U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act Registration and Voting Processes

April 6, 2011

Voting System Testing and Certification Division

1201 New York Ave, NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20005

www.eac.gov
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The EAC would like to thank Paul Lux, Ann McGeehan, Paul Miller, Helen Purcell, and 

Russ Ragsdale for their feedback on the drafts of this document.

Comments on this publication can be submitted to: 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Attn: Voting System Testing and Certification Division

1201 New York Ave, NW, Suite 300, Washington,DC 20005 

The workproduct that follows represents the work of the EAC staff and does 

not represent a policy decision by the Commission.
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Contents

Purpose ...................................................................................................................1

Scope......................................................................................................................2

Overview of UOCAVA Voting................................................................................ 2

What’s Different About UOCAVA Voting?............................................................ 4

UOCAVA voters must make considerable effort to be able to vote. ...............................4

UOCAVA voters must keep their mailing address current. ............................................ 5

Election officials have less control over the UOCAVA voting process............................6

The risk of ballot delivery by mail falls on the voter. ......................................................6

The voter is responsible for ensuring their ballot selections are made privately and 

independently. ................................................................................................................. 7

The voter provides their own voting device. ................................................................... 7

The remote voter does not have poll worker assistance or the ability to easily acquire a 

replacement ballot. ..........................................................................................................8

Remote voting requires a means to verify the identity of voters returning ballots with a 

high level of assurance.....................................................................................................8

The UOCAVA voting period is 45 days............................................................................9

There is an adjudication process that determines whether a ballot will be counted. .... 9

The identity of the voter remains associated with the ballot until the adjudication 

process occurs. ............................................................................................................... 10

UOCAVA Process Descriptions ........................................................................... 10

Prepare & Submit Voter Registration Application &/Or Absentee Ballot Request - 

Voter ................................................................................................................................11

Receive & Process Voter Registration Applications &/Or Absentee Ballot Requests - 

LEO..................................................................................................................................14

Prepare & Deliver Absentee Ballots - LEO .....................................................................15

Receive, Mark, & Return Absentee Ballot - Voter ......................................................... 18

Receive & Process Absentee Ballots -LEO.....................................................................20

Remote Electronic Voting ................................................................................... 23

Conclusion ...........................................................................................................26

Appendix A - Process Diagrams.........................................................................A-1

Figure 1.........................................................................................................................A-2
Figure 2 ........................................................................................................................A-3

Figure 3 ........................................................................................................................A-4

Figure 4 ........................................................................................................................ A-5

Figure 5.........................................................................................................................A-6

Figure 6 ........................................................................................................................ A-7

Figure 7.........................................................................................................................A-8

Figure 8 ........................................................................................................................A-9

Figure 9 ...................................................................................................................... A-10

Figure 10......................................................................................................................A-11
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1. Purpose

The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE) cites the following 

Congressional findings:

1. The right to vote is a fundamental right.

2. Due to logistical, geographical, operational and environmental barriers, 

military and overseas voters are burdened by many obstacles that impact their 

right to vote and register to vote, the most critical of which include problems 

transmitting balloting materials and not having enough time to vote. 

To help overcome these barriers, Section 584 of the MOVE Act requires states to 

provide military and overseas voters at least one electronic method for requesting 

and receiving voter registration applications, absentee ballot requests and related 

election information. Also, section 585 requires states to provide an electronic 

transmission method for delivering blank ballots. Section 596 requires the Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC) to provide a timeline for completing the development 

of the electronic absentee voting guidelines required by Section 567 of the FY2005 

National Defense Authorization Act. The EAC tasked its Technical Guidelines 

Development Committee (TGDC) to develop recommendations for these guidelines. 

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist the Department of Defense in conducting 

pilot projects to examine the potential of remote electronic voting methods for 

overcoming some of the barriers cited above.

The introduction or modification of information technology (IT) tools in any work 

process will change how the process is performed. To assess the nature and impact 

of this change, common IT industry practice is to begin with a baseline description of 

the work process as currently performed (sometimes called the “as is” model). Then 

the future work process is described reflecting the changes occasioned by introducing 

new IT tools (called the “to be” model). Comparison of these models will indicate 

potential implications for implementation factors such as capital investment for 

new equipment and software, maintenance costs, work load impact, different staff 

skills, training requirements, and facility upgrade or expansion needs. There may 

also be requirements for certifying new IT tools, which implies the need for testing 

procedures and standards.

The purpose of this white paper is to provide a framework to assist federal and state 

policy makers, state and local election officials, the TGDC, and other stakeholders 

engaged in making decisions about the use of electronic technology for voting or 

creating standards for testing voting systems. This framework consists of a set of 

functional descriptions of the election administration and voter processes associated 

with absentee voting as prescribed by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act (UOCAVA) and other federal and state laws related to this Act. 

These descriptions are distilled from UOCAVA practices implemented in a number 

of states and consequently are generic in nature. There is a great deal of variability 
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in election administration practices from state to state, so these descriptions will not 

be entirely accurate for every jurisdiction. They provide a starting place that is easily 

modified to capture specific practices and electronic methods in use or considered by 

any jurisdiction.

2. Scope

This paper begins with a summary of the salient features of UOCAVA voting (3.0 

Overview of UOCAVA Voting) and a comparison of UOCAVA voting and polling place 

voting (4.0 What’s Different About UOCAVA Voting). 

Section 5.0 UOCAVA Process Descriptions provides functional level descriptions of 

the five processes directly associated with UOCAVA voting:

1. Prepare and submit voter registration application and/or absentee ballot request

2. Prepare and process voter registration applications and/or absentee ballot 

requests

3. Prepare and deliver absentee ballots

4. Receive, mark and return absentee ballot

5. Receive and process absentee ballot

Each is briefly described and accompanied by one or more flow diagrams. If reading 

the document electronically, adjust the view to enlarge the diagram. Additionally, 

larger diagrams can be found in Appendix A. The diagrams illustrate how process 

steps are affected when various electronic methods are employed for communicating 

between voters and election officials, e.g., email, fax and web servers. The paper 

ballot by mail method is presented as the baseline since it is employed nationwide.

Section 6.0 Remote Electronic Voting discusses how process steps are affected when 

remote voting system technology is employed. In contrast to the relatively minor 

procedural adjustments associated with the introduction of email, fax and web 

servers, this technology has a more significant impact because it automates many 

of the steps currently performed manually by Local Election Officials (LEOs) and 

voters.

Section 7.0 Conclusion summarizes the document and draws comparisons between 

electronic document delivery technology and remote electronic voting systems.

3. Overview of UOCAVA Voting

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) protects the 

right to vote for federal offices by active duty members of the U.S. uniformed services 

and the merchant marine; their spouses or dependents; and U.S. citizens residing 

outside of the United States. The Act requires states allow these citizens to register 
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and vote absentee in federal elections. The Secretary of Defense is the executive 

agent for this Act, and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) administers 

the law on behalf of the Secretary. 

One defining characteristic of UOCAVA absentee voters is that they reside 

somewhere other than the jurisdiction where they are eligible to vote. This Act 

requires the states to permit these voters to use absentee registration procedures and 

to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections for the duration of their absence from 

their voting jurisdictions, which could be for extended periods. UOCAVA prescribes 

a standard federal form, the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), for use by these 

citizens to register to vote and/or request an absentee ballot. Additionally, each state 

has its own voter registration and absentee ballot request forms that any of their 

citizens can use. States are required to accept the federal form from UOCAVA citizens 

when the citizen is absent from their voting jurisdiction. The Act also provides for 

a standard fail-safe ballot, the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB), in the 

event the state absentee ballot does not reach the voter in time. States are required 

to accept and count these ballots in appropriate circumstances. Several states also 

accept the FWAB as a voter registration application.

There are two categories of UOCAVA voters: 

1. Uniformed services members, including their spouses or dependents; and 

2. Civilians who reside outside of the U.S and its territories.

There is an eligibility distinction between these categories that is often overlooked. 

Members of the uniformed services may utilize the UOCAVA process from wherever 

they are stationed – including locations in the U.S. In contrast, civilian voters must 

reside outside of the country to be eligible to use the UOCAVA process. Some states 

have established procedural variations for these two categories. For example, several 

states waive voter registration for uniformed service members, but not for overseas 

citizens.

There is a practical reason for these two categories. In the United States, citizens vote 

in the jurisdiction where they are legally considered a resident. Each state defines its 

own requirements for determining legal residency. The most common criterion used 

is the place where the citizen maintains his or her principal residence. If a civilian 

chooses to move to another location in the U.S., they can establish legal residency 

there and vote in that jurisdiction. If a citizen’s principal residence is not in the U.S., 

some other criterion is needed to determine where they are eligible to vote. Under 

UOCAVA provisions, overseas civilians are eligible to vote in the jurisdiction where 

they resided immediately prior to departing the U.S., even if many years have passed 

and they have not maintained a residence there. 

Unlike civilians, uniformed services members are ordered by the government to 

move to specified locations and relocate as often as required. UOCAVA defines 

uniformed services to include not only military personnel but also those serving 
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in the Public Health Service, the merchant marine and the uniformed corps of the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Military Service members 

in particular may move frequently. If their duty station is in the U.S., uniformed 

services personnel may decide to change their legal residence to their new location, 

just as civilian voters do; however, they are not required to do so in order to remain 

eligible to vote. Whether their new duty station is in the U.S. or overseas, they can 

continue voting throughout their service career in the same jurisdiction where they 

were first qualified to vote. 

4. What’s Different About UOCAVA Voting?

4.1 UOCAVA voters must make considerable effort to be able to vote.

Being absent from their voting residence and not having access to a polling place 

means UOCAVA voters may be required to exercise significantly more responsibility 

than non-UOCAVA voters to ensure they are able to vote. After a non-UOCAVA 

voter is registered, the only action they must take is showing up at their assigned 

polling location on Election Day to cast their ballot. The local election office 

provides the location, the voting system, the ballots, and the poll workers. Many 

voters register through a Department of Motor Vehicles or other social services 

agency transaction, so registration can be very easy and convenient. Through the 

media, candidate campaign publicity and election office voter outreach efforts, nonUOCAVA voters have ample notice of an upcoming election. If some eventuality 

arises preventing them from going to the polls on Election Day, many states provide 

the option of early voting or voting absentee. Typically this can be completed up to 

a few days before Election Day. In general, non-UOCAVA voters have considerable 

notice, ample time and several available alternatives to facilitate their ability to 

vote.

UOCAVA voters do not have the benefit of easily available resources. Often they 

must make considerable effort to get information about where and how to vote. 

Knowing the date of the next election is critical for these voters as it determines 

the voter registration and ballot request deadlines they must meet. Under the 

provisions of the MOVE Act, absentee ballots are required to be sent out 45 days 

before Election Day. For this deadline to be effective, absentee ballot requests 

should be received by local election jurisdictions prior to that time. To allow 

adequate mail transit time for receipt by the date ballots are available, UOCAVA 

voters may have to send their request at least eight weeks before Election Day. For 

example, FVAP’s 2010 - 2011 Voting Assistance Guide recommends that absentee 

ballot requests be mailed by August 15 for the November 2, 2010 General Election. 

The advisable return date could be late September or early October for states where 

FPCAs can be returned electronically or submitted on-line.

Many UOCAVA citizens were already registered voters and may have voted in 

person before becoming UOCAVA absentee voters. Because they are already on 

the voter rolls, registered voters will likely be notified of an upcoming election by 
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their local election office, if they have kept their mailing address current. UOCAVA 

citizens who are not registered lack this connection to the process. All UOCAVA 

citizens need to know they are still eligible to vote in federal elections while absent 

from their home jurisdiction; how to get a voter registration application and/or 

an absentee ballot request form; and where and when to send these forms. Voter 

registration applications and updates to voter information can be submitted at any 

time. Under the MOVE Act, ballot requests must be submitted every federal election 

year. MOVE also requires states to provide at least one electronic method, in 

addition to postal delivery, for receiving these submissions.

There are several ways for UOCAVA citizens to get assistance. Voting Assistance 

Officers are assigned within the Department of Defense and Department of State to 

promote voting awareness and assist citizens. Voters may also consult their state 

or county elections webpage for information. FVAP; the U.S. State Department; 

state and local election offices; and numerous military and overseas citizen 

organizations have active voter outreach and information programs. Because the 

UOCAVA population is widely dispersed and not easy to reach, the MOVE Act 

requires additional outreach efforts by FVAP and military departments to bridge 

the communication gaps. 

4.2 UOCAVA voters must keep their mailing address current.

UOCAVA voters tend to move frequently. Federal elections are scheduled once 

every two years, although there may be additional special elections during that 

interval. UOCAVA voters must remember to inform their local election office 

whenever they move to keep their current mailing address on file. Absentee 

balloting materials are not eligible for forwarding by the U.S. Postal Service and 

will be returned as undeliverable to the local election office. Under National Voter 

Registration Act (NVRA) provisions, LEO are required to attempt to contact these 

voters to determine if there has been a change of address. Failure to respond to 

these inquiries is cause for being removed from the voter list. While overseas ballots 

are permitted to be forwarded, this adds to the delivery time, which could prevent 

timely receipt by the voter. As a result, failure to keep his mailing address current 

will very likely result in a UOCAVA voter being unable to vote. 

Non-UOCAVA voters are expected to keep their voting residence address current, 

as it determines which precinct they are eligible to vote in. Under NVRA provisions, 

a voter may update their voter registration address when changing the address on 

their driver’s license. Election offices utilize change of address information supplied 

by the U.S. Postal Service to identify potential voter moves. The election office must 

confirm that the voter has changed his residence, but the voter typically does not 

have to do anything except respond to the LEO inquiry. NVRA requires election 

officials to maintain current and accurate voter lists, so the principal burden falls on 

LEOs to keep voting residence address information up-to-date. 
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4.3 Election officials have less control over the UOCAVA voting process.

Voting in polling places is a highly controlled and supervised process. The local 

election office provides the location, the voting system, the ballots, and the poll 

workers. Well-defined operating procedures, chain of custody requirements, and 

other measures protect the privacy of the voter, the secrecy of the ballot, and the 

integrity of the ballot box. In contrast, UOCAVA voting is a remote voting process 

taking place somewhere other than a polling place. Consequently, far fewer 

institutional protections exist. When an absentee ballot leaves the local election 

office, the election official no longer has control over what happens to it until it is 

returned to the election office. Mail delivery is provided by third parties not subject 

to management control or oversight by the election official. The U.S. Postal and 

Military Mail Services have procedures to discourage tampering with in-transit mail 

and are fairly reliable insofar as eventually getting mail delivered to the intended 

recipient; however, it is not uncommon for mail to be delivered to a wrong address 

or get lost. 

4.4 The risk of ballot delivery by mail falls on the voter.

After the ballot is placed in the mail by an election official, UOCAVA voters must 

rely on the timeliness and reliability of some combination of the U.S. domestic 

postal service, the Military Mail Service, and foreign postal services for its delivery. 

Multiple post election surveys indicate mail delivery is ineffective for a large 

percentage of UOCAVA voters. 

There are two aspects associated with delivery of a physical object, such as a ballot, 

to a specific individual. The first is the transit time of transporting the object over 

long distances with potentially multiple handoffs within, and between, postal 

services. The second is whether the addressee is available to take possession of the 

object when it arrives. Often, Military Service members are temporarily away from 

their home base for a period of time, frequently without advance notice. Change of 

duty station may occur at inconvenient times in the election schedule. The required 

45 day ballot transit time assumes the voter will vote and return their ballot 

essentially as soon as it reaches their mailbox. If the voter is elsewhere there will 

be a delay in the receipt of the ballot, which may delay its return. The MOVE Act 

requirement for special collection procedures for military voted ballots, which will 

expedite ballot return for those eligible to use it, may help to remedy this situation. 

The MOVE Act requires that UOCAVA voters have the ability to track whether 

their voted ballot was received by their election office. In addition to providing 

confirmation of receipt, this tracking could provide voters with more control over 

the ballot return process. For example, if receipt of a voted ballot is not confirmed 

and the cutoff date is only a few days away, it could alert a voter to contact the 

election office for a replacement ballot or give the voter time to submit a Federal 

Write-in Absentee Ballot. MOVE also requires FVAP to develop a system to identify 

all federal office candidates which will make it easier for voters to use the Federal 

Write-in Absentee Ballot. 
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The MOVE requirement for states to designate an electronic method for delivering 

blank ballots has the potential to provide voters increased control over when they 

receive the ballot. The voter can choose electronic or postal delivery. Electronic 

delivery will significantly reduce ballot delivery time. If the electronic method 

pushes the ballot to the voter, the election official decides when to send it. If the 

electronic method allows the voter to pull the ballot or cue the system when they 

are ready to receive the ballot, the voter can control the timing. Depending on the 

electronic transmission method used, this could enable receipt of the ballot at a 

time and place convenient for the voter.

4.5 The voter is responsible for ensuring their ballot selections are made 

privately and independently.

By definition, absentee voting occurs someplace other than a supervised polling 

place. Consequently, since the ballot is solely under the control of the voter, 

it becomes the voters responsibility to mark ballot selections privately and 

independently. This is true for all absentee voters, not just UOCAVA voters. The 

voting instructions provided in absentee ballot packets typically advise voters 

to protect the privacy of ballot selections. Other than this advice, an election 

official has no means to shield voters from undue influence unless some type of 

supervised remote voting is implemented. Some states allow voters to submit a 

replacement ballot if the voter attests they were under duress when voting the 

original ballot. The typical circumstances and time constraints associated with 

postal mail UOCAVA voting prevent replacement ballots from being an effective 

remedy. For jurisdictions where the voter and LEO can communicate by email and 

the replacement ballot can be delivered and/or returned electronically, the remedy 

becomes a more viable solution. 

4.6 The voter provides their own voting device.

Whether marking a paper ballot with a #2 pencil or selecting ballot choices on a 

computer screen, the remote voter currently provides their own voting ‘device.’ 

Paper ballot voting instructions specify the marking device and how the voter 

should designate their selections. Using the wrong color or type of marker or 

improperly designating choices, e.g., by making a check mark beside the oval 

instead of filling the oval, could invalidate the ballot. Alternatively, state law may 

allow an improperly executed paper ballot to be transcribed to a replacement ballot 

which can be read by the tabulation device. 

If the voter is using a personal computer for some aspect of the voting process, 

e.g., to download a ballot file or make selections using an electronic voting 

application, the computer must meet device specifications. The specifications could 

be hardware related, such as requiring a certain amount of available memory or a 

printer; software related, such as recommending the use of some type of malware 

protection; or both. Some specifications are self-enforcing. For example, if the 

voter’s computer does not have sufficient memory it will not be capable of launching 

the voting application. Other specifications may not be self-enforcing, even though 
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failure to comply could affect the voter’s ballot. For example, failure to use virus 

protection software would not prevent a voter from using the computer, but it might 

put the integrity of his ballot at risk. 

4.7 The remote voter does not have poll worker assistance or the ability to 

easily acquire a replacement ballot.

The remote voter must be able to understand and follow voting instructions without 

assistance. With paper ballots in particular, there are many opportunities for 

making mistakes in the marking process. The voter must mark ballot selections in 

the prescribed manner. For example, using colored ink or not completely filling in 

the oval might cause the tabulation scanner to miss candidate selections or entire 

races. The voter must take care to avoid making extraneous marks on the ballot 

which can cause the entire ballot to be rejected. Trying to correct an erroneously 

marked selection will often cause a race or selection to be excluded from the count 

because the canvass board may not be able to tell which mark indicates the voter’s 

intent. All of these errors would be caught in a polling place using optical scanners 

and a pollworker could provide a replacement ballot. If voting by mail, the only 

choice remote voters have is to return the ballot they received. 

Following procedures is important. Many jurisdictions require the voter to place the 

paper ballot in a secrecy envelope without any identifying marks, such as the voter’s 

name or voter ID number. The voter’s affidavit must be signed, but not placed in the 

secrecy envelope. The secrecy envelope containing the ballot and the affidavit are 

both placed in the return mailing envelope. The mailing envelope must be signed 

and dated or the ballot may be rejected. Portions of the ballot might be missed while 

the voter is scanning it to return as an email attachment or by fax. Some of these 

errors could be corrected if the voter notices them in time, but most likely these 

types of errors will go undetected until the ballot is processed by an election official. 

If the remote voter is returning the ballot electronically, it may be possible to 

correct errors or request a replacement ballot. The voter has to waive his right to a 

secret ballot in order to use an electronic return method. This enables the LEO to 

contact the voter if something is wrong with the ballot packet, such as missing or 

cutoff ballot pages or lack of a signed affidavit. If there is sufficient time before the 

ballot return deadline, the voter could correct these errors.

4.8 Remote voting requires a means to verify the identity of voters returning 

ballots with a high level of assurance.

Many jurisdictions require a voter to present some form of identification when 

checking in at a polling place to vote. A poll worker verifies the name and address 

are on the voter’s list which indicates eligibility to vote in the election. In some 

locations, the voter is required to sign the poll book. Then the voter receives a ballot 

to mark or a poll worker activates a voting machine for voting. 
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A UOCAVA voter’s eligibility in a particular election is similarly determined by an 

election official checking the UOCAVA absentee voter list. Ballots are sent to all 

eligible voters; however, the election official uses signature review to authenticate 

the validity of the voter. The comparison of the voter’s signature on the return 

mailing envelope with the signature on file in the Voter Registration Database 

(VRDB) is the authentication method used for absentee paper ballots. If the two 

signatures do not appear to match or if a name variation is used on the mailing 

envelope differs from the signature on file, the canvassing board will determine 

whether or not to accept the ballot. When a remote electronic voting method is 

used, a comparable voter authentication method is needed to provide a high level of 

assurance that a valid voter returned the ballot. 

4.9 The UOCAVA voting period is 45 days.

The extended UOCAVA voting period means the UOCAVA system will be operated 

and protected for a significantly longer period than the voting system used in a 

polling place or early voting. This applies to all types of UOCAVA voting methods, 

but is of particular significance for remote electronic voting systems. The UOCAVA 

system begins operation approximately six weeks before polling place voting begins. 

It may be required to be available 24 hours a day during the voting period since 

UOCAVA voters are located in time zones all around the world. Protections must be 

in place to preserve the integrity of the voting system and of the voted ballots cast 

during this period. Most, if not all, jurisdictions do not permit the final processing 

of absentee ballots to begin until a few days before Election Day. 

4.10There is an adjudication process that determines whether a ballot will 

be counted.

Most frequently, after a non-UOCAVA voter is checked in by a poll worker, they 

proceed to a voting booth to mark and cast a ballot anonymously. There is no 

association made between the voter’s identity and the ballot. In the exceptional 

case, if a question is raised about the voter’s eligibility to vote, the pollwork provides 

a provisional ballot which remains linked to the voter’s identity. If the eligibility 

question is not resolved within the prescribed time period, the ballot will not be 

counted. 

In contrast, all UOCAVA ballots are subject to an adjudication process. There are 

three threshold criteria that must be met: 1) the return mailing envelope must be 

signed by a valid voter, 2) the ballot must be received by the specified deadline, and 

3) the voter has not voted by another means. If these criteria are met, the mailing 

envelope is removed and the ballot is now anonymous. The next level screening 

criteria are whether there are identifying marks on the ballot and if the ballot has 

been properly marked so it can be read by the tabulation device. How these matters 

are resolved is a matter of state law and/or administrative rule. If the voter has 

written their name on the ballot, for instance, some jurisdictions will allow the 

ballot selections to be transcribed to a replacement ballot which will be counted. 
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4.11The identity of the voter remains associated with the ballot until the 

adjudication process occurs.

Since it is possible that a ballot will not be accepted for tabulation, the voter’s 

identity must remain associated with the ballot until the first level screening is 

completed. If the ballot was received after the deadline or there is not a valid 

signature, the ballot is rejected. If the voter has voted multiple times, each state has 

a decision rule for determining which ballot to include in the count. The election 

official must have a procedure for tracking all ballots returned by every possible 

voting channel to ensure that only one is counted.

There are several situations where an absentee voter could return multiple ballots 

without intentionally engaging in fraudulent behavior. Here are some examples:

− There are occasions when early ballots are sent out in advance of the final ballot 

being ready. For example, there might be a legal challenge to a candidate which 

is not resolved before the deadline for mailing UOCAVA ballots. UOCAVA 

voters could vote and return both the early (sometimes called advance) ballot 

and the final ballot and both could be received before the deadline. 

− Another instance occurs when a voter cannot find their name on the election 

office ballot return list a few days before the cutoff date. In this case, the voter 

could obtain a FWAB and submit it by fax or email. The by mail ballot could 

also be received. 

− Another case occurs when a voter returns to the jurisdiction shortly before 

election day and votes at an early voting location or at a polling place after 

previously voting and mailing an absentee ballot.

5. UOCAVA Process Descriptions

This section provides step by step functional descriptions of the five UOCAVA 

registration and voting processes. These are derived from examining the election 

administration practices of several states. Consequently these are generic 

descriptions that may not correspond in all particulars with actual practices in 

other jurisdictions. It is understood that there is considerable variability in election 

administration practices from state to state. 

The descriptions are accompanied by flow diagrams illustrating how the steps in 

each process are affected when electronic technologies are introduced to expedite 

communication between LEOs and voters. The by mail process is the baseline 

example since it is used in all jurisdictions. The technologies depicted are those 

currently employed by many jurisdictions nationwide: email, fax and web servers. 

The diagrams are generic by technology type and do not reflect any specific system in 

use. They are presented at a high level. For example, a communications link is shown 

as a dashed line between the devices used by LEOs and voters, such as computers 

or fax machines. Intervening telecommunications network devices, such as servers 
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and routers, are not shown, since system configurations will vary from jurisdiction to 

jurisdiction.

The process descriptions and the diagrams can be used as a point of departure to 

develop more detailed descriptions using actual data from any jurisdiction. On a 

functional level, the voter and LEO activities performed for any given process are 

fairly similar across jurisdictions. Typically the variation exist in how these activities 

are carried out. To take voter registration as an example: In most states a voter is 

required to submit certain information to become registered to vote. The specific 

information required is determined by state law. A UOCAVA voter can submit this 

information using one of several documents, e.g., an FPCA, a state registration form, 

a letter. Each state prescribes what documents it will accept as well as how these 

documents may be delivered, e.g., by mail, email, or fax. Each state also specifies the 

application deadline for a voter to be qualified to vote in the next election. So the 

basic activities in the process are the same, but the details of how they are carried out 

can vary considerably.

5.1 Prepare & Submit Voter Registration Application &/Or Absentee Ballot 

Request - Voter

In those states where voter registration is required, UOCAVA citizens must 

obtain, complete and submit an application form such as the FPCA or a state voter 

registration application. Several states accept the FWAB as a voter registration 

request. Some states offer on-line voter registration for all voters, and this practice 

is expected to become more widespread. Several states also accept a letter if it 

contains all the information needed to determine if the applicant is qualified to vote. 

Forms and instructions can be obtained in person, by mail, telephone, email, or fax 

request and downloaded from the Internet. There are multiple sources for obtaining 

this information including Voting Assistance Officers; FVAP; U.S. Department 

of State Consular Officers; state and local election offices; military and overseas 

citizen advocacy groups; and a variety of websites. With so many different sources 

available, it is incumbent on the voter to ensure that they obtains the correct forms 

and instructions.

The FPCA is universally accepted as an absentee voter registration application for 

UOCAVA voters. While the form is standard, the requirements for filling it out and 

submitting it are specified by each state. Over the past few years federal legislation 

has constrained some of the resulting variability to simplify the process. Among 

other changes, a standard federal oath was developed for use by all the states and 

the requirement for notarization of the form was eliminated.

If the form is not completely or legibly filled out, the local election official may 

contact the applicant for clarification or more information. If the application is 

approved, the citizen will receive a confirmation notice, such as a voter registration 

card. If denied, this will be communicated to the applicant by letter or email with an 

opportunity to contest this decision, if desired.
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Under NVRA provisions, an approved voter registration remains in force until one 

of several specified conditions occurs: 

− The voter notifies the LEO of a change in voting residence outside of the LEO’s 

jurisdiction; 

− The LEO ascertains through an address verification process that the voter has 

moved outside of the jurisdiction; or 

− The voter does not choose to vote in two or more consecutive general elections 

for federal office. 

A voter does not have to vote to maintain an active status in the VRDB. Any contact 

with the voter indicating their desire to remain a voter in a particular jurisdiction is 

sufficient. Voter information may be updated over time, such as a change in mailing 

address, which frequently happens for UOCAVA voters.

The FPCA serves the dual purpose of being a voter registration application and an 

absentee ballot request form. Voter registration applications can be submitted at 

any time; however, if the applicant wishes to vote in a particular election, there is 

usually a deadline by which the application must be received so it can be processed 

in time for the election. If it is received after the deadline, an applicant who meets 

the qualifications will be added to the voter roll for future elections. State voter 

registration applications can be used by both UOCAVA and non-UOCAVA voters. 

In some states this application serves the single purpose of voter registration. Other 

states have a combined form that serves both purposes. Consequently, if a UOCAVA 

voter uses a state form to register, in some cases a separate absentee ballot request 

may be required. 

A single voter registration is valid indefinitely, as long as the voter does not change 

legal residence to another state, has not lost the right to vote and has voted in a 

recent election. In contrast, an absentee ballot request must be submitted for each 

federal election year. This serves to notify the election official that the voter still 

has UOCAVA status and to update their mailing address, if necessary. Each state 

determines how long prior to a federal election an absentee ballot request will be 

accepted. If an FPCA is submitted any time within a federal election year, it most 

likely will be accepted for both registration and ballot request purposes. If it is 

submitted in an off year, it may be treated only as a voter registration application 

and the voter may be required to submit another FPCA the following year as an 

absentee ballot request.

In addition to accepting the FPCA, each state has a state absentee ballot request 

form. Some states will accept a letter from the voter if it contains all the required 

information. A number of states permit an immediate family member to make an 

absentee ballot request on behalf of a UOCAVA voter. These proxy requests can be 

made in writing, by email, through the use of on-line forms or in person. The MOVE 

Act requires each state to provide at least one electronic method for receiving voter 
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registration applications and absentee ballot requests to expedite the transmission 

of these transactions. 

Figure 1 illustrates the major steps voters perform to prepare and submit a voter 

registration application or ballot request. First, they obtain an appropriate form 

and the associated instructions, which vary somewhat from state to state. Questions 

may arise requiring some research to answer, such as where to submit the form. 

If the form is completed on-line it may need to be printed, signed and dated. The 

voter can submit the form by mail, email, fax and on-line, depending on the rules 

and capabilities of the state. As noted above, if the ballot is returned electronically, 

several states require the voter to also return a hardcopy with an original signature 

by mail before the LEO can approve the request. A growing number of states obtain 

the voter’s signature by matching voter registration data with data in the motor 

vehicle database. The voter may have to submit a revised application if the LEO 

requires further information.

Figure 1
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5.2 Receive & Process Voter Registration Applications &/Or Absentee Ballot 

Requests - LEO

The LEO receives a voter registration application as an FPCA, state form or letter 

via postal mail. The document is time-stamped to record the date and time of 

receipt to allow for accurate verification that submission deadlines were met. The 

name is checked against the Voter Registration Database (VRDB) to see if the 

person is already registered. If a record exists and the signatures match, the voter’s 

record is updated with any changed information. If the form is received within 

the specified timeframe, the voter’s record is flagged for the voter list for the next 

election. 

If no record exists, the information in the application is verified to determine if 

the applicant qualifies to vote in the jurisdiction. In particular, HAVA requires the 

driver’s license number and/or the last four digits of the social security number 

are validated against the databases of the state motor vehicle authority and/

or the Social Security Administration. If the applicant meets the qualification 

requirements, a voter record is added to the VRDB. A confirmation notice, typically 

a voter registration card, is sent to the voter to indicate that the application was 

approved. If the application is denied, a letter is sent giving the reason for the 

denial.

The LEO receives a ballot request as an FPCA, state form or letter via the postal 

service. Proxy requests may be made in person or in writing. The request is timestamped and the voter’s record is retrieved from the VRDB. This is generally a 

straightforward process unless the voter uses a different form of his name than 

the one previously given on the voter registration application. It may appear that 

no record matches or that there are several possible matches. This may require 

clarification with the voter. The date of the ballot request is recorded. If the request 

was received within the timeframe for the next election, the record is flagged for the 

UOCAVA voter list for the upcoming election.

Figure 2 illustrates the major steps LEOs perform to receive and process voter 

registration applications and absentee ballot requests. The requests can be 

transmitted from the voter by mail, email or fax. Although electronic means can be 

used to transmit the forms, the LEO prints the documents and keeps a hardcopy. 

In many jurisdictions, if the voter’s request is submitted by fax or email, the LEO 

must also receive a hardcopy request by mail with an original signature to complete 

the process. It is important to have a good quality signature on file if signature 

comparison is the method used to authenticate voted ballots. In these jurisdictions, 

the LEOs hold the application in pending status until the paper version is received. 

The LEO may use postal mail, email or fax to communicate with the applicant if 

further information is needed. Confirmation of voter registration is usually done by 

postal mail as it often takes the form of a voter ID card.
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5.3 Prepare & Deliver Absentee Ballots - LEO

The absentee process operates as an adjunct to the polling place voting process. 

The paper ballots mailed to absentee voters are identical to those used for inperson voting in optical scan and hand marked ballot jurisdictions. The use of the 

Election Management System (EMS) to create ballot definitions is not described 

here because it occurs in the polling place process model. Some states use candidate 

filing data from the VRDB to create absentee ballots. 

The assembly of ballot packets is a key element of the absentee process. These 

packets include the ballot, voter instructions, a voter affidavit, a secrecy envelope 

(in many jurisdictions), and a return mail envelope. 

The flagged records in the VRDB are pulled to generate mailing labels or to address 

the outgoing envelopes. For a jurisdiction with a large population of military voters, 

the mobility of this group can make the creation of a complete voter list challenging. 

Due to the increased use of temporary duty assignments . Without a permanent 

change in duty station, the voter’s mailing address remains unchanged even though 

they may physically be stationed elsewhere for extended periods. In addition, 

military personnel who had an expectation of voting at the polls might be deployed 

with minimal notice. 

The matching of ballot styles and voters is also a VRDB function. For ballot 

accounting purposes, a tracking code based on voter ID and ballot style may 

be printed on the ballot, the outgoing mailing envelope and the return mailing 

envelope. Voter records in the VRDB are annotated with the date when the ballot 

Figure 2
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packets are delivered to the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). At this point the LEO gives 

up physical control of the ballots and has limited means to track the status until the 

ballot is returned to the election office. USPS ballot tracking can be used within the 

U.S., but it is expensive and does not extend to overseas locations. The MOVE Act 

requires the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide expedited mail delivery and 

tracking for overseas military voters, in cooperation with the USPS. 

Figure 3 illustrates the steps performed by the LEO to prepare and deliver paper 

ballots by postal mail. Figure 4 provides examples for delivering ballots by email 

and fax. While third party communication networks are outside the LEO’s control, 

they have the advantage of speeding delivery and can provide nearly instantaneous 

confirmation that the ballot reached its destination. Confirmation of delivery does 

not necessarily mean the intended voter has personally received the ballot. Fax 

machines and email accounts can be shared or accessible to individuals other than 

the voter.

Figure 3
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Posting ballot packets on a web server is another method for delivering blank 

ballots. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 

Figure 4

Figure 5
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This method enables the voter to pull down the ballot when the voter is ready to 

receive it. This allows the voter to retrieve the ballot wherever they are located, 

since ballot delivery is not tied to a pre-specified physical or electronic address. 

This delivery method provides more control and flexibility for the voter than the 

methods shown in Figures 3 and 4 where the LEO pushes the ballots out according 

to a set schedule and to a pre-specified voter location. 

5.4 Receive, Mark, & Return Absentee Ballot - Voter

For the paper ballot by postal mail method, the ballot packet is delivered to the 

voter by the USPS, the Military Mail Service (MMS), or a foreign postal service. The 

voter marks selections on the ballot in accordance with the instructions provided. In 

addition to marking the ballot, the voter must also sign the voter affidavit. In many 

jurisdictions the marked ballot is placed in a secrecy envelope. This envelope and 

the affidavit are put inside the mailing envelope. Typically, the voter must sign and 

date the oath printed across the mailing envelope flap as evidence that the contents 

have not been tampered with. Failure to sign will invalidate the ballot. Also, failure 

to date the affidavit may result in invalidation if the ballot is received after the 

deadline and the envelope does not have a postmark to use for verification.

Unless the voter chooses to pay for a traceable return mail or delivery service, there 

are limited options for tracking the ballot after it is placed in the mail. The Overseas 

Vote Foundation (OVF), in partnership with Federal Express has offered a trackable 

ballot return service for overseas voters in nearly 100 countries for the last two 

federal elections. This service was provided free of charge or at a significantly 

reduced rate depending on location. OVF expects to continue this service for future 

elections. As noted above, the MOVE Act requires DoD to provide expedited ballot 

delivery and tracking for overseas military personnel. The MOVE Act requires LEOs 

to provide a means for voters to confirm receipt of their ballot. This might give 

the voter an opportunity to submit a FWAB if it appears the regular ballot is not 

going to arrive prior to the deadline. Due to long postal delivery times, it may be 

necessary to use an electronic transmission method to return this fail-safe ballot by 

the deadline.

The following diagrams illustrate the major steps the voter performs to receive, 

mark and return the voted ballot. Figure 6 depicts the postal mail, email and 

fax methods in a single diagram because the differences are primarily related to 

conversions between hardcopy and electronic formats. For these methods, the LEO 

determines when the ballots are sent to voters. After the voter submits an absentee 

ballot request and indicates their preferred method of delivery they do not have 

to take any further action to receive a ballot. The use of email or fax provides the 

ability for the voter to receive confirmation that the voted ballot was received by the 

LEO.
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Figure 7 illustrates the steps the voter takes to receive a ballot by downloading it 

from a web server combined with four return methods: postal mail, email, fax, and 

upload to a web server. A significant procedural difference with this approach is 

the voter is required to take the action to obtain a ballot. This could be triggered 

by email, or other communication, from the LEO to inform voters that ballots are 

available. At this point it becomes the voter’s responsibility to retrieve a ballot. This 

provides flexibility for the voter to obtain a ballot wherever and whenever they may 

have access to a computer and does not tie ballot delivery to a particular physical or 

electronic address. Depending on state law, the voted ballot may also be returned 

by uploading it to the LEO’s election web server. Alternatively, this ballot delivery 

method can be paired with any of the previously described return methods. 

Figure 6
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5.5 Receive & Process Absentee Ballots -LEO

In the baseline UOCAVA voting method, paper ballots are delivered to the LEO by 

the U.S. Postal Service. The envelopes are time-stamped bringing the voted ballots 

under the LEO’s control. The unopened mailing envelopes are given a visual validity 

check. During validation check, ballots are examined to see if they are signed and 

if each signature matches the one on file. The voter history record is updated in the 

VRDB to reflect a returned ballot. At this point the LEO can post the voter’s name 

to the received ballot list for voter verification. Unsigned ballots are invalidated. 

If the signature does not match, the ballot is held, unopened, for an adjudication 

of whether or not the signature will be accepted. If the answer is yes, the ballot is 

accepted for counting. If the answer is no, the ballot is invalidated.

Figure 7
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The LEO must also determine if the ballot was received by the deadline. This 

process varies from state to state. Typically, if the ballot was received or postmarked 

on or before Election Day it can be counted. In some jurisdictions, only federal 

races are counted if an overseas ballot is received after Election Day but bears an 

appropriate postmark date. The process for accepting ballots received after Election 

Day varies from state to state. 

After these checks are conducted, the accepted ballots are removed from the mailing 

envelopes for counting. Any invalid ballots will remain unopened. The ballots 

are typically commingled with other absentee ballots and all absentee ballots are 

tabulated together. The anonymous ballots are examined for extraneous marks. 

Another determination is made to determine if any of these will be accepted and 

transcribed to replacement ballots for tabulation. When this review is complete the 

ballots are tabulated by whatever method the jurisdiction uses and the absentee 

results are added to the tabulation report.

Figure 8 illustrates the major steps the LEO performs to receive and process paper 

ballots returned by postal mail. 

Figure 8
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Figure 9 shows the variations in document handling activities if email, fax or webbased methods are used for ballot return. All these methods of submission require 

conversion between electronic and paper document formats. The LEO must confirm 

both the voter affidavit and ballot are returned, all pages of a multi-page ballot have 

been received, and the pages are complete and legible, e.g., no portions have been 

cut off and the print quality is acceptable. If an error is noted in the returned ballot 

packet, the LEO may be able to contact the voter electronically and provide an 

opportunity for the voter to remedy the problem.

Figure 9
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6. Remote Electronic Voting

Email, fax and web-based methods have been widely implemented to expedite the 

delivery of UOCAVA-related forms and ballots. These are commonly available and 

accepted electronic tools that are relatively easy to implement without making a 

significant investment in new equipment. Since these methods do not incorporate 

the functions of ballot definition, tabulation and results reporting, they do not 

qualify as voting systems and therefore do not require certification. While there 

are differing operational advantages and disadvantages associated with each of 

these technologies, any one of them can significantly reduce document transit time 

compared with mail delivery. 

These methods typically provide very little communications security. Security 

protection is largely accomplished through procedural means. In addition, the 

voter must waive the right to a secret ballot because the returned voted ballot will 

be viewed by election staff and could be associated with the voter’s name. These 

technologies introduce additional manual steps for the LEO and the voter to convert 

documents between electronic and paper formats. This includes transcribing 

electronically-returned ballots to replacement ballots that can be read by the local 

tabulation device. This increases LEO workload as well as introducing the potential 

for error.

Since it is difficult to discuss the process of remote voting without a hypothetical 

framework in mind, the following discussion is based around previous 

implementations of remote voting systems in the United States. Remote electronic 

voting systems automate the steps of the voting process for LEOs and voters. 

Multiple processes can be integrated and executed using software applications in 

place of manual manipulation of documents and conversion between hardcopy 

and electronic formats. In addition many of the procedural checks performed by 

LEO inspection can be built into the operation of the system. For example, since 

the system can only be accessed by voters during the prescribed voting period and 

voted ballots are received in near real time after they are cast, it is not possible for a 

ballot to arrive after the deadline. So the LEO no longer has to track when ballots are 

received or to inspect postmark dates. 

Also, electronic systems can prevent common voter mistakes. For example, often 

ballots are returned by mail without a signature, thus the ballot does not get counted. 

This could be prevented in several different ways with a remote electronic system. 

One method is for the voting application to prevent the casting of a ballot until 

proper voter authentication is made. Alternatively, the system could deny access to 

a ballot until the voter is authenticated. In another example, the voting application 

prevents over-voting and all selections are electronically recorded so there is no 

ambiguity about voter intent. Canvassing is reduced to reviewing the list of voters 

who cast electronic ballots (produced by the system) to determine if a voter could 

have submitted a ballot by another voting method. If the voter cast a ballot by 

another method, the LEO will apply the state rule for which ballot will count.
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The systems are software-based, so there are many possible implementation designs. 

Figure 10 illustrates a notional system configuration integrating all the functions 

associated with voting, including those performed manually by LEOs for other 

UOCAVA voting methods: ballot definition, voter identification and authentication, 

presentation of correct ballot style for each voter, vote capture and recording, voter 

affirmation of choices, voted ballot receipt verification, cast vote storage, tabulation, 

and results reporting. The submission and processing of voter registration 

applications and ballot requests are not included because these transactions can 

occur any time during the year. The remote electronic voting system is expected to be 

on-line and available to voters only during the UOCAVA 45 day primary and general 

election voting periods in federal election years.

Figure 10
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Since UOCAVA voters are distributed all over the world, the system would operate 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week. The system would typically reside on a central server to 

manage interactive sessions and system communications as well as provide a robust 

level of physical and electronic security. The central server should be housed in a 

secure data center and operated under the state or LEO’s administrative control.

The voter list is obtained from the VRDB and ballot definition data from the local 

EMS and imported to configure the UOCAVA voting system for operation. To protect 

the integrity of the VRDB and the EMS, data transfer from these systems should be 

performed as a manual process, not through a direct electronic connection. After 

the election definition is loaded and verified, the system is ready for use. After the 

system is initialized, the only required LEO activity during the voting period is the 

administrative monitoring of system performance. 

As discussed in 5.3 Prepare & Deliver Absentee Ballots, the creation of a voter list 

for military voters has become challenging with the increased use of temporary duty 

assignments instead of permanent change of duty station assignments. Depending 

on how the remote electronic voting system is designed, updating the voter list could 

have significant system implications. If the list is stored internally to the system, it 

must be “frozen” at the time the system is initialized for operation. At this point, the 

election definition data are validated, the operation of the system is verified through 

Logic and Accuracy testing, and the system is “sealed.” If the voter list is updated 

after the system is on-line and open for voting, it could cause the entire system to 

move offline. If a new voter list is created and the system is taken offline to load it, 

another end-to-end system verification must be performed. 

Voters connect to the system via a telecommunications link either from a voter 

provided computer, e.g., their home or work computer, or from a computer provided 

and controlled by the LEO (designated as “Remote Kiosk” in the diagram).While the 

voting functionality of both methods is the same, there are significant differences 

in the level of security provided and the manner in which system administration 

is performed. When the voter provides the computer, it is his responsibility to 

ensure it meets the prescribed technical specifications and has appropriate security 

protection. When the voter uses a LEO controlled computer, the LEO assumes this 

responsibility. Providing a controlled computer also entails a controlled physical 

space to house it. When the voter provides the computer, there is flexibility in voting 

from a variety of locations at a time convenient for the voter. When the LEO provides 

the computer, the voter must come to a designated location.

All the voted ballots are stored as electronic cast vote records on the central server. 

When the voting period is closed, the system provides a list of the voters who cast 

ballots for the canvass board to review. After the canvass board approves the list 

of accepted ballots, the LEO can retrieve the cast vote records. Each is stored in 

encrypted form. The entire file of records should be encrypted and digitally signed 

to protect its integrity and confidentiality during the data transfer. For security 

purposes, the tabulation application is implemented on a standalone, air-gapped 
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computer under the direct physical control of the LEO or state government. After 

the ballot file is downloaded and integrity checks performed, the encrypted ballot 

file is transported manually via physical media to the tabulation computer. At this 

point the records are decrypted, randomized and tabulated. A results report is run 

to complete the process. All the records are available for post-election audits and/or 

recounts, if required. 

As detailed above, remote electronic voting systems provide many attractive 

capabilities for LEOs and voters. However, there are several security concerns 

associated with this technology. Many of the security concerns fall into the following 

categories:

− Authentication of the voter 

− Auditability of the voting system

− Ability to secure the central server

− Ability to secure the voting station

In addition, the physical security of the voting system hardware and software should 

not be overlooked. It is vital to the successful operation of the voting system that 

physical security of the voting system be maintained.

7. Conclusion

This paper presents high level functional descriptions of the election official and 

voter processes associated with UOCAVA voter registration and voting. Its purpose 

is to provide a framework for requirements analysis to specify, develop and test 

electronic methods to support these functions. For each process described there are 

flow diagrams illustrating how they can be implemented using mail, email, fax, or 

web-based technologies. There is a high level overview of how an integrated remote 

electronic voting system could implement voting processes. The descriptions are 

distilled from examining the election administration practices in a number of states, 

so elements of these procedures in any given jurisdiction may be somewhat different. 

However, these process descriptions capture the basic activities that LEOs and voters 

perform and can easily be modified to reflect actual practices in any jurisdiction. 

The flow diagrams can be modified to reflect the specific technology method that a 

jurisdiction is using or is considering.

The development of process diagrams is especially helpful in understanding how 

a particular technology affects LEO workflow and the resulting implications for 

workload. A LEO could make level of effort estimates for the process steps involved 

with their current technology and see what might change with a different system. 

The analysis involved in diagramming the process often indicates where supporting 

activities may require modification. For example, accounting practices used for paper 

ballots, e.g., ballot stub numbers, are not effective for electronic document delivery 
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systems. Comparisons across different technologies can reveal where workload might 

be reduced. 

The technologies discussed fall into two classes:

− Electronic document delivery systems, and 

− Remote electronic voting systems.

Examples of electronic document delivery systems are email, fax and web-based 

systems. These methods replace postal mail delivery of documents with electronic 

delivery. Registration forms, ballot request forms and ballots are turned into 

softcopy documents for transmission between the LEO and the voter. Upon 

receipt by either party, the softcopy document is printed for processing. This 

point is illustrated in Figures 4, 5 and 9 for LEO processes. The complementary 

voter processes are shown in Figures 6 and 7. The LEO attaches the ballot packet 

to an email, or transmits via fax machine, or uploads it to a web server. The voter 

receives the packet via one of these methods and prints it. When the ballot is 

marked and affidavit signed, the voter scans the paper documents and returns 

them electronically. When the LEO receives the electronically returned ballot, it 

gets printed again and transcribed to a replacement ballot that can be read by the 

tabulation device. 

Typically, signature comparison is used to authenticate a ballot was returned by a 

valid voter using these systems, as is the case with paper ballots returned by mail. 

When the voter’s signature is used as the authentication mechanism, it is essential 

for the LEO to have a good quality signature on file for comparison. Several states 

require that when email or fax methods are used to submit voter registration 

applications or return voted ballots these documents must also be returned by 

mail with an original signature before the application can be approved or the ballot 

accepted. Other states obtain a signature by matching voter registration data with 

data in the state’s motor vehicle database.

Electronic document transfer systems provide a significant benefit for UOCAVA 

voting because they can reduce ballot delivery and return time from weeks to close to 

real time. In addition, email and fax systems provide the sender with a confirmation 

receipt. These systems employ common forms of off-the-shelf technology that can be 

operated and maintained with minimal training. However, they require significant 

manual intervention, which adds complexity to the process. These additional steps 

could increase the workload for jurisdictions with large numbers of UOCAVA voters. 

On the other hand, there may be material cost and processing time savings by 

replacing mailed paper ballots with electronically delivered ones.

Because of the similarities in the way electronic document delivery systems 

operate, it may be possible to develop a common set of security criteria and testing 

requirements for the entire class. These criteria can be supplemented with 
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technology specific requirements where necessary. Formal certification is not 

required because these systems do not incorporate tabulation.

Remote electronic voting systems are a separate class of systems which operate 

differently from electronic document delivery systems. One aspect that electronic 

document delivery and remote electronic voting systems have in common is the use 

of commercial off-the-shelf hardware. However, remote electronic voting systems 

have the potential to be entirely software and firmware-based systems. As described 

above, when the voting system is set up for an election, the system does not require 

manual processing for the LEO, except for the transfer of the voted ballot file from 

the system server to a standalone computer for tabulation. Additionally, manual 

processing is not required by the voter, who can access the voting system by personal 

or work computer, or by a computer provided by the LEO. The ‘ballot’ is ephemeral 

and only exists as a software generated electronic display when a voting session is 

activated. This display enables the voter to indicate selections via a touchscreen 

or other input device. After the voter has finished voting, only the selections are 

captured and stored. When the electronic data is received by the LEO, the conversion 

to paper for tabulation is unnecessary. The tabulation function is provided by a 

software application integrated into the system.

The use of remote electronic voting systems entails significant modification to LEO 

procedures. While these systems may simplify many aspects of a LEO’s work, this 

technology is complex and will require new system management and administration 

methods and supporting personnel with a information technology training. Process 

descriptions and flow diagrams are very useful analysis tools to aid in redefining LEO 

procedures to work effectively with new voting technologies.
Appendix A - Process Diagrams





Figure 6
Figure 7

Figure 9
Figure 10