FILED

September 11, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JUNE SESSION, 1998

TYRONE G. MEADE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9708-CR-00316

)

Appellant, )

)

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JAMES C. BEASLEY, JR.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellee. ) (Post Conviction)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE

CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

RANDALL B. TOLLEY JOHN KNOX WALKUP

242 Poplar Avenue Attorney General and Reporter

Memphis, TN 38103

DOUGLAS D. HIMES

Assistant Attorney General

425 5th Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243

WILLIAM GIBBONS

District Attorney General

JOHN CAMPBELL

Assistant District Attorney General

Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301

201 Poplar Street

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
-2-

OPINION

The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. He was convicted by a jury verdict of two counts of second

degree murder. He sought post-conviction relief asserting that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the

trial court denied relief and we affirm.

The Defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree murder for

shooting and killing Charles Matthews and Lavester Jefferson in Memphis,

Tennessee. He originally received an effective sentence of forty years. He

appealed his convictions and his sentence and this court affirmed his convictions

but remanded for resentencing. State v. Meade, 942 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1996). The record indicates that upon resentencing he received two

concurrent twenty-year sentences. 

With the assistance of counsel, the Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief on March 18, 1997. The petition alleged that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to zealously represent the Defendant, failing to file pretrial

motions, failing to object to testimony, failing to investigate, failing to crossexamine witnesses, failing to properly advise the Defendant concerning his right

to testify, failing to request a mental evaluation, failing to raise the issue of

diminished capacity and failing to adequately prepare for trial.
1

For a detailed summary of the facts developed at trial, see State v. Meade, 942 S.W.2d

561, 563-564 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

-3-

First, we will briefly discuss the underlying facts. The Defendant gave the

police a statement, which was introduced at his trial, in which he admitted that he

had shot and killed both victims. He said that the victims were “crazy” and “high”

on both alcohol and drugs. The men were insulting both him and his girlfriend

and he felt threatened by the way they were talking. He told them to leave but

they would not, so he shot the first victim. He subsequently got into an argument

with the second victim and shot him also. The autopsy report indicated that both

victims died of multiple gunshot wounds with at least one wound to the back of

each victim’s head at close range. Both victims tested positive for cocaine and

alcohol.1 At the post-conviction hearing, the Defendant testified and again

admitted that he had killed both victims. He said that he killed one of the victims

in self defense because he was “threatened or provoked” and that the victim had

a gun. He said that the other victim also threatened him, but he didn’t know if

that victim had a gun or not. He further stated that he had “over-reacted” when

he shot the second victim and that his overreaction may have been due to the

fact that he had consumed alcohol that evening.

In this appeal, the Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

because (1) he filed no pretrial motions to test the strength of the State’s case,

(2) he failed to file a motion to suppress the statements Defendant had given to

police, (3) he filed no motions for discovery, (4) he filed no motion in limine to

inquire as to whether a prior manslaughter conviction could be used against the

Defendant if he testified, (5) he performed an inadequate investigation of the

facts, (6) he failed to investigate or raise the issue of diminished capacity or
-4-

request a pretrial mental evaluation, (7) he made unprofessional errors in

judgment, (8) he gave improper advice concerning the decision not to offer any

defense proof, including proof of self defense, (9) he misrepresented to the

Defendant that he would prevail at trial, and (10) he exhibited an overall lack of

effort and zeal.

Trial counsel testified at great length concerning the various allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel. He testified that he filed no pretrial motions

because he thought none were necessary in view of his theory of self defense.

He said he saw no grounds on which to file a motion to suppress the Defendant’s

statement. He stated that he filed no discovery motions because the district

attorney’s office gave him free and open access to their entire file. Trial counsel’s

testimony was unclear concerning his failure to file a motion to test the

admissibility of the Defendant’s prior manslaughter conviction as contemplated

by Rule 609(a)(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. It is clear, however, that

at trial the judge ruled that the Defendant’s testimony could not be impeached by

reference to this prior conviction and that the Defendant nevertheless decided not

to testify. 

Trial counsel testified that he adequately investigated this case and that his

investigator contacted eleven of the eighteen witnesses whose names were given

him by the Defendant. He obtained statements from these witnesses and

statements from other witnesses who testified for the State. Trial counsel further

testified that he saw no indications that the Defendant suffered from any mental

defects or that “diminished capacity” was a legitimate issue in this case. Counsel

testified that in his view, the only defense to the second degree murder charges
-5-

was self defense or provocation, and he believed he raised these issues fully by

cross examination of witnesses and through the statements which the Defendant

had made to the police. Trial counsel further testified that he advised the

Defendant fully concerning the decision whether to testify at trial. He stated that

the Defendant decided he did not desire to testify. Trial counsel generally denied

the remaining factual allegations presented in the post-conviction petition as

alleged by the Defendant during his testimony at the post-conviction proceeding.

Other than the Defendant and his trial counsel, the primary additional

witness at the post-conviction hearing was a clinical psychologist who testified

generally that the Defendant’s history of alcohol abuse could possibly have

affected his mental capacity and decision-making process at the time of the

killings.

Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court filed a

written order denying post-conviction relief. The court found that many of

counsel’s decisions and the actions complained of by the Defendant fell clearly

in the category of trial strategy and trial tactics, and the court found no

shortcomings in counsel’s actions. Concerning the lack of pretrial motions and

discovery, the post-conviction court accredited counsel’s decision not to pursue

said motions in view of the open access counsel was given to the State’s file and

his judgment that further motions were unnecessary. The court further found that

trial counsel had thoroughly investigated the case prior to proceeding to trial. The

post-conviction court concluded that defense counsel had provided effective

representation to the Defendant and had represented the Defendant to the best

of his ability. The court further concluded that defense counsel had the
-6-

experience and ability to evaluate and properly prepare a criminal case for trial

and had done so in the case at bar. The court accordingly determined that the

Defendant had not established his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and

therefore was not entitled to post-conviction relief.

In determining whether counsel provided effective assistance at trial, the

court must decide whether counsel’s performance was within the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523

S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To succeed on a claim that his counsel was

ineffective at trial, a petitioner bears the burden of showing that his counsel made

errors so serious that he was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment and that the deficient representation prejudiced the petitioner

resulting in a failure to produce a reliable result. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Cooper v. State, 849 S.W .2d 744, 747 (Tenn. 1993); Butler

v. State, 789 S.W .2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). To satisfy the second prong, the

petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unreasonable error, the fact finder would have had reasonable doubt regarding

petitioner’s guilt. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This reasonable probability must

be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Harris v. State, 875

S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994).

When reviewing trial counsel’s actions, this court should not use the benefit

of hindsight to second-guess trial strategy and criticize counsel’s tactics. Hellard

v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). Counsel’s alleged errors should be

judged at the time they were made in light of all facts and circumstances.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see Cooper, 849 S.W.2d at 746.
-7-

In post-conviction relief proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of

proving the allegations of fact in his or her petition by clear and convincing

evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). The factual findings of the trial court

are conclusive on appeal unless the appellate court finds that the evidence

preponderates against the judgm ent. Butler, 789 S.W.2d at 899. In the case at

bar, the trial court found that defense counsel had adequately investigated the

case against the Defendant and had diligently prepared for trial and zealously

represented this Defendant. The post-conviction court further determined that

other actions of trial counsel properly fell within the category of trial strategy and

tactics. The Judge further concluded that the Defendant had not established his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We believe the record supports the

findings and conclusions of the post-conviction judge. From our review of this

record, even if we determined that trial counsel was ineffective in some way, we

do not believe that the Defendant has established prejudice. He has not

demonstrated a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine our confidence in

the outcome, that but for counsel’s error, the jury would have had a reasonable

doubt regarding the Defendant’s guilt.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief

is affirmed.

___________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
-8-

CONCUR:

___________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

___________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE