13

- 1698

- cv

Watson v. Qiu

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT



## SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and

this Court ’ s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Fed eral Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “ summary order ” ). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by

counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, he ld at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square , in the City of New York, on the 5 th
day of February , two thousand fourteen

.

PRESENT: J OSÉ A. C ABRANES

,

D EBRA A NN L IVINGSTON

, S USAN L. C ARNEY

,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

R OBERT R. W

ATSON

,

Plaintiff

- Appellant

,

v. No

. 13

- 1698

- cv

O LIVER H. Q IU

, B RETZ & C OVEN

, LLP

,

Defendant s

- Appellees

.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF

- APPELLANT : Robert R. Watson

, pro se , Manchester, Jamaica

.

FOR DEFENDANT S

- APPELLEE S : Barry Jacobs and Shari Sckolnick, Abrams, Gorelick, Friedman & Jacobson LLP

, New
York, NY.2

Appeal from the March 1 9, 2013 judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York ( George B. Daniels

, J udge ).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the District C ourt ’s judgment is AFFIRMED

.

Plaintiff

- Appellant Robert R. Watson (“Watson”)

, proceeding pro se , appeals from the

District C ourt’s judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to

affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

constru ing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d
147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to
be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. We read pro se complaints liberally with

“special solicitude” and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that [they] suggest[ ].” Hill v.

Curcione , 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).

Here , an independent review of the record and rele vant case law reveals that the District

C ourt pr operly dismissed Watson’s claim against the defendants for legal malpractice

. With regard
to Watson’s argument that the defendants should have filed a timely seventh motion to reopen the

deportation proceedings with the Board of Immigration Appeals (th e “Board”) , w e likewise affirm

, substantially for the reasons as stated by the District Court

— n amely, Watson did not plausibly allege

that the outcome of his deportation proceedings would have been any different had the defendants

timely filed a seventh successive motion to reopen on the same grounds already rejected by the

Board

.

Watson also advances the argument that the defendants were negligent in failing to file an

application for an adjustment of sta tus

. S uch an application , however, first require d the Board to

reopen his proceedings , inasmuch as jurisdiction had vested with the Board (the Board having ruled3

on W atson ’s appeal as well as on six prior motions to reopen)

. S ee 8 C.F.R. § § 1003.2(a),

1003.23(b)(1). Because the Board was not incli ned to grant such relief , this argument similarly fails

. Watson responds that the Board would have been re quired to reopen his proceedings because every adjustment application must be fully adjudicated ; however, t here is no support for this contention

. See , e.g.
, Matter of Yauri

, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 112 (BIA 2009) ( denying an untimely motion to reopen to pursue an applic ation for adjustment of status).

We have considered all of Watson’s arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the March 19, 2013 judgment of the District C ourt.

FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk