J-S45003-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

LEROY C. JOHNSON, 

 Appellant No. 2155 EDA 2012 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 20, 2012

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010278-2011 

BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, and FITZGERALD,*

JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2014 

 Leroy Johnson appeals from the judgment of sentence of five to ten 

years imprisonment followed by six years probation. Sentence was imposed 

after a jury convicted Appellant of involuntary manslaughter, homicide by 

vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol, homicide by vehicle, 

aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI, and four counts each of simple 

assault and reckless endangerment. We reject Appellant’s challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting two of his convictions and affirm. 

Appellant’s offenses all arise from a traffic accident that occurred at 

approximately 8:15 p.m. on February 26, 2011. At that time, Appellant was 

traveling southbound in his silver SUV on Broad Street, which is a heavily 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 
J-S45003-14

- 2 - 

trafficked four-lane roadway in Philadelphia. Since Appellant wanted to go 

northbound on Broad Street, he crossed over a median strip near the 

intersection of Broad and Venango Streets and made a U-turn into the 

northbound lanes of Broad Street. 

Esther Davis was driving her Ford Escort in the left lane of northbound 

traffic of Broad Street between Venango Street and Erie Avenue. She had 

her two daughters and four grandchildren in the car. As Appellant made the 

illegal U-turn, he crashed into the driver’s side of Ms. Davis’ car. The impact 

pushed Ms. Davis’ vehicle into the right lane of the northbound traffic of 

Broad Street. Her vehicle was then struck by another vehicle traveling in 

the right lane of the northbound traffic. That second impact propelled the 

Ford Escort across the median strip and into the southbound lanes of Broad 

Street. Ms. Davis’ car then hit two pedestrians, Inia Withers and her 

boyfriend Devin Whye, who were in the process of crossing Broad Street. 

Ms. Davis’ vehicle struck a parked car, parking meters, and a tree before it 

came to a stop. Mr. Whye died as a result of the accident,while Ms. Withers 

was seriously injured and sustained a broken leg and pelvis. 

Appellant remained at the scene, and Philadelphia Police Officer 

Deborah Kiker, a member of the accident investigation unit, immediately 

responded to the report of the accident. Appellant was identified as the 

driver of the silver SUV that made the U-turn and struck Ms. Davis’ Escort. 

While Officer Kiker was interviewing Appellant, Appellant displayed signs of 

intoxication. Appellant denied that he hit Ms. Davis’ car in the first instance 
J-S45003-14

- 3 - 

and claimed that another vehicle struck Ms. Davis’ Escort and that vehicle, 

which left the scene of the accident, caused her Escort to impact Appellant’s 

SUV. 

Ms. Davis and one of her daughters, Regina Brown, contradicted that 

version of events. They both testified that Appellant’s SUV struck Ms. Davis’ 

car when that SUV was making the U-turn from the southbound lanes into 

the oncoming northbound traffic. The SUV’s impact on the Davis car caused 

it to enter the right hand lane of northbound traffic, where it was then struck 

by the car that left the scene. The collision with the second car caused the 

Escort to travel into the oncoming lane of southbound traffic and the 

pedestrians crossing Broad Street. Officer Kiker examined the damage 

sustained by the Escort and SUV and determined that it did not support 

Appellant’s version of events, and, instead, was consistent with the 

description of the accident provided by Ms. Davis and Ms. Brown. 

After Appellant admitted to consuming alcohol prior to driving his 

vehicle, Officer Kiker transported Appellant to have his blood drawn. 

Dr. Richard Cohn, a forensic toxicologist, reviewed the results of the blood 

alcohol content test. He opined that Appellant’s BAC at 8:15 p.m. on 

February 26, 2011, was .230%. 

Based upon this evidence presented by the Commonwealth, a jury 

convicted Appellant of the above-delineated offenses. In this appeal from 

the judgment of sentence, Appellant raises a challenge to the sufficiency of 
J-S45003-14

- 4 - 

the evidence as to causation in connection with the two offenses pertaining 

to the pedestrians: 

Where the defendant, while operating a vehicle, was 

alleged to have struck another vehicle which, in turn, struck 

pedestrians and property, was the evidence insufficient to prove 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all charges 

pertaining to injuries and damage resulting from the other 

vehicle striking pedestrians and property because the evidence 

failed to prove that the defendant’s conduct, and not the conduct 

of the driver of the other vehicle, was the direct cause of the 

injuries to the pedestrians and property struck by the other 

vehicle. 

Appellant’s brief at 5. 

 We review a sufficiency argument pursuant to the following principles: 

 The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the 

facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts

regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its

burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be 

evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Furthermore, 

when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give 

the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence. 
J-S45003-14

- 5 - 

Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

On appeal, Appellant does not contest that the evidence presented by 

the Commonwealth was sufficient to establish that he struck Ms. Davis’ 

Escort while he was making the U-turn from the southbound into the 

northbound lanes of Broad Street. Nor does Appellant suggest that he was 

not driving while under the influence of alcohol. Instead, he focuses on 

Ms. Davis’ conduct after her Escort was struck by his SUV. Appellant claims 

that Ms. Davis’ driving behavior after her car was hit rendered her culpable 

for striking the two pedestrians. Appellant presented the testimony of an 

expert witness who opined that, after the impact from Appellant’s SUV, Ms. 

Davis should have been able to stop her car prior to hitting Ms. Withers and 

Mr. Whye. Appellant thus contends his convictions for homicide by vehicle 

while DUI and aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI are infirm. 

Appellant correctly observes that the evidence established that 

Ms. Davis struck the two pedestrians. Appellant’s brief at 28. Appellant 

continues that “insufficient evidence was presented at trial to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that his actions caused the accident which resulted in the 

death and injury” to the pedestrians at issue in the present action. Id. at 29. 

He insists that his conduct was not the “direct cause of the injuries to the 

pedestrians and property struck by [Ms. Davis’] vehicle.” Id. 
J-S45003-14

- 6 - 

 To resolve this contention, we first examine the testimony of 

Ms. Davis, who described the events that followed the impact of Appellant’s 

SUV into her Escort. Ms. Davis related that she was hit very hard by 

Appellant’s SUV, was pushed into the right lane, and struck by another car. 

N.T. Trial, 4/24/12, at 175. The impact caused her to lose control of the car. 

Id. at 177; N.T. Trial, 4/25/12, at 38. As a result, the witness panicked. 

N.T. Trial, 4/24/12, at 180. Her Escort had a clutch, and she did not recall 

attempting to brake. When her car came to rest after striking the people, 

another car, and a tree, her left foot was on the pedal to change gears and 

her right foot was on the accelerator. Ms. Davis said she placed her other 

foot on the clutch “trying to take my car out of gear to see if it would stop.” 

Id. Her other foot already was on the accelerator at the time of the first 

crash. 

Ms. Davis explained, “[A]ll I know is just it happened so fast. I didn’t 

really have time to do anything, because we were already in the flow of 

traffic, and my foot was already on the accelerator as we was driving up the 

street.” Id. at 180. Ms. Davis further stated that when Appellant’s vehicle 

hit her car, “I guess I just went in shock, and all I could recall is trying not 

to hit these people.” Id. Ms. Davis insisted that the events occurred so 

quickly “there was really not time that I could do anything,” but she tried “to 

not hit these people.” Id. at 181. Ms. Brown, Ms. Davis’ daughter, 
J-S45003-14

- 7 - 

confirmed that the entire accident happened in a matter of seconds and that, 

as a result of the impact, Ms. Davis lost control over the Escort. 

 Appellant was convicted of homicide by vehicle while DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3735, in connection with Mr. Whye’s death. A person is guilty of that 

offense if he “unintentionally causes the death of another person as the 

result of a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of 

alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating section 

3802 is guilty . . . when the violation is the cause of death[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3735(a) (emphasis added). The other offense challenged by Appellant, 

aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI, occurs when a person “negligently 

causes serious bodily injury to another person as the result of a violation of 

section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance) and who is convicted of violating section 3802 . . . when the 

violation is the cause of the injury.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1(a) (emphasis 

added). Thus, both crimes concern an outcome, either death or serious 

bodily injury, that is unintended by the actor. 

 As noted, Appellant contests that his conduct of DUI caused the death 

of Mr. Whye and the injury to Ms. Withers. Since the injuries in question 

were unintentional outcomes of Appellant’s actions, the definition of 

causation is outlined as follows: 

(a) General rule.—Conduct is the cause of a result when: 

(1) it is an antecedent but for which the result in 

question would not have occurred; and 
J-S45003-14

- 8 - 

(2) the relationship between the conduct and result 

satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed 

by this title or by the law defining the offense. 

. . . . 

(c) Divergence between probable and actual result.—When 

recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element 

of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result 

is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case 

of negligence, of which he should be aware unless: 

(1) the actual result differs from the probable result

only in the respect that a different person or 

different property is injured or affected or that the

probable injury or harm would have been more 

serious or more extensive than that caused; or 

(2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury 

or harm as the probable result and is not too remote 

or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on 

the liability of the actor or on the gravity of his 

offense. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 303(a); (c). 

Herein, Appellant’s conduct met these mandates. Appellant made a Uturn on a four-lane, heavily traveled highway in Philadelphia while driving 

with a BAC over twice the legal limit. Both vehicles were traveling in 

opposite directions and Appellant hit the car hard. The fact that the vehicle 

Appellant struck would lose control and cause death or injury to a pedestrian 

on that roadway was a probable and natural result of his grossly negligent 

actions. Furthermore, the fact that a car that he struck with his vehicle 

would lose control and hit pedestrians was not too remote or accidental in its 
J-S45003-14

- 9 - 

occurrence so as to relieve Appellant’s liability. Indeed, it was highly 

foreseeable. 

 In a recent en banc decision, we discussed criminal causation in an 

analogous circumstance involving a traffic accident. Commonwealth v. 

Spotti, 2014 WL 2535265 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). In that case, an 

accident occurred on a four lane highway. Police had received numerous 

reports that the defendant’s vehicle was driving erratically. One motorist 

was asked to follow the defendant with her hazard lights flashing. She 

complied, and police located her and then the defendant’s car. Police 

started to follow the defendant’s vehicle, which was in the left lane. Another 

motorist, Steven Chung, was traveling in the right lane of the highway. 

When police activated their sirens, the defendant swerved into the right lane 

and then suddenly braked. That action caused Mr. Chung to veer right to 

avoid colliding with the defendant’s vehicle. 

When Mr. Chung swerved to avoid the defendant, he struck a van that 

was disabled and sitting on the side of the road. As a result of this second 

collision, two people helping to change the tire of the van were severely 

injured. The defendant’s blood alcohol content while driving was .203%. He 

was charged and convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a 

vehicle while DUI in connection with the injuries caused to the two people 

changing the tire. 
J-S45003-14

- 10 - 

On appeal, the defendant challenged those convictions based upon the 

same ground as that raised herein: causation. The defendant in Spotti 

insisted that Mr. Chung’s “actions were a sufficiently independent cause of 

the accident, which broke the chain of legal causation required to support 

Appellant's convictions.” Id. at * 6. We disagreed. We observed that to 

establish causation in the criminal context, “the Commonwealth must prove 

that the defendant's conduct was so directly and substantially linked to the 

actual result as to give rise to the imposition of criminal liability.” Id. at * 7. 

Referencing § 303, we noted that there is a “two-part test for 

determining criminal causation. First, the defendant's conduct must be an 

antecedent, but for which the result in question would not have occurred.” 

Id. In other words, a victim's injuries cannot be “entirely attributable to 

other factors; rather, there must exist a causal connection between the 

conduct and the result of conduct; and causal connection requires something 

more than mere coincidence as to time and place.” Id. Secondly, the 

outcome of “the defendant's actions cannot be so extraordinarily remote or 

attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the defendant criminally 

responsible.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). This second

aspect of the causation matrix is established if the victim’s injuries are the 

natural or foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions. Id. 

 We observed that it is not necessary that the defendant’s conduct be the 

sole cause of the victim’s injuries to establish criminal causation for 
J-S45003-14

- 11 - 

unintended injuries to another. We observed: “Criminal responsibility may 

be properly assessed against an individual whose conduct was a direct and 

substantial factor in producing the death even though other factors 

combined with that conduct to achieve the result.” Id. (citation omitted). 

We concluded with the observation that a defendant is considered the direct 

cause of the victim’s injuries and criminal responsibility is established when 

“the defendant's conduct started the chain of causation which led to the 

victim's death[.]” Id. at *8 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 

146, 152 (Pa.Super. 2013)). 

Spotti’s position was that he did not cause the injuries to the people 

located on the side of the road because he did not collide either with them or 

Mr. Chung’s car. Spotti maintained that Mr. Chung’s behavior was reckless 

and unforeseeable and could not be attributed to him. He accused 

Mr. Chung of following his vehicle too closely and acting as a vigilante. 

We rejected his positions based upon the testimony of Mr. Chung, who 

explained that he was in the right lane when the defendant’s car swerved 

into his lane of travel and braked violently. Mr. Chung denied trying to 

follow the defendant’s vehicle or driving too closely to it. Mr. Chung 

explained that when the defendant swerved, Mr. Chung only had two 

options: either to strike the defendant’s car or travel onto the berm. Other 

witnesses confirmed Mr. Chung’s version of events. We concluded that, 
J-S45003-14

- 12 - 

under the circumstances, Spotti’s conduct was the legal cause of the injuries 

to the people who were struck by Mr. Chung’s car. 

The present case cannot be reasonably distinguished from Spotti. 

When Appellant’s SUV hit Ms. Davis’ car, the impact was so violent she lost 

control of her vehicle. Despite her best efforts to avoid striking the 

pedestrians, she was unable to do so. Appellant’s action of hitting Ms. Davis’ 

car was the direct and substantive cause of the chain of events that led to 

her striking the pedestrians. Ms. Davis’ driving was far from the sole cause 

of the pedestrian’s injuries. Moreover, another accident was a natural, 

probable, and foreseeable consequence of Appellant’s attempt to make a Uturn into a heavily trafficked two-lane road. Hence, we reject Appellant’s 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judge Wecht Concurs in the Result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/8/2014