- 1 -

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

(Memorandum Web Opinion)

SCROGGINS V. MOSBRUCKER

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

SKYLER L. SCROGGINS, APPELLANT,

V.

MELISSA K. MOSBRUCKER, APPELLEE.

Filed March 21, 2023. No. A-22-282.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: DUANE C. DOUGHERTY, Judge. 

Affirmed.

George T. Babcock, of Law Offices of Evelyn N. Babcock, for appellant.

Joan Watke, of Watke, Polk & Sena, L.L.O., for appellee.

PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and WELCH, Judges.

MOORE, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Skyler L. Scroggins filed an action in the district court for Douglas County to establish 

paternity, custody, parenting time, and child support. A few months after the commencement of 

the proceedings, the child moved with her mother, Melissa K. Mosbrucker, to Washington and 

then to Idaho where she has remained. After an evidentiary hearing the court found that while it 

had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), 

Nebraska was an inconvenient forum and Idaho was a more appropriate forum. The court later 

dismissed the case on its own motion after Mosbrucker produced evidence that she had filed an 

adoption petition in Idaho. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 

determination that Nebraska was an inconvenient forum and its dismissal of Scroggins’ complaint, 

we affirm.
- 2 -

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mosbrucker gave birth to a child in July 2016 in Missouri. Mosbrucker lived in Nebraska 

with the child from August 2016 until July 2019 when the child moved with Mosbrucker and 

Mosbrucker’s husband to Washington for the husband’s professional advancement. The child, 

Mosbrucker, and Mosbrucker’s husband then moved to Idaho in February 2020 for a job 

opportunity for Mosbrucker. The child has since remained in Idaho.

Both parties concede through various pleadings that Scroggins is the biological father of 

the child. However, the district court did not make a determination regarding the relief sought in 

Scroggins’ complaint. Much of the procedural history of the present case involves Scroggins’

multiple attempts to serve Mosbrucker with his complaint and whether the district court had 

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Initial Complaint and Service Attempts.

On April 18, 2019, Scroggins filed a complaint for paternity, custody, parenting time, and 

child support. Scroggins alleged that Mosbrucker had filed a petition for adoption in April 2018 in 

Douglas County Court where she had made “judicial admissions” that Scroggins was the biological 

father of their minor daughter. Mosbrucker’s petition sought an adoption of the child by her 

husband and was later dismissed. In his complaint, Scroggins requested that the district court order 

genetic testing for the purpose of establishing paternity, make a finding of paternity, grant 

Scroggins custody, and make a child support determination. Scroggins also sought that the matter 

be heard by the same Douglas County Court judge who had been assigned Mosbrucker’s adoption 

petition.

On April 30, 2019, the district court entered an order denying Scroggins’ request that the 

particular county court judge be appointed to hear his complaint. The district court further found 

that the matter was to remain under the jurisdiction of the Douglas County District Court.

On July 10, 2019, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at the 

address of an apartment in Omaha, Nebraska. A service record filed on July 17 reflects three 

unsuccessful attempts to serve Mosbrucker on July 12, 16, and 17.

On August 23, 2019, Scroggins filed a motion for alternative service, noting the multiple 

service attempts on Mosbrucker at her Omaha address and requesting that the district court allow 

service by mail and by leaving a copy of the summons at Mosbrucker’s address. On August 26, 

the district court entered an order granting Scroggins’ motion for alternative service. On August 

28, Scroggins filed a praecipe for alternative service in accordance with the district court’s order. 

A proof of mailing was filed on August 30 and a service record filed on September 3 reflects that 

a service processor posted a copy of the summons on Mosbrucker’s apartment door.

On November 27, 2019, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at 

an Idaho address. A service record filed on January 23, 2020, reflects two unsuccessful attempts 

to serve Mosbrucker on December 10 and 13, 2019.

On March 3, 2020, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at a 

Washington address. A service record filed on May 22 reflects three unsuccessful attempts to serve 

Mosbrucker on May 7 and twice on May 13.
- 3 -

On July 24, 2020, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at another 

Idaho address. A service record filed on August 6 reflects that Mosbrucker was personally served 

on July 30.

On August 13, 2020, Mosbrucker filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that because service 

did not occur within 6 months from the filing of the complaint as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-217 (Cum. Supp. 2022), Scroggins’ complaint should be dismissed. A hearing on the matter 

was held on September 8.

In an order entered on September 17, 2020, the district court denied Mosbrucker’s motion 

to dismiss. The court found that Scroggins attempted service at Mosbrucker’s last known address 

in Omaha and Mosbrucker actually resided at that address at the time of the attempted service. 

Scroggins then obtained appropriate substitute and constructive service. Thus, the court concluded 

that the alternative service was proper and timely.

UCCJEA Jurisdiction and Forum Analysis.

On December 3, 2020, Scroggins filed several motions including a motion for genetic 

testing, motion for temporary visitation and support, motion for the appointment of a guardian ad 

litem, and motion for an UCCJEA order finding Nebraska to be the home state of the child.

On August 4, 2021, Mosbrucker filed a motion to dismiss. The motion noted that her 

adoption petition was not actually dismissed until August 9, 2019, after Scroggins had filed his 

complaint. Because Scroggins’ complaint was filed while the adoption petition was still before the 

county court, Mosbrucker alleged that pursuant to the Nebraska Court Rules of Pleading in Civil 

Cases the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the matter 

and the complaint should be dismissed.

Mosbrucker also alleged in her motion to dismiss that under the UCCJEA, Idaho was the 

home state of the child because the child had moved out of Nebraska with Mosbrucker in the 

summer of 2019. A hearing on the matter was held on September 7, 2021.

In an order entered on October 15, 2021, the district court denied Mosbrucker’s motion to 

dismiss. The court found that the date of service of the initial complaint was completed on August 

30, 2019; approximately 21 days after the formal dismissal of the adoption petition. Thus, while 

the district court may not have had subject matter jurisdiction over the child on the date the 

complaint was filed, the court obtained jurisdiction on the date that the adoption petition was 

dismissed and also had jurisdiction on the date of service. The court additionally found that 

Nebraska was the home state of the child under the UCCJEA at the time the adoption petition was 

dismissed, as the child had only been removed from Nebraska for a total of 19 days prior to the 

date of service. However, the court also noted that the child had been absent from Nebraska for 

over 2 years and there could exist the question as to whether or not Nebraska was an inconvenient 

forum under the UCCJEA or is still the home state.

On October 28, 2021, Mosbrucker filed a motion regarding the UCCJEA which requested 

that the district court find Nebraska to be an inconvenient forum, and alleged that Idaho was the 

home state of the child. An evidentiary hearing on the matter was held on February 9, 2022. Both 

Mosbrucker and Scroggins provided testimony which will be referenced as necessary in our 

analysis.
- 4 -

In an order filed on March 3, 2022, the district court first found that when Scroggins’ initial 

complaint was filed in April 2019, the child resided in the State of Nebraska. Thus for purposes of 

the UCCJEA, “on the date of the commencement of the proceeding,” the court found Nebraska to 

be the home state of the child. The court then analyzed the relevant statutory factors and concluded 

that Nebraska was an inconvenient forum and that the State of Idaho would be a more appropriate 

forum. The court ordered the proceeding to be stayed on the condition that another child custody 

proceeding be promptly commenced within 60 days from the date of the order in the State of Idaho.

On March 23, 2022, the district court filed an order dismissing the matter on its own 

motion. The court noted that it had received a file stamped copy of a complaint for judgment of 

adoption filed by Mosbrucker in the State of Idaho. In accordance with its March 3 order, the court 

found that the matter was to be dismissed without prejudice.

Scroggins appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Scroggins assigns, reordered, that the district court erred in (1) interpreting the UCCJEA 

to allow forum non conveniens to trump home state jurisdiction for the purposes of making an 

initial custody determination and finding Nebraska to be an inconvenient forum; (2) failing to 

apply the doctrine of jurisdictional priority; (3) refusing to require Mosbrucker’s husband to 

testify; and (4) failing to appoint a particular Douglas County Court judge to hear the case. 

Scroggins also assigns that the district court committed plain error in failing to recognize him as 

the child’s legal father as a consequence of paternity acknowledgements.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The question whether jurisdiction should be exercised under the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed 

by an appellate court de novo on the record for abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship of S.T., 300 

Neb. 72, 912 N.W.2d 262 (2018).

ANALYSIS

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Before we address Scroggins’ assignments of errors, we first determine whether the district 

court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding is governed exclusively by the UCCJEA. 

Wolter v. Fortuna, 27 Neb. App. 166, 928 N.W.2d 416 (2019). “Child custody proceeding” is 

defined under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1227(4) (Reissue 2016) of the UCCJEA as a proceeding in 

which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue and includes 

a proceeding for paternity in which the issue of custody or visitation may appear. Id. The present 

case is governed by the UCCJEA, as Scroggins’ initial complaint sought to establish paternity as 

well as an order regarding custody of the child. See Wolter v. Fortuna, supra.

Having decided that the UCCJEA applies, we must now determine whether the district 

court properly found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. In considering 

whether jurisdiction exists under the UCCJEA, a jurisdictional question that does not involve a 

factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law, which requires an appellate 
- 5 -

court to reach a conclusion independent from the trial court. Id. Statutory interpretation is a 

question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. Id.

For a state to exercise jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, it must either be the home 

state as defined by the UCCJEA or fall under limited exceptions to the home state requirement 

specified by the act. Id. Generally speaking, § 43-1238(a)(1) grants jurisdiction to the home state 

of the child and § 43-1238(a)(2) through (4) sets out the exceptions under which a court will have 

jurisdiction, even if it is not in the child’s home state. The UCCJEA defines “[h]ome state” as “the 

state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive 

months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” § 43-1227(7). As 

used in the UCCJEA, “[c]ommencement” of a proceeding means “the filing of the first pleading 

in a proceeding.” § 43-1227(5).

In the present case, Nebraska was the child’s home state. Mosbrucker testified at the 

evidentiary hearing that the child had lived in Nebraska from August 2016 to July 2019. The first 

pleading in this proceeding was Scroggins’ complaint for paternity, which he filed in April 2019. 

Because the child lived in Nebraska for well over six consecutive months before the filing of the 

complaint for paternity, the district court properly found that Nebraska had subject matter 

jurisdiction over the proceeding under § 43-1238(a)(1).

Inconvenient Forum.

Scroggins assigns that the district court erred by interpreting the UCCJEA as allowing 

forum non conveniens to trump home state jurisdiction when making an initial custody 

determination. Scroggins argues that because Nebraska was the child’s home state at the 

commencement of the proceeding, the district court was under no obligation to consider whether 

Idaho was a more convenient forum.

A court of this state which has jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1244(a) (Reissue 

2016) of the UCCJEA to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its 

jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an “inconvenient forum under the circumstances 

and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” See § 43-1244(a). As a general rule, 

a decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA for the reason of an inconvenient 

forum is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Watson v. Watson, 272 Neb. 647, 724 N.W.2d 

24 (2006). Clearly, the statute allows a court which is the home state of the child to, at any time, 

decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that it is an inconvenient forum. We reject Scroggins’

argument in this regard.

Scroggins also argues that the district court erred in finding Nebraska to be an inconvenient 

forum. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider 

whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. § 43-1244(b). For this 

purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant 

factors, including:

(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future 

and which state could best protect the parties and the child;

(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this state;

(3) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would 

assume jurisdiction;

(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
- 6 -

(5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;

(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, 

including testimony of the child;

(7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the 

procedures necessary to present the evidence; and

(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending 

litigation.

See § 43-1244(b).

Pursuant to § 43-1244(b), the district court held an evidentiary hearing on February 9, 2022, 

where both Mosbrucker and Scroggins testified. In the court’s March 3 order, it made explicit 

findings regarding the factors considered in § 43-1244(b)(1)-(8).

Regarding the first factor, the district court found no evidence of domestic violence 

between the parties. Considering the second factor, the length of time the child has resided outside 

this state, the court noted Mosbrucker’s testimony that the child was permanently removed from 

Nebraska in July 2019. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, the child was 5 years old and had 

remained outside of Nebraska for 2 years and 7 months. The court found that period to be a 

“significant and extensive period of time.”

In considering the third factor, the distance between the court in this state and the court in 

the state that would assume jurisdiction, the district court observed that Scroggins had never 

himself resided in Nebraska. The court noted that the distance between Missouri, where Scroggins 

resides, and Nebraska as compared to Missouri and Idaho is greatly different. However, the court 

concluded that the additional distance between Missouri and Idaho was not an “insurmountable 

barrier” for Scroggins to be able to pursue a paternity complaint in Idaho should the case be moved.

The district court did not make any findings regarding the fourth factor, the relative 

financial circumstances of the parties. We note that at the evidentiary hearing Mosbrucker testified 

that her annual income is $76,000 and Scroggins listed his annual income as $21,600 in his poverty 

affidavit.

The district court determined that the fifth factor, any agreement of the parties as to which 

state should assume jurisdiction, was not applicable to the matter.

The district court found the sixth factor, the nature and location of the evidence required to 

resolve the pending litigation, to be a factor of “great weight . . .” The court observed that should 

a custody trial be held in Nebraska, there would exist no witnesses or other evidence relevant in 

making a custody determination within the state. According to the court, the witnesses relevant to 

a custody determination would include current teachers, medical providers, Mosbrucker’s family, 

friends, and colleagues who reside in Idaho, the child’s friends and the parents of those friends, 

and to some degree the child herself. Further, the court noted that all evidence pertaining to the 

child’s daily life, including her activities and routines, would all be within the State of Idaho.

Mosbrucker testified that she is married and through her marriage has two additional 

children who are younger than the child at issue in this case. The district court found that 

Mosbrucker’s husband’s employment information within the State of Idaho as well as evidence 

concerning the relationships between the child and her two younger half-siblings would be relevant 

to a custody determination. Again, this evidence would be within the State of Idaho.
- 7 -

Neither Mosbrucker nor Scroggins have any family residing in Omaha, Nebraska. 

Mosbrucker did briefly testify that her husband’s family resides in Nebraska, but did not state 

whether her in-laws have any significant involvement in the child’s life.

The seventh factor considered by the district court was the ability of the court of each state 

to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence. The court 

found that due to all relevant evidence existing in Idaho, a court in the State of Idaho would more 

expeditiously handle the custody matter, which would benefit the child. The court also noted that 

it was given no evidence regarding any procedural distinctions between the Nebraska and Idaho 

courts regarding the presentation of evidence at trial.

The district court found the eighth and final factor, the familiarity of the court of each state 

with the facts and issues in the pending litigation, related directly to the sixth factor discussed 

above. The court found that the Idaho courts would be more familiar with the environment the 

child has been raised in for the past several years.

Based on the foregoing evidence that was presented at the evidentiary hearing, we conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Nebraska is an inconvenient 

forum and that the State of Idaho is a more appropriate forum. The court properly considered the 

relevant factors under § 43-1244(b).

Scroggins also argues that the Idaho adoption petition filed by Mosbrucker is not a custody 

proceeding under the UCCJEA. Scroggins correctly notes that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1228 (Reissue 

2016), states that the UCCJEA “does not govern an adoption proceeding. . .”

However, Scroggins concedes that Mosbrucker’s petition also requests that the Idaho court 

terminate Scroggins’ parental rights to the child. Section 43-1227 states that a child custody 

proceeding under the UCCJEA includes, “a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, 

dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic 

violence,” in which the issues of legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a 

child is an issue. See § 43-1227 (emphasis added). The termination of Scroggins’ parental rights 

would directly implicate his ability to seek custody or visitation of the child. Thus, we find the 

relief requested in Mosbrucker’s adoption petition incorporates a child custody proceeding under 

the UCCJEA. This assignment of error fails.

Doctrine of Jurisdictional Priority.

Scroggins next assigns that the district court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of 

jurisdictional priority. Scroggins argues that the district court “surrendered its priority jurisdiction 

for the adjudication of custody to an Idaho court for the adjudication of an adoption.” Brief for 

appellant at 31.

Under the doctrine of jurisdictional priority, when different state courts have concurrent 

original jurisdiction over the same subject matter, basic principles of judicial administration 

require that the first court to acquire jurisdiction should retain it to the exclusion of another court. 

Brinkman v. Brinkman, 302 Neb. 315, 923 N.W.2d 380 (2019). In Brinkman, the Nebraska 

Supreme Court determined that the county court had jurisdictional priority over the probate matter 

at issue, as opposed to the district court in a declaratory judgment action concerning the same 

issue. Thus, this doctrine was applied to two courts in the same state and did not involve a 

jurisdictional question between two states.
- 8 -

Scroggins cites to Jesse B. v. Tylee H., 293 Neb. 973, 883 N.W.2d 1 (2016) for the 

proposition that the doctrine of jurisdictional priority should apply to cases under the UCCJEA. 

We disagree. In Jesse B., the Nebraska Supreme Court did not address the UCCJEA. Rather, it 

determined that the district court erred in failing to give full faith and credit to Ohio’s determination 

of the appellant’s paternity, as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1406 (Reissue 2016). The court 

further found that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appellant’s constitutional 

challenges to Nebraska’s adoption statutes under the jurisdictional priority doctrine, rather than 

the county court in the adoption proceeding, since the district court was the first court to exercise 

jurisdiction. The case therefore contemplated the doctrine of jurisdictional priority between two 

courts of the same state rather than two courts of different states.

Moreover, a review of our appellate case law reveals no cases where the doctrine of 

jurisdictional priority has been applied to the UCCJEA. As such, the district court did not err in 

failing to apply the doctrine of jurisdictional priority. This assignment of error fails.

Lack of Testimony by Mosbrucker’s Husband.

Scroggins assigns that the district court erred in refusing to require Mosbrucker’s husband 

to testify at the evidentiary hearing although he was present in the courtroom.

At the start of the evidentiary hearing, Scroggins indicated that he planned to call both 

Mosbrucker’s husband and the husband’s father, who were present at the hearing, as witnesses. 

Mosbrucker responded that both men had not been subpoenaed and so should be free to leave the 

hearing. Scroggins then asked the district court for an order directing the men to remain in the 

building so that they could be called as witnesses. The district court responded, “I don’t have a 

subpoena, so I’m not going to order them to stay here. If they desire to leave, I guess that’s up to 

them if that’s how we want to do this.”

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-103(1)(b) (Reissue 2016), Neb. Evid. R. 103(1)(b), error 

may not be predicated upon a ruling which excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party 

is affected, and the substance of the evidence was made known to the judge by offer or was 

apparent from the context within which questions were asked. State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. 393, 

754 N.W.2d 742 (2008). So, to predicate error upon a ruling of the court refusing to permit a 

witness to testify, or to answer a specific question, the record must show an offer to prove the facts 

sought to be elicited. Id. The offer need not be a detailed recitation of the excluded testimony, but 

simply enough to provide the general nature of the testimony so that an appellate court can properly 

review its effect. Birkel v. Hassebrook Farm Serv., 219 Neb. 286, 363 N.W.2d 148 (1985).

During the evidentiary hearing, Scroggins made no offer of proof concerning the proposed 

testimony to be elicited from Mosbrucker’s husband. Though Scroggins now argues that 

Mosbrucker’s husband was a critical witness, on the record presented on appeal, we are unable to 

ascertain why Scroggins wanted to call the husband, what testimony he could possibly have 

provided concerning the child, or how not being allowed to call him could have prejudiced 

Scroggins’ complaint. This assignment of error fails.
- 9 -

Denying Appointment of County Court Judge.

Scroggins assigns that the district court erred by refusing to appoint a particular Douglas 

County Court judge who had previously heard Mosbrucker’s April 2018 petition for adoption. 

Scroggins’ 2019 complaint for paternity specifically requested the judge be assigned to the case.

Scroggins relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2740 (Reissue 2016), which provides in part:

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, in domestic relations 

matters, a party shall file his or her petition or complaint and all other court filings with the 

clerk of the district court. The party shall state in the petition or complaint whether such 

party requests that the proceeding be heard by a county court judge or by a district court 

judge. If the party requests the case be heard by a county court judge, the county court 

judge assigned to hear cases in the county in which the matter is filed at the time of the 

hearing is deemed appointed by the district court and the consent of the county court judge 

is not required. Such proceeding is considered a district court proceeding, even if heard by 

a county court judge, and an order or judgment of the county court in a domestic relations 

matter has the force and effect of a district court judgment. The testimony in a domestic 

relations matter heard before a county court judge shall be preserved as provided in section 

25-2732.

(3) In addition to the jurisdiction provided for paternity or custody determinations 

under subsection (2) of this section, a county court or separate juvenile court which already 

has jurisdiction over the child whose paternity or custody is to be determined has 

jurisdiction over such paternity or custody determination.

Scroggins argues that because Mosbrucker’s adoption petition concerning the child was 

already pending before the county court at the time he filed his paternity complaint, the county 

court judge who presided over the adoption proceedings should have heard his custody action 

under § 25-2740. However, the statute does not allow a litigant to request a particular county court 

judge as Mosbrucker did here. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Scoggins’ request that 

a particular Douglas County Court judge be assigned to the case. This assignment of error fails.

Recognition as Legal Father.

Finally, Scroggins assigns that the district court committed plain error in failing to 

recognize him as the child’s legal father as a consequence of an acknowledgement. Scroggins 

asserts that his April 2019 verified complaint for paternity should be considered an 

acknowledgement of paternity, and that Mosbrucker also signed notarized acknowledgments of 

paternity as part of her Nebraska adoption action. He argues that these acknowledgments operate 

as a legal finding and he should be recognized as the child’s father as a matter of law.

Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature that to leave it 

uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.

Steffy v. Steffy, 287 Neb. 529, 843 N.W.2d 655 (2014).

Scroggins is correct that the establishment of paternity by acknowledgment is the 

equivalent to the establishment of paternity by judicial proceeding. See Cesar C. v. Alicia L., 281 

Neb. 979, 800 N.W.2d 249 (2011). However, the district court never reached a final determination 

regarding custody, parenting time, and support as the court ultimately found that Nebraska was 
- 10 -

not a convenient forum for these proceedings and declined to exercise its jurisdiction. Scroggins 

is able to assert that he is the child’s legal father in the Idaho proceedings which have been initiated 

by Mosbrucker. Therefore, we find that no plain error has occurred.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Nebraska to be an 

inconvenient forum and in dismissing Scroggins’ complaint. Having considered and rejected 

Scroggins’ other assignments of error, the order of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.