DNA-TR-87-116 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR MILITARY 

PARTICIPANTS 

Exercises Desert Rock I, II., and Ill-Operation 

Buster=Jangle 

M. Barrett, et al. 

Science Applications International Corporation 

P.O. Box 1303 

McLean, VA 22102-1303 

22 December 1987 

Technical Report 

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I1 TITLE (include Securlty C~JurfrcJtJon~ 

ANALYSIS DF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR MILITARY PARTICIPANTS 

Exercises Desert Rock I, II, and III-Operation Buster-Jangle 

I2 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) 

Barrett, M; Goetz, J.; Klemm, J.; Ortlieb, E.; Thomas, C. 

l3a rYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Monfh, l,Jy) 15. PAGE COUNT 

.Technical CROW 861774 ~0371772 

I6 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

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17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Conrrnue on reverse if necessary and rdentrfy by block number) 

FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Operation Buster-Jangle Exercise Desert Rock III 

06 07 Exercise Desert Rock I Radiation Exposure Assessment 

13 03 Exercise Desert Rock II Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

19 ABSTRACT (Contwwe on reverse of necessary Jnd fdentrb by block number) 

Radiation doses to observers, maneuver troops, technical projects, and support units for 

Exercises Desert Rock I, II, and III are reconstructed for each applicable shot of Operation Euster-Jangle (1951). Residual radiation doses are calculated from the characterized radiation environments and the activity scenarios of the participants. Uncertainties 

are determined from the variances of each parameter used in the calculations. Exposure tc 

initial radiation was negligible, but the 50-year bone dose commitment from exposure to 

internal emitters was siqnificanL for some personnel due to the type and duration of activities ;n the resuspendible debris from the surface and underground shots (Sugar and 

Uncle). Calculated mean film badge equivalent doses for the Desert Rock exercises ranged 

up to 0.55 rezl for observers, 0.08 rem for maneuver troops, and about 3.6 rem for a Desert 

Rock I II engineer evaluator (Shot Uncle). Exposure of support units, if personnel had noi 

been rotated, could have led to mean doses ranging to 3.7 rem. Internal doses were as 

high as 2.9 rem bone dose commitment for Desert Rock II ordinance and engineer 

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19. ABSTRACT (continued) 

evaluators at Shot Sugar who also returned to the site (in 1952) after the operation 

for final ovaluation of test equipment, and 2.2 rem for engineer recovery and restoration personnel in 1952. 

UNCLASSIFIED ii 

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sectim 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

LIST OF TABLES 

1 INTRODUCTION 

2 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK I 

2.1 SHOT DATA 

2.2 PARTICIPATION 

2.3 CONCEPT 

2.4 OPERATIONS 

3 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK II 

3.1 SHOT DATA 

3.2 PARTICIPATION 

3.3 CONCEPT 

3.4 OPERATIONS 

4 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK III 

4.1 SHOT DATA 

4.2 PARTICIPATION 

4.3 CONCEPT 

4.4 OPERATIONS 

5 INITIAL RADIATION 

6 RESIDUAL GAMMA EXTERNAL EXPOSURE 

6.1 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK I 

6.2 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK II 

6.3 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK III 

6.4 POST-EXERCISE ACTIVITIES 

Page 

V 

vi 

1 

5 

5 

5 

8 

12 

19 

19 

19 

24 

25 

31 

31 

31 

35 

36 

42 

45 

46 

53 

61 

73 

iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 

section Page 

7 INTERNALRADIATIONEXPOSURE 76 

7.1 EXERCISE DESERTROCK I 76 

7.2 EXERCISESDESERT ROCK IIAND III 77 

8 UNCERTAINTYANALYSISANDTOTALDOSEDETERMINATION 83 

8.1 INTRODUCTION 83 

8.2 EXERCISEDESERTROCK I 84 

8.3 EXERCISESDESERT ROCK II AND111 85 

8.4 TOTALDOSESUMMARY 89 

9 FILMBADGEDOSIMETRY 92 

10 CONCLUSIONS 98 

11 LISTOFREFERENCES 100 

AVAILABILITY INFORMATION 104 

iv 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

Page 

Shot locations, Operation Buster-Jangle 2 

Shot Dog area 14 

Shot Sugar area 27 

Shot Uncle area 37

Shot Dog initial gamma radiation dose 43 

Shot Charlie residual radiation (R/hr @ H+l) and the 47 

Shot Dog display area 

Shot Dog residual radiation (R/hr @ H+l) and observer and 50 

maneuver troop routes 

Shot Sugar residual radiation (R/hr @ H+l) and the Desert Rock 56 

display positions 

Shot Uncle residual radiation (R/hr @ H+l) and the Desert Rock 62 

display positions 

Routes to the Shot Uncle display areas 64 

Display Positions 1 and 2, Shot Uncle 74 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table 

1 Buster-Jangle shot data 

2 Approximate personnel allocations 

Exercise Desert Rock I 

for participants at 

3 Exercise Desert Rock I support units 

4 Exercise Desert Rock II support units 

5 Technical service evaluation of displays, Shot Sugar 

6 Exercise Desert Rock III support units 

7 Technical service evaluation of displays, Shot Uncle 

8 Calculated daily external doses, Exercise Desert Rock I 

9 Calculated daily external doses, Exercise Desert Rock II 

IO Calculated daily external doses, Exercise Desert Rock III 

11 Internal bone dose commitment per unit external dose 

I2 Calculated daily 

Exercise Desert 

internal 

Rock II 

bone dose commitments, 

13 Calculated daily 

Exercise Desert 

internal 

Rock III 

bone dose commitments, 

14 Dose summary, Exercises Desert Rock I, II, and III 

Page 

6 

9 

10 

22 

29 

32 

39 

52 

54 

69 

79 

81 

82 

90 

vi 
SECTION 1 

INTRODUCTION 

This report is an analysis of the nuclear radiation exposure for military 

participants in the 1951 series of nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 

series was designated Operation Buster-Jangle. 

Operation Buster-Jangle consisted of seven shots (figure I), detonated over a 

period of about six weeks, 22 October through 29 November 1951. Exercises Desert 

Rock I, II, and III, conducted in conjunction ‘with the operation, consisted of military 

activities at three of the tests: Shots Dog, Sugar, and Uncle. Exercise Desert Rock III 

continued until 11 December and the participants departed 14 December 1951. As the 

objectives, organization, troops, and rad-safe responsibilities of the three exercises 

differed, this report addresses each exercise separately. 

There were four types of military participation in the Desert Rock exercises. 

The first consisted of observers, who were military personnel sent to Camp Desert 

Rock (CDR) for the specific purpose of observing one shot. Observers participated in 

Shots Dog, Sugar and Uncle. 

The second type of military participation consisted of a battalion-size maneuver 

unit that moved to Camp Desert Rock for the purpose of engaging in a tactical 

exercise to test doctrine being considered for the nuclear battlefield. One such 

exercise was conducted: an Army Battalion Combat Team (BCT), organized from four 

units, maneuvered at Shot Dog. 

Third, there were the personnel assigned to CDR, who planned, administered and 

supported the exercises. Some support elements actually participated in shots as 

technical services support personnel or their effects evaluators. It is also likely that 

some CDR support personnel witnessed Shot Easy (Operation Buster) from the 

observation point. 

The fourth type of participation was the use of evaluators and monitors from the 

technical services to assess damage and measure radiation levels. During Exercises 

Desert Rock II and III, monitors accompanied the observers (References 1, 2). 
UNCLE 

e

SUGAR 

l EASY I

BAK.ER, CHARLIE, DOG # 

ABLE 

-I 

Control Point 

NEVADA 

TEST 

SITE 

mi I es 

Figure 1. Shot locations, Operation Buster-Jangle. 

2 
It should be noted that a major category of military participation, not a part of 

Exercise Desert Rock, consisted of projects conducted under the sponsorship of Field 

Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. These efforts, as well as the 

support provided by Department of Defense personnel to other test groups and to the 

overall operation, are to be analyzed only as necessary to supplement available film 

badge dosimetry. 

Activities for each of the shots are traced from the pre-shot orientation through 

the shot activities, including any tactical maneuver and post-shot equipment inspection. Time-dependent position information is presented in order that an exposure 

analysis can be performed to determine the integrated dose from all contributing 

sources, principally the external dose due to residual radiation from the shot and 

applicable preceding shots. 

The analysis utilizes an automated procedure, developed previously (Reference 3) 

for determining the external dose due to residual radiation. Radiological survey data 

are fit, in statistical regression analyses, to space-time models of residual radiation 

intensity, from which isointensity contours (isopleths) are then developed. 

As in previous reports, the methodology also considers the effect of soil 

activation in the residual radiation analysis. This is appropriate for Shot Dog, where 

the residual contamination at the post-shot times of interest was primarily due to the 

neutron-induced activity of manganese-56 and sodium-24. For Shots Sugar and Uncle, 

the major contribution to residual radiation was from fission products. In all cases, 

the decay model is representative of actual shot conditions, verified by correlations 

with available data. 

The methodology for determining personnel dose is essentially the same as that 

used in previous analyses (References 3, 4, 5), in which comparisons with dosimetric 

data established a high degree of confidence. For Exercise Desert Rock I, such 

comparison is made between calculated dose and available film badge records. Due to 

the lack of film badge dosimetry data for most personnel of Exercises Desert Rock II 
and III, only minimal comparison of calculated dose with film badge dose is possible. 

However, the methodology for determining personnel dose is not significantly different 

than that used in previous analyses (References 3, 41, in which comparisons with 

dosimetric data established a high degree of confidence. Uncertainties in the results 

are due primarily to the uncertainties in both the radiological surveys and the timeposition descriptions of troop activities. Automation of the dose estimation procedure 

facilitates the determination of confidence levels and aids in subsequent exposure 

analyses of other troop operations in the same radiologically contaminated areas. 

The major finding of this report is that the external radiation doses for Exercise 

Desert Rock participants without surviving dosimetry ranged from less than .Ol rem 

(observers at Shot Dog) to about 3 rem for some evaluators and support troops at the 

surface and underground shots. Some of these evaluators accrued another 1.9 rem in 

January 1952 when they returned to the test site to assess the effects on test positions 

not accessible earlier. There is evidence to suggest that no personnel who were not 

already identified in rad-safe documents exceeded the 3 rem dose limit for the 

exercise; e.g., different evaluators were assigned for the high exposure activities at 

Exercises Desert Rock II and III. However, internal (bone) dose commitments were 

relatively high for evaluators and support units due to the highly resuspendible debris 

from the underground shot (Uncle) and the late (January) reentry into the shot areas. 
SECTION 2 

EXERCISE DESERT ROCK I 

2.1 SHOT DATA. 

A summary of the five test shots detonated during the Buster phase of Operation 

Buster-Jangle is contained in table 1. Although Exercise Desert Rock troops participated only at Shot Dog, all shots are considered to account for any residual radiation 

that might have contributed to their total radiation dose. 

2.2 PARTICIPATION. 

Operation Buster-Jangle was the first nuclear test series during which a large 

number of tactical troops received realistic training in the tactical aspects of atomic 

warfare. To support and control the exercise, approximately 3500 troops from the 

Sixth Army’s III Corps were assigned the mission of organizing, constructing, and 

staffing the support facilities that were designated Camp Desert Rock. Initial plans 

were to dismantle Camp Desert Rock and return all support units to their home 

stations following Shot Dog on 1 November 1951. However, on 3 November, orders 

were received from the Commanding General, Sixth Army stating, in effect, that the 

camp would remain open to support the troops that would participate at Shots Sugar 

and Uncle, the last two shots planned for Operation Buster-Jangle. 

The tactical exercise held in conjunction with Shot Dog was originally designated 

Exercise Desert Rock, and by 20 October 1951, approximately 3700 troops arrived at 

Camp Desert Rock to participate in the testing and training programs. These 

activities included the troop observer program and a tactical troop maneuver to be 

conducted in the Shot Dog area. The 1095 maneuver troops were drawn primarily from 

the 1 lth Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the observer troops came 

from all services with the majority, approximately 2300, being Army personnel 

(References 1,9). 

For exercise direction, elements of the Desert Rock staff were responsible for 

advising, training, supporting, and controlling the observer and maneuver troops. The 

5 
Table 1. Buster-Jangle shot data. 

shot (AEC 

Designation) 

Exercise 

Desert Rock 

Date (1951) 

Actual 

(Sched) 

Able 22 October 

( 19 October) 

Baker 28 October 

(23 October) 

Charlie 30 October 

(26 October) 

1 November 

(29 October) 

Easy 5 November 

(1 November) 

Sugar II 19 November 

(I 5 November) 

Uncle III 29 November 

(29 November) 

Local 

Time 

(PST) 

0600 

0720 

0700 

0730 

0830 

0900 

1200 

Location 

Coordinates 

WTM) 

Area 7 (5) 

868042 

Area 7 (3) 

871045 

Area 7 (3) 

871045 

Area 7 (3) 

871045 

Area 7 (I) 

867053 

Area 9a 

854097 

Area 10 

850139 

Source: 

Burst 

Height * 

(rt> 

1OOT 

I,1 18A 

1,132A 

1,417A 

1,314A 

3.5s 

-17u 

References 

Yield 

(K-I-1 

co.1 

3.5 

14 

21 

31 

1.2 

1.2 

1, 2, 32 

+ T-Tower; A-Air Drop; S-Surface; U-Underground 
Control Group elements particularly involved in shot-day operations were the Control 

Staff and its Advisory Group, the Radiological Safety Unit, and the Effects Evaluation 

Teams. 

0 The Control Staff consisted of 19 officers and enlisted men. They were to 

supervise the exercise and maintain contact with the Exercise Director. 

The Advisory Group to the Control Staff consisted of officers from the 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) who provided pre-shot 

indoctrination briefings for the observers and maneuver troops on nuclear 

weapons and their effects. Post-shot, this group briefed the exercise 

troops as they toured the equipment displays. The Control Staff utilized 

military police and signal personnel to assist in the exercise operations in 

the forward area. 

0 The Radiological Safety Unit, under the direction of the AFSWP Radiological Safety Officer, was responsible for establishing and enforcing radiological safety criteria and establishing radiation surveys. Fifteen radiological monitors from the Chemical Corps School at Fort McClellan, arrived at 

Camp Desert Rock on 16 October. These monitors trained 45 monitors 

from the 1st Battalion, 188th Airborne Regiment, as well as 15 monitors 

from other units participating in the exercise. An additional 15 monitors 

were provided by the AEC who were responsible for overall radiological 

safety of personnel at the test site. Monitors accompanied the troops 

throughout their maneuver and other activities in the shot area. The 

Radiological Safety Unit was also responsible for personnel and equipment 

decontamination in the forward area and for issuing and collecting all film 

badges; film badges were processed by an Army Signal Corps photographic 

unit (Reference 1). 

0 The Effects Evaluation Teams, one each from the III Corps Chemical, 

Signal, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, and Quartermaster sections, assessed 

the effects of the Shot Dog detonation on military equipment and field 
fortifications. Each team was responsible for constructing or emplacing 

equipment displays for Shot Dog, recovering equipment after the detonation, and preparing a report of its findings. Technical assistance to the 

Effects Evaluation Teams was provided by the Advisory Group. 

While in the forward area during rehearsals and on shot day, personnel from 

these staff groups formed six teams, one at each display position (positions 1-5) and 

the BCT position. Each team was comprised of members of the Control Staff, 

Advisory Group, rad-safe units, Effects Evaluation Teams, military police, signal 

personnel, and photographers. These teams guided the observers and maneuver troops 

through each display area and provided nuclear damage effects briefings. While in the 

forward area, these personnel were designated the Control Group. A seventh team 

was the Miscellaneous Group, composed primarily of rad-safe personnel trained in 

decontamination, medical personnel who provided aid stations in the forward area, and 

personnel responsible for collecting film badges from the exercise participants. Table 

2 summarizes the approximate number of troops participating in the forward area. 

Table 3 lists the units providing support for Exercise Desert Rock I.* 

2.3 CONCEPT. 

The objectives of Exercise Desert Rock were to (I) provide indoctrination 

training in the tactical employment of nuclear weapons, (2) determine the effects of 

nuclear weapons on various types of ground forces equipment and various tactical 

formations, and (3) determine the psychological reaction of troops witnessing a nuclear 

detonation and passing through a radiologically contaminated area soon thereafter. 

Radiological safety plans were designed to minimize exposure to ionizing radiation 

while allowing participants to conduct realistic military exercises. The radiological 

safety criterion specified for the exercise was that no Desert Rock personnel were to 

enter any area where the intensity was greater than 1 R/hr (Reference 1). Subject to 

radiological constraints, the troop maneuver was allowed near ground zero as long as 

there was no interference with instrumentation or other experiments. 

* Reference 1 indicates that the 95th Engineer Construction Battalion was scheduled 

to participate in the exercise, but the unit did not participate. 
Table 2. Approximate personnel allocations for 

Exercise Desert Rock I. 

Maneuver Troops 

Observers 

Army

Navy

Marine Corps 

Air Force 

Control Group 

Control Staff 

Display Position iI 1 

Display Position # 2 

Display Position i/ 3 

Display Position # 4 

Display Position # 5 

BCT Position 

Miscellaneous Group 

Total Participants (approx.) 

Source: 

participants 

1095 

2300 

200 

188 

200 

19 

30 

81 

36 

18 

31 

26 

73 

4300 

References 

at 

1, 6, 7, 8 
Table 3. Exercise Desert Rock I support units. 

Planned 

Unit Home Station Complement 

Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, III Corps* 

Camp Roberts, California 319 

Headquarters and Headquarters Fort Lewis, Washington 122 

Battery, III Corps Artillery* 

806th Army Postal Unit Fort Lewis, Washington 15 

231st Engineer Combat Fort Lewis, Washington 701 

Battalion* 

Detachment, 597th Engineer Fort Huachuca, Arizona 24 

Light Equipment 

(attached)* 

Company 

359th Engineer Utility Camp Cooke, California 88 

Detachment 

90th Engineer Water Supply Fort Lewis, Washington 75 

Company* 

Maintenance Platoon, 705th Fort Huachuca, Arizona 70 

Engineer Field Maintenance 

Company 

374th Convalescent Center(-)* Fort Lewis, Washington 258 

94th Veterinary Food Inspection Fort Lewis, Washington 5 

Detachment* 

Company A, 505th Xlilitary Camp Roberts, California 154 

Police Battalion* 

Company C, 505th Military Camp Roberts, California 154 

Police Battalion* 

Headquarters and Headquarters Camp Cooke, California 36 

Detachment, 393d Ordnance 

Battalion* 

161s.t Ordnance 

Company (-I* 

Depot Camp Cooke, California 98 

* Available documentation indicates that some elements of these units had preand/or post-shot assignments in the forward area. 

10 
Table 3. Exercise Desert Rock I support units (Concluded). 

Planned 

Unit Home Station Complemer 

3623d Ordnance Company Camp Cooke, California 195 

(Medium Maintenance)* 

Detachment, Headquarters and Utah General Depot 74 

Headquarters Company, 53d 

Quartermaster Base Depot 

Company* 

1st Platoon, 523d Quartermaster Utah General Depot 45 

Subsistence Depot Company* 

Platoon, 539th Quartermaster Fort Lewis, Washington 73 

Laundry Company 

621st Quartermaster Service Fort Lewis, Washington 63 

C om pany 

Detachment, Headquarters and Camp Cooke, California 244 

Headquarters Company, 303d 

Signal Service Battalion 

(augmented)* 

Detachment, Headquarters and Camp Cooke, California 218 

Headquarters Company and 

Company B, 314th Signal 

Service Battalion* 

Detachment, 504th Signal Base Sacramento Signal 18 

Maintenance Company* Depot, California 

4th Transportation Truck Camp Stoneman, California 126 

Company* 

92d Transportation Car Camp Roberts, California 129 

Company* 

562d Transportation Staging Camp Stoneman, California 130 

Area Company* 

TOTAL 3434 

Source: Reference 9 

* Available documentation indicates that some elements of these units had preand/or post-shot assignments in the forward area. 

11 
The maneuver troops were organized into a composite battalion combat team. 

Pre-shot activities of the BCT were to include orientation briefings by AFSWP 

personnel on nuclear weapons and their effects, preparation of a battalion defensive 

position approximately 3500 yards from GZ, and several rehearsals. On shot day, the 

BCT, troop observers, and the Control Group were to observe Shot Dog from a point 

approximately seven miles south of CZ (position 6). After the initial radiological 

survey of the shot area, the Control Group would move forward to the equipment 

display areas that had been radiologically cleared. The observer troops would then 

follow the Control Group and view the display areas. After the observer troops 

departed the observation point for the display area, the BCT troops were to be 

transported to their previously prepared defensive position where they would inspect 

the damage to equipment and field fortification. The BCT was then to attack, on foot, 

an objective area near GZ. They were to be accompanied by radiological safety 

monitors who would determine, based on the criterion of 1 R/hr, the limits of safe 

advance. After reaching the objective area, the maneuver would be terminated and 

the BCT was to inspect the display areas nearest surface zero, being briefed at each 

area by. personnel of the Control Group. Finally, all personnel were to entruck for the 

return trip to Camp Desert Rock (Reference 10). 

2.4 OPERATIONS. 

By 20 September 1951, III Corps Headquarters personnel had arrived at Camp 

Desert Rock and an operational staff was organized for the planning of the troop 

exercise to be held in conjunction with Shot Dog, scheduled for 1 November. It was 

announced that the troops participating in Exercise Desert Rock would be drawn 

primarily from the 1 lth Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. By 10 

October, Operation Order 1 (Operation Thundercloud) was distributed to the participating units. 

Troops of the 11th Airborne Division arrived at Camp Desert Rock during the 

period 12-15 October 1951, and provided the nucleus of the BCT. The participating 

1 lth Airborne units were: 

12 
0 1st Battalion, 188th Airborne Infantry Regiment* 

0 3d Medical Platoon, 188th Airborne Medical Company 

0 Platoon, Company A, 127th Engineer Combat Battalion 

In addition, Battery C, 546th Field Artillery Battalion from Fort Lewis, Washington 

augmented the 1 Ith Airborne units. Troops from these four units were organized into 

the BCT that maneuvered at Shot Dog, 

Between 16 and 20 October, the BCT received its exercise orientation and 

prepared a defensive position approximately 3500 yards southwest of the Shot Dog GZ 

(figure 2). The position included foxholes, observation posts, and military equipment. 

Also depicted in the figure are the objective area, the equipment display area 

(positions l-5), and the observation area (position 6) from which all exercise participants observed the Shot. 

The first rehearsal for Shot Dog was conducted on 21 October. This rehearsal 

included a simulated countdown and a post-shot maneuver by the BCT from its 

defensive position to the objective area (see figure 2). Display positions 1 and 2 were 

not yet completed, as several impending detonations (Shots Able, Baker and Charlie) 

would have adversely affected equipment displayed in them. After the maneuver 

rehearsal, the BCT may have walked through the general area of the displays prior to 

entrucking for the return trip to Camp Desert Rock. 

The bulk of the approximately 2800 observer troops arrived at Camp Desert 

Rock by 26 October, in time to participate in at least one of the exercise rehearsals 

conducted on 21 and 27 October. 

Shot Able, the first shot in the series, was conducted on 22 October 1951. There 

were no Exercise Desert Rock activities held in conjunction with this detonation. 

Between 23 and 26 October, the BCT continued to improve their defensive position in 

* Morning reports and associated documents indicate that each of the four line 

companies (A, B, C & D) was augmented by temporary assignments of about 30 

personnel from the corresponding companies in the 2d Battalion (Companies E, F, G, 

and H). 

13 
' --

.*' 

.' _ I - ._ I f . 1, , II/,) 

1 1 --+-++S~O~Z~D@+,~ 

e 

l-l 

Pdint 

I 

, 

I 

0 

a 

d 

II 

%=-N 

7’00 

95 

‘94 

‘93 

[EET

‘092 

;91 

-%c 

Figure 2. Sllot Dog area. 

14 
the forward area and, on 27 October, the second Shot Dog rehearsal was conducted. 

This rehearsal should have included all of the troop observers, maneuver troops 

Control Group, and evaluation teams. Emplacements probably were completed at 

display positions 1 and 2, but equipment would not have been placed in them. It is 

assumed that all activities planned for shot day were accomplished during this 

rehearsal. 

Shot Baker was detonated on 28 October and Shot Charlie was detonated on 30 

October. Both of these airdrops were detonated over the same CZ as for Shot Dog. It 

was recorded in the morning report of the 303d Signal Service Battalion that 158 of 

their troops observed Shot Charlie, probably from position 6, the observation area. 

There are no indications that these troop went forward after the shot. As expected, 

Shot Charlie caused some damage to the equipment emplacements at positions 1 and 2. 

By the afternoon of 31 October, these emplacements had been repaired and equipment 

that was to be tested at Shot Dog was in place at all display areas. Also during the 

early afternoon of 31 October, the BCT returned to their defensive position and 

attached film badges and position tags to individual weapons, equipment, and vehicles 

to facilitate the post-shot evaluation of blast and radiation effects from the shot. All 

troops, except for a guard detail of three officers and ten enlisted men, then returned 

to Camp Desert Rock (Reference 1). 

Shot Dog was detonated at 0730 hours on I November. All troops had arrived at 

the observation area by 0630 hours; the guard detail had moved from the defensive 

position and display areas to the observation area at 0230 hours. .4t shot time, all 

personnel were seated on the ground, facing south. Three seconds after the flash, the 

troops were instructed to turn around and watch the fireball, but to remain seated 

until the shock wave had passed. 

Shortly after the detonation, an initial radiation survey of the shot area was 

begun by AEC monitors in a helicopter. While this survey was being conducted, 

members of the Radiological Safety Unit and the Control Group departed the 

observation area for the shot area. Based on the results of the helicopter survey, two 

general area surveys were undertaken by monitors in jeeps. These ground surveys 

determined that all areas up to and including display position 3 were free of 

15 
radioactivity and that the 1 R/hr isopleth was approximately 350 yards from CZ. By 

0815 hours, all display positions were manned by the Control Group teams in 

preparation for the briefing of the observer and BCT troops as they toured each 

position. 

According to the march tables in Reference 1, the first serial of observers was 

to move out of the observation area shortly after the detonation and proceed, by bus, 

to position 5. Reference 11 states that the observers departed the observation area 

“within 30 minutes after the shock wave.” It is therefore assumed that all four serials 

of observers departed the observation area within 30 minutes of the detonation, and 

that the times specified in the march tables for the movement of the first serial of 

observers were adhered to. After a lo-minute briefing at position 5, the observers 

entrucked for the trip to Detrucking Area GREEN (see figure 2) in the vicinity of 

position 2, where they arrived at approximately 0820 hours. They spent approximately 

30 minutes inspecting the damaged equipment at position 2 and being briefed by the 

Control Group team assigned to this position. Because of the restriction that 

observers were not to enter any area significantly contaminated with radiation, they 

were instructed not to proceed any closer to GZ than position 2. At approximately 

0850 hours, the observers departed position 2 and proceeded on foot through positions 

3 and 4, then on to Parking Area “A” in the vicinity of the BCT defensive position 

(figure 2). They arrived at the parking area at approximately 1030 hours and were 

again briefed prior to turning in their film badges and entrucking for the return trip to 

Camp Desert Rock at 1100 hours. Since the observer troops had not entered any 

significantly contaminated area, personnel monitoring and decontamination measures 

were not required prior to their return to the camp. 

The march table in Reference 1 indicates that the BCT was to entruck 

immediately following the detonation for the first stage of their advance to Parking 

Area “A”. Reference 11 indicates that this movement did not occur until nearly an 

hour after the shot, which suggests the maneuver was somewhat behind schedule. 

Upon reaching the parking area, the BCT moved to their previously prepared defensive 

positions and recovered the film badges that they had left the previous day. These 

film badges were then turned into the Film Badge Control Section at Parking Area 

16 
“A”. The same reference does not specify when the BCT jumped off in their attack on 

Objective A. According to the march table, they were scheduled to spend slightly 

more than one hour at their defensive position prior to beginning their attack at 0905 

hours. It is assumed that, since they were behind schedule when leaving the 

observation area, time spent in the defensive position was cut short in order that the 

maneuver could begin on schedule at 0905 hours. This assumption tends to high-side 

the dose calculations. 

On order, the BCT moved forward toward the objective area. The attack 

formation was 15 columns abreast, each preceded by an AEC radiological safety 

monitor plus 3 BCT monitors who had been trained by personnel from the Chemical 

Corps School. These monitors had instructions to report any intensity readings of 

1 R/hr or more as prescribed by the Exercise Director and to terminate the forward 

movement. Upon reaching the objective area at 1005 hours, about 500 yards from CZ, 

the BCT moved through position 1 to position 2, where they closed at 1038 hours. 

After a 15-minute briefing at position 2, 1500 yards from GZ, the troops turned in 

their film badges and were monitored prior to entrucking. Only background readings 

were obtained when the troops were monitored and decontamination was not 

necessary. The BCT departed Area GREEN and arrived at position 5 at approximately 

1150 hours. After a short briefing on the effects of the detonation on test equipment, 

the BCT entrucked for the return trip to Camp Desert Rock, arriving there at 

approximately 1330 hours. 

It is assumed that each evaluation team remained at its assigned display position 

throughout the duration of the exercise and did not go from one area to another. It is 

known that evaluators and accompanying monitors had gotten as far forward as 

position 1, 1000 yards from GZ, at 0815 hours and that it took approximately 5 hours 

to brief the inspecting troops and to complete their evaluation (Reference 1). It is 

therefore presumed that they left the forward area sometime after 1300 hours, which 

is consistent with the fact that all observer and maneuver troops had viewed the 

equipment displays and departed the forward area by this time. Logically, the Control 

Group personnel would have been the last Desert Rock personnel to depart the forward 

area. 

17 
Shot Easy, the final shot in the Buster phase of Operation Buster-Jangle, was 

detonated on 5 November 1951. There is evidence that some CDR personnel who had 

remained behind at Camp Desert Rock after Shot Dog, observed this detonation, 

probably from the Exercise Desert Rock I observation area. There is no evidence to 

suggest these troops went forward after the shot (References 7, 12, 13, 14). 

18 
SECTION 3 

EXERCISE DESERT ROCK II 

3.1 SHOT DATA. 

Exercise Desert Rock II was conducted in conjunction with Shot Sugar, a surface 

(35 feet above ground) test detonated at 0900, on 19 November 1951, in Area 9 at 

UTM coordinates 854097. The yield was 1.2 kt. The shot had been planned for 15 

November but was delayed until 19 November (see table 1). 

3.2 PARTICIPATION. 

A total of about 2900 military personnel participated in Exercise Desert Rock II. 

This included 172 officer observers selected from the combat branches and technical 

services. The remainder were Camp Desert Rock support personnel (mostly from the 

III Corps), as shown in table 4. Several support units, in whole or in part, participated 

in activities in the test area before and after Shot Sugar, while some units or 

individuals performed support functions at Camp Desert Rock but did not actively 

participate in the exercise (References 2, 9). 

3.2.1 Observers. 

There were 172 official Desert Rock II Observers, all of whom were U.S. Army 

officers selected from various military branch schools. These official observers 

attended a course of instruction at Camp Desert Rock conducted by two full-time 

AFSWP instructors, assisted by 13 additional instructors from the AFSWP Effects Test 

Group and the exercise staff. These observers and their instructors witnessed Shot 

Sugar from a vantage point about 9 kilometers (5.7 miles) to the south of ground zero. 

Others who observed the shot from the same position included the Exercise 

Director and his staff, members of the Effects Evaluation Teams, and the AFSWP 

Advisory Group (3 officers). Reference 15 states that approximately 250 military 

personnel witnessed the shot. This total probably included a small number of 

additional Desert Rock support personnel. 
3.2.2 Other Desert Rock Participants. 

In addition to the official observers and their instructors, other Desert Rock 

personnel who participated in Exercise Desert Rock II at Shot Sugar included the 

following: 

0 Effects Evaluation Teams. These teams, one each from the Desert Rock 

Chemical, Signal, Engineer, Ordnance, and Quartermaster Sections, were 

responsible for the pre-shot construction and emplacement of the military 

equipment displays for Shot Sugar; the post-shot evaluations of the effects 

of the shot on the various displays; and for post-shot recovery and/or 

disposition of the equipment. Each team was responsible for completing 

damage assessment forms for each display and for a final evaluation report 

of its findings. Available records identify 20 personnel involved in this 

activity. The records may not be complete and the actual number may 

have been somewhat greater (References 2, 16); however, there is no 

evidence that a medical evaluation team participated in this test. 

Technical assistance to the teams was provided by the 3 officers from 

AFSWP who were assigned to the Advisory Group. 

0 Personnel of the 231st Engineer Combat Battalion, with the assistance of 

the 597th Engineer Light Equipment Company, constructed the emplacements and assisted the evaluation teams in the pre-shot set-up and the 

post-shot recovery and disposition of displays. 

0 Xlilitary Police. The 505th MP Battalion provided traffic control in the 

forward area during the pre-shot rehearsals, on shot day, and during the 

periods of post-shot activities. The battalion also provided escorts for the 

observer bus tours as well as security details for the displays prior to and, 

upon clearance by the Rad-safe Officer, after the test. 

0 Personnel of the 3623d Ordnance Company emplaced, evaluated, and 

recovered vehicles and ordnance equipment. 

20 
0 Signal Corps personnel. Established and maintained wire and radio 

communications in the test area as well as at Camp Desert Rock. 

Personnel of the 303d Signal Service Battalion emplaced signal equipment 

and assisted in the post-shot evaluation and recovery of their equipment. 

0 Transportation personnel. Transported observers and evaluators in their 

pre- and post-shot activities. 

0 Exercise Desert Rock II project personnel. The Exercise Director conducted two projects at Shot Sugar: 

A film badge project conducted by Desert Rock Chemical Section 

personnel (incorporated with the Radiological Safety Unit). Project 

activities consisted of pre-shot placement and post-shot recovery of 

high intensity film badges on equiprnent displays and in the revetted 

and unrevetted foxholes interspersed between the displays. The 

recovered badges were calibrated, developed and read at NTS by 

Evans Signal Laboratory personnel. (Reference 2). 

Effects on Food and Water. Personnel from the Quartermaster 

Section placed samples of food and water in various display areas. 

Recovered samples were evaluated by personnel from the National 

Institutes of Health and the Walter Reed Army Medical Center 

(Reference 2). 

0 Radiological Safety Unit. The Desert Rock Chemical Officer was in 

charge of radiological safety, including training of monitor and decontamination crews. He was assisted by two deputies. One deputy served as the 

Desert Rock Rad-safe Officer who controlled entry to the test positions 

following the shot. The Rad-safe Officer’s assistant, who had been a radsafe monitor at Shot Dog, apparently conducted the film badge test 

indicated above. The second deputy was responsible for two groups of 

monitors. Records identify at least 36 Desert Rock rad-safe monitors 

(References 2, 16). 

Table 4 lists the units, home stations, and planned complements of the Desert 

Rock support units, totalling 2722 personnel as indicated. Other than the official 

observers group, the various categories of personnel above were drawn from these 

units. 

21 
Table 4. Exercise Desert Rock II support units. 

Unit 

Headquarters and Headquarters

Battery, III Corps Artillery 

(augmented by Hq & Hq Co., III 

Corps) 

806th Army Postal Unit (Type F) 

231st Engineer Combat Battalion* 

Detachment, 597th Engineer Light 

Equipment Company- (attached)* 

359th Engineer Utilities Detachment 

90th Engineer Water Supply 

Company 

Maintenance Platoon, 705th 

Engineer Field Maintenance 

Company 

94th Veterinary Food Inspection 

Detachment 

Company A, 505th !Military Police 

Battalion* 

Company C, 505th Military Police 

Battalion* 

Headquarters and Headquarters 

Detachment, 393d Ordnance 

Battalion 

161st Ordnance Depot Company (-) 

3623d Ordnance Company (Medium 

Maintenance)* 

Detachment, 53d Quartermaster 

Base Depot Company 

Home Station 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Fort Huachuca, Arizona 

Camp Cooke, California 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Fort Huachuca, Arizona 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Camp Roberts, California 

Camp Roberts, California 

Camp Cooke, California 

Camp Cooke, California 

Camp Cooke, California 

Utah General Depot 

Planned 

Complement 

122 

15 

701 

24 

58 

75 

70 

5 

154 

154 

36 

98 

195 

74 

* Available documentation indicates that some elements of these units had pre-and/or 

post-shot assignments in the forward area. 
Table 4. Exercise Desert 

Unit 

1st Platoon, 523d Quartermaster 

Subsistence Depot Company 

1st Platoon, 539th Quartermaster 

Laundry Company 

621st Quartermaster Service 

Company 

Detachment, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 303d Signal 

Service Battalion (augmented)* 

Detachment, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, and 

Company B, 314th Signal 

Service Battalion (-) 

Detachment, 504th Signal Base 

Maintenance Company 

4th Transportation Truck Company 

2d Platoon, 92d Transportation 

Car Company 

562d Transportation Staging Area 

Company (-1 

Rock II support units (Concluded). 

Planned 

Home Station Complement 

Utah General Depot 45 

Fort Lewis, Washington 24 

Fort Lewis, Washington 63 

Camp Cooke, California 244 

Camp Cooke, California 218 

Sacramento Signal 18 

Depot, California 

Camp Stoneman, California 126 

Camp Roberts, California 43 

Camp Stoneman, California 130 

TOTAL 2722 

Source: References 2, 9 

+ Available documentation indicates that some elements of these units had pre-and/or 

post-shot assignments in the forward area. 

23 
3.3 CONCEPT. 

There were no troop maneuvers conducted at Exercise Desert Rock II. The 

purpose and the resultant objectives differed from those of Exercise Desert Rock I, 

where the emphasis was on a troop maneuver and on evaluation of the psychological 

reaction of the troops. 

The purpose of Exercise Desert Rock II as stated in Reference 2, was I’. . . to 

obtain information relative to the effects of surface . . . nuclear explosions on typical 

Army field emplacements, equipment, and materiel, and to determine, insofar as 

possible, the probable effects on personnel. Although no animals were involved, 

inferences were drawn as to effects on personnel from information obtained from 

Operation Jangle animal experiments conducted by AFSWP.” 

The specific test objectives of Exercise(s) Desert Rock II (and III) were 

(Reference 2): 

(1) To determine nature and extent of damage sustained by sidndard (FM 

5-15) military emplacements when subjected to the effects of surface 

and underground nuclear explosions. 

(2) To determine nature and extent of damage sustained by military 

equipment and materiel when subjected to the effects of surface and 

underground nuclear explosions. This determination included an 

assessment of serviceability for immediate combat use of equipment 

and materiel tested. 

(3) To determine the degree of protection afforded by standard field 

emplacements from nuclear radiation and blast effects, from both 

surface and underground nuclear explosions. 

(4) To determine by indirect methods, through the use of film badges and 

observation of damage to emplacements, the probable effects on 

personnel when exposed to the effects of surface and underground 

nuclear explosions. 

24 
The concept of operations was to construct a variety of standard military 

emplacements at various distances from a surface nuclear burst, to install a variety of 

military equipment at each emplacement; and to attach film badges to the emplacements and display items. Post-shot evaluations of damage and collection of film 

badges would then be combined to provide the necessary data to support the test 

objectives. Concurrently, the official observers would be given a pre-shot indoctrination and tour, and a post-shot tour of the displays. Their observations and 

recommendations would then be incorporated into the post-exercise report. 

Radiological safety precautions and procedures were similar to those in Exercise 

Desert Rock I, except for intensity restrictions. Entry into a contaminated area would 

not be permitted until completion of an initial survey by the Desert Rock Rad-safe 

Officer and release by the Exercise Director. All groups and/or individuals granted 

entry were to wear film badges and be accompanied by a rad-safe monitor. The 

maximum allowed dose accumulation for military personnel for the combined Desert 

Rock II and III exercises was 3 rem. The limit prescribed by the AEC Test Manager for 

Operation Buster-Jangle was 3.9 rem. The established limit for gamma-emitting 

contamination on personnel, equipment or vehicles was 0.02 R/hr. To ensure that no 

personnel or materiel contaminated in excess of the established limits left the forward 

area, a decontamination station was established 4 miles south of the Sugar G7. There 

is no documentation of a field intensity restriction for Exercise Desert Rock II. 

Several instances of personnel traversing intensity fields of about 10 R/hr indicate 

that the 1 R/hr limit established for the first exercise was not in effect. 

3.4 OPERATIONS. 

The 172 official observers were to arrive at Camp Desert Rock prior to 14 

November to receive instruction, tour the shot area, witness the shot, conduct seminar 

discussions and evaluations, and present their observations and findings (Reference 17). 

The delay of the shot from 15 November to 19 November resulted in some revision of 

the schedule, but they did receive the planned indoctrination, which included a tour of 

the shot area on D-4. They also witnessed the shot and toured the display area on D+l. 

25 
The observers prepared and submitted their seminar observations and recommendations as planned. The seminars were organized by combat branches and technical 

services (Infantry, Artillery, Quartermaster, etc.) as were their reports, incorporated 

as appendices to Reference 2. 

Construction of the emplacements in the display positions, and of 19 pairs of 

foxholes at intervals of 40 yards between display positions, was accomplished prior to 

15 November by the 231st Engineer Battalion with the assistance of the 597th 

Engineer Company. The Effects Evaluation Teams, assisted as necessary by the 

appropriate Desert Rock support units, completed the set-up and badging of the 

displays prior to 15 November. Personnel of the 505th MP Battalion were posted as 

guards in the display areas to ensure that the displays were not disturbed. The guards 

were to be relieved the night of D-l and were to be reposted after the shot upon 

clearance by the Desert Rock Rad-safe Officer (Reference 2). 

On shot day, the observers departed Camp Desert Rock at about 0630 hours and 

proceeded by bus to the observation point, 9 km (5.7 miles) south of GZ (figure 3), 

arriving at about 0815 hours. On arrival, they were briefed by advisory group 

instructors on the scheduled detonation and on safety procedures. In addition to the 

observers and their instructors, the Effects Evaluation Teams and others witnessed 

Shot Sugar from this vantage point. A press release from Camp Desert Rock 

(Reference 15) indicates that a total of 250 military personnel were in this group. 

Shortly before the shot, observers were directed to sit on the ground with their 

backs toward GZ. After the initial flash of light from the detonation at 0900 hours, 

they were directed by the instructors to turn and view the fireball and the rising cloud. 

About 15 minutes later, the observer group returned to their buses and departed the 

forward area for Camp Desert Rock (Reference 17). 

On the day after the shot, the observers returned by bus to the Shot Sugar test 

area for a tour of the displays. Figure 3 shows the display area, consisting of six 

displays located at 90 and 180 meters (100 and 200 yards) south of GZ, and 370, 580, 

730 and 910 meters (400, 630, 800 and 1000 yards) south-southwest of GZ, respective26 
17 

06 

05 

5’ 

04 

‘03 

io2 

II I' Observation I 

-’ 

\,, 

an aTa. a2 83 -

Figure 3. Shot Sugar area. 

27 
ly. They were issued film badges as they boarded the buses. Each busload of observers 

was accompanied by an instructor, a rad-safe monitor, and a military police escort. It 

is estirnated that 10 buses were required. All personnel remained on the buses 

throughout the tour. It is inferred from Reference 17 that they went as far forward as 

position 2. They then returned to Camp Desert Rock, where the observers conducted 

their seminar discussions, and prepared, presented, and submitted their reports and 

recommendations. 

The Effects Evaluation Teams conducted their post-shot evaluations of emplacements and displays over a six-day period from 19 through 24 November. Table 5 is a 

compilation of individual evaluations of equipment displays by the various technical 

service evaluators on the dates indicated. The individual damage assessment forms 

list the items evaluated at each display visited. Comparison of these forms with the 

planned equipment displays indicates all items that could be located after the shot. 

The table indicates that each evaluation team conducted at least one post-shot 

evaluation of each display, and thus depicts all of the post-shot evaluation activities in 

the test area. 

The date, time of recovery and disposition of display items as well as the 

restoration of the terrain by the 231st Engineer Battalion and others from the Effects 

Evaluation Teams and supporting technical service units is not known. However, since 

there were several evaluations on D+4 and one on D+5, it is not likely that these 

activities took place before 23 November. Since the same personnel were to construct 

and set up the displays for Shot Uncle, scheduled for 29 November, it is not likely that 

recovery and restoration was delayed beyond this date. 

The rad-safe report in Reference 2 states that chemical personnel recovered the 

film badges. It is likely that the recovery of the film badges took place no earlier than 

D+l and no later than D+4, as foxholes j/7-19 were backfilled on D+4 (Reference 16). 

Backfilling of foxholes Wl-6 (near positions I and 2) was likely not completed until 

after Shot Uncle (see Section 6.2.3). According to Reference 2, the recovery and 

examination of rations and water samples was on Dt5. 

28 
Table 5. Technical service evaluation of displays, Shot Sugar. 

Tech Service Dates 1 

Display positions 

2 4 - 2 - I 6 

Engineer D+l (20 Nov) 

D+2 (21 Nov) 

D+4 (23 Nov) 

x x 

x x X 

X X 

Ordnance D-Day 

D+l 

D+2 

D+4 

D+5 

x 

x 

x 

X 

x x 

X 

x 

X 

x 

Quartermaster D+2 

D+3 

D+4 

x x 

x x 

X 

X 

Chemical D+l x x x x x x 

Signal D+2 x x x x x x 

Source: Reference 16 

29 
As stated earlier, rad-safe monitors accompanied all Desert Rock groups and/or 

individuals who entered the test area after Shot Sugar. The 36 known rad-safe monitor 

personnel available were assigned to the Effects Evaluation Teams and provided the 

pool from which monitors were provided for the observers (one per bus), for project 

participants, and for troops involved in restoration and set-up. 

The 505th MP Battalion provided escorts (one per bus) for the observer party. 

The battalion also provided pre- and post-shot sentries for the display area. The 

numbers of sentries, their exact locations, and the times that they spent in the test 

area are not documented. 

30 
4.1 

4.2 

SECTION 4 

EXERCISE DESERT ROCK tII 

SHOT DATA. 

Exercise Desert Rock III was conducted in conjunction with Shot Uncle, an 

underground (17 feet below surface) test detonated at 1200 hours, 29 November 1951 

(the scheduled date), in Area 10 at UTM coordinates 850139. The yield was 1.2 kt. To 

determine radiation exposure for participants, all pertinent shots are considered for 

any residual radiation that might have contributed to total radiation dose (see table I>. 

PARTICIPATION. 

More than 2100 military personnel participated in Exercise Desert Rock III. 

This included 53 officer observers selected from the combat branches, the technical 

services, and various branch schools of the U.S. Army. Table 6 lists the units, home 

stations, and planned complements of the Desert Rock support units, totalling 2138 

personnel as indicated. Some of the III Corps support units returned to their home 

stations prior to Shot Uncle. There were no maneuver troops at this exercise. Several 

support units and individuals participated in activities in the test area before and after 

Shot Uncle. Other personnel were assigned to support functions at Camp Desert Rock 

and remained at the camp (References 2, 9). 

4.2-I Observers. 

There were 67 official observers at Exercise Desert Rock III, consisting of four 

generals, three aides, and the 53 officers described above. Seven observers were not 

identified. The 53 officer observers attended a course of instruction at Camp Desert 

Rock conducted by two AFSWP instructors, assisted by additional instructors from the 

AFSWP Effects Test Group and the exercise staff. The observers and their instructors 

witnessed Shot Uncle from a vantage point approximately 10 kilometers (6 miles) to 

the southwest (210’) of ground zero at UTM coordinates 800057. Others who observed 

the shot from the same position included the Exercise Director and his staff, and the 

Advisory Group (3 officers) (References 2, 18, 19). 

31 
Table 6. Exercise Desert Rock III support units. 

Unit 

Headquarters and Headquarters 

Battery, III Corps Artillery 

806th Army Postal Unit (Type F) 

23 1st Engineer Combat Battalion* 

Detachment, 597th Engineer Light 

Equipment Company (attached)* 

359th Engineer Utilities Detachment 

Company C, 505th Military 

Police Battalion* 

3623d Ordnance Company 

(Medium Maintenance)* 

Platoon, 523d Quartermaster Subsistence Depot Co 

Detachment, Hq and Hq Co, 

303d Signal Service 

Battalion (augmented)* 

Detachment, Hq and Hq Co, 

and Company B, 3 14th Signal 

Service Battalion (-1 

Detachment, 504th Signal Base 

Maintenance Company 

4th Transportation 

Truck Company 

2d Platoon, 92d Transportation 

Car Company 

562d Transportation Staging Area 

Company (-) 

Food Service Personnel (unit unknown) 

Home Station 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Fort Lewis, Washington 

Fort Huachuca, Arizona 

Camp Cooke, California 

Camp Roberts, California 

Camp Cooke, California 

Utah General Depot 

Camp Cooke, California 

Camp Cooke, California 

Sacramento Signal 

Depot, California 

Camp Stoneman, California 

Camp Roberts, California 

Camp Stoneman, California 

TOTAL 

Source: References 

Planned 

Complement 

122 

15 

701 

23 

85 

154 

195 

45 

244 

218 

18 

126 

43 

130 

16 

2138 

2, 9, 24, 39 

* Available documentation indicates that some elements of each of these units 

had pre- and/or post-shot assignments in the forward area. 

32 
Personnel from the support units were permitted to observe Shot Uncle from 

an area near the AEC Control Point, more than 25 kilometers (16 miles) south of 

ground zero. All participants were accounted for at shot time and were under the 

control of two monitors and two guards, just south of Gate 5 (Reference 20). Other 

observers from AFSWP, with support personnel, also witnessed Shot Uncle from this 

area near the AEC Control Point. 

Because these observers did not go forward of this observer area, they were 

not exposed to initial or residual radiation. No reconstruction of radiation dose is 

necessary. 

4.2.2 Other Desert Rock Participants. 

In addition to the official observers and their instructors, other Desert Rock 

personnel who participated in Exercise Desert Rock III at Shot Uncle included the 

following: 

0 Effects Evaluation Teams. These teams, one each from the III Corps 

Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal Sections, were responsible for the pre-shot construction and emplacement of 

the military equipment displays for Shot Uncle; the evaluations of the 

effects of the shot on the various displays; and for post-shot recovery 

and/or disposition of the equipment. Each team was responsible for 

completing damage assessment forms for each display and for a final 

evaluation report of its findings. Technical assistance to the teams was 

provided by the 3 officers from AFSWP who were assigned to the Advisory 

Group. Available records identify 21 personnel involved in this activity. 

As the records may not be complete; the actual number may have been 

somewhat greater (References 2, 22). 

The 231st Engineer Combat Battalion constructed the emplacements and 

assisted the evaluation teams in the pre-shot setup and the post-shot 

recovery and disposition of displays. The 597th Engineer Light Equipment 

Company assisted the 231st Engineer Combat Battalion in the pre-shot 

activities but not the post-shot activities as the unit departed on D-Day 

(Reference 24). 

33 

0 
0 Personnel of the 3623d Ordnance Company emplaced, evaluated, and 

recovered vehicles and other ordnance equipment. 

0 The Exercise Director conducted two projects at Shot Uncle (Film Badge 

Tests and Effects on Food and Water). These projects were continuations 

of those conducted at Shot Sugar. 

0 Radiological Safety Unit. The Desert Rock Chemical Officer was in 

charge of radiological safety, including training of monitor and decontamination crews. He was assisted by two deputies. One deputy served as the 

Desert Rock Rad-safe Officer, who controlled entry to the test positions 

both prior to and following the shot. The Rad-safe Officer’s assistant was 

responsible for the tests associated with the film badge project and also 

was responsible for the Chemical Evaluation Team. The second deputy 

controlled the assignments of two groups of monitors, the evaluation team 

monitors and the observer monitors. Records identify at least 36 Desert 

Rock rad-safe monitors. The 303d Signal Battalion provided additional 

monitors for shot day (References 2, 24). 

0 Military Police. The 505th MP Battalion provided traffic control in the 

forward area during the pre-shot rehearsals, on shot day, and during the 

periods of post-shot activities. The battalion also provided escorts for the 

observer bus tours as well as security details for the displays prior to and, 

upon clearance by the Rad-safe Officer, after the test. 

0 The 303d Signal Battalion established and maintained wire and radio 

communications in the test area as well as at Camp Desert Rock. The 

battalion also provided personnel who served as monitors on shot day. The 

detachment from the 314th Signal Battalion maintained all long lines and 

pole lines. The Detachment from the 504th Signal Company maintained 

signal equipment for Camp Desert Rock (References 2, 24, 39). 

34 
0 Transportation personnel. The 4th Transportation Company transported 

observers and evaluators in their pre- and post-shot activities. 

4.3 CONCEPT. 

There were no troop maneuvers conducted at Exercise Desert Rock III. The 

purpose and the resultant objectives differed from those of Exercise Desert Rock I, 

but were the same as for Exercise Desert Rock II. 

The purpose of Exercise Desert Rock III, as stated in Reference 2, was to 

obtain information relative to the effects of an underground nuclear explosion ‘I... on 

typical Army field emplacements, equipment, and materiel, and to determine, insofar 

as possible, the probable effects on personnel. Although no animals were involved, 

inferences were drawn as to effects on personnel from information obtained from 

Operation Jangle animal experiments conducted by AFSWP.” 

The concept of operations was also the same as that of Desert Rock II, to 

construct a variety of standard military emplacements at various distances from an 

underground nuclear burst, to install typical military equipment at each emplacement, 

and to attach film badges to the emplacements and display items. Post-shot 

evaluations of damage and collection of film badges would then be combined to 

provide the necessary data to fulfill the test objectives. 

Concurrently, 53 officer observers would be given a pre-shot indoctrination 

course and would be conducted on a pre-shot tour of the displays. Prior to their 

departure for their home stations they were to be provided a post-shot tour if the 

radiological safety criterion permitted and the Exercise Director approved. Their 

observations and recommendations would then be incorporated into the post-exercise 

report. Most likely, they departed for their home stations shortly after they submitted 

their report. 

Radiological safety precautions and procedures were similar to those in the 

previous Desert Rock exercises. Desert Rock personnel could not enter the shot area 

35 
until completion of a radiation survey of the shot area and release by the Exercise 

Director. All groups and/or individuals granted entry were to wear film badges and be 

accompanied by a rad-safe monitor. The maximum allowable dose accumulation for 

the combined Desert Rock II and III exercises was 3 rem. The decontamination 

procedures and station location were the same as for Exercise Desert Rock II 

(References 2, 20). 

4.4 OPERATIONS. 

Other than the general officer observers and their aides, the official observers 

were to arrive at Camp Desert Rock prior to 27 November to receive instruction, 

witness Shot Uncle, conduct seminar discussions and present their observations and 

findings (Reference 2). They received the planned instruction and, on 28 November, 

inspected the display areas to the north and south of ground zero. Figure 4 shows the 

display area consisting of seven displays, located at 90 and 180 meters (100 and 200 

yards) northeast (050’) of GZ and 270, 370, 580, 730 and 910 meters (300, 400, 633, SO0 

and 1000 yards) south (185’) of GZ, respectively. The Shot Uncle area, including the 

display areas, was in the path of the fallout from Shot Sugar, conducted on 19 

November in Area 9 about 4200 meters to the south (Reference 25). 

Construction of the emplacements at the seven display positions, and of 29 

pairs of foxholes at intervals of 30-35 yards between display positions, would have 

been accomplished by the 231st Engineer Battalion (with the assistance of the 597th 

Engineer Company) before Shot Sugar in uncontaminated terrain. Reference 2 

indicates two distinct steps in the final emplacement and set-up process. The initial 

basic set-up was to be accomplished under the supervision of the engineer, ordnance 

and quartermaster evaluators. The second step of placing, tagging, and badging of 

displays involved all of the evaluation teams. The 505th MP Battalion posted guards in 

the display areas by 1600 hours on 26 November (D-3) to insure that the displays were 

not disturbed. The guards were to be relieved during the night of D-l and were to be 

reposted after shot day, upon clearance by the Desert Rock Rad-safe Officer 

(References 2, 20, 26). 

On shot day, the observers departed Camp Desert Rock in buses and arrived at 

their observation position 10 km (6 miles) southwest of CZ prior to 1000 hours. In 

36 
-.L.,-- - t’ 

-_----i _--- -” 

Figure 4. Shot Uncle area. 

37 

-
addition to the observers and their instructors, their accompanying monitors, the 

Effects Evaluations Teams, and others (paragraph 4.2.1) witnessed Shot Uncle from 

this vantage point. Partial bus lists indicate that a total of 10 buses were used to 

transport these personnel. 

The detonation, scheduled for 1100, hours was delayed to 1200 hours due to 

wind conditions. The observers were able to watch the detonation without eye 

protection as it was known that the flash would not be harmfully visible (a small red 

flame was seen at the base of the explosion). They entrucked three minutes after the 

burst and returned to Camp Desert Rock (Reference 25). 

On the morning of 1 December (45 hours after the shot), the observers 

returned by bus to the Shot Uncle test area to tour the displays at position 5 

(Reference 25). Although not specifically stated in the reference, their tour probably 

also included the displays at positions 6 and 7. Radiological safety procedures did not 

permit Inspection of the displays (l-4) closer to CZ (Reference 2, 25). 

As the observers and their instructors boarded the buses, the accompanying 

rad-safe monitors issued each person a film badge. All personnel remained on the 

buses throughout the tour. On completion they returned to Camp Desert Rock where 

the observers prepared, presented, and submitted their reports (Reference 2). 

The Effects Evaluation Teams conducted their post-shot evaluations of emplacements and displays from D-day through 11 December. Helicopter evaluations 

only were conducted on D-day and D+l; ground surveys began on 3 December (D+4). 

Table 7 is a compilation of individual ground evaluations of equipment displays by the 

various technical service evaluators on the dates indicated, as determined from the 

indi.Jidual damage assessment forms. The table indicates that each evaluation team 

conducted at least one post-shot evaluation of positions 3 through 7. A hasty chemical 

evaluation was conducted at all positions on D+4. Limited assessments of other 

materiel, conducted on D+4, are not included in table 7. The table does depict all 

formal post-shot evaluation activities in the test area (References 2, 22, 29). 

38 
Table 7. Technical service evaluation of displays, Shot Uncle. 

Display positions 

Tech Service Dates 1 2 1 CI I 6 7 

Chemical D+4(3Dec) Xl XI X X X X X 

Engineer D+4 (3 Dee) X x2 x2 x2 

D+5 (4 Dee) x x x x 

D+Il (IO Dee) X3 

Medical No Date4 x x x x 

D+II (IO Dee) X 

Ordnance D+5 (4 Dee) x x x x 

D+9 (3 Dee) x x x x 

D+12 (11 Dee) X 

Quartermaster D+5 (4 Dee) x x x x 

D+ll (IO Dee) X 

Signal D+4 (3 Dee) x x x x 

D+ll (10 Dee) X 

Source: References 2, 22, 29 

NOTE: Table does not include helicopter-borne evaluation of displays on D-day and 

D+l. 

1 Wore protective masks; brief visual assessment only. 

2 Including foxholes #20-29 (between positions 5 h 7). 

3 A separate engineer evaluation of foxholes 5-15 on the NE line was conducted on 

this date. 

4 Medical evaluation letter for positions 4-7, dated 6 December 1951. Actual 

evaluation was likely 3 or 4 December (D+4 or D+5). 

39 
On 7 December, a group of senior Army officers visited the test site and 

toured the test positions. This activity is known to have occurred only by virtue of the 

film badge records that are available for these individuals. These sixteen officers 

would have been accompanied by rad-safe monitors and drivers. 

The date and time of recovery and disposition of display items and the 

restoration of the test area by the 231st Engineer Battalion, the Effects Evaluation 

Teams, and supporting technical service units are not known. However, since there 

were several evaluations of position 3 on D+ll, it is not likely that recovery was 

inititated prior to 10 December. Roll-up operations began shortly thereafter. 

The Desert Rock Rad-safe report (in Reference 2) states that chemical 

personnel recovered Sl percent of the film badges by D+5 and that residual radiation 

at the time of recovery was too high to allow the recovery party time to crawl into 

the emplacements (to recover film packets) on the northeast line (positions I and 2). 

Most of the food and water samples in positions 4 through 7 were recovered on 

D+5 (Reference 37). Recovery from position 3 was on D+ll (Reference 35). However, 

the meat samples South of CZ, which were located at positions 3, 5, and 7, were 

recovered on D+7 (and examined on D+8 by personnel from the National Institutes of 

Health in their onsite laboratory) (Reference 2). Although Reference 38 indicates a 4 

December meat recovery, this assertion apparently stems from the undated evaluation 

forrn for meat at position 3, which refers to an intensity measurement made on that 

date (evidently by film badge recovery personnel). 

As stated earlier, rad-safe monitors accompanied all Desert Rock groups and/or 

individuals who reentered the shot areas. Of the 36 known rad-safe monitor personnel 

available, 9 were assigned to the Desert Rock Evaluation Teams. The post-shot 

activities of these 9 are indicated in the damage assessment forms. The remaining 27 

or more provided the pool from which monitors were assigned to the observers (one per 

bus), for project participants, and for troops involved in set-up, recovery, and 

restoration. 

40 
The 505th MP Battalion provided escorts (one per bus) for the observer party. 

The battalion also provided pre- and post-shot security details for the display areas. 

The number of sentries, their exact locations, and the times that they spent in the test 

area are not documented. 

According to the morning reports of the Desert Rock support units, roll-up 

operations commenced on 13 December and the troops departed camp on the afternoon 

of 14 December. A small winterization detachment replaced the departing troop 

complement. According to available records, 20 of the rad-safe monitors were 

assigned to the winterization detachment for a period of 8 days and were to depart the 

camp for their home station on or about 20 December (References 27, 23). 

The administrative unit for the winterization detachment was apparently the 

Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Shore Battalion, 369th Engineer Amphibious Support Regiment (EASR). As tables 4 and 6 indicate, this unit was not part of 

the Desert Rock II or III Exercises and apparently arrived at Camp Desert Rock 

sometime after Shot Uncle (29 November 1951). Special Orders from Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, dated 7 and 8 December 1981, detached several officers and 

enlisted personnel from the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the III Corps 

Artillery at Camp Desert Rock and attached them to the 369th EASR effective lo-12 

December 1951. The morning report of the Hq & Hq Btry, III Corps Arty of 17 

December 1951 indicates that a total of 8 officers and 55 enlisted personnel had been 

attached to the Hq & Hq Svc Co, 369th Engr Shore Bn on 9 and 10 December 1951. 

One of these two groups consisted of 20 Chemical Corps personnel. Their orders 

indicated that their TDY would be completed on or about 20 December. These were 

Rad-safe personnel at DR II and III. No completion date was indicated for the other 

larger group comprised of Ordnance, Signal, Medical, and QM personnel. 

A supplement of Reference 2, dated 21 March 1952, reported the results of 

equipment evaluations in Uncle display positions 1 and 2 conducted on 2 l-23 January 

1952 (Uncle D+53 through D+55). These evaluations were apparently conducted by a 

group of 8 officers, representing each of the pertinent branches, who were briefly 

attached to the 369th EASR for this purpose. Morning reports indicate that they 

reported on 21 January and departed for return to their parent units on 25 and 26 

January 1 952. 

41 
SECTION 5 

INITIAL RADIATION 

For all three of the Desert Rock exercises conducted at Operation BusterJangle, observer distances were at least 9 kilometers from the point of detonation. 

Previous calculations have established that, for the types of devices detonated at 

Buster-Jangle, there was negligible initial radiation dose (less than 0.001 rem) for 

personnel at this distance, whether in trenches or in the open. 

For Shot Dog, film badges were placed in the BCT defensive position, 3500 to 

5000 yards from CZ (see figure 2). The badges were placed in and around the prepared 

field fortifications on the day before the shot and collected when the troops returned 

to the position after the shot. These badges, identified as “equipment” badges, 

measured the initial gamma radiation that personnel would have received had they 

been in these positions at the time of the nuclear detonation. Signal Corps project 

personnel also placed several badges in unprotected (surface) positions at each of the 

Shot Dog display areas. These badges were to provide a measure of initial gamma 

radiation at various distances (1000-3500 yards) from the shot (Reference 1). 

Film badges were issued to each member of the BCT on 31 October, the day 

before the shot. Each man placed the equipment badge in the receiver of his rifle, 

securing it by sliding the bolt forward against the badge (Reference 1). The rifles 

were then left in the defensive position. Some of the rifles were in protected 

locations (e.g., foxholes and trenches) while others remained on the surface. These 

badges, thus exposed at Shot Dog, are specifically identified as such on the Headquarters III Corps dosimetry forms. The doses recorded on the equipment badges are 

tabulated, by name, for most of the personnel in the BCT. 

The results of the film badges exposed by the Signal Corps are plotted in 

figure 5. Also plotted is the initial gamma radiation environment as calculated with 

the computer code ATR 4.1 (Reference 45). It is seen that the agreement between the 

doses measured by the Signal Corps film badges and that (Henderson tissue dose) 

predicted by ATR 4.1 is excellent between 2500 and 3500 yards from GZ. The initial 

42 
SCEL Film Badge Data 

(unshielded) 

ATR Calculated Dose 

Equipment Film Badge Data 

(shielded and unshielded) 

Equipment readings 

above the 95th percentile 

100.0 

10.0 

0.10 

SCEL Film Badge Data 

(unshielded) P 

- ATR Calculated Dose 

Equipment Film Badge Data 

(shielded and unshielded) 

l Equipment readings 

above the 95th percentile 

. 

..a 

. . 1.0 .'. 

\ 

O.UlO I I 

2000 

I I I I 

3000 

I Co "B"/Co 

BCT AREA 

"Cl Hq Co 

4000 

"C" Btrv 

5000 

Horizontal range from Shot Dog GZ (yards) 

F'igure 5 . Shot l)og initial gamma radiation dose. 

43 
gamma dose from ATR 4.1 is plotted out to 5000 yards to compare with the film 

badges exposed within the BCT area. 

Within the BCT area, personnel placed the badges in their specific unit areas. 

Four of the areas are delineated. Companies B and C areas were between 

approximately 3500 and 4000 yards from GZ. Behind them, between 4000 and 4500 

yards from CZ, was the Headquarters Company area, while the artillery battery area 

was behind Headquarters Company out to approximately 5000 yards from GZ 

(Reference I). Equipment badges are available for most of the personnel assigned to 

these elements. The locations of these areas are depicted in figure 5. 

Many of the equipment film badges left in the BCT area recorded zero doses. It 

is assumed these badges were placed in shielded positions and are therefore not 

included in the present analysis. The mean dose and upper bound comprising 95-

percent of the remaining non-zero badges are plotted in figure 5. The doses are 

plotted as if all badges were exposed on the forward boundary (closest to CZ) of each 

area. It is noted that the mean dose values fall below that calculated by ATR 4.1, 

likely because some badges were shielded to varying degrees and some badges were 

farther away from GZ than the leading edge of the unit area. At 3500 yards, the 95th 

percentile reading (0.9 rem> compares favorably with the highest reading (0.8 rem) of 

the Signal Corps badges. The dots indicate those readings above the 95th percentile. 

At 4500 yards, the badge readings are consistent with that predicted by ATR, but all 

are near the badge threshold of reliability. In all cases, the equipment badges provided 

the troops a measure of the radiation that they would have experienced had they 

occupied the defensive positions, and the effect of the shielding afforded by standard 

field fortifications. Had the troops occupied the BCT defensive position at the time of 

the burst, their dose would likely have been as high as about 1 rem and as low as zero, 

depending on their distance from the burst and their degree of protection as afforded 

by the foxholes and emplacements. 

44 
SECTION6 

RESIDUALCAMMAEXTERNALEXPOSURE 

External gamma radiation doses are determined for all known participants in 

Exercises Desert Rock I, II, and III based on their activities in the neutron-induced 

fields of the pertinent shots (Charlie and Dog) and the fission product fields of Shots 

Sugar and Uncle. This includes the Desert Rock observers at all shots, the maneuver 

troops at Shot Dog, and Desert Rock support personnel assigned the various missions 

and duties discussed in Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this report. 

A computerized methodology, described in Reference 3, is used to determine the 

radiological environment for each shot of interest and the radiation environment at 

the post-shot times pertinent to the various activities of Desert Rock personnel. Isointensity contours are displayed for each shot of Operation Buster-Jangle that included 

Desert Rock Exercise participation. These contours are developed principally from 

the radiation survey plots in Reference 36 and are augmented by limited radiation 

readings reported by Desert Rock and AFSWP projects (References 16, 22, 35). From 

-1.2 these, a decay rate of t is observed, and doses are calculated based on time, 

location, and movement scenarios. Where specific times are not available, a D+2 

reading, for example, is taken as H+48 hours. Because personnel activities and surveys 

were during the period 0900-1500 on the days after each shot, this introduces only 

trivial decay differences for the shots of major interest, Sugar (0900 hours) and Uncle 

(1200 hours). 

The computer-calculated doses do not reflect the presence of the human body in 

the radiological environment. Despite the penetrating ability of gamma rays from 

fission and activation products, the body affords some shielding; hence, the gamma 

dose to any organ depends on the geometry of the radiation source and the body 

position. In order to represent reconstructed film badge readings, gamma doses are 

calculated for the surface of the chest, where a film badge is normally worn. The 

calculated film badge dose rate is related to the free-field gamma intensity through 

the conversion factor developed in Reference 4: 1 R/hr + 0.7 rem/hr. 

Observer dose calculations are categorized by the shot in which each observer 

group participated. Contributions from previous shots to the dose are noted as they 

arise. 

45 
Because of limited data concerning the details of display inspection and the 

timing involved, estimates are required for various parameters. Rates of movement 

are estimated from planned or reported times, the number of displays viewed, the 

calculated or reported position of radiological safety limits, and the consequent 

distance to be traversed. A reasonable and consistent set of parameters is 50 yds/min 

walking speed between display positions (including the starting and stopping of troops), 

5 minutes at each position and at the limit of march toward GZ, and 70 yds/min on the 

return. Speeds for motor movements are taken from the operation plans or estimated 

from road conditions, vehicle type, and the nature of the movements. Other functions 

such as construction, set-up, evaluation, and recovery of displays require estimates 

based on standard times for the activities involved. 

6.1 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK I. 

6.1.1 Shots Able, Baker, and Charlie. 

There was no Desert Rock participation at Shots Able and Baker. Shot Charlie, 

with a yield of 14 kt, was airburst at a height of 1132 feet above the terrain on 30 

October 1951. The resultant neutron-induced radiation field at one hour after the 

burst is shown in figure 6. The figure also indicates the relative location of the display 

positions for Shot Dog. 

As indicated in Section 2, Control Croup personnel were assigned to each display 

position associated with Shot Dog, 2 days after Shot Charlie. These personnel were 

responsible for the display position set-up and associated instrumentation, post-shot 

evaluation, and recovery. The Shot Dog display position locations in figure 6 indicate 

that activities prior to Shot Dog on 30 and 31 October would have been in the vicinity 

of the modest radiation field from Shot Charlie. Members of the Control Group 

completed repairs of the equipment emplacements that had been damaged by Shot 

Charlie (positions 1 and 2) and completed placing all of the equipment displays by the 

afternoon of 31 October. 

Reference 8 scheduled emplacement and installation of equipment to take place 

from 0800 (H+l hour) to 1600 on 30 October and from 0800 to 1400 on 31 October. 
Display Position 

Figure 6. Shot Charlie residual radiation (R/hr @ H+l) and 

the Shot Dog display area. 

47 
There are no indications of any changes in this schedule. The necessary repairs at 

positions 1 and 2 would have been accomplished during these periods. Dose 

calculations are based on the decay of sodium-24 (ts = 15 hr) and manganese-56 (ts = 

2.58 hr) (see Reference 3) from the H+l levels as depicted in figure 6. The relative 

contribution to radiation intensity of sodium and manganese is determined from shots 

in the same area during Operation Tumbler-Snapper, from which more thorough 

radiation data are available. The zero-time contribution from manganese is about 

twice that from sodium. The reconstructed residual radiation dose for 8 hours at 

position 1 on 30 October is 92 mR x 0.7 = 64 mrem. The dose for 6 hours at this 

position on 31 October is 13 mR x 0.7 = 9 mrem. Control Group personnel working 

similar hours at position 2 would receive a dose one-half of that at position 1, or 32 

and 5 mrem on 30 and 31 October, respectively. The lack of contamination at the 

positions more distant from CZ results in no contribution to dose from any activities 

there. 

Many personnel from supporting units at Exercise Desert Rock I (see table 3) 

were sent into the forward area along with the Control Group to aid in setting up 

equipment displays for their respective units. Doses for these personnel are 

determined from the radiation environment at the closest display position they would 

have had to enter in order to accomplish their specific tasks. Total time in the 

forward area is assumed to parallel that of the Control Group. For instance, ordnance 

units had equipment displayed at all five display positions; hence, ordnance personnel 

entering the forward area on 30 and 31 October are assigned the same dose as that 

received by the Control Group at position 1 on these two days, 64 and 9 mrem, 

respectively. Personnel from support units proceeding no closer to GZ than position 2 

are assigned a dose of 32 and 5 mrem on 30 and 31 October, respectively. 

The 158 personnel of the 303d Signal Service Battalion who observed Shot 

Charlie from the observation area (Section 2) apparently did not go forward into the 

shot area and therefore received less than 1 mrem dose of residual radiation. 

6.1.2 Shot Dog. 

As indicated in Section 2, post-shot activities of Desert Rock personnel resulting 

in exposure to the residual radiation field of Shot Dog included the post-shot tour of 

48 
the display positions by the Desert Rock observers; the maneuver of the BCT followed 

by their tour of the displays; the posting of members of the control group at the 

display positions; and the damage evaluations and equipment recovery by other 

members of the control group. 

The dose for the Desert Rock observers is based on the post shot planned 

itinerary discussed in Section 2. There are no indications in the available documentation of any departure from this schedule, which specified that the observers would not 

proceed toward GZ beyond position 2. Available survey data (see figure 7) indicate 

that the radiation intensity at position 2 was 10 mR/hr at H+I (0830 hours), the 

approximate time that the observers were in this area. A one-half hour exposure at 

position 2 results in a reconstructed dose of 10 mR/hr x 0.5 hr x 0.7 = 4 mrem for 

observers at Shot Dog. 

The pre-shot activities of the BCT, including the rehearsals on 21 and 27 

October, discussed in Section 2 did not result in any exposure to measurable levels of 

radiation. 

The troop maneuvers and tour of the display positions at Silot Dog included 

witnessing the shot from the observation area 7 miles south-southwest of CZ; 

entrucking and proceeding to Parking Area A; recovering the film badges that they 

had previously placed on various weapons, equipment, and vehicles in the BCT 

prepared defensive position; and forming up in attack formation and proceeding to the 

objective area as indicated on figure 7. Upon completion of the maneuver, they 

proceeded back southward through position 1 to position 2. At this position they 

viewed the displays; received a 15-minute briefing from Control Group personnel; 

turned in their badges; were checked by rad-safe monitors; and entrucked and 

proceeded to position 5, where they received another short briefing on the effects of 

the detonation on displays at that position. They then entrucked for their return trip 

to Camp Desert Rock. The reconstructed residual radiation dose for these activities is 

87 mR x 0.7 = 61 mrem, based on sodium and manganese decay as discussed for Shot 

Charlie. The Charlie radiation field, which was overlain by that from Dog, contributed 

negligibly to the dose. 

49 
- -\-Detruck\ng Area- - -.- - - - - y 

-% GREEN *..... .* *-

--,_l. *.-i --i=-/_- --

1 II I 

I -AEC survey data 

+ =mm=m- DR survey data 

t 

ib R E A 3 

1 Kilometers I I 3- I

'1 r' 2 3 

0 SD isplay Area I \Parking Area rll.-r. =:-1‘. ~-ii 4 1 05. 86 I i 

8s 

Figure 7. Shot Dog 

observer 

residual radiation 

and maneuver troop 

(R/hr 

routes. 

@ H+l) and 

50 
Control Group personnel, including equipment evaluators, photo teams, rad-safe 

monitors and vehicle drivers, proceeded to their assigned positions, arriving at 0815 

hours (H+0.75 hours); they remained at these positions until completion of the 

exercise. They completed their briefing and evaluations and departed the forward ^_ 

area at about 1300 hours. Control Group members stationed at position 1 would have 

received the highest residual radiation dose. They may have spent up to 5 hours at 

this position; the resultant dose is 68 mR x 0.7 = 48 mrem. Control Group personnel at 

position 2 would have received a dose one-half that at position 1, or 24 mrem. Those 

remaining at more distant positions have a reconstructed dose of 0 mrem. 

Reference 8 scheduled a 9-hour period in the forward area on 2 November (OSOO1700) for the Control Group to complete their damage assessment activities and return 

repairable equipment to Camp Desert Rock. It is presumed this schedule was adhered 

to. Control Group personnel performing such activities at position 1 on 2 November 

would have received a dose of 19 mR x 0.7 = 13 mrem, while those at position 2 would 

have received a dose approximately one-half of this, or 7 mrem. 

As with the pre-shot activities on 30-31 October associated with Shot Dog 

(Section 6.1.1), personnel from some Desert Rock support units would likely have been 

required to be in the forward area for the post-shot activities. As before, doses 

calculated for these units are assumed to be comparable to the doses calculated for 

Control Group personnel performing activities in the same display positions. 

6.1.3 Shot Easy. 

The Camp Desert Rock personnel who may have observed this shot (Section 2) 

would not have received any residual radiation dose from this or any preceding shot. 

There were no other Desert Rock participants in Shot Easy. 

6.1.4 Summary of Calculated External Doses at Exercise Desert Rock I. 

Table 8 summarizes the calculated external doses received by Exercise Desert 

Rock I personnel. 

51 
Table ,‘alculated daily external doses, Exercise Desert Rock I. 

Group/Unit * Calculated dose (mrem) 

October November 

30 31 2 1 I 

ShotCharlie - Shot Dog - Shot Easy 

Observers 0 0 4 0 0 

BCT Maneuver (1st Bn, 188 AIR, 

and attached units) 

0 0 61 0 

Control Group (Position 

(Position 

I) 

2) 

64 

32 

9 

5 

4s 

24 

13 

7 

Hq, III Corps & III Corps Arty 64 9 48 13 

231st Engr Bn (C) 64 9 48 13 

597th Engr Co 64 9 48 13 

90th Engr Co 32 5 24 7 

374th Conv Ctr 32 5 24 

94th Veterinary Det 64 9 48 

505th MP Bn 0 0 24 

393d Ord Bn; 161st, 

Ord Cos 

3623d 64 9 48 13 

53d, 523d QM Cos 64 9 48 13 

303d, 314th Sig Bns; 

504th Sig Co 

64 9 48 13 

4th, 92d, 562d Trans Cos 32 5 24 7 

Includes accompanying 

in this table. 

monitors, MPs, drivers, etc., not badged. Survey monitors, who were all badged, are not included 
6.2 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK II. 

As indicated in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, the concept and resultant operation of 

Exercise Desert Rock II at Shot Sugar did not include any troop maneuvers. Because 

Shot Sugar was the first surface nuclear test, the Desert Rock emphasis was on 

identification and evaluation of the uniqueness of the effects of such a detonation on 

standard military emplacements. 

Table 4 identifies and indicates the planned complements of the units that 

comprised the Exercise Desert Rock II Support Group. In addition to these personnel, 

there were 172 official observers. The total number of military personnel involved in 

the exercise was about 2750. Of these, the 172 known official observers and an 

unknown number of support personnel from various units were direct participants in 

functions that involved post-shot activity in the area of the shot. Since no previous 

shot had contaminated Area 9, pre-shot activities in the test area did not involve any 

exposure to ionizing radiation. Pre- and post-shot activities in the forward area 

included the following: 

Official Observers 

Effects Evaluation Teams 

Display Construction, Setup, Recovery, and Restoration 

Desert Rock Project Personnel 

Rad-safe Monitors 

MP Security Detail 

Residual radiation doses are reconstructed for each of these groups. Results are 

summarized in table 9. 

6.2.1 Official Observers. 

Section 3.4 describes the activities of the official observers and their accompanying advisory group instructors, rad-safe monitors, MP escorts, and drivers. At 

Shot Sugar they were apparently also accompanied by a small group of unofficial 

53 
Table 9. Calculated daily external doses, Exercise Desert Rock II. 

Group/Unit* Calculated dose (mrem) 

November December 

19 

Shot Sugar 

20 

-

21- 22- -

23 24- 2 

Official observers 476 

Evaluators 

Chemical 1180 

Signal 803 

Ordnance 25 4 341 1010 108 

Engineer 4 2310 149 

Quartermaster 2310 0 

Display set-up & recovery 

231st Engr Bn 

3623d Ord Co 40 1340 

303d Sig Bn 1 

597th Engr Co 40 

Projects 

Film Badge Project 277 

Food and Water Project 403 

Monitors (weighted mean 1 132 168 37 14 74 

for 36 personnel) 

MP security detail 18 8 4 3 

* Includes accompanying VIPs, drivers, etc. 
observers from the Desert Rock Support Group. This group of 250 military personnel 

(Reference 15) observed the shot from an observation point 9 km (5.7 miles) south of 

GZ. They remained at this position for about an hour after the shot and then returned 

to their vehicles and proceeded back to Camp Desert Rock. There was no exposure to 

measurable amounts of initial or residual radiation from either this activity or the preshot tour. 

The official observers, their instructors, and assigned support personnel returned 

to the Shot Sugar test area on the day after the shot for a bus tour of the Desert Rock 

displays. They remained in their buses throughout their tour. Reference 17 states 

that the tour commenced 25 hours after the shot. The dose reconstruction assumes 

average bus speeds of 15 mph into and out of the area, 5 mph between display 

positions, and 10 minutes at each of the positions visited (2 through 6). Figure 8 

shows the locations of the display positions and the iso-intensity contours from Shot 

Sugar at one hour after the surface shot (H+l hour). By the time of the observers’ tour 

(H+25 to H+27 hours) the field would have diminished nearly fiftyfold in intensity. 

Because of the steep intensity gradient, the time spent closest to GZ dominates the 

dose. The calculated intensity for the observers while at position 2 is 3600 mR/hr, 

which leads to an integrated intensity of 3600 mR/hr x l/6 hr = 600 mR. Overall, the 

gamma radiation dose received by the 172 official observers and their accompanying 

instructors and support personnel is 680 mR x 0.7 = 476 mrem. 

6.2.2 Effects Evaluation Teams. 

As previously indicated in Subsection 3.2.2, the evaluation teams from the 

Desert Rock Chemical, Signal, Engineer, Ordnance, and Quartermaster Sections were 

responsible for the pre-shot construction and set-up of equipment in the display 

positions, for the post-shot evaluation of the effects on the equipment, and recovery 

of the equipment and restoration of the disturbed terrain. Their pre-shot activities 

would not have involved any exposure to initial or residual radiation. 

Table 5 in Section 3 displays the evaluations conducted by the various teams on 

the post-shot dates indicated. The evaluation forms for the teams include the 

identification of the evaluators (and with a few exceptions, their assigned rad-safe 

55 
/ I I Y I 

Kil 

Figure 8. Shot Sugar residual radiation (R/lx @ lI+l)and 

the Desert Rock display positions. 

56 
monitors). A total of 20 evaluators are so identified. As stated in Section’3 and 

indicated in table 5, the evaluation forms document at least one evaluation of each of 

the six display positions by each of the five service teams. It is thus likely that the 

forms document all of the post-Sugar evaluations of Desert Rock displays. 

The reconstructed residual radiation doses for the post-shot evaluations are 

based on average vehicle speeds of 20 mph to and from the display area, 5 mph 

between display positions, and 15 minutes stay time at each position. Evaluators who 

needed less time are assumed to have waited for the others. Engineers who inspected 

foxholes between positions did so concurrently, but are given the higher position dose. 

Other exceptions were for the chemical and signal evaluators, who visited all six 

positions on D+l and D+2, respectively (table 5). The chemical evaluator, who 

reported “brief” visits, had only a pair of gas masks to examine at each position, which 

would have taken only 3 minutes. The signal evaluator conducted a “limited search” at 

position 1, where only the disappearance or burial of items was noted. At this 

position, the stay time is estimated to have been 3 minutes. 

The radiation environment for Shot Sugar is determined from data reported by 

evaluators as well as from data reported in rad-safe surveys and by scientific projects 

(References 16, 35, 36). These data were used in the automated dose procedure to 

characterize the radiation environment at each display position. The intensities at 

position 1, reported by three evaluation teams (engineer, quartermaster, and signal) on 

D+2, are of particular value in establishing the levels closer to CZ than were obtained 

by field surveys. For comparison with figure 8, the D+2 intensity of 12 R/hr at 

position 1, recorded by the evaluation team, corresponds to an H+l intensity of 1250 

R/hr. 

The resultant doses for all evaluators, calculated using the above parameters, 

are shown in table 9. 

6.2.3 Display Construction, Set-up, Recovery, and Restoration. 

The construction of the emplacements and the interspersed foxholes was 

accomplished over the period prior to 15 November (the shot was originally scheduled 

for 15 November) by the 231st Engineer Battalion, probably with some assistance by 

57 
the detachment from the 597th Engineer Light Equipment Company. Although not 

specifically stated, the heavy vehicle emplacements (tanks, trucks, etc.) by the 3623d 

Ordnance Company as well as the set-up of communications equipment by the 303d 

Signal Co were probably accomplished at the same time. There was no radiation 

exposure involved in these activities. 

The specific dates and times of equipment recovery and restoration of the 

terrain are not documented. However, evaluations of display items continued on D+4 

(plus an ordnance evaluation at position 2 on D+5), and the same organizations were 

responsible for pre-shot construction activity for Shot Uncle (29 November). It is 

likely that the recovery and restoration took place as early as completion of 

evaluations would permit --D+4 (November 23) for positions 3-6. Radiation intensities 

at position 1, plus the requirement to begin preparation of the Shot Uncle display 

positions, would have necessitated the postponement of recovery and restoration of 

positions 1 and 2 until after Shot Uncle. 

While it is likely that specific individuals and/or teams were assigned to recovery 

and restoration at specific positions, it is also likely that the heavy equipment 

employed was used at all four positions. The best estimate of the average radiation 

dose received by these personnel is based on a nominal individual who spent an equal 

amount of time at each of the positions. The calculated dose for this activity is based 

on an estimate of 1% hours at each of four positions (3 through 6) on D+4. The 

resultant dose is 57 mR x 0.7 = 40 mrem. It is assumed that recovery and restoration 

of positions 1 and 2 took place on 3 December when radiation levels had decayed 

sufficiently to permit the teams to perform the necessary recovery work and before 

the Shot Uncle intensities permitted work in the Shot Uncle area. For 1% hours at 

each of the two positions, the dose for the 3 December recovery at positions 1 and 2 is 

1910 mR x 0.7 = 1340 mrem. 

6.2.4 Desert Rock Project Personnel. 

As Section 3 describes, there were two Desert Rock projects at Shot Sugar--a 

film badge project and a food and water project. For the film badge project, only 82 

percent of the badges were recovered due to cave-ins of emplacements closest to 

ground zero (Reference 2). With no foxholes between positions 1 and 2, the badge 

58 
recovery rate therefore suggests that no attempt was made to recover badges at 

position 1, since cave-ins would have been observed by the chemical evaluator on D+l. 

Within the time period noted in Section 3, it is most likely that film badge recovery 

was on D+2, concurrent with the several evaluations on that day. It is estimated that 

the recovery required 10 minutes at each position and 2 minutes at each pair of 

interspersed foxholes (Section 3.4). Movement rates of 5 mph between stops and 15 

mph in leaving the area are assumed. The dose for this project is 395 mR x 0.7 = 277 

mrem. 

For the food and water project, recovery was conducted on 24 November (D+5). 

Only a limited number of items from position 1 were recoverable, many having been 

destroyed and scattered as far back as position 2 (Reference 33). The recovery 

personnel likely followed the same procedures as other evaluators in recovering items 

from position 6 inward to position 2. From this point, because of the extensive 

scattering of material as reported by previous evaluators, they would have proceeded 

on foot (50 yards/min) to position 1, determined the non-recoverability of most items 

in a 5-minute stay time, proceeded back to their vehicle at position 2, and departed 

the area. The resultant calculated dose for this project is 576 mR x 0.7 = 403 mrem. 

6.2.5 Rad-safe Monitors. 

There were 36 rad-safe monitors from the Radiological Safety Unit at Shot 

Sugar. They supported all other Desert Rock activities except the MP Security Detail. 

There are a few instances where Desert Rock personnel assigned to post-shot 

activities were rad-safe qualified and served as their own monitors. An example is the 

officer who evaluated the Chemical Corps displays on D+I. Otherwise, all of the postshot activities described above should have involved one or more rad-safe personnel 

who would have received the same doses as for those they accompanied. Multiple 

exposures for any particular individual could have occurred. A weighted average daily 

dose for rad-safe monitors may be used when a specific monitor assignment is 

unknown. It is derived from summing the products of the probable number of monitors 

in each activity times the dose received by the group monitored, and dividing by 36. 

For example, the weighted average monitor dose for the observers’ bus tour on D+l is: 

476 mrem x 10 bus monitors = 132 mrem (table 9). The chemical evaluator served as 

36 monitors 

59 
his own monitor for his D+I evaluation. The doses to the monitor(s) accompanying the 

ordnance and engineer evaluators (4 mrem) would not affect the weighted average for 

this date. These weighted averages are shown in table 9. Not reflected in these doses 

are any monitoring assignments with activities and projects not associated with 

Exercise Desert Rock. 

6.2.6 MP Security Detail. 

Reference 2 contains the following statement under the heading of O.I.C. 

Effects Tests: 

(f) Insure that a guard for each position is posted in his area at 1600 hours 

D-2. The guards will insure that no unauthorized persons enter the area 

and that no equipment or materiel is moved without authority of the test 

position O.I.C. The guards will be relieved during the night D-l - D-day, 

upon direction from Camp Desert Rock S-3. They will be re-posted after 

D-day, and maintained until relieved by test position O.I.C. 

There is no information available concerning the actual reposting of guards in or 

near the test area after Shot Sugar. 

Considering the close spacing of the display positions, one guard post in the 

vicinity of position 5 would have continued to provide the necessary access control. 

The post-shot guard tours would have commenced at 0600 hours on D+l (three guards) 

and every 12 hours thereafter. The average intensity at this position for the first tour 

was 2.1 mR/hr, leading to a dose of 2.1 x 12 x 0.7 = 18 mrem. Subsequent exposures 

are shown in table 9. 

6.2.7 Summary of Calculated External Doses at Exercise Desert Rock II. 

Table 9 summarizes the calculated external doses received by Exercise Desert 

Rock II personnel at Shot Sugar. 

60 
6.3 EXERCISE DESERTROCKIII. 

Exercise Desert Rock III was conducted at Shot Uncle with the same general 

concept and operation as for Exercise Desert Rock II at Shot Sugar. Shot Uncle was 

the first underground burst of a nuclear device (1.2 kt at a depth of 17 feet). 

Table 6 identifies the units that comprised the Support Group and indicates their 

planned complements. Including the 67 known observers, the total number of military 

personnel assigned to the exercise was about 2800. 

As for Exercise Desert Rock II at Shot Sugar, pre- and post-shot activities 

included the following: 

Official Observers 

Effects Evaluation Teams 

Display Construction, Set-up, Recovery, and Restoration 

Desert Rock Project Personnel 

Rad-safe Monitors 

MP Security Detail 

Activities at Shot Uncle differed from those at Shot Sugar in several aspects 

that are significant for residual radiation dose reconstructions. 

I. Figure 9 shows the residual radiation field around the Shot Uncle CZ at 

H+l hour. The dotted concentric circles around GZ are the same as those 

near the top of figure 8. Thus, the Uncle display positions were well within 

the residual radiation field of Shot Sugar, and various pre-shot activities 

that involved exposure to residual radiation are considered in the dose 

reconstructions. 

2. Similarly, the post-Uncle activities were conducted in the combined radiation fields of both shots. While the H+l hour iso-intensity contours 

resulting from the initial survey after Shot Uncle include the decayed field 

61 

from Shot Sugar ten days earlier, the subsequent decay function is a 

combination of the power-law decay functions of both shots. 

3. Shot Uncle was an underground detonation that produced a significant 

crater and resultant high levels of residual radiation at the closer display 

positions (1, 2, and 31, necessitating long delays in the evaluations at these 

positions and even longer delays (well after completion of the exercise) in 

recovery and restoration. 

Considering the above differences, external doses are calculated for the pre- and 

post-shot activities of the groups/units that participated in the exercise. The 

reconstructions are described in the subsections following. 

6.3.1 Official Observers. 

Section 4.4 describes the pre- and post-shot activities of the official observers 

and their accompanying instructors, rad-safe monitors, MP escorts and drivers. Their 

pre-shot tour of the displays on 25 November was a bus tour conducted under the 

following (assumed) conditions: 

0 The route followed on the roads skirting the immediate area of the CZ of 

Shot Sugar is as indicated in figure 10. 

0 The observers remained in their buses throughout the tour. 

0 Bus speeds were 20 mph on the paved roads, below 15 mph on the dirt roads 

leading into the display positions, and 5 mph between positions. 

0 Observers spent an average of 10 minutes at each of the 7 display 

positions. 

The resultant residual radiation dose for the pre-shot tour of the Uncle displays 

by the official observers and their accompanying support personnel is 79 mR x 0.7 = 

55 mrem. 

63 
Figure 10. Routes to the Shot Uncle display areas. 

64 
On shot day, the observers witnessed the shot from the observation area 

indicated in figure 10. They boarded their vehicles shortly after the burst and 

returned to Camp Desert Rock. There was no exposure to measurable amounts of 

initial or residual radiation at this vantage point, 10 km (6 miles) southwest of GZ. 

The reconstruction of the post-shot tour on 1 December, 45 hours after the shot, 

assumes the same basic route as the pre-shot tour. As indicated in Section 4, 

observers are known to have gone as far forward as position 5; it is assumed that they 

were also able to tour positions 6 and 7. The limitation of the tour to these three 

positions resulted in a somewhat longer (than the pre-shot) stay at each display, about 

15 minutes at each of the three positions. The dose calculation for the observers and 

for other groups with activities in the Shot Uncle area uses the post-Uncle survey 

readings, appropriately decayed, to determine (through the computerized methodology) 

the Shot Uncle dose contribution at the time of exposure. The Shot Sugar residual, as 

measured before Shot Uncle, is then decayed to the post-Uncle period and added to the 

first dose. This high-sides the resultant total dose by the small Sugar contribution 

already included in the Uncle residual. 

The resultant radiation dose for the observer tour after Shot Uncle is 124 mR x 

0.7 = 87 mrem. The combined dose to the observers for pre-and post-shot tours at 

Shot Uncle is 55 + 57 = 142 mrem. 

Film badge dosimetry for 7 December identifies 16 senior officers, of whom 6 

were general officers. The similarity of doses indicates that this special group of 

observers likely made a vehicle tour of the display positions radiologically permissible 

for inspection on 7 December (positions 3 through 7). This group of senior officer 

observers would have spent about 10 minutes at each position, with a resultant 

calculated dose of 322 mR x 0.7 = 226 mrem. 

6.32 Effects Evaluation Teams. 

There were six evaluation teams consisting of representatives from the Chemical, Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Medical Corps. As indicated in 

65 
Section 4, they were responsible for the pre-shot construction and emplacement of the 

displays as well as the post-shot evaluations, recovery, and restoration. As in the case 

of the observers, this resulted in exposure to residual radiation for pre-shot as well as 

post-shot activities. 

The dates and times of pre-shot construction and set-up activities under the 

responsibility of the various effects evaluators are not known precisely. The 

Equipment Emplacement Plan in Reference 2 specified that certain equipment, such as 

tanks, howitzers, Bailey bridges, tactical wire, and squad tents, were to be in place by 

1630 on D-3 and that the remainder was to be in place and ready for test by noon on 

D-l. 

However, Reference 26, dated 25 November, states that test positions were 

established and equipment was in place by that date. Because Reference 2 notes that 

engineer, ordnance, and quartermaster equipment would be emplaced in two days, it is 

concluded that set-up of these items began on 24 November. Time and manpower 

planning tables (e.g., Reference 30) and military judgement lead to a high-sided 

estimate of 4 hours in the test area each day (some teams required far less effort). 

Construction of emplacements at the seven display positions and the interspersed 

foxholes would have been accomplished by the 23ls.t Engineer Battalion before Shot 

Sugar, in uncontaminated terrain (Section 4.4). All equipment set-up activities on 24 

and 25 November were in the area contaminated by Shot Sugar. These activities were 

supervised by the respective technical service evaluators. 

Calculated intensities within the display area during pre-shot operations range 

from 352 mR/hr at position 7 on D-5 to 45 mR/hr at position 1 on D-2. The dose 

calculations for the evaluation teams assume that the teams were exposed for four 

hours to the average radiation intensity among positions l-7 on each day. The 

resultant dose for engineer, ordnance, and quartermaster evaluation teams on D-5 is: 

83 + 96 + 144 + 192 + 304 + 320 + 352 ) ’ -- mR/hr x 4 hr x 0.7 = 596 mrem. Similarly, the 

7 

calculated dose for all evaluation teams on D-4 is 171 mR/hr x 4 hr x 0.7 = 479 mrem. 

66 
Reference 29 describes the Exercise Desert Rock III schedule that provides for a 

rehearsal of Desert Rock activities, followed by a final check of test positions, on D-2. 

This activity is confirmed by film badge dosimetry, which identifies chemical and 

ordnance evaluator personnel with recorded doses on 27 November. It is assumed that 

all evaluators and project personnel with test items in the display area would have 

visited all seven display positions on 27 November, travelling by vehicle and spending 

10 minutes at each Desert Rock test position. This exposure to the Shot Sugar residual 

would have resulted in a dose of: 45+55+8I + 108+ 172+ 181 +2OO mR/hrx2hrx 

7 0.7 = 168 mrem. 

Post-shot evaluations began with limited helicopter surveys planned for H+5 and 

D+I. It is assumed that these took place, that the intensity criterion of 1 R/hr was 

observed, and that the loiter time at that intensity was 5 minutes each day. The 

calculated dose is 1000 mR/hr x l/12 hr x 0.7 q 58 mrem each day.

Dates of post-shot ground evaluations by the various teams are indicated in 

Section 4. Evaluation procedures were the same as those assumed for the post-Sugar 

evaluations, with the following exceptions: 

1. The hasty chemical evaluation on D+4 would have required 3 minutes per 

position. Transiting the display area required avoidance of GZ; a 

circumferential road 2000 feet from GZ connected the northeast and south 

positions at permissible radiation levels. This activity would have required 

entry on the northeast line at 15 rnph with 3-minute stops at positions 1 

and 2, backtracking to the circumferential road, going around the 

circumferential at 15 mph to the south display positions, spending 3 

minutes at each position 3 through 7, and exiting to the south. 

2. The brief visual assessments on D+4 by the other evaluators (positions I, 2, 

and 4-7) (References 2, 34) would have required 5 minutes per positions 1 

and 2, the same circle back to the south positions on the circumferential 

road, 10 minutes at position 4 (to include observation of position 3 by 

binoculars), and 5 minutes at position 5, 6, 7. 

67 
3. The engineer evaluation of foxholes northeast of GZ on D+ll would have 

required five minutes at each of 1 I foxhole pairs, 320-650 yards from CZ. 

The doses calculated for all evaluators are based on the same activity parameters used for post-Sugar evaluations except as above, and lead to the doses depicted 

in table 10. It should be noted that the D+ll dose for engineer evaluators reflects the 

aforementioned activity northeast of GZ in addition to the evaluation at position 3, 

south of CZ. For the assessments conducted at positions 1 and 2 on D+4, the 

intensities were 13 R/hr and 10 R/hr, respectively, as reported in References 2 and 34. 

As indicated previously, residual radiation from the earlier shot (Sugar) is included in 

the dose calculations. 

Extensive evaluations of positions 1 and 2 were performed in late January when 

radiation intensities had diminished to 1 R/hr and less. These evaluators were not 

necessarily the same personnel who had participated in Exercise Desert Rock III. 

Doses for these personnel are nonetheless shown in table 10. 

6.3.3 Display Construction, Set-up, Recovery, and Restoration. 

The pre-shot residual radiation doses calculated for the engineer and ordnance 

evaluators (596 and 479 mrem on D-5 and D-4, respectively) are the appropriate preshot doses for the 231st Engineer Battalion, the 597th Engineer Company, and the 

3623d Ordnance Company. The corresponding dose for the 303d Signal Battalion is 479 

mrem on D-4. 

The post-shot dose calculations for remaining personnel (the 597th Engineer 

Company had departed) are based on recovery and restoration at positions 4 through 7 

on December S (Uncle D+9), which is the latest known date of equipment evaluation at 

these positions (table 7). As the table indicates, recovery at position 3 would not have 

been accomplished until December 11 (Uncle D+l2). Since evaluations were not 

completed at positions 1 and 2 until after termination of the exercise, recovery and 

restoration at these positions was not accomplished at Exercise Desert Rock III. These 

functions were apparently performed in late January 1952 by personnel from the 369th 

Engineer Amphibious Support Regiment (Section 6.41, a portion of which had already 

68 
Table 10. Calculated daily external doses, Exercise Desert Rock III. 

Group/Unit l 

24 

-

Official 

observers 

Senior officer 

observers 

Evaluators 

Chemical 

Signal 

Ordnance 

Engineer 

Quartermaster 

Medical 

596 

596 

596 

Display set-up 

d( recovery 

231st Engr Bn 

597th Engr Co 

3623d Ord Co 

303d Sig Bn 

369th Engr Regt 

596 

596 

596 

Projects 

Film Badge 

Project 

Food & Water 

Project 

Monitors 

(weighted 

mean for 

personnel) 

36 

166 

MP security 

detail 

l Includes accompanying 

l * Normal evaluation 

November 

77 28 

55 

29 

Uncle 

22 1. 

87 

Calculated 

2 

-

dose 

2 

(mrem) 

4

-

December 

2 5 7-

226 

s ? E 

January 

A.!.-.....- 21-23s 

479 

479 

479 

479 

479 

479 

165 

168 

168 

168 

165 

165 

55 

5s 

58 

58 

5s 

55 

5s 

5s 

5s 

55 

5s 

5s 

1160 

1500*+ 

1500 

1500** 

1500 

1500’f 

165 

165 

165 

98 

147 

369 

147 

147 

131 

432 

432 

1730 

1730 

432 

432 

479 

479 

479 

479 

342 

342 

342 

549 

549 

549 

1300 

479 

479 

200 

169 

168 

39 15 2 2 24 88 

3390 

165 

16 

113 

3 13 40 

147 

22 19 

673 617 527 458 1255 659 516 425 365 325 294 267 246 22s 212 

monitors, MPs, drivers, 

activities resulted in a dose 

etc. Also includes 

of 200 mrem. 

post-exercise personnel. 
arrived at Camp Desert Rock to begin preparations for Exercise Desert Rock IV, to be 

conducted in the April-May time frame. According to morning reports (Reference 241, 

most of the 303d Signal Battalion departed Camp Desert Rock on 6 December 1951. 

Two officers and eleven enlisted personnel, who remained behind on duty with 

Company B, 231st Engineer Battalion, likely performed signal equipment recovery on 

D+9 and D+12. 

The calculation of these doses is based on an estimated time of four hours 

required to complete recovery and restoration at positions 4 through 7 on D+9 and one 

hour at position 3 on D+12. The resultant doses are 342 mrem on D+9 and 549 mrem 

on D+12. 

6.3.4 Desert Rock Project Personnel. 

As indicated in Section 4, the two projects conducted at Shot Sugar (Film Badge 

Project and Food and Water Project) were also conducted for Exercise Desert Rock III 

at Shot Uncle. Pre-shot emplacement of 354 film packets and food and water samples 

was likely accomplished on 25 November (D-4), in the four-hour period concurrent with 

the service evaluation activities, and resulted in the same dose of 479 mrem. Project 

personnel also participated in the final check of all positions on 27 November as 

described previously for evaluators, receiving the same dose of 168 mrem. 

Based on experience from Shot Sugar and the nature of the residual environment 

after Shot Uncle, film packet recovery operations were apparently conducted on a 

more urgent basis during Exercise Desert Rock III. Reference 31 identifies 13 BusterJangle participants whose radiation dose exceeded operational limits. This included 

six Desert Rock officers who recovered film packets on 4 December (D+5). They 

recovered all but 66 of the 354 packets (Reference 2), likely in an attempt to remove 

them from the area before they became overexposed (indeed, of the 288 packets 

recovered, 35 were overexposed). It is likely that the concern about film packet 

overexposure led to an exception to the 1 R/hr intensity limitation in order to permit 

these offiLers to recover film packets from as many emplacements as possible without 

exceeding the 3 rem Desert Rock limit. One of the officers acted as the group 

monitor (Reference 311, but he failed to properly calibrate his survey meter, thus 

resulting in filrn badge doses of 3.45 to 5.80 rem (verified by dosimetry records). 

70 
It is assumed that these officers proceeded through the display positions as a 

group, fanning out to collect badges from emplacements, weapons, and vehicles. They 

would have started at position 7 and proceeded inward to position 3, where they would 

have taken a circular route (at 15 mph) to the northeast emplacements in the vicinity 

of position 2. They then proceeded toward CZ, where recovery became increasingly 

difficult due to cave-ins and ejecta burials of film packets (non-recovery of 66 packets 

was likely in the vicinity of positions 1 and 2). It is estimated that the officers spent 

10 minutes at each position and 2 minutes at each pair of interspersed foxholes, 

travelling at no less than 5 mph between stops except as noted above. After leaving 

position 1, they departed the area at 20 mph. The resultant calculated dose is 3390 

mrem. 

For the food and water project, meat samples were placed at positions 2, 3, 5, 

and 7, and other food and water samples were placed at all positions (Reference 2). As 

noted in Section 4, recovery of most samples (except meat) in positions 4 through 7 

was on 4 December (D+5), and from position 3 on 10 December (D+ll). The meat 

samples, however, were recovered on 6 December from positions 3, 5, and 7. The 

evaluation and recovery on 4 and 10 December was the same as for the other 

quartermaster activities; hence, the dose is the same. The meat recovery on 6 

December likely required about 5 minutes at each position (3, 5, and 7), assuming some 

of that time was needed to actually locate the few samples involved. A dose of 113 

mrem results for meat recovery. 

6.3.5 Rad-safe Monitors. 

The appropriate doses for rad-safe monitors are the doses of the personnel they 

accompanied. As was done for Exercise Desert Rock II monitors, the weighted 

average dose is the dose for each activity at which a monitor was required, times the 

number of monitors for each such activity, divided by the total number of monitors 

(36). It is assumed that there was one monitor per observer bus, one monitor per 

evaluation team (except for the hasty assessment on D+4, when one monitor would 

have accompanied the group of evaluators), and one monitor per display position when 

units were deployed for set-up, recovery, and restoration. Weighted average doses, 

which may be used when specific monitor assignment is unknown, are shown on a daily 

basis in table 10. 

71 
6.3.6 MP Security Detail. 

Reference 2 contains the following statement as one of the responsibilities of 

the Officer-in-Charge, Effects Tests: 

(d) Insure that sufficient guards are posted in the test area by 1600 hours 

U-3. The guards will be relieved during the night U-l upon direction from 

Camp Desert Rock S-3. They will be reposted after U-day upon clearance 

by Rad-Safe O[fficer] to enter the position and maintained until relieved by 

OIC Effects Test. 

It is noteworthy that this requirement differs from the requirement for posting 

guards for Shot Sugar quoted previously in that it does not specifically require a guard 

for each position and it does require clearance by the Rad-safe Officer prior to 

reposting after the shot. It is also assumed that, because display set-ups were 

completed by 25 November (D-41, the guards would have been posted one day earlier 

than planned above. 

The routes to the Shot Uncle display areas shown in figure 10 indicate where the 

VPs may have been posted. The most likely location to control access to the Desert 

Rock display positions would have been on the 2000-foot arc, just west of position 5. 

At this point, the residual radiation from Shot Sugar would have decayed to about 32 

mR/hr by the night of 25 November. Three guards from the 505th MP Battalion would 

have been assigned to the post at all times; the duration of each tour would have been 

12 hours (1500 - 0600 - 1300 hours). The dose for each tour was 673, 617, 527, and 455 

mrem, respectively, for each of the four days before Shot Uncle, as shown in table 10. 

Similar guard postings after Shot Uncle would have commenced after shot day 

upon clearance by the Rad-safe Officer. The earliest reposting would have been on 30 

November. If it is assumed that the guard post near position 5 was remanned at 0600 

hours on D+I, the 12-hour tour length (3 guards each) on 30 November leads to a dose 

of 1258 mrern, of which 365 mrem is the contribution from Shot Sugar residual. 

Subsequent 12-hour tour lengths lead to the doses for guards as shown in table 10. 

Daily doses shown in the table reflect the higher of the two 12-hour exposures each 

day. 

72 
6.3.7 Summary of Calculated External Doses at Exercise Desert Rock III. 

Table 10 summarizes the calculated external doses received by Exercise Desert 

Rock III personnel at Shot Uncle, as well as for the post-exercise activities described 

hereafter. 

6.4 POST-EXERCISE ACTIVITIES. 

As indicated in Section 4, evaluations of Shot Uncle displays at positions 1 and 2 

took place well after completion of Exercise Desert Rock III and after the bulk of the 

Desert Rock personnel had departed. The 21 March 1952 supplement to Reference 2 

(see Section 41, which reports the results of these evaluations, indicates that they 

took place on 2 1-23 January 1952. Morning Reports of the Hq & Svc Co of the 

Engineer Shore Battalion for the period 22 through 28 January 1952 identify the eight 

officers who arrived at Camp Desert Rock to conduct these evaluations. It is not 

clear if they were assisted by members of the winterization detachment for Camp 

Desert Rock. Considering the equipment requirements for recovery and restoration, it 

is more likely that one or more of the line elements of the 369th Engineer Amphibious 

Support Regiment may have arrived for the preparation phase of Exercise Desert Rock 

IV (Operation Tumbler-Snapper conducted in the spring of 1952) in time to provide the 

necessary support for these post-Desert Rock III activities. 

Figure 11 is a detailed view of the displays at positions 1 and 2. The figure 

provides a reason for the variations in the intensity readings by the several evaluators 

(or rad-safe monitors, if assigned). As shown, specific displays within position 1 in 

particular had nontrivial differences in distance and direction from GZ. These could 

have resulted in some differences in intensities. In addition, irregularities in the 

deposition of crater ejecta, which are typical of underground bursts, could be expected 

to produce irregularities in the intensity field close to GZ. 

The damage summaries by each of the evaluators, contained in the supplement to 

Reference 2, include the following radiation intensity measurements: 

73 
0f ’ 0 . A Q i”

'b oh Position 2 

/J a

/ Position 1 

0 300 1 L 1 Source: Reference 2

feet 

Figure 11. Display Positions 1 and 2, Shot Uncle. 

74 
Radiation Intensity (mR/hr) 

Section Date Evaluated Position 1 Position 2 

Engineer 21 Jan 52 none 

Signal 21 Jan 52 none 800 

Medical 21 Jan 52 none 

Quartermaster (not stated) up to 500 up to 350 

Chemical 23 Jan 52 none 

Ordnance 23 Jan 52 1000 to 300 

Average - 750 -483 

It should be noted that intensities reported on 3 December (Uncle D+4) of 13 

R/hr and 10 R/hr at positions 1 and 2, when decayed (t-la2) to 21-23 January, are 

consistent with the average of the above reported intensities on these dates. 

The difficulty of locating some display items implies a longer duration than the 

15 minutes used previously for evaluation of each position. Assuming 30 minutes at 

each.position, the dose is 0.5 hr x (750 + 483) mR/hr x 0.7 = 432 mrem. 

The times required for recovery of major display items and restoration of the 

terrain is assumed to be comparable to that of the earlier activity at the other display 

positions. There are indications that recovery of some items was more difficult due to 

partial burial, and that some items were not recovered due to complete burial. It is 

estimated that the personnel involved in recovery and restoration spent about 90 

minutes at each position, for a dose of 1.5 hr x (750 + 483) mR/hr x 0.7 = 1300 mrem. 

It is possible that the engineer and ordnance evaluators supervised the recovery 

of major items and the terrain restoration. If so, their doses would have been the 

same as the recovery and restoration personnel. This dose of 1300 mrem is in addition 

to the 432 mrem for evaluation personnel, for a total dose on 21-23 January of 1730 

mrem. 

75 
SECTION 7 

INTERNAL RADIATION EXPOSURE 

The potential for exposure to internal radiation for Desert Rock I, II, and III 

participants was through the pathway of (re)suspension and subsequent inhalation of 

contaminated surface material. Because reentry to the forward area took place after 

fallout deposition and because fallout did not impact Camp Desert Rock, the direct 

inhalation of descending fallout was not a contributory pathway. Decontamination 

procedures in the forward area ensured that levels of contamination remained 

negligible at Camp Desert Rock. With no ingestion of foodstuffs occurring in the 

forward area, neither was ingestion a contributory pathway. 

Body burden measurements, bioassays, or air sampling data are not available to 

calculate the committed dose equivalent (hereafter termed “dose commitment”) to 

specific body organs resulting from inhaled radioactive material. Therefore, an 

indirect approach is necessary. The only indicators of the radiological environment to 

which test participants were exposed are gamma radiation intensities as measured by a 

survey meter or integrated external doses determined from film badges. Fortunately, 

such measurements can be related to an airborne activity concentration of radioactive 

material that can be used to calculated an internal organ dose commitment. 

Bone dose commitment is reported because of the interest in this organ (red 

marrow dose is similar). It is not necessarily the largest internal dose; thyroid and 

lung, in particular, have considerably larger doses under some circumstances. 

7.1 EXERCISE DESERT ROCK I. 

Internal dose commitments resulting from Desert Rock I activities are exceedingly small because of the following circumstances of exposure: modest suspension of 

neutron-activated soil, low external doses, and lack of significant organ-seeking 

radionuclides among the principal contaminants. 

Exposure at Shots Charlie and Dog was solely from activated soil, not from 

fallout. Neutron-activated soil offers much less potential for internal dose than does 

76 
fallout, per unit external dose, because it is distributed with depth rather than being 

readily available for suspension from the surface. In activated Nevada Test Site soil, 

the radionuclides that principally contribute to internal dose commitments for 

exposure on shot day are sodium-24, potassium-42, and manganese-56. Bone dose 

commitment is augmented only slightly through the most-contributing bone-seeking 

radionuclides in the soil, calcium-45 and phosphorus-32. 

A dose determination involving the above radionuclides, a shot-day exposure, and 

an external dose comparable to those calculated for Desert Rock I activities is 

reported in Reference 40. The 50-year bone dose commitment was less than 10 mrem 

despite the occurrence of a dust storm. For the comparatively minor disturbance of 

the soil during Desert Rock I activities, conducted in more placid weather, the dose is 

far less. 

7.2 EXERCISES DESERT ROCK II AND III. 

In the case of inhalation of resuspended fallout at Shots Sugar and Uncle, the 

airborne concentration of radioactive material is calculated through the application of 

a resuspension factor, K(m-‘) which correlates the airborne activity concentration 

(Ci/m3) to the amount of radioactive material on the ground or other surface (G/m21 

under a given set of conditions. The surface activity (SA) is not directly measured; 

however, it can be related to a gamma radiation intensity, I (R/hr), measured at a 

given distance (I meter) above the surface. The ratio SA/I (G/m2 per R/hr) is a 

function of the gamma energy spectrum of the time-dependent mixture of radionuclides on the surface. These concepts are incorporated into the calculation of organ 

dose commitments as follows: 

D = I x y(t) x K x BR x T x DF(t) (1) 

where: D = Fifty-year dose commitment to the organ (rem) 

I = Gamma radiation intensity (R/hr) 

F(t) = Surface activity--intensity ratio (Ci/m2 per R/hr)* 

K = Resuspension factor (G/m3 per Ci/m2, or m-‘) 

* Note that, while the quantities SA/I and DF are independent of radiation levels, 

they are functions of time after detonation because of the changing radionuclide 

inventory due to radiological decay. 

77 
BR = Breathing rate (m3/hr) 

T q Duration of exposure (hr)

DF(t) = Activity-weighted average (composite) dose conversion 

factor** for the organ for the mixture of radionuclides in the 

fallout (rem/G)* 

t = Time after detonation of exposure (hr). 

For Desert Rock applications, the requisite parameters are treated as follows. 

The external dose (film badge reading or calculated), which equals 0.7 x I x T, provides 

a substitution for I x T (or time-integrated intensity, in the more general case). A 

value of 1.2 m3/hr, the breathing rate associated with light activity by a typical adult 

male (Reference 431, is used for BR. K is taken as 10m4m-’ for most Desert Rock II 

and III exposures, as discussed below. 

The complicated time-dependent parameters SA/I and DF have been evaluated 

from shot-specific radiochemistry for use in Reference 44 for various shots, including 

Sugar and Uncle, to determine bone dose commitments. As is most appropriate for 

Desert Rock II and III, the values of DF in the reference pertain to the inhalation of 

aerosols (with oxide clearance classif ication) having an activity median aerodynamic 

diameter (AMAD) of 1 urn. 

The combination of the above parameters leads to a time-dependent relationship 

between internal and external dose. Adaptation of the values listed in Reference 44. 

provides the relationships for Sugar and Uncle shown in table Il. 

* Note that, while the quantities SA/I and DF are independent of radiation levels, 

they are functions of time after detonation because of the changing radionuclide 

inventory due to radiological decay. 

** Dose conversion factors have been published to convert the intake of various 

radionuclides to a 50-year dose commitment to specific body organs. The 

particle size and the chemical and metabolic properties of the specific radionuclide are considered in the calculation of inhalation dose factors (References 

41 and 42). 

78 
Table 11. Internal bone dose commitment per unit external dose. 

Time After 

Detonation 

H+4 hr 

D+l day 

D+2 

D+3 

D+4 

D+5 

D+6 

D+7 

D+8 

D+9 

D+lO 

D+ll 

D+12 

D+13 

D+14 

D+15 

D+16 

D+17 

D+lS 

D+19 

D+20 

D+21 

D+22 

D+55 

D+65 

Bone dose (mrem) per rem of external dose* 

Sugar Uric le 

2.5 2.8 

13 13 

19 19 

27 26 

33 32 

43 42 

53 52 

63 63 

80 80 

100 100 

120 120 

140 140 

160 170 

180 200 

210 230 

230 N/A 

250 N/A 

270 N/A 

300 N/A 

320 N/A 

340 N/A 

370 N/A 

400 N/A 

N/A 1700 

lSO0 N/A 

* For inhalation of 1 urn AMAD particles, resuspension factor of 10e4mm1, 

breathing rate of 1.2 m3/hr. 

79 
Values of resuspension factor are chosen as consistent with Reference 44. Those 

activities involving at most walking or riding in ordinary vehicles are associated with 

K=10m5mm1. This value is appropriate to observers and the MP security detail. Personnel 

who picked up or retrieved contaminated objects, as well as those who dug or set-up in 

10-4 -1 contaminated areas, are given m . These include the evaluators, technical project 

personnel, and support personnel in the forward area. While Reference 44 considers 

retrievers of objects as small as film badges to have K=lO -5 m -1 , the need at Sugar and 

Uncle to retrieve these items from foxholes suggests the higher value. Personnel in the 

immediate vicinity of these activities, such as supervisory personnel or rad-safe 

monitors, are given the same resuspension factor. Thus, except for the monitors, who 

take the resuspension factor of each associated party, all groups keep a consistent value 

of K throughout the Operation (but K=O during helicopter evaluations, which, in order to 

satisfy rad-safe constraints, were conducted at sufficient heights not to loft surface 

contamination). 

Fifty-year bone dose commitments are evaluated for all known group exposures 

based on the external doses in tables 9 and 10 and the factors in table 11 (adapting to 

K= 10m5mm1 as necessary). Contributions from Sugar and Uncle are determined separately 

for post-Uncle exposures because of the different time after each shot; the contribution 

to external dose from each shot is used in this calculation. Daily results are shown in 

table 12 for Desert Rock II and in table 13 for Desert Rock III and post-exercise 

activities. The latter lead to the highest bone doses because of significant resuspension 

and external doses at late times after Uncle (note the increasing ratio of bone dose 

commitment to external dose with time, as shown in table 11). 

80 
0 0 

‘3’ 

5 iJ ;; 

7 .-aJ 

0

I, +-P “E 

81 
Table 13. Calculated daily internal bone dose ccxrmitmwts, Exercise Desert RDck ITT. 

Group/Unit* 

II r zs 

Nutember 

II. a 29 

1JEle 

-30 I 

Calculated 

-2 

dose 

1 

(mrem) 

4-

December 

-5 6 7- -a -9 lo l!.-.-... 

Januay 

21-23’ 

Official 

observers 

Senior officer 

observers 

Evaluators 

Chemical 

Signal 

Ordnance 

Engineer 

Quartermaster 

Medical 

26 

26 

26 

25 

25 

25 

25 

25 

25 

I3 

I3 

I3 

13 

13 

I3 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

42 

53** 

53 

53+* 

53 

53” 

I9 

19 

I9 

20 

22 

58 

22 

22 

23 

740 

740 

2900 

2900 

740 

740 

CD 

r-4 

Display set-up 

& recovery 

231st Engr Bn 

597th Ener Co 

3623d Or’d Co 

303d Sig Bn 

369th Engr Regt 

26 

26 

26 

25 

25 

25 

25 

64 

64 

64 

99 

99 

99 

Projects 

Film Badge 

Project 

Food & Water 

Project 

25 

25 

13 

13 

164 

19 IO 22 

Monitors 

(weighted 

mean for 

personnel) 

36 

7 II 3 <I 0 0 <I 5 2 <I <I 8 3 3 

MP security 

detail 

4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 

l Includes 

l + Normal 

accompanying monitors, MPs, drovers, 

evaluation activities resulted in a bone 

etc. 

dose 

Also rncludes 

commitment 

post-exercise 

of I9 mrem. 

personnel. 
SECTION 8 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION 

8.1 INTRODUCTION. 

The uncertainty in the calculated external doses arises from two basic sources: 

(1) the gamma radiation environment, and (2) the space-time scenario of personnel 

movements. Where the latter is dominated by a high-sided estimate of some 

component parameter, the dose is considered to be high-sided and not afforded a 

formal uncertainty analysis. For internal dose commitments, an additional, and 

dominant, uncertainty involves resuspension factors. These order-of-magnitude estimates are considered to be high-sided as used in conjunction with external doses, 

especially because the associated disturbances of contaminated material by Desert 

Rock personnel rarely occurred continuously throughout the entire period of radiation 

exposure, and because the disturbances did not necessarily produce the fine aerosols 

that are presumed in the use of the inhalation pathway. Thus, the calculated bone 

dose commitments also represent high-sided values that are not further analyzed. 

Where errors are determined, they are estimates of uncertainty in mean dose 

associated with the group activities described in Sections 2 through 4. No attempt is 

made to predict the distribution of dose within a unit. Thus, when only part of a unit 

was required for some activity in the forward area, no account is made of those 

personnel who did not participate (with the exception of the rad-safe monitors, as 

discussed in Section 6). Also, when no differentiation is available among personnel 

working concurrently at the various Desert Rock display positions, departures from the 

average activity scenario are not considered. 

For purposes of calculation and combination for a given exposure, errors are first 

expressed as multiplicative factors. These permit the analytical combination of 

uncertainties from a series of multiplied parameters and also arise naturally from the I 

exponential character of the spatial gradients in the fallout fields. All uncertainties 

are estimated at the 90-percent level, i.e., 5th to 95th percentiles. For example, if 

83 
the radiation intensity has an error factor of 1.5 and the duration of stay has an error 

factor of 2, the combined error factor is antilog [(log 1.5)2 + (log 2)21 Yz = 2.23. 

In order to sum the calculated doses from separate (daily) activities, the 

geometric (lognormal) error distributions are approximated by arithmetic (normal) 

distributions. For the magnitude of the error factors calculated, the arithmetic mean 

is slightly greater than the geometric mean (i.e., each daily value as shown in tables 8, 

9, IO). The summation of arithmetic means for the various daily exposures provides 

the total mean dose. The combination of error bounds is as for normal distributions; 

this is an approximation that ignores the imperfect symmetry of the error bounds 

around the mean. For example: 

+ (902 + 1202) Yz (100 + 28) + (150 _’ ‘828’ = (100 + 150) _ (6o2 + 802) y2 = 250 + ;;; . 

3.2 EXERCISEDESERTROCKI. 

The uncertainty in the radiation fields, which is typically generated through an 

automated procedure (Reference 3), cannot be done so fully because of the condition 

of the radiological data. For Shots Charlie and Dog, no raw survey data are available 

from the AEC area survey; only single-survey contour plots are provided in Reference 

36. Moreover, the depicted intensity levels do not extend as far as the Desert Rock 

positions. Thus, the few Desert Rock intensity readings, including positions I and 2 at 

Shot Dog, are emphasized in the dose assessment. Because these readings are greater 

than the intensities extrapolated from the Reference 36 contours, the doses derived 

therefrom are considered to be high-sided. Also, the Desert Rock data are concurrent 

with the shot-day activities, and the implied decay rate is consistent with that 

deduced from survey data for the same shot area in Operation Tumbler-Snapper. Thus, 

no appreciable uncertainty in dose exists via the decay rate. The similarities of the 

Shot Charlie contours in radius and gradient to the Shot Dog contours suggest that the 

intensities at Desert Rock positions were similar at corresponding times after each 

shot. Stay times at the positions are considered to be well known, based on the 

movement tables. 

a4 
It is thus considered that the calculated doses for Desert Rock I support 

elements are high-sided and do not warrant error bounds. Only the BCT maneuver 

involves a more complicated interaction with the Shot Dog radiation field. The BCT 

dose is dominated by the intensity at closest approach to GZ (the objective). For a 50-

yard uncertainty in the closest approach, the gradient implies an error factor of 1.7 in 

maximum intensity. With estimates of 2.0 for the error factors in the stay time at the 

objective and in the intensity at any position, the overall error factor is 3.0. 

Considering the adjusted mean, the resulting dose is 0.08 _’ :‘A: rem. . 

8.3 EXERCISES DESERT ROCK II AND III. 

In contrast to Shots Charlie and Dog, abundant radiation data were collected at 

Sugar and Uncle. However, References 35 and 36 principally present H+l hour 

t -1.2 intensities, derived from (undisplayed) data using . Thus, the full capability of the 

automated procedure again cannot be used. The uncertainty with respect to the 

-1.2 present use of t decay is judged to be minimal because most significant readings

-1.4 vs and personnel exposures were both obtained days after the shot. For example, t 

t-ls2 from D+2 to D+4 would involve only a 15 percent divergence in intensity (H+l 

extrapolation is not germane). Also, as noted in Section 6, D+4 and Dt53 readings 

demonstrated the utility of t -lm2 decay over the longer term. 

Desert Rock intensity data collected in conjunction with damage evaluations at 

both Sugar and Uncle augment the readings otherwise available, particularly at the 

innermost positions, where intensities were too great at early times for area radiation 

surveys. Most of the evaluators’ readings were nominally of the items evaluated, but 

these usually reflected the general radiation environment. Those items surveyed after 

removal from the radiation field had markedly lower readings and could be distinguished easily. Neutron activation of display objects did not affect the readings; only 

close-in salt samples (sodium-rich) at Shot Sugar were mildly activated (Reference 2). 

An error factor of 1.5 is estimated for the radiation intensity at Shots Sugar and 

Uncle at most locations relevant to Desert Rock activities. South of each GZ, the 

factor is based on the internal consistency of Desert Rock readings, the agreement 

with other survey data, and the mathematical fit obtained for intensities along the 

Desert Rock line using the automated procedure. For Shot Uncle, the usual 

85 
exponential fit for intensity as a function of distance suffices, but for Shot Sugar, the 

addition of a quadratic term in the exponent greatly improves the fit. This latter fit 

accommodates, for example, the particularly sharp rise in intensity from Sugar 

position 2 to position 1. 

The same error factor is used for the Shot Sugar residual during Uncle set-up 

activities. The outer positions were near the Sugar hotline, where the intensity 

maximum is well identified by the data and of broad extent. While the inner positions 

are in a steeper intensity gradient, the effect of any greater uncertainty in intensity is 

diminished by the lesser contribution to dose. 

Northeast of the Shot Uncle GZ, the intensities at positions 1 and 2 have an error 

factor of 1.5 based on the December and January readings and the variations within 

the latter (Section 6). However, outward of position 2, an error factor of 2 is assigned. 

The engineer evaluator readings at foxholes approaching position 2 extrapolate to 

considerably lower intensities at position 2 than otherwise obtained. For groups that 

reached positions 1 and 2, the impact on dose is minor, however. 

The greatest impact on dose from uncertainty in the personnel activity scenario 

is from the stay time at the various positions, particularly for the position closest to 

GZ. For official observers, the estimated error factor in stay time is 1.5; movement 

scheduling information as well as experience with observer movements from other 

Desert Rock exercises minimizes this uncertainty. For evaluators and project 

personnel, as well as the senior officers who toured the test positions at Shot Uncle, 

less timing information is available; the estimated error factor is 2. 

Extended exposures in the forward area, such as display set-up and recovery, 

involve less uncertainty in stay time because of military estimates based on the work 

required and reasonable scheduling around the length of a work day (discounting 

transportation time to and from the forward area). The associated error factor is 

estimated as 1.3. Because signal work is not considered to have been as extensive as 

the engineer and ordnance work, signal personnel would not have remained for the full 

duration in the higher-intensity areas; thus their dose as derived is taken to be highsided. For some of these activities, the date of performance is estimated. Bounds on 

86 
possible dates translate into uncertainties in dose through the time dependance of 

radiation intensity. 

Movement rates have little impact on uncertainty in dose, especially because 

most travel was motorized. An error factor of 1.5 for all rates is assumed. 

Uncertainties are not determined for the weighted-average daily doses for radsafe monitors. The great number of exposures associated with the mean total monitor 

dose ensures that the overall error factor would be small. For individual monitors 

known to have engaged in specific activities, the uncertainties for the associated 

group or element may be used. 

Mean doses and error bounds are derived below for the more significant daily 

exposures. 

For evaluators at Shot Sugar, a common set of error factors describes their 

exposures as indicated in Section 6. Factors of 1.5 for field intensity and 2 for stay 

time apply to almost all of each daily dose. The overall error factor is about 2.2. The 

resultant doses are as follows: 

Chemical, D+ 1 

Signal, D+2 

l I+ 1.1 Ordnance, D+4 . - 0.6 

2 6+ 2.5 Engineer and Quartermaster, D+2 . - 1.6 

The recovery operations at Sugar positions 1 and 2 are estimated to have 

occurred on 3 December, but could have occurred at any time from 30 November (if 

not precluded by intensity limits for recovery operations) to 7 December without 

interfering with Uncle activities. The error factor on intensity is 1.35 on this account, 

which combines with the 1.5 for the intensity field and 1.3 for work duration to yield 

an overall factor of about 1.8. The mean dose, including the small increment on D+4, is 

+ 0.9 1.5- o.7 rem. 

87 
Set-up activities before Shot Uncle are not specifically dated in the available 

references, but no dates other than 24 and 25 November are consistent with other 

activities and documentation; thus, no error in dating is considered. Error factors of 

1.5 for the Sugar intensity and 1.3 for the duration of work apply. The overall error 

factor of 1.6 implies a mean dose of 0.63 _ 0 26 +o*33 rem for evaluators and support units . + 0.26 involved in preliminary set-up on 24 November, and a mean dose of 0.51- o.21 rem for 

all participants on 25 November. For those personnel working on both days, the mean 

+ 0.42 set-up dose is 1.14- o.33 rem. 

The MP detail that guarded Uncle positions starting on the evening of the day 

after Uncle accrued the greatest dose. Although the location of the guard position 

was not documented, the estimated position is judged to have served at least as well as 

any at a higher radiation level. It is possible that a looser guard was established at a 

more distant location, but the greatly diminished dose that results is not considered in 

the uncertainty analysis. Error factors of 1.3 for workshift length and 1.5 for the 

+ 0.7 intensity fields combine to 1.6 overall, which implies a mean dose of 1.3- o 5 rem for . 

the stated shift. 

The hasty chemical evaluation and the brief visual assessments by other 

evaluators on Uncle D+4 have uncertainties in dose that are dominated by the error 

factor of 2 for stay times at positions and 1.5 for the field intensity. The resulting 

combined error factor of 2.2 implies a mean dose of 1.3+- b’i . rem to the chemical 

t 1.6 evaluator and I .7- 1 .3 rem to the other evaluators who viewed items northeast of GZ. 

For the personnel who retrieved film packets on Uncle D+5, the error factor on 

stay time is estimated as only 1.5 because of the firmer judgment regarding retrieval 

requirements as well as the number and approximate location of those packets that 

were successfully retrieved. The field intensity has an error factor of 1.5 or 2, 

depending on location. Overall, the error factor in dose is about 1.9, which implies a 

t 2.7 

mean dose of 3.7- 1 .9 rem. 

The dates of post-Uncle recovery activities are reasonably firm based on the 

dates of preceding evaluations and rapidity with which Exercise Desert Rock III was 

88 
concluded. Error factors for the intensity field and work duration are as for set-up 

operations. The dose for signal personnel is again considered to be high-sided. The 

mean doses for 8 and I1 December are 0.36+ O-l9 rem and 0.5s: 00.;: rem, which - 0.15 . + 0.36 combine to 0.94- o.28 rem. 

The evaluations at Uncle positions 1 and 2 in January 1952 have associated error 

factors of 1.5 for radiation intensity and 2 for duration of stay. The overall error 

factor in dose is about 2.2, resulting in a mean dose of 0.48: t;i rem for most . 

evaluators. Recovery operations, as previous, have a combined error factor of 1.6 for 

+ 0.7 these positions, resulting in a mean dose of 1.4- o 6 rem, The engineer and ordnance . + 0.8 evaluators who supervised the recovery have a total mean dose of 1.9- o.7 rem. 

8.4 TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY. 

Total doses for each Desert Rock exercise are derived from the daily dose tables 

(8, 9, 10) as described in Section 8.1. These exercise doses are shown for each group or 

unit in the Desert Rock exercise columns of table 14. In the absence of specific 

knowledge to the contrary, the total exercise dose for a given group or unit is the sum 

of the daily doses within the time span of each table. A typical exception, however, 

would be for MP guards at the Uncle displays. Because guard duty is a rotational duty, 

no individual would have had to perform such more than once in the exercise (or even 

in the operation); hence, the unit dose for the exercise is the highest daily dose that 

one could have received, not the sum of the daily doses. 

Dose summing for the entire operation, or for participation in more than one 

exercise, is again based on known combinations of multiple exposures. That is, when 

there is evidence to suggest that units or groups engaged in activities involving 

radiation exposure on successive exercises, the exercise-to-exercise doses are summed 

in table 14. This is particularly appropriate for many units that supported the various 

Desert Rock exercises, or for the projects that participated at both Exercises Desert 

Rock II and III. Dose summing is not generally appropriate for observers; hence, the 

total dose given in table 14 for observers is the dose for the highest observer exposure. 

a9 
Table 14. Dose summary, Exercises -Desert Rock I, II, and III. 

Total 

~ __ 

EDR II* EX,.D& 

<O.Ol t 0.52 

o.5’- 0.3, 

+ 0.52 

o.53- 0.31 

l 0.10 

‘I.os* O.“) 0.06 - 0.08- 0.06 

7. I’, 0.14 

3.14 0.14 

1.3:&J 2.1’ )I:1 0.4s’ 8:;s 2.1: tJ:I 

0.90’ 8% 2.7: 1:; 0.4s: ::‘i; 2.7: ;:f 

1.6’ - ‘.’ 0.6 

+ I.7 

3.5- I.1 

, ,9+ 0.s 

0.7 3.5, - I*7

I.1 

2.7’ 2’5 I.6 17 

I I.7 

I.1 1.9’ o.s ‘3.7 3.7+ I-7 - 1.1 

2.6’ 2.5 - 1.6 

l

7.5 1.7 

I.1 0.49’ ‘).47 0.2s 

l 

3-5-

1.7 

I.1 

I 2.7 I.6 

I.0 

o,os+ 9.07 

0.75 

+ I.6 

*-7- 1.0 

9.34’ q.5o

0.25 0.75 + 0.32 7,24 - 1.0+ OS7 - 0.3 

o 45t 0.44 

’ - g.27 1.1: ;:; 1.6+ ‘-’ 0.4 

0.06 0.06 

,.t,‘Q.’ - 0.6 1.4: rj:g 

7.i4 2.1: 2:d 3.7: ;:g 

0.1: 0.07 

0.14 1.1’S:‘r 1.3: 83 

0.92 1.3: 8:: 1.3: i:: 

9.1% 0.14 

9.14 0.14 

7.1’4 3 7+ 

. -

1.0 

0.8 

r,. I ‘i 0.14 

1.14 0.14 

0.14 I.4 2.9 

0.14 0.19 

0.14 0.14 

9.77 0.07 

‘I.07 0.07 

‘1.7: 0.07 

7.13 0.13 

1.1 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

0.74 

0.74 

2.9 

2.9 

0.74 

0.74 

0.215 

<.I5 

<.I5 

2.2 

0.50 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

0.50 

<.I5 

<.I5 

0.47 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

<.I5 

90 
If more is known about participation in (a) specific shot(s) or exercise(s), the dose 

for the actual participation should be used instead of the highest dose given in the 

total dose column of table 14. As was noted previously, evaluation reports provide 

evidence that evaluators were generally not the same from one exercise to another, or 

that a high dose activity at one exercise caused the same evaluator to engage in lower 

exposure activities at a subsequent activity. Even with such rotation of personnel, 

doses for evaluators sometimes exceeded the 3 rem criterion established for the 

combined exercises. Thus, summing of doses from exercise to exercise is 

inappropriate for groups and units when there is evidence (such as evaluation reports 

with named personnel) to suggest that the same personnel were not used in the highest 

exposure activity for all exercises. However, when there is no evidence to support this 

selectivity, the doses are summed to give the benefit of the doubt to the participant. 

An extension of this is seen for monitors, where specific participation information is 

not given. Because so few monitors from the group would have been required, a 

weighted average dose is given for each day (tables 8-10) and for each exercise (table 

14). For a monitor who was known to be present at both Exercises Desert Rock II and 

III, summing of the weighted averages is appropriately done in table 14. 

The total internal doses shown in table 14 are summarized from tables 1 l-13. 

Again, the highest combinations of exposures are used to derive the total, and thus 

should be used only when there is insufficient information on specific shot or exercise 

participation. However, it should be noted that the total external dose shown in table 

14 for a group or unit may not necessarily be from the same exposure that led to the 

total internal dose. This is because the combinations of exposures that lead to the 

highest external doses may be different from the sets of combinations that lead to the 

highest internal doses. However, if specific participation information is not available, 

the use of the highest combinations of each dose high-sides the totals. Internal doses 

less than 150 mrem (50-year bone commitment) are not provided. This is consistent 

with the policy of the Defense Nuclear Agency that establishes a threshold level at 

one-hundredth the annual limit guideline for occupational exposure. Bone is the 

indicator organ because, as noted in Reference 44, many radionuclides give a higher 

dose to the skeleton than to other body parts. It should be noted, however, that 

thyroid doses from exposure to fission debris at early times after the shot could be 

higher than the bone dose given. Therefore, if thyroid dose is an issue, it should be 

assessed separately. 

91 
SECTION 9 

FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 

Film badge records are available for most Desert Rock participants who entered 

the forward area during the first five shots of Operation Buster-Jangle. The majority 

of these badges were issued to document exposures associated with the pre-and postshot activities associated with Shot Dog. These activities included final preparations 

in the Shot Dog display areas on 30-31 October by Control Group personnel, the postshot tour through the display areas by observer personnel (being supervised and briefed 

by the Control Group at each area) on I November, and the post-shot maneuver by the 

BCT troops. Sufficient dosimetry is available for these personnel to provide a 

meaningful comparison with the doses calculated for them in Section 6. 

Approximately 25 Camp Desert Rock personnel were responsible for setting up 

equipment displays and providing effects evaluation briefings at display position I, 

1000 yards south-southwest of the Shot Dog ground zero. In Section 6, doses 

calculated for this group on 30 and 31 October and 1 November are 64, 9, and 48 

mrem, respectively. The dosimetry for these personnel is as follows: 

Control Group Dosimetry: Display Position #l 

Number of personnel badged on 

Dose (mrem) 10/30/51 10/31/51 1 l/01/51 

0 

20 

34 

50 

60 

80 

95 

14 

3 

2 

1 

9 

4 

4 

0 

4 

7 

4 

7 

1 

1 

It is apparent that, on 1 November, there is a definite increase in the mean of the dose 

distribution as derived from the dosimetry, which suggests increased radiation levels 

at display position 1 resulting from Shot Dog. The average dose is about 45 mrem, 

92 
which compares favorably with the calculated film badge dose of 48 mrem on this day. 

The two highest dose badges (95 and 80 mrem) are for a rad-safe monitor and for a 

photographer responsible for documenting the weapon’s effects on displayed equipment, activities likely associated with higher than average exposures. On 31 October, 

the calculated dose of 9 mrem is consistent with the dosimetry, where all badge 

readings are well below 50 mrem (which subsequently became a reporting threshold for 

specific badge readings, suggesting that specific readings less than 50 mrem indicated 

an exaggerated precision). On 30 October, the calculated dose of 64 mrem is greater 

than all doses recorded on that day. This supports the contention made in Section 6 

that, by assuming radiation levels at positions 1 and 2 following Shot Charlie were 

identical to those levels following Shot Dog, subsequent dose calculations for Shot 

Charlie would be high-sided. 

A similar comparison can be made for the approximately 80 personnel assigned 

to the Control Group at display position 2, 1500 yards south-southeast of ground zero. 

Calculated doses for this group on 30 and 31 October and 1 November, are 32, 5, and 

24 mrem, respectively. The following table is an analysis of the dosimetry for these 

personnel: 

Control Group Dosimetry: Display Position #2 

Number of personnel badged on 

Dose (mrem) 10/30/51 10/31/51 11/01/51 

0 18 9 40 

20 2 3 8 

34 4 3 14 

50 3 1 2 

60 

80 

95 1 

Unlike the dosimetry from position 1, the dosimetry from position 2 indicates no 

significant increase in radiation levels resulting from Shot Dog on 1 November; on 

each day, the non-zero badges issued represent approximately the same percentage of 

the total badges issued. This would suggest that a fairly uniform, low-level radiation 

93 
field persisted at position 2 following Shots Charlie and Dog. Calculated doses are 

consistent with the dosimetry on these days when one considers that, with the 

exception of one film badge issued on I November, all badges read at or below 50 

mrem. It should be reiterated that the calculated dose of 32 mrem on 30 October is 

considered quite high-sided for reasons previously mentioned. The highest dose badge 

(95 mrem) is for a medical officer assigned to position 2 on I November, which 

suggests that he ventured farther forward than position 2. 

According to Reference 1, film badges were issued to observers by the Visitors 

Bureau when the individual reported to Camp Desert Rock. The dosimetry records 

indicate that virtually all observer badges have dates of 29, 30, 31 October, and 1 

November. It is presumed these dates refer to the issue date and that all observer 

badges were collected following Shot Dog on 1 November. Approximately 2800 

observers were issued one badge each during the interval 29 October to I November; 

this number agrees with the total number of Shot Dog observer personnel cited in 

Section 2. The following is a breakdown of the observer dosimetry for Shot Dog. 

Dosimetry for Shot Dog observers 

Number of observers issued badges on 

Dose (mrem) 10/29/5 1 10/30/51 10/31/5 1 1 l/01/51 Total 

0 271 374 1312 482 2439 

20 38 61 114 22 235 

34 5 38 33 22 98 

50 1 1 7 5 14 

60 1 0 4 3 8 

80 0 1 0 1 2 

95 2 0 1 1 4 

110 0 1 1 2 

125 1 1 2 

140 I 0 1 

150 0 1 1 

240 0 1 

320 1 0 f 

750 1 1 

- l 

Total 318 478 1476 537 2809 

94 
It is evident that the calculated dose of 4 mrem for observers at Shot Dog (Section 6) 

is supported by the vast majority of the dosimetry records; 87 percent of the film 

badges recorded a zero dose while about 99 percent of the doses are less than 50 

mrem. Reference 1 depicts an analysis of 2714 film badges worn by observers at Shot 

Dog. The results indicate a low dose of less than 20 mrem, an average dose of 31 

mrem, and a maximum dose of 320 mrem. The reference also indicates that the 

average dose “includes only those readings of at least 20 mrem.” Disregarding the 

2439 zero dose records (and the 750 mrem badge, thought to be an equipment badge) in 

the distribution above, the average dose is 30 mrem, which is in excellent agreement 

with Reference 1. If the 2439 zero dose badges are included in the analysis, the 

average dose is only 4 mrem, which is consistent with the calculated dose. Moreover, 

low doses are consistent with the constraint noted in Reference 1 that “The observer 

group will not enter a radioactively contaminated area, nor proceed closer to ground 

zero than EGG Road, [position ,).,I Reference 1 also states that, of the 2714 badges 

worn by the observers, “with exceptions as noted in the summary, none of this group 

proceeded closer than 1500 yards from ground zero [position 21.” If it is considered 

that the film badge threshold of reliability was about 50 mrem, the 37 badges at or 

above this level are likely due to the unauthorized excursions (documented in 

Reference 1) of personnel who proceeded closer to ground zero than the remainder of 

the observer group. 

For the BCT, the 846 film badges worn on 1 November are analyzed as follows: 

Dosimetry for maneuver units 

Dose (mrem) 

Number 

Element of Badges Average Maximum 

Hq Co, 1st Bn 169 0 56 125 

Co A 140 0 53 125 

Co B 145 0 57 125 

co c 167 0 48 140 

Co D 109 0 70 200 

C Btry 116 0 64 95 

-

BCT as a group 846 0 57 200 

95 
Only 12 badges recorded a dose greater than 100 mrem, and 7 of these were in 

Company D. If the zero dose badges are excluded, the results are the same as that 

presented in Reference 1, which indicates that the badges turned in by the DCT troops 

had a minimum dose of 20 mrem, an average dose of 59 mrem, and a maximum dose of 

200 mrem. The calculated mean dose of 0.08’ 8:bg rem for the BCT troops (Section 8) 

is in good agreement with the film badge dosimetry. 

As indicated in Section 6, only a few film badge records for Exercises Desert 

Rock II and III personnel (Shots Sugar and Uncle) are available.* Records are available 

for 27 November for six Desert Rock personnel (including evaluators) and for rad-safe 

monitors who were not necessarily involved with Desert Rock activities. The doses 

apparently reflect exposures associated with the evaluator pre-shot checks of the 

Uncle display positions. The badge doses range from 0.11 to 0.2 1 rem (average 0.152 

rem). The reconstructed mean dose for this activity is 0.19: i:iy rem. 

Sixteen film badge records for a group of senior Army officers who toured some 

of the display positions on 7 December (Uncle, D+S) are available. The badge doses 

range from 0.12 to 0.19 rem with an average of 0.148 rem. There are no other records 

for that date that could pertain to their drivers, monitors, or MP escort, if any. The 

dose calculations assume that these senior officers toured positions 3 through 7, 

+ 0.25 resulting in a mean dose of 0.25- 0.15 rem. 

Reference 31 lists a total of 13 Buster-Jangle participants who exceeded 3.9 

rem. Three of these individuals are identified as Desert Rock, while three others were 

with activities associated with Desert Rock (Reference 36). All six were officers who 

recovered film packets from display positions on 4 December (Uncle D+5). Reference 

31 also states that one of these officers, who had served as their monitor, had failed to 

account for a large instrument calibration factor and that his oversight resulted in the 

following film badge doses (average 5.15 rem>: 4.65, 4.90, 4.90, 5.08, 5.54, and 5.SO 

rem. 

* Reference 2 states that the film badges for Desert Rock evaluation personnel at 

Shot Sugar and Uncle were collected and turned in to the film badge laboratory 

at the AEC Control Point. The Desert Rock Rad-safe Officer obtained film 

badge reports from the laboratory and maintained an operational chart on total 

dose received by each member of the evaluation teams. These records have not 

been located. 

96 
The calculated mean dose for these officers for their likely activites on this date 

is 3.7-f T 3 rem. Reference 36 also depicts activities in which individuals exceeded 3.0 

rem. It is noteworthy that no other Desert Rock individuals are listed, thus suggesting 

that overexposures to Desert Rock personnel were limited to those individuals 

described above and in Reference 31. 

In summary, while dosimetry for Exercise Desert Rock I is extensive and 

correlates well with calculated doses (Section 61, the few film badge records available 

for Exercises Desert Rock II and III, although representative only of unique activities 

by small groups of individuals, nonetheless agree with calculated doses. These, 

together with excellent correlation for Shot Dog, provide high confidence in the 

reconstruction methodology. The calculated doses for Shots Sugar and Uncle are thus 

considered valid. 

97 
SECTION 10 

CONCLUSIONS 

Exercise Desert Rock personnel engaged in activities at five of the seven test 

shots of Operation Buster-Jangle. No personnel were located closer than 10,000 yards 

(9 kilometers) from ground zero at the time of any of the detonations; thus, initial 

radiation dose was insignificant for all participants. 

Residual radiation doses to the bulk of the military personnel in the three 

exercises were modest. For example, doses were 0.14 rem or less for all units and 

groups in Exercise Desert Rock I. Doses for some groups at Exercises Desert Rock II 

and III were near the rad-safe limit of 3 rem. Fifty-year bone dose commitments for 

all observers and maneuver troops at any of the exercises were less than 0.15 rem. 

Calculated external doses from residual radiation (mean film badge equivalent 

doses) and 50-year bone dose commitments to various categories of staff and support 

personnel, military equipment evaluators, and Desert Rock project personnel varied 

due to the nature, intensity, and duration of radiation fields (air, surface, and subsurface bursts) and the timing, duration, and types of activity involved. Moreover, the 

apparent non-specific intensity limit for Exercise Desert Rock II led to higher doses 

(but within the 3 rem dose limit) than would have accrued if an intensity limit had 

been in effect (as it was for the other two exercises). 

Exercise Desert Rock I involved activities resulting in exposures to residual 

radiation (neutron-activated soil) from Shots Charlie and Dog. The highest resultant 

external dose of 0.14 rem was received by personnel of the Control Group assigned to 

Display Position 1 and supporting units involved in set-up and recovery operations at 

this position. Bone dose commitments were much less than 0.15 rem. 

Desert Rock II and III activities in the residual radiation (fission product) fields 

of the surface and sub-surface bursts of Shots Sugar and Uncle resulted in some 

instances of significant external radiation exposure and 50-year bone dose 

commitments for evaluators and project personnel, and for units involved in display 

98 
set-up and recovery. The technical service evaluators at Shots Sugar and Uncle; as 

well as several support units involved in equipment set-up and recovery, accrued the 

highest external doses of all exercise participants, These doses, in some cases, 

approached or slightly exceeded the dose limit of 3 rem established for the combined 

exercises. It is noted that these doses are likely not applicable to the entire units, but 

nonetheless would have been even higher had it not been realized at the time that 

some individuals were approaching the established dose limit, thus causing others to be 

used, when available, in subsequent high exposure activities. Post-exercise activites 

resulted in additional exposures, the doses for which should be recorded for 1952. 

Internal bone dose commitments, while below the 0.15 rem screen threshold for 

the first exercise, exceeded 0.15 for several classes of participants at the surface and 

underground tests as well as for recovery operations in January 1952. 

Calculated doses, both for low exposure and relatively high exposure situations, 

correlate well with available film badge dosimetry records, thus providing a high 

confidence in the calculations. 

99 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

S. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

Y 

** 

*** 

SECTION 11 

LIST OF REFERENCES 

“Exercise Desert Rock 1,” Headquarters, III Corps, Fort MacArthur, CA, June 

1952. (A06) AD/A078 556.” 

“Report of Test Exercises Desert Rock II and III,” Headquarters, Camp Desert 

Rock, NV, December 1951. (A121 AD/B951 583.” 

“Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock VI, 

Operation Teapot,” DNA-5354, July 1980. (A05) AD/AI21 701.” 

“Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot Smoky, Exercise 

Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plumbbob,” DNA-4747F, May 1979. (AM) 

AD/A070 239.+ 

“Analysis of Radiation Exposure, 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise 

Brigade, Exercise Desert Rock V, Operation Upshot-Knothole,” DNA-TR-82-03, 

February 1982. (A041 AD/A 124 279.” 

Memorandum for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Subject: Attendance of Military Personnel at Atomic Weapons Tests, Military Liaison Committee, MLC 31.4, July 16, 1951. 

“Special Weapons Command Participation in Operation Buster/Jangle, 195 1 ,‘I 

John C. Hatlem, Headquarters, [Air Force] Special Weapons Command, January 

1952. 

Equipment Test Plan for Exercise Desert Rock, III Corps, Camp Desert Rock, 25 

October 195 1. 

Directive for Exercise Desert Rock, w/Incl: Troop List, Office, Chief of Army 

Field Forces, 10 October 1951. 

Operation Order 1, Operation Thundercloud, Exercise Desert Rock, III Corps, 

Camp Desert Rock, October 1951. 

“Troop Performance of a Training Maneuver Involving the Use of Atomic 

Weapons,” Operations Research Office, ORO-T-170, March 1952. (A041 AT1 149 

228.” 

Morning Reports, Companies E, F, and G, 1st Battalion, 188th Airborne Infantry 

Regiment; 5, 6, & 7 November 1951. 

Memo for the Record, Subject: Minutes of Meeting with General Kean, I October 

195 1, at N.T.S., Deputy Test Director, 2 October 195 l.** 

Available from NTIS; order number appears before the asterisk. 

Available at CIC. 

Requests subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

100 
14. Memorandum for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Subject: Attendance of Military Personnel at Atomic Weapons Tests, Military Liaison Committee, October 15, 1951. 

15. Press Release, Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, Public Information Office, 19 

November 195 1. 

16. Final Damage Assessment Forms for Chemical, Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal Evaluation Teams, 19-24 November 1951. 

17. Trip Report, Exercise Desert Rock II, Army Field Forces Board No. 3, 29 

November 195 1. 

18. Seminar Group Organization, Headquarters, III Corps Artillery, 27 November 

1951. 

19. Official Observers, [Exercise] Desert Rock III, Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, 

Visitors Bureau, 28 November 1951. 

20. Operation Order No. I-51, Office of the Test Director, Los Alamos Scientific 

Laboratory, J-8000, 25 August 1951.** 

21. Memorandum for Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks, from Projects Officer, 

Bureau of Yards and Docks, Subject: Operation Buster and Jangle, Report on CB 

Participation in, 2 January 1952. 

22. Final Damage Assessment Forms for Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, 

Quartermaster, and Signal Evaluation Teams, 3-l I December 1951. 

23. Memorandum [Bus List for Bus Number 4 through Bus Number 81, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, 27 November 1951. 

24. Morning Reports of: 3623d Ordnance Company (Medium Maintenance), 21 

November 1951; Hq and Hq Det, 303d Signal Service Battalion, 29 November 

1951 and 6 December 1951; and 597th Engineer Light Equipment Company, 30 

November 1951, w/In& 

25. “Observer’s Report on Operation Desert Rock III,” w/o In&., Colonel D.E. 

Beach, Army War College, December 1951.“” 

26. Letter to Carroll L. Tyler, Test Manager, from Brigadier General B.M. Fitch, 

Subject: DR III, Radiological Safety, Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, 25 

November 1951. 

27. Letter to Carroll L. Tyler, Test Manager, from Brigadier General B.M. Fitch, 

[Subject: Winterization Detachment] Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, 

December 1951. 

* Available from NTIS; order number appears before the asterisk. 

** Available at CIC. 

*** Requests subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

4 
28. 

29. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

* 

** 

*** 

Special Orders No. 30, Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, 7 December 1951. 

[Subject: Assignments of Monitors]. 

Memorandum for Test Manager, Nevada Test Site, Subject: Desert Rock III 

Schedule, Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, 25 November 1951.** 

“Engineer Field Data,” Department of the Army Field Manual 5-34, December 

1969. 

Memorandum for T.L. Shipman, from W.R. Kennedy, Subject: Buster-Jangle 

Personnel Exposures in Excess of 3.9R, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 28 

February 1952.*** 

Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test Detonations, 1945-1962, Extracted 

from DASA 1251. Volume 1: “Continental U.S. Tests,” DNA-1251-lEX, May 

1979. (A991 AD/A079 309”. 

Letter to MAJ J.F. Hunt, Camp Quartermaster, from 2/LT SF. Kledas, Subject: 

Additional Summary Assessment of Damage to QM Equipment, Exercise DR 11, 

25 November 51. 

[Memo for the Record] Subject: Preliminary Damage Report, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, 4 December 1951. 

Gamma Radiation Measurements, Operation Jangle, Compendium, Armed Forces 

Special Weapons Project, WT-370, April 1952. (A15) AD/A078 575.* 

“Radiological Safety, Operation Buster-Jangle,” Los Alamos Scientific 

Laboratory, WT-425-EX, July 1953. (A04) AD/B 951 743”. 

Memo for Test Effects and Evaluation Officer from MAJ J.F. Hunt, Subject: 

Evaluation of QM Test Property, Phase III, 6 December 195 1. 

Memo for Test Effects and Evaluation Officer from MAJ J.F. Hunt, Subject: 

Evaluation of QM Test Property, Phase III, 10 December 1951. 

Movement Order 2, Desert Rock III, Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, 26 

November 1951. 

“Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock V, 

Operation Upshot-Knothole,” DNA-5742F, April 1981. (A06) AD/A116 921.“. 

Estimates of Internal Dose Equivalent to 22 Target Organs for Radionuclides 

Occurring in Routine Releases from Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Facilities, Vols I and II, 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/NUREG/TM-190-l&2, Oak Ridge, TN, 

June 1978 and November 1979. 

Available from NTIS; order number appears before the asterisk. 

Available at CIC. 

Requests subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

102 
42. “Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers,” International Commission on 

Radiological Protection, ICRP Pub1 30, 3 parts, New York, Pergamon Press, 

1978, 1980, 1981. 

43. “Report of the Task Group on Reference Man,” International Commission on 

Radiological Protection, ICRP Pub1 23, New York, Pergamon Press, 1975. 

44. “Low Level Internal Dose Screen--CONUS Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel 

Review,” DNA-TR-85-317, December 1986. (A06) AD/A182 563.” 

45. “Energy Dependent Air/Ground Correction Factors for the ATR (Air Transport of 

Radiation) Code,” l3RL Report No. 345, U.S. Army Ballistic Research 

Laboratory, August 1977. AD/A043 807.” 

* Available from NTIS; order number appears before the asterisk. 

** Available at CIC. 

* ** Requests subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

103 
AVAILABILITY INFORMATION 

An availability statement is included at the end of the reference citation for 

those readers who wish to read or obtain copies of source documents. It is anticipated 

that some of the documents marked unavailable may subsequently become available 

during the classification review process. The Coordination and Information Center 

(CIC) and the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) will be provided declassified DNA-WT documents bearing an EX after the report number. 

Source documents bearing an availability statement of NTIS may be purchased 

from the National Technical Information Service. When ordering by mail or phone, 

please include both the price code and the NTIS number. The price code appears in 

parentheses before the NTIS order number. 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road Phone: (703) 487-4650 (Sales Office) 

Springfield, VA 22161 (703) 487-4700 (Customer Assistance) 

Source documents bearing an availability statement of CIC may be ordered or 

reviewed at the following address: 

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P.O. Box 1t 400 Phone: (702) 295-0731 

Las Vegas, NV 89114-4400 FTS: 575-0731 

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