HAROLD I_. BRODE 

DNA 6325F 

OPERATIONS 

ANVIL, CRESSET, TINDERBOX, AND GUARDIAN 

EVENTS 

HUSKY PUP, MIGHTY EPIC, HYBLA GOLD, 

DIABLO HAWK, HURON KING, and MINERS IRON 

24 October 1975 - 31 October 1980 

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies 

and their contractors; Critical Technology, 23 January 

1989. Other requests for this document shall be referred 

to Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC 

20305-1000. 

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is 

restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Section 

2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 

Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq. Violations of these export laws are 

subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with 

provisions of DOD Directive 5230.25. 

United States Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Prepared by Defense Nuclear Agency 
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: 

FOR CLASSIFIED documents, follow the procedures 

in DOD 5200.22-M, Industrial Security Manual, 

Section II-1 9. 

FOR UNCLASSIFIED, limited documents, destroy by 

any method that will prevent disclosure of contents 

or reconstruction of the document. 

Retention of this document by DOD contractors is 

authorized in accordance with DOD 5220.22-M, 

Industrial Security Manual. 

PLEASE NOTIFY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, 

AT-TN: CSTI, WASHINGTON, DC 20305-1000, IF 

YOUR ADDRESS IS INCORRECT, IF YOU WISH IT 

DELETED FROM THE DISTRIBUTION LIST, OR IF THE 

ADDRESSEE IS NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY YOUR 

ORGANIZATION. 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Oc THIS PAGE 

I 

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 

la REPORT SECdR’-Y C_ASSI;,CAT,ON 1 b RES~%CllVE QIARK hGS 

UNCLASSIFIED 

,?a SECl,AITY CLASS,F>CA:lOhl AuTtiORiT” 

N/A since Unclassified 

2~ DECLASS!FICA-‘ON DGWkGGAD’NG SCHEDULE 

N/A since Unclassified 

4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REP097 NUMBER(S) 

3 DlSTRIELJT’Oq /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT 

Distribution nuthorized to IJ.S. Government 

agencies and their contr,lctors; Critical 

S MCNITOR’hG ORGANlZAT’ON REPORT YUMBER;S) 

6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYQlBOL 7d NAME OF MO’rllTORlNG ORGANIZAT’ON 

Reynolds Electrical and (!f appkable) Joe A. Stinson 

Engineering Co., Inc. UNTPR Program Mandqer 

6c ADDRESS iOry. State, and ZIPCode) 7b ADDRESS (Cdry, State and ZIPCodeJ 

I P-0. Box 98521 I 3300 Embudito Drive NE 

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8521 Albuquerque, NM 87111 

Ba NAME OF cUN31”UG SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9 ?ROCLRE%IENT NS-R,.“vlELT ‘DENTIFICA~IO’~: **uYBER 

ORGANIZATION (If apphcable) 

8c ADDRESS (City, State. and ZIP Codef 10 SO~JRCE OF ;~?.rSlhG IruMBERS 

PROGRAM PROJECT TASK NORK LYIT 

ELEMENT NO WO NO ACCESSION ‘~0 

1 1 TITLE (/nc/ude Securrfy c~aSSlf!cJrlOn) 

OPk3ATIONS ANVIL, CRESSET, TINDERBOX, AND GUARDIAN: Events Ilusky Pup, Mighty Epic, Ilybl‘l 

l:old. ni;ghlo H,,wk. F111rr,n Kina. ,?nd Miners Trnn. 34 Ortobc?r 1975 - 31 October 1980 

Brady, William J.; Eubank, Bernard; McDowell, Elizabeth; Stinson, Joe A. 

13a TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 PAGE Cc)uNT 

Technical FROM m 

16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

17 COSAT! CODES ~~ 

FIELD [ GROUP 1 SUE~GROuP 

18 ! 3 ! 

18 S&lECmMm(~on%i on reverse rf nezqandrdentrfy & block number) 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review (UNTPR) 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) 

G I 18 I Nev<lda Test Site (NTS) 

t9 AaSTRACT <Confrnue on reverse !f necessary and Idenrr* by block numberl 

This report is il personnel-oriented hIstory of DOD p,irticipatic)n in underground nucle‘ir 

weapclns testing during OPERATIONS ANVIL,, CRESSl:T, TINDERBOX, <ind GUARDIAN: Events llusky 

PUP, Mighty Epic, Ifybla Cold, Di,iblo Il;lwk, lluron King, and Miners Iron, 24 October 1975 to 

31 October 1980. It is the sixth in ‘1 series of historic,11 reports which will include all 

DOD underground nuclear test participation from 1902 forward. In ;Iddition to these illstoric;il reports, d restricted distribution report_ will itlentify all DOD clnd DOD .Iffili.ltccl 

partlclpants, military, civilian, ‘lnd DOD contractors, ,Ind will list their individu‘il 

radiation dose data. 

20 DISTRIBUTION ;AVAlLABILITY OF ABSTRPCT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

Cl UNCLASSIFIED~J~LIMITED Q SAME ~5 OPT 0 DT’C USERS 

ZZa NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 

Joe A. Stinson 1 (505) 294-7941 1 

10 Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous edIttons are obsolete SECURITY CLASSIFICAT’ON OF TH’S PAGE 

i UNCL>ASSIFIED 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

3. 

18. 

DlS'I'RIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OE' REPORT (Contiliued) 

Technology, 23 January 1989. Other requests for this document shall be referred 

to Director, Defense Nuclear Aqency, Washington, DC 20305-1000. 

SUBJECT TERMS (Continued) 

Underground Test (UGT) GUARDIAN 

ANVIL IIUSKY PUP 

CRESSCT MIGHTY EPIC 

TINDERBOX HYB1.A GOLD 

DIABLO HAWK 

IIURON KING 

MINERS IRON 

SECURITY ClaSSlFlCATloNoF~THls~AGE 

ii UNCIASGIFI!:D 
Six Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored underground test 

events were conducted from 24 October 1975 through 31 October 

1980 to study weapons effects. Five were tunnel-type nuclear 

tests, and one was a vertical shaft-type test. The following 

table summarizes data on these events: 

OPERATION ANVIL CRESSET 

Tl&R- GyA%RDTEST EVENT 

HUp;y MIGHlY HYBLA DIABLO HURON MNE;S 

EPIC GOLD HAWK KING 

DATE 24 Oct75 12May76 1 Nov77 13 Sep 78 24 Jun 80 31 Ott 80 

LOCAL TIME 1011 PDT 1250 PDT 1005 PST 0815 PDT 0810 PDT 1000 PST 

(hours) 

NTS LOCATION u12t.03 U12n.10 U12e.20 U12n.lOa Udky U12n.11 

TYPE Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Shaft Tunnel 

DEPTH (FEET) 1,142 1,306 1,263 1,273 1,050 1,306 

YIELD* LOW Low Low Low Low LOW 

*LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 

iii 
No release of radioactive effluent was detected onsite or 

offsite after any test event discussed in this volume. 

As recorded on Area Access Registers, 1,723 individual entries to radiation exclusion (radex) areas were made after the 

above DOD test events. Of this number 346 were by DOD-affiliated 

personnel (including military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor). 

The remainder were made by United States Energy Research and 

Development Administration (ERDA)*, other government agency, and 

other contractor personnel. 

The average gamma radiation exposure per entry for all participants was 3 milliroentgen (mR). The average gamma radiation 

exposure per entry for DOD-affiliated participants was 4 mR. The 

maximum exposure of a non-DOD participant during an entry was 140 

mR. The maximum exposure of a DOD-affiliated participant was 90 

mR. These maximum exposures occurred during the MINERS IRON 

event. 

*The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) 

succeeded the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on 19 

January 1975. ERDA in turn was succeeded by the U. S. Department 

of Energy on 1 October 1977. 

iv 
PREFACE 

The United States Government conducted 194 nuclear device 

tests from 1945 through 1958 during atmospheric test series at 

sites in the United States and in the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. The U.S. Army's Manhattan Engineer District (MED) implemented the testing program in 1945, and its successor agency, 

the AEC, administered the program from 1947 until testing was 

suspended by the United States on 1 November 1958. 

Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for 

weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An additional 24 nuclear experiments were conducted 

from December 1954 to February 1956 in Nevada. These experiments 

were physics studies using small quantities of fissionable material and conventional explosives. 

President Eisenhower had proposed that test ban negotiations 

begin on 31 October 1958, and had pledged a one-year moratorium 

on United States testing to commence after the negotiations 

began. The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests 

began at Geneva on 31 October 1958, the U.S. moratorium began on 

1 November, and the AEC detected the final Soviet nuclear test of 

their fall series on 3 November 1958. Negotiations continued until May 1960 without final agreement. No nuclear tests were conducted by either nation until 1 September 1961 when the Soviet 

Union resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The United 

States began a series of underground tests in Nevada on 15 September 1961, and U.S. atmospheric tests were resumed on 25 April 

1962 in the Pacific. 

The United States conducted four atmospheric tests in Nevada 

during July 1962, and the last U.S. atmospheric nuclear test was 

in the Pacific on 4 November 1962. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 

which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and 

underwater, was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963. From 

resumption of United States atmospheric testing on 25 April 1962 

until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 weapons 

V 
related and weapons effects tests were conducted as part of the 

Pacific and Nevada atmospheric test operations. The underground 

tests, resumed on 15 September 1961, have continued on a 

year-round basis through the present time. 

In 1977, 15 years after atmospheric testing stopped, the 

Center for Disease Control (CDC)* noted a possible leukemia 

cluster within the group of soldiers who were at the Nevada Test 

Site during SMOKY event, one of the Nevada tests in the 1957 

PLUMBBOB series. After that CDC report, the Veterans 

Administration (VA) received a number of claims for medical 

benefits filed by former military personnel who believed their 

health may have been affected by their participation in the 

nuclear weapons testing program. 

In late 1977, the DOD began a study to provide data for both 

the CDC and the VA on radiation exposures of DOD military and 

civilian participants in atmospheric testing. That study has 

progressed to the point where a number of volumes describing DOD 

participation in atmospheric tests have been published by the 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) as the Executive Agent for the DOD. 

On 20 June 1979, the United States Senate Committee on 

Veterans' Affairs began hearings on Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing. In addition to requesting and receiving information on DOD personnel participation and 

radiation exposures during atmospheric testing, the Chairman of 

the Senate Committee expressed concern regarding exposures of DOD 

participants in DOD-sponsored and Department of Energy (DOE) 

underground test events. 

The Chairman requested and received information from the 

Director, DNA, in an exchange of letters through 15 October 1979 

*The Center for Disease Control was part of the U.S. Department 

of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services). It was renamed The Centers for Disease Control on 1 October 1980. 

vi 
regarding research on underground testing radiation exposures. In 

early 1980, the DNA initiated a program to acquire and consolidate underground testing radiation exposure data in a set of published volumes similar to the program then under way on 

atmospheric testing data. This volume is the sixth of several 

volumes regarding participation and radiation exposures of DOD 

military and civilian participants in underground nuclear test 

events. 

SERIES OF VOLUMES. 

Most volumes in this series discuss DOD-sponsored underground test events, in chronological order, after presenting introductory and general information. These volumes cover all 

except one category of underground test events identified as DODsponsored in Announced United States Nuclear Tests, published 

each year by the DOE Nevada Operations Office, Office of Public 

Affairs. The category of events not covered includes events 

conducted as nuclear test detection experiments in a program 

named VELA-UNIFORM. Generally, reentries after these tests were 

not performed, so significant exposure of participants to radiation did not occur. 

A later volume will discuss general participation of DOD 

personnel in DOE - sponsored* underground test events, with 

*On 19 January 1975, just before the detonation of the first 

event covered by this volume, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 

was reorganized and part of it became the Energy Research 

Development Administration (ERDA). During the time period 

encompassed by this volume, ERDA became the Department of Energy 

(DOE). For readability and ease of understanding, Chapters 1 and 

2 of this volume will use the acronym "DOE" to discuss the 

general responsibilities and procedures applicable to DOE and 

each of its predecessor agencies. Any activity which is tied to 

a specific time period will be discussed using the acronym of the 

agency in control during that peL*iod (i.e., safety experiments 

were conducted only during the era of the AEC). 

vii 
specific information on those events which released radioactive 

effluent to the atmosphere and where exposures of DOD personnel 

were involved. 

A separate set of volumes (comprising one report) is a 

census of DOD personnel and their radiation exposure data. 

Distribution of this volume is limited by provisions of the 

Privacy Act. 

METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THE VOLUMES. 

Information for these volumes was obtained from several 

locations. Security-classified documents were researched at 

Headquarters, DNA, Washington, D.C. Add!_tional documents were 

researched at Field Command, DNA, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory Technical Library, and Sandia National Laboratories in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. Most of the radiation measurement data 

were obtained at the DOE, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), and 

its support contractor, the Reynolds Electrical & Engineering 

Company, Inc. (REECo), in Las Vegas, Nevada. 

Unclassified records were used to document underground testing activities when possible, but, when necessary, unclassified 

information was extracted from security-classified documents. 

Both unclassified and classified documents are cited in the List 

of References at the end of each volume. Locations of the reference documents also are shown. Copies of most of the unclassified references have been entered in the records of the Coordination and Information Center (CIC), a DOE facility located in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

Radiation measurements, exposure data, event data, and offsite reports generally are maintained in hard copy or microfilm 

form at the REECo facilities adjacent to the CIC or as original 

documents at the Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna 

Niguel, California. The Master File of all available personnel 

exposure data for nuclear testing programs on the continent and 

in the Pacific from 1945 to the present is maintained by REECo 

for DOD and DOE. 

viii 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME. 

A summary of this test event volume appears before this 

preface and includes general objectives of the test events, 

characteristics of each test event, and data regarding DOD 

participants and their radiation exposures. 

Section 1, "Introduction" , following this Preface and the 

Table of Contents discusses the historical background, 

underground testing objectives, DOD and DOE organizational 

responsibilities, and locations of NTS underground tesitng areas. 

A section entitled "Underground Testing Procedures" explains 

the basic mechanics of underground testing, including containment 

problems and procedures, emplacement types, diagnostic 

techniques, the purpose of effects experiments, tunnel and 

drilling area access requirements, industrial safety 

considerations, radiological safety procedures, telemetered 

measurements of radiation levels, and air support requirements. 

A section on each test event covered by this volume follows 

in chronological order. Each test event section contains an 

event summary, a discussion of preparations and event operations, 

an explanation of safety procedures implemented, and listings of 

monitoring, sampling, and exposure results. 

A reference list and appendices to the text, including a 

glossary of terms and a list of abbreviations and acronyms, 

follow the event chapters. 

ix 
X 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section 

SUMMARY........ 

PREFACE. . . . . . . . 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 

. 

LIST OF TABLES . . . . 

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

1.1 Historical Background 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

1.2 Underground Testing Objectives 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

1.3 DOD Testing Organizations and Responsibilities 

1.4 DOE Organizations, Contractors, and 

Responsibilities .............. 

1.5 The Nevada Test Site ............ 

2 UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES .......... 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6 

2.7 

2.8 

2.9 

Containment Problems and Procedures . . . . . 

Emplacement Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Diagnostic Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Effects Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tunnel and Drilling Area Access Requirements 

Industrial Safety Considerations . . . . . . 

Radiological Safety Procedures . . . 

Telemetered Measurements of Radiation Levels 

Air Support Requirements 

3 HUSKY PUP EVENT. . . . . . . . 

3.1 Event Summary . . . . . . 

3.2 Preevent Activities . . . 

3.3 Event-day Activities . . 

3.4 Postevent Activities . . 

3.5 Results and Conclusions . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

. 

Page 

iii 

V 

xiv 

xvi 

1 

1 

2 

3 

13 

21 

26 

26 

38 

45 

46 

47 

51 

54 

60 

66 

69 

69 

69 

79 

82 

89 

xi 
Section 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

Page 

4 MIGHTY EPIC EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 

4.1 EventSummary ................... 91 

4.2 Preevent Activities ................ 91 

4.3 Event-day Activities. ............... 101 

4.4 Postevent Activities ............... 103 

4.5 Results and Conclusions .............. 114 

5 HYBLA GOLD EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 

5.1 Event summary ................... 116 

5.2 Preevent Activities ................ 116 

5.3 Event-day Activities ............... 128 

5.4 Postevent Activities ............... 129 

5.5 Results and Conclusions .............. 140 

6 DIABLO HAWK EVENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 

6.1 Event Summary ................... 142 

6.2 Preevent Activities ................ 142 

6.3 Event-day Activities ............... 154 

6.4 Postevent Activities ............... 156 

6.5 Results and Conclusions .............. 169 

7 HURON KING EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 

7.1 Event Summary ................... 171 

7.2 Preevent Activities ................ 171 

7.3 Event-day Activities ............... 184 

7.4 Postevent Activities ............... 189 

7.5 Results and Conclusions ............... 191 

8 MINERS IRON EVENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 

8.1 Event Summary ................... 193 

8.2 Preevent Activities ................ 193 

xii 
Section 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 

Page 

8.3 Event-day Activities ............... 204 

8.4 Postevent Activities ............... 206 

8.5 Results and Conclusions .............. 213 

9 LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 

APPENDICES 

A Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 

B Abbreviations and Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 

C General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department 

of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Nuclear Tests. . . 255 

D U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0524 - Radiological Safety. . . . 269 

E U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0101 - The Nevada Test Site 

Organization (NTSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 

xiii 
Figure 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6 

2.7 

2.8 

2.9 

3.1 

3.2 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

5.1 

5.2 

5.3 

5.4 

5.5 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Federal Government Structure for Continental 

Nuclear Tests .................... 

Partial Organization Chart of Field Command, 

Defense Nuclear Agency. ............... 

Nevada Test Site Organization ............ 

Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada ...... 

The Nevada Test Site ................ 

A Typical Subsidence Crater ............. 

Vertical LOS Pipe Configuration ........... 

Horizontal LOS Pipe Configuration .......... 

Portal of a Typical DOD Tunnel Complex ....... 

NTS Combination Personnel Dosimeter and Security 

Credential Holder .................. 

Neher-White RAMS Probe ............... 

RAMS Readout Console ................ 

Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site ....... 

Typical Permanently-Established Remote Radiation 

Detector Stations Operated Continuously Throughout 

theNTS ....................... 

HTJSKY PUP Event - Tunnel Layout ........... 

HUSKY PUP Event - System Configuration. ....... 

HUSKY PUP Event - Surface RAMS. ........... 

HUSKY PUP Event - Underground RAMS. ......... 

Aerial View of the U12t Portal and Mesa Areas .... 

MIGHTY EPIC Event - Tunnel Layout .......... 

MIGHTY EPIC Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout. ..... 

MIGHTY EPIC Event - Surface RAMS. .......... 

MIGHTY EPIC Event - Underground RAMS. ........ 

MIGHTY EPIC Event - Postevent Reentry Mining and 

Coring Locations. .................. 

HYBLA GOLD Event - Tunnel Layout. .......... 

HYBLA GOLD Event - Experiment Pipes ......... 

HYBLA GOLD Event - Drift Plan ............ 

HYBLA GOLD Event - Surface RAMS ........... 

HYBLA GOLD Event - Underground RAMS ......... 

Page 

4 

8 

17 

22 

23 

41 

42 

44 

53 

57 

62 

63 

64 

65 

70 

72 

77 

78 

81 

92 

95 

99 

100 

110 

117 

119 

120 

126 

127 

xiv 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Concluded) 

Figure 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

6.4 

6.5 

6.6 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

7.4 

7.5 

7.6 

7.7 

7.8 

8.1 

8.2 

8.3 

8.4 

8.5 

Page 

DIABLO HAWK Event - Tunnel Layout .......... 143 

DIABLO HAWK Event - Preevent Mining ......... 146 

DIABLO HAWK Event - Structure Experiments ...... 147 

DIABLO HAWK Event - Surface RAMS. .......... 152 

DIABLO HAWK Event - Underground RAMS. ........ 153 

DIABLO HAWK Event - Reentry Mining. ......... 161 

HURON KING Event - VLOS Pipe System ......... 174 

HURON KING Event - Major Components of the 

Experiment Tank Prior to Assembly .......... 175 

HURON KING Event - Experiment Tank Positioned 

Over the VLOS Pipe System .............. 176 

HURON KING Event - Aerial View of U3ky Prior to 

Device Detonation .................. 177 

HURON KING Event - Front and Left Side of STARSAT 179 

HURON KING Event - Surface RAMS and M-102 Units ... 183 

HURON KING Event - Experiment Tank 

Postevent Position. ................. 186 

HURON KING Event - Subsidence Crater. ........ 187 

MINERS IRON Event - Tunnel Layout .......... 194 

MINERS IRON Event - OBP Before Concrete Pour. .... 196 

MINERS IRON Event - Tunnel and Pipe Layout. ..... 197 

MINERS IRON Event - Surface RAMS. .......... 202 

MINERS IRON Event - Underground RAMS. ........ 203 

xv 
Table 

LIST OF TABLES 

Page 

2.1 DOD Test Events - 24 October 1975 through 

31 October 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

3.1 HUSKY PUP Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . . . 75 

4.1 MIGHTY EPIC Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . . 97 

5.1 HYBLA GOLD Event RAMS Unit Locations. . . . . . . . . 124 

6.1 DIABLO HAWK Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . . 150 

6.2 DIABLO HAWK Reentry Drift Radiation Summary . . . . . 162 

7.1 HURON KING Event RAMS and M-102 Unit Locations . . . 182 

8.1 MINERS IRON Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . . 200 

xvi 
SECTION 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The first United States nuclear detonation designed to be 

fully contained underground was the RAINIER tunnel event conducted by the University of California Radiation Laboratory 

(UCRL) for the AEC in Nevada on 19 September 1957. This was a 

weapons-related experiment with a relatively low yield of 1.7 

kilotons (kt). The second tunnel event with a significant 

nuclear yield was a safety experiment on 22 February 1958, also 

conducted in Nevada by UCRL for the AEC. This experiment, the 

VENUS event, resulted in a yield of less than one ton. These two 

tunnel events and five additional underground safety experiments 

with zero or only slight yields were the beginning of the United 

States underground nuclear testing program, currently the only 

type of nuclear detonation testing permitted by treaty. The 

first DOD-sponsored underground nuclear weapons effects test was 

the 5.7 kt HARD HAT event conducted by the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA) on 15 February 1962 in Nevada. 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. 

While technical conferences between the United States and 

the Soviet Union on banning nuclear detonation tests continued, 

and concern regarding further increases in worldwide fallout 

mounted, a number of nuclear tests were conducted underground 

during 1958 in Nevada. Prior to the United States testing moratorium, six safety experiments in shafts, five safety experiments 

in tunnels, and four weapons-related tests in tunnels were 

conducted by user laboratories. Radioactive products from several of these tests were not completely contained underground. 

Containment of nuclear detonations was a new engineering challenge. Understanding and solving the majority of containment 

problems would require years of underground testing experience. 

When the United States resumed testing on 15 September 1961, 

the first 32 test events were underground, including a cratering 

1 
experiment with the device emplaced 110 feet below the surface. 

The DOMINIC I test series in the Pacific and the DOMINIC II test 

series in Nevada (also called Operation SUNBEAM by DOD) during 

1962 were the last atmospheric nuclear detonation tests by the 

United States. 

The commitment of the United States to reduce levels of 

worldwide fallout by refraining from conducting nuclear tests in 

the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater was finalized when 

the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 

5 August 1963. On 31 March 1976, the Soviet Union and the United 

States agreed to limit the maximum yield of underground tests to 

150 kt. Currently, yields are reported as within a particular 

range; less than 20 kt, less than 150 kt, or 20 to 150 kt. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES. 

The majority of United States underground tests have been 

for weapons-related purposes. New designs were tested to improve 

efficiency and deliverability characteristics of nuclear explosive devices before they entered the military stockpile as components of nuclear weapons. 

In addition to weapons-related tests, safety experiments 

with nuclear devices also were conducted by user laboratories. 

These experiments tested nuclear devices by simulating nuclear 

detonation using conventional high explosives in a manner which 

might occur in an accident during transportation or storage of 

weapons. 

Weapons effects tests sponsored by the DOD were conducted to 

determine the vulnerability or survivability of military systems 

or components when exposed to one or more effects of a nuclear 

detonation. The nuclear devices for these tests were provided by 

the DOE weapons development laboratories and were designed to be 

similar to the nuclear components used in nuclear weapons. 

Actual weapon configurations were used in a few test events. 

Military systems, structures, materials, electronics experiments, 

and other related experiments were provided by DOD and DOE 

2 
agencies. Many of these tests were very complex and involved 

greater numbers of participants than other categories of tests 

previously mentioned. Personnel from DNA, other government 

organizations, user laboratories and contractors, and DOD 

contractor agencies were involved. 

Some tests were designed to study the response of hardened 

structures or geologic formations to shock waves generated by 

nuclear 'detonations. Many tests were designed to study the 

response of military components to effects of radiation produced 

bY nuclear weapons. Such tests required a direct line of sight 

between the nuclear device and the experiments. Many of the radiation effects tests required the simulation of high altitude (up 

to exoatmospheric) conditions. These tests involved installation 

of experiments inside large steel line-of-sight (LOS) pipes, 

hundreds of feet in length, with maximum diameters of several 

feet. Large vacuum pumps were utilized to reduce pressure inside 

the pipes to the desired level. 

DOD weapons effects tests HUSKY PUP, 24 October 1975, 

through MINERS IRON, 31 October 1980, conducted during Operations 

Anvil, Cresset, Tinderbox, and Guardian are discussed in this 

volume. 

1.3 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 

Administering the underground nuclear testing program was a 

joint DOE-DOD responsibility. The similar nature of the DOE-DOD 

organizational structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 

1.3.1 Defense Nuclear Agency. 

Headquarters of DNA is located near Washington, D.C., and is 

composed of personnel from each of the Armed Services and 

civilian DOD employees. It was originally established as the 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) to assume residual 

functions of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), through 

issuance of a joint Army-Navy memorandum, dated 29 January 1947, 

which was retroactive to 1 January 1947 (when the Atomic Energy 

3 
i 

PRESIDENT 

DOE 

GENERAL 

MANAGER 

DIRECTOR, 

COh4MITIEE 

I 1 

I 

JOINT 

CHIEFS 

OF 

STAFF 

OFFICEOF 

MILITARY 

t 

-w--- DIRECTOR, 

APPLICATION DNA 

1 I 

I 

MANAGER, 

NEVADAOPERATIONS 

OFFICE 1 

I 

FIELD 

--- --ICOMMAND, 

DNA 

1 I 

I 

t 

I 

DOETEST 

CONTROLLER - - 

I 

COMMAND 

---- LIAISONAND 

COORDINATION 

Figure 1.1 Federal government structure for continental 

nuclear tests (1977). 

4 
Commission was activated). The responsibility for DOD nuclear 

weapons effects testing was assigned to AFSWP. The National 

Security Act of 1947 had become law when the Secretary of Defense 

issued a memorandum on 21 October 1947 to the three Service 

Secretaries confirming the previous directive of 29 January, and 

thus, AFSWP officially represented all of the services. AFSWP 

was charged with providing nuclear weapons support to the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force. As originally chartered, AFSWP was directly 

responsible to each of the three Service Chiefs. In 1951, the 

Air Force Special Weapons Center (AFSWC) located at Kirtland Air 

Force Base (KAFB), Albuquerque, New Mexico, was assigned by DOD 

the responsibility to provide specific support to the AEC for 

continental nuclear testing (see Section 1.3.2). This command 

was not directly related to AFSWP; however, the two organizations 

coordinated several support tasks. 

BY issuance of General Order No. 2, Headquarters, DASA 

(HQ/DASA), dated 6 May 1959, AFSWP became DASA. Under its new 

charter, DASA was responsible to the Secretary of Defense through 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

DASA's five major areas of responsibility for the DOD 

included: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

Staff assistance to the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Research in weapons effects. 

Atomic tests. 

Weapons-related tests. 

Assistance to the Services. 

Responsibilities of HQ/DASA, included providing consolidated 

management and direction for the DOD nuclear weapons effects 

testing programs, while technical direction and management of 

field operations of DOD nuclear weapons effects testing 

5 
activities were delegated to Field Command, DASA (FC/DASA), 

located at Sandia Base (now KAFB) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

From 6 May 1959 until 1 July 1964 the Weapons Effects Tests Group 

(WETG) of FC/DASA was responsible for nuclear weapons effects 

testing and seismic detection research (VELA-UNIFORM) for the 

Director, DASA. This organization maintained close liaison with 

the AEC/Nevada Operations Office (NVOO). Personnel from FC/DASA 

became the military members of the joint AEC-DOD testing organization at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and at other Continental 

United States test locations. Participation of DOD agencies and 

their contractors in nuclear field tests was coordinated and 

supported by FC/DASA. On 1 July 1964, the testing organization 

in Albuquerque was designated as the Weapons Test Division (WTD), 

a division of HQ/DASA. On 1 August 1966, WTD was changed to Test 

Command (TC/DASA), a separate command under HQ/DASA, but remained 

in Albuquerque. The responsibilities for technical direction and 

management of field operations for nuclear weapons effects tests 

remained in effect during these changes in organization. During 

this period, WTD and TC maintained an engineering and support 

branch (designated Nevada Branch) at the NTS and a liaison office 

at AEC/NVOO. The Nevada Branch maintained liaison with AEC/NVOO 

and supervised FC/DASA activities at NTS. On 12 May 1970, the 

Commander, FC/DASA, assumed additional command of TC/DASA. 

On 29 March 1971 (effective 1 July 1971), the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense directed the reorganization of DASA as a 

result of cutbacks recommended by the "Blue Ribbon Panel" survey 

of agency activities. In his Executive Memorandum, DASA was 

retained as a defense agency under the new title, "Defense 

Nuclear Agency." On 1 July 1971, FC/DASA was redesignated as 

FC/DNA, and TC/DASA became TC/DNA. While the responsibilities 

and manning levels at Field Command were reduced during this 

transition, Test Command remained essentially the same. 

On 1 January 1972, TC/DNA was disestablished and personnel 

were transferred to FC/DNA. The responsibilities for technical 

direction and management of field operations for nuclear weapons 

effects tests were transferred to the newly formed Test 

6 
Directorate (Field Command Test [FCT]), of FC/DNA. The Nevada 

Branch of TC was changed to the Test Construction Division of 

Test Directorate (FCTC), and the responsibility for the liaison 

office at AEC/NVOO was transferred to FCTC. (See Figure 1.2.) 

1.3.2 Air Force Support. 

Until 1 July 1974, AFSWC provided air support to the Nevada 

Test Site Organization (NTSO) during nuclear tests at the NTS. 

Detachment 1 of the 4900th Test Group provided aircraft for 

shuttle service between KAFB, New Mexico, and Indian Springs Air 

Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF) in Nevada. They also provided 

aircraft and crews to perform low-altitude cloud tracking, radio 

relay support, and courier missions. On 1 July 1974, AFSWC'S air 

support responsibility, along with Detachment 1, 4900th Test 

Group, was transferred to the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing (FWW), 

Tactical Air Command, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. AFSWC 

continued to support the Air Force's nuclear research and 

development (R&D) mission until 1 April 1976 when it was 

deactivated. (The nuclear R&D mission was transferred to the Air 

Force Weapons Laboratory [AWFL], KAFB, New Mexico, at this time.) 

Detachment 1 remained at ISAFAF and continued to provide support 

to the NTS; however, personnel, aircraft, equipment, and supplies 

became the responsibility of the FWW. Support was formalized by 

Interservice Support Agreements between the Tactical Fighter 

Weapons Center (as represented by the 57th FWW) and FC/DNA, 

acting as the agent of the Departments of Defense and Energy for 

receiving aeronautical support at NTS. Operations provided by 

Detachment 1 during this period were: 

A. An airborne security inspection of pre-closed areas on 

D-l. 

B. A D-day airborne safety inspection and Test Controller 

standby mission to be flown prior to D-11 hours and to 

cover the downwind area for personnel and livestock 

locations. (The standby portion of this mission was for 

rapid evacuation of personnel and/or reentry of 

scientific personnel, if necessary.) 

7 
DIRECTOR 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

WASHINGTON. DC AREA 

. 

COMMANDER 

FIELD COMMAND. DNA 

KIRTLAND AFE. NM 

INSPECTIONS DIRECTORATE LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE TEST DIRECTORATE PLANS A OPERATIONS PERSONNEL 6 ADMINISTRATION 

KAF0 KAFB KIRTLAND AFB. NM DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE 

m 

KAFB KAFB 

4 c 

----a 

PLANS 4 ANALYSIS 

DIVISION 

KAFB 

I I 

_---- 

v- l 

ENGINEERING TEST CONSTRUCTION TEST OPERATIONS TECHNICAL DIRECTORS 

DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION 

KAFB NEVADA TEST SITE KAFB KAFB 

LIAISON OFFICE 

DOE. NV00 

LAS VEGAS, NV 

Figure 1.2 Partial organization chart of Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (1980). 
C. 

D. 

E. 

F. 

G. 

H. 

A D-day helicopter airborne closed-circuit television 

mission to provide a stable platform for both television 

and color photography coverage of surface ground zero at 

zero time. 

A D-day helicopter cloud surveillance to provide initial 

data for immediate "on-site" decisions regarding 

safeguard actions. (Not to be considered as "cloud 

tracking.") 

Damage survey flights, as required, and other support 

flights as requested by the Test Controller and as 

operationally feasible by the 57th FWW Deputy Commander 

for Operations. 

Normal technical support and laboratory photography 

flights, as required, including surveys of preshot, 

postshot, and new construction areas. 

An airborne security inspection to cover the NTS 

boundary, checking the locked barricades, and looking 

for areas where intruders might have gained access to 

the NTS unobserved. 

Operational orientation tours and management 

surveillance flights as requested by FC/DNA or the 

4900th Test Group. 

1.3.3 DOE-DOD Relationships. 

DOD was responsible for establishing criteria for nuclear 

weapons, developing and producing delivery systems, developing 

nuclear weapons plans and forces, providing defense against 

nuclear attack, and obtaining nuclear weapons effects data 

through DNA. DOE was responsible for research, development, 

production, and supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed Forces in 

quantities and types specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Quantities and types of weapons were described in the Nuclear 

Weapon Stockpile Memorandum, signed jointly by the Secretary of 

9 
Defense and Secretary of Energy or his alternate, and approved by 

the President. DOE in association with DOD, also was responsible 

for providing field nuclear test facilities in the Continental 

United States and on islands in the Pacific. 

The principal points of field coordination between DOE and 

DOD were at the Nevada Operations Office (NV) in Las Vegas and at 

NTS. From the beginning of the DOD underground nuclear weapons 

effects test program (the first test was HARD HAT in February 

1962) through the period covered by this volume, Field Command 

(or Test Command) was the fielding agency for DOD-DNA and served 

as primary point of contact with the Nevada office of the DOE. 

DOE/NV represented DOE in the field for all Continental tests. 

The DOE nuclear weapons development laboratories fielded underground tests as part of the weapons development program; DNA 

fielded underground tests at NTS to obtain weapons effects data. 

Because the NTS was a DOE installation, the Manager, NV, was 

responsible for all operations there. 

For each DOD-sponsored test, HQ/DNA coordinated requirements 

with the military services. Requirements for testing to determine the nuclear vulnerability or hardening of military systems 

or components were submitted by these organizations. As part of 

long-range underground nuclear weapons effects test planning, 

HQ/DNA developed a schedule of specific events designed to 

satisfy military requirements. One or more of the DOD agencies 

were cosponsors and, usually, active participants in each DOD 

underground test. The initial approval of DOD experiments and 

the selection of the nuclear source (device) for each test was 

accomplished at the HQ/DNA level. A request for the appropriate 

nuclear device and associated support was forwarded by HQ/DNA to 

the Director, Division of Military Application, DOE. The DOE assigned one or more of the weapons development laboratories to 

provide the device support. 

Following initial planning, the responsibility for detailed 

planning, engineering, fielding, execution, and reporting was assigned to FC/DNA. Field Command formed a Test Group staff for 

each test. The Technical Director (normally a military officer 

10 
assigned to FC/DNA or AFWL) was appointed by HQ/DNA. The Test 

Group Director and other members of the staff were appointed by 

FC/DNA. The Test Group Engineer normally was selected from FCTC, 

Nevada Branch. 

The Test Group staff developed detailed test plans and 

schedules. Engineering and construction plans were developed by 

Nevada Branch and coordinated with NTSO. Final engineering designs were developed by DOE contractors at NTS - Holmes & Narver, 

Inc. (H&N), and/or Fenix & Scisson, Inc. (F&S). Engineering 

drawings were approved by FCTC and NTSO prior to actual construction. Construction was performed by the principal DOE support 

contractor - REECo. FCTC and members of the Test Group staff 

monitored construction activities. The FC/DNA Test Group staff 

coordinated development of technical experiments and initiated 

action to obtain required support equipment (e.g., steel LOS pipe 

and mechanical closures). The Test Group staff reviewed the 

technical support requirements submitted by experimenter agencies 

and transmitted consolidated requirements to the Nevada Operations Office which, in turn, advised the NTSO of future 

requirements. 

During the construction phase, the Nevada Operations 

Office began collecting containment-related information. During 

drilling or mining operations, rock cores were analyzed for bulk 

density, moisture content, grain density, porosity (determined by 

the difference between bulk and grain densities), unconfined 

compressive strength, triaxial compression (for a variety of 

confining pressures), ultrasonic shear and compressive wave 

velocities, carbon dioxide content, presence of clay which could 

swell, and other features. Testing was done for DNA primarily by 

the H&N Testing Lab at NTS (Mercury) and Terra Tek, a DNA 

contractor located at Salt Lake City, Utah, as part of the DNA 

containment research program. 

Geologic features of the tunnels were examined and mapped as 

construction progressed, usually by an DOE contractor. Several 

months prior to planned event execution, FC/DNA prepared a 

document which contained a general description of the test, site 

11 
geologic information, types and locations of mechanical closures, 

details of concrete plugs, a summary of analytical calculations, 

and other related test history. This document was reviewed by 

Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP, see section 2.1.3) members and 

formally presented by FC/DNA to the CEP for categorization and 

recommendation for execution. 

The FC/DNA Test Group staff normally moved to NTS a few 

months prior to the planned event execution date (three to six 

months depending upon the complexity of the test). Prior to 

arrival of DOD experimenter personnel, the Nevada Operations 

Office made arrangements to provide required instrumentation and 

recording facilities, office space and equipment, communications 

equipment, vehicles, photography, and other support items. 

Housing and food services for DOD personnel at NTS were provided 

bY REECo. Upon arrival at NTS, DOD personnel were briefed on 

safety and security by the Test Group staff and other DOD and DOE 

personnel. Experimenter agencies were provided with copies of 

FC/DNA security and safety plans. These briefings included 

radiation safety control policies, procedures, and equipment. 

Under the supervision of the Test Group staff, experimenter 

personnel installed experiments and checked out instrumentation 

cables and recording systems. A series of electrical dry runs 

were conducted from the participating (user) laboratory control 

room and DNA monitor room at the Control Point (CP) complex (see 

section 1.5) to determine that all signals and remotelycontrolled equipment were functioning properly. After all 

systems were declared ready, permission was requested from the 

DOE to install the nuclear device. Installation and check out 

were conducted by the participating device development laboratory 

with DOE security safeguarding the device and other classified 

materials. The next activities consisted of placing stemming 

materials in preplanned locations and checking all containment 

features. 

When the test facility was ready for event execution, 

control of the entire test and experiment area was transferred to 

the DOE/NV Test Controller and his staff. When the Test 

12 
Controller was satisfied that all conditions were satisfactory to 

detonate the device, he gave permission to the user laboratory to 

arm the device and initiate the final countdown. 

The Test Controller and his staff at the CP monitored the 

countdown, detonation, and postevent response of remotely 

controlled radiation monitoring equipment. When released by the 

Test Controller, REECo Radiological Safety (Radsafe) teams 

entered the area to monitor for radiation and other safety hazards. After assurance that reentry could be accomplished, the 

Test Controller released experimenters to collect recorded data 

from surface areas. All of these operations were conducted in 

accordance with preevent plans developed by the DOE Test Controller staff, the DOD test group staff, and Nevada Branch 

personnel, unless postevent conditions required modifications. 

For tunnel events, initial reentry into the tunnel was 

authorized by the DOE Test Controller after it was determined 

that conditions were safe for reentry operations. Tunnel reentry 

was controlled by Nevada Branch personnel with assistance from 

Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) health physicists, REECo Radsafe 

personnel, and REECo construction personnel. After the tunnel 

was declared safe for experiment recovery, the Test Group staff 

assumed control of the area. Based on REECo Radsafe monitoring 

data, FC/DNA personnel determined when it was safe to remove the 

experiments. Experimenters then removed experiments for analysis 

and documentation of results. 

1.4 DOE ORGANIZATIONS, CONTRACTORS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 

1.4.1 Atomic Energy Commission. 

The AEC was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 in 

July, the same month the Joint Chiefs of Staff were conducting 

Operation CROSSROADS with assistance from the U.S. Army's Manhattan Engineer District. MED was disestablished and the AEC and 

AFSWP assumed MED functions on 1 January 1947. The Atomic Energy 

Act was revised in 1954 and has been amended extensively since. 

13 
The AEC established headquarters (AEC/HQ) offices in Washington, D.C., and operations offices in areas which were centers 

of AEC operations. In areas of lesser activity, area offices, 

branch offices, and field offices were established. The Director 

of the Division of Military Application (DMA) in AEC/HQ was 

delegated responsibility for the nuclear weapons development and 

testing program. The Director of DMA was always a flag officer 

of one of the armed forces, as specified by the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954, and he was an Assistant General Manager 

organization. 

in the AEC 

In 1951, the Director of DMA designated and delegated his 

responsibility for conduct of on-continent tests to the Test 

Manager, who also was Manager of the AEC Santa Fe Operations 

Office (SFOO) near Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Later in 

1951, SF00 was moved to Albuquerque. With delegated authority 

from the Director of DMA, the Manager, SFOO, designated Test 

Managers for on-continent tests. The same authority applied when 

SF00 became the Albuquerque Operations Office (ALOO) in 1956. 

The AEC Las Vegas Field Office (LVFO), established in 1951, 

managed the Nevada Test Site (called the Nevada Proving Ground 

from 1952 to 1955) for the Test Manager. LVFO became a branch 

office in 1955, an Area Office in 1960, and the Nevada Operations 

Office (NVOO, later shortened to NV) in 1962, with the Manager, 

NVOO, or his representative designated as Test Manager. In 1972, 

the Test Manager became the Test Controller. 

The Director of DMA* initiated the chain of authority and 

approval for detonating each nuclear device by requesting that 

each user laboratory and DNA submit proposed test programs to 

DMA. This request was made in the spring of each year for tests 

to be conducted in the next fiscal year. DMA consolidated 

proposed test programs, developed a test program proposal while 

consulting with DOD, and generated a program approval request. 

DMA then presented the proposed test program to the National 

Security Council (NSC) Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Testing. 

*The Division of Military Application (DMA) was changed in 1977 

to the Office of Military Application (OMA). 

14 
Chaired by the NSC, this committee included representatives of 

the DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of State, Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Office 

of Science and Technology, and Central Intelligence Agency. 

After incorporating informal Committee comments, DMA forwarded 

the proposed program from the Secretary of Energy to the 

President through the NSC. The NSC solicited and incorporated 

formal comments in its recommendation to the President. 

Test program approvals were requested at six-month intervals. Approval of tests for the first six months was received 

at the beginning of each fiscal year. The process was repeated 

six months later for tests in the last half of the fiscal year. 

Presidential approvals were signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Subsequently, test program 

authority messages were sent from the Director of DMA to the user 

laboratories, DNA, and DOE/NV. 

Authority to detonate each nuclear device was handled separately and individually. The technical content of detonation 

authority requests originated in presentations to the CEP by the 

user laboratory or DNA. After recommendations by the CEP, the 

Manager, NV, requested detonation authority from DMA. Required 

information in each request included statements on compliance 

with treaties, environmental impact, public announcement plans, 

test program authority, and any particularly noteworthy aspects 

of the test. After DMA and additional DOE reviews, the Manager, 

NV, was notified of detonation authority approval. 

As previously mentioned, DOE succeeded ERDA on 1 October 

1977, which had succeeded the AEC on 19 January 1975. The HUSKY 

PUP and MIGHTY EPIC events (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this volume) 

were conducted under the control of ERDA. The other events in 

this volume occurred under the control of the DOE. 

15 
1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization. 

As stated in Chapter 0101 of the Nevada Test Site Organization Standard Operating Procedure (NTSO SOP Chapter 0101-01, 

see Appendix E), the NTSO included DOE, DOD, user laboratory, 

contractor, agency, and organizational personnel who participated 

in or provided support for test operations at the NTS. The 

Manager, NV, headed the NTSO. (See Figure 1.3.) The NTSO was a 

continuing task organization whose composition could be readily 

changed in response to the needs and technical objectives of each 

test. The Continental Test Organization (CTO)* was part of the 

original NTSO; however, it was disestablished on 1 August 1962 

with its responsibilities (e.g., Military Deputy to the Manager, 

NVOO) being assumed by FC/DASA, WETG and subsequently by FC/DNA, 

Test Directorate. The Military Deputy to the Test Manager, as 

shown in Figure 1.3, was from Field Command and was responsible 

for coordinating DOD programs and support to NTSO. 

1.4.3 NTSO Radiological Safety. 

The Test Controller was responsible for protection of participating personnel and offsite populations from radiation 

hazards associated with activities conducted at NTS. By mutual 

agreement between the Test Controller and a scientific user (see 

section 1.4.4), control of radiation safety within the area 

assigned for a particular activity was delegated to the user's 

Test Group Director during the period of time when such control 

could have had a direct bearing on the success or failure of the 

scientific program. 

The onsite radiological safety support contractor (REECo 

Radsafe) was responsible to the Test Manager for both routine and 

test event radiological safety onsite as detailed in Appendix D, 

AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524**, "Radiological Safety." During test 

* See DNA 6320F for additional information 

**AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524 was not superseded until 23 July 

1982. 

16 
Lawrence Livtxmore Laboratory I Advisory Panel I 

Sandia Laboratories 

I I JOINT OFFICE OF 

Defense Nuclear Agency INFORMATION 

OFFICE OF SITE MANAGER 

Site Manager 

Deputy Site Manager 

Deputy Site Manager for 

OperatiOllS 

SClENTFIC ADVISORS 

I 

I 1 1 

r TFCHNJCALPROGRAM I I DOD PROGRAM I 

DOD DIRJX’IGR SUPPORT 

DOD Ware&using 

Vehicles 

Otk DOD Furnished Support 

Deputy - Military Matters 

DOE L,OGISTlCAL PROGRAM DOE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM 

DJREC-IOR, LOGISTICAL 

SUPPORT 

construction, camp maintenance 

and operation, industria.l safety, 

housing, feeding, recreation, work 

space, utihties, uanspormtion, communications, law enforcement, fire 

protection and personnel service. 

DIRECTOR. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 

DEPUTY DIRJZC’I’UR 

Implementation and coordination of technical support and of operational plans. 

area controls, reports and safety-related 

group activities, as directed by the Site 

Manager and Test Controller. 

OPERATIONS CONTROL GROUP 

I I 

I I 

CONTROL POINT COORJXNATOR 

Assures the availability in the OCC 

of facilities and equipment for the 

control and coordination of N’TS 

operational activities. Serves as Control Point Administrator. 

* Designated for each test of special 

experimental effort Assumes operational control of NTS when directed 

by Manager/NV. 

TEST OPERATIONS OFFICER 

Supeavisers preparation of the Test 

Manager’s Operations Plan which 

includes proposed Area Control, 

,sCheduJe of Events, Special Instruction, Air Operations Plan and 

o$rerrequiredpJansasdirected. 

oordma& wtth the Control Point 

Coordinator in obtaining assistance 

in preparation of test execution 

reports. Implements and supervises execution of operations Plan 

for the Test Controller as directed 

TEST LIAISON OFFICER 

Provides cxaJ communication of test related operational information between 

the Control Point and HeadquartezsAtomicFnergy 

Commission during the test 

execution period. 

SPECIAL STAFF 

Speciahsts to make predictions and 

coordinate field activities in the following areas: 

Device Safety - Representative 

SeClUity - Representative 

Meteorology - Representative 

Wtion Safety - Representative 

Environmental 

program - Representative 

Seismic Program - Representative 

Figure 1.3 Nevada Test Site Organization (1980). 
events, as shown in Figure I of Appendix D and as discussed 

above, the Test Manager delegated control of radiation safety in 

the immediate test area to the user Test Group Director when the 

Director requested control. When this occurred, each radsafe 

coordinator was responsible to the Test Group Director through 

his radiological safety organization for support in his test 

area. 

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was 

responsible to the Test Controller for operation of the offsite 

radiological safety program in accordance with procedures listed 

in Appendix D. 

1.4.4 NTS Scientific Users. 

The NTS scientific users were DNA (for nuclear weapons 

effects) and the development laboratories: Los Alamos Scientific 

Laboratory (LASL), Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL), and 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque (SLA)* LASL and LLL were 

primarily involved in testing for weapons development while SLA 

conducted a limited number of weapons effects tests and supported 

weapons development tests. On 29 December 1979, Congress passed 

a bill changing LASL, LLL, and SLA into national laboratories. 

The names of these organizations changed to the Los Alamos 

National Laboratory (J-ANL), Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), 

respectively. A brief description of these laboratories follows: 

A. LANL was established early in 1943 as Los Alamos, 

Project Y, of the MED for the specific purpose of developing an atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists supervised the test detonation of the world's first atomic 

weapon in July 1945 at the TRINITY site in New Mexico. 

Los Alamos became LASL in January 1947, when the AEC and 

AFSWP were activated to replace the MED. The Laboratory's continuing assignment was to conceive, design, 

test, and develop nuclear components of atomic weapons. 

18 
The contract under which LASL performed work for the AEC 

was administered first by the Commission's Santa Fe Operations Office and later by the Albuquerque Operations 

Office. The Laboratory was operated by the University 

of California. 

B. LLNL (originally the University of California Radiation 

Laboratory [UCRL], then the name was changed several 

times, first to the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (LRL] ’ 

then to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory [LLL], and 

finally to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

[=JJLl) was established as a second AEC weapons 

laboratory at Livermore, California, in 1952. The 

Laboratory's responsibilities essentially were parallel 

to those of LASL. Devices developed by LLL first were 

tested in Nevada in 1953, and LLL-developed devices have 

been tested in each Continental and Pacific series 

since. The contract under which LLL performed work for 

the AEC was administered by the Commission's San 

Francisco Operations Office. This Laboratory also was 

operated by the University of California. 

C. SNL (originally Sandia Laboratory) at Sandia Base (now 

EAFB), Albuquerque, New Mexico, was the AEC's other 

weapons laboratory. It was established in 1945 as a 

branch of Los Alamos. In April 1948 it was named 

Sandia Laboratory Branch of Los Alamos Scientific 

Laboratory: and in 1949 assumed its identity as a fullfledged weapons research institution operated by the 

Sandia Corporation, a non-profit subsidiary of Western 

Electric. SLA's role was to conceive, design, test, and 

develop the non-nuclear phases of atomic weapons and to 

do other work in related fields. In 1956, a Livermore 

Branch of SLA was established to provide closer support 

to developmental work of the LLL. Sandia Laboratories 

also operated ballistic test facilities for the AEC at 

the Tonopah Ballistics Range (now Tonopah Test Range) 

near Tonopah, Nevada. 

19 
1.4.5 Test Support Organizations. 

In keeping with its policy, DOE used private contractors for 

maintenance, operations, and construction (including military and 

civil defense construction) at the NTS. NV personnel administered all housekeeping, construction, and related services activity, 

but performance was by contractors. Major support contractors 

were the following: 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., was the 

principal DOE operational and support contractor for the 

NTS, providing electrical and architectural engineering, 

state-of-the-art large diameter and conventional shaft 

drilling, heavy-duty construction and excavation, mining and 

tunneling, occupational safety and fire protection, radiological safety, toxic gas and explosive mixture monitoring, 

communications and electronics, power distribution, occupational medicine, and other support functions. REECo maintained offices in Las Vegas and extensive facilities necessary to operate at NTS. 

Edqerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., (later renamed EG&G, 

Inc.) was the principal technical contractor, providing 

control point functions such as timing and firing, and 

diagnostic functions such as scientific photography and 

measurement of detonation characteristics. In addition, 

EG&G personnel manned the DOD monitor room. EG&G support 

facilities were maintained in Las Vegas and at NTS. 

Holmes & Narver, Inc., performed architect/engineer services 

for the NTS and was the principal support contractor for the 

Commission's off-continent operations. H&N had a home office in the Los Angeles area and also maintained offices in 

Las Vegas and at NTS. 

Since 1963, Fenix & Scisson, Inc. of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was 

a consultant architect/engineer for drilling and mining 

operations in connection with underground nuclear testing. 

The company was involved in design of many underground 

20 
structures and in the field of deep, large-diameter hole 

drilling. Las Vegas Branch activity was conducted from 

offices in Las Vegas and Mercury, Nevada. 

Numerous other contractors, selected on the basis of lumpsum competitive bids, performed various construction and other 

support functions for the DOE and DOD. 

1.5 THE NEVADA TEST SITE. 

An on-continent location was selected for conducting nuclear 

weapons tests; construction began at what was called the Nevada 

Test Site in December 1950, and testing began in January 1951. 

The name was changed to the Nevada Proving Ground (NPG) in March 

of 1952 and again changed to the Nevada Test Site on 31 December 

1954. 

The original boundaries were expanded as new testing areas 

and projects were added. Figure 1.4 shows the present NTS 

location bounded on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Range. 

NTS encompassed about 1,350 square miles in 1975. This testing 

location was selected for both safety and security reasons. The 

arid climate, lack of industrialization, and exclusion of the 

public from the Nellis Air Force Range resulted in a very low 

population density in the area around NTS. 

The only paved roads within the NTS and Nellis Air Force 

Range complex were those constructed by the government for access 

purposes. NTS testing areas were physically protected by surrounding rugged topography. The few mountain passes and dry 

washes where four-wheel drive vehicles might Lnter were posted 

with warning signs and barricades. NTS security force personnel 

patrolled perimeter and barricade areas in aircraft and vehicles. 

Thus, unauthorized entry to NTS was difficult, and the possibility of a member of the public inadvertently entering an NTS testing area was extremely remote. 

Figure 1.5 shows the NTS, its various area designations, and 

the locations of the six test events covered by this volume. In 

21 
f WARM SPRINGS 

“ALIENTE / GOLDFIELD b \ n*mrr CI, 

NCLLlS AlR fORCL RANGE 

Figure 1.4 Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada. 

a location designation such as tW12n.07,*V the IlUll signifies an 

underground location, II 12 tl identifies the area at the NTS, 'In" 

denotes the tunnel, and 110711 indicates the drift number. 

A low mountain range separated the base camp, Mercury, from 

the location of early AEC and DOD atmospheric tests at Frenchman 

Flat in Area 5. This area also was later used for DOD underground testing. The elevation of Frenchman Dry Lake in the 

middle of the Flat is about 3,100 feet. 

A mountain pass separates Frenchman Flat from Yucca Flat 

testing areas. The pass overlooks both Frenchman and Yucca Flats 

and contains the CP complex of buildings including Control Point 

Building 1 (CP-1) where timing and firing for most atmospheric 

tests were performed, and Control Point Building 2 (CP-2) where 

radiological safety support was based. 

Yucca Flat testing areas include Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 

and 10. Underground tests were conducted in some of these areas 

and generally were shaft emplacement types. The elevation of 

Yucca Dry Lake at the south end of Yucca Flat is about 4,300 

feet. To the west of Yucca Flat, in another basin, is the Area 18 

testing location. Some DOD atmospheric tests were conducted in 

Area 18, and one DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted on 

Buckboard Mesa in this area at an elevation of about 5,500 feet. 

Area 16 is in the mountains west of Yucca Flat toward Area 18. 

The single Area 16 tunnel complex (at an elevation of about 

5,400 feet) was a DOD underground testing location. 

Rainier Mesa is in Area 12, northwest of Yucca Flat. The 

top of the Mesa is at an elevation of about 7,500 feet. All DOD 

tunnel-type emplacement events on NTS that were not in the Area 

16 tunnel complex or the Area 15 shaft and tunnel complex were in 

Rainier Mesa and the adjoining Pahute Mesa. (Parts of T tunnel 

were constructed in the adjoining Pahute Mesa.) The major 

Rainier Mesa tunnel complexes were B, E, G, N, and T tunnels. 

24 
Area 15 is in the foothills at the north end of Yucca Flat. - 

The deeper of the two access shafts drops 1,500 feet below the 

surface elevation of 5,100 feet. There were three events 

conducted in Area 15, all sponsored by DOD. HARD HAT and TINY 

TOT were discussed in DNA Report 6320F, Operations NOUGAT and 

WHETSTONE, while PILE DRIVER was discussed in Report DNA 6321F, 

Operations FLINTLOCK and LATCHKEY. 

25 
SECTION 2 

UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

Underground tests conducted at the NTS prior to 1962 were 

primarily for weapons-related purposes (including safety tests). 

These tests were controlled by the AEC and conducted by LASL or 

LLL. Experience gained in the area of radioactivity containment 

underground during these tests provided the basic concepts for 

development of containment plans for DOD/DNA sponsored underground nuclear weapons effects tests which followed. These DOD 

tests were generally more complex than earlier AEC tests and required development of new containment concepts and hardware. 

A primary consideration in all underground tests was the 

safety of test participants and the general public, especially 

regarding exposures to radioactive materials. This chapter 

discusses, in general terms, containment problems and procedures, 

types of emplacement, diagnostic techniques, area access 

requirements, industrial and radiological safety, and radiation 

measuring systems. 

2.1 CONTAINMENT PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES. 

Completely containing radioactive material underground while 

accomplishing diagnostic measurements and effects experiments 

proved to be a major engineering challenge. Original efforts 

considered only detonation containment in competent rock formations. It was necessary to modify the original efforts to consider zones of weakness in rock caused by faults and containment 

failures resulting from diagnostic and experiment structures. 

Under certain conditions, particularly the presence of clay or a 

high water content in rock formations near the detonation point, 

greater than normal stresses could be generated which could adversely affect containment. Some containment failures were partially attributable to additional overpressure from secondary gas 

26 
expansion, i.e., steam pressure. The major containment features 

and problems that evolved are discussed below. 

2.1.1 Vertical Shaft Containment. 

Some of the first shaft-type safety experiments were in 

unstemmed shafts with concrete plugs penetrated by cable and 

instrumentation holes. When nuclear yields were produced, these 

emplacements did not completely contain the radioactive debris. 

The first method used to fully contain nuclear detonations in 

shafts was stemming, e.g., filling the shaft with aggregate and 

sand after device emplacement. 

Keyed concrete plugs at different depths in the shaft stemming sometimes were used. The shaft diameter was enlarged at the 

plug construction location so the poured concrete plug would key 

into the ground surrounding the shaft and provide more strength 

against containment failure. Combinations of concrete and epoxy 

were used later, and epoxy replaced concrete as a plug material 

for some shaft-type emplacements. 

Radiochemical sampling pipes, LOS pipes, and other openings 

in stemming and plug containment features had to be closed 

rapidly after detonation to prevent venting of radioactive 

effluent to the atmosphere. Closure systems driven by high 

explosives or compressed air were developed to seal the openings. 

After some of these early systems did not prevent releases of 

effluent to the atmosphere, use of openings to the surface for 

diagnostic or experiment purposes was discontinued for several 

years until technology improved. 

Some scientific and other cables from the device emplacement 

to the surface were another source of containment problems. While 

these cables could be embedded in concrete and epoxy, which 

helped prevent leakage along the outside of the cables, 

radioactive gases under high pressure traveled along the inside 

of cables as a conduit to the surface. This problem was solved 

by embedding the inner components of these cables in epoxy at 

27 
appropriate locations (such as in concrete plugs) in a technique 

called gas blocking. 

The most serious containment problems were caused by unanticipated geologic and hydrologic conditions at particular test locations. Even careful and rigorous calculations, engineering, 

construction, and preparations were inadequate when the presence 

of a geologic zone of weakness above the detonation point was 

unknown. 

Another similar problem was the presence of higher water 

content than anticipated in rock formations surrounding or near 

the detonation point. This problem caused greater shock transmission plus secondary gas expansion when the water turned to 

steam. In addition, presence of sufficient iron in the test 

configuration caused the disassociation of water with subsequent 

greater secondary gas expansion from hydrogen gas. A result was 

much higher and longer sustained pressure from the detonation 

point toward the surface and the possibility of subsequent 

failure of geologic or constructed containment mechanisms. 

Recognizing and understanding geologic and hydrologic conditions at each test location was necessary before these containment problems could be solved. As additional information became 

available through drilling and intensive geologic studies, these 

problems were lessened by investigations of proposed detonation 

locations and application of detailed site selection criteria. 

2.1.2 Tunnel-Type Containment. 

As with shaft-type detonations, containment methods used for 

tunnel events were designed keeping the basic characteristics of 

a nuclear detonation in mind. Tunnel configurations were constructed with device emplacements strategically located to cause 

sealing of the access tunnel by force of the detonation. Additional containment features were used to contain radioactive 

debris. 

28 
One of the original user laboratory stemming configurations 

consisted of one or more sandbag plugs installed a short distance 

from the projected self-sealing location toward the tunnel entrance (portal). Two plugs, each about 60 feet in length, were a 

typical installation. The sandbag plugs were later changed to 

solid sand backfill plugs extending several hundreds of feet from 

the device location. In many cases, the sand stemming had short 

sections of air voids between the plugs. Closer to the portal, a 

keyed concrete plug with a metal blast door was constructed. The 

blast door was designed to contain any gases (with pressures up 

to 75 pounds per square inch [Psi1 1 that might penetrate the 

sandbag plugs. 

Also as with shaft-type detonations, the unknown presence of 

undesirable geologic and hydrologic conditions sometimes caused 

venting of radioactive effluent either through the overburden 

(ground above the tunnel) to the surface, through fissures opened 

between the detonation point and the main tunnel, or through the 

plugs and blast door to the main tunnel vent holes and portal. 

More substantial containment features evolved as containment 

problems became better understood and tunnel events became more 

complex. 

The first DOD tunnel test was MARSHMALLOW (1962). Stemming 

for that event consisted of four sandbag plugs extending out to a 

distance of a few hundred feet from the nuclear device (similar 

to earlier AEC-sponsored tunnel events). A gas seal door (blast 

door) was installed in the main access drift. The next DOD tunnel test (GUMDROP, 1965) used sand backfill (with a few air gaps) 

out to a few hundred feet. As DOD tunnel testing continued, sand 

plugs gradually were replaced with various grout mixtures. Some 

grout mixtures were designed to match the strength and shock 

propagation of the native tunnel material (usually ash-fall tuff) 

while other grout mixtures were designed to be weaker and form a 

solid stemming plug shortly after device detonation. 

Also, as tunnel testing continued, the gas seal (blast) door 

no longer was used as a containment device. It was replaced by 

strong concrete plugs 10 to 20 feet long. These plugs were keyed 

29 
into the tunnel wall and were designed to withstand overpressures 

up to 1,000 psi. Some of the plugs were penetrated with electrical cables and steel pipes, and a small access hatch was constructed. All of these penetrations were gas sealed (or capped) 

to provide protection against possible gas seepage through the 

plug. 

Use of horizontal line-of-sight (HLOS) pipes in tunnel 

events necessitated development of additional closure systems. 

The HLOS pipe tunnel and its access tunnels generally were separated from the main tunnel by one or more concrete plugs. These 

closure systems primarily were for protection of the experiments 

inside the HLOS pipe, but they also were considered useful 

features for the formation of a stemming plug. 

The tunnel volume outside of the pipe was filled by stemming 

or grouting, while the experiments inside the HLOS pipe were protected by mechanical closure systems. Various closure systems 

were used, including compressed air or explosive-driven gates and 

doors which closed off the HLOS pipe from the detonation within a 

small fraction of a second after detonation time. One of these 

mechanical closures was the tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS) unit, 

first used on the DOOR MIST event. The TAPS was a heavy steel 

door that was released at shot time and fell to the closed 

position in less than one second. 

Gas blocking techniques similar to those used in shaft 

events were used to prevent leakage of radioactive gases along or 

through cables from the diagnostic and experiment locations to 

the surface. Additionally, a gas seal door usually was installed 

in the main drift nearer the portal than the concrete plug. 

Utility pipes, such as for compressed air, that passed through 

stemming and plugs also were sealed by closure systems. 

2.1.3 Containment Evaluation Panel. 

When containment problems were particularly difficult, the 

AEC began to change its emphasis on conditions under which 

nuclear detonations should be conducted. 

30 
The Manager, AX/NV00 had primary responsibility for the 

underground containment of radioactivity from underground tests. 

Containment of DOD tests was a joint effort on the part of AK, 

DOD, and contractor scientists and engineers. To carry out this 

responsibility, on 17 December 1963, AEC/NVOO established a Test 

Evaluation Panel (TEP) to review plans for each test as presented 

by user testing organizations for each test program. The chairman of this panel represented the Manager, NVOO, and membership 

consisted of two representatives (one voting member plus an 

alternate) from each of the user testing organizations (LASL, 

LLL, SLA, and FC/DNA) plus specialists from contractor and other 

government organizations such as the U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS). Other AEC/NVOO contractor personnel were available to 

present information in their areas of expertise (e.g., mining and 

drilling operations). 

On 19 March 1971, while testing was suspended because containment failure had caused serious venting of a laboratory test 

(BANEBERRY event), the TEP was changed to the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP). The CEP was instructed to give increased 

emphasis to containment of radioactive materials, and the panel 

membership was enlarged by the addition of a hydrologist, a 

scientist with expertise in underground nuclear phenomenology 

(both selected by the Manager, NVOO), and advisors from consultants representing additional areas of expertise. These 

permanent advisors were representatives of the EPA, the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Air Resources Laboratory 

(NOAA/ARL), and REECo. Each underground testing organization was 

represented as before. 

Prior to a formal meeting of the CEP, each user planning a 

nuclear test prepared written documents describing its proposed 

tests with particular emphasis on containment considerations and 

submitted these documents to each panel member for review. This 

information then was presented by the users to the CEP, generally 

at the following meeting. (Meetings were held about ten times a 

year.) Details of the containment plan were reviewed and comparisons to previous successful experiences were reviewed by the 

31 
CEP. Each CEP member (or alternate) was requested to submit a 

written statement describing the details considered favorable or 

unfavorable to successful containment. 

During the period covered by this report, evaluations to 

estimate the probability of successful containment conformed to 

specific guidance from the DMA or OMA (depending on the date of 

the test) at Headquarters, DOE. Each CEP member used this 

guidance to categorize each test as one of the following: 

CATEGORY A 

Considering all containment features and appropriate 

historical, empirical, and analytical data, the best 

judgment of the member indicates a very high confidence 

in successful containment. 

CATEGORY B 

Considering all containment features and appropriate 

historical, empirical, and analytical data, the best 

judgment of the member indicates a lesser but still 

adequate degree of confidence in successful containment. 

CATEGORY C 

Considering all containment features and appropriate 

historical, empirical, and analytical data, the best 

judgment of the member indicates some doubt that 

successful containment will be achieved. 

CATEGORY D 

Unable to categorize. 

A written report on each CEP meeting, containing the statement of 

each panel member and consultant, was forwarded to DOE/HQ for 

review and recommendations for approval to execute each event. 

32 
2.1.4 Test Controller's Advisory Panel. 

Careful consideration of each test event by the CEP to avoid 

releases of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere was followed 

by additional precautions prior to test event execution. If an 

unanticipated release of effluent from an underground detonation 

occurred, it was necessary to assure protection of onsite participants and the offsite population. The Test Controller's Advisory Panel was composed of a scientific advisor and representatives from each organization which could contribute information 

to this protection goal. 

This panel met at readiness briefings in advance of each 

event and in the Control Room prior to and during execution of 

each event. Panel members briefed the Test Controller's representative on aspects of test activities and meteorological 

conditions which he considered in his decision on whether a test 

should be conducted. Information presented by the panel included 

the status of test participants in the test area. Permission to 

arm and detonate the nuclear device was not given until all 

participants (other than those at approved manned stations) were 

clear of the controlled test area. 

Weather conditions were considered in detail. Wind speeds 

and directions at increasing altitudes above ground were measured 

with weather balloons at stations around NTS, both preceding and 

during each test, to calculate and present information on where 

an unanticipated release of effluent might be transported off the 

NTS and what the levels of radiation might be in the predicted 

effluent cloud directions. 

Actual locations of population centers, each dairy cow, and 

numbers of people at ranches and mines in the projected effluent 

cloud directions were presented and evaluated. EPA personnel in 

the offsite areas notified mining people to be above ground for 

safety purposes at the anticipated detonation time of tests which 

might cause a ground shock hazard. This information and numbers 

of people who might need to be advised to stay under cover or be 

33 
evacuated were presented for consideration. EPA personnel 

started offsite air samplers and placed radiation dosimeters in 

offsite locations before detonation time. Readiness information 

included capability for advising state officials to institute a 

milk diversion program if cattle feed or milk might become 

contaminated, and to replace milk and dry feed for localized 

family dairy cows. 

The status of standby aircraft for effluent cloud sampling 

and tracking capability was presented. Communications between 

offsite weather stations and EPA personnel were checked to assure 

proper operation. 

Radsafe personnel onsite assured that remote radiation monitoring stations in the test area and in other NTS areas were 

functional. Data from these stations, the weather stations, offsite EPA personnel, and personnel clearing the test area were 

displayed in the Control Room for continued visual examination by 

the Test Controller and the Advisory Panel. In addition, closedcircuit television cameras were operational in the test area on 

the ground and in helicopters to detect any visual indications of 

possible effluent release and provide capability for immediate 

response action by the Test Controller and the Advisory Panel 

members. 

If the Test Controller decided that the projected effluent 

direction was close to populated areas, or weather conditions 

were not stable enough to determine the direction of any released 

effluent after detonation, the approval to arm and detonate was 

not given, and the test was either postponed for another day or 

placed on hold until conditions were favorable. 

Conditions were considered favorable when (1) projected 

effluent direction was toward sparsely populated areas, (2) 

weather conditions were relatively stable, (3) EPA personnel 

could contact the few residents in the projected effluent 

direction and advise them of protective action to be taken, and 

(4) impact on milk supply from dairy cattle would be minimal. In 

addition, all essential equipment, personnel, and procedures were 

34 
required to be in readiness status or had been activated before 

permission to arm and detonate was given. 

Permission to arm usually was given at least two hours before detonation to allow time for arming, securing of the test 

configuration and containment systems, and departure of the arming party from the test area. The detonation, however, could be 

delayed at any moment up to detonation time, or postponed until 

another day when conditions might be more favorable. 

The Test Controller and the Advisory Panel received information, watched visible displays, and communicated with their 

field personnel up to and after detonation for a sufficient time 

to assure that venting had not occurred. Remote radiation 

detection instrument readings and closed-circuit television of 

the test area were monitored to detect any indication of effluent 

release. 

When all other indications of venting were negative and the 

Test Controller decided personnel could approach the test 

location, (e.g., subsidence craters had formed for shaft-type 

detonations, and cavity collapse had occurred for tunnel-type 

emplacements, as indicated by geophones) initial radiation survey 

teams entered the test area to assure that effluent had not been 

released or that any radiation levels were low enough for 

experiment data recovery to begin. For tunnel-type tests, 

reentry of the tunnel itself (after initial survey of the surface 

areas, recovery of data, and approval by the DOE Test 

Controller) was a matter for separate and careful consideration 

by the Test Group Director and radiological safety personnel. 

2.1.5 Effluent Release Procedures. 

If radioactive effluent was released from an underground 

test event, established procedures were initiated in accordance 

with AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524, "Radiological Safety" (see 

Appendix D) - Immediately upon detection of possible 

venting and effluent release after a detonation, the following 

procedures were initiated: 

35 
A. For some tests, Radsafe survey teams were at manned 

stations in the test area. These teams were released to 

make radiation measurements to be used in determining 

direction and radiation levels of radioactive effluent. 

B. Aircraft were standing by to sample and track the 

effluent. Data reported were used to further refine 

information on effluent direction and radioactivity 

concentrations. 

C. EPA monitors in offsite areas, previously stationed in 

the projected path of any released effluent, were advised of actual effluent direction and radioactivity 

measurement data and directed to move sampling and 

dosimeter equipment, perform ground radiation surveys, 

and notify residents and workers in the effluent path of 

any necessary precautionary measures, such as remaining 

in buildings or evacuating the area temporarily. 

D. Capabilities were held in readiness to advise state officials to implement a milk diversion program. If this 

was necessary, Nevada and neighboring state officials 

could be advised to impound and replace milk supplies 

possibly contaminated through the cattle feed pathway, 

and hold impounded milk for decay of the probable contaminants (radioiodines) before using it for other purposes. On a localized basis, EPA personnel were ready 

to replace family dairy cow milk with fresh milk, and 

analyze milk for concentrations of specific radionuelides. Dry feed supplies also could be replaced for 

family dairy cattle if required. 

E. Capabilities were in readiness for thyroid monitoring of 

offsite individuals possibly exposed to radioiodines 

from the effluent. These mobile monitoring stations 

could be used in the offsite areas for screening measurements to determine if any offsite residents or 

workers exhibited thyroid radioactivity and should be 

36 
transported to Las Vegas facilities for more precise 

thyroid measurements and dose assignment. 

Each of the above procedures was established to avoid or 

minimize exposure of the offsite population and maintain any such 

exposures below the radiation protection standards for individuals and population groups in uncontrolled areas, as established 

in AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524, ltRadiological Safety" (see Appendix 

D) - 

While the above procedures were initiated, additional onsite 

procedures also were implemented. Radsafe survey teams, when 

released by the Test Controller, surveyed the test area in sufficient detail to plot gamma radiation isointensity lines on NTS 

maps and provide specific intensity measurements at experiment 

stations on the surface and at other locations of interest. 

These data were used by the Test Controller in releasing personnel to enter radiation areas in the controlled area and by the 

Test Group Director in determining when surveys of his immediate 

test area and recoveries of experiment data could be accomplished. These decisions were based on calculations of personnel 

gamma radiation doses from survey data, radiation intensities at 

recovery locations, and estimated times in area to assure that 

exposures would be limited only to those necessary and below the 

standards established in AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524. 

Some tunnel-type tests that did not result in venting of 

radioactive effluent to the atmosphere did have a failure of the 

containment system within the tunnel. High radiation levels then 

existed in locations where reentry personnel needed to enter to 

accomplish data recovery. Procedures developed to minimize 

exposures of reentry and recovery personnel included the placement of remote radiation detectors located at strategic tunnel 

complex locations, remote tunnel atmosphere samplers that removed 

tunnel air to locations outside the tunnel for analysis, and 

tunnel air filters that would allow ventilation of tunnels before 

reentry with only controlled gaseous radionuclide releases to the 

atmosphere. 

37 
Remote monitoring and sampling equipment provided information on radiation levels, toxic gases, and explosive mixtures 

necessary to determine whether tunnel ventilation should be accomplished before reentry. Tunnel ventilation filters stopped 

particulate radioactivity and activated charcoal in the filters 

absorbed most of the radioiodines, thus allowing primarily only 

radionuclides of the noble gases, such as xenon, to be released 

to the atmosphere. (Exposure to radionuclides of the noble gases 

is far less hazardous than exposure to other fission products.) 

Release of this radioactive material to the atmosphere in a 

gradual, controlled manner during tunnel ventilation to protect 

reentry personnel was subject to approval by the Test Controller. 

2.2 EMPLACEMENT TYPES. 

The DOD conducted six underground nuclear tests which are 

covered in this report period. Table 2.1 lists the six events 

and pertinent data. There were five tunnel-type DOD tests during 

Operations ANVIL, CRESSETT, and GUARDIAN, and one shaft-type 

event during Operation TINDERBOX. Both emplacement types are 

discussed in this section. An emplacement type not discussed in 

this volume was one that resulted in the excavating or ejecting 

of material from the ground surface to form a crater (see Crater 

Experiment in the Glossary of Terms). A DOD cratering event, 

DANNY BOY, was conducted in 1962 during Operation NOUGAT (see DNA 

6320F). 

2.2.1 Vertical Shaft-Type Emplacement. 

A vertical shaft-type nuclear detonation was intended to be 

contained underground. The shaft was usually drilled, but sometimes mined, and it may have been lined with a steel casing or 

have been uncased. The nuclear device was emplaced at a depth 

calculated to contain the explosion. At detonation time, a 

cavity was formed by vaporized rock. Pressure from the hot gases 

in the cavity held surrounding broken rock in place until the 

cavity area cooled sufficiently to decrease pressure. As broken 

38 
Table 2.1. DOD test events - 24 October 1975 through 31 October 1980. 

TINDER- GUARDOPERATION ANVIL CRESSET BOX IAN 

HUSKY MIGHTY HYBlA DIABLO HURON MINERS 

TEST EVENT PUP EPIC GOLD HAWK KING IRON 

DATE 24 Ott 75 12May76 1 Nov77 13 Sep 78 24 Jun 80 31 Ott 80 

LOCAL TIME 1011 PDT 1250 PDT 1005 PST 0815 PDT 0810 PDT 1000 PST 

(hours) 

NTS LOCATION ula.03 U12n.10 U12e.20 U12n.lOa U3ky U12n.11 

TYPE Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Shaft Tunnel 

DEPTH (FEET) 1,142 1,306 1,263 1,273 1,050 1,306 

YIELD* LOW Low LOW Low LOW LOW 

*LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 
rock fell into the cavity formed by the detonation, a chimney was 

formed. If the chimney of falling rock reached the surface, a 

subsidence crater was formed. Figure 2.1 shows a typical 

subsidence crater. 

If a device was emplaced too deeply in the alluvium of 

Frenchman or Yucca Flat for the detonation yield, or the depth 

was correct but the yield was much less than anticipated, a 

subsidence crater might not form; that is, the chimney might not 

reach the surface. This was a problem during early years of 

underground testing when it was necessary to move drill rigs into 

subsidence craters soon after tests for cavity sample recovery 

purposes. If a subsidence crater did not form, drill rigs could 

not be moved to surface ground zero (SGZ). When directional 

drilling from outside the crater was implemented, lack of a subsidence crater in alluvium became less of a problem. Experience 

gained with depth of device burial also reduced the chance of 

subsidence craters not forming in the alluvium. 

Most vertical shaft-type underground tests conducted by DOD 

included a vertical line-of-sight (VLOS) pipe system to the surface and a mobile tower on the surface that contained the weapons 

effects experiments (see Figure 2.2). The VLOS pipe system contained several mechanical closures designed to prevent the release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These closures were 

open at the time of detonation but closed within milliseconds to 

stop the flow of material up the pipe. The open volume between 

the VLOS pipe and the wall of the drill hole was filled with sand 

and other materials. One or more non-porous material plugs were 

placed around the pipe. Electrical cables which went downhole 

were gas blocked to prevent gas seepage to the surface. Effects 

experiments were contained in a mobile tower on the surface that 

was moved away from the hole after device detonation but before 

surface collapse (formation of the subsidence crater). One 

problem was the possibility of seepage after surface collapse if 

some pathway to the surface developed. Some radiactive effluent 

was released into the atmosphere during several VLOS-type DOD 

tests. 

40 

EFFECTS 

EXPERIMENT 

IN MOBILE TOWER 

SURFACE 

; .$q! .; a*. &a,:,*‘. . 

.::::i:fi:..*~:~!“~.~ 

-.+: ,._. ,.i. i’.... ::;,, 

,.:.::.:‘.:.:.:?tf;..:~::; 

.4*.,.;p... . . *. i :-: . . * 

. . . ._. .A.,’ 

.‘..‘.-...a..-.c..: .: 

STEMMING MATERIALS + 

(FILLS VOIDS BETWEEN & 

WALL OF DRILL HOLE I?; 

AND VLOS PIPE) :? 

NOTE: 

-:,*-.,...,.. “ )‘;.;.‘.‘,~.., ; ; ‘.~,: 

.:.:.:.:... . y*. 

NOT TO SCALE $!;~~~~~~ 

!I &*VERTICAL-LINE-OF-SIGHT 

.:..: ::.* PIPE SYSTEM 

B MECHANICAL CLOSURES 

!+ 

:j;;$ 

WALL OF DRILL HOLE 

(USUALLY STEEL CASED) 

2 MECHANICAL CLOSURES 

Figure 2.2 Vertical LOS pipe configuration. 

42 
2.2.2 Tunnel-Type Emplacement. 

Tunnel-type emplacement nuclear detonations were intended to 

be completely contained. The nuclear device was emplaced in a 

mined drift (tunnel) at a depth designed to contain the detonation. The native material at tunnel elevation was ash-fall tuff 

for events covered in this volume. Chimneying of broken rock to 

the surface was rare, primarily because there was a layer of 

welded rhyolitic ash-flow tuff at and below the surface of 

Rainier Mesa. This tuff has a higher density than ash-fall tuff 

and is more competent (has more strength) than the alluvium 

material in Frenchman and Yucca Flats. Tunnel-type emplacements 

were in one of several configurations: at the end of a single 

horizontal tunnel into a mountain or mesa, at the end of a drift 

(tunnel) within a tunnel complex, at the end of a horizontal 

tunnel driven from a vertical shaft, or in a cavity mined from a 

horizontal tunnel or vertical shaft. 

During the period covered by this volume, four of the five 

tunnel-type emplacements included HLOS pipe systems placed in 

horizontal drifts in tunnel complexes (see Figure 2.3). Each 

device was placed close to the end of a drift inside a tunnel 

complex. An HLOS pipe system, including several mechanical closures and one or more test chambers (which contained effects 

experiments), were installed in the drift. The mined area 

surrounding the HLOS pipe was filled (stemmed) with various 

mixtures of grout to a distance of several hundred feet from the 

device location. This closure of the tunnel in the stemmed area 

was the primary containment system. Ground shock and expansion 

of the gaseous cavity material exerted pressure on the tunnel 

walls and stemming materials to form a stemming plug, closing the 

tunnel and HLOS pipe immediately after detonation. All 

electrical cables and other penetrations within the stemmed area 

were gas blocked carefully to prevent or minimize seepage of 

radioactive gases through the stemming plug. The mechanical 

closures in the HLOS pipe were designed primarily to protect the 

effects experiments; however, they also had some effect on the 

formation of the stemming plug. The secondary (or backup) 

containment system included two or more concrete plugs, which 

43 
44 
were strategically keyed into the tunnel walls to prevent leakage 

of radioactive gases outside the tunnel should the primary system 

fail. These concrete plugs were designed to withstand the 

maximum expected pressure and temperature. 

DNA has led the development of tunnel containment systems 

and has maintained continuing research and development programs 

to improve containment of tunnel events. 

2.3 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES. 

The transition from atmospheric to underground testing substantially reduced the release of radioactive materials to the 

atmosphere, and required the development of new device diagnostic 

techniques. During atmospheric tests, high-speed photography recorded fireball growth and aircraft collected samples from the 

radioactive cloud for diagnostic measurement analysis. Because 

such systems could not be used on underground tests, several new 

diagnostic techniques were developed (some of which are discussed 

in the following subsections). 

2.3.1 Radiation Measurements. 

Measurements of radiation from an underground detonation 

were made possible by the development of a system of remote 

detectors and cabling that sent signals to recording facilities 

located at the surface. Detectors, utilizing various physical 

characteristics of the radiations to be measured, were installed 

near the nuclear device. High-specification coaxial cable and 

connectors carried the measurement signals to the surface where 

electronic equipment, film, and magnetic tape recorded the 

signals or transmitted the signals by microwave to CP. 

The detector signals were on the way to recording equipment 

billionths of a second after a detonation, before the detectors 

were destroyed. These measurement systems required the most 

advanced electronic technology available. Considerable research 

and development were necessary to acquire and refine these 

capabilities. 

45 
2.3.2 Radiochemical Measurements. 

Because clouds from atmospheric detonations no longer were 

available to sample for diagnostic purposes, techniques were 

developed to obtain samples of debris from underground detonations for radiochemical analyses and subsequent yield determinations. The first systems were radiochemical sampling pipes 

leading directly from the device emplacements to filtering equi$- 

ment at the surface. These pipes required closure systems to 

prevent overpressure from venting radioactive effluent into the 

atmosphere after samples were collected. 

While these systems functioned as intended for most 

detonations, the systems did not function properly during all 

tests, and some radioactive effluent was released into the 

atmosphere. Subsequently, routine use of radiochemical sampling 

pipes to the surface was discontinued for a time until technology 

improved. 

A major radiochemistry sampling method which continued in 

use for shaft and tunnel detonations was postevent core drilling. 

The objective of this drilling was to obtain samples of solidified radioactive debris which had collected in a molten pool at 

the bottom of the cavity produced by the detonation. This method 

required and resulted in the development of precise directional 

drilling techniques and several advancements in the sciences of 

core drilling and radiochemical analysis. 

2.4 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS. 

DOD/DNA events were conducted primarily to obtain nuclear 

weapons effects data. The effects of blast, shock, and thermal 

and nuclear radiations had been investigated earlier during atmospheric and underwater tests. Military equipment, structures, 

and materials had been exposed to various nuclear effects. The 

transition to underground testing required development of new 

test techniques. One important new technology was simulation of 

46 
high altitude (to exoatmospheric) conditions for radiation effects experiments. 

This simulation technique involved placing experiments inside test chambers and providing a low-pressure atmospheric condition from the nuclear device to the experiments. This was 

achieved by using large vacuum pumps to reduce pressure inside 

the steel LOS pipe to match the pressure of the desired altitude. 

Experiments were categorized as passive or active (diagnostic). Passive experiments involved placing experiment equipment in test chambers, exposing the equipment to the desired 

nuclear environment, removing the experiment, and analyzing it to 

obtain effects results. Active experiments utilized various 

sensors and high-speed electronic recording equipment to obtain 

data. Many active experiments also involved recovery and 

analysis to obtain effect results. 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS. 

Access to underground work and drilling sites was controlled 

for a number of reasons. During construction, safety of both 

workers and visitors in these locations could have been jeopardized by carelessness or seemingly harmless activities of untrained and uncontrolled workers or visitors. When securityclassified materials were in these locations, only personnel with 

appropriate security clearances were permitted access to the 

area. The presence, or anticipated presence, of radioactive 

material in a location required access control for radiological 

safety purposes. Access requirements established for the above 

purposes are discussed below. 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control. 

During construction and preparations for a DOD event in a 

tunnel or other underground work site, the tunnel Superintendent 

was responsible to the REECo Project Manager for safety of personnel underground. From 1962 forward, Radsafe and tunnel logbooks usually were used to record names and radiation exposure 

47 
information for only those persons entering a tunnel during 

postevent reentry and recovery operations. In the early 197os, 

as a result of the Mine Safety and Health Act, tunnel logbooks 

were expanded to list all persons entering the tunnels (i.e., 

visitor, mining, drilling, Radsafe, etc.). Visitors and other 

personnel not assigned to work in the tunnel obtained permission 

for entry from the Superintendent, or his representative, were 

apprised of tunnel conditions and safety regulations, and were 

listed in the logbooks. In the event of an accident or other 

emergency condition underground, the logbook provided information 

on numbers of personnel and their locations underground. 

When classified material was in the tunnel prior to a test 

event and during initial reentry after an event, the DOD Test 

Group Director, or his representative, was responsible for entry 

and safety of personnel underground. Security personnel checked 

for proper security and entry clearances, maintained records of 

all personnel entering the tunnel, and safeguarded the device and 

other classified material. The check point was often well inside 

the portal thus allowing several activities at various work sites 

to be conducted simultaneously. 

After detonation, aerial damage surveys to determine the 

accessibility of the various recovery stations were required 

before surface reentry operations were begun. When the reentry 

teams were given permission to depart Gate 300 (a check point set 

up in Area 3, north of the turnoff to the Control Point, also 

known as Guard Station 300, see Figure 1.5) by the Test 

Controller, radiation and industrial hygiene surveys were 

conducted on the Mesa and in the portal areas before any other 

personnel were allowed in these areas. 

Before underground recovery operations were begun, a listing 

was made of hazardous elements whose performance degradation; 

functional failure; or physical, chemical, or electrical 

properties constituted a post-test hazard within the test system 

complex. General requirements and standards governing safety 

were based on FC/DNA Instruction 3200.5B. Hazardous elements 

were defined to include active experiments and/or hardware 

48 
containing radioactive, explosive, fire hazard, pressure vessel, 

evacuated container, electrical, toxic, and/or chemically hazardous components. 

Instructions on the proper procedure, should a potential 

hazard have become a real hazard as a result of detonation, were 

made available to the underground reentry team and recovery 

personnel. Situations where special permissions were to be given 

before the tunnel reentry team would be allowed to proceed 

(including checking pressure and sampling gas on the zero point 

side of the gas seal plug, opening the overburden plug [OBP] 

36-inch and 26-inch manway doors, and removing the insulation 

materials from inside the OBP crawl spaces) were outlined in 

detail prior to reentry. Each permission was given by a responsible party outside the tunnel complex on the basis of 

information transmitted by the reentry team. The required 

condition of the tunnel before experimenter personnel were 

allowed access to the test chamber also was outlined specifically. 

Before experiments were released to the experimenters, each 

experiment was monitored for radioactivity and bagged (to reduce 

spread of contamination) as necessary inside the tunnel. Swipe 

samples were taken on experiments and equipment leaving the 

tunnel area to verify contamination standards were not exceeded. 

Experiments and equipment with higher than allowed removable 

contamination levels were sent to a decontamination area or 

released to the experimenter or laboratory with the understanding 

the item would be decontaminated and/or handled in accordance 

with appropiate procedures before analysis or reuse. 

Control of tunnel access reverted to tunnel management personnel after tunnel reentry and recoveries. Entry procedures and 

use of the tunnel logbook were then implemented as discussed 

above. 

Additional access controls were instituted for radiological 

safety purposes after an event or during construction and event 

preparation when radioactivity from a previous event could be 

49 
encountered. Part or all of a tunnel complex could be established as a radiation exclusion (radex) area. 

All persons entering radex areas were logged on a form 

called the "Area Access Register." Names and organizations 

represented were listed. Radiation exposures from reports for 

the year and quarter were listed upon entry. Self-reading pocket 

dosimeter measurements were added upon exit. This was to assure 

that personnel approaching radiation exposure guide limits would 

not be allowed to enter radex areas when they could potentially 

accumulate exposures above guide levels. 

Before entry into a radex area, personnel were dressed in 

anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection as needed 

for the particular radiological conditions in the tunnel. Upon 

exit, anticontamination clothing was removed, personnel were 

monitored for radioactive contamination, and decontamination was 

accomplished, if necessary. 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control. 

Access to drilling areas was controlled by the drilling 

superintendent and the DOD Test Group Director for the same 

reasons as access to underground workings was controlled. While 

drilling an emplacement shaft and during postevent drillback 

operations to recover radioactive core samples, personnel safety 

and compliance with safety regulations were emphasized continuously. 

During preevent drilling activities, all visitors were required to contact the drilling superintendent before entry to the 

drilling site. Names of visitors and the purpose of each visit 

were entered in the daily drilling report, and it was assured 

that visitors wore hard hats and understood safety regulations. 

The laboratory which provided the device controlled access 

to the area, assisted by security force personnel, when classified materials (including the nuclear device) were brought into 

the area for emplacement. After the event, when the drill site 

50 
was a radex area, during classified material removal or postevent 

drilling, both security and radiological safety access controls 

were in effect as discussed under "Tunnel Access Control." 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS. 

Implementation of an effective industrial safety program was 

an important part of any heavy construction operation. Mining 

and drilling operations had a particularly high accident potential. These operations at the NTS involved additional safety 

problems resulting from detonation-induced unstable ground conditions and potential for encountering toxic gases, explosive mixtures, and radioactivity. 

Miles of underground workings were constructed at several 

locations. More depth of vertical big holes (three-foot diameter 

or larger) were drilled than the known total drilled in the rest 

of the world. Directional and core drilling to recover 

radioactive debris samples after underground nuclear detonations 

advanced the science of these drilling techniques. These 

operations often were accomplished under unusual conditions with 

accompanying difficult safety problems. 

The lost-time accident frequency, however, for the NTS support contractor employing most of the NTS personnel (REECo) was 

only one-tenth of the frequency for the heavy construction industry at large (as determined by annual surveys and reports for 

300 heavy construction corporations). This excellent safety 

record was attained by continuing attention to indoctrinating and 

training NTS personnel, investigating and determining causes of 

accidents at the NTS, implementing and enforcing safety regulations, and, most important, maintaining the safety awareness of 

NTS personnel. 

Safety was a joint effort by DOE, DNA, and their 

predecessors, and by the many other government agencies and 

contractors at NTS. Administered by REECo, the safety program 

enjoined all NTS personnel to conduct operations safely, and was 

exemplified by signs at the portal of a typical DOD tunnel 

51 
complex as shown in Figure 2.4, one of which states, "Safety With 

Production is our Goal." 

The safety procedures for all NTS operations are voluminous 

and cannot be included in this report. Appendix C of this volume 

is an example of a pertinent safety procedure: General Tunnel 

Reentry Procedures for Defense Nuclear Agency and Sandia Laboratories Nuclear Tests. As this procedure indicates, several 

aspects of industrial safety are interrelated. Information on 

monitoring levels of radioactivity and personnel exposures to 

radiation is presented in section 2.7, tlRadiological Safety 

Procedures.*' 

Monitoring of toxic gases and checks for explosive mixture 

were an important aspect of safety in underground workings, on 

drill rigs, and in drillhole cellars (the enlarged excavated area 

under the drill rig platform used for valving and other equipment). Toxic gases and explosive mixtures were created by both 

the nuclear detonations and the mining and drilling operations. 

The Draeger multi-gas detector and MSA explosimeter were 

available to detect such gases. The Fyrite or J&W oxygen 

indicator also was available to determine the oxygen content of 

the working atmosphere. The GPK was a combination oxygen 

indicator and explosimeter and was the instrument most commonly 

used by tunnel monitoring personnel throughout the period covered 

by this report. Requirements were that tunnel and drill rig 

breathing atmosphere contain at least 19.5 percent oxygen. 

During the period covered by this volume, it was required that 

the breathing atmosphere contain less than the levels of toxic 

gases and percentage of the lower explosive limit (LEL) listed 

below. Explosimeter instruments are calibrated with 5.6 percent 

methane (adjusted for atmospheric temperature and pressure) in 

air as 100 percent of the LEL for methane mixtures with air. 

Less than 100 percent of the LEL is not an explosive mixture of 

a gas or gases. 

52 

Gases 

Carbon monoxide, CO 

Carbon dioxide, CO2 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen 

dioxide, NO + NO 

Nitrogen dioxide, 602 Explosive mixtures 

Maximum Concentration 

50 ppm 

5,000 ppm 

25 ppm 

5 ppm 

10% of the LEL 

Procedures for controlling percentages of the LEL and toxic 

gases after each test event are discussed in the event chapters 

as appropriate. 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES. 

Procedures were developed in an effort to evaluate radiological, toxic, and other hazards and to protect workers and the 

public from unnecessary exposures. The following were the 

primary written procedures and implementation methods used at the 

NTS from 1975 through 1980. 

2.7.1 The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Test Site 

Organization - Standard Operating Procedure (NTSO SOP).* 

Chapter 0524, Radiological Safety, of this procedure (which 

appears as Appendix D to this volume) defined responsibility and 

established criteria and general procedures for radiological 

safety associated with NTS programs. Some of the major areas 

discussed are film badge procedures, radiation surveys, entry 

into controlled areas, and radiation exposure guides. Roles of 

the onsite REECo Environmental Sciences Department and the 

offsite United States Environmental Protection Agency are defined 

in NTSO SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.2 The Standard Operating Procedures for the Environmental 

Sciences Department, REECo. 

*AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524 was not superseded until July 23, 

1982. 

54 
These were prepared and updated annually to address in more 

detail the radiological safety aspects discussed in the latest 

revision of NTSO SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.3 Implementation of Radiological Procedures. 

The required equipment, devices, and capabilities for 

monitoring radiation levels in the environment and monitoring 

external and internal exposures of personnel are described as 

follows: 

A. Portable Radiation Detection Equipment. 

- Eberline PAC-4G (alpha) 

- Eberline PAC-1SA (alpha) 

- Eberline E-520 survey meter (beta and gamma) 

- Ludlum Model 101 survey meter (beta and gamma) 

- Hanford Cutie Pie survey meter (beta and gamma) 

- Eberline Model PIC-6A (gamma) 

- Eberline Model PNR-4 survey meter (fast and slow 

neutrons) 

- Eberline Model PRM-5 survey meter (alpha, beta, and 

gamma) 

- Teletector Model 6112 (beta and gamma) 

- FIDLER survey meter (low energy x-ray and gamma) 

- Precision Model P-111 Scintillator (gamma) 

- T-290 Military Air Sampler (tritium) 

- Sandia/Bendix T-446 Tritium Alarm Monitor (tritium) 

- Sandia NR-3 Portable Radioactive Gas Detector 

(tritium) 

B. Air Samplinq Equipment. 

- Model 102 semi-portable sampler 

- Satellite sampler 

- Hurricane high-volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

- Vacuum pump low-volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

55 
C. Laboratory Analysis Capability. 

The Environmental Sciences Laboratory analyzed air, 

soil, water, surface swipe, nasal swab, urine, and wound 

swab samples for some or all of the following activities: gross alpha and beta, gross fission products, 

tritium, strontium-90, plutonium-239, and spectrographic 

analysis for specific gamma-emitting radionuclides. The 

laboratory also analyzed some of the above-mentioned 

samples for nonradioactive materials, such as beryllium, 

through use of an emission spectrograph and by wet 

chemistry procedures. A spectrophotometer was used to 

analyze for other materials. 

D. Monitorinq of Personnel Exposures. 

The NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security 

credential holder was placed in use in 1966 to provide 

the increased personnel dosimetry capability necessary 

to meet the radiation exposure problems associated with 

nuclear rocket testing and underground nuclear detonations. The holder was designed to accommodate a Kodak 

film packet, a fast neutron packet, an identification 

plate, criticality accident components, the security 

credential, and a snap-type clip. The complete package 

had capabilities for determining beta, gamma, x-ray, 

thermal neutron, fast neutron, high-range gamma, and 

high-range neutron doses. Components for criticality 

accidents (unintentional or accidental nuclear fissioning of device critical materials) included materials 

which could detect and measure neutron and gamma radiation exposures above the ranges of the film packets. A 

Kodak Type III film packet contained two component 

films, one low range and one high range. Gamma exposure 

ranges of the two components were 30 mR to 10 R and 10 R 

to 800 R, respectively. The NTS combination personnel 

dosimeter and security credential holder is shown in 

Figure 2.5. 

56 

Film badges were exchanged routinely each month for all 

individuals and upon exit from a radex area when it was 

suspected that an individual had received 100 mR or more 

of exposure. 

Personnel entering radex areas also were issued selfreading pocket dosimeters which indicated accumulated 

exposure. Upon exit, pocket dosimeter readings were 

entered on an Area Access Register and added to the 

yearly and quarterly accumulated exposures from the 

automated daily NTS radiation exposure report for use 

until results of film packet processing were included. 

Pocket dosimeter readings were used as estimates because 

such readings were less accurate than the doses of 

record determined by processing film packets. 

This use of Area Access Registers helped to maintain 

personnel exposures below the whole body exposure guides 

in Chapter 0524: 3 rem per quarter and 5 rem per year. 

Personnel whose accumulated exposure was in excess of 

2,500 mrem per quarter or 4,500 mrem per year (as 

recorded on the exposure report plus any pocket 

dosimeter reading since the report) were advised not to 

enter radex areas, and their supervisory personnel were 

so notified. Personnel involved in DOD events covered 

by this volume had accumulated doses substantially below 

these control guides. 

2.7.4 Additional Methods Used to Control Radex Areas. 

A daily logbook was maintained by Radsafe monitors for 

each radex area location. These logs were used to record the 

following information: 

A. Work accomplished - Which people worked where and what 

work was accomplished were briefly described. Any 

unusual conditions, such as equipment failure and 

operational difficulties, were listed. 

58 
B. Visitors - First and last names of visitors were 

entered. Their destination and the reason for their 

visit were included where possible. The time they 

entered and exited the area and results of personnel 

monitoring were recorded. 

C. Unusual occurrences - Any unusual events which occurred during the shift were recorded. Included in this 

type of entry were accidents, high-volume water 

seepage, or any other occurrence of an unusual nature. 

D. Surveys and samples - Information collected was recorded as follows: 

Survey type - Routine or Special* 

Sample type - Routine or Special* 

*The requester's name was indicated for Special type. 

E. Date and signature - The date and shift were entered 

at the beginning of the work period and the logbook 

was signed before leaving the shift. 

Personnel leaving radex areas removed anticontamination 

clothing and equipment and placed them in special containers for 

later laundering or disposal at the designated NTS burial site. 

Personnel then were monitored to assure radiation levels were 

below those listed in Part I of AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524, 

"Radiological Safety" (see Appendix D). Personnel decontamination was accomplished if radiation levels were above specified 

limits. Decontamination usually was accomplished by vacuuming, 

removing radioactive particles with masking tape patches, washing 

hands or localized skin areas with soap and water, or showering 

with soap and water. 

Vehicles and equipment removed from radex areas were monitored to assure that they met criteria for unconditional release 

on or off the NTS (less than 0.4 mrad/h fixed beta plus gamma at 

contact and/or 1,000 disintegrations per minute [dpm] per 100 cm2 

of non-removable plutonium alpha: and less than 1,000 dpm/lOO cm2 

59 
of removable beta plus gamma and/or 100 dpm/lOO cmL of swipeable 

plutonium alpha). Items exceeding these limits but below radex 

area levels could be conditionally released and moved onsite 

only. 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS. 

Beginning in the early 196Os, various applications of 

radiation measurement telemetry were developed at the NTS to 

determine radiation levels at critical underground and surface 

areas following nuclear detonations. Multi-detector systems with 

range capabilities from 1 mR/h to 1,000 R/h and from 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h continuously monitored locations of concern after 

being calibrated and emplaced prior to each test event. Ion 

chamber detectors were hard-wire linked by telephone trunk lines 

to exposure rate meters at a central console in CP-2. Detector 

locations were as far as 35 miles from this console. In 1974, 

these conditioned phone lines were supplemented by portable 

transmission stations. The detector was hard-wired into an area 

trailer and the signals were sent by microwave to the Control 

Point. 

These remote radiation monitoring systems provided data for 

reentry personnel participating in radiation surveys and recovery 

operations after each nuclear device detonation. The systems 

aided in substantially reducing exposure of personnel involved in 

reentry programs and were useful in detecting any venting or 

leakage of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere from an 

underground detonation. 

2.8.1 Telemetry System in Use. 

During the time period covered by this volume, radiation 

telemetry systems developed and used at NTS had specific 

applications depending upon distance, terrain, environment, and 

operational needs. The detection units and components in use for 

DOD events in this volume were part of the remote area monitoring 

system (RAMS). The principal piece of equipment used to form a 

RAMS was the RAMP-4. The RAMP-4 was a multi-channel, hard-wire 

60 
linked, remote area gamma radiation monitoring (telemetry) 

system, designed and modified by Radsafe and produced by 

Victoreen Instrument Corporation. It consisted of a probe 

(Figure 2.6), which used a Neher-White radiation sensing element, 

hard-wired to an area trailer which sent microwave transmissions 

to communicate with the readout console (Figure 2.7) up to 35 

miles away, and terminals which provided a printout of readings 

at set time intervals. 

The readout covered six logarithmic decades (two threedecade scales) to provide a usual range of 1 mR/h to 1,000 R/h 

with a relative accuracy of _ +15 percent over the temperature 

range of -10°F to 150°F. Extended range RAMS unit provided a 

range from 100 mR/h to 100,000 R/h. 

A permanent array of 20 to 35 telemetry stations throughout 

the NTS, as designated by DOE, was maintained and operated 

continuously. Temporary telemetry arrays for DOD events varied 

between 15 and 50 stations depending upon the area or tunnel 

event location. 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring Support. 

Approximately 20 detector units were positioned in the test 

area before a shaft-type event to continuously monitor 

radiological conditions and assess exposure rates before the test 

area was entered after detonation. Detectors were placed in 

circular arrays at appropriate distances from surface ground 

zero (SGZ) which varied with device yield and predicted wind 

direction (See Figure 2.8). Variable numbers of detectors were 

used aboveground and underground during tunnel-type events. The 

additional 20 to 35 permanently established remote radiation 

detector stations operated continuously at living areas, work 

areas, and other locations throughout NTS (Figure 2.9). Eventrelated temporary telemetry detectors operated from zero time 

until it was determined that release of radioactivity probably 

would not occur, or until any released radioactivity had decayed 

to near-background levels at the telemetry stations. For some of 

the earlier events, readout locations were positioned near the 

61 


-- 

-7 

.’ 

-H 

-\ 

/A) 

Figure 2.8 Typical remote radiation detection monitoring 

system for shaft-type emplacement site. 

64 
0 PERMANENT TELEMETRY 

STATIONS 

0 do 20 30 4oooo _ Fr. 

,’ 

Figure 2.9 Typical permanently-established remote 

radiation detection stations operated 

continuously throughout the NTS. 

65 
forward control point (FCP) or at locations where telephone lines 

were available, in addition to the readouts located at CP-2. 

Radiation telemetry data were supplemented with information 

collected through a mobile air sampling program. Model 102 air 

sampling units were used to obtain samples of any radioactive 

effluent released at event time or during the postevent drilling 

operations. Prior to each nuclear detonation experiment, at 

least one sampler was placed at a specified location in the test 

area and remained in position until drillback operations were 

completed or the Test Group Director authorized removal. 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. 

Direct support was provided to NTSO by ISAFAF for DOD underground tests, and other Air Force organizations provided support 

under NAFB control as described in section 1.3.2 of this volume. 

Less air support was required, however, as the probability of 

venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased with development of more effective containment techniques. 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements. 

After 1962, Air Force cloud-sampling and cloud-tracking 

aircraft generally were not required except for cratering events 

conducted by the DOE where radioactive effluent clouds were anticipated. Passage of the radioactive effluent through variable 

amounts and temperatures of rock and other media selectively 

retained some radionuclides underground, and changes occured in 

the fission product ratios previously used during calculation and 

analysis of atmospheric detonation cloud samples. The value of 

analyzing particulate and gaseous cloud samples to determine 

characteristics of a detonation decreased accordingly. 

The first change in cloud sampling and tracking support was 

to a lighter Air Force aircraft, the U-3A, with an Air Force 

pilot and EPA monitor. The EPA monitor also performed aerial 

monitoring of selected locations near surface ground zero and 

along the path of any effluent cloud. This air support later was 

66 
performed by EPA and contractor personnel in their own aircraft. 

No radioactive effluent was detected offsite after the test 

events covered in this volume. 

Perimeter sweeps continued to be conducted daily by Air 

Force and Security personnel during reasonable flying weather, to 

assure that unauthorized vehicles were not entering the NTS over 

rough terrain or around security barricades on secondary roads. 

Air security sweeps of the immediate test area were conducted for 

a few hours before each detonation to assist in clearing the test 

area and to assure that unauthorized vehicles were not approaching it from directions not controlled by manned security 

stations. 

Air support for photography missions during test events and 

initial radiation surveys after each event did not change. Helicopters with Air Force pilots generally were used with contractor 

and military photographers and Radsafe monitors. 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary 

Field Personnel. 

Radsafe support facilities had been established about 20 

miles southeast of Mercury at ISAFAF during earlier atmospheric 

nuclear testing. REECo provided all Radsafe support functions at 

the NTS. This included monitoring personnel stationed at the 

ISAFAF Radsafe quonset facility and a complete stock of film 

dosimeters (badges), radiation detection instruments, and 

anticontamination clothing and equipment for use by air and 

ground crews. In 1974, after the responsibility for air support 

to NTS was transferred from AFSWC to the 57th Fighter Weapons 

Wing (see paragraph 1.3.2), helicopters continued to be supplied 

and manned by personnel stationed at ISAFAF. Radsafe personnel 

were not involved with these monitoring and photography support 

aircraft until they arrived at their NTS staging areas. 

Radsafe monitors issued and exchanged film dosimeters 

(badges), issued self-reading pocket dosimeters, provided anti67 
contamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment, monitored aircraft and personnel after events, decontaminated personnel, and assisted ground crew personnel with decontamination 

of aircraft at the NTS when necessary. 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters. 

Special helicopter Radsafe procedures were implemented for 

helicopters which staged from pads at the NTS, located east of 

Mercury Highway near the CP area and near the Test Controller's 

FCP established for a particular underground event. Helicopter 

pilots usually landed at these locations and were briefed on 

their scheduled or other operational missions there. 

If the mission involved possible contamination of the helicopter, Radsafe monitors lined the floor of the aircraft with 

plastic (or kraft paper) and masking tape to facilitate decontamination. Pilots and crew members were dressed in anticontamination clothing and provided with film badges, pocket dosimeters, 

and respiratory protection equipment if airborne radioactive 

material was anticipated and oxygen masks were not worn. 

Upon completion of missions, helicopters returned to the 

landing pads where they were checked for radiation and, if 

necessary, decontaminated by Radsafe monitors. Pilots and crew 

members were monitored and decontaminated as necessary at an 

adjacent forward Radsafe base station (or at CP-2) where pocket 

dosimeters were collected and read and film badges were exchanged 

if exposures of 100 mR or more were indicated by pocket 

dosimeters. 

68 
SECTION 3 

HUSKY PUP EVENT 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

HUSKY PUP was a DOD-sponsored test conducted at 1011 hours 

PDT on 24 October 1975 with a yield of less than 20 kilotons. 

The device was detonated in the U12t.03 drift of the T tunnel 

complex (Figure 3.1) at a vertical depth of 1,142 feet. The 

purpose of the event was to test the response of materials and 

equipment to a nuclear detonation environment. Additionally, 

experiments were designed to characterize the interaction of 

nuclear burst debris with the earth's surface. An evacuated 

horizontal LOS pipe 951 feet long was used to house experiments. 

Government agencies and contractors conducted 31 projects to 

obtain the desired weapons effects information. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent from this test was detected onsite or 

offsite. 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

3.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all HUSKY PUP project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of ERDA and ERDA contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established ERDA-DOD agreements or were the subject of 

separate action between Field Command/DNA and the ERDA Nevada 

Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments, or delivering them to the installation contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, 

and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

69 
HUSKY PUP 

ZEROPOINT 

0 600 

4 

FEET 

Figure 3.1 HUSKY PUP event - tunnel layout. 
Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LASL fielded 

the device, the LASL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

ERDA Test Controller relieved the LASL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller determined that venting 

had not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological 

safety to the DOD Test Group Director. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

The majority of the hardware concepts and technologies 

used in the vacuum pipe system design (LOS pipe) were 

refinements of those used on previous tests. The 

U12t.03 complex consisted of the LOS pipe drift, a 

bypass drift, four test chambers with associated crosscuts, three overburden plugs (OBPs), and two alcove 

splice rack (ASR) plugs. Test chambers Nos. 1 and 2 and 

five sections of pipe were refurbished hardware from the 

HUSKY ACE event (an N tunnel event during 1973, 

discussed in DNA 6324F). The remainder of the pipe 

system components was newly fabricated. (Station Nos. 3 

and 4 also were test chambers, see Figure 3.2). The 

main OBP was located at 3,540 feet into the T tunnel 

main drift, the mechanical OBP at 140 feet into the 01 

drift, and the reusable cable OBP in the newly mined 

drift between the cable alcove and the 01 drift. 

Sampling, water, power, drain, and pressurization lines; 

a 36-inch manway; and a 24-inch vent tube were run 

through the mechanical OBP. Remote gas sampling 

capabilities were incorporated during construction, 

including lines to sample from the vent lines at the 

portal, zero point sides of the gas seal door and plug, 

portal and zero point sides of the OBP, and LOS drift 

71 
4 

w 

01/W DAlFf JUWCTION 

MAP NOT TO SCALE 

OBP - OVERBURDEN PLUG 

TC - TEST CHAMBER 

DAC - DNA AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

ASR - ALCOVE SPLICE RACK 

TAPS - TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

Figure 3.2 HUSKY PUP event - system configuration. 
and pipe. Provisions to manually take gas samples from 

the zero point sides of the gas seal door, 9s seal 

Plug, and main OBP were made for sampling during 

postevent reentry. 

Construction activities began in April 1974 with cleanup 

of the HUSKY ACE LOS pipe in preparation for its removal 

from the U12n.07 drift and use in the T tunnel HUSKY PUP 

event. Mining of the U12t.03 LOS drift was started in 

July 1974 and was completed when the zero point was 

reached in September 1974. Mining of the bypass drift 

and bypass alcoves began in October and was completed in 

December 1974. During January through March 1975, cable 

installation was begun and concrete pours for the DAC, 

TAPS, and the OBP inverts were completed. Installation 

of the LOS pipe began in April and was completed in June 

1975. Experiments were installed between July and 

September 1975. 

Dry run participation began in late August. Signal dry 

runs (SDRs) began 27 August. The first mandatory dry 

run (MDR) was held 9 September 1975. Generally, two 

mandatory signal dry runs (MSDs) were held each week 

thereafter. A successful mandatory full-power dry run 

(MFP) was conducted on 7 October 1975, the device was 

installed and pre-armed, and final stemming and 

button-up operations were begun. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with ERDA 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support. 

Prior to the test, detailad radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

73 
C. 

D. 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed: provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, 

plastic suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 33 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for HUSKY PUP 

as shown in Table 3.1 and Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Also, an 

air sampling unit was placed at the tunnel portal. All 

RAMS units and the air sampling unit were installed a 

minimum of five days prior to scheduled device detonation. 

EPA operated 46 air sampling stations and 30 gamma rate 

recorder stations in the offsite area. Twenty-five EPA 

personnel were fielded for offsite surveillance activities. 

Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

74 
Table 3.1. HUSKY PUP event RAMS unit locations 

24 October 1975. 

SURFACE 

Station Location 

From the U12t portal: 

1 At the portal 

2 208 feet S 81" W azimuth (on filter system) 

3 222 feet S 75" W azimuth (on vent line) 

4 222 feet S 75" W azimuth (on vent line) 

5 332 feet N 09" W azimuth 

6 345 feet N 68" E azimuth 

7 346 feet S 55" E azimuth 

8 388 feet S 07" E azimuth 

9 324 feet S 43" W azimuth 

10 564 feet N 74" W azimuth 

11 650 feet S 82" E azimuth (at tunnel drain line) 

12 2,020 feet S 89" E azimuth 

From cable downhole: 

13 At cable downhole 

14 264 feet N 04" W azimuth 

15 219 feet N 62" E azimuth 

16 150 feet S 17" E azimuth 

17 165 feet S 87" W azimuth 

18 311 feet N 01" W azimuth 

19 490 feet S 60" E azimuth 

20 503 feet S 61" W azimuth 

From SGZ: 

75 
Table 3.1. HUSKY PUP event RAMS unit locations 

24 October 1975 (Continued). 

UNDERGROUND 

Station Location 

From the U12t main drift: 

21 345 feet into the U12t.03 LOS drift 

22 155 feet into the U12t.03 LOS drift 

23 250 feet into the U12t.03 bypass drift 

24 50 feet into the U12t.03 bypass drift 

*25ER 50 feet into the U12t.03 bypass drift 

26 400 feet into the U12t.01 bypass drift 

27 At the cable alcove 

28 

29 

*30ER 

31 

32 

33 

From the U12t portal: 

2,800 feet into the U12t main drift 

2,240 feet into the U12t main drift 

2,240 feet into the U12t main drift 

1,800 feet into the U12t main drift 

900 feet into the U12t main drift 

100 feet into the U12t main drift 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

76 
77 
ttuw Pup 

ZEROFigure 3.4 HUSKY PUP event - underground RAMS. 
E. 

with ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or 

control stations for issue of stay-in badges, or issue 

and return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

closed area before the final security sweep began. 

Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the 

USAF for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, 

if needed. In addition, the USAF provided a c-130 and 

crew on standby status for cloud tracking. The EPA 

provided a Turbo Beech and crew for cloud sampling. 

Another EPA aircraft was standing by in Las Vegas to 

undertake tracking duties, if required. 

3.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

3.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

On 24 October 1975 at 0001 hours, all persons except the 

arming party, tunnel button-up party, microwave timing party, and 

security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of the muster 

area. At 0430 hours, permission was granted to arm the device. 

By 0700 hours, button-up was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0800 hours on 24 October 

1975 in anticipation of planned test execution at 1000 hours that 

day. Conditions for test execution were favorable, and all 

personnel were mustered out of the area by 0900 hours. The 

countdown started as planned at 0945 hours but was held for 11 

79 
minutes in an attempt to verify the operation of a redundant OBP 

valve. The valve would not operate properly, but because it was 

locked in the closed position, the decision was made to go ahead 

with the test. 

The HUSKY PUP device was detonated at 1011 hours PDT on 24 

October 1975. Subsurface cavity collapse occurred at 1515 hours. 

3.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1013 hours on 24 October 

1975. RAMS unit No. 26 located in the U12t.01 bypass immediately 

was off line (not working). The RAMS units located in the LOS 

drift responded to neutron activation of the LOS pipe and 

experiments. These units, RAMS Nos. 21 and 22, were reading 650 

R/h and 350 R/h, respectively, immediately after detonation. Normal decay of this activation radiation was observed. No indications of radioactive effluent were detected by any tunnel, 

surface, or airborne radiation monitoring units. All RAMS units 

were secured at 1012 hours on 28 October, when RAMS unit Nos. 21 

and 22 were reading 18 mR/h and 9 mR/h, respectively. 

3.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Four reentry teams (two teams to survey the Mesa trailer 

park, one team to survey the portal area, and one team to survey 

the portal area ventilation system, see Figure 3.5) were released 

from Gate 300 at 1057 hours on the day of detonation. The portal 

area surveys were completed at 1130 hours, and the Mesa survey 

was completed at 1146 hours. No radiation levels above 

background (0.05 mR/h) were detected. Mesa and portal data 

recovery was conducted between 1225 and 1510 hours. Data 

recovery teams included SLA, Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL), 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation/Navy Strategic Systems 

Project Office (LMSC/SSPO), Kaman Science Corporation (KSC), 

Science Applications, Inc. (SAI), Lockheed Palo Alto Research 

Laboratory (LPARL), Physics International (PI), and LASL 

personnel. Gas samples were obtained remotely from the zero 

point side of the OBP at 1515 hours. No toxic gas or positive 

80 

LEL level was noted in the LOS drift, and tunnel ventilation was 

reactivated. D-day reentry survey operations were terminated at 

1600 hours. 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

3.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

At 0810 hours on 25 October (D+l), a work party, accompanied 

by monitoring and industrial hygiene personnel, entered the tunnel en route to the gas seal door. Personnel were not required 

to wear anticontamination clothing or respiratory protection 

equipment. They arrived at the gas seal door at 0816 hours. No 

positive toxic gas, LEL, or radiation levels were detected on 

either side of the door. Water was noted on the zero point side 

of the door, so the drain line was opened and the in-line sump 

pump was put in operation. The gas seal door was opened at 0930 

hours, and railroad tracks were reinstalled through the gas seal 

door. 

The work party then moved to the gas seal plug. Air through 

the 36-inch crawl space in the gas seal plug showed no indication of toxic gas or positive LEL levels, and radiation readings 

at background. The vent line was hooked up through the plug at 

1015 hours. A member of the work party crawled through the gas 

seal plug to see if there was any standing water on the zero 

point side, but no water was found. At 1055 hours, the rescue 

team and reentry team Nos. 1 and 2 left the portal and traveled 

by train to the gas seal plug. Team No. 1 was to serve as the 

primary reentry team, and team No. 2 was to stand by on the 

portal side of the OBP to replace team No. 1 if necessary on the 

reentry. The work party returned to the portal. 

Permission was granted for reentry through the gas seal plug 

and towards the mechanical OBP. At 1110 hours, team No. 1, in 

full anticontamination clothing and self-contained breathing 

apparatus (SCBA), had moved through the plug; no toxic gas or 

above-zero LEL levels were noted, and the radiation level was at 

82 
background. As team No. 1 moved towards the OBP, minimal damage 

to the tunnel was observed. 

The mechanical OBP was reached at 1126 hours. Air samples 

taken from the zero point side of this OBP showed no indication 

of toxic gas, positive LEL, or above-background radiation levels. 

A water pump was started to draw out whatever water might exist 

on the zero point side of the plug. At 1156 hours, the rescue 

team and team No. 2 moved up to the mechanical OBP. The doors on 

each end of the OBP manway were opened and the ventilation lines 

were reconnected. At 1205 hours, team No. 1 had moved through 

the OBP and started towards the 03 drift. 

The first above-background radiation reading encountered was 

5 mR/h at the main drift/03 LOS drift junction. The LOS stubs 

area was reached at 1210 hours, and a reading of 80 mR/h was observed. In the LOS drift, industrial hygiene checks for toxic 

gas and LEL levels showed no positive results. Team No. 1 moved 

through the 03 bypass drift to the test chamber No. 1 crosscut, 

and sandbags in the crosscut were removed to provide access to 

the test chamber area. The maximum reading taken at contact with 

the outside of the test chamber was 200 mR/h. A reading of 400 

mR/h was taken on a section of the LOS pipe near the test 

chamber. Toxic gas checks inside the vent pipe above the test 

chamber indicated 1,300 ppm of carbon monoxide, a 19 percent 

oxygen level, and 5 percent of the LEL. At 1228 hours, the door 

to test chamber No. 1 was opened. A radiation reading of 400 

mR/h, a toxic gas level of 750 ppm of carbon monoxide, 5 percent 

of the LEL, and a 19 percent oxygen level were measured at arm's 

length inside the test chamber. No debris was observed in the 

bottom of the chamber, and air flow into the chamber was noted. 

Leaving the door to test chamber No. 1 open, team No. 1 

moved towards crosscut No. 2, observing damage in several of the 

alcoves. At 1320 hours, the exposure rate outside the sandbag 

plug was background, and the maximum reading at contact with the 

sandbags was 5 mR/h. Again, sandbags were moved to facilitate 

entry into the test chamber area. The exposure rate in the work 

83 
area at the beginning of sandbag removal was 0.1 mR/h. As the 

team moved closer to the test chamber through the sandbags, the 

exposure rate increased to 10 mR/h. A passageway was formed 

through the sandbags and the team approached test chamber No. 2. 

At 1340 hours, a reading of 140 mR/h was taken at contact with 

the LOS pipe on the portal side of test chamber No. 2. At 1345 

hours, the test chamber door was partially opened, and 10 percent 

of the LEL and 1,300 ppm of carbon monoxide were measured just 

inside the door. The radiation reading at arm's length inside 

the test chamber was 140 mR/h. 

At 1400 hours, film recovery from one of the alcoves was 

begun. At 1409 hours, recovery of the film had been completed 

and team No. 1 prepared to exit the tunnel. The team stopped to 

fasten closed the door to test chamber No. 1 as an aid in 

ventilation of the LOS pipe. At 1411 hours, permission for team 

members to remove their face masks was received. The team reconnected the vent line on the zero point side of the mechanical 

OBP before returning through the plug. Clothing of team members 

was surveyed by Radsafe personnel from team No. 2 upon return 

through the OBP. No contamination was detected. Swipes taken 

from inside the test chambers read background when checked with a 

portable Geiger-Mueller detector, indicating no radioactive 

debris had entered the test chambers as a result of device 

detonation. At 1434 hours, the train had returned with all the 

teams to the portal. This concluded initial reentry operations. 

A tunnel hazard and damage survey was begun at 0910 hours on 

28 October 1975 and completed at 1015 hours before recovery 

personnel were allowed into the tunnel work areas. The exposure 

rate at each test chamber had decreased to 10 mR/h, and the 

exposure rate in the stubs area was 3 mR/h. A work party began 

to install railroad tracks and repair damage to the ventilation 

system in the 03 bypass drift. At 1100 hours, an assessment 

party in full anticontamination clothing and full-face masks with 

high efficiency particulate aerosol (HEPA) filters went to view 

experiments in the LOS pipe. Two members of the party donned 

SCBA and entered the LOS pipe to view the TAPS. At 1500 hours, 

experimenters were allowed into test chamber No. 2 for removal of 

84 
hazardous and time-degradable experiments. The exposure rate in 

the chamber was 7 mR/h. All personnel in the LOS pipe were 

required to wear full anti-contamination clothing (including 

coveralls, hoods, totes, and gloves) and full-face masks with 

HEPA filters. These requirements remained in effect throughout 

the recovery period for all personnel working in the test 

chambers. Any exceptions to these requirements were made only 

with the permission of the SLA Health Physicist. At 1600 hours, 

miners began work on mining out the gas seal plug and mechanical 

OBP. Experiment recovery personnel exited the LOS and test 

chamber areas by 1730 hours. The gas seal plug was completely 

mined out and railroad tracks were relaid during the night. Work 

to open up the mechanical OBP continued. 

On 30 October, experiment recovery personnel entered test 

chambers No. 1 and 2 to continue experiment removal. The 

exposure rate inside the LOS pipe work area was 4 mR/h, and no 

carbon monoxide and 0 percent of the LEL were observed. All 

personnel were out of the 03 bypass drift and LOS pipe area by 

1700 hours. Miners continued to work on the OBP. 

Railroad tracks were installed through the OBP on the 

morning of 31 October 1975. At 0900 hours, recovery personnel 

returned and continued experiment removal. All personnel were 

out of the recovery area by 1245 hours: contamination was not 

detected on their personal clothing. 

Ventilation was established at 1515 hours on the zero point 

side of the TAPS door by SLA and Radsafe personnel wearing full 

anticontamination clothing and SCBA. A survey of the air from 

the zero point side of the TAPS showed less than the LEL and a 1 

mR/h exposure rate. The air in the main vent line at the 01 

drift/03 drift junction (through which the air behind the TAPS 

was being drawn) showed zero percent of the LEL and only a trace 

of carbon monoxide when surveyed. 

On 3, 4, 5, and 7 November 1975, experimenter personnel 

continued recoveries in the LOS drift and test chambers Nos. 1 

85 
and 2. Mining personnel worked to rehabilitate the 03 bypass 

drift and damaged crosscuts. On 3 November, the flex line above 

test chamber No. 2 (drawing air from behind the TAPS) showed 100 

ppm of carbon monoxide and 15 percent of the LEL. The flex line 

at the TAPS door also was tested and showed 100 percent of the 

LEL with 5,500 ppm of carbon monoxide. Because there was no 

pressure behind the TAPS door, ventilation was discontinued. 

Full-face masks continued to be a requirement for personnel in 

both test chambers. Recoveries from test chamber No. 1 were 

completed on 4 November. 

After experimenter personnel had left the area on 4 

November, ventilation was reestablished behind the TAPS door. At 

the time of hookup of the flex line, 100 percent of the LEL and 

2,000 ppm of carbon monoxide were measured. Compressed air was 

forced onto the zero point side of the TAPS door to supply 

positive air pressure for ventilation. BY day shift on 5 

November, zero percent of the LEL and only a trace of carbon 

monoxide were indicated in the 03 bypass vent line. By 1100 

hours on 7 November, all experiments had been removed. 

The miners continued to clean up and rehabilitate the LOS 

and bypass drifts on 10 November. Also, pipefitters began work 

in the LOS pipe to open the TAPS door this date. By 12 November, 

the TAPS door had been loosened. Levels of 10 ppm of carbon 

monoxide and 10 percent of the LEL were measured behind the TAPS. 

Water began to flow from behind the TAPS and the pipefitters were 

required to leave the area. No beta or gamma activity was 

detected in this water. A pump was placed and a hole was drilled 

in the bottom of the LOS pipe to drain the water. A gas sample 

drawn from the zero point side of the TAPS on 13 November showed 

no indication of toxic gases and zero percent of the &EL. 

Pipefitters opened the door at 1000 hours that day. ’ An 

assessment survey was performed from the TAPS toward DAC No. 1. 

The LOS pipe was extensively damaged; readings of 0.08 mrad/h 

(beta plus gamma) and 10 percent of the LEL were made at the 

furthest accessible point (100 feet from the TAPS). No toxic 

gases were detected. 

86 
At 1030 hours on 14 November 1975, DNA and Pan Am photographers entered the TAPS area. At 1300 hours the same day, an 

H&N party entered the LOS pipe for an engineering survey. All 

personnel were out of the LOS area by 1500 hours. This completed 

reentry and recovery activities. Miners continued cleanup and 

rehabilitation in the LOS area through 19 November, when work in 

the area was abandoned. 

3.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

Work resumed in the 03 bypass drift on 12 July 1976 to 

assess the performance of the DAC and to recover items from DAC 

No. 2. An air quality and radiation survey was conducted that 

morning prior to allowing workers in the area. The radiation 

level was at background, and 6,400 ppm of carbon dioxide was 

noted: no indications of carbon monoxide were found. Water was 

observed on the invert. The vent line was hooked up to about 325 

feet into the drift to restore ventilation. By 1415 hours, the 

carbon dioxide level had dropped to 2,400 ppm at 350 feet into 

the drift. Miners started cleanup operations the next day. A 

test of the air showed the carbon dioxide level to be at 3,200 

ppm. Mucking operations were started on the portal side of the 

vent line end. Water samples were collected at 350 feet into the 

03 bypass drift and from the LOS pipe at crosscut No. 1. No 

above-background radiation readings were noted from these 

samples. A survey showed that the carbon dioxide level varied 

from 900 ppm to 1,300 ppm from the Radsafe station to 350 feet 

into the bypass drift, so the vent line was extended to about 400 

feet into the drift. 

As mucking and mining activities proceeded, the vent line 

was moved back to 325 feet into the drift because it interfered 

with operations. The carbon dioxide level was at 2,600 ppm on 15 

July when blasting and mucking operations on the 03 reentry drift 

began. During this mining, an 18- to 22-foot probe hole was 

drilled in the face before each round was loaded to determine if 

radiation would be encountered or if any other hazard might exist 

after the round was fired. No radiation was encountered during 

any probe. The carbon dioxide level did not, however, return to 

87 
that of normal air. Mining operations continued through 30 July, 

when the heading was at 135 feet into the 03 reentry drift and 

the miners were sent to work in N tunnel. No further reentry 

mining was conducted for the HUSKY PUP event. 

3.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

No drilling to recover zero point core samples was performed 

for the HUSKY PUP event from the Mesa or any underground area. 

3.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to 

measure radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The 

results were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and 

drilling, were established by REECo and emphasized during all 

operations. A written standard operating procedure was required 

for each operation involving explosives, toxic materials, 

radioactive material, or any other operation with the potential 

for personal injury. Each individual involved in such an 

operation was required to know the contents of the applicable 

procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

ERDA-issued miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on the 

initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the 

Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus and had used the 

McCaa two-hour breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and 

regulations, as spelled out in the t'U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," 

were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, 

88 
stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

2. AEC Manual 0500 Series for the Nevada Test Site.* 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. HUSKY PUP Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1013 hours on 24 October and 

all telemetry stations were secured at 1012 hours on 28 October. 

No radiation other than that from normal activation products was 

detected by telemetry units. 

The initial radiation surveys began at 1057 hours on 24 

October and were completed at 1146 hours. No radiation above 

background was detected at the Mesa trailer park area or at the 

tunnel complex portal. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 0810 hours on 25 October. 

A maximum reading of 400 mR/h was detected at contact with the 

LOS pipe near test chamber No. 1 and at arm's length inside test 

chamber No. 1. The maximum toxic gas concentration and LEL 

percentage detected during initial reentry were 1,300 ppm of 

carbon monoxide and IO percent of the LEL, respectively, measured 

inside the door to test chamber No. 2. 

*Applicable parts of the AEC NTSO SOP 0500 series were not 

superceded until 1982. 

89 
During experiment recovery, no airborne radioactive 

contamination was detected. Readings of 5,500 ppm of carbon 

monoxide and 100 percent of the LEL were observed in a flex line 

during ventilation of the zero point side of the TAPS; therefore, 

respiratory protection equipment was required inside the LOS pipe 

throughout experiment recoveries. All experiments were recovered 

between 28 October and 7 November 1975. 

On 12 July 1976, reentry mining operations began in the 03 

bypass drift. This effort continued until 30 July 1976 when 

miners were moved to N tunnel for another mining operation. No 

radiation was encountered during the mining of the reentry drift, 

but positive carbon dioxide readings were noted throughout the 

work period. No further reentry activities were pursued. 

No drilling for recovery of core samples was conducted from 

the Mesa or from any underground location for the HUSKY PUP 

event. 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters 

were documented on Area Access Registers during individual 

entries to HUSKY PUP radex areas from 25 October to 11 November 

1975, when the use of Area Access Registers was discontinued. A 

total of 133 entries into Radex areas was recorded, 44 of which 

were made by DOD-affiliated participants. Although pocket 

dosimeters showed some indication of possible radiation exposure, 

film badges worn by reentry personnel (those most likely to be 

exposed) indicated no evidence of any gamma exposures. The 

minimum detectable gamma exposure with the NTS film dosimeter was 

30 mR. 

90 
SECTION 4 

MIGHTY EPIC EVENT 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

MIGHTY EPIC was a DOD-sponsored test conducted at 1250 hours 

Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 12 May 1976 with a yield of less 

than 20 kilotons. The test was the seventh in the Hussar Sword 

series. The device was detonated in the U12n.10 drift of the N 

tunnel complex (Figure 4.1) at a vertical depth of 1,306 feet. 

The purpose of the event was to test the response of materials 

and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment, study effects 

of severe ground shock on hardened structures, and observe the 

geologic interface with each type of structure. An evacuated 

horizontal LOS pipe 1,800 feet long was used to house 

experiments. DOD and supporting organizations conducted 27 

projects to obtain the desired information. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent from the test was detected onsite or 

offsite. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

4.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all MIGHTY EPIC project activities in Area 

12 was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. 

Responsibilities of ERDA and ERDA contractor personnel were in 

accordance with established ERDA-DOD agreements or were the 

subject of separate action between Field Command/DNA, and the 

ERDA Nevada Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

91 
L3U 

1 I 

0 009 
removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LLL fielded 

the device, the LLL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

ERDA Test Controller relieved the LLL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller determined that venting 

had not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological 

safety to the DOD Test Group Director. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

Lockheed Missiles &I Space Co., Inc. (LMSC) was responsible by contract for providing the design of the basic 

test facilities, developing the delivery schedule, and 

monitoring the installation of hardware and operation of 

the vacuum system for the MIGHTY EPIC LOS facilities. 

The MIGHTY EPIC program was conducted as part of a 

concept for cost-effectiveness called the l'two-for-onel' 

plan. This plan consisted of executing two underground 

tests in succession, using as much of the same hardware, 

tunnel area, and installations as possible from the 

first test for the second test. After execution of the 

first event (MIGHTY EPIC), a new zero point would be 

located some 500 feet closer to the portal for the 

second test (DIABLO HAWK, see Chapter 6). 

The LOS pipe system was composed of an 1,800-foot LOS 

pipe containing four test chambers (one being a highfluence station) to house experiments, a diagnostic stub 

93 
system, and two discrete scatterer systems. Ten data 

and two background detectors were fielded to measure the 

total x-ray fluence. To supplement the x-ray 

experiments, the A, B, and C structure drifts and the 

interface drift were excavated for ground shock and 

interface movement experiments. (See Figure 4.2.) Two 

main crosscuts connected the test chambers to the 10 

bypass drift, and two smaller crosscuts provided access 

to the LOS drift from the A and B structure drifts. 

ROSES units, used to monitor and record test results 

underground, were located in drift U12n.11, mined off 

the U12n.08 drift: and detection and recording trailers 

were placed on the Mesa and at the tunnel portal to 

remotely measure test results. A cable drift connecting 

underground monitoring equipment with surface recorders 

was drilled into the interface drift. Experimenters 

represented in the test included FC/DNA; Space and 

Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO); Navy Strategic 

Systems Project Office (SSPO); AFWL; Kaman Sciences 

Corporation/Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

(KSC/LMSC); LPARL; Science Applications, Incorporated 

(SAI); Merritt Cases, Inc. (CASES); Stanford Research 

Institute (SRI): Agbabian Association (AA); Waterways 

Experiment Station (WES); Systems, Science and Software 

(SSS); PI: LMSC; KSC; Field Command, Test Management, 

Test Director (FCTMD); Field Command, Test Management, 

Construction (FCTMC); Technical Representatives, 

Incorporated (TRI); DNA/EDAC (Engineering Decision 

Analysis Company): General Electric (GE): LMSC/SSPO; C. 

S. Draper Laboratory (Draper); SLA, LASL, and LLL. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with ERDA 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and 

equipment support. 

94 
300 

FEEl 

TC - TEST CHAYBER 

HFS - HIQH FLUENCE SCAlTERER 

TAPS - TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

Figure 4.2 MIGHTY EPIC event - tunnel and pipe layout. 
Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed: provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations: and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, 

plastic suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Samplinq Support. 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 40 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for MIGHTY 

EPIC as shown in Table 4.1 and Figures 4.3 and 4.4. 

Also, an air sampling unit was placed at the tunnel 

portal. All RAMS units and the air sampling unit were 

installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

EPA operated 16 air sampling stations and 32 gamma rate 

recorder stations in the offsite area. Two hundred 

seventy thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) also were 

placed to verify offsite radiation levels. Twenty-one 

96 
Table 4.1. MIGHTY EPIC event RAMS unit locations 

12 May 1976. 

SURFACE 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

ICH 

VH 

From the U12n portal: 

At the portal 

On the filter system 

On the vent line 

On the vent line 

On the tunnel drain line 

399 feet N 16" E azimuth 

275 feet N 89" E azimuth 

364 feet S 16" E azimuth 

482 feet S 12" W azimuth 

558 feet S 48" W azimuth 

417 feet N 69" W azimuth 

1,369 feet S 43" E azimuth 

From the cable downhole: 

At cable downhole 

177 feet N 43" E azimuth 

135 feet S 33" E azimuth 

375 feet S 31" W azimuth 

78 feet S 89" W azimuth 

From the U12n.10 SGZ: 

455 feet N 22" E azimuth 

688 feet S 61" E azimuth 

426 feet S 39" W azimuth 

At the interface cable hole 

At the mesa vent hole 

97 
Table 4.1. MIGHTY EPIC event RAMS unit locations 

12 May 1976 (Continued). 

UNDERGROUND 

Station Location 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

*27ER 

28 

29 

From the U12n.08 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

880 feet into the U12n.10 LOS drift 

510 feet into the U12n.10 LOS drift 

110 feet into the U12n.10 LOS drift 

500 feet into the U12n.10 bypass drift 

200 feet into the U12n.10 bypass drift 

85 feet into the U12n.10 bypass drift 

85 feet into the U12n.10 bypass drift 

150 feet into the U12n.11 drift 

435 feet into the U12n.08 drift from the U12n.05 

drift 

30 

31 

From the U12n main drift: 

1,900 feet into the U12n.05 bypass drift 

600 feet into the U12n.05 drift 

32 

33 

*34ER 

35 

36 

37 

From the U12n portal unless otherwise indicated: 

2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

50 feet into the U12n vent line raise from the U12n 

main drift 

38 200 feet into the U12n main drift 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

98 
0 600 

I J 

FEET 

Figure 4.3 MIGHTY EPIC event - surface RAMS. 
Figure 4.4 MIGHTY EPIC event - underground RAMS. 
EPA personnel were fielded for offsite surveillance 

activities. 

D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations.t' 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or 

control stations for issue of stay-in badges, or issue 

and return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

closed area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the 

USAF for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, 

if needed. In addition, the USAF provided a c-130 and 

crew on standby status for cloud tracking. The EPA 

provided a Turbo Beech and crew for cloud sampling. 

Another EPA aircraft was standing by in Las Vegas to 

undertake tracking duties, if required. 

4.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

4.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

On 12 May at 0001 hours, all persons except the arming 

party, tunnel button-up party, microwave timing party, and 

security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of the muster 

101 
area. Permission was granted to arm the device. Button-up was 

delayed because problems with experiments existed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0600 hours on 12 May in 

anticipation of planned test execution between 0900 and 1100 

hours that day. The time was not fixed because the abovementioned problems with the experiments were not resolved. 

Conditions for test execution became favorable, and by 1025 

hours, all personnel were mustered out of the area. 

The MIGHTY EPIC device was detonated at 1250 hours PDT on 

12 May 1976. 

4.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1251 hours on 12 May 1976. 

RAMS unit Nos. 2 through 12, 15, 35, and 37 (located as shown in 

Figures 4.3 and 4.4) were driven negative by electromagnetic 

pulse (EMP) but later recovered. RAMS unit No. 21 was made 

inoperable by the detonation and never recovered. The RAMS units 

located in the LOS drift responded to neutron activation of the 

LOS pipe and experiments. These units, RAMS Nos. 22 and 23, read 

750 R/h and 500 R/h, respectively, immediately after detonation. 

Normal decay of this activation radiation was observed. All 

other RAMS units reflected background radiation levels. At 1258 

hours, RAMS units Nos. 2 through 12 and No. 15 were functioning, 

showing only background readings. No indications of radioactive 

effluent were detected by any tunnel, surface, or airborne 

radiation monitoring units. All RAMS units were secured at 0800 

hours on 14 May 1976, when RAMS unit Nos. 22 and 23 were reading 

50 mR/h and 72 mR/h, respectively. 

4.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Four reentry teams (one team each to survey the main Mesa 

trailer park, Mesa interface trailer park, portal area, and 

portal area ventilation system) were released from Gate 300 at 

1351 hours on the day of detonation. The portal area surveys 

were completed at 1432 hours, the main Mesa trailer park survey 

102 
was completed at 1435 hours, and the Mesa interface trailer park 

survey was completed at 1450 hours. No radiation levels above 

background (0.05 mR/h) were detected. During remote gas 

sampling, a trace of carbon monoxide was noted on the zero point 

side of the main OBP. A 0.1 mrad/h radiation level at contact 

with the sampling bag and a trace of carbon monoxide were noted 

from a sample taken remotely from inside the LOS pipe. Mesa and 

portal data recovery were conducted between 1645 and 1745 hours. 

D-day operations were terminated at 1810 hours. 

4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

4.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

Remote gas sampling was again performed the morning of 13 

May 1976 (D+l), before any personnel entered the tunnel. All 

surveys indicated normal air. At 0745 hours, a work party 

entered the tunnel bound for the gas seal door. No anticontamination clothing was required. The gas seal door was opened and 

the work party moved to the gas seal plug. Ventilation was 

established on the zero point side of this plug. A pump was set 

up to reduce the one-foot-deep water visible on the zero point 

side invert. Tracks were reinstalled through the gas seal door, 

and the work party returned to the portal at 0925 hours with no 

positive LEL, toxic gas, or above-background radiation level 

having been encountered. 

Reentry team No. 1 entered the tunnel wearing full anticontamination clothing, which included gloves, coveralls with 

openings taped, a hood, and totes. No respiratory protection was 

required to the OBP. At 0936 hours, the backup reentry team 

(team No. 2) and the rescue team entered the tunnel to set up a 

fresh air station at the gas seal plug. By 1010 hours, team No. 

1 had reached the OBP. No toxic gas or positive LEL levels were 

observed, and all radiation readings were background, so 

ventilation was reestablished to the zero point side of the OBP. 

The team moved through the OBP at 1118 hours, each member wearing 

SCBA, and immediately reestablished the ventilation lines to the 

rest of the tunnel complex. 

103 
At 1137 hours, the team arrived at the LOS stubs area. The 

maximum exposure rate was 8 mR/h (gamma) near the left rib on the 

LOS pipe, with a maximum contact radiation level of 10 mrad/h 

(beta plus gamma). The team moved at 1143 hours to test chamber 

No. 1, and a reading made at contact with the test chamber door 

was greater than 200 mR/h. The general radiation level in the 

area was 140 mR/h. An exposure rate of 600 mR/h and 600 ppm of 

carbon monoxide were detected at arm's length inside the test 

chamber when the chamber door was opened slightly. Part of the 

team went into the ROSES units area at 1212 hours; no percentage 

of the LEL or toxic gas was measured, and the radiation level in 

the area was background. At 1340 hours, the team had moved to 

test chamber No. 3 and opened the door. A reading of 500 mR/h 

was taken at arm's length inside the door. A toxic gas level of 

200 ppm of carbon monoxide, 0 percent of the LEL, and a 20 

percent oxygen level were measured in the vent line over the 

chamber. At this point, team No. 2, dressed in full 

anticontamination gear and SCBA, replaced team No. 1 for the rest 

of the reentry. 

At 1430 hours, the door to test chamber No. 2 was opened. 

Fifteen percent of the LEL and 500 ppm of carbon monoxide were 

measured, the oxygen content of the air was 21 percent (normal), 

and the radiation reading was 400 mR/h, each measurement taken at 

three feet inside the test chamber. Swipe samples were taken 

inside the chamber, which showed indications, when later 

analyzed, of some removable contamination in the LOS pipe. The 

door was reclosed, and the team moved on to assess damage to the 

rest of the LOS pipe and the tunnel complex and to recover 

designated equipment. At about 1,060 feet into the 10 bypass 

drift, water was noted coming from the left rib, and a sample was 

taken. All personnel returned to the portal by 1604 hours. The 

water sample taken was read with a portable Gieger-Mueller 

counter; only background radiation levels were noted. Reentry of 

the LOS pipe and test chambers remained to be completed the next 

day. 

Recovery parties scheduled to go into the ROSES area at 1610 

hours were not required to wear anticontamination clothing or 

104 
respiratory protection as all radiation, toxic gas, and LEL 

levels in that area were the same as those before the test. 

Personnel going to recover experiments in the LOS stubs area, 

from the test chamber No. 3 stubs, and from the air scatterer 

station were required to wear full anticontamination clothing. 

Full-face masks also were required in each area where the LOS 

pipe might be open. Radsafe monitors and industrial hygiene 

personnel escorted each recovery group into its respective area. 

Miners began excavating the gas seal plug during swing shift on 

D+l. Recovery personnel were checked out at 1955 hours at the 

"hot line." Some personnel showed minor levels of contamination 

on their skin and were decontaminated through washing of the 

affected area. Mining out the gas seal plug continued throughout 

the night. 

At 0910 hours on 14 May 1976, a safety assessment team 

departed the portal into the tunnel. Part of this group included 

one Radsafe monitor, an industrial hygiene representative, and 

one miner. Members of this group were dressed in double 

anticontamination clothing and SCBA to reenter the LOS pipe to 

the TAPS door. Personnel not entering the TAPS area, but who 

were making a hazard and damage survey of the test chambers, were 

dressed in double anticontamination clothing and full-face masks 

with HEPA filters. Test chamber No. 3 was entered at 1000 hours; 

the exposure rate outside the test chamber was 60 mR/h, and the 

exposure rate inside the chamber was 130 mR/h. At 1015 hours, 

personnel dressed to reenter to the TAPS left the rest of the 

team, reaching the TAPS door at 1030 hours. A water leak was 

noted at the TAPS door. Zero percent of the LEL was noted, but 

600 ppm of carbon monoxide was measured at the leak. The area 

exposure rate was 1 mR/h. In the vent line above test chamber 

No. 1, 300 ppm of carbon monoxide was noted, and inside the doors 

at test chamber Nos. 1 and 2, levels of 100 and 150 ppm of carbon 

monoxide, respectively, were observed. The safety assessment 

team returned to the portal at 1125 hours. 

A work party entered the tunnel at 1330 hours on the same 

day to drain water flowing from behind the TAPS. A flange was 

removed from the zero point side of test chamber No. 3, and a 

105 
pump was set up. At 1,060 feet into the 10 bypass drift, water 

was pouring into the tunnel at the rate of four to five gallons a 

minute: at the LOS pipe, water was accumulating at the rate of 

three to four gallons per minute. Mining out of the gas seal 

plug and OBP was discontinued at 2000 hours because the water was 

building up. Radsafe monitors accompanied tunnel personnel 

during checks made at the OBP of the water buildup through 17 

May. All area and water readings were background: no positive 

LEL or toxic gas levels were found. 

On 17 May, water continued to drain into the drift. Miners 

once again began work at 0245 hours, however, to remove the gas 

seal plug and OBP. No radiation hazard existed so no anticontamination clothing was required. A LOS pipe reentry team wearing 

anticontamination clothing and SCBA departed from the portal at 

1300 hours to go to the TAPS area. The radiation level outside 

test chamber No. 3 was 50 mrad/h (beta plus gamma). Inside the 

chamber, 85 mrad/h and 20 ppm of carbon monoxide were measured, 

but no positive LEL percentage was found. The carbon monoxide 

concentration measured at the TAPS was 400 ppm. Efforts to 

ventilate and clean up inside the LOS pipe on the zero point side 

of test chamber No. 3 continued into swing shift. Personnel 

cleaning up debris wore double anticontamination clothing and 

full-face masks. Tracks were laid through the OBP on swing 

shift, and a flex line was brought in to ventilate inside the LOS 

pipe. 

Radsafe and SLA personnel in full anticontamination clothing 

and SCBA sampled the leak at the TAPS door on 18 May, and 100 ppm 

of carbon monoxide and 45 percent of the LEL were measured. 

Damage to the gas sampling valves in the door prevented taking 

measurements until the valves were repaired at 1545 hours. Ten 

percent of the LEL and 100 ppm of carbon monoxide were measured 

through the TAPS door at that time. 

At 0820 hours on 19 May, a scientific assessment team 

dressed in double anticontamination clothing and full-face masks 

with HEPA filters entered the LOS pipe. Team members went into 

test chamber No. 3 at 1015 hours. The highest area exposure rate 

106 
encountered after entering all chambers was 3 mR/h, and the 

maximum reading at contact with the chamber interiors was 40 mR/h 

in test chamber No. 2. No toxic gas or positive LEL levels were 

observed. The scientific assessment team left the LOS pipe at 

1040 hours, and LASL and Pan Am parties then entered the pipe to 

take photographs. Lockheed and SLA personnel went into the 

scatterer alcove for experiment recovery. (No toxic gases and a 

0.2 mrad/h radiation level were measured.) All experimenter 

personnel wore full anticontamination clothing and full-face 

masks. All personnel were out of the pipe with their experiments 

at 1710 hours. 

Miners cleaned up and rehabilitated the LOS pipe and 

crosscut areas on 20 May. Various personnel requested tours of 

the LOS pipe; each person entering the pipe during this time was 

required to wear two pairs of totes, single pairs of coveralls 

and gloves, and a full-face mask with HEPA filter. LASL 

personnel conducted radiography in test chamber Nos. 1, 2, and 3 

during the entire swing shift and part of graveyard shift. 

Recoveries continued on 21 May and a Radsafe station was set 

up inside the tunnel. A survey inside the .LOS pipe showed a 2 

mR/h exposure rate, no toxic gases, 0 percent of the LEL, and a 

21 percent oxygen level. The exposure rate outside the pipe had 

decreased to background. Experiment removal and photography were 

conducted until 1300 hours. Experiment recoveries continued on 

24 and 25 May with full anticontamination clothing required, 

including double totes and full-face masks. 

On 26 May, pipefitters assisted recovery personnel in 

removing experiments and then installed a valve in the TAPS door. 

Miners continued to do cleanup and rehabilitation work throughout 

this period. 

On 27 May, a check was made behind the TAPS door: 2,800 ppm 

of carbon monoxide and greater than 100 percent of the LEL were 

measured. Limited ventilation was established behind the door. 

On 28 May, recovery of equipment and experiments continued. All 

effects experiments were recovered from test chambers by 28 May. 

107 
On 1 June 1975, readings from the zero point side of the 

TAPS door were taken. Results showed 500 ppm of carbon monoxide 

and 7 percent of the LEL were present. At 1215 hours, the TAPS 

door was opened by pipefitters wearing full anticontamination 

clothing, and water started running from behind the door. A pump 

was rigged up to drain this water. At 1520 hours, personnel 

entered the pipe and were able to walk to DAC No. 1; both the 

pipe and the experiments appeared in good condition. The 

radiation level at test chamber No. 4 was 6 mrad/h. A trace of 

carbon monoxide and 10 percent of the LEL also were measured. 

Experiment recovery continued with full anticontamination 

clothing and full-face masks required. 

On 2 June, the Pan Am photographer entered test chamber No. 

4 to take pictures. Miners continued to work on the OBP. All 

experiments had been removed from test chamber No. 4 on 3 June. 

This completed all recoveries that could be made at this time. 

(Additional recoveries of experiments were made as reentry mining 

progressed.) 

Drilling of holes through the DAC No. 1 door began on 4 

June. Pipefitters wearing full-face masks with supplied air 

drilled through the top of the DAC at 1025 hours. Greater than 

100 percent of the LEL and 800 ppm of carbon monoxide were 

detected through the hole. The radiation level was 4 mrad/h. A 

second hole was drilled, through which water poured. It was 

noted that the DAC had not closed properly. 

4.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

Mining began on 7 June 1975 at about 1,370 feet into the 10 

bypass drift to (1) recover special experiments, (2) recover LOS 

pipe and equipment to be used on the DIABLO HAWK event, and (3) 

facilitate underground core sampling operations. During this 

mining, an 18- to 22-foot probe hole was drilled in the face 

before each round was loaded to establish what conditions would 

exist after the round was fired (presence of water, radiation, 

or other hazards). The rock excavated (muck) by each blast or by 

mining equipment was surveyed for radiation levels. 

108 
Work continued through 7 September 1975 with no radiation 

encountered during mining and mucking operations. Throughout 

this period, mining personnel were preparing the LOS pipe for 

removal and reuse during the forthcoming DIABLO HAWK event. Five 

reentry drifts (called the A & B reentry drift, A crosscut, B 

crosscut, bypass reentry drift, and DAC No. 1 crosscut, see 

Figure 4.5) were mined. Some positive radiation readings were 

encountered during removal of the LOS pipe and related equipment, 

and some ventilation problems occurred. Precautions, including 

full anticontamination clothing and full-face masks with supplied 

air or HEPA filters, were implemented as required during mining 

and removal operations. 

On 23 September 1975, mining of the interface reentry drift 

began at 1,609 feet into the 10 bypass drift. Above-background 

radiation levels were noted during this mining operation, and 

anticontamination clothing requirements including coveralls, 

gloves and miner's boots were required inside the "hot line." 

This mining was conducted simultaneously with preevent DIABLO 

HAWK mining. Work on the interface reentry drift continued 

through 7 April 1977. 

4.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

In the process of locating and mining out experiments and 

equipment from the MIGHTY EPIC reentry drifts, an extensive 

system of probe and exploratory holes were drilled. During 

drilling, each one of these holes was monitored daily by Radsafe 

personnel. Some holes showed above-background radiation 

readings, but the anticontamination clothing requirement inside 

the "hot line" already included coveralls, gloves, and miner's 

boots so no new requirements were necessary except for special 

areas and situations. The use of full-face masks and supplied 

air equipment was implemented as needed. There were two efforts 

underground to obtain core samples from the zero point (RE No. 1 

and 2) and a Mesa drillback operation which are described below. 

109 
TAPS -TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

DAC - DNA AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

RE - REENTRY 

-- REENTRY YININQ 

MAP NOT to SCALE 

RE NO. 2 _ 

Figure 4.5 MIGHTY EPIC event - postevent reentry mining and coring locations. 
Preparations began underground on day shift, 11 August 1976, 

to investigate the event chimney and retrieve core from the 

MIGHTY EPIC zero point area. Drilling on RE No. 1 finally began 

on 17 August, delayed because of various equipment problems. 

Drillers and personnel in the core removal area dressed in 

coveralls, totes, and gloves to begin operations, and a "hot 

line" was set up just inside the area security gate. (See Figure 

4.5 for the location of the security gate and "hot line.") The 

first measurable radiation from this hole was 14 mrad/h at a 

drilling depth of 40 feet. The work area radiation level 

increased to 0.15 mrad/h. One of the drillers contaminated his 

street clothes, in spite of the anticontamination clothing he 

wore, so a requirement of rain slickers was added to the other 

radiation protection clothing prescribed. The highest reading 

encountered during coring was 2.9 R/h, measured on core from a 

drilling depth of 99 feet, 3 inches into the hole. A sandbag dam 

was built at this time near the security gate to inhibit the 

spread of contaminated drilling water through the tunnel. The 

total depth of the core hole was 226 feet, which was reached at 

1315 hours on 25 August. The highest radiation level noted in 

the work area was 160 mrad/h, measured at contact with the invert 

on 19 August 1976. 

Mesa drilling operations to investigate the chimney and 

cavity began on 23 August 1976 and were terminated on 4 

September. Coring was performed, but no core with abovebackground radiation levels was obtained. Tests were run to see 

if tracer gas injected into the cavity through RE No. 1 could be 

detected through the Mesa drill hole. The hole was capped off 10 

November 1976. No exposures to personnel occurred during these 

tests. 

A second cavity core retrieval effort was begun 14 October 

1976. RE No. 2 was started close to where RE No. 1 had been 

drilled in the 10 bypass drift, so anticontamination clothing 

including coveralls, gloves, and miners boots was a requirement 

from the beginning of this operation. The work area radiation 

level was 1 mrad/h because the activity of the contaminated water 

from RE No. 1 drilling operations remained. 

111 
The first indication of radiation from RE No. 2 was at about 

84 feet into the hole, where a radiation level of 15 mrad/h was 

measured on the retrieved core. Although the work area radiation 

level continued to be only 1 mrad/h, a check of the core hole 

showed the presence of 500 ppm of carbon monoxide and 50 percent 

of the LEL at the drill hole opening, so drillers and safety 

personnel were required to wear supplied-air masks from that time 

forward. The highest radiation level detected on a core was 70 

mrad/h, measured on core pulled from about 100 feet into the hole 

on 18 October. The work area radiation level remained at 5 

mrad/h until this core was removed from the area. The highest 

contact radiation level measured during coring was greater than 

200 mrad/h, measured near the returned drill circulation water 

while near the lOO-foot drilling depth. By swing shift on 18 

October, the work area radiation level had dropped to 0.1 mrad/h, 

and it did not increase above 2 mrad/h during the rest of coring. 

On 28 October at 0645 hours, coring operations were discontinued 

at a total drilling depth of 175.2 feet. Valves eventually were 

installed on both of these reentry holes to prevent flow of air 

in or out of the cavity area. Cavity pressure-checking 

operations were conducted using these valves in November 1976 and 

in March 1977. 

A third reentry coring operation was conducted; core hole 

DNRE No. 2 (shown in Figure 4.5) was begun 5 November 1976. The 

highest work area exposure level noted was 0.2 mrad/h, which was 

caused more by the proximity of the drilling rig to the MIGHTY 

EPIC LOS pipe than by the radioactivity of the core retrieved. 

No core exceeded a radiation level of 2 mrad/h, and most of the 

core was at the background level. Work was completed on this 

hole on 10 November 1976. 

4.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to 

measure radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The 

results were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

112 
Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel ~nd prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and 

drilling, were established by REECo and emphasized during all 

operations. A written standard operating procedure was required 

for each operation involving explosives, toxic materials, 

radioactive material, or any other operation with the potential 

for personal injury. Each individual involved in such an 

operation was\ required to know the contents of the' applicable 

procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety ~hoes, safety boots, 

ERDA-issued miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on the 

initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the 

Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa 

two-hour breathing apparatus. standard safety rules and 

'regulations, as specified in the "U.S. 'Bureau of Mines Manual," 

were observed. HEPA canister filters were supplied routinely for 

hazardous situations where full-face masks were required. An 

array of specialized canister filters could be obtained upon 

request for special hazar,dous situations. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224) • 

2. AEC Manual 0500 Series for the Nevada Test site. 

3. Individual Safe operating Procedures (by ex~erimenter 

organization) . 

4. MIGHTY EPIC Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

113 
4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1251 hours on 12 May 1976 

and all telemetry stations were secured at 0800 hours on 14 May 

1976. No radiation other than that from usual activation 

products was detected by telemetry units. 

The initial radiation surveys of the Mesa and portal areas 

began at 1351 hours on 12 May and were completed by 1435 hours. 

No radiation above background was detected at the Mesa trailer 

park or at the tunnel complex portal. 

Reentry into the tunnel began with a work party at 0745 

hours on 13 May 1976. The maximum reading during reentry 

operations was 600 mR/h, detected at arm's length inside test 

chamber No. 1 on 13 May. The maximum toxic gas concentration and 

LEL levels were 2,800 ppm of carbon monoxide and greater than 100 

percent of the LEL, respectively, measured behind the TAPS door 

on 27 May. 

On 7 June, reentry mining operations began in the U12n.10 

bypass drift. A total of six reentry drifts were mined to 

implement equipment and experiment recovery operations. Reentry 

mining efforts continued through 7 April 1977. Some radiation 

was encountered during removal of portions of the LOS pipe and 

related equipment. 

An underground core sampling operation was conducted between 

11 August and 25 August 1977. The maximum reading on core from 

this hole was 2.9 R/h at a depth of about 99 feet into the hole. 

The highest radiation level recorded in the work area was 160 

mrad/h, taken at contact with the invert on 19 August. During a 

second underground drilling operation conducted between 14 

October and 28 October 1976, another core hole was drilled toward 

the MIGHTY EPIC zero point. The highest radiation level noted on 

this core was 70 mrad/h, measured on core retrieved from about 

100 feet into the drill hole. Drilling and safety personnel were 

required to wear supplied-air equipment throughout most of this 

114 
drilling effort because of the 200 ppm carbon monoxide and 50 

percent LEL levels measured near the drill hole opening. The 

highest radiation level noted in the work area was greater than 

200 mrad/h, measured at contact with returned drill circulation 

water. These underground radiation areas were controlled by the 

"hot line" set up inside the area security gate. Drilling on the 

Mesa to recover core was conducted from 23 August until 4 

September, but no core samples above background were retrieved. 

Personnel exposures during individual entries to MIGHTY EPIC 

radex areas from 2 May to 28 October 1976, when use of the Area 

Access Registers was discontinued, are summarized below. Average 

exposures are from self-reading pocket dosimeters as recorded on 

the Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film 

dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Loqqed (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 624 90 4.8 

DOD Participants 485 o* 4.6 

*The minimum detectable radiation exposure which could be 

measured by the NTS film badge dosimeter was 30 mR; an exposure 

of zero means any exposure received was below this level. 

115 
SECTION 5 

HYBLA GOLD EVENT 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

HYBLA GOLD was a DOD-sponsored test conducted at 1005 hours 

Pacific Standard Time (PST) on 1 November 1977 with a yield of 

less than 20 kilotons. The device was detonated in the U12e.20 

drift of the E tunnel complex (Figure 5.1) at a vertical depth of 

1,263 feet. The purpose of the event was to test the response of 

materials and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment and 

to obtain basic physics data related to blast and electromagnetic 

pulse generation for MX trench exposure in the source region. 

Five concrete pipes with varying types of surfaces were used to 

ascertain how the medium a missile would pass through during 

launch would affect the missile shell and trajectory. DOD and 

supporting organizations fielded 10 projects for this test. 

A minor stemming leak was observed but was contained 

completely by closures and secondary tunnel stemming. No 

radioactive effluent from the test was detected onsite or 

offsite. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

5.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all HYBLA GOLD project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of DOE* and DOE contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established DOE-DOD agreements or were the subject of 

separate action between Field Command/DNA, and the DOE Nevada 

Operations Office (DOE/NVOO). 

*DOE succeeded ERDA on 1 October 1977. 

116 
0 ooo 

RR 

Figure 5.1 HYBLA GOLD event - tunnel layout. 
Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

ERDA Manual Chapter 0560*, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LASL fielded 

the device, the LASL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

DOE Test Controller relieved the LASL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller determined that venting 

had not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological 

safety to the DNA Test Group Director. 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

This test was an experiment to study aspects of the MX 

missile system. The test was designed to collect 

physics information on shock front transit in concrete 

pipe and to study the effects of surface roughness, wall 

ablation, and expansion on this transit. Five pipes 

would terminate in a zero room containing a nuclear 

device, which, upon detonation, was designed to drive a 

strong air blast down each pipe. (See Figures 5.2 and 

5.3.) 

The HYBLA GOLD test complex utilized parts of the DINING 

CAR (1975) bypass drift, reentry drift, and associated 

alcoves. A new main and auxiliary drift were excavated 

to provide the desired pipe configuration. Two DNA 

*ERDA Manual Chapter 0560 was superseded by DOE Order 5610.3 in 

December 1981. 

118 

MVBU GOLD ZERO POINT 

,MNlNG CAR ZERO POINT 

HYBLA GOLD STEMMING 

...a 

Q :;:: DINING CAR STEMMING 

--- OUTLINE OF PRESHOT DINING CAR 

$ g 

f-d II 

_____~I__*---__--I__-. 

e. 

-_-_ _ ___-_-___- --~.~J”__‘““““___ 

,___ lJ12e.18 IDS DmwT 

c~~__~__--~---~- 

NUTTOSCALE 

Figure 5.3 HYBLA GOLD event - drift plan. 
Auxiliary Closures (DAC Nos. 1 and 2) were located in 

the U12e.18 LOS drift. The DINING CAR TAPS (in the 

U12e.18 LOS drift) was welded shut before the HYBLA GOLD 

event to prevent leakage from the U12e.18 LOS drift 

through the DINING CAR LOS pipe. The OBP was located in 

the U12e.14 drift as it had been for the DINING CAR 

(1975) and DID0 QUEEN (1973) events. 

Test cables generally were routed from the ground zero 

area through the respective pipe drifts (20 main or 

auxiliary) into the experimenter alcove, through the 

cable gas block at the OBP to the downhole alcove splice 

rack, from there to the cable gas block in the Mesa 

splice room, and finally into a Mesa recording trailer. 

Some recording trailers also were placed at the E tunnel 

portal. The gas seal plug also was placed as it had 

been for the DID0 QUEEN and the DINING CAR events. The 

gas seal door had been installed in the U12e main drift 

prior to the DORSAL FIN (1968) event was reused during 

the HYBLA GOLD event. 

Remote gas sampling lines were installed to sample air 

from the vent lines at the portal; zero point sides of 

the OBP, gas seal plug, and gas seal door: and portal 

sides of the OBP and drift protection plug (DPP). 

Manual gas sampling facilities were placed to take air 

samples from the zero point sides of the gas seal door, 

the gas seal plug, the OBP, and the DPP. 

Mining of the U12e.20 drift was started 11 March 1977 

and was completed by the end of April 1977. Zero room 

excavation and the auxiliary drift were completed by the 

end of June. The concrete experiment pipes, installation of experiments, and containment construction were 

completed by September 1977. 

An MFP dry run was conducted 6 October, and a successful 

post stemming MFP was conducted on 13 October 1977. 

Experimenters represented in the test included KSC; SRI: 

121 
sss ; Thompson, Ramo and Woolridge, Incorporated (TRW): 

and SLA. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with ERDA 

Manual Chapter 0524* and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and 

equipment support. 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, 

plastic suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

*ERDA Manual Chapter 0524 was in effect until May 1980 when it 

was superseded by DOE Order 5480.1 

122 
C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 39 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for HYBLA GOLD 

as shown in Table 5.1 and Figures 5.4 and 5.5. Also, an 

air sampling unit was placed at the tunnel portal. All 

RAMS units and the air sampling unit were installed a 

minimum of five days prior to scheduled device 

detonation. 

EPA operated 48 air sampling stations and 11 gamma rate 

recorder stations in the offsite area. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) also were placed to verify 

offsite radiation levels. Twenty-three EPA personnel 

were fielded for offsite surveillance activities. 

D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or 

exiting the controlled area were required to stop at 

muster or control stations for issue of stay-in badges, 

or issue and return of muster badges. After area 

control was established, all through traffic was 

diverted around the controlled area by use of screening 

stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

closed area before the final security sweep began. 

123 
Table 5.1. HYBLA GOLD event RAMS unit locations 

1 November 1977. 

SURFACE 

Station Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

From the U12es portal: 

On the filter system 

On the vent line 

On the vent line 

897 feet N 13" E azimuth 

572 feet N 62" E azimuth 

476 feet S 71" E azimuth 

382 feet S 22" E azimuth 

415 feet S 34" W azimuth 

492 feet N 44" W azimuth 

870 feet N 22" W azimuth 

On the tunnel drain line (at the U12es portal) 

1,885 feet N 89" E azimuth 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

From the cable downhole: 

At cable downhole 

209 feet N 04" E azimuth 

275 feet S 88" E azimuth 

190 feet S 08" E azimuth 

235 feet S 87" W azimuth 

18 

19 

20 

From the U12e.20 SGZ: 

500 feet due north 

500 feet S 60" E azimuth 

500 feet S 60" W azimuth 

124 
Table 5.1. HYBLA GOLD event RAMS unit locations 

1 November 1977 (Continued). 

UNDERGROUND 

Station Location 

21 

22 

From the U12e.14 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

1,400 feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift 

90 feet into the DAC No. 2 crosscut from the U12e.18 

bypass drift 

23 1,200 feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift 

*24ER 1,200 feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift 

25 1,180 feet into the U12e.18 LOS drift 

26 1,100 feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift 

27 600 feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift 

28 350 feet into the U12e.18 LOS drift 

29 

*30ER 

31 

32 

From the U12e.06 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

1,050 feet into the U12e.14 drift 

1,050 feet into the U12e.14 drift 

450 feet into the U12e.14 drift 

500 feet into the U12e.12 reentry drift from the U12e 

10 drift 

33 700 feet into the U12e.06 drift from the U12e main 

drift 

34 

*35ER 

36 

37 

38 

39 

From the U12e portal unless otherwise indicated: 

3,800 feet into the U12e main drift 

3,800 feet into the U12e main drift 

3,500 feet into the U12e main drift 

2,500 feet into the U12e main drift 

50 feet into the U12e main drift 

95 feet into the U12es drift from the U12es portal 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

125 
120 

0 If 

FEET 

Figure 5.4 HYBLA GOLD event - surface RAMS. 
PROTECTION PLUO 

Od 

PEET 

Figure 5.5 HYBLA GOLD event - underground RAMS. 
E. Air Support. 

Two UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the USAF 

for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, if 

needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130 and crew 

on standby status for cloud tracking. The EPA provided 

a Turbo Beech and crew for cloud sampling. Another EPA 

aircraft (C-130) was standing by in Las Vegas to 

undertake tracking duties, if required. 

5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

5.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

At 0001 hours, all persons except the arming party, tunnel 

button-up party, microwave timing party, and security guards were 

out of the tunnel and clear of the muster area. Permission was 

granted to arm the device, and button-up was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0800 hours in anticipation 

of planned test execution about 1000 hours that day. Conditions 

for test execution were favorable, and all personnel were 

mustered out of the area. The 15-minute countdown started as 

planned at 0950 hours PST and proceeded through zero time. 

The HYBLA GOLD device was detonated at 1005 hours PST on 1 

November 1977. 

5.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1006 hours on 1 November 

1977. Only RAMS unit Nos. 21, 22, and 23 showed above-background 

radiation readings because of a minor stemming leak. Normal 

radioactive decay of these levels was observed. All other RAMS 

units reflected background radiation levels. No indications of 

radioactive effluent were detected by any other tunnel, surface, 

or airborne radiation monitoring unit. RAMS unit Nos. 1 through 

20, 24ER, 25, 30ER, and 31 through 39 were secured at 1430 hours 

on 2 November 1977. The remaining 12 stations were secured at 

128 
about 1300 hours on 15 November 1977. A summary of the RAMS 

indications of the stemming leak is as follows: 

RAMS 

Unit 

No. 

21 

Increased Maximum Time of 

Readings Reading Maximum 

First Noted Noted Reading 

Between H+8 3.8 R/h H+33 mins. 

and H+9 mins. 

22 H+22 mins. 280 mR/h H+33 mins. 

23 H+37 mins. 18 mR/h H+7 hours 

5.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Three reentry teams (one team each to survey the Mesa 

trailer park, the portal area, and the portal area ventilation 

system) were released from Gate 300 at 1113 hours on the day of 

detonation. Surveys of all areas were completed at 1205 hours. 

No radiation levels above background (0.05 mR/h) were detected. 

The survey teams stood by, and gas samples were obtained remotely 

from various points inside the tunnel. All gas samples taken on 

the portal side of the DPP showed normal air. Gas samples on the 

zero point side of the DPP reflected 5 percent of the LEL, 10 ppm 

of carbon monoxide, and a radiation level of 80 mrad/h (beta plus 

gamma). Mesa and portal data recovery were conducted until 1430 

hours. D-day operations were terminated at 1600 hours. 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

Gas sampling again was conducted the next morning (D+l). 

The highest readings obtained were from the zero point side of 

the OBP, which included 10 ppm of carbon monoxide, 3,000 ppm of 

carbon dioxide, 3 percent of the LEL, and a 1.7 mrad/h radiation 

level. The ventilation system was restarted, providing fresh air 

to the gas seal door. 

No reentry was made into the tunnel until 3 November (D+2). 

The initial tunnel reentry was made in three stages: reentry to 

129 
the gas seal plug was conducted on 3 November, on 14 November 

reentry past the DPP was made, and on 29 November reentry was 

made into the DINING CAR LOS pipe on the portal side of the 

TAPS and the U12e.20 main and auxiliary drifts. 

Two teams (team No. 1 and the rescue team) entered the 

portal at 0923 hours on 3 November aboard the train, reaching the 

gas seal door at 0935 hours. The teams members were dressed in 

anticontamination clothing, but no self-contained breathing 

apparatus (SCBA) was required. Air from the zero point side of 

the gas seal door was sampled; zero percent of the LEL, no toxic 

gases, and only background radiation were observed from the 

sample. The team proceeded to open the access door. Water six 

inches deep was observed on the invert on the zero point side of 

the gas seal door, so a valve in the plug was opened to drain the 

water. A water sample was taken, but no above-background 

radiation levels were observed. 

Team No. 1 then moved through the gas seal door. Again the 

air was sampled; no toxic gas or positive LEL was noted, and a 

radiation level of 0.06 mrad/h was observed. The team continued 

towards the gas seal plug, reaching it at 0950 hours. Air was 

sampled through the plug. No above-background radiation or 

LEL level was observed, but 2,000 ppm of carbon dioxide was 

noted. At 0957 hours, the team began to open the 24-inch manway 

door. The vent line was hooked up to provide suction around the 

door. The 24-inch door was opened at 1005 hours, and work began 

to open the 36-inch manway door. At 1012 hours, the 36-inch door 

was opened and a team member passed through the crawl space to 

check for water on the zero point side. Water was observed on 

the invert about one foot below the bottom of the manway door. A 

water sample was taken, ventilation to the zero point side of the 

plug was verified, and the team returned to the gas seal door to 

ride to the portal on the train. The team was out of the tunnel 

by 1042 hours. No SCBA was worn on this reentry. 

Tunnel personnel began work on 3 November to open the gas 

seal door and mine out the gas seal plug. The tunnel was open to 

130 
the OBP by 11 November. No toxic gas, positive LEL, or abovebackground radiation level was encountered during this work 

effort. 

Team No. 1 again entered the tunnel on 14 November to 

continue reentry activities. The team departed the portal at 

0903 hours. Team members were briefed at the gas seal plug, and 

they started toward the OBP at 0921 hours, each equipped with 

SCBA but not wearing it. The condition of the tunnel generally 

was good all along the tunnel to the OBP. At 0932 hours, the 

team reached the OBP with no positive LEL or toxic gas measurements and radiation surveys reflecting background levels. 

Sampling behind the OBP commenced: no above-zero LEL or abovebackground radiation level was noted from these air samples, but 

a positive toxic gas reading of 500 ppm of carbon dioxide was 

observed. At 0940 hours, work was begun to open the 24-inch 

manway door. The door was opened slightly, and a survey verified 

that no radiation, toxic gas, or LEL levels above background 

existed in the crawl space. Work began to open the 36-inch 

manway door, but mechanical problems with the hydraulic system 

prevented opening of door on the portal side of the crawl space. 

One of the team members got hydraulic fluid in his eyes, so all 

members of the team returned to the portal at 1039 hours. 

Another miner was selected to replace the injured team 

member, and the reentry team returned inside at 1050 hours. The 

door on the portal side of the 36-inch manway continued to be a 

problem. The team worked, without SCBA, until 1215 hours when 

the door was opened. The ventilation system was connected to the 

24-inch manway to establish ventilation between the OBP and the 

DPP. Opening the 36-inch manway door on the zero point side of 

the plug now became a problem. At 1243 hours, ventilation 

through the 24-inch crawl space was discontinued so that two team 

members could crawl through the plug to try to manually open the 

manway door from the zero point side. Both team members were 

wearing supplied-air equipment with full-face masks. At 1319 

hours, the door was opened, and ventilation was reestablished 

before the team took a break for lunch. 

131 
At 1357 hours, the reentry team donned their SCBA and, by 

1403 hours, had passed through the manway to the zero point side 

of the OBP. Some damage was observed. The team moved through 

the 18 bypass and reached the U12e.18 LOS drift (DINING CAR) TAPS 

area at 1421 hours. No above-zero LEL or toxic gas level was 

noted, but a radiation level of 0.07 mrad/h (beta plus gamma) was 

observed. Air from the zero point side of the TAPS was sampled. 

No LEL or toxic gas level was observed, and radiation readings 

were at background levels. Team members were proceeded to the 

DPP, reaching it at 1438 hours. No indications of any LEL 

percentage or toxic gas level were found at the plug, and a 

radiation level of 0.08 mrad/h was noted. Team members were 

allowed to remove their face masks at 1459 hours. By 1530 hours, 

all members of the team had returned to the portal. Work to 

remove the OBP began on 15 November and continued until 28 

November. 

On 29 November 1977, the third phase of the reentry was 

begun. Team No. 1 and the rescue team left the portal at 0906 

hours in full anticontamination clothing. At 0915 hours, team 

members arrived at the OBP and donned SCBA with the intention of 

reentering the area on the zero point side of the DPP. The team 

reached the DPP at 0936 hours. An air sample was taken from the 

zero point side of the DPP before reentry was permitted to continue. No LEL or toxic gas level was noted, and the radiation 

level was 0.04 mrad/h. The team was instructed at this time to 

go to the portal side of the U12e.18 LOS drift TAPS. The gas 

sampling line was opened at the TAPS: zero percent of the 

LEL and no toxic gas level were observed, and the radiation level 

was 0.04 mrad/h. The 24-inch access door through the TAPS was 

opened, and ventilation into the experiment drift was 

established. 

The team returned to the DPP and began work to open the 

36-inch manway door at 1022 hours. At 1050 hours, the door was 

opened. Suction from the ventilation line at the TAPS provided 

positive air flow to the zero point side of the DPP, and only 

background LEL, toxic gas, and radiation levels were noted on the 

zero point side of the plug. Some removable contamination was 

132 
noted inside the DPP crawl space. (A swipe taken showed a 

removable contamination radiation level of 0.07 mrad/h.) The 

team had moved to the zero point side of the DPP by 1100 hours. 

Considerable structural damage was noted. 

The team continued into the U12e.20 auxiliary drift where 

more damage was observed, and a survey showed a radiation level 

of 0.15 mrad/h. The team turned back towards the U12e.18 drift. 

At the end of stemming in the U12e.18 bypass drift (see Figure 

5.3), a radiation level of 4 mrad/h was observed. Anticontamination clothing of team members was surveyed as they passed back 

through the DPP at 1128 hours. Because some of the readings from 

the personnel surveys were above background, the team members 

removed their anticontamination clothing and left it at the DPP. 

The team returned to the tunnel portal. No experiments were 

recovered until 3 May 1978. 

5.4.2 Postevent Rehabilitation and Recovery. 

No reentry mining was performed for this event, but miners 

cleaned and rehabilitated the OBP and U12e.18 drifts from 30 

November through 6 December 1977. Because no removable 

contamination was found in the area, no anticontamination 

clothing requirement was instituted. A Radsafe station was set 

up in the U12e.18 LOS drift. On 7 December, removal of the DPP 

was begun, and by 15 November the bulkhead on the zero point side 

of the plug had been reached. Miners cutting through this 

bulkhead were required to wear supplied-air equipment with fullface masks because heat from the cutting torch reacting with the 

coal tar epoxy used as a boundary gas seal around cables caused a 

health hazard. The bulkhead was removed on 15 November and 

miners worked to extend railroad tracks through the DPP. 

Rehabilitation of the U12e.18 LOS drift continued, but only 

personnel entering the area on the zero point side of the DPP 

were required to wear anticontamination clothing. Work continued 

until 1 January 1978 when the miners were moved from E tunnel to 

other mining efforts. 

133 
The tunnel was reopened on 11 April 1978 when removal of the 

OBP was begun. The decision had been made that the HYBLA GOLD 

event would be the last detonation in E tunnel, and efforts to 

remove and salvage or scrap equipment and structures had 

commenced. On 25 April, operations at the OBP were nearly 

completed and a survey of the 20 main/20 auxiliary junction area 

was made. The highest radiation level observed was at an 

existing drill hole in that area, DNRE #2, drilled during DINING 

CAR operations. The contact radiation level at this drill hole 

was 15 mrad/h; water leaking from the hole was at about 2 mrad/h. 

The radiation levels in the work areas ranged from background to 

0.1 mrad/h. Recovery of salvageable materials and scrap 

continued in the 20 drift areas. No items with removable 

contamination were allowed to leave the tunnel. 

On 2 May 1978, miners began to work in full anticontamination clothing including coveralls, totes, gloves, and suppliedair masks to bore into and sample water from the DNRE #2 drill 

hole casing, located near the DAC No. 2 crosscut in the 18 drift. 

Radsafe and industrial hygiene personnel supervised this boring 

operation. When the miners had completed drilling into the pipe, 

a maximum radiation level of 100 mrad/h was noted inside the 

drill pipe, with no indications of toxic gases or any LEL level. 

Water from the pipe was sampled and drained into barrels in which 

quick-drying cement was mixed to solidify this contaminated (100 

mrad/h) water. On3May, an sss representative removed some 

experiments from the end of the stemming area. The background 

radiation level at the 20 drifts junction had increased to 0.5 

mrad/h because the barrels containing the solidified contaminated 

water from DNRE #2 still were in the area. These barrels were 

removed on 4 May 1978, and the background radiation level fell 

back to 0.1 mrad/h. Other personnel from agencies participating 

in the test removed experiments and equipment intermittently 

until the tunnel was closed in December 1978. 

134 
5.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

Seven core holes were drilled in conjunction with the HYBLA 

GOLD event in the U12e.18 bypass drift between the DAC No. 1 

crosscut and the end of stemming. (See Figure 5.3 for drilling 

locations referred to below.) Upon completion of each of these 

holes, various surveys and tests were performed to determine the 

radiation and temperature levels inside the hole, the shape of 

the hole, and/or tests to judge the integrity of the ground into 

which the hole had been drilled. All of the personnel involved 

in these tests and surveys (which included REECo, USGS, Birdwell, 

H&N, and F&S personnel) were required to wear anticontamination 

clothing and conform with safety procedures as directed by the 

responsible health and safety personnel at the location. 

On 4 May, a drill rig was set up at 1,407 feet into the 

U12e.18 bypass drift to drill DNRE #4, which was to run parallel 

to DNRE #2. Preparations continued until 11 May when drilling 

actually began. The work area radiation level on the drilling 

platform was background, although radiation levels as high as 1 

mrad/h were observed in the surrounding area. These 

above-background levels were attributed to the proximity of DNRE 

#4 to DNRE #2. No radiation was detected on core from DNRE #4 

until 19 May when the hole was at a drilling depth of 164 feet. 

Because the drillers already were wearing anticontamination 

clothing, no new restrictions were imposed. The maximum 

radiation level noted on this core was greater than 200 mrad/h, 

measured on a segment of core from 181 feet into the hole on 19 

May. The total drilling depth of 242 feet was reached on 22 May. 

On 24 May, set up began for drilling of DNRE #3 at 1,338 

feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift. A new "hot line" was set up 

on the portal side of DAC No. 1, and drilling operations 

commenced 31 May. The work area radiation level on the drilling 

platform was 0.06 mrad/h, and, because there was no removable 

contamination in the area, the drillers no longer were required 

to wear anticontamination coveralls, only miner's boots or totes. 

135 
The total drilling depth of 334 feet was reached on 15 June 1978, 

with no above-background radiation levels encountered. 

USGS personnel began a ground integrity test in the DNRE #3 

drill hole on 27 June. This was completed 28 June, and the same 

test on DNRE #4 was begun. Because positive radiation readings 

were observed on water from this hole, personnel involved in this 

operation were required to wear coveralls, gloves, and totes. 

This test was completed in one day. 

Drilling of DNRE #5 was begun on 5 July 1978 at 1,346 feet 

into the U12e.18 bypass drift. The radiation level on the drill 

platform was background, and no coveralls were required. Total 

drilling depth was reached on 18 July at 279 feet, with only one 

above-background reading of 0.08 mR/h noted on core from 253 feet 

into the hole. 

Drill hole DNRE #7 was begun at 1,407 feet into the U12e.18 

bypass drift on 28 July. The total drilling depth of 283 feet 

was reached on 11 August with no above-background radiation 

levels observed. 

Drilling on DNRE #6 was begun on 18 August 1978 at 1,412 

feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift, where the radiation level was 

0.09 mrad/h. Gloves were made an anticontamination clothi.ig 

requirement. BY 24 August, full anticontamination clothing w :.s 

required because radiation was expected to be encountered at t.h2t 

point in the drilling effort: however, no radiation was _,__ CO31 

until 25 August when a drilling depth of 158 feet had b'?en 

reached. The core from this depth read 0.2 mR/h (5 mrad/h), aqd 

the work area radiation level increased to 0.3 mrad/h. Ver* 

little core was retrieved after this point, but a piece of cemel. 

was recovered from about 195 feet into the hole with a radiation 

level of around 200 mrad/h (30 mR/h). Water from the drilli:-rcr 

operations was measured at 0.11 mrad/h, so it was pumped into r7 

tank car and taken outside the tunnel. The radiation level in 

the area had increased to 1.5 mrad/h (1 mR/h), and anticontamination clothing requirements continued. Drilling ceased at a 

total drilling depth of 211 feet on 28 August. 

136 
Work on drill hole DNRE #8 commenced on 1 September 1978 at 

1,406 feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift. Because contaminated 

water existed in the area inside the radex areas established 

during previous drilling operations, the radiation level was 1 

mrad/h around the drilling equipment. 

On 5 September, the drilling crew returned from the weekend 

to the DNRE #8 work area to find the Radsafe station and the 

lunchroom filled with water that had come from a fracture in the 

lower right rib at 1,400 feet into the U12e.18 bypass drift. The 

water was not contaminated, and wearing anticontamination totes 

posed a safety hazard because the bottoms of the totes were 

extremely slick when wet. So plywood was placed on the invert 

from the zero point side of the "hot line" to the drill rig in 

the U12e.18 bypass drift to enable the drillers to wear only 

their miner's boots without becoming contaminated from any 

radioactive material on the invert. This also brought the 

general area radiation level down to 0.5 mrad/h. Drilling 

continued. 

On 6 September, grout was pulled from DNRE #8 with a 

radiation level of 5 mrad/h. Full anticontamination clothing 

once again was required. No other positive radiation readings 

were encountered until 232 feet into the hole. A maximum 

radiation level of greater than 200 mrad/h (60 mR/h) was measured 

on core from about 235 feet into the hole on 14 September. This 

core was placed in a side alcove so that the work area background 

radiation level would stay at as low as possible. 

By 15 September, water from the fracture in the lower right 

rib of the U12e.18 bypass drift began to flow at a rate of 25 

gallons per minute. A pump was set up to drain this water, and 

samples were taken to verify that no radioactive contaminants 

were present in it. Drilling was stopped at various times during 

the next few days because water was building up in the area. 

Positive radiation readings on core continued, and by 20 

September, the exposure rate in the area had increased to 1 mR/h 

(3 mrad/h). Because of the flooding, the drillers' lunchroom had 

137 
become contaminated, so they ate their lunch at the Radsafe 

station. The "hot line" was moved outside the lunchroom area 

(from 1,350 feet into the drift to 1,300 feet into the drift). 

By 21 September, enough water pumps had been added to drain the 

water so that the lunchroom was dry and could be decontaminated. 

When this decontamination was completed and the area surveyed, 

the "hot line" was again moved zero point side of the drillers' 

lunchroom. DNRE #8 was completed on 21 September at a drilling 

depth of 303 feet. Intermittent flooding continued to be a 

problem in the lunchroom area. 

On 25 September, a complete survey of the U12e.18 drift was 

made, and contamination was found from the end of stemming to 

about 1,180 feet into the drift. The Radsafe station and the 

"hot line" were relocated at crosscut No. 3 (about 800 feet into 

the U12e.18 drift). 

DNRE #9 was begun on 2 October 1978 on the right rib of the 

U12e.18 bypass drift at 1,404 feet into the drift. Previous 

drilling had brought the background radiation level up to 1.5 

mrad/h, and full anticontamination clothing was required. 

Above-background radiation levels of 0.2 mrad/h were observed 

first on core from 113 feet into the hole. Past a drilling depth 

of about 280 feet, very little core was retrieved. The cuttings 

(bits of material returned in the drill water) were monitored to 

determine the radiation level of each foot of newly drilled hole. 

On 20 October at 353 feet into the hole, efforts to core were 

abandoned and the drillers were instructed to try to drill to 410 

feet. On 23 October, cuttings from 390 feet into the hole showed 

a radiation level of 1 mrad/h, the highest radiation level noted 

from this operation. Drilling to 410 feet was completed that 

day. An additional 10 feet were drilled on 25 October to 

retrieve core at the request of DNA. Flooding was still a 

problem, but some of the water flow was stemmed when the DNRE #9 

drill hole was capped on 30 October. 

No further drilling was accomplished in the E tunnel 

complex. Various drill hole surveys and tests (including a HYBLA 

GOLD cavity pressure test) were performed from 1 November until 

138 
22 November when work began to grout in all the U12e.18 bypass 

drift DNRE drill holes. Movement of drilling and associated 

equipment out of the tunnel had already begun: each piece of 

equipment coming out of the contaminated area was checked to see 

if decontamination of the item was necessary before the equipment 

was moved to a different tunnel. Contaminated equipment was sent 

to the Area 6 Decontamination Facility. The grouting of all the 

18 bypass drill holes was completed on 29 November. On 4 

December 1978, all desired equipment had been removed and the 

tunnel was closed. 

5.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to 

measure radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The 

results were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes 

including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling, 

were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving explosives, toxic materials, radioactive 

material, or any other operation with the potential for personal 

injury. Each individual involved in such an operation was 

required to know the contents of the applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

DOE-issued miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on the 

initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the 

Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa 

two-hour breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and 

regulations, as spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," 

were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, 

139 
stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

2. AEC Manual 0500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. FCTD HYBLA GOLD Safety Instructions. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1006 hours on 1 November 

1977. All stations were secured by 1300 hours on 15 November. 

No radioactivity was detected outside the DPP by telemetry units. 

Initial radiation surveys of the Mesa and portal areas began 

at 1113 hours on 1 November and were completed by 1205 hours. No 

radiation above background was detected at the Mesa trailer park 

area or at the tunnel complex portal. 

Tunnel reentry was divided into three stages; the tunnel was 

reentered to the gas seal plug on 3 November, reentry past the 

DPP was made on 14 November, and team members reentered the 

U12e.20 main and auxiliary drift areas through the DPP in the 

U12e.18 bypass drift on 29 November. The maximum radiation level 

during reentry operations was 4 mrad/h, detected at the end of 

stemming in the U12e.18 bypass drift on 29 November. The maximum 

toxic gas concentration was 2,000 ppm of carbon dioxide, measured 

through the gas seal plug on 3 November 1977. Three percent of 

the LEL was measured during the reentry. 

140 
No reentry mining was conducted for the HYBLA GOLD event. 

No sampling to recover core samples was conducted on the 

Mesa. Underground core sampling operations were conducted 

between 11 May and 25 October 1978, during which time seven core 

sampling holes were drilled for the HYBLA GOLD event. A summary 

of these coring operations is as follows: 

DNRE Date 

Hole Hole 

Number Started 

3 05/31/78 1,338 0.05 0.06 06/15/78 

4 05/11/78 1,407 > 200 181 0.05 05/22/78 

5 07/05/78 1,346 0.08 253 0.05 07/18/78 

6 08/18/78 1,412 200 195 1.5 08/28/78 

7 07/28/78 1,407 0.05 0.05 08/11/78 

8 09/01/78 1,406 200 235 1.5 09/21/78 

9 10/02/78 1,404 1 390 1.5 10/25/78 

were 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters 

documented on Area Access Registers during individual 

Distance 

In Feet 

Into 18 

Bypass 

Drift 

Drilling Average 

Highest Depth Radiation 

Reading In Feet Level 

On Of During 

Core Highest Drilling 

(mrad/h) Readinq (mrad/h) 

Date 

Hole 

Completed 

entries to HYBLA GOLD radex areas from 1 November 1977 to 24 May 

1978, when the use of Area Access Registers was discontinued. A 

total of 135 entries into radex areas was recorded, 8 of which 

were made by DOD-affiliated participants. No indication of 

radiation exposure was noted on any self-reading pocket dosimeter 

nor on film badges worn by reentry and recovery personnel. The 

minimum detectable gamma exposure with the NTS film dosimeter was 

30 mR. 

141 
SECTION 6 

DIABLO HAWK EVENT 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

DIABLO HAWK was a DOD-sponsored test conducted at 0815 hours 

Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 13 September 1978 with a yield of 

less than 20 kilotons. This test was the eighth in the Hussar 

Sword series and was the second test in a two-for-one plan to 

reuse test facilities. The device was detonated in the Ul%n.lOa 

drift of the N tunnel complex (Figure 6.1) at a vertical depth of 

1,273 feet. The purpose of the event was to test the response of 

materials and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment, 

test ground shock response of various structures (container 

types), and conduct x-ray experiments. An evacuated horizontal 

LOS pipe 1,300 feet long was used to house experiments. DOD and 

supporting organizations fielded 36 projects for this test. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent from the test was detected onsite or offsite. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

6.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all DIABLO HAWK project activities in Area 

12 was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of DOE and DOE contractor personnel were in 

accordance with established DOE-DOD agreements or were the 

subject of separate action between Field Command/DNA, and the DOE 

Nevada Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

142 
0 1 

FEET 

Figure 6.1 DIABLO HAWK event - tunnel layout. 
removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LLL fielded 

the device, the LLL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

DOE Test Controller relieved the LLL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller determined that venting 

had not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological 

safety to the DNA Test Group Director. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

Following the execution of the MIGHTY EPIC event in May 

1976, the U12n.10 tunnel complex was inspected and found 

in excellent condition for the follow-on event, DIABLO 

HAWK. The reusable portions of the U12n.10 LOS, bypass, 

and reentry drifts, and new drifts excavated specifically for the DIABLO HAWK event, were designated as the 

U12n.lOa tunnel complex. Mining of the DIABLO HAWK 

complex began a few weeks after detonation of the MIGHTY 

EPIC event. 

In August 1976, mining operations in the Ul2n.lOa LOS 

drift commenced from the MIGHTY EPIC TAPS area. Stemming and the LOS pipe were removed from the MIGHTY EPIC 

TAPS (the DIABLO HAWK zero point area) to test chamber 

No. 3. The portion of MIGHTY EPIC LOS pipe from test 

chamber No. 3 to test chamber No. 1 was repaired, leak 

tested, and reused in the DIABLO HAWK event. 

Mining continued for the structures drifts. The A-B, 

C-l, C-B, D, D-l, F-l, E, and F drifts were completed by 

144 
December 1976. (See Figure 6.2.) A new cable hole to 

support the structures experiments was drilled to the 

Mesa and installation of new sections of pipe for the 

main LOS pipe commenced in December 1976. The G drift 

was completed in March 1977. Pipe rehabilitation 

between the stubs area and test chamber No. 3 was 

completed by April, and installation of new pipe 

sections was begun. When completed, the DIABLO HAWK LOS 

pipe included a muffler, DAC, MAC, and TAPS unit: two 

scatterer systems: several pipe stubs: and three test 

chambers. 

Cable installation was completed in June 1977, and the 

vertical cable hole for the EMP experiment (drilled from 

the Mesa to the EMP drift which was mined from the 

proposed zero point area) was completed in July. The 

entire EMP drift was mined in August and September. 

Stemming of the A and B drifts began in October. A new 

crosscut drift from the bypass drift to the air 

scatterer alcove was mined in November. Portions of the 

LOS drift were stemmed and scientific cables were 

installed in the EMP cable hole in December. 

Installation of structural experiments commenced in 

December 1977. These experiments included: a. capsule 

and water tank as designed by Boeing, SRI jointed 

models, and an Agbabian Association (AA) water tank, 

among others. (See Figure 6.3.) BY May 1978, 

installation of the structural experiments and the EMP 

experiment was completed and scheduled electrical dry 

runs were begun. A total of three vertical cable holes 

provided transmission paths for data from the tunnel to 

the Mesa trailer park. In addition to the Mesa 

facilities, ROSES units were moved into the U12n.11 and 

U12n.lOa bypass drifts, also for data recording. Test 

chamber experiment installation began in June. A vacuum 

test of the entire DIABLO HAWK LOS pipe system was 

completed successfully in July 1978. 

145 
z - 

hl 

. 

aJ 

W 

146 

Containment features consisted of a main overburden plug 

(OBP) in the U12n.08 drift, a cable gas block OBP in 

the U12n.08 bypass drift, a thermal shield plug for 

the ventilation hole off of the U12n.08 drift, and a gas 

seal plug and door in the main access drift. These were 

completed in early September 1978. 

On 8 August 1978, an MFP dry run was conducted, on 9 

August, an FPFF dry run was held, the device was 

installed on 10 August, and an HDR for the device system 

was completed successfully. Final stemming operations 

began on 11 August 1978, and an FDR was completed 

satisfactorily on 12 September 1978. The decision was 

made to detonate the device on 13 September. 

Experimenters for this event included SAI, LMSC, LASL, 

SLA, AFWL, DNA, Boeing, PI, GE, WES, LLL, and KSC. 

B. Radioloqical Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with ERDA 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support. 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

148 
and provide emergency support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations: and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, 

plastic suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 42 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for DIABLO 

HAWK as shown in Table 6.1 and Figures 6.4 and 6.5. 

Also, an air sampling unit was placed at the tunnel 

portal. All RAMS units and the air sampling unit were 

installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

EPA operated 49 air sampling stations and 11 gamma rate 

recorder stations in the offsite area. Thermoluminescent 

dosimeters (TLDs) also were placed to verify offsite 

radiation levels. Twenty-five EPA personnel were 

fielded for offsite surveillance activities. 

D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or 

control stations for issue of stay-in badges, or issue 

and return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

149 
Table 6.1. DIABLO HAWK event RAMS unit locations 

13 September 1978. 

SURFACE 

Station Location 

From the U12n portal: 

1 At the portal 

2 On the filter system 

3 On the vent line 

4 On the vent line 

5 On the tunnel drain line 

6 399 feet N 16" E azimuth 

7 275 feet N 89" E azimuth 

8 364 feet S 16" E azimuth 

9 482 feet S 12" W azimuth 

10 558 feet S 48" W azimuth 

11 417 feet N 69" W azimuth 

12 1,369 feet S 43" E azimuth 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

From the cable downhole: 

At cable downhole 

177 feet N 43" E azimuth 

135 feet S 33" E azimuth 

375 feet S 31" W azimuth 

78 feet S 89" W azimuth 

18 

19 

20 

VH 

SCH 

ICH 

ECH 

From the Ul2n.lOa SGZ: 

500 feet due north 

500 feet S 60" E azimuth 

500 feet S 60" W azimuth 

1,585 feet S 76" E azimuth (at the mesa vent 

hole) 

700 feet S 58" W azimuth (at the structures 

cable hole) 

699 feet n 44" w azimuth (at the interface 

cable hole) 

At the Mesa EMP cable hole 

150 
Table 6.1. DIABLO HAWK event RAMS unit locations 

13 September 1978 (Continued). 

UNDERGROUND 

Station Location 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

*27ER 

28 

29 

From the U12n.08 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

880 feet into the U12n.lOa LOS drift 

510 feet into the U12n.lOa LOS drift 

185 feet into the U12n.lOa LOS drift 

500 feet into the Ul2n.lOa bypass drift 

200 feet into the Ulln.lOa bypass drift 

85 feet into the Ul2n.lOa bypass drift 

85 feet into the U12n.lOa bypass drift 

150 feet into the U12n.11 drift 

435 feet into the U12n.08 drift from the 05 drift 

30 

31 

From the U12n main drift: 

1,900 feet into the U12n.05 bypass drift 

600 feet into the U12n.05 drift 

32 

33 

*34ER 

35 

36 

37 

From the U12n portal unless otherwise indicated: 

2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

50 feet into the U12n vent line raise from the U12n 

main drift 

38 200 feet into the U12n main drift 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

151 
152 
Figure 6.5 DIABLO HAWK event - underground RAMS. 

0 600 

FEET 
In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

closed area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the 

USAF for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, 

if needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130 and 

crew on standby status for cloud tracking. The EPA 

provided a Turbo Beech and crew for cloud sampling. 

Another EPA aircraft was standing by in Las Vegas to 

undertake tracking duties, if required. 

6.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

6.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

On 13 September at 0001 hours, all persons except the arming 

party, tunnel button-up party, microwave timing party, and 

security guards had exited the tunnel and were clear of the 

muster area. Permission was granted to arm the device, the 

device was armed and button-up was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0530 hours on 13 September 

in anticipation of planned test execution that day. Conditions 

for the test were favorable, and all personnel were mustered out 

of the area. The countdown started as planned at 0755 hours and 

continued without difficulty through execution. 

The DIABLO HAWK device was detonated at 0815 hours PDT on 13 

September 1978. 

6.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0816 hours on 13 September 

1978. All PAMS units except for Station Nos. 21, 22, and 23 read 

background until secured. The RAMS units reflecting positive 

154 
radiation levels were located along the LOS pipe and were responding to neutron activation of the LOS pipe and 

experiments. At H+l minute, the readings at RAMS unit Nos. 21, 

22, and 23 were greater than 1,000 R/h, 400 R/h, and 600 R/h, 

respectively. Normal decay of this activation radiation was 

observed. No indications of radioactive effluent were detected 

by any tunnel, surface, or airborne radiation monitoring units. 

Rain in the portal area and on the mesa caused spurious 

readings to be obtained on many of the surface RAMS units. From 

1900 hours until 2145 hours on 14 September, signals from these 

detectors were not reliable. Proper functioning of these units 

resumed after the rain stopped and the field wire began to dry 

out. All RAMS units were secured at 1500 hours on 15 September 

1970, when readings on RAMS unit Nos. 21, 22, and 23 had dropped 

to 45 mR/h, 36 mR/h, and 58 mR/h, respectively. 

6.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Four reentry teams (to survey the main Mesa trailer park: 

Mesa interface trailer park including the EMP cable hole, vent 

hole, and structures pads; portal area: and portal area 

ventilation system) were released from Gate 300 at 0915 hours on 

the D-day. All surveys were completed by 1031 hours. No 

radiation levels above background (0.05 mR/h) were detected. Gas 

samples obtained remotely from the zero point side of the OBP 

indicated there was no above-zero LEL or toxic gas level in the 

LOS drift. Some above-background radiation readings were noted 

on samples taken from inside the LOS pipe, indicating the pipe 

closure system had not been completely successful in preventing 

seepage of radioactive gases down the LOS pipe some time after 

detonation. Ventilation to the gas seal plug was established 

remotely. Data recovery teams were allowed in the Mesa and 

portal trailers immediately after surveys of the respective areas 

had been completed. D-day operations were terminated at 1545 

hours. 

155 
6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

6.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

Tunnel reentry operations began on D+l. Remote gas sampling 

was performed again at the tunnel portal before the reentry teams 

were allowed to proceed into the tunnel. At 0726 hours on 14 

September 1978, a work party including Radsafe and industrial 

hygiene personnel entered the tunnel and travelled to the gas 

seal door, which was opened at 0810 hours. Gas and air samples 

were taken at the gas seal door and from the zero point side of 

the gas seal plug through the sampling line. All readings were 

background with no indication of any LEL or toxic gas level 

observed. Both the 36-inch and 24-inch manways were opened, and 

the vent line through the gas seal plug was reconnected before 

the work team returned to the portal. 

At 0935 hours, reentry team No.1 and the rescue team entered 

the tunnel bound for the gas seal plug. The team proceeded 

through the gas seal plug and on to the OBP. Air sampled from 

the zero point side of the OBP at 1049 hours showed 0 percent of 

the LEL, 10 ppm of carbon monoxide, and background radiation 

levels. The manway door through the OBP was opened at 1129 

hours. At 1230 hours, the reentry team, dressed in full anticontaminaticn clothing and SCBA, passed through the OBP and 

performed a damage and hazard survey of the U12n.lOa bypass drift 

to the test chamber No. 3 crosscut. Little structural damage was 

observed on this walk-through. 

The reentry team returned to the test chamber No. 1 

crosscut. Th? radiation reading was 350 mR/h at four feet from 

the door of ter;t chamber No. 1, and a trace of carbon monoxide 

was noted. :he reading at contact with the test chamber No. 1 

door was 800 r~l/h. The ventilation exhaust valve on the top 

of the LOS j)ipe near test chamber No. I was opened. The work 

area radiatii #:I exposure at the flex line attached to the 

exhaust valvl vent hole increased from 10 mR/h to 100 mR/h, and 

the carbon monoxide level inside the flex line increased from 20 

PPm to 300 PPm. At 1240 hours, the door to test chamber No. 1 

156 
was opened slightly; the radiation reading at the open door was 

800 mR/h, and 1,500 ppm of carbon monoxide and 50 percent of the 

LEL were observed. The team moved to the crosscut at test 

chamber No. 2, where all radiation readings were background, and 

no positive LEL or toxic gas level was observed. The team 

continued to survey as directed. Background radiation readings 

were noted in the U12n.lOa bypass drift at the ROSES drift and 

crosscut No. 3 junctions. A survey of the crawl space to test 

chamber No. 3 showed a radiation level of 0.08 mrad/h, 5 ppm of 

carbon monoxide, and 0 percent of the LEL. The area background 

at the scatterer alcove was 110 mR/h (130 mrad/h). The team 

returned through the OBP at 1510 hours. 

At 1530 hours, experimenter personnel were allowed entry 

into the tunnel to recover some experiments from the crosscut No. 

1 stubs area and U12n.11 drift ROSES units. The area background 

at the stubs was 48 mR/h (50 mrad/h), and the radiation level in 

the U12n.11 drift at the ROSES units was 0.05 mrad/h. 

Experimenters were surveyed as they left the tunnel at 1700 hours 

on 14 September. 

At 0855 hours on 15 September, reentry team No. 1 and a work 

team left the portal to reenter the U12n.lOa LOS drift. The 

reentry team entered the LOS drift at test chamber No. 3 in full 

anticontamination clothing and SCBA. Inside the test chamber 

door, readings were 150 mR/h, 35 percent of the LEL, and 300 ppm 

of carbon monoxide. Also, swipe samples were taken, and some 

removable contamination was noted. The team was out of the LOS 

drift at 1110 hours. Both the reentry and work teams returned to 

the OBP. Reentry team No. 2 left the portal, arriving outside 

test chamber No. 2 at 1145 hours. Outside the door, 5.5 mR/h, 0 

percent of the LEL, and no toxic gas level were measured; inside 

the door, 100 mR/h, 0 percent of the LEL, and 300 ppm of carbon 

monoxide were noted. At 1330 hours, all doors to the chambers in 

the LOS pipe were locked. 

SLA experimenters entered the stubs area on 15 September at 

1415 hours for experiment recovery. The radiation level in this 

157 
area was now 25 mrad/h (20 mR/h, gamma only). Some experiments 

also were removed from the scatterer alcove area, where the 

exposure rate was about 55 mR/h. All experimenter personnel had 

exited the tunnel by 1520 hours. 

Mining began on swing shift, 14 September, to remove the gas 

seal plug, and the plug was removed on 16 September. Work then 

began to mine through the OBP. The OBP was mined out completely 

on 18 September and railroad tracks were relaid. Rehabilitation 

of the U12n.lOa bypass and LOS drifts was begun. On 18 September 

between 1630 and 1830 hours, a walk-through of the area beyond 

the OBP was conducted by the SLA Health Physicist and support 

personnel to assess toxic gas, LEL, and radiation hazard areas. 

Ventilation to the various work areas was checked so that 

respiratory protection requirements could be determined as 

necessary. Water was noted on the invert around test chamber No. 

3. Later investigation showed this water to be originating from 

a rock fissure. The water was contaminated with activation 

products from inside the LOS pipe, and radiological safety 

requirements were adjusted as this water continued to be of 

concern during reentry, recovery, and mining operations, as 

discussed below. 

On the morning of 19 September, a pipe evaluation team 

entered the LOS pipe at test chamber No. 3. Inside the test 

chamber, the general radiation level was 5 mrad/h, with a maximum 

radiation level of 12 mrad/h noted in the area. About 40 feet 

on the portal side of the TAPS, an eight-inch tear was noted at 

the top of the LOS pipe. A carbon monoxide level of 10,000 ppm 

and 100 percent of the LEL were noted at the tear. The pipe 

evaluation team completed its survey, after which experiment 

removal and other routine postevent work began in earnest. 

Ventilation was established at the tear and near the TAPS in the 

LOS pipe to lower carbon monoxide and LEL levels. Experimenters 

were surveyed as they left their respective recovery areas, and 

anticontamination and respiratory protection requirements were 

imposed as necessary for each work area. A "hot line" was set up 

in the Ul2n.lOa bypass drift zero point side of the U12n.lOa bypass/U12n.08 bypass junction on 20 September. 

158 
The tear in the LOS pipe again was surveyed on 25 September. 

The carbon monoxide level had dropped to 2,700 ppm, but the 

LEL remained at 100 percent. This tear continued to be monitored 

whenever personnel were required to work in the area. All 

experiments were removed by 28 September 1978. Some equipment 

recovery was performed after this date by experimenter personnel; 

anticontamination and respiratory protection requirements were 

established for each area as conditions required. 

On 29 September, a pump was set up to reduce the buildup of 

water around test chamber No. 3. On 3 October, efforts were 

begun to open the TAPS door. A survey of the tear in the LOS 

pipe showed 100 percent of the LEL, 1,600 ppm of carbon monoxide, 

and a 0.04 mrad/h radiation level. Around the TAPS door, no 

LEL or carbon monoxide level was indicated, and the radiation 

level was 0.05 mrad/h. A supplied-air system was set up before 

opening of the TAPS was attempted. At 1515 hours, personnel 

wearing full-face masks with supplied air opened the TAPS door: 

100 ppm of carbon monoxide, 10 percent of the LEL, and a 0.05 

mrad/h radiation level were observed inside the door. 

On 4 October, a survey on the zero point side of the TAPS 

door showed no LEL level or toxic gas and a radiation level of 

0.6 mrad/h. At 1300 hours that day, personnel using supplied-air 

equipment with full-face masks entered the LOS pipe area on the 

zero point side of the TAPS and proceeded toward the MAC. 

Readings at the MAC were 100 ppm of carbon monoxide, 10 percent 

of the LEL, and 0.5 mrad/h. A small hole was noted on the left 

side of the MAC. Levels of 12,000 ppm of carbon monoxide, 100 

percent of the LEL, and 110 mrad/h (10 mR/h) were detected coming 

from this hole. A flex line was hooked up in the area of the 

hole to provide ventilation to the area. All personnel had 

exited the pipe by 1520 hours. 

Reentry activities continued. Personnel passed through the 

MAC and on to the DAC. A series of holes were drilled through 

the DAC, and levels as high as 12,000 ppm of carbon monoxide, 

greater than 100 percent of the LEL, and 0.2 mrad/h were observed 

159 
during drilling. These holes were completed 2 November. This 

completed initial reentry into the UlZn.lOa complex areas. 

Surveys and equipment recovery continued for several months in 

the LOS pipe area after experiment removal; anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection requirements were imposed as 

necessary. 

6.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

Cleanup and rehabilitation began on 22 September 1978 in the 

U12n.lOa bypass drift near crosscut No. 3 to prepare for reentry 

mining. Extensive reentry drifts were mined to recover experiments and equipment and examine the various structures fielded 

on the DIABLO HAWK event. (See Figure 6.6.) Mining was 'Ias 

directed," and often one area was abandoned temporarily as 

another reentry/recovery project was made a priority. A summary 

of these drifts, including start and stop dates and the radiation 

encountered, appears in Table 6.2. No general radiation 

protection clothing requirement was put into effect because there 

was no uncontrolled access to areas with above-background 

radiation levels. A discussion of special health and safety 

situations and protection requirements follows. No alpha 

contamination was noted on any of the mined out structures. 

After experimenters had departed 28 September, mining of the 

DIABLO HAWK structures reentry drift was begun at 806 feet into 

the U12n.lOa bypass drift. All muck readings were background. 

On 9 November, at 666 feet into the structures reentry drift, the 

C structures drift was reached. Mining continued, and a 0.5 

mrad/h radiation level was noted at the end of the C structure 

chamber. At 1140 hours, a hole was drilled through the C 

structure steel door plate to check the air quality. Inside the 

hole, the radiation level was 0.06 mrad/h, and 1,000 ppm of 

carbon monoxide and 10 percent of the LEL were measured. Mining 

continued on the structures reentry drift. 

On 7 November, a pump was set up to reduce water in the test 

chamber No. 3/crosscut No. 3 area. The radiation level at contact with this water had increased to 1 mrad/h; a maximum radia160 
UGHT SOLJD SHADING = REENTf?Y MlNfNG COMPLETED 

- OPEN DRIFT 

MAP NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 6.6 DIABLO HAWK event - reentry mining. 
Table 6.2. DIABLO HAWK reentry drift radiation summary. 

Reentry 

Drift (RD) 

Maximum Area Maximum Recorded Location of the 

Radiation Level Radiation Level 

Start 

Date 

FA;l;h (mrad/h unless (mrad/h unless 

Highest Aboveotherwise stated) otherwise stated) 

Background 

Radiation Level 

Structures RD 10/28/78 12/07/78 0.05 0.06 Inside C Structure 

TAPS RD 

Boeing RD 

Boeing 

Crosscut 

12/06/78 01/10/79 0.05 0.05 

01/10/79 01/26/79 0.05 0.05 

01/24/79 01/25/29 0.05 0.05 

: M&D RD 02/05/79 03/12/79 0.5 mR/h 2 

h, 

At hole in the LOS 

pipe, on the portal 

side of the DAC 

A-B RD 01/25/79 10/05/79 0.05 0.05 

CA-EX #I RO 02/20/79 03/08/79 0.05 0.05 

CA-EX #2 RD 02/15/79 02/20/79 0.05 0.05 

C-Cl RD 03/05/79 05/03/79 2 mR/h 200 At ltO3 in C-Cl RD 

(50 mR/h) 

D-D1 RE 03/12/79 08/27/79 0.05 0.05 

A Crosscut 04/17/79 10/02/79 0.05 0.05 

B Crosscut 04/17/79 09/N/79 0.05 0.05 
tion level of 2 mrad/h was noted in the area. Ground water was 

seeping through cracks in the LOS pipe, picking up activated 

materials, and passing back out into the drift, increasing the 

work area radiation level. On 9 November, a pump with a drain 

line was set up to remove water from inside the LOS pipe. The 

drain line was removed inadvertently and contaminated water again 

began to build up in the crosscut. The area was roped off as a 

contaminated area and the pump reinstalled with tVContaminated 

Material" tape on the drain line. Pumps were used from this time 

on duriny operations in the area. 

On 13 November, a swipe sample from the inside of the C 

structure showed removable contamination. Periodic checks of the 

C structure were made, and on 20 November, 2,000 ppm of carbon 

monoxide, 70 percent of the LEL, and a background reading of 0.04 

mrad/h were measured in the chamber. A vent line was hooked up 

to the chamber, and on 21 November the air inside C structure had 

returned to normal levels. 

Beginning in December, sections of LOS pipe were removed by 

the pipefitters. As each section of pipe was removed, swipe 

samples were taken to determine the level of removable contamination, and radiation protection requirements were adjusted as 

necessary to control any potential hazard. 

On 8 January 1979, Boeing personnel opened an experiment box 

located in the Boeing alcove located in the A-B drift, and a 

pungent odor was observed. The box was reclosed until the next 

day when industrial hygiene, Radsafe, and mining personnel, 

dressed in full anti-contamination clothing and SCBA, reopened 

the box. Samples were taken, but no indication of any toxic gas, 

LEL, or above-background radiation level was observed. After 

laboratory analysis of the samples was completed, personnel again 

were allowed to resume work on the box. 

On 12 January, a probe hole, designed to break through into 

the water tank structure area in the A-B drift, was started at 

about 40 feet into the Boeing reentry drift. Supplied-air equipment was made a requirement as drilling approached the break163 
through point. At 1345 hours on 15 January, the miners drilled 

into the sand surrounding the water tank. Aside from a foul 

odor, normal air conditions were noted, and no above-background 

radiation was observed. 

On 16 January, LASL personnel worked in crosscut No. 3 dressed in coveralls, totes, and gloves. Area radiation levels still 

were above background at 0.3 mrad/h. A request was made by the 

SLA Health Physicist on this date to check tritium levels in 

standing water outside the TAPS, from water in the area around 

the LOS pipe and the crosscut No. 3 junction, and from water 

coming from the Boeing reentry drift probe hole. These samples 

showed activities of 4.2 X 10m4 pCi/cc, 1.5 X 10-d /.Ki/cc, and 

3.4 X low4 pCi/cc, respectively. 

Limited reentry mining was accomplished in the U12n.lOa 

complex during the months of February and March. Radsafe 

personnel accompanied user and support personnel into the various 

excavated structures and drifts. In some drifts, vent lines had 

been removed and air quality was poor; these areas were checked 

and air flow reestablished as necessary during tours and 

inspections. 

The MAC and DAC (M&D) reentry drift was begun on 5 February. 

On 15 February, the first of two probe holes drilled toward the 

DAC from the M&D drift was begun. Although radiation levels 

still were at background, the heading of the M&D reentry drift 

was designated as a radex area and anticontamination clothing 

including coveralls, gloves, and totes or miners boots was made a 

requirement. On 28 February, the second hole was begun. 

Industrial hygiene and Radsafe personnel monitored these drilling 

operations continuously. The radiation level of the tailings 

rose from background to 0.12 mrad/h on 1 March. The total 

drilling depths of the two holes were 33 alld 43 feet. 

On 2 March, mining in the E reentrlr drift had reached the 

CA-EX #l bulkhead. A survey of a crack around the bulkhead 

indicated a background radiation reading 0:‘ 0.04 mrad/h radiation 

level at contact, and no carbon monoxide or any LEL level was 

164 
observed. Greater than 100 percent of the LEL and 2,000 ppm of 

carbon monoxide were found in rockbolt holes and cracks in the 

left rib. Work began to cut out the bulkhead. Meanwhile, the 

43-foot probe hole in the M&D reentry drift was being closed off 

with a packer plug and cemented. During the sealing, gas 

concentrations of greater than 6,000 ppm of carbon monoxide and 

over 100 percent of the LEL were being forced from the end of the 

packer assembly. (The radiation level was at background.) A 

vent line had been set up near the end of the packer assembly, so 

no indication of gases was observed in the drift. A valve 

allowed gases to be monitored through the plug as desired. 

On 5 March, mining on a crosscut to the DAC began at about 

160 feet into the M&D reentry drift. Supplied-air equipment was 

brought in for the miners working on this crosscut, and totes 

were made mandatory in the M&D area as well as the previously 

prescribed coveralls and gloves. 

On 9 March, a pipe three to four inches in diameter which 

read 10 mR/h was uncovered at about 70 feet into the C-Cl drift. 

On 12 March, workers in full anticontamination clothing and 

supplied-air equipment drilled through this pipe, and water with 

a radiation level of 0.07 mrad/h spilled out. The quantity of 

this water was not substantial so it was allowed to drain onto 

the invert of the radex area. 

Muck with a maximum radiation level of 1 mrad/h (0.5 mR/h) 

was recovered from the DAC crosscut on 12 March. A hole in the 

LOS pipe was discovered on the portal side of the DAC. Surveys 

into the pipe through this hole revealed levels of 100 ppm of 

carbon monoxide, 0 percent of the LEL, and 2 mrad/h. Mining of 

the M&D drift was completed on 12 March, although experiment 

recovery continued in the area for the next several days. No 

removable radioactive contamination was found on these 

experiments. The maximum exposure level in the LOS pipe, DAC 

crosscut, and M&D reentry drift work areas was 0.5 mR/h. 

On 20 March, the pipe in the C-Cl drift pipe with the abovebackground radiation level had been removed, and mining con165 
tinued. However, on 21 March at 103 feet into the C-Cl drift, 

the radiation level at the face was surveyed at 5 mrad/h, readings on the excavated rock (muck) had risen from background 

levels to 0.15 mR/h, and a reading at the top of the face was 50 

mR/h (150 mrad/h). A bad smell, 200 ppm of carbon monoxide and 

35 percent of the LEL were noted, so operations were shut down in 

the drift until the next day when the area had ventilated and a 

survey showed normal air conditions. Activities in the heading 

were discontinued, although work was performed in other areas in 

the drift. The area exposure rate was 2 mR/h, and full 

anticontamination clothing was made a requirement. Mining in the 

C-Cl drift heading did not resume until 26 April. Readings were 

taken daily in the C-Cl drift during the non-work periods, and 

radiation levels as high as 200 mrad/h (50 mR/h) were measured. 

Alpine mining at the heading of the C-Cl drift was restarted 

26 April. Anticontamination clothing requirements continued from 

when radiation first had been detected. The area exposure rate 

had dropped to 0.1 mR/h because clean earth had been spread over 

the contaminated muck. Mining in the C-Cl drift heading was 

completed on 3 May at 146 feet into the drift, although mining to 

evaluate experiments along the ribs continued after this time. 

No other source of above-background radiation was encountered in 

this drift. 

During the months of May through August 1979, cleanup and 

removal of equipment and instrumentation by mining and user 

personnel continued. Air samples were run and surveys taken when 

work was performed in the reentry drifts, and all equipment 

removed from the area was checked and decontaminated as necessary 

to assure it was free from any removable contamination. 

On 15 May, a security gate was installed at 487 feet into 

the main DIABLO HAWK reentry drift. This gate was locked to 

prevent unauthorized traffic into security and contaminated 

areas. Personnel authorized to pass through this gate were 

escorted by Radsafe personnel. 

166 
Recovery of cable and equipment began in the C-Cl drift on 

31 May. The work area background was 0.2 mrad/h, and radiation 

protection requirements continued. The radiation level dropped 

to 0.15 mrad/h and below in some areas as less contaminated rock 

was mined out. This recovery effort was completed 14 June. 

Drillers began to drill short holes into the various 

chambers of the C structure on 18 July to recover core. Although 

the C structure drift still was considered a radex area and full 

anticontamination clothing was required, no above-background 

radiation levels were noted at contact with the core. This 

drilling was completed on 1 August. 

On 16 August, the water tank in the cable drift off the C-Cl 

drift was uncovered. The work area radiation level was 0.3 

mrad/h, so full anticontamination clothing was worn for this 

operation. An exposure rate of 6 mR/h (60 mrad/h) was measured 

at the door of the structure, and 4 mR/h (40 mrad/h) was noted at 

contact with the stemming around the structure. The contact 

reading on a water sample taken from the structure was 0.2 mR/h 

(0.4 mrad/h). This water showed a tritium level of 3.4 X 10-l 

jKi/cc. On 23 August, DOD gave permission for this radioactive 

water in the CC-1 water tank to be diluted and drained. 

Removal of portions of the LOS pipe at crosscut No. 2 for 

scrap or burial at the U3ax waste site began on 26 September. 

(The U3ax waste site was a subsidence crater in Yucca Flat used 

for radioactive waste disposal). The highest area radiation 

level during the days worked was 0.12 mrad/h. No removable 

contamination was noted on the pipe. 

A radiation level of 0.09 mrad/h was detected on the safety 

shoes of those working around test chamber No. 3 on 29 October. 

The muck from this area was posted with radex area signs, and 

miners in the area were required to wear totes as well as coveralls when in the area. Pipefitters began to remove the TAPS on 5 

November. Three security gates limiting access to the C-B, CC-l, 

and DD-1 drifts were completed 13 November. On 16 November the 

167 
TAPS was removed. Cleanup and final removal of equipment continued until 3 December 1979 when work in the area ceased. 

6.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

No drilling to recover zero point core samples was conducted 

underground or from the Mesa for this event. Holes were drilled 

to verify direction and ground integrity during reentry mining, 

but all radiation readings were background during these 

operations. 

6.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to 

measure radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The 

results were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes 

including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling, 

were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving explosives, toxic materials, radioactive 

material, or any other operation with the potential for personal 

injury. Each individual involved in such an operation was 

required to know the contents of the applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory 

hard hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, 

DOE-issued miners boots, or toe guards). All personnel on the 

initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the 

Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa 

two-hour breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and 

regulations, as spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," 

were observed. HEPA canister filters were supplied routinely for 

hazardous situations in which full-face masks were required. An 

array of specialized canister filters could be obtained upon 

request for special hazardous situations. 

168 
All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-226). 

2. AEC Manual 0500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. DIABLO HAWK Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0816 hours on 13 September 

1978 and all telemetry stations were secured at 1500 hours on 15 

September 1978. No radiation other than that from usual 

activation products was detected by telemetry units. 

The initial radiation surveys of the Mesa and portal areas 

began at 0915 hours on 13 September and were completed by 1031 

hours. No radiation above background was detected at the Mesa 

trailer park area or at the tunnel complex portal. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 0726 hours on 14 September 

1978. The maximum radiation reading during reentry operations 

was 800 mR/h, detected at the test chamber No. 1 door on 14 September. The maximum toxic gas concentration measured was 12,000 

mm of carbon monoxide, measured at a small hole in the MAC on 4 

October 1978. This level of carbon monoxide and greater than 100 

percent of the LEL (the highest LEL level observed) were noted in 

samples drawn from the zero point side of the MAC between 4 

October and 2 November while a series of holes were being drilled 

through the MAC. 

169 
On 22 September, reentry mining operations began in the 

UlZn.lOa bypass drift. These efforts continued until 3 December 

1979. Table 6.2 is a summary of the reentry drifts excavated and 

the radiation encountered. The highest LEL and toxic gas levels 

observed were found during the sealing of a probe hole in the M&D 

drift. A survey of the gases from inside the probe hole 

indicated greater than 100 percent of the LEL and 6,000 ppm of 

carbon monoxide. The highest radiation level encountered was 200 

mrad/h (50 mR/h), noted at the heading of the C-Cl drift when the 

face was at 103 feet. No alpha radiation was observed on any of 

the recovered structures or equipment. 

There was no drilling from underground or Rainier Mesa to 

recover zero point core samples for the DIABLO HAWK event. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DIABLO HAWK radex areas from 14 September to 22 September 1978 

when the use of Area Access Registers was discontinued, are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 347 140 3 

DOD Participants 110 o* 4 

* The minimum detectable radiation exposure which could be 

measured by the NTS film badge dosimeter was 30 mR; an exposure 

of zero means any exposure received was below this level. 

170 
SECTION 7 

HURON KING EVENT 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

HURON KING was an underground nuclear experiment conducted 

by DOD and LANL at 0810 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 24 

June 1980 with a yield of less than 20 kilotons. The device was 

detonated in Area 3 (U3ky) at a depth of 1,050 feet. HURON KING 

was the first DOD vertical line-of-sight (VLOS) pipe test since 

the DIAGONAL LINE event (1971, see DNA 6323F of this series of 

reports). The purpose of the HURON KING event was to test the 

response of materials and equipment to a nuclear detonation 

environment. The event involved the use of a vacuum tank, 

developed to simulate a free space environment, which contained a 

space satellite (STARSAT). Five projects were fielded by 

experimenters. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. No 

radioactive effluent from the test was detected onsite or offsite. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

7.2.1 Responsibilities. 

In early 1979, DNA and LANL entered into an agreement in 

which LANL was to provide the device, a drill hole in Area 3, the 

VLOS pipe system (including closures), timing and firing system 

control, and related engineering support. DNA agreed to provide 

the test object, the experiment tank with associated vacuum and 

recovery systems, radiation and containment measurements, signal 

cables, recording instrumentation for experiments, and related 

operational and engineering support. As event sponsor, DNA was 

responsible for containment. In a separate agreement, SNL 

accepted responsibility for containment diagnostics and a portion 

of the radiation measurements. 

171 
Safety in the testing area was the responsibility of the DOD 

Test Group Director or his representative. Responsibilities of 

DOE and DOE contractor personnel were in accordance with 

established DOE-DOD agreements or were the subject of separate 

action between Field Command/DNA, and the DOE Nevada Operations 

Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations.'t Because LANL fielded 

the device, the LANL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 3,500-foot radius of the zero point 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

DOE Test Controller relieved the LANL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller determined that venting 

had not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological 

safety to the DNA Test Group Director. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Area Facilities Construction. 

Area 5 had previously been used for DOD VLOS tests, but 

the geologic characteristics of Area 3 were determined 

to be superior for containment, so the event was given 

an Area 3 location and designated U3ky. 

The VLOS pipe for this event was 1,050 feet long and 

consisted of 17 steel pipe sections, flanged together, 

and several containment-related components. These 

components would include the device canister (with a 

bolt catcher to deflect objects dropped down the pipe 

172 
during assembly away from the zero point), a muffler 

(which was designed to reduce the flow of non-radiation 

energies up the VLOS pipe), the super-high explosive 

(HE) machine (designed to close off the pipe with high 

explosives after radiation passage), clamshell shutters 

(redundant debris control valves), gas shutters (to 

control movement of gas up the VLOS pipe), the fast gate 

(which was the final debris barrier), and the slide 

valve (the final gas barrier in the VLOS system). These 

components are shown in Figure 7.1. Both the fast gate 

and the slide valve had been used previously in the 

DIAGONAL LINE event. 

The experiment tank (or test chamber) consisted of a 

main cylindrical vacuum tank designed to contain the 

satellite in a free space environment, a vertical pipe 

section (to connect to one end of the main cylindrical 

tank and later to the VLOS pipe) which contained the 

scatterers, a structure to protect the junction boxes 

and cables (which connected to the other end of the main 

vacuum tank), and a "crawlert' support system designed to 

hold the test chamber in place and provide a method of 

moving the test chamber shortly after zero time from 

surface ground zero (SGZ) to a position outside. of the 

potential crater area. (Figure 7.2 shows a photograph 

of these components prior to assembly.) The main 

experiment tank was above the surface and attached to 

the VLOS pipe as shown in Figure 7.3. 

Two major groups of signal cables were used: those in 

the downhole cable bundle for device operation and 

diagnostics, containment closures, and phenomenology 

measurements; and those cables from experiments in the 

test chamber to recording instruments in the main 

instrumentation trailer park. (See Figure 7.4) Most of 

these cables were designed to be cut (using explosives) 

immediately after detonation to facilitate movement of 

the test chamber. The remaining cables were left intact 

to record post-test (including HAMS) data. 

173 
-DRAG PLATE 

BELLOWS 

-SGZ 

s 

0 3 GAS iUTTER 

-SLIP JOINT 

-DRAG PLATES 

- ZERO POINT 

0 7 BOLT CATCHER 

0 2 FAST GATE 

CLAMSHELL SHUTTER 

0 6 MUFFLER 

Figure 7.1 HURON KING event - VLOS pipe system. 

174 



Instrumentation trailers were used to record information 

for SAI, GE, JAYCOR, LPARL, SNL, and LANL. 

Drilling of the emplacement hole began in April 1979 and 

was completed in June. Testing of equipment and grading 

of the area was conducted from June through September, 

when cable-laying operations were begun. The crawler 

track and support structure for the experiment tank were 

delivered and installed in October, and the remaining 

components of the experiment tank were delivered to the 

NTS in early November. Surface construction and 

placement of equipment continued through December 1979. 

The experiment tank was assembled and vacuum checked in 

January 1980. On 17 January, LANL commenced VLOS pipe 

system downhole dry runs. These dry runs were completed 

on 6 February. A vacuum check of the VLOS system was 

successfully completed during 13 and 14 February. On 

14 February, the downhole closures were fired and the 

experiment tank was pulled from the VLOS pipe by the 

winch system. The VLOS pipe was repressurized and the 

pipe system was removed from the hole. The closures 

were refurbished and readied for final installation. 

SDR's commenced 1 April and were held at least twice a 

week until execution. 

The STARSAT test object arrived on 29 April. Installation into the experiment tank was completed 1 May. (See 

Figure 7.5.) The device was inserted 7 May, and pipe 

installation, except for the fast gate and slide valve, 

was completed by 19 May. The VLOS pipe again was vacuum 

checked, and stemming commenced on 21 May. Stemming 

materials included sand, gravel, and various types of 

concrete. The hole was stemmed completely on 6 June. 

The fast gate and slide valve were installed, and the 

experiment tank was positioned over the hole and aligned 

with the VLOS pipe system on 10 June. A MFP dry run was 

conducted successfully on 12 June. 

178 

The personnel access door to the experiment tank was 

closed on the morning of 20 June (D-4), and the final 

vacuum pumpdown of the experiment tank and the VLOS pipe 

system began. An SDR and FDR were conducted successfully on 23 June, and plans were made to detonate at 

0800 hours on 24 June. Following these dry runs, explosives were installed for postevent cutting of the vertical pipe section above the bellows (where the VL,OS and 

experiment tank connected) and the steel conduit around 

the cables and lead shot shielding. Containment, technical, and readiness briefings were held by the DOE Test 

Controller during the afternoon. Experimenters made all 

final adjustments and evacuated the U3ky area prior to 

2300 PDT on D-l. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with DOE 

Manual Chapter 5480.1 and requirements of responsible 

DOD representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and 

equipment support. 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

reentry, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

180 
C. 

D. 

stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, if required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, 

plastic suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 16 temporary RAMS 

units and 8 Model 102 (M-102) air samplers provided 

surface coverage for HURON KING as shown in Table 7.1 

and Figure 7.6. All RAMS and air sampling units were 

installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

EPA operated 24 air sampling stations in the offsite 

area. Thirty-one EPA personnel were fielded for offsite 

surveillance activities. 

Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations.t' Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or 

exiting the controlled area were required to stop at 

muster or control stations for issue of stay-in badges, 

or issue and return of muster badges. After area control was established, all through traffic was diverted 

around the controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

181 
Table 7.1. HURRON KING event RAMS and M-102 unit locations 

24 June 1980. 

RAMS STATIONS 

Station Location 

1 At SGZ 

2 85" azimuth, at 344 feet 

3 On tank - north 

4 On tank - south 

5 00" azimuth, at 656 feet 

6 30" azimuth, at 676 feet 

7 45" azimuth, at 656 feet 

8 90" azimuth, at 656 feet 

9 120" azimuth, at 656 feet 

10 150" azimuth, at 656 feet 

11 180" azimuth, at 656 feet 

12 210" azimuth, at 656 feet 

13 240" azimuth, at 656 feet 

14 270" azimuth, at 656 feet 

15 300" azimuth, at 656 feet 

16 330" azimuth, at 656 feet 

M-102 AIR SAMPLING STATIONS 

Station 

A-l 

A-2 

A-3 

A-4 

A-5 

A-6 

A-7 

A-8 

Location 

00" azimuth, at 984 feet 

45“ azimuth, at 984 feet 

90" azimuth, at 984 feet 

135" azimuth, at 984 feet 

180“ azimuth, at 984 feet 

225" azimuth, at 984 feet 

270" azimuth, at 984 feet 

315" azimuth, at 984 feet 

182 
/ 

’ \ 

183 
closed area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the 

USAF for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, 

as requested. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130 

and crew on standby status for cloud tracking. The EPA 

provided an OV-1OA Bronco and Turbo Beech aircraft and 

crew for cloud sampling, if needed. In Las Vegas, 

another EPA aircraft (C-130) was standing by to 

undertake tracking duties, if required. 

7.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

7.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

On 24 June, at 0600 hours, all persons except the arming 

party, microwave timing party, and security guards were out of 

the test area and clear of the muster area. At 0615 hours, 

permission was granted to arm the device. By 0700 hours, all 

area activity was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0600 hours the morning of 

24 June in anticipation of planned test execution at 0800 hours 

that day. Conditions for test execution were favorable and plans 

to detonate the device continued. 

The HURON KING device was detonated at 0810 hours PDT on 

24 June 1980, after a ten-minute delay to correct a problem with 

the RAMS. 

7.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0810 hours on 24 June. The 

maximum gamma exposure rate detected was at zero time, when 13 

R/h at RAMS station No. 1 (at surface ground zero) was observed. 

Station Nos. 3 and 4 showed 4.7 R/h and 4.4 R/h, respectively. 

184 
All stations showed some above-background radiation levels from 

activation of the VLOS pipe and the experiment tank. By ten 

seconds after the detonation, all readings had dropped below 1 

R/h. All RAMS stations were secured at 1600 hours on 25 June 

1980 when the highest radiation reading was 2.5 mR/h at station 

No. 4 (on the south side of the experiment tank, see Figure 7.8 

for postevent tank position). 

7.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

The experiment tank moved from the top of the VLOS pipe to 

the desired position as planned immediately after detonation. 

(See Figures 7.4 and 7.7.) The collapse time of the HURON KING 

crater occurred at H+50 minutes, 36 seconds. (See Figure 7.8.) 

Survey teams were released from Gate 300 at 0939 hours on 24 June 

to do the initial survey of the trailer park. At 1003 hours, 

Team A had completed its survey. The highest reading during the 

survey was 5 mR/h, measured at 10 feet from the end of the experiment tank. No radiation escaped to the atmosphere as a result 

of this test: these radiation readings occurred because the 

experiment tank had been activated by neutron radiation which had 

moved up the VLOS pipe at detonation. Repair teams were released 

to enter the trailer park at 1002 hours, and Radsafe Team B began 

a more detailed survey of the experiment tank and the surface 

ground zero area at 1004 hours. A reading of 100 mR/h was 

measured at the back port of the VLOS pipe at 1010 hours. 

At 1012 hours, a security station was established on the 

road to the entrance of the test area perimeter fence. Recovery 

teams were allowed to enter the area at 1032 hours, and Radsafe 

personnel accompanied each of the recovery teams. SNL personnel 

worked near surface ground zero for approximately three minutes 

to recover dosimetry packages, where the background exposure rate 

was 25 mR/h. A reading of 700 mR/h was noted on the top of the 

VLOS slide valve during this recovery. This was the highest 

radiation reading noted during recovery. The SNL team was out of 

the area at 1042 hours. 

185 


The trailer recovery teams entered the test area at 1055 

hours. One person, accompanied by a Radsafe monitor, entered the 

crater for camera recovery at 1117 hours. Full anticontamination 

clothing and full-face respirators were required. The work area 

radiation level for this reentry was background, measured at 

about 20 feet from surface ground zero. All personnel had exited 

the crater by 1140 hours. 

The vacuum on the experiment tank was removed, and at 1247 

hours, industrial hygiene personnel verified that there was no 

positive LEL level or toxic gas in the tank. A survey at 1255 

hours of the VLOS pipe showed it also was free of any LEL level 

or toxic gas. At 1310 hours, the ports were opened on the 

experiment tank and recoveries commenced. All recoveries were 

completed by 1322 hours with a maximum recorded reading of 16 

mR/h noted at contact with the ports. Work began to open the 

manway door to the experiment tank at 1327 hours. At 1337 hours, 

this door was opened; a 10 mR/h radiation level was noted, but no 

LEL level or toxic gases were observed. At 1400 hours, the 

manway door was closed, and by 1435 hours, all personnel had 

departed the area. Radsafe personnel continued to survey at the 

perimeter fence for possible radiation leaks each half hour until 

2400 hours on D-day. 

The five-foot door on the experiment tank was opened by DOD 

personnel at 0750 hours on 25 June 1980. Readings from the 

interior ranged from 0.1 to 0.2 mR/h. At 0755 hours, the sixinch port to the top of the tank was opened, and readings ranged 

from 0.08 to 0.13 mR/h. A party of visitors entered the perimeter fence to inspect the crater at 0802 hours. The inspection 

was completed at 0818 hours and all personnel left the area. At 

0930 hours, industrial hygiene personnel checked the oxygen level 

in the experiment tank. Because the level was below normal, when 

reentry of the tank occurred at 1144 hours, both members of the 

reentry team wore self-contained breathing apparatus. This reentry was completed at 1208 hours with no problems. Seven thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were recovered. No removable 

contamination was noted inside the tank, and the work area 

188 
exposure rate in the tank was 0.5 mR/h. The highest radiation 

level noted on the satellite was 1.5 mR/h. 

At 1320 hours, DNA personnel wearing full-face respirators, 

hoods, coveralls, gloves, and totes recovered the lithium hydride 

scatterer from the LOS pipe extensions (which are equivalent to 

the LOS stubs). This material showed a radiation level of 0.3 to 

0.5 mrad/h, and was disposed of at the U3ax radioactive waste 

facility. Reentry into the experiment tank and crater were performed as requested, and equipment was surveyed by Radsafe and 

released throughout the remainder of this day and through 30 

June. On 30 June, the inside of the experiment tank was vacuumed 

because some airborne lithium hydride had been noted. 

Ground motion detection equipment from the crater and some 

TLD's from the experiment tank were removed on 1 July. Tours and 

recovery parties were accompanied by Radsafe personnel as 

requested throughout July. Full anticontamination clothing 

requirements coninued for all entries into the experiment tank. 

An entry was made on 14 July by carpenters measuring the inside 

of the experiment tank to install a floor. On 1 August, the 

carpenters installed the floor in the experiment tank, which was 

then surveyed thoroughly and released to DNA from Radsafe 

control. 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

7.4.1 Post-Recovery Activities. 

A crater entry was made on 20 August. Laborers began 

clearing earth from around the LOS pipe, and by 1250 hours iron 

workers had access to the flange bolts on top of the LOS pipe. 

At 1430 hours, the top valve was pulled. No radiation problems 

were encountered, and the work area radiation rate was at background. Laborers began to clean around the second valve. 

On 28 August, pipefitters partially opened the fast gate in 

the VLOS pipe. A portable radiation instrument probe was lowered 

down the pipe to 256 feet. A trace of contamination was noted 

189 
between 35 and 40 feet. A plate was installed on top of the pipe 

to secure it until operations could be completed. 

A complete exterior surface survey of the satellite was 

conducted on 9 September by Radsafe personnel. No abovebackground radiation levels were noted during this survey. 

On 3 October, work resumed at the U3ky site. The laborers 

finished clearing around the second valve at the top of the VLOS 

pipe. At 1145 hours, the flange was opened, and the radiation 

level was at background. Another portable instrument probe was 

lowered down the pipe to 286 feet. Traces of radiation were 

noted along the pipe. At 280 feet, the radiation level increased 

to 0.5 mR/h. The pipe was secured at 1220 hours. 

On 6 October, a run with a television camera was made down 

the VLOS pipe. After this survey was completed, the camera was 

checked and found free of radioactive contamination. A second 

series of four camera runs were conducted on 7 October, reaching 

a depth of 211 feet. This completed all of the activity 

conducted for the HURON KING event. 

7.4.2 Postevent Drilling. 

No postevent drilling to collect zero point core samples was 

conducted for this event. 

7.4.3 Industrial Safety. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect construction and craft personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. 

Industrial safety codes were established by REECo and emphasized 

during all operations. A written standard operating procedure 

was required for each operation involving explosives, toxic 

materials, radioactive material, or any other operation with the 

potential for personal injury. Each individual involved in such 

an operation was required to know the contents of the applicable 

procedures. 

190 

postevent drilling for ground zero core sample recovery was 

accomplished for this event. 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters 

were documented on Area Access Registers during individual 

entries to HURON KING radex areas on 24 June 1980 (the only day 

when Area Access Registers were used). A total of 515 entries 

into radex areas was recorded, 95 of which were made by 

DOD-affiliated participants. Although pocket dosimeters showed 

some indication of possible radiation exposure, film badges worn 

by recovery personnel (those most likely to be exposed) indicated 

no evidence of any gamma exposures. The minimum detectable gamma 

exposure with the NTS film dosimeter was 30 mR. 

192 
SECTION 8 

MINERS IRON EVENT 

8.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

MINERS IRON was the tenth event in the Hussar Sword Series 

sponsored by DOD and was conducted at 1000 hours Pacific Standard 

Time (PST) on 31 October 1980 with a yield of less than 20 kilotons. The device was detonated in the U12n.11 drift of the N 

tunnel complex (Figure 8.1) at a vertical depth of 1,306 feet. 

The purpose of the event was to test the response of materials 

and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment, specifically, 

to simulate the effect of a Soviet antiballistic missile on an MX 

missile in space. An evacuated horizontal LOS pipe 1,145 feet 

long was used to house experiments. Forty-one projects were 

fielded for the event. 

Stemming was successful and containment was complete. The 

closure system within the LOS pipe did not contain all of the 

radioactive gases generated by the test, and the inside of the 

LOS pipe was slightly contaminated. No radioactive effluent from 

the test was detected onsite or offsite. 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

8.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all MINERS IRON project activities in Area 

12 was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of DOE and DOE contractor personnel were in 

accordance with established DOE-DOD agreements or were the 

subject of separate action between Field Command/DNA, and the DOE 

Nevada Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing experiments or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

193 
194 
removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the zero point area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, t'Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." Because LANL fielded 

the device, the LANL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

DOE Test Controller relieved the LANL Test Group Director of 

responsibility. When the Test Controller determined that venting 

had not occurred, he delegated responsibility for radiological 

safety to the DNA Test Group Director. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

The U12n.11 complex was configured so that the three 

existing overburden plugs (OBPs) from the DIABLO HAWK 

event could be reused. A total of six plugs between the 

LOS pipe and the portal were part of the MINERS IRON 

containment features. These included the main drift OBP 

(see Figure 8.2), cable gas block OBP, U12n.03 OBP, 

ventilation drift thermal shield plug, gas seal plug, 

and structures downhole plug. Additional containment 

features included a gas seal door, stemming of the main 

cable hole, and gas blocks (at the cable splice alcove). 

The LOS pipe system was composed of an 1,145-foot LOS 

pipe containing a zero room, a muffler, two MACs, a 

TAPS, two small bulkhead stations, two sieve/filter 

combinations, two fluence stations, three test chambers, 

a stub pipe system, two vacuum pumping modules, a shock 

mounting system, and shock decouplers. Many of these 

items were recovered from the DIABLO HAWK event. (See 

Figure 8.3.) 

195 

197 
Mining operations for the MINERS IRON test complex 

commenced in April 1979 and were completed in September 

1979. Installation of the LOS pipe began in November 

1979 and was completed and vacuum checked in September 

1980. Labor problems in June and July of 1980 prevented 

the LOS pipe from being vacuum checked in its entirety 

prior to the start of experiment installation in May 

1980. SDR's commenced on 26 August 1980 and continued 

until the FDR on 30 October. A successful MFP dry run 

was completed on 15 October and the device was emplaced 

on 16 October. Final button-up stemming operations were 

initiated that same day. 

Data from all active experiments were recorded by 

oscilloscope cameras and/or magnetic tape recorders 

installed in instrumentation vans located on Rainier 

Mesa or in ROSES units located in the U12n.lOa drift. 

Experimenters included SNL; AFWL; SAI; Corrales Applied 

Physics Company (CAPco); DNA: Effects Technology, Inc. 

(ETI); AFWL/ETI; LANL; LPARL; Field Command Test 

Management; Engineering (FCTME); Field Command; Test 

Construction (FCTC); AFWL/PI; Aerojet, McDonald Douglas 

Aircraft (MDAC) ; Mission Research Corporation (MRC); 

LLNL; Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE); KSC; 

and AFWL/BMO (Ballistic Missile Office). 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with DOE 

Manual Chapter 5480.1 and requirements of responsible 

DOD representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and 

equipment support. 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. Air sampling equipment was positioned in the 

198 
test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel also were standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable 

instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations: and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, 

plastic suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to permanent RAMS units, 40 temporary units 

provided surface and underground coverage for MINERS 

IRON as shown in Table 8.1 and Figures 8.4 and 8.5. 

Also, an air sampling unit was placed at the tunnel 

portal. All RAMS units and the air sampling unit were 

installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

EPA operated 110 air sampling stations in the offsite 

area. Thirty EPA personnel were fielded for offsite 

surveillance activities. 

D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with ERDA Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Ac199 
Table 8.1. MINERS IRON event RAMS unit locations 

31 October 1980. 

SURFACE 

Statlon Location 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

SCH 

From the U12n portal: 

At the portal 

On the filter system 

On the vent line 

On the tunnel drain line 

400 feet N 16" E azimuth 

275 feet N 89" E azimuth 

365 feet S 16" E azimuth 

480 feet S 12" W azimuth 

560 feet S 48" W azimuth 

420 feet N 69" W azimuth 

1,370 feet S 43" E azimuth 

From the cable downhole unless otherwise indicated: 

At cable downhole (cable raise building) 

180 feet N 42" E azimuth 

140 feet S 34" E azimuth 

370 feet S 31" W azimuth 

80 feet N 85" W azimuth 

At the vent hole 

From the U12n.11 SGZ unless otherwise indicated: 

500 feet N 00" E azimuth 

500 feet S 61" E azimuth 

500 feet S 61" W azimuth 

Structures cable hole 

200 
Table 8.1. MINERS IRON event RAMS unit locations 

31 October 1980 (Continued). 

UNDERGROUND 

Station Location 

From the U12n.08 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

21 575 feet into the U12n.11 LOS drift 

22 275 feet into the U12n.11 LOS drift 

23 157 feet into the U12n.11 LOS drift 

24 450 feet into the U12n.11 bypass drift 

25 250 feet into the U12n.11 bypass drift 

26 185 feet into the U12n.lOa drift 

27 85 feet into the U12n.08 bypass drift S curve 

*28ER 85 feet into the U12n.08 bypass drift S curve 

29 In the U12n vent drift 

30 435 feet into the U12n.08 drift from the 05 drift 

31 600 feet into the U12n.05 drift from the U12n main 

drift 

32 300 feet into the U12n.03 drift from the U12n main 

drift 

33 

34 

*35ER 

36 

37 

38 

39 

From the U12n portal unless otherwise indicated: 

2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

2,050 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

50 feet into the U12n vent line raise from the 

U12n main drift 

200 feet into the U12n main drift 

* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h) 

201 
202 

cidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or 

control stations for issue of stay-in badges, or issue 

and return of muster badges. After area control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have 

all personnel not connected with this event out of the 

closed area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the 

USAF for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, 

if needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130 and 

crew on standby status for cloud tracking. The EPA 

provided a Turbo Beech and crew for cloud sampling. 

Another EPA aircraft, an OV-1OA Bronco, was used for 

obtaining meteorological information before the test and 

was on standby after the test to undertake a cloud 

tracking mission, if required. 

8.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

8.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

On 31 October 1980 at 0001 hours, all persons except the 

arming party, tunnel button-up party, microwave timing party, and 

security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of the muster 

area. Permission was granted to arm the device, arming was 

accomplished, and button-up was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0630 hours on 31 October in 

anticipation of planned test execution at 1000 hours that day. 

Conditions for test execution were favorable, and all personnel 

were mustered out of the area. 

204 
The MINERS IRON device was detonated at 1000 hours PST on 31 

October 1980. 

8.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1000 hours on 31 October 

1980. All stations remained operational throughout the test with 

the exception of RAMS unit No. 21, which was inoperative at zero 

time and remained inoperative throughout the test. All stations 

showed background radiation levels after the test with the 

exception of unit Nos. 22 and 23, which were placed in the LOS 

drift and responded as expected to activation radiation. RAMS 

unit No. 22 read a maximum of 540 R/h at H+l minute, decreasing 

to 3.3 R/h by 1102 hours on 31 October 1980. Unit No. 23 read a 

maximum of 512 R/h at H+l minute, decreasing to 1.3 R/h by H+l 

hour. The reading at unit No. 23 had decreased to 1 R/h by 1200 

hours on 31 October 1980. No indications of radioactive effluent 

were detected by any tunnel, surface, or airborne radiation monitoring units. All RAMS units were secured at 1100 hours on 3 

November 1980, when RAMS unit No. 22 read 11 mR/h and No. 23 read 

9 mR/h. 

8.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Four reentry teams (one team each to survey the main Mesa 

trailer park, Mesa ventilation pad, portal area, and portal area 

ventilation system) were released from Gate 300 at 1055 hours on 

the day of detonation. The portal area surveys were completed at 

1136 hours, the Mesa ventilation pad survey was completed at 

1139 hours, and the Mesa trailer park survey was completed at 

1141 hours. No radiation levels above background (0.05 mR/h) 

were detected. Gas samples obtained remotely from the zero point 

side of the OBP indicated no above-background level of 

radioactivity, toxic gases, or the LEL. However, levels of 150 

mrad/h (beta plus gamma), 800 ppm of carbon monoxide, and 27 

percent of the LEL were noted in gas samples drawn from test 

chamber No. 2. Mesa and portal data recoveries were conducted 

between 1630 and 2000 hours after cable disconnects at the Mesa 

205 
splice shack were completed. D-day operations were terminated at 

2000 hours. 

8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

8.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

Remote gas sampling was performed again the morning of 1 

November 1976 (D+l), before any personnel entered the tunnel. 

Gas samples from inside the LOS pipe read 0.2 mR/h (3 mrad/h) at 

contact. One-hundred percent of the LEL and 5,000 ppm of carbon 

monoxide were measured. At 0825 hours, a work party accompanied 

by Radsafe and industrial hygiene personnel entered the tunnel 

and proceeded to the gas seal door. No anticontamination 

clothing was required. The gas seal door was opened, and the 

work party moved to the gas seal plug. The 36-inch crawl space 

in the plug was opened, and air flow towards the portal was 

noted. Surveys showed a 0.04 mrad/h radiation level, no indication of any LEL level or carbon monoxide, and 300 ppm of carbon 

dioxide. Ventilation was established through this plug. The 

work party returned to the portal at 1035 hours with no 

above-background LEL or radiation level having been encountered, 

and only the above-mentioned low level of carbon dioxide noted. 

Reentry team No. 1, accompanied by the rescue team, entered 

the tunnel at 1103 hours wearing full anticontamination clothing, 

which included gloves, coveralls with openings taped, a hood, and 

totes. (No respiratory protection was required to the OBP.) 

Damage to the tunnel was noted as the teams moved toward the OBP. 

After the OBP was reached, the air from the zero point side of 

the OBP was sampled through the plug manual gas sampling line. 

No above-background radiation, LEL, or toxic gas level was 

observed. The 36-inch door to the crawl space in the OBP was 

opened, the ventilation lines through the OBP were hooked up, 

and, at 1352 hours, reentry team No. 1 moved through the plug, 

each member wearing SCBA. 

Damage was noted in all areas. At the door of test chamber 

No. 2, 80 mrad/h was measured: no indications of any LEL level or 

206 
toxic gases were observed. An attempt was made to establish 

ventilation to the LOS pipe at test chamber No. 2, but the flex 

line which had been installed before detonation to the exhaust 

valve on the LOS pipe was badly shredded during the event and was 

unusable. At 1520 hours, the team had moved back to the OBP. 

Before exiting the tunnel and while still wearing SCBA, the team 

worked on a problem with the ventilation system. They were 

ordered back to the portal at 1602 hours. The team exited the 

tunnel at 1630 hours. 

The reentry team, work team, and rescue team reassembled the 

next morning to continue the reentry. Readings from the remote 

gas sampling line showed that a 0.3 mrad/h radiation level, 100 

percent of the LEL, and 2,000 ppm of carbon monoxide remained 

inside the LOS pipe. At 0850 hours, the train left the portal. 

At 0944 hours, the reentry team again passed through the OBP. 

The team corrected the ventilation problem not completed the day 

before, opened the Mesa vent line, and measured 50 ppm of carbon 

monoxide. No other above-background readings were observed. At 

1036 hours, the Mesa blower was started to reestablish tunnel 

ventilation. The reentry team, having previously returned to the 

portal side of the OBP and removed their SCBA, redonned their 

breathing apparatus and passed back through the OBP at 1107 hours 

to continue reentry. They again moved to test chamber No. 2 and 

set up a flex line to the valve at the top of the test chamber. 

The radiation reading at the door was 30 mR/h (50 mrad/h). The 

valve was opened: 100 percent of the LEL and about 1,500 ppm of 

carbon monoxide were measured. 

The team moved to test chamber No. 0. The door was opened, 

and a reading of 40 mR/h was taken at arm's length inside the 

chamber. No positive LEL level or toxic gases were noted. The 

team walked to the ROSES drift where they were allowed to remove 

their SCBA. Ventilation was established into the ROSES area. 

Some damage was noted, and all the ROSES units were tilted 

somewhat. At 1229 hours, the backup reentry team entered the 

tunnel. The freon bottles in the ROSES units were turned off and 

the freon drained according to the reentry plan. All reentry 

207 
personnel had returned to the portal side of the OBP by 1315 

hours. 

At 1400 hours, recovery teams were allowed to enter the 

tunnel. No protective clothing or respiratory protection gear 

was required as no toxic gases, LEL level, or removable 

contamination had been measured in the recovery areas (the ROSES 

and stubs areas). By 1830 hours, initial recoveries had been 

made, and all the recovery teams had been checked for contamination and allowed to depart the area. All personnel had exited 

the tunnel at 2000 hours on D+2. 

On 3 November, remote gas samples again were taken from 

inside of the LOS through the sampling lines to the tunnel 

portal. Inside the LOS pipe, the radiation level had dropped to 

0.04 mrad/h, although indications of 925 ppm of carbon monoxide 

and 75 percent of the LEL still remained. The train left the 

portal at 0900 hours with Radsafe personnel and miners. A "hot 

line" was set up on the zero point side of the OBP. A flex line 

was run through the OBP to test chamber No. 2 to provide ventilation to the TAPS area. A reentry team and the rescue team 

departed for test chamber No. 2. The work area radiation level 

outside test chamber No. 2 was 9 mrad/h, with the highest reading 

being 50 mR/h, made at contact with the LOS pipe on the zero 

point side of the test chamber door. A flex line was hooked up 

to ventilate inside the LOS pipe at the TAPS area, and the 

reentry team donned SCBA to enter to the TAPS with the flex line. 

The door to test chamber No. 2 was opened and the team entered 

the pipe. An exposure rate of 6 mR/h was noted inside the pipe. 

No LEL level was noted, but a trace of carbon monoxide was 

measured. 

The team arrived at the TAPS at 1107 hours. The LEL level 

was 100 percent, and 5,000 ppm of carbon monoxide was noted at a 

leak at the top of the TAPS. The flex line was placed to remove 

the toxic and potentially explosive gases leaking from the top of 

the TAPS, swipe samples were taken, and the reentry team left the 

LOS pipe at 1130 hours. Results of the swipe samples taken 

208 
showed the presence of removable contamination inside the LOS 

pipe. 

A scientific assessment team and LANL and SNL personnel, 

each person wearing full anticontamination clothing, entered test 

chamber No. 0 at 1220 hours to assess damage and take photographs. The general exposure level was 16 mrad/h, with the highest exposure rate of 90 mR/h measured at contact with area experiments. At 1240 hours, the team entered test chamber No. 1. The 

work area radiation level was 3 mrad/h. The team moved on to 

test chamber No. 2. The highest radiation level measured was 110 

mrad/h, noted at contact with the experiments. The work area 

radiation level was 6 mrad/h. The LANL and SNL personnel left 

the pipe at 1400 hours, and the scientific assessment teams left 

at 1620 hours. All were surveyed after they removed their 

anticontamination clothing to make sure they had not contaminated 

themselves inside the test chamber: all were free of 

contamination. 

Work began to remove the containment plugs on swing shift of 

3 November. Assessment teams again entered the LOS pipe on 4 

November at 0845 hours, and recovery teams began test chamber 

recoveries at 0910 hours the same day. Radsafe monitors and 

industrial hygiene personnel conducted each recovery group into 

their respective area. All personnel left the test chambers by 

1330 hours that day. Mining continued on 5 and 6 November to 

remove the gas seal plug and OBP. Assessments of damage were 

made and more photographs were taken on 6 and 7 November. 

Rehabilitation of the damaged areas began 7 November and 

continued for several weeks. On 12 November, recovery parties 

again entered the test chambers. All experiments were bagged and 

shipped out of the tunnel as contaminated materials, and the 

experiments were then decontaminated by Radsafe personnel at the 

SRD (Secret Restricted Data) building in Area 12. Recoveries 

continued through 21 November. Some removal of experiments and 

equipment occurred after this time as the users directed; all 

experiments were checked before release from the tunnel for 

radiation levels and removable contamination. Items were 

decontaminated as necessary. Mining began on the 14 exploratory 

209 
drift during this period, and mining support for work related to 

MINERS IRON continued only as requested. 

On 9 December, a reentry team, dressed in full anticontamination clothing and supplied-air equipment, drilled a hole 

through to the zero point side of the TAPS door. A gas sample, 

which showed a radiation level of 0.8 mrad/h at contact, 500 ppm 

of carbon monoxide, and 100 percent of the LEL, was drawn through 

the drillhole. A valve was installed on this hole, and a ventilation line was hooked up to dissipate the LEL and toxic gas 

levels. Gas samples taken the next day showed 25 percent of the 

LEL and 100 ppm of carbon monoxide still existed behind the TAPS. 

On 11 December, the hole was checked again and levels had 

dropped to 10 percent of LEL and 50 ppm of carbon monoxide. At 

1000 hours, work began to open the TAPS. All personnel left the 

area that day by 1530 hours. Work resumed on 15 December, but 

the TAPS was not opened until 1030 hours on 16 December. 

Readings at the MAC No. 1 door were 20 percent of the LEL, 30 ppm 

of carbon dioxide and 0.1 mR/h. The highest radiation reading 

was 2 mR/h, noted at 20 feet from the zero point side of the 

TAPS. SNL personnel entered the pipe to survey the MAC. All 

personnel had exited the pipe by 1430 hours and were surveyed for 

radioactive contamination. Other entries for surveys by user 

personnel were conducted by Radsafe personnel as requested. 

On 13 January 1981, a team entered the LOS pipe in order to 

purge the air behind MAC No. 1. Two, one-and-one-eighth inch 

holes were begun to facilitate this purging. The radiation level 

at the MAC was 0.3 mrad/h, and 500 ppm of carbon monoxide and 

80 to 90 percent of the LEL were noted. The MAC finally was 

drilled through on 19 January, and 5,000 ppm of carbon monoxide 

and 75 percent of the LEL were noted through the hole. Control 

of the tunnel was turned over to DOD the same day, and work began 

immediately to remove the shield wall at test chamber No. 0 (100 

feet into the 11 LOS drift) and portions of the LOS pipe on the 

portal side of test chamber No. 0. No positive radiation readings were noted from the muck or pipe removed during these operations. 

210 
The purge behind the MAC was performed on 21 January. The 

air coming from behind the MAC showed greater than 100 percent of 

the LEL and 300 ppm of carbon monoxide. The air was drawn 

through the ventilation system, filtered, and released outside 

the tunnel. All personnel left the LOS pipe as air continued to 

be forced from behind the MAC into the ventilation system. By 

1910 hours that day, no trace of any LEL level or any toxic gas 

could be detected. Work to remove the shield wall continued. 

On 23 January, pipefitters began washing down the inside of 

the LOS pipe around test chamber No. 2 to remove loose contamination in preparation for dismantling and removal of the LOS 

pipe. This was done in full anticontamination clothing. Contaminated materials were bagged or packaged, as appropriate to 

prevent spread of contamination, and sent to areas outside the 

tunnel. All personnel and materials from the area were surveyed 

at the Radsafe "hot line" set up to monitor and control 

contamination and neutron-activated materials. Radsafe personnel 

were given control of access to the LOS pipe and test chambers. 

Cleanup and removal of the LOS pipe from MAC No. 1 to the 

portal side end of the LOS pipe continued from January through 

June 1981. Miners and pipefitters cutting the pipe wore fullface masks with HEPA filters as well as full anticontamination 

clothing. The portions of pipe removed were surveyed and swipe 

samples taken to assure no loose contamination remained on the 

pipe sections. Pipe sections with no loose contamination but 

which had been neutron activated at the time of test detonation 

and so showed above-background radiation levels were marked with 

"CONTAMINATED MATERIAL" tape for proper handling. Some mining 

was performed to remove stemming around the LOS pipe near the MAC 

No. 1; no above-background radiation readings were noted on this 

muck. 

On 29 July, preparations to mill through the MAC No. 1 and 2 

were begun. Milling operations began 7 August and continued 

intermittently through the rest of 1981 and into 1982. No 

211 
radiological problems were encountered during these milling 

operations. 

0.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

There was no postevent mining to reenter any of the test 

areas. 

8.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

There was no underground or Rainier Mesa postshot drilling 

to recover zero point core samples for this event. 

8.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to 

measure radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The 

results were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes 

including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling, 

were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving explosives, toxic materials, radioactive 

material, or any other operation with the potential for personal 

injury. Each individual involved in such an operation was 

required to know the contents of the applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and tunnel were mandatory hard 

hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, DOEissued miners boots, or toe guards). All personnel on the 

initial tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the 

Draeger self-contained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa 

two-hour breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were 

observed. HEPA canister filters were supplied routinely for 

hazardous situations where full-face masks were required. An 

212 
array of specialized canister filters could be obtained 

upon request for special hazardous situations. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

2. AEC Manual 0500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. MINERS IRON Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1000 hours on 31 October and 

all telemetry stations were secured at 1100 hours on 3 November. 

Some radioactive debris passed through the LOS containment 

features and contaminated test chamber experiments, but no 

release other than inside the LOS pipe occurred. 

Initial radiation surveys of the Mesa and portal areas began 

at 1055 hours on 31 October and were completed by 1141 hours. No 

radiation above background was detected at the Mesa trailer park 

area or at the tunnel complex portal. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 0825 hours on 1 November 

1980. Initial reentry operations continued over a three-day 

period. The maximum radiation reading taken during reentry 

operations was 80 mrad/h, detected at test chamber No. 2 on1 

November. The maximum toxic gas concentration and LEL level 

encountered during reentry were 5,000 ppm of carbon monoxide and 

213 
100 percent of the LEL, measured at a leak in the top of the TAPS 

on 3 November. 

No reentry mining or drilling to recover zero point core 

samples was conducted for this event. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

MINERS IRON radex areas from 31 October to 20 November when the 

use of the Area Access Registers was discontinued, are summarized 

below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket dosimeters 

as recorded on the Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are 

from film dosimeter records. 

All Participants 

DOD Participants 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

407 80 2 

54 45 3 

214 
SECTION 9 

LIST OF REFERENCES 

References are not indicated within the text of this report, 

but are included in this list by chapter or part. Most references are available for review at or through the DOE/NV Coordination and Information Center (CIC). Security-classified references are located at the DNA/HQ Technical Library in Alexandria, 

Virginia, but are available only to persons with appropriate security clearances and a need for classified information contained 

in the references. 

The CIC is operated by REECo, the custodian of nuclear testing personnel dosimetry and other radiological safety records for 

DOE/NV, and the custodian for DNA of reference documents for 

reports on DOD participation in atmospheric, oceanic, and underground nuclear weapons testing events and series. Arrangements 

may be made to review available references for this report at the 

CIC by contacting one of the following: 

Health Physics and Environmental Division 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Nevada Operations Office 

2753 South Highland Avenue 

Post Office Box 98515 

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8515 

Commercial: (702) 295-0961 

FTS: 575-0961 

Manager, Coordination and Information Center 

Reynolds Electrical 61 Engineering Co., Inc. 

Post Office Box 98521 M/S 548 

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8521 

Commercial: (702) 295-0731 

FTS: 575-0731 

215 
Major source documents also are available through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) and may be purchased 

from NTIS at the address and telephone number listed below: 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road 

Springfield, VA 22161 

Commercial: (703) 487-4650 

(Sales Office) 

References available through public bookstores and libraries, through the U.S. Government Printing Office, and only at the 

CIC are listed without asterisks. Asterisks after references or 

groups of 

* 

** 

*** 

PREFACE. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

references indicate availability as follows: 

Available through the NTIS and the CIC. 

Located in the REECo Technical Information Office adjacent to the CIC, available through the CIC, and may be 

subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

Located in the DNA/HQ Technical Library, and subject to 

security clearance requirements. 

Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Operations Office, "Announced United States Nuclear Tests," 

NVO-209 (Rev. 7), January 1987*. 

Devine, Robert A., Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test 

Ban Debate, Oxford University Press, NY, 1978. 

Harris, P.S., et al, Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

PLUMBBOB, DNA 6005F, 15 September 1981*. 

U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Veterans 

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing," U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1979. 

216 
Section 1, INTRODUCTION 

5. 

6. 

7. 

DOE/NV, "Announced Nuclear Tests," (n. 1). 

Devine, "Nuclear Test Ban Debate," (n. 2). 

Weapons Effects Test Group, Field Command, Defense Atomic 

Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," January 

1962. 

Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," revised 15 August 1964. 

Ponton, Jean, et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation 

DOMINIC II, DNA 6027F, 31 January 1983*. 

Section 2, UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

8. Liverman, James L., Energy Research & Development Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Nevada Test 

Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA - 1551, September 1977*. 

9. Butkovich, Theodore R., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Effects of Water Saturation on Underground Nuclear Detonations, UCRL-51110, 9 September 1971*. 

Committee on Veterans Affairs, "Claims for Disabilities," 

(n. 4), on venting. 

10. Environmental Sciences Department, Reynolds Electrical &I Engineering Co., Inc., "Standard Operating Procedures," January 1976-1980. 

11. Brady, William J., Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., 

Inc., Combination Personnel Dosimeter & Security Credential 

Holder, NVO-162-27, October 1967. 

217 
EVENT SUMMARIES AND EACH EVENT CHAPTER. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

Energy Research and Development Administration, Nevada 

Operations Office, NV Completion Report, Operation Anvil, 1 

July 1975 through 30 September 1976, NVO-180, April 1977***. 

Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, NV - 

Completion Report, Operation Cresset, 1 October 1977 through 

30 September 1978, NVO-201, May 1979***. 

Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, NV - 

Completion Report, Operation Tinderbox, 1 October 1979 

through 30 September 1980, NVO-231, June 1981***. 

Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, NV - 

Completion Report, Operation Guardian, 1 October 1980 

through 30 September 1981, NVO-237, June 1982***. 

REECo Environmental Sciences Department field record archives are maintained chronologically and by test event and include the following: 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

Procedures, Reentry Plans, Radsafe Plans, and Schedules 

of Events**. 

Correspondence**. 

Reports, including onsite Radsafe and offsite USEPA 

event reports**. 

Exposure reports, Radsafe logbooks, Area Access 

Registers, radiation survey forms, telemetry forms, and 

other sampling and dosimetry forms**. 

218 
APPENDIX A 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Activity 

Access Drift 

The rate of decay of radioactive material, usually expressed in disintigrations per minute (dpm) 

A passageway tunnel, usually parallel 

to the LOS drift, also known as the 

bypass, cable, reentry, or work drift, 

in which cables from various experiments in the LOS pipe were laid on 

their way to being connected to the 

downhole cables in the cable alcove and 

which was used for access to the main 

experiment (LOS) drift during construction and recovery phases of a test. 

Activation Products Nuclides made radioactive by neutrons 

from a nuclear detonation interacting 

with usually nonradioactive nuclides. 

Also called "induced activity." 

Advisory Panel 

AFSWC 

A group of experts formed to advise the 

Test Manager (and later the Test 

Controller) concerning operational 

factors affecting a test detonation. 

The Air Force Special Weapons Center, 

located at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, provided air 

support to the AEC Test Manager for NTS 

testing activities. 

219 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

AFSWP 

Air Support 

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was activated on 1 January 1947, 

when the AEC was activated, to assume 

residual functions of the U.S. Army 

Manhattan Engineer District (see DASA 

and DNA). 

This included aircraft, facilities, and 

personnel required for various support 

functions during testing, including 

cloud sampling, cloud tracking, radiation monitoring, photography, and 

transport of personnel and equipment. 

All-Purpose Canisters Combination canisters made up of a 

charcoal bed and a HEPA filter. 

Alpha Particle 

Alpine Mining 

Anticontamination 

Clothing 

Atmospheric Test 

Series 

A particle emitted spontaneously from 

the nucleus of a radionuclide, primarily a heavy radionuclide. The particle is identical to the nucleus of a 

helium atom, having an atomic mass of 

four units and an electric charge of 

two positive units. 

Mining performed with a mining machine. 

(This is an alternative to dynamiting 

for excavation.) 

Outer clothing worn to prevent contamination of personal clothing, contamination of one's body, and the spread of 

contamination to uncontrolled areas. 

This included several series of U.S. 

tests conducted from 1945 through 1962, 

when nuclear device detonations and 

220 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Attenuation 

experiments were conducted primarily in 

the atmosphere. 

The process by which photons or particles from radionuclides are reduced 

in number and energy while passing 

through some medium. 

Back The top (ceiling) of a tunnel. 

Background Radiation There are three meanings for this term, 

the applicable meaning is determined by 

the context. The definitions are: 

1) The radiations of man's natural 

environment, consisting of cosmic 

rays and those radiations which come 

from the naturally radioactive atoms 

of the earth, including those within 

one's body. 

2) A level of radiation (above natural 

background radiation) that existed 

in a test area or location prior to 

a test. 

3) Radiation levels extraneous to an 

experiment (the area exposure rate). 

Ball Valve 

Beta Particle 

A rotating spool valve designed to 

close off and provide a gas seal in an 

LOS pipe in less than one second after 

detonation. Can be pneumatic, hydraulic, or spring driven. 

A negatively charged particle of very 

small mass emitted from the nucleus of 

221 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Bypass Drift 

BJY 

Brattice Cloth 

Bulkhead 

Button-Up Activities 

a radionuclide, particularly from 

fission product radionuclides formed 

during nuclear detonations. Except 

for origin, the beta particle is 

identical to a high speed electron. 

This may also be a positively charged 

particle of equal mass called a 

positron. 

See Access Drift. 

The intersection of Mercury Highway 

with roads originally constructed for 

the BUSTER-JANGLE 1951 atmospheric test 

series, located at the northwest corner 

of Area 3 on the NTS. It was previously called the "Y.'l 

Plastic, cheese-cloth reinforced sheeting used to control the spread of 

contamination. 

This is a wall or embankment constructed in a mine or tunnel to protect 

against earth slides, fire, water, or 

gas. 

Procedures which consist primarily of 

completing the stemming; accomplishing 

the electrical checklist of tunnel portal and trailer park facilities; closing the OBP, gas seal Plug, and gas 

seal door inside the tunnel; clearing 

the controlled area; and preparing command post and monitoring stations for 

the actual nuclear detonation. 

222 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Cable Drift 

Cal-Seal 

Cassette 

Cellar 

Chamber 

Check Points or 

Check Stations 

Chimney 

Chromatograph 

Cloud Sampling 

See Access Drift. 

High-density, quick-drying, highstrength, and resilient commercial 

sealant. 

A holder or container for a sampl.e, an 

experiment, or a group of experiments. 

The excavated, large-diameter part of a 

drilled hole over which the drill rig 

is placed and where valving and other 

equipment are located. 

A natural or man-made enclosed space or 

cavity. 

Geographic locations established and 

staffed to control entry into and exit 

from restricted areas. 

This refers to the volume of broken 

rock above an underground cavity formed 

by a nuclear detonation that falls 

downward when decreasing cavity gas 

pressure can no longer support the 

rocks' weight. 

A piece of equipment used to separate 

and analyze mixtures of chemical substances by chromatographic absorption. 

The process of collecting particulate 

and gaseous samples from an effluent 

cloud to determine the amount of total 

airborne radioactivity and specific 

radionuclides in the cloud for sub223 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Cloud Tracking 

Collar See "Shaft Collar" 

Console A cabinet or panel containing instrumentation for monitoring or controlling 

electronic or mechanical testing 

devices. 

sequent analysis of detonation characteristics. This type of sampling 

usually was accomplished by specially 

equipped aircraft. 

The process of monitoring and determining the drift and movement of an 

effluent cloud, usually performed by 

radiation monitoring and visual sighting from aircraft. 

Construction Station The distance in feet along the tunnel 

from the portal or a particular 

junction, usually expressed in hundreds 

of feet plus remaining whole feet. 

Construction station 350 is expressed 

as CS 3+50. 

Containment The act of preventing release of any 

radioactive effluent into the atmosphere or parts of a tunnel complex 

beyond the stemming and other containment features. It is used in reference 

to the stemming, TAPS, OBP, or the gas 

seal plug. An event is said to have 

been lVcontainedVt if no effluent is 

released to the atmosphere or if no 

radioactive material is released beyond 

the stemmed portion of the tunnel. 

224 
GLOSSARY OF TERNS (Continued) 

Containment 

Assessment Drift 

Contamination 

Crater 

Crater Experiment 

Another name for an access or reentry drift. 

This is defined in two ways as follows: 

1) The term may refer to the presence 

of fixed or removable radioactive 

material in a location. This is 

usually caused by the spread of fission and activation products of a 

nuclear detonation or fissionable 

material from a device incorporated 

with particles of dust or device 

debris. 

2) The term may also refer to the 

depositing on, or spreading of, 

radioactive materials to undesirable 

locations, personnel, structures, 

equipment, or other surfaces outside 

a controlled area. 

This is the depression formed on the 

earth's surface by a near-surface, 

surface, or underground detonation. 

Crater formation can occur by the 

scouring effect of airblast, throw-out 

of broken surface material, or surface 

subsidence resulting from underground 

cavity formation and subsequent rock 

fall, or chimneying, to the surface. 

A test designed to breach and excavate 

the ground surface, thereby forming an 

ejecta crater (as opposed to a sink or 

subsidence crater). 

225 
"LuSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

DAC 

Dance Hall 

DASA 

D-day 

D+l 

Decontamination 

Device 

The DNA Auxiliary Closure (DAC) is a 

closing system found in the LOS pipe 

which closes milliseconds after device 

detonation. 

A large alcove used for data recording 

equipment. 

AFSWP became the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA) in 1959. See AFSWP and 

DNA. 

The term used to designate the day on 

which a test takes place. 

The first day after a test event. D+2 

is the second day after detonation, D+3 

is the third day, etc. 

The reduction or removal of contaminating radioactive material from a 

structure, area, object, or person. 

Decontamination may be accomplished by 

(1) treating the surface to remove or 

decrease the contamination, (2) letting 

the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of 

natural decay, or (3) fixing and covering the contamination to attenuate the 

radiation emitted. 

This is comprised of nuclear fission 

(or fission and fusion) materials together with arming, fusing, firing, 

high-explosive, canister, and diagnostic measurement equipment that have not 

226 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

DNA 

DOD 

Dose 

Dose Rate 

Dosimeter 

dpm 

been configured into an operational 

weapon. 

An acronym for the Defense Nuclear 

Agency, successor to DASA in 1971. 

An acronym for the U.S. Department of 

Defense, the federal executive agency 

responsible for the defense of the 

United States. Included in this group 

are the military services and special 

joint defense agencies. 

The quantity (measured or accumulated) 

of ionizing radiation energy absorbed 

into the medium it passes through. In 

a person, dose is measured in rems or 

rads. 

The amount of ionizing radiation energy 

that an individual or material could 

absorb per unit of time. Dose rates are 

usually expressed as rad or rem per 

hour. Subdivisions of a rad or rem 

also are used, e.g., mrem/h means 

millirem per hour. (A millirem equals 

one thousandth of a rem). 

A device used to measure radiation 

doses. Devices worn or carried by 

individuals are called personnel dosimeters. 

This stands for disintegrations per 

minute, which is a measure of the 

activity of material. 

227 
GLOSSARY OF TEWS (Continued) 

Draeger Breathing 

Apparatus 

Draeger Multi-Gas 

Detector 

Dressed Out 

Drift 

See Scott-Draeger. 

An instrument used to detect toxic gases. A sample of the ambient atmosphere 

is drawn through a selected chemical 

reagent tube which indicates the 

concentration of a particular toxic 

gas. 

This means one is dressed in anticontamination clothing and any necessary 

associated equipment. 

A horizontal or inclined passageway 

excavated underground with one access 

opening. It is used interchangeably 

with the term "tunnel" at the NTS. 

Drill Hole Designations These are defined as follows: 

From the surface - 

PS-1v: Post-shot drill hole number 1 - 

vertical 

PS-1D: Post-shot drill hole number 1 - 

directional 

PS-1A: Post-shot drill hole number 1 - 

angle 

Each IS' added after any of the above 

notations indicates a "sidetrack" or 

change of direction in the drill hole. 

228 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Dry Run 

Dutchman 

From underground locations - sample 

recovery core holes are referred to as 

RE (Reentry) No. 1, RE No. 2, etc. 

(ttDNREt' means the reentry hole was DNA 

requested.) 

A simulation of the functions occurring 

in the minutes before, during, and after the event. All timing and firing 

signals are sent in the proper sequence 

from the Control Room at CP-1. Each 

run begins with the first required timing and firing signal (normally minus 

15 minutes) and ends with the firing 

signal. The audio countdown is transmitted over Net 1 (DNA) and on other 

nets as agreed upon with appropriate 

agencies. There are various types of 

dry runs depending on the degree of 

participation required of the agencies 

involved. 

Part of the tunnel ventilation system. 

It is a small-diameter filler piece 

used to close the gap between two 

lengths of ventilation tubing. 

Effects Experiments These are experiments with the purpose 

of studying the effects of a nuclear 

detonation environment on materials, 

structures, equipment, and systems. 

They include measurements of the 

changes in the environment caused by 

the nuclear detonation, such as ground 

movement, air pressures (blast), 

thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, 

and cratering. 

229 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Exoatmospheric 

Explosimeter 

Exposure 

Exposure Rate 

Face 

FDR 

Film Badge 

This refers to the area outside the 

gaseous mass which envelopes the earth. 

A battery-operated detector calibrated 

to indicate the concentration in the 

ambient atmosphere of explosive gases 

and vapors as percent of the lower 

explosive limit (LEL) of methane gas (5 

percent concentration in air). 

A measure, expressed in roentgens (R), 

of the ionization produced by gamma or 

X rays in air. [This may also be 

represented by subdivisions of R; e.g., 

l/1000 R = 1 milliroentgen (mR).] 

The exposure rate is the radiation exposure per unit of time, usually per 

hour, but it may be stated in smaller 

or larger units (e.g., R/min, mR/h, 

R/day) . 

This is the front end of a tunnel or 

other excavation that is being worked 

to advance the tunnel. 

A successful final dry run (FDR) is the 

last dry run before a test is 

detonated. 

A dosimeter used for the indirect 

measurement of exposure to ionizing 

radiation. It generally contains two 

or three films of differing sensitivity. Films are wrapped in paper or 

other thin material that blocks light 

230 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Fission 

Fission Products 

but is readily penetrated by radiations 

or secondary charged particles resulting from the radiations to be measured. 

Film packets generally have at least 

one metal filter or may be in holders 

with multiple filters. After being 

worn as a film badge or film dosimeter. 

Films are developed and the degree of 

darkening (or optical density) measured 

indicates the radiation exposure. Film 

dosimeters commonly are used to indicate gamma and x-ray exposures, and 

also can be designed to determine beta 

and neutron doses. 

The process whereby the nucleus of a 

particular heavy element splits into 

(generally) two nuclei of lighter elements, with an accompanying release of 

energy. The most important fissionable, or fissile, materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission is 

caused by the absorption of a neutron 

in a nucleus. 

A general term used for the complex 

mixture of radioactive nuclides (see 

Radionuclides) produced as a result of 

nuclear fission. 

Fissionable Material A synonym for fissile material, also 

extended to include material that can 

be fissioned by fast neutrons only, 

such as uranium-238. Used in reactor 

operations to mean reactor fuel. 

231 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Flex Line A temporary flexible plastic tubing 

used to ventilate areas in which the 

main ventilation system did not provide 

adequate circulation of the air. 

Forward Control Point A geographic location in the forward 

test area, usually adjacent to the 

closed (or secured) test area. 

Full Power Full This is similar in intent to a mandaFrequency (FPFF) Dry Run tory full participation dry run. The 

FPFF is sometimes combined with the hot 

dry run (HDR). This run is optional 

with the device engineer. When conducted, the LOS pipe is under vacuum, 

telephones and intercoms are disconnetted, and tunnel utility and instrumentation power are operated in eventday configuration. Also all instrumentation is hooked up and operated in 

event-day configuration (simulators are 

not used). 

Fusion 

Gamma Photons 

The combination of two very light nuclei (of atoms) to form a relatively 

heavier nucleus, with an accompanying 

release of energy is called fusion. 

(It is also known as thermonuclear 

fusion). 

Electromagnetic radiations of high energy that are emitted from the nuclei 

of radionuclides. These photons are 

sometimes referred to as bundles of 

energy, and usually accompany other 

nuclear reactions, such as fission, 

neutron capture, and beta particle 

232 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Gamma Shine 

Gas Seal Door 

Gas Seal Plug 

Gate 300 

emission. Gamma photons, or rays, are 

identical with x rays of the same energy, except that x rays result from 

orbital electron reactions rather than 

being produced in the nucleus. 

This occurs when a measurable gamma 

radiation intensity from an approaching 

radioactive cloud or passing cloud is 

noted, as opposed to measurements from 

or in gamma emitting fallout. This 

also includes gamma radiation scattered 

by air molecules, as opposed to direct 

radiation from a gamma source. 

A steel door on the portal side of the 

gas seal plug. It is closed during 

button up with about a 10 psi gas pressure applied between the gas seal plug 

and the gas seal door as an additional 

reassurance against low-pressure leaks. 

This is one containment feature within 

the tunnel complex: generally it is 

designed for 500°F and 500 psi. The 

gas seal plug is sometimes referenced 

as the "hasty plug.t' This plug is 

similar to a lower pressure overburden 

plug, but is is placed closer to the 

portal and seals off the entire tunnel 

complex from the portal. 

Refers 20 the permanent security 

station set up in Area 6 near the 

Control Point facilities at which 

reentry and recovery personnel wait 

during execution of an event. After 

233 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

reentry parties were released from this 

gate, they moved to the FCP and again 

awaited release. 

Geiger-Mueller Counter An instrument consisting of a GeigerMueller tube and associated electronic 

equipment used to detect, display, and 

sometimes record nuclear radiation 

levels. 

Geophone 

Ground Zero 

Heading 

High-Efficiency 

Particulate Canisters 

An instrument used to detect vibrations 

in rock or soil. At NTS, it is used 

remotely to detect rock falls, earth 

movement, and cavity collapse 

underground while providing audible 

signal and visual display data. 

A term used during atmospheric testing 

to denote a point on the surface of the 

ground directly below or coinciding 

with an atmospheric detonation (see 

surface ground zero and zero point). 

The furthest point one can walk into a 

drift or tunnel. 

Canisters used with a face mask to filter particulate vapors out of breathing 

air. These canisters were called 

1tabsolutett filters because they 

filtered 99.97% of particulate matter 

greater than 0.3 micrometers in size. 

These were later referred to as HEPA 

filters thigh-efficiency particulate 

aerosol). 

234 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

H-hour "Time zero" or the exact time of 

detonation to the minute, second, or 

fraction of a second: as opposed to H + 

1 which implies one hour after detonation (unless otherwise noted in 

seconds or minutes). 

Horizontal Line-of-Sight A general term used to refer to a fami- 

(HLOS) 1Y of events conducted in a horizontal 

tunnel. The term was sometimes used to 

refer to the pipe and vacuum system for 

some events. 

Hot Line 

Invert The bottom (floor) of a tunnel. 

Ion An atomic particle or part of a molecule bearing an electric charge. 

Usually a positively charged ion and a 

negatively charged ion are formed as a 

pair (e.g., a negatively charged electron is displaced from an atom so the 

remaining atom is positively charged). 

A location on the edge of a radex area 

where personnel exiting remove anticontamination clothing and equipment, and 

monitoring for contamination and decontamination is performed as 

necessary. This term also was used to 

denote the centerline of a fallout 

pattern. 

Ionizing Radiation This includes any particulate or 

electromagnetic radiation capable of 

producing ions, directly or indirectly, 

in its passage through air or matter. 

Alpha and beta particles produce ion 

235 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Isotopes 

Keyed Concrete Plug 

LEL 

pairs directly, while the electrons of 

initial ion pairs produced by gamma and 

X rays in turn produce secondary 

ionization in their paths. Neutrons 

may displace a positively charged part 

of a nucleus, such as a proton or alpha 

particle which produces secondary 

ionization. 

This refers to different types of atoms 

within the same element, all reacting 

approximately the same chemically, but 

differing in atomic weight and nuclear 

stability. For example, the element 

hydrogen has three isotopes; normal 

hydrogen (the most abundant) heavy 

hydrogen (called deuterium), and radioactive hydrogen (called tritium). 

This refers to a concrete plug placed 

in an excavated area of greater 

diameter than the shaft or tunnel cross 

section such that the concrete is 

poured into the surrounding rock, thus 

providing greater strength against 

overpressure from the nuclear detonation. 

The lower explosive limit refers to a 

mixture of explosive gases and air that 

is at the minimum concentration necessary to cause an explosion if ignited. 

The MSA explosimeter is used to determine percentages of the LEL, and is 

calibrated with a 5% methane gas and 

air mixture. A minimum explosive mixture is 100% of the LEL. 

236 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Leukemia Cluster 

Long Line 

LOS Pipe 

An apparent but unexpected or extraordinary group of leukemia cases within 

some number or group of persons. 

Gas sampling line into the LOS drift 

which does not connect to the LOS pipe. 

An evacuated pipe that extends from the 

device to the test chambers. It may be 

either horizontal or vertical, and in 

it are experiment protection devices 

and hardware. 

Mandatory Full Parti- This is a dry run peculiar to DOD ecipation (MFP) vents. Its purpose is threefold: first, 

Dry Run to check all experiments with the event 

site electrical system in its shot configuration: second, to check for crosstalk between experiments; and third, to 

operate all recording, timing, and monitoring equipment as closely to shot 

configuration as is possible. The pipe 

is under vacuum and the tunnel and portal instrumentation trailers are cleared of personnel. After a successful 

MFP dry run, all interconnections 

necessary to place experiments into 

shot configuration from the MFP configuration are made. Timing, firing, and 

monitoring system junction boxes are 

locked and no changes are made except 

with the express approval of device 

systems personnel and the Technical 

Director. 

237 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Manhattan Engineer 

District 

Manned Stations 

Manway 

The U.S. Army predecessor organization 

to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

and the Armed Forces Special Weapons 

Project. 

These are locations inside the closed 

and secured area which are occupied by 

authorized personnel during an event. 

A crawl space or other passageway 

through the gas seal plug, the 

overburden plug, and other structures. 

McCaa Two-Hour A self-contained respiratory device 

Breathing Apparatus that supplies two hours of breathing 

oxygen. 

MFP 

mR 

mrad/h 

Mucking 

Noble Gases 

See Mandatory Full Participation Dry 

Run 

This stands for milliroentgens, a radiation exposure term meaning a thousandth of a roentgen (R). (Also, see 

Exposure.) 

A radiation intensity term used to show 

that both gamma and beta levels were 

being measured. 

This refers to the removal of loose 

rock from drilling and mining operations. 

Those inert gases which do not react 

with other elements at normal temperature and pressure (i.e., helium, neon, 

238 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

argon, krypton, xenon, and sometimes 

radon). 

Nuclear Device 

(vs. weapon or bomb) 

This refers to a device in which most 

of the energy released in a detonation 

results from reactions of atomic 

nuclei, either fission, or fission and 

fusion. A device under development 

(see Device) is not considered a weapon 

or bomb. Both A- (or atomic) bombs and 

H- (or hydrogen) bombs could be called 

atomic weapons because both involve 

reactions of atomic nuclei. However, 

it has become customary to call weapons 

A-bombs if the energy comes from fission, and H-bombs if most of the energy 

comes from fusion (of the isotopes of 

hydrogen or other light nuclides - see 

definition). A developmental nuclear 

device is not a weapon or weapon component until it can be mated to a delivery system. 

Nuclear Device Tests Tests carried out to supply information 

required for the design, improvement, 

or safety aspects of nuclear weapons, 

and to study the phenomena and effects 

associated with nuclear explosions. 

Nuclear Weapon Tests Tests that provide development and 

weapons effects information, and may or 

may not utilize a deliverable nuclear 

weapon. 

OAP/R Canister A canister used with a face mask to 

filter out organics, acids, particu239 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Offsite 

Onsite 

Overburden 

lates, and radioactive material from 

breathed air. 

Radiation detected offsite is radioactivity occurring outside the Test 

Range Complex, an area that includes 

both the Nevada Test Site and the adjacent Nellis Air Force Range. 

A notation that radioactivity was detected onsite only is made for tests 

from which there was an unplanned release of radioactivity into the atmosphere that was not detectable beyond 

the boundaries of the Test Range Complex. 

As used in connnection with NTS 

tunnels, this is the consolidated and 

unconsolidated rock above a tunnel 

vertically to the surface: thus, it is 

the burden of rock over a tunnel. 

Overburden Plug (OBP) A containment feature within the tunnel 

complex. It is now a high-strength 

concrete plug keyed into the tunnel 

rock near the test location and is 

generally designed to withstand 1000°F 

and 1000 psi. It originally was named 

because it was constructed to represent 

the same containment strength as the 

rock above the tunnel, or overburden. 

Party Monitors Radiation (Radsafe) monitors assigned 

to reentry and recovery parties or 

groups. 

240 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Privacy Act 

mm 

rad 

Radex Area 

Radiation Exposure 

The Privacy Act of 1974 is part of 

Public Law 93-579. This was an Act to 

amend Title 5, U.S. Code, by adding 

Section 552a, which was to safeguard 

individual privacy from the misuse of 

federal agency records, to provide that 

individuals be granted access to records concerning them which are maintained by federal agencies, to establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. 

The term parts per million is used when 

determining concentrations of toxic 

gases or other materials. It refers to 

either relative weight, such as micrograms of a material per gram of medium, 

or relative volume, such as cubic centimeters or milliliters per cubic meter. 

An acronym for "radiation absorbed 

dose," a unit of an absorbed dose of 

ionizing radiation. A dose of one rad 

means the absorption of 100 ergs of 

energy from ionizing radiation per gram 

of absorbing material (e.g., body 

tissue). 

A radiation exclusion (radex) area is 

any area which is controlled for the 

purpose of protecting individuals from 

exposure to radiation and/or radioactive material. 

Exposure to radiation may be described 

by a number of terms. The type of radiation one is exposed to is important 

241 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

in establishing doses. External exposure can be from beta particles, neutrons, gamma and x rays: internal 

exposure is received from radionuclides 

deposited within the body which may 

emit alpha, beta, gamma, or x radiation 

and irradiate various body organs. (see 

Dose and Exposure). 

Radioactive Effluent This includes the radioactive material, 

steam, smoke, dust, and other particulate debris released to the atmosphere from an underground nuclear detonation. 

Radioactive or Fission A general term for the complex mixture 

Products of radionuclides produced as a result 

of nuclear fission (see Activation Products). 

Radionuclides A collective term for all types of radioactive atoms of a given element, as 

opposed to that element's stable 

nuclides (see Isotopes). 

Recovery Operations The process of finding and removing 

experiments, by-products, or data from 

the test area after a test event. 

Red Shack 

Reentry Drift See Access Drift. 

An underground (usually) intermediate 

point provided for the device laboratory's use in checking out and exercising the arming and firing system. 

242 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

rem 

Rib 

roentgen 

Safety Experiments 

An acronym for 'Iroentgen equivalent man 

or mammal." A rad of radiation 

absorbed dose multiplied by the quality 

factor (QF) of a particular radiation 

equals the rem dose. Current QF values 

are one for x, gamma, and beta 

radiations, 10 for neutrons, and 20 for 

alpha particles. 

This refers to the side of the drift. 

The right or left rib is determined 

with one's back to the portal. 

A special unit of exposure to ionizing 

radiation. It is defined precisely as 

that quantity of gamma (or x) rays 

that, when completely stopped in air, 

will produce positive and negative ions 

with a total charge of 2.58 x 10-a 

coulombs in one kilogram of dry air 

under standard conditions. 

Device tests conducted to determine the 

safety of nuclear weapons during transportation and storage. During these 

tests, elements of the conventional 

high-explosive portions of the devices 

were detonated to simulate accidental 

damage and to determine the potential 

for this damage to result in significant nuclear yield. Data gained from 

the tests were used to develop devices 

that could withstand shock, blast, 

fire, and other accident conditions 

without producing a nuclear detonation. 

243 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Sandbag Plugs 

Sandia Auxiliary A device used to seal an HLOS pipe 

Closure (SAC) after a nuclear detonation. 

Scatterer Station 

Barriers used in tunnels, constructed 

of sandbags, to help contain underground detonations and minimize damage 

to underground workings. 

A point along an LOS pipe where the 

radiation flux is deflected into an 

area off the LOS pipe as required for 

the testing or exposure of scatterer 

area experiments. 

Scientific Station The distance in feet along the HLOS 

pipe measured from the zero point. 

These distances are generally expressed 

in hundreds of feet plus whole numbers 

or to the nearest complete hundredths 

of feet (if fractional). Scientific 

Station 650 is expressed as SS 6+50; 

Scientific Station 390.65 is expressed 

as SS 3+90.65. 

Scott-Draeger Selfcontained Breathing 

Apparatus 

This includes a self-contained recirculating unit, complete with "full view" 

facepiece, compressed oxygen cylinder, 

breathing bag, carbon dioxide absorber, 

and pressure demand regulator. It is 

used when an extended exposure to an 

extremely hazardous or oxygen deficient 

atmosphere, or both, is required. This 

unit is capable of sustaining the 

wearer, under normal usage, for four to 

four and one-half hours; however, 

pertinent approved schedules limit NTS 

use to two hours. 

244 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Seismic Motion 

Shaft 

Shaft Collar 

Shielding Walls 

Earth movement caused by an underground 

nuclear detonation, similar to that of 

a minor earthquake. 

A long narrow passage sunk into the 

earth, usually vertically, but inclined 

for some mining operations. Shafts for 

device emplacement, ventilation, or 

access to underground workings may be 

drilled or mined. 

The area immediately around a shaft at 

ground level, usually cemented, which 

supports the headframe and other 

equipment. 

These are walls or barriers used to 

protect equipment or instrumentation 

from heat, blast, and radioactivity. 

Slushing Operations The process of moving broken rock with 

a scraper or scraper bucket. May be 

used on the surface or underground, 

where ore or waste rock is slushed into 

hoppers or other locations for removal. 

Spalling Rock disintegration evidenced by flaking, chipping, peeling, or loosening of 

layers on the outside edges. It may be 

caused immediately after detonation by 

rock stressing to rock near the detonation point. It also may result later, 

after continued stressing from temperature change expansion and contraction. Spalling also may result or 

begin when rock containing moisture is 

245 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Stemming 

Stubs 

Surface Ground Zero 

Survey 

raised to a high temperature and expanding vapor creates fractures. 

The various materials used to back-fill 

or plug the emplacement shaft, drift, 

or LOS drift to contain overpressure 

and radioactive material from a nuclear 

detonation. 

This refers to a variable number of 

smaller diameter LOS pipes which 

protrude from the portal side end of 

the main LOS pipe and contain 

experiments to be exposed to the 

radiation flux during event execution. 

The location on the ground surface directly above an underground zero point 

(see ground zero and zero point). 

In the tunnels, a survey might include 

taking radiation readings with a portable instrument, checking for the 

presence of an explosive mixture with 

an MSA explosimeter or GPK, determining 

toxic gas levels with Draeger tubes, 

and/or checks for tunnel hazard and 

damage (also called a "walk-throughU1 or 

"walk-outt') . Radsafe personnel made 

the radiation surveys, Radsafe or 

industrial hygiene personnel (both in 

the REECo Environmental Sciences 

Department) checked for toxic gases and 

the LEL level, and tunnel mining and 

construction personnel performed walkthroughs usually accompanied by Radsafe 

246 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

TAPS 

Test Chamber 

Test Controller 

Test Event 

and/or industrial hygiene support (see 

tunnel walk-out). 

The tunnel and pipe seal is an experiment protection feature along the 

LOS pipe which allows the experiments 

to be exposed to the desired levels of 

radiation while being protected from 

debris. It contains a massive steel 

door which closes after ground shock 

passes to form a 1000°F and 1000 psi 

seal. The TAPS also includes the 

high-strength concrete Plug which 

surrounds the metallic shroud of the 

door. 

A section of the LOS pipe in which experiments are placed. It may or may 

not be enlarged, depending upon the 

test design. 

This person was a DOE official 

designated by the Manager, Nevada 

Operations Office, to assume responsibility for the field operations involved in conducting a nuclear test at 

the Nevada Test Site. 

This includes the preparations, including arming and firing, and the actual 

testing of a nuclear device, including 

detonation, concurrent measurments and 

effects, and later measurements and 

studies. 

247 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Testing Organizations Organizations conducting nuclear tests 

at the NTS (see DOD, DNA, LASL, LLL, 

and SLA). 

Tonopah Test Range 

Trailer Park 

Tunnel 

Tunnel Access 

Tunnel Complex 

Tunnel Walk-Out 

Type N Canisters 

The TTR is located in the northwest 

corner of Nellis Air Force Range near 

Tonopah, Nevada. 

Areas near a tunnel portal or on the 

Mesa where instrumentation or instrumentation support trailers are parked. 

At NTS, this refers to a horizontal 

underground excavation driven on a 

predetermined line and grade to some 

specific target. 

This refers to entering to a tunnel or 

tunnel complex upon approval of the 

Test Director during test operations, 

or upon approval of the Tunnel Superintendent during routine operations. 

This includes the complete set of 

drifts and support equipment comprising 

one tunnel test area. 

A visual, walking inspection of the 

tunnel or tunnel complex, usually 

performed as a part of the initial 

reentry after a detonation, to check 

for damage and hazards prior to allowing general access to the underground 

workings. 

These canisters are used with face 

masks to filter out carbon monoxide. 

248 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Underground Structures This refers to the construction and fabProgram rication of test structures underground 

for the purpose of detonation effects 

evaluation. 

User Any organization ynducting tests at 

the NTS (See Testing Organizations). 

Vela Uniform Project A Department of Defense (DOD) program 

designed to improve the capability to 

detect, identify, and locate underground nuclear explosions. 

Venting 

Weapons Effects 

Experiments 

Weather Briefings 

A dynamic release of radioactive 

material, steam, smoke, dust and other 

particulate debris through a zone of 

weakness from the detonation-formed 

cavity into the atmosphere. 

Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on materials, structures, equipment, and systems. They 

include measurements of the changes in 

the environment caused by the nuclear 

detonation such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

These are a part of the readiness 

briefings, which are meetings of testassociated administrators, advisors, 

and other technical personnel prior to 

each test event to evaluate weather 

conditions and forecasts on event day, 

249 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Continued) 

Work Drift 

Workings 

x rays 

Yield 

Zero Point 

and make decisions on any necessary operational schedule changes. 

See Access Drift. 

This refers to an excavation or group 

of excavations made in mining, quarrying, or tunneling. It is used chiefly 

in the plural, such as "the workings 

extended for miles underground." 

Electromagnetic radiations produced by 

electron reactions, as opposed to emission of gamma photons given off by 

nuclei. Otherwise, high energy x rays 

are identical with gamma photons of the 

same energy. 

The total effective energy released by 

a nuclear detonation. It is usually 

expressed in terms of the equivalent 

tonnage of TNT required to produce the 

same energy release in an explosion. 

The total energy yield is manifested as 

nuclear radiation (including residual 

radiation), thermal radiation, and 

blast and shock energy; the actual distribution depending on the medium in 

which the explosion occurs and the type 

of weapon. 

At the instant of detonation, this is 

the center of an underground explosion 

of a nuclear device or weapon. 

250 
APPENDIX B 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The abbreviations and acronyms in the following list are 

used in this sixth volume of DOD underground testing reports. 

Additional information and definitions may be found in the text 

and in the Glossary of Terms. 

AA 

AEC 

Aerojet 

AES 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

AFWL 

AL00 

AMC 

ASN 

ASR 

AVCO 

AWRE 

BAC 

Bkg 

BJY 

BMO 

CAPco 

CASES 

cc 

CCTV 

CDC 

CEP 

CIC 

CP 

CP-1 

CP-2 

CT0 

D-day 

DAC 

DASA 

DMA 

DNA 

DNRE 

DPP 

DOD 

DOE 

dpm 

Draper 

EDAC 

Agbabian Association 

Atomic Energy Commission 

Aerojet General Corporation 

Auxiliary Experiment Station 

Air Force Special Weapons Center 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

Albuquerque Operations Office 

Army Materiel Command 

Air Surveillance Network 

Alcove splice rack 

AVCO Corporation 

Atomic Weapons Research Establishment 

Boeing Aircraft Corporation 

Background radiation measurement 

BUSTER-JANGLE roads intersection with the Mercury 

Highway 

Ballistic Missile Office 

Corrales Applied Physics Company 

Merritt Cases, Inc. 

Crosscut 

Closed-circuit television 

Centers for Disease Control (formerly the Center 

for Disease Control) 

Containment Evaluation Panel 

Coordination and Information Center 

Control Point 

Control Point Building 1 

Control Point Building 2 

Continental Test Organization 

The day a nuclear detonation takes place 

DNA Auxiliary Closure 

Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Division of Military Application 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

DNA Reentry 

Drift Protection Plug 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Disintegrations per minute 

c. s. Draper Laboratory 

Engineering Decision Analysis Company 

251 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Continued) 

EMP 

EG&G 

EPA 

ERDA 

ES 

ET1 

FAC 

FCDASA 

FCDNA 

FCP 

FCTC 

FCTMC 

FCTMD 

FCTME 

FDR 

FPFF 

F&S 

ESD 

GE 

GM 

GSAC 

GZ 

HDL 

HDR 

HE 

HEPA 

HFR 

H&N 

HLOS 

HAC 

IRT 

ISAFAF 

JAYCOR 

ISAFB 

JCS 

KAFB 

KOA 

KN 

KSC 

kt 

LANL 

LASL 

LEL 

LLL 

LLNL 

LMSC 

LOS 

LPARL 

LRL 

LVFO 

M&D 

MAC 

MDAC 

Electromagnetic pulse 

EG&G, Inc. (formerly Edgerton, Germeshausen, & 

Grier) 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Energy Research and Development Administration 

Experiment Station 

Effects Technology, Incorporated 

Fast Auxiliary Closure 

Field Command, 

Field Command, 

Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Forward Control Point 

Field Command, Test Construction (Division of Test 

Directorate) 

Field Command, Test Management, Construction 

Field Command, Test Management, Test Director 

Field Command, 

Final dry run 

Test Management, Engineering 

Full-power full-frequency (dry run) 

Fenix & Scisson, Inc. 

Environmental Sciences Department, REECo 

General Electric Corporation 

Geiger-Mueller 

Gas Seal Auxiliary Closure 

Ground zero 

Harry Diamond Laboratories 

Hot dry run 

High explosives (conventional) 

High-efficiency particulate aerosol 

High Fluence Recoverable 

Holmes & Narver, Inc. 

Horizontal line-of-sight 

Hughes Aircraft Co. 

Intelcom Rad Tech 

Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (formerly 

ISAFB) 

Jaycor Corporation (derived from J. A. Young 

Corporation) 

Indian Springs Air Force Base 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Kirtland Air Force Base 

Ken O'Brien Associates 

Kaman Nuclear 

Kaman Sciences Corp. (formerly Kaman Nuclear) 

Kilotons 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos 

National Laboratory) 

Lower explosive limit 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (formerly LRL) 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

Line-of-sight 

Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory) 

Las Vegas Field Office 

MAC and DAC 

Mechanical Auxiliary Closure 

McDonald-Douglas Aircraft 

252 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Continued) 

MDR 

MED 

MFP 

MPC 

mrad 

mrem/qt 

mrem/yr 

mR/h 

MRC 

MSA 

MSD 

MSL 

:%NO, 

NPG 

NRDS 

NTIS 

NTS 

NTSO 

NV 

OBP 

Pan Am 

PDT 

PI 

PP? 

psi 

PST 

QF 

Radex Area 

rad 

rad/h 

Radsafe 

radsafe 

RAMS 

RCG 

REECo 

rem 

R/h 

ROSES 

RPG 

SAC 

SAI 

SAMSO 

SC 

SCBA 

SDR 

SGZ 

SF00 

SLA 

SNL 

SOP 

SRD 

SRI 

Mandatory dry run 

Manhattan Engineer District 

Mandatory full-participation (dry run) 

Maximum permissible concentration 

Millirad 

Millirem per quarter 

Millirem per year 

Milliroentgens per hour 

Mission Research Corporation 

Mine Safety Appliance 

Mandatory Signal Dry Run 

Mean sea level 

Nitrogen dioxide 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen dioxide 

Nevada Proving Ground 

Nuclear Rocket Development Station 

National Technical Information Service 

Nevada Test Site 

Nevada Test Site Organization 

DOE Nevada Operations Office 

Overburden plug 

Pan American World Airways 

Pacific Daylight Time 

Physics International 

Parts per million 

Pounds per square inch 

Pacific Standard Time 

Quality factor 

Radiation exclusion area 

Radiation absorbed dose 

Radiation absorbed dose per hour 

Environmental Sciences Department (formerly 

Radiological Safety Department), REECo 

Radiological safety, in general 

Remote area monitoring system 

Radioactivity concentration guide 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, 

Incorporated 

Roentgen equivalent man or mammal 

Roentgens per hour 

Recorder and Oscilloscope Sealed Environmental 

System 

Radiation protection guide 

Sandia Auxiliary Closure 

Science Applications, Inc. (now Science 

Applications International Corp., SAIC) 

Space and Missile Systems Organization 

Sandia Corporation (now Sandra National 

Laboratories) 

Self-contained breathing apparatus 

Signal dry run 

Surface ground zero 

Santa Fe Operations Office 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque (now Sandia 

National Laboratories) 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Standard operating procedures 

Secret Restricted Data 

Stanford Research Institute 

253 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Concluded) 

SSPO 

sss 

STU 

TAPS 

TC 

TCDASA 

TEP 

TGD 

TGS 

TNT 

TLD 

TRI 

TRW 

TTR 

UCRL 

USAF 

USGS 

VA 

VLOS 

WETG 

WES 

WSI 

WTD 

Navy Strategic Systems Project Office 

Systems, Science, and Software 

Special Test Unit 

Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

Test chamber 

Test Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Test Evaluation Panel 

Test Group Director 

Test Group Staff 

High explosive chemical (trinitrotoluene) 

Thermoluminescent dosimeter 

Technical Representatives, Incorporated 

Thompson, Ramo and Woolridge, Incorporated 

Tonopah Test Range 

University of California Radiation Laboratory (now 

Lawrence Liver-more National Laboratory) 

United States Air Force 

United States Geological Survey 

Veterans Administration 

Vertical line-of-sight 

Weapons Effects Test Group 

Waterways Experiment Station 

Wackenhut Services, Incorporated 

Weapons Test Division 

254 
APPENDIX C 

GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY PROCEDURES FOR 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SANDIA LABORATORY TESTS 

SLA-74-0199 

Specified External Distribution Only 

Printed May 1974 

GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

AND SANDIA LABORATORIES NUCLEAR TESTS 

J. H. Metcalf 

Instrumentation, Dosimetry and NTS Projects Division, 3313 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87115 

ABSTRACT 

Underground weapons effects testing requires that personnel 

reenter the tunnel complex to recover data and scientific 

experiments for postshot evaluation. The preparation for and 

the handling of the hazards encountered during such reentry 

operations are described. 

255 
Issued by Sandia Laboratories, operated for the United States 

Atomic Energy Cowission by Sandia Corporation 

This report was prepared as an account of work rponsorad by 

the United State8 Government. Nslthar the United States nor 

the United States Atomic Energy Commission, nor any of their 

employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or 

their employees, makes any warranty, express or Implied, or 

assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 

att”raCy, completeness or usefulness of any information, 

apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that 

its use would not infringe privately owned rights. 

u 1004-w (2-74) 

256 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction ..................... 

Responsibilities ................... 

Manager,NVOO ................... 

Test Controller .................. 

Test Group Director ................ 

SLA Environmental Health Department ........ 

NTS Support Contractor ............... 

Preshot Preparations for Reentry ........... 

Containment .................... 

Ventilation System ................. 

Environmental Instrumentation ........... 

Gas Sampling System ................ 

Reentry Communications System ........... 

Possible Hazards to Reentry Personnel ......... 

Radiation ..................... 

Explosive and Toxic Gases ............. 

Tunnel Damage ...... ,. ............ 

Explosives ..................... 

Toxic Materials .................. 

High-Pressure Gas Cylinders ............ 

Reentry Party Composition and Equipment ........ 

Guidelines for Initial Reentry Parties ........ 

Authorities .................... 

Activating h Monitoring Tunnel Ventilation System . 

Reentry Control Group ............... 

Team Limitations .................. 

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus ......... 

Emergency Return to Portal ............. 

Rescue Team .................... 

Medical Support .................. 

Summary of Initial Tunnel Reentries .......... 

Preparation of Tunnel for Reentry ......... 

Evaluation of Tunnel Environment .......... 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

7 

7 

7 

7 

7 

8 

8 

8 

8 

8 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 

11 

11 

11 

11 

11 

12 

Exploration of Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

Page 

257 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) 

Page 

Scientific Assessment of the Experiments ....... 13 

Scientific Assessment Team ............. 13 

Photographic Documentation ............ 13 

Removal of Unexpended Explosives ......... 13 

Recovery of Experiments From the Test Chambers .... 13 

258 
GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

AND SANDIA LABORATORIES NUCLEAR TESTS 

Introduction 

Detonation of a nuclear device in an underground test facility adds many unique 

hazards to those existing in any underground construction. Instrumentation which can be 

remotely monitored can provide a general picture of conditions, but ultimately, personnel, 

properly protected from the hazards they might encounter, must reenter the tunnel to 

verify the condition of the facility. 

Personnel from the Environmental Health Department of Sandia Laboratories have been 

participating in tunnel reentries since 1962. During this time experience, improvements 

in instrumentation, and changes in containment features have caused tunnel reentry 

procedures to be continually revised. This document preshot preparations and postshot 

procedures currently being used for safe and economical reentry and scientific recovery 

from a tunnel area. 

Responsibilities 

Manager, NV00 

The Manager, NVOO, is responsible for administering, preparing, and executing all 

programs and projects at NTS. He has the overall responsibility for the health and safety 

of both the general public and NTS personnel for all activities at the NTS. The Manager, 

NVOO, may delegate operational control of an approved program, project, or experiment to 

a Test Controller, who is responsible for field execution of that specific program. 

Test Controller 

The Test Controller has full responsibility during the test execution period for 

the safe conduct of the program to which he is assigned. by mutual agreement between the 

Test Controller and a scientific user, control of safety hazards within the area assigned 

for a particular activity may be delegated to the user's Test Group Director during times 

other than the test execution period. 

Test Group Director 

Whenever operational control is delegated to a Test Group Director, he is 

responsible to the Manager, NVOO, for the establishment and implementation of safety 

criteria within the assigned area. He will be responsible for submitting a plan for all 

operation to the Manager, NV00 for review and concurrence. Upon termination of need for 

the Test Group Director to retain control of the test L Jmplex, the Test Group Director 

will be relieved of safety responsibility. 

5 

259 
SLA Environmental Health Department 

During the time that the Test Group Director has operational safety responsibility, 

the Environmental Health Department will provide consultants who will advise the Test 

Group Director on tunnel reentry procedures (for Sandia and Defense Nuclear Agency 

sponsored events). These consultants will be familiar with the configuration of the test 

bed, and with possible postshot tunnel conditions and hazards. They will specify the 

necessary instrumentation to monitor the postshot conditions of the tunnel and will 

document any radioactive material to the environment. During postshot reentry and 

recovery operations, they will provide technical direction of radiation and safety and 

industrial hygiene personnel provided by the NTS Support Contractor, 

NTS Support Contractor 

Reynolds Electrical 6 Engineering Company (REECo) is responsible for construction 

and mine safety for all personnel working underground. REECo will provide the personnel 

necessary for the support of the tunnel reentry and experiment recoveries. This includes 

mine-rescue-trained mining personnel, radiation safety monitors, and industrial hygiene 

and industrial safety personnel. 

Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

Containment 

The stemming should contain the fireball and should thus minimize radioactivity and 

explosive and toxic gases in the experimental area. If the stemming fails, the overburden 

plug provides a secondary containment barrier. If the gases penetrate the overburden 

plug, the gas seal plug and/or the gas seal door should contain the gases within the 

tunnel complex. 

Ventilation System 

The tunnel ventilation system is set up so that all areas of the tunnel complex can 

be swept with fresh air from the portal. Valves which can be remotely operated from a 

manned location are installed in the ventilation and makeup lines in the gas seal door 

and/or gas seal plug and the overburden plug. The ventilation system utilizes a positive 

displacement Sutorbilt blower which is installed so that the air from the tunnel complex 

passes through a filter system before it is released to the atmosphere. Radiation 

detectors are placed on the ventilation lines to monitor the radioactive effluent 

released, and continuous samples are taken from the isotope identification. 

Environmental Instrumentation 

Radiation detectors are installed in the tunnel complex to supply tunnel reentry 

personnel with information about radiation levels in the tunnel. Other types of 

instrumentation which are used to remotely monitor conditions in the tunnel include 

geophones and pressure and temperature gauges. 

6 

260 
Gas Sampling System 

Sampling lines for remotely taking gas samples from various points in the tunnel 

are installed during preparation of the facility for the test. Samples taken from these 

lines after test execution help to determine the concentration of explosive and toxic 

gases in the tunnel prior to reentry. Samples can usually be taken from inside the gas 

seal door and/or the gas seal plug, from both sides of the overburden plug, from the 

experiment drift near the stemming, and from the horizontal-line-of-side (HLOS) pipe 

itself. 

Reentry Communications System 

The reentry communications system provides a communications link between the 

reentry control group in the trailer at the portal and the reentry party in the tunnel. 

This system consists of (1) a portable reel of WD-7 field wire and (2) a shielded cable, 

which is permanently installed in the tunnel. Access to this permanent cable is provided 

at designated locations along the reentry route. Preshot preparations for an event 

include installation and checkout of the shielded cable used for reentry communications. 

Possible Hazards to Reentry Personnel 

Radiation 

Reentry teams may encounter radioactivity in the tunnel that results from any one 

or more of the following: 

1. Gross failure of the stemming, in which case large quantities of fission 

products are deposited throughout the tunnel complex. When this condition 

exists, the team must be concerned with external radiation hazards and with 

control of contamination. 

2. Seepage of radioactive gases or materials through fissures or fractures from 

ground zero. In this case, external radiation fields are not usually a 

significant hazard, but contamination control is of primary concern. 

3. Activation of experiment samples and components of the HLOS pipe. If sample 

integrity is maintained after the event, contamination is only a minor problem 

and external radiation is the major consideration. If the sample contaminant 

is ruptured and the sample is dispersed throughout the test chamber, 

contamination control is of primary concern. 

Explosive and Toxic Gases 

Explosive and toxic gases may be produced as directed or secondary products of the 

detonation of the device. They may also be produced by the detonation of explosives used 

in some experimental samples or in HLOS pipe closure systems. These gases may be present 

in concentrations that are hazardous to personnel. 

7 

261 
Tunnel Damage 

The ground motion associated with the detonation of the device may cause structural 

damage to the tunnel. All reentry team members must be alert for unstable overhead 

conditions, such as hanging slabs and broken timber. They should also watch for broken 

ventilation lines and utility lines (water, compressed air, electrical cables). Physical 

damage to the tunnel may be at times be such that rehabilitation of the drift must be 

accomplished before experiment recoveries can be initiated. 

Explosives 

Explosives are associated with pipe closure and sample protection systems, and may 

also be present as part of some of the experiments. These explosives, which may still 

be unexpended after the test, may have been sensitized by the exposure to the device 

radiation. If the unexpended explosives are contained in experiments in which the sample 

integrity has been maintained, they do not pose a significant hazard for initial reentry 

teams. However, team members should be aware of the possibility of unexpended high 

explosives lying on the bottom of the HLOS pipe. 

Toxic Materials 

Experiments to be exposed to radiations from the device may contain materials which 

have some degree of chemical toxicity. In particular, many experiments contain beryllium 

or have beryllium filters, a portion of which will be present in the postshot environment 

as finely divided dust. These materials are of concern primarily during postshot recovery 

of experiments when it is extremely probable that a portion of the dust will become 

airborne. 

High-Pressure Gas Cylinders 

Some experiments typically have pressurized gas as an integral part of the 

experimental system. The gas is usually supplied from high-pressure (2200 psi) gas 

cylinders which may have been damaged as a result of ground motion or high temperature. 

Reentry personnel must exercise caution around pressurized systems and will check them 

to see that the pressure has been bled off. 

Reentry Party Composition and Equipment 

A team for reentry into a tunnel following a nuclear test shall consist of a 

minimum of five personnel, one of whom shall be designated as a team chief. He will be 

responsible for the team during all work underground. All personnel participating as 

members of initial reentry parties must be certified in the use of USBM* -approved selfcontained breathing apparatus. Composition of the reentry parties and their equipment 

is summarized in Table 1. 

*u.s. Bureau of Mines 

8 

262 
TABLE I 

Summary of Reentry Parties and Equipment 

Party Name 

Initial Reentry Parties 

1. Team Chief 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor 

4. Two or More Miners 

Work Party 

1. Team Chief 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor 

4. Miners and Support Personnel 

Rescue Team 

1. Team Chief 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor 

4. Two or More Mine-Rescue 

Trained Personnel 

Scientific Assessment Team 

1. Team Chief 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor 

4. Scientific Advisors 

5. Mine Support Personnel 

Equipment 

Full Radex Clothing 

USBM-approved, P-hour self-contained 

breathing apparatus 

Radiation detectors 

Explosimeter 

Toxic gas indicators 

Oxygen detector 

Hard-wire communications 

Full Radex clothing 

Respiratory protection (as required) 

Radiation detectors 

Exploslmeter 

Toxic gas indicators 

Oxygen detector 

Full Radex clothing 

USBM-approved, 2 hour self-contained 

breathing apparatus 

Radiation detectors 

Explosimeter 

Toxic gas indicators 

Oxygen detector 

Wire litters 

Full Radex clothing 

Respiratory protection (as required) 

Radiation detectors 

Explosimeter 

Toxic gas indicators 

Oxygen detector 

9 

263 
Guidelines for Initial Reentry Parties 

Authorization 

Initial reentry and each subsequent phase will be initiated upon authorization of 

the Test Group Director (TGD) with the concurrence of the Test Controller. Operational 

control will be retained by the TGD until all recovery and reentry mining operations are 

completed and tunnel access is returned to AEC control. 

Activating and Monitoring Tunnel Ventilation System 

Tunnel reentry will not start until after the tunnel ventilation system has been 

activated and samples of tunnel air have been taken and monitored at the portal. 

Evaluation of these samples must indicate that reentry can be made within the limitations 

of this procedure. 

Reentry Control Group 

The reentry control group will normally be composed of an SLA ENvironmental Health 

consultant, the TGD or his designated alternate, the tunnel construction engineer or some 

other person who has an intiamte knowledge of tunnel construction details, a REECo RadSafe Superintendent, and a senior industrial hygienist. All activities of the reentry 

party in the tunnel are performed at the direction of this group, and any deviations from 

the guidelines presented in this procedure are by a consensus of its members. 

Communications between the reentry control group and the reentry party in the tunnel will 

be maintained whenever reentry teams are underground. All observations by team members 

during reentry will be communicated through the team chief to the reentry control group 

and will be recorded for future reference. Only one team will be in the tunnel at any 

one time unless otherwise directed by the reentry control group. 

Team Limitations 

Personnel radiation exposure limits for a reentry operation are 3 rem per calendar 

quarter (NTSO SOP Chapter 0524). If it is assumed that a person's exposure history would 

allow an accumulation of 3 rem during the operation, his exposure will be terminated when 

his pocket dosimeter indicates an accumulated exposure of 2 rem. 

Except under extenuating circumstances and by mutual decision of the reentry 

control group and the team chief, reentry teams will not enter radiation fields greater 

than 10 R/h, nor will they enter ares in which the concentration of carbon monoxide is 

greater than 1000 ppm or the concentration of explosive gases Is greater than 30 percent 

of the lower explosive limit (LEL). 

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

Prior to entry into any potentially hazardous atmosphere, the self-contained 

breathing apparatus of each team member will be personally checked by the team chief 

and/or another certified person for proper fit and operation. Malfunctions of the 

breathing apparatus of any team member shall cause the reentry mission to be aborted. 

264 
Emergency Return to Portal 

A reentry party will return to the portal as a result of any of the following 

conditions: 

1. On decision of the team chief. 

2. When any member of the reentry team has a McCaa oxygen supply less than 30 

atmospheres or a Draeger pressure less than 450 psi. 

3. On loss of communications with the reentry control group at the portal. 

Rescue Team 

A rescue team will be stationed near the portal or at the fresh air station 

underground at all times that reentry teams are in the tunnel. If located at the portal, 

the rescue team will have a train available for immediate departure. The rescue team will 

be dispatched only at the direction of the reentry control group and only after it has 

been determined that the rescue team can conduct its mission safely. 

Medical Support 

A medical technician with an ambulance and the necessary medical equipment will be 

available at the portal during initial reentry operations. This medical support will be 

released only at the direction of the reentry control group. 

Summary of Initial Tunnel Reentries 

This plan is written as though one team can complete the entire reentry operation. 

In actual practice, several teams will probably be necessary. AS many teams as are needed 

will be used to complete the tunnel exploration. 

Preparation of Tunnel for Reentry 

As soon as possible after the event, and with the concurrence of the Test 

Controller, the tunnel ventilation system will be activated. The tunnel complex will be 

further prepared for reentry by securing all unnecessary power going into the tunnel. 

All downhole cables from the mesa trailer park will be disconnected in the cable splice 

shack and each cable termination will be taped. CABLES WILL NOT BE CUT WITHOUT SPECIAL 

AUTHORIZATION FROM THE TEST GROUP DIRECTOR. All electrical power to the mesa trailer park 

will be turned off. All instrumentation and utility power cables and telephone lines 

going into the tunnel from the portal will be disconnected or confirmed to be off. Cables 

for the tunnel ventilation system, the temperature and pressure monitors, the geophones, 

and the remote radiation monitoring system will be left connected. 

11 

265 
Evaluation of Tunnel Environment 

The reentry control group will review the data from the radiation system, the 

temperature and pressure monitors, the geophones, and the gas samples taken from the 

tunnel complex to assure that the reentry can be made within the limitations of this 

procedure. With this assurance, and when cleared by the TGD and the Test Controller, the 

reentry operation may begin. No changes will be made in the tunnel ventilation system 

or in any electrical system while reentry teams are underground. 

Exploration of Tunnel 

The reentry team will enter the tunnel by using a diesel locomotive for 

transportation and will proceed to the gas seal door. The team will monitor continuously 

for radioactivity and for toxic and explosive gases. These readings, as well as the 

progress of the team and the physical condition of the tunnel, will be reported to the 

reentry control group. Pressure gauges at the gas seal dcor will be checked, and a gas 

sample will be taken through the door to determine the environment on the working point 

side of the door. If conditions are satisfactory, the team will open the gas seal door 

and proceed to the gas seal plug. 

The pressure gauges at the gas seal plug will be checked, and a gas sample will be 

taken from the working point side of the plug to determine the environment. If 

ventilation has not been reestablished remotely through this plug, the team will take the 

necessary steps to establish ventilation through the plug. If conditions permit, the team 

will then proceed to the overburden plug, where the same procedure will be followed. 

After ventilation to the working point side of the overburden plug has been 

established and it has been determined that explosive and toxic gases are below the 

reentry guideline concentrations, the team will proceed through the overburden plug and 

check out the experiment drift complex. Team members will walk to the portal face of the 

stemming, if possible, monitoring continuously for radioactivity and for toxic and 

explosive gases. They will also observe the ventilation lines to assure themselves that 

the lines are intact, and will report this information, along with the general condition 

of the tunnel and the HLOS pipe, to the reentry control group. After the condition of 

the tunnel has been determined, the team will establish ventilation to the HLOS pipe. 

The doors to the test chambers will be opened and swipes will be taken from the floor 

of the test chambers. These swipes will be analyzed for beryllium and will also be used 

to identify the radionuclides present inside the HLOS pipe. 

As soon as the reentry team has verified that the tunnel complex is within 

acceptable levels for radiation and for toxic and explosive gases and has determined the 

physical condition of the tunnel and HLOS pipe, the initial reentry operation is complete. 

12 

266 
Scientific Assessment of the Experiments 

Scientific Assessment Team 

As soon as the initial reentry teams have verified that the tunnel and HLOS pipe 

are clear of hazardous amounts of radiation and of toxic and explosive gases and as soon 

as the physical hazards have been Identified and repaired, as necessary, the scientific 

assessment team will enter the HLOS pipe an observe the condition of the experiments. 

Photographic Documentation -- Photographic documentation of the condition of each 

experimental station may take place concurrently with or Immediately after preliminary 

assessment of the experiments. 

Removal of Unexpended Explosives -- Unexpended explosives which are found to be 

uncontained will be removed from the HLOS pipe before experiment recoveries are begun. 

Recovery of Experiments From the Test Chambers 

Before scientific recoveries may be begun, repair of the tunnel to the test 

chambers must be complete. This activity may Include repairing broken lagging and 

removing hazardous conditions, as well as repairing railroad track and ventilation lines. 

Tunnel utility power will be restored before experiment recoveries (except for recovery 

of film) are begun. 

After tunnel repairs have been completed, experiment agencies will be permitted to 

begin recovery of samples from the test chambers In order of priority. A radiation safety 

monitor will be present at the test chambers at all times to assist the experimenters and 

to help control contamination. 

267 
268 
APPENDIX D 

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-05240-01 

Chapter 0524 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

0524-01 Radiological Safety 

011 Purpose 

The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure is to define responsibility and to establish criteria and general procedures for 

radiological safety associated with NTS programs. Additional operational instructions relating to radiological safety for particular activities may be published as a part of the Test Manager's 

Operational Plan. 

012 Responsibilities 

a. Manager, NVOO. The Manager, NVOO, is the ARC official to whom 

the NTSO reports. The Manager, NVOO, as a Test Manager, is 

responsible for administering, preparing, and executing all 

programs and projects. The Test Manager may delegate operational control of the NTSO to specifically-identified Deputy 

Test Managers for the execution of approved programs, projects, and experiments. Only the Test Manager or the Deputy 

Test Manager is authorized to approve or disapprove the field 

execution of approved programs, projects or experiments. 

b. Test Manager. The Test Manager Is responsible for the protection of participating personnel and off-site population from radiation hazards associated with activities conducted at the NTS. By mutual agreement between the Test 

Manager and a scientific user, control of radiological safety 

within the area assigned for a particular activity may be 

delegated to the user's Test Group Director during the period 

of time when such control could have a direct bearing on the 

success or failure of the scientific program. The provisions 

of AEC Manual Chapter 840) shall apply to reactor tests or 

sustained reactor operations. 

c. Test Group Director. Whenever operational radiological safety 

control is delegated to a Test Group Director under provisions 

of 012a above, he is responsible to the Test Manager for establishment and implementation of radiological safety criteria 

within the assigned area. He will be responsible for submitting a detailed radiological safety operational plan to the 

269 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g* 

Test Manager for review and concurrence. This plan shall be 

submitted as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to cover all 

routine operations. Variances from the SOP for non-routine 

operations shall be presented to the Test Manager for review 

and concurrence. Upon termination of need for the Test Group 

Director to retain radiological safety control within an 

assigned area, the Test Group Director will be relieved of 

radiological safety responsibility. 

Director, Nevada Test Site Support Office (NTSSO). Supervises 

the approved NTS on-site radiological safety programs, except 

for those periods in which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others (i.e., Test Manager, Test 

Group Directors, etc.). 

Radiological Safety Advisor. The NTSO Radiological Safety 

Advisor is responsible to the Test Manager for staff supervision of radiological safety policies and procedures at the 

NTS. Monitoring of the radiological safety policies and direction of procedures at NTS, during non-operational periods, 

rests with the Director, NTSSO. 

Chief, Safety Branch (SB), NTSSO. The Chief, Safety Branch, 

NTSSO, will be responsible to the Director, NTSSO, for conducting field inspections at the NTS to assure that N!48 contractors execute safety programs in accordance with approved 

safety procedures and plans as well as with AM: and NV00 

directives. Recommends corrective actions where necessary. 

Assures that radioactive waste management and disposal are 

accomplished in accordance with approved procedures. Coordinates and administers NTS activities relative to the Radiological Assistance Program. Provides day-by-day coordination 

and monitoring of NTS radiological safety activities, except 

for those periods during which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others. 

Director, Safety Evaluation Division (SED), NVOO. Provides 

for staff development of safety programs of NV00 for use at 

NTS. Develops safety programs which are coordinated with 

NTSSO and site user agencies and organizations to meet public 

and operational safety requirements for the conduct of nuclear 

detonations, reactor test programs, chemical explosives tests, 

or other NV00 activities. Arranges for radiological studies as 

may be appropriate. 

270 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

h. Chief, Radiological Safety Branch (RSB), NVOO. Provides staEf 

assistance in all matters relating to radiological safety. Reviews and evaluates for technical adequacy radiological safety 

procedures and operational plans submitted by user organizations. 

Acts as Radiological Safety Advisor (or provides a representative) 

to the Test Manager during all NV00 activities requiring such 

coverage. 

1. Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer. The Director, Southwestern 

Radiological Health Laboratory, U. S. Public Health Service, or 

his representative, will be designated as the Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer and its responsible to the Test Manager 

for the operation of the off-site radiological safety program. 

I* User Organizations. The official in charge of each agency or 

organizational group participating in NTS field activities or 

using NTS facilities is responsible for compliance by his personnel with established radiological safety policies, procedures, and controls. Each official in charge of a participating 

group is also responsible at all times to his parent organization for the radiological safety of personnel under his supervision. Operational safety plans will be submitted by the user 

organization to the Test Manager for review and approval, with 

a copy to the Director, NTSSO. 

k. Operations Coordination Center (OCC). Shipment of radioactive 

materials, radioactive waste disposal, and access to areas contaminated with radioactive debris require prior coordination 

through the Operations Coordination Center, CP-1, telephone 

Mercury 986-2781. 

1. On-Site Radiological Organization. On-site radiological safety 

support services for user organizations and the routine operation of NTS will be provided by the on-site radiological safety 

support contractor as directed by the NTSSO. Routing radiological safety support services at NT'S will be requested in 

writing by the user organization through the Director, NTSSO. 

The on-site radiological safety support contractor is responsible to the Test Manager, through the Director, NTSSO, for the 

following routine on-NTS radiological safety support. 

1. Providing radiological safety support, including certified 

monitors to user organizations. 

2. Making radiological surveys, documenting radiation levels 

from events on the NTS, mapping and properly marking all 

contaminated areas, and furnishing this survey information 

for distribution by the Chief, Safety Branch, NTSSO. 

271 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

Conducting a personnel radiation dosimetry program and disseminating the results of the program to respective organizations covered under this program, and as appropriate 

under ARC Manual Chapter 0525 and Appendix. This program 

to include providing and maintaining a repository for records and source documents pertaining to personnel dosimetry 

for all NVOO activities requiring such dosimetry. 

Maintaining and calibrating radiation detection equipment. 

Procuring, issuing, and decontaminating protective clothing, supplies, and equipment. 

Providing radioactive materials and waste disposal control 

(including receiving, storage, on-site movement and shipping). 

Maintaining and operating personnel and equipment decontamination facilities. 

Providing advice and assistance in matters pertaining to 

radiological safety. 

Conducting an on-site environmental surveillance program. 

Providing necessary support services for the off-site 

radiological safety program. 

Conducting radiological safety training courses. 

Preparing final on-site reports following each test operational period, interim reports for each event, special 

reports and detailed operational plans for each future 

program. 

Providing Radiological Assistance Teams to respond to 

radiation incidents. 

Conducting analysis of samples for radioactivity and for 

certain toxic materials. 

Providing and maintaining a current manual containing the 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for providing radiological safety support, as outlined above, to users and 

contractors at the NTS. 

272 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

m. Other. Other responsibilities as well as more detailed versions 

of the above, are spelled out in NTSO-0103. 

0524-02 Organization 

The chart showing the organizational relationship of the NTS radiological safety activities is shown in Figure 1 on the following page. 

0524-03 Definitions 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g* 

h. 

1. 

k. 

Radiological Safety. The protection of personnel, population 

groups, and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation. 

Ionizing Radiation. Electromagnetic radiation (consisting of 

photons) or particulate radiation (consisting of electrons, 

neutrons, protons, etc.) usually of high energy, but in any 

case capable of ionizing air, directly or indirectly. 

NTS. The Nevada Test Site. 

On-Site. Areas within the NTS boundaries, including Mercury. 

Certified Monitor. Any person certified to the Test Manager 

or his designated representative as a qualified monitor by a 

Test Group Director or the Radiological Safety Representative 

of the radiological safety services. 

Radiation Exclusion Area (Radex). A limited access area designated and posted for radiological safety purposes. 

Controlled Area. Any area to which access is controlied by 

the AEC or AEC contractors. 

User. Any organization or test participant having a NVOOapproved technical program for conduct at the NTS. 

Radiation Incident. Any alleged radiation accident, which if 

true, could result in property damage or loss, injury, over 

exposure, or excessive release of radioactive materials. 

Roentgen. A unit of exposure to X or gamma radiation. 1 mR 

(one milliRoentgen1 is one-one thousandth of one Roentgen. 

Rad. A unit of absorbed dose equivalent to 100 ergs/gram. 

273 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
Test Manager 

NTSO 

Asst. Manager 

for Operations 

I 

Director, 

Safety Evaluation 

Division 

I I 

i ! 

1 Test Group 

Director 

User 

Radiological 

Safety 

Organization 

- 

Chief, 

Safety Branch 

I 

. 

. , 

Chief, 

Radiological 

Safety Section 

USPHS Off-Site 

,_ Radiological Safety 

Organization 

. 

I 

Medical Liaison 

Officer Network 

Veterinary -----Administrative L Technical 

Officer Direct ion 

l I ---------------I---1.-Ii mJ (A) When requested by User 

Figure I. Organization Chart 

Radiological Safety Activities 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

1. Rem. A unit of dose equivalent. It is a unit found convenient 

inpractice to express exposures to different types of ionizing 

radiation in terms that combine both the magnitude of the 

absorbed dose and its biological effectiveness. The dose equivalent is numerically equal to the dose in rads multiplied by 

the appropriate modifying factors. 

m. Exposure Rate or Dose Rate. The time rate at which exposure or 

dose is measured or administered, i.e., dose or exposure per 

unit time, such as R/hr, rem/min, rad/hr, R/set, etc. 

0524-04 Fadiation Protection Standards 

041 Coverage. These standards shall govern ionizing radiation exposure 

to AEC and ARC contractor personnel and to other individuals who 

may be exposed to ionizing radiation from operations of the AEC and 

ABC contractors. These standards do not apply to radiation exposures resulting from natural radiation, medical and dental procedures, nor do they apply to the general population when the activities involved are essential to national security, such as nuclear 

weapons testing. The latter types of activities are covered by 

separate criteria. Safety criteria for each Plowshare event will 

be considered separately until such time as over-all policy for 

the Plowshare program is established. No operation shall be conducted until the radiological hazard has been evaluated and it 

has been determined to the satisfaction of the Test Manager, or 

the Test Group Director (when he has been delegated the radiological safety responsibility for the operation) that radiation 

exposures should not exceed the radiation protection standards 

established in ARC Manual Chapter 0524 (repeated below). Except 

for emergencies, written requests to expose personnel in excess 

of these limits should be directed to the Test Manager. 

275 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
PART I 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SW APPENDIX 0524 

I. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS IN CONTROLLED AREAS’ 

A. RadlatIon from sources external to the body 

Type of Exposure Period of Time Dose (rem) 

Whole body, head and trunk, 

active blood-formlng organs 

gonads, of lens of eye. 

Skin ot whole body and thyroid 

Hands, and forearms, feet and ankles 

Accumu I ated dose 

Calendar quarter’ 

year 

Calendar quarter3 

Year 

Calendar quarter’ 

5 (N-18j2 

34 

304 

10 

154 

25 

8. Radlatlon from amltters lnternal to the 

body 

1, Except as provlded In 2. below, the 

radlatlon protectlon standards for 

alrborne rsdloactlvlty speclfled In 

annex I, table I, shall be followed. 

The concentration standards are 

based upon continuous exposure to 

the concentrat I ons specl t I ed for forty 

hours per week (a “week” being 

seven consscutlve days). For the 

purpose of applying these standards, 

radloactlvlty concentrations may be 

averaged over periods up to 13 consecutlve weeks provlded work areas 

are appropriately monltored and exposure historles are malntalned tar 

each lndlvldual working In such 

areas. 

Type ot Exposure 

Whole body. active bloodtormlng organs, gonads. 

Thyrol d 

rem/year 

5 

30 

2. If It Is not teaslble to govern exposures to Internal emitters by applying alrborne radloactlvlty concentratton standards, the followlng 

radiation protectIon standards shall 

apply: 

Dose 

ram/quarter 

3 

10 

l3one 

Other organs 

Body burden of 0.1 

microgram of radlum226 or Its5blologIcal 

equivalent 

15 

-_ 

5 

The calculation of organ dose shall be 

based on methods recommended by the 

Federal Radlatlon Council and the In- 

‘An lndlvldual under age 18 shall not be 

employed in or allowed to enter controlled 

areas in such manner that he ulll receive 

doses of radlatlon In amounts exceeding the 

standards applicable to Indlvlduals In 

uncontrolled areas. Exposures to lndlvlduals 

under age 18 mey be averaged over perlods not 

to e teed 

i 

one calendar quarter. 

N equals the age In years at last 

blrthday. An lndlvldual employed at age 18 

or an lndlvldual beyond age 18 who had no 

accrued unused exposure shal I not be exposed 

durlng the ensulng year to doses exceeding 

(a) 1.25 ram for the first calendar quarter, 

(b) 2.5 rem total for the first two calendar 

quarters, (c) 3.75 ram total for the tirst 

ternatlonal Commlsslon on Radlologlcal 

Protectlon. 

three calendar quarters and (d) 5 rem for the 

year, but In not case will exposure h more 

than33 rem per quarter. 

A calendar quarter may be taken as a 

predetermined perlod of 13 consecutive weeks 

or any predetermined quarter year based on 

the galendar. 

Personnel monltorlng equipment shall be 

provlded each lndlvldual who receives or Is 

likely to recelvo a dose In any calendar 

quaqer In excess ot 10% of these values. 

Exposure must be governed such that the 

Individual’s body burden does not exceed thls 

value (a) when averaged over any period of 12 

consecutive months and (b) after 50 years of 

276 

occupational exposure. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 
PART I I 

STANMROS FU? RAOIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPEhQlX 0524 

II. RADlATlDf4 PROTECTION STAMIARDS FOR IMIIVIDUALS AH) KWLATlDN r#OURS lN UNCDNTROLLEO AREAS 

A. Radlatlon dose standards for external and Internal exposure 

DOS0 (rem/year) 

Based on 

exposure to 

Based on an average 

exposure to a sultable 

Type of Exposure 

Whole body, gonads or 

bone marrow 

Thyrold or bone 

Bono (alternate standard) 

lndlvlduals 

0.5 

populatlon sample 

I.5 

Body burden of 

O.OOJpg of radium 

226 OT Its blologlcal equivalent. 

0.5 

Body burden of 

O.OOlpg of radium 

226 or Its bfologlcsl equivalent. 

8. Radloactlvlty In effluents released 

to uncontrolled areas 

I. Except as provlded In 2. below, 

rsdloactlvlty In effluents released 

to unwntrolled areas shall not exceed the radlatlon protectlon standards speclfled In annex I, table II. 

The point of releaso of such effluents 

shall be consIdered to be the point 

at whfch the effluents pass beyond 

the s I to boundary. Where such effluents are drscharged through a 

conduit such as a stack or pipe. the 

point of release may be consldered 

to be the conduit discharge. For the 

purpose of applying these standards, 

radioactlvlty concentratlonr In effluents may be averaged over perlodr 

up to one year. 

2. RadIoactIvIty In effluents may be 

released to uncontrolled areas In 

excess of the rsdlatlon protectIon 

standards speclfled In annex I, table 

II, provfded It Is reasonably demonstratod that In uncontrolled areas: 

(a) indlvldusls are not exposed In 

excess of the standards speclfled 

In A. above. 

(b) Indlvlduals are not exposed In 

excess of annex 1, tsblo II stsndards, or 

(c) the average exposure of a suitable samplo of an exposed pOpUlatlon group Is not In excess Of 

oncthlrd of annox I, table II 

standards. RadIoactivIty concontratlons In the environment may 

be averaged over periods up to 

one yew. 

3. In any situation In uhlch the contrlbutlon to radloactfvfty In the enVI rontnent f ram ef f I uents d I scharged 

by one oc more sctlvltles of the 

AEC or AEC contractors Is Ilkely 

to result In exposures In excess of 

the standards speclfled In 1I.A. and 

8. abOve, lower effluent concentratlon llmlts msy be set for these 

Operat 1 ons. In such cases, the manager of the f Ield office may take the 

necessary corrective actlon If all 

actfvitles concerned are rlthln his 

area of responslblllty. Otherrlso, 

each case ul I I bo referred to the 

Dlrector, Oivlslon of Opsratlonal 

Safety, for appropriate action. 

277 

Revl sed : February 9, 1968 
STAMJAROS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NT%-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

Cf)~ENTf?ATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATLRAl eAC)(Gi?OUND 

(See notes at end of antlox) 

Elawsnt 'atomic number) 

Actinium (89)............ 

Amwlc'ur '95)........... 

Antimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Argon (18) .............. 

Arsen’c (33) ............ 

Astat'no '85) ........... 

aariur (%I ............. 

Bwke'lu '97) .......... 

Bwy"'um ‘4) ........... 

Bismuth (83) ............ 

AC 227 

4c 228 

M 24' 

\m 243 

jb 122 

jb I24 

ib 125 

\ 37 

\ 41 

\s 73 

\s 74 

\I 76 

LI 77 

rt 211 

I8 131 

'a '40 

lk 249 

IO 7 

I' 206 

s 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Sub 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

1 

S 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

(Uc/ml) 

2 

. 

2X’O-‘2 

3x10-" 

ax I o-* 

-0 

,';;;-12 

:$; 

lx10 

2x10;; 

lx10 

2x10 

-7 

-8 

2xlo_7 

5x10 

3x10;; 

6~lO_~ 

2x10 

-6 

hc'O_7 

4xlo_7 

3x10 

lx'0 

-7 

-7 

1xlo_7 

1x1q7 

5x1o_7 

4x10 

7x10 -9 

3x10 

-9 

'xl0 

-6 

-7 

4x'0_7 

lxl0 

-0 

;".;;-I0 

'xl0 

-7 

-6 

6x10 

lx'0 

-6 

-7 

2xtq7 

'xl0 

278 

able I 

Column : 

Water 

WC/ml) 

-5 

6x’o_3 

9x10 

3x10-' 

3x10~~ 

lx'O_, 

ax1q4 

lxlo_4 

8x'O_4 

8x1q4 

8x'q4 

7x'o_4 

7x1q3 

3x10 

3x10 

-3 

. . . . 

. . . . 

'xl0 

-2 

'xl0 

-2 

-3 

2xlo_3 

2x10_* 

~x'O_~ 

6x10 

2x10 

-3 

-3 

2xlO_5 

5x10 

2xlO-3 

5x10 

-3 

-5 

5x10_, 

0x ‘o_4 

7x10 

2x1o-2 

2x1o-2 

5xlo-2 

5x10:; 

1x10 

lx’0 

-3 

Column I 

A'r 

(Uc/ml) 

,x10:;; 

9x10 

Jx'0-9 

6x10-" 

2X10;;: 

;$-I3 

4xlO 

-12 

6x10 

-9 

5xld9 

5x'o-9 

7x,o;;0 

9':;;-10 

-4 

lxlo_g 

4x10 

7x10 

-8 

lx'0 

-8 

lx'0 

-8 

-9 

4x1q9 

4x10 

3x,0:; 

2x10 

-8 

1x10 

2x10 

-10 

1x10 

-9 

4x10 

-6 

lx'0 

-6 

-9 

4x'O_9 

::::I;1 

4x10 

-7 

2x10_* 

4x10 

6x10 

-9 

5x10 

-9 

Table II 

Column 2 

Water 

'De/ml) 

2x10 

-6 

3x10;; 

9x10 

9x10 -5 

4x10 

-6 

2x1o-5 

4x10 

-6 

3x10:: 

3x10 

3.1,:: 

2x1q5 

2x10_, 

1x1q4 

lx'0 

. . . . 

. . . . 

5x1o-4 

5x'd4 

5xlo-5 

5xlO-5 

2x1o-5 

2x10-5 

6x10;; 

8x10 

zxto:; 

7x1o_4 

2x'O_4 

2x10 

3x101; 

2x10 

6x10:: 

6x10 

2x10;; 

2x10 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

SH footnotes at and of tablo. 

Rw'rod: fokuwy 9, 1966 
s’T~H)~f?os Fc@ RAOIATION PROTECT'ON NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

C~ENTRAT'ONS 'N AIR At@ WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(Se0 ilotes at end of annex) 

1 

Elanent (atomic number) 

Bralno (5% ............ 

Caddr,lul (48) ............ 

Calclur ,201 ............ 

Callfornlum (98, ........ 

Carbon (6) .............. 

Cwllla '58) ............. 

Ceslum (S5, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Isotope’ 

0' 207 

8' 210 

81 212 

er 82 

Cd 109 

Cd ll5m 

Cd 1'5 

cs 4s 

cs 47 

Cf 249 

Cf 250 

Ct 252 

c 14 

(CO ) 

Co ? 41 

Cm 14s 

Ce 144 

cs 131 

cs 134m 

cs I34 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

t 

Column 

Air 

(Uc/ml) 

-7 

2x10_8 

1x10 

-9 

~xIO_~ 

6x10_, 

1x10_, 

2x10 

-6 

1x10_, 

2x1o_g 

5x10 

-8 

7x10_, 

4x10_* 

4x10_, 

2x10_, 

2x10 

3x10;; 

1x10_, 

2x10_, 

2xlO 

-12 

y;;-10 

-12 

;:;;-1o 

-11 

;$I0 

-6 

4xlo_5 

5x10_, 

4x10 

2x10 

-7 

3x10-' 

2x10 

-7 

1x10 

-8 

-9 

6~10_~ 

1x10 

-6 

3x10_, 

4x10 

-6 

6x10 

-0 

4xlO_g 

lx10 

Water 

(pc/ml) 

2xlo-3 

2x10;; 

1x10 

1x10 

-3 

lx10 

-2 

'xl0 

-2 

-5 

8x10_, 

1x10 

-J 

5x10_, 

5x1q4 

7xlo_4 

7x10 

-3 

lx,o_J 

1x10 

Jxlo-4 

5x10:; 

'xl0 

-3 

lx1O_4 

lx10_4 

7xl0_4 

4xl0_4 

7x10_4 

7xlo_4 

7x10 

2x10 

-2 

. . . . 

3x10-' 

,x10;; 

1x10 

lx10 -3 

5x10 

-4 

3x10:; 

7x10 

-2 

3x10_, 

2x'o_2 

sxlo_4 

3X10_) 

lx10 

Column I 

Alr 

(w/ml) 

6x10 

-9 

5x10y0 

2x10 

,.,0:;0 

sxlo_9 

7x10 

-8 

4x10_+ 

6x10 

2x,0:; 

3x10_9 

lx10_9 

1x10 

8x10:; 

~xIO_~ 

1x10_+ 

4x10 

-9 

6x,0_+ 

6x'O_14 

5x%,2 

3x'O_,, 

;:;;-12 

-15 

;;:;-I2 

-7 

lxlo_6 

1x10 

2xlo-8 

5x10:; 

9x10 

7x10 

-9 

3x10 

-10 

2x10 

-10 

4x10 

-7 

1x10 

-7 

-6 

'x10_, 

2x10 

-9 

'x'O_,0 

4x10 

Table I, 

Column 2 

Water 

('k/ml, 

-5 

~xIO_~ 

6x10 

-5 

4x10_, 

4x'o_4 

4x1o_4 

4x10 

,*I,:; 

4x10 

2xlO-4 

2xlo-4 

3x,0-' 

3x10~; 

3x10_, 

4x10 

-6 

9x1q4 

2x10 

-5 

5x10_, 

3x10 

4x10 

-6 

-5 

2x1O_5 

1x10 

3x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

8xlo-4 

. . . . 

-5 

9X10_) 

9x10 

-S 

4x1o_5 

4x10 

lx10 

-5 

'xl0 

-5 

-3 

2xlo_4 

9x10 

6x10 

-3 

'xl0 

-J 

-6 

9xl0_5 

4x10 

279 

Soo footnotes at end of tablo. 

Rovlrad: February 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FCf? RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

C~EN~TIONS IN AIR ANO WATER MOVE NATURAL BACKGROUNL~CO~~I~UO~ 

(se0 notes at end of ennex) 

‘< 

cs IJY 

cs I36 

cs 137 

ChIocIno (17) . . . . . . . . . . . Cl 36 

Cl 38 

Ctlroalun 124) . . . . . . . . . . . Cr 51 

Cobal+ (27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . co 57 

Co 58m 

Co S8 

I Co 60 

Copper (29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cu 64 

Curlun (96) . . . . . . . . . . . . . cm 242 

Cm 24s 

Cm 244 

CI 245 

CI 246 

oysproslum (66) . . . . . . . . . Oy I65 

OV 166 

Erbfum (68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Er 169 

S 

I 

s 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

lColumn 

Alf 

(lJc/ml) 

5X10-' 

9x10 

-8 

4x10 -7 

2x10-' 

~xIO-~ 

1x10 

-8 

4x10 

-7 

2x10-8 

JxlOd 

-6 

2x10 

lx10 -5 

2x10 

-6 

-6 

3x10_, 

2x10 

2xlo-s 

-6 

9x10_, 

8x10 

-8 

5x10_, 

Jxl0_9 

9x10 

-6 

zx10-6 

1x10 

1x10 

-10 

2x10 

-10 

-12 

6x10 

:$j% 

1x10 

5x10;;; 

1x10 

WO:;g 

1x10 

3xlo:t 

2x10 

2X10-' 

-7 

2x10 

6x10:; 

4x10 

lColumn Z 

Water 

ok/ml) 

-3 3x IO_, 

7x10 

2x10 

-3 

-3 

2xlo_4 

4x10 

1x10 -3 

-3 2xld 

2x10:; 

lxlo_2 

lx10 

-2 

sx10_2 

5x10 

-2 

2xlo_2 

1x10 

8x10 

-2 

6x10 

-2 

4x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

Ix10 

-3 

Ix10 

-2 

6x10:43 

7xlo_4 

7x10 

-4 

1x1q4 

7x10 

-4 

2xlo_4 

8~10_~ 

lxlo_4 

8x10 

-4 

lx1O_4 

8x10 

lx10 -2 

1x10 

-2 

lx10 -J 

1x10 

-3 

sx10-' 

sxlo-3 

Column I 

Air 

(W/ml) 

-8 

2xl0_9 

3x10 

lx10 

-8 

6x10 

-9 

-9 

;y;-10 

-8 

'X'O_,O 

8x10 

-8 

9xlq8 

7x10_, 

4x10 

-8 

8x10_, 

lxlo_9 

6x10 

-7 

6x10_, 

3x10_* 

3x10_+ 

2x10 

-8 

;;:",-10 

7x10 

-8 

-8 

4x10 

-12 

;;;;-I2 

-13 

',"x:gl, 

-13 

;;;",-I2 

-13 

::;",-I2 

-I3 

;$-I2 

9x10 

-8 

-8 

7x1o_9 

BxIO_~ 

7x10 

2x,0:; 

Ix10 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

-4 

lxlo_4 

2x10 

-S 

9x1q5 

6x10 

2xto:; 

4x10 

-5 

8~10_~ 

~xIO_~ 

4x1q4 

4x10 

2xldS 

2xld3 

,x10:: 

4x10 

3xto-3 

2x10:: 

1x10_, 

9x10 

5x10:; 

3x10 

3x10:: 

2x10 

2x10 

-5 

3x10-' 

sx1o-6 

2x1o-s 

-6 

7x10_5 

3x10 

4x10 

-6 

3x10 

-S 

4x10 

-6 

3x10 

-5 

-4 

4x10_4 

4x10 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

-S 

9x1o_5 

9x10 

280 

Soa footnotes at or\d of tablo. 

Rovlsd: Fobruary 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AN0 WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-contlnuad 

(See cot.9 at end of annox) 

Element (atomic number) I Isotope' 

Er I71 S 

I 

Euro~iu (63) . . . . . . . . . . . Eu I52 s 

(T/2=9.2 hrs)l 

Eu I52 S 

(T/2=13 yrr) I 

Eu 154 

Eu 155 

Fluorlno (9) . . . . . . . . . . . . F 18 

Gadoll~l~ (64) . . . . . . . . . Gd 153 

Gd 159 

Gslllum (31) . . . . . . . . . . . . Ga 72 

Gormrnlum 02) . . . . . . . . . . 30 71 

Gold (79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Au 196 

Au 198 

Au 199 

Hafnlw (72) . . . . . . . . . . . . Hf I81 

t+olnlu (67) . . . . . . . . . . . . Ho 166 

Hydrogen (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . H3 

lndlu (49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . In 113m 

In 114m 

In 115m 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

1 

S 

I 

S 

1 

5 

I 

5 

I 

S 

1 

S 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

(k/ml) 

7x10 

-7 

6x10 

-7 

4x10 

-7 

3x10 

-7 

1x10 -8 

2x10 

-8 

-9 

4x10 

-9 

7x10 

9x10 

-8 

7x10 

-8 

5x10+ 

3x10 

-6 

2xlo-7 

9x10 -6 

5xlo-7 

4x10 

-7 

2xlo-7 

2.10;; 

1x10 

6x10 

-6 

1x10 -6 

6x10 

-7 

3xlo-7 

2xl0-7 

1x10-q 

ax10 

-7 

4x10 -8 

7x10 

-8 

2x10:; 

2x10 

5x10 

-6 

2x10;; 

8x10 

7x10 

-6 

1x10 

-7 

-8 

2xl0_6 

2x10 

2x10 

-6 

281 

able I 

Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

3xlo-3 

3.1,:; 

2x10 

2x10;; 

2x10 

2x10-' 

6x10:: 

6x10 

6x10-' 

6x10 

-3 

2xlo-2 

1x10 

-2 

6x10 

-3 

6x10-' 

2x1o-3 

2x1,:; 

1x10 

1x10 -J 

5xlo-2 

5x1o-2 

5x10-3 

4x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

5x10-' 

4x10 

-3 

2xlo-3 

2x10-' 

9xlo-4 

9x10;; 

1x10 

. . . . 

4x10 

-2 

4x10 

-2 

5xlo-4 

5x10;; 

lxlo_2 

1x10 

-r 

Column I 

Air 

(DC/ml) 

2x1o-8 

2x10;~ 

1x10 

-8 

'x'O_,0 

;;;;-I0 

1x10 

-10 

2xl0-10 

Jxlo-9 

3.10;; 

2x1qg 

9x10 

8x10 

-9 

3xlo-9 

2x1o-8 

1x10 

-8 

8~10-~ 

6x10;; 

4x10 

2x10;; 

4x10 

2x10 

-8 

lx10 -8 

8x10 

-9 

4x10 

-8 

3x10:; 

1x10 

3x10 

-9 

7x10 

-9 

6x10 

-9 

-7 

2xlo_5 

4x10 

3x10 

-7 

-7 

2x10_+ 

4x10 

7x10 

-10 

6x10 

-8 

6x10 

-8 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

-4 

lxlo_4 

1x10 

-5 

6~10_~ 

6x10 

-5 

8~10_~ 

8x10 

2x10 

-5 

2x10;: 

2x10_4 

2x10 

-4 

BxIO_~ 

5x10 

2xlo-4 

2x10:; 

BxIO_~ 

8x10 

-5 

4x1q5 

4x10 

2x10:: 

2xlo_4 

2x10_4 

1x10 

5x10:; 

5x10 

2xlo-4 

2xlo-4 

-5 

7X10_) 

7x10 

3x1,:; 

3x10 

3x10-' 

. . . . 

1x10 -3 

1x10 

-3 

-5 

2xlo_5 

2x10 

-4 

4x10e4 

4x10 

See footnotes at and ot tsbla. 

Rovirad: February 9. 1968 
STAN!M?OS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSC-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

CmENmTlCNS IN AIR ANO WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROU@contlnued 

(SO* notes at end of annax) 

Element (atomic number) Isotope' 

In 115 

lodlno (53) . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 125 

I '29 

I '3' 

I 132 

I 133 

I 134 

I I35 

lrldlum '77) . . . . . . . . . . . Ir 190 

If '92 

Ir '94 

Iron (26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fo 55 

Fo 59 

Kryoton (36' . . . . . . . . . . . . Kr 6k 

Kr 65 

Kr 07 

Lsnthan,u (57) . . . . . . . . . . La 140 

Loed (62) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pb 203 

Pb 210 

Pb 2'2 

T 

S 

I 

S 

I 

5 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Sub 

Sub 

Sub 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Tablo I 

II Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

Co I umn 

Air 

(k/ml) 

2XlO-7 

3x10-* 

5x10:; 

2x10 

2.,o:Bp 

7x10 

9x10 

-9 

3xlo-7 

2xlo-7 

9x10 

-7 

3x10-6 

2x1o-7 

5x1o-7 

3x10;; 

'x'O_7 

lx'0 

'xl0 

-6 

4x10 

-7 

1x10 

-7 

3x10:; 

zr'O_7 

2xl0_7 

9x10 

-6 

'xl0 

lx'0 

-7 

5x10-* 

6x10:; 

1x10 

1x10 -6 

2x10;; 

'xl0 

3x1o-6 

2r'O-6 

-10 

'X'O_,O 

2x10 

2x10:; 

2x10 

3x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

4x10 

-5 

6x10 

-3 

1x10 

-5 

-3 

6~10_~ 

6x10 

2x10:: 

2x10 

5xlo-3 

2x10 

-4 

1x10 -3 

4x10 

-3 

2x10 

-2 

7x10 

-4 

2x1,:; 

6x10_, 

5x10 

lx'0 

-3 

'Xl0 

-3 

'x10 

-3 

9x10 

-4 

-2 

2x'o_2 

7x10 

2x10 

-3 

2x1o-3 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

-4 

7x10 

-4 

7x'o_2 

'xl0 

-2 

1x'o_6 

4x10 

5x10 

-3 

-4 

~x'O_~ 

5x10 

T 

Column I 

Air 

(l.k/ml' 

9x10 

-9 

1x10 

-9 

8x10 

-1' 

'xl0 

-9 

2x10:;' 

;:;810 

'x10 

-0 

3x10 

-9 

3x10 

-6 

1x10:; 

7x10 

2x10:; 

lx'0 

'xl0 

-9 

-8 

'xl0 

4x10 

-6 

lx'0 

-6 

-9 

4x'O_,0 

9x10+ 

8x10 

5x10 

-9 

3x10 

-6 

3x10 

-8 

5x'o-9 

2x10:; 

1x'o_7 

3x10 

2x10 

-6 

5x10 

-9 

4x10 

-9 

9x10 

-6 

6x10 

-6 

-12 

4x'O_,2 

8x10 

6x10 

-10 

7x10 

-10 

able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(k/ml) 

-5 

9x1o_5 

9x10 

2x10;; 

2x10 

-7 

4x'o_4 

2x'O_7 

3x10_, 

6x10 

-6 

~xIO_~ 

2x10 

-6 

7xlo_5 

4nlO 

1x10~~ 

6x10 

-5 

2x1q5 

7x10 

2x1o-4 

2x10:; 

4x10 

4x10 

-5 

3x10 

-5 

3x10 

-5 

-4 

8x10 

2x10 

-3 

6x10-' 

5xl0-5 

. . . . 

. . . . 

..,. 

2x10 

-5 

2x10:: 

4x10 

-4 

4x1o_7 

'x1o_4 

2x10 

2x10 

-5 

2x10 

-5 

282 

SW footnotoa at and of tablo. 

Rov'sed: Fobruary 9, 1966 
STANDARDS FDR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-S@ APPENDIX 0524 

C&~CEN~T~ONS IN AIR AN0 WATER ABOVE NATURAL 8%KGROUND_continued 

(See notos at end ot annex) 

Element (atomic number1 Isotope’ 

I 

I 

Lutotlum (71) . . . . . . . . . . . Lu 177 

Manganese (29) . . . . . . . . . . Wn 52 

Mn 154 

Mn 56 

Mercury (80) . . . . . . . . . . . . W 197m 

w 197 

Hg 203 

Molybdonu (42) . . . . . . . . . MO 99 

Neodymium (60) . . . . . . . . . . Nd 144 

Nd 147 

Nd 149 

Neptunium (93) . . . . . . . . . . NP 237 

Np 239 

Nlckol (28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . NI 59 

MI 63 

Nl 65 

Nloblum (Colunblum)Ol).. Nb 93m 

Nb 9S 

Nb 97 

s 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

5 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column 

Alf 

(pc/ml) 

6x10 

-7 

5x10 

-7 

2x10;; 

lxlo_7 

4x10 

-8 

4x10 

-7 

axlq7 

5x10 

-7 

7xlo_7 

8~10_~ 

lx10 

3x1o:g 

7x1o_7 

1xlo_7 

7x10 

2x1o-7 

8x10-" 

3x10:;" 

4x10 

2xl0-7 

2.10:; 

lX'O_12 

4x10 

,,10:;0 

8x10_, 

7x1o_7 

5x1o_7 

axlo_ 

6~10_~ 

3x10 

-7 

9x10s7 

5x1q7 

1x10 

2x1o-7 

5xld7 

1x10 

-7 

6x10 

-6 

5x10 

-6 

‘able I 

Column 2 

water 

(p/ml) 

3xlo-3 

3xto:; 

1x10_4 

9x1o_3 

JxlO 

3x10 

-3 

4x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

-3 

~xIO_~ 

sx1q3 

9x10 

-2 

lxlO_4 

sxlo_3 

3x10 

-3 

sxlo_3 

1x10 

2x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

-3 2X10_) 

2x10 

-3 

8x10 

8x10 

-3 

-5 

9x1o_4 

9x10 

-3 

4x1o_3 

4x10 

-3 

6~10_~ 

6~10_~ 

8~10_~ 

2x10 

-3 

4x10_3 

3x10 

1x10 

-2 

lx10 -2 

3x10 

-3 

3x10 

-3 

3x1o-2 

3x10 

-2 

Column 

Alr 

(lJc/lnl) 

2x10-* 

2xto:g 

7x10_+ 

5x10 

1x10 

-9 

1x10 

-9 

3x10 

-8 

-8 

2x10 

3x1,:; 

JXlO_6 

4x10 

-8 

9x10 

-9 

2xlo_9 

4x10 

3x10:; 

7x10 

3x10 

-12 

1x10;;' 

1x10 

8x101; 

6x10 

5x10 

-0 

1x10 

-13 

4x10 

-12 

-8 

3X10_6 

2x10 

2x10 

-8 

-8 

3x1o_9 

2xlo_8 

1x10 

-6 

sxlo_8 

2x10 

4x10 

-9 

5x10 

-9 

2x10 

-8 

-9 

3xlo_7 

2xlo_7 

2x10 

Column 2 

Water 

(p/ml) 

See tootnotes at and ot tsblo. 

Rovlsd: February 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FfX RAD'AT'ON PROTECTION NT'S+SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AlA AH) WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUtUkontlnuad 

(Se0 not08 at end ot annox' 

Elamont (atomic number) I rotope’ 

Os~lun (76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ds '85 

OS '9lm 

0s '91 

OS 195 

Palladium (46) . . . . . . . . . . Pd '03 

Pd '09 

Phosphorus (15) . . . . . . . . . P J2 

Plat'nm (78) . . . . . . . . . . . Pi '91 

Pt 193m 

Pt '97m 

P? 197 

P'uton'u (941 . . . . . . . . . . RI 238 

Pu 2J9 

Pu 240 

Pu 24' 

Pu 242 

Polon'um (841 . . . . . . . . . . . PO 2'0 

Potassium (19) . . . . . . . . . . K42 

Prasaodym'un (59) . . . . . . . Pr 142 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

s 

I 

5 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

7 

Column I 

A'r 

(uc/m’) 

sx10-7 

sx1d8 

2x'0-5 

9x10 

-6 

1x10 

-6 

-7 

4X10_) 

4x10 

Jx'0 

-7 

lx'o:; 

7x10 

6.10:; 

4x10 

7x10 

-8 

8x',:; 

8~10_~ 

6x10 

7x10 -6 

5x10 

-6 

6x10 

-6 

5x10 

-6 

8x10 

-7 

-7 

6x10-12 

2x10 

3x,0-" 

zX'O-12 

4x10-'l 

2x',:;; 

4x10 

9x'o;;l 

lx'0 

2x10:;; 

4x10 

5x10:;; 

2x10 

2x10:; 

lx'0 

2x10-' 

2x1o-7 

able I 

Column : 

Water 

(k/ml 

2xlo-3 

2x10;; 

7x10 

-2 

7x10_, 

!5*'0 

SxlO 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

2x10:; 

'x10_, 

8x10 

sxto-' 

2xlo-3 

5xlo-4 

7x10:; 

4x10 

sxlO-J 

3x'o-2 

3x1o-2 

Jxlo-2 

3x10~; 

4x10 

-3 

Jx'O_4 

1x10_, 

8x10 

-4 

'x10_, 

~x'O_~ 

1x10 

8x10;; 

7x10 

4x10 

-2 

-4 

'x'o_4 

9x10 

2x10 

-5 

8x10 

-4 

9x10 

-3 

6x10:: 

9x10_4 

9x10 

-IColumn I 

Air 

('k/m'~ 

2x10 

-8 

2x10:; 

~xIO_~ 

3x10 

4x'O 

-8 

lx'0 

-8 

-8 

lx'q9 

9x10 

sx'o-8 

Jx'o~; 

2xlq8 

lx'0 

-9 

2x1qg 

3x10 

3x10:; 

2x10 

-7 

2x10_7 

2x10 

-7 

2x1q7 

2x10 

3x1,:; 

2x10-14 

;",:;-I2 

-14 

y;;-12 

-I4 

6'",;"o-'2 

3xlo-12 

1x10 

6x'o!y: 

lx'0 

-1' 

;z;x-12 

7x10 

-8 

4x10 

-9 

-9 

7xlo_9 

5x10 

able I' 

Column 2 

W8tar 

(UC/a" 

-5 

7x10_, 

7x10 

sxlo~; 

2x10_4 

2x10_, 

2x10 

-5 

6xtq5 

sxlo_4 

3x10_* 

sxto_, 

9x1q5 

7x10 

2x10-' 

2x10-' 

-4 

'xlO_4 

1x10 

Ix10 

-3 

lx'0 

-3 

-s 

txto_, 

9x10_, 

1X10_) 

Ix10 

-6 

Sx'O_, 

3x10 

5x10 

-6 

3x10 

-5 

5x10 

-6 

-5 

3x10 

2x10;; 

1x10 

5x10:; 

3x10 

7x10 

-7 

3x10 

-5 

3x10:; 

2x10 

3x10 

-5 

3x,0-' 

284 

So8 tootnotos at end ot tablo. 

Rw’sad: Fabruary 9. 1968 
STAWARDS FOR RAOIATION PROTECTION NTSGSOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS 'N AIR Am WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUNCkontlnud 

(Se0 notrs at and ot annox) 

Element (atomic number) 

Praoth'um (6" . . . . . . . . 

Protoact'nlur (91) . . . . . 

Redlull '6(I) . . . . . . . . . ..a 

Redon (66) ............. 

Rhonlum '75) ........... 

Rhod'u (4% ........... Rh 10% 

Rh 'OS 

Rubld'un '37) .......... Rb 66 

Rb 87 

Isotop.' 

Pr 143 

Pm 147 

Pm 149 

Pa 230 

Pa 23' 

Pa 233 

Ra 223 

Re 224 

Ra 226 

Ra 228 

Rn 220 

Rn 222 

Ro 163 

Re 1'36 

Re 187 

Ra I88 

S 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

s 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

Column I 

Air 

('&ml) 

3xlo-7 

-7 

2x10 

6x10 -0 

'xl0 

-7 

3x10-' 

2x10 

-7 

2x10:;0 

6x10 

1x10:;; 

lx10 

6xld7 

2x10 

-7 

2x10 

-9 

2XlO-'o 

sxlo-9 

-10 

7x10 

3x10-" 

5x10-" 

:;;I:: 

3xlo-7 

lx'0 

-7 

3x10d 

2x10:; 

6x10 

2x10 

-7 

9x10-6 

-7 

sx'q7 

4xlo_7 

2x10 

BXIO -5 

-Y 

6x10 

-7 

6x10 

5x10 

-7 

3x10 

-7 

7x10 -a 

5x'o-7 

7x10 

-8 

285 

-I- bls I 

Column 2 

Water 

(UC/ml 

1x10 -3 

-3 'xl0 

6x10 -3 

6x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

7x10_, 

7x10 

3x10:~ 

8x10 

4x10 

-3 

3x10;; 

h'O_4 

1x10 

-Y 

7xlo_4 

2X10_' 

4x10 

9x10 

-4 

axlo-' 

7xlo-4 

. . . . 

. . . . 

2x10 -2 

-3 

6x10_, 

3x10 

1x10 

-3 

-2 

7x'o_2 

4x10 

-3 

2xlo_4 

9x10 

-1 

4x10_, 

3x10 

-3 

4x10 

3x10 

-3 

-3 

2xlo_4 

7x10 

3x10 

-3 

5X10-' 

Column I 

Air 

(UC/ml) 

1x10 

-8 

-9 

6x10 

2x10 

-9 

3x10 

-9 

1x10 

-8 

0x10 

6x,0"' 

3x10-" 

4x10:;; 

4x10 

2x10; 

6x10 

-l! 

;:;;-I2 

2xlo-'o 

2x10;;; 

g;-12 

-I2 

;;;x-12 

-0 

1x10 

3x10 

-9 

9x10 

-8 

5x'O 

-9 

-8 

2xlo_9 

8x10 

3x10;; 

2x10 

'xl0 

-8 

6x10 

-9 

3x10 

-6 

2x10:; 

3x10 

2x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

2x10 

-9 

-8 

2xlo_g 

2x10 

tble II 

Column 2 

water 

(UC/ml' 

-5 

5xlo_5 

5x10 

-4 

2xlo_4 

2x10 

-5 

4x10_, 

4xlo_4 

2x'O 

2xld4 

9X10:; 

2xlo_4 

1x1q4 

1x10 

-7 

7x1qg 

4x10 

-6 

2xlo_6 

5x10 

3xlo-8 

3X10-' 

3xlo-a 

3Xlo-s 

. . . . 

. . . . 

-4 

~xIO_~ 

3x10 

-5 

9xw5 

5x10 

-3 

3xlo_3 

2x10 

-S 

Bx'O_~ 

3x10 

Ix10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

-4 

lxlo_4 

1x10 

-S 

7xM5 

2x10 

-4 

1xlo_4 

2x10 

SH footnotes at and of tablo. 

Rovlsd: February 9, '968 
STANOAROS FCf? RAOIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOe APPENOIX 0524 

CMENmT,O,+S IN AIR AH) WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(So0 notes at end of annox) 

Ruthonlua 04, .......... Ru 97 

Ru 103 

Ru 10s 

Ru 106 

Semulum (62) ........... Sm 147 

sm I51 

Sm 153 

Scanndlu (2,) . . . . . . . ...< SC 46 

SC 47 

SC 40 

So,on,ua (34, . . . . . . . . . . . So 7Y 

Slllcon (14) ........... . 

Silvr (47, ............ . 

Sod,ru (1,) ............. 

stront,w (38, ......... . 

51 31 

Ag 105 

Ag ,lOm 

Ag 11, 

Na 22 

Na 24 

Sr 85m 

I Sr 85 

S 

I 

s 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

5 

I 

S 

I 

5 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

T 

Column I 

Air 

(~C/rnl, 

2x10:; 

2x10 

5X10:; 

8xl0_7 

7x10 

5x10 

-7 

-8 

8x1o_9 

6x10 

7x10 -1, 

3x10 

-10 

-8 

~xIO_~ 

1x10 

-7 

5xlo_7 

4x10 

2r10-7 

2x10 

-8 

~x,O-~ 

5x10-' 

2x101; 

1x10 

-6 

lxlo_7 

lx10 

6x10:; 

lxl0_7 

~xIO_~ 

8xlo_7 

2x10 

1x10 

-8 

3xlo-7 

2xlo-7 

2x1o-7 

9x10 

-9 

lx10 -6 

-7 

1X10_) 

4x10 

3xlo-s 

2x10:; 

1x10 

286 

Column i Column I 

wetu Air 

(&/ml, (,x/ml, 

1x10 -2 

lx10 -2 

2x,0 -3 

2x,0:3 

3x10_, 

3x10_4 

4xlo_4 

Jx,O_3 

2xlO_3 

2x1o_2 

lxlo_2 

lx,0 

-3 

ZxlO_3 

2x10_, 

,x10_, 

1x10 

3x10 

-3 

3x10-' 

81c,O-~ 

6x10~; 

9x10_, 

8X,0 

3.10:; 

6x10 

3x10-' 

sx,o:IJ 

9x10_4 

9x10 

lx10 -3 

1x10 

-3 

-3 

,xlo_4 

9x10 

6x10 -3 

,x10;; 

2x10_, 

2x10 

3x,0-' 

5x10-' 

T 

8x10 

-8 

6x10 

-8 

2xlo-8 

sx1d9 

2x10 

-8 

2x10;; 

JxY,O 

;::;-12 

9x10~; 

2xlO_9 

sxlo_o 

2XlO_6 

lx10 

-9 

6X,0_,0 

8x10 

2X10:; 

2x10-9 

6x10+ 

sxlqg 

4x10-9 

4xl0_7 

2yj 

Jxlo_g 

2x10+ 

sx,o_9 

g-,0 

1x10 

-8 

-9 

8x10 

-9 

;;;;-1o 

4x10 -8 

-9 

5X10-6 

lXlO_6 

lx,0 

-9 

8xlo_9 

4x10 

able II 

Column 2 

water 

(w/ml, 

4x10 

-4 

3x10;; 

8x10_5 

art0 

-4 

1x1q4 

1x10 

-5 

lxlq5 

1x10 

6x10 

-5 

-5 

7x10_* 

4x10_* 

4x10_, 

8x10_, 

8x10 

-5 

4x1q5 

4x10 

-5 

9x10_, 

9x10 

-5 

3x,0_, 

3x10_4 

.3x10_, 

3x10_, 

9x1q4 

2x,0_, 

1x10_, 

IX,0 

3x,0;; 

3x10 

4x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

-5 

4x1q5 

3x10 

-4 

2xlo_5 

Jr10 

-3 

7xlO_3 

7x10 

-4 

Ixlo_4 

2x10 

Soo foo?nOtoS at of!d of table. 

Rovlsd: Fokurry 9, 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RAD'ATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOtx 0524 

CmENmTlmS IN AIR AH) WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUNO-~~~~~~IJ~~ 

(Sam not.* at end ot etlnaxx) 

Elaont (aiornlc numbor' I rotop.’ 

Sr 89 

Sr 90 

Sr 91 

Sr 92 

Sulfur (16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . s 35 

Tantalu (73) . . . . . . . . . . . Ta 182 

Tochnotlu (43) . . . . . . . . . Tc 96m 

Tc 96 

Tc 97m 

Tc 97 

Tc 99m 

Tc 99 

Tdlurlu (52) . . . . . . . . . . To 12% 

To 127 

re 12* 

To 129 

0 13ln F 0 '32 

s 

I 

s 

I 

5 

I 

s 

I 

s 

I 

s 

I 

s 

I 

s 

I 

5 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

s 

I 

5 

l 

s 

I 

s 

I 

S 

I 

Tablo I 

T 

3x10-6 

4x10 

3xlor%0 

5x10_, 

4x10 

-7 

3x10_, 

4x10_, 

3x10 

3x10-' 

Jxlo:; 

4x10 

-6 

2x10 

8x10 

-5 

3x101; 

6x10_, 

2x1o_6 

2r10-7 

2x10 

-5 

1x10_, 

3x10 

4x10 

-s 

-5 

'xl0 

2x'O 

-6 

-6 

6x10_, 

4X10-6 

4x10 

2xlo-6 

9x10 

-7 

0x10; 

3x10 

5x10:; 

4x10 

-7 

4x10_, 

2x10_, 

2X10 

1x10 

-7 

3x'o:: 

’ 8x10 

1x10 

-5 

1x10 

-3 

2x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

2x'o-3 

2x1o-s 

2x10:; 

6x10_, 

1x10 

1x10 

-3 

-1 

4x10_, 

3x10 

3x10:3 

1x10 

lx10 

-2 

5x10 

-3 

sxlo-2 

2x10 

-2 

ZX'O-' 

0x10~; 

lx10 

-3 

sx10_3 

SX'O 

2x10:: 

8xlo_3 

sx10_3 

lx'0 

6x10 

-4 

2x10 

-2 

2x10 

-2 

2x10+ 

,x10:: 

9x1o_4 

6x10 

Column I 

Air 

(p/ml' 

3x10;; 

'x'O_,, 

;:;;-10 

-6 

2x1q9 

9x10 

2x10:: 

1x10 

-9 

9xlo_9 

9x10_+ 

'X'O_,O 

7x1o_6 

3xlq6 

1x10 

2x1o;g 

6x10g 

6r'0_9 

5x10_, 

4x10_* 

lxlo_6 

'x10_, 

5x10 

7x10 

-6 

2x10~89 

'x10+ 

1x10 

-6 

6x10-6 

3x10+ 

3xlo_9 

1x10 

-7 

2x10_, 

lXlO_6 

lxlo_g 

~x'O_~ 

7xlo_9 

4x10 

Table II 

I Column 2 

Water 

(w/ml) 

3x10:; 

3x10 

-7 

3xlo_5 

4x10 

7x10 

-5 

5x10 

-5 

-5 

7x10_s 

6x10 

-5 

6x10 

3x101; 

4x10_, 

4x10 

1x10 

-3 

'Xl0 

-2 

1x10 

-4 

-5 

sxlo_4 

4xlo_4 

2x10 

2x10 

-3 

8xlo-4 

6x10 

-3 

3x1o-3 

3xlo-4 

2x10:; 

2x10 

5x10-' 

3x10:: 

2x10 

3x10 

-5 

-5 

2X10-$ 

ex10 

8x10 

-4 

6x10 

-5 

4x10 

-5 

3x10-) 

2xlo-5 

287 

Sme tootnotes at end of table. 

Rovlrod: Fobrwy 9, 1968 
STANOAROS FOFl RADIATION PROTECTION NTSD-SOP APPEMIIX 0524 

CwENTRATlCNS IN AIR ANO WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUNO-contlnud 

(Se0 notos at end of anna) 

Elanont (atomic number) Isotope' Column I 

tAlf 

(UC/ml) 

Torblu (6s) . . . . . . . . . . . . :b '60 S 

I 

mheiliu (81) . . . . . . . . . . . Tl 200 S 

I 

:I 201 S 

I 

rt 202 S 

I 

rl 204 s 

I 

Ttlorlum (901 . . . . . . . . . . . . m 226 S 

I 

Th 230 S 

I 

Th 232 S 

I 

Th natural S 

I 

Th 234 S 

I 

Thullu (69) . . . . . . . . . . . . Tm '70 S 

I 

Tm I71 S 

I 

Tin (SO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sn 113 S 

I 

Sn '2s S 

I 

Tungsten (WoltrrI(74) . . U 161 S 

I 

w 185 S 

I 

w 167 S 

I 

Ufanlur (92) . . . . . . . . . . . . U 230 S 

I 

U 232 S 

I 

'Xl0 

-7 

3x10 

-8 

3x10 

-6 

'X'O 

-6 

2X'o:; 

9x10_, 

8x10 

zxto-' 

6x10-I 

3x10 

-6 

9x10 -12 

-'2 

;;;;-12 

10 

-11 

3x10-ll 

3X10-" 

3X10;;; 

3x10 

6x10 

-8 

3XlO:gB 

4x10 

-0 

3x10_, 

1x10 

-7 

2x10_, 

4XlO_6 

5x10_, 

1x10 

8x10: 

2x10_, 

1x10 

,X101; 

lx10 

4x10 

-7 

3x10 

-7 

3X10:;; 

'xl0 

1x10 

-10 

3X10-" 

Bbl. 1 

Column 2 

Watw 

(&ml) 

-3 

lxlo_3 

'Xl0 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-3 

9X10 

-3 

5x10~; 

4x10 

2x10;; 

3x10 

2x1o-3 

2X10:: 

4x10 

5x10~~ 

9x10 

5x10 

-5 

'0 

-3 

-s 

~xIO_~ 

6x10 

5x10 

-4 

5x10;; 

1x10 

-3 

lx10 

'xl0 

-2 

lx10 

-2 

-3 

2xw3 

2xlO_4 

sx1o_4 

5x10 

1x10 

-2 

1x10 

-2 

-3 

4x10 

3X1O-3 

2Xlo-3 

2x1o:t 

!xlo_4 

1x10 

8X10-' 

8~10-~ 

Column I 

Air 

('&ml) 

3x10~; 

lx'0 

-6 

9XlO_6 

4x10 

7x10 

-6 

3x10: 

3x1o_9 

8x10 

tilO$ 

9*?,, 

:",;;-I3 

-14 

;:;;-13 

-12 

;;-I2 

-12 

'O-12 

10 

2x10:; 

IO 

lx10 

-9 

-9 

1x10 

4x10 

-9 

-9 

8XlO_6 

lxlo_g 

2x10 

4x10 

-9 

-9 

3x10 

8X10;; 

4i'O 

-6 

3x1o_g 

4x10 

-8 

2XlO_6 

1x10 

-'I 

'x'O_,2 

;::;-12 

9x10 

-I3 

gblo II 

Column 2 

water 

(@vl) 

-5 

4x1q5 

4x10 

-4 

4xrq4 

2xlo_4 

3x10_, 

2xlo_4 

1x10_, 

7x10 

-4 

1x10_, 

6x10-6 

7x10_, 

'O-6 

2x10 

3X10-' 

2x10~ 

4x10 

10d 

lo-' 

,101; 

3x10 

-5 

5x10_, 

5x10 

-4 

sxtq4 

5x10 

9x10 

-5 

8x10 

-5 

2x10 

-s 

2X,0:: 

4x10 

3xlO:f 

1x1q4 

1x10 

-5 

7X10_) 

6x10 

5X10 

-6 

5x1o-6 

3Xlo-s 

3X10-' 

288 

Sam footnotes at and of table. 

Rovlsod: Fobruwy 9. 1968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTS@SDP APPEKllx 0524 

CmENmfIO)(S IN AIR Am WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-~~~+~~~O~ 

(Soa notos at and of annox) 

Elront 'stomlc number) 

VmladlU (23) ......... 

Xwn (54) ............ 

Yttorblu (70) ........ 

Y+)tlu (39) .......... 

Zinc (30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zn 65 

Zlrconlun (40) . . . . . . . . . 

t 

I*otop.' 

u 233 

U 234 

u 235 

u 236 

u 238 

U-natural 

v 48 

X0 13tn 

X@ I33 

Xm I35 

Yb I75 

Y 90 

Y 9lm 

Y 91 

Y 92 

Y 93 

Zn 69n 

Zn 69 

Zr 93 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

5 

I 

Sub 

Sub 

Sub 

5 

I 

5 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

5 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

co’umfl I 

Alr 

(w/ml) 

5,10:;g 

:::c;; 

1X10 

5X10::; 

1x10 

-10 

6X'D_,0 

;:;;-,1 

;;;$% 

6x10 

2x10:; 

6x10 

2x10;; 

1x10 

4x10 

-6 

-7 

7xlq7 

~xIO_~ 

1x10 

lx10 

-7 

2x10~; 

2x10 

-8 

4X10-8 

3xlo_7 

4x10 

3x1o-7 

2x10 

-7 

'Xl0 -7 

1x10 

-7 

-8 

6~10_~ 

4x10 

3xlo-7 

7x10 

-6 

9x10 

-6 

1x10 

-7 

3x10 

-7 

Ible I 

Column i 

Water 

('s/ml) 

9X1O-4 

9x10;: 

9x10 

9x1o-4 

8x10:; 

8x10 

lx10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

lx10 -3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

1x10 

-3 

-4 

9xlo_4 

8x10 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

3xlO-3 

3.10:~ 

6x10 

6x10:; 

1x10 

-1 

lx10 

8x101; 

8x10 

2x10:; 

2x10 

BxIO-~ 

BxIO-~ 

3xl0-3 

5xlo-3 

2x10 

-3 

2xlo-3 

5x10 

-2 

sx1o-2 

2x10;; 

2x10 

-Ico’ullm I 

Air 

('.&ml) 

2x10-'l 

;$:: 

4x10 

-I2 

-11 

2x'O_12 

4x10 

-11 

2x10-12 

4x10 

;:;;I: 

-12 

',:;",-12 

-9 

6~10_~ 

2x10 

-7 

4x1o_7 

3x10 

1x10 

-7 

2x10;; 

2x10 

4x10 

-9 

3x10:; 

8x10 

6~10-~ 

1x10:; 

lx10 

1x10 

-8 

1x10 

-8 

6x10 

-9 

5xlo-9 

4x10 

-9 

2x'o-9 

lx!0 -8 

lx10 

-8 

2x1o-7 

3x10-' 

4x10 

-9 

1x10 

-8 

sblo II 

Column 2 

Water 

('ldml) 

-5 3xlo_5 

3x10 

3x10:: 

3x10 

-5 

3x10_, 

3x10 

3xlo-5 

3x10:; 

4x10_, 

4x10 

-5 

2x10_, 

3x10 

-5 

3x10_, 

3x10 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

1x10 

-4 

-4 

1x10_, 

2x10 

2x101; 

3x10 

-3 

3x10_!, 

3x10 

3xlo-5 

6x10:; 

~xIO_~ 

3x10 

3x101; 

1x10 

-4 

2xlo_5 

7x10 

6x10 

-5 

2x10 

-3 

-3 

2xlo_4 

8x10 

8~10-~ 

289 

Sw tootnotos at ad ot tablo. 

RW’SWI: Fokurry 9, '968 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSeSOP APPENDIX 0524 

CCMCENTRATIONS IN AIR AMI WATER ABOVE NATURAL 6ACKGROUND-contlnuod 

(500 notos at and ot annox) 

Elmont (stomic number) Isotope’ Column I 

I Air 

(pee/ml) 

S 1x10 

-7 

I 

-8 

S 

3X10_) 

I 

lxlo_8 

9x10 

Tt 

t 

Zr 95 

Zr 97 

1 

2 

Soluble (S); Insoluble (I). 

“Sub” moans thst values glvon are for su~rsion 

In an infinite cloud of gaseous matorlai. 

ROTE : in any CISO uhoro thorn is a nixturo In rir 

or rrtor of more than one radionucl ido, the I imitlng values for purposes of this Annox should be 

dotwmind a follows: 

1. if the identity end concontrstion of l sch 

radionucl id@ in the nixturo era known, the I imitlng 

veluos should k drlvd es follows: 

Dotormlno, for oath redlonucl ido mixtuto, the rat lo 

ktuoon the quantity ptosont in the mixture rnd tho 

limit othofriso l stabl ishod in Annox I for the 

rpocific rdlonuclido rhon not in a mlxturo. The 

sun of ruch ratios for 81 I tho red ionucl Id.8 in the 

mixture may not oxcoal “1” (I..., xunity”). 

EXAMPLE: If radlonuei idos A, B, and C era 

prosmt in concentrations C , C , and C , end If 

the appiicablo WC’s, MO $c ‘and WC ’ end UPC 

rospactivoiy, than the conc~tr~tions8shall & 

limitd so that tho following relationship exists: 

2. If either the identity of the concentration 

of any redionucllde In the mixture Is not known, 

2x10_, -3 -9 

2x 1 o_4 

4x1o_9 

5x1o_4 

1x1o_9 

4x10 

5x10 3xld9 

Tablo II 

Column 2 

Water 

(@ml 1 

6x10 

-5 

6x10:; 

2X10_) 

2x10 

the I imitlng values for purposes of Annex I shell 

k: 

-12 

a. For purposes of Table I, Coi. l-l X lo_, 

b. For purposes of Teblo I, Col. 2-3 X 10 

c. For purposes of Tablo II, Cal. l-4 X 10 

-14 

d. For purposes of Tsblo II, Cal. 2-l X 

-5 

10 

3. If any of the conditions specified balou are 

net, the corrospondlng values specified below may 

bo used in I IOU of those spuifiod In paragraph 2 

&OW. 

1. If the identify of ouch redionucl ido in the 

mlxturo is known but thm concentration of one or 

more of the rsdionucl ides in tho mitiure is not 

known, the concentration I lmit for tho mixture Is 

tho Iimlt specified in Annox I for the rdionuclldo 

in the mixture having the iouost concontratlon 

I Init; or 

b. If the identify of arch radionucl ido in the 

mixture is not known, but it is known that certain 

rsdionuci ides speclfled in Annex I are not present 

in the mixture, the concentration I imit for the 

mfxturo is the lowest concentration limit specified 

in Annex I for any radionucl Ide uhlch is not known 

to be absent from the mixture; or 

290 

Rovisad: February 9, 1968 
SlAH)ARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENOIX 0524 

P 

c. Elnont (atomic numbor) and Isotope Column I Column 2 Zolumn I Column 2 

Alf Water Alr Water 

(~c/ml) (@ml 1 (DC/ml 1 (UC/ml 1 

If It Is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, PO 210, At 211, Ra 

223, Ra 224, Ra 226, AC 227, Ra 220, Th 230, Pa 231, Th 

232, and Th-nat, are not prosent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, PO 210, Ra 223, Ra 

226, Ra 226, Ra 231, and Th-net, are not Present........ 

If It Is known that Sr 90, Pb 210, Ra 226, Ra 228, at0 

not prosont . ..*......................................... 

If 1 t 1s known Ra 226 and Ra 226, are not Pr l sent . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that alpha-anlttws and Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, 

AC 227, Ra 228, Pa 230, Pu 241, and Bk 249 are not 

prmsont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that alpha-wlttors and Pb 210, AC 227, Ra 

226 and Pu 241, are not present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that alphbmlttors and AC 227 are not 

prront . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If It Is known that AC 227, Th 230, Pa 231, Pu 236, Pu 239, 

Pu 240, Pu 242, and Cf 249, ara not present . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If Pa 231, Pu 239, Pu 240, Pu 242 and Cf 249 are not present. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

3x10 

-9 

3-lo-lo 

3x10 

-11 

-12 

‘x’O_, 2 

2x10 

I 

9x10 -5 

6x10 -5 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

-10 

lx10 

IX10 -11 

1x10 

-12 

-1s 

‘x10_1, 

7x10 

3x I o-6 

2x10.. 

-7 

6~10_~ 

1x10 

. . . . 

C... 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

4. If the nlxturo of radlonuclldos consists of 

uranium and Its daughtr products In ore dust 

prior to chrlcal procosslng of the uranium ore, 

the values spaclflod below may bo used In I IOU of 

those dotoimlnod In eccordanco rlth paragraph 1 

abovo or those spoclfld ln paragraphs 2 and 3 

abovo. 

a. For purpows of Tablo I, Col. l-!l: 10 -10 

~&ml gross alpha ectlvlty; or 2.5 X 10 PC/ml 

natural uranium; or 75 mlcrograms par cubic meter 

or alr natural uranium. 

10 

-91 

For purposes of Tablo I I, Col. l-3-,4 

~c/rl gross alpha actlvlty; or 8 X 10 

PC/ml natural uranlur; or 3 mlcrograms par cubic 

motor of alr natural urenllun. 

5. For purposes of thls note, a redlonucl Ida 

nay k considered as not present In a mlxturo If 

(a) the ratio of the concontratlon of that radionuclldo In the mlxturo (CA) to the concantratlon 

llmlt for that radlonuclldo spoclflod In Tablo II 

of Annox I (UPCAl door not l xcood l/10, 

C 1 

A ( 

-.- 

1.0. MpcA IO 

and (b) the sum of such rat108 for al I the 

radlonuclldes consldored as not present In the 

mixture does not exceed l/4. 

cA % < 1 

1.0. iq +cQcg+ l *** 

S4 

291 

Awlsad February 9, 1968 
292 
APPENDIX E 

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-0101-01 

CHAPTER 0101 THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTSO) 

0101-01 

011 

General 

The Nevada Test Site 

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is a facility provided by the Atomic 

Energy Comnission and managed by the AEC Nevada Operations Office 

(NV). The NTS supports the field test programs of the AEC and its 

contractors, the Department of Defense, and others authorized to be 

conducted at the NTS. 

012 The Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) 

The Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) includes AEC, DOD, 

Laboratory, contractor, agency and organizational personnel who 

participate in, or provide support for, test operations at the Nevada 

Test Site (NTS). The Manager, NV, as the Site Manager, heads the 

NTSO (see Appendix "A"). 

0101-02 

021 

Organizational Concept and Policies 

Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) 

The Nevada Test Site Organization is a continuing task organization 

whose composition may be readily changed in response to the needs and 

technical objectives of the test program. 

022 The NV staff, for the Manager, provides for the approval and 

coordination of program proposals, approvals for project support, 

funding and/or authority for financial agreement, legal counsel, 

contract authority and administration, engineering, accounting, 

classification and security policy and guidance, safety policy and 

guidance, environmental safety analyses, industrial relations, and 

public information policy to the NTSO. 

023 Test execution shall conform to statutory, regulatory, and other 

responsibilities in accordance with delegations to the Manager, NV, 

by the General Manager of the Atomic Energy Cornnission. 

024 Technical users are allowed maximum technical latitude in the conduct 

of their scientific programs and are responsible for their technical 

readiness. 

293 

Revised: March 30, 1972 
025 

THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTSO) NTSO-0101-025 

User groups may be assigned areas in which to conduct their 

operations and exercise technical control subject to operational site 

coordination and control exercised by the Site Manager or, during a 

Test Execution Period, the Test Controller. 

026 The Site Manager, NTS, has the authority to approve or disapprove the 

field execution of tests that have been approved by Headquarters AEC. 

During the Test Execution Period, authority to proceed with or postpone the field execution of approved activities or tests is delegated 

to the Test Controller in accordance with his Delegation of Authority 

from the Manager, NV. 

0101-03 

031 

Responsibilities 

The Slte Manager is responsible for administering the NTS, for all 

preparations required for the safe execution of programs and projects 

at the NTS and for providing construction and logistic support 

services and facilities required to support the technical users. 

032 The Test Controller is responsible to the Manager, NV, for the 

conduct of those experiments and test events in the testing program 

to which he is assigned by the Manager, NV. 

033 The Deputy, Military Matters (Director, Test Directorate, FCDNA), 

serves as deputy for the Site Manager on operational, administrative 

and support matters pertaining to all DNA activities. 

034 The Scientific Manager's Advisory Panel is chaired by a Scientific 

Advisor designated by the Manager, NV, as nominated by the technical 

user. Members of the panel provide advice on matters relative to onand off-site safety. 

035 The Test Group Directors (TGD) are assigned by the scientific sponsor 

to direct the fielding and technical aspects of experiments and 

tests. He reports to the Test Controller on operational matters 

relating to test execution. 

036 The Director, Logistics Support, is responsible for the direction and 

control of construction and logistical support activities at the NTS 

and during Test Execution Periods, supports the Test Controller 

directly in the field execution of experiments and test events. 

037 The Director, Operational Support, aided by the Operations Control 

Group and Special Staff assigned from NV as required, provides 

advice, assistance and serves as principal operations coordinator for 

the Site Manager and during the Test Execution Period, as Director of 

Operations for the Test Controller. 

038 The Control Point Coordinator assures the availability in the OCC of 

facilities and equipment for the control and coordination of NTS 

operational activities. 

294 

Revised: March 30, 1972 
THE NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION (NTSO) NTSO-0101-039 

039 

040 

041 

042 

The Test Operations Officer supervises the preparation of the Test 

Controller's operation and security plan and other required plans as 

directed. He coordinates preparations for the test execution and 

forward area support. During the Test Execution Period, he assists 

the Director of Operations in supervising and coordinating execution 

of the operations and security plan as directed by the Test 

Controller. 

The Test Liaison Officer provides oral communication of test-related 

operational information from the operational control point (NTS) to 

NV and the Test Operations Center (TOC) AEC HQ during the Test 

Execution Period. 

The FCDNA, Test Construction Division, is responsible for directing 

DOD furnished support. 

The Technical Program Groups consist of organizational units and 

staff to satisfy the program objectives of their parent 

organizations. 

295 

Revised: March 30, 1972 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

DISTRIBUTION LIST 

DNA-6325F 

MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY 

ATTN: DIRECTOR OF LIBRARIES 

ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

ATTN: PA0 

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

ATTN: EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

ATTN: RTS-2B 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

ATTN: GC 

ATTN: PA0 

5CYS ATTN: RARP 

25 CYS ATTN: TITL 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

ATTN: TDTM-CF G CHAVEZ 

ATTN: TDTT W SUMMA 

DEFENSE TECHNICAL iNFORMATION CENTER 

2 CYS ATTN: DTIC/FDAB 

FIELD COMMAND DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

4 CYS ATTN: FCLS 

1OOCYS ATTN: FCLS MAJ J STINSON 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

ATTN: ICAF-ICC 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

PENTAGON LIBRARY 

ATTN: ARMY STUDIES 

U S ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

ATTN: DAMH-HSO 

U S ARMY COMD & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

U S ARMY NUCLEAR &CHEMICAL AGENCY 

ATTN: MONA-NU 

U S ARMY WAR COLLEGE 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

JAMES CARSON BRECKINRIDGE LIB 

ATTN: LIBRARY DIV 

MARINE CORPS BASE 

ATTN: DOCUMENT CUSTODIAN 

MARINE CORPS DEV & EDUCATION COMMAND 

ATTN: J C BRECKINRIDGE LIB 

MARINE CORPS HISTORY & MUSEUMS 

ATTN: CODE HDH-2 

NAVAL AVIATION HISTORY 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND 

ATTN: ASSISTANT FOR MEDICAL SURGERY 

NAVAL OCEAN SYSTEMS CENTER 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE 

ATTN: HISTORIAN 

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

NAVAL SCHOOL 

ATTN: COMMANDING OFFICER 

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND 

ATTN: NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY DIV 

ATTN: TECH LIB 

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER 

ATTN: CODE 233 

NAVY DEPT LIBRARY 

ATTN: LIBRN 

OFC OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPS 

ATTN: NOP 0455 

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADV GEN 

ATTN: CODE 64.3 

U S MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY 

2 CYS ATTN: LIBRN 

US NAVAL AIR STATION LIB 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY/EN 

ATTN: C BRIDGMAN 

AIR FORCE WEAPONS LABORATORY 

ATTN: SUL 

AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 

ATTN: AUL-LSE 

MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND 

ATTN: MACOS/XOND 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

ATTN: K MORRIS 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

ATTN: DOCUMENT CONTROL 

Did-1 
DNA-6325F (DL CONTINUED) 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

ATTN: GRACE M PLUMMER 

REYNOLDS ELECTRICAL AND ENGINEERING CO.. INC 

2 CYS ATTN: B EUBANKS 

2 CYS ATTN: E MCDOWELL 

2 CYS ATTN: W BRADY 

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LAB 

ATTN: TECH INFO DIV 

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY 

ATTN: M WALZ 

2 CYS ATTN: REPORT LIBRARY 

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES 

ATTN: CENTRAL LIBRARY 

5 CYS ATTN: GZAMORA 

ATTN: J METCALF 

ATTN: ORG 400 

OTHER GOVERNMENT 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

ATTN: OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS 

ATTN: OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 

EXEC OFC OF THE PRESIDENT 

ATTN: LIBRN 

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

ATTN: LIBRARY SERVICE DIVISION 

ATTN: SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY DIV 

ATTN: SERIAL & GOVT PUBLICATION 

NATIONAL ATOMIC MUSEUM 

ATTN: HISTORIAN 

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 

ATTN: LIBRN 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN 

ATTN: LIBRARY 

OFFICE OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PGRM 

ATTN: R LARSON 

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

2 CYS ATTN: COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ATTN: COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS 

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ATTN: SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH & ENVIR 

U S SENATE 

ATTN: COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS 

U S SENATE 

ATTN: COMMITTE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS 

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION-OFC CENTRAL 

ATTN: DEPT VETERANS BENEFIT 

ATTN: DIRECTOR BOARD OF VERTERAN APPEAL 

WHITE HOUSE (THE) 

ATTN: DOMESTIC POLICY STAFF 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 

ADVANCED RESEARCH &APPLICATIONS CORP 

ATTN: H LEE 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: A NELSON 

KAMAN SCIENCES CORPORATION 

ATTN: DASIAC 

KAMAN SCIENCES CORPORATION 

ATTN: DASIAC 

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 

ATTN: C ROBINETTE 

PACIFIC-SIERRA RESEARCH CORP 

ATTN: H BRODE 

TECH REPS, INC 

ATTN: R HOLMES 

Did-2