******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
MARIA F. MCKEON v. WILLIAM P. LENNON

(SC 19470)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa and Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued January 27—officially released May 17, 2016

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom were Jon T.

Kukucka and, on the brief, Johanna S. Katz, for the

appellant (plaintiff).

Debra C. Ruel, with whom were Anne C. Dranginis

and James M. Ruel, for the appellee (defendant).

Giovanna Shay, Lucy Potter, Anne Louise Blanchard, Shelley White and Steve Dembo filed a brief for

Greater Harford Legal Aid et al. as amici curiae.

Louise Truax and Leslie Jennings-Lax filed a brief
for the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers,

Connecticut Chapter, as amicus curiae.

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV and Wendy Dunne

DiChristina filed a brief for the Connecticut Bar Association as amicus curiae.
Opinion

ZARELLA, J. In this certified appeal, we address two

important issues relating to child support orders. The

first issue is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded, based on this court’s reasoning with respect to

the modification of alimony orders in Dan v. Dan, 315

Conn. 1, 10, 105 A.3d 118 (2014), that the supported

party must show circumstances beyond the increased

income of the supporting party to establish the substantial change in circumstances required to justify the modification of a child support order under General Statutes

§ 46b-86 (a). The second issue is whether the trial court

should consider exercised stock options, restricted

stock and employment perquisites in calculating the

supporting party’s gross income to determine whether

there has been a substantial change in circumstances

under § 46b-86 (a). The plaintiff, Maria F. McKeon,

claims that the Appellate Court, in affirming the trial

court’s denial of her two separate motions to modify

the original child support order, incorrectly concluded

that alimony and child support orders are subject to

the same modification requirements under § 46b-86 (a),

and, therefore, the court improperly applied the reasoning in Dan when denying her motions. See McKeon v.

Lennon, 155 Conn. App. 423, 434, 109 A.3d 986 (2015).

The plaintiff also claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its

discretion in declining to consider income from stock

options, restricted stock and employment perquisites

received by the defendant, William P. Lennon, as part

of his executive compensation package when calculating the defendant’s gross income for the purpose of

determining whether there had been a substantial

change in his financial circumstances following the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. See id., 440, 441. The

plaintiff thus seeks reversal of the Appellate Court’s

judgment and a remand to the trial court to consider

these sources of income in deciding the plaintiff’s

motions. The defendant agrees with the plaintiff that

the Appellate Court’s reliance on the reasoning in Dan

was improper but characterizes that reliance as dictum.

He also argues that the trial court properly calculated

his gross income without considering his stock benefits

and employment perquisites, and, therefore, the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court’s conclusion

that the plaintiff did not establish the substantial change

in circumstances required for the granting of her

motions. We reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following relevant facts are set forth in the Appellate Court’s opinion. ‘‘[This appeal] arise[s] from a series

of postjudgment motions related to the parties’ 2007

dissolution of marriage. The plaintiff and [the] defendant were married on August 29, 1981. During their

twenty-six year marriage, the parties had three children.
In 2005, the plaintiff initiated an action for dissolution

of marriage. On December 31, 2007, the court rendered

judgment dissolving the marriage . . . and entered various orders.

‘‘In the dissolution judgment, the court made several

relevant factual findings. The court found that the

defendant was a vice president at Electric Boat [Corporation], earning a base salary of $225,420, an annual

bonus, stock options, restricted stock awards, and a

pension. The court found that the plaintiff was a highly

skilled and capable corporate attorney, who in the past

had sometimes earned in excess of the defendant’s salary. In the years leading up to the divorce, the plaintiff

had worked part-time in order to be the primary caregiver to their three children. Despite working part-time,

she had been able to earn gross income of $78,500 from

mid-July, 2007, through December 12, 2007.

‘‘The court issued various orders in connection with

the dissolution judgment, including child custody, division of assets of the marriage, and alimony and child

support. First, the dissolution judgment set out a parenting plan regarding the parties’ two minor children. The

parties were to share joint legal custody of the children,

but the plaintiff’s home would serve as the children’s

primary residence. Next, the dissolution judgment

ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $439 per week

in child support for the parties’ two minor children.

The dissolution judgment also ordered the parties to

each pay 50 percent of the cost of the children’s child

care, their after school care and transportation, and

their private school tuition. The judgment ordered the

parties to share all costs over $150 for the children’s

extracurricular activities, while the plaintiff was

ordered to pay for all costs under $150.

‘‘The dissolution judgment also awarded alimony to

the plaintiff in the amount of $900 per week for a period

of fourteen years. This order was modifiable, but not

terminable, upon the plaintiff’s remarriage or cohabitation. [In addition] [t]he court awarded the plaintiff . . .

[an irrevocable 50 percent interest in all stock options

awarded, granted or otherwise credited to the defendant as of the date of dissolution and] an irrevocable

interest in the defendant’s future annual employment

bonuses, executive stock options, and awards of

restricted stock. [Specifically] [t]he plaintiff was to

receive 50 percent of the defendant’s bonuses, stock

options, and restricted stock awarded in 2008, 2009,

and 2010. The plaintiff was to then receive 40 percent

of the defendant’s bonuses [future stock options, and

restricted stock awarded] in 2011, 2012, and 2013, and

. . . 30 percent [of the defendant’s bonuses, future

stock options, and restricted stock] awarded to him in

each year from 2014 through 2021. [The trial court

added in its memorandum of decision issued in connection with the dissolution judgment that ‘[a]ll stock
options that have been awarded, granted or otherwise

credited to the defendant prior to the dissolution of

marriage shall be divided as part of the property settlement and shall not be alimony or child support.’]

‘‘In May, 2008, [less] than six months afterthe dissolution judgment was rendered, the plaintiff filed a motion

for modification in which she requested, inter alia, that

child support be raised from $439 per week to $1700

per week. On June 10, 2008, the court denied the motion

without a hearing. From that [ruling], the plaintiff

appealed to [the Appellate] [C]ourt, which heard argument on the matter on November 18, 2010. [See]

McKeon v. Lennon, 131 Conn. App. 585, 27 A.3d 436,

cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011). On

appeal, [the Appellate] [C]ourt concluded that the trial

court improperly [had] denied the plaintiff’s motion

without first conducting a hearing, and, therefore . . .

reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the

trial court for further proceedings. Id., 599–600, [613–

14]. . . .

‘‘While the appeal of the 2008 motion for modification

was pending before [the Appellate] [C]ourt, the plaintiff

filed another motion for modification of child support

with the trial court on April 22, 2010. The plaintiff’s

motion requested the court to increase the defendant’s

child support obligation in light of the plaintiff’s

increased expenses, her decreased net income, and the

defendant’s increased income since the dissolution

judgment. On July 14, 2010, the defendant filed his own

motion for modification of child support on the basis

that one of theirtwo minor children had turned eighteen

years old and had graduated [from] high school. The

court scheduled a hearing on both motions in May, 2011.

‘‘On May 25, May 26, and June 1, 2011, the trial court

held a contested hearing on the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s motions for modification. On October 20, 2011,

the court . . . [granted] the defendant’s 2010 motion

for modification and den[ied] the plaintiff’s 2010 motion

for modification. The court ordered the defendant’s

child support obligation to be reduced from $439 per

week to $400 per week. This modification reflected the

change from support for two minor children, to support

for only one minor child. From [these rulings], the plaintiff appealed . . . .

‘‘On April 25, 2012, pursuant to [the Appellate]

[C]ourt’s remand, the trial court held a contested hearing on the plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification. Prior

to the hearing, the plaintiff had also filed a motion

for attorney’s fees and a motion for contempt. At the

hearing, the parties presented evidence on all three

motions. As a result of the complicated procedural history of this case, the court was required to determine

whether it could consider all changes in circumstances

since the 2007 dissolution judgment, or whether it was

limited to looking back to only 2011, when the court
ruled on the 2010 motions for modification.

‘‘In November, 2012, the court issued its memorandum of decision, denying the plaintiff’s motion for modification of child support, motion for attorney’s fees,

and motion for contempt. In doing so, the court considered the circumstances of the parties going back to

the 2007 dissolution judgment [through April 25, 2012].

Further, the court found that the 2011 child support

modification order was in accordance with the child

support guidelines and remained equitable and appropriate given the circumstances of the case. From these

[rulings], the plaintiff also appealed . . . .’’ (Footnote

omitted.) McKeon v. Lennon, supra, 155 Conn. App.

425–29.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff

claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had

granted the defendant’s motion for modification of child

support, denied her motions for modification of child

support, modified the defendant’s child support obligation by decreasing his weekly obligation and denied

her motions for contempt and for attorney’s fees. Id.,

425. The Appellate Court disagreed and affirmed the

trial court’s rulings on all issues. Id., 425, 451. With

respect to the plaintiff’s motions for an upward modification of the defendant’s child support obligation, the

Appellate Court concluded that ‘‘both alimony and child

support orders are subject to the same modification

requirements under § 46b-86 (a),’’ and that, ‘‘under Dan,

the plaintiff must show additional circumstances,

beyond the defendant’s increased income, to establish

a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of child support.’’ Id., 434. After considering

the increase in the defendant’s income, the Appellate

Court further concluded that the trial court had not

abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motions.

Id. This certified appeal, relating only to the Appellate

Court’s determination regarding the trial court’s rulings

on the plaintiff’s motions for modification of the defendant’s child support obligation, followed.1

I

The plaintiff first claims that the Appellate Court

incorrectly concluded that alimony and child support

orders are subject to the same modification requirements, and, therefore, the court improperly applied the

reasoning in Dan concerning alimony orders in

affirming the trial court’s denial of her motions for

modification of child support. She claims that, by

extending this court’s holding in Dan to child support

orders, the Appellate Court has profoundly altered Connecticutlaw in a mannerthat will have a negative impact

on thousands of Connecticut families. The defendant

agrees with the plaintiff that the Appellate Court

improperly relied on Dan in affirming the trial court’s

denial of her motions but characterizes that reliance as

dictum. He also points out that the trial court never
concluded that alimony and child support orders are

subject to the same modification requirements when

determining that the plaintiff had failed to establish a

substantial change in circumstances at the hearing on

her motions. We conclude that the reasoning in Dan

regarding alimony orders does not apply to child support orders.

It is well established that interpretation of the statutory scheme governing child support orders in domestic

relations cases constitutes a question of law. See, e.g.,

Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 88, 995 A.2d 1 (2010);

Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 357, 710 A.2d

717 (1998). Accordingly, whether the Appellate Court

properly interpreted the statutory scheme in the present

case is subject to our plenary review. See, e.g., Maturo

v. Maturo, supra, 88.

We begin with § 46b-86 (a), which addresses the modification of alimony and child support orders.2 The statute provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A]ny final order for the

periodic payment of permanent alimony or support

. . . may, at any time thereafter, be continued, set

aside, altered or modified by the court upon a showing

of a substantial change in the circumstances of either

party . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-86 (a). In Dan, we

concluded that ‘‘an increase in the supporting spouse’s

income, standing alone, ordinarily will not justify the

granting of a motion to modify an alimony award . . .

[because] [t]here is little, if any, legal or logical support

. . . for the proposition that a legitimate purpose of

alimony is to allow the supported spouse’s standard of

living to match the supporting spouse’s standard of

living afterthe divorce, when the supported spouse is no

longer contributing to the supporting spouse’s income

earning efforts. Rather, the weight of authority is to the

contrary. We are persuaded by the reasoning of these

cases, namely, that, when the amount of the original

alimony award was and continues to be sufficient to

fulfill the purpose of the award, whether that purpose

was to maintain permanently the standard of living of

the supported spouse at the level that he or she enjoyed

during the marriage or to provide temporary support

in order to allow the supported spouse to become selfsufficient, an increase in the income of the supporting

spouse, standing alone,is not a sufficient justification

to modify an alimony award. In short, when the sole

change in circumstances is an increase in the income

of the supporting spouse, and when the initial award

was and continues to be sufficient to fulfill the

intended purpose of that award, we can conceive of

no reason why the supported spouse, whose marriage

to the supporting spouse has ended and who no longer

contributes anything to the supporting spouse’s income

earning efforts, should be entitled to share in an

improved standard of living that is solely the result

of the supporting spouse’s efforts.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis altered; footnotes omitted.) Dan v. Dan,
supra, 315 Conn. 10–15.

In contrast, child support orders are calculated under

the Connecticut child support guidelines and are based

on the income shares model;3 Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (August 1, 2005) preamble, p. ii; which

has a different purpose. The income shares model considers the income of both parents and ‘‘presumes that

the child should receive the same proportion of parental

income as he or she would have received if the parents

lived together.’’ Id.; accord Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296

Conn. 93. Accordingly, ‘‘the determination of a parent’s

child support obligation must account for all of the

income that would have been available to support the

children had the family remained together.’’ Jenkins v.

Jenkins, 243 Conn. 584, 594, 704 A.2d 231 (1998); see

also Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 408, 72 A.3d

1 (2013) (‘‘the calculation of child support is based on

the income shares model and the parties’ combined net

income rather than on the actual costs associated with

raising a child’’). This means that, unlike when considering a request for the modification of an alimony order,

the trial court may consider a substantial increase in

the supporting spouse’s income, standing alone, as sufficient justification for granting a motion to modify a

child support order to ensure that the child receives

the same proportion of parental income that he or she

would have received if the parents had remained

together.4

We therefore conclude,5in light of the different purposes of alimony and child support, that the Appellate

Court improperly relied on Dan in determining that

‘‘both alimony and child support orders are subject

to the same modification requirements under § 46b-86

(a)’’; McKeon v. Lennon, supra, 155 Conn. App. 434;

and that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was required to show additional circumstances,

beyond the increase in the defendant’s income,to justify

modification of the child support award.6 See id.,

434–36.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the Appellate Court

improperly upheld the trial court’s denial of her motions

for modification because the trial court did not consider

the defendant’s exercised stock options, restricted

stock or employment perquisites for the years in question when calculating his gross annual income.7 The

plaintiff thus argues that the conclusions of the trial

court and the Appellate Court that the plaintiff failed

to establish a substantial change in the defendant’s

financial circumstances were not based on a correct

understanding of the components of his income. The

defendant responds that the trial court acted within its

discretion in concluding that the plaintiff had failed to

establish a substantial change in his financial circumstances and that, even if the trial court had considered
income from the defendant’s stock benefits and employment perquisites, a review of the guidelines worksheet

entered into evidence by the plaintiff herself demonstrates that the court would not have found a change

in his circumstances sufficient to justify an increase in

his child support obligation. The defendant also argues

that the plaintiff has ignored the fact that he pays one

half of their youngest son’s private secondary education

expenses as child support. We agree in part with each

of the parties.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. On January 18, 2008, less than

three weeks after the judgment of dissolution was

entered, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration

and/or reargument, in which she raised numerous

issues pertaining to division of the parties’ pension

plans, the children’s medical coverage, life insurance,

child support, asset valuation, account transfers and

taxes. With respect to child support, the plaintiff’s only

claim relating to the trial court’s calculation of the

defendant’s gross income was that the court had not

included the monetary value of the defendant’s employment perquisites and his in-kind compensation. Neither

party appealed from the trial court’s denial of this

motion.

Thereafter, in May, 2008, and April, 2010, the plaintiff

filed motions for modification of the child support

order. In its memorandum of decision on the plaintiff’s

2010 motion, which was the first motion decided, the

trial court found that the defendant’s base salary in

2011 was $260,000 and that his annual bonus was

$175,000. The court also found that, although the defendant had exercised stock options in the amount of

$190,361 after the judgment of dissolution was rendered, the options were subject to the dissolution

court’s property distribution order that stock options

and restricted stock awards granted to the defendant

prior to the dissolution judgment be divided as property

and not be considered as alimony or child support. The

court thus concluded that any income the defendant

received from the exercised stock options could not

be counted because doing so would result in ‘‘doubledipping.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo

v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 97 n.9. The court further

found that the defendant’s annual bonus of $175,000

had been considered by the court and divided between

the parties at the time of the dissolution judgment, and,

therefore, it also could not be considered a second time

in determining whether there had been a change in

the defendant’s circumstances. The court finally found,

with respect to $59,484 in employment perquisites the

defendant received in 2011, that the plaintiff’s failure

to identify how much, if any, of that amount constituted

basic maintenance or special needs, which are considered a component of gross income as in-kind compensation under the governing regulations; see Regs., Conn.
State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11) (A) (vi); prevented the

court from including any of this amount in its calculation of the defendant’s gross income. The court thus

concluded that, because the defendant’s base salary

had increased only $35,000, from $225,000 on the date

of the dissolution judgment to $260,000 in 2011, there

had been no substantial increase in his income under

the child support guidelines.

The court conducted a similar analysis approximately

one year later in its memorandum of decision on the

plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification. The court

found that the defendant’s base salary as of April 25,

2012, was $270,000 and that he had received a bonus

in 2012 of $185,000. The court again noted the provision

in the dissolution judgment order that stock options

and restricted stock awards granted to the defendant

prior to the dissolution judgment were to be divided

as part of the property settlement and not considered

as alimony or child support. The court thus concluded

that, although the defendant continued to receive and

exercise stock options as part of his executive compensation, his past and future options were subject to the

court’s property distribution order and could not be

counted as income, as doing so would result in doubledipping. The court added that it could not consider

the $55,807 in employment perquisites the defendant

received in 2012 because the plaintiff had failed to identify which items satisfied the definition of eligible perquisites in the statutory regulations. Although the court

did not state, as it did in its memorandum of decision

on the 2010 motion for modification, that it would not

count the defendant’s bonus because the bonus had

been considered and divided at the time of the dissolution judgment, it ultimately concluded that the plaintiff

had failed to show a substantial change in the defendant’s circumstances from the date of the dissolution

judgment to the present.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s rulings

on her motions for modification to the Appellate Court,

which consolidated the appeals for review.8 See

McKeon v. Lennon, supra, 155 Conn. App. 427 and n.1.

The Appellate Court affirmed the rulings with little analysis. The court briefly referred to the trial court’s findings regarding the increase in the defendant’s base

salary and bonus in its decision on the plaintiff’s 2010

motion. See id., 433–34. It then concluded that the plaintiff had not established that there had been a substantial

change in the defendant’s circumstances because,

under Dan, the plaintiff was required to show additional

circumstances beyond the defendant’s increased

income to justify an upward modification of his child

support obligation.9 See id., 434. With respect to the

plaintiff’s 2008 motion, the Appellate Court also concluded, after an equally perfunctory reference to the

trial court’s findings on the defendant’s base salary and

bonuses during the years following the dissolution judg-
ment, that the plaintiff had not established a substantial

change in the defendant’s circumstances. Id., 435–36.

The Appellate Court did not address the trial court’s

findings regarding the defendant’s employment perquisites in its discussion of the plaintiff’s motions. See

generally id., 434–36.

The Appellate Court subsequently considered the

trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s exercised

stock options and restricted stock from its income calculations when ruling on the defendant’s motion for a

downward modification of his child support obligation.

Id., 438. The court noted that the trial court’s exclusion

of the stock benefits was based on its finding that the

benefits previously had been considered and divided

as part of the property settlement. See id., 438–40. In

response to the plaintiff’s argument that income from

the stock options and restricted stock constituted

deferred compensation, the Appellate Court stated that

it was the plaintiff’s burden to distinguish between

stock awarded before and after the dissolution, and

that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that the

stock options the defendant had exercised during the

period in question were awarded after the dissolution.

See id., 439–40. With respect to the restricted stock,

the court explained that, in addition to the fact that

there was evidence indicating that the stock at issue

was part of the property distribution, the defendant’s

testimony regarding when the stock vested indicated

that it had not vested at the time of the plaintiff’s

motions. See id. The Appellate Court thus concluded

that the trial court properly had excluded the exercised

stock options and restricted stock from the defendant’s

gross income. Id., 440. The Appellate Court also concluded, with respect to the defendant’s employment

perquisites, that there was ‘‘nothing in the record to

undermine . . . confidence in the court’s factual findings, and [it thus] defer[red] to [the trial court’s] sound

judgment in reaching its conclusions.’’ Id., 443.

We begin with the standard of review. ‘‘The well settled standard of review in domestic relations cases is

that this court will not disturb trial court orders unless

the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its

findings have no reasonable basis in the facts. . . .

[T]he foundation for this standard is that the trial court

is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case

. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused

its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we

allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the

correctness of its action. . . . Notwithstanding the

great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution

proceedings, a trial court’s ruling . . . may be reversed

if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies

the wrong standard of law. . . . The question of

whether, and to what extent, the child support guidelines apply, however, is a question of law over which
this court should exercise plenary review.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuckman

v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 200, 61 A.3d 449 (2013).

A

We turn first to the question of whether the Appellate

Court properly upheld the trial court’s decision to

exclude the defendant’s exercised stock options and

restricted stock from its calculation of his gross income

for the years in question. General Statutes § 46b-84 (a)

provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon or subsequent to the

annulment or dissolution of any marriage or the entry

of a decree of legal separation or divorce, the parents

of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the

child according to their respective abilities, if the child

is in need of maintenance. . . .’’ The statute further

provides: ‘‘In determining whether a child is in need of

maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of

the parents to provide such maintenance and the

amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health,

station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and

sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation,

amount and sources of income, vocational skills,

employability, estate and needs of the child.’’ General

Statutes § 46b-84 (d).

In addition to these provisions regarding the obligation of parents to provide child support, the legislature

has established a commission to issue child support

guidelines ‘‘to ensure the appropriateness of criteria for

the establishment of child support awards . . . . Such

guidelines shall ensure . . . that current support . . .

shall be based on the income of both parents and the

obligor’s ability to pay.’’ General Statutes § 46b-215a (a).

As previously discussed, the guidelines ‘‘are predicated

upon the concept that children should receive the same

proportion of parental income that they would have

received had the family remained intact. Child Support

and Arrearage Guidelines, [supra, preamble, p. ii].

Toward that end, the guidelines are income driven,

rather than expense driven. At each income level, the

guidelines allocate a certain percentage of parental

income to child support. The percentage allocations

contained in the guidelines aim to reflect the average

proportions of income spent on children in households

of various income and family sizes, and contain a builtin self-support reserve for the obligor. [See id., p. iii].

The result is that the guidelines incorporate an allocation of resources between parents and children that the

legislature has decided is the appropriate allocation.

Consequently, our interpretation of the guidelines must

seek to preserve this allocation.’’ Unkelbach v. McNary,

supra, 244 Conn. 357–58. In order to achieve this goal,

however, ‘‘the determination of a parent’s child support

obligation must account for all of the income that would
have been available to support the children had the

family remained together.’’ (Emphasis added.) Jenkins

v. Jenkins, supra, 243 Conn. 594. ‘‘[T]he party seeking

the modification bears the burden of demonstrating

that such a change has occurred.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665,

672, 81 A.3d 215 (2013).

Section 46b-215a-1 (11) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies defines ‘‘gross income’’ as ‘‘the

average weekly earned and unearned income from all

sources before deductions, including but not limited to

the items listed in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision,

but excluding the items listed in subparagraph (B) of

this subdivision.’’ Subparagraph (A) lists twenty-two

sources of income,10 one of which is ‘‘profit sharing,

[and] deferred and incentive-based compensation

. . . .’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11)

(A) (iv). Subparagraph (B) lists six sources of excluded

income,11 none of which is relevant in the present case.

In considering these income inclusions and exclusions,

the preamble to the child support guidelines instructs

that ‘‘gross income includes all kinds of earned and

unearned income not specifically excluded’’ and that

the ‘‘list of inclusions is illustrative and not exhaustive.’’

Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines, supra, preamble, p. ix.

Applying these guidelines, we conclude that exercised stock options and restricted stock that has

vested12 ordinarily should be considered components

of a party’s gross income for purposes of calculating

child support because they constitute ‘‘deferred or

incentive-based compensation’’; Regs., Conn. State

Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11) (A) (iv); and are not specifically excluded under the guidelines. The fact that the

applicable guidelines in 2005 did not define deferred or

incentive-based compensation as including such benefits is irrelevant. Stock options always have been understood as a form of incentive-based compensation. See,

e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990)(stock option

is ‘‘often granted to management and key employees

as a form of incentive compensation’’). Moreover, ‘‘[w]e

have previously interpreted broadly the definition of

gross income contained in the guidelines to include

items that, in effect, increase the amount of a parent’s

income that is available for child support purposes.’’13

Unkelbach v. McNary, supra, 244 Conn. 360, citing Jenkins v. Jenkins, supra, 243 Conn. 591–95.

In the present case, the trial court explained in its

memorandum of decision on the plaintiff’s 2010 motion

for modification that it did not include $190,361 from

the defendant’s exercised stock options as a component

of his income because the options were subject to the

dissolution court’s property distribution order that

stock options and restricted stock awards granted to

the defendant prior to the dissolution judgment be
divided as property and not be considered as alimony

or child support. Neither party took issue with this

provision of the dissolution order when the plaintiff

filed her motion for reconsideration and/or reargument,

and neither party appealed from the dissolution judgment on that ground. Accordingly, given the parties’

acceptance of this provision, the Appellate Court correctly determined that the trial court had not abused

its discretion in excluding the exercised stock options

and restricted stock from the defendant’s gross income

on the ground that they were part of the original property distribution order.

The trial court’s reasoning when deciding the plaintiff’s 2008 motion, in which the court considered the

defendant’s income from the date of the dissolution

judgment through April 25, 2012, was more ambiguous.

Although the court again referred to the fact that the

dissolution order provided that stock benefits awarded

to the defendant prior to the dissolution judgment were

to be divided as part of the property settlement and

not considered as alimony or child support, the court

did not state how much income the defendant had

received from the exercised stock options or the

restricted stock and did not make a finding as to

whether this income was derived from stock benefits

awarded prior to or following the dissolution judgment.

The court merely stated that the defendant had continued to receive and exercise stock options as part of his

executive compensation and that, because his past and

future stock options were subject to the court’s property distribution order, the funds received from their

exercise could not be counted as income. For the reasons previously discussed, we disagree with the trial

court that the defendant’s income from the exercised

stock options and restricted stock awarded as compensation following the dissolution judgmentis barred from

inclusion in the defendant’s gross income by the dissolution order. Thus, to the extent the defendant received

income from those sources, such income should have

been counted as part of his gross income for the years

in question. For example, the record indicates that, in

the year 2012, the defendantreceived more than $53,000

from the vesting on January 3, 2012, of restricted stock

that he was awarded on March 5, 2008, following the

dissolution judgment. There may be additional evidence

in the record that the defendant received income from

other exercised stock options or restricted stock that

vested following the dissolution judgment and thus was

not part of the property distribution. Accordingly, in

light of this ambiguity in the trial court’s decision, we

conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court, in its ruling on the plaintiff’s

2008 motion for modification, had not abused its discretion in excluding the income derived from these sources

when calculating the defendant’s gross income.14

Rather, the case must be remanded to the trial court
for the purpose of reconsidering the plaintiff’s 2008

motion for an upward modification of the defendant’s

child support obligation in light of our conclusion that

Dan does not apply and that additional findings must

be made as to whether any of the exercised stock

options and restricted stock that vested during the time

in question were awarded following the dissolution

judgment, and, if so, the value of those benefits.

B

We next consider the trial court’s decision to omit

the defendant’s alleged employment perquisites from

its calculation of the defendant’s gross income when

deciding the plaintiff’s motions for modification. Section 46b-215a-1 (11) (A) (vi) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies includes in its definition of

gross income ‘‘employment perquisites and in-kind

compensation (any basic maintenance or special need

such as food, shelter or transportation provided on a

recurrent basis in lieu of or in addition to salary or

wages) . . . .’’

The record indicates that the defendant received

$59,484 in employment perquisites in 2011 and $55,807

in 2012, which, according to the plaintiff’s exhibits, consisted almost entirely of employer contributions to the

defendant’s retirement and health insurance plans.15

The child support guidelines, however, provide that

such contributions are to be deducted from a parent’s

gross income in order to determine the net income

available for child support. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-2b (c) (2) (C) and (F) (repealed July 1,

2015) (providing for deductions from parent’s gross

income of employer contributions to mandatory retirement plans and to medical, hospital, dental or health

insurance premium payments for parent and parent’s

legal dependents).

In the present case, the trial court excluded the

employment perquisites from its calculations of the

defendant’s gross income when ruling on both motions

because it concluded that the plaintiff had failed to

meet her burden of identifying how much, if any, of the

perquisites constituted food, shelter, transportation or

other basic needs pursuant to § 46b-215a-1 (11) (A)

(vi) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.

Although this factual finding and the trial court’s ultimate decision to exclude the employment perquisites

were correct, we also note that most of the perquisites

would have been deducted in any event under § 46b215a-2b (c) (2) (C) and (F) when calculating the parties’

net income. We thus conclude that the Appellate Court

properly determined that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in excluding the employment perquisites

from its calculation of the defendant’s gross income in

its rulings on the plaintiff’s motions for modification.16

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed with
respect to its determination that alimony and child support orders are subject to the same modification

requirements, and its determination that the trial court,

in ruling on the plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification

of child support, did not abuse its discretion in excluding income derived from stock options awarded and

exercised and restricted stock awarded and vesting following the dissolution judgment in its calculation of

the defendant’s gross income, and the case is remanded

to the Appellate Court with direction to remand the

case to the trial court to make findings as to whether

any of the exercised stock options and restricted stock

that vested postdissolution were awarded as compensation following the dissolution judgment, and, if so, how

much income was derived from those sources, and to

reconsider the plaintiff’s 2008 motion for modification

in light of those findings and in accordance with our

determination that child support orders are not subject

to the same modification requirements as alimony

orders; the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed

in all other respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 This court granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal,

limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine,

based upon this court’s decision in Dan v. Dan, [supra, 315 Conn. 1], that

the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff had not established a

substantial change in circumstances in regard to her 2008 and 2010 motions

for modification [of child support]?’’ McKeon v. Lennon, 317 Conn. 901, 114

A.3d 166 (2015).

2 Although alimony and child support orders are calculated on the basis

of several overlapping factors, the court also considers several additional

factors specific to spouses and children, respectively, in calculating such

orders. For example, under General Statutes § 46b-82 (a), the court determines whether alimony should be awarded, and the amount and duration

of the award, after considering the length of the marriage, the causes for

its termination, ‘‘the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources

of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability,

estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the

court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to

whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and

feasibility of such parent’s securing employment.’’ In comparison, the court

calculates child support pursuant to the child support guidelines and the

factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-84 (d), which include ‘‘the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance and the amount

thereof,’’ and ‘‘the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount

and sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each

of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status

and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the child.’’

3

‘‘The guidelines are accompanied by a preamble that is not part of the

regulations but is intended to assist in their interpretation.’’ Maturo v.

Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 92–93.

4 General Statutes § 46b-86 (a) clarifies that ‘‘[t]here shall be a rebuttable

presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen per cent from the child

support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen per cent

or more from the guidelines is substantial.’’ Accordingly, an increase or

decrease in the supporting party’s income that satisfies this standard presumably would justify a request for modification of child support. The statute

nonetheless provides that the court shall continue to consider other factors

when evaluating such a request: ‘‘In determining whether to modify a child

support order based on a substantial deviation from such child support

guidelines the court shall consider the division of real and personal property

between the parties set forth in the final decree and the benefits accruing

to the child as the result of such division. After the date of judgment,

modification of any child support orderissued before, on or after July 1, 1990,
may be made upon a showing of such substantial change of circumstances,

whether or not such change of circumstances was contemplated at the time

of dissolution.’’ General Statutes § 46b-86 (a).

5 We note that all of the amici curiae agree with our conclusion.

6 The Appellate Court initially observed that the plaintiff’s earning capacity

had remained the same, the plaintiff had failed to establish a significant

increase in her expenses and, even though the defendant’s base salary and

bonuses had increased since the dissolution judgment, the increase was not

substantial. McKeon v. Lennon, supra, 155 Conn. App. 432–34. The court

then cited Dan in concluding that the plaintiff must show additional circumstances, beyond the defendant’s increased income, to establish the ‘‘substantial change in circumstances’’ required to justify modification of the child

support order. Id., 434.

7 We address this issue because we view it as implicated in the certified

question of whether the Appellate Court properly relied on the reasoning

in Dan when concluding that the plaintiff had not established a substantial

change in circumstances sufficient to support her 2008 and 2010 motions

for modification of child support, and both parties have briefed the issue

extensively. See footnote 1 of this opinion. In contrast, we do not consider

the effect of the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s bonus from its

calculation of his gross income because that issue was not directly briefed

by the parties, although the plaintiff refers to the bonus as contributing to

the increase in the defendant’s income following the dissolution.

8 As the Appellate Court noted, these appeals were consolidated with

several other appeals by the plaintiff from various rulings by the trial court.

See McKeon v. Lennon, supra, 155 Conn. App. 427 n.1.

9 Despite this assertion, the Appellate Court appeared to agree with the

trial court’s analysis, which was conducted prior to the issuance of this

court’s decision in Dan, and concluded that there had not been a substantial

increase in the defendant’s income under the guidelines. See McKeon v.

Lennon, supra, 155 Conn. App. 434.

10 These are: ‘‘(i) salary; (ii) hourly wages for regular, overtime and additional employment not to exceed 45 total paid hours per week; (iii) commissions, bonuses and tips; (iv) profit sharing, deferred and incentive-based

compensation and severance pay; (v) tribal stipends and incentives; (vi)

employment perquisites and in-kind compensation (any basic maintenance

or special need such as food, shelter or transportation provided on a recurrent basis in lieu of or in addition to salary or wages); (vii) military personnel

fringe benefit payments; (viii) benefits received in place of earned income

including, but not limited to, workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, strike pay and disability insurance benefits; (ix)

veterans’ benefits; (x) Social Security benefits paid to the parent for the

parent’s own needs, provided when the parent whose income is being determined receives both Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security

disability or retirement benefits, the Social Security income inclusion shall

not exceed $5 per week; (xi) Social Security dependency benefits paid on

behalf of a child whose support is being determined, which are based on

the earnings record of the parent whose income is being determined; (xii)

net proceeds from contractual agreements; (xiii) pension and retirement

income; (xiv) rental income after deduction of reasonable and necessary

expenses; (xv) estate or trust income; (xvi) royalties; (xvii) interest, dividends and annuities; (xviii) self-employment earnings, after deduction of

all reasonable and necessary business expenses; (xix) alimony being paid

by an individual who is not a party to the support determination; (xx)

adoption subsidy benefits received by the custodial parent for the child

whose support is being determined; (xxi) lottery and gambling winnings,

prizes and regularly recurring gifts (except as provided in subparagraph [B]

[vi] of this subdivision); and (xxii) education grants (including fellowships

or subsidies, to the extent taxable as income under the Internal Revenue

Code).’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11) (A).

11 These are: ‘‘(i) support received on behalf of a child who is living in

the home of the parent whose income is being determined; (ii) Supplemental

Security Income (SSI) payments, including those received on behalf of a

child who is living in the home of the parent whose income is being determined; (iii) Social Security disability or Social Security retirement benefits

in excess of $5 per week, when the parent also receives SSI; (iv) federal,

state and local public assistance grants; (v) earned income tax credit; and

(vi) the income and regularly recurring contributions or gifts of a spouse

or domestic partner.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11) (B).

12 Restricted stock is considered income in the year that it vests rather
than the year in which it is exercised. See Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296

Conn. 97–98 n.9.

13 To the extent any ambiguity remains, the amended 2015 child support

guidelines have settled the point by clarifying that incentive-based income

includes ‘‘stock options, restricted stock, restricted stock units, phantom

stock, stock appreciation rights and other forms of delayed or deferred

compensation.’’ Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (July 1, 2015) preamble, p. xvi.

14 In light of the parties’ acceptance of the provision in the present dissolution decree that the defendant’s stock options and restricted stock ‘‘shall

be divided as part of the property settlement and shall not be alimony or

child support’’; (emphasis added); we reject as irrelevant the plaintiff’s

arguments that (1) the Appellate Court misapplied our case law on the trial

court’s loss of jurisdiction over property distributed in accordance with a

dissolution decree, (2) the trial court erroneously determined that to include

income from stock options and restricted stock awarded priorto the dissolution judgment would be double-dipping, and (3) the plaintiff was deprived

of the fairness and consistency required by the child support guidelines

because the erroneous calculation of the defendant’s income resulted in a

child support order based on an incorrect presumptive range. If the plaintiff

did not agree with one or more provisions in the dissolution decree, she

should have sought to preclude them from the decree or filed an appeal

from the dissolution judgment on that ground. Additionally, to the extent

the plaintiff relies on Maturo for the proposition that income from stock

options and restricted stock distributed as property should be included in

the defendant’s gross income, that reliance was improper because the court

in Maturo did not directly discuss that issue, and there is no indication in

Maturo whether the dissolution decree in that case included a provision

similar to the provision at issue in the present case, which provided that

the stock benefits were part of the property settlement and not to be considered as alimony or child support. See Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn.

97–98 n.9.

15 For example, the record indicates that, in 2012, the defendant received

$55,807 in employment perquisites consisting of $39,344 in contributions to

his retirement plans and $16,463 in contributions to his health and other

insurance premiums. Of that $16,463, $2219 was allocated to various life,

accident and disability insurance premiums.

16 Because they are outside the scope of the certified question, we do not

address the defendant’s arguments that his child support obligation includes

payment of one half of his youngest child’s secondary private school

expenses or that the plaintiff’s income worksheet indicates that, even if the

trial court had considered the stock benefits, his support obligation would

have remained within the proper range.