NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 16-2710 

___________ 

DOMENIC TRICOME, 

 Appellant 

v. 

EBAY, INC.; BARACK OBAMA 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-05614) 

District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

March 22, 2017 

Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: March 23, 2017) 

___________ 

OPINION*

___________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Domenic Tricome appeals from a District Court order dismissing his complaint for 

lack of prosecution. We will affirm. 

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

I. 

 On October 7, 2015, Domenic Tricome filed a complaint in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania alleging antitrust and contract claims. The District Court directed the Clerk 

of that court to place the matter in suspense, pending Tricome’s submission of a complete 

copy of the complaint, noting that several pages were missing. After Tricome failed to 

file a complete complaint, the District Court again ordered Tricome to file a complete 

copy of his complaint and warned that if he failed to comply, his complaint would be 

subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute. Tricome failed to comply with this order and 

the District Court dismissed Tricome’s complaint without prejudice for failure to 

prosecute. Tricome appeals. 

 II. 

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although an order dismissing 

a complaint without prejudice typically is not final under § 1291, this Court has 

jurisdiction where the defect in the complaint cannot be cured. See Borelli v. City of 

Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). A dismissal without 

prejudice is final for purposes of § 1291 if the statute of limitations had expired by the 

time of the court’s order. Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1156 (3d Cir. 

1986). Although it is difficult to discern Tricome’s exact claims, it appears that a four 

year statute of limitations applied. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5525 (setting out a four year 

statute of limitations for contract actions in Pennsylvania); see 15 U.S.C. § 15b 

(providing a four year statute of limitations for antitrust damage actions). In his 
3 

complaint, Tricome alleged that his claims arose on May 7, 2007.1

 Accordingly, 

Tricome’s claims are effectively barred as the statute of limitations had run at the time of 

the District Court’s dismissal. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the District Court’s 

order is final within the meaning of § 1291. 

III. 

 A district court has the authority to dismiss a suit sua sponte for failure to 

prosecute by virtue of its inherent powers and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(b). See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Donnelly v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 340-41 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that a district court 

may sua sponte dismiss for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with court orders). 

We review a District Court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Rule 41(b) for an 

abuse of discretion. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011). Ordinarily a 

district court is required to consider and balance six factors enumerated in Poulis v. State 

Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), when deciding, sua sponte, to 

use dismissal as a sanction. Id. When a litigant’s conduct makes adjudication of the case 

impossible, however, such balancing under Poulis is unnecessary. See Guyer v. Beard, 

907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that dismissal of a habeas petition was 

proper where the petitioner’s behavior was “contumacious” and “made adjudication of 

the case impossible.”); see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994) 

 

1

 Tricome’s complaint also stated that the Supreme Court of the United States denied his 

petition for certiorari on October 7, 2013. There is no basis to believe that Tricome’s 

antitrust and contract claims arose on the date the Supreme Court denied a petition for 

certiorari. 
4 

(finding sua sponte dismissal appropriate where the plaintiff willfully refused to 

prosecute her case). Tricome’s complaint provided no basis for an opposing party to 

respond, as it referred to “page 6” of the complaint for a detailing of the claim, but “page 

6” was not filed as part of the complaint. The complaint as filed failed to present any 

clear articulation of actionable conduct by the defendants, injuries sustained by Tricome, 

or relief requested. Tricome failed to correct the defect in his complaint that was pointed 

out in two explicit orders of the District Court, and he clearly was advised that he faced 

dismissal of his complaint if he failed to submit a complete copy it. Tricome’s failure to 

file a complete complaint in the nearly seven months provided by the District Court made 

adjudication of his case impossible. See Guyer, 907 F.2d 1430. Under the 

circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Tricome’s 

complaint. 

IV. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.