# C_2022213EN.01002202.xml

| 30.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 213/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/22

---

Appeal brought on 2 February 2022 by the European Investment Bank against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 24 November 2021 in Case T-370/20, KL v European Investment Bank

(Case C-68/22 P)

(2022/C 213/31)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Investment Bank (EIB) (represented by: G. Faedo and I. Zanin, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: KL

Form of order sought

By its appeal, the EIB claims that the Court should:

| — | declare the appeal admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-370/20; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-370/20;

| — | if the Court considers that the state of the proceedings so permits, grant the EIB the form of order sought at first instance; |
| --- | --- |

—

if the Court considers that the state of the proceedings so permits, grant the EIB the form of order sought at first instance;

| — | order KL to pay the entirety of the costs at both instances. |
| --- | --- |

—

order KL to pay the entirety of the costs at both instances.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the EIB raises two grounds.

The first ground of appeal, divided into four sub-grounds, concerns the misinterpretation of the EIB’s internal rules on invalidity.

In the first place, the General Court erred in law as regards the concept of invalidity as provided for in Article 46-1 of the transitional pension scheme regulations applicable to EIB staff (TPSR) and Article 11.1 of the EIB’s administrative measures. By finding that the concept of invalidity within the meaning of those articles must be interpreted as referring to an EIB staff member who has been declared, by an invalidity committee established by the EIB, incapable of resuming his or her duties or equivalent duties within that body, the General Court distorted the letter and the content of the EIB’s internal rules and adopted an interpretation which contradicts the purpose of the invalidity pension as a social protection measure.

In the second place, the General Court erred in law in that it excluded the competence of the invalidity committees established by the EIB to rule on the capacity of a staff member of the EIB to carry out activities outside its premises, on the general labour market.

In the third place, the General Court erred in law by interpreting Articles 46-1 of the TPSR and 11.1 of the EIB’s administrative measures on the basis of reasoning by analogy with Article 78 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

In the fourth place, the General Court erred in law by rejecting the EIB’s interpretation of Article 51-1 of the TPSR and by failing to interpret that article in conjunction with Article 46-1 of the TPSR.

The second ground of appeal, divided into two sub-grounds, is based on a dual distortion of the facts.

In the first place, the General Court erred in law by treating as legally binding documents of the Invalidity Committee which were not undersigned by all the members of that committee.

In the second place, the General Court incorrectly assessed the content of the Invalidity Committee’s opinion in so far as it found that the Invalidity Committee had declared that the applicant was incapable of performing duties at the EIB when the forms signed by all the members of that committee declared that the applicant is not invalid.

---