IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-0056

Filed September 12, 2018

DOLGORSUREN SCHMIDT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

JAMES QUINN,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mary E. Howes, 

Judge.

Mother appeals from an order denying her petition to modify the physical 

care provisions of the parties’ decree of dissolution of marriage. AFFIRMED.

Robert S. Gallagher and Peter G. Gierut of Gallagher, Millage & Gallagher, 

P.L.C., Bettendorf, for appellant.

James J. Quinn, Davenport, pro se appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

Dolgorsuren Schmidt (a/k/a Julia) appeals from an order denying her 

petition to modify the decree dissolving her marriage to James (Joe) Quinn. At 

issue in this appeal are the physical care provisions of the decree. 

This court’s review is de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage 

of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015) (noting modification actions lie in 

equity). Prior cases have little precedential value; this court applies the relevant 

law to the unique facts and circumstances of each case. See In re Marriage of 

Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Snowden, No. 14-1920, 

2015 WL 4233449, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 9, 2015). Although review is de novo, 

appellate courts “afford deference to the district court for institutional and pragmatic 

reasons.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017); see In re 

P.C., No. 16-0893, 2016 WL 4379580, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2016) (“There 

are other, less questionable reasons to exercise ‘de novo review with deference,’

including: notions of judicial comity and respect; recognition of the appellate court’s 

limited function of maintaining the uniformity of legal doctrine; recognition of the 

district court’s more intimate knowledge of and familiarity with the parties, the 

lawyers, and the facts of a case; and recognition there are often undercurrents in 

a case—not of record and available for appellate review—the district court does 

and should take into account when making a decision.”).

The record reflects the parties married in 2006 and divorced by way of 

stipulated decree in 2013. The parties have two children. During the course of the 

parties’ marriage, Joe adopted Julia’s son, C.Q., now eighteen years of age and 
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entering his senior year of high school. The parties also have a younger son, M.Q., 

now eleven years of age. Pursuant to the stipulated decree, the parties were 

granted joint legal custody of both children, Julia was awarded physical care of 

C.Q., Joe was awarded physical care of M.Q., and each parent was granted 

visitation with the other child. Shortly after the entry of the decree, the parties 

modified the decree to expand summer visitation for the parents and to better 

accommodate Julia’s observance of White Month, a Mongolian holiday. In 2016,

Julia filed the instant petition to modify the decree, seeking physical care of both 

children and child support. The district court denied the petition, concluding Julia 

failed to prove a material change in circumstances not in contemplation of the 

decretal court. Julia timely filed this appeal. 

“The general principles guiding our adjudication of petitions for modification 

of dissolution decrees are well-established.” In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 

N.W.2d at 32.

To change a custodial provision of a dissolution decree, the applying 

party must establish by a preponderance of evidence that conditions 

since the decree was entered have so materially and substantially 

changed that the children’s best interests make it expedient to make 

the requested change. The changed circumstances must not have 

been contemplated by the court when the decree was entered, and 

they must be more or less permanent, not temporary. They must 

relate to the welfare of the children. A parent seeking to take custody 

from the other must prove an ability to minister more effectively to 

the children’s well being.

In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). “The burden on the 

party seeking modification is a heavy one.” In re Marriage of Morrison, No. 16-

0886, 2017 WL 936152, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017). Courts are chary to 

disturb the physical care provisions of a decree because “once custody of children 
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has been fixed it should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.” Hoffman, 

867 N.W.2d at 32. Ultimately, when reaching a conclusion, “[t]he children’s best 

interest is the controlling consideration.” Id.; accord Marriage of Winter, 223 

N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974) (listing factors to consider when reaching a bestinterest determination).

Julia contends the animosity between the parties warrants modification of 

the physical-care provisions of the decree. It is not disputed the parties have a 

contentious relationship. It also does not seem disputed the parties’ contentious 

relationship negatively impacts the children. However, the contentious nature of 

the relationship does not support modification here. First, “[t]he parties’

contentious relationship is merely a continuation of what came before.” Morrison, 

2017 WL 936152, at *3. There has been no change in circumstances since the 

entry of the decree. See Albertus v. Albertus, 160 N.W. 830, 831 (Iowa 1917) (“It 

would be a sufficient change of circumstances within the reasoning of those cases 

if this alleged animosity or other unfitness were not in existence when the original 

decree was entered.”). Second, while the parties’ relationship is contentious, we 

cannot say the hostility between the parents rises to the level requiring judicial 

intervention. Finally, much of the contentiousness between the parties is initiated 

by Julia. This is evidenced in her own video exhibits, which show her creating 

contentious situations with Joe regarding the children and then recording the 

exchanges for evidentiary purposes. Julia cannot leverage her instigation of 

conflict into a legal reason to support modification of the decree. The level of 

conflict in this case does not warrant a change in physical care of the child, but 
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both parents must mature and find a way to interact in a non-confrontational 

manner for the benefit of their children. See In re Marriage of Fortelka, 425 N.W.2d 

671, 672 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“Parents must put away their personal animosities 

toward each other and work together to meet the children’s needs.”).

Julia also contends modification is warranted because Joe’s care of the 

children negatively affects their physical health. Specifically, she notes Joe 

smokes in the home. She also notes Joe’s home has mold in the basement. Both 

of these facts, she contends, contribute to M.Q.’s alleged respiratory ailments. The 

evidence relevant to this issue does not support modification. The district court 

made several credibility findings regarding this issue to which we defer. The 

district court credited Joe’s denial that he smoked in the home and that he smoked 

around M.Q. There was no evidence of the existence of mold in Joe’s house other 

than Julia’s assertion. Finally, there was no credible evidence M.Q.’s respiratory 

health was affected by smoke or mold. Because the evidence does not support 

Julia’s concerns, these concerns do not serve as a basis for modification of the 

decree.

There is evidence in the record showing both parents fail to provide or fail 

to timely provide each other with information regarding the children, including 

educational and medical information. The parties’ mutual failures to communicate 

with each other regarding the children’s educational and medical information, 

among other things, is contrary to their duties as joint legal custodians. See Iowa 

Code § 598.1(3) (2013) (providing when parents are awarded joint legal custody, 

both parents have “legal custodial rights and responsibilities toward the child” and 
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“neither parent has legal custodial rights superior to those of the other parent”). 

The parents’ failures do not support modification. Both parents are at fault, and 

changing physical care of M.Q. from Joe to Julia does not resolve the 

communication failure. Again, both parents will have to improve in communicating 

relevant information to the other regarding both children. 

Even assuming Julia had established a material and substantial change in 

circumstances, she has not established the ability to provide superior care. To 

justify modification, Julia must show she can provide superior care to the child at 

issue. See In re Marriage of Whalen, 569 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). 

As noted above, Julia causes much of the tension between her and Joe. She does 

not share or does not timely share relevant information. She is not supportive, or 

only minimally supportive, of Joe’s relationships with the children. Joe has a strong 

bond with M.Q. Joe has coached M.Q.’s sports teams. Joe has been M.Q.’s scout 

master in cub scouts. M.Q. expressed to his therapist his desire to reside with Joe. 

All things considered, the children are doing well in the current care arrangement. 

There is nothing in the record supporting the conclusion Julia can provide superior 

care to the children. See In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 2000) (finding the father failed to prove he could provide superior care 

because, “[a]t most, the record shows [the father] and [the mother] are both fallible 

human beings who can provide the same level of care for their children”).

On de novo review, we have considered each of the parties’ arguments, 

whether or not explicitly referenced in this opinion. “[T]he district court has 

reasonable discretion in determining whether modification [of physical care] is 
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warranted and that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a 

failure to do equity.” In re Marriage of McKenzie, 709 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 2006)

(quoting In re Marriage of Walters, 575 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1998)). We find no 

reason to disturb the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.