No. DA 06-0121 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2007 MT 166 

DOUGLAS GERALD ANDERSON, 

RUTH M. ANDERSON AS TRUSTEE 

OF THE RUTH M. ANDERSON LIVING 

TRUST, DAVAR GARDNER and 

TODD GARDNER, 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

v. 

JOHN STOKES; Z-600, INC.; and 

SKYLINE BROADCASTERS, INC., 

Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV 2001-023(C), 

Honorable Stewart E. Stadler, Presiding Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

 Wade J. Dahood, Knight, Dahood, Everett & Sievers, Anaconda, Montana 

For Respondents: 

James H. Goetz, Trent M. Gardner, Goetz, Gallick & Baldwin, P.C., 

Bozeman, Montana 

David M. Sandler, Bothe & Lauridsen, P.C., Columbia Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: November 22, 2006 

 Decided: July 11, 2007 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 John Stokes, Z-600, Inc., and Skyline Broadcasters, Inc. (collectively, “Stokes”) 

appeal from the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, which 

granted summary judgment in favor of Douglas G. Anderson, Ruth M. Anderson as 

trustee of The Ruth M. Anderson Living Trust, Davar Gardner, and Todd Gardner 

(collectively, “the Andersons”). We affirm. 

¶2 The issues on appeal are as follows: 

1. Are the Andersons’ claims barred on equitable grounds? 

2. Did the District Court err in its construction of the instrument by which the 

Andersons’ predecessors in interest granted an easement to Stokes’s predecessors in 

interest? 

3. Did the District Court err in ordering Stokes to bury the wires, ground radial 

antennas, conduits, and transmission lines at issue here to a minimum depth of 12 inches? 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶3 Stokes is the owner and operator of radio station KGEZ (also known as “The 

Edge”), the building housing the station, and the land on which it sits, all of which are 

located a short distance south of Kalispell, Montana. The Andersons are the owners of 

adjoining land north, south, and east of the station. The dispute in this case concerns the 

location and scope of an easement granted by the Andersons’ predecessors in interest, 

J.R. Anderson and Anna G. Anderson (“J.R. and Anna”), to Stokes’s predecessor in 

interest and then-owner of KGEZ, Donald C. Treloar (“Treloar”). 

¶4 The relevant language of the grant, dated October 11, 1949, provides as follows: 

2
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the said grantee [Treloar] to expand 

and reconstruct the facilities and equipment of said radio station KGEZ and 

in such expansion and reconstruction program it is the desire of the said 

grantee to erect and maintain certain radio towers, guy wires, ground and 

feed wires and conduits on certain portions of the hereinafter described 

lands, the exact location of which it is now impossible to determine; and, 

WHEREAS, the said grantors [J.R. and Anna] have agreed . . . to 

grant to the said grantee the perpetual right and easement to construct, 

erect, operate and maintain radio towers, guy wires and ground and feed 

wires and conduits upon and over the hereinafter described lands; 

NOW, THEREFORE, . . . the said grantors do hereby grant unto the 

said grantee, his heirs and assigns the perpetual right and easement to erect, 

construct, operate and maintain radio towers, guy wires and ground and 

feed wires and conduits in, upon, over and through those certain lands 

situate in the County of Flathead, State of Montana, more particularly 

described as follows, to-wit: 

The North Half of the Southwest Quarter (N1⁄2SW1⁄4), the Southwest 

Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (SW1⁄4NW1⁄4) all in Section 

Twenty-eight (28), Township Twenty-eight (28) North, Range 

Twenty-one (21) West; also, all of Cliffords Addition to 

Demersville, being the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 

(SE1⁄4NW1⁄4) said section, township and range. 

The said grantee shall have the right to select the place or places at 

which the above described facilities shall be erected and maintained and 

shall have the right to do whatever may be requisite or convenient for the 

enjoyment of the rights hereby granted, including the right of clearing said 

land, the removal of barriers and obstructions thereon, and the perpetual 

right on [sic] ingress and egress to and from said lands for the purpose of 

erecting, maintaining, repairing, renewing, altering, removing and restoring 

said radio facilities and equipment when desired by the said grantee his 

heirs and assigns; 

The said grantors, their heirs or assigns are to fully use and enjoy 

said premises except for the easement and rights hereby granted and the 

said grantee for himself, his heirs or assigns hereby covenants to bury all 

wires and conduits capable of such burial to a depth of not less than 12 

inches, so that the same will not unduly interfere with the cultivation of said 

premises, and to fence all towers and/or guy wires for their protection 

against livestock . . . . 

3
¶5 Treloar ultimately selected a site for the radio towers and built two towers with a 

corresponding transmission line, wires, conduits, and ground radial antennas on that site 

in the early 1950s. The towers and ground radial antennas have remained at that location 

since their construction. 

¶6 Stokes purchased KGEZ in April 2000. Shortly thereafter, he advised the 

Andersons that he intended to enlarge or relocate the radio towers. In Stokes’s view, the 

easement granted by J.R. and Anna covered all of the land described in the grant (160 

acres). By contrast, the Andersons believed that the easement covered only the specific 

portion of land that Treloar selected in the early-1950s and on which the radio towers 

ultimately were built (roughly 31 of the 160 acres). 

¶7 In addition to this disagreement as to the location and scope of the easement, the 

Andersons requested that Stokes bury the existing wires and conduits to a depth of at 

least 12 inches, fence the towers and guy wires that were not currently fenced, and repair 

the existing fences that were in disrepair. However, Stokes took the position that the 

Andersons’ agricultural activities had pulled the wires above 12 inches in depth and that 

the Andersons, therefore, were responsible for reburying them. He also claimed that the 

fencing provision of the easement grant did not apply because the Andersons did not have 

livestock on the subject property. 

¶8 Douglas G. Anderson and Ruth M. Anderson as trustee of The Ruth M. Anderson 

Living Trust initiated the instant action on January 12, 2001. Davar Gardner and Todd 

Gardner later joined as plaintiffs pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2) and adopted all of the 

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allegations in Douglas and Ruth’s complaint. Under Count I of their complaint, the 

Andersons sought extinguishment of the easement due to Stokes’s alleged “failure to 

keep the improvements on the easement in repair, refusal to repair the improvements on 

the easement, and noncompliance with the easement.” Alternatively, the Andersons 

sought declaratory relief as to the location and scope of the easement (Count II) and 

injunctive relief requiring that Stokes comply with the terms of the easement grant 

(Count III). With respect to Count II, the Andersons alleged that “[t]he place of the 

easement was permanently set in the early to mid 1950s when Treloar selected the place 

on which to build the radio towers and, thereafter, built the radio towers on that place.” 

¶9 Stokes answered the complaint. He denied the Andersons’ interpretation of the 

granting language, alleging instead that the easement covers the entire parcel of land 

described in the grant and that the towers and ground radial antennas “can be expanded 

upon or relocated anywhere within the entire parcel, as necessary to accommodate the 

operation of [Stokes’s] radio station.” Stokes further alleged that the existing main 

transmission line was not capable of being buried, that the Andersons were responsible 

for reburying any wires or conduits that were not at a depth of at least 12 inches due to 

the Andersons’ agricultural activities, and that the Andersons had no reason to enforce 

the fencing provision of the easement grant because that provision is to protect Stokes, 

not the Andersons. (Stokes also asserted counterclaims that ultimately were 

compromised and settled on the merits and are not at issue here.) 

¶10 On October 29, 2002, the District Court granted the Andersons’ motion for partial 

summary judgment on Count II and denied Stokes’s motion for summary judgment on 

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Count II. The court determined that J.R., Anna, and Treloar had intended the easement to 

be restricted to “certain portions” of the lands described in the grant, not to encompass all 

of those lands. Further, the court determined that only Treloar, and not his heirs or 

assigns, had the right to choose the place or places to erect the radio towers. Finally, the 

court determined that Treloar’s selection and use of the place where the radio towers now 

stand fixed the location and scope of the easement to that place. “Thus, if [Stokes] 

propose[s] to enlarge the towers, add towers or move them to another location, such 

actions exceed the scope of the easement and are not permitted unless [the Andersons] 

agree thereto.” Stokes thereafter filed a “Motion and Brief to Alter and Amend Order of 

October 29, 2002,” which the court denied. 

¶11 On September 29, 2005, the District Court granted the Andersons’ motion for 

summary judgment on Count III and denied Stokes’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment on the theory of laches. The court noted that the Andersons had presented 

evidence that at the time Stokes acquired KGEZ, all lines (radial antennas, conduits, 

transmission lines, and wires) were capable of being buried and historically had been 

buried. The court further noted that Stokes had presented “no evidence [to raise a 

material issue of fact] beyond counsel’s argument to rebut [the Andersons’] evidence that 

the transmission line and any other lines are capable of being buried.” The court 

determined, based on the “uncontroverted admissible evidence,” that the exposed 

condition of the wires and conduits and Stokes’s threats of legal action against the 

Andersons had disrupted the Andersons’ use of the land in question for agricultural 

purposes. However, rather than extinguish the easement, as the Andersons had requested 

6
under Count I, the court determined that since the lines are capable of being buried, “the 

better approach” would be to require Stokes to bury them and otherwise comply with the 

terms of the easement grant. The court therefore ordered Stokes to do so. Finally, the 

court rejected Stokes’s arguments based on the doctrine of laches, reasoning that Stokes 

had not shown prejudice by any delay on the part of the Andersons in enforcing the terms 

of the easement grant. 

¶12 Having prevailed on Counts II and III, the Andersons filed a motion to dismiss 

Count I without prejudice. In addition, the Andersons requested that the court enter final 

judgment and, further, that the court incorporate in its final judgment Certificate of 

Survey 2829, filed March 17, 1977, as Instrument Rec. No. 3157, records of Flathead 

County, Montana (“COS 2829”). This survey, which was commissioned by a former 

owner of KGEZ, designates the location of the radio towers and radial antennas as “Tract 

2,” an area comprising 31.288 acres. The Andersons argued that defining the easement 

according to the terms of COS 2829 would “avoid any disputes between parties as to the 

actual area covered by the present towers, and accordingly the size of the easement.” 

¶13 The District Court entered final judgment on December 27, 2005. The court 

granted the Andersons’ motion to dismiss Count I without prejudice and also granted 

their request concerning COS 2829. With respect to the latter, the court explained (in a 

separate order) that the Andersons and Stokes have, at all times, agreed that the towers, 

lines, and conduits have remained in the same location since the inception of the station 

and that Stokes had offered no reason why COS 2829 was inadequate or deficient. The 

court accordingly took judicial notice of COS 2829 and incorporated COS 2829 into its 

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final judgment, specifying that “[t]he Easement is limited in size and location to the 

historical location of the present towers, described as Tract 2 on [COS 2829].” 

¶14 Stokes now appeals from the District Court’s orders and final judgment. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶15 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56 as did the district court. Redies v. 

Attorneys Liability Protection Soc., 2007 MT 9, ¶ 26, 335 Mont. 233, ¶ 26, 150 P.3d 930, 

¶ 26; Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. City of Billings, 2003 MT 332, ¶ 6, 318 Mont. 407, 

¶ 6, 80 P.3d 1247, ¶ 6. Rule 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment “shall 

be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.” In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that might be 

drawn from the offered evidence should be drawn in favor of the party opposing 

summary judgment. Redies, ¶ 26; Porter v. Galarneau, 275 Mont. 174, 179, 911 P.2d 

1143, 1146 (1996). Summary judgment is an extreme remedy that should never be a 

substitute for a trial on the merits if a controversy exists over a material fact. In re 

Dorothy W. Stevens Revocable Trust, 2005 MT 106, ¶ 13, 327 Mont. 39, ¶ 13, 112 P.3d 

972, ¶ 13; Montana Metal Buildings, Inc. v. Shapiro, 283 Mont. 471, 474, 942 P.2d 694, 

696 (1997). 

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¶16 We review a district court’s findings of fact to determine whether the findings are 

clearly erroneous. Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421, 430, 916 P.2d 751, 

756 (1996); Solem v. Chilcote, 274 Mont. 72, 76, 906 P.2d 209, 211-12 (1995). The 

court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial 

credible evidence, if the court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a 

review of the record leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed. Ray v. Nansel, 2002 MT 191, ¶ 19, 311 Mont. 135, ¶ 19, 53 P.3d 

870, ¶ 19. 

DISCUSSION 

¶17 Issue 1. Are the Andersons’ claims barred on equitable grounds?

¶18 Stokes contends that the Andersons’ claims are barred by the doctrines of laches 

and estoppel. We will address these doctrines in turn. 

Laches

¶19 Laches is an equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who 

has unreasonably delayed or been negligent in asserting a claim, when the delay or 

negligence has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought. Montanans for Justice 

v. State ex rel. McGrath, 2006 MT 277, ¶ 23, 334 Mont. 237, ¶ 23, 146 P.3d 759, ¶ 23 

(citing Black’s Law Dictionary 879 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999), and Cole 

v. State ex rel. Brown, 2002 MT 32, ¶ 24, 308 Mont. 265, ¶ 24, 42 P.3d 760, ¶ 24). 

Laches is not simply a matter of elapsed time; it is also a question of the inequity of 

permitting a claim to be enforced. Therefore, for laches to apply, the court must find lack 

of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted and prejudice to the party 

9
asserting the defense. In re Marriage of Deist, 2003 MT 263, ¶ 17, 317 Mont. 427, ¶ 17, 

77 P.3d 525, ¶ 17; accord Gue v. Olds, 245 Mont. 117, 120, 799 P.2d 543, 545 (1990). 

Because laches is an affirmative defense, see M. R. Civ. P. 8(c), the party asserting the 

defense bears the burden of proof, see Wareing v. Schreckendgust, 280 Mont. 196, 211, 

930 P.2d 37, 46 (1996). 

¶20 In the case at hand, the District Court rejected Stokes’s laches defense, reasoning 

that Stokes had made no showing of prejudice as a result of the Andersons’ allegedly 

unreasonable delay in asserting their claims. In this regard, the court noted: 

In [Stokes’s] brief, counsel simply states: “the prejudice to John Stokes 

would be to destroy his radio station.” There is no explanation nor 

evidence of how complying with the terms of the easement to bury all the 

lines, conduits, etc., would destroy the station. This is simply a conclusory, 

cavalier statement made without any evidence. 

The court also noted that there had been testimony from Stephen Breeze, a former owner 

of KGEZ, that “Stokes got a discounted sales price on the station, due to the condition of 

the station, which includes the towers, and the above ground conduits, etc.” 

¶21 On appeal, Stokes cites a number of authorities for the proposition that laches 

applies in this case, including § 1-3-218, MCA (“The law helps the vigilant before those 

who sleep on their rights.”), and Murray v. Countryman Creek Ranch, 254 Mont. 432, 

838 P.2d 431 (1992). However, in his analysis of this issue, Stokes focuses solely on the 

question of whether the Andersons unreasonably delayed in asserting their claims and 

ignores entirely the question of whether he has been prejudiced by the alleged delay. 

¶22 In Kelleher v. Board of Social Work Exam’rs, 283 Mont. 188, 939 P.2d 1003 

(1997), we did not reach the issue of whether the plaintiff had been negligent in asserting 

10
her claim and we did not address her explanations for the delay. We explained that “[i]n 

order to apply the doctrine of laches, a showing must be made that the passage of time 

has prejudiced the party asserting laches or has rendered the enforcement of a right 

inequitable,” and the defendant in that case had not made such a showing. Kelleher, 283 

Mont. at 191, 939 P.2d at 1005. 

¶23 The same reasoning applies here. Stokes points to no evidence in the record that 

would constitute the required showing of prejudice for application of the doctrine of 

laches. Therefore, we need not reach the issue of whether the Andersons unreasonably 

delayed or were negligent in asserting their claims. We hold that the District Court did 

not err in denying Stokes’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of laches. 

Estoppel

¶24 Stokes argues that the Andersons’ claims are also barred by the doctrine of 

estoppel. The Andersons address Stokes’s argument on the merits, but they also assert, 

as a preliminary matter, that “Stokes never raised this argument in his briefing on 

summary judgment for this matter.” They contend, therefore, that we should not address 

Stokes’s estoppel argument, given our statement in In re A.C., 2004 MT 320, ¶ 16, 324 

Mont. 58, ¶ 16, 101 P.3d 761, ¶ 16, that “we do not consider issues raised for the first 

time on appeal.” Having reviewed the record in this case, however, we conclude that 

Stokes has preserved the estoppel issue for appeal. 

¶25 In his answer to the Andersons’ complaint, Stokes asserted as his “FIRST 

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE” that “[the Andersons’] claims are barred by the doctrines of 

laches, estoppel, and/or waiver.” However, when he argued this defense in subsequent 

11
filings, Stokes focused almost exclusively on laches. Indeed, he explained in his October 

15, 2002 brief in support of his motion to dismiss Count I: 

We will not burden this brief or this Court with legal analysis of the 

other affirmative defenses contained in John Stokes’ answer. Suffice to say 

the rationale and principles of laches are so precisely pertinent to this case 

that no further citation of other defenses and the law would serve any useful 

purpose. 

Were this Stokes’s final word on the matter, we likely would agree with the Andersons 

that he did not preserve the issue of estoppel for appeal. As it turns out, however, Stokes 

presented an argument concerning estoppel in his November 14, 2002 Motion and Brief 

to Alter and Amend Order of October 29, 2002. Indeed, he presented almost verbatim 

the same argument he now asserts on appeal. We conclude, therefore, that Stokes has 

preserved the estoppel issue for appeal, and we will proceed to consider the merits of 

Stokes’s contentions. 

¶26 Stokes informs us that before he purchased the radio station and its property, land, 

and easement, he “exercised due diligence which established that the easement covered 

the 160 acre tract.” Thus, “[w]hen John Stokes acquired ownership in April of 2000 he 

believed he was buying an easement on the 160 acre tract.” He contends that “[n]either 

the Andersons nor anyone else told him the easement was restricted and he should not 

expand and increase his transmission power. In fact, . . . the conduct of the [Andersons] 

was totally contrary to their present position.” In this regard, Stokes points out that in 

1992, the Andersons’ predecessors in interest obtained from Stokes’s predecessors in 

interest a release of a portion of the easement, which was done in conjunction with the 

sale of a parcel of land within the original 160 acres. Stokes also notes Douglas G. 

12
Anderson’s statement, during his September 13, 2002 deposition, that the previous 

owners of KGEZ were “more than willing” to release property from the easement. From 

this, Stokes reasons that the Andersons “knew that the radio station considered all 160 

acres to be subject to the easement. . . . Otherwise, why would releases of the easement 

on certain parcels sold by the Andersons be required?” Relying on Kelly v. Wallace, 

1998 MT 307, 292 Mont. 129, 972 P.2d 1117, Stokes argues that the Andersons, 

therefore, “by their previous conduct are estopped from now contending the easement is 

restricted.” 

¶27 In Kelly, we explained equitable estoppel as follows: 

Equitable estoppel is based on the principle that a party cannot, 

through his intentional conduct, actions, language, or silence, induce 

another party to unknowingly and detrimentally alter his position and then 

subsequently deny the just and legal consequences of his intentional acts. 

For that reason, an equitable estoppel claim rests on the concealment or 

representation of facts by the estopped party. 

Kelly, ¶ 43 (internal quotations marks omitted). The party who asserts equitable estoppel 

bears the affirmative burden of proving the following six elements: 

“(1) there must be conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a 

representation or concealment of material facts; (2) these facts must be 

known to the party estopped at the time of his conduct, or at least the 

circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed 

to him; (3) the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other 

party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time it was acted upon by 

him; (4) the conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the 

expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under the 

circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted 

upon; (5) the conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus 

relying, he must be led to act upon it; and (6) he must in fact act upon it in 

such a manner as to change his position for the worse.” 

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Kelly, ¶¶ 40, 43 (quoting Dagel v. City of Great Falls, 250 Mont. 224, 234-35, 819 P.2d 

186, 192-93 (1991)). The party asserting equitable estoppel must argue that each of these 

elements is present and provide evidence in support. See Wareing v. Schreckendgust, 280 

Mont. 196, 211-12, 930 P.2d 37, 46 (1996). 

¶28 Here, Stokes has failed to argue that each of the foregoing six elements is present 

and to provide evidence in support. In this respect, the case at hand bears a striking 

similarity to Wareing, in which we rejected the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiffs 

should be estopped from asserting their prescriptive easement claim. In so doing, we 

observed that the defendant had not developed or fully argued any of the six elements of 

equitable estoppel, either in the district court or in this Court on appeal. In fact, the 

defendant had failed to even identify the elements and instead had relied on a simple 

conclusory statement that because the plaintiffs had acknowledged the superior rights of 

the defendant’s successor, they should be estopped from denying the superior rights of 

the defendant himself. We reasoned that “[i]t is Schreckendgust’s burden, not this 

Court’s, to establish that the elements of estoppel are met, and we conclude that 

Schreckendgust has failed to meet his burden in this case.” Wareing, 280 Mont. at 212, 

930 P.2d at 46-47. 

¶29 A similar paucity of argument and supporting evidence afflicts Stokes’s estoppel 

analysis. Stokes has neither developed nor argued any of the six elements set forth 

above. In fact, he has failed to even identify those elements in his brief and instead has 

merely quoted other passages from Kelly. Furthermore, Stokes has failed to provide any 

evidence bearing on the six elements. For instance, he has provided no evidence that the 

14
Andersons concealed the extent of the easement from him or that the Andersons 

represented the easement as covering all 160 acres. In this regard, the 1992 release and 

the dubious inferences drawn by Stokes from Douglas G. Anderson’s deposition 

testimony concerning other possible releases are inapposite. There is absolutely no 

evidence in the record that the Andersons obtained releases with respect to land lying 

outside the 31.288 acres on which the two radio towers stand or that Stokes relied on 

such conduct on the part of the Andersons in his decision to purchase KGEZ.1

 Moreover, 

Stokes acknowledges that he “exercised due diligence which established that the 

easement covered the 160 acre tract,” thus suggesting that he acted based on his own 

investigation of the facts and not on a representation or concealment of facts by the 

Andersons. 

¶30 The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing the 

absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 

Hi-Tech Motors v. Bombardier Motor Corp., 2005 MT 187, ¶ 32, 328 Mont. 66, ¶ 32, 

117 P.3d 159, ¶ 32. Stokes has failed to satisfy this burden with respect to his estoppel 

defense. Accordingly, although the District Court did not address this defense 

specifically (the court addressed laches but not estoppel), we conclude that the court, 

nevertheless, correctly denied Stokes’s Motion and Brief to Alter and Amend Order of 

 1

 Directing our attention to COS 2829 and the terms of the 1992 release, the 

Andersons inform us that the 1992 release was necessary because the Andersons’ 

predecessors wanted to sell a parcel of land over which the ground radials from the 

towers extended. The Andersons state, however, that many properties within the original 

160 acres, but outside the historic location of the towers, were sold without first obtaining 

releases from Stokes’s predecessors in interest. 

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October 29, 2002, based on equitable estoppel. We therefore affirm the court’s judgment 

with respect to this particular issue. Cf. Clark v. Eagle Systems, Inc., 279 Mont. 279, 

286, 927 P.2d 995, 999 (1996) (“We affirm district court decisions which are correct 

regardless of the court’s reasoning in reaching the decision.”). 

¶31 Issue 2. Did the District Court err in its construction of the instrument by which 

the Andersons’ predecessors in interest granted an easement to Stokes’s 

predecessors in interest?

¶32 The breadth and scope of an easement are determined by the actual terms of the 

grant. Mary J. Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex Harvest States, Cooperatives, Inc., 2007 

MT 159, ¶ 18, ___ Mont. ___, ¶ 18, ___ P.3d ___, ¶ 18; § 70-17-106, MCA (“The extent 

of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant or the nature of the enjoyment by 

which it was acquired.”). The construction of a writing granting an interest in real 

property, in turn, is governed by the rules of contract interpretation. Baker Revocable 

Trust, ¶ 18; § 70-1-513, MCA (“Grants are to be interpreted in like manner with contracts 

in general, except so far as is otherwise provided in this part.”). Thus, we begin by 

setting forth a number of the rules of contract interpretation that are pertinent to the issue 

discussed below. 

¶33 The interpretation of a contract is a question of law. Ophus v. Fritz, 2000 MT 251, 

¶ 19, 301 Mont. 447, ¶ 19, 11 P.3d 1192, ¶ 19; Van Hook v. Jennings, 1999 MT 198, 

¶ 10, 295 Mont. 409, ¶ 10, 983 P.2d 995, ¶ 10. Likewise, whether an ambiguity exists in 

a contract is a question of law. Mularoni v. Bing, 2001 MT 215, ¶ 32, 306 Mont. 405, 

¶ 32, 34 P.3d 497, ¶ 32; SVKV, L.L.C. v. Harding, 2006 MT 297, ¶ 43, 334 Mont. 395, 

¶ 43, 148 P.3d 584, ¶ 43. “A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the 

16
mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is 

ascertainable and lawful.” Section 28-3-301, MCA. “When a contract is reduced to 

writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone if possible 

. . . .” Section 28-3-303, MCA. “The whole of a contract is to be taken together so as to 

give effect to every part if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the 

other.” Section 28-3-202, MCA. If the language of a contract is unambiguous—i.e., 

reasonably susceptible to only one construction—the duty of the court is to apply the 

language as written. Ophus, ¶ 23; Carelli v. Hall, 279 Mont. 202, 209, 926 P.2d 756, 761 

(1996). With these principles in mind, we now turn to Stokes’s contentions. 

¶34 The parties seem to agree that the language pertaining to the location and scope of 

the easement is unambiguous.2

 However, the parties disagree as to the construction of 

that language. On this question, the District Court determined that the easement does not 

encumber the full 160 acres described in the grant but, instead, is limited in size and 

location to the historical location of the two radio towers—which, according to COS 

2829, consists of 31.288 acres (designated as “Tract 2”). Stokes contends that the court 

 2

 Curiously, Stokes states on the one hand that “[w]e do not think there are any 

ambiguities if the easement contract is read as a whole,” but elsewhere in his briefs 

Stokes twice reminds us that “ ‘the language of a contract should be interpreted most 

strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist’ ” (quoting § 28-3-206, 

MCA). Yet, an uncertainty does not exist where the language is unambiguous. See 

Baker Revocable Trust, ¶¶ 34-36. Thus, if Stokes believes that there are no ambiguities 

in the grant, then his invocation of § 28-3-206, MCA, is misplaced. Nevertheless, to the 

extent Stokes means to suggest, as an alternative theory, that an ambiguity does exist in 

the language of the grant, we note the following: first, that Stokes has failed to provide a 

corresponding argument and, thus, has failed to present this contention properly, see In re 

Marriage of McMahon, 2002 MT 198, ¶ 6, 311 Mont. 175, ¶ 6, 53 P.3d 1266, ¶ 6; 

M. R. App. P. 23(a)(4), and second, that the language at issue here is, in any event, not 

reasonably susceptible to the meaning proffered by Stokes, as explained below. 

17
erred in arriving at this construction of the grant and that, properly interpreted, the grant 

unambiguously created an easement over the full 160 acres. 

¶35 As support for this contention, Stokes points out that J.R. and Anna granted “unto 

the said grantee, his heirs and assigns the perpetual right and easement to erect, construct, 

operate and maintain radio towers, guy wires and ground and feed wires and conduits in, 

upon, over and through those certain lands,” which are thereafter described as the full 160 

acres. Stokes also emphasizes that “[w]e are required to consider the easement document 

as a whole” and “[a]ll of the language in the easement grant must be considered and 

respected and reasonably interpreted so as to give recognition to the entire easement.” 

¶36 It is true that “[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together so as to give effect 

to every part if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” 

Section 28-3-202, MCA (cited by Stokes). Moreover, as we stated in Rumph v. Dale 

Edwards, Inc., 183 Mont. 359, 600 P.2d 163 (1979) (also cited by Stokes): 

It is a well-established principle of contractual construction that in 

interpreting a written instrument, the court will not isolate certain phrases 

of the instrument to garner the intent of the parties, but will grasp the 

instrument by its four corners and in the light of the entire instrument, 

ascertain the paramount and guiding intent of the parties. Mere isolated 

tracts, clauses and words will not be allowed to prevail over the general 

language utilized in the instrument. The words of the contract are to be 

understood in their ordinary and proper sense. [Section 28-3-501, MCA.] 

Particular clauses of the agreement are subordinate to the general intent of 

the contract. [Section 28-3-307, MCA.] Any repugnancies in the contract 

must be reconciled, if possible, by an interpretation which will give some 

effect to the repugnant clauses, subordinate to the general intent and 

purpose of the contract. [Section 28-3-204, MCA.] Furthermore, words in 

a contract which are inconsistent with the general nature of the contract or 

the main intention of the parties are to be rejected. [Section 28-3-503, 

MCA.] 

18
Rumph, 183 Mont. at 368-69, 600 P.2d at 168-69 (some citations omitted). Yet, reading 

phrases in isolation and contrary to the general intent of the grant is precisely what Stokes 

is doing here. In rendering his construction of the grant, he conveniently ignores the 

following crucial language. 

¶37 First, the grant states upfront that “it is the desire of the said grantee [Treloar] to 

erect and maintain certain radio towers, guy wires, ground and feed wires and conduits on 

certain portions of the hereinafter described lands, the exact location of which it is now 

impossible to determine” (emphasis added). It is unmistakably clear from this language 

that J.R., Anna, and Treloar intended the radio towers and associated equipment to be 

constructed on “certain portions”—not “all”—of the 160 acres described in the grant. 

¶38 Second, the grant goes on to describe the lands on which the radio towers, guy 

wires, ground and feed wires and conduits may be constructed, as follows: 

The North Half of the Southwest Quarter (N1⁄2SW1⁄4), the Southwest 

Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (SW1⁄4NW1⁄4) all in Section Twenty-eight 

(28), Township Twenty-eight (28) North, Range Twenty-one (21) West; 

also, all of Cliffords Addition to Demersville, being the Southeast Quarter 

of the Northwest Quarter (SE1⁄4NW1⁄4) said section, township and range. 

Given this specific description, it is evident that “the exact location” which was, at the 

time of the grant, “impossible to determine” was not the 160 acres on which the radio 

towers could be built; rather, it was the “certain portions” of those 160 acres on which the 

radio towers ultimately would be built. Consequently, a construction of the grant under 

which J.R., Anna, and Treloar intended the easement to cover the entire 160 acres would 

render the clauses “certain portions of the hereinafter described lands” and “the exact 

location of which it is now impossible to determine” not only unnecessary, but also 

19
inconsistent with J.R. and Anna’s supposed intent to grant an easement over the entire 

160 acres. 

¶39 Along these same lines, the grant provides that “[t]he said grantors, their heirs or 

assigns are to fully use and enjoy said premises except for the easement and rights hereby 

granted” (emphasis added). Again, if J.R., Anna, and Treloar intended the easement to 

cover 100% of the lands described in the grant, then the clause preserving J.R. and 

Anna’s right “to fully use and enjoy said premises except for the easement and rights 

hereby granted” would be inconsistent with that intent. The rules of contract 

interpretation do not permit such a construction. See § 28-3-204, MCA (“Repugnancies 

in a contract must be reconciled, if possible, by such an interpretation as will give some 

effect to the repugnant clauses, subordinate to the general intent and purpose of the whole 

contract.”); § 28-3-202, MCA (“The whole of a contract is to be taken together so as to 

give effect to every part if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the 

other.”). 

¶40 We conclude, therefore, that the grant did not create an easement over the full 160 

acres described in the grant. The next question is the extent of the easement actually 

created. 

¶41 In Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421, 916 P.2d 751 (1996), the 

instruments by which the easements in question had been created did not specifically set 

forth the extent of those easements. Consequently, in order to ascertain the scope of the 

easements, we relied on the following principles applicable to such instruments: 

20
“If the easement is not specifically defined, it need only be such as is 

reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was 

created. It is sometimes held . . . where the grant or reservation of an 

easement is general in its terms, that an exercise of the right, with the 

acquiescence and consent of both parties, in a particular course or manner, 

fixes the right and limits it to that particular course or manner.” 

Leffingwell Ranch, 276 Mont. at 430, 916 P.2d at 757 (ellipsis in original) (quoting 

Strahan v. Bush, 237 Mont. 265, 268, 773 P.2d 718, 720 (1989)). After reciting these 

principles in Strahan, we added that “[w]hat may be considered reasonable is determined 

in light of the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances.” Strahan, 237 

Mont. at 268, 773 P.2d at 720; accord Guthrie v. Hardy, 2001 MT 122, ¶ 47, 305 Mont. 

367, ¶ 47, 28 P.3d 467, ¶ 47. Relying, in part, on Leffingwell Ranch, the District Court 

determined that the easement at issue here is limited in size to the historical location of 

the two radio towers ultimately selected by Treloar. We agree. 

¶42 Because the grant defined the easement merely as “certain portions of the 

hereinafter described lands” that “[t]he said grantee [Treloar] shall have the right to 

select,” the extent of the easement depends on the following considerations: Treloar’s 

ultimate selection; J.R. and Anna’s acquiescence in or consent to Treloar’s selection; and 

what was reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which the easement 

was created, in light of the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances. 

Leffingwell Ranch, 276 Mont. at 430, 916 P.2d at 757; Strahan, 237 Mont. at 268, 773 

P.2d at 720. Evaluating these considerations, we observe that Treloar selected roughly 31 

of the full 160 acres on which to construct the radio towers and equipment; that Treloar in 

fact constructed the towers and equipment on these 31 acres; that J.R. and Anna 

21
apparently acquiesced in or consented to Treloar’s selection; that the towers have 

remained in the same location since their construction over 50 years ago; and that the 

roughly 31 acres selected and used by Treloar was all that was reasonably necessary and 

convenient for the purpose for which the easement was created—namely, “to expand and 

reconstruct the facilities and equipment of said radio station KGEZ” and, as part of the 

expansion and reconstruction program, “to erect and maintain certain radio towers, guy 

wires, ground and feed wires and conduits on certain portions of the hereinafter described 

lands.” 

¶43 We accordingly hold that the District Court correctly determined that the easement 

is limited in size to the historical location of the two radio towers ultimately selected by 

Treloar. We next consider the final question of whether Stokes may relocate this 

easement—without changing its size—to some other portion of the 160 acres described in 

the grant. 

¶44 At the time of the grant, the exact location where the radio towers, guy wires, 

ground and feed wires and conduits were to be placed was “impossible to determine”; 

thus, the grant provided that “[t]he said grantee shall have the right to select the place or 

places at which the above described facilities shall be erected and maintained.” As 

explained already, the said grantee—i.e., Treloar—selected a site and built two radio 

towers with a corresponding transmission line, wires, conduits, and ground radial 

antennas on that site in the early 1950s, and the towers and ground radial antennas have 

remained at that location since their construction. 

22
¶45 Stokes contends that the clause giving Treloar the right to select the place or 

places at which the radio towers and associated equipment will be erected and maintained 

“simply means that at the beginning of the easement, the grantee and not the grantor will 

select the location.” Stokes points out that J.R. and Anna also granted “the perpetual 

right on [sic] ingress and egress to and from said lands for the purpose of erecting, 

maintaining, repairing, renewing, altering, removing and restoring said radio facilities 

and equipment when desired by the said grantee his heirs and assigns” (emphases added). 

Based on this language, Stokes argues that “[i]n order to have that right, which was 

granted them, it necessarily follows that the altering, removing and restoring would apply 

to any part of the 160 acres that was described for that purpose.” We disagree. 

¶46 First, whereas other provisions of the grant refer to the “grantee, his heirs and 

assigns,” the right to select the place or places at which the radio facilities and associated 

equipment would be erected and maintained was granted to “[t]he said grantee”—

Treloar—alone. Moreover, nothing in the language relied on by Stokes even intimates 

that the easement may be relocated anywhere within the 160 acres when desired by 

Treloar’s heirs and assigns. The words of the grant “are to be understood in their 

ordinary and proper sense,” § 28-3-501, MCA, and we cannot agree that the ordinary and 

proper sense of “altering,” “removing,” and “restoring,” as used in the grant, is 

“relocating.” Rather, it seems that Stokes would have the District Court and this Court 

simply insert the word “relocating” into the grant. This we may not do. See § 1-4-101, 

MCA (“In the construction of an instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain 

and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been 

23
omitted or to omit what has been inserted.”); cf. City of Missoula v. Mix, 123 Mont. 365, 

372, 214 P.2d 212, 216 (1950) (“Where the language of a reservation in a grant is clear, 

certain and unambiguous, it must be given effect as written.”). We therefore conclude 

that the location of the easement is fixed to the historical location selected by Treloar. 

¶47 In sum, we affirm the District Court’s conclusions that the easement in question 

does not encumber the full 160 acres described in the grant but, rather, is limited in size 

and location to the historical location of the two radio towers, described as “Tract 2” on 

COS 2829. Had J.R., Anna, and Treloar intended for the easement to cover all 160 acres 

and for Treloar’s heirs and assigns to have the right to relocate the radio towers and 

corresponding wires and conduits to other portions of the 160 acres, they certainly could 

have used language to accomplish this result. As it is, however, the parties’ intention—

which we ascertain from the grant taken as a whole, see §§ 28-3-202, -303, MCA—was 

to create an easement in favor of Treloar on certain portions of J.R. and Anna’s 160 

acres, the size and location of which was to be selected by Treloar based on what was 

reasonably necessary and convenient to accomplish his stated desire of expanding and 

reconstructing the facilities and equipment of KGEZ. 

¶48 Issue 3. Did the District Court err in ordering Stokes to bury the wires, ground 

radial antennas, conduits, and transmission lines at issue here to a minimum 

depth of 12 inches?

¶49 In their complaint, the Andersons claimed that Stokes has failed to comply with 

the terms of the easement grant requiring him “to bury all wires and conduits capable of 

such burial to a depth of not less than 12 inches” and “to fence all towers and/or guy 

wires.” Specifically, they alleged that many of the buried wires and conduits are not 

24
buried to the required depth; that some of the wires, including the transmission wire, are 

not buried at all; that the radio towers and guy wires either are not fenced or are fenced 

but those fences are in such disrepair that they are not serving their function; and that 

Stokes has refused to bury all wires and conduits to the proper depth, fence the towers 

and guy wires that are not fenced, and repair the existing fences that are in disrepair. The 

Andersons ultimately moved for summary judgment on this issue, asking the court to 

order Stokes to repair the improvements on the easement and otherwise comply with the 

terms of the grant. 

¶50 In its September 29, 2005 order, the District Court determined that there were no 

questions of fact on the issue of whether the wires and conduits were capable of being 

buried according to the terms of the grant. In this regard, the court observed that the 

Andersons had presented evidence that at the time Stokes acquired KGEZ, all lines were 

capable of being buried and historically had been buried. By contrast, Stokes had not 

presented any evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. “Simply 

put, [Stokes] [has] no evidence beyond counsel’s argument to rebut [the Andersons’] 

evidence that the transmission line and any other lines are capable of being buried.”3

 3

 In fairness, we note that Stokes did present two affidavits (one from Stokes and 

the other from Tony Mulligan, KGEZ’s engineer) in support of his opposition to the 

Andersons’ motion for summary judgment and in support of his own cross-motion for 

summary judgment. However, pursuant to a motion by the Andersons, the District Court 

struck and did not consider certain portions of these affidavits, which the court 

determined contained “bald, sweeping statements, made without establishing any 

foundation for making those statements, or . . . not made based on personal knowledge”; 

statements that were “immaterial and irrelevant”; and a statement by Mulligan that 

directly contradicted an assertion by Stokes and, thus, rendered the rest of Mulligan’s 

affidavit suspect. 

25
¶51 Likewise, on the issue of interference, the court noted that the Andersons had 

come forward with evidence demonstrating that their use of the land for agricultural 

purposes had been disrupted by the exposed condition of the wires and conduits and by 

Stokes’s threats of legal action whenever the Andersons attempted to cut, rake, or bale 

hay or work the soil in any other fashion. By contrast, Stokes had come forward with 

nothing more than “bald statements by counsel in briefs on summary judgment,” which 

the court noted “fail to meet the requisite standard for establishing material issues of 

fact.” 

¶52 Accordingly, the District Court granted the Andersons’ motion for summary 

judgment on Count III. In its final judgment, the court ordered Stokes to “perform the 

necessary repairs to the improvements located upon the Easement so as to be in 

compliance with the terms of the Easement,” including “burying all wires, ground radials, 

conduits and transmission lines to a minimum depth of 12 inches so as not to interfere 

with [the Andersons’] agricultural activities.” 

¶53 Stokes asserts that the court’s order is erroneous and should be reversed for two 

reasons. First, he contends that the Andersons’ ranching activity removed topsoil and 

that “[t]hey should have replaced the soil.” However, the grant provides that 

[t]he said grantors, their heirs or assigns are to fully use and enjoy said 

premises except for the easement and rights hereby granted and the said 

grantee for himself, his heirs or assigns hereby covenants to bury all wires 

and conduits capable of such burial to a depth of not less than 12 inches, so 

that the same will not unduly interfere with the cultivation of said premises, 

and to fence all towers and/or guy wires for their protection against 

livestock . . . . [Emphasis added.] 

26
The emphasized language plainly places the responsibility for burying all wires and 

conduits capable of such burial on the grantee, his heirs or assigns. 

¶54 Stokes apparently is of the view that the wires and conduits capable of burial need 

only be buried to a depth of at least 12 inches only once, and that he has no duty to rebury 

any wires and conduits that do not remain at that depth. Nothing in the foregoing 

covenant or the grant as a whole, however, suggests such a minimal requirement. Indeed, 

the language suggests precisely the opposite, given that the Andersons “are to fully use 

and enjoy said premises except for the easement” and that Stokes’s wires and conduits 

are not to “unduly interfere with the cultivation of said premises.” Moreover, Stokes’s 

position is contrary to the general rule in Montana that the owner of an easement has not 

only the right but the duty to keep the easement in repair, and the owner of the servient 

tenement is under no duty to maintain or repair the easement in the absence of an 

agreement. Guthrie v. Hardy, 2001 MT 122, ¶ 59, 305 Mont. 367, ¶ 59, 28 P.3d 467, 

¶ 59 (citing Laden v. Atkeson, 112 Mont. 302, 306, 116 P.2d 881, 883 (1941), and 25 

Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 94, at 666-67 (1996)); see also Koeppen v. Bolich, 

2003 MT 313, ¶ 52, 318 Mont. 240, ¶ 52, 79 P.3d 1100, ¶ 52 (“One having an easement 

in another’s land is bound to use it in such a manner as not to injure the rights of the 

owner of the servient tenement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, there is no 

such agreement by the Andersons or their predecessors to keep the easement in repair. 

Rather, the grant specifically contemplates maintenance by Treloar and his successors: 

“the said grantors do hereby grant unto the said grantee, his heirs and assigns the 

perpetual right and easement to erect, construct, operate and maintain radio towers, guy 

27
wires and ground and feed wires and conduits” (emphasis added). We therefore cannot 

agree with Stokes’s premise that J.R. and Anna granted Treloar an easement over their 

land that he, his heirs or assigns need not maintain and repair, and we reject Stokes’s 

contention that the Andersons “cannot hold [him] liable if the radial wires are not at least 

twelve inches (12”) below the surface of the easement ground.” 

¶55 Stokes’s second basis for challenging the District Court’s order is that the court’s 

underlying finding that the wires, ground radial antennas, conduits, and transmission lines 

are “capable” of being buried to a depth of not less than 12 inches is clearly erroneous. 

Stokes maintains that “[a]ll the evidence on this issue is contrary to the [District Court’s] 

finding.” As support for this proposition, Stokes boldly asserts that “[i]n the entire record 

on appeal there is not any evidence that states or tends to establish that the conduit or 

transmission lines can be buried.” This assertion, however, is directly contradicted by 

Stokes’s pleadings with respect to his counterclaims (“When said radio station was 

constructed in 1949, the ground radial antennae and conduits were buried to a depth of at 

least 12 inches.”), by Stokes’s answer to one of the Andersons’ discovery requests (“The 

history of the easement establishes that the ground antennae and transmission were buried 

to a depth of 12 inches.”), and by the deposition testimony of Stephen Breeze, a former 

owner of KGEZ, who testified that the transmission line and radials were capable of 

being buried. In addition, while Stokes quotes from page 67 of his September 13, 2002 

deposition, where he states that the lines “are not capable of being buried,” on page 69 of 

that same deposition Stokes concedes, after further questioning, that the lines are capable 

28
of being buried. Thus, contrary to Stokes’s assertion, there is evidence in the record 

stating or tending to establish that the wires and conduits are capable of being buried. 

¶56 Stokes also relies on the October 7, 2005 deposition of Tony Mulligan, KGEZ’s 

engineer, in which Mulligan apparently asserted: “It is not possible to bury the existing 

cables or conduits.” However, this deposition, which was taken eight days after the 

District Court ruled on the Andersons’ motion for summary judgment on Count III, is not 

part of the record. Indeed, following the District Court’s entry of judgment, Stokes sent a 

letter to the Clerk of the District Court requesting an order permitting him to file certain 

depositions, including the Mulligan deposition. The Andersons filed a motion for an 

order denying Stokes’s request, and the District Court granted the Andersons’ motion, 

noting that any discovery obtained or promulgated after summary judgment “obviously is 

outside the record on which the Court relied for summary judgment and therefore cannot 

be included as part of the record.” 

¶57 In Bahm v. Southworth, 2000 MT 244, 301 Mont. 434, 10 P.3d 99, we stated that 

“ ‘the parties on appeal are bound by the record and may not add additional matters in 

briefs or appendices.’ ” Bahm, ¶ 11 (quoting Groves v. Clark, 1999 MT 117, ¶ 22, 294 

Mont. 417, ¶ 22, 982 P.2d 446, ¶ 22). We further stated that we would “not consider 

such matters in determining whether the [district] court erred in making its findings.” 

Bahm, ¶ 11. We therefore struck an affidavit, which was not part of the district court 

record, from the Southworths’ appendix and did not consider it in our resolution of the 

appeal. See Bahm, ¶ 11. Likewise, in the case at hand, we will not consider Mulligan’s 

October 7, 2005 deposition. 

29
¶58 Alternatively, in his reply brief, Stokes directs our attention to Mulligan’s July 7, 

2005 affidavit, in which Mulligan asserted (as he did in his October 7, 2005 deposition): 

“It is not possible to bury the existing cables or conduit.” The District Court, however, 

struck and refused to consider this assertion because there was no evidence in the 

affidavit from which the court could ascertain whether Mulligan had personal or 

professional knowledge or experience on which to base this assertion. See M. R. Civ. P. 

56(e) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 

set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 

the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”). Stokes has not provided 

any basis for concluding that the District Court’s reasoning in this regard was erroneous; 

indeed, Stokes lodges no specific challenge to the court’s ruling. We therefore will not 

consider Mulligan’s unsupported assertion in his July 7, 2005 affidavit that “[i]t is not 

possible to bury the existing cables or conduit.” 

¶59 In light of the admissible evidence in the record in this case, we conclude that the 

District Court’s finding that the wires, ground radial antennas, conduits, and transmission 

lines are capable of being buried is not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, we conclude that 

Stokes, not the Andersons, has the duty to keep the easement in repair. Stokes has not 

demonstrated that any genuine issues of material fact remain with respect to Count III of 

the Andersons’ complaint or that the Andersons are not entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law on this claim. We accordingly affirm the District Court’s order requiring Stokes to 

“perform the necessary repairs to the improvements located upon the Easement so as to 

be in compliance with the terms of the Easement,” including “burying all wires, ground 

30
radials, conduits and transmission lines to a minimum depth of 12 inches so as not to 

interfere with [the Andersons’] agricultural activities.” 

CONCLUSION 

¶60 The District Court correctly denied Stokes’s motion for summary judgment based 

on the defenses of laches and estoppel. Furthermore, the court correctly determined that 

the easement in question does not encumber the full 160 acres described in the grant but, 

rather, is limited in size and location to the historical location of the two radio towers, 

described as “Tract 2” on COS 2829. Finally, the court correctly granted the relief 

requested by the Andersons on Count III of their complaint, ordering Stokes to perform 

the necessary repairs to the improvements located upon the easement so as to be in 

compliance with the terms of the grant, including burying all wires, ground radial 

antennas, conduits, and transmission lines to a minimum depth of 12 inches so as not to 

interfere with the Andersons’ agricultural activities. 

¶61 Affirmed. 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

 

We Concur: 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JOHN WARNER 

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

/S/ JIM RICE 

31