Supreme Court No. 2019

- 191

- Appeal. (PC 13

- 6459)

Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of the Estate of George N. Laprocina :

v. : Nicole C. Lourie et al

. :

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Teleph one (401) 222

- 3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov , of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. May 26, 2021- 1

- Supreme Court No. 2019

- 191

- Appeal. (PC 13

- 6459)

Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of the Estate of George N. Laprocina :

v. : Nicole C. Lourie et al

. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson , and Lynch Prat a, JJ.

O P I N I O N
Ju s tice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on April 6, 2021, on appeal by the plaintiff, Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of the Estate of George N. Laprocina, 1 from a Superior Court jud gment in favor of the defendant, T he Narr agansett Electric Company (Narragansett ) , following the grant of Narragansett ’ s motion for summary

1 George Lapro cina died on October 12, 2016, and his estate was substituted as the plain t iff on March 31, 2017. For the s ake of clarity, we will refer to Georg e Laprocina by his first name. No disrespect is intended.- 2

-

judgment

. 2 On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that (1) the trial justice abused her discretion by granting Narragansett’s motion for summary judgme n t after ,

a ccordi ng to the plaintiff, ano t her justice of the Superior Court had denied essentially the same motion ; (2) Narragansett had a duty to maintain and repair streetlights ; and (3) question s of fact remained as to whether Narragansett w as neglig ent and wheth e r it had actual or construc tiv e knowledge of the malfunctioning streetlight . For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court

. Facts and Travel The facts before us are tragic. On December 30, 2 010 , Geor ge Lap rocina was walking a c ross Allens Av enue at the int ersection of Toronto Avenue in Providence , Rhode Island , when he was struck by a motor vehicle operated by defendant Nicole Lourie and owned by defendant Christine Lourie . The front passenger side of the vehicle i mpacted Geor g e , causing his head to st rike the

2 While there were other defendants named in the amended complaint in this case

— namely, Nicole C. L ourie ; Christine M. Lourie ; the City of Providence (the city) by and through its Treasurer James J. Lombardi, III, in his official capacity ; the State of Rhode Island (the stat e) ; Verizon ; John Doe A, B, and C ; and Doe Corporation No. 1 and No. 2

— only The Narragansett Electric Compa ny is involved in the appeal before this Court

. We pause to note that the collision giving rise to this claim occurred over ten years ago, and the injured plaintiff has since passed away ; however, the case has been pending in the Superior Court against the Louries, the city, the state, and the John Doe defendants since 2013 . We are directing that the case be resolved in a timely manner once the papers are returned to the Superior Court.- 3

-

passenger side windshield. Geo rge suffered multiple bodily fractures, severe head
trauma , and permanent brain damage

. In 2013, plaintiff commenced a negligence action in the Superior Court , and later filed an amen ded co m pla in t alleg ing , inter alia , that the area where the collision occu r red was not properly illuminated at the time of the incid ent beca use Narragansett a l lowed a “rolling black out” to occur or failed to repair, replace, and maint ain the st reetlights in the a rea, which created a dangerous condition to pedestrians

. On October 22, 2014, Narragansett filed its initial motion for su mmary ju dgment , arguing that it owed no duty o f c are to George because its duty to maintain the stree tlights in the area of the inc i dent i s governed by a tariff approved by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission ( the PUC streetlight tariff ), which , N arragansett maintained, limit s any duty owed by Narragansett regarding
i t s rendered servi ces solely to its customer

— the City of Pro v idence (the city )

. See R.I.P .U.C. No. 2031

- A. The PUC streetlight tariff contains a disclaimer of liability , which states that Narragansett’s “duties and obligations under this tariff

e xtend only to the [city] , and not to a ny third parties

. [Narragansett ] * * * specifically disclaims any liabi lity to third parties arising out of [Narragansett] ’s obliga tions to [ the city] under this section.” Id

. at Sheet 6.- 4

-

A hearing on the motion for summary j udgment was held on February 9,
2016 . The trial justice denie d Narragansett’s motion , finding that the liability
disc laime r contained in th e PUC streetlight tariff was overly br oad in abs olving Narragansett of liabilities in all situations

— to wit , even in cases of willful or wanton miscond uct

— and was therefore contr a ry to public policy and not
enforceable

. More than two y ears later , Narr agansett filed a second motion for summary judgment based on n ew grounds and a purported ly expanded record . Narragansett argued that, under principles of common law negligence and c ontract la w , it had no duty to George to maintain t he st r eetlight in question

. A hearing on Narragansett ’ s second motion for summary judgment was held befo re a different trial justice. Th e second trial justice determined t hat the issue before her tu rned on a common law duty analysis and , after analyzing the factors outlined in the seminal case of Banks v. Bowen’s Land i ng Corp. , 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987 ), 3 she c o nclud ed that

3 The Banks factors include:

“(1) the foreseeability of h arm to the p l aintiff, (2) the degree of certa i n ty t hat the plaintiff suffered an i njury, (3) the closeness of connection between the defendant ’ s conduct a nd the i njury suffered, (4) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the defendan t and the consequences to the com m u nity for im posing a duty to exercis e care with resulting liability for bre ach.” Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Co rp. , 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987)

.- 5

-

Narragansett did not o we a duty of care to George

. T he second trial justice ente r ed an order granting N arragansett’s motion for summary judgment on February 20, 2019 , and defendant sought and received a judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Super ior Court Rules of Civil P rocedure ; final judgment entered i n favor of Narraganset t on March 18, 201 9

. The plaintiff timely appealed from that ju dgment

. Standard of Review This Court reviews a trial justice’ s grant of su mmary judg ment de novo

. Ballard v. SVF Foundation , 181 A. 3d 27, 34 (R.I. 2018). “Although summary judgment is recog n ized as an extreme remedy, to avoid summary judgment the burden is on the nonmoving party to produce competent ev i d ence that pr oves the

e xistence of a dis puted i ssue of material fact.” Id

. (brackets and deletion omitted) (quoti ng Sullo v. Greenberg , 68 A

. 3d 404, 40 7 (R.I. 2013)). We, like the trial justice, “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if we conclude th at there are no gen uin e issues of material fa c t and that the moving party is enti tled to judgment as a matte r of law, we will affirm the judgment.” Id

. (brackets omitted) (quoting Sullo , 68 A.3d at 406

- 07). Law of the Case Doctrine
W e first address plainti ff’s argumen t tha t, un der the law of the case doctrine, the second trial justice abused her discretion in gr a nting summary judgment after the first summary -

judgment motion had been denied

. We reject this contention.- 6

-

“The law of th e case doctrine provides that, ‘after a j udge h as decided an interlocu t ory matter in a pending suit, a sec ond j udge, confronted at a l ater stage of the suit with the same question in the identical manner, should refrain from disturbing the first ruling.’” L ynch v. Spirit Rent

-

A

- Ca r, Inc. , 965 A. 2d 417, 424 (R.I. 2009) (quoti n g Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A. , 84 4 A.2d 666, 677 (R.I.
20 0 4)). However, the law of the case doctrine “is a flexible rule” and “may be disregarded when a subsequent ruling can be based on an expanded recor d.” Id

. (quo t ing Chave rs , 844 A.2d at 677). “ When presented with an expanded rec o rd, it is within the trial justice’s sound discretion whether to consider the issue.” Felkner v. Rhode Island College , 203 A.3d 433, 44 5 (R.I. 2 0 19) (quoting Ferguson v. Mars hall Contr ac tors, Inc. , 745 A.2d 147, 152 (R. I . 2000)). In 2014, Narragansett mo v ed for summary judgment on t he basis that it was immune from liability pursuant to the liability disclaimer contained in the PUC streetlight tar i ff

. The trial justice denied that moti on bas ed on a de termination that the liability disclaimer was void as against pu blic policy because it absolved Narragansett of all liability with respect to third parties . Nearly four years after the filing of its first motion for summary judgment , Narraganse tt filed a second motion , on different ground s from the first, claiming it had n o common law d u ty or contractual duty to repair the streetlight

. As such, the second trial justice was confronted with what could be chara cte r ized as a different question that requir ed a- 7

-

separate analysis

. See Lynch , 96 5 A.2d at 424 (holding that law of the case doctr i ne did not preclude con sideration of a second motion for summary judgment that was based on new arguments and an expanded record). Because the recor d reveals that d iffer ent , although closely connected, argumen t s were raised and considered on each summary

- judgment motion, we are satisfied that the judgment in this case was not iss ued in con travention of the law of the case doctrine. 4 Duty The primary issue on appea l is narrow: whether Narragansett owed a lega l duty to George , a pedestrian , t o maintain t h e streetlight in question. To properly assert a claim for negligence, “a plai ntiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed b y a defendant to a plaintiff, a bre ach o f that duty, proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting in jury, and th e actual loss or damage.” Ouch v. Khea , 9 63 A.2d 630, 63 3 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Selwyn v. Ward , 879 A .2d 882, 8 86 (R.I. 2005) ) . “A l though complaints sounding in negligence generally are not amenable to summary judgment and should be

re s olv ed by fact findin g at the tri al court, the existence of a duty is a question of law.” Berard v. HCP, Inc. , 64 A.3d 1215 , 1218 (R. I. 2013); see Ouch , 9 63 A.2d at 633 ( noting that whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty o f care “is a question

4 On the other hand, because whether a duty exists is always a question of l aw i n a negligence action, th e second trial justi c e cou ld have re asonably concluded that th is question shoul d have been raise d in the first summary

- judgment m otion ; b ut it was nonetheless within her discretion to reach the issue

.- 8

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of law to be determined by t h e court ” ). To survive summa ry judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is owed a legal duty by the defen dant befor e t hey

are “ entitled to a factual determination on each of the remaining elements: breach, causation, and d amages.” O u ch , 963 A

. 2d at 633. In the abs ence of a legal duty,

“ the trier of fact has nothing to consider ” and the grant of summary j udgment is
proper. Be r

ard , 64 A.3d at 1218 (quoting Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc. , 968 A.2d 271, 274 (R. I. 2009))

. The plaintiff arg ues t h at Narragansett’s duty to repair and maintain
stre etlights ext e nds to individual members of the public . The plaintiff first asserts that the PUC streetlight tariff and the city ’ s ordinances establish this d u ty

— particularly, the city’s duty to repo rt inop e rable streetligh ts to Narragansett and Narragans ett’s duty to replace them . The plaintiff cl aims that there is a “concerted partnership” between the city and Narragansett to report and rep air streetlights

. O nce the PUC adopts a tariff, it beco mes the s t andard for det ermining the duties and obligati ons between a regulated public utility and its customer. 5 See G.L. 1956 §§ 39

- 1

- 3 and 39

- 3

- 10 . Narragansett provided streetlight s ervices to the

5 The PUC is vested with “ the exclusive power and authority to supervise, regulate, and make o r ders governing the conduct of companies offering to the publ ic” ser vices such as streetlight ing. General Laws 1 956 § 39

- 1

- 1(c). We have recognized that this provision “represent[s] a cl ear legislative intent to gran t the commission broad powers as it seeks to e stabl ish a system of rates which will be just and equitable to all concerned including th e u tili ty and i ts customers.” Rhode Island Chamber of Com merce Federation v. Burke , 443 A. 2d 1236, 1237 (R.I. 1982).- 9

-

city pursuant to the PUC streetlight tariff that gover ns the te r ms of service,
i nstallation, maintenance, and payment for str e etlight services. S ee R.I.P.U.C. No.
2031

- A

. The tariff provides: “All inoperable lamps which are owned and maintained by [ Narragansett] wi l l be spot replaced. The [city] is responsible for

no t ifying [Na rragansett] of inoperable lamps.” Id

. at Sheet 7. The ta r iff further provides that Narrag ansett’s “duties and obligations under this tariff extend only to the [city], and not to any third parties.” 6 Id

. at Sheet 6.
Un d er the PUC streetlight tar i ff, Narragans ett owes a duty to the city. The tariff does not impose any affirma t ive duty upon Narragansett t o co nduct inspections to ensure the functionality of streetlights. S ignificantly , the tariff plainly p laces the respon s ibility on the city t o not i fy Narraganse tt of inoperable
street lights

. Additionally, even if t he streetligh t at issue was inoperative or
mal functioning at the time of the incident, the city ordinances cited by plaintiff

6 We note , without deciding the validity of t h e dis claimer of liability provision set forth in the PUC st r eet light tariff, that , as declared by the first tri al justice , exculpa tory cl auses th at completely absolve a company of al l liab ility with respect to third parties, even in cases of willful o r wanton misconduct or gross negligence , may n ot co m port with publ ic policy considerations

.- 10

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clearl y pro vide that the ci ty has a duty to inspect streetlig h ts, and not Narragansett. 7
Th e city ordinances and the PUC streetl ight tariff si m ply do not establish a duty of care owed by Narrag ansett to individual pedestrians injured as a result of an inoperable street light. Cf. Wyso v. F ull Moon Tide, L LC , 78 A.3d 747, 751 , 7 52 (R.I. 2013) (holding that an ordinance requiring propert y owners to maint a in an abutting sidewalk does not create a duty to individual passersby).
We now turn to the relevant common law duty factors to determine whe ther Narraganset owed a d uty in this case

. Becaus e we have not yet had the opportunity to addr ess the issue of w hether a utility owes a duty to private individuals to maintain streetlights, we begin by discussing cases from other jurisdictions

c once rning this issue.
A majority o f juris dictions have concluded th at motorists or pedestrians injured in vehicu l ar accidents allegedly caused, at least in part, by inoperative streetlights were not entitled to recover from the utilities that were obligate d to provide t he streetlights. See , e.g. , T urbe v. Government of Virgin Islands , 938 F.2d

7 The P roviden ce Code o f Ordinances, Supp. No. 4 , § 23

- 125 ( July 15, 2019 ) , places a duty upon the city’s public service engineer to inspect electrical fixtures to ensure that they are maintaine d in “ a proper and safe manner and condition , ” and to inform t he ci ty counci l if the public utility fails to repair or maintain them

. Section 23

- 139 require s the chief of polic e to report daily to the city’s public ser vice engineer on city streetlight outages. Moreover, not cited by plaintiff, § 23

- 136 gives the public serv i ce e n gineer “the ge neral control and supervision of all publ ic lights used by the cit y for illum inating i ts streets, highways, par ks and public pla ces.”- 11

-

427, 4 32 , 4 33 (3d Cir. 1991) (holdin g that utility owe d no duty to pedestria n who

was a ssaulte d because inoperable light did not increase risk of harm but rather returned the lighting conditions to th e ir natural state); Estate of Flyg are v. Ogden City , 4 05 P.3d 970, 977 , 9 78 ( Utah Ct. App. 2017) (holding that utility owed no d uty to ped estrian injured in crosswalk to repair inoperable streetlight because the absence of light did not place the plaintiff in a worse positio n than he would have b een if no streetlight wa s ever installed ) ; Blake v. Public Service Co mpany of New
Mexico , 8 2 P.3d 960 , 96 5 , 9 6 6, 967 ( N.M. Ct. App. 2003) ( considering public policy and holding that public utility owed no duty to pe d estrians t o maintain streetlights because failure to repair a stree tlight “does not launch any instrument of harm , given that the darkness of the street is obvious to traveler s and given that there are other methods of seeing in the darkness, i.e., automo b ile headl amps” ); Martinez v. Florida Power & Ligh t Co. , 785 So.2d 1 251, 1252 , 12 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ( holding that util ity owed no duty to pedestrian killed by a mo t or vehicle while crossing a street where streetlight was not functioning ) ; Vaugha n v . Eastern Edison Co mpany , 719 N.E.2d 520, 521 , 523 (Mass. App. Ct. 19 99) ( holding t hat utility owed no duty to pedestrian in jured while in a crosswalk that was unlit due to inopera tive streetlight s); White v. Southern California Edison
Co m p any , 30 Cal. R p tr. 2d 431, 434 , 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ( holding that utility owed no contractual or common law duty to mop ed driver injured in a collision- 12

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that occurred at an intersect i on where s treetlights were not functioning); Shafouk Nor El Din Hamza v. Bo urgeois , 493 So.2d 112, 117 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the “failu re of [the utility] to provide adequate street lighting was at most the deprivation of a benefit; it was not the violat ion of a duty”); Quinn v. Georgia
Power Co. , 180 S.E. 246, 248 ( Ga. Ct. A pp. 1935) (holding uti lity owe d no duty to general public to maintain inoperable stree tlig ht ); Coc h ran v. Pub lic Serv ice Elec tric Co ., 117 A. 620, 621 (N.J. 1922) (holding that utility owed duty to city concerning inoperable streetlights but not to the ge n eral public).
In White , the California C ourt of Appeal determined that the defendant

u tilit y owed no duty to a moped driver who was injured in a collision alle gedly caused by inoperative lighting at a n intersection. White , 30 Cal. R ptr . 2d at 434 , 437 . T h e court described the issue of duty as a “pol icy consider ation[,]” and explained that the issue requ ires consi deratio n of “not only the foreseeability of harm to a plaintiff but also the burdens to be im posed against a defendant.” Id

. at 437 . Specificall y , the court considered:

“the cost o f imposing t his liability on public utilities, the curren t publ ic utility rate s tructures , the large numbers of streetlights , the likelihood that streetlights will b ecome periodically inoperable, the fact that motor vehi c les operate at night with headlight s, the sligh t chance that a single inoperative streetligh t will be the ca use of a motor v ehicle collision, and the availabil ity of automobile insurance to pay for da mages.” Id

.- 13

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Consequently, the White cou rt concluded th a t “[t]he burden on the public utili ty in
terms of costs and disruption of existing rate sche d ules far exceed s the slight
ben efit to the motoring public from t he imposition of liability.” Id

. Simila rly, in Vaughan , the Appeals Court of Massachusetts declar e d that the defendant utility owed n o duty to a pedestrian who alleged that her injuries were
due t o inoperative st reetlights. Vaughan , 719 N.E.2d at 523 , 524 . R elying on White , the Vaughan court conside red duty as an “allocation of risk” that re quired

“ b a lancing the foreseeability of harm * * * against the burden to be imposed .” Id

. (quoting White , 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43 5 ) . In adopting t he majority rule that ut ilities have no common law duty to injure d third parties to maintain streetlights, the court

co n cluded that, although “relieving the elec tric company of liability may leave the

‘ loss on the shoul d ers o f the individual plain tiff , ’ ” id. at 523

- 24 (quoting Pro sser & Keeton, Torts § 4, at 24),

“th e imposition of tort li ability on those who must render c o ntinuo us service of this kind to all who apply for i t under all kinds of circumstances could also be ruinous and the exp ense of litigation and settling claims over t h e iss ue of whether or not there was n egligence could be a gr eater burden to the rate paye r than can b e socially justified.” Id

. at 52 4 (brackets omitted) (q uoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 93, at 671). The co urt also noted that “ [ t ] he failure to maintain an ins talled stree t light does not create a risk greater than t h e ris k created by the to t al absence o f a streetlight.” Id

. at 525 (quoting White , 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43 7 ).- 14

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The aforementioned cases applied factors th at are closely aligned with Rhode Island jurisprude nce. In Rho de Island, t here is no b right

- line rule for
d e termi n ing wh ether a leg al duty exists

. The determina tion of duty must be made

on a case - by

- case basis. Willis v. Omar , 954 A.2d 126, 130 (R.I. 20 08) . However, as noted su

pra , i n Banks , this Court adopted the fo l lowin g lis t of factors to consider when deciding whe ther a d u ty exists in a particular situation :

“(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suf fered an inj ury, (3) the closeness of connection between t he de fendan t ’ s conduct and the in

jury suffered, ( 4) the poli c y of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.” Banks , 522 A. 2d at 1225

. This Court also has cautione d that Ba n ks did not limit the scope of fact ors that we should consider in future cases with different fact ual scenario s. See, e.g. , Wyso , 78 A.3d at 7 51

. We have recognized that the duty i nquiry should also reflect consideration of “ all releva nt factors, includin g the relationship of t he parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to be impose d upon the defendant, public policy considera t ions, and notions of fairness. ” Carlson v . Town of S outh Kingstown , 131 A.3d 705, 709 (R.I. 2016) (quot ing Woodruff v. Gitlo w , 91 A.3d 805, 814 (R.I. 2014) )

. In Wyso , we distinguished Banks , which involved a p remises

- liability claim against property owners bro ught by an i nvitee who was injured on the lando wner’s- 15

-

pro p erty ; Wyso involved a slip

- an d

- fall on a public sidewalk not o wned or control led by the defendants. Wyso , 78 A.3d at 751

. Because a property owne r ’s duty arises from “ the landowner’s possession of the premise s and his or her attendant right a nd obligati o n to control the pre mises [,]” id. , we d eclin ed in Wyso , and al s o in other cases , to find a duty where an injury occurred on property not owned or controlled by the defendant. See i d

. at 749, 751

- 52 ( finding no duty where the plaintiff was injured on public sidew alk abutting the d efendant’s
business ) ; M

a guire v. Cit

y o f Pro vid ence , 105 A.3d 92, 9 6 (R.I. 2014) ( finding no duty where the plaintiff was injured while walking on a sidewalk outside a shopping mall) ; Ferreira v. Strack , 636 A.2d 682, 6 84 , 6 86

- 67 (R.I. 1 994) ( find ing no duty where the plaintiffs we r e inj ured w h i l e cro ssing public street adjacent to the defendan t’s property because , inter ali a , the defe n dants had no control over the property where the injury occurred ). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the cas e at bar. Narraganset t does no t own, con t rol , or maintain the subject ar ea ; rather, the city has exclu sive ownership and control o f its public streets . The city’s publi c service engineer inspe ct s electrical fixtures within the city and is vested with “th e general control and supervision of all p ublic l ights used by the city f or illuminat ing its streets, highways, parks and public p l aces . ” Providence Code § 23

- 136 ; se e § 23

- 125

. A dditionally, there is no relationship between the parties in the case at bar that- 16

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would j ustify the imposition of a d u ty : T he dece dent was a member of the public who was a p edestrian bu t had no special or direct relationship with N arrag ansett. As for foreseeability of harm, while we glean a variety of unfortunate events that

can befall members of the public using a publi c str eet in d arkness , we must “acknowledge [] that duty i s a flexible concept, that seeks to balance the degree o f
for eseeability of harm against the burden of the duty to be impose d. ” Volpe v. Gallagher , 821 A.2d 699, 716 (R. I. 2003) (brackets omitted) (qu o ting McClung v. Delta Squar e Limite d Partnership , 937 S.W.2d 891, 901 (T enn. 1996) ). If Narragansett were to be held liable to th i rd pa rties for incidents allegedly caused, in part, b y inoperable streetlight s, then it would be required to alt er its busine s s operations by inspe cting, maintai ning, and replacing thousands of
str eetlights on hundreds of streets in the city. T he cost of this mandate would
result in a substantial bu rden on the part of the utility and a cost to its ratepayers that i s not contemp l ated by th e PUC streetlight tariff

. To con clude that Narragansett owes a legal duty to pedestrians or individual members of the publi c to inspec t and maintai n streetlights would unreasonably expand the zone of obligation of the public utility and , indeed , i mpose a n undu e burden

. The exten t and co st cannot be justified by “ the slight chance that a singl e inoperative
stree tlight will be the cause o f a mo tor vehicle collision [

. ] ” White , 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 4 37

. At night, m otor vehicles generally are driven w ith headlights illuminating- 17

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the w ay; therefore, “ it is unlikely that a single inoperable streetlight will be a

su bstan tial f

actor in causing a colli sion [

. ] ” Id

. Co n sider ing the facts of this case in conjunction with well

- settled Rhode Island law and the prevailing view of jurisdictions that have considered this issue, we conclude that a public utility generally owes no comm on law duty to individual
thir d parties who a r e allegedly inj ured, at least in part, as a result of inoperable streetlights. Conc lus i on For these reasons, we affirm t he j udgment of the Superior Court. The papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Co urt.

Just ice Long did not partici pate.SU

- CMS

- 02 A (revised June 20 20 ) STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

– CLERK’S OFFICE L icht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of the Estate of George N

. Laprocina v. Nicole C . Lourie et al.
Case Number No. 2019

- 19 1

- A ppeal. (PC 13

- 6459) Date Opinion Filed May 26, 2021

Justices Suttell, C.J., Gol db er g, Robinson, and L ynch Prata, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Maureen Mc Ken na Goldberg
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Jus tice Melissa A. Long

Attorney(s) on Appeal For Plaintiff: Mark A. Fay, Esq. For Defendant: Mark P . Dolan, Esq. Mark P. Dolan, Jr., Esq.