SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5182-15T1

RON and ESTHER KRUKOWSKI,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

GRACE S. WONG,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________________

Submitted September 19, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Special Civil Part, Monmouth 

County, Docket No. SC-1382-16.

Grace S. Wong, appellant pro se.

Respondents have not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Grace S. Wong appeals from a judgment entered by 

the Law Division on June 16, 2016, awarding plaintiffs Ron and 

Esther Krukowski $3900, plus court costs in the amount of $42. We 

affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

September 28, 2017
2 A-5182-15T1

This appeal arises from the following facts. Plaintiffs 

entered into a lease for certain premises on Avalon Lane in 

Manalapan for a term beginning on April 6, 2015, and ending on

July 5, 2015, at a monthly rent of $3900. The lease identified 

Trinity Referral Company, LLC (Trinity) as the landlord and "Esther 

Krukowski and family" as tenants. Among other things, the lease 

stated that the tenant must pay a security deposit in the amount 

of $3900. 

The lease also stated that the landlord must deposit the 

security deposit in an interest-bearing or money market account 

within thirty days after its receipt. The section of the lease 

pertaining to the security deposit stated in pertinent part that:

The Landlord shall inspect the Property 

after the Tenant vacates at the end of the

Term. Within 30 days of the termination of 

this Lease, the Landlord shall return the 

Security Deposit plus the undistributed 

interest to the Tenant, less any charges 

expended by the Landlord for damages to the 

Property resulting from the Tenant's 

occupancy. The interest and deductions shall 

be itemized in a statement by the Landlord, 

and shall be forwarded to the Tenant with the 

balance of the Security Deposit by personal 

delivery, registered or certified mail. 

If the Landlord sells or transfers the 

Property during the Term of this Lease, the 

Landlord will transfer the Security Deposit 

plus the undistributed interest to the new 

owner. Landlord shall notify the Tenant of the 

sale and transfer, as well as the name and 

address of the new owner. The notice shall be 
3 A-5182-15T1

given by registered or certified mail within 

five days after conveyance of title. After 

acquisition of the Property, the new owner 

shall have all responsibility regarding the 

Security Deposit, and the Landlord shall have 

no further responsibility.

In May 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant 

in the Small Claims Division of the Special Civil Part, seeking 

damages in the amount of $4550. Plaintiffs alleged defendant had 

wrongfully withheld their $3900 security deposit. They also

alleged that defendant had forced them to vacate the premises 

before the end of the lease term. They sought $645, which 

represented a pro-rata portion of the rent they had paid for the 

month ending on October 5, 2015.

On June 16, 2016, the judge conducted a trial in the matter, 

sitting without a jury. At the trial, Ms. Krukowski testified that 

a fire damaged plaintiffs' home. She said that after the fire, the 

family moved to a hotel but they required temporary housing until 

the home was rebuilt. Plaintiffs leased the residence on Avalon 

Lane in Manalapan, at the suggestion of their insurer, State Farm,

and its agent, Churchill Corporate Services (Churchill). 

The initial lease term was for three months, from April 6, 

2015, to July 5, 2015, after which plaintiffs could remain in the 

house on a month-to-month basis. Mr. Krukowski stated that

plaintiffs and their children moved into the house on April 6, 
4 A-5182-15T1

2015, and they later extended the term of the lease to October 5, 

2015. Ms. Krukowski said plaintiffs were informed the property had 

been sold and the closing would take place sometime in October

2015. She stated that defendant offered to allow plaintiffs to 

remain in the house until November 5, 2015, but plaintiffs agreed 

to vacate the premises by October 5, 2015. 

Mr. Krukowski further testified that in September 2015, 

plaintiffs began to receive e-mails stating that contractors would 

be coming to the house to fix certain tiles. The contractors 

performed the work on September 27, 2015. According to Mr. 

Krukowski, on September 29, 2015, plaintiffs received a textmessage stating that they had to vacate the premises by the 

following day. Mr. Krukowski said the notice was a surprise. He 

further testified that on September 30, 2015, plaintiffs received 

numerous text-messages informing them they had to get out of the 

house as soon as possible. 

Plaintiffs vacated the premises on September 30, 2015, and 

expected that their security deposit would be returned to them 

within thirty days. However, plaintiffs received a letter from 

defendant's attorney, which stated that defendant had no 

obligation to return the security deposit. He said the property 

had been sold and plaintiffs should seek the monies from the new 

owner. 
5 A-5182-15T1

Counsel also stated that plaintiffs were not entitled to the 

return of any monies because the cost of repairing the damage 

plaintiffs caused to the property exceeded the amount of the 

security deposit. In his letter, defendant's attorney referenced 

an "extensive number of broken tiles" in the kitchen and bathrooms, 

the condition of the carpets, and the debris left behind when 

plaintiffs vacated the premises. Mr. Krukowski testified that he 

did not understand how his family could have damaged the tiles.

Ms. Krukowski stated that plaintiffs were aware when they 

signed the lease that the property was in foreclosure. They 

understood they would have to move out at some time. She explained 

that State Farm gave money for the rent to Churchill, and Churchill

tendered the rental payments to defendant. 

Ms. Krukowski acknowledged that the lease identified Trinity 

as the landlord, but said all of her dealings with regard to the 

property were with defendant. She said she was defendant's tenant. 

Ms. Krukowski also stated that when she had the garbage disposal

fixed, she called defendant "as the owner" to ask her if she would 

contribute toward the cost. 

Ms. Krukowski stated that when defendant had to show the 

house to prospective buyers, defendant communicated with her by 

text message. Defendant was not acting as an agent. Ms. Krukowski

also said that defendant was identified as the owner of the house
6 A-5182-15T1

on the water bill. In addition, Ms. Krukowski's research identified 

defendant as the owner of 391 Franklin Turnpike. 

Ms. Krukowski further testified that she did not believe the 

new owner was responsible for return of the security deposit 

because plaintiffs had moved out before the closing and they did 

not rent the premises from the new owner. Ms. Krukowski stated 

that plaintiffs vacated the house at around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. and

thereafter, none of their possessions remained in the house.

Defendant's attorney then moved pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b) 

for involuntary dismissal of the complaint. Counsel asserted that 

defendant was not the owner of the property and she was not the 

company that leased the property to plaintiffs. Counsel stated

that defendant did not hold the security deposit and the lease 

provided that upon the sale of the property, the security deposit 

would be turned over to the new owner. He also stated that the 

security deposit was actually Churchill's money and Churchill was 

the real party in interest. The judge denied the motion.

Defendant then testified that 391 Franklin Turnpike was the 

owner of the house. Defendant and her husband are the owners of 

391 Franklin Turnpike. She said that Trinity is the management 

company that "handles" 391 Franklin Turnpike. Defendant stated 

that she is not an owner of Trinity, and she is "the only contact 

person" for 391 Franklin Turnpike.
7 A-5182-15T1

Defendant claimed that Trinity received plaintiffs' security 

deposit, which was in the form of a check payable to Trinity. 

Defendant stated that she did not take the money and put it in her 

name. She said, it was "always Trinity." She claimed the money was 

deposited for Trinity by "one of the persons who goes to the bank" 

on Trinity's behalf. She admitted, however, that sometimes she is 

one of the persons who handles the banking for Trinity. 

Defendant also testified that before plaintiffs moved into 

the house, it "was in perfect condition," and claimed there were 

no broken tiles in the home when plaintiffs moved in. She explained 

that plaintiffs had agreed different selling agents could show the 

house to prospective purchasers. Defendant claimed she was told 

the house was a "mess." 

In addition, defendant stated that plaintiffs had damaged the 

house "tremendously." She said she had an estimate that it would 

cost $12,000 to repair the damaged tiles in the house. The carpet 

also had been damaged "badly." Defendant told plaintiffs that 

because of the damage they caused, the security deposit would not 

be returned to them.

The judge then placed his decision on the record. He found 

that plaintiffs' testimony established that defendant was the 

landlord because she was the person primarily responsible for the 

property. The judge did not find defendant's testimony to be 
8 A-5182-15T1

credible. The judge also did not accept defendant's assertion that 

plaintiffs were responsible for the damage to the property. The 

judge found that the damage resulted from its prior use as a rental 

property. 

The judge determined that defendant was the landlord of the 

leased premises and she was legally responsible for return of 

plaintiffs' security deposit. The judge did not double the amount 

of the deposit that had been wrongfully withheld, as permitted by 

N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1, because the judge believed defendant had 

attempted to comply with the security deposit law. 

The judge also rejected plaintiffs' claim for the return of 

the rent plaintiffs paid for the period from September 30, 2015,

when they vacated the premises, to October 5, 2015, the end of the 

lease term. The judge awarded plaintiffs damages of $3900 for the 

return of the security deposit, and court costs of $42. Thereafter, 

the judge entered a final judgment for plaintiffs in accordance 

with his findings. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by 

finding she is responsible for the return of the security deposit 

because she is not the landlord of the property; and (2) the new 

owner of the property is legally obligated to return the security 

deposit to plaintiffs. 
9 A-5182-15T1

Appellate review of a final determination of a trial judge 

sitting in a non-jury case is limited. Seidman v. Clifton Sav. 

Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). We will not disturb the 

judge's findings of fact and legal conclusions unless "they are 

so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, 

relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the 

interests of justice[.]" In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated 

Dec. 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008) (quoting 

Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 

484 (1974)). Deference to the trial court's findings "is especially 

appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves 

questions of credibility." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 

(1998) (citing In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 

117 (1997)). 

The Security Deposit Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8-19 to -26, provides 

in pertinent part that within thirty days after the termination 

of a tenant's lease, the owner or lessee of the premises shall 

return to the tenant the security deposit, plus any interest or 

earnings accumulated thereon, less any charges expended in 

accordance with a contract, lease, or agreement. N.J.S.A. 46:8-

21.1. 

As noted, defendant argues that Trinity was the landlord of 

the premises leased to plaintiffs. She asserts that she never 
10 A-5182-15T1

claimed to be the person who owns, or who purports to own, or 

exercise control of the premises. There is, however, sufficient 

credible evidence in the record to support the trial judge's 

factual finding that defendant was the landlord of the property 

leased to plaintiffs. 

In his decision, the judge noted that defendant had conceded

she and her husband owned the property through 391 Franklin

Turnpike. The lease identifies Trinity as the landlord. Although 

defendant testified that she had nothing to do with Trinity, the 

judge found defendant's testimony entirely lacking in credibility. 

The judge noted that the evidence showed that defendant 

received plaintiffs' security deposit and she was the person in 

charge of dealing with those monies. The monies also had been 

deposited in Trinity's bank account, and defendant conceded she 

is one of the persons who handles the banking for Trinity. We 

conclude that the record supports the judge's finding that 

defendant was legally obligated under N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1 to return 

the security deposit to plaintiffs upon the end of the tenancy.

The record also supports the judge's finding that defendant 

failed to establish any credible basis for a reduction in the 

security deposit as a result of the alleged damage caused by 

plaintiffs. The judge noted that when the home was sold, the home 

inspection report indicated that certain repairs were required. 
11 A-5182-15T1

The judge found, however, that plaintiffs had credibly testified 

that they did not cause the damage that defendant attributed to 

them. The judge pointed out that plaintiffs had only been in the 

home for a short period of time, and before plaintiffs moved in,

the home had been rented to other persons.

Defendant further argues that she is not legally required to 

return the security deposit to plaintiffs. She argues that this 

obligation falls upon the new owner of the property. N.J.S.A.

46:8-20 provides in pertinent part that an owner or lessee of 

property leased who has received a security deposit from a tenant, 

shall, upon conveying the property or assigning it to another in 

a mortgage foreclosure action, turn over the deposit to the 

grantee, assignee, or purchaser at the foreclosure sale at the 

time of the delivery of the deed or assignment or within five days 

thereafter. 

The statute further provides that notwithstanding any other 

law to the contrary, it shall then be the "duty and obligation of 

the grantee, assignee or purchaser to obtain from the grantor who 

is the owner or lessee at the time of the transfer, conveyance or 

purchase any and all security deposits, plus accrued interest on 

the deposits, that the owner or lessee received from a tenant[.]"

Ibid. In addition, N.J.S.A. 46:8-21 provides:
12 A-5182-15T1

Any owner or lessee turning over to his or its 

grantee, assignee, or to a purchaser of the 

leased premises at a foreclosure sale the 

amount of such security deposit, plus the 

tenant's portion of the interest or earnings 

accumulated thereon, is hereby relieved of and 

from liability to the tenant or licensee for 

the repayment thereof. Whether or not the 

deposit plus accumulated interest are so 

transferred, the grantee, assignee or

purchaser of the leased premises is 

nevertheless responsible for . . . return of 

the security deposit, plus any accumulated 

earnings or interest thereon, to the tenant 

or licensee, in accordance with the terms of 

the contract, lease, or agreement unless he 

or it shall thereafter and before the 

expiration of the term of the tenant’s lease

or licensee's agreement, transfer such 

security deposit to another . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.] 

Here, the evidence shows that the property in question was 

in foreclosure and it was sold to a third-party. As plaintiffs 

explained, they had extended their lease until October 5, 2015, 

but on September 29, 2015, defendant demanded that they vacate the 

premises the following day. Mr. Krukowski testified that 

plaintiffs vacated the premises on September 30, 2015, and all of 

their personal belongings were removed on that day, which was the 

date of the closing. 

Defendant conceded that she did not transfer plaintiffs' 

security deposit to the new owner. Rather, she claimed that the

purchasers used the security deposit in negotiations to lower the 
13 A-5182-15T1

overall purchase price of the property. The judge found defendant's 

testimony to be entirely lacking in credibility. Moreover, 

defendant provided no documentation to show that the deposit had 

been transferred to the new owner by means of a reduction of the 

purchase price. 

Furthermore, there is no evidence that defendant closed on 

the sale of the property before plaintiffs vacated the property

on September 30, 2015. Ms. Krukowski testified that plaintiffs

vacated the property prior to the closing and transfer of title. 

She also testified that plaintiffs did not have a landlord-tenant 

relationship with the new owner. 

We conclude that there is sufficient credible evidence in the 

record to support the judge's determination that defendant was the 

party obligated by N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1 to return the security 

deposit to plaintiffs.

Affirmed.