An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-493

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 January 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Wake County

No. 11 CRS 214643

MARCUS XAIVER BRIDGES

Appeal by the State from order entered 21 August 2012 by 

Judge Carl R. Fox in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the 

Court of Appeals 23 October 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.

Geeta Kapur and The Law Offices of James D. Williams, Jr., 

by James D. Williams, Jr., for defendant-appellee.

CALABRIA, Judge.

The State of North Carolina appeals from the trial court’s 

order setting aside a jury verdict finding Marcus Xaiver Bridges 

(“defendant”) guilty of felony hit and run resulting in serious 

injury or death (“felony hit and run”) and dismissing that 

charge. We affirm.
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On 25 June 2011, defendant was driving his mother’s Pontiac 

Vibe (“the Vibe”) eastbound on Interstate 40 (“I-40”) in 

Raleigh, North Carolina at approximately 65 miles per hour. He 

approached Exit 301, at which point I-40 divides into two right 

lanes continuing as I-40 East and two left lanes exiting onto I440 West. Defendant, who was unfamiliar with the area, was in 

one of the left lanes.

Initially, defendant believed he was supposed to continue 

on I-40 and veered sharply into one of the right lanes in order 

to do so. When he veered, the Vibe entered the lane already

occupied by a Chevrolet Malibu (“the Malibu”). The Vibe came 

within close proximity of the Malibu, but the vehicles never 

physically touched. Defendant then determined that he actually 

wanted to exit to I-440, and he quickly changed lanes to the 

left. Meanwhile, the driver of the Malibu lost control of her 

vehicle in an attempt to avoid defendant. She swerved to the 

right and struck a tree. Seventeen-year-old Morgan McKenzie, a

passenger in the Malibu, died as a result of the crash. 

Law enforcement officers investigating the crash were able 

to link the Vibe with defendant. Lieutenant Kyle Wescoe (“Lt. 

Wescoe”) of the Raleigh Police Department (“RPD”) then went to 

defendant’s home. Defendant identified himself to Lt. Wescoe 
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and admitted that he had recently driven to the Triangle Town 

Center mall in Raleigh. Lt. Wescoe informed defendant that he 

was investigating an automobile accident. Defendant complied 

with Lt. Wescoe’s request to come to the RPD for an interview

regarding the accident. 

At the station, defendant was interviewed by RPD Officer 

Jamie Rigsbee (“Officer Rigsbee”). Defendant told Officer 

Rigsbee that he was attempting to travel to Crabtree Valley Mall 

via I-40 when he approached the I-40/I-440 split at Exit 301 and 

became confused as to which road to take. Defendant admitted 

that he went from an I-440 lane to an I-40 lane and then back. 

Defendant denied seeing another vehicle in the I-40 lane. 

Officer Rigsbee informed defendant that a fatal car crash had 

occurred as a result of his driving, and defendant became very 

upset and started crying.

Defendant was indicted for felony hit and run and 

misdemeanor death by motor vehicle. Beginning 13 August 2012, 

defendant was tried by a jury in Wake County Superior Court. At 

the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the 

evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss both charges.

These motions were denied by the trial court.
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On 20 August 2012, the jury returned verdicts finding 

defendant guilty of both charges. After the verdicts, defendant 

renewed his motion to dismiss, and on 21 August 2012, the trial 

court entered an order setting aside the jury’s verdict and 

dismissing the felony hit and run charge. The misdemeanor death 

by vehicle conviction remained undisturbed. The State appeals.

The State’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial 

court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge 

of felony hit and run. We disagree.

“‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for 

the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each 

essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense 

included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator 

of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’” State 

v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 

(2000)(quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 

918 (1993)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as 

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 

169 (1980). “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a 

motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 

62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).
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Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a), 

The driver of any vehicle who knows or 

reasonably should know:

(1) That the vehicle which he or 

she is operating is involved in a 

crash; and

(2) That the crash has resulted in 

serious bodily injury, as defined 

in G.S. 14-32.4, or death to any 

person;

shall immediately stop his or her vehicle at 

the scene of the crash. The driver shall 

remain with the vehicle at the scene of the 

crash until a law-enforcement officer 

completes the investigation of the crash or 

authorizes the driver to leave and the 

vehicle to be removed, unless remaining at 

the scene places the driver or others at 

significant risk of injury.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a) (2013). In the instant case, the 

trial court held that the State failed to provide substantial 

evidence of defendant’s knowledge that (1) his vehicle was 

involved in a crash and (2) the crash resulted in serious bodily 

injury or death:

Here there’s no evidence that there was any

collision between the vehicles. There’s no 

evidence that the defendant knew anybody --

that an accident occurred, and there’s 

absolutely no evidence that the defendant 

knew that death or physical injury had 

occurred[.] . . . Consistently, the

defendant in this case has denied being --

any knowledge of being involved in an 

accident. There’s nothing from the
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circumstances which would lead the Court to 

believe there is any evidence that he knew 

or reasonably should have known that this 

was -- that he was involved in an accident, 

in the evidence or actual, and that’s 

specifically why this statute exists, so 

that the Court doesn't allow a jury verdict 

to stand where there's no evidence to 

support it. There’s just no evidence to 

support that either of these -- either of 

these elements of this offense, and the 

Court allows the motion to set aside the 

jury’s verdict as to the felony hit and run

charge, . . . that motion is granted and set 

aside . . . .

The State concedes that there was no evidence presented at 

trial that defendant had actual knowledge of the crash, but 

contends that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for 

a jury to conclude that defendant reasonably should have known 

that he caused an accident and that the accident resulted in 

serious injury or death. In support of its contention that it 

met its evidentiary burden as to these elements at trial, the 

State cites two unpublished cases from this Court. In State v. 

Barbour, this Court held that the State presented sufficient 

evidence that the defendant should have known that the victim 

was injured when he struck her vehicle, which was traveling at 

55 miles per hour, and sent it spinning on the highway. ___ 

N.C. App. ___, 735 S.E.2d 452, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1320, 2012 

WL 5859668 (2012)(unpublished). In State v. Williams, this 
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Court held that the evidence presented did not support an 

instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor hit 

and run because the defendant reasonably should have known that 

the victim was injured in the accident. ___ N.C. App. ___, 716 

S.E.2d 90, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1940, 2011 WL 3891983

(2011)(unpublished)(Finding that the following evidence 

demonstrated that the defendant reasonably should have known 

that the victim was injured: (1) defendant’s vehicle, which was 

traveling at 55 miles per hour, rear ended the victim’s vehicle, 

which was traveling at 45 miles per hour; (2) both vehicles went 

off the road and into a ditch, with the victim’s vehicle 

striking a tree; (3) both vehicles suffered extensive damage; 

(4) the victim saw the defendant leave the scene with a third 

person; and (5) the defendant himself was injured in the 

accident.).

However, Barbour and Williams are both distinguishable from 

this case because they both involved actual physical contact 

between the defendant’s vehicle and the victim’s vehicle. While 

contact is not required by our statutes in order for an accident 

to have occurred, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4b) (2013)(A 

“crash” is defined as “[a]ny event that results in injury or 

property damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor 
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vehicle or its load. The terms collision, accident, and crash 

and their cognates are synonymous.”), the contact provides a

substantial basis to conclude that a defendant reasonably should 

have known about an accident. Since there was no contact 

between the Vibe and the Malibu in the instant case, the 

evidence presented by the State at trial must have provided some 

alternative basis through which defendant would reasonably have 

been made aware of the accident. Additionally, this evidence 

would have to demonstrate that defendant was particularly aware 

of the severity of the accident such that he reasonably should 

have known that it resulted in a severe injury or death. See 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a).

In its brief, the State relies upon eyewitness testimony to 

try to establish that there was substantial evidence that

defendant reasonably should have known about the crash of the 

Malibu and its severity. The State cites testimony from 

multiple individuals who witnessed the crash while traveling 

several hundred feet behind it and from an individual in front 

of the crash who witnessed the accident in his side-view

mirrors. However, these witnesses were at substantially

different locations from defendant such that the crash was 

directly within their respective lines of sight. Their 
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testimony does not provide any information about what 

defendant’s vantage point from I-440 would have been at the time 

of the crash. The evidence at trial was that I-440, on which 

defendant was traveling, immediately curved away from I-40, 

where the crash ultimately occurred, after Exit 301. Thus, 

witnesses who had either not reached Exit 301 at the time of the 

crash or who were still traveling on I-40 after that exit could 

not provide substantial evidence that defendant reasonably 

should have seen the crash from his location at the time that it 

occurred.

Finally, the State contends that defendant should 

reasonably have heard the crash based upon the testimony of RPD 

Officer John Michael Walls, III (“Officer Walls”). Officer 

Walls testified that he “heard what [he] thought was a faint 

sound of a vehicle crash” while stopped in traffic on an 

overpass approximately one-eighth of a mile from Exit 301.

However, just as the eyewitness crash testimony did not provide 

evidence of what defendant reasonably could have seen from his 

location, the fact that Officer Walls could faintly hear a crash 

from his precise location does not shed any light on what 

defendant reasonably could have heard from his location at the 

time of the crash. Thus, Officer Walls’s testimony does not 
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provide substantial evidence that defendant reasonably should 

have known that he was involved in a crash.

Ultimately, the State did not present substantial evidence 

that defendant reasonably should have known that he was involved 

in an accident which resulted in a serious injury or death. 

There was no evidence that defendant could have reasonably felt, 

seen, heard, or otherwise been made aware of either the crash or 

its severity based upon his location when the crash occurred. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly set aside the jury’s 

verdict and dismissed the felony hit and run charge. The trial 

court’s order is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).