Filed 5/7/21 Bauman v. Wells Fargo Bank CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JORDANA BAUMAN,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 D076767

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-

00013452-CU-OR-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Ronald F. Frazier and Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judges. Affirmed.

Jordana Bauman, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Severson & Werson and Jan T. Chilton; Severson & Werson and Kerry 

W. Franich, for Defendant and Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jordana Bauman (Bauman) filed two lawsuits against 

defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), both arising from loans 

made in 2007, secured by deeds of trust on Bauman’s condominium in
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San Diego: a first lien of $100,000 and a home equity line of credit of 

$225,000. This case involves the foreclosure on the second lien securing the 

line of credit. Bauman filed this lawsuit in 2019 after Wells Fargo foreclosed 

on the property and purchased it at a trustee’s sale. The other lawsuit now 

on appeal, Bauman v. Wells Fargo, case No. D076781, was filed in 2018 and 

raised various causes of action based on the premise that the loans were 

never funded in 2007.

The parties did not move to consolidate these appeals, but Bauman 

treats this appeal as if it were consolidated with case No. D076781. She 

states that this appeal “is essentially a summary of related appeal 76781,” 

and that most of the issues to be raised in this appeal were raised in 

D076781. She states that she therefore did not repeat the issues she raised 

in D076781, and instead provides six “presumptions” and “a summary of all 

issues for both cases.”

We have reviewed each appeal individually. We affirm this case, as we 

affirm case No. D076781.

BACKGROUND

In 2006, Bauman purchased a condominium on Albatross Street in

San Diego. In 2007 she obtained a home equity line of credit, secured by a 

deed of trust on the property, from Wells Fargo’s predecessor in interest, 

World Savings Bank. World Savings was forced to close, and its assets and 

liabilities were taken over by Wachovia. Wachovia in turn was decertified 

and it was merged into Wells Fargo. 

Bauman claims that the loan was never funded, but that she

nonetheless made payments on the loan from 2007 through April 2011. She 

made no payments after May 1, 2011.
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A trustee’s sale was held on March 4, 2019, after a notice of default and 

notice of trustee’s sale were recorded, and after stays caused by Bauman’s 

bankruptcy proceedings. Wells Fargo purchased the property at the 

foreclosure sale.

Bauman filed this complaint on March 13, 2019. Wells Fargo answered

and moved for judgment on the pleadings. It requested judicial notice of 

recorded documents and the dockets of Bauman’s bankruptcy proceedings. 

The court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for judicial notice and granted 

judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. It then entered a

judgment of dismissal.

DISCUSSION

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is Bauman’s burden to show that the trial court committed an error 

that justifies reversal of the judgment. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

594, 609.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal 

analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the 

record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted 

without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be 

without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ 

[Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments 

for them” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830

(Falcone & Fyke)) or “to examine undeveloped claims” (Paterno v. State of 

California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 (Paterno)).

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings de novo, because, like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the 
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pleadings tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, accepting as true the 

factual allegations in the complaint. (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor 

Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777 (Harris).) We review the 

court’s result and not its reasoning. (Martinez v. San Diego County Credit 

Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (Martinez).) As with a demurrer, we 

accept as true all properly alleged material facts, but not deductions, 

contentions and conclusions of law or fact. (Ibid.) We disregard allegations 

that are contrary to facts judicially noticed. (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans 

Servicing L.P. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052 (Intengan).)

We review and respond to Bauman’s presumptions and issues of law 

but we do not develop arguments on her behalf. (Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 

Cal.App.4th at p. 830; Paterno, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.)

II

PRESUMPTIONS

In arguments that clearly overlap issues raised in case No. D076781, 

Bauman raises what she calls six “presumptions” that she contends require 

reversal of the judgment. We conclude the arguments have no merit.

A. Bankruptcy Does Not Toll Statute of Limitations for Claims by

Debtors Against Others

Bauman’s first “presumption” is that her multiple bankruptcy 

proceedings between 2010 and 2018 tolled the statute of limitations for her 

claims against Wells Fargo. 

The automatic stay of bankruptcy applies only to actions against the 

debtor. Bankruptcy filings do not stay actions by the debtor against others. 

(ECC Construction, Inc. v. Oak Park Calabasas Homeowners Assn. (2004) 118 

Cal.App.4th 1031, 1037, fn. 3 (ECC Construction); In re Palmdale Hills 

Property, LLC (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 868, 875.) Thus, Bauman’s causes of 
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action against Wells Fargo were not prevented or tolled by the bankruptcy 

cases that Bauman filed.

B. Trustee’s Alleged Refusal to Sue Did Not Excuse Bauman

Bauman’s second “presumption” is that she was prevented from filing a 

timely complaint because, although she asked the bankruptcy trustee for 

permission to sue Wells Fargo, the trustee refused.

However, Bauman could have, but did not, ask the bankruptcy court to 

order the trustee to abandon the estate’s causes of action against Wells Fargo 

so that she could pursue that action in state court. (Estate of Spirtos v. One 

San Bernardino County Superior Court Case Numbered SPR02211 (9th Cir. 

2006) 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (Spirtos) [court may order the trustee to abandon 

any property of the estate upon request by debtor]; Danielson v. ITT 

Industrial Credit Co. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 645, 656 (Danielson) [debtor can 

force trustee to prosecute action or abandon it to debtor].)

Further, we note the trustee has exclusive control over the debtor’s 

causes of action only in chapter 7 cases, and not in chapter 13 cases. A 

chapter 13 debtor has standing to sue outside the bankruptcy court. (Kelsey 

v. Waste Management Co. of Alameda County (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 590, 595 

(Kelsey).) In chapter 13 cases, “ ‘the debtor [has] full authority as 

representative of the estate typical of a trustee,’ ” and has standing to

prosecute any of his or her causes of action. (In re DiSalvo (9th Cir. 2000) 

219 F.3d 1035, 1039 (DiSalvo); Kelsey, at p. 595.) The bankruptcy dockets

show that Bauman was in chapter 7 proceedings for two years or less. 

Bauman had standing to sue while she was in chapter 13 proceedings. 

(Kelsey, at p. 595.) Tolling of two years was not sufficient to make her 

complaint timely.
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C. Waiver of Statute of Limitations

Bauman’s third “presumption” is that based on a waiver clause in the 

deed of trust, Wells Fargo waived the statute of limitations for actions. 

However, the waiver alleged by Bauman binds only her, the borrower, and 

not the lender. Bauman cites the waiver clause from the 2007 deed of trust, 

that states, “I will waive, within applicable law, the pleading of the statute of 

limitations as a defense to enforce this Security Agreement . . . .” “I” refers to 

the borrower, Bauman, pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust. The 

waiver did not bind Wells Fargo or its predecessors.

D. New Issues on Appeal

Bauman’s fourth “presumption” is that she can raise new issues for the 

first time on appeal. 

Because review of a judgment on the pleadings tests the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint, an appellant may raise a new theory of law 

based on undisputed facts on appeal. (Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 

Cal.App.4th 848, 857.) An appellant may also propose amendments on 

appeal to show that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant 

leave to amend. (People ex rel. Brown v. Powerex Corp. (2007) 153 

Cal.App.4th 93, 112 (Brown).) To do so, however, the appellant must state 

the specific proposed amendments and supporting legal authority. (Ibid.; 

Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44

(Rakestraw).) Bauman has not proposed any amendments that she could add 

that would support a valid cause of action.

E. Statement of Grounds for Order

Bauman proposes in her fifth “presumption” that we should not 

presume the court’s decision was correct because the court refused to issue a 

statement of decision after her request it do so.
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The record reflects Bauman requested a statement of decision pursuant 

to Code of Civil Procedure section 632, which applies to a trial of facts by the 

court. Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is not applicable here because the 

court made no findings of fact. 

For a demurrer and the analogous judgment on the pleadings, a court 

is required to “include in its decision or order a statement of the specific 

ground or grounds upon which the decision or order is based.” (Code of Civ. 

Proc., § 472d.) The court did not state its reasons here. Neither the tentative 

ruling, the minute order, nor the judgment state the specific grounds on 

which judgment on the pleadings was granted. The error is harmless, 

however, because we assume the allegations of the complaint are true, except 

where contradicted, and we review the ruling de novo. (Harris, supra, 59 

Cal.4th at p. 777; Intengan, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) 

F. Leave to Amend

Bauman’s sixth “presumption” is a summary arguing that we should 

reverse with directions to grant leave to amend. As we note above, Bauman 

has not spelled out proposed amendments that would state a cause of action 

against Wells Fargo.

III

SPECIFIC RULINGS

Bauman presents a summary of the rulings from which she is seeking

review. We briefly address each.

A. Bankruptcy Stay

Citing Kertesz v. Ostrovsky (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 369, 378 (Kertesz)

Bauman contends that the statute of limitations should have been tolled by 

her bankruptcy proceedings. Kertesz discussed tolling due to bankruptcy of 

actions against the debtor, not actions by the debtor, as here. As we have 
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noted, bankruptcy filing does not stay the debtor from pursuing his or her 

claims against others. (ECC Construction, Inc., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p.

1037, fn. 3.)

B. Waiver of Statute of Limitations

Bauman contends Wells Fargo waived the statute of limitations in the

deed of trust, as discussed ante. Again, as we have noted, the waiver 

provision applied only to the borrower, Bauman. 

C. Trustee’s Refusal to Prosecute

Bauman urges reversal based upon the refusal of the bankruptcy 

trustee to prosecute an action against Wells Fargo. She asserts this tolled 

the statute of limitations. As we have noted, Bauman could have asked the 

court to order the trustee to abandon Bauman’s claims against Wells Fargo so 

that she could pursue them on her own behalf. (Danielson, supra, 199 

Cal.App.3d at p. 656; Spirtos, supra, 443 F.3d at p. 1176.) 

Moreover, as we have noted, Bauman was in chapter 7 proceedings for 

no more than two years. Even if that time tolled the statute, only two out of 

the eight years were tolled between 2010, when she started filing bankruptcy 

cases, and 2018 when she filed her complaint. Two years of tolling were not 

enough to make her claims timely. Bauman had standing to pursue this 

litigation during the chapter 13 proceedings, as discussed ante. (Kelsey, 

supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 595; DiSalvo, supra, 219 F.3d at p. 1039.)

D. Denial of Jurisdiction

Bauman contends that a dismissal based on the statute of limitations 

“is a denial of jurisdiction and is not a prejudicial dismissal.” In support of 

this contention Bauman cites Gutkin v. University of Southern California (

2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 967, and People v. McGee (1934) 1 Cal.2d 611, 

overruled in Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 374. Neither 
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case supports her theory. In Gutkin, the court held that a plaintiff’s 

voluntary dismissal of his complaint deprived the appellate court of 

jurisdiction to review rulings made before the dismissal. (Gutkin, at p. 975.) 

The court in People v. McGee stated that parties to a civil action could waive

the statute of limitations, but in criminal cases the court has no power to act 

after the statute of limitations for the crime has run.1 (McGee, at pp. 613–

614.) Bauman has not provided legal authorities that support her argument. 

We reject her conclusory arguments. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at

p. 408.)

E. Res Judicata

Bauman next argues that the ruling in Bauman v. Wells Fargo, case 

No. D076781, does not operate as res judicata in this case. Bauman provides 

no record citation showing that the trial court based its ruling on res judicata. 

Even if the court did, we do not assess the court’s reasoning. (Martinez, 

supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059.)

We do not rely on res judicata. Our opinion is largely based on the 

same authorities that support our opinion in case No. D076781 because of the 

overlap of issues. We have not relied on our ruling in that case, however. We 

have addressed this case individually. 

F. Conversion

Bauman stated a cause of action for conversion, alleging that by means 

of its foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo wrongfully took her power to sell the 

property. She asserts the statute of limitations does not bar this claim 

because the allegedly wrongful foreclosure sale occurred in 2019.

1 Cowan overruled McGee on this point, holding that the statute of 

limitations in criminal cases is not jurisdictional and that a defendant may 

waive the statute. (Cowan, at p. 374.)
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Bauman has not stated a conversion claim and cannot state one based 

on the sale of her property, because “[t]he tort of conversion applies to 

personal property, not real property.” (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 

Cal.App.4th 1275, 1295; see Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 

[“conversion is a tort that may be committed only with relation to personal 

property and not real property”].)

Bauman has failed to “present meaningful legal analysis supported by 

citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the 

claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and 

authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and 

requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.]” (In re S.C., 

supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)

G. Dismissal of Other Defendants

Bauman claims the court acted improperly by dismissing other 

defendants from this case. We cannot assess this claim as Bauman has 

provided no citations to the record that can lead us to determine the basis for 

the decision. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) In the absence of 

supporting citation or a record, we presume “ ‘that the court knew and 

applied the correct statutory and case law’ and applied them to the facts in 

this case.” (In re Marriage of Winternitz (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 644, 653–

654; see also Evid. Code, § 664 [presumption that duty was regularly 

performed].)

H. Tentative Decision

Bauman contends the court denied her due process by “hiding” its 

tentative decision to dismiss the case. Again, she provides no record citations

or legal authority supporting her allegation. (In re S.C., supra, 138 

Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) 
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The tentative ruling for judgment on the pleadings is dated the same 

day as the minute order for the hearing, August 23, 2019. It states the 

motion for judgment on the pleading would be granted but does not state the 

grounds for that decision. Earlier access to the tentative decision would not 

have assisted Bauman. Further, she could have requested a statement of 

grounds for the ruling at the hearing. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 472d.)

We see no harm even if error occurred. As noted above, we review the 

result and not the reasoning of the trial court. (Martinez, supra, 50 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1059.) Bauman has not shown any error in the court’s 

decision even though she has now had time to research and prepare points 

and authorities supporting her claim.

I. Opposition to Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Claim

Bauman next contends that the court “improperly raised for the bank 

an opposition to her UCL claim that the bank did not seek in its initial 

motion (not until reply which is too late).” No record citations support her 

allegation. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)

The court could dispose of the UCL claim on any valid legal basis that 

was applicable. Further, Bauman has not shown any support for her UCL

claim, either in the motion for reconsideration that she filed or here on 

appeal. Any possible error was harmless.

J. Leave to Amend

The next argument raised by Bauman is her claim that the court failed 

to explain why it refused to consider her proposed amendments to her 

complaint. She does not explain what facts she would state upon amendment 

and does not provide legal authority supporting proposed amendments. 

(Brown, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 112; Rakestraw, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 43–44.) Bauman has not demonstrated error.
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K. Continuances

Bauman asks for an order directing the court to allow additional 

continuances due to her disability. Trial courts have discretion in controlling 

their calendars and other courtroom procedures. (See Oliveros v. County of 

Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1396.) This issue is moot, in any 

event.

L. Quiet Title

Bauman also asks for an order directing the trial court to explain why 

her quiet title claim was dismissed, without providing legal analysis, 

authority, or any discussion of the quiet title claim. This conclusory claim of 

error fails. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) 

DISPOSITION

Bauman has not satisfied her burden of showing the court erred in 

granting judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend.

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal to be awarded to defendant 

Wells Fargo.

BENKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.