UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DANIEL LUNA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. David A. Faber, 

Senior District Judge. (7:12-cr-00037-FA-5)

Submitted: November 17, 2015 Decided: December 17, 2015

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph L. Bell, Jr., BATTS, BATTS & BELL, LLP, Rocky Mount, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Phillip 

Anthony Rubin, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Daniel Luna pled 

guilty to: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and 

carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence;

conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to 

distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine; and kidnapping. 

He received an aggregate sentence of 280 months. Luna appeals, 

contending that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.

The United States moves to dismiss the appeal based on a 

waiver-of-appellate-rights provision in Luna’s plea agreement. 

Luna opposes the motion, claiming that the waiver is invalidated 

by the United States’ alleged breach of the agreement. We grant 

the motion to dismiss the appeal.

I

Luna contends that the Government breached its promise in 

the plea agreement to inform the court at sentencing of the 

“full extent” of his cooperation with authorities. Because Luna 

did not raise this claim before the district court, our review 

is for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 

133-34 (2009). To prevail under this standard, Luna must 

demonstrate “that an error occurred, that the error was plain, 

and that the error affected his substantial rights.” United 

States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007).
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We conclude that there was no error in the Government’s 

conduct. At sentencing, the Government described Luna’s 

cooperation to the court. After Luna’s attorney objected that 

the Government had not described the full value of Luna’s 

cooperation, there was extensive discussion about the nature and 

effect of his cooperation. Under these circumstances, we find 

that the Government fulfilled its obligation under the plea 

agreement and that there was no breach. See United States v. 

Godwin, 189 F. App’x 277, 279 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-4987).

II

Given the lack of a breach by the Government, we next 

consider whether Luna knowingly and intelligently waived his 

right to appeal and whether the issue raised on appeal falls 

within the scope of the waiver. See United States v. Blick, 408 

F.3d 162, 168-69 (4th Cir. 2005). To decide whether the waiver 

was knowing and intelligent, we consider “the totality of the 

circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the 

accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and 

familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” United 

States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Other factors we consider are whether 

the waiver language in the plea agreement was “unambiguous” and 

“plainly embodied,” and whether the district court fully 
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questioned the defendant during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy 

regarding the waiver. Id. at 400-401. Generally, if the 

district court specifically asked the defendant about the waiver 

or the record otherwise indicates that the defendant understood 

the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid. 

United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). 

Whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal “is a 

matter of law that we review de novo.” United States v. 

Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010).

Luna was twenty years old when he entered his plea. He had 

an eleventh-grade education, had not been treated for mental 

illness or addiction within the prior two years and was not 

presently under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The waiver 

provision was set forth clearly in a separate paragraph of the 

plea agreement, which Luna signed. Further, the Government 

summarized the plea agreement — including the waiver provision —

at the Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 proceeding. Luna assured the court 

that the summary was accurate, he had carefully read the 

agreement and discussed it with his attorney, and he understood 

everything in the agreement. Finally, the district court 

inquired during the plea colloquy whether Luna understood that 

the plea agreement limited his appellate rights, and Luna 

replied that he did. We conclude that the waiver is valid and 

enforceable. Further, the issue Luna raises on appeal — whether 
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his sentence is substantively unreasonable — falls squarely 

within the scope of the appellate waiver.

III

Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED