[Cite as Village at Galloway Run Condominium Assn. v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-2344.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Village at Galloway Run :

Condominium Association,

: No. 23AP-732

Plaintiff-Appellee, (C.P.C. No. 22CV-5384)

:

v. (REGULAR CALENDAR)

:

Jeffrey Taylor,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on June 18, 2024

On brief: Williams & Strohm, LLC, and Jesse M. Kanitz, for 

appellee. Argued: Jesse M. Kanitz.

On brief: Jeckering & Associates, LLC, Bradley N. Jeckering, 

and Dalia G. Safadi, for appellant. 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Taylor, appeals from the November 8, 2023 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion 

for relief from judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

{¶ 2} On August 5, 2022, plaintiff-appellee, Village at Galloway Run Condominium 

Association (“association” or the “HOA”), sought a permanent injunction against and 

monetary damages from Mr. Taylor for his noncompliance with the association’s governing 

rules and regulations as a unit owner. Specifically, the association took issue with Mr. 

Taylor’s construction of an oversized patio extension behind his unit without prior approval 

from the association’s board, unresponsiveness to the association’s letters regarding this 
No. 23AP-732 2

issue, and failure to take remedial action. Thus, it asked the trial court to permanently 

enjoin Mr. Taylor from maintaining the patio extension in its current size and location, 

order Mr. Taylor to restore the affected areas to their condition prior to the patio extension, 

and order Mr. Taylor to cease construction of any additional unapproved exterior 

modifications unless otherwise approved by the board. (Aug. 5, 2022 Compl. at ¶ 52(1).) 

{¶ 3} Despite receiving service of summons and the association’s complaint on 

August 15, 2022 by Certified Mail, Mr. Taylor never filed an answer in the trial court. 

Instead, he mailed the association’s counsel a signed document captioned “Initial 

Disclosure” and dated September 12, 2022. (See Jan. 11, 2023 Notice of Filing, attached 

Ex. A at 1.) In addition to identifying one witness—Crystal DeLong Varela, the person 

residing in the unit owned by Mr. Taylor (“Ms. DeLong”)—Mr. Taylor contended, in 

relevant part, under the heading entitled “Claimants [sic] Damages Statement”:

Patio extension has not been extended any further than 

numerous other condos in this development that are under 

HOA “Guidelines”. In fact the extension is smaller than many. 

Including an HOA representative that have added, not in 

accordance with “Guidelines” , to their driveway and patio after 

we did.

There is also concern about HOA dues payment. * * *

We feel that we are being held to a different standard than 

anyone else in this development. We feel that the HOA has 

failed in several different areas of responsibility. When we 

purchased this property, the HOA was responsible for 

providing us with a copy of the HOA “Guidelines” at closing. 

They did not. We were only able to get the “Guidelines” after a 

neighbor assisted us to find them online. 

(Sic passim.) (Jan. 11, 2023 Notice of Filing, attached Ex. A at 1-2.)

{¶ 4} The association notified the trial court of Mr. Taylor’s purported answer by 

attaching a copy of that document to its notice filed on January 11, 2023. 

{¶ 5} The association also filed a motion for summary judgment with affidavits and 

supporting documents on January 11, 2023. In that motion, the association contended that 

“no genuine issues of material fact exist to rebut the conclusion that Mr. Taylor constructed, 

or allowed exterior modifications on his [u]nit to be constructed, in violation of the 

applicable Declaration.” (Jan. 11, 2023 Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. at 1.) Thus, the association 
No. 23AP-732 3

argued it was entitled to the permanent injunctive and monetary relief sought in its 

complaint. 

{¶ 6} On February 2, 2023, Mr. Taylor timely filed, pro se, his memorandum 

opposing the association’s summary judgment motion (captioned as a “response”). Just as 

in the September 12, 2022 “Initial Disclosure” he mailed to the association’s counsel

(subsequently filed by the association in the trial court on January 11, 2023), Mr. Taylor

alleged the association failed to provide him and Ms. Delong with a copy of the governing 

documents when they first moved in. (See Feb. 2, 2023 Def.’s Resp. at 1.) In addition to 

raising issues related to the payment of association dues, Mr. Taylor stated as follows 

regarding the patio extension:

The HOA informed us originaly that the extension of the patio 

would hamper the lawn care company from cutting the grass.

It does not. I asked the yard care personel if it creates a 

problem for them on several occasions. They all responded 

that it was not a problem for them. When we originaly

purchased this property, there was very little grass to cut 

anyway. * * *

As far as the extension of the patio, yes it goes past the side of 

the house. However not as far as many other homes in the 

same development. The HOA admits in their request for 

Summary Judgement, that they have allowed other properties 

to extend their patios beyond the side of the building. I do not 

understand why I am being held to a different standard than 

others. One home this past summer had a patio extension that 

was at least 4 feet wide and extended a good distance down 

the side of the house if not all the way. We have pictures of 

many homes that do not comply with the Guidelines. I am 

retired military, having served my country for one month shy 

of 36 years. I understand rules and regulations. I also 

understand that rules and regulations apply to all not just a 

few.

* * *

In conclusion, I respectfully request your decision in my favor 

on this matter.

(Sic passim.) (Feb. 2, 2023 Def.’s Resp.) 

{¶ 7} Based on Mr. Taylor’s response, the association argued there was no dispute 

that “Mr. Taylor had appropriate notice of the restrictions and requirements placed on him 
No. 23AP-732 4

by the Declaration, nor that Mr. Taylor violated Article III, Section 2(p) of the Declaration 

by installing the Patio Extension without approval and after being advised it would not be 

approved as it was ultimately constructed.” (Feb. 10, 2023 Pl.’s Reply at 4.) Because 

evidence presented by the association established Mr. Taylor had blatantly violated the 

condominium complex’s governing documents, the association contended it was entitled 

to money damages and a permanent injunction under R.C. 5311.19 ordering Mr. Taylor to 

remove the patio extension and to cease construction of any additional unapproved 

modification without written approval of the association’s board. 

{¶ 8} On February 15, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment granting the 

association’s motion for summary judgment, ordering the requested permanent injunction

and awarding attorney fees and costs (with interest) to the association. Mr. Taylor filed, 

pro se, a notice of appeal from that judgment on March 16, 2023, and the trial court record 

was transferred to this court on March 28, 2023 under case No. 23AP-178. However, 

because Mr. Taylor did not file a brief within the time required by App.R. 18(A) and failed 

to respond to notification from this court that the time for filing his appellate brief had 

expired, we dismissed that case, sua sponte, on May 10, 2023 pursuant to App.R. 18(C). 

{¶ 9} After Mr. Taylor’s appeal from the February 15, 2023 judgment was 

dismissed by this court, Mr. Taylor apparently retained counsel for this matter. Indeed, on

June 29, 2023, his attorneys filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment in the case 

below on his behalf. Mr. Taylor argued that under Civ.R. 60(B)(1)’s “excusable neglect” 

standard, he should be relieved from the February 15, 2023 judgment because, as a pro se 

litigant, he “is inexperienced in legal matters and unfamiliar with the Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” (See June 29, 2023 Mot. for Relief at 6.) Also in support of his excusable 

neglect argument, Mr. Taylor cited “the good-faith action” he “has taken through his efforts 

to diligently participate in this litigation,” including “interfac[ing] with [the association] 

relating to this matter and potential counterclaims and/or settlements.” (Mot. for Relief at 

6.)

{¶ 10} On November 8, 2023, the trial court issued an entry rejecting those 

arguments and denying Mr. Taylor’s motion for relief from judgment. Mr. Taylor timely 

appealed from that judgment and asserts the following three assignments of error for our 

review:
No. 23AP-732 5

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DENYING MR. TAYLOR’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 

JUDGMENT WHEN THE GROUNDS FOR EXCUSABLE 

NEGLECT APPEAR ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 

HOLDING MR. TAYLOR TO A HEIGHTENED BURDEN 

WHEN EVALUATING WHETHER HE ALLEGED A 

MERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 

[III.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

DENYING MR. TAYLOR’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 

JUDGMENT WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 11} To prevail on a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), Mr. 

Taylor was required to establish (1) a meritorious claim or defense in the event relief is 

granted, (2) entitlement to relief under one of the provisions of Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), 

and (3) timeliness of the motion. Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994), citing 

GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), paragraph two 

of the syllabus. A failure to establish any one of these three requirements will cause the 

motion to be overruled. See, e.g., Argo Plastic Prod. Co. v. Cleveland, 15 Ohio St.3d 389, 

391 (1984); GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. at 151 (observing the Civ.R. 60(B) “requirements are 

independent and in the conjunctive, not the disjunctive”). There is no dispute that the 

motion in this case was made within a reasonable time.

{¶ 12} We review a decision denying a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for an abuse of 

discretion. See, e.g., Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 21 (1988); Strack at

174. 

A. First Assignment of Error

{¶ 13} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Taylor contends the trial court abused its 

discretion in finding no excusable neglect under Civ.R. 60(B)(1). We disagree. 

{¶ 14} To determine whether neglect is “excusable” under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), a court 

must consider all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. at 21. 

Courts have defined excusable neglect in the negative, stating that a party’s inaction is not 

excusable neglect when it can be deemed “a complete disregard for the judicial system” or 

when the party’s conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under the 
No. 23AP-732 6

circumstances. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jackson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 140 Ohio St.3d 

23, 2014-Ohio-2353, ¶ 23-25; Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 20 (1996), 

quoting GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. at 153. 

{¶ 15} Mr. Taylor posits that his inexperience in legal matters and unfamiliarity with 

the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure rises to the level of “excusable neglect” contemplated by 

Civ.R. 60(B). However, “ ‘it is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have 

knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same standard as 

litigants who are represented by counsel.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) State ex rel. Fuller v. 

Mengel, 100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept of Job 

& Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (2001). They are not given greater rights than 

represented parties, and must bear the consequences of their mistakes. See, e.g., Carter v. 

Nhan Le, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-173, 2005-Ohio-6209, ¶ 20; Dailey v. R & J Commercial 

Contracting, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1464, 2002-Ohio-4724, ¶ 17. 

{¶ 16} Contrary to Mr. Taylor’s contention, Civ.R. 60(B) is not intended to afford 

pro se litigants relief from mistakes due to the lack of legal counsel or unfamiliarity with the 

legal system, confusion, or misunderstanding of the law. See, e.g., Gamble Hartshorn, LLC 

v. Lee, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-35, 2018-Ohio-980, ¶ 26. A party has the right to represent 

himself. But, if he does so, he is subject to the same rules and procedures as litigants with 

counsel. See Gamble Hartshorn, LLC at ¶ 26. The fact that a pro se litigant chose not to be 

represented by counsel, and was unsuccessful in pursuing his rights because he did not 

understand the controlling laws and applicable rules, is not a basis to vacate a judgment 

adverse to a pro se litigant and afford him a second chance, this time with counsel. See 

Gamble Hartshorn, LLC at ¶ 26, quoting Dayton Power & Light v. Holdren, 4th Dist. No. 

07CA21, 2008-Ohio-5121, ¶ 12, and citing Ragan v. Akron Police Dept., 9th Dist. No. 

16200, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 137 (Jan. 19, 1994).

{¶ 17} In this case, Mr. Taylor chose to represent himself, as was his right. As such, 

he is presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures. Though it might be true 

he was ultimately unfamiliar with the applicable law and legal standards governing the 

summary judgment procedure, such unawareness does not constitute excusable neglect

under Civ.R. 60(B)(1). See, e.g., Suon v. Mong, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-879, 2018-Ohio-4187, 

¶ 26-28. Mr. Taylor’s “diligent efforts” in responding to the association’s summary 
No. 23AP-732 7

judgment motion have no bearing on this well-established principle. (Compare Brief of 

Appellant at 10-11.) 

{¶ 18} To the extent Mr. Taylor attempts to ameliorate the effect of his initial choice 

to litigate this matter pro se by using a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to collaterally attack the trial 

court’s February 15, 2023 ruling now that he has representation, it is not a procedurally 

viable avenue for relief. It is axiomatic that a Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be used as a 

substitute for a timely appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-720, 2024-

Ohio-45, ¶ 44; Doe v. Trumbull Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 28 Ohio St.3d 128 (1986), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. As such, a litigant may not use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to raise 

issues that should have been raised in a direct appeal of the challenged judgment. See id. 

{¶ 19} For these reasons, we find the trial court did not err by denying Mr. Taylor’s

motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(1). Accordingly, Mr. Taylor’s first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Second Assignment of Error 

{¶ 20} Mr. Taylor also takes issue with the trial court’s evaluation of Civ.R. 60(B)’s 

meritorious defense requirement in his second assignment of error. However, our 

resolution of his first assignment of error ultimately renders his second assignment of error 

moot. 

{¶ 21} “ ‘It has been long and well established that it is the duty of every judicial 

tribunal to decide actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts 

and render judgment which can be carried into effect.’ ” Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. PUC, 

103 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-5466, ¶ 17, quoting Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 

14 (1970). Thus, “[a]n issue becomes moot when it presents only a hypothetical or academic 

question, and a judicial resolution of the issue would have no practical significance.” Darr 

v. Livingston, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-315, 2017-Ohio-841, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Ford v. 

Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, ¶ 55. 

{¶ 22} To prevail on his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, Mr. Taylor 

was required to demonstrate that: (1) he has a meritorious defense or claim to present if 

relief is granted; (2) excusable neglect entitling him to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1); and (3)

his motion was made within a reasonable time. See GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 47 Ohio

St.2d at 150-51. These three requirements are cumulative, meaning all must be established
No. 23AP-732 8

for relief to be granted under Civ.R. 60(B). See Argo Plastic Prod. Co., 15 Ohio St.3d at 391.

Conversely, the failure to establish any one of these three requirements will cause the 

motion to be overruled. See id.

{¶ 23} Even assuming, arguendo, the trial court erred in analyzing whether Mr. 

Taylor alleged a meritorious defense, our determination that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in finding that Mr. Taylor failed to show excusable neglect under Civ.R. 

60(B)(1) renders Mr. Taylor’s second assignment of error moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

C. Third Assignment of Error

{¶ 24} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Taylor attributes error to the trial court’s 

failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motion before denying him relief. 

{¶ 25} It is true that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a hearing on 

a Civ.R. 60(B) motion that sufficiently alleges grounds for relief from judgment and is 

supported with evidence that would warrant relief from judgment.” (Emphasis added.) 

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Jenkins, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1192, 2007-Ohio-3622, ¶ 12, citing 

Kay, 76 Ohio St.3d at 19-20, citing Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 103 (8th 

Dist.1974). But, as already explained in our analysis of his first assignment of error, Mr. 

Taylor’s motion for relief from judgment did not, on its face, contain sufficient allegations 

of operative facts that would warrant relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Again, Mr. 

Taylor’s “inexperience[] in legal matters and unfamiliar[ity] with the Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedure,” as alleged in his motion, do not constitute “excusable neglect” under Civ.R. 

60(B)(1). (See Mot. for Relief at 6.) Thus, Mr. Taylor’s third assignment of error is not welltaken and, as such, is overruled. 

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 26} Having overruled Mr. Taylor’s three assignments of error, we affirm the

November 8, 2023 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ., concur.