[Cite as State v. Roberts, 137 Ohio St.3d 230, 2013-Ohio-4580.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ROBERTS, APPELLANT.

[Cite as State v. Roberts, 137 Ohio St.3d 230, 2013-Ohio-4580.] 

Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Allocution—Death penalty vacated and 

resentencing ordered.

[No. 2007-2288—Submitted May 7, 2013—Decided October 22, 2013.] 

APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull County, 

No. 01-CR-793. 

____________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} This is a death-penalty direct appeal as of right. A jury convicted 

appellant, Donna Roberts, of the aggravated murder of her former husband, 

Robert Fingerhut, with one death specification. The jury recommended that 

Roberts be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted that recommendation and 

sentenced her to death. However, on appeal we vacated the death sentence and 

remanded to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court again 

sentenced Roberts to death. For the following reasons, we are again compelled to 

vacate Roberts’s sentence of death and to remand this case for resentencing. 

Facts 

{¶ 2} Our previous decision in this case sets forth the facts in detail. State 

v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 1-86 

(“Roberts I”). For purposes of this opinion, we summarize the facts as follows. 

{¶ 3} Roberts lived with Robert Fingerhut, her former husband, in 

Howland Township, Trumbull County. Fingerhut, who operated Greyhound 

bus terminals in Warren and Youngstown, owned two insurance policies on his 

life, both of which named Roberts as sole beneficiary. The total benefit of the 

two policies was $550,000. 
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{¶ 4} At some point, Roberts began an affair with Nathaniel Jackson.1 

In 2001, the affair was interrupted by Jackson’s confinement in the Lorain 

Correctional Institution. 

{¶ 5} While Jackson was in prison, he and Roberts exchanged 

numerous letters and spoke on the telephone. Prison authorities recorded 18 of 

their telephone conversations. 

{¶ 6} Passages from the Roberts-Jackson correspondence and the 

recorded phone conversations indicated a plot between the two to murder 

Fingerhut. Jackson repeatedly pledged to kill Fingerhut upon Jackson’s release 

from prison. In one letter, Roberts complained about Fingerhut’s maintaining 

control of her finances and urged Jackson to “[d]o whatever you want to him 

ASAP.” At Jackson’s request, Roberts purchased a ski mask and a pair of 

gloves for Jackson to use during the murder.

{¶ 7} Jackson was released from prison on December 9, 2001. Roberts 

drove to Lorain to pick him up, spent that night with him in a motel, and spent 

much of the next two days with him as well. On December 11, 2001, Fingerhut 

was shot to death at home. 

Indictment, Trial, and Verdict

{¶ 8} Roberts was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder, in 

violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) (prior calculation and design) and (B) (felony 

murder). Both counts carried two death specifications under R.C. 

2929.04(A)(7): one charging murder during an aggravated burglary and one 

charging murder during an aggravated robbery. The indictment also charged 

aggravated burglary, R.C. 2911.11, with a firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145, 

and aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01, also with a firearm specification. The 

jury found Roberts guilty of all counts and specifications. After trial, the 

 

1. Jackson was also convicted of murdering Fingerhut and sentenced to death. State v. 

Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-1, 839 N.E.2d 362. 
January Term, 2013 

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state elected to proceed on Count One (prior calculation and design) for 

sentencing purposes, and the trial court dismissed Count Two (felony murder) 

and its specifications. 

Sentencing

{¶ 9} Before the mitigation hearing, Roberts informed her counsel that 

she did not wish to present any mitigating evidence except an unsworn 

statement. After a hearing pursuant to State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 

N.E.2d 1231 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus, the trial judge determined 

that Roberts was competent to make that decision. 

{¶ 10} At the mitigation hearing, Roberts exercised her right under R.C. 

2929.03(D)(1) to make an unsworn statement to the jury. She elected to 

present no other evidence. In compliance with Roberts’s instructions, defense 

counsel waived opening statement and closing argument. The jury 

recommended a death sentence, and the trial court sentenced Roberts to death. 

Previous Appeal 

{¶ 11} On direct appeal, we affirmed Roberts’s convictions of aggravated 

murder and both death specifications. We also overruled a proposition of law in 

which Roberts attacked the validity of her waiver of mitigation. However, we 

vacated the death sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for 

resentencing because the trial judge had improperly allowed the prosecutor to 

participate in drafting the sentencing opinion and in doing so, had engaged in ex 

parte communications with the prosecutor. Roberts I, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-

Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, at ¶ 153-164. We directed the trial court “to afford 

Roberts her right to allocute,” to “personally review and evaluate the evidence 

[and] weigh the aggravating circumstances against any relevant mitigating 

evidence,” and to “determine anew the appropriateness of the death penalty.” 

We further instructed the trial court to “personally prepare an entirely new 
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penalty opinion * * * and conduct whatever other proceedings are required by 

law and consistent with this opinion.” Id. at ¶ 167. 

Sentencing Proceedings on Remand 

{¶ 12} On remand, the defense filed a motion to allow Roberts to fully 

present mitigation at the sentencing rehearing. The trial court denied the motion. 

However, Roberts proffered her evidence into the record. This consisted of her 

prison records, a Social Security disability claim file documenting Roberts’s head 

injury after a 1999 motor-vehicle accident, an affidavit by a psychologist giving 

his preliminary opinion that Roberts suffered from Bipolar Type II Disorder 

(manic-depressive illness), and a letter about Roberts from her son. 

{¶ 13} At a hearing on October 22, 2007, the trial court heard Roberts’s 

allocution. One week later, after asking Roberts if she had anything further to 

say, and after hearing argument from defense counsel, the trial court sentenced 

Roberts to death and filed its sentencing opinion pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F). 

{¶ 14} Roberts presents seven propositions of law for our consideration. 

Her second proposition of law, which claims that the trial court failed to consider 

her allocution in sentencing her to death, has merit. Accordingly, we sustain it, 

and we remand this case to the trial court for consideration of Roberts’s 

allocution when weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating 

factors. 

I. Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence on Limited Remand 

{¶ 15} In her first proposition of law, Roberts contends that the trial court 

erred by precluding her from presenting mitigating evidence on remand. 

{¶ 16} Before the resentencing hearing, Roberts filed a motion to allow 

her to present mitigation at the resentencing hearing. In her motion, Roberts 

argued that she was entitled to “fully develop her mitigation for the evaluation of 

[the trial court] at her sentencing re-hearing.” The trial court denied the motion. 
January Term, 2013 

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{¶ 17} After the motion was denied, the defense proffered the following 

four items, which would have been adduced in mitigation had the trial court 

granted the motion: 

{¶ 18} (1) Roberts’s prison records, which document her bipolar disorder, 

depression, and an incident of hallucination during her time in prison. 

{¶ 19} (2) A file documenting a Social Security disability claim that 

Roberts had filed after being injured in a 1999 motor-vehicle accident. This file 

also contains a diagnosis that Roberts suffered from a bipolar disorder. 

{¶ 20} (3) An affidavit by James Eisenberg, Ph.D., a psychologist, who 

had reviewed Roberts’s records and formed a preliminary opinion that Roberts 

suffered from Bipolar Type II Disorder, also known as manic-depressive illness, 

probably beginning in childhood. According to Dr. Eisenberg, this disorder 

“causes unusual shifts in a person’s mood, energy, and ability to function.” Its 

symptoms include poor judgment; aggressive behavior; extreme irritability; 

inappropriate, intense, or uncontrolled anger; and “frantic efforts to avoid 

abandonment, either real or imagined.” 

{¶ 21} (4) A letter from Michael Raymond, Roberts’s son, extolling his 

mother’s character, setting forth some of the history of her life before the murder, 

and pleading that her life be spared. 

{¶ 22} Roberts contends that the trial court’s refusal to consider this 

proffered evidence before resentencing her violated the Eighth Amendment. 

A. Roberts’s Eighth Amendment Claim 

{¶ 23} It is a well-established tenet of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 

that the sentencer in a capital case may “not be precluded from considering, as a 

mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the 

circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 

less than death.” (Emphasis sic.) Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 

2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion). Moreover, “[j]ust as the State 
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may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, 

neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant 

mitigating evidence.” (Emphasis sic.) Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-

114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). See also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 

393, 398-399, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). 

{¶ 24} In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 

L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), the court held that a capital defendant had an Eighth 

Amendment right to introduce, at his sentencing hearing, “testimony * * * 

regarding his good behavior during the over seven months he spent in jail 

awaiting trial.” Such evidence was “relevant evidence in mitigation” because 

the jury could have drawn favorable inferences from this testimony 

regarding petitioner's character and his probable future conduct if 

sentenced to life in prison. * * * [T]here is no question but that 

such inferences would be “mitigating” in the sense that they might 

serve “as a basis for a sentence less than death.” * * * [E]vidence 

that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but 

incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating. Under 

Eddings, such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer’s 

consideration. 

Id. at 4-5, quoting Lockett at 604. 

{¶ 25} Roberts contends that the trial court committed constitutional error 

by denying her motion to allow full presentation of mitigation at the resentencing, 

because the Eighth Amendment—as interpreted in Lockett, Eddings, and 

Skipper—entitled her to introduce mitigating evidence before the trial judge on 

remand. 
January Term, 2013 

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{¶ 26} We rejected a similar claim in State v. Davis, 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 584 

N.E.2d 1192 (1992) (“Davis II”). Davis had been tried to a three-judge panel and 

sentenced to death in 1984. State v. Davis, 38 Ohio St.3d 361, 528 N.E.2d 925 

(1988) (“Davis I”). On Davis’s initial appeal, we “affirmed [his] conviction, but 

* * * reversed [his] death sentence based upon errors which occurred after all 

available mitigating evidence had been heard in the penalty phase of [his] trial.” 

Davis II at 44. We then remanded the case to the original three-judge panel for a 

resentencing hearing. Id. 

{¶ 27} At the hearing on remand, the trial court did not permit Davis to 

introduce evidence concerning his adjustment to prison life after his conviction 

and sentencing. Nor was Davis permitted to present expert testimony providing a 

“ ‘psychological update’ ” covering the period since his conviction and 

sentencing. Id. Instead, the panel “limit[ed] its consideration to the evidence 

presented in mitigation at appellant’s 1984 trial” and reimposed the death 

sentence on Davis. Id. at 44-45. 

{¶ 28} We affirmed, rejecting Davis’s argument that Lockett, Eddings, 

Skipper, and Hitchcock entitled him to a new sentencing hearing. We 

distinguished Skipper by noting that it involved the erroneous exclusion of 

“evidence of Skipper’s good prison record between his arrest and trial.” 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 46. In contrast, 

no relevant mitigating evidence was excluded from consideration 

by the panel during the mitigation phase of appellant’s 1984 trial. 

All mitigating evidence which was available at that time was duly 

received and considered by the panel including appellant’s ability 

to adjust to prison life. That same relevant evidence was again 

received and considered by the panel in 1989 for purposes of 

resentencing appellant. The evidence excluded from consideration 
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* * * at appellant’s resentencing hearing concerned certain posttrial matters. 

(Emphasis sic.) Id.

{¶ 29} We considered the same issue in State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 

709 N.E.2d 1166 (1999). In Chinn, the defendant was sentenced to death after a 

jury trial. The court of appeals determined, however, that the trial judge had 

committed errors in performing his functions under R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) and (F)—

i.e., in his independent evaluation of the sentence and in writing the sentencing 

opinion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment as to all other 

issues. 

{¶ 30} Like the appellant in Davis, Chinn argued that Lockett, Skipper, 

and Hitchcock entitled him to present new mitigating evidence on remand. We 

again rejected that argument: 

[E]ach of those cases involved a situation where the capital 

sentencer was prohibited, in some form or another, from 

considering relevant mitigating evidence at trial. * * * [N]o 

relevant mitigating evidence was ever excluded from consideration 

during the penalty phase of [Chinn’s] 1989 trial. Therefore, the 

case at bar is clearly distinguishable from * * * Lockett, Skipper,

and Hitchcock. Accordingly, as was the case in State v. Davis

(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1194-1195, we 

find Lockett, Skipper, and Hitchcock to be inapplicable here. It is 

of no consequence that the additional mitigating evidence in Davis

involved post-trial accomplishments, whereas appellant's 

additional mitigation evidence involves matters appellant claims he 

could have presented but did not present during the mitigation 
January Term, 2013 

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phase of his 1989 trial. In this case, as in Davis, the errors 

requiring resentencing occurred after the close of the mitigation 

phase of the trial. Under these circumstances, the trial court is to 

proceed on remand from the point at which the error occurred. 

Chinn at 564-565. 

{¶ 31} Since our decision in Chinn, the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Sixth Circuit has addressed this issue in habeas corpus proceedings involving 

the Davis case. In Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761 (6th Cir.2007), the Sixth Circuit 

held that the three-judge panel’s decision to exclude posttrial mitigation evidence 

from Davis’s resentencing hearing violated his Eighth Amendment rights and that 

our affirmance of that ruling in Davis II, “based on the court’s belief that the facts 

of Davis’s case could be distinguished from Skipper’s solely on the basis of 

timing, was both an unreasonable application of the decision in Skipper and 

contrary to the holding in that opinion and its antecedent cases.” Id. at 773. 

{¶ 32} Coyle states that “the holding in Skipper that a defendant ‘be 

permitted to present any and all relevant mitigating evidence that is available’ 

* * * requires that, at resentencing, a trial court must consider any new evidence 

that the defendant has developed since the initial sentencing hearing.” Id. at 774, 

quoting Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1. Accord Creech v. 

Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 881-882 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 

197, 199-203, 731 P.2d 192 (1986). See also Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 

1028, 1032-1035 (11th Cir.1994) (assuming, without discussion, that Lockett

requires a trial court to allow new evidence on remand); State v. Tison, 160 Ariz. 

501, 502, 774 P.2d 805 (1989) (case remanded for resentencing; remand order 

specified, without discussion, that “[e]ither party may offer additional evidence of 

aggravation or mitigation applicable in each case as of the time of the hearing”). 
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{¶ 33} As the state points out, we are “not bound by rulings on federal 

statutory or constitutional law made by a federal court other than the United 

States Supreme Court.” State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 424, 755 N.E.2d 857 

(2001). Hence, we are not obliged to follow Coyle. We are, however, free to 

consider whether Coyle is persuasive and whether it is on point in this case. 

{¶ 34} We begin by noting, as we did in Davis II and Chinn, that Lockett, 

Eddings, Skipper, and Hitchcock are all distinguishable from this case. Each case 

in the Lockett-Eddings-Skipper-Hitchcock tetralogy involved the trial court’s 

exclusion of, or refusal to consider, evidence in the original sentencing 

proceeding. None of these cases involved a proceeding on remand. This case, 

like Davis II and Chinn, involves a proceeding on remand for the limited purpose 

of correcting an error that occurred after the defendant had had a full, unlimited 

opportunity to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer. 

{¶ 35} In other words, neither Lockett nor any of its progeny required the 

trial court to reopen the evidence after an error-free evidentiary hearing had 

already taken place. See Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d at 564-565, 709 N.E.2d 1166. 

“[T]he issue in this case is whether the presentation of evidence of mitigating 

* * * factors must be reopened when a death sentence is reversed for a reason 

unrelated to the presentation of evidence. None of the Supreme Court cases cited 

by the majority supports that premise.” Coyle, 475 F.3d at 782 (Gibbons, J., 

concurring). 

{¶ 36} In a case in which the defendant was not deprived of any 

constitutional right—including her Eighth Amendment right to present 

mitigation—at the time of her mitigation hearing, there seems to be no basis for 

requiring the trial court to reopen or supplement that evidence in a later 

proceeding. To hold, as Coyle does, that a new mitigation hearing must be held, 

even though no constitutional error infected the original one, would transform the 
January Term, 2013 

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right to present relevant mitigation into a right to update one’s mitigation. Such a 

right has no clear basis in Lockett or its progeny. 

{¶ 37} Establishing a right to update mitigation could result in arbitrary 

distinctions between similarly situated capital defendants. A defendant who had 

an error-free mitigation hearing could not update his mitigation—no matter how 

compelling the new mitigation that might be available to him—if the trial judge 

committed no error after the mitigation hearing that called for the case to be 

remanded. But another defendant, whose mitigation hearing was equally free of 

error, would have the right to update his mitigation in the event that a posthearing 

sentencing error took place that required a remand. 

{¶ 38} Furthermore, as we noted in Davis II, the right to update mitigation 

would imply that a capital defendant appealing his death sentence would have a 

right to present new mitigation to the appellate court. Davis II, 63 Ohio St.3d at 

46, 584 N.E.2d 1192, fn.2. Under R.C. 2929.05(A), this court (and, in pre-1995 

cases, the court of appeals) has the obligation to independently review the death 

sentence.2

 Hence, a reviewing court could be considered a “sentencer” for 

Lockett purposes. 

 

2. The court of appeals and the supreme court shall review the judgment in the case 

and the sentence of death imposed by the court or panel of three judges in the 

same manner that they review other criminal cases, except that they shall review 

and independently weigh all of the facts and other evidence disclosed in the 

record in the case and consider the offense and the offender to determine 

whether the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of 

committing outweigh the mitigating factors in the case, and whether the 

sentence of death is appropriate. * * * The court of appeals, in a case in which a 

sentence of death was imposed for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, 

or the supreme court shall affirm a sentence of death only if the particular court 

is persuaded from the record that the aggravating circumstances the offender 

was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors present in the 

case and that the sentence of death is the appropriate sentence in the case. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.05(A). 
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{¶ 39} For the foregoing reasons, we adhere to our precedent in Davis II

and Chinn. Accordingly, we reject Roberts’s claim that the Eighth Amendment 

required the trial court to admit Roberts’s proffered mitigation. 

B. The Trial Court’s Compliance with the Remand Order in Roberts I 

{¶ 40} Having rejected Roberts’s Eighth Amendment claim, we will 

briefly consider certain points not argued by Roberts, but set forth in the 

concurring and dissenting opinion. 

{¶ 41} The concurring and dissenting opinion asserts that by refusing to 

admit Roberts’s proffered mitigation evidence, the trial court failed to comply 

with the instructions we issued in Roberts I when we remanded this case to the 

trial court for the first time.3

 Id. at ¶ 99. The concurring and dissenting opinion 

interprets Roberts I as ordering the trial court to hold a new mitigation hearing 

and to permit Roberts to introduce mitigating evidence. 

{¶ 42} Roberts I did no such thing. In Roberts I, we instructed the trial 

court as follows: 

On remand, the trial judge will afford Roberts her right to allocute, 

and the trial court shall personally review and evaluate the 

evidence, weigh the aggravating circumstances against any 

relevant mitigating evidence, and determine anew the 

appropriateness of the death penalty as required by R.C. 2929.03. 

The trial court will then personally prepare an entirely new penalty 

opinion as required by R.C. 2929.03(F) and conduct whatever 

other proceedings are required by law and consistent with this 

opinion. 

 

3. Roberts asserts that our order in Roberts I did not prohibit the admission of new mitigating 

evidence on remand, but she does not contend that the order actually required the trial court to 

admit such evidence. 
January Term, 2013 

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110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 167. 

{¶ 43} The above order says nothing about holding a new evidentiary 

hearing. Nor is a requirement to hold a new evidentiary hearing implicit in our 

instructing the trial court to “weigh the aggravating circumstances against any 

relevant mitigating evidence” and “determine anew the appropriateness of the 

death penalty.” Relevant mitigating evidence may be found in the guilt phase, as 

well as in the penalty phase. Indeed, R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) requires the trial court 

to consider “any evidence raised at trial” that is relevant “to any factors in 

mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death.”4

 

{¶ 44} Moreover, the remand order in Roberts I must be read against the 

backdrop of our precedents in Davis II and Chinn. In Davis II, a death sentence 

had been reversed, and the case remanded for resentencing, because of errors that 

occurred after mitigating evidence had been heard in the penalty phase. On 

appeal from remand, we rejected the claim that the trial court had erred by 

limiting its consideration to the evidence presented in the original mitigation 

hearing. Davis II, 63 Ohio St.3d at 45-46, 584 N.E.2d 1192. 

{¶ 45} In Chinn, we adhered to Davis II and held that when “errors 

requiring resentencing occurred after the close of the mitigation phase,” the 

correct procedure was for the trial court “to proceed on remand from the point at 

which the error occurred.” Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d at 565, 709 N.E.2d 1166. 

Indeed, we stated that “the trial court was required to proceed on remand from the 

 

4. We have repeatedly recognized that the sentencer may glean relevant mitigating evidence from 

the guilt phase. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 101 Ohio St.3d 216, 2004-Ohio-783, 804 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 80 

(quoting R.C. 2929.03(D)(1)); State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 

433, ¶ 208 (“much of the trial-phase evidence was relevant to * * * the nature and circumstances 

of the offense, and the mitigating factors”); State v. Barton, 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, 

844 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 49 (capital defendant elicited mitigating testimony on cross-examination of 

prosecution witnesses during the guilt phase of the trial). 
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point at which the errors had occurred, i.e., after the jury had returned its 

recommendation of death.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 564. 

{¶ 46} The trial court was bound by those precedents, as well as by our 

remand order in Roberts I. Roberts I neither overruled nor modified Davis II or 

Chinn and did not order the trial court to hold a new penalty-phase evidentiary 

hearing, Thus, Roberts I cannot reasonably be understood as imposing a 

requirement that Davis II and Chinn had expressly declined to impose. 

{¶ 47} The concurring and dissenting opinion also points out that Roberts 

“proffered four items in mitigation, only one of which dealt with her conduct in 

prison.” Id. at ¶ 99. While this is true, it lends no support to the claim that she 

should have been allowed a fresh opportunity to submit mitigating evidence on 

remand. 

{¶ 48} As we stated in Chinn, “[i]t is of no consequence that the additional 

mitigating evidence in Davis involved post-trial accomplishments, whereas 

appellant’s additional mitigation evidence involves matters appellant claims he 

could have presented but did not present during the mitigation phase of his 1989 

trial.” (Emphasis sic.) Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d at 564-565, 709 N.E.2d 1166. In 

neither case is a capital defendant entitled to present such evidence on remand 

when “the errors requiring resentencing occurred after the close of the mitigation 

phase of the trial.” Id. at 565. 

{¶ 49} Additionally, mitigation evidence pertaining to events that took 

place before trial could have been presented to the trial court during Roberts’s 

original mitigation hearing in 2003. Instead of doing so at that time, Roberts 

expressly and validly waived her right to present mitigation.5

 Thus, the case for 

 

5. In Roberts I, we considered and rejected Roberts’s claim that the waiver was invalid, 110 Ohio 

St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, at ¶ 132-145, and her claim that she did not receive 

effective assistance of counsel in connection with the waiver, id. at ¶ 146-148. 
January Term, 2013 

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admitting proffered mitigation involving events that took place before trial is, if 

anything, weaker than the case for admitting posttrial prison records. 

{¶ 50} For all of the foregoing reasons, we overrule Roberts’s first 

proposition of law. 

II. The Trial Court’s Failure to Consider Roberts’s Allocution 

{¶ 51} In her second proposition of law, Roberts contends that the trial 

court failed to consider her allocution in determining the sentence. 

{¶ 52} Pursuant to our mandate, the trial judge invited Roberts to make a 

statement in allocution at the hearing on October 22, 2007, and Roberts did. One 

week later, on October 29, the trial court imposed sentence and filed its 

sentencing opinion. Before imposing sentence, the trial court heard a brief 

statement from Roberts’s counsel and asked Roberts if she had anything further to 

say. The trial court then stated that it had considered the record and the oral 

statements. The sentencing opinion notes that the trial court had been instructed 

to provide Roberts with the right of allocution before reimposing a sentence. 

Beyond this, however, the opinion does not discuss Roberts’s allocution. 

{¶ 53} Roberts contends that the trial court’s failure to discuss the 

allocution in its opinion shows that the trial court failed to consider her allocution. 

This alleged failure, Roberts claims, violated the Eighth Amendment’s 

requirement that the sentencer in a capital case consider all relevant mitigation. 

See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1. 

{¶ 54} We have previously rejected claims that a trial court’s failure to 

mention particular mitigating factors in a sentencing opinion obliges a reviewing 

court to infer that the trial court failed to consider those factors. “Appellant 

erroneously assumes that evidence that is not specifically mentioned in an opinion 

was not considered. While a sentencing court must consider all evidence of 

mitigation, it need not discuss each [allegedly mitigating] factor individually.” 
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State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 102, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995), citing Parker v. 

Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 314-315, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991). 

{¶ 55} Nevertheless, we conclude that the particular circumstances of this 

case warrant the inference that the trial judge did, in fact, fail to consider 

Roberts’s allocution in sentencing her to death. 

{¶ 56} To begin with, Roberts’s allocution was the only relevant matter 

that was specifically placed before the trial court as mitigation. At her original 

mitigation hearing in 2003, Roberts had elected to present no evidence. Although 

she had given an unsworn statement before the jury, that statement contained no 

mitigation; indeed, Roberts had used it to insist that a sentence of death be 

imposed upon her. See Roberts I, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 

N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 137 and 148. And although Roberts tried to present mitigating 

evidence during the proceedings on remand, that attempt was (properly, as we 

hold today) overruled by the trial court. The trial court did find one mitigating 

factor in the guilt-phase record.6

 But this merely underscores the fact that nothing 

was placed before the trial court for the specific purpose of mitigating the 

sentence—except Roberts’s statement in allocution. 

{¶ 57} And this statement contained much information whose relevance as 

mitigation was clear. For instance, Roberts stated that she grew up in a “very 

very abusive” household, in which her father abused her mother physically and 

verbally and in which “guns came out” at times during household disputes. 

Roberts claimed that when she was very young, her cousin raped her. Roberts 

also said that she “always felt empty” because she never received any attention or 

affection. 

 

6. The trial court found, in Roberts’s letters to Jackson, indications that Fingerhut “may have been 

physically abusive to her,” which the court considered relevant to the mitigating factors listed in 

R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim-induced or facilitated offense) and (2) (duress, coercion, or strong 

provocation). The trial court gave this factor “very slight weight.” 
January Term, 2013 

17 

{¶ 58} Roberts recounted a long history of motor-vehicle accidents and 

resulting injuries, including injuries to her head, that she claimed affected her 

mental health. In 1963, 1983, and 1999, Roberts said, she was involved in 

accidents serious enough to put her in the hospital. After the 1963 accident, she 

said, she was “spacey for awhile.” In the 1983 collision, she was thrown through 

a windshield. She went to a neurosurgeon for many months after that accident. 

{¶ 59} In 1999, Roberts was involved in an accident that demolished her 

car. Roberts remembered being in the hospital, but after that she could not 

remember anything “for a long time.” Roberts said that Fingerhut “was really 

worried” about her because she was acting “spacey” and “goofy.” After this last 

accident, Roberts stated, she suffered from depression. She attempted suicide and 

was hospitalized in a psychiatric ward. She suffered from auditory hallucinations 

that were successfully treated with Risperdal.7

 

{¶ 60} After the suicide attempt, Roberts began falling down repeatedly, 

hitting her head, and losing track of what day it was. Eventually, Roberts said, 

Fingerhut made her “go to Social Security,” and she was sent to a psychiatrist. 

{¶ 61} In her allocution, Roberts also cited examples of her selflessness 

and contributions to society. Roberts worked “almost 23 years” in a plastic 

surgeon’s office and “helped a lot of people” during that time. She also 

volunteered to go to Israel, along with her employer, to treat wounded soldiers. 

She recounted how, after her conversion to Judaism, she had raised funds to 

rescue a person from Ethiopia who was in danger of being murdered for his 

religious beliefs. She said that when she ran the restaurant in the bus terminal, 

she gave food and money to people who were short of money at the end of the 

month. She also gave several thousand dollars to help her sisters and her son. 

 

7. According to Roberts, when she went to prison and stopped taking Risperdal, she hallucinated 

“giant anthills.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

{¶ 62} Lockett explains that the category of relevant mitigating factors 

includes “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 

circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 

less than death.” 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973. A court may 

“exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior 

record, or the circumstances of his offense.” Id. at 605, fn. 12. See also Brown v. 

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 149-150, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005) (Souter, 

J., dissenting) (“it was settled law that a capital defendant has a plenary right to 

present evidence going to any aspect of [the defendant’s] character, background, 

or record * * * that might justify a sentence less than death”); Skipper v. South 

Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). The information 

contained in Roberts’s allocution was clearly relevant under this definition. 

{¶ 63} We note, too, that our opinion in Roberts I specifically called the 

matter of allocution to the attention of the trial judge. When we remanded this 

case to the trial court, we did so with the following instruction: “The trial court 

shall provide Roberts with her right of allocution before imposing any new 

sentence.”8

 Roberts I, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, 

¶ 166. 

{¶ 64} When we consider the presence of relevant and potentially 

significant mitigation in Roberts’s allocution, the utter lack of anything else 

offered for the specific purpose of mitigation, and our order specifically calling 

the matter of allocution to the trial judge’s attention, we can hardly conclude that 

the trial court’s failure to mention the allocution in its sentencing opinion was a 

mere oversight. Given these unusual circumstances, we are justified in drawing 

 

8. In the original appeal, Roberts alleged that she had not been asked whether she wished to make 

a statement in allocution and that this omission violated Crim.R. 11. Because we had vacated 

Roberts’s original death sentence on other grounds, we held her allocution claim moot. Roberts I

at ¶ 165-166. 
January Term, 2013 

19 

the inference that when the trial judge weighed the aggravating circumstances 

against the mitigating factors, he did not consider Roberts’s allocution.9 

{¶ 65} This failure violated the Eighth Amendment. Unquestionably, the 

allocution contained information relevant to mitigation. That information (unlike 

the evidence discussed in relation to Roberts’s first proposition of law) was 

properly before the court. The court could not, therefore, refuse to consider it.10 

“The sentencer * * * may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating 

evidence. But [it] may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from 

[its] consideration.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1. 

{¶ 66} Our decisions have acknowledged the importance of allocution in 

capital cases. In State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 323-326, 738 N.E.2d 1178 

(2000), and State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 358-360, 738 N.E.2d 1208 (2000), 

we remanded capital cases for resentencing because the trial courts had failed to 

comply with Crim.R. 32(A)(1). “Trial courts must painstakingly adhere to 

Crim.R. 32, guaranteeing the right of allocution. A Crim.R. 32 inquiry is much 

more than an empty ritual: it represents a defendant's last opportunity to plead his 

case or express remorse.” Green at 359-360. In a capital case, the denial of 

allocution can undermine the “constitutional reliability” of a death sentence. Id. 

at 360. 

{¶ 67} We recognize, as the dissent notes at ¶ 114, that the allocution 

under Crim.R. 32(A)(1) is unsworn and thus may not technically amount to 

evidence. See Evid.R. 603 (witness testimony must be preceded by oath or 

 

9. The dissent suggests that drawing this inference is inconsistent with Phillips. Dissenting 

opinion at ¶ 112-113 and 115-116. As we discussed above, Phillips states a general rule. But this 

case presents exceptional circumstances, which the dissent does not take into account, that justify 

a narrow exception to the general rule. 

10. The dissent’s contention that there is no constitutional right to allocution, dissenting opinion at 

¶ 104, is beside the point. Once a capital defendant has used her state-law right of allocution to 

place constitutionally relevant mitigating factors before the sentencer, the Eighth Amendment does 

not permit the sentencer to disregard that mitigation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

20 

affirmation). However, the dissent concludes that the information contained 

therein is therefore not relevant to weighing the aggravating circumstances against 

the mitigating factors. Dissenting opinion at ¶ 110 and 116. This conclusion is 

incorrect. In the context of capital sentencing, as Lockett makes plain, relevant 

information has to do with content, not form. We do not believe that a sentencer 

is licensed to ignore constitutionally relevant mitigating factors brought before the 

sentencer in accordance with state law, simply because they come labeled 

“allocution” instead of “evidence.”11 

{¶ 68} People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159 (Colo.1990), exemplifies this point. 

In Davis, the trial court had instructed the jury that the defendant’s penalty-phase 

unsworn statement12 was not evidence. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized 

that this was “technically correct” because the statement, which was unsworn, 

was not evidence under Colorado law. However, 

in the sentencing phase of a capital case, the jury is not limited to 

consideration of matters technically defined as evidence. In 

making the profoundly moral decision of whether to impose a 

sentence of death, it must consider all the facts and circumstances 

of the crime, the defendant’s background and character and any 

mitigating factors raised by the defendant. 

 

11. The dissent states that we have “confuse[d] allocution—which is not evidence—with the 

opportunity to present an unsworn statement in the penalty phase of the trial and the right to 

present mitigating evidence to the jurors or fact-finders.” Dissenting opinion at ¶ 114. We have 

not. We simply disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that because an allocution is unsworn, it is 

irrelevant to sentencing. Indeed, if that were so, there would have been no reason to remand in 

Campbell and Green. 

12. Davis called the defendant’s penalty-phase statement an “allocution,” consistent with Colorado 

precedent deriving the right to make an unsworn statement to the jury in a capital case from the 

right to allocution provided in Colorado’s version of Crim.R. 32. See 794 P.2d at 191, citing 

People v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854, 856 (Colo.1989). 
January Term, 2013 

21 

Id. at 192. The court then proceeded to evaluate the likelihood that a reasonable 

juror would interpret the trial court’s instructions to prevent consideration of the 

defendant’s statement. Id. at 192-193. Even though the defendant’s unsworn 

statement lacked the status of evidence under Colorado evidentiary law, Davis

regarded that statement as “constitutionally relevant evidence” for Eighth 

Amendment purposes: 

[O]ur examination of the instructions as a whole, as well as the 

context of the sentencing hearing, leads us to conclude that there is 

not a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury applied instructions No. 

1 and No. 4 in a manner preventing it from considering 

constitutionally relevant evidence. On the contrary, reasonable 

jurors would have properly understood that they should consider 

fully the statement offered by the defendant in allocution. 

(Footnote omitted.) 794 P.2d at 193. We cannot, therefore, agree with the 

dissent’s contention that “[b]ecause the allocution offered by Roberts prior to the 

imposition of sentence is not evidence, it has no significance in establishing any 

mitigating factor.” Dissenting opinion at ¶ 116. 

{¶ 69} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court failed to 

consider Roberts’s allocution and that this error violated the Eighth Amendment. 

That leaves us with the question of how to remedy the error. In Phillips, we 

stated: “[E]ven if ‘the trial court in this case should have more explicitly analyzed 

the mitigating evidence,’ this court’s independent reweighing will rectify the 

error.” 74 Ohio St.3d at 102, 656 N.E.2d 643, quoting State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 

160, 171, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). 

{¶ 70} In State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984), we 

used independent review to rectify a trial court’s failure to enunciate its reasoning. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

22 

There, we observed that the very purpose of an independent appellate review of 

death sentences is, “at least in part, to correct such omissions.” Id. at 247. 

{¶ 71} However, we also cautioned: 

In so holding, we do not intend to trivialize the duty of the 

trial court under R.C. 2929.03(F) to articulate its reasoning or to 

suggest that such an omission is insignificant. It is not. The 

failure of a trial court to comply with this aspect of R.C. 

2929.03(F) disrupts the review procedures enacted by the General 

Assembly by depriving the defendant and subsequent reviewing 

courts of the trial court’s perceptions as to the weight accorded all 

relevant circumstances. In a closer case, those perceptions could 

make a difference in the manner in which a defendant pursues his 

appeal and in which a reviewing court makes its determination. 

Id. 

{¶ 72} This case presents the closer call that we anticipated in Maurer.

13 

We find that the sentencing opinion is so inadequate as to severely handicap our 

ability to exercise our power of independent review. Accordingly, we must 

vacate Roberts’s sentence of death and remand this case for resentencing. 

{¶ 73} On remand, the trial court is to review the entire record, including 

Roberts’s allocution of October 22, 2007. The trial court shall consider the entire 

record—again, including the allocution—in determining whether the aggravating 

circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

trial court shall then write and file a sentencing opinion pursuant to R.C. 

2929.03(F) reflecting that it has complied with these instructions. 

 

13. The dissent, in stressing the role of independent review in curing errors by the sentencing 

court, fails to take account of Maurer. 
January Term, 2013 

23 

{¶ 74} In accordance with our holding as to Roberts’s first proposition of 

law, Roberts is not entitled to present any further evidence on remand. Moreover, 

because Roberts has been given her opportunity to make allocution pursuant to 

Crim.R. 32, she is not entitled to make another one. 

{¶ 75} Finally, while the trial court must consider Roberts’s allocution, 

nothing in today’s opinion should be interpreted as a determination that the 

matters discussed in her allocution are true or that the trial court must afford them 

any particular weight. It is for the trial court to determine in the first instance 

what mitigating factors, if any, are present in the case, and what weight, if any, 

they should be given. 

{¶ 76} Roberts’s second proposition of law is sustained. 

III. Nonstatutory Aggravating Circumstances in Sentencing Opinion 

{¶ 77} In her third proposition of law, Roberts contends that the trial 

court’s sentencing opinion demonstrates that the trial court erroneously 

considered nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in sentencing her to death. 

Inasmuch as the trial court, on remand, will be required to write a new sentencing 

opinion, we find that Roberts’s third proposition of law is moot. 

IV. Denial of Recusal Motion 

{¶ 78} In her fourth proposition of law, Roberts contends that the trial 

judge should have recused himself from her resentencing. However, during the 

pendency of this appeal, the trial judge died. Because we are remanding this case 

for resentencing, which necessarily will be conducted by a different judge, we 

find that Roberts’s fourth proposition of law is moot. 

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶ 79} In her fifth proposition of law, Roberts contends that her counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance at her 2003 mitigation hearing. She argues that 

her counsel “fail[ed] to fully investigate and present all possible evidence of 

mitigation.” Specifically, Roberts complains that trial counsel failed to discover 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24 

and present information contained in her Social Security file and in a letter to the 

trial court written by her son, both of which she proffered to the trial court on 

remand in 2007. The state argues that Roberts’s current ineffective-assistance 

claim with regard to the mitigation hearing is barred by res judicata, inasmuch as 

Roberts did not raise it on her original appeal to this court. 

{¶ 80} In light of our disposition remanding this case to the trial court for 

resentencing, we decline to address Roberts’s fifth proposition of law at this time. 

If Roberts receives a death sentence on resentencing, the parties may present these 

arguments (including the state’s res judicata argument) to us for review on the 

ensuing direct appeal. 

VI. Competency to Stand Trial 

{¶ 81} Roberts’s sixth and seventh propositions of law address her 

competency to stand trial during the mitigation hearing in 2003 and during the 

resentencing proceedings on remand in 2007. See generally R.C. 2945.37 

(establishing standards and procedures for adjudicating defendant’s competency 

to stand trial). 

A. Competency during the 2007 Resentencing 

{¶ 82} A defendant is competent to stand trial if she has sufficient present 

ability to consult with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding and has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the 

proceedings against her. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 

L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). In her sixth proposition of law, Roberts contends that the 

state failed to prove that she met the standard of competency during her 2007 

resentencing proceeding. 

{¶ 83} Roberts contends that “[t]he trial court may not conduct a 

sentencing hearing for a death-eligible defendant where the record does not 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is legally 

competent,” that “there was insufficient evidence of her ability to assist counsel in 
January Term, 2013 

25 

preparation for the hearing,” and that “[w]ithout evidence that Roberts could

properly assist counsel, the [sentencing] hearing should not have been 

conducted.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 84} Roberts’s argument misallocates the burden of persuasion. R.C. 

2945.37(G) provides: 

A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. If, 

after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 

that, because of the defendant’s present mental condition, the 

defendant is incapable of understanding the nature and objective of 

the proceedings against the defendant or of assisting in the 

defendant’s defense, the court shall find the defendant incompetent 

to stand trial and shall enter an order authorized by section 2945.38 

of the Revised Code. 

Thus, the question is not whether the state introduced sufficient evidence to prove 

Roberts competent, but whether a preponderance of the evidence proved that she 

was not competent. See State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 

N.E.2d 263, ¶ 45; State v. Jordan, 101 Ohio St.3d 216, 2004-Ohio-783, 804 

N.E.2d 1, ¶ 28; State v. Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d 72, 79, 538 N.E.2d 1030 (1989). 

See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 

(1992) (assigning defendant burden of proving incompetency does not violate due 

process). 

{¶ 85} The trial court appointed Dr. Thomas Gazley, a psychologist with 

the Forensic Psychiatric Center of Northeast Ohio, to conduct a competency 

evaluation. Dr. Gazley interviewed Roberts, had conversations with her defense 

attorneys and with the director of mental-health services at the Ohio Reformatory 

for Women, where Roberts was incarcerated, and reviewed her mental-health 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

26 

chart from the reformatory. Dr. Gazley was the sole witness at the hearing on 

Roberts’s competency. After he testified, his report was admitted without 

objection. 

{¶ 86} Dr. Gazley testified that Roberts had the ability to “understand the 

sentencing process and * * * to understand what the alternatives available are to 

her as well as * * * to provide her counsel with any mitigating circumstances, 

should she desire to do so.” He concluded that based on her ability to interact 

with him and to provide information and a coherent account of her perceptions 

about the situation, she would be able to do so with her defense counsel as well. 

Dr. Gazley further testified: “[W]hen I saw [Roberts] earlier this year, she was 

very coherent, her comments and responses to my questions were very relevant 

and * * * to the point.” Dr. Gazley noted in his report that Roberts’s “memory for 

both recent and remote events is intact” and that she “maintains the capacity for 

abstract thinking.” 

{¶ 87} Dr. Gazley knew that Roberts had been involved in a number of 

automobile accidents and had had several head injuries. He also knew that she 

had been diagnosed with depression and that she had engaged in suicidal thinking, 

which he attributed to her depression. However, Dr. Gazley testified that 

Roberts’s depression had responded to treatment; by the time he saw her, her 

symptoms were in remission, and “[s]he was progressively getting better.” 

{¶ 88} Dr. Gazley’s report states that his opinion, reached “with 

reasonable psychological certainty,” is that Roberts “currently has the cognitive 

ability and functioning to understand, in a general way, the penalties that could or 

will be imposed as a result of her conviction” and that she “has the capacity to 

communicate relevant facts in mitigation to her attorney.” 

{¶ 89} Roberts argues that there was no testimony relevant to the issue of 

Roberts’s ability to work with and assist counsel. Even if that were so, Roberts 
January Term, 2013 

27 

could not prevail, because competency is presumed and the defense bears the 

burden of proving incompetency. R.C. 2945.37(G). 

{¶ 90} However, Dr. Gazley’s testimony was relevant to the criteria for 

competency, including Roberts’s ability to assist counsel. Dr. Gazley testified 

that Roberts was able to understand the sentencing process and what alternatives 

were available and to provide mitigating circumstances. After interviewing 

Roberts, Dr. Gazley concluded that Roberts had the ability to interact with 

defense counsel and to provide information and a coherent account of her own 

perceptions about the situation to her counsel. 

{¶ 91} Roberts contends that Dr. Gazley did not know her psychological 

history before her incarceration and that he had neither reviewed her Social 

Security records nor obtained a neuropsychological evaluation of the effects of 

her head injury. However, Dr. Gazley explained that none of this mattered to his 

evaluation of Roberts’s competency at the time of resentencing, because that 

evaluation was based on his interview with Roberts: 

I base my opinion * * * on the information that I receive 

from the subject at the time I do the interview. * * * I make my 

decision about the opinion based on the responses the person 

provides me to the questions I asked that I believe are related to the 

questions the Court needs to address, rather than the [past] 

diagnosis. 

{¶ 92} A criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial, including 

competency to assist in a sentencing proceeding, is a question of fact. See

Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) 

(upholding state-court finding of competency that was fairly supported by the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

28 

record); State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, 

¶ 33 (deferring to trial court’s “factual findings” that defendant was competent). 

{¶ 93} Dr. Gazley’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding that 

Roberts failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was not 

competent to stand trial at the time of her sentencing proceeding in 2007. 

Because “there was some reliable, credible evidence supporting” the trial court’s 

finding that Roberts was competent, we will not disturb that finding. Vrabel at 

¶ 33. Roberts’s sixth proposition of law is overruled. 

B. Competency during the 2003 Mitigation Hearing 

{¶ 94} In her seventh proposition of law, Roberts contends that there was 

insufficient evidence to prove that she was competent to stand trial during her 

original mitigation hearing in 2003. Roberts also claims that the trial court failed 

to conduct a full evidentiary hearing into her competency. 

{¶ 95} These claims are res judicata. They are based entirely on the 

record of the 2003 hearing. Thus, Roberts could have, and should have, raised 

these issues in Roberts I. She is barred from raising them now. “Where an 

argument could have been raised on an initial appeal, res judicata dictates that it 

is inappropriate to consider that same argument on a second appeal following 

remand.” State v. D’Ambrosio, 73 Ohio St.3d 141, 143, 652 N.E.2d 710 (1995). 

See also State v. Gillard, 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 679 N.E.2d 276 (1997) (issues 

not raised on prior appeal are barred by res judicata and overruled without further 

consideration). 

Conclusion 

{¶ 96} Under the unique circumstances present here, we find that the trial 

court failed to consider relevant mitigating evidence contained in Roberts’s 

allocution. Accordingly, we vacate the death sentence and remand this case for 

resentencing on the basis of the existing record. On remand, the trial court must 

consider all the mitigating evidence reflected in the record, including Roberts’s 
January Term, 2013 

29 

allocution, weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors, 

and file a sentencing opinion that reflects that it has complied with these 

instructions. In doing so, the trial court must make an independent determination 

of whether a death sentence is appropriate and may not give deference to the 

sentences previously entered. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 

O’NEILL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 

 O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent. 

_________________ 

O’NEILL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶ 97} The questions addressed by the majority and the dissent are 

significant, but I do not believe it is necessary to decide them in this case. Our 

previous remand order required the trial court to “afford Roberts her right to 

allocate, * * * personally review and evaluate the evidence, weigh the aggravating 

circumstances against any relevant mitigating evidence, and determine anew the 

appropriateness of the death penalty as required by R.C. 2929.03.” State v. 

Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 167. I believe 

that order was sufficient on its face, but unfortunately it was not followed by the 

trial court. 

{¶ 98} As Justice O’Donnell points out, a capital defendant’s statutory 

right to make an unsworn statement in mitigation under R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) is 

“ ‘not an allocution under the rule.’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) Dissenting opinion at 

¶ 110, quoting State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 326, 738 N.E.2d 1178 

(2000). And if we were addressing this issue in the first instance, the dissent 

might well be correct in concluding that the defendant’s allocution “has no 

significance in establishing any mitigating factor.” Id. at ¶ 116. But our previous 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

30 

remand order was not limited to permitting allocution—it required the court to 

evaluate “any relevant mitigating evidence” and make its sentencing decisions 

“anew.” I would hold that the trial court failed to comply with this remand order 

in that it failed to accept and evaluate relevant mitigation evidence, including the 

unsworn statement offered by the defendant. 

{¶ 99} Given the clear language in our prior mandate, the trial court 

clearly erred by refusing to accept the defendant’s evidence in mitigation. Even if 

I were to accept that the defendant had attempted to “update mitigation” with 

evidence of her good prison conduct and that such evidence was improper, 

majority opinion at ¶ 37, the trial court expressed no opinion on the relevance of 

that evidence and did not render a sentencing decision “anew” as directed. But I 

must also note that the majority’s characterization here is inaccurate. As the 

majority observes, the defendant proffered four items in mitigation, only one of 

which dealt with her conduct in prison. And it is apparent that even the 

defendant’s prison records, like her other proffered evidence, were submitted to 

demonstrate her continued mental illness, not her conduct. Moreover, as the 

majority itself recognizes, its analysis on this point is likely to be set aside by the 

federal courts on collateral review. See majority opinion at ¶ 31-33, citing Davis 

v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761 (6th Cir.2007). 

{¶ 100} Therefore, I concur in the court’s judgment vacating the death 

sentence and remanding this case for resentencing, but I dissent as to the 

limitations placed on that resentencing by the majority. The defendant should be 

permitted to offer a case in mitigation, in accordance with both our prior remand 

and the Sixth Circuit’s judgment in similar cases. And given both my opinion that 

capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the 

United States and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution, see State v. 

Wogenstahl, 134 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2013-Ohio-164, 981 N.E.2d 900, ¶ 2 (O’Neill, 

J., dissenting), and the fact that the record as currently constituted provides strong 
January Term, 2013 

31 

evidence of the defendant’s severe mental illness, I would hold that on remand the 

trial court is precluded from imposing the death penalty upon the defendant. 

____________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 101} Respectfully, I dissent. 

{¶ 102} The principal focus of this appeal concerns whether a trial court 

commits reversible error if it fails to include in its statutorily mandated capitaloffense sentencing opinion a statement that it has considered the allocution of a 

convicted murderer. However, allocution is a statutory right, not a constitutional 

one, and it necessarily follows that the court’s failure to affirmatively state that it 

considered the allocution does not rise to the level of constitutional error. Further, 

this court has never required the trial court to discuss in its sentencing opinion 

every consideration that factors into its sentence. Rather, our precedent 

establishes that any such error is cured by our independent sentence evaluation. 

Accordingly, this court should independently review the allocution and the 

sentence and determine whether the penalty imposed is in conformity with others 

in which the death penalty has been imposed. 

Allocution 

{¶ 103} The purpose of allocution is “to permit a convicted defendant an 

opportunity to plead personally to the court for leniency in his sentence,” United 

States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1996), based on the consideration 

that “[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as 

the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself,” Green v. United 

States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 

plurality opinion). Thus, courts recognize that “[t]he right to allocute is no more 

than the defendant's ‘right to stand before the [sentencer] and ask in his own voice 

that he be spared.’ ” People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 192 (Colo.1990), quoting 

State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 430, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

32 

{¶ 104} There is no recognized constitutional right to allocution. In Hill v. 

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962), the 

Supreme Court rejected a claim that the Constitution requires the trial court to 

invite an accused represented by counsel to make a statement before sentencing, 

explaining that the failure to do so “is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor 

constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a 

complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the 

rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” And in McGautha v. California, 402 

U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971), judgment vacated sub nom.

Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 765 (1972), the court 

noted that “Ohio has provided for retention of the ritual of allocution, albeit only 

in its common-law form, precisely to avoid the possibility that a person might be 

tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in complete silence. We have held that 

failure to ensure such personal participation in the criminal process is not 

necessarily a constitutional flaw in the conviction.” 

{¶ 105} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that “[t]here is 

no constitutional right to allocution under the United States Constitution,” 

Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir.1997), and that federal 

law does not require Ohio to afford the accused an opportunity to make an 

unsworn statement, Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225, 237 (6th Cir.2009). 

Notably, the Sixth Circuit is not alone; almost every federal circuit court has held 

that allocution is not a constitutional right. See United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 

215, 220 (1st Cir.1972), fn. 9; United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125, 132 (2d 

Cir.1997), fn. 3; United States v. Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir.2012); 

United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 365 (4th Cir.2010); United States v. Reyna, 

358 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir.2004); United States v. Covington, 681 F.3d 908, 910 

(7th Cir.2012); United States v. Hoffman, 707 F.3d 929, 937 (8th Cir.2013); 

United States v. Smith, 705 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir.2013); United States v. 
January Term, 2013 

33 

Fleming, 849 F.2d 568, 569 (11th Cir.1988). It is only the Ninth Circuit that 

concludes that “the denial of the right to allocute is a due process violation.” 

United States v. Dablan, 205 Fed.Appx. 620, 622 (9th Cir.2006). 

{¶ 106} This court has previously suggested that the Constitution does not 

require allocution at the sentencing hearing. In State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 

2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, we rejected a claim that the trial court 

violated the constitutional rights of the accused by denying his request to give his 

statement through questioning by counsel, explaining that “the majority view 

[regarding the right to allocution] does not support a holding that a defendant has 

a constitutional right even to make an unsworn statement, let alone an unsworn 

statement in a question-and-answer format.” Id. at ¶ 103. And in Lancaster v. 

Green, 175 Ohio St. 203, 192 N.E.2d 776 (1963), we denied a writ of habeas 

corpus to an offender who claimed that the trial court’s failure to include the 

allocution in the sentence invalidated it, stating that “the failure to include the 

allocution in the certificate of sentence did not void the sentence. In fact, the 

absolute failure to accord petitioner this right is not a ground for relief by habeas 

corpus.” Id. at 206, citing Hill, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417. 

Confusion regarding Allocution 

{¶ 107} The term “allocution” has been used to refer to different 

statements made by an offender. For example, a statement made by a defendant 

at the time of a plea has been described as an allocution. Such a statement can 

give a court a factual basis to adjudicate guilt. United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 

509, 514 (2d Cir.2009) (explaining that the trial court may examine the accused’s 

plea allocution in determining whether a sufficient factual basis supports the 

plea); State v. Jones, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-08-034, 2010-Ohio-1780, ¶ 17 (“A 

plea allocution is conducted only after the individual has been fully apprised of 

and waived a litany of constitutional rights, including Fifth Amendment rights”). 
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{¶ 108} In Ohio, R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) permits an accused to make a 

statement to the jury or fact-finder during the penalty phase of a capital-murder 

trial and further provides that such a statement is not subject to cross-examination 

unless the accused makes the statement under oath. This unsworn statement 

permits the accused to address the jury or fact-finder in an effort to influence the 

penalty recommendation and is sometimes referred to as allocution, but in fact, it 

is a part of the penalty phase of the trial. State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 

326, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (2000); State v. Roe, 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 26, 535 N.E.2d 

1351 (1989) (noting that the statute provides that all mitigating evidence must be 

presented before the jury makes a recommendation in the penalty phase of trial; 

“[a] defendant may not wait for an unfavorable jury recommendation before 

presenting all relevant evidence in mitigation of sentence”). 

{¶ 109} The foregoing examples of statements are not implicated in this 

case. Rather, the common-law right to allocution applicable in capital and 

noncapital cases is contained in Crim.R. 32(A)(1), which directs the trial court, 

prior to imposing sentence, to afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of 

the defendant and to address the defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes 

to make a statement in his or her own behalf or present any information in 

mitigation of punishment. This statement is not made under oath, is not subject to 

cross-examination, and is not evidence—but it can be considered by the court in 

imposing its sentence. 

{¶ 110} We distinguished the right to make an unsworn statement afforded 

by R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) from the allocution before sentence is pronounced in

Campbell, where we said, “No authority requires a trial court to inform a capital 

defendant of his right to make an unsworn, penalty-phase statement. Crim.R. 

32(A)(1) does not apply, because an unsworn statement under R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) 

is not an allocution under the rule.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 326. Thus, a 

penalty-phase statement may be relevant to weighing whether the aggravating 
January Term, 2013 

35 

circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors, but an allocution 

is not. 

{¶ 111} In this case, pursuant to our order on remand, the trial court 

allowed Roberts to allocute prior to reimposing sentence. And before it imposed 

the sentence, the court stated that it had considered the record and the oral 

statements, which included her allocution. In my view, no reasonable inference 

may be drawn from the failure of the trial court to specifically incorporate the 

content of the allocution made by Roberts in its sentencing opinion. Obviously, 

because we remanded for that right to be accorded before sentencing, the trial 

court listened to Roberts and was aware of what she presented. In this case, then, 

“ ‘[t]here is no showing of irregularity to contradict the presumption of regularity 

accorded all judicial proceedings.’ ” State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-

Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Sweet, 72 Ohio St.3d 375, 376, 

650 N.E.2d 450 (1995). 

{¶ 112} We have previously held that in considering mitigating factors in 

a capital-offense sentencing opinion, the failure to incorporate and discuss all of 

them in its sentencing opinion does not mean that the trial court did not consider 

them and that such a failure is not reversible error. E.g., State v. Davis, 116 Ohio 

St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 363; State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 

102, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995). In Phillips, we considered the argument that “the 

trial court's sentencing opinion fail[ed] to give effect to all of the mitigation 

evidence offered by appellant.” Id. We concluded: 

[Phillips] erroneously assumes that evidence that is not specifically 

mentioned in an opinion was not considered. While a sentencing 

court must consider all evidence of mitigation, it need not discuss 

each factor individually. Parker v. Dugger (1991), 498 U.S. 308, 

314–315, 111 S.Ct. 731, 736, 112 L.Ed.2d 812, 822. Further, even 
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if “the trial court in this case should have more explicitly analyzed 

the mitigating evidence,” this court's independent reweighing will 

rectify the error. State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 171-172, 

555 N.E.2d 293, 305. 

 

Id. We therefore rejected that claim. 

{¶ 113} This case is less egregious than Phillips, because the allocution 

statement made by Roberts before sentencing is not evidence; rather it is an 

opportunity for the defendant to make a personal statement in her own behalf or to 

present any information in mitigation of punishment, such as an apology, a 

request for mercy, or an appeal for leniency. A trial court may exercise its 

discretion in considering the allocution when imposing sentence. 

{¶ 114} The majority confuses allocution—which is not evidence—with 

the opportunity to present an unsworn statement in the penalty phase of the trial 

and the right to present mitigating evidence to the jurors or fact-finders, and it 

concludes that the sentence of death violated the Eighth Amendment, specifically 

because the allocution contained relevant mitigating evidence. It is true that a 

sentencer cannot refuse to consider mitigating evidence before imposing the death 

penalty, see, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 

L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), but in this case, Roberts had waived her right to present 

mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. 

{¶ 115} More significantly, however, an unsworn statement in allocution 

is not evidence. Biddinger v. State, 868 N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ind.2007); People v. 

Davis, 794 P.2d at 192. Nor is allocution intended to prove or disprove facts 

relevant to sentencing. State v. Lord, 117 Wash.2d 829, 897, 822 P.2d 177 

(1991); Davis at 192. Thus, an allocution statement made prior to sentencing 

pursuant to Crim.R. 32(A)(1) is not admissible evidence. See Evid.R. 603; 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rule, 64 Ohio St.2d 67, 69, 413 N.E.2d 796, 798 (1980) 
January Term, 2013 

37 

(“Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio requires an oath or affirmation 

as a prerequisite to the testimony of a witness” [footnote omitted]); Stores Realty 

Co. v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 42, 322 N.E.2d 629 (1975) (“it is error for 

unsworn testimony to be admitted in evidence”); Clinton v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27 

(1877), paragraph two of the syllabus (“every one offered as a witness in a court 

must take an oath or affirmation before giving testimony”). 

{¶ 116} I therefore disagree with the conclusion of the majority that 

Roberts’s statement “contained much information whose relevance as mitigation 

was clear.” Majority opinion at ¶ 57. Because the allocution offered by Roberts 

prior to the imposition of sentence is not evidence, it has no significance in 

establishing any mitigating factor. 

Conclusion

{¶ 117} Neither the United States nor the Ohio Constitution requires a trial 

court to permit allocution by a person convicted of a crime. Rather, in Ohio, the 

legislature has allowed a capital defendant to make a penalty-phase statement on 

his own behalf and to provide any information relevant to the penalty that should 

be imposed. But an unsworn allocution statement made after the penalty phase is 

not mitigating evidence. The omission of any reference to what Roberts said 

during allocution in the trial court’s sentencing opinion does not permit an 

inference that the court failed to consider those statements, nor does it constitute 

reversible error. 

{¶ 118} Even if the failure to refer to the allocution in the sentencing 

opinion did constitute error, “[o]ur independent sentence evaluation and 

reweighing can cure the effect of errors in previous death-penalty sentencing 

decisions.” State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 505, 709 N.E.2d 484 (1999). 

Although the sentencer’s consideration of mitigating evidence is mandated by the 

Constitution, Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, we 

have held that our independent review can cure a trial court’s failure to explain 
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how it weighed that evidence, State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 210, 661 N.E.2d 

1068 (1996). And we have recognized that “ ‘[w]hile a sentencing court must 

consider all evidence of mitigation, it need not discuss each factor individually.’ ” 

State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 363, quoting 

Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 102, 656 N.E.2d 643. Tellingly, in Clemons v. 

Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the court 

explained that the sentencer need not make written findings concerning mitigating 

circumstances in order for an appellate court to perform an independent sentence 

evaluation. Thus, contrary to the majority’s conclusion here, the failure to discuss 

the allocution does not hinder our independent review of the sentence. 

{¶ 119} And if it is not reversible error to fail to explain how a court 

weighed mitigating evidence, how can it be reversible error to fail to refer to the 

allocution in a sentencing opinion when that allocution is not evidence? 

{¶ 120} Accordingly, there is no reason for this court to reverse the 

sentence based on the trial court’s failure to expressly mention in its sentencing 

opinion that it had considered Robert’s unsworn statement. I would overrule 

proposition of law II and address the remaining propositions of law on the merits. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

____________________ 

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 

Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

David L. Doughten and Robert A. Dixon, for appellant. 

________________________