J-A20023-23

2023 PA Super 179

SAMUEL A. AND SUSAN J. 

STOLTZFUS, H/W 

Appellants

v.

GREEN LINE LABS, LLC

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1323 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Civil Division at CI-21-05354

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2023

Samuel A. and Susan J. Stoltzfus, husband and wife (Appellants), appeal 

from the order striking the confessed judgment against their tenant, Green 

Line Labs, LLC (GLL). We affirm.

On June 1, 2020, GLL leased from Appellants a 10,000 square-foot 

space, known as “The Greenhouse,” and four parking spaces (with one space 

at the loading dock) (the Property).

1 Lease, 6/1/20, Preamble, ¶ 1. Under 

the Lease, GLL agreed to pay Appellants $55,000 per year, with monthly 

payments of $4,583.33. Id. ¶ 2. GLL leased the Property for use as a “hemp 

genetics cultivation facility.” Id. ¶ 5. 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Property is located at 5541 Old Philadelphia Pike, Gap, Pennsylvania. 

Lease, 6/1/20.
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The trial court explained what next transpired:

This case commenced on August 6, 2021, when Appellants 

filed [a] Complaint for Confession of Judgment for Money and in 

Ejectment for Possession of Real Property (“Complaint”) against 

[GLL] .... See Complaint. Therein, Appellants assert[ed] the 

following: failure to pay rent when due, using leased premises 

beyond the uses permitted in the lease, altering the leased 

premises without approval, unauthorized storage, engaging in 

activities not permitted in the lease, and failure to provide proof 

of liability insurance. Complaint[, 8/6/21,] at 2. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/22, at 2. Appellants claimed past rent, accelerated 

rent, and counsel fees totaling $110,766.17. Complaint, 8/6/21, at 2. 

At the same time, Appellants confessed judgment for past-due rent, 

accelerated rent, and possession of the Property. Confession and Ejectment, 

8/6/21, at 1. Appellants additionally filed Pa.R.C.P. 2958.1 Notice of 

Judgment and Execution Thereon. On October 12, 2021, 

Appellants filed [a] Praecipe for Writ of Possession Upon a 

Confessed Judgment, declaring that notice required under 

Pa.R.C.P. 2973.3 was served more than thirty days prior; a Writ 

of Possession was filed in tandem with the praecipe. On November 

11 , 2021, [GLL] contacted [c]ounsel for Appellants [(Counsel)] in 

an attempt to settle the matter. [GLL] asserts that Counsel 

responded on November 16, 2021, with the following conditions: 

[GLL] must pay all past due rent and rent through the end of the 

year totaling $23,291.65[;] [GLL] must pay legal fees and costs 

totaling $10,750.00[;] all storage must by cleaned up and 

removed[;] and [Appellants] provided a “less than 24-hour 

deadline” to do so. [GLL] states [it] was unable to secure the 

amount of money requested on such short notice and offered to 

pay $10,000.00 the following day in good faith, with the remaining 

funds to be tendered to Appellants on November 24, 2021[.] 

Counsel for Appellants refused the counteroffer.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/22, at 3-4 (citations omitted). 

On November 17, 2021, Appellants ejected GLL from the Property:
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Appellants filed [a] Praecipe for Writ of Execution. On November 

23, 2021, and December 16, 2021, [GLL] contacted Counsel for 

Appellants to request access to the [Property] so [GLL] could 

remove rented equipment which needed to be returned to its 

owner, Plant Productions. [GLL] state[d] both requests were 

denied, and as a result, Plant Productions filed criminal charges 

for theft. On March 23, 2022, Appellants brought [GLL’s] goods, 

inventory, equipment, fixtures, and other assets to public auction,

where, according to [GLL], neither the auction company nor 

Appellants verified ownership of the assets.

Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).

Relevant to this appeal, 

[o]n June 17, 2022, [GLL] filed [a] Petition to Strike and/or Open 

Judgment Entered by Confession[,] alleging the record in this 

matter is fatally flawed and has irregularities on its face[;] the 

docket does not reflect proper service[;] there is no relation 

between the cognovit clause in the Lease and [GLL’s] signature[;]

and Appellants are attempting double recovery for a single wrong. 

In response, Appellants countered, inter alia, that a revised 

Sheriffs Notice of Service, attached to their answer, showed all 

documents were served on [GLL] as required[;] [GLL’s] Petition 

was time[-]barred and did not provide any explanation for the 

delay[;] and [GLL] admitted to default in their Petition and action 

was taken pursuant to the Lease. 

Thereafter, [GLL] filed a reply alleging the Sheriff’s Notice of 

Service from filed [sic] September 10, 2021, and the Sheriff’s 

Notice of Service provided by Appellants in the Answer/New 

Matter[,] significantly differ, and that the matter of effective 

service is unclear. Moreover, [GLL] assert[ed] Appellants 

improperly entered judgment for possession and accelerated rent 

simultaneously, and failed to address this issue in the Answer/New 

Matter, beyond [stating the issue is] a conclusion of law. As a 

result, [GLL] contends, Appellants have waived [] any possible 

defense or objection pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2959(c). 

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added, citations omitted). In its reply, GLL requested 

only that the court grant its petition to strike. GLL’s Sur Reply to Appellants’

Answer in Opposition, 8/2/22, at 3 (unnumbered). 
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On August 22, 2022, the trial court granted GLL’s petition to strike the 

confessed judgment. Order, 8/22/22. Thereafter, Appellants filed the instant 

timely appeal. Appellants and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Before we consider Appellants’ substantive issues, we address whether 

this appeal is properly before us. “The appealability of an order directly

implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Estate of

Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. Super.

2009). “[T]his Court has the power to inquire at any time, sua sponte,

whether an order is appealable.”

2 Id.

Under Pa.R.A.P. 341, a final order disposes of all parties and all claims,

is expressly defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a final order

pursuant to the trial court’s determination under Rule 341(c). Pa.R.A.P.

341(b)(1)-(3). 

[W]here an order is issued that grants a motion to strike a

judgment, such an order is generally not appealable, i.e., it is not

an interlocutory order from which an appeal as of right may lie. 

Such an order anticipates further litigation because the parties are

placed back in the position they were in prior to the entry of the

judgment. ... [However, when] the order striking the

judgment ends the litigation as to all parties and all

claims[, it is] a final order as defined in Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)

and an appeal may be taken as of right.

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2 On October 21, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal 

should not be quashed for lack of jurisdiction. Rule, 10/21/22. Appellants 

filed a response to the rule on November 2, 2022. This Court discharged the 

rule, but advised Appellants the issue might be revisited by the merits panel. 

Order, 12/27/22. 
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United Parcel Serv. v. Hohider, 954 A.2d 13, 16 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(emphasis added). Thus, we consider whether the trial court’s order striking

the confessed judgment ends all litigation between Appellants and GLL. See

id.

Our review discloses that Appellants’ Complaint sought the following

relief: 

Judgment in ejectment in [Appellants’] favor and against [GLL] for

property located at 5541 Old Philadelphia Pike, Gap,

Pennsylvania[,] 17527; and Judgment for $110,766.17. 

Complaint, 8/6/21, at 3. Appellants confessed judgment against GLL for

$110,766.17 and “ejectment in favor of [Appellants] for [the Property].” 

Confession and Ejectment, 8/6/21. 

On August 22, 2022, the trial court entered the order granting GLL’s

petition to strike, stating, “The judgment previously entered in this matter on

behalf of [Appellants] is stricken.” Order, 8/22/22. Thus, the trial court’s

order struck the confessed judgment in its entirety. See id. Although the 

trial court’s order is not marked as “final,” it neither directs nor suggests

further proceedings. Our review discloses no pending action before the trial 

court. No further proceedings are scheduled. Under these circumstances, we 

conclude the order is final and therefore appealable. See id.

Appellants present the following issues:

A. If it is determined that Appellants are not entitled to judgments 

for both possession and accelerated rent, did the trial court 

commit an error of law and/or abuse its discretion in striking 
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both judgments, as [Appellants] are entitled to some remedy 

where [GLL] admitted to defaulting under the lease between 

the parties?

B. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion in not denying [GLL’s] Petition to Strike 

Judgment, which was untimely filed, and where [GLL] gave no 

compelling reason for its delay?

C. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion in ruling that it lacked personal 

jurisdiction over [GLL] to enter confessed judgments for 

possession and money damages, where [GLL] submitted to the 

trial court’s jurisdiction to enter such judgments in the lease 

between the parties?

D. Whether the warrant of attorney to confess judgment is 

sufficient where it is in writing in bold, capital letters in the 

lease between the parties, signed by the person bound by it, 

and such signature bears a direct relation to the warrant?

Appellants’ Brief at 3-4 (issues reordered, punctuation modified).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition to strike a confessed

judgment for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Ferrick v. Bianchini, 69

A.3d 642, 647 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Appellants first challenge the trial court’s order striking both the 

confessed judgment for money damages and for possession of the property. 

Appellants’ Brief at 22. Appellants claim they “should have been permitted to 

pursue at least a judgment of possession with a judgment for rent and other 

sums due to date or a judgment for accelerated rent.” Id. Quoting this 

Court’s decision in Homart Dev. Co. v. Sgrenci, 662 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. 

1995), Appellants assert, “When the judgment is entered for possession, the 

landlord is ... entitled to recover ... those losses which he suffers in attempting 
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to relet the premises for the term of the lease.” Appellants’ Brief at 22-23 

(quoting Homart, 662 A.2d at 1101). Appellants claim,

[t]o the extent it is determined [Appellants] could not obtain both 

a confessed judgment for possession and accelerated rent, [they] 

should be permitted judgment for possession and for money 

damages for past-due rent and for other damages resulting from 

[GLL’s] breach. Striking both judgments deprived [Appellants] of 

all their remedies.

Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).

Appellants additionally rely on our decision in Pops PCE TT, LP. V. R &

R Rest. Group, LLC, 208 A.3d 79, 89 (Pa. Super. 2019). Appellants claim 

that in Pops, this Court concluded the trial court had erred in opening a 

confessed judgment. Appellants’ Brief at 23. According to Appellants, the 

landlord in Pops confessed judgment for accelerated rent and possession, and 

the lease allowed judgment for both. Id. (citing Pops, 208 A.3d at 89, 90 

n.1). Appellants assert,

if this Court determines that [Appellants] could not confess 

judgment for both possession and accelerated rent, ... the 

judgment for possession should be maintained and the judgment 

for accelerated rent should be opened to determine the 

appropriate amount due to [Appellants] for [GLL’s] breach.

Id. at 24.

In addressing Appellants’ issue, we are cognizant of the following:

A petition to strike a judgment is a common[-]law 

proceeding [that] operates as a demurrer to the record. A 

petition to strike a judgment may be granted only for a 

fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the 

record. ... An order of the court striking a judgment annuls 

the original judgment and the parties are left as if no 

judgment had been entered.
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Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Servs., Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 700 

A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. 1997) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. 

Copley Qu-Wayne Assocs., 546 Pa. 98, 683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 

1996)). In assessing whether “there are fatal defects on the face 

of the record ..., a court may only look at what was in the record 

when the judgment was entered.” Id. Moreover, if any defect 

disclosed by the record “is one that can be remedied by an 

amendment of the record or other action, nunc pro tunc, the 

judgment should not be stricken off.” George H. Althof, Inc., v. 

Spartan Inns of Amer., Inc., ... 441 A.2d 1236, 1237 (Pa. 

Super. 1982). ...

Dime Bank v. Andrews, 115 A.3d 358, 364 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

In contrast, “[a] judgment by confession will be opened if the petitioner

acts promptly, alleges a meritorious defense, and presents sufficient evidence

in support of the defense to require the submission of the issues to a jury.” 

9795 Perry Highway Mgmt., LLC v. Bernard, 273 A.3d 1098, 1102 (Pa.

Super. 2022). Thus,

the petition to strike a confessed judgment must focus on any

defects or irregularities appearing on the face of the record, as

filed by the party in whose favor the warrant was given, which

affect the validity of the judgment and entitle the petitioner to

relief as a matter of law. [T]he record must be sufficient to sustain

the judgment. The original record that is subject to review in a

motion to strike a confessed judgment consists of the complaint

in confession of judgment and the attached exhibits.

In contrast, if the truth of the factual averments contained in [the

complaint in confession of judgment and attached exhibits] is

disputed, then the remedy is by proceeding to open the judgment,

not to strike it. A petition to strike a confessed judgment

and a petition to open a confessed judgment are distinct

remedies; they are not interchangeable.

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). 
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Upon review, we conclude that Appellants’ reliance on our decisions in 

Homart and Pops is misplaced. In Homart, the landlord confessed judgment 

against the appellant/tenant for past-due rent, accelerated rent, and 

possession of the property. Homart, 662 A.2d at 1096-97. The 

appellant/tenant petitioned to open the judgments, arguing that he had not 

breached the lease, “but rather that [landlord] had breached the lease and 

rendered [tenant’s] performance impossible ....” Id. at 1097. The trial court 

denied the petition to open, finding that landlord had not breached the lease. 

Id. 

On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded. Id. First, we observed 

that the tenant had presented an equitable defense, which should be resolved 

by the factfinder. Id. at 1100. We further found an independent basis for 

opening the judgment:

A landlord must elect whether to confess judgment for possession

and for all monies then due, or to confess judgment for all monies

due for the entire term. When the judgment is entered for

possession, the landlord is, of course, entitled to recover, as

damages in a civil action, those losses which he suffers in

attempting to re[-]let the premises for the term of the lease.... 

The landlord, however, cannot ... enter judgment for

possession and for all moneys which would otherwise be

due as rents through the end of the term.

Id. at 1101 (emphasis added). This Court concluded that

the money judgment, which included accelerated rent and 

possession, was “entered for an amount which was grossly 

excessive”, in light of the entry of the judgment for possession[] 

and is subject to a motion to strike. [The tenant,] however, did 

not file a motion to strike and, thus, has waived his right to 

this relief. See[] Pa.R.Civ.P. 2959. The judgment should, 
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however, have been opened, in response to the petition to open 

filed by [the tenant], so as to resolve the issue of the amount of 

the money judgment, where [the landlord] had also confessed 

judgment for possession, even if the trial court believed that there 

was not sufficient evidence of a breach of the lease by appellee to 

warrant submission of that issue to a jury.

Id. at 1101-02. 

Similarly, in Pops, the landlord filed a landlord-tenant complaint against 

the tenant, seeking only possession of the leased premises. Pops, 208 A.3d 

at 83. The Magisterial District Judge (MDJ) entered judgment finding tenant

in default of the lease and granting possession to landlord. Id. No damages 

were awarded, and tenant did not appeal the MDJ’s decision. Id. 

Subsequently, the landlord confessed judgment for money damages against 

tenant, including accelerated rent due under the lease. Id. The tenant filed 

a petition to strike/open the confessed judgment. Id. The tenant alleged that

(a) it did not breach the lease; (b) it had properly terminated the lease by 

letter; and (c) the landlord was not entitled to accelerated rent, as it had 

possession of the leased premises. Id. The trial court denied the requests to 

strike and open the confessed judgment. Id. at 84. 

On appeal, the tenant challenged only the trial court’s refusal to open

the confessed judgment. Id. at 85. This Court reversed the denial of the 

petition to open:

[T]he record indicates [the landlord] obtained a judgment for

possession of the leased premises on January 29, 2015, and

remained in possession of the premises at the time it filed its

complaint in confession of judgment in June of 2015, in which it

sought monetary damages including accelerated rent through
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October of 2023. Under Pennsylvania law, however, [the

landlord] was limited to seeking actual monetary damages

as of the date it took possession, and it was legally

precluded from seeking accelerated damages against [the

tenant]. Based on the foregoing, we deem the trial court’s 

refusal to open the confessed judgment to be a clear error of law.

Id. at 89 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 

In both Homart and Pops, this Court recognized the impropriety of 

confessing judgment for both accelerated rent and possession. Homart, 662 

A.2d at 1101; Pops, 208 A.3d at 89. We concluded in both cases that opening 

the judgment was appropriate, where that was the only remedy sought. 

Homart, 662 A.2d at 1101-02; Pops, 208 A.3d at 85, 89. Neither Homart 

nor Pops require a trial court to open a confessed judgment, where a petition 

to strike was filed. 

This Court has long held that “where the lessor terminates the lease and 

enters into possession[,] he may not have possession of the premises and 

also judgment for rent for the unexpired period of the lease.” H. A. Steen

Indus., Inc. v. Richer Commc’n, Inc., 314 A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. Super.

1973). As this Court recognized in both Homart and Pops, a landlord “cannot

... enter judgment for possession and for all moneys which would otherwise

be due as rents through the end of the term.” Pops, 208 A.2d at 89 (quoting

Homart, 662 A.2d at 1100).

Here, Appellants confessed judgment for both accelerated rent and

possession, and GLL filed a petition to strike. Under these circumstances, the
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trial court did not err in striking, rather than opening, the confessed

judgment.3 Appellants’ claim merits no relief.

Appellants next argue the trial court erred in granting the petition to

strike, because it was untimely filed with no compelling reason for the delay. 

Appellants’ Brief at 18. According to Appellants,

[p]ursuant to Rule 2959 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure, if written notice is served on a petitioner pursuant to

Rule 2956.1(c)(2) (which provides for serving notice under Rule

2958.1) or Rule 2973.1(c) (which provides for serving notice

under Rule 2973.2), a petition to strike off or open judgment shall

be filed within thirty days of such service. Pa.R.C.P. No.

2959(a)(3); 2956.1(c)(2); 2973.1(c). A petition to open or strike

a confessed judgment not timely filed shall be denied unless the

defendant can demonstrate compelling reasons for the delay. 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 2959(a)(3).

Appellants’ Brief at 19. Appellants claim GLL was served with Notice of the

judgment and execution under Rule 2958.1, and provided notice of the

judgment and execution on September 8, 2021, in accordance with Rule

2973.2. Id. Appellants assert GLL had no compelling reason for its eightmonth delay in filing the petition to strike. Id. at 20. 

As this Court explained,

[a] petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the validity of 

the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, 

to relief. A fatal defect on the face of the record denies the 

prothonotary the authority to enter judgment. When a 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court explained it granted the petition to strike because “written 

notice of execution has not been served upon [GLL].” Trial Court Opinion, 

11/15/22, at 11. We are not bound by the rationale of the trial court and may 

affirm on any basis. In Re Jacobs, 15 A.3d 509, 509 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011); 

accord Perelman v. Perelman, 259 A.3d 1000, 1010 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2021). 
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prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment

is void ab initio....

Grady v. Nelson, 286 A.3d 259, 264 (Pa. Super. 2022). A void judgment 

cannot be made valid by the passage of time. M & P Mgmt., L.P. v.

Williams, 937 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. 2007). 

Here, a landlord “cannot ... enter judgment for possession and for all

moneys which would otherwise be due as rents through the end of the term.” 

Pops, 208 A.2d at 89 (quoting Homart, 662 A.2d at 1100). Recovery for

both accelerated rent and possession is prohibited. H. A. Steen Indus., 314

A.2d at 322. Consequently, Appellants’ confessed judgment, for both

accelerated rent and possession, is defective on its face and void, not voidable. 

See id.; see also Pops, 208 A.2d at 89; Homart, 662 A.2d at 1100. 

Appellants’ issue merits no relief.

In light of our disposition, we need not address Appellants’ remaining

issues.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/25/2023