Defense Nuclear Agency 

Alexandria, VA 22310-3398 

JUL 23 1993 DNA 6327F 

DASIAC 

Operations 

Praetorian, Phalanx, Fusileer, and Grenadier 

Events 

HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE, MINI JADE, 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR, MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO, 

and MISTY RAIN 

23 September 1982 - 6 April 1985 

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies 

and their contractors; 0ttk-afhchnology, 28Aprlll993. 

Other requests for this document shall be referred to the 

Defense Nuclear Agency, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria. VA 22310-3398. 

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m. Violations of these expert Irws are subject to severe criminal 

penaltk~s. Disseminate in auxwdanoe with provisions of DOD Directive 

5239.25. 

United States Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

ML& Prepared by Defhse Nuclear Agency 
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 

Operation Praetorian, Phalanx, Fusileer, and Grenadier 

DNA-IACRO-92-277 Events HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE, MINI JADE, TOMMEMIDNIGHT ZEPHYR, MIDAS MYTHMILAGRO, and MISTY RAIN 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

Joe A. Stinson, Carole R. Schoengold, and Herbert L. Seguera 

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. 

P.O. Box 98521 

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8521 

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

6801 Telegraph Road 

Alexandria, VA 22310-3398 DNA-6327F 

RARP/AUTON 

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAIlABlLlTY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 

I 

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors; 

Critical Technology, 28 April 1993. Other requests for this document shall be 

referred to the Defense Nuclear Agency, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 

22310-3398. (ITAR) 

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) 

This report is a personnel-oriented history of DOD participation in underground nuclear weapons testing up to and 

during Operation Praetorian, Phalanx, Fusileer, and Grenadier; Events HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE, 

MINNI JADE, TOMMEMIDNIGHT ZEPHYR, MIDAS MYTHMILAGRO, and MISTY RAIN, 23 September 

1982 to 6 April 1985. It is the seventh in a series of historical reports which will include all DOD underground 

nuclear test participation from 1962 forward. In addition to these historical reports, a restricted distribution report 

will identify all DOD and DOD affiliated participants, military, civilian, and DOD contractors, and will list their 

individual dose data. 

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) 290 Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Nevada Test Site (NTS) 16. PRICE CODE 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review (UNTPR) Underground Tests (UGT) 

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACl 

OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT 

UNCLASSIFIED UNCJASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SAR I I I oranoaro rorm ZYU (nev.z-ad) NSN 7540-260-5500 i Prescribed by ANSI Sta 239-l 3 

298-102 

L 
UNCLASSIFIED ECL!RlTY CLASSIFICATION OFMIS PAGE 

CLASSIFIED BY: 

N/A since Unclassified. 

DECLASSIFY ON: 

N/A since Unclassified. 

14. SUBJECT TERMS (continued) 

Praetorian 

Fusileer 

HURON LA

MINI JADE 

NDING 

Phalanx 

Grenadier 

DIAMOND ACE 

TOMME 

MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR MIDAS MYTH 

MILAGRO MISTY RAIN 

ii SECURITY CLASSIFKATION OFTHIS PAGE 

UNCLASSIFIED 
SUMMARY 

Six Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored underground nuclear 

tests were conducted from 23 September 1982 through 6 April 1985 

to study weapons effects. All six were tunnel events. HURON 

LANDING and DIAMOND ACE were unique because this was the first 

time two devices were fired simultaneously (two microseconds 

apart) and in close proximity (40 feet apart). TOMME/MIDNIGHT 

ZEPHYR and MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO were also somewhat different. 

TOMME was a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) event 

while MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR was a DOD add-on that evaluated a low-yield 

testbed. MIDAS MYTH was a DOD event while MILAGRO was the name 

designated by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for their 

front-end physics experiments. The following table summarizes 

data on these events. 

DIAMOND ACE 

LOCATION 

' Low indicates less than 20 kilotons. 

iii 
No accidental releases of radioactive effluent were detected 

onsite or offsite after any of the events discussed in this 

volume. However, controlled releases (planned releases where 

effluent was filtered before being released through the tunnel 

ventilation system) were detected onsite from the HURON LANDING/ 

DIAMOND ACE and MINI JADE events. A controlled release from the 

MISTY RAIN event was detected offsite. 

As recorded on Area Access Registers, 22,763 individual entries 

to radiation exclusion (radex) areas were made after the above 

DOD test events. Of this number, 2,127 entries were by DoD-affiliated personnel (military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor). 

The remainder were made by the Department of Energy (DOE)2, other 

government-agency, and other contractor personnel. 

The average gamma radiation exposure per entry for all participants was 1.3 milliroentgen (mR). The average gamma radiation 

exposure per entry for DOD-affiliated participants was 1.6 mR. 

The maximum exposure of a non-DOD participant during an entry was 

180 mR. The maximum exposure of a DOD-affiliated participant was 

also 180 mR. These maximum exposures both occurred during the 

MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event. 

2 DOE's predecessors were the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 

1 January 1947 to 19 January 1975; and the Energy Research and 

Development Administration (ERDA), 19 January 1975 to 1 October 1977. 

iv 
PREFACE 

The United States Government conducted 194 nuclear device tests 

from 1945 through 1958 during atmospheric test series conducted 

at sites in the United States and in the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. The U.S. Army's Manhattan Engineer District (MED) implemented the testing program in 1945. In 1947 its functions were 

assumed by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) and 

the Atomic Energy Commission that administered the program from 

1947 until testing was suspended by the United States on 1 November 1958. 

Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for weaponsrelated or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An 

additional 24 nuclear experiments were conducted from December 

1954 to February 1956 in Nevada. These experiments were physics 

studies using small quantities of fissionable material and 

conventional explosives. 

President Eisenhower had proposed that test ban negotiations 

begin on 31 October 1958, and had pledged a one-year moratorium 

on United States testing to commence after the negotiations 

began. The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests 

began in Geneva on 31 October 1958, the U.S. moratorium began on 

1 November, and the AEC detected the final Soviet nuclear test of 

their fall series on 3 November 1958. Negotiations continued 

until May 1960 without final agreement. No nuclear tests were 

conducted by either nation until 1 September 1961 when the Soviet 

Union resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The United 

States began a series of underground nuclear tests in Nevada on 

15 September 1961, and U.S. atmospheric tests were resumed on 

25 April 1962 in the Pacific. 

The United States conducted four atmospheric tests in Nevada 

during July 1962, and the last U.S. atmospheric nuclear test was 

conducted in the Pacific on 4 November 1962. The Limited Test 

Ban Treaty, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in outer 

space, and underwater, was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963. 

From resumption of United States atmospheric testing on 25 April 

1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 

weapons-related and weapons-effects tests were conducted as part 

V 
of the Pacific and Nevada atmospheric test operations. The 

underground tests that resumed on 15 September 1961 have continued on a year-round basis through the period of this report. 

In 1977, 15 years after atmospheric testing stopped, the Centers 

for Disease Control (CDC)3 noted a possible leukemia cluster 

within the group of soldiers who were present at the Nevada Test 

Site (NTS) during the SMOKY test, one of the Nevada tests in the 

1957 Plumbbob series. After that CDC report, the Veterans 

Administration (VA) received a number of claims for medical 

benefits filed by former military personnel who believed their 

health may have been affected by their participation in the 

nuclear weapons testing program. 

In late 1977, the DOD began a study to provide data for both the 

CDC and the VA on radiation exposures of DOD military and civilian participants in atmospheric nuclear testing. That study has 

progressed to the point where a number of reports describing DOD 

participation in atmospheric tests have been published by the 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) as the Executive Agent for the DOD. 

On 20 June 1979, the United States Senate Committee on Veterans 

Affairs began hearings entitled Veterans Claims for Disabilities 

from Nuclear Weapons Testing. In addition to requesting and 

receiving information on DOD personnel participation and radiation exposures during atmospheric testing, the Chairman of the 

Senate Committee expressed concern regarding exposures of DOD 

participants in DOD-sponsored and DOE underground nuclear tests. 

The Chairman requested and received information from the Director, DNA, in an exchange of letters through 15 October 1979 

regarding research on underground testing radiation exposures. 

In early 1980, DNA initiated a program to acquire and consolidate 

underground testing exposure data in a set of published reports 

similar to the program then underway on atmospheric testing data. 

This report is the seventh in a series regarding participation 

3 The Center for Disease Control was part of the Department of 

Health, Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health 

and Human Services). It was renamed the Centers for Disease 

Control on 1 October 1980. 

vi 
and radiation exposures of DOD military and civilian participants 

in underground nuclear test events. 

SERIES OF REPORTS. 

Most reports in this series discuss DOD-sponsored underground 

tests in chronological order, after presenting introductory and 

general information. The reports cover all underground tests 

identified as DOD-sponsored in ANNOUNCED UNITED STATES NUCLEAR 

TESTS, (NVO-209) published each year by the DOE Nevada Operations 

Office, Office of Public Affairs, except one category. The 

category of events not covered were nuclear test detection 

experiments in a program named VELA-UNIFORM. Generally reentries 

after these tests were not performed, so significant exposure of 

participants to radiation did not occur. 

One report will discuss general participation of DOD personnel in 

DOE underground nuclear events, with specific information on 

those events which released radioactive effluent to the atmosphere and where exposures of DOD personnel were involved. 

A separate set of volumes (comprising one report) is a census of 

DOD personnel and their radiation exposure data. Distribution of 

this volume is limited by provisions of the Privacy Act. 

METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THE VOLUMES. 

Information for these reports was obtained from several locations. Classified documents were researched at Headquarters, 

DNA, Washington, D.C. Additional documents were researched at 

Field Command/DNA, Phillips Laboratory (a 13 December 1990 

consolidation of the Air Force's Space Technology Center, Weapons 

Laboratory, Geophysics Laboratory, and Astronautics Laboratory), 

and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Most 

of the radiation measurement data were obtained at the DOE, 

Nevada Field Office (DOE/NV), and its support contractor, 

Reynolds Electrical C Engineering Company, Inc. (REECo), both in 

Las Vegas, Nevada. 

vii 

I 
Unclassified records were used to document underground testing 

activities when possible, but, when necessary, unclassified 

information was extracted from classified documents. Both 

classified and unclassified documents are cited in the References 

Section at the end of each report. Locations of the referenced 

documents also are shown. Copies of most of the unclassified 

references have been entered in the records of the Coordination 

and Information Center (CIC), a DOE facility in Las Vegas, 

Nevada. 

Radiation measurements, exposure data, event data, and offsite 

reports generally are maintained in hard copy or microfilm form 

at the REECo facilities adjacent to the CIC or as original 

documents at the Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna 

Nigel, California. The Master File of all available personnel 

exposure data for nuclear testing programs on the continent and 

in the Pacific from 1945 to the present is maintained by REECo 

for DOD and DOE. 

ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME. 

A summary of this volume appears before this Preface and includes 

general objectives of the events, characteristics of each event, 

and data regarding DOD participants and their radiation exposures. 

Section 1, "Introduction," following this Preface and the Table 

of Contents discusses the historical background, underground 

testing objectives, DOD and DOE organizational responsibilities, 

and locations of NTS underground testing areas. 

Section 2, "Underground Testing Procedures," explains the basic 

mechanics of underground testing, including containment problems 

and procedures, emplacement types, diagnostic techniques, the 

purpose of effects experiments, tunnel and drilling area access 

requirements, industrial safety considerations, radiological 

safety procedures, telemetered measurements of radiation levels, 

and air support requirements. 

A section on each event covered by this volume follows in chronological order. Each event section contains an event summary, a 

viii 
discussion of preparations and event operations, an explanation 

of safety procedures implemented, and listings of monitoring, 

sampling, and exposure results. 

A reference list and appendices to the text, including a Glossary 

of Terms (Appendix A) and a list of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

(Appendix B), follow the event sections. 

ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section Page 

SUMMARY ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 

PREFACE ....... . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . V 

FIGURES ....... . . . . . . ....... . . . xvi 

TABLES ....... . . . . . . ....... . . . xx 

1 INTRODUCTION .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . . . . ....... . . . 1 

1.2 UNDERGROUNDTESTING OBJECTIVES ...... . . . 2 

1.3 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES . 3 

1.3.1 Defense Nuclear Agency . . . . . . . . . . 3 

1.3.2 Air Force Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 

1.3.3 DOE-DOD Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

1.4 DOE ORGANIZATIONS, CONTRACTORS, AND 

RESPONSIBILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

1.4.1 Atomic Energy Commission . . . . . . . . . 13 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Organization . . . . . . . . . 15 

1.4.3 NT0 Radiological Safety . . . . . . . . . . 17 

1.4.4 NTS Scientific Users . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

1.4.5 Test Support Organizations . . . . . . . . 19 

1.5 THE NEVADA TEST SITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

2 UNDERGROUNDTESTING PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . 25 

2.1 CONTAINMENT PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . 25 

2.1.1 Vertical Shaft Containment . . . . . . . . 26 

2.1.2 Tunnel Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

2.1.3 Containment Evaluation Panel . . . . . . . 31 

2.1.4 Test Controller's Advisory Panel . . . . . 33 

2.1.5 Effluent Release Procedures . . . . . . . . 35 

2.2 EMPLACEMENT TYPES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 

X 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

Section Page 

2.2.1 Vertical Shaft Emplacement ........ 38 

2.2.2 Tunnel Emplacement ............ 41 

2.3 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 

2.3.1 Radiation Measurements .......... 45 

2.3.2 Radiochemical Measurements ........ 45 

2.4 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS . . 47 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control ........... 47 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control ....... 50 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . 50 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . 53 

2.7.1 The U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Test 

Site - Standard Operating Procedure (NTS 

SOP 0524) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 

2.7.2 The Standard Operating Procedures for the 

Environmental Sciences Department, REECo . 54 

2.7.3 Implementation of Radiological Procedures . 54 

2.7.4 Additional Methods Used to Control Radex 

Areas................... 58 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS . . 59 

2.8.1 Telemetry System in Use . . . . . . . . . . 60 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring 

Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements . . . . 66 

xi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

Section 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs 

Air Force Auxiliary Field Personnel .... 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters ...... 

3 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE EVENTS .......... 

3.1EVENTSUMMARY .................. 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

3.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

3.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

3.3.1 Preshot Activities ............ 

3.3.2 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

3.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Recovery Activities ............ 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 

3.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities ......... 

3.4.2 Postevent Mining ............. 

3.4.3 Postevent Drilling ............ 

3.4.4 Industrial Safety ............. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

4 MINI JADE EVENT ................... 

4.1EVENTSUMMARY .................. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

4.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

4.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

Page 

67 

67 

69 

69 

69 

69 

71 

82 

82 

83 

83 

84 

84 

87 

87 

88 

89 

91 

91 

91 

91 

93 

104 

xii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

Section Page 

4.3.1 Preshot Activities ............ 104 

4.3.2 Test Area Monitoring ........... 105 

4.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Recovery Activities ............ 105 

4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 

4.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities ......... 106 

4.4.2 Postevent Mining and Drilling ....... 107 

4.4.3 Industrial Safety ............. 108 

4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 

5 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 

5.1 EVENTSUMMARY .................. 111 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 111 

5.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 111 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 113 

5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 

5.3.1 Preshot Activities ............ 124 

5.3.2 Test Area Monitoring ........... 125 

5.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Recovery Activities ............ 125 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities ......... 126 

5.4.2 Postevent Mining ............. 127 

5.4.3 Postevent Drilling ............ 128 

5.4.4 Industrial Safety ............. 129 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 

xiii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

Section 

6 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.2.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . . 

6.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.3.1 Preshot Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.3.2 Test Area Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Recovery Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities . . . . . . . . . 

6.4.2 Postevent Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.4.3 Postevent Drilling . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.4.4 Industrial Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7 MISTY RAIN EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7.1EVENTSUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7.2.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . . 

7.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7.3.1 Preshot Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7.3.2 Test Area Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . 

Page 

132 

132 

132 

132 

134 

147 

147 

147 

148 

148 

148 

151 

151 

152 

153 

155 

155 

155 

155 

157 

171 

171 

171 

xiv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

Section Page 

7.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and 

Recovery Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities ......... 172 

7.4.2 Postevent Mining ............. 174 

7.4.3 Postevent Drilling ............ 175 

7.4.4 Industrial Safety ............. 175 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 

8 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 

Appendix 

A GLOSSARY OFTERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-l 

B ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-l 

C U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

CHAPTER 0101 - THE NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION . . . . C-l 

D U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

CHAPTER 0524 - RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY . . . . . . . . . D-l 

E GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR 

AGENCY AND SANDIA LABORATORIES NUCLEAR TESTS . . . . E-l 

xv 
FIGURES 

Figure Page 

l-l Federal government structure for continental nuclear 

tests (1982-1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 

l-2 Partial organization chart of Field Command, Defense 

Nuclear Agency (1982-1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

1-3 Nevada Test Organization (1982-1985) . . . . . . . . 16 

l-4 Nellis Air Force Range and the NTS . . . . . . . . . 21 

1-5 Nevada Test Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

2-l A typical subsidence crater . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 

2-2 Vertical LOS pipe configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 42 

2-3 Horizontal LOS pipe configuration . . . . . . . . . . 44 

2-4 Portal of a typical DOD tunnel complex . . . . . . . 52 

2-5 NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security 

credential holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 

2-6 Neher-White RAMS probe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 

2-7 RAMS readout console . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

2-8 Typical remote radiation detection monitoring system 

for shaft-type emplacement site . . . . . . . . . . . 64 

2-9 Typical permanently-established remote radiation 

detection stations operated continuously throughout 

theNTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 

3-l HURONLANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - tunnel layout . . 70 

xvi 
FIGURES (Continued) 

Figure Page 

3-2 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - tunnel and pipe 

layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

3-3 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - stemming plan . . 75 

3-4 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - view toward working 

point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 

3-5 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - surface RAMS . . . 80 

3-6 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - underground RAMS . 81 

3-7 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - N tunnel mesa 

and portal areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 

4-l MINI JADE event - tunnel layout . . . . . . . . . . . 92 

4-2 MINI JADE event - UlZn.12 complex and stemming layout 94 

4-3 MINI JADE event - TID bucket and gauges . . . . . . . 96 

4-4 MINI JADE event - SREMP experiment . . . . . . . . . 98 

4-5 MINI JADE event - surface RAMS . . . . . . . . . . . 102 

4-6 MINI JADE event - underground RAMS . . . . . . . . . 103 

5-1 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - tunnel layout . . . . . 112 

5-2 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - tunnel and pipe 

layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 

5-3 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - end of stemming looking 

toward ground zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 

5-4 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - surface RAMS . . . . . 121 

xvii 
FIGURES (Continued) 

Figure Page 

5-5 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - underground RAMS . . . 122 

5-6 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - underground RAMS U12n.18 

complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 

6-l MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - tunnel layout . . . . . . 133 

6-2 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - tunnel and pipe layout . . 136 

6-3 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - stemming plan . . . . . . 137 

6-4 MIDAS MYTH/MIL?iGRO event - LPARL radiation output 

measurement experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 

6-5 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - JAYCOR SGEMP experiment . 140 

6-6 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - surface RAMS . . . . . . . 144 

6-7 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - underground RAMS . . . . . 145 

6-8 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - underground RAMS U12t.04 

complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 

6-9 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - mesa trailer park 

subsidence damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 

7-l MISTY RAIN event - tunnel layout . . . . . . . . . . 156 

7-2 MISTY RAIN event - tunnel and pipe layout . . . . . . 158 

7-3 MISTY RAIN event - STARSAT chamber . . . . . . . . . 160 

7-4 MISTY RAIN event - stemming plan . . . . . . . . . . 161 

7-5 MISTY RAIN event - STARSAT experiment . . . . . . . . 163 

7-6 MISTY RAIN event - surface RAMS . . . . . . . . . . . 168 

xviii 
FIGURES (Continued) 

Figure Page 

7-7 MISTY RAIN event - underground RAMS . . . . . . . . . 169 

7-8 MISTY RAIN event - underground RAMS U12n.17 complex . 170 

xix 
TABLES 

Table Page 

2-l DOD events - 23 September 1982 through 06 April 

1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

3-l HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events RAMS unit locations 

23 September 1982 - surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

3-2 HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events RAMS unit locations 

23 September 1982 - underground . . . . . . . . . . . 79 

4-1 MINI JADE event RAMS unit locations 26 May 1983 -

surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 

4-2 MINI JADE event RAMS unit locations 26 May 1983 -

underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 

5-l TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event RAMS unit locations 

21 September 1983 - surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 

5-2 TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR RAMS event unit locations 

21 September 1983 - underground . . . . . . . . . . . 120 

6-l MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event RAMS unit locations 

February 1984 - surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 

6-2 MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event RAMS unit locations 

February 1984 - underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 

7-l MISTY RAIN event RAMS unit locations 06 April 1985 -

surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 

7-2 MISTY RAIN event RAMS unit locations 06 April 1985 -

underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 

xx 
SECTION 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The first United States nuclear detonation designed to be fully 

contained underground was the RAINIER tunnel event. The event 

was conducted by the University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL) for the AEC at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) on 19 September 1957. This was a weapons-related experiment with a relatively low yield of 1.7 kilotons (kt). The second tunnel event with 

a significant nuclear yield was a safety experiment on 22 February 1958, also conducted at NTS by UCRL for the AEC. This experiment, the VENUS event, resulted in a yield of less than one 

ton. These two tunnel events and five additional safety experiments with zero or only slight yields were the beginning of the 

United States underground nuclear testing program, currently the 

only type of nuclear detonation testing permitted by treaty. The 

first DOD-sponsored underground nuclear weapons-effects test was 

the 5.7 kt HARD HAT event conducted by the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA) on 15 February 1962 at NTS. 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. 

While technical conferences between the United States and the 

Soviet Union on banning nuclear detonation tests continued, and 

concern regarding further increases in worldwide fallout mounted, 

a number of nuclear tests were conducted underground during 1958 

in Nevada. Prior to the United States testing moratorium, six 

safety experiments in shafts, five safety experiments in tunnels, 

and four weapons-related tests in tunnels were conducted by user 

laboratories. Radioactive products from several of these tests 

were not completely contained underground. Containment of 

nuclear detonations was a new engineering challenge. Understanding and solving the majority of containment problems would 

require years of underground testing experience. 

When the United States resumed testing on 15 September 1961, the 

first 32 tests were underground, including a cratering experiment 

with the device emplaced 110 feet below the surface. The Dominic 

test series in the Pacific and the Sunbeam test series in Nevada 

1 
during 1962 were the last atmospheric nuclear detonations by the 

United States. 

The commitment of the United States to reduce levels of worldwide 

fallout by refraining from conducting nuclear tests in the 

atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater was finalized when the 

Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 

5 August 1963. On 31 March 1976, the Soviet Union and the United 

States agreed to limit the maximum yield of underground tests to 

150 kt. Currently, yields are reported as within a particular 

range; less than 20 kt, less than 150 kt, or 20 to 150 kt. 

1.2 UNDERGROUNDTESTING OBJECTIVES. 

The majority of United States underground tests have been for 

weapons-related purposes. New designs were tested to improve 

efficiency and deliverability characteristics of nuclear explosive devices before they entered the military stockpile as 

components of nuclear weapons. 

In addition to weapons-related tests, safety experiments with 

nuclear devices also were conducted by user laboratories. These 

experiments tested nuclear devices by simulating a nuclear 

detonation using conventional high explosives in a manner which 

might occur in an accident during transportation, handling, or 

storage of weapons. 

Nuclear weapons-effects tests (NWET) sponsored by DOD were conducted to determine the vulnerability or survivability of military systems or components when exposed to one or more effects of 

a nuclear detonation. The major emphasis of NWET was on collecting radiation-effects data for strategic systems such as Pershing, Polaris, Minute Man, etc. The nuclear devices for these 

tests were provided by DOE weapons-development laboratories and 

were designed to be similar to the actual nuclear components used 

in nuclear weapons. Actual weapon configurations were only used 

in a few events. Military systems, structures, materials, 

electronics experiments, and other related experiments were 

provided by DOD and DOE agencies. Many of these tests were 

complex and involved greater numbers of participants than other 

categories of tests previously mentioned. Personnel from DNA, 

2 
other government organizations, user laboratories and contractors, and DOD contractor agencies were involved. 

Some tests were designed to study the response of hardened 

structures or geologic formations to shock waves generated by 

nuclear detonations. Many tests were designed to study the 

response of military components to effects of radiation produced 

by nuclear weapons. Such tests required a direct line-of-sight 

between the nuclear device and the experiments. Some of the 

radiation-effects tests required the simulation of high altitude 

conditions (up to exoatmospheric). These tests involved installation of experiments inside large steel line-of-sight (LOS) 

pipes, hundreds of feet in length, with maximum diameters of 

several feet. Large vacuum pumps were utilized to reduce pressure inside the pipes to the desired level. Other radiationeffects tests utilized scatterers to direct the radiation to 

experiments outside the pipe. 

DOD weapons-effects tests HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE, 23 September 

1982, through MISTY RAIN, 6 April 1985, conducted during Operations Praetorian, Phalanx, Fusileer, and Grenadier are discussed 

in this volume. 

1.3 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 

Administering the underground nuclear testing program was a joint 

DOE-DOD responsibility. The similar nature of the DOE and DOD 

organizational structure, during the period of this report, is 

shown in Figure l-l. 

1.3.1 Defense Nuclear Agency. 

Headquarters of DNA is located near Washington, D.C., and is 

composed of personnel from each of the Armed Services and civilian DOD employees. It was originally established as the Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) to assume residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer District. This action was 

initiated through issuance of a joint Army Navy memorandum, dated 

29 January 1947, which was retroactive to 1 January 1947 (when 

the Atomic Energy Commission was activated). The responsibility 

for DOD nuclear weapons-effects testing was assigned to AFSWP. The 

3 
SECRETARY OF 

ENERGY 

DOE GENERAL 

MANAGER 

DIRECTOR, 

OFFICE OF 

MILITARY 

APPLICATION 

MANAGER, 

NEVADA OPERATIONS 

OFFICE 

-----------------. 

PRESIDENT 

MILITARY .------------------------------- SECRETARY OF 

LIAISON I DEFENSE 

COMMITTEE I 

DIRECTOR,

DNA 

--------------- - ---- -- ----- py 

, 

DOE TEST 

.----_-- -_------ J CONTROLLER 

COMMAND 

UAISON AND COORDINATION 

Figure l-l. Federal government structure for continental nuclear 

tests (1982-1985). 

4 

I 
National Security Act of 1947 had become law when the Secretary 

of Defense issued a memorandum on 21 October 1947 to the three 

Service secretaries confirming the previous directive of 29 Januaw and thus, AFSWP officially represented all of the services. 

AFSWP was charged with providing nuclear weapons support to the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force. As originally chartered, AFSWP was 

directly responsible to each of the three Service chiefs. In 

1951, the Air Force Special Weapons Center (AFSWC) located at 

Kirtland Air Force Base (KAF'B), Albuquerque, New Mexico, was 

assigned the responsibility by DOD to provide specific support to 

the AEC for continental nuclear testing (see Section 1.3.2). 

This command was not directly related to AFSWP; however, the two 

organizations coordinated several support tasks. 

By issuance of General Order No. 2, Headquarters, DASA (HQ/DASA), 

dated 6 May 1959, AFSWP became DASA. Under its new charter, DASA 

was responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 

DASA's five major areas of responsibility for the DOD included: 

1. Staff assistance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS. 

2. Research in weapons effects. 

3. Atomic tests. 

4. Weapons-related tests. 

5. Assistance to the Services. 

Responsibilities of HQ/DASA included providing consolidated 

management and direction for the DOD nuclear weapons-effects 

testing program. Technical direction and management of field 

operations for DOD nuclear weapons-effects testing activities 

were delegated to Field Command, DASA (FC/DASA), located at 

Sandia Base, now KAFB in Albuquerque, New Mexico. From 6 May 

1959 until 1 July 1964 the Weapons Effects Test Group (WETG) of 

FC/DASA was responsible for nuclear weapons-effects testing and 

seismic detection research (VELA-UNIFORM) for the Director, DASA. 

This organization maintained close liaison with the AEC/Nevada 

5 
Operations Office (NVOO). Personnel from FC/DASA became the 

military members of the joint AEC-DOD testing organization at the 

NTS and other Continental United States test locations. Participation of DOD agencies and their contractors in nuclear field 

tests was coordinated and supported by FC/DASA. On 1 July 1964, 

the testing organization in Albuquerque was designated as the 

Weapons Test Division (WTD), a Division of HQ/DASA. On 1 August 

1966, WTD's name was changed to Test Command, DASA, and it became 

a separate command under HQ/DASA, remaining in Albuquerque. The 

responsibility for technical direction and management of field 

operations for nuclear effects tests remained in effect during 

these changes in organization. During this period, WTD and 

TC/DASA maintained an engineering and support branch (designated 

the Nevada Branch) at the NTS and a liaison office at AEC/NVOO. 

The Nevada Branch maintained liaison with AEC/NVOO and supervised 

FC/DASA activities at NTS. On 12 May 1970, the Commander, 

FC/DASA assumed additional command of TC/DASA. 

On 29 March 1971 (effective 1 July 1971), the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense directed the reorganization of DASA as a result of 

cutbacks recommended by the "Blue Ribbon Panel" survey of agency 

activities. In his Executive Memorandum, DASA was retained as a 

defense agency under the new title, "Defense Nuclear Agency." 

Also on 1 July 1971, FC/DASA was redesignated as FC/DNA, and 

TC/DASA became TC/DNA. While the responsibilities and manning 

levels at Field 

Command remained 

Command were 

essentially 

reduced during 

the same. 

this transition, Test 

On 1 January 1972, TC/DNA was discontinued 

transferred to FC/DNA. The responsibility 

tion and management of field operations for 

and personnel were 

for technical direcnuclear weaponseffects tests were transferred to the newly formed Test Directorate (Field Command Test, FCT), of FC/DNA. The Nevada Branch of 

TC/DASA was changed to the Test Construction Division of Test 

Directorate (FCTC), and the responsibility for the liaison office 

at AEC/NVOO was transferred to FCTC. In 1980 a Containment 

Division (FCTK) was added to Test Directorate to plan and supervise the containment research program for DNA; and in 1982 the 

Test Directorate Safety Engineer (FCTS) was added as a separate 

office. (See Figure l-2.) 

6 
------------- 

DIRECTOR 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, DC 

COMMANDER 

FIELDCOMMAND, DNA 

KIRTLANDAFB, NM 

I 

I 

PLANS& TEST INSPECTIONS LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

DIREg;;ATE DIREg;;ATE DlREg;;ATE DIREEFllATE II -

I I I PLANS I OFFICE OF TEST TEST TECHNICAL 

I 

ENGINEERING CONTAINMENT SAFETY ANALYSIS DIVISION CONSTRUCTlON OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE DIVISION ENGINEER DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION 

(FCTP) W;:’ W-;j (FZt! WFSS) 

‘FA2 KAFB I: 

LIAISON 

OFFICE 

DOE/NV 

LAS VEGAS, NV 

Figure l-2. Partial organization chart of Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (1982-1985). 
1.3.2 Air Force Support. 

Until 1 July 1974, 

Site Organization 

Detachment 1, of 

shuttle service 

AFSWC provided air support 

(NTSO) during nuclear tests 

the 4900th Test Group provided 

between KAFB, New Mexico, and 

to the 

at the 

aircraft 

Indian 

Nevada 

NTS. 

for 

Springs 

Test 

Air 

Force Auxiliary Field (ISAFAF) in Nevada. They also provided 

aircraft and crews to perform low-altitude cloud tracking, radio 

relay support, and courier missions. On 1 July 1974, AFSWC's air 

support responsibility, along with Detachment 1, 4900th Test 

Group, was transferred to the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing (FWW), 

Tactical Air Command (TAC), at Nellis Air Force Base (NAFB), 

Nevada. AFSWC continued to support the Air Force's nuclear 

research and development (R&D) mission until 1 April 1976, when 

it was deactivated. The nuclear R&D mission was transferred to 

the Air Force Weapons Lab (AFWL), KAFB, New Mexico, at this time. 

Detachment 1 remained at ISAFAF and continued to provide support 

to the NTS; however, personnel, aircraft, equipment, and supplies 

became the responsibility of the 57th FWW. Support was formalized by Interservice Support Agreements between the Tactical 

Fighter Weapons Center (as represented by the 57th FWW) and 

FC/DNA, acting as the agent of the Departments of Defense and 

Energy for receiving aeronautical support at NTS. On 1 November 

1983, Detachment 1, 4900th Test Group was deactivated and replaced by the 4460th Helicopter Squadron (HS) which was activated 

at ISAFAF. The 4460th was the largest helicopter unit in TAC 

with six UH-1N helicopters and 77 personnel authorized. Operations provided by the 4460th HS during the period of this report 

were: 

A. An airborne security inspection of pre-closed areas on 

D-l. 

B. A D-day airborne safety inspection and Test Controller 

standby mission to be flown prior to D-11 hours and to 

cover the downwind area for personnel and livestock 

locations. (The standby portion of this mission was for 

rapid evacuation of personnel and/or reentry of scientific personnel, if necessary.) 

C. A D-day helicopter airborne closed-circuit television 

mission to provide a stable platform for both television 

8 
and color photography coverage of surface ground zero at 

zero time. 

D. A D-day helicopter cloud surveillance to provide initial 

data for immediate "onsite" decisions regarding safeguard actions. (Not to be considered as "cloud tracking.") 

E. Damage survey flights, as required, and other support 

flights as requested by the Test Controller and as 

operationally feasible by the 57th FWW Deputy Commander 

for Operations. 

F. Normal technical support and laboratory photography 

flights, as required, including survey of preshot, postshot, and new construction areas. 

G. An airborne security inspection to cover the NTS boundarh checking the locked barricades, and looking for 

areas where intruders might have gained access to the 

NTS unobserved. 

H. Operational orientation tours and management surveillance flights as requested by higher headquarters of 

either activity. 

1.3.3 DOE-DOD Relationships. 

DOD was responsible for establishing criteria for nuclear weapons, developing and producing delivery systems, developing 

nuclear weapons plans and forces, providing defense against 

nuclear attack, and obtaining nuclear weapons-effects data 

through DNA. DOE was responsible for research, development, 

production, and supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed Forces in 

quantities and types specified by the JCS. Quantities and types 

of weapons were described in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

Memorandum, signed by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of 

Energy or his alternate and approved by the President. DOE in 

association with DOD, also was responsible for providing field 

nuclear test facilities in the Continental United States and 

islands in the Pacific. 

9 
The principal points of field coordination between DOD and DOE 

were at the Nevada Operations Office (NV) in Las Vegas and at 

NTS. From the beginning of the DOD underground nuclear weaponseffects test program (the first test was HARD HAT in February 

1962) through the period covered by this volume, Field Command 

(or Test Command) was the fielding agency for DOD-DNA and served 

as the primary point of contact with the Nevada office of the 

DOE. DOE/NV represented DOE in the field for all Continental 

tests. The DOE nuclear weapons-development laboratories fielded 

underground tests as part of the weapons-development program; DNA 

fielded underground tests at NTS to obtain weapons-effects data. 

Because the NTS was a DOE installation, the Manager, NV, was 

responsible for all operations there. 

For each DOD-sponsored test, HQ/DNA coordinated requirements with 

the military services. Requirements for testing to determine the 

nuclear vulnerability or hardening of military systems or components were submitted by these organizations. As part of longrange underground nuclear weapons-effects test planning, HQ/DNA 

developed a schedule of specific events designed to satisfy 

military requirements. One or more of the DOD agencies were 

cosponsors and usually active participants in each DOD underground test. Many of the nuclear weapons-effects tests also 

included active participation by one or more of the DOE laboratories in vulnerability/survivability experiments for nuclear 

warheads, warhead electrical systems, and limited-life components 

(LLC). The initial approval of DOD experiments and the selection 

of the nuclear source (device) for each test was accomplished at 

the HQ/DNA level. A request for the appropriate nuclear device 

and associated support was forwarded by HQ/DNA to the Director, 

Division of Military Application, DOE. The DOE assigned one or 

more of the weapons-development laboratories to provide the 

device support. 

Following initial planning, the responsibility for detailed 

planning, engineering, fielding, execution, and reporting was 

assigned to FC/DNA. Field Command formed a Test Group staff for 

each test. The Technical Director (normally a military officer 

assigned to FC/DNA or AFWL) was appointed by HQ/DNA. The Test 

Group Director and other members of the staff were appointed by 

FC/DNA. The Test Group Engineer normally was selected from FCTC, 

Nevada Branch. 

10 
The Test Group staff developed detailed test plans and schedules. 

Engineering and construction plans were developed by the Nevada 

Branch and coordinated with the Nuclear Test Organization 

(NT0)4. Final engineering designs were developed by DOE contractors at NTS - Holmes & Narver, Inc. (H&N), and/or Fenix & 

Scisson, Inc. (F&S). Engineering drawings were approved by FCTC 

and NT0 prior to actual construction. Construction was performed 

by the principal DOE support contractor - BEECo. FCTC and 

members of the Test Group staff monitored construction activities. The FC/DNA Test Group staff coordinated development of 

technical experiments and initiated action to obtain required 

support equipment (e.g., steel LOS pipe and mechanical closures). 

The Test Group staff reviewed the technical support requirements 

submitted by experimenter agencies and submitted consolidated 

requirements to the Nevada Operations Office which, in turn, 

advised the NT0 of future requirements. 

During the construction phase, the Test Directorate's Containment 

Division (FCTK) began collecting containment-related information. 

During drilling or mining operations, rock cores were analyzed 

for bulk density, moisture content, grain density, porosity 

(determined by the difference between bulk and grain densities), 

unconfined compressive strength, triaxial compression (for a 

variety of confining pressures), ultrasonic shear and compressive 

wave velocities, carbon dioxide content, presence of clay which 

could swell, and other features. Testing was done for DNA 

primarily by the H&N Testing Lab at NTS (Mercury) and Terra Tek, 

a DNA contractor located at Salt Lake City, Utah, as part of the 

DNA containment-research program. 

Geologic features of the tunnels were examined and mapped as 

construction progressed, usually by a DOE contractor. Several 

months prior to the planned event, FC/DNA prepared a document 

which contained a general description of the test, site geologic 

information, types and locations of mechanical closures, details 

of concrete plugs, a summary of analytical calculations, and 

other related test history. This document was reviewed by 

Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP; see Section 2.1.3) members and 

4 Assumed the functions of the Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) in 1982. 

11 
formally presented by FC/DNA to the CEP for categorization and 

recommendation for execution. 

The FC/DNA Test Group staff normally moved to NTS a few months 

prior to the planned event execution date (three to six months 

depending on the complexity of the test). Prior to arrival of 

DOD experimenter personnel, the Nevada Operations Office, in 

conjunction with the Test Group staff, made arrangements to 

provide required instrumentation and recording facilities, office 

space and equipment, communications equipment, vehicles, photography, and other support items. Housing and food services for 

DOD personnel at NTS were provided by REECo. Upon arrival at 

NTS, DOD personnel were briefed on safety and security by the 

Test Group staff and other DOD and DOE personnel. These briefings included radiation 

equipment. Experimenter 

FC/DNA security and safety 

safety control policies, 

agencies were provided 

plans. 

procedures, 

with copies 

and 

of 

Under the supervision of the Test Group staff, experimenter 

personnel installed experiments and checked out instrumentation 

cables and recording systems. A series of electrical dry runs 

were conducted from the participating (user) laboratory control 

room and DNA monitoring room at the Control Point (CP) complex 

(see Section 1.5) to determine that all signals and remotelycontrolled equipment were functioning properly. After all 

systems were declared ready, permission was requested from the 

DOE to install the nuclear device. Installation and check out 

were conducted by the participating device-development laboratory 

with DOE security safeguarding the device and other classified 

materials. The next activities consisted of placing stemming 

materials in preplanned locations and checking all containment 

features. 

When the test facility was ready for event execution, control of 

the entire test and experiment area was transferred to the DOE/NV 

Test Controller and his staff. When the Test Controller was 

satisfied that all conditions were satisfactory to detonate the 

device, he gave permission to the user laboratory to arm the 

device and initiate the final countdown. 

The Test Controller and his staff at the CP monitored the countdown, detonation, and postevent response of remotely-controlled 

12 
radiation monitoring equipment. When released by the Test 

Controller, REECo Radiological Safety (Radsafe) teams entered the 

area to monitor for radiation and other safety hazards. After 

assurance that reentry could be accomplished, the Test Controller 

released experimenters to collect recorded data from surface 

areas. All of these operations were conducted in accordance with 

postshot plans developed by the DOE Test Controller staff, the 

DOD Test Group staff, and Nevada Branch personnel, unless postevent conditions required modifications. 

For tunnel events, initial reentry into the tunnel was authorized 

by the DOE Test Controller after it was determined that conditions were safe for reentry operations. Tunnel reentry was 

controlled by Nevada Branch personnel with assistance from Sandia 

National Laboratories (SNL) health physicists, REECo Radsafe 

personnel, and REECo construction personnel. After the tunnel 

was declared safe for experiment recovery, the Test Group staff 

assumed control of the area. Based on REECo Radsafe monitoring 

data, FC/DNA personnel determined when it was safe to remove the 

experiments. Experimenters then removed experiments for analysis 

and documentation of results. 

1.4 DOE ORGANIZATIONS, CONTRACTORS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 

1.4.1 Atomic Energy Commission. 

The AEC was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 in July, the 

same month the JCS were conducting Operation Crossroads with 

assistance from the U.S. Army's Manhattan Engineer District. On 

1 January 1947, MED was deactivated and the AEC and AFSWP assumed 

its functions. The Atomic Energy Act was revised in 1954 and has 

been amended extensively since. 

The AEC established headquarters (AEC/HQ) offices in Washington, 

D.C., and operations offices in areas that were centers of AEC 

operations. In areas of lesser activity, area offices, branch 

offices, and field offices were established. The Director of the 

Division of Military Application (DMA) in AEC/HQ was delegated 

responsibility for the nuclear-weapons development and testing 

program. The Director of DMA was always a flag officer from one 

of the armed forces, as specified by the Atomic Energy Act of 

13 
1954, and he was an Assistant General Manager in the AEC organization. 

In 1951, the Director of DMA designated and delegated his responsibility for conduct of on-continent tests to the Test Manager of 

the AEC Santa Fe Operations Office (SFOO) near Los Alamo Scientific Laboratory. Later in 1951, SF00 was moved to Albuquerque. 

With delegated authority from the Director of DMA, the Manager, 

SFOO, designated Test Managers for on-continent tests. The same 

authority applied when SF00 became the Albuquerque Operations 

Office (ALOO) in 1956. The AEC Las Vegas Field Office (LVFO), 

established in 1951, managed the Nevada Test Site (called the 

Nevada Proving Ground from 1952 to 1955) for the Test Manager. 

LVFO became a Branch Office in 1955, an Area Office in 1960, and 

the Nevada Operations Office (NVOO, later shortened to NV) in 

1962, with the Manager, NVOO, or his representative designated as 

Test Manager. In 1972, the Test Manager became the Test Controller. 

In 1977 the Division of Military Application (DMA) was changed to 

the Office of Military Applications (OMA). OMA initiated the 

chain of authority and approval for detonating each nuclear 

device by requesting that each user laboratory and DNA submit 

proposed test programs to OMA. This request was made in the 

spring of each year for tests to be conducted in the next fiscal 

year. OMA consolidated proposed test programs, developed a test 

program proposal while consulting with DOD, and generated a 

program approval request. OMA then presented the proposed test 

program to the National Security Council (NSC) Ad Hoc Committee 

on Nuclear Testing. Chaired by the NSC, this committee included 

representatives of the DOD, JCS, Department of State, Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management and Budget, 

Office of Science and Technology, and Central Intelligence 

Agency. After incorporating informal committee comments, OMA 

forwarded the proposed program from the Secretary of Energy to 

the President through the NSC. The NSC solicited and incorporated formal comments in its recommendation to the President. 

Test program approvals were requested at six month intervals. 

Approval of tests for the first six months was received at the 

beginning of each fiscal year. The process was repeated six 

months later for tests in the last half of the fiscal year. 

14 
Presidential approvals were signed by the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs. Subsequently, test 

program authority messages were sent from the Director OMA to the 

user laboratories, DNA, and DOE/NV. 

Authority to detonate each nuclear device was handled separately 

and individually. The technical content of detonation authority 

requests originated in presentations to the CEP by the user 

laboratory or DNA. After recommendations by the CEP, the Manager, NV, requested detonation authority from OMA. Required 

information in each request included statements on compliance 

with treaties, environmental impact, public announcement plans, 

test program authority, and any particularly noteworthy aspects 

of the test. After OMA and additional DOE reviews, the Manager, 

NV was notified of detonation authority approval. 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Organization. 

As stated in Chapter 0101 of the Nuclear Test Organization (NTO) 

Standard Operating Procedure (NTS SOP Chapter 0101, Appendix C'), 

the NT0 included DOE, DOD, user laboratory, contractor, agency, 

and organizational personnel who participated in or provided 

support for test operations at the NTS. The Manager, NV, headed 

the NT0 and appointed the Test Controller who was assigned full 

responsibility for the safe conduct of each nuclear test. (See 

Figure l-3.) The Test Controller was supported by the NTO, which 

was a continuing task organization whose composition could be 

readily changed in response to the needs and technical objectives 

of each test. 

The Continental Test Organization (CT0)6 was part of the original 

Nevada Test Site Organization. However, it was disestablished on 

1 August 1962, with its responsibilities (e.g., Military Deputy 

to the Manager, NVOO) being assumed by WETG, FC/DASA, Weapons 

Test Division (WTD)/DASA, TC/DASA, and subsequently by Test 

Directorate, FC/DNA. During the period of this report, when the 

5 DOE NTS SOP Chapter 0101 superseded AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 

0101-01 on 18 August 1982. 

6 See DNA 6320F, Operations Nougat and Whetstone for additional 

information. 

15 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION 

,,/y*NIou(NG? 

NEVADA TEST SllE USERS 

LOS ALAMOS NATlONAL LABORATORY 

LAWRENCE UVERMORE NATlONAL LAB. DEPUTY YANAGER 

SANDIA NATlONAL LABORATORY 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

OTHERS NEVADA TEST SITE 

PLANNING BOARD 

- THRESHOLD TREATY REVlEW PANEL 

CONTAINMENT EVALUATION PANEL 

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY STUDY 

6 SURVEY GROUPS 

SCIENTIFIC &TECHNICAL DOE SCIENTIFIC mp;lSES & ADVISORY 

TESTS 6 EXPERIMENTS TEST CONTROLLER. 

OFF-SllE SAFETY SUPPORT 

EVALUATION & CONTROLS 

MEMBER(S) ADVISORY 

PANEL 1 1 MEMBER ADVISORY PANE 

L ( -DOE 1 

STAFF SUPPORT 

POUCY ACtidN 

6 ANNOUNCEMENTS 

I/ 

‘DESIGNATED FOR EACH TEST OR SPECIAL EXPERIMENT. (ASSUMES OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF NT8 

DURING TEST OPERATIONAL PERIODS.) 

Figure l-3. Nevada Test Organization (1982-1985). 

16 

1 
NTSO was changed to the NTO, and Test Directorate, FC/DNA, was 

reorganized, the Deputy for Military Matters position was deleted 

from the NT0 organization chart. Responsibilities of that 

position for coordinating DOD programs and support to the NT0 

were transferred to the Test Construction Division, FC/DNA, at 

Mercury, NV. 

1.4.3 NT0 Radiological Safety. 

The Test Controller was responsible for protection of participating personnel and offsite populations from radiation hazards 

associated with activities conducted at NTS. By mutual agreement 

between the Test Controller and a scientific user (see Section 

1.4.4), control of radiation safety within the area assigned for 

a particular activity was delegated to the user's Test Group 

Director during the period of time when such control could have 

had a direct bearing on the success or failure of the scientific 

program. 

The onsite radiological safety support contractor (REECo Radsafe) 

was responsible to the Director, Health Physics Division, for 

both routine and test event radiological safety coordination 

onsite as detailed in Appendix D, DOE NTS SOP Chapter 05247, 

"Radiological Safety." During events, the Test Manager, NV, 

delegated control of radiation safety in the immediate test area 

to the user Test Group Director when the Director requested 

control. When this occurred, each Radsafe coordinator was 

responsible to the Test Group Director through his radiological 

safety organization for support in his test area. 

The U.S. Environmental 

to the Test Controller 

safety program. 

Protection 

for operation 

Agency 

of 

(EPA), 

the offsite 

was responsible 

radiological 

1.4.4 NTS Scientific Users. 

The NTS scientific users were DNA (for nuclear weapons effects) 

and the development laboratories: Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia 

7 DOE NTS SOP Chapter 0524 superseded AEC NTSO SOP Chapter 0524 

on 23 July 1982. 

17 
National Laboratories (SNL). LANL and LLNL were primarily 

involved in weapons-development testing while SNL conducted a 

limited number of weapons-effects tests and supported weaponsdevelopment tests. A brief description of these laboratories 

follows: 

A. LANL was established early in 1943 as Los Alamos, Project Y, of the MED for the specific purpose of developing an atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists supervised 

the test detonation of the world's first atomic weapon 

in July 1945 at the Trinity site in New Mexico. Los 

Alamos became Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) in 

January 1947 when the AEC and AFSWP were activated to 

replace the MED. LASL was renamed LANL on 29 December 

1979 when Congress passed a bill changing LASL, LLL, and 

SLA to national laboratories. The Laboratory's continuing assignment was to conceive, design, test, and develop nuclear components of atomic weapons. The contract 

under which LANL performed work for DOE was administered 

first by the AEC's Santa Fe Operations Office and later 

by the Albuquerque Operations Office. The laboratory 

was operated by the University of California. 

B. LLNL (originally the University of California Radiation 

Laboratory [UCRL], then the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory [LRLI, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory [LLL], and 

finally LLNL) was established as a second DOE weapons 

laboratory at Livermore, California, in 1952. The 

Laboratory's responsibilities were parallel to those of 

LANL. Devices developed by LLNL first were tested in 

Nevada in 1953, and LLNL-developed devices have been 

tested in each Continental and Pacific series since. 

The contract under which LLNL performed work for DOE was 

administered by their San Francisco Operations Office. 

This Laboratory also was operated by the University of 

California. 

C. SNL has also undergone several name changes; it was 

established in 1945 as 2 Division of Los Alamos. In 

April 1948, it was named Sandia Laboratory, Branch of 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; and in November 1949 

it assumed its identity as a full-fledged weapons re18 
search institution operated by Sandia Corporation (SC), 

a non-profit subsidiary of Western Electric. In May 

1956 it was renamed Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque (SLA) 

adding a Livermore Branch in March 1956 (to provide 

closer support to LLL). SLA also operated the ballistics test facilities for the AEC at the Tonopah Ballistics Range (now Tonopah Test Range) in September 1956. 

In 1969, the name was changed to Sandia Laboratories 

(SL), and in 1979 it was changed to Sandia National 

Laboratories. SNL's role was to conceive, design, test, 

and develop the non-nuclear phases of atomic weapons and 

do other work in related fields. 

1.4.5 Test Support Organizations. 

In keeping with its policy, DOE used private contractors for 

maintenance, operations, and construction (including military and 

civil defense construction) at the NTS. NV personnel administered all housekeeping, construction, and related services 

activity, but performance was by contractors. Major support 

contractors were the following: 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., was the principal DOE operational and support contractor for the NTS, providing 

electrical and architectural engineering, state-of-the-art large 

diameter and conventional shaft drilling, heavy-duty construction 

and evacuation, mining and tunneling, occupational safety and 

fire protection, radiological safety, toxic gas and explosive 

mixture monitoring, communications and electronics, power distribution, occupational medicine, and other support functions. 

REECo maintained offices in Las Vegas and extensive facilities 

necessary to operate at NTS. 

Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., (renamed EG&G, Inc. in 

1966) was the principal technical contractor, providing control 

point functions such as timing and firing, and diagnostic functions such as scientific photography and measurement of detonation characteristics. In addition, EGCG personnel manned the DOD 

monitor room. EGCG support facilities were maintained in Las 

Vegas and at NTS. 

19 
Holmes & Narver, Inc., performed architect/engineer services for 

the NTS and was the principal support contractor for AEC's offcontinent operations. H&N had a home office in the Los Angeles 

area and also maintained offices in Las Vegas and at NTS. 

Fenix c Scisson, Inc., of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was a consultant 

architect/engineer for drilling and mining operations in connection with underground nuclear testing since 1963. The company 

was involved in design of many underground structures and in the 

field of deep, large-diameter hole drilling. Las Vegas Branch 

activity was conducted from offices in Las Vegas and Mercury, 

Nevada. 

Numerous other contractors, selected on the basis of lump-sum 

competitive bids, performed various construction and other 

support functions for DOE and DOD. 

1.5 THE NEVADA TEST SITE. 

An on-continent location was selected for conducting nuclear 

weapons tests. Construction began at what was called the Nevada 

Test Site in December 1950, and testing began in January 1951. 

The name was changed to the Nevada Proving Grounds (NPG) in March 

of 1952 and again changed to the Nevada Test Site on 31 December 

1954. 

The original boundaries were expanded as new testing areas and 

projects were added. Figure l-4 shows the present NTS location 

bounded on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Range. NTS 

encompassed about 1,350 square miles in 1985. This testing 

location was selected for both safety and security reasons. The 

arid climate, lack of industrialization, and exclusion of the 

public from the Nellis Air Force Range resulted in a very low 

population density in the area around NTS. 

The only paved roads within the NTS and Nellis Air Force Range 

complex were those constructed by the government for access 

purposes. NTS testing areas were physically protected by surrounding rugged topography. The few mountain passes and dry 

washes where four-wheel drive vehicles might enter were posted 

20 
r TONOPAH 

7 / NELLIS AIR FORCE RANGE 

WELLS I I \ Ih

Figure l-4. Nellis Air Force Range and the NTS. 

21 
with warning signs and barricades. NTS security force personnel 

patrolled perimeter and barricade areas in aircraft and vehicles. 

Thus, unauthorized entry to NTS was difficult, and the possibility of a member of the public inadvertently entering an NTS 

testing area was extremely remote. 

Figure l-5 shows the NTS, its various area designations, and the 

locations of the six events covered by this volume. In a location designation such as VlZn.07" the "U" signifies an underground location, "12" identifies the area at NTS, "n" denotes the 

tunnel, and "07" indicates the drift number. 

A low mountain range separates the base camp, Mercury, from the 

location of early AEC and DOD atmospheric tests at Frenchman Flat 

in Area 5. This area was also later used for DOD underground 

testing. The elevation of Frenchman Dry Lake in the middle of 

the Flat is about 3,100 feet. 

A mountain pass separates Frenchman Flat from Yucca Flat testing 

areas. The pass overlooks both Frenchman and Yucca Flats and 

contains the CP complex of buildings including Control Point 1 

(CP-1) and Control Point 9 (CP-9) where timing and firing for 

most underground nuclear tests were performed, and Control 

Point 2 (CP-2) where radiological safety support was based. 

Yucca Flat testing areas include Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 

10. Underground tests were conducted in some of these areas and 

generally were shaft emplacement types. The elevation of Yucca 

Dry Lake at the south end of Yucca Flat is about 4,300 feet. To 

the west of Yucca Flat, in another basin, is the Area 18 testing 

location. Some DOD atmospheric tests were conducted in Area 18, 

and one DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted on Buckboard Mesa in this area at an elevation of about 5,500 feet. 

Area 16 is 

The single 

5,400 feet) 

in the 

Area 16 tunnel 

was a 

mountains west of Yucca Flat toward 

complex (at an elevation of 

DOD underground testing location. 

Area 18. 

about 

Rainier Mesa is 

the Mesa is 

in 

at an 

Area 12, northwest 

elevation of about 

of Yucca Flat. 

7,500 feet. All 

The top of 

DOD tunnel 

emplacement events on NTS that were not in the Area 16 tunnel 

complex or the Area 15 shaft and tunnel complex were in Rainier 

22 

Mesa and adjoining 

complexes were B, 

constructed in the 

Area 15 is in the 

deeper of the two 

surface elevation 

ducted in Area 15, 

were discussed in 

stone, while PILE 

Operations Flintlock 

Pahute Mesa. The major Rainier Mesa tunnel 

E, G, N, and T tunnels. Parts of T tunnel were 

adjoining Pahute Mesa. 

foothills at the north end of Yucca Flat. The 

access shafts drops 1,500 feet below the 

of 5,100 feet. There were three events conall sponsored by DOD. BARD BAT and TINY TOT 

DNA Report 632OF, Operations Nougat and WhetDRIVER was discussed in DNA Report 6321F, 

and Latchkey. 

24 
SECTION 2 

UNDERGROUNDTESTING PROCEDURES 

Underground tests conducted at the NTS prior to 1962 were primarily for weapons-related purposes (including safety tests). These 

tests were controlled by the AEC and conducted by LASL or LLL. 

Experience gained in the area of underground radioactivity containment during these tests provided the basic concepts for 

development of containment plans for DOD/DNA-sponsored underground nuclear weapons-effects tests which followed. These DOD 

tests were generally more complex than earlier ABC tests and 

required the development of new containment concepts and hardware. 

A primary consideration in all underground tests was the safety 

of test participants and the general public, especially regarding 

exposures to radioactive materials. This chapter discusses, in 

general terms, containment problems and procedures, types of 

emplacement, diagnostic techniques, effects experiments, area 

access requirements, industrial and radiological safety, radiation measuring systems, and air support requirements. 

2.1 CONTAINMENT PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES. 

Completely containing radioactive material underground while 

accomplishing diagnostic measurements and effects experiments 

proved to be a major engineering challenge. Original efforts 

considered only detonation containment in competent rock formations. It was necessary to modify the original efforts to 

consider zones of weakness in rock caused by faults and containment failures resulting from diagnostic and experiment structures. Under certain conditions, particularly the presence of 

clay or a high water content in rock near the detonation point, 

residual stress could be lower, allowing a stronger-than-normal 

shock wave, that could adversely affect containment. Some containment failures were partially attributable to additional overpressure from secondary gas expansion, i.e., steam pressure. The 

major containment features and problems that evolved are discussed below. 

25 
2.1.1 Vertical Shaft Containment. 

Some of the first shaft safety experiments were in unstemmed 

shafts with concrete plugs penetrated by cable and instrumentation holes. When nuclear yields were produced, these emplacements did not completely contain the debris. The first method 

used to fully contain nuclear detonations in shafts was stemming, 

e.g., filling the shaft with aggregate and sand after device 

emplacement. 

Keyed concrete plugs at different depths in the shaft stemming 

sometimes were used. The shaft diameter was enlarged at the plug 

construction location so the poured concrete plug would key into 

the ground surrounding the shaft and provide more strength 

against containment failure. Combinations of concrete and epoxy 

were used later, and epoxy replaced concrete as a plug material 

for some shaft emplacements. 

Radiochemical sampling pipes, LOS pipes, and other openings in 

stemming and plug containment features had to be closed rapidly 

after detonation to prevent venting of radioactive effluent to 

the atmosphere. Closure systems driven by high explosives, 

springs, or hydraulics were developed to seal the openings. 

After some of these early systems did not prevent releases of 

effluent to the atmosphere, use of openings to the surface for 

diagnostic or experiment purposes was discontinued for several 

years until technology improved. 

Some scientific and other cables from the device emplacement to 

the surface were another source of containment problems. While 

these cables could be embedded in concrete and epoxy, which 

helped prevent leakage along the outside of the cables, radioactive gases under high pressure traveled along the inside of 

cables as a conduit to the surface. This problem was solved by 

embedding the inner components of these cables in epoxy or other 

materials at appropriate locations (such as in concrete plugs) in 

a technique known as gas blocking. 

Many containment problems were caused by unanticipated geologic 

and hydrologic conditions at particular test locations. Even 

careful and rigorous calculations, engineering, construction, and 

26 
preparations were inadequate in the presence of unsuitable 

geologic settings. 

Another similar problem was the presence of higher-than-anticipated water content in rock formations surrounding or near the 

detonation point. This problem caused greater shock transmission 

plus secondary gas expansion when the water turned to steam. In 

addition, presence of sufficient iron in the test configuration 

caused the disassociation of water with subsequent greater 

secondary gas expansion from hydrogen gas. A result was much 

higher and longer sustained pressure from the detonation point 

toward the surface and the possibility of subsequent failure of 

geologic or constructed containment features. 

Recognizing and understanding geologic and hydrologic conditions 

at each test location was necessary before these containment 

problems could be solved. As additional information became 

available through drilling and intensive geologic studies, these 

problems were lessened by investigations of proposed detonation 

locations and application of detailed site-selection criteria. 

2.1.2 Tunnel Containment. 

As with shaft detonations, containment methods used for tunnel 

events were designed keeping the basic characteristics of a 

nuclear detonation in mind. Tunnel configurations were constructed with device emplacements strategically located to cause 

sealing of the access tunnel by force of the detonation. Additional containment features were used to contain radioactive 

debris. 

One of the original user laboratory stemming configurations 

consisted of one or more sandbag plugs installed a short distance 

from the projected self-sealing location toward the tunnel 

entrance (portal). Two plugs, each about 60 feet in length, were 

a typical installation. The sandbag plugs were later changed to 

solid sand backfill plugs extending several hundreds of feet from 

the device location. In many cases, the sand stemming had short 

sections of air voids between the plugs. Closer to the portal, a 

keyed concrete plug with a metal blast door was constructed. The 

blast door was designed to contain any gases (with pressure up to 

27 
75 pounds per square inch [psi]) that might penetrate the sandbag 

plugs. 

Also as with shaft detonations, the unknown presence of undesirable geologic and hydrologic conditions sometimes caused 

venting of radioactive effluent either through the overburden 

(ground above the tunnel) to the surface, through fissures opened 

between the detonation point and the main tunnel, or through the 

plugs and blast door to the main tunnel vent holes and portal. 

More substantial containment features evolved as containment 

problems became better understood and tunnel events became more 

complex. 

The first DOD tunnel test was MARSHMALLOW (1962). Stemming for 

that event consisted of four sandbag plugs extending out to a 

distance of a few hundred feet from the nuclear device (similar 

to earlier AEC tunnel events). A Gas Seal Door (blast door) was 

installed in the main access drift. The next DOD tunnel test, 

GUMDROP (1965), used sand backfill (with a few air gaps) out to a 

few hundred feet. As DOD tunnel testing continued, sand plugs 

were gradually replaced with various grout mixtures. Some grout 

mixtures were designed to match the strength and shock propagation of the native tunnel material (usually ash-fall tuff) while 

other grout mixtures were designed to be weaker and form a solid 

stemming plug shortly after device detonation. 

Also, as tunnel testing continued, the Gas Seal Door (GSD) no 

longer was used as a containment device. It was replaced by 

strong concrete plugs 10 to 20 feet thick, referred to as Overburden Plugs (OBP), and later renamed to more adequately describe 

their function i.e., Drift Protection Plugs (DPP). These plugs 

were keyed into the tunnel wall and some were designed to withstand overpressures up to 1,000 psi and temperatures up to 

1000°F. Some of the plugs were penetrated with electrical cables 

and steel pipes, and a small access hatch was constructed. All 

of these penetrations were gas sealed (or capped) to provide 

protection against possible gas seepage through the plug. 

Use of horizontal line-of-sight (HLOS) pipes in tunnel events 

necessitated development of additional closure systems. The HLOS 

pipe tunnel and its access tunnels generally were separated from 

the main tunnel by one or more concrete plugs. These closure 

28 
systems primarily were for protection of the experiments inside 

the HLOS pipe, but they were also considered useful features for 

the formation of a stemming plug. 

The tunnel volume outside the pipe was filled by stemming or 

grouting, while the experiments inside the HLOS pipe were protected by mechanical closure systems. Various closure systems 

were used, including compressed air or explosive-driven gates and 

doors which closed off the HLOS pipe from the detonation within a 

small fraction of a second after detonation time. Another type 

of mechanical closure was the tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS) unit, 

first used on the DOOR MIST event. The TAPS was a heavy steel 

door that was released at shot time and fell to the closed 

position in less than one second, When a drift was successfully 

stemmed, containment was generally achieved. However, even if a 

drift failed to stem properly, radioactive material could still 

be contained underground. Failure of an experiment drift to stem 

properly usually resulted in data loss and, in some cases, 

experiment loss. 

In 1972 DNA developed a containment concept that was to become 

the standard for future underground nuclear tests. This concept, 

known as the nested or three-vessel containment concept, is the 

most successful containment system used to date. It was used for 

all the events discussed in this report except for MISTY RAIN 

which used the two-vessel containment system. While exact 

containment features vary for each event, the following provides 

a general description of the three-vessel concept: 

Vessel I was the stemmed area. Most of the open tunnel volume 

surrounding the working point, including the main and access 

drift, were filled with rock-matching grout (RMG) while some 

areas further from the WP (in both the bypass and LOS drifts) 

were filled with superlean grout (SLG). The remainder of the 

main and bypass drifts out to the end of the stemming, and also 

the Mechanical Auxilary Closure (MAC) and Gas Seal Auxilary 

Closure (GSAC) access drifts, were filled with high-strength 

grout (HSG), or concrete. The MAC, GSAC, and TAPS units themselves were normally surrounded with structural concrete. In 

some cases specific mixtures of grout were used, i.e., SLG and 

HSG, or HSG with high-strength groutcrete or concrete. Steel 

stemming bulkheads were used to seal off sections of the drift 

29 
allowing it to be filled one section at a time. The power gas 

block and cable gas block were filled with groutcrete. All voids 

were completely filled by pressure grouting at the back or top of 

the drift. High-stress valves were installed in all lines which 

penetrated the stemmed area, and all cables were gas blocked by 

using standard DNA gas-blocking procedures. Vertical cable holes 

were typically stemmed with RMG above the tunnel invert followed 

by cement grout, epoxy, and coarse stemming material. 

Vessel II consisted of the Drift Protection Plugs (DPP). Several 

massive containment structures consisting of reinforced concrete 

plugs designed to withstand pressures of 1000 psi and temperatures of 1000°F were installed in the tunnel complex as a backup 

in the event that the drifts failed to stem properly or radioactive material seeped through the stemmed areas. Typical of these 

plugs were the DPP, the Mechanical Drift Protection Plug (MDPP) 

and the Cable Drift Protection Plug (CDPP), each of which was 

reusable. All mechanical penetrations through the containment 

had valves or seals which met or exceeded the containment criteria of the structures themselves. The DPP was a high-strength 

concrete plug keyed into the tunnel rock (normally filled with 

HSG during button-up activities). The MDPP was used for most of 

the mechanical and electrical penetrations out of Vessel II. The 

CDPP used gas-blocking to prevent leakage or radioactive gases 

along or through cables from the diagnostic and experiment 

locations. Utility pipes, such as for compressed air, that 

passed through Vessels I and II were also sealed by closure 

systems. 

Vessel III was that portion of the tunnel main drift protected by 

a Gas Seal Plug (GSP) and Gas Seal Door (GSD). The GSP sealed 

the entire tunnel and was designed to withstand pressures of 

500 psi and temperatures of 500°F. Penetrations of the GSP were 

sealed using the same techniques as the DPP. The GSP contained a 

trainway door which would normally remain open until tunnel 

button-up occurred prior to event detonation. The steel GSD, on 

the portal side of the GSP, was installed in a reinforced concrete plug which was keyed into the rock. The GSD was closed 

during button-up activities, and a 10 psi pressure was applied 

between it and the GSP as additional reassurance against lowpressure leaks. 

30 
2.1.3 Containment Evaluation Panel. 

When containment problems were particularly difficult, the AEC 

began to change its emphasis on conditions under which detonations should be conducted. 

The Manager, AEC/NVOO had primary responsibility for the underground containment of radioactivity from underground tests. 

Containment of the DOD-sponsored tests was a joint effort on the 

part of AEC, DOD, and contractor scientists and engineers. To 

carry out this responsibility, on 17 December 1963, AEC/NVOO 

established a Test Evaluation Panel (TEP) to review plans for 

each test as presented by user testing organizations for each 

test program. The chairman of this panel represented the Manager, NVOO, and membership consisted of two representatives (one 

voting member plus an alternate) from each of the user testing 

organizations (LASL, LLL, SLA, and FC/DNA) plus specialists from 

contractor and other government organizations such as the U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS). Other AEC/NVOO contractor personnel 

were available to present information in their areas of expertise 

(e.g., mining and drilling operations). 

On 19 March 1971, testing was suspended because containment 

failure had caused serious venting of a laboratory test (BANEBERRY). During this time the TEP, under a formal charter, was 

changed to the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP). The CEP, as 

an independent agent, evaluated the containment design of each 

proposed nuclear test, assuring that all relevant data available 

for proper evaluation was considered. They were instructed to 

give increased emphasis to containment of radioactive materials. 

The panel membership was enlarged by the addition of a hydrologist, a geologist with expertise in underground nuclear phenomenology (both nominated by their respective organizations and 

approved by the Manager, NVOO), and consultants representing 

additional areas of expertise. These permanent advisors were 

representatives of the EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration's Air Resources Laboratory (NOAA/ARL), and REECo. 

Each underground testing organization was represented as before. 

Prior to a formal meeting of the CEP, each user planning a 

nuclear test prepared documents (i.e., a prospectus) describing 

its proposed tests with particular emphasis on containment 

31 
considerations, and submitted these documents to each panel 

member for review. This information then was presented by the 

users to the CEP, generally at the following monthly meeting. 

Details of the containment plan were reviewed and compared to 

previous successful experiences. Each CEP member (or alternate) 

was requested to submit a written statement describing the 

details considered favorable or unfavorable to achieve successful 

containment. 

During the period covered by this report, evaluations to estimate 

the probability of successful containment conformed to specific 

guidance from OMA at HQ/DOE. Each CEP member used this guidance 

to categorize each test as one of the following: 

CATEGORY A 

Considering all containment features and appropriate historical, 

empirical, and analytical data, the best judgement of the member 

indicates a very high confidence in successful containment. 

CATEGORY B 

Considering all containment features and appropriate historical, 

empirical, and analytical data, the best judgement of the member 

indicates a lesser but still adequate degree of confidence in 

successful containment. 

CATEGORY C 

Considering all containment features and appropriate historical, 

empirical, and analytical data, the best judgement of the member 

indicates some doubt that successful containment will be 

achieved. 

CATEGORY D 

Unable to categorize. 

The Manager, NV, was advised of the findings of the evaluation in 

order to provide a basis on which to request detonation authority. He forwarded a -written report on each CEP meeting, containing the statements of each voting member and consultant, to 

32 
HQ/DOE for review and recommendations for approval to execute 

each event. The detonation authority request package also 

included the chairman's summary, the prospectus, and a transmittal letter with other pertinent event data, such as approval 

dates. 

2.1.4 Test Controller's Advisory Panel. 

Careful consideration of each event by the CEP to avoid releases 

of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere was followed by additional precautions prior to event execution. If an unanticipated 

release of effluent from an underground detonation occurred, it 

was necessary to ensure protection of onsite participants and the 

offsite population. The Test Controller's Advisory Panel was 

composed of a scientific advisor and representatives from each 

organization which could contribute information to this protection goal. 

This panel met at several readiness briefings in advance of each 

event and in the Control Room prior to and during execution of 

each event. The D-l Containment Briefing provided a technical 

review of containment adequacy only, without considerations of 

cost, schedules, or test objectives. Panel members briefed the 

Test Controller's representative on other aspects of test activities and meteorological conditions which he considered in his 

decision on whether a test should be conducted. Information 

presented by the panel included the status of test participants 

in the test area. Permission to arm and detonate the nuclear 

device was not given until all participants (other than those at 

approved manned stations) were clear of the controlled test area. 

Weather conditions were considered in detail. Wind speeds and 

directions at increasing altitudes above ground were measured 

with weather balloons at stations around NTS, both preceding and 

during each test. Measurements were used to calculate and 

present information on where an unanticipated release of effluent 

might be transported off the NTS and what the levels of radiation 

might be in the predicted effluent cloud. 

Actual locations of population centers, each dairy cow, and 

numbers of people at ranches and mines in the projected direction 

of the effluent cloud were identified and evaluated. EPA person33 
nel in the offsite areas notified mining people to be above 

ground for safety purposes at the anticipated detonation time of 

tests which might cause a ground control hazard. This information and numbers of people who might need to be advised to stay 

under cover or be evacuated were presented for consideration. 

EPA personnel started offsite air samplers and placed radiation 

dosimeters in offsite locations before detonation time. Readiness information included capability for advising state officials 

to institute a milk diversion program if cattle, feed, or milk 

might become contaminated, and to replace milk and dry feed for 

localized family dairy cows. 

The status of standby aircraft for effluent cloud sampling and 

tracking capability was presented. Communications between 

offsite weather stations and EPA personnel were checked to assure 

proper operation. 

Radsafe personnel onsite assured that remote radiation monitoring 

stations in the test area and in other NTS areas were functional. 

Data from these stations, the weather stations, offsite EPA 

personnel, and personnel clearing the test area were displayed in 

the Control Room for continual visual examination by the Test 

Controller and the Advisory Panel. In addition, closed-circuit 

television cameras were operational on the ground and in helicopters in the test area to detect any visual indications of possible effluent release and provide capability for immediate response action by the Test Controller and the Advisory Panel 

members. 

If the Test Controller decided that the projected effluent 

direction was close to populated areas, or weather conditions 

were not stable enough to determine the direction of any released 

effluent after detonation, the approval to arm and detonate was 

not given. The test was either postponed for another day or 

placed on hold until conditions were favorable. 

Conditions were considered favorable when (1) projected effluent 

direction was toward sparsely populated areas, (2) weather 

conditions were relatively stable, (3) EPA personnel could 

contact the few residents in the projected effluent direction and 

advise them of protective action to be taken, and (4) impact on 

milk supply from dairy cattle would be minimal. In addition, all 

34 
essential equipment, personnel, and procedures were required to 

be in readiness status or activated before permission to arm and 

detonate was given. 

Permission to arm usually was given at least two hours before 

scheduled detonation to allow time for arming, securing of the 

test configuration and containment systems, and departure of the 

arming party from the test area. The detonation, however, could 

be delayed at any moment up to detonation time, or postponed 

until another day or time when conditions might be more favorable. 

The Test Controller and the Advisory Panel received information, 

watched visual displays, and communicated with their field 

personnel up to and after detonation for a sufficient time to 

assure that venting had not occurred. Remote radiation detection 

instrument readings and closed-circuit television of the test 

area were monitored to detect any indication of effluent release. 

When all other indications of venting were negative and the Test 

Controller decided personnel could approach the test location, 

k-g., subsidence craters had formed for shaft detonations, and 

cavity collapse had occurred for tunnel emplacements, as indicated by geophones) initial radiation survey teams entered the 

test area to assure that effluent had not been released or that 

any radiation levels were low enough for experiment data recovery 

to begin. For tunnel tests, reentry of the tunnel itself (after 

initial survey of the surface areas, recovery of data, and 

approval by the DOE Test Controller) was a matter for separate 

and careful consideration by 

logical safety personnel. 

the Test Group Director and radio2.1.5 Effluent Release Procedures. 

If radioactive effluent 

established procedures 

was 

were 

released 

initiated 

from 

in 

an underground 

accordance with 

event, 

DOE NTS 

SOP Chapter 0524, "Radiological Safety" (see Appendix D). 

Immediately upon detection of possible venting and effluent 

release after a detonation, the following procedures were initiated: 

35 
A. For some tests, Radsafe survey teams were at manned 

stations in the test area. These teams were released to 

make radiation measurements to be used in determining 

direction and radiation levels of radioactive effluent. 

B. Aircraft were standing by to sample and track the effluent. Data reported were further used to refine information on effluent direction and radioactivity concentrations. 

C. EPA monitors in offsite areas, previously stationed in 

the projected path of any released effluent, were advised of actual effluent direction and radioactivity 

measurement data and directed to move sampling and 

dosimeter equipment, perform ground radiation surveys, 

and notify residents and workers in the effluent path of 

any necessary precautionary measures, such as remaining 

in buildings or evacuating the area temporarily. 

D. Capabilities were held in readiness to advise state 

officials to implement a milk diversion program. If 

this was necessary, Nevada and neighboring state officials could be advised to impound and replace milk 

supplies possibly contaminated through the cattle feed 

pathway, and hold impounded milk for the decay of probable contaminants (radioiodines) before using it for 

other purposes. On a localized basis, EPA personnel 

were ready to replace family dairy cow milk with fresh 

milk, and analyze milk for concentrations of specific 

radionuclides. Dry feed supplies also could be replaced 

for family dairy cattle if required. 

E. Capabilities were in readiness for thyroid monitoring of 

offsite individuals possibly exposed to radioiodines 

from the effluent. These mobile monitoring stations 

could be used in the offsite areas for screening measurements to determine if any offsite residents or 

workers exhibited thyroid radioactivity and should be 

transported to Las Vegas facilities for more precise 

thyroid measurements and dose assignment. 

36 
Each of the above procedures was established to avoid or minimize 

exposure of the offsite population and maintain any such exposures below the radiation protection standards for individuals 

and population groups in uncontrolled areas, as established in 

DOE NTS SOP Chapter 0524. 

While the above procedures were initiated, additional onsite 

procedures also were implemented. Radsafe survey teams, when 

released by the Test Controller, surveyed the test area in 

sufficient detail to plot gamma radiation isointensity lines on 

NTS maps and provide specific intensity measurements at experiment stations on the surface and at other locations of interest. 

These data were used by the Test Controller in releasing personnel to enter radiation areas in the controlled area and by the 

Test Group Director in determining when surveys of his immediate 

test area and recoveries of experiment data could be accomplished. These decisions were based on calculations of personnel 

gamma radiation doses from survey data, radiation intensities at 

recovery locations, and estimated times in the area to assure 

that exposures would be limited only to those necessary and would 

be below the standards established in DOE NTS SOP Chapter 0524. 

Some tunnel tests that did not result in venting of radioactive 

effluent to the atmosphere did have a failure of the containment 

system within the tunnel. High radiation levels then existed in 

locations where reentry personnel needed to enter to accomplish 

data recovery. Procedures developed to minimize exposures of 

reentry and recovery personnel included the placement of remote 

radiation detectors located at strategic tunnel complex locations, remote tunnel atmosphere samplers that removed tunnel air 

to locations outside the tunnel for analysis, and tunnel air 

filters that would allow controlled purging of tunnels before 

reentry with only controlled gaseous radionuclide releases to the 

atmosphere. 

Remote monitoring and sampling equipment provided information on 

radiation levels, toxic gases, and explosive mixtures necessary 

to determine whether tunnel ventilation should be accomplished 

before reentry. Tunnel ventilation filters stopped particulate 

radioactivity and activated charcoal in the filters absorbed most 

of the radioiodines, thus allowing primarily only radionuclides 

of the noble gases, such as xenon, to be released to the atmo37 
sphere. (Exposure to radionuclides of the noble gases is far 

less hazardous than exposure to other fission products.) Release 

of this radioactive material to the atmosphere in a gradual, 

highly-controlled manner during tunnel ventilation to protect 

reentry personnel was subject to approval by the Test Controller. 

2.2 EMPLACEMENT TYPES. 

The DOD conducted six underground tests which are covered in this 

report. Table 2-l lists the events and pertinent data. All six 

DOD events conducted during Operations Praetorian, Phalanx, 

Fusileer, and Grenadier were tunnel events. Both tunnel and 

shaft emplacement types are discussed in this section. An 

emplacement type not discussed in this report was one that 

resulted in the excavating or ejecting of material from the 

ground surface to form a crater (see Crater Experiment in the 

Glossary of Terms). A DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was 

conducted in 1962 during Operation Nougat (see DNA 6320F). 

2.2.1 Vertical Shaft Emplacement. 

A vertical shaft nuclear detonation was intended to be contained 

underground. The shaft was usually drilled, but sometimes mined, 

and it may have been lined with a steel casing or have been 

uncased. The nuclear device was emplaced at a depth calculated 

to contain the explosion. At detonation, a cavity was formed by 

vaporized and melted rock. Pressure from the hot gases in the 

cavity held surrounding broken rock in place until the cavity 

area cooled sufficiently to decrease pressure. As broken rock 

fell into the cavity formed by the detonation, a chimney was 

formed. If the chimney of falling rock reached the surface, a 

subsidence crater was formed. Figure 2-1 shows a typical subsidence crater. 

If a device was placed too deeply in the alluvium of Frenchman or 

Yucca Flat for the detonation yield, or the depth was correct but 

the yield was much less than anticipated, a subsidence crater 

might not form; that is, the chimney might not reach the surface. 

This was a problem during early years of underground testing when 

it was necessary to move drill rigs into subsidence craters soon 

after tests for cavity sample recovery purposes. If a subsidence 

38 
39 

crater did not form, drill rigs could not be moved to the surface 

ground zero (SGZ). When directional drilling from outside the 

crater was implemented, lack of a subsidence crater in alluvium 

became less of a problem. Experience gained with depth of device 

burial also reduced the chance of subsidence craters not forming 

in the alluvium. The depth of burial, for both shaft and tunnel 

tests, was scaled to the maximum credible yield, usually significantly larger than the expected yield. However, the minimum 

depth of burial was 600 feet. 

Most vertical shaft underground tests conducted by DOD included a 

vertical line-of-sight (VLOS) pipe system to the surface and a 

mobile tower on the surface that contained the weapons effects 

experiments (see Figure 2-2). The VLOS pipe system contained 

several mechanical closures designed to prevent the release of 

radioactivity into the atmosphere. These closures were open at 

the time of detonation but closed within milliseconds to stop the 

flow of material up the pipe. The open volume between the VLOS 

pipe and the wall of the drill hole was filled with sand and 

other materials. One or more non-porous material plugs were 

placed around the pipe. Electrical cables which went downhole 

were gas blocked to prevent gas seepage to the surface. Effects 

experiments were contained in a mobile tower on the surface that 

was moved away from the hole after device detonation but before 

surface collapse (formation of the subsidence crater). One 

problem was the possibility of seepage after surface collapse if 

some pathway to the surface developed. Some radioactive effluent 

was released into the atmosphere during several VLOS DOD tests. 

2.2.2 Tunnel Emplacement. 

Tunnel emplacement nuclear detonations were intended to be 

completely contained. The nuclear device was emplaced in a mined 

drift (tunnel) at a depth designed to contain the detonation. 

The native material at tunnel elevation was ash-fall tuff for 

events covered in this volume. Chimneying of broken rock to the 

surface was rare because there was a layer of welded rhyolitic 

ash-flow tuff at and below the surface of Rainier Mesa. This 

tuff has a higher density than the ash-fall tuff and is more 

competent (has more strength) than the alluvium material in 

Frenchman and Yucca Flats. In addition, tunnel emplacements 

41 
SURFACE 

EXPERIMENT 

IN MOBILE TOWER 

~~VERTICAL-LONE-OF-SIGHT .;I.; t: :..* PIPE SYSTEM 

w MECHANICAL CLOSURES 

DRILL HOLE 

STEEL LINED) STEMMING MATERIALS H 

(FILLS VOIDS BETWEEN f$ 

WALL OF DRILL HOLE 2; 

AND VLOS PIPE) ?:I 

22 MECHANICAL CLOSURES 

. . . . . ,... e.7 .I .;.y.‘;‘::;. NOTE: .:.:.:;..~.‘. NOT TO SCALE ‘$$/s$ _I ..:. > SDEVICE 

Figure 2-2. Vertical LOS pipe configuration. 

42 
were buried deeper than required for containment, and the collapse chimney rarely extended to the surface. Tunnel emplacements were in one of several configurations: at the end of a 

single horizontal tunnel into a mountain or mesa, at the end of a 

drift (tunnel) within a tunnel complex, at the end of a horizontal tunnel driven from a vertical shaft, or in a cavity mined 

from a horizontal tunnel or vertical shaft. 

Each of the events covered by this report (except for the MINI 

JADE event) included HLOS pipe systems placed in horizontal 

drifts in tunnel complexes (see Figure Z-3). Each device was 

placed close to the end of a drift inside a tunnel complex. An 

HLOS pipe system (some over 1,000 feet in length), including 

several mechanical closures and one or more test chambers (which 

contained effects experiments), were installed in the drift. The 

mined area surrounding the HLOS pipe was filled (stemmed) with 

various mixtures of grout to a distance of several hundred feet 

from the device location. This closure of the HLOS pipe in the 

stemmed area was the primary containment system. Ground shock 

and expansion of the gaseous cavity material exerted pressure on 

the tunnel walls and stemming materials to form a stemming plug, 

closing the tunnel and HLOS pipe immediately after detonation. 

All electrical cables and other penetrations within the stemmed 

area were gas blocked carefully to prevent or minimize seepage of 

radioactive gases through the stemming plug. The mechanical 

closures in the HLOS pipe were designed primarily to protect the 

effects experiments; however, they also had some effect on the 

formation of the stemming plug. The secondary (or backup) 

containment system included two or more concrete plugs, which 

were strategically keyed into the tunnel walls to prevent leakage 

of radioactive gases outside the tunnel should the primary system 

fail. These concrete plugs were designed to withstand the 

maximum expected pressure and temperature. 

DNA has led the development of tunnel containment systems and has 

maintained continuing research and development programs to 

improve containment of tunnel events. 

43 

-
44 
2.3 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES. 

The transition from atmospheric to underground testing substantially reduced the release of radioactive materials to the 

atmosphere, and required the development of new diagnostic 

techniques. During the atmospheric tests, high speed photography 

recorded fireball growth and aircraft collected samples from the 

radioactive cloud for diagnostic measurement analysis. Because 

such systems could not be used on underground tests, several new 

diagnostic techniques were developed (some of which are discussed 

in the following subsections). 

2.3.1 Radiation Measurements. 

Measurements of radiation from an underground detonation were 

made possible by the development of a system of remote detectors 

and cabling that sent signals to recording facilities located at 

the surface. Detectors, using various physical characteristics 

of the radiations to be measured, were installed near the nuclear 

device. High-specification coaxial cable and connectors carried 

the measurement signals to the surface where electronic equipment, film, and magnetic tape recorded the signals or transmitted 

the signals by microwave to the CP. 

Detector signals were on the way to recording equipment billionths of a second after a detonation, before the detectors were 

destroyed. These measurement systems required the most advanced 

electronic technology available. Considerable research and 

development were necessary to acquire and refine these capabilities. 

2.3.2 Radiochemical Measurements. 

Because clouds from atmospheric detonations no longer were 

available to sample for diagnostic purposes, techniques were 

developed to obtain samples of debris from underground detonations for radiochemical analyses and subsequent yield determinations. The first systems were radiochemical sampling pipes 

leading directly from the device emplacements to filtering 

equipment at the surface. These pipes required closure systems 

to prevent overpressure from venting radioactive effluent into 

the atmosphere after samples were collected. 

45 

-
While these systems functioned as intended for most detonations, 

the systems did not function properly during all tests, and some 

radioactive effluent was released into the atmosphere. Subsequently, routine use of radiochemical sampling pipes to the 

surface was discontinued for a time until technology improved. 

A major radiochemical sampling method which continued in use for 

shaft and tunnel detonations was postevent core drilling. The 

objective of this drilling was to obtain samples of solidified 

radioactive debris which had collected in a molten pool at the 

bottom of the cavity produced by the detonation and cavity gas. 

This method required and resulted in the development of precise 

directional drilling techniques and several advancements in the 

science of core drilling and radiochemical analysis. 

2.4 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS. 

DOD/DNA events were conducted primarily to obtain nuclear weapons 

effects data. The effects of blast, shock, and thermal and 

nuclear radiations had been investigated earlier during atmospheric and underwater tests. Military equipment, structures, 

and materials had been exposed to various nuclear effects. The 

transition to underground testing required development of new 

test techniques. One important new technology was the simulation 

of high altitude (to exoatmospheric) conditions for radiationeffects experiments. 

This simulation technique involved placing experiments inside 

test chambers and providing a low-pressure atmospheric condition 

from the nuclear device to the experiments. This was achieved by 

using large vacuum pumps to reduce pressure inside the steel LOS 

pipe to match the pressure of the desired altitude. Another 

technique was the use of scatterers to direct radiation to 

experiments located outside the LOS pipe. 

In addition to collecting radiation-effects data, other DNA NWET 

objectives were to: (1) provide the desired nuclear-effects 

environment; (2) measure and document nuclear environments of 

interest; (3) protect the experiments from damage, such as debris 

or ground shock; (4) contain radioactive gases and debris underground; and (5) manage the tests in a cost-effective manner. 

46 
Scientific improvements were made in achieving these objectives. 

Cost effectiveness was accomplished primarily by designing 

facilities for maximum reuse. 

Experiments were categorized as passive or active. Passive 

experiments involved placing experiment equipment in test chambers, exposing the equipment to the desired nuclear environment, 

removing the equipment, and analyzing it to obtain effects 

results. Active experiments utilized various sensors and highspeed electronic recording equipment to obtain data. Many active 

experiments also involved recovery and analysis to obtain effects 

results. 

2.5 TUNNEL DRILLING ACCESS REQUIREMENTS. 

Access to underground work and drilling sites was controlled for 

a number of reasons. During construction, safety of both workers 

and visitors in these locations could have been jeopardized by 

carelessness or seemingly harmless activities of untrained and 

uncontrolled workers or visitors. When security-classified 

materials were in these locations, only personnel with appropriate security clearances were permitted access to the area. The 

presence, or anticipated presence, of radioactive material in a 

location required access control for radiological safety purposes. Access requirements established for the above purposes are 

discussed below. 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control. 

During construction and preparation for a DOD event in a tunnel 

or other underground work site, the tunnel Superintendent was 

responsible to the REECo Project Manager for safety of personnel 

underground. From 1962 forward, Radsafe and tunnel logbooks 

usually were used to record names and radiation exposure information for only those persons entering a tunnel during postevent 

reentry and recovery operations. In the early 197Os, as a result 

of the Mine Safety and Health Act, tunnel logbooks were expanded 

to list all persons entering the tunnel (i.e., visitor, mining, 

drilling, Radsafe, etc.). Visitors and other personnel, who were 

not assigned to work in the tunnel, obtained permission for entry 

from the Superintendent or his representative. They were ap47 
praised of tunnel conditions and safety regulations and were 

listed in the logbooks. In the event of an accident or other 

emergency condition underground, the logbook provided information 

on numbers of personnel and their locations, 

When classified material was in 

during initial reentry after an 

tor, or his representative, was 

the tunnel 

event, the 

responsible 

prior 

DOD Test 

for 

to an event and 

Group Direcentry and safety 

of personnel underground. Security personnel checked for proper 

security and entrance clearances, maintained records of all 

personnel entering the tunnel, and safeguarded the device and 

other classified material. The check point was often well inside 

the portal thus allowing several activities at various work sites 

to be conducted simultaneously. 

After detonation, aerial damage surveys to determine the accessibility of the various recovery stations were required before 

surface reentry operations were begun. When the reentry teams 

were given permission to depart Gate 300 (a check point set up in 

Area 3, just north of the turnoff to the CP, also known as Guard 

Station 300; see Figure l-5) by the Test Controller, radiation 

and industrial hygiene surveys were conducted on the mesa and in 

the portal areas before any personnel were allowed in these 

areas. 

Before underground recovery operations began, a listing was made 

of hazardous elements whose performance degradation; functional 

failure; or physical, chemical, or electrical properties constituted a posttest hazard within the test system complex. General 

requirements and standards governing safety were based on the 

FCTC "Safety and Health Compliance Guide for Underground and 

Nuclear Effects Tests." Hazardous elements were defined to 

include active experiments and/or hardware containing radioactive, explosive, fire hazard, pressure vessel, evacuated container, electrical, toxic, and/or chemically hazardous components. 

Instructions on the proper procedure, should a potential hazard 

have become a real hazard as a result of detonation, were made 

available to the underground reentry team and recovery personnel. 

Situations where permission was to be given before the tunnel 

reentry team would be allowed to proceed (including checking 

pressure and sampling gas on the working point (WP) side of the 

48 
GSP, opening the OBP manway doors, and removing the insulation 

materials from inside the OBP crawl spaces) were outlined in 

detail prior to reentry. Permission to proceed was given by a 

responsible party outside the tunnel complex on the basis of 

information transmitted by the reentry team. The required 

condition of the tunnel before experimenter personnel were 

allowed access to the test chambers was also outlined specifically. 

Before experiments were released to the experimenters, each 

experiment was monitored for radioactivity and triple-bagged to 

reduce the spread of contamination inside the tunnel. Swipe 

samples were taken on experiments and equipment being removed 

from the tunnel area to verify that contamination standards were 

not exceeded. Experiments and equipment with higher-than-allowed 

removable contamination levels were taken to the Test Support 

Compound, which was equipped to disassemble radioactive/contaminated'materials. Shipment from the Test Support Compound was 

restricted to organizations that were licensed to store and 

handle radioactive materials. 

Control of tunnel access reverted to tunnel management personnel 

after reentry and recoveries. Entry procedures and use of the 

tunnel logbook were then implemented as discussed previously. 

Additional access controls were instituted for radiological 

safety purposes after an event or during construction and event 

preparation when radioactivity from a previous event could be 

encountered. Part or all of a tunnel complex could be established as a radiation exclusion (radex) area. 

All persons entering radex areas were logged on an "Area Access 

Register" form. Names and organizations represented were listed. 

Radiation exposures from reports for the year and quarter were 

listed upon entry. (The use of previous radiation exposure data 

was to assure that personnel approaching current radiation 

exposure guide limits would not be allowed to enter radex areas 

when they could potentially accumulate exposures above those 

levels.) Self-reading pocket dosimeter measurements were added 

upon exit. 

49 
Before entering into a radex area, personnel were dressed in 

anticontamination clothing and respiratory protection as needed 

for the particular radiological conditions in the tunnel. Upon 

exit, the anticontamination clothing was removed, personnel were 

monitored for radioactive contamination, and decontamination was 

accomplished, if necessary. 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control. 

Access to drilling areas was controlled by the drilling superintendent and the DOD Test Group Director for the same reasons as 

access to underground workings was controlled. While drilling an 

emplacement shaft and during postevent drillback operations to 

recover radioactive core samples, personnel safety and compliance 

with safety regulations were emphasized continuously. 

During preevent drilling activities, all visitors were required 

to contact the drilling superintendent before entry to the 

drilling site. Names of visitors and the purpose of each visit 

were entered in the daily drilling report, and it was assured 

that visitors wore hard hats and understood safety regulations. 

The laboratory that provided the device controlled access to the 

area, assisted by the security force personnel, when classified 

materials (including the nuclear device) were brought into the 

area for emplacement. After the event, when the drill site was a 

radex area, during classified material removal or postevent 

drilling, both security and radiological safety access controls 

were in effect as discussed under "Tunnel Access Control" (paragraph 2.5.1 above). 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS. 

Implementation of an effective industrial safety program was an 

important part of any heavy construction operation. Mining and 

drilling operations had a particularly high accident potential. 

These operations at the NTS involved additional safety problems 

resulting from detonation-induced unstable ground conditions and 

the potential for encountering toxic gases, explosive mixtures, 

and radioactivity. 

50 
Miles of underground workings were constructed at several locations. More depth of vertical big holes (three-foot diameter or 

larger) were drilled than the known total drilled in the rest of 

the world. Directional and core drilling to recover radioactive 

debris samples after underground nuclear detonations advanced the 

science of these drilling techniques. These operations often 

were accomplished under unusual conditions with accompanying 

difficult safety problems. 

The lost-time accident frequency, however, for the NTS support 

contractor employing most of the NTS personnel (REECo) was only 

one-tenth of the frequency for the heavy construction industry at 

large (as determined by annual surveys and reports of 300 heavy 

construction corporations). This excellent safety record was 

attained by continuing attention to indoctrinating and training 

NTS personnel, investigating and determining causes of accidents 

at the NTS, implementing and enforcing safety regulations, and, 

most important, maintaining the safety awareness of NTS personnel. 

Safety was a joint effort by DOE, DNA, and their predecessors, 

and by the many other government agencies and contractors at NTS. 

Administered by REECo, the safety program enjoined all NTS 

personnel to conduct operations safely, and was exemplified by 

signs at the portal of a typical DOD tunnel complex as shown in 

Figure 2-4, one of which states, "Safety With Production is our 

Goal." 

The safety procedures for all NTS operations are voluminous and 

cannot be included in this report. Appendix E of this volume 

(General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Defense Nuclear Agency and 

Sandia Laboratories Nuclear Tests, published by Sandia National 

Laboratories) is an example of a pertinent safety procedure. As 

this procedure indicates, several aspects of industrial safety 

are interrelated. Information on monitoring levels of radioactivity and personnel exposures to radiation is presented in 

Section 2.7, "Radiological Safety Procedures." 

Monitoring of toxic gases and checks for explosive mixtures were 

an important aspect of safety in underground workings, on drill 

rigs, and in drill hole cellars (the enlarged evacuated area 

51 

under the drill rig platform used for valving and other equipment). Toxic gases and explosive mixtures were created by both 

nuclear detonations and mining and drilling operations. The 

Draeger multi-gas detector and MSA explosimeter were able to 

detect such gases. The Fyrite or J&W oxygen indicator also was 

available to determine the oxygen content of the working atmosphere. The GPK was a combination oxygen indicator and explosimeter and was the instrument most commonly used by tunnel monitoring personnel throughout the period covered by this report. 

Requirements were that tunnel and drill rig breathing atmosphere 

contain at least 19.5 percent oxygen. During the period covered 

by this report, it was required that the breathing atmosphere 

contain less than the levels of toxic gases and percentage of the 

lower explosive limit (LEL) listed below. Explosimeter instruments were calibrated with 5.6 percent methane in air (adjusted 

for atmospheric temperature and pressure) as 100 percent of the 

LEL for methane mixtures with air. Less than 100 percent of the 

LEL is not an explosive mixture of a gas or gases. 

Gases Maximum Concentration8 

Carbon Monoxide, CO 50 mm 

Carbon Dioxide, CO2 5,000 ppm 

Nitrogen oxide plus nitrogen 25 PPm 

dioxide, NOtNO, 

Nitrogen dioxide, NOa 5 pw 

Explosive mixtures 10% of the LEL 

Procedures for controlling percentages of the LEL and toxic gases 

after each event are discussed in the event sections (Sections 3 

through 7) as appropriate. 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES. 

Procedures were developed in an effort to evaluate radiological, 

toxic, and other hazards and to protect workers and the public 

from unnecessary exposures. The following were the primary 

written procedures and implementation methods used at the NTS 

from 1982 through 1985. 

53 
2.7.1 The U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Test Site - Standard 

Operating Procedure (NTS SOP 0524). 

Chapter 0524, Radiological Safety, of this procedure (Appendix D) 

defined responsibilities and established criteria and general 

procedures for radiological safety associated with NTS programs 

under normal test conditions. (Environmental Protection, Safety, 

and Health Protection Program for DOE Operations, DOE Order 

5480.1A, Chapter IX, also includes Radsafe criteria under emergency conditions.) 

Some of the major areas discussed in Chapter 0524 are film badge 

procedures, radiation surveys, entry into controlled areas, and 

radiation exposure guides. Roles of the onsite REECo Environmental Sciences Department and the offsite EPA are also defined 

in NTS SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.2 The Standard Operating Procedure for the Environmental 

Sciences Department, REECo. 

These SOPS were reviewed and/or updated annually to address in 

more detail the radiological safety aspects discussed in the 

latest revision of NTS SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.3 Implementation of Radiological Procedures. 

The required equipment, devices, and capabilities for monitoring 

radiation levels in the environment and monitoring external and 

internal exposures of personnel are described as follows: 

A. Portable Radiation Detection Equipment. 

- Eberline PAC-4G (alpha) 

- Eberline PAC-4s (alpha) 

- Eberline E-520 (beta and gamma) 

- Ludlum Model 101 (beta and gamma) 

- Ludlum 14C (beta and gamma) 

- Ludlum Model 19 Micro-R-Meter (gamma) 

- Technical Associates Cutie Pie (beta and gamma) 

- Eberline Model RM-19 Radiation Detector (gamma) 

- Eberline Model PIC-GA (gamma) 

- Eberline Model PNR-4 (fast and slow neutrons) 

54 
- Eberline Model PRM-5 (alpha, beta, and gamma) 

- FIDLER, used with PRM-5 (low energy x-ray and gamma) 

- Teletector Model 6112 (beta and gamma) 

- Eberline E-140 (beta and gamma) 

- Bendix T-290 Tritium Monitoring Detector 

- Bendix T-446 Tritium Monitoring Detector 

- TRITON Model 111 (tritium) 

B. Air Sampling Equipment. 

- Model 102 semi-portable sampler 

- Satellite sampler 

- Hurricane high-volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

- Vacuum pump low-volume portable sampler (Gelman) 

- Gast Model 2565 high-volume, high-flow sampler 

- Gast Model 1550 high-volume, low-flow sampler 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability. 

The Environmental Sciences Laboratory analyzed air, soil, 

water, surface swipe, nasal swab, urine, and wound swab 

samples for some or all of the following activities: 

gross alpha and beta, gross fission products, tritium, 

strontium-go, plutonium-239, and spectrographic analysis 

for specific gamma-emitting radionuclides. The laboratory also analyzed some of the above mentioned samples for 

nonradioactive materials, such as beryllium, through use 

of an emission spectrograph and by wet chemistry procedures. A spectrophotometer was used to analyze for other 

materials. 

D. Monitoring of Personnel Exposures. 

The NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security 

credential holder was placed in use in 1966 to provide 

the increased personnel dosimetry capability necessary to 

meet the radiation exposure problems associated with 

nuclear rocket testing and underground nuclear detonations. The holder was designed to accommodate a DuPont 

type 556 film packet, a fast neutron packet (containing 

Kodak NTA film), an identification plate, criticality 

accident components, the security credential, and a snap55 
type clip. The complete package had capabilities for 

determining beta, gamma, x-ray, thermal neutron, fast 

neutron, high-range gamma, and high-range neutron doses. 

Components for criticality accidents (unintentional or 

accidental nuclear fissioning of device critical materials) included materials which could detect and measure 

neutron and gamma radiation exposures above the ranges of 

the film packets. In March 1971, with the discontinuance 

of the DuPont film, NTS dosimetry operations converted to 

the Kodak Type III film. This film packet contained two 

component films, one low range and one high range. Gamma 

exposure ranges of the two components were 30 mR to 10 R 

and 10 R to 800 R, respectively. The other components of 

the film badge, with the exception of the elimination of 

the Kodak NTA film from the film packet, remained essentially the same. In 1979 the Albedo neutron dosimeter, a 

TLD component system, was adopted at the NTS. This dosimeter was superior to the NTA film because it was a more 

sensitive dosimeter that responded to a much wider neutron energy range. The Albedo dosimeter was not part of 

the film dosimeter packet, but was only issued to those 

personnel who had a potential for exposure to a neutron 

source. The Albedo had its own holder which had to be 

worn flush with the body at all times. The NTS combination personnel dosimeter, including the Albedo dosimeter, 

and the security credential holder are shown in 

Figure 2-5. In April 1984 the I.D. plate was eliminated 

and replaced by a bar-code issue system. 

Film badges were exchanged routinely each month for all 

individuals and upon exit from a radex area when it was 

suspected that an individual had received 100 mR or more 

of exposure. 

Personnel entering radex areas also were issued selfreading pocket dosimeters which indicated accumulated 

exposure. Upon exit, pocket dosimeter readings were entered on an Area Access Register and added to the yearly 

and quarterly accumulated exposures from the automated 

daily NTS radiation exposure report for use until results 

of film packet processing were included. Pocket dosimeter readings were used as estimates because such readings 

56 

were less accurate than the doses of record determined by 

processing film packets. 

This use of Area Access Registers helped to maintain 

personnel exposures below the whole body exposure guides 

in Chapter 0524, 3 rem per quarter and 5 rem per year. 

Personnel whose accumulated exposure was in excess of 

2.5 rem per quarter or 4.5 rem per year (as recorded on 

the exposure report plus any pocket dosimeter readings 

since the report) were advised not to enter radex areas, 

and their supervisory personnel were so notified. Personnel involved in DOD events 

accumulated doses substantially 

guides. 

covered 

below 

in this 

these 

report 

control 

had 

2.7.4 Additional Methods Used to Control Radex Areas. 

A daily log book was maintained by Radsafe monitors for each 

radex area location. These logs were used to record the following information: 

A. Work accomplished - Which people worked where and what 

work was accomplished were briefly described. Any unusual 

conditions, such as equipment failure and operational 

difficulties, were listed. 

B. Visitors - First and last names of visitors were entered. 

Their destination and the reason for their visit were included where possible. The time they entered and exited 

the area and results of personnel monitoring were recorded. 

C. Unusual occurrences - Any unusual events which occurred 

during the shift were recorded. Included in this type of 

entry were accidents, high-volume water seepage, or any 

other occurrences of an unusual nature. 

D. Surveys and samples - Routine surveys and samples were 

recorded as routine. However, the requester's name was 

required for special surveys and samples. 

58 
E. Date and signature - The date and shift were entered at 

the beginning of the work period and the logbook was 

signed before leaving the shift. 

Personnel leaving radex areas removed anticontamination clothing 

and equipment and placed them in special containers for later 

laundering or disposal at the designated NTS burial site. 

Personnel then were monitored to assure radiation levels were 

below those listed in Part 1 of DOE NTS SOP Chapter 0524, "Radiological Safety" (see Appendix D). Personnel decontamination was 

accomplished if radiation levels were above specified limits. 

Decontamination usually was accomplished by vacuuming, removing 

radioactive particles with masking tape patches, washing hands or 

localized skin areas with soap and water, or showering with soap 

and water. 

Vehicles and equipment removed from radex areas were monitored to 

assure that they met criteria for unconditional release on or off 

the NTS (less than 0.4 mrad/h fixed beta plus gamma at contact 

and/or 1,000 disintegrations per minute [dpm] per 100 cm* of nonremovable plutonium alpha; and less than 1,000 dpm/lOO cm2 of 

removable beta plus gamma and/or 100 dpm/lOO cm* of swipeable 

plutonium alpha). Items exceeding these limits but below radex 

area levels could be conditionally released and moved onsite 

only. 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS. 

Beginning in the early 19609, various applications of radiation 

measurement telemetry were developed at the NTS to determine 

radiation levels at critical underground and surface areas 

following nuclear detonations. Multi-detector systems with range 

capabilities from 1 mR/h to 1,000 R/h and from 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h continuously monitored locations of concern after 

being calibrated and emplaced prior to each event. Ion chamber 

detectors were hard-wire linked by telephone trunk lines 

to exposure rate meters at a central console in CP-2. Detector 

locations were as far as 35 miles from this console. In 1974, 

these conditioned phone lines were supplemented by portable 

transmission stations. The detector was hard-wired into an area 

59 
trailer and the signals were sent by microwave or hard-wire link 

to the Control Point. 

These remote radiation monitoring systems provided data for 

reentry personnel participating in radiation surveys and recovery 

operations after each nuclear device detonation. The systems 

aided in substantially reducing exposure of personnel involved in 

reentry programs and were useful in detecting any venting or 

leakage of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere from an underground detonation. 

2.8.1 Telemetry System in Use. 

During the time period covered by this report, radiation telemetry systems developed and used at NTS had specific applications 

depending upon distance, terrain, environment, and operational 

needs. The detection units and components in use for DOD events 

in this report were part of the remote area monitoring system 

(MS) - The principal piece of equipment used to form a RAMS was 

the RAMP-4. The RAMP-4 was a multichannel, hard-wire linked, 

remote area gamma radiation monitoring (telemetry) system, 

designed and modified by Radsafe and produced by Victoreen 

Instrument Corporation. It consisted of a probe (Figure 2-6), 

which used a Neher-White radiation sensing element, hard-wired to 

an area trailer which sent microwave or hard-wire transmissions 

to communicate with the readout console (Figure 2-7) up to 

35 miles away, and terminals which provided a printout of readings at set time intervals. 

The readout covered six logarithmic decades (two three-decade 

scales) to provide a usual range of 1 mR/h to 1,000 R/h with a 

relative accuracy of f 15 percent over the temperature range of 

-10" to 150°F up to 35 miles away, and terminals which provided a 

printout of readings at set time intervals. Extended range RAMS 

units provided a range from 100 mR/h to 100,000 R/h. 

A permanent array of 30 to 40 telemetry stations throughout the 

NTS, as designated by DOE, were maintained and operated continuously during operational periods. Temporary telemetry arrays for 

DOD events varied between 15 and 50 stations depending upon the 

area or tunnel event location. 

60 


2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring Support. 

Approximately 20 detector units were positioned in the test area 

before a shaft event to continuously monitor radiological 

conditions and assess exposure rates before the test area was 

entered after detonation. Detectors were placed in circular 

arrays at appropriate distances from surface ground zero (SGZ) 

which varied with device yield and predicted wind direction (see 

Figure 2-8). RAMS units for tunnel events were placed somewhat 

differently based on each tunnel layout. Variable numbers of 

detectors were used aboveground and underground during tunnel 

events and are discussed in each event section. The additional 

30 to 40 permanently established remote radiation detector 

stations operated continuously at living areas, work areas, and 

other locations throughout NTS (Figure 2-9). Event-related 

temporary telemetry detectors operated from zero time until it 

was determined that release of radioactivity probably would not 

occur, or until any released radioactivity had decayed to nearbackground levels at the telemetry stations. For some of the 

earlier events, readout locations were positioned near the 

forward control point (FCP) or at locations where telephone lines 

were available, in addition to the readouts located at CP-2. 

Radiation telemetry data were supplemented with information 

collected through a mobile air sampling program. Model 102 air 

sampling units were used to obtain samples of any radioactive 

effluent released at event time or during the postevent drilling 

operations. Prior to each nuclear detonation experiment, at 

least one sampler was placed at a specified location in the test 

area and remained in position until drillback operations were 

completed or the Test Group Director authorized removal. 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. 

During this period of time, direct support for DOD underground 

tests was provided to NT0 by elements of the 57th FWW, stationed 

at ISAFAF, (Detachment 1 of the 4900th Test Group during HURON 

LANDING/DIAMOND ACE, MINI JADE, and TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR; and 

the 4460th Helicopter Squadron during MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO and 

63 

* - - --
READOUT WA) 

Figure 2-8. Typical remote radiation detection monitoring system for shaft emplacement site. 

64 
I 0 PERMANENT TELEMETRY 

STATIONS 

I I 

Figure 2-9. Typical permanently-established remote radiation 

detection stations operated continuously throughout the NTS. 

65 
MISTY RAIN). Less air support was required as the probability of 

venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased with 

development of more effective containment techniques. 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements. 

After 1962, Air Force cloud-sampling and cloud-tracking aircraft 

generally were not required except for cratering events conducted 

by the DOE where radioactive effluent clouds were anticipated. 

Passage of the radioactive effluent through variable amounts and 

temperatures of rock and other media selectively retained some 

radionuclides underground, and changes occurred in the fission 

product ratios previously used during calculation and analysis of 

atmospheric detonation cloud samples. The value of analyzing 

particulate and gaseous cloud samples to determine characteristics of a detonation decreased accordingly. 

The first change in cloud tracking and sampling support was to a 

lighter Air Force aircraft, the U-3A, with an Air Force pilot and 

EPA monitor. The EPA monitor also performed aerial monitoring of 

selected locations near surface ground zero and along the path of 

any effluent cloud. This air support later was performed by EPA 

and contractor personnel in their own aircraft. No accidental 

releases of radioactive effluent were detected onsite or offsite 

after the test events covered in this report. 

Perimeter sweeps continued to be conducted daily by Air Force and 

Security personnel, during reasonable flying weather, to assure 

that unauthorized vehicles were not entering the NTS over rough 

terrain or around security barricades on secondary roads. The 

L-20 aircraft, used prior to 1968, were replaced by helicopters 

and other aircraft. Air security sweeps of the immediate test 

area were conducted for a few hours before each detonation to 

assist in clearing the test area and to assure that unauthorized 

vehicles were not approaching it from directions not controlled 

by manned security stations. 

Air support for photography missions during test events and 

initial radiation surveys after each event did not change. 

Helicopters with Air Force pilots generally were used with 

contractor and military photographers and Radsafe monitors. 

66 
2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary 

Field Personnel. 

Radsafe support facilities had been established about 20 miles 

southeast of Mercury at ISAFAF during earlier atmospheric testing. REECo provided all Radsafe support functions at the NTS. 

This included monitoring personnel stationed at the ISAFAF 

Radsafe Quonset facility and maintaining a complete stock of film 

dosimeters (badges), radiation detection instruments, and anticontamination clothing and equipment for use by air and ground 

crews. In 1974, after the responsibility for air support to NTS 

was transferred from AFSWC to the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing (see 

paragraph 1.3.2), helicopters continued to be supplied and manned 

by personnel stationed at ISAFAF. Radsafe personnel were not 

involved with these monitoring and photography support aircraft 

until they arrived at their NTS staging areas. 

Radsafe monitors issued and exchanged film dosimeters, issued 

self-reading pocket dosimeters, provided anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection equipment, monitored aircraft 

and personnel after events, decontaminated personnel, and assisted ground crew personnel 

NTS when necessary. 

with decontamination of aircraft at the 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters. 

Special helicopter 

helicopters which 

Radsafe procedures 

staged from pads at 

were 

the 

imp

NTS, 

lemented 

located 

for 

east of 

Mercury highway near the CP area and near the Test Controller's 

FCP established for a particular underground event. Helicopter 

pilots usually landed at these locations and were briefed on 

their scheduled or other operational missions. 

If the mission involved possible contamination of the helicopter, 

Radsafe monitors lined the floor with plastic (or kraft paper) 

secured with masking tape to facilitate decontamination. Film 

badges and pocket dosimeters were issued to pilots and crew 

members, and anticontamination clothing was available if needed. 

Upon completion of missions, helicopters returned to the landing 

pads where they were checked for radiation and, if necessary, 

decontaminated by Radsafe monitors. Pilots and crew members were 

67 
monitored and decontaminated as necessary at an adjacent forward 

Radsafe base station (or at CP-2) where pocket dosimeters were 

collected and read. Film badges were exchanged if exposures of 

100 mR or more were indicated by pocket dosimeters. 

68 
SECTION 3 

HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE EVENTS 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE were jointly-sponsored (DOD and 

both LANL and LLNL) weapons-effects tests conducted essentially 

simultaneously at 0900 hours PDT on 23 September 1982. Each test 

had a yield of less than 20 kilotons. The HURON LANDING device 

was detonated in the U12n.15 LOS drift of the N tunnel complex at 

a vertical depth of 1,339 feet, and was located only 40 feet from 

the DIAMOND ACE device which was at a vertical depth of 1,335 

feet (see Figure 3-l). This was the first time that two underground nuclear detonations were conducted essentially simultaneously in the same tunnel complex. The purpose of the HURON 

LANDING (DoD/LANL) event was to test the survivability of military hardware in a nuclear detonation environment. The DIAMOND 

ACE (DoD/LLNL) event was a source-development test and evaluated 

the low-yield testbed concept. 

Approximately one hour after detonation, a small amount of 

radioactive gas seeped into the U12n.15 LOS drift between the end 

of the stemming and the Overburden Plug (OBP) where the gas was 

contained. When ventilation to the mesa was established, a controlled9 effluent release of the contained gases occurred. This 

effluent release, consisting of xenons and kryptons, occurred 

from approximately Ht28 until Ht36 hours and was detected onsite 

only. 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

3.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE project activities 

in Area 12 was the responsibility of the DNA Test Group Director 

' The radioactive gas was passed through a filtering system where 

most of the particulates were removed before the gas was released through the tunnel ventilation system. 

69 
HURON LANDINQ/DIAMOND ACE DIAMOND ACE OROUND ZERO

OROUND ZERO 

U12n.16 BYPASS 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 3-l. HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - tunnel layout. 
- - 

(TGD) , subject to controls and procedures established by the DOE 

Test Controller. The DOE Test Controller was responsible for 

safety of the public and onsite personnel during the test. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, and 

installing experiments, or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the working point (WP) 

area and the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with DOE Order 5610.3, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." The LANL TGD had overall 

responsibilities for all operations involving the HURON LANDING 

device as well as the timing control and the arming and firing of 

HURON LANDING closures and experiments. Operations involving the 

DIAMOND ACE device were the responsibility of the LLNL TGD under 

the overall control of LANL. Both the LANL and LLNL TGDs were 

responsible to the DOE Test Controller for radiological safety 

within the designated area of the WP from device emplacement 

until detonation. After detonation, the DOE Test Controller 

relieved both the LANL and LLNL TGDs of their responsibilities. 

The DOE,Test Controller approved the controlled venting of the 

tunnel complex and returned the responsibility for project 

activities back to the DNA TGD. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

Some mechanical hardware and system components, including 

the tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS) and vacuum pumps, were 

reused from the MINERS IRON event. The UlZn.15 complex 

consisted of two LOS drifts (one for each event), the 

bypass drift, two zero rooms, a muffler, two auxiliary 

closures, TAPS, and four test chambers. The 1230-foot 

long HURON LANDING LOS pipe diverged from a diameter of 

eight inches close to the device to 231.5 inches at the 

end of the pipe, while the DIAMOND ACE LOS pipe was only 

100 feet long. The DIAMOND ACE drift was connected to the 

HURON LANDING bypass drift by three crosscut drifts; one 

71 

--a--
for access to the WP for device insertion; one for access 

to the side pipe experiments; and the third for access to 

the LLNL and SNL experiments at the back of the LOS pipe 

(Figure 3-2.). The main OBP was located at 1,335 feet 

from the HURON LANDING WP in the U12n.08 main drift. 

Remote gas sampling capabilities were incorporated during 

construction as well as water, power, drain, and pressurization lines. Provisions to manually take gas samples 

from the WP side of the Gas Seal Door (GSD), Gas Seal Plug 

(GSP) , and main OBP were made during postevent reentry. 

Construction activities began in February 1981 with the 

mining of the HURON LANDING LOS drift in conjunction with 

equipment recovery operations for the MINERS IRON event. 

Mining of the U12n.15 bypass drift began in April 1981 and 

was completed in June. Mining of the LOS drift to the 

HURON LANDING WP was completed in October 1981 when cable 

installation began and concrete pours for the Modified 

Auxiliary Closure (MAC), Gas Seal Auxiliary Closure 

(GSAC) , and TAPS inverts were completed. DIAMOND ACE 

drifts were also completed in October. In addition, HURON 

LANDING LOS pipe installation began in October 1981 and 

was completed in May 1982. The DIAMOND ACE LOS pipe 

installation began in March 1982 and was completed in 

June 1982. 

Experiments and related hardware installations began in 

April 1982 and were completed in August. The experimenter 

organizations included: SNL, conducted zero room nuclear 

effects experiments involving magnetic hydrodynamic effects from shock waves; LANL, conducted continuous 

reflectometry for radius time experiments (CORRTEX) which 

measured the position of shock waves as a function of 

time; Kaman Sciences Corporation (KSC), fielded experiments to measure radiation driven responses of hardware 

for a missile system design; and Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory (LPARL), conducted x-ray diagnostic 

experiments. Bendix Corporation (BENDIX), Physics International (PI), Science Applications International (SAI), 

and the Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL) all fielded 

72 
GSAC - Oar Seal Auxiliary Clorurr 

OBP . Overburden Plug 

MAC - Modified Auxlllary Clorure 

TAPS - llmnel end Pips Seal 

TC - Tert Chamber 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 3-2. HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - tunnel and pipe layout. 
supporting experiments which included: advanced ballistic 

reentry studies where various hardware was exposed to a 

nuclear environment; a structures experiment where six 

minimally hardened tunnel test sections (located in the A, 

B, and C drifts mined from the UlZn.15 bypass drift) were 

tested for response to ground motion; advanced weaponscomponents experiments; device radiation output measurements; and containment measurements. 

The stemming plan for the U12n.15 complex is shown in 

Figure 3-3. The HURON LANDING WP was stemmed with 

rock-matching grout and magnetite sand. The U12n.15 LOS 

(main) drift was stemmed to 550 feet with rock-matching 

grout, superlean grout, and concrete, while the U12n.15 

bypass drift was stemmed with desert fines and then with 

rock-matching grout, superlean grout and concrete out to 

500 feet. The DIAMOND ACE WP, which had an air void in 

the zero room, was stemmed with desert fines while the 

DIAMOND ACE LOS drift was stemmed with both desert fines 

and rock-matching grout. Figure 3-4 shows stemming near 

the HURON LANDING WP end of bulkhead. 

Dry run participation began in early September. A successful mandatory full-participation dry run (MFP) was 

conducted on 8 September after which final device preparation and final stemming commenced. A final inspection of 

the U12n.15 LOS pipe complex and experiments was held on 

20 September followed by final stemming and button-up 

operations. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during these events were in accordance with DOE 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support. 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. 

Air sampling equipment was positioned in the test area. 

74 
DESERT FINES 

lm ROCK MATCHING GROUT 

SUPERLEAN QROUT 

:t=: E3 MAQNETITE SAND 

I AIR VOID 

-HURON LANDINQ WP 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 3-3. HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - stemming plan. 

Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, 

manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel were also standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys and 

provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue 

anticontamination equipment and material, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic 

suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to the permanent RAMS units, 40 temporary 

units provided surface and underground coverage for HURON 

LANDING/DIAMOND ACE. Table 3-l and Table 3-2 list the 

locations of surface and underground RAMS, respectively. 

The location of both surface and underground RAMS units 

are shown in Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6, respectively. All 

RAMS units were installed a minimum of five days prior to 

scheduled device detonation. 

EPA operated continuous monitoring stations at 29 locations in the offsite area. All the stations had highvolume air samplers with collectors for particulates and 

reactive gases, 16 had tritium and noble gas samplers, and 

19 had pressurized ion chamber gamma-rate detector/recorder systems in operation. Thirty-one EPA personnel 

were fielded for offsite surveillance activities. 

D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the WP area and the timing 

and firing control room were in accordance with DOE Order 

77 

- - - -A - -
Table 3-l. HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events RAMS unit locations 

23 September 1982. 

SURFACE 

STATION NUMBER LOCATION 

From the U12n Portal: 

1 At the Portal 

2 On the filter system 

3 On the ventline 

4 On the drain line 

5 400 feet N 16" E azimuth 

6 275 feet N 89" E azimuth 

7 365 feet S 16" E azimuth 

8 480 feet S 12" W azimuth 

9 560 feet S 48" W azimuth 

10 420 feet N 69" W azimuth 

11 1,370 feet S 43" E azimuth 

From Cable Downhole: 

12 At cable rise building 

13 180 feet N 42' E azimuth 

14 140 feet S 34" E azimuth 

15 370 feet S 31" W azimuth 

16 80 feet N 85" W azimuth 

17 At the vent hole 

From the U12n.15 SGZ: 

18 234 feet S 00" E azimuth 

19 500 feet S 60" E azimuth 

20 500 feet S 60" W azimuth 

78 
- - ----- 

Table 3-2. HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events RAMS unit locations 

23 September 1982. 

UNDERGROUND 

STATION NUMBER LOCATION 

From the U12n.15 main drift unless otherwise indicated: 

21 655 feet into the drift 

22 524 feet into the drift 

23 350 feet into the drift 

24 90 feet into the drift 

25 600 feet into the U12n.15 bypass drift 

26 340 feet into the U12n.15 bypass drift 

27 185 feet into the U12n.10 main drift 

28 350 feet into the U12n.11 main drift 

29 85 feet into the S-curve of U12n.08 bypass drift 

30ER1' 85 feet into the S-curve of U12n.08 bypass drift 

31 At the vent drift, vent hole side of plug 

32 435 feet into the U12n.08 drift from the 

U12n.05 drift 

33 . 600 feet into the U12n.05 drift 

From the U12n portal unless otherwise indicated: 

34 2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

35 235 feet into the U12n gas seal plug bypass drift 

36ER1' 235 feet into the U12n gas seal plug bypass drift 

37 1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

38 1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

39 50 feet to the ventline rise from the U12n 

main drift 

40 200 feet into the U12n main drift 

lo ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h). 

79 
a 

al 

80 
HURON LA 4NDtNQ/DIAMOND ACE:- DIAMOND ACE WORKINQ POINT WORKING POINT 

a2n.04 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 3-6. HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE events - underground RAMS. 
5610.3, and DOE Order 5610.3-26, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or control 

stations for issue of stay-in badges. After control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. In accordance 

with the "Test Controller's Operations and Security Plans," 

contractors and agencies were 

connected with this event out 

final security sweep began. 

to 

of 

have all personnel not 

the closed area before the 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters 

for cloud tracking and 

and 

the 

crews were provided 

Test Controller's 

by 

use, 

the 

if 

USAF 

needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130/C-135 and 

crew on standby status for cloud sampling. The EPA used 

an OV-1OA Bronco before the event for obtaining meteorological information and this aircraft and crew, along with 

a Turbo Beech and crew, were standing by to undertake 

tracking duties, if necessary. 

3.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

3.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

On 22 September 1982, at 2400 hours, all persons except the 

arming party, the tunnel button-up party, the mesa button-up 

crew, and the security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of 

the muster area. At 0430 hours, permission was granted to arm 

the device. By 0800 hours button-up was complete. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0700 hours on 23 September 1982, 

in anticipation of planned test execution at 0900 hours that day. 

Conditions for the test were favorable, and all personnel were 

mustered out of the area by 0800 hours. The countdown started as 

planned and proceeded through zero time. 

The HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE devices were detonated simultaneously (two microseconds apart) at 0900 hours PDT on 23 Septem82 
ber 1982. No indication of cavity collapse was evident on the 

geophones after zero time. This probably meant that collapse may 

have occurred immediately and was obscured by the initial ground 

shock noise. 

3.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0900 hours on 23 September 1982. 

RAMS unit numbers 23 and.24, in the U12n.15 main (LOS) drift, 

were immediately inoperative and remained so throughout the test 

period. Responding to the neutron activation of the LOS pipe, 

surrounding tuff and grouts, and experiments, RAMS unit numbers 

21 and 22 read 150 R/h and 18 R/h, respectively, immediately 

after detonation. Readings decreased rapidly as normal activation product decay occurred. 

At 1030 hours RAMS unit numbers 25-29, located in the U12n.15 

bypass drift, the U12n.10 and U12n.11 main drifts, and the 

U12n.08 S curve started to rise indicating a slight seepage of 

radioactive gas into the U12n.15 LOS drift between the end of 

stemming and the OBP. The reading on RAMS unit number 28, 

located in the U12n.11 drift, was 4 mR/h. By 1330 hours readings 

had increased on (1) RAMS unit number 25 to 1.6 R/h, (2) RAMS 

unit number 26 to 300 mR/h, (3) RAMS unit number 27 to 4 mR/h, 

(4) RAMS unit number 28 to 50 mR/h, and (5) RAMS unit number 29 

to 4 mR/h. 

On 24 September 1982, at 1247 hours, the mesa ventline fans were 

turned on and a controlled ventilation of the tunnel complex 

occurred. RAM unit number 17, located at the base of the ventline system, was reading 5.1 mR/h. All RAMS units were secured 

at 0830 hours on 27 September 1982, with all operative units 

reading background except for RAMS unit number 22 which was 

reading 1 mR/h. 

3.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Four reentry teams (two teams to survey the mesa trailer park, 

one team to survey the portal area, and one team to survey the 

portal area ventilation system) were released from gate 300 at 

1045 hours on the day of the detonation. By 1140 hours both the 

mesa trailer park and portal survey teams completed initial 

83 

- -_ -----
surveys. No radiation levels above background (0.04 mR/h) were 

detected. Mesa and portal data recovery was completed by 

1630 hours. Data recovery teams included SNL, EG&G, LANL, SAI, 

and H&N. D-day reentry survey operations were terminated by 

1700 hours. Figure 3-7 shows an overview of the N tunnel mesa 

and portal areas. 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

3.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

At 0703 hours on 24 September (D+l), a work party entered the 

tunnel proceeding as far as the GSP. Ventilation was established 

at 0812 hours at the GSP by opening the 36-inch and 40-inch 

turntubes to the portal side of the OBP. No toxic gas, positive 

LEL, or radiation levels above background were detected. The 

oxygen level was a normal 21 percent and no respiratory protection was required at that time. 

The manway door through the OBP was opened at 1051 hours on 

24 September. Readings on the working point side of the OBP in 

the 36-inch crawlway were 10 mR/h, however no toxic gas or 

positive LEL levels were detected. The back-up reentry team, 

wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, then proceeded to 

walk out the U12n.08 drift to the Thermal Shield Plug where the 

carbon monoxide (CO) concentration measured 30 ppm, the oxygen 

level was 19 percent, and no positive LEL indication was detected. The back-up reentry team then opened the downhole ventline 

closure and established controlled ventilation to the vent pad on 

the mesa. All reentry teams were on the portal side of the GSP 

before the ventilation fans on the mesa were turned on at 

1247 hours. 

Both the initial reentry and back-up teams, wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, returned to the OBP at 1420 hours on 

24 September. The initial reentry team then proceeded to walk 

out the U12n.08 LOS drift to the ROSES drift and shield wall. A 

maximum reading of 5 mR/h was detected five feet from the shield 

wall. However, no positive toxic gases or LEL levels were 

detected in either the U12n.08, U12n.11, ROSES drifts, or the 

84 

crosscuts No. 1 and No. 2 in the U12n.15 bypass. Readings inside 

test chamber No. 1 were 170 mR/h, 50 ppm CO, and 10 percent of 

the LEL. A six-inch ventline was hooked up to the valve on top 

of the LOS pipe at test chamber No. 1 to exhaust air inside of 

the LOS pipe. The readings at the valve on top of the LOS pipe 

were 35 percent of the LEL, 200 ppm CO, and 20 percent oxygen. 

The reentry team then proceeded toward test chambers No. 3 and 

No. 4 via the U12n.15 bypass drift. The maximum readings inside 

test chambers No. 3 and No. 4 doors (at arm's length) were 

80 mR/h, 21 percent oxygen and a slightly positive LEL indication. A positive air flow into the LOS pipe at test chamber 

No. 3 and No. 4 doors was noted. The reentry team then returned 

to test chamber No. 1 and secured the door to increase the air 

flow into the LOS pipe from test chambers No. 3 and No. 4 doors. 

By 1751 hours on 24 September all personnel were on the portal 

side of the OBP. 

On 25 September, an LOS pipe walkout team, wearing self-contained 

breathing apparatus, departed the OBP for the HURON LANDING LOS 

pipe. The team entered the LOS pipe at test chambers No. 3 and 

No. 4 to check the pipe and the TAPS door. The LOS pipe was 

caved in between test chamber No. 4 and the vent port. The 

partially-collapsed LOS pipe was accessible to test chamber No. 4 

and the TAPS. The TAPS door was intact. Maximum readings at the 

top and left side of the door on the seal were 90 mR/h, 100 ppm 

CO, and 20 percent LEL. Laboratory analysis of smear samples 

taken on instrumentation and other items in the U12n.15 bypass, 

the LOS drift, and the user alcoves showed radioactivity levels 

were slightly above background. 

After the LOS pipe walkout teams completed their surveys, the 

Scientific Assessment (SA) Team entered the LOS pipe at test 

chamber No. 1, where the maximum reading was 40 mR/h. The SA 

team, wearing full-face respirators with HEPA filters and full 

anticontamination 

of the tunnel by 

clothing, 

1600 hours 

completed their 

on 25 September. 

survey and were out 

Work continued 

instrumentation 

completed on 

in the test 

until all 

7 October. 

r

chambers to clean-up 

eentry and instrument 

and remove 

recoveries were 

86 
3.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

Work began on mining out the GSP at 0005 hours on 25 September. 

By 0125 hours on 27 September, the miners, dressed in full 

anticontamination clothing, had blasted out the GSP and were 

cleaning up debris. By 2300 hours on 27 September miners had 

laid the trainway, reestablished air and water lines at the GSP, 

and were removing the OBP. Maximum readings at the OBP were 

0.05 mR/h. No positive LEL or toxic gas levels were detected. 

Mining continued in the U12n.08, U12n.15 LOS, and crosscut 

drifts. By 1400 hours on 1 October, the miners had completed the 

major work on the OBP and shielding walls at test chambers No. 2, 

No. 3, and No. 4. The trainway through the OBP and the walkway 

through the shielding walls at crosscuts No. 1 and No. 2 were 

reestablished. Mining in the U12n.15 LOS drift and surveying and 

gas sampling in the test chambers continued throughout October 

1982. 

Reentry mining operations in the HURON LANDING U12n.15 bypass 

drift were started on 8 October. Miners began rockbolting at the 

"C" structure (Figure 3.2) to reinforce the tunnel walls on 

12 October as reentry mining continued. By 29 October general 

clean-up, grading and laying track at the "C'* structure, and 

other reentry mining activities in the U12n.15 bypass drift were 

essentially complete. 

In late October 1983 mining resumed in the U12n.15 bypass drift 

as work on the "A" structure (Figure 3-2) began. The maximum 

exposure rate was 0.05 mR/h, and air sampling data showed zero 

percent CO, zero percent of the LEL, and 21 percent oxygen. 

Mining continued intermittently in the U12n.15 LOS pipe, and in 

the No. 1 and No. 2 crosscuts. 

By the spring of 1985, mining was completed to the HURON LANDING 

WP area. 

at that 

Additional 

time. 

containment-related studies were conducted 

3.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

Control of the postevent 

mesa with a base station 

drilling area 

and appropriate 

was established 

barricades at 

on the 

1400 hours 

87 
on 2 October. Drilling began at 1235 hours on 3 October on the 

first of five drill holes. Twelve core samples were taken from 

postshot (PS) No. 1A hole between 1710 hours and 2015 hours on 

4 October. Sampling of PS No. lAA, PS No. lAB, and PS No. 1AC 

drill holes was done between 1132 hours on 5 October and 

0216 hours, on 7 October from which 12, 13, and 23 samples were 

taken, respectively. No samples were taken from the PS No. lAD, 

because LLNL personnel determined no further sampling was necessary. No LEL or toxic gas levels were detected during postevent 

drilling. The abandonment valve was closed and the operation was 

completed at 1211 hours on 7 October. By 1345 hours on 7 October 

the air sampling equipment on the drilling rig was shut down and 

personnel began moving equipment out of the 

60 core samples were taken from these drill 

maximum intensity at contact being 10.5 R/h. 

area. 

holes 

A total 

with the 

of 

3.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for 

radiation 

were then 

the presence of toxic gases and surveys 

and LEL levels were made on each shift. 

recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

to measure 

The results 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling, were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. A written standard operating 

procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, 

toxic materials, radioactive material, or any other operation 

with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved 

in such an operation was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory hard 

hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, boots, DOE-issued 

miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of the Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa two-hour 

breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as 

spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, 

toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, stored, 

88 
and transported in accordance with applicable sections of the 

following documents: 

1. Army Material Command Regulations (AMCR 385-100). 

2. Appropriate DOE Orders in the 5400 and 5600 Series 

concerning Environmental Protection, Safety & Health 

Protection, and Defense Programs, respectively. 

3. Individual safe operating procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD safety coordinator. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0900 hours on 23 September 1983, 

with the maximum intensity being 150 R/h from activation products 

as measured on RAMS unit number 21 at 0900 hours on 23 September. 

All telemetry stations were secured at 0830 hours on 27 September. 

The initial radiation surveys began at 1045 hours on 23 September 

and were completed at 1140 hours. No radiation above background 

was detected at the mesa trailer park area or at the tunnel 

complex portal. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 0703 hours on 24 September. A 

maximum reading of 170 mR/h was detected inside test chamber 

No. 1. The maximum toxic gas concentration and LEL percentage 

detected during initial reentry were 200 ppm CO and 35 percent of 

the LEL, respectively, measured at the valve on top of the LOS 

pipe at test chamber No. 1. 

Postevent drilling from the mesa for recovery of core samples 

began at 1235 hours on 3 October and was completed when the 

abandonment valve was closed at 1211 hours on 7 October. Sixty 

core samples were taken and the maximum intensity at contact was 

89 
10.5 R/h. No underground core sampling operations were conducted. 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters were 

documented on Area Access Registers during individual entries to 

HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE radex areas over a non-continuous time 

frame beginning 23 September 1982, and ending 30 August 1983. 

Pocket dosimeters showed some indication of possible radiation 

exposure to DOD-affiliated personnel. Film badges worn by these 

reentry personnel indicated that five individuals received some 

gamma exposure most likely from the HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE 

event. The minimum detectable gamma exposure with the NTS film 

badge dosimeter was 30 mR. Area Access Register data are summarized below. 

Entries Maximum Average 

Participants Logged Exposure (mR) Exposure (mR) 

All 1,284 160 3.4 

DOD 97 160 12.1 

90 
SECTION 4 

MINI JADE EVENT 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

MINI JADE was a DOD-sponsored weapons-effects test conducted at 

0730 hours PDT on 26 May 1983. The test had a yield of less than 

20 kilotons. The MINI JADE device was detonated in the U12n.12 

drift of the N tunnel complex in an 11-meter radius hemispherical 

underground cavity at a vertical depth of 1,243 feet (Figure 4-l). 

The purpose of the MINI JADE event was to determine some aspects 

of energy coupling into earth materials from a near-surface 

nuclear detonation and test instrumentation development. 

Within one minute of detonation a small amount of radioactive gas 

seeped into the tunnel and spread to the Drift Protection Plug 

(DPP)ll where the gas was contained. When ventilation to the 

mesa was established, a controlled effluent release of the contained gases occurred. This effluent release, consisting of 

xenons, occurred from approximately Ht5.2 days to Ht6.2 days and 

was detected onsite only. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

4.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all MINI JADE project activities in Area 12 was 

the responsibility of the DNA Test Group Director (TGD), subject 

to controls and procedures established by the DOE Test Controller. The DOE Test Controller was responsible for safety of the 

public and onsite personnel during the test. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, and 

installing experiments, or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

l1 After 1982, the Drift Protection Plug replaced or was used in 

conjunction with the Overburden Plug. The DPP provided an 

improved containment feature by exerting lower in situ pressures in large-volume vessel containment low-yield tests. 

91 

- -A-----
C 

iii 

R- U12fl.16 BYPASS 

v / /-+BLE BUB-DRIFT 

MINI JADE 

aROUND ZERO 

UlPn.12 MAIN DRIFT 

DRIFT PROTECTIDN PLUQ 

Figure 4-l. MINI JADE event - tunnel layout. 
removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the working point (WP) 

area and the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with DOE Order 5610.3, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." The LANL TGD had overall 

responsibilities for all operations involving the MINI JADE 

device. The DNA TGD was responsible to the DOE Test Controller 

for radiological safety within the designated area of the WP from 

device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the DOE 

Test Controller returned the responsibility for project activities to the DNA TGD. However, the controlled ventilation of the 

tunnel complex was done with the approval of the DOE Test Controller. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

The U12n.12 complex consisted of the main drift which 

provided access to an 11-meter radius hemispherical cavity; the side drift; the cable subdrift; the cavity with a 

specially-prepared testbed; the drill alcove; the instrument and support alcoves; and the Recorder and Oscilloscope Sealed Environment System (ROSES) drift as seen in 

Figure 4-2. 

There was no line-of-sight pipe traditionally associated 

with tunnel events. The MINI JADE testbed consisted of 

three major regions: (1) the one-meter cavity invert, (2) 

the Test Instrumentation Development (TID) bucket, and 

(3) the cavity region below one meter. Excavation of a 

one-meter deep region over the entire cavity invert was 

made to facilitate the placement of gauges in the TID 

bucket region (i.e., the high-stress region, directly 

beneath the device, containing a high concentration of 

gauges.) The process used to aid in the emplacement of 

these gauges included: (1) constructing a fiberglass 

container; (2) installing gauges and support structures to 

which cables were attached; (3) drilling holes through the 

side of the fiberglass container to facilitate attachment 

93 
94 
of horizontal cables in the one-meter region; (4) backfilling grout in the TID bucket up to one meter above the 

grout-tuff interface; and (5) removing the fiberglass 

container and support structures when the grout cured. 

Below the one-meter grout region was a ten-meter deep 

region of relatively undisturbed tuff permeated by drill 

holes that contained experimenter gauges. The cable 

subdrift provided access to this region. Figure 4-3 shows 

the TID bucket and gauges. 

These experimenter gauges installed in this region were 

placed in an extensive array of 42 drill holes. Auxiliary 

drifts were mined near the cavity to support placement of 

gauges and cable runs through the drill holes into the 

cavity. All drill holes in the tuff were filled with 

HPNS-2 grout (not the same grout used in the one-meter 

region) because tests had shown that this grout was similar to the tuff regarding stress and wave propagation 

characteristics. 

Mining of the U12n.12 LOS drift, subdrift and drill alcove 

was done simultaneously beginning in October 1982, with 

the work completed by mid-December 1982. By the end of 

January 1983 all drilling and TID bucket spading was 

complete. During February the cavity invert grout was 

poured and installation of the bulkhead and trainway in 

the Gas Seal Plug (GSP) was completed. The manways and 

annulus for the anchor plugs in both the subdrift and side 

drift were installed and the drill alcove was stemmed in 

March. In addition, work in the ten-meter lower region, 

which included gauge installation, grouting all drill 

holes and cavity invert, and stemming the drill alcove, 

was completed in March. Ramp construction for the device 

was completed in April and by early May the shielding of 

the ROSES drift was completed and all experiments were in 

place. 

Additional facilities incorporated during construction 

were remote gas sampling capabilities as well as water, 

power, drain, and pressurization lines. Provisions to 

manually take gas samples from the WP side of the Gas Seal 

95 

_ - a - - - ---

Door (GSD), the GSP, and the DPP were made during postevent reentry. 

The nine fielding organizations conducting experiments for 

this event were: S-CUBED, conducted studies to increase 

the capability to predict ground shock, air blast and 

containment occurrences; Stanford Research Institute 

International (SRII), conducted long-duration stress and 

particle velocity studies; Sandia National Laboratories 

(SNL), conducted airblast, ground shock, radiation diagnostics, decoupled ground wave, and containment studies; 

Science Applications Incorporated (SAI), studied particle 

velocity, shock velocity, shock time-of-arrival (TOA), and 

magnetic field and gamma radiation flux; LANL, conducted 

continuous reflectometry for radius time experiments 

(CORRTEX) to measure fireball growth and shock propagation 

through the invert; JAYCOR, conducted Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) studies involving the collection 

of cable-coupling data (Figure 4-4); Applied Research 

Associates (ARA), measured peak stress generated by device 

detonation at various anticipated stress levels; the Air 

Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL), conducted experiments to 

measure particle motion under stress in a nuclear environment; and Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA), 

conducted tunnel environment and containment studies and 

cable plant noise measurements. 

Signal dry runs began in March 1983. The mandatory fullparticipation (MFP) dry run was successfully completed on 

19 May 1983. From 20 May to 25 May 1983, mandatory signal 

dry runs were held daily to insure that all systems were 

functioning properly. At 0230 hours on 26 May, final 

arming took place after which button-up activities began. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with DOE Manual 

Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support. 

97 

Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. 

Air sampling equipment was positioned in the test area. 

Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, 

manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel were also standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys and 

provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue 

anticontamination equipment and material, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic 

suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to the 39 permanent RAMS units, 31 temporary 

units provided surface and underground coverage for MINI 

JADE. Table 4-l and Table 4-2 list the locations of 

surface and underground RAMS, respectively. The location 

of both surface and underground RAMS units are shown in 

Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6, respectively. All RAMS units 

were installed a minimum of five days prior to scheduled 

device detonation. 

EPA operated continuous monitoring stations at 30 locations in the offsite area. All the stations had highvolume air samplers with collectors for particulates and 

reactive gases, 16 had tritium and noble gas samplers, and 

22 had pressurized ion chamber gamma-rate detector/recorder systems in operation. Twenty-seven EPA personnel were 

fielded for offsite surveillance activities. 

99 
Table 4-1. MINI JADE event RAMS unit locations 26 May 1983. 

SURFACE 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMBER 

From the U12n Portal unless otherwise indicated: 

1 On the drain line 

2 400 feet N 16" E azimuth 

I275 feet N 89" E azimuth 

365 feet S 16" E azimuth 

480 feet S 12" W azimuth 

560 feet S 48" W azimuth 

I 420 feet N 69" W azimuth 

8 1,370 feet S 43'E azimuth 

9 At cable rise building 

IOn the vent hole 

From the U12n.12 SGZ: 

350 feet N 00" E azimuth 

350 feet S 60" E azimuth 

350 feet S 6O"W azimuth 

100 
Table 4-2. MINI JADE event RAMS unit locations 26 May 1983. 

UNDERGROUND 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMBER 

From the U12n.12 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

14 225 feet into the U12n.12 main drift 

15 40 feet into the U12n.12 cable subdrift 

16 500 feet into the U12n.11 main drift 

17 150 feet into the U12n.11 main drift 

18 320 feet into the U12n.11 bvnass drift 

19 400 feet into the U12n.10 main drift I 

20 185 feet into the UlZn.10 main drift 

21 85 feet into the S-curve of the U12n.08 bypass drift 

22ER= 85 feet into the S-curve of the U12n.08 bypass drift 

23 435 feet into the U12n.08 main drift 

From the U12n main drift unless otherwise indicated: 

24 600 feet into the U12n.05 

From the U12n Portal unless otherwise indicated: 

II 25 I 2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

26 I235 feet into the U12n gas seal plug bypass drift 

1 

II 27ER1' 1235 feet into the U12n gas seal olua bvoass drift 

I 28 1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

II 29 11,200 feet into the U12n main drift I 

30 50 feet into the ventline rise from the U12n main 

drift 

31 200 feet into the U12n main drift 

l2 ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h). 

101 

- -A - - - --a 
102 
103 
D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the WP and in the timing and 

firing control room were in accordance with DOE Order 

5610.3, and DOE Order 5610.3-26, "Program to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or control 

stations for issue of stay-in badges. After control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have all 

personnel not connected with this event out of the closed 

area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the USAF 

for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, if 

needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130/C-135 and 

crew on standby status for cloud sampling. EGCG provided 

one Turbo Beech and one Twin Bonanza aircraft and crews 

for tracking duties, if necessary. 

4.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

4.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

By 25 May 1983 at 2400 hours, all persons except the arming 

party, the tunnel button-up party, the mesa button-up crew, and 

the security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of the 

muster area. At 0230 hours on 26 May permission was granted to 

arm the device. By 0615 hours button-up was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 1400 hours on 25 May 1983, in 

anticipation of the planned test execution at 0730 hours the next 

day. On 26 May conditions for the test were favorable, and all 

personnel were mustered out of the area by 0630 hours. The 

countdown started as planned and proceeded through zero time. 

104 

a-- . - --a . -
The MINI JADE device was detonated in the UlZn.12 drift at 

0730 hours PDT on 26 May 1983. 

4.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0730 hours on 26 May 1983 with 

all RAMS stations reading background. All RAMS stations remained 

operational throughout the test and subsequent readout period. 

All stations except for unit numbers 14-22 read background 

throughout the entire readout period. Units 14-22 showed increased readings immediately after zero time due to a possible 

leak in the U12n.12 main drift manway plug. 

At Ht2.3 minutes RAMS unit number 14, located in the U12n.12 main 

drift, indicated a maximum reading of 233 R/h. However, by 

0900 hours the reading had decreased to 12.6 R/h. RAMS unit 

number 17, located in the U12n.11 main drift, showed increased 

readings immediately after zero time and at Ht22 minutes recorded 

a maximum reading of 30.4 R/h. This diminished to 12.1 R/h by 

H+2 hours. By 1230 hours, RAMS units 14 and 17 readings were 

4.1 R/h and 3.8 R/h, respectively. 

Readings decreased rapidly, and all RAMS units were secured at 

1530 hours on 31 May 1983. At that time all units read background except for numbers 14 and 17 which read 0.2 mR/h and 

0.1 mR/h, respectively. 

4.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Initial reentry teams departed from the Test Director's barricade 

at Gate 300 at 0841 hours on 26 May 1983. A mobile base station 

was provided for area control and equipment supply. By 

0922 hours, the initial survey teams in both the ,U12n portal area 

and Rainier Mesa cable rise building and ventilation pad had 

completed the initial surface survey. No radiation levels above 

normal area background were detected. 

Survey teams, consisting of geologists, industrial hygienists and 

radiation safety monitors, stood by at the N tunnel portal and on 

the mesa during data recovery and remote gas sampling of the 

tunnel. The mesa survey was completed by 1045 hours and no 

readings were above background levels. Industrial hygiene 

105 
personnel continued taking remote gas samples from the WP side of 

the DPP with the maximum reading being 7 mR/h at contact with the 

sampling container. These operations were completed by 1600 

hours. By 1610 hours on 26 May 1983 all personnel were checked 

out of the event location. 

4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

4.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

At 0807 hours on 27 May 1983 (Dtl), the 13-member work party, 

dressed in anticontamination clothing, entered the tunnel and 

proceeded as far as the GSP. Ventilation at the GSP was established at 0859 hours by opening the 36-inch and 40-inch turntubes 

to the portal side of the DPP. No toxic gas, or positive LEL 

levels were measured. No radiation levels above background 

(0.04 mR/h) were detected. The oxygen level was a normal 21 percent. 

The reentry team arrived at the DPP at 0938 hours. The reading 

on the portal side of the DPP, at the top side of the turntube, 

was 0.6 mR/h with traces of carbon monoxide (CO). The manual 

valve on the portal side of the DPP was opened to take remote gas 

samples from the working point side of the DPP. Maximum readings 

were 4 mR/h (resulting from the seepage of radioactive gas into 

the tunnel almost immediately after event detonation), 3 percent 

of the LEL level, and 40 ppm CO. 

The work teams completed their assignments and departed the DPP 

at 1011 hours for the GSP. By 1030 hours on 27 May all personnel 

were on the portal side of the GSP. No respiratory protection 

was required for this initial reentry. The tunnel was secured 

until 31 May 1983. 

At 1915 hours on 31 May the reentry, backup, and rescue teams, 

dressed in anticontamination clothing, departed the portal area 

for the GSP. The reentry team proceeded to the DPP and arrived 

at 0948 hours where readings on the portal side of the DPP were 

background, and no toxic gases or positive LEL were detected. At 

1107 hours the 36-inch turntube was opened on the DPP. The 

reentry team, wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, pro106 
ceeded to the working point side of the DPP where the reading was 

0.3 mR/h and the oxygen level was a normal 21 percent. The 

reentry team then opened the downhole ventline closure and established ventilation to the mesa at 1153 hours before proceeding 

out of the U12n.12 main drift (cavity access plug) area. A 

maximum reading of 1.5 mR/h was detected five feet from the 

cavity access plug. By 1306 hours ventilation had been reestablished at both the ROSES shield wall in the U12n.10 drift and in 

the U12n.18 drift (shown in Figure 5-2). By 1400 hours all teams 

were on the portal side of the DPP. 

The Scientific Assessment and Data Recovery Teams entered the 

tunnel at 1445 hours 31 May 1983, and completed their work that 

same day. 

4.4.2 Postevent Mining and Drilling. 

Work began on mining out the GSP at 1830 hours on 31 May and was 

completed at 0200 hours on 1 June. By 0030 hours on 3 June the 

miners had completed major work on the DPP and had completed 

rehabilitation of the U12n.12 main and subdrifts. Miners and 

radiation safety personnel, wearing self-contained breathing 

apparatus, sprayed all work areas on the WP side of the DPP with 

a sodium silicate sealant to control the resuspension of contaminated particulate matter. In addition, sealant was sprayed in 

tunnel drifts adjacent to the MINI JADE complex. Contamination 

in the TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR ground zero and drift areas resulted 

in cleanup and spraying being done in these areas simultaneously 

with postevent mining in the MINI JADE main and subdrifts. By 

mid-June 1983 mining activities for MINI JADE had ceased and work 

continued in preparation for TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR. 

Mining resumed on 15 October 1983, at the U12n.12 main, subdrift, 

and drill alcove bulkheads (see Figure 4.2) and continued until 

late November. Hydraulic fracture (HYDRAFRAC) holes were drilled 

and samples were taken to determine the environment of the yet 

unmined sections of the drifts. Readings taken during this 

period indicated a normal 21 percent oxygen level; CO levels as 

high as 1500 ppm; a maximum 30 percent LEL level; and maximum 

radiation levels of 200 mR/h. 

107 
Drilling operations continued so that monitoring of the MINI JADE 

cavity environment, for subsequent reentry into the cavity, could 

begin. A hole was drilled from the U12n.11 drift into the cavity 

to vent the contained gases, and cavity ventilation began on 

17 October 1983. Remote sampling showed initial readings of 

30 percent of the LEL, 300 ppm CO, and 17 percent oxygen. The 

radiation level was 1.5 mrad/h. By 19 October purging of the 

filtered cavity gases, through the U12n.11 drift and out the 

U12n.08 chimney, was completed. At that time readings indicated 

that the MINI JADE cavity had no toxic gases or positive LEL 

levels, 21 percent oxygen, and the radiation level was 1 mrad/h. 

Work continued, and on 28 November miners, wearing full-face 

masks and anticontamination clothing, broke through the center of 

the face of the MINI JADE cavity and inserted an air sampler 

head. The next day DOD personnel entered the cavity access drift 

to make an evaluation. On 30 November when a Pan Am photographer 

was present, the exposure rate inside the cavity was 7 mR/h. 

Sampling and picture-taking continued until 13 December 1983 when 

this area of the tunnel was shut down. 

No drilling 

the mesa or 

to recover 

the tunnel 

zero point core samples 

for this event. 

was conducted from 

4.4.3 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for 

radiation 

were then 

the presence of toxic gases and 

and LEL levels were made on each 

recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

surveys 

shift. 

to measure 

The results 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling, were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. A written standard operating 

procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, 

toxic materials, radioactive material, or any other operation 

with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved 

in such an operation was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory hard 

hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, boots, DOE-issued 

108 
miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of the Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa two-hour 

breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as 

spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, 

toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, stored, 

and transported in accordance with applicable sections of the 

following documents: 

1. Army Material Command Regulations (AMCR 385-100). 

2. Appropriate DOE Orders in the 5400 and 5600 Series concerning Environmental Protection, Safety & Health Protection, and Defense Programs respectively. 

3. Individual safe operating procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. MINI JADE Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD safety coordinator. 

4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0730 hours on 26 May 1983, with 

the maximum exposure rate being 233 R/h detected on RAMS unit 

number 14 at Ht2.3 minutes. All telemetry stations were secured 

at 1530 hours on 31 May with only unit numbers 14 and 17 reading 

above background. 

The initial radiation surveys began at 0841 hours on 26 May and 

were completed at 0922 hours. No radiation above background was 

detected at the mesa cable rise building or at the tunnel portal 

area. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 0807 hours on 27 May. The 

maximum readings from remote gas sampling were 4 mR/h, 3 percent 

109 
LEL level, and 40 ppm CO. Initial reentry and data recovery was 

completed by 31 May 1983. 

Postevent mining and sampling began on 31 May and continued 

sporadically until 13 December. Mining activities were hampered 

by contamination resulting from resuspension of particulates. 

Spraying sealant in the tunnel allowed miners to continue MINI 

JADE postevent operations while continuing to prepare for the upcoming TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event. Maximum readings during 

mining operations were 21 percent oxygen; 1500 ppm CO; 30 percent 

LEL level; and radiation levels of 200 mR/h. 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters were 

documented on Area Access Registers during individual entries to 

MINI JADE radex areas over a non-continuous time frame from 

4 June 1983 to 12 September 1983. Although pocket dosimeters 

showed some indication of possible radiation exposure, film 

badges worn by reentry personnel indicated no evidence of any 

gamma exposures. The minimum detectable gamma exposure with the 

NTS film badge dosimeter was 30 mR. Area Access Register data 

are summarized below. 

Entries Maximum Average 

Participants Logged Exposure (mR) Exposure (mR) 

All 5,832 85 0.1 

DOD 178 18 0.1 

110 
SECTION 5 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR EVENT 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR was a DOD-sponsored testbed development 

event conducted at 0800 ,hours PDT on 21 September 1983. The 

LLNL-sponsored TOMME test, with the DNA add-on experiment, 

MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR, had a yield of less than 20 kilotons. The 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR device was detonated in the U12n.18 drift 

of the N tunnel complex at a vertical depth of 1,325 feet 

(Figure 5-l). The purpose of the event was to evaluate the 

stemming and containment design of a low-yield testbed, using a 

shorter-than-normal HLOS pipe. This testbed design concept could 

reduce tunnel test costs and provide greater flexibility in 

conducting experiments. 

The TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event was satisfactorily contained. 

However, some radioactive gases seeped into the tunnel, but 

radioactivity decayed to background levels before tunnel ventilation began. There was no radioactive effluent release from this 

event. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

5.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR project activities in 

Area 12 was the responsibility of the DNA Test Group Director 

(TGD), subject to controls and procedures established by the DOE 

Test Controller. The DOE Test Controller was responsible for 

safety of the public and onsite personnel during the test. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, and 

installing experiments, or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

preparing project reports on experiment results. 

111 

_-A _ -----
UlZn.15 BYPASS 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR 

GROUND ZERO 

GB

‘0 1 VENTMOLE @ N LL DmFl PRolEcTloN PLUO

L I 

NOT TO BCALE 

Figure TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - tunnel layout. 5-1. 
Device safety and security procedures in the working point (WP) 

area and the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with DOE Order 5610.3, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." The LLNL TGD had overall 

responsibilities for radiological safety within the designated 

area of the WP from device emplacement until detonation in 

accordance with provisions of Chapter 0524, NTS-SOP. After 

detonation, the DOE Test Controller relieved the LLNL TGD of the 

responsibility and returned it to the DNA TGD. 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

The U12n.18 complex was mined from the U12n.10 main drift 

and used previously-constructed or rebuilt tunnel containment plugs; instrumentation, recording, and experiment 

alcoves. The complex included: (1) an access for a keyway 

for a late-time installation of a Drift Protection Plug 

(DPP) ; (2) vacuum and cable gas block alcoves; (3) access 

to the TOMME Drift; (4) the TOMME Drift; (5) the MIDNIGHT 

ZEPHYR Drift; and (6) the drift for Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) side pipe as seen in Figure 5-2. 

The TOMME and MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR drifts each had an air void 

existing around the working point (WP) to approximately 

four feet from the device where stemming began. The TOMME 

drift, which contained five additional air voids, was 

stemmed first with rock-matching grout to approximately 

67 feet; then with superlean grout to 95 feet, and finally 

with high-strength grout to the end of stemming. The 

MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR drift was stemmed with rock-matching grout 

and superlean grout. Figure 5-3 shows the invert at the 

MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR end of stemming facing in the direction of 

ground zero. 

A high-strength grout plug (keyed into the drift) was 

placed where the MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR stemming joined the 

access drift high-strength grout. A Facility Drift Protection Plug (FDPP), located in the U12n.18 drift, provided additional containment protection for this area of the 

tunnel complex. The TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event also 

113 
TOMME/MIDNIQHT 

h- ZEPHYR WP 

.SNL SIDE PlPE 

SWLA CABLE SPLICE B 

VACUUM ALCOVE 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 5-2. TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - tunnel and pipe layout. 

utilized six previously-constructed containment plugs 

(i.e., the U12n.08 Cable Drift Plug, the Thermal Shield 

Plug (TSP), the structures drift Cable Downhole Plug, the 

U12n.03 plug, the U12n.14 plug, and the U12n.08 DPP) which 

were reconstructed, in some instances, after the MINI JADE 

event was executed. The Gas Seal Plug (GSP) and the Gas 

Seal Door (GSD), in the main access drift, provided additional protection. Following the MINI JADE event, the 

grout inside the GSP trainway was removed. The grout was 

replaced prior to execution of the TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR 

event. 

In January 1983, when a decision was made to move the 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event from U12t tunnel to U12n tunnel complex to avoid scheduling problems with the upcoming MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event, mining of the U12n.18 

drift began. By the end of February, alcoves for vacuum 

pumps and cable block alcoves were mined, and hardened 

HLOS pipe sections were fabricated. Installation of HLOS 

pipe sections began in March, along with successful testing and installation of support instrumentation. 

The TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event complex design included 

the TOMME drift, an access and experiment drift, and the 

HLOS pipe with six vacuum systems. The MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR 

portion contained an experiment drift that supported the 

HLOS pipe system. Portions of the U12n.10 drift were 

allocated for experimenter-support equipment. 

In May when MINI JADE was executed, it was immediately 

apparent that some radioactive gases had seeped into the 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR section of the tunnel complex. 

Cleanup measures, such as painting and spraying sealant to 

reduce particulate resuspension, were implemented. Personnel working in the area donned anticontamination clothing (antics) and wore self-contained breathing masks 

during sealing and decontamination activities. Fixing of 

contaminant was not completely successful, consequently, 

construction of TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHER was completed with 

all personnel wearing antics. 

116 
By the end of August, the HLOS pipes were installed; the 

Fast Auxiliary Closure (FAC), had been tested and installed in the closed position; experimenter data transmission 

cables and timing and firing cables were in place; vacuum 

and timing and firing systems were tested and certified 

operational; and signal dry runs were held on a daily 

basis throughout the month. 

On 30 August the initial joint mandatory, full-participation/full-power, full-frequency (MFP/FPFF) dry run was 

conducted. Follow-up dry runs were performed after several adjustments were made, and the system was declared 

satisfactory on 31 August. Signal dry runs continued on a 

daily basis in September with the final dry run (FDR) 

being held on 20 September. By 1800 hours on 20 September 

button-up activities had begun. 

Additional facilities incorporated during construction 

were remote gas sampling capabilities as well as water, 

power, drain, and pressurization lines. Provisions to 

manually take gas samples from the WP side of the GSD, 

GSP, and the DPP were made during postevent reentry. 

Organizations conducting experiments for this event were: 

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), conducted low-yield 

testbed studies (i.e., the DNA add-on experiment, MIDNIGHT 

ZEPHYR) and containment-related measurements; General 

Research Corporation (GRC), conducted Test Instrumentation 

Development (TID) stress measurement studies; and LANL, 

conducted a continuous reflectometry for radius time 

experiment (CORRTEX) to measure the position of in-ground 

shock waves as a function of time. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during this event were in accordance with DOE Manual 

Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD representatives. Radsafe provided monitoring and equipment support. 

117 
Prior to the test, detailed radiological safety reentry 

plans were prepared and issued to participating agencies. 

Air sampling equipment was positioned in the test area. 

Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, 

manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were 

provided to perform initial radiation surveys, conduct 

aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry 

parties as needed. Radsafe personnel were also standing 

by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to perform surveys and 

provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue 

anticontamination equipment and material, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic 

suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to the 39 permanent RAMS units, 36 temporary 

units provided surface and underground coverage for 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR. Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 list the 

locations of surface and underground RAMS, respectively. 

The location of both surface and underground RAMS units 

are shown in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5, respectively. 

Figure 5-6 shows RAMS unit detailed locations in the 

U12n.18 complex. All RAMS units were installed a minimum 

of five days prior to scheduled device detonation. 

EPA operated continuous monitoring stations at 29 locations in the offsite area. All the stations had highvolume air samplers with collectors for particulates and 

reactive gases, 16 had tritium and noble gas samplers, and 

21 had pressurized ion chamber gamma-rate detector/recorder systems in operation. Twenty-eight EPA personnel were 

fielded for offsite surveillance activities. 

118 
Table 5-l. TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event RAMS unit locations 

21 September 1983. 

SURFACE 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMBER I 

From the Ul2n Portal unless otherwise indicated: 

1 On the drain line 

I 400 feet N 16" E azimuth 

3 275 feet N 89" E azimuth 

4 365 feet S 16" E azimuth 

5 480 feet S 12" W azimuth 

6 560 feet S 48" W azimuth 

7 420 feet N 69" W azimuth 

8 1,370 feet S 43" E azimuth 

In the cable rise building 

On the vent hole 

From the 01211.18 SGZ: 

354 feet N 00" E azimuth 

367 feet S 60" E azimuth 

I 325 feet S 60" W azimuth 

119 
15 

20 

25 

30 

35 

Table 5-2. TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event RAMS unit locations 

21 September 1983. 

UNDERGROUND 

LOCATION 

From the U12n.18 main drift: 

14 130 feet into the U12n.18 main drift 

40 feet into the U12n.18 main drift 

From the U12n.08 main drift unless otherwise indicated: 

16 850 feet into the U12n.10 main drift 

17 400 feet into the U12n.10 main drift 

18 185 feet into the U12n.10 main drift 

19 Alcove I-31 in the U12n.10 main drift 

Alcove I-31 in the U12n.10 main drift 

21 Alcove I-31 in the U12n.10 main drift 

22 Alcove I-31 in the U12n.10 main drift 

23 Alcove I-29 in the U12n.10 bvpass drift 

From the UlZn.08 bypass drift unless otherwise indicated: 

24 500 feet into the U12n.10 bvoass drift 

250 feet into the U12n.10 bvoass drift 

26 85 feet into the U12n.08 S-curve of the bvoass 

27ER13 85 feet into the U12n.08 S-curve of the bvoass 

28 435 feet into U12n.08 main drift from U12n.05 drift 

From the U12n main drift: 

29 600 feet into the U12n.05 main drift 

From the U12n portal unless otherwise indicated: 

2,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

31 235 feet into the U12n uas seal plus bvoass drift 

32ER13 235 feet into the U12n aas seal plug bvoass drift 

33 1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

34 1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

50 feet into the ventline rise from U12n main drift 

36 200 feet into the U12n main drift 

l3 ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h). 

120 
9 

0 

PORTAL 1 

RAINIER MESA ROAD so 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 5-4. TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - surface RAMS. 
U12n.16 BYPASS 

Uiin 

PORTAL $ 

s NOT TO SCALE I 

Figure S-5. TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - underground RAMS. 
TOMME/MIDNlQHT 

ZEPHYR WP 

- INACCESSIBLE AREAS 

NOT TO SCALE 

Fi lex. .gure 5-6. TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event - underground RAMS, U12n.18 camp 
D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the WP and in the timing and 

firing control room were in accordance with DOE Order 

5610.3, and DOE Order 5610.3-26, "Program to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or control 

stations for issue of stay-in badges. After control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. 

In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and 

Security Plans," contractors and agencies were to have all 

personnel not connected with this event out of the closed 

area before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the USAF 

for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, if 

needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130/C-135 and 

crew on standby status for cloud tracking. EG&G provided 

one Turbo Beech and one Twin Bonanza aircraft and crews 

for tracking duties, if necessary. 

5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

5.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

By 20 September 

party, 

1983 at 2400 hours, 

the tunnel button-up party, 

all 

the 

persons 

mesa 

except 

button-up 

the 

crew, 

arming 

and 

the security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of the 

muster area. At 0330 hours on 21 September permission was 

granted to arm the device. By 0630 hours button-up operations 

were complete. 

A readiness briefing was held at 0530 hours on 21 September 1983, 

in anticipation of the planned test execution at 0800 hours the 

same day. Conditions for the test were favorable and all personnel were mustered out of the area. The five-minute countdown 

124 
began at 0755 hours and proceeded without interruption through 

zero time. 

The TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR device was detonated in the U12n.18 

drift at 0800 hours PDT on 21 September 1983. SNL geophones 

indicated cavity collapse occurred between H+35 and H+36 minutes. 

5.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0800 hours on 21 September 1983. 

RAMS unit number 16 became inoperative immediately and remained 

so throughout the test period. All RAMS units, except numbers 

14, 15, and 19 read background throughout the readout period and 

all units, except number 16, remained operational throughout the 

test and subsequent readout period. 

RAMS unit number 14, located on the WP side of the DPP in the 

U12n.18 drift, indicated increased readings beginning at Htl hour 

and 20 minutes and by Ht6 hours the reading was 311 mR/h. Unit 

numbers 15 and 19 had maximum readings of 0.3 mR/h at Ht8 hours 

and 0.2 mR/h at Ht9 hours, respectively. Some seepage of radioactive gases into the U12n.18 drift was indicated by these 

increased readings. However, radioactive decay occurred before 

tunnel ventilation began, and no radioactive effluent was released from this event. All RAMS units were secured at 

1000 hours on 23 September 1983, at that time, all units read 

background levels except for unit number 14, which read 1.5 mR/h. 

5.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Surveys and Recovery Activities. 

Initial reentry teams departed from the Test Controller's barricade at Gate 300 at 1100 hours on 21 September 1983. A mobile 

base station was provided for area control and equipment supply. 

By 1137 hours, the initial survey teams in both the U12n portal 

area and Rainier Mesa cable rise building and ventilation pad had 

completed the initial surface survey. No radiation levels above 

normal area background were detected. 

Survey teams, consisting of geologists, industrial hygienists, 

and radiation safety monitors, stood by at the N tunnel portal 

and on the mesa during data recovery and remote gas sampling of 

125 

_. ------- _ 
the tunnel. No toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected 

in tunnel atmosphere gas samples. Data recovery and gas sampling 

were completed by 1430 hours. The mesa and portal areas were 

secured and all personnel had checked out of the event location 

by 1530 hours on 21 September 1983. 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

Initial tunnel reentry operations began at 1047 hours on 22 September 1983 (D+l), when the reentry work team proceeded to the 

GSP. Ventilation at the GSP was established at 1123 hours by 

opening the 36-inch and 40-inch turntubes to the portal side of 

the DPP. No toxic gases or positive LEL levels were observed. 

No radiation levels above background (0.04 mR/h) were measured, 

and the oxygen level was a normal 21 percent. No respiratory 

protection was required. 

The reentry, backup, and rescue teams proceeded through the GSP 

at 1158 hours, and the DPP manway door was opened at 1331 hours. 

Air samples taken from the WP side of the DPP in the 36-inch 

crawlway showed no indication of toxic gases, positive LEL, or 

above-background radiation levels. The backup reentry and rescue 

teams moved to the portal side of the DPP at 1345 hours while the 

primary reentry team proceeded through the U12n.08 drift to the 

TSP opening where readings showed background radiation levels. 

The reentry team then opened the downhole ventline valve and 

established ventilation to the vent pad on the mesa before proceeding to the portal side of the DPP. At 1410 hours, the 

ventilation fans on the mesa were turned on. No respiratory 

protection was required for this initial reentry. 

At 1425 hours, the reentry team, now wearing self-contained 

breathing apparatus, proceeded to walk out the U12n.08 drift, tI le 

U12n.10 main drift, the l-29 SNL alcove, the l-36 LLNL power 

alcove, the 1-31 LLNL instrumentation alcove, the crosscut, and 

the LLNL Red Shack arriving at the FDPP at 1500 hours. There 

were no toxic gases or positive LEL levels detected. Radiation 

readings indicated background levels, but the oxygen level was 

below normal at 20 percent. Analysis of gas samples taken from 

126 
the WP side of the FDPP indicated 1000 ppm carbon monoxide (CO) 

and 35 percent of the LEL. The radiation reading was 0.3 mR/h. 

By 1536 hours, the reentry team had removed their self-contained 

breathing apparatus and continued to take smear samples on 

instrumentation in various user alcoves and on equipment in both 

the UlZn.10 main and bypass drifts. By 1639 hours, the team had 

returned to the portal side of the DPP. Laboratory analysis of 

the smear samples taken showed no radioactivity above background 

levels. 

At 1720 hours the Data 

recovery was completed 

Recovery teams 

by 1900 hours. 

entered the tunnel. Data 

5.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

Work began on mining 

and was completed at 

out the GSP at 1900 hours on 

0815 hours on 23 September. 

22 September 

By 27 September, miners had cut out the 26-inch turntube at the U12n.08 DPP 

and had begun work in the crosscuts to the user alcoves. Readings indicated no radioactivity levels above background and no 

toxic gases or positive LEL levels. By 2100 hours on 28 September miners were hand mucking and spading at the FDPP (U12n.18). 

Swipes taken at the FDPP indicated no radiation levels above 

background. 

On 4 October at 1030 hours miners and users were wearing selfcontained breathing apparatus when ventilation was established at 

the FDPP. Readings taken with a portable survey instrument 

showed radiation levels were at background levels inside the 

crawltube. Air sample data showed 100 ppm CO, 25 percent of the 

LEL, and 17.5 percent oxygen. Mining continued in the U12n.10 

drift, the crosscuts, and at the U12n.18 FDPP. The turntube was 

removed at the FDPP on 14 October. By 8 November, the miners had 

reached the stemming bulkhead, several rounds were fired, and by 

1330 hours on 9 November, the bulkhead was breached. A gas 

sampler was attached to the preexisting sampling line in the 

bulkhead at the end of the stemming. Readings showed no toxic 

gases, no positive LEL, and a normal 21 percent oxygen. No 

radiation above background levels was detected. Mining and 

cleanup continued in the U12n.18 drift. By 18 January 1984, 

miners, wearing supplied air breathing apparatus, had cut into 

127 

-_ - - - A - - -
the MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR LOS pipe, connected air and water lines, and 

began hand bailing water and slush from the LOS pipe into barrels. Radiation readings were 0.5 mR/h from the water barrel 

and 8 mR/h from the bottom of the slush barrel. The next day 

Radsafe and industrial hygiene personnel entered and surveyed the 

LOS pipe and took bagged samples. Maximum readings showed 

100 ppm CO and 50 percent of the LEL at the top of the FAC. The 

radiation level measured 1.5 mR/h. On 23 January 1984, DNA 

personnel and Pan Am photographers, dressed in double anticontamination clothing and full-face respirators, entered the LOS pipe 

to check the FAC and photograph the area, respectively. Probe 

drill hole core samples, taken in both the TOMME and MIDNIGHT 

ZEPHYR drifts during February, showed radiation levels below 

0.2 mR/h. Mining continued on the WP side of the FAC and in the 

TOMME LOS drift. By mid-March all mining activities, including 

equipment removal and debris cleanup, had been completed. 

5.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

Control of the p

mesa with a base 

on 22 September 

ber 1983, on the 

ostevent 

station 

1983. 

first 

Drilling 

of 

drilling 

and ap

three 

area 

propriate 

began 

drill 

was established 

barricades at 

at 0840 hours on 

holes. Postshot 

on the 

1320 hours 

23 Septem-

(PS) hole 

No. 1A was drilled to over 1,500 feet. Core sampling began at 

1747 hours on 24 September and was completed at 2107 hours that 

same day. Sixteen core samples were taken with the maximum gamma 

intensity being 30 R/h. The maximum reading on the platform 

recorder was 3.0 mR/h when removing the rotating head. When this 

operation was completed, the exposure rate returned to background 

levels within three minutes. Core sampling on PS hole No. 1AA 

began at 1325 hours on 25 September at a depth of 1,532 feet and 

was completed at 1607 hours that same day. A total of nine 

samples were taken with the maximum gamma intensity being 20 R/h. 

The third hole, PS hole No. lAAB, was sampled on 26 September 

beginning at 0105 hours. The work was completed at 0245 hours 

the same day. Core sampling depth was over 1,500 feet. Eight 

samples were taken with a maximum gamma intensity being 15 R/h. 

The abandonment valve was closed at 0700 hours on 26 September. 

Shutdown and cleanup continued with equipment being moved to the 

Decontamination Pad. This operation was completed, and all 

personnel were out of the area by 0535 hours on 27 September 

128 
1983. Cementback operations were not completed until September 

1985. 

One exploratory hole was drilled from tunnel level to obtain core 

samples. Drilling on reentry (RE) hole No. 1 in l-33 alcove off 

the U12n.10 main drift began on 12 October. This 350-foot hole 

was drilled toward the back corner of the instrumentation void of 

the TOMME LOS drift (Figure 5-2). Drilling was completed on 

8 November. Air sampling analysis throughout this time showed no 

toxic gases and no positive LEL. Radiation readings taken on 

numerous core samples were at background levels. 

5.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to measure 

radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The results 

were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling, were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. A written standard operating 

procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, 

toxic materials, radioactive material, or any other operation 

with the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved 

in such an operation was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory hard 

hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, boots, DOE-issued 

miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on initial tunnel 

reentry teams were certified in the use of the Draeger selfcontained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa two-hour 

breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, as 

spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, 

toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, stored, 

and transported in accordance with applicable sections of the 

following documents: 

129 

- -_ - - - -- -
1. Army Material Command Regulations (AMCR 385-100). 

2. Appropriate DOE Orders in the 5400 and 5600 Series concerning Environmental Protection, Safety & Health Protection, and Defense Programs respectively. 

3. Individual safe operating procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD safety coordinator. 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0800 hours on 21 September 1983, 

with the maximum reading of 311 mR/h detected on RAMS unit number 

14 at H+6 hours. All telemetry stations were secured at 

1000 hours on 23 September with only unit number 14 reading above 

background. 

The initial radiation surveys were completed by 1137 hours on 

21 September. No radiation above background was detected at the 

Rainier Mesa cable rise building and ventilation pad or at the 

tunnel portal area. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 1047 hours on 22 September. The 

reentry team, wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, recorded a maximum reading of 0.3 mR/h on a gas sample taken from the 

WP side of the FDPP. Analysis showed 35 percent of the LEL and 

1000 ppm CO. Initial reentry and data recovery was completed by 

1900 hours that same day. 

Postevent mining and sampling began< on 22 September and was 

completed by mid-March. The maximum radiation level recorded was 

8 mR/h from the slush from the MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR LOS pipe. Toxic 

gas levels of 100 ppm CO and 50 percent of the LEL were encountered by personnel surveying in the MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR LOS pipe at 

the top of the FAC. 

130 
Three postshot holes were drilled from the mesa beginning on 

22 September. Thirty-three core samples were taken with the 

maximum gamma intensity being 30 R/h. This operation was completed on 27 September. One 350-foot reentry exploratory hole 

was drilled from the l-33 alcove off the U12n.10 main drift 

toward the back corner of the instrumentation void of the TOMME 

LOS drift. Work began on 12 October and was completed on 

8 November. Radiation readings on core samples taken were at 

background levels. 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters were 

documented on Area Access Registers during individual entries to 

TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR radex areas over a non-continuous time 

frame from July through September 1983. Although pocket dosimeters showed some indication of possible radiation exposure, film 

badges worn by reentry personnel indicated no evidence of any 

gamma exposures The minimum detectable gamma exposure with the 

NTS film badge dosimeter was 30 mR. Area Access Register data 

are summarized below. 

Entries Maximum Average 

Participants Logged Exposure (mR) Exposure (mR) 

All 6,338 11.0 0.0 

DOD 125 0.0 0.0 

131 
SECTION 6 

MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO EVENT 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO was a DOD-sponsored nuclear weapons-effects 

test conducted at 0900 hours PST on 15 February 1984. The test 

had a yield of less than 20 kilotons. The MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO 

device was detonated in U12t.04 drift of T tunnel complex, at a 

vertical depth of 1,184 feet below the mesa surface and 4,749 

feet from T tunnel's portal (Figure 6-l). The purpose of the 

MIDAS MYTH event was to test the survivability of military 

hardware in a nuclear-detonation environment. MILAGRO was the 

LANL front-end physics experiments, sponsored by DOE. The 

purpose of the MILAGRO test was to evaluate device performance, 

radiation output, and containment-measurement techniques. 

MIDAS MYTHIMILAGRO was satisfactorily contained, and no atmospheric release occurred. Low concentrations of fission gases 

were recorded in the tunnel complex by RAMS and remote gas 

sampling, but radioactivity levels had decayed to background by 

the time of manned reentry. Data was recovered from the portal 

recording station (PRS) and the LANL recording trailer on the 

mesa. Data recovery operations were interrupted at Ht3.25 hours 

by an unexpected surface subsidence at the U12t Milagro trailer 

park that occurred when the cavity collapsed. The zero time 

ground shock was higher than expected, causing severe damage to 

the tunnel, experiments, instrumentation, and facilities. In 

spite of this, data recovery from the PRS was accomplished by 

1900 hours on 15 February 1984. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

6.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO project activities in Area 

12 was the responsibility of the DNA Test Group Director (TGD), 

132 
133 

- - -

-- _- a- _ 
subject to controls and procedures established by the DOE Test 

Controller. The DOE Test Controller was responsible for the 

safety of the public and onsite personnel during the test. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, and 

installing experiments, or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the working point (WP) 

area and the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with DOE Order 5610.3, "Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." The LANL TGD had overall 

responsibilities for all operations involving the MIDAS MYTH/ 

MILAGRO device. LANL was also responsible to the DOE Test 

Controller for radiological safety within the designated area of 

the WP from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the DOE Test Controller relieved LANL of their responsibilities. The DOE Test Controller authorized reentry operations to 

begin and issued the responsibility for project activities back 

to the DNA TGD. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

Some mechanical hardware and system components, including 

the Cable Drift Protection Plug (CDPP) and the Device Protection Barrier were reused from the HUSKY PUP event. The 

UlZt.04 complex consisted of one LOS drift, a bypass 

drift, a muffler, two auxiliary closures, the tunnel and 

pipe seal (TAPS), one zero room, three test chambers, four 

diagnostic pipes, and a vacuum pumping and monitoring 

station. The LOS pipe diverged from a diameter of eight 

inches close to the device to 156 inches at the back of 

test chamber (TC) No. 1. 

Remote gas sampling capabilities were incorporated during 

construction as well as water, power, drain, and pressurization lines. Provisions to manually take gas samples 

134 
from the WP side of the Gas Seal Door (GSD) and the DPP 

were made during postevent reentry. 

Construction activities began in May 1982 with mining of 

the MIDAS MYTH drift. Mining of the U12t.04 bypass drift 

began June 1982 and was completed in November. Mining of 

the LOS drift to the MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO working point (WP) 

was completed in December 1982 when cable installation 

began and concrete pours for the Modified Auxiliary Closure (MAC), Gas Seal Auxiliary Closure (GSAC) and TAPS 

inverts were completed. Installation of the LOS pipe 

began in February 1983 and was completed in August 1983 

(Figure 6-2). In November 1983, the MILAGRO area was completely grouted and the LANL Recorder and Oscilloscope 

Sealed Environmental System (ROSES) was installed in the 

U12t.04 bypass drift. In December, the installation of 

fiber optic cables was completed. 

The stemming plan for the U12t.04 complex is shown in 

Figure 6-3. Stemming operations began in July 1983. 

Rock-matching grout, superlean grout and high-strength 

groutcrete were pumped into all void areas from the MIDAS 

MYTH/MILAGRO WP to a distance of 550 feet. The drift was 

backfilled first with rock-matching grout to 156 feet, 

then with superlean grout to 295 feet, and finally with 

high-strength groutcrete to 550 feet. The U12t.04 bypass 

drift was also stemmed in the same manner from the MIDAS 

MYTH WP to a distance of 500 feet. All penetrations into 

the stemmed areas of the drifts (e.g., cables and water 

lines) were gas blocked to prevent the seepage of radioactive gases outside the stemmed region of the drifts. 

Experiment and related hardware installation began in 

September 1983 and was completed by January 1984. The 

experimenter organizations included: Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL), conducted a series of experiments referred to as MILAGRO (front-end diagnostic experiments 

which included device diagnostics, weapon physics, and 

hydrodynamic measurements); Science Applications International (SAI), conducted an energy-coupling experiment; 

135 
GSAC-Gasseal Auxlllaryclosum 

MAC - Modified Auxiliary clo5un 

TAPS -Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

TC - Test Chamber 

VP - Vacuum Pump 

MECHANlCAL DRIFT CABLE PROTECTION PLUQ DOWN HOLE 

FIBER OPTICS 

SPLICE ALCOVE 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 6-2. MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - tunnel and pipe layout. 
CROCK-MATCHING QROUT HHIQH-STRENQTH QROUTCRETE 

AIR VOID COMPRESSIVE HIQH-STRENQTH GROUT cl El 

q SUPERLEAN GROUT q QROUTCRETE 

q HIQH-STRENGTH QRouT q STRUCTURAL CONCRETE 

CQB= CABLE QAS BLOCK 

QSAC = GAS-SEAL AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

MAC - MODIFIED AUXILIARY 

PQB- POWER QAS BLOCK 

RS- RANQE STATION (FEET) 

SS - SCIENTIFIC STATION (FEET) 

TAPS-TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAL 

WP - WORKINQ POINT (132) 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 6-3. MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - stemming plan. 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Lockheed Palo Alto 

Research Laboratory (LPARL), performed device radiation 

output measurement experiments (Figure 6-4). The Defense 

Nuclear Agency (DNA) supported the following experiments: 

JAYCOR, conducted an air-modified source-generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) experiment to verify analysis 

methods for SGEMP calculations (Figure 6-5); APTEK, fielded a prototype gauge and conducted an experiment on impulse coupling; General Electric (GE), conducted an Advanced Antenna Window Correlation experiment; McDonnel 

Douglas Astronautics Corporation (MDAC), conducted a 

shielding compatibility experiment; General Research 

Corporation (GRC), conducted experiments on space components and instrumentation verification; and TRW Systems, 

conducted experiments on solar cells. 

Signal dry run participation began in January 1984. A 

successful mandatory full-participation dry run (MFP) was 

conducted on 31 January after which final device preparation and final stemming commenced. A final dry run was 

successfully conducted on 14 February 1984, and preparations were made to execute the test on the following day. 

At 0130 hours on 15 February 1984, final arming took place 

after which button-up activities began. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during these events were in accordance with DOE 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory 

personnel were provided to perform initial radiation 

surveys, conduct aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry parties as needed. Radsafe personnel 

were also standing by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to 

perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed; 

provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, portal instruments, and dosimeters; operate area 

control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination, as required. 

138 


Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic 

suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to the 40 permanent RAMS units, 38 temporary 

units provided surface and underground coverage for MIDAS 

MYTH/MILAGRO. Table 6-l and Table 6-2 list the locations 

of surface and underground RAMS, respectively. The location of both surface and underground RAMS units are shown 

in Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7, respectively. The U12t.04 

complex RAMS unit locations are shown in Figure 6-8. All 

RAMS units were installed a minimum of five days prior to 

scheduled device detonation. 

EPA operated continuous monitoring stations at 29 locations in the offsite area. All the stations had highvolume air samplers with collectors for particulate and 

reactive gases, 16 had tritium and noble gas samplers, and 

19 had pressurized ion chamber gamma-rate detector/recorder systems in operation. Thirty-one EPA personnel were 

fielded for surveillance activities. 

D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the WP area and the timing 

and firing control room were in accordance with DOE Order 

5610.3, and DOE Order 5610.3-26, "Program to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or control 

stations for issue of stay-in badges. After control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and Security 

Plans," contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not connected with this event out of the closed area 

before the final security sweep began. 

141 

- - - - --a - - -
Table 6-l. MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event RAMS unit locations 

15 February 1984. 

SURFACE 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMBER I 

Fran the U12t portal unless otherwise indicated: 

1 At the portal 

I 6 289 feet S 76" E azimuth 

7 389 feet S 09" E azimuth 

8 323 feet S 43" W azimuth 

9 564 feet N 74" W azimuth 

I 653 feet S 81" E azimuth on the drain line 

11 2,005 feet S 88"E azimuth 

12 In the cable splice building 

13 At MILAGRO cable hole 

From the U12t.04 SGZ: 

I 314 feet N 00" E azimuth 

15 502 feet S 60" E azimuth 

16 591 feet S 65" W azimuth 

142 
Table 6-2. MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event RAMS unit locations 

15 February 1984. 

UNDERGROUND 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMHER 

From the U12t.04 drift unless otherwise indicated: 

17 445 feet into the U12t.04 LOS drift 

18 285 feet into the U12t.04 LOS drift 

19 200 feet into the U12t.04 LOS drift 

20 200 feet into the U12t.04 ballroom 

21 25 feet into the U12t.04 TC-1 alcove 

22 4,145 feet into the U12t.05 drift from the portal 

From the U12t.03 bypass drift: 

23 310 feet into the U12t.04 bypass drift 

24 194 feet into the U12t.04 bypass drift 

From the U12t.05 main drift unless otherwise indicated: 

25 100 feet into the U12t.03 bypass drift 

26 60 feet into the U12n.04 SGEMP CC from U12t.04 

27 220 feet into the U12t.03 main drift 

28 250 feet into the U12t.01 main drift 

29 125 feet into the U12t cable access CC 

30ER14 125 feet into the U12t cable access CC 

31 150 feet into the U12t.07 main drift from U12t.02 

From the U12n portal unless otherwise indicated: 

32 3,320 feet into the U12t main drift 

33 2,800 feet into the U12t main drift 

34 2,240 feet into the U12t main drift 

35ER14 2,240 feet into the U12t main drift 

36 1,800 feet into the U12t main drift 

37 900 feet into the U12t main drift 

38 100 feet into the U12t main drift 

l4 ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h). 

143 
\ i 

I\ 

L

1 \

! I v 

144 
145 
-MIDAS MYTH 

WORKING POINT 

NOT TO SCALE - HACCESSIBLE 

Figure 6-8. MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO event - underground RAMS UlZt.04 complex. 
E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the USAF 

for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, if 

needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130/C-135 and 

crew on standby status for cloud sampling. EG&G provided 

one Turbo Beech and one Twin Bonanza aircraft and crews 

for tracking duties, if necessary. 

6.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

6.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

By 14 February 1984 at 2400 hours, all persons except the arming 

party, the tunnel button-up crew, the mesa button-up crew, and 

the security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of the 

muster area. At 0130 hours on 15 February, permission was 

granted to arm the device. By 0615 hours button-up was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 1400 hours on 14 February 1984, 

in anticipation of the planned test execution at 0700 hours the 

next day. A faulty fiber optics decoder power supply needed 

replacement on the morning of 15 February, causing a two-hour 

countdown delay. The countdown started at 0845 hours, and the 

MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO device was detonated in the U12t.04 drift at 

0900 hours PST on 15 February 1984. 

6.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0900 hours on 15 February 1984. 

At Htl minute, underground RAMS units 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 

and 28 became inoperative and remained so for the entire event 

period. All other RAMS units remained operational throughout the 

event and subsequent postevent periods. Due to ground subsidence 

on the mesa, the surface RAMS units 12 through 15 became inoperative at H+3.25 hours. All RAMS units, except unit 21, read background throughout the entire readout period. RAMS unit 21 

recorded the maximum reading of 0.43 mR/h at Ht2 minutes. By 

Htl hour, the reading decreased to background levels. 

147 

-. - - - -- - -
6.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Survey and Recovery Activities. 

Initial surface reentry teams departed from the Test Controller's 

barricade at Gate 300 at 1007 hours on 15 February 1984. A 

mobile base station was provided for area control and equipment 

supply. By 1101 hours initial survey teams in both the U12t 

portal yard, ventilation pad, and on the mesa had completed the 

initial surface survey. No radiation levels above the normal 

background levels were detected. 

Survey teams stood by in both the U12t tunnel portal and U12t 

Milagro trailer park during data recovery and gas sampling of the 

tunnel atmosphere. At approximately 1225 hours, the U12t.04 

surface ground zero area and the Milagro trailer park subsided 

(Figure 6-9). This subsidence produced a crater 18 feet deep, 

injuring several survey team members and resulting in the only 

fatality that ever occurred from a DOD-sponsored event. One 

survey team member died as a result of complications from injuries sustained when subsidence occurred. 

The initial survey teams, consisting of geologists, industrial 

hygienists, and radiation safety monitors, accompanied by data 

recovery teams, relocated to the access roads, to the U12t 

portal, and to the U12t Milagro trailer park. The portal gas 

sampling team reentered the portal at 1645 hours. No toxic gases 

or positive LEL levels were detected from remote gas sampling of 

the tunnel atmosphere. Data recovery and gas sampling were 

completed at 1900 hours. All personnel had checked out of the 

event location by 2035 hours on 15 February 1984. 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

6.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

Initial reentry operations began at 0909 hours on 17 February 

1984 (Dt2), with all team members dressed in anticontamination 

clothing. The work team went as far as the GSD. Ventilation was 

established at 0951 hours by opening the manway at the GSD to the 

portal side of the GSP. No toxic gases, positive LEL, or radiation levels above background (0.04 mR/h) were detected. The 

148 

oxygen level was a normal 21 percent. No respiratory protection 

was required for this initial reentry. 

At 1315 hours the reentry team, backup reentry, and rescue teams 

departed the portal for the GSP. The manway door was opened 

through the GSP at 1340 hours on 17 February 1984. Air sampling 

data taken in the 24-inch turntube on the WP side of the GSP 

showed no positive toxic gases, LEL, or radiation levels above 

background. 

The reentry team proceeded to the portal side of the main DPP at 

1411 hours. Wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, the 

reentry team opened the 24-inch and 36-inch turntubes, and 

established ventilation at 1633 hours. Readings inside the 

24-inch turntube were 0.06 mR/h, 5 ppm carbon monoxide (CO), and 

5 percent of the LEL. 

At 1645 hours on 17 February 1984, the reentry team proceeded 

through the main DPP in an attempt to walk out the U12t.05 main 

drift and the U12t.04 ballroom. As a result of unexpectedly high 

ground shock on 15 February, an unprecedented amount of damage to 

the LOS pipe, tunnel, ballroom, alcoves, and ROSES was discovered. The invert in the U12t.05 main drift and in the ballroom 

was heaved upward, impeding reentry operations. Readings taken 

15 feet away from the thermal shield wall at the U12t.04 LOS 

drift were 2 mR/h, 50 ppm CO, 5 percent of the LEL, and 20 percent oxygen. The reentry team returned to the portal side of the 

main DPP at 1739 hours. All teams exited the tunnel at 

1809 hours on 17 February 1984. 

At 1052 hours on 29 February 1984, a reentry team, wearing selfcontained breathing apparatus, entered the LOS pipe at TC No. 1 

to check the LOS pipe and tunnel conditions. The LOS pipe was 

collapsed, but access to test chambers and test alcoves was 

possible. The maximum reading at TC No. 1 door was 2 mR/h. No 

toxic gases or positive LEL levels.were detected. The oxygen 

level in the LOS pipe was a normal 21 percent. 

Scientific assessment teams entered the LOS pipe at TC No. 1 

wearing full-face respirators with HEPA filters and full anticontamination clothing at 1300 hours on 29 February 1984. The teams 

completed their work that same day. 

150 
6.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

Extensive rehabilitation to the U12t main drift (inside the DPP) 

and its subdrifts started at 0110 hours on 18 February 1984. 

Miners wearing anticontamination clothing broke through the DPP 

bulkhead at 0555 hours on 19 February 1984. Readings taken 

during this period indicated a normal oxygen level and no toxic 

gases or positive LEL levels. Rehabilitation efforts were completed as far as the ballroom in the U12t.04 drift complex by 

0215 hours on 28 February 1984. 

Mining operations continued simultaneously with experiment 

recovery and reentry operations. Mining began at the U12t.04 LOS 

drift shield wall on 14 March 1984. Rockbolting, cribbing, track 

laying and hanging wire mesh were performed to refurbish the 

drift. LOS rehabilitation was completed on 22 March 1984. 

Radiation readings were background, with 10 ppm CO, 20 percent 

oxygen and no positive LEL levels detected. 

Mining of the U12t.04 reentry drift required drilling probe holes 

to detect toxic gases and radiation levels. Initial probe 

readings indicated background radiation and no toxic gases or 

positive LEL levels. Alpine mining of the U12t.04 reentry drift 

began 12 April 1984. Mining operations continued on a heading 

toward ground zero (GZ) until late June 1984, when contaminated 

water began seeping from the WP side of the bulkhead wall in the 

U12t.04 reentry drift. Mining operations were terminated due to 

radioactive water seepage problems. 

6.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

No postevent drilling from the mesa occurred for core samples. 

However, a drilling area was established in U12t.04 reentry drift 

on 24 April 1984. Drilling began towards the cavity at 1615 

hours on 1 May on the first of three drill holes. Thirty-six 

core samples were taken from U12t.04 Reentry (RE) No. 1A between 

2130 hours on 1 May and 1430 hours on 15 May 1984. Sampling of 

RE No. 2 occurred between 1100 hours on 30 May 1984 and 

1000 hours on 14 June 1984. Radiation, toxic gases and positive 

LEL levels were detected in both RE No. lA, and RE No. 2. The 

maximum readings were 2 mR/h, 2000 ppm CO, and 100 percent of the 

LEL. Both holes were grouted to contain contamination. 

151 

_-_ -- - -
On 27 June 1984, drilling operations were temporarily interrupted 

to evaluate several core samples recovered from hole RE No. 3. 

Among the core samples recovered was a glassy material extracted 

from RE No. 3 at a distance of 422 feet into the drill hole. 

Core samples were sent to LANL for analysis. 

In conjunction with the core sample evaluations there were 

drilling difficulties associated with contaminated material 

seeping from RE No. 3. High pressure steam and radioactive hot 

water seeped from the return line of the drill rig at RE No. 3. 

Readings inside the return line tank indicated a radiation level 

of 100 mR/h, no toxic gases, and zero percent of the LEL. Drilling operations were reevaluated to determine the severity of the 

contamination and the dangers it posed to the entire U12t complex. 

Consequently, drilling operations were terminated on 29 June 

1984. Radiation containment operations began in the U12t.04 

complex with the sealing of the U12t.04 reentry drift. Reentry 

and recovery operations were completed in mid-March 1985. 

6.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to measure 

radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The results 

were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. A written standard operating 

procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, 

toxic material, radioactive material, or any other operation with 

the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved in 

such an operation was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory hard 

hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, boots, DOE-issued 

miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on the initial 

tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the Draeger 

self-contained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa two152 
hour breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, 

as spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, 

toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, stored 

and transported in accordance with applicable sections of the 

following documents: 

1. Army Material Command Regulation (AMCR 385-100) 

2. Appropriate DOE Orders in the 5400 and 5600 Series 

concerning Environmental Protection, Safety & Health 

Protection, and Defense Programs respectively. 

3. Individual safe operating procedures (by experimenter organization). 

4. MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were required to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD safety coordinator. 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0900 hours on 15 February 1984. 

Several RAMS units were lost due to the higher than expected 

ground shock. The maximum reading was 0.43 mR/h detected on RAMS 

unit number 21 at Ht2 minutes. By Htl hour RAM unit 21 recorded 

background levels. 

The initial radiation surveys began at 1007 hours on 15 February 

1984, and were completed by 2035 hours. No radiation above background level was detected at the mesa cable rise building, the 

Milagro trailer park, or at the tunnel portal area. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 0909 hours on 17 February 1984. 

The maximum readings from remote gas sampling analysis showed 

50 ppm CO and 5 percent of the LEL. The maximum radiation level 

was 2 mR/h. Initial reentry was completed as far as the LOS 

153 
drift 29 February 1984; data recovery was completed 27 March 

1984; and final recovery was conducted in March 1985. 

Postevent mining and drilling began on 18 February 1984, and 

continued until 29 June 1984. Mining activities progressed 

slowly due to extensive damage in the U12t tunnel complex. 

Mining operations were terminated in June 1984, as a result of 

radioactive water problems in the U12t.04 reentry drift. The 

maximum radiation reading of 100 mR/h was recorded at drill hole 

RE No. 3. 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters were 

documented on the Area Access Registers during individual entries 

to MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO radex area over a non-continuous time frame 

from 15 February 1984, to 2 April 1986. Although pocket dosimeters showed some indication of possible radiation exposure, film 

badges worn by reentry personnel indicated no evidence of any 

gamma exposure. The minimum detectable gamma exposure with the 

NTS film badge dosimeter was 30 mR. 

Area Access Register data are summarized below. 

Entries Maximum Average 

Participants Logged Exposure (mR) Exposure (mR) 

All 2,764 180 3.1 

DOD 314 180 2.0 

154 
SECTION 7 

MISTY RAIN EVENT 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY. 

MISTY RAIN was a DOD-sponsored nuclear weapons-effects test conducted at 1515 hours PST on 6 April 1985. The test had a yield 

of less than 20 kilotons. The MISTY RAIN device was detonated in 

U12n.17 drift of N tunnel complex at a depth of 1,273 feet below 

the mesa surface (Figure 7-l). The purpose of the MISTY RAIN 

event was to test the survivability of military hardware in a 

nuclear detonation environment. 

At Ht10.5 minutes, RAMS units located within the tunnel complex 

indicated the presence of radioactivity in the alcoves and drifts 

associated with the test. This caused a delay in tunnel reentry 

until 9 April 1985, and subsequent operations were hampered. 

When ventilation to the mesa was established, a controlled 

effluent release, consisting of xenons and kryptons occurred. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

7.2.1 Responsibilities. 

Safe conduct of all MISTY RAIN project activities in Area 12 was 

the responsibility of the DNA Test Group Director (TGD), subject 

to controls and procedures established by the DOE Test Controller. The DOE Test Controller was responsible for the safety of 

the public and onsite personnel during the test. 

Project agencies were responsible for designing, preparing, and 

installing experiments, or delivering them to the installation 

contractor. After the event, these agencies were responsible for 

removing samples, analyzing instrument and sample data, and 

preparing project reports on experiment results. 

Device safety and security procedures in the working point (WP) 

area and the timing and firing control room were in accordance 

with DOE Order 5610.3, "Program to Prevent Accidental or 

155 

- --- -A - a 
NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 7-l. MISTY RAIN event - tunnel layout. 
Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." The LLNL TGD had 

overall responsibilities for all operations involving the MISTY 

RAIN device. LLNL was also responsible to the DOE Test Controller for radiological safety within the designated area of the WP 

from device emplacement until detonation. After detonation, the 

DOE Test Controller relieved LLNL of their responsibilities. The 

DOE Test Controller approved the controlled venting of the tunnel 

complex, and returned the responsibility for project activities 

back to the DNA TGD. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations. 

A. Tunnel Facilities Construction. 

Some mechanical hardware and system components, including 

several sections of LOS pipe recovered from the MINERS 

IRON event, were reused. The U12n.17 complex, a twovessel containment system, consisted of one LOS drift, a 

bypass drift, two access drifts, a muffler, two auxiliary 

closures, tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS), one zero room, one 

test chamber, and a vacuum pumping and monitoring station 

(Figure 7-2). 

Remote gas sampling capabilities were incorporated during 

construction as well as water, power, drain, and pressurization lines. Provisions to manually take gas samples 

from the WP side of the Gas Seal Door (GSD) were made 

during postevent reentry. 

Construction activities began in November 1982 with the 

mining of the U12n.16 drift. Mining of the U12n.17 main 

LOS drift began in March 1983 and was completed in December. During that time, concrete pours for the Modified 

Auxiliary Closure (MAC), the Gas Seal Auxiliary Closure 

(GSAC) , and the TAPS inverts were completed. In April 

1983, mining began in the U12n.17 bypass drift and by 

July 1983 an extension drift15 was mined to meet the 

requirements for accommodating the source-generated 

l5 The main drift diameter was not large enough to accommodate 

some experimental hardware designs. Therefore, a larger-dia- meter extension drift was mined for hardware emplacement. 

157 
7 

QSAC - GAS SEAL AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

MAC - MODIFIED AUXILIARY CLOSURE 

TAPS - TUNNEL AND PIPE SEAl 

TC - TESTCHAMBER 

. / 

U12n.17 Byparo Drift 

MistyRdnVUP hluk MAC I I End ‘of ft,!F TC #l Strmming A00088 I 

Door Door bTARSAT 

TCln 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 7-2. MISTY RAIN event - tunnel and pipe layout. 
electromagnetic pulse test analysis and research satellite 

(STARSAT) chamber (Figure 7-3). The Recorder and Oscilloscope Sealed Environmental System (ROSES) drift and instrumentation alcoves were mined from November 1983 until 

completion in March 1984. Installation of the LOS pipe 

began in February 1984 and was completed in December 1984. 

Several experiment modifications and hardware fabrications 

caused an increase in construction efforts. In May 1984 

an additional 200 feet in the bypass drift was mined for 

the tunnel hardening experiment, and in August 1984, the 

MK5 matrix for the Navy was modified resulting in changes 

to the interior of the test chamber. These projects were 

completed by February 1985. In January 1985 the ROSES 

were installed, and fiber optic cables were connected. 

The stemming plan for the U12n.17 complex is shown in 

Figure 7-4. Stemming operations began in July 1984 when 

rock-matching grout, superlean grout, desert fines sand, 

comprehensive high-strength grout, and high-strength 

groutcrete were pumped into all void areas from the MISTY 

RAIN WP to a distance of 705 feet in the U12n.17 main 

drift. The main drift was backfilled first with desert 

fines sand behind the WP; then with rock-matching grout to 

157 feet; and then with superlean grout over a rock-matching grout invert from 157 feet to 292 feet. Between the 

MAC, GSAC, and TAPS sections, concrete, superlean grout, 

high-strength groutcrete, and comprehensive high-strength 

grout were poured to 459 feet. Finally, high-strength 

grout filled the remaining 246 feet of the stemmed portion 

of the main drift after device emplacement. The U12n.17 

bypass was also stemmed in the same manner out to 500 

feet. All penetrations into the stemmed areas of the 

drifts (e.g., cables and water lines) were gas blocked to 

prevent the seepage of radioactive gases outside the 

stemmed region of the drifts. 

Experiment and related hardware installation began in 

November 1984 and was completed by February 1985. The 

experimenter organizations included: Lockheed Palo Alto 

Research Laboratory (LPARL), Sandia National Laboratory 

(SNL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 

159 

cm - CABLE QAS BLOCK ROCK-MATCHNQ GWUT Ii~TnENOlH MOlJf WAC - GAS OEAL AlJXlLlARYCLOOW16 

FBHlaltNnENaniQROUTCRETE MAC - YODIRED AUXIIARY CLCWRE 

ras - POWER BAS 8mcK ~OMPREHENWE HIW-STRMTH QWUT TAPU -TUNNEL AND PIPE KM m DESERT FINES 8AND 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 7-4. MISTY RAIN event - stemming plan. 
all performed phenomenology experiments addressing sourcegenerated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) and thermomechanical and structural responses; and Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL), performed the source simultaneity 

front-end experiment. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) 

sponsored the following experiments: General Electric 

Company, Federal and Electronics System Division (GEFE), 

performed the spacecraft system experiment, which evaluated the DNA full-scale STARSAT (Figure 7-5); Mission Research Corporation (MRC), conducted an antenna analysis 

measuring SGEMP effects; Kaman Sciences Corporation (KSC), 

performed STARSAT signal measurement experiments; and 

Scientific Application International Corporation (SAIC), 

fielded a radiation diagnostics measurement experiment and 

a wide band fiber-optics experiment. The US Navy Strategic Systems Project Office (SSPO) also fielded an experiment. 

Signal dry runs began in November 1984. A successful 

mandatory full-participation dry run (MFP) was conducted 

on 21 March 1985, after which final device preparation and 

final stemming commenced. A full frequency, full power 

dry run was also successfully conducted on 28 March 1985, 

and preparations were made to execute the test on 2 April 

1985. 

At 0100 hours on 2 April, during final button-up operations, a significant air leak was discovered at the GSP OI -I 

the WP side in the U12n extension drift. Immediate repairs were required, and the test was rescheduled for 

4 April 1985. However, tunnel repairs did not support 

this date, and the test was again rescheduled for 6 April 

1985. 

B. Radiological Safety Support. 

Procedures for radiation exposure and contamination control during these events were in accordance with DOE 

Manual Chapter 0524 and requirements of responsible DOD 

representatives. Radsafe monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, manned stations, and security station requirements. Radsafe monitoring teams and supervisory 

162 

personnel were provided to perform initial radiation 

surveys, conduct aerial surveys by helicopter, and participate in reentry parties as needed. Radsafe personnel 

were also standing by at Gate 300 prior to detonation to 

perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed; 

provide and issue anticontamination equipment and material, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area 

control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, 

and vehicle decontamination, as required. 

Available anticontamination materials and equipment included head covers, coveralls, cloth shoe covers, totes, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic 

suits, plastic bags, gloves, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support. 

In addition to the 40 permanent RAMS units, 40 temporary 

units provided surface and underground coverage for MISTY 

RAIN. Table 7-l and Table 7-2 list the locations of 

surface and underground RAMS, respectively. The location 

of both surface and underground RAMS units are shown in 

Figure 7-6 and Figure 7-7, respectively. The U12n.17 

complex RAMS unit detailed locations are shown in 

Figure 7-8. All RAMS units were installed a minimum of 

five days prior to scheduled device detonation. 

EPA operated continuous monitoring stations at 29 locations in the offsite area. All the stations had highvolume air samplers with collectors for particulate and 

reactive gases, 16 had tritium and noble gas samplers, and 

22 had pressurized ion chamber gamma-rate detector/recorder systems in operation. Twenty-eight EPA personnel were 

fielded for surveillance activities. 

D. Security Coverage. 

Device security procedures in the WP area and the timing 

and firing control room were in accordance with DOE Order 

5610.3, and DOE Order 5610.3-26, "Program to Prevent 

Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations." 

Beginning on D-l, all personnel entering or exiting the 

164 
I 

Table 7-l. MISTY RAIN event RAMS unit locations 06 April 1985. 

SURFACE 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMBER 

From the U12n Portal unless otherwise indicated: 

1 On the drain line 

2 400 feet N 16' E azimuth 

3 275 feet N 89" E azimuth 

4 365 feet S 16" E azimuth 

5 480 feet S 12" W azimuth 

6 I 560 feet S 48" W azimuth 

7 420 feet N 69" W azimuth 

8 1,370 feet S 43" E azimuth 

9 3,559 feet S 34" W azimuth (at B tunnel portal) 

On the vent hole 

From the U12n.17 SGZ: 

11 400 feet N 00" E azimuth 

12 400 feet S 60" E azimuth 

13 400 feet S 60" W azimuth 

165 
Table 7-2. MISTY RAIN event RAMS unit locations 06 April 1985. 

UNDERGROUND 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMBER I 

From the U12n extension drift unless otherwise indicated: 

545 feet into the U12n.17 main drift 

450 feet into the U12n.17 main drift 

16 

18 

I250 feet 

I 185 feet 

I 80 feet 

into 

into 

into 

the U12n.17 main drift 

the U12n.17 main drift 

the U12n.17 main drift 

19 610 feet into the U12n.17 bypass drift 

20 

21 

320 feet 

U12n.17 

I U12n.17 

into the U12n.17 

TC-1 alcove 

SNLA alcove 

bypass drift 

23 330 feet into the U12n.17 ROSES drift 

24 

25 

290 feet 

I 170 feet 

into 

into 

the 

the 

U12n.17 

U12n.17 

ROSES drift 

ROSES drift 

26 200 

I .06 

feet 

drift 

into the U12n.16 drift from the U12nFrom the U12n main drift: 

27 600 feet into the U12n.06 drift 

2816 4,000 feet into the U12n extension drift 

29 I600 feet into the U12n.05 drift 

I6 From the U12n portal extension. 

166 
I 

Table 7-2. MISTY RAIN event RAMS unit locations 06 April 1985 

(Continued). 

UNDERGROUND 

STATION LOCATION 

NUMBER I 

From the U12n portal unless otherwise indicated: 

3o17 2,900 feet into the U12n extension drift 

3P7 2,300 feet into the U12n extension drift 

32 12,600 feet into the U12n main drift 

33 235 feet into the U12n gas seal plug bypass drift 

34ER18 235 feet into the U12n gas seal plug bypass drift 

I 1,700 feet into the U12n main drift 

36 1,200 feet into the U12n main drift 

37 200 feet into the U12n main drift 

3E17 1,200 feet into the U12n extension drift 

3917 200 feet into the U12n extension drift 

40 50 feet into the U12n ventline rise 

l7 From the U12n portal extension. 

l* ER - Extended Range (instrument capable of reading 100 mR/h to 

100,000 R/h). 

167 
t 

N 

~ 

o 

8 

NOT TO SCALE 9 

o 

Figure 7-6. MISTY RAIN event - surface RAMS. 
quaha - punodk3pun sm l 

1 I 
::============~U:'2:n:E~X:T:E:NS:I:0:N:D:R:'F:T::==::::::~~~::::~~~~~~==::::~~ 28 

~=====--=:====:::;:-;:/L-

..... 

-..J 

a 

- 8HIELDWALL 

INAOOESSIBLE 

U12n.07 DRIFT 

NOT TO SCALE 

Figure 7-8. MISTY RAIN event - underground RAMS U12n.17 complex. 
- - 

controlled area were required to stop at muster or control 

stations for issue of stay-in badges. After control was 

established, all through traffic was diverted around the 

controlled area by use of screening stations. In accordance with the "Test Controller's Operations and Security 

Plans," contractors and agencies were to have all personnel not connected with this event out of the closed area 

before the final security sweep began. 

E. Air Support. 

Three UHlN helicopters and crews were provided by the USAF 

for cloud tracking and the Test Controller's use, if 

needed. In addition, the USAF provided a C-130/C-135 and 

crew on standby status for cloud sampling. EGCG provided 

one Turbo Beech and one Twin Bonanza aircraft with crews 

for tracking duties, if necessary. 

7.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES. 

7.3.1 Preshot Activities. 

By 5 April 1985, at 2400 hours, all persons excepts the arming 

party, the tunnel button-up crew, the mesa button-up crew, and 

the security guards were out of the tunnel and clear of the 

muster area. At 0315 hours on 6 April, permission was granted to 

arm the device. By 0800 hours button-up was completed. 

A readiness briefing was held at 1400 hours on 5 April 1985, in 

anticipation of the planned test execution of 0900 hours the next 

day. Adverse weather conditions on 6 April 1985, caused a 

six-hour countdown delay. The countdown started at 1510 hours, 

and the MISTY RAIN device was detonated in the U12n.17 drift at 

1515 hours PST on 6 April 1985. 

7.3.2 Test Area Monitoring. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1515 hours on 6 April 1985, and 

immediately, RAMS units 14, 16, and 19 became inoperative. All 

other units, except for units 15, 17, 18, and 20 through 32, 

recorded background radiation levels throughout the entire 

171 
readout period. All RAMS units on the WP side of the GSP that 

were operational indicated readings above background levels. 

RAMS unit 18 read 19.5 R/h at HtlO seconds, and unit 15 read 

1000 R/h at Htll minutes. Ventilation of the tunnel complex 

began on 9 April. As a result, readings on RAMS units 15 and 18 

had decreased to 4.4 mR/h and 1 mR/h, respectively by 1040 hours 

on 10 April. All RAMS units were secured at 1510 hours on 

12 April 1985. At this time unit 15 was reading 0.9 mR/h; all 

other units indicated background radiation levels. 

7.3.3 Initial Surface Radiation Survey and Recovery Activities. 

Initial surface reentry teams departed from the Test Controller's 

barricade at Gate 300 at 1652 hours on 6 April 1985. A mobile 

base station was provided for anticontamination clothing and 

equipment supply. By 1732 hours both the mesa trailer park and 

portal survey teams completed the initial surface surveys. No 

radiation levels above normal area background were detected. 

Survey teams, consisting of geologists, industrial hygienists, 

and radiation safety monitors, stood by in the U12n tunnel portal 

and at the mesa trailer park during data recovery and gas sampling of the tunnel atmosphere. These operations began in the 

U12n complex at 1804 hours. By 1831 hours on 6 April remote gas 

sample data taken from the WP side of the GSP indicated 2,000 ppm 

of carbon monoxide (CO), 100 percent of the LEL, and 15 percent 

oxygen. The radiation reading on the sampling bag was 1 R/h. 

Remote samples taken from the LOS pipe indicated a radiation 

level of 80 mR/h, 200 ppm CO, 35 percent of the LEL and 15 percent oxygen. This work was completed at 1945 hours on 6 April 

1985. 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES. 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry Activities. 

Ventilation operations began on 8 April 1985 in the U12n tunnel 

complex. At 1450 hours a nine-member reentry team entered the 

tunnel complex to check tunnel pressures between the GSD and GSP. 

By 1518 hours both the GSD and the GSP valves were opened. 

172 
Readings indicated a normal 21 percent oxygen level, background 

radiation levels, no toxic gases and no positive LEL levels. At 

1545 hours the team exited the tunnel, closing the GSD manway 

door from the portal side. Ventilation preparation continued 

until 9 April 1985 with the installation of filters and sampling 

ports and the calibration of the ventlines. 

At 1025 hours on 9 April, a work crew entered the tunnel wearing 

antics and self-contained breathing apparatus. The team opened 

the GSD manway door and proceeded towards the GSP. At 1053 hours 

the team entered the GSP bypass drift and recorded negative 

pressure readings and background radiation levels. The team then 

opened the 42-inch crawltube door at the GSP and took swipes of 

the inside of the tube. Work continued and tunnel ventilation 

began at 1134 hours on 9 April lasting for approximately 

24 hours, with gases being pumped through both the portal and 

mesa ventlines. 

On 10 April 1985 the work crew reentered the tunnel to remove 

bolts from the GSD. They began laying rails and hooking up 

waterlines to the portal side of the GSP. Both the initial 

reentry and back-up teams, wearing double anticontamination 

clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus, returned to the 

GSP at 1149 hours on 10 April 1985. The initial reentry team 

then proceeded from the portal side of the GSP to the U12n.17 

shield wall (shown in Figure 7-8). Readings at the U12n.17 

shield wall No. 1 were 1 mR/h, 500 ppm CO, 100 percent of the 

LEL, and 18 percent oxygen. At 1225 hours, water was drained 

from the ventlines penetrating through the shield wall and the 

turntubes were opened at the shield wall. All teams returned to 

the portal area, and personnel were released at 1330 hours. 

On 12 April 1985 the reentry team, wearing double anticontamination clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus, proceeded 

toward the U12n.17 shield walls No. 1 and No. 2. Maximum readings detected at shield wall No. 2 were 0.2 mR/h, 100 ppm CO, 

15 percent of the LEL, and 20 percent oxygen. At 1035 hours, the 

reentry team opened test chamber (TC) No. 1 door. Readings 

inside the door were 10 mR/h, 30 ppm CO, and 10 percent of the 

LEL. The reentry team continued to walk out the U12.17 bypass 

drift and the crosscuts checking general tunnel conditions. The 

structural experiment drift had extensive damage as a result of 

173 
the collapsed back. The reentry team returned to the ROSES drift 

and STARSAT alcove where the radiation reading was 0.4 mR/h. All 

personnel departed the tunnel at 1125 hours. Later that day a 

work team, wearing double anticontamination clothing and fullface respirators, established utilities to the tunnel. This work 

was completed by 1520 hours. 

On 16 April 1985 the scientific assessment teams and data recovery teams entered the U12n.17 LOS and bypass drifts, wearing 

double anticontamination clothing and full-face respirators with 

GMR-I canisters, to assess conditions and begin recovering 

experiments. The scientific assessment teams completed their 

initial operations that day. However, experiment recovery 

operations continued until 10 May 1985. 

7.4.2 Postevent Mining. 

Work began on the mining of the GSP at 1415 hours on 10 April 

1985 and was completed at 1700 hours on 15 April 1985. On 

19 April 1985, miners wearing double anticontamination clothing 

and full-face respirators began rehabilitating the UlZn.17 main 

drift and subdrifts. Miners mucked the inverts, painted the 

walls, rockbolted drift ribs, hung wire mesh, and poured pea 

gravel in each drift. 

By August 1985 mining activities were progressing simultaneously 

at the TAPS, GSAC, MAC, and muffler. Mining was conducted using 

conventional mining techniques (drill and blast), and probe holes 

were drilled ahead of the working face for early contamination 

detection. Samples collected from the face of the muffler 

crosscut indicated a radiation reading of 175 mR/h, and no toxic 

gases or positive LEL levels. A radiation reading of 60 mR/h was 

recorded after drift rehabilitation. 

From September 1985 through August 1986 a series of hydraulic 

fracture (HYDRAFAC) holes were drilled in the heading and ribs of 

the U12n.17 bypass drift. Each HYDRAFAC hole was initially 

drilled to a four-inch diameter and then sampled to analyze 

geological conditions and determine residual stresses. Data 

recorded during this period indicated a normal oxygen level, no 

toxic gases, no positive LEL levels, and radiation readings less 

than 2.0 mR/h. 

174 
Mining progress was hampered because of the necessity for protective clothing and the reduction of shift work. Mining operations 

were discontinued in December 1986 to allow for geological 

studies in the UlZn.17 complex. 

7.4.3 Postevent Drilling. 

No postevent drilling for core samples occurred from the mesa. 

However, a drilling area was established in the U12n.17 bypass 

drift on 30 April 1986. Drilling began on 1 May 1986, on the 

first of two drill holes. Thirteen core samples were taken from 

the U12n.17 bypass drift reentry (HE) hole No. 1, (at the experimental drift crosscut) between 1010 hours on 1 May 1986 and 

2120 hours on 14 May 1986. RE No. 2 was located at the cross 

section of the TAPS in the U12n.17 main drift. Twenty-nine core 

samples were collected between 1630 hours on 3 June 1986, and 

1425 hours on 18 June 1986. Radiation readings on all core 

samples were at background levels, and gas sampling indicated no 

toxic gases or positive LEL levels. 

7.4.4 Industrial Safety. 

Checks for the presence of toxic gases and surveys to measure 

radiation and LEL levels were made on each shift. The results 

were then recorded in the monitors' logbook. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining personnel and prevent unsafe conditions. Industrial safety codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. A written standard operating 

procedure was required for each operation involving explosives, 

toxic material, radioactive material, or any other operation with 

the potential for personal injury. Each individual involved in 

such an operation was required to know the contents of the 

applicable procedures. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were mandatory hard 

hat and foot protection areas (safety shoes, boots, DOE-issued 

miner's boots, or toe guards). All personnel on the initial 

tunnel reentry teams were certified in the use of the Draegar 

self-contained breathing apparatus and had used the McCaa twohour breathing apparatus. Standard safety rules and regulations, 

175 

- A 
as spelled out in the "U.S. Bureau of Mines Manual," were observed. 

All explosives, electro-explosive components, solid propellants, 

toxic materials, and radioactive materials were handled, stored 

and transported in accordance with applicable sections of the 

following documents: 

1. Army Material Command Regulation (AMCR 385-100) 

2. Appropriate DOE Orders in the 5400 and 5600 Series concerning Environmental Protection, Safety & Health Protection, and Defense Programs respectively. 

3. Individual safe operating procedures (by experimenter 

organization). 

4. MISTY RAIN Safety Regulations. 

All personnel engaged in handling, storing, assembling, or 

installing explosives, propellants, or electro-explosive devices 

(or observers of those operations) were require to wear safety 

glasses or other eye protection which had been approved by the 

DOD safety coordinator. 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUS IONS. 

Telemetry measurements began at 1515 hours on 6 April 1985, and 

several RAMS units became inoperative immediately. The maximum 

reading on unit number 15 was 1000 R/h at Htll minutes. This 

reading decreased rapidly and when all units were secured on 

12 April unit number 15 read 0.9 mR/h. All other units indicated 

background radiation levels. 

The initial radiation surveys began at 1652 hours on 6 April 

1985, and were completed by 1732 hours that same day. No radiation above background level was detected at the mesa trailer park 

or at the tunnel portal area. However, remote sampling of the 

tunnel atmosphere on the WP side of the GSP in the GSP bypass 

drift showed a radiation reading of 1 R/h; the toxic gas level 

was 2000 ppm CO with only 15 percent oxygen. 

Reentry into the tunnel began at 1404 hours on 10 April 1985. 

The reentry team, wearing double anticontamination clothing and 

176 
self-contained breathing apparatus, measured toxic gas levels of 

500 ppm CO at the shield wall in the UlZn.17 main drift. On 

12. April, the reentry team encountered a maximum radiation 

reading of 10 mR/h inside the door of TC No. 1. The team surveyed the damage in the structural experiment drift before 

departing the tunnel. 

Postevent mining began on 10 April and continued intermittently 

until December 1986. HYDRAFRAC holes were drilled to analyze 

geological conditions and determine residual stresses. Normal 

oxygen levels, no toxic gases or positive LEL levels were 

indicated, and radiation readings were less than 2.0 mR/h. When 

these operations ceased in December 1986, geological studies on 

the sediment formations in the U12n.17 complex were conducted. 

Drilling and core sampling in the U12n.17 bypass drift began on 

1 May 1986, on the first of two drill holes. Forty-two core 

samples were taken at the experimental drift crosscut and at the 

cross section of the TAPS in the U12n.17 main drift. This work 

was completed on 18 June 1986. Radiation readings on all core 

samples were at background levels, and gas sampling indicated no 

toxic gases or positive LEL levels. 

Personnel exposure data from self-reading pocket dosimeters were 

documented on the Area Access Registers during individual entries 

to MISTY RAIN radex area over a non-continuous time frame from 

06 April 1985 to 09 December 1986. Pocket dosimeters showed some 

indication of possible radiation exposure to DOD-affiliated 

personnel. Film badges worn by reentry personnel indicated that 

one individual received some gamma exposure most 

MISTY RAIN event. The minimum detectable gamma exposure 

NTS film badge dosimeter was 30 mR. 

likely from 

with 

the 

the 

Area Access Register data are summarized below. 

Entries Maximum Average 

Participants Logged Exposure (mR) Exposure (mR) 

All 6,545 175 2.1 

DOD 1,413 150 1.1 

177 
SECTION 8 

REFERENCES 

References are not indicated within the text of this report. 

However, key references are included in this list by section or 

part. Most unclassified references are available at the DOE/NV 

Coordination and Information Center (CIC). Security-classified 

references are located at the DNA/HQ Technical Library in Alexandria, Virginia, but are available only to persons with appropriate security clearances and a need-to-know justification for this 

information. 

The CIC is operated by REECo, the custodian of DOD and DOE 

nuclear testing personnel dosimetry records and other reference 

documents on DOD participation in atmospheric, oceanic, and 

underground nuclear weapons events. Arrangements may be made to 

review available references for this report at the CIC by contacting one of the following: 

Health Protection Division 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Nevada Field Office 

Post Office Box 98515 

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8515 

(702) 295-0961 

or 

Coordination and Information Center 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. 

Post Office Box 98521 M/S 548 

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8521 

(702) 295-0731 

Major source documents can also be purchased through the National 

Technical Information Service (NTIS) listed below: 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road 

Springfield, VA 22161 

(703) 487-4650 

178 
References available through public bookstores and libraries, 

through the U.S. Government Printing Office, and only at the CIC 

are listed without asterisks. Asterisks after references or 

groups of references indicate availability as follows: 

* Available through the NTIS and the CIC. 

** Located in the REECo Historical Records Center adjacent 

to the CIC, available through the CIC, and may be 

subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

*+* Located in the DNA/HQ Technical Library, and subject to 

security clearance requirements. 

PREFACE 

1. Office of External Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, 

Nevada Operations Office, Announced United States 

Nuclear Tests, NW-209 (Rev. l2), May 1992.* (UNCLASSIFIED) 

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Test Ban Debate, Oxford University Press, NY, 1978. 

(UNCLASSIFIED) 

3. Harris, P.S., et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

PLUMBBOB, DNA 6005F, 15 September 1981.* (UNCLASSIFIED) 

4. U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, Veterans, 

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1979. 

(UNCLASSIFIED) 

Section 1, INTRODUCTION 

DOE/NV, Announced Nuclear Tests, (n. 1). 

Devine, Nuclear Test Ban Debate, (n. 2). 

179 

-.. -- - -
5. Weapons Effects Test Group, Field Command, Defense 

Atomic Support Agency, Orientation, Nevada Test Site, 

January 1962. (UNCLASSIFIED) 

6. Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support Agency, 

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(UNCLASSIFIED) 

7. Ponton, Jean, et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation 

DOMINIC II, DNA 6027F, 31 January 1983.* (UNCLASSIFIED) 

Section 2, UNDERGROUNDTESTING PROCEDURES 

8. Liverman, James L., Energy Research C Development 

Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 

Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA - 1551, 

September 1977.* (UNCLASSIFIED) 

9. Butkovich, Theodore R., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 

University of California, Effects of Water Saturation 

on Underground Nuclear Detonations, UCRL-51110, 

9 September 1971.* (UNCLASSIFIED) 

Committee on Veterans Affairs, Claims for Disabilities, 

(n. 4), on venting. 

10. Environmental Sciences Department, Reynolds Electrical 

& Engineering Co., Inc., "Standard Operating Procedures," January 1982-1985.** (UNCLASSIFIED) 

11. Brady, William J., et al., Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc., Combination Personnel Dosimeter & 

Security Credential Holder, U.S. Department of Energy, 

NV0 162-27, October 1967.** (UNCLASSIFIED) 

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Nuclear Weapons Effects Tests Summary, Issue 18 for 

Calendar Years 1962-1987 (U), December 1990.*** 

(SECRET) 

180 
13. Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United 

States, The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions, released 1 November 1989.* (UNCLASSIFIED) 

EVENT SUMMARIES AND EACH EVENT SECTION 

14. Lantz, Michael W., et al., Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc., Technical Evaluation of a Fast 

Neutron Dosimeter, U.S. Department of Energy, 

NVO/O410-53, November 1979.** (UNCLASSIFIED) 

15. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, NV 

Completion Report, Operation Praetorian (U), 1 October 

1981 through 30 September 1982, NVO-246, September 

1983.*** (SECRET) 

16. Thomas, J. E., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE Events, Hussar Sword/Distant 

Arbor Series, Test Execution Report (U), POR 7089, 

5 April 1983.*** (SECRET) 

17. Summa, W. J., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

HURON LANDING Event, Hussar Sword Series, Preliminary 

Results Report, Final Project Officers Report (U), 

POR 7090, 14 November 1983.*** (SECRET) 

18. Summa, W. J., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

Program Document, Distant Arbor Series, DIAMOND ACE 

Event (U), POR 7106, 27 August 1982.*** (SECRET) 

19. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, NV 

Completion Report, Operation Phlanx (U), 1 October 1982 

through 30 September 1983, NVO-278, March 1985.*** 

(SECRET) 

20. Hoe, G., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, MINI 

JADE Event, Hussar Sword Series, Program Document (U), 

POR 7098, 20 May 1983.*** (SECRET) 

21. Toole, M., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, MINI 

JADE Event, Hussar Sword Series, Test Execution Report, 

POR 7099, 23 December 1983.*** (UNCLASSIFIED) 

181 
22. Wainwright, S. D., Field Command, Defense Nuclear 

Agency, MIDNIGHT ZEPHER Event, Distant Arbor Series, 

Test Execution Report (U), POR 7081, 17 February 

1984.*** (SECRET) 

23. Duff, R. E., S-CUBED, TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR Containment 

Summary Report (U), DNA TR 86-113, 1 February 1986.*** 

(CONFIDENTIAL) 

24. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, NV 

Completion Report, Operation Fusileer (U), 1 October 

1983 through 30 September 1984, NVO-292, December 

1985.*** (SECRET) 

25. Naegeli, R. E., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

MIDAS MYTH Event, Hussar Sword Series, Program Document 

(U), POR 7120, 28 June 1984.*** (SECRET) 

26. Wilcox, J. D., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

MIDAS MYTH Event, Hussar Sword Series, Test Execution 

Report (U), POR 7121, 11 October 1984.*** (SECRET) 

27. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, NV 

Completion Report, Operation Grenadier (U), 1 October 

1984 through 30 September 1985, NVO-301, April 1987.*** 

(SECRET) 

28. Raglan, P. S., Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

MISTY RAIN Event, Hussar Sword Series, Test Execution 

Report (U), POR 7141, 6 November 1985.*** (SECRET) 

29. Andrews, J., et al., General Electric Company, 

STARSAT/MISTY RAIN Program Final Report, Technical 

Report, 15 December 1982 to 22 September 1986 (U), 

DNA TR 86-358, 22 September 1986.*** (SECRET) 

30. Schoengold, C. R., et al., Reynolds Electrical C Engineering Co., Inc., Radiological Effluents Released from 

Announced U.S. Continental Tests 1961 through 1988, 

U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/NV 317, May 1990.* 

(UNCLASSIFIED) 

182 
31. REECo Health Protection Department Field Record Archives are maintained chronologically and by event and 

include the following: 

a. Procedures, Reentry Plans, Radsafe Plans, and 

Schedules of Events.** 

b. Correspondence.** 

C. Reports, including onsite Radsafe and offsite 

USEPA event reports.** 

d. Exposure reports, Radsafe logbooks, Area Access 

Registers, radiation survey forms, telemetry 

forms, and other sampling and dosimetry forms.** 

183/184 

-- - 

APPENDIX A 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Access Drift A passageway tunnel, usually parallel to 

the LOS drift, also known as the bypass, 

cable, reentry, or work drift, also in 

which cables from various experiments in 

the LOS pipe were laid on their way to 

being connected to the downhole cables in 

the cable alcove, and which was used for 

access to the main experiment (LOS) drift 

during construction and recovery phases of 

a test. 

Activation Products Nuclides made radioactive by neutrons from 

a nuclear detonation interacting with usually nonradioactive nuclides. Also called 

"induced activity." 

Activity Decay of radioactive material, usually 

Radioactivity expressed in disintegrations (of atoms) 

per minute (dpm). 

Advisory Panel A group of experts formed to advise the 

Test Manager (and later the Test Controller) concerning operational and safety 

factors affecting a test detonation. 

AFSWC The Air Force Special Weapons Center, located at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuguergue, New Mexico. AFSWC provided air 

support to the AEC Test Manager for NTS 

testing activities. 

AFSWP The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

was activated on 1 January 1947, when the 

AEC was activated, to assume residual functions of the U.S. Army Manhattan Engineer 

District (see DASA). 

A-l 
Air Support This included aircraft, facilities, and 

personnel required for various support 

functions during testing. Included were 

cloud sampling, and tracking, radiation 

monitoring, photography, and transport of 

personnel and equipment. 

Alpha Particle A particle emitted spontaneously from the 

nucleus of a radionuclide, primarily a 

heavy radionuclide. The particle is identical to the nucleus of a helium atom, 

having an atomic mass of four units and an 

electric charge of two positive units. 

Alpine Miner A continuous mining machine using a moveable boom with rotating cutting head. 

Anticontamination Outer clothing worn to prevent contaminaClothing tion of personal clothing, contamination 

of one's body, and the spread of contamination to uncontrolled areas. 

Atmospheric Test Series of U.S. nuclear tests conducted 

Series from 1945 through 1962, when most nuclear 

device detonations were conducted in the 

atmosphere. 

Attenuation The process by which photons or particles 

emitted by radionuclides are reduced in 

number or energy while passing through 

some medium. 

Back The top (ceiling) of a tunnel. 

Background Radiation There are three meanings for this term. 

The applicable meaning is determined by 

the context. The definitions are: 

1) The radiations of man's natural environment, consisting of cosmic rays 

and those radiations which come from 

the naturally radioactive nuclides of 

A-2 
-- - 

Ballroom 

Ball Valve 

Beta Particle 

Bypass Drift 

Bulkhead 

the earth, including those within 

one's body. 

2) A level of radiation (above natural 

background radiation) that existed in 

a test area or location prior to a 

test. 

3) Radiation levels extraneous to an experiment (the area exposure rate). 

A large alcove in a tunnel used for placement of recording equipment (sometimes 

referred to as a Dance Hall). 

A rotating valve designed to close off and 

provide a gas seal in an LOS pipe in less 

than one second after detonation. It 

could be pneumatic, hydraulic, or spring 

driven. 

A negatively charged particle of very 

small mass emitted from the nucleus of a 

radionuclide, particularly from fission 

product radionuclides formed during nuclear detonations. Except for origin, the 

beta particle is identical to a high-speed 

electron. This may also be a positively 

charged particle of equal mass called a 

positron. 

See Access Drift. 

Originally a navy term meaning a wall 

across a ship's hull or a passageway, usually containing a hatch or door. In this 

context, wall or embankment constructed in 

a mine or tunnel to protect against earth 

slides, fire, water, or gas. 

Button-Up Activities Procedures which consist primarily of completing the stemming; accomplishing the 

A-3 
Cable Drift 

Cal-Seal 

Cassette 

Cavity Invert 

Cellar 

Chamber 

Check Points or 

Check Stations 

Chimney 

Chromatograph 

electrical checklist of tunnel portal and 

trailer park facilities; closing the OBP, 

gas seal plug, and gas seal door inside 

the tunnel; clearing the controlled area; 

and preparing command post and monitoring 

stations for the actual nuclear detonation. 

See Access Drift. 

High-density, high-strength, quick-drying, 

and resilient commercial sealant. 

A holder or container for a sample, an 

experiment, or a group of experiments. 

See Invert. 

The excavated, large-diameter initial part 

of a drilled hole, over which the drill 

rig is placed and where valving and other 

equipment are located. 

A natural or man-made enclosed space or 

cavity. 

Geographic locations established and 

staffed to control entry into and exit 

from restricted areas. 

A roughly cylindrical volume of broken 

rock, formed by the collapse of the overburden. Occurs when decreasing gas pressure in the cavity formed by the nuclear 

detonation cannot support the weight of 

the rock. 

A piece of equipment used to analyze mixtures of chemical substances by chromatographic absorption. 

A-4 
Cloud Sampling 

Cloud Tracking 

Collar 

Console 

Construction 

Station 

Containment 

The process of collecting particulate and 

gaseous samples from an effluent cloud to 

determine the amount of total airborne 

radioactivity and specific radionuclides 

in the cloud for subsequent analysis of 

detonation characteristics. This type of 

sampling usually was accomplished by specially equipped aircraft. 

The process of monitoring and determining 

the drift or movement of an effluent 

cloud, usually performed by radiation monitoring and visual sighting from aircraft. 

See "Shaft Collar." 

A cabinet or panel containing instrumentation for monitoring or controlling electronic or mechanical measurement devices. 

The distance in feet along the tunnel from 

the portal or a particular junction, usually expressed in hundreds of feet plus 

remaining whole feet. Construction station 350 is expressed as CS 3t50, or simply station 3t50. 

The act of preventing release of any radioactive effluent into the atmosphere or 

parts of a tunnel complex beyond the stemming and other containment features. It 

is used in reference to the stemming, 

TAPS, OBP, or the gas seal plug. An event 

is said to have been "contained" if no 

effluent is released to the atmosphere or 

if no radioactive material is released 

underground beyond the stemmed portion of 

the tunnel. 

Containment Another name for an access or reentry 

Assessment Drift drift. 

A-5 
Contamination 

Controlled Release 

Crater 

Crater Experiment 

DAC 

This is defined in two ways as follows: 

1) May refer to the presence of fixed or 

removable radioactive material at a 

location. Contamination usually is 

caused by creation, distribution or 

contact with fission and activation 

products from a nuclear detonation or 

that material incorporated with particles from the test environment or 

device debris. 

2) The term may also refer to the deposition on, or spreading of radioactive materials to undesirable locations, personnel, structures, equipment, or other surfaces outside a 

controlled area. 

Radioactive gas is passed through a filtering system to remove most particulates 

before the gas is released into the atmosphere through the tunnel ventilation system. 

This is the depression formed on the earth's surface by a near-surface, surface, 

or underground detonation. Crater formation can occur by the scouring effect of 

airblast, by throw-out of broken surface 

material, or by surface subsidence resulting from underground cavity formation and 

subsequent rock fall, or chimneying, to 

the surface. 

A test designed to breach and excavate the 

ground surface, thereby forming an ejecta 

crater (as opposed to a sink or subsidence 

crater). 

An experiment protection system no longer 

used. The DNA Auxiliary Closure (DAC) was 

A-6 
Dance Hall 

DASA 

D-Day 

Dtl 

Decontamination 

Device 

DNA 

DOD 

a system for closing the LOS pipe milliseconds after device detonation. 

A large alcove used for data recording 

equipment. 

AFSWP became the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA) in 1959. See AFSWP and DNA. 

The term used to designate the day on 

which a test takes place. 

The first day after a test event. Dt2 is 

the second day after detonation, Dt3 is 

the third day, etc. 

The reduction or removal of contaminating 

radioactive material from a structure, 

area, object, or person. Decontamination 

may be accomplished by (1) treating the 

surface to remove or decrease the contamination, (2) letting the material stand so 

that the radioactivity is decreased as a 

result of radioactive decay, or (3) fixing 

and covering the contamination to attenuate the radiation emitted. 

Nuclear fission (or fission and fusion) 

materials together with arming, fusing, 

firing, high-explosive, canister, and diagnostic measurement equipment that have 

not been configured into an operational 

weapon. 

An acronym for the Defense Nuclear Agency, 

successor to DASA in 1971. 

An acronym for the U.S. Department of Defense, the federal executive agency responsible for the defense of the United 

States. Included in this group are the 

A-7 
Dose 

Dose Rate 

Dosimeter 

dpm 

Draeger Breathing 

Apparatus 

Draeger Multi-Gas 

Detector 

Dressed Out 

Drift 

Drill Hole 

Designations 

military services and special joint defense agencies. 

A quantity of ionizing radiation energy 

absorbed by a medium. For a person, dose 

units are in rem or rad. 

An amount of ionizing radiation energy 

that an individual or material could absorb per unit of time. Dose rates are usually expressed as rad or rem per hour. 

Subdivisions of a rad or rem also are 

used, e.g., mrem/h means millirem per 

hour. (A millirem equals one thousandth 

of a rem.) 

A device used to measure radiation doses. 

Devices worn or 

called personnel 

carried by 

dosimeters. 

individuals are 

Disintegrations per minute, 

measure of radioactivity. 

which is a 

See Scott-Draeger. 

An instrument used to detect toxic gases. 

A sample of the ambient atmosphere is 

drawn through a selected chemical reagent 

tube, which indicates the concentration of 

a particular toxic gas by changing color. 

Personnel dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and any associated equipment. 

A horizontal or inclined passageway excavated underground. It is used interchangeably with the term "tunnel" at the NTS. 

These are defined as follows: 

From the surface -

A-8 
Dry Run 

Effects 

Experiments 

PS-1V: Post-shot drill hole number l-vertical 

PS-1D: Post-shot drill hole number l-directional 

PS-1A: Post-shot drill hole number l-angle 

Each 'S' added after any of the above notations indicates a "sidetrack" or change 

of direction in the drill hole. 

From underground locations sample recovery 

core holes are referred to as RE (Reentry) 

No. 1, RE No. 2, etc. ("DNRE" means the 

reentry hole was DNA requested.) 

A rehearsal of the functions occurring in 

the minutes before and during an event. 

All timing and firing signals are sent in 

the proper sequence from the Control Room 

at CP-1. Each run begins with the first 

required timing and firing signal (normally minus 15 minutes) and ends with the 

firing signal. The audio countdown is 

transmitted over Net 1 (DNA) and on other 

nets as agreed upon with appropriate agencies. There are various types of dry runs 

depending on the degree of participation 

required of the agencies involved. 

These are experiments with the purpose of 

studying the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. They include measurements of changes in the environment 

caused by the nuclear detonation, such as 

ground movement, air pressures (blast), 

thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and 

cratering. 

Event See test. 

A-9 
Exoatmospheric 

Explosimeter 

Exposure 

Exposure Rate 

Face 

FDR 

Film Badge 

This refers to the area outside the gaseous mass which envelopes the earth. 

A battery-operated detector calibrated to 

indicate the concentration in the ambient 

atmosphere of explosive gases and vapors 

as a percent of the lower explosive limit 

(LEL) of hydrogen gas (four percent concentration in air) or methane gas (five 

percent in air). 

A measure, expressed in roentgens (R), of 

ionization produced by gamma or x rays in 

air. (This may also be represented by 

subdivisions of R; e.g., l/1000 R = 1 milliroentgen [mR].) 

Exposure rate is radiation exposure per 

unit of time, usually per hour, but it may 

be stated in smaller or larger units 

(e.g., R/set, mR/h, R/day). 

The end of a tunnel or other excavation 

that is being worked to advance the tunnel. 

A successful final dry run (FDR) is the 

last dry run before a test is detonated. 

A dosimeter used for the indirect measurement of exposure to ionizing radiation. 

It generally contains two or three films 

of differing sensitivity. Films are 

wrapped in paper or other thin material 

that blocks light but is readily penetrated by radiations or secondary charged particles resulting from the radiations to be 

measured. Film packets generally have at 

least one metal filter or may be in holders with multiple filters. After being 

worn as a film badge or film dosimeter, 

films are developed and the degree of 

A-10 
Fission 

Fission Products 

Fissionable Material 

Forward Control 

Point 

Front-End Experiments 

Full Power Full 

Frequency (FPFF) 

Dry Run 

darkening (or optical density) measured 

indicates the radiation exposure. Film 

dosimeters commonly are used to indicate 

gamma and x ray exposures, but also can be 

designed to determine beta and neutron 

doses. 

The process whereby the nucleus of a particular heavy element splits into (generally) two nuclei of lighter elements, with 

accompanying release of energy and neutrons. The most important fissionable, or 

fissile, materials are uranium-235 and 

plutonium-239. Fission is caused by the 

absorption of a neutron in the nucleus. 

A general term used for the complex mixture of radioactive nuclides (see Radionuelides) produced as a result of nuclear 

fission. 

A synonym for fissile material, also extended to include material that can be 

fissioned by fast neutrons only, such as 

uranium-238. 

to mean reactor 

Used in 

fuel. 

reactor operations 

A geographic 

area, usually 

secured) test 

location 

adjacent 

area. 

in 

to 

the 

the 

forward 

closed 

test 

(or 

Those experiments located in the immediate 

vicinity of the working point. 

This is similar in intent to a mandatory 

full participation dry run. The FPFF is 

sometimes combined with the hot dry run 

(HDR) . This run is optional with the device engineer. When this run is conducted, the LOS pipe is under vacuum, telephones and intercoms are disconnected, and 

tunnel utility and instrumentation power 

A-11 
Fusion 

Gamma Photons 

Gamma Shine 

Gas Blocking 

are operated in event-day configuration. 

All instrumentation is hooked up and operated in event-day configuration (simulators are not used). 

The combination of two very light nuclei 

(of atoms) to form a relatively heavier 

nucleus, with an accompanying release of 

enerm is called fusion. (It also is 

also known as thermonuclear fusion.) 

Electromagnetic radiations of high energy 

that are emitted from the nuclei of radionuclides. These photons are sometimes 

referred to as bundles of energy, and usually accompany other nuclear reactions, 

such as fission, neutron capture, and beta 

particle emission. Gamma photons, or 

rays, are identical with x rays of the 

same energy, except that x rays result 

from orbital electron reactions rather 

than being produced in the nucleus. 

This occurs when a measurable gamma radiation intensity from an approaching radioactive cloud or passing cloud is noted, as 

opposed to measurements from or in gamma 

emitting fallout. This also includes gamma radiation scattered by air molecules, 

as opposed to direct radiation from a gamma source. 

The application of approximately 10 psi of 

pressure between the Gas Seal Door and the 

Gas Seal Plug, during button-up procedures 

as an additional reassurance against lowpressure leaks. Embedding the inner components of cables in epoxy at appropriate 

locations, such as concrete or epoxy 

plugs. 

A-12 
Gas Seal Door 

Gas Seal Plug 

Gate 300 

Geiger-Mueller 

Counter 

Geophone 

Ground Zero 

A steel door on the portal side of the Gas 

Seal Plug. It is closed during button up, 

with about a 10 psi gas pressure applied 

between the Gas Seal Plug and the Gas Seal 

Door as an additional reassurance against 

low-pressure leaks. 

A containment feature within the tunnel 

complex; generally it is designed for 

500°F and 500 psi. The Gas Seal Plug is 

sometimes referenced as the "hasty plug." 

This plug is similar to the Overburden 

Plug, but it is placed closer to the portal and seals off the entire tunnel complex from the portal. 

Permanent security station in Area 6 near 

the Control Point facilities, at which 

reentry and recovery personnel wait during 

execution of an event. After reentry parties were released from this gate. They 

moved to the FCP and again awaited release. 

An instrument consisting of a Geiger-Mtieller tube and associated electronic equipment used to detect, display and sometimes 

record nuclear radiation levels. 

An instrument used to detect vibrations in 

rock or soil. At NTS, it is used remotely 

to detect rock falls, earth movement, and 

cavity collapse underground. It provides 

audible signal and visual display data. 

A term used during atmospheric testing to 

denote a point on the surface of the 

ground directly below or coinciding with 

an atmospheric detonation point (see surface ground zero and zero point). 

A-13 
Grout 

H-hour 

Hot Line 

HYDRAFRAC (Hydraulic 

Fracture) 

Invert 

Ion 

A cementing or sealing mixture of cement 

and water to which sand, sawdust, or other 

fillers may be added. Some organic epoxy 

compounds are used where high strength or 

a controlled setting is desired. 

"Time zero" or the exact time of detonation to the minute, second, or fraction of 

a second; as opposed to H t 1 which implies one hour after detonation (unless 

otherwise noted in seconds or minutes). 

A location on the edge of a radex area 

where personnel exiting remove anticontamination clothing and equipment, are monitored for contamination, and are decontaminated as necessary before release. This 

term also was used to denote the centerline of a fallout pattern. 

Injection of a dye-containing fluid under 

pressure into rock which causes areas of 

the rock to open (i.e., crack) allowing 

the fluid to permeate the rock. The 

cracks can be traced upon mining into the 

area. 

The bottom (floor) of a tunnel or other 

underground excavation (as in cavity invert). 

An atomic particle or part of a molecule 

bearing an electric charge. Usually a 

positively charged ion and a negatively 

charged ion are formed as a pair (e.g., a 

negatively charged electron is displaced 

from its positively charged remaining 

atom). 

Ionizing Radiation This includes any particulate or electromagnetic radiation capable of producing 

ions, directly or indirectly, in its 

A-14 
Isotopes 

Keyed Concrete Plug 

Leukemia Cluster 

Long Line 

LOS Pipe 

passage through air or matter. Alpha and 

beta particles produce ion pairs directly, 

while the electrons of initial ion pairs 

produced by gamma and x rays in turn produce secondary ionization in their paths. 

Neutrons may displace a positively charged 

part of a nucleus, such as a proton or 

alpha particle which produces secondary 

ionization. 

This refers to different types of atoms 

within the same element, all reacting approximately the same chemically, but differing in atomic weight and nuclear stability. For example, the element hydrogen 

has three isotopes; normal hydrogen (the 

most abundant) heavy hydrogen (deuterium), 

and radioactive hydrogen (tritium). 

This refers to a concrete plug placed in 

an excavated area of greater diameter than 

the shaft or tunnel cross section such 

that the concrete is poured into the surrounding rock, thus providing greater 

strength against overpressure from the 

nuclear detonation. 

An apparent but unexpected or extraordinary group of leukemia cases within some 

number or group of persons. 

The longest air sampling pipe into the 

tunnel which does not connect to the LOS 

pipe. 

An evacuated pipe that extends from the 

device to the test chambers. It may be 

either horizontal or vertical, and in it 

are experiment protection devices and experiments. 

A-15 
Mandatory Full 

Participation (MFP) 

Dry Run 

Manhattan Engineer 

District 

Manned Stations 

McCaa 2-Hour 

Breathing Apparatus 

mR 

mrad/h 

Mucking 

This is a dry run peculiar to DOD events. 

Its purpose is threefold: first, to check 

all experiments with the event site electrical system in its shot configuration; 

second, to check for electrical crosstalk 

between experiments; and third, to operate 

all recording, timing, and monitoring equipment as closely to shot configuration as 

is possible. The pipe is under vacuum and 

the tunnel and portal instrumentation trailers are cleared of personnel. After a 

successful MFP dry run, all interconnections necessary to place experiments into 

shot configuration from the MFP configuration are made. Timing, firing, and monitoring system junction boxes are locked 

and no changes are made except with the 

express approval of device systems personnel and the Technical Director. 

The U.S. Army predecessor organization to 

the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. 

Locations inside the closed and secured 

area which are occupied by authorized personnel during an event. 

A self-contained respiratory device that 

supplies two hours of breathing oxygen. 

Milliroentgens, a radiation exposure term 

meaning thousandth of a roentgen (R). 

(Also, see Exposure.) 

A radiation intensity term traditionally 

used to show that gamma plus beta was being measured. 

Removal of broken rock from mining operations (also used loosely for drilling operations). 

A-16 
Muffler 

Noble Gases 

Nuclear Device (vs. 

weapon or bomb) 

Nuclear Device Tests 

Nuclear Weapon Tests 

Offsite 

An experiment protection component of the 

HLOS Vacuum System which is designed to 

break up high-energy flow within the HLOS 

system. 

Inert gases which do not react with other 

elements at normal temperature and pressure (i.e., helium, neon, argon, krypton, 

xenon, and, sometimes, radon). 

A devi

leased 

tions 

fission 

ce in 

in a 

of atomic 

and 

which most of the 

detonation results 

nuclei, either 

fusion. A device 

energy 

from 

fission, 

under 

rereacor 

development (see Device) is not considered a 

weapon or bomb. Both A- (or atomic) bombs 

and H- (or hydrogen) bombs could be called 

atomic weapons because both involve reactions of atomic nuclei. However, it has 

become customary to call weapons A-bombs 

if the energy comes from fission, and Hbombs if most of the energy comes from 

fusion (of the isotopes of hydrogen or 

other light nuclides - see definition). A 

developmental nuclear device is not a weapon or weapon component until it can be 

mated to a delivery system. 

Tests carried out to supply information 

required for the design, improvement, or 

safety aspects of nuclear weapons, and to 

study the phenomena and effects associated 

with nuclear explosions. 

Tests that provide development and weapons 

effects information, and may or may not 

utilize a deliverable nuclear weapon. 

Radiation detected offsite is radioactivity occurring outside the Test Range Complex, an area that includes both the 

A-17 
Onsite 

Overburden 

Overburden Plug 

Party Monitors 

Portal Recording 

Station 

PPm 

Nevada Test Site and the adjacent Nellis 

Air Force Range. 

A notation that radioactivity was detected 

onsite only is made for tests from which 

there was an unplanned release of radioactivity into the atmosphere that was not 

detectable beyond the boundaries of the 

Test Range Complex. 

As used in connection with NTS tunnels, 

this is the consolidated and unconsolidated rock above a tunnel vertically to the 

surface; thus, it is the burden of rock 

over a tunnel. 

A containment feature within the tunnel 

complex. It is now a high-strength concrete plug keyed into the tunnel rock near 

the test location and is generally designed to withstand 1000°F and 1000 psi. 

It originally was named because it was 

constructed to represent the same containment strength as the rock above the tunnel, or overburden. 

Radiation (Radsafe) monitors assigned to 

reentry and recovery parties or groups. 

The Portal Recording Station (PRS) is a 

building located outside of the tunnel 

where fiber optic cables are terminated 

and event data is recorded. 

The term parts per million is used when 

determining concentrations of toxic gases 

or other materials. It refers to either 

relative weight, such as micrograms of a 

material per gram of medium, or relative 

volume, such as cubic centimeters or milliliters per cubic meter. 

A-18 
Privacy Act 

rad 

Radex Area 

Radiation Exposure 

Radioactive 

Effluent 

The Privacy Act of 1974 is part of Public 

Law 93-579. This is an Act to amend Title 

5, U.S. Code, by adding Section 552a, 

which is to safeguard individual privacy 

from the misuse of federal agency records, 

to provide that individuals be granted 

access to records concerning them which 

are maintained by federal agencies, to 

establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. 

An acronym 

a unit 

tion. 

for "radiation 

of absorbed dose 

A dose of one rad 

absorbed 

of ionizing 

means the 

dose," 

radiaabsorption of 100 ergs of energy from ionizing 

radiation per gram of absorbing material 

(e.g., body tissue). 

A radiation exclusion (radex) area is any 

area which is controlled for the purpose 

of protecting individuals from exposure to 

radiation and/or radioactive materials. 

Exposure to radiation may be described by 

a number of terms. The type of radiation 

one is exposed to is important in establishing doses. External exposure can be 

from beta particles, neutrons, gamma and 

x rays; internal exposure is received from 

radionuclides deposited within the body 

which may emit alpha, beta, gamma, or radiation and irradiate various body organs. 

(See Dose and Exposure.) 

This includes the radioactive material, 

steam, smoke, dust, and other particulate 

or gaseous debris released to the atmosphere from an underground nuclear detonation. 

A-19 
Radioactive or 

Fission Products 

Radionuclides 

Recovery Operations 

Red Shack 

Reentry Drift 

rem 

Rib 

Rock Bolting 

roentgen 

A general term for the complex mixture of 

radionuclides produced as a result of nuclear fission. (See Activation Products.) 

A collective term for all types of radioactive atoms of various elements, as opposed to stable nuclides. (See Isotopes). 

Process of finding and removing experiments, by-products, or data from the test 

area after a test event. 

An underground (usually) intermediate 

point provided for the device laboratory's 

use in checking out and exercising the 

arming and firing system. 

See Access Drift. 

An acronym for "roentgen equivalent man or 

mammal." A rad multiplied by the quality 

factor (QF) of a particular radiation 

equals the rem dose. Current QF values 

are one for 

10 for all 

ticles. 

n

x, gamma, and beta 

eutrons, and 20 for 

radiations, 

alpha parThis 

right 

back 

refers 

or left 

to the 

to the side of the 

rib is determined 

portal. 

drift. 

with 

The 

one's 

A method whereby rock bolts (i.e., threaded steel rods) are inserted into a drilled 

hole to pin the rock to the rib or back to 

reinforce the tunnel walls. The bolts are 

driven into the wall perpendicular to the 

shaft. The ends project far enough for 

end plates to solidify the structure. 

A special unit of exposure. It is defined 

precisely as that quantity of gamma or 

x rays that, when completely stopped in 

A-20 
Safety Experiments 

Sandbag Plugs 

Sandia Auxiliary 

Closure (SAC) 

Scatterer Station 

Scientific Station 

air, will produce positive and negative 

ions with a total charge of 2.58 x 10m4 

coulombs in one kilogram of dry air under 

standard conditions. 

Device tests conducted to determine the 

safety of nuclear weapons during transportation and storage. During these tests, 

elements of the conventional high-explosive portions of the devices were detonated to simulate accidental damage and to 

determine the potential for this damage to 

result in significant nuclear yield. Data 

gained from the tests were used to develop 

devices that could withstand shock, blast, 

fire, and other accident conditions without producing a nuclear detonation. 

Barriers that are used in tunnels and are 

constructed of sandbags to help contain 

underground detonations and minimize damage to underground workings. 

A device used to seal an HLOS pipe after a 

nuclear detonation. 

A point along an LOS pipe where the radiation flux is deflected into an area off 

the LOS pipe as required for the testing 

or exposure of scatterer area experiments. 

The distance in feet along the HLOS pipe 

measured from the zero point. These distances are generally expressed in whole 

numbers or to the nearest complete hundredths of feet (if fractional). Scientific Station 650 is expressed as SS 6t50; 

Scientific Station 390.65 is expressed as 

SS 3t90.65. 

A-21 
Scott-Draeger 

Self-Contained 

Breathing 

Apparatus 

Seismic Motion 

Shaft 

Shaft Collar 

Shielding Walls 

Slushing Operations 

Spalling 

This includes a self-contained recirculating unit, complete with "full view" apparatus facepiece, compressed oxygen cylinder, breathing bag, carbon dioxide absorber, and pressure demand regulator. It is 

used when an extended exposure to an extremely hazardous or oxygen deficient atmosphere, or both, is required. This unit 

is capable of sustaining the wearer, under 

normal usage, for four to four and onehalf hours; however, pertinent approved 

schedules limit NTS use to two hours. 

Earth movement caused by an underground 

nuclear detonation, similar to that of a 

minor earthquake. 

A long narrow passage sunk into the earth, 

usually vertically, 

mining operations. 

placement, ventilation, 

derground workings 

mined. 

may be 

but inclined 

Shafts for 

or access 

drilled 

for 

device 

to 

or 

some 

emunThe area immediately around the shaft at 

ground level, usually cemented, which supports the headframe and other equipment. 

Walls or barriers used to protect equipment or instrumentation from heat, blast, 

and radioactivity. 

The process of moving broken rock with a 

scraper or scraper bucket. May be used on 

the surface or underground, where ore or 

waste rock is slushed into hoppers or other locations for removal. (See Mucking.) 

Rock disintegration by evidenced flaking, 

chipping, peeling, or loosening of layers 

on the outside edges. It may be caused 

immediately after detonation by rock 

A-22 
Stemming 

Surface Ground Zero 

Survey 

TAPS 

stressing near the detonation point. It 

also may result later, after continued 

stressing from temperature change expansion and contraction. Spalling also may 

result or begin when rock containing moisture is raised to a high temperature and 

expanding vapor creates fractures. 

The materials used to back-fill or plug 

the emplacement shaft, drift, or LOS drift 

to contain overpressure and radioactive 

material from a nuclear detonation. 

The location on the ground surface directly above an underground zero point or directly below an airburst. 

In the tunnels, a survey might include 

taking radiation readings with a portable 

instrument, checking for the presence of 

an explosive mixture with an MSA explosimeter or GPK, determining toxic gas levels 

with Draeger tubes, and/or checking for 

tunnel hazard and damage (also called a 

"walkthrough" or "walk-out"). Radsafe 

personnel made the radiation surveys. 

Radsafe or industrial hygiene personnel 

(both in the REECo Environmental Sciences 

Department) monitored LEL and toxic gas 

levels, and tunnel mining and construction 

personnel performed walk throughs usually 

accompanied by Radsafe and/or industrial 

hygiene support personnel. (See tunnel 

walk-out.) 

The tunnel and pipe seal is an experiment 

protection feature along the LOS pipe 

which allows the experiments to be exposed 

to the desired levels of radiation while 

being protected from later arriving debris. It contains a massive steel door 

which closes after ground shock passes to 

A-23 
Test 

Test Chamber 

Test Controller 

Testing 

Organizations 

Thermal Shield 

Plug 

Tonopah Test Range 

Trailer Park 

form a 1000°F and 1000 psi seal. The TAPS 

also includes the high-strength concrete 

plug which surrounds the metallic shroud 

of the door. 

The preparations for, and actual testing 

of, a nuclear device. This includes arming and firing, 

measurements 

measurements 

detonation, 

and effects, 

and studies. 

and 

concurrent 

later 

A section of the LOS pipe in which experiments are placed. It may or may not be 

enlarged, depending upon the test design. 

This person was a DOE official designated 

by the Manager, Nevada Operations Office, 

to assume responsibility for the field 

operations involved in conducting a nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. 

Organizations conducting nuclear tests at 

the NTS (see DOD, DNA, LASL, LLL, and SL). 

A bulkhead built to close off a drift (usually the LOS pipe drift) that protects 

equipment and instruments on the portal 

side of the bulkhead. Construction and 

containment features of the bulkhead are 

determined by the nature of the event. 

TTR is located in the northwest corner of 

Nellis Air Force Range near Tonopah, 

Nevada. 

Areas near a tunnel portal or on the Mesa 

where instrumentation or instrumentation 

support trailers are parked. 

A-24 
Tunnel 

Tunnel Access 

Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

Tunnel Complex 

Tunnel Walk-Out 

Turntube 

Type N Canisters 

Underground 

Structures Program 

User 

At NTS, this refers to a horizontal underground excavation driven on a predetermined line and grade to some specific target. 

This refers to the entering of a tunnel or 

tunnel complex upon approval of the Test 

Controller or Test Director during test 

operations, or upon approval of the Tunnel 

Superintendent during routine operations. 

See TAPS 

This includes the complete set of underground workings and support equipment comprising one tunnel test area. 

A visual, walking inspection of the tunnel 

or tunnel complex, usually performed as a 

part of the initial reentry after a detonation, to check for damage and hazards 

prior to allowing general access to the 

underground workings. 

In the tunnels at the NTS, this refers to 

a crawlway through a containment barrier 

(i.e., bulkhead, blast wall, or plug.) 

After an event, the crawlway is used for 

access through the barrier until the manway can be opened. 

These canisters are used with face masks 

to absorb carbon monoxide. 

This refers to the fabrication and construction of test structures underground 

for the purpose of detonation effects 

evaluation. 

Any organization conducting nuclear tests 

at the NTS. (See Testing Organizations.) 

A-25 
VEIA UNIFORM 

Venting 

Weapons Effects 

Experiments 

Weather Briefings 

Work Drift 

Working Point 

Workings 

x rays 

Department of Defense (DOD) program designed to improve the capability to detect, identify, and locate underground 

nuclear explosions. 

Release of radioactive material, gases, 

steam, smoke, dust and other particulate 

debris through a zone of weakness from the 

detonation-formed cavity into the atmosphere. 

Experiments with the purpose of studying 

the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on materials, structures, equipment, and systems. They include measurements of the changes in the environment 

caused by the nuclear detonation, such as 

ground movement, air pressures (blast), 

thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and 

cratering. 

A part of the readiness briefings, which 

are meetings of test-associated administrators, advisors, and other technical 

personnel prior to each test event for the 

purpose of evaluating weather conditions 

and forecasts on event day, and making 

decisions on any operational schedule 

changes necessary for safety reasons. 

See Access Drift. 

The location in the emplacement hole centered in the nuclear device. 

An excavation or group of excavations made 

in mining, quarrying, or tunneling, used 

chiefly plural, such as "the workings extended for miles underground." 

Electromagnetic radiations produced by 

orbital electron reactions, as opposed to 

A-26 
emission of gamma photons by nuclei of 

atoms. Otherwise, x rays are identical 

with gamma photons of the same energy. 

Yield The total effective energy released by a 

nuclear detonation. It is usually expressed in terms of equivalent tonnage of 

TNT required to produce the same energy 

release in an explosion. The total energy 

yield is manifested as nuclear radiation 

(including residual radiation), thermal 

radiation, and blast and shock energy. 

Actual distribution depends upon the medium in which the explosion occurs and the 

type of weapon or nuclear device used. 

Zero Point The location of the center-of-burst of a 

nuclear device at the instant of detonation. The zero point in tests covered by 

this volume is always below ground. 

A-27/28 

APPENDIX B 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The abbreviations 

this ninth volume 

tion and definitions 

and acronyms in the following list are used in 

of the DOD DNTPR reports. Additional informamay be found in the text and in the Glossary 

of Terms. 

AA 

AFX 

AEc/Nvoo 

Aerojet 

AES 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

AFWL 

AL00 

AMC 

ASN 

ASR 

AVCO 

AWRE 

BAC 

BKG 

BMO 

CAPCO 

CASES 

Agbabian Association 

Atomic Energy Commission 

AEC Nevada Operations Office 

Aerojet General Corporation 

Auxiliary Experiment Station 

Air Force Special Weapons Center 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

Albuquerque Operations Office 

Army Material Command 

Air Surveillance Network 

Alcove splice rack 

AVCO Corporation 

Atomic Weapons Research Establishment 

Boeing Aircraft Corporation 

Background radiation measurement 

Ballistics Missile Office 

Corrales Applied Physics Company 

Merritt Cases, Inc. 

Crosscut 

B-l 

cc 
CIC 

CCTV 

CDC 

CEP 

co 

CORRTEX 

CP 

CP-1 

CP-2 

CT0 

DAC 

DASA 

DMA 

DNA 

DNRE 

DOD 

DOE 

DOE/NV 

dpm 

DPP 

Draper 

EDAC 

EG&G 

EMP 

EPA 

ERDA 

Closed-circuit television 

Centers for Disease Control (formerly the 

Center for Disease Control) 

Containment Evaluation Panel 

Coordination and Information Center 

Carbon monoxide 

Continuous Reflectometry for Radius Time Experiments 

Control Point 

Control Point, Building 1 

Control Point, Building 2 

Continental Test Organization 

DNA Auxiliary Closure 

Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Division of Military Application 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

DNA Reentry 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office 

Disintegrations per minute 

Drift Protection Plug 

C.S. Draper Laboratory 

Engineering Decision Analysis Company 

EGCG, Inc. (formerly Edgerton, Germeshausen, and 

Grier) 

Electromagnetic pulse 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Energy Research and Development Administration 

B-2 
ES 

ESD 

ET1 

F&S 

FAC 

FCDASA 

FCDNA 

FCP 

FCT 

FCTC 

FCTE 

FCTK 

FCTO 

FCTP 

FCTS 

FCTT 

FDPP 

FDR 

FPFF 

FWW 

GE 

GM 

GRC 

GSAC 

GSD 

GSP 

GZ 

Experiment Station 

Environmental Sciences Department, REECo 

Effects Technology, Incorporated 

Fenix & Scisson, Inc. 

Fast Auxiliary Closure 

Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

Forward Control Point 

Field Command Test 

Field Command, Test Construction (Division of Test 

Directorate) 

Field Command, Test Engineering Division 

Field Command, Test Containment Division 

Field Command, Test Operations Division 

Field Command, Test Plans & Analysis Division 

Field Command, Test Office of Safety Engineer 

Field Command, Technical Directors Division 

Facility Drift Protection Plug 

Final dry run 

Full-power-full-frequency (dry run) 

Fighter Weapons Wing 

General Electric Corporation 

Geiger-Mueller 

General Research Corporation 

Gas Seal Auxiliary Closure 

Gas Seal Door 

Gas Seal Plug 

Ground Zero 

B-3 
H&N 

HAC 

HDL 

HDR 

HE 

HEPA 

HFR 

HLOS 

HQ, DASA 

HSG 

IRT 

ISAFAF 

JAYCOR 

JCS 

KAFB 

KN 

KOA 

KSC 

kt 

LANL 

LASL 

LEL 

LLC 

LLL 

LLNL 

LMSC 

Holmes C Narver, Inc. 

Hughes Aircraft Co. 

Harry Diamond Laboratory 

Hot Dry Run 

High explosives (conventional) 

High-efficiency particulate aerosol 

High Fluence Recoverable 

Horizontal line-of-sight 

Headquarters, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

High-strength grout 

Intelcom Rad Tech 

Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field (formerly

Indian Springs Air Force Base) 

Jaycor Corporation (derived from J.A. Young Corporation) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Kirtland Air Force Base 

Kaman Nuclear 

Ken O'Brien Associates 

Kaman Sciences Corp. (formerly Kaman Nuclear) 

Kilotons 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 

Lower explosive limit 

Limited-life components 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

B-4 
LOS 

LPARL 

LRL 

LVFO 

M&D 

MAC 

MDAC 

MDAC 

MDR 

MED 

MFP 

MFP/FPPF 

MPC 

mR 

mrad 

MRC 

mrem/qt 

mrem/yr 

mR/h 

MSA 

MSD 

MSL 

NAFB 

NOAA/ARL 

NO* 

NOtNO, 

Line-of-sight 

Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory 

Las Vegas Field Office 

MAC and DAC 

Mechanical Auxiliary Closure 

McDonald Douglas Aircraft Corporation 

McDonnel Douglas Astronautics Corporation 

Mandatory Dry Run 

Manhattan Engineer District 

Mandatory full-participation 

Mandatory full-participation/full-power full-frequency 

Maximum permissible concentration 

Milliroentgen 

Millirad 

Mission Research Corporation 

Millirem per quarter 

Millirem per year 

Milliroentgens per hour 

Mine Safety Appliances 

Mandatory Signal Dry Run 

Mean sea level 

Nellis Air Force Base 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 

Air Resources Laboratory 

Nitrogen dioxide 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen dioxide 

B-5 
N-v 

NPG 

NRDS 

NSC 

NTIS 

NTS 

NTSO 

NV00 

NWET 

OBP 

OMA 

Pan Am 

PDT 

PI 

wm 

PRS 

PS 

psi 

PST 

QF 

R&D 

rad 

rad/h 

Radsafe 

radsafe 

RAMP-4 

Nevada Proving Ground 

Nuclear Rocket Development station 

National Security Council 

National Technical Information Service 

Nevada Test Site 

Nevada Test Site Organization 

DOE Nevada Operations Office 

Nevada Operations Office 

Nuclear weapons-effect test 

Overburden Plug 

Office of Military Application 

Pan American World Airways 

Pacific Daylight Time 

Physics International 

Parts per million 

Portal Recording Station 

Postshot 

Pounds per square inch 

Pacific Standard Time 

Quality factor 

Research and development 

Radiation absorbed dose 

Radiation absorbed dose per hour 

Environmental 

logical Safety 

Sciences Department

Department), REECo (formerly RadioRadiological safety, in general 

Multichannel, 

monitoring 

hard-wire linked, 

telemetry system 

remote area gamma 

B-6 
RAMS Remote area monitoring system 

RCG Radioactivity concentration guide 

REECo Reynolds Electrical t Engineering Company, Inc. 

rem Roentgen equivalent man or mammal 

R/h Roentgens per hour 

RMG Rock-Matching Grout 

ROSES Recorder 

System 

and Oscilloscope Sealed Environmental 

RPG Radiation Protection Guide 

SAC Sandia Auxiliary Closure 

SAI Science Applications, tions International Inc. 

Corp., (became Science Applica- SAIC on 1 August 1984) 

SAMSO Space and Missile Systems Organization 

SC Sandia Corporation 

SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

SDR Signal Dry Run 

SF00 Santa Fe Operations Office 

SGEMP Source Generated Electromagnetic Pulse 

SGZ Surface Ground Zero 

SL Sandia Laboratories 

SLA Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque 

SLG Superlean Grout 

SNL Sandia National Laboratories 

SOP Standard Operating Procedures 

SRD Secret Restricted Data 

SREMP Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse 

SRI Stanford Research Institute 

SRI1 Stanford Research Institute International 

B-7 
SSPO 

sss 

STARSAT 

STU 

TAC 

TAPS 

TC 

TCDASA 

TCDNA 

TEP 

TGD 

TGS 

TID 

TLD 

TNT 

TOA 

TRI 

TSP 

TTR 

UCRL 

USAF 

USGS 

VA 

VLOS 

WES 

WETG 

WP 

WSI 

WTD 

Strategic Systems Project Office (Navy) 

Systems, Science, and Software 

Source Generated Electroma netic Pulse Test, Analysis and Research Sate 9 lite 

Special Test Unit 

Tactical Air Command 

Tunnel and Pipe Seal 

Test Chamber 

Test Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Test Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

Test Evaluation Panel 

Test Group Director 

Test Group Staff 

Test Instrumentation Development 

Thermoluminescent dosimeter 

High explosive chemical, (2,4,6-trinitrotoluene) 

Time-of-Arrival 

Technical Representatives, Incorporated 

Thermal Shield Plug 

Tonopah Test Range 

University of California Radiation Laboratory 

United States Air Force 

United States Geological Survey 

Veterans Administration 

Vertical line-of-sight 

Waterways Experiment Station 

Weapons Effects Test Group 

Working Point 

Wackenhut Services, Incorporated 

Weapons Test Division 

B-8 
APPENDIX C 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE 

NTS-SOP-0101 

CHAPTER 0101 THE NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION (NTO) 

0101.01 GENERAL 

011 The Nevada Test Site 

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) facility managed by the Nevada Operations Office (NV). The 

NTS supports the field test programs of the DOE and its 

contractors, the Department of Defense (DOD), and others 

authorized to conduct programs at the NTS. 

012 The Nuclear Test Organization (NTO) 

The Nuclear Test Organization (NTO) includes DOE, DOD, 

Laboratory, contractor, agency and organizational personnel who participate in or provide support for test operations at 

the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Manager, NV, heads the NTO. 

(See Appendix A). 

0101.02 ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT AND POLICIES 

021 Nuclear Test Organization (NTO) 

The Nuclear Test Organization is a continuing task organi- zation whose composition may be readily changed in response 

to the needs and technical objectives of the test program. 

022 The NV staff, on behalf of the Manager, provides for the 

approval and coordination of program proposals, approvals for project support, funding and/or authority for financial 

agreement, legal counsel, contract authority and administration, engineering, accounting, classification and security policy and guidance, safety policy and guidance, environmental safety analyses, industrial relations, and 

public information policy to the NTO. 

023 Test execution shall conform to statutory, regulatory, and 

other responsibilities in accordance with delegations to the 

Manager, NV, by the Assistant Secretary for Defense 

Programs. 

024 Technical users are allowed maximum technical latitude in 

the conduct of their scientific programs and are responsible for their technical readiness. 

Revised: August 18, 1982 

C-l PO691-1 
THE NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION (NTO) NTS-SOP-0101 

025 

0101.03 

031 

032 

033 

034 

035 

036 

The Manager, NV, has the authority to approve or disapprove the field execution of tests that have been approved by Headquarters, DOE. During the Test Execution Period, authority to proceed with or postpone the field execution of 

approved activities or tests is delegated to the Test Controller in accordance with his Delegation of Authority from 

the Manager, NV. 

RESPONSIBILITIES 

The Manager, NV, is responsible for administering the NTS,

for all preparations required for the safe execution of 

programs and projects at the NTS and for providing construction and logistic support services and facilities 

required to support the technical users. 

NTS Users are assigned areas in which to conduct their 

operations and exercise technical control subject to opera- tional site coordination and control exercised by the 

Manager, NV, or, the Test Controller (TC), (during a Test 

Execution Period). 

The NTS Planning Board is a permanent board composed of 

representatives designated by the principal users of the NTS 

and appointed by the Manager, NV, whose principal function 

is to assess current and proposed NTS activities with regard to technical impact and economic implications. 

The Threshold Treaty Review Panel (TTRP) evaluates and 

validates preshot yield estimates to determine if design 

estimates are within the limits of the Threshold Test Ban 

Treaty (TTBT). Postmortem analyses are also evaluated if 

the post-shot prompt yield measurements data indicate that a 

threshold breach may have occurred. Reports on these 

evaluations are made to the Manager, NV. 

The Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP) evaluates, as an 

independent agent, the containment design of each proposed nuclear test assuring that all relevant data available for 

proper evaluation is considered. The Manager, NV, is advised of the findings of the evaluation in order to provide 

a basis on which he may request detonation authority. 

The Nuclear Explosive Safety Study and Survey groups conduct 

safety analyses of all proposed operations involving nuclear 

explosives and prepare reports for the approval and 

signature of the Manager, NV, which may contain safety rules, recommendations, and/or approvals of operations. 

Revised: August 18, 1982 

c-2 PO691-2 
THE NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION (NTO) NTS-SOP-0101 

037 

038 

039 

040 

041 

042 

The Test Controller is appointed by the Manager, NV, and is 

assigned full responsibility for the safe conduct of nuclear 

tests. The NV Master Schedule of Tests lists the individual 

scheduled to be Test Controller for each test. In 

performing his functions, the Test Controller will be 

supported by the Nuclear Test Organization. 

The Scientific Advisory Panel is comprised of individuals 

who have combined expertise in the fields of underground testing phenomenology, meteorology, radiation medicine and 

other subjects pertaining to the safety of a specific activity. Members of the panel will be selected from a list 

of candidates which has previously been approved by the 

Manager, NV. The chairman of the Panel is the scientific 

advisor nominated by the scientific user and designated by the Manager, NV. The Panel makes recommendations to the 

Test Controller as to whether the test should proceed or be 

delayed. 

The Test Group Directors (TGD) are assigned by the scientific sponsor to direct the fielding and technical aspects of experiments and tests. The TGD reports to the Test 

Controller on operational matters relating to test execution. 

The Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory (EPA/EMSL) provides a member to serve 

on the Test Controller's Advisory Panel, provides a 

comprehensive radiological surveillance and safety program in off-site areas surrounding the NTS and conducts a public 

contact and information program in the off-site area to 

assure residents that reasonable safeguards are being employed to protect health and property from radiation or 

other test hazards off-site. 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Weather 

Service Nuclear Support Office (NOAA/WSNO) provides a member 

to serve on the Test Controller's Advisory Panel, analyzes data obtained from weather stations and presents pre- and 

post-shot weather predictions to the Test Controller and his 

panel. 

Test Support is provided to DOE and the user organizations by the organizations responsible for technical, construction, M&O, Security, on-site safety and other support as 

required. 

Revised: August 18, 1982 

c-3 PO691-3 
THE NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION (NT01 NTS-SOP-0101 

043 The Health Physics Division provides a radiation safety advisor during Test Execution periods, coordinates and 

resolves rad-safety problems between the technical laboratories and other organizations and assures that the Test 

Controller is fully advised on radiological matters. 

044 The Director, NTSSO, is responsible for the direction and 

control of construction and logistical support activities at

the NTS and, during Test Execution Periods, supports the 

Test Controller directly in the field execution of experiments and test events. 

045 The Director, Operations Support Division, provides for the 

manning of the Operations Coordination Center and the services of the Test Operations Officer, Test Liaison Officer,

Air Operations Officer, and support in the area of containment and effects and assures compliance with the National 

Environmental Policy Act. 

046 The Director, Office of Public Affairs, advises and assists 

the Test Controller with regard to informational aspects of 

public safety and public affairs generally, providing management of special projects as assigned. 

047 The Director, Safeguards and Security Division, assigns a 

security advisor to the Test Controller to provide coordination and resolution of security problems between the Test 

Group Directors, organizations and users in compliance with 

security policy. 

Revised: August 18, 1982 

c-4 PO691-4 
-- 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

NUCLEAR TEST ORGANIZATION 

r

I

MANAGER NV 

NEVADA TEST SlTE USERS I 

LOS ALAMOS NAllONAL LABORATORY 

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATlONAL LAB. DEPUTY YANAGER 

SANDIA NATlONAL LABORATORY 

DEFENSENUCLEARAGENCY 

OTHERS I NEVADA TEST SITE 

PLANNING BOARD 

ORGiii%lON THRESHOLD TREATY REVlEW PANEL 

CONTAlNMENT EVALUATlON PANEL 

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY STUDY 

6 SURVEY GROUPS 

SClENTlFlC & TECHNICAL SCIENTlFIC mpilS;r C ADVlSORY 

TESTS & EXPERIMENTS TESTCGOUFT 

OFF-SITE SAFETY SUPPO#T TEST SUPPORT 

II SNL, EG&G, REECo, WSI, H&N, I EPA (EMSL-LV) F&S. DRl. USGS, JAB. etc. 

DOE 

sTAFFsuPPol?T 

RAD;o$gCAL 11 TEST E;=lCS 

I e talnr r SUPPORT 

PUBLIC ~~bsoc’EoaG~~~s” ii?kk%lit?iiiT lNFORMATlON,

SAFETY SUPPORT MERCURY CONlROL POLICY ACTlON SAFE-IV 6 HEALM & ANNOUNCEMENTS 

‘DESIGNATED FOR EACH TEST OR SPECIAL EXPERIMENT. (ASSUMES OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF NTS DURING TEST OPERATIONAL PERIODS.) 

Revised: August 18, 1982 

C-5/C-6 P"691-5 

APPENDIX D 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE 

NTS-SOP-0524 

CHAPTER 0524 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

0524.01 POLICY 

a. Establish radiation protection standards applicable to 

DOE and DOE contractor operations which are designed to 

protect the general public, DOE and DOE contractor and 

user personnel and property. 

b. Conduct DOE and DOE contractor operations in such a 

manner that radiation exposure to individuals is limited 

to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). 

C. Assure compliance with NVO-232 "Radiation Safety Manual 

for the Nevada Test Site" published in October 1981, for 

all NTS operations. 

0524.02 OBJECTIVE 

The objective of this policy is to assign and delineate radiological safety coordination responsibilities for all activities and operations at the NTS. 

0524.03 RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES 

031 The Manager, NV, has the overall responsibility for the 

radiological safety of personnel on the NTS and of the 

general public for all activities conducted at the NTS;

for protection of property, both government and private; and for the application of DOE and NV codes and standards for radiological safety. 

032 The Test Controller, as the Manager's representative, is 

responsible for overall health and safety during test 

execution periods as defined in NTS-SOP-Appendix 0501,

Part 11, relative to the field execution of nuclear 

tests at the NTS. (See NTS-SOP-0103-02 for Test Controller operational control). 

Revised: July 23, 1982

D-l PO69J-1 
SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES NTS-SOP-0524 

033 The Director, Health Physics Division (HPD), is respon- sible to the Test Controller durina test execution weriods and has direct responsibility,-at other times tb the 

Manager, NV, through the Assistant Manager for Defense, for radiological safety. The Chief, Coordination 

Branch, OSD, administers for HPD the delegation and 

return of the primary radiological safety responsibility within the GZ area to the Laboratory or other Test Group Directors when the device is in the field and during post-shot operations. 

034 The Director, Office of Safety and Health (OSH) is 

responsible to the Manager, NV for nuclear criticality safety and non-ionizing radiation safety. 

035 Reynolds Electrical C Engineering Co., Inc. (REECo) is 

responsible to the Director, HPD ror radiological safety coordination at all facilitiek and areas, except when 

responsibility for such coordination for a specified 

area has been assigned to another contractor or to a 

user organization. 

036 Test Group Directors and Heads of Participating Test 

Site User Organizations, Contractor Operations Otricials, and Other Groups are responsible to the Manaqer, NV; to the Test Controller during test operational periods; and to their parent organizations for-radiolog- ical safety of their employees. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-2 PO69J-2 
NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

PART I PROCEDURESAND CONTROLS 

A. Procedures 

Radiological safety procedures for the NTS are listed in NVO-232 

"Radiation Safety Manual for the Nevada Test Site" published in 

October 1981. These procedures are required of all NTS users and 

are updated on an annual basis. 

B. Controls 

Assurance of compliance with NTS radiological safety requirements is accomplished by several means: 

1. Quarterly contractor CPAF reviews by HPD. 

2. Regular other contractor reviews by HPD. 

3. Functional and Management appraisals by OSH. 

4. Monitoring of laboratories under San Francisco Operations Office (SAN) and Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) Memorandums of Understanding. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-3 PO69J-3 
NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

FART II DEFINITIONS 

A. Test Execution Period. The period of time following the comple- tion of the D-l Readiness Briefing through the time when initial 

reentry into the surface ground zero and trailer park is complete,

and the Test Controller announces that all work forces may return 

to normal work areas or as otherwise directed by the Manager, NV. 

B. Radiological Safety and Health Coordination requires managerial cognizance of all assigned activities being performed within an 

assigned area, and the exercise of controls to assure that these 

activities are conducted in a manner which will either eliminate 

or reduce the possibility of radiation exposure above reasonably

achievable levels. 

C. Radiological Safety, as used herein, pertains to ionizing radiation, including X-rays, but excluding nuclear criticality matters. 

It does not include non-ionizing radiation (e.g., lasers, microwaves, etc.), for which the NV OSH has responsibility. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-4 PO69J-4 
NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

PART III STANDARDS 

DOE Order 5480.1A Environmental Protection, Safety

tection Program for DOE operations. 

and Health ProDOE Order 5480.1A 

Chapter XI Requirements for Radiation Protection. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-5 PO69J-5 
NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

PART IV POST-SHOT RADIOLOGICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA AND CONTROL 

PROCEDURESAT DRILL HOLES, PORTALS AND OTHER LOCATIONS 

A. PURPOSE 

1. This Appendix establishes radiological environmental criteria 

and control procedures to minimize radiation exposure of 

personnel and to preclude the establishment of any new unnecessary radioactive waste disposal areas. 

2. The responsibilities and requirements for post-shot cleanup and the handling of contaminated equipment and materials are 

established within NTS-SOP 0524 and NTS-SOP 8800 to prevent the proliferation of radiation and contamination areas and to 

provide criteria for the proper posting and surveillance of 

such areas. 

B. CRITERIA 

The criteria of Exhibit I to this Appendix for cleanup of all 

sites have been established in order that each construction 

location drill hole site and/or tunnel portal will be restored 

to a radiologically satisfactory condition and properly documented for release of radiological safety delegation and 

reassignment to NV. It is recognized that some areas at NTS 

exceed these criteria when area responsibility is delegated. Due to the nature of nuclear testing and drilling operations at NTS, levels not to exceed ten (10) times Exhibit 1 will be 

permitted. In all cases, cleanup to ALARA shall be conducted. 

C. PROCEDURES 

1. Radiation and Contamination 

Where feasible, all areas shall be cleaned up to the levels 

specified in Exhibit I. All contaminated muck and debris as 

well as any clean superficial materials or articles should be 

removed prior to return to NV unless ongoing programs require their retention. All contaminated materials shall be disposed of in approved waste disposal areas. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-6 PO69J-6 
PART IV NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

C. PROCEDURES(continued) 

2. Fencing and Posting 

Posting and fencing for radiological protection are unnecessary when Exhibit I criteria have been met. However, if 

meeting the criteria is not feasible, levels not to exceed ten 

(10) times Exhibit 1 shall be permitted provided properly marked equipment and materials are fenced and posted and 

documentation is provided to NV. 

Should radiation levels exceed (10) times Exhibit 1 and cleanup to such levels is still not considered feasible, request for special exception may be approved by the Radiological Operations Branch, HPO, NV. 

Fences around potential crater sites shall be at a radius 

50 percent longer than the radius of the anticipated crater. 

Fencing around steep-sided collapsed craters will be based on 

analysis of potential safety hazards. Access roads will be 

appropriately fenced and barricaded. All fences will consist 

of two strands of 3/32 inch diameter, 7 x 7, wire rope covered 

with a high visibility polyvinyl yellow plastic coating, or 

the equivalent, plus reflectors at road crossings and signs to 

clearly indicate the status of the area. 

3. Inspection 

All sites to be returned to NV shall be subject to inspection by Radiological Operations Branch, NV, personnel prior to 

acceptance on the site by NV. Radiological Operations Branch 

personnel will also make periodic inspections of all returned 

sites and recommend the corrective actions or maintenance 

items required. 

D. EXCEPTIONS 

Exceptions to these criteria may be made by NV on a case-by-case basis. Requests for exceptions should be directed to the Radiological Operations Branch, HPD, NV. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-7 PO69J-7 
PART IV NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

EXHIBIT 1 

CRITERIA L/ 

ISOTOPE 2/ REMOVABLE 3/ TOTAL A/ z/ 

U nat, U-235, U-238 Th nat, Th-232, 1,000 dpm o on 10,000 dpm Q on 

and associated decay products any 100 cm2 any 100 cm2 

Other isotopes which decay by alpha 100 dpm u on 1,000 dpm Q

emissions or by spontaneous fission any 100 cm2 on any 100 cm2 

Beta-gamma emitters (Isotopes with 1,000 dpm fly 0.4 mrad/hour 6/

decay modes other than alpha emis- on any 100 cm2 at 1 cm from tfie 

sion or spontaneous fission) surface 

11 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the 

rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector 

and count rate meter, for background, efficiency and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation. 

-

21 Where surface contamination by both alpha and beta-gamma emitting isotopes exists, the limits established for alpha and beta-gamma

emitting isotopes shall apply independently. 

31 The amount of removable radioactive material on any 100 cm2 of 

surface area shall be determined by wiping the area with dry filter or soft absorbent paper and with the application of moderate 

pressure, and assessing the amount of radioactive material on the 

wipe with an appropriate instrument of known efficiency. In 

determining the removable contamination on an object of surface 

area less than 100 cm2, the pertinent levels shall be reduced 

proportionately, and the entire surface shall be wiped. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-8 PO69J-8 
PART IV NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

41 Alternatively, for total contamination one may elect to use an 

average level one-half of that listed in this column, provided that: 

a. The average shall be taken over the total area or 10 square meters, whichever is the lesser; and 

b. At no location shall the maximum exceed 2.5 times the level 

listed in this column. In any event, the entire area must be 

surveyed. 

s/ It is assumed that measurements of total contamination are made 

with instruments having a sensitive cross-sectional area of 

100 cm2. Measurements made with instruments having more or less 

than 100 cm2 of sensitive area may be related to levels 

proportionately adjusted, or additional measurements may be made 

on contiguous areas totaling 100 cm2 and the findings added for 

comparison with the specified levels. 

61 Measure through not more than a total of 7 milligrams per square centimeter of absorbing material. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-9 PO69J-9 
NTS-SOP-APPENDIX 0524 

PART V X-RAY MACHINE SURVEILLANCE ON THE NTS 

A. PURPOSE 

This appendix establishes radiological safety procedures for the 

registration and surveillance of X-ray machines on the NTS. 

B. PROCEDURES 

1. Register all X-ray machines with REECo/Environmental Sciences 

Department (ESD) - RAMATROL, Building 180, Mercury. 

2. Provide the following information to RAMATROLwhen register- ing X-ray machines: 

a. The output of useful beam in R/mA-min at lm at maximum 

rated tube potential. 

b. A locking procedure for the X-ray machine to prevent unauthorized or accidental production of radiation. 

C. A program to calibrate radiation survey instruments at 

three-month intervals, or a program to utilize services 

of the radiation safety contractor during X-ray opera- tion. 

d. A statement that a Utilization Log, including such items 

as location, date, radiographer, parameters of use, exposure rate at closest point to source of personnel, etc., will be used. 

e. The identity of each X-ray machine operator with accompa- nying statement certifying his/her competence. 

f. A description (make and model number, collimation, filtration, maximum voltage (kVp), and maximum amperage for 

each X-ray machine. 

g. Measurements of leakage rate (not in useful beam) when 

the X-ray machine is operating at maximum voltage and 

aximum current. 

h. A documented inspection in compliance with applicable American National Standards Institution (ANSI) standards 

shall be furnished RAMATROLat least annually for all 

machines in use at NTS over one year. This inspection shall be performed by the user or, upon request, by RAMATROL. 

Revised: July 23, 1982 

D-10 PO69J-10 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

1. -

Rem. A unit of dose equivalent. It is a unit found 

convenient in practice to express exposures to different 

types of ionizing radiation in terms that combine both 

the magnitude of the absorbed dose and its biological effectiveness. The dose equivalent is numerically equal 

to the dose in rads multiplied by the appropriate modify- ing factors. 

m. Exposure Rate or Dose Rate. The time rate at which exposure or dose is measured or administered, i.e., dose or 

exposure per unit time, such as R/hr, rem/min,-rad/hr, R/set, etc. 

0524-04 Radiation Protection Standards 

041 Coverage. These standards shall govern ionizing radiation 

exposure to AEC and AEC contractor personnel and to other 

individuals who may be exposed to ionizing radiation from 

operations of the AEC and AEC contractors. These standards 

do not apply to radiation exposures resulting from natural 

radiation, medical and dental procedures, nor do they apply to the general population when the activities involved are 

essential to national security, such as nuclear weapons testing. The latter types of activities are covered by separate criteria. Safety criteria for each Plowshare event 

will be considered separately until such time as over-all 

policy for the Plowshare program is established. No opera- tion shall be conducted until the radiological hazard has 

been evaluated and it has been determined to the satisfaction of the Test Manager, or the Test Group Director (when he has been delegated the radiological safety responsibility for the operation) that radiation exposures should not 

exceed the radiation protection standards established in AEC 

Manual Chapter 0524 (repeated below). Except for emergen- cies, written requests to expose personnel in excess of 

these limits should be directed to the Test Manager. 

D-11 Revised: February 9, 1968 
PART I 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

1. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS IN CONTROLLED AREAS ’ 

A. Radiation from sources external to the bocfv 

Tvoe of Exposure Period of Time Pose (rem) 

Whole body, head and trunk, Accumulated dose 5 (N-18)2 

active blood-forming organs Calendar quarter 3 34 

Gonads, or lens of eye. Year 30 

Skin of whole body and thyroid Calendar quarter 3 104 

Year 754 

Hands, and forearms, feet and ankles Calendar quarter3 254 

B. Radiation from emitters internal to thg averaged over periods up to 13 consecutive weeks provided work areas k!!z& 

1. Except as provided in 2. below, the are appropriately monitored and exradiation protection standards for posure histories are maintained for 

airborne radioactivity specitied in each individual working in such 

annex I, table I, shall be followed. areas. 

The concentration standards are 

based upon continuous exposure to 2. If it is not feasible to govern exthe concentrations specified for forty posures to internal emitters by ap 

hours per week (a “week” being plying airborne radioactivity conseven consecutive days). For the centration standards, the following 

purpose of applying these standards, radiation protection standards shall 

radioactivity concentrations may be apply: 

Dose 

Tvoe of Exposure rem&ear remiauarter 

Whole body, active blood- 5 3 

forming organs, gonads. 

Thyroid 30 10 

Bone Body burden of 0.1 

microgram of radium228 or its biological 

equivalent5 

Other ograns 15 5 

The calculation of organ dose shall be International Commission on Radiological 

based on methods recommended by the Protection. 

Federal Radiation Council and the 

’ An individual under age 18 shall not be three calendar quarters and (d) 5 rem for the 

employed in or allowed to enter controlled year, but in no case will exposure be more 

areas in such manner that he will receive than 3 rem per quarter. 

doses of radiation in amounts exceeding the 3 A calendar quarter may be taken as a 

standards applicable to individuals in predetermined period of 13 consecutive weeks 

uncontrolled areas. Exposures to individuals or any predetermined quarter year based on 

under age 18 may be averaged over periods not the calendar. 

to ;xceed one calendar quarter. 4 Personnel monitoring equipment shall be 

N equals the age in years at last provided to each individual who receives or is 

birthday. An individual employed at age 18 likely to receive a dose in any calendar 

or an individual beyond age 18 who had no uarter in excess of 1OW of these values. 

9 accured unused exposure shall not bs exposed Exposurs must be governed such that the 

during the ensuing year to doses exceeding individual’s body burden does not exceed this 

(a) 1.25 rem for the first cslendar quertsr, value (a) when averaged over any period of 12 

(b) 2.5 rem total for the first two calendar ounseoutlve months and (b) after 50 years of 

quarters, (c) 3.75 rem total for the first occupational exposure. 

Revised: February g,l988 

D-12 
PART II 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSOSOP APPENDIX 9524 

II. RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND POPULATION GROUPS IN UNCONTROLLED 

AREAS 

A. Radiation dose standards for external and internal exwsure 

Dow (rem&ear) 

Based on Based on an average 

exposure to exposure to a suitable 

Tvoe of Exwsure individuals Population sample 

Whole body, gonads or 0.5 0.17 

bane marrow 

Thyroid or bone 1.5 0.5 

Bone (alternate standard) Body burden of Body burden of 

0.003pg of radium 0.001 pg of radium 

229 or its biolog- 226 or its biological equivalent ical equivalent 

B. Radioactlvitv in effluents released (b) individuals are not exposed in 

to uncontrolled areas excess of annes I, BMe II standards, or 

1. Except as provided in 2. below, 

radioactivity in effluents released (c) the avemge exposure of a suitto uncontrolled areas shall not ex- able sample of an exposed popuceed the radiation protection stand- lation group is not in excess of 

ards specified in annex 1. table II. one-third of annex I, table II 

The point of release of such effluents standards. Radioactivity concenshall be considered to be the point trations in the environment may 

at which the effluents pass beyond be averaged over periods up to 

the site boundary. Mere such ef- one year. 

fluents are discharged through a 

conduit such as a stack or pipe, the 3. In any situation in which the contripoint of release may be considered bution to radioactivity in the ento be the conduit discharge. For the vironment from efffuents discharged 

purpose of applying these standards, by one or more activities of the 

radioactivity concentrations in ef- AEC or AEC contractors ie likely 

fluents may be averaged over petioda to result in exposures in excess of 

up to one year. the standards specified in 1I.A. and 

B. above, lower effluent concentm2. Radioactivity in effluents may be tion lim* may be set for these 

released to uncontrolled areas in Operations. In such cases, the manexcess of the radiation protickon ager of the field oflice may take the 

standards specified in annex I, table II, necessary corrective action if all 

provided it is reasonably demon- activities concerned am within his 

strated that in uncontrolled areas: area of responsibility. Otherwise, 

each case will be referred to the 

(a) individuals am not exposed in Director, Division of Operational 

excess of the standards specified Safety, for appropriate action. 

in A. above. 

Revised: February 9.1968 

D-13 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(See notes at end of annex) 

T; I0 I 

Column I Column 2 Column I Element (atomic number) l8otope’ Water 

(u%ll, (&ml) &zll) 

Actinium (89) . . . . . . . . . . . AC 227 S 8xlo-s :;;I;: gg::: I 9XlO-3 

AC 228 S 8xld8 3x1 o-3 3x1 o-9 

I 2X10-a 3x1 d3 :;;::; Americium (95) . . . . . . . . . . Am 24’ S 6x16’2 lxlo-4 

I lxlo-‘o 8x16’ 

g;;:;: Am243 S 8X1 O-l2 lxlo-4 

I 1x10-‘0 8~16~ 4x10-‘2 

Antimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . , Sb 122 S 2xlo-7 8x16’ 8x1 O+ 

I 1x10-‘l 8x1 d4 5x1 o-9 

Sb 124 S 2x10-7 7x10-4 5x10-9 

I 2xlo-8 7xlo-4 7xld’O 

Sb 125 S 5x1 o-7 3x1 o-3 2xlo-8 

I 3xlo-8 3x1 o-3 9x10-‘O 

Argon (18) .............. A 37 Sub’ 8XldS . . . . 1x10-’ 

A 41 Sub 2x1o-8 . . . . 4x1 de 

Arsenic (33) ............. As 73 S 2xlo-8 1x10-2 7x1 o-8 

I 4xlo-7 lxlo-2 lxlo-8 

As 74 S 3xlo-7 2xlo-3 lxlo-8 

I lxlo-7 2xlo-3 4x1 o-9 

As 78 s lxld7 8xlo-4 4xlo-9 

I lxld7 Sxld4 3xld9 

Aen S 5x1 d7 2xlo-3 2x10-9 

I 4x1 d7 2Xld3 lxlo-8 

A&tine (85) . . . . . . . . . . . . . At 211 S 7x1 dS 5xld5 2xlo-‘0 

I 3xlo-8 2x10-” lxlo-9 

Barium (56) . _ . . . . . _ . . . . . Ba 131 S lxlo-8 5x1 o-3 4x10-9 

I 4x1 o-7 5x1 o-3 lxlo-8 

Ba 140 S lxlo-7 8xld4 4x1 o+ 

I 4x10” 7x1 o-4 lxlO-9 

Berkelium (97) ........... Bk 249 S 9X10-‘0 2xlo-2 3x10-l’ 

I lxlo-7 2x10-2 4x1 d9 

Beryillium (4) ............ Be7 S Bxl o-8 5x1 o-2 2xlo-7 

I lxlo-6 5x1 d2 4x1 d8 

Bismuth (83) ............. Bi 208 S 2X10-7 1x10-3 8xlo-9 

I lxlo-7 1x10-3 5x1 o-9 

‘able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(udml) 

2xld8 

3xlo-4 

9xlo-s 

8xlo-5 

4x1 o-8 

2x10-9 

4x1 o-9 

3x1 o-5 

3x1 o-5 

3x1 o-5 

2XlO-5 

2xlo-5 

lxlo-4 

lxlo-4 

. . . . 

. . . . 

5x10-’ 

5xlo-4 

5x10-5 

5xlo-5 

2x10-9 

2xlo-5 

8x1 O-9 

8x10-9 

2xld8 

7x1 o-5 

2x10-4 

2x10-’ 

3xldS 

2x10-5 

8xlo-4 

8xlo-4 

2xlo-3 

2xlo-3 

4x1 o-5 

4x1 o-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-14 
STANDARDS FOR RADlATlON PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDlX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(See note6 at end of annex) 

-II Tt le I T 1‘able II 

Column I Column 2 Column I Column 2 Element (atomic number) Isotope’ 

($9 (St% cu%9 (zzci) 

Bi 207 S 2xld7 2xlo-3 6x10-5 

I IrId 2xlo-3 6XlO-5 

Bi210 S 6x10* 1x10-3 4xlo-5 

I 6x10* lx103 4xlo-5 

Bi212 S lxld7 lxlo-2 4x10-4 

I 2xld7 lxlo-2 4xlo-4 

3romine (35) ............ Br82 S lxlo-6 8x1o-3 3x1o-4 

I 2xld7 lxlo-3 4xlo-5 

Cadmium (48) ............ Cdl09 S 5xldb 5xlo-3 2xlo-4 

I 7xld8 5x10-3 2xlo-4 

Cdll5m S 4xlo-8 7x1o-4 3x10-6 

I 4xld8 7xlo-4 3x10-6 

Cd 115 S aid7 lxlo-3 3x1o-5 

I 2xld7 lxlo-3 4xlo-5 

Cakzium(20) ............. Ca 45 S 3xld8 3x10-4 axlo-6 

I 1x10-7 5x1o-3 2xlo-4 

Ca 47 S 2x10-7 1x10-3 5xlo-5 

I 2xld7 1x10-3 3xldS 

Califomium (98) .......... Cf249 S lxlO-4 4xlo-6 ;$:i I 7xlo-4 2xlo-5 

Cf250 S 4xld4 lxlo-5 ;:x:: I 7xlo-4 3xlo-5 

Cf252 S 2x10-" 7xlo-4 2X10-6 

I lxld'0 7x10-4 2x10-S 

Carbon(6) .............. c 14 S 4xldS 2xlo-2 8xlo-4 

(CO2) Sub 5xld5 . . . . . . . . 

Cerium(58) ............. co141 S 4xld7 3x103 9xlo-5 

I 2x10-7 3xld3 9xlo-5 

co143 S 3x10-7 lxlo-3 4xlo-5 

I 2xlo-7 1x10-3 4xlo-5 

co144 S 1x10-* 3xlo-4 lxlo-5 

I 6x10* 3x10-' lxlo-5 

Cesium(55) . . . . . . . . . . . . . co131 S lxld5 7xlo-2 2XlO-3 

I 3xld6 3x1o-2 9xlo-4 

Csl34m S 4x10-9 2x10-1 6xlo-3 

I 6xld6 3x10-2 lxlo-3 

cs134 S 4x10-8 3xlo-4 9xlo-6 

I lxlo-8 lxld3 4x10-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February Q,lQ68 

D-15 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(See note9 at end of annex) 

7 ‘ablle I - Column I Column 2 Column I Element (atomic number) Isotope’ Water 

(u%l) (udml) &ill) 

cs 

cs 

135 

136 

S 

I 

S 

I 

7 5x10-’ 

B 9x10-’ 

7 4x10-’ 

7 MO-’ 

3x1 o-3 

7x1 o-3 

2x10-3 

2x10-3 

2x10-9 

3x1 o-9 

1x10-9 

6x1 O-9 

Chiorine (17) .......... 

cs 137 

Ci 36 

Ci 38 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

B 6x10-l 

B 1x10-’ 

7 4x1 o-; 5 2x10-’ 

3 3x1 o-’ 

1 2x10-’ 

4x1 o-’ 

1x10-3 

2x10-3 

2x1o-3 

lxlo-2 

1x10-2 

2xlo-9 

5x10-‘C 

1x10-* 

8x10-” 

9x10-8 

7x10-9 

Chromium (24) ......... Cr 51 S 5 1x10-! 5x10-2 4x1 o-7 

Cobalt (27) ............ co 57 

Co 58m 

co 58 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

I 2x10-t 

1 3x10-t 

r 2x10-’ 

i 2x10-! 

I 9x10-e I 8x10-l 

I 5x10-s 

5xld2 

2xlo-2 

lxlo-2 

8~10-~ 

6~10-~ 

4x10-3 

3x1 o-3 

8x10-9 

1x16 

6x10-9 

6x10-’ 

3x10-7 

3x10-9 

2x10-9 

Copper (29) ............ 

co 60 

cu 64 

S 

I 

S 

3x1 o-7 

I 9xlo-g 

2xlo-e 

1x10-3 

1x10-3 

1x10-2 

1x10-8 

3x10-10 

7x10-9 

Curium (96) ............ Cm 242 

I 

S 

1x10-9 

0 1x10-l 

6x1 O-3 

7x10-4 

4x1 o-9 

4x1 o-12 

Cm 243 

Cm 244 

Cm 245 

Cm 246 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

S 

I 

0 2x10-l 

2 6x’d’ 

0 1x10-’ 

2 9x10-’ 

0 1x10-’ 

2 5x10-’ 

0 1x10-” 

2 5x10-‘: 

D 1x10-” 

7x10-4 

lxld 

7x1 o-4 

2x10-’ 

8x10-’ 

1x10-4 

6x10-4 

1x10-4 

8x10-’ 

6x1 o-12 

2x10-13 

3x1 o-12 

3x10-‘3 

~:;I:: 

4x1 o-12 

E:$:: 

Dysprosium (66)) . . . . . . . . Dy 165 S 3x1 o-9 1x10-2 9x10-9 

I 2x10-9 1x10-2 7x10-9 

Dy 166 S 2u10-7 lxld3 6xld9 

I 2x10-7 lxld3 7x10-9 

Erbium (68) . . . . . . . . . . . _ Er 166 S 6x1 O-7 3x10-3 2xlo-8 

I 4x1 o-7 3x1 o-3 1x10-9 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Table II 

Column 2 

Water 

(udml) 

1x10” 

2x10-’ 

9x10-5 

6xlo-5 

2xlo-5 

4x1 o-5 

8x1 O-5 

6x1o-5 

4x1 o-’ 

4x10-4 

Mo-3 

2XlO-3 

5x10-’ 

4x10-4 

3x1o-3 

2x1o-3 

1x10-4 

Qx1o-5 

5x1 o-5 

3x1 o-5 

3x1 o-4 

2x10-’ 

2x10-5 

3x1 o-5 

5x1 o-8 

2xld5 

7x1 o-s 

3x10-5 

4x1 o-8 

3x1o-5 

4x1 o-6 

3x10-5 

4x1 o-’ 

4x’o-4 

4x1 o-5 

4x1o-5 

9xld5 

9x1o-5 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-16 
STANDARDS FOR RADlATlON PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(Seenotesatendofannex) 

l- T le I ‘able II 

Cotllmn I Column2 Column I Column2 Element (atomic number) kotope . Water 

(lJi%l) (w/ml) (Lzll, (iz%) 

Er 171 S 7x10-7 3x10-3 2x10-6 1x10-’ 

I 6x10-7 3x1o-3 2xlo-6 1x16’ 

Europium (63) . . . . . . . . . . . Eu 152 S 4x10-7 2Xlo-3 lxlo-6 6x10-5 

(T/2.=9.2 hrs) I 3x10-’ 2xlo-3 lx1o-6 6xlo-5 

Eu 152 S 1x10-6 2x10-3 6x10-’ ;;;::i (TI2=13yrs) I 2xld8 2x1o-3 6x10-’ 

Eu154 S 4x10-s 6x10-’ lxlo-1o 2XlO-5 

I 7x10-Q 6x16’ 2XlO-‘o 2x1o-5 

Eu155 S 9x10-0 6xlo-3 3x10-g 2x10-’ 

I 7x10-8 6~10-~ 3xlo-g 2x10-’ 

Fluorine (9) ............. F16 S 5x10-6 2x10-2 2x10-’ 8x10-’ 

I 3xlo-6 lxlo-2 9X1o-(I 5x10-’ 

Gadolinium (64) ......... Gd153 S 2x10-’ 6xlo-3 8x10-@ 2x10-’ 

I 9x10-6 6x1o-3 3x10-@ 2x16’ 

Gd159 S 5x10-7 2x1o-3 2x10-6 8Xld5 

I 4x10-7 2xlo-3 lxld6 8xld5 

Gallium (31) ............ GP 72 S 2x10-7 lxlo-3 8x10-’ 4x10-6 

I 2x10-7 1x10-j 6x1o-s 4x10-6 

Gerrnanium(32) ......... Ge 71 S 1x10-6 5xld2 4x10-’ 2xlo-3 

I 6x10+ 5x1o-2 2x10-’ 2x1o-3 

Gold(79) .............. Au 196 S 1x10-6 5x10-3 4xlo-6 2x10-’ 

I 6x10-7 4xlo-3 2xlo-6 1x10-’ 

Au196 S 3x10-7 2%lo-3 lxlo-6 5x1o-5 

I 2x10-7 1x1o-3 8x10+ 5xlo-5 

Au199 S 1x10’~ 5x1o-3 4x10-6 2x10-’ 

I 8x10-7 4x1o-3 3x10-6 2x10-’ 

Hafnium(72) ............ Hfl61 S 4x10-6 2x10-3 lxlo-Q 7x1o-5 

I 7x10-6 zxlo-3 3x10+ 7x10+ 

Holmium(67) ............ Ho 166 S 2x10-7 9x10-’ 7x10-O 3xlo-5 

I 2x10-7 9x10-’ 6x10-@ 3xlo-5 

Hydrogen(l) ............ H3 S 5x10-6 1x10-l 2x10-’ 3xlO-3 

Sub 2X10-3 . . . . 4xlo-5 . . . . 

lndium(49) .............. lnll3m S 8x10-6 4x1o-2 3x10-’ lxlo-3 

I 7x10-6 4x10-2 2x10-’ lxlo-3 

nll4m S 1x10-7 5x10-’ 4xlo-s 2x10-6 

I 2x10-6 5x1o-4 7x10-‘O 2xlo-5 

nll5m S 2x10-6 lxlo-2 8x16’ 4x10-’ 

I 2x10-6 1x10-2 6xlo-6 4x16’ 

Seefootnotesatendoftable. 

Revieed: February9,1968 

D-17 
STANDARDS FOR RADlATlON PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR 

Element (atomic number) 

Iodine (53) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Iridium (77) .............. 

Iron (26) ................ 

Krypton (38) ............. 

Lanthanum (57) .......... 

Lead (82) ............... 

laotope’ 

In 115 

I 125 

I 129 

I 131 

I 132 

I133 

I 134 

I 135 

Ir 190 

Ir 192 

Ir 194 

Fe 55 

Fe 59 

Krffi 

Kr85 

I<r87 

La140 

=b 203 

=b 210 

=b 212 

ANNEX I 

AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL 

(See notes at end of annex) 

T Table I 

Column I Column . Water 

($0 Wml) 

S 2xld7 3x1 o-3 

I 3xld8 3x1 o-3 

S slildO 4x1o-5 

I 2xlo-7 6xlo-3 

S 2x10-@ 1x1o-3 

I 7xld8 6xlo-3 

S 9x1 o-@ 6xlo-5 

I 3x10-I 2xdd3 

S 2xlo-7 2x1o-3 

I 9xlo-7 5x1 o-3 

S 3xlo-(I 2x16’ 

I 2XlO-7 lxld3 

S 5x1 o-7 4xlo-3 

I 3xld8 2xld2 

S 1x1o-7 7x1 o-4 

I 4x1 o-7 2x1o-3 

S 1x1o-8 8x10-3 

I 4x10-I 5x1 o-3 

S lxlo-7 1x10-3 

I 3x1 o-6 1x10-3 

S 2xlo-7 lx1o-3 

I 2x10-‘l 9X10-’ 

S 9X1O-7 2xlo-2 

I lxlo-8 7xld2 

S lx1o-7 2xlo-3 

I 5x1 o-8 2x1o-3 

SUL 6x1o-8 . . . . 

Sub lxlo-s . . . . 

Sub lxlo-8 . . . . 

S 2xlo-7 7x10-4 

I 1x1o-7 7x10-’ 

S 3x1 da lxlo-2 

I 2xld8 lxlo-2 

S lxlo-‘o 4xld8 

I 2x1 o-l0 5x10-” 

S 2%lo-8 6x10-’ 

I 2x10-O 5x10-4 

BACKGROUND 

T 

2 Column I . 

(ui%) 

9x1o-e 

1x10-Q 

8x10-” 

lx1o-B 

2x10-” 

2x10-@ 

lxlo-‘o 

lxlo-8 

3x10-@ 

3xlo-8 

lxlo-‘o 

7x10-@ 

2xld9 

lxlo-7 

1x10-@ 

lxlo-8 

4x1 o-8 

lxlo-8 

4x10-O 

9xlo”o 

8xlo-s 

5x10-O 

3x1 o-8 

3x1 o-8 

5x1 o-9 

2x10+ 

1x1o-7 

3x1o-7 

2xlo-8 

5x1 o-@ 

4x10-O 

9x10-6 

6xlo-8 

g;;:: 

Table II 

Column 2 

Water 

(UC/ml) 

9xlo-5 

9xlo-5 

2x1o-7 

3x1o-5 

4x1 o-7 

2x16’ 

3x1 o-7 

6xlo-5 

8x1o-8 

2x10-’ 

7x1 o-8 

4x1 o-5 

lxlO-5 

6x10-’ 

2xlo-5 

7x10-5 

2x10-’ 

2x16’ 

4x1 o-5 

4xld5 

3xldS 

3x1o-5 

8x10-’ 

2x1o-3 

8x1o-5 

5xlo-5 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

21clo-5 

2xlo-5 

4x1 o-’ 

4x1 o-’ 

1x1o-7 

2x10-’ 

2xlo-5 

2xlo-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9,1988 

D-18 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(See notee et end of annex) 

Ti I8 I 

Column I Column 2 Column I Element (atomic number) 

&h (szl) (Sl) 

Lutetium (71) ........... Lu 177 S 8xlo-7 3x1 o-3 2xlo-8 

I 5x1o-7 3x1o-3 2xlo-a 

Manganeee (25) ......... Mn 52 S 2x10-7 lxlo-3 7x1 o-9 

I lxld7 9x10-’ 5x1 dS 

Mn54 S 4rld7 4x1o-3 1x10-@ 

I 4x1 o-8 3x1o-3 1x10-~ 

Mn 56 S 8xld7 4x1 o-3 3x1 da 

I 5x1 d7 3x1o-3 2xlo-8 

Mercury (80) . . . . . . . . . . . . Hg 197m S 7x1 d7 8xld3 3xld8 

I 8x1o-7 5x1o-3 3x1 o+ 

Hg 197 S lxlda 9x1o-3 4x1 o-8 

I 3xldS 1x1d2 9xld8 

Hg 203 S 7x1 d8 5x1 o-4 2x1o-s 

I 1x1o-7 3x1 o-3 4x1 o-9 

Molydbenum (42) ........ MO 99 S 7xld7 5x1 o-3 3x1 o-6 

I 2xlo-7 lxlo-3 7x16’ 

Neodymium (80) ......... Nd 144 S 

I ;;s:; 2x10-3 2x1d3 $: 

Nd 147 S 4x1d7 2xlo-3 lxlds 

I 2x1o-7 2xdd3 8xlo-s 

Nd 149 S 2uld6 8x1 O-3 6xld8 

I 1x10+ 8x1 O-3 5x10-e 

Neptunium (93) .......... Np 237 S 

I t;;::; 9xlo-5 9xlo-4 

1x10-13 

4x1o-‘2 

Np 239 S 8x1 d7 4x1 o-3 3x1o-8 

I 7x10-7 4x1 o-3 2xld8 

Nickel (28) ............. Ni 59 S 5x1 d7 8x10-3 2xlo-8 

I 8x1 d7 8xlo-2 3xld8 

Ni 83 S 8x10-* 8xlo-4 2x10-’ 

I 3x1 o-7 2xld2 1x10-* 

Ni 85 S 9x10-’ 4x1 o-3 3xld8 

I 5x1 o-7 3xld3 2xlo-8 

Nioblum (Columbium) (41) . . Nb 93m S lxld7 1x10-2 4x10-’ 

I 2x10-l 1x10-2 5x1 o-9 

Nb 95 S 5x1 o-7 3xlo-3 2x10-e 

I 1x1o-7 3xld3 3x10-s 

Nb 97 S 8xld6 3xld2 2x10-‘l 

I 5x1 de 3xld2 2xlo-7 

‘able II 

Column 2 

(EYEi) 

1x10-’ 

1x10-4 

3x1o-5 

3x1 o-5 

1x1o-4 

1x1o-4 

1x10-’ 

1x1o-4 

2xlo-4 

2xlo-4 

3x1 o-4 

5x10-’ 

2xlo-5 

lxld4 

2x10-’ 

4x1 o-5 

7x1 o-5 

8x1 O-5 

6x1o-5 

8x10-5 

3x10-’ 

3xlo-4 

3x10-6 

3x1 o-5 

lxlo-4 

1x10-’ 

2x10-4 

2X10-3 

3xldS 

7x16’ 

1x16’ 

1x10-’ 

4x16’ 

4x1 o-’ 

1x10-’ 

lxlo-4 

9x10-’ 

9x10-’ 

See footnotes et end of table. 

Revieed: February Q,lQ68 

D-19 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Element (atomic number) 

Osmium (76) . . . . . . . . . . . 

Palladium (46) _ _ . . . 

Phosphotus (15) . . . . . . . . . 

Platinum (76) . . . . . _ . _ 

Plutonium (94) . . . . . . . . . . . 

Polonium (84) ............ 

Potassium (19) ........... 

Praseodymium (59) ........ 

Isotope’ 

OS 185 S 

I 

OS 19lm S 

I 

OS 191 S 

I 

OS 193 S 

I 

Pd 103 S 

I 

Pd 109 S 

I 

P 32 S 

I 

Ptl91 S 

I 

Pt 193m S 

I 

Pt 197m S 

I 

Pt197 S 

I 

Pu 238 S 

I 

Pu 239 S 

I 

Pu 240 S 

I 

Pu 241 S 

I 

Pu 242 S 

I 

PO 210 S 

I 

K 42 S 

I 

Pr 142 S 

I 

Ta 

Column I 

&All) 

5x1 o-’ 

5x1 o-8 

2X1O-5 

9xlo-6 

lx1o-8 

4x10-7 

4x10-’ 

3x10-7 

1x10-9 

7x10-7 

6x10-’ 

4x10-7 

7x1 o-8 

6~16~ 

8x16’ 

6x10-’ 

7x1 de 

5xlo-8 

6xlo-6 

5xld6 

8x10-’ 

6x10-’ 

z;$ 

$:: 

~;;::: 

9x10-1’ 

4xlo-8 

z;$ 

;;;:;; 

2xlo-6 

1x10-’ 

2x10-7 

2x10-’ 

Column 2 

Water 

WW 

2x1o-3 

2x1o-3 

7x10-* 

7x1 o-* 

5x1 o-3 

5x1 o-3 

2x1o-3 

2x10-3 

1x10-* 

6~10-~ 

3x1o-3 

2xlo-3 

5x10-’ 

7x16’ 

4x10-3 

3xld3 

3x10-* 

3x1 o-* 

3x10-* 

3x10-2 

4xlo-3 

3xlo-3 

1x10-’ 

8x10-’ 

1x10-’ 

8x10-’ 

1x10-’ 

8x1 O-4 

7x1 o-3 

4x10-2 

1x10-’ 

9xlo-4 

2xlo-5 

8x10-’ 

9x10-3 

6x1 o-’ 

9x10-’ 

9x10-’ 

Column I 

&Ill) 

2K10-* 

2xlo-9 

6x10-’ 

3x10-’ 

4xlo-8 

1x10-8 

1x10-* 

9x10-9 

5x10-8 

3x1 o-6 

2x10-* 

lxlo-B 

2xlo-9 

3x10+ 

3xlo-8 

2nlo-8 

2x10-’ 

2x10-’ 

2x16’ 

2x16’ 

3x1 o-8 

2xlo-8 

;:;;::: 

y ;I:: 

;:g::: 

3x10-‘* 

1x10-9 

;;;::: 

2x10-” 

7x10-‘* 

7x1 o-* 

4x1 o+ 

7x1 o-9 

5xlo-g 

‘able II 

Column 2 

Water 

(udml) 

7x1 dS 

7xlo-5 

3xlo-3 

2xlo-3 

2x10-’ 

2x10-’ 

6xlo-5 

5x1 o-5 

3x1 o-4 

3x1 o-’ 

9x1o-5 

7x1 o-5 

2xlo-5 

2xlo-5 

1x10-’ 

1x10-’ 

1xlo-3 

lx1o-3 

lxlo-3 

9x10-’ 

1x10-’ 

1x10-’ 

5x1o-8 

3xlo-5 

5x1 o-6 

3x1 o-5 

5xlo-6 

3x1o-5 

2x10-’ 

lxlo-3 

5xlo-8 

3xlo-5 

7x10-’ 

3x10-5 

3x1 o-’ 

2XlO-5 

3x10-5 

3x1 o-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-20 
2 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND 

(See 

Element (atomic number) Mope1 

Pr 143 S 

I 

Promethium (61) . . . . . . . . . Pm 147 S 

I 

Pm 149 S 

I 

Protoactinium (91) . . . . . . . . Pa 230 S 

I 

Pa 231 S 

I 

Pa 233 S 

I 

Radium (88) . . . . . . . . . . . . Ra 223 S 

I 

Ra 224 S 

I 

Ra 226 S 

I 

Ra 228 S 

I 

Radon (86) ............. Rn 220 S 

Rn 222 

Rhenium (75) ........... Ro 183 S 

I 

Ro 188 S 

I 

Rs 187 S 

I 

Re 188 S 

I 

Rhodium (45) ............ Rh 103m s 

I 

Rh 105 S 

I 

Rubidium (37) ............ Rb 86 S 

I 

Rb 87 S 

I 

ANNEX I 

WATER ABOVE NATURAL 

notes at end of annex) 

-T T le I 

Column I Column 

Water 

&w (UC/ml) 

3x1 o-’ 1x10-J 

2X10-’ 1x10-3 

6xld8 6x10-J 

lx1o-7 6~10-~ 

3x16’ 1x10-3 

2x16’ 1x10-3 

2x1 o-8 7x1 o-3 

7x1 o-3 y;::; 3x10-5 

lxlo-‘c 8x10-’ 

6x10-’ 4x10-3 

2x10-’ 3x10-3 

2x1o-9 2X10-5 

2x1 o-la 1x10-4 

5x10-0 7x10-5 

7x10-1° 2x10-4 

4x10-7 ;;;::: 9x10-4 

7x10-” 8x10-’ 

4x10-” 7x1 o-4 

3x1 o-’ . . . . 

1x16’ . . . . 

3x1 o-6 2x10-2 

2x10-’ 8~10-~ 

6x16’ 3x10-3 

2x10-’ lxlo-3 

9x10+ 7x10-2 

5x1 o-’ 4x1 o-2 

4x16’ 2xlo-3 

2x10-’ 9x10-4 

8x10-6 4x10-1 

6x10+ 3x1 o-1 

8x10-’ 4x1 o-3 

5x10-7 3x1 o-3 

3x10-’ 2x10-3 

7x1 o-8 7x10-4 

5x1 o-’ 3x10-3 

7x1 o-a 5x1 o-3 

NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

BACKGROUND-continued 

2 Column I 

&%I) 

1x10-8 

6x1o-8 

2x10-0 

3x10-Q 

lxlo-8 

8x10-O 

fg;;i: 

;:;I:: 

2x1o-8 

8xlO-Q 

8x10-” 

8x10-l2 

;;;I;; 

3x10-‘2 

2x1 o-l2 

;;$ 

3x1o-8 

3x10-Q 

9xld8 

5x10-@ 

2x10-O 

8x1 O-9 

3x10-’ 

2xlo-8 

lx1o-8 

6x1o-a 

3x1 o-8 

2xlo-8 

3x1 o-8 

2x10-8 

lxlo-8 

2xlo-g 

2xld8 

2x10-Q 

‘able II 

Column 

Water 

wmo 

5x1 o-5 

5x1 o-5 

2x10-’ 

2xlo-4 

4xlo-5 

4x1 o-5 

2xlo-4 

2x16’ 

9x16’ 

2xldS 

1x10-’ 

1x10-’ 

7x1 o-’ 

4x1 o-8 

2x10-8 

5x1 o-8 

3x1 o-8 

3x1 o+ 

3xlo-8 

3xlo-5 

. . . . 

. . . . 

6xld4 

3xld4 

9xlo-5 

5xlo-5 

3x1 o-3 

2X10-3 

6xlo-5 

3x1 o-5 

lxlo-2 

1x10-2 

1x10-4 

lxlo-4 

7x1o-5 

2nldS 

1x10-4 

2X16’ 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-21 
2 

STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes atendofannex) 

n le I ‘able II 

Column I Column 2 Column I Column Element(atomicnumber) kotopfz . . Water 

&b (Z% (SW (UC/ml) 

Ruthenium(44).......... Ru97 S 2xlo-e 1x10-2 8x1 O-8 4x10-’ 

I 2x1o-8 1x10-2 8xld8 3x16’ 

RulO3 S 5x10-’ 2%lo-3 2xlo-8 8x10-’ 

I 8x10-’ 2xlo-3 3x10-@ 8~10-~ 

Ru105 S 7x10-’ 3x10-3 2x10-6 1x10-’ 

I 5x10-’ 3x10-3 2x10-8 1x10-’ 

Ru108 S 8~10-~ 4x16’ 3x10-@ 1xlo-5 

I 8x1o-g 3x10-’ lxlo-5 ;:;I;; Samarium(62) . . . . . . . . . . Sm147 S 7x10-” 2xlo-3 6x1o-5 

I 3x1 o-l0 2xlo-3 9x1 o-l2 7x1o-5 

Sm151 S 6xlo-8 1x10-2 2x10-O 4x10-’ 

I 1x16’ 1x10-2 5x10-@ 4x10-’ 

Sml53 S 5x16’ 2x10-3 2xlo-6 8xldS 

I 4x10-’ 2xld3 1x10-6 8xld5 

Scandium (21) . . . . _ . . . . . SC46 S 2x10-I 1x1o-3 8x10-’ 4x1o-5 

I 2xlo-6 1x10-3 8~10-‘~ 4x1o-!j 

SC47 S 8x10-’ 3x10-3 2nlo-8 !3x1o-5 

I 5x10-’ 3x1o-3 2xdda 9x1o-5 

SC 48 S ado-’ 8x10-’ 6x10-’ 3x1o-5 

I 1x10-7 8~10-~ 5x10-’ 3x1o-5 

Seknium(34) ............ so75 S lxlo-s 9xlo-3 4x1o-8 3xlo-4 

I 1x10-’ 8x1o-3 4x10-@ 3xld4 

Silicon(14) .............. si 31 S 8x1o-6 3x10-2 2x10-’ 9x1o-4 

I lxlo-6 6x10-3 3x10-8 2x1o-4 

Silver(47) .............. AqlE S 8x10-’ 3x1o-3 2nlo-8 1x16’ 

I 8x10-I) 3x10-3 3xlo-s 1x16’ 

AgllOm S 2x10-’ 9x10-4 7x10-@ 3xld5 

I lxlo-8 6x10-4 3xlo”o 3x10+ 

&J 111 S 3x10-I 1x10-3 1x10-8 4xldS 

I 2x10-’ 1x10-3 8x10-O 4xldS 

Sodium(l1) ............. Na 22 S 2x10-’ 1x1o-3 6x10-@ 4xldS 

I 9x10-@ !9xld4 3xld’O 3xldS 

Na 24 S 1x1o-6 6x10-3 4x10-I a1o-4 

I 1x10-’ 8x10-4 5x10-Q 3xldS 

Sbontium(38) ............ Sr85m S 4xld5 2x10-’ 1x10-* 7xld3 

I 3xldS 2x10-l lxld6 7x1o-3 

Sr85 S 2x10-’ 3x10-3 8xldS 1x10-’ 

I 1x10-’ 5x10-3 4x10-@ 2x10-’ 

Seefootnotesatendoftabk. 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-22 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR 

Element (atomic number) 

SumJr(l6) ............. 

Tantalum (73) ........... 

Technetium(43) ......... 

Tellurium(52) . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sr 99 

Sr 90 

SR 91 

SR 92 

535 

Ta 182 

Tc 9&n 

Tc 96 

Tc 97m 

Tc 97 

Tc 99m 

Tc 99 

Te 12!5m 

Te 127 

Te 129111 

Te 129 

To 131m 

Tel32 

ANNEX I 

AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See note8 at end of annex) 

Table I 1 Table II 

Column I Column 2 Column I Column 2 

csyml, t:% &h (zz) 

S 3xld8 3x10-' 3x16lo 3xlo-6 

I 4xld8 &lid4 1x10-@ 3xlo-s 

S 3x10-1’ lxlo-5 3x10-" 3x10-7 

I 5x10-S lxld3 2xld'O 4xlo-s 

S 4x1 o-7 2x10+ 2x10-0 7x10-5 

I 3x10-7 lxld3 Qxlo-s 5xldS 

S 4x10-7 2xlo-3 2x10-6 7x1o-s 

I 3x10-7 2xlo-3 1x10-* 6x10-s 

S 3x10-7 2x10-3 9x10-@ 6x1o-s 

I 3x16' l3xlo-3 fhtldS 3x10-' 

S 4xld8 iKid 1x10-Q 4xldS 

I 2xld8 lxld3 7x1o-10 4xldS 

S 8x10-~ 4x10-l 3xld6 1x1d3 

I 3x10-S 3x10-l lxld6 lxld2 

S 6x10-' 3ltld3 2xld8 1x10-' 

I 2Kdd' 1x1o'3 ?3x10-@ 5x1o-s 

S 2xld6 lxlo-2 8xld8 4x10-' 

I 2x10-7 5x10-3 5xlo-e 2x10-' 

S 1x10-s 5xlo-2 4x10-7 2xlo-3 

I 3x10-7 2xld2 lxlo-6 8x10-' 

S 4x10-S 2x10-l lxlo-a 6x1o-3 

I 1x10~ 8xld2 5x10-' 3xld3 

S 2X10-6 1x10-2 7xld8 3x10-4 

I 6xld8 5x10-3 2x10+ 2x10-' 

S 4x10-7 5xld3 lxlo-8 2x10-' 

I 4xld8 2xld3 1x10-@ 5x1o-s 

S 2x10-6 tbllo-3 6xlo-8 3x10-4 

I 9x10-' 5x10-= 3x10-a 2x10-4 

S 8xld8 lxlO-3 3x10-@ 3xldS 

I 3x10-6 6xld4 1x10-@ 2xlo-s 

S 5x10-8 2Xld2 2X10-' 8x10-' 

I 4x10-a 2xlo-2 1x16 8x1o-4 

S 4x10-7 2x1o-3 1x10-* 6x1o-s 

I 2x10-' 1x10-3 6x10-Q 4x10-5 

S 2x10-7 Qxld4 7x10-9 3x1o-s 

I 1x10-' 6x10-' 4x10-9 2x10-s 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revieed: February 9,1968 

D-23 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND 

(See 

Element (atomic number) 180tope1 

Terbium (85) ............. Tb 160 S 

I 

Thallium (81) ............ Ti 200 S 

I 

TI 201 S 

I 

TI 202 S 

I 

TI 204 S 

I 

Thorium (90). . . . . . . . . . . . . Th 228 S 

I 

Th 230 S 

I 

Th 232 S 

I 

Th natural S 

I 

Th 234 S 

I 

Thulium (89) . , . . . . . . . . . . . Tm 170 S 

I 

Tm 171 S 

I 

Tin (50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sn 113 S 

I 

Sn 125 S 

I 

Tungsten (Wolfram) (74) . . . . W181 S 

I 

w185 S 

I 

W187 S 

I 

Uranium (92) . . . . . , . . . . . . u230 S 

I 

U 232 S 

I 

ANNEX I 

WATER ABOVE NATURAL 

notes at end of annex) 

TZ el 

Column I Column . Water 

(u%d) oJc/ml) 

1x10-’ 1x10-= 

3x1 o-8 lxlo-3 

3xlo-8 lxlo-2 

lxlo-8 7x1 o-3 

2xlo-8 9x10-= 

9x10-’ 5x1 o-3 

8x10-’ 4x1 o-3 

2x10-7 2x10-= 

8x10-7 3x10-= 

3x1 o-8 2xlo-3 

2xlo-4 y;::: 4x1 o-4 

5x1 o-5 y::: 9xlo-4 

3x10-” 5x10-5 

lo-3

y;::: 8x10-’ 

3x10-” 8xlo-4 

8x10-6 5xlo-4 

3x1 o-6 5xlo-4 

4x1 o-8 1x10-= 

3x1 o-8 lxlo-3 

1x10-’ 1x10-2 

2x10-’ 1x10-2 

4x1 o-’ 2xlo-3 

5x1 o-8 2xlo-3 

1x10-’ 5xlo-4 

8~10-~ 5x1 d4 

2xlo-8 1x10-2 

1x10-’ lxld2 

8x10-’ 4xlo-3 

1x10-’ 3x16” 

4x1 o-’ 2x10-3 

3x10-’ 2xlo-3 

lx1o-4 $:; lxlo-4 

lxlo-‘o 8x1 O-4 

3x10-l’ 8x1 O-4 

NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

BACKGROUND-continued 

Table II 

2 Column I Column 2 

Water 

f (u%l) wmo 

3x1 o-e 4x1 o-5 

1x10-g 4xlo-5 

9xlo-8 4x1 o-4 

4xlo-8 2xlo-4 

7xlo-8 3x1 o-4 

3x1 o-8 2xlo-4 

3x1 o-8 1x10-’ 

8x1 O-g 7x1 o-5 

2x10-6 lxlo-4 

8x1o-5 

$:: 7x1 o-8 

lo-5 

f$:: 2x10-e 

3xldS 

“:s 2x10-e 

4xlo-5 ;;::: lo-8 

lo-l2 lo+ 

2xlo-9 2XlO-5 

10-g 3x1 o-5 

lxlo-9 5xlo-5 

lxlo-9 5x1o-5 

4x1 o-9 5xlo-4 

8x1 O-9 5x1 o-4 

lxlo-8 9x1o-5 

2x10+ 8~10-~ 

4x1 o-9 2xlo-5 

3xlo-9 2x1o-5 

8x10-’ 4x1 o-4 

4x10+ 3xlo-4 

3xld8 lxlo-4 

4xld9 lxlo-4 

2xlo-8 7x1 o-5 

lxlo-8 6x10-S 

1x10-” 5xlo-8 

5xlo-8 ;;;;: 3xlo-5 

9xlo-3 3x1 o-5 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-24 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(Sea notes at end of annex) 

T Table I T Table II 

Element (atomic number) 180tope1 Column . I Column 2 

W8teC 

Column I Column 

Water 

2 

(L!k) WJ~) (uzll) wm 

u233 s 9x10-’ 3x1o-5 

I 9x10-’ 3x1o-5 

u234 S 9x10-’ 3x1o-5 

I 9x10-’ 3x1o-5 

U 235 S 8x1 o-’ 3x1 o-5 

I 8x1 o-’ 3x1 o-5 

u236 S 1x1o-3 3x1o-5 

I lxlo-3 3x1o-5 

u238 S lxlo-3 4x1 dS 

I 1x1o-3 4x1 d5 

U-natural s 1x1o-3 2xlo-5 

I lxlo-3 3xldS 

Vanadium (23) .......... V48 S 9x10-’ 3xld5 

I 8x1 o-’ 3xldS 

Xenon (54) ............. X0 13lm Sul . . . . . . . . 

x0 133 Sul . . . . . . . . 

x0 135 Sul . . . . . . . . 

Ytterbium (70) ........... Yb 175 S 3x1o-3 1x10-’ 

I 3x1o-3 1x10-’ 

Yttrium (39) ............ Y90 s 6x10-’ 2x10-S 

I 6x16’ 2X1O-5 

Y 9lm S 1x10-l 3x1 o-3 

I 1x10-l 3x1 o-” 

Y 91 S 0x10-’ 3x1o-5 

I 8x1 O-’ 3x1o-5 

Y 92 S 2xlo-3 6x1o-5 

I 2xld3 6x1o-5 

Y 93 S 8x10-’ 3x1 o-5 

I 8x10-’ 3x1 o-’ 

Zinc (30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zn 65 S 3xld3 1x10-’ 

I 5x1d3 2x10-’ 

Zn 69m S 2xld3 7x1 o-5 

I 2X10-3 6x1o-5 

Zn 69 S 5xlo-2 2xlo-3 

I 5x1 o-2 2xlo-3 

Zirconium (40) . . . . . . . . . . . Zr 93 S 2xlo-2 8x10-’ 

I 2x1 o-2 8x10-’ 

See footnotes at end of table. 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-25 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION NTSO-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

ANNEX I 

CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER ABOVE NATURAL BACKGROUND-continued 

(See notes at end of annex) 

Table I T 7‘able II 

Column I Column 2 Column I Column 2 Element (atomic number) l80tope’ . Water 

&m ww &m (S%) 

zrs5 S 1X1O-7 2x10-3 4x10+ 8x10-5 

I 3x10d 2xlo-3 lxldg 8x10-5 

zrQ7 S 1x10-’ 5x1 o-4 4x1 o-’ 2x10-s 

I Bxld* 5x16’ 3x1 o-@ 2x10-s 

’ Solubla (S); Insolubb (I). 

2 ‘Sub” means that values given are for submersion 

in an intinite doud of gaseous material. 

NOTE: In any casa whom there is a mixturu in air Ubs limiting values for purposes of Anrhex I shall 

or water of mom than one mdiinudide, the limit- b0: 

ing values Ibr purposes of thii Annex should be 

determined as Iblbws: a. For purposes of Tabb I, Col. l-l x lo-l2 

1. If the identity 8nd concentration of sad7 b. For purpose8 of Table I, Col. 2-3 x lo-’ 

rsdiinudii in UM mixture are ti, UW limiting c. For purposes of Tobls II, Col. 14 x 10”’ 

values should be derived as follows: d. For purposes of Tabb II, Col. 2-l x 10m5 

Determine, for each mdiinudii mixture. the mtb 

between Iha quantity present in the mixture and the 3. If any of the conditions specihd below are 

limit otherwiw estaMished in Annex I for the rnsf Uts corresponding values speciti6d bebw may 

specific radbnudide when not in I mixture. The bs used in iiiu of those specified in pamgraph 2 

sum of such ratios for all the radiinudiis in the above. 

mixture may not exceed V’ (i.e., ‘uw). a. If the identity of each mdiinudide in the 

EXAMPLE: If radiinudidas A, B, and C am mixturs is known but ths concentration of one or 

present in concentmtions ‘AnCe’ and cC* and if mom of the mdbnudiis in the mixture is not 

the appkabb MPC’s, are MPCA, and MPCB, and MPCC hwn, ths concantmibn limit for the mixture is 

rsspectlvely, then the corucenW~tions shsll be Uw limit specitied in Annex I for UW mdionuclii 

limited so that the following relalhship ox&s: in lhe mixture having UMB lowest concentrstbn 

limit; or 

C C b. If the identity of each mdiinudida in the cA B -+-+-

MPCA MPCB MPCC c *1 mixtun ir not known, but it is known that certain = mdbnudidss afmifml in Annex I am not pmwnt 

2. If either ths kkMty of the concentration in the mixture, the concsntmtion limit for the 

of any radiinudii in the mixtum k not know, mixture is the lowest concentration limit qecified 

in Annsx I for any radiinudii which is not known 

tobeabsentfrom~mixtum;or 

Revised: February 9,1968 

D-26 
STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION 

C. Element (atomic number) 

IfitisknownthptSrgO,l129,Pb210,Po210,At211,Rs 

23, Ra 224, Ra 228, AC 227, Ra 228, Th 230, Pa 231, Th 

232,andTh+afarenotpresent . . . . . . . . . . . 

IfitisknownthatSr90,1129,Pb210,P0210,Ra223, 

Ra 228, Rs 228, RP 231, and Th-naf are not present . . . 

It it is known ‘hat Sr 90, Pb 210, Ra 226, Ra 228, am 

not present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . , , . . . . . . 

ItitisknownRa228andRa228,arr,notprs~nt . . . . . . 

It it is known that alphaamitters and Sr 90, I lZg, Pb 210, 

Ao 227, Ra 228, Pa 230, Pu 241, and 8k 249 are not 

present..................................... 

It it is known that alphaamitters and Pb 210, AC 227, Ra 

228andPu241,arenotpreeent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If it is known that alpha+mitters and AC 227 are not 

present..................................... 

If it is known that AC 227, Th 230, Pa 231, Pu 238, Pu 239, 

Pu24O,Pu242,andCf2#,arenotpresent . . . . . . . . . 

If Pa 231, Pu 239, Pu 240, Pu 242, and Cf 249 ars not 

present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. If the mixture of radionudiis consists of 

uranium and its daughter produots in ore dust 

prior to ohsmioal prooessing of the uranium ore, 

the values specified below may be used in lieu of 

those determined in accordance with paragraph 1 

above or ‘hose specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 

above. 

a. For purposes of Table 1, Col. l-l x 10 -lo 

pdml gross alpha aotivity; or 2.5 x -” pa/ml 

natural umnium; or 75 micrograms per oubio meter 

or air natural uranium. 

b. For purposes of Table II, Col. 13 x 10-l’ 

pdml gross alpha aclivity; or 8 x 10 -13 

pclml natural uranium; or 3 micrograms per oubic 

meter of air natuml uranium. 

NTSD-SOP APPENDIX 0524 

Tal el T 1 Me II 

Column . I Column 

Water 

2 Column I Column 2 

Gh (vc/ml) (SW (S% 

. . . . 9x10J . . . . 3x109 

. . . . 8x106 . . . . 2x10-e 

. . . . 2xlo’5 . . . . 8x10-7 

. . . . 3x10-@ . . . . 1x10” 

3X10-3 . . . . 1x1o”o . . . . 

3x10-10 . . . . 1x10”’ . . . . 

3x10”’ . . . . lxlo”2 . . . . 

3x10-l2 . . . . 1x10-‘3 . . . . 

2x10-l2 . . . . 7x10-l4 . . . . 

5. For purposes of thii note, a mdiinudii 

may bs conskjered as not present in a mbrture if 

(a) the ratio of the oonoenbation of thst radiinudii in the mix’um (C,) ti ‘he oonoentition 

limit for that mdikwwdii speoified in Table II 

of Annex I (MPCJ does not exoeed l/10. 

C i.e. A<1 

F “Xl 

and(b)‘hesumofauohratiosfora#ths 

mdiinudides oonekkwed as not present in Uw 

mixturs does not exoeed 114. 

C i.e. 54 8 (1 - +- + ..... = MPC* MPCS 4

Revised: February 0,1968 

D-27/D-28 

SLA-74-0199 

Specified External Distribution Only 

Printed May 1974 

GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

AND SANDIA LABORATORIES NUCLEAR TESTS 

J. H. Metcalf 

Instrumentation, Dosimetry and NTS Projects Division, 3313 

Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87115 

ABSTRACT 

Underground weapons effects testing requires that personnel reenter the tunnel complex 

to recover data and scientific experiments for postshot evaluation. The preparation 

for and the handling of the hazards encountered during such reentry operations are 

described. 

E-l 

1-2 
Issued by Sandia Laboratories, 

operated for the United States Atomic 

Energy Commission by Sandia 

Corporation 

This report was prepared as an account 

of work sponsored by the United States 

Government. Neither the United States 

nor the United States Atomic Energy 

Commission, nor any of their 

employees, nor any of their 

contractors, subcontractors, or their 

employees, makes any warranty, express 

or implied, or assumes any legal 

liability or responsibility for the 

accuracy, completeness or usefulness 

of any information, apparatus, product 

or process disclosed, or represents 

that its use would not infringe 

privately owned rights. 

SF 1004-DB(2-74) 

E-Z 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Introduction ............. ..................... 5 

Responsibilities ........... ..................... 5 

Manager, NV00 ........... ..................... 5 

Test Controller .......... ..................... 5 

Test Group Director ........ ..................... 5 

SLA Environmental Health Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 

NTS Support Contractor ...... ..................... 6 

Preshot Preparations for Reentry ... ..................... 6 

Containment ............ ..................... 6 

Ventilation System ........ ..................... 6 

Environmental Instrumentation ... ..................... 6 

Gas Sampling System ........ ..................... 7 

Reentry Communications System ... ..................... 7 

Possible Hazards to Reentry Personnel . ..................... 7 

Radiation ............. ..................... 7 

Explosive and Toxic Gases ..... ..................... 7 

Tunnel Damage ........... ..................... 6 

Explosives ............ ..................... 8 

Toxic Materials .......... ..................... 8 

High-Pressure Gas Cylinders .... ..................... 8 

Reentry Party Composition and Equipment ..................... 8 

Guidelines for Initial Reentry Parties ..................... 10 

Authorization ........... ...................... 10 

Activating 6 Monitoring Tunnel Ventilation System .............. 10 

Reentry Control Group .............. .............. 10 

Team Limitations ................ .............. 10 

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus ....... .............. 11 

Emergency Return to Portal ........... .............. 11 

Rescue Team. .................. .............. 11 

Medical Support ................. .............. 11 

Summary of Initial Tunnel Reentries ......... .............. 11 

Preparation of Tunnel for Reentry ........ .............. 11 

Evaluation of Tunnel Environment ........ .............. 12 

Exploration of Tunnel .............. .............. 12 

3 

E-3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) 

Page 

Scientific Assessment of the Experiments .................... 13 

Scientific Assessment Team ......................... 13 

Photographic Documentation ........................ 13 

Removal of Unexpended Explosives ..................... 13 

Recovery of Experiments From the Test Chambers ................. 13 

E-4 
GENERAL TUNNEL REENTRY PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 

AND SANDIA LABORATORIES NUCLEAR TESTS 

Introduction 

Detonation of a nuclear device in an underground test facility adds many unique 

hazards to those existing in any underground construction. Instrumentation which can 

be remotely monitored can provide a general picture of conditions, but ultimately, 

personnel, properly protected from the hazards they might encounter, must reenter the 

tunnel to verify the condition of the facility. 

Personnel from the Environmental Health Department of Sandia Laboratories have 

been participating in tunnel reentries since 1962. During this time experience, 

improvements in instrumentation, and changes in containment features have caused 

tunnel reentry procedures to be continually revised. This document describes preshot 

preparations and postshot procedures currently being used for safe and economical 

reentry and scientific recovery from a tunnel area. 

Responsibilities 

Manager, NV00 

The Manager, NVOO, is responsible for administering, preparing, and executing 

all programs and projects at NTS. He has the overall responsibility for the health 

and safety of both the general public and NTS personnel for all activities at the NTS. 

The Manager, NVOO, may delegate operational control of an approved program, project, 

or experiment to a Test Controller, who is responsible for field execution of that 

specific program. 

Test Controller 

The Test Controller has full responsibility during the test execution period for 

the safe conduct of the program to which he is assigned. By mutual agreement between 

the Test Controller and a scientific user, control of safety hazards within the area 

assigned for a particular activity may be delegated to the user's Test Group Director 

during times other than the test execution period. 

Test Group Director 

Whenever operational control is delegated to a Test Group Director, he is 

responsible to the Manager, NvOO, for the establishment and implementation of safety 

criteria within the assigned area. He will be responsible for submitting a plan for 

all operation to the Manager, NV00 for review and concurrence. Upon termination of 

need for the Test Group Director to retain control of the test complex, the Test Group 

Director will be relieved of safety responsibility. 

E-5 

5 
SLA Environmental Health Department 

During the time that the Test Group Director has operational safety 

responsibility, the Environmental Health Department will provide consultants who will 

advise the Test Group Director on tunnel reentry procedures (for Sandia and Defense 

Nuclear Agency sponsored events). These consultants will be familiar with the 

configuration of the test bed, and with possible postshot tunnel conditions and 

hazards. They will specify the necessary instrumentation to monitor the postshot 

conditions of the tunnel and will document any release of radioactive material to the 

environment. During postshot reentry and recovery operations, they will provide 

technical direction of radiation safety and industrial hygiene personnel provided by 

the NTS Support Contractor. 

NTS Support Contractor 

Reynolds Electrical 6 Engineering Company (REECo) is responsible for 

construction and mine safety for all personnel working underground. REECo will 

provide the personnel necessary for the support of the tunnel reentry and experiment 

recoveries. This includes mine-rescue-trained mining personnel, radiation safety 

monitors, and industrial hygiene and industrial safety personnel. 

Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

Containment 

The stezzning should contain the fireball and should thus minimize radioactivity 

and explosive and toxic gases in the experimental area. If the stemming fails, the 

overburden plug provides a secondary containment barrier. If the gases penetrate the 

overburden plug, the gas seal plug and/or the gas seal door should contain the gases 

within the tunnel complex. 

Ventilation System 

The tunnel ventilation system is set up so that all areas of the tunnel complex 

can be swept with fresh air from the portal. Valves which can be remotely operated 

from a manned location are installed in the ventilation and makeup lines in the gas 

seal door and/or gas seal plug and the overburden plug. The ventilation system 

utilizes a positive displacement Sutorbilt blower which is installed so that the air 

from the tunnel complex passes through a filter system before it is released to the 

atmosphere. Radiation detectors are placed on the ventilation lines to monitor the 

radioactive effluent released, and continuous samples are taken for isotope identification. 

Environmental Instrumentation 

Radiation detectors are installed in the tunnel complex to supply tunnel reentry 

personnel with information about radiation levels in the tunnel. Other types of 

instrumentation which are used to remotely monitor conditions in the tunnel include 

geophones and pressure and temperature gauges. 

E-6 

6 
Gas Sampling System 

Sampling lines for remotely taking gas samples from various points in the tunnel 

are installed during preparation of the facility for the test. Samples taken from 

these lines after test execution help to determine the concentration of explosive and 

toxic gases in the tunnel prior to reentry. Samples can usually be taken from inside 

the gas seal door and/or the gas seal plug, from both sides of the overburden plug, 

from the experiment drift near the stemming, and from the horizontal-line-of-sight 

(HLOS) pipe itself. 

Reentry Communications System 

The reentry communications system provides a communications link between the 

reentry control group in the trailer at the portal and the reentry party in the 

tunnel. This system consists of (1) a portable reel of WD-7 field wire and (2) a 

shielded cable, which is permanently installed in the tunnel. Access to this permanent cable is provided at designated locations along the reentry route. Preshot 

preparations for an event include installation and checkout of the shielded cable used 

for reentry communications. 

Possible Hazards to Reentry Personnel 

Radiation 

Reentry teams may encounter radioactivity in the tunnel that results from any 

one or more of the following: 

1. Gross failure of the stemming, in which case large quantities of fission 

products are deposited throughout the tunnel complex. When this condition 

exists, the team must be concerned with external radiation hazards and 

with control of contamination. 

2. Seepage of radioactive gases or materials through fissures or fractures 

from ground zero. In this case, external radiation fields are not usually 

a significant hazard, but contamination control is of primary concern. 

3. Activation of experiment samples and components of the HLOS pipe. If 

sample integrity is maintained after the event, contamination is only a 

minor problem and external radiation is the major consideration. If the 

sample contaminant is ruptured and the sample is dispersed throughout the 

test chamber, contamination control is of primary concern. 

Explosive and Toxic Gases 

Explosive and toxic gases may be produced as direct or secondary products of the 

detonation of the device. They may also be produced by the detonation of explosives 

used in some experimental samples or in HLOS pipe closure systems. These gases may be 

present in concentrations that are hazardous to personnel. 

E-7 

7 
Tunnel Damage 

The ground motion associated with the detonation of the device may cause 

structural damage to the tunnel. All reentry team members must be alert for unstable 

overhead conditions, such as hanging slabs and broken timber. They should also watch 

for broken ventilation lines and utility lines (water, compressed air, electrical 

cables). Physical damage to the tunnel may at times be such that rehabilitation of 

the drift must be accomplished before experiment recoveries can be initiated. 

Explosives 

Explosives are associated with pipe closure and sample protection systems, and 

may also be present as part of some of the experiments. These explosives, which may 

still be unexpended after the test, may have been sensitized by the exposure to the 

device radiation. If the unexpended explosives are contained in experiments in which 

the sample integrity has been maintained, they do not pose a significant hazard for 

initial reentry teams. However, team members should be aware of the possibility of 

unexpended high explosives lying on the bottom of the HLOS pipe. 

Toxic Materials 

Experiments to be exposed to radiations from the device may contain materials 

which have some degree of chemical toxicity. In particular, many experiments contain 

beryllium or have beryllium filters, a portion of which will be present in the 

postshot environment as finely divided dust. These materials are of concern primarily 

during postshot recovery of experiments when it is extremely probable that a portion 

of the dust will become airborne. 

High-Pressure Gas Cylinders 

some experiments typically have pressurized gas as an integral part of the 

experimental system. The gas is usually supplied from high-pressure (2200 psi) gas 

cylinders which may have been damaged as a result of ground motion or high temperature. Reentry personnel must exercise caution around pressurized systems and will 

check them to see that the pressure has been bled off. 

Reentry Party Composition and Equipment 

A team for reentry into a tunnel following a nuclear test shall consist of a 

minimum of five personnel, one of whom shall be designated as a team chief. He will 

be responsible for the team during all work underground. All personnel participating 

as members of initial reentry parties must be certified in the use of USBM* -approved 

self-contained breathing apparatus. Composition of the reentry parties and their 

equipment is summarized in Table 1. 

*U.S. Bureau of Mines 

E-8 
TABLE I 

summary of Reentry Parties and Equipment 

Initial Reentry Parties Pull Radex clothing 

1. Team Chief USBM-approved, P-hour self-contained 

breathing apparatus 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor Radiation detectors 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor Explosimeter 

4. Two or More Miners Toxic gas indicators 

oxygen detector 

Hard-wire communications 

1. Team Chief Respiratory protection (as required) 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor Radiation detectors 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor Explosimeter 

4. Miners and Support Personnel Toxic gas indicators 

Rescue Team Pull Radex clothing 

1. Team Chief USBM-approved, 2-hour self-contained 

breathing apparatus 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor Radiation detectors 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor 

4. Two or More Mine-Rescue Toxic gas indicators 

Trained Personnel 

Oxygen detector 

Wire litters 

Scientific Assessment Team 

1. Team Chief Respiratory protection (as reguired) 

2. Radiation Safety Monitor Radiation detectors 

3. Industrial Hygiene Monitor Explosimeter 

4. Scientific Advisors Toxic gas indicators 

5. Mine Support Personnel Oxygen detector 

E-9 

9 
Guidelines for Initial Reentry Parties 

Authorization 

Initial reentry and each subsequent phase will be initiated upon authorization of 

the Test Group Director (TGD) with the concurrence of the Test Controller. Operational 

control will be retained by the TGD until all recovery and reentry mining operations are 

completed and tunnel access is returned to ABC control. 

Activating and Monitoring Tunnel Ventilation System 

Tunnel reentry will not start until after the tunnel ventilation system has been 

activated and samples of tunnel air have been taken and monitored at the portal. 

Evaluation of these samples must indicate that reentry can be made within the limitations 

of this procedure. 

Reentry Control Group 

The reentry control group willnormallybe composed of an SLAEnvironmental Health 

consultant, the TGD or his designated alternate, the tunnel construction engineer or some 

other person who has an intimate knowledge of tunnel construction details, a RBECo RadSafe Superintendent, and a senior industrial hygienist. All activities of the reentry 

party in the tunnel are performed at the direction of this group, and any deviations from 

the guidelines presented in this procedure are by a consensus of its members. 

Communications between the reentry control group and the reentry party in the tunnel will 

be maintained whenever reentry teams are underground. All observations by team members 

during reentry will be communicated through the team chief to the reentry control group 

and will be recorded for future reference. Only one team will be in the tunnel at any 

one time unless otherwise directed by the reentry control group. 

Team Limitations 

Personnel radiation exposure limits for a reentry operation are 3 remper calendar 

quarter (NTSO SOP Chapter 0524). If it is assumed that a person's exposure history would 

allow an accumulation of 3 remduring the operation, his exposure will be terminated when 

his pocket dosimeter indicates an accumulated exposure of 2 rem. 

Except under extenuating circumstances and by mutual decision of the reentry 

control group and the team chief, reentry teams will not enter radiation fields greater 

than 10 R/h, nor will they enter ares in which the concentration of carbon monoxide is 

greater than 1000 ppm or the concentration of explosive gases is greater than 30 percent 

of the lower explosive limit (LEL). 

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

Prior to entry into any potentially hazardous atmosphere, the self-contained 

breathing apparatus of each team member will be personally checked by the team chief 

and/or another certified person for proper fit and operation. Malfunctions of the 

breathing apparatus of any team member shall cause the reentry mission to be aborted. 

E-10 

10 
Emergency Return to Portal 

A reentry party will return to the portal as a result of any of the following 

conditions: 

1. On decision of the team chief. 

2. When any member of the reentry team has a McCaa oxygen supply less than 30 

atmospheres or a Draeger pressure less than 450 psi. 

3. On loss of communications with the reentry control group at the portal. 

Rescue Team 

A rescue team will be stationed near the portal or at the fresh air station 

underground at all times that reentry teams are in the tunnel. If located at the portal, 

the rescue teamwillhave a train available for immediate departure. The rescue teamwill 

be dispatched only at the direction of the reentry control group and only after it has 

been determined that the rescue team can conduct its mission safely. 

Medical Support 

Amedical technicianwith an ambulance and the necessary medical eguipmentwillbe 

available at the portal during initial reentry operations. This medical support will be 

released only at the direction of the reentry control group. 

Summary of Initial Tunnel Reentries 

This plan is written as though one team can complete the entire reentry operation. 

In actual practice, several teams willprobablybe necessary. As many teams as are needed 

will be used to complete the tunnel exploration. 

Preparation of Tunnel for Reentry 

As soon as possible after the event, and with the concurrence of the Test 

Controller, the tunnel ventilation systemwillbe activated. The tunnel complex will be 

further prepared for reentry by securing all unnecessary power going into the tunnel. 

All downhole cables from the mesa trailer park will be disconnected in the cable splice 

shack and each cable termination will be taped. CABLES WILL NOT BE CDT WITHOUT SPECL?U 

AUTHORIZATION FROMTHE TEST GROUP DIRRCTOR. All electrical powertothe mesa trailer park 

will be turned off. All instrumentation and utility power cables and telephone lines 

going into the tunnel from the portalwillbe disconnectedor confirmed to be off. Cables 

for the tunnel ventilation system, the temperature and pressure monitors, the geophones, 

and the remote radiation monitoring system will be left connected. 

11 

E-11 
12 

Evaluation of Tunnel Environment 

The reentry control group will review the data from the radiation system, the 

temperature and pressure monitors, the geophones, and the gas samples taken from the 

tunnel complex to assure that the reentry can be made within the limitations of this 

procedure. With this assurance, and when cleared by the TGD and the Teat Controller, the 

reentry operation may begin. No changes will be made in the tunnel ventilation system 

or in any electrical system while reentry teams are underground. 

Exploration of Tunnel 

The reentry team will enter the tunnel by using a diesel locomotive for 

transportation andwillproceed to the gas seal door. The teamwillmonitor continuously 

for radioactivity and for toxic and explosive gases. These readings, as well as the 

progress of the team and the physical condition of the tunnel, will be reported to the 

reentry control group. Pressure gauges at the gas seal door will be checked, and a gas 

sample will be taken through the door to determine the environment on the working point 

aide of the door. If conditions are satisfactory, the team will open the gas seal door 

and proceed to the gas seal plug. 

The pressure gauges at the gas seal plug will be checked, and a gas sample will be 

taken from the working point side of the plug to determine the environment. If 

ventilation has not been reestablished remotely through this plug, the teamwilltake the 

necessary steps to eatabliahventilationthroughthe plug. If conditions permit, the team 

will then proceed to the overburden plug, where the same procedure will be followed. 

After ventilation to the working point aide of the overburden plug has been 

established and it has been determined that explosive and toxic gases are below the 

reentry guideline concentrations, the teamwill proceed through the overburden plug and 

check out the experiment drift complex. Teammembers will walk to the portal face of the 

stemming, if possible, monitoring continuously for radioactivity and for toxic and 

explosive gases. They will also observe the ventilation lines to assure themselves that 

the lines are intact, and will report this information, along with the general condition 

of the tunnel and the HLOS pipe, to the reentry control group. After the condition of 

the tunnel has been determined, the team will establish ventilation to the HLOS pipe. 

The doors to the test chambers will be opened and swipes will be taken from the floor of 

the teat chambers. These swipes will be analyzed for beryllium and will also be used to 

identify the radionuclidea present inside the HLOS pipe. 

As soon as the reentry team has verified that the tunnel complex is within 

acceptable levels for radiation and for toxic and explosive gases and has determined the 

phyaicalconditionofthetunnelandHLOS pipe, theinitialreentryoperationis complete. 

E-12 
Scientific Assessment of the Experiments 

Scientific Assessment Team 

As soon as the initial reentry teams have verified that the tunnel and RLOS pipe 

are clear of hazardous amounts of radiation and of toxic and explosive gases and as soon 

as the physical hazards have been identified and repaired, as necessary, the scientific 

assessment team will enter the HLOS pipe and observe the condition of the experiments. 

Photographic Documentation -- Photographic documentation of the condition of each 

experimental station may take place concurrently with or immaediately after preliminary 

assessment of the experiments. 

Removal of Unexpended Explosives -- Unexpended explosives which are found to be 

uncontained will be removed from the RLOS pipe before experiment recoveries are begun. 

Recovery of Experiments From the Test Chambers 

Before scientific recoveries may be begun, repair of the tunnel to the test 

chambers must be complete. This activity may include repairing broken lagging and 

removing hazardous conditions, as well as repairingrailroadtrack andventilationlines. 

Tunnel utility power will be restored before experiment recoveries (except for recovery 

of film) are begun. 

After tunnel repairs have been completed, experiment agencies will be permitted to 

begin recovery of samples from the test chambers in order of priority. A radiation safety 

monitor will be present at the test chambers at all times to assist the experimenters and 

to help control contamination. 

13 

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