### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00207- CR

Da nie l R ayM e nde z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 274TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 2001- 114, HO NORAB LE DON B . MO RGAN, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant Daniel Ray Mendez g uilty of ag g ravated assault and asse ssed punishment, enhanc ed by a previous felony conviction, at imprisonment for twe nty y ear s. See T e x. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02 (West Supp. 2005). Mendez contends that he was de nied hi s ri g ht to a speedy trial, his retrial f

ollowing a

n ear lier mistrial constituted double jeopar dy , and his punishment
wa s u n l aw fu l l y

en h an ce d
. W e w i l l re m an d fo r an ew p u n i s h m en th ea ri n g. Speedy T rial I n p oin t of

e rr or fo ur , M e nd e z c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld h a ve g ra

nte d h is motion to dismiss for want of a spee dy trial. See U
. S
. C o n s t
. a m e n d s . V I, X IV ; T e x . C o n s t
. art
. I, § 1 0; Barker v . W

ingo , 4 07 U. S. 5 14 (1 97 2) ; Hu ll v . S tate , 699 S.W .2d 220, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Appellate revie w of a trial court’s decision to gr ant or de ny a spee dy trial claim is conducte d2

de novo. J

oh ns on v . S

tate , 954 S.W .2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). I n conductingthis review, we ba lance four f

actor s: leng th of delay , rea son for de lay , asser tion of the right, and pre

judice to the
acc used. Barker , 4 07 S.W. 2d a t 53 0; Johnson , 954 S.W .2d at 771. Length of delay

Th e le ng th of de lay is me a sure d fr om the date the de fe nd ant w a s arr e ste d o r f or ma lly char g ed. Ri v e ra v . S

tate , 990 S.W .2d 882, 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref ’d). Me ndez was
arr ested on Mar ch 6, 2001, and he was indicted two months later. He ha s been in c ontinuous custody since his ar

rest. Mende z’s moti on to dismi ss for wa nt of a spee dy trial was ove rruled on F ebrua ry 20, 2003. His first trial beg an on F ebrua ry 24 and ende d in a mistrial two day s l ater . The sec ond trial, which re sulted in this conviction, bega n on May 19, 2003. As the State c on c e de s, the tw e nty -t hr e e -m on th d e lay

in t his c a us e is s uf fi c ie nt t o tr ig g e r a fu ll Barker analy sis. See D oggett v. United States , 5 05 U. S. 6 47 , 6 51 -5 2 ( 19 92 ). B e c a us e the de lay str e tc he d w e ll b e y on d th e min imum ne e d e d to tr ig g e r t he inq uir y , th is f a c tor we ig hs he a vil y ag ainst the State. Zam oran o v . S tate , 84 S.W .3d 643, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Reason for delay

I t appea rs that Mende z was first schedule d to be tried o n No v em b er 19, 2001. O n No v em b er

1 6 , M en d ez ’s co u n s el fi l ed a m o t i o n fo r c o n t i nu an ce b as edo na c o n fl i ct i n g t ri al s et t i n g. Although no a ction on the motion is i ndicated in the r ecor d, Mendez was not tried as sc heduled. On A p r i l 2 3 , 2 0 0 2 , M e n d e z f i l e d a m o t i o nf o r s p e e dy t r i a l a s k i n g f

o r a p r o mp tt r i a l s e t t i n g . T w o d ays later, the State fi l ed a m o t i o n fo r continuance on the g round that it had bee n unable to locate the3

complainant and a

nother witness. The motion was g rante d and the c ause w as re set for Aug ust 2002. A fe w day s befor e the August trial setting, Mende z’s attorney was a llowed to withdr aw d u e t o a
c on fl ic t of

int e re st a nd ne w c ouns e l w a s a

pp oin te d. Me nd e z wa s n ot t ri e d as sch e du le d, bu t it

is
un c le ar w he the r t

he c a se sim

ply wa s n ot r e a c he d o r i f n e w c ouns e l a sk e d f or a dd iti on al ti me to prepa re. The next t rial setting was January 27, 2003. On th at d at e, t h e S t ate r equeste d another contin u ance , ag ain citing its inabili ty to secure the pre sence of its witnesses. Def ense c ounsel responde d by

filing Me ndez’s motion to di smiss f or wa nt of a spee dy

trial. The c ourt g rante d the State a fur ther c ontinuance a

nd schedule d a hear ing on Mendez’s motion to dismiss for F ebrua ry 20. After the motion to dis miss was overr uled, Mende z’s first trial beg an on F ebrua ry 24. Mendez does not contend that the delay betwee n Marc h 2001, when he wa s arr ested, and Apr il 2002, when the State was gra nted i ts first continuance , was unjust ified. This ac counts for over ha lf of the total dela

y betwee n the time of arr est and the start of the f irst trial. Of the r emaining te n mo nths, five are a ttr ibuta ble to t he State ’s re qu e ste d c on tin ua nc e s d ue to t he a bs e nc e of its witnesses. I t has bee n held t hat t he absence of a witness is a valid rea son for de lay and should not be held a g ainst the State. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 531
. Th e po stp on e me nt of tr ia l fr om Au g us t 20 02 to J anuar y 2003 is attributable, at lea st in part, to the chang e in def ense c ounsel. Thu s , m o s t of the delay in Mendez’s trial is ei t h er unchalleng ed or justifiable. This we ighs a g ainst a finding of a constitutional viol ation.
Ass e rtion o

f righ t Mendez asser

ted hi s rig ht to a speedy trial in April 2002, and reasser ted it in J anuar

y 2003. This weig hs in his favor. Zamorano , 84 S.W .3d at 651-52.4

Prejudice T h e s p e e dy tr ia l a c t s e r

v e s to p r e v e n t o p p r e s s iv e p r e tr ia l i n c arc era tion, mi n im iz e anxiety resulting from the pe nding c harg es, and limit t h e p o ssible impairment of the def ense. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 2. Al tho ug h M e nd e z wa s c on tin uo us ly inc arc e rate d f

oll ow inghis arr e st, it
wa s und isp ute d b e low

tha t he wa s a ls o bei ng hel d on a pa ro le re vo c a tio n w arr ant a nd thu s w ou ld have be e n in

c us tod y in a ny case . Men de z of

fe re d n o e vid e nc e of

a c tua l pr e

jud ic e to t

he de fe ns e resulting from the de lay

of hi s t ri al. In his brief, he asser ts that anx iety

and pre judice should be i n fer red me rely

from the f

act of the delay
. See Zamorano , 8 4 S. W. 3 d a t 6 5 4
. O n th is rec ord, the prejudice prongaff

ords Mende z sl ight support at best.
Bal anc ing Two of th e fa c tor s— the le ng th o f d e lay

and the a sse rt ion

of ri g ht— we ig h in Mendez’s fa

vor. One fac tor—rea son for the de lay —weig hs ag ai n s t a finding of a c onstitut ional violation. The rema ining f actor —prejudice —is essentially neutra l on this r ec o rd
. I n light of the justification for most of the delay , we conclude that, on balanc e, Mendez’s constitutional speedy trial rig ht was not violated. Point of error four is over

ruled. Double Jeopardy The fir st trial of this cause e nded in a mistrial on Mendez’s motion. I n points of error two and thre e, Men d ez u rges that double jeopardy principles bar

red his re trial. See U. S. Co ns t.
a me nd s. V, XIV; Te x. Con st. art
. I , § 14
. Un de r the F if th Am e ndme nt, a de fe nd ant who su c c e ssf ull y moves for a mistrial c annot be retrie d if the mistrial moti on was prompted by prosec utorial conduc t5

“intended to ‘g oad’ the defe ndant into moving for a mistrial.” Oregon v . Kennedy , 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982). Unde r the Te x as Constitut ion, retrial is also bar red if the prosec utor “wa s awa re [o f] bu t c on sc iou sly

dis re g ard e d th e ri sk

tha t an o bje c tio na

ble e ve nt f

or wh ic h he wa s r e sp on sib le wo uld require a mistrial at t he def endant’ s reque st.” Ba ud

e r v . S tate , 921 S.W .2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Trial and a ppellate c ourts analy

zing a double je opardy

mistrial cl ai m must make a thr e e -p art ana ly sis : (1 ) wa s the mis tr ia l pr ov ok e d by manif e stl y imp ro pe r p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t, (2 ) w a s th e pr e

jud ic e re su lti ngfr om t

he mis c on du c t inc ur a

ble , and (3 ) did

the pr os e c uto r e ng a g e in the mis c on du c t w iththe int e nt to g oa d the de fe nd a nt int o re qu e sti nga

mis tr ia l ( Kennedy ) or with a conscious disreg ar d fo r a s ubstantial risk that a mistrial would be re quired ( Bauder). Ex

pa rte Peterson , 117 S.W .3d 804, 816-17 (Tex
. Crim. App. 2003). The burden of proof is on the de fenda nt to p ro ve his Kennedy

/ Bauder claim by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id
. a t 81 8. Ap pe llate c ourt s defe r to the trial cour

t’s finding s of fa ct but revie w de novo those mix ed questions of law a nd fac t that do not depend upon c redibility and deme anor. Id . at 819. The re levant fa cts are not disputed. I n J anuar y 2002, a y ear

befor e Mende z’s first trial beg an, the pr osecutor the n handling the ca se sent a le tter to the attorne y then re prese nting Me ndez notify ing him that the State intende d to use Mendez’s pre vious felony co n victions to enhance punishment. Se e Br oo k

s v . S tate , 957 S.W .2d 30, 33-34 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997) (re quired notice of previous convic tions to be used for e nhance ment need not be given in indictment). A newattorney
wa s app oin te d to re pr e se nt M e nd e z in Augus t 20 02 , a nd ne w p ro se c uto rs we re a ssi g ne d to the c a se in J anuar y 2003. Whe n t ri al beg an in Fe bruar y 2003, both sides voir dired the jury panel on the6

rang e of punishment for

an unenha

nced se cond deg ree felony . Two day s later, just befor e testimony
was to be g in, the prosec utors broug ht the J anuar y 2002 letter to the attention of def ense c ounsel and said that the State would be se eking an enha nced punishment. De fense counsel moved f or a mistrial on the g round that he had been denied an opportunity to question the potential jurors re g ardingthe highe r ra ng e of punishment. The motion was g rante d. We hold that Mendez did not demonstrate by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that his mistrial motion wa s provoked by manifestly improper prosec utorial misconduct. At the hea ring on the motion, the prosecutor s informed the c ourt that they had discove red the notice letter only that morning just before speakingto de fense counsel and they pointed out that the State had also fa iled to voir dire the jury

panel on the hig her r ang e of punishment. In short, the re cord r efle cts that, like defe nse counse l, the prosecutors di d not timely discover the notice letter that was in the re cord a nd
wer e not attempting to sandbagthe def ense. F urthermor e, the unfairness to the de fense perc eived by the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld have be e n c ur e d sh or t of a mis tr ia l. T he c ourt

c ou ld h a ve sim

ply re fu se d to submit t he enha

nced punishment ra

ng e to the jury , but it was not asked to do so. F inally , there is no evidenc e that the jury

selec tion process, the only part of the trial that had be en conduc ted bef ore the mistrial was dec lare d, had g one badly for the State so a s to support an infer ence that the prosec utors
wer e deliber ately

or re cklessly

courtinga mistrial by

announcingthat they

intended to see k an enhanc ed punishment. Points of error two a nd three are overr

uled.
Enha nc e ment P

ro c e dure The State’s only

punishment witness was a police office r who identified appe llant’s fing erpr ints in t he penitentiar y rec ords introduce d by

the State to prove Me ndez’s two previous7

nonsequential fe lony

convictions. After the S tate rested, defense counsel broug ht it to the court’s attention that Mendez had not e ntere d his ple a to the enhanc ement alleg ations. When the court said, “We’ll just

d o it n o w , ” M e n d e z o b

je c te d th a t i t w a s to o la

te an d a s k e d th e c o u rt f

o r a “ d ir e cted verdic t . . . that this enhance ment provi s i o n i s n o t ap plicable.” The objec tion and motion were
overr uled, the State re ad the enhanc ement alleg ations, and Mendez enter ed his plea of not true befor e the ju ry . T h e o ff

i cer ’s testimony

was not re offe red or

stipulated. Mendez now contends that the
e vid e nc e pr op e rl y

be fo re the jur

y do e s n ot s up port th e ju ry ’s fi nd ingthat he ha d b e e n p re vio us ly convicted. I t has long been the rule that the re ading of the e nhance ment alleg ations and the e ntry of the de fenda

nt’s plea ther eon ar e mandatory , and that no issue is joined betwee n the S tate and the defe ndant with respe ct to the def endant’ s prior cr iminal recor d if this is not done. Tur ne r v . S tate , 8 9 7 S
. W
. 2 d 7 8 6 , 7 8 8 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 19 95 ); W elch v . S tate , 6 45 S.W. 2d

28 4, 28 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1983). When, as he re, the err or is discovere d afte r the State rests at the punishment stag e, the
corr ect proce dure is to allow the State to r eopen, r ead the enhanc ement alleg ations, take the ple a, and reintroduc e or stipulate the pr eviously introduced e vidence
. W

elch , 645 S.W .2d at 285. I t is error to pe r mi t t h e ju r y to c o n s id e r

e n h an c e me n t e v id e n c e a dmi tt e d b e f o r e th e e n tr

y o f th e d e f endant’ s plea. Id
. T h e S t a t e u r g e s t h a t M e n d e z f a i l e d t o p r e s e r

v e t h i s m a t t e r f

o r r e v i e w b y f

a i l i n g to object to t h e o ff

i ce r’s testimony

when it was of

fer ed. We disag ree . W

elch makes it clea

r that an obje c ti o n a t an y p o in t d

u r in g th e p e n a lt

y s ta g e is s u f

f ic ie n t to p r e s e r

v e th e e r r o r an d require the
corr ective a ction presc ribed in that opinion. And more r ece ntly , the cour t of criminal appea ls has8

held that when, a s here , the enhanc ement alleg ations are not c ontained in the indictment, the failure to rea d t h em at t h e s tart of the pe nalty stag e does not put the de fenda nt on notice that “the proce eding s may

have g one amiss” a

nd thus no objection i s require d at t hat time. Ma rsh all v . S tate , No. PD-2016-04, 2006 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 360, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2006).

The failure to timely rea d the enhanc ement alleg ations and take Mendez’s plea was broug ht to the attention of the trial court a nd the State at a time whe n it was possible to corre ct the
e rr or . A t th a t po in t, the State wa s o bli g a te d to e ith e r a ba nd on the e nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio ns or to
corr ect the e rror

in the manner

presc ribed in W

elch . Although the State belatedly rea d the enhanc ement alleg ations and Mende z entered his plea , the State fa iled t o re o ff er its evidence as
r e qu i r e d b y W elch
. We hold that Mendez did all that was require d to preser ve this err or for

appea l
an d t h a tn o f u rt h e r o b j e c t i o nw a s n e c e s s ar

y. I n Turner , the cour

t held that harmless e rror

analy sis was inapplicable to error of the sort prese nted her e. Turner , 897 S.W .2d at 789. The c ourt has since held, howeve r, that except for a narrow gr oup of federa l constitutional err ors, no err or i s cate g orica lly immune to a har mless error analy sis. C

a i n v . Stat e , 947 S.W .2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (over ruling “any

other decision [that] conflicts with the p rese nt opinion”). We theref ore turn to the que stion of whether Mendez’s substantial rig hts were aff ecte d. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(b). The only evidenc e that Mendez had been pre viously convicted w as introduce d befor e h e e n t e r e d

h i s p l e a t o t h e e n h an c e m e n ta l l e g a t i o n s . T h i s e v i d e n c e w a s n o tp r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e j u r y, and it is clear

that the j ury ’s consideration of this evidence for the pur pose of e nhance ment harme d Mendez. W

elch , 645 S.W .2d at 285. Be cause there was no prope rly admitted evidenc e to support9

the e n h an c e me n t a ll e g a ti o n s , th e ju r y s h o u ld h a v e li mi te d it s d e li b e r a ti o n s to the ra ng e of punishment applicable to a n unenhanc ed sec ond deg ree felony : two to twenty y ear s. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 12.33 (West 200 3 ). Al t h o u gh the punishment assessed w as within that rang e, we cannot a ssume that the jury was uninfluenc ed by

the first deg ree fe lony

punishment rang e it was imp r o p e r l y a

u t h o r i z e d t o a

p p l y . W e ar e n o t s a t i s f

i e d t h a t t h e j u r

y w o u l d h a v e a s s e s se d th e sa me twenty -y ear

punishment had it known that this wa s the maximum applicable penalty . We theref ore
c on c lud e that th e e rr or

a ff e c te d a su bs tanti a l r ig ht. Be cause the er

ror r elates to punishment only , we will re verse and re mand for a new punis hme nt d e te rm inatio n. Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . Ann . a rt . 4 4. 29 (b ) ( Wes t Su

pp . 2 00 5) . We no te that the er

ror doe s not have double je opardy implications and the State m ay seek a n enhanc ed punishment upon remand. W elch , 64 5 S.W. 2d

a t 28 6; se e Be ll v . S

tate , 9 9 4 S. W. 2 d

1 7 3 , 1 7 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1999).

T h e j u d gm en t i s re v er s ed an d t h e cau s e is re m an d ed fo r a ne w pu n i s h m en th ea ri n g.

____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Reverse d and Remande d Filed: May

4, 2006 Pub lis h