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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTHONY ROSS, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2685 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered, August 20, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005393-2005.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED APRIL 30, 2019

Anthony Ross appeals pro se from the order denying as untimely his 

serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In 2006, a 

jury convicted Ross of four counts of robbery and one count of criminal 

conspiracy after he and two others robbed a Family Dollar Store. The trial 

court sentenced Ross to an aggregate term of 15 to 60 years of imprisonment. 

On September 18, 2008, his Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Ross, 963 A.2d 573 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished 

memorandum). Ross did not seek further review.

Ross filed his first PCRA petition on December 29, 2008, and the PCRA 

court appointed counsel. Thereafter, PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw 
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and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to the dictates of Commonwealth v. 

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 

213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). PCRA counsel was permitted to withdraw,

and the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intention to dismiss 

Ross’ PCRA petition. By order entered August 26, 2009, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition. We affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. 

Commonwealth v. Ross, 6 A.3d 567 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished 

memorandum).

On August 13, 2015, Ross filed a second PCRA petition. After issuing

Rule 907 notice, and considering Ross’ response thereto, the PCRA court 

denied Ross’ second petition as untimely. In his timely pro se appeal to 

this Court, Ross claimed that the mandatory minimum sentences imposed as 

part of his aggregate sentence were illegal in light of Alleyne v. U.S., 133 

S.Ct. 2151 (2013), and that a challenge to the legality of his sentence is nonwaivable. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 153 A.3d 1120 (Pa. Super. 2016), 

unpublished memorandum at 2. We determined that Ross’ second request for 

post-conviction relief was untimely, and that a legality of sentence claim 

cannot be addressed when a court lacks jurisdiction. Id. at 3-4. In addition, 

we rejected Ross’ attempt to argue the “new constitutional right” time-bar 

exception, because Ross failed to file his PCRA petition within 60 days of the 

Alleyne decision, and because Alleyne had not been held to apply 

retroactively to cases where the judgment of sentence had become final. See 

id. 
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On July 3, 2018, Ross filed a motion, which he titled “Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. Section 6501, 6502, and 6503.” The PCRA 

court noted that the motion addressed the legality of Ross’ sentence and was

“virtually identical” to Ross’ second PCRA petition, “raising the claim that the 

mandatory minimum that he was subjected to has been deemed 

unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne.” PCRA Court Opinion, 9/19/18, at 2-3. 

Treating Ross’ latest filing as an untimely, serial PCRA petition, the PCRA court 

issued Rule 907 notice of its intention to dismiss the petition without a hearing. 

Ross filed a response. By order entered on August 20, 2018, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition. This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court did not 

require Pa.R.A.P 1925 compliance.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA court’s findings will not 

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Before addressing the merits of Ross’s substantive claims on appeal, we 

must first address his assertion that the PCRA court wrongfully treated his 

habeas corpus petition under the PCRA. Our Supreme Court “has consistently 

held that, pursuant to the plain language of Section 9542, where a claim is 

cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral 

review. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (Pa. 2013) 
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(explaining the PCRA subsumes the remedies of habeas corpus and coram 

nobis). Ross’ challenge to the legality of his sentence is clearly cognizable 

under the PCRA. Therefore, his characterization of his latest request as a 

habeas corpus petition is incorrect. The PCRA court correctly treated the 

motion as a PCRA petition.

Next, we consider whether Ross’ serial petition was timely filed. The 

timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for 

relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the 

petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. sections 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.1 

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1 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).

 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. A PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory 

exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claims could have 

been presented.” See Hernandez, 79 A.3d 651-52 (citations omitted); see 

also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).2 Finally, exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar 

must be pled in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Here, Ross’ judgment of sentence became final on October 20, 2008, 

when the time to file an allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Thus, Ross had until October 

20, 2009, to file a timely PCRA petition. As he filed the petition at issue in 

2017, it is untimely unless Ross has satisfied his burden of pleading and 

proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez, 

supra.

Ross has failed to establish any exception to the PCRA’s time bar. 

Instead, he argues that he is entitled to relief via a habeas corpus petition, 

which provides an avenue for post-conviction relief outside the parameters of 

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2 Our legislature recently amended this section of the PCRA to provide 

petitioner’s one year to file a petition invoking at time-bar exception. See Act 

of 2018, October 24, P.L. 894, No. 146. This amendment does not apply to 

Ross’ serial petition.
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the PCRA. As noted above, well-settled case law holds otherwise. See 

Turner, supra. In addition, and contrary to Ross’ contention, there is no 

“miscarriage of justice” exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Burton, 936 A.2d 

at 527. As such, the PCRA court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, 

and we affirm the court’s order denying Ross post-conviction relief.3

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/30/19

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3 Ross’ reliance on the federal court’s decision in Satterfield v. District 

Attorney Philadelphia, 872 F.3d 152 (3rd Cir. 2017), is misplaced. See 

Commonwealth v Brown, 143 A.3d 418, 420 (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining 

that this Court “has already deemed such decisions pertaining to federal 

habeas corpus law irrelevant to our construction of the timeliness provisions 

set forth in the PCRA”).