SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 6D23-665

Lower Tribunal No. 2021-CA-002428

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FOOT & ANKLE CENTER OF FLORIDA, LLC,

Appellant, 

v.

CARLOS VARGAS, IV,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County.

Lauren L. Brodie, Judge.

April 19, 2024

BROWNLEE, J.

Foot & Ankle Center of Florida, LLC (“FAC”) appeals both the trial court’s 

order granting summary judgment in favor of Carlos Vargas IV (“Vargas”), as well 

as the final order awarding Vargas damages and attorney’s fees and costs, which 

included a contingency fee multiplier.

1 We find merit in FAC’s argument that the 

trial court erred in applying a multiplier in this case—where there was no evidence

1 This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this 

Court on January 1, 2023.
2

that the relevant market required a multiplier to obtain competent counsel—and 

reverse on that basis. As to all other issues raised, we affirm without discussion. 

Vargas sued FAC, asserting a cause of action under the Florida Consumer 

Collection Practices Act in Count I, and seeking declaratory relief in Count II. 

Vargas’s claims were based on his assertion that FAC placed an illegitimate lien on 

his worker’s compensation settlement proceeds after a doctor at FAC treated Vargas 

for a work-related injury. Vargas later moved for summary judgment on his claims 

and prevailed. 

The parties then proceeded to an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount 

of damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. At that hearing, Vargas 

argued, for the first time, that he was also entitled to a contingency fee multiplier. 

He then presented evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees 

and costs, including the testimony of an expert witness. For its part, FAC disputed 

various aspects of the fees and costs sought and challenged Vargas’s entitlement to 

a contingency fee multiplier in a statutory fee case like this one. After the hearing, 

in accordance with the trial court’s instructions, both parties filed memorandums of 

law. In its memorandum, FAC maintained that Vargas was not entitled to a 

multiplier and further noted that, even if he were, the evidence in this case was 

insufficient to support the imposition of a multiplier. 
3

The trial court ruled in favor of Vargas, finding he was entitled to a 

contingency fee multiplier of 1.5. The order included specific findings in support of 

that determination, including a finding “that the relevant market requires the 

application of contingency risk multiplier to incentivize effective counsel to 

undertake the representation of plaintiffs in these cases, such as Plaintiff, on 

contingent basis[, and] that the Plaintiff could not have afforded to hire an attorney.” 

It then awarded Vargas $500.00 in statutory damages, $5,404.59 in costs, applied 

the 1.5 multiplier, and awarded Vargas $14,310.00 in attorney’s fees. 

FAC now appeals that ruling. As it did below, FAC attacks the trial court’s 

imposition of the multiplier, in part, because the trial court’s findings were not based 

on competent, substantial evidence. Specifically, FAC argues there was no evidence 

presented as to whether the relevant market required a contingency fee multiplier to 

obtain competent counsel. Because we agree with FAC that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the imposition of a multiplier and reverse on that basis, we do 

not reach FAC’s additional challenges to the multiplier. 

We review the trial court’s application of a contingency fee multiplier under 

the abuse of discretion standard. See TRG Columbus Dev. Venture, Ltd. v. Sifontes, 

163 So. 3d 548, 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citing Sunshine State Ins. Co. v. Davide,

117 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)). The trial court’s findings as to the 

application of a multiplier must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
4 

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deshpande, 314 So. 3d 416, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2020) (citing Sifontes, 163 So. 3d at 552–53); Joyce v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 228 

So. 3d 1122, 1128 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]rial judges are not required to use a multiplier; 

but when they do, evidence must be ‘presented to justify the utilization of a 

multiplier.’” (quoting Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 

(Fla. 1990))). 

According to the Florida Supreme Court, in order to justify a contingency fee

multiplier, the moving party must present evidence of three factors: (1) whether the

relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel;

(2) whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way; and

(3) whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe2 are applicable, especially, the

amount involved, the results obtained, and the type of fee arrangement between the

attorney and his client. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834. “The purpose of the relevant

market factor is ‘to assess, not just whether there are attorneys in any given area, but 

specifically whether there are attorneys in the relevant market who both have the 

skills to handle the case effectively and who would have taken the case absent the 

availability of a contingency fee multiplier.’” Impex Caribe Corp. v. Levin, 338 So. 

3d 13, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (quoting Joyce, 228 So. 3d at 1135). “Importantly, 

‘evidence of each of these factors must be presented to justify the utilization of a 

2 Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). 
5 

multiplier.’” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Candelaria, 339 So. 3d 

463, 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (quoting Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834).3

 

The imposition of a multiplier in this case fails that factorial analysis right 

from the start. Despite the trial court’s finding as to the first factor—that “the

relevant market requires the application of contingency risk multiplier to incentivize

effective counsel to undertake the representation of [Vargas]”—Vargas presented no 

evidence on this point. While the record does contain testimony from Vargas’s 

expert witness, explaining that the purpose of the contingency fee multiplier is to 

incentivize attorneys to take difficult cases on a contingency basis and that Vargas 

could not afford to pay an attorney on an hourly basis, this testimony reveals nothing 

as to the relevant market or whether any local lawyers would have agreed to take 

Vargas’s case without a multiplier. See Levin, 338 So. 3d at 15 (reversing imposition 

of a multiplier where “Levin’s fees expert . . . never testified that there was a lack of 

well-qualified, local construction lawyers, or that it was unlikely that Levin would 

have found a competent lawyer to take his lien foreclosure case without the 

possibility of a contingency fee multiplier.”). 

Nor does Vargas point to any evidence establishing the relevant market factor

in his briefing. Rather, Vargas asserts there was evidence from which the trial court

“could have reasonably inferred—in a way that is not ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or

3 Neither party challenges the applicability of the Quanstrom factors.
6 

unreasonable’”—that the relevant market required a contingency fee multiplier. 

That, however, is not the standard. Contrary to Vargas’s assertions, the record must

contain competent, substantial evidence of the first factor in order to support the

imposition of a multiplier. See Deshpande, 314 So. 3d at 421 (“Because the record 

is devoid of any evidence that the relevant market required a contingency fee 

multiplier to obtain competent counsel, we reverse the trial court’s application of a 

multiplier.”); Sun Bank of Ocala v. Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 1990)

(“[T]here should be evidence in the record, and the trial court should so find, that

without risk-enhancement plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulties in

finding counsel in the local or other relevant market.” (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del.

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 731, 107 S. Ct. 3078, 3089,

97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987))); see also Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508, 513 (Fla. 1990)

(Overton, J., concurring) (explaining that in public interest cases, “no enhancement 

for risk is appropriate unless the applicant can establish that without an adjustment 

for risk the prevailing party would have faced substantial difficulties in finding 

counsel in the local or other relevant market.” (quoting Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 

832) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And, as the party seeking fees, the onus

was on Vargas to establish he “would have difficulty securing counsel without the

opportunity for a multiplier.” Levin, 338 So. 3d at 15. 
7 

Because no such evidence exists in this case, we reverse the trial court’s

imposition of the contingency fee multiplier. We do so without remanding for 

further proceedings on this point. See Deshpande, 314 So. 3d at 420 (“Generally, 

when an attorney’s fee or cost order is appealed and the record on appeal is devoid 

of competent substantial evidence to support the order, the appellate court will 

reverse the award without remand.” (quoting Brake v. Murphy, 736 So. 2d 745, 748 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1999))). As the Fifth District put it: “[W]here a party seeking fees and 

costs has been afforded an evidentiary hearing, it is not entitled to a second bite at 

the apple to prove its claim.” Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. JM Family Enters., Inc.,

77 So. 3d 227, 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Accordingly, we remand solely for the 

trial court to enter a judgment that does not include the application of a contingency 

fee multiplier. 

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. 

NARDELLA and SMITH, JJ., concur.

Christopher DeCosta, of Mahshie & DeCosta P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.

Jordan T. Isringhaus, of Swift Law, PLLC, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING 

AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED