HAROLD L. BRODE 

DNA 6322~ 

OPERATIONS 

CROSSTIE AND BOWLINE 

EVENTS 

DOOR MIST, DORSAL FIN, MILK SHAKE, 

DIANA MOON, HUDSON SEAL, AND MING VASE 

31 AUGUST 1967 - 20 NOVEMBER 1968 

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies 

and their contractors; Critical Technology, 13 November 1985. Other requests for this document shall be 

referred to Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

Washington, DC 203051000. 

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is 

restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Section 

2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of these export 

laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. 

United States Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Prepared by Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency I-IIlk2~4& 
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: 

FOR CLASSIFIED documents, follow the procedures in 

DOD 5200.22-M, Industrial Security Manual, Section II-19 

or DOD 5200.1-R. Information Security Program Regulation, 

Chapter IX. 

FOR UNCLASSIFIED, limited documents, destroy by any 

method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. 

Retention of this document by DOD contractors is authorized 

in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R. Information Security 

Program Regulation. 

PLEASE NOTIFY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, 

ATTN: STTI, WASHINGTON, DC 20305-1000, IF YOUR 

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IS NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY YOUR ORGANIZATION. 
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.cURITVC_ASSsF’CATION OF THlS PAGE 

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 

a ?EPORT SiCi,RITY CLASSIFICATION 1 b ?ESTRICTlVE 1IIARKlNGS 

UNCLASSIFIED 

a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 OISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT 

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N/A since Unclassified Technology, 13 November 1985. Other requests 

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NC;MBER(S) 

DNA 6322F 

a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION 

Reynolds Electrical and (Ifapp/icableJ Field Command 

Engineering Co., Inc. Defense Nuclear Agency 

c.ADDRESS (Oty, State, and Z/Pcod~) 7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIPCode) 

P.O. Box 14400 FCLS (MAJ J.A. Stinson) 

Kirtland AFB, NM 87115-5000 Las Vegas, NV 89114-4400 

a. NAME OF FUNDING iSPONSORING Bb OFFICE SYMBOL 3 PROCUREMENT ,NSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION UUMBER 

ORGANIZATION (/f applicable) 

c. ADDRESS (Oty, State. and ZIPCode) 10 SOURCE OF FlJPliDlNG NUMBERS 

PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK cNlT 

ELEMENT NO NO YO ACCESSION NO 

1 TITLE (Include Securrty C/asslfrcJtlon) 

OPERATIONS CROSSTIE AND BOWLINE EVENTS DOOR MIST, DORSAL FIN, MILK SHAKE, DIANA MOON, 

HUDSON SEAL, AND MING VASE, 31 AUGUST 1967 - 20 NOVEMBER 1968 

2 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Horton, Karen K.; Eubank, Bernard F; and Brady, William J. 

3a TYPE OF REPORT 14 o~jEl~f5REPORT (Year. Month, Day)

Technical '3~~oT~Me6%"8'jyED ro 681120 

6 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

7 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Contrnue on reverse if necessary and !den.trfy b block n mberj 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review rUNTPRy 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA) 

FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP 

18 3 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) 6 18 

9 ABSTRACT (Contrnue on reverse If necessary and rdenpfy by block numbQr) 

This report is a personnel-oriented hlstory of DOD participation in underground nuclear 

weapons testing during OPERATIONS CROSSTIE AND BOWLINE, test events DOOR MIST, DORSAL FIN, 

U1ILK SHAKE, DIANA MOON, HUDSON SEAL, and MING VASE from 31 August 1967 through 20 November 

1968. It is the third in a series of historical reports which will include all DOD underground nuclear weapons tests and all DOE underground nuclear weapons tests with significant 

DOD participation from 1962 forward. In addition to these historical volumes, a restricted 

distribution volume will identify all DOD participants (military, civilian and DOD contractors) and will list their radiation dosimetry data. 

DO FORM 1473,84 MAR 
UNCLASSIFIED 

lC”R,TY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT (Continued) 

for this document shall be referred to Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, DC 

20305-1000. 

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continued) 

Nevada Test Site (NTS) DIANA MOON DOOR MIST BOWLINE 

Underground Test (UGT) DORSAL FIN MING VASE 

HUDSON SEAL MILK SHAKE CROSSTIE 

. . ~ UNCLASSIFIED 11 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 
SUMMARY 

Six Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored underground test 

events were conducted from 31 August 1967 to 20 November 1968 to 

study weapons effects. Two were shaft-type and four were tunneltype nuclear tests. The following table summarizes data on these 

events: 

OPERATION CROSSTIE BOWLINE 

TEST EVENT 

DATE 31 bum 87 29 FES 68 21 MAR 88 27 AUQ 00 24 SEP (18 20 NOV 08 

LOCAL TIME (hour) 0930 PDT 0008 PST 1044 PST 0830 PDT 1005 PDT 1000 PST 

NTS LOCATION AREA 12 AREA 12 AREA 6 AREA 11 AREA 12 AREA 16 

TYPE TUNNEL TUNNEL SHAFT SHAFT TUNNEL TUNNEL 

DEPTH (feet) 1,483 1.345 887 794 1.130 1.010 

YIELD LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 

NOTE: LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS. 

1 

L 
Releases of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere were detected both onsite and offsite after DOOR MIST, a tunnel-type 

event. Releases of radioactive effluent were detected only within 

the confines of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) after the MILK SHAKE 

and DIANA MOON events. No release of radioactive effluent was detected onsite or offsite after the DORSAL FIN, HUDSON SEAL, and 

MING VASE test events. 

As recorded on Area Access Registers, 8,428 individual entries to radiation exclusion areas were made after the above DOD 

test events. Of this number 1,396 were by DOD-affiliated personnel (including military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor). The 

remainder were United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 

other government agency, and other contractor personnel. 

The average gamma radiation exposure per entry for all participants was 16 mR. The average gamma radiation exposure per 

entry for DOD-affiliated participants was 33 mR. The maximum exposure of a non-DOD participant during an entry was 1,625 mR. The 

maximum exposure of a DOD-affiliated participant was 1,185 mR. 

These exposures occurred on 29 November 1967 during reentry and 

recovery operations conducted after the DOOR MIST event. 

2 
PREFACE 

The United States Government conducted 194 nuclear device 

tests from 1945 through 1958 during atmospheric test series at 

sites in the United States and in the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. The United States Army Manhattan Engineer District implemented the testing program in 1945, and its successor agency, 

the AEC, administered the program from 1947 until testing was 

suspended by the United States on 1 November 1958. 

Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for 

weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An additional 22 nuclear experiments were conducted 

from December 1954 to February 1956 in Nevada. These experiments 

were physics studies using small quantities of fissionable material and conventional explosives. 

President Eisenhower had proposed that test ban negotiations 

begin on 31 October 1958, and had pledged a one-year moratorium 

on United States testing to commence after the negotiations 

began. The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests 

began at Geneva on 31 October 1958; the U.S. moratorium began on 

1 November, and the AEC detected the final Soviet nuclear test of 

their fall series on 3 November 1958. Negotiations continued until May 1960 without final agreement. No nuclear tests were conducted by either nation until 1 September 1961 when the Soviet 

Union resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The United 

States began a series of underground tests in Nevada on 15 September 1961, and U.S. atmospheric tests were resumed on 25 April 

1962 in the Pacific. 

The United States conducted several atmospheric tests in 

3 
Nevada during July 1962, and the last United States atmospheric 

nuclear test was in the Pacific on 4 November 1962. The Limited 

Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in 

outer space, and underwater was signed in Moscow on 5 August 

1963. From resumption of United States atmospheric testing on 25 

April 1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 

weapons related and weapons effects tests were conducted as part 

of the Pacific and Nevada atmospheric test operations. The 

underground tests, resumed on 15 September 1961, have continued 

on a year-round basis through the present time. 

In 1977, 15 years after atmospheric testing stopped, the 

Center for Disease Control (CDC)* noted a possible leukemia 

cluster within the group of soldiers who were present at the 

SMOKY test event, one of the Nevada tests in the 1957 PLUMBBOB 

test series. After that CDC report, the Veterans Administration 

(VA) received a number of claims for medical benefits filed by 

former military personnel who believed their health may have been 

affected by their participation in the nuclear weapons testing 

program. 

In late 1977, the DOD began a study to provide data for both 

the CDC and the VA on radiation exposures of DOD military and 

civilian participants in atmospheric testing. That study has 

progressed to the point where a number of volumes describing DOD 

participation in atmospheric tests have been published by the 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) as the executive agency for the DOD. 

On 20 June 1979, the United States Senate Committee on 

Veterans' Affairs began hearings on Veterans' Claims for Dis-

*The Center for Disease Control was part of the U.S. Department 

of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services). It was renamed The Centers for Disease Control on 1 October 1980. 
abilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing. In addition to requesting and receiving information on DOD personnel participation and 

radiation exposures during atmospheric testing, the Chairman of 

the Senate Committee expressed concern regarding exposures of DOD 

participants in DOD-sponsored and Department of Energy (DOE)* 

underground test events. 

The Chairman requested and received information from the 

Director, DNA, in an exchange of letters through 15 October 1979 

regarding research on underground testing radiation exposures. In 

early 1980, the DNA initiated a program to acquire and consolidate underground testing radiation exposure data in a set of published volumes similar to the program under way on atmospheric 

testing data. This volume is the third of several volumes regarding the participation and radiation exposures of DOD military and 

civilian participants in underground nuclear test events. 

SERIES OF VOLUMES 

Each volume of this series discusses DOD-sponsored underground test events, in chronological order, after presenting introductory and general information. The volumes cover all underground test events identified as DOD-sponsored in Announced 

United States Nuclear Tests, published each year by the DOE 

Nevada Operations Office, Office of Public Affairs, except events 

conducted as nuclear test detection experiments where reentries 

and, subsequently, significant exposure of participants to radiation did not occur. 

*The U.S. Department of Energy succeeded the U.S. Energy Research 

and Development Administration (ERDA) in October 1977. ERDA had 

succeeded the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on 19 January 1975. 

5 
An additional volume will discuss general participation of 

DOD personnel in DOE-sponsored underground test events, with specific information on those events which released radioactive effluent to the atmosphere and where exposures of DOD personnel 

were involved. 

A separate set of volumes will be a census of DOD personnel 

and their radiation exposure data. Distribution of these volumes 

will necessarily be limited by provisions of the Privacy Act. 

METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THE VOLUMES 

Information for these volumes was obtained from several 

locations. Security-classified documents were researched at 

Headquarters, DNA, Washington, DC. Additional documents were 

researched at Field Command, DNA, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory Technical Library, and Sandia National Laboratories in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. Most of the radiation measurement data 

were obtained at the DOE, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), and 

its support contractor, the Reynolds Electrical & Engineering 

Company, Inc. (REECo), in Las Vegas, Nevada. 

Unclassified records were used to document underground testing activities when possible, but, when necessary, unclassified 

information was extracted from security-classified documents. 

Both unclassified and classified documents are cited in the List 

of References at the end of each volume. Locations of the reference documents also are shown. Copies of most of the unclassified references have been entered in the records of the Coordination and Information Center (CIC), a DOE facility located in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

Radiation measurements, exposure data, event data, and offsite reports generally are maintained as hard copy or microfilm 

6 
at the REECo facilities adjacent to the CIC, or as original hard 

copy at the Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna Niguel, 

California. A master file of all available personnel exposure 

data for nuclear testing programs on the continent and in the 

Pacific from 1945 to the present also is maintained by REECo for 

DOD and DOE. 

ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME 

A Summary of this test event volume appears before this 

Preface and includes general objectives of the test events, 

characteristics of each test event, and data regarding DOD 

participants and their radiation exposures. 

An Introduction following this Preface discusses reasons for 

conducting nuclear test events underground, the testing organization, the NTS, and locations of NTS underground testing areas. 

A chapter entitled Underground Testing Procedures explains 

the basic mechanics of underground testing, purposes of effects 

experiments, containment features and early containment problems, 

tunnel and shaft area access requirements, industrial safety and 

radiological safety procedures, telemetered radiation exposure 

rate measurements, and air support for underground tests. 

A chapter on each test event covered by the volume follows 

in chronological order. Each test event chapter contains an 

event summary, a discussion of preparations and event operations, 

an explanation of safety procedures implemented, and listings of 

monitoring, sampling, and exposure results. 

Following the event chapters are a Reference List and appendices to the text including a Glossary of Terms and a list of Abbreviations and Acronyms. 

7 

•• •• •• •• ••

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 

SUMMARY......................... 

PREFACE.................... 

Series of Volumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Methods and Sources Used to Prepare the Volumes • . . 

Organization of this Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................. 

LIST OF TABLES ..................... 

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION ............... 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .............. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES ......... 

1.3 TEST EVENTS IN THIS VOLUME ........... 

1.4 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES . . 

1.4.1 Responsibilities of the Defense Atomic 

Support Agency .............. 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization ...... 

1.4.3 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support . 

1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOD, THE AEC, AND 

CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS ............ 

1.5.1 Test Command/DASA (TC/DASA) and the 

Nevada Operations Office (AEC/NVOO) ... 

1.5.2 Test Organizations ............ 

1.5.3 Support Contractors ........... 

1.6 THE NEVADA TEST SITE .............. 

CHAPTER 2 - UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES ...... 

2.1 EMPLACEMENT TYPES ................ 

2.1.1 Shaft-Type ................ 

2.1.2 Tunnel-Type ............... 

2.2 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES .............. 

2.2.1 Radiation Measurements .......... 

2.2.2 Radiochemical Measurements ........ 

2.2.3 Line-of-Sight (LOS) Pipe ......... 

PAGE 

1 

3 

5 

6 

7 

16 

17 

19 

19 

20 

21 

21 

23 

24 

24 

27 

27 

28 

31 

32 

37 

37 

37 

39 

41 

41 

43 

43 

9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.3 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS ............... 44 

2.4 CONTAINMENT FEATURES AND PROBLEMS ........ 45 

2.4.1 Shaft Containment ............ 45 

2.4.2 Tunnel Containment ............ 47 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS . . 49 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control .......... 49 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control ....... 51 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . 51 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . 54 

2.7.1 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Nevada Test 

Site Organization - Standard Operating 

Procedure, Chapter 0524, 

Radiological Safety . . . . . . . . . . . 54 

2.7.2 Standard Operating Procedures for the 

Radiological Sciences Department, REECo, 

dated January 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 

2.7.3 Implementation of radiological procedures; 

required equipment, devices and capabilities 

for monitoring radiation levels in the 

environment and monitoring external and 

internal exposures of personnel . . . . . 54 

A. Portable Radiation Detection 

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

B. Air Sampling Equipment . . . . . . . . 55 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability . . . . 55 

D. Monitoring of Personnel Exposures . . 56 

2.7.4 Additional Methods Used for Control 

of Radex Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS . . 60 

2.8.1 Telemetry Systems in Use . . . . . • . . • 60 

A. Remote Area Monitoring System (RAMS) . 61 

B. Digital Data System . . . . . . . . - 61 

10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

C. Well Logging Unit . . . . . . . . . . 62 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring 

Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 

2.9.1 Changes In Air Support Requirements . . . 66 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs AFAF . 67 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters . . . . . 68 

CHAPTER 3 - DOOR MIST EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

3.2.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . 75 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction . . . . 75 

B. Radiological Safety Support . . . . . 75 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 76 

D. Security Coverage . . . . . . . . . . 78 

E. Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities . . . . . . . . . 79 

3.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . 80 

3.3.1 Telemetry and Radioactive Effluent 

Release Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 

3.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Reentry 

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 

3.3.3 Cloud Tracking and Sampling . . . . . . . 81 

A. PHS Aircraft Mission . . . . . . . . . 81 

B. ARMS Aircraft Mission . . . . . . . . a2 

C. NATS Cloud Tracking Mission No. 1 . . 82 

D. NATS Cloud Tracking Mission No. 2 . . a2 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a3 

3.4.1 Portal Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 

3.4.2 Tunnel Reentry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a3 

11 
CHAPTER 

3.5 

CHAPTER 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

CHAPTER 

5.1 

5.2 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

3.4.3 Postevent Mining (U12e.04 Drift to 

U12g.07 Drift) .............. 

3.4.4 Postevent Drilling ............ 

3.4.5 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

4 - DORSAL FIN EVENT ............. 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

4.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

C. Security Coverage .......... 

D. Air Support ............. 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

4.3.1 Radiation Surveys and Surface Reentry . . 

4.3.2 Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

4.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery . . 

A. D+l (1 March 1968) .......... 

B. D+2 (2 March 1968) .......... 

C. D+3 (3 March 1968) .......... 

D. D+4 (4 March 1968) .......... 

E. D+5 (5 March 1968) .......... 

F. Extended Recovery Activities ..... 

4.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 

4.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

5 - MILK SHAKE EVENT ............. 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

PAGE 

85 

91 

91 

92 

95 

95 

95 

95 

97 

97 

98 

101 

102 

102 

102 

104 

104 

105 

105 

105 

106 

107 

108 

108 

109 

109 

110 

110 

113 

113 

113 

12 
••••••••

•••••••••••••

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

5.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 113 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 115 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 115 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 116 

C. Security Coverage .......... 116 

D. Air Support ............. 118 

5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 118 

5.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 118 

5.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Sampling ....... 119 

A. U-3A Tracking Mission ........ 119 

B. Vegas 8 Mission ........... 119 

5.3.2 Test Area Radiation Surveys and Reentry 

Activities ................ 121 

5.3.3 Experiment Recovery Activities ...... 121 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 123 

5.4.1 Tower Experiment Recovery Activities ... 123 

5.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 123 

5.4.3 Industrial Safety 124 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 124 

CHAPTER 6 - DIANA MOON EVENT ............. 127 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 127 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 127 

6.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 127 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 129 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 129 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 130 

C. Security Coverage .......... 130 

D. Air Support ............. 132 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 132 

6.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 133 

6.3.1 First Radioac'ive Effluent Release 

Situation ................ 134 

13 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

6.3.2 Surface Reentry and Recovery Operations. . 134 

6.3.3 Second Radioactive Effluent Release 

Situation ............... . 136 

6.3.4 Cloud Tracking and Sampling ...... . 136 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............. . 140 

6.4.1 Experiment Recovery Operations ..... . 140 

6.4.2 Postevent Drilling ........... . 140 

6.4.3 Industrial Safety ........... . 141 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............ . 142 

CHAPTER 7 - HUDSON SEAL EVENT ........... . 145 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY ................. . 145 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. . 145 

7.2.1 Responsibilities ............ . 145 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations ....... . 147 

A. Radiological Safety Support .... . 147 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 148 

C. Security Coverage ......... . 149 

D. Air Support ............ . 149 

7.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ........ . 149 

7.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ...... . 151 

7.3.1 Telemetry Coverage ........... . 151 

7.3.2 Radiation Surveys ........... . 152 

7.3.3 Surface Experiment Recovery ...... . 152 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............. . 153 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities and Experiment 

Recovery ................ 153 

7.4.2 Offsite Radiation Surveillance ..... 154 

7.4.3 Industrial Safety ........... 155 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............ 155 

CHAPTER 8 - MING VASE EVENT ............ 157 

8.1 EVENT SUMMARY ................. 157 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 157 

14 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

8.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 157 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 159 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 159 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 160 

C. Security Coverage .......... 162 

D. Air Support ............. 162 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 162 

8.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 163 

8.3.1 Surface Reentry Activities and Experiment 

Recovery ................. 163 

8.3.2 Initial Tunnel Reentry .......... 164 

8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 165 

8.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery . . 165 

8.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 166 

8.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 166 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 168 

REFERENCE LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 

APPENDICES 

A. Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 

B. Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . 201 

C. General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department 

of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Nuclear Tests . 205 

D. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0524 - Radiological Safety . . 219 

15 
•••••••••••••

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FIGURE PAGE 

1.1 Federal Government Structure for Continental 

Nuclear Tests ................... 22 

1.2 Nevada Test Site Organization ........... 25 

1.3 Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada ..... 33 

1.4 The Nevada Test Site ............... 35 

2.1 A Typical Subsidence Crater 40 

2.2 Portal of Typical DOD Tunnel Complex ....... 42 

2.3 NTS Combination Personnel Dosimeter and 

Security Credential Holder ............ 57 

2.4 Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site ...... 63 

2.5 Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Tunnel-Type Emplacement Site ...... 64 

2.6 Typical Permanently Established Remote Radiation 

Detector Stations Operated Continuously Throughout 

theNTS ...................... 65 

2.7 Air Force Personnel Decontaminating a B-57 Cloud 

Sampling Aircraft ................. 69 

2.8 Air Force and Radsafe Personnel Monitoring a B-57 

After Decontamination ............... 70 

2.9 Radsafe Monitor Measuring Exposure Rate on a B-57 

Aircraft ..................... 71 

3.1 DOOR MIST Event - Tunnel Layout .......... 74 

3.2 DOOR MIST Event - Planned Reentry through U12e.04 . 87 

3.3 DOOR MIST Event - Postevent Tunnel Layout ..... 88 

4.1 DORSAL FIN Event - Tunnel Layout ......... 96 

5.1 MILK SHAKE Event - U5K Site Plan ......... 114 

6.1 DIANA MOON Event - Ulle Site Plan ......... 128 

7.1 HUDSON SEAL Event - Tunnel Layout ......... 146 

8.1 MING VASE Event - Tunnel Layout .......... 158 

16 
LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE PAGE 

2.1 DOD Test Events - 31 August 1967 to 20 November 

1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 

3.1 DOOR MIST Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . . 77 

3.2 Air Sampling Unit Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

4.1 DORSAL FIN Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . 99 

5.1 MILK SHAKE Event RAMS Unit Locations. . . . . . . . 117 

5.2 MILK SHAKE Event - U-3A Cloud Tracking Summary . . . 120 

5.3 MILK SHAVE Event - Initial Radiation Survey Data . 122 

6.1 DIANA MOON Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . 131 

6.2 DIANA MOON Event - Initial Radiation Survey of 

Trailer Park Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 

6.3 DIANA MOON Event - U-3A Monitoring Results . . . . 138 

6.4 DIANA MOON Event - Vegas 8 - Aerial Monitoring 

Results...................... 139 

7.1 HUDSON SEAL Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . 149 

8.1 MING VASE Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . . 161 

17 
18 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The first United States nuclear detonation designed to be 

fully contained underground was the RAINIER tunnel event conducted in Nevada on 19 September 1957. This was a weapons related 

experiment with a relatively low yield of 1.7 kilotons (kt). The 

second tunnel event was a safety experiment on 22 February 1958 

also conducted in Nevada. This experiment, the VENUS event, resulted in a yield less than one ton. These two tests were the 

beginning of a United States underground program that is currently the only method of testing permitted by treaty. 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

While technical conferences between the United States and 

the Soviet Union on banning nuclear detonation tests continued, 

and concern regarding further increases in worldwide fallout 

mounted, a number of nuclear tests were conducted underground 

during 1958 in Nevada. Prior to the United States testing moratorium, six safety experiments in shafts, five safety experiments 

in tunnels, and four weapons development tests in tunnels were 

conducted. 

However, radioactive products from several of these tests 

were not completely contained underground. Containment of nuclear detonations was a new engineering challenge. Fully understanding and solving containment problems would require years of 

underground testing experience. 

When the United States resumed testing on 15 September 1961, 

the initial 33 test events were underground including a single 

19 
cratering experiment with the device emplaced 110 feet below the 

surface. The DOMINIC I test series in the Pacific and the DOMINIC 

II test series in Nevada during 1962 were the last atmospheric 

nuclear detonation tests by the United States. 

The commitment of the United States to reduce levels of 

worldwide fallout by refraining from conducting nuclear tests in 

the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater was finalized when 

the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 

5 August 1963. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES 

The majority of United States underground tests have been 

for weapons development purposes. New designs were tested to 

improve efficiency and deliverability characteristics of nuclear 

explosive devices before they entered the military stockpile as 

components of nuclear weapons. 

Safety experiments with nuclear devices were conducted in 

addition to weapons development tests. These experiments tested 

nuclear devices by simulating detonation of the conventional high 

explosives in a manner which might occur in an accident during 

transportation or storage of weapons. 

Weapons effects tests utilized device types designed to be 

equivalent to weapons, or in some instances actually to be used 

in weapons, to determine the effects of weapon detonations on 

structures, materials, and equipment. The devices generally were 

provided by one of the weapons development laboratories. However,' 

the DOD sponsored weapons effects tests, and such tests usually 

involved greater numbers of participants and were more complex 

than the other categories of tests previously mentioned. 

20 
Effects of shock waves on rock formations, buildings, other 

structures, materials, and equipment have been tested. Effects 

of other detonation characteristics such as heat and radiation 

have been studied in the same manner. The most complex weapons 

effects tests have been those simulating high altitude detonations by using very large evacuated pipes hundreds of feet in 

length and containing experiments. 

1.3 TEST EVENTS IN THIS VOLUME 

Weapons effects tests conducted from 31 August 1967 to 20 

November 1968 during Operation CROSSTIE and Operation BOWLINE are 

discussed in this volume. The objective of each of these tests 

was to determine the effects of a nuclear detonation environment 

on equipment and materials. Test events and execution dates are 

listed below. 

1. DOOR MIST, 31 August 1967. 

2. DORSAL FIN, 29 February 1968. 

3. MILK SHAKE, 25 March 1968. 

4. DIANA MOON, 27 August 1968. 

5. HUDSON SEAL, 24 September 1968. 

6. MING VASE, 20 November 1968. 

1.4 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Administering the underqLound nuclear testing program at NTS 

was a joint AEC-DOD responsibility. The parallel nature of the 

AEC-DOD organizational structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 

21 
PRESIDENT 

COMMAND 

_ _ _ LIAISON AND COORDINATION 

Figure 1.1 Federal Government structure for continental nuclear 

tests (during 1967-68). 

22 
1.4.1 Responsibilities of the Defense Atomic Support Agency 

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was activated on 1 January 1947 (when the Atomic Energy Commission was 

activated) to assume residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer 

District. The DOD nuclear weapons testing organization was within AFSWP until 1959 when AFSWP became the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA)*. The responsibilities of Headquarters, DASA, in 

Washington DC, included providing consolidated management and 

direction for the DOD nuclear weapons effects and nuclear weapons 

testing program. The technical direction and coordination of DOD 

nuclear weapons testing activities was delegated to Test Command, 

DASA (TC/DASA) headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

The responsibilities of TC/DASA in 1967 regarding DOD nuclear weapons testing activities were: 

1. exercising technical direction of nuclear weapons effects tests of primary concern to the Armed Forces, and 

weapons effects phases of developmental or other tests 

of nuclear weapons involving detonations within the continental United States and overseas; 

2. coordinating and supporting all DOD act ivities and assisting in support of the AEC in the conduct of joint 

tests involving nuclear detonations within the continental United States: 

3. completing detailed plans, preparing for and conducting 

technical programs, and assisting in the preparation of 

technical and operational reports on tests; and 

*DASA became the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) on 1 July 1971. 

23 
4. coordinating military operational training and DOD aspects of official visitor and public information programs. (Underground testing did not include troop participation and troop observers. The official visitor and 

public information programs were integrated with the AEC 

organization during joint AEC-DOD continental tests.) 

These missions were accomplished for DOD underground nuclear 

tests through the Test Command Weapons Effects and Tests Group 

(TCWT). The TCWT testing organization included administrative 

operations at Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and operations at the Nevada Test Site. 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization 

In the joint AEC-DOD testing program, TCWT was a part of the 

Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) as shown in Figure 1.2. The 

Military Deputy to the Test Manager was the Deputy Chief of 

Staff, TCWT, and TCWT personnel provided DOD coordination and 

support. 

The CT0 was part of the original Nevada Test Site Organization along with the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), the 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (LRL), Sandia Corporation (SC), and 

the Civil Effects Test Organization (CETO). In addition to his 

position as Military Deputy to the Test Manager, the Deputy Chief 

of Staff, TCWT, was also the CT0 Test Group Director. The CT0 

was disestablished on 1 August 1962 with its responsibilities 

being assumed by TCWT. 

1.4.3 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support 

The commander of the Air Force Special Weapons Center 

(AFSWC) was requested by TC/DASA to provide air support to the 

NTSO during nuclear tests at NTS. Direct support was provided by 

24 
- OFFICE OF THE TEST MANAGER 

ADVISORY PANEL . 

• TEST MANAGER 

• DEPUTY TEST MANAQER NTS PLANNING BOARD -

• MILITARY DEPUTY I 

. 

NTS USERS 

••LOS ALAMOS 

SCIENTIFIC LAB 

••LAWRENCE BLAST PREDICTION 

LIVERMORE LAB 

••SANDIA LABORATORIES 

••DEFENSE ATOMIC CONTROL POINT

SUPPORT AQENCY COORDINATION 

••OTHERB I I

I I I 

PROJECT OPERATIONS 

OPERATIONS 

- COORDINATION 

TECHNICAL DOD PROGRAM PROGRAM 

AIR SUPPORT GROUP 

DIRECTOR

TEST BROUP DIRECTORS DOD SUPPORT 

AFSWC 

SAFETY EVALUATION 

RADIOLOGICAL 

- SAFETY SUPPORT 

SECURITY 

Figure 1.2 Nevada test site organization. 
the Nuclear Test Directorate, the Special Projects Division, and 

the 4900th Air Base Group of AFSWC. The 4900th Air Base Group 

provided aircraft for shuttle service between Kirtland AFB, New 

Mexico, and Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF) in 

Nevada. The 4900th also provided aircraft and crews to perform 

low-altitude cloud tracking and for radio relay and courier 

missions. 

Other Air Force organizations providing support to the NTSO 

under AFSWC control on a temporary basis were as follows: 

1. Elements of the 1211th Test Squadron (Sampling), Military Air Transport Service, McClellan AFB, were detached 

to ISAFAF. Their primary task was cloud sampling. Personnel from this unit also assisted NTSO radiological 

safety personnel in providing support at ISAFAF, including decontamination of crews, equipment, and aircraft. 

2. Elements of the 4520th Combat Crew Training Wing, Tactical Air Command, Nellis AFB, Nevada, provided support 

functions, such as housing, food, and logistics, to the 

units operating from ISAFAF and Nellis AFB. In addition, they conducted security sweep flights over NTS and 

control tower operations, fire-fighting, and crash 

rescue services at ISAFAF. They also maintained and 

provided equipment for the helicopter pad at the NTS 

Control Point (CP) and other helicopter pads at each 

Forward Control Point (FCP). 

3. The 55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Military Air 

Transport Service, McClellan AFB, supplied one aircraft 

and a crew to perform cloud tracking. 

4. The Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems 

Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, provided aircraft and 

crews to perform technical projects. 

26 
1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOD, THE AEC, AND CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS 

The DOD was responsible for establishing nuclear weapons 

criteria, developing and producing delivery vehicles, obtaining 

military effects data, and providing defense against nuclear 

attack. 

The AEC was responsible for development, production, and 

supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed Forces in quantities and 

types specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The AEC, in 

association with the DOD, also was responsible for providing 

field nuclear test facilities in the continental United States 

and overseas. 

1.5.1 Test Command/DASA (TC/DASA) and the Nevada Operations 

Office (AEC/NVOO) 

The principal points of field coordination between the AEC 

and the DOD were at Las Vegas and the Nevada Test Site. From 1 

August 1966 to 1 July 1971, TC/DASA represented the Director, 

DASA and DOD. The AEC/NVOO represented the AEC in the field for 

continental tests. Each organization's primary interest was 

field testing of nuclear weapons. Close liaison was maintained 

between TC/DASA and AEC/NVOO during planning phases for field 

test programs of primary interest to the DOD. 

During test operations, military and AEC personnel were combined into a single test organization. Normally, the Manager, 

NV00 was the senior member of the combined test organization and 

the Director, Directorate of Nuclear Field Operations, TC/DASA, 

was his deputy. Other personnel in this joint'test organization 

were selected from those available on a best-qualified basis. In 

accomplishing this, personnel were drawn not only from TC/DASA 

and NV00 but from other agencies of DASA, the Armed Forces, mili27 
tary laboratories, military contractors, universities, civilian 

laboratories, AEC laboratories, AEC contractors, other government 

agencies, and from other sources when special qualifications or 

knowledge were required. 

Since the Nevada Test Site was an AEC installation, the Manager, NVOO, was responsible for its operation. The DOD and AEC 

laboratories were the principal users of the Test Site. The Directorate of Nuclear Field Operations, TC/DASA, was the point of 

contact for the Manager, NVOO, for all matters pertaining to DOD 

field test programs, and supported all DOD agencies operating at 

the Test Site. 

To accomplish these two major responsibilities, TC/DASA had 

a Nevada Branch with a liaison office in the AEC building in Las 

Vegas and a larger office at Mercury, Nevada. The Nevada Branch 

maintained liaison with NV00 top management on all DOD matters 

pertaining to field operations, and supported DOD agencies at the 

Test Site by providing office and laboratory space, transportation, test equipment, logistical support, and administrative support as needed. All DOD personnel and DOD contractor personnel 

connected with field test were under administrative control of 

the Nevada Branch while in Las Vegas and at the Nevada Test Site. 

1.5.2 Test Organizations 

Before 1957, the Test Group Director for each series had 

been a LASL representative. For the 1957 PLUMBBOB series, an LRL 

staff member was appointed to the position, reflecting growing 

LRL participation in test operations. After 1961, the Test Group 

Director for events of primary interest to the DOD was generally 

an officer from one of the Services. The Test Group Director was 

responsible for overall coordination and scientific support for 

the entire scientific test program, including planning and coordination. Generally, the AEC weapons laboratories provided 

nuclear devices for DOD test events. 

28 
Other officials of the NTSO were responsible for various 

functions, such as logistical support, weather prediction, fallout prediction, blast prediction, air support, public information, radiological safety, industrial safety, and fire protection. 

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY was established early in 

1943 as Los Alamos in New Mexico, for the specific purpose of developing an atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists supervised the 

test detonation of the world's first atomic weapon in July 1945 

at the TRINITY site in New Mexico. Los Alamos became the Los 

Alamos Scientific Laboratory in January 1947 when the AEC and 

AFSWP were activated, and replaced the Manhattan Engineer District. The Laboratory's continuing assignment was to conceive, 

design, test, and develop nuclear components of atomic weapons. 

The contract under which LASL performed work for the AEC was 

administered by the Commission's Albuquerque Operations Office. 

The Laboratory was operated by the University of California. 

LAWRENCE RADIATION LABORATORY was established as a second 

AEC weapons laboratory at Livermore, California, in 1952. The 

Laboratory's responsibilities were essentially parallel to those 

of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Devices developed by 

LRL were first tested in Nevada in 1953, and they have been 

tested in each continental and Pacific series since. The contract under which LRL performed work for the AEC was administered 

by the Commission's San Francisco Operations Office. This 

Laboratory also was operated by the University of California. 

SANDIA LABORATORY (later Sandia Laboratories) at Sandia 

Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, was the AK's other weapons laboratory. It was established in 1946 as a branch of the Los Alamos 

Scientific Laboratory, but in 1949 assumed its identity as a 

full-fledged weapons research institution operated by the Sandia 

Corporation, a non-profit subsidiary of Western Electric. Sandia 

29 
Laboratory's role was to conceive, design, test, and develop the 

non-nuclear phases of atomic weapons and to do other work in related fields. In 1956, a Livermore Branch of the Laboratory was 

established to provide closer support to developmental work of 

the LRL. Sandia Corporation also operated ballistic test facilities for the AEC at the Tonopah Ballistics Range (now Tonopah 

Test Range) near Tonopah, Nevada. 

DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY was located in Washington, 

D.C. and was composed of personnel from the Armed Services and 

civilian DOD employees. It was activated on 1 January 1947 to 

assume certain residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer District and to assure continuity of technical military interest in 

nuclear weapons. The broad mission of DASA was planning specified technical services to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps in the military application of nuclear energy. Among the 

services performed were: 1) maintaining liaison with the AEC 

laboratories in the development of nuclear weapons, 2) planning 

and supervising the conduct of weapons effects tests and other 

field exercises, 3) providing nuclear weapons training to military personnel, and 4) storing and maintaining nuclear weapons. 

Early in the program for testing nuclear devices and weapons, 

DASA was given responsibility for planning and integrating with 

the AEC for military participation in full scale tests. After 

the NTS was activated, this planning responsibility was broadened 

to include conducting experimental programs of primary concern to 

the Armed Forces and coordinating other phases of military participation including assistance to the AEC. The Director, DASA, was 

responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Test Command, DASA, located at Kirtland Air Force Base (then 

Sandia Base), New Mexico, carried out the weapon field testing 

responsibilities and seismic detection research responsibilities 

(VELA-UNIFORM) for the Director, DASA. This organization main30 
tained close liaison with the AEC Nevada Operations Office. 

Personnel from the TC/DASA became the military members of the 

joint AEC-DOD test organization at the Nevada Test Site and other 

continental United States test locations. All participation of 

DOD agencies and their contractors in nuclear field tests was 

coordinated and supported by TC/DASA. 

Nevada Branch at Mercury, Nevada, maintained liaison with 

AEC/NVOO and supervised TC/DASA activities at the Nevada Test 

Site. In addition to continental test responsibilities, TC/DASA 

provided key personnel for the military scientific test unit, and 

managed technical and scientific programs for DOD agencies and 

contractors during overseas tests. 

1.5.3 Support Contractors 

In keeping with its policy, the AX used private contractors 

for maintenance, operation, and construction (including military 

and civil defense construction) at the NTS. Nevada Operations 

Office personnel administered all housekeeping, construction, and 

related services activity, but performance was by contractors. 

Major contractors were the following: 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company (REECo) was the 

principal AEC operational and support contractor for the NTS, 

providing electrical and architectural engineering, state-of-theart large diameter and conventional shaft drilling, heavy duty 

construction and excavation, mining and tunneling, occupational 

safety and fire protection, radiological safety monitoring, communications and electronics, and occupational medicine. REECo 

maintained offices in Las Vegas and extensive facilities at the 

NTS. 

Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., (EG&G) of Boston, -

Massachusetts, was the princi;.:el technical contractor, providing 

31 
control point functions such as timing and firing, and diagnostic 

functions such as scientific photography and measurement of detonation characteristics. In addition, EG&G personnel manned the 

DOD monitor room. EG&G facilities were maintained in Las Vegas 

and at the NTS. 

Holmes & Narver, Inc., (H&N) performed architect-engineer 

services for the NTS and was the principal support contractor for 

the Commission's off-continent operations. H&N had a home office 

in Los Angeles, and also maintained offices in Las Vegas and at 

the NTS. 

Since 1963, Fenix & Scisson, Inc., (F&S) Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

was architect-engineer for drilling and mining operations in connection with underground nuclear testing. The company was involved in design and construction of many underground structures, 

and in the field of deep, large-diameter hole drilling. Las 

Vegas Branch activity was conducted from offices in Las Vegas and 

Mercury, Nevada. 

Numerous other contractors, selected on the basis of lumpsum competitive bids, performed various construction and other 

support functions for the AEC and the DOD. 

1.6 THE NEVADA TEST SITE 

An on-continent location was selected for conducting nuclear 

weapons tests; construction began at the Nevada Proving Ground 

(NPG) in December 1950; and testing began in January 1951. This 

testing area was renamed the Nevada Test Site in 1955. 

The original NPG boundaries were expanded as new projects 

and testing areas were added. Figure 1.3 shows the present NTS 

location bounded on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Range. 

32 
I /WARM SPRINGS 

GOLDFIELD 

t I 

L 

eJ 

\ \ /

\ MAP AREA 

‘7 

Figure 1.3 Nellis Air Force range anti NTS in Nevada. 

33 
NTS encompasses about 1,350 square miles. This testing location 

was selected for both safety and security reasons. The arid climate, lack of industrialization, and exclusion of the public from 

the Nellis Air Force Range have combined to result in a very low 

population density in the area around the NTS. 

The only paved roads within the NTS and Nellis Air Force 

Range complex are those constructed by the government for access 

purposes. The NTS testing areas are physically protected by surrounding rugged topography. The few mountain passes and dry 

washes where four-wheel-drive vehicles might enter are posted 

with warning signs and barricades. NTS security force personnel 

patrol perimeter and barricade areas in aircraft and vehicles. 

Thus, unauthorized entry to NTS is difficult, and the possibility 

of a member of the public inadvertently entering an NTS testing 

area is extremely remote. 

Figure 1.4 shows the NTS, its various area designations, and 

the locations of the six test events covered by this volume. 

Generally, the "U" means an underground location, the number the 

area, and the "a" the first test location in an area; in addition, for tunnels, the "g.07" indicates the seventh drift from 

the main "g" tunnel, as U12g.07 in Figure 1.4. 

A low mountain range separates the base camp, Mercury, from 

the location of early AEC amd DOD atmospheric weapons effects 

tests at Frenchman Flat in Area 5. A few shaft-type underground 

tests also were conducted in this area. The elevation of Frenchman Dry Lake in the middle of the Flat is about 3,100 feet. 

A mountain pass separates Frenchman Flat from Yucca Flat 

testing areas. The pass overlooks both Frenchman and Yucca Flats 

and contains the CP complex of buildings including Control Point 

Building 1 (CP-1) where timing and firing for most atmospheric 

tests was performed, and Control Point Building 2 (CP-2) where 

radiological safety support was based. 

34 
HUDSON SEAL 

I 

I 

I I 

Figure 1.4 The Nevada test site. 

35 
Yucca Flat testing areas include Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 

and 10. Underground tests have been conducted in some of these 

areas and generally were shaft emplacement types. The elevation 

of Yucca Dry Lake at the south end of Yucca Flat is about 4,300 

feet. To the west of Yucca Flat, in another basin, is the Area 

ia testing location. Some DOD atmospheric tests were conducted 

in Area 18, and one DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted 

on Buckboard Mesa in this area at an elevation of about 5,500 

.feet. Area 16 is in the mountains west of Yucca Flat toward Area 

ia. The single Area 16 tunnel complex at an elevation of about 

5,400 feet was a DOD underground testing location. 

Rainier Mesa is in Area 12 northwest of Yucca Flat, and the 

top of the Mesa is at an elevation of about 7,500 feet. All DOD 

tunnel-emplacement type events on NTS that were not in the Area 

16 tunnel complex or the Area 15 shaft and tunnel complex were in 

Rainier Mesa. The major Rainier Mesa tunnel complexes were B, E, 

G, N, and T tunnels. 

Area 15 is in the foothills at the north end of Yucca Flat. 

The deepest of two access shafts drops 1,500 feet below the surface elevation of 5,100 feet. There were three events conducted 

in Area 15, all sponsored by DOD. HARD HAT and TINY TOT were 

discussed in the volume covering Operations NOUGAT and WHETSTONE 

while PILE DRIVER was discussed in the volume covering Operations 

FLINTLOCK and LATCHKEY. 

36 
CHAPTER 2 

UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

Underground tests conducted at NTS prior to 15 February 1962 

primarily were for weapons related or safety experiment purposes. 

The experience gained contributed substantially to the DOD 

weapons effects testing program to be conducted underground. However, these later DOD underground tests generally were of greater 

complexity than previous underground tests, and a number of technical problems remained to be solved. 

Obtaining satisfactory test data was an important objective, 

but equally important was the objective of assuring safety of 

test participants and the public. This chapter discusses historical underground testing methods, problems encountered, and 

safety procedures used during DOD underground weapons effects 

tests conducted from 31 August 1967 to 20 November 1968. 

2.1 EMPLACEMENT TYPES 

The DOD conducted six underground nuclear test events during 

this period. Table 2.1 lists these events and pertinent data including emplacement type. An emplacement type not discussed in 

this volume is one that results in excavating or ejecting material from the ground surface to form a crater (see Crater Experiment in the Glossary of Terms). There were two shaft and four 

tunnel type tests during Operations CROSSTIE and BOWLINE. These 

emplacement types are discussed in this section. 

2.1.1 Shaft-Type 

A shaft-type nuclear detonation was intended to be contained 

37 
38 
underground. The shaft was usually drilled, but sometimes mined, 

and it may have been lined with a steel casing or have been uncased. The nuclear device was emplaced at a depth established to 

contain the explosion. At detonation time a cavity, formed by 

vaporized rock under pressure, held surrounding broken rock in 

place until the cavity cooled sufficiently to decrease pressure. 

As broken rock fell into the cavity formed by the detonation, a 

chimney was formed. If the chimney of falling rock reached the 

surface, a subsidence crater was formed. 

If a device was emplaced too deep in the alluvium of Frenchman or Yucca Flat for the detonation yield, or the depth was correct but the yield was much less than anticipated, a subsidence 

crater might not form; that is, the chimney might not reach the 

surface. This was a problem during early years of underground 

testing when it was necessary to move drill rigs into subsidence 

craters soon after tests for cavity sample recovery purposes. If 

a subsidence crater did not form, drill rigs could not be moved 

to SGZ. When directional drilling from outside the crater was 

implemented, lack of a subsidence crater in alluvium became less 

of a problem. Experience gained with depth of device burial also 

reduced the chance of subsidence craters not forming in alluvium. 

Figure 2.1 shows a typical subsidence crater. 

2.1.2 Tunnel-Type 

A tunnel-type nuclear detonation was intended to be completely contained. The nuclear device was emplaced in a mined 

opening at a depth which usually contained the detonation. Chimneying of broken rock to the surface seldom occurred primarily 

because a layer of rhyolite rock on the surface of Rainier Mesa 

and the granite rocks of Area 15 were more competent than 

alluvium in Frenchman and Yucca Flats. A tunnel emplacement 

might be at the end of a single horizontal tunnel into a mountain 

or mesa, in one tunnel of a complex of horizontal tunnels used 

39 

for experiments and other nuclear detonations, in a horizontal 

tunnel from the bottom of a vertical shaft, or in an opening of 

variable size and shape mined from a tunnel or the bottom of a 

shaft. Figure 2.2 shows the portal of a typical DOD tunnel 

complex. 

2.2 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES 

The major advantage of underground testing was containment 

of radioactive material. One of the major disadvantages was increased difficulty in determining characteristics of a detonation. Photographing a fireball growing in the atmosphere was no 

longer possible. Samples of a radioactive cloud for diagnostic 

purposes no longer could be obtained by sampling aircraft. 

Measurements of thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and blast 

were complicated by the confined underground structures. These 

disadvantages were overcome by developing new diagnostic techniques, some of which are discussed below. 

2.2.1 Radiation Measurements 

Measurements of radiation from an underground detonation 

were made possible by developing a system of remote detectors and 

cabling to send signals to recording facilities located on the 

surface. Detectors utilizing various physical characteristics of 

the radiations to be measured were installed near the nuclear device. High-specification coaxial cable and connectors carried 

the measurement signals to the surface where electronic equipment, film, and magnetic tape recorded the signals. 

The detector signals were on the way to recording equipment 

in billionths of a second after a detonation, before detectors 

were destroyed. These measurement systems required the most advanced electronic technology available. Indeed, considerable research and development was necessary to acquire and refine these 

capabilities. 

41 

2.2.2 Radiochemical Measurements 

Because clouds from atmospheric detonations no longer were 

available to sample for diagnostic purposes, techniques were developed to obtain samples of debris from underground detonations 

for radiochemical analyses and subsequent yield determinations. 

The first systems were radiochemical sampling pipes leading directly from the device emplacements to filtering equipment on the 

surface. These pipes required closure systems to prevent overpressure from venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere 

after samples were collected. 

While these systems functioned as intended for most detonations, the systems did not function properly during some tests, 

and radioactive effluent was released to the atmosphere. Subsequently, regular use of radiochemical sampling pipes to the surface was discontinued. 

A major radiochemistry sampling method which continued in 

use for shaft detonations was postevent core drilling. The objective of this drilling was to obtain samples of solidified 

radioactive debris which had collected in a molten pool at the 

bottom of the cavity produced by the detonation. This method 

required and resulted in development of precise directional 

drilling techniques and several advancements in the science of 

core drilling. 

2.2.3 Line-of-Sight (LOS) Pipes 

Most of the DOD shaft-type detonations included LOS pipes 

from the device emplacement to the surface. These pipes allowed 

effects experiments to be conducted as well as measurement of radiations from the detonations. 

However, the LOS pipes to the surface required closure 

43 
systems as did the radiochemical sampling pipes, and use of LOS 

pipes to the surface also resulted in some releases of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere. Thus, the frequency of DOD 

shaft-type events, including use of these pipes to the surface, 

decreased for several years until containment techniques improved, but use of horizontal LOS pipes in underground tunnel complexes became frequent and a valuable weapons effects testing 

system. 

2.3 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS 

Weapons effects experiments were the primary reason for conducting DOD underground nuclear detonations. The effects of 

blast, heat, and radiation from a nuclear detonation in the atmosphere had been studied extensively. Structures, equipment, 

and materials had been exposed to atmospheric detonations, and 

military hardware also had been exposed to underwater detonations. Underground testing provided an opportunity to study 

effects of ground shock and motion, and, of particular importance, the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials at a simulated high altitude. 

The simulation of a high-altitude detonation was made possible by enlarging and improving the LOS pipe system discussed in 

section 2.2.3. Large-diameter pipes hundreds of feet long were 

constructed underground with the device emplaced at one end of 

the pipe. An access tunnel sometimes was constructed parallel or 

at an angle to the LOS tunnel, and crosscuts connected the two at 

intervals. Hatches allowed access to the LOS pipe and sealing of 

the pipe. Equipment and materials were installed at locations 

within the LOS pipe. The atmosphere in the LOS pipe was reduced 

in pressure by vacuum pumps, to simulate a high altitude, before 

the detonation. Thus, testing of weapons effects was extended 

from atmospheric and underwater to underground and at simulated 

high altitudes. 

44 
2.4 CONTAINMENT FEATURES AND PROBLEMS 

Completely containing radioactive material underground while 

accomplishing diagnostic measurements and effects tests proved to 

be a major engineering challenge. Original efforts considered 

only detonation containment in competent rock formations. It was 

necessary to modify the original efforts to consider zones of 

weakness in rock caused by faults and containment failures caused 

by diagnostic and experiment structures. Under certain conditions, particularly the presence of clay, high water content of 

rock near the detonation point resulted in greater stress toward 

the surface which sometimes caused containment failures. These 

failures were partially attributable to additional overpressure 

from secondary gas expansion or, in other words, steam pressure. 

The major containment features and problems that evolved are 

discussed below. 

2.4.1 Shaft Containment 

Some of the first shaft-type safety experiments were in 

unstemmed shafts with concrete plugs penetrated by cable and 

instrumentation holes. When nuclear yields were produced, these 

emplacements did not completely contain the radioactive debris. 

The first method used to fully contain nuclear detonations in 

shafts was stemming, or filling the shaft with aggregate and sand 

after device emplacement. 

Keyed concrete plugs at different depths in the shaft stemming sometimes were used. The shaft diameter was enlarged at the 

plug construction location so the poured concrete plug would key 

into the ground surrounding the shaft and provide more strength 

against containment failure. Combinations of concrete and epoxy 

were used later, and epoxy was used in place of concrete as a 

plug material for some shaft-type emplacements. 

45 
Radiochemical sampling pipes, LOS pipes, and other openings 

in stemming and plug containment features had to be closed rapidly after the detonation to prevent venting of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere. Fast-gate closure systems driven by high 

explosives or compressed air were developed to seal the openings. 

After some of these early systems did not prevent releases of effluent to the atmosphere, use of openings to the surface for diagnostic or experiment purposes was discontinued for several 

years until technology improved. 

Scientific and other cables from the device emplacement to 

the surface were another source of containment problems. While 

cables could be imbedded in concrete and epoxy, which effectively 

prevented leakage along the outside of the cables, radioactive 

gases under high pressure traveled along the inside of cables as 

a conduit to the surface. This problem was solved by imbedding 

the inner components of cables in epoxy at appropriate locations 

or intervals, such as in epoxy or concrete plugs, in a technique 

called gas blocking. 

The most serious containment problems were caused by unanticipated geologic and hydrologic conditions at particular test 

locations. Even careful and rigorous calculations, engineering, 

construction, and preparations were inadequate when the presence 

of a geologic zone of weakness near the detonation point and toward the surface was unknown. 

Another similar problem was the presence of higher water 

content than anticipated in rock formations surrounding or near 

the detonation point. This problem caused greater shock transmission plus secondary gas expansion when the water turned to steam. 

In addition, presence of sufficient iron in the test configuration caused disassociation of water with subsequent greater secondary gas expansion from hydrogen gas. A result was much higher 

and longer-sustained pressure from the detonation point toward 

46 
the surface, and possible subsequent failure of geologic or constructed containment mechanisms. 

Recognizing and understanding geologic and hydrologic conditions at each test location was necessary before these containment problems could be solved. As additional information became 

available through drilling and intensive geologic studies, these 

problems were resolved by investigations of proposed detonation 

locations and application of detailed site selection criteria. 

2.4.2 Tunnel Containment 

As with shaft-type detonations, containment methods used for 

tunnel events were designed using basic characteristics of the 

nuclear detonation. Tunnel configurations were constructed with 

device emplacements strategically located to cause sealing of the 

access tunnel by force of the detonation. Additional containment 

features were used to contain radioactive debris. 

One of the original stemming configurations consisted of one 

or more sandbag plugs installed a short distance from the projected self-sealing location toward the tunnel entrance (portal). 

Two plugs, each about 60 feet in length, were a typical installation. Farther toward the portal, and before entering the main 

tunnel in a complex with more than one test location, a keyed 

concrete plug with a metal blast door was constructed. The blast 

door was designed to contain any gases, with pressures up to 75 

pounds per square inch (psi), that might penetrate the sandbag 

plugs. 

Also as with shaft-type detonations, the unknown presence of 

undesirable geologic and hydrologic conditions sometimes caused 

venting of radioactive effluent either through the overburden 

(ground above the tunnel) to the surface, through fissures opened 

between the detonation point and the main tunnel, or through the 

47 
plugs and blast door to the main tunnel vent holes and portal. 

More substantial containment features evolved as containment 

problems became better understood and tunnel events became more 

complex. 

Generally, the sandbag plugs became solid sand backfill hundreds of feet long. Stemming was used that had ground-matching 

characteristics, such as matching transmission of shock waves and 

other properties so that differences from surrounding ground 

would not contribute to containment failure. The blast door 

evolved into a massive overburden (equivalent) plug separating 

test location tunnels from the main tunnel. The plug typically 

was 20 to 30 feet of keyed concrete with a large steel door 

containing a smaller access hatch, and was designed to withstand 

overpressure up to 1000 psi. 

Use of the LOS pipe in tunnel events necessitated development of additional containment and closure systems. The LOS pipe 

tunnel and its access tunnels were separated from the main tunnel 

by the overburden plug. Additional containment and closure systems were for protection of the LOS pipe and its experiments as 

well as preventing release of effluent to the surface. 

Generally, the tunnel volume outside of the pipe was filled 

by stemming, grouting, or other means to facilitate containment, 

while the inside of the pipe and its experiments were protected 

by closure systems. Various systems were in use including compressed air or explosive-driven gates and doors which closed off 

the LOS pipe from the detonation within a small fraction of a 

second after detonation time. Beginning with the DOOR MIST event, 

one of these enclosures was the Tunnel and Pipe Seal (TAPS) unit. 

The TAPS unit usually was 500 to 550 feet from the zero point. 

The same gas blocking techniques used in shaft events were 

used to prevent leakage of radioactive gases along or through 

48 
cables from the diagnostic and experiment locations to the surface. Additionally, a gas seal door usually was installed in the 

main drift nearer the portal than the overburden plug. Utility 

pipes, such as for compressed air, that passed through stemming 

and plugs also were sealed by closure systems. 

Containment systems evolved to the point that release of 

detectable radioactivity to the atmosphere has seldom occurred. 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 

Access to underground workings and drilling sites was controlled for a number of reasons. During construction, safety of 

both workers and visitors in these locations could have been 

jeopardized by carelessness or seemingly harmless activities of 

untrained and uncontrolled visitors. When security-classified 

material was in these locations, only personnel with appropriate 

security clearances were permitted access. The presence, or anticipated presence, of radioactive material in these locations 

required access control for radiological safety purposes. Access 

requirements established for the above purposes are discussed 

below. 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control 

During construction and preparations for a DOD event in a 

tunnel or other underground working, the tunnel superintendent 

was responsible to the project manager for safety of personnel 

underground. From 1962 forward, Radsafe log books and tunnel log 

books were used to record names and radiation exposure information for only those persons entering a tunnel during postevent 

reentry and recovery operations. In the early 197Os, as a result 

of the Mine Safety and Health Act, tunnel log books were expanded 

to list all persons entering the tunnels (i.e., mining, drilling, 

49 
Radsafe, etc.). Visitors and other personnel not assigned to 

work in the tunnel obtained permission for entry from the superintendent, or his representative, and were apprised of tunnel 

conditions and safety regulations. In the event of an accident 

or other emergency condition underground, the log book provided 

information on numbers of personnel and their locations underground. 

When classified material was in the tunnel, and during initial reentry after an event, the DOD Test Group Director, or his 

representative, was responsible for entry and safety of personnel 

underground. Security personnel checked for proper security and 

entry clearances, and maintained records of all personnel entering the tunnel. 

Control of tunnel access reverted to tunnel management personnel after tunnel reentry and recoveries. Entry procedures and 

use of the tunnel log book, if appropriate, were then as discussed above. 

Additional access controls were instituted for radiological 

safety purposes after an event or during construction and event 

preparations when radioactivity from a previous event could be 

encountered. Part or all of a tunnel complex could be established as a radex area. 

All persons entering radex areas were logged on Area Access 

Registers. Names and organizations represented were listed. Radiation exposures for the year and quarter were listed upon entry 

and added to self-reading pocket dosimeter measurements upon 

exit. This was to assure that personnel approaching radiation 

exposure guide limits would not be allowed to enter radex areas 

and accumulate exposures above guide amounts. 

Before entry, personnel were dressed in anticontamination 

50 
clothing and respiratory protection as needed for the particular 

radiological conditions in the tunnel. Upon exit, anticontamination clothing was removed, personnel were monitored for radioactive contamination if necessary, and decontamination was accomplished. 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control 

Access to drilling areas was controlled by the drilling superintendent and the DOD Test Group Director for the Same reasons 

as controlling access to underground workings. During drilling 

of an emplacement shaft, and during postevent drillback operations to recover radioactive core samples, personnel safety and 

compliance with safety regulations were emphasized continuously. 

During preevent drilling activities, all visitors were required to contact the drilling superintendent before entry to the 

drilling site. Names of visitors and purposes of visits were entered in the daily drilling report, and it was assured that visitors had hard hats and understood safety regulations. 

When classified materials, including the nuclear device, 

were brought into the area for emplacement, the Laboratory which 

provided the device controlled access to the area with assistance 

from security force personnel as in similar tunnel operations. 

After the event, when the drill site was a radex area, during 

classified material removal, or during postevent drilling, both 

security and radiological safety access controls were in effect 

as discussed under "Tunnel Access Control." 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 

Implementation of an effective industrial safety program was 

an important part of any heavy construction operation. Mining 

51 
and drilling operations had a particularly high accident potential. These operations at the NTS involved additional safety 

problems resulting from detonation-induced unstable ground conditions and potential for encountering toxic gases, explosive mixtures, and radioactivity. 

Miles of underground workings were constructed. More depth 

of big holes (three-foot diameter or larger) were drilled than 

the known total drilled in the rest of the world. Directional 

and core drilling to recover radioactive debris samples after 

underground nuclear detonations advanced the science of these 

drilling techniques. These operations often were accomplished 

under unusual conditions with accompanying difficult safety problems. 

However, the lost-time accident frequency for the NTS support contractor employing most of the NTS personnel (REECo) was 

only one-tenth of the frequency for the heavy construction industry at large (as determined by annual surveys and reports for 

300 heavy construction corporations). This excellent safety 

record was attained by continuing attention to indoctrinating and 

training NTS personnel, investigating and determining causes of 

accidents at the NTS, implementing and enforcing safety regulations, and, most important, maintaining the safety awareness of 

NTS personnel. 

This was a joint effort by the DOE and DNA, and their predecessors, and by the many other government agencies and contractors at the NTS . Administered by REECo, the safety program enjoined all NTS personnel to conduct operations safely, and was 

exemplified by the signs on the portal of a typical DOD tunnel 

complex as shown in Figure 2.2, including "Safety With Production 

Is Our Goal." 

The safety procedures for all NTS operations are voluminous 

52 
and cannot be included in this report. Appendix C of this report 

is an example of pertinent safety procedures: General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department of Defense and Sandia Laboratory 

Tests. As these procedures indicate, several aspects of industrial safety are interrelated. Information on monitoring levels 

of radioactivity and personnel exposures to radiation is presented in the next section, 2.7 "Radiological Safety Procedures." 

Monitoring of toxic gases and explosive mixtures was an important aspect of safety in underground workings, on drill rigs, 

and in drillhole cellars (enlarged first part of drillhole for 

valving and other equipment). Toxic gases and explosive mixtures 

were created by both the nuclear detonations and the mining and 

drilling operations. The Draeger multi-gas detector and MSA explosimeter were used to detect such gases. The Fyrite or J&W 

oxygen indicators were used to determine the oxygen content of 

the working atmosphere. Requirements were that tunnel and drill 

rig breathing atmosphere contain at least 19.5 percent oxygen. 

During the period covered by this volume, it was required that 

breathing air contain less than the following levels of toxic 

gases and explosive mixtures: 

Gases Maximum Concentration 

Carbon monoxide, CO 50 wm 

Carbon dioxide, CO2 5000 ppm 

Nitric oxide plus 

nitrogen dioxide, NO + NO2 25 ppm 

Nitrogen dioxide, NO2 5 ppm 

Explosive mixtures 10% of LEL (lower 

explosive limit) 

Procedures for controlling explosive mixtures and toxic 

gases after each test event are discussed in event chapters as 

appropriate. 

53 
2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES 

Procedures were developed in an effort to evaluate radiological, toxic, and other hazards, and protect workers and the 

public from unnecessary exposures. The following were primary 

written procedures and implementation methods used at the NTS 

from 1967 through 1968. 

2.7.1 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Test Site Organization - Standard Operating Procedure, Chapter 0524, Radiological 

Safety 

Chapter 0524, which appears as Appendix D to this volume, 

defined responsibility and established criteria and general procedures for radiological safety associated with NTS programs. 

Some but not all of the major areas discussed are film badge procedures, radiation surveys, entry into controlled areas and radiation exposure guides. Roles of the onsite REECo Radiological 

Sciences Department and the offsite United States Public Health 

Service (PHS) are defined in NTSO-SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.2 Standard Operating Procedures for the Radiological Sciences Department, REECo. 

These procedures were prepared and updated annually to 

address in more detail the radiological safety aspects discussed 

in the latest revision of NTSO-SOP Chapter 0524. The same major 

areas were discussed but in a more specific manner. 

2.7.3 Implementation of radiological procedures; required equipment, devices, and capabilities for monitoring radiation levels 

in the environment and monitoring external and internal exposures of personnel. 

Equipment and devices used for these purposes and necessary 

capabilities were as follows: 

54 
A. Portable Radiation Detection Equipment 

Eberline PAC 3G (alpha) 

Eberline PAC 4G (alpha) 

Eberline PAC 1SA (alpha) 

Jordan AGB-500-SR Radector (gamma) 

Jordan AGB-lOK-SR Radgun (beta and gamma) 

Eberline E-500B Survey Meter (beta and gamma) 

Technical Associates and Hanford Cutie Pie Survey 

Meter (beta and gamma) 

Technical Associates Juno Survey Meter (alpha, beta, 

and gamma) 

Precision Model 111 Scintillator (gamma) 

B. Air Sampling Equipment 

- Model 102 semi-portable sampler 

- Satellite sampler 

- Hurricane high volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

- Vacuum pump low volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability 

The Radiological Sciences laboratory analyzed air, soil, 

water, surface swipe, nasal swab, urine, and wound swab 

samples for some or all of the following activities: 

gross alpha and beta, gross fission products, tritium, 

strontium-90, plutonium-239, and spectrographic analysis 

of specific gamma-emitting radionuclides. The laboratory also analyzed some of the above samples for nonradioactive materials, such as beryllium, through use of 

an emission spectrograph and by wet chemistry procedures. A spectrophotometer was used to analyze other 

materials. 

55 
D. Monitoring of Personnel Exoosures 

The Du Pont type 301-4 film packet was replaced with the 

NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security credential holder in 1966 to provide increased personnel dosimetry capability necessary to meet the radiation exposure problems associated with nuclear rocket testing and 

underground nuclear detonations. The holder, designed 

to accommodate a Du Pont type 556 film packet, a fast 

neutron packet, an identification plate, criticality accident components, the security credential, and a snaptype clip, had capabilities for determining beta, gamma, 

X-ray, thermal neutron, fast neutron, high range gamma, 

and high range neutron doses. Components for criticality accidents (unintentional or accidental nuclear fissioning of device critical materials) included materials 

which could detect and measure neutron and gamma radiation exposures above the ranges of the film packets. 

The Du Pont 556 film packet contained two component 

films, type 519 (low range) and type 834 (high range). 

Gamma exposure ranges of the two components were 30 mR 

to 10 R and 10 R to 800 R, respectively. The NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security credential 

holder is shown in Figure 2.3. 

Film badges were exchanged routinely each month for all 

individuals, and upon exit from a radex area when it was 

suspected that an individual had received 100 mR or more 

of exposure. 

Personnel entering radex areas also were issued selfreading pocket dosimeters which indicated accumulated 

exposure. Upon exit, pocket dosimeter readings were 

entered on Area Access Registers and added to the yearly 

and quarterly accumulated exposures from the automated 

56 

daily NTS radiation exposure report for use until results of film packet processing were included. Pocket 

dosimeter readings were only estimates because such 

readings were less accurate than the doses of record 

determined after processing film packets. 

This use of Area Access Registers helped to maintain 

personnel exposures below the whole-body exposure guides 

in Chapter 0524: 3000 mrem per quarter and 5000 mrem per 

year. Personnel with exposures from the report plus any 

dosimeter reading since the report in excess of 2500 

mrem per quarter or 4500 mrem per year were advised not 

to enter radex areas and their supervisory personnel 

were so notified. 

2.7.4 Additional methods used for control of radex areas and to 

prevent spread of contamination to uncontrolled areas were as 

follows: 

A daily log book was maintained by Radsafe monitors for each 

radex area location. These logs were used to record the 

following information: 

A. Work accomplished: Where people worked and what work 

was accomplished were briefly described. Any unusual conditions, 

such as equipment failure and operational difficulties, were listed. 

B. Visitors: First and last names of visitors 

were entered. Their destination 

and reason for their visit were included where possible. Time they 

entered and exited the area and results of personnel monitoring were 

recorded. 

58 
C. Unusual occurrences: Any unusual events which occurred 

during the shift were recorded. 

Included in this entry were accidents, high-volume water seepage, 

or any other occurrence of an unusual nature. 

D. Surveys and samples: Information collected was recorded 

as follows: 

Survey type - Routine or Special* 

Sample type - Routine or Special* 

*Indicate requester's name for Special type. 

E. Date and signature: The date and shift were entered at 

the beginning of the work period 

and the log book was signed before 

leaving the shift. 

Personnel leaving radex areas removed anticontamination 

clothing and equipment and placed them in special containers for 

later laundering or disposal at the designated NTS burial site. 

Personnel then were monitored to assure radiation levels were below those listed in Part I of Appendix D, AEC NTSO-SOP Chapter 

0524, Radiological Safety. Personnel decontamination was accomplished if radiation levels were above specified limits. Decontamination usually was accomplished by vacuuming, removing radioactive particles with masking tape patches, washing hands or localized skin areas with soap and water, or showering with soap 

and water. 

Vehicles and equipment removed from radex areas were monitored to assure that they met acceptable radiation levels for 

release on the NTS. Limits for release of vehicles and equipment 

off the NTS were 0.3 mrad/h beta plus gamma radiation at contact 

and no detectable alpha acti vity. Vehicles and equipment normally 

59 
were decontaminated by vacuuming and steam cleaning with water or 

detergent solutions. 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS 

Beginning in the early 1960's, various applications of radiation measurement telemetry were developed at the NTS to determine radiation levels at critical underground and surface areas 

following nuclear detonations. Multi-detector systems with range 

capabilities from 0.5 mR/h to 500 R/h and from 10 mR/h to 10,000 

R/h, continuously monitored locations of concern after being 

emplaced and calibrated prior to each test event. Ion chamber 

detectors were hard-wire-linked by telephone trunk lines to exposure rate meters at a central console in CP-2. Detector locations 

were as far as thirty-five miles from this console. 

These remote radiation monitoring systems provided data for 

reentry personnel participating in radiation surveys and recovery 

operations after a nuclear device detonation. The systems aided 

in substantially reducing radiation exposure of personnel involved in reentry programs, and were useful in detecting any 

venting or leaking of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere from 

an underground detonation. 

2.8.1 Telemetry Systems in Use 

The radiation telemetry systems developed and used had specific applications depending upon distance, terrain, environment, 

and operational needs. The detection units, systems, and components being studied and developed or in use in 1967 were the 

following: 

60 
A. Remote Area Monitoring Svstem (RAMS) 

The principal piece of equipment used to form a RAMS was 

the RAMP-4. The RAMP-4 was a multi-channel, hardwirelinked, remote area gamma radiation monitoring (telemetry) system, designed and modified by Radsafe and produced by Victoreen Instrument Corporation. It consisted 

of a probe which used a Neher-White radiation sensing 

element, hardwire communication to the readout console 

(up to 35 miles), and components of Victoreen Radector 

instruments with recorders for readout. 

The readout covered six logarithmic decades (two threedecade scales) to provide a usual range of 1 mR/h to 

1,000 R/h with a relative accuracy of + 15 percent over 

the temperature range of -lOoF to 150°F. 

A permanent array of 21 telemetry stations throughout 

the NTS as designated by the AEC was maintained and 

operated continuously. Temporary telemetry arrays for 

DOD events varied between 20 and 50 stations depending 

upon the area or tunnel event location. 

B. Diqital Data System 

The Digital Data System was a multi-channel, radiolinked, remote gamma radiation monitoring system. The 

detection unit and communications consisted of a RAMP-4 

probe hardwire-linked to a field trailer where signal 

data was digitized and transmitted via UHF to a trailer 

at the CP. The readout consisted of a typewriter, a 

punched tape, and a digital printer, and all three operated simultaneously to provide current operational data, 

permanent records, and the capability for reproduction 

of data at any future time. 

61 
This system was used primarily in remote areas where 

hardwire communication did not exist. Communications between the field trailer and the CP were accomplished via 

NTS radio net 3 and a UHF net assigned prior to each 

event for use during installation and checkout, in addition to use during and after the event. 

C. Well Loqqinq Unit 

This unit was a Jordan ion chamber gamma detector with a 

glass-head thermister capable of obtaining gamma radiation or temperature measurements either separately or 

simultaneously, and was used at drill sites for postevent hole radiation and temperature measurements. 

Radiation detection ranges were from 0.5 mR/h to 500 R/h 

and temperature measurement ranges were from OOF to 

350°F. 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring Support 

Approximately two hundred remote radiation detector channels 

were available to continuously monitor radiological conditions 

and assess exposure rates before the test area was entered after 

detonation. Approximately 20 detector units were positioned in 

the test area before a shaft-type event. Detectors were placed 

in circular arrays at appropriate distances from SGZ which varied 

with device yield and predicted wind direction (see Figures 2.4 

and 2.5). Variable numbers of detectors were used aboveground 

and underground during tunnel-type events. An additional 20 to 

35 permanently established remote radiation detector stations 

operated continuously at living areas, work areas, and other 

locations throughout NTS (Figure 2.6). The large number of remaining channels was available for additional detector locations 

and substitute channels. Event-related telemetry detectors 

operated from zero time until it was determined that release of 

62 
Figure 2.4 Typical remote radiation detection monitoring 

system for shaft type emplacement site. 

63 
PROBE PLACED ON RIM 

OF MESAABOVEBTUNNEL PORTAL 

/

/ 1

\\ 

i 

G-TUNNEL 

(U12G) 

\ 

02 200 ~0,000 FT. 

/ \ 

\ 

A REMOTE RADIATION DETECTOR 

Figure 2.5 Typical remote radiation detection monitoring 

system for tunnel-type emplacement site. 

64 
0 PE RMANENT TELEMETRY STATIONS 

Figure es tablished remote 2.6 Typical permanently 

detector stations operated continuously 

the NTS. 

65 

radiation 

throughout 
radioactivity probably would not occur, or until any released 

radioactivity had decayed to near-background levels at the telemetry stations. For some events, readout locations were positioned near the FCP or at locations where telephone lines were 

available, in addition to those events where readouts were located at CP-2. 

Radiation telemetry data were supplemented with information 

collected by a mobile air sampling program. Model 102 air sampling units were used to obtain samples of any radioactive effluent released at event time or during the postevent drilling operations. Test groups used an average of 21 units during each 

test event. Prior to each nuclear detonation experiment, these 

samplers were placed at specified locations around the test area 

and units remained in position until drillback operations were 

completed or the Test Group Director authorized removal of the 

units. 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 

The AFSWC provided direct support to NTSO for DOD underground tests, and other Air Force organizations provided support 

under AFSWC control as described in section 1.4.3 of this report. 

However, less air support was required as the probability of 

venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased with development of more effective containment techniques. 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements 

After 1962, Air Force cloud sampling and cloud tracking aircraft generally were not required, except for AEC cratering 

events where radioactive effluent clouds were anticipated. Passage of the radioactive effluent through variable amounts and temperatures of rock and other media selectively retained some radi66 
onuclides underground, and changed known ratios of fission products previously used during analysis of atmospheric detonation 

cloud samples. The value of analyzing particulate and gaseous 

cloud samples to determine characteristics of a detonation decreased. 

The first change in cloud sampling and tracking support was 

to a lighter Air Force aircraft, the U-3A, with an Air Force pilot and PHS monitor. The PHS monitor also performed aerial monitoring of selected locations near surface ground zero and along 

the path of any effluent cloud. This air support later was performed by PHS and contractor personnel in their own aircraft. 

Perimeter sweeps continued to be conducted daily by Air 

Force and Security personnel, during reasonable flying weather, 

to assure that unauthorized vehicles were not entering the NTS 

over rough terrain or around security barricades on secondary 

roads. L-20 aircraft used prior to 1968 were replaced with 

helicopters and other aircraft thereafter. Air security sweeps 

of the immediate test area were conducted for a few hours before 

each detonation to assist in clearing the test area and to assure 

that unauthorized vehicles were not approaching it from directions not controlled by manned security stations. 

Air support for photography missions during test events and 

initial radiation surveys after each event did not change. Helicopters with Air Force pilots generally were used with contractor 

photographers and Radsafe monitors. 

2i9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary 

Field (ISAFAF) 

Radsafe support facilities had been established about 20 

miles southeast of Mercury at ISAFAF during atmospheric nuclear 

device testing series. During 1962 tests, and subsequent DOD 

67 
underground tests requiring support aircraft staged from ISAFB 

(which became ISAFAF in 19681, REECo provided all radsafe support 

functions available at the NTS. This included monitors stationed 

at the ISAFAF radsafe quonset facility and a complete stock of 

film dosimeters (badges), radiation detection instruments, and 

anticontamination clothing and equipment for use by aircrews and 

ground crews. 

Radsafe monitors issued and exchanged film dosimeters (badges), issued self-reading pocket dosimeters, provided anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection equipment, monitored 

aircraft and personnel after events, decontaminated personnel, 

and assisted ground crew personnel with decontamination of 

aircraft. 

Figures 2.7 through 2.9 show decontamination and monitoring 

of typical B-57 cloud sampling aircraft used from 1962 until the 

type of sampling aircraft was changed. 

Aircrews departing from contaminated aircraft removed anticontamination clothing and equipment at the radsafe facility, 

showered, and were monitored to assure complete decontamination 

before they dressed in regulation clothing and were released. 

Ground crew personnel who removed particulate and gaseous cloud 

sample collection media from aircraft or who participated in aircraft decontamination were subject to the same personnel decontamination procedures. 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters 

Although ISAFAF radsafe support extended to all participating aircraft, special helicopter radsafe procedures were implemented because these aircraft landed at NTS and staged from helicopter pads located east of Mercury Highway at the CP area and 

near a Test Director's FCP established for a particular under68 



ground event. Helicopter pilots usually landed at these locations, and were briefed at the CP or particular FCP regarding 

their scheduled missions or other operational missions. 

If the mission involved possible contamination of the aircraft, Radsafe monitors lined the floor of the aircraft with 

plastic, or kraft paper, and masking tape to facilitate decontamination. Pilots and crew members were dressed in anticontamination clothing and provided with film badges, pocket dosimeters, 

and respiratory protection equipment if airborne radioactive 

material was anticipated and oxygen masks were not worn. 

Upon completion of missions, helicopters returned to the 

landing pads where they were decontaminated by Radsafe monitors. 

Pilots and crew members were decontaminated at an adjacent forward Radsafe base station, or at CP-2, where the pocket dosimeters were collected and read, and film badges were exchanged if 

exposures of 100 mR or more were indicated by pocket dosimeters. 

72 
CHAPTER 3 

DOOR MIST EVENT 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

DOOR MIST was a DOD-sponsored underground test detonated at 

0930 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 31 August 1967 with a 

yield less than 20 kt. The device was detonated in tunnel U12g.07 

at a vertical depth of 1,463 feet and approximately 5,655 feet in 

from the portal (Figure 3.1). The objective of this test was to 

determine the response of materials and equipment to a nuclear 

detonation environment. Government agencies and contractors conducted 11 projects to obtain the desired weapons effects information. 

Stemming and containment failures occurred and resulted in 

damage to, and contamination of, the experiments. Effluent was 

released to the atmosphere, and minor levels of radioactive effluent were detected offsite. 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all DOOR MIST project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations Office. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

73 
DooR Y’ST,~EMMIN. 

ZERO POINT12g.07 (IS f 62) 

uizg.07 

DRIFT (13 . 62’) 5170’ PL 

CABLE HOLE 

AREAS 

ASTER CONSOLE ALCOVE 

u12g.os 

DRIFT 

AS SEAL DOOR 

0 200 400 

SCALE: 

600 

1 INCH = 800 FEET 

1600 ’ Ul2g TUNNEL 

PORTAL 

Figure 3.1 DOOR MIST event - tunnel layout. 
and installing their experiments, or delivering them to the installation contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample 

data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Because LASL fielded the device, the LASL Test Group Director was responsible for radiological safety within a 6,000-foot 

radius of ground zero (GZ). This responsibility was in effect 

from device emplacement until the device was detonated. At that 

time, the Test Manager relieved the LASL Test Group Director of 

responsibility and delegated responsibility to the DOD Test Group 

Director. Device safety and security procedures in the GZ area 

and the timing and firing control room were in accordance with 

AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction 

The DOOR MIST experimental facility was installed as designed. It consisted of an 800-foot-long vacuum pipe 

with two test chambers. Test chamber No. 1 was installed 

at the end of the pipe 800 feet from the device, while 

test chamber No. 2 was located 565 feet from the device. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with requirements of responsible DOD and SC representatives. Radsafe 

provided monitoring and equipment support, air sampling, 

and telemetry. 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were given to 

75 
participating agencies prior to the test event. Reference markers and air sampling equipment were positioned 

in the test area. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, manned stations, and security station requirements. All RAMS units and air sampling units 

were installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial surface radiation surveys, 

perform aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in 

reentry parties, as needed. Radsafe personnel also were 

standing by at the FCP prior to detonation to perform 

surveys and provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, 

portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Thirty-seven remote telemetry radiation monitoring system units provided aboveground and underground coverage 

for the DOOR MIST event as shown in Table 3.1. 

Eleven air sampling units were located as shown in Table 

3.2. 

76 
Table 3.1. DOOR MIST event RATEi unit locations. 

Station Location (distances are from portal) 

ABOVEGROUND 

1 38 feet at 311"23' azimuth 

2 138 feet at 160'45' azimuth 

3 138 feet at 160"45' azimuth 

4 281 feet at 31"23' azimuth 

5 496 feet at 71"34' azimuth 

6 438 feet at 123"30' azimuth 

7 366 feet at 163'07' azimuth 

a 223 feet at 245'55' azimuth 

9 255 feet at 334'00' azimuth 

10 1,374 feet at 14"56' azimuth 

11 1,565 feet at 50"40' azimuth 

12 1,445 feet at 81°40' azimuth 

13 1,446 feet at 113"30' azimuth 

14 1,235 feet at 195"Ol' azimuth 

15 1,778 feet at 253"15' azimuth 

16 2,687 feet at 28S"O08 azimuth 

17 2,048 feet at 330"32' azimuth 

ia 3,779 feet at 264O41' azimuth 

19 4,470 feet at 279O59' azimuth 

20 4,795 feet at 293'01' azimuth 

21 4,635 feet at 300'44' azimuth 

22 4,732 feet at 3Ol"OS' azimuth 

23 4,672 feet at 301"35' azimuth 

24 4,611 feet at 302"06' azimuth 

25 4,709 feet at 302'22' azimuth 

26 5,811 feet at 304"29' azimuth 

26a 5,378 feet at 308O31' azimuth 

UNDERGROUND 

27 5,098 feet in the 07 drift 

28 4,888 feet in the 07 drift 

29 4,458 feet in the 07 drift 

30 4,358 feet in the 07 drift 

31 3,800 feet in the reentry drift 

32 2,500 feet in the main drift 

33 2,400 feet in the main drift 

34 1,200 feet in the main drift 

35 50 feet in the i,.ain drift 

36 4,676 feet in t‘!e 08 drift 

77 
Table 3.2. Air sampling unit locations. 

Station 

Number Distance and Azimuth from Portal 

1 50 feet at 111" 

2 281 feet at 31"23' 

3 496 feet at 74O13' 

4 438 feet at 123'30' 

5 366 feet at 163'7' 

6 138 feet at 160'45' 

7 510 feet at 304"30' 

8 4,635 feet at 300"44' 

9 4,732 feet at 301"5' 

10 4,611 feet at 302'6' 

11 4,709 feet at 302'22' 

D. Security Coverage 

Device security procedures in the zero point area and 

the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled test 

area were required to stop at muster or control stations 

for issue of stay-in badges, and issue or return of muster badges. After area control was established, all 

through traffic was diverted around the controlled area 

by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Manager's Schedule of 

Events," contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not connected with this event out of the closed 

area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support 

Event photo documentation was performed by Army Pictori78 
al Service (APS) personnel in a USAF UH-1F aircraft. An 

additional USAF UH-1F and crew provided dual support 

coverage by performing aerial security sweeps prior to 

the event and then being put on emergency standby for 

the Test Manager's use if needed. Cloud sampling was 

provided by PHS personnel in a Turbo-Beechcraft with an 

additional Turbo-Beechcraft on standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. A USAF U-3A aircraft with USAF crew 

and PHS technical personnel, the EG&G/Nevada Aerial 

Tracking System (NATS) aircraft, and the EG&G/Aerial Remote Monitoring System (ARMS) aircraft were used for 

cloud tracking. 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Because this event was originally scheduled for 30 August . 

1967, the first security sweep was conducted between 1905 and 

2230 hours on 29 August. Shortly after this sweep was completed, 

early in the morning hours of 30 August, personnel from SC, Stanford Research Institute (SRI), EG&G, LASL, and DOD made final instrumentation checks at the portal, in the tunnel, and at the 

Rainier Mesa trailer park. They loaded film and checked closed 

circuit television cameras. 

A security sweep was conducted between 0100 and 0149 hours 

on 30 August. Permission to arm the device was granted at 0740 

hours and arming was complete by 0840 hours. However, at 0852, 

zero time was rescheduled for 0930 hours because a storm between 

Mercury and Las Vegas was causing problems with power lines. At 

0925 hours, the decision was made to postpone the test for 24 

hours, and a readiness briefing was scheduled for 1500 hours on 

30 August. The arming party was given permission to disarm the 

device at 0930 hours, and completed this task by 1012 hours. 

A security sweep was conducted from 1930 to 2100 hours on 30 

August. 

79 
3.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

The final security sweep began at 0030 hours on 31 August 

1967, and was completed at 0115 hours. 

All projects were rechecked to assure that instruments were 

functioning properly. The arming party entered the area at 0610 

hours. Permission to arm the device was granted at 0737 hours, 

arming procedures were completed, and the arming party was clear 

of the area by 0815 hours. 

DOOR MIST zero time was 0930 hours PDT on 31 August 1967. 

3.3.1 Telemetry and Radioactive Effluent Release Situations 

At approximately 0945 hours an uncontrolled release began 

through instrumentation cables. The first telemetry reading outside the underground complex was 0.5 mR/h at 0945 hours at the 

surface cable hole, which increased to a maximum of 30 R/h at 

1105 hours, and then decreased to 3 R/h by 1530 hours. This 

release consisted primarily of noble gases. 

A second uncontrolled release, this time from the tunnel 

portal, started at 1045 hours when a reading of 0.1 mR/h was 

recorded. This reading increased gradually until a maximum of 40 

R/h was reached at 1217 hours. This release consisted of noble 

gases and radioisotopes of iodine and ruthenium. 

At 1300 hours, a controlled release took place when tunnel 

ventilation was turned on and effluent was passed through a filter system. This controlled release situation continued until 

1500 hours. 

Shortly after 1530 hours, a third uncontrolled release 

occurred from the tunnel portal. It, too, consisted of noble 

80 
gases, iodines, and radioisotopes of ruthenium. At 1730 hours, 

the tunnel ventilation system again was turned on and effluent 

was released through the filter system until H+72 hours. Radiation readings continued to decrease steadily thereafter. 

3.3.2 Initial Radiation Survey and Reentry Activities 

The initial radiation survey of Rainier Mesa trailer park 

was performed from 1036 hours to 1117 hours on D-day. When 

radiation readings reached 15 mrad/h and 9 mR/h at Stake 12R-6 

(1110 hours) about 2 miles southwest of the portal, the reentry 

team members put on respiratory protection equipment and completed the survey. 

Film, magnetic tape, and instrument recovery from Rainier 

Mesa trailer park was conducted between 1130 and 1220 hours. The 

reentry teams were dressed in anticontamination clothing and had 

appropriate respiratory protection equipment available if needed. 

The maximum exposure rate detected was 500 mR/h at the trailer 

park approximately 500 feet south from the downhole cables at 

1150 hours. A second radiation survey team accompanied the recovery party. 

Venting prohibited immediate tunnel reentry. Therefore, the 

initial survey of U12g access roads and tunnel was postponed until 1 September. 

3.3.3 Cloud Tracking and Sampling 

A. PHS Aircraft Mission 

A USAF U-3A aircraft flown by a USAF pilot with two PHS 

monitors on board tracked the effluent. Winds on D-day 

were light and variable, moving the radioactive effluent 

slowly to the north-northwest. By the time the cloud 

81 
had moved to offsite populated areas, it was diffused 

over a large area and most of the short-lived radionuclides were not detectable. 

0. ARMS Aircraft Mission 

At 1450 hours, a request was made for the ARMS aircraft 

to perform a cloud tracking and sampling mission. The 

aircraft departed Las Vegas at 1506 hours and intercepted the effluent cloud over Kawich Valley at 1600 

hours. Perimeter tracking was successful, resulting in 

two complete circumnavigations of the cloud. The maximum 

count rate was greater than 100,000 cps at 10,000 feet 

MSL over the portal. The mission was terminated at 1940 

hours. 

C. NATS Cloud Tracking Mission No. 1 

The NATS aircraft departed Las Vegas, Nevada, at 0610 

hours on 1 September 1967. Initial contact with the 

cloud occurred at 0715 over Railroad Valley. Spotty and 

intermittent count rates prevented complete circumnavigation and good cloud edge delineations. Upon mission 

completion at 1130 hours, the aircraft landed at Reno, 

Nevada. 

D. NATS Cloud Tracking Mission No. 2 

The NATS aircraft departed Reno, Nevada, at 1302 hours 

on 1 September 1967. Initial contact with the cloud was 

made at 1350 hours over Austin, Nevada. Intensity levels 

were weak and occasionally intermittent: however, count 

rates greater than 100,000 cps were detected at 9,500 

feet MSL over the DOOR MIST portal. The aircraft landed 

at Las Vegas at 1730 hours after completing its mission. 

82 
3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.4.1 Portal Survey 

The initial survey of the U12g access roads and portal area 

was conducted from 1040 to 1300 hours on 1 September 1967. The 

maximum reading at the portal was 1000 mR/h. After this survey, 

no further attempts were made to reenter U12g.07 until 5 September. 

The ventilation system to the 07 drift was not working; however, ventilation was remotely activated to the 08 drift. The 08 

drift was a mined but unused drift past the 07 drift entrance in 

the U12g tunnel complex. Ventilation through the tunnel to the 

08 drift would allow access to the 07 drift entrance. 

3.4.2 Tunnel Reentry 

On 5 September at 1655 hours, a team dressed out in appropriate anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection 

equipment entered the tunnel to the gas seal door. No tunnel 

damage was noted to this point. This team then began opening the 

manway door in the gas seal door, with successful completion of 

the task occurring at 1802 hours. When the door was opened, team 

members observed water approximately one foot deep extending 75 

to 100 feet beyond the door to the curve in the main drift. A 

maximum radiation intensity of 10 R/h was detected at the gas 

seal door. After obtaining radiation measurements, and checking 

for toxic gases and explosive mixtures, the team exited the 

tunnel at 1812 hours. 

On 6 September at 1015 hours, a team (appropriately dressed 

for entry into a radex area) entered the tunnel to remove bolts 

from the gas seal door and set up a pump to remove water from the 

area. They exited the tunnel at 1037 hours. Some problems with 

83 
a ventilation fan occurred later in the day, but an auxiliary fan 

was started in order to maintain continuity. The primary ventilation fan was back in operation on 8 September. No tunnel entries 

were allowed on 9 and 10 September. 

A reentry party attempted to reach the overburden plug on 12 

September. They were dressed in anticontamination clothing and 

provided with respiratory protection equipment as on previous reentries. They entered the tunnel at 1405 hours and proceeded toward the overburden plug, measuring radiation intensities, toxic 

gases, and explosive mixtures as they traveled. Approximately 

550 feet into the 07 drift, they obtained a radiation reading of 

20 R/h. The party immediately withdrew from the area and exited 

the tunnel at 1435 hours. No further reentries were made until 

19 September when a reentry team walked out the 08 drift, which 

was found to be in good condition. 

On 20 September at 1030 hours, team members dressed in full 

anticontamination clothing and wearing McCaa-supplied air breathing apparatus proceeded toward the overburden plug. Approximately five feet before reaching the plug, their radiation detection 

instruments measured 12 R/h. The floor of the 07 drift had 

become crusty and very soft. Considerable steam was present and 

bubbles were coming from the manway door. The team exited the 

tunnel at 1130 hours without proceeding further into the drift. 

Between 20 September and 3 October, various work parties 

performed tasks necessary to open the overburden plug door. These 

reentry operations were generally for extremely short periods of 

time. The manway door was opened at 0930 hours on 3 October. At 

that time, a contact reading of 6 R/h was measured at the door, 

as well as a personnel exposure rate of 1.5 R/h, 500 ppm carbon 

dioxide, and 200 ppm carbon monoxide. No explosive mixtures were 

detected. 

84 
The first reentry beyond the overburden plug began at 1025 

hours on 5 October. Upon exiting the tunnel at 1110 hours, the 

team reported the following conditions as recorded in the "Field 

Support Report:" 

1. Radiation intensity was approximately 5 R/h at the overburden plug manway door. 

2. There were eight inches of water on the tunnel floor. 

3. Fifty feet beyond the plug, the radiation intensity was 

3 R/h and carbon monoxide was 1200 ppm. 

4. Debris was estimated to be four feet deep across the 

tunnel floor. 

5. All the lagging was burned out beyond the overburden 

plug. 

6. The temperature was in excess of 130'F. 

The reentry team aborted the reentry mission because of the 

condition of the tunnel. At this time, all reentry and experiment 

recovery operations became concentrated on mining through from 

the U12e.04 drift. 

3.4.3 Postevent Mining (U12e.04 Drift to U12g.07 Drift) 

Numerous reentries made into the G tunnel complex after the 

DOOR MIST event indicated that the tunnel was extensively damaged 

on the zero point side of the overburden plug. No lagging 

remained between the sets, rubble and spalled rock were on the 

tunnel floor, and high temperatures were encountered. Explosive 

mixtures, toxic gases, and hi;jh radiation fields were encountered 

as well. Even after partial ventilation of the tunnel, it was 

85 
determined that the presence of debris and existence of substantial radiation levels precluded experiment recovery through 

the g.07 drift. 

In order to effect experiment recovery, the decision was 

made to mine a reentry tunnel from the existing U12e.04 personnel 

drift to the U12g.07 drift (Figure 3.2). Rehabilitation of the 

e.04 drift was conducted between 15 and 27 September, with mining 

toward U12g.07 beginning on 28 September. This recovery drift 

intersected the DOOR MIST drift at the Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

(TAPS) No. 1. Two branch drifts, the containment assessment 

drift and the experiment recovery drift, were mined paralleling 

the DOOR MIST drift. Crosscut drifts were mined at appropriate 

stations of interest (Figure 3.3). 

On 1 November 1967, the concrete plug surrounding TAPS No. 1 

became visible in the working face. Contact readings at this location were 1 R/h with a personnel exposure rate of 25 mR/h. 

After the round was mucked out, the exposure rate increased to 50 

mR/h at the face. 

During graveyard shift on 3 November, the reentry heading 

broke into the 9.07 drift on the portal side of the TAPS No. 1 

plug. Considerable steam was observed coming from the g.07 

drift, and work in the heading was stopped until a procedure 

could be developed for continuing. A survey of the muckpile 

indicated an exposure rate of 50-100 mR/h and a temperature of 

130“ F. After the round was mucked out on 6 November, the 

exposure rate in the 9.07 drift was found to be 4 R/h. 

Crosscut No. 2, mined from the containment assessment drift 

to the zero point side of TAPS No. 2, broke into the g.07 LOS 

drift on 8 November. Contaminated water was noted seeping through 

the muck pile into the containment assessment drift. A nauseating odor also was noted, but could not be identified. Work was 

86 

ZERO POINT 

TEST 

W 

w CHAMBER 

ELEVATION:6164.10 

N664.656.16 

E634.076.03 / 

U12g.07ie.04 RE-ENTRY BEGINS 

Figure 3.3 DOOR MIST event - postevent tunnel layout. 
stopped in crosscut No. 2 until 13 November when the previouslyfired round was mucked out. Sand was visible in the face and the 

exposure rate was up to 1.8 R/h in the heading. 

With the face in crosscut No. 3 at 0 + 20 feet, a probe hole 

was drilled ahead to intersect the LOS drift. A gamma survey of 

this probe hole on 16 November indicated the following readings: 

Face plus 10 feet 100 mR/h 

Face plus 20 feet 500 mR/h 

Face plus 26 feet 1 R/h 

Face plus 28 feet 2 R/h 

Mining in crosscut No. 3 continued until 18 November when 

miners uncovered a seam with a radiation intensity of 50 R/h at 

contact, with an exposure rate of 10 R/h. All personnel were 

cleared from this area and no further work was conducted in this 

crosscut. 

Several other crosscuts were mined from the containment assessment drift to the LOS drift, all of which encountered high 

exposure rates and bad ground. Numerous probe holes were drilled 

from the containment assessment drift and its crosscuts to determine radiation intensities and composition, cavity dimensions, 

and other containment-related parameters. 

On 17 November, a turnout to the right from the reentry 

heading toward the portal side of TAPS No. 1 broke into the manway. On 20 November, an entry was made into the LOS pipe from 

this point, with the reentry party going to scientific station 

No. 2. The exposure rate was 7 R/h approximately 50 feet from 

the entrance point into the LOS pipe and 5 R/h at scientific 

station No. 2. 

On 28 November, another reentry was made into the LOS pipe 

89 
and some scientific samples were recovered. The maximum exposure 

rate encountered during the reentry was 4 R/h; no toxic gases or 

explosive mixtures were detected. Radiation levels decreased as 

the team progressed toward scientific station No. 1, with an 

exposure rate of 500 mR/h being detected at the test chamber. 

On 30 November, the experiment recovery drift was started 

off of the left rib of the reentry drift. Crosscut No. 1 was 

started off this heading toward test chamber No. 2 on 8 December. 

This crosscut broke into the 9.07 LOS drift on 13 December. The 

exposure rate at the junction of the crosscut and the LOS drift 

was 5 R/h; ventilation was good with the air flow toward U12g.07. 

Mining in the experiment recovery drift continued, breaking 

into the 9.07 LOS drift near scientific station No. 1 on 20 December. An exposure rate of 50-100 mR/h was detected in the test 

chamber area. The exposure rate at the test chamber door was 500 

mR/h. 

On 26 December test chamber No. 1 was entered for documentary photographs. The exposure rate in the test chamber was 2.5 

R/h. Photography in test chamber No. 1 by various agencies 

continued on 27 December with experiment recoveries from this 

station beginning on this same date. All major experiment 

recoveries from test chamber No. 1 were completed by 4 January. 

Photography and recovery work in test chamber No. 2 began on 

4 January; the maximum exposure rate was 15 R/h, with a general 

exposure rate of 5-7 R/h. No toxic gases or explosive mixtures 

were detected in the test chamber. Recovery operations from the 

LOS pipe were completed and experiments had been packaged for 

shipment by 15 January. 

At the close of reentry activities, a concrete plug was 

placed in the reentry drift to close off the g.07 reentry/recovery drifts. 

90 
3.4.4 Postevent Drilling 

LASL personnel began postevent drilling operations at 1537 

hours on 12 September 1967. The drill rig was set up and made 

ready earlier in the day; however, tunnel reentry activities delayed the start of drilling. Drilling began and continued until 

0800 hours on 13 September when core sampling operations began. 

Core sampling was completed at 1130 hours. Twenty samples were 

taken with a maximum intensity of 11 R/h at contact with a single 

core sample. 

The drill hole was sealed with a ball valve and blind flange 

to facilitate subsequent use of the hole by DOD/SC: therefore, 

capping integrity was not determined for this drillback. Telemetry surveillance was maintained for approximately 18 hours after 

closing in the hole, during which time no gross leaks were detected. 

Operations were completed at 1300 hours on 14 September. 

Releases of radioactive effluent during this drillback were below 

the detection limit of the telemetry array. The maximum gamma 

reading not associated with a core sample was 160 mR/h at contact 

with a drilling tool at 0110 hours on 14 September. 

A survey of the cellar showed a maximum spot contamination 

of 0.6 mR/h. No alpha radiation was detected at any time during 

the drillback operation. 

3.4.5 Industrial Safety 

Checks were made on each shift for radiation levels, toxic 

gases, and explosive mixtures. These measurements were then recorded in the monitors' log book. Maximum industrial hygiene 

readings for the DOOR MIST event were: 

91 
1. 14,000 ppm CO2 on 19 September 1967 at the junction of 

the GZ personnel and scientific drifts. 

2. 40 ppm NO+N02 on 1 November 1967 in the reentry drift. 

3. 100 percent of the LEL on 22 November 1967 during a 

routine survey of the work area. 

4. 25,000 ppm CO on 27 November 1967 during a routine work 

area survey of the U12e.04-g.07 work area. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection areas (safety shoes, safety boots, miners 

boots or toe guards). Each participating agency provided its own 

safety equipment. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 0931 hours on 31 August 1967 

and ended at 1500 hours on 11 November 1967. The maximum gamma 

exposure rate measured was greater than 1,000 R/h at underground 

stations 27 through 33 and 36 at various times on 31 August 1967. 

The initial surface radiation survey teams entered the area 

at 1036 hours and completed the survey at 1117 hours on 31 August 

1967. The maximum gamma exposure rate obtained was 200 mR/h at 

the Rainier Mesa trailer park security fence at 1117 hours. No 

alpha radiation was detected. 

92 
LASL began postevent drilling operations at 1537 hours on 12 

September 1967, and completed the effort at 1300 hours on 14 September 1967. The maximum core sample contact intensity was 11 

R/h, and the maximum gamma reading obtained, not associated with 

a core sample, was 160 mR/h at contact with a drilling tool at 

0110 hours on 14 September 1967. No alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent mining began at 1530 hours on 28 September 1967 

and all major experiment recoveries were completed by 15 January 

1968. The maximum gamma personnel exposure rate measured was 

15.0 R/h at test chamber No. 2 on 5 January 1968. No alpha 

radiation was detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DOOR MIST radex areas from 31 August 1967 to 31 January 1968 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 4,215 1,625 82 

DOD Participants 468 1,185 155 

93 
94 
CHAPTER 4 

DORSAL FIN EVENT 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

DORSAL FIN was an underground DOD weapons effects test conducted at tunnel site U12e.10 (Figure 4.1) on 29 February 1968 at 

0908 hours Pacific Standard Time (PST). The device, which had a 

yield less than 20 kt, was emplaced at a vertical depth of 1,345 

feet. The test objective was to obtain information on the response of material and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and contractors conducted 15 projects 

to obtain desired weapons effects information. Containment of 

the DORSAL FIN event was complete. No radioactive effluent was 

detected onsite or offsite from this event. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all DORSAL FIN event activities in Area 12, subject to controls and procedures established by the Test Manager and the 

NTSO. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were 

in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the 

subject of separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the 

AEC Nevada Operations Office. Sandia Corporation was responsible 

for timing and firing systems, stemming design, and for installation of necessary measuring devices and equipment to indicate 

postevent tunnel condition. EG&G personnel were responsible for 

timing and firing mechanisms for the device which was provided by 

LASL. 

95 
Ulles PORTAL 

GAS SEAL DOOR 

DORSAL FIN 

ZERO POINT 

IITO U12g 

0 650 1300 

L I I 

SCALE: 1 INCH = 650 FEET (APPROX.) 

Figure 4.1 DORSAL FIN event - tunnel layout. 
Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing their experiments or delivering them to the installation contractor for subsequent placement. After the event, 

project agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing 

instrument and sample data, and preparing reports on experiment 

results. 

The LASL Test Group Director was responsible for the area 

within a 6,000-foot radius of the zero point. This responsibility was in effect from the time the device was moved to the zero 

point area until the device was detonated. At that time, the 

Test Manager relieved the LASL Test Group Director of responsibility pursuant to provisions of NTSO guidance, and delegated 

responsibility to the DOD Test Group Director. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "DORSAL FIN Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to conduct a safe and economical reentry within the desired time frame. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were provided 

to participating agencies prior to the test event. Test 

area maps with appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference markers and air sampling equipment were 

positioned in the test area. Reentry routes into the 

test area were established during "dry runs." Radsafe 

personnel were briefed regarding reentry, sample recoveryl manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe monitors were stationed at all WSI security 

roadblocks, manned stations, and work areas located 

within the controlled area. Personnel at these loca97 
tions were provided with appropriate anticontamination 

clothing and equipment. Available materials included 

coveralls, head covers, full-face masks, supplied-air 

breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, shoe covers, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for surface radiation surveys, helicopter surveys, and tunnel reentry parties. These personnel were 

stationed at the DOD Test Group Director's FCP to perform initial and subsequent surveys as required; provide 

emergency rescue and support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, 

and dosimetric devices; perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination; and operate a sample return 

station. 

A mobile issue facility for anticontamination clothing, 

respiratory protection equipment, instruments, and dosimetric devices was positioned, prior to the event, at 

the security barricade near the FCP. When authorized by 

the Test Group Director, this facility was repositioned 

to a convenient location near the tunnel portal. A personnel and vehicle decontamination facility was established adjacent to the mobile issue facility for use if 

needed. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Forty-five RAMS units were in operation; 26 on the 

surface and 19 inside the tunnel (Table 4.1). Prior to 

DORSAL FIN, the original U12e portal and main drift had 

been abandoned, except for the vent lines, when a second 

entrance to U12e was mined (U12es), and this portal and 

drift were used for DORSAL FIN. However, the U12e por98 
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

Table 4.1. 

Station 

3 225 feet 

4 300 feet 

300 feet 

6 225 feet 

7 300 feet 

8 195 feet 

9 200 feet 

300 feet 

11 300 feet 

12 300 feet 

13 300 feet 

14 Filter 

DORSAL FIN RAMS unit locations. 

Location 

ABOVEGROUND 

at 10' azimuth 

at 45" azimuth 

at 90" azimuth 

from e portal 

from e portal 

from e portal 

at 340" azimuth from es portal 

at 250" azimuth from e portal 

at 303" azimuth from e portal 

at 22.5O azimuth from es portal 

at 102" azimuth from es portal 

at 180" azimuth from es portal 

at 237" azimuth from es portal 

at 286" azimuth from es portal 

Blower Stack 

16 Blower Stack 

17 2,250 feet at 63" azimuth from Station No. 6 

19 1,100 feet at 128" azimuth from Station No. 6 

1,655 feet at 254" azimuth from Station No. 6 

21 2,500 feet at 337" azimuth from Station No. 6 

22 200 feet at 180" azimuth from U12e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

23 220 feet at 90" azimuth from U12e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

24 0 feet from U12e.10 cable hole No. 2 

225 feet at 270° azimuth from U12e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

26 250 feet at 0' azimuth from U12e.10 cable hole 

No. 2 

99 
Table 4.1. DORSAL FIN RAMS unit locations (concluded). 

Station Location 

ABOVEGROUND (Continued) 

27 500 feet from u12e.10 cable hole at 180' azimuth 

28 500 feet from u12e.10 cable hole at 60" azimuth 

29 500 feet from u12e.10 cable hole at 300" azimuth 

UNDERGROUND 

33 1,000 feet from U12e.10 drift 

34 875 feet from U12e.10 drift 

35 580 feet from U12e.10 drift 

35a 580 feet (buried 24 inches) from U12e.10 drift 

36 430 feet from U12e.10 drift 

36a 430 feet (buried 24 inches) from U12e.10 drift 

37 370 feet from U12e.10 drift 

37a 370 feet (buried 24 inches) from U12e.10 drift 

38 500 feet from U12e.06 drift 

39 290 feet from U12e.06 drift 

41 100 feet from U12e.04 drift 

42 3,475 feet from U12e main drift 

43 3,425 feet from U12e main drift 

44 1,090 feet (buried 24 inches) from U12e.10 drift 

45 2,886 feet from U12e main drift 

46 1,850 feet from U12e bypass drift 

48 At es access drift 

49 At e access drift 

50 3,900 feet from U12e main drift 

100 
tal was used as a point from which to measure distances 

to RAMS unit locations as well as the U12es portal. All 

detectors in the tunnel were housed in explosion-proof 

steel boxes and were encased in foam jackets to provide 

shock mitigation. These units each used a pair of signal wires to conduct signals to the reentry safety 

trailer located at the FCP. Surface locations were 

chosen with a consideration for weather conditions 

required at zero time and for terrain features. The 

instrumentation was to detect airborne radioactive 

effluent in case of venting for purposes of reentry 

safety and documentation of compliance with the Test Ban 

Treaty. 

Air sampling units were positioned at six surface locations (two at each portal and two in the trailer park). 

Air sampling locations were selected by an actual onsite 

survey with consideration given to surface features and 

practicality of installation. The units were started 

and set in continuous sampling mode approximately three 

hours prior to scheduled device detonation by Radsafe 

manned station personnel. 

PHS air samplers were operating at 105 routine stations 

in the offsite area, and 24-hour sample filters were 

collected daily. Ten PHS personnel were on duty for 

offsite surveillance activities during and after this 

event. 

C. Security Coverage 

Muster stations were established at the Rainier Mesa 

check point just west of Area 12 camp and on the Stockade Wash Road east oi the Pahute Mesa Road. WSI personnel performed sweeps of the controlled area and issued 

101 
muster badges to all personnel. Control of the area was 

maintained by using roadblocks, access permits, and a 

"Schedule of Events." 

D. Air Support 

A UH-1F helicopter was flown by a USAF pilot with three 

military crewmen to perform still photography coverage 

of the event for the APS. A separate DOD photo mission 

was flown by a USAF pilot and one crewman in a UH-1F 

helicopter. Both aircraft had Radsafe monitors on 

board. A U-6A aircraft was used by security personnel 

to perform aerial security surveys and sweeps. PHS had 

a USAF U-3A aircraft and two Turbo-Beech aircraft available for cloud tracking and sampling. The U-3A was 

flown by a USAF pilot with two PHS personnel as crew. 

Both Turbo-Beech aircraft were manned by civilian pilots 

and crews. In addition, the EG&G/NATS aircraft was on 

standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas in case it was 

needed for cloud tracking. 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

A readiness briefing was held at 1600 hours on 28 February. 

The first security sweep of the controlled area began at 

2025 hours on 28 February. At that time, all experimenter personnel who did not have permission to remain were mustered from 

the closed area. Gates at E and G tunnels were locked and 

secured. This security sweep was completed at 2340 hours. 

4.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

WSI personnel began the second security sweep at 0108 hours 

102 
on 29 February (D-day). This sweep was completed at 0305 hours. 

At 0430 hours, the WSI muster station was moved from the intersection of Pahute Mesa and Stockade Wash Roads to the intersection of Pahute Mesa Road and Road 16-02. Personnel representing 

DASA, REECo, EG&G, LASL, SRI, and WSI were inside the closed area 

performing final button up activities until 0545 hours. By 0655, 

the area was clear except for the arming party and the zero point 

security guards. At that time, permission to arm the device was 

granted. The arming party performed their mission and exited the 

area at 0745 hours. A final aerial security sweep was performed, 

after which the photographic aircraft took their positions and 

were in place by 0855 hours for scheduled event execution at 0900 

hours. However, a technical hold was called at H-2 seconds. The 

technical problem was quickly solved and the countdown resumed. 

DORSAL FIN zero time was 0908 hours PST on 29 February 1968. 

Telemetry measurements were recorded from 0909 hours on 29 

February through 1600 hours on 8 March 1968. With the exception 

of detectors identified as underground RAMS Stations 35, 35a, 36, 

and 36a, which measured some activation products, all radiation 

detectors both in the tunnel and aboveground indicated preevent 

background readings after detonation. 

RAMS Unit H+l Min. H+250 Min. 

35 260 R/h 1 R/h 

35a 5 R/h 16 mR/h 

36 8 R/h 40 mR/h 

36a 300 mR/h 1.5 mR/h 

The presence of background readings on the bulk of the aboveground RAMS units indicated that containment within the tunnel 

had been good. 

103 
4.3.1 Radiation Surveys and Surface Reentry 

Initial surface radiation survey teams, dressed in anticontamination clothing and provided with respiratory equipment, entered the closed area at 1045 hours and completed the surface 

initial survey at 1138 hours on D-day. 

There were Eour Radsafe reentry teams, each consisting of 

two Radsafe monitors. Teams No. 1 and No. 2 were stationed at the 

FCP. When released by the Test Group Director, they proceeded to 

the E tunnel portal area. Team No. 1 surveyed the new portal 

(es) while team No. 2 surveyed the trailers and cable runs, beginning with the first trailer in the old portal (e) area. 

Teams No. 3 and 4 were stationed at the Rainier Mesa security check point. When released by the Test Group Director, they 

traveled to the Rainier Mesa trailer park where team No. 3 surveyed the U12e tunnel vent holes. Team No. 4 surveyed the trailer park and cable runs. Both teams then stood by at the cable 

runs until all trailer recoveries were completed and downhole 

cables were disconnected. 

All surface initial survey radiation measurements indicated 

background levels. 

4.3.2 Experiment Recovery Activities 

After the initial portal and Rainier Mesa radiation surveys 

were completed, the DOD Test Group Director released parties from 

LASL, SRI, LMSC, DOD, EG&G, General Atomic (GA), and SC to recover data and instruments from Rainier Mesa trailer park. Shortly thereafter, DOD Test Group personnel led DOD and SC data recovery teams to the portal area to reenter SC trailers which were 

located there. The gas sampling system was operated from these 

trailers. No radiation problems were encountered. 

104 
4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Tunnel ventilation by exhaust was initiated immediately following the detonation. This diluted or removed any existing toxic 

or radioactive aerosols via a filtering system and the exhausting 

vent lines. Ventilation effluent was monitored for radioactivity 

and toxic gases to evaluate the adequacy of implemented safety 

controls prior to tunnel entry by the initial reentry party. 

Each member of the initial reentry teams was provided with 

sets of required anticontamination clothing; two self-reading 

pocket dosimeters (O-200 mR, O-5 R); one two-hour McCaa breathing 

device; a Bureau of Mines-approved, hat-mounted miner's light 

with battery pack; and an MSA-approved explosive-proof flashlight. Subsequent reentry and recovery parties were equipped 

with full-face masks beyond the overburden plug. 

A. D+l (1 March 1968) 

When cleared by the DOD Test Group Director, and when 

all surface recoveries were complete, tunnel reentry 

teams No. 1 and 2 began initial tunnel reentry. Team 

members were dressed as discussed above. This occurred 

on 1 March 1968 beginning at 1015 hours. The reentry 

teams proceeded from the portal to the gas seal door 

surveying for toxic gases, explosive mixtures, and 

radioactivity. The maximum radiation reading was 1.5 

mR/h at the junction of the old main drift (e) and bypass main drift (es) at 1,700 feet. All other readings 

to this point were less than 0.5 mR/h. 

Opening the manway door in the gas seal door at 1125 

hours revealed approximately two feet of water on the 

105 
zero point side. Pumps were turned on to remove the 

water. At 1135 hours, reentry team No. 3 (dressed in 

the same manner as the previous teams except for McCaa 

breathing devices) entered the tunnel to open the large 

gas seal door (only the manway door was previously 

opened) and establish railroad tracks through the door. 

Although full-face masks were not required to be worn at 

the gas seal door, any person entering the tunnel was 

required to have a mask in his possession. The gas seal 

door was opened and tracks reinstalled, and team No. 3 

exited the tunnel at 1400 hours. 

Between 1430 and 1540 hours, team No. 1 (appropriately 

dressed-out) performed a radiation survey from the gas 

seal door to the overburden plug. From 2,900 feet in 

the main drift to the 07 junction, gamma exposure rate 

readings of 0.5 to 0.7 mR/h were measured. No explosive 

mixtures or toxic gases were encountered. Vent lines 

through the overburden plug were opened in preparation 

for ventilating behind the blast door. At 2000 hours, 

the overburden plug was opened and survey measurements 

showed 10,000 ppm CO, less than 0.5 mR/h gamma exposure 

rate, and 15 percent LEL of explosive mixtures. 

Miners removed sand from the vent lines and began hooking them up in order to begin ventilation in the early 

morning hours of 2 March. 

B. D+2 (2 March 1968) 

By 0800 hours, tunnel ventilation had been established 

to the overburden plug. Reentry team No. 1 entered the 

tunnel and performed a walkthrough from the overburden 

plug to the LOS pipe drift. Water was still being pumped 

from the tunnel at this time. Other than the water prob106 
lem, the drift was found to be clear. Maximum radiation 

readings were 45 mrad/h beta plus gamma, and 40 mR/h 

gamma. No explosive mixtures or toxic gases were encountered. 

After several hours of pumping water from the tunnel, a 

team entered the LOS drift for an initial survey at 1425 

hours. Scientific station No. 2 was reached and opened 

at 1515 hours. A maximum gamma reading of 150 mR/h was 

detected, but no explosive mixtures or toxic gases. The 

team next opened the door to scientific station No. 1 at 

1530 hours. No explosive mixtures were detected; however, 100 ppm CO and 125 mR/h gamma were measured. The 

reentry team exited the tunnel at 1600 hours. Shortly 

after their exit, experiment recovery operations were 

authorized. 

Experiment recovery parties from EG&G, Naval Research 

Laboratory (NRL), Nuclear Defense Laboratory (NDL), 

LASL, and LRL entered the tunnel at 1630 hours. All 

personnel were appropriately dressed for work in this 

radex area. Work continued for approximately an hour 

before parties began exiting the tunnel. Alpha contamination was detected in the LOS pipe and up to 25,000 cpm 

was detected on anticontamination clothing. All personnel were decontaminated as needed and urine samples were 

collected. 

C. D+3 (3 March 1968) 

Miners and Radsafe personnel were the first to enter the 

010 drift at 0800 hours on this date. Radsafe personnel 

made routine checks and detected alpha contamination of 

3,000 cpm. They immediately left the tunnel to inform 

the supervisor and tunnel superintendent, and to redress 

107 
in double anticontamination clothing. Before they reentered, they were advised by the tunnel superintendent 

that once the Radsafe station was installed underground 

and all drainage pumps were installed on the zero point 

side of the overburden plug, all personnel would depart 

the tunnel for the remainder of the day. Upon reentering 

the tunnel, a complete survey of the work area disclosed 

that the alpha contamination problem persisted. The Radsafe station was installed on the portal side of the 

overburden plug. Surveys detected alpha levels ranging 

from 3,000 cpm to 100,000 cpm. A Radsafe hot line was 

set up outside the overburden plug for control. Urine 

samples were collected from personnel exiting the tunnel. By 1300 hours, all personnel were out of the area 

with the exception of hourly security checks by Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) personnel. 

D. D+4 (4 March 1968) 

No recovery operations were performed until 1605 hours 

on 4 March. Photographers were in the tunnel earlier in 

the day, but it was not until SC personnel reentered 

scientific station No. 1 that experiment recovery operations resumed. Operations were complete for the night at 

2200 hours. All personnel were monitored by Radsafe 

after removal of anticontamination clothing and no alpha 

activity was detected. 

E. D+5 (5 March 1968) 

Walkout of the LOS pipe was completed at 1300 hours. The 

LOS pipe was partially collapsed but DOD and LRL personnel completed their recovery operations. Experiment recovery operations continued to be conducted by SC, LRL, 

and LMSC personnel at scientific stations No. 1 and 2. 

108 
F. Extended Recovery Activities 

Routine scientific recoveries were made by personnel 

representing LRL, LMSC, SC, AFWL, AVCO Corporation 

(AVCO), LASL, GA, SRI, EG&G, and DOD during the period 

from 5 March through 11 April 1968. Alpha contamination 

was confined to the area between the overburden plug and 

scientific station No. 1. Urine samples taken from reentry personnel showed no detectable alpha emitters. No 

other radiological problems were encountered. 

4.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling on PS-1V began at 1325 hours on 6 March 

1968. Drilling continued until a total depth of 1,504 feet was 

reached at 0205 hours on 7 March 1968. Then the decision was 

made to begin core sampling at 0300 hours. The lab trailer continuous air monitor detected increased radioactivity levels beginning at 0312 hours, reaching a maximum of 10,000 cpm of gamma 

activity at 0330 hours, and steadily decreasing thereafter. It 

was discovered that a portion of a core sample had fallen into 

the cellar causing radioactivity to be introduced into the recirculation blower system. A cellar survey at 0340 hours indicated a maximum reading of 0.6 mrad/h beta plus gamma, and an air 

sample taken at the same time indicated no gaseous contamination 

in the cellar. The drill rig was washed down at 0830 hours, and 

the platform radiation readings decreased. Coring operations 

were completed at 1230 hours on 7 March. A total of 19 core 

samples were taken with a maximum contact radiation reading of 5 

R/h for a single core sample. The containment plug was closed at 

1605 hours and the blind flange set at 1630 hours. Rig teardown 

began at 1730 hours on 7 March and the rig was removed by 2030 

hours. 

109 
4.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Each participant in tunnel reentry operations was certified 

by the Bureau of Mines as having satisfactorily completed training in the use of the a-hour McCaa breathing apparatus, and had 

been instructed in mine rescue procedures. 

Checks were made on each shift for toxic gases and explosive 

mixtures. These measurements were recorded in the Radsafe monitors' log book. Industrial safety codes were established by REECo 

and were emphasized during all operations. 

4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 0909 hours on 29 February 

1968, and ended at 1600 hours on 8 March 1968. The maximum gamma 

exposure rate measured was 260 R/h at 5+80 feet into the U12e.10 

drift at 0909 hours on 29 February 1968. 

The tunnel reentry survey teams entered the area at 1015 

hours and completed the survey to the overburden plug at 1540 

hours on 1 March 1968. The maximum gamma exposure rate obtained 

during the initial survey was 1.5 mR/h at construction station 

17+00 in the main drift (es). No alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent recovery operations began at 1145 hours on 1 March 

1968 and were completed on 11 April 1968. The maximum gamma 

exposure rate measured was 150 mR/h both outside and inside test 

chamber No. 2 at 1454 hours on 2 March 1968. The maximum alpha 

radiation measurement obtained was 100,000 cpm at contact with 

the portal side of test chamber No. 1 at 0930 hours on 3 March 

1968. Evaluation of urine sample results indicated that no significant internal deposition had occurred. 

110 
Postevent drilling began at 1325 hours on 6 March 1968, and 

the containment plug was set at 1605 hours on 7 March. The maximum gamma activity rate obtained during drillback operations was 

more than 5 R/h at contact with a core sample on 7 March. The 

maximum alpha radiation measurement obtained was 10,000 cpm on 

the platform at 0330 hours on 7 March 1968. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DORSAL FIN radex areas from 29 February 1968 to 9 May 1968 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Maximum 

Exposure 

(mR) 

Average

Exposure 

(mR1 

All Participants 1,266 120 4 

DOD Participants 240 40 10 

111 
112 
CHAPTER 5 

MILK SHAKE EVENT 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The MILK SHAKE event was conducted on 25 March 1968 at 1044 

hours PST. LRL supplied the device, which had a yield less than 

20 kt. Device emplacement was at shaft site U5k in a 66-inch 

diameter cased hole drilled to a depth of 867 feet (Figure 5.1). 

A vertical LOS pipe which had a 37-inch opening at the surface 

was used. Seventeen projects were fielded by government agencies 

and contractors in support of the test objective, which was to 

determine response of test equipment and samples to a nuclear 

detonation environment. 

A subsidence crater formed 21 minutes after detonation. Due 

to the failure of gas seals in the downhole cables, a slight release of radioactive gases occurred. Minor levels of radioactive 

effluent were detected onsite only. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all MILK SHAKE event activities in Area 5, subject to controls 

and procedures established by the Test Manager and the NTSO. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject 

of separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada 

Operations Office. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project 

activities. 

113 
Lll-.- ~-L-*-L~~~‘ -*-s-x --I- L-B-.-,-

I 

I 2.30 0 AQl 2 03 1 an -4 I 0 

i E aFFICE 

i 

. . 

I=

LRL PU+%CS 

.-r-x-*--r-x 

Figure 5.1 MILK SHAKE event - U5k site plan. 
Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

and installing or delivering their experiments to the installation contractor for subsequent placement. After the event, these 

agencies were responsible for removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on experiment 

results. 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were provided 

to participating agencies prior to the test event. Reference markers and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test area. "Dry runs" were performed to establish reentry routes into the test area. Radsafe personnel were briefed regarding surface reentry, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

All remote area monitoring stations and air sampling 

units were installed according to DOD and LRL specifications prior to D-5 days. 

All personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and 

Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial 

surveys by helicopter, and reentry parties as needed. In 

addition, Radsafe personnel were standing by at the DOD 

Test Director's FCP prior to scheduled detonation to 

perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment and 

material, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate 

115 
area control check stations; and perform personnel, 

equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

gloves, plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Seventeen remote telemetry radiation monitoring stations 

provided event coverage as shown in Table 5.1. 

Eighteen air sampling units with detector recorders were 

in operation at zero time. These units were positioned 

at 20" intervals on a 2,000-foot arc beginning at 20" 

azimuth. Samplers were started and set on continuous 

sampling mode by manned station teams five hours before 

scheduled device detonation. 

PHS air samplers were operating at 108 routine stations 

at offsite locations. 

C. Security Coverage 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at the muster or control stations 

for issuance or return of their muster or stay-in badges. All personnel were required to have proper security 

clearances for the area. Control of the area was maintained by using roadblocks, access authorizations, and a 

"Schedule of Events." Parties could enter the controlled 

area only if they were listed on the "Test Manager's 

Schedule of Events," or with permission of the Test 

Group Director. WSI security guards were responsible 

for activating roadblocks to direct traffic flow. 

116 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

Table 5.1. MILK SMAKE event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location (from SGZ) 

SGZ 

350 feet at 180' azimuth 

750 feet at 0" azimuth 

750 feet at 45' azimuth 

750 feet at 90° azimuth 

750 feet at 159' azimuth 

750 feet at 184" azimuth 

750 feet at 202" azimuth 

750 feet at 270' azimuth 

750 feet at 315" azimuth 

2,500 feet at 0' azimuth 

2,500 feet at 45" azimuth 

2,500 feet at 90" azimuth 

2,500 feet at 135" azimuth 

2,500 feet at 180' azimuth 

2,500 feet at 225' azimuth 

2,500 feet at 270" azimuth 

2,500 feet at 315O azimuth 

117 
D. Air Support 

A UH-1F helicopter was flown by a USAF pilot with three 

military crewmen and a Radsafe monitor on board to perform still photography coverage of the event. A USAF 

U-6A aircraft was used by security personnel to perform 

aerial surveys. PHS had a USAF U-3A aircraft and two 

Turbo-Beech aircraft on standby status. The U-3A was 

flown by a USAF pilot with two PHS crew members. 

5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

On D-6 days, a practice reentry was staged from the primary 

MILK SHAKE recovery point. The final timing and firing dry run 

was performed on D-2. 

On D-l, final button up activities were performed by personnel from LMSC; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); 

Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO); AVCO; GA; Boeing 

Aircraft Co. (BAC); Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL); Naval 

Ordnance Laboratory (NOL); NRL; SRI: Moleculon Consultants, Inc. 

(Moleculon); LRL; LASL; and SC. Initial preevent security sweeps 

were begun and muster and control stations were established. 

5.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

Readiness briefings were conducted during the pre-dawn hours 

on D-day. 

MILK SHAKE zero time was 1044 hours PST on 25 March 1968. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1045 hours on 25 March. An 

effluent release, which apparently came from a downhole cable, 

began at 1051 and lasted until 1145 hours. All radiation levels 

118 
had decreased to background by 0800 hours on 26 March. The maximum gamma exposure rate measured was 4.5 R/h at SGZ on 25 March 

at 1045 hours. Telemetry coverage for MILK SHAKE was terminated 

on 27 March 1968 at 1600 hours. 

Cavity collapse occurred at 1105 hours on D-day. 

5.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Sampling 

Two PHS monitors performed initial monitoring in a USAF U-3A 

aircraft. One of the PHS Turbo-Beech aircraft (Vegas 8) was used 

to perform additional aerial monitoring and cloud sampling. The 

cloud was sampled as it drifted northeast from SGZ. 

A. U-3A Tracking Mission 

A background level exposure rate was measured on the 

first pass over SGZ at 3,850 feet MSL. The first reading 

above background was 0.18 mR/h over SGZ at 1051 hours. 

The remaining measurements recorded on this flight are 

summarized in Table 5.2. A final axial pass from north 

of Papoose Lake, starting at approximately 15" and 20 

miles out and flying toward SGZ, detected only a trace 

of activity over Papoose Lake at 1230 hours. The aircraft completed its mission and returned to ISAFAF at 

1300 hours. 

B. Vegas 8 Mission 

Vegas 8 first entered the cloud at 1105 hours on D-day. 

At 1107 hours, the cloud's leading edge was located 3.4 

miles from SGZ on a 15" azimuth. A spiral descent was 

made through the release plume two miles from SGZ at 

1115 hours. Vegas 8 established a sampling path ahead 

of the cloud at 5003 feet MSL 6.5 miles from SGZ and 

119 
Table 5.2. MILK SHAKE event - U-3A cloud tracking summary,

25 March 1968. 

Time Azimuth Distance Exposure 

(Hours) Altitude from SGZ from SGZ Rate 

(PST) (ft, MSL) (degrees) (miles) (mR/h) Remarks 

1051 3850 0 0 0.18 

1058 3850 20 0.2 9.0 

1100 4000 10 1.0 1.0 

1117 4000 10 5.0 0.6 

1122 4000 15 7.0 0.6 

1123 4000 15-20 10.0 Leading Edge 

1151 4000 20 12.0 Leading Edge 

1159 4000 20 13.0 0.13 Over Papoose Lake 

1215 4000 20 14.0 Bkg" 

1232 6500 15 15.0 Trace 

*Background radiation measurement. 

120 
normal to the direction of cloud movement. Sampling was 

performed from 1119 until 1208 hours, at which time the 

majority of the radioactive effluent appeared to have 

passed the sampling line. An axial pass beginning 6.5 

miles from SGZ, along the 15" azimuth, showed continuous 

very small amounts of activity. 

Sequential samples were collected on the spiral descent 

and four cross passes were made. Because the sample 

volumes were small and half-lives short for the particulate activity, there was insufficient activity for meaningful analysis. 

The release of activity from the MILK SHAKE event consisted primarily of noble gases. At the time of sampling, the major radionuclide detected was cesium-138. 

The low concentration and short half-lives of the radionuclides involved resulted in the conclusion that no detectable concentrations were released offsite. 

5.3.2 Test Area Radiation Surveys and Reentry Activities 

Initial radiation survey teams No. 1 and 2 were officially 

released from the FCP at 1117 hours. They entered the area at 

1118 hours and completed their surveys at 1225 hours (Table 5.3). 

The maximum gamma exposure rate obtained was 15.0 R/h at contact 

with the cables to the EG&G Trailer 9.11a. No alpha radiation 

was detected. 

5.3.3 Experiment Recovery Activities 

Experiment recovery operations began on D-day at 1215 hours 

and continued through D+3 days. Only trailer park recoveries were 

performed on D-day; however, trailer park and tower recoveries 

were conducted through D+3 days. Representatives from DASA, AFWL, 

121 
Table 5.3. NILK SHAKE event - initial radiation survey data, 

25 March 1968. 

Gamma 

Time Exposure Rate 

(Hours) Location (from SGZ) (mR/h 1 

1118 Stake 5Y13 (2.7 miles SW) 0.07 

1119 Stake 5Y15 (2.2 miles SW) 0.08 

1120 Stake 5Y17 (1.7 miles SW) 0.07 

1120 Stake 5Y19 (1.3 miles (SW) 0.07 

1121 Watsonville (Area 5 Compound) 0.07 

1123 0.1 mile west of trailer fence 0.3 

1124 Entrance to trailer park 1.0 

1126 Center of trailer park 9.0 

1127 East end of trailer park 30.0 

1133 Cables to trailer No. 9.11a 10,000.0* 

1138 Door to trailer No. 9.11a 2,000.0 

1139 Door to trailer No. 102 200.0 

1140 Door to trailer No. 40003 1.0 

1155 Cables to trailer No. 9.11a 15,000.0* 

1213 Trailer No. 9.11b 7.0* 

1225 Inside trailer No. 9.11a 1,500.0* 

*Contact radiation reading 

122 
Moleculon, AVCO, EG&G, LRL, BAC, GA, HDL, SC, Army Pictorial Center (APC), LMSC, NRL, LASL, MIT, GE, and NDL participated in experiment recovery operations. 

Experiment recovery teams arrived at the tower at 0800 hours 

on 26 March. When the main steps were ready to be placed on the 

tower, all electricity to the tower was shut off. Contractor personnel used a hydrocrane to position the tower steps. An SC/REECo 

safety group then entered the tower exposure room to check for 

any potential safety problems. Following completion of the tower 

safety inspection, specific project personnel were allowed to enter the tower and remove critical equipment and take measurements. These personnel were required to wear full-face masks in 

addition to full anticontamination clothing at all times. The 

safety team remained at the tower until all project agency personnel had departed. 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.4.1 Tower Experiment Recovery Activities 

Trailer park recoveries which were begun on D-day continued. 

In addition, project agencies were allotted time after D-day to 

recover experiment cassettes from the tower. All recovery operations were performed without incident. After experiment recovery 

operations were completed, the tower was partially disassembled 

and transported to the Area 5 radioactive waste storage facility. 

5.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

No surface drillback operations were conducted for this 

event. 

123 
5.4.3 Industrial Safety 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving explosives, toxic materials, radioactive 

materials or any other operation with the potential for personal 

injury. Each individual involved in a project was required to be 

knowledgeable regarding applicable procedures for their project. 

Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for drilling, were established by REECo and were emphasized during all operations. 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1045 hours on 25 March 1968 

and ended at 1600 hours on 27 March 1968. The maximum gamma exposure rate measured by telemetry was 4.5 R/h at SGZ on 25 March 

at 1045 hours. 

The initial radiation survey was conducted between 1118 

hours and 1225 hours on 25 March 1968. The maximum gamma exposure reading obtained was 15.0 R/h at contact with the cables to 

the EG&G Trailer 9.11a. No alpha radiation was detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

MILK SHAKE radex areas from 25 March 1968 to 8 August 1968 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 491 545 12 

DOD Participants 212 140 13 

124 
No radioactivity above normal background levels was detected 

offsite by ground and aerial monitoring teams or by ground-based 

exposure rate recorders, either after the detonation or during 

subsequent sample recovery operations. No fresh fission products 

were detected in any environmental sample collected offsite 

throughout this period, and no prefilter air samples contained 

levels of gross beta activity above normal background. 

It was the opinion of the PHS that no radioactive contamination of the offsite area resulted from this event. 

125 
126 
CHAPTER 6 

DIANA MOON EVENT 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

DIANA MOON was a DOD-sponsored underground test detonated at 

0930 hours PDT on 27 August 1968 with a yield less than 20 kt. 

Device emplacement depth was 794 feet in a 66-inch diameter cased 

hole (Ulle) with a 48 l/2-inch diameter LOS pipe to the surface. 

Experiments were arranged in a bell jar/instrument spool resting 

on a recoverable sled (Figure 6.1). The objective of this test 

was to obtain weapons effects information related to the response 

of materials and equipment to the environment produced by a nuclear detonation. Government agencies and contractors conducted 

eight projects to obtain the desired information. 

A subsidence crater formed six minutes after detonation. 

Minor seepage of radioactive effluent was detected in the SGZ 

area from H+3 minutes (0933 hours) to H+17 minutes (0947 hours), 

and again from H+5 hours (1430 hours) to H+13 hours (2230 hours). 

No radioactive effluent was detected offsite. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all DIANA MOON project activities in Area 11. Responsibilities 

of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Test Command, I\SA, and the AEC Nevada Operations 

Office. LASL fielded the dl,y>7ire; therefore, the LASL Test Group 

127 
Figure 6.1 DIANA MOON event - Ulle site plan. 
Director was responsible to the Test Manager for the area within 

a 2,000-foot radius of SGZ. This responsibility was in effect 

from the time the device was moved to the emplacement site until 

device detonation. At that time, the Test Manager relieved the 

LASL Test Group Director of responsibility which was subsequently 

delegated to the DOD Test Group Director. 

Sandia Corporation was responsible for reentry and recovery 

safety and LASL performed downhole recovery work. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with the requests of responsible DOD and SC representatives. Participating agencies were provided with detailed radiological safety reentry plans prior to the test event. 

Monitors were briefed regarding test area surface reentry, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe provided reference markers, monitoring and equipment support, and air sampling and telemetry arrays 

which were positioned in the test area prior to D-5 

days. Two reserve Radsafe monitoring teams were on 

standby for use by the Test Manager in emergency SitUations. All personnel at manned stations were provided 

with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment. Anticontamination materials available included 

coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, 

supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

Monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were provided 

129 
for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial surveys, 

and reentry parties as needed. Radsafe personnel were 

standing by at the FCP prior to detonation to: 

- perform surveys and provide emergency support as 

directed; 

- provide and issue anticontamination equipment and 

materials, portable instruments, and dosimeters; 

- operate area control check stations; and 

- Perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Seventeen RAMS units provided coverage for the DIANA 

MOON event as shown in Table 6.1. 

Twelve air sampling units with detector recorders were 

located at 30" intervals on a l,OOO-foot arc from SGZ 

beginning at 0" azimuth. These units were operational 

at zero time. 

PHS air samplers were operating at 126 routine stations 

at offsite locations, and 19 personnel were on duty in 

the field to perform surveillance activities. 

C. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on D-day. 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at the appropriate station to obtain or to return their muster or stay-in badges. All 

130 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

Table 6.1. DIANA MOON event FLWIS unit locations. 

Station Location (from SGZ) 

SGZ 

600 feet at 0" azimuth 

600 feet at 45" azimuth 

600 feet at 90' azimuth 

600 feet at 135O azimuth 

600 feet at 171" azimuth 

600 feet at 190° azimuth 

600 feet at 220° azimuth 

600 feet at 290" azimuth 

600 feet at 315" azimuth 

766 feet at 176' azimuth 

2,000 feet at 0" azimuth 

2,000 feet at 60" azimuth 

2,000 feet at 120" azimuth 

2,000 feet at 180" azimuth 

2,000 feet at 240° azimuth 

2,000 feet at 270' azimuth 

131 
personnel were required to have proper clearances for 

the area. Control was maintained by using roadblocks, 

access authorizations, and a "Schedule of Events.*' Personnel could enter the controlled area only if they were 

listed on the "Test Manager's Schedule of Events," or 

had the permission of the DOD Test Group Director. 

D. Air Support 

Aircraft support for this event was as follows: 

Type Organization Mission 

UH-1F LMAFS Photography 

*UH-1F DOD Photography 

*UH-1F USAF/Test Manager Standby 

U-6A WSI Security 

U-3A USAF/PHS Cloud Tracking 

Turbo Beech PHS Cloud Sampling** 

Turbo Beech PHS Cloud Sampling 

Martin 404 EG&G/NATS Cloud Tracking** 

Cessna 206 AAS Postevent Survey 

*Dual function 

**On standby in Las Vegas 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Final dry runs were conducted on 26 August 1968 without incident. Button up activities at the trailer park were performed 

by personnel representing SC, LRL, EG&G, SRI, LASL, and DOD. 

During this time a high wind blew an empty box into the SGZ pit 

complex, damaging a vacuum readout probe and permitting a small 

amount of air to rush into the pipe before it could be repaired. 

After appropriate repairs were made, the vacuum system was 

checked and it performed as designed. A final readiness briefing 

132 
was requested for 0400 hours on D-day, with an earliest event 

readiness of 0630 hours. The first security sweep began at 1915 

hours and was completed at 2015 hours on D-l; the second sweep 

was conducted between 2130 and 2205 hours. 

6.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

At the 0400 readiness briefing, the weather forecast remained essentially the same as on the previous day with winds 

predicted to be 5 to 10 knots from the south. Air sampling units 

were started and set on continuous sampling mode by manned station teams five hours before scheduled device detonation. Permission to arm the device was requested and obtained at 0553 hours. 

The device was armed and the arming party exited the closed area 

by 0637 hours. Readiness at 0637 was attained; however, the unfavorable winds persisted at the event location, although reduced 

to light and variable, until about 0900 hours. At that time, a 

steady southerly air flow was observable on the Test Manager's 

closed circuit television (event location flags were waving), and 

weather bureau monitoring stations confirmed the flow. All experiment and containment system monitors were functioning properly, 

so permission to initiate countdown was requested and received. 

The countdown began at 0915 hours and proceeded without holds or 

accelerations. 

DIANA M30N was detonated at 0930 hours PDT on 27 August 

1968. 

Telemetry coverage began at 0931 hours and continued until 

2300 hours on 25 September 1968. The maximum radiation reading 

was 80 R/h at 0931 hours as indicated by the RAMS unit on the 

bell jar. This reading was attributed to activation products 

which were expected as part cf the experiment. Approximately 20 

seconds after detonation the recovery sled winch system was 

133 
remotely activated to move the sled away from SGZ. This operation was successful, and the winch system was remotely disabled 

from CP at about 0933 hours when the monitor system indicated the 

sled had completed its desired travel. RAMS unit No. 2 (located 

600 feet due north from SGZ) indicated 120 mR/h at 0931 hours; 

however, this measurement steadily decreased as the bell jar was 

pulled to the south. 

A subsidence crater formed at 0936 hours. It was 264 feet 

in diameter and had a maximum depth of 17 feet. 

6.3.1 First Radioactive Effluent Release Situation 

The first seepage of radioactive effluent from SGZ began at 

0933 hours and continued until 0947 hours. Radiation readings at 

RAMS unit No. 12 reached a maximum of 35 mR/h at 0940 hours. 

Readings at this unit then steadily decreased to background by 

0954 hours. 

By 1000 hours, all RAMS units continued to indicate decreasing readings. Therefore, permission to initiate reentry and recovery operations was requested and obtained. 

6.3.2 Surface Reentry and Recovery Operations 

Initial surveys of the Ulle trailer park, perimeter fence, 

crater, pit, and gas seals were conducted between 0947 and 1100 

hours on D-day (Table 6.2). During these surveys, Radsafe personnel set up barricades around the bell jar and sled. When this 

was completed, the Test Director authorized personnel representing SC, SRI, LASL, EG&G, LRL, and NRL to recover film and tapes 

from the trailer park. 

Reentry parties were required to wear full anticontamination 

clothing but no respiratory protection equipment. 

134 
Table 6.2. DIANA MOON event - initial radiation survey of 

trailer park area*, 27 August 1968. 

Time 

(Hours) 

0957 

0958 

1000 

1000 

1003 

1005 

1006 

1008 

1010 

1013 

1015 

1030 

1031 

1033 

1045 

1048 

1048 

1050 

1052 

1055 

1056 

1100 

Location 

Stake 5Y20 

Junction 5 Road and 5B Road 

Entrance to Ulle trailer park 

West perimeter fence 

North perimeter fence 

Trailer J,RL 170 

East perimeter fence 

Cable run 

Bell jar - southwest 

Bell jar sled 

Low beta trailer 

Bell jar - bottom 

Bell jar - northwest 

South edge of crater 

South edge of pit 

East edge of downhole cables 

East edge of pit over downhole cables 

Edge of pit - north 

West edge of pit 

Approximately 100 feet SE of 

pit at gas seals 

20 feet south of gas seals at cable 

Working area at bell jar - south side 

Gamma 

Exposure Rate 

(mR/h 1 

0.04 

0.04 

0.7** 

3.0 

9.0 

0.7** 

5.0 

0.7** 

1,500.0** 

11500.0 

0.6** 

200.0 

200.0** 

5.0 

100.0 

900.0 

15,000.0** 

150.0 

50.0 

5,000.0** 

25.0** 

200.0 

*This survey was performed !y three separate Radsafe teams 

**Contact readings 

135 
6.3.3 Second Radioactive Effluent Release Situation 

Slow seepage from around the SGZ casing began at approximately 1430 hours. RAMS unit readings fluctuated between 1 R/h 

and 1.8 R/h until about 2000 hours, when readings began to decrease. During this time, Halliburton personnel dressed in anticontamination clothing and MSA masks performed Cal-sealing operations to stop the effluent release. When this operation was completed, all RAMS readings returned to background. 

Concurrently, an exposure incident occurred involving an inspection party consisting of two TC/DASA personnel, a representative of EG&G, an SC health physicist, and a Radsafe monitor. At 

approximately 1430 hours, all party members dressed in coveralls, 

shoe covers, and gloves, and proceeded to the SGZ pit. No radioactivity had been detected after cavity collapse, so no respiratory protection was required. Upon their approach, gaseous radioactivity began seeping from SGZ as discussed above. This seepage 

caused inadvertent exposure of the five individuals. Upon exit 

from the area, all personnel were decontaminated at the Radsafe 

decontamination facility. Personnel were advised that urinalysis 

and thyroid counts would be necessary. These were subsequently 

performed. The maximum thyroid exposure received was 737 mrem. 

Permissible limits for the thyroid were 10,000 mrem per 13 weeks 

and 30,000 mrem per year. 

Small seepages of radioactive effluent from cracks and fissures around SGZ continued periodically over the next three days. 

These were sealed with Cal-seal as soon as they were detected. 

6.3.4 Cloud Tracking and Sampling 

The PHS provided aerial support to determine the magnitude, 

composition, and trajectory of any radioactive effluent release. 

Initial monitoring was performed by two PHS monitors in a USAF 

136 
U-3A aircraft with USAF pilot and co-pilot. In addition, a TurboBeech aircraft (Vegas 8) and crew performed a cloud tracking and 

cloud sampling mission. 

At zero time, the U-3A and Vegas 8 were orbiting the closed 

area. The U-3A made several passes over SGZ with results as shown 

in Table 6.3. Ground elevation at SGZ was about 3,400 feet MSL. 

Vegas 8 requested clearance to 6,000 feet MSL five miles 

north of SGZ at 0950 hours to set up a sampling pattern. At 1010 

hours, Vegas 8 moved closer and found the leading edge of the 

cloud about three miles north of SGZ with a reading of 0.06 mR/h. 

Vegas 8 returned to the five-mile sampling path and did not encounter the cloud, which indicated that the cloud was moving very 

slowly. The cloud had not reached the sampling path by 1030, but 

at 1031 hours it was located about four miles north of SGZ. A 

pass at 1031 hours indicated a peak reading of 0.2 mR/h at 6,000 

feet MSL four miles north of SGZ. Subsequent passes indicated a 

very slow cloud movement onto the Nellis Bombing and Gunnery 

Range. The cloud appeared to be circular with a diameter of l-1/2 

miles. The cloud entered bombing and gunnery range airspace at 

1036 hours, and the first mission was terminated at 1040 hours. 

Vegas 8 reentered the area at 1835 hours to monitor and sample radioctive effluent leaking from SGZ. Several horizontal 

passes were made normal to the hot line five miles from SGZ. The 

readings obtained are shown in Table 6.4. The effluent was leaking continuously, resulting in a plume about 2,000 feet thick 

vertically and l-1/4 miles wide at five miles. Surveillance during the first mission showed an initial short-term release primarily consisting of noble gas activity. The peak exposure rate in 

the cloud at 1037 hours was 0.2 mR/h four miles north of SGZ. 

The second mission indicated a continuing release of noble gas 

activity. Samples taken from 1847 to 1904 hours found xenon-135 

in an average concentration of 8.2 x lo3 pCi/m3 (250 curies total 

137 
Table 6.3. DIANA MOON event - U-3A monitoring results, 

27 August 1968. 

Altitude Gamma 

Time 

(Hours) 

(Feet)

(MSL)* 

Distance from 

SGZ (miles) 

Exposure Rate 

(mR/h) 

0933 3700 0 0.2 

0937 3700 0 80.0 

0939 3600 0 160.0 

0941 3900 l/4 N 1.0 

0943 3500 l/2 N 20.0 

0945 4000 l/4 N 40.0 

0950 4400 1N 6.0 

0954 3500 0 1.7 

1000 3500 1N 0.8 

1009 4700 1N 1.0 

*Elevation of SGZ was 3,400 feet MSL. 

138 
Table 6.4. DIANA NOON event - Vegas 8 - aerial monitoring 

results, 27 August 1968. 

Altitude Gamma 

Time 

(Hours) 

(Feet) 

(MSL)* 

Distance from 

SGZ (miles) 

Exposure Rate 

(mR/h) 

First Mission 

1010 6000 3 0.06 

1031 6000 4 0.02 

Second Mission 

1843 4500 0.30 

1847 4500 0.70 

1856 4500 0.20 

1904 4500 0.40 

*Elevation at SGZ was 3,400 feet. 

139 
release based on a 15 mph wind speed). Radioactive effluent from 

the event was not detected offsite by ground monitoring. 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.4.1 Experiment Recovery Operations 

Experiment recovery from the bell jar and sled began on D+l 

and continued until 4 September 1968. A preconstructed assembly 

building was placed (using a crane) over the bell jar and sled. 

Access to the building was controlled by Radsafe and WSI. Major 

experiments were then recovered by LMSC and REECo personnel. 

After all experiments were removed, the sled, bell jar, and instrument spool were decontaminated and placed in storage at the 

LASL construction yard for possible use on future events. 

6.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling on PS-1A began at 1235 hours on 24 September 1968 and was completed at 1115 hours on 25 September. A 

core sampling operation was conducted between 0755 and 1050 hours 

on 25 September. Fifteen core samples were extracted with a maximum reading of 450 mR/h in contact with a single sample. 

A sidetrack hole, PS-lAS, was begun at 1230 hours on 25 September and completed at 1825 hours the same day. Core sampling 

was conducted from 1515 to 1715 hours. Twenty-eight core samples 

were extracted with a maximum contact reading of 240 mR/h for a 

single sample. 

An additional postevent drilling operation (to examine the 

LOS pipe) was performed from 27 September to 4 October 1968. 

Photographs of the LOS pipe and containment system were taken 

while drilling through various closures. A minor release of ra140 
dioactivity occurred during a cellar survey; however, the location had been previously designated as a radex area and personnel 

were dressed in anticontamination clothing. The release consisted of small amounts of xenon-133 and xenon-135. 

6.4.3 Industrial Safety 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Materiel Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures. 

4. DIANA MOON Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD Safety Coordinator. 

The area enclosed by the Ulle fence was designated a hard 

hat area. Hard hats were required to be worn and foot protection 

in the form of safety boots, safety shoes, or toe guards was 

strongly recommended. 

A written standard operating procedure was required for each 

operation involving explosives, toxic material, radioactive material, or any other operation of a hazardous nature. Each individual involved in the project was required to be knowledgeable 

of the contents of the procedure. 

Checks were made during each shift for toxic gases and ex141 
plosive mixtures. These measurements were recorded in the monitors' log book. Maximum readings of 70,000 ppm CO2, 10,000 ppm 

CO, and 100 percent LEL of explosive mixtures were measured during experiment recovery activities on 29 August 1968. 

Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for drilling, were established by REECo and were emphasized during all operations. 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at 0931 hours on 27 August and continued until 2300 hours on 25 September 1968. The maximum radiation reading was 80 R/h at 0931 hours at the unit located on the 

bell jar. This reading was attributed to activation products. 

Initial radiation surveys were conducted between 0947 hours 

and 1100 hours on D-day. The maximum reading was 15 R/h at the 

east edge of the pit over the downhole cables at 1048 hours. 

Postevent drilling began at 1235 hours on 24 September and 

was completed on 4 October 1968. Two postevent core sampling operations and one photographic mission to examine the LOS pipe and 

containment system were conducted. A total of 43 core samples 

were extracted with a maximum radiation intensity of 450 mR/h in 

contact with a single core sample. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DIANA MOON radex areas from 27 August 1968 to 4 October 1968 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

142 
No. of Entries 

Maximum 

Exposure 

Average 

Exposure 

Logged (ml?) (mR) 

All Participants 990 600 7 

DOD Participants 68 210 15 

143 
144 
CHAPTER 7 

HUDSON SEAL EVENT 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

HUDSON SEAL was a DOD underground test conducted in tunnel 

U12n.04 at 1005 hours PDT on 24 September 1968 with a yield less 

than 20 kt (Figure 7.1). Device emplacement was at a vertical 

depth of 1,130 feet. The objectives of the event were to test 

materials and equipment in a nuclear detonation environment and 

to provide a basis for comparison of several environment-measuring techniques. Government agencies and contractors conducted 21 

projects to obtain desired weapons effects information. Containment of the HUDSON SEAL event was complete. No radioactive effluent was detected onsite or offsite from this event. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all HUDSON SEAL project activities in Area 12. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with 

established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate 

action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations 

Office. LRL was responsible for fielding the device. Sandia 

Corporation was responsible for reentry and recovery safety. The 

DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, 

145 
ZERO POINT 

4650’ 

U12n.04 

HUDSON SEAL 

OVERBURDEN 

v=ia70’ 

S-950’ 

PLUG 

U12n 

PORTAL 

0 

L 

SCALE: 1 INCH 

500 

= 500 FEET 

1000 I 

(APPROX.) 

Figure 7.1 HUDSON SEAL Went - tunnel layout. 
and installing, or delivering their experiments to the installation contractor, and for removal of experiments from the NTS 

postevent. 

The LRL Test Group Director was responsible to the Test Manager for the area within a 6,000-foot radius of SGZ. This responsibility was in effect from the time the device was moved to 

the emplacement site until device detonation. At that time, the 

Test Manager relieved the LRL Test Group Director of responsibility and delegated responsibility to the DOD Test Group Director. 

The DOD Test Group Director and Test Group Staff were assigned from Test Command, DASA. The Technical Director for the 

scientific program was from the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, 

Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and was designated by the 

Director, DASA. The Safety Director was assigned to the Test 

Group Staff from LRL. 

When in the field at NTS, the DOD Test Group Director reported directly to the Military Deputy Test Manager and was additionally responsible to the AEC Test Manager for all matters affecting the Test Manager's NTS management functions. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A. Radioloqical Safety Support 

A "HUDSON SEAL Operations Plan" was issued in August 

1968 to provide information required for planning and 

conducting the test event. This plan covered project 

organization and personnel, dry runs, area control, reentry operations, effluent documentation, safety, air 

operations, reports, and security. Preevent preparation 

and postevent procedures used to produce safe and economical reentry within the desired time frame were de147 
scribed in a "HUDSON SEAL Reentry Plan." Stemming designs incorporated necessary provisions to maximize reentry safety. 

Detailed reentry plans were submitted to participating 

agencies prior to the test event. Test area maps showing appropriate reference points were prepared. Reentry 

routes into the test area were established during dry 

runs. Radiation monitors were briefed regarding surface 

reentry sample recovery, manned stations, and security 

station requirements. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial 

surveys, and tunnel reentry parties. Radsafe personnel 

were stationed at the DOD Test Group Director's FCP to 

- perform initial and subsequent ground surveys, as 

required; 

- provide emergency rescue and support as directed; 

- provide and issue anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimetric devices; 

- perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination; and 

- operate a sample return station. 

Coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, 

supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape were available for anticontamination purposes. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Twenty-eight remote telemetry stations were in operation; 18 on the surface and 10 inside the tunnel (Table 

7.1). 

148 
Table 7.1. HUDSON SEAL event RAMS unit locations. 

Station Location 

ABOVEGROUND 

67 feet from portal at 45' azimuth (vent line) 

i 67 feet from portal at 45O azimuth (vent line) 

6 400 feet from portal at 16O azimuth 

7 275 feet from portal at 89" azimuth 

8 363 feet from portal at 164' azimuth 

10 558 feet from portal at 228" azimuth 

11 416 feet from portal at 291' azimuth 

12 648 feet from portal at 333" azimuth 

17 3,086 feet from portal at 282O azimuth 

18 3,110 feet from portal at 289" azimuth 

19 3,350 feet from portal at 282' azimuth 

20 drill hole building at 288" azimuth 

21 3,130 feet from portal at 289" azimuth 

22 3,300 feet from portal at 291" azimuth 

23 3,490 feet from portal at 288" azimuth 

24 500 feet from SGZ AT 120" azimuth 

26 500 feet from SGZ at 240° azimuth 

27 500 feet from SGZ at 0" azimuth 

UNDERGROUND 

32 275 feet (04 drift) 

36 2,960 feet (main drift) 

36a 2,870 feet (main drift) 

37 21740 feet (main drift 

37a 2,780 feet (main drift .; 

40 1,701 feet (main drift 

40a 1,616 feet (main drift ,; 

41 1,475 feet (main drift ,I 

42 700 feet (main drift) 

43 50 feet (main drift) 

149 
Air sampling units were positioned at four surface 

locations: 

2 - Portal 

2 - Near downhole cable house on Rainier Mesa 

C. Security Coverage 

Two muster stations were established. Muster station No. 

1 was located at Rainier check point just west of Area 

. 12 Camp, and No. 2 was located on Stockade Wash Road 

just east of Pahute Mesa Road. Security air sweeps were 

performed in a U-6A aircraft. Security procedures were 

in accordance with AEC Manual Chapter 0560, "Program to 

Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive 

Detonations." 

D. Air Support 

One UH-1F helicopter was used by LMAFS personnel for 

closed-circuit television coverage. Additional UH-1F 

aircraft were used by DOD personnel for an aerial photo 

mission and as standby support for the Test Manager. A 

USAF U-3A aircraft was used by USPHS personnel for cloud 

tracking purposes. These aircraft were all staged from 

ISAFAF. Security sweeps were performed using a U-6A 

aircraft also staged from ISAFAF. In addition, the PHS 

had available a Turbo-Beechcraft (Vegas 8) for cloud 

sampling, if needed. The NATS Martin 404 was on standby 

at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. 

7.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

At 1500 hours on D-l, a readiness briefing was conducted at 

CP-1. A detonation time of 0930 hours was requested at this 

briefing. 

150 
A final dry run and button up activities were conducted by 

personnel representing GA, LMSC, LRL, SC, EG&G, AFWL, Kaman 

Nuclear, GE, SAMSO, SRI, and AVCO. 

In accordance with the "Test Manager's Schedule of Events," 

muster and control stations were established at 1800 hours. Once 

these were in place, security personnel conducted the first security sweep between 1825 and 2020 hours. A second security check 

was made from 2200 hours to 2330 hours. After 2400 hours, only 

persons listed on the "Schedule of Events" or specifically authorized by the Test Manager or Test Group Director were allowed 

to remain in the closed area. 

7.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

Final security sweeps of Areas 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 

30 were conducted from 0115 hours to 0500 hours on D-day. At the 

0500 readiness briefing, a zero time of 0900 hours or earlier was 

requested. A scheduled zero time of 0830 hours was subsequently 

established. Permission to arm the device was granted at 0520 

hours. Final countdown began on schedule; however, technical 

problems were encountered which delayed test execution. 

HUDSON SEAL zero time was 1005 hours PDT on 24 September 

1968. 

7.3.1 Telemetry Coverage 

Telemetry measurements were taken from 1006 hours on 24 

September to 1600 hours on 27 September 1968. The maximum gamma 

reading obtained was 800 R/h by RAMS unit No. 32 on 24 September 

at 1006 hours. Only three underground RAMS units (Nos. 32, 36, 

36A) showed readings above background; Nos. 36 and 36A had 

reached background by 2400 hours on 24 September. RAMS unit No. 

151 
32 showed steadily decreasing readings, with a final reading of 

17 mR/h when telemetry was secured on 27 September. No radioactivity above background was detected by surface RAMS units. 

7.3.2 Radiation Surveys 

The initial surface radiation survey began at 1133 hours 

when Radsafe survey teams No. 3 and 4 were released. Both teams 

surveyed from the FCP to Rainier Mesa trailer park. This survey 

was completed at 1220 hours, and no radiation readings above 

background were detected. 

Radsafe survey teams No. 1 and 2 were released at 1248 hours 

to survey the portal area. All radiation readings were background. This survey was completed at 1355 hours after Radsafe 

personnel had placed a barricade inside the portal. 

7.3.3 Surface Experiment Recovery 

DOD personnel were in charge of experiment and data recovery 

activities during reentry to the Rainier Mesa trailer park and a 

subsequent reentry to the portal area trailer park. 

Reentry and experiment recovery teams entered Rainier Mesa 

trailer park at 1145 hours on D-day. They had been released 

shortly after the initial Radsafe survey teams. Film and magnetic tape recovery was performed by participants representing 

AVCO, GA, LASL, LRL, EG&G, AFWL, SRI, GE, Kaman Nuclear, and DOD. 

LMSC personnel recovered oscillograph paper and scope camera 

film. Only background radiation readings were obtained during 

this experiment recovery operation. 

At 1248 hours, teams were released to enter and perform data 

recovery at the portal trailer park. Magnetic tapes and film were 

recovered by personnel from GA, LRL, and EG&G. LMSC representa152 
tives recovered film, video tape, and temperature charts. Again, 

only background radiation readings were obtained. All initial 

surface experiment recovery work was completed by 1335 hours on 

D-day. 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities and Experiment Recovery 

The initial tunnel reentry began at 1030 hours on 25 September (D+l). Team No. 1 went to the gas seal door by means of a 

train, performing radiation and tunnel damage surveys as they 

traveled. The tunnel was in good condition, allowing unobstructed passage to the gas seal door. At 1041 hours, they opened the 

manway door, thus allowing continued access through the tunnel to 

the overburden plug. After the gas seal door was opened and 

chained at 1100 hours, it was apparent that railroad tracks beyond the gas seal door were in place. Since there appeared to be 

no damage to the tracks, reentry to the overburden plug was made 

by train. Some minor spalling was noted between the gas seal 

door and the overburden plug. No toxic gas or explosive mixtures 

were detected and no radiation levels greater than 1 mR/h were 

measured. The overburden plug was reached at 1205 hours and the 

team began removing bolts from the overburden plug door, which 

was opened at 1257 hours. When this was accomplished by 1259 

hours, the team began exiting the tunnel, reaching the portal at 

1310 hours. Team members were checked for contamination, but no 

radioactivity was detected. 

Reentry team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1343 hours and 

traveled by train to the overburden plug. Sandbags and vermiculite had to be removed before the overburden plug could be 

cleared and opened, all of which was completed at 1410 hours. 

Reentry team No. 2 exited the tunnel at 1420 hours. No contamination was detected. 

153 
At 1450 hours, the Damage Assessment Team (DAT) entered the 

tunnel to walk out the 02, 03, and 04 drifts. All DAT members 

wore respiratory protection equipment beyond the overburden plug. 

Only minor damage was found in the 02 and 03 drifts, and the 

drain line through the 03 plug was opened. No explosive mixtures 

or toxic gases were detected. Radiation measurements were less 

than 1 mR/h. The 04 drift was entered at 1529 hours. Minor 

damage was observed and a radiation measurement of 200 mR/h was 

recorded at test chamber No. 1, which was located approximately 

1,100 feet from the zero point. The DAT exited the tunnel at 

1632 hours. At 1700 hours, reentry party No. 4 entered the 

tunnel to repair vent lines. Repairs were completed and the team 

exited the tunnel at 1835 hours. Between 1910 and 2010 hours, 

reentry party No. 5 entered the tunnel and opened test chamber 

doors. Operations were secured for the evening at 2010 hours. 

Experiment recovery was performed by personnel representing 

GE, LRL, NDL, SC, EG&G, DOD, LMSC, LASL, NOL, AVCO, NRL, AFWL, 

MIT, McDonnell-Douglas, and Kaman Nuclear from 26 September 

through 15 October 1968. The maximum radiation reading obtained 

during recovery operations was 250 mR/h inside test chamber No. 1 

at 1230 hours on 28 September 1968. No alpha radiation was detected. The maximum toxic gas concentration detected was 50 ppm 

CO in test chambers No. 1 and 2. Although mineback operations 

continued through November, experiment recovery was essentially 

complete in mid-October. 

7.4.2 Offsite Radiation Surveillance 

The PHS had air samplers operating at 104 routine stations 

at offsite locations. Fifteen PHS personnel were on duty for 

surveillance activities for this event, and aerial monitoring was 

performed by the PHS cloud tracking team in an Air Force U-3A 

aircraft. One PHS Turbo-Beech aircraft was standing by in Las 

Vegas to undertake a cloud sampling mission and supplement cloud 

tracking if needed. 

154 
No radioactivity above normal background levels was detected 

offsite by ground and aerial monitoring teams or by ground-based 

exposure rate recorders either after the detonation or during 

subsequent sample recovery operations. No fresh fission products 

were detected in any environmental sample collected offsite 

throughout this period, and no prefilter air samples contained 

levels of gross beta activity above normal background. 

7.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for drilling, were established by REECo and were emphasized during all operations. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, toxic material and radioactive material were handled, 

stored, and transported in accordance with applicable sections of 

the following documents: 

1. Army Material Command Regulations (AMCR 385-224). 

2. AEC Manual 500 Series for the Nevada Test Site. 

3. Individual Safe Operating Procedures. 

4. DIANA MOON Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection approved by the DOD Safety Coordinator. 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1006 hours on 24 September 

1968 and ended at 1600 hours on 27 September 1968. The maximum 

155 
gamma reading obtained was 800 R/h by RAMS unit No. 32 at 1006 

hours on 24 September 1968. This unit was located behind the 

blast plug at 275 feet in the 04 drift. 

The initial surface radiation survey began at 1133 hours and 

ended at 1220 hours on 24 September. No radiation levels above 

background were detected. 

The initial underground radiation survey began at 1030 hours 

and ended at 1632 hours on 25 September. The maximum gamma exposure rate measured was 200 mR/h at test chamber No. 1. No alpha 

radiation was detected. The maximum toxic gas concentration 

measured was 50 ppm CO in test chambers No. 1 and 2. The maximum 

gamma exposure rate reading during recovery operations was 250 

mR/h inside test chamber No. 1 at 1230 hours on 28 September. 

There were no whole-body external or internal exposures 

which exceeded established guidelines. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

HUDSON SEAL radex areas from 24 September 1968 to 4 December 1968 

are summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading 

pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum 

exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Maximum 

Exposure 

(mR) 

Average

Exposure 

(mR) 

All Participants 791 240 11 

DOD Participants 238 0* 15 

*No positive exposures were detected by film badges. The minimum 

detectable exposure by film badge was 30 mrem. 

156 
CHAPTER 8 

MING VASE EVENT 

8.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

MING VASE, a DOD underground test with a yield less than 

20 kt, was conducted at 1000 hours PST on 20 November 1968 at 

tunnel site U16a.04 in Area 16 of the NTS. The LASL-provided 

device was emplaced at a vertical depth of 1,010 feet (Figure 

8.1). The objective of this test was to evaluate the response of 

material and equipment to a nuclear detonation environment. Government agencies and contractors conducted 18 projects to obtain 

desired weapons effects information. 

Containment of the MING VASE event was complete. No radioactive effluent was detected onsite or offsite from this event. 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director had responsibility for safe conduct of all MING VASE project activities in Area 16. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations Office. Because LASL fielded the test device, the LASL Test 

Group Director was responsible to the Test Manager for the area 

within a 4,500-foot radius of SGZ. This responsibility was in 

effect from the time the device was moved to the emplacement site 

until device detonation. At zero hour the Test Manager relieved 

the LASL Test Group DirectoL- of responsibility and delegated 

157 
158 
responsibility to the DOD Test Group Director. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of 

equipment necessary for its project activities. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "MING VASE Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to assure a safe and economical reentry. In addition, Radsafe personnel were provided with "Detailed Initial Reentry Procedures" for reentry and recovery operations. Stemming design incorporated provisions to maximize reentry safety. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Participating agencies were provided with detailed radiological safety reentry plans prior to the test event. 

Test area maps with appropriate reference points were 

prepared. Reference markers and air sampling equipment 

were positioned in the test area. Reentry routes into 

the test area were established during "dry runs." 

Radiation monitors were briefed regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and security station requirements. All personnel at manned stations were provided with anticontamination clothing and equipment, and 

Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

A mobile issue facility for anticontamination clothing, 

respiratory devices, instruments, and dosimetric devices 

was positioned prior to the event at the security barricade near the FCP. A personnel and vehicle decontamination facility was established adjacent to the mobile issue facility. 

159 
Radsafe monitors were stationed at all WSI security 

roadblocks and work areas within the exclusion area to 

perform surveys and provide other support as directed. 

Monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial 

surface radiation surveys, helicopter surveys, and tunnel reentry parties were provided, Radsafe personnel 

were stationed at the DOD Test Group Director's FCP to 

perform initial and subsequent ground surveys as required and provide emergency rescue and support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment, 

portable instruments, and dosimetric devices; perform 

personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination; and 

operate a sample return station. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Seventeen remote telemetry radiation monitoring stations 

provided coverage for the MING VASE event (Table 8.1). 

Four air samplers were placed in an array at the portal 

and SGZ, and were calibrated and operational at zero 

time. Two units were located 500 feet from SGZ at 25' 

azimuth, one was 381 feet from the portal at 34' azimuth, and one was 50 feet from the portal at 5' azimuth. 

PHS had 105 air samplers operating at offsite locations. 

Twenty personnel were on duty for offsite surveillance 

activities. 

160 
Table 8.1. MING VASE event FUUIS unit locations. 

Station Location 

ABOVEGROUND 

1 Portal 

2 205 feet from portal at 305' azimuth 

3 381 feet from portal at 34' azimuth 

4 430 feet from portal at 78" azimuth 

5 325 feet from portal at 147" azimuth 

6 160 feet from portal at 281' azimuth 

7 270 feet from portal at 311' azimuth 

8 300 feet from portal at 86' azimuth 

11 600 feet from portal at 253' azimuth 

12 2,240 feet from portal at 48" azimuth 

16 500 feet from SGZ at 157" azimuth 

17 500 feet from SGZ at 253' azimuth 

18 500 feet from SGZ at 25" azimuth 

UNDERGROUND 

27 1,964 feet inside 04 drift 

28a 1,780 feet inside 04 drift 

32a 56 feet inside 04 drift 

35 200 feet in from portal in main drift 

161 
c. Security Coverage 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at muster or control stations for 

issuance or return of appropriate badges. All personnel 

were required to have proper security clearances for the 

area. Control of the area was maintained by the use of 

roadblocks, access authorizations, and a "Schedule of 

Events." Parties could enter the controlled area only 

if they were listed on the "Test Manager's Schedule of 

Eventsn or had the permission of the Test Group Director. WSI security guards were responsible for activating roadblocks to direct traffic flow. 

D. Air Support 

Aircraft support for this event was as follows: 

Type Organization Mission 

U-6A Security D-day Safety Sweep 

UH-1F LMAFS Aerial CCTV Coverage 

UH-1F USAF/Test Manager Emergency Standby 

U-3A USAF/USPHS Cloud Tracking 

Turbo-Beech USPHS Cloud Sampling 

Turbo-Beech USPHS Cloud Sampling* 

Martin 404 EG&G/NATS Cloud Tracking* 

Cessna 206 AAS Postevent Survey 

*On Standby at McCarran Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

A readiness briefing was held at 1430 hours on D-l. Experimenters were in the closed area all day performing button up activities. Experimenter organizations represented were AFWL, KN, 

LASL, SC, GE, SRI, BAC, LRL, EG&G and DOD. 

162 
The first security sweep of the closed area was conducted 

before 2400 hours on D-l. 

8.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

After a second security sweep of the closed area was completed at 0500 hours on D-day, the final readiness briefing for 

the Test Manager and Advisory Panel was conducted at 0800 hours. 

At 0805 hours permission to arm the device was granted. WSI personnel then conducted a final security sweep which was completed 

at 0845 hours. The arming party was out of the closed area and 

the area secured by 0900 hours. Manned photo station personnel 

were in their assigned positions at 0945 hours. 

MING VASE zero time was 1000 hours PST on 20 November 1968. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1001 hours on 20 November 

and ended at 1600 hours on 23 November 1968. At 1001 hours, a 

maximum gamma intensity of 325 R/h was measured by underground 

RAMS unit No. 27, which was located 1,964 feet inside the 04 

drift of U16a. 

8.3.1 Surface Reentry Activities and Experiment Recovery 

Initial surface safety and radiological surveys were performed under the direction of the Test Group Director in accordance with the "Radiological Safety Support Plan for MING VASE." 

Initial survey teams were released by the Test Group Director at 

1042 hours and the initial survey was completed at 1105 hours. 

Initial survey results were background. 

All survey data were reported to the net 3 radio control 

operator when measurements were made. Plotting facilities were 

maintained at the FCP and CP-1. Radsafe control was located in 

163 
the operations trailer at FCP where sufficient personnel were 

standing by to provide rescue and emergency support, and radiological area control as radex areas were established. 

Experiment recovery on the surface began at 1112 hours on Dday. Those organizations recovering data from trailers at the 

portal area were SC, LASL, EG&G, SRI, LRL, AVCO, BAC, LMSC, AFWL, 

KN, and GE. Film, tape, and instrument recovery was accomplished 

without encountering detectable radiation. Surface experiment 

recovery operations were completed on 3 December 1968. 

8.3.2 Initial Tunnel Reentry 

Tunnel ventilation was established at 1325 hours on 20 

November. By 1450 hours, the muster station and the Radsafe Base 

Station had been moved to the portal area. 

Since there appeared to be no radiological or industrial hygiene hazards, it was decided that the tunnel reentry team members would not wear Scott-Draeger breathing equipment when they 

attempted to open the gas seal door, but would carry MSA all-purpose masks. Initial reentry began at 1530 hours. The reentry 

team arrived at the gas seal door at 1534 hours, having found the 

tunnel to be in good condition. The gas seal door was opened at 

1610 hours. A maximum radiation reading of 4 mR/h was obtained 

just inside the manway door. This was residual radioactivity 

from a previous event. No explosive mixtures or toxic gases were 

detected. 

At 1625 hours, the initial tunnel reentry team began its 

exit. No further tunnel reentry activities were conducted on 20 

November 1968. 

164 
8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

Tunnel reentry activities began again at 0910 hours on 21 

November when reentry team No. 1 entered the tunnel complex to 

open the overburden plug door. By 1015 hours the overburden plug 

was opened; the radiation reading measured at this location was 4 

mR/h beta plus gamma, and no explosive mixtures or toxic gases 

were detected. Upon reaching test chamber No. 1 at 1030 hours, 

readings were again recorded. A reading of 250 mR/h was obtained 

in contact with the door at test chamber No. 1. The manhole 

located twenty feet from the zero point side of test chamber No. 

1 read 60 mR/h with 10,000 ppm CO and 90 percent of the LEL for 

explosive mixtures detected. The test chamber No. 1 door was 

opened at 1050 hours. Greater than 10,000 ppm CO and 100 percent 

of the LEL for explosive mixtures were measured. Team No. 1 returned to the portal area at 1100 hours. 

Reentry team No. 2 entered the tunnel at 1245 hours and reestablished ventilation to the test chambers. The maximum exposure rate reading obtained at this time was 150 mR/h outside test 

chamber No. 1. Team No. 2 exited the tunnel at 1335 hours. 

At 1504 hours on 21 November, a third reentry team and an 

LRL experiment recovery party reentered the tunnel beyond the 

overburden plug. A radiation reading of 200 mR/h was obtained 

outside the door of test chamber No. 1, and 100 ppm CO was measured. The LRL recovery party completed recoveries and reassembled 

at the overburden plug with reentry team No. 3. All personnel 

exited the tunnel at 1600 hours, and operations were secured for 

the day. 

The LOS pipe was walked tiut on 22 November. A maximum reading of 4 mR/h at TAPS No. 1 ~3s obtained. 

165 
After all tunnel surveys were completed and the ventilation 

system was operational, personnel from experimenter organizations, accompanied by Radsafe monitors, were allowed to enter the 

tunnel and perform experiment recovery operations. Those personnel performing recovery tasks were from SC, SRI, GE, GA, SWC, 

LRL, LMSC and DOD. Experiment recoveries proceeded as planned 

with no radiation problems encountered. Recovery operations went 

smoothly; experiments were recovered from the tunnel and LOS 

pipe, and the operation was terminated on 17 January 1969. 

8.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Drilling on PS-1V began at 1255 hours on 9 December 1968. 

After encountering several problems with drilling equipment, sufficient depth was reached to begin the core sampling operation at 

1320 hours on 10 December. This operation was completed at 1800 

hours. The maximum gamma exposure rate measured during drillback 

operations was 0.2 mR/h at 2330 hours. Thirty-three core samples 

were taken with a maximum reading for a single sample of 5 R/h at 

contact. Directional surveys and gamma logging were performed 

during the operation. Eight RAMS units were in operation during 

drillback. They were located at 45O intervals beginning at 22.5' 

on a 900-foot-radius circle around the drill hole. No toxic 

gases were detected. 

Postevent drilling was completed and the ball valve closed 

at 2335 hours on 10 December 1968. No abandonment valve or blind 

flange was installed. This allowed for possible future use of 

the drill hole as a vent line for mining operations. 

8.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Sand stemming and plugs with blast doors had been emplaced 

in the tunnel. The plugs provided containment, reduced radioactivity in the reentry area, and minimized reentry problems. 

166 
Blast doors contained any debris that might pass the stemming. 

Radiation sensing instruments provided remote detection of tunnel 

radiation levels while tunnel condition indicators remotely monitored the condition of the tunnel. 

Reentry was not made beyond ventilation, 1,000 ppm CO, or 10 

percent LEL of explosive gas mixtures. 

Checks were made on each shift for radiation levels, toxic 

gases, and explosive mixtures. These measurements were then recorded in the monitors' log book. Maximum industrial hygiene 

readings for the MING VASE event were: 

1. 100 percent of the LEL inside of test chamber No. 1 on 

21 November 1968; 

2. 20,000 ppm CO behind the TAPS door on 9 December 1968; 

3. 7,000 ppm CO2 behind the TAPS door on 9 December 1968; 

and 

4. 1 ppm NO+N02 at Sample Protection Station (SPS) No. 1 on 

3 January 1969. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling, were established by REECo and were emphasized during all 

operations. 

All explosives and all electro-explosive components, toxic 

materials or radioactive materials were handled, stored, and 

transported in accordance with the applicable section of the Army 

Material Command Regulations (AMCR-385-2241, NTS-SOPS, and all 

revisions thereto. 

167 
The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection (safety shoes, safety boots, miners boots or 

toe guards) areas. Each participating agency provided its own 

safety equipment. 

Eye protection, safety glasses or cover-all goggle type, was 

worn whenever explosives of any configuration were being handled. 

Conductive booties were worn over shoes at all times in the Explosive Assembly Building. Conductive safety shoes could be worn 

in lieu of the conductive booties provided they had not been worn 

on gravel or dirt surfaces. 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1001 hours on 20 November 

1968 and ended at 1600 hours on 23 November 1968. The maximum 

gamma exposure rate measured was 325 R/h at 1001 hours on 20 November 1968 by the unit located 1,964 feet inside the 04 drift of 

U16a. 

Initial reentry radiation survey teams entered the controlled area at 1042 hours and performed a survey. This survey 

operation was completed at 1105 hours on 20 November 1968. Only 

background gamma exposure rates were measured. No alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent drilling began at 1255 hours on 9 December 1968 

and was completed at 2335 hours on 10 December. The maximum 

gamma exposure rate measured during drillback operations was 0.2 

mR/h following completion of coring operations at 2330 hours on 

10 December. The maximum intensity at contact with a single core 

sample was 5 R/h. No alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent operations were completed on 17 January 1969. 

168 
Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

MING VASE radex areas from 20 November 1968 to 17 December 1968 

are summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading 

pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum 

exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Maximum 

Exposure 

(mR) 

Average

Exposure 

(mR) 

All Participants 675 85 3 

DOD Participants 170 85 4 

169 
170 
REFERENCE LIST 

References are not indicated within the text of this report, 

but are included in this list by chapter or part. Most references are available for review at or through the DOE/NV Coordination and Information Center (CIC). Security-classified references are located at the DNA/HQ Technical Library in Alexandria, 

Virginia, but are available only to persons with appropriate security clearances and a need for classified information contained 

in the references. 

The CIC is operated by REECo, the custodian of nuclear testing dosimetry and other radiological safety records for DOE/NV, 

and the custodian for DNA of reference documents for reports on 

DOD participation in atmospheric, oceanic, and underground nuclear weapons testing events and series. Arrangements may be 

made to review available references for this report at the CIC by 

contacting one of the following: 

Health Physics Division 

U.S. Department of Energy

Nevada Operations Office 

2753 South Highland Avenue 

Post Office Box 14100 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 295-0994

FTS: 575-0994 

or 

Manager, Coordination and Information Center 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. 

Post Office Box 14400 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 295-0748

FTS: 575-0748 

171 
Major source documents also are available through the 

National Technical Information Service (NTIS) and may be purchased from NTIS at the address and telephone number listed below: 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road 

Springfield, VA 22161 

Commercial: (703) 487-4650 

(Sales Office) 

References available through public bookstores and libraries, through the U.S. Government Printing Office, and only at the 

CIC are listed without asterisks. Asterisks after references or 

groups of references indicate availability as follows: 

* Available through the NTIS and also located at the CIC. 

** Located in the REECo Technical Information Office adjacent to the CIC, available through the CIC, and may be 

subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

*** Located in the DNA/HQ Technical Library, and subject to 

security clearance requirements. 

PREFACE 

1. Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Operations Office, "Announced United States Nuclear Tests," 

NVO-209 (Rev. 41, January 1984* 

2. Devine, Robert A., Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test 

Ban Debate, Oxford University Press, NY, 1978 

3. Harris, P.S., et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

PLUMBBOB, DNA 6005F, 15 September 1981" 

172 
4. U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Veterans' 

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing," U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1979 

Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION 

DOE/NV, "Announced Nuclear Tests," (n. 1). 

Devine, “Nuclear Test Ban Debate," (n. 2). 

5. Weapons Effects Test Group, Field Command, Defense Atomic 

Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," January 

1962 

6. Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support Agency, 

"Orientation, Nevada Test Site," revised 15 August 1964 

7. Ponton, Jean, et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

DOMINIC II, DNA 6027F, 31 January 1983* 

Chapter 2, UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

8. Liverman, James L., Energy Research & Development Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Nevada Test 

Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA - 1551, September 1977* 

9. Butkovich, Theodore R., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Effects of Water Saturation on Underground Nuclear Detonations, UCRL-51110, 9 September 1971* 

Committee on Veterans Affairs, "Claims for Disabilities," 

(n. 41, on venting. 

173 
10. Radiological Sciences Department, Reynolds Electrical & 

Engineering Co., Inc., "Standard Operating Procedures," 

January 1961-1968 

EVENT SUMMARIES AND EACH EVENT CHAPTER 

11. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, NV00 

Completion Report, Operation Crosstie, 1 July 1967 through 

30 June 1968, NVO-42, June 1969, Unpublished. 

12. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, NV00 

Completion Report, Operation Bowline, 1 July 1968 through 30 

June 1969, NVO-66, January 1970, Unpublished. 

13. REECo Environmental Sciences Department field record archives are maintained chronologically and by test event and include the following: 

a. Procedures, Reentry Plans, Radsafe Plans, and Schedules of Events. ** 

b. Correspondence. ** 

c. Reports, including onsite Radsafe and offsite PHS 

event reports. ** 

d. Exposure reports, Radsafe log books, Area Access 

Registers, radiation survey forms, telemetry forms, 

and other sampling and dosimetry forms. ** 

174 
Activation Products 

Advisory Panel 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

Air Support 

APPENDIX A 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Nuclides made radioactive by neutrons 

from a nuclear detonation interacting 

with usually nonradioactive nuclides. 

Also called induced activity. 

A group of experts formed to advise the 

user (see Testing Organizations) Test 

Director concerning operational factors 

affecting a test detonation. 

The Air Force Special Weapons Center, 

located at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. AFSWC provided 

air support to the AEC Test Manager for 

NTS testing activities. 

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was activated on 1 January 1947, 

when the AEC was activated, to assume 

residual functions of the U.S. Army 

Manhattan Engineer District (see DASA). 

Aircraft, facilities, and personnel required for various support functions 

during testing, such as cloud sampling, 

cloud tracking, radiation monitoring, 

photography, and personnel and equipment transport. 

175 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Alpha Particle A particle emitted spontaneously from 

the nucleus of the radionuclide, primarily heavy radionuclides. The particle is identical with the nucleus of 

a helium atom, having an atomic mass of 

four units and an electric charge of 

two positive units. 

Anticontamination 

Clothing Outer clothing worn to prevent contamination of personal clothing and the 

body, and the spread of contamination 

to uncontrolled areas. 

Atmospheric Test 

Series Each of several series of U.S. tests 

conducted from 1945 through 1962, when 

nuclear device detonations and experiments were conducted primarily in the 

atmosphere. 

Attenuation The process by which photons or particles from radioactive material are 

reduced in number or energy on passing 

through some medium. 

Background Radiation 1) Natural environmental radiation. 

2) The radiations of man's natural environment, consisting of cosmic 

rays and those radiations which 

come from the naturally radioactive 

atoms of the earth, including those 

within man's body. 

176 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Ball Valve 

Bell Jar 

Beta Particle 

BJY 

Blast Door 

3) The term also may mean radiation 

extraneous to an experiment. 

Rotating spool valve designed to close 

off and provide a gas seal in an LOS 

pipe in less than one second. Can be 

pneumatic, hydraulic, or spring driven. 

Test chamber used on vertical LOS system events. 

A negatively charged particle of very 

small mass emitted from the nucleus of 

a radionuclide, particularly from the 

fission product radionuclides from nuclear detonations. Except for origin, 

the beta particle is identical with a 

high speed electron. Also may be a 

positively charged particle of the same 

very small mass called a positron. 

The intersection of Mercury Highway 

with roads originally constructed for 

the BUSTER-JANGLE 1953 atmospheric test 

series, located at the NW corner of 

Area 3 on the NTS. Previously called 

the "Y." 

May be in blast plug, but originally 

was in its own keyed plug toward the 

portal from the blast plug. Evolved 

into an overburden plug with a large 

steel door containing a smaller access 

hatch and designed to withstand up to 

1000 psi overpressure. May be welded or 

177 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Blast Plug 

Button up Activities 

Cable Drift 

bolted closed during detonation. Sometimes a loosely used substitute term 

for a gas seal door. 

Barrier constructed underground as a 

primary containment feature. May be 

constructed with sandbags (see Sandbag 

Plugs), solid sand backfill, concrete 

(see Keyed Concrete Plug), or other 

materials. Some plugs may have openings through them that are sealed with 

blast doors, and sometimes sandbags are 

added to protect the opening temporarily during detonation. 

A procedure which consists primarily of 

completing the stemming, accomplishing 

the electrical checklist of tunnel portal and trailer park facilities, closing the OBP, gas seal plug, and gas 

seal door inside the tunnel, clearing 

the controlled area, and preparing command post and monitoring stations for 

the actual nuclear detonation. 

A passageway tunnel, usually parallel 

to the LOS drift, also known as the access or reentry drift, in which cables 

from various experiments in the LOS 

pipe were installed toward a cable alcove and then through a sealed shaft to 

the surface. 

Cal-Seal A commercial sealant that is high density, quick-drying, high strength, and 

resilient concrete. 

178 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Cassette 

Cellar 

Chamber 

Check Points or 

Check Stations 

Chimney 

Cloud Sampling 

Cloud Tracking 

A holder or container for a sample, an 

experiment, or a group of experiments. 

The larger diameter, first part of a 

drilled hole where valving and other 

equipment are located. 

A natural or man-made enclosed space or 

cavity. 

Geographic locations established and 

staffed to control entry into restricted areas. 

The volume of broken rock above an underground detonatjon cavity that falls 

downward when decreasing cavity gas 

pressure can no longer support the column of broken rock. 

The process of collecting particulate 

and gaseous samples of an effluent 

cloud to determine the amount of airborne radioactivity, and/or for subsequent analysis of detonation characteristics. Sampling usually was accomplished by specially equipped aircraft. 

The process of monitoring and determining the drift and movement of an 

effluent cloud, either by radar or by 

radiation monitoring and visual sighting from aircraft. 

179 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Coaxial Cable A single conductor cable with outer 

shield used for fast or high frequency 

signals (as oscilloscopes, etc.). 

Collar See "Shaft Collar" 

Console A cabinet or panel containing instrumentation for monitoring or controlling 

electronic or mechanical devices. 

Containment The act of preventing any release of 

radioactive material into the environment. Used in reference to the stemming 

plug area, or at the TAPS, OBP, or gas 

seal plug. An event is said to have 

"contained" if no radioactive material 

is released beyond the stemmed portion 

of the tunnel. 

Contamination 1) Radioactive material in an undesirable location, usually fission and 

activation products of a nuclear 

detonation, or fissionable material 

from a device, incorporated with 

particles of dust or device debris. 

2) The process of depositing radioactive material on, or spreading it 

to, an undesirable location, such 

as personnel, structures, equipment, and other surfaces outside a 

controlled area. 

Crater The depression formed on the earth's 

surface by a near-surface, surface, or 

180 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

underground detonation. Crater formation can occur by the scouring effect 

of airblast, by throw-out of broken 

surface material, or by surface subsidence resulting from underground cavity 

formation and subsequent rock fall, or 

chimneying to the surface. 

Crater Experiment A test-designed to breach and excavate 

the ground surface, thereby forming an 

ejecta crater; as opposed to a sink or 

subsidence crater. 

DASA After 

Atomic 

1959, AFSWP became the Defense 

Support Agency. See AFSWP. 

D-Day The term used to designate 

which a test takes place. 

the day on 

D+l The first day after a test event. 

Decontamination The reduction of amount or removal of 

contaminating radioactive material from 

a structure, area, object, or person. 

Decontamination may be accomplished by 

(1) treating the surface to remove or 

decrease the contamination; (2) letting 

the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of 

natural decay; or (3) fixing and covering the contamination to attenuate the 

radiation emitted. 

Device Nuc'ear fission or 

matr>rials together 

fission and fusion 

with the arming, 

181 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

DOD 

Dose 

Dose Rate 

Dosimeter 

dpm 

fusing, firing, high explosive, canister, and diagnostic measurement equipment, that have not reached the development status of an operational weapon. 

The U.S. Department of Defense. The 

federal executive agency responsible 

for the defense of the United States. 

Includes the military services and special joint defense agencies. 

A quantity (measured or accumulated) of 

ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy 

absorbed by a medium, including a person. 

As a general rule, the amount of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy that 

an individual or material would absorb 

per unit of time. Dose rate is usually 

expressed as rads (or rems) per hour or 

multiples or divisions of these units. 

An instrument or device used to indicate the total accumulated dose of (or 

exposure to) ionizing radiation. Instruments or devices worn or carried by 

individuals are called personnel dosimeters. 

Disintegrations per minute; a measure 

of radioactivity. Literally, atoms disintegrating per minute. 

182 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Draeger Multi-Gas 

Detector An instrument used to detect toxic gases, such that a sample of the ambient 

atmosphere is drawn through a selected 

chemical reagent tube which indicates 

the concentration of a toxic gas. 

Dressed-Out Dressed in anticontamination clothing 

and associated equipment. 

Drift A horizontal passageway excavated underground with one access opening. It 

is used interchangeably with tunnel at 

the NTS. 

Drillhole Designations PS-1v: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 -

vertical 

PS-1D: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 -

directional 

PS-1A: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 -

angle 

Each 'S' added after any of the above 

notations indicates a "sidetrack" or 

change of direction in the drillhole. 

Dry Run A simulation of the functions occurring 

in the minutes before, during, and 

after the event. All timing and firing 

signals are sent in the proper sequence 

from the Control Room at CP-1. Each run 

begins with the first required timing 

and firing signal (normally minus 15 

183 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

minutes) and ends with the firing signal. The audio countdown is transmitted 

over Net 1 (DNA) and on other nets as 

agreed upon with appropriate agencies. 

There are various types of dry runs depending on the degree of participation 

required of the agencies involved. 

Effects Experiments Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

Explosimeter A battery-operated detector calibrated 

to indicate the concentration in the 

ambient atmosphere of explosive gases 

and vapors as percent of the lower 

explosive limit (LEL) of methane gas. 

Explosive-Proof 

Flashlight A flashlight constructed in such a manner that its use will not cause or create an explosion in an explosive gas 

atmosphere. 

Exposure A measure expressed in roentgens (R) of 

the ionization produced by gamma rays 

(or x-rays) in air [or divisions of R; 

l/1000 R = 1 milliroentgen (mR)]. The 

exposure rate is the exposure per unit 

184 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

of time, usually per hour but sometimes 

smaller or larger units (e.g., R/min, 

mR/h, R/day). 

Film Badge 

Fission 

Fission Products 

Used for the indirect measurement of 

exposure to ionizing radiation. Generally contains 2 or 3 films of differing sensitivity. Films are wrapped 

in paper (or other thin material) that 

blocks light but is readily penetrated 

by radiations or secondary charged particles resulting from radiations to be 

measured. The films are developed and 

the degree of darkening (or density) 

measured indicates the radiation exposure. Film dosimeters commonly are used 

to indicate gamma and x-ray exposures, 

and also can be designed to determine 

beta and neutron doses. 

The process whereby the nucleus of a 

particular heavy element splits into 

(generally) two nuclei of lighter elements, with an accompanying release of 

energy. The most important fissionable, or fissile, materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission is 

caused by the absorption of a neutron. 

A general term used for the complex 

mixture of radioactive nuclides (see 

185 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Fissionable Material 

Forward Control Point 

Fusion 

Gamma Log 

Gamma Rays 

Radionuclides) produced as a result of 

nuclear fission. 

A synonym for fissile material, also 

extended to include material that can 

be fissioned by fast neutrons only, 

such as uranium-238. Used in reactor 

operations to mean reactor fuel. 

A geographic location in the forward 

test area, usually adjacent to the 

closed (or secured) test area. 

The combination of two very light nuclei (of atoms) to form a relatively 

heavier nucleus, with an accompanying 

release of energy. Also called thermonuclear fusion. 

Instrument used to measure natural 

radiation levels in a preemplacement 

hole, and after an event to measure 

radiation in the cavity. 

Electromagnetic radiations of high energy emitted from the nuclei of radionuclides, or bundles of energy called 

photons, which usually accompany other 

nuclear reactions, such as fission, 

neutron capture, and beta particle 

emission. Gamma rays, or photons, are 

identical with x-rays of the same energy, except that x-rays result from 

orbital electron reactions and are not 

produced in the nucleus. 

186 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Gamma Shine Measurable gamma radiation intensity 

from an approaching radioactive cloud 

or passing cloud, as opposed to measurements from or in gamma emitting 

fallout. Also gamma radiation scattered by air molecules, as opposed to 

direct radiation from a gamma source. 

Gas Seal Door A steel door on the portal side of the 

gas seal plug. It is closed during 

buttonup with about a 10 psi gas pressure applied between the gas seal plug 

and the gas seal door as additional 

reassurance against low pressure leaks. 

Gas Seal Plug A containment feature within the tunnel 

complex; generally designed for 500' F 

and 500 psi. Sometimes called hasty 

plug. Similar to a lower level overburden plug, but is close to the portal 

and seals the entire tunnel complex. 

Geiger-Mueller Counter An instrument consisting of a Geiger 

tube and associated electronic equipment used to detect and measure (and 

sometimes record) nuclear radiation. 

Geophones Electronic instruments which detect and 

record rock falls and earth movements 

by the use of sound. 

Ground Zero The point in a test bed configuration 

where the device is located. 

187 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

H-Hour Time zero or exact time of detonation 

to the minute, second, or fraction of a 

second; as opposed to H + 1 which implies one hour after detonation, unless 

time units of seconds or minutes are 

listed. 

Horizontal Line of Sight General term used to refer to a family 

of events conducted in a horizontal 

tunnel. Sometimes used to refer to the 

pipe and vacuum system for such events. 

Hot Line A location on the edge of a radex area 

where exiting personnel remove anticontamination clothing and equipment and 

are monitored for contamination and decontaminated as necessary before release. Also used to denote the centerline of a fallout pattern. 

Instrument Spool Instrument package placed beneath bell 

jar on a vertical LOS pipe system. Instrument package was placed within a 

pipe which looked like a spool. 

Ion An atomic particle or part of a molecule bearing an electric charge, usually a positively charged ion and a negatively charged ion are formed as a pair 

(e.g., A negatively charged electron 

displaced from its positively charged 

remaining atom). 

Ionizing Radiation Any particulate or electromagnetic radiation capable of producing ions, di188 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Isotopes 

Keyed Concrete Plug 

Leukemia Cluster 

LOS Pipe 

rectly or indirectly, in its passage 

through air or matter. Alpha and beta 

particles produce all ion pairs directly, while the electrons of initial ion 

pairs produced by gamma rays and x-rays 

in turn produce secondary ionization in 

their paths. 

Different types of atoms within the 

same element, all reacting approximately the same chemically, but differing 

in atomic weight and nuclear stability. 

For example, the element hydrogen has 

three isotopes; normal hydrogen is the 

most abundant, heavy hydrogen is called 

deuterium, and radioactive hydrogen is 

the radioisotope called tritium. 

A concrete plug of greater diameter 

than the shaft or tunnel cross section, 

such that the concrete is poured into 

the surrounding rock, providing greater 

strength against overpressure from the 

nuclear detonation. 

An apparent but unexpected or extraordinary group of leukemia cases within 

some number or group of persons. 

An evacuated pipe that extends from the 

device to the test chambers. The part 

of the vacuum system may be either horizontal or vertical, and it may connect 

containment experiment protection and 

experiment hardware. 

189 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Manhattan Engineer 

District 

Manned Stations 

mR 

Mucking 

Noble Gases 

Nuclear Device 

(vs. weapon or bomb) 

The U.S. Army predecessor organization 

to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 

Locations inside the closed and secured 

area which are occupied by authorized 

personnel during an event. 

A radiation exposure term (see Exposure). 

Removal of loose rock from drilling and 

mining operations. 

Those inert gases which do not react 

with other elements at normal temperature and pressure (i.e., helium, neon, 

argon, krypton, xenon and sometimes 

radon). 

A device in which most of the energy 

released in a detonation results from 

reactions of atomic nuclei, either fission, or fission and fusion. A device 

under development (see Device) is not 

considered a weapon or bomb. Both A-

(or atomic) bombs and H- (or hydrogen) 

bombs could be called atomic weapons 

because both involve reactions of atomic nuclei. However, it has become customary to call weapons A-bombs if the 

energy comes from fission, and H-bombs 

if most of the energy comes from fusion 

(of the isotopes of hydrogen - see definition). A developmental nuclear de190 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

vice is not a weapon or weapon component until it can be mated to a delivery system. 

Nuclear Device Tests Tests carried out to supply information 

required for the design, improvement, 

or safety aspects of nuclear weapons, 

and to study the phenomena and effects 

associated with nuclear explosions. 

Nuclear Weapon Tests Tests to provide development and weapons effects information, which may or 

may not utilize a deliverable nuclear 

weapon. 

Overburden Plug A containment feature within the tunnel 

complex. It is a high-strength concrete blockage of the tunnel near the 

test area and is generally designed for 

1000° F and 1000 psi. 

Party Monitors Radiation monitors assigned to reentry 

and recovery parties or groups. 

Pipe String Consists of pieces of drill pipe that 

are added as drilling continues. 

Privacy Act The Privacy Act of 1974. Public Law 

93-579. An Act to amend Title 5, U.S. 

Code, by adding Section 552a to safeguard individual privacy from the misuse of Federal Records, to provide that 

individuals be granted access to record.; concerning them which are mainta. >tl by federal agencies, to estab191 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

lish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. 

rad Abbreviation for radiation absorbed 

dose. A unit of absorbed dose of 

radiation representing the absorption 

of 100 ergs of ionizing radiation per 

gram of absorbing material, including 

body tissue. 

Radex Area An acronym for radiation exclusion 

area. A radex area is any area which 

is controlled for the purpose of protecting individuals from exposure to 

radiation and/or radioactive material. 

Radiation Exposure Exposure to radiation may be described 

and modified by a number of terms. The 

type of radiation is important: external exposure is to beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays and X-rays; internal 

exposure is from radionuclides deposited within the body emitting alpha, 

beta, gamma or x-radiation and irradiating various body organs. (see Dose 

and Exposure). 

Radioactive Effluent The radioactive material, steam, smoke, 

dust, and other particulate debris released to the atmosphere from an underground nuclear detonation. 

Radioactive or Fission 

Products A general term for the complex mixture 

of radionuclides produced as a result 

192 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Radionuclides 

Recovery Operations 

rem 

roentgen 

Safety Experiments 

of nuclear fission (see Activation Products). 

A collective term for all types of radioactive atoms of elements as opposed 

to stable nuclides (see Isotopes). 

Process of finding and removing experiments, by-products, or data from the 

test area after a test event. 

A special unit of biological radiation 

dose equivalent; the name is derived 

from the initial letters of the term 

"roentgen equivalent man or mammal." 

The number of rem of radiation dose is 

equal to the number of rads multiplied 

by the quality factor (QF) and other 

factors of the given radiation. 

A special unit of exposure to gamma (or 

x-1 radiation. It is defined precisely 

as the quantity of gamma (or x-) rays 

that, when completely stopped, in air, 

will produce positive and negative ions 

with a total charge of 2.58~10~~ coulomb in one kilogram of dry air under 

standard conditions. 

Device tests conducted to determine the 

safety of nuclear weapons during transportation and storage. Elements of the 

conventional high explosive portions of 

the devices were detonated to simulate 

accidental damage and to determine the 

193 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Sandbag Plugs 

Scientific Station 

Seismic Motion 

Shaft 

Shaft Collar 

potential for such simulated damage to 

result in significant nuclear yield. 

Data gained from the tests were used to 

develop devices that could withstand 

shock, blast, fire, and other accident 

conditions without producing a nuclear 

detonation. 

Barriers used in tunnels, constructed 

of sandbags, to help contain underground detonations and minimize damage 

to underground workings. 

Distance in feet along the HLOS pipe 

measured from the zero point. These 

distances are generally expressed in 

whole numbers or to the nearest complete hundred feet if fractional. Scientific Statj on 650 is expressed as 

SS650; Scientific Station 390.65 is expressed as SS390.65. 

Earth movement caused by an underground 

nuclear detonation, similar to a minor 

earthquake. 

A long narrow passage sunk into the 

earth. Shafts for device emplacement, 

ventilation, or access to underground 

workings may be drilled or mined. 

The area immediately around the shaft 

at ground level, usually cemented, 

which supports the headframe and other 

equipment. 

194 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Shielding Walls Walls or barriers used to protect 

equipment or instrumentation from heat, 

blast, and radioactivity. 

Slushing Operations The process of moving broken rock with 

a scraper or scraper bucket. May be 

used on the surface or underground, 

where ore or waste rock is slushed into 

hoppers or other locations for removal. 

Spalling Rock disintegration by flaking, chipping, peeling, or layers loosening on 

the outside edges. May be caused immediately by rock stressing in proximity 

to a detonation point. Also results 

later, after continued stressing from 

temperature change expansion and contraction. Spalling also may result or 

begin when rock containing moisture is 

raised to a high temperature, and expanding vapor creates fractures. 

Stemming The materials used to back-fill or plug 

the emplacement shaft, drift, or LOS 

drift to contain overpressure and 

radioactive material from a nuclear 

detonation. 

Surface Ground Zero The location on the ground surface directly above an underground zero point 

or directly below an airburst. 

Test Chamber A section of the LOS pipe in which experiments are placed. It may or may not 

be enlarged, depending upon the test 

design. 

195 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Test Event The immediately preceeding preparations 

for, including arming and firing, and 

the testing of a nuclear device, including the detonation and concurrent 

measurements and effects. 

Testing Organizations Organizations conducting nuclear tests 

at the NTS (see DOD, DASA, LASL, LRL 

and SL). 

Tonopah Test Range Located in the northwest corner of 

Nellis Air Force Range near Tonopah, 

Nevada. 

Trailer Park Area near the portal or on the Mesa 

where instrumentation or instrumentation support trailers are parked. 

Tunnel At NTS, a horizontal underground excavation driven on a predetermined line 

and grade to some specific target. 

Tunnel Access Entry to a tunnel or tunnel complex 

upon approval of the Test Director during test operations, or upon approval 

of the Tunnel Superintendent during 

routine operations. 

Tunnel and Pipe Seal (TAPS) An experiment protection feature 

along the LOS pipe which allows the experiments to be exposed to the desired 

levels of radiation while being protected from debris. It contains a 

massive steel door which closes after 

ground shock passes to form a 1000" F 

and 1000 psi seal. 

196 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Tunnel Complex The complete set of drifts and support 

equipment comprising one tunnel. 

Tunnel Walk-Out A visual, walking inspection of the 

tunnel or tunnel complex, usually as a 

part of the initial reentry after a 

detonation, to check for hazards of any 

and all kinds prior to allowing general 

access to the underground workings. 

2-Hour McCaa Breathing 

Apparatus A self-contained respiratory device 

that supplies two hours of breathing 

oxygen. 

Underground Structures 

Program The construction and fabrication of 

test structures underground for the 

purpose of detonation effects evaluation. 

User An organization conducting tests at the 

NTS (See Testing Organizations). 

Vela-Uniform Department of Defense (DOD) program designed to improve the capability to detect, identify, and locate underground 

nuclear explosions. 

Venting Release of radioactive material, steam, 

smoke, dust and other particulate debris through a zone of weakness from 

the detonation-formed cavity into the 

atmosphere. 

197 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Weapons Effects 

Experiments 

Weather Briefings 

Workings 

x-rays 

Yield 

(continued) 

Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

A part of the Readiness Briefings which 

are meetings of test-associated administrators, advisors, and other technical 

personnel prior to each test event to 

evaluate weather conditions and forecasts on event day, and make decisions 

on any necessary operational schedule 

changes. 

An excavation or group of excavations 

made in mining, quarrying, or tunneling, used chiefly in the plural, such 

as "the workings extended for miles 

underground." 

Electromagnetic radiations produced by 

electron reactions, as opposed to emission of gamma rays by nuclei. Otherwise high energy x-rays are identical 

with gamma rays of the same energy. 

The total effective energy released by 

a nuclear detonation. It is usually 

expressed in terms of the equivalent 

198 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (concluded) 

Zero Point 

tonnage of TNT required to produce the 

same energy release in an explosion. 

The total energy yield is manifested as 

nuclear radiation (including residual 

radiation), thermal radiation, and 

blast and shock energy; the actual distribution depending on the medium in 

which the explosion occurs and also 

upon the type of weapon. 

The location of a center of a burst of 

a nuclear weapon or device at the instant of detonation. The zero point may 

be above or below the surface of ground 

or water or otherwise offset. 

199 
200 
APPENDIX B 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The abbreviations and acronyms in the following list are 

used in the third volume of DOD underground testing reports. 

Additional information and definitions may be found in the text 

and in the Glossary of Terms, 

AAS American Aerial Survey

AEC Atomic Energy Commission 

AFSWC Air Force Special Weapons Center 

AFSWP Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

AFTAC Air Force Technical Applications Center 

AFWL Air Force Weapons Laboratory

AMC Army Material Command 

APC Army Pictorial Center 

APS Army Pictorial Services 

ARMS Aerial Radiation Monitoring System 

AVCO AVCO Corporation

BAC Boeing Aircraft Corporation 

Bkg Background Radiation Measurement 

BJY BUSTER-JANGLE roads intersection 

BRL Ballistics Research Laboratory

BTL Bell Telephone Laboratories 

CCTV Closed Circuit Television 

CDC Center for Disease Control 

CETO Civil Effects Test Organization

CIC Coordination and Information Center 

co Carbon monoxide 

Carbon dioxide co2 CP-1 Control Point Building 1 

CP-2 Control Point Building 2 

CPS Counts per second 

CT0 Continental Test Organization

D-Day The day a nuclear detonation takes place

DASA Defense Atomic Support Agency

DAT Damage Assessment Team 

DF Distribution Factor 

DNA Defense Nuclear Agency

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

dpm Disintegrations per minute 

EDT Eastern Daylight Time 

EGbG EG&G, Inc. (formerly Edgerton, Germeshausen, & 

Grier)

ERDA Energy Research and Development Administration 

201 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (continued) 

FCDASA Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

FCDNA Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

FCP Forward Control Point 

FCWT Field Command Weapons Effects and Tests Group

F&S Fenix & Scisson, Inc. 

FPFF Full Power Full Frequency

GA General Atomic Corporation

GE General Electric Corporation

GM Geiger-Mueller 

GZ Ground Zero 

HAC Hughes Aircraft Company 

HDL Harry Diamond Laboratories 

HE High explosives (conventional) 

H&N Holmes & Narver, Inc. 

ICC Interstate Commerce Commission 

ISAFAF Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (formerly

ISAFB) 

ISAFB Indian Springs Air Force Base 

IS0 Isotopes, Incorporated 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

KN Kaman Nuclear 

kt Kilotons 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos 

National Laboratory)

LEL Lower explosive limit 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LMAFS Lookout Mountain Air Force Station 

LMSC Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

LOS Line-of-sight

LRL Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory) 

MPC Maximum permissible concentration 

MRC Moleculon Research Corporation

mrem/qt Millirem per quarter

mrem/yr Millirem per year

mR/h Milliroentgens per hour 

MSA Mine Safety Appliance 

MSL Mean sea level 

NATS Nevada Aerial Tracking System

NB Nevada Branch 

NC Northrup Corporation

NDL Army Chemical Corps Nuclear Defense Laboratory

NOB Nevada Operations Branch 

NOL Naval Ordnance Laboratory

Nitrogen dioxide 

%NO2 Nitric oxide plus nitrogen dioxide 

NPG Nevada Proving Ground 

NRDS Nuclear Rocket Development Station 

NRL Naval Research Laboratory 

NTS Nevada Test Site 

NTSO Nevada Test Site Organization 

NV00 Nevada Operations Office 

202 
ABBREVIATIONS 

OBP 

PDT 

PHS 

ppm

psi 

PST 

QF 

Radex Area 

rad/h 

Radsafe 

radsafe 

RAMS 

RCG 

REECo 

rem 

R/h

RPG 

SAMSO 

SC 

SGZ 

SL 

SNL 

SOP 

SRI 

STWT/DASA 

swc 

TAPS 

TC 

TCDASA 

TCWT 

TGD 

TNT 

TTR 

USAF 

VA 

WES 

WSI 

AND ACRONYMS (concluded) 

Overburden Plug 

Pacific Daylight Time 

United States Public Health Service 

Parts per million 

Pounds per square inch 

Pacific Standard Time 

Quality Factor 

Radiation Exclusion Area 

Radiation absorbed dose per hour 

Radiological Sciences Department (formerly 

Radiological Safety Department), REECo 

Radiological Safety, in general 

Remote area monitoring station 

Radioactivity concentration guide 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, 

Incorporated 

Roentgen equivalent man or mammal 

Roentgens per hour 

Radiation protection guide 

Space and Missile Systems Organization

Sandia Corporation (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Surface Ground Zero 

Sandia Laboratories (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Standard operating procedures 

Stanford Research Institute 

Weapons Test Division/Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Special Weapons Center 

Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

Test Controller 

Test Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Test Command, Weapons Effects & Test Group 

Test Group Director 

High explosive chemical (trinitrotoluene) 

Tonopah Test Range 

United States Air Force 

Veterans Administration 

Waterways Experiment Station 

Wackenhut Services, Incorporated 

203 
204 
APPENDIX C 

SC-M-68-227 

GESER,\L TU?JXEL REESTRY PROCEDURES FOR 

DEPART\IENT OF DEFESSE AND S.ISDW LXBOR.ATORY NUCLEAR TESTS 

. . George R. IVenz 

Harold L. Rarrick 

Health Physics Division. 3312 

Sandra Laboratory, Albuquerque 

April 1968 

ABSTRACT 

This document describes preshot preparations and postshot procedures iOr saie and economical reentry into a tunnel arca after a nuclear detonation. Associated responslbilltms. possible 

hazards, reentry ground rules, prcshot preparations, communications. reentry parties and equipment, initial tunnel reentrlcs, and recovery of scientific experiments are esplamed. 

205 
Issued by Sandia Corporation, 

a prime contractor to the 

United States Atomic Energy Commission 

LEGAL NOTICE 

This report was prepared as an account of Government sponsored work. 

Neither the United States, nor the Commission, nor any person actir.g on 

behalf of the Commission: 

A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, 

with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in the report may not 

infringe privately owned rights; or 

B. Assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for 

damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, 

or process disclosed in this report. 

As used in the above, "person acting on behalf of the Commission" 

includes any employee or contractor of the Commission or employee of 

such contractor, to the extent that such employee or contractor of 

the Commission, or employee of such contractor prepares, disseminates, 

or provides access to, any information pursuant to his employement or 

contract with the Commission, or his employment with such contractor. 

206 
Significant contributions on tunnel reentry procedures have been made by W. D. Burnett, 

P. 0. hlatthews, and T. R. Crites of Sandia Laboratory and by C. R. Penwell and his staff of 

Rejmolds Electric and Engineering Co. (REECo). Mercury. Nevada. Significant contributions in 

explosive and toxic gas monitoring and ventilation have been made by D. R. Parker, Sandia Laboratory and R. IV. Viet, REECo. Rlr. L. W’. Brewer pioneered the use of a gas chromatograph in 

severe environments and D. J Coleman and J. D. Ashworth greatly improved the radiation detector 

installation and contributed the remote explosimeter. bIr. G. IV. Dwyer is largely responsible for 

the present filter system. Mr. !V’. P. Bennett, LRL-Livermore, gave us valuable assistance during 

our lnitlal efforts. The continued support of Col. J. J. Neuer. USAF, and the advice and guidance 

of W. II. Kingsley are gratefully acknowledged: 

Specifically commended are G. A. Clayton, II. D. EJ\a;ards. F. J. Solacgul and thclr initial 

reentry teams who hate perf’ormed these duties in very severe envlronmcnts. 

207 
Introduction 

Responsibilities 

Possible Hazards 

Reentry Ground Rules 

Summary of Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

Communications 

Reentry Parties and Equipment 

Initial Tunnel Reentries 

Tunnel Scientific Recoveries from the Espcrimcntal Chvnbcr 

205 

105 

106 

207 

208 

209 

110 

211 

213 

208 
GESERAL TL-XXL REESTRY PROCDDCRFS FOR 

DDP_kRTlIEST 017 DEFENSE ASD SXA”1.A LXEOR.\TORY NUCLEAR TESTS 

Introduction 

The Health Physics Division bcqsn tunne! reentries in 1062. The procedures tha: are 

given In this document represent a compilation oi a series of tunnel reentry procedures that 

have been continually improved based upon experience and better instrumentation. The reentry 

plan presented describes prcshot preparations and postshot procedures ior safe and economlcsl 

reentry and scientific rcco:vcry In a tunnel area. 

Rcsponstbiiittes for safe and cconomtcal tunnel reentry procedures aitcr a nucicsr ::ctonation kndtcated hereln for :\EC or .\EC contractor (I.c.. Sands Laboratory) ncrsonncl :.rc’ in 

accord \iith cstablislwd ALC/DOD Jgrccmcnt or arc tllc subject 01’ separate :Lctlon bct\q,t.en 

TC: DXS.1 and S\‘OO. 

(1) The Test \:anager IS responsible to the AEC for the safety of all the 

participating personnel at sites under the jurisdiction of NV00 and 

has approval authority over decisions effecting the safety of these 

personnel. (Rcf: NTSO Draft 0524-0133.1 

(2) The NV00 Operational Safety Division will advise the DOD Test 

Group Director (TGD) and the Reentry Control Group on all problems 

pertaining to health and saiety. 

b. Sandia Laboratory 

(1) 

(2) 

(7) 
with the experimental 

conditions and hazards. 

setup and with possible postshot tunnel 

(4) The Reentry Control Group will arrange the necessary support 

for reentry and recovery, e.g., it will provide mine rescue trained 

personnel, Rad-Safe support (see _4nnex A), Industrial Hygiene 

Support, etc. 

c. TClDAS.4 or Sandia Laboratory Test Group Director 

(1) The TCD is responsible for the safe conduct of all activities in the 

tunnel area He will authorize and initiate both a tunnel condition 

survey and reentry and recovery operations with the concurrence 

of the Test !Janager. 

(2) The TCD will be responsible for 

insta!lation and postshot removal 

for Test Group support activities 

responsibilities in the AEC/DOD 

initiating all 

of equipment 

except those 

agreement. 

action for the 

and services 

items covered 

preshot 

required 

as AEC 

3. Possible Hazards 

a. Radiation. Radiation 

the iollowing: 

in tunnel reentry areas may result from any one of 

(1) Leak 

from 

of radioactive 

ground zero. 

gases or materials through fissures or iractures 

(2) Failure of the tunnel stemming. 

(31 Activation and/or dispersion of samples in the experimental chamber. 

b. Explosive or toxic 

direct or secondary 

trations dangerous 

gases. Various explosive 

products of the detonation 

to personnel. 

and toxic 

may be 

gases 

present 

released as 

in concenc. Explosives. 

the tunnel. 

Undetonated IIE may remain either intact or scattered in 

d. Toxic mater:als. Beryllium 

particularl:., if it becomes 

recovery samples. 

may pose a toxic 

oispersed in the air 

prob!cm 

and/or 

to personnel 

deposited on 

e. Tunnel damace. 

generated shock 

Damage 

‘Nave. 

to the tunnel may result from !hc dc\,ice 

(11 Collapse 

stcmmin;; 

distances 

prcccded 

nllel drlit. 

oi the tunnel would 

however, p3rtial 

from ground zero. 

by mining throcch 

not normally be expected hcyond the 

or tot31 collapse may occur at greater 

Reentry through collsose zones must be 

broken ground or by driving a ne’~v nar210 
(2) Heave of the tunnel floor may cause slabbing or spallation of the 

rock and iailure of utility lines, railroad track, tunnel sets, and 

laggmg. This damage will create safety hazards \vhich must be 

removed prior to experimental recoveries. 

f. High pressure gas. High pressure ( 2200 psi) gas cylinders normally 

exist xvithin the tunnel complex. 

4. Reentr.: Ground Rules 

a. Initial reentry and each subsequent phase will be initiated upon authorization of the TGD with concurrence of the Test Manager. and control 

~vlll be retained by the TGD until all recovery operations are completed 

and tunnei access is returned to AEC control. Only those personnel 

authorized by the TCD and the Chici of the Reentry Control Croup v.111 

be permitted :n the portal arca and tunnel. 

b. TLnnei communications will be by a hard ‘.vire portable phone system. 

c. TL:nncl parttes wtll be controilcd by the Chief of the Reentry Controi 

Croun \vho IS located at the tunnel portal. Tunnel parties may be 

retailed nt his direction. Only one team :I 111 be in the tunnel at any 

sinsle ttme unless directed otherwise by tilt Chiei of the Reentry Control Group. 

d. A tunnel party will return to the portal under any of the iollowing 

conditions: 

(11 Upon decision of the Team Chief. 

:: (2) When any member of Teams 1, 2, 3, and -1 show a McCaa osygen 

supply less than 30 atmospheres or a Draeger pressure less than 

450 psi. 

(3) Upon loss of communications with the Reentry Control Group at 

the portal. 

e. Tsam 1 (Rescue Team) will be dispatched upon direction oi the Chief 

0: the Reentry Control Group, the Team Chlci !n the tilnncl. or :i 

sommtintcat:ons should he lost \vith any team in ,he tunnel (ailo\~~in~ 

3. rc3sonat)le titnc I’or the team to i-sit ;if:er ioss 0: comm;:n~c.i:iorls~. 

f. ;\il ohservntlons during reentry lvill be communicated tkro:l:h the 

C!::cf oi‘ I’.irt;,v to the C!l:cf of the Rcenrr:, CJ:itrol G~.oun 2nd rccordc‘tl 

ior iuturc rcl’crcncc. 

211 
g. Personnel radiation exposure limits are those set by STS SOP

Chapter 052-L. The radiation dose limit for the operation 1s 3 Rem 

per calendar quarter. A person’s exposure, however, will be terminated when his pocket dosimeter reaches 2.0 Rem, assuming his exposure history would allow 3 Rem during this operation. 

h. Tunnel reentry will not be made before the tunnel ventilation has been 

turned on and samples of the air monitored at the portal. Evaluation 

of the sample must indicate that reentry can be made within the limi 

tations of this procedure. 

1. Reentry will not be made beyond ventilation, lOR/hr, 1000 ppm CO, or 10 

percent of the lower explosive limit of explosive gas mixtures. Teams 1, 

2. 3. and 4 may be exempted from these requirements under extenuating 

circumstances by mutual decision of the Chief of the Reentry Control 

Group and the Chief of the Party. 

i The Rescue Team will always be stationed near the portal with a train 

for immediate dispatch. 

5. Summarv of Preshot Preoarations for Reentrv 

a. Stemming should provide fireball containment and should reduce radioactivity and explosive gas in the reentry area. The overburden plug 

should contain any debris that may pass the stemming. The gas seal 

door should contain any gases that penetrate the overburden plug. 

b. Remote radiation sensing instruments will provide knowledge of tunnel 

radiation levels, while tunnel condition indicators (geophones, pressure 

and temperature gages, and explosimeters) remotely monitor the tunnel. 

c. Am sampling lines for gas chromatography are normally installed through 

both the gas seal door and the overburden plug. Each installation is provided with suitable remotely operated valves. Samples may be drawn 

from the inside of the gas seal door, from both sides of the overburden 

plug. and lrom near the stemming. Sampling from these Lines will help 

determine the explosive and tosic gas concentrations In the tunnel prior 

to reentry. 

d. Valves are normally installed in the \,ent lines and makeup ports in the 

gas seal door and o\,erburden plug. An axial vane fan IS located on the 

makeup valves to reduce negative pressure. The valves and ian are 

remotely operated from a manned location and fill have position monitors to indicate whether they are fully open or iully closed. The position 

monitors v/ill also show jvhether the ian power IS on or off. 

212 
e. The following items ordinarily have power turned on through and after 

zero time: 

(1) Tunnel utilities and instrumentation. Power to these items will be 

turned off near zero time. 

(2) Geophone transmitter trailer. This supplies power to the geophone 

and the pressure and temperature amplifiers which must be left on 

to monitor for cavity collapse and pressure changes. 

(3) Ventilation fans. Power will be controlled remotely. 

(4) Radiation detectors. 

(5) Explosimeters. 

(6) Ventilation and gas sampling valves. Power will be controlled 

remotely. 

f. The Sutorbilt fans will be installed so they will pull air through the vent 

line filter system before it is released to the atmosphere. One Sutorbilt 

fan will be used for a back-up in case the other fan fails. 

g. Ventilation. 

(1) The ventilation system is installed so that all areas of the tunnel 

that are not closed off are swept with fresh air from the portal. 

(2) After zero time and when the TGD gives his approval (with the consent of the Test Manager), the tunnel ventilation system will be 

turned on, exhaust and makeup air will be supplied from the portal 

through valves in the gas seal door and, if possible, the overburden 

plug. There will be valves that can be remotely operated in both 

vent lines at the gas seal door and, if possible, at the overburden 

plug. Vent line samples will be taken to monitor for radioactive, 

explosive, and/or toxic effluents. 

6. Communications 

A communication system with the necessary wtre on a portable reel will be used during 

initial reentry. A back-up reel will be available. All convcrsaclon between the reentry party 

and reentry control will be recorded. 

213 
7. Reentrv Parties and Eouiomcnt 

The reentry parties will consist of the personnel 

following table: 

Party Name 

a. Teams 1, 2, and 3 - Tunnel Reentry Party 

(11 Chief of Party 

(2) Rad-Safe monitor 

(31 Industrial Hygiene monitor (May be 

performed by Rad-Science personnel) 

(4) Tunnel safety 

(51 Scientific Advisor (as required) 

b. Team 4 - Tunnel Rescue Party 

(1) Chief of Party 

(2) Three to six REE Co. Mine Rescue 

(3) Two monitors for Rad-Saie and 

Industrial IIygiene 

c. Team 5 - Tunnel Scientific Assessment Team 

(as required) 

(1) Chief of Party 

(21 Rad-Safe and Industrial Hygiene monitors 

(31 Scientific Advisors 

(4) Mine support 

d. Team 6 - Tunnel \Vork Party 

(1) Chief of Party 

(2) Rad-Safe and Industrial IIygicnc monitors 

(31 REE Co. Sliners 

e. Team 7 - Tunnel Scic,ntific Rccoverles to 

E?.pcrimcntal Chamber (see 

P~r3. 9 for details) 

i. Tc,srna- IIE D1aposal Group 

(as required) 

P. ‘I’cam 9 - 1l~dical Support 

RI. D. and mcdlcal technician 

214 

and equipment described in the 

Equipment 

Full Radex clothing 

Bureau of Mines approved 

2-hour self-contained 

oxygen breathing apparatus 

Radiation detectors 

Explosive gas meter 

Toxic gas detectors 

Oxygen percent meter 

Hard wire communications 

Full Radex clothing 

Bureau of !Uincs approved 

2-hour self-contained 

oxygen breathing apparatus 

Radiation detectors 

Tdsic gas detectors 

Explosive gas meters 

it’ire litters 

Hard wire communications 

Full Radex clothing 

Respiratory protection (as 

required) 

Radiation detectors 

Toxic gas detectors 

Explosive gas meter 

Hard wire communications 

Full Radcs clothing 

Respiratory protection (as 

required) 

Radiation detectors 

To.<ic gas detectors 

F(111 Radcs clothing 

Rcsprratory protcctlon (as 

rcquircd) 

1’1111 17:1tlcs clothing 

Respiratory protection (as 

rcquircd) 

Nccessnry mcllical cquipmcnt 

Amb~llance 
8. Initial TGnnel Reentries 

a. Xiter the event the TGD will review radiation and tunnel condition 

monitors. When he determines that it is sale, and ,.vith the agreement 

oi the Test Manager, the tunnel ventilation system will be turned on 

EXHAUST. Makeup air will be supplied from the portal through the 

valves in the plugs. 

b. Prior to entry into the tunnel, all esperimental cables and all electrical and telephone lines going into the tunnel through the portal will 

be either locked open or disconnected. .411 other cables going into the 

tunnel w31 be disconnected and taped or cut and grouted as necessary. 

Along with the pressure, temperature, and geophone instruments, the 

remote radiation monitoring system and the remote explosimeters will 

be left connected. No circuit Into the tunnel or into the instrumentation 

trailers wiLl be closed when personnel are either tn the tunnel or directly 

in front of the portal (including an area extending 50 feet on either side of 

the portal). 

The Chief of the Reentry Control Group will advise the TGD on tunnel 

conditions by reviewing surface conditions, eshaust gas iniormation. 

tunnel radiation, tunnel condition indicators, and seismic mformatton. 

This review will determine when tunnel reentry may actually begin. 

When cleared by the TGD and the Test Ilanager and \vhen all surface 

recoveries and power checks are complete, Team 1 will be allowed to 

make the initial tunnel reentry. There will be no change In the tunnel 

ventilation setup or in utilities while Teams 1 through 5 are underground. 

The number of people in the portal area and trailer parks will be held to 

a minimum. 

c. Team 1 will be the first group to reenter and will proceed to the gas 

seal door. A train may be used to supply transportation to the gas 

seal door, conditions permitting. Team 1 will continuously monitor 

for radioactivity and ior toxic and explosive gases. Pressure gages at 

the gas seal door \vill be checked, and ti no pressure 1s observed, a 

sample will be taken through the door to deterrn:nc i!:e environmc:it on 

the other side oi the door. I:nder saie cond!:lons. Team I \vill then 

open the gas seal door. They xc111 inspect the tunnel to the ovcrburdcn 

plug. T!w pressure gages at the overburden plug ivlll be ctlccked and 

if no pressure IS observed. a sample will be taken rhrough the plug to 

dctcrmtnc the cnvtron,ncnt on the other side oi the i)ltIg. Tc~m 1 will then 

ivtthdraw to the I>ortal :r;:a. Ii remote ventilation has not been established 

previously bchtnd the overburden plug, the \\ork party (Team 6) will then 

reenter and tnkc the necessary steps to establish ~cnti!ation through the 

215 
plug. They will then exit the tunnel, and samples will be taken from the 

vent line to verify earlier remote sampling. A second work party may be 

required to open the overburden plu, n door and remove the material from 

the manway. 

Team 2 will reenter with an engine and car containing the necessary 

equipment to open the overburden plug door. This group wtll take in 

the reel of communication wire and connect it up to the existing communication line Jack at the overburden plug to reestablish communications with 

the reentry control group at the portal. Team 2 will open the manway door 

and will continuously monitor for radioactivity and for toxic and explosive 

gases. They will then withdraw to the portal with the engine. 

Team 3 will reenter to the overburden plug and reestablish communications 

using the reel connected to the communication line lack. The team !rpill v:alk 

out the remaining drift continuously monitoring for radioactivity and ior 

toxic and explosive gases. They will also observe the vent lines to assure 

themselves that the lines are intact. Team 3 will proceed to the stemming, 

if possible, noting tunnel and pipe conditions. They wrll then return to the 

end of the experimental pipe and establish ventilation in the pipe if time 

and conditions permit. Swipes will be taken on the sent port oi the test 

chamber and checked for contamination. These will be later analyzed ior 

Be and isotope identification. 

The mission of Teams 1. 2, and 3 is to verify that the tunnel comples 

is within acceptable levels for toxic and radioactive gases and to check 

the condition of the pipe and tunnel. 

d. If Teams 1. 2. and 3 determine that tunnel rehabilitation may be safely 

conducted, they will leave the tunnel and Team 6 will make temporary 

repairs as needed to the vent line or tunnel. A Rad-Safe monitor will 

remain with Team 6 while in the tunnel and continue to monitor for 

radiation and toxic gases. 

e. The oblect of Teams 1 and 3 will be to explore as much oi the tunnel 

on one reentry as possible. Previous espericnce has shown that 

IlcC~a or Draeger Teams can explore up to 4300 feet in t-112 liours 

with a l/2 hour safety margin. Ii an additional initial rcentr:.’ IS 

required to iuLly explore the tunnel. Team 4 (with Rnd-Sire and 

industrial IIygiene monitors) will complctc the tunnel csplornrion 

with Team 1 standing by as Tunnel Rescue. 

216 
9. Ti:nnel Scientific Recoveries from the Esoerimental Chamber 

8. Scientific recoveries in the tunnel xvi11 not be permitted until Tean. 1, 

2. or 3 has searched all drifts and verified that the tunnel is clear of 

dangerous amounts of toxic, explosive, and radioactive gases. 

b. Before scientific recoveries may begin, repair of the tunnel along the 

recovery route to the experimental chamber must be complete. This 

activity may include repairin g broken lagging and removing hazardous 

obstacles as well as repairing railroad track and vent lines. The tunnel 

lights will be turned on before all scientific recoveries except film 

recoveries begin. All cabling extending into a crushed zone will be cut. 

c. Team 5 will conduct a technical survey and perform the necessary 

actions to begin scientific recoveries. 

d. Team 7 will then be permitted to proceed to the experimental chamber 

and begin the removal of samples in order of priority. A Rad-Safe/ 

Industrial Safety monitor will be present at all times. This monitor 

will advise the Chief of the Reentry Control Group, who is responsible 

for terminating scientific recovery, whenever the tunnel environment 

becomes dangerous. .4 Rad-Safe check station will be established at 

each Scientific Station to control contamination. 

217 
218 
APPENDIX D 

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-0524-01 

Chapter 0524 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

0524-01 Radiological Safety 

011 Purpose 

The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure is to define responsibility and to establish criteria and general procedures for 

radiological safety associated with NTS programs. Additional operational instructions relating to radiological safety for particular activities may be published as a part of the Test Manager's 

Operational Plan. 

012 Responsibilities 

a. Manager, NVOO. The Manager, NVOO, is the AEC official to whom 

the NTSO reports. The Manager, NVOO, as a Test Manager, is 

responsible for administering, preparing, and executing all 

programs and projects. The Test Manager may delegate operational control of the NTSO to specifically-identified Deputy 

Test Managers for the execution of approved programs, projects, and experiments. Only the Test Manager or the Deputy 

Test Manager is authorized to approve or disapprove the field 

execution of approved programs, projects or experiments. 

b. Test Manager. The Test Manager is responsible for the protection of participating personnel and off-site population from radiation hazards associated with activities conducted at the NTS. By mutual agreement between the Test 

Manager and a scientific user, control of radiological safety 

within the area assigned for a particular activity may be 

delegated to the user's Test Group Director during the period 

of time when such control could have a direct bearing on the 

success or failure of the scientific program. The provisions 

of AEC Manual Chapter 8401 shall apply to reactor tests or 

sustained reactor operations. 

C. Test Group Director. Whenever operational radiological safety 

control is delegated to a Test Group Director under provisions 

of 012a above, he is responsible to the Test Manager for establishment and implementation of radiological safety criteria 

within the assigned area. He will be responsible for submitting a detailed radiological safety operational plan to the 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

213 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

Test Manager for review and concurrence. This plan shall be 

submitted as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to cover all 

routine operations. Variances from the SOP for non-routine 

operations shall be presented to the Test Manager for review 

and concurrence. Upon termination of need for the Test Group 

Director to retain radiological safety control within an 

assigned area, the Test Group Director will be relieved of 

radiological safety responsibility. 

d. Director, Nevada Test Site Support Office (NTSSO). Supervises 

the approved NTS on-site radiological safety programs, except 

for those periods in which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others (i.e., Test Manager, Test 

Group Directors, etc.). 

e. Radiological Safety Advisor. The NTSO Radiological Safety 

Advisor is responsible to the Test Manager for staff supervision of radiological safety policies and procedures at the 

NTS. Monitoring of the radiological safety policies and direction of procedures at NTS, during non-operational periods, 

rests with the Director, NTSSO. 

f. Chief, Safety Branch (SB), NTSSO. The Chief, Safety Branch, 

NTSSO, will be responsible to the Director, NTSSO, for conducting field inspections at the NTS to assure that NTS contractors execute safety programs in accordance with approved 

safety procedures and plans as well as with AEC and NV00 

directives. Recommends corrective actions where necessary. 

Assures that radioactive waste management and disposal are 

accomplished in accordance with approved procedures. Coordinates and administers NTS activities relative to the Radiological Assistance Program. Provides day-by-day coordination 

and monitoring of NTS radiological safety activities, except for 

those periods during which operational control of specified 

areas may be delegated to others. 

g* Director, Safety Evaluation Division (SED), NVOO. Provides 

for staff development of safety programs of NV00 for use at 

NTS . Develops safety programs which are coordinated with 

NTSSO and site user agencies and organizations to meet public 

and operational safety requirements for the conduct of nuclear 

detonations, reactor test programs, chemical explosives tests, 

or other NV00 activities. Arranges for radiological studies as 

may be appropriate. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

220 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-012 

h. 

1. 

k. 

1. 

Chief, Radiological Safety Branch (RSB), NVOO. Provides staff 

assistance in all matters relating to radiological safety. Reviews and evaluates for technical adequacy radiological safety 

procedures and operational plans submitted by user organizations. 

Acts as Radiological Safety Advisor (or provides a representative) 

to the Test Manager during all NV00 activities requiring such 

coverage. 

Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer. The Director, Southwestern 

Radiological Health Laboratory, U. S. Public Health Service, or 

his representative, will be designated as the Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer and its responsible to the Test Manager 

for the operation of the off-site radiological safety program. 

User Organizations. The official in charge of each agency or 

organizational group participating in NTS field activities or 

using NTS facilities is responsible for compliance by his personnel with established radiological safety policies, procedures and controls. Each official in charge of a participating 

group is also responsible at all times to his parent organization for the radiological safety of personnel under his supervision. Operational safety plans will be submitted by the user 

organization to the Test Manager for review and approval, with 

a copy to the Director, NTSSO. 

Operations Coordination Center (CCC). Shipment of radioactive 

materials, radioactive waste disposal, and access to areas contaminated with radioactive debris require prior coordination 

through the Operations Coordination Center, CP-1, telephone 

Mercury 986-2781. 

On-Site Radiological Organization. On-site radiological safety 

support services for user organizations and the routine operation of NTS will be provided by the on-site radiological safety 

support contractor as directed by the NTSSO. Routine radiological safety support services at NTS will be requested in 

writing by the user organization through the Director, NTSSO. 

The on-site radiological safety support contractor is responsible to the Test Manager, through the Director, NTSSO, for the 

following routine on-NTS radiological safety support. 

1. Providing radiological safety support, including certified 

monitors to user organizations. 

2. Making radiological surveys, documenting radiation levels 

from events on the NTS, mapping and properly marking all 

contaminated areas, and furnishing this survey information 

for distribution by the Chief, Safety Branch, NTSSO. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

221 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

NTSO-0524-012 

Conducting a personnel radiation dosimetry program and disseminating the results of the program to respective organizations covered under this program, and as appropriate 

under AEC Manual Chapter 0525 and Appendix. This program 

to include providing and maintaining a repository for records and source documents pertaining to personnel dosimetry 

for all NV00 activities requiring such dosimetry. 

Maintaining and calibrating radiation detection equipment. 

Procuring, issuing, and decontaminating protective clothing, supplies, and equipment. 

Providing radioactive materials and waste disposal control 

(including receiving, storage, on-site movement and shipping). 

Maintaining and operating personnel and equipment decontamination facilities. 

Providing advice and assistance in matters pertaining to 

radiological safety. 

Conducting an on-site environmental surveillance program. 

Providing necessary support services for the off-site 

radiological safety program. 

Conducting radiological safety training courses. 

Preparing final on-site reports following each test operational period, interim reports for each event, special 

reports and detailed operational plans for each future 

program. 

Providing Radiological Assistance Teams to respond to 

radiation incidents. 

Conducting analysis of samples for radioactivity and for 

certain toxic materials. 

Providing and maintaining a current manual containing the 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for providing radiological safety support, as outlined above, to users and 

contractors at the NTS. 

Revised February 9, 1968 

222 



__ 

PART I 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

I. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS IN CONTROLLED AREAS' 

A. Radiation from sources external to the body 

Type of Exposure Period of Time Dose (rem) 

Whole body, head and trunk, Accumulated dose 5 (N-18)2 

active blood-forming organs Calendar quarter3 34 

gonads, or lens of eye. 

Skin of whole body and Year 30 

thyroid Calendar quarter3 104 

Hands, and forearms, feet Year 75 

and ankles Calendar quarter3 254 

B. Radiation from emitters internal to the averaged over periods up to 13 conbody secutive weeks provided work areas 

are appropriately monitored and ex1. Except as provided in 2. below, the posure histories are maintained for 

radiation protection standards for each individual working in such 

airborne radioactivity specified in areas. 

annex I, table I. shall be followed. 

The concentration standards are 2. If it is not feasible to govern exbased upon continuous exposure to posures to internal emitters by apthe concentrations specified for plying airborne radioactivity conforty hours per week (a "week" being centration standards, the following 

seven consecutive days). For the radiation protection standards shall 

purpose of applying these standards, apply:

radioactivity concentrations may be 

Dose 

Type of Exposure rem/year rem/quarter 

Whole body, active blood- 5 3 

forming organs, gonads. 

Thyroid 30 10 

Bone Body burden of 0.1 

microgram of radium226 or its biological 

equivalents 

Other organs 15 5 

The calculation of organ dose shall be ternational Commission on Radiological 

based on methods recomnended by the Protection. 

Federal Radiation Council and the In1An individual under age 18 shall not be em- the year, but in no case will exposure be more 

ployed in or allowed to enter controlled areas in than 3 rem per quarter. 

such manner that he will receive doses of radia- 3A calendar quarter may be taken as a pretion in amounts exceeding the standards applicable determined period of 13 consecutive weeks or 

to individuals in uncontrolled areas. Exposures to any predetermined quarter year based on the 

individuals under age 18 may be averaged over per- calendar. 

iods not to exceed one calendar quarter. 'Personnel monitoring equipment shall be 

*N equals the age in years at last birthday. provided each individual who receives or is 

An individual employed at age 18 or an individual likely to receive a dose in any calendar quarbeyond age 18 who had no accrued unused exposure ter in excess of 10% of these values. 

shall not be exposed during the ensuing year to SExposure must be governed such that the 

doses exceeding (a) 1.25 rem for the first calen- individual's body burden does not exceed this 

dar quarter, (b) 2.5 rem total for the first two value (a) when averaged over any period of 12 

calendar quarters, (c) 3.75 rem total for the consecutive months and (b) after 50 years of 

first three calendar quarters and (d) 5 rem for occupational exposure. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

226 
PART II 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

II. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND POPULATION GROUPS IN 

UNCONTROLLED AREAS 

A. Radiation dose standards for external and internal exposure 

Dose (rem/year) 

Based on an average 

Based on exposure to a suitexposure to able population 

Type of Exposure individuals sample 

Whole body, gonads or 0.5 0.1 

bone marrow 

Thyroid or bone 1.5 0.5 

Bone (alternate standard) Body burden of Body burden of 

0.003ug of radium O.OOlug of radium 

226 or its biolog- 226 or its bioloaical equivalent. ical equivalent.-

B. Radioactivity in effluents released to 

uncontrolled areas 

1. Except as provided in 2. below, 

radioactivity in effluents released 

to uncontrolled areas shall not exceed the radiation protection standards specified in annex I, table II. 

The point of release of such effluents shall be considered to be the 

point at which the effluents pass 

beyond the site boundary. Where such 

effluents are discharged through a 

conduit such as a stack or pipe, the 

point of release may be considered 

to be the conduit discharge. For the 

purpose of applying these standards, 

radioactivity concentrations in effluents may be averaged over periods 

up to one year. 

2. Radioactivity in effluents may be 

released to uncontrolled areas in 

excess of the radiation protection 

standards specified in annex I, 

table II, provided it is reasonably 

demonstrated that in uncontrolled 

areas: 

(a) individuals are not exposed in 

excess of the standards specified in A. above, 

(b) individuals are not exposed in 

excess of annex I, table II 

standards, or 

(cl the average exposure of a suitable sample of an exposed population group is not in excess of 

one-third of annex I, table II 

standards. Radioactivity concentrations in the environment may 

be averaged over periods up to 

one year. 

3. In any situation in which the contribution to radioactivity in the environment from effluents discharged 

by one or more activities of the 

AEC or AEC contractors is likely 

to result in exposures in excess of 

the standards specified in 1I.A. and 

B. above, lower effluent concentration limits may be set for these 

Operations. In such cases, the manager of the field office may take the 

necessary corrective action if all 

activities concerned are within his 

area of responsibility. Otherwise, 

each case will be referred to the 

Director, Division of Operational 

Safety, for appropriate action. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

2 2 -1 
7 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(pCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (PCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

Actinium (89) .............. AC 227 .... S 2x10-12 6x10 - 5 8~10-1~ 2x10-6 

: 3x10-" 9x10 -3 9x10-13 3x10 -4 

AC 228 .... 8x10-a 3x10- 3 3x10- 9 9x10 - 5 

I 2x10-8 3x10-3 6x10J” 9x10- 5 

Americium (95) ............. Am 241 .... 

Am 242m . . . 

S 

: 

I 

;:;$ 

i::$ 

1x10-4 

8x10 -4 

1x10- 4 

3x10- 3 

2x10-13 

;;;$ 

9x10.‘2 

4x10- 6 

3x10-5 

4x10- 6 

9x10-s 

Am 242 . . . . S 4x10-8 4x10 - 3 1x10- g 1x10- 4 

I 5x10-a 4x10-3 2x10- 9 1x10-4 

Am 243 . . . . S 6x100l2 1x10- 4 2x10-13 4x10 - 6 

I IxlO-lo 8x10- 4 4x10-‘2 3x10- 5 

Am 244 .... S 4x10-6 1x10-’ 1x10- 7 5x10- 3 

I 2x10-s 1x10- 1 8x10* 7 5x10- 3 

Antimony .............. ..... Sb 122 .... S 

I 

2~10-7 

1x10- 7 

8x10-” 

8x10- 4 ;x,:;ri 

3x10 - 5 

3x10-5 

Sb 124 .... S 2x10- 7 7x10- 4 5x10- 9 2x10- 5 

7x10- 4 7x10.‘0 2x10- 5 

Sb 125 .... : 2x10-5 87 3x10- 3 2x10- 8 1x10- 4 

I 3x10- 8 3x10- 3 9xlOJO 1x10-4 

Argon (18) ................. A 37 ...... Sub2 6~10-~ . . . . 1x10- 4 . . . . 

A 41 ...... Sub 2x10-s . . . . 4x10 - 6 . . . . 

Arsenic (33) ............... As 73 ..... S 2x10-6 1x10-2 7x10-8 5x10-4 

I 4x10- 7 1x10-2 1x10-8 5x10- 4 

As 74 ..... S 3x10- 7 2x10- 3 1x10-8 5x10-5 

As 76 ..... 

I 

S 

I 

::;;-

1x10: 

: 

7 

2x10-3 

6x10- 4 

6x10- 4 

4x10-9 

;;:;r i 

5x10-5 

2x10-5 

2x10- 5 

As 77 ..... S 5x10- 7 2x10- 3 2x10-8 

I 4x10- 7 2x10-3 1x10-e ;g-: -

Astatine (85) .............. At 211 .... S 

I 

7x10-s 

3x10-a 

5x10-s 

2x10-3 

2xlO-‘O 

1x10- 9 

2x10-6 

7x10- 5 

Barium (56 ................ Ba 131 .... S 1x10-6 5x10- 3 4x10-8 2x10-4 

5x10-3 1x10- * 2x10-4 

Ba 140 .... : 4x10- 1x10- 7 8~10-~ 4x10-9 3x10- 5 

7x10-4 1x10-9 2x10-5 

Berkelium (’97) ............. Bk 249 .... : ;;:z: 2x10-2 

2x10-2 

3x10-” 

4x10-9 

6~10-~ 

6~10-~ 

Bk 250 .... : 1x10-7 1x10- 7 6x10-3 5x10- 9 2x10-4 

: 1x10-s 6x10-3 4x10--8 2x10-4 

Beryllium (4) .............. Be 7 ...... 6x10-s 5x10-2 2x10-7 2x10-3 

1x10-s 5x10-2 4x10- 8 2x10-3 

Bismuth (83) ............... Bi 206 .... I 2~10.7 1x10--3 6x10- 9 4x10-5 

1x10-7 1x10-3 5x10-9 4x10-5 

Bi 207 .... I 2x10-7 2x10-3 6x10-9 6x10-5 

I 1X10- 8 2x10-3 5xlOdO 6x10-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

229 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSD-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) Isotope 

Bi 210 . . . . 

Ei 212 . . . . 

Bromine (35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Br 82 . . . . . 

Cadmium (48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cd 109 . . . . 

Cd 115m . . . 

Cd 115 . . . . 

Calcium (20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ca 45 . . . . . 

Ca 47 . . . . . 

Californium (98) . . . . . . . . . . . Cf 249 . . . . 

Cf 250 . . . . 

Cf 251 . . . . 

Cf 252 . . . . 

Cf 253 . . . . 

Cf 254 . . . . 

Carbon (6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c 14 . . . . . . 

(C02) . . . . . 

Cerium (58) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ce 141 . . . . 

Ce 143 . . . . 

Ce 144 . . . . 

Cesium (55) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cs 131 . . . . 

Cs 134m . . . 

cs 134 . . . . 

cs 135 . . . . 

Cs 136 . . . . 

S 

: 

: 

: 

1 

I 

S 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

i 

: 

Sub 

Table I Table II 

Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) 

6x10-s 1x10 - 9 2xlO-'O 4x10 -5 

6~10-~ 1x10-3 2x10-'0 4x10- 5 

1x10-7 1x10-2 3~1D-~ 4x10~” 

2x10-7 1x10-2 7x10-9 4x10-4 

1x10- 6 3x10- 4

;::“,’ : ;::;I : 

',% 7 0 5x10- 3 “,“x::: 2x10- 9 

7x10- a 3x1* 9 2x10- 4 

:;:;r : 4x1*a 1x10- 9 3x10- s 

4x1* a 7x10- 4 1x10- 9 3x1& s 

2x10- 7 1x10- 3 8x10-9 3x10- 5 

2x10- 7 1x10- 3 6x10- 9 4x10- 5 

3x1* 8 3x10- 4 1x10- 9 9x10- 6 

1x10- 7 5x10- 3 4x10- 9 2x1& 4 

2x10- 7 1x10- 3 6x10~ 9 5x10- s 

2x10- 7 1x10- 3 6~10-~ 3x10-s 

1x10- 4 5xlOJ4

:::$ 7x10- 4 3x10-12 ;::;z: 

5x10-12 4x10- 4 2x10-13 1x10- 5 

lxlwo 7x10-k 3x10-12 3x10- s 

2x10-12 1x10-4 6x10-l” 4x10-6 

1x1wo 8x1+ 4 3x10-12 3x10- 5 

2x10-4 2x10-‘3

!:;E:: 2x1* 4 :::E: 

8x1+10 ;gi: 4x10- 3 1x10-4 

8x1&10 4x10- 3 3xl@l 1x10-4 

4x10- 6 lxlv- 7

;;;::: ;;g:: 4x100 6 1x10- 7 

2x10- 2 1x10- 7 8x10- + ",:;:: . . . . 1x1& 6 . . . . 

4x10- 7 3x10-9 

:;gL: ;g:: 

g;;r: :;::: 9x10- 9 4x10- 5 

2x10- 7 1x1* 3 7x10- 9 4x10-s 

1x1& 9 3x10- 4 3x1*10 1x10- 5 

6x10- 9 2x10-10 1x10- s :;$I : 1xlP 5 4x10- ’ 2x10- 3 

3x10- 6 9x10- 4 

::g : :::: 5 

;::“,c : ;x”:: : 

:% 2 ::;:: 9x10- 6 

;:;r i 1x10--: 4x10-1 0 4x10- 5 

5x10: 7 lxlc- 4 :;:;r : :;;: : 2x10- 4

7 :z:“,L a 1x10- 9 9x10- s 

2x10- 7 ;::;r : 6x10- 9 6x10- 5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

229 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I 

Element ( atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) 

cs 137 .*.. S 6x10- 8 4x10-4 

1x10- 8 1x1* 3 

Chlorine (17) .............. Cl 36 . . . . . : 4x10- 1 2x10- 3 

I 2x10- 8 2x10- 3 

Cl 38 . . . . . S 3x10- 6 ::;e; : 

Chromium (24) .............. Cr 51 . . . . . 5 :;;: : 5x10- 2 

I 2x10- 6 5x10- * 

Cobalt (27) ................ co 57 . ...* S 3x10- 6 2x10- 2 

I 2x10- t 1x1&- 2 

Co 58m . . . . S 2x10- 5 8x10- 2 

I 9x10- 6 6x1& 2 

Co 58 . . . . . S 8x10- ’ 4x1(1 3 

I 5x1* 8 3x10- 3 

Co 60 . . . . . S 3x10- ’ 1x10- 3 

I 9x10- 9 1x10- 3 

Copper (29) ................ Cu 64 . . . . . S 2x10- 6 1x10- 2 

1x10- 6 6x10- 3 

Curium (96) ................ Cm 242 . . . . : lxl@‘O 7x10- 4 

I 2x10-‘0 7x10- 4 

Cm 243 . . . . S 6~10-‘~ 1x10- 4 

I 1x1&10 7x10- 4 

Cm 244 . . . . S 9x10-12 2x10- 4 

I 1 xl&‘0 8x10- 4 

Cm 245 . . . . S 5x10-12 1x10- 4 

1x10-10 8x10- 4 

Cm 246 . . . . : 5xlbli 1x10- 4 

I lxlD_~O 8x10- 4 

Cm 247 . . . . S 5x1&12 1x16 4 

I 1x1&‘0 6x10- 4 

Cm 248 . . . . S 1x1& 5 ;;;,“:: 4x1@ 5 

Cm 249 . . . . : 1x1s 5 6x10- 2 

1x10- 5 6x10- 2 

Dysprosium (66) ............ Dy 165 . . . . : 3x10- 6 1x10- 2 

I 2x10- 6 1x10- 2 

Dy 166 . . . . S 2x10- t 1x10- 3 

I 2x10- 1 1x10- 3 

Einsteinium (99) ........... Es 253 . . . . S 8~1C!-‘~ 7x10- rr 

I 6x10-10 7x10- 4 

Es 254m . . . S 5x10- 9 5x10- * 

I 6x10- 9 5x10- 4 

Es 254 . . . . S 2x1+11 4X10- 4 

1 XlOJO 4x10- 4 

Es 255 . . . . : 5x10-‘0 8x10- 4 

I 4x10-‘0 8x10- 4 

Table 

Column 1 

Air 

(uCi/ml) 

2x10-9 

5xl@‘O 

1x10- 8 

8~10-‘~ 

9x10- 6 

7x1& 8 

4x10- ’ 

8x10- 8 

1x10- 1 

6x1& 9 

6xlL I 

3x1& ’ 

3xlL fJ 

2x1& 9 

1x1& 8 

3x1&10 

7x10- 8 

4xlcL 8 

4x1&12 

;,“;::: 

:g:: 

3x10-12 

2x10-13 

4xlW2 

2x1o-l3 

;,x:::: 

4x10-12 

2x10-‘+ 

4x10-13 

4xlL ’ 

4x10- ’ 

9x10- * 

7x10- 8 

8x10- 9 

7x10- 9 

3x10-11 

2x10-11 

2x10-10 

2x10-10 

6xlOJ 3 

;;;;T:: 

1x10-” 

II 

Column 2 

Water 

(&i/ml) 

2x10- 5 

4x10- 5 

8x10- s 

6x1& 5 

4x10- Q 

4x10- 4 

2x10- 3 

2x10- 3 

5x10- 4 

4x1+ 4 

3x10. 3 

2xlc- 3 

1x10- r, 

9x10- 5 

5x10- 5 

3x10- 5 

3xlOc U 

2xlc!- I* 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

5x10- 6 

2x10- 5 

7x10-6 

3x10- 5 

4x10- 6 

3x10-5 

4x10- 6 

3x10- 5 

4x10- 6 

2x10- 5 

4x10- ’ 

1x10- 6 

2x10- 3 

2x10- 3 

4x10- 4 

4x10- 4 

4x10- 5 

4x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

2x10- 5 

1x10- 5 

1x10- 5 

3x10- 5 

3x10- 5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

230 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(&i/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (pCi/ml) 

Erbium (68) . . . ..*.......... Er 169 . . . . S 6x10, l 3x10- 3 2x10-a 9x10*5 

I 4x10, f 3x10- 3 1x10-a 9x10-s 

Er 171 . . . . S 7x10,/ 3x10- 3 2x10- * 1x10. 4 

6x10- ' 3x10- 3 2x10-a 1x10-' 

Europium (63) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eu 152 . . . . S 4x10- 7 2x10-3 1x10-a 6x10- s 

(T/2=9.2 hrs) I 3x10-' 2x10- 3 1x10- a 6x10 -5 

Eu 152 . . . . S 1x10- 8 2x1o- 3 4xlOJO SX~O-~ 

(T/2=13 w-s) I 2x10- 8 2x10- 3 6~101~ 8x10 -!j 

Eu 154 . . . . S 4x10- 9 6xlO-I( 1X10-'0 2x10 -5 

I 6x10, 4 2xlOJO 2x10 -5 

Eu 155 . . . . S ;;;k YJ 6x10- 3 3x10-9 2x10 -4 

I 7x10- 8 6x10 - 3 3x10-9 2x10 -4 

Fermium (100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fm 254 . . . . S 4x10 -3 2x10-9 1x10 -4 

;::: : I 4x10- 3 2x10-9 1x10 -4 

Fm 255 . . . . S 2x10 - 8 1x10-3 6xlOJo 3x10 -5 

I 1x10- 8 1X10-3 4xlOJO 3x10 -5 

Fm 256 . . . . S 3x10- 9 3x10- 5 1x10J0 9x10 2 

I 2x10- 9 3x10- 5 6xlOJl 9x10 -’ 

Fluorine (9) ............... F 18 ..*..* s 5x10 -6 2x10- 2 2x10- 1 8x10 -4 

I 3x10- 6 1x10-2 9x10-a 5x10 -4 

Gadolinium (64) ............ Gd 153 . . . . S 2x10- ’ 6x10 - 3 8x10-9 2x10 -4 * 9x10- 8 6x10 _ 3 3x10-3 2x10 -4 

Gd 159 . . . . ; 5x10 - ’ 2x10 _ 3 2x10-a 8x10 -5 

4x10- ’ 2x10, 3 1x10 -a 8x10 -5 

Gallium (31) ............... Ga 72 . . . . . I 2x10- ’ 1x10 -3 8~10-~ 4x10 -5 

I 2x10- ’ 1x10 - 3 6~10-~ 4x10 3 

Germanium (32) ............. Ge 71 . . . . . S 1x10-~ 5x10 -2 4x10 -' 2x10 -3 

I 6x10L6 5x10-2 2x10-' 2x10 -3 

Gold (79) .................. Au 196 . . . . S 1x10 -6 5x10 -3 4x10-s 2x10 -4 

I 6x10- ’ 4x10 _ 3 2x10-8 1x10 -4 

Au 198 . . . . S 3x10 c’ 2~10-3 1x10- 8 5x10 -5 

I 2x10- ’ 1x10-3 5x10-9 5x10 -5 

Au 199 . . . . S 1x10-6 5x10-3 4x10-8 2x10 -4 , 8x10-’ 4x10 _ 3 3x10 -8 2x10 -4 

Hafnium (72) ............... Hf 181 . . . . : 4x10 -8 2~10-3 1x10-9 7x10 -5 

I 7x10-8 2x10 - 3 3x10 -9 7x10 _s 

Holmium (67) ............... Ho 166 . . . . S 2x10-’ 9x10-4 7x10- 9 3x10-s 

I 2x10-7 9x10-4 6x10 -9 3x10 -5 

Hydrogen (1) ............... H3 . . . . . . . . S 5x10- 6 1x10 -1 2x10-7 3x10 -3 

5x10-6 1x10-l 2x10 - 7 3x10 -3 

;ub 2x10-3 . . . . 4x10-5 

Indium (49) ................ In 113m . . . S 8xiO-6 4xlL 2 3x10 - ? 1x10 -3 

7x10 - 6 4x10-2 2x10 c 1 1x10 -3 

In 114m . . . ; 1x10 c 1 5x10-4 4x10 -9 2x10 -5 

I 2x10-8 5x10- 4 7xlOdO 2x10 -5 

In 115m . . . S 2x10-6 1x10-2 8x10 - * 4x10 -4 

2x10 -6 lxiO- 2 6x10-8 4x10 i* 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

231 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

In 115 . . . . S 2x10-7 3x10-3 

I 3x10-a 3x10- 3 

Iodine (53) . . . . . . . . . . ..*.a. I 125 . . . . . S 5x10- s 4x10- s 

I 2x10- ? 6x10- 3 

I 126 . . . . . S 8x10- s 5x10- s 

I 129 . . . . . : ;$)r; :;:;r : 

I 7x10- a 6x10- 3 

I 131 . . . . . S 9x10- s 6x10- s 

3x10- ’ 2x10- 3 

I 132 . . . . . : 2x10- 7 2x10- 3 

9x10- 1 5x10- 3 

I 133 . . . . . : 3x10- a 2x10- 4 

I 2x10- J 1x10 -3 

I 134 ..*.. S 5x10- 7 4x10- 3 

I 3x1& 6 2x10 -2 

I 135 . . . . . S 1x10- ’ 7x10 -4 

Irididum (77) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ir 190 . . . . : 

4x10-

1x10-

j 

6 

2x10 -3 

6x10 -3 

I 4x10- 1 5x10 -3 

Ii- 192 . . . . S 1x1% I 1x10 -3 

3x10- * 1x10-3 

Ir 194 . . . . : 2x10-

2x10-

) 

7 

1x10- 3 

9x10 -4 

Iron (26) . . ..*............. Fe 55 . . . . . : 

I 

9x10-

1x10-

1 

6 :;;; -: 

Fe 59 . . . . . S 1x10-7 2x10 13 

I 5x10- * 2x10 -3 

Krypton (36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kr 85m . . . . 

Kr 85 . . . . . 

Sub 

Sub 

6~10-~ 

1x10- s 

. . . . 

. . . . 

Kr 87 . . . . . Sub 1x10- 6 . . . . 

Kr 88 . . . . . Sub 1x10-6 . . . . 

Lanthanum (57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . La 140 . . . . S 2x10- t 7x10. 4 

I 1x10- 1 7x10-4 

Lead (82) . . ..*............. Pb 203 . . . . S 

I 

3x10 -6 

2x10 -6 

1x10-

1x10-

2 

2 

Pb 210 . . . . S 1x10-1* 4x10-6 

2x10 20 5x10- 3 

Pb 212 . . . . : 6x10- 4 

I ;;:;r: 5x10-Q 

Lutetium (71) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lu I77 . . . . S 6x10- I 3x10- 3 

Manganese (25) n............ Mn 52 . . . . . 

I 

S 

5x10-

2x10-

) 

’ 

3x10 -3 

1x10- 3 

I 1x10- ‘J 9x10-4 

Mn 54 . . . . . S 4x10 - I 4x10- 3 

I 4x10- a 3x10- 3 

Table 

Column 1 

Air 

(pCi/ml) 

9x10-s 

1x10- g 

8x10-” 

6x10- g 

9x10-1’ 

1x10- 8 

2x10-11 

2x10- s 

1xlOJd 

1x10- a 

3x10- 9 

3x10- a 

4x10-‘0 

7x10- s 

6x10- g 

1x10- ’ 

1x10- 9 

1x10-a 

4x10- s 

1x10- a 

4x10-s 

9xlOJO 

;::;r : 

3x10 -a 

‘,;g:: 

2x10- 9 

1x10- 7 

3x10- 1 

2x10- a 

2x10- s 

5x10- 9 

4x10- s 

9x10- * 

6x10- a 

4x10-12 

8x10-12 

6x10-1” 

7xlO-lO 

;:;z 8” 

7x10- s 

5x10- s 

1x10- a 

1x10- s 

II 

Column 2 

Water 

(uCi/ml) 

9x10- 5 

9x10-s 

2x10- f 

2x10- 4 

3x10 -l 

9x10- s 

6x10- a 

2x10- Ir 

3x10- t 

6x10- s 

8x10- 6 

2x10- 4 

1x10- 6 

4x10-s 

2x10- s 

6x10- 4 

4x10-s 

7x10-5 

2x10-4 

2x10-4 

4x10-5 

4x10-5 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

;::; r’; 

6xlO-!j 

5x10 -5 

2x10- s 

2x10- s 

4x10- 4 

4x10- 4 

1x10- 1 

2x10-4 

‘,;;;r : 

1x10-4 

1x10-4 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

1x10-4 

1x10--4 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

212 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (vCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

Mn 56 . . . . . S 8x10 - 1 4x10- 3 3x10-8 1x10 -4 

5x10- 1 3x10- 3 2x10 - 8 1x10 -4 

Mercury (80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hg 197m . . . 

Hg 197 . . . . 

: 

I 

S 

I 

7x10 - 1 

8x10. ‘/ 

1x10-6 

3x10 -6 

6x10- 3 

5x10- 3 

9x10, 3 

1x10-2 

3x10-8 

3x10-8 

4x10-a 

9x10 -8 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

3x10-4 

5x10 -4 

Hg 203 . . . . S 

I 

7x10-a 

1x10 -7 

5x10-

3x10-

4 

3 

2x10 -9 

4x10- 9 

2x10 -5 

1x10 -4 

Molybdenum (42) ............ MO 99 . . . . . S 

I 

7x10 -’ 

2x10 -’ 

5x10-

1x10-

3 

3 

3x10 -

7x10-

a 

9 

2x10 w4 

4x10 -5 

Neodymium (60) ............. Nd 144 . . . . S 

I ;;;;-:o’ 

2x10-3 

2x10- 3 :::$f 

7x10 -5 

8x10 - 5 

Nd 147 . . . . S 4x10 -1 2x10- 3 1x10 -e 6x10 -5 

Nd 149 . . . . : 

2x10 -’ 

2x10 -6 

2x10-

8x10-

3 

3 

8x10 -g 

6~10-~ 

6x10 -5 

3x10 -l* 

I 1x10- 6 8x10- 3 5x10 -a 3x10 -4 

Neptunium (93) ............. Np 237 . . . . S 

;::;‘:: 9x10-5 

9x10-4 

lxlOJ3 

4xlOJ2 

3x10 -6 

3x10 -5 

Np 239 . . . . : 

I 

8x10-I 

7x10- 1 

4x10-3 

4x10- 3 

3x10 -8 

2x10 -8 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

Nickel (28) ................ Ni 59 . . . . . S 

I 

5x10-

8x10-

1 

7 

6~10-~ 

6x10~~ 

2x10 -a 

3x10 -8 

2x10 -Ir 

2x10 o-3 

Ni 63 . . . . . S 

I 

6x10-* 

3x10- 7 

8x10-

2x10-

1( 

2 

2x10 -9 

1x10-e 

3x10 -5 

7x10 -4 

Ni 65 . . . . . S 9x10- f 4x10 - 3 3x10 -a 1x10 -4 

5x10- 7 3x10-3 2x10 -8 1x10 -4 

Niobium (Columbium) (41) . . . Mb 93m . . . . 1 1x10-

2x10-

1 

1 

1x10-2 

1x10 -2 

4x10 -9 

5x10 -9 

4x10 -4 

4x10 -4 

Nb 95 . . . . . : 5x10- ’ 3x10-3 2x10 -8 1x10 w4 

1x10--’ 3x10-3 3x10 -9 1x10 -4 

Nb 97 . . . . . : 

I 

6x10 - 6 

5x10-6 

3x10 -2 

3x10- 2 

2x10 -’ 

2x10 -1 

9x10 -I(

9x10 -4 

Osmium (76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OS 185 . . . . S 5x10- ? 2x10 -3 2x10 -a 7x10 -5 

5x10-a 2x10- 3 2x10 -9 7x10 -5 

OS 191m . . . : 2x10-5 7x10-2 6x10 c I 3x10 -3 

I 9x10-6 7x10-2 3x10 _I 2x10 -3 

OS 191 . . . . S 1x10 -6 5x10-3 4x10 -8 2x10 -I, 

OS 193 .*.. : 

4x10-

4x10-

’ 

’ 

5x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

1x10 -8 

1x10 -a 

2x10 -I( 

6x10 -5 

3x10-l 2x10 -3 9x10 -9 5x10 -5 

Palladium (46) ............. Pd 103 . . . . : 1x10 -6 1x10-2 5x10 2 3x10 -4 

7x10-l 8x10 -3 3x10 -8 3x10 w4 

Pd 109 . . . . : 6x10-’ 3x10 -3 2x10 *a 9x10 -5 

I 4x10-7 2x10 -3 1x10-a 7x10 -5 

Phosphorus (15) ............ P 32 . . . . . . S 

I 

7x10 -8 

8x10 -8 

5x10 -4 

7x10 -4 

2x10 -9 

3x10 -9 

2x10 3 

2x10 2 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

233 
STANDARDSFOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONSIN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (&i/ml) (uCi/ml) 

Platinum (78) . . . . . . . . . . . ..a Pt 191 . . . . S 8x10 -I 4x10- 3 3x10 -8 1x10 -4 

I 6x10-l 3x10- 3 2x10 -8 1x10 -4 

Pt 193m . . . S 7x10 -6 

5x10 -6 

3x10 -

3x10-

2 

2 

2x10-

2x10 -

) 

1 

1x10 - 3 

1x10- 3 

Pt 193 . . . . : 1x10 -6 3x10- 2 4x10 -8 9x10-4 

I 3x10- 1 5x10- 2 1x10-e 2x10- 3 

Pt 197m . . . S 6x10 -6 3x1+ 2 2x10- 1 1x10 -3 

I 5x10 -6 3x10 - 2 2x10 -’ 9x10 -4 

Pt 197 . . . . 5 8x10-’ 4x10- 3 3x10-8 1x10 -4 

I 6x10 - 1 3x10-3 2x10 -8 1x10 -4 

Plutonium (94) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pu 238 . . . . S 

:;;g: 

1x10-

8x10 -

4 

h ;:;;;‘: 5x10 -6 

3x10 - 5 

Pu 239 . . . . : 2xlOJ2 

4x10,’ 1 

1x10-

8x10-

Q 

’ !:::i’ 2 

5x10 c 6 

3x10-5 

Pu 240 . . . . : 2xlOJ2 1x10- 4 6~10-1~ 5x10 -6 

I 4x10,” 8x10-“ lxlOJ2 3x10 -5 

Pu 241 . . . . S 9x10-1 1 7x10- 3 3x10 J2 2x10 -4 

I 4x10- 8 4x10- 2 1x10- 9 1x10 -3 

Pu 242 . . . . S 2x10-12 1x10- 4 6x10 -I4 5x10 -6 

Pu 243 . . . . 

I 

S 

4x10-” 

2x10- 6 

9x10-

1x10-

‘( 

2 

1x1012 

6x10e8 

3x10 -5 

3x10 -4 

I 2x10- 6 1x10-2 8x10 - 8 3x10-q 

Pu 244 . . . . S 

:::;-:: 

lxlo-b 

3x10- Ir ;::$” 2 

4x10-6 

1x10 -5 

Polonium (84) .............. PO 210 *... : 5xlOJO 

2x10-‘0 

2x10-

8x10-

5 

’ :;;$ 2 ’ 7x10 - 1 3x10 -s 

Potassium (19) ............. K42 . . . . . . . 5. 2x10- 6 9x10- 3 7x10 -* 3x10 -4 

I 1x10- ’ 6x10- 4 4x10 -9 2x10 -5 

Praseodymium (59) .......... Pr 142 . . . . S 2x10- I 9x10- 4 7x10- 9 3x10 -5 

I 2x10-’ 9x10- 4 5x10 -9 3x10 -5 

Pr 143 . . . . S 3x10- 1 1x10-3 1x10 -8 5x10 -5 

I 2x10- ’ 1X10- 3 6x10 -9 5x10 -5 

Promethium (61) ............ Pm 147 . . . . S 

I 

6x10-

1x10-

* 

’ 

6x10- 3 

6x10 -3 

2x10 -9 

3x10 -9 

2x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

Pm 149 . . . . S 3x10- J 1x10-3 1x10 -8 4x10 -5 

I 2x10- ’ 1x10-3 8x10 -9 4x10 -5 

Protoactinium (91) ......... Pa 230 . . . . S 2x10- 9 7x10 -3 6x10 J ’ 2x10 -rc 

I BxlOJo 7x10 -3 3x10 -11 2x10 -4 

Pa 231 . . . . S 1x10-12 3x10 -5 4x10 J4 9x10 -’ 

1x10-‘0 8x10 -I, 4x10 J2 2x10 -5 

Radium (88) ................ 

Pa 233 

Ra 223 

. . . . 

. . . . 

: 

I 

6x10-

2x10-

2x10-

) 

j 

9 

4x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -* 

6x10ey

6xlOJ’ 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

7x10 -’ 

Ra 224 . . . . 

I 

s 

2xlOJO 

5x10- 9 

1x10-+ 

7x10-5 ;;;;s 

4x10 -6 

2x10 -6 

I 7x10-'0 2x10 -4 2x10-” 5xi0 -6 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

234 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

Ra 226 . . . . S 3x10-" 4x10- 1 3x10-12 3x10-a 

I 5x10-" 9x10- 4 2x1032 3x10-5 

Ra 228 . . . . S 7x10-" 8x10- ’ 2x10-12 3x10-8 

4x10-" 7x10 -4 1x10-12 3x10-5 

Radon (86) .,............... 

Rhenium (75) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rn 220 . . . . 

Rn 2223 

Re 183 . . . . 

: 

S 

3x10-I 

3x10-8 

3x10-6 

.*.. 

..*. 

2x10 -2 

1x10- 8 

3x10- g 

9x10 - 8 6~10-~ 

I 2x10- 1 8x10 - 3 5x10-9 3x10w4 

Re 186 . . . . S 6x10 -I 3x10 -3 2x10-a 9x10--s 

I 2x10- 1x10 -3 8~10-~ 5x10-5 

Re 187 . . . . S 9x10-6 7x10 -2 3x10-' 3x10-3 

I 5x10-' 4x10 3 2x10-a 2x10-3 

Re 188 . . . . S 4x10-1 2x10 -3 1x10-a 6~10-~ 

I 2x10-' 9x10 -4 6~10-~ 3x10-s 

Rhodium (45) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rh 103m . . . S 

I 

8~10-~ 

6~10-~ 

4x10 -1 

3x10 -1 

3x10-6 

2x10--6 

1x10 -2 

1x10 -2 

Rh 105 . . . . S 8x10-l 4x10 -3 3x10 -a 1x10 -4 

I 5x10-' 3x10 -3 2x10-s 1x10 -4 

Rubidium (37) ..a........*.. Rb 86 . . . . . S 

I 

3x10-' 

7x10-a 

2x10 -3 

7x10 -4 

1x10 -a 

2x10-9 

7x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

Rb 87 . . . . . S 5x10- r 3x10 -3 2x10 -a 1x10 -4 

I 7x10-s 5x10 -3 2x10-9 2x10 -4 

Ruthenium (44) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ru 97 . . . . . S 

I 

2x10-6 

2x10-6 

1x10 -2 

1x10 -2 

8x10 -* 

6x10 -a 

4x10 -4 

3x10 -4 

Ru 103 . . . . S 5x10-I 2x10 -3 2x10-a 8x10 -5 

I 8x10-a 2x10 -3 3x10 -9 8x10 -5 

Ru 105 . . . . S 7x10-' 3x10 -3 2x10-s 1x10 -4 

I 5x10- ’ 3x10 -3 2x10 -8 1x10 -4 

Ru 106 . . . . S 8x10-a 4x10 -4 3x10 -9 1x10 -5 

I 6x10-s 3x10-r 2x10-13 1x10 -5 

Samarium (62) ..*........... Sm 147 . . . . S 

I 

7x1031 

3xlOJO :;:; r: 2xlOJ2 

9x10-12 

6x10 -5 

7x10 a 

Sm 151 . . . . S 6x10-e 1x10-2 2x10-9 4x10 -4 

I 1x10.’ 1x10 -2 5x10-9 4x10-4 

Sm 153 . . . . S 

I 

5x10-

4x10-’ 

2x10 -3 

2x10 -3 

2x10-a 

1x10-a 

8x10 -!j 

8x10 a 

Scandium (21) . . ..*......... SC 46 . . . . . S 

I 

2x10- 1 

2x10-8 

1x10-3 

1x10-3 

8x10 -9 

8x10-10 

4x10 -5 

4x10 -5 

SC 47 . . . . . S 6x10 - ’ 3x10-3 2x10-a 

I 5x10- ’ 3x10-3 2x10-a ;;:; r: 

SC 48 . . . . . S 2x10 - ’ 8x10-4 6x10*9 3x10 -5 

I 1x10-I 8x10-4 5x10-9 3x10 -5 

Selenium (34) . . . . ..*....... Se 75 . . . . . S 

I 

1x10-6 

1x10- ’ 

9x10-3 

8~10-~ 

4x10 -8 

4x10-s 

3x10 -4 

3x10 -4 

Silicon (14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Si 31 . . . . . c 

Kl-” -6 

3x10-2 

6x10-' 

2x10-' 

3x10-* 

9x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

235 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(&i/ml) (uCi/ml) (PCi/ml) (&i/ml) 

Silver (47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ag 105 . . . . S 6x10 -’ 

ado -8 

3x10 -3 

3x10 - 3 

2x10 -8 

3x10 -9 

1x10 e4 

1x10 -4 

Ag 1lOm . . . i 

I 

2x10-’ 

1x10 -8 

9x10 -4 

9x10- Ir 

7x10 -9 

3x10-‘0 

3x10-5 

3x10-5 

Ag 111 . . . . 5 

I 

3x10 -’ 

2x10-’ 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -8 

8x10 -9 

4x10 -5 

4x10-5 

Sodium (11) . . . ..a.*........ Na 22 . . . . . S 

I 

2x10 - 1 

9x10-9 

1x10-3 

9x10-4 

6x10 -q 

3xlOJO 

4x10-5 

3x10-s 

Na 24 . . . . . S 1x10- 6 6x10 -3 4x10 -8 2x10-4 

I 1x10 -’ ax10 -4 5x10 -9 3x10-5 

Strontium (38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sr B5m . . . . S 4x10 -5 

3x10 -5 

2x10 - 1 

2x10 - ’ 

1x10 -6 

1x10-6 

7x10-3 

7x10 -3 

Sr a5 . . . . . : 

I 

2x10 -1 

1x10 -I 

3x10 -3 

5x10 -3 

8x10 mq 

4x10 -9 

1x10 -4 

2x10 -4 

Sr a9 . . . . . S 3x10-8 3x10 -4 3xlOLO 3x10 -6 

4x10 -8 8x10-4 1x10 -9 3x10 -5 

Sr 90 . . . . . : 1x10 -9 1x10 -5 3x10-’ 1 3x10 -I 

I 5x10 -9 1x10-3 2x10 10 4x10 -5 

Sr 91 . . . . . S 4x10-’ 2x10 -3 2x10 -8 7x10 -5 

I 3x10- ’ 1x10-3 9x10 -9 5x10 -5 

Sr 92 . . . . . S 4x10 - ’ 2x10 -3 2x10 -8 7x10 -5 

3x10 -1 2x10 -3 1x10 -0 6x10 -5 

Sulfur (16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s 35 . . . . . . : 

I 

3x10 - 1 

3x10 - 1 

2x10 -3 

8x10 2 

9x10 -9 

9x10 -9 

6x10 -5 

3x10 -4 

Tantalum (73) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ta 182 . . . . S 

I 

4x10-

2x10-

* 

0 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -9 

7xlOJO 

4x10 -5 

4x10 -5 

Technetium (43) . . . . . . ...*.. Tc 96m . . . . S ado-5 

3x10-5 

4x10 - 1 

3x10 - 1 

3x10 -6 

1 x10 -6 

1x10 -3 

1x10 -2 

Tc 96 . . . . . : 6x10 -’ 3x10 -3 2x10 -8 1x10 e4 

2x10-’ 1x10 -3 8x10-9 5x10 -5 

Tc 97m . . . . : 2x10 -6 1x10 -2 8x10 -B 4x10 -4 

I 2x10-f 5x10 -3 5x10 -9 2x10 -4 

Tc 97 . . . . . S 1x10’ 5 5x10 --2 4x10 -’ 2x10 -3 

I 3x10 -f 2x10-2 1x10 -8 8x10 -4 

Tc ggm . . . . S 

I 

4x10-5 

1x10 -5 

2x10 -1 

8x10 -2 

1x10 -6 

5x10 -1 

6x10 -3 

3x10 -3 

Tc 99 . . . . . S 2x10 -6 1x10 -2 7x10 -8 3x10 -4 

6x10-* 5x10 -3 2x10 -9 2x10 -4 

Tellurium (52) . . . . . . ..*.a.. Te 125m . . . i 4x10 -’ 5x10 -3 1x10 -8 2x10 -4 

1x10- 3x10 -3 4x10 -9 1x10 -4 

Te 127m . . . f 1x10 -1 2x10 -3 5x10 -9 6x10 -f~ 

I 4x10 -8 2x10 -3 1x10 -9 5x10 -5 

Te 127 . . . . S 2x10 -6 ax10 -3 6x10 we 3x10 - 4 

I 9x10 -1 5x10 -3 3x10 -8 2x10 -4 

Te 129m . . . S ax10 - 8 1x10 -3 3x10 -9 3x10- 5 

I 3x10-8 6x10 A 1x10 -9 2xlfl-s 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

236 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water 

(PCi/ml) (&i/ml) 

Te 129 . . . . S 5x10 -6 2x10 - 2 

2x10 - 2 

Te 131m . . . : “,“x:“, -c ,I 2x10 -3 

2x10 -’ 1x10 -3 

Te 132 . . . . : 2x10-1 9x10 -4 

1x10 -’ 6x10- 4 

Terbium (65) ............... Tb 160 . . . . : 1x10- 1 1x10 -3 

3x10-8 1x10 -3 

Thallium (81) .............. Tl 200 . . . . : 3x10 -6 1x10 -2 

I 1x10 -6 7x10 -3 

Tl 201 . . . . S 2x10 -6 9x10 -3 

I 9x10 -’ 5x10 -3 

Tl 202 . . . . S 4x10 -3 

I ;;:; z: 2x10 - 3 

Tl 204 . . . . S 6x10 -’ 3x10 -3 

I 2x10 -3 

Thorium (90) .*............. Th 227 ..a. S 5x10 -4 ;;:;3: 

I 2xlOJO 5x10 -4 

Th 228 . . . . S 9x10 12 2x10 -4 

I 6x10-12 4x10 z 

Th 230 . . . . S 2x10-‘2 5x10 -5 

10-11 9x10 -4 

Th 231 . . . . : 1x10 -6 

I 1x10 -6 ::g -: 

Th 232 . . . . S 3x10-1 1 5x10 -5-

3x10-I 1 1x10 -3 

Th natural : 6xlOA1 6x10 -5 

I 6x1041 6x10 -4 

Th 234 . . . . S 5x10 -4 

I 5x10 -4 ;::; r,” 

Thulium (69) .*..........,.. Tm 170 . . . . S 4x10 -8 1x10 -3 

1x10 -3

,/ Tm 171 . . . . : ::t -* 1x10 -2 

2x10 -f 1x10-2 

Tin (50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sn 113 . . . . f 4x10 -’ 2x10 -3 

5x10 -8 2x10 -3 

Sn 125 . . . . : 1x10 -I 5x10 -4 

5x10 -4 

Tungsten (Wolfram) (74) . . . . W 181 . . . . . : ;::“,ri 1x10 -2 

I 1x10 -’ 1x10 -2 

W 185 . . . . . S 8x10 - 1 4x10 - 3 

I 1x10-’ 3x10 -3 

W 187 . . . . . S 4x10 -’ 2x1~-3 

I 3x10 L 1 2x10 -3 

Uranium (92) . . ..*....*..... U 230 . . . . . S 1x10 -4 

I :“,:;‘:: 1x10 -4 

Table 

Column 1 

Air 

(PCi/ml) 

2x10 - ‘l 

1x10- 1 

1x10- * 

6x10- g 

7x10 -9 

4x10 -9 

3x10 -9 

1x10 -9 

9x10-8 

4x10-8 

7x10-8 

3x10- * 

3x10-8 

8x10 -g 

2x10- * 

9x10-10 

1x10-” 

;$$ 

2x10-13 

8x10J4 

3xlOJ3 

5x10- 8 

4x10- 8 

lxlOJ2 

1 x10-12 

2x10-12 

2x10-12 

2x10-9 

1x10- 9 

1x10-9 

1x10- 9 

4x10- 9 

8~10-~ 

1x10-8 

2x10- 9 

4x10- 9 

3x10-9 

8x10- 8 

4x10-9 

3x10-8 

4x10-9 

2x10 -8 

1x10- * 

1xlOJ’ 

4xlOJ2 

II 

Column 2 

Water 

(pCi/ml) 

8~10-~ 

8x10m4 

6~10-~ 

4x10-s 

3x10-s 

2x10-s 

4x10-s 

4x10-s 

4x10-4 

2x10-4 

3x10-4 

2x10 -4 

1x10-4 

7x10- 5 

1x10--’ 

6x10-5 

2x10-5 

2x10-5 

7x10 -6 

-5 

2x:: -6 

3x10 -5 

2x10 -4 

2x10-4 

2x10 -6 

4x10 -5 

2x10 -6 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -s 

5x10 -5 

5x10 -5 

5x10 -4 

5x10-4 

9x10 -5 

8x10 -5 

;;‘,; 2 

4x10 -4 

3x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

1x10 -4 

7x10 -5 

6x10 -5 

5x10 -6 

5x10 -6 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

237 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND tiATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I Table II 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(pCi/ml) (&i/ml) (&i/ml) (&i/ml) 

U 232 ..a.. S 1x10-10 8x10 -‘+ 3xlOJ2 3x10 -5 

I 3x10-*1 8x10 -4 9xlOJ3 3x10 -5 

U 233 . . . . . S 5x10-'0 9x10 -4 2x10-" 3x10-5 

lxl&'O 9x10 -4 4x1032 3x10-5 

U 234 . . . . . :4 6~10-1~ 9x10 -4 2xlB" 3x10-5 

U 235 . . . . . 

I 

S' 

IXIO-'0 

5xlOJO 

9x10 -4 

8x10 -’ ;:;$ 3x10 m5 

3x10- 5 

U 236 .,... 

I 

S 

1x10-'0 

6~10-'~ 

8x10 -I( 

1x10 -3 ;;;::: 

3x10- 5 

3x10 -s 1x10-10 1x10 -3 4x10-12 3x10- 5 

U 238 . . . . . :4 7x10-" 1x10 -3 3x10-12 4x10 -5 

1x10-10 1x10 -3 5x10-12 4x10-5 

U 240 ,.... : 2x10- 1 1x10 -3 8~10-~ 3x10 -5 

I 2x10-1 1x10 -3 6~10-~ 3x10-5 

U-natural . Sb 1x10-*0 1x10-3 5x10-12 3x10-5 

1xlOdL' 1x10 -3 5x10-'2 3x10-5 

Vanadium (23) .............. V 48 . . . . . . 1 2x10- / 9x10-’ 6x10-9 3x10-5 

Xenon (54) ................. Xe 131m . . . 

I 

Sub 

6x10-a 

2x10-5 

8x10 -4 

. . . . 

2x10-9 

4x10-' 

3x10 - 5 

. . . . 

Xe 133 . . . . Sub 1x10-s . . . . 3x10-' . . . . 

Xe 133m . . . 

Xe 135 ..,. 

Sub 

Sub 

1x10-5 

4x10-6 

. . . . 

. . . . 

3x10-1 

1x10-

. . . . 

. . . . Ytterbium (70) ............. Yb 175 . . . . S 7x10-t 3x10 - 3 2x10-8 1x10 -4 

6x10- I 3x10 -3 2x10-0 1x10 -4 

Yttrium (39) ............... Y 90 . . . . . . : 1x10-f 6x10 -4 4x10-9 2x10 -5 

Y 91m . . . . . 

I 

S 

1x10-/ 

2x10-* 

6x10- 4 

1x10--’ 

3x10-9 

8x10-' 

2x10 - 5 

3x10 -3 

I 2x10-5 1x10 -1 6x10- I 3x10-3 

Y 91 . . . . . . S 4x10-8 8~10-~ 1x10-9 3x10-5 

Y 92 . . . . . . 

I 

S 

3x10-8 

4x10-' 

8~10-~ 

2x10 -3 

1x10-9 

1x10-a 

3x10 -5 

6x10 -5 

Y 93 . . . . . . 

I 

S 

3x10-' 

2x10-1 

2x10- 3 

8x10-’ 

1x10-

6x10-

8 

9 

6x10 -!j 

3x10 -5 

I 1x10-' 8x10 - 4 5x10- 9 3x10 -4 

Zinc (30) .*.*...*.......... Zn 65 . . . . . S 1x10- 3x10-3 4x10 - 9 1x10 -4 

I 6x10-8 5x10-3 2x10 - 9 2x10 -4 

2n 69m . . . . S 

I 

4x10- ' 

3x10.. J :::K-’ -3 

1x10 - 8 

1x10 -8 

7x10 -5 

6x10 -s 

Zn 69 .,... S 7x10-6 5x10 -2 2x10 -’ 2x10 -3 

I 9x10-6 5x10 -2 3x10- ’ 2x10 -3 

Zirconium (40) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zr 93 

Zr 95 

. . . . . 

. . . . . 

S 

I 

S 

1x10-

3x10-’ 

1x10 -’ 

2X10” 2 

2x10-2 

2x10 -3 

4x10-9 

1x10 -8 

4x10 -9 

8x10 -(( 

8x10 -(( 

6x10 -5 

I 3x10 -8 2x10 -3 1x10 -9 6x10 -5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

238 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table 

Element (atomic number) Isotope Column 1 

Air 

(PCijml) 

Zt- 97 . . . . . S 1x10- J 

I 9x10-a 

'Soluble (S); Insoluble (I). 

I Table II 

Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Water 

(&i/ml) 

Air 

(PCi/ml) 

Water 

(&i/ml) 

5x10-4 

5x10- 4 

4x10 -9 

3x10-9 

2x10 -5 

2x10 -5 

"'Sub" means that values given are for submersion in an infinite cloud of gaseous material. 

NOTE: In any case where there is a mixture 

in air or water of more than one radionuclide, 

the limiting values for purposes of this Annex 

should be determined as follows: 

1. If the identity and concentration of 

each radionuclide in the mixture are known, the 

limiting values should be derived as follows: 

Determine, for each radionuclide mixture, the 

ratio between the quantity present in the mixture and the limit otherwise established in 

Annex I for the specific radionuclide when not 

in a mixture. The sum of such ratios for all 

the radionuclides in the mixture may not exceed 

"1" (i.e., "unity"). 

EXAMPLE: If radionuclides A, B, and C are 

present in concentrations CA, CB, and CC, and 

if the applicable MPC's, are MPCA, and MPCB and 

MPCC respectively, then the concentrations 

shall be limited so that the following relationship exists: 

C

cA + B + cC 5 I 

T F Mm;C 

2. If either the identity or the concentration of any radionuclide in the mixture is not 

known, the limiting values for purposes of 

Annex I shall be: 

a. For purposes 

10-12 

b. For purposes 

c. For purposes 

10-14 

d. For purposes 

10-5 

of Table I, Cal. 1-l X 

of Table I, Col. 2-3 X low7 

of Table II, Col. l-4 X 

of Table II, Col. 2-l X 

3. If any of the conditions specified below 

are met, the corresponding values specified below may be used in lieu of those specified in 

paragraph 2 above. 

a. If the identity of each radionuclide in 

the mixture is known but the concentration of 

one or more of the radionuclides in the mixture 

is not known, the concentration limit for the 

mixture is the limit specified in Annex I for 

the radionuclide in the mixture having the lowest concentration limit; or 

b. If the identity of each radionuclide in 

the mixture is not known, but it is known that 

certain radionuclides specified in Annex I are 

not present in the mixture, the concentration 

limit for the mixture is the lowest concentration limit specified in Annex I for any radionuclide which is not known to be absent from 

the mixture; or 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

239 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

c. Element (atomic number) and isotope 

If it is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, 

PO 210, At 211, Ra 223. Ra 224, Ra 226, 

AC 227, Ra 228, Th 230, Pa 231, Th 232, 

and Th-nat, are not present. 

If it is known that Sr 90, I 129, Pb 210, 

PO 210 Ra 223, Ra 226, Ra 228, Ra 231, 

and Th-nat, are not present. 

If it is known that Sr 90, Pb 210, Ra 226, 

Ra 228, are not present. 

If it is known Ra 226 and Ra 228, are 

not present. 

If it is known that alpha-emitters and Sr 90, 

I 129, Pb 210, AC 227, Ra 228, Pa 230, 

Pu 241, and Bk 249 are not present. 

If it is known that alpha-emitters and 

dPb 210, AC 227. Ra 228 and Pu 241, 

are not present. 

If it is known that alpha-emitters and 

AC 227, are not present. 

If it is known that AC 227, Th 230, Pa 231, 

Pu 238, Pu 239, Pu 240, Pu 242, and 

Cf 249 are not present. 

If Pa 231, Pu 239, Pu 240, Pu 242 and 

Cf 249 are not present. 

4. If the mixture of radionuclides consists 

of uranium and its daughter products in ore 

dust prior to chemical processing of the uranium ore, the values specified below may be used 

in lieu of those determined in accordance with 

paragraph 1 above or those specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. 

a. For purposes of Table 1, Col. 1-1~10-~~ 

PC/ml gross alpha activity; or 2.5x10-11 UC/ml 

natural uranium; or 75 micrograms per cubic 

meter of air natural uranium. 

b. For purposes of Table II, Col. 1-3x 

lo-11 PC/ml gross alpha activity or 8x10-13 

uc/ml natural uranium; or 3 micrograms per 

cubic meter of air natural uranium. 

5. For purposes of this note, a radionuclide may be considered as not present in a mixTable I Table II 

Column 1 Column 2 Column 1 Column 2 

Air Water Air Water 

(uCi/ml) (uCi/ml) (PCi/ml) (uCi/ml) 

. . . . 9x10-5 . . . . 3x10 -6 

*... 6x10D5 . . . . 2x10 - 6 

. . . . 2x10- 5 . . . . 6x10. ’ 

. . . . 3x10-6 . . . . 1x10 - ’ 

3x10- 9 . . . . lxlO_‘~ . . . . 

3x10-‘0 . . . . 1x10-” . . . . 

3x10-1 l ..a. lxlOJ2 . . . . 

3xlOJ2 . ..* 1x1033 . . . . 

2x10-12 .a.. 7x10-” . . . . 

ture if (a) the ratio of the concentration of 

that radionuclide in the mixture (CA) to the 

concentration limit for that radionuclide specified in Table II of Annex I (MPCA) does not 

exceed l/10, 

i.e. _ cA 

MPCA =irj 

and (b) the sum of such ratios for all the radionuclides considered as not present in the 

mixture does not exceed l/4. 

i.e. 'A + '9 + . . . . < ' 

MPCA MPCB z ii 

Revised: February 9, 1968 

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