Supreme Court

No. 2019-191-Appeal.

(PC 13-6459)

Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of 

the Estate of George N. Laprocina

:

v. :

Nicole C. Lourie et al. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 

May 26, 2021
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Supreme Court

No. 2019-191-Appeal.

(PC 13-6459)

Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of 

the Estate of George N. Laprocina

:

v. :

Nicole C. Lourie et al. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme 

Court on April 6, 2021, on appeal by the plaintiff, Jean Laprocina, as 

Administratrix of the Estate of George N. Laprocina,1from a Superior Court 

judgment in favor of the defendant, The Narragansett Electric Company 

(Narragansett), following the grant of Narragansett’s motion for summary 

1 George Laprocina died on October 12, 2016, and his estate was substituted as the 

plaintiff on March 31, 2017. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to George 

Laprocina by his first name. No disrespect is intended.
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judgment.

2

 On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that (1) the trial justice abused her 

discretion by granting Narragansett’s motion for summary judgment after, 

according to the plaintiff, another justice of the Superior Court had denied 

essentially the same motion; (2) Narragansett had a duty to maintain and repair 

streetlights; and (3) questions of fact remained as to whether Narragansett was 

negligent and whether it had actual or constructive knowledge of the 

malfunctioning streetlight. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of 

the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The facts before us are tragic. On December 30, 2010, George Laprocina 

was walking across Allens Avenue at the intersection of Toronto Avenue in 

Providence, Rhode Island, when he was struck by a motor vehicle operated by 

defendant Nicole Lourie and owned by defendant Christine Lourie. The front 

passenger side of the vehicle impacted George, causing his head to strike the 

2 While there were other defendants named in the amended complaint in this 

case—namely, Nicole C. Lourie; Christine M. Lourie; the City of Providence (the 

city) by and through its Treasurer James J. Lombardi, III, in his official capacity;

the State of Rhode Island (the state); Verizon; John Doe A, B, and C; and Doe 

Corporation No. 1 and No. 2—only The Narragansett Electric Company is 

involved in the appeal before this Court.

We pause to note that the collision giving rise to this claim occurred over ten 

years ago, and the injured plaintiff has since passed away; however, the case has 

been pending in the Superior Court against the Louries, the city, the state, and the 

John Doe defendants since 2013. We are directing that the case be resolved in a 

timely manner once the papers are returned to the Superior Court.
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passenger side windshield. George suffered multiple bodily fractures, severe head 

trauma, and permanent brain damage.

In 2013, plaintiff commenced a negligence action in the Superior Court, and 

later filed an amended complaint alleging, inter alia, that the area where the 

collision occurred was not properly illuminated at the time of the incident because 

Narragansett allowed a “rolling blackout” to occur or failed to repair, replace, and 

maintain the streetlights in the area, which created a dangerous condition to 

pedestrians. 

On October 22, 2014, Narragansett filed its initial motion for summary 

judgment, arguing that it owed no duty of care to George because its duty to 

maintain the streetlights in the area of the incident is governed by a tariff approved 

by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (the PUC streetlight tariff), 

which, Narragansett maintained, limits any duty owed by Narragansett regarding 

its rendered services solely to its customer—the City of Providence (the city).

See R.I.P.U.C. No. 2031-A. The PUC streetlight tariff contains a disclaimer of 

liability, which states that Narragansett’s “duties and obligations under this tariff 

extend only to the [city], and not to any third parties. [Narragansett] * * *

specifically disclaims any liability to third parties arising out of [Narragansett]’s 

obligations to [the city] under this section.” Id. at Sheet 6.
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A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on February 9, 

2016. The trial justice denied Narragansett’s motion, finding that the liability 

disclaimer contained in the PUC streetlight tariff was overly broad in absolving 

Narragansett of liabilities in all situations—to wit, even in cases of willful or 

wanton misconduct—and was therefore contrary to public policy and not 

enforceable. 

More than two years later, Narragansett filed a second motion for summary 

judgment based on new grounds and a purportedly expanded record. Narragansett 

argued that, under principles of common law negligence and contract law, it had no 

duty to George to maintain the streetlight in question. A hearing on Narragansett’s 

second motion for summary judgment was held before a different trial justice. The 

second trial justice determined that the issue before her turned on a common law 

duty analysis and, after analyzing the factors outlined in the seminal case of Banks 

v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987),3she concluded that 

3 The Banks factors include:

“(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the 

degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, 

(3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s 

conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the policy of 

preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden 

to the defendant and the consequences to the community

for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 

liability for breach.” Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 

522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987).
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Narragansett did not owe a duty of care to George. The second trial justice entered

an order granting Narragansett’s motion for summary judgment on February 20, 

2019, and defendant sought and received a judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) 

of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; final judgment entered in favor of 

Narragansett on March 18, 2019. The plaintiff timely appealed from that judgment.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial justice’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Ballard v. SVF Foundation, 181 A.3d 27, 34 (R.I. 2018). “Although summary 

judgment is recognized as an extreme remedy, to avoid summary judgment the 

burden is on the nonmoving party to produce competent evidence that proves the 

existence of a disputed issue of material fact.” Id. (brackets and deletion omitted)

(quoting Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404, 407 (R.I. 2013)). We, like the trial 

justice, “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and 

if we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the judgment.” Id.

(brackets omitted) (quoting Sullo, 68 A.3d at 406-07).

Law of the Case Doctrine

We first address plaintiff’s argument that, under the law of the case doctrine, 

the second trial justice abused her discretion in granting summary judgment after 

the first summary-judgment motion had been denied. We reject this contention.
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“The law of the case doctrine provides that, ‘after a judge has decided an 

interlocutory matter in a pending suit, a second judge, confronted at a later stage of 

the suit with the same question in the identical manner, should refrain from 

disturbing the first ruling.’” Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 424 

(R.I. 2009) (quoting Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A., 844 A.2d 666, 677 (R.I. 

2004)). However, the law of the case doctrine “is a flexible rule” and “may be 

disregarded when a subsequent ruling can be based on an expanded record.” Id.

(quoting Chavers, 844 A.2d at 677). “When presented with an expanded record, it 

is within the trial justice’s sound discretion whether to consider the issue.” Felkner

v. Rhode Island College, 203 A.3d 433, 445 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Ferguson v. 

Marshall Contractors, Inc., 745 A.2d 147, 152 (R.I. 2000)).

In 2014, Narragansett moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was 

immune from liability pursuant to the liability disclaimer contained in the PUC 

streetlight tariff. The trial justice denied that motion based on a determination that 

the liability disclaimer was void as against public policy because it absolved 

Narragansett of all liability with respect to third parties. Nearly four years after the 

filing of its first motion for summary judgment, Narragansett filed a second 

motion, on different grounds from the first, claiming it had no common law duty or

contractual duty to repair the streetlight. As such, the second trial justice was 

confronted with what could be characterized as a different question that required a 
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separate analysis. See Lynch, 965 A.2d at 424 (holding that law of the case 

doctrine did not preclude consideration of a second motion for summary judgment 

that was based on new arguments and an expanded record). Because the record 

reveals that different, although closely connected, arguments were raised and 

considered on each summary-judgment motion, we are satisfied that the judgment 

in this case was not issued in contravention of the law of the case doctrine.4 

Duty

The primary issue on appeal is narrow: whether Narragansett owed a legal

duty to George, a pedestrian, to maintain the streetlight in question.

To properly assert a claim for negligence, “a plaintiff must establish a 

legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, 

proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual 

loss or damage.” Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630, 633 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Selwyn v. 

Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I. 2005)). “Although complaints sounding in 

negligence generally are not amenable to summary judgment and should be 

resolved by fact finding at the trial court, the existence of a duty is a question of 

law.” Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1218 (R.I. 2013); see Ouch, 963 A.2d at 

633 (noting that whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care “is a question 

4 On the other hand, because whether a duty exists is always a question of law in a 

negligence action, the second trial justice could have reasonably concluded that 

this question should have been raised in the first summary-judgment motion; but it 

was nonetheless within her discretion to reach the issue.
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of law to be determined by the court”). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate that he or she is owed a legal duty by the defendant before they 

are “entitled to a factual determination on each of the remaining elements: breach, 

causation, and damages.” Ouch, 963 A.2d at 633. In the absence of a legal duty, 

“the trier of fact has nothing to consider” and the grant of summary judgment is

proper. Berard, 64 A.3d at 1218 (quoting Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc., 968 

A.2d 271, 274 (R.I. 2009)).

The plaintiff argues that Narragansett’s duty to repair and maintain 

streetlights extends to individual members of the public. The plaintiff first asserts 

that the PUC streetlight tariff and the city’s ordinances establish this duty—

particularly, the city’s duty to report inoperable streetlights to Narragansett and 

Narragansett’s duty to replace them. The plaintiff claims that there is a “concerted 

partnership” between the city and Narragansett to report and repair streetlights. 

Once the PUC adopts a tariff, it becomes the standard for determining the 

duties and obligations between a regulated public utility and its customer.5 See

G.L. 1956 §§ 39-1-3 and 39-3-10. Narragansett provided streetlight services to the 

5 The PUC is vested with “the exclusive power and authority to supervise, regulate, 

and make orders governing the conduct of companies offering to the public”

services such as streetlighting. General Laws 1956 § 39-1-1(c). We have 

recognized that this provision “represent[s] a clear legislative intent to grant the 

commission broad powers as it seeks to establish a system of rates which will be 

just and equitable to all concerned including the utility and its customers.” Rhode 

Island Chamber of Commerce Federation v. Burke, 443 A.2d 1236, 1237 (R.I. 

1982). 
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city pursuant to the PUC streetlight tariff that governs the terms of service, 

installation, maintenance, and payment for streetlight services. See R.I.P.U.C. No.

2031-A. The tariff provides: “All inoperable lamps which are owned and 

maintained by [Narragansett] will be spot replaced. The [city] is responsible for 

notifying [Narragansett] of inoperable lamps.” Id. at Sheet 7. The tariff further 

provides that Narragansett’s “duties and obligations under this tariff extend only to 

the [city], and not to any third parties.”6Id. at Sheet 6.

Under the PUC streetlight tariff, Narragansett owes a duty to the city. The 

tariff does not impose any affirmative duty upon Narragansett to conduct 

inspections to ensure the functionality of streetlights. Significantly, the tariff 

plainly places the responsibility on the city to notify Narragansett of inoperable 

streetlights. Additionally, even if the streetlight at issue was inoperative or 

malfunctioning at the time of the incident, the city ordinances cited by plaintiff

6 We note, without deciding the validity of the disclaimer of liability provision set 

forth in the PUC streetlight tariff, that, as declared by the first trial justice, 

exculpatory clauses that completely absolve a company of all liability with respect 

to third parties, even in cases of willful or wanton misconduct or gross negligence, 

may not comport with public policy considerations.
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clearly provide that the city has a duty to inspect streetlights, and not Narragansett.7 

The city ordinances and the PUC streetlight tariff simply do not establish a duty of 

care owed by Narragansett to individual pedestrians injured as a result of an 

inoperable streetlight. Cf. Wyso v. Full Moon Tide, LLC, 78 A.3d 747, 751, 752 

(R.I. 2013) (holding that an ordinance requiring property owners to maintain an 

abutting sidewalk does not create a duty to individual passersby). 

We now turn to the relevant common law duty factors to determine whether

Narraganset owed a duty in this case. Because we have not yet had the opportunity 

to address the issue of whether a utility owes a duty to private individuals to 

maintain streetlights, we begin by discussing cases from other jurisdictions 

concerning this issue.

A majority of jurisdictions have concluded that motorists or pedestrians 

injured in vehicular accidents allegedly caused, at least in part, by inoperative

streetlights were not entitled to recover from the utilities that were obligated to 

provide the streetlights. See, e.g., Turbe v. Government of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 

7 The Providence Code of Ordinances, Supp. No. 4, § 23-125 (July 15, 2019),

places a duty upon the city’s public service engineer to inspect electrical fixtures to

ensure that they are maintained in “a proper and safe manner and condition,” and

to inform the city council if the public utility fails to repair or maintain them. 

Section 23-139 requires the chief of police to report daily to the city’s public 

service engineer on city streetlight outages. Moreover, not cited by plaintiff, § 23-

136 gives the public service engineer “the general control and supervision of all 

public lights used by the city for illuminating its streets, highways, parks and 

public places.” 
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427, 432, 433 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that utility owed no duty to pedestrian who 

was assaulted because inoperable light did not increase risk of harm but rather 

returned the lighting conditions to their natural state); Estate of Flygare v. Ogden 

City, 405 P.3d 970, 977, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (holding that utility owed no 

duty to pedestrian injured in crosswalk to repair inoperable streetlight because the 

absence of light did not place the plaintiff in a worse position than he would have 

been if no streetlight was ever installed); Blake v. Public Service Company of New 

Mexico, 82 P.3d 960, 965, 966, 967 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (considering public 

policy and holding that public utility owed no duty to pedestrians to maintain 

streetlights because failure to repair a streetlight “does not launch any instrument 

of harm, given that the darkness of the street is obvious to travelers and given that 

there are other methods of seeing in the darkness, i.e., automobile headlamps”); 

Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co., 785 So.2d 1251, 1252, 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 2001) (holding that utility owed no duty to pedestrian killed by a motor 

vehicle while crossing a street where streetlight was not functioning); Vaughan v. 

Eastern Edison Company, 719 N.E.2d 520, 521, 523 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) 

(holding that utility owed no duty to pedestrian injured while in a crosswalk that 

was unlit due to inoperative streetlights); White v. Southern California Edison 

Company, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 434, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that utility

owed no contractual or common law duty to moped driver injured in a collision 
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that occurred at an intersection where streetlights were not functioning); Shafouk

Nor El Din Hamza v. Bourgeois, 493 So.2d 112, 117 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 

that the “failure of [the utility] to provide adequate street lighting was at most the 

deprivation of a benefit; it was not the violation of a duty”); Quinn v. Georgia 

Power Co., 180 S.E. 246, 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935) (holding utility owed no duty to 

general public to maintain inoperable streetlight); Cochran v. Public Service

Electric Co., 117 A. 620, 621 (N.J. 1922) (holding that utility owed duty to city 

concerning inoperable streetlights but not to the general public).

In White, the California Court of Appeal determined that the defendant 

utility owed no duty to a moped driver who was injured in a collision allegedly 

caused by inoperative lighting at an intersection. White, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434,

437. The court described the issue of duty as a “policy consideration[,]” and 

explained that the issue requires consideration of “not only the foreseeability of 

harm to a plaintiff but also the burdens to be imposed against a defendant.” Id. at 

437. Specifically, the court considered:

“the cost of imposing this liability on public utilities, the 

current public utility rate structures, the large numbers of 

streetlights, the likelihood that streetlights will become 

periodically inoperable, the fact that motor vehicles 

operate at night with headlights, the slight chance that a 

single inoperative streetlight will be the cause of a motor 

vehicle collision, and the availability of automobile 

insurance to pay for damages.” Id.
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Consequently, the White court concluded that “[t]he burden on the public utility in 

terms of costs and disruption of existing rate schedules far exceeds the slight 

benefit to the motoring public from the imposition of liability.” Id.

Similarly, in Vaughan, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts declared that the 

defendant utility owed no duty to a pedestrian who alleged that her injuries were

due to inoperative streetlights. Vaughan, 719 N.E.2d at 523, 524. Relying on 

White, the Vaughan court considered duty as an “allocation of risk” that required 

“balancing the foreseeability of harm * * * against the burden to be imposed.” Id.

(quoting White, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435). In adopting the majority rule that utilities 

have no common law duty to injured third parties to maintain streetlights, the court 

concluded that, although “relieving the electric company of liability may leave the 

‘loss on the shoulders of the individual plaintiff,’” id. at 523-24 (quoting Prosser & 

Keeton, Torts § 4, at 24),

“the imposition of tort liability on those who must render 

continuous service of this kind to all who apply for it 

under all kinds of circumstances could also be ruinous

and the expense of litigation and settling claims over the 

issue of whether or not there was negligence could be a 

greater burden to the rate payer than can be socially 

justified.” Id. at 524 (brackets omitted) (quoting Prosser 

& Keeton, Torts § 93, at 671).

The court also noted that “[t]he failure to maintain an installed street light does not 

create a risk greater than the risk created by the total absence of a streetlight.” Id. at 

525 (quoting White, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437). 
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The aforementioned cases applied factors that are closely aligned with 

Rhode Island jurisprudence. In Rhode Island, there is no bright-line rule for

determining whether a legal duty exists. The determination of duty must be made 

on a case-by-case basis. Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126, 130 (R.I. 2008). However,

as noted supra, in Banks, this Court adopted the following list of factors to 

consider when deciding whether a duty exists in a particular situation:

“(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the 

degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, 

(3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s 

conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the policy of 

preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden 

to the defendant and the consequences to the community 

for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 

liability for breach.” Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225.

This Court also has cautioned that Banks did not limit the scope of factors 

that we should consider in future cases with different factual scenarios. See, e.g., 

Wyso, 78 A.3d at 751. We have recognized that the duty inquiry should also

reflect consideration of “all relevant factors, including the relationship of the 

parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, 

public policy considerations, and notions of fairness.” Carlson v. Town of South

Kingstown, 131 A.3d 705, 709 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Woodruff v. Gitlow, 91 A.3d 

805, 814 (R.I. 2014)).

In Wyso, we distinguished Banks, which involved a premises-liability claim 

against property owners brought by an invitee who was injured on the landowner’s 
- 15 -

property; Wyso involved a slip-and-fall on a public sidewalk not owned or 

controlled by the defendants. Wyso, 78 A.3d at 751. Because a property owner’s 

duty arises from “the landowner’s possession of the premises and his or her 

attendant right and obligation to control the premises[,]” id., we declined in Wyso,

and also in other cases, to find a duty where an injury occurred on property not 

owned or controlled by the defendant. See id. at 749, 751-52 (finding no duty 

where the plaintiff was injured on public sidewalk abutting the defendant’s 

business); Maguire v. City of Providence, 105 A.3d 92, 96 (R.I. 2014) (finding no 

duty where the plaintiff was injured while walking on a sidewalk outside a 

shopping mall); Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 684, 686-67 (R.I. 1994) (finding 

no duty where the plaintiffs were injured while crossing public street adjacent to 

the defendant’s property because, inter alia, the defendants had no control over the 

property where the injury occurred).

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case at bar. Narragansett 

does not own, control, or maintain the subject area; rather, the city has exclusive 

ownership and control of its public streets. The city’s public service engineer 

inspects electrical fixtures within the city and is vested with “the general control 

and supervision of all public lights used by the city for illuminating its streets, 

highways, parks and public places.” Providence Code § 23-136; see § 23-125. 

Additionally, there is no relationship between the parties in the case at bar that 
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would justify the imposition of a duty: The decedent was a member of the public 

who was a pedestrian but had no special or direct relationship with Narragansett. 

As for foreseeability of harm, while we glean a variety of unfortunate events that 

can befall members of the public using a public street in darkness, we must 

“acknowledge[] that duty is a flexible concept, that seeks to balance the degree of 

foreseeability of harm against the burden of the duty to be imposed.” Volpe v. 

Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 716 (R.I. 2003) (brackets omitted) (quoting McClung v. 

Delta Square Limited Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 901 (Tenn. 1996)).

If Narragansett were to be held liable to third parties for incidents allegedly 

caused, in part, by inoperable streetlights, then it would be required to alter its 

business operations by inspecting, maintaining, and replacing thousands of 

streetlights on hundreds of streets in the city. The cost of this mandate would 

result in a substantial burden on the part of the utility and a cost to its ratepayers 

that is not contemplated by the PUC streetlight tariff. To conclude that 

Narragansett owes a legal duty to pedestrians or individual members of the public 

to inspect and maintain streetlights would unreasonably expand the zone of 

obligation of the public utility and, indeed, impose an undue burden. The extent 

and cost cannot be justified by “the slight chance that a single inoperative 

streetlight will be the cause of a motor vehicle collision[.]” White, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

at 437. At night, motor vehicles generally are driven with headlights illuminating 
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the way; therefore, “it is unlikely that a single inoperable streetlight will be a 

substantial factor in causing a collision[.]” Id.

Considering the facts of this case in conjunction with well-settled Rhode 

Island law and the prevailing view of jurisdictions that have considered this issue, 

we conclude that a public utility generally owes no common law duty to individual 

third parties who are allegedly injured, at least in part, as a result of inoperable 

streetlights. 

Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The papers 

in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.

Justice Long did not participate.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Jean Laprocina, as Administratrix of the Estate of 

George N. Laprocina v. Nicole C. Lourie et al.

Case Number No. 2019-191-Appeal.

(PC 13-6459)

Date Opinion Filed May 26, 2021

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Mark A. Fay, Esq.

For Defendant:

Mark P. Dolan, Esq.

Mark P. Dolan, Jr., Esq.