IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-338

No. COA21-226

Filed 17 May 2022

Henderson County, No. 20 CVS 517

RACHEL LYNNE OSBORNE, Plaintiff,

v.

HEATH PARIS, JORDAN ASHWORTH and GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 

INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiff from judgment entered 11 September 2020 by Judge Peter 

B. Knight in Henderson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 

December 2021.

Whitfield-Cargile Law, PLLC, by Davis A. Whitfield-Cargile, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Davis & Hamrick, L.L.P., by James G. Welsh, Jr., and Ann C. Rowe, for 

Defendant-Appellee.

INMAN, Judge.

¶ 1 This appeal arises from a dispute between an insured and her insurance 

provider over motor vehicle liability insurance coverage for grave injuries she 

sustained in a collision between an uninsured motorcycle, on which she was a 

passenger, and an underinsured car. Resolving the disagreement requires us to apply 

North Carolina statutes to three automobile insurance policies, two providing
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uninsured motorist coverage, and one providing combined uninsured and 

underinsured motorist coverage. After careful review of the insurance policies at 

issue, the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act (“Financial 

Responsibility Act”), and our caselaw, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Government Employee’s Insurance 

Company (“GEICO”), in part, but modify the amount GEICO must pay Ms. Osborne 

because it was not entitled to a credit against its uninsured motorist coverage.

¶ 2 Plaintiff-Appellant Rachel Osborne (“Ms. Osborne”) argues that the trial court 

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of GEICO on her claim for $70,000 in 

underinsured motorist coverage in addition to $100,000 of uninsured motorist 

coverage. Ms. Osborne contends her right to recover underinsured motorist coverage 

was triggered when GEICO tendered Defendant Jordan Ashworth’s (“Mr. Ashworth”) 

liability limits to Ms. Osborne, and that the Financial Responsibility Act, N.C. Gen. 

Stat. §§ 20-279.21(b)(3) and (4) (2021), does not allow GEICO to reduce the $160,000 

uninsured motorist coverage by its payment of Mr. Ashworth’s $30,000 liability limit. 

Ms. Osborne also argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 

GEICO on her claims of bad faith and unfair trade practices.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On the night of 4 April 2017, Ms. Osborne was a passenger on a motorcycle on 

Crab Creek Road in Transylvania County, traveling toward Brevard. The motorcycle 
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was operated by its owner, Defendant Heath Paris (“Mr. Paris”). Ahead of Mr. Paris

on the same road, Mr. Ashworth was driving his car, also headed toward Brevard. As 

Mr. Ashworth approached an intersection, he allegedly signaled to turn right and 

slowed his vehicle as if he was pulling over on the shoulder of the road. Anticipating 

the car’s right turn, Mr. Paris attempted to pass on the car’s left, in a non-passing 

zone. At the same time, Mr. Ashworth turned left, instead of right, and the 

motorcycle and car collided. The impact sent the motorcycle airborne. Ms. Osborne 

was ejected and landed on the ground a great distance from the motorcycle. She 

sustained serious injuries requiring several surgeries and other extensive medical 

treatment, and her injuries will require future surgeries and treatment.

¶ 4 Mr. Paris’ motorcycle was uninsured, meaning no policy of liability insurance 

existed to provide coverage for the motorcycle or for Mr. Paris as a driver. Mr. 

Ashworth’s car was insured by a liability insurance policy through GEICO, with 

minimum-limits bodily injury liability coverage of $30,000 per person. It is 

undisputed Mr. Ashworth’s vehicle is an “underinsured motor vehicle” as defined by 

the Financial Responsibility Act.

¶ 5 GEICO tendered $30,000 to Ms. Osborne under Mr. Ashworth’s policy on 6 

March 2020.

¶ 6 Three days later, on 9 March 2020, Ms. Osborne, through counsel, sent a 

written demand to GEICO for $160,000 of uninsured motorist coverage and $70,000 
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of underinsured motorist coverage under three different GEICO policies. Her own 

liability insurance policy with GEICO, Policy no. 4416-06-95-42 (“Policy 42”), 

provided uninsured motorist coverage up to $30,000 per person. Because Ms. 

Osborne lived in the same household as her parents, Bobby and Ginger Osborne, she 

was also covered by their policies with GEICO. Policy no. 4325-46-40-65 (“Policy 65”), 

which covers two vehicles, neither of which were involved in the underlying accident, 

provides combined uninsured and underinsured bodily injury liability coverage of 

$100,000 per person and a total limit of $300,000 per accident. Policy 65 provides 

that the “limit of bodily injury liability shown in the Declarations for each accident 

for Combined Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage is [the] maximum limit 

of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one accident.” Ms. 

Osborne also claims she is entitled to coverage under Policy no. 4325-46-67-06 (“Policy 

06”), which insures a single motorcycle owned by Ms. Osborne’s parents and not 

involved in the underlying accident. Policy 06 provides limits of liability for

uninsured motorist bodily injury liability of $30,000 for each person, with a total limit 

of $60,000 per accident.

¶ 7 On 13 March 2020, four days after Ms. Osborne formally demanded payment

from GEICO, she filed suit against Mr. Paris and Mr. Ashworth, alleging negligence,

as well as GEICO, alleging GEICO had: (1) breached its obligation to pay 

underinsured motorist benefits and uninsured motorist benefits to her; (2) displayed 
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bad faith in its refusal to settle with Ms. Osborne on reasonable terms; and (3) 

engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices. Ms. Osborne alleged that because 

Mr. Paris was uninsured, she was entitled to benefits under her policy’s uninsured 

coverage, uninsured coverage under her parents’ motorcycle policy, and uninsured 

coverage of her parents’ automobile policy. She also alleged she was entitled to an 

additional $100,000 in underinsured coverage under her parents’ automobile policy, 

Policy 65, because Mr. Ashworth was an underinsured motorist.

¶ 8 On 6 April 2020, GEICO remitted to Ms. Osborne three checks totaling 

$130,000––$100,000 combined uninsured/underinsured coverage under Policy 65, 

$15,000 uninsured coverage under Policy 42, and $15,000 uninsured coverage under 

Policy 06.

1 GEICO’s counsel asserted Ms. Osborne was entitled to $130,000 of 

uninsured motorist coverage, the total available coverage of $160,000 under all three 

policies, less a $30,000 credit for the amount paid to Ms. Osborne under Mr. 

Ashworth’s liability policy. GEICO contends this credit is required by its policy 

language providing that “coverage shall be reduced by all sums . . . [p]aid because of 

bodily injury . . . by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally 

responsible . . . .”

 

1 As explained in further detail below, the amounts GEICO paid under Policies 42 and 

06 reflect a pro rata credit distribution of the $30,000 from Mr. Ashworth’s policy.
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¶ 9 One month later, on 12 May 2020, GEICO responded to Ms. Osborne’s 

complaint and counterclaimed for declaratory judgment. GEICO moved for summary 

judgment as to all claims against it or, in the alternative, an order granting its claim 

for a declaratory judgment as to its duties and obligations for payments under the 

policies at issue. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of GEICO on 11 

September 2020. The trial court’s order included a certification pursuant to Rule 

54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Osborne timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Ms. Osborne argues the trial court erred in concluding she may recover only 

$130,000 from GEICO. She contends: (1) she is entitled to recover underinsured 

coverage in addition to uninsured coverage under Policy 65, and (2) GEICO 

improperly reduced its uninsured coverage by the amount remitted from Mr. 

Ashworth’s policy. After careful interpretation of all relevant statutes in pari

materia, we affirm in part and remand in part the trial court’s summary judgment in 

favor of GEICO, as described below.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review an appeal from summary judgment de novo. In re Will of Jones, 362 

N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when 

the record establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that any 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 
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622, 766 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2014) (citing Rule 56(c)). We view the record “in the light 

most favorable to the non-movant, giving it the benefit of all inferences which 

reasonably arise therefrom.” Murray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 123 N.C. App. 1, 

8, 472 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1996) (citation omitted). Interpreting the Financial 

Responsibility Act and examining the terms of a motor vehicle insurance policy are 

also questions of law which we review de novo. Lunsford, 367 N.C. at 623, 766 S.E.2d 

at 301 (citations omitted).

¶ 12 “Statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari 

materia, and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each.” Hoffman v. Edwards, 48 

N.C. App. 559, 564, 269 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1980) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). We presume that the General Assembly acts with full knowledge of prior 

and existing law. Ridge Cmty. Inv’rs, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 

570 (1977) (citation omitted).

B. Discussion

¶ 13 The Financial Responsibility Act requires, among other things, that drivers 

maintain insurance at certain mandatory minimum coverage limits. See N.C. Gen. 

Stat. §§ 20-279.21(b)(2)-(3) (2021). The purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act 

“is to compensate the innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists. It is a 

remedial statute to be liberally construed so that the beneficial purpose intended by 

its enactment may be accomplished.” Sutton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 
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265, 382 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1989) (citations omitted). We must interpret the Act “to 

provide the innocent victim with the fullest possible protection.” Proctor v. N.C. Farm 

Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 221, 225, 376 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1989).

¶ 14 The terms of the Financial Responsibility Act are impliedly written into every 

policy of insurance as a matter of law. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dana, 379 

N.C. 502, 2021-NCSC-161, ¶ 9 (citations omitted). “An insurance policy is a contract 

between the parties, and the intention of the parties is the controlling guide in its 

interpretation. It is to be construed and enforced in accordance with its terms insofar 

as they are not in conflict with pertinent statutes and court decisions.” Hawley v. 

Indem. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 381, 387, 126 S.E.2d 161, 167 (1962) (citation omitted).

¶ 15 Though the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act is to protect innocent 

victims of motor vehicle negligence, “that fact does not inevitably require that one 

interpret the relevant statutory language to produce the maximum possible recovery 

for persons injured as a result of motor vehicle negligence regardless of any other 

consideration.” N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., ¶ 20. In this case, we must consider 

the amount and nature of coverage purchased under each of the three policies at 

issue. Ms. Osborne purchased the following coverage under Policy 42: uninsured 

motorist coverage up to $30,000 per person. Ms. Osborne’s parents purchased the 

following coverage under Policy 65: combined uninsured and underinsured bodily 

injury liability coverage of $100,000 per person and a total limit of $300,000 per 
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accident. And Ms. Osborne’s parents purchased the following coverage under Policy 

06: uninsured motorist bodily injury liability of $30,000 for each person, with a total 

limit of $60,000 per accident.

¶ 16 The trial court concluded that Ms. Osborne is entitled to recover $130,000 from 

GEICO: $160,000 of total coverage ($100,000 under Policy 65, $30,000 under Policy 

42, and $30,000 under Policy 06) less the $30,000 previously paid by GEICO from Mr. 

Ashworth’s policy. GEICO contends the trial court decided this matter correctly and

directs our attention to Subsection (n) of the Financial Responsibility Act, which 

specifies: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to provide greater amounts of 

uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage in a liability policy than the insured 

has purchased from the insurer under this section.” § 20-279.21(n).

1. Underinsured in Addition to Uninsured Coverage

¶ 17 Because Policy 65 provides combined uninsured/underinsured coverage, 

GEICO contends, Ms. Osborne may not recover uninsured and underinsured 

coverage beyond the policy’s combined coverage limits. Ms. Osborne, on the other 

hand, argues she is entitled to $160,000 of uninsured motorist coverage and an 

additional $100,000 of underinsured motorist coverage, less the $30,000 paid from

Mr. Ashworth’s policy, for a total of $230,000 in coverage. She argues Subsection

(b)(4) of the Act mandates she recover the highest limits of both the underinsured and

uninsured coverage in Policy 65, $100,000 each and totaling $200,000, because the 
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statute provides underinsured motorist coverage shall be “in addition to” uninsured 

coverage.

¶ 18 Subsection (b)(4) provides that the owner’s liability policy

[s]hall, in addition to the coverages set forth in subdivisions 

(2) and (3) of this subsection, provide underinsured 

motorist coverage, to be used only with a policy that is 

written at limits that exceed those prescribed by 

subdivision (2) of this subsection. The limits of such 

underinsured motorist bodily injury coverage shall be 

equal to the highest limits of bodily injury liability coverage 

for any one vehicle insured under the policy[.]

§ 20-279.21(b)(4).

¶ 19 Subsection (b)(2), cross-referenced by Subsection (b)(4), provides minimum 

limits of insurance coverage for any motor vehicle in the State as:

. . . thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) because of bodily 

injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, 

subject to said limit for one person, sixty thousand dollars 

($60,000) because of bodily injury to or death of two or more 

persons in any one accident, and twenty-five thousand 

dollars ($25,000) because of injury to or destruction of 

property of others in any one accident[.]”

§ 20-279.21(b)(2). Subsection (b)(3), also cross-referenced by Subsection (b)(4), 

provides parameters for uninsured coverage: “The limits of such uninsured motorist 

bodily injury coverage shall be equal to the highest limits of bodily injury liability 

coverage for any one vehicle insured under the policy[.]” § 20-279.21(b)(3).

¶ 20 In simpler terms, if not as written by the General Assembly, substituting 
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“liability coverage” for (2) and “uninsured motorist coverage” for (3) in the text of 

Subsection (b)(4), results in the following reading: “such owner’s policy of liability 

insurance . . . [s]hall, in addition to [liability coverage and uninsured motorist 

coverage], provide [underinsured motorist coverage].”

¶ 21 We are not persuaded that Subsection (b)(4) requires insurance companies to 

pay the combined limit amount for both uninsured and underinsured coverage

regardless of the insurance policy language. Rather, we interpret Subsection (b)(4)

simply to reiterate that all drivers in North Carolina must purchase liability coverage 

of at least $30,000, § 20-279.21(b)(2), to include uninsured coverage at those limits,

§ 20-279.21(b)(3), and that drivers have the additional option to purchase 

underinsured coverage greater than the minimum liability limits, in the event a 

negligent driver’s policy does not cover the cost of an insured’s injuries or damage to 

their property. Pursuant to Subsection (b)(4), an uninsured/underinsured combined 

limits policy written for $60,000 in combined coverage, for example, would necessarily 

include $30,000 of uninsured coverage and an additional $30,000 of underinsured 

coverage, unless otherwise specified in the policy. In the event of a loss of equal to or 

greater than $60,000, involving both an uninsured and underinsured motorist, the 

insurer would be responsible for the combined limit of $60,000.

¶ 22 The terms of Policy 65 do not conflict with the Financial Responsibility Act or 

our caselaw. Policy 65 provides uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with a 
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combined limit of $100,000.2 Ms. Osborne’s parents, who purchased the policy, and 

GEICO entered into a contract providing that GEICO would be responsible for 

$100,000 total coverage, in the event of negligence of an uninsured motorist or 

underinsured motorist or both. The terms do not bind GEICO to provide $100,000 

uninsured coverage and an additional $100,000 of underinsured coverage, for a total 

of $200,000. Though the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act is “to provide 

protection for innocent victims of motor vehicle negligence,” we will not interpret the 

relevant statutory language to produce the maximum possible recovery for Ms. 

Osborne regardless of the terms of the policy or our canons of statutory construction.

See N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., ¶ 20; Hoffman, 48 N.C. App. at 564, 269 S.E.2d 

at 313.3

¶ 23 We affirm the trial court’s declaratory judgment in favor of GEICO subject to 

the modifications we outline next. 

 

2 Though not dispositive, GEICO notes that, generally, combined 

uninsured/underinsured policies, like Policy 65, are funded by a single, combined premium 

based upon the maximum liability coverage. The State then imposes taxes based upon the 

the “gross premiums.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-228.5(b)(1) (2021). 

3 In reaching this conclusion, we distinguish and do not rely on this Court’s decision 

in Monti v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 108 N.C. App. 342, 423 S.E.2d 530 (1992). In Monti, 

our Court considered whether a plaintiff could collect both uninsured and underinsured 

coverage from a single tortfeasor. 108 N.C. App. at 344-45, 423 S.E.2d at 531. The tortfeasor 

in Monti was covered by liability limits under an out-of-state policy providing less than the 

minimum coverage required in North Carolina. Id. We held that though the tortfeasor was 

both uninsured and underinsured in North Carolina, the plaintiff could recover either 

uninsured coverage or underinsured coverage from the tortfeasor, but not both. Id. at 345-

46, 423 S.E.2d at 531-32.
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2. Coverage Less the Amount Received from Underinsured’s Policy

¶ 24 Ms. Osborne contends the Financial Responsibility Act precludes GEICO from 

reducing its $160,000 uninsured coverage by the $30,000 GEICO tendered from Mr. 

Ashworth’s policy. We agree.

¶ 25 Subsection (b)(4) provides: “[T]he limit of underinsured motorist coverage 

applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid 

to the claimant under the exhausted liability policy or policies and the limit of 

underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the 

accident.” § 20-279.21(b)(4). Consistent with the statute, Ms. Osborne concedes she

is entitled only to $70,000 of the total $100,000 underinsured limits under Policy 65, 

allowing GEICO a credit for Mr. Ashworth’s $30,000 liability limits. However, she 

contends the Financial Responsibility Act does not authorize a set off for the amount 

of uninsured coverage based on the liability payment of Mr. Ashworth, an 

underinsured motorist.

¶ 26 GEICO argues the terms of its policies, read in concert with the statute, entitle 

it to a credit for the payment Ms. Osborne received from Mr. Ashworth’s liability 

policy. Policies 06 and 65 provide: “The limits of bodily injury liability shown in the 

[Schedule or] Declarations page for each person and each accident for this coverage 

shall be reduced by all sums: 1. Paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf of 

persons or organizations who may be legally responsible.” (Alteration in original.) 
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Policy 42 employs slightly different language, “The limit of liability otherwise 

applicable under this coverage shall be reduced by all sums: 1. Paid because of bodily 

injury . . . by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible,” 

to create the same credit.

¶ 27 Interpreting Subsection (b)(4), this Court has held underinsured carriers are 

entitled to set off the amount received by a claimant from a tortfeasor’s liability 

carrier against any underinsured amounts the injured party’s carrier owed. Onley v. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.C. App. 686, 690, 456 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1995) (“Under 

the terms of the statute, a[n] [underinsured] carrier is entitled to credit for the 

amounts paid to a claimant under the tortfeasor’s liability policy.” (citation omitted)); 

Falls v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 114 N.C. App. 203, 208, 441 S.E.2d 583, 586

(1994) (“[T]he primary provider of [underinsured] coverage . . . is entitled to the credit 

for the liability coverage.”).

¶ 28 For example, in Falls, the tortfeasor driver had the minimum amount of 

liability insurance mandated by our statutes at the time, $25,000, and the injured 

party was covered by an underinsured motorist policy with limits of liability of 

$50,000 per person. 114 N.C. App. at 204-05, 441 S.E.2d at 583-84. On appeal, this 

Court rejected the argument that the injured party’s primary insurance carrier was 

not entitled to a credit for $25,000 in the tortfeasor’s liability coverage tendered. Id. 

at 208, 441 S.E.2d at 585-86. We interpreted Subsection (b)(4) to conclude that the 
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primary provider of underinsured coverage was entitled to a credit for the amount 

received under the tortfeasor’s policy. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 586. More recently, in N.C. 

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dana, the Supreme Court considered the reduction of 

the insurer’s per-person, as opposed to per-accident, liability by the amount tendered 

by the underinsured’s policy. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., ¶¶ 4-5 (“[The 

insurance provider] offered to pay the full per-person limit to both [injured parties], 

less the amount that had been received from [another provider’s] liability coverage.”).

¶ 29 Our Supreme Court has also held our General Statutes authorize an insurance 

carrier to reduce uninsured motorist coverage available by the amount of workers’ 

compensation benefits an injured party received. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ditillo, 348 

N.C. 247, 253, 499 S.E.2d 764, 768 (1998) (“[Uninsured] carriers are permitted to 

reduce coverage for [the estates of the decedent parties] by the amount of workers’

compensation benefits paid or payable.” (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(e) (1997)). 

Subsection (e) explicitly provides for this set off:

Uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage that is 

provided as part of a motor vehicle liability policy shall 

insure that portion of a loss uncompensated by any 

workers’ compensation law and the amount of an 

employer's lien determined pursuant to G.S. 97-10.2(h) or 

(j). In no event shall this subsection be construed to require 

that coverage exceed the applicable uninsured or 

underinsured coverage limits of the motor vehicle policy or 

allow a recovery for damages already paid by workers’

compensation.
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§ 20-279.21(e) (2021).

¶ 30 But the Financial Responsibility Act does not authorize a set off for uninsured 

coverage from payment received by a tortfeasor’s policy. Compare § 20-279.21(b)(4) 

(providing for a credit from underinsured coverage) with § 20-279.21(b)(3) (omitting 

the same in the uninsured provision of the statute). We cannot discern any

underlying policy reason or legislative intent for this omission. However, our canons 

of statutory construction require us to presume that the General Assembly acts with 

full knowledge of prior and existing law. See Ridge Cmty. Inv’rs, Inc., 293 N.C. at

695, 239 S.E.2d at 570. We therefore assume the legislature had full knowledge it 

provided for a credit in the uninsured context from other collateral sources, namely

workers’ compensation benefits, and for underinsured coverage against other liability 

policies, when it authored Subsection (b)(3) and did not provide the same set off for 

uninsured coverage.

¶ 31 We hold GEICO, providing uninsured coverage, was not entitled to a set off for 

payment Ms. Osborne received from Mr. Ashworth’s policy. Thus, we modify the 

judgment of the trial court to order GEICO to pay an additional $30,000 ($160,000 

total) to Ms. Osborne.

C. Bad Faith and Unfair Trade Practices Claims

¶ 32 Ms. Osborne also argues we should reverse the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment on her bad faith refusal to settle and unfair practices claims because there 
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remains a genuine issue of fact about GEICO’s conduct. In the alternative, Ms. 

Osborne requests we remand to the trial court to allow for discovery under Rule 56(f)

of our Rules of Civil Procedure to allow her to develop evidence necessary to maintain 

these claims. We will not.

¶ 33 As reflected by this Court’s detailed analysis of the applicable statutes and the 

language of the policies, the absence of controlling caselaw regarding the difference 

between the set off allowed for underinsured motorist coverage versus uninsured 

motorist coverage, and the trial court’s conclusion allowing a set off for the uninsured 

coverage provider, we cannot conclude that Ms. Osborne has raised or even forecast 

evidence to raise a disputed issue of genuine fact regarding whether GEICO acted in 

bad faith or engaged in unfair trade practices in denying further coverage. 

III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s order granting 

summary judgment to GEICO in part and remand in part for modifications not 

inconsistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART.

Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.