In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-2803 

DOUG TAYLOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, DEARBORN COUNTY, STATE OF 

INDIANA, an Indiana municipal corporation, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division. 

No. 4:14-cv-00077-RLY-TAB — Richard L. Young, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 20, 2018 

____________________ 

Before SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and LEE, District Judge.

LEE, District Judge. The appellant, Doug Taylor, claims that 

the Board of Public Works and Safety of the City of Lawrenceburg (“the Board”) terminated his employment with the City 

  The Honorable John Z. Lee, District Judge for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
2 No. 17-2803 

because of his disagreements with the Mayor and exposure of 

purported wrongdoing by City officials. Seeking redress, Taylor filed suit against the City, members of the Board, and several City officials, bringing a claim of First Amendment retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Taylor also asserted state 

law claims of defamation, violation of free-speech rights under the Indiana constitution, and violation of Indiana’s whistleblower statute. The district court entered summary judgment in the City’s favor as to Taylor’s claims. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Doug Taylor is a former police officer of the City of Lawrenceburg, Indiana. He also held positions with the City’s 

civil-city, parks, and electric departments. Taylor ran for a position on Lawrenceburg’s City Council and, in April 2011, improperly appeared in police uniform at an event for his campaign. Taylor also inaccurately represented on his police time 

sheet that he was on duty during the campaign event. The Indiana State Police investigated this conduct, resulting in the 

filing in October 2011 of criminal charges against Taylor for 

Official Misconduct and Ghost Employment. Taylor won election to the City Council in November 2011. 

The Board placed Taylor on administrative leave with pay 

shortly after the criminal charges were filed. It later moved 

him to a front-desk position within the police department in 

January 2012. 

On March 13, 2013, Taylor signed a deferred prosecution 

agreement admitting to the criminal charges and agreeing to 

resign from the City Council. The next day, he distributed to 

local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies an eleven-
No. 17-2803 3

page letter accusing the Board and various City officials, including Mayor Dennis Carr, of corruption and criminal 

wrongdoing. 

A week later, the Board notified Taylor of its intent to terminate his employment as a police officer (as well as with 

“any other department of the City”) and informed him of his 

right to a hearing pursuant to Indiana Code § 36-8-3-4(c). Taylor requested a hearing. 

Prior to the hearing, the Board adopted a rule that its decision would be determined by a simple majority vote of the 

Board members who were present during the presentation of 

evidence and argument. Five members, including the Mayor, 

were present to hear the evidence and arguments at Taylor’s 

hearing. After considering the evidence, the Board voted 2 to 

1 to terminate Taylor’s employment. The Mayor, who votes 

only in the event of a tie, did not vote, and one other member 

of the Board abstained. Taylor’s employment was terminated, 

and he stopped receiving paychecks from the City. 

The Board subsequently issued its findings of fact and law 

pursuant to § 36-8-3-4(i). In its findings, the Board credited a 

local prosecutor’s testimony that he would not accept caserelated information from a police officer, like Taylor, who had 

admitted to a crime of dishonesty. The Board also rejected 

Taylor’s contention that the Board members were biased 

against him. 

In addition, the Board rebuffed Taylor’s suggestion that 

the termination proceedings were initiated in response to his 

March 14, 2013, letter accusing Board members and others of 

wrongdoing. The Board found “no causal connection” be-
4 No. 17-2803 

tween the termination proceedings and the letter and explained that it had waited for the resolution of Taylor’s criminal charges before issuing the notice of termination. 

Pursuant to § 36-8-3-4(e), Taylor had the right to appeal the 

Board’s decision to “the circuit or superior court of the county 

in which [the Board was] located,” within thirty days, § 36-8-

3-4(f), after which the Board’s decision would become “final 

and conclusive,” § 36-8-3-4(g). Taylor timely appealed the 

Board’s decision to the Dearborn County Superior Court on 

October 25, 2013, but he voluntarily dismissed the appeal in 

August 2014, before it was adjudicated. 

II. ANALYSIS

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of 

the defendants, concluding that Taylor’s First Amendment retaliation claim was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel 

and that the individual defendants were immune to Taylor’s 

state law claims pursuant to § 36-13-3-5(b) because he had alleged that they had acted “under authority or color of state 

law.” The district court also found that the state law claims 

failed on the merits. We review a grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2016). 

In University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798–99 

(1986), the Supreme Court held that federal courts must give 

state administrative factfinding “the same preclusive effect to 

which it would be entitled in the State’s courts,” provided that 

the state agency acted in a judicial capacity and resolved issues that the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate. 

We have no trouble concluding that the Board acted in a 

judicial capacity here. In Goodwin v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 442 F.3d 611, 620 (7th Cir. 2006), we held that 
No. 17-2803 5

a state board that made employment decisions had acted in a 

judicial capacity because (1) its decision was subject to judicial 

review pursuant to state law, (2) a hearing officer had presided over the hearing, which provided the opportunity for 

counsel to examine and cross-examine witnesses under oath, 

and (3) the board issued findings of fact. The same is true here. 

For his part, Taylor points to evidence that, he contends, 

shows certain Board members engaged in improper ex parte 

communications with some witnesses, City employees, and 

fellow Board members. But Taylor had the opportunity to 

raise these issues when he appealed the Board’s determination to the Indiana Superior Court and chose not to do so. 

Given Taylor’s ability to fully litigate these issues before the 

Board, the Board’s findings of fact and law, and the availability of judicial review, we are satisfied that the Board acted in 

a judicial capacity. 

Turning to the application of issue preclusion under Indiana law, as we explained in Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 

669, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 227 (2017), 

the Supreme Court of Indiana has stated that “[i]n general, 

issue preclusion bars subsequent litigation of the same fact or 

issue that was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit.” Miller 

Brewing Co. v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 903 N.E.2d 64, 68 

(Ind. 2009). Moreover, “Indiana courts follow federal precedents in applying issue preclusion (also commonly referred 

to as collateral estoppel).” Mains, 852 F.3d at 675–76 (citing 

Miller, 903 N.E.2d at 68). Thus, “[i]n order for issue preclusion 

to apply under Indiana law, the ... decision must be final.” Id.

at 676. From there, we ask two questions: “(1) whether the 

party in the prior action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and (2) whether it is otherwise unfair to apply 
6 No. 17-2803 

collateral estoppel given the facts of the particular case.” Indianapolis Downs, LLC v. Herr, 834 N.E.2d 699, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005). 

Taylor first argues that issue preclusion should not apply 

because the Board’s decision was a nullity and, therefore, not 

final. Prior to Taylor’s hearing, the Board had adopted a decisional rule requiring a majority vote of the Board members 

who were present to hear evidence and argument. Five Board 

members participated in the hearing, but only three actually 

voted, with two out of the three voting for termination. And 

so, Taylor contends, the Board “never made a decision to terminate his employment.” 

Of course, Taylor cannot mean to argue that the Board issued no decision at all. It made a determination and issued 

findings of fact and law. As a result, Taylor’s employment was 

terminated, and he stopped receiving checks from the City. 

Instead, what Taylor is doing is challenging the validity of 

that decision. 

But the appropriate forum for Taylor to press this issue 

was the Circuit or Superior Court in Dearborn County. § 36-

8-3-4(e). Knowing this, Taylor filed an appeal, but withdrew 

it before it could be adjudicated. Under Indiana law, once an 

appeal is withdrawn, it is as though it was never filed. See 

State ex rel. Weaver v. Paxson, 11 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Ind. 1937) 

(holding that police officer who withdrew appeal of a Board 

of Public Works decision had “manifestly” failed to appeal). 

And, because “the decision of the board is final and conclusive upon all persons not appealing,” § 36-8-3-4(g), the 

Board’s decision became final as to Taylor once he withdrew 

his appeal. 
No. 17-2803 7

The next question is whether Taylor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate before the Board the same issues that underlie his claims in this suit. The crux of Taylor’s federal and 

state free-speech retaliation claims, as well as his state law 

whistleblower claim, is his contention that the Board terminated him because of his March 2013 disagreements with 

Mayor Carr. 

Taylor litigated these issues before the Board, and the 

Board found against him. In its findings, the Board stated that 

there was no causal connection between its decision and Taylor’s letter, but rather that the proceedings were “causally related to the resolution or disposition of judicial proceedings 

... . Specifically, ... [Taylor] was subject to criminal charges 

prior to the execution of the deferred prosecution agreement, 

such that disciplinary proceedings could not commence until 

after the execution of the agreement. The Board finds that until [Taylor] admitted the elements of his criminal activity in 

the context of a judicial proceeding, any prior admission by 

[him] was entitled to less weight.” Moreover, as to Taylor’s 

clashes with Mayor Carr, the Board also rejected his argument 

that the Board members were improperly biased or prejudiced against him. 

Taylor therefore had the opportunity to litigate before the 

Board the same material issues underlying his claims in this 

case. And, for the same reasons discussed above, we are convinced that Taylor had a full and fair opportunity to be heard 

on these issues. 

Lastly, as to his defamation claim, Taylor argues again that 

this claim should be revived because the Board’s determination was not approved by the required majority vote. His defamation claim arises out of the Board’s proposed findings, 
8 No. 17-2803 

which he contends improperly credited the testimony of a 

prosecutor about Taylor’s inability to testify credibly in his 

role as a police officer after having admitted to a crime of dishonesty. But, again, Taylor failed to appeal the Board’s determination and, therefore, is bound by its findings as to these 

issues under Indiana law. To the extent Taylor’s defamation 

claim rests on issues that could not have been litigated until 

after the Board issued its decision, Taylor could argue that issue preclusion should not apply; but he does not make that 

argument and thus waives it. See Hojnacki v. Klein-Acosta, 

285 F.3d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 2002). In any event, it is difficult to 

see how the Board’s findings regarding the testimony by the 

state prosecutor that he would not rely on Taylor in the future 

could possibly constitute defamation. 

The district court’s decision is affirmed.