*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 4, 2007*

Decided April 11, 2007

Before

 Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-4147 

ANDREA HEATH, STEVEN

HEATH, and LAST CALL FOR

GOD’S LOVE MINISTRY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF HARVEY, BRENDA

THOMPSON, and NICHOLAS

GRAVES,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 03 C 1097

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Appellants, all of whom own property in Harvey, Illinois, sued the City and

two of its former officials, Brenda Thompson and Nicholas Graves, alleging that

they conspired to deprive the appellants of their property and retaliated against

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 05-4147 Page 2

them for publicly opposing the City. They now contest a series of interlocutory

rulings culminating in an entry of judgment against them. We affirm.

After two and a half years of delays, nonappearances, and lack of prosecution,

this lawsuit picked up its pace in July 2005, when the City moved to disqualify

appellants’ newest attorney because he had previously worked for the City. 

Appellants quickly denied any conflict of interest, but the district court did not

immediately rule. A month later the City, Thompson, and Graves filed motions for

summary judgment. On the eve of the deadline for their response, appellants

requested more time, arguing that the motions were too long and complex for them

to timely respond. They reminded the court that the motion to disqualify counsel

was still pending, and said that, as a result of that motion and the complexity of the

issues, they had retained additional attorneys who would need another forty days to

familiarize themselves with the case. 

In one fell swoop, the district court denied the City’s motion to disqualify

appellants’ counsel, denied appellants’ motion for an extension of time, and granted

summary judgment in favor of the City, Thompson, and Graves. In denying the

appellants’ motion for extra time, the judge explained that he was unsympathetic to

their last-minute request because for more than three months they had been aware

of the deadline, which he had made clear was firm. He also said that the issues at

summary judgment were not so complex as to require additional attorneys, nor to

prolong the already protracted litigation.

Appellants sought reconsideration of the court’s rulings, arguing for the first

time that they were unable to respond to the summary judgment motions because

their attorney was unsure whether he would be disqualified, and that the district

court should have sua sponte stayed the proceedings while the motion to disqualify

was pending. Appellants also informed the court that they had not been able to

complete discovery because the City had failed to produce witnesses for depositions

scheduled in late July.

 After construing the appellants’ motion as one under Rule 59(e), the district

court rejected the appellants’ post hoc justifications, finding that their failure to

timely respond was their own fault and “part of a pattern of a lack of diligence and

delays.” Concluding that appellants had not presented any newly discovered

evidence nor a manifest error of law or fact, see County of McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the

West, 438 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 2006), the court denied the motion. The court also

explained that if the appellants needed more time for discovery, they should have

filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit explaining why. See Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d

701, 706 (7th Cir. 2006). 
No. 05-4147 Page 3

Appellants now assert that the district court erred by not ordering a stay

while the motion to disqualify was pending. But they waived this argument both by

failing to cite to any legal authority, see Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 866 n.3

(7th Cir. 2005), and by failing to present the argument to the district court until

they filed their Rule 59(e) motion, see Estremera v. United States, 442 F.3d 580, 587

(7th Cir. 2006). Anyway, if they wanted a stay, it was their responsibility to file a

motion and explain why. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997).

Appellants also assert that they were denied due process by the City’s failure

to produce witnesses for scheduled depositions, and that the district court erred by

not granting Rule 59(e) relief based on the missed depositions. But appellants

suffered no constitutional deprivation; they could have filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit to

extend the time for discovery, see Deere & Co., 462 F.3d at 706; see Woods v. City of

Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 990-91 (7th Cir. 2000), or a Rule 37(a) motion to compel the

depositions, see In re Thomas Consol. Indus., Inc., 456 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2006). 

As the district court noted, the failure to do so was their error alone.

Finally, appellants argue that, in not ruling swiftly on the motion to

disqualify counsel, the district court deprived them of their constitutional rights to

due process and effective assistance of counsel. But appellants waived this

argument both because they cite no relevant legal authority, see Blise, 409 F.3d at

866 n.3, and because they never argued it before the district court, see Republic

Tobacco Co., v. N. Atlantic Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 728 (7th Cir. 2004). 

AFFIRMED.