294 Ga, 813

FINAL C OPY S13G0590. STANFIELD et al. v. ALIZOTA. THOMPSON, Chief Ju stice. We grante d certi orari to conside r whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the principl e of priorit y jurisdictio n when it held t hat the Fayette C ounty Superior Co urt lacked the juris diction to t erminate Emmanuel Alizota’s parental rights and erred in gr anting Ryan and Mel issa Sta nfield’s petitio n for the adoption of S. K. Alizo ta v. Stanfield , 319 Ga . App. 25 6 (734 SE2d 497 ) (2012). The Co u r t of Appeals det ermined that because the ju venile court h ad previously exerc ised j u risdiction over a depriva tion proce eding invol

ving Alizota and S. K . and ha d enter ed a te mporar ylong-ter m cust ody agre eme nt, the doctrine of priorit y jurisdi ction de

prived the

superior court

of jurisdictio n over the te rmina

tion proce eding. I d. at 258 . Base d on this de term ination, the Cour t of Appeal s vaca

ted thesuperior court’s order a nddeclin ed to co nsider A lizota ’s appeal on the m erits. This Cou rt grante d the Stanfie lds’ peti tion for c ertiora ri to consider the questi on of whethe r the Cou

rt of Appe als properly app lied the principle of priority jurisdiction inthis case. See Ertter v. Dunb ar , 292 Ga . 103 (734 SE2d 403) (20 12). For th e rea son s that follo w, wefind the C ourt of2

Appeals erred in hold in g the superior court lacke d jurisdic tion over the termination pro ceeding. T he r ecord re flect s that on D ecem ber 3, 201 0, the St anfiel ds filed a petitio n in the sup erior

court to a dopt S. K. , Meli ssa’s 18-m onth-old nie ce who had been in their

care for over a y ear after the G eorgia Departm ent of Family and Childre n Servi ces (DFACS) remov ed her f rom he r mother’s custo dy and initiated depriva

tion procee dings in juve

nile co urt. The

Stanfie lds’ peti tion for adoption sought theinvolunta

ry ter minat ion o f the pa

rental rights of both Alizot a and S. K.’s bio logica l mother. Previous ly, on Janua

ry 22, 201 0, the J

u venile Court of Fayette

County had adjudicated S. K. deprived as to her mother on the ground s of neglect, lack of proper pa

rental careand supe rvision, a

nd dru g use. There after, Alizot a, S. K.’s biologic al fat

her, fi led a pe tition

to legitimate her which the juvenile co urt granted in Marc h 2010. Sub s equentl y, however, bot

h Alizot a and S. K.’s mother consent ed to non-r eunific ation , pro mpting D FACS to move for nonreunific ation

with re linqui shm ent of custod y before the juven ile court. See OCGA§ 15-11-58 ( i). Following a hearing, the juvenilecourt entered an o rder1 This order was subsequently amended on August 18, 2010 to correct S. K.’s birthdate.

3 dated June 14, 2010, nunc pro tunc t o Apri l 1 5, 2010, 1 finding , among other things, that S.K. contin ued to be depr ived and that Aliz ota had agree d to nonreunific ation a

nd to the relinquis hment

of custody

to the St anfiel ds until S. K. reached 18 yea

rs of age . Additi onally , the order instr ucted D FACS to r evie w S. K.’s placement every 36 month s as provid edb y OCG A § 15-11-58 ( i) (2) (A), and required Alizota to pay child support whil e allow ing him supervised visits with S. K. The order also provided Aliz ota the opportunity to obtain unsuperv ised visits upon fur ther order o f the court. Evidence in the r ecord sh ows Aliz ota com pleted parenting cla sses an d, between August 2010 a

ndDece mber 2 010, part

icipat ed in both s upervise d and unsuperv ised visits wi th S. K. while remit ting chil d support to t

he St an fields. Nonethe less, the Stanfiel ds fi led the ir petit ion for ado ption seeking the involunta ry t ermination of his pare ntal rig hts. Ali zota a

nswere d the pe tition challe nging the Sta

nfields’ content

ions that S. K. continued to be de prived as to him an d that termina

tion of his parental rights was in S. K. ’s best interest. He asked that the

petitio n for adopti on be deni ed, an dfiled a counter claim seekin g perma nent custody of S . K. After a lengthy hearin g, the superior co urt2 While the applicable statutory authority gives juvenile courts exclusive original jurisdiction over deprivation actions and exclusive jurisdiction for the termination of parental rights in most case s, superi or court s have co ncurre nt jurisdiction to ter

minate pa rental r ights when the termination is in connection with an adoption proceeding. See Ertter , 292 Ga. at 104- 105; OCGA § 15-11-28 (a) (2) ( C). We note, however, that unde r recent comprehensive revisions to the Juvenile Code effective January 1, 2014, see Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1/HB 242, OCGA § 15-11-28 has been repealed, and the new statute addressing the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, OCGA § 15-11-10 (2) (D), no longer ref ers to the superior court as having concurrent jurisdiction in termination proceedings rela ted to adoption, but provides instead that the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction for the termination of parental rig hts “shall not affec t the supe

rior cou rt’s exclusive

jurisdiction to terminate the legal parent-child relationship as set forth in Chapters 6 through 9 of Title 19.” (Emphasis supplied.) 4 terminated the parental r ights of bot

h biologic al pare

nts and gra

nted the Stanfie lds’ petition for adopti on . Alizota appealed, argui ng that the evid ence was insu fficie nt to support the tria l court’s order. In its dec ision vac atingthe su perior c ourt’s order in this c ase, the Cour t of Appeals correctly ob served that in cases where the termination of parental rights is sought in connection with a peti tion for a doption, su perior c ourts have

concurr ent

jurisdic tion with

juvenile courts ove

r termination p rocee dings. OCGA§ 15-11-28 (a

) (2) ( C). See Alizota , 319 Ga . App. a t 258. 2 We disagree, howeve r, with the

Court of Appeal s’ concl

usion that be cause

the juvenile co urt in this cas e pr eviously

had exercised

jurisdic tion over a depri vation a ction involving Alizot a and S. K. whic h culm inated in the e ntry

o f a cons ent agree ment

awarding temporary

long-term custody to the Stanfie lds pursuant to3 OCG A § 23-1-5 states: Where law a nd equity have concurrent juri sdiction, whichever first takes j urisdi ction s hall r etai n it, unless a good reason sha ll be gi ven for the inter fere nce of e qui ty. 5 OCGA§ 15-11- 58 (i), the d octrine of priorit y jurisdi ction prevented t

he super ior court from exercising juris dict ion over a termination of pare ntal rights procee ding in con

junction with the

Stanfie lds’ adopt

ion petit ion. The doctrine

of priorit y jurisdi ction prov i des that where differen t tribunals have concurrent juri sdiction over a matt er, the

first court to e xercis e jurisdi ction will retain it. Se e OCG

A § 23-1-5; 3 Ertter , 292 Ga . at 104. Invocat ion of the doctrine requires both the e xistenc e of conc urrent sub ject matter

jurisdic tion by different courts , and the

actual exerc ise of jur

isdicti on by one of

the trib unals. Here, although t he juvenil e court was the firs t tribunal t o take personal jurisdic tion

over S. K . for the

depriva tion action , it never took subject matter jurisdic tion over the ter

minat ion of S. K .’s pare

nts’ parental rig

hts bec ause no petitio n for

termination was ever fi led in the juv enile court. See In the Interest of C. M. , 258 G a. App. 387 (5 74 SE2d 433) ( 2002) (holdin g depriva tion procee dings and termination o f parental right s procee dings are separa te and distinct ). Nor was the dep rivation caseturned in

to a te rmina

tion ca se by

entry4 OCGA § 15- 11-58 (i) (1) prov ides: If t he co ur t h as en te re d a n o rd er fi nd in g t ha t r ea so na bl e e ff or ts to re un if

y a child with his or her

family would be d

etriment al to the c hild in ac cordanc e with subsection (h) of this Code section and if the court finds that referr al for termination of parental rights and adoption is not in the best interest of the child, the cour t may , upon pro

per peti tion, ente r a custo dy order wh

ich shall r emain in ef fe ct un ti l t he ch il d’ s e ig ht ee nt h b ir th da y. 6 of the j uvenile co urt’s long-t erm t empora ry cust ody order

under OC GA § 15-11- 58 (i) (1). 4 See OCGA §§ 15-1 1-54 to 1 5-11-58 .1 (setting f orth pro cedures and rules governing d eprivat ion proce edings); OCGA §§ 15-11-93 to 15-1 1-106 (settin g forth proc edures a nd rules go verning te

rmina tion proce edings). The juvenile code treats de

privatio n action s and te rmina tion ac tions sep arate ly, a

nd the fact t hat a j uvenile

court is authorized to deci de in a d eprivat ion proce eding whether a “ referr

al for term ination of pare ntal rig

hts and a doption is no t in the best intere st of the child”as requ ired by OCGA § 15-11-58 (i) ( 1) is not the

same as being autho rized to decide that the actual term ination

of parental rights is or is not in

a chil d’s best

interests. Su ch a referral is not equivalen t to filin g a term ination p etition . See OCGA § 15-11-94. T his Court’s recent decision in Ertter is instruct ive as to the pro per applic ation

of priorit y jurisdi ction

in this case. In th at

case, the juve nile co urt presiding over a d eprivat ion action ent ered a long-term tempor ary custody ord er7

pursuant to OCGA § 15-1 1-58 (i) wh ich named the child’s grandmother as custodian and was to remain in force until the child’s eig hteenth birt hday subject to triennial revi ews by the juven ile cou r t. See Ertter , 292 Ga . at 103. Subsequen tly, the chi ld’s aunt and uncl e petit

ioned t he super ior court

for perma nent custody , whic h was gra

nted. Id . Simi lar to it s reaso ning in this case, the Court of Appeals determ ined on a ppeal t hat throug

h entry o f the long -term tempo rary

custody order, t he juvenile court had taken jurisdict ion of essentially all custody

issues t hroughout the

child’s m inority and thesuperior

court lacked jurisdic tion

to hear a separa

te permanent custody actio n. Id. at 104. This Court reversed, however , holding that

[s]ince the superior cour t a nd the juve

nile co urt did not ha

ve

concurr ent

jurisdictio n over the issue of perm anent

custody of the child, it was error

for the Court of Appeals to rely on the princ iple of priority jurisdiction to hold that the superior court co uld not

exerc ise jurisdic tion of the Ertter s’ petition for per

mane ntcustody of the c hild.5 OCGA § 19- 8-2 (a)provides : The superior courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption, except suc

h jurisdiction as may

be gra nted to the

juvenile courts. 8 Id. at 105. Add itionally, t his Court o bserved, [t]hejuvenile

court’s a uthori ty to place a child in the custody of a “willing” and “qual ified”

relative is not

aut hor ity to a

ward perma nent custody o f the ch ild, as the la tter is determ

ined by discer ning the best interests of the c hildand not the willingn ess or the qualifi cation s of a pe rson to ta ke tem porary c ustody of t

he chil d.

Id. Here, unlike in Ertter , the ju venilecourt pot ential ly had c oncurre nt jurisdic tion

with respec t to the i ssue of te rmina tion of pa rental rights. I d. at 104- 105. However, it is undisputed that a petitio n for term

ination of parental rights had never been filed in the juvenile court in thi s case. Compare In the Int erest of J. C. W. , 315 Ga. App. 5 66, 572 (727 S E2d 127) (201 2). More over, th e Stanfie lds were n ot parti es to the depriva tion proce edings in the juve nile co urt and were required

to file their a doption pe tition in the superio r court. See OCGA § 19-8-2 (a)

. 59

As we find

that the issue o f termination of Alizota’s parent al rights was raised for the firs ttime in conjunction with the Stanfields’ adoption petition, we hold the doc trine of priority jurisdic tion did not

deprive the su perior c our t of jurisdic tion

over the terminat

ion proceeding in this case. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgme nt of the C ourt of Appeal s and re mand t

his cas e to tha

t court for consid eration of Ali zota’s appeal on t he merits. Judgme nt reve rsed and

caserema

nded. A ll the Ju stice s concur .

Decid ed March 17, 2014. Certio rari to t

he Court of Appeals of Ge orgia – 319 Ga. A pp. 256. James B. Outman , for app ellant s. Justin B. Grubbs , for appellee. Hester& Hester, Justin Y. Heste r, Sherriann H. Hick s, Julie A. Wilkes Wisotsky, Kazmarek, Geiger & Laseter , Richard A. Horder , amici curiae.