_AD-Al66 033 

DNA-TR-84-6 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR NAVAL 

PERSONNEL AT OPERATION CASTLE 

Science Appkatiom International Corporation 

P. O.&ox, 1303 

McLean, VA 22102-1303 

-

28 February 1984 

Technical Report 

CONTRACT No. DNA 001-83-C-0039 

THIS WORK WAS SPONSORED BY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

UNDER RDTLE RMSS CODE 8350033466 U99AMXMKODDDl H259OD. 

Preparedfor 

Director 

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Washing&n, DC AME-1000 @&3/ 

Qlb

mC FILE COPY Qb 

86 3 4 . I 05* .’ i _ * . _ . . . . . ._._._..*.- . . . .: : _- .-\ 

i 
l5 -

? Director 

g Defense Nuclear Agency * ATTN: SlTl 

Washington, DC 20305-1000 

iiDirector 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

AI-TN: Sill 

Washington, DC 20305-1000 
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an_3,t_La>? 

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PROGRAM PROlECT TASK WORK UN11 

ELEMENT NO. NO. No. ACCESSION NO. 

6271SH USSjjMXM K OH006481 

11 TITLE Ihdtd Security Chdfk~thJ 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR NAVAL PERSONNEL AT OPERATION CASTLE 

12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) 

Thomas, C., Goetz. J., Klemm, J., Weitz., R. 

13r TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 

Technical Report FROM 830101 TO 840131 

16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under RDThE RMSS Code 

BjS0083466 U991L”MMKOOOO1H2590D. 

17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on tewrse if n+ceswry and ianti@ by Mock mm&r) _ 

F$iD GROUP SUB-GROUP Operation CASTLE 

/6 18 Radiation Exposure Assessment 

,‘6 21 _ Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) i 39 ABSTRACT (Continur on rrwru it n~ccss~y end idmttfy &y block numkr) 

- tilm badge doses are reconstructed for sixteen ships and the residence islands of Encwctnk 

nd Kwajalein Atolls resulting from the six nuclear detonations comprising Operation CAST1.E 

fi (March-Nay 1954). Fallout from Shots BRAVO and ROMEO was the major source of contamination 

on most of the ships and islands. Varying amounts of fallout from Shots UNION, YANKEE, :~rld 

NECTAR contributed somewhat to the total doses of the shipboard and island-based personnel; 

no fallout was experienced as a result of Shot KOON. Shipboard personnel received ndditional exposure from hulls and salt water piping systems that had become contaminated from 

operating in the radioactive waters of Bikini Lagoon. 

From the reconstructed radiation environments, both topside and below, an equivalent film 

badge dose is calculated and compared to actual dosimetry data. ARrcBemcnt is very good 

during badged periods when the ships received significant fallout. When topside intens i t ic! 

20 DISTRIWTION I AVAILABILITY Ci AMfRAn 21. AOSflUCT SECURITY CUSSIFICATION 

0 uNCLASSIFIEWUNLIMITED a SAME AS RPT. 0 OllC USERS UNCLASSIFIED 

NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 

202/32S-7042 

Y

)D FORM 1473,M MAR 83 *PR odltlon mry k uti untilrxhwstod. SECURITY CLASS IPKATION Of THIS PAGF 

All other Jdd,tlonr JIO obsolete. UNCLASSI FI ED 

i 
18. SUBJECT mmls (Continued) 

Joint Task Force Seven 

Task Group 7.3 

ceanic Nuclear Test5 

the operation when intensity levels were low, 

agreement is not as good. amlnatlon doses of significance are 

osimetry data. 

1 range from a low of 0.19 rem for 

em for the crew of the USS PHILIP. 

tak and Kwajalein Atolls are 1.09 rem 

UNCLASSIFIED 

ii 3ECURITY CLASSIFICATION Of T"IS PAGr 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Set tion Page 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 3 

LIST OF TABLES 5 

INTRODUCTION 7 

I.1 BACKGROUND 7 

1.2 NAVAL PARTICIPATION 8 

1.3 METHODOLOGY 8 

SHIP OPERATIONS AND RADIATION ENVIRONMENTS 16 

2.1 SHIP OPERATIONS 16 

2.1.1 Shot BRAVO 17 

2.1.2 Shot ROMEO 20 

2.1.3 Shot KOON 22 

2.1.4 Shot UNION 23 

2.1.5 Shot YANKEE 24 

2.1.6 Shot NECTAR 25 

2.2 RADIATION ENVIRONMENTS 26 

2.2.1 Enewetak Atoll 34 

2.2.2 Kwajalein Atoll 40 

2.2.3 USS APACHE (ATF-67) 46 

2.2.4 USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) 51 

2.2.5 USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-Z) 57 

2.2.6 USS CURTISS (AV-4) 62 

2.2.7 USS EPPERSON (DDE-7 19) 67 

2.2.8 USS ESTES (ACC-12) 71 

2.2.9 USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH (TAP-181) 76 

2.2.10 uss GYPSY (ARSD-1) 81 

2.2. I 1 USS LST-55 I 85 

2.2.12 USS LST-762 81 

2.2.13 USS LST-825 92 

2.2.14 USS LST-975 92 

2.2.15 USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449) 96 

2.2.16 USS PHILIP (DDE-498) 101 

2.2.17 USS RENSHAW (DDE-499) DTtC TAB 106 

2.2.18 USS SIOUX (ATF-75) U.rllrm.md 110 

Judificatkm .____. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Kowbdcd) -

Section PaKe 

3 DOSE CALCULATIONS 117

3.1 PERSONNEL ACTlVITlES 117 

3.2 CALCULATED PERSONNEL FlLM BADGE DOSES 118 

3.2.1 Enewetak Atoll Dose Calculations 119 

3.2.2 Kwajalein Atoll Dose Calculations 120 

3.2.3 USS APACHE Dose Calculations 121 

3.2.4 USS BAIROKO Dose Calculations 124 

3.2.5 USS BELLE GROVE Dose ialculations 126 

3.2.6 USS CURTISS Dose Calculations 128 

3.2.7 USS EPPERSON Dose Calculations 130 

3.2.8 USS ESTES Dose Calculations 131 

3.2.9 USNS FRED C. AlNSWORTH Dose Calculations 133 

3.2.10 USS CY PSY Dose Calculations 135 

3.2.11 USS LST-551 Dose Calculations 137 

3.2.12 USS LST-762 Dose Calculations 137 

3.2.13 USS LST-825 Dose Calculations 137 

3.2.14 USS LST-975 Dose Calculations 141 

3.2.15 USS NICHOLAS Dose Calculations 143 

3.2.16 USS PHILIP Dose Calculations 145 

3.2.17 USS RENSHAW Dose Calculations 147 

3.2.18 USS SIOUX Dose Calculations 14s 

4 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 150 

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5 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 156 

6 CONCLUSIONS AND TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY 163 

7 LIST OF REFERENCES 165 

1 
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure Page 

l-l Northern ,varshall Islands 9 

1-2 Bikini Atoll, Operation CASTLE shot locations 10 

1-3 Enewetak Atoll, Operation CASTLE shot location II 

l-4 Operation CASTLE dose reconstruction methodology 14 

2- 1 Locations of various TC 7.3 ships at the time of Shot BRAVO 18 

2-2 Average intensity below deck on the USS CURTISS due to ship 

contamination 33 

2-3 Parry and Enewetak Island intensity following Shot BRAVO 35 

2-4 Parry and Enewetak Island intensity following Shot ROMEO 36 

2-5 Parry and Enewetak Island intensity following Shot NECTAR 38 

2-6 Kwajalein Atoll intensity following Shot BRAVO 42 

2-7 Kwa,ialein Atoll intensity following Shot ROMEO 43 

2-8 Kwajalein Atoll intensity followin& Shot YANKEE 44 

2-9 USS APACHE topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 47 

48 

52 

54 

58 

59 

63 

2-10 USS APACHE topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

2-11 USS BAIROKO topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 

2-12 USS BAIROKO topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

2-13 USS BELLE GROVE topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 

2-14 USS BELLE GROVE topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

2-1s USS CURTISS topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 

2-16 USS EPPERSON topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 68 

2-17 USS ESTES topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 72 

2-18 USS ES1 1S topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 73 

3 
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-

I 

-

’ -

I 

Figure 

2-19 

2-20 

2-21 

2-22 

2-23 

2-24 

2-25 

2-26 

2-27 

2-28 

2-29 

2-30 

2-31 

2-32 

3-1 

4-1 

5-1 

5-2 

5-3 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Concluded) 

USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 

USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

USS GYPSY topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 

USS LST-551 topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

USS LST-762 topside intensity following Shot YANKEE 

USS LST-975 topside intensity following Shot YANKEE 

USS NICHOLAS topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

USS NICHOLAS topside intensity following Shot UNION 

USS PHILIP topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 

USS PHILIP topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

USS RENSHAW topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

USS SIOUX topside intensity following Shot BRAVO 

USS SIOUX topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 

Sea water intensity measured from the USS SIOUX 

following Shot YANKEE 

Crew activity time-line for the USS APACHE, 1-2 March 1954 

Results of radiological surveys onboard the Y AC-40 

following Shot ROMEO and Shot YANKEE 

USS ESTES-Comparison of dosimetry data with calculated doses 

USS PHILIP-Comparison of dosimetry data with calculated doses 

USS SIOUX-Comparison of dosimetry data with calculated doses 

PaRe 

78 

79 

82 

86 

90 

94 

97 

98 

102 

103 

108 

111 

112 

114 

121 

152 

157 

158 

159 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

1-I Operation CASTLE shot data 8 

1-2 Atolls and ships for which dose reconstructions are applicable 12 

2-I Daily integrated intensity, residence islands 39 

of Enewetak Atoll 

2-2 Daily integrated intensity, Kwajalein Atoll 45 

2-3 Daily integrated intensity, USS APACHE xl 

2-4 Daily integrated intensity, USS BAIROKO 56 

2-5 Daily integrated intensity, USS BELLE GROVE 61 

2-6 Daily integrated intensity, USS CURTISS 65 

2-7 Daily integrated intensity, USS EPPERSON 70 

2-8 Daily intebr,re d intensity, USS ESTES ;5 

2-9 Daily integrated intensity, USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH 80 

2-10 Daily integrated intensity, USS GYPSY 84 

2-11 Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-551 88 

2-12 Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-762 91 

2-13 Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-825 93 

2-14 Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-975 95 

2-15 Daily integrated intensiyy, USS NICHOLAS 100 

2-16 Daily integrated intensity, USS PHILIP 105 

2-17 Daily integrated intensity, USS RENSHAW 109 

2-18 Daily integrated intensity, USS SIOUX 116 

5 
LIST OF TABLES (Concluded) 

Table Page 

3-l Glculated personnel film badge dose, residence islands 119 

of Enewetak Atoll 

3-2 Calculated personnel film badge dose, Kwajalein Atoll 120 

3-3 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS APACHE 123 

3-4 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS BAIROKO 125 

3-5 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS BELLE GROVE 127 

3-6 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS CURTISS 129 

3-7 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS EPPERSON 130 

3-8 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS ESTES 132 

3-9 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH 134 

3-10 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS (: YPSY 136 

3-11 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS LST-551 138 

3- 12 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS LST-762 139 

3-13 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS LST-825 140 

3-14 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS LST-975 I42 

3-15 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS NICHOLAS 144 

3-16 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS PHILIP 146 

3-17 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS RENSHAW 147 

3-13 Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS SIOUX 149 

6- I Summary of calculated mean doses 164 

6 
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SECTION 1 -

INTRODUCTION 

I_ 

i- ‘Iperation CASTLE was a series of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by the 

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) at the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG) during the 

Spring of 1954. Radiological safety procedures included the issuance of film badges to 

approximately 10 percent of the personnel throughout the operation and to individuals 

during periods of potentially significant radiation exposure. Cohort badging, i.e., one 

badge worn by one individual in a group, was the primary means of determining 

individual exposurf 5. Recorded dosimetry data and medical record data for personnel 

aboard most of the ships involved in the operation are sufficient to accurately 

determine their radiation exposure. There were, however, sixteen ships involved 

(either directly or indirectly) for which available dosimetry data are insufficient to 

assess the exposures of crew members assigned to them. Consequently, where film 

badge coverage is incomplete, it is necessary to reconstruct the radiation dose. This 

report describes the operation, the radiological situation, and the time-space relationships of each ship with respect to the radiological environment. The results are I- portrayed as equivalent film badge doses for the crews of each of the 16 vessels of 

inrerest. 

Because some personnel of the naval contingent were assigned to the residence 

i 

.- islands of Enewetak and Kwajalein Atolls, the radiation environments on both atolls 

are also reconstructed. Plans had also called for the use of the residence islands of 

‘, - Bikini Atoll (Eneman and Eneu Islands), but heavy contamination following the first 

shot (BRAVO) required a conversion from land-based to ship-based operations. 

Personnel could go ashore on Bikini only for short periods of time and then, only when 

accompanied by a trained rad-safe monitor (Reference 1). Film badges were generally 

issued to personnel going ashore and exposures are documented. Because of this, the 

reconstruction of the Bikini radiation environments are not addressed in this report. 

1.1 BACKGROUND IThere were six shots in the CASTLE test series: BRAVO, ROMEO, KOON, I- UNION, YANKEE, and NECTAR. The first five were detonated on Bikini Atoll and 

7 
.-:. ‘. ._._._-. 

Shot NECTAR was detonated on Enewetak. Figure I-l depicts th\* locations of Bikini 

and Enewetak with respect to the other atolls comprising the northern Marshall 

Islands. Figures 1-2 and l-3 show the main features of Bikini and Enewetak, 

respectively, and the locations of the CASTLE detonations. The pertinent details of 

each test are summarized in Table 1 -I (Reference 2). 

Table 1- 1. C@xation CASTLE shot data. 

Shot Name Local Date (time) Yield Location 

BRAVO I Mar 54 (0645) 15 Mt Bikini 

ROMEO 27 Mar 54 (0630) 11 Mt Bikini 

KOON 7 Apr 54 (0620) 110 Kt Bikini 

UNION 26 Apr 54 (0605) 6.9 Mt Bikini 

YANKEE 5 May 54 (0610) 13.5 Mt Bikini 

h ECTAR I4 May 54 (0620) 1.69 Mt IVY MIKE Cra*er, 

Enewetak 

1.2 NAVAL PARTIClPAllON 

The devices were tested by a joint military and civilian organization designated 

as Joint Task Force Seven (JTF-7). Although military in form, it was comprised of 

military, civil service, and contractor personnel. JTF-7 was organized into five main 

task groups with Task Group 7.3 being the naval contingent. Most of the approximately 6000 personnel assigned to TC 7.3 were aboard the various task group ships; 

however, approximately 650 were stationed on Enewetak and Kwajalein Atolls. Table 

l-2 is a summary of the atolls and ships for which dose reconstructions are specifically 

addressed in this report. Also tabulated are the approximate number of personnel 

assigned to each. 

1.3 METHODOLOGY 

The procedures developed in previous dose reconstruction efforts have been 

adapted to the shipboard radiological environments of Operation CASTLE (References 

8 
East Longitude 

.60° 162' 164' 166O 168O 170° 

12O 

,_Enewetak Bik+$ Rongelap •

i,? I*'7 "k, ,J' '3 Ige;'ik 

- :-2 Ijalein 

Ujelang 

& Ponape 

6' 

Ck 

I Kusaie 

Figure l-l. Northern Marshall Islands. 

9 
BIKINI 

Shot BRAVO (Surface) 

Shot ROMEO (Barge) 

Shot UNION (Barge) 

Shot YANKEE (Barge) 

COCA 

ENIORIU 165O30 EAST 

LUKOJ PASS 110 30 rromI* t 

ENEU CHANNEL 

I 

Shot KOON (Surface) 

Figure l-2. Bikini Atoll, Operation CASTLE shot locations. 

10 
ENEWETAK 

MIKE CRATER 

ENJEBI \ 

DEEP 

ENTRANCE 

WIDE 

ENTRANCE 

+ 

Figure l-3. Enewetak Atoll, Operation CASTLE shot location. 

11 
Table 1-2. Atolls and ships for which dose reconstructions are applicable. 

Island-Based Personnel Personnel Assigned 

Enewetalc Atoll (Enewetak, Parry, and Japtan Islands) 241 

Kwajalein Atoll 418 

Shipboard Personnel 

USS APACHE (ATF-67) 82 

USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) 892 

USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) 338 

USS CURTISS (AV-4) 708 

USS EPPERSON (DDE-7 19) 307 

USS ESTES (ACC- 12) 647 

USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH (TAP-MI) 197 

US~GYP~Y (ARSD-1) 68 

USS LST-551 105 

USS LST-762 128 

USS LST-825* 108 

USSLST-975* 110 test) 

USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449) 273 

USS PHILlPfDDE-498) 263 

USS RENSHAW (DDE-499) 259 

USS SIOUX (ATF-75) 86 

TOTAL 5230 

*Not assigned to TG 7.3 

Source: Reference 1 

12 
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I 

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! 

I

I-

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. 

L 

3, 4, 5 and 6). Figure l-4 depicts the steps taken in calculating personnel film badge 

doses. These steps are pursued to a level of detail governed by the availability of 

data. Sufficient data were recorded at the time and enough have survived to 

understand the ship and land operations and to characterize the radiation environment. 

Individual ship deck logs serve as an authoritative source of ship position and activity. 

Radiation intensity data and crew activity scenarios are applied to reconstruct 

the time-dependent radiation environment for an average crewman on each of the 

sixteen ships of interest. Characterization of the radiation environment starts with 

the determination of on-deck intensities from radiological survey data. The periodic 

shipboard surveys, in conjunction with fallout time-of-arrival data and nearby island 

surveys, serve to define the topside intensity as a function of time. At times following 

the last reported shipboard survey, a power law function determined from Bikini Atoll 

radiological data is utilized. Despite significant differences in decay rate between 

ship and shore because of early-time washdown, decontamination, and weathering, 

late-time decay, mostly from insoluble particles adhering to shipdeck or soil, is taken 

to be the same. As ships operated in the contaminated waters of Bikini Lagoon, their 

hulls and salt water piping systems accumulated radioactive materials, thus increasing 

the radiation exposure to crew members while below deck. The radiation environment 

due to ship contamination is derived from a previously-developed ship contamination 

model (Reference 6). Specific data regarding the development of the time-dependent 

radiation environments are presented in Section 2. 

Shipboard radiation surveys indicated a considerable variation in topside intensities because of ship geometry, redistribution of fallout during washdowr ma’ 

decontamination, and non-uniform adherence of fallout particles to ship materials. If 

only an average survey reading was reported, this value is used. In those cases where 

readings were taken at many predetermined positions on the ship’s exposed surfaces, 

they represent the topside radiation field. The ship’s crew is presumed to have been 

located at random positions when on deck; thus, the mean survey readings, 

appropriately decayed, are used to determine the mean intensities encountered by the 

crew when on deck. The distribution of survey readings suggests a distribution in 

radiation exposure to the crew. Uncertainties associated with mean survey readings 

13 

_ ._ -. . . -_ . . -. ‘. -_ -. *_ ..” ;. _._.‘. *-..,A.r% .‘. *.*;. , ._.,y._... ,~,._‘_.~*_“_w,._~ -’ .- : : . : _ .._‘_..‘,._._._‘*. -_ ._ ‘ 
RADIOLOGICAL SHIP UNIT OPERATIONS DATA - CONTAMINATION - (DECK LOGS) (AFTER-ACTION MODEL 

REPORTS) 

FREE-FIELD i INTEGRATED 

INTENSITY

.:

a/ 

.. 

. FILM BADGE I-‘.- SHIELDING DOSE 

I UNCERTAINTIES 

BOUNDED COMPARE TOTAL DOSIMETRY 

FILM BADGE I_ RECORDS 

DOSE I I 

Figure l-4. Operation CASTLE dose reconstruction methodology. 

‘_ 

14 

':.:. :._.:-_..‘_." ._-_.. 

I 
topside, as well as those associated with various parameters in the ship contamination 

model, are addressed in the uncertainty analysis. 

The analysis of radiation exposure to the crew also requires estimation of 

radiation intensities below deck (due to fallout) and the apportion,nent in time of crew 

activities below and on deck. A ship-shielding factor is defined as the ratio of 

intensity below to the mean intensity topside. This factor, previously determined for 

each type of ship of interest in References 3, 4, 5 and 6, is roughly 0.1 and is nearly 

constant over the usual crew locations within a ship. Variations in this value, due 

primarily to different main deck thicknesses, are treated as an uncertainty in Section 

4. Specific durations of topside exposure are given in ship logs for shot day (rarely 

thereafter) when the radiological situation altered the normal pattern of duties. For 

other days, and when unspecified, the topside intervals are taken to be 0800-1200, 

1330-1700, and 1800-2000 hours, which amount to 40 percent of a day. 

The mean film badge dose to the crew is obtained from time integration of 

intensity for all intervals below (including the shielding factor) and on deck; a 

conversion factor is used to account for body shielding by the badge wearer (Reference 

7). To facilitate the calculation, the daily fractional topside duration, rather than each 

specified interval, is used on the third and subsequent days after burst, when the lower 

intensity lessens the need for such precision in timing. Because the specified intervals 

are nearly centered around midday, this approximation is suitable by the third day. 

Day-by-day and cumulative film badge doses to the average crewman of each 

ship are calculated and presented in Section 3. Calculations are continued through 

31 May 1954 when the roll-up phase was drawing to an end. An uncertainty analysis of 

the dose calculations is provided in Section 4. ln Section 5, the available dosimetry 

records are analyzed and compared with the calculated doses. Conclusions and a total 

dose summary are presented in Section 6. 

15 
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- SECTION 2 

SHIP OPERATIONS AND RADIATION ENVIRONMENTS 

This section describes the movements of the TC 7.3 ships at the Pacific Proving 

Grounds during Operation CASTLE and correlates these movements with the radiation 

environment following the six detonations in the test series. Ship movements are 

reconstructed primarily from data contained in the deck logs of the sixteen ships of 

interest (References 8 and 9). The shipboard radiation environments resulting from 

radioactive fallout are reconstructed based on available radiological survey data. In 

the absence of ship-specific radiological data, topside radiation environments are 

inferred from those of other nearby ships or island data from Enewetak, Kwajalein, 

and Bikini Atolls, as appropriate. In addition, as ships operated in the contaminated 

waters of Bikini Lagoon, their hulls and interior salt water systems became radiologically contaminated exposing personnel below to varying degrees of radiation. The 

radiation environments below are derived from a previously-developed ship contamination model. 

2.1 St-UP OPERATIONS 

Exclusive of the landing craft and small boats belonging to the boat pool, TC 7.3 

had 31 surface craft in the Pacific Proving Grounds for Operation CASTLE. This 

reconstruction focuses on sixteen of the ships: APACHE (ATF-671, BAIROKO (CVEI IS), BELLE GROVE (LSD-21, CURTISS (AV-4), EPPERSON (DDE-7191, ESTES (ACC- - 121, FRED c. AINSWORTH (~~~-180, GYPSY (ARID-I), LST-551, LST-762, LST825*, LST-975+, NICHOLAS (DDE-4491, PHILIP (DDE-4981, RENSHAW (DDE-499), 

and SIOUX (ATF-75). 

The AINSWORTH served as living quarters afloat for the bulk of the support 

personnel. The two tugs, APACHE and SIOUX, placed and retrieved floating 

instrumentation. The GYPSY, a salvage lifting vessel, performed salvage operations in 

the lagoon and assisted in decontaminating the harbor craft and small boats that were 

• Not assigned to TG 7.3. 

16 
left in Bikini Lagoon during shots detonated there, The BAIROKO provided helicopters 

and a radiological laboratory. The BELLE GROVE provided the boat pool, both 

personnel and small craft. The CURTISS transported the test devices and the 

associated personnel of TC 7.1. The ESTES was the JTF-7 flagship and also provided 

headquarters facilities for the staffs of TG 7.1 through 7.4 during operations at Bikini. 

The destroyers EPPERSON, NICHOLAS, PHILIP, and RENSHAW provided surface 

security patrols and performed plane guard, escort, and air control station duties. 

LST-551 and LST-762 provided interatoll transportation. The LST-825 and LST-975 

were transient ships not attached to TG 7.3 and thus had no operational assignments 

with respect to the rest of the task group (Reference I). 

Because the first five shots were detonated at Bikini, the majority of the ships 

operated in the vicinity of Bikini until after Shot YANKEE on 5 May. Exceptions to 

this were the LST-551 and LST-762 which, except for trips to Bikini between shots, 

remained at or near Enewetak. The LST-825 departed Enewetak the day after Shot 

BRAVO enroute to Japan and LST-975 did not arrive in the PPG until approximately 1 

May. Two of the four destroyers were always on patrol either in the Enewetak area or 

far from Bikini at the time of the five Bikini events. Following Shot YANKEE, most 

of the ships began to shift operations to Enewetak where Shot NECTAR was detonated 

on 14 May. 

During Bikini operations the AINSWORTH, BAIROKO, BELLE GROVE, CURTISS 

and ESTES were normally anchored in Bikini Lagoon except for late on D-l and well 

into D-Day during which time they, along with the other ships operating in the vicinity 

of Bikini, took assigned stations to the southeast of the atoli, some 30 to 50 nautical 

miles from surface zero. All personnel evacuated Bikini aboard TC 7.3 ships the night 

before each shot; return to Bikini anchorages was planned for the afternoon of D-Day. 

2.1.1 Shot BRAVO 

Shot BRAVO was detonated at Bikini Atoll at 0645 hours, 1 March 1954. Nine of 

the task group ships were operating in the southeast quadrant off Bikini (see Figure 

2-l), having departed Bikini the night before. With the exception of the NICHOLAS, 

17 
18 
which was in the vicinity of Kusaie Atoll, the remaining ships were at or near 

Enewetak. Those in the vicinity of the Bikini were: 

AINSWORTH BELLE GROVE GYPSY 

APACHE CURTISS PHILIP 

BAIROKO ESTES SIOUX 

They remained in their assigned areas until about 0800 hours when the first onset of 

fallout occurred. By 0815 hours all were proceeding southward with their washdown 

systems activated. The southward movement was terminated about 1000 hours and the 

ships began moving northward again to resume their assigned stations. 

Shortly after noon, a second period of fallout deposition began. The affected 

ships again activated their washdown systems and maneuvered at various courses and 

speeds to enhance its effectiveness. 

Some ships reported encountering intermittent periods of fallout later during the 

afternoon in the Bikini area. Others enroute to Enewetak encountered fallout between 

2200 hours, 1 March and 0100 hours, 2 March. These were the AINSWORTH, 

BAIROKO, CURTIS& and ESTES, which had begun their movement to Enewetak 

between 1700 and 1900 hours when it became evident that, due to the severity of the 

contamination in the lagoon, they could not reenter the lagoon as planned. The SIOUX 

proceeded to retrieve buoys in support of Project 2.5a, and moved generally north and 

west of Bikini Atoll. The other ships in the Bikini area appear to have remained 

generally on station. 

At the time of Shot BRAVO, the EPPERSON, LST-551, LST-762, LST-825 and 

the RENSHAW were in the vicinity of Enewetak Atoll. The EPPERSON was patrolling 

close to the atoll while the RENSHAW was midway between Enewetak and Bikini. The 

LST-551 was about 30 miles west of Enewetak and the LST-762 and LST-825 were 

beached or anchored off Parry Island the whole day. About 2100 hours the RENSHAW 

began to patrol the area close offshore of Enewetak Atoll. Between 1800-2300 hours, 

the residence islands of Enewetak (Enewetak and Parry Islands) recorded a period of 

fallout deposition. 

19 

. .-+-_,.-.-.-.‘_.. ‘. . _. 5.’ ” .).. .~.‘.‘r:_-_‘_‘.:~‘.‘ ,‘,_*.~._.:.,,‘,~‘..~-. . . . . . .-_ :. :. :_ .‘, :. --.--

:. : .:..:..: . . . . -. _ :. .- :. -. *, .’ : 
The APACHE, BELLE GROVE, PHILIP, and SIOUX remained in the Bikini area 

overnight. On 2 March the APACHE maneuvered slowly westward toward Enewetak 

and the SIOUX continued its retrieval of buoys for Prolect 2.5a until about 2000 hours, 

at which time it also headed for Enewetak. Tht SELLE GROVE moored in Bikini 

Lagoon at 0844 hours and the GYPSY reentered the lagoon approximately 4 hours 

later. The PHILIP continued patrolling off Bikini until about 1900, when it entered the 

lagoon and anchored. About 2145 hours, the PHILIP got underway for Rongelap Atoll 

where it evacuated personnel to Kwajalein. 

The EPPERSON, LST-551, LST-762, LST-825, and the RENSHAW, all near 

Enewetak on shot day, were joined on the morning of 2 March by the AINSWORTH, 

BAIROKO, CURTISS, and ESTES. At approximately 0823 hours, the LST-825 departed 

Enewetak enroute to Japan. Late in the afternoon on 2 March, the BAIROKO, ESTES, 

and LST-762 departed Enewetak for Bikini, arriving there on 3 March. The LST-551 

departed Enewetak on 3 March and arrived at Bikini the following day. 

2.1.2 Shot ROMEO 

When Shot ROMEO was detonated at Bikini Atoll at 0630 hours, 27 March, nine 

of the ships were operating in assigned areas southeast of Bikini Atoll. They were: 

AINSWORTH BELLE GROVE ESTES 

APACHE CURTISS NICHOLAS 

BAIROV 0 EPPERSON SIOUX 

The GYPSY had departed Bikini on 26 March and was enroute to Kwajalein when Shot 

ROMEO was detonated. The AINSWORTH, BAIROKO, BELLE GROVE, EPPERSON, 

and ESTES returned to the Bikini Lagoon anchorage area early in the afternoon; the 

CURTISS and the NICHOLAS returned late in the afternoon. At midday the APACHE 

and the SIOUX began buoy retrieval operations. The APACHE proceeded west of 

Bikini while the SIOUX proceeded north. About 1600 hours the EPPERSON departed 

the lagoon to begin patrolling north of the atoll. 
About 1600 hours on 27 March, at a point some 30 miles west southwest of the 

ROMEO Ci!, the APACHE recorded the peak intensity during a period of fallout which 

had begun about an hour earlier. At this time the ship began to proceed to the 

northwest. At approximately noon on the following day, the APACHE was operating 

some 60 miles northwest of the ROMEO CZ when it encountered another period of 

fallout. The ship proceeded southwestward until about 1600 hours, when the peak 

intensity was recorded; it then proceeded southward out of the fallout area. Later 

that evening the APACHE changed course for Enewetak. 

The EPPERSON encountered fallout in its patrol area at approximately 1600 

hours when it was about 26 miles north of the ROMEO GZ. At 1933 hours, this ship 

also activated its washdown system. The following morning, when the EPPERSON was 

patrolling five to ten miles north of Bikini Atoll, it received more fallout between 

0700-0800. Fallout during the same period was detected by the PHILIP south of Bikini 

Atoll, but was not noted by any of the ships anchored in the Bikini Lagoon 

(AINSWORTH, BAIROKO, BELLE GROVE, ESTES, and LST-551). 

Around 2000 hours the CURTISS and NICHOLAS departed Bikini for Enewetak, 

arriving there at approximately 0700 hours on 28 March. The NICHOLAS remained at 

anchor until the afternoon of the 29th; the CURTISS got underway for Bikini about 

1900 hours on the 28th and arrived at 0730 hours on the 29th. 

At shot time the RENSHAW was on station midway between Enewetak and Bikini 

Atolls. About 1845 hours it took a station south of Eneman Entrance to Bikini Atoll. 

LST-762 was anchored off Enewetak Island and remained there for the next four days. 

LST-551 was at anchor in Enewetak Lagoon at shot time, but got underway for Bikini 

at 1017 hours. The PHILIP, which was patrolling eastward of the Deep Entrance to 

Enewetak Atoll at shot time, joined the LST-551 in formation bound for Bikini at 1035 

hours. Between 1400-2400 hours these two ships encountered minor fallout; peak 

intensities were recorded about 1800 hours when they were some 70 miles east of 

Enewetak. After they arrived at Bikini at approximately 0700 hours on 28 March, the 

PHILIP began to patrol off Eneman Island while the LST-551 entered the lagoon and 

beached itself on Eneman. 

21 

_. . . . :. y . . .._-. ._. ._ . ._- .; ._. . .,-._-.. ; . * . ._. . - ._. ,’ ._. ._- ..-_.;:.. ..~~.,‘~.,’ _._; ._ _; .‘.;, . _.. .’ ,.
Around 2400 hours, the SIOUX began encountering fallout of increasing intensity 

in the area 30-40 miles northeast of Bikini. The ship proceeded slowly northwestward 

until approximately 1200 hours on 28 March, then southeastward during the afternoon, 

receiving fallout throughout the day. The SIOUX also received fallout during the 

morning of 29 ‘March while enroute to Enewetak from Bikini. 

The PHILIP briefly entered the lagoon between 1300-1415 hours on 28 March, 

then resumed its patrol to the south of Eneman Island. The EPPERSON entered the 

lagoon about 2000 hours and remained there overnight. The RENSHAW was relieved 

by PHILIP at 1415 hours and proceeded to the anchorage area for the night. 

During the night of 28-29 March, fallout was recorded on all ships in Bikini 

Lagoon between approximately 2200-0830 hours. The BELLE GROVE, moored to buoy 

“Y”, set condition ABLE at 2200 hours. The BAIROKO, in berth “Z”, turned on its 

washdown system twice--at 0130 and 0320 hours. The LST-551, beached on Eneman 

Island, set condition ABLE and took rad-safe measures at 0315 hours. The EPPERSON 

put to sea between 0630-0900 hours to wash down the ship (washdown was completed 

about 0735 hours). 

About 1500 hours the LST-551 got underway for Enewetak and the BELLE 

GROVE followed approximately three hours later. Thus, on the night of 29-30 March, 

the ships in the Bikini area were the AINSWORTH, BAIROKO, CURTISS, EPPERSON, 

ESTES, PHILIP, and RENSHAW. Those in the Enewetak area were the APACHE, LST551, LST-762, NICHOLAS, and SIOUX, with the BELLE GROVE enroute. The GYPSY 

departed Kwajalein at 1922 hours on 29 March enroute to Ailinglapalap Atoll tc 

perform salvage operations; it was not affected by the fallout on Kwajalein during 

30-31 March. 

2.1.3 Shot KOON 

Shot KOON was detonated at Bikini Atoll at 0620 hours, 7 April 1954. Eight of 

the ships of interest were operating in the Bikini area. They were: 

22 
AINSWORTH CURTISS NICHOLAS 

BAIROKO EPPERSON SIOUX 

BELLE GROVE ESTES 

At shot time, all except the NICHOLAS were in assigned areas southeast of Bikini 

Atoll. They remained there until around midday, when they reentered the lagoon as 

planned. The NICHOLAS, which was patrolling approximately midway between Bikini 

and Enewetak at shot time, proceeded to Bikini during the afternoon and anchored in 

the lagoon at 1915 hours. 

Five other TG 7.3 ships were either at or enroute to Enewetak at shot time. 

These were: 

APACHE LST-762 RENSHAW 

LST-55 1 PHILIP 

The APACHE, enroute to Enewetak from Bikini, was about 25-30 miles east of 

Enewetak at shot time. The other ships were all anchored/beached at Enewetak or 

Parry Islands. 

The GYPSY, having completed saIvage operations at Ailinglapalap Atoll on 

1 April, returned to Kwajalein where it was anchored when Shot KOON was detonated. 

On 9 April, the GYPSY departed Kwajalein enroute to Pearl Harbor. This ship did not 

return to the PPG during Operation CASTLE. 

Fallout from Shot KOON moved generally to the north of Bikini (as predicted) 

and none of the ships operating in the vicinity of Bikini, Enewetak, or Kwajalein Atolls 

received significant fallout following this test. 

2.1.4 Shot UNION 

Shot UNION was detonated at Bikini Atoll at 0605 hours, 26 April 1954. Seven of 

task group ships of interest were operating in the Bikini area. These were: 

23 

. . -,. . _ _._. i_._-._-. *._.. _-. -. &-. _-. _.., -: .:. :_. . . .’ : . .’ ._: 
AINSWORTH CURTISS PHILIP 

BAIROKO ESTES NICHOLAS 

BELLE GROVE 

At shot time, all of these ships except the NICHOLAS were in their assigned areas 

southeast of Bikini; the NICHOLAS was again on patrol midway between Bikini and 

Enewetak Atolls. During the afternoon of 26 April, the PFIILIP began patrolling off 

Bikini and the other ships entered and anchored in Bikini Lagoon. The NICHOLAS, 

while still on station midway between atolls, encountered fallout between 1313-1429 

hours, during which time its washdown system was activated. 

The APACHE was at Kwajalein Atoll at shot time. The remaining five task 

group ships of interest were at or near Enewetak Atoll: the EPPERSON on patrol north 

of Enewetak and the LST-551, LST-762, RENSHAW, and SIOUX at rnchor off Parry 

and Enewetak Islands. 

With the exception of the NICHOLAS, the remaining twelve ships in the vicinity 

of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls received no significant fallout following Shot UNION, 

the major portion of the radioactive cloud having moved generally to the north. 

2.1.5 Shot YANKEE 

Shot YANKEE was detonated at Bikini Atoll at 0610 hours, 5 May 1954. Eight of 

the task group ships of interest were in their assigned areas southeast of Bikini Atoll. 

They were: 

AINSWORTH CURTISS RENSHAW 

BAIROKO ESTES SIOUX 

BELLE GROVE PHILIP 

The PHILIP and RENSHAW remained on patrol off Bikini until the morning of 6 May, 

while the SIOUX remained at sea retrieving instrumentation. The remaining five ships 

in the vicinity of Bikini reentered the lagoon for a short period of time during the late 

24 
afternoon of 5 May to transfer passengers. Because lagoon water contamination levels 

were still quite high, the decision was made not to reenter the lagoon on a permanent 

basis until the following morning. None of these ships received any fallout due to Shot 

YANKEE. 

The A: 1CHE was berthed at Kwajalein Atoll on 5-6 May, during which time this 

atoll received ntlnor secondary fallout from the YANKEE cloud. 

The EPPERSON and NICHOLAS were patrolling off Enewetak at shot time while 

LST-551 was anchored at Enewetak throughout the day. None of these ships received 

fallout following Shot YANKEE. 

The LST-762 had departed Enewetak on 27 April enroute for Pearl Harbor. Due 

to engine failure and other equipment malfunctions, the ship was taken in tow on 5 

May by LST-975 which was enroute from Japan to Pearl Harbor. During the morning 

of 6 May, LST-762 commenced monitoring for fallout. The ship, still under tow by 

LST-975, was about 700 miles east of Bikini at the time. By early afternoon, 

washdown* of the weatt:er decks on both ships was initiated and continued intermittently until 0930 hours, 7 May. 

2.1.6 shot NECTAR 

Following Shot YANKEE on 5 May, the task group ships began to shift operations 

to Enewetak Atoll where Shot NECTAR was to be detonated on 14 May. The BELLE 

GROVE, CURTIS& EPPERSON, ESTES, AINSWORTH, LST-551, NICHOLAS, RENSHAW, and SIOUX had all arrived at Enewetak by 13 May. The APACHE and PHILIP 

remained in the vicinity of Bikini until they departed the PPG for Pearl Harbor on I4 

and 15 May, respectively. The BAIROKO was enroute to Bikini from Kwajalein on 14 

May, :vhile LST-762, still under tow by LST-975, was approximately midway between 

Johnston Island and Pearl Harbor. 

*Only LST-762 was equipped with a washdown system; the crew of LST-975 used fire 

hoses. 

23 
When Shot NECTAR was detonated at 0620 hours on 14 May, seven of the ships 

were in their assigned operational areas southeast of Encwetak. These were: 

CURTISS LST-55 1 SIOUX 

ESTES NICHOLAS RENSHAW 

AINSWORTH 

The EPPERSON and BELLE GROVE were enroute to Ujelang and Rongerik 

Atolls, respectively. Within several hours after the detonation, all ships that were 

southeast of Enewetak, except the NICHOLAS, reentered the lagoon; the NICHOLAS 

did not get back into the lagoon until late afternoon. The EPPERSON returned to 

Enewetak from UjeJang late in the afternoon on 14 May, while the BELLE GROVE did 

not return until the morning of 16 May. The BAIROKO had arrived at Enewetak from 

Bikini during the morning of 15 May. 

Between 1830-2100 hours on 14 May, light fallout from the NECTAR cloud was 

experienced on the residence islands of Enewetak. The CURTISS, ESTES, and 

AINSWORTH had departed Enewetak for San Francisco, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor, 

respectively, before the fallout began. The EPPERSON, NICHOLAS, and RENSHAW 

did not depart the lagoon until approximately 2200 hours enroute to Pearl Harbor and 

could have experienced the fallout. Similarly, LST-551 and SIOUX remained at, or in 

the vicJnity of, Enewetak until 16 and 17 May, respectively, and they too, probably 

received the fallout on 14 May. The LST-551 departed Enewetak for Ponape Atoll 

while the SIOUX departed for Bikini. As stated earlier, the BAIROKO and BELLE 

GROVE did not return to Enewetak until 15 and 16 May, respectively, well after the 

faJlout had ceased. The BELLE GROVE departed Enewetak fGr Bikini on 16 May and 

the BAIROKO got underway to San Diego on 17 May. 

2.2 RADIATION ENVTROfWENTS 

Extensive radiation intensity readings obtained on How Island (Bikini Atoll) 

following Shot BRAVO indicated decay rates that varied considerably from the 

traditional t-**’ rule (Reference J 1). Average values for the decay exponent (k) 

26 

_-_ .-. _.. _-. -- .= .-* _-._>_*. _‘. _-. _-. ;, _-. :. 
- .-- ._>,_-.idA. ll,.._ ~. .._,. .\--.__._.A.- A....._ - , 

obtained with several gamma ionization time-intensity meters on Bikini (Reference 11) 

are as follows: 

3 < t 5 10 hours; k = -1.19 

10 < t < 48 hours; k = -0.82 

48 < t 5 480 hours; k P -1.50 

t > 480 hours; k = -1.20 

A varying decay of this type is consistent with the presence of Np-239 (t, = 56 hr) and 

U-237 ($=160 hr), which are both generated in significant quantities from neutron 

capture in uranium. After several half-lives, when the presence of these two 

radioisotopes no longer dominate the decay rate, it approaches the traditional twl** 

value. In the absence of radiological survey data, the time-dependent decay rate is 

used in reconstructing the radiation environments on the ships and atolls covered in 

this report. Generally, radiologicat data on the residence islands of Enewetak and 

Kwajalein support a t-1.5 decay rate between 48 and 480 hours after detonation; 

(t -1.6 to shipboard data indicate sligh;ly greater decay rates ,-1.9 ) during the same 

period. The steeper shipboard decay rates can be attributed to a combination of the 

increased effectiveness of “weathering” on a ship’s surfaces (as opposed to island soil), 

and to decontamination being carried out onboard the ships. 

All of the ships addressed in this report encountered fallout following one or 

more of the six CASTLE detonations. In most instances, particularly where significant 

fallout was encountered, shipboard radiological data are available to define the 

topside radiation environment. In some instances, however, shipboard environments 

must be inferred from radiological data obtained on nearby islands, such as the 

residence islands of Enewetak and Kwajaltin Atolls. For each atoll and ship, an 

average intensity curve is presented showing the free-field radiation intensity as a 

function of time after each shot that resulted in significant fallout. The intensity 

curves are then time-integrated to yield a daily free-field integrated intensity for 

each atoll/ship through 31 May 1954, when the roll-up phase was nearly complete. 

The water in Bikini Lagoon also became contaminated following several of the 

five detonations conducted there. As ships steamed or anchored in the contaminated 

27 
water, radioactive materials began to accumufate on the hulls below the water line 

and in the saltwater systems within the ships. As a result, radiation intensities below 

deck began to increase, adding to the crew’s exposure. When compared to the topside 

radiation environments resulting from Shot BRAVO and Shot ROMEO fallout, this 

radiation was “considered more of an operational nuisance than a hazard” 

(Reference 12). 

The same phenomenon was observed on the ships at Operation CROSSROADS 

conducted at Bikini Atoll in 1946. A model was developed in Reference 6 to determine 

personnel exposure aboard the ships at CROSSROADS due to ship contamination. 

Because only limited lagoon water contamination data have been found for Operation 

CASTLE, this model cannot be applied directly to the ships participating at this 

operation; however, several simplifying assumptions concerning the degree of contamination can be made, which allows portions of the model to be used. 

Two basic assumptions are made in developing the ship contamination model. 

The first is that the mixture of fission products present in the accumulated radioactive 

-1.3 material on the hull and in the piping of a ship decayed radiologically as t . This 

decay rate was verified experimentally for fission products deposited in seawater and 

on the decks of target ships at CROSSROADS. The second assumption involves the 

rate of contamination buildup on the hull and interior piping. The radioactive buildup 

on a previously uncontaminated ship is assumed to be initially proportional to the 

radiation intensity of the water surrounding the ship, but, as buildup progresses, a 

limiting or saturation value of contamination is approached asymptotically. The 

occurrence of such a saturation effect is indicated by hull intensity readings taken on 

various ships after their departure from the lagoon following CROSSROADS operations. Based on these assumptions, the exterior gamma intensity of the hull I,(t) of a 

contaminated ship at time t is given by: 

St-l.3 I,(t) = [I*xP I- FDw(t)l] . (1) 

28 
-

-

-

-

-

-

where C and S are constants, and 

tt 1.3 D,(t) = Iw(t) d . (2) / 0 

Here Iw(t) is the intensity of the surrounding water at time t; hence, this quantity is 

dependent on the contaminated water and on the ship’s path through that environment. 

It is evident that, as a ship spends sufficient time in contaminated water, Dw becomes 

large and the hull intensity approaches a saturation value: 

-1.3 1 (t)-St . (3) h 

The constants S and C were evaluated from CROSSROADS support ship intensity data, 

as discussed in Reference 6. The derived values are given below. 

s= 1800 mR-dayoo3 for destroyers, (4) 

0.3 1570 m R-day for all other ships. 

c= 11.0 day” for all ships. (5) 

It was also observed at Operation CROSSROADS that steaming in clean water 

reduced the accumulated contamination by about half during the first day after 

departing the lagoon, but that subsequent steaming had a much smaller effect. In the 

model, it is assumed that both hull and piping intensities were reduced to half their 

departure values during the first day after departure from the lagoon, and that 

-1.3 subsequent decay while out of the lagoon foltowed the t decay rate. 

The exterior hull gamma intensity (lh) is then used to determine the average 

interior ship intensity. This analysis, as described in detail in Reference 6, results in 

an apportionment factor Pa, which relates average interior intensities (Ii) to exterior 

hull gamma intensities (lh) by the relation: 

1. = Falh. (6) I 

29 
Therefore the interior intensity at any time t after the detonation is given by: 

Ii(t) = FaSt-1’3 1 - expl -g D,,,(t)1 . (7) 

I 

Since detailed radiological data for the waters of Bikini Lagoon are not available 

for Operation CASTLE, several assumptions are made in order to apply the CROSSROADS ship contamination model to the ships at CASTLE. It is documented that the 

anchorage areas in the lagoon became contaminated to varying degrees following Shots 

BRAVO, UNION and YANKEE. The assumption is made that ships entering the lagoon 

after each of these shots would reach the saturation level of contamination if they 

- remained in the lagoon. The rate and level at which hulls become saturated is 

dependent on the intensity of the water surrounding the ship. At CROSSROADS, it 

was found that ships remaining in radioactive lagoon water generally reached 

saturation within one or two days. Based on these observations, this analysis assumes 

that the ships’ hulls approached saturation linearly over a one-day period, i.e., any ship 

remaining in the lagoon for 24 hours became saturated. This assumption allows (highsided) exposure estimates to be calculated without detailed knowledge of the water 

environment, leading to: 

L(t) = FaSt-“3. (8) 

- It is further assumed that, upon departing the contaminated lagoon water, hull 

and piping intensities were reduced by one-half, and that subsequent decay while out 

-1.3 of the lagoon followed the t decay rate. -

With these assumptions, the model developed for CROSSROADS ships is used to 

estimate the personnel exposure at Operation CASTLE due to contaminated lagoon 

water. Values of S and Fatfrom Reference 6) for pertinent ship types are given below. 

Ship Type S (mR-day0*3) Fa FaS 

- CVE 1570 0.10 160 

TAP, LSD, AV 1570 0.15 240 

AGC 1570 0.20 310 

LST 1570 0.33 520 

ATF, ARSD 1570 0.39 610 

DDE 1800 0.39 700 

30 
Discussions of the lagoon contamination following Shots BRAVO, UNION, and 

YANKEE, and pertinent assumptions concerning these environments, are as follows: 

shot BRAVO 

Documentation (e.g., Reference 1) indicates that the water throughout the 

lagoon became contaminated by BRAVO plus three days (4 March); however, little is 

known of the water intensity levels. Therefore, it is assumed that ships entering the 

lagoon on or after 4 March became contaminated to the saturation level one day after 

entry into the lagoon. 

Shot UNION 

The water in the vicinity of the anchorage area was relatively free of 

contamination following this shot. However, five days after the shot (1 May), 

messages indicate that lagoon contamination was presenting more of a problem. For 

the present analysis, it is assumed that contamination spread to the anchorage area 

five days after the shot, and ships that entered the lagoon on or after 1 May reached a 

saturation level of contamination after one day of exposure to this water. 

Shot YANKEE 

Documentation indicates that the water in the anchorage areas became contaminated the day of Shot YANKEE (5 May). For this analysis, it is assumed that any ship 

entering the lagoon after the shot reached saturation if it remained there for a day or 

more. 

Also following Shot YANKEE, the SIOUX encountered contaminated water while 

steaming outside of the lagoon. The water intensities are recorded in detail in 

Reference 13 (see Figure 2-30). With this information, the full contamination model in 

Reference 6 is applied to calculate the crew’s exposure. 

In order to demonstrate the inferred build-up and decay of the intensity below 

deck as a ship enters and leaves contaminated water (the Bikini anchorages), 

31 
calculations are detailed for the USS CURTISS, a typical ship. The deck log of the 

CURTISS (AV-4) indicates that this ship entered Bikini Lagoon fifteen times during 

Operation CASTLE, remaining in the lagoon for various periods (see Section 2.2.6). 

When the ship remained in the lagoon for 24 hours or more, it is assumed the hull 

reached the saturation level with the intensity below deck given by: 

Ii(t) = 240 t-1*3, (9) 

where 240 is the product of F, and S. Upon leaving the lagoon, it is assumed that the 

intensity was immediately reduced t d’ a factor of two. If the ship had not reached 

saturation, i.e., it remained in the lagoon for less than 24 hours, the intensity after 

departing the lagoon is one-half the intensity it reached during the linear one-day 

buildup period. 

Figure 2-2 depicts the below deck intensity for the CURTISS through 31 May, 

resulting from hull contamination. The integrated intensities are detailed for each 

period in and out of the lagoon (see Section 2.2.6). The maximum below deck intensity 

measurement following Shot BRAVO was obtained in the engineering spaces in the 

vicinity of a contaminated auxiliary condenser on the CURTISS and was 2 mR/hour 

(48 mR/day). Shown in Figure 2-2, it is consistent with the observation in Reference 6 

that, in general, engineering spaces in the vicinity of contaminated piping and salt 

water systems would have intensities approximately 1.5 times the average below deck 

intensity. (Although the actual date of the measurement is not known, it is assumed 

that it corresponded to the time of first hull saturation following Shot BRAVO.) 

Similar ship contamination curves are derived for each ship that entered Bikini 

Lagoon during Operation CASTLE. These curves are time-integrated to yield a daily 

free-field integrated intensity below through 31 May 1954. Integrated intensities 

topside and below are detailed in the following sections for each ship that received 

fallout and/or entered the contaminated waters of Bikini Lagoon. 

32 
50 

••t4aximum intensity measured 

in engineering spaces on the 

\ CURTISS following Shot BRAVO 

40 

30 

10 

- A 

t t UNION 

1 Uarch 15 narch _ April 15 April 11 Y 15 n8y 31 i4ay 

I 10 t 

Date (1954) 

Figure 2-2. Average intensity below deck on the USS CURTISS due to ship contamination. 
2.2.1 Enewetak Atoll 

Of the six shots, BRAVO, ROMEO, and NECTAR caused measurable fallout on 

the residence islands of Enewetak Atoll. Generally, such fallout was secondary (onset 

was well after the time of detonation) and relatively minor in nature. At the time it 

was considered a “nuisance factor” (Reference 12). Fallout on Enewetak from Shots 

UNION and YANKEE was apparently even less significant as evidenced by the 

conflicting reports of the minor contamination following these two shots (References 

10 and 14). 

Fallout from Shot BRAVO began on Enewetak at i rjproximately 1745 hours on 

1 March, I1 hours after the shot (Reference 10). Soon after, average gamma 

intensities were 3-4 mR/hr and by 2300 hours, when fallout stopped, average 

intensities were 10 mR/hr with a maximum intensity of 15 mR/hr being reported. 

Figure 2-3 depicts the free-field radiation intensity on the residence islands (Parry and 

Enewetak) of Enewetak Atoll. Radioactive decay after 2300 hours is inferred from 

decay rates measured during the same time period on Bikini Atoll. 

Fallout on Enewetak from Shot ROMEO came in two distinct “waves”. It began 

at approximately 1700 hours on 27 March and peaked at 2100 hours with average 

intensities of 3 mR/hr being reported on Parry Island (Ref:?rence 12). Another period 

of fallout began during the late evening of 28 March and did not peak until noon on 

30 March, at which time the average island intensities were approximately 9 mR/hr; 

maximum intensities were reported to be 15 mR/hr. Figure 2-4 depicts the radiation 

intensity for Enewetak Atoll. It is seen from the figure that BRAVO fallout 

contributed but little to the intensity after Shot ROMEO. 

The TG 7.2 unit history for Operation CASTLE (Reference 141 indicates that 

Enewetak Island may have received contamination following Shots UNION and 

YANKEE. It states, “The radiation level, however, did not become significant. 

Following UNION, a peak intensity of four milliroentgens per hour (mR/hr) was 

received, and following YANKEE, the peak reading was only one mR/hr.” Although 

these levels are not high, they are contradictory to those given in the JTF-7 rad-safe 

34 

. ..-... . . i 

: 5 ,% :.__-. ..:‘_-.‘,~,‘,..;.-. -.. . . .:~.y:.‘.“:. 1. 4 ,,‘_-. _.. :. , . . . ’ , _. ‘, _- -2:.2 : 
••

190 I I I IIIII I I I I Ill1 I I I llll1. 

••Maximum 

P Measurements 

O Average 

Heasurements 

I 

aJ 

u 

C 

cc 

1.0 

I I i I ItIll I I I lllll 0.1 

1 10 100 1000 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Yours) 

Figure 2-3. Parry and Enewetak Island intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

35 
@Maximum 

Measurements 

0 Average 

Measurements 

h

& 

5 

h

U

Y-4 

:

U 

C

c( 

lo 

0 

0 

1.0 

10 100 1000 

AA Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) zf mllcm UNKU! 

Figure 2-4. Parry and Enewetak Island intensity following Shot ROMEO. 

36 
. . . . _~s.-_ ..r.-. ..I1 * ••- &.YA_-_L-_.&-L. .* -1:. . .: . . . 1 I -

final report (Reference 10) which states, “At 1900M on shot day (UNION) a report was 

received from the rad-safe monitoring team at Enewetak to the effect that Fred 

(Enewetak Is.), Elmer (Parry Is.), and Ursula (Rojoa Is.) were reading background.” 

Reference 10 also states that, **By noon on shot day (YANKEE), it was evident that 

Enewetak would not be contaminated. This was confirmed at 1900M (shot day) by a 

report from the rad-safe alert system at Enewetak, indicating Fred, Elmer and Ursula 

with negative contamination.” Since fallout arrival times and durations were not 

detailed in Reference 14, the reported contamination was probably due to cloud 

“shine” as small portions of the radioactive cloud passed near Enewetak. Aircraft 

cloud tracking information in Reference 10 indicates that the UNION cloud drifted to 

the north of Enewetak while the YANKEE cloud drifted to the south of the atoll. Any 

dose received by island-based personnel from these two shots would have been 

insignificant compared to BRAVO and ROMEO fallout and is not considered in this 

report. 

Shot NECTAR, the only shot in the CASTLE series detonated at Enewetak, 

produced very little fallout on the residence islands in the southern portion of the 

atoll. Radiation intensities on Parry Island began to increase at 1830 hours on 14 May 

and peaked at 2 mR/hr at approximately 2100 hours the same day (Reference 121. 

Radioactive decay after 2100 hours (H+l4.6) is assumed to follow the Bikini rates as it 

did with the previous shots. Figure 2-5 depicts Shot NECTAR fallout and its 

relationship with background intensities from Shots BRAVO and ROMEO. The solid 

curve is the total intensity resulting from fallout from all three shots. 

The intensity curves in Figures 2-3, 2-4, and 2-5 have been time integrated from 

the beginning of fallout through 31 May 1954. Daily contributions to the free-field 

integrated intensity from each source have been summed and are tabulated in 

Table 2- 1. 

37 
0 Haxilaum 

Measurements 

BRAVO and ROMEO 

I I lllll 

10 100 

A 

31 w*'l 54 

Time After Shot NECTAR (Hours) 

Figure 2-5. Parry and Enewetak Island intensity following Shot NECTAR. 

38 
Integrated 

March Intensity (mR) 

1 (BRAVO) 47.4 

2 153.5 

3 85.3 

4 48.9 

5 32.4 

6 23.5 

: 18.044 

9 11.8 

10 10.0 

11 8.5 

12 7.4 

13 6.5 

14 5.8 

15 5.2 

16 4.7 

17 4.3 

IS 3.9 

19 3.6 

20 3.3 

21 3.0 

22 2.9 

23 f= 

:: 2.4 

Z (ROMEO) 14.5 2.3

28 43.1 

29 67.2 

30 180.0 

31 139.7 

Table 2-l. Daily integrated intensity, 

residence islands of entwctak AtolL 

Integrated 

April intensity (mR) 

1 101.7 

2 78.4 

3 63.0 

4 52.0 

5 44.1 

37.9 

f (KOON) 33.1 

8 29.2 

9 26.1 

10 23.5 

21.3 

f : 19.5 

13 17.8 

14 16.5 

15 15.3 

14.3 

:; 13.5 

12.9 

:x 12.2 

11.6 

:: 11.1 

22 10.6 

23 10.2 

24 9.7 

9.4 

Z (UNION) 9.0 

27 8.7 

2% a.4 

29 8.1 

30 7.8 

Integrated 

May Intensity (mR) 

1 7.6 

f 7.31 

2 (YANKEE) 6.96 

6 6.5 

7 6.3 

8 6.1 

9 6.0 

10 5.9 

:: 5.76 

134 (NECTAR) 1::;

15 30.2 

16 19.0 

17 12.9 

1% 10.1 

19 8.6 

20 7.6 

21 6.9 

f3 6.5 

24 f:F 

25 5.3 

26 5.2 

27 5.0 

28 4.8 

29 4.7 

30 4.5 

31 4.3 
_ ‘.&,_- _ ‘*,,,.., ,-_.-__-. ., ,C.L. .:.--._ i-..--

2.2.2Knjdein Atoll 

On Kwajalcin Atoll, measurable fallout occurred after Shots BRAVO, ROMEO, 

and YANKEE, while Shots KOON, UNION, and NECTAR produced no fallout. As on 

Enewetak, all fallout was secondary in nature and low in intensity. 

The Naval Station at Kwajalein provided basing support to Patrol Squadron 

TWENTY-NINE (VP-291 during Operation CASTLE (Reference 15). This squadron 

supported the AEC’s worldwide fallout monitoring program with aerial radiation survey 

flights following each of the CASTLE events. The results of these survey flights, 

which included Kwajalein, were converted to ground intensities using experimentallydetermined air-ground correction factors (Reference IO). In some instances, actual 

ground survey data for Kwajalein were recorded. These comprise the primary source 

of intensity data used for dose reconstructions. In addition, a few intensity readings 

taken at the Naval Station were also recorded in Reference 10. The intensity data are 

summarized below. 

Date (Time) Intensity (mR/hr) Notes 

2 Mar (1800) 0.6 actual ground survey reading 

4 Mar (1200) 0.5 actual ground survey reading 

19 Mar (12001 0.1 based on aerial survey reading 

30 Mar (1545) 0.05 actual ground survey reading 

31 Mar (1545) I J-3.0 on beaches (ground) 

3 Apt (1354) 1.4 based on aerial survey reading 

8 Apr (1453) 0.53 based on aerial survey reading 

12 Apr (1200) . . > annoted in Ref. 2 as probably 

erroneously high (ground) 

12 Apr (1452) 0.4 baseti on aerial survey reading 

21 Apr (1435) 0 probably not actually zero (aerial) 

I May (1200) 0.1 actual ground survey reading 

6 May (1455) 0.4 based on aerial survey reading 

6 May (1645) 1.0 maximum ground survey intensity 

7 May (18001 4.5 highly questionable ground 

intensity reading 

8 May (1335) 0.2 based on aerial survey reading 

I5 May (13351 0.1 based on aerial survey reading 

16 May (12361 0.08 based on aerial survey reading 

The onset of fallout following Shot BRAVO did not occur until approximately 

0800 hours on 2 March. By 1800 hours, ground surveys on Kwajalein recorded average 

40 
intensities of 0.6 mR/hr. The next survey, at noon on 4 March, indicated a slight drop 

in intensities to 0.5 mRhr; an aerial survey on 19 March indicated a further reduction 

to 0.1 mR/hr. Figure 2-6 depicts the radiation environment on Kwajalein resulting 

from Shot BRAVO as inferred from the survey data. l’t-e 4 March intensitv of 

0.5 mRIhr has been extrapolated back to 2000 hours, 2 March, using the decay 

exponents derived from the Bikini fallout data (Section 2.2). This indicates that the 

fallout on Kwajalein probably did not peak until shortly after the survey conducted at 

1800 hours on 2 March. The 19 March intensity derived from the aerial survey data 

appears somewhat higher than would be expected if the 4 March intensity is extrapolated forward with time using tht Bikini decav data. Much more significance is 

attached to actual ground readings, when available, than to ground intensities derived 

from aerial survey data. 

Secondary fallout from Shot ROMEO did not arrive at Kwajalein until 3 days 

after the detonation. A ground survey on Kwajakin at 1545 hours, 30 March, indicated 

an intensity of 0.05 mR/hr, approximately twice the Shot BRAVO background at that 

time. Subwent surveys on 31 March reveakd intensities of l-3 mR/hr. Aerial 

surveys on 3, 8, and 12 April establish a rate of decay for the ROMEO fallout that is 

proportional to t-‘*5; a ground survey reading of 0.1 mR/hr on 1 Mav supports the 

decay rate established from the aerial surveys. Figure 2-7 depicts the total fallout on 

Kwajalein following Shot ROMEO and the individual contributions from Shots BRAVO 

and ROMEO. 

Minor fallout also occurred on Kwajalein approximately one day after Shot 

YANKEE. Surveys conducted during the afternoon of 6 May indicated maximum 

ground intensities of 1.0 mR/hr. Average intensities of 0.4 mR/hr were derived from 

aerial surveys. Subsequent aerial survevs on 8, 15, and 16 May revealed that YANKEE 

-1.5 fallout also decayed approximately proportional to t . Figure 2-8 shows the 

YANKEE fallout on Kwajalein as derived from the aerial and ground survey data. Also 

shown are the contributions from BRAVO and KtifviiE3 iaiioui io titi &i&L 

The intensity curves defining the radiation environment on Kwajalein during 

*ration CASTLE are time integrated, by day, through 31 May. Daily integrated 

free-field intensities are summed and tabulated in Table 2-2. 

41 

- . - :. :. .“._X,‘. ;. ;. _-. .‘.‘,‘.‘.‘.‘~‘.‘~‘.‘,‘.‘~..‘_..‘_,’~..’,,’ ._ ._’ ._.‘._..<_. * 
10 

0 Average Measurements 

m Aerial Survey lleasureawr 

h 1.0 

10 

.Ol 

10 100 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure 2-h. Kwajalcin Atoll intensity following Shot BRAVO. 
10 

t 

1 I I1 1111 I I I I Ill1 1 I 

0 Average Measurements 

••Maximum Measurements 

I I Ill1 c 

. 

t 

••Aerial Survey Measurements 

.lO 

BRAVO Background 

\ I I I IllIll a I I lllbl I I 1 IAIII .Ol L 

1 10 100 1000 

A Air cm INIOY IANKFX 

Time After Shot ROMEO (liours) 

Figure 2-J. Kwajalein Atoll intensitv following Shot ROMEO. 

43 
j 

, 

. 

-

-, 10 ‘_ I 1 I I II11 I I I 

0 

I Ill1 I I 

MaxImum Measurements 

lllll 

I 

I 

I-

• krial Survey yeasurements 

! 

, 

I_ 

! 

I 

,-

i 

1 

II 

b 

II 

l-i 

1 

\ 

/_ 

.-

b’ . 

i 

id* 

.--

5 

. 

2

V 

1.0 

. 10 

.Ol 

1 

I 

BRAVO and ROMEO 

Background 

1 1 I IIIII 

10 

Time After 

fqsq 

\ 

\ I \ 

Shot YANKEE a’\ 

Fallout 

I 

I L I I III 

100 

Shot YANKEE (Hours) 

\ 

\ \ 

\ 

\ 

A WECTAl 

, 

3 

I I II, 

1000 

A II HAY %I 

Figure 2-8. Kwajalein Atoll intensity following Shot YANKEE. 

44 

- ._._-_... _,,‘_ ._... ._ ._.... ._-_ . _. . . . . ‘., . . . _ -, ._-
Table 2-2. 

Integrated 

March Intensity (mR) 

1 (BRAVO) 0.0 

2 7.3 

3 21.2 

4 12.2 

5 8.1 

6 5.9 

7 4.5 

8 3.6 

9 3.0 

10 2.5 

11 2.1 

12 1.9 

13 1.6 

14 1.4 

15 1.3 

16 1.2 

17 1.1 

18 1.0 

19 0.9 

20 0.8 

21 0.8 

22 0.7 

23 0.7 

24 0.7 

25 0.6 

26 

27 (ROMEO) X:t 

28 0.5 

29 0.5 

30 1.1 

31 35.9 

Daily integrated 

April 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

76 (~00~) 

8 

9 

IO 

II 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 (UNION) 

27 

28 

29 

30 

intensity, Kwajalein Atoll. 

lntegra ted 

Intensity (mR) 

50.6 

38.8 

31.1 

25.7 

21.7 

18.6 

16.2 

14.3 

12.8 

11.4 

10.3 

9.4 

8.6 

8.0 

7.4 

6.9 

a5 

6.2 

5.9 

5.6 

5.4 

5.1 

4.8 

4.6 

4.4 

4.3 

4.1 

4.0 

3.8 

3.7 

Integrated 

May Intensity (m R) 

1 3.6 

2 3.5 

3 3.4 

: (YANKEE) ::: 

6 5.2 

7 6.5 

8 4.9 

9 4.2 

IO 3.8 

11 3.4 

12 3.2 

13 3.1 

14 (NECTAR) 2.9 

15 2.9 

16 2.7 

17 2.7 

18 2.5 

19 2.5 

20 2.4 

21 2.3 

22 2.2 

23 2.2 

2.1 

:; 2.0 

26 2.0 

27 1.9 

1.9 

f; 1.9 

30 1.9 

31 1.8 
? 

!Y, 

i’l - ‘.

Iii :-

; 

-* - 

: 

22.3 U!S APACHE (ATF-67) 

The APACHE encountered fallout after three of the CASTLE detonations. 

During the early afternoon of 1 March, while operating in an area southeast of the 

BRAVO GZ, the APACHE began receiving fallout at approximately 1300 hours 

(Reference 10). The ship’s washdown system was turned on several times during the 

day, which helped to reduce intensities somewhat, but it was not until early in the 

morning on 2 March when intensities leveled off at approximately 30 mR/hr and then 

began to decay. Figure 2-9 depicts the average topside radiation levels on the 

APACHE as derived from shipboard measurements taken through 0800 hours, 8 March 

(Reference IO). 

Approximately nine hours after Shot ROMEO, the APACHE began receiving a 

relatively light fallout while operating in an area southwest of the ROMEO CZ. At 

1600 hours, when average intensities had reached 20 mR/hr, the washdown system was 

turned on for an hour which quickly reduced intensities to approximately 1 mR/hr (see 

Figure 2-10). No further fallout was encountered by the APACHE on 27 March. 

During the late afternoon and evening of 28 March, while enroute to Enewetak, the 

APACHE again encountered fallout from Shot ROMEO. A peak intensity of 42 mR/hr 

was recorded at 1600 hours (Figure 2-101, but it was not until early in the morning on 

29 March, while anchored at Enewetak, that intensities were reduced below 20 mR/hr. 

The same fallout encountered by the APACHE while east of Enewetak eventually 

drifted westward resulting in fallout on Enewetak. Figure 2-4 shows *a very similar 

fallout “pattern” as that received by the APACHE except that its time of arrival was 

delayed somewhat and maximum intensity levels had decayed accordingly. 

The APACHE was anchored at Kwajalein when Shot YANKEE fallout occurred on 

that atoll. It is assumed that, while at anchor, the ship received the same fallcut as 

Kwajalein (See Figure 2-8). None of the other shots in the CASTLE series resulted in 

__. _- . --. . . _- shipboard contamination on the APACHE. -. - . - .. -

The APACHE entered the contaminated waters of Bikini Lagoon eight times 

during the operation; dates and times are detailed below. Based on the ship 

46 
i -

t 

1-

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

i_ 

. 

\

i 

. 

II 

I-

\ 

% 

i_ 

;r 

. 

. 

0 !

>-

8’ 2 Mar 4 nar . 

. 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

c- Figure 2-9. USS APACHE topside intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

r

I-

.-

. 

47 

i_ 

I. 

c 
lG0 I I I I Ii’1 I I I I Ill1 I I I I IIIT 

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

Shot ROMEO Fallout /r ', yAe u \ 

( \: 

---mm p-*-u I t 1 I II IILl 

10 100 1000 

A A A A 28 Uar 29 Har 30 Mar KOON "Nib &WE 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

_ ___ . .t .-

Figure 2-10. USS APACHE topside intsnsity followinp; Shot ROMEO. 

48 
contamination model described earlier, the average ‘intensity below deck due to 

contaminated lagoon water is calculated through the end of May. Intensities for each 

period in and out of the lagoon are integrated and are 

Time at Bikini Lagoon 

Month In 

March -

-

April 

May 

-

06/2009-09/l 555 

11/1559-12/0359 

13/0807-19/0905 

Zl/1937-22/1924 

25/0720-26/0940 

01/0838-05/1337 

13/1422-14/2000 

07/0950-13/2205 

Table 2-3 summarizes 

intensity on the APACHE due 

1 March to 31 May 1954. 

-

09/1555-l l/l559 

12/0359-l 3/0807 

19/0905-21/1937 

22/ 1924-2510720 

26/0940-O 1 /OS30 

05/l 337-l 3/1422 

14/2000-07/0905 

13/2205-31/2400 

the daily contributions 

to fallout (topside) and 

shown below. 

Integrated Intensity (mR) 

108.4 

33.4 

8.7 

11.1 

103.0 

15.9 

8.5 

13.0 

8.0 

23.9 

25.4 

20.8 

4.3 

37.6 

450.7 

152.6 

to the free-field integrated 

ship contamination (below) from 

i 

i 

-

-

49 
Table 2-3. Daily integrated intensity, USS APACHE. 

Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (m R) 

March Topside(Below) April Topside(Below) 

I (BRAVO) 234.9 I 129.7 

2 

3 

410.0 

132.3 s 88.6 

69.3 

4 71.6 4 55.9 

5 46. I 5 46.2 

6 

7 

32.7 

24.7 

(3.0) 

(45.8) F (~00~) 

79. 1 

33.6 

8 

9 

10 

19.4 

15.8 

13.1 

8 

9 

10 

29.2 

25.8 

22.9 

(2.6) 

(2.6) 

II 11.1 II 20.5 

VI 

0 

12 

13 

9.6 

8.3 (15.8) 

12 

I3 

18.5 

16.9 

I4 7.4 (19.4) 14 15.5 

15 

16 

6.5 

5.9 

(18.9) 

(17.3) :z# 

14.2 

13.2 

17 5.3 17 12.6 

18 4.8 18 11.9 

19 4.4 19 11.3 

20 

21 

4.0 

3.7 

(6.4) 

(4.8) 

20 

21 

10.8 

10.3 

22 3.5 22 9.9 

23 3.3 23 9.5 

24 3.2 24 9.0 

25 3.0 8.7 (1.6) 

2.9 :i (UNION) 8.4 (1.6) 

ZF (ROMEO) 

28 

9.9 

373.0 

(4.3) 

(4.1) 

27 

28 

8.1 

7.9 

29 417.1 0.9) 29 7.5 

30 231.4 (3.7) 30 7.3 

31 176.0 (3.6) 

May 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 (YANKEE) 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 (NECTAR) 

i’6 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 
224 U!SS BAlROKO (WE-1 15) 

At approximately 0800 hours on 1 March, the BAIROKO began receiving heavy 

fallout from the Shot BRAVO cloud (Reference 10). Material Condition ABLE was set 

throughout the ship and all unnecessary personnel were ordered below. All ventilation 

was shut down to minimize contamination of spaces below the hangar deck. The ship’s 

washdown system was activated at 0810 hours and remained on for approximately two 

hours, but failed to provide a sufficient volume of water to wash away the heavy 

fallout of contaminated coral sand (Reference 16). By this time average intensities on 

the flight deck were 500 mR/hr; intensities as high as 5 R/hr were measured in some 

of the cross deck gutters and a maximum reading of 25 R/hr was obtained from a 

flight deck drain. Fire hoses were broken out at approximately 1000 hours and u=d to 

wash down exposed areas for the remainder of the afternoon; by 1600 hours, average 

flight deck intensities had been reduced to approximately 200 mR/hr. 

Another period of fallout consisting of very fine particles was encountered while 

enroute to Enewetak between approximately 1700 and 2400 hours, 1 March. Fire hoses 

were again used to wash down the flight deck, forecastle, fantail, and the bridge until 

approximately 1900 hours. At this time, topside intensities were still quite high (180 

mR/hr), however, tad-safe personnel recommended sending all personnel who could be 

spared below decks because of the possibility of inhaling the extremely fine particles. 

No further decontamination was accomplished on 1 March (Reference 16). 

At 0800 hours on 2 March, a rad-safe survey indicated that average intensities on 

the flight deck were from 100-200 mR/hr. Decontamination efforts were carried out 

all day on 2 March and, by 2000 hours, intensity levels had been reduced to 

approximately 30 mR/hr (Reference 16). After two more days of decontaminating the 

flight deck and other exposed surfaces, average intensities of approximately lo-15 

mR/hr were recorded on 4 March, when decontamination was considered complete 

(Reference 17). Figure 2 -1 I depicts the average radiation intensity on the flight deck 

of the BAIROKO resultin,:: from Shot BRAVO fallout. The effectiveness of the 

decontamination efforts on 2 March are clearly evident by the sharp decrease in the 

average intensity between approximately H+28 and H+34 hours. Decontamination 

51 
Average Top&de 

- Measurements 

Maximum Topside 

Measurements 

-

10 100

A A A 

2 Mar 3 Har 4 l4ar 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure Z-11. USS BAIROKO topside intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

52 

. . 
efforts on 3-4 March were directed at cleaning up ‘hot spots”; hence, the decrease in 

average topside intensities is due mainly to natural radioactive decay. 

-

At the time of Shot ROMEO on 27 March, the BAIROKO was steaming in 

company with the EPPERSON southeast of Bikini Atoll. At approximately 1400 hours, 

it returned to Bikini and anchored in the lagoon where it remained until 5 April. At 

2000 hours on 28 March, the BAIROKO began receiving secondary fallout from the 

ROMEO cloud (Reference 10). Average intensities on the flight deck peaked at 25 

mR/hr during the early morning hours of 29 March, and the ship’s washdown system 

was turntd on intermittently between 0130 and 0400 hours. Thert is no mention in the 

BAIROKO’s deck log that further efforts were made to decontaminate the ship on 29 

March. On 30 March, intensities were down to approximately 10 mR/hour. Figure 2-

12 shows the buildup and decay of the Shot ROMEO fallout on the flight deck of the 

BAIROKO. Also shown is the Shot BRAVO background radiation on the ship and its 

contribution to tht total rtcordtd inttnsity. lht BAIROKO did not receive any more 

fallout following the four remaining shots in tht test series. 

In addition to exposure from fallout, the BAIROKOS saltwater piping system 

became contaminated whilt at anchor in Bikini Lagoon. By 4 March, “the average 

intensity in berthing spaces below the hanger deck was less than 2 milliroentgens per 

hour (gamma only)” and on 8 March, “the saltwater piping systems did not exceed 2 I 

b -

milliroentgens per hour (gamma only)” (Reference 17). This reference also states that 

I 

“all fresh water samples from the evaporators tested by Task Group 7.1 have shown 

: - l/5000 micro curies per milliliter or less.” Tht ship contamination model dtvtloped in 

I Section 2 is used to determine the crew’s exposure due to ship contamination. Specific 

dates and times in and out of the lagoon, along with corresponding integrated 

iintensities, are detailed below. 

i 

I -

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) I Month In Out In out

March 03/0834-12/1720 108.3 

12/1720-13/0720 1.9 

13/0720-26/2034 49.7 

26/2034-2711400 0.8 

April 27/1400-05/1226 16.2 

53 

. _ ,.,_ ._._. _ 
. 

100 

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

. ••Maximum Topside 

Measurements . 

10 

1.0 .

Fallout 

I BRAVO Background # 

0.1 C

1 100 

A A A 

29 ktar30 itar KOON 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-12. USS BAIROKO topside intensity following Shot ROMEO. 

54 

_' . ,. ._.. -. -_ .,.. -._-.*._.,. .,. . _-_ _ _..-:_~.-. -
Time at Bikini Lagoon lnttgrattd Intensity (mR) 

Month A Out In Out 

1.4 

otl1028-15/1317 10.0 

15/1317-16/1824 

April 05/1226-07/1028 

0.7 

16/1824-20/0953 3.5 

20/0953-2011427 0.1 

20/1427-25/1853 4.5 

25/1853-26/1535 0.4 

May 26/1535-04/1555 43.8 

04/ 1555-05/1643 4.8 

05/1643-05/1942 0.7 

Or/ 1942-06/0709 1.9 

06/0709-I 2/2227 174.2 

12/2227-14/l 132 7.8 

14/l 132-15/1701 7.9 

15/1701-31/2400 32.4 

Table 2-4 is a compilation of the daily contributions to integrated inttnsity on 

the BAIROKO dut to fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below). The daily 

integrated intensities calculated from the ship contamination model on 4 and 8 March 

are consistent with those observed below in Reference 17, i.e., less than 2 mR/hour. 

55 

. - - _- ,- _-_. . . ,.-. . -. ‘_. ..,.( 
Table 2-4. Daily integrated intensity, US!5 BAIROKO. 

Integrated Integrated 

March 

Intensity (mR) 

Topside(Below) April 

Intensity (mR) 

Topside(&low) 

I (BRAVO) 

2 

3943.4 

2150.7 

1 

2 

137.3 

107.6 

(1.8) 

(1.7) 

1 

4 

5 

487.5 

306.4 

195.2 

(13.2) 

(22.8) 

3 

4 

5 

69.6 

56.8 

47.5 

(1.7) 

6 130.9 (17.5) 40.6 

7 

8 

9 

94.2 

71.3 

56.0 

(14.1) 

(11.7) 

7” (KOONI 

8 

9 

35.3 

31.1 

27.6 

10 45.2 10 24.9 

il 37.3 11 22.6 

I2 31.3 12 20.5 

13 26.7 13 18.9 

14 

15 

16 

17 

23.1 

20.1 

17.8 

15.8 

(5.4) 

(4.9) :f 

16 

17 

17.4 

16.2 

15.2 

14.5 

18 14.1 18 13.8 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

12.7 

11.5 

10.7 

10.1 

9.6 

(3.6) 

0.4) 

(3.2) 

0.0) 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

13.2 

12.6 

12.1 

11.6 

11.3 

24 9.1 24 10.8 

25 8.6 25 10.4 

26 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

8.2 

7.8 

35.2 

(1.6) 26 (UNION) 

27 

28 

10.0 

9.8 

9.4 

29 492.1 29 9.2 

30 244.5 30 8.9 

31 163.8 

May 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 (YANKEE) 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 (NECTAR) 

15 

ft 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 
2.25 US BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) 

IAt the time of Shot BRAVO, the BELLE GROVE was slightly farther east of CZ 

than were the BAIROKO, ESTES, and PHILIP. When it received word that these other 

ships were receiving fallout shortly after 0800 hours, it steamed in a southerly 

direction and avoided being contaminated by the early-time fallout (Reference 10). At 

noon on shot day, the BELLE GROVE began receiving fallout. Material Condition 

ABLE was set at 1245 hours, and 7 minutes later the ship’s washdown system was 

activated (Reference 8). Even with the washdown system on, topside intensities rose 

to approximately 30 mR/hr before it was turned off and the ship opened up at 1537 

hours. Intensities continued to rise onboard the ship throughout the day, and by 2012 

hours when the ship was closed up and the washdown system turned on again, topside 

intensities averaged 300 mR/hr (Reference 10). The washdown system was turned off 

at 2115 hours and, when Material Condition BAKER was set at 2223 hours, intensities 

had been reduced to approximately 100 mR/hr. Figure 2-13 depicts the average 

topside intensities on the BELLE GROVE following Shot BRAVO. It appears that some 

efforts were made to decontaminate the ship betweeu 1600 (H+33) and 2000 hours 

(H+37) on 2 March when intensities were reduced to 21! mR/hr. 

The only other detonation in the CASTLE series that resulted in contamination 

of the BELLE GROVE was Shot ROMEO. On 27 March, the BELLE GROVE reentered 

Bikini Lagoon at approximately 1300 hours. During the early evening of 28 March, 

while still at anchor, the ship began receiving a relatively light fallout. At 2000 hours, 

topside intensities were 4 mR/hr and increasing (Reference 10). Material Condition 

ABLE was set throughout the ship at 2200 hours and, at midnight, average topside 

intensities were 20 mR/hr. From Figure 2-14 it appears that light fallout continued to 

contaminate the ship until approximately 0800 hours, 29 March (H+SO). Although the 

sharp decline in intensity after the peak is reached (Figure 2-14) suggests that 

decontamination was initiated, no mention is made in the deck log of any attempt to 

decontaminate the ship following Shot ROMEO. 

The BELLE GROVE entered Bikini Lagoon fifteen times between 2 March and 

the end of May. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as weli as the 

57 

‘Y 

i 
0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

-

-

- 10 100 

A A A 

2 n*r 3 lbr 4 Mar 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure 2-13. USS BELLE GROVE topside intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

-

58 

-:_ ..-. /r_. . . -_. _. . -,.*._. . ._ .. . j;.:.‘. - _ . -_. - *. -_--:;_‘_:..,,_~__.‘._.‘. . 

- -. ._ -. ._* ,*\ . .,I. . -. * ._ .*_ :, :. r* .‘. .*, _-_ : : : . . : . .- _- -. -. -. *_ _* . 
0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

BRAVO Background t 

A 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-14. USS BELLE GROVE topside intensity following Shot ROMEO. 

59 
, 

-

corresponding integrated intensities determined from the ship contamination model, 

- are given below. 

- Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In Out I 

- March 02/0730-06/I826 67.6 

06/1826-OS/O843 17.6 I 08/0843-12/1830 55.5 

- 12/1830-13/0630 2.4 1 13/0630-l O/O654 6.8 ! 14/0654-14/171 I 1.8 

’ - 14/171 l-26/2000 62.7 

26/2000-27/ 1300 1.1 

1 27/1300-29/1803 6.3 

1 29/1803-31/1606 2.8 

April 31/1606-05/1348 11.9 I - 05/1348-07/1050 2.1 . 07/1050-07/1450 0.2 

8’ - 07/1450-lo/1024 1.7 

: 10/1024-13/1224 5.1 . 

. 13/1224-13/1810 0.2 

13/1810-15/1427 2.7 I- 15/1427-16/1859 1.0 . 16/1859-2511937 12.7 . 25/1937-26/1656 0.6 

26/1656-29/1727 3.4 I -

May 29/1727-01/1007 1.0 

01/1007-04/1645 53.0 i 04/ 1645-05/ 1648 7.0 ,- 05/ 1648-05/20 13 1.5 

05/20 13-0610743 3.4 

06/0743-OS/ 17 15 142.1 

I--- 08/1715-lo/O443 27.9 

10/0443-lo/O857 2.7 l 10/0857-31/2400 55.0 

The daily contribution to the free-field integrated intensity on the BELLE 

GROVE from fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-5. 

-

60 

-
Table 2-5. Daily integrated intensity, USS BELLE GROVE. 

Integrated Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) 

March Topside(Below) April Topside(.Below) May Topside(Below) 

i (BRAVO) 1275.6 1 118.0 (2.8) 1 7.9 (10.2) 

2 1145.5 2 88.5 (2.6) 2 7.7 (18.5) 

3 

4 

284.2 

188.1 (19.8) 

3 

4 

69.5 

56.5 

(2.5) 

(2.4) 

3 

4 

7.5 

7.3 

5 155.5 (34.2) 5 47. I (1.5) 5 (YANKEE) 7.1 

6 

7 

107.7 

66.7 

(19.9) 

(10.6) F (KOON) 

CO.0 

34.6 

(1.1) 

(0.8) 

6 

7 

6.9 

6.7 

8 46.3 (13.4) 8 30.3 (0.6) 8 6.6 

9 36.8 (13.6) 9 26.9 (0.6) 9 6.4 (16.2) 

10 30.0 (12.9) 10 24.1 (1.1) 10 6.2 (9.3) 

QI P 

11 

12 

13 

25.0 

21.2 

18.3 

(11.3) 

(6.3) 

(7.2) 

11 

12 

13 

21.7 

19.7 

18.0 

(1.9) 

(1.8) 

(1.0) 

11 

12 

13 

6.1 

6.0 

5.8 

14 

15 

15.9 

14.0 

(4.6) 

(8.0) 

14 

15 

16.6 

15.3 

(1.7) 

(0.8) 

14 (NECTAR) 

15 

5.7 

5.6 

16 

17 

12.4 

11.1 

(6.8) 16 

17 

14.4 

13.7 I:-:; 

16 

17 

5.5 

5.3 (2.6) 

18 IQ.0 IZ 18 13.0 (1:5) 18 5.2 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

9.0 

8.2 

7.7 

7.3 

6.9 

6.5 

6.2 

&4) 

(5.1) 

(4.7) 

(4.4) 

(4.2) 

(4.0) 

(3.8) 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

12.4 

11.9 

11.3 

10.9 

10.5 

10.1 

9.7 

(1.5) 

(1.5) 

(1.4) 

(1.4) 

(1.4) 

(1.3) 

(0.9) 

i9 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

5.1 

5.0 

5.0 

4.8 

4.7 

4.6 

4.6 

5.9 Ii WN*ONI 9.4 (0.7) 26 4.5 

Z (ROMEO) 

28 

5.6 

48.5 

I;.%; 

(2:4) 

27 

28 

9.0 

8.8 

(1.3) 

(1.2) 

27 

28 

4.4 

4.3 

29 

30 

31 

291.7 

284.9 

175.7 

(2.3) 

(1.5) 

(1.4) 

29 

30 

8.4 

8.2 

(0.7) 

(0.6) 

29 

30 

31 

4.2 

4.2 

4.1 
2.2.6 US CURTIS!5 (AV-4) 

The CURTISS was in its assigned operating area southeast of the Shot BRAVO 

GZ when it began to receive fallout at approximately 0830 hours, 1 March. Average 

topside intensities increased to 8 mR/hr at 0900 hours before they began to subside 

(Reference IO). It appears the CURTISS must have been at the extreme .wuthern 

boundary of the “early-time” Shot BRAVO fallout pattern since those ships to the 

north of the CURTISS, the BAIROKO, ESTES, and PHILIP, received fallout of much 

greater intensity and duration at approximately the same time. 

Average topside intensities on the CURTISS had decayed to 2 mR/hr by noon, but 

at 1300 hours, the ship encountered another “wave” of the Shot BRAVO fallout. At 

1323 hours, Material Condition ABLE was set throughout the ship (Reference 8). The 

ship’s washdown system was activated intermittently between 1330 and 1700 hours, 

and average topside intensities reached 55 mR/hr before they began to decline. At 

approximately 1800 hours, the CURTISS was directed to proceed to Enewetak in 

company with the AINSWORTH, arriving there at 0730 hours, 2 March. Further 

attempts to decontaminate the ship during the night of 1 March are not documented. 

Figure 2-15 depicts the reconstructed radiation environment on the CURTISS resulting 

from Shot bRAV0 fallout. The steep decay rate between H+25 and H+33 :0800-1600 

hours, 2 March) indicates that some effort was probably made to decontaminate the 

CURTISS while anchored at Enewetak--probably flushing the weather decks with high 

pressure water from fire hoses. After this time, reduced intensities are primarily the 

result of natural radioactive decay and weathering. 

Shot BRAVO appears to be the only detonation that resulted in significant fallout 

onboard the CURTISS during its participation in Operation CASTLE. It is quite 

possible the CURTISS received some contamination from the ROMEO cloud as it 

steamed between Enewetak and Bikini during the evening of 28 March and early 

morning of 29 March. There is much evidence that the secondary fallout from Shot 

ROMEO that fell on the ships at Bikini at approximately 2400 hours, 28 March, also hit 

Enewetak 24-36 hours later. This potential source of contamination was not 

documented onboard the CURTISS and is not considered in reconstructing the topside 

radiation environment. 

62 
0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

-

-

-

-

-

-

10 190 

A A A

2 Har 3 Mar 4 Uar 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

- Figure Z-15. USS CURTISS topside intensity following Shot BRAVO.

-

63 

-
As mentioned previously in Section 2.2, the CURTISS entered the contaminated 

water in the lagoon fifteen times between 5 March and the end of May. Based on the 

ship contamination model, a profile of the average intensity below deck due to the 

contaminated water was reconstructed and presented in Figure 2-2. This intensity 

profile is time-integrated for each period in and out of the lagoon; results are detailed 

below. 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

March 05/0745-12/1712 122.0 

12/1712-13/1112 3.6 

13/1112-14/l 122 6.5 

14/l 122-15/0705 3.3 

15/0705-21/1430 36.3 

21/1430-21/1540 0.1 

21/1540-21/1728 0.2 

21/1728-2111912 0.1 

21/1912-26/1956 18.9 

26/1956-27/1500 1.4 

27/1500-27/2OCO 0.4 

27/2000-2910730 1.5 

29/0730-05/1300 18.5 

April 

07/1332-07/1948 

05/1300-07/1332 

0.3 

2.3 

07/1948-09/0745 1.0 

09/0745 - 13/0908 

13/0908-13/1753 

7.1 

0.3 

i 

13/1753-15/1342 

15/1342-15/1820 

2.7 

0.2 

15/1820-2511931 14.4 

25/1931-26/1653 0.6 

26/1653-01/0732 5.3 

May 

01/121 l-04/1616 

01/0732-01/1211 

50.8 

0.1 1:. i 

04/1616-05/1653 7.1 

05/1653-0511920 

05/1920-06/0702 

0.8 

2.4 i. 

(. 

06/0702-06/ 1905 

06/1905-31/2400 

13.2 

72.6 

The daily contributions to the integrated intensity on the CURTISS from fallout 

(topside) and ship contamination (below) are presented in Table 2-6. Following Shot 

64 

. . . . . ._ . . . :.--.:” 
1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i 

Table 2-6. Daily integrated intensity, USS CURTIS% 

Integrated Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) 

March Topside(Below) April Tops;de(Below) May Topside(Befow) 

1 (BRAVO) 

2 

400.3 

395.0 

1 

2 

1.9 

1.9 

1 

2 

0.9 

0.9 

(9.5) 

(17.2) 

3 146.7 3 1.8 3 0.8 (17.5) 

4 76.3 4 1.7 4 

5 47.8 (14.7) 5 1.7 5 (YANKEE) E 

6 33.2 (25.1) 6 1.6 6 0.8 

7 24.6 (21.1) 7 (~00~) 1.6 7 0.8 

8 19.0 (17.5) 8 1.5 8 0.8 

9 15.3 (14.9) 9 1.5 9 0.7 

IC 12.6 (12.9) 10 1.4 10 0.7 

11 10.5 11 1.4 11 0.7 

m 

v, 12 

13 

9.0 

7.8 

“(:*:; 

(3:4) 

12 

13 

1.4 

1.3 

12 

I3 

0.7 

0.7 (1.7) 

14 6.8 (7.3) 14 1.3 14 (NECTAR) 0.7 (2.3) 

15 6.0 15 1.2 15 0.7 (2.0) 

16 5.3 g:; 16 1.2 16 0.7 (1.8) 

17 4.8 $;; 17 1.2 (1.6) 17 0.7 (1.6) 

18 4.3 18 1.2 18 0.6 (1.5) 

19 3.9 &4) 19 1.1 19 0.6 (1.3) 

20 3.6 (5.1) 20 1.1 20 0.6 (1.2) 

21 3.3 (2.8) 21 1.1 21 0.6 (1.1) 

22 3.1 22 !.(, 22 0.6 (1.0) 

23 2.9 I:*;; 23 1.0 23 0.6 

24 2.8 (0:01 24 1.0 24 0.6 

25 2.6 (3.8) 25 1.0 25 0.6 

26 2.5 (2.8) 26 (UNION) 1.0 26 0.6 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

2.4 

2.3 

(1.4) 

(1.0) 

27 

28 

0.9 

0.9 

27 

28 

0.6 

0.6 (0.7) 

29 2.2 (2.1) 29 0.9 29 0.6 (0.7) 

30 2.1 (2.9) 30 3.9 30 0.5 (0.6) 

31 2.0 (2.8) 31 0.5 (0.5) 
BRAVO, the maximum intensity below deck on any ship due to contaminated saltwater 

systems was measured on the exterior of an auxilary condenser on the CURTISS 

(Reference 10). This reading was 30 mR/hr, but Reference 10 states that “the average 

intensity in the engineering spaces where this condenser was located was only about 2 

milliroentgens per hour” (48 mR/day). The ship contamination model predicts an 

average intensity below of 25 mR/day for the CURTISS (Table 2-6, March 6) which is 

consistent with a maximum readrng of 48 mR/day. It was calculated (Reference 6) 

that engineering spaces in the vicinity of saltwater piping systems would have 

intensities approximately 1.5 times the average below deck intensity; hence, the 

measured maximum on the CURTISS appears to support the ship contamination model. 

66 
-

- 2.2.7 USS EPPERSON (DDE-7 19) 

During the late afternoon and evening of 1 March, the EPPERSON was patrolling -

the waters off Wide Passage and Deep Entrance, Enewetak Atoll. Fallout from Shot 

BRAVO hit the residence isl-rids between 1745 and 2300 hours. It is assumed the 

- EPPERSON received the s; ..c fallout (see Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2-3). 

- Following Shot ROMEO on 27 March, the EPPERSON reentered Bikini Lagoon at 

1400 hours prior to returning to patrol duties that took it in a counter-clockwise 

direction around Bikini Atoll. The ship began receiving very light fallout as it 

departed the lagoon at 1600 hours. By 1900 hours, when it was approximately 20 miles 

north of Bikini, intensities suddenly rose to 25 mR/hr (Reference 10). The ship’s -

washdown system was activated at 1933 hours (Reference 8) and, when it was turned 

off 17 minutes later, topside intensities had been reduced to 10 mR/hr (see Figure 2-

- 16). Intensities continued to decrease until approximately 0400 hours on 28 March 

when they began to increase once more, rising to 15 mR/hr at 0800 hours when the 

ship was northwest of the atoll. No mention is made of any efforts to decontaminate 

the ship on 28 March. The ship continued around the atoll and reentered the lagoon at 

approximately 2000 hours. At 0650 hours, 29 March, the EPPERSON departed on -

another patrol assignment and immediately encountered more fallout. The washdown 

system was activated from 0708 to G73J hours. Average topside intensities were 

- mR/hr at 0800 hours (H+50), and a steady decline was noted thereafter (see Figure 2-

16). 

-

When Shot NECTAR was detonated on 14 May, the EPPERSON was in the 

vicinity of Ujelang Atoll to evacuate the natives if it became necessary. At -

approximately 1300 hours, when it became clear that evacuation would not be 

necessary, the ship was directed to return to Enewetak, arriving there at approxi-

- mately 1820 hours. Fallout on the residence islands of Enewetak began at 1830 hours, 

14 May; hence, the crew of the EPPERSON would have encountered the same fallout 

(see Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2-5). No significant fallout was encountered by this ship 

following Shots KOON, UNION, and YANKEE. 

-

-

67 

-

8 
-

-

100 . I I I1 IllI w I I I III1 1 1 I I lfI$ 

-

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

0 Maximum Topside 

Measurements 

J 

-

Total FalloutI 

0.1 

1 

I 

10 

A 20 War 

I 

29 

I 1 I 

tar diar 

Ill 

100 A 

KOON 

I Illll 

1000 AA 

UNION YANKEE 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-16. USS EPPERSON topside intensity following Shot ROHEO. 

68 

-
The EPPERSON entered Bikini Lagoon fifteen times between 3 March and the 

end of May. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as well as the 

corresponding integrated intensities determined from the ship contamination model, 

are given below. 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out -_ 

March 03/1656-03/2040 0.0 

03/2040-08/0840 0.0 

08/0840-08/l 045 0.2 

08/1045-09/0959 1.8 

09/0959-09/2017 4.3 

09/2017-l l/l700 14.8 

1 I /1700-12/0849 9.5 

12/0849-l 5/l 250 29.2 

15/1250-17/l 105 32.2 

17/l 105-18/1316 9.8 

18/1316-19/l 120 11.1 

19/1120-21/1340 15.1 

21/1340-21/1705 1.0 

21/1705-21/2200 0.8 

2 l/2200-23/1 124 15.3 

23/l I24-24/1258 6.5 

- 24/1258-26/0851 17.5 

26/0851-27/1404 6.2 

27/1404-27/l 557 0.4 

27/l 557-2812008 3.1 

28/2008-29/0907 2.3 

29/0907-29/1914 1.3 . 

: , 

29/1914-30/1054 3.1 - April 30/1054-01/1412 6.8 

01/1412-05/0837 25.4 

05/0837-08/0852 9.8 

08/0852-08/l 234 0.5 - 08/l 234-09/0847 1.5 

09/0847-0912 I46 1.6 

April/May 09/2146-)I/2400 58.1 -

The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensity on the EPPERSON 

- from fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-7. 

69 
i 7 7‘ I ---II 

Table 2-7. Daily integrated intensity, USS EPPERSON. 

2: 

March 

1 (BRAVO)

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

II 

I2 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

29 

30 

31 

Integrated 

Inknsity (mR) 

Topside(Below) 

47.4 

153.5 

85.3 

48.9 

32.4 

23.5 

18.0 

14.4 

11.800 

8.5 

6.5 

5.8 

5.2 

4.7 

4.3 

3.9 

7.4 

3.3 

3.0 

3.6 

2.7 

2.6 

2.4 

2.3 

52.2 

147.6 

142.2 

109.2 

57.5 

2.9 

(1.8) 

I;*;; 

(7:l) 

%-Z 

(8:5) 

It;*:; 

(lo:91 

(6.4) 

“,z 

(4:8) 

% 

(7:5) 

(10.5) 

(5.7) 

(2.9) 

(2.6) 

(4.1) 

(4.8) 

(3.1) 

April 

In tegra ted 

In tensiti (m R) 

Topside(Below) May 

In tega ted 

Intensity (mR) 

Topside(Below) 

1 

2 

3 

21.5 

10.2 

4.9 

1 

2 

3 

1.1 

1.1 

1.1 

(1.1) 

(1. I) 

4 4.0 1.1 If*:; 

5 3.6 :: (YANKEE) 0.9 (LOI 

6 3.2 6 0.9 

7 (K00N) 

8 

2.9 

2.6 

7 

8 

0.9 

0.9 

It*:; 

(LOI 

9 2.5 9 0.9 

10 2.3 10 0.9 K; 

11 2.2 11 0.9 to:91 

12 

13 

14 

15 

2. I 

1.9 

1.8 

1.8 

(1.8) 

(1.7) 

(1.7) 

12 

13 

:; (NECTAR) 

0.9 

;:I: 

25.9 

(0.9) 

(0.9) 

K; 

16 

17 

1.6 

1.6 

16 

17 

14.8 

8.8 

$;; 

18 

19 

1.6 

1.5 

IS 

19 

6.1 

4.7 

g:;; 

20 1.4 20 3.8 $9 

21 1.4 21 3.2 

22 

23 

1.4 

1.4 

22 

23 

2.8 

2.4 

$;; 

24 1.3 24 2.2 to:71 

25 

26 WNT0N) 

27 

1.2 

1.2 

1.2 

25 

26 

27 

1.9 

1.7 

1.6 

(0.7) 

I:*:; 

28 1.2 28 1.5 to:71 

29 

30 

1.1 

1.1 

29 

30 

31 

1.4 

1.3 

1.2 

(0.7) 

(0.7) 

(0.7) 
2.28 US!5 ESTES (ACC-12) 

At the time of Shot BRAVO, the ESTES was operating in its assigned area eastsoutheast of CZ, somewhat further north than the BAIROKO, PHILIP, and CURTISS, 

the three other ships that received early fallout from the BRAVO cloud. Heavy fallout 

began on the ESTES shortly after 0800 hours and Condition PURPLE II (Atomic Attack 

imminent, one half of crew at battle stations) was set at 0830 hours (Reference 8). 

The washdown system was probablv turned on at this time and remained on until 

approximately 1130 hours, which made it difficult to obtain reliable intensity measurements (recorded intensities for 0900, 1000, and 1100 hours are estimated intensities). 

A survey at 1125 hours indicated that conditions were worsening since Condition 

PURPLE III (Atomic Attack imminent, one third of crew at battle stations) was set at 

this time. By noon, topside intensities had leveled off at approximately 100 mR/hr 

(Reference 10). At 1400 hours, they began to increase again as the ship encountered 

more fallout. Topside intensities increased to 140 mR/hr at 1600 hours before they 

leveled off at 120 mR/hr for the next twelve hours. At approximately 1800 hours, the 

ESTES was directed to proceed to Enewetak Atoll. While enroute, the washdown 

system was activated intermittently but did not prove to be very effective in removing 

the fallout particles from the topside surfaces. Upon arriving at Enewetak at 

approximatelv 0800 hctlrs on 2 March (H+25), decontamination with fire hoses was 

probably undertaken for the remainder of the day. This is evidenced by the steep 

decav rate in Figure 2-17 between H+25 and H+35. After departing Enewetak at 1900 

hours (H+36), it appears that natural radioactive decay was primarily responsible for 

reducing the topside intensities. 

Following Shot ROMEO on 27 March, the ESTES reentered Bikini Lagoon at 

approximately 1300 hours. With the exception of a two-hour sortie to sea on 28 

March, it remained in the lagoon through 5 April. During the night of 28-29 March, 

the ESTES encountered fallout similar to that experienced on the other ships anchored 

in the lagoon. Average topside intensities reached a maximum of 12 mR/hr, but it 

appears that measures to reduce the contamination were not required. Figure 2-18 

depicts the topside intensities on the ESTES resulting from Shot ROMEO fallout. No 

other fallout was encountered by the ESTES during Operation CASTLE. 

71 

: : . : - : . . . ., 
-

o Average Topside 

- Measurements 

-

I--

lTime After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure 2-l 7. USS ESTES topside intensity following Shot BKAVO. 

72 
0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

••Maximum Topside 

Measurements 

1.0 -

BRAVO Background c 

0.1 IAL- __ 1 1u 100 

A A A A

20 nar 29 but 30 uat KOON

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-18. USS ESTES topside intensity following Shot ROMEO. 

73 
The ESTES entered Bikini Lagoon eleven times between 3 March and the end of 

May. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as well as the corresponding 

integrated intensities determined from the ship contamination model, are given below. 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

March 03/0814-l l/1027 191.7 

11/1027-l l/1700 2.1 

1l/1700-12/1725 10.3 

12/1725-13/0650 3.5 

I 3/0650- I3/2347 5.6 

13/2347-14/1236 2.5 

1I/ 1236-26/2039 82.3 

2612039 -2711325 1.6 

April 27/1325-0511227 31.6 

05/1227-07/1101 2.8 

07/l 101-12/1858 13.1 

12/1858-13/1616 1.0 

13/1616-15/1335 3.6 

15/1335-16/1912 1.3 

16/1912-2512228 16.6 

25/2228-2611552 0.6 

26/l 552-26/ 1952 0.2 

May 26/ 1952-041094 1 3.3 

04/094 I -04/2049 I.2 

04/2049-05/ 1709 2.6 

05/1709-05/ 1934 1.0 

05/1934-31/2400 12.1 

The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensity on the ESTES from 

fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-8. 

74 
1 I 

Table 2-S. Daily integrated intensity, USS ESTER, 

Integrated Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (m R) Intensity (mR) Intensity (m R) 

March Topside(Below) April Topside(Below) May Topside(Below) 

i (BRAVO) 

2 

2 132.8 

1460.2 

1 

2 

75.2 

60.4 

1 

2 

7.2 

7.0 :i-:; 

3 324.7 3 57.3 3 6.8 to:41 

4 175.0 (25.6) 4 47.3 6.6 (1.7) 

5 112.4 (44.1) 5 3? ,’ 15 (YANKEE) 6.4 (6.1) 

6 79.5 (33.9) 6 33.9 6 6.3 (2.8) 

7 59.9 (27.3) 7 (K00N) 29.5 7 6.2 (1.4) 

i 8 

9 

47.0 

38.1 

(22.6) 

(19.2) 

8 

9 

25.9 

23.1 

8 

9 

6.0 

5.9 

(O-9) 

(0.6) 

10 31.7 (16.6) 10 20.8 10 5.6 

II 26.8 (7.4) 11 18.9 11 5.6 I:-:; 

12 23.1 (9.8) 12 17.2 12 5.5 (0:3) 

. 

-.l 

VI 13 

I4 

20.1 

17.7 

(6.6) 

(7.9) 

13 

14 

15.8 

14.6 

(1.4) 

(2.3) 

13 

14 (NECTAR) 

5.3 

5.2 

(0.3) 

(0.2; 

15 I5 13.6 I5 5.1 

16 15.841 ::*“8; 16 12.7 16 5.0 I:*:; 

17 12.7 1”:; 17 12.1 17 4.9 to:21 

18 11.6 18 11.5 18 4.8 (0.1) 

19 10.6 ii:;; 19 11.0 19 4.7 (0.1) 

20 9.7 20 10.6 20 4.6 (0.1) 

21 9.1 (6:l) 21 10.2 21 4.5 (0.1) 

22 

23 8.6 5.1 1x; 

22 

23 

9.7 

9.3 

22 

23 

4.4 

4.4 

(0.1) 

(0.1) 

’ 24 7.7 &l) 24 9.1 24 4.2 (O-1) r 

/ 25 7.3 (4.8) 25 8.7 25 4.2 (0.1) 

26 7.0 (3.1) 26 (UNION) 8.5 26 4.1 (0.1) 

27 (ROMEO) 6.7 (3.2) 27 8.1 27 4.1 (0.1) 

28 

29 

29.5 

209.2 

(4.3) 

(4.0) 

28 

29 

7.9 

7.6 :; 9:: I:*:{ 

30 189.6 (3.8) 30 7.5 30 3.8 co: I) 

31 132.2 (3.6) 31 3.8 (O-0) 
2.2.9 USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH (TAP-181) 

At the time of Shot BRAVO, the AINSWORTH was about J-10 miles southeast of 

the CURTISS and did not encounter the early fallout as did the CURTISS, PHILIP, 

BAIROKO, and ESTES, all of which were north of the AINSWORTH’s position. At 1300 

hours, the ship began receiving fallout and, by 1700 hours, average topside intensities 

had reached 22 mR/hr (Reference IO). Although not explictly stated in the deck log, 

there is an indication that the ship utilized its washdown system shortly after the 

fallout started and also intermittently between 1600 hours, 1 March and 0800 hours, 2 

March. Figure 2-19 depicts the average topside intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

The leveling off at 20 mR/hr for a 12-hour period is indicative of either using the 

washdown system while fallout is still being encountered or cloud “shine”. The latter 

is unlikely since the AINSWORTH was in company with the CURTISS enroute to 

Enewetak during this time period and a similar phenonemon was not seen to occur on 

that ship (see Section 2.2.6). It is also noted from Figure 2-19 that decontamination 

with fire hoses may have been attempted between 1200 and 2000 hours on 2 March 

(H+29 to H+37), in order to reduce intensity levels to 10 mR/hr. 

Following Shot ROMEO on 27 March, the AINSWORTH, with many of the other 

TG 7.3 ships, reentered Bikini Lagoon at approximately 1300 hours. During the 

evening of 28 March and early morning of 29 March, the AINSWORTH encountered 

secondary fallout from the ROMEO cloud (Reference 10). Topside intensities peaked 

at 24 mR/hr at midnight but did not begin to decline significantly until approximately 

0800 hours, 29 March (H+50). The deck log makes no mention of efforts to 

decontaminate the ship on 29 March. The AINSWORTH remained in the lagoon until 5 

April when it got underway in preparation for Shot KOON on 7 April. Figure 2-20 

depicts the average intensities resulting from Shot ROMEO fallout. No other shot in 

the test series resulted in fallout on the AINSWORTH. 

The AINSWORTH entered Bikini Lagoon ten times between 5 March and the end 

of May. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as well as the corresponding 

integrated intensities determined from the ship contamination model, are as follows: 

76 
Time at Rikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

March 05/0830-21/1733 182.6 

2 l/ 1733-2210748 1.4 

22/0748-26120 I I 17.1 

26/201 l-27/1317 1.2 

April 27/1317-05/1310 24.5 

05/1310-07/1135 2.2 

07/l 135-IO/1918 6.3 

10/1918-12/0900 1.5 

12/0900-15/1409 5.2 

15/1409-16/1930 1.0 

16/1930-25/1535 12.6 

25/1835-26/ 1650 0.6 

26/1650-2712103 1.2 

27/2103-29/1200 1.0 

29/1200-04/1621 62.6 

04/1621-05/1838 7.6 

05/1838-05/2000 0.2 

05/2000-06/07 12 1.1 

06/0712-l l/1919 238.8 

11,“VlV-3lj2400 78.5 

The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensity on the AINSWORTH 

from fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-V. 

77 
0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

1 

1 10 A tr hr loo 1000 

2 Mar 3 4 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Ftgure 2-19. USNS FRED C. ALNSWORTH topside intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

78 
0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

Shot ROMEO 

Fallout 

BRAVO Beckground /' 

,,,,,,, 

100 

A A A 29 llrr 30 tlar roan u&i r:E 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-20. USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH topside intensity following Shot ROMEO 
. 

3.3 

2.8 

__ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __. _.. _ _ _ _

I I I I I I ‘

I 

_1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I 

Table 2-9. Daily integrated intensity, USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH. 

Integrated Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) 

March Topside(Below) April Topside(Below) May Topside(Below) 

I (BRAVO) 

2 

178.2 

381.9 

1 

2 

87.0 

54.6 

1 

2 

4.4 

4.3 

(12.8) 

(22.2) 

3 

4 

145.0 

114.0 

3 

4 

34.8 

28.5 

3 4.1 (18.6) 

5 

6 

7 

89.6 

63.7 

46.3 

(14.5) 

(24.2) 

5 

6 

7 (KOON) 

23.8 

20.4 

17.7 

45 (YANKEE) 

6 

:I”, 

3.9 

‘l&Z 

(46:O) 

8 35.3 8 15.6 78 3.76 ~~:=~; 

9 27.9 9 13.9 9 3.6 (34:2) 

10 

II 

22.7 

18.8 

(12.9) 10 

11 

12.5 

11.4 

10 3.5 (26.3) 

12 15.9 12 10.3 1112 3.3 %Z 

13 

I4 

15 

13.6 

11.8 

10.4 

13 

14 

15 

9.6 

8.8 

8.1 

fh (NECTAR) 

15 

::Z 

3.1 

(7:4) 

(6.4) 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

9.2 

8.2 

7.3 

6.6 

6.0 

(6.8) 

(6.3) 

(5.8) 

(5.4) 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

7.7 

7.3 

7.0 

6.6 

6.4 

16 

17 

18 

19 

3.0 

2.9 

2.9 

2.9 

:;*;; 

(4:5) 

(4.1) 

(3.7) 

21 5.6 21 6.1 201 2.8 :;*z 

22 5.3 22 5.9 22 2.6 (2:9) 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

29 

30 

5.0 

4.7 

4.5 

4.3 

4.1 

38.0 

354.2 

163.3 

(4.00) 

(4.0) 

(3.8) 

(2.0) 

(2.7) 

(3.3) 

(3.1) 

(2.9) 

23 

24 

25 

26 (UNION) 

27 

28 

29 

30 

5.7 

5.5 

5.3 

5.1 

4.9 

4.8 

4.6 

4.5 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

2.6 

2.6 

2.5 

2.5 

2.5 

2.5 

2.3 

2.3 

(2.7) 

(2.5) 

(2.4) 

(2.2) 

I% 

(L9) 

(1.8) 

31 114.8 (2.8) 31 2.3 (1.3) 
2.2.10uss cww (ARSD-1) 

At the time of Shot BRAVO, the GYPSY was in its assigned area east-southeast 

of Bikini (see Figure 2-1). Being much farther south than the BAIROKO, PHILIP, and 

ESTES, the GYPSY did not receive the early fallout that these ships did. Intunsities 

began to rise on the deck of the GYPSY at approximately 1400 hours and peaked at 

1800 hours when a shipboard survey indicated average intensities of 250 mR/hr 

(Reference 10). The GYPSY’s deck log makes no mention of the washdown system 

being turned on; however, a rapid decrease in average topside intensities to 150 

mR/hr by 2000 hours (Figure 2-21) suggests some efforts were made to decontaminate 

the ship, probably with fire hoses. Figure 2-21 also indicates that further efforts to 

decontaminate the ship were made between 0800-1200 hours on 2 March (H+25 to 

H+29) when average intensities were reduced to 45 mR/hr. The GYPSY reentered 

Bikini Lagoon at approximately 1300 hours on 2 March, and the following day the crew 

began to wash down (decontaminate) the LCUs and other small craft that had been left 

in the lagoon for Shot BRAVO. Topside intensities did not decay as rapidly on the 

GYPSY as on the other ships in the lagoon. It was surmised at the time (Reference IO) 

that the reason for this was that the ship’s weather decks were quite rusty, which 

appeared to hold the radioactive particles. Also, the ship was used extensively to 

recover contaminated chains and mooring gear from the bottom of the lagoon. Except 

for two brief periods out of the lagoon on 12 and 19 March, the GYPSY remained in 

the lagoon conducting salvage operations until it got underway for Kwajalein on 26 

March. 

The GYPSY arrived at Kwajalein on 27 March, but on 30-31 March when that 

atoll received fallout from Shot ROMEO (see Section 2.2.21, the ship was conducting 

aircraft recovery operations at Ailinglapalap Atoll. It returned to Kwajalein on 2 

April and on 9 April it departed for Pearl Harbor. The GYPSY did not return to the 

PPG during Operation CASTLE; hence, Shot BRAVO was the only detonation that 

resulted in fallout on this ship. 

nte GYPSY remained in Bikini Lagoon almost continuously from 2-26 March, 

departing only twice for brief periods. The ship contamination model described 

81 
Q Average Topside 

Measurements 

I 

( 

: 

. 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

p 

! 

k

,

t

,

1

.

. 

P

i 

, P ‘, :- . . . 

Figure 

\. 

2-21. 

. . . 

I’SS GYPSY topside intcnsi 

82 

_ _ \ 

ty following Shot BRAVO. 
Ii 

previously is used to estimate the crew’s exposure due to radioactive lagoon water. 

Specific periods in and out of the lagoon, and the corresponding integrated intensities 

for each period, are detailed below. 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) -

i Month In out In out 

March 02/1303-12/1812 4f4.1 

12/1812-13/0635 16.5 

i- 13/0635- 19/ 1750 101.0 

19/1750-19/2115 8.3 

? 19/2115_26/i256 63.4

f 26/1256-31/2400 22.9 

_- April Ol/OOOO-3012400 66.7 

Ic May Ol/OOOO-)I/2400 34.3 

T-

‘.* The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensities on the GYPSY 

from fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-10. 

83 
Table 2-10. Daily integrated intensity, USS GYPSY. 

Integrated Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) 

March Topside&low) April Topside&low) May Topside&low) 

i (BRAVO) 

2 

3 

4 

1519.8 

1554.4 

624.2 

442.5 (50.3) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

34.3 

33.0 

31.8 

30.7 

(3.4) 

(3.3) 

0.2) 

(3.1) 

I 

2 

3 

4 

15.3 

15.0 

14.7 

14.4 

(l-4) 

(1.4) 

(1.4) 

(1.4) 

5 

6 

334.5 

294.5 

(86.9) 

(66.8) 

5 

6 

29.7 

28.7 

5 (YANKEE) 

6 

14.2 

13.9 

(1.3) 

7 238.3 (53.7) 7 (KOON) 27.8 7 13.7 IF;; 

8 199.1 (44.5) 8 26.9 (2.6) 8 f3.4 (1:3) 

9 170.4 (37.8) 9 26.1 9 13.2 

10 148.4 (32.7) IO 25.3 10 13.0 z 

11 

I2 

13 

I4 

131.1 

117.2 

105.8 

96.2 

(28.7) 

(19.1) 

(16.9) 

(20.7) 

11 

12 

I3 

24.6 

23.9 

23.2 

22.6 

(2.3) 

(2.3) 

11 

12 

13 

14 (NECTAR) 

12.7 

12.5 

12.3 

12.1 

(1:2) 

(1.2) 

(1.1) 

I5 88.2 (18.9) f: 22.0 15 11.9 I:*:! 

16 81.2 (17.3) 16 21.4 16 11.8 Cl) 

17 75.3 (16.0) 17 20.9 17 11.6 

18 70.0 (14.8) 18 20.4 18 Il.4 I:-;; 

19 

20 

65.5 

61.4 

(9.7) 

(12.5) 

19 

20 

19.9 

19.4 

19 

20 

11.2 

11.1 

I:“; 

;; 

57.3 

54.5 

(I 2.0) 

(I 1.3) 

21 

22 

18.9 

18.5 f : 

10.9 

10.7 

g:;; 

23 

24 

51.6 

48.9 

(10.7) 

‘I...;; 

23 

24 

18.1 

17.7 

(1.7) 

(1.7) 

23 

24 

10.6 

10.4 

$;; 

25 46.5 25 17.3 (I.61 25 10.3 to:91 

26 44.3 (5:7) 26 16.9 (1.6) 26 10.1 

27 16.6 27 10.0 E 

278 (ROMEO) 42.304 I’t-:; 28 16.2 28 9.9 to:91 

29 38.7 (3:9) 29 15.9 29 9.7 

30 30 15.6 30 9.6 IZ 

31 31 9.5 (0:9) 

_ _. _ __ _ _~_.__ -_-- . .._ . ..__- _._____. __.~_~ _.- _ _ . , . _ __. .___ _ __.__ ^ . -.__.__- --
-- 

2.2.11 US!3 L!5T-551 

rAt the time of shot BRAVO, LST-551 was operating in an area 30 miles west of 

Enewetak. At approximately 1000 hours, the ship entered Enewetak Lagoon where it 

remained anchored/beached off Parry Island until 3 March, when it left for Bikini. It 

is assumed that while beached at Parry, the LST-551 received the same fallout as the 

residence islands of Enewetak between 1745 and 2300 hours on 1 March (Section 2.2.1 

and Figure Z-3). 

Shortly after Shot ROMEO was detonated on 27 March, LST-551, which had been 

I--

rbeached on Parry Island (Enewetak), got underway lu:, Bikini. At approximately 1500 

hours, the ship began receiving a relatively light fallout which peaked at 1900 hours 

with average topside intensities approaching 3 mR/hr. There is no mention in the deck 

log of efforts to decontaminate the ship, but by 0800 hours on 28 March, when it 

arrived at Bikini, intensities were only 0.3 mR/hr (Reference 10). During the night of 

28 March and early morning of 29 March, LST-551 was beached on Eneman Island at 

Bikini when it received more fallout. At 0315 hours on 29 March, Material Condition 

rABLE was set throughout the ship and the deck log states that it “took rad-safe 

measures”. Intensities at this time were approximately 25 mR/hr. From the deck log, 

_- it appears that crew routines during the day of 29 March were not altered by the 

presence of this contamination. Figure 2-22 depicts the reconstructed radiation 

environment onboard the LST-551 resulting from Shot ROMEO fallout. 

rThe only other radioactive fallout received by the LST-551 while at Operation 

CASTLE was following Shot NECTAR on 14 May. Althoqh shipboard radiological data 

was not obtained to document the NECTAR fallout, it is assumed that while anchored 

in Enewetak Lagoon on I4 May, the LST-551 received the same fallout as was 

experienced on the residence islands during the same time period (See Section 2.2.1 

and Figure 2-5). 

The LST-551 made eight trips to Bikini from Enewetak during Operation 

CASTLE. Specific time periods in and out of the lagoon and integrated intensities for 

each period as determined from the ship contamination model are as follows: I-. ? 

. 

.-

85 i 

I 

‘.-

\ 
100 I I I IllIll 1 1 I I llil I I lllll

I 

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

Shot ROMEO 

Time Af trbr Shot KtlNEO (burs) 

I’SS MT-5il topside intclnsity I’ollowin~ Shot ROFIEO. 

86 

1. _ ._.. ..-. _ _ . _ . . . . _._. _.. . 
. . . .:..- _- . . . .._ _.- _.,1;IJ%hhL*_... .‘.A.\ L-“r* .__ -

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In Out 

March 04/1200-09/1014 241.6 

09/1014-l l/1228 30.6 

11/1228-12/0952 IS.1 

12/0952-14/1600 21.3 

14/1600-Is/l405 26.7 

L6/1405-21/1020 30.2 

21/1020-2311641 19.5 

231164 l-28/0720 18.6 

2810720~2911452 7.4 

April 29/1452-031 I457 15.1 

03/1457-05/l 148 8.5 

05/l 148-17/1626 25.4 

17/1626-19/1822 6.1 

19/1822-27/1350 11.6 

27/1350-30/1233 7.0 

April/May 30/1233-31/2400 30.0 

Table 2-l I summarizes the daily contributions to the total integrated intensity 

on the LST-551 due to io’lout (topside) and ship contamination (below). 

2.2. I2 US N-762 

On 1 March, the LST-762 was anchored off Par? Island, Enewetak Atoll, and 

probably received fallout from shot BRAVO. Although shipboard radiological &ta was 

not obtained or documented on the LST-762 following Shot BRAVO, it is assumed that 

it received the same fallout as experienced on the residence islands of Enewctak 

durrng the evening of I March (see Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2-3). 

During the period 27-30 March, LST-762 was again anchored off Enewetak when 

Shot ROMEO fallout occurred on the atoll. Again, no radiological survey data on the 

LST-762 was recorded, but it is assumed that the ship received the rame fallout (see 

Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2-4). 

On 27 April, the LST-762 got underway from Enewetak enroute to Pearl Harbor. 

On 4 May, LST-975 rendezvoused with LST-762 and took it in tow for the remainder of 

its trip to Pearl. Two days later, on 6 May, both ships began receiving fallout from 

87 
_____ _ . __-__- -. ..-- ,, i

__ _(, - _,, _. _, -\ _,, - - .1

1. 1, ‘, ‘, ‘I ’\ ‘I ‘I ‘I ‘I I, 

Table 2-I I. Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-S51. 

March 

Integrated 

Intensity hR) 

Topside(Below) April 

Integrated 

Intensity (mR) 

Topsideklow) May 

ln tegra ted 

Intensity (mR) 

Topside(Below) 

03 

(D 

I (BRAVO) 47.4 I 104.6 (2.9) I 4.9 

2 153.5 2 61.7 4.7 

3 85.3 3 46.4 I:f; : 4.6 

4 48.9 00.0) 4 37.5 (5:o) 4 4.5 

5 32.4 (6 5.8) 5 31.1 5 (YANKEE) 4.3 

6 23.5 (56.9) 26.3 ::*t; 6 4.2 

7 ! 9.s (4 5.8) F (KOON) 22.6 (2:3) 7 4.1 

8 14.4 (38.0) 8 19.7 (2.3) 8 4.0 

9 11.8 (18.7) 9 17.4 (2.2) 9 3.9 

10 10.0 10 15.4 10 3.8 

11 8.5 It :-:; I1 13.9 I:*:; II 3.7 

12 7.4 (I 4:91 12 12.6 t2:01 I2 3.6 

I3 6.5 (9.2) I3 Il.4 (1.9) 13 3.6 

I4 5.8 (11.3) I4 IO.5 (1.9) 14 (NECTAK) 9.9 

15 5.2 (14.0) 15 9.7 (1.8) 15 28.4 

16 4.7 (9.7) 16 9.0 (1.8) 16 17.2 

17 4.3 (6.8) 17 8.5 (2.2) 17 11.2 

18 3.9 (6.3) 18 8.1 0.0) 18 8.4 

19 19 7.7 (2.4) 7.0 

20 ::: I;=;; 20 7.3 (1.6) :; 6.0 

21 3.0 (9:6) 21 7.0 (1.5) 21 5.4 

22 2.9 (9.0) 22 6.8 (1.5) 22 4.9 

23 2.7 (6.4) 23 6.5 (1.5) 23 4.5 

24 2.6 (4.3) 24 6.2 (1.4) 24 4.2 (0.8) 

25 2.4 (4. I) 25 6.0 (I.41 25 3.9 (0.8) 

26 2.3 0.9) 26 (UNION) 5.8 (1.4) 26 3.7 (0.8) 

27 (ROMEO) 19.5 0.7) 27 5.6 (1.7) 27 3.6 (0.8) 

28 46.9 (4.1) 28 5.4 (2.5) 28 3.4 (0.8) 

29 433.2 (5.6) 29 5.1 (2.6) 29 3.3 (0.8) 

30 229.6 30 5.0 (1.6) 30 3.2 

31 163.8 31 3.0 
••

-- 

_-

Shot YANKEE, which had been detonated on 5 May (Reference IO). At 1330 hours, 

average topside intensities had reached 20 mR/hr and the ship’s washdown system was 

turned on (Reference 8). With the washdown system still activated, intensities 

increased to 40 mR/hr by 1730 hours when the fallout apparently ceased. The LST975, which did not have a washdown system (Reference IO), reported shipboard 

intensities approximately twice those on the LST-762 (see Section 2.2.14). The 

washing down continued on 6 May and, by 0930 hours on 7 May, when decontamination a--

was terminated, intensities had been reduced to 5 mR/hr. On 8 May, a tad-safe survey 

on the ship indicated average topside intensities were 3 mR/hr. Figure 2-23 depicts 

r- the reconstructed radiation environment onboard the LST-762 resulting from Shots t 

BRAVO, ROMEO, and YANKEE, the only three shots in the series restilting in fallout 

P- onboard this ship. 

I 

The LST-762 sortied to Bikini Lagoon only four times during operation CASTLE. 

The ship contamination model is used to determine the crew exposure due to 

contaminated lagoon water. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as well 

r_ as the corresponding integrated intensities, are given below. 

T-- Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

w--

‘. March 03/1412-04/1930 12.1 . 04/1930-07/1410 42.8 

37/1410-1010819 84.7 7- 10/0819-13/1206 38.3 

: 13/1206-14/1307 15.0 

April 14/1307-08/1OlS 108.3 

-- 08/1015-l l/1242 12.3 

. 11/1242-31/2400 60.5 

?-- The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensity on the LST-762 

i from fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Tab1-J 2-12. 

. 

. 

!--

89 
_--

_-

_-

_-

t 

I 1 I ii0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

• Maximum Topside 

Measurements 

_-

I 

rr- Total 

t0.1 

L--

--

--

Figure z-23. 

Time 

USS UT-762 

After 5hot YANKEE 

tops idc intensl ty 

(Hou *s) 

Co1 lowing Shot YANKEE. 

--

--

90 

-

i 
Table Z-12. Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-762. 

March 

In tegra ted 

Intensity (mR) 

Topside(Below) April 

Integrated 

lntensity (mR) 

Topside(Below) May 

Integrated 

Intensity (m R) 

Topside(Below) 

I (BRAVO) 47.4 1 101.7 

2 153.5 2 78.4 

3 85.3 3 63.0 

4 48.9 4 52.0 

5 32.4 5 44.1 

6 23.5 37.9 

7 18.0 76 (~00N) 33.1 

8 14.4 8 29.2 

9 Il.8 9 26.1 

10 10.0 (15.0) 10 23.5 

11 8.5 (12.2) 11 21.3 

12 7.4 12 19.5 

13 6.5 13 17.8 

14 5.8 14 16.5 

15 5.2 15 15.3 

16 4.7 16 14.3 

17 4.3 17 13.5 

18 3.9 18 12.9 

19 3.6 19 12.2 

20 3.3 20 11.6 

21 3.0 21 11.1 

22 2.9 22 10.6 

23 2.7 23 10.2 

24 2.6 24 9.7 

25 2.4 9.4 

2.3 Z (UNION) 9.0 

;; (ROMEO) 14.5 27 8.7 

28 43.1 28 8.4 

29 67.2 (3.3) 29 8.1 

30 180.0 (3.2) 30 7.8 

31 139.7 (3.1) 

(2.9) 

(2.8) 

(2.7) 

(2.6) 

(2.9) 

(4.2) 

(4.2) 

(1.9) 

(1.8) 

(1.8) 

(1.7) 

(1.7) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 (YANKEE) 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

;; (NECTAR) 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

7.6 

7.3 

7.1 

6.9 

6.6 

298.3 

145.7 

66.6 

46.1 

35.0 

28.1 

23.5 

20.1 

17.6 

IS.? 

14.2 

13.0 

12.0 

11.2 

10.4 

9.8 

9.4 

8.9 

8.4 

7.9 

7.7 

7.4 

7.2 

7.0 

6.8 

6.6 

(0.9) 

(0.9) 

(0.8) 

(0.8) 

(0.8) 

(0.8) 

(0.8) 

(0.7) 

(0.7) 

- -- _..__ _-_. 
2.2.13 USS LST-825 

Although not part of the task group, LST-825 was operating in the Pacific 

Proving Ground prior to Shot BRAVO. The ship departed Bikini on 27 February and 

arrived at Enewetak the following morning. It remained anchored in the lagoon until 

approximately 0830 hours on 2 March when it got underway enroute to Japan. It is 

assumed that the LST-825 received the same fallout as the residence islands of 

Enewetak following Shot BRAVO (see Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2-3). Table 2-13 is a 

tabulation of the daily integrated intensities topside on the LST-825 as inferred from 

the island data. Since this ship did not enter Bikini Lagoon, there is no contribution 

due to ship contamination. 

2.2.14 USS LST-975 

On 28 April, while steaming from Japan to Pearl Harbor, the LST-975 was 

requested to rendezvous with the LST-762 at Ilo N, 1750 35’ E, and to take it in tow 

to Pearl Harbor. The rendezvous was accomplished on 4 May (See section 2.2.12). On 

6 May, while the LST-975 was towing LST-762, both ships encountered fallout from 

Shot YANKEE. By 1330 hours, intensities averaged 20 mR/hr on the weather surfaces 

and, at 1505 hours, General Quarters was called. The crew secured from General 

Quarters at 1556 hours (Reference 81, and fire hoses wlcre used in an attempt to 

reduce the shipboard intensities. At approximately 1730 hours when the fallout 

stopped, average intensities were as high as 96 mR/hr. By 0930 hours the next day, 

topside intensities had been reduced to 10 mR/hr; a subsequent survey on 8 May 

showed a further decrease to 7 mR/hr (Reference J.0). Figure 2-24 depicts the 

reconstructed radiation environment onboard the LST-975; Table 2-14 details the daily 

topside integrated intensities through 31 May resulting from Shot YANKEE fallout. 

Ship contamination from Bikini Lagoon is not an issue. 

92 
March 

I BRAVO) 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

\o 

w 14

I5 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

29 

30 

31 

Table 2-13. Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-825. 

Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) April Intensity (m R) May 

47.4 1 1.8 1 

153.5 2 1.7 2 

85.3 3 1.7 3 

48.9 4 1.6 4 

32.4 5 1.6 5 (YANKEE) 

23.5 1.5 6 

18.0 7” (KOON) 1.5 7 

14.4 8 1.4 8 

11.8 9 1.4 9 

10.0 10 1.3 10 

8.5 11 1.3 11 

7.4 12 1.3 12 

6.5 13 1.2 13 

5.8 14 1.2 14 (NECTAR) 

5.2 15 1.2 15 

4.7 16 1.1 16 

4.3 17 1.1 17 

3.9 18 1.1 18 

3.6 19 1.0 19 

3.3 20 1.0 20 

3.0 21 1.0 21 

2.9 22 1.0 22 

2.7 23 1.0 23 

2.6 24 0.9 24 

2.4 25 0.9 25 

2.3 26 (UNION) 0.9 26 

2.2 27 0.9 27 

2.1 28 0.9 28 

2.0 23 0.8 29 

2.0 30 0.8 30 

1.9 31 

Integrated 

Intensity (m R) 

0.8 

0.8 

0.8 

0.8 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.6 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

-

-

._-

;_ 

o Average Topside 

Measurements -

0 Maximum Topside 

Measurements 

b -

1- 00 -

i-

-

10 -

II L 

-

-

_-

-

Time After Shot YANKEE (Hours) 

Figure 2-24. USS LST-975 topside intensity following Shot YANKEE. 

94 -
Table 2-14. Daily integrated intensity, USS LST-975. 

lntegra ted Integrated Integrated 

March Intensity (mR) April Intensity (m R) May Intensity (mR) 

1 (BRAVO) 1 1 

2 2 2 

3 3 3 

4 4 

5 5 ; (YANKEE) 0 

6 6 6 611.2 

7 7 (KOON) 7 322.6 

8 3 8 154.1 

9 9 9 102.5 

10 10 10 74.4 

11 11 II 57.2 

12 12 12 45.7 

I3 13 13 37.6 

14 14 14 (NECTAR) 31.7 

I5 15 15 27.1 

16 16 16 23.6 

17 17 17 20.7 

18 18 18 18.4 

19 19 19 16.5 

20 20 20 14.9 

21 21 21 13.6 

22 22 22 12.4 

23 23 23 11.4 

24 24 24 10.5 

25 25 25 9.8 

26 (UNION) 26 9.3 

:7” (ROMEO) 27 27 8.8 

28 28 28 8.3 

29 29 29 7.9 

30 30 30 7.5 

31 31 7.2 
2.2.15 USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449) 

On 1 March, the NICHOLAS was approximately 300 miles south of Enewetak 

Atoll when Shot BRAVO was detonated and did not arrive at Bikini until 4 March. The 

NICHOLAS encountered no fallout following Shot BRAVO. 

Following Shot ROMEO, the NICHOLAS reentered Bikini Lagoon at approximately 1700 hours. At 2000 hours, the ship departed Bikini in company with the 

CURTISS enroute to Enewetal;, arriving there at 0800 hours, 28 March. The ship 

departed the evening of 29 March to patrol the waters east and southeast of the atoll, 

and returned at approximately noon on 30 March. Two waves of fallout occurred on 

Enewetak following Shot ROMEO (see Section 2.2.1)--the first during the evening of 27 

March and the second on 29-30 March (see Figure 2-4). It is assumed that the 

NICHOLAS encountered the second wave of fallout while it was in the vicinity of 

Enewetak. Figure 2-25 depicts the radiation environment as inferred from the 

Enewetak data. 

Approximately 7 hours after Shot UNION was detonated on 26 April, the 

NICHOLAS, while on patrol 90 miles west southwest of Biki.ni, encountered fallout 

from the UNION cloud. Material Condition ABLE was set at 1313 hours, and the 

washdown system was turned on (Reference 8). Intensity levels peaked at 1417 hours 

with average intensities of 37 mR/hr being recorded; a maximum intensity of 110 

mR/hr was also reported at this time (Reference 8). Washdown continued until 1429 

hours and Material Condition BAKER was set at 1440 hours. Figure 2-26 depicts the 

reconstructed radiation environment following Shot UNION. Radioactive decay after 

1417 hours (H+8) is assumed to follow the Bikini decay rates (Section 2.2). 

Following Shot NECTAR on 14 May, the NICHOLAS was on patrol in the vicinity 

of Enewetak Atoll. It entered the lagoon to refuel at approximately 1600 hours and 

resumed patrol at approximately 2200 hours. The time in the lagoon corresponds to 

the time when Enewetak received minor fallout from Shot NECTAR (see Section 2.2.1 

and Figure 2-5) and it is assumed the NICHOLAS received this fallout. 

96 
100 I I I Illll I I I I1111 I I I I 1111: 

10 

1.0 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-25. USS NICHOLAS topside intensity following Shot ROMEO. 

97 
1000 - I I II 1111 I I I Ill11 I I I Ilrll: 

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

••Maximum Topside 

Measurements 

Fallout 

1 1 I III rrl I I I IIll I 1 III11 

1 10 100 loOn

A A A A A 27 Apr 28 Apr YANKEE NECTAR 31 Hay 

Time After Shot UNION (Hours) 

Figure 2-26. USS NICHOLAS topside intensity following Shot UNION. 

98 
The NICHOLAS entered Bikini Lagoon fifteen times between 4 Marc)1 and the 

end of May. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as well as the 

corresponding integrated intensities determined from the ship contamination model, 

are given below. 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In Out In out 

March 04/0810-05/1935 106.2 

05/1935-07/1735 74.6 

07/1735-0712356 9.1 

0712356-l l/O900 47.0 

1 l/0900-11/1241 2.0 

I l/1241-24/0800 51.4 

24/0800-2511909 12.0 

25/1909-27/1701 9.9 

27/1701-2711956 0.6 

27/1956-01/0718 11.1 

April 01/0718-03/l 107 13.8 

03/l 107-05/1018 7.0 

05/1018-05/1217 0.3 

05/1217-07/1850 4.0 

07/1850-l l/1029 19.4 

1 l/1029-13/1747 6.2 

13/1747-14/0720 1.8 

14/0720-14/1558 0.7 

14/1558-14/1703 0.1 

14/1703-17/1332 2.9 

17/1332-17/1637 0.2 

17/1637-19/0919 1.2 

19/0919-20/0937 2.5 

20/0937-20/ 1352 0.4 

20/1352-21/0752 2.2 

21/0752-23/1016 3.8 

23/1016-25/1541 7.5 

25/1541-26/1759 2.1 

26/1759-27/1353 2.1 

April/May 27/1353-31/2400 41.6 

The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensity on the NICHOLAS 

from fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-15. 

99 
If I ff ’l Z) ’(f If 5 ’3 0) ’ (6

Of I OL ’6 1) ’ (3 Of 8s ’9 1) ’ (5 Of 9-s (6.0) 

62 8tl ’6 I) ‘(( 62 06 ’8 1) ’ (9 62 6-C 0) ’ (6

t1.0 Z) ’ (9 82 7 L9 ’fi 82 9 ’1 0) ’ (6 . F!t (03WOIl) 0 ZOf ’6 :z*;; LZ 9 ’f 1) ’ (0

91 0 tt (NOINn) L9Z ’9 1) ’ (6 92 9 ’9 1) ’ (0

!TZ 0 (9-6) 51 Z-8 WZ) <I 9 ’8 1) ’ (0

0 5) ’ (1 +lZ 8 ’9 f) ’ K tlZ L ’Z 1) ’ (0

:; 0 wa fZ 6 ’0 WC) fZ 9-L 1) ’ (0

zz Z-8 0 I) W zz e-6 1) ’ (2 zz . 1Z 6 ’8 1Z L-8 :; ‘I; IZ 0 2) ’ (8 . oz 0 (0-f) oz O1 ’f I:*:; oz C-6 1) ’ (1

61 0 61 01 ’6 1) ’ (1 61 L-01 1) ’ (1 . 81 0 I:*;; 81 11 ’ 11 1) ’ (0 81 Z1 ’f 1) ’ (1

/!l 0 iS=f) Ll ll ’I 0) ’ (9 11 f-cl 1) ’ (1

91 0 fi) ‘ (1 91 1 8-Z 1) ’ (0 91 lZ ’9 1) ’ (1

ST f f ’l ST 0 olw 41 fl ’9 1) ’ (0

111 0 fir 01 ’8 ill (WLXN) 631 ;; ‘I: . fl 0 I:*:; fl 91 ’1 r; ‘:: fl 8 ’6 (I:,) 

Zl 0 9) ’ (0 Zl Ll ‘9 (iZ) Zl 6 ’9 1) ’ (2

TJ 0 (O-8) II f-61 f) ’ (Z IT f-01 1) ’ (2

01 0 ll) ’ (L 01 TZ ’ Q S) ’ (L OT 11 ’1 l) ’(f

6 0 I) f ’ (5 6 fZ ’6 5) ’ (6 6 Zl ’I l) ’(f

8 0 51) ’ (6 91 ’6 S) ’ (Z 8 fl ’Z l) ’(f

L 0 8Z) ’ (L 8L (NOOY) Of ‘< (6-Z) L tll ’L l) ’(f

9 0 8f) ’(f 9 5f ’1 Z) ’ (O 9 91 ’5 l) ’ (Q

5 0 L) 1 ’ (8 4 lfi ’ O 1) ’ (8 5 (33YNVA) 81 ’8 1) ’ (3

tl 0 9s) ’ (0 t, L-83 KY) f7 ZZ ’ O 1) ’ 07

f 0 f 64 ’2 fi) ‘ (f f 9Z ’f l) ’ K

0 Z 3L ’1 WL) Z Zf ’5 Cl) 

: (Ohvxl) 0 1 C-96 5) ’ (1 1 ZQ ‘1 1) ’ (4

(*ol~cl)~P!sdol (~ol~G)~P!~d~l JdV I! 

Al!suaaul UJ) (a kyJa11q UJ) (X 

palPJ%lUI U] palPJ%l 

alqel 1-z 4 ‘ Al!q plPJ%lU! ‘h!sual~ !&Xl SVlOH3IN ‘
2.2.16 USS PHILIP (DDE-498) 

The PHILIP was providing plane guard for the BAIROKO when the two ships 

encountered Shot BRAVO fallout at approximately 0800 hours, 1 IMarch. Intensities 

rose rapidly and by 0900 hours, average topside intensities had reached 750 mR/hr 

(Reference IO). Although not stated in the deck log, the washdown system was 

probabIy activated at this time and all unnecessary personnel were ordered below. At 

approximately 1000 hours, when the fallout had ceased, decontamination efforts 

probably paralleled those being carried out onboard the BAIROKO, i.e., fire hoses were 

broken out and the weather decks flushed with high pressure water (see Section 2.2.4). 

This assumption is supported by the relatively rapid reduction in topside intensities 

between 0900 and 1200 hours (H+2.3 to H+5.3) as evidenced in Figure 2-27. Another 

period of fallout was encountered by the PHILIP between 1600 hours and midnight, 1 

March, when intensities increased to approximately 200 - 250 mR/hr before they began 

to decrease. Figure 2-27 depicts the BRAVO failout on the PHILIP. It does not appear 

that attempts to decontaminate after 2430 hours, 1 March (H+17), were very 

successful; the rate of reduction in topside intensities is not much greater than would 

be expected from natural decay alane. 

During the early morning of 27 March, the PHILIP was on patrol east of 

Enewetak Atoll and, at approximately 1030 hours, it joined company with the LST-551 

enroute to Bikini. While steaming in formation, both ships encountered minor fallout 

from Shot ROMEO at approximately 1500 hours; average intensities of approximately 

3 mR/hr were recorded on both ships (See Section 2.2.11). At approximately midnight 

on 28 March, while on patrol south and southeast of Bikini, the PHILIP encountered the 

same secondary fallout from the ROMEO cloud as that received by the ships anchored 

in the lagoon. Shipboard intensities reached a maximum of approximately 20 mR/hr at 

0400 hours on 29 March (Reference 10). Figure 2-28 depicts the reconstructed 

radiation environment on the PHILIP following Shot ROMEO. It is almost identical to 

the environment onboard the LST-551 (Figure 2-22). Shots BRAVO and ROMEO were 

the only two detonations that resulted in the ship receiving significant fallout. 

101 
10 A A A 100 1000 

2 Mar 3 Mar 4 Har 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure 2-27. USS PHILIP topside intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

102 

. . . . ,. ..-:. _- . . : .,.;,_ ._.__ 
1OOC I I I I III11 I I I1 IIll( I I I I IlIl1) 

t 

I I 1 

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

0.1 

1 10 100 1000 

A A A A 

28 uaar 29 Mar 30 naar KOON “NI$i kNKEE 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-28. USS PHILIP topside intensity following Shot ROMEO. 

103 
The PHILIP entered Bikini Lagoon fifteen times between 2 March and the end of 

May. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as well as the corresponding 

integrated intensities determined from the ship contamination model, are given below. 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

March 02/1910-02/2145 0.0 

02/2145-05/0738 0.0 

05/0738-06/ 1800 43.6 

06/1800-07/0857 39.2 

07/0857-07/ 1955 17.6 

07/1955-0910726 28.0 

09/0726-09120 18 12.1 

09/2018-l I/O800 19.5 

1 l/0800-1 l/2027 8.7 

1 l/2027-28/1305 94.5 

28/1305-28/1414 0.2 

28/1414-30/1127 3.1 

30/l 127-31/1901 7.5 

April 31/1901-10/1500 33.6 

10/1500-13/1605 15.2 

13/1605-lo/O742 1.8 

1Q/0742-lb/2000 1.5 

14/2000-2510933 17.0 

25/0933-25/ 1029 0.1 

25/ 1029-27/1600 1.6 

27/1600-27/1905 0.1 

27/1905-29/0940 6 .2 

May 29/0940-01/1006 1.0 

01/1006-01/1254 0.7 

01/1254-04/1236 140.8 

04/1236-06/0758 35.7 

06/0758-l 410745 807.1 

14/0745-14/1201 1.5 

14/1201-15/0735 20.5 

15/0735-31/2400 133.2 

The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensity on the PHILIP from 

fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-16. 

104 
Table 2-16. Daily integrated intensity, US PHILIP. 

Integrated Integrated In tega ted 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) 

March Topside(Below) April Topside(Below) May Topside(Below) 

1 (BRAVO) 

2 

3287.2 

2240.0 

1 

2 

134.1 

10 1.4 

1 

2 

10.4 

10.1 

(22.2) 

(57.3) 

3 736.2 3 80.2 3 9.9 

4 381.0 4 65.7 9.6 

5 234.3 (40.0) 5 55.2 4 (YANKEE) 9.3 

6 

7 

160.2 

117.3 

(39.8) 

(29.9) 75 (KOON) 

47.3 

41.2 

(3.3) 

(3.1) 

6 

7 89:; 

(134.9) 

(200.0) 

8 90.0 (18.2) 8 36.4 (3.0) 8 8.7 (138.8) 

9 

10 

71.5 

58.3 

(18.8) 

(12.7) 

9 

10 

32.5 

29.3 

9 

10 

8.5 

8.3 

(99.7) 

(76.6) 

5

VI 

I1 

12 

13 

14 

48.6 

41.2 

35.408 

(13.8) 

(9.7) 

:;=;; 

11 

12 

13 

I4 

26.6 

24.4 

22.4 

20.8 

11 

12 

13 

14 (NECTAR) 

8.1 

7.9 

7.7 

7.6 

15 

16 

27.1 

24.0 

I;::; 15 

16 

19.3 

18.2 

15 

16 

7.4 

7.3 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

21.5 

19.3 

17.5 

15.947 

13.9 

(6: 1) 

(5.6) 

(5.2) 

I*:; 

(4:3) 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

17.3 

16.6 

15.9 

15.1 

14.6 

14.0 

(1.7) 

(1.7) 

(1.6) 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

7.2 

7.0 

6.9 

6.7 

6.6 

6.4 

(10.7) 

(9.7) 

(8.9) 

(8.2) 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

13.2 

12.5 

11.9 

Il.3 

26.1 

3!.5 

(4.1) 

(3.8) 

(3.6) 

(3.5) 

123’:; 

23 

24 

25 

26 (UNION) 

27 

28 

13.5 

13.0 

12.6 

12.2 

11.8 

11.4 

(1.5) 23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6.4 

6.3 

6.1 

6.0 

6.0 

5.8 

29 

30 

393.3 

253.2 

(1:6) 

(2.8) 

29 

30 

11.1 

10.8 

29 

30 

5.7 

5.7 

31 189.3 (7.0) 31 5.5 

._ 
2.2.17 uss~~~s~~w(D13~49) 

On I March, when Shot BRAVO was detonated, the RENSHAW was on patrol 

approximately midway between Enewetak and Bikini Atolls. At about 2100 hours, the 

ship steamed toward Enewetak where fallout from Shot BRAVO was already 

descending (See Section 2.2.1). Although not documented, it is probable that the 

portion of the cloud responsible for the Enewetak fallout passed over the RENSHAW 

sometime during the evening of 1 March, exposing the crew to levels of radioactive .-

fallout comparable to those documented on Enewetak. Since shipboard intensity levels 

are not documented, it is assumed the RENSHAW received the same fallout as 

Enewetak following Shot BRAVO. (See Figure 2-3). 

On 27 March, the RENSHAW was on patrol when Shot ROMEO was detonated and 

it did not return to Bikini until approximately 1500 hours, 28 March. It remained 

anchored in the lagoon until 31 March when it resumed patrol duties. At 2000 hours, 

28 March, the ship began receiving secondary fallout from Shot ROMEO and by 2400 

hours, average topside intensities were 20 mR/hr (Reference IO). The deck log for 28-

29 March does not specify if decontamination of the ship was undertaken, but at 0800 

hours on 29 March when the crew was mustered, average intensities were less than 10 

mR/hr. Figure 2-29 depicts the average topside intensity onboard the RENSHAW 

resulting from the Shot ROMEO fallout. 

Following Shot NECTAR on 14 May, the RENSHAW briefly returned to Enewetak 

Lagoon at approximately 0800 hours and again at approximately 1730 hours. At 2200 - hours, it departed Enewetak enroute to Pearl Harbor. While in the lagoon between 

1730 and 2200 hours, the ship probably received the same fallout as the residence 

islands of Enewetak during this same period (See Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2-5). The 

three other shots in the CASTLE series did not result in fallout on the RENSHAW. 

The RENSHAW entered Bikini Lagoon eighteen times between 8 March and the 

end of May. Specific periods of time in and out of the lagoon, as well as the - corresponding integrated intensities determined from the ship contamination model, 

are given below. 

-

106 

. - . - - . . . . _. ._,. _.:, _* .:_ ._ -*_ ‘_‘\.-_ _ : _ ..-_ :,_..-_ .-. --_ .-; .-.,.-. : . . -_ .-. .-. , -..-. .-_ ;, .-_ .-. _-_ .- : : _- : . . _- _’ _-

.,,_. . . . ., *. 
Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

March 08/0738-08/1935 5.6 

08/1935-IO/O714 15.1 

10/0714-lo/1952 8.4 

10/1952-12/0726 15.3 

12/0726-1211058 1.6 

12/1058-13/1212 6.0 

13/1212-14/0041 5.4 

14/0041-14/1321 3.9 

14/1321-15/l 100 12.5 

15/l lOO-16/1225 10.4 

16/1225-18/l 122 31.1 

18/l 122-20/1322 16.8 

20/1322-21/1349 10.9 

21/1349-22/1850 8.2 

22/1850-2411018 17.2 

24/1018-26/1126 11.4 

26/l 126-26/1445 0.7 

26/1445-2811459 5.6 

28/1459-3110642 20.4 

31/0642-31/1742 1.9 

31/1742-31/1900 0.2 

April 31/1900-15/0733 24.2 

15/0733-l 5/0906 0.1 

15/0906-16/2227 1.2 

16/2227-17/1133 1.0 

17/1133-18/2105 2.0 

18/2105-18/2135 0.0 

18/2 135-28/0752 6.1 

28/0752-28/2000 0.7 

May 28/2000-01 /OS45 2.6 

01/0945-01/1226 0.4 

01/1226-01/1628 0.6 

01/1628-02/1315 25.3 

02/ 13 15-06/0847 75.9 

06/0847-0711958 243.2 

07/1958-31/2400 443.7 

The daily contributions to the free-field integrated intensity on the RENSHAW 

from fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) are shown in Table 2-17. 

107 

I 
-

-

100 I I I I1111 I I I I Ill1 I I I I I Ill: 

- 0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

0 Maximum Topside 

Measurements 0 

10 -

u 

‘- C 

3

! +I 

4 

‘- !z. 

g 

l1.0 -

L 

( 

-

0.1 I I I I III,1 I I

1 10 100 1000 

A A A A 

28 UAr 29l4Ar 30t4Ar KOON UNIQ &NKEEI 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 2-29. USS RENSHAW topside intensity following Shot ROMEO. 

108 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 

Table 2-17. Daily integrated intensity, USS RENSHAW. 

lntegra ted Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) lntensity (mR) 

March Topside(Below) April Topside(Below) May Topside(Below) 

1 (BRAVO) 47.4 1 54.0 1 2.8 (11.1) 

2 153.5 2 33.4 2 2.7 (33.2) 

3 85.3 3 23.2 3 2.6 (21.8) 

4 48.9 18.9 4 2.6 

5 32.4 : 15,8 (1.8) 5 (YANKEE) 2.4 

6 23.5 13.4 (1.7) 6 2.4 

7 18.0 F (KoON) 11.7 (1.7) 7 2.3 (153.1) 

8 14.4 (10.8) 8 10.2 8 2.3 (69.4) 

9 

10 

11.8 

10.0 

(9.8) 

(13.6) 

9 

10 

9.1 

8.1 

9 

10 

2.2 

2.2 

(49.8) 

(38.3) 

11 8.5 (10.1) 11 7.4 11 2.2 (30.8) 

12 7.4 (6.7) 12 6.8 12 2.1 (25.6) 

I3 

I4 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

6.5 

5.8 

5.2 

4.7 

4.3 

3.9 

3.6 

3.3 

I% 

I;;:;; 

(17:8) 

(10.1) 

(7.9) 

(6.0) 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

6.1 

5.7 

5.3 

4.9 

4.7 

4.5 

4.2 

4.1 

(1.6) 

13 

14 (NECTAR)

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

2.1 

8.4 

27.0 

15.9 

9.8 

7.1 

5.7 

4.8 

(21.7) 

(13.1) 

(11.9) 

(10.8) 

(9.9) 

21 

22 

23 

3.0 

2.9 

2.7 

(11.9) 

(6.7) 

(12.0) 

21 

22 

23 

3.9 

3.8 

3.7 

21 

22 

23 

4.1 

3.7 

3.3 

(9.2) 

24 

25 

26 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

29 

30 

2.6 

2.4 

2.3 

2.2 

17.8 

226.9 

141.9 

(6.7) 

(5.5) 

(3.7) 

(2.8) 

(5.0) 

(7.7) 

(8.6) 

24 

:6’ (UNION) 

27 

28 

29 

30 

3.5 

3.3 

3.2 

3.2 

3.1 

2.9 

2.8 

(0.6) 

(1.3) 

(1.0) 

(1.0) 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

3.0 

2.8 

2.6 

2.5 

2.4 

2.3 

2.2 

(6.9) 

(6.5) 

(5.2) 

31 71.8 (3.1) 31 2.0 (3.7) 
-

-

- 2.2.18 USS SIOUX (ATF-75) 

On I March, while operating in an area southeast of Bikini, the SIOUX began -

receiving fallout at approximately 1300hours (Reference 10). The washdown system 

was turned on at 1413 hours and used intermittently until 2000 hours, when it appeared 

- that the fallout had ceased. Average intensities had reached 50 mR/hr, but by 2000 

hours, they were reduced to 15 mR/hr. At approximately 2300 hours, fallout was again 

encountered and the washdown system was turned on at 2345 hours. Aver age 

intensities on deck rose to 40 mR/hr at 2400 hours. The washdown system was used 

intermittently until approximately 0200 hours on 2 March, when it became apparent 

that the fallout had ended (Reference 8). By the time the crew was mustered at 0800 

hours (H+25), average topside intensities had been reduced to 12 mR/hr. Figure Z-30 

depicts the radiation environment on the SIOUX resulting from Shot BRAVO fallout. 

- When Shot ROMEO was detonated on 27 March, the SIOUX was again in an area 

southeast of Bikini. After the detonation, the ship proceeded to the north of Bikini to 

search for Project 2.5 buoys. At 2400 hours on 27 March, when it was approximately 

50 miles northeast of Bikini, the SIOUX began receiving secondary fallout. The 

buildup was gradual, peaking at 30 mR/hr at 2000 hours on 28 March, when the ship 

was north of Bikini (and heading southeast). This was probably the same fallout that 

occurred onboard the ships anchored in the lagoon approximately four hours later. The 

ship continued toward Bikini, and at 0300 hours when it was off Enyu Island, it was 

ordered to proceed to Enewetak. At 0800 hours, while enroute to Enewetak, intensity 

- levels again rose to 30 mR/hr (Reference lo), probably from the same portion of the 

ROMEO cloud that the ship had encountered north of Bikini I2 hours earlier, and that 

passed over Bikini Lagoon between midnight and 0400 hours. Figure 2-31 depicts the 

average topside intensities resulting from ROMEO fallout. 

-

-

The SIOUX was in Enewetak Lagoon on 14 May when that atoll received fallout 

from Shot NECTAR. Although the SlOUX departed at approximately 1900 hours 

- (lallout had started at 1830 hours), it is assumed the ship received the same fallout as 

the residence islands (See Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2-5). 

-

-

110 

-
LOOO* I I I IIIII I 1 I I IllI\ I I I IllIf 3 

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

I 

: 

.

8. 

‘” 

‘. 

‘L 

:-

i

i- -

r 

10 100 

A A A 

2 uar 3 Mar 4 Uar 

Time After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure 2-30. uss s :OUX topside intensity following Shot BRAVO. 

-

111 

5 -. -. --*..-.-.-.. ::.-:..._:_ 
100 I I 1 Illll I I I1 III1 I 1 II11 

0 Average Topside 

Measurements 

10 

1.0 

0.1 

'1 10 100 

A A A A 20 liar 29 Mar 30 Ftar KOON 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

tigure 2-31. USS SIOUX topside intensity following Shot RONEO. 

112 
-.- In addition to receiving fallout while at Bikini and Enewetak, the STOUX was 

utilized to “map out” the over-water extent of the fallout following Shots YANKEE 

and NECTAR. While aiding in this experiment (Project 2.71, the SIOUX was required -

to steam through water contaminated by fallout and take periodic water samples and 

sea surface intensity readings. The ship’s path through contaminated water and water 

intensity readings are well documented for a five day period following Shot YANKEE 

(Reference 131 and it is possible to reconstuct the radiation environment to which the 

crew was exposed while participating in this experiment. Similar documentation is not 

as comple: * following Shot NECTAR since the USS MOLALA (ATF-106) served as the 

primary water sampling platform during this experiment. The few intensity readings 

obtained from the SIOUX indicate the ship was in water much less contaminated than 

it was after Shot YANKEE (Reference 13). The resultant crew exposure would thus be 

much less. 

-

Figure 2-32 depicts the reconstructed radiation intensity of the water through 

which the SIOUX steamed following Shot YANKEE. Several simultaneous measureL- ments made on the deck of the ship indicated deck level (topside) intensities due to I “shine” from the contaminated water were approximately 40 percent of the measured 

water intensities. 

I

I 

-

--

Prior to its Project 2.7 activities during May, the SIOUX was in and out of Bikini 

Lagoon on nine occasions between 6 March and 17 April. Integrated intensities due to 

hull contamination while in the lagoon have been determined from the ship 

contamination model. These are detailed below for each period in and out of the 

lagoon. 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

March 06/1726-09/1316 110.6 

09/1316-l l/2102 38.7 

1 l/2102-12/0456 5.1 

12/0456-13/0810 9.5 

13/0810-19/0910 102.4 

19/0910-21/1926 15.8 

i- 21/1926-22/1908 8.5 

22/1908-26/0141 16.7 

1_ 113 
t;i 

t-

: 

Ii-

!:-

I.

-i 

‘:__ 

‘.* 

’ _. 

6 May 

0000 

.‘- . 

8:‘ 

Lf-

! Figure 

-. 

I 

.’ 

L’_ 

b’ 

;’ 

y-

. 

. 

.

*-

. 

. 

i 

.-

. 

. 

. 

I 

7 May 8 May 9 May 

0000 0000 0000 

Date/Time (1954) 

2-32. Sea water intensity measured from the 

USS SIOUX following Shot YANKEE. 

114 
-- 

Time at Bikini Lagoon Integrated Intensity (mR) 

Month In out In out 

March 26/0141-26/1013 1.9 

April 26/1013-04/0900 22.5 

04/0900-05/1054 4.5 

05/1054-07/1320 6.0 

07/1320-09/1854 10.5 

09/1854-13/1425 9.2 

13/1425-14/1824 4.1 

- 14/1824-17/1735 6.2 

17/1735-17/1920 0.2 

April/May 17/1920-05/2300 16.0 

+05/2300-31/2400 1125.9 

*Off-site contamination 

Table 2-18 summarizes the daily contribution to the free-field integrated 

intensity on the SIOUX due to fallout (topside) and ship contamination (below) from 1 

March to 31 May. The tabulated topside values for 5-9 May include the topside 

contribution from “shine” while steaming in the contaminated water following Shot 

YANKEE. 

-

-

115 
Table 2-18. Dail!, integrated intensity, USS SIOUX, 

Integrated Integrated Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) Intensity (mR) 

March Topside(Below) April Topside(Below) May Topside(Below) 

I (BRAVO) 

2 

3 

4 

5 

244.3 

355.3 

119.0 

96.8 

96.0 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

90.5 

66.7 

47.1 

38.8 

33.0 

(2.3) 

(2.2) 

(2.1) 

(3.2) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 (YANKEE) 

7.5 

7.4 

7.2 

7.0 

25.2 

(0.7) 

(0.7) 

6 96.0 (9.0) 6 28.8 6 194.0 (422.1) 

7 96.0 (46.3) 7 (~00~) 25.4 7 34.3 (2 18.0) 

8 91.0 (44.5) 8 22.7 8 20.8 (I 33.4) 

9 73.6 (24.31 9 20.6 (3.8) 9 31.4 (93.6) 

10 60.1 (16.1) 10 18.8 (2.5) 10 6.0 (43.1) 

II 50.7 (11.4) 11 17.3 11 6.0 

12 42.5 (10.0) 12 16.0 12 5.8 

F

QI 

13 

14 

36.5 

31.8 

(16.1) 

(20.0) 

13 

14 

14.8 

13.9 fi (NECTAR) 

5.7 

12.1 (16.4) 

15 28.0 (I 8.9) 15 13.1 15 30.6 (14.4) 

16 24.8 (17.3) 16 12.5 16 19.4 

17 22.2 (16.0) 17 11.9 17 13.4 

18 20.0 (I 4.8) I8 11.4 18 10.5 

19 19 11.0 19 9.0 

20 18.165 :z; 20 10.5 20 8.0 

21 15.3 g:;; 21 10.2 21 7.3 

22 14.4 22 9.9 22 6.8 

23 13.6 (5:3) 23 9.5 23 6.3 

24 12.9 (5.0) 24 9.2 24 6.1 

25 12.3 (3.8) 25 8.9 25 5.8 

26 Il.7 (4.5) 26 (UNION) 8.7 26 5.6 

27 (ROMEO) 12.3 (2.9) 27 8.4 27 5.4 

28 316.8 (2.7) 28 8.2 23 5.3 

29 467.1 (2.6) 29 7.9 29 5.1 

30 175.0 (2.5) 30 7.7 (0.8) 30 4.9 

31 98.5 (2.4) 31 4.8 
SECTION 3 

DOSE CALCULATIONS 

-

-

-

-

-

To determine the dose to personnel, consideration is given to the time spent 

topside (outside) and below decks (inside) and the radiation protection afforded by a 

ship or building. The daily, free-field integrated intensities (topside and below) from 

Section 2 are adjusted to account for crew activities, either documented or assumed. 

The daily exposures (mR) ale then converted to film badge equivalence (mrem). 

Results are presented as a daily cumulative dose to personnel through 31 May 1954, 

when the CASTLE roll-up phase was nearly complete. 

3.1 PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES 

An estimate of personnel movements is critical in determining a film badge dose, 

especially during fallout deposition and at early times when intensities are relatively 

high and intensity levels are changing through decontamination. As inferred from deck 

logs and after-action reports, normal crew activities were somewhat altered during 

the day that S lot BRAVO fallout occurred. By the following day (2 March) normal 

crew duties were generally resumed. Because intensity levels were still relatively high 

on some of the ships, it is necessary to account for specific periods of time on deck in 

order to calculate personnel doses. Shot ROMEO fallout, on the other ban,, peaked at 

approximately 0001-0400 hours, 29 March, on nearly all of the ships anchored in Bikini 

Lagoon. Rad-safe measures, such as turning on the ship’s washdown system, were 

generally accomplished at a time when virtually aI of the crew was already below 

deck. By the time crews were mustered at approximately 0800, shipboard intensity 

levels had been reduced to where normal crew duties could be resumed without too 

many restrictions. Hence, it is not necessary to detail personnel movements onboard 

the task group ships following Shot ROMEO to estimate their dose. 

With the exception of 1-2 March, when actual times topside and below are used, 

the integrated intensities topside are multiplied by a time-averaged shielding factor to 

account for the time spent topside (outside) and below (inside) during a typical work 

day* It is estimated that the crew on each ship was on deck at the following times: 

117 

-
-

0800-1200, 1330-1700, and 1800-2000 hours. This amounts to 40 percent of the day (9K 

hours) topside and 60 percent (145 hours) below. While below, the crew was offered 

shielding provided by the ship’s structure. In References 3, 4, 5, and 6, it is estimated -

that ship-shielding factors vary from approximately 0.06 to 0.15, depending on the 

main deck thickness. A time-averaged shielding factor is computed as 0.4 + 0.6 x shipshielding factor, where the 0.4 and 0.6 represent the fraction of the day spent above 

and below the deck, respectively. The time-averaged shielding factors vary from 

- approximately 0.44 to 0.49. An average value of 0.46 (corresponding to a shipshielding factor of 0.1) is used in this analysis and variations are treated as an 

- uncertainty in Section 4. A similar argument is used to obtain a time-averaged 

shielding factor of 0.8 for the land-based personnel. This assumes that 60 percent of 

the day is spent outside and 40 percent inside. While inside, personnel are afforded a -

protection factor of 2, i.e., a shielding factor of 0.5. 

- In addition to being exposed to a fraction of the topside (fallout) radiation 

environment, crew members, while below, were exposed to radiation from the ship’s 

- hull and saltwater systems that became contaminated while in the radioactive waters 

of Bikini Lagoon. Since the typical crew was below for an estimated l4H hours per 

day, they received 60 percent of the integrated intensity below due to ship 

contamination. 

3.2 CALCULATED PERSONNEL FILM BADGE DOSES 

Film badge doses are calculated by applying the actual exposure conditions to 

the free-field integrated intensity and converting this to a film badge dose. Conditions of exposure include shielding as well as duration of exposure. When fallout was -

significant, actual periods topside (outside) and below (inside) are used, such as for the 

APACHE on I March when crew routines were altered due to BRAVO fallout. When -

fallout was relatively minor and duty routines were not significantly altered, film 

badge doses are calculated by applying the appropriate time-averaged shielding factor 

to the free-field integrated intensity and again converting to a film badge dose. The 

conversion factor has been determined to be 0.7 rem/R (Reference 7). The following 

sections describe the dose calculations for both island-based and shipboard personnel. 

I 

c 

i 

118 
Fallout on the residence islands of Enewetak Atoll following Shots BRAVO, 

ROMEO, and NECTAR was relatively light and daily duty routines would not have been 

altered. Personnel film badge doses are calculated by multiplying the daily free-field 

integrated intensities in Table 2-l by the time-averaged shielding factor for 

island-based personnel (0.81, and then by 0.7 to convert to an equivalent film badge 

dose. Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-l. -

Table 3-I. Cakzuhted ptrsoontl film badge &se, 

residence islands of Enewetak Atoll. 

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

I (I~RAVO) 27 1 594 1 954 

2 113 2 638 2 958 

3 160 3 673 3 962 

4 188 4 702 

5 206 5 727 : (YANKEE) Zf8 

6 219 6 748 6 973 

7 229 7 (~00~) 767 7 977 

8 237 8 783 8 980 

9 244 9 798 9 983 

10 249 10 811 10 987 

- 11 254 11 823 11 990 

12 258 12 834 12 993 

I3 262 13 844 13 996 

14 265 14 853 ;; (NECTAR) 1003 

15 268 15 861 1020 

16 271 16 869 16 1030 

17 273 17 877 17 1037 

18 275 18 884 18 1043 

19 277 19 891 19 1048 

20 279 20 898 20 1052 

21 281 21 904 21 1056 

22 282 22 910 22 1060 

23 284 23 915 23 1063 

24 285 24 921 24 1066 

25 287 926 25 1069 

26 288 :i (UNION) 931 26 1072 

27 (ROMEO) 296 27 936 27 1075 

28 320 28 941 28 1078 

29 358 29 945 29 1080 

30 459 30 950 30 1083 

31 537 31 1085 

119 

. 
. 

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3-2.2 Kwajalein Atoll DOSC Calcuhtiocu 

Fallout on Kwajalein Atoll following Shots BRAVO, ROMEO, and YANKEE was 

relatively light and daily duty routines would not have been altered. Personnel film 

badge doses are calculated by multiplying the daily free-field integrated intensities in 

Table 2-2 by the time-averaged shielding factor for island-based personnel (O.S), and 

then by 0.7 to convert to an equivalent film badge dose. Cumulative film badge doses 

through 31 May 1954 are given in:.Table 3-2. 

, 

; 

Table )_2. Calculated p&same1 film badge dose, Kwajalein Atoll. 

Cumulative ;, Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April :tiDose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

i (BRAVO) 0 1 98 1 273 

2 4 2 .il20 2 275 

3 16 3 ’ 37 3 277 

4 23 4 1.51 4 279 

5 27 5 5 (YANKEE) 281 

6 31 t !*; 6 284 

7 33 ? MOON) 183 7 287 

8 35 8 8 290 194 

9 37 9 1981 9 292 

10 38 10 205 L 10 295 

11 39 11 210 \ 11 297 

12 40 12 216 12 298 

I3 41 13 221 ’ 13 300 

14 42 14 225 ’ 14 (NECTAR) 302 

15 43 15 229 ; 15 303 

16 44 16 233 I6 305 

17 44 17 237 ‘. 17 306 

18 45 18 240 18 308 

19 45 19 243 19 309 

20 46 20 247 20 310 

21 46 21 250 21 312 

22 47 22 252 22 313 

23 47 23 255 23 314 

24 47 24 258 24 315 

25 48 260 25 317 

26 48 :ii (UNION) 263 26 318 

27 (ROMEO) 48 27 265 27 319 

28 49 28 267 28 320 

29 49 29 269 29 321 

30 50 30 271 30 322 

31 70 31 323 

120 

. 

-

-.;.-. . . . .i,-:,- -. :. *.-: _*.:* .-. .-_ .-...-\‘-._<._<\--._. ._- . . ._. ._- ,_. \- ..- <. .,. .,- . 
-

-

3.2.3 USS APACHE Dose Calculations 

-

‘The crew activity time-lines depicting periods spent above and below deck on l-2 

March are shown in Figure 3-1. Also shown is the average topside intensity during this 

- time period. For 1 March, periods during which the ship’s wa+down system was turned 

on are annotated as obtained from the APACHE% deck log. It is assumed that when 

the washdown system was on, all personnel were below. Other time periods above or 

below deck for eating, working, and sleeping are also annotated. On 2 March, a 

“typical” work day is resumed, i.e., 9K hours on deck and 14% hours below. 

I-

*-

II-

,-

I - Tin of D8y 

Figure 3-1. Crew activity time-line for the USS APACHE, 1-2 Grch 1354. 

121 
Dose calculations for personnel onboard the APACHE on 1-7 March are detailed 

below. Time periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk (*I. After 2 Mafch, the 

daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the integrated intensity topside 

(Table 2-3) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); the integrated intensity below 

is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below deck (0.6). Contributions from 

each source are summed and converted to a film badge dose. Cumulative film badge 

doses for the APACHE’s crew through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-3. 

Integrated Ship Shielding Adjusted 

Day Time Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (mR) 

1 March 0000-0600+ 0 0 

0600-0700 0 0 

0700-oIJoo* 0 0 

0800- 1200 0 0 

1200- 1330* 1.5 0.1 0.2 

1330-1430 ::; 1.0 5.0 

1430-1500* 0.1 0.4 

1500-1730 51.0 1.0 51.0 

1730-1900* 29.0 0.1 2.9 

1900-2000 24.7 1.0 24.7 

2000-2400+ 120.0 0.1 12.0 

234.9 (Table 2-3) 96.2 

1 March film badge dose = (96.2 mR) (0.7) = 67.3 mrem (Table 3-3) 

2 March oooo-0800* 229.4 0.1 22.9 

64.8 

OSOO- 1200-1330* 1200 64.8 15.0 E 1.5 

1330-1700 35.0 1.0 35.0 

1700-1800” 10.0 0.1 1.0 

1800-2000 20.0 1.0 20.0 

2000-2400 * 35.8 0.1 3.6 

410.0 (Table 2-3) 148.8 mR 

2 March film badge dose = (148.8 mR) (0.7) = 104.2 mrem 

Cumulative film badge dose through 2 March = 172 mrem (Table 3-3) 

122 

F -.-.- ‘_. -.._-*. -_..-_. ; _- ._. -_. _ _ - . -_ &, -_ . . -..*-. ‘. - .--C’.)-._.‘.r.. I _. f ,- .*:_._-_‘_ . _‘.-_‘-~ . . _--. 5s.-.m~*.v.’ \.,\.-jS:. -:. .::-‘.’ 1.’ _b. _. . _ . .-‘*t -_-:-.-:.=:-_-‘..:._-, _ _-_ ;. _- _ _-. P . _ . 

. * 
L ! 

Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS APACHE. 

i -

Table 3-3. 

Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) 

1 (BRAVO) 67 

2 172 

3 214 

4 237 

5 252 

6 264 

291 

ti 316 

9 332 

10 343 

11 353 

12 360 

13 370 

14 380 

15 390 

16 399 

17 408 

416 

tX 420 

20 424 

21 427 

22 433 

23 436 

24 439 

25 443 

;; (ROMEO) :;! 

28 573 

29 709 

30 785 

31 843 

April 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 (~00~0 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

tX 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 (IJNION) 

:: 

29 

30 

Cumulative 

Dose (mrem) 

887 

918 

943 

964 

980 

994 

1006 

1016 

1026 

1034 

1042 

104% 

1055 

1062 

1067 

1072 

1077 

1082 

1086 

1091 

1095 

1099 

1102 

1106 

1109 

1113 

1116 

1119 

1122 

1125 

Cumulative 

Dose (mrem) May 

1 1128 

2 1131 

3 1134 

4 1136 

5 (YANKEE) 1139 

6 1142 

7 1170 

8 1220 

9 1259 

1289 

:; 1314 

12 1334 

13 1349 

14 (NECTAR) 1358 

15 1366 

16 1373 

17 1379 

1% 1385 

19 1391 

20 1396 

21 1400 

22 1405 

23 1409 

1413 

I: 1417 

26 1421 

27 IQ24 

28 1428 

1431 

30’ 1434 

31 1436 

1 123 

‘;-- h 

i 
-

3.2.4 USS BAIROKO Dose Calculations 

Dose calcuk tions for the BAIROKO on l-2 March 1954 are detailed below. 

For 1 March, separate calculations are presented for the average crew and for 

crewmen involved in shipboard decontamination. For 2 March, it is assumed the 

“average” crew and “deck” crew had equal opportunity for exposure. Time periods 

below deck are indicated by an asterisk(*). After 2 March, the daily film badge dose is 

calculated by multiplying the integrated intensity topside (Table 2-4) by the time- -

averaged shielding factor (0.46); the integrated intensity below is multiplied by the 

fraction of the day spent below deck (0.6). Contributions from each source are 

summed and converted to a film badge dose. Cumulative film badge doses through 31 

May 1954 are given in Table 3-4. 

Integrated Ship Shlclding Adjusted 

lime Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (mR) Oay 

Average Crew 

1 March oooo-0600. 0 0 

0600-0100 0 0 

ogoo- 1300. 1901.9 0. I 190.2 

1300-1700 823.7 1.0 825.7 

1700-2900. 1215.g 0.1 121.6 

3943.e (Table 2-b) 117.) 

1 March film badge dose = (I 131 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 797 mrem (Table 3-b) 

Deco&e& Crew 

I March 0000-0600* 

0600-0tOO 8 x 

oaoo-1000* 660.3 0.1 66.0 

I ooo- 1200 917.9 1.0 917.9 

- 1200-13009 323.6 0.1 32.0 

1300-1900 Iltb.1 1.0 I lab.1 

1900-2000. 1157.3 0.1 

3911.0 (Table 2-b) 

- I March film badge dose = (2216 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 1600 mrem 

2 March OOOO-ogoo* 1165.6 0.1 116.6 

oaoo- I200 110.9 1.0 b80.9 

1200-1330. 112.0 0.1 IS.2 

I 330-I 700 152.1 1.0 152.1 

I700- I aoo* 33.5 0.1 3.1 - 1100-2000 62.9 62.9 

2000-2bOO* 113.7 ::: 

2150.7 (Table 2-b) 

- 2 March film badge dose = (Ib2 mR) (0.7 mR/mrem) : Sg9 mrem 

Cumulative film badge dose through 2 March = I386 mrem (Table 3-U) 

124 

-. 

i 
-- Table 3-4. Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS BAIROKO. 

_-

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

-

1 (BRAVO) 797* 1 2338 1 2585 

2 1386 2 2374 2 2594 

3 1543 3 2397 3 260 1 

4 1647 4 2416 4 2606 

5 1720 5 2432 5 (YANKEE) 2611 

6 1769 6 2445 6 2627 

7 1805 7 (~00~) 2457 7 2650 

8 1833 8 2467 8 2665 

9 1855 9 2477 9 2677 - 10 1874 10 2485 10 2687 

11 1889 11 2493 11 2695 

I2 1900 12 2500 12 2700 

13 1911 I3 2507 13 2704 

14 1921 I4 2513 14 (NECTAR) 2709 

15 1930 I5 2518 15 2714 

16 1937 16 2524 16 2717 - 17 1944 17 2529 17 2720 

18 1950 18 2534 18 2723 

19 1956 19 2538 19 2726 . . 

.:

- 20 1961 20 2542 20 2729 IL. 21 1966 21 2547 21 2731 -5 22 1970 22 2551 22 2734 t. 

23 1975 23 2555 23 2736 

24 1979 24 2559 24 2739 

25 1982 2562 25 2741 1’: 26 1986 :Z (UNION) 2566 26 2743 

27 (ROMEO) 1989 27 2569 27 2745 

28 2001 28 2573 28 2747 

29 2160 29 2576 29 2750 

30 2240 30 2579 30 2751 

31 2294 31 2753 

i 

-

*An additional 803 mrem would ha,re been received on 1 March by personnel involved 

in decontaminating the ship’s weather decks. 

-

125 
ii3.2.5 USS BELLE GROVE Dose Calculations 

Dose calculations for the BELLE GROVE on l-2 March when BRAVO fallout was 

encountered are detailed below. lime periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk 

(*I. After 2 March, the daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the 

integrated intensity topside (Table 2-5) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); 

the integrated intensity below is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below 

deck (0.6). Contributions from each source are summed and converted to a film badge 

dose. Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-5. 

Integrated Ship Shielding Adjusted 

Day Time Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (mR) 

1 March 0000-0600 + 

0600-0830 i i 

0830-1030” 

1030-1200 i.5 1.0 i.5 

1200-1530+ 39.6 0.1 4.0 

1530-1700 68.5 68.5 

1700-1800* 108.9 ::: 10.9 

1800-2000 411.0 1.0 411.0 

2000-2400* 647.1 0.1 64.7 

1275.6 (Table 2-5) 5Yz 

1 March film badge dose = (559.6 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 391.7 mrem (Table 3-5’ 

2 March 0000-0800 + 516.7 0.1 51.7 

0800-1200 218.9 1.0 218.9 

1200-1330* 75.0 0.1 7.5 

1330-1700 168.0 1.0 168.0 

1700-1800” 37.7 0.1 3.8 

1800-2000 49.2 49.2 

2000-2400* 80.0 A:: 8.0 

1 I= (Table 2-5) 507.1 

2 March film badge dose = (507.1 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 355.0 mrem 

Cumulative film badge dose through 2 March = 747 mrem (Table 3-5) 

126 
__ 

. . .._ _ _...., w-

-. 

/ 

-

‘-

Table )_5. Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS BELLE GROVE. 

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem) 

-

1 (BRAVO) 392 1 1495 1 1734 

2 747 2 1524 2 1744 ,- 3 838 3 1548 3 1754 

4 907 4 1567 4 1760 

5 971 5 1583 5 (YANKEE) 1765 

6 1014 6 1596 6 1787 

7 1040 7 MOON) 1607 7 1820 

8 1061 8 1617 8 1837 

9 1078 9 1626 9 1846 

10 1093 10 1635 10 1852 

11 1106 11 1642 11 1856 

12 1116 12 1649 12 1860 

13 1125 13 1656 13 1864 

14 1132 I4 1662 14 (NECTAR) 1867 

15 1140 15 1667 15 1871 

16 1146 16 1672 16 1874 .-

17 1153 17 1677 17 1876 

1158 18 1682 18 1879 

t “S 1163 19 1687 19 1882 

20 1168 20 1691 20 1884 

21 1173 21 1695 21 1886 * 

L 22 I177 22 I699 22 I8R9 1 

*- 23 Il!Il 21 1703 23 ISYl 

24 1185 24 1707 24 1893 

25 I I88 25 1711 25 1895 

;; (ROMEO) 11941 276 (UNION) 17147 267 18997

28 1211 28 1721 28 1901 . 29 I306 29 1724 29 1903 

30 1398 30 1727 30 1904 

31 1455 31 1906 

-

. 

‘c 

127 
._ _> _.,_. .- ._ “.e._J_,,_ .- _ _I.. -. -

I3.2.6 USS CURTIS!5 Dose Cakulations ‘-

Dose calculations for personnel onboard the CURTISS on 1-2 March are detailed ‘_ 

below. Time periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk(*). After 2 March, the 

/ daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the integrated intensity topside 

- (Table 2-6) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); the integrated intensity below 

is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below deck (0.6). Contributions from 

!_ each source are summed and converted to a film badge dose. Cumulative film badge 

doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-6. 

Integrated Ship Shielding Adjusted 

Day Time Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (ml?) 

1 March 0000-0600s 0 0.1 0 

0600- 1200 12.6 1.0 12.6 

1200-1800* 171.6 0.1 17.2 

1800-2000 83.2 1.0 83.2 

2000-2400* 132.9 0.1 13.3 

400.3 (Table 2-6) 126.3 

1 March film badge dose = (126.3 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 88.4 mrem (Table 3-6) 

2 March 0000-0800s 198.7 0.1 19.9 

0800- 1200 69.3 1.0 69.3 

1200-1330* 21.0 0.1 2.1 i-

. 1330-1700 38.1 1.0 38.1 

1700-1800s 10.0 0.1 1.0 

1800-2000 20.0 1.0 20.0 -

2000-2400* 37.9 0.1 3.8 

3m (Table 2-6) 15Gz 

2 March film badge dose = (154.2 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 107.9 mrem 

Cumulative film badge dose through 2 March = 196 mrem (Table 3-6) 

128 

i 
Table 3-6. 

Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) 

I (BRAVO) 88 

2 196 

3 244 

4 268 

5 290 

6 311 

7 328 

8 341 

9 352 

10 362 

11 370 

12 376 

13 380 

14 385 

I5 389 

16 394 

17 398 

18 402 

19 405 

20 409 

21 411 

22 414 

23 416 

24 419 

25 421 

26 423 

27 (ROMEO) 425 

28 426 

29 427 

30 429 

31 431 

Calculated personnel film badge 

Cumulative 

April Dose (mrem) 

I 433 

2 434 

3 436 

4 438 

5 439 

440 

F (~00~) 441 

8 441 

9 443 

10 444 

II 445 

12 446 

13 447 

14 448 

I5 449 

16 450 

17 451 

18 452 

19 453 

20 454 

21 455 

22 456 

23 457 

24 458 

25 459 

26 (UNION) 459 

27 460 

28 461 

29 462 

30 462 

dose, USS CURTISS. 

Cumulative 

May Dose (mrem)

1 467 

2 474 

3 482 

4 487 

5 (YANKEE) 489 

6 499 

7 505 

8 509 

9 512 

10 514 

11 516 

12 517 

13 519 

14 (NECTAR) 520 

15 521 

16 522 

17 523 

18 524 

19 524 

20 525 

21 526 

22 526 

22 527 

24 527 

25 528 

26 529 

27 529 

28 530 

29 530 

30 530 

31 531 

129 
__ _. __-. -.. 

3-2.7 USS EPPERSON Dose CaIcuIations 

The EPPERSON received relatively light fallout following Shots BRAVO, 

ROMEO, and NECTAR and crew duty routines were probably not altered by its 

presence. The daily badge dose is calculated by multiplying the integrated intensity 

topside (Table 2-7) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); the integrated 

intensity below is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below deck (0.6). 

Contributions from each source are summed and converted to a film badge dose. 

Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-7. 

Table 3-7. Calculated personnel film badge dose, USS EPPERSON. 

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

hAarch Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

I (BRAVO) 15 

2 65 

- 3 92 

4 108 

5 118 

6 126 

7 132 

8 137 

9 145 

10 151 

II 157 

12 166 

13 172 

14 177 

15 183 

16 193 

17 199 

18 203 

19 210 

20 214 

21 217 

22 223 

23 2?7 

24 231 

236 

I65 239 

27 (ROMEO) 257 

28 306 

29 353 

30 390 

31 410 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

7” (~00N) 

8 

9 

10 

II 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

;; (UNION) 

27 

28 

29 

30 

419 

425 

430 

434 

437 

439 

441 

443 

445 

446 

448 

449 

451 

452 

453 

454 

456 

457 

458 

459 

460 

461 

462 

463 

464 

465 

466 

467 

467 

468 

1 469 

2 470 

3 471 

4 471 

5 (YANKEE) 472 

6 473 

7 474 

8 474 

9 475 

10 476 

II 476 

12 477 

I3 478 

14 (NECTAR) 480 

I5 489 

16 494 

17 497 

18 5OO 

19 501 

20 503 

21 504 

22 506 

23 507 

24 508 

509 

$2 509 

27 510 

28 511 

29 512 

30 512 

31 513 

130 
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Dose calculations for the EWES on 1-2 March 1954are detailed below. For 1 

March, separate calculations are presented for the average crew and for crewmen 

involved in shipboard decontamination. For 2 March, it is assumed the “average” crew 

and “deck” crew had equal opportunity for exposure. lime periods below deck are 

indicated by an asterisk(+). After 2 March, the daily film badge dose is calculated by 

multiplying the integrated intensity topside (Table 2-8) by the time-averaged shielding 

factor (0.46); the integrated Lltensity below is multiplied by the fraction of the day 

spent below deck (0.6). Contributions from each source are summed and converted to 

a film badge dose. Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in 

fable 3-8. 

Intqpted Adjusted 

Time Period Intemitv (mRj x 5 Exposure (mR) !kY 

Averue Cm 

larch OOOO- 0 0 

136.6 136.6 

z bS5.i A:: 45.5 

IloO- 122.4 1.0 122.4 

1200- MY.0 0.1 20.3 

Iwo- 116.0 1.0 116.0 

ISOO- tS9.6 0.1 26.0 

l?OO- 120.0 1.0 120.0 

IaoO- 2W.O 0.1 24.0 

2w.o 1.0 240.0 

2200- 2W.O 0.1 24.0 

2i33 (frbk 2-8) ax3 

I Much film badge dose = (87@.8 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) z 612.4 mrem (Table 3-8) 

/Deck Crew 

IMuch ooood 0 

06oo-a 136.6 1.0 136.6 

0900-l 451.2 0.1 21.5 

1100-1 441.4 1.0 441.4 

IWO-1 2f9.6 0.1 26.0 

1700-I 120.0 1.0 120.0 

Iwo-l 120.0 0.1 12.0 

1900-a MO.0 1.0 MO.0 

2w)o-1 GO.0 0.1 12.0 

2m (t&k 2-8) 12x3 

I Much film w dou = (1273.5 mR) (0.7 mrrm/mR) = 191.5 mR 

2Yucll OOOQ-OaoO~ 172.3 0.1 a7.2 

OaOO-1200 253.9 1.0 253.9 

1330-1700 1200-1330~ 116.6 672 0.11.0 II:::

1700-WOO* 26.0 0. I 

l800-2000 bb.2 1.0 ::“2 

2oQo-2roo* 0.1 

14% (T&k 2-8) 5l8 

2 Much film badge dose -- (519.2 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 363.4 mrem 

Cwnu&tive film badge done tluoqh 2 Much : 976 mrem (T&k 3-1) 

131 
-

-

Table 3-a cakuhted persame film badge due, USS ESTES 

-

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

-

I (BRAVO) 612* 1 1664 1 1869 

2 976 2 1685 2 1872 

3 1080 3 1705 3 1874 

4 1147 4 1721 4 1877 

5 1202 5 1735 5 (YANKEE) 1882 

-

- 6 1242 1746 6 1885 

7 1272 t MOON) 1757 7 1887 

8 1297 8 1766 8 1890 

- 9 1317 9 1775 9 1892 

10 1335 10 1782 10 1894 

11 1346 11 1790 11 1896 

12 1358 12 1796 12 1898 - 13 1367 13 1801 1900 

14 1376 14 1807 f : (NECTAR) 1901 

15 1385 15 1812 15 1903 

- 16 1393 16 1817 16 1905 

17 1401 17 1821 17 1906 

18 1408 18 1826 18 1908 

19 1414 19 1830 19 1910 - 20 1420 20 1834 20 1911 

21 1425 21 1838 21 1913 

22 1430 22 1842 22 1914 

- 23 1435 23 1846 23 1915 

24 1440 24 1850 24 1917 

25 1444 1853 1918 

26 1448 Z WN10NI 1856 :: 1920 - 27 (ROMEO) 1451 27 1859 27 1921 

28 1463 28 1862 28 1922 

29 1532 29 1864 29 1924 

- 30 1594 30 1867 30 1925 

31 1638 31 1926 

-

* An additional 279 mrem would have been received on 1 March by personnel involved 

in decontaminating the ship’s weather decks. -

-

-

132 
2 

-

-

Dose calculations for personnel onboard the AINSWORTH on 1-2 March are -

detailed below. Time periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk (*). After 

March, the daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the integrated intensity 

topside (Table 2-9) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); the integrated 

intensity below is multiplied by the fractian of the day spent below deck (0.6). 

Contributions from each source are summed and converted to a film badge dose. 

Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-9. 

Integrated Ship Shieldig Adjusted 

Day Time Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Expo~re (mR)

1 March 0000-0600* 0 0 

0600-1200 : 0 

1200-1330* 0 

1330-1700 38.2 1.0 38.2 

1700-1800* 20.5 0.1 2.1 

1800-2000 39.5 39.5 

2000-2400 * 80.0 ;:: 8.0 

178.2 (Table 2-9) 8= 

1 March film badge dose = (87.8 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 61.4 mrem (Table 3-9). -

- 2 March 0000-0800* 160.0 0.1 16.0 

OSW-1200 80.0 1.0 80.0 

ItOO-1330* 27.9 0.1 2.8 - 1330-1700 47.1 1.0 47.1 

1700-18OO* 10.2 0.1 1.0 

1800-2000 20.9 1.0 20.9 

- 2000-2400” 35.8 0.1 3.6

3m (Table 2-9) 17i-x 

2 March film badge dose = (171.4 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 120.0 mrem - Cumulative film badg dose through 2 March = 181 mrem (Table 3-9) 

-

-

-

-

133 
___ 

Tabk 3-9. c8kul8ted pmomel fib badge &se, lJSN!i FRED C AINsI0Rl-H. 

-

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrcm) May Dose (mreml

1 (BRAVO) 61 I 738 1 877 

- 2 181 2 757 2 888 

3 228 3 769 3 897 

4 265 4 779 4 903 

5 300 5 787 5 (YANKEE) 906 - 6 331 6 794 6 927 

7 354 7 (~00~) 801 7 959 

8 373 8 807 8 980 

- 9 388 9 812 9 995 

10 401 10 817 IO 1008 

II 412 11 821 II 1016 

12 421 I2 824 12 1020 - 13 429 13 828 13 1024 

14 437 14 832 14 (NECTAR) 1028 

15 443 15 835 15 1032 

- 16 449 16 838 16 1035 

17 454 17 841 17 1037 

18 459 18 844 18 1040 

19 463 19 846 19 1043 -

20 467 20 849 20 1045 

21 471 21 852 21 1047 

22 474 22 854 22 1049 - 23 477 23 857 23 1051 

24 480 24 859 24 1053 

25 483 25 861 25 1055 

26 486 26 (UNION) 863 26 1057 

27 (ROMEO) 488 27 865 27 1058 

28 502 28 867 28 1060 

29 617 29 869 29 1062 

-

- 30 671 30 870 30 1063 

31 709 31 1064 

-

-

-

-

134 

-
0 

-

3.210 u3sCwSY DoaeCakula~ 

Dose calculations for the GYPSY on 1-2 March when BRAVO fallout was 

encountered are detailed below. Time periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk 

(*I. After 2 March, the daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the 

- integrated intensity topside (Table t-10) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); 

the integrated intensity below is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below 

deck (0.6). Contributions from each source are summed and converted to a film badge 

I dose. Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-10. 

I -

Integrated Ship Shielding Adjusted 

Day Time Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (mR)

I1 March oooo-O6oo* 0600-1200 0 x 

1200-1330. 32::: 0.1 0.1 i

I 

. 

.- 1330-1700 1.0 324.5 . 

. 1700-1800, 240.0 0.1 24.0 

1800-1900 223.7 223.7 

I 

: 

- 1900-2400. 730.8 73.1 

1519.5 (Table 2-10) 6zz 

I March film badge dose = (645.4 mRX0.7 mrem/mR) = 451.8 mrem (Table 3- 101 

2 March 0000-0800* 852.6 0.1 85.3 

OSOO-1200 241.6 1.0 241.6 

12OG1330* I 330- 1700 1$:“7 0.11.0 14;:; 

1700- 1800* 38.5 0.1 3.9 

1800-2000 73.0 1.0 73.0 

2000-2400* 140.0 0.1 14.0 

‘- 155~(Table 2- IO) m-l 

2 March film badge dose = (567. I mRH0.7 mrem/mR) = 397.0 mrem 

Cumulative film badge dose through 2 March = 849 mrem (Table 3-l 0) 

135 
i 

_-

Table )_10. Clrkulated per#mcl film badge dos, uss GYPSY. 

-

I-

) --

I

,-

-

-

-

Cumulative 

March Dose (mrcm) 

1 (BRAVO) 452 

2 849 

3 1050 

4 1213 

5 1357 

6 1480 

7 1580 

8 1662 

9 1733 

10 1795 

II 1849 

12 1895 

13 1936 

I4 1975 

15 2012 

16 2045 

17 2076 

18 2105 

19 2130 

20 2155 

21 2179 

22 220 1 

23 2222 

24 2242 

25 2261 

26 2278 

27 (ROMEO) 2293 

28 2308 

29 2322 

30 2336 

31 2349 

Cumulative 

April Dose (mrem) 

I 2361 

2 2373 

3 2385 

4 2396 

5 2407 

6 2417 

7 (KOON) 2427 

8 2437 

9 2446 

10 2456 

11 2464 

12 2473 

13 2482 

14 2490 

15 2498 

16 2505 

17 2513 

18 2520 

19 2528 

20 2535 

21 2542 

22 2548 

23 2555 

24 2561 

2567 

:65 (UN*ON) 2574 

27 2580 

28 2585 

29 2591 

30 2597 

Cumulative 

May Dose (mrem)

1 2602 

2 2608 

3 2613 

4 2618 

5 (YANKEE) 2623 

6 2628 

7 2633 

8 2638 

9 2643 

10 2648 

II 2652 

12 2657 

13 266 1 

i4 (NECTAR) 2666 

15 2670 

16 2674 

17 2678 

18 2682 

19 2687 

20 269 1 

21 2694 

22 2698 

23 2702 

24 2706 

25 2710 

26 2713 

27 2717 

28 2720 

29 2724 

30 2727 

31 2731 

. 

136 
3211 ussLST-551 l&m caklJhtiaul 

The LST-551 experienced fallout after Shots BRAVO, ROMEO, and NECTAR 

while participating at Operation CASTLE. All fallout was either light (Shots BRAVO 

and NECTAR), or came at a time when normal crew rol:tines were not significantly 

altered by its presence (ROMEO). The daily film bsdge dose is calculated by 

multiplying the integrated intensity topside (Table 2-I I) by the time-averaged 

shielding factor (0.46); the integrated intensity below is multiplied by the fraction of 

the day spent below deck (0.6). Contributions from each source are summed and 

converted to a film badge dose. Table 3-l I gives the cumulative film badge dose 

through 31 May 1954. 

3.2-12 us!5 IS-762 oosc cak&atiorH 

Most of the fallout that was experienced onboard the LST-762 occurred while 

the ship was beached on Parry Island, Enewetak Atoll (Shots BRAVO and ROMEO). 

This fallout was relatively light and normal crew routines were probably not altered by 

its presence. Although Shot YANKEE fallout necessitated using the ship’s washdown 

system intermittently for a four-hour period during the afternoon of 6 May, intensities 

-_ were not so high as to seriously restrict crew duties. A “typical” work day has been 

assumed on 6 May which tends to high-side the dose calculated for that day. The daily 

film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the integrated intensity topside 

(Table 2- 12) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); the integrated intensity ‘. 

below is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below deck (0.6). Contributions ‘. 1 

from each source are summed and converted to a film badge dose. Cumulative film 

badge doses are given in Table 3- 13 thorugh 3f May 1954. i 

- / -. 

3.213 USS LsT-g25 Dose Cablations ‘. 

The LST-825 experienced light fallout following Shot BRAVO as it was passing 

through the PPC enroute to Japan. CICW activities woi;!d rat have been Y..W. =r*=+*ed by 

this contamination. Since the ship’s hull and interior saltwater systems did not become 

contaminated from steaming in radioactive water, personnel film badge doses are 

calculated by multiplying the integrated free-field intensities in Table 2- 13 by the 

time-averaged shielding factor (0.461, and then by 0.7 to convert to a film badge dose. 

Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3- 13. 

137 

._- . . . . .._ -; ..- _ _. ,.‘._.‘. ..: ‘. : :-
Table f-11. Cakuhted perscmel film badge dose, USS LST-551. 

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) Dose (mrem) - -- May 

-

I (BRAVO) 15 I 666 I 835 

2 65 2 687 2 837 

3 92 3 704 3 839 

4 120 4 718 4 841 

5 158 5 729 5 (YANKEE) 843 

6 190 6 739 6 845 

7 215 7 (KOON) 747 7 847 

8 236 8 ?54 8 849 

9 247 9 761 9 850 

10 256 10 767 10 852 

11 264 11 772 11 853 

12 274 12 777 I2 855 

I3 280 I3 781 13 857 

I4 287 I4 785 ;; (NECTAR) 860 

15 294 15 789 877 

16 300 16 793 16 876 

17 304 17 797 17 880 

18 308 18 800 18 883 

19 311 19 804 19 885 

1. 20 315 20 807 20 888 k -

cc 21 320 21 810 21 890 

7 22 325 22 813 22 892 

23 328 23 815 23 894 

24 331 24 818 24 895 

. 

‘. 

25 333 821 25 897 

26 336 :: (UNION) 823 26 898 

DI- 27 (ROMEO) 343 27 826 27 900 ? 2s 360 28 828 28 901 

29 502 29 831 29 903 

30 577 30 a33 30 904 

31 631 31 905 

I138 
Table 3-12 

Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) 

1 (BRAVO) 15 

2 65 

3 92 

4 117 

5 I34 

6 147 

7 161 

8 180 

9 198 

10 207 

11 215 

12 222 

13 227 

14 236 

15 241 

16 246 

17 250 

18 254 

19 257 

20 261 

21 264 

22 267 

23 270 

24 272 

25 275 

26 277 

27 (ROMEO) 283 

28 299 

29 322 

30 381 

31 427 

calcuhted persumel film badge 

Cumulative 

April Dose (mrem) 

1 461 

2 488 

3 509 

4 527 

5 542 

6 555 

7 MOON) 567 

8 578 

9 588 

10 597 

11 605 

12 612 

13 619 

I4 625 

15 630 

16 636 

17 641 

18 646 

19 650 

20 655 

21 659 

22 663 

23 667 

24 671 

25 674 

26 (UNION) 678 

27 681 

28 684 

29 687 

30 691 

dose, USS LST-762. 

Cumulative 

May Dose (mrem)

1 693 

2 696 

3 699 

4 702 

5 (YANKEE) 704 

6 801 

7 848 

8 870 

9 885 

10 897 

II 907 

12 915 

13 922 

14 (NECTAR) 928 

15 933 

16 938 

17 943 

18 947 

19 951 

20 955 

21 958 

22 961 

23 965 

24 968 

25 971 

26 973 

27 976 

28 979 

29 981 

30 984 

31 986 

139 
Table f-13. Cakuhted persomel film badge dose, USS LST-825. 

March 

I (BRAVO) 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 -

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 - 24 

25 

:; (ROMEO) 

28 

29 

30 - 31 

Cumulative 

Dose (mrem) 

I5 

65 

92 

108 

118 

126 

132 

136 

140 

143 

146 

148 

151 

152 

154 

156 

157 

158 

159 

160 

161 

162 

163 

164 

165 

166 

166 

167 

168 

168 

169 

April 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 (KOON) 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

2s 

26 (UNWON) 

27 

28 

29 

30 

Cumulative 

Dose (mrem) 

169 

170 

171 

171 

172 

172 

173 

173 

173 

174 

174 

175 

175 

175 

176 

176 

177 

177 

177 

178 

178 

178 

179 

179 

179 

179 

180 

180 

180 

181 

Cumulative 

May Dose (mrem) 

I 181 

2 181 

3 181 

4 182 

5 (YANKEE) 182 

6 182 

7 182 

8 182 

9 183 

10 183 

11 183 

12 183 

184 

fl (NECTAR) 184 

15 184 

16 184 

17 184 

18 185 

19 185 

20 185 

21 185 

22 185 

23 186 

24 186 

25 186 

26 186 

27 186 

28 186 

187 

:; 187 

31 187 

-

140 
-

Table S-13. cakuhtd per#wnel film badge dose, USS LST-825. 

-

March 

I (BRAVO) 

2 

- 3 

4 

5 

6 - 7 

8 

9 - 10 

II 

12 

- 13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

- 20 

21 

22 

23 - 24 

25 

26 

27 (ROMEO) 

28 

29 

30 

31 

Cumulative 

Dose (mrem) 

15 

65 

92 

108 

118 

126 

132 

136 

140 

143 

146 

148 

151 

152 

154 

156 

157 

158 

159 

160 

161 

162 

163 

164 

165 

166 

166 

167 

168 

168 

169 

April 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

! (KOON) 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 (UNION) 

27 

28 

29 

30 

Cumulative 

Dose (mtem) 

169 

170 

171 

171 

172 

172 

173 

173 

173 

174 

174 

175 

175 

175 

176 

176 

177 

177 

177 

178 

178 

178 

179 

179 

179 

179 

180 

180 

180 

181 

Cumulative 

May Dose (mrem) 

1 181 

2 181 

3 181 

4 182 

5 (YANKEE) 182 

6 182 

7 182 

8 182 

9 183 

10 183 

I1 183 

I2 183 

184 

tl (NECTAR) 184 

15 184 

16 184 

17 184 

18 185 

19 185 

20 185 

21 185 

22 185 

23 186 

24 186 

25 186 

26 186 

27 186 

28 186 

29 187 

30 187 

31 187 

-

140 
••

-

3.2.14 USS UT-975 Dose Calculations 

Dose calculations for the LST-975 on 6-7 May, when YANKEE fallout was 

encountered, are detailed below. Time periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk -

(*). After 7 May, the daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the integrated 

intensities in Table 2-14 by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46), and then by the I- film badge conversion factor (0.7). Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 

are given in Table 3-14. 

I 

. Integrated Ship Shieldig Adjusted 

Time Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (mR) 

i-

. 

. 6 May 0000-0600* 0 0 . 0600- 1200 0 0 . 

‘. - 1200-1330+ 0 0 I 1330-l 500 40.0 1.0 40.0 

1500-1600* 43.0 0.1 4.3 

1600- 1700 69.0 1.0 69.0 .- 1700-1800* 90.5 0.1 t 1800-2000 162.2 1.0 16;:: 

2000-2400+ 206.5 0.1 20.7 

61L.z (Table 2-l 4) 3m 

6 May film badge dose = (305.3 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 213.7 mrem (Table 3-I 4) 

7 May 0000-0800+ 177.5 0.1 17.8 

0800-1200 42.5 1.0 42.5 

1200-1330* 14.0 0.1 1.4 

1330- 1700 31.3 1.0 31.3 

1700-1800* 8.6 0.1 0.9 

1800-2000 16.7 16.7 

2000-2400 32.0 A:; 3.2 

3% (Table 2-14) 113.8 

7 May film badge dose = (113.8 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 79.7 mrem 

Cumulative film badge dose through 7 May = 293 mrem (Table 3-14) 

141 
Table 3-14. Calculated petsmnel film badge dose, USS LST-975. 

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

.March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) Dose (mrem) ..- May 

I (BRAVO) I I 

2 2 2 

3 3 3 

4 4 4 

5 5 5 (YANKEE) 0 

6 6 6 214 

7 7 (K00N) 7 293 

8 8 8 343 

9 9 9 376 

10 10 400 

II :; 11 418 

I2 12 12 433 

13 I3 13 445 

14 14 14 (NECTAR) 455 

I5 15 15 464 

16 16 16 471 

17 17 17 478 

18 18 18 484 

19 19 19 489 

20 20 20 494 

21 21 21 499 

22 22 22 503 

23 23 23 506 

24 24 24 510 

25 25 513 

26 ii (UNION) 26 516 

27 (ROMEO) 27 27 519 

28 28 28 521 

29 29 29 524 

30 30 30 526 

31 31 529 

142 
i-

-

-

-

-

-

3.2.15 USS NICLIOLAS Dose Calculations 

Dose calculations for the NICHOLAS on 26-27 April, when UNION fallou, was 

encountered, are detailed below. Time periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk 

(*). For all other days, the daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the 

integrated intensity topside (Table Z-15) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); 

the integrated intensity below is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below 

deck (0.6). Contributions from each source are summed and converted to a film badge 

dose. Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-l 5. 

Integrated Ship Shieldig Adjusted 

Day Time Period Intensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (mR) 

26 April 0000-0600* 0 0 

0 

0600-I 1200-1430s 200 3i.5 0.1 3.3

1430-1700 78.5 1.0 78.5 

1700-1800s 25.2 0.1 2.5 

1800-2000 50.4 1.0 50.4 

2000-2400” 81.0 0.1 8.1 

267.6 (Table 2-l 5) 142.8 

26 April film badge dose = (142.8 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 100.0 mrem 

27 April 0000-0800* 127.2 0.1 12.7 

0800- 1200 49.9 ::: 49.9 

1200-1330” 17.6 1.8 

1330-1700 41.4 ;:‘: 41.4 

1700-1800s 10.3 1.0 

1800-2000 19.5 19.5 

2000-2400, 37.0 0 3.7 

302.9 (Table 2-l 5) 130.0 

27 April film badge dose = (130.0 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 91 mrem 

143 
-

TabIe 3-15. Calculated personnel film badge dose, USb NICHOLAS. 

-

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem) I -

-

I (BRAVO) 0 1 283 1 799 

2 0 2 310 2 810 

, - 3 0 3 331 3 819 

4 24 4 348 4 827 I 5 54 5 362 5 (YANKEE) 833 

6 70 6 374 6 839 

7 82 7 (~00N) 385 7 845 

8 88 8 396 8 849 

94 9 406 9 854 ,- 9 

10 99 10 415 10 858 I I1 102 II 423 11 862 

12 105 12 430 12 865 

I3 107 13 436 13 869 I--

I4 109 14 442 14 (NECTAR) 874 

15 111 15 446 15 885 i 

16 113 16 451 16 893 I- 17 114 17 455 17 898 I 18 116 18 459 18 903 II 

19 117 19 464 19 906 

:- 20 119 20 468 20 910 

8 

I 

21 120 21 472 21 913 

22 121 22 476 22 916 

23 122 23 480 23 919 ‘8- 24 124 24 484 24 922 

25 128 25 488 25 924 

26 130 26 (UNION) 589 26 927

-__ - 27 !ROMEO) 132 27 681 27 YZY 

28 133 28 735 28 932 

i 29 150 29 765 29 93s: 

30 206 30 785 30 936 .- 31 250 31 938 

* 

, -

!

** 

!-

t 

\

I

-

I 

I 

. 

*-

144 I

i-
- - _ _ _-_ -_ -_ . . .._I_ s_. . __.I__.. -..- .

Dose caJcuJat.ions for the PHILIP on l-2 Mar& 1954 are detailed belcw. For 1 

March, separate calculations are presented for the average crew and for crewmen 

invo!ved in shipboard &contamination. For 2 March, it is assumed the “average” crew 

and “tkdc” crew had equal opportunity for exposure. Time periods below deck are 

indicated by an asterisk(*). After 2 March, the daily film badge dose is calculated by 

multiplying the integrated intensity topside (Table 2-16) by the time-averaged shielding 

factor (0.46); the integrated intensity below is multiplied by the ftaction of the day 

spent below deck (0.6). Contributions from each source are summed and converted to 

a film badge dose. Cumulative film badge dases through 31 May 1954 are given in 

Table 3--16. -

Integrated Ship Shielding Adjusted 

Time Period lntmsity (mRI x Factor = Exposure (mR) !aY 

AveraRe Crew 

I warch oow-o6w* 0 0 

060045900 211.7 1.0 211.7 

0900-I 100. 619.0 0.1 67.9 

I loo-1200 16a.3 1.0 168.3 

IZOO-IbOO. 2sa.b 0.1 2a.a 

l&W-1500 136.0 1.0 136.0 

lmo-1700* 3U.b 0.1 35.1 

- 17w-1s00 2b3.3 1.0 203.3 

UW-2000. b22.3 0.1 42.2 

2aoo-2200 392.0 1.0 392.0 

2200-2100~ 3a.I 

I3rn 

- I Uarch film badge dose = (1371. mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 959.1 mrem (Table 3-16) 

I March OWO4l600 • 0 0 

06oo49oo 211.7 I .o 21a.7 

woo-l 100. 679.0 0.1 67.9 

IIW-I5oO 592.6 I.0 592.6 

- ISJO-1730. 3M.b 0.1 35.t 

1700-1300 2b3.3 1.0 2b3.3 

Iaoo-l9oo~ 2256 0. I 22.6 

I mo-2300 7S0.b I.0 7a0.b 

2300-2bOO. 119.0 0. I la.9 - 3tjfIlfTable Z-16) 1910.2 

I Uarch !~lm badge dox : (1950.2 mRf (0.7 mrem/mR) = 1366 mrem 

. . 

- 2 Warch oooo-oaoo* I21 I.b 0.1 121.1 

MOO- I MO 372.5 I.0 372.5 

I2oo-I330* 110.6 0.1 II.1 

133o-l7oo 219.5 I.0 219.5 

l700-1400. 56.9 Ll 5.7 - l$W-Moo 97.7 I.0 ‘j7.7 

ZOOO-ZbOO* 171.2 0.1 Il.1 

22Lo.o (Table 2- 16) 511.7 

2 Varch film bdge dou I (tbs.7 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 591.1 mrem - Cwnc’atti *e film badge dose through 2 March = 1551 mrem (Table 3-16) 

145 -
Table 3-16. Cakuhted ptssomel fii tdge dose, uss PHILIP. 

.-

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

-

1 960+ I 2710 1 3014 

2 1551 2 2745 2 3041 

- 3 1788 3 2772 3 3o66 

4 1911 4 2795 308 1 

5 2003 5 2814 t (YANKEE) 3091 

- 6 2072 2831 6 3151 

7 2122 f (~00~) 2845 7 3238 

8 2158 8 2858 8 3299 

9 2189 9 2870 9 3344 

I- 10 2214 2880 10 3378 

II 2235 E 2891 II 3407 

12 2252 12 2902 12 3431 

-. 13 2267 13 2910 I3 3452 

14 2281 I4 2918 14 (NECTAR) 3464 

I5 2292 15 2925 I5 3474 

I- 176 231203 16 2932 16 3481 

17 2938 17 3489 

18 2321 18 2944 18 3495 

19 2329 19 2950 19 3502 

20 2336 2G 2955 20 3508 

21 2343 21 2961 21 3513 

22 2349 22 2966 22 3518 

23 2355 23 297 1 23 3524 - 2975 3528 

;“5 23606 :: 2980 :: 3533

26 237 I 26 (UNION) 2984 26 3537 

,- 27 (ROMEO) 2381 27 2988 27 3541 

28 2392 28 2992 28 3546 

29 2519 29 2996 29 3549 

30 2602 30 3001 30 3553 -

31 2666 31 3556 

-

*An additional 426 mrem would have been received on 1 March by personnel involved 

- in decontaminating the ship’s weather decks. 

146 
--- 

-_ 3.247 USS RWSHAW Dose Cakzulatiocrr 

The RENSHAW experienced relatively light fallout following Shots BRAVO, 

ROMEO, and NECTAR and crew duty routines probably were not altered by its 

presence. The daily film badge dose is calculated by multiplying the integrated 

-.. intensity topside (Table 2-17) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); the 

integrated intensity below is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below deck 

-. (0.6). Contributions from each source are summed and converted to a film badge dose. 

Cumulative film badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-17. 

Table 3-17. Cakuhtd ptromel film badge dose, USS RENSHAV. 

Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

I (BRAVO) 15 1 421 1 515 

2 65 2 432 2 530 

I- 3 92 3 441 3 540 

4 108 4 447 548 

5 118 5 453 : (YANKEE) 556 

6 126 6 458 6 612 - 7 132 7 (KOON) 463 7 677 

8 141 8 467 8 707 

9 149 9 470 9 729 

- 10 158 10 474 10 74s 

11 165 11 476 11 759 

12 170 12 479 12 770 

13 175 13 482 780 - 14 180 14 484 f: (NECTAR) 791 

15 189 15 486 15 806 

16 196 !6 488 16 818 

- 17 204 17 490 17 826 

18 210 18 492 18 834 

19 214 19 494 19 840 

20 218 20 496 20 846 -

21 224 21 497 21 851 

22 228 22 499 22 856 

23 234 23 500 23 860 

- 24 237 24 502 24 864 

25 240 25 503 25 868 

26 243 26 (UNION) 504 26 871 

27 (ROMEO) 245 27 505 27 875 -. 

28 252 28 507 28 878 

29 329 29 508 29 881 

30 378 30 5kO 30 884 

-. 31 402 31 886 

[ 

147 

-
Dose calculations for l-2 March for personnel oriboard the SIOUX are detailed 

below. Time periods below deck are indicated by an asterisk (*I. After 2 March, the 

daily film badge &se is calculated by multiplying the integrated intensity topside 

(Table 2-18) by the time-averaged shielding factor (0.46); the integrated intensity 

below is multiplied by the fraction of the day spent below deck (0.6). Contributions 

from each source are summed and converted to a film badge dose. Cumulative film 

badge doses through 31 May 1954 are given in Table 3-18. 

Integrated Ship Shielding Adjusted 

Day Time Period (ntensity (mR) x Factor = Exposure (mR)

1 March 0000-0600 • 0 0 

0600-l 200 0 0 

1200-I 330 • 3.0 0.1 0.3 

1330-I 400 5.0 1.0 5.0 

1400-I 500’ 8.6 0.1 0.9 

1500-1700 24.8 1.0 24.8 

1700-2000* 98.8 0.1 

2000-2100 17.5 1.0 13:; 

2 100-2400 • 86.6 0.1 8.7 

240 (Table 2-l 8) 67.1 

1 March film badge dose = (67.1 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 47.0 mrem (Table 3-18) 

2 March 0000-0800 * 215.9 0.1 21.6 

0800-1200 43.8 1.0 43.8 

1200-1330* 14.6 0.1 1.5 

1330-l 700 31.8 1.0 31.8 

1700-l 800 • 8.5 0.1 0.9 

1800-2000 14.8 1.0 14.8 

2000-2400* 25.9 0.1 2.6 

3m (Table 2-l 8) 117.0 

2 March film badge dose = (117 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR) = 81.9 mrem 

Cumulative film badge dose through 2 March = 129 mrem (Table 3-18) 

148 
I 

__ 

-. 

Table %l& cakubted persame film badge dose, USS SIOUX. 

- Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 

March Dose (mrem) April Dose (mrem) May Dose (mrem)

I (BRAVO) 47 1 994 1 1189 

2 129 2 1016 2 1192 

3 167 3 1032 3 1194 - 4 198 4 1046 

5 229 5 1058 2 (YANKEE) KZ 

6 264 1069 6 1445 - 7 314 7” (KOON) 1079 7 1548 

8 362 8 1088 8 1610 

9 396 9 1096 9 1660 

10 422 10 1103 10 1680 

11 443 11 1110 11 1693 

12 461 1116 12 1704 

13 480 :: 1121 13 1714 

14 498 14 1128 14 (NECTAR) 1725 

15 515 15 1133 15 1741 

16 531 16 1138 16 1752 

- 17 544 17 1142 17 1761 

18 557 18 1146 18 1769 

19 566 19 1150 19 1776 

20 574 20 1154 20 1782 

21 582 1158 21 1788 

22 590 f: 1161 22 1793 

23 596 23 1165 23 1798 

- 24 603 24 1168 24 1803 

25 608 1171 25 1807 

Z (UNION) 1175 26 1811 

:F (ROMEO) 21; 27 1178 27 1815 - 28 722 28 1181 28 1819 

29 874 29 1183 29 1823 

30 931 30 1186 30 1826 - 31 964 31 1830 

-

II- 149 

-.: . . . 
SECTKW 4 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 

The uncertainty in calculated film badge doses is mtimated from the underlying -

parameters. Not only is the uncertainty in the mean fihn badge dose determined, but 

also the distribution in dose about the mean is estimated for typical personnel. The 

basic uncertainties in the topside environment include radiation intensities on deck, 

the positions of personnel (hence their exposure) on deck, the time spent on deck, and 

- the shielding from falloUt afforded to those below. Uncertainties in the radiation 

environment below due to ship contamination are dominated by assumed buildup and 

decay rates of the radioactive material accumulated on the ship’s hull and interior salt 

water systems. 

-

Intensity levels on deck are determined from shipboard radiological survey data, 

supplemented at late times by decay rates measured on Bikini Atoll. Individual meter 

- readings on deck, where available, are taken as accurate, their inherent error having a 

negligible influence on the overall uncertainty in dose. Average on-deck intensity as a 

- function of time is taken as accurate; the power law interpolation in time between 

surveys closely approximates fission product decay at the times after burst considered. 

Power law fitting is less accurate during fallout deposition and decontamination; -

however, the influence of this uncertainty is minimized because the typical crewmember was below during these intervals. Overall, error in on&ck intensity is small 

compared to the uncertainty associated with crew position in the non-uniform 

radiation environment. 

-

The significant variation in on-deck intensities following fallout deposition 

focuses attention on the positioning of the crew relative to those intensities. Specific -

data on crew positioning are lacking; however, the crew size and the variety of duties 

performed suggest that the crew was, on the average, randomly positioned on deck and 

- therefore randomly exposed to each reported intensity. The uncertainty in dose 

resulting from these assumptions cannot be directly quantified, except by considering 

- unrealistic extremes. However, an indication is provided by the assumption that, for 

each interval topside, personnel remained in the same general deck area but were 

-

150 
-

randomly repositioned for each subsequent interval. A distribution around the mean 

t 

film badge reading is calculated by assuming a random position, corresponding to an 

intensity reading, each time a crewman comes on deck. The tails of this distribution 

indicate, in a general way, the possible error of the mean dose if crew positioning were 

significantly biased toward the extremes of intensity readings. Note: for personnel 

-

moving continuously about the deck, their dose approaches the calculated mean. 

In order to arrive at dose distributions, it is assumed the reported average 

intensities used to reconstruct the topside environments in Section 2 were derived 

from many topside measurements that were normally distributed, and could be 

characterized by a mean ( u ) and standard deviation ( a ). For the sixteen ships under 

consideration, shipboard survey data are not available to substantiate this assumption; 

however, detailed surveys on the YAG-40 following Shots ROMEO and YANKEE 

indicate a distribution of topside intensity values that can be approximated by applying 

- a normal distribution to the data. Figure 4-I summarizes the results of surveys taken 

onboard the ship on 31 March and 8 May. Each survey consists of 70 topside intensity 

readings obtained at the same location following each shot (Reference 18). The survey 

data are depicted by histograms while the smooth curves represent normal distributions fitted to the survey data. From Figure 4-1, it does appear that the topside 

intensities following fallout deposition can be adequately represented by assuming a 

normaA distribution of values. 

The fractional (of mean) standard deviation (u/a), a measure of the spread in the 

intensity data obtained during each survey, is determined to vary between 0.52 

(31 March survey) and 0.40 (8 May survey) on the YAG 40. A value af 0.50 is chosen 

as being applicable to represent the spread in intensity data around the average (mean) 

values reported for the sixteen ships of interest. The normal distribution around the 

average intensity is integrated throughout each interval on deck to obtain the 

corresponding distribution in dose. When the dose distributions from all intervals are 

combined, the square of the standard deviation of the resultant normal distribution is 

equal to the sum of the squares of the standard deviations of the contributing 

distributions. As contributions from more intervals are added, the fractional standard 

deviation of the combined distribution decreases. Because the calculated dose in 

151 
24 

31 March Survey - (Shot ROMEO Fallout) 

20 

16 I - - 8 

1 

‘. 

8 

12 

---- 4___--

I 

-.__. t I Ml3 ‘. 

Topside Intensity (mR/hr) 

, 

16 n 

h 8 May Survey - 14 (Shot YANKEE 

Fallout) 

6 -

-

Topside Intensity (mR/hr) 

t -

Figure 4-l Results of radiological surveys onboard the YAC-40 

following Shot ROMEO and Shot YANKEE 

- 152 

- _..- __._._ ._._..... .- ‘_ _’ -. . ..,’ 

i 
reality approaches a limit with time, a 

total dose. Distributions for each ship 

Zl.650 (5th to 95th percentile). Although 

contribution to the mean total dose, it 

finite distribution 

are reported at 

exposure below 

is not used in 

remains around the mean 

the 90-percent level, i.e., 

deck to fallout makes some 

generating a topside dose 

distribution because its minor contribution involves an averaging of topside readings 

(for geometrical reasons). Despite the simplified calculation of mean dose starting on 

the third day after burst, the uncertainty analysis continues to reflect three intervals 

(taken equal) per day of on-deck exposure at random positions. 

The value for the fraction of time spent on deck is estimated to be accurate 

within a factor of 1.2 with 90-percent confidence. For the typical (non-shot) day, this 

corresponds to 8 to 1 IH hours on deck. The systematic uncertainty in the time on deck 

-

- is considered to 

The uncertainty 

in time on deck 

contribution to 

distributions as 

proportional to 

be greater than its random variation from day to day and ship to ship. 

in mean total dose is reasonably high-sided by treating the uncertainty 

as a systematic error; as such, the factor of 

the mean total dose as well. Not only 

discussed above (minus the below-deck 

the time spent on deck. The below-deck 

small, ship-dependent perturbation to the factor of 1.2. 

The ship-shielding factor reduces the below-deck 

minor contribution to dose, thus any realistic error in 

percent effect on the total dose. For example, for 

deck) and a ship-shielding factor of 0.10, with an error 

- 0.60(0.05) the fractional error introduced is o 6. o 1o +. ,,. 1 

1.2 applies to the on-deck 

the means, but also the 

contribution) are directly 

contribution introduces a 

crew exposure to fallout to a 

that parameter has only a fewa typical day (60 percent below 

generously assumed to be ZO.05, 

= 0.065. Such values negligibly 

increase the uncertainty in dose res&ing from uncertainty in time spent topside. 

-

For doses resulting from fallout onboard ships or islands, the calculated dose 

distribution for typical personnel (except as noted) and the uncertainty in the mean -

(based on time topside) are as follows. The bounds on each represent the 5th and 

95th percentiles. 

-

-

-

153 

-
_. Shipboard Personnel 

USS APACHE 

USS BAIROKO 

(Average Crew) -. 

(Decon Crew) 

USS BELLE GROVE 

..~ USS CURTISS 

USS EPPERSON 

- USS ESTES 

(Average Crew) 

(Decon Crew) 

USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH 

uss GYPSY 

- USS LST-551 

USS LST-762 

- USS LST-825 

USS LST-975 

USS NICHOLAS 

USS PHILIP 

(Average Crew) 

- (Decon Crew) 

USS RENSHAW 

- uss SIOUX 

-

Island Based Personnel 

Enewetak Atoll - Kwa jalein Atoll 

Calculated Fallout 

Dose Distribution 

1.01 + .I2 rem 

2.56 2.58 

3.36 + .92 

1.67 + .31 

0.37 + .07 

0.39 + .05 

1.76 + .27 

2.04 + .43 

0.79 + .lO 

2.43 + .32 

0.69 + .09 

0.83 + .08 

0.19 + .03 

0.53 + .12 

0.75 + .08 

2.93 + .44 

3.36 + .67 

0.45 2.05 

1.19 + .12 

1.09 + .lO 

0.32 + .03 

Uncertainty in 

Mean Fallout Dose_ 

1.01 2.20 rem 

2.56 + .51 

3.36 + .67 

1.67 + .33 

0.37 2.07 

0.39 + .08 

1.76 + .35 

2.04 2.41 

0.79 + .16 

2.43 + .49 

0.69 + .I4 

0.83 + .17 

0.19 + .04 

0.53 + .ll 

0.75 2.15 

2.93 + .59 

3.36 + .67 

0.45 + .09 

1.19 + .24 

1.09 + .22 

0.32 + .06 

154 
--- 

___ 

-. 

lnteasity levels below are estimated using a ship contamination model that is 

dependent on radiological decay rates and the rapidity with which hulls accumulate 

contamination. The decay rate of t-1*3 that was used for Operation CROSSROADS is 

applied in this report, but an estimated uncertainty in the exponent of 20.2 is also 

considered. This variation is of the magnitude that thermonuclear devices can exhibit -

within days after detonation. By influencing the parameter S described in Section 2, 

the steeper decay rate (t-lo5) results in larger contamination doses for all ships. In all 

cases, the variation in dose with decay rate is within a factor of two. Also as 

determined for Operation CROSSROADS, saturation of ship hulls occurred within the 

- order of one day. Estimated limits for the time to saturation are 0.5 and 2 days. For 

all ships, these saturation times influence the contamination dose by less than a factor 

of 1.5. The combined uncertainty from decay rate and saturation time, approximated 

as a normal distribution, is shown for each ship below at the estimated YO-percent 

level. 

Ship 

APACHE 

BAIROKO 

BELLE GROVE 

CURTISS 

EPPERSON 

ESTES 

AINSWORTH 

GYPSY 

LST-551 

LST-762 

LST-825 I 

ILST-975 ! 

NICHOLAS 

i -- PHILIP 

RENSHAW 

l

.- SIOUX 

Ship Contamination 

0.43 + .17 rem 

0.20 + .OY 

0.24 + .12 

0.17 + .I0 

0.12 + .06 

0.16 + .07 

0.27 + .13 

0.31 t .I2 

0.21 + .08 

0.16 + .07 

0.19 2 .I0 

0.63 + .4 

0.44 + .3 

0.64 + *; - . 

Dose 

155 
SECTION 5 

FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 

At Operation CASTLE, the issuance of film badges to personnel generally 

followed one of two basic procedures: (I) individual or “mission” badging, where 

personnel were issued badges when they were expected to enter areas of radioactive 

contamination other than those encountered onboard the ships; and (2) cohort badging, 

where a group of individuals performing duties in the same area of a ship would be 

assigned a dose based on the actual reading of one film badge worn by an individual 

within the group. Generally, individual badges reflect higher than average doses, 

whereas cohort badges reflect the average exposure of a group of individuals during a 

certain time period. The total dose assigned to an individual was obtained by summing 

the recorded dose on a cohort badge with any individual (mission) badges assigned to -

[ that individual during the same period of time covered by the cohort badge. 

.- Sufficient dosimetry data are available for three ships for which dose calculations have been performed that allow meaningful comparisons. On these three ships, 

I- the ESTES, PHILIP, and SIOUX, cohort badges were issued for three time periods and 

provide a continuous record of exposure during the entire operation. Reconstructed 

doses are compared with dosimetry data obtained during each specific time period and a--

with the total operational exposure of individuals who were badged during all three 

periods. Not all personnel badged during a specific period wore badges for all three 

periods, thus the number of doses obtained covering the entire operation is less than 

the number of personnel badged in any one time period. 

Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 summarize the available dosimetry data from the 

ESTES, PHILIP, and SIOUX, respectively, as obtained from cohort badges. The 

dosimetry data for each ship are depicted by a series of four histograms; one for each 

of the three badged periods and a summary of the total dose received by those 

personnel who were badged for the entire operation, i.e., for all three periods. For 

comparison, the calculated mean is also depicted above each histogram. For the total 

operation summaries, upper and lower bounds for the calculated means are also 

depicted. For the ESTES and PHILIP, calculated means for the average crew and for 

those involved with decontamination following Shot BRAVO are both presented. l-

-. 

156 
1 

! 

s 

! 

f 

! 24i

a 

I I 

I
-

158 
I I I 

r 

i 

Total for Operatior, 

2/24/54 - 5/16/54 

9 Individuals 

LEGEND 

Calculated Mean 

Witlt Bounds ‘: ‘. 

‘_ 

I 4 .’ !I_ I 1 . . I ,* .< 080 I100 88 1500 1788 leea 2100 i ‘, : .’ 

Film Badge Dose !mram) 

Figure 5-3. uss SIOUX - Comparison of dosimetry data with calculated doses. : 

: ,’ 

-. 

; : 

. ‘. 

: : 
I -

,-

:-

F 

The first badged period covers Shot BRAVO fallout only, and agreement between 

the calculated mean and the mean of the dosimetry data is quite good for each ship. 

Calculated doses for the average crew for the ESTES, PHILIP, and SIOUX are lower 

than the mean film badge dose by 28, 19, and 19 percent, respectively. It is 

interesting to note that the calculated doses for the decontamination crews on the 

ESTES and PHILIP are quite close to the mean film badge dose, only 13 and 2 percent 

lower, respectively. The dose contribution from contaminated lagoon water during 

this period accounts for only 5-S percent of the total calculated dose for the crew of 

each ship; hence, calculations based on radiological surveys obtained during and after 

cessation of the BRAVO fallout appear to adequately describe the crews’ exposure. 

Fallout from Shot ROMEO was the second largest contributor to the total dose 

received by the crews of the ESTES, PHILIP, and SIOUX. The second badged period 

reflects exposures due to Shot ROMEO fallout as well as the residual from Shot 

BRAVO. Fallout from other shots that occurred during this period did not contribute 

to the dose on these three ships. The dose contribution due to ship contamination 

during the second badged period amounts to approximately 16 percent of the total dose 

received by the crews of each ship; The calculated mean for the ESTES is 24 percent 

lower than the mean of the dosimetry data; again the agreement is quite good. This is 

not the case, however, with the PHILIP and the SIOUX; calculated doses are almost 

twice the mean of the dosimetry data. Because ship contamination during this period 

accounts for only 16 percent of the calculated dose, the overestimation could be due 

to assumptions concerning crew activity scenarios during and after the ROMEO 

fallout. The crews on these two ships may have taken more protective measures 

during the ROMEO fallout than described in Section 3.1, where it is assumed that 

normal duty routines were not interrupted by the occurrence of ROMEO fallout. When 

the crews were mustered at approximately 0800 hours on 29 March, topside intensities 

on the ESTES were only 8 mR/hr and duty routines were probably not altered. On the 

PHILIP and SIOUX, hdwever, intensities at that time were 19 and 30 mR/hr, 

respectively, and it is probable that normal crew routines were somewhat altered to 

reduce exposures. This change, however likely, is undocumented and thus cannot be 

used with certainty. 

r-

! 160 

I 

I 
The third badged period terminated the day of Shot NECTAR for the crews of 

the ESTES and PHILIP, and two days Later (16 May) for the crew of the SIOUX. For 

the crew of the ESTES, dose calculations significantly underestimate the crews’ 

exposure as inferred from the dosimetry data. As for fallout, only residual radiation 

from Shots BRAVO and ROMEO are considered as contributing to crew exposure; 

because the ESTES reentered Bikini Lagoon only briefly after Shots UNION and 

YANKEE, ship contamination did not contribute significantly to the calculated dose. 

The reasons for the poor agreement between the calculated doses and dosimetry data 

for the ESTES during this period are not clear, but it should be noted that exposures 

during this badged period are relatively low and account for only 7 percent of the 

crews’ average operational exposure. For the entire operation, calculated doses are 

only slightly lower than the mean of the dosimetry data. 

Dose calculations for the crew of the PHlLlP during the third badged period are 

significantly higher than inferred from the dosimetry data. Because the PHILIP 

remained in Bikini Lagoon during most of the badged period (see Section 2.2.16), most 

of the calculated dose (92 percent) is due to ship contamination, while residual 

radiation from shots BRAVO and ROMEO is only a minor contributor. Uncertainties in 

the ship contamination model alone do not account for the overestimation of crew -

exposure; it is more likely that the contaminated lagoon water from Shot YANKEE 

took longer to reach the anchorage areas in the southern part of the la;l,oon than the 

- few hours assumed in the analysis. Again it should be noted that exposures during this 

badged period are relatively low and account for only 5 percent of the operational dose 

- for the crew of the PHILIP as inferred from the dosimetry data. For the entire 

operation, calculated doses are slightly higher than the mean of the dosimetry data. 

-

The correlation between calculated doses and dosimetry data for the crew of the 

SIOUX during the third badged period is excellent. Although Shot NECTAR fallout, -

along with residual radiation from Shots BRAVO and ROMEO, contributed somewhat 

to the calculated doses, approximately 80 percent of the calculated dose is due to the 

- ship steaming in contaminated water for five days following Shot YANKEE (see 

Section 2.2.18). The ship contamination model described in Reference 6 was applied 

for the full period to calculate the crew’s exposure. Results compared favorably with -

161 

i 
I--

, ‘-

II 

!-

the dosimetry data. For the entire operation, calculated doses for the crew of the 

SIOUX are approximately 28 percent higher than the mean of the dosimetry data 

covering all three badged periods. 

162 
SECTION 6 

CONCLUSIONS AND TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY 

For Operation CASTLE, calculated doses and dosimetry data for the crews of 

three ships are, for the most part, in good agreement. During badged periods when 

exposures were relatively high and radiation environments were well documented, the 

dose calculations correlate well with the dosimetry data. For periods when topside 

intensities were not documented, generally late in the operation when radiation levels 

were low, agreement between calculated doses and dosimetry is not as good. A ship 

contamination model is used to estimate crew exposures due to radioactive water 

contaminating the ships’ hulls and saltwater piping systems while in Bikini Lagoon. 

During the first two badging periods, doses accrued due to ship contamination are 

masked by the much higher contribution from BRAVO and ROMEO fallout. During the 

last badge period when fallout was not a significant factor, the SfOUX remained in 

contaminated water of known intensity for a five-day period. Doses calculated using 

the model are in excellent agreement with the film badge doses recorded onboard the 

ship. 

Table 6-1 summarizes the calculated dose contributions due to fallout as well as 

from ship contamination for the sixteen ships considered in this report; Enewetak and 

Kwajalein Atoll fallout doses are also listed. The total dose (with bounds) is tabulated 

and, in the absence of dosimetry data, should be used for dose determination. The 

calculated distribution in dose due to the spatial nonuinformity of topside radiation 

intensities is not reflected in the mean total dose or its bounds (see Section 4). 

163 

. .,__._I_..._.~.~_~.‘. . - ‘- , -_.‘_‘_‘_‘,\- . -,’ 
.._- -_._.. .--_-_.--

Table 61. 

Shipboard Personnel 

USS APACHE 

USS BAIROKO(Average Crew) 

(Decon Crew) 

USS BELLE GROVE 

USS CURTISS 

USS EPPERSON 

USS ESTES (Average Crew) 

(Decon Crew) 

USNS FRED C. AINSWORTH 

uss GYPSY 

USS LST-551 

USS LST-762 

USS LST-825 

USS LST-975 

USS NICHOLAS 

USS PHILIP (Average Crew) 

(Decon Crew) 

USS RENSHAW 

uss SIOUX 

Island-Based Personnel 

Enewetak Atoll 

Kwajalein Atoll 

Summary of calculated mean doses. 

Dose (rem) Contribution From 

Fallout Ship Contamination 

1.01 L .20 0.43 + .I7 

2.56 + .51 0.20 ,+. .09 

3.36 2.67 

1.67 2.33 0.24 2.12 

0.37 + .07 0.17 + .lO 

0.39 + .08 0.12 + .06 

1.76 2.35 0.16 + .07 

2.04 +.4l 

0.79 +.I6 0.27 + .I3 

2.43 + .49 0.31 2 .I2 

0.69 + .I4 0.21 + .08 

0.83 +.I7 0.16 + .07 

0.19 2.04 --

0.53 +.I1 --

0.75 2.15 0.19 + .lO 

2.93 + .59 0.63 + .4 

3.36 + .67 

0.45 + .09 0.44 + .3 

1.19 + .24 0.64 + ••; - . 

1.09 + .22 

0.32 2.06 

Total 

Dose (rem) 

1.44 + .26 

2.75 + .52 

3.56 + .68 

1.91 + .35 

0.53 + .12 

0.51 +.!O 

1.93 + .36 

2.20 + .42 

1.06 + .21 

2.73 + .50 

0.90 + .I6 

0.99 + .I8 

0.19 2.04 

0.53+.11 

0.94 + .I8 

3.56 + .7 

3.98 + .8 

0.89 + .3 

1.83 + ••; - . 

1.09 + .22 

0.32 + .06 

164 
SECTION 7 

LIST OF REFERENCES 

1. “CASTLE SERIES, 1954,” DNA 6035F, Defense Nuclear Agency, I April 1982. 

2. “Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Nuclear Test Detonations, 1945-1962,” 

Volume 11 - Oceanic US Tests, DNA 1251-2-EX, Defense Nuclear Agency, 1 May 

1979. 

3. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation GREENHOUSE,” DNA-TR-82-15, Defense Nuclear Agency, 30 July 1982. 

4. ‘*Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation IVY,” DNA-

- TR-82-98, Defense Nuclear Agency, 15 March 1982. 

5. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation SANDSTONE,” 

DNA-TR-83-13, Defense Nuclear Agency, 15 August 1983. -

6. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Units of Operation CROSSROADS,” 

DNA-TR-82-05, Defense Nuclear Agency, 3 March 1982. 

7. “Fallout Inventory and Inhalation Dose to Organs (FIIDOS),” Science Applications, Inc., 1982. 

8. Deck Logs from the following ships: USS APACHE (ATF-671, USS BAIROKO 

(CVE-1151, USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-21, USS CURTISS (AV-41, USS EPPERSON 

(DDE-7191, USS ESTES (AGC-121, USNS FRED C. AlNSWORTH (T-AP-18I), USS - GYPSY (ARSD-l), uss ~~~-551, uss ~~~-762, uss ~~~-975, uss NICHOLAS 

(DDE-449), USS PHILIP (DDE-4981, USS RENSHAW (DDE-4991, USS SIOUX 

(ATF-75). 

9. “LST-825 at Operation CASTLE,” Memorandum for Record, NNTPR, 10 

November 1983. 

10. “Final Report, Radiological Safety, Operation CASTLE, Spring 1954,” Volume II, 

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN (Unpublished). 

- Il. “Distribution and lntensity of Fallout,” Project 2.5a, Operation CASTLE, 

WT-915. 

12. “Radiological Safety,” Operation CASTLE, WT-942 (Unpublished). -

I 3. “Distribution of Radioactive Fallout by Survey and Analysis of Sea Water,” 

Project 2.7, Operation CASTLE, WT-935 (Unpublished). 

-

14. “Unit History of Task Group 7.2,” TC-7.2, 8 April 1954 - 19 May 1954 

Installment, (Unpublished). 

165 
-

15. “History of Naval Station, Kwajalein during Operation CASTLE,” NNTPR, 

November 1981. 

16. “USS BAIROKO (CVE-115); Radiological Contamination of,” letter from CO USS 

BAIROKO (CVE-I 15) to CNO, 7 March 1954. 

17. “Radioactive Contamination; Summary of for Period l-8 March 1954,” letter 

from CO USS BAIROKO (CVE-I 15) to CTC 7.3, 1 I March 1954. 

18. “Proof Testing of Atomic Weapons Ship Countermeasures,” Project 6.4, Operation CASTLE, WT-927, 25 October 1957. -

166 
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. 

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c-

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‘. 

‘I 

._

1 

‘. 

*. -

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L 

-I. 

: -

.-

1.. -

br. 

. 

. 

1 

I -

] 

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168 
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National Cancer Institute, NIH 

Laboratory of Pathology 

ATTN: A. Rabson 

ATTN: 0. Plstenmaa 

ATTN: J. Uyngaarden 

National Institute for Occupation Safety L Health 

ATTN: W. Murray 

National Institutes of Health 

ATTN: Library, Acquisition Uni 

National library of Medicine. NIH 

Technical Services Division 

XTTN: Library 

National Science Foundation 

ATTN: Kin-Pinq Uong 

ATTN: P. Harriman . 

Nat1 Heart, Lung 6 Blood Institute, NIH 

ATTN: U. Zukel 

Dffice on Smoking L Health 

ATTN: J. Pinney 

US Senate, Subcommittee of Nuclear Regulatory 

ATTN: J. Curtlss 

US House of Reoresentatives 

Comnitte on Armed Services 

ATTN: Subcotnnittee on Nil Per B Comp 

US House of Representatives 

Conrnittee on Interstate 6 Foreign Commerce 

ATTN: Subconvnlttee on Health L Envir 

US House of Representatives 

Committee on Veterans Affairs 

ATTN: C. Graves 

ATTN: C. Moore 

ATTN: F. Stover 

ATTN: M. Fleming 

ATTN R. Wilson 

US Nuclear Reaulatorv CWWiiSSiOn 

ATTN: -R. Uhipp for F. Arsenault 

ATTN: R. Whipp for R. Minoque 

ATTN: R. Uhlpp for If. Mills 

OlHfR GOVERNRENT AGENCIES (Contlnued) 

US Public Health Service 

Bureau of Radiological Health 

ATTN: Library 

US Senate. Conmiittee on Armed Services 

ATTN: J. NcGovern 

US Senate, Coasnlttee on Veterans Affairs 

ATTN: ;'. ;;;;:;erg 

ATTN: 

ATTN: K: Burdick 

ATTN: T. Prlnclpi 

ATTN: V. Raymond 

ATTN: U. Brew 

US Senate. Comnlttee on Governmental Affairs 

ATTN: 5. Ulm. Senate Court 

Veterans Admln Medical Center, OSPCC. 151-K 

ATTN: K. Lee 

Veterans Administration t:edlcal Center 

ATTN: 0. McGregor 

Veterans Admln Nedlcal Center 

ATTN: C. Tessmer 

Veterans A&in Wadsworth Hospital Ctr 

ATTN: T. Maklnodan 

Veterans Administration 

ATTN: 8. Poloari 

ATTN: D. Bosch 

ATTN: J. Smith 

ATTN: L. Hobson 

2 cys ATTN: 0. Starbuck 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Admlnlstratlon-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Olrector 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Oirector 

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169 
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued1 OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued) 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans A&nfnfstratfon-RO 

PTTN. Director 

Veterans A&nfnistratfon-RO 

ATTN: Mrector 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Dtrector 

Veterans ACfnfstration-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans ACinistration-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Atiinistration-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans A&inistratfon-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Dtrector 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Adminlstration-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Adminstration-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Dfrector 

Veterans Adninlstration-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Abnfnistratfon-RO 

ATTN: Dlrector 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administratfon-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Dlrector 

Veterans Administratlon-RG 

ATTN: Dtrector 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Admtnistration-RO 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-RU 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Directpr 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-R0 

ATTN: Director 

Veterans Administration-RP 

ATTN: Director 

The White House 

ATTN: Oft of Policy Dev, DP 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 

Advanced Research 8 Applications Corp 

ATTN: R. Armistead 

170 
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) 

BDM Corp 

ATTN: J. Braddock 

i Colorado State University I ATTN: M. Zelle 

I 

I -~ JAYCOR 

ATTN: A. Nelson 

Kaman Tempo 

; - ATTN: OASIAC 

Louisiana University School of Med. Shreveport 

1 AJTN: Library 

! .__ 

I National Academy of Sciences 

ATTN: National Materials Advisory Board 

ATTN: 5. Joblon 

ATTN: S. McKee 

, - 7 cys ATTN: C. Robinette 

University of Nebraska 

ATTN: Library 

_- Ohio State University 

i ATTN: Library 

Pacific-Sierra Research Corp 

ATTN: H. Erode. Chairman SAGE 

RID Associates 

ATTN: C. Lee 

I_ R&D Associates 

ATTN: A. Deverill 

Radiation Research Associates, Inc 

RTTN: N. Schaeffer 

Rand Corp 

ATJN: Library 

AJTN: P. Davis 

Rand Corp 

AJTN: 6. Bennett 

Science Applications lntl Corp 

AJTN: W. McRaney 

2 cys ATJN: C. Thomas 

? cys AJTN: J. Goetz 

2 cys AJTN: J. Klemn 

2 cys ATJN: R. Weitz 

5 cys ATTN: J. McGahan 

Science Applications lntl Corp 

ATTN: ,I. Striegel 

Scientific Information Services, Inc 

ATTN: Library 

Varian Associates, Inc 

ATTN: E. Tochilin. Radiation Div C-063 

FOREIGN 

Canadian Embassy 

ATTN: Library 

FOREIGN (Continued) 

BDF - RETN 1 

ATTN: Library 

Indian Council of Medical Rsch 

ATJN: A. Taskar 

Japan-H;;;/i Cancer Study 

: G. Glober 

Maurice Delpla. C/O 0. Lefebvre 

French Engineering Bureau 

ATTN: M. Delpla 

McGill University 

ATTN: R. Oseasohn 

Presidente lhberio Colombo. Comitato Nazionale 

ATTN: Library 

University of Puerto Rico Sch of Medicine 

ATTN: Library 

Unlted Kingdom Scientific Mission, British Embassy 

ATTN: Military Liasion for D. Fakley 

2 cys ATTN: Publications, for MRC, SO 128 

DIRECTORY OF OTHER 

Brookhaven Natlonal Laboratory 

ATTN: A. Brill. Medical Deot 

ATTN: E. Cronkite. Medical' Dept 

ATTN: H. Bender. Hedlcal Dept 

ATTN: Tech Library 

ATTN: V. Bond 

California Institute of Technology 

ATTN: E. Lewis 

ATTN: R. Christy 

University of Chicago 

AJTN: P. Meier 

University of Colorado 

ATTN: Library 

Columbia University 

ATTN: A. Bloom 

ATTN: Library 

Columbia University 

ATTN: Div of Biostatistlcs 

Cornell University 

AJJN: W. Federer 

University of Drew 

ATTN: Library 

Medical College of Georgia 

ATTN: L. Stoddard 

Harvard School of Public Health 

ATTN: J. Bailor 

ATTN: Library 

ATJN: R. Reed 

171 
DIRECTORY OF OTHER (Continued)_ DIRECTORY OF OTHER (Continued) 

Harvard School of Public Health 

ATTN: 8. MacMahon 

Harvard University, Dept of Atmospheric Sciences 

University of North Carolina 

ATTN: 6. Greenberg 

ATTN: Library for Dean 

ATTN: W. Coghran 

- University of Hawaii 

ATTN: Y. Hatsumoto 

Indiana University 

- ATTN: F. Putnam 

Iowa State University 

ATTN: T. Bancroft 

- Johns Hopkins University 

ATTN: A. Kimball 

ATTN: R. Seltser 

Kansas Univ of Agri 6 Applied - ATTN: H. Fryer 

Kingston Hospital 

ATTN: X. Johnson 

Science 

Northwestern University 

ATTN: H. Cember 

Oak Ridae Associated Universities 

~TTN: D. Lushbaugh 

ATTN: E. Tomokins 

ATTN: J. Totter 

University of Oklahoma 

ATTN: P. Anderson 

University of Oregon 

ATTN: B. Pirofsky 

Pacific Nortirwest Laboratory 

ATTN: S. Mprks 

Pennsylvania Unlv Hospital Dept of Radioloqr_. 

ATTN : 5. Baum. 

University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine 

Memorial Hosp for Cancer & Allied Diseases ATTN: P. Nowell 

ATTN: P. Liebenan 

University of Pittsburgh, Dept of Epidemiology 

Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center ATTN: Library 

ATTN: J, Laughlin ATTN: E. Radford 

ATTN: P. Marks 

University of Pittsburgh 

Merck:Sharp 6 Dohme Intl Graduate School of Public Health 

ATTN: A. Bearn ATTN: N. Wald 

University of Miami Rochester Univ Medical Ctr 

ATTN: P. Hodes ATTN: C. 0doro:f 

ATTN: G. Casarett 

University of Michigan Medical School 

ATTN: J. Neel University of Rochester 

ATTN: L. Hempelmann 

University of Michigan, Dept of Biostatistics 

ATTN. R. Cornell Saint Francis Hospital 

ATTN: R. Blaisdell 

University of Michigan, School of Public Health 

ATTN: F. Moore 

Minnesota Dept of Health 

ATTN: D. Lilienfeld 

University of Minnesota 

ATTN: J. Bearman 

ATTN: L. Schuman 

ATTN: Library 

Nat1 Council on Radiation 

ATTN: W. Sinclair 

University of New Mexico 

ATTN: C. Key 

ATTN: R. Anderson 

New Vork Univ Medical Center 

ATTN: N. Nelson 

New York Univ. Dept of Environmental 

ATTN: A. Upton 

ATTN. B. Posternack 

ATTN: Library 

ATTN: M. Eisenbud 

Medical University of South Carolina 

ATTN: P. Liu 

University of Southern California 

ATTN: J. Birren 

Standford University Medical Ctr 

ATTN: J. Brown 

Stanford University 

ATTN: L. Moses 

Stanford University Hospital 

ATTN: D. Dorfman 

Texas AW University 

ATTN: R. Stone 

University of Texas, Austin 

ATTN: H. Sutton 

Medicine 

University of Texas 

ATTN: C. Cook 

University of Texas, School of Public Health 

ATTN: R. Stalloales 

172 
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DIRECTORY OF OTHER (Conl.inucd) 

University of Texas. Systas Cancer Center 

AI-TN: Y. Sutor 

University of Texas. Grad Sch of Bioa,edlcal Sciences 

ATTN: t. Taylor 

University of Utah, Cullege of Medicine 

ATTN: Library 

University of Utah, Serials Order Oepartment 

ATTN: C. Rays 

ATTN: E. Wrenn 

ATTN. L. Lyons 

ATTN: Library 

Vanderbilt University 

ATTN: R. Quinn 

DIRECTORY OF OTHER (Continued1 

University of Washington, Sch of Public Health 

ATTN: 0. Thompson 

University of WasLingten. School of Medicine 

ATTN: A. Motulsky 

University of Wisconsin 

Laboratory of Genetics 

ATTN: J. Crow 

Yale University School of Medicine 

Department of Epidemiology h Public Health 

ATTN: J. Meigs 

ATTN: Library 

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