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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ROBERT WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

October 31, 2017

v No. 332753

Wayne Circuit Court

PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE 

COMPANY and PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

LC No. 15-003421-NF

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and MURPHY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor 

of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on plaintiff’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits, 

which claim arose out of an alleged injury sustained by plaintiff when he slipped on gasoline 

while fueling his car. We affirm, albeit for a different reason than that given by the trial court for 

dismissing the suit.

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that about ten seconds after he began fueling his 

vehicle at a gas station, the hose broke off the pump handle and began “wandering around all 

over the place spewing gas everywhere.” Plaintiff stated that he attempted to step back, slipped 

on the gasoline, and then fell, resulting in injuries to his spine. Defendants moved for summary 

disposition on the basis that plaintiff’s injury was merely fortuitous or incidental to the use of his 

vehicle. Plaintiff responded that he was engaged in maintenance of the vehicle at the time of the 

accident. The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants, ruling that while fueling a 

vehicle does concern the maintenance of the vehicle, it was the malfunctioning gas pump and not 

the maintenance of the vehicle that actually caused plaintiff’s injuries.

In Kemp v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, __ Mich __, __; __ NW2d __ (2017); slip

op at 4-5, our Supreme Court recited the following well-established principles that are applicable

in this case:

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that summary 

disposition is appropriate when, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is 
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no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” In determining whether there is 

a genuine issue as to any material fact, we consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Where there is no dispute about the facts, the 

issue whether an injury arose out of the use of a vehicle is a legal issue for a court 

to decide and not a factual one for a jury. 

Issues of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. When 

interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, focusing 

first on the statute's plain language. In so doing, we examine the statute as a 

whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire 

legislative scheme. When a statute's language is unambiguous, the Legislature 

must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be 

enforced as written. [Citations, quotation marks, and alteration brackets omitted.]

MCL 500.3105(1) provides that “[u]nder personal protection insurance an insurer is 

liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, 

maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this 

chapter.” And MCL 500.3106 provides, in relevant part:

(1) Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, 

maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless any of the 

following occur:

(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of 

the bodily injury which occurred.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (2) [inapplicable], the injury was a 

direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the 

vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used, or property being lifted 

onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (2), the injury was sustained by a 

person while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle.

 The instant case involved a parked vehicle, as it was temporarily stationary at the gas 

pump while plaintiff fueled the vehicle, at which point the injuries occurred. The Kemp Court 

explained the interplay between MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3106 and the analysis pertaining 

to MCL 500.3106, observing:

The no-fault act's initial scope of coverage for PIP benefits is set forth in

MCL 500.3105(1) . . . . However, when an injury involves a parked motor 

vehicle, coverage is generally excluded unless the claimant demonstrates that one 

of [the] three statutory exceptions [in § 3106(1)] applies. . . . .

This Court has provided a three-step framework to analyze coverage of 

injuries related to parked motor vehicles. First, the claimant must demonstrate that 

his or her conduct fits one of the three exceptions of subsection 3106(1). Second, 
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the claimant must show that the injury arose out of the ownership, operation, 

maintenance, or use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. Finally, the 

claimant must demonstrate that the injury had a causal relationship to the parked 

motor vehicle that is more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for. We analyze each 

of these requirements in turn. [Kemp, __ Mich at __; slip op at 6-7 (citations, 

quotation marks, emphasis, and alteration brackets omitted).]

Here, plaintiff’s injuries did not arise because of the way in which his vehicle was 

parked. MCL 500.3106(1)(a). Further, plaintiff did not sustain his injuries “while occupying, 

entering into, or alighting from the vehicle.” MCL 500.3106(1)(c). Additionally, plaintiff’s 

injuries were not “a direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the 

vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used.” MCL 500.3106(1)(b). And finally, 

plaintiff’s injuries were not “a direct result of . . . property being lifted onto or lowered from the 

vehicle in the loading or unloading process.” MCL 500.3106(1)(b). Although we understand 

why plaintiff does not address MCL 500.3106 and its exceptions in his initial appellate brief, 

considering that the trial court did not do so, plaintiff fails to even acknowledge MCL 500.3106 

in his reply brief, despite the fact that defendants’ appellee brief focuses heavily on MCL 

500.3106 and the parked-vehicle exceptions. Again, there is no dispute that plaintiff’s vehicle 

was parked when the alleged injuries arose; therefore, MCL 500.3106 is necessarily applicable, 

and the exceptions in MCL 500.3106 that could potentially allow for recovery are simply not 

implicated in this case. “When this Court concludes that a trial court has reached the correct 

result, this Court will affirm even if it does so under alternative reasoning.” Messenger v Ingham 

Co Prosecutor, 232 Mich App 633, 643; 591 NW2d 393 (1998).

Affirmed. Having fully prevailed on appeal, defendants are awarded taxable costs under 

MCR 7.219. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause