# C_2022213EN.01002502.xml

| 30.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 213/25 |
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30.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/25

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands) lodged on 22 February 2022 — X, Y, and their six minor children v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

(Case C-125/22)

(2022/C 213/35)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: X, Y, and their six minor children

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, (1) read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of the Qualification Directive, Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as meaning that, in considering whether an applicant is in need of subsidiary protection, all relevant factors relating both to the applicant’s individual situation and personal circumstances, and to the general situation in the country of origin, must always be examined and assessed as an integrated whole and having regard to their mutual interdependence before determining what feared manifestation of serious harm may be substantiated by those factors? |
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1.

Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, (1) read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of the Qualification Directive, Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as meaning that, in considering whether an applicant is in need of subsidiary protection, all relevant factors relating both to the applicant’s individual situation and personal circumstances, and to the general situation in the country of origin, must always be examined and assessed as an integrated whole and having regard to their mutual interdependence before determining what feared manifestation of serious harm may be substantiated by those factors?

| 2. | In the event that the Court of Justice answers the first question in the negative, is the evaluation of the applicant’s individual situation and personal circumstances in the context of the assessment of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, which the Court has already clarified must be taken into account, more comprehensive than the assessment of the individualisation requirement referred to in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in N.A. v. United Kingdom? (2) Can those factors, in the case of the same application for subsidiary protection, be taken into account when assessing both Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive and Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive? |
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2.

In the event that the Court of Justice answers the first question in the negative, is the evaluation of the applicant’s individual situation and personal circumstances in the context of the assessment of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, which the Court has already clarified must be taken into account, more comprehensive than the assessment of the individualisation requirement referred to in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in N.A. v. United Kingdom? (2) Can those factors, in the case of the same application for subsidiary protection, be taken into account when assessing both Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive and Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive?

| 3. | Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive be interpreted as meaning that, when assessing the need for subsidiary protection, the so-called sliding scale, which the Court of Justice has already clarified must be applied when assessing an alleged fear of serious harm as referred to in Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, must also be applied when assessing an alleged fear of serious harm as referred to in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive? |
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3.

Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive be interpreted as meaning that, when assessing the need for subsidiary protection, the so-called sliding scale, which the Court of Justice has already clarified must be applied when assessing an alleged fear of serious harm as referred to in Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, must also be applied when assessing an alleged fear of serious harm as referred to in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive?

| 4. | Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as meaning that humanitarian circumstances, which are a direct or an indirect consequence of acts and/or omissions of an actor of serious harm, must be taken into account when assessing whether an applicant is in need of subsidiary protection? |
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4.

Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as meaning that humanitarian circumstances, which are a direct or an indirect consequence of acts and/or omissions of an actor of serious harm, must be taken into account when assessing whether an applicant is in need of subsidiary protection?

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(1)  Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).

(2)  ECHR 17 July 2008, No 25904/07, N.A. v United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0717JUD002590407.

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