providing construction and logistic 

support services and facilities required to support the technical 

users. 

The Test Controller is responsible to the Manager, NV, for the 

conduct of those experiments and test events in the testing program 

to which he is assigned by the Manager, NV. 

The Deputy, Military Matters (Director, Test Directorate, FCDNA), 

serves as deputy for the Site Manger on operational, administrative 

and support matters pertaining to all DNA activities. 

The Scientific Manager's Advisory Panel is chaired by a Scientific 

Advisor designated by the Manager, NV, as nominated by the technical 

user. Members of the panel provide advice on matters relative to 

on- and off-site safety. ’ 

The Test Group Directors (TGD) are 

sponsor to direct the fielding and 

and tests. He reports to the Test 

relating to test execution. 

assigned by the scientific 

technical aspects of experiments 

Controller on operational matters 

The Director, Logistics Support, is responsible for the direction 

and control of construction and logistical support activities at the 

NTS and during Test Execution Periods, supports the Test Controller 

directly in the field execution of experiments and test events. 

The Director, Operational Support, aided by the Operations Control 

Group and Special Staff assigned from NV as required, provides 

advice, assistance and serves as principal operations coordinator 

for the Site Manager and during the Test Execution Period, as 

Director of Operations for the Test Controller. 

Revised: March 30, 1972 

HT020 

286 
038 

039 

040 

041 

042 

The Control Point Coordinator assures the availability in the OCC of 

facilities and equipment for the control and coordination of NTS 

operational activities. 

The Test Operations Officer supervises the preparation of the Test 

Controller's operation and security plan and other required plans as 

directed. He coordinates preparations for the test execution and 

forward area support. During the Test Execution Period, he assists 

the Director of Operations in supervising and coordinating execution 

of the operations and security plan as directed by the Test 

Controller. 

The Test Liaison Officer provides oral communication of. test-related 

operational information from the operational control point (NTS) to 

NV and the Test Operations Center (TOC), AEC HQ during the Test 

Execution Period. 

The FCDNA, Test Construction Division, is responsible for directing 

DOD furnished support. 

The Technical Program Groups consist of organizational units and 

staff to satisfy the program objectives of their parent organizations. 

Revised: March 30, 1972 

HTOZO 

287 
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