NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRENCE WHITCOMB, an individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JANA MOSER, an individual; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-55723 

D.C. No. 

3:23-cv-00019-L-KSC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2024**

Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and DESAI, Circuit Judges, and SCHREIER,*** District 

Judge.

Terrence Whitcomb appeals the district court’s dismissal of his defamation 

suit against federal employee Jana Moser. We review the district court’s dismissal 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the 

District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 18 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, Leuthauser v. United States, 71 

F.4th 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2023), and its determinations as to jurisdictional 

discovery and evidentiary hearings for abuse of discretion, Yamashita v. LG Chem, 

Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 507 (9th Cir. 2023); McLachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908, 910 (9th 

Cir. 2001). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

1. The district court did not err in affirming the Government’s scope of 

employment certification. Applying California law, see Saleh v. Bush, 848 F.3d 

880, 889 (9th Cir. 2017), the allegedly defamatory statements here were within the 

scope of Moser’s employment, because she made them during an interview as part 

of a workplace investigation into sexual harassment, see Fowler v. Howell, 50 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 484, 487 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[A]n employee who has been encouraged to 

complain and provided a procedure to complain of sexual harassment by a 

coworker acts within ‘the scope of [her] employment’ by making such complaint.”

(quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2)). 

Even accepting that Whitcomb’s claims are based solely on statements that 

Moser made to coworkers other than the interviewer, which is not supported by the 

Complaint, those statements were also broadly incidental to her employment under 

California respondeat superior doctrine. See McLachlan, 261 F.3d at 912

(applying California law and holding that even “willful and malicious defamation” 

in the workplace may be within the scope of employment); Jacobus v. Krambo 
3 

Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 431 (Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he risk that one worker may 

accuse another of sexual harassment to deflect an adverse performance review is a 

risk inherent in employment, analogous to the risk . . . that one worker may assault 

another in a job-related dispute.”). 

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow 

discovery or conduct additional proceedings. See Arthur v. United States, 45 F.3d 

292, 296 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that in reviewing certification under the Westfall 

Act, a district court “should hold such hearings as appropriate”). To warrant an 

evidentiary hearing, the complaint itself must sufficiently allege that the defendant 

acted outside the scope of employment. See Saleh, 848 F.3d at 892; U-Haul Int’l, 

Inc. v. Est. of Albright, 626 F.3d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Here, the 

district court properly construed the allegations in the complaint as true and based 

its conclusion solely on Whitcomb’s allegations. Whitcomb has not identified, 

either before the district court or on appeal, any disputes of fact that need to be 

resolved to address whether Moser was acting within the scope of her employment. 

See Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 507 (explaining that jurisdictional discovery is 

unwarranted when there are no controverted, pertinent facts bearing on 

jurisdiction).1 

1 Moser does not challenge the district court’s denial of leave to amend on 

appeal. See Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 72 F.4th 1103, 1106 n.5 (9th Cir. 2023) 
4 

AFFIRMED. 

(“[Plaintiffs] do not argue ‘specifically and distinctly’ that the district court abused 

its discretion by denying leave to amend, so we do not review that issue.” (quoting 

Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994))).