AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed December 19, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00476-CR 

JIMMY JONES, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-1615371-R 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Myers, Carlyle, and Goldstein 

Opinion by Justice Goldstein 

Jimmy Jones appeals the trial court’s order deferring his adjudication on a 

charge of aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen. After Jones’ 

bench trial on a plea of no contest, the trial court deferred adjudication of his guilt 

and placed him on deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years. In 

five issues in his original brief, Jones argues: 

1. The evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant sexually abused 

complainant. 

2. The evidence was insufficient to support Appellant’s plea of “no 

contest” admitting that he sexually abused complainant. 
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3. The trial court violated Appellant’s right to due process and statutory 

rights by placing the burden on Appellant to disprove the offense by 

establishing that complainant had a motive for falsity. 

4. The trial court violated Appellant’s statutory and due process rights to 

enter a voluntary plea by accepting Appellant’s “no contest” plea when 

the trial court misinformed Appellant he was not eligible for probation 

from a jury, misinformed Appellant that his plea of no contest was not 

an admission and failed to explain that an admission would be required 

on probation. 

5. The trial court violated Appellant’s statutory and due process rights 

voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial by accepting Appellant’s 

waiver when the trial court misinformed Appellant he was not eligible 

for probation from a jury, misinformed Appellant that his plea of no 

contest was not an admission and failed to explain that an admission 

would be required on probation. 

Jones’ supplemental brief raises three issues: 

1. The trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of impracticability 

findings in the juvenile court certification order. 

2. If there was a waiver of the jurisdictional claim Appellant is entitled to 

relief based on his right to have the effective assistance of counsel. 

3. Trial counsel’s failure to inform Appellant about the lack of jurisdiction 

combined with the mistaken and incomplete information from the trial 

court to render Appellant’s no contest plea and jury waiver involuntary. 

 In a single cross-issue, the State argues the order of deferred adjudication 

should be modified to omit the references to a plea bargain. As modified, we affirm 

the trial court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND 
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The record shows that the complainant, A.R., was born in May 1997. A.R.’s 

mother testified that Jones is Mother’s cousin and is “eight or nine years” older than 

A.R. Jones sometimes looked after A.R. In 2014, when A.R. was seventeen years 

old, A.R. told Mother that Jones had molested him. On April 1, 2014, A.R. gave a 

forensic interview at the Irving Family Advocacy Center. A.R. was sixteen years 

old at the time of the forensic interview. 

Jones was sixteen years old on June 16, 2006, the date of the alleged assault.1

Therefore, the State filed in juvenile court a petition for discretionary transfer 

pursuant to section 54.02(j) on April 13, 2016. The petition alleged that there was 

probable cause to believe Jones committed the charged offense and that, because of 

the seriousness of the offense, the welfare of the community required that the 

juvenile court waive jurisdiction and have Jones transferred to a Criminal District 

Court. The petition further alleged, among other things, that for a reason beyond the 

control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before Jones’ 

eighteenth birthday and/or after exercising due diligence, it was not practicable to 

proceed before Jones’ eighteenth birthday because Jones could not be found and/or 

the State did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new evidence 

had been found since Jones’ eighteenth birthday. The petition requested that the 

1

 Jones was originally charged with two felony offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child. After 

trial and imposition of deferred adjudication in this cause, the State moved to dismiss, and the court 

dismissed F16-15370 on March 13, 2020. The dismissed cause is not before us; therefore, we proceed 

solely on this cause. 
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juvenile court find probable cause that Jones committed the alleged offense and 

order that Jones be transferred to the proper Criminal District Court for criminal 

proceedings. 

In June 2016, Jones entered a written stipulation of evidence stipulating, in 

pertinent part, that (1) Jones was sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense 

and twenty-six years old at the present time; (2) no adjudication hearing had been 

conducted concerning the alleged acts; and (3) Jones and his attorney waived a 

discretionary transfer hearing and agreed to the existence of the elements and 

consideration in favor of transfer to criminal court for prosecution of Jones as an 

adult for the offense alleged in the petition for discretionary transfer. 

On June 28, 2016, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the State’s 

petition for discretionary transfer. Jones and his attorney were present at the hearing. 

Among other things, the court read the charges against Jones and advised him of his 

right to remain silent and call witnesses to testify on his behalf. Jones stated he did 

not have any questions regarding the proceedings; he intended to waive the hearing 

and presentment of the State’s evidence and waive calling witnesses on his behalf; 

he understood that, by waiving this hearing, the court would transfer his case to an 

adult criminal district court; and he wished to proceed. That same day, the juvenile 
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court signed an order waiving jurisdiction and transferring the case to Criminal 

District Court.2

In December 2016, Jones was charged by indictment with the offense of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child, A.R., younger than fourteen years old. The 

indictment stated Jones’ birthdate was in August 1989 and alleged that, on or about 

June 16, 2006, Jones caused the contact and penetration of A.R.’s anus with Jones’ 

sexual organ. Thus, Jones was sixteen years old at the time of the assault and twentysix years old at the time he was indicted. 

At a trial before the court on November 26, 2019, Jones waived a jury and 

entered a plea of no contest. That same day, Jones and his defense counsel signed a 

written jury waiver, and the trial court signed the waiver and approved it. The trial 

court admonished Jones as follows: 

I want you to know that when you plead No Contest I do not believe 

that’s an admission of guilt. As far as I’m concerned when you say No 

Contest you’re saying Not Guilty and the State has to prove your case 

beyond a reasonable doubt. If they can’t I find you not guilty. If they 

can I have an option that a jury would not have. I could defer a finding 

of guilt and place you on probation for up to 10 years or I could find 

you guilty and send you to prison. 

At the trial that followed, A.R. testified that, on an occasion when he was 

seven years old and Jones was watching A.R. at A.R.’s house while Mother was at 

work, A.R. and Jones were on top of A.R.’s bed, A.R. was lying on his stomach, and 

2

 The juvenile court found that Jones was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to be tried as an adult 

and aid an attorney in his defense. Jones and his attorney also stipulated to these factual findings. 
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Jones’ “penis was between like [A.R.’s] scrotum and like [his] thighs, from the 

back.” A.R. testified Jones’ penis touched his “butt” and touched “on or around the 

area where [A,R.’s] anus is.” A.R. testified he did not think Jones put his penis in 

A.R.’s “butt.” 

Jones moved for a directed verdict on the ground the State failed to prove, as 

charged in the indictment, “contact and penetration” of A.R.’s anus by Jones’ penis. 

The trial court agreed that there was “no evidence of penetration.” The State 

responded that 

we can do ”and” during the indictment portion, but during the 

charging portion at trial it’s ”or,” so penetrate or contact, it’s how it 

would be created in a jury charge. So the jury or the judge can consider 

either one. 

The trial court agreed with the State and denied Jones’ motion for directed verdict. 

Following closing arguments, the trial court stated that A.R. said there was contact 

between Jones’ penis and A.R.’s anus, and the trial court found this testimony 

“credible.” At the sentencing hearing on March 9, 2020, the trial court placed Jones 

on deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years, with an Order of 

Deferred Adjudication filed among the papers of the court. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Original Brief: Issues 1 and 2 - Insufficient Evidence 
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In his first and second issues in his original brief, Jones argues the evidence 

was insufficient to prove he sexually abused A.R. and to support his plea of no 

contest admitting he sexually abused A.R. 3

 

A plea of nolo contendere has the same legal effect as a guilty plea for 

purposes of the criminal prosecution. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.02(5); 

Gomez v. State, 399 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d). When 

a defendant waives a jury trial and enters a no contest plea on a non-capital offense, 

the proper procedure is to conduct a unitary trial. Gomez, 399 S.W.3d at 606. In a 

unitary trial, there is no “bifurcation” (where the guilt/innocence and punishment 

stages are conducted separately), even when the trial court employs procedures 

characteristic of bifurcation. Id. Rather, such a procedure remains a unitary trial 

“punctuated by a recess in the middle.” Id. The evidence is admitted at the unitary 

proceeding both to substantiate the defendant’s plea and to allow the trial court to 

determine an appropriate sentence. Flores-Alonzo v. State, 460 S.W.3d 197, 203 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.). 

The entry of a valid guilty plea has the effect of admitting all material facts 

alleged in the formal criminal charge. Id. With one exception not applicable here, 

a plea of nolo contendere or “no contest” has the same legal effect as a guilty plea. 

Id. Nevertheless, article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits the 

3

 We note that the record is devoid of any evidence that the court treated the no contest plea as an 

admission of sexual abuse, and Jones has identified none. 
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court to render a conviction only after the admission of sufficient evidence 

establishing a defendant’s guilt, even if he has entered a plea of guilty or no contest. 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15; Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009). However, when a defendant waives his right to a jury trial and 

enters a plea of guilty or no contest, the State is not required to prove the defendant’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Flores-Alonzo, 460 S.W.3d at 203. Rather, article 

1.15 only requires substantiation of the plea. Id. By its plain terms, it requires 

evidence in addition to, and independent of, the plea itself to establish the 

defendant’s guilt. Id. We are therefore required to determine whether the evidence 

embraces each essential element of the offense charged. Id. If the State fails to 

introduce sufficient evidence under Article 1.15’s standard, the trial court is not 

authorized to convict. Id. A conviction rendered without sufficient evidence to 

support the no contest or guilty plea constitutes non-constitutional trial error. Id. 

As in Gomez, we recognize that in the trial proceedings here, although 

appellant pleaded nolo contendere, the parties treated this case in some respects as a 

“not guilty” plea, and it is clear appellant was contesting his guilt. See Gomez, 399 

S.W.3d at 606. Despite appellant’s nolo contendere plea, appellant was given many 

of the benefits of a “not guilty” plea. See id. For example, the trial court permitted 

appellant to contest his guilt and stated it was holding the State to the constitutional 

“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof. See id. On appeal, appellant now 

seeks to avoid the effect of his plea and seeks review as if he had pleaded not guilty. 
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See id. Although it does not bind the State to a higher burden of proof on appeal, 

the trial court essentially required the State to present more evidence than was legally 

required to satisfy it that Jones was, in fact, guilty. See Flores-Alonzo, 460 S.W.3d 

at 202 n.2. Because Jones entered a no-contest plea, “[t]he State ... [was] not 

required to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the supporting 

evidence must simply embrace every essential element of the charged offense.” Id.

(quoting Staggs v. State, 314 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2010, no pet.)). 

The indictment alleged Jones intentionally and knowingly caused the contact 

and penetration of the anus of A.R., a child younger than fourteen. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(B)(iv), (a)(2)(B). A.R. testified that, when 

A.R. was seven, Jones got on top of him, and Jones’ penis touched his “butt” and 

touched “on or around the area where [A,R.’s] anus is.” The trial court found 

“credible” A.R.’s statement that there was contact between Jones’ penis and A.R.’s 

anus. A conviction under section 22.021 is supportable on the uncorroborated 

testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the victim was seventeen years of 

age or younger. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07. We conclude A.R.’s 

testimony embraced each essential element of the charged offense of aggravated 

sexual assault of a child. See Flores-Alonzo, 460 S.W.3d at 203. This evidence was 

sufficient to prove Jones sexually abused A.R. and to support Jones’ plea of no 

contest. See id. We overrule Jones’ first and second issues in his original brief. 
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B. Original Brief: Issue 3: Improper Burden on Motive 

In his third issue in his original brief, Jones argues the “trial court violated 

[his] right to due process and statutory rights by placing the burden on [him] to 

disprove the offense by establishing that complainant had a motive for falsity.” 

The trial court, sitting without a jury, is presumed to have used the correct 

standard of proof absent a showing to the contrary. Freeman v. State, 525 S.W.3d 

755, 757–58 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting In re D.E.W., 654 

S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)) The burden is on 

appellant to show that the proper standard was not applied. Id. 

Jones’ argument at trial was that A.R. got caught with pornographic images 

of himself and, when confronted by his mother, A.R. decided “the easiest 

explanation was to say my cousin, who comes from a homosexual household 

performed something homosexually on him.” After the parties’ closing arguments, 

the trial judge stated the following: 

Mr. Jones, your lawyer makes some good arguments and she’s 

absolutely right. A lot of these cases boil down to he said/ she said or 

he said/he said. 

I watched the complainant when he testified. He appeared troubled at 

times. He very easily could have said, “Yes, I was penetrated,” but he 

didn’t. He said that –- But he did say that he felt you thrusting between 

his legs and it felt like penetration but it wasn’t penetration. Now, he 

might have thought it was penetration at the time and as he got older 

maybe he realized it wasn’t, but either way he did say that there was 

contact between his penis –- excuse me –- your penis and his anus. 

[Jones’ counsel] is right. She does not have to prove a motive, but I 

always look for a motive or lack of a motive. And I cannot find any 
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motive for him to lie. This is not an accidental disclosure, but the 

disclosure was not made to get you in trouble. It wasn’t made to get 

him out of trouble. It was made for him to try to explain to himself as 

well as his mother why maybe his actions were not what she considered 

normal. 

I believe he was credible. And I believe based on the credible evidence 

it did happen and I’m going to find that the evidence proves your guilt. 

I’m not finding you guilty, Jimmy. I don’t know what I’m gonna do. 

I’m gonna continue you on bond right now. I want a Pre- Sentence 

Report. I want to find out a little bit more about you and then I’ll make 

a decision. But at this point in time you are free to leave the courthouse. 

You will have to come back for a Pre-Sentence Report with the 

probation department. 

Jones argues these statements show the trial court placed the burden on him to 

“disprove the complainant had a motive for falsity.” We disagree. This record 

reflects that, the trial court was merely commenting on the due consideration given 

to the theory argued by Jones’ counsel and the trial court’s conclusion that the 

complainant was “credible.” Nothing in the trial court’s comments indicates that 

any additional burden of proof was placed on Jones or that the trial court did anything 

more than consider the evidence presented by both sides. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude Jones has not met his burden to show that the proper 

standard of proof was not applied. See Freeman, 525 S.W.3d at 757–58. We 

overrule Jones’ third issue in his original brief. 

C. Original Brief: Issues 4 and 5 – Violation of Right to a Jury Trial 

 In his fourth and fifth issues in his original brief, which he argues together, 

Jones complains that the trial court violated his statutory and due process rights to 
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enter a voluntary plea and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial when the trial 

court (1) misinformed Jones that he was not eligible for probation from a jury, (2) 

misinformed Jones that his plea of no contest was not an admission, and (3) failed 

to explain that an admission would be required on probation. 

A guilty plea, to be consistent with due process of law, must be entered 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). To be “voluntary,” a guilty plea must be the expression of the 

defendant’s own free will and must not be induced by threats, misrepresentations, or 

improper promises. Id. An accused who attests that he understands the nature of his 

guilty plea and that it is voluntary has a heavy burden on appeal to show that his plea 

was involuntary. Jones v. State, 600 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. 

ref’d). 

A trial court is not required to admonish the defendant that a plea of no contest 

has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

26.13 (identifying admonishments that must be given to defendants pleading nolo 

contendere); Flores-Alonzo, 460 S.W.3d at 201. Article 26.13 also does not require 

that a defendant pleading nolo contendere be admonished that an admission of guilt 

would be required while on community supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 26.13. Substantial compliance by the court is sufficient to satisfy the 

statute, unless the defendant affirmatively shows he was not aware of the 

consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment the 
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court gave. Id. art. 26.13(c); Luckett v. State, 394 S.W.3d 577, 580 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2012, no pet.). 

While the State concedes the trial court inaccurately stated that Jones was not 

eligible to receive community supervision from a jury, the record reflects that the 

judge advised that 

If those 12 people find you guilty you can either have them set 

punishment or you can have the judge set punishment but you would 

not be eligible for probation. The law says that if you're found guilty 

of this type of case you cannot get probation. 

Appellant did not object to the trial court’s admonishment. The record shows that, 

immediately after the trial court admonished Jones, the trial court asked Jones, “I 

have been told that you do not want to have a jury trial; is that correct?” Jones 

answered, “Yes, sir.” The trial court asked, “I understand that you’re willing to 

waive or give up your right to a jury trial and have me hear the evidence to determine 

your guilt or innocence; is that true?” Again, Jones answered, “Yes, sir.” The 

voluntary waiver was memorialized in writing, signed by Jones, his defense counsel, 

the district attorney and approved by the trial court upon finding the waiver was 

made in person and in open court. 

A defendant has an absolute right to a jury trial. Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 

193, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As a matter of federal constitutional law, the State 

must establish, on the record, a defendant’s express, knowing, and intelligent waiver 

of jury trial. Id.; see also Rios v State, 2022 WL 17481021 (Tex. Crim. App. 
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December 7, 2022)(defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to 

a jury trial and as a matter of first impression a violation of the right to a jury trial is 

structural error).4

 

On this record, we conclude Jones has not met the heavy burden on appeal to 

show that his plea was involuntary. See Jones, 600 S.W.3d at 99. The record reflects 

a written waiver as well as one made in open court. Jones has failed to affirmatively 

show he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or 

harmed by the admonishment the court gave. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

26.13(c); Luckett, 394 S.W.3d at 580. Finally, consistent with the admonishment, 

the record reflects that, at the time of sentencing, although the court found the 

evidence proved guilt, instead of finding Jones guilty, the court deferred the 

adjudication of guilt and placed him on deferred adjudication probation.5

 We 

overrule Jones’ fourth and fifth issues in his original brief. 

D. Supplemental Brief – Issue 1 – Juvenile Transfer Jurisdictional Issue 

In Jones’ first issue in his supplemental brief, he argues the failure of the 

juvenile court to comply with the provisions of the transfer statute deprived the 

juvenile court of its authority to transfer the case and, as a result, the district court 

4

 Critically distinguishable from the facts before us, in Rios, the defendant pled not guilty, never 

signed a written waiver, was not admonished about his right to a jury trial and the right was never discussed 

in open court. Id. 

5

 At the March sentencing hearing, the court, referencing the November trial, reiterated that appellant 

entered a plea of no contest, waived his right to a jury, and “did not admit guilt whosoever [sic].” 
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never acquired jurisdiction. Specifically, Jones complains that the juvenile 

certification order did not find it was impracticable to bring proceedings in juvenile 

court before his eighteenth birthday.6

 However, the requirement of case-specific 

fact-findings to support the transfer order are not required by the text of the statute 

or constitutional precedent. Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370, 381 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2021) (overruling Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). It 

is the hearing itself that prevents the transfer process from being arbitrary; the casespecific fact-findings are not necessary to protect a fundamental constitutional right. 

Id. Thus, we conclude the absence of a finding of impracticability was not required 

and did not deprive the juvenile court of its authority to transfer the case or prevent 

the district from acquiring jurisdiction. See id. We overrule Jones’ first issue in his 

supplemental brief. 

E. Supplemental Brief: Issue 2: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his second issue in his supplemental brief, Jones asserts that, if there was 

waiver of the jurisdictional claim raised in his first issue, then he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. As a threshold matter, “a reviewing court on direct appeal 

will rarely be able to fairly evaluate the merits of an ineffective-assistance claim 

because the record on direct appeal is usually undeveloped and inadequately 

6

 The undisputed and stipulated record reflects that Jones was 16 at the time of the alleged offense and 

26 at the time of the hearing to transfer based upon the complaining witness’ outcry to his mother not made 

until well after Jones’ eighteenth birthday. 
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reflective of the reasons for defense counsel’s actions at trial.” Mata v. State, 226 

S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However, because we find no waiver 

related to Jones’ jurisdictional claim, we need not further address his second issue 

in his supplemental brief. 

F. Supplemental Brief: Issue 3: Revisit Voluntariness of No Contest Plea 

and Jury Waiver 

In his third issue in his supplemental brief, Jones argues that trial counsel’s 

failure to inform him about the “lack of jurisdiction” combined with the “mistaken 

and incomplete information from the trial court” render his no contest plea and jury 

waiver involuntary. In making this argument, Jones revisits his arguments raised in 

his fourth and fifth issues in his original brief and “now asks this Court to consider 

the impact of counsel’s failure to request the dismissal of the indictment on the 

voluntariness of [Jones’] waivers in combination with the mistaken and incomplete 

information as provided by the trial court.” Specifically, Jones complains that 

“[f]ailure by counsel to adequately explain [Jones’] right to challenge jurisdiction 

was thus an additional factor that rendered [Jones’] decisions involuntary regarding 

waivers of his rights and his plea.” We have already addressed and rejected Jones’ 

arguments raised in his fourth and fifth issues in his original brief, and we have 

discussed the reasons a finding of impracticability in the transfer order was not 

required. To the extent Jones endeavors to also challenge the ineffective assistance 

of counsel, the record before us on direct appeal is undeveloped to fairly evaluate 
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the merits of any alleged claim. See Mata, 226 S.W.3d at 430. Further, because 

Jones’ challenges all fail, we find no errors or failures on the part of counsel to 

address in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. 

Id. We overrule Jones’ third issue in his supplemental brief. 

G. State’s Cross Point

In a single cross-point, the State requests that the order of deferred 

adjudication community supervision be modified to omit the reference to a plea 

bargain in the section entitled “Terms of Plea Bargain.” This Court has the power 

to correct and reform the judgment of the court below to make the record speak the 

truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so, or make any 

appropriate order as the law and the nature of the case may require. Asberry v. State, 

813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Jones declined the 

State’s plea bargain offer and instead entered a plea of no contest. Accordingly, we 

delete the phrase “10 YEARS DEFERRED PROBATION” from the section entitled 

“Terms of Plea Bargain” and substitute “N/A” in that section in the order of deferred 

adjudication community supervision. We sustain the State’s cross-point. 

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

200476F.U05 

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/

BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JIMMY JONES, Appellant 

No. 05-20-00476-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 265th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-1615371-R. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Goldstein. Justices Myers and 

Carlyle participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

MODIFIED as follows: 

 in the order of deferred adjudication community supervision, the 

phrase “10 YEARS DEFERRED PROBATION” is deleted from the section 

entitled “Terms of Plea Bargain” and “N/A” is substituted in that section. 

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered December 19, 2022