FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: PG&E CORPORATION 

SECURITIES LITIGATION, 

------------------------------

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF 

NEW MEXICO, The Class; YORK 

COUNTY ON BEHALF OF THE 

COUNTY OF YORK RETIREMENT 

FUND; CITY OF WARREN POLICE 

AND FIRE RETIREMENT SYSTEM; 

MID-JERSEY TRUCKING 

INDUSTRY & LOCAL NO. 701 

PENSION FUND, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

ANTHONY F. EARLEY, Jr.; 

GEISHA J. WILLIAMS; NICKOLAS 

STAVROPOULOS; JULIE M. 

KANE; CHRISTOPHER P. JOHNS; 

PATRICK M. HOGAN; BARBARA 

L. RAMBO; DAVID S. 

THOMASON; DINYAR B. MISTRY; 

No. 22-16711 

D.C. No.

5:18-cv-03509-

EJD 

OPINION
2 PERA V. EARLEY

LEWIS CHEW; FRED J. FOWLER; 

MARYELLEN C. HERRINGER; 

RICHARD C. KELLY; ROGER H. 

KIMMEL; RICHARD A. MESERVE; 

FORREST E. MILLER; BARRY 

LAWSON WILLIAMS; ROSENDO 

G. PARRA; ANNE SHEN SMITH; 

ERIC D. MULLINS; BARCLAYS 

CAPITAL, INC.; BNP PARIBAS 

SECURITIES CORPORATION; 

MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC; 

MUFG SECURITIES AMERICAS, 

INC.; WILLIAMS CAPITAL 

GROUP, L.P., AKA Siebert Williams 

Shank Co., LLC; CITIGROUP 

GLOBAL MARKETS, INC.; J.P. 

MORGAN SECURITIES, LLC; 

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE 

FENNER & SMITH, INC, AKA B of 

A Securities, Inc.; MIZUHO 

SECURITIES USA LLC; 

GOLDMAN SACHS & CO; RBC 

CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC; WELLS 

FARGO SECURITIES, LLC; BNY 

MELLON CAPITAL MARKETS, 

LLC; TD SECURITIES (USA), LLC; 

C. L. KING & ASSOCIATES, INC.; 

GREAT PACIFIC SECURITIES; 

CIBC WORLD MARKETS CORP.; 

SMBC NIKKO SECURITIES 

AMERICA, INC.; U. S. BANCORP 

INVESTMENTS, INC.; MISCHLER 

FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.; 
PERA V. EARLEY 3

BLAYLOCK VAN, LLC; SAMUEL 

A. RAMIREZ & COMPANY, INC.; 

MFR SECURITIES, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

PG&E CORPORATION, 

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 13, 2023

San Francisco, California

Filed May 3, 2024

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Danny J. Boggs,*and Danielle 

J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest

*The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
4 PERA V. EARLEY

SUMMARY**

Bankruptcy Stay

The panel vacated the district court’s order staying a 

securities fraud action pending completion of a Chapter 11 

bankruptcy case and remanded. 

A group of retirement and pension funds filed a 

consolidated putative securities class action against PG&E 

Corp. and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (collectively, PG&E) 

and some of its current and former officers, directors, and 

bond underwriters (collectively, Individual Defendants). 

PG&E filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, automatically 

staying this action as against PG&E but not the Individual 

Defendants. The district court then sua sponte stayed these 

proceedings as against the Individual Defendants. 

The panel held that it had jurisdiction over this 

interlocutory appeal under the Moses H. Cone doctrine 

because the stay was both indefinite and likely to be lengthy. 

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion 

in ordering the stay as to the Individual Defendants. When 

deciding to issue a docket management stay, the district 

court must weigh three non-exclusive factors: (1) the 

possible damage that may result from the granting of a stay; 

(2) the hardship or inequity that a party may suffer in being 

required to go forward; and (3) judicial efficiency. As to 

judicial efficiency, the district court properly concluded that 

the bankruptcy court’s initial determination of identical 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PERA V. EARLEY 5

factual and legal issues could promote efficient adjudication 

of the claims presented in this action. The district court, 

however, did not adequately consider whether the stay 

imposed hardship on plaintiffs that outweighed the 

efficiencies to be gained by the stay. The panel vacated the 

stay and remanded for the district court to weigh all the 

relevant interests in determining whether a stay was 

appropriate.

COUNSEL

Carol C. Villegas (argued), Jeffrey A. Dubbin, Thomas A. 

Dubbs, and Michael P. Canty, Labaton Keller Sucharow

LLP, New York, New York; Darren J. Robbins, Robbins 

Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, San Diego, California; 

Willow E. Radcliffe, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, 

Nashville, Tennessee; Hadiya Deshmukh, Robbins Geller 

Rudman & Dowd LLP, San Francisco, California; James M. 

Wagstaffe, Adamski Moroski Madden Cumberland & Green 

LLP, San Luis Obispo, California; Frank Busch, Coblentz 

Patch Duffy & Bass LLP, San Francisco, California; for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Stephen P. Blake (argued) and Jonathan Sanders, Simpson 

Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Palo Alto, California; Jonathan 

Youngwood, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, 

New York; Steven S. Scholes, McDermott Will & Emery 

LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Jason D. Strabo, McDermott Will & 

Emery LLP, Los Angeles, California; Neal A. Potischman, 

Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Menlo Park, California; 

Charles S. Duggan, Dana M. Seshens, and Craig T. Cagney, 

Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New York, New York; for 

Defendants-Appellees.
6 PERA V. EARLEY

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

Following several wildfires in Northern California in 

2017 and 2018, a group of retirement and pension funds filed 

this consolidated putative securities class action against 

PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Company 

(collectively, PG&E) and some of its current and former 

officers, directors, and bond underwriters (collectively, 

Individual Defendants), alleging that all the Defendants 

made false or misleading statements related to PG&E’s 

wildfire-safety policies and regulatory compliance. Shortly 

after lead plaintiff Public Employees Retirement 

Association of New Mexico (PERA) and the other 

retirement and pension funds (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed 

the operative complaint, PG&E filed for Chapter 11 

bankruptcy, automatically staying this action as against 

PG&E but not the Individual Defendants. The district court 

then sua sponte stayed these proceedings as against the

Individual Defendants, pending completion of PG&E’s 

bankruptcy case. In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs argue 

that the district court abused its discretion by entering the 

stay. 

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under the so-called 

Moses H. Cone doctrine. We conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in ordering the stay as to the Individual 

Defendants, vacate the stay, and remand with instructions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs’ Securities-Fraud Action

In June 2018, a PG&E shareholder filed a putative class

action against PG&E and some of its current and former 
PERA V. EARLEY 7

officers for violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(Exchange Act). The district court consolidated that

shareholder’s case with other similar cases, and Plaintiffs 

jointly filed the operative third amended consolidated classaction complaint (Complaint) in May 2019. The Complaint 

asserts two categories of federal securities claims against 

three groups of defendants. The first category of claims 

arises under the Exchange Act and is asserted against PG&E

and six current or former PG&E officers. The second 

category of claims arises under the Securities Act of 1933 

(Securities Act) and is asserted against former PG&E 

officers and directors and over 20 financial institutions that 

participated in certain PG&E note offerings.1

Plaintiffs’ claims against PG&E and the Individual 

Defendants are based on nearly identical legal theories and 

factual allegations. The Exchange Act claims are based on 

19 allegedly false or misleading statements that PG&E and 

the Individual Defendants made between April 29, 2015, and 

November 15, 2018.2 These statements concern numerous 

complex issues relating to PG&E’s wildfire-safety policies 

and regulatory oversight. Plaintiffs’ Securities Act claims 

are based on substantially similar alleged 

misrepresentations. Plaintiffs allege that the prospectus 

filings for three PG&E note offerings and one note-exchange 

offer that took place between March 2016 and April 2018 

contained or incorporated statements that misleadingly 

1 PG&E was not named in the Securities Act claims because the 

bankruptcy court’s automatic stay was in place. 

2 The Exchange Act claims are brought on behalf of a putative class of 

“all persons and entities who, during the period from April 29, 2015,

through November 15, 2018, . . . purchased or otherwise acquired 

publicly traded PG&E securities.” 
8 PERA V. EARLEY

omitted material information about PG&E’s regulatory 

compliance, vegetation-management practices, and 

equipment inspections and maintenance.3

The Individual Defendants filed two motions to dismiss 

in October 2019. The parties completed briefing on those 

motions, and they were submitted for decision in the district 

court, in January 2020. Those motions remain pending.

B. PG&E’s Bankruptcy Case

In January 2019, a few months before Plaintiffs filed the 

Complaint, PG&E filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 

Accordingly, this action was automatically stayed as to 

PG&E under 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bankruptcy court 

confirmed PG&E’s Plan of Reorganization (Plan) in June 

2020, which provided for PG&E’s emergence from 

bankruptcy as a solvent debtor on July 1, 2020. The Plan did 

not extend the automatic bankruptcy stay to the Individual 

Defendants and, with some limitations, explicitly permitted 

continued prosecution of this action against those 

defendants. 

The Plan provided for the bankruptcy court’s continued 

jurisdiction over certain claims asserted against PG&E, 

including federal securities claims brought by shareholders 

in the bankruptcy case by way of proofs of claim. The Plan 

treats these “shareholder claims as ‘subordinated’”—

meaning that, if they succeed, they “are to be paid at reduced 

amounts in shares of reorganized PG&E’s common stock.”

Earlier in the bankruptcy proceedings, Plaintiffs sought 

to pursue their securities claims against PG&E through a 

3 The Securities Act claims are brought on behalf of “all persons or 

entities that acquired PG&E senior notes in or traceable to one or more 

of the Notes Offerings and corresponding Offering Documents.” 
PERA V. EARLEY 9

class-action procedure. They moved the bankruptcy court to 

treat their claims as “class proofs of claim” and to appoint 

PERA (the lead Plaintiff here) as lead claimant for the class. 

They presented to the bankruptcy court the Complaint in this 

case and expressly incorporated its claims and allegations 

into their securities claims filed in the bankruptcy court. 

Further, Plaintiffs sought to define the proposed bankruptcy 

class as “the proposed class [PERA] represents” in this 

action, and made clear that the proposed bankruptcy class’s 

claims “are based solely on the allegations in the 

[Complaint].” 

The bankruptcy court denied Plaintiffs’ request for class 

treatment in January 2021, and instead adopted a specialized 

multi-step alternative-dispute-resolution procedure (the 

securities-claims ADR) to “facilitate and simplify the 

resolution of” the securities claims filed in the bankruptcy

case.

4 The securities-claims ADR allows individual 

claimants to submit trading information; make and receive 

settlement offers; and, if necessary, mediate with PG&E. 

Securities claims in the bankruptcy case that are not resolved 

through settlement or mediation ultimately proceed to a 

“claims reconciliation and objection process” before the 

bankruptcy court. The parties appear to agree that this 

claims-reconciliation process necessarily will require the 

bankruptcy court to address the merits of the securities 

claims raised in this litigation. 

4 The securities-claims ADR applies to shareholders who filed proofs of 

claim in PG&E’s bankruptcy case alleging losses “related to purchases 

of publicly-traded PG&E . . . securities as a result of alleged inadequate 

or fraudulent disclosures or non-disclosures of information from April 

29, 2015 through November 15, 2018.” 
10 PERA V. EARLEY

As of April 9, 2021, more than 7,100 securities claims 

had been filed in the bankruptcy case, totaling in the billions 

of dollars. Approximately 1,600 of those claims have settled 

through the securities-claims ADR, and many more remain

pending. PG&E and the Individual Defendants represent that 

all settlements with securities claimants in the bankruptcy 

case “have also resolved those claimants’ putative claims in 

this [a]ction” through releases of claims.5

C. The District Court’s Notice of Intent to Stay

In April 2021, well over a year after the Individual 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss were ripe for decision, the 

district court issued a Notice of Intent to Stay (Notice) this 

action based on the parties’ status reports concerning the 

bankruptcy case. In one joint status report, Plaintiffs 

emphasized the significant overlap between the bankruptcy 

case and this action because the Plan “includes a ‘class’ . . . 

of shareholder claims against PG&E that is, for all practical 

purposes, a large subset of the putative class before th[e]

[district court].” Plaintiffs further acknowledged:

[P]roceedings involving the merits of the 

securities claims in bankruptcy court . . . will 

necessarily involve addressing identical 

issues [the district court] may be called on to 

consider, including whether the 19 asserted 

false and misleading statements made over 

three-and-a-half years are actionable 

5 Certain named Plaintiffs in this action, but not PERA, allege that they 

“are [entirely] excluded” from the bankruptcy securities-claims ADR.

However, it appears undisputed that many (or all) of the securities 

claimants participating in the securities-claims ADR are also members 

of the putative class in this action. 
PERA V. EARLEY 11

(including the elements of falsity, materiality, 

and scienter), as well as whether and to what 

extent these statements caused investor losses 

over the nine asserted loss causation events.

Thus, Plaintiffs predicted that the bankruptcy court’s 

adjudication of securities claims “may be conducted in 

parallel with [this action in the district court], including to 

judgment and, potentially, to inconsistent judgments on 

identical issues.” In another status report, Plaintiffs 

reiterated that “at some point, the bankruptcy court will face 

the merits of the claims against PG&E that are also at issue 

in the securities action before [the district court].” 

Apparently relying on Plaintiffs’ representations that the 

two proceedings “will necessarily involve addressing 

identical issues,” the district court issued the Notice 

indicating its “inten[t] to stay this case pending completion 

of the claims procedure and ADR.” The district court 

reasoned that a stay “will promote judicial efficiency and 

economy, as well as avoid the potential for inconsistent 

judgments,” in part because “the ongoing bankruptcy 

[securities] claim process will affect, among other things, the 

size and potential damage claims of the putative classes in 

this action.” The district court acknowledged that resolution 

of the Individual Defendants’ motions to dismiss would be 

delayed but determined that “the potential prejudice a delay 

will cause to any of the parties” was outweighed by the 

district court’s “stated justifications.” 

Plaintiffs objected to the district court’s Notice, 

vigorously contending that staying the action would not 

further judicial efficiency and that they and the putative class 

would be prejudiced by the delay. Regarding judicial 

efficiency, Plaintiffs argued that having the bankruptcy court 
12 PERA V. EARLEY

address the merits of the securities claims in the first instance 

“cannot possibly avoid the potential for inconsistent 

judgments” because the bankruptcy court’s decisions are 

appealable to the district court, thereby eventually requiring 

the district court to decide the full set of issues for itself. The 

only efficient course, Plaintiffs reasoned, was for the district 

court to decide the merits issues first. Additionally, Plaintiffs 

argued that, because the Individual Defendants’ 

proportionate responsibility for any damages owed to the 

putative class for securities violations must be determined by 

a jury, the district court was incorrect that the bankruptcy

case addressing PG&E’s responsibility would affect the 

“size and potential damage claims . . . in this action.”

Regarding prejudice, Plaintiffs submitted reports of 

multiple experts who estimated that the bankruptcy court’s 

securities-claim ADR will likely take between four and 

seven years to complete. Plaintiffs argued that this delay 

significantly increased “the likelihood of lost evidence and 

fading memories,” thereby prejudicing their ability to collect 

evidence for their action. Plaintiffs also contended that a stay 

would increase PG&E’s bargaining power and unfairly 

inflate the importance of the securities-claim ADR because 

putative class members who did or could not submit claims 

were excluded from participating in the ADR.

The Individual Defendants did not object to a stay or 

identify any harm they would suffer if this action were not 

stayed.

D. The District Court’s Stay Order

Over a year-and-a-half after issuing the Notice, the 

district court entered a stay on the last day of September 

2022 in a summary order (Order) that differed from the

Notice in several ways. First, the Order recited only 
PERA V. EARLEY 13

“efficiency” and an “overlap between the bankruptcy 

proceedings and the instant securities fraud action” as 

justifications for the stay, without any analysis. The Order 

did not include the Notice’s additional justifications of “the 

potential for inconsistent judgments” or the impact on “the 

size and potential damage claims of the putative classes in 

this action.” And second, the Order delineated that the stay 

would last until “resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings” 

instead of until “completion of the [securities-claims ADR],” 

as the Notice had previously indicated. Plaintiffs timely 

appealed from the Order.6

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a district court’s stay order for abuse of 

discretion. However, the standard is ‘somewhat less 

deferential’ than the abuse of discretion standard used in 

other contexts.” Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. 

Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted). Regarding stays, “[a] district court 

abuses its discretion if it ‘base[s] its ruling on an erroneous 

view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 

evidence.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 

(1990)). It is more likely that a district court has abused its 

discretion when the party seeking relief from the stay 

establishes the stay “will result in irreparable injury and a 

6 Contrary to the opening brief’s representation that the notice of appeal 

was filed on October 28, 2022, the notice of appeal was dated and filed 

on October 31, 2022. The appeal was nevertheless timely because 

October 30, the end of the statutory period, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), fell 

on a Sunday, see Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (“[I]f the last day is a 

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the 

end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”).
14 PERA V. EARLEY

miscarriage of justice.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 

268 (9th Cir. 1962).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

We first consider whether we have jurisdiction over this 

interlocutory appeal. “Ordinarily, a stay order is not an 

appealable final decision.” Davis v. Walker, 745 F.3d 1303, 

1308 (9th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court has recognized,

however, that a stay order is appealable as a final decision 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 if the order places the plaintiff 

“effectively out of court.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (quoting 

Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 

(1962)). Moses H. Cone concerned a stay of a federal action 

pending resolution of a state action that would have 

preclusive effect, thereby placing the litigant “effectively out 

of [federal] court.” Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But the reasoning of Moses H. Cone applies even 

“absent risk that another proceeding will have res judicata 

effect” where “an indefinite delay amounts to a refusal to 

proceed to a disposition on the merits.” Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield of Ala. v. Unity Outpatient Surgery Ctr., Inc., 490 

F.3d 718, 723–24 (9th Cir. 2007). And while lengthy or 

indefinite stays may fall within Moses H. Cone’s ambit, see

id. at 723, we comfortably assert jurisdiction over appeals 

from orders imposing stays that are both lengthy and 

indefinite, see Davis, 745 F.3d at 1309. 

The stay entered in this case is indefinite because its end 

date is triggered by the occurrence of an external event that 

is not time limited. See id.; see also Dependable Highway, 

498 F.3d at 1066–67 (observing that “stays of short, or at 

least reasonable, duration” are favored). But see Blue Cross,
PERA V. EARLEY 15

490 F.3d at 724 (stating that lengthy or indefinite stays are 

not “invariably improper or inappropriate”). Although the 

stay could be lifted at some point in the future, the simple 

fact that “litigation may eventually resume” does not deprive 

us of appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 724; see Lockyer v. Mirant 

Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A]bsolute 

certainty is not required in order to put a party ‘effectively 

out of court’ within the meaning of the Moses H. Cone

doctrine.”). 

The stay entered here is also likely to be extremely

lengthy. The stay has already been in place for over 18 

months, the benchmark we first recognized in Blue Cross. 

490 F.3d at 724. We agree with the Individual Defendants 

that Blue Cross did not establish a categorical rule that any 

stay lasting longer than 18 months places litigants effectively 

out of court. Nor do we establish such a rule here. There may 

be circumstances in which a stay of this duration does not 

prevent litigants from accessing court.7 But 18 months is 

nonetheless a guidepost for our analysis, and the 

circumstances here fall within Moses H. Cone’s reasoning.

Moreover, given the size and complexity of PG&E’s 

bankruptcy proceeding, we are persuaded that the stay is 

likely to continue for a significant period. Plaintiffs’ expert 

opined that the securities-claims ADR process alone could 

7 Our prior cases endorse a clear rule that the district court abuses its 

discretion by issuing a stay order that places a plaintiff out of court, 

regardless of the type of court presiding over the related proceeding. See 

Leyva v. Cert. Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 

1979) (“This rule [governing the district court’s stay authority] applies 

whether the separate proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral 

in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are 

necessarily controlling of the action before the court.”); id. at 864

(collecting cases).
16 PERA V. EARLEY

take approximately seven years to complete, a calculation 

that the Individual Defendants do not contest. And as 

explained, the stay the district court entered does not 

terminate until “resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings,” 

which could be much longer than seven years. 

Finally, to the extent there is any ambiguity regarding 

whether the district court intended to end the stay at the 

conclusion of the securities-claim ADR process or at the 

conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings as a whole, the 

difference is immaterial. Measured against either end point, 

the stay is of such a duration as to trigger jurisdiction under 

Moses H. Cone and Blue Cross. Accordingly, we conclude 

that we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.8

B. The Stay Order

We next turn to whether the district court abused its 

discretion by staying this case pending resolution of PG&E’s 

bankruptcy proceedings. The district court possesses 

“inherent authority to stay federal proceedings pursuant to 

its docket management powers.” Ernest Bock, LLC v. 

Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 842 (9th Cir. 2023). A district court 

“may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket 

and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an 

8

In cases invoking Moses H. Cone, we have previously also analyzed 

the existence of jurisdiction under the related doctrine set forth in Cohen 

v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See, e.g.,

Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1103–04; see also Dependable Highway, 498 F.3d 

at 1065 (“To fall within Cohen’s ambit, an order ‘must [1] conclusively 

determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively 

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” (quoting Coopers & 

Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978))). We decline to conduct 

this additional analysis here because this appeal clearly falls within 

Moses H. Cone.
PERA V. EARLEY 17

action before it, pending resolution of independent 

proceedings which bear upon the case.” Mediterranean 

Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th 

Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). The decision to stay 

proceedings “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must 

weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” 

Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936).

Our prior cases have “identified three non-exclusive 

factors courts must weigh when deciding whether to issue a 

docket management stay: (1) ‘the possible damage which 

may result from the granting of a stay’; (2) ‘the hardship or 

inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go 

forward’; and (3) ‘the orderly course of justice measured in 

terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and 

questions of law.’” Ernest Bock, 76 F.4th at 842 (quoting 

Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110).

9 A district court’s concern for 

the last factor, which courts refer to as “judicial efficiency,”

“standing alone is not necessarily a sufficient ground to stay 

proceedings.” Dependable Highway, 489 F.3d at 1066. We 

begin our analysis there.

1. Judicial Efficiency

The district court gave a single justification for its stay 

order: judicial efficiency. Because of “the overlap between 

9

In Blue Cross, we referenced a five-factor balancing test set forth in 

Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1995). 

490 F.3d at 724. Keating’s five-factor test is materially similar to the test 

originally described in CMAX—both consider judicial efficiency and 

prejudice to the parties and others—but the Keating test has been applied 

when a district court is considering staying “civil proceedings in the face 

of a parallel criminal proceeding,” as was the case in Blue Cross. 

Keating, 45 F.3d at 324. Because there are no parallel criminal 

proceedings here, we apply the balancing test set forth in CMAX. See

Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (applying the CMAX test).
18 PERA V. EARLEY

the bankruptcy proceedings and the instant securities fraud 

action,” the district court concluded that “[a] stay of the 

entire action ‘is in the interest of efficiency’ and would avoid 

proceeding on a piecemeal basis.” The parties dispute 

whether the stay here achieves any efficiency. 

A district court may stay a case “pending resolution of 

independent proceedings which bear upon the case,” and we 

have clarified “that the issues in such [independent] 

proceedings” do not need to be “necessarily controlling of 

the action before the [district] court.” Leyva, 593 F.2d at

863–64. Indeed, we have repeatedly held that a district court 

does not abuse its discretion by staying litigation for 

efficiency reasons pending resolution of other related 

proceedings. See, e.g., Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110–12 

(discussing cases upholding stays). For example, in CMAX, 

a mandamus proceeding challenging a stay order, we upheld 

a stay pending resolution of related administrative 

proceedings because “at the very least, the [administrative] 

proceeding [would] provide a means of developing 

comprehensive evidence bearing upon the highly technical 

. . . questions which [were] likely to arise in the district court 

case.” 300 F.2d at 269. And in Mediterranean Enterprises, 

we sustained the district court’s stay of an entire federal 

action pending resolution of arbitration proceedings, even 

though only some of the plaintiff’s claims were subject to 

arbitration, because both the federal action and arbitration 

involved identical questions. 708 F.2d at 1465.

Plaintiffs argue that any efficiency achieved by the stay 

entered here is illusory because any decision the bankruptcy 

court makes about PG&E’s liability for federal securities 

violations is appealable to—and not binding on—the district 

court. Plaintiffs further contend that “the [s]tay does not 

avoid piecemeal litigation because the separate claims 
PERA V. EARLEY 19

against [the Individual] Defendants . . . will still, eventually, 

need to proceed to discovery and then judgment in the 

District Court.” We are not persuaded. As the Individual 

Defendants argue, the efficiency to be gained by the stay is 

not illusory simply because the bankruptcy court’s decision 

will not bind the district court or because the district court 

will still have to adjudicate the claims. See Leyva, 593 F.2d 

at 863–64; CMAX, 300 F.2d at 269. 

Put simply, because the bankruptcy court must address 

issues identical to those presented in this action in resolving

the securities claims asserted against PG&E in the 

bankruptcy action, the district court could receive 

“considerable assistance in resolving” this action from the 

bankruptcy court’s development of the record and 

assessment of common issues. Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110. 

Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledge as much: They represented 

that PG&E is likely to “seek and provide discovery, engage 

experts, and conduct evidentiary hearings” in litigating the 

securities claims pending in the bankruptcy court, including 

in relation to the complex element of loss causation. 

Plaintiffs’ own statements thus highlight how the bankruptcy 

court’s adjudication of “identical” securities claims could “at 

the very least, . . . provide a means of developing

comprehensive evidence bearing upon the highly technical 

[securities] questions which are likely to arise in the district 

court case.” CMAX, 300 F.2d at 269; see also Leyva, 593 

F.2d at 863 (“[F]indings, as well as the documents and 

testimony produced during the arbitration hearing, may be 

of valuable assistance to the court in resolving the [statutory] 

claims presented in . . . the complaint, even under the 

assumption that the court is not bound and controlled by the 

arbitrator’s conclusions.”). 
20 PERA V. EARLEY

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in determining that the bankruptcy court’s 

initial determination of identical factual and legal issues 

could promote efficient adjudication of the claims presented 

in this action.

10 See Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1113 (holding that 

the district court’s stay was improper where, among other 

considerations, “the proceeding in the bankruptcy court 

[was] unlikely to decide, or contribute to the decision of, the 

factual and legal issues before the district court”).

2. Prejudice

Even if there are efficiencies to be gained by a stay, the

district court must also weigh the relative hardships that a 

stay might cause. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55; CMAX, 

300 F.2d at 268. In Landis, the Supreme Court made clear 

that “if there is even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will 

work damage to some one else,” the party seeking a stay 

“must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being 

required to go forward.” 299 U.S. at 255. Here, no party 

sought a stay, and the district court did not adequately weigh 

these interests. 

To begin, the Individual Defendants do not articulate any 

prejudice that they will suffer from having to continue 

litigating this case. See Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (“[B]eing

10 The district court’s Notice included two more efficiency-based 

justifications—the “potential for inconsistent judgments” and that “the 

ongoing bankruptcy claim process will affect, among other things, the 

size and potential damage claims of the putative classes in this action.”

Because we conclude that the invocation of judicial efficiency in the 

district court’s Order was a proper justification for a stay and adequately 

supported by the record, we need not address the additional questions of 

whether we may look to the Notice’s justifications and, if so, whether 

these justifications support a stay.
PERA V. EARLEY 21

required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute 

[prejudice].”). Therefore, there are no relative hardships to 

balance. The question is whether the stay imposes hardship 

on Plaintiffs that outweighs the efficiencies to be gained by 

the stay. Both below and on appeal, Plaintiffs raised several 

arguments for why they will be prejudiced by a stay, 

including: (1) danger of lost evidence; (2) competition with 

claimants in other actions for limited insurance covering 

damages awards; and (3) inability for class members who 

did not (or were unable to) submit claims in the bankruptcy 

proceedings to “pursue a remedy in any court, for an 

unknown length of time.” The district court’s Notice tersely

acknowledged that a stay could cause prejudicial delay, but

its Order was silent as to Plaintiffs’specific arguments raised

in their objections.

The Order’s failure to address Plaintiffs’ prejudice 

arguments is particularly problematic because the length of 

the stay ordered exceeds what the district court initially 

indicated in the Notice.11 While a district court has discretion 

to grant a lengthy stay, it must “weigh[] the proper factors” 

in doing so. Blue Cross, 490 F.3d at 724. “We cannot review 

the district court’s exercise of its discretion in weighing 

these factors unless we know that it has done so and why it 

reached its result.” Id. Here, the district court’s Order gives 

no indication that Plaintiffs’ specific objections were 

considered or why the efficiencies the district court seeks to 

gain outweigh the potential prejudice caused by the

11 Despite the plain terms of the Order stating that the stay remains in 

place until “resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings,” the Individual 

Defendants contend that the stay lasts only until completion of the 

securities-claims ADR, as contemplated in the district court’s Notice. 

The Individual Defendants offer no authority establishing that the district 

court’s Notice controls over the express terms of the Order. 
22 PERA V. EARLEY

significant delay. Because we generally “decline to indulge 

in speculation in an effort to make plain that which is not 

discernible in the record,” Barba-Reyes v. United States, 397 

F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1967), we must end our analysis here.

The district court, more familiar with the complexities 

presented in this action and the extent of this action’s overlap 

with the bankruptcy action, is in the better position to assess

and weigh Plaintiffs’ objections to the stay in the first 

instance. If, after considering the potential prejudice to 

Plaintiffs, the district court determines that a stay is 

nonetheless appropriate, it should state its findings and 

explain why a stay promotes “a just and efficient 

determination of th[is] case.” Leyva, 593 F.2d at 864.

For these reasons, we vacate the stay and remand for the 

district court to weigh all the relevant interests in 

determining whether a stay of this action is appropriate. See 

CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268.

VACATED and REMANDED.12

12 Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial notice [Dkt. 46] is granted.