18-800

Wang v. Barr

BIA

Christensen, IJ

A202 039 152

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 23rd day of April, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT:

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

Chief Judge,

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

ZHI WANG,

Petitioner,

v. 18-800

NAC

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Louis H. Klein, The Kasen Law 

Firm, PLLC, Flushing, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General; Mary Jane Candaux, 

Assistant Director; Edward E. 
2

Wiggers, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Zhi Wang, a native and citizen of the People’s 

Republic of China, seeks review of a February 27, 2018, 

decision of the BIA affirming a June 1, 2017, decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhi Wang, No. A 202 039 152

(B.I.A. Feb. 27, 2018), aff’g No. A 202 039 152 (Immig. Ct. 

N.Y. City June 1, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of 

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 

524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review the agency’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings under the 

substantial evidence standard. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 
3

325, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). “[T]he administrative findings of 

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). 

Asylum and Withholding of Removal

As relevant to this appeal, to qualify for asylum and 

withholding of removal, an “applicant must establish that 

. . . political opinion was or will be at least one central 

reason for” the claimed persecution. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see also Matter of C-T-L, 25 I. 

& N. Dec. 341, 346 (BIA 2010) (holding that the “one central 

reason” standard also applies to withholding of removal). 

Asylum or withholding “may be granted where there is more 

than one motive for mistreatment, as long as at least one 

central reason for the mistreatment is on account of a 

protected ground.” Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The agency’s 

determination of whether an applicant has shown a nexus 

between his alleged mistreatment and a protected ground is 

reviewed for substantial evidence. Edimo-Doualla v. 

Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2006).
4

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 

that the harm Wang suffered was not on account of a protected 

ground. Much of Wang’s testimony supports the IJ’s 

conclusion that the government officials’ actions were 

motivated by their desire to secure the government buildings. 

The agency could reasonably conclude that the security guards 

were motivated to beat Wang and his neighbors because they 

charged the guards and entered a property without permission. 

As to the second incident, after Wang accused officials 

of embezzling government money and was detained for 

approximately 12 hours, the police told him not to go back to 

the demolition relocation department to petition again. 

After the third incident, Wang was accused of interfering 

with the conduct of official business. As the IJ’s decision 

acknowledged, see Certified Administrative Record 48, 

retaliation against a person for petitioning the government 

for redress can constitute persecution on the basis of 

political opinion. Under the circumstances of this case, 

however, the IJ was not required to draw the inference that 

the officials desired to punish Wang because he petitioned 

the government. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d 

Cir. 2007) (“Decisions as to which of competing inferences to 
5

draw are entirely within the province of the trier of fact.” 

(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, although Wang accused certain officials of 

corruption, there is no indication that his accusations were 

“directed toward a governing institution,” as opposed to 

“isolated, aberrational acts of greed or malfeasance.” 

Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 548 (2d Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, the IJ reasonably concluded that Wang did 

not show that the officials were motivated by his political 

opinion or their perception of his opinion, as opposed to 

their own security concerns. Moreover, although “prosecution 

that is pretext for political persecution is not on account 

of law enforcement,” Jin Jin Long v. Holder, 620 F.3d 162, 

166 (2d Cir. 2010), the IJ’s conclusion that the government’s 

actions were a legitimate law enforcement response is 

reasonable, particularly given the brevity of Wang’s 

detention. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 

that Wang failed to establish a nexus between the harm he 

suffered and his political opinion. Because Wang failed to 
6

demonstrate the required nexus, the agency did not err in 

denying asylum and withholding of removal. 

CAT

To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must show 

“that it is more likely than not” that he will be tortured in 

his country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture 

is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, 

whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 

person . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent 

or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 

in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT 

relief. The agency reasonably determined that the past harm 

that Wang suffered did not qualify as torture. Wang 

testified that his hand was injured during the first incident 

when the guards attempted to prevent him and his neighbors 

from entering the building. After the third incident, he was 

harassed and was required to report weekly to the police for 

“self-criticism and re-education.” Certified Administrative 

Record 72. Although undoubtedly unpleasant, and perhaps 

unjustified, this harm does not rise to the level of torture. 

Additionally, Wang did not testify that authorities are still 
7

looking for him in China. Accordingly, the agency did not 

err in determining that Wang failed to demonstrate that it 

was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he 

returned to China. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court