HAROLD L’. BRODE 

DNA 6324F 

OPERATIONS 

TOGGLE, ARBOR, & BEDROCK 

EVENTS: DIAMOND SCULLS, DID0 QUEEN, HUSKY ACE, 

MING BLADE, HYBLA FAIR, & DINING CAR 

20 July 1972 - 5 April 1975 

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies 

and their contractors; Critical Technology, 8 October 

1985. Other requests for this document shall be referred 

to Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC 

203051000. 

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is 

restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Section 

2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 

Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq. Violations of these export laws are 

subject to severe criminal penalties, Disseminate in accordance with 

provisions of DOD Directive 5230.25. 

United States Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Prepared by Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: 

FOR CLASSIFIED documents, follow the procedures in 

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Chapter IX. 

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agencies and their contractors; Critical 

Technoloqy, 8 October 1987. Other requests 

5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 

DNA 6324F 

a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONliORlNG ORGANIZATION 

?eynolds Electrical and (If applicable) Field Command 

Engineerinq Co., Inc. Defense Nuclear Aqencv 

C. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIPCode) 7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIPCode) 

3.0. Box 14400 FCLS (MAJ J. A. Stinson) 

_a? Vegas, NV 89114-4400 Kirtland AFB, NM 87115-5000 

a. NAME OF FUNDING /SPONSORING 

ORGANIZATION 

c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 

1. TITLE (Include Security C/assrficationJ 

8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 

I 

10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS 

PROGRAM 

ACCESSION NO 

I I I I 

1PERATIONS TOGGLE, ARBOR, BEDROCK, EVENTS: DIAMOND SCULLS, DID0 QUEEN, HUSKY ACE, MING 

3LADE, HYBLA FAIR, & DINING CAR, 20 July 1972 - 5 April 1975 

2 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) 

(cDowel1, Elizabeth; Brady, William J.; and Eubank, Bernard F. 

3a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 15 PAGE COUNT 

Technical FROM 720720 TO 750405 

14 DATE OF REPORT (year, Month, Day) 

871130 

6. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

7. COSATI CODES 18. SUElECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) 

FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP _ Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review (UNTPR) 

18 3 Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA) 

6 18 Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) 

9. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block numberJ 

This report is a personnel-oriented history of DOD participation in underground nuclear 

weapons testing during OPERATIONS TOGGLE, ARBOR, & BEDROCK; EVENTS: DIAMOND XULLS, DID0 

OUEEN, HUSKY ACE, MING BLADE, HYBLA FAIR, & DINING CAR, 20 July 1972 - 5 April 1975. It is 

the fifth in a series of historical reports which will include all DOD underground nuclear 

weapons tests and all DOE underground nuclear weapons tests with significant DOD participation from 1962 forward. In addition to these historical reports, a restricted distribution 

report will identify all DOD and DOD affiliated participants (military, civilian and DOD 

contractors) and will list their radiation dosimetry data. 

20. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 121. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

q UNCLASSIFIEDIUNLIMITED @ SAME AS RPT 0 DTIC USERS UNCLASSIFIED 

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 

Major Joe A. Stinson 

22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL 

(505) 844-9186 FCDNA/FCLS 

BD FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edItIon may be used until exhausted. 

All other edltgons are obsolete. 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

UNCLASSIFIED 

i 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CCASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT (Continued) 

for this document shall be referred to Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, 

DC 20305-1000. 

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continued) 

Nevada Test Site (NTS) 

Underground Test (UGT) 

DIAMOND SCULLS 

DID0 QUEEN HYBLA FAIR 

HUSKY ACE DINING CAR 

MING BLADE 

SECURITY CLASSIFKATION OF THIS PAGE 

ii UNCLASSIFIED 
SUMMARY 

Six Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored -underground test 

events were conducted from 20 July 1972 through 5 April 1975 to 

study weapons effects. All six were tunnel-type nuclear tests. 

The following table summarizes data on these events: 

OPERATION TOGGLE ARBOR BEDROCK 

TEST EVENT 

DATE 

LOCAL TIME (hours) 

NTS LOCATION 

TYPE 

DEPTH (feet) 

YIELD* 

go@ o\OO 

O’P 

M\@ #BLP o,t-@ 

,s & 

@@ 

sG+ a+ 

pG* a~@E +B Gf” 

20 Jul 72 6 Jun 75 12 act 73 10 Jun 74 28 081 74 6 Apr 76 

1010 PDT tOOD PDT tOD0 PDT 0000 PDT 0700 PST 1246 PDT 

u121.02 U120.14 U12n.07 ut 2ll.08 u12n.00 U12*.18 

Tunnd Tunnd Tuml~l Tunnd Tmmd TWbWl 

1.591 t ,284 1.360 1.270 1,320 1.217 

I.01 LOW Low Low LOW LOW 

*LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 
No release of radioactive effluent was detected onsite or 

offsite after any test events discussed in this volume. 

As recorded on Area Access Registers, 10,173 individual entries to radiation exclusion (radex) areas were made after the 

above DOD test events. Of this number 887 were by DOD-affiliated 

personnel (including military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor). 

The remainder were United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)*, 

other government agency, and other contractor personnel. 

The average gamma radiation exposure per entry for all participants was 3 mR. The average gamma radiation exposure per 

entry for DOD-affiliated participants was 10 mR. The maximum exposure of a non-DOD participant during an entry was 265 mR. The 

maximum exposure of a DOD-affiliated participant was 495 mR. 

These maximum exposures were during the HYBLA FAIR and DID0 QUEEN 

events, respectively. 

*The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) 

succeeded the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on 19 

January 1975. 

2 
PREFACE 

The United States Government conducted 194 nuclear device 

tests from 1945 through 1958 during atmospheric test series at 

sites in the United States and in the Atlantic, and Pacific 

Oceans. The U.S. Army's Manhattan Engineer District (MED) implemented the testing program in 1945, and its successor agency, 

the AEC, administered the program from 1947 until testing was 

suspended by the United States on 1 November 1958. 

Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for 

weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An additional 22 nuclear experiments were conducted 

from December 1954 to February 1956 in Nevada. These experiments 

were physics studies using small quantities of fissionable material and conventional explosives. 

President Eisenhower had proposed that test ban negotiations 

begin on 31 October 1958, and had pledged a one-year moratorium 

on United States testing to commence after the negotiations 

began. The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests 

began at Geneva on 31 October 1958, the U.S. moratorium began on 

1 November, and the AEC detected the final Soviet nuclear test of 

their fall series on 3 November 1958. Negotiations continued until May 1960 without final agreement. No nuclear tests were conducted by either nation until 1 September 1961 when the Soviet 

Union resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The United 

States began a series of underground tests in Nevada on 15 September 1961, and U.S. atmospheric tests were resumed on 25 April 

1962 in the Pacific. 
The United States conducted several atmospheric tests in 

Nevada during July 1962, and the last U.S. atmospheric nuclear 

test was in the Pacific on 4 November 1962. The Limited Test Ban 

Treaty, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, 

and underwater, was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963. From 

resumption of United States atmospheric testing on 25 April 1962 

until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 weapons 

development and weapons effects tests were conducted as part of 

the Pacific and Nevada atmospheric test operations. The underground tests, resumed on 15 September 1961, have continued on a 

year-round basis through the present time. 

In 1977, 15 years after atmospheric testing stopped, the 

Center for Disease Control (CD(Z)* noted a possible leukemia 

cluster within the group of soldiers who were present at the 

SMOKY test event, one of the Nevada tests in the 1957 PLUMBBOB 

test series. After that CDC report, the Veterans Administration 

(VA) received a number of claims for medical benefits filed by 

former military personnel who believed their health may have been 

affected by their participation in the nuclear weapons testing 

program. 

In late 1977, the DOD began a study to provide data for both 

the CDC and the VA on radiation exposures of DOD military and 

civilian participants in atmospheric testing. That study has 

progressed to the point where a number of volumes describing DOD 

participation in atmospheric tests have been published by the 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) as the executive agency for the DOD. 

*The Center for Disease Control was part of the U.S. Department 

of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services). It was renamed The Centers for Disease Control on 1 October 1980. 

4 
On 20 June 1979, the United States Senate Committee on 

Veterans' Affairs began hearings on Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing. In addition to requesting and receiving information on DOD personnel participation and 

radiation exposures during atmospheric testing, the Chairman of 

the Senate Committee expressed concern regarding exposures of DOD 

participants in DOD-sponsored and Department of Energy (DOE)* 

underground test events. 

The Chairman requested and received information from the 

Director, DNA, in an exchange of letters through 15 October 1979 

regarding research on underground testing radiation exposures. In 

early 1980, the DNA initiated a program to acquire and consolidate underground testing radiation exposure data in a set of published volumes similar to the program under way on atmospheric 

testing data. This volume is the fifth of several volumes regarding participation and radiation exposures of DOD military and 

civilian participants in underground nuclear test events. 

SERIES OF VOLUMES 

Most volumes in this series discuss DOD-sponsored underground test events, in chronological order, after presenting introductory and general information. These volumes cover all 

except one category of underground test events identified as DODsponsored in Announced United States Nuclear Tests, published 

each year by the DOE Nevada Operations Office, Office of Public 

Affairs. The category of events not covered includes events 

conducted as nuclear test detection experiments in a program 

named VELA-UNIFORM. Generally, reentries after these tests were 

not 

*The U.S. Department of Energy succeeded the U.S. Energy Research 

and Development Administration (ERDA) in October 1977. 

5 
performed, so significant exposure of participants to radiation 

did not occur. 

A later volume will discuss general participation of DOD 

personnel in DOE-sponsored underground test events, with specific 

information on those events which released radioactive effluent 

to the atmosphere and where exposures of DOD personnel were 

involved. 

A separate set of books (comprising one volume) is a census 

of DOD personnel and their radiation exposure data. Distribution 

of this volume is limited by provisions of the Privacy Act. 

METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THE VOLUMES 

Information for these volumes was obtained from several 

locations. Security-classified documents were researched at 

Headquarters, DNA, Washington, D.C. Additional documents were 

researched at Field Command, DNA, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory Technical Library, and Sandia National Laboratories in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. Most of the radiation measurement data 

were obtained at the DOE, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), and 

its support contractor, the Reynolds Electrical & Engineering 

Company, Inc. (REECo), in Las Vegas, Nevada. 

Unclassified records were used to document underground testing activities when possible, but, when necessary, unclassified 

information was extracted from security-classified documents. 

Both unclassified and classified documents are cited in the List 

of References at the end of each volume. Locations of the reference documents also are shown. Copies of most of the unclassified references have been entered in the records of the Coordination and Information Center (CIC), a DOE facility located in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

6 
Radiation measurements, exposure data, event data, and offsite reports generally are maintained in hard copy or microfilm 

form at the REECo facilities adjacent to the CIC or as original 

documents at the Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna 

Niguel, California. The Master File of all available personnel 

exposure data for nuclear testing programs on the continent and 

in the Pacific from 1945 to the present also is maintained by 

REECo for DOD and DOE. 

ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME 

A summary of this test event volume appears before this 

preface and includes general objectives of the test events, 

characteristics of each test event, and data regarding DOD 

participants and their radiation exposures. 

An introduction following this preface discusses reasons for 

conducting nuclear test events underground, the testing organization, the NTS, and locations of NTS underground testing areas. 

A chapter entitled "Underground Testing Procedures" explains 

the basic mechanics of underground testing, purposes of effects 

experiments, containment features and early containment problems, 

tunnel and shaft area access requirements, industrial safety and 

radiological safety procedures, telemetered radiation exposure 

rate measurements, and air support for underground tests. 

A chapter on each test event covered by this volume follows 

in chronological order. Each test event chapter contains an 

event summary, a discussion of preparations and event operations, 

an explanation of safety procedures implemented, and listings of 

monitoring, sampling, and exposure results. 
A reference list and appendices to the text, including a 

glossary of terms and a list of abbreviations and acronyms, 

follow the event chapters. 

. 

8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

SUMMARY ......................... 

PREFACE ......................... 

Series of Volumes .................. 

Methods and Sources Used to Prepare the Volumes ... 

Organization of this Volume ............. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................... 

1 

3 

5 

6 

7 

9 

16 

18 

19 

19 

20 

21 

22 

25 

28 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................. 

LIST OF TABLES ..................... 

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION ............... 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .............. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES ......... 

1.3 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES . 

1.4 

1.5 

CHAPTER 

2.1 

2.2 

1.3.1 Defense Nuclear Agency .......... 

1.3.2 Air Force Support. ............ 

1.3.3 AEC-DOD Relationships .......... 

AEC ORGANIZATIONS, CONTRACTORS, AND 

RESPONSIBILITIES ................ 

1.4.1 Atomic Energy Commission ......... 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization ...... 

1.4.3 NTSO Radiological Safety ......... 

1.4.4 NTS Scientific Users ........... 

1.4.5 Test Support Organizations ........ 

THE NEVADA TEST SITE .............. 

TWO - UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES ...... 

CONTAINMENT, PROBLEMS, AND PROCEDURES ...... 

2.1.1 Vertical Shaft Containment ........ 

2.1.2 Tunnel-Type Containment ......... 

2.1.3 Containment Evaluation Panel ....... 

2.1.4 Test Manager's Advisory Panel ...... 

2.1.5 Effluent Release Procedures ....... 

EMPLACEMENT TYPES ................ 

2.2.1 Vertical Shaft-Type Emplacement ..... 

33 

33 

35 

37 

38 

39 

41 

46 

46 

47 

49 

51 

53 

56 

59 

61 

9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6 

2.7 

2.8 

2.9 

2.2.2 Tunnel-Type Emplacement ......... 

DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES .............. 

2.3.1 Radiation Measurements .......... 

2.3.2 Radiochemical Measurements ........ 

EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS ............... 

TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS . . 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control .......... 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control ....... 

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS ........ 

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES ......... 

2.7.1 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada 

Test Site Organization - Standard 

Operating Procedure (NTSO SOP), ..... 

2.7.2 Standard Operating Procedures for the 

Radiological Sciences Department, REECo . 

2.7.3 Implementation of Radiological Procedures .................. 

A. Portable Radiation Detection 

Equipment .............. 

B. Air Sampling Equipment ........ 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability .... 

D. Monitoring of Personnel Exposures . . 

2.7.4 Additional Methods Used for Control 

of Radex Areas .............. 

TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS . . 

2.8.1 Telemetry System in Use ......... 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection 

Monitoring Support ............ 

AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ............ 

2.9.1 Changes In Air Support Requirements ... 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs 

Air Force Auxiliary Field ........ 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters ..... 

64 

66 

67 

67 

68 

69 

69 

71 

72 

75 

75 

75 

76 

76 

76 

76 

77 

79 

81 

82 

82 

85 

88 

89 

89 

10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

CHAPTER 

3.1 

3.2 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

THREE - DIAMOND SCULLS EVENT .......... 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

3.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction .... 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

3.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

3.3.2 Rainier Mesa Initial Radiation Survey 

and Reentry Activities .......... 

3.3.3 Portal Initial Radiation Survey 

Activities ................ 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

3.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities ........ 

3.4.2 Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

3.4.3 Postevent Mining Activities ....... 

3.4.4 Postevent Drilling Activities 

on Rainier Mesa. ............. 

3.4.5 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

CHAPTER FOUR - DID0 QUEEN EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4.2.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction . . . . 

B. Radiological Safety Support . . . . . 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

11 

91 

91 

91 

91 

95 

95 

98 

98 

99 

99 

104 

104 

104 

105 

105 

106 

106 

111 

111 

116 

116 

117 

119 

119 

119 

119 

121 

121 

122 

123 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. .............. 

4.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

4.3.2 Trailer Park and Portal Initial Radiation' 

Survey and Reentry Activities ...... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

4.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Activities ................ 

4.4.2 Postevent Mining ............. 

4.4.3 Postevent Drilling ............ 

4.4.4 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

CHAPTER FIVE - HUSKY ACE EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5.1 

5.2 

5.3 

5.4 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

5.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction .... 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

5.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

5.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Reentry 

Activities ................ 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry .............. 

5.4.2 Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

128 

128 

129 

129 

130 

130 

132 

132 

141 

143 

144 

145 

147 

147 

147 

147 

149 

149 

150 

151 

156 

156 

157 

157 

157 

158 

158 

158 

166 

12 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

5.4.3 Postevent Mining ............. 

5.4.4 Postevent Drilling ............ 

5.4.5 Industrial Safety ............ 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

CHAPTER SIX - MING BLADE EVENT ............. 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

6.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Tunnel Facilities Contruction .... 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

6.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

6.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

6.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Data 

Recovery Activities ........... 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

6.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Activities ................ 

6.4.2 Postevent Mining ............. 

6.4.3 Postevent Underground Drilling ...... 

6.4.4 Cavity Study ............... 

6.4.5 Industrial Safety ............ 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

CHAPTER SEVEN - HYBLA FAIR EVENT ............ 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

7.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

168 

168 

168 

170 

172 

172 

172 

172 

174 

174 

176 

177 

177 

182 

182 

182 

182 

184 

184 

184 

190 

190 

191 

191 

193 

195 

195 

195 

195 

197 

13 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

7.3 

7.4 

7.5 

CHAPTER 

8.1 

8.2 

8.3 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction .... 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

C. Telemetry Support .......... 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

7.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 

7.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

7.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and 

Reentry Activities ............ 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Activities ................ 

7.4.2 Reentry Mining .............. 

7.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

EIGHT - DINING CAR EVENT ............ 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

8.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction .... 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

D. Security Coverage .......... 

E. Air Support ............. 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

8.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

8.3.2 Initial Radiation Surveys and 

Reentry Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 

197 

200 

200 

201 

201 

206 

206 

206 

208 

208 

208 

217 

222 

223 

226 

226 

226 

226 

228 

228 

229 

230 

230 

235 

235 

236 

236 

14 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 

CHAPTER 

8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities . . . . . . . . 

8.4.2 Postevent Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8.4.3 Industrial Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

REFERENCE LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

APPENDICES 

A. Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

B. Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . 

C. General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department 

of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Nuclear Tests . 

D. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0524 - Radiological Safety . . 

E. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0101 - The Nevada Test Site 

Organization (NTSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

PAGE 

237 

237 

245 

245 

247 

249 

255 

289 

293 

307 

331 

15 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FIGURE PAGE 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6 

2.7 

2.8 

2.9 

3.1 

3.2 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

3.6 

3.7 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

Federal Government Structure for Continental 

Nuclear Tests .................. 

Partial Organization Chart of Field Command, 

Defense Nuclear Agency ............. 

Nevada Test Site Organization .......... 

Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada .... 

The Nevada Test Site .............. 

A Typical Subsidence Crater ........... 

Vertical LOS Pipe Configuration ......... 

Horizontal LOS Pipe Configuration ........ 

Portal of a Typical DOD Tunnel Complex ..... 

NTS Combination Personnel Dosimeter and Security 

Credential Holder ................ 

Neher-White RAMS Probe ............. 

RAMS Readout Console .............. 

Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site ..... 

Typical Permanently-Established Remote Radiation 

Detector Stations Operated Continuously Throughout 

theNTS ..................... 

DIAMOND SCULLS Event - Tunnel Layout ...... 

DIAMOND SCULLS LOS Pipe Section 

Prior to Assembly ................ 

Stubs Area of the DIAMOND SCULLS Event LOS Pipe . 

DIAMOND SCULLS Event - Surface RAMS ....... 

DIAMOND SCULLS Event - Underground RAMS ..... 

DIAMOND SCULLS Event - Aerial View of T Tunnel 

Portal ..................... 

DIAMOND SCULLS Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout . . 

DID0 QUEEN Event - Tunnel Layout ........ 

DID0 QUEEN Event - Surface RAMS ......... 

DID0 QUEEN Event - Underground RAMS ....... 

16 

23 

26 

37 

42 

43 

62 

63 

65 

74 

78 

83 

84 

86 

87 

92 

93 

94 

102 

103 

107 

109 

120 

126 

127 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Concluded) 

FIGURE PAGE 

4.4 

4.5 

5.1 

5.2 

5.3 

5.4 

5.5 

5.6 

5.7 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

6.4 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

7.4 

7.5 

7.6 

8.1 

8.2 

8.3 

8.4 

8.5 

DIDO QUEEN Event - ES Tunnel Portal . . . l l . . 

DIDO QUEEN Event - LOS, HFR, and Bypass Drifts b 

HUSKY ACE Event - Tunnel Layout ......... 

HUSKY ACE Event - Surface RAMS ......... 

HUSKY ACE EVENT - Underground RAMS ....... 

HUSKY ACE Event - Rainier Mesa Trailer Park ... 

HUSKY ACE Event - N Tunnel Portal ........ 

HUSKY ACE Event - System Configuration ..... 

HUSKY ACE Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout .... 

MING BLADE Event - Tunnel Layout ........ 

MING BLADE Event - Surface RAMS ......... 

MING BLADE Event - Underground RAMS ....... 

MING BLADE Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout .... 

HYBLA FAIR Event - Tunnel Layout ........ 

HYBLA FAIR Event - Closeup of HLOS Pipe Sections. 

HYBLA FAIR Event - HLOS Pipe Sections ...... 

HYBLA FAIR Event - Surface RAMS ......... 

HYBLA FAIR Event - Underground RAMS ....... 

HYBLA FAIR Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout .... 

DINING CAR Event - Tunnel Layout ........ 

DINING CAR Event - Surface RAMS ......... 

DINING CAR Event - Underground RAMS ....... 

DINING CAR Event - E Tunnel Portal ....... 

DINING CAR Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout .... 

131 

136 

148 

154 

155 

159 

160 

162 

165 

173 

180 

181 

187 

196 

198 

199 

204 

205 

212 

227 

233 

234 

238 

240 

17 
LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE PAGE 

2.1 

3.1 

4.1 

5.1 

6.1 

7.1 

8.1 

DOD Test Events - 20 July 1972 through 

5 April 1975 .................. 

DIAMOND SCULLS Event RAMS Unit Locations .... 

DID0 QUEEN Event RAMS Unit Locations ...... 

HUSKY ACE Event RAMS Unit Locations ....... 

MING BLADE Event RAMS Unit Locations ...... 

HYBLA FAIR Event RAMS Unit Locations ...... 

DINING CAR Event RAMS Unit Locations ...... 

60 

100 

124 

152 

178 

202 

231 

18 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The first United States nuclear detonation designed to be 

fully contained underground was the RAINIER tunnel event conducted by the University of California Radiation Laboratory 

(UCRL) for the AEC in Nevada on 19 September 1957. This was a 

weapons-related experiment with a relatively low yield of 1.7 

kilotons (kt). The second tunnel event with a significant 

nuclear yield was a safety experiment on 22 February 1958, also 

conducted in Nevada by UCRL for AEC. This experiment, the VENUS 

event, resulted in a yield of less than one ton. These two 

tunnel events and five additional underground safety experiments 

with zero or only slight yields were the beginning of the United 

States underground nuclear testing program, currently the only 

type of nuclear detonation testing permitted by treaty. The 

first DOD-sponsored underground nuclear weapons effects test was 

the 5.7 kt HARD HAT event conducted by the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA) on 15 February 1962 in Nevada. 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

While technical conferences between the United States and 

the Soviet Union on banning nuclear detonation tests continued, 

and concern regarding further increases in worldwide fallout 

mounted, a number of nuclear tests were conducted underground 

during 1958 in Nevada. Prior to the United States testing moratorium, six safety experiments in shafts, five safety experiments 

in tunnels, and four weapons development tests in tunnels were 

conducted by user laboratories. Radioactive products from several of these tests were not completely contained underground. 

19 
Containment of nuclear detonations was a new engineering challenge. Understanding and solving the majority of containment 

problems would require years of underground testing experience. 

When the United States resumed testing on 15 September 1961, 

the first 32 test events were underground, including a cratering 

experiment with the device emplaced 110 feet below the surface. 

The DOMINIC I test series in the Pacific and the DOMINIC II test 

series in Nevada (also called Operation SUNBEAM by DOD) during 

1962 included the last atmospheric nuclear detonation tests by 

the United States. 

The commitment of the United States to reduce levels of 

worldwide fallout by refraining from conducting nuclear tests in 

the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater was finalized when 

the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 

5 August 1963. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES 

The majority of United States underground tests have been 

for weapons-related purposes. New designs were tested to improve 

efficiency and deliverability characteristics of nuclear explosive devices before they entered the military stockpile as components of nuclear weapons. 

In addition to weapons-related tests, safety experiments 

with nuclear devices also were conducted by user laboratories. 

These experiments tested nuclear devices by simulating detonation 

of conventional high explosives in a manner which might occur in 

an accident during transportation or storage of weapons. 

Weapons effects tests sponsored by the DOD were conducted to 

determine the vulnerability or survivability of military systems 

20 
or components when exposed to one or more effects of a nuclear 

detonation. The nuclear devices for these tests were provided by 

the AEC weapons development laboratories and were designed to be 

similar to the nuclear components used in nuclear weapons. 

Actual weapon configurations were used in a few test events. 

Military systems, structures, materials, electronics experiments, 

and other related experiments were provided by DOD and AEC 

agencies. Many of these tests were very complex and involved 

greater numbers of participants than other categories of tests 

previously mentioned. Personnel from DASA, other government 

organizations, user laboratories and contractors, and DOD 

contractor agencies were involved. 

Some tests were designed to study the response of hardened 

structures or geologic formations to shock waves generated by 

nuclear detonations. Many tests were designed to study the 

response of military components to effects of radiation produced 

by nuclear weapons. Such tests required a direct line of sight 

between the nuclear device and the experiments. Many of the radiation effects tests required the simulation of high altitude (up 

to exoatmospheric) conditions. These tests involved installation 

of experiments inside large steel line-of-sight (LOS) pipes, 

hundreds of feet in length, with maximum diameters of several 

feet. Large vacuum pumps were utilized to reduce pressure inside 

the pipes to the desired level. 

DOD weapons effects tests DIAMOND SCULLS, 20 July 1972, 

through DINING CAR, 5 April 1975, conducted during Operations 

TOGGLE, ARBOR, and BEDROCK are discussed in this volume. 

1.3 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Administering the underground nuclear testing program was a 

joint AEC-DOD responsibility. The similar nature of the AEC-DOD 

21 
organizational structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 

1.3.1 Defense Nuclear Agency 

Headquarters of the Defense Nuclear Agency is located near 

Washington, D.C., and is composed of personnel from each of the 

Armed Services and civilian DOD employees. It was originally 

established as the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) 

to assume residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer District 

(MED), through issuance of a joint Army-Navy memorandum, dated 29 

January 1947, which was retroactive to 1 January 1947 (when the 

Atomic Energy Commission was activated). The responsibility for 

DOD nuclear weapons effects testing was assigned to AFSWP. The 

National Security Act of 1947 had become law when the Secretary 

of Defense issued a memorandum on 21 October 1947 to the three 

Service Secretaries confirming the previous directive of 29 

January, and thus, AFSWP officially represented all of the services. AFSWP was charged with providing nuclear weapons support 

to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As originally chartered, AFSWP 

was directly responsible to each of the three 

1951, the Air Force Special Weapons Center 

Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB), Albuquerque, 

signed by DOD the responsibility to provide 

Service Chiefs. In 

(AFSWC) located at 

New Mexico, was asspecific support to 

the AEC for continental nuclear testing (see 

This command was not directly related to AFSWP; 

organizations coordinated several support tasks. 

Section 1.3.2). 

however, the two 

By issuance of General Order No. 2, Headquarters, DASA, 

dated 6 May 1959, AFSWP was redesignated the Defense Atomic 

Support Agency. Under its new charter, DASA was responsible to 

the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

DASA's five major areas of responsibility for the DOD included: 

A. Staff assistance to the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

22 
9 I I 

I 1 MILITARY I I 

t 

LIAISON 

AEC COMMlrrEE 

I 

SECRETARY 

----e-----m 

COMMISSIONERS 

OF 

DEFENSE 

I I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

AEC r-l GENERAL 

MANAGER 

JOINT r-l CHIEFS 

OF 

STAFF 

I I 

I 1 I I 

MANAGER, I FIELD 

NEVADA 

COMMAND 

------B-B-- 

OPERATIONS 

OFFICE 

I I I I 

I 1 

I 

AEC I 

TEST MANAGER I 

_-w--w ,I 

(MANAGER, 

NVOO) 

- COMMAND I. 

- - - LIAISON AND COORDINATION 

Figure 1.1 Federal Government Structure for 

Continental Nuclear Tests (1972) 

23 
B. Research in weapons effects. 

C. Atomic tests. 

D. Weapons development. 

E. Assistance to the Services. 

Responsibilities of Headquarters, DASA (HQ/DASA), included 

providing consolidated management and direction for the DOD 

nuclear weapons effects testing programs, while technical direction and management of field operations of DOD nuclear weapons 

effects testing activities were delegated to Field Command, DASA 

(FC/DASA), located at Sandia Base (now KAFB) in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico. From 6 May 1959 until 1 July 1964 the Weapons Effects 

Tests Group (WETG) of FC/DASA was responsible for nuclear weapons 

effects testing and seismic detection research responsibilities 

(VELA-UNIFORM) for the Director, DASA. This organization maintained close liaison with the AEC/Nevada Operations Office 

(NVOO). Personnel from FC/DASA became the military members of 

the joint AEC-DOD testing organization at the Nevada Test Site 

(NTS) and at other Continental United States test locations. 

Participation of DOD agencies and their contractors in nuclear 

field tests was coordinated and supported by FC/DASA. On 1 July 

1964, the testing organization in Albuquerque was designated as 

the Weapons Test Division (WTD), a division of HQ/DASA. On 1 

August 1966, WTD was changed to Test Command (TC/DASA), a separate command under HQ/DASA, but remained in Albuquerque. The 

responsibilities for technical direction and management of field 

operations for nuclear weapons effects tests remained in effect 

during these changes in organization. During this period, WTD 

and TC maintained an engineering and support branch (designated 

Nevada Branch) at the NTS and a liaison office at AEC/NVOO. The 

Nevada Branch maintained liaison with AEC/NVOO and supervised 

FC/DASA activities at NTS. On 12 May 1970, the Commander, 

24 
FC/DASA, assumed additional command of TC/DASA. 

On 29 March 1971 (effective 1 July 19711, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense directed the reorganization of DASA as a 

result of cutbacks recommended by the "Blue Ribbon Panel" survey 

of agency activities. In his Executive Memorandum, DASA was 

retained as a defense agency under the new title, "Defense 

Nuclear Agency." On 1 July 1971, FC/DASA was redesignated as 

FC/DNA, and TC/DASA became TC/DNA. While the responsibilities 

and manning levels at Field Command were reduced during this 

transition, Test Command remained essentially the same. 

On 1 January 1972, TC/DNA was disestablished and personnel 

were transferred to FC/DNA. The responsibilities for technical 

direction and management of field operations for nuclear weapons 

effects tests were transferred to the newly formed Test 

Directorate [Field Command Test (FCT)] of FC/DNA. The Nevada 

Branch of TC was changed to the Test Construction Division of 

Test Directorate (FCTC), and the responsibility for the liaison 

office at AEC/NVOO was transferred to FCTC (see Figure 1.2). 

1.3.2 Air Force Support 

Until 1 July 1974, AFSWC provided air support to the Nevada 

Test Site Organization (NTSO) during nuclear tests at the NTS. 

Detachment 1 of the 4900th Test Group provided aircraft for 

shuttle service between KAFB, New Mexico, and Indian Springs Air 

Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF) in Nevada. They also provided 

aircraft and crews to perform low-altitude cloud tracking, radio 

relay support, and courier missions. On 1 July 1974, Detachment 

1, 4900th Test Group, was consolidated with the 57th Fighter 

Weapons Wing, Tactical Air Command, at Nellis Air Force Base. 

Detachment 1 was inactivated at ISAFAF, and personnel, aircraft, 

equipment, and supplies were transferred to the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing (FWW). Operations provided by Detachment 1 and the 

57th FWW after the transfer were: 

25 
DIRECTOR 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

WASHINGTON. DC AREA 

I 

COMMANDER 

FIELD COMMAND, DNA 

KIRTLAND AFB. NM 

w---m _---- 

I I 

4 

INSPECTIONS DIRECTORATE LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE TEST DIRECTORATE PLANS 6 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL &ADMINISTRATION 

KAFB KAFB KIRTLAND AFB. NM DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE 

KAFE KAFB 

% 

4 4 4 4 

----_ 

PLANS h ANALYSIS 

DIVISION 

KAFB 

I 

_---- 

I 

ENGINEERING TEST CONSTRUCTION TEST OPERATIONS TECHNICAL DIRECTORS 

DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION 

KAFB NEVADA TEST SITE KAFB KAFB 

. 

DOE. NV00 

LAS VEGAS, NV 

Figure 1.2 Partial Organization Chart of Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (1972) 
A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

E. 

F. 

G. 

H. 

I. 

Normal technical support and laboratory photography 

flights as required, including preevent areas, postevent 

documentation, and new construction. 

Security perimeter sweeps to cover the NTS boundary, 

check the local barricades, and look for areas where 

intruders could gain access to the NTS unobserved. 

Operational orientation tours and management surveillance flights, as required, or as requested by the 

hierarchy of either group. 

Security sweeps of closed areas on D-l day. 

Airborne closed-circuit television for check-out operations on D-day. 

D-day helicopter safety sweeps and Test Controller 

standby missions to be flown prior to zero time and 

cover the downwind area for personnel and livestock 

locations to facilitate rapid evacuation of personnel 

and/or reentry of scientific personnel as necessary. 

D-day helicopter airborne closed-circuit television 

support to provide a stable platform for both television 

and color photography coverage of surface ground zero 

(SGZ) at zero time. 

D-day helicopter cloud surveillance. This mission (not 

to be considered "cloud tracking") provided intitial 

data for immediate onsite decisions for any needed safeguard actions. 

Damage survey flights as required. 

27 
J. Other support flights as requested by the AEC Test 

Controller and approved as operationally feasible. 

Other Air Force organizations providing support to the NTSO 

under AFSWC control on a temporary basis were as follows: 

K. 

L. 

M. 

N. 

Elements of the 1211th Test Squadron (Sampling), Military Airlift Command, McClellan AFB, were detached to 

ISAFAF. Their primary task was cloud sampling. Personnel from this unit also assisted NTSO radiological 

safety personnel in providing support at ISAFAF, including decontamination of crews, equipment, and aircraft. 

Elements of the 4520th Combat Crew Training Wing, Tactical Air Command, Nellis AFB, Nevada, provided support 

functions, such as housing, feeding, and logistics, to 

the units operating from ISAFAF and Nellis AFB. In addition, they conducted security sweep flights over NTS 

and control tower operations, fire-fighting, and crash 

rescue services at ISAFAF, and equipment was provided 

and maintained for the helicopter pad at the NTS Control 

Point (CP) and other helicopter pads at each Forward 

Control Point (FCP). 

The 55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Military Airlift Command, McClellan AFB, supplied one aircraft and 

crew to perform cloud tracking. 

The Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems 

Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, provided aircraft and 

crews to perform technical projects. 

1.3.3 AEC-DOD Relationships 

DOD was responsible for establishing criteria for nuclear 

28 
weapons, developing and producing delivery systems, developing 

nuclear weapons plans and forces, providing defense against 

nuclear attack, and obtaining nuclear weapons effects data 

through DNA. The AEC was responsible for research and development, production, and supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed 

Forces in quantities and types specified by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. Quantities and types of weapons were described in the 

Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum, signed jointly by the 

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy 

Commission, and approved by the President. The AEC, in association with the DOD, also was responsible for providing field 

nuclear test facilities in the Continental United States and 

overseas. 

The principal points of field coordination between the AEC 

and the DOD were at NV00 in Las Vegas and at NTS. From the 

beginning of the DOD underground nuclear weapons effects test 

program (the first test was HARD HAT in February 1962) until the 

present, Field Command (or Test Command) was the fielding agency 

for DOD-DNA and served as primary point of contact with AEC/NVOO. 

AEC/NVOO and its predecessors represented AEC in the field for 

all Continental tests. The AEC nuclear weapons development 

laboratories fielded underground tests as part of the weapons 

development program; DNA fielded underground tests at NTS to 

obtain weapons effects data. Because the NTS was an AEC installation, the Manager, NVOO, was responsible for all operations 

there. 

For each DOD-sponsored test, HQ/DNA coordinated requirements 

with the military services. Requirements for testing to determine the nuclear vulnerability or hardening of military systems 

or components were submitted by these organizations. As part of 

long-range underground nuclear weapons effects test planning, 

HQ/DNA developed a schedule of specific events designed to 

satisfy military requirements. One or more of the DOD agencies 

29 
were cosponsors and, usually, active participants in each DOD 

underground test. The initial approval of DOD experiments and 

the selection of the nuclear source (device) for each test was 

accomplished at the HQ/DNA level. A request for the appropriate 

nuclear device and associated support was forwarded by HQ/DNA to 

the Director, Division of Military Application, AEC. The AEC assigned one or more of the weapons development laboratories to 

provide the device support. 

Following initial planning, the responsibility for detailed 

planning, engineering, fielding, execution, and reporting was assigned to FC/DNA. Field Command formed a Test Group staff for 

each test. The Technical Director (normally a military officer 

assigned to FC/DNA or AFWL) was appointed by HQ/DNA. The Test 

Group Director and other members of the staff were appointed by 

FC/DNA. The Test Group Engineer normally was selected from Field 

Command Test Construdtion (FCTC), Nevada Branch. 

The Test Group staff developed detailed test plans and 

schedules. Engineering and construction plans were developed by 

Nevada Branch and coordinated with NTSO. Final engineering designs were developed by AEC contractors at NTS - Holmes & Narver, 

Inc. (H&N), and/or Fenix & Scisson, Inc. (F&S). Engineering 

drawings were approved by FCTC and NTSO prior to actual construction. Construction was performed by the principal AEC support 

contractor - Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. (REECo). 

FCTC and members of the Test Group staff monitored construction 

activities. The FC/DNA Test Group staff coordinated development 

of technical experiments and initiated action to obtain required 

support equipment (e.g., steel LOS pipe and mechanical closures). 

The Test Group staff reviewed the technical support requirements 

submitted by experimenter agencies and transmitted consolidated 

requirements to Nevada Branch which, in turn, advised the NTSO of 

future requirements. 

30 
During the construction phase, Nevada Branch began collecting containment-related information. During drilling or mining 

operations, rock cores were analyzed for bulk density, moisture 

content, grain density, porosity (determined by the difference 

between bulk and grain densities), unconfined compressive 

strength, triaxial compression (for a variety of confining 

pressures), ultrasonic shear and compressive wave velocities, 

carbon dioxide content, presence of clay which could swell, and 

other features. Testing was done for DNA primarily by the H&N 

Testing Lab at NTS (Mercury) and Terra Tek, a DNA contractor 

located at Salt Lake City, Utah, as part of the DNA containment 

research program. 

Geologic features of the tunnels were examined and mapped as 

construction progressed, usually by an AEC contractor. Several 

months prior to planned event execution, FC/DNA prepared a 

document which contained a general description of the test, site 

geologic information, types and locations of mechanical closures, 

details of concrete plugs, a summary of analytical calculations, 

and other related test history. This document was reviewed by 

Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP, see section 2.1.3) members and 

formally presented by FC/DNA to the CEP for categorization and 

recommendation for execution. 

The FC/DNA Test Group staff normally moved to NTS a few 

months prior to the planned event execution date (three to six 

months depending upon the complexity of the test). Prior to 

arrival of DOD experimenter personnel, Nevada Branch made 

arrangements to provide required instrumentation and recording 

facilities, office space and equipment, communications equipment, 

vehicles, photographic, and other support items. Housing and 

food services for DOD personnel at NTS were provided by REECo. 

Upon arrival at NTS, DOD personnel were briefed on safety and 

security by the Test Group staff and other DOD and AEC personnel. 

Experimenter agencies were provided with copies of FC/DNA 

31 
security and safety plans. These briefings included radiation 

safety control policies, procedures, and equipment. 

Under the supervision of the Test Group staff, experimenter 

personnel installed experiments and checked out instrumentation 

cables and recording systems. A series of electrical dry runs 

were conducted from the user laboratory control room and DNA 

monitor room at the Control Point (CP) complex (see 1.5) to 

determine that all signals and remotely-controlled equipment were 

functioning properly. After all systems were declared ready, 

permission was requested from the AEC to install the nuclear 

device. Installation and check out were conducted by the 

participating device development laboratory with AEC security 

safeguarding the device and other classified materials. The next 

activities consisted of placing stemming materials in preplanned 

locations and checking all containment features. 

When the test facility was ready for event execution, 

control of the entire test and experiment area was transferred to 

the AEC/NVOO Test Controller and his staff. When the Test 

Controller was satisfied that all conditions were satisfactory to 

detonate the device, he gave permission to the user laboratory to 

arm the device and initiated the final countdown. 

The Test Controller and his staff at the CP 

countdown, detonation, and postevent response 

monitored the 

of remotely 

controlled radiation monitoring equipment. When released by the 

Test Controller, REECo Radiological Safety (Radsafe) teams 

entered the area to monitor for radiation and other safety hazards. After assurance that reentry could be accompl.ished, the 

Test Controller released experimenters to collect recorded data 

from surface areas. All of these operations were conducted in 

accordance with preevent plans developed by the AEC Test Controller staff, the DOD test group staff, and Nevada Branch 

personnel, unless postevent conditions required modifications. 

32 
For tunnel events, initial reentry into the tunnel was 

authorized by the AEC Test Controller after he determined that 

conditions were safe for reentry operations. Tunnel reentry was 

controlled by Nevada Branch personnel with assistance from Sandia 

Laboratories, Albuquerque (SLA), health physicists, REECo Radsafe 

personnel, and REECo construction personnel. After the tunnel 

was declared safe for experiment recovery, the Test Group staff 

assumed control of the area. Based on REECo Radsafe monitoring 

data, FC/DNA personnel determined when it was safe to remove the 

experiments. Experimenters then removed experiments for analysis 

and documentation of results. 

1.4 AEC ORGANIZATIONS, CONTRACTORS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

1.4.1 Atomic Energy Commission 

The AEC was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 in 

July, the same month the Joint Chiefs of Staff were conducting 

Operation CROSSROADS with assistance from the U.S. Army's 

Manhattan Engineer District. MED was disestablished and the AEC 

and AFSWP assumed MED functions on 1 January 1947. The Atomic 

Energy Act was revised in 1954 and has been amended extensively 

since. 

The AEC established headquarters (AEC/HQ) offices in Washington, DC, and operations offices in areas which were centers of 

AEC operations. In areas of lesser activity, area offices, 

branch offices, and field offices were established. The Director 

of the Division of Military Application (DMA) in AEC/HQ was 

delegated responsibility for the nuclear weapons development and 

testing program. The Director of DMA was always a flag officer 

of one of the armed forces, as specified by the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954, and he was an Assistant General Manager in the AEC 

organization. 

33 
In 1951, the Director of DMA designated and delegated his 

responsibility for conduct of on-continent tests to the Test 

Manager who also was Manager of the AEC Santa Fe Operations 

Office (SFOO) near Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Later in 

1951, SF00 was moved to Albuquerque. With delegated authority 

from the Director of DMA, the Manager, SFOO, designated Test 

Managers for on-continent tests. The same authority applied when 

SF00 became the Albuquerque Operations Office (ALOO) in 1956. 

The AEC Las Vegas Field Office (LVFO), established in 1951, 

managed the Nevada Test Site (called the Nevada Proving Ground 

from 1952 to 1955) for the Test Manager. LVFO became a Branch 

Office in 1955, an Area Office in 1960, and the Nevada Operations 

Office (NVOO) in 1962, with the Manager, NVOO, or his representative designated as Test Manager. In 1972, the Test Manager 

became the Test Controller. 

The Director of DMA initiated the chain of authority and 

approval for detonating each nuclear device by requesting that 

each user laboratory and DNA submit proposed test programs to 

DMA. This request was made in the spring of each year for tests 

to be conducted in the next fiscal year. DMA consolidated 

proposed test programs, developed a test program proposal while 

consulting with DOD, and generated a program approval request. 

DMA then presented the proposed test program to the National 

Security Council (NSC) Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Testing. 

Chaired by the NSC, this committee included representatives of 

the DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of State, Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Office 

of Science and Technology, and Central Intelligence Agency. After incorporating informal Committee comments, DMA forwarded the 

proposed program from the Secretary of Energy to the President 

through the NSC. The NSC solicited and incorporated formal comments in its recommendation to the President. 

34 
Test program approvals were requested at six-month intervals. Approval of tests for the first six months was received 

at the beginning of each fiscal year. The process was repeated 

six months later for tests in the last half of the fiscal year. 

Presidential approvals were signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Subsequently, test program 

authority messages were sent from the Director of DMA to the 

device development (user) laboratories, DNA, and AEC/NVOO. 

Authority to detonate each nuclear device was handled 

separately and individually. The technical content of detonation 

authority requests originated in presentations to the CEP by the 

user laboratory or DNA. After recommendations by the CEP, the 

Manager, NVOO, requested detonation authority from DMA. Required 

information in each request included statements on compliance 

with treaties, environmental impact, public announcement plans, 

test program authority, and any particularly noteworthy aspects 

of the test. After DMA and additional AEC reviews, the Manager, 

NVOO, was notified of detonation authority approval. 

The Manager, AEC/NVOO, was named the Test Controller in 

1972, and he or the representative he designated as Test 

Controller was responsible for conducting each test event in this 

volume. The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) 

succeeded the AEC on January 19, 1975. The DINING CAR event (see 

Chapter 8 of this volume) was conducted by ERDA. 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization 

As stated in Chapter 0101 of the Nevada Test Site Organization Standard Operating Procedure (NTSO SOP) Chapter 0101-01 

(see Appendix E), the NTSO included AEC, DOD, user laboratory, 

contractor, agency, and organizational personnel who participated 

in or provided support for test operations at the NTS. The 

Manager, NVOO, headed the NTSO. (Figure 1.3) The NTSO was a 

35 
NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NEVADA TEST SITE USERS 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 

Sandia Laboratories 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

1 JOINT OFFICE OF INFORMATION &-- 

OFFICE OF SITE ttAUAGEf 

Site Manager 

Deputy Site Manager 

Deputy Site Manager 

for Operations 

Deputy - Military 

Matters 

AEC LOGISTICAL PROGRAM 

DIRECTOR, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

Construction, camp maintenance and 

operation, industrial safety, housing, 

feeding, recreation, work space, 

utilities, transportation, comnunications, law enforcement, fire protection and personnel service. 

OPERATIONS CONTROL GROUP 

I 

AEC OPERATIONAL PROGRAM 

DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL SUPPOR'T 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

Implementation and coordination of 

technical support and of operational 

plans, area controls, reports and 

safety-related group activities, as 

directed by the Site Manager and Test 

Controller. 

CORTROL POINT COORDIIIATOR 

Assures the availability 

in the OCC of facilities 

and equipment for the 

control and coordination 

of NTS operational activities. Serves as Control 

Point Administrator. 

TEST OPERATIONS OFFICER 

Supervises preparation of the Test 

Controller's Operations Plan which 

includes proposed Area Control, 

Schedule of Events, Special Instructions, Air Operations Plan and 

other required plans as directed. 

Coordinates with the Control Point 

Coordinator in obtaining assistance in preparation of test execution reports. Implements and supervises execution of Operations Plan 

for the Test Controller as directed. 

Designated for each test or special 

experimental effort. Assumes operational control of NTS when directed 

by Manager, NVOO. 

Figure 1.3 Nevada Test Site Organization (1972) 

TEST LIAISON OFFICER 

Provides oral comnunication of test related 

operational information 

between the Control 

Point and Headquarters 

Atomic Energy Cowission 

during the test execution net-in& 

SPECIAL STAFF 

Specialists to make predictions 

and coordinate field activities in 

the following areas: 

Device Safety - Representative 

Security 

Meteorology 

- Representative 

- Representative 

Radiation Safety - Representative 

Environmental 

Program - Representative 

Seismic Program - Representative 
continuing task organization whose composition could be readily 

changed in response to the needs and technical objectives of,each 

test. The Continental Test Organization (CTO) was part of the 

original NTSO; however, it was disestablished on 1 August 1962 

with its responsibilities (e.g., Military Deputy to the Manager, 

NVOO) being assumed by FC/DASA, WETG and subsequently by FC/DNA, 

Test Directorate. The Military Deputy to the Test Manager, as 

shown in Figure 1.3, was from Field Command and was responsible 

for coordinating DOD programs and support to NTSO. 

1.4.3 NTSO Radiological Safety 

The Test Controller was responsible for protection of participating personnel and offsite populations from radiation 

hazards associated with activities conducted at NTS. By mutual 

agreement between the Test Manager and a scientific user (see 

section 1.4.4), control of radiation safety within the area 

assigned for a particular activity was delegated to the user's 

Test Group Director during the period of time when such control 

could have had a direct bearing on the success or failure of the 

scientific program. 

The onsite radiological safety support contractor (Radsafe) 

was responsible to the Test Manager for both routine and test 

event radiological safety onsite as detailed in Appendix D, USAEC 

NTSO SOP Chapter 0524, "Radiological Safety." During test 

events, as shown in Figure I of Appendix D and as discussed 

above, the Test Manager delegated control of radiation safety in 

the immediate test area to the user Test Group Director when the 

Director requested control. When this occurred, Radsafe was 

responsible to the Test Group Director through his radiological 

safety organization for support in his test area. 

37 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was responsible to the Test Manager for operation of the offsite radiological safety program in accordance with procedures listed in 

Appendix D. 

1.4.4 NTS Scientific Users 

The NTS scientific users were DNA (for nuclear weapons 

effects) and the development laboratories: Los Alamos Scientific 

Laboratory (LASL), Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL), and 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque (SLA). LASL and LLL were 

primarily involved in testing for weapons development while SLA 

conducted a limited number of weapons effects tests and supported 

weapons development tests. A brief description of these 

laboratories follows: 

A. LASL was established early in 1943 as Los Alamos, 

Project Y, of the MED for the specific purpose of developing an atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists supervised the test detonation of the world's first atomic 

weapon in July 1945 at the TRINITY site in New Mexico. 

Los Alamos became LASL in January 1947, when the AEC and 

AFSWP were activated to replace the MED. The Laboratory's continuing assignment was to conceive, design, 

test, and develop nuclear components of atomic weapons. 

The contract under which LASL performed work for the AEC 

was administered first by the Commission's Santa Fe Operations Office and later by the Albuquerque Operations 

Office. The Laboratory was operated by the University 

of California. 

B. LLL (originally the University of California Radiation 

Laboratory and then the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory) 

was established as a second AEC weapons laboratory at 

Livermore, California, in 1952. The Laboratory's 

38 
responsibilities essentially were parallel to those of 

LASL. Devices developed by LLL first were tested in 

Nevada in 1953, and LLL-developed devices were tested in 

each Continental and Pacific series since. The contract 

under which LLL performed work for the AEC was 

administered by the AEC San Francisco Operations Office. 

This Laboratory also was operated by the University of 

California. 

C. SLA at Sandia Base (now KAFB), Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

was the AX's other weapons laboratory. It was established in 1946 as a branch of Los Alamos, but in 1949 

assumed its identity as a full-fledged weapons research 

institution operated by the Sandia Corporation, a nonprofit subsidiary of Western Electric. SLA's role was 

to conceive, design, test, and develop the non-nuclear 

phases of atomic weapons and to do other work in related 

fields. In 1956, a Livermore Branch of Sandia Laboratories was established to provide closer support to 

developmental work of the LLL. Sandia Laboratories also 

operated ballistic test facilities for the AEC at the 

Tonopah Ballistics Range (now Tonopah Test Range) near 

Tonopah, Nevada. 

1.4.5 Test Support Organizations 

In keeping with its policy, the AEC used private contractors 

for maintenance, operations, and construction (including military 

and civil defense construction) at the NTS. NV00 personnel 

administered all housekeeping, construction, and related services 

activity, but performance was by contractors. Major support 

contractors were the following: 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., was the 

principal AEC operational and support contractor for the 

39 
NTS, providing electrical and architectural engineering, 

state-of-the-art large diameter and conventional shaft 

drilling, heavy-duty construction and excavation, mining and 

tunneling, occupational safety and fire protection, radiological safety, toxic gas and explosive mixture monitoring, 

communications and electronics, power distribution, occupational medicine, and other support functions. REECo maintained offices in Las Vegas and extensive facilities necessary to operate NTS. 

Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., of Boston, Massachusetts, was the principal technical contractor, providing 

control point functions such as timing and firing, and 

diagnostic functions such as scientific photography and 

measurement of detonation characteristics. In addition, 

EGbG personnel manned the DOD monitor room. EG&G support 

facilities were maintained in Las Vegas and at NTS. 

Holmes & Narver, Inc., performed architect/engineer services 

for the NTS and was the principal su;?port contractor for the 

Commission's off-continent operations. H&N had a home office in the Los Angeles area, and also maintained offices in 

Las Vegas and at NTS. 

Since 1963, Fenix & Scisson, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma, was a 

consultant architect/engineer for drilling and mining operations in connection with underground nuclear testing. The 

company was involved in design of many underground structures and in the field of deep, large-diameter, hole drilling. Las Vegas Branch activity was conducted from offices 

in Las Vegas and Mercury, Nevada. 

Numerous other contractors, selected on the basis of lumpsum competitive bids, performed various construction and other 

support functions for the AEC and the DOD. 

40 
1.5 THE NEVADA TEST SITE 

An on-continent location was selected for conducting nuclear 

weapons tests; construction began at what was called the Nevada 

Test Site in December 1950, and testing began in January 1951. 

The name was changed to the Nevada Proving Ground (NPG) in March 

of 1952 and again changed to the Nevada Test Site in 1955. 

The original boundaries were expanded as new testing areas 

and projects were added. Figure 1.4 shows the present NTS 

location bounded on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Range. 

NTS encompassed about 1,350 square miles in 1975. This testing 

location was selected for both safety and security reasons. The 

arid climate, lack of industrialization, and exclusion of the 

public from the Nellis Air Force Range resulted in a very low 

population density in the area around NTS. 

The only paved roads within the NTS and Nellis Air Force 

Range complex were those constructed by the government for access 

purposes. NTS testing areas were physically protected by surrounding rugged topography. The few mountain passes and dry 

washes where four-wheel drive vehicles might enter were posted 

with warning signs and barricades. NTS security force personnel 

patrolled perimeter and barricade areas in aircraft and vehicles. 

Thus, unauthorized entry to NTS was difficult, and the possibility of a member of the public inadvertently entering an NTS testing area was extremely remote. 

Figure 1.5 shows the NTS, its various area designations, and 

the locations of the six test events covered by this volume. In 

a location designation such as "U12n.07," the "U" signifies an 

underground location, "12" identifies the area at NTS, " n " 

denotes the tunnel, and "07" indicates the number of the drift. 

41 
MAP 

NTS 

‘BEArTY+ I I 

LiTHAOPv 

WELL_S 

\ 

CALIENTE / 

Figure 1.4 Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada 

42 
ADDENDUM 

For 

DNA 6324F 

OPERATIONS TOGGLE, ARBOR, & BEDROCK 

EVENTS: DIAMOND SCULLS, DID0 QUEEN, HUSKY ACE, MING BLADE, HYBLA FAIR & 

DINING CAR - 20 July 1972 - 5 April 1975 

Enclosed, for your convenience, is an enlargement of Figure 1.5 The Nevada 

Test Site. Please insert before page 43 of your report. 



A low mountain range separated the base camp, Mercury, from 

the location of early AEC and DOD atmospheric tests at Frenchman 

Flat in Area 5. Frenchman Flat also was later used for DOD 

underground testing. The elevation of Frenchman Dry Lake in the 

middle of the Flat is about 3,100 feet. 

A mountain pass separates Frenchman Flat from Yucca Flat 

testing areas. The pass overlooks both Frenchman and Yucca Flats 

and contains the CP complex of buildings including Control Point 

Building 1 (CP-1) where timing and firing for most atmospheric 

tests were performed, and Control Point Building 2 (CP-2) where 

radiological safety support was based. 

Yucca Flat testing areas include Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 

and 10. Underground tests were conducted in some of these areas 

and generally were shaft emplacement types. The elevation of 

Yucca Dry Lake at the south end of Yucca Flat is about 3,900 

feet. To the west of Yucca Flat, in another basin, is the Area 

18 testing location. Some DOD atmospheric tests were conducted 

in Area 18, and one DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted 

on Buckboard Mesa in this area at an elevation of about 5,500 

feet. Area 16 is in the mountains west of Yucca Flat toward Area 

18. The single Area 16 tunnel complex (at an elevation of about 

5,400 feet) was a DOD underground testing location. 

Rainier Mesa is in Area 12, northwest of Yucca Flat. The 

top of the Mesa is at an elevation of about 7,500 feet. All DOD 

tunnel-type emplacement events on NTS that were not in the Area 

16 tunnel complex or the Area 15 shaft and tunnel complex were in 

Rainier Mesa and the adjoining Pahute Mesa. (Parts of T tunnel 

were constructed in the adjoining Pahute Mesa.) The major 

Rainier Mesa tunnel complexes were B, E, G, N, and T tunnels. 

Area 15 is in the foothills at the north end of Yucca Flat. 

The deeper of the two access shafts drops 1,500 feet below the 

44 
surface elevation of 5,100 feet. There were three events 

conducted in Area 15, all sponsored by DOD. HARD HAT and TINY 

TOT were discussed in Report DNA 6320F, Operations NOUGAT and 

WHETSTONE, while PILE DRIVER was discussed in Report DNA 6321F, 

Operations FLINTLOCK and LATCHKEY. 

45 
CHAPTER 2 

UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

Underground tests conducted at the NTS prior to 1962 were 

primarily for weapons development or were safety tests. These 

tests were controlled by the AEC and conducted by LASL or LLL. 

Experience gained in the area of containment of radioactivity 

underground during these tests provided the basic concepts for 

the development of containment plans for the DOD/DNA sponsored 

underground nuclear weapons effects tests which followed. These 

DOD tests were generally more complex than earlier AEC tests and 

required the development of new containment concepts and hardware. 

A primary consideration in all underground tests was the 

safety of test participants and the general public, especially 

regarding exposures to radioactive materials. This chapter 

discusses, in general terms, the basic mechanics of underground 

testing, containment and procedures, types of emplacement, 

diagnostic techniques, area access requirements, industrial and 

radiological safety, and radiation measuring systems. 

2.1 CONTAINMENT, PROBLEMS, AND PROCEDURES 

Completely containing radioactive material underground while 

accomplishing diagnostic measurements and effects experiments 

proved to be a major engineering challenge. Original efforts 

considered only detonation containment in competent rock formations. It was necessary to modify the original efforts to consider zones of weakness in rock caused by faults and containment 

failures resulting from diagnostic and experiment structures. 

Under certain conditions, particularly the presence of clay or a 

46 
high water content in the rock near the detonation point, greater 

than normal stresses could be generated and these stresses could 

adversely affect containment. Some containment failures were 

partially attributable to additional overpressure from secondary 

gas expansion, i.e., steam pressure. The major containment 

features and problems that evolved are discussed below. 

2.1.1 Vertical Shaft Containment 

Some of the first shaft-type safety experiments were in 

unstemmed shafts with concrete plugs penetrated by cable and 

instrumentation holes. When nuclear yields were produced, these 

emplacements did not completely contain the radioactive debris. 

The first method used to fully contain nuclear detonations in 

shafts was stemming, e.g., filling the shaft with aggregate and 

sand after device emplacement. 

Keyed concrete plugs at different depths in the shaft stemming sometimes were used. The shaft diameter was enlarged at the 

plug construction location so the poured concrete plug would key 

into the ground surrounding the shaft and provide more strength 

against containment failure. Combinations of concrete and epoxy 

were used later, and epoxy replaced concrete as a plug material 

for some shaft-type emplacements. 

Radiochemical sampling pipes, LOS pipes, and other openings 

in stemming and plug containment features had to be closed 

rapidly after the detonation to prevent venting of radioactive 

effluent to the atmosphere. Closure systems driven by high 

explosives or compressed air were developed to seal the openings. 

After some of these early systems did not prevent releases of 

effluent to the atmosphere, use of openings to the surface for 

diagnostic or experiment purposes was discontinued for several 

years until technology improved. 

47 
Scientific and other cables from the device emplacement to 

the surface were another source of containment problems. While 

cables could be embedded in concrete and epoxy, which helped 

prevent leakage along the outside of the cables, radioactive 

gases under high pressure traveled along the inside of cables as 

a conduit to the surface. This problem was solved by embedding 

the inner components of cables in epoxy at appropriate locations 

(such as in concrete plugs) in a technique called gas blocking. 

The most serious containment problems were caused by unanticipated geologic and hydrologic conditions at particular test locations. Even careful and rigorous calculations, engineering, 

construction, and preparations were inadequate when the presence 

of a geologic zone of weakness near the detonation point toward 

the surface was unknown. 

Another similar problem was the presence of higher water 

content than anticipated in rock formations surrounding or near 

the detonation point. This problem caused greater shock transmission plus secondary gas expansion when the water turned to 

steam. In addition, presence of sufficient iron in the test 

configuration caused the disassociation of water with subsequent 

greater secondary gas expansion from hydrogen gas. A result was 

much higher and longer sustained pressure from the detonation 

point toward the surface, and possible subsequent failure of 

geologic or constructed containment mechanisms. 

Recognizing and understanding geologic and hydrologic conditions at each test location was necessary before these containment problems could be solved. As additional information became 

available through drilling and intensive geologic studies, these 

problems were lessened by investigations of proposed detonation 

locations and application of detailed site selection criteria. 

48 
2.1.2 Tunnel-Type Containment 

As with shaft-type detonations, containment methods used for 

tunnel events were designed keeping basic characteristics of a 

nuclear detonation in mind. Tunnel configurations were constructed with device emplacements strategically located to cause 

sealing of the access tunnel by force of the detonation. Additional containment features were used to contain radioactive 

debris. 

One of the original user laboratory stemming configurations 

consisted of one or more sandbag plugs installed a short distance 

from the projected self-sealing location toward the tunnel entrance (portal). Two plugs, each about 60 feet in length, were a 

typical installation. The sandbag plugs were later changed to 

solid sand backfill plugs several hundreds of feet long from the 

device location. In many cases, the sand stemming had short sections of air voids between the plugs. Closer to the portal a 

keyed concrete plug with a metal blast door was constructed. The 

blast door was designed to contain any gases [with pressures up 

to 75 pounds per square inch (psi11 that might penetrate the 

sandbag plugs. 

Also as with shaft-type detonations, the unknown presence of 

undesirable geologic and hydrologic conditions sometimes caused 

venting of radioactive effluent either through the overburden 

(rock above the tunnel) to the surface, through fissures opened 

between the detonation point and the main tunnel, or through the 

plugs and blast door to the main tunnel vent holes and portal. 

More substantial containment features evolved as containment 

problems became better understood and tunnel events became more 

complex. 

The first DOD tunnel test was MARSHMALLOW (1962). Stemming 

for that event consisted of four sandbag plugs extending out to a 

49 
distance of a few hundred feet from the nuclear device (similar 

to earlier AEC-sponsored events). A gas seal door (blast door) 

was installed in the main access drift. The next DOD tunnel test 

used sand backfill (with a few air gaps) out to a few hundred 

feet. As DOD tunnel testing continued, sand plugs gradually were 

replaced with various grout mixtures. Some grout mixtures were 

designed to match the strength and shock propagation of the 

native tunnel material (usually ash-fall tuff), while other grout 

mixtures were designed to be weaker and to form a solid stemming 

plug shortly after device detonation. 

Also, as tunnel testing continued, the gas seal (blast) door 

no longer was used as a containment device and was augmented by 

strong concrete plugs 10 to 20 feet long between the door and the 

zero point. These plugs were keyed into the tunnel wall and were 

designed to withstand overpressures up to 1000 psi. Some of the 

plugs were penetrated with electrical cables and steel pipes, and 

a small access hatch was constructed. All of these penetrations 

were gas sealed (or capped) to provide protection against 

possible gas seepage through the plug. 

Use of horizontal line-of-sight (HLOS) pipes in tunnel 

events necessitated development of additional closure systems. 

The HLOS pipe tunnel and its access tunnels generally were separated from the main tunnel by one or more concrete plugs. The 

additional closure systems primarily were for protection of the 

experiments inside the HLOS pipe, but they also were considered 

useful features for the formation of a stemming plug. 

The tunnel volume outside of the pipe was filled by stemming 

or grouting, while the experiments inside the HLOS pipe were protected by mechanical closure systems. Various closure systems 

were used, including compressed air or explosive-driven gates and 

doors which closed off the HLOS pipe from the detonation within a 

small fraction of a second after detonation time. One of these 

50 
mechanical closures was the tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS) unit, 

first used on the DOOR MIST event. The TAPS was a heavy steel 

door that was released at shot time and fell to the closed 

position in less than one second. 

Gas blocking techniques similar to those used in shaft 

events were used to prevent leakage of radioactive gases along or 

through cables from the diagnostic and experiment locations to 

the surface. Additionally, a gas seal door usually was installed 

in the main drift nearer the portal than the concrete plug. 

Utility pipes, such as for compressed air, that passed through 

stemming and plugs also were sealed by closure systems. 

2.1.3 Containment Evaluation Panel 

When containment problems were particularly difficult, the 

AEC began to change its emphasis on conditions under which 

nuclear detonations should be conducted. 

AEC had primary responsibility for the underground containment of radioactivity from underground tests. Containment of DOD 

tests was a joint effort on the part of AEC, DOD, and contractor 

scientists and engineers. To carry out this responsibility, 

AEC/NVOO established a Test Evaluation Panel (TEP) on 17 December 

1963 to review plans for each test as presented by user testing 

organizations for each test program. The chairman of this panel 

represented the Manager, NVOO, and membership consisted of two 

representatives (one voting member plus an alternate) from each 

of the user testing organizations (LASL, LLL, SL, and FC/DNA) 

plus specialists from contractor and other government organizations such as the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Other AEC/NVOO 

contractor personnel were available to present information in 

their areas of expertise (e.g., mining and drilling operations). 

51 
On 19 March 1971, while testing was suspended because containment failure had caused serious venting of a laboratory test 

(BANEBERRY Event), the TEP was changed to the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP). The CEP was instructed to give increased 

emphasis to containment of radioactive material, and the panel 

membership was enlarged by the addition of a hydrologist, a 

scientist with expertise in underground nuclear phenomonology 

(both selected by the Manager, AEC/NVOO), and advisors from 

organizations representing additional areas of expertise. These 

permanent advisors were representatives of the EPA, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Air Resources Laboratory 

(NOAA/ARL), and REECo. Each underground testing organization was 

represented as before. 

Prior to a formal meeting of the CEP, each user planning a 

nuclear test'prepared written documents describing their proposed 

tests, with particular emphasis on containment considerations, 

and submitted these documents to each panel member for review. 

This information then was presented by the individual users to 

the CEP, generally at the following meeting (meetings were held 

about ten times a year), Details of containment plans were 

reviewed and comparisons to previous successful experiences were 

reviewed by the CEP. Each CEP member (or alternate) was 

requested to submit a written statement describing the details 

considered favorable or unfavorable to successful containment. 

Evaluations to estimate the probability of successful containment conformed to specific guidance from the DMA at AEC/HQ. 

Each CEP member used this guidance to categorize each test as one 

of the following: 

CATEGORY I 

Underground nuclear tests which, on the basis of 

experience and judgment, will be contained satisfactorily. 

52 
CATEGORY II 

Underground nuclear tests which are designed to be 

contained satisfactorily but which, in the judgment of 

the CEP, cannot be assigned to Category I because of 

location, configuration or other factors. It is 

expected that experiments in this category will require 

special consideration and approval before being 

conducted. 

CATEGORY III 

Underground nuclear tests which are expected to release 

a significant amount of radioactive material. 

Experiments in this category will require special 

consideration and approval before being conducted. 

A written report on each CEP meeting, containing the statement of each panel member and consultant, was forwarded to AEC/HQ 

for review and recommendations for approval to execute each 

event. 

2.1.4 Test Manager's Advisory Panel 

Careful consideration of each test event by the CEP to avoid 

releases of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere was followed 

by additional precautions prior to test event execution. If an 

unanticipated release of effluent from an underground detonation 

occurred, it was necessary to assure protection of onsite participants and the offsite population. The Test Manager's Advisory 

Panel was composed of a Scientific Advisor and representatives 

from each organization which could contribute information to this 

protection goal. 

This panel met at readiness briefings in advance of each 

53 
event and in the Control Room prior to and during execution of 

each event. Panel members briefed the Test Controller on aspects 

of test activities and meteorological conditions which he 

considered in his decision on when a test should or should not be 

conducted. Information presented by the panel included the 

status of test participants in the test area. In particular, 

permission to arm and detonate the nuclear device was not given 

until all participants not at approved manned stations were clear 

of the controlled test area. 

Weather conditions were considered in detail. Wind speeds 

and directions at increasing altitudes above ground were measured 

with weather balloons at stations around NTS, both preceding and 

during each test, to calculate and present information on where 

an unanticipated release of effluent might be transported off 

NTS, and what the levels of radiation might be in the predicted 

effluent cloud directions. 

Locations of population centers, locations of each dairy 

cow, and numbers of people at ranches and mines in the projected 

effluent cloud directions were presented and evaluated. EPA 

personnel in offsite areas notified mining people to be above 

ground for safety purposes at the anticipated detonation time of 

each test which might cause a ground shock hazard. This information and numbers of people who might need to be advised to 

stay under cover or be evacuated were presented for consideration. EPA personnel started offsite air samplers and placed 

radiation dosimeters in offsite locations before detonation time. 

Readiness information included capability for advising state 

officials to institute a milk diversion program if cattle feed or 

milk might become contaminated, and capability to replace milk 

and dry feed for localized family dairy cows. 

54 
Status of standby aircraft for effluent cloud sampling and 

tracking was presented. Communications between offsite weather 

stations and EPA personnel were checked to assure proper 

operation. 

Radsafe personnel onsite assured that remote radiation monitoring stations in the test area and in other NTS areas were 

functional. Data from these stations, the weather stations, offsite EPA personnel, and personnel clearing the test area were 

displayed in the Control Room for continued visual examination by 

the Test Controller and the Advisory Panel. In addition, closedcircuit television cameras were operational in the test area on 

the ground and in helicopters to detect any visual indications of 

possible effluent release and provide capability for immediate 

response action by the Test Controller and the Advisory Panel 

members. 

If the Test Controller decided that the projected effluent 

direction was close to populated areas, or weather conditions 

were not stable enough to determine the direction of any released 

effluent after detonation, the approval to arm and detonate was 

not given, and the test was either postponed for another day or 

placed on hold until conditions were favorable. 

Conditions were considered favorable when projected effluent 

direction was toward sparsely populated areas, weather conditions 

were relatively stable, EPA personnel could contact the few 

residents in the projected effluent direction, and impact on milk 

supply from dairy cattle would be minimal. In addition, all 

essential equipment, personnel, and procedures were required to 

be in readiness status or to have been initiated before 

permission to arm and detonate was given. 

Permission to arm usually was given at least two hours before detonation to allow time for arming, securing of the test 

55 
configuration and containment systems, and departure of the arming party from the test area. The detonation, however, could be 

delayed at any moment up to detonation time, or postponed until 

another day when conditions were favorable. 

The Test Controller and Advisory Panel received information, 

watched visible displays, and communicated with their field 

personnel up to and after detonation for a sufficient time to 

assure that venting had not occurred. Remote radiation detection 

instrument readings and closed-circuit television of the test 

area were monitored to detect any indication of effluent release. 

When all other indications of venting were negative and the 

Test Controller decided personnel could approach the test 

location, (e.g., subsidence craters had formed for shaft-type 

detonations, and cavity collapse had occurred for tunnel-type 

emplacements, as indicated by geophones) initial radiation survey 

teams entered the test area to assure that effluent had not been 

released or that any radiation levels were low enough for 

experiment data recovery to begin. For tunnel-type tests, 

reentry of the tunnel itself, after initial survey of surface 

areas and recovery of data, was a matter for separate and careful 

consideration by the Test Group Director and radiological safety 

personnel. 

2.1.5 Effluent Release Procedures 

If radioactive effluent were to be released from an underground test event, established procedures were initiated in accordance with NTSO 0524, "Radiological Safety" (see Appendix D), 

"Protection of Participating Personnel and Off-Site Population 

from Radiation Hazards Associated with Activities Conducted at 

the NTS." Immediately upon detection of possible venting and 

effluent release after a detonation, the following procedures 

were initiated: 

56 
A. For some tests, Radsafe survey teams were at manned 

stations in the test area. These teams, or t.hose 

standing by outside the cleared area for other tests, 

were released to make radiation measurements to be used 

in determining direction and radiation levels of 

radioactive effluent. 

B. Aircraft were standing by to sample and track the 

effluent. Data reported were used to further refine 

information on effluent direction and radioactivity 

concentrations. 

C. EPA monitors in offsite areas, previously stationed in 

the projected path of any released effluent, were advised of actual effluent direction and radioactivity 

measurement data and directed to move sampling and 

dosimeter equipment, perform ground radiation surveys, 

and notify residents and workers in the effluent path of 

any necessary precautionary measures, such as remaining 

in buildings or evacuating the area temporarily. 

D. Capabilities were held in readiness to advise state officials to implement a milk diversion program. If this 

were necessary, Nevada and neighboring state officials 

could be advised to impound and replace milk supplies 

possibly contaminated through the cattle feed pathway, 

and hold impounded milk for decay of the probable contaminants (radioiodines) before using it for other purposes. On a localized basis, EPA personnel were ready 

to replace family dairy cow milk with fresh milk, and 

analyze milk for concentrations 

elides. Dry feed supplies also 

family dairy cattle if required. 

of specific radionucould be replaced for 

E. Capabilities were in readiness for thyroid monitoring of 

offsite individuals possibly exposed to radioiodines 
from the effluent. Mobile monitoring stations were 

ready to be transported to and used in offsite areas for 

screening measurements to determine if any offsite 

residents or workers exhibited thyroid radioactivity and 

should be transported to Las Vegas facilities for more 

precise thyroid measurements and dose assignment. 

Each of the above procedures was established to avoid or 

minimize exposure of the offsite population and maintain any such 

exposures below the radiation protection standards for individuals and population groups in uncontrolled areas, as established 

in NTSO 0524, "Radiological Safety" (see Appendix D). 

While the above procedures were to be initiated, additional 

onsite procedures also were to be implemented. Radsafe survey 

teams, when released by the Test Controller, surveyed the test 

area in sufficient detail to plot gamma radiation isointensity 

lines on NTS maps and provide specific intensity measurements at 

experiment stations on the surface and at other locations of 

interest. These data were used by the Test Controller in 

releasing personnel to enter radiation areas in the controlled 

area and by the Test Group Director in determining when surveys 

of his immediate test area and recoveries of experiment data 

could be accomplished. These decisions were based on 

calculations of personnel gamma radiation doses from survey data, 

radiation intensities at recovery locations, and estimated times 

in area to assure that exposures would be limited only to those 

necessary and below the standards established in NTSO 0524. 

Some tunnel-type tests that did not result in venting of 

radioactive 

containment 

existed in 

accomplish 

effluent to the atmosphere did have a failure of the 

system within the tunnel. High radiation levels then 

locations that reentry personnel needed to enter to 

data recovery. Procedures developed to minimize 

included the placeat strategic tunnel 

exposures of reentry and recovery personnel 

ment of remote radiation detectors located 

58 
complex locations, tunnel atmosphere remote samplers that removed 

tunnel air to locations outside the tunnel for analysis, and 

tunnel air filters that would allow ventilation of tunnels before 

reentry with only controlled gaseous radionuclide releases to the 

atmosphere. 

Remote monitoring and sampling equipment provided information on radiation levels, toxic gases, and explosive mixtures 

necessary to determine whether tunnel ventilation should be accomplished before reentry. Tunnel ventilation filters stopped 

particulate radioactivity, and activated charcoal in the filters 

absorbed most of the radioiodines, thus allowing primarily only 

radionuclides of noble gases, such as xenon, to be released to 

the atmosphere. (Inhaling radionuclides of noble gases results 

in far less internal exposure than inhaling other fission products.) Release of this radioactive material to the atmosphere 

in a gradual, controlled manner during tunnel ventilation to 

protect reentry personnel was subject to approval by the Test 

Controller. 

2.2 EMPLACEMENT TYPES 

The DOD conducted six underground nuclear tests in this 

report period. Table 2.1 lists the six tunnel-type events during 

Operations TOGGLE, ARBOR, and BEDROCK and pertinent data. This 

emplacement type is discussed in this section along with the 

shaft-type emplacement sometimes used by DOD (but not for events 

in this report). An emplacement type not discussed in this 

volume was one that resulted in the excavating or ejecting of 

material from the ground surface to form a crater (see Crater 

Experiment in the Glossary of Terms). A DOD cratering event, 

DANNY BOY, was conducted in 1962 during Operation NOUGAT. 

59 
Table 2.1 DOD Test Events - 20 JURY 1972 throuqh 5 April 1975 

OPERATION TOGGLE ARBOR BEDROCK 

DATE 

LOCAL TIME (hours) 

NTS LOCATION 

TYPE 

DEPTH (feet) 

YIELD* 

20 Jul 72 6 Jun 73 12 act 73 10 Jun 74 26 act 74 6 76 Apr 

1016 PDT 1000 PDT 1000 PDT 0000 PDT 0700 PST 1246 PDT 

u12t.02 U12e.14 U12n.07 U12n.08 U12n.00 u12e.10 

Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel 

1.391 1.284 1,366 1.276 1.326 1,267 

LOW Low Low Low Low Low 

*LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 
2.2.1 Vertical Shaft-Type Emplacement 

A vertical shaft-type nuclear detonation was intended to be 

contained underground. The shaft was usually drilled, but sometimes mined, and it may have been lined with a steel casing or 

have been uncased. The nuclear device was emplaced at a depth 

calculated to contain the explosion. At detonation time, a 

cavity was formed by vaporized rock. Pressure from the hot gases 

in the cavity held surrounding broken rock in place until the 

cavity area cooled sufficiently to decrease pressure. As broken 

rock fell into the cavity formed by the detonation, a chimney was 

formed. If the chimney of falling rock reached the surface, a 

subsidence crater was formed. Figure 2.1 shows a typical 

subsidence crater. 

If a device was emplaced too deeply in the alluvium of 

Frenchman or Yucca Flat for the detonation yield, or the depth 

was correct but the yield was much less than anticipated, a 

subsidence crater might not form: that is, the chimney might not 

reach the surface. This was a problem during early years of 

underground testing when it was necessary to move drill rigs into 

subsidence craters soon after tests for the purpose of obtaining 

core samples from the bottom of the cavity. If a subsidence 

crater did not form, drill rigs could not be moved to surface 

ground zero (SGZ). When directional drilling from outside the 

crater was implemented, lack of a subsidence crater in alluvium 

became less of a problem. Experience gained with depth of device 

burial also reduced the chance of subsidence craters not forming 

in alluvium. 

Each vertical shaft-type underground test conducted by DOD 

included a vertical line-of-sight (VLOS) pipe system to the surface and a mobile tower on the surface that contained the weapons 

effects experiments (see Figure 2.2). The VLOS pipe system contained several mechanical closures designed to prevent the release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These closures were 

61 

~ 

EFFECTS 

EXPERIMENT 

IN MOBILE TOWER I 

PIPE SYSTEM 

ECHANICAL CLOSURES 

WALL OF DRILL HOLE 

STEMMING MATERIALS USUALLY STEEL CASED) 

NOTE: 

NOT J-0 SC ALE 

Si MECHANICAL closures 

Figure 2.2 Vertical LOS Pipe Configuration 

63 
open at the time of detonation but closed within milliseconds to 

stop the flow of material up the pipe. The open volume between 

the VLOS pipe and the wall of the drill hole was filled with sand 

and other materials. One or more non-porous material plugs were 

placed around the pipe. Electrical cables which went downhole 

were gas blocked to prevent gas seepage to the surface. Effects 

experiments were contained in a mobile tower on the surface that 

was moved away from the hole after device detonation but before 

surface collapse (formation of the subsidence crater). One 

potential problem was the possibility of seepage after surface 

collapse if some pathway to the surface developed. Some radioactive effluent was released into the atmosphere on several 

VLOS-type DOD tests. 

2.2.2 Tunnel-Type Emplacement 

Tunnel-type nuclear detonations were intended to be completely contained. The nuclear device was emplaced in a mined 

drift (tunnel) at a depth designed to contain the detonation. 

The native material at tunnel elevation (for events covered in 

this volume) was ash-fall tuff. Chimneying of broken rock to the 

surface was rare, primarily because there was a layer of welded 

rhyolitic ash-flow tuff at the top of Rainier Mesa. This tuff 

has a higher density than ash-fall tuff and is more competent 

(has more strength) than the alluvium of Frenchman and Yucca 

Flats. Tunnel-type emplacements were in one of several 

configurations: at the end of a single horizontal tunnel into a 

mountain or mesa, at the end of a drift (tunnel) within a tunnel 

complex, at the end of a horizontal tunnel driven from a vertical 

shaft, or in a cavity mined from a horizontal tunnel or vertical 

shaft. 

During the period covered by this volume, the six tunneltype emplacements included HLOS pipe systems placed in horizontal 

drifts in tunnel complexes (see Figure 2.3). Each device was 

64 
P 

iii 
placed close to the end of a drift inside a tunnel complex. An 

HLOS pipe system, including several mechanical closures and one 

or more test chambers (which contained effects experiments), were 

installed in the drift. The void space between the tunnel walls 

and the HLOS pipe was filled (stemmed) with different mixtures of 

grout as plugs and/or sand plugs out to a distance of several 

hundred feet from the device location. Two or more concrete 

plugs were keyed into the tunnel walls between the test chamber 

and main drift of the complex. 

The primary containment system was the closure of the tunnel 

in the stemmed area. Ground shock and expansion of the gaseous 

cavity material exerted pressure on the tunnel walls and stemming 

materials to form a stemming plug (closing the tunnel and HLOS 

pipe). All electrical cables and other penetrations within the 

stemmed area were gas blocked carefully to prevent or minimize 

seepage of radioactive gases through the stemming plug. The 

mechanical closures were designed primarily to protect the 

effects experiments; however, they also had some effect on the 

formation of the stemming plug. The concrete plugs were backup 

containment features. In the event the stemming plug did not 

contain the radioactive gases, the concrete plugs were designed 

to withstand the maximum expected pressure and temperature. 

FC/DNA has led the development of tunnel containment systems 

and has maintained continuing research and development programs 

to improve containment of tunnel events. 

2.3 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES 

The transition from atmospheric to underground testing substantially reduced the release of radioactive materials to the 

atmosphere, and required the development of new device diagnostic 

techniques. During atmospheric tests, high-speed photography re66 
corded fireball growth, and aircraft collected samples from the 

radioactive cloud for diagnostic measurement analysis. Because 

such systems could not be used during underground tests, several 

new diagnostic techniques were developed (some of which are 

discussed in the following subsections). 

2.3.1 Radiation Measurements 

Measurements of radiation from an underground detonation 

were made possible by developing a system of remote detectors and 

cabling that sent signals to recording facilities located at the 

surface. Detectors, utilizing various physical characteristics 

of the radiations to be measured, were installed near the nuclear 

device. High-specification coaxial cable and connectors carried 

the measurement signals to the surface where electronic equipment, film, and magnetic tape recorded the signals. 

The detector signals were on the way to recording equipment 

in billionths of a second after a detonation, before the detectors were destroyed. These measurement systems required the 

most advanced electronic technology available. Considerable 

research and development were necessary to acquire and refine 

these capabilities. 

2.3.2 Radiochemical Measurements 

Because clouds from atmospheric detonations no longer were 

available to sample for diagnostic purposes, techniques were 

developed to obtain samples of debris from underground detonations for radiochemical analyses and subsequent yield determinations. The first systems were radiochemical sampling pipes 

leading directly from the device emplacements to filtering equipment at the surface. These pipes required closure systems to 

prevent overpressure from venting radioactive effluent into the 

atmosphere after samples were collected. 

67 
While these systems functioned as intended for most 

detonations, the systems did not function properly during all 

tests, and some radioactive effluent was released into the 

atmosphere. Subsequently, regular use of radiochemical sampling 

pipes to the surface was discontinued for a time until technology 

improved. 

A major radiochemistry sampling method which continued in 

use for shaft and tunnel detonations was postevent core drilling. 

The objective of this drilling was to obtain samples of solidified radioactive debris, which had collected in a molten pool at 

the bottom of the cavity produced by the detonation. This method 

required and resulted in the development of precise directional 

drilling techniques and several advancements in the science of 

core drilling. 

2.4 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS 

DOD/DNA events were conducted primarily to obtain nuclear 

weapons effects data. The effects of blast, shock, and thermal 

and nuclear radiations had been investigated earlier during atmospheric and underwater tests. Military equipment, structures, 

and materials had been exposed to various nuclear effects. The 

transition to underground testing required development of new 

test techniques. One important new technology was simulation of 

high altitude (to exoatmospheric) conditions for radiation 

effects experiments. 

This simulation technique involved placing experiments inside test chambers and providing a low-pressure atmospheric condition from the nuclear device to the experiments. This was 

achieved by using large vacuum pumps to reduce pressure inside 

the steel LOS pipe to match the pressure of the desired altitude. 

68 
Experiments were catagorized as passive or active (diagnostic). Passive experiments involved placing experiment 

equipment in test chambers, exposing it to the desired nuclear 

environment, removing equipment, and analyzing it to obtain 

effects results. Active experiments utilized various sensors and 

high-speed electronic recording equipment to obtain data. Many 

active experiments also involved recovery and analysis to obtain 

effect results. 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 

Access to underground work and drilling sites was controlled 

for a number of reasons. During construction, safety of both 

workers and visitors in these locations could have been jeopardized by carelessness or seemingly harmless activities of untrained and uncontrolled workers or visitors. When securityclassified materials were in these locations, only personnel with 

appropriate security clearances were permitted access to the 

controlled areas. The presence, or anticipated presence, of 

radioactive material in a location required access control for 

radiological safety purposes. Access requirements established 

for the above purposes are discussed below. 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control 

During construction and preparations for a DOD event in a 

tunnel or other underground work site, the tunnel Superintendent 

was responsible to the REECo Project Manager for safety of personnel underground. From 1962 forward, Radsafe and tunnel logbooks usually were used to record names and radiation exposure 

information for only those persons entering a tunnel during 

postevent reentry and recovery operations. In the early 197Os, 

as a result of the Mine Safety and Health Act, tunnel logbooks 

were expanded to list all persons entering the tunnels (i.e., 

69 
mining, drilling, Radsafe, etc.). Visitors and other personnel 

not assigned to work in the tunnel obtained permission for entry 

from the superintendent, or his representative, and were apprised 

of tunnel conditions and safety regulations. In the event of an 

accident or other emergency condition, the logbook provided 

information on numbers of personnel and their locations underground. 

When classified material was in the tunnel prior to a test 

event and during initial reentry after an event, the DOD Test 

Group Director, or his representative, was responsible for entry 

and safety of personnel underground. Security personnel checked 

for proper security and entry clearances, maintained records of 

all personnel entering the tunnel, and safeguarded classified 

material and the device. The check point was often well inside 

the portal thus allowing several activities at various work sites 

to be conducted simultaneously. 

Control of tunnel access reverted to tunnel management personnel after tunnel reentry and recoveries. Entry procedures and 

use of the tunnel logbook, if appropriate, were then implemented 

as discussed above. 

Additional access controls were instituted for radiological 

safety purposes after an event or during construction and event 

preparation when radioactivity from a previous event could be 

encountered. Part or all of a tunnel complex could be established as a radiation exclusion (radex) area. 

All persons entering radex areas were logged on a form 

called the "Area Access Register." Names and organizations 

represented were listed. Radiation exposures from reports for 

the year and quarter were listed upon entry. Self-reading pocket 

dosimeter measurements were added upon exit. This was to assure 

that personnel approaching radiation exposure guide limits would 

70 
not be allowed to enter radex areas when they could accumulate 

exposures above guide amounts. 

Before entry, personnel were dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection as needed for the particular 

radiological conditions in the tunnel. Upon exit, anticontamination clothing was removed, personnel were monitored for radioactive contamination, and decontamination was accomplished if 

necessary. 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control 

Access to drilling areas was controlled by the drilling 

superintendent and the DOD Test Group Director for the same 

reasons as access to underground workings was controlled. During 

emplacement shaft drilling and during postevent drillback 

operations to recover radioactive core samples, personnel safety 

and compliance with safety regulations were emphasized continuously. 

During preevent drilling activities, all visitors were required to contact the drilling superintendent before entry to the 

drilling site. Names of visitors and the purpose of each visit 

were entered in the daily drilling report, and it was assured 

that visitors wore hard hats and understood safety regulations. 

The laboratory which provided the device controlled access 

to the area, assisted by security force personnel, when classified materials (including the nuclear device) were brought into 

the area for emplacement. After the event, when the drill site 

was a radex area, during classified material removal, or during 

postevent drilling, both security and radiological safety access 

controls were in effect as discussed under "Tunnel Access 

Control." 

71 
2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 

Implementation of an effective industrial safety program was 

an important part of any heavy construction operation. Mining 

and drilling operations had a particularly high accident potential. These operations at the NTS involved additional safety 

problems resulting from detonation-induced unstable ground conditions and potential for encountering toxic gases, explosive mixtures, and radioactivity. 

Miles of underground workings were constructed during mining 

operations. More depth of big holes (three-foot diameter or 

larger) were drilled during drilling operations than the known 

total drilled in the rest of the world. Directional and core 

drilling to recover radioactive debris samples after underground 

nuclear detonations advanced the science of these drilling 

techniques. These operations often were accomplished under 

unusual conditions with accompanying difficult safety problems. 

However, the lost-time accident frequency for the NTS support contractor employing most of the NTS personnel (REECo) was 

only one-tenth of the frequency for the heavy construction industry at large (as determined by annual surveys and reports for 

300 heavy construction corporations). This excellent safety 

record was attained by continuing attention to indoctrinating and 

training NTS personnel, investigating and determining causes of 

accidents at the NTS, implementing and enforcing safety regulations, and, most important, maintaining the safety awareness of 

NTS personnel. 

This was a joint effort by DOE, DNA, and their predecessors, 

and by the many other government agencies and contractors at NTS. 

Administered by REECo, the safety program enjoined all NTS 

personnel to conduct operations safely, and was exemplified by 

the sign on the portal of a typical DOD tunnel complex as shown 

72 
in Figure 2.4, which states, "Safety With Production is our 

Goal." 

The safety procedures for all NTS operations are voluminous 

and cannot be included in this report. Appendix C of this volume 

is an example of a pertinent safety procedure: General Tunnel 

Reentry Procedures for Department of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Tests. As this procedure indicates, several aspects of 

industrial safety are interrelated. Information on monitoring 

levels of radioactivity and personnel exposures to radiation is 

presented in section 2.7, "Radiological Safety Procedures." 

Monitoring of toxic gases and checks for explosive mixture 

were an important aspect of safety in underground workings, on 

drill rigs, and in drillhole cellars (the excavated area under 

the drill rig platform used for valving and other equipment). 

Toxic gases and explosive mixtures were created by both the 

nuclear detonations and the mining and drilling operations. 

Draeger multi-gas detectors and MSA explosimeters were used to 

detect such gases and mixtures. Fyrite or J&W oxygen indicators 

were also used to determine the oxygen content of the working 

atmosphere. Requirements were that tunnel and drill rig 

breathing atmosphere contain at least 19.5 percent oxygen. 

During the period covered by this volume, it was required that 

the breathing atmosphere contain less than the following levels 

of toxic gases and explosive mixtures: 

Gases 

Carbon monoxide, CO 

Carbon dioxide, CO2 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen 

dioxide, NO + NO2 

Nitrogen dioxide, NO2 

Explosive mixtures 

Maximum Concentration 

50 ppm 

5000 ppm 

25 ppm 

5 ppm 

10% of LEL (lower 

explosive limit, 5% 

methane calibration) 

73 

Procedures for controlling explosive mixtures and toxic 

gases after each test event are discussed in the event chapters 

as appropriate. 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES 

Procedures were developed in an effort to evaluate radiological, toxic, and other hazards, and protect workers and the 

public from unnecessary exposures. The following were the 

primary written procedures and implementation methods used at the 

NTS from 1972 through 1975. 

2.7.1 The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Test Site 

Organization - Standard Operating Procedure (NTSO SOP) 

Chapter 0524, Radiological Safety, of this procedure (which 

appears as Appendix D to this volume) defined responsibility and 

established criteria and general procedures for radiological 

safety associated with NTS programs. Some of the major areas 

discussed were film badge procedures, radiation surveys, entry 

into controlled areas, and radiation exposure guides. Roles of 

the onsite REECo Environmental Sciences Department and the 

offsite United States Environmental Protection Agency are defined 

in NTSO SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.2 The Standard Operating Procedures for the Environmental 

Sciences Department, REECo 

These were prepared and updated annually to address in more 

detail the radiological safety aspects discussed in the latest 

revision of NTSO SOP Chapter 0524. 

75 
2.7.3 Implementation of Radiological Procedures 

The required equipment, devices, and capabilities for 

monitoring radiation levels in the environment and monitoring 

external 

A. 

B. 

C. 

and internal exposures of personnel are described below: 

Portable Radiation Detection Equipment 

- Eberline PAC 4G (alpha) 

- Eberline PAC 1SA (alpha) 

- Jordan AGB-SOOB-SR Radector (gamma) 

- Jordan AGB-lOK-SR Radgun (beta and gamma) 

- Eberline E-500B survey meter (beta and gamma) 

- Eberline E-520B survey meter (beta and gamma) 

- Ludlum Model 101 survey meter (beta and gamma) 

- Technical Associates and Hanford Cutie Pie survey 

meter (beta and gamma) 

- Technical Associates Juno survey meter (alpha, beta, 

and gamma) 

- Precision Model P-111 Scintillator (gamma) 

- T-290 Military Air Sampler (tritium) 

- T-446 Tritium Alarm Monitor (tritium) (Sandia/Bendix) 

- NR-3 Portable Radioactive Gas Detector (tritium) 

(Sandia) 

Air Sampling Equipment 

- Model 102 semi-portable sampler 

- Satellite sampler 

- Hurricane high-volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

- Vacuum pump low-volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

Laboratory Analysis Capability 

The Environmental Sciences Laboratory analyzed air, 

76 
D. 

soil, water, surface swipe, nasal swab, urine, and wound 

swab samples for some or all of the following radioactivities: gross alpha and beta, gross fission products, tritium, strontium-90, plutonium-239, and 

spectrographic analysis for specific gamma-emitting 

radionuclides. The laboratory also analyzed some of the 

above-mentioned samples for nonradioactive materials, 

such as beryllium, through use of an emission 

spectrograph and by wet chemistry procedures. A 

spectrophotometer was used to perform additional 

analyses. e 

Monitoring of Personnel Exposures 

The NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security 

credential holder was placed in use in 1966 to provide 

increased personnel dosimetry capability necessary to 

monitor radiation exposure problems associated with 

nuclear rocket testing and underground nuclear detonations. The holder was designed to accommodate a Du Pont 

type 556 film packet, a fast neutron packet, an identification plate, criticality accident components, the 

security credential, and a snap-type clip. The complete 

package had capabilities for determining beta, gamma, xray, thermal neutron, fast neutron, high-range gamma, 

and high range neutron doses. Components for criticality accidents (unintentional or accidental nuclear fissioning of device critical materials) included materials 

which could detect and measure neutron and gamma radiation exposures above the ranges of the film packets. 

The Du Pont 556 film packet contained two component 

films, type 519 (low range) and type 834 (high range). 

Gamma exposure ranges of the two components were 30 mR 

to 10 R and 10 R to 800 R, respectively. The NTS 

combination personnel dosimeter and security credential 

holder is shown in Figure 2.5. 

77 

Film badges were exchanged routinely each month for all 

individuals and upon exit from a radex area when it was 

suspected that an individual had received 100 mR or more 

of exposure. 

Personnel entering radex areas also were issued selfreading pocket dosimeters which indicated accumulated 

exposure. Upon exit, pocket dosimeter readings were 

entered on an Area Access Register and added to the 

yearly and quarterly accumulated exposures from the 

automated daily NTS radiation exposure report for use 

until results of film packet processing were included. 

Pocket dosimeter readings were used as estimates because 

such readings were less accurate than the doses of 

record determined by processing film packets. 

This use of Area Access Registers helped to maintain 

personnel exposures below the whole body exposure guides 

in Chapter 0524: 3000 mrem per quarter and 5000 mrem 

per year. Personnel whose accumulated exposure was in 

excess of 2500 mrem per quarter or 4500 mrem per year 

(as recorded on the report plus any pocket dosimeter 

reading since the report was published) were advised not 

to enter radex areas, and their supervisory personnel 

were so notified. 

2.7.4 Additional Methods Used for Control of Radex Areas 

To help control radex areas and prevent spread of 

contamination to uncontrolled areas, the following 

procedures were used. 

A daily logbook was maintained by Radsafe monitors for 

each radex area location. These logs were used to record 

the following information: 

79 
A. Work accomplished - Which people worked where and what 

work was accomplished were briefly described. Any 

unusual conditions, such as equipment failure and 

operational difficulties, were listed. 

B. Visitors - First and last names of visitors were 

entered. Their destination and the reason for their 

visit were included where possible. The time they 

entered and exited the area and results of personnel 

monitoring were recorded. 

C. Unusual occurrences - Any unusual events which occurred during the shift were recorded. Included in this 

type of entry were accidents, high-volume water 

seepage, or any other occurrence of an unusual nature. 

D. Surveys and samples - Information collected was recorded as follows: 

Survey type - Routine or Special* 

Sample type - Routine or Special* 

*The requester's name was indicated for Special type. 

E. Date and signature - The date and shift were entered 

at the beginning of the work period and the logbook 

was signed before leaving the shift. 

Personnel leaving radex areas removed anticontamination 

clothing and equipment and placed them in special containers for 

later laundering or disposal at the designated NTS burial site. 

Personnel then were monitored to assure radiation levels were 

below those listed in Appendix D, Part I of AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 

0524, “Radiological Safety." Personnel decontamination was accomplished if radiation levels were above specified limits. 

80 
Decontamination usually was accomplished by vacuuming, removing 

radioactive particles with masking tape patches, washing hands or 

localized skin areas with soap and water, or showering with soap 

and water. 

Vehicles and equipment removed from radex areas were monitored to assure that they met acceptable radiation levels for 

release on the NTS [less than 25 mrad/h beta plus gamma at contact and 250 counts per minute (cpm) non-removable alpha]. 

Limits for release of vehicles and equipment off the NTS were 0.3 

mrad/h beta plus gamma radiation at contact and no detectable 

alpha activity. Vehicles and equipment normally were decontaminated by vacuuming and steam cleaning with water or detergent 

solutions. 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS 

Beginning in the early 196Os, various applications of 

radiation measurement telemetry were developed at the NTS to 

determine radiation 1evel.s at critical underground and surface 

areas following nuclear detonations. Multi-detector systems with 

range capabilities from as low as 0.5 mR/h to 1000 R/h 

(well-logging units) to as high as 100 mR/h to 100,000 R/h 

(extended range units) continuously monitored locations of 

concern after being calibrated and emplaced prior to each test 

event. Ion chamber detectors were hard-wire linked by telephone 

trunk lines to exposure rate meters at a central console in CP-2. 

Detector locations were as far as 35 miles from this console. 

These remote radiation monitoring systems provided data for 

reentry personnel participating in radiation surveys and recovery 

operations after a nuclear device detonation. The systems aided 

in substantially reducing exposure of personnel involved in reentry programs and were useful in detecting any venting or leak81 
age of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere from an underground 

detonation. 

2.8.1 Telemetry System in Use 

The radiation telemetry systems developed and used at NTS 

had specific applications depending upon distance, terrain, 

environment, and operational needs. The detection units and 

components in use in 1972 for DOD events were part of the remote 

area monitoring system (RAMS). The principal piece of equipment 

used to form a RAMS was the RAMP-4. The RAMP-4 was a multichannel, hard-wire linked, remote area gamma radiation monitoring 

(telemetry) system designed and modified by Radsafe and produced 

by Victoreen Instrument Corporation. It consisted of a probe 

(Figure 2.6) which used a Neher-White .radiation sensing element, 

hard-wired to communicate with the readout console (Figure 2.7) 

up to 35 miles away, and components of Victoreen Radector 

instruments with recorders for readout. 

The readout covered six logarithmic decades (two threedecade scales) to provide a usual range of 1 mR/h to 1,000 R/h 

with a relative accuracy of + 15 percent over the temperature - 

range of -10°F to 150°F. Extended range RAMS unit provided a 

range from 100 mR/h to 100,000 R/h. 

A permanent array of 20 to 35 telemetry stations throughout 

the NTS, as designated by the AEC, was maintained and operated 

continuously. Temporary telemetry arrays for DOD events varied 

between 20 and 50 stations depending upon the area or tunnel 

event location. 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring Support 

Approximately 200 remote radiation detector channels were 

available to continuously monitor radiological conditions and 

82 


determine exposure rates before the test area was entered after 

detonation. Approximately 20 detector units were positioned in 

the test area before a shaft-type event. Detectors were placed 

in circular arrays at appropriate distances from SGZ which varied 

with device yield and predicted wind direction (See Figure 2.8). 

Variable numbers of detectors (20-50) were used aboveground and 

underground during tunnel-type events. An additional 20 to 35 

permanently established remote radiation detector stations operated continuously at living areas, work areas, and other locations throughout NTS (Figure 2.9). The large number of remaining 

channels was available for additional detector locations and 

substitute channels. Event-related telemetry detectors operated 

from zero time until it was determined that release of radioactivity probably would not occur, or until any released radioactivity had decayed to near-background levels at the telemetry 

stations. For some events, readout locations were positioned 

near the forward control point (FCP), or at locations where telephone lines were available, in addition to the readouts located 

at CP-2. 

Radiation telemetry data were supplemented with information 

.collected through a mobile air sampling program. Model 102 air 

sampling units were used to obtain samples of any radioactive 

effluent released at event time or during the postevent drilling 

operations. Test groups used an average of 21 units during each 

test event. Prior to each nuclear detonation experiment, these 

samplers were placed at specified locations around the test area, 

and units remained in position until drillback operations were 

completed or the Test Group Director authorized removal of the 

units. 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 

Direct support was provided to NTSO by AFSWC for DOD underground tests, and other Air Force organizations provided support 

85 
-- 

_-c_- 

Figure 2.8 Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring System 

for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site 

86 
Fig 

0 PERMANENT TELEMETRY 

R29 

78 

nmrn 1 

.3Q /lb 

,29 

6 

ure 2.9 Typical Permanently-Established Remote Radiation Detect 

Stations Operated Continuously Throughout the NTS 

:or 

87 
under AFSWC control as described in section 1.3.2 of this volume. 

Less air support was required, however, as the probability of 

venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased with development of more effective containment techniques. 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements 

After 1962, Air Force cloud-sampling and cloud-tracking 

aircraft generally were not required except for AEC cratering 

events where radioactive effluent clouds were anticipated. Passage of the radioactive effluent through variable amounts and 

temperatures of rock and other media selectively retained some 

radionuclides underground. The known fission product ratios 

previously used during calculation and analysis of atmospheric 

detonation cloud samples were no longer valid. Thus, value of 

analyzing particulate and gaseous cloud samples to determine 

characteristics of a detonation decreased. 

The first change in cloud sampling and tracking support was 

to a lighter Air Force aircraft, the U-3A, with an Air Force 

pilot and EPA monitor. The EPA monitor also performed aerial 

monitoring of selected locations near surface ground zero and 

along the path of any effluent cloud. This air support later was 

. performed by EPA and contractor personnel in their own aircraft. 

Perimeter sweeps with helicopters continued to be conducted 

daily by Air Force and Security personnel, during reasonable 

flying weather, to assure that unauthorized vehicles were not 

entering the NTS over rough terrain or around security barricades 

on secondary roads. Air security sweeps of the immediate test 

area were conducted by helicopter for a few hours before each 

detonation to assist in clearing the test area and to assure that 

unauthorized vehicles were not approaching it from directions not 

controlled by manned security stations. 

88 
Air support for photography missions during test events and 

initial radiation surveys after each event did not change. 

Generally, helicopters were used with Air Force pilots, 

contractor and military photographers, and Radsafe monitors. 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary 

Field (ISAFAF) 

Radsafe support facilities had been established about 20 

miles southeast of Mercury at Indian Springs Air Force Base 

(ISAFB became ISAFAF in 1968) during atmospheric nuclear device 

testing series. During 1962 tests, and subsequent DOD underground tests requiring support aircraft staged from ISAFAF, REECo 

provided all Radsafe support functions available at the NTS. 

This included monitors stationed at the ISAFAF Radsafe quonset 

facility and a complete stock of film dosimeters (badges), 

radiation detection instruments, and anticontamination clothing 

and equipment for use by aircrews and ground crews. 

Radsafe monitors issued and exchanged film dosimeters 

(badges), issued self-reading pocket dosimeters, provided anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment, monitored aircraft and personnel after events, decontaminated personnel, and assisted ground crew personnel with decontamination 

of aircraft. 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters 

Although ISAFAF Radsafe support extended to all participating aircraft, special helicopter radsafe procedures were implemented because these aircraft landed at NTS and staged from 

helicopter pads located east of Mercury Highway near the CP area 

and near the Test Controller's FCP established for a particular 

underground event. Helicopter pilots usually landed at these 

89 
locations and were briefed on their scheduled or other operational missions there. 

If the mission involved possible contamination of the aircraft, Radsafe monitors lined the floor of the aircraft with 

plastic (or kraft paper) and masking tape to facilitate decontamination. Pilots and crew members were dressed in anticontamination clothing and provided with film badges, pocket dosimeters, 

and respiratory protection equipment if airborne radioactive 

material was anticipated and oxygen masks were not worn. 

Upon completion of missions, helicopters returned to the 

landing pads where they were decontaminated by Radsafe monitors. 

Pilots and crew members were decontaminated at an adjacent forward Radsafe base station (or at CP-2) where the pocket dosime- . 

ters were collected and read and film badges were exchanged if 

exposures of 100 mR or more were indicated by pocket dosimeters. 

90 
CHAPTER 3 

DIAMOND SCULLS EVENT 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

DIAMOND SCULLS was a DOD-sponsored underground test detonated at 1016 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 20 July 1972 

with a yield less than 20 kilotons (kt). The device was 

detonated in T tunnel (U12t.02 drift, see Figure 3.1) at a 

vertical depth of 1,391 feet. DIAMOND SCULLS had the largest LOS 

pipe and tunnel excavation in the history of NTS underground 

testing. The pipe was 1,900 feet long, diverging from less than 

one foot outside diameter at zero point interface to about 26 

feet at test chamber No. 1. (See Figure 3.2 to view the size of 

the sections of LOS pipe assembled for the event and Figure 3.3 

which shows the size of the portal end of the LOS pipe after 

assembly.) The objective of this test was to determine the 

response of materials and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and contractors conducted 38 

projects to obtain the desired weapons effects information. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent was released to the atmosphere. 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all DIAMOND SCULLS project activities in 

Area 12 was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. 

Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in 

accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DNA, and AEC/NVOO. 

91 
I 

l-l 

.u 

92 


Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments, or delivering them to the. installation contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample 

data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LLL fielded 

the device, the LLL Test Group Director was responsible for 

radiological safety prior to the event within a 6,000-foot radius 

of the zero point. This responsibility was in effect from device 

emplacement until device detonation. After detonation, the Test 

Controller relieved the LLL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller had determined that 

venting had not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological safety in the test event area to the DOD Test Group 

Director. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

From initial conception to actual execution, DIAMOND 

SCULLS spanned a period of more than three years. Mining of the U12t.02 drift began on 2 August 1969. At a 

meeting held on 6 and 7 January 1970, the readiness date 

was set for 1 June 1971. To meet this schedule, it was 

decided that four different crews would mine on a threeshift day, seven days a week, beginning 1 June 1970. A 

labor strike, which did not end until mid-September 

1970, halted mining on 9 June. From July 1971 to 

February 1972, several effects and diagnostic experiment 

meetings were held to discuss and refine experiment de95 
tails and test chamber layouts. A subsequent June 1972 

readiness date was set. 

Mining the U12t.02 drift allowed many facilities installed for the U12t.01 MINT LEAF event to be reused. 

Among these facilities were the gas seal door, cable 

alcove (which included two downhole cable runs from 

Rainier Mesa trailer park to the cable alcove), and T 

tunnel portal facilities and trailer park. 

The experiment drift complex consisted of an LOS pipe 

drift and a bypass drift connected by eight crosscuts 

(see Figure 3.1). The crosscuts, in conjunction with 

the bypass drift, provided (1) late-time access for installation of the Sandia Auxiliary Closure (SAC): (2) 

alcove space to be used by experimenter agencies for 

housing power supplies and signal conditioning equipment: (3) experiment preparation and working space; and 

(4) access for early grouting of the main LOS pipe. 

All cables installed on the zero point side of the TAPS 

were gas blocked inside the grout using bulkhead feedthrough connectors. Cables installed in the stemmed 

region of the bypass drift were gas blocked using bulkhead feed-through connectors mounted on a fiberglass 

frame. The majority of the cables passed through the 

OBP in the bypass drift enroute to the cable alcove. 

These cables were gas blocked by installing bulkhead 

feed-through connectors on fiberglass bulkheads inside a 

grout plug. 

96 
DIAMOND SCULLS used a multiplex (multiple switching) 

system to control and monitor the reentry ventilation 

valves, fans, and electrical power distribution system. 

The system employed two similar control panels, one at 

the tunnel portal and one at the DOD monitor room at 

CP-1. All the valves through the gas seal door were 

electrically operated, but the ventilation valves 

through the gas seal plug and the OBP required manual 

operation. The gas sampling system allowed air samples 

to be drawn remotely from the zero point side of the gas 

seal door, gas seal plug, and OBP into a plastic bag. 

The gases could then be analyzed for radioactivity and 

for the presence of any explosive mixture, and returned 

through the system to the inside of the respective plug. 

Ventilation and gas sampling systems could be operated 

manually at all points during tunnel reentry. 

Multiconductor and coaxial cables were laid in elevated 

metal trays from the Rainier Mesa splice shack to the 38 

instrumentation trailers which were arranged in the Mesa 

trailer park. These trailers, along with three instrumentation trailers at the portal, were shock mounted and 

electrically isolated from the ground. The Mesa instrumentation trailers contained oscilloscopes, tape recorders, and oscillographs on which diagnostic and other 

measurement data were recorded. Operational functions 

in the Mesa trailer park and in the tunnel would be 

controlled from CP-1 by timing signals during the 15- 

minute countdown. These timing signals would be transmitted by microwave and hardwire from CP-1 to the timing 

and firing trailer in the Mesa trailer park. Critical 

functions in the tunnel and portal instrumentation 

trailers would be monitored at CP-1 in the LLL control 

room and the DOD monitor room. 

97 
B. Radiological Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination 

control during this event were in accordance with AEC 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support, air sampling, and telemetry. 

Prior to the test event, detailed radiological safety 

reentry plans were prepared and issued to participating 

agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform surface initial radiation surveys, 

conduct aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in 

reentry parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were 

standing by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform 

surveys and provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, 

portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment 

included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 42 temporary units 

provided coverage for the DIAMOND SCULLS event as shown 

98 
in Table 3.1 and Figures 3.4 and 3.5. A single air 

sampling unit was located at the portal. All RAMS units 

and the air sampling unit were installed a minimum of 

five days prior to scheduled device detonation. 

D. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, llProgram to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or 

exiting the controlled area were required to stop at 

muster or control stations for issue of stay-in badges 

or issue and return of muster badges. After area 

control was established, all through traffic was 

diverted around the controlled area by use of screening 

stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plan," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with the event out of the 

controlled area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

One UH-1F and two UH-1N helicopters with USAF pilots and 

crews were available to provide support for aerial 

closed-circuit television coverage, cloud surveillance 

(should venting occur), and security sweeps. One Turbo 

Beech aircraft was airborne at the NTS for use if needed 

for cloud sampling and tracking. An EPA Turbo Beech 

aircraft was standing by at McCarran Airport in Las 

Vegas to undertake a sampling and tracking mission if 

required. 

99 
TABLE 3.1 

DIAMOND SCULLS EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

20 July 1972 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

SURFACE 

From portal: 

At portal 

208 feet S 81" W azimuth on filter system 

222 feet S 75" W azimuth on ventilation line 

222 feet S 75O W azimuth on ventilation line 

332 feet N 09' W azimuth 

345 feet N 68' E azimuth 

346 feet S 55' E azimuth 

388 feet S 07" E azimuth 

324 feet S 43O W azimuth 

564 feet N 74O W azimuth 

650 feet S 82O E azimuth on tunnel drain line 

2,020 feet S 89O E azimuth 

1,710 feet S 57" E azimuth 

1,275 feet S 01" E azimuth 

1,995 feet S 60' W azimuth 

1,370 feet N 37" W azimuth 

1,740 feet N 50' E azimuth 

From cable downhole: 

At cable downhole 

264 feet N 04' W azimuth 

219 feet N 62' E azimuth 

150 feet S 17O E azimuth 

165 feet S 87O W azimuth 

From SGZ: 

23 260 feet N 51" E azimuth 

24 380 feet S 02" E azimuth 

25 280 feet N 45' W azimuth 

100 
TABLE 3.1 (Concluded) 

Station Location 

UNDERGROUND 

From the main drift unless otherwise indicated: 

31 1,450 feet into LJ12t.02 LOS drift 

32 1,000 feet into U12t.02 LOS drift 

33 650 feet into U12t.02 LOS drift 

34 900 feet into U12t.02 bypass drift 

35 300 feet into U12t.02 bypass drift 

36 450 feet into U12t.02 drift 

*37ER 450 feet into U12t.02 drift 

38 300 feet into U12t.02 drift 

39 400 feet into U12t.01 bypass drift from the 

40 Cable alcove (400 feet into the U12t.02 LOS drift) 

From the portal: 

41 2,800 feet into U12t main drift 

42 2,240 feet into U12t main drift 

*43ER 2,240 feet into U12t main drift 

44 1,800 feet into U12t main drift 

45 1,600 feet into U12t main drift 

46 900 feet into U12t main drift 

47 100 feet into U12t main drift 

LOS drift 

u12.01 

"ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

101 
i \ 

I 

I 
GAS SEAL PLUG 

u121.02 

ZERO POINT 

Od 

FEET 

Figure 3.5 DIAMOND SCULLS Event - Underground RAMS 
3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

The final dry run (FDR) was completed at 1514 hours on 17 

July. After only one hold in the countdown, all monitoring 

equipment was functioning properly: however, DIAMOND SCULLS 

detonation was delayed for 48 hours so the Test Group staff could 

reevaluate a technical problem and deal with an air leakage 

problem which had occurred at the OBP. During this time, two 

additional FDRs were conducted. Another 24-hour delay in test 

execution occurred because AEC/HQ approval had not been given. 

At a readiness briefing conducted on 19 July, test execution 

was scheduled for 0800 hours on 20 July. All weather conditions 

appeared favorable. 

3.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

On D-day (20 July 1972), several minor problems were encountered from the time of the FDR to detonation, as would be 

expected because the system had been in event-ready configuration 

for five days. The 0800 zero time was delayed until security 

guards accounted for all personnel in the forward areas. Countdown started again at 0955 hours. All systems were operating 

properly. A hold was activated approximately nine minutes into 

the countdown to discuss an experiment problem. The countdown 

resumed, and all other monitoring equipment indicated proper 

operation at zero time. 

The DIAMOND SCULLS device was detonated at 1016 hours on 20 

July 1972. 

3.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry measurements began at 1017 hours on 20 July. At 

104 
H+l minute, RAMS unit No. 31 showed a maximum reading of 300 R/h. 

RAMS unit Nos. 32, 33, 36, 37, and 38 also showed radiation readings, with the highest being 200 R/h at H+l minute. This was as 

expected because these RAMS units were located along the LOS pipe 

and responded to neutron activation of the LOS pipe and its 

contents. All RAMS units except Nos. 3 and 4 (on the surface 

vent line and filter system), and 31, 32, and 33 underground were 

secured at 1416 hours on 24 July. RAMS Nos. 3 and 4 on the vent 

line filter system continued to operate at AEC request, but the 

remaining functioning stations were secured at 1300 hours on 26 

July. No indications of radioactive effluent release were 

observed by underground, surface, or airborne monitoring systems. 

3.3.2 Rainier Mesa Initial Radiation Survey and Reentry Activities 

An aerial survey of postevent surface conditions showed that 

the Mesa could be accessed via the East Mesa Road with minimal 

delays for removal of rock fall. Surface reentry began at 1145 

hours and ended at 1600 hours on D-day. All measurement records 

were recovered without incident. No radiation level above background was detected in the area. 

3.3.3 Portal Initial Radiation Survey Activities 

Radiation readings during reentry of the portal area were 

0.05 mR/h (background). Remote gas sampling on the zero point 

side of the OBP indicated that no evidence of explosive mixture 

or above-background radioactivity levels were present. Gas chromatograph samples collected remotely on D-day from the LOS pipe 

area indicated a maximum of 25 percent of the LEL and 0.05 

percent hydrogen. Ventilation was established on the portal side 

of the gas seal door at 1840 hours on D-day. Also at 1840 hours, 

a valve was opened to allow water to drain from the zero point 

side of the OBP towards the portal side. 

105 
3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities 

On D+l, members of initial tunnel reentry team No. 1 entered 

the portal (see Figure 3.6) at 1035 hours and traveled to the gas 

seal door. All team members were dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and wearing Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus. 

No tunnel damage was observed along the way. Upon arrival, permission was granted to open the large gas seal door. As a first 

step in performing this task, team members opened the access door 

and installed sump pumps to remove water approximately 1 l/2 feet 

deep from the zero point side of the door. Team members partially opened the large gas seal door before exiting the tunnel 

at 1319 hours. A reading of 600 ppm carbon dioxide was detected, 

radiation readings were background, and no evidence of explosive 

mixture was detected. 

Team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1342 hours and traveled 

through the gas seal door to the gas seal plug. The radiation 

reading at that location was background (0.05 mrad/h). Team 

members installed a vent line through the gas seal plug, then 

returned to the gas seal door, opened it, and reinstalled train 

tracks. The requirement for Draeger self-contained breathing 

apparatus was discontinued near the end of this reentry. Team 

No. 2 exited the tunnel at 1615 hours. The maximum radiation 

reading detected was 0.05 mrad/h (beta plus gamma), and 1,000 ppm 

carbon dioxide was measured. No evidence of any explosive 

mixture was detected. 

On D+2, a reentry team left the portal at 0855 hours and 

traveled to the gas seal plug. Radiation levels between the 

portal and the gas seal door remained at background. Team 

members were dressed in anticontamination clothing, and Draeger 

self-contained breathing apparatus again was required for 

106 

reentry. A hazard and damage survey of the tunnel to the OBP was 

conducted, which included sending one team member through the OBP 

to check for water on the zero point side. No water was found. 

A vent line was installed and team members exited the tunnel at 

1140 hours. The maximum radiation reading detected at the OBP 

was 0.05 mR/h. No evidence of explosive mixture or toxic gases 

was detected. 

On 23 July, a reentry team, a rescue team, and support personnel entered the tunnel at 0829 hours and proceeded toward the 

OBP. The purpose of this reentry was to walk through the LOS 

pipe drift and bypass drift as far as possible (to the end of 

stemming if possible), make a hazard and damage survey, and 

establish ventilation in the LOS pipe (Figure 3.7). Team members 

arrived at the portal side of the OBP, which appeared to be in 

good condition, and the rescue team and support personnel remained on the portal side of the OBP while the reentry team 

proceeded through it. A radiation level of 0.05 mR/h was 

measured on the zero point side and no evidence of explosive 

mixture was detected. The same conditions were found in the 

bypass drift at crosscut No. 1. By 0938 hours, team members had 

reached the stemming plug at the end of the cable drift. All 

radiation readings taken were less than 1 mR/h. At 0948 hours, 

team members had returned to the LOS drift/cable drift junction 

and were preparing to proceed into the LOS drift. Test chamber 

No. 1 was reached at 0957 hours. The exposure rate at the door 

was 6 mR/h, test chamber No. 2 had an exposure rate of 7 mR/h, 

and test chamber No. 3 had an exposure rate of 15 mR/h. Team 

members reached the end of stemming at 1022 hours. 

The team returned to the TAPS area, and the door to test 

chamber No. 3 was opened at 1031 hours. An exposure rate of 25 

mR/h was measured at arm's length inside the chamber. Team 

members then traveled to test chamber No. 2 and opened the door. 

An exposure rate of 19 mR/h was detected at arm's length inside 

108 
I 

I- 

. 

m 
this chamber. The door to test chamber No. 1 was opened at 1110 

hours and an exposure rate of 24 mR/h was measured at arm's 

length into the chamber. Swipes were taken at each test chamber 

door. At 1126 hours, the face mask requirement was removed, and 

team members began exiting the tunnel, reaching the portal side 

of the OBP at 1135 hours. Team members exited the portal at 1150 

hours and reentries were completed for the day. 

On 24 July, two personnel entered the LOS pipe to perform a 

scientific assessment of the experiments. They were the only 

persons who entered the pipe for this purpose and both wore anticontamination clothing and full-face masks with supplied air. 

One person took air samples which were analyzed for beryllium: 

none was detected. Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) 

photographers began station photography, and LASL personnel 

entered the pipe to lower one experiment to the floor of the test 

chamber in an effort to protect it from damage. All personnel 

wore anticontamination clothing and full-face masks with selfcontained breathing apparatus. 

On 25 July, the face mask and anticontamination clothing 

requirement was removed based on results of swipes for beryllium 

and air samples taken in the test chambers: however, this protective equipment was available if desired by users. Pan Am station 

photography continued. Pan Am personnel elected to wear anticontamination clothing, but not face masks. LASL personnel entered 

the pipe to look through the debris and take photographs. These 

personnel elected to wear anticontamination clothing and face 

masks. 

A reentry to the TAPS was performed on 26 July. The TAPS 

was reached by entering the LOS pipe through a porthole on the 

zero point side of debris barrier station (DBS) No. 3. The 

radiation reading at contact with the TAPS door was 0.7 mR/h. A 

trace of carbon monoxide was detected. 

110 
3.4.2 Experiment Recovery Activities 

Recovery of the smaller experiments began on 31 July. No 

anticontamination clothing or face masks were required. Almost 

all of the small experiments were recovered by 2 August. 

Recovery of major experiments began on 7 August and continued through 10 August. During this time, preparations to begin 

mining a reentry drift were made. 

3.4.3 Postevent Mining Activities 

On 21 August, a toxic gas survey of drill holes at the 

reentry drift face showed one hole (with water running from it) 

which measured 500 ppm carbon monoxide in the ambient air. The 

area was cleared for about one hour to allow the ventilation system to dissipate the gas. The vent line was then extended to the 

face. No more problems with toxic gases were experienced on day 

shift and through the first part of swing shift. At about 1815 

hours, lo-20 percent of the LEL and loo-250 ppm carbon monoxide 

were detected in a drill hole in the face. Work at the face was 

stopped until the drill holes were ventilated. No other problems 

were encountered on this shift. 

At about 0200 hours on 22 August, an explosive mixture was 

detected in a 16-foot probe hole in the heading and in several 

holes drilled for dynamiting operations at the heading. Greater 

than 100 percent of the LEL and more than 3,000 ppm carbon 

monoxide were detected. Later, a high range carbon monoxide tube 

was used to check the holes, and a 5,500 ppm concentration was 

detected. The heading was evacuated for the remainder of the 

shift although routine toxic gas and explosive mixture checks 

were made at the face and in the probe hole. 

111 
During day shift, a reentry inside the LOS pipe to the TAPS 

door to collect gas samples and measure pressure on the zero 

point side was performed. Team members wore anticontamination 

coveralls and Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus. The 

reentry lasted approximately 30 minutes. Based on these sample 

results, AEC/NVOO gave permission to begin bleeding pressure from 

the zero point side of the TAPS into the vent line. Team members 

returned to the TAPS plug. The valve was opened at 1700 hours 

and gas was bled into a vent line. An explosimeter measured 

three percent of the LEL in th.e vent line approximately ten feet 

from the TAPS plug. Samples, taken from the gas sampling system 

through the vent line out to the portal, indicated the absence of 

any explosive mixture. The system was allowed to operate for 

approximately 40 minutes. The vent line at the TAPS plug was 

resurveyed and three percent of the LEL still was indicated. The 

system was allowed to continue ventilating, all personnel were 

evacuated from the tunnel, and the portal gates were locked at 

1800 hours. 

On 23 August, a reentry team (with a rescue team on standby) 

was organized to: 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

Check the pressure on the gauge at the TAPS door, open 

the valve, and watch to see if air flow had been 

established. 

Take a gas sample and close off the valve (if the flow 

had been established). 

Sample gas from behind the TAPS door. 

Close the valve at the TAPS and watch for an increase in 

air pressure. 

112 
F A. 

F. 

Check the face in the reentry heading and the pressure 

on the gauge in the l/2-inch line into the 16-foot probe 

hole. 

Attach a nitrogen bottle to the line in the reentry 

heading and pressurize the 16-foot probe hole with 

nitrogen. 

Reentry team members were required to dress in the same 

manner as the previous day. Reentry began at 1130 hours. The 

reentry heading was checked; no pressure was noted on the gauge, 

but a bag sample could be filled slowly from the line. The valve 

at the TAPS was left in the "open" position, and reentry was 

aborted. Tunnel gates were locked at 1430 hours. 

All personnel working in the reentry drift from 24 August to 

27 August wore full-face masks with all-purpose canisters. 

On 28 August, a work party entered the tunnel and prepared 

to drill into the LOS pipe. Personnel in the heading during 

drilling wore supplied-air respiratory protection equipment. 

Drilling began at 1510 hours, and at 1830 hours 10,000 ppm carbon 

monoxide and greater than 100 percent of the LEL were detected. 

Personnel were evacuated from the heading even though the vent 

line was pulling the toxic and explosive gases from the working 

area into the ventilation system. Four persons wearing Draeger 

self-contained breathing apparatus entered the working area to 

connect a flex-line to the vent line and place the flex-line over 

the hole. Air samples from the vent line indicated explosive 

mixture at seven percent of the LEL and carbon monoxide at 35 

ppm. All personnel exited the tunnel by 1930 hours and the 

portal gate was locked. 

On 29 August, tunnel areas near the Red Shack were checked. 

An SLA party traveled to the 01 drift to remove an experiment. 

113 
Later, an attempt was made to sample gas from the reentry heading 

and from the zero point side of the TAPS door. Party members 

were unable to get a sample from the reentry heading because air 

pressure was lacking, but were able to pump a sample from the 

line at the TAPS door. Toxic gas surveys indicated concentrations of 4,300 ppm carbon monoxide and 1,800 ppm carbon dioxide. 

At approximately 1100 hours, it was decided that because there 

was no pressure on the zero point side of the TAPS door the 

opportunity should be taken to remove the gas sampling plug from 

the TAPS door. This would provide a 1 l/2-inch diameter hole 

into the void instead of the l/4-inch diameter hole then available. The task was performed by personnel wearing Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus. No problems were experienced 

during this operation, which lasted approximately 20 minutes. At 

1415 hours, personnel began pumping water out of the drill hole 

at the reentry heading. During this operation, air quality 

checks reflected concentrations approaching 60 percent of the LEL 

and 2,000 ppm carbon monoxide. After the hole was drained, a 

closed ventilation system was reestablished with exhaust pumped 

through the vent line. The vent line was then sampled about 

every half hour throughout the night. 

During the morning of 30 August, two REECo industrial 

hygiene personnel performed a survey of the tunnel because a 

noxious odor could be smelled in the area from the Radsafe 

station to the reentry drift heading. All working areas were 

checked for the presence of hydrogen sulfide, but none was 

detected. The gas sample line had been modified so that samples 

could be taken from the collar pipe in the drill hole to monitor 

gases coming from the LOS pipe. Because this system was 

available and the odor had not been identified, the DOD 

representative in charge elected to continue efforts to identify 

the odor, remove people from the tunnel, and allow tunnel entry 

only when necessary. 

114 
On 5 September, preparations were made to resume the mining 

operation. Two personnel again took samples in an effort to 

identify the noxious odor experienced the previous week. No 

further problems were noted during swing shift, but graveyard 

shift personnel detected the odor while drilling probe holes 

toward the LOS pipe. A face-mask requirement was instituted. 

On 12 September, work to drill through the LOS pipe wall 

continued. A hole was drilled into the lower portion of the 

pipe, and water and a noxious odor were encountered. Drillers 

were wearing supplied-air masks and the Radsafe monitor wore a 

face mask with MSA Type N canister. Work was stopped except for 

pumping water into tank-type mine cars and moving these cars to 

the portal for dumping. This work was performed by personnel 

wearing masks and supplied air equipment. 

On 13 September, mining resumed in the reentry heading with 

no evidence of the odor, and the mask requirement was removed. 

The drift face was drilled during swing shift and the odor 

occurred again in the work area. Face masks again were required 

until the odor dissipated. 

The LOS pipe was reached on 14 September. Personnel cutting 

into the pipe wore full-face masks with self-contained breathing 

apparatus. Water four to six inches deep was present in the 

pipe, as well as the noxious odor previously discussed. Work was 

discontinued until REECo industrial hygiene and SLA personnel 

collected more air and water samples. After taking samples, the 

hole into the pipe was enlarged to three feet by five feet to 

provide access into the LOS pipe. A miner wearing hip boots, a 

rubber coat, and a full-face mask with supplied air entered the 

LOS pipe to install a sump pump behind the TAPS door. 

Routine mining operations continued until 2 November when 

drilling of a probe hole (the first of two) was begun in an 

115 
effort to delineate the cavity radius. All personnel working at 

the drill face wore supplied-air breathing apparatus. Maximum 

readings were 5 mrad/h, a trace of carbon monoxide, and 3 to 20 

percent of the LEL at the second probe hole on 13 November 1972. 

Drilling of the two holes was completed, and work in the U12t.02 

drift was discontinued on 16 November 1972. 

3.4.4 Postevent Drilling Activities on Rainier Mesa 

Postevent drilling toward the underground zero point from 

the surface of Rainier Mesa was delayed due to problems with the 

drilling rig, finally beginning at 0047 hours on 26 August 1972. 

The maximum exposure rate detected during drilling operations was 

0.5 mrad/h from 0700 hours to 1600 hours at PS-1A on 28 August. 

Core sampling operations were conducted from 1725 hours on 27 

August to 1615 hours on 28 August. Eighteen samples were 

collected, with a maximum gamma reading for a single core sample 

of 2.5 R/h. No alpha radiation was detected. The drill hole was 

cemented to the top at 0010 hours on 30 August after coring 

operations were completed. 

3.4.5 Industrial Safety 

Measurements of radiation levels, toxic gases, and explosive 

mixtures were made on each shift. These measurements were 

recorded in the Radsafe monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for mining and drilling, were 

established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. A 

written standard operating procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, toxic material, or any other operation 

with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved 

in such an operation was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedure. 

116 
The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

miners boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency provided 

its own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of McCaa two-hour breathing apparatus and had used Draeger self-contained breathing 

apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as outlined in 

the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

A. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

B. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

C. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

D. DIAMOND SCULLS Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1017 hours on 20 July 1972. 

The maximum gamma radiation level detected was 300 R/h at H+l 

minute by RAMS unit No. 31. This was attributed to neutron 

activation of the LOS pipe. No uncontained effluent was detected 

inside or outside the tunnel complex. All RAMS units had been 

secured by 1300 hours on 26 July. 

117 
The initial postevent survey began at 1145 hours and ended 

at 1600 hours on D-day. No radiation levels above background 

were detected. Initial tunnel reentry began at 1035 hours on D+l 

and was completed at 1319 hours. Maximum gamma radiation and 

toxic gas concentrations measured during this reentry were 0.05 

mR/h and 600 ppm carbon monoxide, respectively. No indications 

of explosive mixture were detected. Tunnel reentry and mining 

operations continued until 16 November 1972. Maximum readings 

were 10,000 ppm carbon monoxide and greater than 100 percent of 

the LEL during the drilling of a probe hole into the LOS pipe on 

28 August 1972. Beginning 30 August, a noxious odor was noted at 

times in the reentry heading. Because this odor was never 

identified, a face mask requirement was instituted when the odor 

occurred. After 14 September, the LOS pipe had been reached and 

supplied air apparatus was required at all times. 

Mesa postevent drilling began at 0047 hours on 26 August 

1972 and was completed at 0010 on 30 August 1972. The maximum 

gamma radiation measured was 2.5 R/h at contact with a single 

core sample. No alpha radiation was detected. 

Personnel gamma radiation exposures received during individual entries to DIAMOND SCULLS radex areas from 20 July 1972 to 

24 October 1972 are summarized below. The average exposures are 

from self-reading pocket dosimeter readings as recorded on Area 

Access Registers. No positive exposures were recorded by film 

dosimeters during these entries because the minimum reportable 

gamma exposure for NTS film dosimeters was 30 mR per film packet. 

Average 

No. of Entries Exposure 

Logged (mR) 

All Participants 943 0.05 

DOD Participants 51 0.10 

There were 

exposures which 

no cumulative whole body external or internal 

exceeded established limits. 

118 
CHAPTER 4 

DID0 QUEEN EVENT 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

DID0 QUEEN was a DOD-sponsored underground test detonated at 

1000 hours PDT on 5 June 1973 with a yield less than 20 kt. The 

device was detonated in E tunnel (U12e.14 drift, see Figure 4.1) 

at a vertical depth of 1,284 feet. The objective of this test 

was to determine the response of materials and equipment to a 

nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and 

contractors conducted 37 projects to obtain the desired weapons 

effects information. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent was detected by surface or airborne 

monitoring systems. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all DID0 QUEEN project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DNA, and AEC/NVOO. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments, or delivering them to the installation contractor. After the event, these agencies were 

119 
L I 

FEET 

Figure 4.1 DID0 QUEEN Event - Tunnel Layout 
responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample 

data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LLL fielded 

the device, the LLL Test Group Director was responsible for 

radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

prior to the event. This responsibility was in effect from 

device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the Test 

Controller relieved the LLL Test Group Director of responsibility* When the Test Controller had determined that venting had not 

occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological safety in 

the test event area to the DOD Test Group Director. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

Mining the U12e.14 drift permitted the reuse of many 

facilities installed for previous events. Additional 

facilities required for DID0 QUEEN were the experiment 

and bypass drifts, a new OBP with a gas blocking alcove, 

a gas seal plug between the OBP and the ga.s seal door, 

and new facilities for a second LOS pipe for high fluence recoverable (HFR) experiments. Also included were 

a new Rainier Mesa HFR trailer park and a new vertical 

downhole cable run. The U12e.14 drift complex consisted 

of the main experiment (LOS pipe) drift (1,065 feet 

long), a bypass drift connected by crosscuts to the main 

LOS pipe drift, and an auxiliary LOS pipe drift (see 

Figure 4.1). The bypass drift in conjunction with its 

crosscuts provided: (1) access for installation of the 

DNA Auxiliary Closures (DACs); (2) access for experiment 

121 
installation in the test chambers; (3) access to alcove 

space used by experimenters to house power supplies, 

contain signal conditioning equipment, and provide 

experiment preparation working space (called the "Dance 

Hall"); (4) capability for early grouting around the 

main LOS pipe prior to device installation; (5) access 

for experiment installation in the HFR LOS pipe: and (6) 

access for device installation. 

Cables used by experimenters were routed from Mesa 

trailers through the Mesa splice shack, into the 

underground cable alcove, through gas blocks, then along 

the right rib of the previous HUDSON MOON event 

(U12e.12) reentry drift, through the OBP and a gas 

blocking alcove, and across the bypass drift in a trench 

to the Dance Hall. 

Multiconductor and coaxial cables were laid in elevated 

metal trays from the Mesa splice shack to the 21 instrumentation trailers which were arranged in clusters at 

the E tunnel main Mesa trailer park. These trailers, 

along with instrumentation trailers at the HFR pad and 

at the portal, were shock-mounted and electrically 

isolated from the ground. Mesa and HFR pad instrumentation trailers contained oscilloscopes, tape recorders, 

and oscillographs on which diagnostic data were 

recorded. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with AEC 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support, air sampling, and telemetry. 

122 
Prior to the test event, detailed radiological safety 

reentry plans were prepared and issued to participating 

agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform surface initial radiation surveys, 

conduct aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in 

reentry parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were 

standing by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform 

surveys and provide emergency support as directed: provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, 

portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. y Telemetr 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 41 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for the DID0 

QUEEN event as shown in Table 4.1 and Figures 4.2 and 

4.3. A single air sampling unit was placed near each 

portal (the U12e main portal and the U12es portal). All 

RAMS units and the two air sampling units were installed 

a minimum of five days prior to scheduled device 

detonation. 

123 
TABLE 4.1 

DID0 QUEEN EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

5 June 1973 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

SURFACE 

From U12es (new) portal: 

195 feet at N 66" W azimuth (at vent filter system) 

195 feet at N 66' W azimuth (at vent filter system) 

195 feet at N 66" W azimuth (at vent filter system) 

898 feet at N 13' E azimuth 

572 feet at N 62O E azimuth 

476 feet at S 71° E azimuth 

382 feet at S 22O E azimuth 

415 feet at S 34' W azimuth 

492 feet at N 44O W azimuth 

870 feet at N 22" W azimuth 

1,290 feet at N 31' E azimuth 

1,885 feet at N 89" E azimuth 

981 feet at S 59O E azimuth 

940 feet at S 49" W azimuth 

1,630 feet at N 32" W azimuth 

End of tunnel drain line (at new portal) 

From the Mesa cable splice shack: 

Cable splice shack 

209 feet at N 04O E azimuth 

275 feet at S 88O E azimuth 

190 feet at S 08" E azimuth 

235 feet at S 87" W azimuth 

From SGZ unless otherwise indicated: 

443 feet at S 89O E azimuth 

459 feet at S 39O W azimuth 

561 feet at N 29" W azimuth 

510 feet at N 39O E azimuth at HFR cable downhole 

124 
TABLE 4.1 (Concluded) 

Station Location 

UNDERGROUND 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35ER* 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41ER* 

42 

43 

44 

4s 

46 

From the U12e.06 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

1,240 feet into U12e.14 LOS drift 

1,095 feet into U12e.14 LOS drift 

1,170 feet into U12e.14 bypass drift 

900 feet into U12e.14 drift 

900 feet into U12e.14 drift 

450 feet into U12e.14 drift 

700 feet into U12e.06 drift from the U12e main drift 

500 feet into U12e.12 reentry drift from the U12e.12 

main drift 

From the U12e portal unless otherwise indicated: 

Cable alcove (at main drift/06 drift junction) 

3,800 feet into U12e main drift 

3,800 feet into U12e main drift 

3,575 feet into U12e main drift 

3,300 feet into U12e main drift 

1,950 feet into U12e bypass drift 

50 feet into U12e main drift 

90 feet into U12es main drift from the U2es portal 

*ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h (to 

100,000 R/h). 

125 
126 
127 
EPA personnel operated 48 air sampling stations and 30 

gamma rate recorder stations in the offsite area. 

Twenty-two personnel were fielded for offsite surveillance. 

D. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or 

control stations for issue of stay-in badges or issue 

and return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's 

around the 

Operations 

Plan," contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not connected with this event out of the controlled 

area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

One UH-1F and two UH-1N helicopters with USAF pilots and 

crews were available to provide aerial support for 

closed-circuit television coverage, cloud surveillance 

(should venting occur), and security sweeps. One of 

these also was on standby for the Test Controller's use 

if needed. EPA provided one Turbo Beech aircraft, 

pilot, and crew to be airborne for cloud tracking and 

sampling, if required, and one on standby at McCarran 

Airport in Las Vegas if needed. 

128 
4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

The first mandatory full participation (MFP) dry run was 

conducted on 15 May 1973 at 0940 hours. Thirty minutes prior to 

the dry run zero time, there was a one-hour delay to allow time 

for the timing and firing microwave receiver to be replaced in 

the timing and firing van on the Mesa. The 20-minute countdown 

began at 1040 hours and included several holds before its 

completion. Shortly after the first run was finished, a second 

run was scheduled for 1530 hours. The problems which occurred 

during the first run were solved before the second run began. 

The second run was successfully completed without complications 

or holds. 

The LLL full-power full-frequency (FPFF) dry run was then 

scheduled for 1500 hours on 16 May 1973. This countdown was completed after one five-minute hold. After solving some problems, 

another FPFF was successfully completed on 17 May 1973. 

On 4 June, after several holds due to technical problems, 

the full dry run (FDR) was successfully completed. A readiness 

briefing was held at 1430 hours. Conditions were found to be 

favorable and a detonation time of 0900 hours on 5 June was 

established. Another readiness briefing at 2130 hours confirmed 

the scheduled detonation time. 

4.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

Routine security sweeps and experimenter button-up operations were performed. Device arming began approximately four 

hours prior to scheduled device detonation. The 0700-hour readiness briefing indicated favorable winds. Problems with button-up 

activities caused a delay of one hour in device detonation. 

129 
DID0 QUEEN zero time was 1000 hours PDT on 5 June 1973. 

A geophone system was used to monitor postevent seismic 

disturbances. Signals were routed to CP-1 for audible and 

recorded readout. 

4.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry began at 1001 hours on D-day. RAMS units' located 

along the LOS pipe responded to neutron activation of the LOS 

pipe and its contents. At 1001 hours, RAMS unit Nos. 31 and 32 

indicated greater than 1,000 R/h (gamma). At 1010 hours, unit 

No. 31 was still reading greater than 1,000 R/h, but No. 32 had 

decreased to 150 R/h. These two units and No. 34 (29 mR/h) were 

the only units with readings above background levels at 1010 

hours. RAMS unit No. 31 became inoperative at 1030 hours. No 

indications of radioactive effluent release were detected by the 

underground, surface, or airborne monitoring systems. Stations 1 

through 25 on the surface indicated only background readings from 

1001 hours until telemetry was secured. All telemetry was 

secured at 1000 hours on 18 June 1973. 

4.3.2 Trailer Parks and Portal Initial Radiation Survey and 

Reentry Activities 

The Rainier Mesa trailer parks initial radiation surveys 

were conducted between 1025 and 1240 hours. Team No. 1 conducted 

a survey of the main trailer area between 1025 and 1111 hours, 

and team No. 2 conducted a survey of the HFR trailer park between 

1106 and 1240 hours. All radiation readings were background. 

The portal initial radiation survey was conducted between 

1041 and 1130 hours with a maximum of 0.07 mrad/h (beta plus 

gamma) detected in the general portal area. Figure 4.4 shows the 

U12es tunnel portal. Recovery teams were released to perform 

130 

their assigned functions at 1054 hours. At 1105 hours, an SLA 

health physicist authorized surface reentry and data recovery 

teams to proceed without wearing anticontamination clothing. 

Gas sampling drain valve operations and ventilation to the 

portal face of the gas seal plug were accomplished by 1300 hours. 

Gas chromatograph sampling was conducted between 1310 and 1337 

hours. No radioactive or toxic gases were detected in the underground complex. Tunnel ventilation began at 1445 hours, and 

ventilation to the gas seal door was established at 1457 hours. 

4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery Activities 

Reentry team No. 1 entered the tunnel at 1002 hours on 6 

June (D+l), wearing anticontamination clothing and Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus. Members of team No. 2 also were 

dressed in anticontamination clothing and standing by for deployment as needed. Team No. 1 reached the gas seal door at approximately 1017 hours, and radiation readings of 0.2 mR/h were 

observed but no indications of explosive mixture or toxic gases 

were encountered. The team proceeded through the gas seal access 

door and continued toward the gas seal plug, reaching it at 1036 

hours. No indication of toxic gas or explosive mixture was 

found, and the radiation reading was background. Ventilation was 

reestablished and this area became a fresh air station. Selfcontained breathing apparatus was no longer required from the 

portal to the gas seal plug, and Team No. 1 removed their 

breathing gear. Air and water samples were collected remotely 

from the zero point side of the gas seal plug. The team started 

back to the portal at 1230 hours, reaching it at 1250 hours. 

132 
Reentry team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1310 hours and proceeded to the gas seal plug where they donned Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus, passed through the gas seal plug, 

and continued into the tunnel complex to check the status of the 

cable alcove and the OBP. Team No. 3 was dressed out and standing by. Radiation levels continued at background, and no explosive mixture or carbon monoxide was detected; however, 800 ppm 

carbon dioxide was measured on the portal side of the OBP. 

Between 1506 and 1530 hours, both the 24- and 36-inch doors of 

the manway through the OBP were opened. After reinstalling the 

vent line at the OBP, all personnel returned to the gas seal plug 

at 1553 hours and from there exited the tunnel at 1616 hours. 

The portal gate was locked at 1640 hours. Vent line filters 

(located exterior to the portal) were checked every half hour. 

At the request of an SLA health physicist, explosive mixture and 

toxic gas readings were taken every hour during swing and graveyard shifts as a precautionary measure. 

Reentry team No. 1 (accompanied by a rescue team) entered 

the tunnel at 0835 hours on 7 June with self-contained breathing 

apparatus and traveled to the OBP. Measurements taken from the 

zero point side of the OBP at 0935 hours indicated radiation 

levels of 1 mrad/h with no evidence of toxic gases or explosive 

mixture. The team members donned their Draeger self-contained 

breathing apparatus, passed through the OBP, and continued 

through the tunnel complex to the junction of the LOS and bypass 

drifts. Readings taken at this junction indicated 20 percent of 

the LEL. After the explosimeter used was checked to make sure it 

was operating properly, the area was surveyed a second time and 

no evidence of explosive mixture was detected. Vent lines in 

both drifts were checked for damage, but only the one in the LOS 

pipe drift. required repair work. A radiation level of 0.2 mR/h 

was measured. Team members continued to survey the area for 

damage and hazards while waiting for a piece of flex-line to be 

brought in to repair the vent line. Readings taken at 1003 hours 

133 
in the Dance Hall area reflected a 20 percent oxygen level, 0.2 

mrad/h, and no evidence of toxic gases or explosive mixt,ure. 

Crosscut No. 1 was inspected and found to have considerable 

damage. Team members removed sandbags in this crosscut and at 

the entrance to test chamber No. 1. Measurements indicating 15 

percent of the LEL, 50 ppm carbon monoxide, 800 ppm carbon 

dioxide, and 0.2 mR/h were obtained in crosscut No. 1. The team 

departed for the portal at 1119 hours. 

Reentry team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1135 hours and 

arrived at the OBP at 1145 hours. After donning Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus, team members passed through the 

OBP to inspect the high-strength grout plug which they reached at 

1226 hours. A radiation level of 20 mrad/h was measured. The 

air inside the 24-inch vent line in the high-strength grout plug 

measured 80 percent of the LEL. The permanent vent line was 

reinstalled. At 1330 hours, the vent line was resampled on the 

portal side of the OBP. Measurements indicated 5 percent of the 

LEL, 25 ppm carbon monoxide, 1,000 ppm carbon dioxide, and 20 

percent oxygen. After air flow through the vent line was 

established, concentrations were reduced to 15 ppm carbon 

monoxide and 600 ppm carbon dioxide, with no evidence of any 

explosive mixture. At 1500 hours, a reading of 1 R/h was 

detected in the work area on top of the LOS pipe. The maximum 

radiation level detected in the area around test chamber No. 1 

was 1.1 R/h. Radiation exposure levels decreased with increased 

distance from the test chamber, indicating neutron activation of 

the LOS pipe rather than stemming failure. The doorway to test 

chamber No. 1 was opened at 1516 hours and a radiation reading of 

1.2 R/h was detected at arm's length inside the LOS pipe. No 

evidence of an explosive mixture was detected. Team No. 2 exited 

the tunnel at 1554 hours. At 1630 hours, 18 miners, accompanied 

by a Radsafe monitor, began work to mine out the gas seal plug. 

This work continued on an around-the-clock basis until the task 

was completed. 

134 
On 8 June, reentry team members, dressed in double sets of 

anticontamination clothing, departed from the OBP at 0930 hours 

and proceeded to test chamber No. 1 (see Figure 4.5). A radiation survey, taken at the zero point end of test chamber No. 1 

at 0955 hours, showed a radiation level of 900 mR/h. After 

obtaining this measurement, team members moved inside the LOS 

pipe to the zero point end of test chamber No. 2 where a reading 

of 700 mR/h was obtained at 0958 hours. Team members then 

traveled to the TAPS door which was found to be ajar approximately one inch. Readings of 7 mR/h, 75 ppm carbon monoxide, and 

5 percent of the LEL were observed at the TAPS. Team members 

then began to proceed back through the LOS pipe, reaching test 

chamber No. 2 at 1015 hours. A radiation reading taken at the 

center of test chamber No. 2 was 1.4 R/h, and a reading taken at 

the doorway was 500 mR/h. Returning to test chamber No. 1, a 

reading of 4 R/h was observed near one of the experiments at 1023 

hours. 

By 1038 hours, team members had reached the LOS pipe 

drift/bypass drift junction, and were preparing to walk through 

the bypass drift. No problems were encountered in the bypass 

drift and all personnel had returned to the zero point side of 

the OBP by 1056 hours. Team members removed one set of anticontamination clothing before returning to the portal side of the 

OBP at 1109 hours. Exit from the tunnel began at 1112 hours. 

This completed initial reentries into the E tunnel complex. A 

Radsafe station was established at the pipefitters' alcove to 

control entry to and exit from the LOS pipe drift. No 

anticontamination clothing requirements were in effect on the 

portal side of the Radsafe station. From 1300 to 1430 hours, LLL 

and DNA photo parties entered the LOS pipe drift for 

documentation purposes. 

From 9 to 11 June, work to remove the OBP was conducted. 

Cleanup and rehabilitation of the bypass drift and Dance Hall 

135 
KEY 

ZERO POINT 

NOT TO SCALE 

HFR = HIGH FLUENCE RECOVERABLE 

TAPS - TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

TC = TEST CHAMBER 

OBP = OVERBURDEN PLUG 

LOS = LINE OF SIGHT 

Figure 4.5 DID0 QUEEN Event - LOS, HFR, & Bypass Drifts 
area prior to experiment recovery operations also were in 

progress. Between 1130 and 1320 hours on 11 June, five LLL 

representatives entered the LOS pipe drift to recover experiments 

from the pipe stubs at the portal end of test chamber No. 1. 

Single pairs of coveralls, boots, and gloves were the anticontamination clothing requirement; respirators were not required. 

At 1330 hours, an SLA health physicist and a DNA representative, 

accompanied by two Radsafe monitors, entered the LOS pipe and 

traveled to test chamber No. 2. Entry of the team was necessary 

to check the condition of the scatterer station and to establish 

ventilation into the station. Each person entering the LOS pipe 

wore coveralls (with openings taped), two pairs of boots and 

gloves, a hood, and a full-face respirator with Type N canister. 

About 200 to 500 ppm carbon monoxide, 5 percent of the LEL, and 

20 percent oxygen concentration were measured along the back of 

the LOS pipe. 

These same conditions were found at the .scatterer No. 2 pipe 

stub. An SLA health physicist entered the pipe stub area to 

check the air in the scatterer station. Five to ten percent of 

the LEL, 200 to 250 ppm carbon monoxide, and 18 to 19 percent 

oxygen were detected inside the station. After about five 

minutes, the task was completed and the SLA health physicist 

exited the pipe stub. The station appeared to be in excellent 

condition. Team members next walked to the TAPS plug to view a 

piece of metal which had prevented the TAPS door from fully 

closing. Team members returned to test chamber No. 2, performed 

a radiation survey, then traveled to test chamber No. 1 to 

perform a radiation survey at that location. Radiation levels 

measured in the LOS pipe during these operations were: 

Outside test chamber No. 1 - 10 mR/h 

Outside scatterer No. 1 - 20 mR/h 

Test chamber No. 1, inside station - 150 mR/h 

137 
Test chamber No. 1 experiments (average near contact) - 400 

mR/h 

Test chamber No. 1 experiments (maximum near contact) - 1'.5 

R/h 

LOS pipe between test chamber Nos. 1 and 2 - 6 mR/h 

Test chamber No. 2 (exposure rate inside test chamber) - 140 

mR/h 

Test chamber No. 2 experiments (average near contact) - 400 

mR/h 

Test chamber No. 1 experiments (maximum near contact) - 1 

R/h 

LOS pipe between test chamber No. 2 and TAPS - 1 mR/h 

TAPS door (maximum near contact) - 6 mR/h 

Boeing experiment, test chamber No. 1 (maximum near contact) 

- 250 mR/h 

Ventilation was established inside the LOS pipe during swing 

shift. Flex-line was brought through an 18-inch port on the 

bottom of the LOS pipe to the zero point side of test chamber No. 

1 and extended along the floor of the LOS pipe to test chamber 

No. 2. During this time, rehabilitation work in the Dance Hall 

and bypass drift continued. 

On 12 June at 0030 hours, miners began sandbagging a walkway 

in the LOS pipe drift and clearing the train tracks in the bypass 

drift. The LOS pipe was opened for experiment recoveries from 

test chamber No. 1 and scatterer No. 1. Recovery personnel each 

wore two pairs of coveralls, gloves, and boots, and a hood; those 

entering test chamber No. 1 additionally wore a respirator with a 

dust filter. Each person working at scatterer No. 1 or outside 

the LOS pipe at test chamber No. 1 wore a single pair of coveralls, boots, and gloves. No anticontamination clothing requirements were in effect for persons working in the alcoves or for 

miners working in the bypass drift and Dance Hall. Organizations 

represented during this reentry included Lockheed Missile and 

138 
Space Corporation (LMSC), LLL, SLA, Hughes Aircraft Co. (HAC), 

DNA, Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Kaman Sciences Corporation 

(KSC), Raytheon, AVCO, Boeing, and Physics International (PI)* 

Maximum survey readings were 500 ppm carbon dioxide and 10 mR/h 

at test chamber No. 1 at 1600 hours. 

Experiment recovery continued on 13 June from test chamber 

Nos. 1 and 2, and scatterer No. 1. Anticontamination clothing 

required for each of the recovery personnel included one pair of 

coveralls and a hood, two pairs of gloves and boots, and either 

an Acme or MSA face mask. Recovery personnel included representatives of LMSC, DNA, KSC, General Electric (GE), LLL, SLA, AFWL, 

and Intelcom Rad Tech (IRT). At 1300 hours, a fire started in 

scatterer alcove No. 1. All personnel were evacuated from the 

LOS pipe drift until the fire was extinguished, the smoke 

cleared, and the area surveyed. Work resumed in test chamber No. 

1 at 1345 hours and at scatterer No. 1 at 1445 hours. At 1745 

hours, personnel checked the TAPS to determine how the TAPS door 

could be raised. Concentrations of 15 percent of the LEL and 500 

ppm carbon monoxide were measured on the zero point side of the 

TAPS door. Since there was no way to determine if this sample 

was representative, it was decided to wait at least until 15 June 

to begin pumping compressed air into the TAPS area, allowing the 

pressure to be bled off into the vent line during the following 

weekend. Experiments in test chamber No. 1 were surveyed and the 

maximum radiation level was 2.5 R/h at contact with one of the 

experiments. The personnel exposure rate was 100 to 150 mR/h in 

the area. At 1830 hours, the ventilation system was turned off 

to repair a fan line at the gas seal plug. All personnel were 

evacuated from the zero point side of the OBP while air was not 

circulating. Ventilation was reestablished at 2300 hours after 

the fan line repair was completed. 

Experiment recovery activities in the LOS pipe and at scatterer station No. 1 continued during the early morning hours and 

139 
throughout the day on 14 June. Each person entering the LOS pipe 

wore a single pair of coveralls and a hood, two pairs of gloves, 

two pairs of boots, and a full-face mask. Each person working at 

scatterer station No. 1 was required to wear only a single pair 

of coveralls, shoe covers, and gloves. Organizations represented 

during these activities were LMSC, HAC, LASL, SLA, IRT, LLL, GE, 

PI, MDAC, EG&G, and DNA. At 0835 hours, three Radsafe monitors 

traveled to the TAPS door to check for the presence of toxic 

gases or any explosive mixture. Gas concentration levels on the 

zero point side of the TAPS door were 110 ppm carbon monoxide, 

1,600 ppm carbon dioxide, and 21 percent oxygen; the radiation 

level was 6 mR/h. Survey of one experiment indicated the 

possible presence of alpha contamination. All personnel were 

evacuated from the LOS pipe until the situation could be assessed. Swipes were taken from the surrounding area and analyzed 

for alpha contamination, but none was detected. Personnel were 

allowed to return to work at 1245 hours with no change in 

anticontamination clothing requirements. At 1400 hours, a barricade was placed to block access to test chamber No. 1. Experiment recoveries were nearly completed that day, and all recovery 

personnel were out of the tunnel complex by 1600 hours. 

Rehabilitation efforts continued in the bypass drift. 

Cleanup work continued in crosscut No. 2 on 15 June from 

0015 to 0530 hours. At 0800 hours, two LMSC personnel, accompanied by Radsafe monitors and dressed in double sets of anticontamination clothing, entered the test area. From 0900 to 1635 

hours, personnel representing LMSC, LLL, SLA, and FC/DNA entered 

the test area. Work continued on removal of an experiment from 

test chamber No. 1. After this work was completed for the day, 

test chamber No. 1 was sealed, and compressed air was bled off 

through a small hole in the center of the TAPS door. This 

operation continued throughout the weekend. 

140 
During graveyard shift on 18 June, miners continued working 

in the Dance Hall and at crosscut No. 2 in the bypass drift. 

Surveys in these areas indicated 800 ppm carbon dioxide, 0.06 

mrad/h, and no evidence of explosive mixture in the Dance Hall; 

and 1,000 ppm carbon dioxide, 60 ppm carbon monoxide, 0.05 

mrad/h, and no evidence of explosive mixture in the bypass drift 

at crosscut No. 2. At 0850 hours, recovery personnel began 

dressing in anticontamination clothing to enter test chamber No. 

1 and remove the remaining two major experiments. Each person 

working in the test chamber wore double coveralls, boots, and 

gloves: a hood: and a full-face mask with dust filter. Roth 

experiments were removed from the test chamber by 1200 hours. 

Miners continued working in crosscut No. 2 for the remainder of 

the day. 

4.4.2 Postevent Mining 

On 19 June 1973, reentry mining to evaluate the performance 

of the TAPS and the DNA auxiliary closures and to recover experiments from the HFR station began. This work continued, without 

interruption, until 5 June 1974. During this time, several seams 

of radioactive material were encountered. Precautions (i.e., 

anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment, 

as needed) were taken to protect personnel. 

On 22 June, pipefitters and miners raised the TAPS door 

enough to allow access to the zero point side of the door. A 

damage and hazard survey of the LOS pipe on the zero point side 

of the TAPS was conducted. No indications of explosive mixture 

or toxic gases were detected, and the maximum radiation reading 

was 13 mR/h. The LOS pipe was closed off approximately 100 feet 

on the zero point side of the door. Each person involved in this 

survey wore a single pair of coveralls, a hood, two pairs of 

boots and gloves, and a full-face mask with supplied air. 

141 
Between 2 August and 7 September, drilling to probe the DID0 

QUEEN chimney and cavity and mining of the HFR reentry drift 

continued. On 7 September, an exploratory hole was drilled from 

the reentry heading face toward the HFR station. All personnel 

were dressed in anticontamination clothing and full-face masks 

with supplied air. 

On 21 September, miners broke through into the HFR LOS 

drift. Instrumentation was recovered from the HFR station on 8 

October. Recovery personnel wore full anticontamination clothing 

and supplied-air respiratory protection gear. A security gate 

was constructed at crosscut No. 1 which was closed and locked 

until after the detonation of the HUSKY ACE event. 

The reentry drift was reopened on 5 November. Work to 

reestablish ventilation, air, and water lines was performed. 

Water had to be pumped from several of the crosscuts. 

During mining operations on 6 November, an odor which 

smelled very faintly of ammonia was noticed in an HFR reentry 

crosscut. Ventilation to the area was increased because many 

workers were complaining of headaches. Industrial hygiene 

personnel were requested to take samples to attempt to identify 

the odor, but the odor was never identified. 

On 9 November, experiment removal from the HFR station 

began. Each person in the area wore two sets of anticontamination clothing and supplied-air breathing appraratus. The 

exposure rate one foot from the experiments was 50 mR/h. On 13 

November, experimenters were given permission to enter the HFR. 

Each experimenter wore a single pair of coveralls and two pairs 

of shoe covers and gloves: no face masks or hoods were required. 

Several people knelt on the brattice cloth pad in the HFR and 

contaminated their street clothing, so a requirement of two pairs 

of coveralls was instituted. No other problems were encountered. 

142 
The radiation exposure rate was 30 mR/h. Recovery work in the 

HFR heading was discontinued for one week at Thanksgiving, 

restarting 26 November. Work to remove one experiment with difficult logistics problems continued until it was successfully removed on 29 November. During removal of this experiment, each 

person dressed in two sets of anticontamination clothing, a hood, 

and a full-face mask with supplied air. Other recovery work 

continued after this date. Experiment recovery from the HFR 

drift was completed on 5 December. 

Cleanup activities were conducted during the month of 

January 1974. Throughout February, miners worked in the area of 

DAC No. 1, mining around the housing for the DAC so it could be 

removed and repaired for future use. Each miner was required to 

wear one pair of coveralls, gloves, and shoe covers or miners 

boots. No contamination problems were experienced. 

Crosscut No. 7A was mined out from 19 March to 5 April. On 

5 April, experiments were removed from the crosscut, completing 

work in this area. During these activities, the maximum exposure 

rate measured was 5.5 mrad/h. 

Some additional evaluation work was performed during October 

1974. No radiation problems were encountered. 

4.4.3 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling from the Rainier Mesa toward the underground zero point began at 1100 hours on 29 August 1973. The 

maximum exposure rate detected during drilling operations at PS-1 

was 0.06 mrad/h. No alpha radiation, evidence of explosive 

mixture, or toxic gases were detected. The drill hole was capped 

at 1355 hours on September 13. 

143 
4.4.4 Industrial Safety 

Surveys to measure radiation, toxic gas, and explosive 

mixture levels were made each shift. These measurements were 

then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including those for mining, tunneling, and drilling, were 

established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. A 

written standard operating procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, toxic materials, radioactive material, 

or any other operation with a potential for personal injury. 

Each individual involved in these operations was required to know 

the contents of the applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and tunnel were mandatory hard 

hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, miners 

boots or toe guards). Each participating agency provided its own 

safety equipment. Each participant in tunnel reentry operations 

was certified by the Bureau of Mines as having successfully completed training in the use of the two-hour McCaa breathing apparatus and had used the Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus. 

Standard safety rules and regulations, as spelled out in the 

"U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

A. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

B. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

C. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

144 
D. DIDO QUEEN Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

DID0 QUEEN telemetry measurements began at 1001 hours on 5 

June 1973. The maximum gamma exposure rate measured was greater 

than 1,000 R/h at underground RAMS unit Nos. 31 and 32 at 1001 

hours on D-day. This was an expected response to neutron 

activation of the LOS pipe. No effluent release was detected. 

Telemetry was secured at 1000 hours on 18 June 1973. 

The initial radiation survey teams entered the area at 1025 

hours and completed survey operations at 1240 hours on 5 June 

1973. Maximum radiation levels detected were background for the 

areas. No alpha radiation was detected. Remote air samples 

taken on 5 June 1973 and analyzed by gas chromatograph indicated 

the absence of any toxic gases or explosive mixture. 

Reentry of the tunnel began at 1002 hours on 6 June 1973. 

The maximum radiation measurement detected was 4 R/h near one of 

the experiments in test chamber No. 1 at 1023 hours on 8 June 

1973. During the reentry, maximum air concentrations of 15 

percent LEL, 500 ppm carbon monoxide, and 1000 ppm carbon dioxide 

were detected at various survey points along the reentry route. 

No alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent mining began on 19 June 1973 and continued until 5 

June 1974. The maximum radiation level measured was 13 mrad/h in 

145 
the LOS pipe, zero point side of the TAPS, on 22 June 1973. No 

alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent drilling began at 1100 hours on 29 August 1973. 

The maximum radiation level detected during drilling operations 

at PS-1 was 0.06 mrad/h. No alpha radiation was detected. The 

drill hole was capped at 1355 hours on 13 September 1973. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DID0 QUEEN radex areas from 5 June 1973 to 16 October 1974 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR1 (mR) 

All Participants 5,055 495 4 

DOD Participants 410 495 12 

146 
CHAPTER 5 

HUSKY ACE EVENT 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

HUSKY ACE was a DOD-sponsored underground test detonated at 

1000 hours PDT on 12 October 1973 with a yield less than 20 kt. 

The device was detonated in N tunnel (U12n.07 drift, see Figure 

5.1) at a vertical depth of 1,356 feet. The objective of this 

test was to determine the response of materials and equipment to 

a nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and 

contractors conducted 29 projects to obtain the desired weapons 

effects information. 

Stemming was successful and containment complete. No 

radioactive effluent was released to the atmosphere. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all HUSKY ACE project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DNA, and AEC/NVOO. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments, or delivering them to the installation contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample 

data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

147 
I 

148 
Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LASL 

fielded the device, the LASL Test Group Director was responsible 

for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero 

point prior to the event. This responsibility was in effect from 

device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the Test 

Controller relieved the LASL Test Group Director of responsibility. When the Test Controller had determined that venting had 

not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological safety 

in the test event area to the DOD Test Group Director. 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

The first HUSKY ACE planning meeting was held at HQ/DNA 

on 9 and 10 May 1972, and the initial project officers' 

meeting was held 31 August and 1 September at NTS. 

Utilizing the U12n.07 drift enabled DNA to reuse 200 

feet of a previously mined drift as the beginning of the 

LOS pipe drift and approximately 520 feet of previously 

mined drift as the start of the bypass drift. HUSKY ACE 

used all common facilities of the N tunnel complex including portal equipment, main tunnel, Mesa trailer 

park, and the downhole instrumentation cable system with 

few, if any, modifications. A new overburden plug (OBP) 

and gas seal plug were constructed for this event. 

According to the DOD Test Execution Report for DID0 

QUEEN, most of the hardware concepts and technologies 

used on HUSKY ACE were evolutions and refinements of 

those used in previous DOD tests. The vacuum pipe, muffler, TAPS, test chambers, experiment mounting methods, 

149 
and vacuum monitoring and pump control were all similar 

to those developed for, and used in, prior programs. 

The vacuum pumps had been used for DIAMOND SCULLS, recovered, and reused for HUSKY ACE. 

Mining of the experiment drift began on 21 August 1972. 

The first 300 feet were mined 16 feet wide by 16 feet 

high using conventional mining techniques. Mining 

operations for the experiment drift were completed on 3 

November 1972. Two access drifts were mined from the 

bypass drift to the experiment drift. Crosscuts were 

mined in the vicinity of test chamber Nos. 2 and 3. 

These subsequently were divided into experimenter 

alcoves. 

Large components for the HUSKY ACE test bed facility 

were shipped by truck from their point of manufacture to 

the U12n portal. At the portal, each component was offloaded and transported by special transport carriage into the U12n.07 drift. 

Installation of the LOS pipe, electrical equipment, experiment cables to the cable alcove from the Mesa, and 

pipe stubs was completed in June 1973. Signal dry runs 

(SDRs) began on 21 August and generally were held every 

working day with a minimum of two per week being designated as mandatory runs. Experiment installation was 

completed on 6 September. A successful mandatory full 

participation (MFP) dry run was held on 25 September. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with AEC 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

150 
representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and 

equipment support, air sampling, and telemetry. 

Prior to the test event, detailed radiological safety 

reentry plans were prepared and issued to participating 

agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys and 

conduct aerial surveys by helicopter, and to participate 

in reentry parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also 

were standing by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed; 

provide and issue anticontamination equipment and 

material, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate 

area control check stations; and perform personnel, 

equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included hoods, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face masks, 

supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, plastic 

bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

c. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 42 temporary RAMS 

units provided surface and underground coverage for the 

HUSKY ACE event as shown in Table 5.1 and Figures 5.2 

and 5.3. A single air sampling unit was located near 

the U12n portal. All RAMS units and the air sampling 

unit were installed a minimum of five days prior to 

scheduled device detonation. 

151 
TABLE 5.1 

HUSKY ACE EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

12 October 1973 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

SURFACE 

From portal: 

At portal 

445 feet at N 40" W azimuth (on filter system) 

445 feet at N 40" W azimuth (on vent line) 

445 feet at N 40" W azimuth (on vent line) 

69 feet at S 31' E azimuth (on tunnel drain line) 

399 feet at N 16" E azimuth 

275 feet at N 89" E azimuth 

364 feet at S 16" E azimuth 

482 feet at S 12" W azimuth 

558 feet at S 48O W azimuth 

417 feet at N 69O W azimuth 

647 feet at N 27" W azimuth 

1,316 feet at N 20° E azimuth 

1,369 feet at S 43" E azimuth 

2,938 feet at S 79" W azimuth 

2,765 feet at N 44O W azimuth 

From cable hole #2: 

At cable downhole 

177 feet at N 43O E azimuth 

135 feet at S 33" E azimuth 

335 feet at S 12" E azimuth 

675 feet at S 28" W azimuth 

375 feet at N 31" W azimuth 

78 feet at S 89" W azimuth 

152 
TABLE 5.1 (Concluded) 

Station Location 

24 409 feet at N 22" E azimuth 

25 416 feet at S 10" W azimuth 

26 420 feet at N 77O W azimuth 

UNDERGROUND 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

*36ER 

37 

38 

From the U12n.06 drift: 

490 feet into U12n.07 LOS drift 

345 feet into U12n.07 LOS drift 

210 feet into U12n.07 LOS drift 

400 feet into U12n.07 bypass drift 

From the U12n main drift unless otherwise indicated: 

725 feet into U12n.06 LOS drift 

725 feet into U12n.06 LOS drift 

350 feet into U12n.06 drift 

At the cable alcove 

From the portal: 

39 2,600 feet into U12n main drift 

40 2,050 feet into U12n main drift 

*41ER 2,050 feet into U12n main drift 

42 1,700 feet into U12n main drift 

43 1,475 feet into U12n main drift 

44 900 feet into U12n main drift 

45 In the vent line raise 

46 200 feet into U12n main drift 

SURFACE (Cont'd) 

From SGZ: 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

153 
\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ _ 

U12n.04 ---w--_--l_ 

013 

-\ 

/-, 

06 

06 

09 

0 600 

l ’ FEET 

140 

Figure 5.2 HUSKY ACE Event - Surface RAMS 

The EPA had 49 air sampling stations and 30 gamma rate 

recorder stations operating in the offsite area. 

Twenty-two EPA personnel were fielded for surveillance 

activities. 

D. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or 

control stations for issue of stay-in badges or issue 

and return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plan," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

controlled area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

An EPA Turbo Beech aircraft was airborne at the NTS for 

cloud sampling and tracking of any effluent. Another 

EPA Turbo Beech aircraft was standing by in Las Vegas to 

undertake a sampling and tracking mission, if required. 

In addition, two USAF-provided UH-1N helicopters with 

military crews provided support for aerial closedcircuit television coverage, any cloud surveillance 

needed, and security sweeps. 

156 
5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

The final SDR was held on 9 October: however, technical 

problems coupled with unfavorable wind forecasts forced a delay 

in test execution. Wind forecasts for 11 October were uncertain 

and the decision was made to attempt to detonate on 11 October if 

conditions became favorable. The device was armed, final tunnel 

button up completed, and all personnel evacuated from the area. 

As it turned out, the wind direction remained unfavorable and a 

decision was made to disarm the device and reschedule test 

execution for 12 October. 

5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

Unfavorable weather conditions ultimately forced a three-day 

total delay in test execution until 12 October. However, on 12 

October 1973 at 0945 hours the fifteen-minute countdown began and 

continued with no holds. 

The HUSKY ACE device was detonated at 1000 hours on 12 

October 1973. 

5.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry measurements began at 1001 hours on D-day. RAMS ’ 

unit Nos. 19, 21, 24, 25, 31, and 32 were lost at zero time. 

RAMS units located along the LOS pipe responded to neutron 

activation of the LOS pipe and its contents. The maximum reading 

detected was 650 R/h at unit No. 33 at 1002 hours on D-day. All 

but RAMS unit No. 33 read background within five hours of detonation. All functioning RAMS units were secured at 0801 hours on 

15 October except unit Nos. 3 and 4, which were located on the 

vent lines, and unit No. 5 which was on a drain line. 

157 
5.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Reentry Activities 

Initial survey teams were released from the FCP at 1135 hours 

to survey the Rainier Mesa trailer park (Figure 5.4) and the 

portal area (Figure 5.5). The Mesa trailer park survey was 

completed at 1200 hours with no radiation readings above background, no toxic gases, and no evidence of an explosive mixture 

detected. The portal survey was completed at 1210 hours with the 

same background readings as the Mesa survey. After both areas 

were pronounced clear for data recovery parties to enter and 

perform their assigned tasks, data recoveries began at 1220 and 

were completed at 1400 hours. A Radsafe base station was set up 

at the portal in preparation for tunnel reentry on D+l. 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry 

Initial entries into the N tunnel complex began at 0805 hours 

on 13 October 1973 (D+l). All reentry team members were dressed 

in full anticontamination clothing and were wearing Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus. The team traveled to the gas seal 

door, observing that tunnel damage was minor. No radiation readings above background levels and no indications of explosive 

m mixture or toxic gases were detected. The small access door was 

opened and secured in the open position, and the team proceeded 

toward the gas seal plug, reaching it at 0834 hours. Readings 

taken on the portal side of the gas seal plug continued at background levels. Samples taken through the gas seal plug indicated 

that the atmosphere on the zero point side was normal. The manway door in the plug was opened, allowing team members to observe 

the presence of water on the zero point side. A sample of the 

water was taken. Ventilation lines were reinstalled through the 

158 


gas seal plug, and the air flow was checked and found adequate. 

At this time, 0912 hours, the team proceeded through the plug. A 

radiation reading of 0.05 mrad/h was measured and no evidence of 

explosive mixture or toxic gases was detected. After walking to 

the U12n.01 drift/main drift junction, team members returned to 

the gas seal plug at 0928 hours. The portal side of the gas seal 

plug was established as a fresh air station. At 0930 hours, team 

members returned to open the gas seal door and reestablish train 

tracks. This task was completed and team No. 1 exited the tunnel 

complex at 1022 hours. 

Team No. 2 boarded the train and entered the tunnel at 1029 

hours, proceeding to the gas seal plug where they disembarked and 

walked to the main drift/06 drift junction. Some minor rock fall 

on the tracks and along the travel route was noted as the team 

approached the OBP. There was no structural damage on the portal 

side of the OBP, and no radiation readings above background were 

detected. After surveying for toxic gases and the presence of 

any explosive mixture, checking the air flow, and finding 

conditions to be acceptable, the area was established as a fresh 

air station and team members removed their self-contained 

breathing apparatus. Routine cleanup work was completed at 1138 

hours and team members returned to the gas seal plug. At 1212 

hours, all personnel relocated from the gas seal plug to the 

newly established fresh air station at the OBP. 

At 1235 hours, team members again donned self-contained 

breathing apparatus and continued into the tunnel complex through 

the OBP crawlway. No water or tunnel damage was found on the 

zero point side of the OBP. A radiation reading of 0.1 mR/h was 

measured, but no indications of explosive mixture or toxic gases 

were detected. The Recorder and Oscilloscope Sealed Environmental System (ROSES) area was checked and only background levels 

were detected. The door to test chamber No. 1 (Figure 5.6) was 

surveyed. A reading of 90 mR/h was obtained, but no explosive 

161 
TEST CHAMBER #2 

TEST CHAMBER # 

EST CHAMBER #I 

VACUUM PUMPING STATION 

7FT. 0 IN. TAPS 

I/ 

DNA AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

Figure 5.6 HUSKY ACE Event - System Configuration 
mixture or toxic gases were detected. Next, crosscut No. 2 was 

checked and team members began removing sandbags. The maximum 

reading taken over the top of the sandbags was 4 mR/h with no 

indications of toxic gases or explosive mixture detected. 

Between 1310 and 1325 hours, crosscut No. 3 was checked. The alcoves were extensively damaged and the tunnel was partially 

collapsed. The maximum radiation reading taken near the doorway 

to test chamber No. 3 was 130 mR/h. At the zero point end of the 

test chamber outside the pipe the maximum reading was 250 mR/h. 

At 1335 hours, the door to test chamber No. 3 was opened and 

readings of 1,200 ppm carbon monoxide, 2 percent of the LEL, and 

600 mR/h were measured inside the test chamber. Subsequently, 

team members began to exit the tunnel complex, reaching the 

portal at 1404 hours. 

Team No. 1 reentered the tunnel at 1420 hours and proceeded 

through the OBP to perform temporary repairs on the vent line 

before traveling on to test chamber No. 1 (which now measured 100 

mR/h at the door). The valve on top of the LOS pipe at test 

chamber No. 1 was opened to allow ventilation of the pipe. 

Sampling indicated 1,000 ppm carbon monoxide, a trace of carbon 

dioxide, and no evidence of explosive mixture. Between 1520 and 

1542 hours, test chamber Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were checked. Readings 

of 300 ppm carbon monoxide and 120 mR/h were detected inside test 

chamber No. 1; 300 ppm carbon monoxide, 110 mR/h, and no explosive mixtures inside test chamber No. 2; and 200 ppm carbon 

monoxide at test chamber No. 3. Team members returned to the 

portal side of the OBP at 1605 hours and this completed initial 

reentries in the N tunnel complex. By 1625 hours, all personnel 

had exited the tunnel. 

Train tracks were reestablished through the gas seal plug 

early on 15 October 1973 (D+3). A reentry team went to check the 

condition of the LOS pipe (carbon monoxide concentrations) before 

the scientific assessment team entered the LOS pipe. The flex 

163 
line above test chamber No. 1 and inside test chamber Nos. 1, 2, 

and 3 were checked, and the valve on the zero point side of test 

chamber No. 3 was opened and that line checked. No carbon 

monoxide was detected. The maximum exposure rate inside the LOS 

pipe was 90 mR/h in test chamber No. 3. No anticontamination 

clothing or face masks were required for this evaluation survey 

because the team did not enter the LOS pipe but surveyed from 

test chamber doorways. 

The scientific assessment team entered the LOS pipe at test 

chamber No. 2, walked to test chamber No. 1, and returned to test 

chamber No. 2. They next traveled to test chamber No. 3, 

experiment station No. 4, the TAPS (see Figure 5.7) where a 

radiation reading of 3 mrad/h was detected, and then returned to 

test chamber No. 2 to exit the pipe. Anticontamination clothing 

required for this entry into the LOS pipe included one pair of 

coveralls (with openings taped), a hood, two pairs of gloves and 

shoe covers, and a full-face mask with a.canister to filter 

organics, acid, particulate, and radioactive (OAP/R) materials. 

Upon exit from the LOS pipe, the first pair of shoe covers was 

removed. The scientific assessment lasted approximately l-1/2 

hours, followed by photographers who performed station 

photographic documentation, and a damage and hazard survey of the 

LOS pipe conducted by personnel from HQ/DNA. All persons 

entering the LOS pipe were dressed in anticontamination clothing 

and subject to the same requirements as the scientific assessment 

team. 

On 16 October 1973 (D+4), train tracks were reinstalled 

through the OBP. KSC personnel began recovering experiments. 

Each person recovering experiments in the LOS pipe wore 

anticontamination coveralls (with openings taped), two pairs of 

gloves and shoe covers, a hood, and a full-face mask with OAP/R 

canister. A Radsafe monitor accompanied a Sandia health physicist into the LOS pipe to obtain samples from the zero point side 

164 
KEY 

cc = CROSSCUT 

TC = TEST CHAMBER 

OBP = OVERBURDEN PLUG 

TAPS = TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

DAC = DNA AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

: 

u-l 

ZERO POINT 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 5.7 HUSKY ACE Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout 
of the TAPS door. They were dressed in the same anticontamination gear as the other recovery personnel entering the LOS pipe. 

A survey of toxic gas and explosive mixture levels indicated 5 

percent of the LEL and 7,000 to 8,000 ppm carbon monoxide on the 

zero point side of the TAPS door. 

5.4.2 Experiment Recovery Activities 

On 17 October (D+S), experiment recovery from all test chambers began. Each person recovering experiments inside the LOS 

pipe wore anticontamination coveralls (with openings taped), two 

pairs of gloves and shoe covers, a hood, and a full-face mask 

with OAP/R canister. Exceptions to this rule were the Lockheed 

experimenters who were recovering experiments at the end of the 

LOS pipe (swipes were taken from the experiments to determine 

beryllium contamination levels). Because it was not necessary 

for any persons recovering experiments from this station to be 

exposed to the atmosphere inside the area for longer than a few 

minutes, face masks were not required. Another exception to the 

face mask requirement involved Pan Am photographers taking photographs of KSC experiments at test chamber No. 1. No other personnel were allowed in the pipe at the same time as the Lockheed 

and Pan Am personnel in an effort to minimize airborne particulate matter. This exposure lasted approximately 15 minutes. 

Agencies recovering experiments from pipe stubs and alcoves had 

no anticontamination clothing requirement. 

Experiment recoveries continued on 18 October (D+6) in test 

chamber Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Each person recovering experiments 

wore one pair of anticontamination coveralls with openings taped, 

two pairs of gloves and shoe covers, a hood, and a full-face mask 

with OAP/R or dust canister. The majority of the experiments 

were recovered by 1200 hours. Additional instrumentation was 

being recovered from the alcoves by miners, electricians, and 

experimenters. No anticontamination clothing was required for 

166 
these personnel. At the request of the DOD Test Group Director, 

samples were taken from the zero point side of the TAPS. Results 

were as follows: 

- higher than 100 percent of the LEL (calibrated to a 5% 

methane equivalent), 

- 7 percent oxygen, and 

- 1.2 percent carbon monoxide. 

Additional samples were taken and sent to the laboratory to 

be analyzed using a gas chromatograph. Results were: 

- 22 percent hydrogen 

- 8 percent oxygen 

- 65 percent nitrogen 

- 500 ppm methane, and 

- 1.2 percent carbon monoxide (using a Draeger tube) 

After discussing the results of this sampling effort with 

other test group staff members, the Test Group Director requested 

permission from the Test Controller to begin ventilation through 

the TAPS after first assuring that all nonessential personnel had 

exited the area. Permission was granted. At 1845 hours, a 

Sandia health physicist and a Radsafe monitor entered the LOS 

pipe at test chamber No. 3 to check conditions in the LOS pipe. 

Each wore anticontamination coveralls (with openings taped), a 

hood, two pairs of gloves and shoe covers, and full-face masks 

with Type N canister. Concentrations detected were 55 percent of 

the LEL and 600 ppm carbon monoxide just inside the door to test 

chamber No. 3, and 40 percent of the LEL and 650 ppm carbon monoxide at test chamber No. 1. All major experiments had been 

recovered by 1635 hours on 18 October. Work to raise the TAPS 

door continued until 25 October 1973. 

167 
5.4.3 Postevent Mining 

The major objectives of the postevent mining effort were to 

evaluate the performance of the TAPS, DACs, and stemming. Mining 

began on 28 February 1974 and continued until 7 April 1975. Test 

chamber Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were washed down with water on 9 May 

1974, and all reentry mining activities were then halted until 15 

July 1974. Between 15 July 1974 and 7 April 1975, mining efforts 

concentrated on removing the bulkheads from test chamber No. 1 

and exposing DAC Nos. 1 and 2 for analysis. The maximum radiation level detected during the mining effort occurred on 1 August 

1974 at 1700 hours. The reading, 9 mrad/h (beta plus gamma), was 

at contact with a length of pipe in the 07 reentry drift at 213 

feet from the heading. The highest exposure rate in a work area 

was observed during cleanup operations in test chamber No. 2. 

Pipe fitters washed down the inside of the test chamber in a 0.5 

mR/h environment. In general, the exposure rate remained near or 

at background levels during mucking and mining operations. No 

alpha radiation was detected. 

5.4.4 Postevent Drilling 

There was no postevent drilling into the zero-point area for 

sample recovery. 

5.4.5 Industrial Safety 

Surveys to determine radiation levels and to check for the 

presence of toxic gases and any explosive mixture were made on 

each shift. The measurements were recorded in the Radsafe 

monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes 

including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling were 

168 
established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. A 

written standard operating procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, toxic material, or any other operation 

with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved 

in these operations was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedure. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

miners boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency provided 

its own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of the McCaa two-hour 

breathing apparatus and had used the Draeger self-contained 

breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as 

spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

A. 

B. 

c. 

D. 

All 

Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMRC 385-224). 

AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter organization). 

HUSKY ACE Safety Regulations. 

personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

169 
5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1001 hours on 12 October 1973 

and ended at 0801 hours on 15 October 1973. The maximum reading 

detected was 650 R/h at underground RAMS unit No. 33 at 1002 

hours on D-day. 

Initial radiation survey teams were released from the FCP at 

1135 hours. The Mesa survey was completed at 1200 hours and the 

portal survey at 1210 hours. No radiation above background, no 

toxic gases, and no explosive mixture were detected. 

Initial tunnel reentry was performed from 0805 until 1605 

hours on 13 October. Maximum readings were 600 mR/h, 1,200 ppm 

carbon monoxide, and 2 percent of the LEL inside test chamber 

No. 3 at 1335 hours. 

Experiment recovery activities were conducted on 17 and 18 

October. Maximum explosive mixture and toxic gas readings in 

work areas were 55 percent of the LEL, and 650 ppm carbon 

monoxide, as identified in.section 5.4.2. 

Postevent mining began on 28 February 1974 and continued 

intermittently until 7 April 1975. The maximum radiation rate 

measured during reentry mining was 9 mrad/h (beta plus gamma), 

near contact with an exposed pipe in the 07 reentry drift on 1 

August 1974 at 1700 hours. The highest work area exposure rate 

recorded was 0.5 mR/h, read while the inside of test chamber No. 

2 was being washed down by pipe fitters. No alpha radiation was 

detected. 

No postevent drilling activities on the Rainier Mesa or 

underground were conducted for this event. 

170 
Personnel gamma radiation exposures received during individual entries to HUSKY ACE radex areas from 13 October through 

19 October 1973 are summarized below. Average exposures are from 

self-reading pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. No positive exposures were recorded by film dosimeters 

during these entries because the minimum reportable gamma exposure for NTS film dosimeters was 30 mR per film packet. 

All Participants 89 4 

DOD Participants 39 6 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Average 

Exposure 

(mR) 

171 
CHAPTER 6 

MING BLADE EVENT 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

MING BLADE was a DOD-sponsored underground test detonated at 

0900 hours PDT on 19 June 1974 with a yield less than 20 kt. The 

device was detonated in N tunnel (in the U12n.08 drift, see 

Figure 6.1) at a vertical depth of 1,276 feet. The objective of 

this test was to determine response of materials and equipment to 

a nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and 

contractors conducted 24 projects to obtain the desired weapons 

effects information. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent was released to the atmosphere. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all MING BLADE project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DNA, and AEC/NVOO. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments or delivering them to the 

installation contractor. After the event, these agencies were 

responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample 

data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

172 
U12n.08 

ZERO POINT 

Figure 6.1 MING BLADE Event - Tunnel Layout 
Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LASL 

fielded the device, the LASL Test Group Director was responsible 

for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero 

point prior to the event. This responsibility was in effect from 

device emplacement until detonation. At that time, the Test 

Controller relieved the LASL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller had determined that 

venting had not occurred, he delegated responsibility to the DOD 

Test Group Director. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

Mining of the U12n.08 drift bega'n on 18 June 1973. 

Mining this drift allowed many facilities installed for 

previous events to be reused, including the cable 

alcove, three downhole cable runs from the Mesa trailer 

park to the cable alcove, the N tunnel Mesa trailer 

park, and portal facilities. Additional facilities 

required for MING BLADE were experiment (LOS) and bypass 

drifts which made up the U12n.08 drift complex; a new 

overburden plug (OBP); a cable gas-blocking alcove and 

plug; a cable drift; a gas seal plug between the gas 

seal door and the OBP; and three short, side pipe drifts 

close to the zero point. The bypass drift and the adjoining crosscuts provided access for (1) installation 

of the DACs; (2) experiment installation at the test 

chambers and the side pipes; (3) alcove space which was 

used by the experimenter agencies to house power supplies, signal conditioning equipment, and experiment 

preparation working space; (4) early grouting of the 

main LOS pipe prior to device installation; and (5) 

device installation. 

174 
ROSES units were used for MING BLADE. The ROSES 

provided an underground recording system for data and 

reduced the lengths and cost of cable runs. MING BLADE 

used a hardwire multiplex system to control and monitor 

the reentry electrical power distribution. The tunnel 

ventilation system employed two control panels, one at 

the portal and one at the DOD monitor room at CP-1. 

Remotely-controlled ventilation was an aid to early 

tunnel reentry. Remote controls for the gas sampling 

system were located at the portal and allowed gas to be 

sampled from the zero point sides of the gas seal door, 

gas seal plug, and OBP as well as from inside the LOS 

pipe. Gas sampling also could be manually performed 

from the portal side of each plug. 

Mining was halted on 26 September to provide support for 

HUSKY ACE preevent activities and was resumed on 15 

October. Mining of the new cable and experiment drifts 

began in November 1973 and was completed by 22 January 

1974. Installation of the LOS pipe began on 4 February 

1974. Mining of ,the bypass drift and zero point area 

were completed 26 February 1974. Prestemming of the 

main drift began on 13 March, and on 5 April the LOS 

pipe installation was completed. Experiment installation began on 22 April. Experimenter organizations 

represented were SLA, LASL, Space and Missile Systems 

Organization (SAMSO), AFWL, Lockheed Palo Alto Research 

Laboratory (LPARL), IRT, KSC, LMSC, DNA, Science 

Applications, Inc. (SAI), PI, DOD, and LLL. On 24 

April, instrumentation vans were installed at the Mesa 

trailer park and prestemming of the LOS drift was completed. BY 8 May, the first mandatory signal (FMS) dry 

run was accomplished, and on 15 May, experiment instal175 
lation was complete. Verification of experiment alignment was accomplished 18 May, necessitating some minor 

adjustments of experiment positions. 

A mandatory full-participation (MFP) dry run was held on 

4 June, but was unsatisfactory. A rerun was successfully completed on 5 June, and device emplacement and 

button-up activities were begun. A labor strike occurred at the NTS on 6 June. By using supervisory personnel 

and nonstriking craft personnel, button-up activities 

continued. Final placement of all stemming materials 

was completed on 12 June. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with requirements of AEC Manual Chapter 0524 and responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support, air sampling, and telemetry. 

Prior to the test event, detailed radiological safety 

reentry plans were prepared and issued to participating 

agencies, air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area, and Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform postevent initial radiation surveys, 

conduct aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in 

reentry parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were 

standing by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform 

surveys and provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, 

176 
portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included hoods, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face masks, 

supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, plastic 

bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 35 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for the MING 

BLADE event as shown in Table 6.1 and Figures 6.2 and 

6.3. An air sampling unit was placed near the U12n 

portal. All RAMS and the air sampling unit were 

installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

D. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or control stations for issue of stay-in badges or issue and 

return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area through use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations 

Plan,ll contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not connected with this event out of the controlled 

area before the final security sweep began. 

177 
TABLE 6.1 

MING BLADE EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

19 June 1974 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 578 feet at N 01" E azimuth 

19 535 feet at S 67O E azimuth 

20 415 feet at S 60° W azimuth 

SURFACE 

From the portal: 

At portal 

445 feet at N 40' W azimuth (on filter system) 

445 feet at N 40° W azimuth (on vent line) 

445 feet at N 40° W azimuth (on vent line) 

69 feet at S 31° E azimuth (on tunnel drain line) 

399 feet at N 16O E azimuth 

275 feet at N 89O E azimuth 

364 feet at S 16" E azimuth 

482 feet at S 12O W azimuth 

558 feet at S 48O W azimuth 

417 feet at N 69O W azimuth 

1,369 feet at S 43O E azimuth 

From cable downhole: 

At cable downhole 

177 feet at N 43O E azimuth 

135 feet at S 33O E azimuth 

375 feet at S 31° W azimuth 

78 feet at S 89' W azimuth 

From SGZ: 

178 
TABLE 6.1 (Concluded) 

MING BLADE EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

19 June 1974 

Station Location 

21 1,070 feet into the U12n.08 LOS drift 

22 790 feet into the U12n.08 LOS drift 

23 1,150 feet into the U12n.08 bypass drift 

24 970 feet into the U12n.08 bypass drift 

25 85 feet into the U12n.08 into the bypass from the LOS 

*26ER 

27 435 feet into the U12n.08 drift 

28 600 feet into the U12n.05 drift from the U12n.04 

29 

30 

*31ER 

32 

33 

34 

35 

UNDERGROUND 

From the U12n.05 main drift unless otherwise 

indicated: 

drift S-curve 

85 feet into the U12n.08 into the bypass from the LOS 

drift S-curve 

drift 

From the portal: 

2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the Ul2n main drift 

1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

On vent line raise 

200 feet into the U12n main drift 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

179 
018 

FEET 

PORTAL AREA m5 

100 08 

09 

07 

120 

Figure 6.2 MING BLADE Event - Surface RAMS 

E. Air Support 

One UH-1F and two UH-1N helicopters with USAF pilots and 

crews provided support for aerial closed-circuit television coverage, any cloud surveillance required, and 

security sweeps. One of the three was on standby for 

the Test Controller's use, if needed. EPA had a Turbo 

Beech aircraft available for cloud tracking and 

sampling, if this were to be necessary. 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Shortly after the first security sweep was completed, personnel from experimenter organizations made final instrumentation 

checks at the portal, in the tunnel, and at the Rainier Mesa 

trailer park. Film was loaded into the event recording equipment 

before personnel left the area. 

Final button up of the tunnel complex began at 1700 hours on 

18 June and was completed without problems. 

6.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

All projects were rechecked to assure that instruments were 

functioning properly. At the 0700-hour readiness briefing, conditions were reported to be favorable for an 0900-hour detonation. 

MING BLADE zero time was 0900 hours PDT on 19 June 1974. 

6.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry coverage began at 0901 hours. Other than the expected neutron activation in the LOS pipe, no radioactivity above 

182 
background was detected inside or outside the tunnel complex. 

All multiplex RAMS units went off line at zero time except No. 18 

which was positive, possibly as a result of ground shock. RAMS 

unit Nos. 21 and 22 were on line immediately: Nos. 13, 14, 15, 

16, 17, 19, and 20 were negative for less than one minute. This 

negative response of the detectors was a result of the 

electromagnetic pulse associated with device detonation. All 

other RAMS units came back on line as follows: 

RAMS 

Unit No. 

2 

3 

4 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

23 

24 

27 

28 

29 

32 

33 

34 

35 

Time 

0910 

0912 

0909 

0918 

0913 

0913 

0918 

0905 

0905 

0913 

Did not return 

0908 

0905 

0906 

0906 

0903 

0905 

0907 

0905 

The No. 23 unit appeared to be lost as a result of cable 

failure caused by tunnel collapse. The maximum radiation level 

detected was 900 R/h at RAMS unit No. 21 at 0901 hours. Other 

positive readings at 0901 hours were 250 mR/h at 0901 hours on 

183 
RAMS unit No. 22 and 50 mR/h at RAMS unit No. 25. Both of these 

readings were the result of expected LOS pipe neutron activation. 

All other on-line RAMS indicated background levels of radiation 

immediately after device detonation. Telemetry was discontinued 

at 1600 hours on 20 June 1974 at which time the maximum reading 

was 155 mR/h at RAMS unit No. 21. 

6.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Data Recovery Activities 

Initial radiation survey teams Nos. 1 through 4 were 

released at 0933 hours from Gate 300 and traveled to the FCP. 

The portal survey began at 0950 hours and was completed at 1010 

hours. The Mesa trailer park survey was conducted from 0950 to 

1015 hours. No readings above background were detected at either 

location. Data recovery personnel were released from the FCP at 

1040 hours, completed their assigned tasks, and exited the area 

by 1310 hours. 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery Activities 

Remote gas sampling from the zero point side of the OBP was 

conducted from 0602 to 0620 hours on D+l (20 June). No indication of toxic gases or explosive mixture was detected outside the 

LOS pipe: however, 150 ppm carbon monoxide was detected inside 

the pipe. Conditions were judged to be favorable for initial 

reentry, and reentry team No. 1 entered the tunnel portal at 0726 

hours. Each team member was dressed completely in anticontamination clothing and was wearing Draeger self-contained breathing 

apparatus. They arrived at the gas seal door at 0730 hours. A 

0.04 mrad/h radiation level was measured at the gas seal door, 

but no toxic gases or explosive mixture was detected. Water was 

found seeping under the door. Gas samples collected remotely 

184 
from the zero point side of the gas seal door showed no indication of toxic gases or explosive mixture. Permission was granted 

to open the access door. Because the water level was above the 

bottom of the door when it was opened, a pump was installed to 

remove the water. Team members were allowed to remove their 

Draeger units while waiting for the water level to lower. Work 

to loosen the bolts on the large gas seal door was begun at 0750 

hours. 

The large gas seal door was opened at 0817 hours. One team 

member was sent to the portal to pick up the work party and 

lengths of rail so track could be laid through gas seal door. At 

0850 hours, team members again donned Draeger self-contained 

breathing apparatus and passed through the gas seal door toward 

the gas seal plug. No structural damage was observed between the 

gas seal door and the gas seal plug, which was reached at 0858 

hours. The oxygen content of the air was found to be at normal 

levels and there was no indication of toxic gases or explosive 

mixture. By 0914 hours the team had reached the zero point side 

of the gas seal plug. Standing water about six inches deep was 

observed, so team members'were directed to install a pump prior 

to leaving the area. The reentry team moved on to the 01 

drift/main drift junction, removed a cover which had been placed 

over the train and prepared to move the train to the gas seal 

Plug* The gas seal plug was reached at 0927 hours, the water 

pump was installed, and team members returned to the portal side 

of the gas seal plug at 0944 hours. As the team exited the 

tunnel, they stopped at the gas seal door to open a valve in one 

of the vent lines so the water could drain. All personnel exited 

the tunnel at 0955 hours. 

Team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1012 hours, accompanied by 

a rescue team and support personnel. After stopping at the gas 

seal door to put on Draeger units, Team No. 2 reached the gas 

seal plug at 1039 hours and continued toward the OBP, while the 

185 
rescue team and support personnel remained on the portal side of 

the gas seal plug. At 1045 hours, Team No. 2 had reached the 

intersection of the 04 and 06 drifts, both of which appeared to 

be in good condition. There were no indications of toxic gases 

or explosive mixture at this location. Team members traveled 

into the 05 drift to its junction with the 08 drift and inspected 

the ROSES units, which appeared to be in good condition. They 

reached the 08 OBP (Figure 6.4) at 1115 hours. There were no 

evidence of toxic gases or explosive mixture, and only background 

radiation levels were measured. The 36-inch manway door was then 

sandbagged open. It was noted that the air flow through the 

manway was toward the portal. Standing, water about eight inches 

below the manway door was found on the zero point side, so a pump 

was set up. A fresh air station was established on the portal 

side of the OBP, and rescue and support personnel were moved to 

this location. 

At 1245 hours, team members again donned their Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus and traveled through the OBP toward 

test chamber No. 1. Team members had been cautioned to avoid 

getting wet if at all possible; however, wading through water a 

few inches deep was required to proceed. The radiation level at 

the door to test chamber No. 1 was 40 mR/h, and no toxic gases or 

explosive mixture were detected. Team members next traveled 

through the bypass drift to crosscut No. 2. The condition of 

crosscut No. 2 was good, although the bypass drift was collapsed 

approximately 30 feet to the zero point side of the vacuum pump 

alcove. 

Team members began to remove sandbags from crosscut No. 2 in 

an attempt to reach the LOS drift. When enough sandbags were 

removed to provide a crawl space, this pathway was used to reach 

the LOS drift. There was no evidence of toxic gases or explosive 

mixture, but 130 mR/h was measured. Test chamber No. 2 was 

reached at 1337 hours and the door was opened. Readings of 150 

186 
KEY 

DAC = DNA AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

TAPS = TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

TC = TEST CHAMBER 

OBP = OVERBURDEN PLUG 

SCALE IN FEET 

Figure 6.4 MING BLADE Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout 
mR/h and 120 ppm carbon monoxide were obtained, but no indication 

of explosive mixture was detected inside the chamber. A small 

amount of debris was on the test chamber floor; otherwise, 

conditions were good. At 1343 hours, the team returned to test 

chamber No. 1 and opened the door. A reading of 130 mR/h and 100 

ppm carbon monoxide was measured, but there was no evidence of 

explosive mixture inside the chamber. Draeger breathing units 

were removed before the group returned to the portal side of the 

OBP at 1430 hours. While exiting the tunnel, the train ran out 

of fuel, forcing team members to leave their equipment on the 

train and walk to the gas seal plug. Initial tunnel reentry 

activities were completed at 1500 hours. 

Immediately following initial reentry, a scientific assessment team and ROSES recovery teams entered the tunnel complex to 

perform data recovery. Each person entering the LOS pipe was 

dressed in two pairs of anticontamination coveralls, shoe covers, 

and gloves, and wore a full-face mask with Type N canister. The 

exposure rate at the data recovery area was 40 to 50 mrad/h (beta 

plus gamma). A DNA representative, accompanied by a REECo 

industrial hygienist and a Radsafe monitor, walked to the TAPS 

door to see if it had sealed. No toxic gases were detected at 

the TAPS door but the explosive mixture level was 5 percent of 

the LEL. Preparations to remove the OBP and the gas seal plug 

began. 

On 21 June (D+2) at 1500 hours, a DNA and KSC inspection 

party entered the LOS pipe to check test chamber Nos. 1 and 2. 

Each person wore a full-face mask and two sets of coveralls, shoe 

covers, gloves, and hoods. The inspection was completed at 1700 

hours. 

Removal of the gas seal plug and the OBP was completed on 24 

June (D+4). A Radsafe station was set up at the intersection of 

crosscut No. 1 and the bypass drift. Limited experiment recovery 

188 
was conducted in the LOS drift. A vent line was installed in the 

LOS pipe to the TAPS. All work party members wore anticontamination clothing and full-face masks with Acme canisters. After the 

vent line was in place, a REECo industrial hygienist and an SLA 

health physicist, each dressed in anticontamination clothing and 

wearing full-face masks with Type N canisters, entered the LOS 

pipe to take gas samples from the zero point side of the TAPS. 

Sample results showed an air mixture of 68 percent nitrogen, 25 

percent hydrogen, 5 percent oxygen, 1 percent methane, and 1 

percent carbon monoxide. It was decided that ventilation to 

remove this explosive mixture (25% of hydrogen is equal to 625% 

of the LEL for hydrogen) would not be attempted until all 

recovery and mining personnel were out of the area. 

Experiment recoveries began on 25 June (D+5) and were conducted in accordance with the schedule established by the Test 

Group staff. All experiment recovery personnel wore single pairs 

of anticontamination coveralls; double sets of gloves, shoe 

covers, and hoods; and a full-face mask with Acme canister. The 

maximum radiation levels surveyed in test chambers No. 1 and 2 

were 3 mrad/h and 10 mrad/h, respectively. Recovery operations 

continued through 27 June, which was a Friday, and then were 

suspended for the weekend. During swing shift on 27 June, 

ventilating of the LOS pipe on the zero point side of the TAPS 

was begun. Surveys of the ventilation line showed concentrations 

of 1.5% carbon monoxide and greater than 100% of the LEL at the 

start of the shift. By the end of the shift, there was no 

evidence of explosive mixture or toxic gases, and the oxygen was 

at normal (21%) levels. Hourly checks were made throughout the 

weekend with no change in these concentrations. 

Recoveries continued on 1 and 2 July with personnel dressed 

in single sets of anticontamination clothing and wearing fullface masks with Acme canisters. The TAPS door was opened on 8 

July. Industrial hygiene personnel checked for the presence of 

toxic gases and explosive mixture; none were detected. An 

189 
assessment team entered the LOS drift to check the DACs. After 

this was completed, the area was secured until 5 November 1974. 

6.4.2 Postevent Mining 

Postevent mining to recover DAC No. 1 began on 5 November 

1974 with mining through the TAPS concrete. By 22 November, miners had reached the DAC No. 1 area. All radiation readings in 

this area were background. Although Radsafe coverage was not required, the heading was monitored once per shift to assure that 

potential problem locations were not overlooked. On 10 December, 

an area large enough to allow removal of DAC No. 1 had been 

mined. The DAC was subsequently removed for possible future reuse. Work on MING BLADE was halted on 13 December so that miners 

could work on operations in the U12n.11 drift and in the U12n.10 

LOS drift. 

6.4.3 Postevent Underground Drilling 

Drilling equipment was set up underground on 4 August 1975 

in the DAC No. 1 excavation. Urine samples were obtained from 

drill crew members to establish background radioactivity levels 

for these personnel in case any internal deposition should occur 

during drilling activities. Drilling of exploratory hole RE No. 

1 toward the MING BLADE chimney began on 12 August. All 

radiation, toxic gas, and explosive mixture levels were normal 

until 10 September when readings of 10 ppm carbon monoxide and 10 

percent of the LEL were detected at the drill stem. Radsafe 

monitors checked for tritium with negative results. This drilling activity was secured on 30 September. No radiation readings 

above background levels had been detected. 

Drillers began setting up drilling equipment hole RE No. 2 

on 2 October. Tritium monitoring was conducted during this 

operation. On 9 October, a core which read 40 mrad/h at contact 

190 
was extracted. The area immediately was roped off as a radex 

area and urine samples were collected from all personnel. Drill 

crew members were dressed in anticontamination coveralls, shoe 

covers, and gloves. The hole was ultimately drilled to a total 

length of 446 feet with some cores reading greater than 200 mR/h. 

On 10 October, tritium measurements of 55 microcuries per cubic 

meter of air were measured with a T-446 and 30 microcuries per 

cubic meter were measured with an NR-3. Urine sample results 

indicated no significant tritium uptakes occurred as a result of 

this drilling activity. This drilling was completed on 10 

October. 

6.4.4 Cavity Study 

Underground drill hole RE No. 2 was reopened on 25 February 

1976 to conduct a cavity study. Drillers were dressed in 

coveralls, boots, and rubber gloves. Tritium samplers (T-446s) 

were set up in the drilling area. No readings above background 

were detected, and work was completed on 1 March. On 2 March, RE 

No. 1 was reopened. The radiation level rate at the drill hole 

was 1.8 mrad/h. Drillers were dressed in coveralls, boots, and 

rubber gloves while in the general work area and wore rubber 

suits while participating in the drilling operation. Maximum 

readings measured during this cavity study were 1.8 mrad/h at 

drill hole RE No. 2, 200 ppm carbon monoxide, and 10 percent of 

the LEL. Again, urine samples taken from workers in the area 

indicated no significant tritium uptakes. The cavity study was 

completed on 5 March 1976. 

6.4.5 Industrial Safety 

Measurements to determine radiation levels and check for 

the presence of any toxic gases or explosive mixture were made 

each shift. These measurements were then recorded in the 

monitors' logbook. 

191 
Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes 

for mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. A written standard operating 

procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, 

toxic materials, radioactive material, or any other operation 

with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved 

in such an operation was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedure. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

miner's boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency 

provided its own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial 

tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the McCaa twohour breathing apparatus and had used the Draeger self-contained 

breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as 

spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

All 

Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

MING BLADE Safety Regulations. 

personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

192 
6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 0901 hours on 19 June 1974 

and ended at 1600 hours on 20 June 1974. The maximum gamma exposure rate measured was 900 R/h at underground RAMS unit No. 21 

at 0901 hours on D-day. 

Initial radiation survey teams Nos. 1 through 4 were released to begin their surveys at 0933 hours, completed the portal 

survey at 1010 hours, and completed the Mesa survey at 1015 hours 

on D-day. No radiation above background was detected. 

Initial tunnel reentry was conducted from 0726 to 1500 hours 

on 20 June. Maximum readings were 150 mR/h and 120 ppm carbon 

monoxide in test chamber No. 2 at 1337 hours. 

Experiment recovery activities were conducted from 25 June 

to 8 July. The maximum radiation levels during the recovery 

period were 3 mrad/h in test chamber No. 1 and 10 mrad/h in test 

chamber No. 2. 

Postevent mining began on 5 November 1974 and was halted on 

13 December. No radiation above background levels was detected. 

Postevent drilling was conducted underground between 4 

August and 10 October 1975. Maximum readings were 10 percent of 

the LEL and 10 ppm carbon monoxide on 10 September at the drill 

stem, and greater than 200 mrad/h at contact with a core sample 

on 9 October and again on 10 October. No Mesa surface drilling 

to recover core samples was conducted. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

MING BLADE radex areas from 19 June to 3 July 1974 are summarized 

below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket dosimeters 

193 
as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from 

film dosimeter records. 

All Participants 

DOD Participants 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

223 205 9 

88 205 12 

194 
CHAPTER 7 

HYBLA FAIR EVENT 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

HYBLA FAIR was a DOD-sponsored underground test detonated at 

0700 hours Pacific Standard Time (PST) on 28 October 1974 with a 

yield less than 20 kt. The device was detonated in N tunnel 

(U12n.09 drift, see Figure 7.1) at a vertical depth of 1,326 

feet. The objective of this test was to determine the response 

of materials and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment. 

Government agencies and contractors conducted ten projects to 

obtain the desired weapons effects information. 

Stemming was not completely successful, but containment 

inside the tunnel complex was complete. No radioactive effluent 

was released to the atmosphere. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all HYBLA FAIR project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DNA, and the AEC/NVOO. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

195 
Figure 7.1 HYBLA FAIR Event - Tunnel Layout 
preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LLL fielded 

the device, the LLL Test Group Director was responsible for 

radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

prior to the event. This responsibility was in effect from 

device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the Test 

Controller relieved the LLL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller had determined that 

venting had not occurred, he delegated responsibility to the DOD 

Test Group Director. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

In late February 1974, mining personnel began to prepare 

a bypass drift and an experiment (LOS pipe) drift which 

were connected by various crosscuts. (See Figures 7.2 

and 7.3 for exterior views of the HLOS pipe.) Two of 

these crosscuts were used as experimenter alcoves; one 

was used for access purposes. Mining operations were 

completed on 9 May 1974. Cable installation began on 20 

May and was scheduled for completion on 2 August, although the actual completion date was delayed until 11 

September by labor problems. Experiment installation 

began on 5 August 1974. 

197 


B. Radiological Safety Support 

C. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with requirements of AEC Manual Chapter 0524 and responsible DNA 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and 

equipment support, air sampling, and telemetry. 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating 

agent ies. Air sampling equ ipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included hoods, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face masks, 

supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, plastic 

bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

Telemetry Support 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 35 temporary RAMS 

units provided surface and underground coverage for the 

200 
HYBLA FAIR event as shown in Table 7.1 and Figures 7.4 

and 7.5. All RAMS units were installed a minimum of 

five days prior to scheduled device detonation. 

D. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or control stations for issue of stay-in badges or issue and 

return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plan," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

closed area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

One UH-1F and two UH-1N helicopters with USAF pilots and 

crew members provided support for aerial closed circuit 

television coverage, any cloud surveillance (if venting 

should occur.), and security sweeps. One of the three 

was on standby for the Test Controller's use, if needed. 

EPA had a Turbo Beech aircraft available for cloud 

tracking and sampling of any effluent, and a USAF C-118 

aircraft also was on standby at Nellis Air Force Base if 

needed for cloud tracking. 

201 
TABLE 7.1 

HYBLA FAIR EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

28 October 1974 

Station Location 

SURFACE 

From mortal: 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

445 feet at N 40° W azimuth (on filter system) 

445 feet at N 40° W azimuth (on vent line) 

445 feet at N 40° W azimuth (on vent line) 

69 feet at S 31' E azimuth (on tunnel drain line) 

399 feet at N 16O E azimuth 

275 feet at N 89O E azimuth 

364 feet at S 16O E azimuth 

482 feet at S 12O W azimuth 

558 feet at S 48O S azimuth 

417 feet at N 69" W azimuth 

1,369 feet at S 43" E azimuth 

From cable downhole: 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

At cable downhole 

177 feet at N 43O E azimuth 

135 feet at S 33" E azimuth 

375 feet at S 31' W azimuth 

78 feet at S 89O W azimuth 

From SGZ unless otherwise indicated: 

300 feet North 

270 feet at S 64O E azimuth 

300 feet at S 60° W azimuth 

On DIANA MIST cavity drill hole 

202 
TABLE 7.1 (Concluded) 

HYBLA FAIR EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

28 October 1974 

Station Location 

UNDERGROUND 

From the U12n.09 LOS drift/bypass drift junction: 

21 255 feet into the U12n.09 LOS drift 

*22ER 255 feet into the U12n.09 LOS drift 

23 240 feet into the U12n.09 bypass drift 

"24ER 240 feet into the U12n.09 bypass drift 

From the U12n.06 drift: 

25 400 feet into the U12n.07 bypass drift 

From the U12n.04 drift: 

26 

*27ER 

28 

29 

30 

*31ER 

32 

33 

34 

35 

600 feet into the U12n.06 LOS drift 

600 feet into the U12n.06 LOS drift 

350 feet into the U12n.06 drift 

From the portal unless otherwise indicated: 

2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

50 feet into the vent line raise 

200 feet into the U12n main drift 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

203 
\ 

\ 

\ 

AREA 

09 07 

08 

011 

Figure 7.4 HYBLA FAIR Event - Surface RAMS 
Figure 7.5 HYBLA FAIR Event - Underground RAMS 
7.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

The first signal dry run (FSD) was held on 12 September. On 

15 October, an unsuccessful mandatory full participation (MFP) 

dry run was performed. A second attempt conducted that afternoon, however, was successful. Event preparations continued, 

with the final dry run (FDR) held on 25 October in anticipation 

of the scheduled 26 October detonation. Marginal weather, 

culminated by a lightning strike resulting in the loss of microwave and monitoring systems, caused event postponement until 28 

October. In the meantime, another FDR was successfully completed 

on the afternoon of 27 October. 

Shortly after the first security sweep was completed on 27 

October, personnel from SLA, PI, LPARL, IRT, LLL, EG&G, Bendix, 

and DNA made final instrumentation checks at the portal, in the 

tunnel, and at the Rainier Mesa trailer park. They loaded film 

into the event recording equipment before leaving the area. 

7.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

All projects were rechecked to assure that instruments were 

functioning properly. Permission to arm the device was granted, 

arming procedures were completed, and the arming party cleared 

the area by 0400 hours. A readiness briefing was held at 0500 

hours and all factors were judged to be favorable for an 0700 

test execution. 

HYBLA FAIR zero time was 0700 hours PST on 28 October 1974. 

7.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

The test failed to fully contain in the stemmed region. 

Shortly after zero time, RAMS units located between the HYBLA 

206 
FAIR overburden plug (OBP No. 2) and the HUSKY ACE OBP (OBP No. 

1, see Figure 7.1) detected radiation which had penetrated the 

HYBLA FAIR OBP. Long-term seepage of radioactive gas occurred. 

The seepage did not pose a threat to ultimate containment of 

these gases underground because pressures and temperatures 

between the two OBPs never differed significantly from ambient 

preevent levels. Readings varied from 175 R/h on the portal side 

of the HYBLA FAIR OBP, to 2.5 R/h on the zero point side of the 

HUSKY ACE OBP. These readings decreased to 800 mR/h, and 240 

mR/h respectively, by D+l. 

At zero time, RAMS unit Nos. 1 and 15 were not on line, unit 

21 and 22ER were lost, and all other units were functioning. 

Both unit Nos. 23 and 24ER indicated radiation levels greater 

than their respective 1,000 R/h and 100,000 R/h detection capacities. Unit No. 25 increased to 5 R/h and then began to decrease. At approximately two minutes after zero time, readings 

from unit No. 25 began to increase, reaching a maximum of 175 R/h 

at H+17 minutes after which levels began to decrease 

continuously. 

RAMS unit No. 26 began showing an increase at approximately 

H+ll minutes, increasing to 15 mR/h at H+13 minutes. It then 

showed a decay with a half-life of approximately seven minutes. 

At about H+38 minutes, it began showing a rapid increase, rising 

to 175 mR/h at H+40 minutes, and continuing to increase until 

H+210 minutes. 

RAMS unit No. 24ER came back on line with a reading of 

100,000 R/h at H+55 minutes. RAMS unit No. 23 in SLA alcove No. 

6 came back on line reading 1,000 R/h at H+210 minutes. 

No indication of radioactive effluent was detected by RAMS 

unit Nos. 28 through 35 located on the portal side of the HUSKY 

ACE OBP. RAMS unit No. 30 increased to approximately 1 mR/h when 

207 
remote gas samples taken at the portal were discharged back to 

the zero point side of the gas seal plug. 

All telemetry was secured at 0800 hours on 19 December 1974. 

7.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Reentry Activities 

Between 0809 and 0825 hours, a Radsafe base station was 

established beyond the FCP. All readings were background' at that 

location. The initial radiation survey of the portal was 

conducted between 0915 and 0934 hours and all readings were at 

background. A survey of the Mesa trailer park was conducted 

between 0915 and 0948 hours, and only background radiation levels 

were detected. Data recovery teams were released and performed 

their tasks from 1130 to 1245 hours. 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery Activities 

Reentry team No. 1 entered the tunnel portal area at 0900 

hours on 29 October (D+l) and received a briefing and smoke check 

of their masks. Teams were staged from approximately 50 feet 

inside the portal to stay out of the snow and rain. Team members 

proceeded to the gas seal door at 0920 hours dressed in complete 

sets of anticontamination clothing and wearing Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus. The gas seal door was reached at 

0930 hours and the drain valve was opened so that any water on 

the zero point side of the gas seal door could be pumped out. A 

survey indicated 400 ppm carbon dioxide, and a background reading 

of 0.05 mrad/h (beta plus gamma) was measured. No carbon 

monoxide or explosive mixture was detected. Work to open the 

access door in the gas seal door began at 0940 and was accomplished at 0943 hours. Standing water at about eight inches 

208 
below the sill of the access door was found, and the sandbag 

walkway had water a few inches deep over it. Toxic gas, 

explosive mixture, and radiation levels remained the same. 

Permission was given for team members to pass through the 

door and proceed to the gas seal plug, which was reached at 0952 

hours. Water from the zero point side of the plug was being 

pumped into the drain line on the portal side of the plug without 

overflowing from the ditch there into the drift. Team members 

confirmed a positive air flow toward the portal, measured a 

radiation level of 0.05 mrad/h, and detected no toxic gases or 

explosive mixture. Between 1000 and 1006 hours, both the 24-inch 

and 36-inch manway doors were opened. A team member passed 

through the 36-inch manway to check on the water level behind the 

plug, which he reported as between one and two inches below the 

manway opening and extending to the U12n.01 drift/main drift 

junction. He then returned to the portal side of the gas seal 

Plug* Team members removed their Draeger breathing apparatus and 

returned to the gas seal door to establish a fresh air station. 

At 1045 hours, a rescue team, work party, and Radsafe personnel 

entered the tunnel complex to open the large gas seal door, lay 

railroad track, and establish a "hot line." By approximately 

1115 hours, the large gas seal door was open and secured, and 

railroad tracks were reestablished through the door. 

Reentry team No. 1 again entered the tunnel complex and 

reached the gas seal door at 1140 hours, where they put on 

Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus before continuing into 

the tunnel complex. They reached the portal side of the gas seal 

plug at 1203 hours. The water level was now between six and 

eight inches below the bottom of the manway opening when team 

members went through the gas seal plug at 1206 hours. The 

U12n.01 drift/main drift junction was reached at 1210 hours. The 

train which had been left at this location was uncovered and 

209 
backed out, and team members then traveled by train toward OBP 

No. 1 (HUSKY ACE). The tunnel was virtually undamaged in the 01 

drift, and OBP No. 1 was reached at 1225 hours. A reading at 

contact with the portal side manway door was 0.5 mrad/h, 10 

mrad/h was measured at contact with the inside of the manway 

crawl space, and 1 mrad/h was measured two feet from the zero 

point side manway door. No alpha radiation was detected. The 

drain line was opened to obtain a water sample, but there was no 

water in the line. Gas which measured 200 mrad/h flowed from the 

drain line. The valve was closed and team members departed to 

check the U12n.05 (MISTY NORTH) drift at 1258 hours. No damage 

was found in the U12n.05 drift or at the 03 drift/OS drift 

junction. The ROSES units were checked at 1303 hours: levels of 

0.1 mrad/h and 400 ppm carbon dioxide were measured, but no 

carbon monoxide or explosive mixture was detected. Team members 

next traveled to the cable splice alcove, where only background 

radiation readings were obtained and there were no indications of 

toxic gases or explosive mixture. By 1340 hours, team members 

had returned to the portal side of the gas seal plug. Monitoring 

of reentry team members indicated no personnel contamination. 

All reentry team members were at the portal by 1345 hours. 

Between 1350 and 1445 hours, a party entered the tunnel 

complex to recover data from the ROSES units. No anticontamination clothing was required for this recovery operation. By 

1455 hours, all personnel had exited the tunnel complex and the 

tunnel was secured for the night. 

On 30 October (D+2), a reentry to OBP No. 1 was made to 

collect a gas sample. [An additional reentry to the same 

location was performed on 31 October (D+3) for the same reason.] 

Other than gas sampling, only work on the removal of the gas seal 

plug was conducted. Removal of the gas seal plug was completed 

on 4 November (D+7). 

210 
An attempt was made on 6 November (D+9) to pump water from 

the zero point side of OBP No. 1 through a line which had been 

run to the edge of the muck pile created by the mining out of the 

gas seal plug. Because there were problems with the line, 

* 

pumping was conducted for only 30 minutes. 

On 13 November (D+16), a reentry team prepared to establish 

ventilation through OBP No. 1. Team members were dressed in 

anticontamination coveralls (taped at the wrists and ankles), 

gloves, shoe covers, and were wearing supplied-air breathing 

apparatus. By 1055 hours, the 36-inch manway door was opened. 

Observation through the 36-inch manway showed very little water 

on the zero point side of OBP No. 1. Work at this location was 

completed at 1135 hours. Reentry team members removed their 

anticontamination clothing near this OBP to minimize the spread 

of contamination. Their gloves were contaminated, reading 2 

mrad/h; no alpha activity was detected. The glove having the 

highest reading was sent to the Radsafe laboratory for analysis. 

At 1140 hours, a hole in the vent line, about 100 feet on the 

portal side of OBP No. 1, was surveyed with the following 

results: 2,300 ppm carbon. monoxide, 30 percent of the LEL, and 

3.5 mrad/h at contact with the ventilation line. 

A Radsafe station was set up in the U12n.06 drift in 

preparation for reentry to OBP No. 2. On November 15 (D+18), 

reentry was made from OBP No. 1 to OBP No. 2 (Figure 7.6) to 

check the condition of the tunnel and take samples from the zero 

point side of OBP No. 2. Each reentry team member was dressed in 

two sets of coveralls (the first pair taped at the ankles and 

wrists), two sets of shoe covers, two sets of gloves, a hood, and 

was wearing Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus. Team 

members suited up at the fresh air station (located approximately 

100 feet on the portal side of OBP No. 1). At 1012 hours, 

reentry team members departed the fresh air station. As they 

proceeded, a few small puddles were noticed, and a reading of 2 

211 
BYPASS DRIFT 

ZERO POINT 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 7.6 HYBLA FAIR Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout 
mR/h was detected at the HUSKY ACE LOS drift/bypass drift 

junction and at the entrance to the U12n.07 bypass drift. They 

continued toward the IRT alcove (located about 40 to 50 feet into 

the 07 bypass drift). Radiation levels increased to 4 mrad/h, 

although no explosive mixture or toxic gases were detected. As 

they continued toward the U12n.09 drift, about 75 feet from the 

07 bypass drift/09 drift junction the reading was 13 mR/h. The 

U12n.09 drift was entered at 1021 hours where minor spalling was 

noted on the right rib of the drift. The radiation level at SLA 

alcove No. 1 was 20 mR/h. OBP No. 2 looked undamaged. A filter 

system was connected to a manual gas sampling line and team 

members began sampling through this plug at 1038 hours. No toxic 

gases or explosive mixture were detected. The general exposure 

rate in this area was 80 mR/h. No water was available for 

sampling purposes. 

Between 1130 and 1139 hours, the area of the HUSKY ACE DAC 

No. 1 was checked (the maximum reading was 2 mR/h). At 1139 

hours, team members returned to the IRT alcove to recover tapes, 

then returned to the fresh air station at 1150 hours. Reentry to 

OBP No. 2 was completed at this time. Maximum contamination 

levels on clothing of reentry team members were: 

1 to 2 mrad/h on coveralls 

15 mrad/h on shoe covers 

5 to 6 mrad/h on gloves 

Requirements for additional reentries beyond the fresh air 

station included single coveralls, a full-face respirator, a 

hood, gloves, and shoe covers. 

On 19 November at 1046 hours, a team entered the tunnel 

complex to check OBP No. 2 to ascertain where seepage had come 

through the plug. Air samples were collected to help determine 

respiratory protection equipment requirements for continued 

213 
reentry and recovery operations. Each team member wore a fullface respirator (with. OAP/R canister), single coveralls (with 

openings taped), double shoe covers, double gloves, and a hood. 

The team left OBP No. 1 at 1045 hours and collected air samples 

in the IRT and SLA alcoves. A survey of OBP No. 2 indicated 

carbon monoxide and an explosive mixture were coming from several 

locations. A contact reading of 700 mrad/h was obtained above 

the 24-inch manway door. Additionally, experimenter alcoves and 

the HUSKY ACE DAC No. 1 area were checked. The maximum radiation 

level measured was 150 mrad/h on the portal side of OBP No. 2 at 

1113 hours. 

On 20 November, a team left the fresh air station at 0930 

hours and traveled to OBP No. 2 to collect gas samples. Each 

team member was dressed in single coveralls (with openings 

taped), two pairs of gloves and shoe covers, a hood, and a fullface mask with an OAP/R canister. Levels of l,OOO-1,500 ppm 

carbon monoxide and approximately 15 percent of the LEL were 

measured seeping from various locations at this OBP. No 

radiation readings greater than the 50 mrad/h (background) in the 

vent line were detected. Team members returned to the fresh air 

station at 1020 hours and crews were sent in to remove OBP No. 1. 

All work was terminated at 1600 hours and the security gate was 

locked for the day. 

From 21 November to 2 December, routine tunnel cleanup 

operations were performed. On 2 December, preparations began to 

decontaminate the area between the two OBPs. On 3 December, the 

decision was made to use water to decontaminate about 100 feet of 

the drift along the left rib. Decontamination using water was 

not as effective as had been hoped: therefore it was decided to 

fix the contamination by spraying the area with a sealing agent. 

At the same time, an experiment recovery team went to work in SLA 

alcove No. 1. Participants were dressed in double coveralls, 

214 
shoe covers, and gloves. Each wore a full-face mask with OAP/R 

canister. Recovery operations took approximately two hours. 

Decontamination efforts on the zero point side of OBP No. 1 

continued on 4 December. Anticontamination clothing and 

respiratory protection requirements were the same as for the 

previous day. 

A survey of the U12n.07 reentry drift was conducted on 9 

December 1974 between 0930 and 0940 hours. Complete sets of 

anticontamination clothing and full-face masks with OAP/R 

canisters were required. Preparations were made to-begin rehabilitating the tunnel in the HUSKY ACE DAC area so that a probe 

hole into the U12n.09 LOS drift could be drilled. Exposure rates 

were 5 mrad/h at DAC No. 1 and 2 mrad/h at DAC No. 2. Rehabilitation efforts were completed on 10 December. Drilling began at 

1430 hours, and, by 1500 hours, two feet had been drilled. 

Drilling activity was terminated for the day. When drilling 

resumed on 11 December, the radiation level in the DAC No. 2 area 

had increased to 4 mrad/h. The drill crew, accompanied by 

Radsafe and industrial hygiene personnel, entered the area at 

1305 hours. All personnel were dressed in full anticontamination 

clothing and wore full-face masks with either Type N canisters or 

supplied air. The hole was drilled to 32 feet by the end of the 

shift. Drilling continued on subsequent days, with personnel 

dressed as on 11 December. The hole was drilled to 50 feet when 

drilling was stopped to put a blowout preventer on the collar 

pipe. The blowout preventer installed on 17 December leaked, so 

a new one was requested. During this time, a carbon monoxide 

monitor with alarm was installed near the blowout preventer. 

After drilling resumed, the hole was drilled to 108 feet before 

the end of shift. No other problems were encountered. On 18 

December, drilling resumed, but problems with the drilling 

operation occurred, causing work to be stopped for the day. 

215 
Drilling into the U12n.09 drift was completed at 1135 hours 

on 19 December 1974. No indications of explosive mixture or 

toxic gases were detected in the work area. During an attempt to 

recover a core sample for analysis, with 124 feet of drill pipe 

left in the hole, 3,000 ppm carbon monoxide and greater than 100 

percent of the LEL were detected coming from the hole. The 

operation was stopped, the hole was closed off, and the vent line 

blower was started. All personnel departed the area at 1545 

hours. 

On 20 December 1974, an SLA health physicist and a Radsafe 

monitor traveled to OBP No. 2 to inspect the portal face of the 

plug and to take gas samples through the plug. They were dressed 

in full anticontamination clothing and wore full-face respirators 

with Type N canisters. Following this entry, operations were 

suspended for the Christmas holidays and no entries were 

. 

scheduled until 6 January 1975. 

EGbG technicians, dressed in full anticontamination clothing 

with full-face masks, began recovering equipment from the IRT 

alcove on 8 January 1975. No radiation problems occurred. 

On 10 January 1975, miners, dressed in single anticontamination coveralls, single hoods, and double sets of shoe covers and 

gloves, entered the U12n.09 drift to begin work at OBP No. 2. 

When the damper on the vent line was opened, 3,000 ppm carbon 

monoxide was detected above the crawlway door at OBP No 2. 

Personnel were immediately evacuated from the area. The maximum 

radiation level was 30 mrad/h (at 1115 hours). When work resumed 

at 1300 hours, personnel were wearing supplied-air equipment. 

The vent line was extended to the face of OBP No. 2 and left in 

that configuration for the weekend. On 13 January, another 

attempt was made to work at OBP No. 2; this was unsuccessful, 

however, because unacceptable levels of toxic gases and explosive 

mixture were present. 

216 
Workers, dressed in single sets of coveralls and hoods and 

double sets of shoe covers and gloves, traveled to OBP No. 2 on 

14 January 1975. No carbon monoxide was detected at the start of 

work and the radiation level measured was 20 mrad/h. After two 

hours, 500 ppm carbon monoxide and 45 percent of the LEL were 

detected. Work continued with no problems. 

On 15 and 16 January, work continued with the same Radsafe 

requirements. Sandia personnel, each wearing a single set of 

coveralls, a hood, double shoe covers and gloves, and a full-face 

mask with dust canister, entered SLA alcove No. 1 to remove 

electronic gear. Recovery operations took approximately two 

hours. Maximum levels measured were 4,500 ppm carbon monoxide 

and 60 percent of the LEL at a fissure in the upper portion of 

the right rib at OBP No. 2. No problems were noted in the 

working area. Experiment recovery also was accomplished by one 

PI representative dressed in a single set of coveralls, a hood, 

double shoe covers and gloves, and a full-face mask with a dust 

canister. This recovery effort took less than one hour. 

7.4.2 Reentry Mining 

On 29, January 1975, miners and electricians worked in the 

i112n.09 drift in preparation of mining the U12n.09 reentry drift. 

The exposure rate in this work area was 3 mrad/h. All personnel 

were dressed in full anticontamination clothing and wore fullface masks. Reentry mining began on 31 January. 

Reentry mining operations were conducted during the months 

of February and March. Some core drilling also was performed. 

During coring operations, drillers, Radsafe, and industrial 

hygiene personnel dressed in anticontamination clothing and fullface masks with supplied air. The radiation level measured was 2 

mrad/h. Alpha contamination measuring 500 cpm was encountered in 

the reentry heading. 

217 
On 15 and 16 April, the reentry heading was sprayed with a 

sealing agent to fix the alpha contamination. An exposure rate 

of 35 mR/h was encountered during mining operations conducted 

from 17 April to 4 May. Additional precautions taken to protect 

workers included more spraying of the area and sandbagging. 

These efforts reduced the exposure rate to 0.15 mR/h. 

Drilling into SLA No. 6 alcove began on 5 May. The carbon 

monoxide reading from one probe hole was 20,000 ppm. Six more 

probe holes were drilled during day shift that day with ventilation on the first hole keeping negative pressure on the holes 

being completed into the alcove. During the shift change, 

compressed air was blown into the probe hole allowing the air to 

exit through the new holes in the face. Swing shift continued 

drilling, at one point detecting 5,000 ppm carbon monoxide in the 

flex line. At 1900 hours a decision was made to flush the chamber with compressed air and ventilate for 30 minutes. After this 

ventilation effort, the carbon monoxide level was reduced to 10 

ppm. Work was continued without respiratory protection equipment. At approximately 2200 hours, however, a miner became 

light-headed and slightly faint, complaining that he smelled the 

odor of rotten eggs. Personnel working at the access hole face 

were immediately instructed to begin wearing supplied air 

equipment. Nothing was detected in the area to account for the 

miner being affected. 

No personnel were allowed into the work area on 6 May until 

industrial hygiene personnel checked the air quality for acceptability. Readings were 10 ppm carbon monoxide; no other gases 

were detected which would account for the previous day's problem. 

Radiation levels at arm's length into the SLA alcove were 20 mR/h 

and 80 mrad/h. Since the alcove had about 6 to 8 inches of water 

on the invert, it was decided that personnel entering the alcove 

would not be required to wear respiratory protection equipment. 

(The dampness would minimize airborne dust particles). At 1115 

218 
hours, two personnel entered the SLA alcove to remove film and 

photograph the area. When work was completed (about 35 minutes 

later), one person's hands were contaminated because he had 

removed his gloves in order to feel the edge of the film in a 

camera. The initial reading from his hands was 1.3 mrad/h; 

however, repeated washings reduced this to 0.3 mrad/h. The 

person was instructed to wear a plastic glove on the contaminated 

hand until he reached Area 6 and further decontamination could be 

performed. A urine sample was requested and was submitted on 16 

May. This sample showed no indication of any internal deposition 

of radionuclides. 

On 8 May, miners began enlarging the access hole into SLA 

alcove No. 6 to facilitate equipment removal. 

Underground sampling operations for radiochemical analysis 

began on 9 May. The exposure rate in the area after the first 

core had been removed (at 1030 hours) was 8 mR/h. An hour later, 

the exposure rate in the area had increased to 11 mR/h. A swipe 

of the drill hole cuttings indicated alpha contamination; 

however, this positive indication could not be reproduced later, 

indicating the possibility that this actually had been a beta 

reading. As a precautionary measure in the event alpha 

contamination did exist, the following procedures were 

instituted: 

A. 

B. 

C. 

Full-face respirators with supplied-air or highefficiency particulate filters for all personnel in the 

work area were required. 

A double brattice cloth curtain was hung to delineate 

the hot line area, separating the area into "hot," 

"warm," and "cold" work areas. 

An absolute filter was installed in the vent line. 

219 
D. Double anticontamination clothing was required for all 

personnel inside the second brattice cloth curtain. 

Drilling was halted between 1345 and 1800 hours while these 

procedures were implemented. A swipe survey of the work area at 

the time indicated no alpha contamination. During drilling 

operations, all personnel forward of the double curtain were 

required to wear double anticontamination clothing and supplied 

air. Radchem drilling operations were completed on 5 June. 

Preparations to drive a drift to reach the LOS drift began 

on 9 June. Workers wore full-face masks and hoods in addition to 

normally required anticontamination clothing. The exposure rate 

in the heading was 15 mR/h on 10 June. Mining continued until 

the LOS drift was reached on 17 June. 

On 30 June 1975, preparations to enter the LOS drift were 

made. Reentry personnel wore double coveralls and gloves, 

waders, a hood, and full-face masks with supplied air. Personnel 

were in the drift a maximum of one hour. The maximum reading for 

this entry (750 mR/h) was obtained near the stemming plug. Water 

was on the invert. When the team members exited the drift, each 

member's clothing exceeded established contamination guides. Two 

additional personnel were contaminated helping the team members 

undress. All personnel were decontaminated to acceptable levels 

using standard decontamination techniques. 

Each person working in the LOS drift on 1 July wore a single 

set of coveralls, rubber pants and jacket, double shoe covers and 

gloves, a plastic hood, and a full-face mask with supplied air. 

These clothing requirements continued through 3 July for all 

recovery personnel. 

The face mask requirement was lifted 11 July. At the end of 

day shift on 16 July 1975, nasal swabs were taken from miners who 

220 
had worked in the 08 reentry heading. The policy of not requiring face masks continued. One person had contamination of 

0.3 mrad/h on his clothing, and two people who had not been 

wearing hoods showed radioactive contamination of their hair. As 

of 17 July, miners working in the U12n.09 reentry heading wore 

coveralls, shoe covers, gloves, and hoods. On 21 July, the 

radiation level had increased to 55 mrad/h, and the contact 

reading at the face was greater than 200 mrad/h. A check of 

mining personnel indicated some contamination in the nostrils as 

well as on hard hats. All personnel were removed from the 

heading. Three personnel were selected as a representative 

sample and sent to Mercury for whole body counts to see if 

internal depositi on of radionuclides had occurred. No internal 

deposition was detected, and all miners were allowed to return to 

work with no change in radsafe requirements. Upon checking out 

at the hot line, some personnel again were noted to have some 

nasal contamination, and a maximum reading of 2 mrad/h was found 

on them after anticontamination clothing had been removed. All 

personnel were decontaminated to less than 0.2 mrad/h, and a mask 

requirement for work in the heading was reestablished. 

On 22 July 1975, miners dressed in single coveralls, hoods, 

gloves, and double shoe covers for work in the U12n.09 reentry 

drift. All personnel in the reentry work area, zero point side 

of the end of the vent line, also wore supplied-air equipment. 

All personnel working in the U12n.07 muck dumping area wore fullface masks with high-efficiency particulate filters. 

Work on the 09 reentry drift continued on 23 July. Just 

before 1500 hours, when the train was being prepared to leave the 

heading, it was surveyed and found to be contaminated. The 

decision was made to spray the reentry area with a sealing agent 

to prevent further spreading of contamination, then close it down 

until ventilation could be improved. Spraying of the drift was 

conducted from the beginning of swing shift to 2315 hours. 

221 
On 24 July 1975, the drift was closed off until ventilation 

could be improved. 

Operations in the U12n.09 reentry drift resumed on 4 August 

1975. Work began on crosscut No. 3 on 5 August. Miners wore 

coveralls, gloves, and shoe covers, but no self-contained breathing apparatus was required. This effort, as well as work in the 

other crosscuts, continued until 15 August 1975 when all work was 

suspended. l 

The U12n.09 drift was reopened on 1 December for core drilling into the zero point area and to check the ventilation and 

general condition of the drift. No carbon monoxide was detected. 

Work was conducted between 1 and 15 December in preparation 

for emplacement of a sandbag plug before closing the drift. 

These operations were completed, the security gate was locked, 

and the facility was secured on 15 December 1975. 

7.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Measurements to determine radiation levels and check for the 

presence of any toxic gases or explosive mixture were made each 

shift. These measurements were then recorded in the monitors' 

logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and 

drilling were established by REECo and emphasized during all 

operations. A written standard operating procedure was required 

for each operation involving explosives, toxic materials, 

radioactive material, or any other operation with the potential 

for personal injury. Each individual involved in such operations 

was required to know the contents of the applicable procedures. 

222 
The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

miners boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency provided 

its own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of the McCaa two-hour 

breathing apparatus and had used the Draeger self-contained 

breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and practices, as 

spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

A. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

B. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

c. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

D. HYBLA FAIR Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 0701 hours on 28 October 

1974 and ended at 0800 hours on 19 December 1974. The maximum 

gamma reading was greater than 100,000 R/h at RAMS unit No. 24ER, 

immediately after zero time. Stemming was not completely 

successful. 

223 
Initial radiation survey teams entered the area at 0809 

hours and completed the survey at 0948 hours on 28 October 1974. 

All measurements were area background. No alpha radiation was 

detected. 

Tunnel reentry and experiment recovery activities were conducted from 29 October 1974 to 16 January 1975. Maximum readings 

were 80 mR/h general exposure rate at OBP No. 2 on 15 November 

1974, greater than 100 percent of the LEL at a core hole. drilled 

into U12n.09 on 19 December 1974, and 4,500 ppm carbon monoxide 

at a fissure in the upper right rib of the drift at OBP No. 2 on 

16 January 1975. 

Reentry mining was conducted from 31 January 1975 to 15 

August 1975. Maximum readings were 55 mrad/h at the U12n.09 

reentry heading on 21 July, 750 mrad/h at contact with the LOS 

pipe near the stemming plug on 30 June, and 20,000 ppm carbon 

monoxide at a probe hole drilled into SLA alcove No. 6 on 5 May. 

No drilling from the Mesa was conducted after this event, 

although underground core sampling was performed. Coring to 

obtain radiochemical samples was performed in February, March, 

MayI June, and December, 1975. The highest radiation reading recorded during these operations was 11 mR/h. Some alpha contamination in drill hole cuttings was indicated by portable survey 

instruments, and special clothing requirements were instituted, 

but no alpha emitters were detected during laboratory analysis of 

representative samples. 

Recorded personnel exposures received during individual 

entries to HYBLA FAIR radex areas from 29 October 1974 to 15 

December 1975 are summarized below. Average exposures are from 

self-reading pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access 

Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

224 
Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 3,399 265 3 

DOD Participants 204 260 6 

225 
CHAPTER 8 

DINING CAR EVENT 

8.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

DINING CAR was a DOD-sponsored test conducted at 1245 hours 

PDT on 5 April 1975 with a yield less than 20 kt. The device was 

detonated in the U12e.18 drift of the U12e tunnel complex (Figure 

8.1) at a vertical depth of 1,257 feet. The purpose of the event 

was to test the response of materials and equipment to a nuclear 

detonation environment. Government agencies and contractors 

conducted 31 projects to obtain the desired weapons effects 

information. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent was released to the atmosphere. 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all DINING CAR project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of ERDA* and ERDA contractor personnel were in accordance with established ERDA-DOD agreements or were the subject of 

separate action between Field Command, DNA, and the ERDA/Nevada 

Operations Office. 

*ERDA (Energy Research and Development Administration) succeeded 

the AEC on 19 January 1975. 

226 
OVERBURDEN 

0 900 

FEET 

Figure 8.1 DINING CAR Event - Tunnel Layout 
Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments, or delivering them to the insta.llation contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, 

and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accide'ntal or 

Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LLL fielded 

the device, the LLL Test Group Director was responsible for 

radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

Test Controller relieved the LLL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller had determined that 

venting had not occurred, he delegated responsibility to the DOD 

Test Group Director. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

The U12e.18 complex consisted of the 

drift, a bypass drift, several crosscuts 

main LOS and bypass drifts, a side pipe 

access drift. Mining also was required 

the old DID0 QUEEN 

U12e.19, was mined to 

protection features 

Containment features 

and a gas seal plug. 

cable facility. 

main LOS pipe 

connecting the 

drift, and an 

to make use of 

A new drift, 

house the ROSES units. Experiment 

included two DACs and a TAPS. 

included an overburden plug (OBP) 

Construction activiti es began in October 1973 with removal of the old DID0 QUEEN OBP and tunnel cleanup in 

preparation for mining the U12e.18 complex. LOS drift 

228 
mining was completed when the zero point was reached on 

5 April 1974, at which time mining of the side pipe 

drift began. The bypass and side pipe drifts were 

completed in June 1974. Mining of the ROSES drift began 

on 3 July and was completed on 23 August 1974. Installation of the LOS pipe began in late July 1974 and was 

completed at the end of November 1974. Experiments were 

installed between 4 December 1974 and the middle of 

February 1975. 

Signal dry runs (SDRs) began on 20 January. The first 

two mandatory signal dry runs (MSDs) were conducted on 4 

and 6 February. Generally, two MSDs were held each week 

thereafter. A successful full-power, full-frequency 

(FPFF) dry run was held on 20 March and a final dry run 

(FDR) was held on 2 April. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with ERDA 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and 

equipment support. 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating 

agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

229 
parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

c. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 37 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for DINING CAR 

as shown in Table 8.1 and Figures 8.2 and 8.3. An air 

sampling unit was placed near each portal (U12e and 

U12e.s). All RAMS units and air sampling units were 

installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

Forty-six air sampling stations and 30 gamma rate recorder stations were operated by EPA in the offsite 

area. Twenty-seven EPA personnel were fielded for surveillance activities. 

D. Security Coveraqe 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

230 
TABLE 8.1 

DINING CAR EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

5 April 1975 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

SURFACE 

From the U12es portal: 

On filter system 

On vent line 

On vent line 

897 feet at N 13O E 

572 feet at N 62O E 

476 feet at S 71° E 

382 feet at S 22O E 

415 feet at S 34O W 

492 feet at N 44O W 

870 feet at N 22O W 

Tunnel drain line 

1885 feet at N 89O E 

From cable downhole: 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

HFR 

At cable downhole 

209 feet at N 4O E 

275 feet at S 88' E 

190 feet at S 9' E 

235 feet at S 88' W 

From SGZ unless otherwise indicated: 

501 feet at N 26O E from SGZ 

474 feet at S 14' E from SGZ 

414 feet at S 59" W from SGZ 

At U12e.14 HFR cable downhole 

231 
TABLE 8.1 (concluded) 

Station Location 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

"27ER 

28 

29 

From the U12e.14 drift: 

875 feet into the U12e.18 LOS drift 

515 feet into the U12e.18 LOS drift 

215 feet into the U12e.18 LOS drift 

900 feet into the U12n.18 bypass drift 

600 feet into the U12n.18 bypass drift 

From the U12.06 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

1,050 feet into the U12e.14 LOS drift 

1,050 feet into the U12e.14 LOS drift 

450 feet into the U12e.14 LOS drift 

500 feet into the U12e.12 reentry drift from the 

U12e.14 drift 

30 700 feet into the U12e.06 drift from the U12e main 

drift 

31 

*32ER 

33 

34 

35 

36 

From the U12e portal unless otherwise indicated: 

3,800 feet into the U12e main drift 

3,800 feet into the U12e main drift 

3,565 feet into the U12e main drift 

2,500 feet into the U12e main drift 

50 feet into the U12e drift 

95 feet into the U12es drift from the U12es portal 

UNDERGROUND 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

232 
0 900 

Figure 8.2 DINING CAR Event - Surface RAMS 
Figure 8.3 DINING CAR Event - Underground RAMS 
controlled area were required to stop at muster or 

control stations for issue of stay-in badges, or issue 

and return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

closed area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

One UH-1F and 

crew members 

two UH-1N helicopters with USAF pilots and 

provided support for aerial closed circuit 

television coverage, any cloud surveillance (if venting 

should occur), and security sweeps. One of the three 

was on standby for the Test Controller's use, if needed. 

EPA had a Turbo Beech aircraft available for cloud 

tracking and sampling of any effluent, and a USAF C-118 

aircraft also was on standby at Nellis Air Force Base if 

needed for cloud tracking. 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

A readiness briefing was held at 1430 hours on 2 April in 

anticipation of planned test execution on 3 April. Because conditions for the test were unfavorable at that time, another readiness briefing was scheduled for 0800 hours on 3 April. At the 

0800 briefing on 3 April, test execution was set for 1230 hours; 

however, problems during dry runs caused a further delay until 4 

April. On 4 April at 0630 hours, a readiness briefing was held 

and test execution was again postponed because additional technical problems were encountered. Two more readiness briefings were 

held on 4 April, one at 1400 hours and one at 1700 hours. The 

FDR was scheduled for 2100 hours, with a new proposed test 

execution time of 1100 hours on 5 April. 

235 
Experimenter organizations represented during button up were 

SLA, EGcG, LLL, LASL, DNA, and PI. 

8.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

At 0130 hours on 5 April, experimenter personnel were evacuated from the tunnel, and the button-up crew arrived at the OBP. 

By 0200 hours, experimenters had departed the Mesa trailer parks, 

and the arming party had departed CP-1 enroute to the U12e.18 

zero point area. The arming party requested permission to arm 

the device at 0430 hours, performed their functions, and exited 

the area by 1000 hours. A readiness briefing had been held at 

0800 hours, at which time weather conditions were found favorable, and no further technical problems had been encountered. 

Because final button up and arming had proceeded more slowly than 

planned, the final countdown was not initiated until 1230 hours. 

The DINING CAR device was detonated at 1245 hours PDT on 5 

April 1975. 

8.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Stemming was successful and the pressures and temperatures 

inside the tunnel complex remained normal. Telemetry measurements began at 1246 hours on 5 April. The RAMS units located 

along the LOS pipe responded to neutron activation of the LOS 

pipe and experiments. Normal radioactive decay of this activation was observed. No indications of radioactive effluent were 

detected by any tunnel, surface, or airborne radiation monitoring 

units. All RAMS units were secured at 1245 hours on 14 April 

1976. 

An aerial survey of the roads to Rainier Mesa indicated that 

reentry to the Mesa trailer parks could be performed along the 

East Rainier Mesa Road without delays for removal of rocks. 

236 
8.3.2 Initial Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities 

Reentry to make radiation surveys and recover data from the 

Mesa trailer parks and the portal area began at 1325 hours. The 

portal survey was completed at 1415 hours, and the Mesa survey 

was completed at 1430 hours. No readings above background were 

measured. Data recovery was conducted between 1430 and 1845 

hours. Gas samples were obtained remotely from the zero point 

side of the OBP at 1447 hours. These samples indicated normal 

air composition. D-day reentry operations were terminated at 

1845 hours. 

8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities 

At 0826 hours on 6 April (D+l), a work party entered the 

tunnel complex portal (Figure 8.4). Personnel were not required 

to wear anticontamination clothing or respiratory protection 

equipment. They moved to the gas seal door at 0838 hours and 

established communications with personnel at the portal. No 

toxic gases, explosive mixture, or radiation problems were 

encountered. The gas seal access door was opened and members of 

the party proceeded through it to the gas seal plug. Readings of 

5 ppm carbon monoxide and 500 ppm carbon dioxide were measured, 

but no explosive mixture was detected. Some work party personnel 

then returned to the portal side of the gas seal door to open the 

large door and begin reestablishing train tracks. No radiation 

reading above background (0.05 mrad/h) was detected. The work 

party completed its assignment and exited the tunnel at 1015 

hours. 

Reentry and rescue teams again entered the tunnel complex at 

1030 hours and proceeded toward the OBP. Team members wore 

complete anticontamination clothing with Draeger self-contained 

237 

breathing apparatus. At 1105 hours, they reached the 11 drift/06 

drift junction where they found minor rock spa11 on the tracks. 

The tunnel appeared to be otherwise in good condition. Similar 

conditions existed at the 14 drift/06 drift junction, in the 

U12e.06 drift, and in the U12e.12 reentry drift. Team members 

arrived at the OBP at 1114 hours and observed that the portal 

side of the plug was in good condition. No explosive mixture or 

toxic gases were detected and 0.03 mrad/h was measured. Team 

members opened and secured the OBP manway door. The ROSES units 

were checked at 1205 hours and found to be in good condition. 

Some rock spa11 was evident in this area. The Dance Hall area 

was in good condition with only minor damage suffered. A reading 

of 10 ppm carbon monoxide was measured at the Dance Hall. Next, 

the SLA No. 1 alcove was checked and also found in good condition. At 1213 hours, test chamber No. 1 was reached (see Figure 

8.5). A reading of 150 mR/h was obtained at the door before it 

was opened. The door was opened, and 400 mR/h and 50 ppm carbon 

monoxide were measured inside the door. Debris was found in the 

bottom of the test chamber, but no alpha radiation was detected. 

Team members then traveled to test chamber No. 2 crosscut where a 

radiation reading of 0.1 mR/h was obtained. They began moving 

sandbags in an effort to reach the test chamber No. 2 door. A 

reading of 400 mR/h was detected at the closed door to test 

chamber No. 2 at 1305 hours. At this time, ground motion was 

felt by rescue team members located at the OBP. All personnel 

were advised to exit the tunnel and had done so by 1348 hours. 

The ground motion later was attributed to cavity collapse. 

Rescue and reentry teams departed the portal at 0756 hours 

on 7 April (D+2) and traveled to the OBP where they donned 

Draeger self-contained breathing appratus before progressing 

further. At 0836 hours, team members proceeded through the OBP 

and traveled to test chamber No. 3 via the bypass drift, reaching 

crosscut No. 3 at 0845 hours. A radiation level of 0.05 mR/h was 

239 
NOT TO SCALE 

KEY 

DAC = DNA AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

TAPS = TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

TC = TEST CHAMBER 

OBP = OVERBURDEN PLUG 

Figure 8.5 DINING CAR Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout 
measured. The ROSES unit at this location appeared to be in good 

condition. It was not possible to reach the door to test chamber 

No. 3 safely at that time because the ground was in very poor 

condition. At about 100 feet to the zero point side of crosscut 

No. 3 the drift was found to be completely closed off. 

Team members returned to crosscut No. 2 and opened the door 

to test chamber No. 2. An exposure rate of 150 mR/h was measured 

with a trace of carbon monoxide, but no explosive mixture or 

alpha contamination was detected. The general condition of 

the experiments was good. Team members next traveled to the 

ROSES drift through the bypass drift. Only three team members 

traveled all the way to the end of the ROSES drift. After 

checking the ROSES units, team members exited the tunnel at 1111 

hours. 

The first group of personnel to recover ROSES data entered 

the tunnel at 1255 hours. This group consisted of about 30 

people including representatives from Radsafe, industrial 

hygiene, miners, and communications support. After performing 

their assigned tasks, they exited the tunnel at 1420 hours. They 

were immediately followed by a second group of data recovery 

personnel who entered at 1423 hours and exited at 1630 hours. No 

respiratory protection equipment was required for personnel on 

either of these reentries. 

On 8 April (D+3), the scientific assessment team entered the 

LOS drift to assess the condition of experiments in test chamber 

No. 1 and recover KSC experiments at that $ocation. Complete 

anticontamination clothing (with openings taped) and full-face 

masks were required. The scientific assessment team exited the 

tunnel at 1315 hours, after which ventilation of the LOS pipe was 

authorized. The average exposure rate at test chamber No. 1 was 

30 mR/h, with a maximum reading of 100 mR/h. Three personnel 

performed a damage and hazard survey of the LOS pipe from test 

chamber No. 1 to test chamber No. 2. The general condition of 

241 
the experiments was good. During this same time, a work crew 

continued to remove sandbags from crosscut No. 2. 

Mining through the gas seal plug was completed and train 

tracks were established on 9 April (D+4). Scientific assessment 

continued at test chamber Nos. 2 and 3. Anticontamination clothing requirements included double sets of coveralls and shoe 

covers, one pair of gloves, a hood, and a full-face respirator 

with dust canister. Team members traveled through the LOS pipe 

to test chamber No. 3 and then to the TAPS. Workers continued to 

remove sandbags from crosscut No. 2. No anticontamination clothing requirements were in effect at crosscut No. 2. During swing 

shift, mining work began at the OBP. 

On 10 April (D+S), a LASL reentry party entered test chamber 

No. 2 and went through the LOS pipe to test chamber No. 3 where 

they worked for about two hours. All personnel wore complete 

anticontamination clothing (including double sets of coveralls 

and shoe covers) and full-face masks with dust filters. The 

radiation level in this area was 18 mrad/h. At 1510 hours, two 

persons reentered the LOS pipe to continue cleaning up at test 

chamber No. 2. They wore coveralls, shoe covers, and gloves, but 

because results from previous swipes were negative, no masks were 

required. At 1600 hours, KSC personnel recovered some 

experiments from test chamber No. 2. The same Radsafe 

requirements applied as for the previous crew. When a decision 

was made to inspect test chamber No. 3, those personnel 

performing the inspection donned face masks in addition to other 

anticontamination clothing they were wearing. The group exited 

the area at 1830 hours. 

Work continued on 11 April (D+6) to remove sandbags from 

crosscut Nos. 2 and 3. The Radsafe station was moved to crosscut 

No. 1. No work was conducted in the LOS pipe. 

242 
On 12 April (D+7), miners continued to prepare the tunnel 

for experiment recovery. Work also continued in crosscut Nos. 2 

and 3. 

Ventilation was established in test chamber No. 3 on 14 

April (D+9). Fresh air was then available in the LOS pipe on the 

zero point side of test chamber No. 3. No face mask requirement 

was in effect anywhere in the LOS pipe at that time. 

Sandia and LASL parties dressed for work in the LOS pipe. 

A LASL party entered test chamber No. 3 to assess the condition 

of the experiments. Exposure rates measured were: 1 mR/h on the 

portal side of the test chamber; 4 mR/h at the center of the LOS 

pipe at the test chamber door; and 4 mR/h on the zero point side 

of the test chamber. 

On 15 April (D+lO), the LOS pipe was opened to experimenters 

for recovery. Only four persons were allowed in each test chamber at any one time. No anticontamination clothing was required 

inside the LOS pipe. Recovery of instrumentation from alcoves 

was performed simultaneously with LOS pipe recoveries. All test 

chambers were secured by 1800 hours with experiment recovery 

activities between 75 and 90 percent complete. 

Experiment recovery from the LOS pipe continued on 16 April 

(D+ll), again with no anticontamination clothing requirements. 

All three test chambers were locked at 1500 hours; however, personnel stood by for LASL experimenters to arrive to complete 

their recoveries. LASL personnel arrived at 1645 and had 

completed their recoveries by 1745 hours. 

Experiment recovery continued on 17 April (D+l2) with no 

anticontamination clothing requirements. At 1135 hours, two 

243 
persons entered test chamber No. 3 to go to the TAPS and remotely 

sample gases behind the TAPS door. Both wore Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus with full-face masks. Sampling Gas 

completed at 1210 hours. Results indicated two percent carbon 

monoxide, five percent oxygen, and greater than 100 percent of 

the LEL. 

On 18 April (D+13), two persons wearing Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus entered the LOS pipe to remove 

sampling valves from the TAPS door and to connect a compressed 

air line to the door. Readings taken at this time indicated 20 

percent oxygen, 10 percent of the LEL, and 90 ppm carbon 

monoxide. A check at the OBP showed vent line concentrations of 

one percent of the LEL, and five ppm carbon monoxide. 

Routine operations continued until 1440 hours on 28 April 

when the TAPS door was opened slightly and water flowed from 

behind the door. A reading taken at contact with this water 

indicated background levels of radiation. No explosive mixture 

or toxic gases were detected behind the door. 

At 1345 hours on 29 April, the TAPS area was surveyed. No 

toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected, and the contact 

reading at the bottom of the LOS pipe was 0.4 mrad/h. DNA, 

Lockheed, and Radsafe personnel, wearing anticontamination 

coveralls, shoe covers, and gloves, entered the zero point side 

of the TAPS at 1420 hours. They returned to the portal side at 

1445 hours. The average radiation level was 0.5 mrad/h. 

Readings of 10 ppm carbon monoxide and 20 percent oxygen were 

measured, and no explosive mixture was detected. Minor 

experiment recoveries continued between 30 April and 6 May. On 7 

May, a damage and hazard survey of the LOS pipe from the TAPS to 

DAC No. 1 was conducted. No anticontamination clothing was 

required inside the LOS pipe. Routine clean-up work continued in 

the LOS pipe until 18 July when entry was made into U12e.14 to 

244 
look at tunnel damage. Levels of 1,500 ppm carbon dioxide and 20 

percent oxygen were measured. The U12e.14 reentry drift had 

collapsed and was impassable beyond the DAC area. 

During May, June, and July, efforts were concentrated on removal of the LOS pipe and rehabilitation of the U12e.18 bypass 

drift to reach the end of the stemming. 

8.4.2 Postevent Mining 

On 28 August, reentry mining in the U12e.18 bypass drift began. The reentry drift was to follow the bypass drift to DAC No. 

2 crosscut, then cut over to the main drift and continue toward 

the zero point. No anticontamination clothing requirements were 

imposed during this time. During September and October, routine 

reentry mining operations continued, with reentry to the DAC No. 

1 crosscut accomplished on 30 October 1975. The DAC No. 2 

crosscut was reentered on 5 November. Readings were 30 ppm 

carbon monoxide, 4 ppm nitrous oxide plus nitrogen dioxide, and 

0.05 mrad/h. No explosive mixture was detected. Experiment 

removal from the two crosscuts was conducted on 11 and 12 

November. Final reentry mining and experiment recovery were 

conducted during January 1976, and all event-related operations 

were completed on 16 January. 

8.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Measurements to determine radiation levels and check for the 

presence of toxic gases and explosive mixture were made each 

shift. These measurements were then recorded in the monitors' 

logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and 

drilling, were established by REECo and emphasized during all 

245 
operations. A written standard operating procedure was required 

for each operation involving explosives, toxic materials, 

radioactive material, or any other operation with the potential 

for personal injury. Each individual involved in such an 

operation was required to know the contents of the applicable 

procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

miners boots, or toe guards). Each participating agency provided 

its own safety equipment. All personnel on the initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of the McCaa two-hour 

breathing apparatus and had used the Draeger self-contained 

breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as 

spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material, and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

All 

Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

ERDA Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

DINING CAR Safety Regulations. 

personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

246 
8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1246 hours on 5 April 1975 

and all telemetry stations were secured at 1245 hours on 14 April 

1975. No radiation other than that from normal activation 

products was detected. 

The initial radiation survey began at 1325 hours on 5 April 

and was completed at 1430 hours. No radiation above background 

was detected at the Mesa trailer park area or at the tunnel 

complex portal. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 0826 hours on 6 April 1975. 

The maximum reading of 400 mR/h was inside test chamber No. 1 and 

at the test chamber No. 2 door. No airborne radioactive 

contamination was detected by air sampling equipment, and 

respiratory protection equipment was required inside the LOS pipe 

during initial reentry only. Most experiment recoveries were 

completed between 10 and 29 April 1975. 

On 28 August 1975, reentry mining began in the U12e.18 bypass drift. This effort was completed on 16 January 1976. 

No drilling from the Mesa for core sampling was performed 

for this event. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DINING CAR radex areas from 5 April to 29 April 1975, when the 

use of Area Access Registers was discontinued, are summarized 

below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket dosimeters 

as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from 

film dosimeter records. 

247 
Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (rnR) (mR) 

All Participants 464 205 8 

DOD Participants 95 205 15 

248 
REFERENCE LIST 

References are not indicated within the text of this report, 

but are included in this list by chapter or part. Most references are available for review at or through the DOE/NV Coordination and Information Center (CIC). Security-classified references are located at the DNA/HQ Technical Library in Alexandria, 

Virginia, but are available only to persons with appropriate security clearances and a need for classified information contained 

in the references. 

The CIC is operated by REECo, the custodian of nuclear testing personnel dosimetry and other radiological safety records for 

DOE/NV, and the custodian for DNA of reference documents for 

reports on DOD participation in atmospheric, oceanic, and underground nuclear weapons testing events and series. Arrangements 

may be made to review available references for this report at the 

CIC by contacting one of the following: 

Health Physics Division 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Nevada Operations Office 

2753 South Highland Avenue 

Post Office Box 14100 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 295-0961 

FTS: 575-0961 

or 

Manager, Coordination and Information Center. 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. 

Post Office Box 14400 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 295-0731 

FTS: 575-0731 

249 
Major source documents also are available through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) and may be purchased 

from NTIS at the address and telephone number listed below: 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road 

Springfield, VA 22161 

Commercial: (703) 487-4650 

(Sales Office) 

References available through public bookstores and libraries, through the U.S. Government Printing Office, and only at the 

CIC are listed without asterisks. Asterisks after references or 

groups of references indicate availability as follows: 

* 

** 

*** 

PREFACE 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Available through the NTIS and also located at the CIC. 

Located in the REECo Technical Information Office adjacent to the CIC, available through the CIC, and may be 

subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

Located in the DNA/HQ Technical Library, and subject to 

security clearance requirements. 

Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Operations Office, "Announced United States Nuclear Tests," 

NVO-209 (Rev. 7), January 1987* 

Devine, Robert A., Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test 

Ban Debate, Oxford University Press, NY, 1978 

Harris, P.S., et al, Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

PLUMBBOB, DNA 6005F, 15 September 1981* 

250 
4. U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Veterans' 

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing," U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1979 

Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION 

5. 

6. 

7. 

DOE/NV, "Announced Nuclear Tests," (n. 1). 

Devine, "Nuclear Test Ban Debate," (n. 2). 

Weapons Effects Test Group, Field Command, Defense Atomic 

Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," January 

1962 

Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," revised 15 August 1964 

Ponton, Jean, et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation 

DOMINIC II, DNA 6027F, 31 January 1983* 

Chapter 2, UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

8. Liverman, James L., Energy Research 6, Development Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Nevada Test 

Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA - 1551, September 1977* 

9. Butkovich, Theodore R., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Effects of Water Saturation on Underground Nuclear Detonations, UCRL-51110, 9 September 1971* 

Committee on Veterans Affairs, "Claims for Disabilities," 

(n. 41, on venting. 

251 
10. 

11. 

Environmental 

gineering Co. 

ary 1972-1975 

Sciences Department, Reynolds Electrical & En- 

, Inc., "Standard Operating Procedures," JanuBrady, William J., Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., 

Inc., Combination Personnel Dosimeter & Security Credential 

Holder, NVO-162-27, October 1967 

EVENT SUMMARIES AND EACH EVENT CHAPTER 

12. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, NV00 

Completion Report, Operation Toggle, 1 July 1972 through 30 

June 1973, NVO-141, February 1974*** 

13. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, NV00 

Completion Report, Operation Arbor, 1 July 1973 through 30 

June 1974, NVO-150, February 1975*** 

14. Energy Research and Development Administration, Nevada 

Operations Office, NV00 Completion Report, Operation 

Bedrock, 1 July 1974 through 30 June 1975, NVO-162, January 

1976*** 

15. REECo Environmental Sciences Department field record archives are maintained chronologically and by test event and include the following: 

a. Procedures, Reentry Plans, Radsafe Plans, and Schedules 

of Events ** 

b. Correspondence ** 

252 
c. Reports, including onsite Radsafe and offsite USEPA 

event reports ** 

d. Exposure reports, Radsafe logbooks, Area Access 

Registers, radiation survey forms, telemetry forms, and 

other sampling and dosimetry forms ** 

253 
254 
APPENDIX A 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Activity 

Access Drift 

Activation Products 

Advisory Panel 

AFSWC 

The rate of decay of radioactive material, usually expressed in disintigrations per minute (dpm) 

This is passageway tunnel, usually parallel to the LOS drift, also known as 

the bypass, cable, reentry, or work 

drift, in which cables from various 

experiments in the LOS pipe were laid 

on their way to being connected to the 

downhole cables in the cable alcove and 

which was used for access to the main 

experiment (LOS) drift during construction and recovery phases of a test. 

These are nuclides made radioactive by 

neutrons from a nuclear detonation interacting with usually nonradioactive 

nuclides. Also called "induced activity.II 

This was a group of experts formed to 

advise the Test Manager (and later the 

Test Controller) concerning operational 

factors affecting a test detonation. 

The Air Force Special Weapons Center, 

located at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, provided air 

support to the AEC Test Manager for NTS 

testing activities. 

255 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

AFSWP The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was activated on 1 January 1947, 

when the AEC was activated, to assume 

residual functions of the U.S. Army 

Manhattan Engineer District (see DASA 

and DNA). 

Air Support 

All-Purpose Canisters 

Alpha Particle 

Anticontamination 

Clothing 

This included aircraft, facilities, and 

personnel required for various support 

functions during testing, including 

cloud sampling, cloud tracking, radiation monitoring, photography, and 

transport of personnel and equipment. 

These are combination canisters made up 

of a charcoal bed and a HEPA filter. 

This is a particle emitted spontaneously from the nucleus of a radionuclide, primarily a heavy radionuclide. The particle is identical to 

the nucleus of a helium atom, having an 

atomic mass of four units and an 

electric charge of two positive units. 

This is outer clothing worn to prevent 

contamination of personal clothing, 

contamination of one's body, and the 

spread of contamination to uncontrolled 

areas. 

256 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Atmospheric Test 

Series 

Attenuation 

This included several series of U.S. 

tests conducted from 1945 through 1962, 

when nuclear device detonations and 

experiments were conducted primarily in 

the atmosphere. 

This is the process by which photons or 

particles from radionuclides are reduced in number and energy while passing through some medium. 

Back The top (ceiling) of a tunnel. 

Background Radiation There are three meanings for this term, 

the applicable meaning is determined by 

the context. The definitions are: 

1) The radiations of man's natural 

environment, consisting of cosmic 

rays and those radiations which come 

from the naturally radioactive atoms 

of the earth, including those within 

one's body. 

2) A level of radiation (above natural 

background radiation) that existed 

in a test area or location prior to 

a test. 

3) Radiation levels extraneous to an 

experiment (the area exposure rate). 

257 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Ball Valve 

Beta Particle 

Bypass Drift 

BJY 

Brattice Cloth 

Bulkhead 

This is a rotating spool valve designed 

to close off and provide a gas seal in 

an LOS pipe in less than one second 

after detonation. Can be pneumatic, 

hydraulic, or spring driven. 

This is a negatively charged particle 

of very small mass emitted from the 

nucleus of a radionuclide, particularly 

from fission product radionuclides 

formed during nuclear detonations. 

Except for origin, the beta particle is 

identical to a high speed electron. 

This may also be a positively charged 

particle of equal mass called a 

positron. 

See Access Drift. 

This is the intersection of Mercury 

Highway with roads originally constructed for the BUSTER-JANGLE 1951 

atmospheric test series, located at the 

NW corner of Area 3 on the NTS. It was 

previously called the "Y." 

This is a plastic, cheese-cloth 

reinforced sheeting used to control the 

spread of contamination. 

This is a wall or embankment constructed in a mine or tunnel to protect 

against earth slides, fire, water, or 

gas. 

258 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Button-Up Activities These are procedures which consist 

primarily of completing the stemming; 

accomplishing the electrical checklist 

of tunnel portal and trailer park 

facilities: closing the OBP, gas seal 

plug, and gas seal door inside the 

tunnel; clearing the controlled area: 

and preparing command post and 

monitoring stations for the actual 

nuclear detonation. 

Cable Drift See Access Drift. 

Cal-Seal This is a high-density, quick-drying, 

high-strength, and resilient commercial 

sealant. 

Cassette 

Cellar 

Chamber 

Check Points or 

Check Stations 

This is a holder or container for a 

sample, an experiment, or a group of 

experiments. 

This is the excavated, large-diameter 

part of a drilled hole over which the 

drill rig is placed and where valving 

and other equipment are located. 

This is a natural or man-made enclosed 

space or cavity. 

These are geographic locations established and staffed to control entry 

into and exit from restricted areas. 

259 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Chimney This refers to the volume of broken 

rock above an underground cavity formed 

by a nuclear detonation that falls 

downward when decreasing cavity gas 

pressure can no longer support the 

rocks' weight. 

Chromatograph 

Cloud Sampling 

Cloud Tracking 

Collar See "Shaft Collar" 

Console This is a cabinet or panel containing 

instrumentation for monitoring or controlling electronic or mechanical 

testing devices. 

This a a piece of equipment used to 

separate and analyze mixtures of chemical substances by chromatographic 

absorption. 

This is the process of collecting 

particulate and gaseous samples from an 

effluent cloud to determine the amount 

of total airborne radioactivity and 

specific radionuclides in the cloud for 

subsequent analysis of detonation 

characteristics. This type of sampling 

usually was accomplished by specially 

equipped aircraft. 

This is the process of monitoring and 

determining the drift and movement of 

an effluent cloud, usually performed by 

radiation monitoring and visual sighting from aircraft. 

260 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Construction Station This is the distance in feet along the 

tunnel from the portal or a particular 

junction, usually expresed in hundreds 

of feet plus remaining whole feet. 

Construction station 350 is expressed 

as CS 3+50. 

Containment 

Containment This is another name for access or reAssessment Drift entry drift. 

Contamination 

This is the act of preventing release 

of any radioactive effluent into the 

atmosphere or parts of a tunnel complex 

beyond the stemming and other containment features. It is used in reference 

to the stemming, TAPS, OBP, or the gas 

seal plug. An event is said to have 

been "contained" if no effluent is 

released to the atmosphere or if no 

radioactive material is released beyond 

the stemmed portion of the tunnel. 

This is defined in two ways as follows: 

1) The term may refer to the presence 

of fixed or removable of radioactive 

material in a location. This is 

usually caused by the spread of fission and activation products of a 

nuclear detonation or fissionable 

material from a device incorporated 

with particles of dust or device 

debris. 

261 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Crater 

Crater Experiment 

DAC 

Dance Hall 

DASA 

2) The term may also refer to the 

depositing on, or spreading of, 

radioactive materials to undesirable 

locations, personnel, structures, 

equipment, or other surfaces outside 

a controlled area. 

This is the depression formed on the 

earth's surface by a near-surface, 

surface, or underground detonation. 

Crater formation can occur by the 

scouring effect of airblast, throw-out 

of broken surface material, or surface 

subsidence resulting from underground 

cavity formation and subsequent rock 

fall, or chimneying, to the surface. 

This is a test designed to breach and 

excavate the ground surface, thereby 

forming an ejecta crater (as opposed to 

a sink or subsidence crater). 

The DNA Auxilliary Closure is a closing 

system found in the LOS pipe which 

closes milliseconds after device 

detonation. 

This is a large alcove used for data 

recording equipment. 

AFSWP became the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA) in 1959. See AFSWP and 

DNA. 

262 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

D-day 

D+l 

Decontamination 

Device 

DNA 

DOD 

This is the term used to designate the 

day on which a test takes place. 

This is the first day after a test 

event. D+2 is the second day after 

detonation, D+3 is the third day, etc. 

This is the reduction or removal of 

contaminating radioactive material from 

a structure, area, object, or person. 

Decontamination may be accomplished by 

(1) treating the surface to remove or 

decrease the contamination, (2) letting 

the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of 

natural decay, or (3) fixing and covering the contamination to attenuate the 

radiation emitted. 

This is comprised of nuclear fission 

(or fission and fusion) materials 

together with arming, fusing, firing, 

high-explosive, canister, and diagnostic measurement equipment that have not 

been configured into an operational 

weapon. 

This is an acronym for the Defense 

Nuclear Agency, successor to DASA in 

1971. 

This is an acronym for the U.S. 

Department of Defense, the federal 

executive agency responsible for the 

defense of the United States. Included 

263 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Dose 

Dose Rate 

Dosimeter 

dpm 

Draeger Breathing 

Apparatus 

Draeger Multi-Gas 

Detector 

in this group are the military services 

and special joint defense agencies. 

This is the quantity (measured or 

accumulated) of ionizing radiation 

energy absorbed into the medium it 

passes through. In a person, dose is 

measured in rems or rads. 

This is the amount of ionizing 

radiation energy that an individual or 

material could absorb per unit of time. 

Dose rates are usually expressed as 

rad or rem per hour. Subdivisions of a 

rad or rem also are used, e.g., mrem/h 

means millirem per hour. (A millirem 

equals one thousandth of a rem). 

This is a device used to measure 

radiation doses. Devices worn or 

carried by individuals are called 

personnel dosimeters. 

This stands for disintegrations per 

minute to which are a measure of the 

activity of material. 

See Scott-Draeger. 

This is an instrument used to detect 

toxic gases. A sample of the ambient 

atmosphere is drawn through a selected 

chemical reagent tube which indicates 

the concentration of a particular toxic 

gas. 

264 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Dressed Out This means one is dressed in anticontamination clothing and associated 

equipment. 

Drift This is a horizontal or inclined 

passageway excavated underground with 

one access opening. It is used 

interchangeably with the term "tunnel" 

at the NTS. 

Drill Hole Designations These are defined as follows: 

From the surface - 

PS-1v: Post-shot drill hole number 1 - 

vertical 

PS-1D: Post-shot drill hole number 1 - 

directional 

PS-1A: Post-shot drill hole number 1 - 

angle 

Each IS' added after any of the above 

notations indicates a "sidetrack" or 

change of direction in the drill hole. 

From underground locations sample 

recovery core holes are referred to as 

RE (Reentry) No. 1, RE No. 2, etc. 

Dry Run This is a simulation of the functions 

occurring in the minutes before, 

during, and after the event. All 

timing and firing signals are sent in 

265 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Dutchman 

Effects Experiments 

Exoatmospheric 

Explosimeter 

the proper sequence from the Control 

Room at CP-1. Each run begins with the 

first required timing and firing signal 

(normally minus 15 minutes) and ends 

with the firing signal. The audio 

countdown is transmitted over Net 1 

(DNA) and on other nets as agreed upon 

with appropriate agencies. There are 

various types of dry runs depending on 

the degree of participation required of 

the agencies involved. 

This is part of the tunnel ventilation 

system. 

These are experiments with the purpose 

of studying the effects of a nuclear 

detonation environment on materials, 

structures, equipment, and systems. 

They include measurements of the 

changes in the environment caused by 

the nuclear detonation, such as ground 

movement, air pressures (blast), 

thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, 

and cratering. 

This refers to the area outside the 

gaseous mass which envelopes the earth. 

This is a battery-operated detector 

calibrated to indicate the concentration in the ambient atmosphere of explosive gases and vapors as percent of 

the lower explosive limit (LEL) of methane gas (5 percent concentration in 

air). 

266 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Exposure 

Exposure Rate 

Face 

FDR 

Film Badge 

This is a measure, expressed in roentgens (RI, of the ionization produced by 

gamma rays or x rays in air [This may 

also be represented by subdivisions of 

R; e.g., l/1000 R = 1 milliroentgen 

(mRJ.1 

The exposure rate is the exposure per 

unit of time, usually per hour, but it 

is sometimes stated in smaller or larger units (e.g., R/min, mR/h, R/day). 

This is the surface area of a tunnel 

heading. 

A successful final dry run is the last 

dry run before a test is detonated. 

This is a dosimeter used for the indirect measurement of exposure to ionizing radiation. It generally contains 

two or three films of differing sensitivity. Films are wrapped in paper or 

other thin material that blocks light 

but is readily penetrated by radiations 

or secondary charged particles resulting from the radiations to be measured. 

Film packets generally have at least 

one metal filter or may be in holders 

with multiple filters. After being 

worn as a film badge or film dosimeter, 

films are developed and the degree of 

darkening (or optical density) measured 

indicates the radiation exposure. Film 

dosimeters commonly are used to indi267 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Fission 

Fission Products 

Fissionable Material 

Flex Line 

Forward Control Point 

cate gamma and x-ray exposures, and 

also can be designed to determine beta 

and neutron doses. 

This is the process whereby the nucleus 

of a particular heavy element splits 

into (generally) two nuclei of lighter 

elements, with an accompanying release 

of energy. The most important fissionable, or fissile, materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission is 

caused by the absorption of a neutron 

in a nucleus. 

This is a general term used for the 

complex mixture of radioactive nuclides 

(see Radionuclides) produced as a result of nuclear fission. 

This is a synonym for fissile material, 

also extended to include material that 

can be fissioned by fast neutrons only, 

such as uranium-238. Used in reactor 

operations to mean reactor fuel. 

This is a temporary flexible plastic 

tubing used to ventilate areas in which 

the main ventilation system did not 

provide adequate circulation of the 

air. 

A geographic location in the forward 

test area, usually adjacent to the 

closed (or secured) test area. 

268 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Full Power Full This is similar in intent to a mandaFrequency (FPFF) Dry Run tory full participation dry run. The 

FPFF is sometimes combined with the hot 

dry run (HDR). This run is optional 

with the device engineer. When conducted, the LOS pipe is under vacuum, 

telephones and intercoms are disconnected, and tunnel utility and instrumentation power are operated in eventday configuration. Also all instrumentation is hooked up and operated in 

event-day configuration (simulators are 

not used). 

Fusion 

Gate 300 

Gamma Photons 

The combination of two very light nuclei (of atoms) to form a relatively 

heavier nucleus, with an accompanying 

release of energy is called fusion. 

(It is also known as thermonuclear 

fusion). 

This refers to the permanent security 

station set up in Area 6 near the 

Control Point facilities at which 

reentry and recovery personnel waited 

during the detonation of an event. 

After reentry parties were released 

from this gate, they moved to the FCP 

and again awaited release. 

These are electromagnetic radiations of 

high energy that are emitted from the 

nuclei of radionuclides. These photons 

are sometimes referred to as bundles of 

energy, and usually accompany other 

269 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Gamma Shine 

Gas Seal Door 

Gas Seal Plug 

nuclear reactions, such as fission, 

neutron capture, and beta particle 

emission. Gamma photons, or rays, are 

identical with x rays of the same energy, except that x rays result from 

orbital electron reactions rather than 

being produced in the nucleus. 

This occurs when a measurable gamma 

radiation intensity from an approaching 

radioactive cloud or passing cloud is 

noted, as opposed to measurements from 

or in gamma emitting fallout. This 

also includes gamma radiation scattered 

by air molecules, as opposed to direct 

radiation from a gamma source. 

This is a steel door on the portal side 

of the gas seal plug. It is closed 

during button up with about a 10 psi 

gas pressure applied between the gas 

seal plug and the gas seal door as an 

additional reassurance against lowpressure leaks. 

This is one containment feature within 

the tunnel complex: generally it is 

designed for 500" F and 500 psi. The 

gas seal plug is sometimes referenced 

as the "hasty plug." This plug is 

similar to a lower pressure overburden 

plug, but is is placed closer to the 

portal and seals off the entire tunnel 

complex from the portal. 

270 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Geiger-Mueller Counter This is an instrument consisting of a 

Geiger-Mueller tube and associated 

electronic equipment used to detect, 

display, and sometimes record nuclear 

radiation levels. 

Geophone 

Ground Zero 

Heading 

This is an instrument used to detect 

vibrations in rock or soil. At NTS, it 

is used remotely to detect rock falls, 

earth movement, and cavity collapse 

underground while providing audible 

signal and visual display data. 

This is a term used during atmospheric 

testing to denote a point on the surface of the ground directly below or 

coinciding with an atmospheric detonation (see surface ground zero and zero 

point). 

This is the furthest point one can walk 

into a drift or tunnel. 

High-Efficiency These are canisters used with a face 

Particulate Canisters mask to filter organic vapors out of 

breathing air. These canisters were 

called "absolute" filters because they 

filtered 99.97% of particulate matter 

greater than 0.3 micrometers in size. 

These were later referred to as HEPA 

filters (high-efficiency particulate 

aerosol). 

271 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

H-hour This is "time zero" or the exact time 

of detonation to the minute, second, or 

fraction of a second; as opposed to H + 

1 which implies one hour after detonation (unless otherwise noted in 

seconds or minutes). 

Horizontal Line-of-Sight This is a general term used to refer to 

(HLOS) a family of events conducted in a horizontal tunnel. The term was sometimes 

used to refer to the pipe and vacuum 

system for some events. 

Hot Line 

Invert 

Ion 

Ionizing Radiation 

This is a location on the edge of a 

radex area where personnel exiting 

remove anticontamination clothing and 

equipment, and monitoring for contamination and decontamination is 

performed as necessary. This term also 

was used to denote the centerline of a 

f'allout pattern. 

The bottom (floor) of a tunnel. 

This is an atomic particle or part of a 

molecule bearing an electric charge. 

Usually a positively charged ion and a 

negatively charged ion are formed as a 

pair (e.g., a negatively charged electron is displaced from an atom so the 

remaining atom is positively charged). 

This includes any particulate or 

electromagnetic radiation capable of 

producing ions, directly or indirectly, 

272 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Isotopes 

Keyed Concrete Plug 

LEL 

in its passage through air or matter. 

Alpha and beta particles produce .ion 

pairs directly, while the electrons of 

initial ion pa irs produced by gamma 

rays and x rays in turn produce secondary ionization in their paths. Neutrons may displace a positively charged 

part of a nucleus, such as a proton or 

alpha particle which produces secondary 

ionization. 

This refers to different types of atoms 

within the same element, all reacting 

approximately the same chemically, but 

differing in atomic weight and nuclear 

stability. For example, the element 

hydrogen has three isotopes: normal 

hydrogen (the most abundant) heavy 

hydrogen (called deuterium), and radioactive hydrogen (called tritium). 

This refers to a concrete plug placed 

in an excavated area of greater 

diameter than the shaft or tunnel cross 

section such that the concrete is 

poured into the surrounding rock, thus 

providing greater strength against 

overpressure from the nuclear detonation. 

The lower explosive limit refers to a 

mixture of explosive gases and air that 

is at the minimum concentration necessary to cause an explosion if ignited. 

The MSA explosimeter is used to deter273 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Leukemia Cluster 

Long Line 

LOS Pipe 

mine percentages of the LEL, and is 

calibrated with a 5% methane gas and 

air mixture. A minimum explosive mixture is 100% of the LEL. 

An apparent but unexpected or extraordinary group of leukemia cases within 

some number or group of persons. 

This is the longest sampling line into 

the tunnel which does not connect to 

the LOS pipe. 

This is an evacuated pipe that extends 

from the device to the test chambers. 

It may be either horizontal or 

vertical, and in it are experiment 

protection devices and hardware. 

Mandatory Full Partici- This is a dry run peculiar to DOD 

pation (MFP) Dry Run events. Its purpose is threefold: 

first, to check all experiments with 

the event site electrical system in its 

shot configuration; second, to check 

for crosstalk between experiments; and 

third, to operate all recording, timing, and monitoring equipment as 

closely to shot configuration as is 

possible. The pipe is under vacuum and 

the tunnel and portal instrumentation 

trailers are cleared of personnel. 

After a successful MFP dry run, all 

interconnections necessary to place experiments into shot configuration from 

the MFP configuration are made. 

274 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Manhattan Engineer 

District 

Manned Stations 

Manway 

Timing, firing, and monitoring system 

junction boxes are locked and no 

changes are made except with the 

express approval of device systems personnel and the Technical Director. 

This was the U.S. Army predecessor organization to the U.S. Atomic Energy 

Commission and the Armed Forces Special 

Weapons Project. 

These are locations inside the closed 

and secured area which are occupied by 

authorized personnel during an event. 

This is a crawl space or other passageway through the. gas seal plug, the 

overburden plug, and other structures. 

McCaa Two-Hour 

Breathing Apparatus 

This is a self-contained respiratory 

device that supplies two hours of 

breathing oxygen. 

MFP See Mandatory Full Participation Dry 

Run 

mR 

mrad/h 

This stands for milliroentgens, a 

radiation exposure term meaning a 

thousandth of a roentgen (R). (Also, 

see Exposure.) 

This is a radiation intensity term used 

to show that both gamma and beta levels 

were being measured. 

275 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Mucking 

Noble Gases 

Nuclear Device 

(vs. weapon or bomb) 

Nuclear Device Tests 

This refers to the removal of loose 

rock from drilling and mining 

operations. 

These are those inert gases which do 

not react with other elements at normal 

temperature and pressure (i.e., helium, 

neon, argon, krypton, xenon, and 

sometimes radon). 

This refers to a device in which most 

of the energy released in a detonation 

results from reactions of atomic 

nuclei, either fission, or fission and 

fusion. A device under development 

(see Device) is not considered a weapon 

or bomb. Both A- (or atomic) bombs and 

H- (or hydrogen) bombs could be called 

atomic weapons because both involve 

reactions of atomic nuclei. However, 

it has become customary to call weapons 

A-bombs if the energy comes from fission, and H-bombs if most of the energy 

comes from fusion (of the isotopes of 

hydrogen or other light nuclides - see 

definition). A developmental nuclear 

device is not a weapon or weapon component until it can be mated to a delivery system. 

These are tests carried out to supply 

information required for the design, 

improvement, or safety aspects of 

nuclear weapons, and to study the 

276 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

phenomena and effects associated with 

nuclear explosions. 

Nuclear Weapon Tests These are tests that provide development and weapons effects information, 

and may or may not utilize a deliverable nuclear weapon. 

OAP/R Canister 

Offsite 

Onsite 

Overburden 

This is a canister used with a face 

mask to filter out organics, acids, 

particulates, and radioactive material 

from breathed air. 

Radiation detected offsite is radioactivity occurring outside the Test 

Range Complex, an area that includes 

both the Nevada Test Site and the adjacent Nellis Air Force Range. 

A notation that radioactivity was detected onsite only is made for tests 

from which there was an unplanned release of radioactivity into the atmosphere that was not detectable beyond 

the boundaries of the Test Range Complex. 

As used in connnection with NTS 

tunnels, this is the consolidated and 

unconsolidated rock above a tunnel 

vertically to the surface; thus, it is 

the burden of rock over a tunnel. 

Overburden Plug (OBP) This is a containment feature within 

the tunnel complex. It is now a high277 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Party Monitors 

Privacy Act 

PPm 

rad 

strength concrete plug keyed into the 

tunnel rock near the test location and 

is generally designed to withstand 

looo" F and 1000 psi. It originally 

was named because it was constructed to 

represent the same containment strength 

as the rock above the tunnel, or overburden. 

These are radiation (Radsafe) monitors 

assigned to reentry and recovery 

parties or groups. 

The Privacy Act of 1974 is part of 

Public Law 93-579. This was an Act to 

amend Title 5, U.S. Code, by adding 

Section 552a, which was to safeguard 

individual privacy from the misuse of 

federal agency records, to provide that 

individuals be granted access to records concerning them which are maintained by federal agencies, to establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. 

The term parts per million is used when 

determining concentrations of toxic 

gases or other materials. It refers to 

either relative weight, such as micrograms of a material per gram of medium, 

or relative volume, such as cubic centimeters or milliliters per cubic meter. 

This is an acronym for "radiation 

absorbed dose," a unit of an absorbed 

278 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Radex Area 

Radiation Exposure 

dose of ionizing radiation. A dose of 

one rad means the absorption of 100 

ergs of energy from ionizing radiation 

per gram of absorbing material (e.g., 

body tissue). 

A radiation exclusion (radex) area is 

any area which is controlled for the 

purpose of protecting individuals from 

exposure to radiation and/or radioactive material. 

Exposure to radiation may be described 

by a number of terms. The type of radiation one is exposed to is important 

in establishing doses. External exposure can be from .beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays and x rays; internal 

exposure is received from radionuclides 

deposited within the body which may emit alpha, beta, gamma, or x radiation 

and irradiate various body organs. (see 

Dose and Exposure). 

Radioactive Effluent This includes the radioactive material, 

steam, smoke, dust, and other particulate debris released to the atmosphere from an underground nuclear detonation. 

Radioactive or Fission This is a general term for the complex 

Products mixture of radionuclides produced as a 

result of nuclear fission (see Activation Products). 

279 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Radionuclides 

Recovery Operations 

Red Shack 

Reentry Drift 

rem 

Rib 

roentgen 

This is a collective term for all types 

of radioactive atoms of a given element, as opposed to that element's 

stable nuclides (see Isotopes). 

This is the process of finding and 

removing experiments, by-products, or 

data from the test area after a test 

event. 

This is an underground (usually) 

intermediate point provided for the 

device laboratory's use in checking out 

and exercising the arming and firing 

system. 

See Access Drift. 

This is an acronym for "roentgen 

equivalent man or mammal." A rad of 

radiation absorbed dose multiplied by 

the quality factor (QF) of a particular 

radiation equals the rem dose. Current 

QF values are one for x, gamma, and 

beta radiations, 10 for neutrons, and 

20 for alpha particles. 

This refers to the side of the drift. 

The right or left rib is determined 

with one's back to the portal. 

This is a special unit of exposure to 

ionizing radiation. It is defined 

precisely as that quantity of gamma (or 

x) rays that, when completely stopped 

280 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Safety Experiments 

Sandbag Plugs 

Sandia Auxiliary 

Closure (SAC) 

Scatterer Station 

Scientific Station 

in air, will produce positive and negative ions with a total charge of 2658 x 

lo-4 coulombs in one kilogram of dry 

air under standard conditions. 

Device tests conducted to determine the 

safety of nuclear weapons during transportation and storage. Elements of the 

conventional high explosive portions of 

the devices were detonated to simulate 

accidental damage and to determine the 

potential for such simulated to result 

in significant nuclear yield. Data 

gained from the tests were used to 

develop devices that could withstand 

shock, blast, fire, and other accident 

conditions without producing a nuclear 

detonation. 

These were barriers used in tunnels, 

constructed of sandbags, to help contain underground detonations and minimize damage to underground workings. 

This is a device used to seal an HLOS 

pipe after a nuclear detonation. 

A point along a LOS pipe where the 

radiation flux is deflected into an 

area off the LOS pipe as required for 

the testing or exposure of scatterer 

area experiments. 

This is the distance in feet along the 

HLOS pipe measured from the zero point. 

281 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

These distances are generally expressed 

in hundreds of feet plus whole numbers 

or to the nearest complete hundredths 

of feet (if fractional). Scientific 

Station 650 is expressed as SS 6+50; 

Scientific Station 390.65 is expressed 

as SS 3+90.65. 

Scott-Draeger Selfcontained Breathing 

Apparatus 

This includes a self-contained recirculating unit, complete with "full view" 

facepiece, compressed oxygen cylinder, 

breathing bag, carbon dioxide absorber, 

and pressure demand regulator. It is 

used when an extended exposure to an 

extremely hazardous or oxygen deficient 

atmosphere, or both, is required. This 

unit is capable of sustaining the 

wearer, under normal usage, for four to 

four and one-half hours; however, 

pertinent approved schedules limit NTS 

use to 2 hours. 

Seismic Motion 

Shaft 

Shaft Collar 

This is earth movement caused by an 

underground nuclear detonation, similar 

to that of a minor earthquake. 

This is a long narrow passage sunk into 

the earth, usually vertically, but 

inclined for some mining operations. 

Shafts for device emplacement, 

ventilation, or access to underground 

workings may be drilled or mined. 

This is the the area immediately around 

a shaft at ground level, usually ce282 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Shielding Walls 

Slushing Operations 

Spalling 

Stemming 

Stubs 

mented, which supports the headframe 

and other equipment. 

These are walls or barriers used to 

protect equipment or instrumentation 

from heat, blast, and radioactivity. 

The process of moving broken rock with 

a scraper or scraper bucket. May be 

used on the surface or underground, 

where ore or waste rock is slushed into 

hoppers or other locations for removal. 

This is rock disintegration evidenced 

by flaking, chipping, peeling, or 

loosening of layers on the outside 

edges. It may be caused immediately 

after detonation by rock stressing to 

rock near the detonation point. It 

also may result later, after continued 

stressing from temperature change 

expansion and contraction. Spalling 

also may result or begin when rock 

containing moisture is raised to a high 

temperature and expanding vapor creates 

fractures. 

This is the various materials used to 

back-fill or plug the emplacement 

shaft, drift, or LOS drift to contain 

overpressure and radioactive material 

from a nuclear detonation. 

This refers to a variable number of 

smaller diameter LOS pipes which 

283 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

protrude from the portal side end of 

the main LOS pipe and contain 

experiments to be exposed to the 

radiation flux during event execution. 

Surface Ground Zero The location on the ground surface directly above an underground zero point 

(see ground zero and zero point). 

Survey 

TAPS 

In the tunnels, a survey might include 

taking radiation readings with a portable instrument, checking for the 

presence of an explosive mixture with 

an MSA explosimeter, determinig toxic 

gas levels with Draeger tubes, and/or 

checks for tunnel hazard and damage 

(also called a "walk-through" or "walkout"). Radsafe personnel made the 

radiation surveys, Radsafe or industrial hygiene personnel (both in the 

F&EC0 Environmental Sciences Department) checked for toxic gases and 

explosive mixture, and tunnel mining 

and construction personnel performed 

walk-throughs usually accompanied by 

Radsafe and/or industrial hygiene 

support (see tunnel walk-out). 

The tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS) is an 

experiment protection feature along the 

LOS pipe which allows the experiments 

to be exposed to the desired levels of 

radiation while being protected from 

debris. It contains a massive steel 

door which closes after ground shock 

284 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Test Chamber 

Test Controller 

Test Event 

passes to form a 1000° F and 1000 psi 

seal. 

This is a section of the LOS pipe in 

which experiments are placed. It may 

or may not be enlarged, depending upon 

the test design. 

This was an AEC/ERDA/DOE official 

designated by the Manager, Nevada 

Operations Office, to assume 

responsibility for the field operations 

involved in conducting a nuclear test 

at the Nevada Test Site. 

This includes the preparations, 

including arming and firing, and the 

actual testing of a nuclear device, including detonation, concurrent measurements and effects, and later measurements and studies. 

Testing Organizations These are organizations conducting 

nuclear tests at the NTS (see DOD, DNA, 

LASL, LLL, and SLA). 

Tonopah Test Range 

Trailer Park 

The TTR is located in the northwest 

corner of Nellis Air Force Range near 

Tonopah, Nevada. 

These are areas near a tunnel portal or 

on the Mesa where instrumentation or 

instrumentation support trailers are 

parked. 

285 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Tunnel 

Tunnel Access 

Tunnel Complex 

Tunnel Walk-Out 

At NTS, this refers to a horizontal 

underground excavation driven on a 

predetermined line and grade to some 

specific target. 

This refers to entering to a tunnel or 

tunnel complex upon approval of the 

Test Director during test operations, 

or upon approval of the Tunnel Superintendent during routine operations. 

This refers to the complete set of 

drifts and support equipment comprising 

one tunnel complex. 

This is a visual, walking inspection of 

the tunnel or tunnel complex, usually 

performed as a part of the initial 

reentry after a detonation, to check 

for damage and hazards prior to allowing general access to the underground 

workings. 

Type N Canisters These canisters are used with face 

masks to filter out carbon monoxide. 

Underground Structures This refers to the construction and 

Program fabrication of test structures underground for the purpose of detonation 

effects evaluation. 

User This is defined as any organization 

conducting tests at the NTS (See 

Testing Organizations). 

286 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Vela Uniform Project This was a Department of Defense (DOD) 

program designed to improve the 

capability to detect, identify, and 

locate underground nuclear explosions. 

Venting 

Weapons Effects 

Experiments 

Weather Briefings 

Work Drift 

This is defined as a dynamic release of 

radioactive material, steam, smoke, 

dust and other particulate debris 

through a zone of weakness from the 

detonation-formed cavity into the 

atmosphere. 

These are experiments with the purpose 

of studying the effects of a nuclear 

detonation environment on materials, 

structures, equipment, and systems. 

They include measurements of the 

changes in the environment caused by 

the nuclear detonation such as ground 

movement, air pressures (blast), thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and 

cratering. 

These are a part of the readiness 

briefings, which are meetings of testassociated administrators, advisors, 

and other technical personnel prior to 

each test event to evaluate weather 

conditions and forecasts on event day, 

and make decisions on any necessary operational schedule changes. 

See Access Drift. 

287 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Workings This refers to an excavation or group 

of excavations made in mining, quarrying, or tunneling. It is used chiefly 

in the plural, such as "the workings 

extended for miles underground." 

x rays 

Yield 

Zero Point 

These are electromagnetic radiations 

produced by electron reactions, as 

opposed to emission of gamma photons 

given off by nuclei. Otherwise, high 

energy x rays are identical with gamma 

photons of the same energy. 

This is the total effective energy 

released by a nuclear detonation. It 

is usually expressed in terms of the equivalent tonnage of TNT required to 

produce the same energy release in an 

explosion. The total energy yield is 

manifested as nuclear radiation (including residual radiation), thermal 

radiation, and blast and shock energy; 

the actual distribution depending on 

the medium in which the explosion 

occurs and the type of weapon. 

At the instant of detonation, this is 

the center of an underground explosion 

of a nuclear device or weapon. 

288 
APPENDIX B 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The abbreviations and acronyms in the following list are 

used in this fifth volume of DOD underground testing reports. 

Additional information and definitions may be found in the text 

and in the Glossary of Terms. 

AEC 

AES 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

AFWL 

AL00 

AMC 

ASN 

AVCO 

BAC 

Bkg 

BJY 

cc 

CCTV 

CDC 

CEP 

CIC 

CP 

CP-1 

CP-2 

CT0 

D-day 

DAC 

DASA 

DMA 

DNA 

DOD 

DOE 

dpm 

EG&G 

EPA 

ERDA 

ES 

FAC 

FCDASA 

Atomic Energy Commission 

Auxiliary Experiment Station 

Air Force Special Weapons Center 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

Albuquerque Operations Office 

Army Materiel Command 

Air Surveillance Network 

AVCO Corporation 

Boeing Aircraft Corporation 

Background Radiation Measurement 

BUSTER-JANGLE roads intersection with the Mercury 

Highway 

Crosscut 

Closed Circuit Television 

Centers for Disease Control (formerly the Center 

for Disease Control) 

Containment Evaluation Panel 

Coordination and Information Center 

Control Point 

Control Point Building 1 

Control Point Building 2 

Continental Test Organization 

The day a nuclear detonation takes place 

DNA Auxiliary Closure 

Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Division of Military Application 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Disintegrations per minute 

EG&G, Inc. (formerly Edgerton, Germeshausen, & 

Grier) 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Energy Research and Development Administration 

Experiment Station 

Fast Action Closure 

Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

289 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (continued) 

FCDNA 

FCP 

FCTC 

F&S 

FDR 

FPFF 

ESD 

GE 

GM 

GSAC 

GZ 

HDL 

HE 

HFR 

H&N 

HLOS 

HAC 

IRT 

ISAFAF 

ISAFB 

JCS 

KAFB 

KOA 

KN 

KSC 

kt 

LANL 

LASL 

LEL 

LLL 

LLNL 

LMSC 

LOS 

LPARL 

LRL 

LVFO 

MAC 

MDAC 

MED 

MFP 

MPC 

mrem/qt 

mrem/yr 

mR/h 

MSA 

MSL 

N02 

NO+N02 

NPG 

NRDS 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

Forward Control Point 

Test Construction Division of Test Directorate 

Fenix & Scisson, Inc. 

Final dry run 

Full Power Full Frequency 

Environmental Sciences Department, REECo 

General Electric Corporation 

Geiger-Mueller 

Gas Seal Action Closure 

Ground Zero 

Harry Diamond Laboratories 

High explosives (conventional) 

High Fluence Recoverable 

Holmes & Narver, Inc. 

Horizontal line-of-sight 

Hughes Aircraft Co. 

Intelcom Rad Tech 

Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (formerly 

ISAFB) 

Indian Springs Air Force Base 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Kirtland Air Force Base 

Ken O'Brien Associates 

Kaman Nuclear 

Kaman Sciences Corp. (formerly Kaman Nuclear) 

Kilotons 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos 

National La,boratory) 

Lower explosive limit 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (formerly LRL) 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

Line-of-sight 

Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory) 

Las Vegas Field Office 

Mechanical Action Closure 

McDonald-Douglas Aircraft 

Manhattan Engineer District 

Mandatory Full Participation 

Maximum permissible concentration 

Millirem per quarter 

Millirem per year 

Milliroentgens per hour 

Mine Safety Appliance 

Mean sea level 

Nitrogen dioxide 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen dioxide 

Nevada Proving Ground 

Nuclear Rocket Development Station 

290 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (continued) 

NTIS 

NTS 

NTSO 

NV00 

OBP 

Pan Am 

PDT 

PI 

ppm 

psi 

PST 

QF 

Radex Area 

rad/h 

Radsafe 

radsafe 

RAMS 

RCG 

REECo 

rem 

R/h 

ROSES 

RPG 

SAC 

SAI 

SAMSO 

SC 

SGZ 

SF00 

SLA 

SNL 

SOP 

STU 

TAPS 

TC 

TCDASA 

TEP 

TGD 

TGS 

TNT 

TTR 

UCRL 

USAF 

USGS 

VA 

VLOS 

National Technical Information Service 

Nevada Test Site 

Nevada Test Site Organization 

Nevada Operations Office 

Overburden Plug 

Pan American World Airways 

Pacific Daylight Time 

Physics International 

Parts per million 

Pounds per square inch 

Pacific Standard Time 

Quality Factor 

Radiation Exclusion Area 

Radiation absorbed dose per hour 

Radiological Sciences Department (formerly 

Radiological Safety Department), REECo 

Radiological safety, in general 

Remote area monitoring system 

Radioactivity concentration guide 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, 

Incorporated 

Roentgen equivalent man or mammal 

Roentgens per hour 

Recorder and Oscilloscope Sealed Environmental 

System 

Radiation protection guide 

Sandia Auxiliary Closure 

Science Applications, Inc. (now Science 

Applications International Corp., SAIC) 

Space and Missile Systems Organization 

Sandia Corporation (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Surface Ground Zero 

Santa Fe Operations Office 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque (now Sandia 

National Laboratories) 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Standard operating procedures 

Special Test Unit 

Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

Test Chamber 

Test Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Test Evaluation Panel 

Test Group Director 

Test Group Staff 

High explosive chemical (trinitrotoluene) 

Tonopah Test Range 

University of California Radiation Laboratory (now 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) 

United States Air Force 

United States Geological 

Veterans Administration 

Vertical line-of-sight 

291 

Survey 

APPEND I X C 

SC-M-68-227 

GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY PROCEDURES FOR 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SANDIA LABORATORY NUCLEAR TESTS 

George R. Wenz 

Harold L. Rarrick 

Health Physics Dlvlslon, 3312 

Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque 

April 1968 

ABSTRACT 

This document describes preshot preparations and postshot procedures for safe and 

economical reentry into a tunnel area after a nuclear detonation. Associated responslbllitles, 

possible hazards, reentry ground rules, preshot preparations, conununlcations, reentry parties 

and equlpment, Initial tunnel reentries, and recovery of sclentlflc experiments are explained. 

293 
Issued by Sandia Corporation, 

a prime contractor to the 

United States Atomic Energy Commission 

LEGAL NOTICE 

This report was prepared as an account of Government sponsored work. 

Neither the United States, nor the Commission, nor any person acting on 

behalf of the Commission: 

A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, 

with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in the report may not 

infringe privately owned rights; or 

R. Assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for 

damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, 

or process disclosed in this report. 

As used in the above, "person acting on behalf of the Commission" 

includes any employee or contractor of the'Commission or employee of 

such contractor, to the extent that such employee or contractor of 

the Commission, or employee of such contractor prepares, disseminates, 

or provides access to, any information pursuant to his employment or 

contract with the Commission, or his employment with such contractor. 

294 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Significant contributions on tunnel reentry procedures have been made by W. D. Burnett, 

P. 0. Matthews, and T. R. Crites of Sandia Laboratory and by C. R. Penweii and his staff of 

Reynolds Electric and Engineering Co. (REECo), Mercury, Nevada. Significant contributions in 

explosive and toxic gas monitoring and ventilation have been made by D. R. Parker, Sandia Laboratory and R. W. Viet, REECo. Mr. L. W. Brewer pioneered the use of a gas chromatograph in 

severe environments and D. J. Coleman and J. 0. Ashworth greatly improved the radiation detector 

instai latlon and contributed the remote expioslmeter. Mr. G. W. Dwyer is largely responsible for 

the present filter system. Mr. W. P. Bennett, LRL-Livermore, gave us valuable assistance during 

our initial efforts. The continued support of Col. J. J. Neuer, USAF, and the advlce and guidance 

of W. H. Klngstey are gratefully acknowledged: 

Specifically commended are G. A. Clayton, H. D. Edwards, F. J. Solaegui and their Initial 

reentry teams who have performed these duties In very severe environments. 

295 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction 

Responsibilities 

Possible Hazards 

Reentry Ground Rut es 

Summary of Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

Communications 

Reentry Parties and Equipment 

Initial Tunnel Reentries 

Tunnel Sclentlfic Recoveries from the Experimental Chamber 

Page 

297 

297 

298 

299 

300 

301 

302 

303 

305 

296 
GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY 

DEPARTMENT CF DEFENSE AM3 SANOIA 

1. Introduction 

PROCEDURES FOA 

LABORATORY NUCLEAR TESTS 

The Health Physics Division began tunnel reentries In 1962. The procedures that are 

given in this document represent a cunpflation of a serfes of tunnel reentry procedures that 

have been continually Improved based upon experience and better instrumentation. The.reentry 

plan presented describes preshot preparations and postshot procedures for safe and economical 

reentry and scientific recovery In a tunnel area. 

2. Responsibi I ities 

Responslbllltles for safe and economical tunnel reentry procedures after a nuclear detonatlon lndlcated herein for AEC or AEC contractor (I.e., Sandia Laboratory) personnel are In 

accord wlth establlshed AEC/OCO agreement or are the subject of separate a&Ion between 

TC/OASA and NVCG. 

a. AEC-NVGO 

(1) The Test Manager Is responslble to the AEC for the safety of ail the 

participating personnel at sites under the Jurisdiction of NW0 and 

has approval authority over decisions effecting the safety of these 

personne I . (Ref : NTSO Oraft 0524-013a.I 

(2) The NWC Operational Safety Oivlslon will advlse the OCXI Test 

Group Director (TGO) and the Reentry Control Group on all problems 

pertaining to health and safety. 

b. Sand I a Laboratory 

(1) The Sandla Laboratory Health Physics Olvlslon has three responslbl I ltles: It speclfles the necessary measuring devices and equipment 

to indicate the postshot condition of the tunnel; it provides the Reentry 

Control Group; and It documents any release of radloactlve material. 

(2) The Chief of the Reentry Control Group will act as advisor to the 

TGO on surface and tunnel reentry safety until the tunnel has been 

cleared for normal operation. 

-(3) The Reentry Control Group will provlde consultants who will advlse 

on tunnel reentry procedures. These consultants will be familiar 

297 
with the experlmental setup and with possible postshot tunnel 

conditions and hazards. 

(4) The Reentry Control Group will arrange the necessary support 

for reentry and recovery, e.g., It will provide mine rescue tralned 

personnel, Rad-Safe support (see Annex A), Industrial Hygiene 

Support, etc. 

c. TWDASA or Sandla Laboratory Test Group Dlrector 

(1) The TGD Is responsible for the safe conduct of all actlvltles In the 

tunnel area. Ha will authorlre and inltlate both a tunnel condltlon 

survey and reentry and recovery operations with the concurrence 

of the Test Manager. 

(2) The TGD wlii be responsible for inltiating ail action for the preshot 

lnstallatlon and postshot removal of equipment and services required 

for Test Group support activities except those items covered as AEC 

responslbllities In the AEC/DOD agreement. 

3. Possible Hazards 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

e. 

Radiatlon. Radiation in tunnel reentry areas may result from any one of 

the following: 

(1) Leak of radioactive gases or materials through fissures or fractures 

from ground zero. 

(2) Failure of the tunnel stemnmlng. 

(3) Activation and/or dispersion of samples in the experimental chamber. 

Explosive or toxic gases. Varlous explosive and toxic gases released as 

direct or secondary products of the detonation may be present in concentratlons dangerous to personnel. 

Expiosives. Undetonated HE may remain either intact or scattered in 

the tunnel. 

TOXIC materials. Beryillum may pose a toxic problem to personnel 

psrtlculariy If it becomes dispersed in the air and/or deposited on 

recovery samples. 

Tunnel damage. Damage to the tunnel may result from the device 

generated shock wave. 

(I) Collapse of the tunnel would not normally be expected beyond the 

stenmlng; however, partial or total collapse may occur at greater 

distances from ground zero. Reentry through col lapse zones must be 

preceded by mining through broken ground or by driving a new paral lel drift. 

298 
(2) Heave of the tunnel floor may cause slsbblng of spsllatlon of the 

rock and failure of utility lines, railroad track, tunnel sets, and 

lagging. This damage will create safety hazards which must be 

removed prior to experimental recoveries. 

f. High pressure gas. High pressure (2200 psi) gas cylinders normally 

exist within the tunnel complex. 

4. Reentry Ground Ru I es 

a. 

b. 

c. 

d. 

8. 

f. 

Initial reentry and each subsequent phase will be Initiated upon authorlzation of the TGD with concurrence of the Test Manager, and control 

will be retained by the TGD until all recovery operations are completed 

and tunnel access is returned to AEC control. Only those personnel 

authorized by the TGD and the Chief of the Reentry Control Group WI I I 

be permitted in the portal area and tunnel. 

Tunnel connnunications will be by a hard wire portable phone system. 

Tunnel parties will be controlled by the Chief of the Reentry Control 

Group who is located at the tunnel portal. Tunnel parties may be 

recalled at hls direction. Only one team will be in the tunnel at any 

single time unless directed otherwise by the Chief of the Reentry Control Group. 

A tunnel party will return to the portal under any of the following 

conditions: 

(1) Upon decision of the Team Chief. 

(2) When any member of Teams 1, 2, 3, and 4* show a McCaa oxygen 

supply less than 30 atmospheres or a Draeger pressure less than 

430 PSI,. 

(3) Upon loss of camnunicatlons with the Reentry Control Group at 

the portal. 

Team 4 (Rescue Team) will be dispatched upon direction of the Chief 

of the Reentry Control Group, the Team Chief in the tunnel, or if 

conmnJnicatlons should be lost with any team In the tunnel (allowing 

a reasonable time for the team to exit after loss of communications). 

Al I observations during reentry will be communicated through the 

Chief of Party to the Chief of the Reentry Control Group and recorded 

for future reference. 

See Paragraph 7, “Reentry Part I es and Equ I pment ,10 for a description of the personnel, 

function, and equipment of each team. 

299 
g. Personnel radiation exposure limits are those set by NTS SOP 

Chapter 0524. The radiation dose limit for the operation is 3 Rem 

per calendar quarter. A person’s exposure, however, will be terminated when his pocket dosimeter reaches 2.0 Rem, assuming his exposure history would allow 3 Rem during this operation. 

h. Tunnel reentry will not be made before the tunnel ventilation has been 

turned on and samples of the air monitored at the portal. Evaluation 

of the sample must indicate that reentry can be made w?thln the Iimltations of this procedure. 

1. Reentry will not be made beyond ventilation, lOR/hr, 1000 ppm CO, or 10 

percent of the lower explosive limit of explosive gas mlxtures. Teams 1, 

2, 3, and 4 may be exempted from these requirements under extenuating 

circumstances by mutual decisfon of the Chief of the Reentry Control 

Group and the Chief of the Party. 

.I. The Rescue Team will always be stationed near the portal with a train 

for imnediate dispatch. 

5. Sumnary of Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

Stemming should provide fireball containment and should reduce radioactivity and explosive gas in the reentry area. The overburden plug 

should contain any debris that may pass the stemming. The gas seal 

door should contain any gases that penetrate the overburden plug. 

Remote radiation sensing instruments will provide knowledge of tunnel 

radiation levels, while tunnel condition indicators (geophones, pressure 

and temperature gages, and explosimeters) remotely monitor the tunnel. 

Air sampling lines for gas chromatography are normally installed through 

both the gas seal door and the overburden plug. Each installation is provided with suitable remotely operated valves. Samples may be drawn 

from the inside of the gas seal door, from both sides of the overburden 

plug, and from near the steming. Sampling from these lines will help 

determine the explosive and toxic gas concentrations In the tunnel prior 

to reentry. 

Valves are normally installed in the vent lines and makeup ports in the 

gas seal door and overburden plug. An axial vane fan Is located on the 

makeup valves to reduce negative pressure. The valves and fan are 

remotely operated from a manned location and will have position monltors to Indicate whether they are fully open or fully closed. The posltion 

monitors will also show whether the fan power Is on or off. 

300 
e. The followlng Items ordlnariiy have power turned on through and after 

zero time: 

(1) Tunnel utllitles and instrumentation. Power to these items will be 

turned off near zero time. 

(2) Geophone transmitter trafler. Thts supplles power to the geophone 

and the pressure and temperature amplifiers which must be left on 

to monitor for cavity collapse and pressure changes. 

(3) Ventllatlon fans. Power will be controlled remotely. 

(4) Radiation detectors. 

(5) Exploslmeters. 

(6) Ventllatlon and gas sampling valves. Power will be controlled 

remotely. 

f. The Sutorbilt fans will be Installed so they will pull air through the vent 

line filter system before it Is released to the atmosphere. One Sutorbilt 

fan will be used for a back-up In case the other fan fails. 

g. Ventilation. 

(1) The ventllatlon system Is installed so that all areas of the tunnel 

that are not closed off are swept with fresh air from the portal. 

(2) After zero time and when the TGC gives his approval (with the consent of the Test Manager), the tunnel ventilation system will be 

turned on, exhaust and makeup air will be supplled from the portal 

through valves In the gas seal door and, If posstble, the overburden 

plug. There will be valves that can be remotely operated in both 

vent lines at the gas seal door and, If possfble, at the overburden 

plug. Vent line samples will be taken to monftor for radioactive, 

explosive, and/or toxic effluents. 

6. Conmunlcatlons 

A communication system with the necessary wire on a portable reel will be used during 

Initial reentry. A back-up reel WI II be aval lable. All conversation between the reentry party 

and reentry control will be recorded. 

301 
7. Reentry Parties and Equipment 

The reentry partles will consist of the personnel and equlpment described In the 

fol lowlng table: 

Party Name Equipment 

. Teams 1, 2, and 3 - Tunnel Reentry Party Full Radex clothing 

(1) Chlef of Party Bureau of Mines approved 

(2) Rad-Safe monitor 2-hour sel f-contalned 

oxygen breath1 ng apparatus 

(3) lndustrlal Hygiene monltw (May be Radlatlon detectors 

performed by Rad-Science personnel) Explosive gas meter 

(4) Tunnel safety TOXIC gas detectors 

(5) Sclentlflc Advlsor (as requlred) Oxygen percent meter 

Hard wire camnunlcatlons 

. Team 4 - Tunnel Rescue Party 

(1) Chlef of Party 

(2) Three to SIX REE Ca. Mine Rescue 

(3) Two mon I tors for Rad-Safe and 

lndustrlal Hygiene 

Full Radex clothing 

Bureau of Mines approved 

2-hour sel f-contalned 

oxygen breathing apparatus 

Radlatlon detectors 

TOXIC gas detectors 

Explosive gas meters 

Wire I ltters 

Hard wire communlcatlon 

. Team 5 - Tunnel Sc lent I f Ic Assessment _ Full Radex clothing 

Team (as required) Respiratory protectlon (as 

(1) Chief of Party requlred) 

(2) Rad-Safe and lndustrlal Hygiene Rad I at Ion detectors 

monitors TOXIC gas detectors 

(3) Sclentlflc Mvlsors Explosive gas meter 

(4) Mine support Hard wire comnunlcatlons 

. Team6- Tunnel Work Party Full Radex clothing 

(1) Chief of Party Respiratory protectlon (as 

(2) Rad-Safe and lndustrlal Hygiene requ I red 1 

monitors Radlatlon detectors 

(3) REE Co. miners TOXIC gas detectors 

I. Team7- Tunnel Sclentlflc Recoveries to Full Radex clothing 

Exper lmental Chamber (see Para. 9 Respiratory protection (as 

for detal Is) requlred) 

‘. Teama- HE Dlsposal Group (as required) Full Radex clothing 

Respiratory protectlon (as 

required) 

I. Team9- Med I cal Support 

M. D. and medlcal technlclan 

Necessary medlcal equipment 

knbulance 

302 
8. lnitlal Tunnel Reentries 

a. After the event the TGD will review radiation and tunnel condltlon 

mon I tors. When he determlnes that It Is safe, and with the agreement 

of the Test Manager, the tunnel ventllatlon system rlll be turned on 

EXHAUST. Makeup air will be supplled from the portal through the 

valves In the plugs. 

b. Prlor to entry Into the tunnel, all experimental cables and all electrical and telephone lines going Into the tunnel through the portal ~111 

be either locked open or disconnected. All other cables golng Into the 

tunnel will be dlsconnected and taped or cut and grouted as necessary. 

Along with the pressure, temperature, and geophone Instruments, the 

remote radlatlon monitoring system and the remote exploslmeters will 

be left connected. No clrcult Into the tunnel or Into the Instrumentation 

trailers will be closed when personnel are either In the tunnel or directly 

In front of the portal (Including an area extending 50 feet on either side of 

the portal). 

The Chief of the Reentry Control Group will advise the TGD on tunnel 

condltlons by revlewlng surface condltlons, exhaust gas Informatlon, 

tunnel radlatlon. tunnel condltlon Indicators, and selsmlc Information. 

This review ~111 determlne when tunnel reentry may actually begin. 

When cleared by the TGD and the Test Manager and when all surface 

recoveries and power checks are complete, Team 1 ~111 be allowed to 

make the lnltial tunnel reentry. There ~111 be no change In the tunnel 

ventllatlon setup or In utllltles while Teams 1 through 5 are underground. 

The number of people In the portal area and trailer parks will be held to 

a mlnlmum. 

c. Team 1 will be the flrst group to reenter and will proceed to the gas 

seal door. A traln may be used to supply transportation to the gas 

seal door, condltlons permitting. Team 1 wlll continuously monitor 

for radIoactIvIty and for toxic and explosive gases. Pressure gages at 

the gas seal door WI I I be checked , and If no pressure Is observed, a 

sample will be taken through the door to determlne the environment on 

the other side of the door. Under safe conditions, Team I will then 

open the gas seal door. They will Inspect the tunnel to the overburden 

plug. The pressure gages at the overburden plug WI I I be checked and 

If no pressure Is observed, a sample will be taken through the plug to 

determine the environment on the other side of the plug. Team 1 will then 

withdraw to the portal area. If remote ventllatlon has not been established 

previously behlnd the overburden plug, the work party (Team 6) WI I I then 

reenter and take the necessary steps to establish ventllatlon through the 

303 
plug. They will then exit the tunnel, and samples WI I I be taken from the 

vent line to verify earlier remote sampling. A second work party may be 

required to open the overburden plug door and remove the material from 

the manway. 

Team 2 will reenter with an engine and car contalnlng necessary 

equipment to open the overburden plug door. This group will take in 

the reel of communication wire and connect It up to the existing ccmmunlcation line jack at the overburden plug to reestablish communications with 

the reentry control group at the portal. Team 2 will open the manway door 

and will continuously monitor for radioactlvity and for toxic and explosive 

gases. They will then withdraw to the portal with the engine. 

Team 3 will reenter to the overburden plug and reestablish comunlcations 

uslng the reel connected to the communication line jack. The team will walk 

out the remaining drift continuously monitoring for radioactlvlty and for 

toxic and explosive gases. They will also observe the vent lines to assure 

themselves that the lines are intact. Team 3 will proceed to the stenmlng, 

if possible, notlng tunnel and pipe conditions. They will then return to the 

end of the experimental pipe and establish ventilatfon In the pipe If time 

and conditions permit. Swipes WI I I be taken on the vent port of the test 

chamber and checked for contamination. These WI II be later analyzed for 

Be and Isotope Identification. 

The misslon of Teams 1, 2, and 3 is to verify that the tunnel complex 

Is withln acceptable levels for toxic and radloactives gases and to check 

the condition of the pipe and tunnel. 

d. If Teams 1, 2, and 3 determine that tunnel rehabilitation may be safely 

conducted, they will leave the tunnel and Team 6 will make temporary 

repal rs as needed to the vent I 1 ne or tunnel. A Rad-Safe monitor will 

remain with Team 6 while in the tunnel and continue to monitor for 

radlatlon and toxic gases. 

8. The obJect of Teams 1 and 3 wfil be to explore as much of the tunnel 

on one reentry as possible. Previous experience has shown that 

McCaa or Draeger Teams can explore up to 4300 feet in 1-l/2 hours 

with a l/2 hour safety margin. If an addltional inltiai reentry Is 

required to fully explore the tunnel, Team 4 (with Rad-Safe and 

Industrial Hygiene monItorsI will complete the tunnel exploratlon 

with Team 1 standlng by as Tunnel Rescue. 

304 
9. Tunnel Sclentlfic Recoveries from the Experimental Chamber 

a. Sclentlflc recoveries In the tunnel will not be permitted until Team 1, 

2, or 3 has searched all drlfts and verlfled that the tunnel Is clear of 

dangerous amounts of toxic, explosive, and radloactlve gases. 

b. Before sclentlflc recoveries may begin, repair of the tunnel along the 

recovery route to the experimental chamber must be complete. Thls 

activity may Include repalrlng broken lagglng and removing hazardous 

obstacles as well as repairing rallroad track and vent lines. The tunnel 

lights will be turned on before all sclentlflc recoveries except film 

recover I es beg I n. All cabling extending Into a crushed zone will be cut. 

c. Team 5 will conduct a technlcal survey and perform the necessary 

actlons to begin sclentlflc recoveries. 

d. Team 7 will then be permltted to proceed to the expertmental chamber 

and begin the removal of samples In order of prlorlty. A Rad-Safe/ 

Industrial Safety monitor will be present at all times. Thls monitor 

will advlse the Chlef of the Reentry Control Group, who Is responsible 

for termlnatlng sclentlflc recovery, whenever the tunnel envlronment 

becomes dangerous. A Rad-Safe check statlon WI I I be establ lshed at 

each Sclentlflc Statlon to control contamlnatlon. 

305 
306 
APPENDIX D 

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-05240-01 

Chapter 0524 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

0524-01 Radiological Safety 

011 Purpose 

The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure is to define responsibility and to establish criteria and general procedures for 

radiological safety associated with NTS programs. Additional operational instructions relating to radiological safety for particular activities may be published as a part of the Test Manager's 

Operational Plan. 

012 Responsibilities 

a. Manager, NVOO. The Manager, NVOO, is the AEC official to whom 

the NTSO reports. The Manager, NVOO, as a Test Manager, is 

responsible for administering, preparing, and executing all 

programs and projects. The Test Manager may delegate operational control of the NTSO to specifically-identified Deputy 

Test Managers for the execution of approved programs, projects, and experiments. Only the Test Manager or the Deputy 

Test Manager is authorized to approve or disapprove the field 

execution of approved programs, projects or experiments. 

b. Test Manager. The Test Manager is responsible for the protection of participating personnel and off-site population from radiation hazards associated with activities conducted at the NTS. By mutual agreement between the Test 

Manager and a scientific user, control of radiological safety 

within the area assigned for a particular activity may be 

delegated to the user's Test Group Director during the period 

of time when such control could have a direct bearing on the 

success or failure of the scientific program. The provisions 

of AEC Manual Chapter 8401 shall apply to reactor tests or 

sustained reactor operations. 

c. Test Group Director. Whenever operational radiological safety 

control is delegated to a Test Group Director under provisions 

of 012a above, he is responsible to the Test Manager for establishment and implementation of radiological safety criteria 

within the assigned area. He will be responsible for submitting a detailed radiological safety operational plan to the 

307 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

Cl. 

e. 

f. 

Test Manager for review and concurrence. This plan shall be 

submitted as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to cover all 

routine operations. Variances from the SOP for non-routine 

operations shall be presented to the Test Manager for review 

and concurrence. Upon termination of need for the Test Group 

Director to retain radiological safety control within an 

assigned area, the Test Group Director will be relieved of 

radiological safety responsibility. 

Director, Nevada Test Site Support Office (NTSSO). Supervises 

the approved NTS on-site radiological safety programs, except 

for those periods in which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others (i.e., Test Manager, Test 

Group Directors, etc.). 

Radiological Safety Advisor. The NTSO Radiological Safety 

Advisor is responsible to the Test Manager for staff supervision of radiological safety policies and procedures at the 

NTS. Monitoring of the radiological safety policies and direction of procedures at NTS, during non-operational periods, 

rests with the Director, NTSSO. 

Chief, Safety Branch (SB), NTSSO. The Chief, Safety Branch, 

NTSSO, will be responsible to the Director, NTSSO, for conducting field inspections at the NTS to assure that NTS contractors execute safety programs in accordance with approved 

safety procedures and plans as well as with AEC and NV00 

directives. Recommends corrective actions where necessary. 

Assures that radioactive waste management and disposal are 

accomplished in accordance with approved procedures. Coordinates and administers NTS activities relative to the Radiological Assistance Program. Provides day-by-day coordination 

and monitoring of NTS radiological safety activities, except 

for those periods during which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others. 

Director, Safety Evaluation Division (SED), NVOO. Provides 

for staff development of safety programs of NV00 for use at 

NTS. Develops safety programs which are coordinated with 

NTSSO and site user agencies and organizations to meet public 

and operational safety requirements for the conduct of nuclear 

detonations, reactor test programs, chemical explosives tests, 

or other NV00 activities. Arranges for radiological studies as 

may be appropriate. 

308 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

h. Chief, Radiological Safety Branch (RSB), NVOO. Provides staff 

assistance in all matters relating to radiological safety. Reviews and evaluates for technical adequacy radiological safety 

procedures and operational plans submitted by user organizations. 

Acts as Radiological Safety Advisor (or provides a representative) 

to the Test Manager during all NV00 activities requiring such 

coverage. 

1. Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer. The Director, Southwestern 

Radiological Health Laboratory, U. S. Public Health Service, or 

his representative, will be designated as the Off-Site,Radiological Safety Officer and its responsible to the Test Manager 

for the operation of the off-site radiological safety program. 

User Organizations. The official in charge of each agency or 

organizational group participating in NTS field activities or 

using NTS facilities is responsible for compliance by his personnel with established radiological safety policies, procedures, and controls. Each official in charge of a participating 

group is also responsible at all times to his parent organization for the radiological safety of personnel under his supervision. Operational safety plans will be submitted by the user 

organization to the Test Manager for review and approval, with 

a copy to the Director, NTSSO. 

k. Operations Coordination Center (OX!). Shipment of radioactive 

materials, radioactive waste disposal, and access to areas contaminated with radioactive debris require prior coordination 

through the Operations Coordination Center, CP-1, telephone 

Mercury 986-2781. 

1. On-Site Radiological Organization. On-site radiological safety 

support services for user organizations and the routine operation of NTS will be provided by the on-site radiological safety 

support contractor as directed by the NTSSO. Routing radiological safety support services at NTS will be requested in 

writing by the user organization through the Director, NTSSO. 

The on-site radiological safety support contractor is 

ble to the Test Manager, through the Director, NTSSO, 

following routine on-NTS radiological safety support. 

1. Providing radiological safety support, including 

monitors to user organizations. 

responsifor the 

certified 

2. Making radiological surveys, documenting radiation levels 

from events on the NTS, mapping and properly marking all 

contaminated areas, and furnishing this survey information 

for distribution by the Chief, Safety Branch, NTSSO. 

309 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

Conducting a personnel radiation dosimetry program and disseminating the results of the program to respective organizations covered under this program, and as appropriate 

under AEC Manual Chapter 0525 and Appendix. This program 

to include providing and maintaining a repository for records and source documents pertaining to personnel dosimetry 

for all NV00 activities requiring such dosimetry. 

Maintaining and calibrating radiation detection equipment. 

Procuring, issuing, and decontaminating protective clothing, supplies, and equipment. 

Providing radioactive materials and waste disposal control 

(including receiving, storage, on-site movement and shipping). 

Maintaining and operating personnel and equipment decontamination facilities. 

Providing advice and assistance in matters pertaining to 

radiological safety. 

Conducting an on-site environmental surveillance program. 

Providing necessary support services for the off-site 

radiological safety program. 

Conducting radiological safety training courses. 

Preparing final on-site reports following each test operational period, interim reports for each event, special 

reports and detailed operational plans for each future 

program. 

Providing Radiological Assistance Teams to respond to 

radiation incidents. 

Conducting analysis of samples for radioactivity and for 

certain toxic materials. 

Providing and maintaining a current 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 

logical safety support, as outlined 

contractors at the NTS. 

manual containing the 

for providing radioabove, to users and 

310 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

m. Other. Other responsibilities as well as more detailed versions 

of the above, are spelled out in NTSO-0103. 

0524-02 Oraanization 

The chart showing the organizational relationship of the NTS radiological safety activities is shown in Figure 1 on the following page. 

0524-03 Definitions 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

h. 

1. 

k. 

Radiological Safety. The protection of personnel, population 

groups, and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation. 

Ionizing Radiation. Electromagnetic radiation (consisting of 

photons) or particulate radiation (consisting of electrons, 

neutrons, protons, etc.) usually of high energy, but in any 

case capable of ionizing air, directly or indirectly. 

NTS. The Nevada Test Site. 

On-Site. Areas within the NTS boundaries, including Mercury. 

Certified Monitor. Any person certified to the Test Manager 

or his designated representative as a qualified monitor by a 

Test Group Director or the Radiological Safety Representative 

of the radiological safety services. 

Radiation Exclusion Area (Radex). A limited access area designated and posted for radiological safety purposes. 

Controlled Area. Any area to which access is controlled by 

the ARC or AEC contractors. 

User. Any organization or test participant having a NVOOapproved technical program for conduct at the NTS. 

Radiation Incident. Any alleged radiation accident, which if 

true, could result in property damage or loss, injury, over 

exposure, or excessive release of radioactive materials. 

Roentgen. A unit of exposure to X or gamma radiation. 1 mR 

(one milliRoentgen1 is one-one thousandth of one Roentgen. 

Rad. A unit of absorbed dose equivalent to 100 ergs/gram. 

311 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
-----Administrative & Technica 

Direction S 

(A) When 

w 

,.... 

I\..) 

c 

III I I 

I 

Asst. Manager 

fOl' Opel'at ions 

I 

Director, 

Safety Evaluation 

Division 

;g 

< 

In 

f'I) 

Co 

.." 

f'I) 

r::T 

-s 

J 

Chief, 

Radiological 

Safety Branch 

I I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I

..... 

Radiological 

Safety 

Advisor 

I 

USPHS Off-Site 

Radiological Safety 

Organization 

Test Manager 

NTSO 

ESSA/ARL 

Weather, Radiation 

Predic'tion 

Test Group 

Director 

I 

User 

Radi9 l og i cal 

Safety 

Organization 

--' 

(Al 

• 

On-site Radiological 

Safety Support 

Contractor 

I 

Director, 

NTSSO 

I 

Chief, 

Safety Branch 

I 

Chief, 

Radiological 

Safety Section 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

L- I r--'" 

~ I ~ Medical Liaison Veterinary I

Officer Network Officer I 

:0 I I I I I I ~ L---------------________ J 

Figure 1. Organization Chart 

Radiological Safety Activities 

l '''5 '~~..%a••#IIiit"ii£!2lli&ll$£U&J8~ir€!IBJr'Lj t"!ii-esU"-CS07 ".... ... o€ ' ~ ­
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

1. Rem. A unit of dose equivalent. It is a unit found convenient 

in practice to express exposures to different types of ionizing 

radiation in terms that combine both the magnitude of the 

absorbed dose and its biological effectiveness. The dose equivalent is numerically equal to the dose in rads multiplied by 

the appropriate modifying factors. 

m. Exposure Rate or Dose Rate. The time rate at which exposure or 

dose is measured or administered, i.e., dose or exposure per 

unit time, such as R/hr, rem/min, rad/hr, R/set, etc. 

0524-04 Radiation Protection Standards 

041 Coverage. These standards shall govern ionizing radiation exposure 

to AEC and AEC contractor personnel and to other individuals who 

may be exposed to ionizing radiation from operations of the AEC and 

AEC contractors. These standards do not apply to radiation exposures resulting from natural radiation, medical and dental procedures, nor do they apply to the general population when the activities involved are essential to national security, such as nuclear 

weapons testing. The latter types of activities are covered by 

separate criteria. Safety criteria for each Plowshare event will 

be considered separately until such time as over-all policy for 

the Plowshare program is established. No operation shall be conducted until the radiological hazard has been evaluated and it 

has been determined to the satisfaction of the Test Manager, or 

the Test Group Director (when he has been delegated the radiological safety responsibility for the operation1 that radiation 

exposures should not exceed the radiation protection standards 

established in AEC Manual Chapter 0524 (repeated below). Except 

for emergencies, written requests to expose personnel in excess 

of these limits should be directed to the Test Manager. 

313 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
PART I 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPEND I X 0524 

I. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS IN CONTROLLED AREAS’ 

A. Radlatlon from sources external to the body 

Type of Exposure Perlod of Time Dose (rem) 

Whole bady, head and trunk, 

active blood-formlng organs 

gonads, or lens of eye. 

Skin of whole body and thyrold 

Accumulated dose 

Calendar quarter3 

Year 

Ca I endar quarter3 

5 (N-1812 

34 

3Q4 

10 

Hands, and forearms, feet and ankles 

Year 

Calendar quarter3 

754 

25 

B. Radlatlon from emitters Internal to the 

body 

1. Except as provlded In 2. below, the 

radratlon protectlon standards for 

alrborne radloactlvlty speclf led In 

annex I, table I, shall be followed. 

The concentration standards are 

based upon continuous exposure to 

the concentrations specified for forty 

hours per week (a Week11 being 

seven consecutive days). For the 

purpose of applying these standards, 

radloactlvlty concentrations may be 

averaged over periods up to 13 consecutlve weeks provided work areas 

are appropriately monltored and exposure hlstorles are malntalned for 

each lndlvidual worklng in such 

areas. 

2. If It Is not ‘feasible to govern exposures to lnternal emitters by applying alrborne radloactivlty concentratlon standards, the followlng 

radlatlon protectlon standards shall 

apply: 

Dose 

Type of Exposure rem/year rem/quarter 

Whole body, active bloodformlng organs, gonads. 

Thyrold 

5 

30 

3 

10 

Bone Body burden of 0.1 -- 

Other organs 

The calculation of organ dose shall be 

based on methods recommended by the 

Federal Radlatlon Council and the Inmlcrogram of radlum226 or lts5blologlcal 

equivalent 

15 5 

ternatlonal Commlsslon on Radlologlcal 

Protectlon. 

‘An lndlvldual under age 18 shall not be 

employed In or allowed to enter controlled 

areas In such manner that he will receive 

doses of radiation In amounts exceeding the 

standards applicable to lndlvlduals In 

uncontrolled areas. Exposures to lndivlduals 

under age 18 may be averaged over periods not 

to elceed one calendar quarter. 

N equals the age In years at last 

bl rthday. An lndlvldual employed at age 18 

or an lndlvldual beyond age 18 who had no 

accrued unused exposure shall not be exposed 

during the ensuing year to doses exceeding 

(a) 1.25 rem for the first calendar quarter, 

(b) 2.5 rem total for the first two calendar 

quarters, (c) 3.75 rem total for the flrst 

three calendar quarters and (d) 5 rem for the 

year, but In not case will exposure be more 

than33 rem per quarter. 

A calendar quarter may be taken as a 

predetermined period of 13 consecutive weeks 

or any predetermined quarter year based on 

the talendar. 

Personnel monltorlng equipment shall be 

provlded each lndlvldual who receives or Is 

likely to receive a dose In any calendar 

quarpr In excess of IOl of these values. 

Exposure must be governed such that the 

lndlvldual’s body burden does not exceed thls 

value (a) when averaged over any period of 12 

consecutive months and (b) after 50 years of 

occupatlonal exposure. 

314 

,‘sed: Februar\e Q ‘968 
PART I I 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

II. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOA INOIVIDUALS AN0 POPULATION GROUPS IN UNCONTROLLED AREAS 

A. Radiation dose standards for external and internal exposure 

Dose (rem/year) 

Based on Based on an average 

exposure to exposure to a sultable 

Type of Exposure lndlviduals populatlon sample 

Whole body, gonads or 

bone marrow 

Thyroid or bone 

Bone (alternate standard) 

0.5 

1.5 

Body burden of 

0.003Ug of radium 

226 or its blological equivalent. 

0.17 

0.5 

Body burden of 

O.OOlUg of radium 

226 or Its blologlcal equivalent. 

B. RadIoactIvIty In effluents released (b) Indlvlduals are not exposed In 

to uncontrolled areas excess of annex I, table II standards, or 

1. Except as provided In 2. below, 

radfoactlvlty In effluents released (cl the average exposure of a sultto uncontrolled areas shall not ex- able sample of an exposed poputeed the radlatlon protection stand- latlon group Is not In excess of 

ards speclfled In annex I, table II. one-third of annex I, table I I 

standards. RadIoactIvity concentratlons In the environment may 

be averaged over periods up to 

one year. 

3. In any sltuatlon In which the contriThe point of release of such effluents 

sha I I be cons1 dered to be the pal nt 

at which the effluents pass beyond 

the sl te boundary. Were such ef - 

fluents are discharged through a 

conduit such as a stack or pipe. the 

polnt of release may be consldered 

to be the conduit discharge. For the 

purpose of applying these standards, 

radioactlvlty concentrations In effluents may be averaged over periods 

up to one year. 

2. Radioactivity In effluents may be 

released to uncontrolled areas In 

excess of the radiation protectIon 

standards specified In annex I, table 

II, provlded It Is reasonably demonstrated that In uncontrolled areas: 

(a) lndlvlduals are not exposed In 

excess of the standards speclfled 

In A. above. 

butfon to radioactfvlty in the envlronment from effluents discharged 

by one or more actlvltles of the 

AEC or AEC contractors IS likely 

to result in exposures In excess of 

the standards speclfled in 1I.A. and 

8. above, lower effluent concentration limits may be set for these 

Operat I ons . In such cases, the manager of the field offlce may take the 

necessary corrective actlon If all 

activities concerned are uithln hls 

area of responslblllty. Otherwlse, 

each case WI I I be referred to the 

Dlrector, Olvlslon of Operational 

Safety, for approprlate actlon. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

315 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL 6ACKGROUNO 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) Isotope' 

Actlnlum (89)............ AC 227 

AC 228 

Amerlclum (95)........... Am 241 

Am 243 

Antimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sb 122 

Sb 124 

Sb I25 

Argon (18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A 37 

A 41 

Arsenic (33) . . . . . . . . . . . . As 73 

As 74 

As 76 

As 77 

Astatlnb (85) ........... At 211 

Barium (56) ............. Ba I31 

Ba 140 

Berkellum (97) .......... Bk 249 

Beryllium (4) . . . . . . . . . . . IBe 7 

Bismuth (83) . . . . . . . . . . . . BI 206 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

Sub' 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

Qic/ml) 

2xt0-12 

3x10-l' 

8x10:; 

2x10 

6x10;;; 

z+; 

Ix10 

-7 

2x1o_7 

1x10 

2x10 

-7 

-8 

2x1o_7 

5x10 

3xlo-8 

-3 

6~10_~ 

2x10 

-6 

2x1o_7 

4x10 

3x10:; 

1x10 

-7 

lx10 

-7 

1x10 

-7 

5x1o_7 

4x10 

7x1o-9 

3x10 

-8 

lx10 -6 

-7 

4x10_7 

lx10 

-8 

;;;;-I0 

-7 

1x10 

6x10;; 

1x10 

2x10:; 

Ix10 

able I 

Column 2 

Water 

(w/ml) 

6x10:; 

9x10 

3x10 

-3 

-3 

3x1q4 

Ix1o_4 

8xlq4 

lx10_4 

8xlq4 

~xIO_~ 

~xIO_~ 

7x10 

7x10 

-4 

-3 

3x1o_3 

3x10 

. . . . 

. . . . 

1x10 

-2 

-2 

1x1q3 

2x10 

-3 

2x1o_4 

~xIO_~ 

6x10 

-3 

2x1o_3 

2x10 

-5 

5x1o_3 

2x10 

-3 

5x10-3 

5xlo_4 

~xIO_~ 

7x10 

-2 

2x1o_2 

2x10 

-2 

5xlo_2 

5x10 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

Column I 

Air 

(lJc/ml) 

8x10 

-14 

9x10 

-13 

-9 

;",;;-I0 

2x10:;; 

3xy:xl3 

4x10 

-12 

-9 

6x10+ 

5x10 

5x1o-9 

7x10;;0 

2x10 

9x10-lo 

-4 

1xlo_8 

4x10 

7x10 

-8 

-8 

1x10 

lx10 

-8 

4x10 

-9 

4x10 

-9 

3x10:89 

2x10 

-8 

lx10 

2x10-lo 

-9 

1x10 

4x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

4x10 

-9 

1x10 

-9 

3x10 

-11 

-9 

4x10 

-7 

2x1o_8 

4x10 

6x10 

-9 

5xlo-9 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(l.Ic/ml) 

-6 

2xlo_4 

3x10 

-5 

9x10-5 

9x10 

4x10 

-6 

-5 

2x10 

4x10 

-6 

3x10;; 

3x10-5 

3x10 

2x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

-4 

1xlo_4 

lx10 

. . . . 

. . . . 

5x10:: 

5x10 

5x10 

-5 

5x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

2x1o-5 

8x10 

-5 

-5 

8x10 

2x10+ 

7x10 

-5 

-4 

2xlo_4 

2x10 

3x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

-4 

6~10_~ 

6x10 

-3 

2x1o_3 

2x10 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

Sea footnotes at end of table. 316 

Revlsed: February 9, 1968 
STANOAROS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AN0 WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomlc number) 

BraIn (351 ............ 

Cadmium (48) ............ 

Calcium (20) ............ 

Callfornlum (98) ........ 

Carbon (6) .............. 

Cerlun (58) ............. 

Ceslum (55) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Isotop~l 

81 207 

81 210 

Bl 212 

Br 82 

:d 109 

Zd ll5m 

:d 115 

:a 45 

:a 47 

:t 249 

:t 250 

:f 252 

: I4 

(CO 1 

:e 41 ? 

:a 143 

:e 144 

:s 131 

:s 134ln 

:s I34 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

t 

Column 

All- 

(w/ml) 

2x10 

-7 

1x10 

-8 

6x10 

-9 

6x10 

-9 

-7 

1x1o_7 

2x10 

-6 

1xlo_7 

2x10 

5x10-8 

7x10 

-8 

4x10 

-8 

4x10 

-8 

-7 

2x1o_7 

2x10 

3x10;; 

lx10 

2x1o-7 

2x10 

-7 

-12 

2x'O_10 

1x10 

5x10 

-12 

-10 

'x'O_ll 

y;",-10 

4x10 

-6 

5x10 

-5 

-7 

4xlo_7 

2x10 

3x1o-7 

2x10 

-7 

1x10 

-8 

6x10 

-9 

1x10 

-5 

3x10 

-6 

4x10 

-5 

6x10 

-6 

4x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

Column 2 

Water 

(w/ml) 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

lx10 

-3 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

8x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

5xlo_3 

5x1q4 

7xlo_4 

7x10 

-3 

1xlo_3 

1xlo_4 

3x10 

5x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-4 

lx10_4 

7x10 

-4 

4x1o_4 

7xlo_4 

7xlo_4 

7x10 

2x10 

-2 

. . . . 

3x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

lx10 

-3 

lx10 

-3 

-4 

3xlo_4 

3x10 

7x10 

-2 

-2 

3x10_, 

2xlo_2 

3xlo_4 

3x10_3 

1x10 

-IColumn I 

Air 

(pc/lnl) 

6x10 

-9 

5x10 

-10 

2x10 

-10 

2x10;; 

3x1qg 

7x10 

-8 

4x10_g 

6x10 

-9 

2x10_g 

3xl0_g 

lxlo_g 

lx10 

-9 

BxIO_~ 

6x10 

-9 

1x1o_g 

4x10 

-9 

6~10_~ 

6x10 

5x10;;; 

;;;;-I3 

-12 

3x10-13 

7x10-12 

4x10 

-7 

1x1o_6 

1x10 

2x10 

-8 

5x10 

-9 

9x10 

-9 

-9 

;;;;-10 

2x10 

-10 

4x10 

-7 

1x10 

-7 

-6 

1xlo_7 

2xlo_g 

lxlO_10 

4x10 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(w/ml) 

-5 

6xlq5 

6x10 

4x10 

-5 

-5 

4x1o_4 

4x1q4 

4x10 

3x1013 

4x10 

-4 

2x1q4 

2x10 

-5 

3x10 

3x10:: 

3xlo_5 

4x10 

-6 

9x10_4 

2x10 

-5 

5x1o_5 

3x10 

4x10 

-6 

2x10 

-5 

1x10 

-5 

-5 

3x1o_5 

2x1o_5 

2x10 

8x10 

-4 

. . . . 

-5 

9x10_5 

9x10 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

1x10 

-5 

1x10 

-5 

-3 

2x1o_4 

9x10 

6x10 

-3 

-3 

1x10 

9x10 

-6 

4x10 

-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 317 

Revised: February 9. 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUN&contInued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) Isotopa' 

cs 135 

Cs 136 

cs 137 

Chlorine (17) . . . . . . . . . . . Cl 36 

Cl 38 

Chromium (24) . . . . . . . . . . . Cr 51 

Cobalt (27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Co 57 

Co 58m 

co 58 

Co 60 

iOpp8r ( 29 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cu 64 

Curium (96, . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cm 242 

Cm 243 

Cm 244 

Cm 245 

Cm 246 

Dysprosium (66) . . . . . . . . . Dy 165 

Dy 166 

Erblum (68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Er 169 

See footnotes at end of table. 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

lColumn Column Z Column I 

Air Water Air 

(w/ml) (w/ml) (UC/ml) 

5x10 

-7 

9x10 

-0 

4x10 

-7 

2x10 

-7 

6x10:; 

1x10 

4x10 

-7 

2x1,:; 

3x10 

2x10 

-6 

'xl0 -5 

2x10 

-6 

3x10:; 

2x10 

2x10:; 

9x10 

8x10 

-7 

5x10-8 

3x10:; 

9x10 

2x10:: 

;:;x-10 

2x10 

-10 

6x10:;; 

1x10 

9x1o-12 

1x10 

-10 

5x10;;; 

1x10 

5x10-l2 

1x1o-1o 

3xlo-6 

2x10 

-6 

hclO-7 

2x10 

-7 

6x10;; 

4x10 

318 R8VlSed: February 9, 1968 

T 

-3 

3xlo_3 

7x10 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

4x10 

-4 

-3 

lx10 

2x101; 

2x10 

-2 

lxlo_2 

1x10 

-2 

5xlo_2 

5x10 

-2 

2xlo_2 

1x10 

8x10 

-2 

6x10 

-2 

4x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

lx10 

-3 

1x10 

-2 

-3 

~xIO_~ 

7xlo_4 

7xlO_4 

1x10 

7x10 

-4 

2x10 

-4 

-4 

8x10_, 

lxlo_4 

8x10 

1x10 

-4 

8x10 

-4 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

1x10 

3x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

-8 

2xlo_g 

3x10 

-8 

lxlqg 

6x10 

2x10 

-9 

5x10 

-10 

1x10 

-8 

8x10 

-10 

9x10 

-8 

-6 

7x10 

-7 

4xlo_8 

8x10 

-7 

lxlo_g 

6x10 

-7 

6xlq7 

3x10 

-8 

3xlo_g 

2x10 

-8 

'X'O_,D 

3x10 

7x10 

-8 

-8 

4x10 

4x10 

-12 

6x10 

-12 

2x10 

-13 

3x10 

-12 

3x10 

-13 

3x10 

-12 

-13 

2x'O_12 

4x10 

2x10 

-13 

4x10:;2 

9x10 

7x10 

-8 

8x10 

-9 

7x10 

-9 

2x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(M/ml) 

-4 

lxlo_4 

2x10 

-5 

9xlo_5 

6x10 

2x10;; 

4x10 

-5 

8xlq5 

6x10 

-4 

4x1q4 

4x10 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

-4 

5xlo_4 

4x10 

3x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

-4 

lxlo_5 

9x10 

5xlo-5 

3x10:1 

3xlo_4 

2x10 

-5 

2X10_) 

3x10 

-6 

5xlo_5 

2x10 

-6 

7xlo_5 

3x10 

-6 

4xlo_5 

3x10 

4x10 

-6 

3x10 

-5 

-4 

4xlo_4 

4x10 

-5 

4x1o_5 

4x10 

-5 

9x1o_5 

9x10 
STANDARDS FOA RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) 

=uropIum (63) . . . . . . . . . . . 

Fluorine (9) ............ 

Gadollnlum (64) ......... 

Gallium (31) ............ 

Germanium (32) .......... 

Gold (79) ............... 

Hsfnlum (72) ............ 

Holmlrn (67) ............ 

Hydrogul (1) ............ 

Indlum (49) ............. 

Isotope' 

Er 171 S 

I 

Eu 152 S 

[T/2=9.2 hrsll 

Eu 152 S 

[T/2-13 yrsl I 

Eu 154 

Eu I55 

: 18 

;d I53 

;d I59 

is 72 

;e 71 

\u 196 

\u 198 

\u 199 

+t I81 

* 166 

43 

In 113m 

In 114m 

In 1151 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

(k/ml) 

7x10 

-7 

6x10;; 

4x10 

-7 

3x10 

1x10 -8 

2x10 

-8 

4x10 

-9 

-9 

7x10 

-8 9x10 

7x10 

-8 

5xl0-6 

-6 

3x10 

2xlo-7 

9x10 -8 

5x10-7 

4x10 

-7 

2x10-I 

2x10;; 

1x10 

6x10:; 

1x10 

6x10 

-7 

3xl0-7 

2x10 

-7 

1x10 -6 

8x10 

-7 

4x10 -8 

-8 

7x10 

-7 

2x10 

2x1o-7 

5x1o-6 

2x10:,' 

8x10 

-6 

7x10 

1x10 

-7 

2xlo:g 

2xlo_6 

2x10 

able I 

Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

3x10-3 

3x10;; 

2x10 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

-4 

6~10_~ 

6x10 

6x10 

-3 

6x10 

-3 

-2 

2x1o_2 

1x10 

6x10-' 

6x10:; 

2x10 

2x10;; 

1x10 

1x10 -3 

5x10 

-2 

5x10:; 

5x10 

4x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

lx10 -3 

5x10 

-3 

4x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

2xlo-3 

9xlo-4 

9xloy 

lx10 

. . . . 

4x10 

-2 

4x10 

-2 

5x10 

-4 

5x10 

-4 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

T 

Column I 

Air 

(lk/mll 

2xlo-8 

2x,o:,e 

1x10 

-8 

1x10 

4x10 

-10 

-10 

;;;;-I0 

2x10 

-10 

3xIo-9 

3xl0-9 

2x10:; 

9x10 

8x10 

-9 

3x1o-9 

zxlo-8 

Ix10 

-8 

-9 

8~10_~ 

6x10 

4x10 

-7 

2x10:; 

4x10 

2x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

8x10 

-9 

4x10 

-8 

3x10:; 

1x10 

3x10:; 

7x10 

6x10;; 

2x10 

4x10 

-5 

3x10 

-7 

-7 

2x1q9 

4x10 

7x10 

-10 

8x10 

-8 

6x10 

-8 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

-4 

1xlo_4 

lx10 

-5 

6x10-5 

6x10 

-5 

8x10-5 

8x10 

-5 

2x10-5 

2x10 

-4 

2x1q4 

2x10 

-4 

8~10_~ 

5x10 

2x1o-4 

2x1o-4 

8x10:; 

8x10 

-5 

4x10-5 

4x10 

2x10:; 

2x10 

2x101; 

1x10 

5x10:; 

5x10 

2x1o-4 

2x1o-4 

-5 

7x10-5 

7x10 

3x1,:: 

3x10 

3xlo-3 

. . . . 

1x10 

-3 

lx10 

-3 

-5 

2x10-5 

2x10 

-4 

4x1o_4 

4x10 

See footnotes at end of table. 319 

Revised: February 9. 1968 
STANOAROS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSC-SCP APPENOIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AN0 WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) 

Iodine (53) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

lrldfum (77) . . . . . . . . . . . 

Iron (26) ............... 

Krypton (36) ............ 

Lanthanum (57) .......... 

Lead (82) ............... 

Isotope1 

In 115 

I 125 

I 129 

I 131 

I 132 

I I33 

I 134 

I 135 

Ir 190 

Ir 192 

lr 194 

re 55 

'0 59 

Ir 85m 

tr 85 

tr 87 

_a 140 

'b 203 

'b 210 

'b 212 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Sub 

Sub 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Table I 

Column I Column 2 

Air Water 

(k/ml) (k/ml 1 

2x 10;; 3x10 

-3 

3x10 5

-9 

2x10 

-7 

4x10 3x10:; 

6x10 

-3 

2x10:; 

7x10 

1x10 -5 3

9x10 -9 

6x10 

6x10 

-5 

3xlo-7 

2xlo-7 

2xlo-3 

-7 

2x1o-3 

9x10 

3x10:; 

5x10 -3 

2x10 

2x10 -4 3

-7 

1x10 

5x10 

3x10:; 

4x10 -3 

lx10 

2x10 -4 2

-7 

7x10 

4x10 1x10 

-6 

2x10:; 

4x10 

-7 

~xIO_~ 

1x10 -7 

5x10 

-3 

3x10:; 

1x10 

1x10 

-3 

2x10-7 -3 

2x10 

lxlo_4 

-7 

9x10 

9x10 

1x10 

-6 

2xlo_2 -2 

lxioB7 

7x10 

-3 

5x10 

-8 

2x1o_3 

6x105 

2x10 

. . . . 

1x10 

1x10 -6 l *** 

2x10 

-7 .***_4 

-7 

7x10 

1x10 

3x10 

-6 

7x10 -4 

1x10 

-2 

zXlO-6 -2 

1x10 

-10 lxlo_6 

2x10 -10 

4x10 

-3 

-8 

2x10 

5xlo_4 

6x10 

2x10 

-8 

5x10 

-4 

,liI:’ 

9x10 

-9 

lx10 

-9 

8xlO:;' 

1x10 

2x10 

-11 

2xlo-9 

1x10 

-10 

1x10 

-8 

3x1o-9 

3x1o-8 

1x10 

-10 

7x10 

-9 

-9 

2x10-7 

1x10 

lx10 

-9 

1x10 

-8 

4x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

-9 

4x'O_,0 

9x10 

8x10 

-9 

5x10 

-9 

-8 

3xlo_8 

3x10 

5x10 

-9 

2x10 

-9 

-7 

1x1q7 

3x10 

2x10 

-8 

5x10 

-9 

4x10 

-9 

9x10 

-8 

6x10 

-8 

4x10 

-12 

8x10 

-12 

6x10 

-10 

7x10 

-10 

2x10 

-4 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

3x10 

-5 

3x10;~ 

8x10 

2x10 

-3 

6x10 

-5 

5x10 

-5 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

2x10 

-5 

-5 

2xlo_4 

4x10 

4x10 

-4 

-7 

lx'0 

2x10 

-4 

2x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 320 

Revlsad: February 9, 1968 
STANOAROS FOR RAOIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) Isotope1 

Lutetium (71) . . . . . . . . . . . Lu 177 

Manganese (2s) . . . . . . . . . . Mfl 52 

Hn 54 

Mn 56 

Mercury (80) . . . . . . . . . . . . Hs 197m 

% 197 

Hg 203 

Molybdenum (42) . . . . . . . . . MO 99 

Neodymium (60) . . . . . . . . . . Nd 144 

Nd 147 

Nd 149 

Neptunlum (93) . . . . . . . . . . Np 237 

Np 239 

Nickel (28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nl 59 

NI 63 

NI 65 

Nloblum (Columblum)(41).. 

I 

Nb 93m 

Nb 95 

Nb 97 

See footnotes at end of table. 321 

lColumn I 

Air 

(l&ml) 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

-7 

~xIO_~ 

5xlo_7 

2x1o_7 

1xw7 

4x10 

-8 

4x1o_7 

BxIO_~ 

5x10 

-7 

7x1o_7 

8x10 

1x10 

-6 

-6 

3x1qg 

7x1o_7 

1x10 

7x10 

-7 

2x10 

8xlO:i: 

3x10 

4x10 

-7 

2x10 

-7 

2x10:; 

1x10 

4x10 -12 

lx10 

-10 

8x10:; 

7x10 

5x10:; 

8x10 

-8 

~xIO_~ 

3x10 

-7 

9xlo_7 

5x10 

1x10 

-7 

2x10;; 

5x10 

1x10 

-7 

6x10 

-6 

5x10 

-6 

Column 2 

Water 

(PC/ml) 

3x10:; 

3x10 

-3 

Ix10_4 

9x10 

4x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

-3 

4x1o_3 

3x10 

6x10 

-3 

5x10 

-3 

9x10 

-3 

lx10 

-2 

-4 

5xlo_3 

3x10 

5x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

8x10 

-3 

8x10 

-3 

9x10 

-5 

9x10 

-4 

4x10 

-3 

4x10 

-3 

-3 

~xIO_~ 

~xIO_~ 

8x10 

2x10 

-2 

4x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

1x10 

-2 

lx10 

-2 

3x10 

-3 

3x10:; 

3x10 

3x10 

-2 

I 

Column 

Air 

(DC/ml) 

-8 

2x1o_8 

2x10 

-9 

7x1o_9 

5x10 

-9 

Ixlo_9 

lx10 

3x10 

-8 

2x10:; 

3x10 

3x10 

-8 

4x10 

-8 

9x10 

-8 

-9 

2xl0_9 

4x1o_8 

3x1o_9 

y;;-12 

1x10 

-I1 

-8 

lxlo_9 

8x10 

6x10 

-8 

5x10 

-8 

1x10 

-13 

4x10 

-12 

-8 

3xlo_8 

2x10 

2x10 

-8 

3x10 

-8 

2x10 

-9 

lx10 

-8 

-8 

3xlo_8 

2x10 

4x10 

-9 

5x10 

-9 

2x10 

-8 

-9 

3x1o_7 

2x10_, 

2x10 

Table II 

Column 2 

Water 

(@ml) 

-4 

lxlo_4 

lx10 

3x10 

-5 

-5 

3xlo_4 

1xlo_4 

lx10 

-4 

1x1q4 

1x10 

2x10;: 

2x10_4 

3x1o_4 

5x10 

-5 

2x1o_4 

1x10 

-4 

2x10-5 

4x10 

-5 

7x10-5 

8x10 

6x10 

-5 

6x10 

-5 

-4 

3x1o_4 

3x10 

3,10:6, 

3x10 

-4 

1xlo_4 

lx1o_4 

2x10 

2x10 

-3 

-5 

3xtq4 

7xlo_4 

Ixlo_4 

1x10 

-4 

4x1q4 

4x10 

-4 

lxlo_4 

1x1o_4 

9xlo_4 

9x10 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) Isotoope' 

Osmlum (76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . OS 185 

OS 19lm 

0s 191 

OS 193 

Palladlurn (46) . . . . . . . . . . Pd 103 

Pd 109 

Phosphorus (15) . . . . . . . . . P 32 

Platinum (78) . . . . . . . . . . . Pt 191 

Pt 193m 

Pt 197m 

Pt 197 

Plutonium (94) . . . . . . . . . . Pu 236 

Pu 239 

Pu 240 

Pu 241 

Pu 242 

Polonium (84) . . . . . . . . . . . Po 210 

Potassium (19) . . . . . . . . . . K42 

Praseodymium (59) . . . . . . . Pr 142 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

(k/ml) 

5x10;; 

5x10 

2x10:,' 

9x10 

1x10 

-6 

4x10 

-7 

4x10 

-7 

3x10 

-7 

1x10:; 

7x10 

6~10-~ 

4x10 

-7 

7x10 

-8 

8x10 

-8 

8x1"; 

6x10 

7x10 -6 

-6 

5x10 

6x10 

-6 

5x10 

-6 

axlo:; 

6x10 

2x10-12 

3x10-" 

2x10:;; 

:,x:x12 

4x10;;; 

9x10 

4x10 

2xlo!;; 

4x10 

5x10:;; 

2x10 

2x10:': 

1x10 

2xlo-7 

2x1d7 

able I 

Column : 

Water 

olc/ml) 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

7x10 

-2 

7x10 

-2 

5x10 

-3 

5x10 

-3 

-3 

2xlo_3 

2x10 

-2 

lx10_3 

8x10 

3x1o-3 

2x10:: 

5x10 

7x10 

-4 

4x10 

-3 

3xlo-3 

3x10:; 

3x10 

-2 

3xl0_2 

3x10 

4x10 

-3 

-3 

3x1o_4 

1x10 

8x10 

-4 

-4 

lxlo_4 

8x10 

1x10 

-4 

8x10 

-4 

7x10 

-3 

4x10 

-2 

1x10 

-4 

9x10 

-4 

2x10:: 

8x10 

9x10 

-3 

6x10 

-4 

-4 

9xlo_4 

9x10 

T 

Column I 

Air 

(k/ml) 

-8 

2x10_, 

2xlo_7 

6x1q7 

3x10_* 

4x10 

-8 

lx10 

-8 

lxlqg 

9x10 

-8 

5x1qg 

3xl0_g 

2x1o_8 

1x10 

-9 

2x1qg 

3x10g 

3x10 

2x10;; 

2xlo_7 

2x1o_7 

2x1o_7 

2x10 

3x10;; 

2x'D_,4 

;x,;;-12 

-14 

y",:;-12 

-14 

6x'D_,2 

Ix10_,2 

3x10 

1x10 

-9 

6x10 

-14 

1x10 

-12 

-11 

2x1O_,2 

7x10 

7x10 

-8 

-9 

4x10 

-9 

7xlo_g 

5x10 

Table II 

Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

-5 

7x1q5 

7x10 

3x10:; 

2x10 

2x101; 

2x10 

-5 

6x1q5 

5x10 

3x10:; 

3x10 

-5 

9x10_5 

7x10 

2xlo-5 

2x10:5 

lxlo_4 

1x10 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

1x1q4 

9xlo_4 

1x1q4 

1x10 

5x10 

-6 

3xlo-5 

5x101; 

3x10 

5x10 

-6 

3x1o-5 

2x10:; 

1x10 

5x10 

-6 

3x10:; 

7x10 

3x10 

-5 

3x10 

-4 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

3x1o_5 

3x10 

See footnotes at end of table. 322 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
STAMMROS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AN0 WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(SW notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) 

Praeothlum (61) . . . . . ..I 

Protoactlnlum (91) . . . . . 

Radium (88) . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Radon (86) ............. 

Rhenium (711) ............ 

Rhodium (45) ........... 

Rubldlum (371 .......... 

Isotop.1 

Pr 143 

Pm 147 

Pm 149 

Pa 230 

Pa 231 

Pa 233 

Ra 223 

As 224 

Ra 226 

Ra 228 

Rn 220 

An 222 

Ro 183 

Re 186 

Ro 187 

Ro 188 

Rh 103m 

Rh 105 

Rb 86 

Rb 87 

See footnotes at end of table. 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

(pdml) 

3xl0-7 

2xlo-7 

6x10:; 

lx10 

3xlo-7 

-7 

2x10 

2x1o-g 

8x10-" 

1x10:;; 

1x10 

6x10;; 

2x10 

2xlo-g 

2x10 

-10 

5x1o-g 

7x10 

-10 

3x10-l1 

5x10-l1 

7x10:;; 

4x10 

3x1o-7 

1x10 

-7 

3x10;; 

2x10 

6~10-~ 

2x10 

-7 

9x10;; 

5x10 

4x10 

-7 

2x10 

-7 

8x10 

-5 

6x10 

-5 

8x10 

-7 

5x10 

-7 

3xlO-7 

7x10 

-8 

5x10:; 

7x10 

323 

able I 

Column 2 

Water 

(w/ml) 

lx10 -3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

~xIO_~ 

6x10 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

7xlo_3 

7x10 

-5 

3x1o_4 

8x10 

-3 

4x10 

3x10 

-3 

-5 

2xlo_4 

1x10 

-5 

7x10_, 

2xl0_7 

4x1o_4 

9x10 

-7 

8XlO_4 

7x10 

. . . . 

. . . . 

2x10 

-2 

8x10 

-3 

3x1o-3 

-3 

1x1o_2 

7x10 

4x10 

-2 

-3 

2x1o_4 

9x10 

-1 

4x10_, 

3x10 

4x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

7x10 

-4 

-3 

3x1o_3 

5x10 

Column I Column 2 

Alr Water 

(pz/ml) (pz/ml) 

1x10 -8 

-9 

6x10 

2x10:; 

3x10 

lx10 -8 

-9 

8x10 

6x10 

-11 

3x10;;; 

4x10 

4x10 

-12 

2x1o-8 

6x10 

6x10:;; 

8x10 

-10 

2xlO_ll 

2x10 

3x10-l2 

2x10;;; 

y;;;-12 

1x10 

-8 

3x10;; 

9x10 

5x10:; 

2x1o_g 

8x10 

3x1o-7 

2x10 

-8 

lx10 

-8 

-9 

6x10 

-6 

3x10_6 

2x10 

3xlo-8 

2x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

2x10;; 

2x1o_g 

2x10 

able II 

-5 

silo_, 

5x10 

2xl0-4 

2xlo-4 

4x10 

-5 

-5 

4x10 

2x1o-4 

2x10-' 

9x10:; 

2x10 

-4 

lxlo_4 

1x10 

7x10 

-7 

-6 

4x10 

2x10+ 

5xld6 

3x1o-8 

3x10+ 

3x1o-8 

3x10+ 

. . . . 

. . . . 

-4 

6~10_~ 

3x10 

-5 

9x1q5 

5x10 

3xlo:j 

2x10 

6x10 

-5 

3x10 

-5 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

-4 

lxto_4 

1x10 

7x10 

-5 

,,I,:: 

lxlo_4 

2x10 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AN0 WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) 

Ruthenium (44) . . . . . . . . . 

Samarium (62) . . . . . . . . . . 

Scandium (21) . . . . . . . . . . 

Selenium (34) .......... 

Silicon (14) ............ 

Silver (47) ............. 

Sodfum (11) . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I 

Isotope' 

\g 111 

ss 22 

h Is 24 

Strontium (38) . . . . . . . ..( Sr 85m 

Sr 85 

Ru 97 

Ru 103 

Ru 105 

Ru 106 

Sm 147 

sm 151 

Sm 153 

SC 46 

SC 47 

SC 48 

se 75 

;I 31 

Jg 105 

ig 1lOm 

-r 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

(pc/ml) 

2x10 

-6 

2x10 

-6 

5x10-I 

-8 

~xIO_~ 

7x10 

5x10 

-7 

-8 

~x'O_~ 

6x10 

7x10-l' 

3x10:;0 

~xIO_~ 

'x10_, 

5xlo_7 

4x10 

2xld7 

-8 

2xlo_7 

~xIO_~ 

5x10 

-7 

2x'O_7 

1x10 

-6 

lx1o_7 

1x10 

6x10 

-6 

1x10 

-6 

6x10 

-7 

-8 

~x'O_~ 

2xlo_8 

1x10 

3x10:; 

2x10 

2x10 

-7 

-9 

9x10 

1x10 -6 

1x10 

-7 

4x10 -5 

3x10 

-5 

-7 

2x1o_7 

1x10 

,ble I 

Column 

Water 

(w/ml) 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

-3 

3xlo_4 

4xl0_4 

3x10 

2x10 -3 

2x10 

-3 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

-3 

2xlo_3 

2x10 

'Xl0 -3 

1x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

3x101,' 

~x'O_~ 

8x10 

9x10 

-3 

8x10 

-3 

-2 

3x1o_3 

6x10 

3x10 

-3 

3x10:3 

9x10 

9x10 

-4 

lx10 -3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

9x10 

-4 

6x10-' 

8xlb;; 

2xlo_l 

2x10 

3x10 

-3 

5x10 

-3 

-r 

Column I 

Air 

(p/ml) 

8x101; 

6x10 

-8 

2xlo_g 

3x10 

2x10:; 

2xl0_g 

;"x;g-10 

-12 

2x10-12 

9x10 

-9 

2xl0_g 

5x10 

-8 

2x1qg 

lxlo_g 

,";;;-I0 

-8 

2xlo_8 

2x10 

-9 

~x'O_~ 

5x10 

4x10 

-8 

-9 

4xl0_7 

2xlo_8 

3x10 

2x10 

-8 

3x10:; 

7x'O_,O 

3x10 

'xl0 -8 

8x10 

-9 

-9 

6x'O_,0 

3x10 

4x10 -8 

5x10:; 

1x10 

lx10 

-6 

-9 

8~10_~ 

4x10 

'able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(UC/ml) 

-4 

4xl0_4 

3x10 

-5 

Bx'O_~ 

8x10 

-4 

lxlo_4 

1x10 

-5 

lxlo_5 

1x10 

-5 

6xlq5 

7xlo_4 

4x1o_4 

4x10 

-5 

~xIO_~ 

8x10 

-5 

4x10 

4x10 

-5 

-5 

9x1o_5 

9x10 

-5 

3x1o_5 

3xlo_4 

3x1o_4 

3x10 

-4 

9x1o_4 

2x1o_4 

lxlo_4 

1x10 

3x'O 

-5 

3x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

3xlo-5 

2x1o-4 

3x10;; 

7x10 

7x10 

-3 

1x10 

-4 

2xlo-4 

See footnotes at end of table. 324 

Revised: February 9. 1966 
STANDARDS FOR RAOlATlON PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AH) WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) Isotope' 

Sr 89 

Sr 90 

Sr 91 

Sr 92 

Sulfur (16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . s 35 

Tantalum (73) . . . . . . . . . . . Ta 182 

Tecchnetlum (43) . . . . . . . . . Tc 96~ 

Tc 96 

Tc 97m 

Tc 97 

Tc 99~ 

c 99 

Tellurium (52) . . . . . . . . . . 

i 

e 125~ 

To 127 

To 12% 

To 129 

To 131m 

i 

e 132 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column 

Air 

(p/ml) 

3x10 

-8 

-8 

;;;,o-10 

-9 

5x1o_7 

4x10 

3x10 

-7 

-7 

4x1o_7 

3x10_7 

3x10 

-7 

3x10_* 

4x10 

-8 

2x10-5 

8~10_~ 

3x10 

-7 

6~10_~ 

2x10 

-6 

2xlo_7 

2x10 

-5 

1x1o_7 

3x10 

4x10 

-5 

1x10 

-5 

2.10:; 

6~10_~ 

4x1o_8 

4x10 

2x10 

-6 

-7 

9x10 

8x10 

-8 

3x10 

-8 

-6 

5x1o_6 

4x10 

-7 

4x1o_7 

2x10_, 

2xlo_7 

1x10 

1 

-r 

I 

T 

Water 

(~c/ml) 

-4 

3x1o_4 

8x10 

1x10 

-5 

1x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

lx10 

-3 

-3 

2x10_3 

2x10 

2x10 

-3 

8x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

1x1o_1 

4x1o_1 

3x10 

3x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-2 

5x10 

-3 

5x10 

-2 

2x10:; 

2x10 

8x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

-3 

5x10_3 

5x10 

2x10 

-3 

8x10 

-3 

5x10 

-3 

-3 

lxlo_4 

6x10 

2x10 

-2 

2x10 

-2 

2xlo-3 

-3 

lxlo_4 

9x10 

6x10 

-4 

Column 

Air 

(w/ml) 

3xloy 

1x10 

3x10 

-11 

2x10:;" 

2x1q9 

9x1o_8 

2x1o_8 

1x10 

9x10 

-9 

-9 

9x10_9 

q0 

3xlo_6 

lx10 

2x10:", 

8~10_~ 

8x10 

5x10 

-9 

4x10 

-7 

1x10 

-8 

lx10 

-6 

5x10 

-7 

-8 

7xlo_9 

2x10 

-8 

1x1o_9 

lx10 

6x10 

-8 

3x10 

-8 

3x10:; 

1x10 

-7 

2xlo_7 

lx10 

lx10 

-8 

-9 

6~10_~ 

7x10 

4x10 

-9 

Table II 

I Column 2 

Water 

(w/ml) 

-6 

3x10_5 

3x10 

-7 

3x10_5 

4x10 

-5 

7x10-5 

5x10 

-5 

7xlO_5 

6x10 

-5 

~xIO_~ 

3x10_5 

4x10-5 

4x10 

-3 

lxlo_2 

1x10 

lx10 

-4 

5x10 

-5 

4x10 

-4 

2x10 

-4 

-3 

2x10_4 

8x10 

6x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

3x10 

-4 

2x10:44 

2xlo_5 

5x10 

3xlo:: 

2x10 

3x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

-4 

~xIO_~ 

8x10 

6x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

3x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 325 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FOA RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) Isotope' 

Terblw (65' . . . . . . . . . . . . Tb '60 S 

I 

Thallium (81) . . . . . . . . . . . Tl 200 S 

I 

r' 201 S 

I 

rl 202 S 

I 

TI 204 S 

I 

Thorium (90) . . . . . . . . . . . . Th 228 S 

I 

Th 230 S 

I 

Th 232 S 

I 

Th natural S 

I 

Th 234 S 

I 

Thulium (69) . . . . . . . . . . . . Tm 170 S 

I 

Tm 171 S 

I 

Tln (50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sn 113 S 

I 

Sn 125 S 

I 

Tungsten (WoltramI(74) . . W 181 S 

I 

W 185 S 

I 

W 187 S 

I 

Uranlun (92) . . . . . . . . . . . . U 230 S 

I 

U 232 S 

I 

See footnotes at end of table. 326 

T 

Column I 

Air 

(DC/ml) 

1x10 

-7 

3x10 

-8 

3x10;; 

1x10 

2x10:; 

9xl0_7 

~x'O_~ 

2x10 

~x'O-~ 

3x10 

-8 

9x10 

-12 

6x10 

-12 

-12 

2xlO_l' 

3x;:;;; 

3x10 

3x10-1' 

3x10;;' 

6x10 

3x10 

-8 

4x10 -8 

3x10;; 

1x10 

2x10 

-7 

4x10 

-7 

5x10:; 

1x10 

8x10 

-8 

2x10 

-6 

1x10 

-7 

-7 

~x'O_~ 

1x10 

4x10 

-7 

3xlo-7 

3x1o;:g 

lx10 

'xl0 

-10 

3x10 

-I' 

able I 

Column 2 

Water 

(p/ml) 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-2 

7x10 

-3 

9x10 

-3 

5x10;; 

4x10 

2x1o-3 

3xlo-3 

2x10 

-3 

2x10:; 

4x10 

-5 

5xlo_4 

9x10 

-5 

5xl0_3 

10 

6x10 

-5 

6x10;; 

5x10 

5x10:; 

lx10 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-2 

'xl0 

-2 

-3 

2xlo_3 

2x10 

-4 

5xlo_4 

5x10 

lx10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

4x10 

-3 

3x10:; 

2x10 

2x10;: 

1x10 

1x10 

-4 

~xIO-~ 

~xIO-~ 

-IColumn I 

Air 

(',&ml' 

3x10:; 

'xl0 

-8 

9xtqg 

4x10 

7x10 

-8 

3xlo-8 

3X10-J 

8x10 

2xlo-8 

-10 

',$13 

2x10 

-13 

-14 

y;;-13 

-12 

{X-l2 

10 

-12 

lo-l2 

2x10:; 

10 

1x10 

-9 

1x10 

-9 

4x10 

-9 

8x10 

-9 

-8 

lxlO_g 

2xlo_g 

4x10 

3x10 

-9 

8x10 

-8 

4x10 

-9 

3x10:; 

4x10 

-8 

2xlo_8 

'xl0 

;:;$i 

3x'O_,3 

9x10 

sble II 

Column 2 

Water 

(pc/ml) 

-5 

4x10-5 

4x10 

4x10 

-4 

2x,0:: 

3xl0_4 

2x10 

-4 

lxl0_5 

7x10 

1x10 

-4 

-5 

6x10 

-6 

7x10-5 

10 

-6 

2x10-5 

3x10 

2x10:; 

4x10 

-6 

'O-5 

10 

2xlo-5 

3x10:; 

5x10 

,,I,:: 

5xlo_4 

5x10 

-5 

9X10_) 

8x10 

2x10:; 

2x10 

-4 

4x1q4 

3x10 

-4 

lxlo_4 

'xl0 

-5 

7x10-5 

6x10 

5x10 

-6 

5x10 

-6 

3x10;; 

3x10 

Revised: February 9, I968 
STANDARDS FOR RADlATl0N PROTECTION NTSO-SW APPENOIX 0524 

C0NCENTRATlf.W IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(Sea notes at end of annex) 

Etement (atonIc numbor) 

Vanadium (23) ......... . 

Xenon (54) ............. 

Ytterblun (70) ......... 

Yttrium (39) ........... 

2 :Inc (300) . . . . . . . . . . . ..# Zn 65 

Zlrconlum (40) . . . . . . ..( 

hotop.' 

U 233 

U 234 

u 23s 

u 236 

U 238 

U-natural 

V 48 

Xa I3ln 

X0 I33 

X0 135 

Yb 175 

Y 90 

Y 91m 

Y 91 

Y 92 

Y 93 

Zn 691~ 

Zn 69 

Zr 93 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Sub 

Sub 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

r 

Column I 

Air 

(MC/ml) 

5x10~;~ 

;;;;-I0 

;$i 

lx10 

-10 

6X'0_10 

::;;I;; 

lX'O_10 

7x10 

6x10;;' 

h'0_8 

6x10 

2x,0:; 

1xlo_6 

4x10 

-7 

7xlo_7 

6~10_~ 

1x1q7 

1x10 

-5 

2x10 

2x10:; 

4x10_* 

5x10_7 

4x10 

3xlo-7 

2x,0:; 

1x10 

lx10 

-7 

6x10:; 

4x10 

3x1o-7 

-6 

7x10 

9x10 

-6 

-7 

1x10 

3xlo-7 

sble I 

Column 2 

Water 

(pc/ml) 

9x10 

-4 

9x10 

-4 

9x10 

-4 

-4 

9xl0_4 

8~10_~ 

8x10 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

1x10 

-4 

9xlo_4 

8x10 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

3x10 

-3 

-3 

3x1o_4 

6xlq4 

6x10 

-1 

lxlO_l 

1x10 

-4 

BxIO_~ 

~xIO_~ 

2x10 

-3 

2x10_* 

8x10 

8x10 

-4 

3x10 

-3 

SXIO 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

-3 

2xlo_2 

5x10 

5x10 

-2 

2x10:; 

2x10 

T 

Column I 

Air 

(~C/lnl) 

2x10-11 

4x10-l2 

2xlO$ 

4x10 

2x1,::; 

4x10 

2x10;:; 

4x10 

3x10:;", 

5rlO_12 

3x10 

2x10 

-12 

6x10 

-9 

2x10:; 

4xlo_7 

3x10 

1x10 

-7 

2xlo-8 

2xlo:g 

4x10 

-9 

3xlo_7 

8x10 

~xIO-~ 

1x10~; 

lxlo_8 

1x10 

lx10 

-8 

6x10 

-9 

5x10 

-9 

-9 

4x10 

2xlo-9 

1x10 

-8 

-8 

lxlo_7 

2x10 

3x10 

-7 

-9 

4x10 

1x10 

-8 

Water 

(uc/mlI 

Table II 

Column 2 

-5 

3x10-5 

3x10 

-5 

3x10-5 

3x10 

-5 

3x10-5 

3x10 

-5 

3x10-5 

3x10 

-5 

4x10-5 

4x10 

2x101; 

3x10 

3x10 

-5 

3x10-5 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

1x10 

-4 

-4 

1x10_, 

2x10 

2x10;: 

3x10 

-3 

3x10-5 

3x10 

3x10;: 

6x10 

-5 

6x10-5 

3x10 

3x10:: 

1x10 

2x10;; 

7x10 

6x10:: 

2x10 

-3 

2xlo_4 

8x10 

8x10 

-4 

See footnotes at end of table. 327 

Rwlred: February 9. 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSD-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

CDNCENTRATlDNS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(SW notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) 1 Isotope’ E 

1 fr 95 S I -7 

1x10-m 

Zr 97 

I 

S 

3x10:; 

1x10 

I 9x10 

-8 

&I ub ilo (S); Insolub IlO (I). 

%ub” means that values g Iven are for submersion 

In an Inflnlte cloud of gaseous material. 

NOTE: In any case where there 1s a mixture In alr 

or water of more than one radlonucl Ide, the I ImltIng values for purposes of this Annex should be 

determlned as follows: 

1. If the Idsntlty and concentration of each 

radlonucl Ida In the mlxturs are known, the I lmitlng 

values should be derived as follows: 

DetermIne, for each radlonucl Ide mixture, the ratlo 

between the quantity present In the mixture and the 

I lmlt otherwlse establlshed In Annex I for the 

speclflc radlonuclldo uhon not In a mlxturo. The 

sum of such ratlos for all the radlonuclldes In the 

mixture may not exceed llln (I.e., Qnlty”). 

EXAMPLE : If radlonucl Ides A, B, and C are 

present In concentrations C , C , and 

the applicable MPC*s, are IJC 

C 

, ‘and MPC 

C’ 

and If 

and MPC 

respectively, then the con&rat ions ’ shal I bi 

llmlted so that the followlng relatlonshlp exists: 

cA % 

C 

+A$1 Gq+-iiiq npc 

C 

2. If either the ldentlty of the concentration 

of any radlonucllde In the mixture Is not known, 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(@ml) 

6x10 

-5 

6x10;; 

2x1q5 

2x10 

the limltlng values for purposes of Annex I shal I 

b0: 

a. For purposes of Table I, Col. l-l X 10 

-12 

b. For purposes of Table I, Col. 2-3 X 10 

-7 

c. For purposes of Table II, Cal. l-4 X 10 

-14 

d. For purposes of Table II, Col. 2-l X 10 

-5 

3. If any of the condltlons speclfled below are 

met, the Corresponding values speclf led below may 

be used In I leu of those speclfled In paragraph 2 

above. 

a. I f the Identify of each radionucl lde In the 

mixture Is known but the concentrat Ion of one or 

more of the radlonucl Ides In the mixture Is not 

known, the concentration 1 iml t for the mlxture Is 

the I Imlt speclfIed In Annex I for the radlonucl Ide 

In the mixture havlng the lowest concentration 

I Imlt; or 

b. If the ldentlfy of each radlonucl Ida In the 

mixture Is not known, but it Is known that certain 

radlonucl Ides speclfled In Annex I are not present 

In the mixture, the concentration I lmlt for the 

mixture Is the lowest concentration Ilmlt speclfled 

In Annex I for any radlonucl ido which Is not known 

to be absent from the mixture; or 

328 

Revised: February 9. 1968 
STANOARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

-r 

c. Element (atomic number) and isotope 

It It Is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, Po 210. At 211, Ra 

223, Ra 224, Ra 226. AC 227, Rs 228, Th 230, Pa 231, Th 

232, and Th-nat, are not present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

It It Is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, PO 210, Ra 223, Ra 

226. Ra 228, Ra 231, and Th-nat, are not PfeSenf..,..... 

If It is known that Sr 90, Pb 210, Rs 226, Rs 228, are 

not present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known Ra 226 and Ra 228, are not present . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that alpha-emitters and Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, 

AC 227, Ra 228, Pa 230, Pu 241, end 8k 249 are not 

present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It 1s known that alphbaltters and Pb 210, AC 227, Ra 

228 and Pu 241, are not present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that alpha-mltters and AC 227 are not 

present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that AC 227, Th 230, Pa 231, Pu 238, Pu 239, 

Pu 240, Pu 242, and Cf 249, are not present . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If Pa 231, Pu 239, Pu 240, Pu 242 and Cf 249 are not present. 

Tab11 I 

Column I Column 2 Column I Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(pc/ml) (DC/m I 1 (PC/ml 1 (DC/ml) 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

3x1o-9 

3-lo-‘O 

3x10-” 

-12 

3x10i12 

2x10 

9x10 

-5 

6x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

3x10 

-6 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

T 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

1x10 

-10 

1x10 

-11 

1x10 

-12 

;:;I:: 

3xlo-6 

2x10 

-6 

-7 

6~10_~ 

1x10 

. . . . 

ri.. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

4. If the mixture of radlonuclldes consists of 

uranium and Its daughtr products In ore dust 

prior to chemical processing of the uranium ore, 

the values specified below may be used In I IOU of 

those detrmlned In accordance wlth paragraph 1 

above or those speclfled In paragraphs 2 and 3 

above. 

a. For purposes of Table I, Cal. l-i,: 10 

-10 

DC/ml gross alpha activity; or 2.5 X 10 PC/ml 

natural uranlum; or 75 mlcrograms per cubic meter 

or air natural uranium. 

-tt 

For purposes of Tabla I I, Col. 

10 vc/nl 

‘-3-14 

gross alpha actlvlty; or 8 X 10 

PC/ml natural uranium; or 3 mlcrograms per cubic 

motor of air natural uranlm. 

5. For purposes of thls noto, a radlonucl Ids 

may k consldered as not present In a mixture If 

(a) the ratio of the concentratfon of that radlonucl Ido In the mixture (CA) to the concentration 

Ilmlt for that radlonuclldo speclfled In Table II 

of Annex I (MPCA) does not exceed l/10, 

C 

A < 

1 

Ai1.0. MPcA 10 

and (b) the sum of such ratlos for all the 

radlonucl Ides considered as not present In the 

mixture does not exceed l/4. 

329 

Revlsed February 9, 1968 
330 
APPENDIX E 

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-0101-01 

CHAPTER 0101 THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTs~) 

0101-01 General 

011 The Nevada Test Site 

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is a facility provided by the Atomic 

Energy Conmnission and managed by the AEC Nevada Operations Office 

(NV)= The NTS supports the field test programs of the AEC and its 

contractors, the Department of Defense, and others authorized to be 

conducted at the NTS. 

012 The Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) 

The Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) includes AEC, DOD, 

Laboratory, contractor, agency and organizational personnel who 

participate in, or provide support for, test operations at the Nevada 

Test Site (NTS). The Manager, NV, as the Site Manager, heads the 

NTSO (see Appendix "A"). 

0101-02 Organizational Concept and Policies 

021 Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) 

The Nevada Test Site Organization is a continuing task organization 

whose composition may be readily changed in response to the needs and 

technical objectives of the test program. 

022 The NV staff, for the Manager, provides for the approval and 

coordination of program proposals, approvals for project support, 

funding and/or authority for financial agreement, legal counsel, 

contract authority and administration, engineering, accounting, 

classification and security policy and guidance, safety policy and 

guidance, environmental safety analyses, industrial relations, and 

public information policy to the NTSO. 

023 Test execution shall conform to statutory, regulatory, and other 

responsibilities in accordance with delegations to the Manager, NV, 

by the General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission. 

024 Technical users 

of their scient 

readiness. 

are allowed maximum technical 1 

ific programs and are responsib 1 

331 Revised . 

. 

atitude in the conduct 

e for their technical 

March 30, 1972 
THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTS~) NTSO-0101-025 

025 

026 

0101-03 

031 

032 

033 

034 

035 

036 

037 

038 

User groups may be assigned areas in which to conduct their 

operations and exercise technical control subject to operational site 

coordination and control exercised by the Site Manager or, during a 

Test Execution Period, the Test Controller. 

The Site Manager, NTS, has the authority to approve or disapprove the 

field execution of tests that have been approved by Headquarters AEC. 

During the Test Execution Period, authority to proceed with or postpone the field execution of approved activities or tests is delegated 

to the Test Controller in accordance with his Delegation of Authority 

from the Manager, NV. 

Responsibilities 

The Site Manager is responsible for administering the NTS, for all 

preparations required for the safe execution of programs and projects 

at the NTS and for providing construction and logistic support 

services and facilities required to support the technical users. 

The Test Controller is responsible to the Manager, NV, for the 

conduct of those experiments and test events in the testing program 

to which he is assigned by the Manager, NV. 

The Deputy, Military Matters (Director, Test Directorate, FCDNA), 

serves as deputy for the Site Manager on operational, administrative 

and support matters pertaining to all DNA activities. 

The Scientific Manager's Advisory Panel is chaired by a Scientific 

Advisor designated by the Manager, NV, as nominated by the technical 

user. Members of the panel provide advice on matters relative to onand off-site safety. 

The Test Group Directors (TGD) are assigned by the scientific sponsor 

to direct the fielding and technical aspects of experiments and 

tests. He reports to the Test Controller on operational matters 

relating to test execution. 

The Director, Logistics Support, is responsible for the direction and 

control of construction and logistical support activities at the NTS 

and during Test Execution Periods, supports the Test Controller 

directly in the field execution of experiments and test events. 

The Director, Operational Support, aided by the Operations Control 

Group and Special Staff assigned from NV as required, provides 

advice, assistance and serves as principal operations coordinator for 

the Site Manager and during the Test Execution Period, as Director of 

Operations for the Test Controller. 

The Control Point Coordinator assures the availability in the OCC of 

facilities and equipment for the control and coordination of NTS 

operational activities. 

332 Revised: March 30, 1972 
THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTSO) NTSO-0101-039 

039 The Test Operations Officer supervises the preparation of the Test 

Controller's operation and security plan and other required plans as 

directed. He coordinates preparations for the test execution and 

forward area support. During the Test Execution Period, he assists 

the Director of Operations in supervising and coordinating execution 

of the operations and security plan as directed by the Test 

Controller. 

040 The Test Liaison Officer provides oral communication of test-related 

operational information from the operational control point (NTS) to 

NV and the Test Operations Center (TOC) AEC HQ during the Test 

Execution Period. 

041 The FCDNA, Test Construction Division, is responsible for directing 

DOD furnished support. 

042 The Technical Program Groups consist of organizational units and 

staff to satisfy the program objectives of their parent 

organizations. 

333 Revised: March 30, 1972 
334 
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ATTN: GC 

ATTN: PA0 

5CYS ATTN: RARP 

25CYS ATTN: TITL 

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2 CYS ATTN: DD 

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40 CYS ATTN: FCLS 

100 CYS ATTN: FCLS MAJ J STINSON 

ATTN: TDTT W SUMMA 

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ATTN: ICAF-ICC 

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