### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-09-00066- CR

William Duncan Sartain, II, App ellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F MCCULLO CH COUNTY , 198 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 529 8, H ONO RAB LE EMI L K ARL P ROH L, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant Wil liam Dunca n Sartain g uilty o f e vading arr est with a vehicle and assessed his punishment, enhanc ed by two previous felony convictions, at eleve n y ear s in prison and a $10,000 fine. Appellant contends that the evidenc e is leg ally and fac t u al l y i n sufficie nt to sustain the g uilty

verdic t. We overrule the se conte ntions and aff irm the conviction.
At 8:20 p.m. on Dec ember 5, 2007, Br ady police office r L upe Carrisale s, J r., was dispatched to the 500 block of West 16th Street wher e a vehicle was re ported to have been pa rked in the middle of the street fo r “a wh i l e. ” Arriving at the location, Carrisale s found a blue pickup truck parke d in the middle of the street with its eng ine running and lights on. Two persons wer e in

t he truck; appellant was the driver. Carrisale s testified that he stopped his patrol car behind th e pickup and turned on his emer g ency lights. Appellant g ot out of the truck and walked back toward the office r. Carrisale s testified that appellant “appe are d disoriented.” Appellant pointed to a near byhouse and told Carrisale s that he lived there

. Refer ring to a trailer that was parke d at the curb beside his truck, appe llant said that he wa s planning to pull the trailer to the house in orde r to paint it.

Carrisale s asked appellant for his driver’ s license. The office r noticed that the license had a San Ang elo addre ss. Carrisale s testified that when he asked appellant about this, “[H]e said, well, that’s what it say s.” Having n ev er seen appellant befor e, Carrisale s decide d to investiga te whether appellant a ctually

lived in Bra dy

. He told appellant, who had gotten back i n the truck, to exit the vehicle . Carrisale s descr ibed what ha ppened ne x t:

A. When I asked him to exit the vehicle, he ignor ed me and started taking off. As he was driving off, he closed the door. I hollered ag ain at him to stop. At that point he still continued g oing down the block. I ran back to my patrol unit a nd went af ter him. Q. Okay . And what ha

ppened w hen y ou g ot back in y our patrol unit?
A. When I g ot back in my patrol unit, I took off afte r him. He had just made it down the rest of the block, and he made a rig ht-hand turn. At that point I thought there was g oing to be a pursuit, so I turned in—made the rig ht turn as well. As soon as he made the rig ht turn, he stops his vehicle aga i n i n the roadw ay , and I see the lights come off a

nd seen him exit t he vehic le. Q. And wha t happene d afte r that?
A. After he exit ed the vehicle, I immediately jumped out of my vehicle and hollered at him, come back. He ignor ed me. I didn’t make an ey e contac t. He said, no. I ag ain t old him, come back to me. He said, no. I live h er e. One more time I told him, sir, come back. And he kept on g oing.[ ] At that point I ran afte r him and 1 tackled him to the g round.

Carrisale s later testified tha t appellant appe are d to be “stag g ering ” as he walked a way . 1 2This low-spee d chase l ast ed about sevente en seconds and was rec orded by the video unit in

Carrisale s’s police vehicle. The video was introduced in evidenc e and shown to the jury

. The house in ques t i o n wa s n o t owned by appellant, but there is a sug g estion in the rec ord that he was living ther e. Appellant did not testify

. The only d ef ense witness, a convenie nce store cashie r, testified that appellant purcha sed beer at the store sometime betwee n 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on the night in question. Acc ording to the witness, appellant did not appea r to be disoriented and was not stag g ering

. A person is g uilty of evading arr est or detention if he intentionally flee s from a person h e k nows is a peac e office r attempting lawfully to arr est or detain him. Tex. Penal Code An n . § 38.04(a) (West Supp. 2009). Ordinar ily a class A misdemeanor , the offe nse is a state jail f elony if the ac tor uses a ve hicle while in flig ht. Id . § 38.04(b)( 1)(B ).

Carrisale s testified that appellant’ s truck was stopped in West 16th Street more than eig hteen inches from the curb, a traff ic offe nse. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.303(a) (West Supp. 2009). This, plus appellant’ s appar ent disorientation and the confusion reg arding his addre ss
g ave the office r a lawful basis to d et ai n h im, a fact t hat appellant does not deny

. There is also no question that appellant kne w that Carr isales was a police off

icer . Appellant ar g ues, however, that there is no evidence that he fle d from the of fice r. The penal code does not define “fle es” as it is used in s ec t i o n 3 8.04. I n common
usag e, it means “to run awa y .” Webster’s Third New I nterna tional Dictionary 868 (2002). Appellant
arg ues that succe ssful prosec utions under the statute have involved high speeds, evasive maneuve rs,

3extended pursuits, o r s o m e co mbination there of. See Mayfield v. State , 219 S.W .3d 538, 539-41

(Tex. App.—Texa

r k a n a 2 0 0 7 , n o p e t. ) ( afte r office r turned on emer g ency lights, defe ndant continued
to drive slowly and randomly for “extended period of time” before stopping and running away on foot); Hobyl v. State , 152 S.W .3d 624, 625-26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), pet. dism’d , 193 S.W .3d 903, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (three -mile pursuit at speeds up to 110 miles per hour); Rogers v. State , 832 S.W .2d 442, 443 (Tex. App.—Au s t i n 1 9 92, no pet.) (three -mile pursuit at 95 miles per hour); Goodson v. State , No. 06-05-00107- CR, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 5930, at *14-15 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Fe b. 21, 2006, no pet.) (mem, op., not d e s ig n a te d f o r p u b lic ation) (def

endant drove slowly for two miles, past place s he could have safe ly stopped, befor e responding to office r).
I n this case , appellant slowly drove his truck around the corne r and stopped, a maneuve r that lasted a mere seventeen seconds. He urg es t hat a jury could not rationally conclude that this constituted intentional flight fr om the office r.

When there is a challeng e to the suffici en cy of the evidenc e to sustain a criminal conviction, the question prese nted is w hether a ra tional trier of f act c ould have found the essential elements of the offe nse bey ond a rea sonable doubt. Jack son v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Clayton v

. State , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Johnson v. State , 23 S.W .3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n a leg al sufficie ncy revie w, all the evidenc e is revie wed in the light most favor able to t h e v erdic t; it is assumed that the trier of fac t resolved conflicts in the testimony , weig hed the evidenc e, and drew rea sonable infere nces in a manner that supports th e v erdic t. Clayton , 235 S.W .3d at 778.

4I n Mayfield , the court commented that section 3 8

. 0 4 “does not require high- speed

flee ing, or even effe ctual fleeing . I t require s only an attempt to g et away from a known officer of the law. Thus, under the law, flee ing slowly is still flee ing.” 219 S.W .3d at 541. I n the case befor e
us, appellant plainly knew that a police office r was attempting t o d etain him. He never theless
returne d to his truck and, disreg arding the office r’s command to stop, drove awa y , albeit only a short distance. He then g ot out of his truck and, c ontinuing to disreg ard the office r’s c ommands, beg an
to walk awa

y . Viewing this evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t, a rational trier of fac t could find bey ond a rea sonable doubt that appellant intentionally attempted to g et awa y from a police office r who he knew was attempting to lawfully detain him, and that appellant used a vehicle while in this flight. Point of error one is overrule d.

I n a fac tual sufficie ncy revie w, all the evidenc e is considere d equally , including the testimony of defe nse witnesses and the exi s t ence of alterna tive hy potheses. Clewis v. State , 922 S.W .2d 126, 129 (Tex. C rim. App. 1996); Orona v. State , 836 S.W .2d 319, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). The evidenc e will b e d ee m ed fac tually insufficient if the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is so wea k as to make the finding of g uilt clea rly wrong or manifestly unjust,

or if the verdic t is ag ainst the g rea t weig ht and preponde ranc e of the available evide n ce . W a t s o n v. State , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006); Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11.

I t can be arg ued that if appellant had intended to flee from Carrisale s, he would have done so more eff

ectively than he did. I t is also possible to infer an innocent purpose for appellant’ s conduct that night. Perhaps he mere ly wanted to p ar k h i s t ruck in a safe r location. On the other hand, appellant g ave no indication that this was his intention, and he continued to ignor e the office r

5and walk awa y from him even afte r stopping at the house wher e he was living. Howeve r ineffe ctual appellant’ s brief “flig ht” may have been, the evidenc e that he intentionally soug ht to g et awa y from the office r using his truck is not so wea k as to make the finding of g uilt clea rly wrong , and the jury ’s verdic t is not aga inst the gr eat we ight a nd preponde ranc e of the available evidenc e. Point of e rror two is overrule d.

The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice
Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: May

19, 2010 Do Not Publish

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