DEFENSE’S NUCLEAR AGENCY

1947 – 1997

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2002
FIRST PRINTING

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offic

Washington, D.C. 20402
i

PREFACE

Defense’s Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997, traces the development of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), and its descendant government organizations,

from its original founding in 1947 to 1997. After the disestablishment of the Manhattan

Engineering District (MED) in 1947, AFSWP was formed to provide military training

in nuclear weapons’ operations. Over the years, its sequential descendant organizations

have been the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) from 1959 to 1971, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) from 1971 to 1996, and the Defense Special Weapons

Agency (DSWA) from 1996 to 1998. In 1998, DSWA, the On-Site Inspection Agency,

the Defense Technology Security Administration, and selected elements of the Office

of Secretary of Defense were combined to form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(DTRA).

This publication has been reviewed by concerned government agencies and its contents have been cleared for release to the public. Although the manuscript and its appendices have been cleared, some of the official sources cited in the notes and

bibliography may remain classified. Finally, in democratic societies history is an iterative process, written and rewritten over many generations. Consequently, while this

book is an official publication of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency History Series,

the views and interpretations expressed are those of the authors and editors and do not

necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense.

The Prologue sets the stage for the national and international events leading up to

the founding of AFSWP in 1947. The history of AFSWP and its descendant organizations is presented in eight narrative chapters that cover logical periods of evolution and

development. These chapters are followed by appendices that provide further background on organizational transitions, including charters, chronology, and an agency

time line. Chapters are arranged in chronological order and cover the evolution of the

agency, as portrayed against the larger backdrop of military and political currents. Each

chapter addresses external influences, internal program response, ancillary programs,

and transitions. Issues that overlap chapters are revisited. Although it is difficult at times

to separate the agency’s mission from the larger Department of Defense (DoD) or the

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the text is centrally focused upon the department’s

nuclear agency over five decades, 1947–1997. Technical issues and terms, so much a

part of a technical defense agency, have been held to a minimum; an abbreviation/acronym list is provided in the appendix for reference. Photographs and illustrative matter

for this history were obtained from the Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis

Center (DTRIAC) Archives, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and from other

government sources.
ii

Numerous individuals, organizations, and consultants contributed to this volume,

all under the guidance of a history manuscript Review Committee. The production effort of Defense’s Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997 began in 1997 with agency research and

oral history interviews conducted by History Associates, Inc., that set the historical

foundation for the text. Those interviewed for this volume included: Colonel John A.

Ord, Admiral John T. Hayward, Dr. Frank Shelton, Vice Admiral Robert Monroe, Vice

Admiral John T. Parker, Dr. Harold Brode, Dr. Paul Carew, Dr. Fred Wikner, Dr. Marvin C. Atkins, and Dr. Robert Brittigan. Other individuals associated with the agency

contributed technical commentary and advice during chapter development: Dr. John

Northrop, Dr. Edward Conrad, Dr. Joseph Braddock, Dr. Donald Sachs, Dr. Eugene

Sevin, Dr. Francis Wimenitz, Dr. Paul Caldwell, and Donald Moffett. The Review Committee consisted of: Dr. C. Stuart Kelley (DTRA), Dr. Joseph Harahan (DTRA), Adrian

Polk (Logicon/RDA), Eugene Driscoll (DTRIAC), Don Alderson (DTRIAC), and

Christian Brahmstedt (DTRIAC). The Agency is indebted to the editor of this history,

Christian Brahmstedt, who has been associated with this effort, in a production capacity, since its inception. Adrian Polk’s contribution to this book cannot be overstated.

He was the guiding light for the organization of the early chapters and he reviewed

carefully the technical content and presentation of the later chapters. His insight and

remarkable memory for detail added substantial depth. Dr. Kelley’s and Dr. Harahan’s

determination to see this effort through to completion are gratefully acknowledged.

The detailed security review for this volume was accomplished by John Bilsky, DTRA,

and Herb Hoppe, Logicon/RDA. DTRA extends its appreciation to both Mr. Bilsky

and Mr. Hoppe for their thorough professional review. This review was complex, with

many issues needing resolution. Throughout they made valuable contributions and their

stimulating questions improved the final product substantially.

We hope you enjoy reading this history of our Agency as much as we enjoyed preparing it.

September 24, 2002
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACEl ................................................................................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTSl.......................................................................................... iii

PROLOGUEl .............................................................................................................. v

CHAPTER ONEl ........................................................................................................ 1

THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

CHAPTER TWOl ..................................................................................................... 47

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

CHAPTER THREEl ................................................................................................. 95

THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

CHAPTER FOURl ................................................................................................. 131

SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

CHAPTER FIVEl ................................................................................................... 171

A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

CHAPTER SIXl ..................................................................................................... 215

ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

CHAPTER SEVENl ............................................................................................... 257

A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

CHAPTER EIGHTl ................................................................................................ 293

POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 TO 1997

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................... 327

APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST ......................................................................... 353

APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY ........................................................................... 357

APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS .................................................................. 395

APPENDIX E: AGENCY THROUGH THE DECADES CHART ............................... 445

APPENDIX F: INDEX ........................................................................................ 449
iv
v

PROLOGUE

A series of scientific discoveries heralded the birth of mankind’s utilization of the

atom. In 1911, British experimental physicist Ernest Rutherford proposed the nuclear

model for the atom based on experimental data. Niels H. Bohr, a Danish physicist,

contributed to the understanding of atomic particles, including the behavior of electrons in orbits around protons. In 1938, German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman discovered fission products after irradiating uranium with neutrons. Lise Meitner,

an Austrian physicist, interpreted this as being caused by the neutron-induced fission

of uranium. Her interpretation led to over 100 papers being published in 1939, essentially defining the modern theory of atomic fission. Later, in a letter drafted by colleagues led by Hungarian theoretical physicist Leo Szilard, Albert Einstein wrote to

President Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 2, 1939: “It may become possible to set up

a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, which would... lead to the construction of... extremely powerful bombs...” The National Defense Research Council,

under Vannevar Bush, supported research in 1940 that indicated applications to weapons development were not as “remote” as earlier thought. In a Presidential review on

October 9, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt chartered a Top Policy Group and directed that the U.S. Army take the lead in a maximum effort to develop an atomic bomb.

On August 13, 1942, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, issuing General Order 33,

established the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), the cover name for “Project Y,”

the atomic bomb development project. Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves was chosen

to head the MED project; General Groves selected Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, a University of California physicist, to lead the scientific effort. Together, they chose an isolated ranch school in Los Alamos, New Mexico, as the site for the atomic laboratories.

On December 2, 1942, Enrico Fermi’s research group, in a converted squash court at

Stagg Field, University of Chicago, operated the world’s first self-sustaining nuclear

fission reactor, establishing the technical feasibility for building a weapon.

Approximately three years of highly classified research and development by scientists at Los Alamos led to an experimental weapon. On July 16, 1945, Los Alamos

scientists detonated an implosion-type plutonium device, named Trinity, near the remote town of Alamogordo, New Mexico; the world’s first nuclear detonation. On August 6, 1945, the U.S. Army Air Corps’ 509th Composite Group dropped Little Boy, a

uranium gun-type nuclear bomb, over Hiroshima, and, on August 9, dropped Fat Man,

a plutonium implosion nuclear bomb, over Nagasaki. Shortly thereafter the Japanese

government agreed to surrender, ending World War II on September 2, 1945.

Post-war bomb damage and radiation assessments of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki

were conducted by the Navy’s Bureau of Yards & Docks and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The extraordinary power of these early atomic weapons encouraged initia-
vi

tives for international controls. Planning began in earnest for nuclear control initiatives, including the Baruch-Lilienthal Plan that the U.S. presented to the United Nations, which was rejected by the Soviets in 1946. At the same time, the momentum of

demobilization in the wake of World War II was being felt within the MED as the scientists, engineers and other workers sought to return to their normal peacetime pursuits

as rapidly as possible. Something had to be done to ensure that the atomic weapon

technology was not lost and that the U.S. military remained prepared to employ nuclear weapons when and if necessary.
design strategies that would enable the

Armed Forces to deliver the bombs quickly, effectively, and, in a period of shrinking budgets, inexpensively. The level of

destruction brought by such “absolute

weapons,” in the terminology of one of

the country’s leading nuclear warfare theorists, Bernard Brodie, made military control imperative to those who had led the

country’s nuclear effort during the war,

particularly General Groves, the head of

the Manhattan Project. The beating of the

drums of war had ceased, but because of

the strategic and policy changes dictated

by atomic weapons, in the years immediately following the hostilities, civilian and

military officials struggled to play the

pipes of peace.

2

AN OUTPOST ON A

NEW MEXICAN MESA

Major General Leslie R. Groves was

concerned. By July of 1946, having successfully completed the founding requirements of the Manhattan Engineer District

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The destruction caused by the atomic

bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, on

August 6, 1945, ushered in the nuclear age

and forced military strategists to rethink

the nature of warfare. Out of a world war

that confirmed for many the triumph of

democratic society over fascism, there

was great public pressure to bring the

military applications of atomic energy

under civilian control. Many hoped that

nations would unite behind some form of

international control and totally ban nuclear weapons. “It did not take atomic

weapons to make man want peace,”

J. Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the

atomic bomb, wrote in 1946, “But the

atomic bomb was the turn of the screw. It

has made the prospect of war unendurable.”1 Military planners, however,

viewed those prospects in a different perspective than the nation’s most prominent

civilian scientist. They had to consider

that these weapons would change how

wars would be fought. They also had to

“

CHAPTER ONE

THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

Before us now lies a new era in which the power of atomic energy has

been released. That age will either be one of complete devastation, or

one in which new sources of power will lighten the labors of mankind and

increase the standards of living all over the world.”

President Harry S. Truman,

Public Address to Governing Board of the

Pan American Union, April 15, 1946
2 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

(MED) task, the civilian scientists he had

fought so hard to acquire were abandoning Los Alamos. Groves knew he would

need something tangible to hold this intellectual core team together. In haste, he

summoned Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland

to Washington to discuss a “special

project.” Dorland, a property disposal officer for the MED, who was just recently

posted to the nuclear production complex

at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, boarded the next

train to Washington. The next day Groves

explained to Dorland the loss of civilian

scientists who “...put the bomb together.

We are going to have to provide military

personnel, regulars, who are not going to

be discharged over the next week or whatever, those who are regular members of

the Corps of Engineers to take on this

project.” Groves’ intention was to form a

new unit, the Los Alamos office of the

Manhattan District, which was to be activated in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

There the 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special) would take over the bomb assembly

function that the scientists were abandoning. He wanted the 2761st located on a

small air base east of Albuquerque. He

asked Dorland to go west and “...take a

look around and tell me what you think.”

Dorland returned to Oak Ridge, packed

his bags and left for New Mexico.3

Dorland’s inspection provided the information Groves sought. For the next

week, the Colonel met with MED officers

in Los Alamos and at Oxnard Field (Sandia) in Albuquerque. Located east of the

Rio Grande River on a mesa about six

miles from Albuquerque, Sandia Base

lacked any permanent facilities. The base

consisted of single-story wood-frame prefabricated houses that had been shipped

down from Hanford in April, a mess hall,

warehouses, and a bachelor officers quarters. Dorland was amazed by what he

found. Oxnard, called Sandia (Spanish:

watermelon) by the new inhabitants, was

little more than a landing strip surrounded by row after row of surplus fighters,

bombers, and cargo planes. Owned by the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the

old planes shimmered in the desert sun,

waiting to be cut up for scrap. Some of

the military personnel at Sandia, Dorland

thought, did not measure up to regular

Army standards. Two days later the Colonel was back in Groves’ office, reporting

his findings and offering solutions to what

needed to be done. The General replied,

“Well, go do it,” with a proviso cautioning Dorland to “...remember you have got

to get along with the Air Corps and the

scientists from Los Alamos.”4

With the extent of his non-specific orders to “...go do it,” Dorland headed west

again, this time to take command of the

2761st Engineer Battalion (Special). The

2761st would later become the field operations command unit for the Armed

Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) at Sandia Base.

THE ORIGINS OF AFSWP

General Groves was not an easy man

to please. He had been in his third year of

studies at the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology in June 1916, when he received a coveted and highly competitive

Presidential appointment to the U.S. Military Academy, graduated fourth in his

class on November 1, 1918, ten days before the armistice that ended World War

I. Dick Groves (only those who did not

know him called him Leslie), according

to his biographer, was “...an intensely

businesslike and almost precociously serious young man whose exaggerated selfconfidence and bristling sarcasm tended

to keep potential friends at a distance.”

Over the years, Groves developed a hardcharging, straight-ahead style that would

characterize his military career. The construction of the Pentagon and the forging

of the nation’s atomic weapons complex
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 3

reflected his drive and singleness of purpose.5

In the fall of 1945, as commanding officer of the MED, Groves could be justifiably proud of the achievements of the

scientists and soldiers under his command. From his Washington, D.C., office

in the new War Department building at

21st Street and Virginia Avenue, NW, just

four blocks from the White House, Groves

assessed the vast secret industrial complex

he had built to design, manufacture, and

deliver the atomic bomb. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the ensuing Japanese surrender, most Americans learned

for the first time about such places as

Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Los Alamos.

For Groves, secrecy and science were critical elements in the success of the Manhattan Project.

Groves’ wartime accomplishments

were widely acknowledged and praised.

President Harry S. Truman and Secretary

of War Henry L. Stimson had awarded

him the Distinguished Service Medal, the

country’s highest non-combat honor, for

his role in developing the atomic bomb.

To many, Groves and the Manhattan

Project had been crucial to winning the

war. The General was on the cover of

Business Week and featured prominently

in daily newspapers and popular magazines such as Time, The Saturday Evening

Post, and Collier’s. Fiorello LaGuardia,

the popular and irrepressible mayor of

New York City, had praised him in a ceremony on the steps of City Hall as the man

who had “...accomplish[ed] the impossible.”6 Wartime achievements, however,

did not necessarily translate into peacetime success. In fact, in the months after

V-J Day as 1945 drew to a close, Groves’

atomic empire was already crumbling, a

victim to both the rapid demobilization of

the military and the failure of politicians

and other government officials to reach

agreement on a postwar nuclear policy.

General Groves was no stranger to

seemingly intractable problems. The

atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki had–most historians agreed–

forced the Japanese to surrender and hastened the end of World War II. Atomic

weapons exemplified the triumph of the

“can do” spirit of the American military

and American scientists and engineers.

The Manhattan Project was proof positive

of Groves’ ability to grapple with huge

challenges and create workable solutions.

Yet herein lay Groves’ dilemma.7

Groves knew that peacetime would

bring to an end the Manhattan Project and

its singular purpose to build an atomic

weapon. He recognized that the military

role in atomic energy would be reduced.

Since the government failed to establish

nuclear weapons policy between the summer of 1945 and July 1946, Groves did

not know how much reduction of the military’s role would occur. “Since our objective [in the Manhattan Project] was

finite,” he later wrote, “we did not design

our organization to operate in perpetuity.”

J. Robert Oppenheimer and Major General

Leslie Groves at Ground Zero in Alamorgordo, New Mexico, about two months

after Trinity test, 1945.
4 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

Manhattan Engineering District (MED) Organization Chart, 1946.

INSPECTION & MISCELLANEOUS

DIVISION

Col. D. E. Antes

PLANNING

DIVISION

Col. R. G. Butler

COMMITTEES

BOARDS & PANELS

ADMINISTRATIVE

DIVISION

Maj. J. C. Healey

OCE

Safety

Mr. R. L. Jenkins, Actg.

Real Estate

Col. A. H. Burton

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Lt. Col. C. Vanden Bulck

J. C. Clarke

INDEPENDENT UNITS DIVISION

Col. G. M. Dorland

Maj. O. M. Brumfield

SECURITY DIVISION

Col. D. F. Shaw

PERSONNEL DIVISION

Lt. Col. C. A. Nelson

Lt. J. J. Flaherty (USNR) Asst.

Maj. H. E. Thruston, Deputy

FISCAL BRANCH

D.C. Bogart

PROPERTY AUDIT BRANCH

Lt. Col. G. W. Studebaker

(Oak Ridge)

SAFETY BRANCH

J. R. Maddy

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

1st Lt. J. L. O'Gara MILITARY PERSONNEL

BRANCH

Capt. T. S. Johnson OFFICE SERVICE BRANCH

J. R. Gorman REDISTRIBUTION &

SALVAGE BRANCH

R. H. Miller

INFORMATION SECURITY

BRANCH

1st Lt. A. L. Rydzewski LABOR BRANCH

Maj. L. D. Geiger CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

BRANCH

J. G. LeSieur, Jr. REDISTRIBUTION BRANCH

R. A. Rodgers (office)

T. P. Thompkins (field)

PERSONNEL SECURITY

BRANCH

1st Lt. M. E. Rogers

PROCEDURES, ASSIGNMENTS

& UTILIZATION BRANCH

Maj. W. P. Miller CONTRACT & CLAIMS

BRANCH

Lt. Col. J. E. Travis SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT

SECTION

Maj. J. W. Gost

PRODUCTION SECURITY

BRANCH

W. L. Deitz, Actg. U. S. NAVAL UNIT

Lt. J. J. Flaherty (USNR)

INSURANCE BRANCH

W. J. Setterfield

SHIPMENT SECURITY

BRANCH

1st Lt. A. V. R. Wullf

PROPERTY & GOVERNMENT

WAREHOUSE BRANCH

Maj. E. C. Stumpf

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Maj. J. J. Jackson

Y-12 DIVISION

Col. G. J. Forney REDISTRIBUTION BRANCH

D. E. Russell

DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC SAFETY

Lt. Col. D. G. Williams

K-25 DIVISION

Lt. Col. R. W. Cook SURPLUS PROPERTY

BRANCH

Capt. J. C. Deal, Jr. DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC WELFARE

Maj. P. C. Leahy

DECATUR AREA

Capt. R. L. Crawford, Jr. SALVAGE BRANCH DETROIT AREA Capt. C. L. Musser Capt. J. D. McCormick

MILWAUKEE AREA

Capt. J. D. Anderson

ELECTRIC POWER DIVISION

D. M. Clarke

CONTRACTOR SALES

BRANCH

Capt. F. H. Fain

SELECTIVE SERVICE

BRANCH

CWO M. S. Levine

CLINTON ENGINEER WORKS

Col. E. E. Kirkpatrick, C.O.

Col. E. H. Harsden, Exec. Off.

PLANT OPERATONS GROUP

Col. S. L. Brown

Lt. Col. A. D. Arnold, PH Liaison

Maj. H. E. Gates, Asst.

REDISTRIBUTION & SALVAGE

DIVISION

Col. G. M. Dorland

R. H. Miller, Asst.

HANFORD ENGINEER WORKS

Col. F. J. Clarke

Lt. Col. B. T. Rogers, Deputy

Maj. W. L. Sapper, Exec. Off.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVSION

Maj. M. D. Riley

PRODUCTION DIVISION

Lt. Col. H. E. Skinner

CONSTRUCTION DIVISION

J. T. Flanagan

ENGINEERING &

MAINTENANCE DIVISION

O. S. Clark

FIELD OFFICES

MANHATTAN DISTRICT STAFF

MANHATTAN DISTRICT

DISTRICT ENGINEER

Brig. Gen. K. D. Nichols

DEPUTY

Col. E. E. Kirkpatrick

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Col. E. H. Harsden

COMMANDING GENERAL MANHATTAN PROJECT

Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Lt. Col. J. B. Lampert

DISTRICT ENGINEER – MANHATTAN DISTRICT

Brig. Gen. K. D. Nichols

Lt. Col. A. Tamaro, Special Assistant

PUBLIC RELATIONS

DIVISION

Capt. R. J. Coakley

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT

W. C. Rothermal

COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT

Maj. S. H. Johnson

FACILITIES & SERVICE DIVISION

Col. P. F. Kromer, Jr., Dep. C.O.

Capt. L. T. Zbansk, Asst.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

Maj. J. H. Turner
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 5

LEGAL & CONTRACT REVIEW

DIVISION

Lt. Col. C. B. Rhodes

INFORMATION & PROCEDURES

 DIVISiON

Lt. Col. L. C. Fairbank, Jr.

MEDICAL DIVISION

Col. S. L. Warren

Lt. Col. H. L. Friedell, Deputy

Capt. B. H. Brundage, Ex. Off.

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

W. J. Williams

Maj. L. E. Johnston, Asst.

RESEARCH DIVISION

Lt. Col. A. V. Peterson

Maj. H. A. Fidler, Deputy

RESEARCH BRANCH

Capt. J. W. Howland

PRODUCTION DIVISION

Col. S. L. Brown

OPERATIONS BRANCH

Maj. M. J. Barnett

T. S. Chapman, Deputy

MILITARY INSPECTION

BRANCH

Maj. A. T. Rose

INDUSTRIAL BRANCH

Capt. B. S. Wolf

 CONSTRUCTION DIVISION

Lt. Col. W. P. Cornelius

TECHNICAL BRANCH

(Vacant)

REPORTS & STATISTICS

BRANCH

Maj. B. G. Seitz

CLINICAL BRANCH

Capt. F. E. Donoghue

PROCUREMENT &

EXPEDITING

Maj. W. S. Dunning

ISOTOPES BRANCH

D. C. Aebersold

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

BRANCH

E. C. Schulte

ROCHESTER AREA

Maj. E. L. VanHorn

HISTORICAL RECORDS

BRANCH

T. J. Rentenbach

DECLASSIFICATION &

PUBLICATIONS BRANCH

Lt. Col. W. S. Hutchinson

MADISON SQUARE AREA

Col. G. W. Besler

W. E. Kelly, Exec. Off.

CHICAGO AREA

Col. A. H. Frye, Jr. CALIFORNIA AREA

Col. E. B. Kelley

TRAIL AREA

Lt. Col. B. T. Rogers

CLINTON LABORATORIES

Lt. Col. W. B. Beber

COLORADO AREA

Maj. P. C. Leahy

IOWA AREA

Capt. E. M. Velten

ST. LOUIS AREA

Capt. E. M. Velten

TONWANDA AREA

Maj. E. L. VanHorn

COLUMBIA AREA

Capt. L. L. Grotjan

WILMINGTON AREA

Capt. G. L. Ryan

NEW YORK AREA

Maj. W. C. Campbell

SANDIA BASE

Lt. Col. A. J. Frolich

LOS ANGELES AREA

Lt. Col. S. L. Stewart

CENTERLINE AREA

Capt. J. D. McCormick

SANTA FE AREA

Col. L. E. Seeman

Col. A. W. Betts

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

DIVISION

Lt. Col. C. H. Banks

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

DIVISON 

Lt. Col. R. H. Free

RAW MATERIAL SECTION

Col. J. R. Janarone

FIELD OFFICES

MANHATTAN DISTRICT STAFF

MANHATTAN PROJECT HEADQUARTERS & STAFF

RESEARCH & TECHNICAL CONTROL ONLY

Organization Chart

MANHATTAN PROJECT 

(MED)

WASHINGTON, D.C.

PATENTS DIVISION

Capt. R. A. Lavender, U.S.N. SPECIAL LIAISON BRANCH

Col. W. R. Shuler

TECHNICAL GROUP

Col. K. E. Fields

MILITARY OPERATION

DIVISION

Col. M. C. Gee

INFORMATION & LIBRARY 

BRANCH (Vacant)

ORGANIZATION &

PROCEDURES BRANCH

DuVal Stoaks

RESEARCH & TECHNICAL

CONTROL ONLY
6 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

But the general fully expected that Congress would speedily act on a proposal to

form a civilian commission to take over

the Manhattan Project soon after the war.8

Since 1944, the Office of Scientific

Research and Development, Groves, and

lawyers in the War Department had drafted a number of versions of an atomic energy bill that would put the weapons

complex under a largely civilian commission. The scientists and the military representatives, however, had not agreed on

the details by the time the war had ended,

dashing any hopes for a speedy resolution

or transition to a domestic postwar atomic energy policy. Instead, Groves complained, there were a number of people

“...pushing their pet schemes” and trying

to “...advance their careers by displaying

an interest in atomic energy matters.” In

the meantime, Groves sought to maintain

operation of the Manhattan District’s basic functions while carrying out the inevitable demobilization that came with

peace.9

With no national policy in place,

Groves ran the Manhattan Project as he

saw best, even though he did not believe

his assumption of such broad powers was

justified after the war. Groves knew that

many of the soldiers and scientists of the

Manhattan Project longed to return to their

more normal, prewar lives. To free up regular Army officers for the battlefield during the war, he had deliberately staffed the

military side of the Manhattan District

with noncareer reserve officers, who

would quickly return to civilian life when

they became eligible for discharge. “The

great goal had been achieved,” Groves

said, “and there was nothing [for the scientists] to look forward to.”10

Many of the scientists were already

leaving to take up their former university

research and teaching positions that they

had left during the war. Moreover, the

success of the atomic bomb had created a

sharp demand for additional atomic physicists in academic institutions. Even junior men, Groves noted, were receiving

offers “...far beyond anything they could

have previously expected to get after even

20 years of experience.” Military officers viewed the demobilization as a precursor to what had occurred after World

War I, when boredom of garrison life was

the major enemy and military careers advanced at a snail’s pace.11

By the fall of 1945, Groves had to figure out how to reduce the Manhattan

Project’s wartime work force of more than

90,000, return facilities and materials to

civilian use as rapidly as possible, and still

maintain a nuclear weapons capability

that meshed with whatever final American nuclear policy might evolve. The

Manhattan District had made some preparations for postwar operations, and

Groves moved to implement those plans.

He set out to cut all but essential operations, closing the laboratory at Columbia

University, considering its work completed. At Oak Ridge, he closed the liquidthermal diffusion plant, S-50, and placed

the older sections of Y-12, the electromagnetic separation plant, on standby. At

Hanford, Groves terminated the operations of one of the chemical separation

plants, closed the last heavy water facility, and sharply cut back the level of plutonium production. Groves said that

“...we want to get rid of five million dollars worth of facility every week,” one of

his assistants later recalled.12

The fate of the Los Alamos laboratory in peacetime, however, demanded special attention. During the war, Los Alamos

had combined two critical elements of the

Manhattan Project, research and development and bomb production. That would

now change. Groves wanted to keep a

cadre of scientists in Los Alamos who

would be available for future weapons

improvement and development. Their
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 7

leader, however, was leaving. Robert

Oppenheimer, who had recommended the

Los Alamos site and directed the scientific effort there since 1942, told Groves

he was returning to his academic post

at the University of California at Berkeley as soon as possible.13

In an attempt to keep the scientists together amid such uncertainty about their

careers, Groves traveled to Los Alamos

in August 1945 to reassure them. World

War II was ending and Groves wanted to

avoid a mass exodus of civilian and military staff from MED facilities. Loudspeakers were set up to allow the large

crowd that gathered inside and outside the

building to hear the general. Groves explained that President Truman was sponsoring an atomic energy bill that would

establish a new federal agency to run the

nuclear program and that he expected that

the laboratory would continue as a research center for atomic weapons. There

would still be the element of secrecy to

their work, though their schedules would

be far less strenuous.14

Groves’ speech yielded mixed results.

The civilians who disliked Groves during

the war were not inclined to change their

minds about him or the Army. “What we

heard,” one engineer recalled, “was a

monologue of how great General Groves

was; as a result the exodus from Los Alamos accelerated.”15 Though many of the

wartime division leaders chose to leave

Los Alamos, a number of younger men

remained to head new divisions. Groves

seized on the changes to move the bomb

assembly function, an engineering rather

than scientific operation, out of Los Alamos to Oxnard Field. More important,

Oxnard was adjacent to Kirtland Field in

New Mexico, which had served as a transit point for the climax of the Manhattan

Project (Trinity) and was being developed

after the war into a facility to load atom

bombs into the specially modified B-29s,

code-named Silverplate. 16

General Groves addresses MED military and civilian workers at Los Alamos, August 29, 1945.
8 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

Groves still needed a new director to

replace Oppenheimer. He wanted someone “...with sufficient prestige to secure

the cooperation of his colleagues at Los

Alamos, and the assistance of distinguished scientists throughout the country,

particularly of those who were now leaving the project.” In consultation with Oppenheimer, Groves named U.S. Navy

Commander Norris E. Bradbury, a physicist and the number two man in the Explosives Division, as the interim director

of the lab. In Bradbury, Groves finally

found a blend of scientist and military

officer who could maintain “...smooth

relations between the civilian scientific

staff and the military administrative officers.” Such a combination, Groves

hoped, might squelch the bickering between the two groups, which had plagued

his own relationship with the scientific

community during the war.17

As Groves struggled with reducing his

operations while at the same time keeping them operable, he was frustrated by

policymakers who continued to quarrel

over how civilian control of atomic energy might be best accomplished. Groves

believed he needed to act in the absence

of any specific orders. With Bradbury in

place to cover his scientific flank, Groves

moved to strengthen his military contingent. He had concluded that, to ensure a

smooth transition to whatever organization eventually would assume the responsibilities of the MED, he needed about 50

regular Army officers to run the weapons

complex in the meantime. Drawing on the

lessons of his wartime experiences, especially the running battles with civilian

scientists who made no secret of their

contempt for the military and its secrecy

restrictions, Groves put out the word that

he preferred West Pointers, officers who,

as cadets, had been among the top 5-10

percent in their class scholastically. If

forced to compromise, Groves allowed

that he would also consider men who

graduated in the top 10 percent. “A successful athletic career,” he recalled, one

that demonstrated “...a more than average determination and will to win, was a

particular asset.”18

Groves asserted that the new officers

had to command the respect of those already in the Manhattan Project, particularly the scientists. Scientists, Groves had

discovered, “...were most critical of anyone whose mental alertness did not equal

or excel theirs.” The general wanted men

who “...were young enough to break into

the atomic field, but who were senior

enough in rank to have demonstrated their

ability to accept heavy responsibilities.”

Younger men, those under 35, he believed,

would be more acceptable to the scientists, nearly all of whom, Groves said,

“...were extremely young.”19

Normally, finding 50 replacement officers would not be difficult. But Groves’

special requirements caused a barrage of

protests from the War Department GenNorris E. Bradbury and J. Robert Oppenheimer at MED-sponsored weekly scientific colloquia gathering in Los Alamos.
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 9

eral Staff, which did not agree that the

Manhattan Project should have the pick

of the best officers. Groves’ appeal to the

new Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight

D. Eisenhower, was unsuccessful. Groves

argued that “...there was no place for anyone in the atomic field who was not a super-superior officer.” Placing lesser men

in the Manhattan Project, he insisted,

“...would lead to adverse reactions

among our scientific personnel, and

through them, among the rest of the academic world and the press.” Clearly,

Groves did not wish to suffer from another

round of headaches such as those he had

experienced from the scientists at Los

Alamos.20

In August 1946, the General carried

his case for selection priority to Robert P.

Patterson, the Secretary of War who succeeded Henry L. Stimson in late September 1945. Patterson called in General

Eisenhower and General Thomas T.

Handy, who had served as Acting Chief

of Staff before Eisenhower’s appointment. Both men opposed Groves on the

personnel issue, believing that there were

other important Army operations, especially overseas, requiring the best officers besides the Manhattan Project. After

a heated discussion, Patterson settled the

dispute. “I agree with Groves,” he said.

“I want him to have as many officers as

he decides he needs and the quality he

thinks he needs, and I want him to have

complete freedom of choice.” Groves had

won a major victory. “Only the high quality of our regular officers enabled us to

weather the difficult period of demobilization between V-J Day and the activation of the Atomic Energy Commission,”

he concluded in his memoirs.21

Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, 1945-1947.
10 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

The ability to select specific personnel was a critical triumph for Groves. With

Oppenheimer, Groves more than any other individual could claim parenthood for

the American nuclear program. The inability of Congress to pass an atomic energy bill genuinely troubled him. Groves

viewed the Manhattan Project as his baby,

and he keenly recognized that it could not

have a secure peacetime future without

appropriate legislation. Thus, between the

summer of 1945 and August 1946, the

MED would exist in awkward adolescence, never quite making the transition

between a temporary wartime project and

a permanent part of the country’s defense

establishment.

Moreover, Groves was uncertain of

his own role or, for that matter, the Army’s role in the postwar nuclear program.

No commander liked uncertainty, and

Groves clearly disliked his caretaker position. Nonetheless, he would make the

best of the situation. As MED employees

were cut back by as much as half in some

facilities, Groves was able to fill critical

positions in 1945 and 1946 with his select officers. They proved to be excellent

choices for the job. “A... surprising large

percentage of these... officers in key positions,” the Army historian of the Manhattan Project wrote, “stayed on until the

latter part of 1946, and many of those who

did resign continued with the atomic

project in a civilian capacity.” Groves’

action ensured that the military would

have a continuing presence in the nuclear

program, regardless of the outcome of the

debate over the atomic energy bill in Congress.22

Groves wanted the military to have

more than a presence in the postwar period; it also required a mission. Since November 1945, Groves had worked with

Oppenheimer and Bradbury to boost morale at Los Alamos. Deteriorating conditions at the laboratory, caused by the

facility’s uncertain future, the flight of the

top scientists, and the lack of basic amenities in a city built during wartime, jeopardized the continued stockpiling of

atomic weapons.

Operation CROSSROADS, the

planned nuclear test series scheduled to

begin at Bikini Atoll in June 1946, placed

additional pressure on the scientists who

were responsible for the development,

fabrication, and assembly of the weapons.

Groves turned to his long-time assistant,

Brigadier General Kenneth D. Nichols, to

find a solution.23

Nichols was the model of Groves’

conception of an ideal officer. Slightly

balding, thin, and ramrod straight, Nichols

wore rimless glasses and looked every bit

the intellectual who could deal easily with

scientists. The looks were not deceiving.

Nichols graduated fifth in the Class of

1929 from West Point, had earned two

graduate degrees in engineering at Cornell, had taken graduate work in Germany, and completed a doctorate in hydraulic

engineering at the University of Iowa before World War II. By 1937, Nichols had

gained a coveted faculty appointment at

West Point where he taught military and

civil engineering and military history. In

the summer of 1942, Nichols received

orders to “...volunteer for a very important technical project, or be drafted.” Soon

he was working for the Manhattan Engineer District and General Groves.24

The two men complemented each other and worked well together, though they

were a study in contrasts. With a full head

of hair, heavy frame tending to paunch,

and slightly rumpled appearance, Groves

contrasted sharply with the lean, more

soldierly Nichols. Nor did his education

match that of his scholarly assistant.

Groves had attended the University of

Washington and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before receiving a

Presidential appointment to West Point.
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 11

Graduating in 1918 as World War I was

ending, Groves began his Army career

when promotions were few and far between. In the period between the wars, he

graduated from the Army Engineer

School, the Command and General Staff

School, and the Army War College. At the

time of Pearl Harbor, Groves was the

Deputy Chief of Construction under the

Chief of Engineers. Groves’ academic

background was typical for an Army officer of his generation, but it did not match

up to the scientists with whom he dealt, a

factor that nagged him, unfairly or not,

during the Manhattan Project.25

WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

At Groves’ behest, Nichols examined

the situation at Los Alamos and decided

that to improve the rate of weapons development, the wide responsibilities of the

scientists should be narrowed. In March

of 1946, he wrote Groves proposing that

outside contractors take over the fabrication of most bomb components. He also

recommended that a new special military

unit in the Manhattan District assume the

final assembly of the weapons. Such

changes, he argued, would free the scientists for the development of new types of

bombs and thereby speed up the process.26

Nichols’ concern about the snail’s

pace of bomb production was well founded. In 1945 and early 1946, all atomic

weapons were laboratory weapons, handcrafted by the scientists at Los Alamos.

As a result of peacetime personnel reductions throughout the nuclear weapons

complex and the lack of a definitive postwar nuclear policy, advanced research and

Brigadier General Kenneth D. Nichols, first AFSWP Deputy Director.
12 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

design on a new generation of weapons

was largely halted. Therefore, each bomb

produced was based on the Mark III Fat

Man implosion weapon dropped on Nagasaki. Improvements were made incrementally as each weapon was developed,

fabricated, and assembled. The process

was painfully slow. Scientists worked on

every aspect of the weapon, and a group

might take 30 days to complete the assembly of a bomb from the components. For

example, the high explosive lenses, which

would implode to achieve a critical mass

in the plutonium core, were hand cast.

Because of the complexity of the firing

mechanism and the slow-drying adhesive

that held the lenses in place, it took more

than two days for a specially trained team

of 39 scientists to assemble a Mark III

bomb.27

In an effort to incorporate new weapons concepts that would increase a bomb’s

effective yield and increase the size of the

stockpile, Groves and Oppenheimer had

moved the weapons assembly division,

Group Z-7 (Assembly), to Sandia Base at

the end of 1945. The Z-Division was

formed in July 1945 and named after its

initial leader, Jerrold R. Zacharias. There

was discussion at that time about having

military personnel assemble the bombs for

stockpiling, but up until that time all

bombs exploded had been under civilian

control.28

Nichols and Groves both realized the

irony that there were very few weapons

for anyone, civilian or military, to assemble. The head of the Manhattan District

and his top aide belonged to a very select

few who knew that, at the end of June

1946, the United States nuclear stockpile

held sufficient components to assemble

only nine weapons. General Eisenhower,

the Army representative to the Joint

Housing units at Z-Division, (Zacharias), Sandia Base, February 1946.
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 13

Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of War

Patterson were the highest ranking

government officials to be informed regularly of the stockpile numbers. No procedures existed for formally reporting on

stockpile information to top military and

civilian officials. Only the passage and

implementation of the Atomic Energy Act

would remedy that condition. In the meantime, President Truman, Secretary of State

James F. Byrnes, Secretary of the Navy

James V. Forrestal, and the rest of the Joint

Chiefs were not briefed about the country’s nuclear capability.29

OPERATION CROSSROADS

In fact, such a briefing might have

horrified those officials. In 1946 the United States possessed very few nuclear

weapons. Operation CROSSROADS, a

planned series of three tests to investigate

the effects of nuclear weapons on naval

vessels during the summer of 1946, would

require at least three nuclear components,

called cores or pits, and perhaps a greater

number of non-nuclear mechanical assemblies, which included the high explosives, electrical firing mechanisms, and

outside casings. At that time, there were

only nine bombs in the stockpile. The tests

would use one-third of the country’s nuclear arsenal. With plutonium production

reduced from its wartime levels, the stockpile was not expanding. When Truman

learned from Eisenhower of the small

number of weapons in the stockpile in

September 1946, he canceled the third

CROSSROADS test at Bikini. The President probably did so realizing that only

approximately six bombs remained in the

stockpile, though he believed “...that was

enough to win a war.”30

Nevertheless, Operation CROSSROADS provided a unique opportunity to

evaluate atmospheric nuclear weapon test

data. Conducted in the Marshall Islands

in the Central Pacific within the confines

of Bikini Atoll, the 1946 test series consisted of Shot ABLE, air-dropped by a B29 and detonated at an altitude of 520 feet

on June 30, and Shot BAKER, detonated

90 feet underwater on July 24. The target

naval vessels for both shots consisted of

old U.S. capital ships, three captured German and Japanese ships, surplus U.S.

cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, and

a large number of auxiliary and amphibious vessels. The weapons used in ABLE

and BAKER were of the same design as

the one used in Japan on Nagasaki. Each

had a yield of 21 kilotons (KT), the approximate equivalent of 21,000 tons of

trinitrotoluene (TNT). The support fleet

for Operation CROSSROADS consisted

of more than 150 ships, which provided

quarters, experimental stations, and workshops for most of the 42,000 men of Joint

Task Force 1 (JTF 1), which administered the tests. Additional personnel during the tests were stationed on nearby

atolls such as Enewetak and Kwajalein.

Another senior group present through the

CROSSROADS series was the JCS Evaluation Board, charged with advising the

Commander of JTF 1 (Vice Admiral W.H.

Blandy) in the planning of the tests and

presenting to the JCS an evaluation of the

results. This board included: Dr. K.T.

Compton (President, MIT); Mr. Bradley

Dewey (President, American Chemical

Society); Major General Farrell (MED);

General J.W. Stilwell (Commanding,

Sixth Army Area); Brigadier General

K.D. Nichols (AFSWP); Lieutenant General L.H. Brereton (Office of the Secretary of War); Vice Admiral Hoover (Navy

General Board); and Rear Admiral R.A.

Offsite (U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey).

Because of the very high level of secrecy surrounding stockpile information,

few men realized the feeble sting of the

country’s nuclear weapons. Moreover,

with the end of Operation CROSSROADS in September 1946, the scientists
14 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

who had assembled the weapons left the

program. For the next six or eight months

there was zero capability of assembling a

weapon. Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland, officer in charge of the stockpile at Sandia,

claimed, “We were plain bluffing. We

couldn’t have put the bomb together and used

it.”31

WHO WILL CONTROL THE BOMB?

Groves and Nichols moved quickly to

remedy the problem. With the passage of

the Atomic Energy Act in August 1946,

they implemented the plan to place the responsibility for the assembly of nuclear

weapons and the surveillance of the nuclear stockpile with the Army. Nichols still

chafed at the fact that civilian scientists

had continued to have “...a key part in the

assembly and exploding of the bomb.”

That created for the military “...an intolerable situation,” he emphasized in a September 1946 speech analyzing the military

responsibilities under the Atomic Energy

Act. Even as he spoke, Nichols knew that

the Corps of Engineers was filling the vacMembers of JCS Evaluation Board for Operation CROSSROADS, left to right, Major General Farrell, General Stilwell, Brigadier General Nichols, Lieutenant General Brereton and

Vice Admiral Hoover.
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 15

uum left by the departing scientists. In the

summer of 1946, men began to gather in

Albuquerque as the Pacific tests ended,

military men selected by Groves and his

assistants who would take over the responsibilities of assembly and surveillance.32

Lacking any precedent or historical

guidelines, U.S. government officials and

military officers at the highest level struggled throughout 1946 to find an appropriate policy governing both domestic and

international control of nuclear weapons.

All spring and summer, Congress argued

over several possible versions of a civilian AEC that would assume the duties and

responsibilities of the military’s MED.

The debate often focused on the relationship between the military’s role and the

extent of civilian authority over atomic

weapons. It was not until August 1, when

Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act,

that a formal nuclear policy began to

emerge.33

Laboring with the birth of nuclear policy, the Truman administration mired itself in the details. The search for the

proper commissioners took several

months. The same uncertainty applied to

the international arena. Unsure of the actions of the Soviet Union and ambivalent

over their own response, administration

officials, scientists, and soldiers hammered out several versions of a plan for

international control before agreement

was reached. Then, abruptly, the administration shifted position and another proposal became the centerpiece of U.S.

Bikini Atoll, 1946, showing ABLE and BAKER test sites for the CROSSROADS Test Series.
16 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

policy at the United Nations. Touting international disarmament in one forum

while testing nuclear weapons at the same

time in another sent signals that many believed could be easily misinterpreted. Surrounded by high level indecision, Groves

cautiously moved to keep his country’s

nuclear armor polished.34

SHAPING THE

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In August 1946, after months of behind-the-scenes deliberations and millions

of words of public debate, Congress finally passed the McMahon Bill (Atomic

Energy Act), named for its chief sponsor,

Senator Brien McMahon, a Connecticut

Democrat. The Atomic Energy Act was

the result of a series of compromises,

some of which were designed to limit the

postwar role of the military.35

Although all sides in the debate had

supported the transfer of the atomic energy program, including military applications, from the MED to a five-member

civilian AEC appointed by the President,

there was substantial disagreement about

the shape of the Commission, the nature

of the military’s future mission under such

an arrangement, and the level of military

participation sufficient for the national

defense. Groves supported a part-time

commission with a military representative

with extensive experience “...who is not

going to forget for one minute that... defense must come first and other things will

have to come afterward.” McMahon, who

had the strong support of scientists who

had chafed under the strictures of the

Manhattan District and now opposed any

military control, wanted a full-time commission and sought to exclude the military altogether. McMahon received his

full-time commission. But in the final bill,

an amendment successfully pushed by

Michigan Republican Senator Arthur H.

Vandenberg, the uncle of the head of the

Army Air Corps, General Hoyt VandenCROSSROADS Series, Test BAKER, held on July 24, 1946, tested the effects of blast on

surface ships.
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 17

berg, ensured that, although the commissioners would be civilians, the interests

of the military would be fully represented to the Commission by a Military Liaison Committee (MLC).36

CONTROL AND CUSTODY

The issue of control and custody of

nuclear weapons was equally crucial.

Early versions of McMahon’s atomic energy bill had given the Commission exclusive control over weapons research and

development and the weapons stockpile.

McMahon softened his position on research and development and changed the

stockpile clause to read that the “...President from time to time may direct the

Commission to deliver such quantities of

weapons to the armed forces for such use

as he deems necessary in the interests of

national defense.” The stockpile compromise continued to rankle with Groves and

Nichols, but both knew in the summer of

1946 that the atomic arsenal was slim.

With the Atomic Energy Act in place,

however, the Army would now develop

and articulate detailed weapons policy,

before the Truman administration could

select commissioners who would chart the

course for the AEC and civilian control

of atomic energy.37

Not surprisingly, Groves’ closest

aides, led by Nichols and his Chief of

Staff, Colonel Sherman V. Hasbrouck,

outlined the future relationships between

the military and atomic energy in a twoday conference sponsored by the Manhattan District at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on

September 25-26, 1946. Although nuclear policy had yet to be defined by either

the military or civilian parts of the government, Nichols’ and Hasbrouck’s papers

provided a baseline for the defense establishment’s views in the fall of 1946.

Nichols had lobbied long and hard for

strong military control over atomic energy and was not at all pleased with the provisions of McMahon’s bill. “The act as

written,” he told the officers on the first

day of the conference, “may not be the

best for getting the military end of the job

done, but it is the way prescribed by law

and the War and Navy Departments must

find the way to work within its provisions

to insure that the job is done properly.”

For Nichols, this meant that the military

should control as much of the nuclear

weapons program as possible.38

Nichols bluntly outlined the powers

of the civilian commission but emphasized that the atomic bomb was “...a major part of our national defense and of

primary interest to the military establishment.” He noted the division of responsibility between the AEC and the MLC,

whose members would be appointed by

the Secretaries of War and Navy, emphasizing that the details for developing the

military application of atomic energy or

the production and custody of the weapons had yet to be settled. The logical division, he suggested, would be for the

Commission “...to make all parts of the

bomb, deliver these parts to the military,

and the military would then have the responsibility for proper storage, assembly

and delivery of the weapon,” much the

way “...our air forces acquire[d] airplanes.”39

Nichols also stressed the importance

of the military role within the AEC

through the Director of Military Application, who, though under the Commission,

had to be, by law, a member of the Armed

Forces. That individual, Nichols argued,

should control all aspects of weapons research, development, and production except that relating to nuclear material,

which would be turned over to the military for conversion into weapons. He noted that all of the bombs exploded to that

time had been assembled and fired by civilian scientists, “...a situation,” he

warned, “that from a military point of
18 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

view should not be tolerated indefinitely.”40

In calling for active military participation in the formulation of the country’s

foreign policy, Nichols anticipated the

several policies that would come to shape

the Cold War. He foresaw a country on

constant alert, stocked with thousands of

atomic bombs to be used in attacks of

massive retaliation and assuring destruction of an aggressor. “The atomic bomb

cannot be outlawed unless war is outlawed,” he said. He maintained that atomic warfare “...lends itself best to a

sustained aggressive surprise attack.”

Because a nation must deliver a “knockout blow” within the first few weeks,

“...we can no longer prepare for an initial defensive war while our nation is

mobilizing,” as the United States had done

before entering World War II. One part of

the solution, Nichols said, was an extensive intelligence network to learn about

the kinds of atomic energy research other

nations were conducting. The second part

of the solution was to discourage an attack by being prepared to retaliate

“...with a similar attack multiplied a hundredfold.” No nation, Nichols maintained,

“...could stand up to a sustained atomic

attack if they were not able to give equal

or greater punishment in return.”41

Preparedness would not come cheaply, Nichols warned. A potential enemy

could easily support an atomic energy

program costing “...tens of billions of

dollars, particularly if they felt that by

such an expenditure they could win a short

aggressive war.” But if the United States

provided sufficient funding to develop

and produce large numbers of weapons

and devised ways other than the B-29 to

deliver them, “...this nation [would be]

undefeatable in war.” He suggested that a

funding level of $500 million per year

would be adequate, though the country

might need to increase the annual expenditures to $2 billion should the “...international situation become critical.” He

reminded his audience that regardless of

cost, “...atomic warfare promises to be

the cheapest form of death and destruction ever devised by man.” It was up to

the military, he told the officers, to educate the public and the nation’s leaders to

insure that such a defensive strategy received strong support.42

Nichols did not believe that a nuclear

war was imminent; rather, he imagined

that it was a possibility “...some fifteen

to thirty years from now.”43 In any case,

the United States must be prepared.

On September 26, 1946, at the AEC’s

Fort Belvoir Conference, General Groves,

Rear Admiral William S. (Deke) Parsons,

and other prominent officers from the

Manhattan Project listened to Colonel

Hasbrouck provide additional information

on the bomb, most of it extrapolated from

the military’s experience in the war and

at Operation CROSSROADS. Nuclear

weapons, he explained, were not mass

produced and could not “...be made like

donuts rolling off a machine.” Every

bomb, therefore, was “...precious and

must be conserved, safeguarded and expended wisely.” He emphasized the strategic importance of nuclear weapons,

contrasting the enormous cost of firebombing Tokyo in March 1945 with the

results obtained by one B-29 and one

atomic bomb six months later at Hiroshima and then at Nagasaki. After using hundreds of planes, thousands of air and

ground crewmen, and thousands of tons

of incendiary bombs, he noted, “...the

Japs fought on.” After dropping two atomic weapons, “...the Japs could take no

more.”44

Hasbrouck offered an additional example on the power and strategic value

of atomic bombs. The Japanese had hammered away at Pearl Harbor with hundreds of planes for several hours, he
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 19

pointed out, but at the CROSSROADS

operation at Bikini earlier in the summer

of 1946, “...a single bomb in a single moment [had] crippled a fleet.” The nature

of warfare had changed. He wondered if

“...the day of the battleship and the big

carrier [was] over.” For example, what

might have happened to the American

fleet had the Japanese possessed such a

weapon during the invasion of Leyte or

to the Allied invasion force had Hitler

been able to use one on the English Channel ports in June 1944, he asked rhetorically.45

The Colonel continued his discussion

of the strategic value of atomic bombs by

emphasizing the different ways the weapons might be used. Targeting was critical,

Hasbrouck explained. He cited industrial

cities, naval bases, embarkation ports,

power dams, and reservoirs as the most

appropriate and “remunerative” targets.

Since the use of atomic bombs would be

decided by the President with advice from

the military, it was critical for the military to have the very best intelligence

about potential targets so it could calculate the number of bombs necessary for

destruction. It was also vital that the weapons be dropped with accuracy. A bomb

dropped on “...Chevy Chase would not

greatly hurt the federal installations in

Washington,” he noted dryly. To obtain

the desired accuracy, he believed that the

Air Force needed a “...comparatively

small number of very highly trained

bomber crews.”46

Perhaps of equal importance, Hasbrouck continued, was the psychological

impact of an atomic bomb. The war with

Japan, he argued, had been brought to an

end by a threat, the threat of continued

bombing and the destruction of more cities. The Japanese “...did not know that we

had even one more bomb. General Groves

is probably the only one who knew.” Hitler, he said, effectively used the threat of

a “secret weapon” during the war. The

United States had the same advantage

with the atomic bomb. “There can be no

doubt,” Hasbrouck concluded, “that our

present possession of this weapon is a stabilizing factor toward world peace.”47

THE BARUCH PLAN AND

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The two-day conference was a crash

course in nuclear policy from the veterans of the Manhattan Project for the postwar military planners. Experience with

the uses and effects of atomic weapons

was more apparent than either the shape

of the government’s postwar nuclear policy or the military’s future relationship

with the AEC, both of which were encountering major problems of definition.

Even as Hasbrouck spoke, at the end of

September 1946, of the atomic bomb as a

stabilizing factor in world peace, he implied that nuclear weapons would continue to be a major part of postwar policy,

reflecting a military position that had by

then moved beyond the Truman administration’s public posture of disarmament

embodied in the Baruch Plan.

Establishment of the country’s nuclear policy had been debated within the administration since early 1946 with mixed

success. Secretary of State Byrnes appointed a panel headed by David E. Lilienthal, then the head of the Tennessee

Valley Authority, and Undersecretary of

State Dean G. Acheson to formulate such

a policy. The group consisted of representatives from the business, scientific, and

military communities, including General

Groves. After nearly three months of discussion, the panel issued its findings. The

Acheson-Lilienthal Report, as the proposal was called, did not seek to outlaw atomic weapons. “Any system based on

outlawing the purely military development of atomic energy and relying solely
20 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

on inspection for enforcement,” the report

stated, “would at the outset be surrounded by conditions that would destroy the

system.” Rather, the panel sought to control every stage of weapons production.

Control, the report specified, would come

from an international Atomic Development Authority that would keep track of

potential violations as well as license acceptable activities such as research in

nuclear medicine.48 No sooner had the

administration had its first view of the

Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations

when Truman, on Byrnes’ advice, appointed noted Presidential advisor, millionaire financier, and major contributor

to the Democratic party Bernard M.

Baruch to present the U.S. position on

atomic energy before the United Nations

Atomic Energy Commission. Once more,

American nuclear policy shifted. Baruch

immediately rejected many of the provisions of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on

the basis that it [the Report] failed to deal

with the central problem of enforcement.

Baruch’s plan called for “...sanctions

against those who violated the rules” and

required the United States to give up its

nuclear monopoly only as other nations

agreed to these terms. Finally, he stipulated that no nation could use the Security Council’s veto power to block those

sanctions. Baruch presented his proposal

at the United Nations that summer.49

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union rejected Baruch’s ideas and immediately

countered with its own proposal, which

required immediate and total nuclear disarmament but lacked any provisions for

inspection to see that signatories were

following the rules. Further, the Soviets

demanded to retain veto power in the Security Council. Throughout the summer,

each side remained at the negotiation table, but, in fact, there was little chance that

either side would agree to a compromise.50

The debate over the outcome of international control of nuclear energy became

further muddied by Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace. A former Secretary of Agriculture and Vice President

under Franklin D. Roosevelt during most

of the war, Wallace had acquired a reputation in Washington as a loose cannon.

His brand of high idealism, attachment to

Bernard M. Baruch (center) presented to the United Nations the American Plan for International

Control of Atomic Energy on June 14, 1946.
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 21

the controversial ideas of a Russian mystic of dubious character, and a willingness

to publicly champion a foreign policy that

was at odds with the administration’s, insured that Truman would have to replace

him. However, in the summer and fall of

1946, Truman had not felt comfortable

enough in the office he had inherited to

sack Wallace.51

As Groves, Nichols, and Hasbrouck

were preparing for the military symposium on atomic weapons under a civilian

authority, Wallace tried to torpedo his

nation’s policy for the international control of atomic energy. Wallace pointed to

the Bikini tests and the production of the

B-36 bomber that could carry a nuclear

weapon from the continental United

States to the Soviet Union, something the

“silverplated” B-29s could not do, as evidence that the United States was not seeking accommodation with the Soviet

Union. Wallace blasted Baruch’s step-bystep disarmament plan and proposed instead to “...reach an agreement which will

commit us to disclosing information and

destroying our bombs at a specific time

or in terms of specified actions by other

countries, rather than at our unfettered

discretion.” Baruch was furious. He had

never proposed that the United States unilaterally establish any timetable. But the

major damage had been done. Although

Truman fired Wallace soon thereafter, his

administration had been thoroughly embarrassed. In addition, Baruch found himself occupied with patching over the

damage at home. With so much vacillation within the administration and so

much suspicion from the Soviets, an

agreement on international control of

atomic energy became impossible.52

Faced with an administration whose

nuclear policy was conspicuous by its

drifting and shifting on both an international and a national level, Groves and his

officers in Washington had moved ahead

in the fall of 1946 to define and articulate

a formal military role in the new world of

civilian-controlled atomic energy. Outlining their ideas to other officers at Fort

Belvoir was only one aspect to their plan,

however. Groves saw the basis for continued and vital military participation in

nuclear weapons through upgrading the

MED’s presence in the field in Albuquerque, New Mexico. There, a new unit of

superior, highly trained Army officers

would control a critical point in the weapons production process: the assembly of

atomic bombs and the training of officers

to act as weaponeers for combat drops.

ESTABLISHING SANDIA BASE

Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland fit General Groves’ profile for the men he wanted to run the Manhattan District’s postwar

operations. He had ranked twenty-first of

276 cadets at the U.S. Military Academy

in the Class of 1936. While on duty in

San Francisco, Dorland earned a graduate degree in civil engineering from the

University of California at Berkeley in

1940. In August 1942 he shipped out with

the 21st Engineers, serving as a battalion,

then regimental, commander in North

Africa and Italy. During the war, he earned

the Bronze Star, the Legion of Merit, and

the Order of the British Empire and won

promotion to full Colonel in 1944.53

Dorland had returned from Europe

and was finishing Command & General

Staff School at Fort Leavenworth just as

Groves was selecting regular officers for

the postwar Manhattan District. The selection process, while sharply defined,

was also extremely personal. It consisted

largely of an intense canvass and discussion of West Pointers whose talents and

qualifications were known to Groves and

his assistants. Colonel James B. Lampert,

General Groves’ chief administrative aide

in Washington, did much of the selecting,

including suggesting Dorland. Lampert
22 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

had been Dorland’s classmate at West

Point. In the summer, a number of these

bright and highly motivated young officers received high priority orders to return

from overseas. The posting carried a sense

of stability; they were to report to New

Mexico with their families.54

In late summer of 1946, while most

of the scientists and military personnel

from Los Alamos and Sandia were in the

South Pacific rehearsing for the second

test of Operation CROSSROADS, Colonel Dorland arrived in Albuquerque to

take command of the 2761st Engineer

Battalion (Special) as part of the MED.

Within a month, a sufficient number of

men had returned from Bikini or had been

transferred from the Los Alamos Technical Services Unit to activate the battalion.

He immediately formed a Headquarters

and Services Company and Company A,

which handled base security. Dorland

would command two other companies

once the men arrived for staffing. Company B, a technical company with the assignment of assembling atomic bombs,

was to consist of 40 officers and 60 enlisted men, enough to form three assembly teams. In establishing Company B’s

mission, the Manhattan District provided

that the military assembly personnel

would perform only electrical and mechanical duties. In the summer of 1946,

there was widespread belief that nuclear

assembly was “...so complex that officers of the Armed Services did not possess

sufficient knowledge to perform this work

properly.” Since many of the experienced

assembly leaders had returned to civilian

life, Company B would have to be largely self-trained from manuals and reports

prepared at Los Alamos, supplemented by

advice from the few knowledgeable scientists remaining in the project. Company C, when activated, would direct

radiological monitoring.55

By September, the cream of the young

officers selected by General Groves and

his aides began arriving at Sandia Base.

The men had orders to fly “immediate air”

from Europe and the Pacific. Their families followed, usually by ship. One officer had travel orders to Sandia but had no

idea where it was and wondered how he

would get there. “Go to Albuquerque and

ask,” his intelligence officer whispered.

The officers reported first to Washington,

then toured the Oak Ridge operation before heading to New Mexico. The majority were graduates of the U.S. Military

Academy from the classes of 1943, 1944,

and 1945, primarily from the Corps of Engineers, with an additional sprinkling of

honor graduates from Reserve Officer

Training Corps (ROTC) programs. By the

end of the month, approximately 25 officers had begun a series of orientation

lectures conducted by Lieutenant Colonel

A. (Al) J. Froehlich, the battalion executive officer, and Lieutenant Colonel John

A. Ord.56

By October, the initial orientation lectures covering nuclear physics and the

basic workings of the Fat Man atomic

bomb needed to be replaced by more technical weapons assembly training. But, as

Groves had feared, the scientists remained

aloof, certain that “...none of those stupid Army people could understand the

intricacies of an atomic weapon,” Dorland

recalled. The reason for this low regard

of the military, he believed, was because

the only soldiers they had dealt with during the war at Los Alamos were “...basically housekeeping types and security

people.” As a result, without much input

from the scientists, for the first several

months the military personnel serving as

instructors were “...inadequately trained

in the methods and techniques of bomb

assembly,” according to the unit’s official

history.57

One major difference between scientists and the military, aside from the long-
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 23

Layout of Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1947.
24 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

standing disagreement about secrecy and

security, was the approach each used in

assembling a weapon. A team of scientists

constructed the entire bomb in a series of

steps, moving in a logical progression

from one part to the second part, then the

third, and so on until the assembly process was complete. Each member of the

team worked at every stage in the assembly process. The military, on the other

hand, used a variation of the procedures

adopted from the Army arsenal system,

which systematically broke down the assembly process into specific tasks, with a

group of officers assigned to each. Later,

the officers would be rotated to learn each

of the separate tasks, but the military had

no intention of its personnel performing

all tasks during an assembly operation.

Each group in the battalion performed

different tasks. When the groups came

together, everything was in place to assemble the bomb.58

To carry out the separate functions,

Company B was divided into four training groups, Command, Mechanical Assembly, Electrical Assembly, and Nuclear.

The Command Group, after its orientation

on components, assembly, and operation

of the bomb, began making logistical

plans for the movement of an assembly

team to a forward base. This involved the

preparation of assembly kits, aircraft loading calculations, and time schedules.

Eventually the group would also develop

equipment to raise weapons with two sets

of loading pits at the base and plan activities relating to test drops of dummy

units.59

Training programs also evolved in the

other groups. The Electrical and Nuclear

Groups combined to create a self-instructed course on radio and fundamental electrical circuitry, using the manuals created

by Los Alamos for Operation CROSSROADS. Ultimately, the Electrical Group

focused on the Flight Test Box, a device

that enabled the team to determine the

readiness of the batteries and the electrical firing system. The firing system consisted of a series of circuits for the

barometric switches and “Archies,” converted radars that had been designed to

protect fighter pilots from the rear but

were used to detect the altitude for detonation as the bomb fell. They also developed a rotating-mirror camera that

checked the simultaneity of the detonators. The Nuclear Group moved up to Los

Alamos, where scientists provided on-thejob training on the nuclear assembly operation, putting the cores together and

taking them apart. The Mechanical Group

trained on assembling detonators and the

high explosive lenses.60

While working with the spherical high

explosive assemblies early in their training, the Mechanical Group discovered

that several segments of the lenses were

stuck together. After a couple of days of

prying, tapping, and tugging to separate

them, one of the men suggested using a

solvent to dissolve the adhesive that held

them together. Alcohol and gasoline

proved fruitless, so they called in an expert from Los Alamos. He arrived, looked

over the situation, and ordered the evacuation of the whole building. Gasoline and

the high explosive, the neophytes learned,

formed a highly unstable mix that was

easily detonated by a minor shock or

rough handling.61

Nonetheless, General Groves’ decision to select only the brightest officers

began to pay off. Many of the officers took

courses in theoretical physics at the University of New Mexico. In the course of

the training sessions at Los Alamos and

with the Z-Division scientists posted at

Sandia Base, the attitude of the scientists

“...changed around completely,” or at

least enough to develop some respect for

the soldiers, Dorland recalled. Over time,

Los Alamos invited the military teams to
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 25

occasional colloquiums for lectures by

such luminaries as Edward Teller, Hans

Bethe, Lise Meitner, and Enrico Fermi on

the health hazards of atomic energy, the

Fat Man implosion bomb, the Little Boy

gun-type weapon, and the effects of atomic bombs.62

During the fall and early winter of

1946, only officers received bomb assembly training. By the end of the year, Dorland believed that his organization had

some competence to assemble atomic

bombs for combat, even though everyone

connected with the project agreed that “a

great deal of additional training was necessary” before the battalion could be said

to have any reliable operational capability. With a cadre of trained officers in place

by the end of the year, the 2761st began

to recruit highly qualified enlisted men to

fill jobs on the assembly teams. Three

months later, when security clearances

were obtained, noncommissioned officers

began training in the Mechanical Group,

specializing in high explosive assemblies

and “canning” of bomb components for

the stockpile.63

The training program was strained by

an influx of novice Air Corps bomb commanders. In response, Dorland formed the

Technical Training Group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ord. By the

end of June 1947, every officer and most

of the enlisted men had participated in

three or more assembly operations and a

number of special projects. But after nine

months, following all the intense procedural and repetitive training, the special engineer battalion had yet to

conduct an actual trial assembly or a

joint training exercise with the Army Air

Corps.64

Colonel Dorland was also concerned

about his independent command at SanSandia Base guard tower and Building #452, viewed from the east.
26 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

dia. For four months, no one from Washington had even visited Sandia to find out

how Dorland or the 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special) were doing. With the birth

of the AEC and the growth of the training

program, that laissez faire attitude was

about to change.65

Dorland’s first visitors were not military officers but the newly appointed commissioners from the AEC. In November

1946, the commissioners began touring

most of the MED facilities that soon

would belong to the Commission. After

visiting Oak Ridge, the commissioners

headed west. As their aircraft sped toward

New Mexico, Robert F. Bacher, a

Los Alamos physicist who had headed the

group that designed the implosion weapon and the only scientist among the five

commissioners, gave “...a vivid picture

of the making of the bomb” and what to

expect when they landed, according to

Lilienthal. “We were so enthralled that for

an hour or so we were hardly conscious

of being anywhere at all.”66

The commissioners had two scheduled stops in New Mexico. The first stop

was Los Alamos where, on the morning

of November 16, they spoke with the scientists, received a briefing on weapons

research and production, and visited the

bomb storage areas. During the briefing,

they first heard the term “Alarm Clock,”

the code name for a thermonuclear device

recently proposed by Edward Teller. But

the commissioners sensed a lack of purpose among the scientists and a slow rate

of weapons development and production.

The country’s nuclear arsenal, they

learned for the first time, was not as sizeable as they had believed.67

That afternoon the group drove to Albuquerque to check out the operations

at Sandia Base. Lilienthal described Dorland and his staff as “...alert and handsome young West Pointers, eager to learn

the art of putting things together, a rather

‘getting in on the ground floor’ sort of

thing.” Lilienthal recorded in his journal

that he asked numerous questions and

learned “...quite a lot, particularly about

what has not been done in the way of planning, coordination, and the like.” Like

Oppenheimer, Lilienthal found himself

captivated by the beauty of the New Mexican mountains and concerned by the nuclear enterprises they sheltered. “There is

something ironic,” he confided to his journal, “about the contrast between these

magnificent vistas of nature and the things

I saw during the day.”68

THE AEC AND AFSWP

In the afternoon of December 31,

1946, as much of Washington prepared to

welcome the new year, President Truman

and top officials from the military and the

AEC met at the White House. The gathering was historic. By the stroke of Truman’s pen, the Army’s responsibility for

the Manhattan District would be taken

over by a civilian agency, the AEC. General Groves, who had commanded the

MED since September 17, 1942, would

be relieved by a General Manager, Carroll L. Wilson, a 36-year old engineer. The

change came at the beginning of a new

year. As 1946 became 1947, the Commission, according to new Chairman, David

E. Lilienthal, would control “the most

potent weapon of all time.” But, he added, the Commission would also pursue

“the peaceful and beneficial possibilities

of this great discovery.”69

The AEC, composed of a board of five

full-time Presidential appointees, was to

assume responsibility for most of the activities of the MED soon after passage of

the legislation creating the Commission.

But Truman took three months after the

passage of the Atomic Energy Act in August to select the commissioners. In November, Chairman, Lilienthal, asked

Groves and the military to run the opera-
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 27

tion until the end of the year. The transfer

to civilian authority was set for December 31, 1946. The Chairman had no choice

but to defer the transfer because the Commission had “...no offices, no funds, no

secretaries, no staff, no budget, no files,

and no property,” as its historians have

succinctly noted. Groves was not happy

with the delay or the appointments. “Everyone knew that I was in a caretaker’s

position,” he dryly recorded in his memoirs, and that there was “...no assurance

that my views would be those of the Commission.” Once the commissioners were

appointed, Groves later complained, “...it

was quite evident that my views would

not be accepted without a long-drawn-out

delay.”70

A series of meetings at the end of November 1946 between the civilian commissioners and the military, represented

by Groves and Nichols, emphasized how

many devils lurked in the transfer details.

The commissioners asked Groves for a

detailed list of the facilities to be transferred from the MED. Lilienthal had interpreted the transfer section of the

Atomic Energy Act to include all MED

property to the AEC. Nichols was drafting such a list, Groves said, but it would

not be ready by the end of the year. He

added that he believed that nuclear weapons and weapons facilities, specifically

Sandia and the Naval Ordnance Test Station at Inyokern, California, were excluded from the transfer. Groves, Nichols, and

others believed it was essential to the strategic defense of the United States to have

custody of all weapon stockpiles, affecting as it did, the “...potential efficiency

and speed of action of the Armed Forces

in the event that war is declared.” The custody issue, always simmering, began to

boil.71

The transfer was not easy for either

the MED officers or the new commissioners. That General Groves viewed the

Manhattan Project as his own creation

was no secret. He confided to one of the

commissioners during their talks that he

“...was in the position of a mother hen

watching strangers take away all her

chicks.” He thought the commissioners

lacked much understanding about the

technical issues of atomic energy and

were in over their heads. Nichols agreed.

He was annoyed that the commissioners

seemed to ignore his advice on running

the weapons complex and believed they

were more interested in nuclear power

than nuclear weapons. For their part, the

commissioners thought that Groves and

the military wanted to retain control over

nuclear weapons despite legislation to the

contrary. Consequently, they were suspicious of any departure from their interpretation that the AEC should receive all

property and functions of the Manhattan

District and viewed Groves’ suggestions

as attempts to get them to ratify military

dominance before the Commission became fully operational. Officials within

the Commission believed the Army was

trying to undermine civilian control of

atomic energy.72

Nichols did nothing to allay this concern. He continued his campaign for military control in the last weeks before the

scheduled transfer and insisted that weapons, bomb parts, and fabricated materials

ready for assembly be retained by the

military. Nichols did not say so, but these

were the very items under the custody of

the 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special).

Nichols intensified the Commission’s distrust by submitting a draft of an Executive Order that would convey MED

property to the AEC. In each paragraph

Nichols had appended a clause excepting

“...those functions, facilities, materials,

and equipment of a military character

which the Secretary of War or Navy and

the Commission mutually agree” would

remain with the military. The Commission
28 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

President Truman transfers control of the atom from the military representatives to the civilian Atomic Energy Commission, December 12, 1946. Seated, from left to right: Carroll L.

Wilson (Commission General Manager), President Truman, David E. Lilienthal (Commission Chairman), Standing, from left to right: Sumner T. Pike (Commission member), Col.

Kenneth D. Nichols (Deputy Chief of MED), Robert P. Patterson (War Department Secretary), Major General Leslie R. Groves (head of MED), Lewis L. Strauss (Commission member) and William W. Waymach (Commission member).

rejected Nichols’ position. Secretary of

War Patterson wrote Lilienthal at the end

of January, stating that “I anticipate that

when the matter has been reviewed by the

President, he will direct that a certain

number of bombs and bomb parts will be

wholly within the custody of the Armed

Services.” Thereafter, both sides decided

to let President Truman decide the custody issue.73

Nichols’ last ditch attempts had failed.

On Tuesday, December 31, Secretary of

War Patterson, Groves, and Nichols, along

with four of the five members of the AEC

and its new General Manager, watched as

President Truman signed Executive Order 9816 ending the Manhattan District.

All MED property, including fissionable

material, would go to the Commission,

although some part – including Sandia

Base, its physical properties, and Army

and Navy personnel – would stay with the

military. With the exception of his selected officers at Sandia, General Groves had

little more than a paper command. Soon

thereafter, he announced his retirement.

Nichols’ career in atomic energy also appeared to be stalled. By refusing to com-
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 29

promise on the custody issue, Nichols

believed he had eliminated any chance of

being appointed Director of Military Application, the highest military position at

the AEC. In that regard, he was correct.

Lilienthal spurned Nichols, the only candidate nominated by the military. After a

two-month search, the Commission

named Colonel James McCormack, Jr., of

the Army Air Corps, a 1932 West Point

graduate and Rhodes scholar, Director of

Military Application. Nichols returned to

a West Point teaching post.74

Unfortunately, none of these actions

addressed the basic problems of defining

operational responsibilities. The length of

time taken to settle on the Atomic Energy

Act had contributed to the drift in making decisions. As a result, the act gave

birth to a set of Siamese triplets, three

organizations – the Atomic Energy Commission, the Military Liaison Committee,

and the Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project – all figuratively joined at the hip

and often heading in separate directions.

The MLC was to “consult and advise” the

Commission on “all atomic energy matters which the MLC deems to relate to

military applications.” As a matter of policy, the MLC would only advise; the AEC

would develop, manufacture, and store

nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Commission would have custody of all atomic

weapons and fissionable material, as well

as control access to classified atomic energy information.75

The clumsiness of such an arrangement

was obvious to AFSWP officers at Sandia,

who were caught in the middle between

the Commission’s drive to impose civilian control and the MLC’s bid for greater

military participation. Groves had compounded the confusion by having men from

the special engineer battalion learn weapon assembly and testing, similar to the

duties of Z-Division, the Los Alamos group

stationed at Sandia under an AEC contract.

As a consequence, the custody issue continued to rankle all parties.76

THE ARMED FORCES

SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

When the AEC took control of the

MED properties on January 1, 1947, Sandia Base remained under the control of the

War Department, with General Groves

still in command. Groves and Dorland

expected Z-Division, the Ordnance Engineering Division and its laboratories, to

remain as the center for research and development of the military aspects of atomic weapons under military control. A

number of the officers from the 2761st

battalion had been assigned to Z-Division,

including Lieutenant Colonel Ellis E. Wilhoyt, who served as the alternate division

leader. The Commission thought otherwise, however, wishing to retain control

of Z-Division and its facilities on Sandia

Base. The separation issue was complicated by the fact that both Groves and

Nichols had left Washington in early January and the War Department had not yet

hammered out a formal organizational

structure for the battalion.77

By the end of January, the organizational issue was somewhat settled. A

memorandum issued by Secretary of War

Robert P. Patterson and Secretary of the

Navy James V. Forrestal on January 29,

1947, generally referred to as the AFSWP

Charter, established, “...effective midnight December 31, 1946, a joint ArmyNavy atomic energy organization which

will discharge all military Service functions relating to atomic energy and will

be known as the Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project.” The head of the new

organization was to be appointed by and

report directly to the Chief of Staff of the

Army and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The two chiefs would also select a deputy from the opposite Service. Both the

head of AFSWP and his deputy, the memo
30 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

directed, would serve as members of the

MLC to the AEC. The Chief of the

AFSWP would assume responsibility for

“...all military service functions of the

Manhattan Project as are retained under

the control of the Armed Forces.” This

included training of special personnel,

coordination with the AEC in the development of atomic weapons of all types,

technical training of bomb commanders

and weaponeers, and participation with

other agencies in developing joint radiological safety measures.78

The charter clearly anticipated the ultimate unification of the military Services. As if to emphasize the importance of

AFSWP as the first interservice unit under the proposed National Military Establishment, Forrestal, in another

memorandum to Patterson on the same

day, underlined the word “joint.”79

The military’s failure to select an AFSWP director was surprising. Neither

Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D.

Eisenhower and Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had

made a selection. Therefore, between the

beginning of January and the end of

February 1947, there was no officially

appointed chief of AFSWP. During this

period, Groves’ aide, Colonel Hasbrouck,

assumed Headquarters command in

Washington as the senior officer of the

organization. The offices of AFSWP were

first headquartered in the new War Department Building, at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, NW, where the Washington

offices of the Manhattan District had been

located. On April 15, 1947, the AFSWP

offices were moved to the Pentagon; first

on the fifth floor, and later, in October

1947, on the second floor in Corridor 2,

due to security requirements. Little

change could occur until the officials in

Washington decided how the new joint organization would be constituted and its

functions clearly defined.80

AFSWP OPERATIONS

AT SANDIA BASE

All of the politics in Washington and

the establishment of the AFSWP had little impact on the day-to-day operations at

Sandia Base. Dorland continued to direct

the activities of the 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special), and any changes he introduced were largely driven by local

demands. By the beginning of 1947, training of officers had progressed to the point

that the military was confident it had an

organization capable of assembling an

atomic bomb for combat. At the same

time, Dorland and his staff saw the necessity for a great deal of additional training

and that the development of procedures,

organizations, and equipment left much

to be desired.81

As Sandia Base expanded, more of the

trained officers would be assigned to administrative duties. To relieve the pressure

on training created by the reassignments, Dorland created a Technical Training Group, under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel Ord. Ord was not an

engineer. He was in the Signal Corps and

been selected for duty with the Manhattan District at Sandia by Groves’ Executive Officer, Colonel Herbert Gee, who,

as district engineer in Jacksonville, Florida, had worked with Ord in constructing

the Southern Signal Corps School, Camp

Murphy, in 1942. Gee told Ord that his

background in Army schools fit perfectly

with what was needed at Sandia. Ord

headed to Albuquerque in early September of 1946.82

Ord’s first task was to recruit new instructors, especially those specializing in

radio and radar electronics. In November

1946, he traveled to Fort Monmouth, New

Jersey, to interview potential instructors

from the ranks of both officers and enlisted personnel. After the usual complaints

from the Army that the Manhattan District was stealing too many men, Ord suc-
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 31

cessfully convinced Washington and Fort

Monmouth to transfer his selections. By

the time he set up the Technical Training

Group in January 1947, Ord had assembled a team of instructors from both the

Signal Corps and the Corps of Engineers.

The group set up office and classroom

space in old Civilian Conservation Corps

buildings at the south end of the base.

With only fans to battle the fierce New

Mexican heat, Ord noted that “the generals had to sweat it out with the rest of us.”

Two of Ord’s instructors, William R.

Cherry and Ivan M. Moore, both second

lieutenants from the Corps of Engineers,

established a teaching laboratory in the

“Farm,” a building off Sandia Base near

the loading pit at Kirtland Field. There

they installed work benches and wired in

the electrical outlets necessary to test a

bomb’s electrical components. The building was also used for assembling high

explosive lenses.83

Ord’s training methods were taken

from the same book he had used at the

Southern Signal Corps School—hands-on

experience with actual equipment. This

training method was particularly adapted

to the maintenance and assembly of the

bomb altimeter, an airborne radar unit that

determined the altitude for firing the Fat

Man implosion weapon. Ord put his students through their paces on actual equipment by altering the circuitry and

challenging the men to find the problem.

The one problem with Ord’s alterations

and hands-on training was that the radar

units wore out after only a year of use.

Replacements of specific components labeled for nuclear weapons were not easily obtained, but, fortunately, one of Ord’s

enlisted men, Master Sergeant James R.

Corman, noticed that identical altimeters

under a different name were stored in a

warehouse on the base. Corman hauled

the worn-out Fat Man altimeters to the

warehouse, changed nameplates with

their identical twins, and brought the new

ones back to the weapons training center.84

For training men on the firing mechanism, Ord created a “reality check” process to ensure that the spark plugs

(initiators) that fired the high explosive

were properly wired and sequenced. The

spark plugs were assembled in a rack and

connected to the flight test box in the same

manner as for an airborne bomb. With this

equipment, students could test the firing

order. Should the student make an error

in testing, Ord recalled, “...the spark

plugs would fire and announce to all the

class that they had theoretically been

blown up.”85

Colonel Ord firmly believed that these

training methods served to prevent such

accidents under combat conditions. “We

enforced a hard and fast rule,” he said,

“that there was but one way to handle

every procedure—the right way.” He tolerated no deviations from the checklists

that covered every procedure; they were

followed consistently, with no exceptions.

Ord proudly pointed to the fact that there

were no accidents while handling high

explosives, changing initiators, or making insertions of active material.86 In his

recollections, he described the process:

“...the initiators were assembled in a

rack and connected to the flight test box

for training on the latter, and if a mistake

was made they would fire and embarrass

a student. The same arrangement was

used to fire the spark plugs and take a

picture of the sparks using a high speed

rotating mirror to test for simultaneity.

This initial method of testing for simultaneity was time consuming and, I am

told, was later improved. The adding of

electrolyte to the batteries used in the

bomb and their charging was also a critical operation.”

As Ord’s group had successfully employed enlisted men in the training pro-
32 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) Organization Chart, 1947.

PERSONNEL &

ADMINISTRATION

DIVISION

ADJUTANT

GENERAL

MILITARY

PERSONNEL

BRANCH

ADMINISTRATIVE

BRANCH

INSPECTOR

GENERAL

JUDGE

ADVOCATE

CIVILIAN

PERSONNEL

BRANCH

SECURITY

DIVISION

PERSONNEL

CLEARANCE

BRANCH

PUBLIC

RELATIONS

BRANCH

PHYSICAL SECURITY

& TOP SECRET

CONTROL BRANCH

REPRODUCTION

BRANCH

OPERATIONS

& TRAINING

DIVISION

PLANS

BRANCH

OPERATIONS

BRANCH

TRAINING

BRANCH

TECHNICAL

EQUIPMENT

BRANCH

FISCAL &

LOGISTICS

DIVISION

SERVICES, SUPPLY

& PROCUREMENT

BRANCH

BUDGET

BRANCH

FISCAL

BRANCH

CONSTRUCTION

& LAND

BRANCH

CHIEF OF STAFF

DEPUTY

CHIEF OF STAFF

CHIEF

AFSWP

DEPUTY CHIEF

USAF

ASSISTANT

CHIEF OF STAFF

SPECIAL

PROJECTS

Organization Chart

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL

WEAPONS PROJECT

(AFSWP)

JANUARY 1947
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 33

WEAPONS

DEVELOPMENT

DIVISION

NUCLEAR

BRANCH

ENGINEERING

BRANCH

ORDNANCE

BRANCH

RADIOLOGICAL

WARFARE

BRANCH

WEAPONS

EFFECTS

DIVISION

DIRECTOR,

TECHNICAL

DIVISION

SCIENTIFIC &

TECHNICAL ASSISTANT

SPECIAL

ASSISTANTS

WEAPONS

DATA HISTORICAL

DEPUTY CHIEF

USN

RADIATION

BRANCH

BLAST

BRANCH

TEST

BRANCH

TECHNICAL

LIBRARY

BRANCH

WEAPONS

DEFENSE

DIVISION

MATERIAL

BRANCH

MEDICAL

BRANCH

PLANNING

BRANCH
34 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

cess, it soon became obvious that the

2761st Engineer Battalion (Special) could

not handle all the bomb assembly operations solely with officers. Enlisted men

were also capable of doing the work,

Dorland and his staff decided. Since certain elements of the Army had expressed

some displeasure with sending the Service’s best officer talent to Groves’ special project, there was some urgency to

the decision to recruit noncommissioned

officers. Some enlisted men were already

stationed at Sandia, carryovers from Los

Alamos who were assigned to Z-Division

after the end of the war, but they were not

trained in weapons assembly techniques.

In January, Dorland sent Major Oscar M.

Brumfiel to Fort Belvoir to find highly

qualified enlisted men from outside the

Manhattan District. The enlisted men began arriving in February. After a month

of processing all the necessary clearances, they began training as part of the mechanical assembly teams, working with

high explosive assemblies, and “canning,”

or packaging, bomb components for the

stockpile.87 Ord remembered the quality

of the enlisted men in his command in his

recollections:

“I had no problem with training EM [enlisted men] to handle complicated radar

equipment in the early forties, and the

same proved true at Sandia Base. An interesting event took place one day that

proved my point. The members of the

AEC were visiting Sandia Base and we

were putting on a ‘country fair’ type tour

of our training facilities for them. A M/

Sgt (who later was promoted to warrant

officer) had proved very adept at learning the physics of the bomb and the monitoring of the pit during insertion, so I

used him as the instructor at that station

of the tour. [Colonel] Dorland was somewhat concerned that no officer was handling this task, but it was my neck that

was out, and I let the sergeant do the job.

When it appeared that the line of visitors

had slowed up, I investigated and found

that the AEC members were listening to

the sergeant, asking questions, and were

very complimentary of his performance.”

In addition to the ongoing training

programs, the men at Sandia Base began

a number of special projects in the spring

of 1947, several of which emphasized the

interservice nature of AFSWP. For some

time the Navy Department had wanted to

modify Midway-class aircraft carriers to

provide atomic bomb assembly sites

aboard. Early in 1947, the Bureau of Ships

and Sandia Base initiated discussions to

determine the specifications for the shipboard assembly areas. The Army Air

Corps also examined the possibility of

having its own mobile assembly site. Not

long after Operation CROSSROADS, the

Air Corps suggested converting a C-97

cargo plane into an assembly facility. In

late 1946, the design work commenced

for adapting the interior of the C-97 for

Colonel John A. Ord, Commander, Technical Training Group, Sandia Base, 1947.
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 35

forward assembly operations, codenamed CHICKENPOX. The Air Corps

proposed another project, OPERATION

65, in the spring of 1947. Under this plan,

the Sandia assembly teams and the Air

Force would conduct a series of assembly tests in Alaska at Arctic temperatures,

but the idea never went beyond the early

planning stage.88

Another combined operation came

from General Groves, who urged that officers of the special weapons battalion be

trained as weaponeers for combat drops

of atomic bombs. To implement this plan,

Dorland’s staff made arrangements with

the 509th Bombardment Wing, the same

unit that had dropped the atomic bombs

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and later at

CROSSROADS, to take groups of five

officers for a six-week tour at its base in

Roswell, New Mexico, to orient them to

the duties of air crew personnel.89

GROVES BACK IN COMMAND

At the end of February 1947, Eisenhower and Nimitz appointed Major General Groves Chief of AFSWP. His offices

remained in the new War Department

building on Virginia Avenue and 21st

Street, NW, where the Washington offices of MED were located. Rear Admiral

William S. Parsons was named Deputy

Chief. By virtue of their positions, both

men became members of the MLC.

Groves assumed command of the remnants of his beloved MED, which consisted primarily of the operations at Sandia

Base. From his new position, he could

oversee limited operations in developing

nuclear weapons. AFSWP acted for the

Armed Forces in liaison with non-military

agencies in the field of atomic energy, the

exception being with the AEC, which by

law dealt instead with the MLC.90

General Groves may have lost some

power to the AEC, but he was not powerless. From his additional position on the

MLC, he could influence policy, prodding

the Commission to produce more nuclear materials and weapons and attacking

the men who earlier had ignored his suggestions on running a nuclear program. He

also retained a forum for his views on the

custody issue. The Groves appointment

kept the MLC and the AEC at battle stations.91

The nature of the atomic energy responsibilities of the military had been discussed among Groves and his staff for

over a year, while Congress debated the

atomic energy bill. As the senior military

officer and perhaps the most highly respected in the field, at least by the military, Groves could shape the AFSWP

organization to his own thinking. In a

memorandum to Eisenhower, he quickly

seized on some initial work begun by Hasbrouck to flesh out the organization of

AFSWP to define more sharply its relationship within the nuclear weapons complex, and to establish a permanent charter

for the organization. Groves reiterated

AFSWP’s basic responsibility for all military Service functions relating to atomic

energy that were in the directive issued

by Patterson and Forrestal. These included technical training of special personnel

“...in all phases of the military use of

atomic energy,” providing military participation “...in research on development of

atomic weapons of all types,” and “...in

developing and effecting joint radiological safety measures.”92

Groves then expanded on these official responsibilities. He believed that

AFSWP must have “centralized control”

in atomic energy matters. In particular,

Groves proposed that “...research contracts involving military application of

atomic energy concluded by any agency

of the Armed Forces will be concurred in

by” AFSWP. The organization, he said,

would take on the storage and surveillance

of atomic weapons in custody of the
36 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

armed forces, provide recommendations

to assure a uniform policy concerning the

security of atomic energy information,

help prepare training courses for the military academies, assist in the preparation

of staff studies and war plans related to

atomic weapons, and prepare materials to

educate the public on the military uses of

atomic energy, “...particularly in connection with passive defense measures.”

Groves also offered to furnish AFSWP

staff assistance to the MLC. But in reviewing AFSWP’s relationship with the

AEC, Groves carefully followed the

guidelines outlined in the Atomic Energy

Act of 1946 and no more.93

Nearly three months later, Eisenhower and Nimitz sent back their comments

on Groves’ draft organization plan. The

two Service Chiefs were not inclined to

give General Groves all the authority he

sought. Where Groves had argued for

“...centralized control of atomic energy

activities,” the high command limited

AFSWP’s role to “coordination.” Where

Groves had sought AFSWP concurrence

in research contracts for military application of atomic energy, Eisenhower and

Nimitz again restricted its authority to coordination. The revised memorandum

contained a new provision that AFSWP

“...will not enter directly into functions

of operational command,” assuming that

special weapons project personnel would

come under the command of a Task Force

Commander.94

Critical to General Groves’ and AFSWP’s position in the military was its

place in the chain of command. Groves

wanted AFSWP to be considered in the

same relationship as “...between the Director of any General Staff Division and

other agency of the Army” or a “...Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and any other agency of the Navy.” Eisenhower and

Nimitz knocked that relationship down a

peg or so by categorizing AFSWP as a

Technical Service. Other changes in

Groves’ original memorandum also narrowed AFSWP’s range of power within

the Armed Services and in its dealings

with the AEC.95

Groves could swallow most of the

changes, but he found two simply unacceptable. AFSWP should be seen as a

General Staff Division, he complained to

an aide to Nimitz. Since his orders required him to report to the Army Chief of

Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations,

Groves asserted, “I should have direct

personal access to these two officers such

as enjoyed by Directors of General Staff

Divisions in the Army.” The AFSWP

project, Groves confided, was of such

importance as to merit personal attention.

“It would be unfortunate if I had to deal

through intermediaries.” In addition,

Groves took considerable umbrage at the

idea that he lacked a command function.

That was not true, he maintained, since

he commanded the troops at Sandia.

Moreover, requiring that AFSWP personMK V bomb being loaded on B-29 aircraft. nel be placed under Task Force command
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 37

in the future, Groves thought, was “...unwise.” The issue, he concluded, “...should

be settled when the time comes.”96

There was good news and bad news

for Groves. Eisenhower would concede

that Groves should report to the Service

Chiefs. But neither Eisenhower nor Nimitz would budge on the issue of command.

Groves would be limited largely to staff

functions except in special ordnance and

technical training duties at Sandia. When

the AFSWP Charter came up for modification in August, shortly after passage of

the National Security Act of 1947 creating the Department of the Air Force,

Groves found he had acquired a third boss,

the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The

Air Force also assigned its own Deputy

Chief to AFSWP, Brigadier General

R.C. Wilson. Groves knew Wilson, who

had worked with the Manhattan Project

to modify B-29s to carry nuclear weapons and to train the crews.97

For the rest of the year and through

the end of February 1948, AFSWP’s primary mission remained unchanged; that

of training troops to assemble and store

atomic weapons. The training would continue at Sandia and elsewhere, but the

weapon storage function, according to an

early AFSWP evaluation, did “...not

reach the importance which was expected... because no atomic weapons have yet

been turned over to the custody of AFSWP.”98

The custody issue continued to grate

with Groves and the AFSWP command.

In the transition period from military to

civilian control of atomic energy, decisions regarding the ultimate custody of

nuclear weapons were deliberately left

vague. The contending parties had strong

opinions which were diametrically opposed. Chairman Lilienthal of the AEC

harbored no doubts that the civilian agency should have custody. Just as vigorously, Groves and Nichols believed it was

imperative for the military to retain custody. With the AFSWP Charter more

clearly defined, Groves turned his attention to the custody issue and began lobbying once more for nuclear weapons to

be under military control.

General Groves raised the custody

question in a series of meetings between

the AEC and the MLC in the summer and

fall of 1947. His timing, however, was not

propitious. In July, several newspapers

broke a story about the theft of secret documents from Los Alamos by two Army

sergeants in 1946. Groves had persistently raised questions about the inability of

civilians to properly care for nuclear secrets, and rumors circulated in Washington to the effect that Groves was behind

the delayed leak to the papers as an attempt to discredit the Commission. But

officials at the AEC were particularly

amused by Groves’ predicament since the

theft had occurred under his command.

Groves, of course, was not so amused. He

sent one of his aides to question Commission staffers about the story, which served

to annoy Lilienthal when he learned of the

visit. Whatever the truth of the matter, the

flare-up did nothing to promote Groves’

custody campaign with the Commission.99

A second, and more fatal, reason for

Groves’ failure was the fact that his effectiveness as the commander of AFSWP

and as a member of the MLC had ended.

He had overstayed his time. At the end of

June 1947, Lilienthal had gone to the Pentagon to have lunch with General Eisenhower. Their conversation covered many

topics, but the general often returned to

Groves. “I know what a problem he is,”

Lilienthal remembered Eisenhower saying, “he was a czar during the war, and

everything is a comedown for a man of

his type.” Eisenhower admitted that

Groves had made many enemies “...because of the way he rode herd on every-
38 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

one during the war.” There were lots of

ways to get things done, Eisenhower continued, that “...don’t require humiliating

people and making enemies of them.”

After all, he explained to Lilienthal, he had

worked with both Field Marshall Bernard

Montgomery and General George Patton,

two of the most difficult personalities in

the Allied armies.100

Eisenhower revealed that Groves had

lost support from the senior military officers. Initially, the generals thought it

wise to “...use him as long as he has anything to contribute” and “to pump him

dry,” Eisenhower explained. Now, perhaps, the well was dry. “If at any time he

causes you trouble, let me know,” he told

the chairman, “and we will take him off.”

The flap over the lost documents certainly gave Lilienthal the provocation. He

complained to his journal that he had had

enough of Groves’ “...sniping at us,

sneering at us and running us down.” The

Commission, he concluded, had “...taken all the kicking around we intend to

take.”101

By September, Eisenhower told General Lewis H. Brereton, then Chairman of

the MLC, that he had decided to relieve

Groves of his AFSWP command. Brereton delivered the news to Lilienthal, with

the caveat that Groves might stay on as a

member of the MLC. Lilienthal said he

would discuss the matter with the Commission but told Brereton that “...the minimum was the removal of Groves from the

Special Weapons Command.” For several weeks nothing changed.102

TRANSITION

Groves was a wily survivor and the

beneficiary of a divided military. During

a meeting with Secretary of the Army

Kenneth C. Royall a month later, Lilienthal learned that the Secretary had

strongly disagreed with Eisenhower’s recommendation to relieve Groves, whom he

described as “...the best-qualified man in

the Armed Forces for the Special Weapons Project.” Royall, who had worked

with Groves in drafting the May-Johnson

Bill and believed, as did Groves, that the

McMahon Act was a mistake, wanted to

keep Groves at AFSWP but replace him

on the MLC. When asked for his opinion, Lilienthal pulled no punches. He

pointed out that a civilian commission

was responsible for atomic energy matters and that Groves had disagreed with

the law, had no confidence in the men who

administered it, and had “...conducted

himself in a way that carried out his fundamental disagreement and opposition to

the Commission.” Lilienthal told Royall

about a meeting of AFSWP officers at

Sandia at which Groves had “crudely disparaged” the Commission and said “...it

wouldn’t be long until the Commission’s

mess of things would throw the whole

business back in the Army’s hands.”103

That the military was waffling on

Groves thoroughly aroused Lilienthal,

and he fully vented his frustration on Royall. Groves, Lilienthal declared, thought

that the Commission “...was no damned

good.” Groves believed that he, Groves,

had all the answers, and “...he regarded

it as a kind of sacred duty in his various

capacities to prove his point.” Lilienthal

began to lecture the Secretary. The country was either entitled to civilian control

under the McMahon Act with the full cooperation of the rest of the government

or military control under Groves so everyone could cooperate with him. But the

country could not have it both ways.104

When Lilienthal finished, Royall delivered the coup de grace. The three

Chiefs of Staff, Royall said, had reached

a unanimous conclusion that Groves

would continue as head of AFSWP. Only

the new Secretary of Defense, James V.

Forrestal, could alter the decision. Lilienthal was astonished. In his view, “...the
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 39

situation was heading for disaster.”

Groves would have to go. The Commission had done “...everything we knew

how to do to make the situation [with

Groves] workable,” he explained. “But a

time comes when no self-respecting

men... can have any other course open to

them, and still maintain their self respect.”

Nonetheless, as Lilienthal well knew, any

final decision about Groves would be

made by Forrestal.105

Economic and political instability in

Europe and Soviet opposition to an agreement governing the international control

of atomic energy set off alarm bells in

Washington. To address Soviet expansionism in Central Europe, in early November 1947 the Air Force called for 70

combat groups consisting of 7,000 aircraft, including an expanded fleet of

planes capable of delivering atomic weapons, to defend the United States and maintain world peace. The question of whether

or not nuclear weapons would be available to the military in an emergency was

back on the table. A week later, General

Brereton, on behalf of the MLC, asked officials at the AEC to deliver to the Armed

Forces “...all weapons now in stockpile

and completed weapons and parts thereof ...at the earliest practicable date.” For

Lilienthal, the request was a policy issue

to be settled by the President. His staff,

following the lead of Commissioner Sumner Pike, wondered if it was even technically feasible to transfer nuclear weapons

Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower congratulates Leslie Groves on his promotion to

Lieutenant General on January 26, 1948, a few days before Groves’ retirement.
40 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

to the military on the grounds that the

AFSWP lacked technical competence to

handle or maintain them. In no rush to answer the MLC formally, the Commission

asked Brereton for further clarification.106

In mid-December, the MLC reaffirmed its position on transferring custody of nuclear weapons to the military, for

reasons of national security. It was a

“...prerequisite for national security,” the

MLC argued, “...that all possible means

of defense be available to the Armed Forces for instant use.” The current arrangement between the AEC and the military

was too complex and ponderous to permit a rapid response. The Armed Forces,

the MLC asserted, “...must have the authority to place the forces and weapons at

their disposal in strategically sound locations” for immediate use and delivery. The

MLC admitted to some ambivalence

about their request, however. The military

was not sufficiently “...staffed and trained

at the present time,” the report conceded,

to assume immediate custody. That must

come gradually with additional training

“...in the reasonable near future.” The

dilemma was a classic Catch-22 situation:

as long as the AEC held custody of the

weapons, the AFSWP unit at Sandia Base

could not acquire the expertise necessary

to assume custody.107

While the commission pondered

Brereton’s request, Forrestal asked his

staff to examine the entire question of

military organization for atomic energy.

The report, submitted in January 1948 by

Charles F. Brown, called for the abolition

of AFSWP, whose functions, the report

argued, could be absorbed by the three

armed Services. The report also called for

the elimination of the Division of Military Application within the AEC. That

group’s functions would be assigned to a

more powerful MLC, appointed by the

Secretary of Defense, with full authority

to deal with the Commission for the military. Several weeks later, on February 2,

General Groves announced that he was retiring at the end of the month from military Service to enter private business. No

more, Lilienthal told his journal, would

the Commission be troubled by “...having Napoleon sitting on Elba while his

crew waited for the Day.”108

General Groves’ retirement was made

the occasion for the enactment of an unusual bill by the Congress of the United

States. This bill “authorized and requested” the President to appoint him, “without confirmation by the Senate,” to the

permanent grade of Major General in the

Regular Army, effective as of the day prior to the effective date of his retirement;

and, in addition, to place him on the retired list “with the rank and grade of Lieutenant General with honorary date of rank

thereof as of July 16, 1945, which date

commemorates the first explosion by man

of an atomic bomb...” This bill, S.2223,

was passed by the Senate on May 10, 1948

and by the House on June 16, 1948. It was

signed by the President on June 24, 1948

and became Public Law 394A.109

Groves’ retirement had removed but

one voice in the custody debate. On

March 1, 1948, the AEC released a report

that restated the Commission’s long-held

view that the military did not have the

technical expertise to assume custody of

nuclear weapons. The report did, however, propose a joint AEC-AFSWP training

program to prepare the military for surveillance and inspection duties. The Commission still held to its position that only

the President could decide on the question of custody. The MLC, through Brereton, pushed Forrestal to take up the issue

with President Truman. The Secretary

turned to General Carl A. Spaatz for advice. Spaatz favored military custody but,

in addition, wanted to place all responsibilities of AFSWP under Air Force control. The two men decided to delay any
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 41

showdown with the President on the custody issue.110

After nearly two years of debate, the

government officials, civilian and military, still could not agree on a unified nuclear policy. Indeed, both Groves and

Nichols were painfully aware of the military’s obligation in regard to nuclear

weapons despite perceived civilian control; as Nichols would eloquently state:

“The responsibility of the military is to

see that if we must fight an atomic war,

we win it. That still remains our responsibility...”111 Consequently, AFSWP’s

centralized role in nuclear testing would

go on, at Camp Desert Rock.
42 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

ENDNOTES

1. J. Robert Oppenheimer, The Atomic

Bomb and College Education, quoted in

Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 16th Edition (Boston: 1992), p. 714.

2. Brodie, quoted in Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950,

(Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 423.

3. Gil Dorland Oral History, p. 142.

4. Ibid., pp. 142-43.

5. William Lawren, The General and the

Bomb, (New York: 1988), pp. 43, 61.

6. Ibid., p. 259.

7. Lawren, The General and the Bomb, pp.

259-60; Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be

Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project,

(Harper & Row, New York, 1962), p. 413.

8. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 389-90,

415.

9. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 411-15, 624; Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, pp. 389-90. Groves

had integrated the scientists from the nuclear energy component of the Office of

Scientific Research and Development

into the Manhattan Project in mid-1943,

though not without some friction. But in

1945, the transfer of an entire industrial

complex for producing atomic weapons

proved to be more difficult once the urgency of war and victory had dissipated.

See Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The

Army and the Atomic Bomb, (Washington, 1985), pp. 91-92.

10. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 390,

373, 376-77.

11. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World

1939/1946, p. 625. See also, Vincent C.

Jones, United States Army in World War

II, Special Studies, Manhattan: The Army

and the Atomic Bomb, (Washington,

D.C., 1985), pp. 583-85. On concerns

about postwar careers, see Col. Gilbert

M. Dorland Oral History, “Engineer

Memoirs,” April 1-3, 1987, Corps of

Engineers Archives, p. 152.

12. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 377,

379; Hewlett and Anderson, The New

World, 1939/1946, p. 624; Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb,

pp. 580-85; David Alan Rosenberg, “U.S.

Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38, no. 5

(May 1982): 27; Gilbert M. Dorland Oral

History, “Engineer Memoirs,” April 1-3,

1987, p. 141, Corps of Engineers Archives. There are varying estimates on the

numbers employed by the Manhattan

Project. The number of 90,000 is taken

from Jones, Manhattan: The Army and

the Atomic Bomb, pp. 584-85. The Army

Air Corps also reduced its nuclear capability, cutting back the number of “Silverplated” B-29s (planes specially

modified to carry an atomic bomb) from

46 during the war to 23 at the end of 1946.

See Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile,

1945 to 1950,” p. 28.

13. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 377;

Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, p. 625; Jones, Manhattan:

The Army and the Atomic Bomb, p. 581;

Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen,

Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall,

Critical Assembly: A Technical History

of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer

Years, 1943-1945, (New York, 1993), pp.

399-400.

14. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 377.

15. Ibid., p. 377.

16. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 377;

Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, p. 625; Jones, Manhattan:

The Army and the Atomic Bomb, p. 581;

Hoddeson, et al., Critical Assembly, pp.

399-400; Necah Furman, Sandia National Laboratories: The Postwar Decade,

(Albuquerque, 1990), pp. 123-26.

17. Ibid., p. 377.

18. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 373-74.

19. Ibid., pp. 374-75.

20. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the

Atomic Bomb, pp. 583-85; Groves, Now

It Can Be Told, pp.374-75. Eisenhower

became Army Chief of Staff in November 1945. See Historical Office, Office of

the Secretary of Defense, Department of

Defense, Key Officials, 1947-1995,

(Washington, D.C., 1995), p. 60.

21. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the

Atomic Bomb, pp. 541, 584; Groves, Now
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 43

It Can Be Told, p. 374; Patterson quoted

in Ibid., p. 376.

22. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the

Atomic Bomb, pp. 584-85. Jones also noted that the number of commissioned officers in the Manhattan Project dropped

from more than 700 in September 1945

to a low of 250 in December 1946, just

prior to transferring all the Manhattan

Engineer District facilities to the Atomic

Energy Commission. Ibid., p. 584.

23. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the

Atomic Bomb, p.593; Kenneth D.

Nichols, The Road to Trinity, (New York,

1987), p. 228.

24. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, 25-26, 29.

As a fresh Second Lieutenant, Nichols

had traveled to Nicaragua to survey a

route for a proposed second inter-ocean

canal where he encountered First Lieutenant Leslie R. Groves.

25. For Groves’ background, see Groves,

Now It Can Be Told, p. 465.

26. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the

Atomic Bomb, pp. 593-94.

27. Furman, Sandia National Laboratories,

p. 132; Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950,” p. 29.

28. Furman, Sandia National Laboratories,

p. 132.

29. Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile,

1945 to 1950,” pp. 26-27.

30. Ibid., p. 27; Truman quoted in Ibid., p.

27. Richard Rhodes in Dark Sun writes

that there were but three cores in the

stockpile and that CROSSROADS used

two of them. Rhodes, Dark Sun (New

York, 1995), p. 261. Stalin also realized

that there were few weapons in the American stockpile based on information he

received from Fuchs and perhaps other

spies. See David Holloway, Stalin and the

Bomb, (New Haven, 1994), p. 153.

31. Dorland, Oral History, April 1-3, 1987,

Corps of Engineers Archives, pp. 153,

150.

32. Colonel K. D. Nichols, “Responsibilities

of the Military Under the McMahon Bill:

Atomic Weapons and Atomic Power,”

September 25, 1946, Record Group 374,

Entry 19, Box 18, National Archives and

Records Administration (NARA).

33. James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations:

The United States, 1945-1974, (New

York, 1996), pp. 115-17.

34. Ibid.

35. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the

Atomic Bomb, p. 596; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/1939-1946, pp. 482-

530.

36. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 502-3; Groves quoted in

Ibid., 502. Hewlett and Anderson credit

Eisenhower for being flexible on the role

of the military as long as there was “reasonable liaison between the commission

and the military Services.” Ibid., p. 511.

37. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 511-12, 525. Quote on

control of the stockpile from Ibid., p. 512.

38. Nichols, “Responsibilities of the Military

Under the McMahon Bill,” pp. 98-101,

103.

39. Ibid., pp. 99-102, 104.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., pp. 116-17.

42. Ibid., pp. 118, 117. At the same conference the next day, Nichols stated that “for

a few billion you can build a few thousand [bombs] in a few years.” See Hasbrouck, Military Implications of the

Atomic Bomb, September 26, 1946, Ft.

Belvoir, Virginia, 123, in RG 374, Entry 19, Box 18, “Notes on Atomic Energy,” NARA II.

43. Nichols, “Responsibilities of the Military

Under the McMahon Bill,” p. 119.

44. S. V. Hasbrouck, Military Implications of

the Atomic Bomb, pp. 123-24.

45. Ibid., pp. 124-25, 128.

46. Ibid., pp. 127-29.

47. Ibid., p. 126.

48. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 531-54; Rhodes, Dark

Sun, pp. 231-33.

49. Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 239-40.

50. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 590-97; Patterson, Grand

Expectations, p. 117.

51. Patterson, Grand Expectations, p. 117.

52. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/
44 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

1939-1946, pp. 598-619; Patterson,

Grand Expectations, p. 117; Rhodes,

Dark Sun, pp. 241-42.

53. Dorland, Oral History, 143-45; Register

of Graduates and Former Cadets, 1802-

1990, (West Point, NY, 1990), 436-37;

Dorland to William C. Baldwin, March

12, 1987, attachment, “Military Service.”

54. Ibid.

55. Dorland, Oral History, p. 144; Headquarters, 8460th Special Weapons Group,

Sandia Base, “Early History of the Special Weapons Organization,” September

1949, 1-3, in “First History of AFSWP,

1947-1954, Vol. 1, 1946-1948,” Department of Energy, Coordination and Information Center, Accession Number

NV0068990 (hereafter “First History of

AFSWP,” Vol. 1). See also, Gilbert M.

Dorland to Lt. Gen. E. R. Heiberg III,

May 3, 1985, in “History of an Engineer

Special Weapons Battalion, 19 Aug. 1946

- 31 Dec. 1948,” Research Program, U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers.

56. William Taylor, ed., Sandia Pioneer Reminiscences, October 5, 1996, pp. 2, 4;

“First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1", pp.

3-4.

57. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, pp. 6-

7.

58. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” pp.

7-8. For a history of the Army arsenal

system, see Merritt Roe Smith, Military

Enterprise and Technological Change,

(Cambridge, MA, 1985).

59. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” pp.

7-8, 13.

60. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” pp.

8-9.

61. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” pp.

8-9; Sandia Pioneer Reminiscences, p. 3.

62. Sandia Pioneer Reminiscences, 3; “First

History of AFSWP, Vol. 1,” pp. 8-11;

author’s conversation with Ernest

Graves, Sandia Pioneers’ Conference,

October 5, 1996.

63. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, pp.

11-13.

64. Ibid., pp. 11-13, 15.

65. Dorland, Oral History, pp. 143-44.

66. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 641-42; David E. Lilienthal, (The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: The Atomic Energy Years,

1945-1950, New York, 1964), pp. 105-

106, (hereinafter cited as Lilienthal Journals).

67. Lilienthal Journals, p. 106, emphasis in

original; Hewlett and Anderson, The New

World/1939-1946, p. 642.

68. Lilienthal Journals, p. 107.

69. New York Times, January 1, 1947, p. 28

70. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, p. 638; Groves, Now It Can

Be Told, p. 395.

71. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 244;

Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 643-44.

72. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, p. 644; Nichols, The Road to

Trinity, p. 245.

73. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, pp. 651-52; “First History of

AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chapter 4, 4.2.23.

74. Hewlett and Anderson, The New World/

1939-1946, p. 655; Richard G. Hewlett

and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield/1947-

1952 (University Park, PA, 1969), p. 33;

Nichols, The Road to Trinity, pp. 246-50.

Nichols’ rejection was short-lived. He assisted the transition to the AEC for another month, then continued to consult on

atomic energy matters at the United Nations, in Congress, and with the intelligence community. In May 1947, Nichols

reported to West Point where he had accepted an appointment in the department

of mechanics.

75. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, p. 136; “History of the Military Liaison Committee,” MLC 085-46, p.

1.

76. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, p. 136.

77. “First History of AFSWP, 1947-1954,”

Vol. 1, 1947-1948, Chapter 5, Sandia

Base,” 8-9, declassified version, DSWA

Library; Nichols, The Road to Trinity,

p. 247.

78. Forrestal to Patterson, January 29, 1947,

RG 77, Entry 5, Box 58, Folder 322, “Or-
THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948 45

ganization-AFSWP.”

79. Patterson and Forrestal to Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army, and Chief of Naval Operations, January 29, 1947, General Counsel’s Office, Forrestal to Patterson,

January 29, 1947, RG 77, Entry 5, Box

58, Folder 322, “Organization-AFSWP”;

“First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” Chapter 5, pp. 8-9.

80. Patterson and Forrestal to Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army, and Chief of Naval Operations, January 29, 1947, RG 77, Entry 5,

Box 58, Folder 322, “Organization-AFSWP; “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,”

Chapter 4, Headquarters, 4.2.1. See also,

Hasbrouck to Major M. N. Kadick, February 10, 1947, RG 77, Entry 5, Box 58,

Folder 322, “Organization—AFSWP.”

81. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” p. 10;

John A. Ord, “Evolution of the Technical Training Group, Sandia Base,” n.d.

(c. 1996), p. 1.

82. Ibid.

83. Ord, “Evolution of the Technical Training Group, Sandia Base,” pp. 1-2.

84. Ibid., p. 2.

85. Ibid., p. 2. Ord adopted another Signal

Corps idea to the classified world of Sandia Base. Rather than putting charts on

poster board as was common Army practice, Ord wrote the information on white

window shades which could then be

rolled up and placed in a locked steel cabinet designed to hold classified materials.

86. Ord, “Evolution of the Technical Training Group, Sandia Base,” p. 2.

87. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” pp.

11, 13.

88. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

89. Ibid., pp. 14-16.

90. Ibid., Chapter 4, Headquarters, 4.1.2,

4.2.1; Groves to the Chief of Staff, April

4, 1947, RG 77, Entry 5, Box 58, Folder

322, “Organization-AFSWP”; Hewlett

and Duncan, Atomic Shield/1947-1952,

pp. 131-32.

91. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, pp. 131-32.

92. Groves to the Chief of Staff, April 4,

1947, RG 77, Entry 5, Box 58, Folder

322, “Organization-AFSWP.”

93. Ibid.

94. Draft memorandum, Eisenhower and

Nimitz to Groves, June 24, 1947, RG 77,

Entry 5, Box 58, Folder 322, “Organization-AFSWP,” passim, and “Memorandum for the Chief, Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project,” July 8, 1947, copy in

General Counsel’s Office, Defense Special Weapons Agency. This letter is the

official document sent to Groves by

Eisenhower and Nimitz.

95. Ibid.

96. Groves to Admiral DeWitt C. Ramsey,

July 10, 1947, RG 77, Entry 5, Box, 58,

Folder 322, “Organization-AFSWP.”

97. Eisenhower, Memorandum No. 850-25-

8, October 29, 1947, RG 77, Entry 5, Box

36, Folder “032.1 Legislation.” See also,

Forrestal to Eisenhower, Nimitz, and

Spaatz, October 21, 1947, RG 77, Entry 5, Box 38, Folder “040 (OSD) Armed

Forces Special Weapons Project”; “First

History of AFSWP, Vol. 1,” Chapter 4,

Headquarters, 4.3.2; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield / 1947-1952, pp. 131-

32. Spaatz was the first Chief of Staff of

the Air Force, though Lieutenant General L. H. Brereton served as the Air Force

representative and Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee.

98. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chapter 4, Headquarters, 4.2.4-5.

99. Lilienthal Journals, pp. 221-24.

100. Ibid., pp. 217-18.

101. Ibid., pp. 218, 227-28.

102. Ibid., p. 236.

103. Ibid., pp. 249-50.

104. Ibid., pp. 250-51.

105. Ibid., pp. 251-52.

106. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, pp. 149-50; Rearden, The

Formative Years, p. 426.

107. Brereton quoted in Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 427; “First History of

AFSWP, Vol. 1,” Chapter 4, Headquarters, 4.2.24.

108. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, pp. 151-52; Rearden, The

Formative Years, p. 112; Lilienthal Journals, p. 287.
46 THE POST-WAR TRANSITION, 1946 TO 1948

109. Congressional Record, June 16, 1948, pp.

8634, 8635, (Ref. 33).

110. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 427-

28.

111. Colonel K.D. Nichols, Address, “Responsibilities of the Military Under the

McMahon Bill,” Fort Belvoir, VA, September 25, 1946.
Asingle demand of you, Comrades. Provide us with atomic weapons

in the shortest possible time... provide the bomb–it will remove a

great danger from us.”

Josef Vissarionvitch Dshugashvili (Josef Stalin)

to the Peoples Commissar of Munitions,

August 1945

1948-1949: YEAR OF DECISION

The signals from Europe turned most

ominous in the winter of 1948. In late February, while Congress in Washington debated the merits of the economic recovery

offered by the Marshall Plan, the Communists, backed by the Red Army, took

over the government of Czechoslovakia,

thereby consolidating Soviet power in

Central Europe. Truman compared the

situation to the pre-war Central European crisis in 1938-39 after the Munich conference. For Truman, the Soviet takeover

was history repeating itself. “Things look

black,” he wrote his daughter, Margaret.

“A decision will have to be made. I am

going to make it,” he said. But the United

States did nothing to change what had

happened.1

A month later the Russians put the

squeeze on Berlin. The city, controlled by

all the victorious Allied powers – the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,

and France – was, in essence, an isolated

island in the Soviet sector of divided Germany. The pressure, at first, was light but

noticeable. Soviet representatives walked

out of conferences, authorities stopped

highway traffic on the pretense that the

autobahns needed repairs, and soldiers

held up rail traffic between Berlin and the

western sectors of the country.2

At the end of March the Soviet military decreed that no rail traffic could leave

Berlin without permission. General Lucius D. Clay, the commander of U.S. Forces in Europe and military governor of the

American zone in occupied Germany,

decided to test the Soviets by sending a test

train with a few armed guards across the

border into the Russian zone. He told his

superiors in Washington that to permit

Soviet control over military freight

“...would be inconsistent with the free and

unrestricted right of access in Berlin.” Officials at the Pentagon agreed, and Clay

sent a stern warning message to the Russians that their actions violated specific

agreements among the Allies. Then he sent

the test train west from Berlin. The Soviets dismissed Clay’s protests; the train

fared no better. The Russians shunted the

“

CHAPTER TWO

THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952
48 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

train to a siding after it had traveled into

the Soviet zone. There the cars sat for a

few days before withdrawing “rather ignominiously,” according to Clay. “It was

clear,” the general wrote in his memoirs,

that “the Russians meant business.”3

Clay also meant business. He rejected the possibility of an American withdrawal from Berlin, which he believed

was psychologically the most important

city in Europe for the West. “Evacuation,”

he told a group of reporters as he drew a

symbolic line in the dirt with his shoe, “is

unthinkable.” As spring turned to summer,

tensions grew. Then, on the morning of

June 24, 1948, the Soviets closed all traffic from the western sectors into Berlin.

Electricity from the Soviet zone was cut

off. The blockade had begun.4

The Berlin crisis was the first ominous

confrontation in the Cold War. Soviet

Premier Josef Stalin hoped to block the

establishment of a separate West German

state and eliminate the Allied outpost in

West Berlin. Khrushchev later recalled

that Stalin’s purpose in blockading Berlin was “...to exert pressure on the West

to create a unified Berlin in a [German

Democratic Republic] with closed borders.” At the time, Truman saw through

Stalin’s ploy, concluding that the blockade was “...a major political and propaganda move... to force us out of Berlin.”

Knowing the Soviet’s motivation, however, did not translate into how to respond

to this Cold War skirmish.5

The underlying question, of course,

was how much would each side shove and

push before resorting to more than a clash

of words. In retrospect, neither the Russians nor the Americans wanted war. Stalin, according to Andrei Gromyko, then

Deputy Foreign Minister, believed that the

Americans would not resort to nuclear

war over Berlin. The Truman administration, in Stalin’s opinion, was not run by

“frivolous people” who would start a war.

Moreover, the Soviets controlled the

blockade; if the West threatened hostilities, the blockade could be loosened and

war averted.6

American policy makers did not believe the Soviets would go to war over

Berlin either. Even as Soviet pressure increased in the spring and summer of 1948,

General Clay, not one to underestimate the

Russian threat, did not anticipate any

shooting. He recognized that the situation

was a political, not a military, operation.

Moreover, Clay believed that the American monopoly of the atomic bomb and the

threat of its use prevented a Russian invasion of the West. American intelligence

also regarded a shooting war as unlikely.

Although the Russians had a large army

stationed in Germany, there were few

means to keep it supplied should war

erupt. The Russians had pulled up all the

rail lines in East Germany except one and

sent the rails and ties back to the Soviet

Union as reparations for the damage the

Nazis caused during the war. The remaining single track line running east from

Berlin, which changed from a standard to

a wider gauge in Poland, was entirely inadequate to supply fighting troops with

supplies and material.7

The United States responded in two

ways. The first response to the blockade

came at the local level. Clay was determined to stay in Berlin, and his superiors

in Washington fully supported that view.

The morning the Russians closed the land

corridors to the city, Clay called Air Force

Lieutenant General Curtis E. LeMay, asking him to free up his cargo planes to assist Berlin through the air. The first C-47

transports arrived on the morning of June

25. The next day an organized airlift was

under way, hauling thousands of tons of

food and coal to the two airports under

allied control; Templehof in the American sector and Gatow in the British. “Operation Vittles” had begun. Air Force
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 49

pilots soon were passing out calling cards

labeled “LeMay Coal & Food Co.,” which

guaranteed “round-the-clock service via

the airlift.” Later in the summer, Clay

convinced the Air Force to provide 160

C-54s, a plane that carried ten tons of cargo as compared with the two-and-a-half

ton capacity of the C-47s. Around the

clock, flying by instruments in all weather, American and British pilots landed in

West Berlin in the summer and fall of

1948 and into 1949. The steady drone of

airplanes became part of the daily life for

the beleaguered but indomitable Berliners. In mid-May 1949, after the Allies had

flown more than 1,402,644 tons of food,

coal, and other essential supplies into

Berlin, the Soviets lifted the blockade.8

AFSWP PREPARES

Since 1946, the 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special), renamed the 38th Engineer Battalion (Special) in April 1947, had

expanded its training operations at Sandia Base in a measured pace. Cutbacks in

military funding, the transfer of nuclear

control to a civilian agency, and the possibility of internationalizing atomic energy had drained any sense of urgency from

AFSWP’s activities at Sandia. Over its

first year, the Special Weapons Group had

acquired basic assembly skills but was

hardly combat ready. With a stockpile of

parts for fewer than 50 Mark III Nagasaki-type implosion bombs, classroom

training and the development of standard

operating procedures took precedence

over operational exercises. Not until the

fall of 1947 did AFSWP conduct its first

joint field exercise, Operation AJAX, with

B-29s from the 509th Bombardment

Group of the Eighth Air Force and the

First Air Transit Unit.9 Operation AJAX

was to practice and test the personnel and

equipment in the rear/forward method of

assembly, using a portable building at the

forward assembly point at Wendover. An

additional objective was to check the condition of the stockpile of bomb units.10

As the first joint operation, AJAX

faced a number of coordination problems;

some due to cuts in military funding

which limited the equipment available for

the exercise. Operational plans called for

a two-stage assembly procedure, the initial assembly carried out on Sandia Base,

from which the 509th would ferry the

bomb and its components to a forward

assembly base at Wendover Field, Utah,

an air base some 100 miles west of Salt

Lake City on the Nevada border. AFSWP

personnel provided an orientation course

for bomber crews on the handling and

assembly of the weapons during the fall

of 1947. Colonel Dorland, who commanded the 38th and was in charge of the

operation, realized that more than bomb

assembly teams were necessary, and he

organized the first Special Weapons Unit

consisting of a team of 109 technical, security, overhead and support personnel to

handle the activities at the forward base.

As preliminary planning shaped the operation, its major objectives became better defined.

The most ticklish problem faced by

the joint group was determining the best

place to assemble weapons at a forward

base. Hangers and tents were leading candidates, but Dorland and his assembly

teams determined that the only sure method of having a suitable facility available

was to create a transportable unit. The

group procured a 20' x 100' portable building of aluminum sheets over wood forms,

equipped it with power plants, distribution lines, and all utilities, and loaded it

on a transport plane headed for Wendover.11

On November 15, the B-29s began

loading their cargo at Kirtland Air Force

Base, New Mexico, then left for Wendover. For the next 10 days, Operation

AJAX unfolded. At the forward assembly
50 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

area at Wendover, the 38th inaugurated

radiological safety procedures to prepare

for an unexpected atomic explosion. A

radiation safety team developed a disaster

plan to keep damage to a minimum and

allow the task force to continue its mission

as far as possible. The maneuvers consisted of the complete assembly and “theoretical bombardment missions” of three

strikes of two Mark III bombs. One of the

six high-explosive bombs was used in a

live drop at the Naval Ordnance Testing

Station at Inyokern, California. Significantly, the AJAX operation did not involve

fissile material. Nonetheless, the weapon

was so bulky and heavy, Dorland later remembered, that “the plane jumped a hundred feet” as the bomb was released. More

important to Dorland, his men had accomplished their mission of assembling and

dropping an atomic bomb right on schedule. They took great pride in being able to

take what they still viewed as a scientific

device and turn it into a military weapon.12

Regardless of its successes, Operation

AJAX was more important for its failures.

Dorland and the 38th learned that communications between the forward and rear

bases were inadequate, that the power

supply of the portable assembly building

was largely unreliable, and, perhaps most

important, that “...under the existing law,

with the AEC charged with procurement

and custody of all atomic weapons, there

was no adequate logistic support for the

weapon.” That experience, according to

one officer, “...gave strong support to the

contentions of the AFSWP and, indeed,

the whole of the Armed Services, with

respect to atomic bombs.” As a consequence, General Robert F. Montague, the

AFSWP commander at Sandia, recommended to Groves that the military be given a larger role in the surveillance of the

stockpile. That was beyond Groves’ ability to make happen.

Within a couple of months after the

conclusion of AJAX, most of the 38th

Battalion would be headed to a sundrenched atoll in the Pacific named

Enewetak, where they would have their

opportunity to practice with nuclear cores

by participating in Operation SANDSTONE.13 For more than a year AFSWP

had been planning for Operation SANDSTONE, a critical test of the first new

weapon design since Trinity, but the troubles in Central Europe and in Berlin in the

spring of 1948 gave the operation a sense

of immediacy. In accordance with his

objective to place the Army at the core of

the country’s nuclear program, Groves

directed Dorland to provide for the maximum possible participation by the personnel of the 38th Engineer Battalion

(Special) in this operation.

Following Groves’ orders, Dorland

filled every possible job with contingents

of the 38th. Some men were to assemble

the bombs, some were designated to take

measurements of detonation phenomena

and conduct and analyze effects tests, others were to participate in radiological safety drills, and a fourth group was assigned

to security details with the main purpose

of providing them with the opportunity to

see the detonation and results. In December 1947, the first contingent went to

Enewetak; others followed in the ensuing

months. The 38th became part of the technical task group of Joint Task Force 7, and

practically every officer and technical enlisted man in the unit traveled to the Pacific for at least one of the tests. When

Nichols took command of AFSWP in

March, only one skeleton bomb assembly group remained at Sandia.14

NICHOLS TAKES COMMAND

Major General Kenneth D. Nichols

took command of a unit that seemingly

stood at the very center of American military policy but one that was, nonetheless,

emasculated by the politics, both civilian
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 51

and military, that swirled about it. Nichols’

frustration, even fury, with the AEC’s attitude on maintaining custody of atomic

weapons was clear in regard to AFSWP’s

preparation and training. He heartily endorsed the conclusions about custody that

his men carried from AJAX. The AEC had

presented Nichols with a classic Catch22 situation: AFSWP could not achieve

the level of technological familiarity necessary to be fully competent in nuclear

weapons assembly without more nuclear

experience, the very thing civilian authorities prohibited, in Nichols’ mind, by retaining custody of the bomb. Full

involvement of AFSWP at SANDSTONE

would help break that dilemma.

Even as Nichols pushed for greater

nuclear responsibilities for AFSWP,

events in Berlin conspired to limit its participation. Nichols’ alarm at Soviet actions

in Berlin in March contributed to the dilemma. Nichols had asserted, at a special

meeting of the MLC, that the situation in

Berlin might well lead to war. He wanted

to move the nuclear stockpile to new storage sites where they would be less vulnerable to sabotage or potential enemy air

attack. He also suggested recalling civilians who had assembled atomic weapons

during the war. Cueing on Nichols’ remarks, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, an AEC

commissioner, warned Forrestal about the

large number of weapons assembly teams

already at Enewetak for the SANDSTONE tests. Strauss feared that a sneak

attack on Task Force 7 at Enewetak might

cripple or destroy the nation’s ability to

assemble nuclear weapons. The two men

also discussed the possibility of postponing SANDSTONE altogether to preserve

the stockpile and bringing back the assembly teams should they be needed for an

emergency in Europe. SANDSTONE was

not postponed, but the discussion did reflect the inadequacies of American nuclear preparedness.15

Military politics and interservice rivalries also served to constrain AFSWP’s

role. At the very time that the military

sought control over the custody of nuclear weapons, the Air Force sought to be the

dominant Service in handling atomic

weapons, much to the concern of the

Navy. In the spring of 1948, the Air Force

pressed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to designate it as the exclusive agent of AFSWP

“for operational command.” The dispute

clouded the future of AFSWP, particularly as possible reorganization of the special weapons project was then under

review. Forrestal was inclined to favor the

Air Force position, limiting the Navy to

strategic bombing under the direction of

the Air Force and to sorties on purely

Naval targets. The Air Force, however, rejected even a secondary role for the Navy.

Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington

demanded that all Naval air operations involving nuclear weapons should be under

Air Force control.16

Forrestal deflected the Air Force’s

grab for power. When the Secretary of

Major General Kenneth D. Nichols, Chief

AFSWP, 1948-1951.
52 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

Defense received a report on the reorganization of the department’s nuclear organization, he adopted some of its

recommendations in an effort to settle the

military’s internal disputes. Rather than

tuck AFSWP under an Air Force wing,

Forrestal, at the insistence of the Navy, decided to retain AFSWP, which the Navy

viewed as a positive force toward promoting interservice collaboration. In addition,

he hoped the appointment of Donald F.

Carpenter, Vice President of the Remington Arms Company, as chairman of the

MLC might soothe the troubled waters

separating the military and the AEC.

Nichols, too, hoped to avoid the internal

controversies and saw SANDSTONE as

a reprieve from the debate and an opportunity for AFSWP to field assemble actual atomic weapons.17

Nonetheless, the dispute continued

over the summer. A decision regarding the

organization and responsibilities of AFSWP was intertwined with more general

policy on the use of nuclear weapons.

Forrestal called a meeting of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff at the Naval War College

in Newport, Rhode Island, in August

1948. Following this meeting, Nichols

reported to the Air Force Chief of Staff in

carrying out emergency war plans but, in

exchange, each Service, including the

Navy, would have access to atomic weapons. The compromise worked, at least to

a point. Nichols made certain that AFSWP

would work with both the Air Force and

the Navy in developing a nuclear response

capability, though he noted that Truman’s

strict budget limitations made it impossible to provide “...for the desires of both

the Air Force and the Navy.”18

Fears over events in Berlin and the exposure of the paucity of weapons assembly teams did give new urgency to another

crucial facet of AFSWP, the transfer of

nuclear weapons to the military in an

emergency. While Groves, Nichols, and

other military leaders had argued in vain

for permanent custody of nuclear weapons, the generals, the AEC commissioners, and the President all agreed that the

military needed to get the weapons quickly and efficiently in a national emergency. In early April, Carroll L. Wilson, the

AEC General Manager, and General

James McCormack, head of the Division

of Military Application, met with the

AFSWP commander at Sandia, to develop plans for the delivery of atomic weapons to the military in the event of an

emergency. Within a week, the three men

had coordinated transfer details to the

degree that Wilson said there would be

“...absolutely no delay.”19

THE NUCLEAR CARD

The Berlin Airlift was the most direct

Allied response to the Soviet blockade.

Even so, it was limited in its goal to keep

a western presence in Berlin. The Truman

administration readily accepted Clay’s

domino theory regarding the Russian

squeeze on Berlin. Czechoslovakia had

been “...lost,” Clay believed, and other

European nations were menaced by Soviet actions. “When Berlin falls,” he told

Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall in April 1948, “Western Germany will

be next... We must not budge. If we withdraw, our position in Europe is threatened.

If America does not understand this now,

does not know that the issue is cast, then

it never will and communism will run

rampant.” The airlift saved the moment,

but its success could not have been anticipated in the dark spring of 1948. The airlift was but a temporary bandage remedy

to maintain a symbolic presence in Berlin. It did not address the larger strategic

issue facing the Allies with the Soviet

Union, in the form of the Red Army, overrunning the badly outnumbered Allied

forces in Western Europe. That policy

aspect was left to the United States’ seem-
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 53

ingly invincible ultimate weapon, the

atomic bomb.20

In the spring of 1948, even as the Russians began to apply the first pressure on

Berlin, the Truman administration struggled to find an acceptable and realistic role

for atomic weapons in formulating foreign

policy against the background of shrinking military expenditures and growing

antagonisms with the Russians in Europe.

The United States and its allies clearly

recognized the numerical superiority of

the Red Army and the limited options

available should war break out over Berlin and the Red Army move west. In a

meeting with Truman and Secretary of

State George C. Marshall, Forrestal emphasized the Allies’ weakness should the

Russians resort to military aggression.

The country’s total reserves amounted to

just more than two divisions, only one of

which could be deployed in Europe with

any speed, he explained. At the end of the

discussion, Truman said he sought diplomatic solutions “...in order to come to

some kind of an accommodation to avoid

war.”21

Part of Truman’s diplomatic response

was the atomic bomb. Not that Truman

had plans to use the weapon in Europe;

he did not. In fact, plans for military use

of atomic weapons were ill-formed at

best. Although AFSWP, through Groves,

Nichols, and their staffs, had suggested as

early as 1946 how nuclear weapons might

be employed in a war scenario, American

planners were focusing on diplomatic,

rather than military, applications in the

spring and summer of 1948. The Berlin

crisis served to prod policy makers to review the long-standing issue of civilian

versus military custody and control of

nuclear weapons. With so few nuclear

weapons and nuclear weapon assembly

teams available, the only diplomatic card

that Americans could play was the threat

of their country’s nuclear monopoly.

Since Soviet leaders also knew these limitations, as historian David Holloway noted in Stalin and the Bomb, the nuclear

card made little difference. But the Berlin blockade took on the characteristics of

a major international crisis and therefore

required a very public response. As the

airlift was the practical response, so wagging a nuclear finger became the diplomatic response. It was a pretense. In

reality, the United States was offering up

a strategy of nuclear deception.22

In a period of demobilization, the

atomic bomb was the ideal weapon, the

solution to a shortchanged military planner’s most pressing problem: how to

achieve military superiority at the least

cost. Nuclear bombs, as Nichols had explained in 1946, required fewer planes,

fewer servicemen, and fewer weapons to

achieve comparable levels of destruction.

The Air Force promoted this view because

of the importance it placed on a large air

arm and, not incidentally, the lack of importance it gave to a Navy role. Most military and civilian authorities accepted that

position, especially after rejecting the

more costly non-nuclear alternative of

universal military training in late winter

of 1948. Public support remained high for

Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, air power, and the atomic bomb.23

The Berlin Airlift was an economic

and political response to the Soviet blockade. The Allies also responded with another military airlift. Nuclear weapons

carried no threat without the ability to

deliver them. To give the atomic deterrent

some public muscle, in mid-July the United States, with great fanfare, announced

that 60 “atomic-capable” B-29 Superfortresses, part of the newly-formed Strategic Air Command (SAC), were being

transferred to bases in Great Britain, within striking distance of the Soviet Union.

Press reports noted that the planes carried

no bombs on their trip across the Atlantic
54 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

but that their machine guns were manned

and loaded. Bomber crews, often accompanied by AFSWP personnel, would be

on full alert throughout the Berlin blockade. After the blockade began, bomber

units went on alert, adding that when relations over Berlin became further

strained the bombers would head toward

Europe. The Soviets, the Americans knew,

could not fail to notice these heavy-handed public hints of nuclear deterrence.24As

elements of the SAC prepared to fly to

Britain, AFSWP officers in Albuquerque

accelerated training of nuclear assembly

teams to meet anticipated needs.

While the B-29 was indeed atomic-capable, the B-29s in England were not. In

the summer of 1948, the atomic stockpile

consisted of the same model of bombs

dropped in World War II. Only the Silverplate B-29s of the 509th Bombardment

Group, those that had been specifically

reconfigured to accommodate the bulky

weapons, were truly atomic-capable.

Further, while the 509th was placed on a

24-hour alert, the group remained in the

United States. The technological advances achieved in the SANDSTONE tests at

Enewetak in the spring of 1948, which

proved the feasibility of mass producing

a smaller, more powerful bomb using less

nuclear material, would eliminate the

need for specially altered bombers, but

those changes lay in the future. By the

summer of 1948, American military commanders seriously considered establishing policy for the use of atomic weapons

in the event of war, but the Truman Administration refused to make any substantive moves since diplomacy was still an

option. In any case, Truman insisted that

only he would decide to use the bomb.

The President told Forrestal that he did

not want “...some dashing lieutenant

colonel [to] decide when would be the

proper time to drop one.”25

At the center of Truman’s decision

was the continuing dispute over who

should control the atom. The rivalry between civilian and military control was as

old as the atomic age, first pitting scientists against Groves and the Army, then

Strategic Air Command B-29 Silverplate Superfortress.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 55

the AEC against the military. The controversy of custody and control was further

exacerbated by a feud between the three

branches of the Armed Services, something that the creation in the fall of 1947

of the National Military Establishment

and a purportedly unified Department of

Defense had failed to reconcile.

The crisis in Berlin served to sharpen

the military’s insistence on having custody of atomic weapons. Groves’ replacement at AFSWP, General Nichols, was as

adamant about the necessity for military

custody as Groves had been, perhaps even

more so. General Omar Bradley, Chief of

Staff of the Army, asked Nichols to take

over AFSWP the first week of March

1948, pending official orders and a promotion to the position. Nichols moved

into AFSWP’s Pentagon offices just as

tensions over Czechoslovakia and Berlin

increased. On March 5, Secretary of the

Army Royall invited Nichols, Forrestal,

John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy,

Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air

Force, Donald F. Carpenter, the new

Chairman of the MLC, and AEC Chairman Lilienthal to dinner at his Pentagon

office overlooking the Potomac. Royall

hoped to promote better cooperation between the Armed Services and the AEC

over nuclear weapons. The strategic application of atomic weapons became particularly urgent, given Soviet actions in

Central Europe and a telegram that arrived

that day from General Clay in Berlin. That

evening General Clay’s analysis from

Berlin that Soviet attitudes toward the

West were becoming increasingly hostile

became the main topic of conversation.26

As the discussion evolved, military

and civilian officials alike connected

atomic weapons to a possible American

response to Soviet actions. War in Europe

seemed like a possibility, and atomic warfare would be part of the scenario. “How

long would it take to get a number of

‘eggs’ to, say, the Mediterranean?” Royall wondered, using the slang term for

atomic bombs. Symington noted that most

Americans were “...misinformed about

how quickly we could go into action and

what we could do,” meaning that the public did not sense the weakness of the atomic option. From the civilian perspective

of the Commission, Lilienthal told the

group that the most important need was

to improve Sandia Base, “where the AEC

and the military must fit closely.” Royall

had recently visited Sandia and agreed. “I

saw it was a mess, just as Dave

[Lilienthal] said, and something had to be

done.” He added that the Army was not

doing it as fast as the AEC would like, but

“we’re moving that way.” Nichols, who

had just assumed command of Sandia on

an interim basis, remained distrustful of

Lilienthal and the AEC, which he believed

had held up his promotion. He made no

mention of the Sandia part of the discussion in his memoirs.27

The March 5 meeting did not accomplish Royall’s goal of bringing the military and the civilian aspects of atomic

energy closer together. President Truman

made no bones about where he stood

when he summoned Lilienthal, Nichols,

and Royall to the White House six days

later on March 11. He wanted the problem solved. Truman wanted everyone

present to clearly understand that he wanted cooperation between the civilian and

military agencies in matters of atomic

weapons. “I know you two hate each

other’s guts,” Nichols reported Truman

saying to Lilienthal and him, but “I expect you two to cooperate.” Both men

agreed.28

Immediately, Nichols began to push

for detailed plans for the use of atomic

weapons, including their transfer to the

military in case of an emergency. He met

with General Albert M. Gruenther, the

Director of the Joint Staff, to discuss AF-
56 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

SWP’s activities. Nichols told Gruenther

that AFSWP should be doing more planning and holding joint exercises with the

AEC and the Air Force. Gruenther’s response was a bombshell. He told Nichols

that his aims violated a Presidential order

not to plan on the use of atomic weapons.

Nichols was flabbergasted and asked if he

should stop working on such plans. “I’m

not telling you to stop,” Gruenther said,

“I just wanted you to know that you are

not in accord with present Presidential

policy.”29

At the end of March, Nichols went to

Forrestal’s office for a working lunch with

Symington, Royall, the three Joint Chiefs,

Under Secretary of State Robert A.

Lovett, and Dwight Eisenhower, then

president of Columbia University, to discuss the intensifying crisis in Berlin.

Nichols, who was there to report on the

country’s atomic readiness, noted “...how

easily Eisenhower assumed leadership of

the entire group.” Asked if the United

States was able to deliver any atomic

weapons, Nichols replied that the country could not. He explained that the only

assembly teams, military and civilian,

were at Enewetak for the SANDSTONE

tests and “...that the military teams were

not yet qualified to assemble atomic

weapons.” Eisenhower, Nichols recorded,

told him “...in very definite terms to accelerate training and improve the situation

at once.” By the next morning, Nichols

had briefed a joint meeting of the MLC

and the AEC about the situation.30

Berlin provided the catalyst for

Nichols to proceed with arranging for a

more active military role in atomic weapons. Both at a policy level in the Pentagon and an operational level at Sandia,

Nichols initiated action “...to perfect

plans for transfer of atomic weapons to

the military in case of emergency and to

expedite training and equipping the military assembly teams.” The Presidential

directive, at least as far as Nichols was

governed by it, was not placed on a back

burner; it was taken off the stove.31

While he beefed up assembly training

at Sandia, especially as the teams returned

from the successful SANDSTONE tests

in the spring and summer of 1948, Nichols

once more attacked the custody issue head

on. He found a willing and powerful ally

in the Secretary of Defense. As Secretary

of the Navy, Forrestal had viewed some

level of military control of atomic weapons as essential to the national security.

As Secretary of Defense, he had asked

Truman in March 1948 to transfer custody of nuclear weapons from the AEC to

the military. In June, Forrestal asked

Nichols to prepare a memorandum for the

President which recommended the military be given authority to withdraw weapons from the stockpile for training

purposes or in a national emergency.

Meetings between Forrestal and Lilienthal

during the month failed to reconcile the

military and civilian positions on custody. Nichols noted that the issue for the

Commission was not the lack of technical competency of AFSWP, a reason usually given for keeping the bomb in civilian

hands, but, as Lilienthal confessed in one

of the June meetings, the real issue was

civilian control of atomic weapons.

“Emotion rather than reason,” Nichols

said of Lilienthal, “was the basis of his

position.” Both sides agreed to present

their divergent views to Truman for resolution.32

Lilienthal’s emotions stemmed from

his conviction that the military was treating atomic bombs “...like any other kind

of weapon.” In Lilienthal’s mind, they

were anything but the same. Civilians,

Lilienthal believed, served as a check on

military assumptions, which he believed

included the use of atomic weapons.

Therefore, he drew a careful distinction

between technical custody and underly-
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 57

ing policy because the Berlin crisis had

led the military to plan for the use of the

bomb and the selection of appropriate targets. Thus, the custody issue took on increased importance in times of crisis.33

Lilienthal’s views were also shaped by

an earlier meeting, which AEC representatives held with Dr. Walter F. Colby, an

intelligence expert from the University of

Michigan. The Commission had asked

Colby to explore with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies how long it might be

before the Soviet Union developed an

atomic weapon. “The thing that rather

chills one’s blood,” the chairman noted in

his diary, “is to observe what is nothing

less than lack of integrity in the way intelligence agencies deal with the meager

stuff they have.” He feared that in the future some President might order “a terrible atomic attack” in “anticipatory

retaliation” based on the thinnest of intelligence reports. “No one will ever know

what terrible things could ensue that might

have been prevented,” he concluded, “that

may have been utterly needless.”34

The custody showdown came at the

White House on July 21. Lilienthal had

learned from Clark Clifford, the President’s legal and political advisor, that Truman favored keeping atomic weapons

under civilian control. He passed Clifford’s comment on to Forrestal, who carefully mulled it over. In the end, Clifford’s

warning was ignored. The Secretary of

Defense was firmly committed to the notion that the end user of the bomb, the

National Military Establishment, should

have custody of it, partly because it would

bring a concentration of authority and a

unified command structure. With the military Services and AFSWP pushing for

custody and the threat of Berlin giving

urgency to the issue, Forrestal would not

back away from an official Presidential

decision. On the way to the White House

meeting, Forrestal asked General Nichols

if the custody issue was important enough

to resign over should the President say no.

“It certainly is important enough,”

Nichols replied, adding, nonetheless, “I

hope you will not resign over the issue.”35

On July 21, 1948, Forrestal, two of the

Service Secretaries, Carpenter, his deputy from the MLC, William Webster, and

the five AEC commissioners packed into

Truman’s office. Lilienthal believed it was

the largest group he had seen in a Presidential conference since the summer of

1936. From the outset, the tone of the

meeting was somber and serious. There

were no light preliminaries. Truman, looking “worn and grim” according to Lilienthal, got right down to business. Sitting

to the President’s left, Forrestal began by

asking Carpenter to read the military’s

single-spaced, two-and-a-half-page position paper on transferring the custody of

nuclear weapons. In Lilienthal’s view,

reading the document word for word was

“...mistake number 1.” When Carpenter

added that he also had additional supporting materials from the Secretaries of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force and from the

Joint Chiefs, Truman’s patience was exhausted. “I can read,” the President

snapped, “curtly and not pleasantly,” according to Lilienthal.36

Lilienthal then took up the objections

of the AEC to any change in the existing

civilian/military arrangements regarding

nuclear weapons. He said that atomic

weapons carried the widest kind of international and diplomatic implications. He

emphasized policy issues, asking if the

civilian control over atomic weapons as

established in the Atomic Energy Act

could be preserved by transferring custodial issues to the military. In short, Lilienthal argued that the present

arrangement was working smoothly and

that there was no need to change it, though

he was careful to add that the decision was
58 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

entirely the President’s own. With Carpenter’s reading gaffe in mind, Lilienthal

stopped.37

The military men tried to salvage their

position. Symington told the President

that he had visited Sandia and “...our fellas [there] think they ought to have the

bomb. They feel they might get them

when they need them and they might not

work.” Truman, according to Lilienthal,

was not impressed with this line of argument. Royall asserted that economics required military control. “We have been

spending 98 percent of all the money for

atomic energy for weapons. Now if we

aren’t going to use them, that doesn’t

make any sense.” Lilienthal observed in

his diary that if Truman was concerned

about trusting “...these terrible forces in

the hands of the military establishment,

the performance these men gave certainly could not have been reassuring on that

score.”38

The AEC Chairman had correctly read

the President. Truman told the group that

he needed to consider atomic weapons in

the light of international relations. He emphasized that the responsibility for using

the bomb was his and a responsibility he

intended to keep. With the politics of the

1948 campaign and the Berlin crisis as a

background, Truman cautioned that

“...this is no time to be juggling an atom

bomb around.” Three days later, on July

24, Truman announced that all aspects of

the atomic energy program would remain

with civilian authorities.39

The President’s decision rankled the

Pentagon. In dealing with Forrestal, Truman tried to ease his Defense Secretary’s

disappointment by explaining that political considerations were key to the decision. After the November election, he told

Forrestal, “...it would be possible to take

another look at the picture.” But Forrestal openly fretted that the President’s ruling had made it “difficult for me to carry

out my responsibilities.” Again, he raised

the possibility of resigning, but his aides

talked him out of such a course.40

The military did not see Truman’s decision as irrevocable. One might evade the

custody impasse. If AEC officials visited

the AFSWP operation at Sandia, some

generals believed, the members might be

convinced that the military unit was

“...fully qualified and could be ready for

this responsibility in a comparatively

short time.” Nichols, consistently a hardliner on the custody issue, also disagreed

with the President’s decision. The outcome of the custody battle, he later wrote,

taught him that “...patience, persistence,

and the real threat of war would be required to obtain the right decision.” In the

meantime, he would bolster AFSWP’s

operational ability to transfer weapons to

the military in an emergency.41

Donald Carpenter, the civilian

brought in to head the MLC, had a different perspective. Caught between both

warring parties, Carpenter did not believe

that the President’s decision had changed

anyone’s views. Relations between civilians and soldiers dealing in atomic energy had improved little. Part of the reason,

Carpenter later said, were the strong views

“...that members of the AEC thought all

military officers were damn fools and officers thought all AEC people were damn

crooks.”42

THE SANDSTONE TESTS

The same week that Montague,

McCormack, and Wilson settled the details for transferring nuclear weapons,

engineers from the 38th Battalion (Special) completed laying several miles of

submarine cable connecting a 200-foot

steel tower rising above Entebbe, a small

island on the north rim of the Enewetak

Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The tower

contained electronic test instruments to

measure blast, thermal, and radiation ef-
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 59

fects. The assembly team, including AFSWP personnel, practiced arming a dummy weapon and testing the firing circuits.

Other components of AFSWP served as

guards, provided technical assistance, or

worked in a radiation safety unit. Satisfied with the checks, the scientific director, Darol K. Froman, gave the order to

fire the actual device. While the firing

party proceeded to point zero, most of the

task force relocated to the command center on Parry Island, 10 miles away.43

Operation SANDSTONE was to be

the second test series held in the Marshall

Islands, yet it differed from the first series (CROSSROADS) in that it was primarily an AEC scientific test series with

the Armed Services serving in a supporting role. SANDSTONE’s stated purpose

was to proof test improved design atomic

weapons. The weapons were tested at

Enewetak by JTF 7 during April/May

1948. Three weapons were detonated in

the test series, to include X-RAY (April

15), YOKE (May 1), and ZEBRA

(May 15).

At 6:17 in the morning of April 15 the

fireball of Shot X-RAY, the first test in

the SANDSTONE series, rose from Enjebi. The brilliant light of the blast was

visible in Kwajalein, some 300 miles to

the southeast. Almost immediately scientists raced toward ground zero to collect

critical samples and data on the shot.

Drone planes filled the air collecting fallout samples, and a remote controlled tank

began scooping earth off the island’s surface. Using airplane relays, the Air Force

quickly ferried test samples back to Los

Alamos for full analysis. Within hours, the

scientists in New Mexico confirmed what

those in the Pacific strongly suspected,

that the new design principles were a stunning success. The air sampling at SANDScientists leaving shot island (Enjebi) just prior to X-RAY event, April 15, 1948.
60 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

STONE, conducted by the then top secret

Air Force Office of Atomic Testing

(AFOAT-1), demonstrated for the first

time the feasibility of airborne radiological detection of nuclear explosions. Thereafter, such “sniffer” flights became part

of an American long-range detection system that would keep a nose into the Soviet atomic energy program.44

X-RAY and the two tests that followed

at Enewetak over the next month, YOKE

and ZEBRA, demonstrated two new technological advances in bomb design.45

The implications of the data from the

SANDSTONE tests, according to two historians of nuclear strategy, “...were enormous. Not only would weapons become

more plentiful, but they could also be of

increasingly diverse design,” from lightweight tactical weapons to larger strategic bombs. The old 10,000-pound

Nagasaki implosion bomb, requiring delivery in a single specially outfitted B-29,

was immediately obsolete. The new core

design also allowed the weapon to be prefabricated, thus marking the change from

a laboratory device to a production weapon. Days of slowly adding a handful of

atomic bombs to a tiny stockpile would

soon be over. Suddenly, American scientists had created more bang for fewer

bucks. A public announcement from the

AEC following the tests allowed only that

“...the position of the United States in the

field of atomic weapons has been substantially improved.” The military view was

more optimistic. After SANDSTONE,

Nichols said “we should be thinking in

terms of thousands of weapons rather than

hundreds.”46

NEW PRESSURES AT SANDIA

Increased friction with the Soviet

Union and the prospective boom in the

production of nuclear weapons greatly

boosted AFSWP activities at Sandia. To

meet this increase, the 38th Engineer Battalion (Special) was reorganized into three

Special Weapons Units soon after most of

the men had returned from SANDSTONE. With a nucleus of trained officers from SANDSTONE and new officers

who had finished the technical training

course, the new units were to direct operational and field training. The war scare

over Berlin created a crash program to

train bomb assembly crews and, under the

new schedule, the number of students,

according to the unit historian, “...mushroomed by leaps and bounds” in the early

summer of 1948.47

The growth proved to be too fast.

Training programs expanded so rapidly

that they were badly crippled by Los Alamos’ inability to provide the necessary

classified equipment, including test calibrators, flight test boxes, and other electrical meters. The equipment problem was

another manifestation of the military/civilian dichotomy in nuclear weapons. The

AFSWP training program experienced

great difficulty in obtaining replacement

parts from the AEC and in getting repairs

completed on equipment. The soldiers

complained about the Commission’s policy of requiring all repairs of AEC equipment to be made by AEC employees, and,

groused one Army engineer, “...this took

time, sometimes causing classes to be held

up.” In the meantime, the new Special

Weapons Groups remodeled a warehouse

and office building to handle the expected materials and maintained a training

program “...consistent with available

equipment.” One building, dubbed the

“museum,” held mock-ups of various

models of atomic bombs. A nearby building contained two large bomb assembly

areas complete with an elaborate monorail system on which the bomb components moved. When the needed equipment

arrived in November, it arrived all at once

in a “landslide,” severely taxing the available storage space. Toward the end of
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 61

Operation SANDSTONE, Event X-RAY detonation, April 15, 1948.
62 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

1948, after much pressure from Nichols,

production equipment, instead of prototype test equipment, began to appear in the

training classes.48

Nichols viewed Soviet actions in Berlin with a wary eye. He would not have

his unit be less than fully prepared for all

contingencies. In March 1948, 250 paratroopers from Fort Hood, Texas, landed

on the edge of Tijeras Canyon, southeast

of Sandia Base. Base defenders repulsed

the simulated attack, which tested base

defenses of the technical area but did not

involve atomic weapons or nuclear equipment. The next month, General Montague

brought in 18 tanks and stationed them

around the Ordnance, Igloo, and Technical areas. Security experiments were also

conducted with the Air Force, trying out

various aircraft and equipment configurations. AFSWP sought alternatives to

hydraulic lifts to conduct bomb loading.

Most air bases lacked special loading pits

with hydraulic lifts to place nuclear weapons into the bombers. In May, a joint

AFSWP-Air Force team successfully

loaded a Mark III bomb into a B-29 using a standard aircraft hoist over a deep

pit. Because of a need for a reserve of

transport aircraft for bomb components,

AFSWP experimented with both Air

Force and Navy cargo planes to carry

these units.49

FIELD OPERATIONS

As the training programs for bomb assembly teams increased, so did the number of field operations. In July, one

company of the 38th held a joint exercise

with the 509th Bombardment Group at

Walker Air Force Base in Roswell, New

Mexico. Operation BANJO involved the

first operational employment of assembly

units since AJAX in November 1947. It

called for air transport of the entire unit

with equipment and a transportable assembly building to a forward base and the

assembly of five bombs at a forward base.

Four of the weapons were to be used in a

mock strike mission, the fifth was held as

a spare. By completely assembling a

weapon at a forward area, rather than the

rear-forward area approach used at AJAX,

AFSWP found that the rate of assembly

considerably increased. AFSWP pronounced the operation a success, even

though it was necessary to raid other AFSWP units to bring the complement of

personnel up to strength for the maneuvers. Thereafter, field operations were

held on a monthly basis.50

Field exercises grew in complexity. As

units graduated from the training course,

they practiced on continuous assemblies,

aircraft loading operations, and finally in

a field exercise in conjunction with an Air

Force unit. In August, two Army companies and a Navy unit from AFSWP conducted a joint exercise with two Air Force

units at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in

Tucson, Arizona. Code-named “COWBOY,” the operation was an expansion of

the rear-forward assembly method initiated in AJAX. COWBOY’s goal was to

assemble five weapons using a modified

C-97 aircraft, code named “Chickenpox”

as the B-29 was “Silverplate,” to determine if the plane could be used as a forward assembly site. One of the C-97s

contained an airborne assembly laboratory built into the aircraft. Other C-97s

would carry a portable assembly building,

called a “Palmer House,” which was redesigned to eliminate the deficiencies experienced at AJAX. Two teams, one from

the Army and one from the Navy, handled

the rear assembly, the first operation to

include a Naval assembly unit. The third

AFSWP team conducted the forward

check and final assembly. Results were

mixed. By the time the fifth bomb had

been assembled, the teams were exhausted. The time schedule for the delivery of

an assembled weapon, 16 hours as sug-
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 63

gested from an earlier exercise, proved

impossible to meet. Rather, assembly time

averaged about 24 hours for each bomb.

However, this COWBOY exercise indicated that the Chickenpox C-97 assembly

laboratory could be used operationally.51

Close coordination between the Air

Force and AFSWP became increasingly

critical, which COWBOY had demonstrated. Nichols arranged for monthly

meetings between the staffs of the two

organizations to brief him: General Lauris Norstad, and other top Air Force officers on the capabilities of the Air Force

and AFSWP to deliver atomic weapons.

The meetings, which began in September,

gave each group a top level forum to analyze the continuing field operations and

readiness plans.52

The AFSWP units had scarcely returned to Sandia from COWBOY when

one company was sent to check out the

assembly facilities at one of the recently

built nuclear weapons storage bases in

Texas. The permanent assembly facilities

for the site had not been completed; however, two storage igloos had been recently modified into assembly facilities as a

result of the Berlin crisis. Operation NUTMEG was designed to see if, indeed, the

storage areas would suffice. Shortly after

Labor Day 1948, an AFSWP detachment

flew to Texas, toured the retrofitted storage bunkers, evaluated the equipment, and

pronounced the igloos acceptable for

weapons assembly.53

PREPARING FOR WAR

Just as NUTMEG was ending in September, Forrestal asked Nichols to come

to his office for a meeting on the Berlin

issue. There, the head of AFSWP was

Nose view of USAF C-97 aircraft used by AFSWP as forward assembly site.
64 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

joined by the Joint Chiefs, the three Service Secretaries, Secretary of State

George C. Marshall, Generals Gruenther

and Norstad, and Carpenter, head of the

MLC. They discussed deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and the growing prospects of a war. All agreed that

“...a greater state of readiness to deliver

atomic weapons was necessary.” Nichols

immediately accelerated AFSWP’s activities. He expedited the training of assembly teams at Sandia and put additional

pressure on Los Alamos to provide badly

needed assembly equipment for the teams.

He also sent a delegation to visit the United Kingdom with an eye toward installing nuclear weapons assembly equipment

in key air bases. Nichols was extremely

pleased with the direction that events had

taken AFSWP and confirmed the central

strategic role he and Groves had always

envisioned for it. “It is amazing,” Nichols

later wrote in his memoirs, “how cooperation can be improved by a careful selection of personnel, clear-cut objectives, and

a sense of urgency.”54

Events in Berlin in the fall of 1948

also caused Truman to change his position on planning for the use of atomic

energy, something he had rejected previously. “I have a terrible feeling that we

are very close to war,” Truman noted in

his diary after a September briefing from

his generals on the situation in Europe,

“but I hope not.” Caught between international tensions and his own proclivity

not to use atomic weapons, Truman ordered the military to draw up operational

plans that would rely on a nuclear response. AFSWP continued its monthly

schedule of field exercises with a renewed

sense of urgency.55

Operation WHIPPOORWILL, held

over a two-week period in October 1948,

combined the storage site experience of

NUTMEG with the assembly operations

conducted at BANJO and COWBOY.

Again, elements from the 38th Engineer

Battalion (Special) of AFSWP and the

509th Bomb Group of the Eighth Air

Force joined to conduct the field operation. WHIPPOORWILL was the most extensive field exercise planned to that time.

It consisted of assembling 11 bombs, 10

to be used in simulated bombing attacks

with a single spare. Similar to AJAX, a

plane would fly west, to Inyokern, California, and drop one of the bombs that had

been assembled, less its fissile material.

The purpose of the operation was to test

forward base assembly conditions and the

capabilities of an assembly team during

extended maneuvers.56

Before a sizable number of high-ranking visitors anxious to see this new business of field assembly of atomic bombs,

the assembly crew from Sandia established a new, and faster, standard time for

assembling the Mark III weapons: 16

hours. Once again, however, fatigue

proved to be a critical factor. The results

suggested that outside labor, rather than

assembly team personnel, be brought in

to erect the portable assembly building so

that the team’s primary purpose would not

be impaired. For the first three days it was

possible to deliver three bombs a day;

thereafter, the officers found, two bombs

were a more realistic expectation. The

bulky weapons still required numerous

planes in the delivery/assembly process.

Each bomb capsule required a separate

aircraft, as did the balance of the bomb

components. At its conclusion, officials

believed WHIPPOORWILL had been the

most realistic joint operation the Armed

Services had ever conducted and proved

the military’s competency in assembling

and delivering atomic weapons.57

Other exercises combined AFSWP

units’ Naval operations. The initial joint

AFSWP-Navy operation had taken place

in 1947, when Sandia developed shipboard assembly site specifications for the
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 65

Bureau of Ships. The Navy, seeking to

protect its nuclear role against opposition

from the Air Force, believed that it could

develop an atomic capability by modifying certain large Midway-class carriers by

strengthening their flight decks to accommodate larger aircraft capable of carrying

atomic weapons. In late November of

1948, AFSWP’s Navy Special Weapons

Unit No. 471 flew to Norfolk, Virginia,

to conduct Operation EASTWIND, an

exercise to test bomb assemblies on one

of the modified carriers. The Naval unit

was to check the assemblies of both bomb

types then in the stockpile, the Little Boy,

the gun-type uranium bomb that had been

dropped on Hiroshima, and the Mark III

Nagasaki-type implosion weapon. The

operation also included a third model, a

prototype mock-up of the newly designed

Mark IV bomb, the product of the results

of SANDSTONE. The aim was to thoroughly review the technical work and investigate handling and weapons stowage

problems.58

Including the Mark IV in EASTWIND

was critical. The new weapon held the potential for being a smaller weapon in size

and weight than the Mark III, crucial differences for sea-based aircraft. Because

Naval aircraft could more readily carry a

smaller weapon, the Mark IV revitalized

the Navy’s push to maintain an atomic

carrier-based capability. Detailed results

of Operation EASTWIND remain classified to this day. The AFSWP report simply noted that “...work was begun at once

to correct the deficiencies noted.” By the

end of 1948, a Navy XAJ-1 aircraft, which

would carry atomic weapons, had arrived

at Kirtland for wiring and test loading of

the three types of atomic bombs.59

The final exercise of 1948, held in the

week before Christmas, drew on the experience of AFSWP’s other operations

during the course of the year. Operation

UNLIMITED was a joint AEC-AFSWP

exercise at Sandia designed to test the

emergency transfer plans which dealt with

the turnover of nuclear capsules to the

military by the Commission. The exercise

began with the simultaneous transmission

of special code words from Washington

to the field. Using dummy bombs, the

complicated transfer procedure worked

out between the military and the AEC

began its first test. Nichols was uneasy.

He had just enough confidence in the level

of cooperation at the operational level to

think the procedures could “...work under many but not all emergency situations.” Nichols thought there were “...too

many possibilities for a snafu.”60

Nichols would not have full confidence in any transfer procedure until it

was entirely under military control. Nonetheless, Operation UNLIMITED demonstrated that AFSWP and the AEC could

satisfactorily transfer nuclear weapons in

a timely fashion. The teams did recommend that Air Force rather than AFSWP

personnel move weapons capsules to a

forward base and that the capsules be

transferred in a secluded area rather than

at the more conspicuous gate of the ordnance area. All agreed that officials in

Washington should initiate additional

drills once every four to six months.61

At the end of 1948, Nichols looked

back on the 10 months he had commanded AFSWP. He took heart that considerable progress had been made in the

weapons program. Mark IV weapons

were nearing production stage, the scarcity of fissionable material was easing,

new smaller and lighter weapons were

being developed, and a spirit of closer cooperation between civilian and military

authorities had developed. Operation

UNLIMITED had proved that atomic

bombs could be transferred successfully

without military custody. Nichols believed he could live with this arrangement,

but, he added, “I hope for not too long.”
66 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

But on the whole, 1948, the AFSWP head

concluded, had been an exciting and demanding year. “I was glad to be back in a

position of responsibility,” Nichols later

wrote. “I enjoyed it.” He realized the

changes taking place in 1948 were shaping a timetable that would eventually permit the military to assume full custody and

surveillance of atomic weapons. Nichols’

long-time goal seemed to be drawing closer.62

SEARCH FOR A

CONTINENTAL TEST SITE

In early 1947, Admiral William S.

Parsons, the Navy deputy to AFSWP, recommended that the United States establish a site within the continental United

States for testing nuclear weapons. Lilienthal and the AEC rejected the idea,

which surfaced again prior to SANDSTONE only to be driven into hibernation once more because of opposition

from Los Alamos, which preferred a Pacific site. Issues of safety, security, logistics, weather, and costs that stemmed from

the SANDSTONE operation, however,

rekindled interest in a continental site.

Most of the interest came from the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and mainly flowed from

budgetary worries. The AEC persisted in

its opposition but did agree to a survey of

possible sites within the United States, but

only if the work was to be done in the utmost secrecy. Because of AFSWP’s expertise in conducting radiological

monitoring, especially the recent work at

SANDSTONE, Parsons suggested that

the radiological division could conduct

the survey for the Joint Chiefs. In the late

summer of 1948, the AFSWP assigned

Project Nutmeg - not to be confused with

Operation NUTMEG that occurred about

the same time - to Navy Captain Howard

B. Hutchinson.63

During the fall of 1948, Captain

Hutchinson collected data from the Pacific tests and Japan, especially looking at

fallout patterns of radionuclides. With this

information, Hutchinson believed he

could identify those areas of the country

where wind and weather would be most

favorable to safeguard population centers.

By 1949 he had finished the AFSWP survey. In his report to the AEC and the

MLC, Hutchinson identified two primary regions: a stretch along the eastern seaboard between Cape Fear and Cape

Hatteras and a large area in the desert

southwest. Hutchinson preferred the Carolinas because of prevailing winds and

ocean currents.64

That was as far as Hutchinson progressed. His report did not consider rather critical problems such as “...real estate,

public relations, soil composition, safety,

physical security, and logistics,” the AEC

noted. Nor did the Nutmeg report identify a specific area as a continental test site.

The Carolina coast, in the opinion of the

AEC staff, “...would obviously pose

Rear Admiral William S. Parsons, Navy

Deputy to AFSWP and Deputy Commander of JTF-1 during CROSSROADS.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 67

difficult domestic and possibly international relations problems.” In the Commission’s view, short of a national

emergency, a continental test site was

“...not desirable,” and the report was

shelved.65

PROGRESS ON BOMB ASSEMBLY

The results of SANDSTONE and the

military’s unsuccessful attempt to gain

custody of nuclear weapons largely determined AFSWP’s direction in 1949. The

development of a simplified Mark IV production weapon permitted AFSWP to assemble bombs in far greater numbers than

previously. Moreover, although Nichols

had lost the custody battle at the Presidential level in July 1948, he quickly saw that

the subsequent agreement that the AEC

made with AFSWP to facilitate the transfer of atomic bombs in an emergency

would prove to be an avenue by which the

military could obtain a yet greater participation in handling nuclear weapons. Finally, revisions of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1946 and a reorganization of the AEC’s

Division of Military Application in 1949

led to closer working relationships between the Commission and AFSWP.

Since the summer of 1948 when Truman decided to stay with civilian control

of atomic weapons, Nichols had focused

AFSWP’s energies on strengthening the

process by which the AEC would promptly deliver the needed number of weapons

to the military. In late January 1949,

Nichols recommended to the Commission

that a formal agreement be worked out

fitting the transfer of weapons to the actual war plans. Nichols emphasized that

it was essential that weapons be delivered

to field commanders not only at the proper time and in proper numbers but, with

the development of the Mark IV weapon,

also by proper model. He asked that the

AEC maintain a transfer capacity for each

weapon type equal to AFSWP’s capacity

to assemble that type. AFSWP, Nichols

added, would notify the AEC of any

changes in its assembly capabilities.66

The AFSWP general also requested

his command’s stake in stockpile matters

be increased. AFSWP, he wrote Lilienthal,

should make the necessary arrangements

with war planners and field commanders

to ensure stockpile utilization in accordance with the weapons’ relative efficiency, subject to military requirements for

particular types of weapons. Such an

agreement, he concluded, would allow the

AFSWP commander at Sandia Base to

develop specific transfer schedules, by

number and type, and maintain a current

delivery plan with “...as many alternates

as necessary.” The AEC agreed to

Nichols’ suggestions five weeks later.67

Critical to Nichols’ plan was AFSWP’s assembly capability. At the time

he sent Lilienthal the recommendations,

AFSWP was able to assemble 10 Mark

III bombs per day. By July 1, Nichols estimated, AFSWP’s teams could assemble

20 old Mark IIIs and 30 new Mark IV

weapons per day. By the end of the year,

he predicted that daily assembly production levels would increase to 30 Mark IIIs

and 50 Mark IVs. Nichols’ estimates

proved to be too low. By July, AFSWP,

“...by the most efficient utilization of

available personnel and equipment...”

(meaning dispatching additional personnel from Sandia Base to weapons storage

sites) was able to assemble 21 Mark IIIs

and 24 Mark IVs, or 45 bombs per day,

he told Lilienthal. By September, AFSWP

could handle 63 bombs a day. Nichols

now believed that his men could assemble approximately 100 per day by the end

of the year. The assembly and transfer process had evolved so smoothly and efficiently in the course of the year that the

AEC agreed to permit AFSWP personnel

to “...handle nuclear weapons incident to

their emergency transfer.”68
68 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE

Nichols pushed for AFSWP to acquire

greater nuclear responsibilities in areas

outside the emergency transfer of weapons. For months he had argued that technical surveillance of the weapons

stockpile should be a joint responsibility

of the military and the AEC. If the AEC

was responsible for weapons development and production, Nichols wanted

AFSWP involved in laboratory and destructive tests, the analysis of tests and inspection data, and the determination of

defects and preventive measures relating

to atomic weapons. The three stockpile

storage areas - Sites Able, Baker, and

Charlie - became the focus of Nichols’

campaign to extend AFSWP activities, if

not control, in lieu of outright custody of

atomic weapons.69

By the spring of 1949, General

Montague, Sandia Base Commander, had

cut an agreement with the AEC’s manager of the Santa Fe Operations Office, Carroll L. Tyler. The arrangement, attempted

to sort out some of the confusion inherent in the dual military/AEC responsibilities established in the Atomic Energy Act.

It provided that the AEC and AFSWP

would jointly occupy the storage sites.

The military would support operations in

the event of a national emergency and

conduct training exercises and maneuvers

at the sites. In addition, AFSWP would

also participate in nuclear and non-nuclear

inspection, surveillance, and assembly of

weapons under AEC supervision. AFSWP

soon took over the re-inspection of the

non-nuclear electrical and mechanical

components at Baker and Charlie sites and

much of the nuclear surveillance as well.70

Increased weapons production, however, soon made the Tyler-Montague

Agreement obsolete. Montague estimated that it would take the AFSWP inventory officer 10 to 14 days each month to

complete the inventories at Los Alamos

and the storage sites. Montague suggested revising the system to permit two AFSWP representatives at each storage site

to conduct the inventory, one to survey the

electrical and mechanical components and

the other to inventory the nuclear material. Each of the individuals had to serve a

full year on the assignment and could not

be transferred between the storage sites,

thereby eliminating the possibility that

any one of them could obtain complete

stockpile figures. The stockpile figures,

with the approval of the AEC’s representative at Sandia Base, were then forwarded to Nichols in Washington. Tyler agreed

to Montague’s changes. By the end of the

year, AFSWP was participating in the inspections of AEC contractors in their final acceptance of major non-nuclear

subassemblies to assure that the products

would be acceptable for military use.

Thus, the agreement provided a means for

increased AFSWP responsibilities in the

weapon production process and at the

stockpile storage sites. Groves’ goal of

building a highly trained cadre of military

personnel to handle nuclear weapons had

been largely realized. By the end of 1949,

the AEC had recognized the advanced

technical training and weapons capabilities of military personnel far more than it

had acknowledged previously.71

MEASURING NUCLEAR

WEAPON EFFECTS

Perhaps the best example of the technical competencies acquired by AFSWP

related to weapons effects testing and

measurement. At SANDSTONE, the

AFSWP contingent had performed some

technical monitoring but generally believed that it had been underutilized. In

the spring of 1949, Dr. Alvin C. Graves,

the director of J Division at Los Alamos,

asked that AFSWP assume the responsibility for measuring free air pressures at

the planned 1951 atomic tests. Nichols
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 69

readily agreed. The work, done in conjunction with the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Maryland, was to

measure the blast effect of a bomb to determine the overpressure of the shock

wave in free air. J Division hoped that

AFSWP could assemble a group that

would bring together balloon, blast, and

instrument experts to manage a Free Air

Pressure Group.72

By the end of the year, AFSWP, led

by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander J. Frolich, had convened a team of experts located in the Washington, D.C. area to find

methods for measuring blast effects. One

proposed method involved taking measurements with impulse transmitters suspended at a height of 2,000 feet from

barrage balloons.

In addition to the Naval Ordnance

staff at the White Oak facility, the blast

effects team soon included the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, based in

Silver Spring, Maryland, which supplied

an electronic instrument research and radio transmitter expertise, and the Army’s

Engineer Research and Development

Laboratory (ERDL) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which undertook balloon research,

design, and procurement. Under Frolich,

the AFSWP Free Air Pressure Group, or

Test Group as it became known, would

firmly establish AFSWP’s future administrative and technical credentials in nuclear effects, and became the basis for the

main focus of the agency for the next 40

years.73

If new scientific and technical initiatives were being shaped under Frolich in

Washington, activities at Sandia Base took

on a new face as well. In December 1948,

the designation of the 38th Engineer Battalion (Special) was changed to the 8460th

Special Weapons Group. The change,

which came at a time of rapid expansion,

new weapons, and changing operational

concepts, was part of a general reorganization of AFSWP that more closely reflected the Joint-Service nature of the

weapons program. The 8460th became an

administrative and operational command

consisting of special units from all three

Services, fully integrated into AFSWP.

Experienced officers from the 38th, including Colonel Dorland, continued to

lead the new Special Weapons Group.74

TOWARD A

MARK IV STOCKPILE

Changes in nuclear weapons design

made a significant impact on the activities of the Special Weapons Group. The

first development was the modification of

the Mark III Nagasaki-type bomb in 1947.

For some time, the military had clamored

for a weapon that could be field assembled in a short period of time and be reliable enough for the most stringent military

applications. In the spring of 1949, the

AEC delivered to the stockpile a modified Mark III, called a 31.* It was not a

radically new weapon from the 30 but incorporated a more rugged and reliable firing system and permitted a considerable

saving of time in field assembly. Concurrent with the development of the 31 bomb,

the AEC delivered the Mark IV, or 40,

bomb to the military for training in the late

spring of 1949. The Mark IV was a production bomb designed “...to provide

maximum speed in field assembly consistent with reliability of performance.”

Within weeks of working with the new

weapon, AFSWP had realized that smaller, 46-man assembly teams could achieve

the same rate of assembly under field conditions.75

* The first digit of the number 30 translated

from the initial design number of the weapon, or

Mark III. The second digit indicated the modification, or Mod, to the basic weapon. Thus the

first modification to the original Mark III would

be labeled a 31 bomb.
70 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

As they became part of the stockpile,

the 31 and 40 type bombs significantly

improved the performance of the special

weapons units. By April 1949, a joint

Navy/Air Force exercise in New Mexico

used the Fat Man weapon for the last time.

Whereas the assembly team worked eleven hours to assemble the now obsolete

weapon, a team took only seven hours to

assemble a modified Fat Man, the Mark

III Mod 1 (31) bomb, the following

month. By June, the 31 and 40 weapons

were the only bombs for which SAC and

AFSWP developed standard operating

procedures, and AFSWP intensified its

program at Sandia to train 10 SAC assembly teams, which would then be assigned

to the SAC operating bases. At the same

time, the Air Force began staffing permanent storage and assembly facilities at the

three stockpile sites, using them as rear

assembly bases in nuclear field exercises.76

SUPPORTING THE AIR FORCE

Since the early stages of development

of assembly organizations, AFSWP and

the Air Force had planned to conduct a

field exercise under arctic conditions. The

idea was to assemble and deliver an atomic weapon at a forward base in extremely

cold weather. The Air Force, however,

cancelled the drill scheduled for the winter of 1948 in the northern part of Alaska.

The next fall, AFSWP and the Air Force

tried again. In September 1949, a Special

Weapons Unit left Sandia for Eielson Air

Force Base in Alaska, to run a limited assembly exercise and generally prepare for

a second outing later in the winter. The

September exercise went off without a

hitch except for the weather, which proved

to be frustratingly mild. Afterward, cold

tests on equipment and personnel were

conducted in the cold chamber at Eglin

Air Force Base in Florida.77

As American nuclear policy came to

be centered more and more on the Air

Force in 1949, the Technical Training

Group at Sandia found itself inundated

with SAC assembly organizations, which

arrived at the base at the rate of one a

month. General LeMay and SAC were

eager to deploy these teams to air bases

as quickly as possible, allowing only 12

weeks for team training and operational

instruction. AFSWP complained of the

“high pressure training schedule,” which

was hampered additionally by a shortage

of equipment and training facilities. To

ease the space problem, AFSWP erected

a number of classrooms. The limited training time also raised doubts with the staff

of the 8460th about the level of expertise

and qualifications of SAC’s 12-week wonders when they left Sandia. To insure the

highest standards of performance, technical knowledge, and operational readiness, Dorland established a proficiency

board made up of experts from experienced assembly teams to pass on the functional skills of each unit prior to

deployment. By mid-year, the length of

Sandia’s bomb assembly training course

was cut to two months, with a fundamental course in electronics moved to Keesler

Air Force Base, Mississippi, for Air Force

personnel and to Treasure Island for the

Navy personnel.78

One technical development, a result

of switching to the production of the

smaller Mark IV weapon, changed the

training program for weaponeers.79 With

the bulky Mark III bomb, a weaponeer

was needed on all flights to monitor the

Flight Test Box, an instrument that tested

the circuitry of bomb components during

flight. General Montague recognized the

possibilities of replacing the complicated

and cumbersome Flight Test Box with a

simple “go/no go” indicator. By the fall

of 1949, research and development teams

from AFSWP, the newly-established Sandia Laboratory, and the AEC had devel-
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 71

oped a simplified device known as an InFlight Monitor. The new instrument permitted the bomb commander to assume

the duties of the in-flight weaponeer, and

the weaponeer training course was

dropped from the AFSWP curriculum in

the spring of 1950.80

The impact of the Air Force’s elevated position in nuclear weapons was demonstrated by the growth in assembly teams

in 1949. The year before, the Air Force

had two Special Weapons Units; at the end

of 1949, there were 12 operational units

and three more in training. By comparison, the Army remained static at four, and

the Navy added one unit in 1949, bringing its total to three. In addition, the preponderance of nuclear bomb commanders

and weaponeers trained in 1949 were

from the Air Force.81

A NEW AFSWP

HEADQUARTERS

As AFSWP increased its field activities at Sandia Base, headquarters operations also expanded. AFSWP’s offices on

the second floor of the B Ring at the Pentagon had filled up early in 1949. The film

library and photographic branch of the

Radiological Defense Division had spilled

into rooms on D Ring on the first floor.

Security for the spread-out offices was,

as AFSWP staff agreed, unsatisfactory.

Therefore room for expansion was sought.

On August 29, 1949, AFSWP moved

into new offices in the Pentagon. The

space for the agency on Corridor Six of

the first floor of B Ring combined AFSWP’s headquarters staff and the photographic collection. The new space

required considerable reconstruction, especially from the standpoint of security.

The location lacked outside walls and

windows and was illuminated only by artificial light. The outer walls were masonry construction from floor to ceiling,

pierced only by a guarded single doorway

for entrance and exit. A vault housing

records from CROSSROADS was constructed of 8-inch brick; other vaults,

which stored both film and records, were

of 6-inch tile covered on the outside with

an inch of plaster. A darkroom was added

for photographic work. AFSWP designed

a heavily soundproofed conference room,

which was located next to the reception

area, constructed with double soundproof

walls and a double door. Steel burglar

stops were installed in all the ceiling

ducts. In all, AFSWP’s new offices occupied more than 18,000 square feet; sufficient, it was decided, for current

headquarters needs.82

A GREENHOUSE FOR

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS

On July 11, 1949, Admiral Tom B.

Hill, Parson’s replacement as Deputy

Chief of AFSWP and Navy member of the

MLC, asked that AFSWP assume responsibility for a program to study military effects of atomic weapons. Hill’s request was

an ideal task for the Joint Service unit to

take on, and Nichols readily accepted. Hill

had compiled a distinguished record under

Nimitz in the Pacific during World War II.

He sufficiently impressed Nimitz that the

admiral invited him aboard the USS Missouri to be part of the Japanese surrender

in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. Eight

months later, Hill took command of the

Missouri, where he remained until becoming the Director of Atomic Defense in the

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in

April 1947 and the Assistant to the Deputy Chief of AFSWP a month later. Two

years later he became a Deputy Chief when

Admiral Parsons retired.83

Hill believed that it was critical for the

Armed Services to assemble as much information as possible regarding the effects

of nuclear weapons from underwater, underground, and atmospheric tests. Other

types of effects demanding study, he said,
72 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

were blast, thermal radiation on structures

and individuals, and ionizing radiation.

He hoped that the studies would help refine the criteria used by the Armed Services in determining the effectiveness of

atomic weapons against all types of targets. The Army and Navy immediately

initiated programs under AFSWP’s Development Division to carry through on

Hill’s request. The Air Force declined to

join the program, citing the need for additional authorization. Nevertheless, by

the end of 1949, the Development Division had gathered materials on underwater effects, including a study of base surge

phenomena, and had contracted with the

Naval Ordnance Laboratory to conduct a

series of underwater explosions to gather

additional data. AFSWP instituted a similar program with the Corps of Engineers

on the effects of underground explosions,

which also included a study of the possibility of a base surge emanating from that

type of blast, and another with the U.S.

Weather Bureau to evaluate the effects of

weather on atomic explosions.84

Another result of Hill’s order to gather more data on weapons effects was a

handbook drafted in 1949 to explain unclassified areas of weapons effects information and to contribute to military

training and civil defense planning. Written under the auspices of the Weapons Effects Classification Board, under

Chairman Norris E. Bradbury, the director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the volume was prepared jointly by

the AEC and the DoD. This draft manuscript on the nature of weapons effects,

published in 1950 as The Effects of Atomic

Weapons, was the first in a series of important public documents explaining the

technical and scientific phenomena of

atomic weapons to the public, written by

Dr. Samuel Glasstone and retitled The

Effects of Nuclear Weapons (1957).

Glasstone’s pioneering works, partly

based on an earlier effects manual entitled the “Smythe Report,” described the

same airblast, ground and water shock,

thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation

phenomena that Hill had initially outlined

in his 1949 letter.85

RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Another effect of nuclear weapons

that became part of AFSWP’s mission was

the potentiality of radiological warfare,

which, like the weapons effects handbook,

was an outgrowth of the investigations of

AFSWP’s Technical Branch of the Radiological Defense Division. The National

Military Establishment and the AEC had

established the Joint Panel on Radiological Warfare in late 1948, but the group did

not begin work until the next year. The

joint panel asked that the military develop an “...intensive study [of] the possible operational uses and military

worth...” of radiological warfare, including a program of field testing. The panel

asked that particular attention be given to

Pa-233 (Protactinium 233) “...since this

material is the most promising radiological warfare (RW) agent in the light of information presently available.”

Representatives from the Air Force, Army

Chemical Corps, AEC, and AFSWP selected a site in the Dugway-Wendover,

Utah, area where chemical, biological,

and radiological agents and weapons

might be field tested. The first contamination experiments were held in the late

fall of 1949, using a 2,000-pound bomb

to scatter radioactive Ta-182 (Tantalum).

Satisfied with the first experiments, the

JCS requested that the Technical Division

continue its investigations so that an evaluation of radiological warfare could be

completed by 1954.86

A MONOPOLY OF NONE

In July 1949, President Truman told

a group of Congressional leaders that he
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 73

no longer believed international control

of atomic energy was possible. “Since we

can’t obtain international control,” he announced, “we must be strongest in atomic weapons.” Later events would prove his

belief. The President soon authorized an

increased weapon production program. To

avoid the impression that the Soviet detonation had an impact on American decisions, Truman couched the expansion

decision simply as part of the country’s

previous plans and capabilities. Within the

year, atomic weapons came to occupy the

focal point of U.S. military planning. The

limited number of atomic bombs of World

War II vintage became - as a result of the

technological advances learned at SANDSTONE and expanded nuclear processing

and production capabilities - the basic

source of America’s power. “The atomic

strategy had, de facto, been further endorsed,” according to two historians of

nuclear strategy. Atomic weapons were

“...economical, efficient, intimidating,

and, above all, more available than

ever.”87

On September 20, 1949, the CIA completed a top-secret evaluation on the “Status of Atomic Warfare in the USSR.” The

Soviet Union’s atomic energy program,

the memorandum noted, was “...being

vigorously pursued under a top priority.”

Nonetheless, the Joint Atomic Energy

Intelligence Committee, comprised of

technical experts from the AEC, CIA,

State Department, and representatives

from the military Services, estimated

“...that the earliest possible date by which

the USSR might be expected to produce

an atomic bomb is mid-1950 and the most

probable date is mid-1953.” Three days

later, on September 23, President Truman

announced that “...within recent weeks an

atomic explosion occurred in the

USSR.”88

Not only was the September estimate

put forward by the CIA badly mistaken,

it was obsolete even as it was being written. In fact, the September memo was a

rehash of a series of annual estimates on

Soviet nuclear weapons capability. CIA

Director, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoeter, had sent a similar memo to President

Truman in July 1948 and again a year later, less than two months before the Soviet test.89

The intelligence estimates were based

more on a consensus of official Washington thinking than on actual knowledge.

Groves had estimated the Soviets would

take 20 years; the consensus in the scientific community had been five years, or

sometime in 1950; some had thought that

the Russians would never solve the technical and industrial problems. So firmly

did top military and civilian officials believe that the Russians were years behind

the United States that, when the AFOAT1 planes picked up radioactivity in their

air filters, the President questioned the

possibility of a Russian atomic bomb. If

it was a bomb, he told Lilienthal, it was

the product of German scientists. The new

Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson,

believed that a Soviet reactor had exploded. Before Truman made the public announcement, he asked Lilienthal and

others analyzing the fallout data to sign a

statement that they indeed believed the

Soviets had fired a bomb.90 The U.S. nuclear monopoly had lasted just four years!

RUSSIAN PROGRESS

As the sun rose over the steppes of Kazakhstan, in the Soviet Union, on the

morning of August 29, 1949, the country

detonated its first atomic weapon.91 Preparations for the detonation at this site, locally known as Semipalatinsk-21, had

begun two years previously; a 30-meter

tower had been erected and a workshop

had been constructed. Aided by nuclear

data – details of the plutonium implosion

bomb – provided by Klaus Fuchs, the
74 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

Russian nuclear program was accelerated by American progress. Much of the

Soviet research, headed by Igor Kurchatov and later, Andrei Sakharov, was

initially conducted at secret facilities on

the outskirts of Moscow; i.e., Laboratory

No. 2, and later at Arzamas-16, approximately 450 miles northeast of Moscow.

Arzamas-16 was known as the “archipelago” or center of atomic institutes in Russia and was soon dubbed “Los Arzamas”

by American military and civilian nuclear researchers. The tower detonation on

August 29, 1949 in Kazakhstan, about 165

kilometers west/southwest of the city of

Semipalatinsk, proved that the Soviet

Union possessed the capability to produce, assemble, and detonate a nuclear

device.

THE THERMONUCLEAR OPTION

Truman’s downplaying of the effect

of Joe 1 on the weapons expansion program hid another undercurrent pushing

the technology of nuclear weapons: a thermonuclear bomb called the “Super.” In

1946, a group of scientists at Los Alamos

had discussed the theoretical feasibility of

a hydrogen bomb. An H-bomb might be

built in one or two years, they predicted.

The scientists studied a detailed design of

such a weapon, which they said was,

“...on the whole, workable.” By the following year, however, scientific advice

was far less optimistic. In December

1947, Los Alamos reported to General

McCormick, the Commission’s Director

of Military Application, that “...our

progress to date in this field has been so

limited that it will be many years before

we develop the thermonuclear reaction for

weapons purposes.” The scientists also

warned McCormack that any nation that

could develop a “...bigger and better fission bomb than we have yet developed...

will also be able to do at least as well as

we have done on the thermonuclear

project.” The scientists, backed by Senator Brien McMahon, chairman of the Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy, envisioned

a return to a Manhattan Project drive to

produce the new weapon. If the government wanted the Super, “...we had better

get more brains to work.”92

Many scientists soon turned cool to

the prospects of a thermonuclear bomb.

On August 18, 1948, from his position as

Director of the Institute for Advanced

Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, Dr.

Oppenheimer submitted a draft report on

long-range military objectives in atomic

energy to Lilienthal, in which he counseled against developing the Super, “...in

view of the magnitude and complexity of

the problem, the special personnel requirements, and the uncertainties as to the

characteristics of a feasible weapon.” He

also cited the “...extraordinarily difficult

problems” of delivery, cryogeny, and tritium production as reasons to rely on

“boosting” a fission weapon in the short

term.93

JOE 1: The first Soviet nuclear test, detonated on August 29, 1949.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 75

The JCS, however, pressed for the development of a thermonuclear weapon. In

early 1949, they stressed the importance

of military uses of a hydrogen bomb, especially if costs were reasonable and its

further development did not impair the

production of other atomic weapons. With

the success of Joe 1, the military stepped

up its interest in the Super. In testifying

before the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy in October, General Omar Bradley urged Congress to support a major

effort to develop thermonuclear weapons.

At the same time, two prominent scientists, Enrico Fermi and Isidor I. Rabi,

strongly recommended that the United

States not develop the Super on ethical

grounds if the Soviets promised not to

work on it either. The AEC’s General

Advisory Committee was even more definite. It opposed the Super even if the

Russians proceeded with its development.94

Still the administration was undecided. Truman appointed a special committee consisting of Lilienthal from the AEC,

Johnson from DoD, and Secretary of State

Dean Acheson to review the issue. The

pressure to build a hydrogen bomb focused the debate between those who developed weapons and those who would

use them. On one side stood Edward Teller and other scientists at Los Alamos, who

relished the scientific elegance of creating a new weapon and their military allies in the Pentagon who viewed the Super

as the ultimate, and inexpensive, weapon

in the race to stay ahead of the Soviet

Union. The other side also favored nuclear

weapons but preferred improving atomic

bombs to developing thermonuclear

weapons. Led by Oppenheimer, this group

thought that the military wanted larger

weapons to compensate for having such

poor aim in bombing targets. The second

group supported smaller atomic weapons

that used less fissionable material so that

the stockpile might be expanded even

before the new nuclear production facilities began operating. Lilienthal also opposed the Super; appalled by the weapon’s

potentially awesome power and the arms

race it would breed. This second group

also had doubts as to the Super’s military

usefulness. Where might such a weapon

be used, they wondered? They were horrified with its possible use on cities and

large civilian populations. Atomic bombs

were more practical, they argued, as they

could be used against strictly military targets.95

By the end of 1949, the National Security Council and the military, led by

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, had

recommended that Truman direct the development of a super bomb. On January

31, 1950, Truman took the first step, directing the AEC to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear reaction. Los

Alamos took the lead, estimating that it

could test the concept within two years if

enough tritium was available. The laboratory asked that one of the production reactors at Hanford be converted to tritium

production to meet this schedule. On June

8, the President approved the tritium production program. While problems regarding the production rate of Tritium and

Lithium-6 continued to surface and more

time was needed to develop a fusion

weapon, the nation was firmly set on the

thermonuclear path. The invasion of

South Korea by Communist armies from

North Korea two weeks later served to

confirm Truman’s decision.96

THE KOREAN INVASION

Two events in the first half of 1950

had an impact on the country’s thermonuclear program: Korea and the Loper

Memorandum. Of the two, Korea is far

better known. North Korea’s invasion of

the southern half of the peninsula in June

caused officials at the AEC and the MLC
76 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

to review plans for GREENHOUSE, a

weapon test series in the Pacific planned

for the spring of 1951. There were rumblings from Washington that the test

should be cancelled. The day after Truman named Gordon Dean chairman of the

AEC, Robert LeBaron, head of the MLC,

phoned to tell the new chairman that the

military, including members of the MLC,

wanted to withdraw from or cancel

GREENHOUSE outright. The JCS wanted to free the Navy vessels committed to

those tests for a blockade of North Korea.97

Dean, however, unlike his predecessor Lilienthal, was an outspoken proponent of nuclear weapons, including the

Super, and not inclined to delay. His first

decision as chairman after war broke out

had been to transfer non-nuclear weapons

components to the United Kingdom. His

views on GREENHOUSE were equally

firm. Pushing aside LeBaron’s concerns

of military opposition, Dean wrote in his

diary that “the test must go now.” For the

next several months he fought to ensure

that Joint Task Force 3, headed by Air

Force General Elwood R. Quesada, would

not be raided. Dean also lobbied for the

establishment of a continental test site and

was able to win Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen T. Early over to both positions. By September, the Joint Chiefs had

retreated, deciding that the military could

indeed spare the resources for GREENHOUSE the following spring.98

THE LOPER MEMORANDUM

Before the Korean conflict erupted,

the military drew on other public fears to

increase the pace of nuclear weapons testing. Revelations of the extent of information passed to the Russians by accused spy

Klaus Fuchs gave rise to the belief that

the Soviets could not have achieved their

nuclear success without Fuchs’ perfidy. In

truth, no one really knew how important

Fuchs was to the Soviet weapons program. Early in 1950, LeBaron had asked

AFSWP chief General Nichols and Brigadier General Herbert B. Loper, another

member of the MLC, to estimate the damage done by Fuchs’ disclosures. Their

rather alarming and sensational conclusion was that the Soviets might be much

further advanced in nuclear weaponry

than Americans believed. “The USSR

stockpile and current production capacity,” the report stated, might be “equal or

actually superior to our own, both as to

yields and numbers.” Moreover, they concluded gloomily, the Russians might even

have a thermonuclear weapon in production. The Nichols/Loper report moved up

the command chain to the desk of Secretary of Defense Johnson, the Joint Chiefs,

and the President. After digesting the report, the military wanted a crash program

to develop a super bomb, even if it meant

cutting back on the existing atomic bomb

program.99

Revelations of Fuchs’ spying activities reverberated at AFSWP. There was a

distinct possibility that Fuchs had betrayed the nature of the radar fuzing systems used in atomic weapons, thereby

allowing the Soviets to jam and compromise radar systems. In view of this possible threat, AFSWP immediately began

developing a more accurate barometric

fuze than those used for the Mark I and

III bombs. By the spring of 1952, the new

fuze was ready to be included in the stockpile.100

Through the winter of 1950 the administration debated the fate of the Super. Finally, in late February, with a push

from the Pentagon, the special committee of Acheson, Johnson, and Henry

Smyth, who replaced Lilienthal as the

AEC representative, advised Truman to

prepare for production of hydrogen

bombs. Truman, accepting recommendations of his advisors, approved the ther-
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 77

monuclear program on March 10 “...as a

matter of the highest urgency.” GREENHOUSE, scheduled for the following

year, would test the thermonuclear theories being developed at Los Alamos by

Teller and Stanislaw M. Ulam.101

OPERATION GREENHOUSE

Even as the SANDSTONE operation

was being completed in the summer of

1948, planning had begun at Los Alamos

for another nuclear test series scheduled

for the Pacific Proving Ground in 1951.

Los Alamos had formed J Division in July

1948 to design and conduct a test of a new

concept growing out of SANDSTONE, to

“boost” the efficiency of the nuclear explosion with a heavy isotope of hydrogen,

deuterium. Deuterium, the scientists believed, would allow the explosion to

achieve higher temperatures than previously obtained and, if successful, would

provide the “trigger” for a thermonuclear

reaction. Construction for the test series,

code-named Operation GREENHOUSE,

had begun on Enewetak in 1949, before

Joe 1. An Army Engineer Construction

Battalion and a civilian contractor had

cleared sites on several test islands and

had begun building a large plant for liquefying deuterium and buildings to test

nuclear blast effects. Although Joe 1 hastened the movement of Mark IVs into the

stockpile, it had little effect on the schedule for GREENHOUSE.102

The focus on the GREENHOUSE operation was weapons development, not

weapons effects, and, as a result, AFSWP

assumed a secondary role to Los Alamos

scientists, especially those like Edward

Teller who were eager to prove the theoretical feasibility of a fusion weapon. By

mid-1950, Teller and his colleagues had

looked at a system combining a deuterium-tritium booster with the core developed at SANDSTONE. But no one knew

if the fission reaction would produce a

fusion reaction. Teller’s idea was to see if

the fission reaction would ignite a small

amount of deuterium and tritium in an adjoining chamber. As one scientist commented, “using a huge atomic bomb to

ignite the little vial of deuterium and tritium was like using a blast furnace to light

a match.”103

Operation GREENHOUSE, similar to

the SANDSTONE tests, was held at

Enewetak. AFSWP’s responsibility was

limited to the blast effects on a number of

military and civilian buildings. In all,

AFSWP had six men at the tests, two to

run the structures program and four handling radiation safety duties. Weapon development and science took front stage.

Two shots, GEORGE and ITEM, would

verify the thermonuclear concepts.

GEORGE, fired on May 9, 1951, proved

that the blast furnace worked. A fission

bomb ignited the deuterium and tritium,

which, in turn, contributed to the size of

the blast. Two weeks later, ITEM proved

that a small amount of tritium could dramatically boost the yield of fission weapons. While neither of the devices were

weapons, the tests did establish the feasibility of fusion weapons but complicated

planning for the country’s expansion of

its nuclear production capacity. Increased

tritium production could be achieved only

at the expense of plutonium production at

the existing plants. Solving the hydrogen

bomb mystery served only to heighten the

dilemma of how to increase the stockpile

before the new production facilities came

on stream. By the first of January, 1951,

there were approximately 300 atomic

weapons in the stockpile.104

AFSWP AND

CONTINENTAL TESTING

The threat to American security posed

by the North Korean invasion renewed

interest in establishing a continental test

site and revived AFSWP’s 1949 Project
78 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

Nutmeg report. The AEC and military

looked at six possible sites before choosing an area called Frenchman Flat in the

Nevada desert on the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range. By the end of

1950, the Air Force had turned over a large

area to the AEC for testing atomic weapons. Originally called Site Mercury, the

area would later be called the Nevada

Proving Grounds and finally the Nevada

Test Site (NTS). The name Mercury has

been retained as the housing area, just

outside the test range. Before the end of

January 1951, Operation RANGER, the

first series of atomic tests within the continental United States, was under way.105

RANGER constituted an ideal opportunity for increased AFSWP participation

in a weapon test. But that did not happen.

Los Alamos designed the RANGER series of tests to gather additional data for

improving on the weapon design tested

at GREENHOUSE in the spring of 1951.

Since no weapon effects tests occurred,

there was no AFSWP test group at

RANGER, and only six men comprised

the AFSWP contingent that did attend.

Those men were placed in the Scientific

Tests Section under the supervision of Los

Alamos scientists and other AEC officials.

Since RANGER tested new weapon designs, Los Alamos scientists, not AFSWP

personnel, assembled the nuclear devices. Nonetheless, the test devices were

dropped from Air Force planes and the

military had a significant presence at

RANGER. Over 350 servicemen participated, mostly in Air Force weapons delivery, weather, and cloud sampling

programs.106

Aerial view of storage area, aircraft ramp, and runway on Enewetak Island, Enewetak Atoll,

during Operation GREENHOUSE, 1951.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 79

FIELD COMMAND

The contingent of officers, enlisted

men, and scientists at Camp Desert Rock,

located approximately 65 miles from Las

Vegas, just outside the southern boundary of

the Nevada Proving Grounds, formed the

precursor of AFSWP’s Field Command

presence at Sandia Base. Field Command, AFSWP was officially designated

by General Order No. 4, April 28, 1951,

and its first Commander, General Robert

F. Montague, was assigned responsibility for exercising command jurisdiction

over and supervision of activities at Sandia Base and tenant organizations of

AFSWP.

REVIEWING AFSWP’S MISSION

AFSWP’s role in the planning for

RANGER and for the upcoming test series in 1951 and 1952 emphasized a need

for the agency to re-examine its function

in the development of nuclear weapons.

Early in 1951, General Herbert B. Loper,

who had served as the Army representative to the MLC since November 1949,

replaced Nichols as chief of AFSWP. Loper, according to Nichols, was “...a very

capable engineer, easygoing but firm, and

well liked by his associates.” While Loper had worked with Nichols in drafting the

memorandum about Fuchs and Soviet

progress on nuclear weapons development, he had not been associated with

Groves or part of the early development

of AFSWP. Loper had been a deputy to

General Omar N. Bradley when Bradley

was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In 1950 Loper had helped persuade policy makers not to use atomic weapons in

Korea, opposing the views of General

Douglas McArthur. There were too few

weapons in the stockpile to be decisive,

he had argued. Less than a year later, as

the new chief of AFSWP, he decided that

it was time to review and clarify the mission of the agency he now headed.107

Since the establishment of AFSWP in

1947, Loper wrote to the Chiefs of the

three Armed Services, a number of events

had prompted him to re-examine AFSWP’s mission. He explained that the responsibilities of the Department of

Defense with respect to the operation of

the stockpile had greatly expanded. So,

too, had the level of military participation

in test planning and evaluation of weapons effects. As a result, he believed that

AFSWP had assumed new responsibilities while altering the scope of others.

Therefore, Loper wrote, he had drafted a

new mission statement and outline of AFSWP’s responsibilities for the Joint

Chiefs’ review.108

Within six weeks, the Joint Chiefs had

approved Loper’s draft with only a few

changes. Boiled down to the salient

Shot GEORGE, part of Operation

GREENHOUSE at Enewetak Atoll, May

1951.
80 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

points, AFSWP’s major responsibilities,

according to Loper and the Joint Chiefs,

were providing specialized training and

technical services, coordinating storage

and surveillance of the nuclear stockpile

with the AEC, planning continental and

overseas weapons tests with other agencies, and determining and evaluating

weapon effects from those tests. Under

Loper’s plan, AFSWP would continue its

role in weapon development, procurement, and assembly. Loper recognized the

increasing activities in the field of atomic energy assumed by staff divisions and

subordinate agencies in the Departments

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. AFSWP

would play a coordinating role under Loper’s plan, an interdepartmental, rather than

joint, agency, “...utilizing established

agencies of the Armed Forces to carry out

programs. Existing organizational structures will not be duplicated, nor will additional activities be established.” The

new directive accurately reflected AFSWP’s central role in the country’s expanding nuclear program.109

A TIME OF TESTING

Reveille blared over the loudspeakers

at 2:00 am on November 1, 1951, as several sleepy-eyed officers from AFSWP

dragged themselves from their tents at

Camp Desert Rock. These AFSWP test

participants were part of Operation

BUSTER-JANGLE, the first nuclear

combat training exercise conducted by the

Armed Services. For several days the officers had conducted a series of orientation training activities for nearly 2,800

troops, the largest group of servicemen

ever assembled to witness a nuclear test

in the continental United States. AFSWP

instructors used films and lectures developed at Sandia Base in Albuquerque to

explain the characteristics of a nuclear

detonation and the procedures to follow

during the test, including a rehearsal of

shot day activities. In the cold morning

air, the men ate breakfast and trudged over

to a long line of waiting trucks which

would convey them from Desert Rock to

an observation point overlooking Yucca

Flat.110

Before dawn, the troops arrived at the

observation point, some seven miles from

ground zero. The AFSWP officers conducted a final pre-shot orientation. A

minute before the blast, the order came

over a loudspeaker for the observers to sit

on the ground and face south, with their

backs toward ground zero. The countdown continued, then came the announcement, “Bomb Away.” Just after dawn, at

7:30, the men saw the sharp silhouettes

of their huddled forms and helmets neatly outlined by the initial flash of white

light from the blast. About 30 seconds

later, when the light had dimmed, the

AFSWP instructors directed the soldiers

to turn and view the atomic fireball and

billowing cloud from Shot DOG. The roar

Major General Herbert B. Loper, Chief

AFSWP, 1951-1953.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 81

and the shock waves produced by the explosion swept over the troops. One battle-hardened veteran paratrooper, known

mostly for his exquisite profanity, simply

said, “It’s extraordinary!”111

The participation of large numbers of

troops at a nuclear test demonstrated the

changing missions and responsibilities of

the U.S. military as its leaders wrestled

with the questions raised by the specter

of atomic warfare. AFSWP was at the

heart of these changes. Shifts in international politics, the growth of the atomic

weapon stockpile, the marked increase in

numbers of atomic weapon assembly organizations, and increased activity by all

the Armed Services in the atomic weapons field forced AFSWP to review and

clarify its own mission between 1948 and

1952. AFSWP’s primary mission of bomb

assembly training grew less important

than inspecting the nuclear stockpile, preparing plans and budgets for military activities at atomic tests, providing technical

and logistical services, and coordinating

the study of military effects of atomic

weapons. The increased military participation in test planning and quantification

of weapons effects - culminating with the

large joint military exercise at Shot DOG

on November 1, 1951 - sharply illustrated the impact of events on AFSWP’s operations in the early years of the Cold

War.112

OPERATION BUSTER-JANGLE

Although its participation at RANGER had been limited, AFSWP’s site studies had been critical to the decision to

place the continental proving ground in

Nevada. In addition, AFSWP’s work became central to the planning of a second

Aerial photo of Camp Desert Rock showing rows of tents and Quonset huts, April 21, 1952.
82 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

Field Command Organization Chart, 1952.

AIDE-DE-CAMP

EXPLOSIVE

SAFETY SECTION STAFF

SURGEON

CHIEF OF STAFF

COMMANDING

GENERAL

ASST

CHIEF OF STAFF

8452ND

AAU DEPUTY COMDR

US ARMY

ARMY FLD FORCES

LIASON OFFICER 

DIRECTOR OF

ADM & SERVICES

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

PERS & ADM

DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE

& SCTY DIV

MATERIAL

DIVISION

STATISTICAL

SERVICES

PERS SEC

ANALYSIS

ENGINEERING &

FACILITIES BR

CIVILIAN

PERSONNEL

INSP &

PLANS

SERVICES-SUPPLY

& MAINT

CHAPLAIN CLASSIFICATION

& REVIEW

PURCHASING &

CONTRACTING

HISTORIAN

SAFETY

SECTION FISCAL FINANCE

PLANS

DIVISION

ORG & MANPOWER PLANNING

PROGRAMS

& CONTROL

EQUIP & FAC

PLANNING

TECH TNG GP

INDUSTRIAL

ENGINEERING

SITE A SITE B SITE C
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 83

INSPECTOR

GENERAL

JUDGE 1090TH ADVOCATE SRG

NAU

& NAD DEPUTY COMDR

US NAVY

DIRECTOR OF

OPERATIONS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ADJUTANT

GENERAL

OPERATIONS

DIVISION

TRAINING

DIVISION

OPERATIONS

& PROJECTS

TRAINING

REQUIREMENTS

OPERATIONAL

EVALUATION

TRAINING

STANDARDS

COM &

CONTROL

STUDENT

PROGRAMMING

SW UNIT TNG GP

SPECIAL

PROJECTS

LOGISTICS

DIVISION

DEVELOPMENT

DIVISION

SURVEILLANCE GUIDED

MISSILES

PROGRAMMING SP WEAPONS

DEPOT

WEAPONS

PROGRAMS

STORAGE

CONTROL

WEAPONS

EFFECTS

INSPECTION

SUPPLY

CONTROL

ASSEMBLY

EQUIPMENT

COMPONENTS

& SYSTEMS

DIR OF SW

DEV & LOGISTICS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

SITE D SANDIA BASE

Organization Chart

FIELD COMMAND

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL

WEAPONS PROJECT

(AFSWP)

MARCH 1952
84 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

series of tests scheduled in the fall of

1951. In 1950, AFSWP and the AEC had

selected a site on Amchitka Island in the

Aleutian chain west of Alaska for a

planned series of tests code named Operation WINDSTORM. For the test, AFSWP planned to fire two 20-kiloton

devices, one at ground level, the second

beneath the surface. At the end of November 1950, President Truman had endorsed

those plans. At that point AFSWP asked

the Army, Navy, and Air Force to submit

proposals for the projects they wished to

conduct at WINDSTORM. High on the

Armed Services’ list of programs was an

examination of the effects and possible

military value of an underground detonation. Another objective of the proposed

series was to determine the effects of surface detonation. The AFSWP Research

and Development Board weighed these

proposals along with those submitted for

another test series, Operation BUSTER,

also planned for the fall of 1951. After rereviewing the geology at Amchitka, AFSWP realized that prospects for obtaining

useful data were not as good as once believed. Therefore, AFSWP recommended that the WINDSTORM test be held in

Nevada rather than Amchitka and be made

part of the BUSTER operation. The AEC

agreed to AFSWP’s recommendation.

Subsequently, WINDSTORM was renamed Operation JANGLE and the two

test series were to be conducted as consecutive phases in one series renamed

BUSTER-JANGLE. The weapons effects

test in the series would consist of one 20-

kiloton airdrop and two 1-kiloton surface

shots.113

Operation BUSTER-JANGLE demonstrated how complex nuclear weapons

testing had become. In February of 1951,

AFSWP had gone to the Joint Chiefs with

an Army plan for the participation of

troops in a combat training exercise at

BUSTER. More than 150 different military units and armored battalions, paratroopers, transportation companies, engineers, and a veterinary detachment among

others based from Washington, DC, to

Chunchon, Korea, would participate.

AFSWP did the planning and budgeting

to pull the intricate operation together.

BUSTER-JANGLE consisted of a number of weapon effects experiments, studying the physical results of blast and

thermal radiation as related to the particular interests of the Armed Services, the

Federal Civil Defense Administration,

and the U.S. Public Health Service. For

AFSWP, the test series provided a splendid opportunity to train new radiation

monitors to augment its pool of experienced men.114

Operation BUSTER-JANGLE was an

outgrowth of the increasing importance of

atomic weapons in shaping U.S. defense

policy. Military planners realized that

atomic bombs would radically alter battlefield conditions. They wondered how

troops would react to such powerful explosions. One historical reference they

had was the behavior of Union troops in

1864, at the siege of Petersburg, Virginia

during the Civil War. At Petersburg,

Union sappers (Pennsylvania coal miners)

mined a tunnel to the Confederate breastworks and planted tens of thousands of

pounds of explosives. The following detonation opened a huge gap in the rebel fortifications. Rather than rush into the gap

and seize the city, however, Union soldiers

stood in wonder and awe of the explosion

and found themselves completely defenseless as they attempted to scramble

up the loose soil on the far side of the crater; the opportunity for advancement was

lost. Perhaps, the commanders at NTS

thought, atomic blasts would produce the

same immobility.

The Army developed a war game scenario for BUSTER-JANGLE to evaluate

troops on a nuclear battlefield. In this ex-
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 85

ercise, two mythical enemy armies had

invaded the northwest coast of the United States, sending the U.S. forces retreating to the southeast. The enemy had

driven the U.S. Sixth Army back to a line

anchored by Los Angeles on one end and

the Nevada desert on the other. In Nevada, the enemy had established strong defensive positions, supposedly impervious

to a counterattack with conventional

weapons. To gain the offensive, the American forces would use an atomic bomb

dropped from a B-29, labeled Shot DOG,

then advance to capture the enemy’s positions.115

To conduct the war game, the military

sent nearly 3,000 troops, mainly drawn

from the Sixth U.S. Army based at the

Presidio in San Francisco, to a hastily

constructed encampment called Camp

Desert Rock. The purpose of bringing

troops to the test was to train soldiers in

the tactical use of atomic weapons and to

observe the reactions of soldiers to a nuclear detonation. At the same time, the

men would be instructed in radiation protection. The Armed Services also wished

to gather additional information on the

effects of a blast on animals, field fortifications, and military equipment.116

While AFSWP had occupied a central

role in the planning and coordinating stages of BUSTER-JANGLE, its role at the

test was relatively small and largely advisory. The most prominent was a group

of three officers who were assigned to

Camp Desert Rock and provided technical assistance and radiological safety advice to the Army troops participating in

Shot DOG. Before the shot, the group

briefed observers and troops on nuclear

weapons and their effects. Within an hour

after the detonation, at least one AFSWP

officer with a radiation monitor led the

combat teams toward ground zero to inspect damage to animals, equipment, and

fortifications. The group later assisted other military evaluation teams in assessing

data and preparing weapon effects reports.

In all, a total of eight AFSWP personnel

participated in BUSTER-JANGLE, five

of whom received radiation doses between one and three roentgens during

their participation at the tests. The Army

was pleased with the fact that none of the

film badges worn by Desert Rock combat or support troops read above 0.225

roentgen, “...well beneath the militarily

accepted limits,” and far below the 3.9

roentgen limit established by the AEC.117

Although most of the Desert Rock

troops departed after DOG, the Army requested that other units be allowed to witness two of the JANGLE shots: SUGAR,

a surface blast, and UNCLE, an underground detonation. The AEC reluctantly

agreed. The two JANGLE shots took

place during the last two weeks of NoSSgt. T.B. Davis and Cpl. J.E. Bell check

B-29 aircraft for radioactivity after its return from “hot” area during CHARLIE

event during Operation BUSTERJANGLE, October 31, 1951.
86 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

vember 1951. Both had a yield of 1.2 kilotons, relatively small detonations when

compared to the 21-kiloton DOG shot, but

radiation levels from the ground shots

proved to be much higher that those from

an air-dropped weapon. The troops participating in the remaining JANGLE series observed the shots from a distance

and toured the forward areas in buses.

They received even less radiation than the

shot DOG participants.118

The military’s satisfaction with the results of BUSTER-JANGLE led the Joint

Chiefs to push for continued weapons effects tests in Operation SNAPPER

planned for the spring of 1952. The AEC

and Los Alamos scientists viewed effects

testing as a hindrance to weapons development, but the MLC strongly argued that

nuclear tactics depended on a clear understanding of blast pressure data and the

proper heights for air bursts. On January

2, 1952, the AEC and Joint Chiefs agreed

on the urgent need for an air blast effects

test. Loper and the AEC test organization

worked out the details a week later in Los

Alamos. To include the military participation, the series was renamed Operation

TUMBLER-SNAPPER.119

The tests in the spring of 1952 marked

an increased role in radiation monitoring

at NTS. Los Alamos wanted to surrender

its responsibility for radiation safety at the

test site and the Department of Defense

quickly offered to assume that role. The

AFSWP headed that effort, under James

B. Hartgering, a Medical Corps officer on

the AFSWP staff. Hartgering planned the

radiation safety monitoring programs for

TUMBLER-SNAPPER and remained as

an advisor after an Air Force officer was

chosen to head the radiological safety

group.120

Radiation safety took on increased importance with the reopening of Camp

Desert Rock and the development of AFSWP’s plans to place combat troops some

7,000 yards from ground zero. Once more

military and scientific views clashed. The

AEC, which thought seven miles was

close enough, emphasized that something

might go amiss with an air drop, such as

an error in flight path or bomb release. Air

Force Brigadier General Alvin R. Luedecke, a Deputy Chief of AFSWP, wrote

the Commission that “...in the interest of

indoctrination of ground troops to an extent which would be of value in readying

them for the actual use of atomic weapons,” the rules had to be revised. Troops

should also be allowed to “...maneuver

in the vicinity of ground zero as soon as

practicable after the explosion.” To Luedecke, “a safe but tactically sound distance” was 7,000 yards. In the end, the

AEC gave in. If the Department of Defense, “...after review of the hazards involved, still feel that a military

requirement justifies the maneuver, the

Commission would enter no objection to

stationing troops at not less that 7,000

yards from ground zero.”121

The TUMBLER-SNAPPER tests

were similar to BUSTER-JANGLE. Test

CHARLIE, involving an air-dropped device of 31 kilotons fired on April 22, 1952,

troops observed from trenches some 7,000

yards south of ground zero. They were

asked a battery of questions relating to the

psychological reactions to the blast, then

advanced toward ground zero, moving

within 200 yards of the area. Army paratroopers landed in an area north of ground

zero. Radiation readings were relatively

low, with readings more than .01 roentgen per hour confined within the immediate area of ground zero.122

The second test during TUMBLERSNAPPER was conducted by the Navy

and Marine Corps. DOG, which yielded

19 kilotons, was dropped just over a week

later on the morning of May 1. Participants watched from the same trenches

overlooking Yucca Flat. A Marine Corps
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 87

Provisional Atomic Exercise Unit from

Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, the

first to participate in a nuclear test,

marched toward ground zero until stopped

by unexpectedly high levels of radiation.

Observers from the Navy took the same

psychological survey and accompanied

AFSWP monitoring teams during the initial survey of the ground zero area to learn

radiological monitoring techniques. But

there had been contamination and

“...much recovery work was unavoidably

delayed.” Nonetheless, the military was

satisfied with the care it had taken with

the Desert Rock troops at

TUMBLER-SNAPPER and would continue to push for troop participation at

nuclear tests.123

By the end of 1951, AFSWP’s role in

atomic testing had evolved to be more active in the planning stages than in actual

participation during the tests, an evolution

closer to the role anticipated in the Atomic Energy Act than desired by General

Groves in 1946.

TRANSITION

Between 1948 and 1952, atomic

weapons had become a vital component

of America’s defense. The advent of the

atomic age had a profound impact upon

AFSWP, the first military unit established

solely to deal with atomic weapons. The

Berlin Crisis, the Soviet development of

an atomic bomb, the Communist invasion

of South Korea, the development and production of the Mark IV bomb, and additional technical advances in nuclear

weapons design achieved by the scientists

at Los Alamos intensified the basic AFSWP mission as defined in 1946. The

Technical Training Group had significantly increased the numbers of classes coming through the program at Sandia Base,

both in the training of weapons assembly

teams and in courses for bomb commanders. Interservice training exercises between AFSWP and the other Services

increased in frequency as AFSWP sought

to refine and speed up both forward and

rear assembly operations.

Front gate of Camp Mercury, later renamed Nevada Test Site.
88 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

The administration’s softening on the

custody issue, particularly after the retirement of Lilienthal and the invasion of

Korea, prompted Truman to increase AFSWP’s responsibilities at the weapons

storage sites in the United States and to

transfer non-nuclear bomb components to

the military at bases within the country

and abroad and aboard aircraft carriers.

Old grumblings by scientists and others

at the AEC about military incompetence

to handle complex nuclear weapons became muted as the weapons became less

complicated, AFSWP technical training

and experience expanded, and storage and

surveillance costs borne by the AEC grew.

The Commission readily recognized that

its budget, already stretched to meet the

demands for greater production, could be

eased somewhat by allowing AFSWP to

assume more of the duties relating to the

stockpile.

AFSWP’s original mission placed it

on a Pentagon hot seat from the start. A

stepchild of the three Services, AFSWP

operated in an unexplored territory organized by the creation of the national military establishment. As interservice

rivalries intensified over which Service

would gobble up the largest slice of the

Soldiers from Desert Rock exercise sitting down, facing air-dropped DOG shot, part of Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, November 1, 1951.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 89

nuclear pie, AFSWP was caught in the

middle. Each Service branch wished to

have its own capability. Held under the

lamp of scrutiny and possible reorganization by the Pentagon, AFSWP was rescued by Forrestal at the Newport

Conference in August 1948. Thereafter,

the Services passed on more responsibilities, and less and less was heard about

AFSWP’s dissolution.

By 1952, AFSWP, because of its close

relationship to the three Services, the

MLC, the AEC, and other Washington

agencies, had proved its value and the

usefulness of an interservice organization.

AFSWP would go forward, as its technical staff prepared for a whole new series

of weapon tests during Operation IVY,

including the first thermonuclear test.
90 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

ENDNOTES

1. William Manchester, The Glory and the

Dream, (Bost on, 1974), p. 441; James T.

Patterson, Grand Expectations, (New

York, 1996), p. 134.

2. Patterson, Grand Expectations, p. 134;

Manchester, The Glory and the Dream,

p. 441.

3. Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany,

(New York, 1950), pp. 357-59, 365.

4. Life, vol. 24 (April 19, 1948): p. 47.

5. Khrushchev quoted in David Holloway,

Stalin and the Bomb, (New Haven, 1994),

p. 259; Truman quoted in Rhodes, Dark

Sun, p. 325.

6. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 260.

7. Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 359, 366;

Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 326, 329-30.

8. Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 366-68,

390-91; “The Squeeze on the Corridors,”

Newsweek, vol. 32 (July 26, 1948): pp.

30, 32. See also Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy, (New York, 1969), p.

700.

9. “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” p. 20.

10. “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” pp. 18-

20; Ibid., Chap. 5, Sandia Base, 5.52a.

11. “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” p. 20.

12. “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.52a-5.52b; “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” pp. 20-21; author’s conversation with Dorland,

October 5, 1996, Alexandria, Virginia.

13. “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.52a-5.52b.

14. “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” pp. 23-

24.

15. See Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, pp. 159-60.

16. Ibid., pp. 170-71; Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 428.

17. Ibid.; “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,”

p. 24.

18. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, p. 171; Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 401-2; Nichols, The Road

to Trinity, p. 265.

19. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, p. 160.

20. Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 361.

21. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries,

(New York, 1951), p. 459.

22. Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon:

The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War,

1945-1950 (New York, 1980), pp. 246-

48; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp.

271-72; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp.

459-60.

23. Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 462-63.

24. Clay told Joseph Alsop that the bomb prevented the Soviets from invading western Europe. See Noel Francis Parrish,

Behind the Sheltering Bomb (New York,

1979), p. 250. New York Times, July 16,

1948, 1; Ibid., July 17, 1948, 3; Newsweek, Vol. 32 (July 26, 1948): 32; Herken,

The Winning Weapon, p. 259; William R.

Harris, Functions of the Defense Nuclear Agency and its Predecessor Organizations, 1947-1994, DDR-997-OSD,

February 1995, p. 11.

25. Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, (New

York, 1987), p. 33; Samuel R. Williamson and Steven L. Rearden, The Origins

of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953,

(New York, 1993), p. 88; Truman quoted

in Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 326.

26. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 259; Lilienthal Journals, pp. 302-3.

27. Lilienthal Journals, p. 303; Nichols, The

Road to Trinity, pp. 258, 259.

28. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 259; Lilienthal Journals, p. 303.

29. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 260.

30. Ibid., pp. 260-61.

31. Ibid.

32. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 424,

282, 428-29; Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 263. Forrestal believed that the

American people placed too much value

on atomic weapons. He believed atomic

bombs were powerful but not decisive.

Royall, the Secretary of the Army, argued

that nuclear weapons might be decisive.

Both men agreed, according to Lilienthal,

that nuclear weapons “were best and almost the only thing we had that could be

used quickly.” See the Lilienthal Journals, p. 377.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 91

33. Lilienthal Journals, p. 374.

34. Ibid., p. 376.

35. Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 460-61;

Lilienthal Journals, p. 388-89; Rearden,

The Formative Years, p. 430; Nichols,

The Road to Trinity, pp. 263-64. Nichols

did not attend the meeting.

36. Lilienthal Journals, pp. 388-89.

37. Ibid., p. 390; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 461; Rearden, The Formative

Years, p. 430.

38. Lilienthal Journals, pp. 390-91.

39. Ibid., p. 391; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 461.

40. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 112-

13; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 461.

41. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 112-

13; “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,”

Chap. 4-Headquarters, 4.2.25; Nichols,

The Road to Trinity, p. 265.

42. Carpenter quoted in Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 113.

43. Ibid., p. 163; “First History of AFSWP,

vol. 1,” Chap. 5, Sandia Base, 5.54.

44. Neal O. Hines, Proving Ground, (Seattle, 1962), pp. 83-87; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/1947-1952, pp.

163-64; Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 369-70.

As early as November 1946, the Army

Air Corps, under a contract with New

York University, instituted a program

using “constant level” balloons which

carried a Sonobuoy and FM transmitter

launched from Alamagordo Army Air

Field (now Holloman Air Force Base) to

detect shock waves from nuclear explosions. The program, code-named Project

Mogul, used balloons made from neoprene, which degraded in sunlight and fell

back to earth. It was one of these balloons,

a GAO report stated, that crashed near

Roswell, New Mexico, in July 1947 and

gave rise to the mysterious “flying saucer” and captured alien stories which persist to the present. See Philip Greenstein,

“Radio Transmitting, Receiving and Recording System for Constant Level Balloon,” Project Report No. 4, March 31,

1947; New York Times, June 14, 1997, 1,

6, and Ibid., June 15, 1997, Arts and Leisure, 38.

45. Williamson and Rearden, The Origins of

U.S. Nuclear Strategy, p. 108; Rhodes,

Dark Sun, pp. 320-21.

46. Ibid.; “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,”

Chap. 5, Sandia Base, 5.54-5.55; Nichols,

The Road to Trinity, p. 269.

47. “First History of AFSWP, vol. 1,” p. 27.

48. Ibid., Chap. 5, Sandia Base, 5.135-5.141.

49. Ibid., 5.62-5.66.

50. Ibid., p. 27; Chap. 5, Sandia Base, 5.55.

51. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.56, 5.63-6.64; “First

History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1,” p. 27.

52. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 266.

53. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.57; “First History of

AFSWP,” Vol. 1, p. 28.

54. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, pp. 266-67.

55. Ibid., pp. 267-68.

56. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.58; “First History of

AFSWP,” Vol. 1, p. 28.

57. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.59.

58. Ibid., 5.59-5.60.

59. Rearden, The Formative Years, pp. 397-

98; Frank Camm, “Chronology of Early

Days at Sandia Base,” 1996, DSWA History Project Files. The Air Force opposed

Navy participation in the atomic weapons program because of the limited stockpile and its desire to assume all

responsibility for delivering atomic

weapons. The results of SANDSTONE,

which eased stockpile pressures and led

to the development of smaller weapons,

enabled the Navy to renew its demand to

have carrier-based nuclear weapons. See

Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 265.

60. Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 431;

Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 268;

“First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.61-5.62.

61. Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 431;

“First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 1, Chap.

5, Sandia Base, 5.61-5.62.

62. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 268.

63. Text relies heavily on materials from

Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, (Berkeley, 1994), pp. 40-42, in the

passage on Project NUTMEG.
92 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

64. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 40.

65. Ibid.

66. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 2, Chap.

3, Headquarters, 3.2.39-3.2.40. In nuclear weapons terminology, a significantly

new design receives a new Mark number. Subsequent improvements to the

same basic design are designated with

modification (or mod) numbers by

changing the second digit.

67. Ibid., Headquarters, 3.2.40, referencing

Nichols to Lilienthal, January 26, 1949,

and Carroll L. Wilson to Nichols, March

7, 1949.

68. Ibid., Headquarters, 3.2.41, referencing

Nichols to Lilienthal, July 19, 1949, and

James McCormack to Nichols, October

27, 1949.

69. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 2, Chap.

3, Headquarters, 3.2.34-3.2.35.

70. Ibid., Headquarters, 3.2.35-3.2.37.

71. Ibid., Headquarters, 1949, 3.2.30-3.2.32.

72. Ibid., Headquarters, 3.2.43-3.2.49.

73. Ibid.

74. Beside Dorland, other Sandia “Pioneers”

continued with the 8460th, including

Captain John H. Cushman, Major Lowell L. Wilkes, and Captain D. A. Kellog.

See “First History of AFSWP,” General,

pp. 29-30.

75. “First History of AFSWP,” General, pp.

31, 33, 36.

76. Ibid., 32.

77. Ibid., 36.

78. “First History of AFSWP,” General, p.

37; Ibid., vol. 2, Chap. 3, “Headquarters,

1949,” 3.3.10a-3.3.11.

79. Weaponeers: all inclusive term for assembly and deployment personnel associated with nuclear weapons.

80. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 2, Chap.

3, “Headquarters, 1949,” 3.3.12-3.3.13;

Ibid., 3.7.12-3.7.13.

81. “First History of AFSWP,” General, pp.

36-37; Ibid., Vol. 2, Chap. 3, “Headquarters, 1949,” 3.3.4-3.3.10.

82. Ibid., “Headquarters, 1949,” 3.9.4-3.9.7

and 3.1.2-3.1.3.

83. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 2, Chap.

3, “Headquarters, 1949,” 3.2.1-3.2.3,

3.2.27.

84. Ibid., 3.2.27-3.2.28; Ibid., 3.6.11-3.6.12.

85. Ibid., 3.2.24-3.2.25 and 3.7.10-3.7.11;

Glasstone’s first edition appeared in

1957. He wrote revised editions in 1962

and 1977.

86. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 2, Chap.

3, “Headquarters, 1949,” 3.5.53-3.5.57.

87. Williamson and Rearden, The Origins of

U.S. Nuclear Strategy, pp. 109-11.

88. Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under

Harry Truman, (Washington, 1994), p.

319; see also Rearden, The Formative

Years, pp. 613, fn. 79. At the time of the

Joe-1 explosion, the Applied Physics

Branch of the Evans Signal Laboratory

in Belmar, New Jersey, had developed an

ultra-low frequency sound detection system for locating such explosions. Colonel Ord, who was assigned to Evans

Laboratory, recalled that the system

“...had obtained readings indicating a

possible Soviet test...” but he was never

told if President Truman factored this information in his announcement of the Soviet test. (Col. Ord to Chris Brahmstedt,

April 3, 1998).

89. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 213-

17, 220.

90. Nichols, The Road to Trinity, p. 272;

Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 372-73.

91. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 215-

17.

92. “MLC Comments Concerning H-Bomb

Developments,” June 16, 1954, Secretary’s Files, AEC 493/37, Record Group

326, National Archives.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

95. Barton Berstein, “Truman, Acheson, and

the H-Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 60, no. 6

(June 1983): p. 21.

96. Ibid., pp. 9-15.

97. Roger M. Anders, ed., Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean, (Chapel Hill,

1987), pp. 65, 70-71.

98. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952 93

99. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, pp. 415-16; Rhodes, Dark

Sun, pp. 420-21. Report quoted in

Rhodes. No one at Los Alamos, where

scientists might have made a keener analysis of the impact of Fuchs’ information,

reviewed the report. Ibid., p. 420. Even

today, the impact of Fuchs’ spying and

its potential on Soviet nuclear weapons

production is in debate. In the early

1950s, it was natural to credit Soviet success to stolen American secrets. Fuchs’

confession fueled this attitude. Recent

studies on the Soviet program, however,

offer alternate interpretations of Fuchs

and credit intelligence from other Soviet

spies or sources as being more important,

especially in the development of a thermonuclear weapon. Fuchs had left Los

Alamos before the scientists had discovered a way to build a workable thermonuclear device. See David Halloway,

Stalin and the Bomb, New Haven: 1994,

and Frank H. Shelton, “A Perspective:

Reflections on the Big Red Bombs,” Science & Technology Digest, August 1996,

p. 9.

100. Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 450.

101. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, pp. 415-17; Berstein, “Truman, Acheson, and the H-Bomb,” 34;

Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 419-21.

102. Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 379; Hewlett and

Duncan, Atomic Shield/1947-1952, p.

371; Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation

GREENHOUSE, 1951, DNA Report

6034F, pp. 21, 226.

103. Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 457.

104. DNA, Operation GREENHOUSE, 1951,

pp. 157-58, 226; Richard G. Hewlett to

author, June 27, 1997, DSWA History

Project Archives; Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950,” p. 26.

105. “Operation RANGER,” DNA Report

6022F, Nuclear Test Personnel Review,

February 1982, pp. 19-25.

106. Ibid., pp. 42, 37-40, 50-64.

107. John Newhouse, War and Peace in the

Nuclear Age, (New York, 1989) p. 83;

Nichols, Road to Trinity, p. 282; Loper

to Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, May 29,

1951, RG 374, Box 3, Folder 322, Field

Command, Sandia, 1951-1971, NARA II.

108. Ibid.

109. Joint Chiefs to Loper, “Mission and Responsibilities of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project,” July 12, 1951.

110. Defense Nuclear Agency, “Shots ABLE

to EASY: The First Five Tests of the

BUSTER-JANGLE Series, 22 October5 November 1951,” DNA 6024F, 1982,

pp. 67-68.

111. Ibid., 68; Howard L. Rosenberg, Atomic

Soldiers, (Boston, 1980), pp. 43-44.

112. See Herbert B. Loper to Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army, May 28, 1951, RG 374, Box

3, Folder 322, Field Command, Sandia,

1951-1971, NARA II.

113. “Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, 1951,”

Defense Nuclear Agency, DNA 6023F,

NTPR, 1982, pp. 20-22.

114. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield/

1947-1952, p. 563; Defense Nuclear

Agency, “Operation BUSTER-JANGLE,

1951, DNA 6023F, 1982, 135-152; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 67.

115. Defense Nuclear Agency, “Shots ABLE

to EASY,” DNA 6024F, pp. 69-70;

Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers, p. 43.

116. “Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, 1951,”

DNA 6023F, 1982, pp. 46-48.

117. Defense Nuclear Agency, “Shots ABLE

to EASY: The First Five Tests of the

BUSTER-JANGLE Series, 22 October5 November 1951,” DNA 6024F, 1982,

65, 68; Ibid., “Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, 1951,” DNA 6023F, 1982, p. 144;

Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 70-71. The NTPR study of

Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, published in 1982, lists eight Navy participants from AFSWP, three Army

representatives, and 12 Air Force participants. The highest radiation exposure to

the AFSWP contingent was to one individual who received a total dose of 3.8

roentgen. See Ibid., pp. 135-152.

118. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 71.

119. Ibid., 72-73.

120. Ibid., 73.

121. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 75-76.
94 THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, 1949 TO 1952

122. Defense Nuclear Agency, “Operation

Tumbler-Snapper, 1952,” DNA 6019F,

NTPR, 1982, pp. 3-4;

123. Ibid., 4-5; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 78-81.
ADVENT OF THE

THERMONUCLEAR AGE

On the morning of June 30, 1952,

AEC Chairman Gordon Dean and members of his staff entered the Oval Office

for a meeting with President Truman. Accompanying them were General Kenneth

E. Fields, the director of the AEC’s Division of Military Application, and Norris

E. Bradbury, director of the Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory. Fields opened a

wooden case he was carrying and displayed for the President a scale model of

MIKE, which was scheduled for testing

at Enewetak in the autumn. As Bradbury

and Fields explained, MIKE could not be

considered a weapon prototype; it was too

big, too heavy, and too much like a Rube

Goldberg contraption to earn that designation, but the nation’s hopes for beating

the Soviet Union to the hydrogen bomb

rested on MIKE.1

Drawing on the success in igniting a

small amount of tritium in the GEORGE

shot at GREENHOUSE a year before, the

MIKE device would test the feasibility of

igniting a substantial amount of deuterium in what, in essence, would be an immovable but powerful thermonuclear

device. Los Alamos estimated that if it

worked, MIKE would produce a blast

equal to 5-10 megatons of TNT. The devastation wrought by such a weapon would

be almost incomprehensible. So awesome

was the possibility that the National Security Council asked the Psychological

Strategy Board to consider how the American public might first be informed about

the arrival of the thermonuclear age.2

Until MIKE could be fired, it was imperative to maintain the highest possible

secrecy around that event, not just to keep

information from the Soviet Union but

also to avoid wild speculation that might

terrify the American people. The words

“thermonuclear” and “hydrogen bomb”

were not to be spoken even within the

security confines of the AEC, AFSWP, or

the JCS.

The timing of the shot, scheduled for

November 1, 1952 (Pacific Time), was

also a concern of the administration. The

We are in the era of the thermonuclear bomb that can obliterate cities

and can be delivered across continents. With such weapons, war has

become, not just tragic, but preposterous.”

President Dwight D. Eisenhower,

Republican National Convention,

August 23, 1956

“

CHAPTER THREE

THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957
96 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

President was about to hit the campaign

trail in an attempt to prevent the Republicans from putting General Eisenhower in

the White House. Firing MIKE just four

days before the Presidential election

raised the danger of entangling the test in

a political battle. Truman hoped that the

test could be postponed at least until November 5, the day after the election, but

when that proved impossible for technical reasons, he agreed to the scheduled

date.

By late October the 2,000 military and

civilian personnel in Joint Task Force 132,

under the command of Major General

Percy W. Clarkson*, were completing the

installation on Elugelab Island on the

northern rim of the Enewetak Atoll, 23

miles from Clarkson’s base at Enewetak

and Parry Islands on the south rim. The

test device, weighing more than 80 tons,

sat in a large building which housed the

cryogenic plant needed to keep the deuterium fuel in liquid form. Stretching

away from the black building was a low

wooden helium-filled tube.3

As with GREENHOUSE, the overriding purpose of the IVY series was weapon development, so AFSWP had virtually

no direct participation on the atoll. The

agency, however, had a crucial role in

planning and coordinating weapon effects

tests to be performed by all three military

Services. This planning effort spanned

more than a year as AFSWP, headquartered at the Pentagon, determined what

tests were needed and how they should

be conducted. By the summer of 1952,

AFSWP had negotiated an approved list

of 21 projects. The Air Force was responsible for long-range detection of seismic

waves and recording the fireball at a distance. Navy scientists conducted an extensive geophysical and marine survey of

the atoll before the tests to establish a

benchmark for measuring the effects of

the blast. Navy teams also installed instrumentation to record underwater pressures,

thermal radiation, and sea waves produced by the detonation while ships in the

Navy Task Force were responsible for

gathering fallout to measure intensity and

distribution. The Army Signal Corps set

up instruments to measure electromagnetic phenomena while the Chemical Corps

was prepared to analyze fallout and cloud

particles. Similar projects, but on a smaller scale, were set up for Shot KING, to

be detonated after MIKE.4

OPERATION IVY

Concerns about weather conditions

threatened to delay the firing of MIKE,

but General Clarkson gave the order to

fire as scheduled on the morning of October 31, 1952 (local time). By that time

base operations at Enewetak and Parry

Islands had been evacuated to Task Force

ships, which retreated to positions east

and south of the Enewetak Atoll to avoid

possible fallout and blast effects. Most of

the instrumentation installed by Scientific Task Group 132.1 performed as expected, and the yield of the shot was soon

determined to be 10.4 megatons, at the upper end of the expected range. For observers on the ships, the experience of

witnessing a shot in the megaton range

was awesome. As one observer recorded

after detonation of MIKE:

“Accompanied by a brilliant light, the

heat wave was felt immediately at distances of thirty to thirty-five miles. The tremendous fireball, appearing on the horizon

like the sun when half-risen, quickly expanded after a momentary hover time and

appeared to be approximately a mile in

* A June 30, 1951 JCS Letter of Instruction,

with AEC concurrence, designated authority to

General Clarkson, Commander of Joint Task

Force 132, to activate Scientific Task Group

132.1, to oversee Operation IVY (Shots MIKE

and KING) in 1952.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 97

Firing party standing in front of MIKE device prior to detonation; left to right, H.E. Grier,

S.W. Burriss, R.T. Lunger, and M.D. Sprinkel.

diameter before the cloud-chamber effect

and scud clouds obscured it from view. A

very large cloud-chamber effect was visible shortly after the detonation and a tremendous conventional mushroom-shaped

cloud soon appeared, seemingly balanced

on a wide, dirty stem. Apparently, the dirty

stem was due to the coral particles, debris, and water which was sucked up high

into the air. Around the base of the stem,

there appeared to be a curtain of water

which soon dropped back around the area

where the island of Elugelab had been.

The shock wave and sound arrived at the

various ships approximately two and onehalf minutes after the detonation, accompanied by a sharp report, followed by an

extended rumbling sound. The pressure

pulse and the reduced pressure period as

received by the ear were exceptionally

long. Although the upper cloud first appeared unusually white, a reddish-brown

color could be seen within the shadows of

its boiling mass as it ascended to greater

height and spread out over the atoll area.

At approximately H+30 minutes, the upper cloud was roughly sixty miles in diameter with a stem, or lower cloud,

approximately twenty miles in diameter.

The juncture of the stem with the upper

cloud was at an altitude of about 45,000

feet.” 5
98 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

Within six hours the cloud had risen

to 118,000 feet and appeared to have penetrated the tropical tropopause. Although

the cloud moved to the northwest as expected, efforts to track it by ship and by

aircraft from Kwajalein proved difficult

as the cloud eventually split into four segments. With no land-based collection

points north and west of Enewetak, a comprehensive map of MIKE fallout could not

be drawn. MIKE had been a stunning success and its implications for the future

were staggering.

THE EISENHOWER IMPRINT

Less than a week after the MIKE shot

and the Presidential election, Roy B.

Snapp, the secretary of the AEC, hurried

to the Augusta National Golf Club in

Georgia to brief the President-elect,

Dwight D. Eisenhower, on what had occurred at Enewetak. Eisenhower initially

seemed more interested in developing

atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but

he quickly sensed the significance of

MIKE. He was troubled by the growing

power of nuclear weapons and understood

the scientific interest in developing more

powerful and efficient weapons, but he

thought there was no need “...for us to

build enough destructive power to destroy

everything.” “Complete destruction,” he

said, “was the negation of peace.” The

United States needed enough force to

meet the Soviet threat, but he neither

feared the Russians nor thought that kind

of fear should influence American foreign

policy. Secrecy, however, was all important. The President-elect saw no need to

release any information at all about the

tests at Enewetak.6

Eisenhower reinforced these opinions

in a secret two-hour meeting with officials

at AEC headquarters on November 19,

1952. While he supported the Commission’s efforts to build a growing arsenal

of nuclear weapons, he was still uneasy

about the possession of so much physical

power. He seemed to understand the possibilities of human failure, misdirected

ambition and treachery in the nuclear era.

Eisenhower made clear a key principle of

his administration: a dedication to economy in government, in terms of both funding and federal authority.

Eisenhower’s decisive victory in the

1952 election–“I Like Ike” movement–

swept Republicans into control of Congress for the first time in 20 years and

brought about massive changes in the

leadership of federal departments and

agencies. Within DoD, as elsewhere,

American industry with its conservative

economic principles would have a strong

voice. Eisenhower appointed General

Motors President, Charles E. Wilson, to

be Secretary of Defense and a few days

later selected four industrialists to fill the

positions of Deputy Secretary and the

three Service secretaries. The nomination

of John Foster Dulles to be Secretary of

State in December of 1953 revealed

Eisenhower’s determination to take new

and decisive initiatives in international

affairs. That same month, before his inauguration, the President-elect made a trip

to Korea. Shortly after his inauguration,

to make certain that the war did not break

out again, Eisenhower let it be known

through diplomatic channels that “...we

intend to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons.” Thus, the

threat of nuclear warfare was to be a significant element in American foreign policy in the new administration.7

During the hectic weeks that preceded his inauguration, the new President

could not dispel the image of MIKE.

Eisenhower did not refer directly to the

thermonuclear development in his inaugural address on January 20, 1953, but there

were overtones in his speech:

“Are we nearing the light—a day of

freedom and of peace for all mankind? Or
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 99

are the shadows of another night closing

in upon us ... This trial comes at a moment when man’s power to achieve good

or to inflict evil surpasses the brightest

hopes and sharpest fears of all ages...

Science seems ready to confer upon us,

as its final gift, the power to erase human

life from this planet.”8

THE CHALLENGE FOR AFSWP

Just a week before the President’s inaugural address, Major General Herbert

B. Loper, who had served for two years

as AFSWP Chief, suffered a heart attack

and was forced to retire from the Army.

Fortunately, the agency had a highly qualified and experienced officer in Air Force

Brigadier General Alvin R. Luedecke to

assume leadership in the difficult months

that lay ahead.

At the age of 53, Luedecke already

had 21 years of military Service, beginning with a reserve commission in the

Army when he graduated from Texas

A&M in 1932. The following year he

transferred to the Army Air Force, completed flight training, and served in air

operations in the Canal Zone and as Assistant Military Attaché for Air in Central

America. During World War II, he was

Deputy Chief of Air Staff for the Army

Air Force in the India-Burma theater and

then Assistant Chief of Staff in the China

theater. After the war he was an Air Force

member of the Joint Strategic Plans Group

of the JCS and Executive Secretary of the

MLC before joining AFSWP in 1951.

In his new position General Luedecke

would be the connecting link between the

MLC, Field Command in Albuquerque,

and the three Armed Services. With General Nichols’ departure as Chief of AFSWP, his successors were not appointed

to the MLC but served that body only as

observers. For Luedecke, this arrangement proved no hindrance; rather, it gave

him more flexibility. He continued to meet

with the advisory committee regularly and

had direct access to its members in all

three Services, and particularly to Robert

LeBaron, who served not only as Advisory Committee Chairman but also as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

(Atomic Energy). Luedecke, like his predecessors, reported directly to the JCS and

to each of the chiefs individually. He had

no direct line to Secretary of Defense

Wilson or to the White House, but through

LeBaron and the Joint Chiefs he could

command attention at the highest levels.

Luedecke’s headquarters command in

the Pentagon was small, but it was staffed

with experienced officers and civilian scientists.9 Most prominent among the civilians was Herbert Scoville, Jr., who

served as technical director and technical

advisor to Luedecke. It was Scoville who

had noted the lack of adequate data on

height of burst curves taken in the BUSTER-JANGLE test series and who had initiated action to incorporate additional

Major General Alvin R. Luedecke, AFSWP

Director, 1953-1957.
100 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

projects on this subject in the forthcoming UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE series, to be

held in the spring of 1953.

While Scoville worked with Sandia

and Los Alamos on weapon development

for UPSHOT, the Weapons Effects Division had, since 1951, been developing

plans with the Armed Services for weapon effects tests during UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. By the time Luedecke took

command in 1953, the division was working on preliminary plans for effects experiments to be conducted in 11 more test

series tentatively scheduled for the next

five years.10 Planning was based on extended discussions with the Armed Services to determine what kinds of effects

data were most critical for their operations

and then to consider the experimental programs and instrumentation that would

produce the data. Headquarters staff

awarded contracts to defense and university laboratories for studies of the possible environmental effects of radiation

from nuclear weapons during UPSHOT.

The activities of the Weapons Test Division paralleled those of the Weapons Effects Division in terms of long-range

planning and technical support of each test

series.11

During AFSWP’s first three years, the

agency relied on such other government

organizations as the AEC’s national laboratories, the National Bureau of Standards, and the Army Chemical Corps, for

research and development. In the 1950s,

as typified by the effects testing during

UPSHOT, AFSWP began to seek support

from universities, industrial contractors,

and service laboratories; a practice that became a permanent feature of the agency.

If AFSWP Headquarters was becoming a research and development agency,

it was even more a training organization,

as it always had been. The Operations and

Training Division at Headquarters, in

combination with the school facilities at

Field Command, was responsible for a

broad range of activities, beginning with

training of military personnel assigned to

AFSWP to assemble, handle, and store

weapons and extending to individual

training courses for air crews, staff officers, and atomic defense teams. The division also prepared films and orientation

material for members of Congress and

other government officials who would be

observers at Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, as well as military units involved

in exercises and maneuvers during some

of the shots. During 1953 more than 7,000

military personnel would be involved in

AFSWP training courses. In support of

operations, the division coordinated training programs in atomic defense within

DoD, conducted scores of technical training courses for air crews and DoD personnel involved in assembly and

maintenance of nuclear weapons, and prepared dozens of training films. AFSWP

carried out these training activities within the complex and often changing working relationships among the three Armed

Services, the laboratories, and the AEC.12

Additionally, on October 16, 1953, the

Secretary of Defense directed AFSWP to

maintain “a centralized system of reporting and accounting to ensure that the current status and location” of each nuclear

weapon “will be known at all times.” This

critical function resulted in the establishment of AFSWP’s Atomic Warfare Status Center, which continued throughout

the history of the agency.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN

WEAPON DEVELOPMENT

In at least two ways, the Operation

IVY Series, which included MIKE,

KING, and other tests, marked a turning

point in weapon development. The KING

shot on November 15, 1952, with a yield

of 550 kilotons, was the most powerful

fission stockpile weapon ever detonated.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 101

However, the tests were used not to produce larger fission weapons, but to develop a growing variety of small weapons,

including new missile and rocket warheads and such tactical weapons as artillery shells and demolition munitions.

The first way that MIKE affected

AFSWP involved the rapid proliferation

of nuclear warhead designs, many of

which could be adapted for use with a variety of weapon systems. This greatly increased the planning and coordination

responsibilities for AFSWP in training

courses, weapon test planning, warhead

assembly, and weapon storage maintenance, both at Headquarters and Field

Command.

The second way that MIKE affected

AFSWP was that it launched the joint

organization into the thermonuclear age,

with all its risks and responsibilities. The

enormous power of MIKE seemed to validate Lewis Strauss’ prediction that the

hydrogen bomb would represent a giant

leap in nuclear weapon capability and

hence would keep the United States ahead

of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The

pressures on thermonuclear development

brought by the JCS, the Joint Committee

on Atomic Energy, and scientists like

Ernest O. Lawrence and Edward Teller

had a powerful impact, not just on the

AEC and Los Alamos, but on AFSWP as

well. MIKE demonstrated what was possible, but it did not lead directly to a deliverable thermonuclear weapon.

Eisenhower saw that point at his very first

briefing in Augusta, Georgia. He was concerned that it would take a year or more

after MIKE to produce a deliverable

weapon.

Dr. Edward Teller had become so impatient with the lack of progress at Los

Alamos that he had resigned from the laboratory and, with support from the Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy, had

forced the AEC to build a second weapons laboratory operated by Lawrence Livermore’s Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California. The UPSHOT series in

1953 would be the first to include test devices from both laboratories.13

The painful fact was that a prototype

of a deliverable thermonuclear weapon

would not be ready for testing until Operation CASTLE in the fall of 1953 or the

spring of 1954. In the meantime, Los Alamos and Sandia hastened to develop and

produce “emergency” weapons, that is,

models that could go into the stockpile

without the assurances of full-scale testing.14 Although these “emergency” weapons were not deployed, their development

characterize the pressures of the Cold War

in early 1953.

With weapon development moving

toward smaller devices with smaller

yields in parallel with the high-yield thermonuclear designs, the continental test

site would be flooded with requirements

for dozens of shots, while the Pacific test

areas at Enewetak and Bikini Atolls would

be reserved for the thermonuclear shots

in the megaton range that were too large

for detonation in Nevada. As the number

of thermonuclear tests increased, operations in the Pacific would become almost

continuous, as plans for new test series

followed on the heels of those already

completed.

Reflecting this change in the frequency of Pacific tests, the JCS abandoned the

practice of creating a special Joint Task

Force for each Pacific series and created

Joint Task Force 7 as a permanent organization for those tests. In the short term,

this change lightened the burden on AFSWP when the new Task Force took over

responsibility for technical reports from

IVY, but in April 1953, the JCS gave AFSWP responsibility for exercising

“...within any Task Force organization,

technical direction of weapons effects

tests of primary concern to the Armed
102 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

Forces and the weapons effects phases of

development or other tests of atomic

weapons.”15

EXPANSION OF FIELD COMMAND

AFSWP’s operational arm at Field

Command inherited greater responsibility as Pacific test and training roles increased. Field Command Director,

Brigadier General Leland S. Stranathan

and his deputy, Rear Admiral Frederick

M. Trapnell, held jurisdiction over the

base and all tenant organizations, including the buildings used by the Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Western Electric

and a prime contractor of the AEC. Sandia Corporation had the task of taking designs created by Los Alamos and,

beginning in 1953 by Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, transforming them

into fully engineered and operational

weapons. In this process, Field Command

staff worked closely with the Sandia Corporation and the laboratories at Los Alamos and Livermore. Stranathan and

members of his staff could make regular

trips to Los Alamos for meetings with scientists on weapon design, while a small

resident staff provided the same function

at Livermore.

On-site training was a major responsibility of Field Command, both for weapon assembly teams and for those assigned

to test and storage operations. Field Command continued to supervise the training

and performance of military personnel assigned to weapon assembly, monitored

AEC activities, revised production schedules as required, and maintained master

schedules to establish priorities for personnel and facilities. In addition to operating assembly and storage facilities, Field

Command coordinated testing of all kinds

of electronic and other components of

each weapon type, including drop tests,

barometric pressure sensing, fuzing, and

ballistic performance. With the Air Force,

Field Command directed the modification

of aircraft and ground-handling equipment to accommodate the variety of airborne weapons entering the stockpile. To

speed the development of emergency

weapons that would enter the stockpile

without testing, the AEC, with AFSWP’s

assistance helped to define assembly procedures and proof-test an assembly kit, all

in accordance with ground rules established by Los Alamos.16

With broad responsibilities for construction, supply, and logistics at Sandia

Base, the weapon storage sites, and other

Armed Forces installations throughout the

nation, Field Command, in 1953, was a

large organization that boasted 10,250

staff, consisting of 1,550 officers, 7,100

enlisted personnel, and 1,600 civilians.17

As the tempo of continental testing increased, whole units of engineering and

operations personnel moved from Sandia

Base to the Nevada Proving Grounds to

begin construction and installation of

equipment months before a forthcoming

test series. At the same time, Field Command had to adjust to direct participation

in Pacific tests, a requirement that led to

Agency coordination throughout 1953

with Joint Task Force 7.18

LUEDECKE INITIATIVES

In 1953, as new weapon designs

emerged from Los Alamos and Livermore

and additional storage sites were constructed for the increasing number of assembled weapons entering the stockpile,

General Luedecke, like his predecessors,

put the question of custody high on his

agenda. A week after Eisenhower’s inauguration Luedecke wrote a memorandum

for the JCS proposing that DoD seek custody of just enough weapons “...to meet

deployment and delivery requirements for

initial strike operations of all strategic and

tactical forces.” Such an arrangement, in

Luedecke’s opinion, would suffice until
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 103

the new administration had time to reexamine the thorny question of custody.

Partial custody of the stockpile would not

be an acceptable long-term solution, but

in the short run it might improve security, operational flexibility, and military

readiness. Certainly it would avoid another nasty fight with the AEC if complete

transfer were not proposed. When asked

in a session with the Joint Chiefs on February 10 to list the disadvantages of such

a move, Luedecke admitted that partial

custody would be inefficient, expensive,

and not very practical for a number of

reasons. The following week, however, he

learned from Robert LeBaron that Secretary of State Dulles, in a meeting of the

National Security Council, had maintained that nuclear weapons should be an

integral part of the military weapon system and that all nuclear weapons should

be transferred to DoD. Dulles further argued that DoD should be responsible for

its own non-nuclear hardware, which

LeBaron interpreted to include research,

development, production, and storage of

all non-nuclear components.19

Although Roger M. Keyes, the new

Deputy Secretary of Defense, agreed with

Dulles’ position on custody, he asked the

Joint Chiefs to reexamine the whole question. This request brought Luedecke center stage once again as he briefed the JCS

on the opinions of Dulles and Keyes and

then directed an AFSWP staff study,

which he sent informally to the Joint

Chiefs’ Strategic Plans Committee. The

result was a memorandum from the JCS

Brigadier General Leland S. Stranathan (center), Commander of AFSWP Field Command,

along with Dr. Frank Shelton, (left) and Colonel Jack James (right) after Operation TEAPOT,

Shot MET, in 1955.
104 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

to Secretary of Defense Wilson recommending transfer of the entire stockpile

to DoD. Part of the package was a draft

directive giving AFSWP responsibility for

centralized control of, and accountability

for, the stockpile. The Chief of AFSWP

would report directly to the Secretary of

Defense on the operational and technical

status of the stockpile and would maintain a centralized system of reporting and

accounting for the status and location of

all weapons and components in DoD custody.20

Luedecke was also present at a meeting of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on April 15, 1953,

to discuss the custody issue. Keyes and

Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S.

Vandenberg spoke for the Defense Department. Walter Bedell Smith, Under

Secretary, represented the State Department while Gordon Dean and two of his

fellow commissioners opposed transfer of

custody to DoD. Despite Keyes’ strong arguments for transfer, Dean convinced the

special committee that there was nothing

wrong with Commission custody of the

stockpile. The Commission understood

the need for flexibility and readiness and

assured the committee that the Commission could transfer weapons to the military within the time limits specified for

an emergency situation.21

Keyes and Luedecke had one consolation. Just three weeks earlier Secretary

Wilson had signed an agreement with

Chairman Dean setting forth in detail a

cooperative plan defining the functions

and responsibilities of the two agencies

in the development, production, and standardization of nuclear weapons. The

agreement did not touch on the custody

issue, but it did specify the roles of the

AEC and the DoD in weapon conception,

determination of feasibility, development,

first production, quantity assurance, and

stockpile maintenance. No longer would

the Commission have sole authority in

these areas; in each area both the AEC and

the DoD would have complementary responsibilities. The AFSWP Weapons Development Division had spent months

drafting each section of the agreement and

had cleared its provisions with the three

Armed Services. It was an agreement both

the AEC and DoD could live with, and it

gave the military Services, for the first

time, a significant role in nuclear weapon

development.

The new agreement, in fact, reflected

cooperative procedures that were already

being used. Early in 1953 AFSWP and the

Commission’s Division of Military Application had agreed to replace radar fuzes

with barometric devices on some weapons after determining that radar fuzes gave

no advantage in weapon effects but greatly increased operational and logistics

problems in maintaining weapon reliability. At the same time Field Command and

Sandia Corporation had worked out a plan

to standardize fuzes for all weapons.22

This agreement, with two amendments,

remained in effect as of 1997 as the baseline document for clarifying nuclear

weapon life cycle roles between the two

departments.

Useful as the new agreement was, it

did not resolve the custody issue, and Luedecke was not about to give up the fight.

On April 17, he briefed Lewis L. Strauss,

the former AEC Commissioner and now

special assistant to President Eisenhower. In explaining the operation and maintenance of the stockpile, Luedecke was

careful not to criticize the Commission in

light of rumors that Strauss would soon

replace Dean as chairman. Rather, he described the confusion and duplication of

effort inherent in the existing arrangement

under which the AEC maintained custody of the weapons while AFSWP was responsible for building and operating the

storage sites. The following week Lue-
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 105

decke received a staff study by Headquarters and Field Command that concluded

that transfer of “...the complete stockpile

of atomic weapons and weapons components to DoD was necessary to ensure the

military readiness and operational flexibility required by the Armed Forces to

conduct atomic warfare.”23

Before Luedecke could present his

study to the JCS, he learned that the President was prepared to transfer custody to

DoD. Acting on this rumor, Luedecke ordered the Plans Division to draft memorandums, directives, and agreements

needed to implement the President’s order. Field Command prepared similar orders, and all was ready for Presidential

action by the end of May. Luedecke was

impatient but optimistic. From what he

could learn, the President intended to

transfer 95 percent of the stockpile to

DoD, and this was to be accomplished

without public announcement in order to

avoid any “...public reaction or international political implications.”24

Although this rumor did not prove entirely accurate, in June the President did

authorize deployment of some nuclear

components to military installations outside the continental United States. A

month later the AEC was directed to transfer the components to the Chief of AFSWP. It would be the first such component

transfer to AFSWP and a chink in the custody armor of AEC.25

OPERATION

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

More than a year of planning by Los

Alamos, Livermore, and Field Command

culminated in UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE,

an 11-shot series at the Nevada Proving

Grounds conducted in 1953. Now, for the

first time, Field Command had full responsibility for all the military exercises

in a Nevada test series. As with TUMBLER-SNAPPER series in 1952, Field

Command faced the difficulties of melding the military projects with the everchanging plans of the Los Alamos and

Livermore scientists in scheduling and

setting the yields for the diagnostic tests

of new weapon designs. Ultimately, Los

Alamos conducted six diagnostic shots

during the UPSHOT program, five of

which were tied to military and/or civilian effects tests in KNOTHOLE. Livermore had two diagnostic tests on novel

weapon designs. Los Alamos devoted

only three shots for weapon effects: two

air drops to simulate combat conditions

for troop maneuvers and one, GRABLE,

a test of a nuclear warhead in an artillery

shell fired from a 280-millimeter cannon,

the first test ever of such a weapon. The

effects tests conducted by Field Command

included blast, thermal, and radiation

measurements similar to those at SNAPPER, as well as survivability/vulnerability studies of trucks, railroad stock,

communications equipment, and aircraft.26

Following troop exercises during the

1952 TUMBLER-SNAPPER tests, AFSWP began planning for DESERT ROCK

V, part of UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, in the

spring of 1953. For weeks AFSWP negotiated with the AEC to obtain full responsibility for the safety of all troops and to

set the safety criteria for radiation exposure. The Commission delayed approval

for fear of public criticism if some troops

were injured or exposed to excessive radiation doses. There was also concern that

DoD would set exposure limits higher

than the Commission had permitted in the

past. Not until January 1953 was a compromise reached. The Test Manager (an

AEC official) would set the overall radiological and safety criteria for the Nevada

Proving Grounds but would oversee implementation only for those “...other than

troops and troop observers.” In fact, radiological safety tests for DESERT
106 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

ROCK V and the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

tests were conducted independently.27

More than 13,000 troops, along with

officers and official observers, participated in the maneuvers following six of the

11 shots. At shot BADGER on April 18,

1953, two Marine battalions, entrenched

4,000 yards from ground zero, moved

forward until one of the battalions encountered significant radiation levels and

quickly withdrew. Twelve Army and Marine volunteer officers, entrenched at

2,000 yards, were shaken by the blast,

sound waves, and falling debris, and had

to be evacuated quickly to avoid undue

radiation exposure. At another test a week

later, two Army battalions at 4,000 yards

and volunteer officers at 2,000 yards encountered much more severe conditions

when the shot yield turned out to be 43

kilotons, or almost twice the yield of

BADGER.28

More highly publicized at UPSHOTKNOTHOLE than the military operations

were the civil effects tests conducted in

close cooperation with the Federal Civil

Defense Administration. AFSWP provided scores of reports to civil defense officials after earlier tests, but here, for the

first time, the general public witnessed the

effects of nuclear explosions on such familiar objects as residential homes and

automobiles, through both the eyes of

hundreds of observers and the graphic

photographs released to the press. The

civil effects tests, in addition to the measurable offsite fallout from several of the

shots, prompted inquiries–from the public and federal officials–about the safety

of tests at the Nevada site.29

THE THERMONUCLEAR

SPECTRE

Even before UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE,

AFSWP officers at Headquarters and

Field Command were making plans to

participate in the test of a prototype thermonuclear weapon during the Operation

280-mm “Atomic Cannon” in foreground just after detonation of Shot GRABLE, at

Frenchman’s Flat, Nevada Test Site, on May 25, 1953.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 107

CASTLE Series in 1954. Working under

great pressure to have the test ready on

schedule, AFSWP personnel felt even

greater tension when, on August 8, 1953,

Soviet Premier Georgi M. Malenkov announced that the United States no longer

had a monopoly on the hydrogen bomb.

Until the Air Force could collect and analyze samples of fallout from the Soviet

test, it was impossible to verify Malenkov’s claim. In order not to reveal the United States’ detection capabilities, the

Eisenhower administration delayed any

comment on the test, which became

known as Joe 4. The President, as usual,

was reluctant to make any statement other than a general announcement that a test

had taken place in the Soviet Union. On

August 19, the Air Force unit concluded

firmly that “...a fission and thermonuclear

reaction had taken place within Soviet territory.” When Moscow radio announced

later that day that the Soviet Union had

conducted a thermonuclear test, Chairman

Strauss released a statement confirming

the event.

Congressman W. Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy, mirrored public reaction when he

pointed out in a speech to the American

Legion in October that the Russians had

detonated a hydrogen weapon “...only

nine months after our own hydrogen test.”

Even though President Eisenhower in a

press conference referred to the Soviet

achievement as the creation of a hydrogen bomb, there was no incontrovertible

evidence that the Soviets had such a weapon. It would be several years before most

scientists could agree that the Soviet device had “burned” some thermonuclear

fuel, but it was in no sense a hydrogen

bomb. The misconception about the nature of the Soviet test, whether sincerely

accepted or deliberately promoted, had

the effect of ratcheting up American efforts to perfect the hydrogen bomb as a

response to what seemed a frightening

escalation of the Soviet threat.30

As the AEC’s absolute control of the

stockpile began to erode in the fall of

1953, Deputy Secretary of Defense Keyes

issued a directive updating the responsibilities of AFSWP. The Chief, AFSWP,

was to report directly to the Secretary of

Defense on the technical status of the

stockpile and to advise him of any deficiencies that needed to be corrected. The

Chief was to maintain a centralized system of reporting and accounting to ensure

that the current status and location of

atomic weapons and components in DoD

custody were known at all times. He was

to arrange for the transfer of weapons and

components to storage sites in accordance

with JCS war plans.

In addition, the Chief of AFSWP was

to keep the three Service secretaries informed of: “...scheduling and performance

Protective lead-glass cloth schroud being

placed on an Air Force pilot during sampling operations.
108 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower,

1953.

of nuclear and non-nuclear maintenance

and minor modernization programs at both

the national stockpile and operational storage sites.” He coordinated major modernization schedules with the AEC. The Chief

was also responsible for transportation and

security of weapons and components between storage sites, internal security at the

national stockpile sites, and for construction of facilities at these sites.” 31

THE EISENHOWER RESPONSE

In response to the growing Soviet

threat in the autumn of 1953, President

Eisenhower was moving in what seemed

two parallel directions. The first course

would lead the nation and the world to

open nuclear technology for peaceful

uses. The second would exploit the nation’s arsenal of nuclear weapons as a

deterrent to Communist aggression

around the world.

In his very first discussions of nuclear energy as President-elect, Eisenhower

had been engrossed with the prospects of

developing a nuclear power industry. If

the AEC could induce leaders of American industry to invest in the design and

construction of nuclear power plants, it

would be possible to demonstrate that nuclear energy could be more than an instrument of war, that it could be a beneficial

force in the world. Further, by involving

private industry, the President saw the

possibility of avoiding heavy expenditures of federal funds. Building national

security at home and abroad while balancing the federal budget was a key strategy

for the new administration.

It was immediately obvious, however, that industrial participation would require amending the Atomic Energy Act,

to allow private ownership of nuclear materials and ease the severe restrictions on

access to technical information. As industry leaders responded enthusiastically to

the President’s overture, amending the

Atomic Energy Act became a popular subject in the halls of Congress and in industrial lobbies. In April 1954, a member of

the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy introduced in the House of Representatives

a bill that would give private industry access to nuclear materials.32 It was probably this widespread interest in amending

the act that induced General Luedecke to

lay aside a proposal the AFSWP staff had

drafted to solve the custody issue by

amending the act so as to transfer all of

the functions and authorities of the AEC

to DoD.33

Efforts to revise the Atomic Energy

Act by “simple” piecemeal amendments

failed during the summer and fall of 1953

as the public debate became snarled in the

complexities of patent law and the old battle between public and private power

interests. By December, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had embarked

on drafting an entirely new law, which

would take another six months to work

its way through Congress. It became ap-
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 109

ing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Neither the DoD nor the AEC knew what

was in the speech before it was delivered

or knew at the time what it really meant.

The “Atoms-for-Peace” plan would be a

landmark of the Eisenhower administration, setting the context for much that the

AEC and the DoD would accomplish in

the next eight years.35

In contrast to the benign course the administration was pursuing toward peaceful uses of atomic weapons, the second

course seemed more belligerent. Eisenhower was determined to move American

foreign policy in the Cold War away from

what he considered a defensive stance that

merely reacted to Soviet challenges to a

“New Look” in which the United States

would take the initiative. The principles

of the “New Look” appeared in a report

presented to the National Security Council in October 1953.36 The report concluded that military planning should focus

on long term objectives rather than on

specific Soviet threats. American forces

worldwide were to be reduced in order to

preserve the economic stability of the

United States and its fundamental values

and institutions. To replace the military

forces withdrawn from abroad, the United States would be prepared, if necessary,

to threaten to use, or actually use, its nuclear arsenal to deter, or failing this, to

counter Communist aggression. The administration’s “New Look” policy was to

be a selective approach to the Soviet

threat, an effort to keep the Communists

off guard. As one scholar observed, the

“New Look” policy was “...an attempt to

combine a defensive nuclear military policy with an offensive strategy in the nonmilitary field.”37

Like Project Candor and the “Atomsfor-Peace” plan, the “New Look”

emerged out of months of heated debate

within the administration. Only by the end

of 1953 had the President clearly defined

parent to all, including Keyes and Luedecke, that the new legislation would

solve the custody issue, even if the DoD

and the AEC had not reached agreement

on the matter by that time.34

While the public debate over amending the act continued in 1953, the Eisenhower administration was engaged in its

own internal discussions of how to introduce the American public to the frightening realities created by the growth of the

nuclear weapon stockpile, and particularly

the threat posed by thermonuclear weapons. Actually created in the final days of

the Truman administration, Project Candor was an attempt to draft, in simple

terms the public could understand, a description of the nuclear dilemma that the

nation and the world faced: how could potential benefits of nuclear energy be realized without throwing the world into the

horrors of nuclear war? One early proposal, soon abandoned, was to give the

public some idea of the size and capability of the nuclear weapon stockpile. This

proposal for Candor, like many others to

follow, foundered on troublesome questions. Could the administration be candid

without jeopardizing national security?

Could the facts be stated in simple terms

without misleading the public or in terms

that would not create widespread anxiety?

These and many other reservations

blocked the acceptance of draft after draft

of the Candor statement. By November

1953, the President’s advisors had given

up on Candor and were transforming the

statement into one in a completely new

context. The result was Eisenhower’s dramatic presentation of his “Atoms-forPeace” plan before the United Nations

General Assembly on December 8, 1953.

The President proposed not only to open

access to nuclear science and technology

to American industry and research institutions but also to launch a broad program

of international cooperation in develop-
110 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

these proposals in his own mind. A month

after his “Atoms-for-Peace” speech,

Eisenhower set forth the elements of the

“New Look” in his State of the Union

address. As a general principle of foreign

affairs, he stressed the importance of

maintaining good relations with America’s allies, but the key to national defense

was to deter aggression by maintaining “a

massive capability to strike back.” The

President pledged to “take into full account our great and growing number of

nuclear weapons,” and he mentioned explicitly weapons designed “for tactical

use.” Nuclear weapons, he noted, would

permit reductions in military force levels,

an assumption reflected in the administration’s fiscal year 1955 budget. It reduced military spending authority from

$41.5 billion, proposed by President Truman in 1953, to $31 billion just two years

later.38

In his State of the Union address,

Eisenhower had revealed elements of the

“New Look” without defining it as a

whole. Such a definition came a week later, on January 12, 1954, when Secretary

of State Dulles spoke before the Council

on Foreign Relations in New York City.

He declared that local defenses against

Communism the world over would be

reinforced by “...the further deterrent of

massive retaliatory power.” The United

States would seek to deter the Soviets with

“...a great capacity to retaliate, instantly,

by means and at places of our own choosing.” The speech implied that the United

States might respond with strategic nuclear air power against the Soviet Union itself, or perhaps against Communist China,

in the event of Communist aggression

anywhere in the world.39 The aggressive

tone of Dulles’ speech aroused a storm of

criticism both at home and abroad. Those

who did not read his speech carefully saw

it as a commitment to respond to every

incident with a massive attack with nuclear weapons; others considered it such

a gigantic bluff so transparent that it

would fail to deter aggression. Although

Dulles responded to such criticisms by

qualifying or elaborating on his initial

statements, the President, Secretary of

Defense, the JCS, and Congressional

committees endorsed the concept of

“massive retaliation.” The concept in turn

would shape the mission of DoD and AFSWP in the years ahead.

Indeed, the threat to use nuclear weapons by the United States was viewed by

many as one of the chief bargaining chips

used to secure the Korean armistice in

July 1953. Eisenhower’s belief that the

tactical use of nuclear weapons against the

North Korean honeycombed enemy dugouts would halt the Korean conflict, and

send a strong message of retaliation to the

Chinese. Passing this message of “potential use” to the Koreans was the President’s intent. “...We dropped the word,

discretely, of our intention...We felt quite

sure it would reach Soviet and Chinese

ears.”40

The primary ammunition for massive

retaliation was to be the thermonuclear

weapon. As new AEC Chairman Lewis

Strauss and Secretary Wilson pointed out

to the President in early February, the JCS

believed that thermonuclear weapons

would “...insure that the United States

maintain[ed] its superiority over the

U.S.S.R.” The Joint Chiefs were also convinced that “...the production of thermonuclear weapons is the cheapest method

to obtain high yield weapons and improved destructive capability.”

Following JCS advice, Wilson discussed with Strauss new military requirements for thermonuclear weapons.

Strauss agreed that the Commission could

meet the new requirements by July 1956

at a cost of $360 million for plant and

equipment and $75 million in operating

costs in the next fiscal year. The follow-
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 111

ing day Eisenhower approved the proposed expansion.41

CASTLE SERIES:

THERMONUCLEAR REALITY

For more than a year prior to the

MIKE shot in 1952, the AEC’s weapon

laboratories and a score of military organizations coordinated by AFSWP had

been preparing for the crucial test of a

device that could be considered the prototype of a thermonuclear weapon. Until

such a weapon was actually available, the

United States would have no counter to

the Soviet challenge embodied in Joe 4.

The American response came in Operation CASTLE, a series of six tests of

thermonuclear devices at the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG) in the spring of 1954.

Table 3-1 summarizes the tests during the

CASTLE series and Table 3-2 details the

types of weapon effects experiments approved by AFSWP.

With more than 10,000 personnel participating from the military Services,

CASTLE was the first Pacific series in

which AFSWP had direct field responsibility for DoD projects. Scientific advisors and military officers from AFSWP

Headquarters and Field Command had

consulted with scientists at the weapon

laboratories on some aspects of experiments and tests, but the main burden on

AFSWP came in the weapon effects tests

at Bikini. Of the 1,300 persons working

on the atoll in setting up the tests and instrumentation, the majority–uniformed

personnel and civilians–participated in

DoD programs. As in the past, AFSWP

had solicited Service requirements for

weapon effects information, assisted DoD

laboratories in designing experiments, and

dovetailed these experiments with the

weapon designers42 of Los Alamos and

Livermore. AFSWP ultimately approved

weapon effects experiments in the categories shown in Table 3-2.

All six tests were successful, but the

most dramatic CASTLE test was Shot

BRAVO, fired on March 1, 1954. The

largest device ever fired during atmospheric nuclear testing by the United

States, BRAVO, yielded 15 megatons.

This high-yield test was made possible by

the first use, by the United States, of Lithium-6 Deuteride, a dry thermonuclear fuel

that eliminated the need for cryogenic

equipment. Because the neutron crosssections of certain isotopes were not well

known at the time, the actual yield of

BRAVO was nearly three times the predicted yield. Other and more ominous inTable 3-1. Summary of Events, CASTLE Series (March-May 1954).

D t ate T n es L ) ocatio Yield (MT

M O arch 1 B ) RAV B 5 ikini (Sandspit off Nam Island 1

M O arch 27 R ) OME B 1 ikini (Barge in BRAVO Crater 1

A N pril 7 K ) OO B ) ikini (Surface off Eneman Island 110 (KT

A N pril 26 U ) NIO B 9 ikini (Barge off Iroij Island 6.

M E ay 5 Y ) ANKE B 5 ikini (Barge in UNION Crater 13.

M R ay 14 N ) ECTA E 9 newetak (Barge in MIKE Crater 1.6
112 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

Table 3-2. Experiment Categories During CASTLE Test Series.43

T r ype of Experiment Numbe

B 0 last wave propagation through air, ground, and water. 1

Initial neutron and gamma radiation, documentation of

fallout, especially downwind deposition of weapon debris.

9

B 5 last effects on structures, tree stands, and sea mine fields.

T 6 est of Service equipment and techniques.

Burst detection studies in electromagnetic pulse generation,

airborne low-frequency sound, and collection of nuclear

weapon debris.

3

C 1 loud photography.

T 4 otal 3

dications of the higher than expected yield

were the high levels of radiation that made

it impossible to return immediately to any

part of Bikini, forcing Naval ships carrying test personnel to retreat to more than

50 miles south of the atoll. Unable to enter the Bikini lagoon, the principal vessels of the Task Group returned to the

main base at Enewetak, 190 miles west

of Bikini.

Before the end of the day, Air Force

cloud tracking teams reported that winds

aloft were carrying the radioactive cloud

from BRAVO slightly northeast, toward

a group of Marshall Islands that were beyond the danger zone established by Joint

Task Force 7 for the CASTLE series. Early on March 2, 1954, the Air Force sent

amphibious aircraft to Rongerik, 133 nautical miles from ground zero, to evacuate

28 military personnel who were part of

the Joint Task Force. Later in the day the

Navy dispatched destroyers from the Bikini area to evacuate native populations

from other atolls. Almost 200 islanders

were transported to Kwajalein, where they

were treated for radiation exposure.44

The most unfortunate radiation incident from BRAVO was not discovered

until March 14, when Japanese fishermen

aboard the Daigo Fukurya Maru (Fortunate Dragon No. 5) returned to Japan with

all 23 members of the crew suffering from

radiation exposure. The ship’s log indicated that the vessel had been about 82

nautical miles from Bikini at the time of

the shot, just beyond the eastern boundary of the exclusion area. Within a week

the incident created a sensation in the Japanese press as reporters wrote frightening

stories about “ashes of death,” while one

newspaper reported that the Japanese people were “terror-stricken by the outrageous power of atomic weapons which

they had witnessed for the third time.”45

Even before ROMEO, the second shot

in the CASTLE series, could be fired on

March 27, Washington was seeking more

information on the impact of BRAVO.

General Kenneth E. Fields, the Director

of the Commission’s Division of Military

Application, cabled General Clarkson, the

Joint Task Force commander, for

“...broad information on present opera-
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 113

tional conditions” prevailing at the proving grounds, particularly “the fallout situation.” AFSWP scientists joined those

from the weapons laboratories in producing an analysis, “Radioactive Fallout Hazards from Surface Bursts of

Very-High-Yield Nuclear Weapons.”46

Before solid information on fallout

was available, President Eisenhower had

set in motion the establishment of a special Technological Capabilities Panel to

study the danger of surprise attack on the

United States by the Soviet Union. James

R. Killian, Jr., president of Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, submitted the

panel’s report to the National Security

Council in February 1955. The report concluded that both sides would be vulnerable to surprise attack by thermonuclear

weapons. The United States would hold

the upper hand until 1960, but thereafter

the panel predicted that an attack by either side with thermonuclear weapons

would undoubtedly destroy more than cities or devastate regions; it would result

in mutual destruction of the combatants.47

Faced with the staggering implications of thermonuclear weapons, the Office of Defense Mobilization joined a

special interagency task force to revise

minimum standards for dispersal of new

industrial facilities from the ground zero

of potential targets. Prior to BRAVO the

standard had been 10 miles, but now with

the enormous fallout pattern from that

test, even tripling that standard would not

Brigadier General Estes, PPG Operations Commander (in shorts) greeting Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay, SAC Commander (far right) and his party upon their arrival at Enewetak

airstrip on April 12, 1954 during Operation CASTLE.
114 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

offer protection from a cloud 40 miles

wide and 200 miles long.48

By early April 1954, the BRAVO test

had raised international fears. Indian

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called

for a test moratorium, soon to be followed

by statements from Pope Pius XII and

Albert Schweitzer raising moral concerns

about continued testing. Within a week

both Dulles and Henry Cabot Lodge, the

United States Ambassador to the United

Nations, raised the question of a partial

test ban. At a National Security Council

meeting on May 6, the President spoke

warmly in favor of a test moratorium. He

believed that United States’ sponsorship

of a moratorium would gain a propaganda advantage over the Soviet Union. But

even more important, Eisenhower thought

it was wrong to treat “this terrible problem” negatively. He could not envision a

long-term solution to the danger of nuclear warfare without first establishing a test

ban. Only when he was convinced that a

test ban was unenforceable at that time did

the President, at least temporarily, abandon the idea.49

In the absence of a nuclear test ban,

the United States had no choice but to rush

the development of an arsenal of thermonuclear weapons, despite, or even because

of, the potential horrors of thermonuclear warfare. After viewing films of the

IVY-MIKE shot, Prime Minister Winston

Churchill had ordered all work on air raid

shelters abandoned as useless, and he informed Eisenhower that the British would

proceed with development of their own

thermonuclear weapon.* 50

BUILDING THE

NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Throughout the construction of the

nuclear arsenal, AFSWP continued to

have a central role within DoD. As General Luedecke explained to the House

Committee on Appropriations 10 days

after the BRAVO shot:

“In pursuing our three-way mission of

technical, logistic, and training services,

our basic principle has been to provide

only those things which the Services cannot do themselves or which can be done

more economically by one organization.

In implementation of this principle, we

have trained all the atomic weapons assembly organizations of the three Services. We secure from the Atomic Energy

Commission all the training weapons and

testing and handling equipment which

must be manufactured by it. We are the

focal point for the three Services in the

military phases of research and development and testing of atomic weapons. We

are thus able to prevent duplication and

become the source of basic information

leading to the military requirements for

weapons development, weapons effects,

and weapons defense.”

In his presentation, Luedecke provided the figures shown in Table 3-3 to support AFSWP’s 1955 budget. He reported

that between 8,500 and 9,000 military personnel and about 1,700 civilian employees were assigned to AFSWP, stationed

at either Headquarters, Field Command,

or at AFSWP test sites.51

As the budget figures suggests, a large

share of the resources (and personnel)

of AFSWP were devoted in one way or

another to supporting the continuing series of weapon tests in Nevada and the Pacific. In direct response to the fallout crisis

created by BRAVO, AFSWP Headquarters set up a fallout study group to provide the JCS with a series of reports

showing analysis and evaluation of radi-

 * The first British atomic bomb was detonated within the hold of a supply ship, the HMS

Plym, on October 3, 1952 during Operation

HURRICANE, conducted off Australia’s Monte Bello islands. The later British thermonuclear

weapon development tests were conducted during Operation GRAPPLE in 1957, in the vicinity of Christmas Island in the South Pacific.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 115

ation hazards resulting from weapon tests.

The technical divisions at Headquarters,

however, continued to fund scores of contracts at university and government laboratories to study the biological and

biomedical effects of radiation, quite apart

from the direct analysis of data from

weapon tests.52

After the completion of the CASTLE

series in May of 1954, Field Command

personnel assigned to Task Unit 13 at the

PPG returned to Sandia Base, and the

Weapons Effects Division at Field Command began preparations for the next test

series, Operation TEAPOT, to be conducted in the spring of 1955. Staff members

of the Development Division were busy

serving on 14 committees set up to study

missile warhead designs while another

committee continued work on the nuclear artillery projectile. During 1954, the

Plans Division felt new pressures on staff

with an added maintenance workload as

a result of the increase in the numbers and

types of weapons entering the stockpile.

As design improvements came from Los

Alamos and Livermore, retrofitting stockpile weapons became a significant

agency effort.53

TEST OPERATIONS:

WIGWAM, TEAPOT,

AND REDWING

Since the underwater shot had been

canceled at the CROSSROADS series in

1946, the Navy had been hoping to conTable 3-3. AFSWP 1955 Budget.

C t ategory A t moun 1955 Budge

Maintenance and Operation

S 0 upport of Testing Beyond Budgets of the Three Services $11,786,00 000

T 0 raining $800,20 000

O 0 peration of National Storage Sites $4,802,98 000

O 5 peration of AFSWP Headquarters $774,27 000

O 0 peration of Field Command $2,000,00 000

M 5 aintenance and Operation, Sandia Base $6,417,80 000

Total, Operation and Maintenance $26,581,000000

Research and Development

F 0 or Full-scale Weapon Tests $9,900,00 000

F 0 or Laboratory Research $2,350,00 000

Total, Research and Development $12,250,000000

Procurement and Production* $279,190000

Total, AFSWP $66,750,000000

* With funds carried over from the previous year, the total amount available in this category was $28 million.
116 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

duct such a test to observe the effects of a

nuclear detonation on ships and submarines. Not until December 1952 did the

JCS recognize the need for an underwater test and direct the Chief of AFSWP to

begin planning. A month later AFSWP

created the Special Field Project Division

to give the planning group a place in the

Headquarters organization.

WIGWAM was to be designed to determine the optimum yield of nuclear

depth bombs and their lethal range against

submarines and surface ships, particularly in terms of hull splitting and internal

shock damage. The test would also help

to judge the effectiveness of an underwater nuclear burst against convoy or task

force formations as compared to a surface

or air burst. It would also be necessary to

study effects on marine biology, oceanographic phenomena associated with the

explosion, problems of long-range detection, and shockwave phenomena.

Early 1953 was not a propitious time

to launch a new project as the Eisenhower administration began looking for ways

to reduce the defense budget. As a result,

some ancillary atomic studies and research was canceled. Only one test was

to be conducted on just two full-scale targets, both at the same depth but at different distances from the detonation. Not until

late in 1953 was most of the funding restored and a third target added.

After considering dozens of possible

targets, the Special Field Project Division

settled on a simplified, conservative design, 120 feet in length, a prototype of the

563 class submarine. For the detonation, the

Navy would use a nuclear weapon that

could be easily adapted for suspension

under sea and for remote control of the

safe handling and firing sequence. The test

would be conducted in the eastern Pacific, at least 50 miles from the coast and

200-600 miles south and southwest of San

Diego.54

The most challenging feature of the

test was designing the vast array of precisely spaced floats and barges on the surface that were tethered to the nuclear

device and three targets 2,000 feet below

the surface. Each of the barges above the

targets had to be equipped with electronic cables and air hoses to blow the ballast

tanks on the targets so that they could be

lowered or raised to the surface. Once the

preliminary design had been completed,

the David Taylor Model Basin ran a series of tests of the array on a 1-to-13 scale

early in 1954. Trials of a one-third scale

model, off the Virginia coast in heavy seas

later in the year with one target, resulted

in some damage to air hoses and prevented surface handling and towing of the target at slightly negative buoyancy. The

model performed sufficiently well, however, that confidence in a full-scale array

surviving extreme sea conditions rose. At

the same time, the Long Beach Naval

Shipyard had begun constructing the three

target vessels and modifying the barges

that would carry the instrumentation for

the targets.55

Trials of the full-scale array off San

Diego in January 1955 went smoothly, but

severe weather on the third day of the tests

pulled the air hose and instrumentation cable out of one target and damaged another. The Naval group struggled through

heavy seas back to Long Beach, where the

target vessels were repaired and cables

were modified.

Although WIGWAM was not to be

conducted at the Pacific Proving Grounds,

the designated test site was outside the

continental United States. For that reason

control of the test was assigned to Joint

Task Force 7, and the Navy group in

charge of the array was designated as

CTG 7.3. On May 2, 1955, ships in the

Task Group began moving to the test area

from west coast ports. High seas on the

way damaged the target vessels as they
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 117

were being towed on the surface. Once repairs were made, the Task Force began assembling the five-mile array on May 12.

Despite the severe weather, the array remained intact, and the test was fired midday on May 14. Although one target vessel

was destroyed by the detonation and another damaged, the test produced solid

data for determining the distances for lethal damage to submarines and surface

ships by a deeply submerged nuclear

weapon.56

Following normal procedures, the

AEC provided the nuclear device for the

test and WIGWAM was almost entirely a

Navy operation. AFSWP, however, had

played a vital role, first in providing the

administrative structure and then participating in the planning, working out administrative channels with the Navy and

other Services, and obtaining the necessary funding. Without AFSWP, the WIGWAM test never would have occurred.

In January of 1955, six weeks before

the first shot in the Operation TEAPOT

Series, Eisenhower summed up his views

“...on our general needs in military

strength” in a letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson. The letter contained nothing that had not been stated a year earlier

in the President’s presentation of the

“New Look,” but the short two-page document highlighted his principal convictions. The threat to the nation’s security,

the President wrote, was a continuing and

many-sided threat that required a broad

and sustained response that had to be

“...founded on a strong and expanding

economy, readily convertible to the tasks

of war.” In the face of rapid scientific and

technical change, the President held that

“...we should base our security upon milOverhead view of Frenchman Flats; part of Nevada Test Site.
118 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

itary formations which make maximum

use of science and technology in order to

minimize numbers in men.” Furthermore,

the increasing destructiveness of modern

weapons and the increasing efficiency of

long-range bombers made the nation,

“...for the first time in its history,” vulnerable to a sudden enemy attack. The

nation, Eisenhower concluded, had to

maintain the capability to deter or blunt

an enemy attack “by a combination of

effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing

effectiveness.”57

The Department of Defense could

have had no better rationale for Operation TEAPOT, a 15-shot series (one nonnuclear test) scheduled for the Nevada

Proving Grounds now renamed the Nevada Test Site (NTS), in the winter and

spring of 1955. Four of the shots were related to what the President referred to as

strategic bombing capability: Shots

WASP and WASP PRIME were used to

test air-drop delivery techniques; HADR

was a non-nuclear high-explosive device

detonated at 38,000 feet to calibrate delivery and technical equipment for Shot

HA, a nuclear shot detonated on April 6.

Shot ESS, a prototype nuclear demolition

device, was detonated in a shaft 67 feet

deep, and eight low-yield shots were detonated on towers on Yucca Flat. One shot,

MET, fired on Frenchman Flat, was designed only for weapon effects tests.58

Table 3-4 provides a summary of Operation TEAPOT events.

As in the earlier Nevada test series,

TEAPOT combined the diagnostic measurements designed by Los Alamos and

Livermore with the DoD projects, which

included weapon effects projects and

troop participation. In fact, the activities

of the laboratories and DoD units were so

closely scheduled through the Joint Test

Organization that it was no longer necessary to assign a double name, such as

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, to the series. It

was named simply TEAPOT.

On the Defense side, Field Command’s responsibilities were widespread

and diverse. DoD assigned 11,000 military and civilian personnel to the test site,

8,000 of whom participated in DESERT

ROCK VI. This test contingent was composed of support and administrative staff

and military personnel from all Services

participating as observers or as troops in

exercises and maneuvers under a variety

of post-shot conditions.59

The Joint Test Organization coordinated all scientific and technical operations, which included weapon diagnostics,

weapon effects tests, effects on civilian

populations, and an operational training

program for DoD personnel and support

services. Although relatively few individuals participated in these activities

compared to the DESERT ROCK VI exercises, their personal responsibilities

were critical to the gathering of test data

and the success of the shots during the series.60

AFSWP Field Command, Los Alamos, Livermore, and the Civil Effects Test

Group, staffed by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, comprised the four

test groups at TEAPOT. Composed of scientists and technicians from military and

civilian laboratories, support contractors,

and the Armed Services, the test groups

developed and conducted field experiments before, during, and after the detonations.

Field Command consulted with the

laboratories in planning the shot series and

coordinating the placement of diagnostic

instrumentation, but its heaviest work

came at the test site. For almost all the

shots in the series, Field Command

worked with each sponsoring organization in designing the experiment and deciding how to place the instrumentation

for the experiment around the test site.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 119

Each experiment was organized as a

project, ranging from seven to more than

20 projects for each of the shots. Many of

the projects followed the patterns established at UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE for basic measurements of blast, thermal, and

radiation effects, tests of equipment and

operational techniques, and measurements in support of other projects, such

as technical photography. Examples of the

diversity and complexity of these projects

are shown in Table 3-5, which lists the

projects scheduled for Shot BEE on

March 22.61

The Joint Task Organization, working

with scientists from the AEC, took additional precautions at TEAPOT to avoid radiation exposures above the limits established by the Commission, and especially

incidents of off-site fallout such as occurred at UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE. Nine of

the fourteen shots at TEAPOT were less

than 10 kilotons, to reduce the probability of offsite fallout. To further reduce the

hazard of radiation, the Test Director delayed many of the shots until favorable

weather conditions prevailed. The cumulative effect of these delays was that ZUCCHINI, the last shot in the series

scheduled for April 1, was not fired until

May 15.

Operation REDWING, similar to its

Table 3-4. Summary of Events, TEAPOT Series (1955).

S r HOT Sponso

Planned

Date

Actual

Date

Local

Time

NTS

Location

Type of

Detonation

Height

of Burst

(Feet)

Actual

Yield

(KT)

W L ASP L b AS 1 b 8 Fe 1 0 8 Fe 1 7 20 A p rea A 2 irdro 7 1 6

M L OTH L b AS 2 b 2 Fe 2 5 2 Fe 0 3 54 A r rea T 0 owe 3 2 0

T L ESLA U b CR 2 h 5 Fe 1 0 Marc 0 9 53 A r rea T 0 owe 3 7 0

T L URK U b CR 1 h 5 Fe 7 0 Marc 0 2 52 A r rea T 0 owe 5 3 0 4

H L ORNET L h AS 6 h Marc 1 0 2 Marc 0 3 52 A r rea T 0 owe 3 3 0

B L EE L h AS 1 h 0 Marc 2 5 2 Marc 0 7 50 A r rea T 0 owe 5 8 0

E D SS D h O 1 h 5 Marc 2 0 3 Marc 1 0 23 A r rea 1 C 7 rate - 1 6

H D ADR D h O 1 h Marc 2 0 5 Marc 0 e 90 Abov

Area 1

A * irdrop 3 - 8,000 (non

nuclear)

A L PPLE1 L h AS 1 h 8 Marc 2 6 9 Marc 0 4 45 A r rea T 0 owe 5 4 0 1

WASP

PRIME

L h ASL 2 h 0 Marc 2 0 9 Marc 1 7 00 A p rea A 7 irdro 7 3 3

H D A D h O 4 l Marc 6 0 Apri 1 e 00 Abov

Area 1

A * irdrop 3 3 6,520

P L OST U h CR 1 l Marc 9 0 Apri 0 9 43 A r rea T 0 owe 3 2 0

M / ET LASL

DOD

1 l March 1 5 5 Apri 1 5 11 A r rea T 0 owe 4 2 0 2

A L PPLE2 L l AS 2 y 6 Apri 5 0 Ma 0 1 51 A r rea T 0 owe 5 9 0 2

Z L UCCHINI L l AS 1 y Apri 1 0 5 Ma 0 7 50 A r rea T 0 owe 5 8 0 2

* Mean sea level
120 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

Table 3-5. Field Command Military Effects Group Projects, Shot BEE, March 22, 1955.

P e roject T s itl Participant Estimated

Personnel

1 y .2 S y hock Wave Photograph N 2 aval Ordnance Laborator

1 e .10 Overpressure and Dynamic Pressure versus Tim

and Distance

S 5 tanford Research Institute 1

1 - .14b Measurements of Airblast Phenomena with Self

Recording Gauges

B 6 allistic Research Laboratories

2 e .1 G g amma Exposure versus Distanc Army Signal Corps Engineerin

Laboratories

4

2 s .2 N y eutron Flux Measurement N 5 aval Research Laborator

2 s .5.1 F ; allout Studie Chemical Research Laboratory

Chemical Warfare Laboratory

*

2 h .8a Contact Radiation Hazard Associated wit

Contaminated Aircraft

Air Force Special Weapons

Center

5

2 s .8b M s anned Penetrations of Atomic Cloud Air Force Special Weapon

Center

2

3 n .1 Response of Drag-Type Equipment Targets i

the Precursor Zone

B 5 allistic Research Laboratories

5 t .1 Destructive Loads on Aircraft in Fligh W * right Air Development Center

5 t .2 Effects on Fighter Aircraft in Fligh W 2 right Air Development Center

6 t .1.1a E g valuation of Military Radiological Equipmen Army Signal Corps Engineerin

Laboratories

3

6 g .1.1b Evaluation of a Radiological Defense Warnin

System

Army Signal Corps Engineering

Laboratories

3

6 r .3 M g issile Detonation Locato Army Signal Corps Engineerin

Laboratories

*

6 t .4 Test of IBDA Equipmen W 4 right Air Development Center 1

6 A .5 T s est of Airborne Naval Radars for IBD B 3 ureau of Aeronautic

8 d .1 Measurement of Direct and Ground-Reflecte

Thermal Radiation at Altitude

B 4 ureau of Aeronautics

8 d .4b Thermal Measurements from Fixed Groun

Installations

Naval Radiological Defense

Laboratory

3

8 s .4d S e pectrometer Measurement Naval Radiological Defens

Laboratory

*

8 s .4f B e olometer Measurement Naval Radiological Defens

Laboratory

*

9 y .1 T ; echnical Photograph Lookout Mountain Laboratory

AFSWC; Air Force Missile Test

C &G enter; EG

7

9 y .4 A h tomic Cloud Growth Stud Air Force Cambridge Researc

Center; U.S. Weather Bureau;

E &G G

*

* Unknown
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 121

thermonuclear predecessors, reflected the

determination of President Eisenhower

and his advisors to make thermonuclear

weapons the keystone of national defense

against Soviet attack. REDWING consisted of 17 shots, at the Pacific Proving

Grounds, from May through July of 1956.

Ten shots (11th at Bikini Atoll), each with

a yield of less than one megaton, were

fired at Enewetak, where weapon effects

were unlikely to damage structures or endanger personnel working at the headquarters and main base of the operation.

The other five tests (6th at Enewetak), all

in the megaton range, were either surface

shots or air drops at Bikini, 190 miles east

of Enewetak. Table 3-6 summarizes the

Operation REDWING tests.

REDWING was the first test of megaton weapons in the Pacific since the CASTLE series two years earlier, when fallout

from BRAVO spread far beyond the exclusion area, caused radiation burns on

islanders and Japanese fishermen, and

aroused a worldwide storm of protest. In

an attempt to allay the anxieties raised by

another series of thermonuclear tests, the

DoD and the AEC issued a joint press release a week before the first shot on May

9 to outline the precautions to be taken

during REDWING. The press release described the improved fallout prediction

Table 3-6. Summary of Events, REDWING Series (May-July 1956).62

D e ate N n am L d ocatio Yiel

M E ay 4 L ) ACROSS E T newetak (Surface 40 K

M E ay 20 C ) HEROKE B T ikini (Air Drop 3.8 M

M I ay 27 Z ) UN B T ikini (Surface 3.5 M

M A ay 27 Y ) UM E s newetak (Tower 190 Ton

M E ay 30 E ) RI E T newetak (Tower 14.9 K

J E une 6 S ) EMINOL E T newetak (Surface 13.7 K

J D une 11 F ) LATHEA B T ikini (Barge 365 K

J T une 11 B ) LACKFOO E T newetak (Tower 8 K

J O une 13 K ) ICKAPO E T newetak (Tower 1.49 K

J E une 16 O ) SAG E T newetak (Air Drop 1.7 K

J A une 21 I ) NC E T newetak (Tower 15.2 K

J A une 25 D ) AKOT B T ikini (Barge 1.1 M

J K uly 2 M ) OHAW E T newetak (Tower 360 K

J E uly 8 A ) PACH E T newetak (Barge 1.85 M

J O uly 10 N ) AVAJ B T ikini (Barge 4.5 M

J A uly 20 T ) EW B T ikini (Barge 5 M

J N uly 21 H ) URO E T newetak (Barge 250 K
122 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

capability available and the extensive

monitoring network at the test site and

beyond. Plans for surveying marine life

in the Pacific and the expectation that

yields expected at REDWING would be

lower than those in 1954 were also described.

For the first time since the CROSSROADS test in 1946, uncleared observers were permitted during a test.

Approximately 15 media observers and

17 officials from the Federal Civil Defense Administration were permitted to

witness the LACROSSE and CHEROKEE shots, the first two in the series.

CHEROKEE was a 3.8 megaton device

dropped from a B-52 bomber, the first

such event conducted by the United

States. The shot did host some unique

measurements, but it was primarily a demonstration of the ability to deliver largeyield thermonuclear weapons. Such a

demonstration seemed essential after the

Soviet Union announced the air drop of a

thermonuclear weapon six months earlier, in November of 1955.63

Although weapon diagnostics and

tests were the primary purpose of REDWING, AFSWP had a major role in conducting the series. Once again

Headquarters staff evaluated, selected,

and organized weapon effects projects

while Field Command assisted the many

military and civilian research groups in

setting up experiments at the test site.

Members of Task Group 7.1.3 began moving to the Pacific in January of 1956 with

each project having one Field Command

representative on hand.64

Field Command organized eight programs for REDWING, as shown in Table 3-7.

SEARCH FOR A TEST BAN

Even before the REDWING tests ended, the CHEROKEE shot became the

source of a heavy attack on the test program. A few days after the air drop, General James M. Gavin, Army Chief of Research and Development, used the shot to

illustrate the power and significance of the

hydrogen bomb. He told a Senate committee that a bomb like CHEROKEE

dropped on the east coast of the United

States would “kill or maim seven million

persons and render hundreds of square

miles uninhabitable for perhaps a generation.” Even worse, Gavin predicted that

a similar attack on the Soviet Union would

spread death from radiation across Asia

to Japan and the Philippines. If the winds

blew the other way, an attack on eastern

Russia would eventually kill hundreds of

millions of Europeans, including, some

commentators added, half the population

of the British Isles.65

Under pressure from the White House

to release some information about the

success at REDWING, AEC Commissioner Strauss told the public that the tests

had “...achieved a maximum effect in the

immediate area of a target with minimum

widespread fallout hazard.” He concluded that REDWING had proven “...much

of importance not only from a military

point of view but from a humanitarian

aspect.”66 The Administration’s attempt

to use the “clean weapon” issue to counter

the growing demand for an end to nuclear testing backfired when critics jumped

on the implications in Strauss’ statement

that a weapon that could kill millions of

people could somehow be called “humanitarian.”

In the fall of 1956 nuclear weapons,

for the first time, became an issue in a

Presidential election when Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, told an

American Legion convention that the

United States should end the testing of

megaton thermonuclear weapons. Although Eisenhower, with his access to

classified information, could convincingly refute Stevenson’s arguments, Steven-
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 123

son did succeed in making disarmament

and nuclear testing major campaign issues

and thus kept the debate before the American public.67

Once the election was over, the Administration returned again to the test ban

issue. Since its first proposal in 1956, the

Administration had taken the position that

it would consider a test ban only when a

foolproof system of international inspection had first been established. Now, in

January 1957, United Nations (UN) Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presented a

five-point disarmament proposal to the

UN General Assembly. The key to the

plan was a call for the end to the production of nuclear weapons under strict international supervision. There was even

an offer to consider a future test ban if an

international inspections system could be

established. However, the preconditions

demanded by the Russians (complete nuclear disarmament) ensured the American

proposal would fail.

Facing this stalemate, the United

States, the Soviet Union, and the United

Kingdom pressed forward with nuclear

testing in 1957. The Russians conducted

a long series of secret tests from August of

1956 through April of 1957; the five April

tests spreading heavy fallout levels, although this was not known in the West at

the time. The British, ignoring impassioned opposition at home, fired their first

thermonuclear test at Christmas Island in

the Pacific on May 15. Two weeks later

Joint Task Force 7 began another series of

tests, Operation PLUMBBOB, in Nevada.

Table 3-7. Operation REDWING Programs (May-July 1956).

P e rogram T l yp Detai

1 s B k last Effect Experiment established basic blast and shoc

phenomenology of specific shots in various environments

(10 projects).

2 n Nuclear Radiatio Planned to obtain comprehensive fallout data for a model

that would permit extrapolation to different devices, burst

heights, and surface conditions; research on

decontamination and nuclear radiation countermeasures;

and studies of initial gamma and neutron radiation (17

projects, most at Bikini).

3 s E n ffects on Structure One experiment on the blast effect of multi-megato

detonations on industrial buildings (one project).

4 s C l horioretinal Burn Experiments on the eyes of animals at six shots (severa

projects).

5 t Effects on Aircraf

Structures

Experiments to test the reliability and delivery capability of

aircraft subjected to weapon effects ( 9 projects).

6 f Studies o

Electromagnetic Effects

Experiments for long-range detection of nuclear explosions

(6 projects).

7 d Thermal Radiation an

Effects at Cherokee

(7 projects).

8 y S . upporting Photograph For all projects in the military effects program
124 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

As the tempo of nuclear testing increased in 1957, so did public opposition.

Albert Schweitzer captured world attention in his Nobel Peace Prize address on

April 24, when he focused on the danger

that radioactive fallout posed for human

life. A month later Linus Pauling, in an

address at Washington University in St.

Louis, declared that “...no human being

should be sacrificed to the project of perfecting weapons that could kill hundreds

of millions of human beings.” The response to Pauling’s remarks was so favorable that he launched a petition, signed by

2,000 scientists, calling for an international agreement to halt testing. At the same

time the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy launched eight days of hearings on

fallout and radiation effects. The hundreds

of pages of technical material printed in

the hearings served as a convenient reference document for further public debates on the fallout issue.68

The international debate over fallout,

beginning with Schweitzer’s letter and

continuing through the Joint Committee

hearings, brought about an abrupt change

in public attitudes. In the fall of 1956, 44

percent of respondents to a Gallup poll

supported a test ban; while 63 percent of

Americans thought the United States

should end testing if all other nations so

agreed. This shift in public opinion reinforced Eisenhower’s strong interest in a

nuclear test ban, as he spurred his Administration toward that goal.69

A CHANGE IN

AFSWP COMMAND

During the first phase of the

PLUMBBOB series in June of 1957, General Luedecke completed his tour as

Chief, AFSWP, and retired from the Air

Force to replace Kenneth Nichols as General Manager of the AEC. In his four years

as head of AFSWP, Luedecke had reached

most of the goals he had set for the agency early in 1953.

Luedecke had played a leading part in

negotiating the transfer of most of the nuRB-57D sampling aircraft during test operations.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 125

clear weapon stockpile from the AEC to

AFSWP and then to each of the Armed

Services. By 1954, AFSWP had become

the control point for the allocation, distribution, and control of non-nuclear components. Field Command now had the

funding it needed to build and maintain

additional weapon storage sites in the continental United States and to assist the

Armed Services in handling weapons at

overseas bases and on Navy ships at sea.

In 1955, Eisenhower had directed that

weapons with yields of over 600 kilotons

would remain in AEC custody, even if

dispersed to military units, but in 1956 the

Commission had agreed that military personnel could perform this task on its behalf. The Commission still maintained

custody of some high-yield thermonuclear

weapons, but most of the stockpile was

in military custody where it was readily

accessible in case of a surprise attack.70

In October of 1952, a few months before Luedecke took command of AFSWP,

the Headquarters staff was just coming to

realize that AFSWP was not to be only a

bridge organization until the military Services could take over all aspects of developing, testing, acquiring, and handling of

nuclear weapons. Rather, AFSWP would

continue to have a research and coordination function for years to come.71 AFSWP, under Luedecke’s leadership, had

assumed a central role within DoD and in

its relationships with the AEC and its

weapon laboratories. As a result, AFSWP

had made a major contribution to the

growth of the nuclear stockpile, now

largely in the hands of the military Services. At the end of 1952, the nation had

stockpiled 841 weapons with a total yield

of almost 50 megatons. By the time Luedecke left AFSWP in 1957, the stockpile

had grown to 5,543 weapons with a total

yield of 17,546 megatons.72

Luedecke’s drafts of legislation to

amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 had

not gone beyond AFSWP Headquarters,

but he supported efforts at higher levels

in DoD to amend Section 6 of the Act that

gave primary custody to the Commission.

In the end, the new Atomic Energy Act of

1954 not only clarified the language of

Section 6 but also permitted the Commission to remove information primarily related to military applications from the

Restricted Data category.73 In the future,

Restricted Data was to be reserved for

weapon design only and limited to the

AEC, while a lesser classification became

available for weapon effects. These revisions gave the military Services much

easier access to data they needed to plan

for the effects of nuclear weapons.

Replacing General Luedecke at AFSWP in June 1957 was Rear Admiral

Edward N. Parker. A native of Pennsylvania, Parker had graduated from the U.S.

Naval Academy in 1925 and served mainly at sea prior to World War II. He took

command of the USS Parrott in January

of 1940 and immediately found himself

at the hottest part of the sea war in Asia.

He earned a Navy Cross for his capable

leadership under heavy fire from a Japanese task force off Borneo in the Dutch

East Indies in January 1942, shortly after

hostilities began in the Pacific. Three

weeks later, Parker won a second Navy

Cross for bravery and seamanship in the

Badoeng Straits, and a Silver Star a week

later. By the end of 1942, Parker had won

a third Navy Cross, which, with the exception of the Congressional Medal of

Honor, was the Service’s highest award

for valor. In command of the USS Cushing, Parker “...engaged at close quarters

and defeated a superior enemy force” near

Guadalcanal, although the Cushing sank

in the battle. In 1946 he received a commendation from the Secretary of the Navy

for his activities at CROSSROADS. After a series of commands stateside and in

the Mediterranean, Parker returned to
126 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

Washington. For more than two years,

from September of 1952 to the end of

1954, Parker served as Deputy Chief of

AFSWP under Nichols. After two more

years at sea, he came back to Washington

as a Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief

of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)

before reporting to his AFSWP assignment.74

Parker immediately confronted a

number of issues that threatened the direction of nuclear testing. The most immediate was fallout from weapons testing. Anxiety about the danger of

radioactive fallout was rapidly becoming

a major public concern in the United

States and abroad. Since the Japanese

fishing boat incident during the CASTLE

BRAVO test in 1954, President Eisenhower and other administration officials,

Congressmen, scientists, and the public

expressed increasing concern about radioactivity and atmospheric testing. The

CASTLE BRAVO incident led the government to heighten its fallout precautions

and intensify radiation monitoring in the

field. The TEAPOT tests at NTS in 1955

incorporated these new policies.75

TRANSITION

General Luedecke’s tenure as AFSWP

Chief had been years of accomplishment

and growth for the agency. The United

States’ growing arsenal of tactical and

strategic nuclear weapons provided what

the Eisenhower administration saw as a

credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.

Within a few months, however, under the

helm of Admiral Parker, the agency

would, once again, have to meet new challenges in creative ways, while the nation

met the Soviet’s newest challenge... in

space.

Rear Admiral Edward N. Parker, AFSWP

Chief, 1957–1960.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 127

ENDNOTES

1. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan,

Atomic Shield/1947-1952, University

Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University

Press, 1962. p. 590.

2. Roger M. Anders, ed., Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Diary of Gordon E. Dean, Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, 1987, p. 218.

3. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation IVY,

1952, DNA Report 6036F, December

1982, pp. 29-38.

4. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 5, 3.10.13

- 3.10.16; Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation IVY, 1952, DNA Report 6036F,

December 1982, pp. 118-176, 199-200.

5. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation IVY,

1952, DNA Report 6036F, December

1982, pp. 187-188.

6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,

Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961:

Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 1-5.

7. Ibid., pp. 17-18; quoted in Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race,

1939 to the Present, New York: Oxford

University Press, 1987, p. 62.

8. Public Papers of the Presidents of the

United States, 1953: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1960, p. 2.

9. In early 1953, the AFSWP Headquarters

staff totaled 249, comprised of 154 military officers and enlisted personnel and

95 civilians. “First History of AFSWP,”

Vol. 6, 3.1.1 - 3.1.2.

10. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 5, 3.8.6 -

3.8.7.

11. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.8.1 -

3.8.27, 3.10.1 - 3.10.24.

12. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.6.1 -

3.6.71.

13. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp.

581-584; Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for

Peace and War, p. 146.

14. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.7.59

- 3.7.60.

15. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.3.4 -

3.3.5; Chap. 4, Field Command, 4.3.16.

16. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 4, 4.1.2 -

4.1.3, 4.4.3, 4.5.53 - 4.5.70; Vol. 5, 4.3.16;

Vol. 6, 4.4.1 - 4.4.10, 4.4.20.

17. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.1.4.

18. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 4.6.1 -

4.6.6.

19. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.5.5 -

3.5.9.

20. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.5.10

- 3.5.12.

21. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.5.13.

22. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.7.1 -

3.7.5; Atomic Energy Commission, “An

Agreement Between the AEC and the

DoD for the Development, Production,

and Standardization of Atomic Weapons,” March 31, 1953, DSWA General

Counsel’s Files. The basic agreement,

with some modifications, was still in effect in 1984 between the Departments of

Defense and Energy.

23. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.5.14

- 3.5.15.

24. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.5.16.

25. “History of the Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project,” Latter Period, 1955-

1958, Part I [henceforth cited as “AFSWP

History, 1955-1958”], pp. 30-31.

26. “AFSWP History, 1955-1958,” pp. 30-

31; “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6,

Chap. 4, Field Command, 4.4.41 -

4.4.42’; Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for

Peace and War, pp. 145-147.

27. Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission

and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, pp.

93-95.

28. Ibid., pp. 96-99.

29. Ibid., pp. 99-113; Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, pp. 150-159.

30. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 57-59.

31. “AFSWP History, 1955-1958,” Part I, pp.

31-34.

32. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 27-32; Congressional Record,

83 Cong., 1 Sess., 3414, A2010.
128 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957

33. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 3.5.72

- 3.5.73.

34. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 119-122.

35. Ibid., pp. 42-44, 50-57, 59-62, 65-67, 71-

72; Public Papers, 1953, Eisenhower, pp.

813-822; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, Garden City, NY, 1963,

pp. 251-255.

36. NSC 162/2, October 30, 1953, Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1952-

1954, Vol. 2, National Security Affairs,

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1984, pp. 577-597.

37. Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look

National Security Policy, 1953-61, London: MacMillan, 1996, p. 4; Michael

Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The

United States and Nuclear Weapons,

1946-1976, London: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 50-52.

38. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “The Origins of

Massive Retaliation,” Political Science

Quarterly, 96. Spring 1981, pp. 31-33.

39. Glenn H. Snyder, “The ‘New Look’ of

1953,” in W.R. Schilling, P.Y. Hammond,

and G.H. Snyder, eds., Strategy, Politics,

and Defense Budgets, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. 463-465.

40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House

Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956,

Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963, pp.

180, 181.

41. Strauss and Wilson to the President, February 5, 1954; Eisenhower to Chairman,

Atomic Energy Commission, February 6,

1954; Eisenhower Library.

42. Weapon design plans were then at the

heart of a jurisdictional argument between DoD and AEC-DOE concerning

where the interface should be drawn between weapon design and effects studies.

The interface finally agreed on was that

the AEC would calculate warhead outputs

in as much technical detail as required to

predict effects. This was significant additional work for the labs since it required

them to continue calculations further out

in time and radius than was required for

their own purposes of burn and yield. The

interface was between the warhead and

weapon, which precluded DoD participation in weapon “design.” However, DoD

did assume responsibility for calculation

of (i.e., x ray, gamma ray, neutron) penetration through the missile skin, the whole

missile, and the atmosphere. Thus DoD

never became a party to warhead design.

43. Defense Nuclear Agency, Castle Series,

1954, DNA Report 6035F, 1982, pp. 167-

200.

44. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 172-177.

45. American Embassy, Tokyo, Daily Summaries of the Japanese Press, Periodicals

Division (microfilm), Library of Congress.

46. Fields to Clarkson, March 12, 1953, Department of Energy Historian’s Office;

Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 272-273.

47. James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists,

and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Cambridge: MIT

Press, pp. 67-71.

48. “ODM Planning for Dispersal of Facilities,” AEC Staff Paper 540/15, June 4,

1954, Record Group 326, National Archives.

49. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 274-276.

50. Ibid., p. 276.

51. House Committee on Appropriations,

Department of the Army Appropriations

for 1955, March 10, 1954, Washington,

1954, pp. 587-593.

52. “History of AFSWP,” Part I, Chap. 7-4,

pp. 7-38.

53. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 1953,

Chap. 4, Headquarters, Field Command,

4.4.9 - 4.7.4.

54. “First History of AFSWP,” Vol. 6, 1953,

Chap. 3, Special Field Projects Division,

3.11.1 - 3.1.20.

55. Deputy Chief of Staff, Technical Services, to Historian, AFSWP, July 30, 1954,

History of the Special Field Projects, January 1 - June 30, 1954.
THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957 129

56. Deputy Chief of Staff, Technical Services, to Historian, AFSWP, July 30, 1955,

History of the Special Field Projects, January 1 - June 30, 1955.

57. Eisenhower to Wilson, January 5, 1955,

National Security Archive.

58. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation Teapot 1955, DNA Report 6009F, pp. 34-35.

59. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

60. Ibid., pp. 29-35.

61. Ibid., pp. 81-130; Defense Nuclear Agency, Shot Bee, A Test in the Teapot Series,

March 22, 1955, DNA Report 6011F, pp.

10-30.

62. U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, United States Nuclear

Tests, July 1945 through September 1992,

DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 14), Washington,

D.C., GPO, 1995.

63. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation Redwing 1956, DNA Report 6037F, pp. 21-

23.

64. AFSWP, “Semiannual Report,” Headquarters, Field Command, Vol. 1, January 1, 1956 - June 30, 1956, pp. 243-266.

65. Robert A. Devine, Blowing on the Wind:

The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-

1960, New York: Oxford University

Press, 1978, pp. 80-81; Hewlett and Holl,

Atoms for Peace and War, pp. 345-346.

66. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, p. 347.

67. Ibid., pp. 364-370.

68. Ibid., pp. 389-391; Devine, Blowing on

the Wind, pp. 120-129; Hacker, Elements

of Controversy, pp. 190-191; Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on

the Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its

Effect on Man, May-June 1957, Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.,

1957.

69. Devine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 139-

142.

70. L.A. Ninnich, Jr. and Lewis L. Strauss,

“Memorandum of Conference with the

President,” August 6, 1956; Eisenhower

to Strauss, August 8, 1956, National Security Archives.

71. RADM W.K. Mendenhall, Jr., to General Loper, AFSWP, October 29, 1952,

Record Group 374, National Archives.

72. U.S. Department of Energy, Restricted

Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to

the Present, RDD-3, January 1, 1996, Appendix D.

73. Section 6, Atomic Energy Act of 1946,

P.L. 585, 79 Cong., 60 Stat., pp. 755-775;

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, P.L. 703, 83

Cong., 69 Stat., p. 919. Section 91 of the

1954 Act clarified the language of the old

Section 6 by authorizing the Department

of Defense “to manufacture, produce, or

acquire any atomic weapon or utilization

facility for military purposes.” Section

142 of the new act removed weapon data

from the Restricted Data category.

74. Biography, Vice Admiral Edward N.

Parker, Navy Office of Information, Internal Relations Division, December 6,

1963; Washington Post, October 17,

1989.

75. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, 451-52; Herbert F. York, Making

Weapons, Talking Peace (New York:

1987), p. 117.
130 THE SPRINT FOR SUPREMACY, 1952 TO 1957
THE SOVIET’S TURN:

SPUTNIK

In the last half of 1957, there were

changes in the strategic landscape that

permanently altered the nation’s perceptions of the balance of world power and

that had a lasting impact on the Department of Defense and AFSWP.

On August 21, 1957, the Soviet Union

tested an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) over a 4,000-mile trajectory

extending the length of Siberia. The

ICBM, (SS-6), carried a 10,000-pound

payload (equivalent to a three-megaton

warhead). The launch was carried out secretly and was initially known to only a

few in the U.S. intelligence community.

The Soviets subsequently announced that

they had successfully tested a strategic

missile with intercontinental range and

claimed an imminent operational capability. Disbelief of the claim was the predominant reaction in national defense circles

and, indeed, among the general public.

The Soviet Sapwood ICBM was deployed

in 1958, with an announced range of 8,500

kilometers (5,270 miles). It was, at the

time, significantly more capable than any

operational U.S. strategic missile system.

The apparent Soviet advantage in intercontinental-range missiles helped fuel the

“missile-gap” issue of the 1960 Presidential campaign and the U.S. determination

to catch and surpass the Soviet Union in

scientific/engineering expertise and

achievements.

Any lingering U.S. disbelief in the Soviet’s ICBM claim was dispelled less than

two months after their ICBM test when,

around dinnertime on October 4, 1957,

technicians in New York City picked up

Radio Moscow’s announcement earlier

that day: a Russian rocket had successfully launched an artificial satellite into

orbit at the outer edges of the earth’s atmosphere. Radio operators at the Radio

Corporation of America facility in Riverhead, Long Island, soon confirmed the

story, picking up the steady “beep...beep...

beep” of the satellite’s radio as it streaked

over the eastern United States. Life magazine characterized the first man-made

So let us begin anew—remembering on both sides that civility is not a

sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never

negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”

John F. Kennedy

Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961

“

CHAPTER FOUR

SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963
132 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

noise from space as an “...an eerie intermittent croak of a cricket with a cold.” To

American scientists, the radio transmission shattered notions of their country’s

scientific superiority. To the American

military, the satellite served as a Cold War

alarm: the Soviets now had the capability

to deliver an intercontinental missile with

a nuclear warhead. The world in the atomic age had just grown much, much smaller and Americans were expressing some

second thoughts about Soviet technological development.1

The satellite was a stunning success.

Sputnik, short for Iskustvennyi Sputnik

Zemli or “Artificial Traveler Around the

Earth,” was a shiny 184-pound, manmade sphere, 22 inches in diameter, about

the size of a large beach ball. Launched

from the Baiknonur Cosmodrome in the

Soviet Union and orbiting the earth at

18,000 miles per hour—at altitudes ranging from 300 to 560 miles—the satellite

completed one revolution every 96 minutes. Sputnik contained rows of batteries

to power two radio transmitters. Outside

the satellite antennas sent the signals

earthward. By the next morning, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington confirmed that the satellite had

passed over the United States four times.2

The Russians were ecstatic. Sputnik

was a technological and propaganda triumph, even though the satellite’s orbit

around the earth would only last six

months. “The present generation,” Radio

Moscow boasted, “will witness how the

free and conscious labor of the people of

the new socialist society turns even the

most daring of man’s dreams into reality.” In Washington, three visiting Soviet

scientists told reporters that their country

was ahead in engineering and science. “In

America,” one explained, “you have trouble recruiting young men to study science.

In the Soviet Union, everyone wants to

be a scientist.” When told that their Sputnik was stealing the limelight from the

World Series, another replied, “In Russia,

scientists are not compared with football

players.” More painful and revealing,

however, was the Russian assertion that

“Americans design better automobile tail

fins but we design the best intercontinental ballistic missiles and earth satellites.”

3 Most Americans recognized the Radio

Moscow statement as Cold War propaganda. Nevertheless, Sputnik’s impact on

Main Street USA was profound. On the

whole, Newsweek magazine reported,

Americans were concerned, not panicked.

Rather, they “...seemed to have suffered

a severe blow to their pride,” conducting

what one scholar has called “...a veritable orgy of national self-examination and

self-criticism.” Whatever position one

took on Sputnik’s immediate impact, few

would argue with the NBC announcer

who described the satellite’s beeps as

“...the sound which forever separates the

new from the old.” 4

The beeps from space resonated most

keenly in discussions regarding the military applications that Sputnik’s launch

implied. Newsweek noted that the difference in sending a 184-pound satellite into

Model of Soviet Satellite: Sputnik.
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 133

orbit and firing an ICBM “...with Hbombs instead of radio transmitters and

batteries” was not great. “...very few

technical changes,” the magazine stated,

needed to be made for these weapons to

“...spew their lethal fallout over most of

the U.S. or Europe.” A scientist working

on the Air Force Titan ICBM program put

the military implications more succinctly. Unless the United States caught up to

the Russians fast, he warned, “...we’re

dead.”5

SPUTNIK, THE MILITARY, AND

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Sputnik’s beeps sounded a sharp reveille for U.S. military planners. Three

years before, in 1954, Dr. John von Neumann indicated that hydrogen bombs

could be reduced in size to fit into a missile, prompting the military to raise von

Neumann’s concept to a top priority. Even

so, the development of the Vanguard rocket, which was to launch the first U.S. satellite, had been largely divorced from the

military’s programs, and funding levels

for all the rocket programs had been held

under tight leash by the fiscally conservative Eisenhower administration. Rocket development had been further

hampered by inter-service rivalries,

primarily between the Army’s

Redstone missile program, developed by

a team under the direction of German

rocket scientist Dr. Wernher von Braun

and the Air Force’s triad missile program,

represented by the Atlas, Titan, and Thor

missiles. Then, on October 7, two days

after Sputnik first orbited over the United

States, the Soviets announced that they

had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb

warhead, presumably designed for an

ICBM. Von Neumann’s prediction of the

marriage of thermonuclear weapons to

missiles had become a reality but, to the

country’s chagrin, the United States had

not led the way.6

Since the beginning of the Nuclear

Age, DoD had conducted numerous

weapons effects tests piggy-backed on

AEC-sponsored shots as well as a number of specific DoD detonations designed

solely for the purpose of effects measurements. In the late 1940s and early 1950s,

military planners sought to understand the

effects of nuclear weapons, including atmospheric, underwater, cratering, and

surface explosions. How vulnerable were

men and material, they wanted to know,

to a nuclear explosion’s blast, heat, shock,

radiation and radioactivity? How would

troops react? How well would tanks, airplanes, ships, docks, housing, underground shelters, and the like hold up? By

the late 1950s, “...the effects of low-level or surface nuclear bursts were in general adequately understood,” according to

William E. Ogle, a Los Alamos scientist

and Science Deputy to the military’s Joint

Task Forces at that time. However, with

the advent of missile delivery systems and

the threat posed by satellites, the planners

changed focus completely, now concentrating their attention on the effects of high

altitude and deep space bursts, especially

on radio and radar. “The effects of highaltitude detonations were still very uncertain,” Ogle noted. “On some subjects, the

knowledge was still too dim to ask even

the right questions.” In fact, Ogle admitted, the level of knowledge of these blasts

“...was still very primitive.”7

While there was a great public outcry

bewailing a possible “missile gap” and

America’s loss of scientific and technological leadership after Sputnik, the military’s efforts to unite nuclear weapons and

missiles had not lagged as much as the

administration’s critics argued. Work had

begun soon after von Neumann had suggested that small thermonuclear weapons

could be designed to be placed in a rocket. Von Neumann convened a meeting of

the AFSWP Blast Panel at the agency’s
134 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

Pentagon headquarters in February 1954.

The discussions from that panel led to

AFSWP’s development of the DoD nuclear effects tests at TEAPOT and later

test series.8

For its planning of the TEAPOT

weapon effects program, which was to

include the development and testing of a

Nike-Hercules warhead, AFSWP acquired from Sandia the services of Dr.

Frank H. Shelton, an expert on the phenomenology of high-altitude detonations.

As Technical Advisor to AFSWP, Shelton

provided detailed calculations for the effects from a small yield explosion at

40,000 feet, a standard air defense altitude

for the high-altitude shot and extrapolated his figures for a 100,000 foot burst.

Working with Shelton were Dr. Edward

B. Doll, the AFSWP technical director at

Field Command in Albuquerque and a

fellow Cal Tech graduate, and Jack Kelso

from the Headquarters blast group, who

oversaw work on drone aircraft, shock

wave, and surface-blast programs, among

other DoD effects tests.9

As a result of their mutual interests,

Doll and Shelton became good friends. In

June 1955, Doll confided to Shelton that

he had become increasingly worried that

Soviet development of ICBMs with thermonuclear warheads put the United States

at great risk. Doll believed he could respond more effectively by getting out of

AFSWP. He told Shelton he was leaving

the agency to join a private company in

California to work on an Air Force missile program. In turn, Shelton had a surprise of his own for Doll: he would be

leaving Sandia to take Pete Scoville’s

place as AFSWP’s Technical Director.

NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS

Public interest remained high in the

biological effects of radiation on human

health through the 1950s, but many of the

studies done by the AEC remained classified. Instead, the public’s imagination

about the effects of nuclear warfare was

captured by On the Beach, a best-selling

apocalyptic novel by the Australian writer Nevil Shute. Appearing in the summer

of 1957, Shute’s book described a world

slowly poisoned by radioactivity from the

devastating explosions of thousands of

“cobalt” bombs.12

AFSWP had its own version of nuclear war in 1957. With the expectation that

better information would aid civil defense

workers, the DoD and the AEC issued

Samuel Glasstone’s The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. The unclassified work, an

update of a 1950 Glasstone study on the

effects of atomic weapons, described the

grim destruction caused by a nuclear

blast. Glasstone also saw the dangers of

worldwide fallout and long-term residual

radiation, arguing that thermonuclear

bombs could be used in radiological warfare as “...an automatic extension of the

offensive use of nuclear weapons of high

Dr. Frank H. Shelton, Technical Director,

AFSWP (1955-1959).
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 135

yield.” Glasstone’s analysis may not have

been as dramatic as On the Beach, but its

scientific accuracy lent credibility to

Shute’s vision of a nuclear apocalypse.13

The publication of Henry Kissinger’s

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and

a series of Congressional hearings on fallout kept the cauldron of public concern

with radioactivity bubbling in the summer

of 1957. Kissinger made clear to a wide

audience what most policy makers in

Washington already understood: the U.S.

policy of “massive retaliation” was no deterrent to a potential enemy who also possessed thermonuclear weapons. There

would be no limited nuclear war,

Kissinger argued. As Americans read

Kissinger and Shute that summer, they

also learned from hearings conducted by

the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

about increasing levels of radioactive

Strontium-90 appearing in soil and milk,

radioactivity that would linger long after

a cessation in weapons testing. Accordingly, scientists asked the AEC to “...hold

testing to a minimum consistent with scientific and military requirements.”14

Eisenhower was already considering

a suspension of nuclear weapons testing.

He had planned to introduce the notion

of a limited test ban as early as 1956, but

Adlai Stevenson grabbed the initiative in

that year’s Presidential campaign and the

idea remained confined to policy discussions at the White House. Determined to

end the arms race, Eisenhower hoped to

end or limit nuclear tests and restrict the

production of fissionable material to

peaceful purposes. Nuclear testing had become a moral issue to some of

Eisenhower’s closest advisors, including

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Neither the military nor the AEC supported a cessation of testing, arguing that

some check against the deterioration of

the stockpile and the development of new

safety technologies were critical to national defense. Moreover, an effective detection system had to be in place before testing stopped so that knowledge about

Soviet intentions and activities might better guarantee American security. The administration proposed the end of 1957 as

a possible date to limit the country’s nuclear testing program.15

Not surprisingly, some of the most

strident opposition to a test ban came from

nuclear scientists who argued that low

yield, small, ‘clean’ fusion weapons could

be developed and tested without creating

a significant fallout hazard.

The military argued for continued

testing. During the 1956 planning for the

PLUMBBOB series, AFSWP’s technical

director thought it “...prudent to approach

the 1957 DoD effects test series as though

it might be the last atmospheric effects

program.”

JOHN was a DoD shot during the

PLUMBBOB Series, which AFSWP

Field Command held in Nevada between

March and October 1957. JOHN tested

the performance of an air-to-air “Genie”

rocket with a nuclear warhead detonated

at some 20,000 feet to assess radiation and

blast effects on an aircraft as it banked

away from the detonation. Three Air

Force officers stood on the ground directly

below the burst to “...demonstrate that air

defense could occur above a population

without danger to the population.”17

While Field Command supervised

DoD work at NTS during PLUMBBOB, AFSWP Headquarters continued to

shape plans for high-altitude tests, codenamed HARDTACK, in 1958 to take

place in the Pacific. Bruised by public

outrage over radioactive fallout, AFSWP

played down the dangers of fallout from

testing to a Congressional committee. Dr.

Frank Shelton claimed that atomic testing might be continued “...at the present

rate for forty to fifty years and not create

any danger from radioactive fallout.” He
136 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

told the Congressmen that it would take

the equivalent of 1,500,000 Nagasaki

bombs to bring the concentration of Strontium-90, a carcinogen that collected in

human bones and caused bone cancer and

leukemia, to the maximum permissible

concentration. Other military and scientific representatives held opposing viewpoints on the concentration levels. At the

same hearing, however, Shelton admitted

that had the Marshall Islanders lived on

the other side of the Bikini Atoll during

the CASTLE-BRAVO test in 1954, “...all

would have died.”18

For all the public comments in support of a continued nuclear testing program, AFSWP moved cautiously in

planning HARDTACK. The fallout precautions proposed in July 1957 by Dr.

Alvin C. Graves of the Los Alamos Laboratory were, in Shelton’s estimation,

“...insufficient from a scientific point to

warrant Department of Defense support.”

A series of meetings between AFSWP, the

AEC, and Los Alamos scientists led

Graves to revise his initial plans. Thereafter, AFSWP initiated a series of briefings to DoD officials, including the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the former Presidential candidate and Democratic party leader

Adlai Stevenson, on the status of fallout

and testing.19

As talk of a testing moratorium grew

louder throughout 1957, both the AEC

weapons laboratories, Los Alamos and

Livermore, and the military argued for

more tests at HARDTACK. Although

Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of

the AEC, told the President that he had

cut the number of laboratory and military

tests by half, Eisenhower expressed great

concern to his advisors about the large

number of HARDTACK tests and the

excessive length of the series, which now

stretched over four months into the summer of 1958. Eisenhower was frustrated

by the plan to conduct numerous tests

while arguing in the international arena

for a policy to suspend testing altogether.

He believed the rest of the world would

lose faith in the United States as it followed this seemingly paradoxical policy.20

As a result of AFSWP’s concerns,

throughout 1957, on radioactivity altering

the conduct of HARDTACK’s fallout program, DoD staff urged the President to

permit testing to gain information on specific weapon effects deemed critical to

military applications. DoD planned two

series of effects tests. One series consisted of underwater shots that would continue the investigations of nuclear

explosions on Naval vessels begun at

CROSSROADS and WIGWAM. The second series sponsored by DoD was to examine the effects of high-altitude nuclear

blasts. Combined with the weapons design tests conducted by Los Alamos and

Livermore, the HARDTACK series

would fire as many nuclear devices as had

been exploded in all prior Pacific tests.

Throughout 1957, AFSWP pushed to conduct full-scale test programs examining

large yield nuclear explosions at high altitudes, taking its case directly to Donald

A. Quarles, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Quarles supported the high-altitude

weapon effects tests, and Eisenhower

agreed. The decision came none too soon.

Three days before the end of the PLUMBBOB series, the Soviets had launched the

world’s first satellite into space.21

HIGH-ALTITUDE TESTING

Dr. Shelton welcomed fresh ideas and

quickly recognized that one of the places

in the Pentagon to get them was the newly formed Advanced Research Projects

Agency (ARPA). On one foray, Major

General Cyrus Betts, the head of ARPA,

gave Shelton a paper by Nicholas C.

Christofilos, a self-educated Greek immigrant who worked at the University of
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 137

California’s Lawrence Radiation

Laboratory in Berkeley. Christofilos’ paper suggested that electrons could be

trapped in the magnetic field of the earth’s

upper atmosphere by a high-altitude nuclear explosion and would interrupt radio,

radar, and other communications systems,

perhaps damaging or destroying the fuzing mechanisms of ICBMs. Shelton and

his predecessor, Scoville, who had become the Deputy Director for Science and

Technology of the CIA, worried that the

Soviets might also be thinking along the

lines of Christofilos’ paper and use a nuclear weapon to form a long-lasting

trapped radiation belt and interfere with

U.S. satellites. The Russians had detonated a large, high-yield weapon in 1956 and

Sputnik intensified American concerns.

The Soviet launching, in November 1957,

of Sputnik II, a half-ton satellite capable

of carrying a nuclear weapon into space,

heightened concern at the Pentagon and

at Langley.22

Christofilos’ study was an extension

of the DoD’s interest in the effects of nuclear explosions in the outer atmosphere.

In the early years of the missile age, military planners feared that electrons emitted by such large high-altitude nuclear

blasts could become trapped in the earth’s

atmosphere and might possibly block the

operation of ballistic missiles and defensive radar systems. In particular, AFSWP

intensified its investigations into the nature of nuclear explosions at high altitudes

and their generation of an electromagnetic

pulse (EMP). Drawing on TEAPOT,

AFSWP began planning, in mid-1956, a

series of tests on the effects of EMP and

high-altitude phenomenology which

were, at that time, little understood testing addressed series of missile-launched

ultra-high-altitude nuclear tests for the

1958 HARDTACK test series in the Pacific. There were numerous questions

about the effects of missile-launched

weapons and detonations in space, especially the effects of EMP on radio communications and equipment. This concept

was discussed with AFSWP’s Thermal

Radiation Panel in late November 1956,

and would be honed, over the next two

years, and become an integral part of the

HARDTACK Pacific test as part of the

military’s plan to carry out von Neumann’s suggestion of designing a smaller nuclear weapon to fit into the warhead

of a missile.23

Planned against a background of

growing concern with worldwide radioactive fallout and President Eisenhower’s

inclination to call a moratorium on the

U.S. nuclear testing program, HARDTACK would not be an easy series to conduct. The dangers of radioactive fallout,

particularly of Strontium-90, were placed

in perspective at a Congressional hearing

in the spring of 1957. Nevertheless, many

were not convinced that the danger from

fallout was as insignificant as the agency

Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of

Defense, 1957 to 1959.
138 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

suggested. Nuclear testing, according to

much of world opinion, was the kind of

saber rattling that enhanced international

tensions and might lead to war. The Soviet Union, which had completed its test

series in the spring of 1958, gained some

propaganda victories by renouncing nuclear testing. Many in the United States,

however, believed that continued testing

was vital to American security and that

the resulting fallout was an inconsequential price to pay. In any case, weapons designers hoped to avoid the fallout problem

by developing radiologically ‘clean’

weapons to make testing more acceptable

in world opinion.24

Against this international background,

HARDTACK planners, including

AFSWP, which was responsible for weapon effects data collection for DoD, were

squeezed between those who believed the

peace was enhanced through demonstrated deterrence and those who believed that

peace would be the product of negotiations. The difficulties were further exacerbated by the difference in aims between

the scientists and administrators created

by the structure of the Joint Task Force,

which would manage the series in the Pacific. There was the usual urgency to start

and end a test series on time and to conduct the tests as economically as possible. “This urgency,” William Ogle

recalled, “could be produced by programmatic aims, economics, or political consideration, or simply the desire to get the

operation over with and go home.” For administrators, delays were cost prohibitive,

on average approaching a million dollars

for each day of delay. For scientists, however, each shot had an experimental purpose, and the need to take appropriate

effects measurements often clashed with

the “shoot it now” attitude of administrators. Disputes were often solved at the

highest staff levels, but only after considerable discussion through the permanent

AEC Laboratory and AFSWP structure

rather than through the temporary Joint

Task Force.25

The inter-service rivalry over missiles

complicated AFSWP’s job of preparing

for the two high-altitude shots planned for

HARDTACK. In May 1956, AFSWP recommended to the JCS that the Army’s

Redstone missile, the product of Wernher

von Braun’s German V-2 rocket scientists

in Huntsville, Alabama, be used in ORANGE and TEAK, both planned to be

conducted at Bikini Atoll or at Enewetak

at the Pacific Proving Grounds.26

The Redstone missile possessed a

number of critical advantages. The missile was produced at the Chrysler plant in

volume; the Reynolds Metal Company

fabricated some of the airframe components. Built to Wernher von Braun’s specifications by the North American

Rocketdyne Division, the Redstone developed 75,000 pounds of thrust using liquid oxygen propellant. The missile had an

excellent record of successful launches at

Cape Canaveral, Florida. Further, the missile was exceptionally mobile. Along with

its launching, fueling, and auxiliary support equipment, the Redstone could be

transported by cargo plane or by truck.

The logistics of moving missiles and

ground support equipment to the Pacific

were relatively simple when compared

with the Navy’s Polaris missile, which

would not be successfully launched until

October 1957, and the Air Force’s Atlas

rocket, which would not have its first successful firing until late November of 1957.

Nevertheless, over a year before possessing a proven workable rocket, the NRL

and the Air Force Special Weapons Center recommended that AFSWP use missiles developed by their respective

Services for the 1958 HARDTACK

high-altitude weapons effects tests.27

As a face-saving compromise for the

Joint Chiefs, AFSWP took its Redstone
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 139

Joint Task Force 7, did not

believe that it was practical

to control the 4,000 or so

Marshallese that might be

exposed to the flash hazard.

Moving the launch site,

however, would mean a

five-month delay and

would spoil critical measurements from an Army

satellite put up in March

1958 to gather information

from TEAK during its

scheduled April test.29

Sputnik gave urgency

to the tests. AFSWP proposed moving the tests to

Wake, Midway, Christmas,

or Johnston Island. Strauss

agreed. He would approve

the high-altitude tests on

one condition: move the

launch site from Bikini to

Johnston Island, some 800

hundred miles to the southwest of Hawaii and approximately 1,500 miles

northeast of Enewetak. At

a meeting with Strauss and

other senior government

officials in April of 1958,

Quarles agreed to the move.

Redstone missiles would

carry TEAK and

ORANGE aloft from

Johnston Island.30

Just as an agreement

wasreached on the Johnston

Island location for the tests,

the DoD and ARPA proposed three additional highaltitude tests in a new top

secret series named ARGUS. The main purpose of ARGUS was to examine the

“Christofilos effect.” A conference of scientists held at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in February 1958 concluded that

recommendation to two senior civilian officials at the

Department of Defense, C.

C. Furnas, the Assistant

Secretary for Research and

Development, and E. V.

Murphee, Special Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense

(Guided Missiles). Both

agreed with AFSWP’s advice and forwarded their decision to Donald Quarles,

the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Quarles, however, in

consultation with AEC

Chairman Lewis Strauss,

canceled the two tests. At

once, AFSWP and the Army

worked to get the effects

tests reinstated. Shelton

convinced the Weapons

System Evaluation Group

of the JCS to keep the highaltitude shots. General

Maxwell Taylor, the Army

representative to the JCS,

urged Quarles to change his

opposition. By the end of

August of 1957, Quarles

agreed to proceed with

ORANGE and TEAK as

planned.28

The AEC, however,

continued to block the tests.

Strauss opposed the highaltitude shots because the

flash might blind islanders

on nearby atolls. After the

fiasco with CASTLE-BRAVO fallout on the Fortunate

Dragon and the Marshallese,

he would not gamble with

the health and safety of the islanders. The

DoD, which had initially argued that eye

burn from the flash would not be a problem, also began to have second thoughts.

General Luedecke, the commander of

The Army’s Redstone Missile.
140 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

TEAK would not produce serious effects

on military radio and radar systems but that

a properly optimized shot might “...cause

difficulties” for several months. Because of

the uncertainty of the calculations, the

group recommended firing a small shot to

test the facts. It was too late in the planning

to include the verification of Christofilos’

concept during the HARDTACK series, but

the idea was placed on a fast track test

schedule for the ARGUS series to be conducted in August and September of 1958.

On May 1, Eisenhower approved the additional series, which would be conducted operationally by AFSWP.31

TEAK AND ORANGE

For more than three minutes, the fiery bright flames that shot from the engine of the Redstone rocket were plainly

visible in the night sky as the missile lifted off its launch pad at Johnston Island,

at 11:50 pm on July 31, 1958. As the rocket reached an altitude of nearly 50 miles,

the megaton-range warhead detonated. A

huge, spectacular fireball erupted, reaching a diameter of more than 18 miles in

three and a half seconds and rising at a

rate of up to one mile per second. A brilliant aurora, produced by electrons from

the TEAK explosion, developed at the

bottom of the fireball and filled the sky

with vivid colors.32

Throughout the Pacific, observers

marveled at the blast. One observer, an Air

Force lieutenant watching the sky around

midnight that evening from his porch, recalled TEAK: “...it seemed to be a semicircular fireball on the horizon... I just

thought it was Honolulu or Pearl Harbor

and I was dead.”33 The Apia Observatory

in Western Samoa approximately 2,000

miles to the south described the “...violent magnetic disturbance,” which heralded “...the most brilliant manifestation of

the Aurora Australis [Southern Lights]

ever seen in Samoa.” The resulting persistent ionization of the low-density atmosphere cut high frequency radio communications with New Zealand for six hours.

In Hawaii, where there had been no announcement of the test, the TEAK fireball turned from light yellow to dark

yellow to orange to red. “The red spread

in a semi-circular manner until it seemed

to engulf a large part of the horizon,” one

resident told the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

The red glow remained clearly visible in

the southwestern sky for half an hour. In

Honolulu, military and civilian air traffic

communications were interrupted for several hours. At the AFSWP’s offices in the

Pentagon, Admiral Parker grew concerned for the personnel on Johnston Island as hour after hour passed with no

word regarding the test. Finally, some

eight hours after TEAK had occurred, the

word that all was well came from Luedecke, the commander of Joint Task Force

7 and soon to be General Manager of the

AEC. The communications blackout worried others as well. Later AFSWP learned

that one of the first radio messages received at Johnston Island once communications was restored was: “Are you still

there?” By any measure, TEAK was a

most impressive test.33

Spectacular as it was, TEAK was one

of three HARDTACK weapon effects

tests to study blast, thermal, and nuclear

radiation effects at high altitudes, particularly as they might affect ballistic missiles. The first shot of Operation

HARDTACK was YUCCA, a low-yield

weapon of 1.7 kilotons launched from the

aircraft carrier USS Boxer and carried

aloft by a helium-filled balloon and detonated at 86,000 feet. Preparations for the

YUCCA test brought old inter-service rivalries to the surface. The Air Force had

designed and developed the balloon system for the high-altitude test, but the persistent surface winds on Enewetak made

launches from the airfield uncontrollable
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 141

Johnston (Atoll) Island,* South Pacific, looking to the West (photo circa 1965).

* Johnston Atoll (JA) or Johnston Island, located 717 nautical miles southwest of Honolulu,

Hawaii, is operated and maintained by Field

Command. The atoll consists of four coral islands: Johnston Island, Sand Island, North Island,

and East Island. At just over 625 acres, Johnston

is the largest island and base for all operations

and management activities, including all personnel and community support functions. Although

Johnston served as a staging area and test site

during the atmospheric nuclear test series, its

current mission (by Albuquerque Operations) is

to support the U.S. Army chemical weapon storage and destruction program.

and unreliable. With great reluctance, the

Air Force accepted the suggestion of

launching the balloon from the carrier,

which could sail downwind to create zero

velocity wind conditions. Just before midday on April 28, 1958, the Boxer turned

downwind, and the balloon rose from the

flight deck with the YUCCA device hanging from a cable below. At 2:40 in the afternoon, a radio command signal fired the

weapon, much to the relief of several observers whose worst case scenarios included a free flying balloon being driven

toward Japan by the upper level Krakatoan winds.34

The final test of a high-altitude detonation began just after TEAK. The Army

Redstone crew returned to Johnston Island

to make final preparations at the launch

pad for ORANGE. During the evening of

August 11, the missile was launched.

When it reached 125,000 feet, the fire signal was sent to the missile with no apparent response. Someone had failed to throw

a safety switch once the missile had

cleared the island’s safety zone. Technicians quickly discovered and corrected the
142 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

error, though the Redstone reached

141,000 feet before detonating. ORANGE’s yield was equal to the TEAK

shot, but less spectacular. The dramatic

display of southern lights which TEAK

generated raised considerable anxiety in

Hawaii, but most observers in the islands

were disappointed in ORANGE. One observer on the top of Mount Haleakala on

Maui described the display as “...a dark

brownish red mushroom [that] rose in the

sky and then died down and turned to

white with a dark red rainbow.” While

ORANGE was visible for about 10 minutes in Hawaii, it had little effect on radio

communications.35 The ORANGE event

was a critical effects test for AFSWP. The

nuclear weapon was salted with tracer

elements so that the residence time for

nuclear debris in the stratosphere could be

determined.

AFSWP’s U-2 high-altitude sampling

program (HASP) had begun in 1956 but

was kept secret within the agency.

AFSWP was reluctant to share its HASP

activities with even the AEC in order to

protect its security. Additionally, information acquired through HASP flights

shaped AFSWP’s position on worldwide

fallout patterns. This information was promulgated in Glasstone’s The Effects of

Nuclear Weapons, which was being written under AFSWP’s and AEC’s auspices

in 1956-57.36

While some valuable information had

been gathered from TEAK and ORANGE, many scientists in the nuclear

weapons community considered the tests

TEAK high-altitude shot; taken from Maui, 794 nautical miles from the explosion.
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 143

to be only partially successful. Neither

detonation had occurred where it had been

planned and, due to cloud cover, detailed

photographic coverage was incomplete.

One Los Alamos scientist requested that

AFSWP repeat the TEAK event, but the

DoD maintained that it was satisfied with

the results of the test and rejected the request on August 14, 1958. A week later

President Eisenhower announced a oneyear moratorium on nuclear testing, effective October 31, 1958.37

ARGUS

The rejection of a second TEAK test

may have been in part due to another series of high-altitude tests scheduled for the

South Atlantic at the end of August. The

DoD and the AEC sought to detonate nuclear devices at far higher altitudes than

both ORANGE and TEAK to obtain effects data on communications systems

and long-range missiles. The central idea

was to test Christofilos’ idea that a defensive shield of high-energy electrons might

destroy any missile attacking the country.

At the direction of ARPA’s Order No. 4,

AFSWP designed ARGUS to determine

if an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system

might use radiation effects from nuclear

detonations to create an umbrella of electrons to prematurely detonate missile warheads or jam the electronics of incoming

missiles. A large number of scientists had

advocated the development of a nuclear

weapon ABM system, but the initial analyses from TEAK and ORANGE were inconclusive. In addition, scientist sought

information about the feasibility of a highaltitude detection system that might complement seismic data gathered from a

network of worldwide ground monitoring

stations.38

Time, however, was running out for

the scientists. Rockets capable of reaching heights far above the HARDTACK

shots would not be ready for at least a year

or more. With the prospect of a test ban

going into effect before the end of 1958,

the DoD proposed conducting a series of

tests immediately, using available rockets that could reach an altitude of some

400 miles, where the experiment would

be conducted at a point in the earth’s magnetic field where an electron umbrella

shield could be established. Since no existing test site proved acceptable, officials

planned to conduct the series from Naval

vessels in the South Atlantic, where, at

roughly 45 degrees south latitude, the

earth’s magnetic field at a height reached

by existing missiles was appropriate for

trapping electrons in stable orbits. In selecting the South Atlantic, the military appreciated the fact that the area was remote

and sparsely populated. Moreover, if

asked, the AFSWP technical director for

ARGUS later said there was an excellent

“. . . likelihood that we could indefinitely

maintain that [the tests] had never occurred.”

Location of Johnston and Christmas Islands.
144 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

Starboard view of Admiral Mustin’s (subsequent DASA Director) flagship–the USS Tarawa–

underway in the Atlantic.

Although the South Atlantic provided a good test site technically, there were

international concerns. If the United

States conducted a nuclear test in international waters, there was no good argument to prevent the Soviet Union from

doing the same. Only when Eisenhower

had received the concurrence of the Department of State and his scientific advisor did he approve the ARGUS series. At

the end of April 1958, AFSWP, with the

assistance of ARPA, began planning the

South Atlantic operations to test, in late

August 1958, the “Christofilos effect.”

This test would determine if an artificial

electron belt trapped in space, similar to

the naturally occurring Van Allen radiation belts, could act as a defensive

shield.39

On April 28, 1958, a couple of days

before Eisenhower formally approved the

ARGUS series, Admiral Parker notified

the skipper of the USS Norton Sound,

Captain Gralla, that his ship had been selected to launch the missiles. AFSWP and

Sandia began training sessions aboard the

Norton Sound off the southern California

coast to ensure adequate coordination

among those responsible for the missile,

nuclear device, and fuzing and to maintain tight security away from the rest of

the flotilla in the Atlantic. After refitting

the Norton Sound at the Navy’s San Francisco Shipyard, the vessel headed south

to conduct a series of test firings off Point

Mugu, California. Technicians from

Lockheed’s Missile Systems Division led

the exercise. Two launch failures, including one in which the third stage of the missile and the dummy nuclear warhead

landed within 300 feet of the ship, led

Lockheed to change their missile design.

Back east, Rear Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin, the Task Force commander, moved

into AFSWP offices in Washington to receive a steady stream of briefings on the

technical aspects of the tests. Uncertain

of the probability of a clean launching success even after the test firings, Mustin requested a third test shot, which was

quickly approved. High winds and rough

seas were of special concern to AFSWP,

even though the Norton Sound could

launch its missiles in spite of pitch and

roll, high-sea conditions. AFSWP anticipated heavy cloud cover at shot time,
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 145

which would cloak the explosions from

the ship crews and would necessitate aircraft photography and another instrumentation ship off the Azores.40

The ARGUS tests were to be held in

complete secrecy. Although conducted on

Navy ships, ARGUS used an older version of an Air Force solid fuel rocket. At

the same time, ARGUS would study the

feasibility of the Army’s Nike-Zeus antiballistic missile, then in development. The

nine ships of Task Force 88, under the command of Rear Admiral Mustin, quietly put

to sea some three months after receiving

Presidential approval for ARGUS. The

key vessels for the series were the guided

missile ship Norton Sound, a converted

World War II seaplane tender from which

the rockets carrying low yield atomic devices would be fired, and the USS Tarawa, an aircraft carrier outfitted with radar

tracking equipment and anti-submarine

reconnaissance planes. The Tarawa was

to track the flight of the missiles and

search the test area for prying Soviet submarines.41

On August 1, 1958, the Norton Sound

departed from Port Hueneme California,

and, under radio silence, skirted the west

coast of South America, avoiding the Panama Canal, and rounded Cape Horn into

the South Atlantic. The Tarawa and the

remaining six support ships left Quonset Point, Rhode Island, on August 7. The

flotilla headed south, losing a couple of

Soviet trawlers in a hurricane in the Caribbean. On August 23, the radioman on

the Tarawa received a cryptic radio message: “Doctor Livingston, I presume?” It

came from the Norton Sound. The missile ship had arrived and rendezvoused

with the rest of Task Force 88 by August

25, during the heart of winter in the southern hemisphere.42

Once Task Force 88 was in place in

the lee of Gough Island, an uninhabited

British possession in the South Atlantic,

the ARGUS tests began. On August 27,

1958, five days after Eisenhower announced that a test moratorium would go

into effect in the beginning of November,

a 43-foot, specially modified X-17, a

three-stage rocket fitted with a small nuclear warhead, roared off the deck of the

Norton Sound. The second shot went off

on August 30, and the third a week later

on September 6. Each of the devices exploded some 300 miles into space. Mustin and an AFSWP staff member, Navy

Launch of Argus missile from USS Norton

Sound, August 1958.
146 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

Captain William Wallace, observed each

of the shots from planes flying above the

clouds.43

Shortly thereafter, Explorer IV, an

American satellite launched a month before the first ARGUS test, passed through

the artificially induced radiation belts

several times a day for the next week or

so, measuring effects data from the detonations. At the same time, in a related

weapons effects investigation at Kirtland

Air Force Base in Albuquerque, the Air

Force fired 16 five-stage Jason rockets

outfitted with radiation instrumentation

some 450 miles into space. The three ARGUS firings were successful in that neither radioactive fallout nor nosy Russian

submarines were detected in the test area.

The ARGUS experiments were less successful in confirming the Christofilos effect. Dr. Herbert F. York, the chief

research scientist at ARPA, admitted that

while the radiation belts Christofilos anticipated had indeed occurred, the concentration of electrons was too small, too

unstable, and too weak to prevent missiles

from reentering the earth’s atmosphere

(serving as a protective shield). Nonetheless, ARGUS proved that a test series

could be taken from concept to conclusion in an extraordinarily short period of

time if interest and inter-service cooperation were present. “Ten months from the

germ of an idea to its actual execution in

outer space was just short of fantastic,”

York later wrote, still in awe of what

AFSWP, the DoD, and Task Force 88 had

accomplished.44

ARGUS was unique among U.S. nuclear testing operations. It was the most

expeditiously planned and conducted series, the first launch of a ballistic missile

with a nuclear warhead from a ship, and

the only nuclear operation in the Atlantic

Ocean. In addition, it was the only clandestine test series conducted by the United States. ARGUS involved neither

diagnostic testing of a weapon design nor,

strictly speaking, the effects of an explosion on military systems as did other test

series. Rather, ARGUS was largely a scientific examination of the feasibility of

Christofilos’ theory that a very high-altitude nuclear detonation would create an

electron belt that might interfere with

communications and weapon performance.45

The epilogue to the top secret ARGUS

series came some six months later when

Hanson Baldwin, a New York Times military reporter, broke the story in March

1959 after determining to his satisfaction

that the Soviets had gleaned much information from the tests. Baldwin, who specialized in reporting on the Navy, had the

story as early as January 1959. The Pentagon was furious and, with White House

support, tried unsuccessfully to block

publication. After some internal debate at

the newspaper, however, the editors decided to delay the story until March 19.

To deflect Baldwin’s scoop, Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles called his own

press conference the same day. With Roy

W.Johnson and Herbert York from ARPA,

William J. Thaler of the Office of Naval

Research, and Frank Shelton from

AFSWP sitting alongside, Quarles downplayed the military applications of the

tests, emphasizing that the experimentation was focused on the scientific investigation of electrons in the upper

atmosphere. York was a bit more candid.

After describing Christofilos’ theory, he

told reporters that “...it became clear that

if we could fire an atomic bomb above the

earth’s atmosphere and inside of the

earth’s magnetic field that some of the

electrons would be spewed out with a sufficient energy and in such directions that

they would be trapped.” By examining

what occurred after the explosion, York

continued, “...we would be able to learn

a great deal more about the lifetime, about
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 147

the stability of these electron shells, etc.,

and that’s essentially what has been accomplished.” 46

THE MORATORIUM

AND TESTING READINESS

Even as Eisenhower announced that

the United States would cease testing nuclear weapons in August 1958, he asked

the DoD and AEC to maintain their capability to test. He had clearly recognized

the heightened dangers that the marriage

of missiles and nuclear weapons brought

to international affairs, a risk made all too

apparent by Sputnik. Ballistic missiles

with nuclear warheads drastically reduced

decision times for government leaders.

With this in mind, in 1957 Eisenhower

gave senior military commanders the authority to retaliate with nuclear weapons

if the President could not be reached or

was unable to respond to a nuclear attack

against the United States. At the same

time, Eisenhower hoped to avoid a nuclear

armageddon. While strongly backing an

end to the arms race and an end to radioactive fallout, Eisenhower did not want

to be caught unprepared. Therefore, even

as talks about a moratorium and a nuclear test ban treaty grew more productive,

he asked his scientists to keep the nation’s

testing program at the ready.47

The suspension of nuclear weapons

testing moved AFSWP responsibility

from direct field nuclear testing to a focus on laboratory experimentation, theoretical studies, and field tests that would

not involve nuclear explosions. On September 19, 1958, Neil McElroy, the Secretary of Defense, outlined AFSWP’s new

role. During the moratorium, McElroy

wrote, AFSWP should “...continue the

necessary research, laboratory, planning

and budgetary activities within [its]

present responsibilities” on the assumption that limited testing might resume by

February 1960 and “...extensive test operations may be initiated by, but not earlier than, mid-1960.” In the meantime,

AFSWP would continue to coordinate

with the AEC to gather essential nuclear

information from all sources except actual nuclear testing.48

To facilitate discussions between the

military and the AEC, Quarles, who had

become the acting Secretary of Defense,

established in October the Joint Atomic

Information Exchange Group (JAIEG)

within AFSWP under the policy guidance

of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the AEC. Under the agreement,

AFSWP provided necessary administrative support and daily technical advice and

assistance to the Group. Brigadier General R. H. Harrison, Deputy Chief of

AFSWP, became the first head of the Joint

Group. Harrison’s group, which consisted of staff assigned by each military Service and the AEC, was also responsible

for disseminating atomic information to

foreign governments and regional defense

organizations. The formation of JAIEG

was more than a response to the moratorium. The new organization represented

the increased responsibility of the military, sanctioned and implemented by

Eisenhower a year earlier, to deal with nuclear issues outside the United States.49

AFSWP and the AEC adopted a cooperative approach to meet another growing concern, accidents involving nuclear

weapons. After several months of discussions and negotiations, AFSWP and the

Commission signed a joint agreement in

February 1958 defining the areas of responsibility and operational procedures

applicable to achieving a “...prompt, effective, and coordinated response” to nuclear accidents. Under this arrangement,

the two agencies established the Joint

Coordinating Center in Albuquerque using the resources of Field Command,

AFSWP, and the AEC’s Albuquerque Operations Office to provide assistance and
148 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

information as required. The agreement

stipulated that for accidents occurring

within the United States, the Army would

have primary responsibility and command; for accidents elsewhere, the primary duty went to the agency having

physical control of the weapon at the time

of the incident. Events would soon overtake the fine points of this agreement.50

On March 11, 1958, two weeks after

the nuclear accident response agreement,

a B-47 bomber headed for North Africa

accidentally dropped an atomic bomb over

Mars Bluff, near Florence, South Carolina. According to the bomber crew, the safety device failed on a shackle which held

the bomb in place. As a crewman tried to

refasten the bomb, it broke loose and

dropped through the bomb bay doors,

nearly taking the crew member with it.

The bomb dug a 20-foot crater near a

farmhouse, setting off a high explosive

arming plug, damaging several other

buildings, and injuring six people, none

seriously. Air Force police, unmindful of

the new joint agreement and the Army’s

primary responsibility, quickly sealed off

the area, swept it for any scattered bits of

plutonium, and soon announced that

“...there was not enough radioactivity

present to make a Geiger counter click.”

Secretary of Defense McElroy explained

that “...these are perilous times and that,

as part of our security measures, strategic

bombers are on 24-hour training,” adding

that “...this accident is one of the dangers.”

But, he assured the country, there had

been no nuclear explosion and no radiation danger. Most people, according to

one news magazine, feared an “atomic

Pearl Harbor” and understood the need to

keep bombers with nuclear weapons in the

air at all times. Bill Gregg, a World War II

paratrooper who owned the damaged

farmhouse, agreed that the security was

worth the danger. Assured that the Air

Force would take care of all damage, he

quipped, “I’ve always wanted a swimming

pool, and now I’ve got a hole for one at no

cost.”51

DEFENSE REORGANIZATION

ACT OF 1958

On April 3, 1958, President

Eisenhower proposed to Congress a general reorganization of the Department of

Defense. The nature of war and the requirements of national defense, he said,

had changed fundamentally, and that

“...separate ground, sea, and air warfare

is gone forever. If ever again we should

be involved in war, we will fight it in all

elements, with all Services, as one single

concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact.”52

The President’s plan called for a dramatic expansion in the authority of the

Secretary of Defense, who henceforth

would allocate funds among the Services, assign each Service combat roles in

accordance with overall national strategy,

select officers for promotion to the most

senior rank, centralize all public relations,

and, presumably, put an end to inter-service squabbling. The JCS was to be transformed into a senior staff responsible for

assisting the Secretary in exercising unified direction. The act also authorized the

Secretary to establish without further

Congressional legislation such defense

agencies as were necessary “...to provide

more effective, efficient, and economical

administration and operation” within the

Defense Department.53

Despite scattered complaints from

lawmakers about “Prussian-like centralization” and disgruntlement in some military quarters over the loss of autonomy

the Services would suffer, by August the

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 had

won Congressional approval and was

ready for Eisenhower’s signature.

Although the President spoke like a
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 149

visionary in introducing defense reorganization, his primary motivation was political. He was responding in large part to

the anxieties engendered by recent setbacks in the Cold War. In the media and

in Congress, Soviet breakthroughs in

space and in the development of ICBMs

were generally attributed not to Soviet

technical superiority but to American bungling and mismanagement, chiefly among

turf-minded Pentagon bureaucrats. “The

Russians are catching up to us,” charged

retired Air Force Chief of Staff General

Carl Spaatz, “not because we lack scientific and technical genius...[but] because

our present defense organization is defective. With the best will in the world, it

cannot make the best use of the brainpower and materials at its disposal.”55 Certainly there were well-publicized examples of

duplication and waste in the weapons development arena. The latest round of

Army-Air Force missile competition, between the Army’s intermediate-range

Thor and the Air Force’s Jupiter, was estimated to have cost taxpayers an additional

$500 million.

The nation’s nuclear weapons program had also been disrupted by inter-service conflict. In public, there was no more

avid defender of the program than AEC

Chief Strauss, but privately he was a harsh

critic. In a 1957 conversation with Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles, he “...compared it to the faltering missile

program—too many designs, too much

inter-service rivalry, too much time spent

on engineering refinements, and too little

time spent on developing radically new

approaches.”56 The unprecedented scope

and scale of HARDTACK exemplified his

concerns. Not only did HARDTACK

stretch AFSWP’s field capabilities almost

to the breaking point, it also heightened

public sensitivity to the whole testing program at a time when it was already under

critical scrutiny and thus hastened what

the military and the AEC wished to avoid:

a moratorium on testing.

BIRTH OF DASA

On August 22, 1958, two weeks after

passage of the Defense Reorganization

Act, AFSWP was ordered to conduct a full

evaluation of its mission and responsibilities under the new defense structure. The

review was completed in a fortnight, and,

after evaluation and coordination, approved by the JCS by the end of December. On May 1, 1959, with the

endorsement of Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles, AFSWP aquired a new

name: the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) and a new charter, and the

AFSWP of old was retired. Within this

new agency charter, the Joint Chiefs noted the growing dependence of the Armed

Forces on atomic weapons and their continuing responsibility for logistical and

administrative support of the nuclear

stockpile. DASA became the first defense

field agency established under the 1958

legislation.57

On paper, the creation of DASA was

in accordance with the spirit of the Defense Reorganization Act. Nothing appeared to have changed aside from the

nuclear organization’s name and its reporting relationships. The DASA chief,

whose position was to be rotated among

the Services, would now report through

the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. Requests for DASA’s advice and assistance

would now have to be approved either by

the Office of the Secretary or one of the

unified commands. The new charter gave

DASA responsibility for supervising all

DoD weapon effects tests, which had formerly been conducted by the individual

Services. But in most other respects,

DASA’s new charter looked identical to

the one under which AFSWP had operated since July 1951, and so did the organization itself. DASA’s official history
150 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

conceded that “...there were no apparent

differences within the headquarters” between the old organization and the new.58

Nor was there to be a change in leadership; Admiral Parker had agreed to stay

on as director.

MORATORIUM IN ACTION

When it came to the reorganization of

the defense establishment in general and

the nuclear testing establishment particular, appearances were deceiving. In

Eisenhower’s mind, the Defense Reorganization Act was as much about forging

the new institutional arrangements that

would permit the Cold War to be gradually wound down as it did with the public

purpose of confronting the Soviet threat

more “efficiently.” Increasingly uncertain

about the validity of America’s strategic

assumptions, distressed by the prospect of

a continuing arms race, and convinced

that the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, was more amenable than his predecessors to negotiations, Eisenhower, late in

his second term, was determined to burnish his legacy as a peacemaker. For the

President, the moratorium on nuclear testing was the harbinger of a relaxation of

tensions that would hopefully lead to a

nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear disarmament, and overall detente with Moscow.59

The transition from AFSWP to DASA

reflected the change in the agency’s fundamental purpose associated with the

moratorium. For DASA, vast quantities

of data from previous tests, especially

HARDTACK and ARGUS, remained to

be analyzed; the stockpile still required

intensive maintenance; training had to be

conducted; and war planners would still

turn to DASA for advise as they pondered

the role nuclear weapons would play on

the battlefield of the future.

Some testing still went on in the laboratories. AFSWP-DASA had developed

exploding wire experiments, where huge

amounts of electricity, released instantaneously through an extremely fine wire,

which literally atomized the wire. Dynamic loading machines, which used specifically designed conventional explosives or

gases under pressure released through

quick opening valves, simulated the rise

time, peak pressure, and duration of a

nuclear weapon’s shock pulse.60

Based on the results of such laboratory experiments along with continuing theoretical calculations, DASA continued to

expand its understanding of nuclear weapon effects. Through similar techniques,

Los Alamos and Livermore were able to

continue developing and stockpiling new

weapons during the moratorium. “Testing” now consisted largely of extrapolating data from previous tests on similar

warheads. Inevitably, some of the new

weapons developed problems that had

gone undetected in the laboratories. Original thinking on new designs, those for

which no test precedents could be extrapolated, went largely by the board.61

PROJECT Plowshare

Another moratorium-stimulated stratagem was Project Plowshare, the aptly

named effort to investigate civilian uses

of nuclear explosions. As early as 1956,

Dr. Herbert York, Director of Lawrence

Livermore Laboratory, had raised the possibility of using the energy released by

nuclear or thermonuclear reactions to produce electrical power, dig excavations for

mines and canals, dredge harbors, and

other practical uses. Livermore received

approval to begin investigations, with the

proviso that the Plowshare research not

interfere with the weapons program.

Funding averaged approximately

$100,000 a year between 1956 and 1959.

The moratorium threw Plowshare into

a new light. Some scientists, notably Edward Teller and AEC officials, started

thinking about it as a way to compensate
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 151

for the absence of direct weapons tests

during the moratorium, not as a subterfuge, but as a means of acquiring new information about nuclear behavior relevant

to weapons testing. Fiscal year 1960 funding for Project Plowshare, primarily managed by the AEC Livermore labs, shot up

to $6 million. DASA, however, was ambivalent, believing that any involvement

by a Defense Department agency would

be construed ipso facto as a violation of

the moratorium. This ambivalence was

increasingly shared by the administration,

which saw Plowshare as a transparent

evasion of the spirit, if not the letter, of

the moratorium. When the Soviets, with

their own voluntary moratorium, pointedly suggested that two could play the Plowshare game, the project quietly returned

to the back burner.62

Later hearings on Project Plowshare

before the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy in January 1965 expanded a

wealth of creative uses for the “peaceful

applications of nuclear explosives.”

Among these nuclear applications, espoused by Dr. Glenn Seaborg and Dr. John

Kelly of the AEC in Congressional testimony, were proposals on underground engineering of all types, recovery of oil from

shale and tar sands, recovery of underground

gas, canal dredging and excavation, and harbor expansion.63

Despite these efforts to develop alternative approaches to nuclear testing, the

heart of AFSWP’s old mission was gone.

In this area, the agency’s future hinged on

the outcome of U.S.-Soviet negotiations

to achieve a test ban treaty, negotiations

for which opened at 3:00 p.m. on October 31, 1959, at the Palace of Nations in

Geneva.

The new global realities posed administrative as well as functional challenges

for DASA. Among these challenges,

funding was the thorniest. Considerations

of economy were hardly absent from

Eisenhower’s calculations in promoting

defense reorganization, and, with no nuclear tests to conduct, the best that DASA

could hope for was funding to maintain a

low level of readiness in case nuclear testExample Project Plowshare Proposal: Use of nuclear explosive for excavation of mountain

roadway from Project Carryall; Congressional Hearing, “Peaceful Applications of Nuclear

Explosives-Plowshare,” January 5, 1965.
152 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

DASA Organizational Chart, May 1959.

SURG PIO

EXECUTIVE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(SCIENTIFIC)

COLLATERAL DUTY

OF BIOMEDICAL CHIEF

WEAPONS TESTS

(SANDIA)

WEAPONS TEST

SUPPORT

TEST

OPERATIONS

NEVADA

OPERATIONS

BLAST &

SHOCK

PROTECTIVE

STRUCTURES

AIR

BLAST

NAVAL

EFFECTS

RADIATION

FALLOUT

ELECTROMAGNETIC

NUCLEAR

BIOMEDICAL

THERMAL

ANALYSIS &

PROGRAMMING

TEST

ANALYSIS

RESEARCH

OPERATIONS

SAFETY

STOCKPILE

MANAGEMENT

ATOM MATERIAL

& TRAINING

COMMUNICATION

COMMANDER

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER

FIELD COMMAND

EXECUTIVE

DEPUTY

ARMY

DEPUTY

SCIENTIFIC

DEPUTY

NAVY

CHIEF

OF STAFF

SCIENCE TASK

GROUP

J1 J2 J3 J4

J5 J6

JOHNSTON

ISLAND

PLANS PIO

ASSISTANT DEPUTY

SUPPORT

AG LOG PERSONNEL COMP

SURG SEC

JA IG

OIAP

OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT

EVALUATION

SANDIA

BASE NSS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

COMMANDER SANDIA B

DIRECTOR
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 153

COMP IG

JOINT ATOMIC

INFORMATION

EXCHANGE GROUP

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(OPERATIONS &

ADMINISTRATION)

COLLATERAL DUTY

OF PERSONNEL &

ADMINISTRATIVE CHIEF

PLANS

PLANS &

POLICY

M & O

SPECIAL

PROJECTS

IREQ

ADV CONCEPTS

& REQUISITION

DEVELOPMENT

PERSONNEL &

ADMINISTRATION LOG

CONSTRUCTION

& INSTALLATION

SUPPLY

CONTRACT

MANAGEMENT

PERSONNEL

ADMINISTRATIVE

SERVICES

SECURITY

CLASS POLICY

& MANAGEMENT

INDUSTRY &

PERSONNEL SECURITY

SECURITY POLICY

& OPERATIONS

Organization Chart

DEFENSE ATOMIC

SUPPORT AGENCY (DASA)

MAY 1959

DIRECTOR ARMED FORCES

RADIOBIOLOGICAL

RESEARCH INSTITUTE

EXECUTIVE

ASSISTANT DEPUTY

WEAPONS & TRAINING

ATOMIC

WEAPONS

MATERIAL

ATOMIC

WEAPONS

TRAINING

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

(NAVY)

OPERATIONS &

ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT

CHIEF

SCIENTIST

PROGRAM

COORDINATION

OFFICE

EXPERIMENTAL

PATHOLOGY

DEPARTMENT

BEHAVIORAL

SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT

PHYSICAL

SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT

RADIATION

BIOLOGY

DEPARTMENT

TECHNICAL

INFORMATION

& SERVICES

DEPARTMENT

MILITARY

ANALYSIS

DEPARTMENT

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

(AIR FORCE)

RADIOLOGICAL

SAFETY

DEPARTMENT

STATISTICS

OFFICE
154 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

ing should resume. The transition from

AFSWP to DASA provided that all the

Services’ nuclear testing budgets would

be lumped together into a single appropriation under DASA’s control. The adequacy of that appropriation was another

question.

THE DISMANTLING OF

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

Among the first subordinate organizations to feel the effects of moratorium-related stringencies was Joint Task

Force Seven (JTF-7). In March 1959,

Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles suggested to AEC Chief John McCone, who

had replaced Strauss the previous July,

that “...in consideration of the present test

moratorium and the uncertainties...[of] the

nature, scope and locations of future tests

if testing should be resumed,” they should

conduct a joint study on the future of the

Pacific test infrastructure.64 McCone

readily agreed, both to the proposed study

and the assumptions that would guide it.

“In recognition of the domestic and international situation regarding the resumption of testing,” the study group observed,

“it may be too readily concluded that

plans and preparations for overseas operations, in particular, could be safely relegated to the back burner, if not abandoned

completely.”65

They agreed that a strong case could

be made on the grounds of economy for

closing out the test facilities entirely. But

they also warned of “...serious political

and psychological consequences,” domestic and diplomatic, if that were done.

Unilateral dismantling of the test facilities, the study group concluded, would

convey the message that the military regarded the atmospheric testing in the Pacific as unnecessary and, worse, eliminate

any incentive for the Soviets to make

comparable concessions of their own.

Despite the “relatively low probability” that the PPG would ever be used again

for atmospheric testing, the study recommended the retention of the facilities on a

much-reduced basis. Some base camp

facilities and depots would be consolidated and others mothballed. All new construction came to an end.

Communications equipment was turned

over to contractors for conservation. As

for JTF-7, its total authorized manpower

was slashed from 945 to 206. Task Group

7.1, the group of scientists that had served

as the liaison between the laboratories and

the field, was entirely eliminated.66 “In

retrospect,” wrote William Ogle, “this

move appears as possibly the most serious single move made during the moratorium toward winding down our

capability to test in the atmosphere.”67

HIGH-ALTITUDE

TESTING POSSIBILITIES

Implicit in the decisions about JTF-7

was another assumption: that, whatever

became of the moratorium, the days of

atmospheric testing for the United States

were numbered. Given the emotions surrounding the fallout issue, military planners concluded that, if and when testing

resumed, their focus would necessarily

turn underground and to space.

Even underground and high-altitude

testing was not free from political complications, however. The public controversy over ARGUS six months after the fact

had less to do with testing per se than with

the nuclear agencies’ deliberate failure to

keep Congress informed of their plans.

The implication, disquieting in light of the

ongoing test ban negotiations, was that

tests conducted in outer space could go

entirely undetected. Nevertheless, it was

the fallout question that absorbed public

attention immediately after the ARGUS

revelations. To what extent was high-altitude testing safer than atmospheric tests?

How high was high enough to prevent ra-
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 155

dioactivity from returning to earth? Congressional hearings in May of 1959 produced warnings from AEC, DASA, and

public health experts that even a shot 30

miles up offered only a 50 percent margin of protection. However, at much higher altitudes—ARGUS had taken place

approximately 300 miles above the

earth—fallout dropped off dramatically.

For DASA planners, this turned deep

space into the next frontier for nuclear

testing once the moratorium was lifted.

In particular, it revived interest in

Project Willow, a Defense Department

initiative designed as an ARGUS followon project, to test effects of nuclear explosions on communications, radar

operations, and so forth. After the spring

1959 hearings, discussions began between

DASA and the AEC to expand the scope

of Willow to include AEC requirements

for high-altitude testing, detection, and

evasion.

The process soon bogged down, largely for budgetary reasons. One could hardly make a persuasive case for a project

which, if nothing changed, would never

be productive. It was especially difficult

to make such a case for a project as costly as Willow. Operational and safety complexities led planners to switch the site of

the proposed launch from Cape Canaveral to Johnston Island, adding $50 million

to the projected cost. The agency requested $6 million for one phase of 1960 planning; it received $2 million. By early

1960, Project Willow was no further along

than it had been a year earlier.68

HARDTACK II

AND THE DILEMMA OF

UNDERGROUND TESTING

A week after the President’s announcement of the moratorium, AEC

Chief McCone had persuaded a reluctant Eisenhower to authorize “...one more

test series” before the formal cessation of

testing actually went into effect. The official name for the series, which consisted of 19 small shots, four of them

underground, was HARDTACK II, although the press dubbed it “Operation

Deadline.” The test series took place at

Yucca Flats, 90 miles northwest of Las

Vegas, over a period of six weeks. The last

blast occurred on October 30, 1958, just

hours before the moratorium was to begin the following day.69

Meanwhile, negotiators in Geneva,

James Wadsworth for the United States

and Semyon Tsarapkin for the Soviets,

had turned to the business at hand, fleshing out the agreements reached between

U.S. and Soviet technical experts in Geneva over the previous summer. The central

issue was verification and inspection. On

the basis of the 1957 RAINIER blast, the

Americans had concluded that it was seismically possible to detect underground

blasts in excess of five megatons and to

differentiate between a naturally occurring earth tremor and one caused by a

nuclear detonation. This position was

agreeable to the secretive Soviets, who

opposed stringent verification. According

to the experts’ agreement signed on August 21, monitoring would be carried out

from a network of 180 land- and sea-based

stations around the globe.70 But the shortcomings of the scientists’ agreement was

revealed soon after the Wadsworth-Tsarapkin negotiations got under way. Talks

quickly bogged down over political questions, such as the composition of the seven-member control commission that

would supervise the inspection arrangements and the nationalities of the commission’s technicians.

Then a crucial substantive obstacle

arose. In January of 1959, analysis of the

data from HARDTACK II cast considerable doubt on the RAINIER-based assumptions embodied in the bilateral

experts’ agreement. HARDTACK II
156 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

showed that the seismic signals produced

by underground blasts were much weaker than RAINIER had indicated: detecting blasts down to five megatons would

require as many as 1,000 on-site inspections or three times as many monitoring

stations as the experts’ agreement contemplated. To the Soviets, this represented an

unthinkable intrusiveness. They cried

foul, accusing the Americans of manipulating the data to justify reneging on the

experts’ agreement. Eisenhower was embarrassed and angry, for he had accepted

the judgment of his scientists; judgment

based on RAINIER alone, as a basis for a

negotiating position that subsequent evidence proved untenable.71

Nevertheless, with the Geneva talks

apparently headed for a breakdown,

Eisenhower again turned to his scientists.

The chairman of his Science Advisory

Commission, James R. Killian, Jr., recommended the appointment of an investigative panel to review the HARDTACK II

findings and to investigate ways in which

existing monitoring technology might be

improved, perhaps making it possible to

retain the original Geneva monitoring

framework. The panel, headed by university president Lloyd V. Berkner, reported

its findings in March, and, for test ban

treaty proponents, the news was not good.

It reaffirmed the HARDTACK II conclusion and then raised a new issue that reinforced it: the so-called “big hole”

phenomenon. Scientific evidence now

showed that if an underground explosion

took place in a large cave, as opposed to

being drilled directly into the bedrock, it

would be much more difficult to detect

seismically.72

The Berkner Panel’s concluding call

for a crash program of seismic research

provided further motivation for the VELA

UNIFORM project, which produced major advances in underground test detection technology.73 In the meantime,

however, there was no method the United States and the Soviet Union could

agree to for monitoring underground testing that was both effective and unobtrusive. Additionally, no method was known

to effectively monitor nuclear testing in

outer space. By the spring of 1959, even

as the Geneva negotiators struggled on,

it was clear that a comprehensive test ban

treaty was beyond reach; a ban on atmospheric testing was all that could realistically be achieved.

Pressure began to build in the United

States for a resumption of testing, if not

in the atmosphere, then underground.

Strauss and McCone had always had difficulty keeping their moratorium misgivings to themselves. Other defense officials

were similarly candid in expressing their

concerns about the United States falling

behind in the arms race; they and their

colleagues at the AEC took for granted

that the Soviets were conducting underground tests even as they were pledging

to adhere to the moratorium. By December, even Secretary of Defense Thomas

Gates was calling for the resumption of

underground testing. On the defensive,

test ban treaty proponents agreed on a

compromise proposal to the Soviets that

would bar atmospheric testing and underground testing above a specified kiloton

level, the latter to be determined based on

a number of on-site inspections to be determined by Moscow. On December 29,

1960, Eisenhower announced the end of

the moratorium, with the caveat that the

United States would give notice before

resuming testing. Six weeks later, he formally presented the compromise proposal to the Soviets.

Before the Soviets had a chance to

react, France became the fourth member

of the nuclear fraternity when it detonated a 60-kiloton bomb at Reggan, a remote

Sahara oasis approximately 750 miles

southwest of Algiers. It was the first at-
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 157

mospheric nuclear test in 16 months.

French President Charles de Gaulle insisted that by developing an independent

nuclear capability not responsive to Moscow or Washington, France was “...rendering a service to the balance of the

world.” Others saw it differently. In Africa, French embassies were the scene of

violent protests. The hostility of eastern

bloc nations was predictable, but even in

Washington and London, the reaction was

noticeably cool to what amounted to an

ally’s triumph. For the French, the blast

highlighted the dangers of nuclear proliferation—and the fact that the window of

opportunity to prevent nuclear weaponry

from spreading to other, perhaps less responsible, governments would not stay

open indefinitely.74

That sobering realization lent new urgency to the test ban negotiations. Two

days after the French test, Soviet treaty

negotiator Tsarapkin indicated that Moscow was studying the U.S. compromise

proposal eliminating atmospheric tests

and large underground tests. On March

19, 1961, he brought a counterproposal:

in addition to the prohibitions proposed

by the Americans, the Soviets proposed

an end to smaller underground tests, but

without provision for verification. The

plan would be based on good faith, a

scarce commodity in the Cold War. In the

United States, ardent Cold Warriors

quickly denounced the Soviet plan as a

ploy that would permit Moscow to conduct smaller tests in massive numbers behind closed doors while U.S. compliance

would be subject to the world’s scrutiny.

But Eisenhower was determined to have

an agreement. As he told his advisors,

unless the U.S. accepted the Soviet proposal as a basis for new negotiations,

which he hoped to begin with Khrushchev

during their upcoming summit in Paris,

“...all hope of relaxing the Cold War

would be gone.”75

MORATORIUM ENDS

In October, 1961, the Soviets

ended the moratorium by detonating a 50

megaton,* parachute-retarded weapon

from a Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber over

Novaya Zemlya test range. The weapon,

named Tsar Bomba, was in response in

Kruschev’s specific command to Sakharaov and other bomb designers to pursue the quick development of a

100-megaton range weapon. Although

this weapon was actually fielded and added to Soviet stockpile, it was deemed

“militarily useless” due to its weight of

27 tons. The fabrication of the massive

parachute used with this weapon actually

disrupted the Soviet hosiery industry. In

response to the threat imposed by Soviet

nuclear tests, DASA was tasked with several program support initiatives in 1961;

many in direct response to White House

requests.

The DoD Damage Assessment Center (DODDAC) began operations in the

Pentagon and at the underground Alternate National Military Command Center

(ANMCC) at Fort Ritchie, Maryland in

1961. DASA contributed staff to DODDAC and to the Assessment Center’s research programs.

In late 1961, at White House request,

DASA staff analyzed the effects of a 100-

megaton weapon detonated on the ANMCC at Fort Ritchie, and on proposed new

underground facilities in Washington,

D.C. DASA also supported the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), established at SAC, beginning in 1960.

DASA and its contractors developed computer models of nuclear effects, notably

airblast, based on data collected at NTS

and Pacific test series.

* Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear weapon ever

constructed or detonated, was actually a 100-

megaton bomb design, however, the yield on detonation was 50 megatons.
158 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Just before sunrise on May 1, 1960, a

31-year-old Air Force lieutenant rolled out

of his bunk in the U.S. barracks at Peshawar, Pakistan. After breakfast, he

squeezed into his flight suit and then into

the cockpit of the plane that, if all went

according to plan, would carry him over

the Soviet Union and land in Norway 18

hours later. His name was Francis Gary

Powers.76

First Lieutenant Powers, an Air Force

pilot flying F-84 fighter aircraft, had been

solicited by the CIA in 1956 to support a

unique mission the agency was developing. With the imminent test flight of a new

secret surveillance aircraft, the Lockheed

U-2, the CIA began a crash program to

train top-flight pilots in high-altitude surveillance. Powers entered U-2 training at

Watertown Strip in Nevada and after several months began service at U.S. military bases in Turkey and Pakistan.

Originally flying the U-2 along the Soviet borders for reconnaissance, the May 1,

1960 flight was to be the first direct traversing flight across the USSR from Pakistan to Norway. A little more than

halfway though his flight, Power’s U-2

was disabled by a Soviet surface-to-air

missile near the city of Sverdlovsk . After bailout, Lieutenant Powers was taken

into custody by local military and turned

over to the KGB in Moscow.

The downing of his U-2 reconnaissance plane over Sverdlovsk set in motion a train of events that abruptly ended

the Paris summit, all hopes for rapid

progress toward a nuclear test ban treaty,

and Eisenhower’s dream of achieving

detente between the United States and the

Soviet Union. Eisenhower’s disappointment was acute, but he would have undoubtedly had real difficulty selling to the

Senate a treaty resembling the one that the

Soviets had proposed; a treaty that would

have frozen U.S. testing both above and

below ground, and trusted the Soviets’

pledge to do likewise.

Soon after the Paris summit failure,

Wadsworth and Tsarapkin resumed negotiations in Geneva. But these were negotiations that were going nowhere, at least

not until a new administration took office

in Washington. With the Pentagon and the

AEC clamoring for a reopening of testBecoming operational in 1955, the B-52 bomber served as a USAF mainstay front-line bomber.
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 159

ing, new President John F. Kennedy’s expressed commitment to continuing the

moratorium became increasingly difficult

to sustain. After August 31, 1961, when

the Soviets unilaterally resumed largescale atmospheric testing, it became impossible. Kennedy’s first reaction to the

news of the Soviet decision, according to

Theodore Sorensen, was “unprintable.”77

His second reaction was to order “the resumption of nuclear tests, in the laboratory and underground, with no fallout.”

Meanwhile, the fledgling Soviet space

program, still reveling in the success of

the earlier launch of the Sputnik satellite,

enjoyed another first; the launch of Vostok 1 from Baikonur in the Soviet Union,

and the earth orbit of Yuri Gagarin on

April 12, 1961. Gagarin’s spacecraft circled the Earth once in an elliptical orbit

with successful re-entry, making the Soviet Union’s first cosmonaut a worldwide

celebrity. Once again, American notions

of superiority were shattered by the Soviet space triumph, yet it was this achievement that prompted the United States to

launch its own program to “get a man on

the moon” by the end of the 1960s.

OPERATION NOUGAT

Coupled with the fact that larger

weapons and anti-missile weapons could

not be tested underground under any circumstances and that each day seemed to

bring reports of new and bigger Soviet

atmospheric blasts, it is no wonder that

Kennedy’s inclination was increasingly to

embrace a resumption of atmospheric testing. He announced that decision several

months later, on November 30, 1961.78

Kennedy’s call for the resumption of nuclear tests with “no fallout” led to a hastily prepared program of underground

testing at NTS, called Operation NOUGAT; a series of underground nuclear

tests. The initial test, Shot ANTLER, got

off to a rocky start on September 15, 1961.

About an hour after the initial detonation,

involving a 2.6 kiloton device, radioactivity vented from the tunnel complex into

the atmosphere, destroying most of the

data and rendering some of the test tunnels unusable for a month, despite aroundthe-clock clean-up efforts. Operation

NOUGAT tests continued at NTS through

1961 and on into 1962, with more than

45 individual weapon-related tests; the

Lockheed U-2 Surveillance aircraft of the type used by Lieutenant Powers in 1960.
160 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

Major General Robert H. Booth, DASA

Director, 1961-1964.

majority of which were tunnel or shafttype tests.

Prompted by Soviet testing, the U.S.

accelerated deployments of nuclear weapons to Europe late in 1961. The NATO nuclear stockpile virtually doubled between

January 1961 and May 1965. The tension

and pressure of the Cold War began to boil

over.

DASA AFTER

THE MORATORIUM

The change from AFSWP to DASA

on May 1, 1959 was soon accompanied

by a change in agency leadership. Admiral Parker resigned as DASA Director in

August of 1960; taking his place on an

interim basis was Major General Harold

C. (Sam) Donnelly, commanding general

of Field Command. In January of 1961,

Major General Robert H. Booth took over

the reins at DASA, where he would serve

until health problems forced his retirement in 1964.79 Born in Washington,

D.C., in 1905, General Booth graduated

from West Point in 1930. He attended the

Air Corps flying school and then, with

limited opportunity to put his flying skills

to use in the peacetime Army, switched

back to field artillery. He then began a

long series of teaching and staff assignments: three years as an instructor of field

artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; four years

in the mathematics department at West

Point; and, after a year in combat against

Japan, as an operations officer with a specialty in new weapons applications.

Booth’s postwar field commands took

him to Germany, first in divisional and

then in corps artillery. Before coming to

DASA, he commanded the Second Army

Air Defense Region at Fort Meade, Maryland. He had just completed his 31st year

of active duty.80

Booth’s wealth of administrative experience would be put to the test in rehabilitating a nuclear testing capability that,

as Frank Shelton put it succinctly, “...had

gone to pot” during the moratorium

years.81 NOUGAT’s start-up difficulties,

in which the first 11 underground tests all

vented radioactivity to a significant extent, even though they were all AEC tests,

still underscored the challenge DASA

faced in meeting President Kennedy’s

stricture of “no fallout.” But the agency

now had the budgetary wherewithal to get

the job done: the appropriation for fiscal

year 1962 was nearly double that for fiscal year 1959, during the depths of the

moratorium.82 As DASA personnel continued their work in the Nevada desert into

the early months of 1962, mishaps of the

sort that vexed NOUGAT at the outset and

that had prodded Kennedy to resume atmospheric testing, became less frequent.

Underground testing was relatively new,

and experience paid big dividends. Testers

learned the relative advantages of tunnels

for some applications and vertical holes

for others. A search got under way for a
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 161

second site to augment the NTS; the Mississippi salt domes seemed especially

promising. Veteran test engineers from

AFSWP days, who had scattered to other

assignments during the moratorium, returned to DASA. Booth ordered the recruitment of experienced radiochemists,

who brought with them advanced techniques of data collection and evaluation.

DASA logisticians unraveled bottlenecks

in the delivery of materials—coaxial cable was for a time in particularly short

supply—and heavy equipment. Labor unrest, particularly among the unionized

pipe fitters and operating engineers, was

ironed out when the workweek was reduced from 54 hours to 40. By January, a

schedule of 24 NTS shots had been submitted to and approved by the President,

a schedule consistent with the demands

of national security and the capabilities of

the test site.83

OPERATION DOMINIC

For all the progress stateside, the Pacific would be the main theater of nuclear test operations should atmospheric

testing be approved. In preparation for resumption, Joint Task Force Eight (JTF-8),

the successor to JTF-7, was activated. On

October 21, 1961, the JCS assigned

DASA the task of planning for the tests

to be carried out under control of JTF-8.

JTF-8 was organized much like prior

test organizations, incorporating elements

of the military Services and their contractors, of the AEC and its contractors, and

of other government agencies in its structure. Command went to Major General

Alfred D. Starbird, who had served as the

AEC’s senior military officer since 1955.

General Starbird was responsible to both

the JCS and the AEC Chairman. He had

three deputy commanders: one from the

Navy, who also commanded the Navy

Task Group (JTG 8.3); another was from

the Air Force who commanded the Air

Force Task Group (JTG 8.4); the third

deputy was an AEC civilian, who directed all the scientific activities. Base support would be carried out by the same

civilian contractor that had supplied these

services in all the Pacific tests during the

1950s. Starbird had at his disposal 95

ships, 233 aircraft, and more than 19,000

military, civilian, and contractor personnel.84

General Starbird and his staff had a

full plate with Operation DOMINIC, a

series of 36 tests that began April 25,

1962. The principal location for the weapon development phase of the project was

British-owned Christmas Island, a largely uninhabited atoll lying about 1,200

miles south of Hawaii. Christmas Island

offered two principal benefits. First, it was

not Enewetak, the obvious and best choice

from a technical standpoint but problematic politically. Even U.S. allies, the State

Department argued, might reasonably

question whether Washington was doing

right by the Marshallese under United

Nations trusteeship in once again turning

their tropical island into a nuclear firing

range. Second, Christmas Island, 30 miles

long, was considerably larger than

Johnston Island, another frequent test site,

but too small to accommodate any except

the high-altitude shots planned for DOMINIC. The one drawback, of course, was

that Christmas Island was British, but high

level negotiations, culminating in a Bermuda summit meeting between Kennedy

and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan,

and a quid pro quo agreement allowing

the British to use NTS for some test blasts

of their own, settled that matter.85

DOMINIC was to be a comprehensive

test series. It involved two key Navy tests

(FRIGATE BIRD and SWORDFISH), a

Defense Department rocket-launched

high-altitude series, code-named FISHBOWL, plus a variety of nuclear weapons development tests designed by AEC
162 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

nuclear weapons laboratories. In approving DOMINIC, Kennedy imposed an approximate 90-day time limit; all tests were

to be completed by July of 1962.

The Navy series (FRIGATE BIRD

and SWORDFISH) and FISHBOWL

were the most consequential for national security. FRIGATE BIRD, on May 6,

marked the first firing of a Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM) system with a nuclear warhead,

delivered by the submarine USS Ethan

Allen. The missile traveled over 1,000

nautical miles before reentering the atmosphere and exploding as an air burst

over the Pacific. It was the capstone of

the development of the Polaris, which

subsequently joined the long-range

bomber and the land-based ICBM to form

the three legs of the U.S. deterrent triad.

SWORDFISH was both a weapon system test and a weapon effects test of

the Navy’s ASROC program, the development of a rocket-launched, antisubmarine nuclear depth charge. It, too,

was a near-complete success.86

FISHBOWL, however, knew both

success and failure, and the failures were

spectacular. A high-altitude rocket was to

be launched from Johnston Island, where

a massive crash rebuilding program was

under way, involving a new launch complex for Thor missiles and improvements

to the island airfield. FISHBOWL’s component shots, code-named BLUEGILL

and STARFISH, were effects tests designed to answer two questions: whether

neutrons and gamma rays from a nuclear

blast were capable of neutralizing enemy

reentry vehicles, and whether varying intensities of nuclear radiation would interrupt enemy radar and communications.

Announcement of FISHBOWL brought

protests from prominent scientists, who

charged that they would disturb the Van

Allen radiation belt, a vast field of protons and electrons recently discovered by

Professor James Van Allen of Iowa State

University and thought to be critical to the

earth’s radio communications. Van Allen

himself gave BLUEGILL and STARFISH

a clean bill of health, and President

Kennedy added his own reassurances at

his May 9 press conference.87

With the eyes of the scientific community focused on these two tests, it was

naturally a great embarrassment when the

BLUEGILL rocket had to be destroyed 10

minutes into the June 5 launch due to the

failure of radar tracking. Two weeks later, on June 19, the STARFISH rocket

barely got off the ground when the missile propulsion system exploded and the

warhead had to be destroyed. In the second iteration of STARFISH, called

STARFISH PRIME, the rocket left the

launch pad on time and in one piece. But

its detonation discharged billions of electrons into the Van Allen belt, belying AEC

Operation DOMINIC, Shot TRUCKEE, June

9, 1962; 210 KT weapons-related airdrop at

Christmas Island, South Pacific.
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 163

assurances that nothing of the sort would

occur. BLUEGILL was also rescheduled,

but this time the Thor rocket erupted in

flames after lift-off and had to be destroyed, strewing considerable nuclear debris.88

Other tests in the FISHBOWL series

had better results. CHECKMATE (October 20), KINGFISH (November 1), and,

finally, on November 4, TIGHTROPE all

went off much as planned. That was a

good thing, for, as Air Force Chief of Staff

General Curtis LeMay pointed out, there

were no Thor missiles left in case any

failed.

After observing the success of

TIGHTROPE, Frank Shelton returned to

his living quarters in a melancholy mood.

“That was the 65th atmospheric nuclear

weapon burst that I have observed in the

past 10 years,” he recalled saying to himself, “and I think it is probably the last one

that I will ever see conducted in the atmosphere.”89

Shelton was correct. From the perspective of DASA and the AEC, DOMINIC had been a major success. The test

series had yielded data that proved indispensable for improving safety and reliability. It also increased the

yield-to-weight ratio and the shelf life of

the warheads. From these data eventually came a new generation of more advanced nuclear weapons.90

DOMINIC pointed up all of the liabilities inherent in nuclear testing—

scientific, political, economic, and

diplomatic. It had cost U.S. taxpayers

more than $250 million. Kennedy’s three

month time limit had turned into six, and

that for a significantly abbreviated series

of tests. On at least one occasion,

Kennedy’s exasperation led him to consider calling off the whole exercise, only

to learn that Soviet tests of devices far

larger than anything contemplated for

DOMINIC were proceeding apace.

THE CUBAN MISSILE

CRISIS AND A NEW TREATY

Agency staff on Johnston Island, like

tens of millions of other Americans, were

glued to their radios and televisions on

October 22, 1962, as Kennedy announced

the discovery of nuclear-capable Soviet

surface-to-surface, nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba and demanded that the Soviets remove them forthwith. The world

held its breath as U.S. warships moved into

position to enforce a blockade around Cuba.

For DASA personnel assigned to Hickam

Air Force Base in Hawaii, the long

stretches of empty asphalt on parking

ramps which customarily held as many as

50 military aircraft bespoke the gravity of

the crisis; all had been recalled to the

mainland to participate in the buildup of

forces against Cuba.91

The Kennedy and Khrushchev brush

with nuclear catastrophe had a sobering

effect upon both leaders, who emerged

from the experience determined not to

repeat it. Kennedy, who had earlier dismissed Khrushchev’s suggestion that a

telephone “hot line” be installed between

the Kremlin and the White House, now

accepted the idea with alacrity. Both

evinced a sense of urgency about coming

to an agreement on curtailing nuclear testing and the arms race. In the exchange of

notes that brought the missile crisis to a

close, they expressed their mutual commitment to that cause. While the ensuing

months saw enough posturing and haggling to raise questions about whether an

agreement would ever be reached, the will

was clearly there to achieve the breakthrough that had eluded the superpowers

for five years.

President Kennedy hinted at the sort of

peace he sought in a June 1963 Commencement Address at American University in Washington. In his speech, Kennedy

announced the early agreement with Soviets to begin discussions “...on a compre-
164 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

President John F. Kennedy signs the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963.

hensive test ban treaty...” to “ban nuclear

tests in the atmosphere.” Kennedy continued his thoughts, explaining, “While we

proceed to safeguard our national interests

let us also safeguard human interest. And

the elimination of war and arms is clearly

in the interests of both.”

The agreement was, however, a limited breakthrough, for the two sides were

never able to bridge the American insistence on on-site inspections and the Soviets’ refusal to consider them. “NATO

spies,” said Khrushchev, and that was that.

With the exception of that point, the negotiations moved rapidly. Averill Harriman and the U.S. delegation arrived in

Moscow on July 15, 1963; 10 days later,

Harriman, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei

Gromyko, and the British representative,

Lord Hailsham, signed the Limited Test

Ban Treaty (LTBT). It consisted of a mere

800 words, a preamble and five articles

prohibiting nuclear detonations in space,

at high altitude, in the atmosphere, or under water. It permitted underground testing, but only to the extent that discharge

of radioactivity was confined to the borders of the country doing the testing. On

July 26, Kennedy again took to the airwaves, but this time it was to announce

an agreement with the Soviets rather than

an ultimatum. On October 7, after Senate

hearings, he signed it into law. “No other

accomplishment,” wrote Theodore Sorensen, “ever gave Kennedy more satisfaction.”93

TRANSITION

DASA faced enormous change dealing with the world of the new treaty, which

would be different from the world of the

moratorium into which it had been born.

In response to Senate (and Joint Chiefs

of Staff) concerns that ratification would

again play havoc with the country’s nuclear capabilities, Kennedy pledged to the

Senate that he would implement four specific safeguards to assure that nuclear

readiness would be maintained. Safeguard

A continued the underground nuclear test

program. Safeguard B committed the

United States to maintaining modern nu-
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 165

clear laboratory facilities and programs.

Safeguard C established a National Nuclear Test Readiness Program. Safeguard

D provided for improved verification of

the Treaty, including continued work on

VELA detection and seismic monitoring.94 This ambitious mandate became

DASA’s mission during the mid-1960s

under the aegis of the Limited Test Ban

Treaty.
166 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

ENDNOTES

1. “Into Space,” Newsweek, October 14,

1957, p. 38; “Soviet Satellite Sends U.S.

into a Tizzy,” Life, October 14, 1957.

2. “Red Moon Over the U.S.,” Time 70, no.

16 (October 14, 1957): p. 27; “Into

Space,” Newsweek, October 14, 1957, p.

38; Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile

Age, 1956-1960: History of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, Volume IV

(Washington, D.C.: 1997) pp. 123-24.

3. “Soviet Satellite Sends U.S. into a Tizzy,” Life, October 14, 1957, p. 35. As if

in response to the Soviet comment, tail

fins on American automobiles reached

their apogee in 1957 and shrank in each

year thereafter.

4. “Did Russia Steal Satellite Secret from

U.S.?” U.S. News & World Report 43

(October 18, 1957): p. 44; “The U.S., Ike,

and Sputnik,” Newsweek 50 (October 28,

1957): pp. 31, 32, 35; Watson, Into the

Missile Age, p. 124; Time 70, no. 16 (October 14, 1957): p. 27.

5. “Man’s Awesome Adventure,” Newsweek

50 (October 14, 1957): pp. 39-40.

6. “Man’s Awesome Adventure,” Newsweek

50 (October 14, 1957): pp. 40-41; Watson, Into the Missile Age, pp. 124-26.

7. William E. Ogle, An Account of the Return to Nuclear Weapons Testing by the

United States after the Test Moratorium,

1958-1961, (Las Vegas: 1985), pp. 85-

87, 89 (hereinafter cited as Ogle, “Return

to Testing”).

8. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 7.5-7.11.

9. Ibid, pp. 7.18-7.22.

10. Ibid, pp. 7.5-7.25. Scoville went to the

Central Intelligence Agency.

11. Ibid, pp. 7.22, 7.25.

12. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, p. 452.

13. Ibid, p. 453. When the moratorium was

announced in 1958, AFSWP decided that

another revision of The Effects of Nuclear Weaponsshould be prepared. The version published in 1962 incorporated new

information gleaned from the HARDTACK and ARGUS series, especially the

effect on radio communications and radar and detection of distant explosions.

See Glasstone, ed., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons(Washington: 1962), pp. viiviii.

14. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 455-56.

15. Ibid, pp. 361-70.

16. Ibid, p. 399.

17. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 8.17-8.22.

18. New York Times, May 10, 1957; Washington News, May 10, 1957, reprinted

in Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear

Weaponeer, pp. 8.9-8.11.

19. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 8.49-8.51.

20. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 456-57.

21. Defense Nuclear Agency, “Operation

HARDTACK I, 1958,” DNA 6038F, December 1, 1982, pp. 1-3; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp.

8.51-8.52.

22. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 8.40-8.42, 9.12; Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation Argus 1958,

DNA 6039F, April 30, 1982, p. 1.

23. Ogle, Return to Testing, p. 101; Shelton,

Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, p.

8.46.

24. U.S. House, 85th Cong., 1st sess., Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Part 2, March 11,

1957, 1533-1551; Ibid., March 21, 1957,

1551-57; DNA, “Operation HARDTACK I,” DNA 6038F, p. 25.

25. Ogle, Return to Testing, pp. 90-91.

26. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 8.34-8.35; Hewlett and Holl,

Atoms for Peace and War, p. 482.

27. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 8.34-8.35, 8.33.

28. Ibid, pp. 8.35-8.36.

29. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, p. 483; Edward N. Parker, memorandum, “Joint Task Force-7 Relations

with DASA Under the Proposed Reorganization,” November 9, 1959, pp. 15-17.

30. Ogle, Return to Testing, pp. 101-2;

Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, p. 483.
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 167

31. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, p. 483; Ogle, Return to Testing, p.

101; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear

Weaponeer, pp. 8.40, 10.6-10.21.

32. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 9.35-9.36; Joint AEC-DoD

Statement of Results of the TEAK and

ORANGE shots in the 1958 HARDTACK Series, June 15, 1959, DSWA

Technical Library, pp. 070-046.

33. Adrian Polk recollection of TEAK detonation, discussion with author, Alexandria, VA, September 29, 1999.

34. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 9.35-9.36; quotes from Ibid.,

p. 9.39.

35. Ogle, Return to Testing, p. 100; Shelton,

Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp.

9.18-9.24; U.S. DOE, United States Nuclear Tests, 1945-1992 (Las Vegas:

1993), p. 6.

36. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 9.40-9.41.

37. Ibid, pp. 9.41, 8.4-8.5.

38. Ogle, Return to Testing, p. 106.

39. DNA, Operation ARGUS, DNA 6039F,

pp. 20-21; Watson, Into the Missile Age,

p. 461; York, Making Weapons, Talking

Peace, pp. 180-81; New York Times,

March 20, 1959, pp. 1-2; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 10.17,

9.1. The Soviets and Americans discussed

the issue of detecting very high-altitude

nuclear detonations using a system of

satellites. See p. 9.9.

40. Watson, Into the Missile Age, p. 461;

Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 10.17, 10.15; Ogle, “Return to

Testing,” 103; DNA, Operation ARGUS,

1958, DNA 6039F, pp. 17-20; Hewlett

and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, p.

483. The other area in the world where

the Christofilos effect could be easily

measured because of the imperfect symmetry of the Earth’s magnetic field was

Iceland. See York, Making Weapons,

Talking Peace, p. 149.

41. DNA, Operation ARGUS 1958, DNA

6039F, pp. 31-32, 53, 83-84; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, p.

10.21.

42. New York Times, March 20, 1959, pp.

1-2; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear

Weaponeer, pp. 10.5-10.15. Mustin

would later become the head of DASA.

43. DNA, Operation ARGUS 1958, DNA

6039F, pp. 32-34; Shelton, Reflections of

a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 10.20-10.21.

44. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace, p.

149; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear

Weaponeer, p. 10.21.

45. New York Times, March 20, 1959, pp. 1-

2; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear

Weaponeer, p. 10.15; York, Making

Weapons, Talking Peace, p. 149. The secrecy of the ARGUS tests was blown

when Hanson Baldwin, a military writer

for the New York Times, got hold of the

whole story in January 1959. After three

months of discussions with the Pentagon,

Baldwin ran the ARGUS story, much to

the distress of Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles and other administration officials. See York, Making

Weapons, Talking Peace, pp. 149-50.

46. DNA, Operation ARGUS, 1958, April 30,

1982, pp. 11-12, 1.

47. New York Times, March 20, 1959.

48. Washington Post, March 21, 1998.

49. “History of the Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project: Latter Period, 1955-

1958,” Part 1, p. 39.

50. “History of the Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project: Latter Period, 1955-

1958,” pp. 40-41.

51. Philip L. Cantelon and Robert C.

Williams, Crisis Contained: The Department of Energy at Three Mile Island (Carbondale, Ill.: 1982), pp. 20-21; “History

of the Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project: Latter Period, 1955-1958,” pp.

33-34. The agreement was extended to

permit the Joint Center to include mutual assistance in radiation monitoring and

medical safety for military or civilian radiation accidents. The Albuquerque Center later became known as the Joint

Nuclear Accident Coordination Center.

Cantelon and Williams, Crisis Contained,

pp. 21, 78.

52. U.S. News & World Report 44 (March 21,

1958): pp. 55, 57; Time 71 (March 24,
168 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963

1958): pp. 23-24; Newsweek 51 (March

24, 1958): p. 60; Life 44 (March 24,

1958): p. 48.

53. Eisenhower quoted in Watson, Into the

Missile Age, p. 257.

54. William R. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities: From the Armed Forces

Special Weapons Project to the Defense

Nuclear Agency, 1947-1971 (Washington, D.C., 1996), pp. 76-77.

55. U.S. News & World Report 44 (April 18,

1958); New Republic 138 (April 14,

1958): pp. 12-13.

56. Spaatz, “Where We Went Wrong—Plan

for the Future,” Newsweek 50 (December 30, 1957): p. 19.

57. Strauss quoted in Hewlett and Holl, Atoms

for Peace and War, p. 457.

58. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities,

pp. 77-78; Memorandum for the Chief,

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project,

6 May 1959, Subject: Organization and

Functions of the Defense Atomic Support

Agency.

59. “History of the Defense Atomic Support

Agency,” Part I: Mission, Organization,

Liaison, Strength, ch. 1, pp. 5-6.

60. The extent to which Eisenhower sought

to perpetuate or terminate the Cold War

has been widely debated. On this subject,

see Stephen G. Rabe, “Eisenhower Revisionism,” Diplomatic History 17, no. 1

(Winter 1993), esp. p. 111.

61. “Red Test Fallout Will Double 59’s” [interview with Major General Robert H.

Booth], Army, Navy, Air Force Register

p. 83 (December 16, 1961): pp. 13-14;

John S. Foster, Jr. to Starbird, June 2,

1959, DMA Collection, Box 3788, Department of Energy Archives.

62. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, p. 11.1.

63. Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and

War, pp. 528-30; Ogle, Return to Testing,

pp. 135-36.

64. Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosives-Plowshare, Hearing before the Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th Congress, First Session, January 5, 1965, US

GPO: Washington, D.C.

65. Quarles to McCone, March 7, 1959, in

Report of the Study Group on Organization for Future Test Operations, August

20, 1959, p. 8.

66. “Factors Bearing on the Organization and

Planning for Future Weapons Testing,”

March 17, 1959, in Ibid., p. 10.

67. “Discussion,” Ibid., pp. 30-35. See also

Joint Task Force 7, “Relations with

DASA Under the Proposed Reorganization,” November 1959.

68. Ogle, Return to Testing, pp. 128-29.

69. Ibid, pp. 131-32, 140-49.

70. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, p. 10.2; Robert A. Divine, Blowing On the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban

Debate (New York, 1978), pp. 231-34.

71. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 10.3-10.5; Divine, Blowing on

the Wind, pp. 241-61.

72. Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 231-

40.

73. James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists,

and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Mass.,

1977), pp. 165-68.

74. On VELA, see Ogle, Return to Testing,

pp. 170-84.

75. Time 75 (February 22, 1960): p. 22; U.S.

News & World Report p. 48 (February 29,

1960): p. 75.

76. Eisenhower quoted in Divine, Blowing on

the Wind, p. 301.

77. Michael R. Beschloss, May-Day:

Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2

Affair (New York, 1986), pp. 13-17, 231-

33, 379-80.

78. Sorensen quoted in Glenn T. Seaborg,

Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban

(Berkeley, Calif., 1981), p. 81.

79. Ibid, 89-90; Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 11.9-11.11.

80. ”History of the Defense Atomic Support

Agency, 1959-1969,” p. 5.1.

81. “Joint Task Force Eight Moves Ahead,”

Army, Navy, Air Force Journal and Register 94 (March 17, 1962): p. 20; “Major

General Robert Highman Booth, USA,”

in U.S. Army Center of Military History

Archives.
SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963 169

82. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, p. 12.21.

83. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 81.

84. Ogle, Return to Testing, pp. 242-302.

85. “Joint Task Force Eight Moves Ahead,”

p. 20; Joint Task Force Eight (Activation

and Charter Development), in “History

of the Defense Atomic Support Agency,

1959-69”; DNA, DOMINIC I, DNA

6040F, pp. 43-44.

86. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the

Test Ban, pp. 108-10, 117-19, 126-31.

87. DNA, DOMINIC I, pp. 184-85, 196-99.

88. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the

Test Ban, pp. 152-57.

89. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 11.35-39; DNA, DOMINIC

I, pp. 218-32; Ogle, Return to Testing, pp.

416-31.

90. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, p. 11.63.

91. Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 88-

89.

92. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, pp. 11.60-11.63.

93. A useful evaluation of recent literature on

the subject is Robert A. Divine, “The Cuban Missile Controversy,” Diplomatic

History 18 (Fall 1994): pp. 551-60.

94. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the

Test Ban, pp. 263-82; Richard Reeves,

President Kennedy (New York, 1993), pp.

545-51, 593-94; Arthur H. Dean, Test Ban

and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation (New York, 1966), pp. 86-92.
170 SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, 1957 TO 1963
“

NEW FRONTIER

It took several years for the full impact of Kennedy’s New Frontier spirit to

be felt within DASA. Through a series of

steps in the 1960s, DASA was reshaped

and reinvigorated by policies implemented by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Based on the specifics of

McNamara’s nuclear policies, DASA’s

role in the American defense establishment moved to center stage. The “dreadful note of preparation” at the core of the

Cold War rang loudly at DASA as the

agency constantly tested the new nuclear

weapon delivery systems that McNamara’s policies demanded.

Kennedy’s new generation of leaders

faced the nuclear arms race with fresh approaches in strategy, in management, and

in personnel. The President selected McNamara to head the DoD in 1961, bringing him to the cabinet only five weeks

after he had accepted a position as Chief

Executive Officer of Ford Motor Company. At the DoD, McNamara surrounded

himself with a group of young advisors,

disparagingly referred to by an older generation of military leaders as the “Whiz

Kids.” Fred Wikner, who served in DASA

during the era, characterized the Whiz Kid

leadership of McNamara as divided between budget specialists like Allen Enthoven and the “West Coast Nuclear

Mafia” including Harold Brown, William

McMillan, and the nuclear policy group

at RAND Corporation. The Whiz Kids’

philosophy affected strategic thinking

about nuclear weapons development and

testing policies, and even the internal

structure of DASA itself.1

Like Kennedy, McNamara believed

that an elite team of experts could invigorate organizations, including government. Throughout the business world in

the 1950s, progressive companies had

sought ways to tap into the technical intelligence of specialists through participatory management, matrix and project

management, and other means that attracted what Charles McCormick called “the

power of people.” Such innovations bypassed older structures in which generalCHAPTER FIVE

A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

Yesterday, a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were

concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the

atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater... to bring the forces of nuclear

destruction under international control.”

President John F. Kennedy,

Radio Address on Nuclear Test Plan Treaty,

July 26, 1963
172 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

ists at the top of the organization simply

made decisions and issued orders.2

After the assassination of Kennedy in

November 1963, President Lyndon B.

Johnson kept McNamara as Secretary of

Defense, and he was retained when

Johnson was elected President in 1964.

The spirit of the New Frontier was

embodied throughout the decade in federal and civilian service. At DASA, the

New Frontier meant an influx of new talent and the promotion of staff with fresh

ideas to positions of power and responsibility at the heart of the nuclear arms race.

DASA, although a defense organization

run by military officers and technical experts, had to adjust to this new style of

management that gave a louder voice to

brilliant, lower-ranking officers and scholarly civilians.

NEW GENERATION OF MISSILES

The first multiple-warhead weapon

that the military developed was the submarine-launched Polaris A-3. This multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) weapon,

deployed first in 1964, carried three warheads. All three reentry vehicles (RVs)

went to the same target, enveloping the

area with the combined nuclear effects of

the three weapons.3 As McNamara endorsed the perfection of the concept, later models of both SLBMs and

ground-launched ICBMs mounted “independently targetable” reentry vehicles that

could attack separate targets. Minuteman

III, the submarine-launched Poseidon

C-3, Trident C-4, Trident D-5, and Peacekeeper were all sophisticated multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

(MIRVs).

The United States deployed its first

Minuteman II missiles in 1965 and the

first Minuteman IIIs in 1970. Minuteman

III was the first U.S. missile equipped

with MIRV capability, each with its own

nuclear warhead. The missile deployed its

RVs early in the trajectory and the nuclear-tipped RVs proceeded on their own

course to different specific targets.4

Multiple warheads, although having

a total yield considerably less than that of

the single warhead they replaced, if optimally separated over a large target, would

cause much greater damage than the single high-yield warhead. The ensuing requirements for new families of low-yield,

light, and physically small warhead designs resulted in a considerable challenge

for the design laboratories. The MIRV

technology—allowing each RV to be sent

to a totally separate target—provided a

larger number of targets to be covered by

a single missile launch. The separation of

the RVs as they approach their targets dictates the hardness required to avoid fratricide (disablement of a friendly weapon

system resulting from a nuclear environment generated by friendly weapons). It

was also required that, in any defensive

ABM environment, a single ABM burst

Lyndon B. Johnson, President, 1963 to

1969.
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 173

not destroy more than one attacking RV.

Designing such RVs and their carrier missiles to withstand the effects of defensive

nuclear weapons became the central technology thrust of DASA for the following

decade.

With steadily increasing Soviet deployment of nuclear warheads, and with

the U.S. policy of rotating older missiles

into retirement while moving to newer

models, the total ICBM armaments of the

two superpowers reached parity in 1969,

with a growing Soviet lead in subsequent

years (see Table 5-1). “Throw weight”

issues escalated numbers of warheads in

a single missile, which favored the USSR

and exacerbated the disparity shown in

this table.

As a requirement of the Single Integrated Operability Plan established by

SAC in 1964, a sufficient number of

American nuclear weapons had to survive

a first strike to be capable of subsequently inflicting unacceptable damage on the

Soviets, thus deterring the original attack.

To achieve sufficiency, the U.S. nuclear

arsenal had to increase vastly. The 1960s

saw the greatest growth in number and

variety of nuclear warheads and delivery

systems of the whole Cold War period.

The proliferation of new missiles and

weapons created a crowded agenda for

DASA, to include testing the survivability of those weapons under simulated nuclear battle conditions.6

Secretary McNamara detailed the logic of building such a vast arsenal when

he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee in January 1964 to

present his defense program and budget.

He spelled out the extremes of policy positions, ranging from “overkill” to “full

first strike” capability. The overkill advocates pushed for the capability to destroy

Soviet cities in retaliation for a first strike

by the Soviets. The “full first strike” advocates focused on the ability to attack

Soviet arms capacity first. McNamara

explained to Congress that a strategy allowing the United States to survive a first

strike and to respond by destroying remaining or residual nuclear forces in the

enemy arsenal required a vast number of

weapons. The total needed was even more

than necessary to destroy cities in the

“overkill” strategy.7

Through all of his presentations before Congress, McNamara’s concept of

weapons as instruments of negotiation and

communication continued to shape policy. McNamara’s weapons policy, announced publicly through Congress,

would serve to communicate to the Soviet Union a believable and credible willingness to retaliate against any use of

nuclear weapons. McNamara took a diTable 5-1. Total U.S. and USSR ICBM Deployed from 1962 through 1970.5

Y A ear U R S USS

1 4 962 2 5 9 7

1 4 964 8 0 3 20

1 4 966 9 0 0 30

1 4 968 1 0 ,05 80

1 4 970 1 0 ,05 1,30
174 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

rect interest in the precise details of which

delivery system was most effective, which

weapons were to be included in the stockpile, and how well those weapons could

be expected to perform against Soviet

defenses. He demanded that the Office of

the Secretary of Defense be more involved with the individuals who developed and tested the reliability of the

weapons. Given the high level of concern

about the reliability of nuclear weapons,

DASA’s testing work took on extreme importance through these years.

By 1965, McNamara’s shift away

from a manned-bomber delivery system

to reliance on ground-launched and sealaunched missiles was well under way,

much to the dismay of Air Force leaders

like General Curtis LeMay. McNamara

announced that the nation’s strategic missile forces, which had almost tripled in

fiscal year 1963-64 and had more than

doubled again in fiscal year 1964-65,

would continue to increase, but more

slowly, over the next several years.

McNamara had included in the 1964-1965

budget support for some 800 Minuteman

I missiles, augmented by 150 Minuteman

IIs. The Minuteman II missiles were expected to provide increased payload, longer range, a smaller circular error probable

(CEP),* and greater flexibility in choice

of pre-assigned targets. In addition, the

Minuteman II missiles could be launched

by commands from an airborne command

post.8

Due to their high cost of operation and

maintenance, McNamara phased out earlier generations of missiles, including the

Atlas D and E models as well as the Titan

I. The yearly cost of maintaining the new

Minuteman missiles was about $100,000

per missile, he claimed, while the earlier

missiles cost approximately 10 times as

much.9 For such practical budgetary reasons, the American arsenal of ICBMs

leveled off in 1970, while the less costconscious Soviets added new missiles to

their collection of aging older models. The

perceived growing lead of the Soviet nuclear arsenal dismayed U.S. strategists

who believed that sheer numbers of missiles, no matter how outmoded or costly

to maintain, would be important during

disarmament talks and in impressing other

nations, even if their obsolete characteristics might prove unreliable in an actual

war. Edward Luttwak, in particular, believed that McNamara’s concern with

budget matters blinded him to the diplomatic and political aspects of total missile numbers.10

The Air Force side of the debate over

nuclear weapons surfaced early in 1965,

when Senator Barry Goldwater expressed

concern over the reliability of silo-based

American missiles. Goldwater, a reserve

Air Force general and a staunch defender

of SAC’s manned bomber approach to

strategic defense, argued that McNamara

had ignored the advice of generals and

listened too intently to civilian planners.

McNamara responded with a public and

very detailed argument, emphasizing that

Minuteman missiles were dispersed in

sites “hardened” to protect them from

nearby nuclear bursts, with one missile

per silo. The Minuteman missiles, he noted, were much less vulnerable than

manned bomber delivery systems since

the detonation of a thermonuclear weapon over a SAC base would destroy all its

bombers on the ground. Citing calculations of probable penetration of Soviet

defenses, McNamara demonstrated that

missiles had higher rates of dependability and reliability than did aircraft.11

Through such calculations, McNamara

* Circular Error Probable: A measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system; specifically

it is the radius of a circle around a target of such

size that a weapon aimed at the center has a 50-

percent probability of falling within the circle.
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 175

aimed at getting the highest destructive

capability possible for each dollar expended. He viewed that capability as part of

the effort to mount the most credible retaliatory force, to communicate “the

dreadful note of preparation” as loudly

and convincingly as possible.

In 1963, McNamara supported developing an American ABM, the Nike-X. He

explained to Congress that this missile

represented an improvement over the

Nike-Zeus, which he had reduced to a

study program that focused on reentry

phenomena and defense techniques. The

Nike-X system included the Sprint missile, which boasted high acceleration capability. This ABM was also able to

discriminate between reentry objects,

such as the missile booster, chaff, decoys,

and the actual warhead. The Nike-X system included a Multi-Function Array Radar; its ability to track a large number of

incoming items simultaneously would

avoid the problem caused by decoys overloading the missile’s radar system. The

Nike-X system, with several sites around

each city, could be hardened against attack, thus improving reliability of the total defensive system. A prototype of the

radar system was planned for installation

at White Sands, New Mexico, in the summer of 1964.12

Even though McNamara spoke highly of the promise of Nike-X in his 1963

presentation to Congress, over the next

two years he became convinced that

mounting an ABM system would further

provoke the arms race. Based on this reasoning, he turned against the Nike-X system. He concluded that almost any

defense would simply stimulate a responding offense and that once some form

of credible capability to destroy the other

side in a second strike existed, the arms

race might be stabilized. However, both

to American supporters of a defensive

ABM system and to his Soviet opponents,

the logic of defense rather than simple

reliance on the fear of retaliation seemed

more compelling than the concept of deployed offensive weapons as signals of intent. The disparity between McNamara’s

concept of weaponry and that of the Soviet leadership soon surfaced.

In June of 1967, Soviet Premier Alexis Kosygin visited the United Nations

in New York City. After arguing over

whether President Johnson would visit

New York to meet Kosygin or whether

Kosygin would go to Johnson in Washington, the two settled on a halfway point,

Hollybush Hall at Glassboro State College in southern New Jersey. At their June

23 meeting, President Johnson tried to

explain the U.S. opposition to fielding an

ABM system. Johnson called on McNamara to relate the position of the UnitU.S. Army Nike-Hercules missile.
176 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

ed States to the Soviet representatives.

McNamara stated that a proper U.S. response to a Soviet ABM force would be

expansion of American offensive forces.

“If we had the right number of offensive

weapons to maintain a deterrent before

you put your defenses in,” said

McNamara, “then to maintain the same

degree of deterrence, in the face of your

defense, we must strengthen our offense.”

Therefore, an ABM would accelerate the

arms race, McNamara claimed. “That’s

not good for either one of us.” It all

seemed perfectly logical to McNamara,

who expected Kosygin to immediately

understand the concept. Kosygin, however, could not believe his ears. Rather, he

saw weapons in much more traditional

military terms. Kosygin’s face flushed in

anger. “Defense is moral,” said Kosygin.

“Offense is immoral.”13

Following the meeting, McNamara

returned to Washington, discussed policy

with the Joint Chiefs, and decided to proceed with the MIRV program. The United States did not plan to deploy MIRVed

weapons unless attempts to negotiate a

treaty prohibiting deployment of defensive systems failed to outlaw ABMs.14As

it turned out, ABMs were eventually limited, but only after both the United States

and the Soviet Union had adopted MIRV

technology.

McNamara said that the construction

of MIRV systems was “an insurance program to counter what we feared would be

a widespread deployment of the Soviet

ABM system.”15 Later, McNamara regarded the decision to begin MIRV technology and initiate a new round in the

arms race as a tragic move. He came to

see that the MIRV systems themselves,

rather than preventing weapons escalation, only took it to a higher and even

more potentially destructive level.16

In 1966, members of Congress leaked

reports that the Soviets were building an

ABM system around Leningrad, the socalled Tallinn Line. Despite the opposition of McNamara and many advisors, the

pressures increased on Johnson to build

an ABM system in response to the Tallinn

Line. The Army claimed that their

planned Nike-X system would work well

as a U.S. ABM system and that it could

be deployed at a cost of $8.5 to $10 billion. This investment, the Army claimed,

would protect 25 American cities.

American intelligence agencies debated whether the Tallinn Line was actually

an anti-missile system. Analysts within

the CIA believed the Soviets had built an

anti-bomber defense system, while the

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that the Tallinn Line would strike

at incoming missiles as an ABM system.17

Both agencies correctly understood that

the Galosh system deployed around Moscow consisted of a Nike-type anti-missile

system, and if the DIA view of the Tallinn

Line were correct, it would mean the Soviets already had two ABM systems (Galosh System and Tallinn Line System).18

In mid-1967, McNamara quietly

shelved the Nike-X program. Instead of

balancing the Soviet ABMs with U.S.

ABMs, the United States would seek a

credible ability to overwhelm ABM defenses with MIRVed weapons, just as he

had warned at Glassboro. Once they had

decided not to support the Nike-X ABM

program, due to its limited defensive capacity, Johnson and McNamara successfully resisted the Army’s pressure to

restore it to the budget and the arsenal.

TRANSITION TO

THE “NEW” DASA

All these decisions taken by McNamara and Johnson with regard to weapons, both defensive and offensive,

required that DASA shape the nuclear

weapons effects testing and stockpile

management program accordingly. Each
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 177

high-level policy created specific new

challenges and agenda issues for the agency. The decision to ensure an American

second-strike capability, with deployment

of Polaris SLBMs, required testing many

new weapons systems. The Soviet deployment of their ABM system, despite McNamara’s warning that it would accelerate

the arms race, made ever more urgent the

requirement that American weapon systems be protected against the effect of

defensive, nuclear-weapon-tipped ABMs.

DASA would need to be able to test the

new U.S. systems to ensure their capability in a nuclear environment.

The signing of the LTBT early in 1963

and the resulting cessation of atmospheric tests required that DASA develop new

methods to test the effects of nuclear

weapons on military weapon systems. At

the same time, it is essential to recognize

that several other fundamental changes in

the Cold War had further effects on

DASA’s mission, its agenda, and its internal structure. Those changes included

managing the sheer size of the new stockpile that emerged as a consequence of the

national policy of assured destruction.

During the Johnson years, DASA’s stockpile management responsibilities, both

numerically and geographically, vastly

increased. Changing military priorities

caused the nuclear stockpile to escalate

from approximately 12,000 weapons in

1959 to over 22,000 two years later. The

significant increase of weapons in the

system required more staff at the stockpile sites maintained by DASA. The Soviet Union also increased its stockpile, but

at a more gradual rate. The total Soviet

stockpile did not exceed 22,000 until

1988, when the Cold War was about to

end and the Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks (START) soon put both arsenals into

decline.

The changing arms race, with its focus on missile delivery systems and new

defensive systems, imposed other pressures on DASA. ICBMs and other missiles would travel at thousands of miles

per hour, resulting in less than 30 minutes

warning time from the moment the incoming weapons were detected until they detonated. To have a viable assured response

in such a short time required a constant

state of readiness to launch. If the United

States had to be prepared to respond almost instantly to a surprise attack, its nuclear weapons had to be in the hands of

the Services that would employ them.

Thus, the older concept of stockpile management by DASA and AEC, with only

“operational” weapons in the hands of the

Services, no longer made sense.

Even the AEC believed that the custody issue was moot, a far cry from the

heated days of civilian-military control

arguments in the late 1940s. On July 11,

1966, Glenn T. Seaborg, AEC Chairman,

formally recommended the transfer to

military control, seeing “no practical purpose” in continued AEC control.19

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara

and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1964.
178 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

Through 1966, DASA and the AEC

worked out changes to the stockpile agreement giving more authority to DASA. In

January of 1967, the draft of the new stockpile agreement was sent to the President.

Johnson ordered the AEC to deliver all

completed nuclear weapons to the DoD on

February 10, 1967, bringing to an end the

era of civilian custody of the nuclear arsenal. The AEC signed the new agreement

on March 10, and the DoD signed it on

March 20. Under the new agreement, the

AEC continued to be responsible for safety, quality assurance, and retrofit programs, and would have access to weapons

in the stockpile for these purposes. The

Services and DASA exercised all other

day-to-day responsibilities.20

Compared with the heated discussions

in 1946 about custody, the quiet ending

of the policy of civilian control reflected

not a major debate but simply recognizing reality. With the deployment of readyto-launch nuclear weapons in missile

silos, aboard submarines, at SAC bases,

and at NATO bases in Europe, physical

custody and possession was already in

military hands. Given the readiness posture, AEC control of the arsenal was maintained through the President’s role as

Commander-in-Chief.21

Part of the policy of readiness required

keeping some weapons airborne at all

times. Such readiness required safety

measures to prevent accidental detonation

as well as to prevent lower-ranking officers from making unauthorized decisions

to launch or drop. The SAC policy of flying in proximity to the Soviet borders with

operational hydrogen bombs aboard

meant that the chances of an accident or

incident in which nuclear weapons fell to

the ground and broke or their non-nuclear high explosive components detonated

on foreign territory greatly increased.

While such Broken Arrow* incidents had

occurred before over the United States

and over international waters, taking airborne weapons close to the Soviet borders

increased the chances of such an incident

over the territory of a friendly country.

Thus, on the one hand, instant readiness

meant that the responsibility for the stockpile shifted away from DASA to the respective Services. On the other hand,

readiness only increased the likelihood of

accidents involving weapons in aircraft,

aboard ships, and in transit that might require DASA’s expertise in handling nuclear weapons.

McNamara’s endorsement of multiple

warheads also affected DASA’s responsibilities and requirements. Both the MRV

and MIRV, like the ABM, raised specific

new technological considerations that

DASA had to investigate. MRV or MIRV

weapons, if employed, would descend on

targets, exploding within a few minutes

or possibly within a few seconds of each

other over targets, some only hundreds of

yards apart. ABM systems, when armed

with nuclear devices, would intercept incoming missiles outside the earth’s atmosphere. Each of these considerations

required that DASA explore new mechanisms to cause damage and invent new

means of testing to determine the effects

of nuclear weapons detonated in outer

space upon delivery systems and the incoming RVs.

In July 1969, Melvin Laird, Richard

Nixon’s Secretary of Defense, made the

final decision to introduce true MIRVs

into the force, with the first such deployment of Minuteman III under way in

1970. For DASA, the introduction of

MIRV planning and then deployment

through the late 1960s and early 1970s

meant a burgeoning of new agenda items

in these years.22

* Broken Arrow: a DoD term to identify and

report on an accident involving a nuclear weapon/warhead or nuclear component.
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 179

During a full-scale war, both Soviet

ABMs and U.S. MIRVs would create a

“nuclear environment” in which U.S. missiles would be exposed to radiation from

other explosions when in space, or to radiation, heat, and blast when in the atmosphere. In the 1940s and 1950s, when

planners had expected all or most nuclear weapons to be delivered by aircraft over

targets, none of these factors had been

envisioned. A single weapon might

present a threat to the delivering aircraft

as it hastened from the area, but no one

had considered what the effect of a nuclear weapon would be upon a second nuclear weapon. ABMs and MIRVs changed

all that.

In order for a missile to survive to

deliver its warhead in a MRV, MIRV, or

ABM environment, the delivery system

and warhead components required thorough testing, to assure their hardness to

these environments. Designers had to

undertake a host of improvements to harden nuclear weapons and their delivery and

launching systems against the effects of

other nuclear weapons. The nature of

those effects at the high altitudes of incoming missiles had to be determined, and

new specifications had to be developed to

guard weapon systems against those effects.

The quickly escalating arms race of

the years following 1963 involved delivery systems and defensive systems that

catapulted DASA into a central role. The

agency rather quickly found a new agenda of crucial interest to the Secretary of

Defense and to nuclear planners. A larger

stockpile, a higher risk of accidents, many

new weapons and weapon systems that

had to be tested against nuclear weapon

damage under ABM and MIRV environments, and difficult new limitations imposed by the LTBT required a very high

order of scientific and administrative capability by DASA. The Director, Defense

Research and Engineering (DDR&E)

Harold Brown, took the lead in ensuring

that the organization was restructured to

handle the rising tide of issues.

POLICY CONSEQUENCES

FOR DASA MANAGEMENT

The various developments in international weapons policy and Defense Department management principles during

the 1960s created pressures to change the

way DASA did its work. Internal management was affected and changed with the

recognition, by McNamara and throughout the DoD, that high-level policy had

to be shaped by current advice from scientists and engineers, not just politicians

and policy specialists. The “Whiz kid”

philosophy meant that the status, recognition, and reporting channels for the scientists and engineers at DASA had to be

modernized and modified. The variety of

management reforms and administrative

changes that took place inside the agency

did not come in isolation, but were internal consequences of powerful external

factors. The reforms DASA would undertake during the mid-1960s came because

the agency’s mission, as redefined under

McNamara, required a much greater level of scientific and technical expertise than

had been envisioned in its original 1959

charter. The general concept of upgrading the status and improving the voice of

scientific and technical staff made its way

from Kennedy and McNamara into

DASA through a series of specific directives, reports, committee studies, and finally, through a set of revisions to the

DASA charter.

Shortly after taking office, McNamara and his staff developed 120 broad questions, many of which led to book-length

reports. For DASA, question number 97

was crucial: “What must be done in order

to enhance the capability of our in-house

research and development laboratories?”
180 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

McNamara assembled Task Group 97 to

develop an answer. Eugene Fubini, a deputy to Brown, served as Task Force Chairman. Fubini also served on a number of

science advisory boards through the decade before retiring from government, later becoming a director of Texas

Instruments Company and long-term

member of the Defense Science Board.

Fubini’s Task Group 97 conducted

field visits and interviews with laboratory personnel and reported in 1961 with

five basic recommendations for the Services. Fubini urged that each laboratory

have a well-defined mission, adequate

supplies of competent manpower, improved personnel policies to raise morale,

simpler procedures for programming and

budgeting, and better facilities. Partly in

response to the Fubini report, McNamara

asked the Services to provide extended

tours of duty to military officers assigned

to laboratories and to raise salaries for

technical personnel. DASA, like the Service laboratories, began to benefit from

the respect for scientific training that permeated DoD under McNamara and

Brown.23

A separate study, headed by David

Bell, director of the Bureau of the Budget, also focused on research and development. The Bell report, similar to

Fubini’s Task Group 97 report, urged

strengthening of all government in-house

research capacities and particularly

stressed the lack of clarity in the relationship between military officers and civilian technical staff in the military Service

labs. Both the Fubini and Bell reports

served as part of the justification used by

Brown in reorganizing all DoD scientific

enterprises, and DASA in particular, during the mid-1960s.24

In June of 1961, Brown established

the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Weapons Effects and appointed RAND physicist William McMillan as chairman. The

so-called McMillan Committee played an

influential role in establishing priorities

for DASA’s nuclear test program in the

early 1960s. Like the Fubini and Bell reports on a broader scale, the McMillan

Committee urged greater participation by

scientists in decision making at DASA.

From the perspective of those working

within DASA, the McMillan Committee

reports, not the broader Bell and Fubini

studies, were the more immediate documents stimulating reform.25

A step in the direction of clarifying the

role of DASA was a clearer delineation

of the separate duties of AEC and DASA,

made by agreement between the two

agencies in mid- November of 1962. AEC

Chairman Glenn Seaborg and Deputy

Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric

set out the specific division of labor between the AEC and DASA on November

14, 1962. They agreed that the AEC would

be responsible for weapons development,

testing, stockpile confidence testing, effects tests on warhead components, and

management of NTS. DASA, in turn,

would be responsible for providing test

facilities and some of the associated hardware necessary for environmental diagnostics and data recording, field support,

and test-related funding. DASA was to

integrate test results into useful documentation, disseminate evaluations, and perform survivability and operability testing

for DoD weapon systems. Yet this clarification did not address the more profound

issue of ensuring a good flow of technical information from the agency to the

policy makers.26

In order to develop specific organizational reforms to restructure DASA, the

Deputy Secretary of Defense directed, on

November 30, 1962, that the DoD’s Director of Organizational and Management

Planning, Solis Horwitz, conduct an analysis of the functions, responsibilities, and

charter of DASA. Horwitz served as
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 181

chairman of a study group with representatives from the military Services, from

the JCS, from DDR&E, and from DASA

itself. The Horwitz report noted that

Brown, as DDR&E, believed the technical continuity in DASA required strengthening, especially in regard to weapon

effects testing. The study reviewed the origins of DASA, showing that AFSWP

actually preceded the formation of the

Department of Defense, and that DASA’s

charter did not reflect the new organization of DoD or the role of the Secretary

of Defense.

In short, the Horwitz group recognized what Brown and the McMillan

group had come to realize: that DASA,

as the agency dealing with nuclear weapons within the DoD, should be able to affect DoD policy in these areas at the

highest level. The Horwitz group made 12

recommendations, including the elevation

of the rank of the chief of DASA to a

three-star officer and creating explicit

channels of communication between

DASA and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense.27

The DASA charter originally drafted

by Donald Quarles in 1959 had given the

agency the responsibility to supervise the

conduct of full-scale DoD weapons effects tests. But supervising and conducting tests did not necessarily suggest that

the specialists of the agency could affect

policy at a higher level, nor did it assure

even within the agency that the views of

scientific personnel would carry weight

against those of Service personnel.28 Another aspect of the 1959 mission was a

limited role of assisting the JCS in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense.

Technical assistance envisaged in the

1959 charter was subordinate to policy

making. DASA advice would have to filter through the JCS before getting to the

Secretary of Defense in Quarles’ original

scheme.29

Following the McMillan Committee

recommendations, McNamara considerably modified the 1959 charter by issuing DoD Directive 5105.31 on July 22,

1964, signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance. The changes outlined

in this 1964 Directive converted the organization from one headed by a “chief”

supported by two deputies as well as a

chief scientist, a chief of staff, and three

deputy chiefs of staff to a much simpler

one headed by a “director.”30 In the new

organization, the director would be supported by two major deputy directors: one

for Science and one for Operations and

Administration. This change was central

to the concerns of McMillan.

The 1964 directive also indicated that

when the deputy directors of DASA were

military officers, they would normally be

from Services different from the director.

In practice, the director would be a threestar officer, while the Deputy Director for

Operations and Administration was usually a two-star officer, as was the Commander of the Field Command, while the

Deputy Director for Science (later Science

and Technology) was a civilian scientist.31

In terms of budgetary responsibility, the

Research, Development Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) budget and some of the

Operation & Maintenance were under the

complete control of the Deputy Director,

Science and Technology (DDST). This

post of DDST would be crucial. By the

simple stroke of creating two deputy directors, the role of scientific personnel

within the organization was suddenly

made parallel and equal in importance to

operations and administration. This organizational change was intended to allow

feedback and advice from the technical

side, as well as from the administrative

side, directly to the agency’s head.32

As part of the elevation of the role of

scientists, Brown ordered the McMillan

Committee to report directly to the direc-
182 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

tor of DASA as a Scientific Advisory

Group on Effects (SAGE).33 By this measure, the outside consulting group became

incorporated as a highly-respected and

high-powered brain trust, well populated

in its early days by experienced nuclear

specialists from Lawrence Livermore,

RAND, Sandia, and west coast private

sector firms in the nuclear and defense

businesses.34 Through SAGE and direct

communication between the Assistant to

the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), ATSD(AE), and sometimes through

informal networking channels, control of

DASA shifted dramatically in 1964 from

the military Joint Chiefs to the civilian

Secretary of Defense.

Table 5-2 presents an overview of

DASA manpower authorizations for the

period ending June 30, 1965. It includes

DASA Headquarters, Field Command,

Joint Task Force-8, and other support divisions within the agency. An agency organizational chart detailing the agency

structure as of April of 1966 follows this

table.

The transformation went beyond simply raising the visibility or the reporting

level for technical advice. DASA transitioned from being a support agency to taking the lead within DoD in identifying,

structuring, funding, implementing and

overseeing the application of critical new

programs. Specifically, the hardness and

survivability programs of the nation’s

strategic systems, which the Services

were most reluctant to address, became

the primary focus of DASA’s RDT&E

program.

The changes in internal organization

continued through the late 1960s. In 1965,

the Weapons Test Division became the

Test Command (at Field Command in Albuquerque, NM), which reported directly to headquarters DASA (now

located in Alexandria, VA).35 This change

was an indication that the Office of the

Secretary of Defense wanted more direct

control over the research side of nuclear

weaponry. Additionally, stockpile accountability, and all its related responsibilities, was turned over completely to

Early gathering of the Scientific Advisory Group on Effects (SAGE).
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 183

Table 5-2. DASA Manpower Authorizations, June 30, 1965.

O L ff/WO E V N C l I Tota

H ) eadquarters, DASA ( ) 207 ( ) 219 ( ) 157 (583

D 3 25 irector

PIO 2215

C 43 0 omptroller 1 71

S ) ubtotal ( ) 9 ( ) 5 ( ) 13 (27

Deputy Director Operations &

Administration

2 13

J 77 AIEG 2 43

O 6 perations Division 3 73367

P 1 lans Division 1 23 61

R 2 equirements Division 1 14 71

Personnel & Administrative

Division

8 43 23 47

S 53 4 ecurity Division 1 22

L 23 9 ogistics Division 1 42

S ) ubtotal ( ) 83 ( ) 80 ( ) 103 (266

Deputy Director Science &

Technology

2248

R 8 adiation Division 1701 53

A 0 nalysis & Programs Division 2 44 82

B 1 last & Shock Division 1 29 22

Bio-Medical Division 812 11

W 6 eapons Tests Division (Sandia) 5 8 1 2 1 1 6 18

S ) ubtotal ( ) 115 ( ) 134 ( ) 41 (290

F ) ield Command, DASA ( ) 725 ( ) 3154 ( ) 1802 (5681

H 6 Q Field Command, DASA 4 2 7 1 7 23 1 5 30 301

K 2 illeen Base 5 8 3 3 6 1 3 1 53

B 9 ossier Base 3 1 3 8 2 8 8 44

M 8 anzano Base 4 3 4 4 0 8 5 53

C 3 larksville Base 5 4 4 1 0 1 8 1 56

L 7 ake Mead Base 5 4 4 9 2 9 0 58

J 7 TF-8 5 2 1 9 0 15

B 6 io-Medical Division 3 12 9 1 6 6 22

T 4 OE (901st ICD & 46th MP) 2 14 56

G 9 rand Total 1 2 13 3 6 59 2 7 11 684
184 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

DASA Field Command. These reorganization efforts raised the administrative and

leadership position of those engaged in

scientific research, while turning over the

more procedural and policing authority of

stockpile management to the more strictly military and operational, administrative

side of the organization. By transferring

to Field Command the “caretaking” or

“warehousing” side of the agency, Headquarters staff could concentrate on the

more intellectually challenging technical

work involving new weapon effects testing.

The 1964 Directive issued by Deputy

Secretary Vance clarified the reporting

channels to the Secretary of Defense, giving the Director, DDR&E, responsibility

for approving or modifying the DASA

research programs and giving the

ATSD(AE) responsibility for exercising

staff supervision over stockpile management. The underlying McNamara-Brown

philosophy of tapping into technical talent through the chain of command received very practical and specific

implementation in these reforms. In addition to the testing program and the question of stockpile management, the 1964

Directive clearly spelled out DASA’s responsibilities in conducting courses for

the military departments to train technically qualified personnel.

Under the reorganization of DASA in

Directive 5105.31, issued July 22, 1964,

the agency gained control over and operated the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). On July 28,

1964, as per DoD Instruction 5100.45,

DDR&E Harold Brown assigned the DoD

Data Center, then located in Santa Barbara, California, to DASA as the agency’s

primary information analysis center

(IAC). Renamed as the DASA Data Center, and later the DoD Atomic Support

IAC, this agency technical resource

formed the impetus behind the current

Information Analysis Center (DASIAC),

which continues to serve the agency with

analysis of scientific and technical data.

Once DASA had become established as

the premier DoD nuclear agency, these

collateral activities logically came under

the organization’s aegis.36

Unlike the early days of the Manhattan Project, during which scientists were

often drawn from academia, a new generation of civilian and military scientists

emerged. Colonels and civilians with

graduate degrees filled DASA’s scientific and administrative positions alike. General Groves’ early efforts to recruit the

most talented officers continued to be part

of the organizational culture. Therefore,

rather than reflecting an internal division

between civilian and military staff, the

emerging cultural division within DASA

tended to cut along other lines. On the one

side was a group of scientists and engineers, both civilian and military, under the

DDST, who were deeply involved in the

technical questions of exactly how to most

effectively and safely conduct weapon

tests. On the other side was a group of administrators and managers who served

under the Deputy Director for Operations,

which also contained both civilian civil

servants and career military officers. One

observer of the cultural divide commented that it struck him as similar to the divisions within academia between faculty on

the one hand and staff on the other.37

The first civilian DDST under the new

system, Theodore Taylor, served from October 13, 1964, to August 31, 1966. The

appointment of Taylor, who was never

known as a steady administrator, reflected the effort to bring a representative of

the new generation of brilliant young nuclear physicists into the agency.38Taylor’s

successor, Fred Wikner, served from September 1, 1966, through December 27,

1968. Wikner had worked for several

West Coast nuclear firms, including Aero-
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 185

jet General Nuclear, qualifying him as a

member of the “West Coast Nuclear Mafia.” Like the appointment of Taylor,

Wikner’s appointment infused the agency with talent drawn from the country’s

growing nuclear physics community.

Wikner initially joined DASA as Scientific Assistant to the Director, serving in

that post for a year under Taylor, before

becoming Deputy Director.39

A NEW DIRECTOR

Lieutenant General Harold C. Donnelly assumed the helm of DASA in 1964,

having served as Acting Director from

1960 through 1961. General Donnelly,

who had served as Commander of Field

Command, was well connected within the

Services and well positioned to be an advocate for testing new weapon systems

nuclear survivability. A West Point graduate, Donnelly had served in World War II

as Deputy and then Chief of Staff of the

China-India-Burma Theater. He transferred to the Air Force in September 1947

when it was created and served at Air

Force Headquarters until 1948.40

DASA INNOVATIONS:

UNDERGROUND TESTING

In the fall of 1966, the staff of the Deputy Director (Science & Technology) began developing programs responsive to

problems of national significance, bringing more scientific rigor to nuclear weapon effects tests on equipment and on

weapon systems. The DDST program

meshed a thorough understanding of physical phenomena with larger policy issues,

ensuring focus on the minute details of

testing and experimentation.41 These issues were addressed as the agency confronted a series of specific policy and

practical problems that grew out of the

new conditions of the 1960s arms race.42

Above all, the new national policy

prohibiting atmospheric testing demanded innovative testing methods. After the

LTBT went into effect in 1963, the nuclear

weapons testing program faced fundamental difficulties. First of all, the last

tests in the DOMINIC series of atmospheric tests in 1962 had demonstrated

that when nuclear weapons detonated at

extremely high altitudes, the released energy took the form of an intense radiation

burst. In addition to the burst of x rays,

gamma rays, and neutrons, which at these

altitudes traveled over very great distances, high-altitude detonations produced an

electromagnetic pulse (EMP), containing

a flood of energy ranging across the spectrum. EMP was capable of damaging electronic devices over thousands of square

miles. The STARFISH PRIME detonation

in the DOMINIC series, exploded more

than 800 miles from Hawaii, affected the

streetlight system in Honolulu. Without

the opportunity to conduct further highaltitude tests because of the test ban, the

nuclear weapon testing program was

faced with the challenge of how to measure the full dimensions of EMP effects

and other radiation effects.

Another issue was the limited experiLieutenant General Harold G. Donnelly,

DASA Director 1964 to 1968.
186 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

Headquarters Defense Atomic Support Agency Organizational Chart, 1966.

PUBLIC INFORMATION 

OFFICE INSPECTOR GENERAL

JOINT ATOMIC INFORMATION 

EXCHANGE GROUP

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

OPERATIONS & ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATIVE & 

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

OPERATIONS DIVISION PLANS DIVISION

PERSONNEL & 

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION SECURITY DIVISION LOGISTICS DIVISION

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIVISION

COMMANDER,

FIELD COMMAND FIVE DASA BASES COMMANDER,

JOINT TASK FORCE EIGHT

REQUIREMENTS DIVISION
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 187

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(SCIENTIFIC)

RADIATION DIVISION ANALYSIS & PROGRAMS DIVISION BLAST & SHOCK DIVISION

BIOMEDICAL DIVISION WEAPON TEST DIVISION (SANDIA) ADVANCED TECHNICAL 

STUDIES DIVISION

JOHNSTON ISLAND ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY

RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Organization Chart

HEADQUARTERS

DEFENSE ATOMIC

SUPPORT AGENCY

(DASA)

MAY 1966 SURGEON COMPTROLLER

DEPUTY DIRECTOR
188 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

ence DASA and the AEC had with underground tests; in fact, the first test DASA

managed underground was shot HARD

HAT on February 15, 1962. In 1964 and

1965, the nuclear testing program concerned itself with developing procedures,

technologies, and support groups that

would acquire the technical knowledge to

properly manage the tests and develop

means of testing nuclear weapon effects

without actual nuclear detonations. Although the division of labor between AEC

and DASA was relatively clear, especially after the November 14, 1962, agreement, some areas of concern remained.

The AEC operated the NTS, and AEC laboratories that provided the devices to be

detonated in DASA effects tests. A set of

“safeguards” under the treaty legislation

provided guidance to both agencies, but

the responsibilities of the two agencies

intersected under those safeguards. First

of all, both AEC and DASA would conduct tests; second, the AEC would continue to maintain nuclear laboratories;

third, under the so-called “Safeguard C,”

DASA would maintain the ability to restart atmospheric testing in the National

Nuclear Test Readiness program; and

fourth, both AEC and DASA supported

research to detect both atmospheric and

underground tests by other nations.43

Both AEC and DASA conducted tests

over the next decade to improve methods

used to detect underground testing around

the world, both to monitor Soviet progress

in underground testing and to determine

if other nations had joined the nuclear

club. Tests that aided in this effort were

designated “VELA UNIFORM” tests, the

initial letters of which stood for “Verification-Underground.” “VELA-HOTEL”

tests would improve methods of verifying high-altitude testing.

One important test, conducted underground by the AEC in Mississippi in 1964,

attempted to verify the theory that the

magnitude of a device yield could be concealed from distant seismic sensors by

“decoupling” the device from the surrounding geologic strata through detonation in a large space in a cavern. It showed

that it was extremely difficult to conceal

the magnitude of a nuclear yield in this

fashion, contradicting results from an earlier test, RAINIER. Although conducted

by the AEC, this test was a crucial event

in the VELA UNIFORM program, and

many later studies by personnel in DASA

focused on its data. MUDPACK, a DASA

test conducted in December 1964, tested

shock propagation through two different

ground strata. DASA scientists reviewed

the data from this event over the next several years, concluding that seismic detection of large bursts would allow

monitoring of the Soviet testing program.

A leading agenda item of the underground testing program conducted by

DASA through these years remained concern with the effect of nuclear weapons

on various weapon storage sites, such as

structures, silos, “igloos,” and hangars.

DoD planners assumed that primary targets, during a potential nuclear strike by

the Soviets, would be the stockpile of nuclear weapons held by the United States,

together with the underground missile silos in which ICBMs were housed.44

In the fall of 1965, the DDST concluded that the DASA testing program had

been driven by scientific and technical

interests rather than by a sense of national weapons priorities. It was evident that

the tests had been designed to investigate

important technical issues, but lacked

clear linkage between the knowledge

gained by the scientists and the design of

new weapon systems. DASA’s testing

philosophy was about to transition from

the pursuit of studies based on scientific

curiosity to a prioritization derived from

two considerations laid out in McNamara’s nuclear strategy.
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 189

The research agenda would, henceforth, be directed by the needs of the endusers, not by the interests of the

researchers. Nuclear forces had to be able

to survive a nuclear attack, and they had

to be capable of retaliation in a second

strike. DASA should, therefore, test every weapon delivery system under development to be sure it would survive a

nuclear environment.45 Within the DoD,

opinions were divided over whether every weapon development program should

incorporate such testing. DASA supported the concept, as did Harold Brown. Yet

others, more concerned with budgetary

issues, felt such testing was unnecessary.46

For support, General Donnelly, DASA

Director, turned to his classmate and personal friend, General Earl Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS. Soon Wheeler arranged

for the Joint Chiefs to prepare and issue a

directive establishing the policy that all

weapons under development should be

tested for survivability in a nuclear environment. Getting the JCS directive drafted and issued, however, was no easy

matter. DASA maintained that all strategic missile systems and certain other

classes of system development programs

had to pass through agency testing as a

major milestone. Henceforth, DASA’s

scientific and technical role was no mere

adjunct to DoD policy; it became the core

of weapon system acquisition.

With the JCS Directive, the experts at

DASA moved to the very center of the nuclear arms race. No new weapon system,

including every non-nuclear system, developed by the Army, the Navy, or the Air

Force, could be deployed without first

passing technical muster with DASA.

With this change, the administrative as

well as the advisory role of DASA had

been enhanced, reflecting the concerns of

Brown and the McMillan Committee.

The issue of nuclear weapon effects

on existing and new weapon systems became an increasingly important concern,

driven by the knowledge that EMP and

other radiation effects could damage or

destroy the electronics in a missile in

flight if it was exposed to a nuclear burst.

Such scenarios now seemed a heightened

danger. Soviet ABM systems, armed with

nuclear devices, would intercept incoming missiles while still in space or at very

high altitude. As a result, U.S. equipment

had to be hardened against x-rays transmitted in a near vacuum.

The concern with EMP dominated

DASA’s technical programs and test results as early as 1963-64. Although the

tests in FISHBOWL and DOMINIC had

revealed the significance of EMP effects

on communications, radar, and electronic equipment, the ending of atmospheric

testing hampered further study. DASA

representatives discussed this matter with

the Office of Science and Technology on

July 30-31, 1963, reviewing concerns regarding EMP effects on hardened military

sites. At Oak Ridge, an AEC group that

had gathered information on shielding of

nuclear reactors was instructed to expand

its purview to include information on nuclear weapons and space radiation. The

center at Oak Ridge produced the first

cumulative bibliography on shielding information in April of 1963.47

In order to find out more about highaltitude radiation effects, DASA experimenters faced a major technical challenge:

how to structure an underground test to

simulate high-altitude conditions. Test personnel developed methods that involved

the attachment of a long, sealed pipe to the

explosive device. They evacuated the air

from the pipe and exposed samples to be

tested at the other end of this either vertical or horizontal line-of-sight (VLOS or

HLOS) pipe in early tests in 1964. Later,

DASA weapon effects testers would develop many improvements to this method of

simulating high-altitude conditions.
190 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

Through 1964 and 1965, testing continued to focus on high-explosive shock

and blast effects on ships, with a new

emphasis on high-altitude radiation effects on materials and electric parts.

WISHBONE, detonated on February 18,

1965, was the first such test. DILUTED

WATERS, conducted on June 16, 1965,

tested radiation effects on materials and

electrical parts using a VLOS system.

The LTBT did not prevent testing the

effects of large explosions of conventional

high explosives in the atmosphere. Such

tests could prove extremely useful in evaluating methods of detecting underground

tests and in further establishing high-explosive blast equivalents. In July of 1964,

the DASA test program included SNOWBALL, a joint United States-Canadian test

in Alberta, Canada. SNOWBALL participants conducted basic blast, ground

shock, and other measurements using high

explosives. NASA researchers developed

a device installed on an airplane which

would determine particle size distribution

in a cloud of debris; in Operation SNOWBALL, pilots flew the device through the

resulting cloud to validate its technology.48

Several other DASA tests during this

period, including detonations in the range

of 500 tons (0.5 KT) of high-explosive

TNT helped address the problem of determining nuclear blast effects. Since a

high-explosive detonation releases its

energy somewhat more slowly than a nuclear explosion, it was determined that a

0.5 KT high-explosive burst would generally represent a 1 KT nuclear yield in

blast effect. Such tests included the 1965

SAILOR HAT test. Blast effects on ships,

aircraft, buildings, and underground structures could all be examined through the

use of high explosives, once reliable scaling principles had been discovered, thoroughly developed, and validated.49 In

1966, the Naval Ordinance Laboratory

tested the concept of exploding stacked

ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO),

instead of TNT, to simulate nuclear weapon blast effects. Later, the Navy, and in

turn DASA, utilized the same procedure

for high-explosive testing since it was less

expensive and more readily available than

TNT, and that ANFO was much safer to

handle and stack.

DASA adjusted to the conditions imposed by the LTBT by developing several above-ground research facilities that

could simulate radiation effects of weapons without requiring a nuclear detonation. Neutron emission and x-ray testing

stations, although operating on a small

scale, could help establish measurement

tools and anticipate some effect issues

which could then be further tested underground, with the exception of EMP. Because no weapon had to be detonated,

such tests could also prove more economical and much easier to repeat frequently.

In 1965, DASA reported several accomplishments in the field of transient radiation effects on electronics (TREE) using

one such piece of nuclear simulation

equipment. The agency tested and proved

feasible the accelerator pulsed fast assembly (APFA), a bare, unshielded nuclear reactor. It produced neutrons in very short

pulses, a few microseconds in length. Although pulsed neutron sources had been

developed earlier, none had been capable

of producing such short-duration bursts

necessary for nuclear simulation. In order

to study such effects as short-lifetime annealing of materials that might occur in a

nuclear explosion environment, experimenters had to direct very short bursts at

targets.50 In all such areas, DASA work

flowed steadily to the weapons designers,

leading to improvements and modifications of the new systems.51

During the mid and late 1960s, as the

agency made its first adaptations to the

new world of the Limited Test Ban Trea-
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 191

ty, the specialists at DASA worked

out three basic new approaches to

the testing of nuclear weapon effects

on the weapons, structures, and

communications equipment of the

military Services. These three methods would continue to be used over

the next decades, making progress

in defending weapons systems

against nuclear weapons without

once setting off a nuclear device in

the atmosphere.

The first method involved improvements in underground testing

techniques, particularly in highly

evacuated line-of-sight (LOS) pipes

to simulate high-altitude conditions, improvement of data gathering methods and

safety features. The second method involved the use of high explosives. Setting

off very large above-ground detonations

allowed exploration of effects such as airblast, shock waves in ground or water, and

the resultant impact of such effects on

weapon systems. By working out the scaling relationships between high-explosive

detonations and nuclear detonations, it

was possible to develop methods to protect weapon systems and equipment

against nuclear weapon effects without

actually setting off a nuclear weapon in

the air, at the surface, or under water. The

third method used simulators to achieve

particular radiation effects, with some of

the first efforts involving the use of unshielded reactors to expose target materials to bursts of neutrons.

More sophisticated underground testing, high-explosive tests above ground or

under water, and the development and use

of effects simulation facilities became the

hallmarks of DASA testing. Improvements and modifications in testing, and

addressing some of the technical problems

encountered in the underground testing

work, became a major push for DASA

during the 1960s.

TEST MANAGEMENT

Once the underground testing of nuclear weapons was running on a full

schedule in the mid-1960s, the test series

designation names simply referred to all

the tests, whether AEC or DoD, planned

for a fiscal year, as shown in Table 5-3.

From 1964 through 1968, the AEC conducted the vast majority of the 40 to 50

underground nuclear tests per year in

these series, while DASA scheduled a

maximum of five such tests each year.

While the AEC usually designed its tests

to evaluate a single weapon design,

DASA tests often evaluated 20 to more

than 70 experiments simultaneously, incorporating a wide variety of equipment

from different weapons, weapons systems, and structures. There were two major problems; initially, the percentage of

tunnel tests that leaked radioactivity was

unacceptably high to the AEC, which ran

the test site. Of the five FLINTLOCK effects tests, three were in tunnels and all

three leaked radioactivity. Second, the

equipment that required testing was becoming physically larger, and at the same

time had to be exposed to ever-increasing intensities of radiation, both of which

pushed tunnel designs in a direction that

made radioactive containment more dif1965 SAILOR HAT high-explosive test stack prior

to detonation.
192 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

Table 5-3. DASA Test Series, 1964-1969.

ficult. These factors demanded a reduction of testing while major efforts were

made to understand more thoroughly and

improve on containment design. As the

tests became larger and more complex

their costs rapidly increased, causing budgetary consideration and some later limitations on test scope.

In the late 1960s, methods were perfected for getting ever more systems tested during the same shot. PILE DRIVER,

in June 1966, included ground motion

phenomena in granite with a total of 73

test chambers constructed in tunnel segments to check effects on structures and

other experiments. With such “piggybacked” and multiple test projects, both

technical demands and budgetary pressures were stressed.52

DASA staff worked hard to ensure

that the testing of weapons systems under development fit into the development

schedule of the Services’ program offices. Test directors designated one Service

as lead for a particular test, devoting the

main priority on a particular event to evaluating one particular weapon system. The

other Services would then be allowed to

“piggy-back” their experiments with

those of the lead Service.53

Weapon effects tests provided opportunities to examine the radiation response

of the Nike-Zeus, the Minuteman III, and

other weapons systems. A 1965 underground test, TAPESTRY, established the

threshold for permanent damage to electronic parts due to the thermal shock produced by the absorption of x rays. The

underground tests allowed for the correlation of data from such detonations with

data from flash x-ray machines, encouraging experimenters to consider additional experiments to test x-ray effects on a

wide variety of electronic parts, and to determine remedial action to be taken to

raise the threshold for damage.54

In 1965 DASA updated the TREE

handbook, first issued in 1964, and

planned a completely new edition that

would incorporate the results of the extensive testing program conducted both in

the above-ground facilities and the underground tests. This handbook, a pioneering effort, assisted the Services to develop

hardened systems more quickly and effectively. DASA held a TREE symposium at

Albuquerque in December of 1965, attracting more than 200 specialists who

exchanged information concerning the

concept, execution, and results of their

TREE-related research.55

Still another means DASA used to

gather information after the test ban was

to collect data from tests conducted by the

French or other nations that had not joined

the test ban treaty. Such work had to be

S d eries P s erio T s otal Test Total Effects Test

W 5 HETSTONE 1 1 964-6 5 5

F 6 LINTLOCK 1 0 965-6 5 5

L 7 ATCHKEY 1 8 966-6 3 4

C 8 ROSSTIE 1 6 967-6 5 4

B 9 OWLINE 1 8 968-6 5 5
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 193

done without the cooperation of the testing nation by stationing staff and detection equipment at some distance to gather

data. As early as 1965, the agency developed tentative plans to conduct such observations in 1967 and 1968.

Increasingly through the 1960s,

DASA’s tests shifted from using shafts

drilled vertically from the surface to emplacing devices in tunnels mined horizontally into the base of a mountain to a point

where the amount of rock and soil directly above the test chamber, the overburden,

exceeded 1,000 feet, adequate to preclude

venting. DASA shifted from shafts to tunnels for several reasons. Shafts created

problems of closure and emission, as PIN

STRIPE demonstrated with the leakage of

a radioactive cloud in April of 1966. When

using shafts, experimenters had to mount

test materials on towers at the surface over

the shaft, moving samples or the tower

itself before the subsidence crater collapsed (sometimes within less than a

minute). This awkward procedure for the

shaft shots made tunnel methods far more

preferable for effects tests. Tunnels would

allow for big rooms to be mined out,

where test arrays could hold collections

of target samples for the many experiments simultaneously mounted by the different Services.

One of the major difficulties that developed was that experimenters needed to

find ways to expose the test samples to

the radiation burst of a nuclear device but

prevent damage to the samples from debris coming through the evacuated LOS

pipe. DASA addressed the problem by

installing a system of fast-closing gates

that closed off the pipe immediately after

the radiation passed, blocking debris from

A typical underground horizontal line-of-sight (HLOS) test bed.
194 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

reaching the target arrays. However, even

thick doors constructed of heavy steel

failed to protect the samples, and better

closure methods had to be developed.

DASA discovered that as the shock

wave traveled through the tuffaceous soil

under Rainier Mesa test site at NTS, the

ground shock itself could be used to collapse the evacuated pipe, closing it thoroughly. However, as a means of protecting

the samples from debris, such stemming

or collapse of the LOS pipes induced by

ground shock was not always reliable and

not adequately predictable. Many times

the pipe collapsed very close to the detonation point, after debris had escaped and

damaged the experiment samples.

Dr. John Northrop, as DASA Deputy

Director (Science and Technology),

tasked John Lewis, who managed the

agency’s research work on ground shock,

to find out why the timing of the ground

shock induced closure of the LOS pipes

varied so greatly from one test event to

another, even in cases where the yield of

the nuclear device was practically identical. The ground shock community researchers developed a numerical material

model of the test-event geology that

would be sensitive to variations in the

water content, and thus the air-void content, within limits of those properties as

observed in Rainier Mesa. Using the model in a spherically symmetric point source

calculation, they found that variation of

several percent in air-void content could

dramatically influence shock velocities

and range-to-effect along the length of the

LOS pipe.

DASA’s test site team developed laboratory methods for testing samples to

evaluate the air-void content of the tuff at

forward locations ahead of the mined tunnels. This consisted of drilling ahead, taking cores, sealing them in wax, and

sending them off for evaluation. Using

these data, the team could then pick locations for emplacement of nuclear test devices that would provide optimum

geologic conditions for rapid transmission

of the ground shock to collapse the LOS

pipes. After adoption of these methods,

ground shock stemming of the pipes succeeded in essentially every case in preventing debris damage to the sample

arrays. This collaborative research served

as a memorable example of how scientific deduction from first principles, coupled

with newly gathered test data, could yield

a practical solution to an engineering

problem of national significance.56

Although more expensive, DASA

found tunnel emplacement safer both in

sealing against radiation emission and in

protecting test personnel during re-entry

to examine the exposed sample materials.

DASA could conduct more experiments

simultaneously through a network of horizontal tunnels than would be possible

with a shaft system, with its test arrays

mounted above the ground at the top of

the shaft.

Perhaps the most important element

driving the shift from shaft to tunnel emplacement was the increasing need

through the late 1960s and into the 1970s

to test larger and larger subsystems and

eventually complete systems. Shafts, even

those of wide diameters, simply could not

provide the large chambers that could be

created by moving heavy equipment into

a tunnel and mining out appropriately

large spaces.57

Since each test required as much as

one to two years to prepare and upwards

of $40 million to mount, the DDST-appointed test directors tried to gain maximum knowledge from each detonation.

Operating as many as 20 separate projects

on the same test required the cooperation

and participation of many contractors and

separate AEC and DoD and civilian laboratory personnel. In the late 1960s,

DASA researchers developed safety and
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 195

security procedures early in the test period to ensure that personnel did not receive

radiation exposure that exceeded allowed

prescribed limits, to eliminate noxious or

explosive gases after an explosion, and to

preserve the physical safety of personnel

working in the tunnels.58

The two agencies used some identical techniques and many of the same contractors. Holmes and Narver performed

architect/engineer services for the test site

and acted as the principal support contractor for AEC off-continent operations. Reynolds Electrical and Engineering

Company, Incorporated, served as the

principal AEC and DASA operational and

support contractor for the test site, providing electrical and architectural engineering, large diameter and smaller

conventional shaft drilling, heavy-duty

construction and excavation, mining and

tunneling, occupational safety and fire

protection, and many other support functions. Beginning in 1963, Fenix and Scisson, Inc., of Tulsa, Oklahoma, took a lead

role in designing many underground

structures and specialized in the field of

deep, large-diameter hole drilling, working for both AEC and DASA.59

The Nevada Operations Office of the

AEC oversaw both AEC and DASA construction phases and, during construction,

collected containment-related information. During either drilling or mining operations, the Nevada Operations Office

ordered analysis of rock cores for moisture content, porosity, carbon dioxide content, and many other conditions. The AEC

contractors examined and mapped the

geologic features of the tunnels several

months prior to a planned event.60 AEC’s

local Nevada office arranged for required

instrumentation and recording facilities,

office space and equipment, communications equipment, vehicles, photography,

and other support facilities. Contractors

provided food services and housing at the

test site.61

Instrumentation trailers on Rainer Mesa in advance of underground nuclear weapons test at NTS.
196 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

Through the 1960s, as DASA tests

grew more sophisticated, they took on a

character and developed a degree of technological culture of their own due to the

unique testing methods involved. Although DASA test crews began to switch

from shafts to tunnels, the AEC only rarely adopted the more expensive tunnel

emplacement. To reduce costs, DoD test

managers began to employ a number of

ingenious means to re-use equipment and

even to re-bore and re-use tunnels. By the

late 1960s, DASA developed methods of

re-using long lengths of LOS pipe and

other equipment, resulting in reduced cost

of operations.62

DASA leadership developed organizational or cultural approaches that, like

the technological developments, stayed

with the agency as part of its “way of doing business.” DASA’s staff would select

a prime or lead project, giving that particular project office or program office

within one of the Services the advantage

of being able to set the schedule. Then,

DASA would accept applications from

other offices and programs needing items

or materials tested. The “piggy-backed”

projects competed for space, much like

grant applicants in an academic setting.

In some cases, DASA would provide

funding and support and in other cases the

project offices would fund their own operations. Early in the planning for the shot,

the project officers would travel to the

DASA Field Command office in Albuquerque. Meeting in a large hall, in a process similar to college registration, the

project officers would go from table to

table, filling out applications for the services they would need. For example,

DASA staff asked each program officer,

as one of the first considerations, how

much cabling they would require. Even

before emplacement, the cable to relay

data would cost over a dollar a foot “on

the reel” of spooled cable. With hundreds

of data-gathering cables, some stretching

thousands of feet, the total cable cost

could become a major consideration.63

When executing an experiment, the

experimenters recorded data from the test

stations underground through a system of

remote detectors and cabling that sent signals to recording facilities located in trailers on the surface. Prior to a test, operators

would maintain electronic equipment,

film, and magnetic recorders in the trailer parks to capture the data. Capturing

data required the most advanced electronic technology since a test transmitted data

for only an instant before the sensors were

destroyed. The equipment operated automatically, and crews could not enter the

trailer area to recover equipment and data

sheets until monitors had declared the area

safe.

Most of the early DoD shaft emplacements included LOS pipes from the device emplacement chamber directly to the

surface. However, these pipes required

systems to prevent release of radioactive

debris to the atmosphere. In the mid-sixties, several such releases gave added incentive to switch to tunnel emplacement.

Work continued to improve closure techniques for the LOS pipes to allow radiation, but not blast or debris, to reach the

test samples. Fast gate closure systems

driven by high explosives or compressed

air sealed the openings in LOS pipes, but

some of these early systems did not prevent releases.

Cables presented further containment

problems. Test crews embedded the cables in concrete and epoxy to prevent

leakage from venting. Even so, they found

that radioactive gases under high pressure

traveled along the inside of cables as a

conduit. DASA solved this problem by

embedding the inner components of cables in epoxy at appropriate intervals, calling the technique “gas blocking.”64 The

most serious containment problems, how-
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 197

ever, resulted from unanticipated geologic

conditions at particular test locations.

Sometimes a formation would contain

more water than anticipated near the detonation point. The nuclear explosion

turned the water to steam under pressure.

The resulting pressure was sufficient to

occasionally break through the surface,

despite containment methods.65

DASA test staff encountered such a

serious difficulty with PIN STRIPE, a

vertical LOS test in April of 1966. The test

crew emplaced the device in a mined shaft

at a depth of approximately 970 feet. Experimenters had mounted a mobile tower, with samples to be tested, directly over

the underground emplacement. A vertical

LOS pipe with a maximum diameter of

36 inches extended to the surface. Venting from the underground explosion began one minute after detonation and

continued until the cavity collapse that occurred about five minutes after the detonation. Further seepage from the ground

zero area began seven hours after the detonation and continued for another 21

hours.66

At one minute after the detonation,

crews began to winch the mobile tower

away from the expected subsidence area.

At about that time the first effluent

emerged from the ground about 150 feet

away from the tower. Soon the gases began to seep from a crack that extended

both towards the shaft and away from it.

A grey cloud formed, growing steadily

until the cavity collapsed. The cloud rose

to an altitude of about 2,000 feet over the

test area, and then was blown in a northnorthwest direction at about ten miles an

hour.67 Even though the direction of the

wind did not draw the cloud directly over

the area where trailers with recording instruments were parked, “gamma shine,”

or radiation from the cloud, did expose the

trailers and the recording equipment.68

The radiation count in the trailer park

rose to 400R/hour for two to three minutes; in about twenty minutes the radiation fell off to 15 to 20R/hour. The test

manager gave permission to proceed with

recovering high priority data from the

trailers but instructed the crews not to

enter areas with exposure rates greater

than 17R/hour. They entered the trailers

and were able to recover all film within a

few minutes. Over a period of six or seven hours, the level of radioactivity

dropped as the cloud drifted from the

shaft. Soon the crew removed the mobile

trailers and began recovering the experiment packages.69

The cloud ultimately rose to approximately 5,500 feet, moving to the east at

about twenty miles per hour.70 Both the

Public Health Service and the Air Force

Technical Applications Center (AFTAC)

sent aircraft to track and sample the cloud

during the night. VEGAS-8, a Public

Health Service twin-turboprop Beechcraft, overflew the cloud and then entered

the cloud path to get information on the

nature of the release and to collect samples. The next day, however, researchers

found it much harder to track the cloud

as it headed over Utah and Colorado.

The Public Health Service already had

established a milk sampling network, and

the Service placed it in operation throughout Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, and southern Idaho. On April 26, a search plane

made a positive contact with the cloud

about 300 miles due east of the NTS, and

a larger, slightly radioactive air mass extended from southern Wyoming south to

southwestern Kansas. Late on the night

of the 26th, the air mass shifted to a wide

area between central Minnesota and central Kansas. Rain and snow in the upper

Midwest had a leaching effect. The aircraft tracking the cloud lost all contact

with it on the April 27.

Monitors measured their highest radiation level of a populated area near the
198 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

PIN STRIPE test tower at D-1 hour (prior to detonation), April 18, 1966.

test site at Hiko, Nevada. There at 4:00

p.m. on the day of the test, outdoor radiation levels reached 1.45mR/h. A higher

level of 8mR/h was detected at Coyote

Summit, an unpopulated area. The Public Health Service moved a mobile medical trailer to the Hiko area, and 134 cows

at one dairy in Hiko were placed on dry

feed rather than being allowed to graze.71

Careful measurement of exposures at

the site and offsite indicated that none of

the exposures of individuals exceeded the

AEC guideline level of 5 rem per year or

about .5mR/h for industrial personnel

exposure. Nevertheless, the PIN STRIPE

event had revealed that underground nuclear weapon effects testing, particularly

in shafts, entailed a risk of offsite radiation exposure.

During the next test, DISCUS THROWER, managers established a more extensive “radsafe” system, complete with

monitoring teams and supervisory personnel, for initial radiation surveys on the

surface and aerial surveys by helicopter.

They detected no onsite or offsite radiation from this test.72

PERMISSIVE ACTION

LINKS AND BROKEN ARROWS

While the DASA experimenters perfected testing that provided the maximum

data from the tests at acceptably low risks

to personnel and/or radiation releases, the

scientific, technical, and military jurisdiction of DASA continued to require other

adjustments and new ways of conducting

business. DASA researchers needed to

deal with safety and security of the weapons and response to weapons as hazardous devices.

The AEC’s development of Permissive Action Links* (PALs), first installed

outside the United States in 1962 at the

direction of President Kennedy, derived

from an international policy consideration

that affected DASA’s mission. In 1966,

the United States began to locate nuclear

weapons with PALs in other NATO countries. This development added to existing
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 199

concerns about the security of weapons

which might be stored in overseas locations. The United States had to extend the

PAL system so that the weapons deployed

in these countries could not be used if stolen, or could not be improperly employed

by local personnel in units to which they

had been assigned. The goal was to ensure that U.S. personnel would remain

physically in control of the weapons.73

Sandia National Laboratory and

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory developed PALs in response to concerns expressed in a January 1960 JCS report on

the safety of atomic weapons.74 After investigating joint custody arrangements in

Britain, Germany, and other locations

outside the United States, Congressmen

on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy grew concerned that relaxed procedures might allow foreign military

officers to seize and possibly employ

weapons.75

Herbert York served at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory as director and then as

director of DDR&E in the last days of the

Eisenhower administration. In that position, he established a Safety Steering

Group, in January of 1961, that focused

on safety issues surrounding nuclear

weapons. DASA supported the Group

with technical staff, adding a major new

aspect to its agenda of nuclear military

responsibilities.76 PALs supplemented the

dual-key approach by requiring that

launching codes be given from higher authority in the chain of command.

The DoD installed the first PAL in

1962, designating them as “Category A,”

on the Quick Response Aircraft in Germany. DoD later installed “Category A”

PALs on the Jupiter strategic missile and

a range of tactical nuclear missiles.77 To

reassure Allies that the locks did not imply distrust of Allied officers, DoD installed the same system on weapons in

strictly U.S. facilities stationed in Europe.

The AEC made a series of improvements to the PALs through the 1960s, including moving the location of the system

from external to the weapon to deep inside to prevent anyone from “wiring

around” the link. A “Category B” PAL

involved setting a four-digit code with a

limited-try system so that after a few incorrect attempts, the system could not be

activated. “Category C”, introduced in the

late 1960s, required a six-digit code, again

with a limited-try feature. Production of

the “Category B” PALs began in 1966.78

The United States made the Soviets aware

of PAL technology and, as early as 1963,

the Soviet Union appeared to have developed and installed the systems on their

own nuclear weapons.79

In 1964, the Johnson administration

began to extend the PAL concept beyond

NATO to other aircraft-delivered and

ground-launched nuclear weapons. In the

late spring of 1966, the Secretary of the

Air Force authorized a panel made up of

outside experts to review recent “Broken

Arrow” incidents and develop recommendations. Although the forthcoming recommendations focused on safety procedures,

the panel also urged more assertive protection be exercised over all nuclear weapons carried aboard B-52 aircraft. Secretary

Brown accepted the recommendation and

extended the use of devices based on the PAL

concept to all SAC weapons.80

In late 1966 and early 1967, Carl

Walske, ATSD(AE) initiated a comprehensive study of use-control devices for

nuclear weapons. The new policy, unlike

the earlier PALs put in place in Europe,

focused on American military personnel.

* Permissive Action Link: a device included in

or attached to a nuclear weapon system to preclude arming and/or launching until the insertion

of a prescribed discrete code or combination. It

included equipment and cabling external to the

weapon or weapon system to activate components within the weapon or weapon system.
200 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

In particular, the Air Force installed a system of use-control on planes headed for

the failsafe point so that officers on recalled planes would not be able to unilaterally decide to attack.81 From a military

point of view, the advantage of the system was that it would allow the deployment of a greater number of weapons at a

high state of readiness. SAC commanders assumed less risk by putting armed but

“locked” weapons aboard planes in the air

than by using fully armed weapons. This

policy vastly increased the number of

weapons available at a moment’s notice.82

The DoD exempted the Navy from the

new system of controls, partly because of

the difficulty of communicating with submarines under way with only a few

minute’s time for notification, and due to

the inherent safety of nuclear weapons

aboard ships, that would insulate them

from outside interference or capture. A

system of dual keys aboard the submarines required concurrence of two officers in a launch decision. Nevertheless, the

Navy adopted PAL systems for some of

its nuclear depth charges stored on land.83

As a consequence of the policy of remaining in a state of high readiness, SAC

began operation “Chrome Dome” in

1961. B-52s, loaded with nuclear weapons, flew airborne alert patrols near the

Soviet Union, fully ready to attack with

only a few hours’ flight time to their ultimate targets.84

On January 17, 1966, a B-52 bomber

returning from a flight near the Soviet border collided with a KC-135 tanker while

refueling over Spain. Both planes disintegrated in the air high over Palomares, a

small fishing village on the country’s

Southern Mediterranean coast. The bomber’s four hydrogen bombs fell through the

flaming debris, automatically deploying

safety parachutes. However, some of the

parachutes did not fully open.

Three of the four weapons landed

among the fields and houses of the village. One broke open and another suffered

a high-explosive detonation, scattering

plutonium. Within days, Air Force crews

located the three grounded weapons and

began an extensive program of decontamination and soil removal to prevent risk

to the population from the alpha-emitting

plutonium. While the crews worked to cut

down vegetation and remove soil, public

attention began to focus on the fourth, lost

weapon that had fallen into the sea.85

The Navy concentrated an assemblage

of deep-diving underwater and exploring

equipment, including Alvin and Aluminaut, to locate and recover the fourth

weapon, a process that lasted several

months. Finally the Navy recovered the

missing bomb on April 7, 1966. In general, the DoD followed a policy of not discussing the procedure with the press,

creating, in the eyes of some observers,

more suspicion and public hysteria than

if the department had more frankly discussed the risks and problems.86

By focusing on the “lost” bomb at sea,

the international press partially ignored

the immediate danger from the scattered

plutonium on the ground, and such a focus may have helped limit hysteria. Without disclosing classified technology or

procedures, U.S. officials had to reassure

host country officials, and the general

European public to an extent, that the

weapons aboard B-52s did not pose a high

risk. The public relations and diplomatic

tasks proved as difficult as the cleanup

itself. No villagers suffered any radiation

injury, and the United States compensated all with justified damage claims for lost

crop and fishing revenue.87

The 16th Air Force, and specifically

the commander of the 16th Air Force,

Major General Delmar Wilson, retained

responsibility for coordinating all recovery efforts. Field Command, DASA, and

the Joint Nuclear Accidents Coordinating
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 201

Center (JNACC), located at Sandia Base

in Albuquerque, provided technical assistance. Later, the agency would take a direct interest in studying the whole

Palomares episode for “lessons learned,”

generating a “Summary Report” in 1975

that provided a detailed account of the

event.88

A series of Broken Arrow incidents in

the United States and at sea during the

same years received far less publicity than

the Palomares incident, but like that event,

they required DASA advisory participation in search, cleanup, decontamination,

and after-incident reports. Publicly disclosed incidents included several involving SAC aircraft. On January 13, 1964,

response teams recovered two weapons

relatively intact after an aircraft accident

near Cumberland, Maryland.89

Another B-52, taking part in the

Chrome Dome exercises, caught fire over

Greenland on January 21, 1968. The pilot diverted the craft to Thule where the

United States maintained a key part of its

North American early warning radar system. The plane crashed seven miles short

of the runway. The crew ejected and six

of the seven airmen survived. Four bombs

were destroyed by fire. A four-month decontamination effort followed, which required the removal of contaminated ice

and snow.90

DASA personnel from the JNACC

participated in the emergency. Response

teams assembled for both the Palomares

Aboard the USS Petrel, Major General D. E. Wilson, Commander of the 16th Air Force and

Rear Admiral W. S. Guest, Commander of Navy Task Force 65, look over MK28 bomb

retrieved from 2,800 feet of water off Palomares, Spain, in 1966.
202 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

DoD and JNACC personnel participating in the ice cleanup after Broken Arrow incident at

Thule, Greenland, 1968.

incident and the Thule incident. JNACC

personnel assisted in the recovery of contaminated debris and provided technical

assistance and advice to the troops on the

ground. DASA established an emergency response team for future accidents as

a result of the Palomares accident.91

In the wake of Palomares and Thule,

Secretary McNamara ordered SAC to discontinue its policy of full peacetime airborne alerts, with its near-border flights of

nuclear-armed aircraft. He also discontinued the Chrome Dome exercise a few days

after the Thule Broken Arrow incident.92

Nevertheless, refueling B-52s from KC135 tankers remained an extremely dangerous procedure. Earlier, on October 15,

1959, a B-52 bomber collided with a KC135 tanker near Hardinsberg, Kentucky, resulting in the death of eight crewmen

aboard the two aircraft and two nuclear

weapons falling to earth. The two unarmed

weapons were recovered intact. One had

been burned, but this did not result in dispersion of nuclear material or other contamination.93

The high state of nuclear readiness

that resulted from the national defense

policy of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations through this period had

reshaped DASA’s responsibilities. Operation Chrome Dome was only the most

dramatic and best known program requiring that nuclear weapons be kept aloft. It

was almost inevitable that accidents

would occur; when they did, DASA-led
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 203

teams flew to the spot to assist. Locating

weapons overseas to put them credibly

close to their probable targets for use in a

nuclear war also engaged the agency in

designing and testing viable permissive

action systems to prevent misuse of the

weapons.

REPORTING AND TRAINING

DASA’s responsibilities for keeping

cadres well informed expanded greatly

because of the high state of nuclear preparedness and the involvement of all the

military Services in managing and transporting nuclear weapons. Literally thousands of people had a genuine “need to

know” about nuclear weapons technology, policy, safety, and handling.

DASA scientists convened symposia

and conferences that individuals from all

over the American nuclear establishment

attended. Some conferences that involved

non-classified material even met on an

international basis. For example, in October of 1963, DASA personnel participated in the Nuclear Detonations and

Marine Radioactivity Conference held in

Norway, in another conference on the

Biological Effects of Neutron Irradiation

held at Brookhaven Laboratory in New

York, and in a Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program meeting in London.94

Personnel from DASA regularly conducted classified “briefings” for groups

including SAC, the President’s Scientific

Advisory Committee, and the Office of

Science and Technology Policy of the

Executive Office of the President.95

The establishment of the Limited Test

Ban demonstrated the importance of a

thorough review of already-conducted

tests, although such a historical or retrospective study of data ran counter to the

experimental culture of the nuclear scientific community. Yet, without the ability

to conduct further atmospheric tests, the

data from the last tests had to be carefully and thoroughly reviewed. Accordingly, in early November 1963, DASA held

an “Operation FISH BOWL Review Symposium” in Chicago attended by 500 visitors from military organizations and the

nuclear industry. Its purpose was to summarize the latest results and theories derived from Operation FISH BOWL, the

series of tests conducted in 1962-63. The

symposium was composed of five separate sessions: phenomenology; trapped radiation in the Van Allen belt; disturbed

ionosphere, and its implications on communications; radar blackout; and thermal

and blast effects.

Along the same lines, project officers

and technical people prepared reports

from other prior experiments and sent

them to DASA headquarters. A conference on measurements of a 1962 test,

SMALL BOY, focused on questions involving interpretation and analysis measurements of the time dependence of the

gamma ray intensities.

Tests at Tonopah, Nevada, had included Operation ROLLER COASTER, a series of three one-point safety detonations

conducted in May and June of 1963.

ROLLER COASTER’s objective was to

define plutonium dispersal after an accidental explosion of the high explosive in

a weapon, information that proved useful

later at both Thule and Palomares.96

Through 1964 and 1965, DASA scientific and technical personnel issued a

dramatically increasing number of reports, scientific papers, and other publications devoted to radiation effects.

Subjects ranged from studies of x-ray

spectra of shots in prior tests, to studies

of electromagnetic blackouts, simulation

of EMP, studies of effects on radar, missiles, semiconductors, satellites, and other equipment, and the effects of various

kinds of shielding. The agency issued

many reports quantifying non-radiation

nuclear phenomena, to include fire prop-
204 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

agation, debris scattering, ground shock

measurement, blast effects on concrete

and other structures, and a wide range of

retrospective studies of the last atmospheric tests. Such selective subjects only

hint at the extensive and intensive work

being conducted through the mid-1960s

on these and other effects.

DASA’s reports demonstrated that its

responsibilities in scientific and technical

areas had grown to include a range of specializations in a very short period. These

reports concentrated on a combination of

basic scientific and measurement information on the one hand, and on very practical technological information about the

effects of weapons on materials, equipment, weapons, communications systems,

and structures on the other hand. Like the

symposia and the briefings, the reports

served to disseminate knowledge and

findings to a broader audience.97

By the late 1960s, the training programs that AFSWP had initiated years

before had burgeoned into a large-scale

school with hundreds of faculty and thousands of graduates. The training programs

were conducted within the Atomic Weapons Training Group building at Field

Command, which was later renamed Interservice Nuclear Weapons School and

more recently, Defense Nuclear Weapons

School. The subject matter taught eventually expanded into the fields of nuclear

weapon assembly, maintenance, nuclear

hazards, safety, emergency demolition,

post-graduate scientific courses, and DoD

orientation and familiarization courses.

Equally important were the courses sponsored by DASA at many of the Service

schools, particularly the Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey and the Air Force

Institute of Technology in Dayton. In addition, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory in Albuquerque became an important

source of highly trained technical Air

Force officers who frequently continued

on to staff positions in Headquarters and

Test Command.

The training program conducted by

the Field Command expanded greatly,

burgeoning into an institution the size of

a major vocational school or community

college, variously nicknamed by its students as “Nuclear U.,” “The Vault,” or,

even more ironically, “the Kremlin.”

Lodged in a heavily guarded, windowless

building with only one door, the students

faced intensive work schedules. No classroom notes could be taken away, and all

course materials and notes would be

locked in classified-material safes overnight. By the mid-1960s, the school had

a curriculum of specialized courses, some

3,500-4,000 graduates per year, and a staff

of about 300 instructors and administrative personnel to handle the teaching, registration, security, and logistics side of the

courses.98

By far, the 37-hour Weapons Orientation-Advanced (WOA) program proved

itself the most important and largest single course. This course graduated about

500 students per six-month period and

engaged officers with the rank of major

or above in the Army or Air Force, or lieutenant commander or above in the Navy.

The WOA course brought these officers

together with senior civil servants and

provided them an intensive briefing on

nuclear weapons and their effects. Using

a program of lectures and DoD-developed

motion pictures, students reviewed national weapons policy and strategy, the

history of nuclear weapons and their effects, and the types of weapons deployed.

This “big picture” course, in a fairly typical six-month period (July-December

1966), ran five separate times, graduating

more than 300 officers and 190 civilians.

The school also offered many technical courses, including these specializations: Army Nuclear Weapons Officer,

Army Nuclear Weapons Electronics Spe-
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 205

cialist, Calibration and Electronics, Nuclear Emergency Team, Navy Nuclear

Weapons Electronic Calibration and

Maintenance, and Nuclear Weapons

Maintenance.

The technical courses included classroom instruction on detector fundamentals, dosimetry, radiation detectors, and

nuclear weapons fire fighting. Field work

included detection exercises for betagamma detection, as well as nuclear emergency team exercises.99

In addition to Army and Navy Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) courses in these nuclear areas, the weapons

school established a number of “transitional” courses that provided a holding

class while students awaited arrival of

their security clearances. Other transitional courses served as preparatory classes

to bring students up to the entry-level

technical expectations of the more advanced work.100 Although the school

modified the curriculum through the

1960s, it consistently offered the core of

material for technical qualification of enlisted servicemen and of some civilians

through the later years of the decade.

Military demands of responding to accidents, managing the stockpile, testing

weapons, and maintaining a headquarters

staff with a good understanding of policy

required a steady flow of about 3,000

trained individuals every year from the

school.

The nuclear weapons school also operated a Motion Picture Production Division that engaged in constant development

of a variety of training and documentary

films in conjunction with personnel from

Sandia Base. In addition, the school ran a

publications and visual aids department

that generated slides and prints for instructional purposes and that printed and bound

its own technical manuals. A small staff

kept up a technical reference library that

instructional staff and students used.

By the end of the decade, DASA had

become a large enterprise, serving the

nuclear weapons establishment not only

Entrance to Field Command’s Atomic Weapons Training Group building (Nuclear U), later

renamed Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) at Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, New

Mexico.
206 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

with research and development and effects testing but also with a significant

educational infrastructure to ensure that

the information flowed to those with a

need to know. Harold Brown’s and Robert McNamara’s support for invigorated

communication of knowledge had resulted in channeling expert nuclear knowledge not only up through the chain of

command to policy makers but down

through the chain of command to the civilian technical specialists and the enlisted men who took care of the day-to-day

mechanical aspects of the weapons program.

ARMED FORCES

RADIOBIOLOGY RESEARCH

INSTITUTE

By DoD Directive 5154.16, issued

May 12, 1961, McNamara established the

Armed Forces Radiobiology Research

Institute (AFRRI). The Directive came to

be regarded as the Institute’s “charter.”

The basic mission of the Institute was to

conduct scientific research in the field of

radiobiology in support of the U.S. military and for national welfare and general

human well being. The rationale for the

establishment of AFRRI was based on two

realities of the late 1950s and early 1960s;

one: the threat scenario of numerous Soviet infantry divisions overcoming the

German Fulda Gap defenses and overtaking Europe, and two: the use of nuclear

weapons, particularly enhanced weapons

rich in neutron output, to halt such a European invasion force. Since there was no

DoD or DOE research laboratory at that

time that had reactor or other neutron

sources as an integral part of its research

facilities, AFFRI was constructed around

an existing, state-of-the-art Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomic

(TRIGA) nuclear reactor, which had the

capability of pulsing and thereby partially simulating the radiation characteristics

of a nuclear weapon. The institute was

located at the National Naval Medical

Center in Bethesda, Maryland, and governed by a Board of Governors consisting of the Chief of DASA as Chairman,

and the three Surgeons General of the military Services.

In July of 1964, by DoD Directive

5105.31, DASA was charged with command and administrative control over

AFRRI, a role it and its successor agencies continued to play over the next three

decades, until 1993 when it came under

the control of the Uniformed Services

University of the Health Sciences. AFRRI officially became an operational field

element of DASA by a further directive

in November of 1964.101

On a budget which ran in the range

of $2 to $3 million per year through the

1960s, the Institute built on its original

base. In addition to administrative and

support departments, five research departments carried on basic scientific and medical research. The Experimental

Pathology Department studied the pathologic effects of ionizing radiation. The Behavioral Sciences Department worked in

several areas of fundamental research

with special emphasis on the applied area

of psychological effects of radiation and

noxious agents. The Physical Sciences

Department contained several divisions.

One worked with the TRIGA experimental reactor, and another with linear accelerators. A Chemistry Division, a

Radiological Physics Division, and a Theoretical Division, all formed the basis for

later expansion. The Radiation Biology

Department worked on both basic and

fundamental research, with a core of principal investigators focusing on several research projects. The primary emphasis of

the Department was to provide information to the Department of Defense on the

deleterious effects of ionizing radiation.102
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 207

AFRRI made many contributions in

the open literature through the 1960s in

the area of the biological effects of ionizing radiation of different types and doses. The Institute investigated the

incapacitating doses of radiation and the

biological responses to radiation. Studies

with rats, monkeys, dogs, mice, and other animals helped establish the effects of

radiation on nerves, the central nervous

system, the blood system, and other tissues and organs.

The Board of Governors of AFRRI

usually met twice a year. With turnover

of Surgeons General and Directors of

DASA, staff at AFRRI would conduct

tours and familiarize the new board members with the research activities of the

Institute. A 1965 review, for example,

covered four research program areas: role

of bacteria in radiation injury; radiation

studies; depth dose evaluation, and “behavioral incapacitation following lethal

radiation exposure.”103 Through papers at

conferences, published journal articles

and AFRRI reports, investigators disseminated their findings.104

AFRRI signed Memoranda of Understanding with several universities, working with the Catholic University of

America in Washington and with the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine in radiobiology and cancer research.

AFRRI also entered into inter-agency

agreements with a number of government

agencies, colleges, and corporations, sharing resources and equipment on a variety

of research projects related to radiation,

exposure, and basic medical research.105

By the late 1960s, the staff size had

stabilized at 241 authorized positions, and

the research program had become quite

varied. Although AFRRI remained structured as a field activity of DASA, it continued to operate as an independent

Institute, sponsoring research on the radiation effects on biological systems.

CHANGES ON THE HORIZON

For DASA, 1968 witnessed another

command change; Vice Admiral Lloyd

M. Mustin, former Navy Deputy and

Commander of Joint Task Force 8, replaced General Donnelly as DASA Director on August 1, 1968. There were also

changes on the national horizon. The inauguration of President Nixon in January

of 1969 marked significant change in policies established during the Johnson administration. However, much of the

practice and structure that the DoD had

established for DASA in the 1960s continued into this next period. Yet, increasingly in the late 1960s, the Services

rankled at the loss of control over nuclear

testing, nuclear training, and the nuclear

stockpile that had been within their grasp

in 1959 when the JCS had established

DASA. McNamara and Brown had wrested away that control, and the Services had

some practical reasons to be concerned.

In particular, officers in the separate

Services appeared to resist DASA’s conVice Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin, USN,

DASA Director 1968 to 1971.
208 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

Organizational Chart of Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), July 1969.

DIRECTOR, DASA

RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 

OFFICE (RMO)

ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT (ADM) RADIOLOGICAL & INDUSTRIAL

SAFETY DEPARTMENT (SAF)

LOGISTICS

DEPARTMENT (LOG)

DIRECTOR, AFRRI (DIR)

MILITARY ANALYSIS

DEPARTMENT (MAL)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

OPERATIONS (DDO)

ADMINISTRATIVE 

 SERVICES, DIV. (ADSV)

SECURITY DIV. (ADSC)

LIBRARY DIV. (ADLD)

GRAPHIC SERVICES 

 DIV. (ADGD)

OPERATIONAL HEALTH 

 PHYSICS (SAHP)

RADIOLOGICAL 

 ENGINEERING DIV. 

 (SARE)

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

 DIV. (SAIS)

SUPPLY DIV. (LOGS)

ENGINEERING SUPPORT 

 DIV. (LOES)

FACILITIES DIV. (LOGF)

TELEVISION DIV. (LOTV)
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 209

PUBLICATIONS

OFFICE (DDSP)

Organization Chart

ARMED FORCES

RADIOBIOLOGY 

RESEARCH INSTITUTE

(AFRRI)

JULY 1969

SPECIAL STAFF 

OFFICE (DSA)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SCIENTIFIC (DDS)

VETERINARY SUPPORT 

OFFICE (VSO)

ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR (DDSA)

BEHAVIORIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT (BHS)

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT (PSD)

RADIATION BIOLOGY

DEPARTMENT (RAB)

EXPERIMENTAL PATHOLOGY

DEPARTMENT (EXP)

PROJECT GROUP I (EXP-1)

PROJECT GROUP II (EXP-2)

PROJECT GROUP III (EXP-3)

PROJECT GROUP IV (EXP-4)

PROJECT GROUP I (BHS-1)

PROJECT GROUP II (BHS-2)

PROJECT GROUP III (BHS-3)

PROJECT GROUP IV (BHS-4)

SUPPORT GROUP (GHS-5)

PROJECT GROUP I (RAB-1)

PROJECT GROUP II (RAB-2)

PROJECT GROUP III (RAB-3)

PROJECT GROUP IV (RAB-4)

REACTOR DIV. (PSRD)

ACCELERATOR DIV. (PSAD)

RADIOLOGICAL PHYSICS 

 DIV. (PSRP)

CHEMISTRY DIV. (PSCH)

MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 

 DIV. (PSMA)
210 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

trol over weapon development programs

that the Services initiated. Every weapon

program had its project or program office

that focused on the development of that

particular weapons system. Officers

would devote years of their lives to overseeing a weapon system through the pitfalls of technology, testing, funding, and

opposition. Any obstacle in the way of a

weapon’s development could play into the

hands of the “Antis,” those who opposed

the development.

At DASA, the officers in charge of

testing had a difficult, and even controversial, role. Once the JCS directive was

promulgated in 1966, DASA had to determine the conditions under which particular weapon systems would likely fail.

For example, some Naval officers refused

to believe that the nose cones on their reentry vehicles would degrade under the

effects of x rays and other radiation fluences. When confronted with the data,

they could only believe it would inhibit,

delay, and possibly even kill their program. Nevertheless, DASA test scientists

insisted that the results be fully reported.106

DASA testing through the 1960s had

yielded what the test community came to

call “surprises,” that is, determinations

that a weapon or other system under development or already in deployment was

extremely vulnerable to a particular weapon effect and would need to be re-engineered. A RAND study of DASA noted

that although the specific nature of the

“surprises” remained classified, it was a

general fact that a “high rate” of such surprises characterized DASA work in the

1960s. Weapons systems were constantly hardened and upgraded to address the

findings of the tests.107

Several specific yet unexpected results requiring follow-on action turned up

in the Minuteman III, its Mark 12 and

Mark 12A reentry vehicles, the Spartan

ABM system, the Polaris Mark 2 Mod 2

reentry body, the Poseidon C3 Mark 3

reentry body, and the Trident C4 Mark 4

reentry body. The “unexpected results” in

some of these weapon systems would

have constituted major system failures if

occurring operationally. Before these systems were deployed, however, the Services addressed the issues through additional

hardening and retesting.108

TRANSITION

Early in his administration, President

Nixon and his Secretary of Defense,

Melvin Laird, appointed a Blue Ribbon

Defense Panel to examine the operation

of the Department of Defense. The panel

consisted of 16 prominent individuals,

drawn largely from corporate and academic leadership positions. Corporate

viewpoints were provided by Chief Executive Officers and Board Chairmen

from Caterpillar Tractor, Teledyne, and

TRW, and by Hobart Lewis of Reader’s

Digest. Their views were balanced by the

insights of Lane Kirkland of the AFLCIO, and academics from Columbia, Princeton, and the University of Chicago. The

panel began its study in the summer of

1969 and issued its report on July 1, 1970.

It concluded that excessive concentration

of managerial responsibility at the level

of the Secretary of Defense had impaired

the operation of the department. In effect,

the panel offered a stinging criticism of

McNamara and the widely resented development of “Whiz Kid” control that had

taken place over the 1960s, both in budgetary and technical areas. The panel explicitly criticized the growth of large

civilian and military staffs, and much of

the report focused on undoing many of

Harold Brown’s accomplishments.109

In reference to DASA, the report became quite specific and biting in its charges and recommendations, suggesting that

its extensive headquarters and staffing
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 211

would no longer be required. With each

of the new weapon systems being developed by the Services now being designed

to meet nuclear weapon effects specifications, and with each Service developing

its own cadre of nuclear experts, times and

conditions had changed. “The conditions,” the Panel noted, “which led to the

assignment of most of the functions initially assigned to DASA no longer exist.”

Two functions remained relevant in 1970,

the Panel admitted: stockpile oversight

and weapons effects test coordination.

“The scope of the two unique functional

capabilities of DASA,” the report concluded on this point, “no longer justifies

the continuation of the administrative

overhead load inherent in a Defense

Agency.” In effect, it seemed to some reviewers, that the panel was calling for the

disbanding of DASA, or at least its downgrading from defense agency status.110

Many within the agency agreed that

DASA had become top-heavy with administrative overhead. Some military personnel stationed at the Field Command

had begged for reassignment, frankly admitting that they reported to work with

nothing to do.111 Clearly, DASA could cut

some of the fat without endangering the

central mission. Once again, as the agency entered a new decade, it would face the

challenges of reorganization and clarification of mission.
212 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

ENDNOTES

1. Dr. Frederick Wikner, interview by Rodney P. Carlisle, September 25, 1997.

2. Charles P. McCormick, The Power of

People, New York: Harper and Brothers,

1949. McCormick’s work was an influential management book through the

1950s, advocating that older models of

management as top-down enforcement of

rules be abandoned in favor of various

methods of tapping the talents of lower

ranking individuals in organizations.

3. Luttwak, Strategic Power, pp. 20-21.

4. Ibid., p. 36.

5. Figures from Luttwak, Strategic Power,

p. 20.

6. The expansion of weapons and delivery

systems during the 1960s as the greatest

of the cold war is asserted in the official

publication: Donald P. Steury, Intentions

and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet

Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington, DC: 1996, Center for the Study of

Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency), p. 223.

7. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity,

p. 151.

8. Ibid., p. 164.

9. Ibid., p. 165.

10. Luttwak, Strategic Power, pp. 20-23.

11. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity, pp.

168-69.

12. For a discussion on the Nike-X, see

Moulton, From Superiority to Parity,

pp. 177-79.

13. Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the

Nuclear Age, New York, 1986, p. 57.

14. Ibid., p. 58.

15. Ibid., p. 65.

16. Ibid., p. 66. Henry Kissinger, President

Nixon’s National Security Officer, also

shared the same regret at the development

and deployment of MIRVed missiles.

17. Edgar M. Bottome, The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race, 1st ed.,

Boston, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 128.

18. Ibid., p. 132.

19. As quoted in William R. Harris, Defense

Nuclear Responsibilities: From the

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

to the Defense Nuclear Agency, 1947-

1971, RAND Study draft: DRR-1285-

DNA, February 1996, p. 125.

20. Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States, Ithaca, New

York, 1992, p. 210; Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 125.

21. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, p. 211.

22. Freeman J. Dyson, Weapons and Hope,

1st ed. New York, 1984, pp. 272-73.

23. W. B. Foster, “Introduction to Panel of

8th Institute on Research Administration

at the American University in April

1963,” Records of the Office of the DNL,

R.C. 3-1, Series 4, Acc. #82-18, Box 14,

folder entitled Task 97: Enhancement of

DoD In-House R & D, Naval Historical

Center.

24. U.S. Congress, Senate, Report to the

President on Government Contracting for

Research and Development, S. Doc. 94,

87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, Bureau of the

Budget, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1962,

pp. 21-22.

25. Wikner interview; Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 91. Other internal

agency documents from the period and

from later stress the McMillan Committee as providing the intellectual framework for reform, ignoring the broader

push of Harold Brown to affect such reforms throughout the Defense establishment. See, for example, Defense Special

Weapons Agency, 1947-1997, The First

50 Years of National Service, DSWA

Printing (FCDSWA), Albuquerque, New

Mexico, 1997, p. 15.

26. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities,

pp. 100-101.

27. Defense Atomic Support Agency, History of the Defense Atomic Support Agency, 1959-1969, Part 2 - Headquarters,

Chapter 6 - Plans and Operations, pp. 53-

63.

28. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 81.

29. A copy of this charter is reproduced in

RAND Corporation, Charters and Directives for the Defense Nuclear Agency and
A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970 213

Predecessor Organizations, 1947-1971,

RAND Study draft DRR-xxxx-DNA,

April 1994, document number 10.

30. RAND Corporation, Charters and Directives, Documents 10 and 12; Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 103.

31. Admiral Robert Monroe, interview by

Rodney P. Carlisle, September 24, 1997,

p. 4.

32. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 91.

33. Ibid., pp. 91, 10; H. L. Brode, “Partial

History of the DNA Scientific Advisory

Group on Effects (And Its Predecessors)”

(Los Angeles, July 1989), Pacific Sierra

Research Corporation report 197, as cited in Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 91.

34. Wikner interview.

35. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 104.

36. The text of 5105.31 giving authority over

AFRRI and JNACC is found in DASA,

History of DASA, 1959-1969, as an appendix to Vol. 1.

37. DASA: History of DASA, 1959-1969, appendix to Vol. 1; Robert Brittigan, interview by Rodney Carlisle, October 24,

1997.

38. For a description of Taylor’s varied interests and his changing positions on nuclear issues, see John McPhee, The Curve

of Binding Energy, New York, 1973.

39. Wikner interview.

40. Biography, U.S. Air Force, DTL 070 289.

41. Ibid. The test record during this period

reflects many of the reforms Wikner discussed. See Defense Nuclear Agency,

Operations Flintlock and Latchkey,

Events Red Hot, Pin Stripe, Discus

Thrower, Pile Driver, Double Play, Newpoint, Midi Mist, March 5, 1966 - June

26, 1967, DNA Report 6321F, Kirtland

AFB, New Mexico.

42. Wikner interview.

43. Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-

1997, p. 15.

44. Purposes of tests through this period are

summarized in DNA operations reports

6321F, 6322F, and 6325F.

45. Wikner interview.

46. Ibid.

47. DASA, History of DASA, 1947-1971,

Part 2, Headquarters, Chapter 8–Weapons Effects and Tests, Section 8-3–Radiation, DSWA Technical Resource Center,

34 (hereafter: DASA: History of DASA,

Part 2, Chapter 8).

48. DASA: History of DASA, Part 2, Chapter 8, p. 32.

49. Dr. Marv Atkins, interview by Rodney P.

Carlisle, October 10, 1997.

50. DASA: History of DASA, Part 2, Chapter 8, pp. 45, 66.

51. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

52. Operations Flintlock and Latchkey, p.

127; Wikner interview.

53. Ibid.; Monroe interview, pp. 8-10.

54. DASA: History of DASA, Part 2, Chapter 8, p. 68.

55. Ibid., p. 69.

56. Telephone conversation, R. Carlisle with

John Lewis, September 25, 1998.

57. Atkins interview.

58. General observations regarding the evolution of testing and testing procedures

through the period derived from review

of DNA operations reports 6321F, 6322F,

and 6325F.

59. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Anvil, Cresset, Tinderbox, and Guardian,

Events Husky Pup, Mighty Epic, Hybla

Gold, Diablo Hawk, Huron King, and

Miners Iron, October 24, 1975 -October

31, 1980, DNA Report 6325F (Kirtland

AFB, New Mexico, 1989), pp. 20-21.

60. Operations Anvil and Cresset, pp. 10-11.

61. Ibid., p. 12.

62. See Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations

Crosstie and Bowline, Events Door Mist,

Dorsal Fin, Milk Shake, Diana Moon,

Hudson Seal, and Ming Vase, August 31,

1967 - November 20, 1968, DNA Report

6322F, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico,

1985, pp. 43-44. For reasons that DoD

test crews switched to tunnels and for information on how pipe and other equipment were reused, see Operations

Crosstie and Bowline, p. 140.

63. Atkins interview.

64. Operations Flintlock and Latchkey, p. 46.

65. Wikner interview.
214 A NEW PARADIGM, 1963 TO 1970

66. Operations Flintlock and Latchkey, p. 96.

67. Ibid., pp. 103-104.

68. Ibid., pp. 103-110.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 105.

71. Ibid., p. 110.

72. Ibid.

73. Shaun Gregory, The Hidden Cost of Deterrence: Nuclear Weapon Accidents,

Washington, D.C., 1990, pp. 27-30.

74. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 90.

75. Gregory, Hidden Cost of Deterrence, pp.

27-30; Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, pp. 63-64, 90.

76. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities, p. 90.

77. Gregory, Hidden Cost of Deterrence, pp.

27-28.

78. Ibid., pp. 28-29. PAL Category B production is discussed in DASA, History of

DASA, 1959-1969, Part 1, Chapter 3, pp.

113-14, 134, 157-58, and 186.

79. Gregory, Hidden Cost of Deterrence, p.

30.

80. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, p. 207.

81. Ibid., p. 208.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., p. 39; Gregory, Hidden Cost of Deterrence, p. 33.

84. Ibid., p. 26; Defense Nuclear Agency,

Palomares Summary Report: Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, Technology and Analysis Directorate, Kirtland

Air Force Base, New Mexico, Accession

#NV0067458, Department of Energy,

Nevada Coordination and Information

Center, p. 13.

85. Ibid., pp. 13-24.

86. Ibid., p. 191.

87. For a full narrative account of this accident, see Tad Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, New York, 1967. For details on

the public relations situation, see pp. 168-

77, 214-18.

88. Defense Nuclear Agency, Palomares

Summary Report, p. 17.

89. Gregory, Hidden Cost of Deterrence, p.

26.

90. Ibid., p. 164.

91. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities,

p. 70.

92. Gregory, Hidden Cost of Deterrence, pp.

163-64.

93. Ibid., p. 167.

94. History of DASA, Part 2, Chapter 8, p.

33.

95. Ibid., p. 34.

96. Ibid., p. 31.

97. DASA: History of DASA, Part 2, Chapter 8, pp. 74, 77-79, 97-99.

98. William Harnin, “Privates and Generals

Study A-Bomb,” Popular Mechanics,

August, 1956, pp. 110-12, 210.

99. Defense Atomic Support Agency, Semiannual Historical Report of Atomic

Weapons Training Group, July 1 - December 31 1966, DSWA Technical Resource Center (unpaginated).

100. DASA, Semiannual Historical Report,

p. 30.

101. DoD Directive 5105.33, dated November 20, 1964, as cited in Armed Forces

Radiobiology Research Institute, Command Historical Report for calendar year

1964, dated January 28, 1965.

102. AFRRI, “Functional Statements,” no

date, c. 1965.

103. “Historical Report,” July 1 - December

31 1965, AFRRI SP66-18, January 1966,

p. 1.

104. “Historical Report,” AFRRI, SP66-22,

July 1966, p. 26.

105. “Historical Report” July 1 - December 31

1967, AFRRI SP68-1.

106. Wikner interview; Monroe interview.

107. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities,

pp. 109-11.

108. Harris, Defense Nuclear Responsibilities,

pp. 110-13, 115.

109. Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, et al., Report to the

President and the Secretary of Defense

on the Department of Defense by the Blue

Ribbon Defense Panel, July 1, 1970

(Washington, D.C., 1970), iii, 1 (hereafter Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report).

110. Fitzhugh, Blue Ribbon Defense Panel

Report, 43-44; Atkins interview.

111. Atkins interview.
“

CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE

The basic changes in American popular values in the late 1960s and the early

1970s affected many questions central to

the very existence of the Department of

Defense and DASA. Americans changed

their views of the federal government in

general, of the Executive branch, of the

conduct of international affairs, and of the

military Services. Americans had even

come to mistrust the triumphs of “Yankee ingenuity,” long a mainstay of American pride and self-confidence. That

confidence in technology had reached a

culmination in the early Apollo project of

the 1960s, a confidence that quickly

waned by the mid-1970s.

This crisis of confidence had been

mounting for several years. But for agencies of government attempting to meet

their established missions, the change in

public perception and in Congressional

attitude occurred in a very short span of

years, and the change would directly affect the mission of DASA. In 1969, Congress had rallied to support a wide variety

of national defense and technologyrelated efforts; whereas by 1974, after

Vietnam and Watergate, there was a different Congress, with new demands and

expectations.

A host of new public issues impinged

on the agency’s areas of responsibility.

Clearly, DASA would have to find “another way” of doing business in this decade of change. Concern with the

exposure of individuals to radiation, that

sprang from the new levels of suspicion

of government and from new levels of

concern with the impact of science and

technology upon public health and the environment, led to examination of radiation exposure experienced by the

“downwinders,” residents in Utah and

Nevada affected by fallout from early atmospheric testing at NTS. However, the

AEC, not DASA, bore the brunt of most

of those particular nuclear-related concerns.

Congress reorganized the AEC in

1975, partly in response to such issues.

To many in Congress it seemed no longer

CHAPTER SIX

ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

We shall continue, in this era of negotiation, to work for the limitation

of nuclear arms, and to reduce the danger of confrontation between

the great powers. Let us build a structure of peace in the world...”

President Richard M. Nixon,

Second Inaugural Address,

January 20, 1973
216 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

appropriate that the agency promoting

nuclear power should engage in regulating it. As a consequence, the research and

development side of nuclear weapons and

nuclear power became the core of one new

agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), while

another new agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) took on the function of regulating nuclear energy. In 1978,

Congress established the Department of

Energy (DOE), which took over the functions of ERDA.

PACKARD COMMISSION

AND AGENCY REORGANIZATION

As controversies related to nuclear

weapons and nuclear research mounted,

DASA did not emerge entirely unscathed.

Initially, DASA’s functions had been

slightly reduced as a result of the Blue

Ribbon Defense Panel (BRDP) recommendations contained within the Packard

Commission report. On March 29, 1971,

to be effective on July 1, 1971, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard,

directed that DASA be reorganized. He

retained DASA, with reduced responsibilities and a new title, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). On January 1, 1972,

DNA disestablished the Test Command

and transferred its personnel to Field

Command, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Test Directorate at Field Command took over direction of field

operations for nuclear weapon effects

tests, with Headquarters, DASA, retaining test planning activities.1

Packard spelled out the specific

changes that would accompany the transformation of DASA into DNA. Initially,

DNA functions would be limited to nuclear weapon management, nuclear weapon testing, and nuclear weapon effects

research; second, in Albuquerque, the

Kirtland Air Force Base, the Sandia Base

and the Manzano Base would be consolidated under Air Force control; third, the

military Departments would take full responsibility for nuclear training; and

fourth, host-manager responsibilities at

Johnston Atoll would remain with the Air

Force.2

Even though the Packard Commission

had suggested transfer of the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, the

agency retained the medical research facility. As Admiral Mustin pointed out,

AFRRI began to make more progress

under DASA administration, in terms of

research and development results, than it

had under Navy administration prior to

1964. After presenting this argument to

David Packard, Mustin claimed, the Deputy Secretary decided to retain AFRRI

under DNA control. Mustin argued that

the “Mansfield Amendment,” that prohibited the Armed Services from sponsoring

research that did not have a military application, precluded AFRRI from undertaking broad-based radiological basic

research. With a focus on military applications under DNA, AFRRI would conLieutenant General Caroll H. Dunn, DNA

Director 1971 to 1973.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 217

form to the letter and spirit of the Mansfield Amendment.3

Stockpile responsibility of the agency now consisted of inspection of units

of the Services that actually held the

weapons to ensure safe practices. Conduct

of nuclear effects tests, in the range of one

or two per year, continued as another

DNA responsibility. However, with the

ability to mount numerous effects tests at

the same time, and with the increase in

technical know-how, underground testing

became more routine. As weapon system

engineers developed experience and understanding of nuclear weapon effects, designing various forms of hardening also

became more routine. The Joint Service

training function of DNA had been transferred to the individual Services, further

reducing the scale of the agency’s operations. The Joint Service training activity

at Field Command was transferred to the

Air Force.4

The changeover from DASA to DNA

took place in several steps. In fiscal

year 1970-71, the Sandia Base Hospital

transferred from DASA to the Department

of the Army, and JTF-8 was dissolved.

JTF-8 had maintained a staff of 55 military personnel at Johnston Atoll to manage the facility. Johnston Atoll, which was

held in readiness by the Air Force for possible use if atmospheric testing were to

be resumed, would continue under Air

Force control. Administration of the Atoll

was assumed by DNA in 1973 primarily

due to “Safeguard C” testing requirements.

The reorganization plan for

DASA—developed during the 1970-1971

timeframe—went into effect in 1971-

1972. The official establishment of DNA

took place in a charter issued November

3, 1971. With the transfer of stockpile,

training, and other responsibilities from

DASA to the Services, the agency staff

fell from about 6,500 in 1969 at DASA,

to about 1,200 in 1973 at DNA.5 The rapid drop in personnel largely resulted from

the transfer of the responsibility to provide guards and personnel at each of the

stockpile sites. As Admiral Mustin pointed out to Congress in 1971, the agency

staff had been drastically reduced from its

peak year in 1959, as shown in Table 6-1.

The transfer of stockpile responsibility

alone had reduced DASA by half by 1970-

1971, even before the conversion to the

new organization of DNA.6

DNA: THE NEW

POLICY CLIMATE

DNA thus became a leaner agency

with a lower profile in the Services than

DASA. The changing climate of values

and policies affected the mission and

agenda of the agency in a number of other major ways through the decade. Early

in the 1970s, concern with the effect of

nuclear weapon tests on public health,

arising from the “downwinder” cases, increased public concern for two other

groups of individuals: the Pacific Islanders who had been displaced during nuclear

weapon testing on Bikini and Enewetak,

and the military and civilians who had

attended the above-ground tests in the

Pacific and in Nevada.

Table 6-1. Agency Staffing, Civilian and Military, 1959 to 1973.

1 9 959 1 0 96 1 3 97 197

8 0 ,760 6 1 ,50 4 0 ,08 1,20
218 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

As the organizational heirs of the Joint

Task Forces that operated the Pacific and

Nevada tests, DNA inherited the task of

addressing the concerns of test participants. The changing international attitudes toward nuclear weapons also

affected the responsibilities of DNA. With

detente came a series of arms control

agreements, limiting the scale of underground nuclear testing, the deployment of

ABM systems, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries, and the emplacement of nuclear weapons in new

environments by the existing nucleararmed countries. The ABM Treaty of 1972

achieved the limitation on ABM systems

that McNamara had sought in the mid1960s. Without an anti-missile defense of

fixed U.S. strategic missile sites, alternate

forms of protecting American missiles by

making them more survivable became attractive, leading planners to work on alternative basing systems.

Continued pressure for nuclear arms

limitation and for limitation on testing

generated a movement for a comprehensive test ban. Leaders at DNA and elsewhere in the defense establishment

questioned whether the United States

should enter a comprehensive test ban;

many believed such a ban could place the

whole weapon development program in

jeopardy. Vice Admiral Monroe later argued that the United States would be unable to maintain a credible nuclear

deterrent without a sustained weapons’

improvement and test program. Peter

Haas and Ed Conrad, both Deputy Directors (Science and Technology) under

Monroe, and responsible for the preparation of the agency’s Congressional testimony, developed arguments for weapon

effects testing of strategic systems and forwarded them to the DDR&E and Congressional staffs. Advocates of continued

testing within and outside the agency believed that a comprehensive test ban

would represent unilateral nuclear disarmament and placed U.S. strategic systems

at unacceptable risk. Their efforts to forestall the test ban prevailed and, in part,

made possible the validation of the nuclear hardness of U.S. strategic systems.

Despite adjustment to new national

priorities, continuing responsibilities and

established trends still drove DNA’s policy. Technological progress, particularly

due to integrated electronic circuitry and

the development of faster and smaller

computer components, aided the development of new and enhanced weapons. Although the number of nuclear weapons

developed in the 1970s declined from the

previous decade, two new warheads and

a new missile went from the development

laboratories to DNA for effects and vulnerability testing before entering the arsenal. The move to mobile launching

system concepts spawned a series of tests

of underground structures, tunnels,

trenches, and communication systems.

The advent of the B-1 manned bomber

Lieutenant General Warren Johnson, DNA

Director 1973 to 1977.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 219

prompted EMP hardness testing of aircraft

designs.

The adoption of a computerized inventory system allowed DNA to instantly check on the location of critical weapon

parts and their currency. Computer simulation of the effects of nuclear weapons

detonated over land brought the realization that unanticipated dirt and dust lofted into the atmosphere could create a new

class of weapons effects that required further study.

THEATER DETERRENCE

AND DEFENSE

The emergence of Soviet nuclear forces in the 1950s shaped a nuclear force

policy and strategy in the U.S. that persisted for decades. Influencing these developments were the operational

experiences of World War II, the unfavorable conventional force balance in postwar Europe, and the leadership required

of the United States for the free world

which was slowly recovering from the

ravages of that war.

The 1950s saw the formulation of offensive nuclear forces for the nation and

its friends and allies, manned aircraft were

the principal means. These strategic forces

were created and matured with the development of new aircraft and new bombs;

later augmented with long-range ballistic

missiles. The U.S. also developed a nuclear-armed, strategic defense force made

up of manned interceptors and surface-toair missiles. With the establishment of

NATO came the decision on the use of

U.S. strategic forces. This policy, in the

late 1950s, was given the name of massive retaliation, although terms like

brinksmanship were used earlier.

Early in NATO’s history, General

Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), along with

his staff, conducted studies to address the

conventional (non-nuclear) defense of

Europe in the face of substantial Soviet

ground forces. In the most comprehensive

of these studies, the Lisbon Planning Conference surfaced the need for at least 90

Army divisions, and approximately

10,000 aircraft, for the conventional defense of Europe. For the most part, the

nations of Europe were largely destroyed

by the war fought there from 1939 to

1946, and Great Britain, although suffering less in the way of physical destruction, had been largely bankrupted by the

war. It was clear that there was a significant gap between the desires of the military planners and what the nations could

provide. When elected President, Eisenhower came to office with these blunt and

disturbing facts in mind.

In his early presidency, Eisenhower

effected a compromise, which included

creating theater nuclear forces. A lower

NATO objective, of approximately 26

ready divisions and 1,400 aircraft, were

set as goals. These would result from the

buildup of national forces, including those

of the Federal Republic of Germany. In

addition, there would be a theater nuclear

force, whose composition would be underwritten entirely by the United States.

This force would be based upon a firepower replacement concept to make up,

with destructive power, the shortfall in

conventional numbers and capabilities. A

coupling was to exist between the strategic and theater nuclear force components.

The overall strategy was one of massive

retaliation. This policy was embodied in

a NATO Military Committee document

“14/2,” sometimes referred to as the

NATO Nuclear Strategy. The operational

concept for all these forces was one that

merged the technical destructive character of nuclear weapons with the successful characteristics of World War II forces.

The 1960s saw substantiated refinements and modernization. These were

focused for more than a decade on the
220 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

DNA Oganizational Chart, 1971.

GENERAL COUNSEL INSPECTOR GENERAL

FIELD COMMAND

ADMINISTRATION & 

PERSONNEL OFFICE

INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY

DIRECTORATE MANPOWER & PERSONNEL 

DIRECTORATE

ARMS CONTROL & 

POLICY OFFICE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

OPERATIONS & ADMINISTRATION

LOGISTICS &

ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE

JOINT ATOMIC

INFORMATION EXCHANGE

GROUP

ACQUISITION

MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE

OPERATIONS

DIRECTORATE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR

CHIEF OF STAFF
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 221

ADDST

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

ADDST

THEORETICAL PHYSICS

BIMEDICAL EFFECTS

DIRECTORATE

NUCLEAR ASSESSMENT

DIRECTORATE

RADIATION

DIRECTORATE

SHOCK PHYSICS

DIRECTORATE

Organization Chart

DEFENSE NUCLEAR

AGENCY (DNA)

1971

COMPTROLLER LIAISON OFFICE

AFRRI

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

ADDST

TEST

ADDST

EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS

TECH INFORMATION

DIRECTORATE
222 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

strategic triad, and intelligence and command central improvements such as early warning and attack assessment

capabilities. During this period, theater

and tactical forces were expanded quantitatively using the previously mentioned

firepower replacement concept.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the

Nixon administration and Congress addressed the need for a more comprehensive strategy to underwrite deterrence and

defense should deterrence fail. The signing of the ABM treaty and the termination of the U.S. strategic defense program

added additional pressure on this strategy. What emerged over the next decade

and a half was profoundly different from

the past. It is important to understand the

differences and the state of the firepower

replacement program as the nation entered

the 1970s.

Theater forces, in the late 1950s, could

be called firepower replacement forces,

since nuclear warheads replaced conventional warheads in conventional combat

systems. In the Army, the missile-based

air defense forces were nuclearized. The

Nike-Hercules and Hawk, the SAM-D,

the predecessor of the Patriot missile, was

intended to be nuclear but political considerations intervened. All of the Army’s

artillery missiles were nuclearized, starting with the Pershing and Sergeant, which

was followed by Lance. Nuclear rounds

were developed for the 280-mm, 203-mm,

and 155-mm artillery systems. The Davy

Crockett was an infantry crew-launched

weapon of low yield, intended to be used

in a close battle environment. Atomic

Demolition Munitions were provided to

the engineers for breaching obstacles and/

or creating obstacles.

In the Air Force, nuclear munitions

were provided for air-delivered bombs

and air-to-air missiles. The Navy experienced a nuclear upgrade in the same sense

of changing conventional lethality mechanisms to nuclear for surface-to-air weapons, surface-to-surface weapons, air-tosurface weapons, and anti-submarine

warfare weapons. Much of this was accomplished by the late 1950s and early

1960s. Doctrine and concepts were developed, although, in many cases, the concept followed the development of the

actual weapons systems.

Doctrinal efforts concentrated on tactical warfighting and were based on the

combination of environment effects and

physical vulnerabilities. DNA provided

response/vulnerability data from field experiments. Efforts to understand the operational and tactical implications took the

form of major experiments such as the

Army’s Oregon Trail, and the reorganization of the Army into a so-called Pentomic Army. At the same time, dispersion

of air bases, for both launch and recovery, was implemented by the Air Force.

The Navy likewise took measures to improve survivability of the fleet at sea.

Toward the end of the 1960s, the

NATO Alliance adopted a new nuclear

strategy called Flexible Response, embodied in Military Committee document

“14/3.” It was not universally acclaimed.

Some have argued that it led to the departure of the French from the military element of NATO. When the Nixon

administration came to office in the late

1960s, it conducted a thorough review of

both threat developments and the policy

for nuclear forces for the nation and the

Alliance. The initiatives which grew out

of this review were developed by Secretary Schlesinger, Senator Nunn, the Services, and by other senior people,

including the leadership of DNA. The

agency put substantial energy into alternative concepts to provide an adequate deterrent and defense should deterrence fail;

where both deterrence and defense might

be more viable without an early resort to

the use of nuclear forces, but, at the same
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 223

time, taking advantage of the presence of

these forces. DNA led the way in providing the intellectual underpinning for what

was demanded by the leadership; not only

the DoD but to Congress as well.

Continuing collaboration was effected with OSD, led by Mr. Donald Cotter,

as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, ATSD(AE), the

leadership of DNA encompassing its Directors, its DDSTs, and the various CINCs

responsible for the regions where nuclear forces were based and might be employed. The basis for this coordination

was the development of new concepts.

The major change embodied in these ideas

was to focus planning, training, and modernization on a combination of both operational and physical considerations. It

was a much wider base of consideration

than before, and it led to more effective

options. As a result, DNA initiated a New

Alternatives program with the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency

(DARPA), seeking to improve both conventional and nuclear forces and—in

some cases—even decrease dependence

upon nuclear forces. Thus, the beginnings

of the 1970s was a time of substantial

change that affected theater forces as well

as strategic forces.

With this as background, the theater

developments, that started in the early

1970s, resulted from a four-pronged initiative by DNA on behalf of SACEUR and

with CINCPAC. The first point involved

characterizing Soviet operations at a level of detail sufficient to understand the

strengths, the weaknesses, and the opportunities for new or improved Alliance

operations. In a sense, these new initiatives strove to “target” vulnerabilities

within Soviet doctrine for the offensive

use of Warsaw Pact Forces as well as the

forces themselves. Next, the formulation

and examination of alternative options,

which were political-military, for the use

of conventional and nuclear forces. Third,

the examination of technologies which

could contribute to the alternative options.

Fourth, the intersection of these with components of planning, training, and the use

of infrastructure such as surveillance assets. Again, DNA made a substantial investment in its activities in understanding

the interaction between new policies and

strategies with military concepts and new

technologies. The dollar value of these

efforts was small compared to the overall

agency budget, but the yield was very

high.

At the same time, the Army and the

Air Force were initiating both conceptual and system development activities,

which would improve forward defenses

in Europe. They borrowed liberally from

DNA’s work. The Army developed new

forward defense concepts based upon the

very successful fielding of a new family

of highly accurate, highly lethal and very

affordable anti-armor weapons to offset

the major advantage the Soviets had in

armor. The Air Force was developing precision-guided weapons, which would permit them to effectively attack fixed targets

and some movable targets in ways which

were difficult or impossible beforehand.

These developments offered the opportunity to make major changes in the structuring and deployment of forces. They

also imposed threats on the Soviet forces, which added to their dispersion requirements in the face of the theater

nuclear threat.

In the early 1980s, these efforts by

DNA culminated in a series of doctrinal

innovations, which included Air-Base and

Infrastructure attack programs of the Air

Force, the AirLand Battle jointly developed by the Air Force and the Army, and

Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) promulgated by NATO and agreed to by its

member nations. In the U.S., it led to the

modernization effort called the Deep At-
224 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

tack Program, a $55 billion acquisition

program to underwrite AirLand Battle and

Follow-On Forces Attack concepts.

DNA played a key role in the development of the military requirements, for

the nuclear Ground-Launched Cruise

Missile and the improvement to the Pershing missile, by conducting the key Cost

and Operational Effectiveness Analysis

(COEA) for the Army. These developments, in turn, led to substantial improvements in conventional capabilities. The

new nuclear systems also demonstrated

improved nuclear survivability over the

previous posture. DNA directly assisted

the operational community in understanding new technologies and assuring overall theater nuclear force survivability. The

agency, in effect, provided the schoolhouse and subject matter experts for U.S.

Commands and their forces, the Multinational Alliance Commands, and materiel

commands as well. It also provided substantial technical assistance for the conventional and nuclear improvements

undertaken by the DoD acquisition community. Finally, all these efforts, under the

Theater Deterrence and Defense umbrella, led to the establishment of a Theater

Nuclear Force Survivability, Security, and

Safety (TNFS3) Program, which addressed every threat to Theater Nuclear

Forces (TNF). These efforts were the

“crown jewels” of the agency’s TNF mission thrust during the decade and ultimately, led the Army and Air Force, “kicking

and screaming,” into accepting new doctrine.

ENVIRONMENT AND EXPOSURE:

JOHNSTON ATOLL

At Johnston Atoll, DNA took on a variety of relatively low profile administrative duties during the 1970s, which

touched on the issues of environment and

exposure resulting from its administrative

role as the DoD’s central agency for dealing with nuclear issues. On the Atoll,

where DNA’s Field Command served as

the local government following transfer

from the Air Force in July 1973, administrators took up such prosaic issues as

mail delivery and demolition of fire-hazard wooden structures and laundry facilities. These duties were minor compared

to the issues of environment and exposure.7

Retroactive records of radiation exposure of military and contractor personnel

at Johnston Atoll continued to be a major

issue. In June of 1978, McDonnell Douglas Corporation requested that DNA provide Johnston Atoll radiation exposure

data in connection with a workman’s compensation claim alleging death due to plutonium exposure. Local DNA staff

retrieved the data from historical files and

forwarded it to DNA Headquarters for distribution to McDonnell Douglas through

the Public Affairs Office.8

In 1976, DNA Director Lieutenant

General Warren Johnson urged the JCS to

modify the language surrounding “Safeguard C,” that is, the stipulation that the

United States remain ready to “promptly

resume atmospheric testing.” Johnson

recommended that the term “promptly” be

deleted. With the implementation of this

change in 1977, Johnson reduced the readiness stature at the Atoll, declaring much

testing equipment as surplus and reducing the operating and maintenance budget there by about $5 million per year.9

In 1972, following the Vietnam War,

more than 10,000 tons of Agent Orange

had been stored in some 27,000 fifty-five

gallon drums on Johnston Atoll, and DNA

Field Command was given the responsibility for its destruction. During 1977,

Field Command coordinated Agent Orange incineration at sea. The incineration

method used diesel fuel to rinse the herbicide drums and the loading and dedrumming equipment, which was then mixed
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 225

with the herbicide for burning. The burning took place on the open sea, about 120

miles west of Johnston Atoll. The motor

tanker Vulcanus took 3,300 tons of the

Agent Orange aboard, mixed it with diesel fuel, then spent ten days on station,

burning the mix in three separate voyages in the period July-September of 1977.

The Air Force monitored the atmosphere

and stated that the disposal met all Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards. Extensive analysis of samples of

water from Johnston Atoll and adjacent

areas found no contamination as a result

of the disposal.10

However, during the testing of the

drinking water on Johnston Atoll for

Agent Orange residue, the Air Force

Environmental Health Laboratory discovered measurable quantities of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a chemical

regarded as potentially carcinogenic. Tests

revealed the concentration in the drinking water at 1 to 3 parts per billion (ppb).

Engineers suspected the plastic liners of

the reservoirs as the source of the PCBs,

which was verified when administrators

took both reservoirs off the water system.

The PCB concentration then fell below

the detectable level of .2 ppb. With the reservoirs off the system, the water production costs from desalinization doubled, so

Field Command ordered the larger of the

two reservoirs water-blasted to remove

residues. Unfortunately, when engineers

returned the reservoir to the water system,

the PCB level once again climbed. Field

Command decided to sandblast and recoat

the reservoir, which corrected the problem.11

As the administrator for Johnston

Atoll, DNA became involved in many civil government responsibilities, going well

beyond environmental concerns, maintenance issues, and security operations. For

example, even though no commercial

shipping or aircraft routinely served

Johnston Atoll, its remote location itself

made the island important to travelers in

the Central Pacific. The Atoll is the only

land in several hundred square miles of

ocean, and as a result, it became an emergency haven for both ships and aircraft.

During 1977-1978, it served as the refuge

or medical evacuation point for 114 people, of whom 42 had been rescued by a

Japanese fishing boat, Taiki Maru, from

the sinking Philippine-registered ship La

Carlotta.

12

BIKINI CLEANUP

When DASA took on the cleanup of

Bikini Atoll in 1969, it was the first such

effort in the world to repair a landscape

damaged by nuclear tests. The Atoll had

been the site of 23 atmospheric and

underwater nuclear detonations in four series: two shots in Operation CROSSROADS in 1946, five shots in Operation

CASTLE in 1954, six shots of Operation

REDWING in 1956, and ten shots of the

series Operation HARDTACK in 1958.

The BRAVO shot of the CASTLE series

at Bikini received perhaps the most public attention of all the Pacific nuclear tests.

Fallout from this 15 MT detonation, carried to the east rather than to the north, as

predicted, contaminated the atolls of

Rongelap, Alinginae, and Rongerik,

where U.S. authorities had resettled residents from Bikini. The public response

concerning BRAVO spurred a world-wide

movement for a limited nuclear test ban

treaty.13

In December of 1966, Secretary of

the Interior Stewart Udall made two inquiries to the AEC regarding Bikini. He

asked if the island was safe for habitation

and when the inhabitants might have hazard-free use of the resources of the Atoll.

After several radiological surveys of the

island, in August of 1968, President Lyndon Johnson announced that the United

States no longer required Bikini for nu-
226 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

clear testing. In January of 1969, the JCS

designated the Director of DASA as the

project manager for the Defense Department to cooperate with the AEC in the first

phase of the Bikini cleanup.14

In the nine-month cleanup operation

in 1969, DASA worked with the AEC in

the first phase of the cleanup of the Atoll,

dismantling abandoned nuclear test facilities and disposing of radioactive debris

on the islands of the Atoll. The U.S. State

Department then turned the island over to

the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(TTPI), for completion of five more years

of rehabilitation of the islands preparatory to the return of the Bikini natives to the

island from Kili island, an isolated and inhospitable spot over 400 miles away,

where they had to subsist almost entirely

on imported food.15

Bikini had been abandoned for 11

years, and it included not only the remains

of the nuclear weapon tests, but wreckage and debris from World War II. A sealift opportunity came with transport by the

Navy of troops and equipment to Vietnam,

and using the Navy ship Belle Grove, a

DASA work force landed on February 17,

1969, to begin cleanup efforts.

Forces under the command of JTF-8

conducted the operation, including both

DoD and AEC personnel stationed in

Honolulu and on Johnston Atoll. Immediately after landing on the island, crews

went to work clearing overgrown vegetation from an old airstrip on the island of

Eneu.16 Within five days, a team cleared,

graded, and compacted a 4,600 foot coral

runway. A Military Airlift Command C54 landed five days after the first landing, and began making weekly support

deliveries of personnel, food, equipment,

mail, and movies. Later, C-124s delivered

over 300 tons of cargo through this airstrip.17 During the course of the cleanup,

over 40,000 tons of scrap and rubble were

buried.18

The project continued from February

to June of 1969, using JTF-8 provided

landing craft and barges.19 Crews buried

thousands of tons of concrete rubble, and

used some 800 tons of concrete rubble to

provide riprap to protect the runway from

wave damage. Many salvageable buildings were cleaned out and left intact.20

At the time of the Bikini administration turn over on October 12, 1969, an

agency report noted the project ahead of

schedule and $300,000 under budget.

Contractor crews soon followed to lay out

housing sites, plant trees, and prepare for

the return of the islanders.

Shortly after the successful cleanup of

Bikini, just as native peoples were beginning to return, the issue arose of cleaning

up the Pacific Atoll that had been used for

even more testing than at either Bikini or

Johnston.

CLEANUP AT ENEWETAK

The testing program at Enewetak, as

at Bikini, had left a legacy of damage and

radioactivity, but the contrasts and differences between the two projects warrant

close inspection. Enewetak, in the western region of the Marshall islands some

200 nautical miles from Bikini, had been

occupied by the Japanese during World

War II. Enewetak had been temporarily

evacuated during the first Pacific nuclear

tests of the CROSSROADS series at Bikini in 1946. The AEC established the

Enewetak Proving Ground in 1947, and in

October of that year, Joint Task Force-7

(JTF-7) began to prepare the Atoll for the

SANDSTONE series of nuclear tests. The

native people, the dri-Enewetak and

dri-Engebi, after a brief return to their island following the CROSSROADS tests,

were again evacuated to Ujelang in December of 1947, where they remained for

over 30 years. The 136 evacuees and their

descendants made clear their desire to return to their homeland.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 227

Over the decade 1948-1958, the United States detonated 43 nuclear and thermonuclear devices on the islands of the

Enewetak Atoll, in the Atoll lagoon, on

barges, and on towers. A few detonations

were very high yield hydrogen-fusion

devices, such as the MIKE shot at 10.4

megatons on October 31, 1952, and the

8.9 megaton OAK shot in the HARDTACK series on June 28, 1958. Table 6-2

details the test series on Enewetak during

the 1948-1958 period.21

As a consequence of the tests, two islands, Elugelab and Lidibut, were completely obliterated along with most of two

others. Nine of the shots had taken place

on or near Runit, and the surface-emplaced CACTUS shot of May 5, 1958 had

created a wide crater at the northern tip

of the island into which the sea flowed.

Even on island areas with slight radiological damage, ruined habitat and waste

scarred the few livable acres of land.22

The agreement between the DoD and

the DOI under which Enewetak Atoll had

been used for nuclear testing came under

review by the parties June 30, 1961 and

every five years afterwards. During the

1971 review, the DoD agreed to terminate

the use of Enewetak as a test range and to

return it to the Trust Territory. Under the

original agreement between the DOI, as

the Trust Territory representative, and the

DoD, upon the decision to leave, the U.S.

would have 30 days to remove any improvements and structures it wished to

take, and then to leave everything else for

the Trust Territory government. However, as the DNA official report later noted,

“the United States recognized a moral, if

Bikini natives loading their gear into LST-1108 in preparation for evacuation, 1946.
228 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

not legal, obligation to restore the Atoll

to a more habitable condition.”23 An immediate departure would leave debris,

ruined buildings, and numerous radiologically contaminated areas.

Following an interagency conference

in February of 1972, Interior officials

notified the U.S. Ambassador to the Micronesian Status Negotiations, Franklin

H. Williams, that the United States would

begin cleanup and restoration of the Atoll

and planned to return it to the Trust Territory. Although the DOI anticipated return

of the atoll in 1973, planning, funding, and

a series of administrative and jurisdictional issues delayed completion of the process for seven years.24

Lieutenant General Caroll H. Dunn,

Director of DNA, went to Enewetak in

September 1972 to personally survey the

situation. He ordered an immediate start

on a pre-cleanup survey. Later that year,

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird formally notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

DNA would be the responsible agency for

the cleanup, and requested that the Director of DNA be designated as Project Manager. The Joint Chiefs accepted the

recommendation, and authorized DNA to

act for the DoD in planning and operations.25 The choice of DNA reflected the

agency’s prior history of involvement in

similar, but smaller scale clean-up operations at Palomares, Thule, and, especially, Bikini.26

Lieutenant General Warren Johnson,

Dunn’s successor at DNA, faced a complex new mission, now including the operation of two island groups: Johnston

Atoll and Enewetak. The Air Force transferred Johnston Atoll to DNA in July

1973, and Enewetak on January 1, 1974.27

Suddenly, the agency became, in effect, a

temporary governing agent of two remote

island territories.

DNA originally planned to subcontract the work of the cleanup of Enewetak.

The Pacific Ocean Division of the Army

Corps of Engineers, accomplished the

actual contracting, including design, preparation, award of contract, and monitoring of contractors’ performance. DNA

expected to provide only conceptual guidance, leaving the administrative details to

the Corps.28As it turned out, however, interagency concerns, funding, and logistical problems prevented such a simple

solution.

While inspections, planning, and

preparation of a Draft Environmental

Impact Statement was being developed in

1974 and 1975, DNA worked with ConTable 6-2. Enewetak Tests, 1948 through 1958.

Y s ear S s erie Number of Shot

1 E 948 S 3 ANDSTON

1 E 951 G 4 REENHOUS

1 Y 951 I 2 V

1 E 954 C 1 ASTL

1 G 956 R 1 EDWIN 1

1 I 958 H 2 ARDTACK 2
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 229

gressional staffs to secure appropriations

to cover the cost of the cleanup. During

these planning stages, DNA officials considered several alternative plans to dispose of the radioactive waste and scrap

from the islands, including ocean dumping, transfer of the materials to the continental United States, and crater

entombment.29

All the plans seemed to have political

or legal impediments. The shipment of

waste to the United States proved costly

and seemed likely to arouse political opposition. The EPA advised that ocean

dumping, the method used legally and

properly earlier at Bikini, would violate

new domestic law and international agreements, established when the United States

ratified the International Ocean Dumping

Treaty in 1970. Furthermore, Public Law

92-532, Title I, Section 101c prohibited

the dumping of radiological materials intended for warfare. DNA administrators

doubted whether the letter of the law prevented dumping of residue from prior

weapon tests. The EPA, however, insisted that it would interpret the law to require that any materials contaminated by

plutonium, if dumped in the ocean, be

housed in containers guaranteed to remain

intact for 125,000 years. DNA recognized

that ocean dumping would encounter severe legal problems and abandoned that

option for any radiologically contaminated materials.30

At a number of conferences through

1975 and 1976, ERDA representatives, as

the successors to AEC, continued to argue for an ocean-dumping solution on the

grounds that the amount of radioactive

material from Enewetak would represent

a very small fraction of the total radioactive waste already dumped in the ocean.

Since ERDA would be responsible for the

long-term storage site if crater entombment were chosen, that agency preferred

ocean dumping.31

In the face of legal opinions and the

opposition of both DNA and EPA to the

ocean dumping concept, the DNA proposal for entombment prevailed. Under this

plan, radiological debris would be transported to the large crater on Runit caused

by the CACTUS shot of the HARDTACK

series. Workers mixed the debris and contaminated soil with concrete, and pumped

the mix into the crater and covered the

mass with a thick concrete dome. After

rehabilitation of several islands for residence, agriculture, and fishing, the driEnewetak and dri-Engebi would return to

live on the southern islands of the Atoll.

They agreed to avoid Runit and its domed

repository of radioactive waste.

With the project still in the planning

stage in 1974, General Johnson estimated that a full cleanup and restoration of

all the islands would cost $200 to $300

million. Had the project required making

all of the islands completely habitable,

Johnson had probably made a reasonably

accurate estimate. Considering that Con350-foot wide CACTUS crater dome on

Enewetak Atoll.
230 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

gress had refused to support estimates in

the much lower range of $40 million

(eventually approving only $20 million

for cleanup), Johnson concluded that either DNA would have to recommend less

than a complete rehabilitation or the

project would have to be declared not feasible. However, General Johnson felt

strongly that the Government had a “moral obligation” to do everything within reason to accomplish the cleanup.32

Operations on the Atoll began in early 1977 and continued intensively over the

next three years. Army engineers constructed a base camp and provided cleanup labor, while Air Force personnel

operated communications equipment and

aircraft, and the Navy provided military

sealift command vessels to bring cargo

and equipment. The three-year operation

encountered many setbacks and difficulties, including two major typhoons in

1978, vast quantities of non-radiological

debris that had to be hauled and dumped

at three sites in the lagoon, and a number

of difficulties with the construction of the

entombment dome.33

Bureaucratic concerns led to further

delays. For example, even though EPA

had approved the environmental impact

statement and all the plans, DNA decided that the Corps of Engineers should acquire all the usual permits to proceed with

work. As a consequence, the Corps sought

permits for disposal of non-radiological

debris in the lagoon, for clearance of coral obstructions to channels into the lagoon, and for the main crater containment

of contaminated debris and soil.34

The permit from the Corps of Engineers for the crater presented difficulties.

Since the crater entombment project included levels below water, engineers assumed that water would migrate from the

entombed area into the lagoon. Regulations required that anyone constructing a

structure that might leach into navigable

waterways had to commit to perpetually

maintaining the structure. At the last moment, the Corps issued the permit in November of 1977, one week before the

“mobilization phase” of entombment in

the crater began.35 The eventual entombment crater on Enewetak was called the

CACTUS crater dome, which featured a

massive circular concrete cover.

The project involved not only cleanup, but extensive preparation of home

sites, agricultural plantings and provision

of infrastructure, such as roads, utilities,

and common areas.36 With the completion

of all such work, DNA returned the island

to the Enewetak people, now numbering

about 400, in a ceremony held on April 8,

1980.37 The full population returned from

Ujelang in several trips in early October

of 1980.38

BIKINI AND ENEWETAK

CLEANUPS COMPARED

A contrast between the speed and simplicity of the earlier operation to clean up

Bikini and the project taken up by DNA

to rehabilitate Enewetak is striking.

Whereas the DASA Bikini project took

about 9 months and less than $2 million,

the DNA operation at Enewetak took

nearly seven years and $19 million to

bring to completion after three years of

preliminary planning. First discussed in

1971, DNA fully completed the project in

1980.

There were similarities. The natural

environments of both Bikini and

Enewetak Atolls were damaged by the

nuclear test program. At Bikini, in addition to the 1946 CROSSROADS test with

two weapons, other series in 1954, 1956

and 1958, had resulted in the detonation

of a total of 23 devices, ten of them in

1958. The BRAVO 15 megaton-yield

thermonuclear device fired in 1954 at

Bikini exceeded the yield of any fired at

Enewetak.39 While Enewetak saw 43 det-
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 231

onations and Bikini experienced only 23,

the damage, waste, and radiological hazards at the two locations were roughly

comparable. The reasoning behind the

differences in cost and time can be attributed to several factors. JTF-8, in cleaning up Bikini, had not sought approvals

from other agencies. Furthermore, the

EPA did not come into existence until December 2, 1970, 14 months after the completion of the Bikini project.

The United States had not adhered to

any treaty in 1969 to prohibit the dumping of radioactive waste at sea, nor did

domestic law at that time preclude this

approach. Thus, at Bikini, DASA never

had to face the extensive costs of entombment, characteristic of the Enewetak

cleanup undertaken by DNA a few years

later. Furthermore, at Bikini, DASA had

responsibility for only the very first phase

of the cleanup, leaving full rehabilitation

of the island for occupation to other agencies after JTF-8 departed. But at

Enewetak, the agency prepared the islands

for agriculture and residency. Table 6-3

provides further comparisons on the two

island’s cleanup effort.

Another cause of the broad contrast

between the prompt restoration of Bikini

in 1969, and the decade-long process at

Enewetak, is the change in policy, procedures, and values between the two periods.

In the late 1960s, President Johnson could

order the cleanup of Bikini, and DASA

could then immediately proceed to the

task, employing existing JTF forces and

relatively small amounts of already-appropriated funds. In the mid- and late-1970s,

a similar decision required negotiation

Table 6-3. Enewetak and Bikini Restorations Compared.

B k ikini Eneweta

G 8 overnment Commitment A 1 ugust 12, 196 197

S 9 tart of Work F 7 ebruary 17, 196 March 197

E 9 nd of Work S 0 eptember 22, 196 April 198

C 0 ost $ 0 1,300,00 $18,770,00

N 6 umber of Islands in Atoll 2 04

L 0 agoon Size 2 × 1 3 0 st. mi. 2 × 17 st. mi.

L . agoon Size in Miles 2 . 40 sq. mi 388 sq. mi

A s creage 8 s 94 acre 1,761 acre

Total Nuclear Weapons Tested

at Atoll

2 3 3 4

W s aste Disposed: 5 s 00 ton 125,000 ton

(Non-radioactive)

C 0 ubic Yards Removed 1 0 00,00 253,65

P y opulation Resettled 1 t 00 temporar 450 permanen
232 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

through a hostile Congress for funding,

considerable inter-agency communication

and clearance, and extensive planning and

documentation not needed only a few

years before. Despite the fact that radiological standards had not changed, those

standards were applied much more aggressively in the mid-1970s than they had

been five to six years before.40

Arising from the different level of expenditure and care in the two cleanups,

Bikini proved less safe for the returnees,

in the long run, than Enewetak. At

Enewetak, the islanders declared some

contaminated islands off-limits entirely,

and visited others only for food-gathering purposes, rather than settlement. Their

settlements on Medren and Enewetak islands, carefully screened for radiological

safety, became permanent residences, and

those islands most targeted during the testing were simply not resettled.

A similar pattern of settlement had

been arranged at Bikini. The Trust Territory government preferred that Bikini settlers return in small groups, allowing time

for newly-established plants and trees to

mature. Accordingly, between 1974 and

1977, over 100 Bikinians gradually returned to their Atoll. In the spring of 1977,

however, regular testing of radiation revealed an alarming increase in radioactive

cesium among the Bikinians.41 Specialists traced the problem to the diet. Since

the islanders preferred fresh food to imported supplies, they had exceeded recommended limits on plants and animals

grown locally, especially coconuts from

new groves. In the summer of 1978, the

U.S. government removed the islanders

once again. At the Enewetak project, specialists noted that the Bikinians suffered

unexpectedly high levels of strontium and

cesium from eating locally grown coconuts, and the agricultural and dietary plans

for Enewetak natives were adjusted to

take account of the news.42

The DNA effort to restore Enewetak

turned out to be far more successful than

the earlier Bikini cleanup by DASA. What

appeared to be bureaucratic delay and

constant negotiation paid off in the end.

Resulting from the additional labor, time,

and money expended, and because of

more stringent concern with standards,

health, and the well-being of the islanders that characterized the mid 1970s, the

dri-Enewetak and dri-Engebi stayed on

their islands permanently, while the Bikinians once again returned to exile.

In later years, the Bikinians won a settlement of over $200 million in compensation. While not returning to their island

to live, they began to convert the site into a

tourist destination. Over 2,300 descendants of the original 186 Bikinians removed from the island in 1946 now live

on Kili, other islands in the Marshall islands, and in other countries.43

NEW DNA MISSION: NUCLEAR

TEST PERSONNEL REVIEW

The Nuclear Test Personnel Review

(NTPR) program grew out of one veteran’s claim, initiated in 1977 at the Veterans’ Administration (VA) office in Boise,

Idaho. Retired sergeant Paul R. Cooper, a

patient in the VA hospital in Salt Lake

City, filed for disability payments, attributing his acute myelocytic leukemia to the

radiation exposure he had received as a

participant in shot SMOKY, conducted on

August 31, 1957 as part of Operation

PLUMBBOB. The VA denied Cooper’s

claim, but an appeals board later reversed

the decision, noting that sufficient signs

of the disease had been present when

Cooper served on active duty to support

his claim that his disability grew out of

his military service. The appeals board,

however, did not establish whether or not

the disease stemmed from his radiation

exposure at SMOKY.

While Cooper’s case proceeded
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 233

through the VA, his physician at Salt Lake

City contacted Dr. Glynn G. Caldwell,

Chief of the Cancer Branch of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, expressing concern over the possibility

of a connection between Cooper’s disease

and his exposure at SMOKY. Caldwell,

in turn, contacted Colonel LaWayne R.

Stromberg, USA, Director of AFRRI, a

DNA subordinate organization, located in

Bethesda, Maryland.

On the denial of his case in February

of 1977, Cooper took his case to the media, and the event became a major news

story in March and April. Within a few

days, the CDC received letters from several dozen people who had participated in

nuclear weapon tests. Within four months,

the number increased to 2,000.44

Vice Admiral Robert Monroe succeeded Lieutenant General Warren

Johnson as Director, DNA, in March of

1977, and found himself in the thick of

the issues surrounding the exposure of

Service personnel to nuclear detonations.

Dr. Caldwell at the CDC notified DNA

that he had identified three leukemia cases among personnel who had written to

the CDC claiming to have participated in

SMOKY. The number of cases exceeded

the expectation for a comparable population, and Caldwell conducted a study of

everyone who had been exposed at

SMOKY. AFRRI representatives agreed

that a complete roster of participants

should be made available from the DoD.

Researchers found information on service

personnel participation in nuclear tests incomplete and scattered in archives and repositories across the country. An

inter-agency ad hoc group recommended

that DNA should function as the DoD executive agency for all matters pertaining

to DoD personnel who had participated

in the atmospheric nuclear test program.45

By the end of 1977, the DoD, and

DNA in particular, became deeply committed to gathering the needed information and conducting a study of the relationship between atmospheric exposure at

nuclear weapon tests and later evidence

of cancer among participants. When the

Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held

hearings in January and February of 1978

on actions to collect data on DoD personnel, Admiral Monroe and Dr. Darrell

McIndoe, the new Director of AFRRI,

were able to testify to the considerable

effort already mounted. The hearings

spurred the official establishment of the

NTPR in January 1978.46

The NTPR officially began with two

memoranda issued by Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, John P. White. On

January 28, 1978, he wrote to Admiral

Monroe, assigning several tasks to DNA.

He requested that DNA develop a history

of every atmospheric nuclear event that

Vice Admiral Robert Monroe, DNA Director 1977 to 1980.
234 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

involved DoD personnel, that the agency

identify the specific radiation monitoring

and control policies in effect at the tests,

and assemble a census of personnel at

each event. For each individual, DNA

should identify their location, movements,

protection, and radiation dose exposures.

Further, DNA should handle both public

relations and Congressional relations in

regard to DoD responsibility.47

Admiral Monroe led the coordination

of the DoD effort for DNA, and beginning in February of 1978, the information

gathering started in earnest. In June of

1978, Monroe ordered that the data be

consistent for each participant, including

name, branch of service or contractor organization, unit or ship, grade or rank,

service serial number and social security

number, date of birth, shots participated

in, as much detail as possible about exposure, and the sources for each of the

data elements.48

In October of 1979, the database was

expanded to include DoD personnel who

had been exposed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even though these were not

“tests.”49 In this fashion, DNA emerged

as lead agency for conducting the NTPR,

an activity, like the ongoing Enewetak

cleanup, devoted not to improving U.S.

weapons capability, but to remedying past

negative consequences that had grown out

of the nuclear side of the Cold War. The

shift in emphasis grew naturally out of

prior work at the agency. Earlier AFRRI

and JNACC responsibilities had established the agency’s credentials in the area

of monitoring and radiation testing.

The NTPR eventually encompassed a

group of separate but related tasks. These

included development of a roster of DoD

participants in nuclear tests and preparation of a “personnel-oriented” history of

the atmospheric test program, that resulted in 41 volumes totaling over 9,000

pages. The agency took on the declassification of over 1,000 publications with

data and the development of dose reconstruction to determine exposures of personnel. The agency sought to make

personal contact with all DoD personnel

who had participated in the tests, to identify those with high exposures, and to provide free medical examinations. DNA

sponsored studies on mortality of test participants. The agency also officially undertook the development of a roster of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki veterans.50

On February 9, 1978, DNA established a toll-free call-in program for participants to report their involvement in

atmospheric nuclear tests. Multiple news

releases explained the purposes of NTPR

and included the toll-free number and the

DNA address for postal replies. During

the first two weeks after the toll-free lines

were established, the program received almost 13,000 calls. The number of calls

and letters per week declined thereafter,

but by 1985, about 50,000 test participants

had called or written to DNA.51

Since the toll-free number could not

be used in Hawaii, Field Command made

arrangement for residents there who participated in testing between 1946 and

1963 to call the Pacific Support Division

in Hawaii.52Within a week, over 100 calls

came in to the Hawaii office, each requiring discussion to record the needed information.53 Later, DNA arranged that calls

from participants in Alaska, Hawaii, and

Virginia could be made on a collect basis

to a number at DNA Headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia.54 Researchers entered

the information gathered from the phone

calls and from the letters into the NTPR

database. In addition to the voluntary call

and write-in program, DNA sent out direct mailings to participants, continuing

the program into the 1980s.55

NTPR attracted national attention

with interviews and intensive reports appearing on television shows such as 60
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 235

Minutes (September 28, 1980) and 20/20

(March 5, 1981), and in national magazines and newspapers such as People,

National Geographic, New West, and The

Washington Post.

56 Admiral Monroe and

other DNA representatives testified regarding the NTPR effort frequently

through the late 1970s, with several appearances at the Senate Committee on

Veterans Affairs.57

Considering the active participation of

over 200,000 servicemen and civilians in

the tests from Trinity in 1945 through

DOMINIC II and PLOWSHARE in 1962,

a rather small number of individuals received significant doses of radiation. A 5-

rem exposure in a twelve-month period

had been established by the 1980s as an

annual whole body dose limit recommended by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements.

Using that standard retroactively after examining all of the records, NTPR concluded that, of 202,224 participants, only some

1,299 had received gamma exposures in

excess of the limit. About 40 troops who

volunteered to move close to ground zero

during troop-exposure exercises of UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE (1953), TEAPOT

(1955), and PLUMBBOB (1957), received neutron doses of radiation estimated to be as high as 28 rem.58

The initial case of Sergeant Cooper

had grown out of exposure at shot

SMOKY during Operation PLUMBBOB.

As a consequence, both the CDC and

DNA closely examined the data from

SMOKY.59 DNA helped identify 3,153

individuals who had received film badges during the period of the SMOKY shot

and related exercises. DNA found a total

of nine leukemia cases (later increased to

ten), including the case of Sergeant Cooper. The CDC noted that, among a group

of this size and age, one might typically

expect three to four cases of leukemia and

regarded the excess number of cases as

significant. Later, the CDC extended the

count to some 3,217 veterans.60

The CDC found disease records and

mortality causes on over 95 percent of the

group. Surprisingly, in a group that size,

one might expect over 117 deaths from

cancers of all types, consistent with the

112 cancer cases that were found. However, a total of 10 leukemia cases, in a

group in which 3 or 4 might normally be

expected, remained statistically significant.61

Other surprises came from the study:

the mean dose received by the military

participants in units close to ground zero

of SMOKY was higher than others in support groups, although still well under the

estimated safe dose of 5 rem per year. Yet

the frequency of cancers ran higher

among the support units who received the

lower doses, rather than among those

close to ground zero. If the dosimetry and

the dose reconstruction were correct, one

would have expected the reverse to be

true.62 After examining these anomalies

and the fact that the overall cancer rate

fell well within acceptable or normal standards, the CDC concluded that the excess

of six or seven leukemia cases could be

attributed to chance, to factors other than

radiation, or “to a combination of risk factors, possibly including radiation.”63

PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND

STATISTICAL REALITY

To gather the NTPR information required an outreach campaign; inevitably,

that outreach campaign had a dual effect.

The campaign helped to locate information, but the repeated statements that the

government searched for information that

might establish a correlation between cancer cases and exposure to nuclear radiation during nuclear testing helped enforce

the popular impression that such a correlation existed, whether or not statistics

eventually uncovered the correlation.
236 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

Another factor compounding the effort to respond to public concerns in this

area was the very nature of the statistical

reasoning employed by epidemiologists

and the ambiguous nature of the statistical results. Even when independent agencies or research groups such as the CDC

or the National Research Council applied

epidemiological methods to the facts, the

results were not reassuring to victims or

those who suspected they were victims.

When scientists at the National Research

Council reviewed the data, the number of

leukemia cases (10) in the SMOKY case

exceeded the expected number (3.97)

from the total. They concluded that radiation could only account for less than 1

case (an increase of 0.2 case), and that the

increase was either “a chance aberration”

or that the mean radiation doses were several times the doses recorded by the film

badges used, which did not seem likely.64

The National Research Council language

was reassuring to DNA officials and to

others concerned with the military record

of handling radiation exposure and the

consequences of exposure. Yet to the public, an assertion that the facts could not

“affirm or deny” a correlation, or that excess numbers of cases of cancer might be

due to “chance” seemed hardly reassuring, especially coming from official

sources that might, in the public’s eyes,

be associated with officialdom in general.

Admiral Monroe explained one aspect

of the statistical problem in his 1979 testimony before the Senate Committee on

Veterans’ Affairs. After collecting information for one and a half years, Monroe

noted that the agency had reached some

preliminary conclusions. He pointed out

that the DoD estimated some 250,000

personnel had participated in the nuclear

tests. According to national statistics regarding distribution of various kinds of

cancer among populations, one might expect 40,000 of the 250,000 people to die

of cancer of one form or another. After

studying the best estimates of radiation

exposure during the tests, one might expect that among the 250,000 individuals

there would be 12 cancer deaths that could

be attributed to radiation. However, he

pointed out, “Medical science is not able

to distinguish the 40,000 deaths not related to radiation from the 12 deaths that

are.”65

Another problem arose from the fact

that in the 1950s, scientific authorities on

radiation believed that low levels of ionizing radiation posed no likelihood of

permanent danger or risk to individuals.

Thus, health officials set permissible exposure levels of 3 or 5 rem, and test administrators accepted such limits as

operational. Because so many exposure

records were in the low and safe range,

many film badges and film badge records

were discarded. Only later did the suspicion arise that very low levels of ionizing

radiation might cause permanent effects,

long after the records had been destroyed

or discarded.66

The problem of dealing with classified documents led to anxiety and complaint among veterans seeking

information. As Admiral Monroe pointed out, both in testimony and in correspondence with members of Congress,

classification of documents in no case

stood in the way of an individual receiving information about personal exposure

during a test. However, sometimes veterans would request a whole document that

remained classified and it could not be

supplied; sometimes the person would

suspect that officials were hiding something that contained relevant information.67

VETERANS’ ADVOCATES AND DNA

Stewart Udall, who had served as Secretary of Interior under Presidents
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 237

Kennedy and Johnson, authored an introduction to one atomic veteran’s memoir,

Countdown Zero. The work, noted Udall,

was “an exposé of a systematic thirty-year

cover-up by high officials in the U.S. government of the plague of cancer and other illnesses they needlessly inflicted on the

soldiers and civilians who were unwitting

participants in their experiments.”68 Udall

linked the concern of the atomic veterans

to other issues: “This book is part of a

search for justice which Orville Kelly

started in 1977, a search which now includes not only the atomic veterans who

were sacrificed, but the Marshallese and

the civilians who were downwind from

the Nevada tests, the test-site employees

whose workplace was the poisoned pit at

Yucca Flat in Nevada, and the early uranium miners who were allowed to work

underground in air impregnated with

long-lived radiation emanations.”69 Udall,

after his retirement from government,

served as an attorney representing several such groups, including some “downwinders” and some uranium miners who

had filed claims for compensation for illnesses that they believed derived from

their exposure to radioactive mine tailings.

At the time he wrote the introduction

to the work on atomic veterans, Udall

served as co-counsel on the case of Irene

Allen v. the United States. The Allen case,

filed in August of 1979 by 24 plaintiffs,

served as the lead case representing the

plight of the “downwinders.” 70 DOE attorney Henry Gill argued that there was

no scientific evidence that any exposure

to radiation caused the illnesses or death.

Udall fought to establish a correlation between dosages from the weapon tests and

illness in both the courts and in the more

public forum of the press and literature.71

The Allen case went to trial, after various

efforts by government attorneys to dismiss the case, on September 20, 1982. After ruling on a variety of complex issues

of law and responsibility, Judge Bruce

Jenkins awarded the plaintiffs some $2.66

million in damages, almost all to the surviving family members of eight leukemia

victims.72

Authors like Saffer and public figures

like Udall used the same facts that the

CDC epidemiological study had suggested were statistically significant, but not

conclusive. Udall and Saffer gave those

statistics a different flavor of importance,

sometimes based on little more than a

general suspicion that an extensive conspiracy had worked to suppress evidence.

Atomic veterans like Cooper, Kelly,

and Saffer did not believe the experts. The

leading experts on the issues of greatest

concern to them were employees of the

CDC, of the DNA, or government contractors. It seemed unlikely to Saffer that

such an organization “would bite the hand

that feeds it.”73 The Secretary of Defense

in this period was Harold Brown, former

director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the laboratory that had designed the

very weapons tested during some of the

subject exposures. This fact seemed to the

atomic veterans to place all evidence or

testimony by current defense department

employees or contractors under suspicion

of conflict of interest.74

Because the conclusions derived from

the NTPR data were ambiguous, veterans

and their advocates found it extremely

logical to question the objectivity of employees of the agency ultimately responsible for organizing military participation

in nuclear weapon tests. Most of the experts suggesting that the lack of correlation between radiation exposure dosages

and cancers prevented assigning causality were indeed “hired guns” of the government.75

A balanced treatment of the issue by

Barton Hacker, a historian, suggests that

AEC policy makers made a series of con-
238 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

scious decisions early in the testing program to “reassure rather than inform.”76

He went on to comment, “Reluctance to

acknowledge any risk, the policy that

mainly prevailed in the 1950s, undercut

the AEC’s credibility when the public

learned from other sources that fallout

might be hazardous.”77 Part of the unraveling of that policy of reassurance led to

the decision to conduct a full and open investigation that eventually produced the

NTPR. In effect, the function of the

NTPR, despite criticisms of statistical

conclusions and the ease of communication over the complex issues, eventually

became clear.

Work on the NTPR program continued. The problems which had surfaced in

the first years of the program persisted.

DNA proceeded to gather information and

to attempt to report it in a balanced fashion. Dealing with deep-seated suspicions

of the veracity of the government remained an issue to haunt the agency for

years to come.

CONTINUING TESTING

The inability to gather test data from

atmospheric nuclear detonations and the

expense and relative immaturity of underground nuclear effects testing prompted

DASA and the Service laboratories, in the

late 1960s, to seek additional laboratory

facilities to simulate the effects of nuclear weapons. These were sorely needed for

studying the effects of nuclear radiation

on military electronic systems such as

fuzing, guidance, and control. Linear accelerators, pulsed critical nuclear assemblies, a pulsed nuclear reactor called

TRIGA, and flash x-ray (FXR) generators

were vying for funding.

The FXR generator is an interesting

case in point. It consists of either a Van

de Graaff machine that charged a large capacitor or a Marx generator to store energy. The high electric fields were a source

of cold field emission of electrons that

impinge on an x-ray-emitting target. The

suggestion to use this technique came

from a highly imaginative staff member,

Charley Martin, at the Atomic Weapons

Research Establishment in the United

Kingdom. He had been using this technique for high-speed FXR photography

and thought it would be useful for studying radiation effects. This innovation gave

birth to a family of x-ray and gamma-ray

simulators developed at the Naval Research Laboratory and other commercial

laboratories that became the backbone of

laboratory nuclear weapon effect (NWE)

radiation simulators. Similar machines

were developed to conduct the stored energy into radiating antennas to study EMP

effects.

One of the great services performed

by DNA in the 1970s was to erect these

simulators at the Service laboratories and

to staff them with the resident experts.

This was done without regard to just those

radiation problems peculiar to that Service. The result was that the experimental staffs of these simulators became

familiar with the radiation effects problems of their sister Services thereby enhancing the national resource of expertise.

Correspondingly, the staffs at the Service

laboratories played a key role in assisting

DNA on the development of new and better facilities.

The requirements for NWE radiation

testing by DASA were different than those

for nuclear weapon development and validation testing by the AEC. Radiation effects testing required a vertical pipe

through which the radiation from an underground device could be transported up

to the surface and impinge on the experiments placed directly above, in cassettes

that were mounted in a multi-story tower

above the pipe. Monitor cables ran from

the experimental cassettes to an instrumentation park about a thousand feet from
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 239

surface zero. The trick was to let the radiation out and close off the pipe before

debris could escape. Many closure techniques, including ball valves, clamshells,

explosively driven steel gates and spoilers were tried.

Recovery of the experimental cassettes was essential. Since the tower was

destined to fall into the subsidence crater, a number of techniques were investigated to recover the cassettes before this

happened. At first, the cassettes were

mounted on sleds and pulled away a few

minutes after zero time by cables. Ultimately, they were mounted on a wheeled

mobile tower that was pulled away by

large winches. Until the techniques could

be sufficiently refined there was a high

incidence of effluent leakage. Closures

would fail or escape would occur from the

pipe at a deep location and travel up a fault

or fissure in the soil. Since much of the

data was recorded on high-speed (up to

ASA 10,000) Polaroid film cameras affixed to oscilloscopes, they were at risk

from being fogged by the radioactive effluence. The film could not be developed

until it was safe to enter the trailer park.

This necessitated a speedy reentry shortly after the detonation to avoid fogging

of the film. In particularly risky environments it was decided to remove the whole

camera and deliver it to the Polaroid Corporation, where it was hoped that they

could provide a more optimized development.

The first time this was done, after the

1965 DILUTED WATERS event, the experimenters brought the box of cameras

to Polaroid’s chief engineer and said that

they had some film that was fogged, but

they couldn’t tell him how and where. On

the next event, PIN STRIPE, the shot

vented again and the experimenters returned to Polaroid with the same clandestine posture. The chief engineer was much

more scientifically acute than they

thought. He remarked, “Oh, you guys out

in Nevada did it again.” As time went on

it became generally much more practical

to utilize horizontal tunnels that, with

some exceptions, provided greater reliability and economy.

Through the 1970s, DNA mounted an

average of two tests per year, each with a

large number of projects scheduled for

testing. The patterns set up during the

1960s became routine. Yet the tests ventured into new areas, testing radiation effects on satellites and on new systems,

testing effects previously unexplored, and

researching problems associated with deployment and protection of the proposed

MX* or mobile missile system.

SIMULATORS

Simulators provided an alternative to

direct testing using nuclear devices as

sources in underground tunnels and shafts.

In fact, by the early 1970s, DNA had become quite successful in simulating nuclear radiation phenomena using large

simulation machines. AURORA was a

FXR machine located at the U.S. Army’s

Harry Diamond Laboratories, in Adelphi,

Maryland. It simulated the effects of gamma rays from nuclear weapons. This sixstory high, 100-foot long FXR simulator

could provide radiation of up to 30,000

rads, over a volume of one cubic meter,

in one ten-millionth of a second. With this

volume, the system could test whole electronic systems and subsystems. This system had the advantage that it would allow

repeated testing of electronic equipment in various stages of operation, with up to ten separate tests per day. Compared to the

difficulty of exposing electronic equipment in tunnels, the AURORA FXR offered a much more efficient and economic

arrangement for testing gamma ray effects

* MX (Peacekeeper) missile also referred to as

M-X in technical reference.
240 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

than underground nuclear tests.78The agency supplemented the AURORA facility

with another at Adelphi built over a five

year period ending in 1978, at a cost of

about $2.5 million. Nicknamed

“CASINO”, it was operated by Naval

Surface Warfare Center, Silver Spring,

Maryland. It was originally built to test

the response of Pendulous Integrating

Gyro Accelerometers (PIGAs) to x-ray induced heating and to test accelerometers

of missile systems. Later, as these requirements faded, CASINO was used to test

the effects of x rays on critical materials

such as military satellites. Since so much

critical military communication was carried by satellite, DNA focused attention

on the problem of improving the ability

of satellites to withstand nuclear effects

during a nuclear weapon exchange.79

Exposing a full-scale satellite in a test

chamber presented difficulties of expense

and arrangement. While feasible to use

scaled-down simplified models, it would

have been extremely expensive to test

full-size satellites in an underground nuclear test because of their size, fragility,

and the requirement that the satellite be

inside a vacuum chamber two to three

times its size. For this reason, work on

CASINO continued through the 1970s,

with the expectation that it would go on

line by 1983.80

Through the 1970s, scientists developed an increasing variety of means of

simulating nuclear weapon effects, going

well beyond the use of high explosives

and radiation machines. In 1977 DNA

launched a special transmitter on a dedicated Navy transit satellite. The transmitter provided a means for evaluating the

propagation of data formats through the

atmosphere when disturbed by natural

phenomena such as the Aurora Borealis.

Using computer codes, the natural phenomena could be compared with nuclear

effects. Receivers located in Lima, Peru

and Fairbanks, Alaska, recorded the degree of interference in the data transmission. DNA also participated in missile

launches in Alaska to measure the blackout effect of the aurora on radio and radar

reception. Large, pulsed transmitters,

some of which were transportable, with

Missile x-ray test by CASINO simulator, Adelphi, Maryland.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 241

specially designed antenna, were used to

simulate nuclear weapon high altitude

EMP. This capability enabled DNA engineers to test military equipment and strategic land-line facilities. In another

experiment, DNA engineers arranged for

the release of barium at a high altitude between an existing Air Force satellite and

several ground and airborne receivers.

The barium release provided a simulation

of a nuclear disturbance in the atmosphere. Using the results from this experiment, engineers could test the reliability

of the computer codes, and extrapolate the

results to nuclear tests.81

DNA found another opportunity to

learn about nuclear effects by observing

French testing of nuclear weapons in the

Pacific during 1973. The Test Ban Treaty

prohibited the United States from coopAURORA flash x-ray simulator under construction at Harry Diamond Laboratory in 1978.
242 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

erating in the French tests, but it did not

prohibit the U.S. from observing or detecting the weapon effects on their own.

Accordingly, DNA arranged for 784 observers on two ships, the Wheeling and the

Corpus Christi Bay, several helicopters,

and at least two other aircraft, working out

of Hickam AFB in Hawaii and supported

by Field Command offices. The teams recorded effects from remote locations,

gathering data unobtainable in any other

fashion.82 A similar operation was fielded during the French tests of 1974, but

used only one ship and considerably fewer

observers.

Experiments during the 1970s continued to involve ingenious adaptations to

new challenges. MINT LEAF, in May of

1970, was a HLOS test of the vulnerability of the Army Spartan missile system.

Due to the size of the device to be tested

and the number of HLOS tests being prepared simultaneously, engineers constructed the largest tunnel system ever

used at NTS. In July 1970, DASA ran

DIAL PACK, a joint U.S. and Canadian

high explosives test at the Defence Research Establishment, Suffield, in Alberta, Canada to determine loading and

response of various systems to airblast and

ground shock. The primary objective of

this test was to obtain loading and response data for a variety of military targets such as missiles, communications

and field equipment, shelters, and various

structural parts. A secondary objective

was to obtain data on air blast and ground

motion, both direct and air blast-induced.

Another test would use a method of directing blast to produce effects with characteristics similar to those produced by

much larger charges than actually used.83

At the NTS and at other test facilities

DNA conducted a series of underground

effects tests. DIAMOND MINE was a

cavity shot to evaluate seismic effects under various conditions in July of 1971. DIAGONAL LINE, conducted in November of 1971, was a VLOS test of Poseidon missile components, including a

study of internal effects of EMP. DIAMOND SCULLS, conducted in July of

1972, used the largest LOS pipe system,

with a large, 26-foot diameter test chamber to test the vulnerability of Spartan missile components. MIXED COMPANY

was a series of 1972 high explosive tests

in Colorado to investigate blast, cratering,

and shock effects of a simulated 1-KT airblast. DIDO QUEEN, in June of 1973,

and HUSKY ACE, in October of 1973,

tested several weapons systems, each using new test equipment. DIDO QUEEN

made successful use of a new closure system, while HUSKY ACE made use of a

self-contained recorder and oscilloscope

system. Like a few other tests through this

period, HYBLA FAIR, in October of

1974, was designed to improve testing

equipment.

A few tests illustrate the range of effects being studied by DNA in this period. HYBLA GOLD, executed on

November 1, 1977, was a specialized investigation of some of the physics of a nuclear detonation in or near a buried trench,

to gather data that might be used in a particular missile basing scheme. Although

prior tests had focused on nuclear weapon effects on weapon systems, engineers

designed this test primarily to gather information about the effect of weapons on

tunnels and trenches that could be used

to house an MX system. In particular, experimenters measured such effects as scoring and breaking of pipe walls, and

magnetic and EMP effects on cables and

electronic instrumentation. Extensive

grounding and shielding of equipment resulted in accurate readings and such methods were established as mandatory on

future tests.84

Through the 1970s, DNA arranged

tests to evaluate three separate concepts
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 243

of the MX system, with many

high explosive tests through the

decade providing assistance in

evaluating the concepts. The

three different concepts being

tested included trench systems,

shelter systems, and a liquidpool system. The pool system

involved a concept of 20' x 20'

x 100' liquid shelters that would

be designed to survive the effects of a nearby 5-MT nuclear

surface burst. During the

MIXED COMPANY tests in

November of 1972, various

plastic-lined “pans” or holes

filled with liquid were situated in different orientations at varying distances from

the blast, to determine how much liquid

would “slosh” out the containers due to

airblast. Using scaling laws, the effectiveness of the full scale system as a means

of sheltering nuclear missiles could be determined.85

The test ran into a great number of difficulties. Researchers found it impossible

to simultaneously scale ground motion,

airblast, and debris effects. Debris tended to mix with the fluid, making fluid loss

impossible to determine. Even so, experimenters determined that construction of berms

around the pools would reduce fluid loss.86

Another experiment, the (PRE) DICE

THROW II event with 100 tons of TNT,

measured the effects of a pressure environment inside a collapsing MX trench.

Two small steel trenches were constructed, one with a two-foot diameter and the

other, a half-foot in diameter. To isolate

the pressure effect from other effects,

technicians covered surrounding dirt with

dust-suppressing material. The test allowed verification of the strength of roof

panels. Another part of the test studied the

way in which ground debris mounded

around an explosion and how it might

entrap shelters and tunnel opening. The

motion of debris as it moved from ground

zero had always been hard to determine

as fireballs and dust clouds during atmospheric nuclear tests obscured the debris

motion in the first seconds after a blast.

The latter test produced a surprise, with

debris mounding five to ten times the

amount predicted. Still another test determined how concrete cylindrical tunnels

compacted, and how they might be made

strong enough to withstand multiple detonations. Such tests built up a base of information that could be used to evaluate

future MX missile designs.87

By 1977, the development of the MX

missile was the “largest single driving

function” behind DNA’s work in developing strategic structures that could better withstand nuclear weapon effects.

Supporting the general MX concept were

a number of specific basing concepts, with

different types of tunnels, tracks, roadways, and connecting systems. For each

proposed basing concept, simulation testing methods had to be developed and validated to evaluate and overcome potential

weak points.88

Nuclear radiation experimenters had

been concerned with the accuracy of their

data because of the large currents induced

on cables in earlier tests. They determined

DIAL PACK high-explosive test; dummy in foxhole

facing 500-ton TNT test stack, July 1970.
244 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

that with proper shielding of cables close

in to the detonation, such currents could

be successfully suppressed. They planned

to incorporate the grounding and shielding techniques on future tests.89 Using the

principle of dual use developed in the

1960s with equipment, experimenters extended the concept to using whole drift

and tunnel complexes used from the earlier, May 1976, MIGHTY EPIC test.

Although the primary experiment on

DIABLO HAWK had been an Air Force

reentry system, a nine-month delay in

schedule allowed the addition of a wide

range of other tests. For example, an EMP

phenomenology experiment, and a major

Navy Trident missile body electronics experiment, became part of the final test.

The EMP phenomenology experiment required several modifications, including a

completely separate drift. The Navy

project required a very large vacuum

chamber. Other materials being tested required underground air-conditioning. One

of the largest tests, DIABLO HAWK, required 16 instrumentation trailers which

were supported by nine contractors.90

Along with the continuing program of

underground nuclear tests, DNA continued to use high-explosive simulation tests

to investigate ground motions generated

by single and multiple nuclear

detonations. DNA designed the

MISERS BLUFF test to determine the effect of several nearsimultaneous bursts directed at

the proposed MX system of

weapons situated in underground tunnels.91

DNA conducted MISERS

BLUFF in two phases, the first

at the White Sands Missile

Range in New Mexico, and the

second at Planet Ranch in western Arizona. The White Sands

series consisted of eight highexplosive events using small

TNT spheres in the range of 265 pounds

to 1,000 pounds, over the period from

June to December of 1977. The second

phase in Arizona, in April to August, 1978,

included two multi-burst events using

120-ton charges of ANFO mixtures. These

experiments provided data from which

analysts could refine and prove a model

for nuclear effects in different geological

settings in which the MX missile might

be deployed.92These tests, required a high

number of data channels and recording

equipment, resulting in a shortage of gear

for the DIABLO HAWK nuclear test being set up at the same time. The tests at

White Sands required 850 channels for recording airblast and ground motion data.

In the high-explosive tests at Planet

Ranch, the first event required 470 data

channels, while the second event required

370 channels. As a result, Field Command

had to rent and borrow equipment to meet

its test obligations through 1978.93

Like the nuclear tests, the high-explosive tests made maximum use of the event

by scheduling multiple experiments and

engaging various projects. MISERS

BLUFF involved over 180 different users. Facing the heat of Arizona in August

was also a serious problem for the trailers and the power distribution systems.94

NTS underground test tunnel the moment after

detonation. Note cabling and sensor devices mounted

on tunnel walls.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 245

Another two-event highexplosive test, MIGHTY

MACH, was held near Alberta

Canada in August and September of 1978.95 Each of these

two events involved a 1,000

pound sphere of Pentalite explosive suspended 15 feet

above a flat surface. Experimenters gathered data on static and dynamic pressures from

the surface up to 40 feet, out

to a range of 245 feet.

The urgent need to determine exactly what sort of underground emplacement would

be safe for MX missiles led to a compressed schedule of testing. With MISERS BLUFF and MIGHTY MACH,

both high-explosive tests, and the nuclear DIABLO HAWK test all running at

nearly the same time, some of the equipment that test managers used did not measure up to the usual standards of quality.

Taking equipment to the Canadian site,

and variations in weather conditions presented further difficulties.96 Since the

schedule through this period resulted in

four ongoing tests during the summer of

1978, DNA dealt with a severe shortage

of equipment by borrowing equipment

from the National Security Agency

(NSA), from NASA, from the Air Force

Weapons Laboratory, and from several

smaller agencies. Altogether, the borrowed equipment had a value over

$2,000,000. DNA also purchased some

new equipment and modified existing

equipment to help meet its needs.97

DNA conducted thermal radiation

simulation tests using arrays of oxygenfilled polyethylene bags injected with aluminum powder that were then ignited. The

thermal output could be varied by arranging the array in different geometric patterns, presenting scaled simulation of the

thermal flux, fluence, and waveform of

the thermal pulse from nuclear explosions

in the 1KT to 1MT range. DNA used these

tests in conjunction with the airblast tests

to determine the characterization of the

dusty thermal layer formed over many soil

surfaces in the vicinity of a nuclear blast.

The agency scheduled four of these tests

starting in August of 1978.98 Such tests

allowed DNA to examine phenomena not

originally studied during the atmospheric testing program. The United States had

conducted no atmospheric tests of thermonuclear devices over a large land mass.

Furthermore, when atmospheric testing

had been terminated in 1963, nuclear warfare scenarios had not incorporated the

possibility that multiple weapons would

be detonated near each other over targets

within seconds of each other. As a consequence, earlier experiments had not examined such effects as the interference of

massive amounts of dust with incoming

weapons or weapon systems. By combining scaled non-nuclear test results with

data from the older atmospheric tests, researchers could extrapolate some of the

new effects they needed to know.

In 1971, Admiral Mustin testified to

Congress that a rising fireball of a onemegaton burst would probably loft up to

500,000 tons of dust into the atmosphere, with

Workmen construct high-explosive TNT test sphere.
246 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

particles ranging from boulder size down to

powder size. Such a cloud would rise tens

of thousands of feet, spread out for tens

of miles, and last for as long as a half-hour.

The effect on a B-1 bomber would be “erosion” of the structure. “It just gets sandpapered,” concluded Mustin.

Table 6-4 summarizes the tests conducted during the 1970-1980 period.99 The

decline in testing rate from the 1960s, when

DASA had fielded five or more tests a year,

derived from several factors. On one hand,

in the 1970s, the Services introduced fewer new systems. In addition, because of

the increasing complexity and cost of the

experiments fielded by DNA, the number

of tests had to be reduced. By the late

1970s, the cost for a single underground

nuclear test was on the order of $30 million. As a consequence, managers extended the practice of combining

(piggy-backing) experiments as well as reusing older LOS pipes and chambers. By

1978, the Director of DNA could tell Congress that in a single underground test, the

agency would field as many as 400 separate experiments, for all three Services,

other defense agencies, and DOE laboratories.100

By the early to mid 1970s, the individual

Services were not only incorporating the results of DNA tests

into their new weapon systems,

they were beginning to respond

in other ways to the knowledge

gained from DNA work. Planned

military satellites were being

hardened against radiation effects as a regular part of the design process. The Navy had

incorporated new methods of

strengthening ship structures as

a consequence of data provided

by DNA about airblast and underwater nuclear blast and shock

effect in the 1950s. The Navy

constructed its own EMP simulator operated off of Solomons, Maryland,

and conducted its underwater shock tests

against ship structures at Norfolk and

Portsmouth. By 1974, DNA Deputy Director (Science and Technology), Peter

Haas, reported that the Navy had made

substantial effort incorporating EMP

hardening technology and other radiation

effects programs.101

TEST BAN

NEGOTIATIONS AND DNA

When Averill Harriman negotiated the

LTBT with the Soviet Union in 1963,

President Kennedy faced a difficult time

ensuring that it would be ratified by the

Senate. In order to win the support of the

JCS for the treaty, Kennedy had agreed

to four safeguards: comprehensive and aggressive underground testing program;

maintenance of modern weapons laboratories; maintenance of the ability to resume atmospheric testing on short notice;

and improvement of the means to verify

compliance with the treaty.102

DASA, and then DNA, played important parts in three of the safeguards.

DNA’s nuclear testing of weapon effects

on military systems, DOE’s program of

underground development testing of the

MIXED COMPANY: 500-ton TNT test stack, November 1972.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 247

new nuclear warheads, and the operation

of Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore

laboratories fulfilled the first and second

safeguards. DARPA and AFTAC work on

means to verify compliance met the fourth

safeguard. The third safeguard, or “Safeguard C,” to maintain readiness for resumption of above-ground testing

required that Johnston Atoll be retained

as a possible site for resumption of atmospheric testing, especially with the rehabilitation of Enewetak and the cleanup of

Bikini. Despite fears that the end of atmospheric testing would impede weapon

development, observers noted that the

vigorous underground testing program of

Table 6-4. DNA Tests, 1970-1980.

T e est D n at Functio

R 0 OCKTEST II M s arch 197 HE test silo structure

D 0 IAMOND DUST M s ay 197 Cavity shot, seismic effect

M 0 INT LEAF M e ay 197 HLOS to test Spartan missil

D 0 IAL PACK J k uly 197 HE airblast/ground shoc

D 1 IAMOND MINE J s uly 197 Cavity shot, seismic effect

D 1 IAGONAL LINE N e ovember 197 VLOS to test Poseidon Missil

D 2 IAMOND SCULLS J e uly 197 HLOS to test Spartan missil

M 2 IXED COMPANY N k ovember 197 HE blast, cratering, shoc

D 3 IDO QUEEN J s une 197 HLOS effects on weapon system

H 3 USKY ACE O s ctober 197 HLOS effects on weapon system

M 4 ING BLADE J s une 197 HLOS effects on weapon system

H 4 YBLA FAIR O d ctober 197 Evaluate short LOS & low yiel

D 5 INING CAR A e pril 197 HLOS tests Trident, Minuteman missil

H 5 USKY PUP O s ct. 197 HLOS tests Navy reentry vehicle

M 6 IGHTY EPIC M s ay 197 HLOS test Air Force/Navy reentry vehicle

D 7 ICE THROW 1 s 975-197 HE events, White Sand

H 7 YBLA GOLD N X ovember 197 HLOS airblast on M

M 8 ISERS BLUFF 1 Z 977-197 HE events, NM and A

D 8 IABLO HAWK S s eptember 197 HLOS certify reentry vehicle

H 0 URON KING J s une 198 VLOS test satellite

M 0 INER'S IRON O s ctober 198 HLOS test MX component
248 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

the 1960s and the 1970s allowed weapon

development to proceed almost unimpeded. The LTBT did very little to impede the

development of modern nuclear weapons.103

The goal of negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) treaty remained part

of the official agenda of the Johnson and

Nixon administrations, although neither

one vigorously pursued such a test ban.

Rather, Lyndon Johnson sought to arrest

nuclear proliferation, and to slow the production of fissile materials by cutting back

on production facilities. Since the United

States already had a surplus, closing seven production reactors over the period

1964-68 was a peace gesture that did not

adversely impact the nation’s nuclear preparedness. Johnson also began the process

that led to a strategic arms limitation agreement, and achieved international agreement

on a non-proliferation treaty.104

The increasing tempo of arms control

talks and resultant arms limitation treaties

through this period demonstrated that the

thaw was not simply a one-sided illusion

on the part of the United States, but that

the Soviet Union reciprocated with concessions and negotiation. Not incidentally, other nuclear powers, especially Great

Britain, also joined in the spirit of negotiating nuclear arms settlements.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was

opened for signature July 1, 1968 and it

entered into force on March 5, 1970. This

treaty prohibited the nuclear-weapon nations from transferring to or assisting in

the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear

weapons or other nuclear devices by nonnuclear nations. It also prohibited nonnuclear nations from manufacturing or

acquiring nuclear devices.

The United States and the Soviet

Union agreed to two new treaties on September 30, 1971. One improved the existing hot-line telephone link between the

two countries by setting up a satellite

phone connection. The second treaty, an

agreement on measures to reduce the risk

of nuclear war through accidents, required

each party to give immediate notification

of any unauthorized incident involving the

possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.

It also required immediate notification of

the detection of an unidentified object by

either country’s missile warning system,

as well as notice of any interference with

the warning systems. Both countries

agreed to notify each other in case of any

planned missile launches beyond their

own borders in the direction of the other

country.105

A new multilateral treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear

weapons on the seabed of the ocean entered into force on May 18, 1972. Although a minor treaty, readily agreed to,

it prevented the deployment of nuclear

weapons on the bottom of the sea for any

purpose, including mining of straits and

access channels.

While these specialized treaties did

much to lessen tensions between the two

countries, the ABM agreements, signed in

1972, limited permissible ABM systems

to the defense of the capital of both the

Peter Haas, DNA Deputy Director (Science

and Technology), 1974 through 1979.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 249

United States and the Soviet Union, together with a system at one other site

housing ICBMs. The ABM treaty captured the long-held view of Robert McNamara, to which Henry Kissinger and

the Nixon administration adhered, that

these new missiles, although defensive,

represented an incentive to an another

arms race. Although the public had difficulty understanding or accepting the concept of assured destruction, by prohibiting

the emplacement of ABM systems around

population centers and by protecting

weapons instead of people, the threat of

population destruction would serve to

deter each country from embarking on a

nuclear first-strike. The protection of the

capital cities, it was thought, would allow

decision making to proceed in the unlikely

event of an accidental war, with the hope

that escalation might be limited by the

surviving leadership. A protocol added to

the ABM treaty in 1974, that went into

force in 1976, reduced the sites to be protected by ABMs to one site each.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) Agreement of 1972 limited the

number of missiles each country would

deploy, for a period of five years, as an

interim measure while the two countries

worked out further details. Between 1972

and the completion of the SALT II Treaty

in 1979, several other arms control treaties went into effect. The general thrust

of these treaties during the 1970s extended the area of agreement between the

United States and the Soviet Union, and

put the various testing programs of DNA

into a new international context. Table 6-

5 lists the treaties and agreements in effect during this period.

DNA was particularly governed by

the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of

1974, which prohibited underground nuclear tests over 150-KT yield and specified the sites at which the tests would be

conducted. For the U.S. test program, this

limitation did not represent a change in

policy, as the vast majority of weapon

tests were well under the limit. For example, the DoD weapon effects tests arranged by DNA through the period were

all in much lower ranges of yield.

President Carter was the first president since John Kennedy to make a serious effort to negotiate a CTB treaty. In two

speeches, in January and March of 1977,

Carter announced that he would seek an

end to all nuclear testing. Secretary of

State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko met in March

of 1997, and agreed to work toward a treaty that would involve Great Britain in a

comprehensive treaty to ban all nuclear

tests, including those underground. Negotiations began in earnest toward a new

treaty in October 1977 at Geneva.107

The negotiations with the Soviet

Union made relatively rapid progress in

1977-78. Two negotiating obstacles were

easily overcome. The Soviets agreed to a

moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions for the duration of the discussions

and Premier Brezhnev took a more lenient

attitude towards the question of on-site inspections than had characterized the Soviet negotiating positions since early in

the 1960s.108

The Soviets agreed to a fixed number

of tamper-proof seismic stations to supplement observation by satellite and remote seismic stations outside of the Soviet

Union. Both the United States and the

Soviets agreed to a system of voluntary

on-site inspections.109

While these issues were being discussed at Geneva, opponents to a CTB

treaty mounted a campaign in both Britain and the United States. In hearings before Congress in August of 1978,

representatives from the DoD, the weapons laboratories, and the Joint Chiefs all

indicated that continued testing would be

required to identify and correct problems
250 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

that might develop in new warheads or

bombs. Such issues could not be addressed with confidence without underground testing. Continued reliability of

the stockpile of weapons simply required

some form of testing. In making arguments to oppose the CTB treaty, far more

public support was mustered for the concept of maintaining the stockpile and its

deterrent capability, than for modernizing

and developing new weapons.110

Admiral Monroe testified before Congress, carefully marshalling the arguments

against a CTB. After detailing the current

underground test program, he pointed out

that scientists at the agency had been using simulation methods and a decreasing

number of underground tests. Nonetheless, moving entirely to simulators presented several scientific issues. “We are

dealing,” he said, “in power levels of trillions of watts, and time spans of billionths

of a second.” With intensive priority and

funding, and some luck, he pointed out,

it might be possible in five or ten years to

accomplish most, but not all of the experimentation with simulators.111

Some members of Congress agreed

that limiting testing in the 1960s had already posed a danger to the strategic safety of the United States. Representative

Bob Wilson, a long-time Republican Congressman from California, led his witness.

“We were caught flat footed. Is that a pretty accurate statement?” DNA Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Pete

Haas, referred the question to the intelligence community, but had to admit that

he agreed.112

However, when the Chairman of the

Committee, Representative Dan Daniel,

asked Monroe if DNA had “...officially

gone on record as opposed to a comprehensive test ban treaty,” the Admiral clearly stated that the agency had not taken

such a position. To clarify his own position, as distinct from that of his predecessor, he chose his words carefully. “This

country’s security can be enhanced by

arms control measures, including test ban

treaties, that are symmetrical, verifiable,

and take into account other national security needs.”113

The committee members encouraged

Admiral Monroe to make a clear statement opposing the CTB. Clearly, from a

military point of view, such an issue involved a broad policy question not within DNA’s purview. On the other hand, as

members of Congress saw it, Monroe was

the best-qualified expert to speak to

whether such a treaty would harm U.S.

defense readiness. Congressman Stratton

attempted to elicit more direct opposition.

Table 6-5. U.S.-Soviet Treaties and Agreements, 1973-79.106

B 3 asic Principles of Negotiation Signed June 197

Agreement on Prevention Nuclear War In Force June 1973

T 4 hreshold Test Ban Treaty Signed July 197

V 4 ladivostock Accord Signed Nov 197

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty Signed May 1976

SALT II Signed June 1979
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 251

“I assume,” asked Stratton, “you agree

with your predecessor that there are military disadvantages in a Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty?” “Absolutely, sir,” said

Monroe.114 When recounting his experiences later, Monroe remembered that he

had taken a very firm tone, in his opposition.115 Monroe went on to make it clear

that he believed that with current methods of verification, it would be possible

for the Soviets to conduct tests below the

level of verification and to obtain a military advantage from such testing.116

With seismic sensing representing the

primary means of detecting nuclear explosions, verifiers confronted a serious problem. Literally thousands of natural seismic

events per year exceeded in force very low

yield nuclear devices. A great deal of experimentation could proceed with nuclear devices with a yield of under five

kilotons, and it would be difficult to determine if any of the seismic events in that

range derived from testing or not.117

The Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency (ACDA) continued to argue

through this period that detection and verification could be achieved. The JCS did

not agree. A substantial body of members

of Congress, together with a conservative

sector of the press, also doubted the assurances of ACDA.118

President Carter changed his tactics in

May of 1978, negotiating with the Soviets for a CTB of five-year, limited duration, and then asking for an agreement for

a three-year treaty in September. Again,

in October of 1978, Congressional committees provided forums for military objections to the treaty.

Negotiations addressed the issues of a

renewable three-year CTB treaty through

late 1978 and early 1979. Both Brezhnev

and Carter turned their negotiation toward

the issue of SALT II, a treaty that would

limit the total number of nuclear weapons

in the arsenals of the two major powers. By

1978, negotiators had worked out the terms

of SALT II, and President Carter signed the

new treaty. It was withheld from Senate

ratification due to the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in December of 1979. Along

with SALT II, the CTB appeared dead. Testing would continue.119

TRANSITION

Throughout the 1970s, DNA continued to meet its core mission of weapon

effect testing, while adding new missions

that grew out of the new, more environmentally conscious sensitivities of the

decade. Cleaning up Enewetak in the

1970s, in comparison to the clean up of

Bikini in a few months in 1969, took much

longer and a much higher order of expenditure and time. Yet bureaucratic delays,

coordination with other agencies, and the

effort to respond to the concerns of the

dri-Enewetak all paid off in the long run.

While Bikini had to be evacuated, over

400 native people returned to Enewetak,

no longer living as refugees, readjusting

to a new life in their ancestral homeland.

The NTPR absorbed a significant part

of DNA’s efforts in the late 1970s and

early 1980s, but in this area, as in the

Enewetak cleanup, the agency’s care in

dealing with veterans, its patience in developing information, and the detailed

and careful responses, produced a body

of data that bounded the problem. In the

end, federal compensation to a handful of

leukemia victims and their families appeared to represent a just solution to a

intricate problem with legal, epidemiological, scientific, and administrative complications.

The focus of testing itself changed, as

Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter considered building the MX (Peacekeeper) missile. Proposed designs required that a wide

variety of weapon effects be understood,

including the effect of nuclear near misses on tunnels and trenches, on the propa-
252 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

gation of effects through tunnels, and on

the effect of weapons on liquid missile

emplacement systems. By using a wide

variety of high-explosive simulation testing, radiation equipment, evaluations of

foreign tests, and study of natural phenomena, DNA contributed volumes of information to each of these defense concerns.

When the Carter administration considered a CTB treaty as a capstone to its

negotiating efforts with the Soviet Union,

DNA administrators found themselves in

an awkward position. As Admiral Monroe made clear to Congress, the agency

had to carry out its mission and it would

be inappropriate to offer political opinions, especially when those opinions ran

counter to a plan supported by the Commander in Chief. On the other hand, as

the agency within the military closest to

the subject of nuclear testing, DNA had

the expertise to be able to comment on the

effect that such a test ban would have. So,

without stepping out of bounds, representatives of the agency made clear to Congress and to the Joint Chiefs, that in their

opinion, a CTB would adversely affect

U.S. preparedness.

With the decline in Soviet-American

relations during the decade, the issue of a

CTB became moot, at least for the time

being. Disarmament and a nuclear testing

accord would have to wait until the wheel

of time turned a few more rotations.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 253

ENDNOTES

1. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations

Mandrel and Grommet, Events Minute

Steak, Diesel Train, Diana Mist, Mint

Leaf, Hudson Moon, Diagonal Line, and

Misty North, September 12, 1969 to May

2, 1972, DNA Report 6223F (Kirtland

AFB, NM, 1987), p. 7.

2. Packard to Sen. Thomas McIntyre, cited

in hearings, U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1972 Authorization for Military

Procurement, Research and Development, Construction and Real Estate Acquisition for the Safeguard ABM and

Reserve Strengths (herein referred to as

Fiscal Year 1972 Authorization), Part 3

of 5 Parts, 92nd Congr., 1st Session,

1971, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971),

pp. 2427-2428.

3. U.S. Congress, Senate, Fiscal Year 1972

Authorization, p. 2449.

4. Admiral Robert Monroe, interview by

Rodney P. Carlisle, September 18, 1997,

20-21; Dr. Marvin Atkins, interview by

Rodney P. Carlisle, October 10, 1997.

5. Defense Nuclear Agency, Field Command, DNA–Special Historical Report,

1946-1985, DSWA Technical Resources

Center, 15-20. U.S. Congress, Senate,

Fiscal Year 1972 Authorization, p. 2448.

6. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on

Armed Services, Hearings, Fiscal Year

1972 Authorization, p. 2448.

7. Defense Nuclear Agency, Annual Historical Summary, Field Command, Defense

Nuclear Agency, October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1978, RCS: HQDNA(A) -1M,

(herein referred to as 1978 Field Command Historical Summary) DSWA Technical Resources Center, pp. 21, 88.

8. Defense Nuclear Agency, 1978 Field

Command Historical Summary, p. 91.

9. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Military Posture and H.R. 11500; Department of

Defense Authorization for Appropriations

for Fiscal Year 1977, Part 5 of 5 Parts,

94th Congr., 2nd Session, 1976, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), p. 1256.

10. Defense Nuclear Agency, 1978 Field

Command Historical Summary, pp. 240-

241.

11. Ibid, p. 241.

12. Ibid, pp. 244-245.

13. Defense Nuclear Agency, The Radiological Cleanup of Enewetak Atoll, (Washington, DC: Defense Nuclear Agency,

1981), 45-55. Steve Fetter, Toward a

Comprehensive Test Ban, (Cambridge,

MA: 1988), p. 3.

14. Defense Atomic Support Agency, Cleanup of Bikini Atoll, (Washington, DC: Defense Atomic Support Agency, 1971);

Stewart L. Udall to Seaborg, December

7, 1966, cited in Barton Hacker, Elements

of Controversy, (Berkeley, CA, 1994), p.

256.

15. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 256.

16. Defense Atomic Support Agency, Cleanup of Bikini Atoll, pp. 10-11.

17. Ibid, p. 11.

18. Ibid, pp. l 2, 9.

19. Ibid, p. 12-13.

20. Ibid, p. 13.

21. Defense Nuclear Agency, Radiological

Cleanup of Enewetak Atoll, pp. 51, 56.

22. Ibid. p. 51.

23. Ibid. p. 63.

24. Ibid, p. 64.

25. Ibid, p. 68.

26. Ibid, pp. 63, 98.

27. Ibid, p. 80.

28. Ibid, p. 82.

29. Ibid, p. 93.

30. Ibid, p. 94.

31. Ibid, pp. 97-98.

32. Ibid, p. 99.

33. Ibid, p. 158.

34. Ibid, p. 175.

35. Ibid, p. 176.

36. Ibid, p. 523.

37. Ibid, p. 548.

38. Ibid, p. 557.

39. Defense Atomic Support Agency, Cleanup of Bikini Atoll, pp. 2-3.

40. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 258.

41. Ibid, p. 257.

42. Defense Nuclear Agency, Radiological

Cleanup of Enewetak Atoll, p. 532.
254 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

43. John Noble Wilford, “For Pacific’s Atomic Nomads, A Symbolic Ground-Breaking,” New York Times, April 10, 1988.

The Bikinians maintain a web page at

www.bikiniatoll.com that contains statistics and current news about Bikini Atoll.

44. Abby A. Johnson, Jerald L. Goetz, and

William K. McRaney, For the Record–A

History of the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program, 1978-1986 (herein referred to as For the Record), (McLean,

VA: 1986), pp. 1-2.

45. Johnson et. al., For the Record, pp. 4-5.

46. Ibid, p. 5.

47. Ibid, p. 6.

48. Ibid, p. 8.

49. Ibid, p. 9.

50. The eight NTPR tasks are noted in the

1996 updated edition of the NTPR report.

See For the Record: A History of the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program,

1978-1993 (McLean, VA: 1996), pp.

11-16.

51. Johnson et. al., For the Record, 1986 edition, pp. 11-13.

52. Details of which news media were contacted are noted in Defense Nuclear

Agency, 1978 Field Command Historical Summary, p. 36.

53. Defense Nuclear Agency, 1978 Field

Command Historical Summary, p. 36.

54. Johnson et. al., For the Record, p. 13.

55. Ibid, p. 14.

56. Media coverage cited in Johnson et. al.,

For the Record, p. 14. Also, David Kaplan, “Where the Bombs Are,” New West,

April 1981, pp. 76-83.

57. Johnson et. al., For the Record, pp. 15-

16. Over an eight-year period, DNA officials gave testimony regarding the

NTPR in front of: the Subcommittee on

Health and Environment, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce January 24-26, and February 14,

1978; the Subcommittee of the House

Committee on Government Operations,

July 13, 1978; the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal

Services, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, May 8, 1979; the Senate

Committee on Veterans Affairs, June 20,

1979; the Senate Committee on Labor

and Human Resources, October 27, 1981;

the Senate Committee on Veterans affairs,

April 18, 1983; the Subcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations, House

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, May 24,

1983; and the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, December 11, 1985.

58. Johnson et. al., For the Record, p. 21.

59. Ibid, p. 28.

60. Glyn G. Caldwell, Delle B. Kelley, Clark

W. Heath, Jr., “Leukemia Among Participants in Military Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test: A Preliminary Report,”

Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 244, no. 14, p. 3, October 1980.

61. Johnson et. al., For the Record, p. 183.

62. Ibid, p. 183; Caldwell et. al., “Leukemia

among Participants in Military Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test.”

63. Caldwell et. al., “Leukemia among Participants in Military Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test,” pp. 620-624.

64. C. Dennis Robinette, Seymour Jablon,

and Thomas L. Preston, Studies of Participants in Nuclear Tests, NRC Medical

Follow-Up Agency, (Washington, DC:

1985), as cited in Johnson et. al., For the

Record, pp. 187-88.

65. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Veterans’

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear

Weapons Testing (herein referred to as

Veterans’ Claims), 96th Congr., 1st sess.,

June 20, 1979 (Washington, DC: GPO,

1979), p. 19.

66. Admiral R.R. Monroe to Cranston, June

18, 1979, 2, in U.S. Congress, Senate,

Veterans’ Claims, p. 353.

67. Admiral R.R. Monroe to Cranston, June

18, 1979, 4, in U.S. Congress, Senate,

Veterans’ Claims, p. 355.

68. Thomas H. Saffer and Orville E. Kelly,

Countdown Zero, (New York: 1982),

p. 13.

69. Ibid, p. 14.

70. Howard Ball, Justice Downwind, (New

York: 1986), p. 148.

71. Ibid, p. 147.

72. Ibid, p. 161.
ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980 255

73. Saffer and Kelly, Countdown Zero, p.

275.

74. Ibid.

75. Ball, Justice Downwind, p. 118.

76. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 278.

77. Ibid.

78. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense

Appropriations for 1973, Part 4, 92nd

Congr., 2nd Session, 1972, (Washington,

DC: GPO, 1972), p. 1229.

79. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973,

(herein referred to as FY 73 DoD Appropriations) Part 1, 92nd Congr., 2nd Session, 1972 (Washington, DC: GPO,

1972), p. 1022. Also see U.S. Congress,

House, Hearings, Committee on Armed

Services, Hearings on Military Posture

and H.R. 10929, Department of Defense

Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 (herein referred to as FY

79 DoD Authorization for Appropriations) Part 3 of 7 Parts, Book 2 of 2

Books, 95th Congr., 2nd sess., 1978,

(Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), pp. 1648-

1650.

80. U.S. Congress, House, FY 79 DoD Authorization for Appropriations, pp. 1656-

57.

81. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on

Armed Services, Hearings on Military

Posture and H.R. 11500, Department of

Defense Authorization for Appropriations

for Fiscal Year 1977 (herein referred to

as FY 77 DoD Authorization for Appropriations), Part 5 of 5 Parts, 94th Congr.,

2nd sess., 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO,

1976), pp. 1248-1249. Regarding barium

release, see also U.S. Congress, House,

FY 79 DoD Authorization for Appropriations, p. 1655. Regarding missile

launches, see U.S. Congress, Senate, FY

73 DoD Appropriations, pp. 1027-1029.

82. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on

Military Posture and H.R. 12564, Department of Defense Authorization for

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, Part

4 of 4 Parts, 93rd Congr., 2nd Session,

1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), pp.

3624-3625.

83. “History of the Shock Physics Directorate”, 21, in Defense Nuclear Agency,

DNA Semi-Annual Historical Reports,

January 1, 1970-June 30, 1970, Volume

I, DSWA Technical Resources Center.

84. Defense Nuclear Agency, 1978 Field

Command Historical Summary, pp. 213-

214.

85. U.S. Congress, House, FY 77 DoD Authorization for Appropriations, p. 1261.

86. Ibid, pp. 1262-1263.

87. Ibid, pp. 1266-1267, 1269, 1270.

88. Ibid, pp 1251-1252. Also, see John

Edwards, Superweapon: the Making of

M-X, (New York: 1982).

89. Defense Nuclear Agency, 1978 Field

Command Historical Summary, p. 215.

90. Ibid, pp. 217-218.

91. Ibid, p. 219.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid, pp. 218, 220.

94. Ibid, p. 220.

95. Ibid, p. 221.

96. Ibid, pp. 221-222.

97. Ibid, p. 225.

98. Ibid, p. 224.

99. U.S. Congress, Senate, Fiscal Year 1972

Authorization, pp. 2438-2439, 2447.

100. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Current Negotiations on the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty, 95th Congr., 2nd sess., March

15 and 16, 1978, (Washington, DC: GPO,

1978), p. 55.

101. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on

Military Posture and H.R. 12564, Department of Defense Authorization for

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, Part

4 of 4 Parts, 93rd. Congr., 2nd Session.,

1974, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p.

3638.

102. Steve Fetter, Toward a Comprehensive

Test Ban, (Cambridge, MA: 1988), p. 10.

103. Ibid, p. 11.
256 ANOTHER WAY, 1970 TO 1980

104. Ibid.; Rodney P. Carlisle and Joan M.

Zenzen, Supplying the Nuclear Arsenal,

(Baltimore: 1996), p. 152.

105. Julie Dahlitz, Nuclear Arms Control, With

Effective International Agreements, (Boston: 1983), p. 29.

106. As described in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms

Control and Disarmament Agreements,

1990 edition, (Washington, DC: 1990).

107. Fetter, Toward a Comprehensive Test

Ban, p. 15.

108. Ibid, p. 16.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. U.S. Congress, House, Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty, p. 55.

112. Ibid, pp. 56-57.

113. Ibid, p. 63.

114. Ibid, p. 65.

115. Monroe interview, p. 34.

116. U.S. Congress, House, Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty, pp. 66-67.

117. Ibid, p. 72.

118. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “NO

Rubber Stamping,” Washington Post,

March 16, 1978.

119. Fetter, Toward a Comprehensive Test

Ban, p. 17.
“

REAGAN DEFENSE BUILDUP

The inauguration of Ronald Reagan

in 1980, his landslide reelection in 1984,

and the subsequent dramatic increase in

defense spending—euphemistically referred to as the “Reagan Defense Buildup”—were a direct result of public

disenchantment of the Carter administration in the late 1970s. Double-digit inflation, the Iran hostage debacle, the Soviet

Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Olympic boycotts by the U.S., and later the

USSR, and the rearmament of Soviet strategic forces created a sense that the nation faced a “window of vulnerability.”

Indeed, part of Reagan’s election strategy hinged on his theme of closing this

window of vulnerability and achieving a

“rebirth of confidence” in American technical and military superiority.

In 1980-1981, Reagan and Secretary

of Defense Caspar Weinberger sought

several broad defense spending initiatives

to counter the Soviet rearmament. Their

spending initiatives were a dramatic departure from prior military policies espoused by President Carter. Military

spending under the Reagan administration

rose from $171 billion in 1981 to more

than $300 billion in 1985, the largest

peacetime defense appropriation in U.S.

Ronald Reagan, President, 1981 to 1989.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

If history teaches anything, it teaches self-delusion in the face of

unpleasant facts is folly... we see totalitarian forces in the world who

seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous

assault on the human spirit... let us move toward a world in which all people

are at last free to determine their own destiny.”

President Ronald Reagan,

Speech to House of Commons, London, England

June 8, 1982
258 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

history. Approximately 10 percent of that

total, or $180 billion, was earmarked for

the development and procurement of new

strategic systems. Congress approved the

construction of 100 long-range B-1 bombers, the development of totally new fighters and bombers employing Stealth

technology, the stockpiling of tactical nuclear and neutron bombs, the acquisition

of 400 air-launched and ground-launched

cruise missiles (ALCMs and GLCMs),

100 MX (Peacekeeper) ICBMs, the development of the Trident submarine program, and a variety of other defense

programs and initiatives.1 Additionally,

Reagan also began planning for the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI) or Star Wars, a space-based system

designed to intercept Soviet missiles

headed toward American targets.

DNA PROGRAMS

IN THE EARLY 1980S

President Reagan’s “defense buildup”

had a direct effect upon DNA’s programs

and policies in the 1980s, and dictated the

course of agency support to DoD. The

resurgence of the Cold War and the shift

in America’s nuclear strategy also had a

profound effect on DNA’s mission. The

agency’s activities turned to enhancing the

endurance and destructive superiority of

the country’s strategic and conventional

forces in the event of nuclear war; a war

that U.S. planners now believed the country must be prepared to fight and win. This

policy was shared by the agency’s new director in 1980, Lieutenant General Harry

A. Griffith, USA.

Shortly after taking office in 1976,

President Carter signed Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18), which directed the

defense establishment to conduct three

studies: an ICBM Force Modernization

study, a study on the maintenance of the

country’s military reserve structure, and

a third, the Nuclear Targeting Review

(NTR), which dealt with Soviet strategic

doctrine, perceptions of U.S. nuclear strategy, and means for the destruction of the

Soviet governmental infrastructure. In this

last connection, the review recommended the adoption of an expanded set of targets in the Soviet Union, including some

700 underground shelters earmarked for

top Soviet officials, 2,000 strategic targets, hundreds of critical factories, communications installations, airfields, fuel

depots, and more. These recommendations formed the basis of another directive: PD-59.2

Even before President Carter approved PD-59 and the changes in strategic policy it implied, Defense Secretary

Harold Brown ordered DNA to get a head

start on its implementation in case it was

approved. In contrast to the earlier theater

nuclear force evaluation, the Strategic

Nuclear Implications and Assessments

program launched by DNA in 1979 had a

decidedly offensive character. It evaluated and prioritized the new target list, defined damage objectives, considered

Lieutenant General Harry A. Griffith, USA,

DNA Director 1980 to 1983.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 259

alternate nuclear weapon employment

strategies, and developed improved targeting tools. It was a critical step in acquiring the techniques, the hardware, and

the expertise needed to carry out the PD59 nuclear strategy.3

DNA played a critical role in virtually every phase of the buildup of U.S. strategic and theater forces in the early 1980s.

Survivability—of shelters, weapons, and

the communication, intelligence, and control systems that would tie them all together—became the linchpin of its programs

in the early 1980s, consuming a substantial share of DNA’s RDT&E budget.

Like the strategy itself, the shift by

DNA to a more proactive footing, in

which nuclear exchange was considered

a legitimate option, actually began during

the Carter administration. As discussed

earlier, in 1977 the agency was assigned

the task of establishing a Theater Nuclear Force Survivability, Security, and Safety program to assess the degree to which

U.S. nuclear forces in Europe would be

vulnerable to a Soviet first strike and how

much warfighting capability would remain. It went far beyond the issues of

nuclear survivability. This study addressed every threat in Europe, including

sabotage, special forces, conventional

forces, hostile environments and safety.

This program reflected heightened sensitivity to the insecurities of the global political climate and the weakening of the

U.S. force structure of the post-Vietnam

era. It also represented a departure from

DNA’s traditional focus on strategic systems. Its orientation, however, was strictly defensive.4

As part of the study, DNA conducted

a series of specific, Service-related studies. For the Navy, DNA conducted tests

on the survivability of submarines to nuclear blast. Building on existing knowledge about how shock is transmitted

through water, DNA began intensive investigations, utilizing conventional high

explosives, of how shock is conveyed

through the hull to the critical subsystems

of the submarine. These experiments led

to improved shock hardening and resistance techniques that were integrated into

future submarine designs. For the Air

Force, DNA conducted groundbreaking

work on the survivability of tactical and

strategic aircraft in the face of EMP

threats. The aging B-52 bomber fleet was

retrofitted with advanced avionics capability to give it enhanced survivability

against Soviet air defenses. Direct support

to the Army included assistance in conducting a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Assessment in the choice between the

nuclear capable 155-mm howitzer and the

8-inch alternative, and the construction of

a Large Blast-Thermal Simulator (LB/

TS). This simulator, eventually constructed at White Sands Missile Range

(WSMR) in New Mexico, would be the

world’s largest shock tube, capable of fullscale thermal and blast testing of military

systems.

Department of Defense Instruction

(DoDI 4245.4), Acquisition of NuclearSurvivable Systems, issued in September

of 1983, tasked the ATSD(AE) with assuring the nuclear survivability of major

weapon systems. This senior official, in

turn, tasked DNA with this effort and

beefed up the agency’s budget and manpower resources. DNA formed the Survivability Technology Division and

produced courses, publications, and

guidelines to assure that the weapon system development plans would pass Defense Systems Acquisition Review

Council (DSARC) reviews. DNA wanted its program managers to include hardening techniques as early as possible in

weapon system development to assure

minimal cost impact. This program fit

well with the agency’s overall nuclear

survivability mission.
260 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

All the Services, especially the Army,

were beneficiaries of DNA’s increasing

research on tactical issues. Based on its

growing operational experience at the theater level and working with ground commanders, initially in Europe and then in

the Pacific as well, DNA was able to make

significant contributions to the design and

employment of tactical weaponry. To provide support for these improvements,

DNA developed hand-held calculators designed to allow unit commanders to rapidly calculate nuclear weapon effects, thus

speeding targeting decisions. This was extended to a much more sophisticated Target and Analysis Planning System (TAPS)

for desktop computers. As with its strategic testing program, technical evaluation

of Soviet capabilities, and identification

of potential vulnerabilities constituted a

major portion of its theater-level mission.

Having evaluated enemy weapons capabilities, DNA advisers were able to help

theater commanders better match nuclear weapons with targets by providing information on damage criteria and weapon

effects.5 In 1980, DNA assisted in the

deployment of the new systems at U.S.

commands and NATO headquarters in

Europe.

The close support by DNA to SACEUR, CINCPAC and CINCSAC was

not just an in-name only function. It was

a first name personal relationship with the

CINCs and their staffs. It was a tradition

started by Fred Wikner, strongly enhanced

by Peter Haas, and arduously maintained

by his successor, Ed Conrad. Haas opened

a DNA support office in Munich, Germany. Ed Conrad institutionalized the DNA

support role by creating a dedicated nuclear support directorate within the agency. The PACOM Tactical Nuclear Force

improvement program was implemented

in the early 1980s. In recognition of the

key role played by DNA, the Undersecretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Richard Perle, appointed the

DDST as a permanent U.S. team member of the NATO High Level Group that

dealt with TNF modernization. In 1985,

the ATSD (AE), with the support of DNA,

implemented the recommendation of the

Secretary of Defense to the Secretary

General of NATO to form and lead a Senior Level Weapons Protection Group

(SLWPG) to address the security and survivability of nuclear weapons deployed to

NATO countries. The DNA Deputy Director for Operations headed the U.S. delegation to the new group, which was

instrumental in the installation of the

Weapons Security and Survivability System (WS3) throughout NATO. It significantly enhanced weapon security.

STRATEGIC MISSILE

MODERNIZATION

The MX missile (Peacekeeper) program began in the early 1970s and entered

advanced development by the U.S. Air

Force in the mid-to-late 1970s. Prompted

Dr. Ed Conrad, DNA Deputy Director (Science and Technology), 1979 to 1983.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 261

by the realization that new Soviet ICBMs

posed a serious threat to Minuteman missiles in their silos, and the fact that Minuteman technology approached 20 years

of reliance, the MX missile was designed

and developed with advanced components and technology in its missile booster, guidance and inertial control system,

post-boost vehicle, reentry system, and

warhead. These enhancements were expected to be a significant improvement over

the Minuteman III capabilities. Additionally, the MX missile was designed to address key survivability concerns through

an elaborate basing program, which

stressed survivability of a Soviet firststrike nuclear attack.

The MX was to be a whole new

ICBM, with multiple basing options. The

basing “modes” for the MX involved contentious military and political consideration of numerous alternatives to include

underground “racetrack” deployment in

massive closed-loop road systems; underground shelter or “trench” deployment;

rail deployment; closely-spaced or

“dense-pack” hardened-shelter deployment; or, at very least, deployed in revamped Minuteman silos. Probably no

project absorbed more of DNA’s attention

and resources than the MX missile.

DNA’s role in the MX project was

three-dimensional. First, it focused on the

survivability of the missile proper in what

was expected to be an unprecedented hostile operational environment. For the MX,

the alternative to fixed basing (silos) was

mobility, which required large land areas,

presumably in the midwestern part of the

country. To address limited land usage,

MX proponents countered with the idea

of mobility with deception; i.e., a sufficiently large number of fixed targets with

only a few containing real missiles, so the

enemy couldn’t afford to attack all threats.

The feasibility of such a basing solution

rested on avoiding multiple kills with a

single weapon; the harder the facility

(blast resistant, EMP resistant, etc.) the

less the required separation between possible targets, thus the smaller land area

required. This survivability rested on nuclear hardness, which DNA confirmed in

one research study after another.

Shelter hardness was the second role

of DNA’s MX involvement. MX basing

had proved almost as controversial as the

missile itself. Environmentalists and

ranchers from largely Republican western states, who rarely agreed on such

things, were infuriated by the proposition

that vast unsettled tracts of land should

be earmarked for the mobile missile’s

underground complexes. The subject of

land withdrawal was particularly frustrating for both the Carter and Reagan administrations because the basing scheme

originally required a spacing of approximately one mile to preclude an attacker

from targeting two silos with the blast

from one warhead. Richard Latter, who

sat on the Defense Science Board, warned

that a mile separation wasn’t adequate

because a detonation on one site would

place the adjacent silos in the EMP source

region, which could potentially create

burnout in the electronics of the two

neighboring silos. To resolve the issue

DNA conducted a study to stipulate construction guidelines to mitigate the vulnerability. Ultimately, the problem

became moot with a change in basing

scheme, but the study was important in

that it impressed the DDR&E with the

agency’s responsiveness.

The MX quickly became a major

stumbling block in the START negotiations. The Soviets saw the solid-fuel, multiple-warhead MX as a potent first-strike

weapon and insisted that the Americans

drop their deployment plans in order for

the arms limitation talks to proceed. In

addition, the MX system requirements

called for the ability to withstand extraor-
262 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

dinarily high levels of radiation. This required harder materials than ever, especially for the protection of motor cases,

interstage cablings, and other external

booster components.

An early MX basing option, the socalled multiple aim point “racetrack” concept, was favored by the Carter

administration and entered engineering

development in 1981 when Reagan was

elected. Shortly thereafter, the “racetrack”

basing option was abandoned, partly due

to land requirements and other restrictive

limitations.

Domestic and foreign concerns led to

growing opposition to the MX program

in Congress. The suspicion that MX stood

in the path of progress on START and that

the administration was insincere in its

commitment to the negotiations led to

Congressional rejection of another MX

basing scheme, known as the closelyspaced basing or “dense-pack.” Dense

pack plans called for launch sites 1,800

feet apart in a column 14 miles long near

Cheyenne, Wyoming. The rationale for

this basing scheme assumed that, by placing the MX silos virtually atop each other, incoming Soviet warheads would

disable each other, improving the odds

that multiple MX missiles would survive

an attack. In rejecting this plan, Congressional opponents cited both political and

technical problems with the plan. But it

was also putting the administration on notice that its premise of Soviet negotiating

intransigence would no longer be accepted at face value.

While the “dense pack” basing option

was founded upon viable scientific research, its rejection by Congress led to a

follow-on basing scheme: the development of a “superhard” silo which would

be hard enough to survive an incoming

missile detonation up to the silo crater’s

edge. The Air Force became the proponent for this concept and DNA conducted numerous cratering and site geology

tests, as part of the “superhard” basing

scheme. Despite initial promise, this “superhard” silo option was later rejected,

due to widespread belief that Soviet missile accuracy was too great for the development of any fixed silos, no matter how

much they were hardened or deemed survivable.

There were several interesting DNA

scientific efforts undertaken in connection

with the “superhard” silo-basing concept.

According to the accepted method of estimating the size of megaton-yield craters

and the intensity of crater-induced ground

motions, silo survivability was controlled

by these effects rather that hardness to

airblast. Further, there was considerable

debate within the scientific community

regarding the accuracy of crater estimates

based, as they were, on the megaton craters in the coral atolls of the Pacific missile range. DNA thus funded an extensive

scientific exploration, by the United States

Geological Service (USGS), of several

Pacific crater sites. This exploration,

One-eighth scale MX silo model after being subjected to a large TNT blast during

DNA testing.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 263

Peacekeeper (MX) missile transporter at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

called the Pacific Enewetak Atoll Cratering Experiments (PEACE) program, completely rewrote the accepted data on large

yield crater estimates. Additionally, the

concept of beneficial site geology was

first introduced as an essential aspect of

the “superhard” silo design.

To break the basing logjam, in January 1983, President Reagan established a

Commission headed by former national

security adviser Lieutenant General Brent

Scowcroft. Although the Commission was

dominated by one-time MX supporters,

its report, prepared with input from DNA,

was a disappointment to the administration. While the report endorsed MX deployment, it recommended placing the

new missile in existing Minuteman missile silos, thus eliminating mobile characteristics that constituted the MX

program’s chief attribute. Even then, the

Scowcroft report suggested that the nation’s security could be better safeguarded with small, mobile, single-warhead

“midgetman” missiles, which were less

threatening to the Soviets. In conclusion,

Scowcroft delivered a mild rebuke to the

administration for insufficient zeal in pursuing a strategic arms agreement.6

The controversy over MX basing

brought complications for DNA. At one

time or another in the MX controversy,

no fewer than 34 separate basing schemes

were advanced, and all were candidates

for DNA evaluation. The concepts required the agency to repeatedly reorient

its hardening program to identify the relevant survivability issues. DNA built

scale model mock-ups of proposed hard

silo designs and subjected them to tremendous overpressures to validate their survivability, and then, when the basing

modes changed, went through an iterative

process.7

DNA data and estimates of the hardness of the proposed Peacekeeper and the

Soviet missile silos brought the agency to

the attention of the Administration and

Congress. The Deputy Director (Science

and Technology) and members of his staff

had to personally brief the Secretary of

Defense on this hardness and survivability

data. When some of the DNA recommendations were ignored, the DDST was

called to testify before the full House

Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Even as treaty negotiations moved

forward, the administration strengthened

the strategic missile armament of the

United States. Fifty MX launchers, each

carrying ten MK-21 MIRVS, deployed
264 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

starting in 1986. Following the Scowcroft

Commission Report, Reagan approved

basing the MX missiles in silos. More advanced deployment options, like the forthcoming SDI initiative, would mean

increased agenda items for DNA.

DNA provided a number of studies

and other support to the Commission.

Once Reagan had approved the basing decision, the agency mined its databases and

other resources to assist in the design of

the silos. DNA evaluated existing craters

and historical data to assess the survivability of various silo designs. DNA’s

Structural Dynamics Division continued

several projects through the 1980s with a

focus on silos. The Silo Test Program

(STP) included studies of silo hardness

and survivability, airblast hardness of Soviet silos, and tests of innovative methods of attacking silos within varied site

geology.8

The Special Projects Office coordinated the interdisciplinary work on both the

hardened mobile launcher (HML) and the

rail-garrison basing of the MX missile

systems. Under the memorandum of

agreement with the Ballistic Missile Office, the work focused on site characterization, definition of the airblast and

thermal radiation environment, developing airblast simulation methods, developing instrumentation, and field testing the

entire system for loads and blast. Researchers scheduled a full-scale test of the

new mobile missile system for the MISERS GOLD high-explosive test in 1988.

For the rail-garrison basing method considered for the MX missile, the Special

Projects Office worked on a research program to define the nuclear effects environment that would apply to a rail garrison

system at existing missile bases.9

COMMAND,

CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS

AND INTELLIGENCE

The third role of DNA’s strategic initiative involvement, which actually started in the early 70s, concerned the

survivability of DoD’s command, control,

communications, and intelligence (C3I )

systems. DNA’s C3I program illustrated

the increasingly complex, fast-moving,

and interrelated nature of DNA’s work.

The new emphasis on interoperability

within the military Services meant that

findings gathered for one system had application to others. Any easing of DNA’s

workload associated with the more generic weaponry, however, was offset by the

accelerating pace of technological development, which in turn meant a more sophisticated threat to be defended against.

The long lead time for testing and evaluation meant that solutions were often obsolete before they were introduced. For

example, after decades of studying the

Peacekeeper (MX) missile launch. physical behavior of metals in a nuclear
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 265

environment, the introduction of synthetic

and composite materials, like graphite epoxy, for aircraft and missile construction

raised entirely new survivability issues.

Projects were launched with great fanfare

only to be abandoned when design parameters changed.

The largest breakthroughs occurred in

computer technology. For weapon testers,

computerization was both a blessing and

a bane. DNA increasingly found that computer memory and speed was the solution

to some of its own long-standing technical and analytical problems. On the other

hand, densely packed microcircuits

proved unusually susceptible to radiation

and other nuclear weapon effects. The

more missile guidance systems depended upon microcircuitry, the more critical

it became to protect and harden them.

A particular focus of C3I vulnerability, which consumed an average of about

15 percent of DNA’s RDT&E budget

through the early 1980s, was on satellite

links. Like ground-based components of

the military communications network,

satellites were ultimately as important as

the survival of the weapon itself in a nuclear conflict; they were also a potential

critical vulnerability. While satellites were

not subject to blast waves, which do not

propagate outside of the atmosphere, they

were highly sensitive to x rays and other

radiation. And while ground-based equipment could be physically relocated and

protected in the event of hostilities, satellites were essentially sitting ducks in predictable orbits, exposed to physical

damage from radiation as well as to disruption of their communication, infrared,

and optical paths. This inherent vulnerability, and their growing indispensability

to the whole C3I framework, made satellites a major focus of DNA’s total C3I effects program.10

Thus, DNA undertook a major test

program to address radiation and plasma

effects on satellites. The whole satellite

program was designed to achieve three

objectives: use of shielding to reduce the

amount of x rays bombarding the satellite; using internal enclosures for sensitive components to reduce exposure; and

improving circuit design to reduce susceptibility to the radiation that did reach the

electronics.

The major challenge in the testing program was constructing a power generator capable of delivering the necessary

ionization fluence to adequately simulate

the nuclear environment. DNA turned to

its stable of government laboratories and

contractors for help. Under the terms of a

new memorandum of understanding between the two agencies, DNA worked

closely with the DOE to accomplish the

mission. With DOE-developed technology to increase radiation output, DNA developed a new generation of pulse power

generator and primary radiating sources—

known as PITHON and BLACKJACK

BLACKJACK radiation simulator under

development.
266 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

V—to augment AURORA and CASINO

simulators.11

MICROELECTRONICS

HARDENING

Following the DoD Nuclear

Survivability Directive in 1983, DNA reinforced its role in encouraging Service

System Program Offices (SPOs) and Program Managers to adopt radiation-hardened microelectronic components.

Re-analysis of system-generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP) effects led to

early consultations with system designers

to assure operability without large system

retrofit costs. As the semiconductor industry increased processing speeds within

smaller silicon chip packages, miniaturized circuits exhibited reduced tolerances to radiation. DNA sponsored

development of radiation tolerant satellite

and computer microelectronics, which

subsequently demonstrated their endurance through solar flares that disrupted

unhardened satellites. DNA’s microelectronics hardening program contributed to

U.S. preeminence in long-lived reconnaissance, space exploration, and communication satellites.

Deficiencies in understanding of certain radiation effects, in terms of environment characterization of source region

EMP, led DNA in the 1980s to design an

underground test as part of the DISTANT

LIGHT program and to correlate results

with above ground test simulations and

computer models.

DNA RESOURCES DURING THE

DEFENSE BUILDUP

Testifying before the House Armed

Services Committee in the spring of 1983,

DNA Director Griffith, warned that “...facilities have been allowed to erode to an

unacceptable condition.” Griffith was

referring to the fact that over 75 percent

of DNA’s test instrumentation was over

10 years old. The cable plant had been installed in 1965 and had not been expected to last for more than five years. Instead,

after nearly two decades of use, fewer than

half the test cables were fully functional.

“Not only is repair becoming difficult and

increasingly expensive,” Griffith said,

“but the majority of this equipment (at

NTS) is not suited for the increasing sophistication of the underground experiments.” Indeed, only one of the tunnel

complexes was operational, which was

the major reason why the program had

been reduced from four to five underground tests per year during the 1960s to

two or three shots per year during the

1970s to less than one per year in the early 1980s. The result was not only a decline in nuclear readiness but also erosion

in the technical skills of the NTS personnel. “We are on the ragged edge now,”

Griffith warned.

The agency’s primary objective, clearly, was to repair the damage sustained by

use and decay of its testing facilities. One

way DNA went about this budgetary rehabilitation was by enlisting the support

Radiation hardened 64-kilobit static random access memory chip from the early

1980s.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 267

of outside experts. Early in 1981, Director Griffith asked Under Secretary of Defense Richard DeLauer to commission a

study by the Defense Science Board on

how well DNA was meeting its responsibilities in the post-PD-59 era. DeLauer

agreed. The Board, headed by Professor

John Deutch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, submitted its report

in December of 1981. It concluded that

DNA’s mission was more crucial to national security than ever before, and essentially all of the agency’s endorsed

current programs and priorities. It found

that the agency was doing an admirable

job with its constrained resources, but, because of budget limitations, “signs of

weakness” were evident, most glaringly

in the underground testing facilities. The

Defense Science Board therefore recommended that DNA should receive an immediate increase of 20 civilian personnel

slots and an increase in resources “...in

proportion to the cost of living and new

near-term system requirements.”12

With this vote of confidence, DNA

was able to make a persuasive case for its

budgetary needs to the Pentagon budget

analysts, to the Administration, and to the

Congressional authorization and appropriations committees. As a result, DNA’s

fiscal year 1983 budget reflected a nearly

19 percent real dollar increase in its spending authority. Already under way was a

$30 million program to upgrade the NTS

underground facilities to provide digital

recording systems, fiber-optic data transmission, physical restoration of the tunnel complexes, and the acquisition of

modern mining equipment.13 Although

fiscal year 1984 witnessed another budgetary setback in real terms, the agency

soon recouped those losses as well.14

Soon after the 1983 House Armed

Service Committee hearings concluded,

DNA Director Griffith retired and was replaced by Lieutenant General Richard K.

Saxer, USAF, who served the agency

through 1985.

UNDERGROUND AND

HIGH-EXPLOSIVE TESTING

The development of new and more

powerful simulators did not eliminate the

necessity of maintaining a robust underground nuclear test capability for confirming satellite hardening against x rays,

although, to hear DNA managers discuss

it, they would have preferred to use simulators exclusively if it were possible. In

addition, given DNA’s mounting responsibilities, both underground nuclear testing and above ground testing had to be

stepped up in the late Carter and early Reagan years to meet satellite survivability

needs.

In June of 1980, DNA conducted test

HURON KING, a vertical Line of Sight test

to investigate the radiation hardening technology of satellites. A large evacuation

chamber located at the surface contained a

full-size mockup of the satellite. MINERS

IRON, a horizontal LOS test in October of

Lieutenant General Richard K. Saxer,

USAF, DNA Director 1983 to 1985.
268 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

1980, was designed to evaluate the nuclear

hardness of MX components such as the

motor case, control section, and laser gyro.

A fiber-optic data transmission system, replacing the hard wiring that was itself susceptible to radiation, was successfully

tested for the first time to improve data recovery.15

HURON LANDING, conducted in

September of 1982, was an HLOS test to

validate hardness of MX components that

were unavailable for MINERS IRON. In

addition, the event included a test of fiber-optic data transmission and a portal

recording system to reduce the number of

recording systems on the mesa above the

tunnel. DIAMOND ACE was fired simultaneously with HURON LANDING and

designed to evaluate the low yield test bed

design being developed by DNA. MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR, conducted in September of 1983, had the primary objective to

evaluate the performance of the low-yield

test bed concept. For the first time on a

DNA event the data was totally recorded

underground, putting to work the ideas developed in HURON LANDING.16

The increased reliance on high-explosive testing for blast and shock hardening of equipment and structures was the

result of several factors. Underground

tests are extremely expensive and inappropriate for use in evaluating blast effects

of free air nuclear bursts. There are significant limitations to the size of test objects that can be exposed in underground

tests, while results from small-scale models are frequently uncertain. In addition,

expensive test equipment frequently cannot be recovered for reuse. In high-explosive tests like DISTANT RUNNER in

November of 1981, high-explosive chargSatellite test chamber recovery apparatus utilized for June 1980 HURON KING test.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 269

es were detonated inside and outside hardened aircraft shelters to evaluate their

vulnerability to external air blast and to

the accidental explosion of stored aircraft

weapons. With the data collected from

DISTANT RUNNER, the Air Force was

able to establish the proper shelter spacing and construction ratios; specifically,

the right quantity of reinforced concrete

to achieve specific thresholds of survivability, for its new generation of shelters,

runways, and taxiways in the tactical theaters.17

Another test in the Distant Runner series validated the survivability of the under ground weapon storage vault and the

Weapon Security and Survivability System (WS3), leading to the elimination of

above ground storage of weapons in Europe during the 1990s.

The agency’s Structural Dynamics Division continued work through the 1980s

on studies of shallow and deeply-buried

underground structures, using high-explosive simulation techniques. One test revealed that concrete structures coated with

teflon to reduce friction with the surrounding soil survived better than uncoated

structures. The deep underground structure work included evaluation of issues

surrounding construction operation and

maintenance. Researchers tested tunnel

sections and scaled tunnel intersections at

the MIGHTY OAK test in 1986.18 Work

on improving the DNA-designed HML

for strategic missiles continued through

many agency studies in the mid-1980s. A

Memorandum of Agreement between the

BMO and DNA in 1983 led to a series of

survivability tasks. During 1986, studies

of a large-scale airblast test validated

models used in survivability assessments

of HML designs.19

In order to conduct experiments in

which tactical and strategic weapon systems, communications, vehicles, and

structures would be subjected to a high

airblast and ground shock environment,

DNA successfully detonated a 4,800 ton

high-explosive charge. This June 27, 1985

DISTANT RUNNER high-explosive above-ground test conducted in November 1981, at White Sands Missile Range.
270 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

test, MINOR SCALE, was the largest

non-nuclear explosion ever detonated by

the U.S. or its Allies. Twenty U.S. agencies and six foreign governments sponsored about 200 separate experiments.

One of the experiments, sponsored by the

Norwegian government, included the construction of a reinforced concrete tactical

shelter not far from the fiberglass hemisphere housing the explosive charge.20

DNA continued work on the survivability of underground structures in other

ways. To increase the survivability of U.S.

bunkers, as well as to determine how to

make Soviet bunkers vulnerable, weapon designers turned to enhancing the

ground shock produced by nuclear weapons. Existing weapons, aimed at producing surface blast effects, had not been

optimized to propagate the force into the

ground. Moreover, the larger atmospheric tests in the 1950s provided information

on ground effects in a Pacific coral geology and the smaller Nevada tests of the

same period in a desert geology. Extrapolating these results to very different underground soil and rock configurations

was risky. Underground tests included excavations containing constructed model

silos and other structures, to be subjected

to ground shock. In effect, DNA had been

able to move an atmospheric test setup

into a large cavern, keeping the test underground.21

In 1986, DNA Director Lieutenant

General John L. Pickitt, USAF, transferred the Field Command Test Directorate to DNA Headquarters.

TITAN II

EXPLOSION AND

NUCLEAR SAFETY

The issue of the aging land-based deterrent was dramatized in an accident at a

Titan II missile site near Damascus, Arkansas. On September 19, 1980, a maintenance worker dropped a heavy socket

wrench, which rolled off a work platform

and fell toward the bottom of the silo. The

wrench bounced and struck the missile,

causing a leak from a pressurized fuel

tank. The missile complex and the surrounding area were immediately evacuated and a team of specialists were called

in from Little Rock Air Force Base. About

eight and a half hours after the initial

puncture, fuel vapors within the silo ignited and exploded, injuring 22 Air Force

personnel, one fatally. The force of the

blast sent pieces of debris, some weighing several tons, as far as a half-mile away.

Initially, in accordance with established DoD policy, the Air Force refused

to confirm or deny that the missile carried a nuclear warhead. However, after

public and behind-the-scenes protests

from then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, it was finally acknowledged that the

missile had indeed borne a 6,000-pound

warhead, which had survived the disaster

with only a few dents and no leakage of

radioactivity.22 As a consequence of this

incident, the policy of “neither confirming nor denying” the presence of nuclear

weapons was changed with respect to

nuclear accidents.

Titans used extremely corrosive liquid fuel and oxidizers which ignite on

contact. After years of storage the missiles

were showing their age. Between 1975

and 1981, there had been numerous accidents or incidents at Titan sites, including several with fatalities.23 As a result,

procedures were devised to deal with

emergencies such as the Damascus incident. A DNA Nuclear Weapons Accident

Advisory Team, trained to control the radiological hazards from fissionable material, conduct radiation surveys, and

organize cleanup of the site, was rushed

to the scene.24

The Arkansas accident had two significant results. It was in some ways the

final straw for the increasingly accident-
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 271

prone Titan II and became a persuasive

argument in favor of the MX program to

replace it. A program was initiated to retire the Titan missiles; the last one was

decommissioned in the fall of 1987.25

Second, the accident accelerated plans to

systematize the Armed Services’ response

to nuclear incidents, accidental or deliberate. In the latter regard, in January 1982,

the Departments of State, Energy, and

Defense signed a memorandum of understanding “...for responding to malevolent

nuclear incidents outside U.S. territory,”

which assigned responsibilities for dealing with possible acts of nuclear terrorism and sabotage.26

Concern about the aging ICBM force

had prompted DoD in 1979 to assign

DNA the task of organizing and conducting a joint DoD/DOE nuclear weapons

accident training exercise (NUWAX). It

was designed to determine the effectiveness of the existing capacity to deal with

an accident, and the results of the 1979

exercise gave the organizers pause. NUWAX-79 “...clearly demonstrated the

need for significant changes in DoD’s organization, training, equipment, and procedures to ensure effective response to a

real nuclear accident.”27 The coordination

of military and civilian authorities in U.S.

localities, initially through the Federal

Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), was deemed problematic and

inter-Service communications were not

much better. Clearly there was work to be

done. In 1981, therefore, DNA received

the mission to carry out a ten-year series

Joint DoD (DNA), DOE, and FEMA personnel participating in NUWAX exercise (simulated

crash of Navy helicopter) at Nevada Test Site on May 5, 1983 as part of NUWAX ’83.
272 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

of biennial field exercises and annual

command post exercises to upgrade the

response capability. Lessons learned from

the exercises were compiled into formal

Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures.28

Not unexpectedly, NUWAX-81 and

NUWAX-83 were more successful. The

latter was held in early May at NTS,

which had been set up to simulate an urban environment. The scenario was an

accident on a Navy base, that rapidly

spilled over into the surrounding communities. DNA’s job, specifically, its Emergency Actions Division, was to coordinate

the 7 DoD and 10 non-DoD agencies involved in the exercise, as well as the 150

official visitors, 71 observers from other

NATO countries, and dozens of media

representatives who witnessed the exercise.29

BIOMEDICAL

AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

By fiscal year 1984, the NTPR program was entering what most of those involved believed would be a wind-down

phase. Total spending during that period

amounted to just under $4 million, less

than half of what the program cost at its

peak, even before adjusting for inflation.

The number of man-years devoted to the

project showed an even steeper decline:

from a peak of just over 200 in fiscal year

1981 to 60 in fiscal year 1984. By September of 1986, the catalog of NTPR’s accomplishments included a 41-volume

history of the U.S. atmospheric testing

program; the identification of 198,000 of

the estimated 200,000 American Servicemen and civilians who had participated in

atmospheric tests; the sponsorship of a

large number of scientific, medical, and

other studies; and correspondence with

over 50,000 veterans to provide them with

relevant information. All that was presumably left to do was to maintain contact

with these veterans and handle the trickle

of new inquiries. The basic research, declassification, and release of information

that was NTPR’s objective was complete.30

With NTPR’s original goals essentially met, DoD and DNA believed they could

safely curtail the program. In 1985,

Air Force Lieutenant General John L. Pickitt, who had just taken over leadership

of DNA from Lieutenant General Saxer,

proposed to change the existing NTPR

structure, under which DNA had served

as executive agent and separate teams

from each of the military Services had

carried out the work dealing with their

own respective personnel. Under Pickitt’s

proposal, DNA would assume all remaining NTPR responsibilities. He projected

annual savings from this consolidation of

as high as $1 million. The Service Chiefs

readily agreed. By the middle of 1988,

consolidation had been accomplished.31

Despite the findings from a succession

of independent analyses concluding that

exposure to low level radiation was not

responsible for any statistically significant

increase in health problems among former

Servicemen, suspicion remained widespread that the government was engaged

in a cover-up to hide a more damning

truth. The administration was believed to

be doing everything in its power to limit

the government’s liability to lawsuits, and

this belief exposed it to allegations of indifference to the plight of the sick and

dying veterans.32

As the executive agent for NTPR,

DNA frequently found itself in the hot

seat, having to defend not only its own

handling of the project but also the administration’s opposition to legislative proposals to compensate veterans for illness

related, to a greater or lesser degree, to

their exposure to radiation as participants

in the testing program. Often these appearances, taking the form of Congressional
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 273

testimony, turned rancorous, as administration opponents used the issue as a

wedge to attack the Reagan military buildup. A number of later laws did pass, which

permitted claims by several new groups

of veterans, the largest being those who

had participated in the occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after World War II.

Thus, DNA’s NTPR responsibilities were

marginally reduced in the mid- to late1980s, and the resources allotted to DNA

for the purpose were also reduced.33

NUCLEAR WINTER

“Nuclear Winter” is a term generally

applied to a hypothetical climatic consequence of nuclear war. The theory was

first written and published in 1982 in Europe as “The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon,” by German

researchers Paul Crutzen and John Birks.

It was later reworked and advanced, in

1983, by Richard Turco, Brian Toon, Tom

Ackerman, and Jim Pollack, who were

joined by Cornell University scientist,

Carl Sagan, (research team colloquially

named TTAPS). This team, drawing

heavily on the research by Crutzen and

Birks, conceived that Martian dust storms

might be an example of the climatic phenomena on earth following a nuclear exchange. Sagan’s role in TTAPS largely

involved popularization of the “nuclear

winter” theory; he published this theory

in Parade magazine in November of

1983, and later developed it in other journals and symposia. If the theory were true,

no shelter, no weapon and, no existing

technology could protect the world from

a catastrophe infinitely more damaging

and more widespread than anything that

might occur as a direct consequence of

blast, fire, or radiation.

Follow-up studies and computer modeling on the “nuclear winter” hypothesis

suggested that its proponents were wrong

or, at best, half right.34Some of these studies were conducted or commissioned by

DNA, which was assigned to be DoD’s

agent on the subject. Perhaps the most significant of the DNA-sponsored studies was

the one published by the National Academy of Sciences in 1985. It confirmed that

the phenomena Sagan and associates described could conceivably occur, but urged

caution in drawing such sweeping conclusions from unknown and unknowable circumstances. Other independent studies

found TTAPS’s methodology was badly

flawed, its conclusions based on unreliable

sources, works “in preparation,” and speculation. A 1987 study by the National Center for Atmospheric Research, based on a

state-of-the-art computer model, found

that, in the worst case, most of the world

would experience “...a mild nuclear winter, not a deep freeze.” Such a “mild” winter might, however, cause a dramatic drop

in food production.

In short, the “nuclear winter” debate

was inconclusive and deeply frustrating

to Congress, which in 1984 had ordered

Lieutenant General John L. Pickitt, USAF,

DNA Director 1985 to 1987.
274 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

the Pentagon to study the implications of

all of this theorizing for U.S. nuclear policy and to come up with recommendations. But it proved impossible for DNA

to come out squarely on one side or the

other of a debate that was as much about

the politics of nuclear weapons as it was

about much-disputed scientific facts. In

the end, as one analyst put it, the threat of

nuclear winter became “...but one more

item on an already lengthy list of convincing reasons to avoid a nuclear holocaust.”35

DEALING WITH

TECHNOLOGICAL RISK

The late 1970s and mid-1980s

brought a number of mishaps that cast

public doubt on America’s technological

competence. The Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Three Mile Island accident in March

1979 was a major setback for proponents

of nuclear power. Then, on January 28,

1986, seconds after liftoff, the Challenger space shuttle exploded, killing all seven astronauts aboard. Throughout the

country, the grief was profound, and so

was disillusionment with the space program. Concern about hidden technological problems in space and defense systems

prompted numerous investigations.

Worse, with the shuttle fleet grounded and

the military dependent on the shuttle to

partially support critical satellite launches, access to space was limited. Later, in

1986, a Titan III missile carrying a major

classified defense satellite exploded over

the coastal California launch site, grounding the expendable launch vehicle fleet

and thus effectively cutting off the United States from space.

DNA was not immune to failures of

U.S. advanced technology. In April of

1986, the MIGHTY OAK underground

test went awry, contaminating the tunnel

and damaging critical test equipment.

Although this test was successful, the test

was the final MK-21 reentry vehicle validation for the MX missile as well as the

Trident II D-5 missiles. Downstream tests

were jeopardized, and DNA had to hastily reprogram funds to replace equipment.

Each of these disasters took its toll on

public confidence. In February of 1984,

an HLOS test, MIDAS MYTH, had damaged the NTS underground chambers containing sensor equipment. The slumping

of the subsidence crater after the test injured a number of people, causing one

death. Americans and their representatives

in Congress wondered whether the string

of mishaps was coincidental or related to

common managerial or technical deficiencies.36

At Johnston Atoll, DNA developed a

radiation-monitoring and waste-sorting

robot to aid cleanup operations. Plutonium had been scattered when a Thor missile exploded on the launch pad in 1962.

Similar machines were later used at NTS.

The U.S. Army began constructing a

Thor missile at DNA’s Johnston Island

launch site.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 275

chemical agent incineration system on the

atoll, which, when operational in 1990,

began destruction of nerve and mustard

gas stocks from the United States and

Germany.37 DNA Field Command coordinated the improvements to accommodations, utilities, and food service to

support the tripling of the island population in support of the Johnston Island

chemical demilitarization operations.

The agency’s expertise in dealing

with accidents, hazardous materials, and

the problems of radiological cleanup also

played into the newly emerging spirit of

improved relations with the Soviet Union.

After the catastrophic 1986 Chernobyl reactor fire in the Ukraine, DNA staff from

AFRRI formed part of an International

Chernobyl Site Restoration Assistance

Team.38 DNA later provided assistance to

environmental cleanup efforts at the

closed Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk,

Kazakhstan.39

STRATEGIC

DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Throughout his administration, President Reagan spoke with a number of scientists and administrators in the weapons

laboratories regarding new developments

that might change the nuclear balance.

Among them was Edward Teller, who

claimed that a technological breakthrough

promised to cut the arms control “Gordian knot” and simply make the United

States immune to any Soviet attack. Specifically, Teller and his team at Livermore

claimed to have moved a nuclear-pumped

x-ray laser from speculative concept to

feasibility.

Reagan had known Teller since his

time as governor, and it had been Teller

who recommended George Keyworth for

the post of science advisor. Teller’s advice

and ideas impressed Reagan. In a nationwide March 1983 broadcast address, Reagan recalled the Manhattan Project and

announced for a similar effort to develop

a defensive shield that would intercept

nuclear missiles, the Strategic Defense

Initiative (SDI). Dubbed by its opponents

“Star Wars,” after the popular 1977 science fiction film, SDI led to a variety of

research investigations that would involve

DNA for several years.

SDI touched off vigorous and protracted debates among scientists, policy

makers, journalists, and the public. Critics claimed that the SDI systems would

violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. Supporters

noted that SDI only called for exploratory and conceptual development, while

both the ABM treaty and the Outer Space

Treaty addressed deployment of full systems. If a promising technology developed from the research, modification of

the treaties would then be necessary. For

example, Article XIV of the ABM treaty

specifically allowed for amendment and

review, at which time, modifications to the

treaty could be discussed.40

Strategic Defense Initiative laser test.
276 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

The largest area of disagreement,

however, concerned definition and technical feasibility. As initially conceived, it

would have consisted of a layered defense

umbrella of various weapons covering the

entire United States. Space-based sensors

would detect the launch and boost phase

of offensive missiles, track them, and relay data to various defensive systems. The

defensive systems would include spaceand ground-based nuclear-pumped x-ray

lasers, particle beam weapons, and socalled kinetic “kill” or “hit to kill”

weapons, all of which would be computer-controlled to attack and destroy any

hostile missiles during the boost or midcourse phases. Previous ABM concepts

had targeted the incoming warheads during re-entry, a difficult enough task with

single warheads, but made increasingly

complex in the case of multiple warheads.

In the slower boost phase, or while

coasting at the edge of space, the vehicles

would be easier to target and hit. Advocates of the SDI approaches pointed out

that to interdict missiles during their

launch phase, and to use non-nuclear devices to destroy them, provided clear advantages over previous ABM systems.

Traditional ABM systems depended upon

detonation of nuclear defensive missiles

high over the target country, that would

almost certainly lead to some collateral

effects. With such ABM systems, the

United States would face the prospect of

detonating hundreds, perhaps thousands,

of nuclear weapons over its own territory

to defend itself. This was an unpalatable

approach that had been more or less abandoned with the ABM treaty limiting antiballistic missile installations in both the

U.S. and the Soviet Union. The United

States had deployed one of the two installations allowed under the ABM treaty and

then had shut it down.41

A committee led by NASA administrator James Fletcher worked during the

summer of 1983 to define the technical

scope and architecture of the proposed

SDI program and the committee sought

information from DNA. Both the Fletcher Committee that studied the technical

feasibility of such concepts, and another

group working under Dr. Fred Hoffman

to study policy matters concluded that

these new possibilities for defense should

be further explored. The two committees

served to validate, both from a technical

feasibility and a policy viewpoint, the SDI

program put forward in Reagan’s March

1983 speech.42

In 1982, the DDST elected to expand

the scientific activities of the agency beyond its nuclear domain. It was apparent

that the expertise in x-ray thermomechanical effects could be applied to issues of

laser lethality and survivability. The

counter argument offered against this initiative was that the Congressional staffs

might object to the diversion of research

resources to this new activity. The DDST

was able to capitalize on his amiable relationship with the Congressional staff

members and win approval. By the time

the Strategic Defense study was initiated,

the broader expertise within the agency

was recognized and cognizant agency

staff were invited to participate in the

summer study.

The DoD tasked DNA, after its work

with the Fletcher Committee, as Executive

Agent for Directed Energy Lethality and

Target Hardening research, testing, and

evaluation. With a special budget infusion,

DNA took over management of all Defense Department activities in this area,

identifying military requirements, assessing technologies, and identifying potential

countermeasures available to the Soviets.

SDI, however, faced continuing political obstacles. On one hand, a range of

scientists and policy specialists, who overlapped with those publicizing the nuclear

winter theory, opposed the concept. Op-
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 277

ponents included a group headed by Hans

Bethe and Carl Sagan, working through

the Union of Concerned Scientists. Raising technical issues about the limited

range of lasers, and the ineffectiveness of

railgun projectiles, such experts claimed

that most, if not all, the concepts under

discussion would never be brought to fruition.43

Even one of the most staunch advocates of such a system, retired General

Daniel O. Graham, who headed High

Frontier, a group devoted to supporting a

space-based defense system, argued by

1986 that a program so heavily dependent

on research, rather than deployment,

would be difficult to support for a long

period. Another political difficulty, even

for supporters, was that neither the Air

Force nor the Navy had a vested interest

in developing such a system and viewed

SDI as a drain on their budgets. Even

members of Congress generally on the

side of increased defense expenditure

balked when estimates of the cost to deploy even a partially effective system became astronomical. Cost estimates ran

from $160 billion for a partial system, to

$770 billion for a comprehensive system

as envisioned by Reagan in his original

speech.44

Even so, through the mid-1980s, several billion dollars per year became available for studies and research into the

feasibility of SDI systems and methods

that might be employed to foil them. An

additional long-range benefit to the military Services might be transfer of technology from SDI projects to other

applications in weaponry and defense.

DNA’s SDI work on directed energy

weapons, as well as its existing expertise

in pulsed power generators for nuclear

radiation simulators, for example, found

ready application in improving muzzle

velocity and range of artillery.45

SDI projects ranged from a few with

immediate and practical results, to more

speculative work. Some generated promising progress very quickly, such as DNAsponsored research in the field of

electromagnetic launchers. By 1987, the

agency could report the achievement of a

velocity of 6 kilometers/second with a sixgram projectile, using the Scientific Ultravelocity Accelerator (SUVAC) built by

Westinghouse. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization’s (SDIO) Innovative

Science and Technology office sponsored

the construction of SUVAC in Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania. Westinghouse researchers

designed, built and tested the pulse power systems for both THUNDERBOLT, an

early system constructed in California,

and SUVAC, however, they reported continuing technical challenges in the barrel

design. Researchers anticipated an early

high payoff from this work in the Army’s

Armor/Anti-Armor effort.46

A wide variety of studies and technical evaluations in support of different

types of SDI weapon systems proceeded

under DNA auspices. In 1986 DNA studied Thermal Laser Lethality, focused not

only on validation of analytic predictive

failure models, but on effective hardening systems. Studies of impulse laser lethality investigated improving the

efficiency of the system and at the same

time, developing effective hardening materials. On particle beam lethality studies,

technical issues included target/decoy discrimination capability, failure modes for

electronic components and subsystems,

and again, development of hardening and

mitigation techniques.47

SDI work altered the agenda of the

communications degradation specialists

at DNA. By 1986-1987, researchers used

the Pharos II facility at NRL to study different kinds of “collisionless” processes

in high altitude regimes. One earth-orbiting satellite, HiLat, launched in 1983 provided a better physical understanding of
278 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

ionospheric dynamics at high altitudes.

The Polar BEAR satellite, launched in

1986, carried a radio beacon, a magnetometer, and a four-color imager. Highaltitude rockets provided data on infrared

light over a wide range of altitudes and

intensities.48 The infrared data was crucial to evaluations of the space-based SDI

detection and identification systems.

Among the many projects in new areas that SDI spawned, DNA conducted innovative experiments to evaluate infrared

sensors, using the natural Aurora Borealis as a simulated nuclear environment that

might confuse sensors with an intense

background. SPIRIT I, launched April 8,

1986, received the SDI Laboratory Award

from the American Defense Preparedness

Association in recognition of the results

received. SPIRIT I measured a bright aurora, studying the “window-filling” infrared emissions, that appeared to result from

earthshine, scattered into the receiver

from gases that accompanied the rocket

or from problems with the optics.49

Researchers tested reentry vehicles

and components for the Trident II and

Peacekeeper weapons for survivability,

and evaluated SDI-related electronics.

The increasing miniaturization of electronics and the extreme tolerances and operational environments expected for SDI

systems, especially those that would be

based on orbiting satellites, required constant improvements in hardening of electronics.50

As conceptual development and research proceeded on various SDI systems,

the issue of survivability of space-based

systems became ever more important and

more complex. SDIO sponsored studies

to increase tracking, battle management,

engagement, and other features of satellites planned as part of the new defensive

shield systems. Working with DNA,

SDIO developed the concept of “Operate

Through,” in which systems would be

able to operate without interruption following a burst of harmful radiation. Consequently, information flow to parts of a

system could be disturbed or interrupted

without loosing the mission. Studies examined such issues as how outage and

recovery times would affect the tolerance

of a system to a radiation dose rate. During key portions of the system’s mission,

the outage requirements might be more

restrictive than at other times. Researchers explored various techniques of allowing systems to work smarter and faster.

The Operate Through program worked on

developing an integrated test module that

contained processors, hard memories, input/output logic and other subsystems that

could be used to gain experimental insight

into the effect of combined hardness techniques. Operate Through sought to identify and solve individual technology

difficulties prior to deployment of SDI

systems.51

The various scenarios of warfighting

considered under SDI planning included

Dr. Marvin C. Atkins, DNA Deputy Director (Science and Technology), 1983-1989
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 279

the possibility of massive multiple nuclear

bursts at high altitude. Studies by Los

Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and

other researchers showed the potential for

serious degradation of command and control abilities, of radar, and of other sensor

systems. Plans focused on a theoretical effort to “bound the uncertainties” in the

predictions of such effects through

1987.52

Groups working on Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE) and

other radiation effects phenomena naturally found their work schedule, the number of contracts monitored, and the

activity of related scientists at other facilities vastly increased as a result of the

SDI effort through the mid-1980s. Work

on a protective film, SIMOX, proved dramatically successful, and opened the way

to protection of high-performance integrated circuits. DNA let contracts to develop

high-performance radiation hardened computer components. Meanwhile, studies produced new codes, standards, and detailed

documentation. The Electromagnetic Applications Division coordinated SDI activities associated with space power, and

worked with the Air Force in developing

radiation hardened optical sensors and

mirrors for space-based systems.

The degree to which x-ray lasers, kinetic energy weapons, neutron particle

beams, and microwave defensive weapon systems could effectively destroy missiles was also a central problem. The

Electromagnetic Applications group of

DNA’s Radiation Sciences Directorate

worked to determine the ability of such

proposed new defensive weapon systems

to damage strategic missile systems. For

kinetic energy lethality studies, the issues

included modeling predictions, development of kill criteria for re-entry vehicles

and booster targets, and development of

hardening materials.53

Admiral Parker noted that work on

nuclear survivability would increase if

any of the SDI systems moved from concept to deployment. To the extent that SDI

systems would depend on easily targeted

satellites, every effort had to be made to

protect the electronics aboard from radiation. Parker pointed out that the agency

had already done some testing of satellite

components. As SDI systems became part

of the strategic deterrent, much more extensive testing would

be required to ensure

survivability of the

new systems. Increased testing of all

such pieces of proposed new systems

would necessarily add

to the agency’s workload.54 SDI participants had exploited

the agency’s underground tests to expose

the components and

subsystems to radiation. A notable

example was the ex-

“Brilliant Pebbles” attitude control system undergoing DNA

radiation hardening test.
280 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

periments involving the structural

response of the highly sensitive components used for SDI detection, tracking, and

aiming functions. Radiation induced

structural response was of prime concern.

In the late 1980s, the “Brilliant Pebbles”

concept became the leading interceptor

option for SDI, with the space-based infrared system as the leading detection and

tracking candidate. The developers of

these systems articulated substantial requirements for DNA products, including

a substantial number of underground nuclear effects tests. These requirements

never fully materialized because the Clinton administration, in the 1990s, de-emphasized SDI. A new Ballistic Missile

Defense Office (BMDO) was set up, with

most of its research activities aimed at

Theater Missile Defense and preserving

options for National Missile Defense.

During the mid-1980s, as negotiations

moved toward more comprehensive reductions in nuclear forces with the Soviet Union, and as SDI and continuing DoD

research into new defensive systems progressed, the agency explored a wide variety of hardening techniques,

for satellites, for ground facilities, for aircraft, and for

missile launching equipment. DNA publications between 1984 and 1987

included new approaches to

hardening aircraft, an assessment of satellite survivability, studies of hardening

ground based facilities, including mobile launchers,

against EMP, and studies on

the use of thin metal films

as a hardening shield

against x-ray laser effects.

The subjects of the reports

show the direction of DNAsponsored research during

the mid-1980s, as the agency continued to focus on the hardening of

defensive weapon systems against the effects of nuclear weapons.55

As in the past, DNA’s technical contractors generated many of the research

studies and reports. A study of EMP

guidelines for Navy ship platform hardening in 1983 was produced, along with

research on communication facility design practices for protection against highaltitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) in

1984. Other DNA-sponsored research included a multi-volume EMP engineering

handbook in 1986 and a guide to some

1,900 citations pertinent to the effects of

EMP on communications in 1987. These

represent only a few of several dozen

studies generated through the mid-1980s

reflecting similar emphasis.56

With the possibility that a comprehensive test ban would prohibit all nuclear

testing, including underground detonations, the importance of simulation increased. One publication reflected the

effort to develop methodologies for the

use of nuclear simulators to integrate several types of effects. Equipment that

Space Power Experiments Aboard Rockets (SPEAR) II,

sponsored by the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO)

and DNA, was a 1988 technology experiment to operate

strategic power components in space environment.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 281

would suffer near simultaneous effects

from blast, heat, radiation, and shock,

such as ground mobile electrical equipment, be needed for such an integrated approach to testing.57

During the mid-1980s, DNA also

expanded its research into conventional

explosive weapons. Its expertise in highexplosive modeling of blast effects fed directly into new programs and new

authority to investigate much more effective conventional munitions. In October

of 1983 a car bomb killed nearly 250 marines at their Beirut headquarters. DNA

applied its expertise in analyzing the terrorist bombing of the barracks, thereby

developing an application for conventional high-explosive analysis that it would

use in the future.

POLITICAL CONTINUITY

AND CHANGE: MID-1980S

In the United States, the 1984 presidential elections reaffirmed the choices

made by Americans in 1980. President

Reagan and Vice President George Bush

defeated the Democratic nominees,

Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro, in

a landslide election. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, political changes began to

drastically change the international security context, with direct impact for the

agency. Premier Leonid Brezhnev died in

1982, succeeded by aged Yuri Andropov

for fifteen months, and then by a similarly ailing Konstantin Chernenko. During

this period, a younger Communist Party

Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, began to

emerge as a leader of Soviet Union. He

won election as the Secretary General of

the party in March 1985. He would be the

leader with whom President Reagan began to deal on a face-to-face basis in arms

control negotiations.

Reagan began his second term in the

same month that Gorbachev won the post

of Party Secretary. Gorbachev, urbane, affable, young, and vigorous, with impeccable Soviet credentials and portfolio,

found that despite many differences with

Reagan they shared much in common.

Both men wanted to make an impact; both

brought vigor and energy to public presentations; both tried to think outside the

framework of strategic thinking that had

put both great powers into the “two scorpions in a bottle” model. However, by

1985, relations between the two nations

had brought strategic arms control talks

to a standstill.58

Summits in Geneva (1985) and Reykjavik (1986) brought Reagan together

with Gorbachev. Unlike his predecessors,

who had been suspicious and hostile toward the United States, Gorbachev sought

a lessening of tensions, and he had the

good health and energy to pursue that goal

vigorously. The breakthrough came in the

personal tête-à-tête of the 1985 Geneva

summit. Reagan discovered, in place of

the standard cartoon caricature of a grey

and unyielding Soviet man, a reasonable

person with whom he could get along.

Gorbachev, in turn, found Reagan to be

far more open to new ideas than his rhetoric implied.59

In July of 1985 Gorbachev unexpectedly had halted Soviet underground nuclear testing. Six months later he stunned

Russians and Americans by calling for abolition of all nuclear weapons by the year

2000. He backed up what might have been

perceived as a rhetorical ploy with a credible, staged plan. As an early step, he proposed dismantling and removing all

mid-range weapons in Europe, verified by

on-site inspection. Some observers

thought it ironic that the Soviet leadership

appeared to endorse a position taken by

American conservatives; perhaps Gorbachev had called an American bluff.

“The famous zero-option,” noted one,

“handiwork of hard-liners, non-negotiability its charm—had been embraced by
282 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

this alarmingly original Soviet leader.”60

The 0/0 option is defined succinctly as

“...the arms control proposal to reduce

land based intermediate range nuclear

capable missiles in Europe to zero.”

As plans developed for the next summit, Gorbachev seemed eager to come

away with a signed agreement. In pre-negotiations, the Soviets and Americans

agreed to meet in Reykjavik, Iceland. The

agenda, for the first time, put all tactical,

and strategic offensive weapons, and strategic defensive weapons, on the table.61

In Iceland, the two leaders thought

that they had made a breakthrough agreement. In a way they had, for they had

forged a personal bond of trust even if the

agreement itself fell to pieces almost immediately. The two leaders’ senior staffs

found it difficult to determine just what

had been agreed. The verbal agreement to

work toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons appeared ideal in many ways,

yet unworkable in other ways. Reagan’s

senior staff, Congressional leaders, and

the European allies all challenged pieces

of what Reagan and Gorbachev so spontaneously fused together. Reagan himself

did not feel totally optimistic after the

talks, however, disturbed by Gorbachev’s

insistence that SDI be part of the bargaining process. Back in Washington, where

SDI had already outgrown its “bargaining chip” status and had become an established set of research programs, the

Defense establishment did not care to risk

bargaining away the progress for Soviet

promises that might prove empty.62

Even though the Reykjavik agreements did not win wide support, the spirit of cooperation that emerged at the

meeting provided a basis for further negotiations between the two leaders. Gorbachev seized the initiative. He removed

Soviet linkage of the Intermediate Nuclear

Forces (INF) agreement with a strict interpretation of the ABM treaty and accepted on-site verification and inspection

“anytime, anywhere” as the Reagan administration had proposed. The position

that American arms control negotiators

had assumed would never be accepted by

the Soviets, called for both sides to

achieve absolute reductions in weapons,

to be confirmed and verified with extensive systems of on-site inspection, including unannounced visits. Suddenly, the

zero/zero option or “0/0,” as the option

was identified in military reports, became

feasible. By the fall of 1987, a new, significant treaty seemed possible.63

The INF treaty, signed on December

8, 1987 at the Washington Summit, for the

first time eliminated an existing set of

deployed missiles rather than setting limits on future deployments. It called for the

destruction of existing IntermediateRange Missiles (IRMs), Short-Range

Missiles (SRMs), and associated launchers, bases, support equipment, and other

infrastructure. It even called for control

on the production of such technology. The

land-based nuclear missiles of intermediate and short range constituted only a

small fraction of the two powers’ nuclear

arsenals, but the treaty represented a solid step forward by requiring that those

weapons be physically dismantled. Perhaps even more precedent-setting than the

destruction of missiles, both sides agreed

to a wide range of verification measures,

including for the first time, extensive onsite inspections.64

If the INF treaty were not coupled

with a wider easing of U.S.-Soviet relations, DNA personnel worried that it

might have ironic implications, heightening rather than alleviating certain aspects

of the nuclear arms race. DNA Director

Parker told the House Committee on

Armed Services that “...if the INF treaty

is ratified and we move into a START environment where we have to remain dependent upon our deterrent, but with
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 283

smaller forces, then each part of that force

bears a greater burden of the deterrent, and

each part of our remaining force would

have to be more inviting to attack, would

have to be better protected, would have

to be more survivable....” With intermediate and short range deterrent missiles

gone from Europe, if the policy of Assured

Destruction were to continue to apply, the

U.S. strategic triad would be even more

crucial and important than it had been

before.

In short, the INF could increase

DNA’s workload, especially in providing

testing for the survivability of C3I and the

remaining weapon systems. Over the

short term, events began to bear out agency predictions, as new planning had to be

formulated to deal with the new situation.65

In a triumphant and hopeful visit to

Moscow in late May 1988, after ratification by the U.S. Congress and the Soviet

Presidium, President Reagan and Premier

Gorbachev exchanged the instruments of

ratification of the INF treaty on June 1,

1988, in Moscow.

DNA AND THE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

The formation of the congressionally-mandated Blue Ribbon Task Group in

1985 led to the recommendation to disestablish the Military Liaison Committee

and to establish the joint DoD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). These

actions were legislated in 1986, with the

intent of improving the coordination on

nuclear weapon programs between DoD

and the DOE. DNA played an important

role in the early formation activities of the

NWC and continues to be an active member of the supporting Standing and Safety Committee by providing staff members

to the NWC Staff.

ARMS CONTROL

IMPACT ON DNA

With momentous changes already

under way and the prospect of even more

in the future, DNA confronted a new context. But agency leaders could not clearly

read the implications of that context. In

1986-87, as Reagan and Gorbachev

moved through negotiation to agreement,

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan signed the

INF Treaty on December 8, 1987.
284 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

American defense analysts and planners

anticipated that the Soviet threat to the

NATO alliance would remain as strong as

it had been in the past. Political scientists,

defense department personnel, cabinet

officers, and journalists alike simply could

not foresee the dissolution of the Soviet

Union and the breakup of the Warsaw

Pact, events that lay a few years in the

future. DNA and defense planners faced

the reality that INF would mean that the

United States had fewer missiles as part

of its deterrent, but that U.S. strategic forces still had to keep up deterrence as essential to maintaining the balance of

peace.

The movement toward INF appeared

to promise a reduction in tension and reduced armaments. Yet its implementation

could have two almost contradictory effects, both of which could add to the tasks

undertaken by of DNA. To implement the

treaty would require lots of work by experts in inspection and dismantling of

weapons, clearly in an area close to the

specialties of DNA staff and contractors.

And as both sides implemented the treaty, the United States would rely ever more

heavily for deterrence on remaining nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, SDI programs

continued, with no requirement in the INF

treaty that the proposed new systems be

abandoned or cut back. Therefore, the

years 1987 and 1988, represented a continuation and expansion for the agency,

not a diminution of responsibilities and

activities.

The agency reorganized in February

1987, with the changes officially in place

March 2, 1987. A Directorate for Operations took over former directorates, such

as Nuclear Assessment, which became a

subdirectorate within Operations. DoD

Directive 5105.31 repromulgated a mission statement that incorporated the “taskings” DNA had received from the

Secretary of Defense subsequent to the

previous agency mission statement. Still

in the midst of the Cold War, the new mission affirmed the requirement to assist

NATO commands in areas relative to nuclear warfare.66

The old Nuclear Assessments Theater

Forces division became the Nuclear Assessments Nonstrategic Forces division,

recognizing the withdrawal of nuclear

strategic forces from the European theater

under INF. The new division would now

be concerned with protecting European

military assets of a non-nuclear nature.

The agency had to focus on the 0/0 option. Research projects for the division,

however, continued to reflect some of the

same issues: how would command and

control facilities in theater operations,

both in Europe and the Pacific, survive under nuclear attack? Studies focused on

USPACOM’s Enhanced Management Capability, the NATO’s Central Region Battlefield Information and Targeting System

(BITS) and Allied Tactical Operations

Center Automation. New projects included studies of the effect of the INF Treaty,

and the development of a mobile electrical power generation system.67

While the INF Treaty option changed

the work of the groups charged with assessing nuclear survivability issues in the

European theater, other groups continued

with ongoing studies that appeared little

changed by the developing treaty negotiations. Analysts were not ready to declare

the Cold War over, nor to wave aside concern with the Soviet threat in 1986 and

1987. Thus, for example, the Strategic

Forces Division continued to work on

enhancing the computer programs used by

SHAPE and worked to interface those

programs with the Nuclear Planning System being developed for the JCS. They

also worked on a continuing, five-year

effort to improve the SIOP planning process.68

The studies conducted by DNA re-
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 285

flected the changing priorities in European nuclear survivability, with the diminished concern for protecting strategic

assets, and for protecting command and

control systems. DNA contractors, as well

as computer hardware/software firms,

provided much of the detailed work for

the nuclear assessment groups. The Nuclear Security and Safety Division worked

with Sandia National Laboratory, with the

Waterways Experiment Station of the

Army Corps of Engineers at Fort Polk,

Louisiana, and other DNA contractors.

Much of the research conducted for the

Security and Safety Division through the

mid- to late-1980s focused on development of techniques for automatic control

of sensor equipment and on improvement

of intruder-detection systems.69

The depth of experience of DNA and

its contractors in dealing with security and

protection of the nuclear stockpile would

have clear applications under the new arrangements evolving in the arms control

discussions. DNA had years of background in dealing with monitoring the

nuclear stockpile, both visually and

through automated methods. The methods

of inspection agreed to under the Memorandum of Understanding associated with

the INF treaty included on-site inspections

of listed military facilities on short notice.

Inspections included the insides of buildings, vehicles, boxes, containers, and other covered objects the size of missiles or

launchers. Between 1988 and 2001, both

sides had the right and conducted annual

short- notice inspections at the sites

named in the Memorandum of Understanding. Other methods included automatic monitoring, and national technical

means, such as satellite imaging and

ground and sea-based radars and listening devices. Furthermore, each side

agreed to notify the other of movement

of missiles and launchers. DNA had the

contacts, the capability, and the experience to be the DoD agency for procurement of personnel, systems, and the management of such activities.70

In addition, under the INF Treaty, both

sides could establish a monitoring center

on each other’s territory. The U.S. site

would be established at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant east of the Ural

Mountains in Udmurt. The Soviets set up

their matching monitoring facility at Hercules Plant Number I, in Magna, Utah,

near Salt Lake City. The Hercules plant

manufactured the Pershing II missile. At

each of these plants, inspectors would

monitor three plant exits with weight sensors, x-ray equipment and other measuring devices.71 To implement the wide

variety of on-site inspections and to monitor the stationary equipment, DoD established the On-Site Inspection Agency

(OSIA). In accordance with DoD emphasis on holding down overhead costs, the

Department created OSIA with DNA providing essential administrative services,

such as legal, procurement, and personnel work.72

REDUCTION IN

GOVERNMENT

Early in his administration, Reagan

had stressed the policy of contracting

many government functions to the private

sector. This policy carried forward a concept developed in prior administrations,

which had resulted in an order from the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB

Circular A-76) that required every federal agency to examine whether it was more

cost effective to contract work than to

conduct it in-house. In December of 1983,

the Grace Commission, appointed by Reagan, issued the “President’s Private Sector Survey of Cost Control, Task Report

on Research and Development.” In addition to asking for more strategic planning

within in-house government laboratories

and other efficiencies, the report urged the
286 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

federal government to contract its research and development work, whenever

possible.73

This new policy harmonized with

DNA’s long-standing administrative style

that depended on substantial use of contractors for scientific work, policy analyses, database development, engineering

and technology, procurement, and a wide

variety of classified and unclassified documentary report writing. Considering the

number of personnel in the agency and the

vast amounts of intellectual products generated by its contractors, the proportion

of in-house to outside work came close

to the ideal recommended by OMB.74

As the entire federal government

shifted during the 1980s and 1990s away

from reliance on in-house facilities and

research to procurement of services from

contractors, DNA’s heritage in this regard

would help defend it against those who

sought to cut government spending. During the Reagan administration, while defense budgets climbed, DoD remained

under constant pressure to reduce inhouse expenditures. Ironically, during the

period of Defense budget expansion from

$171 billion in 1981 to $303 billion by

1989, the military and the civil service

side of the defense establishment faced

budgetary restraint, personnel ceilings,

and grade limitations. DNA, however, had

little obvious “fat” to be cut.

In 1987, the agency put in place a new

charter reflecting the mid-1980s mission

changes. The new organizational structure

incorporated other reforms suggested by

the Grace Commission, such as eliminating layers of bureaucracy within agencies.

The new DNA charter altered the structure of the agency, eliminating the positions of Deputy Director Science and

Technology (DDST) and Deputy Director for Operations, in accordance with

Grace Commission recommendations to

cut down on intermediate level personnel.

The civilian incumbent of the DDST position became the Deputy Director. The

agency created a Plans and Programs

function and administratively transferred

Field Command’s underground test functions to headquarters, reflecting the Director’s concern that Field Command’s

expertise and management activities had

grown too remote from headquarters. This

change also coincided with DoD attempts

to streamline its agencies and to reduce

administrative overhead in accordance

with shifting national priorities.75

A 1986 review by a Defense Science

Board Task Force concluded that DNA

“...is, and has been, operating effectively across a wide range of national nuclear

weapons, operational and research missions.”76 The new charter recognized, to

an extent, the shift in missions of the agency that had evolved out of the rapidly

changing world situation. The new responsibilities, which had very quickly

emerged under the INF treaty, had been

captured in the new charter. DNA underVice Admiral John T. Parker, DNA Director 1987 to 1989.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 287

viet Union, policy makers knew that the

START treaty would lead to a stockpile

drawdown. With lessened U.S.-Soviet

tensions, and the unilateral Soviet decision to suspend nuclear testing, it seemed

likely that a comprehensive test ban

would be discussed once more. The two

nations had already begun the INF elimination of weapons, exchanging site visit

delegations, and monitoring compliance.

In 1988, Vice President George Bush

defeated the Democratic candidate

Michael Dukakis. President Bush eagerly looked forward to addressing festering

domestic and economic troubles that had

continued in the background, obscured by

the dramatic breakthroughs in SovietAmerican relations. Little did he know,

however, that he would preside during

even more tumultuous international

events that would bring the Cold War to

an end and possibly represent a beginning

of the end of the delicate nuclear balance

that had dominated international relations

for decades.80 Other precipitous world

events— Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan, the end of the Warsaw Pact, the fall

of the Berlin Wall, and the Gulf War—

would herald the beginning of the “nineties” and signal a new world order under

which DNA’s mission would evolve once

again.

took treaty verification technology development, including perimeter monitoring

systems and unique identifiers for missile

and reentry vehicle inventories.77

In April of 1984, Secretary of Defense

Weinberger authorized DNA to begin

research on advanced conventional weapons, a role later reinforced by an agreement with the Energy Department for joint

studies on conventional weapons. The

1987 charter also explicitly made this

area, ongoing for some time, a part of the

agency’s revised mission.78

The Defense Department’s directive

of March 18, 1987 more clearly defined

DNA’s mission, functions, and responsibilities in line with changes that had taken place in the interim. The reorganization

had been carried out March 2, 1987 and

the directive captured the effort to provide

better management structure and assure

the maintenance of a broad technology

base to support defense needs.79 The new

charter also brought about a change in

DNA’s director in 1987, from Lieutenant

General John L. Pickitt to Vice Admiral

John T. Parker, who served from 1987 to

1989.

TRANSITION

While no one could foresee the momentous events yet to come with the So-
288 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

ENDNOTES

1. Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear

Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, New

York, 1987, p. 188.

2. DNA, For the Record: A History of the

Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program,

1978-1993, March 1996, pp. 41.

3. DNA, Program Objective Memorandum

[hereafter POM], May 1979, I-2; DNA,

POM, May 1983, pp. V-10 - V-11.

4. DNA, POM, May 1979, pp. 3, I-3 - I-4.

5. DNA, POM, June 1981, I-2 - I-5; Prepared statement of Vice Admiral R.R.

Monroe, USN, Director, DNA, Senate

Subcommittee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1981, Washington, D.C.,

1980, pp. 707-8, 709-710.

6. Powaski, March to Armageddon, pp. 205-

6; Michael R. Gordon, “The Midgetman

Missile—A Counterpoint to the Giant

MX, But Will It Work?,” Defense 15, October 1, 1983, p. 2000.

7. Historical Report, Oct. 1, 1981 - Sept. 30,

1982, Electromagnetic Pulse Effects Division, Radiation Directorate, 8; “Defense Nuclear Agency Nurtures A

Surging Budget,” Defense Week,

April 12, 1983; House Subcommittee on

Appropriations, Department of Defense

Appropriations for 1984, Washington,

D.C., 1983, pp. 423-25.

8. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, Structural Dynamics Division.

9. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, Special Projects Office Section.

10. “Satellite Vulnerability,” Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of

Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year

1980, Washington, D.C., 1980, pp. 74-76.

11. “Satellite Vulnerability,” Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of

Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year

1980, Washington, D.C., 1980, pp. 74-76;

House Subcommittee on Appropriations,

Department of Defense Appropriations

for 1985, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp.

547-48; House Armed Services Committee, Defense Department Authorization

and Oversight for FISCAL YEAR 1984,

Washington, D.C., 1983, pp. 964-68;

“Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense and the

Department of Energy on Objectives and

Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapons Activities, Jan. 1983.”

12. “Defense Science Board Task Force Review on the Defense Nuclear Agency

Technology Base Program, July - December 1981,” pp. 1-8.

13. House Armed Services Committee,

Hearings on Military Posture, Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 201-13.

14. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, May 6, 1983, Subject: Program

Objective Memorandum, FISCAL

YEAR 1985-1989,” in DNA, POM Fiscal Year 1985-1989.

15. Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations,

Department of Defense Appropriations

for Fiscal Year 1981, Washington, D.C.,

1980, pp. 712-713; on MINERS IRON,

see Field Command, Annual Historical

Summary, October 1, 1979 to September

30, 1980, pp. 99-100.

16. “Field Command Chronology,” n.p.; on

HURON LANDING, see Field Command, Annual Historical Summary October 1. 1982 thru [sic] September 30,

1983, pp. 86-87.

17. “Field Command Chronology,” n.p.; K.

E. Gould and Kaman Tempo, “High-Explosive Field Testing (1945-1987): A

DNA Historical Perspective,” December

1, 1987, p. 11; David Kennedy, “Big

Bang in the Desert,” Science 17, JulyAugust 1986, pp. 35-36.

18. Ibid.

19. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1986, Aerospace Systems Division.

20. Nuclear Survivability, August 1985, p. 7;

September 1986, pp. 5, 11.

21. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989—HR

4264 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on

Armed Services, House of Representa-
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 289

tives, 100th Cong., 2d sess., Title II—

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, 1988, 169; House Committee on

Armed Services, Defense Department

Authorization and Oversight, Hearings

on H.R. 2287, Department of Defense

Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, 97th Cong., 2d

sess., pt. 2, pp. 80-85.

22. DoD: Narrative Summaries of Accidents

Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1950-

1980, 1; New York Times, September 22,

1980, pp. 1, 16.

23. Defense Monitor 10, No. 5 (1981), p. 11.

24. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Historical Report October 1, 1986

- September 30, 1987, p. 8.

25. Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-

1997: The First Fifty Years of National

Service, 50-Year Commemorative Document, FC DSWA Printing, Kirtland

AFB, NM, 1997, p. 23.

26. As cited, January 28, 1982.

27. DNA, POM Fiscal Year 1981-1985, p. 4.

28. DNA, POM Fiscal Year 1983-1987,

p. I-9.

29. DNA, Emergency Action Division, Annual Historical Review Oct. 1, 1981-Sept.

30, 1982; Ibid., Oct. 1, 1982-Sept. 30,

1983.

30. DNA, For the Record: A History of the

Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program,

1978-1993 (March 1996), pp. 10, A-6.

31. DNA, For the Record: A History of the

Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program,

1978-1993, March 1996, pp. 40-42.

32. In 1984, at the administration’s behest,

Senator John Warner (R- VA) attached an

amendment to a bill that protected federal contractors from claims for injuries

arising out of atomic weapons testing

programs. The Warner amendment provided that in such suits involving the

employees of contractors, the Federal

government should be substituted for the

contractor as the defendant. But, as Warner seemed not to know, the Federal government was immune from such lawsuits

under a Supreme Court ruling known as

the Feres Doctrine. In effect, the Warner

Amendment was a complete bar to suits

by atomic veterans who had been employed by contractors. The veterans

sought to have their rights reinstated

through passage of a new law. See Sandra Sugawara, “Bomb Testing Victims

Seek Right to Sue U.S.,” Washington

Post, October 3, 1985, p. A8.

33. F. Gladeck and A. Johnson, For the

Record: A History of the Nuclear Test

Personnel Review Program, 1978-1993,

DNA 6041F, Washington, D.C., Defense

Nuclear Agency, 1996, see especially

“Chronology.” For examples of DNA

and NTPR under fire, see House Veterans Affairs Committee, Review of Federal Studies on Health Effects of Low

Level Radiation Exposure and Implementation of Public Law 97-72, 6-24;

DNA, For the Record: A History of the

NTPR, pp. 41-44.

34. Garcia Marquez quoted in “Nuclear Winter Debate Heats Up,” Science 235, January 16, 1987, p. 27; Defense Special

Weapons Agency, 1947-1997, p. 23; Larry Badash, “Nuclear Winter Research:

Science and Politics,” paper presented at

the 1993 History of Science Society Annual Meeting.

35. House Committee on Armed Services,

Defense Department Authorization and

Oversight, Hearings on H.R. 2287, Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986 and

Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, 98th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 4, p. 284;

David C. Morrison, “Nuclear Winter,”

Defense 18, June 21, 1986, p. 1570.

36. Department of Defense Appropriations

for 1988, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,

U.S. Senate, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987,

p. 1003.

37. Vice Admiral R. R. Monroe to Hon. Philip Burton, House of Representatives, 28

March 1980, in Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Hearings

Before a Subcommittee of the Committee

on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 96th

Cong., 2d sess., 1981; “Marshall Islands
290 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988

Stagger from Ravages of U.S. Control,”

Baltimore Sun, October 26, 1997, pp. 1A,

14A; “Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-1997,” pp. 24-25.

38. Transcript of Mr. Paul Carew, Oral History, November 13, 1997, DSWA Headquarters, pp. 19-20.

39. Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-

1997, pp. 24-25.

40. Richard N. Perle, “The Strategic Defense

Initiative: Addressing Some Misconceptions,” Journal of International Affairs

39, Summer 1985, p. 28.

41. Hans Mark, “War and Peace in Space,”

Journal of International Affairs 39, Summer, 1985, p. 12.

42. Richard Garwin, “Star Wars: Shield or

Threat,” Journal of International Affairs

39, Summer, 1985, pp. 33-34.

43. Richard Ned Lebow, “Assured Strategic

Stupidity: The Quest for Ballistic Missile

Defense,” Journal of International Studies 39, Summer, 1985, pp. 57-79. Lebow

reviews the critiques in detail, including

those by Bethe and Sagan.

44. David C. Morrison, “Shooting Down Star

Wars,” Defense 18, October 25, 1986, p.

2544 ff.

45. Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-

1997, p. 25; Vice Admiral John Parker,

interview by Joseph N. Tatarewicz, September 18, 1997.

46. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 87, Electromagnetics Division,

DNA Radiation Sciences Directorate.

47. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1986, p 3-5, Lethality and Hardening Division.

48. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, Atmospheric Effects Division, Radiation Directorate, pp. 4, 5.

49. House Committee on Armed Services,

Defense Department Authorization and

Oversight, Hearings on H.R. 2287, Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985 and

Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, 98th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 4, p. 983;

Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, Radiation Directorate, p. 6.

50. Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-

1997, p. 23; Harold L. Brode, Partial

History of the Defense Nuclear Agency

Scientific Advisory Group on Effects (And

Its Predecessors), Santa Monica, (California: Pacific Sierra Research Corp.,

December 13, 1985). The changing composition of topics discussed at SAGE reflected the impact of the Strategic

Defense Initiative.

51. Charles Hill, “Operate Through, A New

DNA/SDIO Program,” Nuclear Survivability, July 1988, p 3, 4, 9.

52. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, Atmospheric Effects Division, Radiation Directorate, p. 7.

53. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1986, p. 3-5, Lethality and Hardening Division; Annual Historical Report,

FISCAL YEAR 1987, Electronics Effects

Division, Radiation Sciences Directorate.

54. “Nuclear Survivability Interviews

VADM Parker, Director, DNA, ”Nuclear Survivability, July 1989, p. 2.

55. The reports, referenced in Nuclear Survivability, July 1988, p. 10, included:

DNA-TR-86-33, “HARDTAC Program

Summary and Test Bed Aircraft Hardening Approach,” AD B177691L; DNATR-86-154, “DSP-1 Satellite

Survivability Assessment,” AD CO

41977L; DNA-H-86-60-V1, “DNA EMP

Engineering Handbook for Ground

Based Facilities, 3 Volumes.” AD

B114878 (V3), AD B116353 (V2), AD

B115101 (V1); DNA-TR-87-100, “EMP

Coupling to Hard Mobile Launcher,” AD

C041752L; and DNA-TR-87-51, “ThinFilm Standoff Radiation Shields,” AD

B114956.

56. Donald C. Sachs, A Guide to Nuclear

Weapons Phenomena and Effects Literature, (1993 Edition), Kaman SciencesDASIAC SR-92-004, lists these citations

on EMP on pages 10-7 through 10-9.

57. DNA-TR-87-94 “A Strategy of Integrated Use of Nuclear Weapon Effects Simulators,” AD B117664L, cited in Nuclear

Survivability, August 1988, p. 10.

58. Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 377-79.
A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988 291

59. Ibid., p. 387.

60. Ibid., p. 389.

61. Ibid., pp. 395-98; Don Oberdorfer, The

Turn: From Cold War to the New Era:

The United States and the Soviet Union,

1983-1990, New York: Poseidon Press,

1991.

62. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 394.

63. Ibid., p. 401.

64. Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-

1997, p. 25; Admiral Parker interview;

Understanding the INF Treaty, Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency. 1989, pp. 1, 13-15.

65. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989—HR

4264 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on

Armed Services, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d sess., Title II—

Research, Development, Test and

Evaluation, 1988, p. 159.

66. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, Nuclear Assessments and

Applications (OPNA) Section, p. 2.

67. Ibid., p. 3-4.

68. Ibid., p. 6.

69. Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, OPNA Section, passim;

Annual Historical Report, FISCAL

YEAR 1987, Nuclear Security and Safety Division.

70. Understanding the INF Treaty, pp. 26-28.

71. Ibid., p. 28.

72. Robert Brittigan, interview with Rodney

Carlisle, 1998.

73. “President’s Private Sector Survey of

Cost Control, Task Report on Research

and Development,” December 8, 1983,

pp. 16-17, 61-65.

74. An Assessment of Defense Nuclear Agency Functions: Pathways Toward a New

Nuclear Infrastructure for the Nation,

Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1994, budget graph on p. 30 and

commentary; William M. Arkin, “Beltway Bandits,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, No. 8, September 1985, pp.

5-6; Harold Brode, interview by Joseph

N. Tatarewicz, October 17, 1997.

75. Department of Defense Directive

5105.31, 18 March 1987, reproduced in

William Harris, ed., “Charters and Directives for the Defense Nuclear Agency and

Predecessor Organizations, 1947-1993,

RAND Review of the Defense Nuclear

Agency,” draft, April 1994; Parker interview.

76. Memo, June 18, 1986 from Fowler.

77. Harris study, RAND, February 1995,

p. xxv.

78. Defense Special Weapons Agency, 1947-

1997, p. 23.

79. Study team report, draft Sept. 1, 1987. In

1987, the OSD Reorganization Study

Team, confirmed the conclusion of the

task force and concluded that DNA

should be named a Combat Support

Agency.

80. John Lewis Gaddis, “The New Cold War

History,” in Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 281-95.
292 A REBIRTH OF CONFIDENCE, 1980 TO 1988
NEW WORLD ORDER:

COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM

The Cold War, centered in Europe,

ended in 1989, far more suddenly than

anyone anticipated. In the summer of

1989 major political changes occurred in

Poland and Hungary. Then, into the fall

of 1989, national revolutions swept across

Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The Berlin Wall—the

quintessential symbol of the Cold War—

fell in November 1989. Less than a year

later, Germany had been unified by treaty and the Soviet Union was carrying out

its declared commitment to withdraw,

within four years, all of its 680,000 stationed troops from East Germany and other Eastern European states.

Against this background of political

revolution, German Unification, and massive military withdrawals, the leaders of

the European States, the United States,

Canada, and the Soviet Union met in

France in November of 1990 to sign the

Peace of Paris treaties. Two arms control

treaties constituted the heart of that peace

conference: the Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe Treaty and the 1990

Accords for the Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe. At the same

time a major nuclear arms control measure, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), was in the final stages of

negotiation. This treaty would reduce U.S.

and Soviet nuclear arsenals, while establishing a comprehensive system to monitor all nuclear forces in the future.

Then, early in 1991, U.S. leaders declared that within three years, by 1994,

nearly 2/3 or 160,000 American troops

from Western Europe would be withdrawn. As 1991 progressed, demonstrations for national independence occurred

across Europe further and further to the

east. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader

of the Soviet Union, hoped that his reform

programs of glasnost and perestroika

would breathe new life into the increasingly stagnant Soviet system. Instead, by

removing the rigid controls that had kept

the system together for decades, he

brought about its dissolution. In April,

The Cold War is over... and we no longer live in the shadow of nuclear

annihilation... yet we still have to finish the work of reducing the Cold

War nuclear stockpiles. We cannot afford to ignore these challenges.”

President William J. Clinton,

Radio Address, January 15, 1994

“

CHAPTER EIGHT

POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 TO 1997
294 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

President Gorbachev and other Soviet

Republic leaders signed a new treaty of

union. That measure proved insufficient

to stem the tide of nationalism sweeping

across the Eurasian continent. Soviet-led

Communism had failed; new nations were

emerging.

Following an abortive coup attempt

against the Soviet Union’s government in

August by “hard-line” Communists, the

parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus declared independence. At the same time,

newly-appointed Russian President

Boris Yeltsin and his government

banned the Communist Party.

In September of 1991, less than a

month after the failed coup, President

George Bush announced a series of unilateral reductions in U.S. strategic and

tactical weapons. A week later Gorbachev

responded, canceling Soviet nuclear

weapons programs, withdrawing tactical

nuclear weapons, and extending a moratorium on underground nuclear testing indefinitely. Then, on December 25, 1991,

as the world watched in amazement, the

Soviet Union collapsed as a nation and 15

new nations emerged, along with a new

international organization, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. New arms

control treaties were promptly negotiated and signed, including the Open Skies

Treaty, the START II Treaty, and the

Chemical Weapons Convention. Adding

to the political complexity and fueling

later unrest, three new nations split away

from the former Yugoslavia: Slovenia,

Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the

end of President Bush’s administration in

January 1993, a post-Cold War peace had

emerged across Europe.

With the signing of the START I and

START II treaties came a dramatic change

in direction for nuclear forces and nuclear weapons. New questions arose regarding nuclear testing, force modernization,

technologies for treaty verification, and

the future of nuclear deterrence. Existing

Department of Defense agencies whose

missions had focused on nuclear weapons

found their existence suddenly challenged. Defense panels, Congressional

studies, and internal examinations raised

hard questions through the decade.

AGENCY REACTION

The question of exactly how DNA

should adapt to the cessation of Cold War

conflict and the broader international

changes generated much discussion inside

and outside the agency during the late

1980s and early 1990s. At first, DNA leadership asserted several roles that they believed would continue or would expand

in the new world situation. DNA’s director, Vice Admiral John T. Parker, evaluated the situation as early as mid-1989,

well before the fall of the Wall. “Superficially,” he noted, it might “be reasonable

to conclude that DNA’s role was to be

reduced,” with the INF treaty, START

negotiations, and U.S. and Soviet unilatMajor General Gerald Watson, DNA Director, 1989-1992.
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 295

eral initiatives, all of which would lead

to substantially reduced total number of

nuclear weapons. Admiral Parker believed the agency would continue to play

a major role in maintaining deterrence and

ensuring the survivability of existing deterrent systems. Furthermore, if the nation

came to rely on space-based SDI systems,

the agency would be responsible for helping the Strategic Defense Initiative Office

(SDIO) ensure that these systems were

survivable. Testing of satellite components had already become a part of DNA’s

agenda, and that work would only expand

if the nation planned to rely on such systems.1 In May of 1990, Major General

Gerald Watson, Parker’s successor as Director of DNA, concurred with his predecessor’s earlier assessment. “As treaties

are signed that limit the number of offensive weapons, DNA’s lead role in developing the technology necessary to verify

treaty compliance increases in importance.”2

PERSIAN GULF WAR

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990, a U.S.-led coalition of nations deployed forces to Saudi

Arabia and surrounding

areas to help prevent further Iraqi offensive incursions. In January of 1991,

coalition air power began

executing a massive air

campaign, Operation

Desert Storm, against

Iraq’s military and supporting infrastructure.

The effectiveness of precision-guided munitions

and stealth aircraft was

quickly demonstrated.

Coalition air power attacked facilities suspected

of housing Iraqi weapons

of mass destruction

(WMD) in hardened bunkers. Coalition

forces launched a ground offensive in late

February of 1991 that expelled Iraq’s forces from Kuwait 100 hours after the offensive began.

DNA’s expertise in weapon lethality

and modeling of atmospheric dispersion

of hazardous materials supported target

planning and consequence assessments

during the Gulf War. The agency deployed

expert teams to a DNA assessment facility, to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Headquarters, and to the Pentagon in support of operational target planning from

the start of the air campaign through the

expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The agency also set up a 24-hour command center to assess the consequences

if Iraq launched Scud missiles, armed with

WMD warheads, against Saudi Arabia

and Israel. DNA provided the results of

these assessments to U.S. Central Command. Agency officers also participated

in post-war inspections of coalition-struck

targets to validate DNA’s lethality and survivability models in comparison to wartime experience. Battle damage

assessments suggested new damage indicators, such as the temperature of target

General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, briefs

reporters at the beginning of Desert Storm air campaign.
296 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

smoke. The agency incorporated data from the Persian

Gulf War in lethality, survivability, and collateral effects

modeling, especially for

hardened targets. Another

Gulf War-related effort, initiated by DNA, was the development and militarization

of an anti-emetic compound

named Kitral, which was

used for military applications to treat nausea and

vomiting in nuclear, chemical, and biological environments. The agency

sponsored Kitral’slater FDA

approval. Later, this compound acquired commercial use for controlling nausea and vomiting following

cancer treatment.

FUTURE OF

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

In September 1991, President Bush

announced nuclear posture changes reflecting the end of the Cold War. These

changes included the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from overseas

Army bases, surface ships, and attack submarines; cancellation of mobile basing

programs for the Peacekeeper missile; cancellation of the Short Range Attack Missile-II (SRAM-II) and the Small ICBM; and

stand down from alert of strategic bombers and Minuteman ICBMs. In January

1992, another Presidential decision set the

groundwork for the eventual elimination

of all fifty Peacekeeper missiles, the reduction of MIRV deployments, and the

shift of bombers to conventional missions.

September of 1992 brought about an

end of an era in nuclear testing. HUNTERS TROPHY, a weapon effects test of

less than 20 KT, was detonated in a HLOS

shaft under Rainier Mesa at NTS on September 18, 1992. It was the last nuclear

effects test executed. After the HUNTERS

TROPHY test, NTS and its facilities

served as a testbed for experiments to

develop and validate the use of non-nuclear munitions for defeat of facilities located within tunnels or hardened

installations.

The inauguration of President Bill

Clinton in 1993 brought further change

throughout the U.S. government. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), chartered in

1993 and led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, sought

to determine the role of nuclear weapons

in U.S. security strategy and resultant military consequences. Among the findings

of the 1993 NPR was a new definition of

an “enduring stockpile” of nuclear weapons. DNA staff supported the NPR study,

coordinating requirements with agency

analyses and other activities, and provided products to meet the NPR needs. In

September of 1994, President Clinton approved a reduced strategic force. That

force consisted of significantly reduced

arsenals of Minuteman ICBMs, Trident

submarines (all with D-5 missiles), B-2

and B-52 strategic bombers, and a nonnuclear role for the B-1 bomber.

Underground connection tunnel prior to detonation of

HUNTERS TROPHY test, NTS, September 18, 1992.
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 297

With the 1993 decision to conditionally cease U.S. nuclear testing, questions

arose concerning how to maintain the reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile.

The Department of Energy advocated

“Science Based Stockpile Stewardship,”

in which reliability would be preserved

through stockpile surveillance, laboratory experiments, and improved computational software and hardware.

Subsequently, a DoD-DOE agreement

called for “dual revalidation” of weapons

remaining in the inventory through a process in which each DOE weapon laboratory independently and periodically

examines all data relevant to a specific

weapon type. The results are reviewed by

DOE Headquarters staff and provided to

the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council for

final action. DNA participated in the process, stationing agency military officers

at all three national laboratories. These

officers contributed to the dual revalidation process and annual recertification of

the stockpile. In 1995, the President instituted an annual certification program to

certify the safety and reliability of the

nuclear weapons stockpile as part of his

decision to eliminate underground testing.

DNA is a full participant in this process

that involves the full spectrum of the nuclear weapons community.

DNA ADJUSTS TO THE

POST-COLD WAR ERA

The post-Desert Storm revelations of

the breadth and scope of the Iraqi quest

to obtain nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons spawned a heightened awareness of WMD proliferation. DNA began

a series of initiatives in 1991 to address

the proliferation of WMD by terrorists and

third-world countries. In a briefing on the

“Implications of Nuclear Proliferation” to

the American Nuclear Society in Orlando, Florida, on June 5, 1991, DNA Deputy Director, Dr. George W. Ullrich

summarized the pertinent issues surrounding nuclear and WMD proliferation and

the difficult questions such proliferation

presented to U.S. defense and security

policy.2 His briefing painted a picture of

ongoing rogue nation “threat containment” in order to control what Dr. Ullrich

deemed the “proliferation genie.” Such

technical briefings contributed general

understanding toward later counterproliferation measures and raised the national

consciousness on this issue. Later counterproliferation conferences, the first at

the Air Force Academy in Colorado in

May of 1994 and the second at the National Defense University (Fort McNair)

in Washington, D.C., in October of 1995,

focused national attention on counter-proliferation concerns. President Clinton

highlighted the growing crisis in the proliferation of WMD in his 1994 speech to

the United Nations General Assembly,

“One of our most urgent priorities must

be attacking the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction whether they are nuMajor General Kenneth Hagemann, DNA

Director, 1992-1995.
298 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

clear, chemical or biological, and the ballistic missiles that can rain down on populations hundreds of miles away... If we

do not stem the proliferation of the

world’s deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure.” Later in 1995, at a Fort

McNair conference, Dr. Harold P. Smith,

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

(Atomic Energy), echoed the President’s

earlier message that “...the number one

challenge facing the United States now,

and probably for the years ahead, is to prevent the proliferation of these weapons of

mass destruction, whether chemical, biological, or nuclear, and the scientific

knowledge of how to make them.” The

clear message was that DNA’s central focus, for the foreseeable future, would be

counterproliferation concerns.

The agency supported a review of all

U.S. non-proliferation and counterproliferation activities that were the responsibility of the (then) Deputy Secretary of

Defense, Dr. John Deutch. DNA supported counterproliferation planning by the

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

(Atomic Energy), later renamed the ATSD

(Nuclear and Chemical and Biological

Defense Programs, or NCB). That office

was assigned centralized responsibility

for DoD counterproliferation research and

development activities. DNA’s tasks within the counterproliferation mission area,

under the DoD Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, addressed critical technology base support to the emerging DoD

counterproliferation strategy.

DNA’s research focused specifically

on military response options to develop

and provide new weapons that used discriminant lethality against counterproliferation targets and could minimize

unwanted or collateral effects. The agency’s Counterproliferation Technology

Base Support program emphasized collateral effects definition and prediction analysis; chemical weapon/biological weapon

(CW/BW) agent neutralization; hardened/

underground structural analysis; enhanced

conventional weapon payload concepts;

targeting technical assistance; and target

signature evaluation.

In response to the dangers associated

with the potential breakdown of nuclear

controls in the new nations of the former

Soviet Union in late 1991, the U.S. embarked on an innovative program of cooperative assistance. Until 1993, the

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program was called the Safe, Secure Dismantlement Program; it was also known as the

“Nunn-Lugar Program.” The program’s

fundamental objectives were to help all

of the new nations, except Russia, to become non-nuclear, to accelerate START

arms reductions, to enhance nuclear safety, security, and control, to initiate FSU

chemical weapon destruction, to encourage demilitarization, and to extend contacts between the U.S. and FSU defense

establishments.

In January of 1993, Dr. Harold Smith,

ATSD(AE), assigned DNA the task of

implementing the CTR program, on a cradle-to-grave basis, for each of the program’s elements. As of mid-1996, the

agency was executing over 50 CTR

projects, ranging from supplying Russia

with secure containers for transport and

storage of fissile material, to projects in

demilitarization designed to ensure that

threat reduction efforts led to enduring,

peaceful, and commercially viable endeavors. Specifically, the CTR program

achieved the removal of over 1,200 warheads from deployed systems in Russia;

realization of nuclear-free status in

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; and

elimination of many FSU strategic nuclear

delivery systems.

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in scaling

down their nuclear arsenals under such

treaties as the INF signaled a changing

role for the agency. In December of 1987,
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 299

a ten-member task force set up offices in

the Coast Guard headquarters at Buzzards

Point in Washington, D.C. The group was

to develop a plan for carrying out the onsite inspection provisions of INF. One of

the original cadre of military personnel

assigned to the work maintained that the

original concept for this new agency was

as a DNA component that would handle

baseline (initial inspections) only. Later

inspections were originally envisioned to

be contracted out and the agency dissolved.3

The On-Site Inspection Agency

(OSIA), formed with budgetary and administrative support from DNA, became

a separate and more permanent inspection

agency.4 The mission of OSIA increased

with the growth of several further treaties

over the next few years, each requiring onsite inspection capability. In particular, the

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

Treaty, both signed in 1990, and START

in 1991, required further inspection teams.

In July of 1991, OSIA became the DoD

executive agent for supporting the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the organization conducting

inspections of Iraq to determine treaty

compliance regarding elimination of Iraqi WMD threats. Over the decade 1989-

1997, for all treaties and inspections, OSIA

deployed more than 9,600 inspectors.5

As OSIA split from DNA and performed the direct inspection role, DNA

itself appeared at first to have only a very

minor part to play in the new arms control

regime. This changed, however, following

the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Arms control and verification, and the

ongoing destruction of missiles as dictated by treaty, were too expensive for the

states which emerged from the former

Soviet Union, and the work lagged.

Throughout the new decade, as a primary

mission thrust, DNA staff would address

elements of this arms control and verification need in the new republics.

The “nuclear club” suddenly had four

new nations: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine,

and Kazakhstan, where the Soviet Union

had been only one member before 1991.

The impact of the dissolution of the Soviet Union on the issue of proliferation

was worrisome and unpredictable. Then,

in 1991, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and

Ukraine all announced their plans to send

to Russia for storage and dismantling

thousands of Soviet-produced nuclear

weapons that were housed on their territories. Intentions were one thing, action

another. Leonard Spector, Director of the

Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Project, noted that “...it is increasingly

difficult to judge whether proliferation is

on the wane or on the rise.” He speculated that the protests from the republics of

the FSU against the spread of nuclear

weapons might be a “...thin veneer” over

more sinister intentions. Concern about

smuggling of nuclear materials and possibly whole missile systems from the new

nuclear states was voiced in the press.6

Although Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan stated their willingness to eliminate

missiles on their territories, they claimed

they were unable to pay for the effort.

In response to this problem, Congress

in November of 1991 funded assistance

to the new republics to destroy nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons and to

transport, store, disable, and safeguard

weapons in conjunction with their destruction. The funding established safeguards against the spread of the weapons

to new countries. The initial legislation,

known as the Nunn-Lugar Act, authorized

the transfer of up to $400 million from

DoD accounts to this program. An additional $400 million was authorized under

the fiscal year 1993 Defense Appropriations Act (Public Law 102-396). In a prac-
300 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

tical sense, the CTR effort would require

the procurement of tools and equipment

and the sending of teams to do the actual

work of missile dismantling, safeguarding, storing, and transporting nuclear warheads. OSIA, a small agency made up of

technical people engaged in actual inspections, was not capable of mounting a major contracting/procurement effort.

In March of 1992, the Secretary of

Defense delegated responsibility for executing the CTR Program to the

ATSD(AE). The considerable responsibilities under CTR required an agency capable of contracting, providing logistics,

support, and management on a vast scale.

DNA was a logical choice. On January 11,

1993, DNA was delegated responsibilities

for program management and execution,

including project and acquisition planning, procurement, financial management, and performance oversight. DNA’s

ability to quickly contract out this work

soon paid off. The CTR Program included a number of proposed projects that

supported the umbrella agreement and

fourteen implementing agreements signed

between the United States and Russia, and

another group of eight agreements between the United States and Belarus. On

September 24, 1993, an additional umbrella agreement was initiated between

the United States and Kazakhstan, with

five draft implementing agreements. In

addition, a number of agreements between

the United States and Ukraine went

through preliminary drafting before being

tabled in 1993.

In late 1993, DNA’s CTR Program

completed its first project with the delivery of 2,500 soft armored blankets, used

to protect nuclear devices from small arms

fire or from spreading hazardous debris

in case of accident during transportation,

to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine also

were planning “Defense Conversion”

projects. Specialized projects included

Russian containers to store fissile materials and construction of a new Science

and Technology Center in the Ukraine.7

A later initiative under Nunn-Lugar allowed the purchase and transfer of a limited amount of highly enriched uranium

from Kazakhstan to storage in the United

States. In addition and collaterally related to the CTR Program, more than 5,000

warheads were removed from missiles in

Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan and returned to Russia.8

By 1994, DNA set up a “Defense ConSecretary of Defense William Perry, Colonel-General Volodymy Mikhtyuk, and

Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy

Shmarov at Silo #8 at Pervomaysk supervise removal of SS-19 missile in compliance with START under the Cooperative

Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 301

version Division” to implement specific

agreements between the United States and

four new republics directed at conversion

of the defense industrial base in those republics to peaceful purposes. For example, DNA awarded contracts for industrial

partnerships for a hearing aid factory, an

air traffic management system, a bottling

plant, and a dental equipment production

firm. Other industrial partnership contracts involved work on automobile battery chargers, integrated circuits,

antennas, and other non-defense related

items. Part of the focus of the division’s

activities was to provide assistance in

building pre-fabricated housing for demobilized Strategic Rocket Force personnel

in the former Soviet Union.9 The division

also took on a variety of complementary

projects within the CTR Program including setting up the international science and

technology centers, conducting environmental restoration of former strategic

rocket force bases, and assisting in the

disposal of such non-nuclear, conventional weapons systems as radar arrays and

tanks.10

DNA’s Verification Technology Programs, conducted under the agency’s

Arms Control Verification Technology

Research and Development Program, expanded during the 1990s to include support to virtually every arms control and

bilateral agreement to which the U.S. was

a party. Technology verification achievements and activities during this period

included sensors for Open Skies aircraft,

unified databases relevant to arms control,

analytical techniques and sensors for

chemical and biological agents, gravity

gradiometers to characterize START Treaty Limited Items, and improved seismic

sensing capabilities to verify provisions

of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT).

DNA sponsored annual conferences

and symposia showcasing arms control

and verification technologies, which typically attracted domestic and international participants from a wide variety of

government, industry, and academic institutions. These conferences highlighted important lessons learned from

previous and existing treaty verification

technology, cost-effective strategies of

verification assurance, and illustrated

arms control verification technologies in

development.

In his 1995 annual report to Congress,

Secretary of Defense William Perry pointed out that American military forces deployed to defeat aggression “will likely

face the use or threat of use of weapons

of mass destruction (WMD).” Shortly after this speech, DNA was designated by

DoD a Center of Excellence for WMD

Counterproliferation. To provide technical analyses to assist decisionmakers in

countering the WMD threat, the agency

developed a wargame support process that

allowed DoD participants to use analytic

tools to access WMD impact in a training

environment.

In 1995, the agency provided wargame support in eight sessions. The Air

Force Wargaming Institute sponsored five

of the sessions, held at Maxwell Air Force

Base in Alabama. The Naval War College

sponsored Global War Games 1995 at

Newport, Rhode Island, and cosponsored

another session in Hawaii with the Commander in Chief, Pacific. The U.S. Army

Chemical and Biological Defense Command sponsored a Counterproliferation

Research Development Seminar Wargame in McLean, Virginia. The DNA support package included pre-packaged

presentations and briefings, seminars, and

training sessions to familiarize decisionmakers with the use of analytic tools developed by technical directorates within

DNA: Shock Physics, Radiation Sciences, Technology Applications, and Test,

and Field Command. Feedback from the
302 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

sessions was used to validate and refine

the models and simulations.11

TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS

FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

As the breadth and scope of terrorism

expanded in the 1990s, it became apparent that much of the DNA Cold War expertise was applicable to efforts to counter

this terrorism. In particular, DNA expertise in Command, Control, and Communications (C3) facility survivability had

direct application to the safeguarding of

U.S. and allied facilities that were potential terrorist targets. Through the 1990s,

DNA performed numerous Balanced Survivability Assessments of critical DoD

and federal agency facilities. Chief among

the findings of these survivability assessments were judgments regarding a facility’s vulnerability to terrorism as virtual

roadmaps to risk reduction measures.

DNA applied blast response calculations

to structures using calculational codes and

models originally developed for nuclear

applications. This analytical support was

provided to law enforcement agencies

during forensic investigations of terrorist

events, including the World Trade Center

(1994) and Oklahoma City (1995) bombings.

The agency’s culture had centered

around the study of catastrophic scenarios with a rational approach, building data

to deal with nuclear weapon effects so as

to mitigate them. Thus, its institutional

culture was well suited to dealing with

new terrorist scenarios. The accumulated

databases available through DNA, the

agency-sponsored Nuclear Information

Analysis Center (DASIAC), and its other

contractors, were highly pertinent to the

issues of proliferation and terrorist use of

high explosives, chemical or biological

weapons. New threats by non-state-sponsored and state-sponsored terrorists, now

armed with more powerful explosive devices and WMD, required technical understanding of such weapons on civilian

populations. The attack on Khobar Towers in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia, in 1996, and

the release of Sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1996 hammered home the need for

the U.S. to be prepared for such terrorist

acts within its homeland.

DNA’s background in dealing with

scenarios involving catastrophic attacks

with nuclear weapons upon civilian populations gave it techniques and tools for

assisting in evaluating such threats and

events. Work on countering civilian terrorism led to a high-profile task in an era

when small groups of terrorists were

armed with extremely powerful weapons.12 Following the terrorist bombing of

the Khobar Towers military housing area

in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the Defense

Department turned to DNA to assess the

yield and makeup of the bomb used to

destroy Khobar Towers.

With its models and expertise, DNA

estimated the likely yield of the bomb.

The exact size of the yield would be very

important in reviewing security precautions. A low-yield device, say in the range

of 5,000 pounds or less, would indicate

that traditional security precautions

should have prevented extensive damage;

a much larger yield would suggest that

terrorism had reached a new scale and that

entirely new security precautions would

be required henceforth to protect personnel exposed in such locations. Using cratering data from the DIPOLE MIGHT

tests of 1995, and calculating for a heightof-burst of 5.3 feet, based on the Dhahran tank truck design, DNA estimated that

the yield had been approximately 11.5

tons, or 23,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent, in sharp contrast to press reports that

had set the yield at about 5,000 pounds.

To confirm that this yield estimate was

accurate, DNA examined several other effects of the bomb. Using a variety of
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 303

methods, DNA generated estimated yields

that varied somewhat but all much higher than the press reports. By using glass

breakage as an indicator, and acknowledging that the blast wave was shielded by

buildings, it was apparent there were varying high and low pressure zones. DNA ran

a computer study of the 243 broken windows in the vicinity. This study produced

an estimated yield of 31,000 pounds of

TNT-equivalent blast.

Another DNA study focused on the

deformation and displacement of the concrete facade leading into the building, resulting in a yield of at least 15,000 pounds.

Computer studies, assuming the charge to

have been roughly cylindrical in the tank

truck, indicated a yield of 20,000-25,000

pounds of TNT-equivalent. A number of

anomalies in the event were explained by

the computer studies. An individual standing near an Army High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) or

Humvee, which was positioned approximately 125 feet from the blast, survived

and foliage relatively near the explosion

center was still on the trees. The Fort Polk

tests, conducted by the U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers for DNA along with computer analysis, showed that a blind area

existed at a 45-degree angle from the main

axis of the truck were the individual stood,

with greatly reduced pressures. DNA concluded with a high degree of confidence

that the charge used was between 20,000

and 30,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent. To

confirm the findings, a 21,000-pound

truck bomb was detonated at Fort Polk,

Louisiana, on August 27, 1995, which

satisfied investigators and confirmed

DNA’s findings.13 The conclusion of

DNA’s Khobar Towers study was no mere

technical fact but a finding that would influence safety considerations and facility

improvements to withstand possible future attacks.

Such improvements, designed around

an understanding of the Khobar Towers

explosion, would lead to redesign of office and room layouts, new installationwide warning systems, new

battery-operated lighting, better training

for personnel, procedural changes to minimize visits of trucks to areas with large

numbers of personnel, and the creation of

safe-haven areas to be used in cases of

early warning. Earthen barriers and blastresistant windows could reduce glass

fragment injuries. The use of earthquakeproofing technologies in building construction could also increase resistance to

terrorist attacks by such weapons.14

The 300-page Khobar Towers report

by the DNA bomb-damage survey team

concluded that the 20,000+ pound bomb

had overwhelmed existing security meaFort Polk cratering phenomenology test

conducted by DNA and U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers to determine accuracy of

Khobar Towers bomb damage assessment;

upper photo is tank loaded with explosives,

lower photo is resultant crater.
304 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

sures at the facility. In an investigation led

by retired Army General Wayne Downing, former commander of the U.S. Special Forces, Downing criticized the

security measures and placed responsibility for inattention to security problems on

the commander of the 4404th Air Wing

at Dharhan. Downing estimated the truck

bomb at 3,000-8,000 pounds. Downing

disagreed with the DNA study, noting that

“...there is no way a bomb could have

been 20,000 pounds and have that man

survive,” referring to the individual near

the Humvee. He also doubted that the

leaves could remain on nearby plants if

the blast had been over 20,000 pounds of

TNT-equivalent.15 However, Deputy Secretary John White and Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs General John Shalikashvili

emphasized security improvements rather than placement of blame. White

stressed that “Americans didn’t kill these

airmen. Terrorists killed these airmen.

And our focus is on what we can do in

order to make sure that we minimize and

protect against these kinds of enormous,

complicated and sophisticated threats in

the future.”16

Thus, the DNA study was at the heart

of the controversy surrounding the question of responsibility and security precautions. General Shalikashvili and Secretary

of Defense William Perry accepted the

DNA findings and the agency’s technical

assessment both as to the size of the blast

and its anomalous effects. As an indication of support, the DNA report on the

Khobar bomb survey was attached to the

Downing report prior to submission to the

President.17

END OF NUCLEAR TESTING–

EFFECTS TEST AND SIMULATION

The U.S. underground nuclear testing

program ended in September 1992, when

the President signed a funding bill that

contained an amendment introduced by

Senator Mark Hatfield imposing a ninemonth nuclear test moratorium. When

President Clinton took office in 1993, he

extended the moratorium for one year and

repeated the extensions after that. In September of 1996, Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),

which was sent to Congress but not ratified. The United States had stopped production of new nuclear warheads in 1989,

and the stockpile aged more rapidly than

when new weapons were being introduced. Scientists at the weapons laboratories argued that tests remained the best

way to determine whether nuclear weapons remained safe and stable, and they

argued for as many as 15 full-scale tests

in the early 1990s.

DNA had responsibility for two nuclear effects simulators as part of the Centralized Test and Evaluation Investment

Program (CTEIP). That program had been

approved in November 1988, providing

a centrally funded RDT&E program for

executing high-priority improvements to

the Major Range and Test Facility Base.

This $1.3 billion program funded 29 different projects, running from fiscal year

1990 through 1994. CTEIP included support of two DNA nuclear simulator programs that focused on survivability: the

Large Blast/Thermal Simulator (LB/TS)

and the DECADE radiation effects simulator.

Munitions effectiveness assessment

modeling used empirical data obtained, in

large measure, from DNA’s Permanent

High Explosives Test Site (PHETS) at

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Since 1988, there had been more than

a 30-fold increase in conventional effects

tests. DNA’s White Sands test facilities

were also employed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to create a

computerized database and investigative

protocol for law enforcement agencies to

use in large-scale vehicle bomb investi-
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 305

gations. The LB/TS, operated jointly since

1994 by DNA and the Army at White

Sands, is the largest shock tube in the

world. The simulator replicates the blast

and thermal environments of nuclear

weapons with yields from one to 600 kilotons. The LB/TS conducted rapid turnaround testing of full-scale systems in a

simulated nuclear blast and thermal environment, evaluating hardness to the effects of these nuclear weapons. By 1990,

over 200 untested systems were in the

backlog that would be addressed by the

LB/TS.

Another simulator, DECADE, was

operated by the Air Force’s Arnold Engineering Development Center. It was designed to simulate x-ray radiation effects

of a nuclear detonation in space for testing hardness of space systems and their

components. The name implied the fact

that the facility would lead to a tenfold

increase in capabilities to provide a highlevel radiation source that could support

hardness validation testing for space subsystems, including communications, navigation satellites, missile electronics, and

seeker and surveillance systems.18 The

relationship between the testing equipment that represented one of the agency’s

core capability and its continued role under a test ban regime was apparent to the

staff at DNA at the time. DNA’s Director

for Test claimed that, “Expertise, coupled

with a sound architecture, test methodology, and smarter use of simulator capabilities can be the response to a CTBT. We

need to preserve and build upon our existing capabilities and expertise if a CTBT

comes along. DNA provided this core of

expertise in nuclear weapons effects... We

are the honest broker in advising our senior leadership as to whether or not system requirements have been met.”19

Recognizing the lead that the agency

had in the area of simulation, DNA decided to devote three special editions of

its Nuclear Survivability newsletter, to

Drawing of DNA DECADE Radiation Test Facility at Arnold Engineering Development

Center.
306 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

broadcast its capabilities within the defense community. The August, 1990 edition focused on “Testing in Nuclear

Hardness Validation,” the February, 1991

issue on “Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation,” and the September, 1991 issue

on “Nuclear Weapons Effects Codes and

Analysis.” Contributors to the issues

spanned the nuclear effects community,

including specialists from the national

laboratories and different divisions within DNA. All contributed articles explaining a variety of simulator programs and

equipment.

The aboveground testing Radiation

Simulator Program continued to support

testing while developing simulator improvements. BLACKJACK 5, DOUBLE

EAGLE, PITHON, CASINO, PHOENIX, and AURORA continued as the

workhorse simulators and were fully

booked throughout the 1990s. These simulators tested the Air Force’s Peacekeeper missile, the Navy’s Trident II SLBM,

the Milstar satellite, the Army Tactical

Shelter, and Instrumentation Command

and Control Programs, several NSA components, and satellite optical coatings and

materials.20

With the reorganization of DNA in the

1990s, administration of the agency’s testing program was transferred to Field

Command, including the Test Operations

Directorate that took over the testing functions formerly conducted out of the Test

Directorate at Headquarters in Alexandria,

Virginia. With the elimination of underground nuclear testing, more emphasis

was placed on nuclear effects simulations

and conventional weapon testing. Facilities were located not only at WSMR and

the NTS, but at other locations and contractor facilities. At White Sands, stacks

of high explosive were detonated to simulate nuclear airblast up to the 8 kilotons.

The test site itself included hardened targets, instrumentation bunkers, and test

control facilities. Tests and targets were

also designed to evaluate advanced conventional penetrating weapon performance, new types of penetrating weapon

fuzes, and structures themselves. The

PHETS at White Sands allowed both live

air-drop and static testing of conventional weapons. The new large simulators at

White Sands provided ideal airblast wave

forms of pressures up to 35 pounds per

square inch. The thermal simulator could

be operated separately from the blast simulator, or both could be used together to

show the synergistic effects from both

thermal and blast effects. Aircraft and ship

parts, missiles, and other new weapon

systems and subsystems developed since

the ending of underground nuclear testing could be evaluated for nuclear hardness in this facility.21

During the period of underground nuclear testing, experiments to determine

gamma-ray and x-ray radiation hardness

were conducted in several stages, with

limited testing of components in the laboratory and testing of sub-assemblies conducted in underground tests. Prior to the

cessation of underground nuclear testing,

the investigation of radiation effects and

the validation of hardening procedures

was conducted through a protocol of

aboveground laboratory simulation testing or above-ground testing, computer

analysis, a final underground test, and an

analytical extrapolation to an operational

environment. It had long been established

that aboveground test simulations were

adequate for investigation of neutron and

gamma effects.22 The underground test

provided the proper fluence and spectrum

of x rays that were not available aboveground and an interesting mixture of radiations that proved informative, albeit

not a true representation of an operational environment. The underground test was

always considered a less than optimal

simulator for effects testing. It was expen-
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 307

sive, risky, difficult to instrument and it

required a very long lead time for preparation. Recognizing this fact, DNA, in the

1960s, began an extensive program to develop an aboveground simulator for x-ray

testing. The progress of this program was

expensive and slow because of the enormous amounts of energy required to generate a proper fluence over a sufficiently

large area and of the proper energy spectrum.

When the U.S. entered an underground test moratorium in 1992, the timeproven test methodology was no longer

available. All research and validation testing was relegated to aboveground testing

and computer simulation. Despite the aggressive programs carried on by DNA, as

well as the Department of Energy laboratories, to develop an aboveground test

simulator for x rays, the realization of the

goals remained many years away. There

were suitable simulators for the upper end

of the required energy spectrum, the “hot”

x-rays. However, the inherent efficiency

of the machines for producing the lower

portion of the energy spectrum, the “cold”

and “warm” part, was a daunting task.

Designing the power storage systems and

the radiation output sources would have

to await the development of a fusion

source, such as those later researched at

the National Ignition Facility of Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratories.23

Older facilities also proved useful

with the new, heavier reliance on simulation and high-explosive testing. At Kirtland Air Force Base, the Advanced

Research Electromagnetic Simulator

(ARES) was upgraded in 1995 to allow

for up to 20 simultaneous data channels

from any particular test object, with up to

36 simulated high-altitude EMP events

tested on a single day. ARES was designed as a vertically polarized HEMP

simulator to provide an EMP environment

compliant with any military or commercial environment. System upgrades gave

the ARES facility the capability to produce pulses similar to those generated by

a high-altitude nuclear detonation. At

NTS in Nevada, using surplus tunnels, the

agency conducted high-explosive tests to

develop and improve understanding of the

response of tunnels and deeply buried

structures to nuclear explosions.24

In September of 1996, one week after signing the CTBT, President Clinton

authorized an expenditure for testing nuclear weapons, not through nuclear explosions but through simulation with high

explosives and computers and through the

use of above-ground, non-nuclear facilities. Among the facilities was a proposed

$1.1 billion National Ignition Facility

(NIF) to be constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The NIF

would consist of a 192-beam laser to converge the beams on deuterium and tritium

pellets, causing them to implode and ignite by nuclear fusion. The NIF represented one small fraction of a planned

stockpile stewardship program of $41 billion proposed by the Department of Energy.

DNA made use of facilities maintained by the national laboratories of

DOE, including Los Alamos’ Dual Axis

Radiographic Hydrodynamic Facility that

generates flash x-ray images of shock

waves, simulating the first-stage detonation of a nuclear weapon. Livermore also

maintained a Contained Firing Facility for

high-explosive experiments, while Los

Alamos housed Atlas, a pulsed power

machine to simulate a nuclear weapon

trigger implosion.25

Additionally, DNA assumed further

responsibilities at Johnston Atoll. A stateof-the-art chemical agent incineration facility, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent

Disposal System (JACADS), was completed by the Army in 1990. The transfer

of chemical munitions from Europe to
308 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

Johnston Atoll took place in November

1990. These munitions were later destroyed in the JACADS facility.

AGENCY IN CRISIS

From 1989 through 1994, DNA was

subjected to numerous official reviews,

both internal and external, that examined

how the agency functioned and the services it provided. The fiscal year 1993

Congressional Authorization called for

the Defense Science Board (DSB) and

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

to review the agency’s roles and missions.

After the DSB and OSD reports were issued, in June 1993, Secretary of Defense

Les Aspin responded back to Congress

that, “I am satisfied with the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the DNA

program and the manner in which it is

adapting to post Cold War realities.” In

short, Secretary Aspin endorsed DNA’s

mission as well as the findings of the DSB

and OSD reports.

Later in 1993, a Strategic Air Command report recommended the abolishment of DNA as a separate defense

agency, with its functions transferred to

the Services and ARPA. Later in the same

year, Secretary of Defense William Perry

wrote to Senator Ted Stevens, claiming

“We need the expertise of DNA and the

unique technical and operational capabilities of the current [DNA] programs.”

This action was followed by OSD and the

nuclear community rallying in support of

the agency. Congressional support soon

followed. In turn, Senators Nunn, Thurmond, Exon, and Lott urged reconsideration of DNA as a separate defense agency

and reexamination of the agency’s proposed (fiscal year 1994) budget.

In order to develop a logical and

planned response to Congressional interest for these agency reviews, Victor Reis,

the DDR&E, requested the DSB to establish a task force to conduct a thorough

review of DNA’s science and technology

programs and to recommend changes by

May 1993. In particular, Reis asked the

task force to review the technology base

program and the technology application

programs of the agency to assess the impact of a comprehensive test ban as well

as a reduction in the total number of new

weapon systems in which nuclear survivability would be a high priority. “Specific consideration,” he said, “should be

given to continuing DNA in its historical

role as the focal point within the DoD for

nuclear weapons expertise.” Furthermore,

he wanted the task force to examine how

DNA’s role could be expanded “in the

non-nuclear areas where its unique expertise can contribute” to defense requirements.26

John Cornwall of UCLA served as

chairman of the DSB Task Force, which

focused on agency scientific and technical issues. At the same time, a separate

review group made up of a team from the

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the

Joint Staff (OSD/JS) considered the organization, management, and funding of

DNA. Both the DSB Task Force and the

OSD/JS review group delivered their reports in 1993. These two reports captured

the rapid evolution of missions which had

already taken place within the agency, but

which had not yet been incorporated into

its charter.

Cornwall, reporting for the DSB Task

Force, noted that “...because of the noticeable and distressing tendency of the Services to reduce their nuclear related

expertise,” the task force conducted its

review in a broader context, rather than

simply providing a narrow consideration

of science and technology issues. Cornwall placed the review in the larger setting of the future of United States nuclear

and conventional weapons technology

strategy. With this perspective, the issues

became slightly changed from those the
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 309

task force had originally been charged to

examine. In particular, the DSB Task

Force looked at how the “DoD in total,”

not just DNA, “will meet its nuclear responsibilities in this uncertain world.”

Furthermore, the task force examined the

question of how the DoD could make use

of advanced technology which had been

originally developed for nuclear purposes and now might be used to meet future

non-nuclear needs, particularly in the area

of countering chemical and biological

WMD.27 The detailed report of the DSB

examined many facets of the issue, but its

primary thrust was to recommend that the

DNA charter be modified to provide focus for non-nuclear activities of critical

importance to the DoD. These areas included developing the technology base for

advanced conventional munitions, and becoming a focal point for technologies related to counterproliferation of WMD. In

addition, the task force expected DNA to

continue with major responsibility in warhead stockpile management, military radiobiology research, and new methods of

testing in the light of the cessation of underground testing.28

The OSD review group slightly overlapped in membership with the DSB Task

Force working at the same issue. The

overlap allowed the two policy groups to

be current on each other’s deliberations.

The OSD review group received a series

of briefings from DNA personnel and conducted interviews and panel discussions.

The review group contacted DNA’s customers in the military Services, DNA’s

“performers” such as contractors and service and DOE laboratories, and officials

in ARPA and DOE, as well as former

DNA directors and civilian leaders.29

The OSD review group made its assumptions explicit, and those assumptions

provide a good indication of viewpoints

and observations common among Defense Department planners in 1993. The

group assumed that the United States

would maintain nuclear forces into the

future and that several nations would continue to have nuclear arsenals larger than

100 weapons. Despite efforts at non-proliferation, the review group assumed the

number of nuclear powers would increase

in the period 1993-2003. It would remain

plausible that various warfighting scenarios for the United States would involve

nuclear weapons and that adversaries

might employ nuclear weapons. The public would continue to insist on high standards for safety, security, and personnel

competence in nuclear matters. Underground testing would diminish, downsizing of nuclear arsenals would require

dismantling, destruction, and verification

technologies, and budgets for nuclear

matters would further diminish.30 Working from these assumptions and examining the mission of DNA, the review group

concluded that “DNA is the only logical

focal point in DoD for nuclear competencies.” Dispersing the expertise to various

other groups within DoD would run the

“danger of dilution/loss” of the expertise.31

The two reports reflected changes already afoot at the agency. Yet each report

gave a different emphasis—one suggesting that the new missions would help ensure that DoD maintained its core of

nuclear expertise, while the other stressed

the new missions as important in themselves. The DSB report stressed the need

for the agency to focus nuclear weapon

effects work and continuing stockpile

management. The DSB report regarded

several new missions in countering nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction and

in dealing with advanced conventional

munitions, as a means to “...ensure maintenance of nuclear-related core competencies.” The DSB, with its more scientific

and technical orientation than the administrative OSD report, viewed the nuclear
310 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

issues as paramount, and saw the new programs taken on by the agency primarily

as useful to maintain its ability to serve

as the DoD’s “continuing repository of

certain essential nuclear expertise.” Essentially the DSB treated DNA as a nuclear agency that would survive better if

it took on some non-nuclear functions.32

The OSD report stressed the new missions as crucial in themselves in a world

that was drastically changed. The report

gave a close analysis and comparison of

the programs at DNA in 1985 with those

in 1993, capturing the details of the

“changing focus of DNA’s key programs

from a time of the Cold War to the

present.” By asserting that the changes

had occurred from “a time of the cold

war,” the OSD report made clear that its

participants regarded the Cold War as over

and that a new era was already well under way. The changes in program emphasis included such new elements as

“Dismantlement in the Former Soviet

Union,” “Counter-proliferation,” and

“Verification Technology.”33

Pointing to these last three programs,

the OSD report noted that such programs

were “consistent with geopolitical trends

to denuclearize and curb nuclear ambitions throughout the world.” Other programs such as Adaptive Targeting

represented a broadening of DNA’s weapon system lethality mission to encompass

conventional weapons, as applied to hardened targets, such as the deeply buried

bunkers encountered during the Gulf War.

Still other programs represented the

search for “high fidelity testing alternatives” in anticipation of a comprehensive

underground test ban. In short, the report

stated, “all current DNA programs have

been reoriented to meet the emerging

needs of the post-Cold War era.”34 The

language of the OSD report made it clear

that the review group saw its charge as

documenting and capturing what had already begun to happen within the agency, and recommending that it be more

formally recognized. Despite the fact that

the two groups overlapped to some extent

in membership, the tone of the two reports

represented two shades of opinion. However, they did agree on certain essentials.

Both the DSB Task Force and the OSD

review group agreed that DNA was doing the right thing to adapt. With more

emphasis on DNA’s nuclear heritage, the

DSB Task Force saw the changes and new

programs as essential in justifying and

helping to maintain that core heritage. The

OSD recognized that the new programs

at the agency represented the beginnings

of an adaptation to a different world, one

in which nuclear weapons were only one

of several types of WMD, and a world in

which “denuclearization” was the order

of the day. While nuclear threats remained

part of that new world, new issues regarding other weapons of mass destruction

would occupy the agency, and those new

programs were not supportive of the nuclear function but were important in themselves.

The two reports, differing in emphases, gave the DDR&E two different justifications for continuing and redefining the

mission of the agency—one that echoed

Cold War assumptions about a continuing nuclear stand-off with one or more

nuclear powers and another based on postCold War assumptions. By either rationale, DNA would continue to exist and

have a crucial mission.

Even as the mission and program emphasis evolved, further studies focused on

DNA’s role in stockpile stewardship and

on the nature of weapons research and

weapon effects research in a post-Cold

War world where international agreement

prohibited underground testing of nuclear weapons. In May of 1993, the Scientific Advisory Group on Effects (SAGE)

conducted a meeting that reviewed the
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 311

OSD and DSB reports. The meeting of the

SAGE included a number of classified

briefings, as well as a concluding executive session held as a closed meeting. The

objectives of the May 1993 meeting of the

SAGE Panel, held at Tyndall Air Force

Base in Florida, were to review the reports

produced by OSD and DSB, to discuss an

investment strategy for the next generation of radiation effects simulators, and

to develop planning regarding nuclear

non-proliferation. Reiterating points made

in the two prior studies, the published report of the SAGE meeting stressed the fact

that DNA was uniquely qualified to provide the research and development needed

to develop effective counterproliferation

capabilities. Specifically, the agency

could “play a particularly important role

as the technical agent (and advocate)” for

military responses to proliferation threats.

However, the SAGE group recommended, “...the agency must develop a clear

vision and anticipation of what [the agency] is and what it should do.”35

Among the recommendations raised

at the meeting was the agreement that strategic thinking should focus on the increased threat of proliferation in a world

in which both the former Soviet Union

and the United States vastly reduced their

nuclear arsenals. To study the question

would require the integration of military,

political, and diplomatic considerations,

and these different responsibilities should

be housed in a single command. For this

reason, DNA would need to work with the

intelligence community and the Services

to ensure that all parties understood nuclear weapon effects, especially on those

crucial military systems that had never

been hardened. Thus, considerable attention should focus on developing Command and Control, Communications,

Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems

as the organizing principle and framework

for DNA.36 As in the earlier studies by

DSB and OSD, the SAGE Panel simultaneously recognized what was already happening at the agency and recommended

that it be made explicit. Shortly after the

group delivered its findings in 1993 the

SAGE Panel was disbanded, as part of a

government-wide move to reduce the

number of federal advisory groups.

The Congress 1994 Appropriations

Conference Report retained DNA, but

called for independent review, by the

RAND Corporation, to further investigate

the agency’s functions. The RAND review would be utilized by the Secretary

of Defense in his 1995 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of roles and missions. The RAND review presented an

opportunity to gain support for DNA’s

course of change. All of these official reviews focused attention on not just DNA

but how the DoD, in total, would meet its

continuing nuclear responsibilities in the

uncertain world. Additionally, the reviews

addressed not just nuclear responsibilities,

but how DoD could best use advanced

technology, originally developed for nuclear purposes, to meet future non-nuclear needs, particularly in countering WMD

threats looming on the horizon.

The first RAND study on the agency’s future mission, presented as a briefing in March of 1994, assessed the options

facing DNA. Agency personnel provided

the RAND group with extensive briefings,

including one presented in February of

1994, that opened with the assertion:

“DNA is a highly dynamic organization,

still evolving, whose technical and operational expertise is vital to our national

security.”37 This RAND study identified

several trends under way during the early

1990s, including the likelihood that the

United States would only require minimum nuclear deterrence in the future, and

that arms control, non-proliferation and

counterproliferation agreements, backed

by security guarantees, would tend to ad-
312 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

dress regional instabilities. In the future,

the study asserted, there would be increasing demand for innovative non-nuclear

solutions to nuclear problems, and such

solutions would only marginally involve

nuclear “core competencies” as discussed

in the 1993 reports.

The sense of having moved to a new

era was pervasive: the RAND study pointed out that fiscal constraints would force

a competitive search for the least expensive way to achieve the non-nuclear work

done by DNA. The pressure would not

necessarily lead to the “...conversion of

Government agencies.” Rather, work

would be shifted on the basis of “value

added” and on the basis of the value of

the products of agencies. On both counts,

DNA was highly respected in the defense

community, the report asserted, with “almost universal support for DNA continuing” its nuclear weapon effects and

stockpile functions. Various agencies utilizing DNA’s services praised the agency’s contributions and responsiveness,

particularly DNA’s flexible resources both

in handling funding and in getting access

to contractors and to government and Service laboratories performing the technical work. Most of the findings of the

March, 1994 study were presented as

“preliminary,” but it was clear that the

study had identified some of the major

strengths of the agency, especially its reputation for excellence and responsiveness

and its ability to work with very low direct budget costs. The agency’s reliance

on contractors to serve its clients in the

services meant that the cost of running the

agency itself was relatively low, considering its variety of services and products.38

Philip E. Coyle, Victor Gilinsky, and

Harold M. Agnew authored a second

RAND report. Their study, published in

December, took a different perspective on

the changes than did the 1993 OSD and

DSB reports and went beyond the March

1994 study to address how DNA might

fare under consolidation of nuclear work

from both DoD and DOE.39 Coyle, Gilinsky, and Agnew addressed the post-Cold

War environment of smaller defense budgets, declining nuclear weapon stockpiles,

and changing missions. In light of these

changes, they wrote, the United States

nuclear weapons establishment was already beginning to consolidate its activities, and it would continue in that

direction. They saw three possible pathways for further consolidation: consolidation within DoD, consolidation of all

non-military nuclear functions in DOE, or

possibly establishing a separate independent agency for nuclear-weapons related

functions. They reviewed the three possibilities, institutional obstacles, and the

possible role of DNA within a larger realignment of United States nuclear weapons policy.40 Their study concluded that,

for the first time in five decades, there

Dr. George W. Ullrich, DNA/DSWA

Deputy Director, 1990-1997.
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 313

were no military requirements for any

new nuclear warheads or bombs. The only

“unsatisfied needs” were for an earth-penetrating warhead and an air-delivered enhanced radiation bomb. The authors

commented that it might be possible to

develop both such devices without any

nuclear testing, using existing warheads

repackaged to meet the objectives.41

With reductions in the stockpile, with

phasing out of nuclear organizations in

the Services, and with reduction in training centers, it was becoming more difficult to attract and retain skilled personnel

to handle stockpile maintenance. Furthermore, the character of the work done by

DNA, DOE, and their contractors had

shifted dramatically from designing and

producing new warheads to maintaining

the nuclear capability, taking care of a declining number of warheads, dismantling

American weapons, assisting in the reduction of the former Soviet stockpile,

and cleaning up the nuclear sites.

Consequently, the authors of the December, 1994 RAND study looked at

three different alternatives: either creating an enlarged agency within DoD that

would encompass DNA as well as related nuclear functions, or creating an independent agency that would incorporate

DNA functions along with other nuclear

functions, or consolidating its functions

within the DOE. After weighing a series

of pros and cons, the group recommended the first option: an expanded DoD

agency that would take on issues of threat

reduction, nuclear weapons effects, and

technology applications, as well as centralized stockpile management.42

In this conclusion, the December,

1994 RAND study echoed the February,

1994 presentation by DNA in which a series of pros and cons regarding a similar

set of options had been weighed. DNA

leaders themselves concluded that the

“cons” of combining nuclear work in the

DOE or in an independent agency like

ARPA outweighed the pros. Whereas they

thought that the pros outweighed the cons

in the option of combining the functions

in an expanded DNA.43 Over the next few

years, the suggestions made by OSD,

DSB, the SAGE review, and the RAND

studies all continued to bear fruit for later

agency reorganization.

NUCLEAR WEAPON SAFETY

In 1990 the Drell Committee on Nuclear Weapons Safety submitted a report

to the House Armed Services Committee.

It led to many new agency responsibilities. DNA played an important role in the

implementation of the committee recommendations, to include serving as chair of

the Red Team which addressed the design

safety of the W-80 warhead, execution of

the executive secretary role for the Joint

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons

Surety, and the development and conduct

of the Joint Nuclear Surety Executive

Course, as well as carrying out numerous

assessments to develop enhanced safety

baseline data.

NEW AGENCY CHARTERS

After internal review at DoD, Donald

J. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense,

issued a revised organizational charter for

DNA in January 1991. The new charter,

replacing the 1987 charter, strengthened

the role of the Deputy Secretary of Defense in oversight management of DNA

and reduced the policy-setting role of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new charter also

changed the administrative structure of the

Armed Forces Radiobiology Research

Institute, removing it as a subordinate

command of DNA. The DNA mission had

expanded in 1987. Under that version of

the charter, DNA’s role in planning nonstrategic nuclear force requirements had

increased “to improve the ability to plan,

modernize and preserve a U.S. and allied
314 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

global nuclear deterrence strategy.”44 The

Office of the Secretary of Defense issued

a summary statement in the Federal Register in February of 1991 affirming that

the new charter placed the Director of

DNA directly under the direction, authority, and control of the Pentagon’s Director, DDR&E.45

The mission of DNA, however, remained identical in both the 1987 version

of DoD Directive 5105.31, the DNA charter, and the 1991 new edition of the same

directive and in the changed Code of Federal Regulations, showing the authority of

DDR&E over DNA. The revised charter

of 1991 seemed to make little adjustment

to the end of the Cold War, and policy

discussions within the agency and among

advisory groups regarding the precise role

of DNA continued at a high pace throughout the period of 1989 to 1994.46

DNA TRANSITION TO DSWA

As explained earlier, in 1992, and

again in 1993, Congress mandated reviews of DNA’s roles, missions, and functions. The eventual result was a

reaffirmation of the DoD commitment to

maintain nuclear competencies with DNA

as the center of excellence for the Department’s nuclear matters, including cooperative threat reduction and activities in

Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship. DNA also

gained responsibility for non-nuclear development activities that took advantage

of the agency’s nuclear heritage. The traditional DNA roles, along with the new

tasks, were institutionalized in a new charter issued in 1995. Subsequently, the agency reorganized to improve service to its

customers, to implement total quality

management, to break away from Cold

War traditions, and to foster a higher degree of coordination and teamwork.

On June 26, 1996, the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) was established, replacing the Defense Nuclear

Agency. DSWA had a new charter and an

explicitly expanded mission. In addition

to the missions which the new agency inherited from AFSWP, DASA, and DNA,

such as management of the military nuclear weapons stockpile, the agency now

was charged with conducting programs

associated with the CTR work, with arms

control technology, and with counterproliferation support. The ‘special weapons’

designation was a symbolic return to the

agency’s roots, yet in accordance to its

new missions encompassing both nuclear and advanced conventional weapons

support programs. In an August 1996 Science & Technology Digest article entitled

“DNA Restructuring,” DSWA Deputy

Director Dr. George Ullrich explained the

basis for the new agency name, “We

didn’t want our old name to preclude us

from applying our unique nuclear skills

and tools to such new program areas as

counterproliferation and hard target kill...

we felt strongly that ‘weapons’ should be

Major General Gary L. Curtin, DSWA Director, 1995-1998.
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 315

part of the name to convey the fact what

we deal with warfighting issues.”

DSWA was also charged with researching and developing technologies to

enable the United States to implement,

comply with, and verify nuclear, strategic, chemical, biological, and conventional arms control treaties and agreements.

With an authorized personnel level of

slightly over 1,000 and a budget for fiscal year 1996 of $361 million, the agency appeared to have found a solid place

in the post-Cold War environment.47 Subsequent events would modify that appearance.

DSWA Director Major General Gary

L. Curtin, who succeeded Major General Hagemann in 1995, expressed the reasoning behind maintaining DSWA in the

post-Cold War environment: “DSWA has

been evaluated by a number of different

review groups... to determine how the

agency could be best employed today and

in the future. After careful investigation,

every one of those studies concluded that

there was a need for a center of nuclear

excellence within DoD, because of the

curtailment of these activities within the

Services and many CINC Headquarters.”

AGENCY PROGRAMS

IN THE 1990S

In addition to DSWA’s overall counterproliferation, ACTD, and CTR mission

emphasis in the 1990s, a number of smaller, yet critically important programs and

mission tasks emerged that built upon the

agency’s legacy nuclear experience.

Among these programs were the following:

JOINT SCIENCE PROGRAMS

DSWA sponsored joint science programs with scientific institutions in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakstan through the

1990s. These programs included an evaluation of the Russian Topaz reactor for

thermionic energy, applications of energetic materials, comparative findings on

nuclear weapons effects, and the use of

advanced computational techniques. The

Topaz program was unique, involving the

acquisition and subsequent non-nuclear

testing of a power system that served as

the means to evaluate Russian technology and to find peaceful civilian applications. Topaz research began at Phillips

Laboratory in May of 1992, after two unfueled nuclear reactors were delivered to

Kirtland AFB following a statement by

President Bush to allow the purchase.

Nicknamed Topaz, the reactors used a nuclear power system for non-nuclear testing and technology spin-off applications.

This technology was ahead of what the

United States or any other country had yet

developed. Topaz was an international

technology cooperation program involving DSWA, Phillips Laboratory, Sandia

A Russian-built Topaz II nuclear reactor

sits in a DSWA laboratory at Kirtland AFB,

New Mexico.
316 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

DSWA Organizational Chart, July 1996.

OPERATIONS

DIRECTORATE

STOCKPILE OPERATIONS 

DIVISION

HQ, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

DETACHMENT

DSWA NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, 

AND BIOLOGICAL LIAISON 

OFFICE

DSWA EUROPEAN LIAISON 

OFFICE HQ, EUCOM

DSWA USSTRATCOM/SPACECOM/

ACC LIAISON OFFICE

STOCKPILE TECHNICAL 

SUPPORT DIVISION

OFFICE OF LOGISTICS 

AND ENGINEERING

OFFICE OF THE 

GENERAL COUNSEL STOCKPILE DUALREVALIDATION BRANCH

STOCKPILE ANNUAL 

CERTIFICATION BRANCH

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL

 LABORATORY LIAISON OFFICE

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE 

NATIONAL LABORATORY 

LIAISON OFFICE

VISUAL SERVICES DIVISION

DESIGN SERVICES DIVISION

LOGISTICS DIVISION

ENVIRONMENTAL AND 

ENGINEERING DIVISION

STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT 

BRANCH

SYSTEMS INFORMATION 

SECTION

STOCKPILE OPERATIONS 

SECTION

COMMAND, CONTROL & 

 COMMUNICATION BRANCH

OPERATIONS CENTER

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

SECTION

EMERGENCY ACTIONS BRANCH

EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

PLANNING SECTION

TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

EXERCISE OVERSIGHT SECTION

SUPPORT TRAINING SECTION

SAFETY ASSESSMENT BRANCH

ASSESSMENT SECTION

SAFETY SECTION

FORCES AND SECURITY 

SUPPORT DIVISION

FORCES SUPPORT BRANCH

NUCLEAR FORCES 

SUPPORT SECTION

CINC SUPPORT SECTION

SECURITY SUPPORT BRANCH

PHYSICAL SECURITY SECTION

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAM

PHYSICAL SECURITY TEAM

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 

SECTION

INFORMATION SECURITY 

SECTION

ELECTRONICS AND SYSTEMS 

DIRECTORATE

NUCLEAR TEST PERSONNEL 

REVIEW OFFICE

SIMULATION AND TEST 

DIVISION

SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENTS 

DIVISION

ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY 

DIVISION

OFFICE OF MANPOWER

MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 

MANAGEMENT DIVISION

HUMAN RESOURCES 

MANAGEMENT BRANCH

MILITARY PERSONNEL 

DIVISION

WEAPONS EFFECTS 

DIRECTORATE

NUCLEAR PHENOMENOLOGY 

DIVISION

WEAPONS LETHALITY 

DIVISION

WEAPON TARGET 

INTERACTION TEAM

MODELING AND 

SIMULATION TEAM

COLLATERAL EFFECTS TEAM
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 317

Organization Chart

DEFENSE SPECIAL

WEAPONS AGENCY

(DSWA)

JULY 1996

JOINT ATOMIC INFORMATION 

EXCHANGE GROUP

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

DEFENSE FINANCE AND 

ACCOUNTING SERVICE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE OFFICE OF THE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 

OFFICE

PLANS AND 

REQUIREMENTS OFFICE

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE 

AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER

MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 

DIVISION

PROGRAM AND BUDGET 

DIVISION

ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS 

SUPPORT OFFICE

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

DIRECTORATE

ACQUISITION DIVISION

CONTRACTS DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

PROCUREMENT DIVISION

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

DIRECTORATE

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 

OFFICE

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT 

DIVISION 

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 

SYSTEMS DIVISION

INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

BRANCH

FINANCIAL SYSTEMS BRANCH

SYSTEMS OPERATIONS BRANCH

TECHNICAL SUPPORT BRANCH

SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING 

BRANCH

SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT 

DIVISION

DEFENSIVE INFORMATION 

 WARFARE BRANCH

SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS 

BRANCH

PROGRAM

DIRECTORATE

PROGRAM COORDINATION 

AND REVIEW OFFICE

ARMS CONTROL 

TECHNOLOGY OFFICE

COUNTERPROLIFERATION 

PROGRAM OFFICE

HARD TARGET DEFEAT 

PROGRAM OFFICE

SPECIAL PROGRAMS OFFICE

COOPERATIVE THREAT 

REDUCTION OFFICE

FIELD COMMAND (FC)

DEPUTY COMMANDER

TEST DIRECTORATE

INTEGRATED OPERATIONS 

DIRECTORATE

NUCLEAR STOCKPILE 

LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE

RESOURCES DIRECTORATE

JOHNSTON ATOLL

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

CHIEF-OF-STAFF
318 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

National Laboratories, the University of

New Mexico in Albuquerque, and Los

Alamos National Laboratory, all managed

by the Ballistic Missile Defense Office.

Originally, Topaz was Russia’s answer for

a space nuclear reactor capable of delivering power to its orbiting or long-range

satellites and spacecraft. The Russians

fabricated 26 complete Topaz II systems

from 1970 through 1990 for system testing, but research cutbacks ended the program.

GRAYBEARDS/DARE:

DATA AND KNOWLEDGE

PRESERVATION

Two linked agency efforts were initiated in 1993 as a cohesive program to

ensure that irreplaceable nuclear effects

information and expertise survived and

was readily accessible for future generations: the Data Archival and Retrieval Enhancement (DARE) Program and Project

Graybeard. The DARE Program sought

to locate, store, and retrieve effects data

from its inventory of waveforms, numeric tables, diagrams, reports, photographs,

and video media. Integration and declassification of effects knowledge was underway in the new Handbook of Nuclear

Weapon Effects (Calculational Handbook), that drew upon the agency’s authoritative 22-volume Effects Manual One

(EM-1). The agency broadcasted community technology advancements and data

preservation achievements in the publications Nuclear Survivability and its successor, Science & Technology Digest.

The second DNA archival program,

Project Graybeard, planned to identify, locate, interpret, and comment on test data

and lessons learned, and integrate the information into the DARE database for

archival storage. Project Graybeard had,

as its goal, the documentation of the technical history of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapon effects testing. It

was originally organized into four technical area domains of shock physics, ionizing and electromagnetic radiation,

thermomechanical effects, and biological

effects. A fifth domain, nuclear sources,

was added later. The early shock physics

emphasis of Project Graybeard built the

template for subsequent study of other

nuclear effects such as high-altitude phenomenology, nuclear radiation, and electromagnetic effects, underwater and

underground effects. John Lewis, who

served as DASA’s program manager for

seven atmospheric tests between 1958 and

1962, worked as a leader in the Graybeard

Project and as a member of the DARE

Data Review Group. Lewis recognized

that he was one of “relatively few remaining scientists” who had participated in

atmospheric testing. He believed that such

testing had been necessary to validate theory, but he also prayed “that world conditions will never again present anyone

with the same dilemma” of having to understand all the potential effects of weapons of mass destruction in order to

effectively control such weapons. Like

simulation testing, DARE and Project

Graybeard, using “legacy” data, would

allow for study of nuclear effects without

the necessity of conducting new tests.48

HIGH PERFORMANCE

COMPUTING

The underpinning of the agency’s nuclear expertise and advanced conventional

weapon applications was its high performance computing and modeling work.

The High Performance Computing and

Communications (HPCC) program provided advanced scientific computing resources to the nuclear effects community

since the mid-1970s. In the early years,

this was accomplished by buying large

blocks of computer time from the AEC

and Service laboratories. From 1980 to

1983, DSWA (then DNA) operated its
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 319

own CDC 7600 supercomputer at Kirtland AFB. In 1983, the agency entered

into an arrangement with Los Alamos

National Laboratories to provide high

performance computing resources. Since

then, Los Alamos has integrated a series

of DSWA supercomputers (CDC CYBER 176 in 1984 and Cray M98 in 1994)

into its computational environment and

operated a private communications network providing classified and unclassified computing to DSWA’s

geographically distributed support sites.

In 1995, DSWA augmented its high performance computing capability with a

Cray J90 operating at its headquarters.

Arguably the most important “product” of DSWA and its predecessors over

the years had been information. The results of the 1993 SAGE meeting had confirmed this point: information was

perhaps the most crucial product of the

agency in the fast-changing strategic environment. With the development of

more and more powerful desktop computers, and with protection of them so that

classified databases and programs could

be operated, the agency’s production of

a wide variety of information sets and

programs for customers in the Defense

community flourished. As “Windows”

and “hypertext” programs became available, DSWA adapted and updated programs to make this technology even more

usable.

COMBAT SUPPORT

One example of a high-performance

computing effort was the agency’s work

on the Joint Munitions Effectiveness

Manual. This manual was developed by

the Joint Technical Coordinating Group

for Munitions Effectiveness. The agency worked with the group to bring together effectiveness evaluations of

air-to-surface weapons with analysis

methods for prediction of weapon effects

into a single software application. The system, dubbed Joint Munitions Effectiveness

Manuals/Air-to Surface (JMEMM/AS or

JAWS), brought together the contents of

more than a dozen different air-to-surface

manuals, dealing with such topics as weapon characteristics and effectiveness, target

vulnerability, and delivery accuracy. One

of the major goals of the system designers was to enable weapon planners to immediately and effectively access and use

the information in the assorted manuals.

By June of 1994, designers had prepared

a version of the computer program for testing. They believed that with its system of

links and intuitive presentation, it would

make the data far more usable than the

older paper manuals, some of which, designers discovered, had become either redundant or obsolete. The new JAWS

software package held out the promise of

serving as a model for future cross-platform weaponeering analysis packages.49

Early in the 1990s, DNA, with Service

headquarters and laboratory participation,

and support from the agency’s Information Analysis Center, established the Joint

Services Conventional Weapons Effects

Advisory Group. It managed the consolidation and technology update of Service

conventional weapon effects protective

design manuals, with the support and participation of NATO International Staff.

Drawing upon the technical expertise of

conventional weapon experts across the

DoD, DSWA integrated the fruits of its

research and test results and with those of

the Services to publish, in August of 1998,

an authoritative, state-of-the art technical

manual, The Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons

Effects (DAHS CWE Manual). A hyperlinked version of the design manual, developed in parallel, and complete with

executable analytic codes for both design

and analysis use, was published in September of 1998. It was known as the Protec-
320 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

tive Structures Automated Design System.

With the advent of both floppy and

compact disk media readers on personal

computers, DSWA published a wide range

of powerful desktop computer aids or

“comp aids,” designed to benefit the nuclear and conventional weapon effects

communities. The variety of such computational aids ranged from methods of

calculating airblast phenomena and ocean

basin acoustic reverberation from nuclear blasts, to the response of satellite subsystems to x-ray induced fields. Newly

developed aids reflected the changing and

evolving mission of DSWA to deal with

new threats. High Explosive Blast calculated effects produced by above-ground

detonations of high-explosive charges,

providing scaling models from ANFO and

TNT for other explosives. Fireball Radiation modeled radiated infrared, visible,

ultraviolet power, and energy time histories and distributions for the first ten seconds following a nuclear detonation. Developers subjected each updated or republished computational aid to an

intensive three-month period of testing by

technical and operational users.50 These

computational aids were distributed extensively throughout DoD, DOE, the contract community, and among Allied

countries.51

To an extent, DSWA became the beneficiary of consolidation of a variety of

informational sources. In 1981, the agency’s Information Analysis Center, DASIAC, became the point of contact for the

Electronics Radiation Response Information Center (ERRIC), previously operated by the U.S. Army’s Harry Diamond

Laboratories as the Component Response

Information Center. By the late 1990s,

ERRIC contained a large database of over

11,000 data sets detailing the response of

electronic parts to nuclear radiation. ERRIC made information readily available reDefense Nuclear Weapons School Virtual Tour Interface, part of DSWA’s

nuclear weapons training multimedia technology.
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 321

garding the transient radiation effects on

electronics to the “hardening community” in DoD, the Services, other government agencies, and government

contractors. To facilitate technical access,

ERRIC was later distributed via server

access on the Internet/World Wide Web.52

Another combat support initiative that

DSWA enthusiastically pursued was the

Hard Target Defeat program. Acknowledging that the U.S. and its Allies face a

growing threat related to critical military

targets hidden within and shielded by

hardened, deeply-buried tunnel complexes, the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition and Technology’s

Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat

Capability Initiative was commissioned.

It set the priorities for DSWA’s Hard Target Defeat program. The objective of the

agency’s support was to examine existing

U.S. and Allied capabilities to target hardened, deeply-buried complexes and to

pursue new technologies to mitigate shortfalls in such targeting. Responding to the

challenge of characterizing hard targets to

exploit specific weapons, DSWA identified areas of focus, to include examination of operational signatures of tunnels

or underground development; scale testing of target subsystem vulnerabilities;

utilization of geological models for weapon defeat; and intelligence and surveillance assessment to provide targeteers

with information required to defeat hard

targets with conventional weapons.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SCHOOL

When DASA was reorganized and became DNA in 1973, the nuclear school

that had flourished in the 1960s was

turned over to the Air Force for operation

as the Interservice Nuclear Weapons

School. Twenty years later, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense John Deutch

directed the transfer of the school back to

DNA, effective October 1, 1993. Deutch

designated the agency as the DoD Executive Agent “...for sustaining general interest nuclear weapons training

expertise.”53 Renamed the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, the training facility remained at Kirtland Air Force Base

in Albuquerque, New Mexico. In the

1990s, many of the courses taught at the

school reflected the same topics taught

thirty years earlier, although they had been

regularly updated with new information.

For example, the Senior Officers Nuclear Accident Course and the Nuclear Weapons Orientation Course served as

introductions for military officers and civilians who would serve at DNA or in

other organizations requiring familiarity

with nuclear weapons and policies.

At the request of the joint DoD-DOE

Nuclear Weapons Council and the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, new

courses were added, including a one-day

executive course on nuclear weapons

surety for senior DoD and DOE officials

with nuclear weapons-related responsibilities. Other new courses included a oneday Nuclear Weapons Technical

Inspection course and a four-day Counterproliferation Awareness Course. The

latter provided a mix of historical and

current information to ensure that decisionmakers, action officers, and operators

would have a common frame of reference.

It examined all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological missiles. Through the school’s

long history, attendance at such a course

required a high-level security clearance.

Additional classes, reflecting the growing

assortment of new missions of the agency, included Environmental Management

of Radioactive and Chemical Contamination. This course was designed to train

federal and support personnel who would

manage or lead the cleanup and restoration of contaminated sites. The course
322 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

included topics on chemical and nuclear

materials, the effects of the material on

the environment, site characterization,

and issues involving transportation of

hazardous materials. Other lessons included a two-day course to train flag officers in dealing with nuclear weapon

accidents, an eight-day course for nuclear emergency team members, a four-day

course on nuclear hazards, and a five-day

ordnance disposal course. The courses not

only met significant continuing and new

needs but also adapted new technologies

of distance learning. Using video teleconferencing equipment, for example, a lecturer on the “Tokyo Subway Gas Attack”

presented his material from DSWA headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, to attendees at the school in Albuquerque, New

Mexico, during a 1996 snowstorm that

prevented him from flying out of Washington.

TRANSITION

Throughout 1989 to 1997, the agency had responsibly adapted to the changing defense environment. DSWA

represented an investment in intellectual

capital that many of its supporters within

DoD and on Capitol Hill recognized and

did not want to see dispersed. Through the

DoD, a wide variety of customers for

DSWA’s services and knowledge had

come to rely on the organization. The

agency had a good reputation both for

technical competence as well as timely

and responsive service. The new international environment suddenly became alive

with potential threats from new directions,

to which the agency was capable of responding with expertise, experience, and

dispatch; when DoD “customers” sought

repositories of talent and knowledge,

many of them reflexively turned to

DSWA. The very nature of the technical

work and the body of data and knowledge

that DSWA and its predecessor agencies

had assembled over fifty years became

even more pertinent in the post-Cold War

world. The nature of its structure as a Joint

Service organization gave it flexibility not

present in line organizations. Thus,

DSWA was well positioned for the emerging post-Cold War military structure and

policy.

The effort to reduce the size of government bureaucracy which had characterized the administrations of Presidents

Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George

Bush, and William Clinton did not undermine or destroy the agency. Since DNA

operated efficiently, with a small, responsive, and technically competent core of

civilian employees, augmented by a talented array of military staff, and since it

had well-established relationships with

the contractors who had expertise in many

areas related to WMD, the agency demonstrated that it was quite capable of

adapting to changing priorities as the Cold

War ended. DSWA emerged from DNA

as a strong and important resource for the

Defense Department to meet its continuing and new responsibilities.

As the heir of the Manhattan Engineer

District, DSWA became the natural and

efficient choice of an agency to house the

DoD’s response to the WMD technological dangers of the coming 21st century.

EPILOGUE: DTRA

On October 1, 1998, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Technology

Security Administration, along with selected elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, were merged to

form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a new combat support agency. Like its predecessor, the new agency

would exist, and its missions would be rewritten, to focus on “special” or perceived

threats while its traditional role of “nuclear” stewardship remained. Veteran
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 323

nuclear phenomena and effects “Graybeards” were phased out of agency employ while a new breed of young threat

analysts assumed control of the agency.

Agency contracts were rewritten to focus

upon new defense threats.

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen formally established DTRA in a ceremony at Dulles International Airport in

Northern Virginia, where DTRA was initially headquartered. Secretary Cohen outlined the agency’s mission areas as

maintaining current nuclear deterrent capability, reducing threats from nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons, and

countering WMD threats, in order “...to

help catapult America, safe and secure,

into a new century.”

The initial DTRA Director, Dr. Jay

Davis, reported directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology (USD(A&T)). Dr. Davis’ advisors included senior officials from the

Department of State, the Department of

Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DTRA’s Advanced Systems and

Concepts Office (ASCO), was charged

with analyzing emerging WMD threats

and the future technologies and concepts

needed to counter them. DTRA’s Threat

Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC),

comprised of senior experts in policy, science, and defense, considers and assesses emerging WMD threats. The agency’s

personal and special staff and business

management offices performed key support functions for the Director and the

agency. DTRA’s six directorates—OnSite Inspection, Chemical-Biological

Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction,

Technology Security, Nuclear Support

and Operations, and Counterproliferation

Support and Operations, carry out

DTRA’s critical mission elements. In

October 1998, DTRA was authorized

2,110 military and civilian personnel and

a fiscal year 1999 budget authorization of

$1.9 billion. The agency operated field

offices in Alexandria and Arlington, Virginia; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Magna, Utah; and San Francisco, California;

along with numerous overseas locations.54

On October 4, 1998, Deputy Secretary

of Defense John Hamre, writing in an editorial for the Armed Forces Information

Service’s Defense Viewpoint, expressed

DTRA as “ ...a coherent, focused organization that will create the intellectual infrastructure for a new approach to deal

with weapons of mass destruction.”55

DTRA’s mission statement was to reduce

the threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical,

conventional and special weapons

through the execution of technology security activities, CTR programs, arms

DTRA Inspectors examining missile warhead as part of treaty compliance in the

Former Soviet Union.
324 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

control treaty monitoring and on-site inspection, force protection, nuclear, biological and chemical defense, and

counterproliferation; to support the U.S.

nuclear deterrent; and to provide technical support on WMD matters to the DoD

components.

The nation’s oldest defense agency

thus lives on; MED to AFSWP to DASA

to DNA to DSWA to DTRA.
POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997 325

ENDNOTES

1. “Nuclear Survivability interviews VADM

Parker, Director, DNA,” Nuclear Survivability, July 1989, pp.1, 2.

2. “DNA Director Shares Expectations,

May 22, 1990,” Contact(DASIAC newsletter), June 1990, p. 2.

3. Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections

Under The INF Treaty, Chapter 1, U.S.

General Printing Office, Washington,

D.C., 1993.

4. On Site Insights, January 1998, Pat Snyder, “Humble Beginnings for the Inspection Professionals at Buzzard Point,” p.

7.

5. Joseph P. Harahan, “Ten Years, Twelve

Treaties and Agreements, Hundreds of

People: One Agency,” On Site Insights,

January 1998, pp. 18, 19.

6. “Using the Tools of Diplomacy,” Carnegie Quarterly, Spring-Summer 1996, pp.

8-11.

7. Annual Historical Report (AHR), 1992-

93, section on Cooperative Threat Reduction Office (no pagination).

8. “Using the Tools of Diplomacy,” Carnegie Quarterly, Spring-Summer, 1996,

p.13, note 5.

9. AHR, 1993-94, section on Defense Conversion (no pagination).

10. Ibid., section on Safe Secure Nuclear

Weapons (no pagination).

11. DNA, The Course of Change, presented

to RAND review panel, February 7, 1994,

viewgraphs not numbered.

12. RAND: Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

Functions, An Assessment of Future Options, Senior Review Board, March 1994,

Slides 22, 23.

13. Ibid., Slide 7.

14. Philip E. Coyle, Victor Gilinsky, and

Harold M. Agnew, A Perspective on the

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure

Evolution (PM302-DNA), RAND, December 1994.

15. Rand, pp.2-3.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 24.

18. See February 1994 The Course of Change

viewgraphs weighing “Mandated Study

Options.”

19. AHR, 1990-91, OPNA section, p. 2.

20. Noted 15 February 1991 Federal Register, 32 CFR 361, pp. 6273-77.

21. Comparison of 5105.31 of 1987, with

5105.31 of 1991, both in Harris Materials.

22. Victor Reis, DDR&E, to Chairman, DSB,

January 21.1993, Harris Materials.

23. John Cornwall (Chair, DSB task force)

to John S. Foster, Jr. (Chair, DSB), May

3, 1993, DSB Report.

24. Cornwall to Foster, May 3, 1993.

25. OSD-JS Report, p. 5.

26. Ibid., p. 9.

27. Ibid., pp.15,14.

28. DSB Report, pp. 39, 38.

29. OSD-JS Report, pp.19-20.

30. Ibid., p.19.

31. Daun A. Sanders, “DNA Weapons of

Mass Destruction Game Support,” Science and Technology Digest, September

1995, pp. 11-12.

32. Peter H. Thompson, “FCDNA Testing

Capabilities Support Anti-Terrorist Programs,” September 1995, pp.14-15.

33. Steve Macko, “Report Says Pentagon

Failed to Take Adequate Security Measures,” EmergencyNet News Service,

www.emergency.com/dhaharpt.htm

(hereafter “Macko, ENN”).

34. Lt. Col. Ken Knox, “Khobar Towers

Bomb Damage Survey,” Science and

Technology Digest, May 1997, 7-10.

35. “Macko, ENN”.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. John V. Bolino (Director Test Facilities

and Resources, Defense Research and

Engineering), open letter, June 7, 1990,

as published in Nuclear Survivability,

August 1990, p. 3.

39. “Nuclear Survivability interviews Dr.

Don A. Linger, Director for Test, DNA,”

Nuclear Survivability, August 1990, p.5.

40. AHR, 1990-91, section on Electromagnetic Applications Division of the Radiation Sciences Director (no pagination).
326 POST-COLD WAR ERA: NEW MISSIONS, 1989 to 1997

41. Eric J. Rinehart and Harlan Lawson,

“Field Command Becomes Center for

DSWA Test Operations,” Science and

Technology Digest, August 1996, pp.15-

17.

42. Ibid.

43. DSWA, “Radiation Test Facilities and

Capabilities,” fourth ed., January 1997.

44. Ray Kelley, “ARES Upgrade,” September 1995, pp. 21-22.

45. Irwin Goodwin, “Without Explosions to

Test the Aging Nuclear Arsenal, Bomb

Builders turn to Inertial Fusion and Supercomputers,” Physics Today, March

1997, pp. 63-65.

46. Redesignation Ceremony, June 26, 1996,

DSWA Congressional Affairs Office.

47. John G. Lewis, “Project Graybeard: Preserving Legacy Nuclear Data,” Science

and Technology Digest, August 1996, pp.

31-35.

48. Rob Mahoney, “Overview—May 1993

SAGE Meeting” (DRAFT), June 3, 1993,

p.2.

49. SAGE Overview, pp.38-39.

50. Edwin Wolfe, Geoffrey Butler, and Graham Rhodes, “The JMEM Air-To-Surface Weaponeering System (JAWS),” pp.

27-29.

51. Tom Stephens and Stuart Kelly, “DNA

Updates Computational Aids,” Science

and Technology Digest, September 1995,

pp. 29-30; “Computational Aids Update,”

Science and Technology Digest, August

1996, pp. 42-43.

52. Claude Fore, “New ERRIC Contact at

DASIAC,” Science and Technology Digest, September 1995, p. 30.

53. William B. Daitch, “Nuclear Weapons

Training—The Defense Nuclear Weapons School Returns to DNA,” Science

and Technology Digest, September 1995,

pp. 8-9; “Defense Nuclear Weapons

School Update,” Science and Technology Digest, August 1996, pp. 40-41.

54. Joseph P. Harahan and Robert J. Bennett,

Creating the Defense Threat Reduction

Agency, DTRA History Series, U.S. General Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,

2002, pp. 12-21.

55. John Hamre, Editorial, Defense’s Viewpoint, U.S. Armed Forces Information

Service, November 1998.
PRIMARY SOURCES ~ U.S.

GOVERNMENT REPOSITORIES

Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir,

Alexandria, VA

Department of Defense Nuclear Information Analysis Center (DASIAC),

Albuquerque, NM and Alexandria, VA

Defense Technical Information Library,

Alexandria, VA

Department of Energy, History Office,

Germantown, MD

Department of Energy, Nevada Operations

Office, Las Vegas, NV

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential

Library, Abilene, KS

National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II, College Park, MD

Record Group 77 Army Corps of

Engineers

Record Group 326 Atomic Energy

Commission

Record Group 374 Defense Special

Weapons Agency

REPORTS AND PROJECT HISTORIES

American Embassy, Tokyo. Daily

Summaries of the Japanese Press.

Microfilm collection, Periodicals

Division, Library of Congress.

Anderson, C.H. et al. Report of the Study

Group on Organization for Future Test

Operations, Defense Nuclear Agency,

1959. DOE/NV, NV94021.

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.

First History of AFSWP, 1947-1954. 6

Volumes. Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project, 1954. DSWA

Defense Technical Library.

———. History of the Armed Forces

Special Weapons Project (Latter Period,

1955-1958), Parts I and II. Armed

Forces Special Weapons Project, 1959.

DSWA Defense Technical Library.

Brown, Harold. “Research and Engineering in the Defense Laboratories,”

Records of the Office of the Director of

Navy Laboratories, R.C. 3-1, Series 3,

Acc. 84-55, Box 61, Naval Historical

Center.

Camm, Frank Chronology of Early Days

at Sandia Base. 1996.

———. “Interview with Lieutenant

General Frank A. Camm.” Washington,

DC: Army Corps of Engineers.

Defense Atomic Support Agency. Armed

Forces Radiobiology Research

Institute (AFRRI) Semi-Annual

Historical Reports, 1963 Through

1969, Volume I. DTL 070,052. Defense

Atomic Support Agency. DSWA

Defense Technical Library.

———. History of the Defense Atomic

Support Agency, 1959-1969. Parts I

and II. Defense Atomic Support

Agency. DSWA Defense Technical

Library.

Defense Nuclear Agency. AFRRI Historical Documents, DTL 070,590. Defense

Nuclear Agency. DSWA Defense

Technical Library.

———. Cleanup of Bikini Atoll, DTL

070,170. Defense Atomic Support

Agency, Washington, DC, 1971.

DSWA Defense Technical Library.

———. Field Command, DNA–Special

Historical Report, 1946-1985, DTL

070,204. Defense Nuclear Agency.

APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHY
328 APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. Test Command Historical

Documents, DTL 070,589. Defense

Nuclear Agency. DSWA Defense

Technical Library.

Defense Special Weapons Agency.

Defense Special Weapons Agency:

1947-1997: The First 50 Years of

National Service. Alexandria, VA:

Defense Special Weapons Agency,

1997.

“DNA Director Shares Expectations–May

22, 1990.” Contact (June 1990).

Dorland, Colonel Gilbert M. Engineer

Memoirs: Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland,

USA, Retired. 1987. Interviewed by

William C. Baldwin. US Army Corps

of Engineers, Alexandria, VA.

For the Record: A History of the Nuclear

Test Personnel Review Program, 1978-

1993, DNA 6041F. Jaycor, Vienna, VA,

1996. DOE/NV, NV57580.

Gould, Kenneth E. High-Explosive Field

Testing (1945-1987): A DNA Historical Perspective. DNA 001-82-C-0274.

DASIAC-TN-87-3.

Groves, Major General Leslie R. Now It

Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project. New York: Harper and

Brothers, 1962.

Harris, William R. Defense Nuclear

Responsibilities: From the Armed

Forces Special Weapons Project to the

Defense Nuclear Agency, 1947-1971.

Rand Corporation Study, 1996.

———. Functions of the Defense Nuclear

Agency and Its Predecessor Organizations, 1947-1994. Rand Restricted

Draft Series, 1995.

Jackson, Robert E. Guide to US Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Effects Data,

DASIAC SR-92-007. Kaman Sciences

Corporation, Santa Barbara, CA, 1993.

DASIAC.

Johnson, Abby A., Jerald L. Goetz, and

William K. McRaney. For the Record–

A History of the Nuclear Test Personnel Review Program, 1978-1986.

SAIC, McLean, VA, 1986. DOE/NV,

NV51275.

National Security Archives. US Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Policy 1945-91.

Ogle, William E. An Account of the

Return to Nuclear Weapon Testing by

the United States After the Test

Moratorium, 1958-1961. Department

of Energy, Nevada Operations Office,

Albuquerque, NM, 1993. NVOO291–

Nevada Operations Office.

MEMOIRS AND HISTORIES

Alvarez, Luis. Alvarez: Adventures of a

Physicist. New York: Basic Books,

1987.

Barnard, Chester I., and others. A Report

on the International Control of Atomic

Energy [Acheson-Lilienthal Report].

Washington, DC: Department of State,

1946.

Baruch, Bernard. The Public Years. New

York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston,

1960.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and

Principle: Memoirs of the National

Security Adviser, 1977-1981. New

York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983.

Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of

a President. Toronto: Bantam Books,

1982.

———. “Transcripts of the President’s

Address on Energy Problems.” New

York Times, 16 July 1979, sec A, p. 10.

Church, Frank. Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks and Comprehensive Test Ban

Negotiations: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States

Senate. Washington, DC: GPO, 1978.

Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany.

Garden City, NY: Doubleday and

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ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACTD Advanced Concept

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AEC Atomic Energy Commission

AFB Air Force Base

AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute

AFOAT Air Force Office of Atomic

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AFSWP Armed Forces Special

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AFTAC Air Force Technical

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ALO Albuquerque Operations

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ALCM Air-Launched Cruise

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ANFO Ammonium nitrate and fuel

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ANMCC Alternate National Military

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APFA Accelerator-Pulsed Fast

Assembly

ARES Advanced Research

Electromagnetic Simulator

ARPA Advanced Research

Projects Agency

ASCO Advanced Systems and

Concepts Office

ATSD(AE) Assistant to the Secretary of

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ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense (Nuclear and

Chemical and Biological

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BITS Battlefield Information and

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BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense

Office

BMO Ballistic Missile Office

BRDP Blue Ribbon Defense Panel

C3 or C3 Command, Control and

Communications

C3I Command, Control,

Communications and

Intelligence

CEP Circular Error Probable

CFE Conventional Forces in

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CDC Centers for Disease Control

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC Commander in Chief

CINCEUR Commander in Chief,

Europe

CINCPAC Commander in Chief,

Pacific

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

COEA Cost and Operational

Effectiveness Analysis

COMSAT Communications Satellite

CTB Comprehensive Test Ban

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty

CTEIP Centralized Test and

Evaluation Investment

Program

APPENDIX B

ACRONYM LIST
354 APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST

CTR Cooperative Threat

Reduction

CWE Conventional Weapons

Effects

DARE Data Archival and Retrieval

Enhancement

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DASA Defense Atomic Support

Agency

DASIAC DoD Nuclear Information

Analysis Center

DDR&E Director, Defense Research

and Engineering

DDST Deputy Director, Science

and Technology

DIA Defense Intelligence

Agency

DIHEST Direct-Induced High

Explosive Simulation

Technique

DNA Defense Nuclear Agency

DNWS Defense Nuclear Weapons

School

DoD Department of Defense

DoDD Department of Defense

Directive

DoDI Department of Defense

Instruction

DODDAC Department of Defense

Damage Assessment Center

DOE Department of Energy

DOI Department of the Interior

DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council

DSB Defense Science Board

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System

DSWA Defense Special Weapons

Agency

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction

Agency

EM Electromagnetic

EM-1 Effects Manual-1

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse

EMPRESS EMP Radiation Effects

Simulator for Ships

EPA Environmental Protection

Agency

ERDA Engineering Research and

Development Administration

ERDL Engineer Research and

Development Laboratory

ERRIC Electronics Radiation

Response Information

Center

ETC Electrothermal Chemical

FC Field Command

FEMA Federal Emergency

Management Agency

FOFA Follow-On Forces Attack

FSU Former Soviet Union

FXR Flash x ray

GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise

Missile

HA High Altitude

HASP High-Altitude Sampling

Program

HE High Explosive

HEMP High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

HEST High-Explosive Simulation

Technique

HF High Frequency

HILAT High Latitude

HLOS Horizontal Line-of-Sight

HML Hardened Mobile Launcher,

Hardened Missile Launcher

HMMWV High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

HPC High Performance Computing

HPCC High Performance Computing and Communications

IAC Information Analysis

Center
APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST 355

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile

INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces

IRM Intermediate-Range Missile

JAIEG Joint Atomic Information

Exchange Group

JAWS Joint-Munitions Effectiveness Manuals/Air-to-Surface

or JMEM/AS Weaponeering

System

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident

Coordinating Center

JSTPS Joint Strategic Target

Planning Staff

JTF Joint Task Force

KT Kiloton

LANL Los Alamos National

Laboratory

LB/TS Large Blast/Thermal

Simulator

LLNL Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory

LOS Line-of-sight

LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty

MC Military Committee

MED Manhattan Engineering

District

MT Megaton

MIRV Multiple Independently

Targeted Reentry Vehicles

MLC Military Liaison Committee

MOS Military Occupational

Specialty

MRV Multiple Reentry Vehicle

NARP Nuclear Weapon Accident

Response Procedure

NASA National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

NCB Nuclear and Chemical and

Biological Defense Programs

NIF National Ignition Facility

NME National Military Establishment

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NRC Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

NRL Naval Research Laboratory

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NTPR Nuclear Test Personnel

Review

NTR Nuclear Targeting Review

NTS National Test Site, Nevada

Test Site

NUWAX Nuclear Weapon Accident

Training Exercise

NWE Nuclear Weapon Effects

NWC Nuclear Weapons Council

OMB Office of Management and

Budget

OSD Office of the Secretary of

Defense

OSIA On-Site Inspection Agency

OSRD Office of Scientific

Research and Development

PAL Permissive Action Link

PCBs Polychlorinated Biphenyls

PD Presidential Directive

PEACE Pacific Enewetak Atoll

Cratering Experiments

POD Pacific Ocean Division

PPG Pacific Proving Ground

PHETS Permanent High-Explosive

Test Site

ppb parts per billion

psi pounds per square inch

QDR Quadrennial Defense

Review

RB Reentry body

RDT&E Research, Development,

Test & Evaluation

ROTC Reserve Officer Training

Corps
356 APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST

RV Reentry vehicle

SAC Strategic Air Command

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAGE Scientific Advisory Group

on Effects

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks or Treaty

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative

Office

SGEMP System-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters

Allied Powers Europe

SIOP Single Integrated Operation- al Plan

SLBM Submarine-Launched

Ballistic Missile

SPEAR Space Power Experiments

Aboard Rockets

SPO System Program Office

SRAM Short-Range Attack Missile

SRM Short-Range Missile

START Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks or Treaty

STP Silo Test Program

STRATCOM United States Strategic

Command

SUVAC Scientific Ultravelocity

Accelerator

SWEG Special Weapons Effects

Group

TAPS Targeting and Planning

System, Target Analysis and

Planning System

TEMPS Transportable Electromagnetic Pulse Simulator

TNF Theater Nuclear Forces

TNFS3 Theater Nuclear Force

Survivability, Security and

Safety

TNT Trinitrotoluene

TRAC Threat Reduction Advisory

Committee

TREE Transient Radiation Effects

on Electronics

TRIGA Training, Research,

Isotopes, General Atomic

TTBT Threshold Test Ban Treaty

TTCP The Technical Coordinating

Panel

TTG Technical Training Group

TTPI Trust Territory of the

Pacific Islands

UN United Nations

UGT Underground Test

UNSCOM United Nations Special

Commission

USA United States of America,

United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

U.S. United States

USGS United States Geological

Service

USN United States Navy

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics

USEUCOM United States European

Command

VA Veterans Administration

VLOS Vertical Line-of-Sight

VNTK Vulnerability Number/Type/

K-Factor

WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction

WOA Weapons OrientationAdvanced

WSMR White Sands Missile Range

WS3 Weapon Security and

Survivability System
1789. M.H. Klaproth isolated a small

amount of a heavy metal from pitchblende

found in Saxony. He named the metal uranium for the planet Uranus, which had

been discovered in 1781. For the next 100

years the metal was used primarily as a

color fixative in ceramics.

1895. Henri Becquerel discovered that the

element uranium has radioactive properties.

1896. Marie and Pierre Curie discovered

radium.

1903. Ernest Rutherford predicted that a

wave of atomic disintegrations might be

started that would “make the world go up

in smoke” if a suitable detonator could be

found.

1905. Albert Einstein published his

Theory of Relativity.

1914. World War I begun.

1917. The Russian Revolution launched.

1932. James Chadwick discovered the

neutron.

Nov. 8, 1932. Franklin D. Roosevelt elected President of the United States.

1934. Enrico Fermi bombarded uranium

with neutrons, producing several radioactive elements.

Sep. 1938. At Munich, France and Britain ceded the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland to Germany sowing the seeds for

World War II.

Dec. 22, 1938. Otto Hahn and Fritz

Strassmann bombarded uranium with

neutrons and, unknowingly, split the

atom. Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, in exile, explained the results. Hahn and Strassmann published an article on their

experiment in Die Naturwissen schaften

in January 1939.

Jan. 22, 1939.The uranium-235 atom was

split in the United States at Columbia University by J. D. Dunning and H. Anderson.

Jan. 26, 1939.At the Fifth Conference on

Theoretical Physics held at the George

Washington University in Washington

D.C., Nils Bohr first announced the results

of the Hahn-Strassmann experiments that

demonstrated that slow neutrons caused

the “splitting” of uranium.

Mar. 1939. Anderson, Fermi and Hanstein in the United States, Halban, Juliot

and Kowarski in France and Szilard and

Zinn in the United States found that two

or three neutrons are emitted per fission

in uranium confirming the possibility of

a self sustained chain reaction. Bohr and

Wheeler identified U-235 as the fissionable isotope of uranium.

Apr. 29, 1939.A secret uranium research

project was established by the German

Ministry of Education; a meeting of nuclear scientists considered the possible applications of uranium fission. All available

uranium was acquired for the project and

a ban was imposed on the export of uranium from Germany.

Apr. 29, 1939. The possibility of a chain

reaction was publicly discussed by Bohr

and others at the Washington D.C. meeting of the American Physical Society and

reported in the press.

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY
358 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Aug. 2, 1939. Einstein signed Szilard’s

letter addressed to Roosevelt warning him

of German atomic research and its implications.

Sep. 1, 1939. World War II began. Germany invaded Poland and quickly reached

Warsaw.

Sep. 3, 1939. Britain and France declared

war on Germany. Roosevelt declared U.S.

neutrality.

Sep. 26, 1939. German scientists formed

the Uranium Society, which concluded

that power from the fission of U-238

could create a tremendous explosion.

Oct. 11, 1939. Dr. Alexander Sachs met

with President Roosevelt and delivered

Einstein’s letter, his own introductory note

on the implications of the German pursuit

of the atomic bomb, with input from

Szilard’s earlier memo on the current and

evolving scientific research on uranium

fission. Roosevelt recognized the need for

immediate action.

Oct. 21, 1939. Lyman Briggs, Director of

the Bureau of Standards, held a meeting

of the newly appointed “Uranium Committee” of Army and Navy representatives

to investigate the feasibility of building

and exploding an atomic bomb.

Dec. 6, 1939. Werner Heisenberg sent his

conclusions to the German War Office:

the surest way to a reactor for energy production is enrichment of U-235; it was

also “...the only method of producing explosives several orders of magnitude more

powerful than the strongest explosives yet

known.”

Apr. 1940.A top secret committee of British scientists, code named MAUD, was

established under the Ministry of Aircraft

Production to explore the possibilities for

building a uranium bomb. For reasons of

security, uranium was called “tube alloy”

and uranium hexafluoride was known as

“working gas.”

May 3, 1940. German troops in Norway

seized control of the world’s only heavy

water production facility and increased

production to supply the German fission

program.

Jun. 15, 1940. Philip Abelson and Edward McMillan demonstrated that neutron

bombardment of U-238 produced neptunium, which quickly decayed into plutonium. The British government later

protested this publication; after significant

fission findings were withheld from publication. At a meeting of the Uranium

Committee in Washington, Fermi reported that neutron absorption measurements

on high-purity graphite showed it could

be an effective moderator. Under new secrecy rules, his findings were not published.

Dec. 1940. Franz Simon submitted a

memorandum on isotope separation to the

British MAUD Committee, projecting

that an isotope separation plant using gaseous barrier diffusion would produce one

(1) kilogram per day of highly enriched

U-235 at a cost of 5 million pounds.

Mar. 1941. Merle Tuve in Washington reported a refined measurement of the U235 fast-fission cross section. The

Frisch-Peierls critical mass estimate for

a bomb was recomputed at 8 kilograms

or 4 kilograms with a neutron reflector.

Mar. 3, 1941. Glen Seaborg, at the University of California, isolated the first

measurable quantities of a new element

he named “plutonium.”

Aug. 22, 1941. Fritz Houtermans submitted a report to the German Post Office that

included a critical mass formula, but without quantitative estimates, and the suggestion that fissionable plutonium would be

generated in a reactor. Houtermans’ work

gained little attention.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 359

Nov. 27, 1941. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) Director Vannever Bush reported to President

Roosevelt that an engineering group was

being formed to accelerate physics research aimed at fissionable material plant

design. President Roosevelt approved

Bush’s decision.

Dec. 7, 1941. Japan launched a surprise

attack against the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; the next day the U.S. declared war on Japan; four days later,

Germany declared war on the U.S.

Jun. 4, 1942. A secret meeting is held in

Dahlem, Germany, with War Minister

Speer and leading nuclear scientists attending. Heisenberg described atomic

bombs as possible but not in the near future. Speer approved all the scientists’ requests, including a bomb resistant bunker

for a large reactor, but the project received

the lowest priority that allowed it to proceed.

Aug. 13, 1942. The Army Chief of Engineers issued Order No. 33 setting up the

Manhattan Engineer District (MED), an

engineering district without territorial limits.

Aug. 20, 1942. Glenn Seaborg’s research

group at Berkeley chemically extracted

pure plutonium (Pu-239) from reactor irradiated uranium, the basis for the plutonium production at Hanford.

Sep. 23, 1942. Col. Leslie R. Groves promoted to Brigadier General and appointed the head of the MED.

Nov. 16, 1942. General Groves and

Robert Oppenheimer selected the Los

Alamos Ranch School (40 miles from

Santa Fe) to be the site for an atomic bomb

development laboratory.

Dec. 2, 1942. Enrico Fermi’s group, at

Stagg Field, University of Chicago, operated a self-sustaining critical reactor at

a power of 1/2 watt.

Feb. 1943. The Russians initiate their

atomic bomb project under the direction

of Igor Kurchatov after learning of the

U.S. secret effort.

Mar. 1943. The Japanese physics colloquium in Tokyo decided that an atomic

bomb was possible but not attainable by

anyone for use in the current war.

Sep. 3, 1943. Italy surrendered unconditionally. The tide of the war begins to

change.

Oct. 1943. John von Neumann realized

that plutonium could be squeezed by high

explosives to such high densities as to turn

a sub-critical sphere into a super-critical

mass; this premise was quickly adopted

as the basis for the implosion bomb at Los

Alamos.

Jun. 6, 1944. Operation Overlord

(D-Day) launched; the Allies land on

French beachhead against stiff German

resistance.

Sep. 8, 1944. The first V-2 rockets hit

London and Antwerp, Belgium.

Dec. 1944. Fermi predicted a lightninglike electromagnetic emission from the

upcoming Trinity atom bomb test. Experimenters tried to shield their instruments.

Apr. 12, 1945. President Franklin D.

Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Georgia. Harry S. Truman assumed the office.

May 7, 1945. 100 tons of high explosive

(TNT), seeded with radioactive fission

products from the Hanford slug, was exploded as a trial shot to calibrate instruments and to simulate, at a low level, the

radioactive products from the nuclear explosion. This was the first time a large

scale, high-explosive detonation was used

to simulate a nuclear burst.

May 8, 1945. Victory in Europe (VE)

Day. The Germans signed an unconditional surrender to the Allies.
360 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Jun. 1945. The Soviets transferred captured German atomic scientists to the

USSR, to reactivate their dormant atomic program.

Jun. 26, 1945. The charter of the United

Nations was signed in San Francisco.

Jul. 16, 1945. Trinity—the first atomic

bomb—an implosion type of weapon, was

detonated near Alamogordo, New Mexico, with a yield of 21 kilotons (KT).

Jul. 26, 1945. The U.S. and its allies issued the “Potsdam Declaration,” calling

for the immediate and unconditional surrender of the Japanese forces. The Japanese refused.

Aug. 6, 1945. A B-29 named Enola Gay

dropped the Little Boy gun-type atomic

bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

Aug. 8, 1945. Russia declared war on Japan and immediately advanced into Manchuria.

Aug. 9, 1945. A B-29 named Bock’s Car

dropped the Fat Man implosion-type

atomic bomb that destroyed Nagasaki.

Sep. 2, 1945. Japan formally surrendered

to U.S. General MacArthur on the deck

of the battleship USS Missouri.

Dec. 10, 1945. The Secretaries of War and

the Navy publicly announced the proposed nuclear weapons tests for scientific experiments.

Dec. 25, 1945. The first Soviet nuclear reactor became operational.

Jan. 11, 1946. Joint Task Force One

(JTF-1) forms, composed of Army and

Navy personnel and civilian scientists, for

atomic bomb testing.

Feb. 26, 1946. Stalin delivers “Cold War”

speech.

Mar. 5, 1946. Winston Churchill delivers “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri.

Mar. 21, 1946. By order of Headquarters,

Army Air Forces, Continental Air Forces

became the Strategic Air Command

(SAC).

Mar. 28, 1946. Department of State formally releases the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. Fashioned primarily by

Oppenheimer, it evolves into the Baruch

Plan, America’s formal proposal for international control of atomic energy.

Jun. 14, 1946. In the first attempt at nuclear arms control, Bernard M. Baruch,

who was the U.S. representative on the

United Nations (UN) Atomic Energy

Commission, (AEC), presented his plan

to the UN for the control of nuclear weapons and the development of nuclear technology for peaceful applications. The

essence of the Baruch Plan was the centralization and control of all dangerous

nuclear processes, i.e., nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing, and manufacture

of nuclear explosives.

Jun./Jul., 1946. Operation CROSSROADS conducted at Bikini Atoll.

ABLE, an airdrop weapons effects test,

on June 30 and BAKER, an underwater

effects test, on July 24.

Aug. 1, 1946. Through the McMahon Act,

President Truman established the AEC, a

five-member civilian board serving fulltime and assisted by a military liaison

committee and a general advisory committee.

Aug. 19, 1946. 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special) activates at Sandia Base.

Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland is designated as Commanding Officer. Its mission is

to perform assembly functions on atomic

bombs, which previously had been performed solely by civilian personnel. In

addition, the Battalion is to organize and

train military personnel teams in the assembly of atomic weapons.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 361

Sep. 15, 1946. Officers of the 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special) begin reporting

to Sandia Base.

Sep. 16, 1946. Maj. O.M. Brumfiel activates Technical Company B of 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special); Company A

provides security.

Sep. 25, 1946.Atomic Energy Conference

is held at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Speakers include General Groves, Rear Admiral Parsons, Colonel Nichols, and Colonel

Hasbrouck. This conference was the second part of a three-part orientation; the

first part was an orientation program held

in the Pentagon for the top War Department planners, whereas the third part was

to be the conference attendees to return

to their headquarters or schools and

present to their staff or faculty the information learned at the conference. Concurrently, Lt. Col. A.J. Frolich, Battalion

Executive Officer of the 2761st Engineer

Battalion (Special), conducts series of

orientation lectures for 25 officers. These

lectures were designed to present the overall picture of the atomic bomb and its

present status.

Sep.-Dec. 1946. Most of initial officers

of 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special)

arrive at Sandia.

Oct. 7, 1946. 52 new officers form into

Command, Mechanic, Electronic, and

Nuclear groups. Nuclear group moves to

Los Alamos. Major Frank A. Camm becomes Bomb Supervisor.

Nov. 15, 1946. Los Alamos Staff begins

giving series of lectures to 2761st Engineer Battalion

Nov. 16, 1946. Newly appointed commissioners of the AEC visit Sandia Base

Dec. 31, 1946. President Truman signs

Executive Order 9816, which transfers all

MED properties and facilities, including

fissionable materials and atomic weapons,

to AEC ownership (i.e., custody of weapons became a legal function of the AEC).

Secretary of War Patterson and Chairman

Lilienthal of the AEC agree that Sandia

Base be exempted from transfer to the

AEC, under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act. Design work commences on

project “Chickenpox,” an Army Air Forces project in which the interior of a C-97

cargo aircraft is adapted for forward assembly operations.

Jan. 1, 1947. AEC takes charge officially of the nation’s atomic energy program.

Jan. 17, 1947. Secretary of War Robert

Patterson and Secretary of the Navy

James Forrestal approve charter for the

Military Liaison Committee (MLC), listing the committee’s statutory functions

and setting its membership at six, three

apiece from the Army and Navy. Lt. Gen.

Lewis H. Brereton, U.S. Army, is designated Chairman. The charter provides that

MLC members should serve as the military members of the AEC of the Joint Research and Development Board.

Jan. 29, 1947. The Armed Forces Special

Weapons Project (AFSWP) is established

January 1, 1947, retroactively by Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. Headed

by Gen. Leslie Groves, AFSWP is to be

the successor of the MED program, assuming responsibility for function of the

Manhattan Project not assigned to the

AEC. This includes training of special

personnel required, military participation

in the development of atomic weapons of

all types, technical training of bomb commanders and weaponeers, and developing and effecting joint radiological safety

measures in coordination with established

agencies. AFSWP had no officially appointed chief from January 1, to February 28, Col. S.V. Hasbrouck was the

senior officer of the organization. The di-
362 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

rective which activates AFSWP states that

it would operate under a Chief who would

be selected by mutual action of the Chief

of Staff Army and the Chief of Naval

Operations. A Deputy Chief from the opposite Service would also be selected.

Jan. 31, 1947. Maj Gen Leslie R. Groves

becomes member of MLC.

Feb. 1, 1947. Brig Gen James McCormack, Jr., is appointed Director of the

Division of Military Application, a division within the AEC.

Feb. 28, 1947. Maj Gen Groves becomes

first Chief AFSWP, serving for one year,

until his retirement on February 29, 1948;

he is promoted to Lt. General on January

24, 1948.

Mar. 1947. AEC (Santa Fe Office) and

AFSWP (Sandia Base) divide security and

intelligence responsibilities.

Mar. 25, 1947.JCS sends memo to Chief

AFSWP, directing him to organize the

Joint Radiological Safety Training Committee (JRSTC), to carry out Joint

CROSSROADS Committee recommendations.

Mar. 31, 1947. Rear Admiral W.S. Parsons, U.S. Navy, receives appointment as

Deputy Chief AFSWP; previously Parsons had become a Navy member of the

MLC to the AEC (November 6, 1946),

and was Chairman of the Joint CROSSROADS Committee.

Apr. 1947. The AEC inaugurates regular

meetings with the MLC to exchange ideas

and discuss problems of mutual interest.

The commission had put off discussion of

military access to nuclear weapons because of the controversy surrounding the

appointment of David E. Lilienthal as

AEC chairman. At Sandia Base, B Company supervises training of mechanical

assembly groups. The 2761st Engineer

Battalion (Special) redesignated the 38th

Engineer Battalion (Special).

Apr. 15, 1947. AFSWP headquarters

moves from the New War Department

Building, 21st Street and Virginia Avenue,

Washington, D.C., to the Pentagon.

May 7, 1947.At General Groves’ urging,

first team of 2761st Engineer Battalion officers begins training as weaponeers for

combat drops of atomic bombs. Battalion

members joined 509th Bombardment

Wing at Roswell, New Mexico, for a sixweek tour.

May 29, 1947. Panel convenes by MLC

including representatives from AEC and

NME, “deadlocked over the question of

whether or not an investigation by the FBI

is a necessary prerequisite for clearance

of military personnel.” AFSWP’s Security Division maintains that AEC clearances based upon FBI investigations would

be more efficient, more convincing, and

more quickly processed. Concurrently,

AFSWP initiates plans for permanent

under ground storage and bomb assembly sites.

Jun. 10, 1947. Residual functions of Joint

CROSSROADS Committee are transferred to the AFSWP, which establishes

the CROSSROADS Division. Responsibilities include directing technical and

scientific aspects of the Bikini Atoll.

Jun. 12, 1947. First concrete step taken

to effectively organize the Radiological

Safety Division (changed to Radiological

Defense (RD) Division on February 5,

1948). RD Division activities are divided

among RD training, defense material,

medical, operational development, and

technical (including radiological warfare,

which previously had been the responsibility of a separate branch and later

merged with the Technical Branch).

Jun. 27, 1947. President Truman approves 1948 weapons testing plan (Operation SANDSTONE).
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 363

Jul. 1947. Brig. Gen. R.W. Montague becomes Commanding General, Sandia

Base.

Jul. 8, 1947. Memorandum from Chiefs

of Staff, U.S. Army and Navy, to Chief

AFSWP, outlined in detail the organization, responsibilities, and guiding principles surrounding AFSWP operations.

Groves and JCS agree to revised directive that narrows the scope of AFSWP’s

functions to those of a technical agency

concerned primarily with training troops

to handle and assemble atomic weapons.

Revisions to the AFSWP charter includes

the coordination by AFSWP of atomic

energy activities, military participation in

research and development of atomic

weapons within the Armed Forces, and

furnishing assistance to planning agencies, Service schools, and governmental

agencies regarding atomic weapons. The

charter also clarifies AFSWP’s responsibility for storage and surveillance of

weapons in military custody. AFSWP

headquarters divided into six divisions:

Personnel and Administration; Operations

and Training; Fiscal and Logistics; Radiological Defense; Development; and Security.

Jul. 24, 1947. Public Information Officer of the Security Division, AFSWP, issues a guarded statement describing the

activities and responsibilities of the AFSWP, and acknowledging, for the first

time, the fact that Sandia Base is an installation of the AFSWP.

Jul. 26, 1947. President Truman signs into

law the National Security Act (Public Law

253, 80th Congress), which provides

“three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the

Navy... and the Air Force” as well as “for

their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but

not to merge them.” This act creates the

National Military Establishment (NME),

consisting of the Departments of the

Army, Navy and Air Force. The act created a new Department of the Air Force

and directed that the Army Air Forces be

transferred to it as the United States Air

Force.

Aug. 13, 1947. MLC meeting. MLC

Chairman General Brereton recommends

a directive clearly detailing the precise division of responsibilities at Sandia between Carrol Tyler, the AEC’s recently

appointed manager of Santa Fe Directed

Operations (including Los Alamos, Sandia Base, and a half dozen other western

sites), and General Robert M. Montague,

commanding general of Sandia. Brereton

suggests that the military and the Commission issue a joint directive; General

Groves argues that the Commission and

the Secretary of Defense should ask the

President to transfer all weapons and

weapon parts to the armed forces. After

the meeting, Acting AEC Chairman Sumner Pike states that the commission unanimously opposed transferring weapon

custody on the ground the AFSWP lacked

the technical competence for handling and

maintaining atomic weapons. AFSWP

teams being trained to assemble weapons,

even under close AEC supervision, still

had to return all bombs to AEC custody.

Sep. 4, 1947. MLC Chairman Lt. Gen.

Lewis H. Brereton asks for and receives

support from Service Secretaries on issue

of whether AEC should share weapons

custody with military.

Sep. 17, 1947. James Forrestal becomes

the first Secretary of Defense.

Sep. 30, 1947. Committee on Atomic Energy (CAE) established; is closely allied

to the MLC.

Sep. 1947. 38th Engineer Battalion visits

USS Franklin D. Roosevelt to study its nuclear weapon assembly facility needs.
364 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Oct. 18, 1947. The “first” Joint Task Force

Seven (JTF-7) is established, which will

perform Operation SANDSTONE at the

Enewetak Proving Grounds in April &

May 1948. Designation skipped from “1”

to “7” for security reasons.

Oct. 21, 1947. Letters from Secretary of

Defense to Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army,

Navy, Air Force, confirmed AFSWP as

Joint Armed forces atomic energy organization. Memorandum from Secretary of

Defense is almost exact duplicate of January 1, 1947 directive, except that it included the Air Force.

Oct. 29, 1947. Joint Strategic Survey

Committee completes eight-month report

for Joint Chiefs of Staff on “...long range

estimates of total military requirements of

fissionable material.” Based on the report’s recommendations, the JCS informed the chairman of the AEC that the

military needs 400 atomic bombs of destructive power comparable to that used

on Nagasaki. The JCS timetable, completed in early December 1947, called for all

400 bombs to be ready by January 1,

1953.

Nov. 12, 1947. Brereton writes to Lilienthal recommending that “...all weapons now in stockpile and completed

weapons and parts thereof, when ready for

stockpiling, be delivered to the Armed

Forces at the earliest practicable date.”

More specifically, Brereton requests that

AFSWP assume custody of atomic weapons and responsibility for their storage and

surveillance, and sollicits the AEC’s

“...formal views” on the matter. AEC responds by asking MLC to clarify its position in writing.

Nov. 15, 1947. Using B-29s from the

509th Bombardment Group of the Eighth

Air Force and the 1st Air Transit Unit, the

38th Engineering Battalion begins conducting joint field exercises at Sandia and

Wendover Air Force Base (Utah) for Operation AJAX.

Dec. 5, 1947. Col. R.C. Wilson, USAF, is

appointed as a Deputy Chief AFSWP, in

order that the Air Force would be properly represented, with the Army and Navy.

After this date, there continues to be two

Deputy Chief positions in the AFSWP.

Dec. 16, 1947. MLC argues formally to

AEC that custody should be transferred

to the Armed Forces for reasons of national security and the need to have a single

agency responsible for the nation’s atomic

arsenal. At the same time, the MLC concedes that the armed services were not

currently staffed and trained to properly

maintain the atomic stockpile, and proposed a gradual transition period.

Dec. 22, 1947. Secretary of Defense issues memo to Secretaries of Armed Forces, MLC, JCS, and others on “Clearance

of Personnel of the National Military Establishment for Access to Atomic Energy

Act Restricted Data.” NME personnel

granted access to restricted data only after obtaining clearance based upon a background investigation of the “same

standard” imposed upon AEC employees.

Jan. 1948. Charles F. Brown, of Secretary Forrestal’s staff, recommends abolishing both AFSWP and the AEC’s

division of military applications, their

functions to be transferred to a more powerful MLC and to the individual Armed

Services.

Feb. 25, 1948. At special meeting of the

Committee of Four, Forrestal expresses

his intention to accept his staff’s recommendation to place the MLC under the

Secretary of Defense, and replacing

Brereton with a “top-level civilian.” Navy

Secretary Sullivan opposes any alteration

to AFSWP’s organizational status, arguing that it should continue as a joint agency in the interests of interservice
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 365

collaboration. The meeting ends with a

consensus for MLC reorganization and

strengthening, but to further study AFSWP’s future.

Feb. 29, 1948. Groves retires from U.S.

Army. Parson serves as Acting Chief until Nichols’ appointment in late April.

Mar. 1, 1948. The AEC issues report supporting earlier contention that the military

did not have the technical knowledge or

training to cope with problems of custody. It proposes a joint AEC-military program to prepare the armed forces for

surveillance and inspection duties. Lilienthal did not state whether or not he favored their adoption and implementation.

Mar. 1, 1948. Sandia Joint Research and

Development Board is established, composed of three members each from Sandia Laboratory and the military staff of the

base.

Mar. 3, 1948. Lilienthal meets with MLC.

He states that only the President could decide whether the military should have custody, and suggests that he might consult

with Truman to determine what recommendations the President would accept.

In reaction to March 3 incidents, Brereton notifies Forrestal, sends him a copy

of the AEC report, and requests that he

intercede. Before signing off on letter to

Truman advocating military’s views, Forrestal consults Gen. Spaatz, Air Force

Chief of Staff, on the feasibility of immediate transfer. Spaatz concedes that he

lacked sufficient information to have full

confidence in assuming such responsibility. At same time, Spaatz proposes to other Chiefs of Staff that the Air Force be

designated executive agent of AFSWP.

Mar. 9, 1948. A simulated Category III

attack on Sandia Base by 250 paratroopers was conducted to measure base security.

Mar. 11, 1948. Forrestal meets with Joint

Chiefs in Key West (herein referred to as

the Key West Conference). Talks include

issues of Service relations.

Mar. 15, 1948. Forrestal meets with President Truman, recounts Key West meeting with Joint Chiefs. Suggests that “Navy

not to be denied use of A-bomb” and that

the Joint Chiefs were of the opinion that

custody of the completed bombs should

be turned over to the military.

Mar. 26, 1948. Forrestal approves of a revised MLC charter, effective April 12,

1948, which affirms that AFSWP will

continue to operate as a separate organization (rather than abolish it and have the

three services assume its functions, as

suggested in Forrestal’s staff’s January report). The revised charter also allows the

Secretary of Defense to appoint the MLC

chairman. The MLC now had the authority, in behalf of the NME, to exercise the

authority conferred by the Atomic Energy Act, including surveying the nation’s

overall atomic military requirements and

recommending allocation of responsibility for the conduct of military atomic energy activities.

Mar. 23, 1948. Air Force Chief of Staff,

Gen. Carl Spaatz, asks his JCS colleagues

to join him in petitioning Forrestal to

transfer to the Air Force control over all

of AFSWP’s operational functions, excluding training and technical activities.

In addition, Spaatz feels it only logical

that he be named JCS executive agent for

AFSWP, in light of the recent Key West

agreement that had granted the Air Force

primary responsibility for strategic bombing. The other chiefs deferred action on

this proposal until the MLC could study

the matter.

Mar. 30, 1948. Forrestal decides to wait on

Brereton’s suggestion to intercede on behalf of military regarding custody dispute.
366 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Apr. 8, 1948. To head a reconstituted

MLC (organized on March 26, 1948),

Forrestal replaces Lewis Brereton with

Donald F. Carpenter.

Apr./May 1948. Operation SANDSTONE conducted at Enewetak (April 14

though May 14, 1948). AFSWP takes part

in tests, and also provides security guards,

technical assistance, and a radiological

safety task group. AFSWP accounts for

roughly 40 percent of the newly formed

J-Division, the largest fraction provided

by any single agency, Los Alamos included. AFSWP also studies weapons effects;

physicist Herbert Scoville, Jr., joins “radsafe” as head of technical measurements

unit. AFSWP developed improved instruments to measure weapons blast and

shock environments during future nuclear weapon tests.

Apr. 19, 1948. MLC adopts resolution

recommending that completed atomic

weapons be transferred from AEC to

NME.

Apr. 21, 1948. Forrestal issues paper entitled “Functions of the Armed Forces and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the result of the

Key West Conference and subsequent discussions.

Apr. 27, 1948. Command change; Gen.

Kenneth Nichols replaces Rear Admiral

Parsons, as Chief AFSWP, and is promoted to Major General.

Mar. 1948. General Lucius Clay issues

war warnings in response to Soviet troop

deployments in East Germany, which

stimulates the development of the first

strategic plan for U.S. atomic bombing of

Soviet cities.

May 1948. A joint AFSWP-Air Force

team successfully loaded a MK-III bomb

into a B-29 aircraft, using aircraft hoists,

shoring materials, and a deep pit.

May 19, 1948. Postwar Joint Emergency

War Plan, “Halfmoon”, was approved. Its

objective was to destroy “the will of the

USSR, to resist by a main offensive effort in Western Eurasia, and a strategic defensive in the Far East.”

May 24, 1948. MLC Chairman Donald

Carpenter, taking over from Brereton, inspects Sandia base and listens to concerns

of AFSWP and AEC senior staffers. By

the time he leaves the base he becomes

convinced that a transfer of authority is

necessary and feasible within certain limitations.

Jun. 2, 1948. Carpenter directs Nichols

to prepare, for discussion with AEC (and

ultimately the President) definite recommendations giving the military authority

to withdraw weapons from storage either

for training or use in times of national

emergency.

Jun. 14, 1948. Carpenter sends memorandum to AEC on “Custody and Surveillance of Completed and Stockpiled

Atomic Weapons” that suggests weapons

be transferred to NME.

Jun. 16, 1948. AEC meets with MLC. Issues of June 14 memo are raised. AEC

says it would be willing to join with Secretary of Defense in bringing up custody

question to President, but would not suggest to the President that there is only one

possible solution; i.e., transfer of custody

to military. Lilienthal explained that AEC

did not endorse the recommended transfer.

Jun. 23, 1948. Forrestal and Lilienthal

meet for lunch at Pentagon to discuss

transfer issue before Forrestal took his

case to the President. Although they understand each other’s point, they can not

agree. In Europe, Soviets declare Berlin

blockade.

Jun. 26, 1948. Operation Vittles begins,

in which C-47 and C-54 transport aircraft

shuttle food and coal to Berlin’s airports.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 367

Jun. 29, 1948. Nichols’ letter to MLC

Chairman Carpenter states: “I feel now,

as I have always felt, that the assignment

of custody of atomic weapons to the military is a matter of urgency and the question should be referred to the President for

decision at the earliest practicable date.”

Jun. 30, 1948. Forrestal, along with

Carpenter, Nichols, Vannevar Bush and

Secretary Royall, meets with the full commission in his office. The meeting results

in an agreement that the President should

decide the issue and that the AEC and the

military would prepare separate position

papers for his consideration.

Jul. 1948. AFSWP participates in a deception plan with the British to announce

forward deployment of atomic weapons

two years before this actually occurred.

Jul. 12, 1948. Operation BANJO: 38th

Engineer Battalion, A Company, conducts

exercises at Walker Air Force Base,

Roswell, New Mexico. BANJO, the first

operational employment of assembly

units since AJAX, involved the assembly

of five atomic bombs, by the complete

assembly method, at a forward base.

Jul. 13, 1948. MLC sends memorandum

to Chief AFSWP asking latter to initiate

a program for disseminating atomic energy information within the National Military Establishment (NME); the program

is initiated on July 28, 1948.

Jul. 1948. SAC’s 509th Bombardment

Group, containing the nation’s only atomic modified aircraft, goes on 24-hour alert

due to the Berlin crisis. AFSWP provides

Air Force with three assembly teams.

Meanwhile, JCS proves unable to resolve

the question of command and control over

AFSWP. The Army conditionally supported the Air Force proposal for control while

the Navy opposed it categorically. Unable

to reach consensus, the JCS refers the matter to Forrestal, with written comments

from the Air Force and the Navy. Navy

Admiral Louis Denfeld expresses concern

that exclusive Air Force control over AFSWP would inhibit and possibly prevent

the Navy from acquiring atomic weapons

necessary for its assigned mission.

Jul. 18, 1948. New York Times article describes Air Secretary Symington’s speech

to aviation engineers in Los Angeles, in

which Symington acerbically declares

that air power should be put in balance

not with the Army or Navy, but with the

Air Force. Behind this remark is the issue of responsibility of strategic warfare

and the use of the atomic bomb.

Jul. 19, 1948. After dinner with the three

Service Secretaries, Forrestal notes that

the disagreement between the Air Force

and Navy Air is deep. The Navy is willing to concede the responsibility of strategic warfare to the Air Force but not

willing to be denied the use of the atomic

bomb on particular targets. Secretary Royall expresses his view to Sullivan and

Symington that the Navy should accept

not only the “dominant interest” of the Air

Force in the atomic bomb but also their

practical control of it. Forrestal outlines

a plan based on this view, which Symington finds largely unacceptable.

Jul. 21, 1948. Confrontation over custody at White House; Forrestal, the five

commissioners, and their advisors meet

and debate the issue. Truman indicates he

needed time to think about the matter.

Jul. 23, 1948. Truman rules in favor of

the AEC on the custody issue, officially

informing Forrestal on August 6. In his

diary, Forrestal notes that Truman spoke

with him after that day’s Cabinet meeting. The President said that his negative

decision on the custody transfer was influenced by political considerations of the

immediate moment, and would take another look at the picture after the upcom-
368 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

ing election. The next day Truman makes

a public statement regarding civilian authority of the atomic energy.

Jul. 28, 1948. In light of Truman’s decision, Forrestal writes letters to the Secretaries of the three Services that plans for

the emergency transfer of atomic weapons be reviewed. Forrestal speaks with

General Vandenberg about differences

between Navy and Air Force on use of the

atomic bomb. According to Forrestal, fundamental psychoses included Navy’s belief that the Air Force wanted control over

all aviation; and Air Forces’ belief that the

Navy was encroaching upon the strategic

air prerogatives of the Air Force. Forrestal himself is solidly behind the Air Force

in its claim for predominance in the field

of strategic air warfare.

Aug. 1, 1948. Sites Able, Baker, and

Charlie form respectively at Sandia Base,

Camp Hood & Camp Campbell.

Aug. 3, 1948. Influenced by escalation of

Berlin Crisis, MLC Chairman Donald

Carpenter writes Forrestal that the MLC

is prepared to recommend placing AFSWP under the Air Force temporarily to

deal with emergencies pending more thorough study of the situation.

Aug.-Sep. 1948. MLC initiates study on

military organization for atomic warfare

to help advise the War Council. Pressing

concerns include continuation of AFSWP

as a joint agency and the control of airatomic operations.

Aug. 20, 1948. Forrestal meets with Joint

Chiefs of Staff at Newport, to wrestle once

more with problems unresolved at Key

West Conference in March. Forrestal

reads report by General Spaatz and Admiral Towers recommending that Navy be

equipped to bomb strategic targets within the area of Naval operations, even

though the Air Force had primary responsibility for strategic missions; they split

on the question of atomic bomb custody:

The permanent future organization for

control and direction of atomic operations

was postponed until the MLC could complete its study on the link between the

AEC and the Armed Forces. The immediate Navy-Air Force quarrel is settled by

the decision to allow each Service to have

exclusive responsibility for planning and

programming but since all available resources must be used then there could be

no preclusive participation.

Sep. 7, 1948. JCS write memorandum to

AFSWP Chief Nichols requesting that he

review technical requirements for use of

atomic weapons, and to take steps to train

sufficient personnel so that NME can assume full custody as soon as possible.

Sep. 10, 1948. MLC votes 4 to 2 to maintain AFSWP as a tripartite agency answerable to the three Service chiefs

individually.

Sep. 16, 1948. 502d and 508th Aviation

Squadrons activate and join 38th Engineer

Battalion as Units E and F on September

28, 1948, and October 25, 1948, respectively.

Sep. 29, 1948. Forrestal meets with Joint

Chiefs, who advise him that preparations

for a potential military emergency in Berlin were proceeding smoothly. AFSWP

representatives were to be sent to England

in order to establish air-atomic operations.

The Air Force had checked with the AEC

and AFSWP on prearranged plans to

transfer custody of atomic weapons in

case of emergency.

Oct. 1948. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay is appointed head of SAC.

Oct. 1948. Operation WHIPPOORWILL:

38th Engineer Battalion, C Company,

conducts extensive field exercises on radsafety at Wendover AFB. WHIPPOORWILL’s purpose was to test forward base

assembly conditions and the capabilities
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 369

of the assembly team for an extended operation.

Oct. 21, 1948. AEC confidently predicts

that nuclear production goal for creating

400 bombs can be met by January 1, 1951,

two years ahead of schedule.

Oct. 28, 1948. Nichols reports to Chiefs

of Staff about orderly turn-over of atomic weapons to National Military Establishment (NME) in an emergency; states that

AFSWP and Air Force had conducted

joint maneuvers in which the AEC turned

over the required AFSWP atomic weapons, and that no difficulties were encountered in these tests. Further, Nichols

claims AFSWP capable of assuming responsibility for weapons custody.

Nov. 22, 1948. Operation EASTWIND:

AFSWP and Navy hold joint exercise at

Norfolk, Virginia, to test bomb assembly

facilities aboard a modified aircraft carrier.

Dec. 14, 1948. Operation UNLIMITED:

AEC and AFSWP hold joint exercise at

Sandia to determine the effectiveness of

current custody arrangement. Satisfactorily transferred “dummy” weapons.

Dec. 15, 1948. The AEC and NME start a

joint study on future storage requirements

for atomic weapons; 38th Engineer Battalion (Special), Companies A, B, C, & D

convert to 111th, 122nd, 133rd, and 144th

Special Weapons Units. Lt. Col. Dorland

activates Headquarters, 8460th Special

Weapons Group over four Army, one

Navy, and two Air Force special weapons

units.

Dec. 25, 1948. Navy XAJ-1 aircraft arrives at Kirtland AFB for wiring and test

loading of Little Boy, Fat Man, and Mark

IV atomic bombs.

Dec. 30, 1948. JCS directs AFSWP to accelerate training of personnel so that it

would be able to assume “...full custody

and surveillance as soon as possible...”.

Jan. 1949. JCS assigns responsibility to

AFSWP for collecting, reviewing, and

disseminating data on atomic weapons effects; this research results in The Effects

of Atomic Weapons(1950), prepared jointly with the AEC.

Jan. 1949. AEC receives “Nutmeg Report” from project sponsored by AFSWP.

Project Nutmeg was a survey of sites,

within the continental United States, proposed for future atomic weapons tests.

Jan. 29, 1949. Nichols recommends to

Lilienthal that formal agreement be made

in the matter of fitting weapons transfer

to the actual war plans. AEC agrees to

Nichols’ proposals on March 7, 1949.

Mar. 1949. Nichols endeavors to enlist

support of Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy in custody battle.

Apr. 4, 1949. U.S. signs North Atlantic

Treaty, formally committing itself to defense of Western Europe.

May 11, 1949. AEC authorizes joint AECAFSWP operation and maintenance of

storage sites Able, Baker, and Charlie,

with the AEC responsible for all stockpile items in storage, undergoing inspection, or surveillance; and AFSWP in

custody of AEC weapons released for

training and maneuver purposes, and for

“...support of operations in the event of

national emergency.”

Jun. 1949. Nichols agrees to AEC request

that AFSWP assume responsibility for

measurement of free air pressures during

proposed atomic bomb tests in 1951.

The AFSWP Free Air Pressure Group

would eventually become known as Test

Group.

Jul. 11, 1949. MLC requests that AFSWP

assume responsibility for a program for

the study of military effects of atomic

weapons, in response to so-called “Hill

Letter”. AFSWP’s program was to consist of studies of: underwater, under-
370 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

ground, atmospheric, blast, thermal radiation, and ionizing radiation effects. Two

days later, Chief AFSWP writes to the

three Services for information on this topic.

Aug. 29, 1949. First Soviet test, Joe-1,

provides push to U.S. development efforts. AFSWP begins briefings on the strategic implications of the hydrogen bomb.

Sep. 26, 1949. Board of Officers is established to study the future requirements for

storage of atomic weapons, with AFSWP

Chief Nichols as Chairman. This board established a new Joint Working Group on

Future Storage.

Oct. 30, 1949. AEC’s General Advisory

Committee recommends against development of thermonuclear weapons.

Oct. 1949. Representatives from AFSWP,

the Air Force, Army Chemical Corps, and

the AEC conduct contamination experiments at a site in the Dugway-Wendover,

Utah, area.

Nov. 1, 1949. Management and technical

direction of Sandia Laboratory, formerly

operated under research contract between

AEC and Univ. of California, taken over

by the newly formed Sandia Corporation,

a wholly owned subsidiary of the Western Electric Company. JTF-3 established

for Operation GREENHOUSE (1951).

Nov. 4, 1949. In a letter from Nichols to

McCormack, Chief AFSWP advises AEC

that they have met the planned assembly

rate of 100 bombs per day.

Dec. 1949. First three operational storage

sites (Able, Baker, Charlie) established by

AFSWP working with the AEC. Sites are

used by 1st, 8th, and 2nd Air Forces.

Jan. 31, 1950. Truman announces that he

had “...directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms

of atomic weapons, including the socalled hydrogen or super-bomb.”

Mar. 1950. With no more doubt that the

military had trained personnel in sufficient

numbers to perform the necessary custodial functions, AEC releases a study that

recommends that the commission obtain

the President’s approval of the “transfer

of custody of stockpile of non-nuclear

components of atomic bombs to the Department of Defense.” These proposals

were strongly endorsed by the MLC and

JCS. MLC asks AFSWP to undertake a

weapons vulnerability test program for the

MK-4 bomb, which results in development of new systems. A formal AFSWP

Weapons Vulnerability Program later

emerged in 1955.

Apr. 14, 1950. Paul Nitze authors “National Security Council 68 (NSC-68),” a

National Securities policy memorandum

which warns that U.S. military resources

will have to be substantially increased in

order to deter threat of Soviet surprise attack.

Jun. 25, 1950. Korean War begins.

Jul. 11, 1950. Secretary Johnson, with

JCS and Service Secretaries support, appeals to the President to turn over nonnuclear components to military as

precaution against wider emergency than

Korea. As a result, President Truman directs the AEC on case-by-case basis to

transfer custody of bomb capsules (without nuclear explosives) to the Air Force

and Navy for overseas location deployment

Jul. 1950. Truman approves AFSWP support to SAC nuclear-capable units at overseas bases.

Aug. 1, 1950. AEC-AFSWP Re-acceptance Inspection program becomes operative: surveillance work jointly

supervised by Sandia Corporation and

AFSWP. AFSWP inspectors responsible

for both military and AEC re-acceptance

of surveillance work.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 371

Nov. 1950. Truman approves Operation

Windstorm, a program run by the Department of Defense to be conducted between

mid-September and mid-November 1951.

Dec. 29, 1950. The first edition of The

Effects of Atomic Weapons (retitled : The

Effects of Nuclear Weapons in later editions), edited by Dr. Samuel Glasstone, is

published.

Jan. 1951. AFSWP is assigned, by the

JCS, responsibility for test planning and

coordinating Service needs for nuclear

test data. Command change; Major General Herbert R. Loper replaces Gen.

Nichols.

Jan. 27, 1951. Operation RANGER commenced at Nevada Test Site (NTS), the

first on-continent nuclear tests since Trinity. The five RANGER tests were designed to gather data to improve weapon

design; since no weapons effects tests

were conducted no AFSWP test group

attended these tests.

Mar. 10, 1951. Truman secretly endorses recommendation (made by special

committee of Dean Acheson, Louis

Johnson, and Henry Smyth) to order the

AEC to prepare for hydrogen bomb production.

Apr. 24, 1951. AFSWP orders nuclear

component assembly teams at Sandia to

go on alert status, ensuring deployment

of bomber weapons within 12 hours of

notification.

Apr. 28, 1951. AFSWP Field Command

formally established at Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. AFSWP General Order No. 4, dated April 28, 1951,

was the basis for this change. Field Command included the Weapons Effects Test

Group.

May 29, 1951. AFSWP Chief Herbert B.

Loper sends revised mission statements

to Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy, and Air

Force. Loper cites “...need for review and

clarification of the mission” of AFSWP

due to change in stockpile numbers, stockpile complexity, increased numbers of

atomic weapons assembly organizations,

and increased activity by military Services

in atomic weapons field.

Apr. 7, 1951. Operation GREENHOUSE

(four events) commenced in the Pacific.

It included the first test of the boosting

principle and confirmed the feasibility of

thermonuclear weapons. The bulk of the

rad-safe unit comes from the AFSWP.

Jul. 9, 1951. JTF-132 is established for

Operation IVY (1952).

Jul. 12, 1951. AFSWP charter revised to

include more extensive controls over

weapons in custody of the military services and greater technical, logistic, and

training services. Also calls for increased

levels of military training and development of further procedures for weapons

usage. Second charter for AFSWP is less

specific as to organization, more specific

as to responsibilities. AFSWP is still an

inter-departmental agency.

Aug. 1951. AFSWP and AEC agree on coordinated procedure for maintaining standards at operational storage sites.

Oct./Nov. 1951. Operation BUSTERJANGLE (seven events) conducted at

NTS. Exercise Desert Rock (November

1, 1951) includes use of 2,800 servicemen

seven miles from ground zero to test effect of blast on troops. Operation JANGLE was the first series to test surface and

sub-surface cratering effects. AFSWP conducted the planning and budgeting to pull

the intricate operation together.

Jan. 1952. AFSWP personnel strength

peaked with 11,182 authorizations. This

included the personnel required to operate the five National Stockpile Storage

Sites.
372 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Jan. 29, 1952. AFSWP unit, Test Command, is established with headquarters at

Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The personnel in the special group at Kirtland AFB formed the nucleus of Test

Command. Its mission was to act as technical supervisor of military participation

and to assist the AEC. In August, this unit

is merged with Field Command under the

Directorate of Weapons Effects Tests. Responsibilities include operating field

groups at future tests of atomic weapons

involving nuclear detonations within the

continental limits of the United States.

Apr. 22, 1952. Operation TUMBLERSNAPPER (eight events) conducted at

NTS, which included 2,000 soldiers

placed four miles from the blast site. The

test on June 1 called for troops to enter

the blast area immediately after the event

to determine if they could engage enemy

positions.

Aug. 1, 1952. Establishment of the Directorate of Weapons Effects Tests. As a result of the Directorate, Test Command,

AFSWP, was disestablished and its responsibilities were assumed by Field

Command, AFSWP. This was effective

with issuance of FC/AFSWP General

Order No. 50, dated August 1, 1952, and

FC General Order No. 10, dated July 18,

1952.

Sep. 1952. Truman administration rejects

proposition by State Department’s Panel

of Consultants on Disarmament, led by

Vannevar Bush and J. Robert Oppenheimer,

to delay first thermonuclear test.

Oct. 3, 1952. Britain explodes its first

atomic bomb at the Monte Bello Islands

near Australia.

Oct. 29, 1952. Navy’s Rear Admiral W.K.

Mendenhall, Jr., responds to AFSWP

Chief Loper’s October 6 memorandum.

States that although Services could be

prepared to assume all responsibilities and

functions now performed by AFSWP

within one year of receipt of directives,

the Services should choose to leave such

duties to AFSWP. Mendenhall stated that

it was “...healthy evolution” for AFSWP

to not be dissolved by the services, but

rather receive additional responsibilities.

He saw AFSWP as an expedient functionary of the armed services. He also stated

that, “with the relatively small number of

weapons in existence, the very idea of dividing them among the Services even for

custodial purposes will inevitably give

rise to conflicting claims as to priority,

numbers, and Marks [sic]. All this can be

avoided by making the AFSWP the custodian, AFSWP being responsible solely

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the Secretary of Defense for this purpose”

Oct. 31, 1952. Operation IVY, Shot

MIKE: U.S. explodes first full-scale thermonuclear device using cryogenic liquid

deuterium at Enewetak.

Nov. 15, 1952. Operation IVY, Shot

KING: largest fission device, detonated.

Dec. 1952. Teapot Panel headed by Von

Neumann recommends development of

thermonuclear tipped guided missiles.

Jan. 1953. Command change; Major

General Alvin R. Luedecke replaces General Loper.

Jan. 20, 1953. Eisenhower inaugurated

President of the United States.

Feb. 1, 1953. The “second” JTF-7, a redesignation of JTF-132, is established for

Operations CASTLE (1954), WIGWAM

(1955), REDWING (1956), and HARDTACK (1958).

Mar. 17, 1953. Operation UPSHOTKNOTHOLE (eleven events) begins at

NTS.

Mar. 21, 1953. AEC releases “An Agreement Between the AEC and the DoD for

the Development, Production, and Stan-
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 373

dardization of Atomic Weapons.” This

agreement delineates the responsibilities

to be assumed by the DoD and the AEC

respectively regarding proposed atomic

weapons programs (development, testing,

standardization, and production). The

statement notes that “it is fundamental to

progress that both agencies pursue aggressively [sic] the study of new and radical

concepts for military application of atomic energy.” Delineated functions fall into

six phases: Weapon Conception, Program

Study, Development Engineering, Production Engineering, First Production,

and Quantity Production and Stockpile.

Apr. 1953. JCS assigns AFSWP the responsibility for technical direction of

weapon effects tests and of weapon effects

phases within any task force organization.

May 25, 1953. First use of artillery piece

to launch nuclear device (GRABLE, a

special 280-mm cannon).

Aug. 12, 1953. Soviet test, Joe 4, first

thermonuclear explosion.

Oct. 1953. President Eisenhower approves the “New Look” strategy, as outlined in NSC 162/2. This strategy includes

expansion of forward deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe, and a declaration of readiness to deploy nuclear

weapons for strategic bombardment and

tactical defense.

Oct. 16, 1953. As part of its command and

control mission, AFSWP ordered by Secretary of Defense to establish a centralized system to account for status and

location of nuclear weapons “...at all

times.”

Jan. 21, 1954. Launch of USS Nautilus,

first nuclear powered submarine.

Feb. 28, 1954. Operation CASTLE (six

events) begins at Bikini Atoll. After BRAVO produced heavy fallout, the JCS asked

AFSWP to monitor and predict worldwide

fallout during testing. Worldwide pressure

increases for a nuclear test ban. Using U2 aircraft, AFSWP initiates a High Altitude Sampling Program (HASP) to

measure radiation effects in the upper atmosphere.

Jun. 1954. Under new proposal, the command of AFSWP becomes a rotating position shared by each of the three military

branches.

Jul. 21, 1954. The AFSWP mission directive was revised to include the maintenance of a technical inspection system to

assist the Service Chiefs with their own

technical inspection systems, performance of periodic technical inspections

to assure standardization in the procedure,

and the maintenance of continuous liaison with the inspection agencies of the

Services.

Aug. 30, 1954. Eisenhower signs the

Atomic Energy Act.

Jan. 1955. Eisenhower directed that

weapons with yields of over 600 kilotons

would continue to remain in AEC custody, even if dispersed to military units. This

directive required AEC custodians at

many SAC bases and on ships at sea.

Jan. 1955. The Special Weapons Materiel Control Division was established at

Field Command, AFSWP, as the sole DoD

activity responsible for procurement and

distribution of training weapons, major

components, test and handling equipment,

associated spares and base spares in support of War Reserve Weapons.

Feb. 18, 1955. Operation TEAPOT (14

events) commences at NTS.

Apr. 6, 1955. Test HA (High Altitude) employed a three-kiloton device at 36,000

feet to test air defense options under conditions of delayed radioactive fallout.

May 14, 1955. Operation WIGWAM

(one event) underwater test in the Pacific.
374 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Jun. 22, 1955. NATO agreements call for

bilateral programs to coordinate nuclear

deployment. In 1956, NATO adopts plan

MC 14/2 which includes forward deployment of nuclear weapons and their tactical usage.

Nov. 22, 1955. First Soviet test of a twostage thermonuclear weapon.

May 4, 1956. Operation REDWING (17

events) begins in the Pacific. This series

of events included the first extensive thermonuclear effects tests involving blast radiation, biomedical, and thermal effects.

Jul. 26, 1956. SAC announces start of its

ICBM program.

Oct. 1956. Designated Atomic Energy

Commission Military Representative

(DAECMR) concept developed: commanding officers of SAC bases and of Naval combatant and ammunition ships

become designated AEC custodians directly responsible to the AEC.

Jan. 1957. The Atomic Weapons Safety

Board was established to study the safety

aspects of weapons under development.

Mar. 28, 1957.At the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee in

London, the U.S. announces it would consider stopping or limiting testing if verification issues could be settled.

May 28, 1957. Operation PLUMBBOB

(29 tests) begins at NTS.

Jun. 1957. Command change; Rear Admiral Edward Parker replaces General

Luedecke.

Jun. 14, 1957. Soviets propose immediate cessation of nuclear weapons testing

for two to three years, monitoring conducted by an international commission,

and establishment of manned control

posts in the U.S., Britain, the USSR., and

the Pacific. According to Seaborg, Eisenhower, who was favorably disposed

toward the Soviet offer, was partly dissuaded when AEC Chairman Lewis

Strauss brought scientists Edward Teller,

Ernest Lawrence and Mark Mills to the

White House. The nuclear scientists stated that the U.S. could develop fallout-free

weapons within seven years and that the

Soviets could negate any test moratorium

by undetectable, clandestine tests.

Aug. 21, 1957. President Eisenhower proposes suspension of nuclear testing for up

to two years. Soviets criticize proposal’s

linkage to a cutoff in production of fissionable materials for weapons.

Oct. 4, 1957. Sputnik I launch.

Nov. 7, 1957. Eisenhower creates the

White House position of special assistant

for science and technology, appointing to

it MIT President James R. Killian, Jr.

Shortly afterward he established a President’s Science Advisory Committee

(PSAC). Prior to these appointments the

scientific advice (vis-a-vis nuclear arms

control matters) received by President

Eisenhower and Secretary of State John

Foster Dulles emanated primarily from

Los Alamos, Livermore, and Defense Department scientists. A large part of the advice was filtered through AEC chairman

Strauss, who also served as special assistant to the president for atomic energy.

The Killian group introduced new voices

(and therefore greater diversity) to the test

ban debate, arguing that greater difficulties might ensue in the absence of an

agreement.

Mar. 11, 1958. A SAC B-47 bomber inadvertently drops a atomic weapon on a

training mission near Florence, South

Carolina. There had been a non-nuclear

yet high explosive detonation on impact,

resulting in a large crater. The survey team

detected no radiation hazard at the farm

on which the bomb had landed.

Mar. 27, 1958. Nikita Khrushchev becomes Premier of Soviet Union.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 375

Mar. 31, 1958. Soviets announce unilateral moratorium on testing; start of the test

ban debate. Due to disagreements, all

three nuclear-weapons countries continue to test for another several months.

Khrushchev urges Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to

follow Soviet’s decree to prohibit further

nuclear testing.

Apr. 8, 1958. Eisenhower’s answer to

Khrushchev proposes that the Soviet

Union join the Western nations in an examination of the technical requirements

for nuclear test ban verification. Khrushchev expressed his willingness, despite

doubts, to try this course of action.

Apr. 28, 1958. Operation HARDTACK I

(35 events) begins with YUCCA, a balloon-launched weapons effects test in the

Pacific. Thirty-two tests were conducted

at Enewetak and Bikini. In anticipation of

a testing ban, AFSWP and the AEC jointly sponsor a series of high-altitude tests,

TEAK and ORANGE, at Johnston Island.

EMP effects from Test TEAK results in

the temporary loss of communications in

some locations in the Pacific.

Apr. 28, 1958. The U.K. conducts a threemegaton nuclear weapon test at Christmas

Island.

Aug. 1958. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, United States Navy, proposed to

AFSWP that a bio-nuclear facility be established at the National Naval Medical

Center.

Aug. 21, 1958. The Conference of Experts, composed of scientists from the

U.S., Britain, France, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland, release report after two- month study in Geneva.

The report concludes that a comprehensive test ban in the atmosphere, underground, underwater, and outer space

within 50 kilometers can be verified with

some 160 monitoring stations worldwide.

Aug. 22, 1958. Eisenhower proposes tripartite negotiations to end nuclear tests.

Eisenhower announces that the U.S.

would stop testing for one year, beginning

October 31, 1958, provided that the Soviet Union did not resume testing. The

U.K. does the same.

Aug. 27, 1958. Operation ARGUS (three

tests) conducted in the South Atlantic.

ARGUS verified the “Chistofilos Effect,”

in which fission electrons become trapped

in the atmosphere’s magnetic field, creating radiation belts. These tests also demonstrated the vulnerability of electronic

components in radiation belts.

Aug. 30, 1958. Soviet Union agrees to

idea of negotiations beginning October

31, but refused to indicate whether it

would suspend tests during the conference. U.S. rushes to complete its HARDTACK series before the conference.

Sep. 1958. Soviet Union begins extensive

test series of 16 shots.

Sep. 12, 1958. HARDTACK II test series

begins at NTS.

Oct. 30, 1958. U.S. ceases atmospheric

testing with TITANIA on October 30.

Oct. 30, 1958. Soviet Union refuses unconditionally to suspend testing for one

year as proposed by U.S. and U.K., and

reserved the right to determine when and,

under what conditions, they would continue testing.

Oct. 31, 1958. Test ban talks in Geneva

begin formally (Geneva Conference on

the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons

Tests). They result in U.S. and Britain declarations of one-year moratorium; Soviets join in a few days later. However,

verification issues prove more difficult

than had been anticipated.

Nov. 3, 1958. Soviet Union conducts the

final shot of its 1958 series and refrains

from testing until September 1, 1961.
376 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Nov. 7, 1958. Eisenhower announces that

the Soviets’ testing after the October 31

deadline relieved the U.S. of any obligation under its offer to suspend tests. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the U.K. would

observe the moratorium “...for the time

being.”

Dec. 1958. Defense Reorganization Act.

AFSWP is placed under control of JCS

and is to be renamed Defense Atomic

Support Agency (DASA). The act authorizes the Director of Defense Research

and Engineering (DDR&E) to allocate

majority of effects testing funds to AFSWP. AFSWP and the AEC establish a

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center. Sandia Laboratory began research on

permissive actions links (PAL) for war reserve weapons. Research and development began on use-denial hardware.

Jan. 1959. Eisenhower directs the transfer of custody to the DoD of all weapons

dispersed to the DoD, including those

with yields in excess of 600 kilotons. Thus

approximately 82 percent of the stockpile

is transferred to DoD custody.

May 6, 1959. AFSWP formerly changes

to DASA. In a major organizational shift,

the DASA changes from an inter-departmental agency reporting to the JCS to an

independent agency of the Department of

Defense. DASA remains responsible for

reporting on nuclear testing requirements

and test ban considerations. Under its new

charter, DASA was responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. DASA’s five major areas of responsibility included: 1) Staff assistance

to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

through the JCS; 2) Research in weapons

effects; 3) Atomic tests; 4) Weapons development; and 5) Assistance to the Services.

Aug. 26, 1959. U.S. announces it will extend its testing moratorium until the end

of the year.

Aug. 28, 1959. Soviets announce that it

will not resume testing as long as the

“Western Powers” do not test.

Oct. 1959. Director of Defense Research

and Engineering recommended support of

DASA proposal for a biomedical research

reactor at National Naval Medical Center.

Nov. 27, 1959. JTF-7 assigned as subordinate command of DASA.

Dec. 29, 1959. Eisenhower announces

that after the moratorium expires at the

end of the year, “...we consider ourselves

free to resume nuclear testing”, but that

any resumption would be announced in

advance. In the meantime, the U.S. would

continue weapon research, development,

and “laboratory-type” experimentation.

Dec. 30, 1959. First Polaris missile submarine becomes operational, USS George

Washington. First successful launch of Polaris missile takes place several months later.

Jan. 14, 1960. Khrushchev states to Supreme Soviet that the Soviet Union will

continue to observe the test moratorium

as long as “...the western powers” do not

test...”.

Feb. 2, 1960. The Department of Army

takes over as fiscal agent for DASA, and

also provides the agency with procurement authority.

Feb. 11, 1960. U.S. proposes phased

agreement with first step prohibiting tests

in the atmosphere, tests underwater, and

underground tests registering over 4.75 on

the Richter scale.

Feb. 13, 1960. France explodes its first

nuclear device in the Sahara Desert.

Mar. 4, 1960. AEC-DoD memorandum

of Understanding for the Transfer of

Weapons is released.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 377

Mar. 19, 1960. Soviets respond to February U.S. proposal by adding ban on all

tests in space, and calling for a 4-5 year

moratorium on tests below seismic magnitude 4.75.

May 1, 1960.After a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft is shot down over Sverdlovsk, Khrushchev cancels the “Big Four”

Paris summit.

Aug. 1960. Command change; Major

General Harold Donnelly replaces Admiral Parker.

Dec. 2, 1960. Charter for Armed Forces

Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI)

approved by the three Surgeons General

(of the Armed Services) and DASA.

Dec. 15, 1960. DASA supports the Joint

Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS),

established at SAC, by providing computer models for nuclear weapons blast effects; DASA sponsors formation of the

Defense Atomic Support Information and

Analysis Center (DASIAC) in Santa Barbara, California.

Jan. 16, 1961. Command change; Major

General Robert Booth replaces General

Donnelly as Chief, DASA.

Jun. 30, 1961. JTF-7 discontinued.

Jul. 15, 1961. Air Force forms first Minuteman I missile wing.

Aug. 1961. East Germany begins construction of the Berlin Wall.

Aug. 30, 1961. Soviets announce resumption of testing, citing French testing and

tension created by Berlin Crisis as reasons.

Sep. 1, 1961. Soviets resume testing, thus

breaking nuclear test moratorium. When

the Soviets test a 58-megaton device on

October 30, the largest in history, DASA

is asked to model the effects of a 100-

megaton weapon used on the Pentagon.

Sep. 5, 1961. Kennedy announces that

U.S. would resume testing with a series

of underground tests at NTS.

Sep. 15, 1961. Operation NOUGAT

(1961-1962) (45 events), begins with Shot

ANTLER, was the first completely underground nuclear test series at NTS.

Oct. 24, 1961. JTF-8 activated as subordinate command of DASA. Participates

in Operations DOMINIC (1962) and

FISHBOWL (1962).

Dec. 1961. Using large mainframe computers, DASA begins providing the Atomic Warfare Status Center in the basement

of the Pentagon. Its mission is “...to collect, collate, display and disseminate information” on the status of reserve

weapons, allocated and dispersed weapons, weapon expenditures and targets, and

other operational data. Additionally, in

response to the Soviet testing of a 58 MT

device, DASA is tasked to analyze the

effects of a 100 MT weapon on the underground Alternate National Military

Command Center (ANMCC) at Fort

Richie, Maryland, and on proposed Washington, D.C., underground facilities. The

Department of Defense Damage Assessment Center (DODDAC) begins operating in the Pentagon and at the ANMCC.

Jan. 1962. DASA’s joint research with a

British team, in conjunction with the

Armed Services Explosives Safety Board,

results in high-explosive testing of igloo

safety. An ad hoc Committee on Radiation Effects, established under Dr. William G. McMillan, identifies retrofit

solutions for Minuteman II systems, and

advocates designed-in hardening for future strategic missiles.

Jan. 1962. AFRRI begins research.

Mar. 2, 1962. Kennedy announces his decision to resume atmospheric testing unless the Soviet Union agrees to the

Western test ban proposals by late April.
378 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Apr. 25, 1962. Operation DOMINIC (36

events) conducted in the Pacific. STARFISH PRIME shot detonated near

Johnston Island and produced EMP effects as far away as Hawaii. The USS

Ethan Allen fired a Polaris missile in the

Pacific as part of the test series.

Jul. 31, 1962. Military command of

AFRRI vested in the Commanding Officer, National Naval Medical Center.

Jul. 1962. The last atmospheric tests conducted in the continental United States

were fired in Nevada in July 1962.

Aug. 1962. In response to the Donnelly

Report, DASA Field Command recommends field testing of all components of

a nuclear weapon system. DASA solicits

test priorities from the McMillan Panel,

a nuclear effects task force for the

DDR&E (later this panel would be known

as the Scientific Advisory Group on Effects (SAGE). From 1961 to 1965, the

McMillan Panel urges survivability tests

for weapons systems; between 1964 and

1970, DASA designs and funds many of

these tests. Of particular concern is the

vulnerability of the Minuteman II guidance system to radiation. The panel also

raised concern regarding missile reentry

hardness, silo design, and electronic system vulnerability to EMP.

Oct. 14, 1962. Cuban missile crisis begins.

Nov. 4, 1962. TIGHTROPE high-altitude

test. President Kennedy announces the

completion of atmospheric nuclear weapon testing on Operation DOMINIC at

Johnston Island in the Pacific.

Nov. 14, 1962. To facilitate future nuclear weapon test operations between AECDoD, Glenn Seaborg, Chairman AEC,

and Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary

of Defense, signed the AEC-DoD Nuclear Weapon Effects Research Agreement.

Dec. 11, 1962. The Minuteman ICBM becomes operational.

Jan. 1, 1963. Nassau Agreement on British testing at Nevada; U.S. sells Polaris

A-3 missiles to the UK; Operation FISHBOWL series measures implications of

magnetic pulses produced during explosions - street lights on the island of Oahu,

800 miles away, were shorted out; National Security Council adopts new safeguards

for control of nuclear weapons, including

Permissive Action Links and safety and

security improvements; Department of

Defense Damage Assessment Center

(DODDAC) transferred from DASA to

National Military Command System Support Center (NMCSSC).

Apr. 23, 1963. AEC and DoD meet to follow-up November 14, 1962 meeting regarding future nuclear weapons test

operations.

Apr. 29, 1963. Operating under joint

agreement of the previous week, AEC and

DoD representatives meet at Sandia Base

to review test readiness program.

May 6, 1963. President Kennedy formally

authorizes the June 1, 1964 readiness date

for a new series of atmospheric tests.

Jun. 10, 1963. Kennedy announces initiation of special test ban discussions and a

U.S. moratorium on atmospheric tests, if

the USSR reciprocates.

Jun. 1963. Agreement is made on establishing a Heads-of-Government Hot Line.

DASA is tasked to review the survivability of hotline technical designs. This hotline connected the White House, via the

Pentagon’s National Military Command

Center, to the Kremlin.

Jul. 2, 1963. Khrushchev announces his

acceptance of the idea of a Limited Test

Ban Treaty (LTBT) banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in

outer space.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 379

Jul. 12, 1963. Operation NIBLICK

(1963-1964) (43 events) at NTS. All shots

were conducted underground in this and

all future series.

Jul. 14, 1963. U.S. delegation, headed by

Harriman, departs for Moscow to begin

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiations.

Jul. 26, 1963. Kennedy addresses the

American people on the Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty, initialed in Moscow on July 25 by

the delegates. The treaty is subsequently

formally signed in Moscow on August 5,

1963 by Rusk, Home (U.K.), and Gromyko, and sent on August 8, 1963 by

Kennedy to the U.S. Senate for its “advice and consent” for ratification.

Jul. 1963. Prior to LTBT ratification,

DASA plans to have several SLEIGH

RIDE events to further define Air Force

and Navy strategic reentry vehicle (RV)

survivability/vulnerability issues.

Aug. 5, 1963. LTBT is signed by the U.S.,

U.K. and the USSR., banning tests in the

ocean, atmosphere, and outer space.

Sep. 24, 1963. The U.S. Senate consents

to ratification of the LTBT by a vote of

80 to 19.

Oct. 10, 1963. The LTBT enters into

force, ratified by the U.S., U.K. and the

USSR.

Nov. 22, 1963. President Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas, Texas.

Dec. 4, 1963. AEC and DoD meet for the

“Third Meeting of the Joint AEC-DoD

Nuclear Weapons Effects Coordinating

Group”.

Jan. 1964. JTF-2 established and assigned to Sandia Base on a host-tenant

agreement. (It was dis-established on Dec.

31, 1968).

Jan. 27, 1964. Command change; Lt Gen.

Harold C. Donnelly replaces Gen. Booth.

His official position is now Director rather

than Chief.

Jul. 1964. Event SNOWBALL: Joint

U.S./Canada high explosive test in Alberta, Canada, to conduct basic blast, ground

shock, electromagnetic, and other measurements.

Jul. 1, 1964. Weapons Test Division,

Headquarters, DASA established; despite

name, is physically located at Sandia

Base. Reorganized and redesignated as

Test Command, DASA, effective Aug. 1,

1966. Weapons Effects and Test Group redesignated Weapons Test Division

(STWT) DASA, a staff division under

direct control of HQ/DASA (Not Field

Command). Authority for this action was

DASA General Order No. 10, dated July

1, 1964.

Jul. 16, 1964. Operation WHETSTONE

begins at NTS.

Jul. 22, 1964. New DASA charter redefines top positions, including the creation

of two deputy director posts: a civilian

Deputy Director, Science & Technology,

for the testing program; and a military

Deputy Director, Operations and Administration, who also serves as Chief, Joint

Atomic Information Exchange Group

(JAIEG). The civilian Deputy Director

oversaw radiation, blast and shock, biomedical, and test plans and programs activities. Charter is DoD Directive 5103.31.

Aug. 1964. JCS establishes Joint Task

Force 2 at Sandia Base to develop strategies to penetrate Soviet nuclear-armed airdefense systems.

Sep. 1, 1964. Director, DASA, assumed

command and administrative control over

AFRRI.

Oct. 1964. Event SALMON conducted in

a salt dome in Mississippi as part of the

nuclear test detection program. DASA Director begins sponsorship of the McMillan Panel, with DDR&E approval.

Oct. 16, 1964. China explodes its first fission device at Lop Nor.
380 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Nov. 3, 1964. Lyndon B. Johnson elected

President of the United States.

Nov. 16, 1964. Research on weapons effects summarized in the classified publication Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons.

Publication later replaced by January

1968 edition and later by new manual,

Effects Manual 1 (EM-1) in 1972.

Dec. 1964. Event MUDPACK: Studied

the influence of layering upon the propagation of ground shock between soft and

hard medium. Defense Secretary McNamara described the “mutual assured

destruction” (MAD) concept. President

Johnson announces cutbacks in production of nuclear material.

Feb. 1965. Beginning with WISHBONE,

DASA begins a series of vertical line-ofsight (VLOS) tests that exposed electronic

components, circuits, and systems to gamma rays and neutrons.

Feb. 1965. SAILOR HAT Event: A 500-

ton, high-explosive test in Hawaii to evaluate effects of airblast loading and

underwater shock on surface ships.

Sep. 1965. DISTANT MIST Event: A

VLOS test of fluence effects on material

and electrical samples. This was the first

test of different parts of the energy spectrum.

Jan. 1966. DASA develops nuclear stockpile reporting standards. JCS tasks DASA

Field Command with responsibility of accounting for entire nuclear stockpile. In

the late 1960s, the JCS authorizes transfer of all war reserve nuclear weapons to

Service custody. As a result of this custody change, DASA personnel declines

from a peak of almost 11,000 in the 1950s

to 1,800 in fiscal year 1975.

Apr. 1966. PIN STRIPE Event. A VLOS

test using a mobile tower, which was

pulled away from the shaft after detonation to evaluate radiation effects.

Jun. 1966. PILE DRIVER Event. A

ground motion phenomenology experiment, which examined survival of underground structures and shock propagation

in granite materials. 71 tunnel segments

were excavated for the various structures

and experiments.

Jun. 1966. DASA sponsors DOUBLE

PLAY Event, the first exposure of fullscale reentry systems.

Jul. 11, 1966. In a letter to Cyrus Vance,

Dr. Seaborg proposes transferring all finished weapons from AEC to DoD custody.

Jul. 28, 1966. Operation LATCHKEY (38

events) begun at NTS. STERLING shot,

at Hattiesburg, MS, a Plowshare experiment, NEW POINT and MIDI MIST

events were DoD weapon effects tests.

Aug. 1, 1966. Weapons Test Division,

Headquarters, DASA is reorganized and

redesignated as Test Command, DASA.

Commander of JTF-8 was assigned collateral duty as Commander, Test Command. JCS approves of a plan, drafted by

the DASA Deputy Director for Science

and Technology (DDST), for a series of

underground tests to assure weapons system survivability.

Nov. 1966. AEC and DoD work out various changes regarding weapons custody.

DASA Field Command and Albuquerque

Operations Office (ALOO) revise agreements then in effect.

Feb. 10, 1967. President Johnson directs

AEC to deliver weapons and components

to DoD in accordance with January 30,

1947 agreement.

Mar. 10, 1967. Dr. Seaborg signs the new

Stockpile Agreement, followed by Secretary Vance on March 20, 1967.

Jun. 17, 1967. China explodes a megaton-range hydrogen bomb.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 381

Jun. 26, 1967. MIDI MIST Event. A

HLOS test to evaluate radiation effects on

several weapon systems. The test incorporated for the first time sample protection systems (SPS) to protect experiments

from debris. It was also the first major test

conducted under the JCS-approved test

program.

Aug. 31, 1967. DOOR MIST Event. This

test also evaluated radiation effects and

was the first to use a tunnel and pipe seal

(TAPS) for containment and experiment

protection in a HLOS test.

Jan. 1, 1968. EMP Simulation Panel

formed to explore ways of testing for

EMP effects. DASA eventually funds

ARES, an EMP simulator lab for the Air

Force at Sandia Labs, and EMPRESS

designed for the Navy.

Feb. 1968. DORSAL FIN Event. An

HLOS test which evaluated radiation effects in several weapon systems.

Jul. 1, 1968. Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT) is signed, obligating nonnuclear-weapon states not to manufacture

or acquire nuclear weapons.

Aug. 1, 1968. Command change; Vice

Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin replaces Gen.

Harold Donnelly as Director, DASA.

Aug. 24, 1968. France explodes a megaton range hydrogen bomb.

Sep. 1968. HUDSON SEAL Event. A

very successful HLOS test of the survivability of several weapon systems.

Nov. 5, 1968.Richard Nixon elected President of the United States.

Dec. 7, 1968. DoD directive terminates

DASA activities at Clarksville, Killean,

and Lake Mead military bases. DASA activities transferred to nearby military installations.

Dec. 31, 1968. JTF-2, at Sandia Base, is

dis-established. After nuclear-related accidents in Palomares, Spain on January

17, 1966, and in Thule, Greenland, on January 21, 1968, DASA provides database

of nuclear accidents to the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, which later requests

suspension of all routine SAC nuclear

armed bomber patrols.

Jun. 1969. Construction of first MIRVed

warheads begin for use on the Minuteman

III and Poseidon missiles.

Sep. 1969. MINUTE STEAK Event: A

VLOS test which evaluated Minuteman

III systems as well as other missile systems.

Dec. 10, 1969. DoD directive terminates

activities of JTF-8 and transfer control of

Johnston Atoll to the Air Force.

Dec. 1969. DIESEL TRAIN Event: An

HLOS test of the survivability of weapon

systems.

Mar. 26, 1970. 500th announced nuclear

test takes place in Nevada.

May 19, 1970. By General Order No. 20,

Headquarters DASA, May 19, 1970, the

Commander of Field Command, DASA,

Major General Francis W. Nye, assumes

command of Test Command, DASA.

JTF8 to be deactivated.

May 1970. MINT LEAF Event: An

HLOS test of the vulnerability of the

Army Spartan missile system. Due to the

size of the experiment and the number of

HLOS tests being conducted, the “T” tunnel complex was begun.

Jun. 1970. Construction of B-1 bomber

begins.

Jun. 30, 1970. JTF-8 is deactivated. As a

result, Commander, Field Command,

DASA, assumes command of Test Command, DASA (change occurred on May

19, 1970).

Jul. 1, 1970. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel

recommends that DASA be dis-established.
382 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Jul. 1970. DIAL PACK Event. A joint

U.S./Canadian high-explosive test in Alberta, Canada, to determine loading and

response of military systems subjected to

airblast and ground shock. This test, along

with PRAIRIE FLAT, helped the Air

Force assess and improve Minuteman II

silo survivability.

Sep.1, 1970. Reorganization of DASA

Field Command to include subcommands

of: Nuclear Weapons School, Stockpile

Management Command, Data Automation Command, and the Nuclear Weapons

Development Command. These activities

had been Directorates of Headquarters

Field Command. The Stockpile Management Command also included the Nuclear Material Directorate.

Dec. 18, 1970. Operation EMERY, test

BANEBERRY accidentally vents large

radioactive cloud. U.S. test program is

shut down for six months and new safety

(containment) procedures are initiated.

Feb. 11, 1971. Seabed Arms Control Treaty is signed, prohibiting parties from placing nuclear weapons on seabed or ocean

floor beyond a twelve-mile coastal zone.

Mar. 29, 1971. DoD publishes Blue Ribbon Panel report recommending that

DASA be dis-established and its functions

taken over by Deputy Secretary of Defense for Testing and Operations. In an

Executive Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard directs reorganization of DASA as a result of

cutbacks recommended by the Blue Ribbon Panel survey, to be effective July 1,

1971. DASA was to be retained as a defense agency under the new title: Defense

Nuclear Agency (DNA). Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, subject:

“Defense Atomic Support Agency,” directed the Nuclear Weapons School be

discontinued by June 30, 1972.

Jul. 1, 1971. DASA (DNA) reorganized.

The new agency is solely responsible for

sponsoring all future effects tests. Other

duties include consolidated management

of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile,

management of DoD nuclear weapons

testing and nuclear weapons effects research programs, and providing staff advice and assistance on nuclear weapons

matters to the government. Under authority of DNA General Order No. 1, the following major changes in the DASA

organization and mission were directed:

1) Field Command was retained but the

Albuquerque complex of Sandia Base and

Kirtland AFB was consolidated for support purposes under the Air Force. 2) The

DASA-oriented national storage site was

transferred to the Air Force. 3) The responsibility for nuclear weapons technical training was transferred to the

individual military Services. The JCS

were tasked to identify general interest

courses to be continued on a Joint Service

level and to assign a Service as executive

agent for these courses. (The Joint Services Nuclear Weapons School on Kirtland AFB began to teach general interest

courses on a Joint Service level). 4)

DASA’s responsibilities for weapons development were transferred to the Services. DNA’s new role in weapons research

and development was defined as advisory through participation in Service planning groups. 5) Manning levels at the

weapons laboratories were cut due to the

reduced role of DNA in weapons research

and development. The Air Force was designated host of support functions in the

Albuquerque area, and DNA was directed to obtain its support through Inter-Service Support Agreements with the host.

This decision required the disestablishment of Sandia and Manzano Bases as

DASA units and transfer of most of the

functions to Kirtland AFB. The closure
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 383

and transfer of the National Stockpile

Sites to the Services in their respective

proximities and the transfer of the Nuclear Weapons School and the Sandia Base

Hospital to the Air Force brought about

drastic decreases in manpower authorizations during the 1969-1973 period; DNA

authorizations dropped from about 6,500

to about 1,200.

Aug. 1971. Command change; Lt. General Carroll Dunn replaces Admiral Lloyd

Mustin as Director, DASA.

Aug. 20, 1971. Technical Analysis Group

established within DNA to replace the

Weapons Development Command. DNA

to exercise greater responsibility for recommending DoD-wide security standards

and operating procedures for nuclear

weapons.

Nov. 24, 1971. DIAGNOL LINE event.

A VLOS shaft-test evaluation of Poseidon

missile components which included investigation of Internal Electromagnetic

Pulse (IEMP) effects.

Jan. 1, 1972. Test Command and Field

Command consolidated together into single organization at Sandia. Weapons Effects Test Group redesignated as Test

Directorate. Test Command was deactivated.

May 26, 1972. SALT I agreement signed

by U.S. and USSR.; negotiations began

in November 1969. SALT I became an interim (5 year) agreement that focused on

the limitation of strategic arms. It was intended to be a holding action designed to

complement the ABM Treaty by limiting

competition in strategic offensive arms.

It provided time for further negotiations.

May 26, 1972. Anti-Ballistic Missile

(ABM) Treaty was signed, permitting

each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capitol and an ICBM

launch area. It provided for a U.S.-Soviet

Standing Consultative Commission

(SCC), designed to promote ABM objectives and treaty implementation.

Jun. 30, 1972. The military Services assume responsibility for nuclear training;

the Nuclear Weapons School is transferred to the Air Force.

Jul. 20, 1972. DIAMOND SCULLS

Event. The largest LOS pipe system test

conducted with a drift of 1,900 feet and a

test chamber over 26 feet in diameter. The

test objective was to evaluate vulnerability of Minuteman III components.

Nov. 1972. SALT II negotiations commence. Talks focus on developing a longterm treaty limiting all nuclear weapon

systems. The principal U.S. objectives

were to provide for equal numbers of U.S.

and Soviet strategic delivery vehicles, and

to impose restraints on technological developments like MIRVs.

Nov. 7, 1972. Richard Nixon is reelected

President of the United States.

Apr. 25, 1973. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Johnston Atoll,” directed the U.S. Air Force to transfer the

host-manager responsibility for Johnston

Island to DNA, effective July 1, 1973.

Jun. 5, 1973. DIDO QUEEN Event. An

HLOS test, which evaluated effects on

several weapons systems. This test included the first use of the DNA Auxiliary Closure (DAC), an improved version of the

SAC, for better sample protection.

Jul. 1, 1973. DNA is asked to take over

administration of Johnston Atoll from the

Air Force. The agency designs a massive

cover for plutonium contaminated sites.

Johnston Atoll is to be maintained by

Field Command for use as a base of operations should it become necessary to resume atmospheric testing of nuclear

weapons under Safeguard C of the Limited Test Ban Treat of 1963.
384 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Oct. 2, 1973. Beginning of Operation ARBOR (21 events) conducted at NTS.

HUSKY ACE (10/12/73) and MING

BLADE (6/19/74) events were DoD

weapon effects tests.

Oct. 1973. Command change; Lt. General Warren Johnston replaces Gen. Dunn

as DNA Director.

Dec. 1973. SACEUR asks DNA to make

assessments of methods to provide a

stronger, improved forward defense in

Europe. In particular, the integrated deterrent roles of theater and strategic nuclear forces were to be examined.

Jul. 3, 1974. Threshold Test Ban Treaty

(TTBT) signed, limiting underground

tests to less than 150 kilotons.

Aug. 9, 1974. Richard Nixon resigns as

President of the United States. Gerald

Ford assumes office. Vladvistok accord

puts cap on U.S. strategic offensive forces of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and of 1,320 MIRVs.

Oct. 28, 1974. HYBLA FAIR Event: Designed to evaluate a lower yield source

and shorter LOS pipe for future weapon

effect tests.

Nov. 1974. Brezhnev and Ford meet in

Valdivostok and agree on an outline for

SALT II. Defense Secretary Schlessinger

announces an end to MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) policy, opting for “limited strategic options,” which states that

deterrence must operate across the entire

spectrum of possible contingencies. The

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) directed DNA to conduct study of the economic feasibility and

operational practicality of establishing

DNA as the DoD Integrated Material

Manager for AEC controlled consumable

items, and to submit a proposed implementation plan. This plan was eventually

approved.

Jan. 1975. Policy established that DNA

conducted Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections (NWTIs) can suffice for technical operations of Armed Services

Technical Proficiency Inspection. Energy

Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) begun in place of

AEC.

Jan. 1975. DNA is in the forefront of developing microcomputer applications for

nuclear effects. DNA DDST oversees development of nuclear effects algorithms

for handheld calculators and for the first

generation of personal computers. DNA

provides field commanders with the first

microcomputer-based planing tools, including the Targeting and Planning System (TAPS).

Jan. 1975. DICE THROW tests begin: A

series of high-explosive events conducted at White Sands Missile Range

(WSMR) to examine blast, cratering, and

fireball effects leading up to a 500-ton

equivalent event. Tests end in June 1977.

Apr. 5, 1975. DINING CAR Event: An

HLOS test in support of the Trident and

Minuteman III missile systems.

Oct. 24, 1975. HUSKY PUP Event: An

HLOS event to test survivability of Navy

reentry vehicles and material phenomenology. A 60-ton granite monolith was

placed underground to study energy coupling.

Nov. 1975. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that FCDNA inspect nuclear capable units at a rate of 20 to 25 percent

annually. Formal agreements between

DNA and both the Air Force and USAEUR established surveillance inspections

by Field Command of nuclear capable

units. National Emergency Airborne

Command Post (NEACP) becomes operational.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 385

Dec. 1975. DNA develops its Silo Test

Program (STP) to assess new protective

structures for U.S. strategic and theater

force deployments, as ballistic missile accuracies improve. Although initially created to assess potential vulnerabilities of

Soviet hardened targets, STP provided insights into hardening design for U.S.

ICBM silos.

Jan. 1976. Along with studying theater

force modernization, DNA participates in

various Joint Working Groups that provide a forum with allies to model alternative force employment tactics and

exercise new scenarios and force mixes.

DNA supports CINCPAC’s effort to ensure operability of command, control, and

communications (C3) links in nuclear environments, including high-altitude bursts

with EMP effects. In addition, DNA assessed C3 network survivability after both

direct attack and exposure to EMP.

May 12, 1976. MIGHTY EPIC Event: An

HLOS test in support of Air Force and

Navy reentry vehicles. It was the first of

two-for-one test to reuse the same tunnel

complex for subsequent tests and reduce

costs.

Oct. 1976. DICE THROW Event, a 628-

ton domed cylinder of ANFO was detonated at the WSMR to test military

equipment. The success of this test proved

the utility of the technique and launched

a progression of tests.

Nov. 2, 1976.Jimmy Carter elected President of the United States.

Dec. 1976. FCDNA Commander represented the United Sates in signing agreements for the return of Enewetok to its

people. Field Command developed and

monitored procedures to provide base

support for the launch of two THOR missiles from Johnston Atoll. FCDNA participated in conferences at Los Angeles

Air Force Station and Vandenburg AFB

to develop and implement revised configuration of the Johnston Atoll launch facilities upon completion of the program.

Jan. 1977. Secretary of Defense tasks

DNA to conduct an evaluation and technology program on Theater Nuclear Force

Security and Survivability (TNFS2).

Apr. 1977. Command change; Vice Admiral Robert Monroe replaces Gen. Warren Johnston as Director, DNA.

Jun. 1977. MISER’S BLUFF tests begin:

A series of high-explosive events to investigate ground motion generated by

multiple bursts. Five allied governments

participated. MISER’S BLUFF I was conducted at WSMR and MISER’S BLUFF

II was conducted at Plant Ranch, Arizona. The event ended in August 1978.

Aug. 4, 1977. U.S. Congress creates the

Department of Energy (DOE), which was

given the responsibility for nuclear weapon development and testing.

Oct. 1977. NATO’s Nuclear Planning

Group establishes task force on modernization. Emphasis is placed on two-track

approach of improving tactical weaponry while pursuing arms control. Eventual

deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles in

Europe during the 1980s.

Nov. 1977. HYBLA GOLD Event: A specialized HLOS test to investigate airblast

propagation in proposed MX missile

trench, in support of MX basing. DNA

tested extensive grounding and shielding

improvements and made them mandatory for future events.

Dec. 28, 1977. Charter changed so that

DNA placed under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Research and Engineering.

DNA to be supervised by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff for military aspects of DNA activities, including composition of the nuclear stockpile; allocation and deployment

of nuclear weapons; military participation
386 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

and support of nuclear testing; frequency

of technical standardization inspections;

and requirements for technical publications. Operational phase of the radiological cleanup of Enewetak Atoll begins;

Field Command is designated as operational manager of the cleanup project.

Sep. 1978. DIABLO HAWK Event: An

HLOS test to certify an Air Force reentry

system and the Navy C-4 missile body.

Also included an extensive structure test

and a test in EMP phenomenology. The

event utilized the same experiment drift

and hardware from the MIGHTY EPIC

Event.

Dec. 1978. President Carter orders Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish program to study fallout

effects from nuclear testing. OSD establishes Nuclear Test Personnel Review program to track long-term health effects of

fallout exposure on personnel.

Jan. 1979. Field Command provided data

to support the search and recovery of the

Soviet satellite with on-board nuclear reactor that fell over Canada. Field Command facilitated transfer of emergency

destruction information to the Services so

they could write their own manuals on the

destruction of nuclear weapons.

Feb. 1979. New procedures developed to

insure survivability of government communications in the event of a nuclear attack.

Jun. 18, 1979. U.S. and USSR. sign the

SALT II Treaty at the Hofber Palace, Vienna, Austria. SALT II replaced the interim agreement of SALT I; it allowed an

aggregate limit on strategic offensive

arms, and included detailed definitions of

limited systems, provisions to enhance

verification, and a ban on circumvention

of treaty provisions. Treaty signed but not

ratified.

Nov. 29, 1979. Operation TINDERBOX

(15 events) began at NTS.

Dec. 1, 1979. NUWAX-79 was conducted at NTS to simulate a nuclear weapon

accident and test the response of various

agencies. The Air Force was the lead

agency for this particular exercise. The

DOE co-sponsored the event, the first of

many biennial emergency response exercises.

Dec. 28, 1979. The Soviet Union invades

Afghanistan. U.S. announces plans to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. DNA and DOE begin collaborating

on joint emergency response exercises for

weapon accidents recovery and post-recovery remediation.

Jan. 1980. With DIA cooperation, DNA

reverse-engineers Soviet ICBM silos, and

begins subscale testing. New DNA models aid in Single Integrated Operational

Plan (SIOP) adjustments. DNA supports

hardening of the Supreme Headquarters,

Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Mons,

Beigium; conducts protective structures

assessments for ground-launched cruise

missiles (GLCMs); and holds Pershing

survivability field exercises. With its programs designed to cope with immediate

and delayed nuclear effects, DNA community demonstrates its support for presidential initiatives aimed at procuring

survivable C3 systems and at assuring

continuity of government in wartime.

Feb. 1980. On JCS initiative, DNA establishes a Hard Target Kill research program

that includes consideration of earth penetrating weapons. DNA begins focusing

on applying its technologies towards civilian benefits. For example, DNA develops the e-SCRUB program, which uses

electron beams to remove oxides of sulfur and nitrogen from coal stack gases;

this technique permits electric power

plants to use high sulphur coal in areas
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 387

with sensitive air restrictions. DNA adapts

its nuclear effects models so that the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) and other relief organizations

can predict natural phenomena damage

and target disaster relief operations. Using its nuclear effects ground shock research and tools, DNA advises the

construction industry on methods to mitigate earthquake damage to buildings.

Jun. 24, 1980. HURON KING Event: A

VLOS test that evaluated the hardening

of satellites to nuclear radiation. A large

evacuation chamber located at the surface

contained a full-size mockup of the satellite.

Aug. 1980. Command change; Lt. General Harry Griffith replaces Admiral Monroe.

Oct. 16, 1980. China conducts world’s

last atmospheric test at Lop Nor.

Oct. 31, 1980. MINOR’S IRON Event:

An HLOS test containing MX related materials and phenomenology experiments.

A fiber-optic data transmission system

was tested for the first time to improve

data recovery.

Nov. 4, 1980. Ronald Reagan elected

President of the United States.

Nov. 15, 1981. DISTANT RUNNER

Event: A series of aboveground, highexplosive tests at WSMR to determine the

suitability of quantity and distance criteria and standards for hardening aircraft

shelters, runways, and taxiways in Europe, as part of the Theater Nuclear Survivability, Security, and Safety Program.

Dec. 1981. NUWAX-81 was conducted

at NTS with the Army as the lead Service.

Sep. 23, 1982. DIAMOND ACE Event:

This test was fired simultaneously with

HURON LANDING and was designed to

evaluate the low-yield testbed design that

DNA was developing.

Nov. 10, 1982. Leonid Brezhnev dies.

Yuri Andropov assumes power in the

USSR.

Dec. 1982. Following a SAC maintenance

accident, which resulted in an explosive

fire at a Titan II missile site, OSD reinstates emergency response teams under

the coordination of DNA’s Joint Nuclear

Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC).

Field Command’s JNACC began 24-hour

operation. Field Command supported

studies on intrinsic radiation, an antisubmarine warfare standoff weapon, plutonium dispersal analysis, and retirement of

the Titan II missile system.

Feb. 1983. DNA sponsors summer studies (also in 1986) on high altitude nuclear

effects. In 1983, it sponsors the satellite

HILAT, for “high latitude,” whose transmissions through a striated barium cloud

would be measured.

Mar. 23, 1983. President Reagan announces the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). DNA is tasked by the SDI

Office (SDIO) to evaluate lethality of all

SDI weapons against their targets. DNA

conducts underground tests for SDI candidate subsystems.

Apr. 6, 1983. The Scowcroft Commission, on the Future of Strategic Offensive

Missiles, releases its report. DNA provided technical support and briefings to the

Commission. During the years preceding

this report, DNA provided support in the

evaluation of how Peacekeeper ICBMs

could be based. After the release of this

report, DNA would apply its expertise to

silo survivability. It also examined nonideal airblast and its simulation for tests

of the Small ICBM’s Hardened Mobile

Launcher (HML). Many of these activities were accomplished jointly with the

Air Force’s Ballistic Missile Office

(BMO)
388 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Jul. 1983. The Judge Clark Memorandum, from the National Security Council, reaffirmed the Presidential action of

1976 which redefined Safeguard C of the

LTBT as “the maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear testing in the

atmosphere should that be deemed essential to national security.” This action reconfirmed FCDNA’s mission on Johnston

Atoll, and FCDNA’s decision to undertake

the DIRECT COURSE event in October

1983.

Aug. 1983. Command change; Lt. General Richard Saxer replaces General Griffith.

Sep. 21, 1983. MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR

Event: The primary objective of the

HLOS test was to evaluate performance

of low yield test bed concept. For the first

time on a DNA event the data was totally

recorded underground.

Oct. 26, 1983. DIRECT COURSE Event:

A high-explosive aboveground test at

WSMR to evaluate blast effects from a

simulated one-kiloton airburst. The event

included several NATO nations and

France.

Nov. 1983. Soviets walk out of the INF

and START talks.

Dec. 9, 1983. Operation FUSILEER (17

events) begins at NTS.

Jan. 1984. In response to a DoD Nuclear

Survivability Directive, DNA develops a

microelectronics hardening program, and

encourages the military Services to implement radiation-hardened microelectronics

components in their operating systems. In

addition, DNA sponsored development of

radiation-tolerant satellite and computer

microelectronics.

Feb. 9, 1984. Yuri Andropov dies; Constantine Chernenko assumes power in the

USSR.

Feb. 15, 1984.MIDAS MYTH (MILAGRO)

Event: An HLOS test evaluating the effects of radiation on several weapons systems. A subsistence crater formed on top

of Rainer Mesa, destroying a number of

Los Alamos recording trailers and fatally

injuring one of the technicians in the trailer park.

Apr. 1984. Secretary of Defense memorandum authorizes DNA to begin research

on advanced conventional weapons. Later reinforced by agreement with DOE for

joint studies on conventional weapons.

Sep. 1984. DNA finalizes its operations

plan for removing plutonium contaminated debris from Johnston Atoll. A long

range plan was conceived to mine plutonium from contaminated soil at Johnston

Atoll and free needed space.

Oct. 10, 1984. Operation GRENADIER

(17 events) conducted at NTS.

Nov. 6, 1984. Ronald Reagan re-elected

President of the United States.

Jan. 1985. Logistics Directorate, Services Division, completed a sophisticated

computer bond system, the Enewetak Radiological Records System (ERRS), designed to retain all necessary operational

and radiological data. The ERRS contains

all information relating to each individual’s exposure (approximately 8,000 personnel).

Feb. 1985. Twenty-seven freight containers filled with plutonium-contaminated

debris (weighing a total of 540 tons) were

shipped from Johnston Atoll to the Nevada Test Site. At NTS, the containers were

placed in the U3AXBL crater, a designated radioactive waste disposal site for “defense” wastes. No person received a

measurable radiation dose from this

project, and there was no leakage of contamination from the containers.
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 389

Feb.- Jun. 1985. EMP testing conducted

at the Advance Research Electromagnetic Pulse Simulator (ARES) at Kirtland

AFB, New Mexico. Field Command tested EMP effects on the Ground Launched

Cruise Missile Support System.

Mar. 10, 1985. Chernenko dies; Mikhail

Gorbachev assumes power in the USSR.

Apr. 6, 1985. MISTY RAIN, a HLOS test,

conducted. A DoD weapon effects test,

MISTY RAIN’s objective was to measure

satellite survivability and hardening verification on the MK21 and MK5 reentry

vehicle. This test’s technology allowed

satellite hardening study as well as evaluation of functional response of electronics under high stress.

Jun. 1985. MINOR SCALE test conducted. This high-explosive effects test was

designed to test precursor effects of a nuclear blast on a Hardened Missile Launcher, and also to test blast effects on foreign

military hardware and foreign structures,

plus blast effects on U.S. equipment.

Jul. 29, 1985. Gorbachev halts Soviet underground nuclear testing.

Sep. 1985. EMP testing of EC-135 SAC

Flying Command Post aircraft is conducted at the Advance Research Electromagnetic Pulse Simulator at Kirtland AFB.

Oct. 1985. DIAMOND BEACH test conducted. The primary objective of this

HLOS pipe test was to evaluate performance of the low-yield test bed concept.

This test was a follow-on to the MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR event conducted in

September 1983. FCDNA conducts two

Stockpile Emergency Verification exercises and a relocation exercise. The number of nuclear safety studies increased by

25 percent, with the W48 program providing the most significant improvement

in safety.

Jul. 1986. Command change; Lt. General John Pickitt replaces General Saxer.

Nov. 1986. Peacekeeper missile system

becomes operational.

Nov. 14, 1986. National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 1987 disestablishes the Military Liaison Committee

(MLC) and replaces it with the Nuclear

Weapons Council (NWC).

Dec. 1986. DNA’s AFRRI deploys a Chernobyl Site Restoration Assistance Team

to Chernobyl, Ukraine, in wake of the nuclear power plant accident. DNA later provides assistance to environmental

remediation efforts at the closed test site

at Semipalatinsk Kazakhstan.

Feb. 1987. Exercise Premier Task 87, a

JCS-coordinated and DNA-sponsored

command post exercise, is held.

Feb. 20, 1987. Soviets resume underground testing.

Mar. 1987. New DNA charter authorizes

research into non-nuclear systems where

the agency has unique, albeit nuclear-derived, capabilities for the research.

Apr. 1, 1987. DoD JNACC is transferred

to Headquarters DNA from Field Command.

May 11, 1987. Field Command’s Test Directorate, with its functions at Kirtland

AFB and the NTS, becomes a part of the

Director for Test, Headquarters, DNA.

Aug. 1987. Command change; Vice Admiral John Parker replaces General Pickitt.

Dec. 1987. Mighty Derringer, a multiagency exercise under the direction of the

National Security Council, involving

Washington level and field activity interactions, is conducted.

Dec. 8, 1987. Reagan and Gorbachev sign

the INF Treaty in Washington, D.C. The

treaty requires the destruction and elimi-
390 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

nation of U.S. and Soviet ground launched

ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges

between 500 and 5500 kilometers, along

with all launchers and associated support

equipment. 859 U.S. and 1,752 Soviet

missiles were to be eliminated from Europe, including U.S. Pershing and Soviet

SS-20 missiles.

May 27, 1988. Senate ratifies INF treaty,

voting 93 to 5.

Jun. 1, 1988. INF treaty enters into force.

TTBT and PNE protocol signed.

Oct. 1988. Gorbachev is selected as

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

Nov. 8, 1988. George Bush elected President of the United States.

Jan. 1989. Headquarters DNA orders

Field Command to coordinate with the

Logistics Planning Group in the development of a document outlining the considerations on the maintenance of a basic

Safeguard C capability.

Apr. 19, 1989. Tianemen Square demonstrations begun in China.

Sep. 1989. Command change: Maj. General Gerald Watson replaces Admiral Parker.

Nov. 1989. DNA creates a Stockpile

Emergency Verification Subsystem

(SEV), which rapidly disseminates selected or total nuclear weapon stockpile serial inventories for site emergency

verification under peacetime conditions.

DNA implements its Nuclear Management

Information System (NUMIS), whose software maintains and provides to system users status reports from the national nuclear

weapons and major components stockpile

for peacetime, emergency, and wartime

conditions.

Aug. 2, 1990. Iraq invades Kuwait. A

U.S.-led coalition of nations deploys forces to Saudi Arabia and surrounding areas.

Sep. 1990. Drell Report to Congress on

the safety of aging nuclear weapons calls

for implementation of several procedural

changes. DNA works jointly with the Services to assess risk of plutonium dispersal in plausible accident scenarios. DNA’s

inspections bring discrepancies to Services’ command attention. DNA-sponsored

chemical weapons disposal facility (JACADS) begins operations at Johnston Atoll.

Dec. 1990. DNA verification technology

programs expand to include support of

practically every arms control and bilateral agreement to which the U.S. is a party. Recent technological achievements

include sensors for Open Skies aircraft

and improved seismic sensing capabilities

to verify the CTBT. DNA begins applying its expertise in C3 facility survivability towards safeguarding U.S. and allied

facilities from terrorist attack. The Agency has performed over 50 Balanced Survivability Assessments of critical DoD

and federal agency facilities; findings are

used in determining risk reduction measures. Such analytical support is provided to law enforcement agencies during

forensic investigations of terrorist events,

such as the Oklahoma City and Khobar

Towers bombings.

Jan. 1991. DNA provides targeting and

damage assessment information to Gulf

War operations. DNA sets up a 24-hour

command center to assess the consequences of potential Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) warheads on the

Scud missiles Iraq launched against Israel and Saudi Arabia; DNA proves the results of these assessments to Central

Command.

Mar. 1991. DNA officers participate in

post-Gulf War inspections to validate lethality and survivability models based on

wartime experience. After the Gulf War,

DNA begins undertaking counterprolifer-
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 391

ation initiatives. Early planning includes

review of all U.S. non-proliferation and

counterproliferation activities headed by

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John

Deutch. The Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense (Atomic Energy) ATSD(AE)

designates DNA as the lead defense agency for the counterforce elements of the

counterproliferation support program.

Jul. 31, 1991. Bush and Gorbachev sign

the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START), requiring both nations to reduce

their strategic nuclear arsenals by about

25 percent. Both states also moved to reduce conventional weapons and continue

a phased withdrawal of forces from Europe.

Dec. 25, 1991. Mikhail Gorbachev resigns

his post, signaling the disbanding of the

USSR, and the end of the Cold War. Reflecting the end of the Cold War, President Bush announces nuclear posture

changes. These changes include: withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from

Europe; cancellation of the Peacekeeper

mobile basing programs, of the Short

Range Attack Missile II (SRAM-II) and

of the Small ICBM; and stand down from

alert of strategic bombers.

Jan. 1992. A Presidential decision lays the

groundwork for eventual elimination of

all 50 Peacekeeper missiles, reduced

MIRV deployments, and the shift of nuclear bombers to conventional missions.

Apr. 1992. Command change; Maj. General Kenneth Hagemann replaces General Watson as Director, DNA.

Sep. 18, 1992. HUNTERS TROPHY -

last U.S. weapons effects test.

Oct. 2, 1992. Bush signs the Energy and

Water Development Appropriations Act.

Its Hatfield II Amendment mandates a

nine-month moratorium on all U.S. underground nuclear weapons tests, followed

by a limited testing program between July

1, 1993 and January 1, 1997. Testing is to

be limited to those tests related to the safety of “nuclear explosive devices” and to

the reliability of “nuclear weapons”. No

underground test may be conducted by the

U.S. after September 30, 1996, unless a

foreign government conducts a test after

this date, at which time the prohibition

against U.S. testing will be lifted.

Oct. 23, 1992. DIVIDER - last U.S. nuclear test.

Nov. 3, 1992. William Clinton elected

President of the United States.

Dec. 1992. Congress mandates reviews of

DNA’s roles, missions, and functions. The

eventual result was reaffirming DNA’s

central position in the DoD’s commitment

to maintaining nuclear competencies.

Along with CTR and Nuclear Stockpile

Stewardship responsibilities. DNA also

gained responsibility for non-nuclear development activities that draw upon the

Agency’s nuclear heritage. This mission

shift becomes institutionalized by the new

charter issued in 1995. ATSD(AE) tasks

DNA with implementing the Cooperative

Threat Reduction (CTR) program; previously, the program was known as the Safe,

Secure Dismantlement Program.

Jan. 1993. George Bush and Boris Yeltsin

sign the START II Treaty.

Jul. 3, 1993. President Clinton announces that the U.S. will extend the year-long

moratorium on nuclear weapon testing by

another 15 months, with the hope of making the ban permanent. DNA provides technical help to the Deutch Task Force as part

of its support new counter-proliferation initiatives.

Oct. 1993. Armed Forces Radiobiology

Research Institute (AFFRI) transferred

from DNA.
392 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY

Oct. 1, 1993. DNA begins operating the

Inter-Service Nuclear Weapons School

(INWS), later renamed Defense Nuclear

Weapons School (DNWS), at Kirtland

AFB. Reflecting new challenges in its

mission, the school’s curriculum now includes courses in counterproliferation and

counterterrorism. The SAGE Panel is disbanded after its annual meeting as part of

a government-wide effort to reduce the

number of federal advisory groups.

Nov. 1993. DNA initiates two efforts to

preserve nuclear effects information and

expertise: Project Graybeard and the

DARE program. The Data Archival and

Retrieval Enhancement (DARE) program

locates, stores, and retrieves effects data

from a vast informational inventory.

Project Graybeard identifies, locates, and

interprets test data and integrates the information into the DARE database.

Dec. 1993. The Clinton administration

conducts a Nuclear Posture Review

(NPR) that defines the “enduring stockpile” of nuclear weapons. A DNA pointof-contact coordinates NPR requirements

with DNA analyses and other activities.

DNA military officers participate in the

“dual revalidation” process, by which

each Department of Energy weapons laboratory independently and periodically

examines all data relevant to a specific

weapon type still in the inventory. The

results are reviewed by DOE headquarters, and provided to the Nuclear Weapons Council for final action.

Sep. 1994. President Clinton approves a

reduced strategic force, comprised of

Minuteman ICBMs, Trident submarines

armed with D-5 missiles, B-2 and B-52

bombers, and non-nuclear B-1 bombers.

Dec. 5, 1994. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) goes into effect.

Aug. 1995. Major General Gary L. Curtin replaces Major General Kenneth

Hagemann as Director, DNA.

Jan. 27, 1996. U.S. Senate approves the

START II treaty, which would cut the

number of nuclear warheads possessed by

U.S. and Russia by 50 percent if both nations ratified it. The treaty would eliminate Russia’s big multiple-warhead

land-based missiles. America would eliminate its large Peacekeeper (MX) missiles

and reduce the number of warheads in its

Minuteman missile from three to one.

Jun. 26, 1996.A new charter is issued that

reaffirms DNA’s traditional roles and institutionalizes the new roles as mandated

in the 1992 and 1993 Congressional studies. DNA is retitled the Defense Special

Weapons Agency (DSWA), reflecting the

Agency’s evolving role in the post-Cold

War environment.

Jul. 1996. DSWA is executing over 50

CTR projects, from supplying Russia with

storage containers for fissile materials to

projects in the demilitarized zone dedicated to maintaining viable threat reduction

efforts. DSWA sponsors joint science programs with institutions in Russia,

Ukraine, and Kazakstan.

Jul. 29, 1996. China conducted its last nuclear weapons test.

Aug. 1996. The centerpiece of DoD’s

counterproliferation activities is an Advanced Concept Technologies Demonstration (ACTD), which improves

capability to neutralize WMD targets with

minimal and predictable collateral effects.

This ACTD can predict, minimalize, and

measure post-attack collateral effects.

DNA/DSWA is Demonstration Manager

of the counterproliferation ACTD.

Sep. 24, 1996. President Clinton, along

with top officials of China, France, Russia, Britain and more than fifty other na-
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY 393

tions signed the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty at the United Nations. India and

Pakistan declined. The signatories must

go through the usual ratification procedures before the treaty is fully implemented.

Sep. 25, 1996. Terrorist attack the USAF

housing complex, Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia.

Jan. 29, 1997. Defense Special Weapons

Agency (DSWA) celebrates 50-year anniversary as oldest defense agency, ranging from AFSWP-DSWA.

Sep. 30, 1998. Through DoD Directive

5105.62 and following from the November 1997 DoD Defense Reform Initiative,

the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the

On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense

Technology Security Administration,

along with selected elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, were

merged to form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). On October 1,

1998, Secretary of Defense William S.

Cohen formally established DTRA in a

ceremony at Dulles International Airport

in Northern Virginia, where DTRA was

initially headquartered. Secretary Cohen

outlined the agency’s mission areas as

maintaining current nuclear deterrent capability, reducing threats from nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons, and

countering WMD threats, in order “... to

help catapult America, safe and secure,

into a new century.”
394 APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY
APPENDIX D

AGENCY CHARTERS

Manhattan Engineering District (MED)

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP)

Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA)

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA)
396 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 397

MED
398 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 399
400 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 401

AFSWP
402 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 403
404 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 405
406 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 407

DASA
408 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 409
410 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 411
412 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 413
414 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 415
416 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 417
418 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 419
420 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 421

DNA
422 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 423
424 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 425
426 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 427
428 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 429
430 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 431
432 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 433
434 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 435
436 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 437

DSWA
438 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 439
440 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 441
442 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS 443
444 APPENDIX D: AGENCY CHARTERS
APPENDIX E

AGENCY THROUGH THE DECADES CHART
446 APPENDIX E: AGENCY THROUGH THE DECADES CHART
APPENDIX E: AGENCY THROUGH THE DECADES CHART 447
448 APPENDIX E: AGENCY THROUGH THE DECADES CHART
Symbols

2761st Engineer Battalion .................... 49

38th Battalion ....................................... 50

509th Bombardment Group .................. 49

A

ABLE (Test) ......................................... 13

Accelerator-Pulsed Fast

Assembly (APFA) ....................... 190

Acheson, Dean G. ................................. 19

Acheson-Lilienthal Report ................... 19

Advanced Research Electromagnetic

Simulator (ARES) ....................... 307

Advanced Research Projects

Agency (ARPA) .......................... 136

Advanced Systems and Concepts

Office (ASCO) ............................ 323

Agnew, Harold M., Dr. ....................... 313

Air Force Office of Atomic Testing

(AFOAT) ....................................... 60

Air Force Technical Applications

Center (AFTAC) ......................... 197

AJAX (Operation) ................................ 49

Albuquerque, New Mexico .................... 2

Albuquerque Operations Office.......... 147

Alternate National Military

Command .................................... 157

Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil

(ANFO) ....................................... 190

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) ............. 143

ARES (Simulator) .............................. 307

ARGUS (Operation) ........................... 139

Armed Forces Radiobiology

Research Institute (AFRRI) ........ 206

Armed Forces Special Weapons

Project (AFSWP) ............................ 2

Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency (ACDA) ......................... 251

Army Air Corps .................................... 16

Aspin, Leslie, Secretary ...................... 308

Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense, Atomic Energy

ATSD(AE) .................................. 182

Atkins, Marvin C., Dr. ........................ 278

Atomic Energy Act ............................... 13

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) ....... 9

Atwood, Donald J., Deputy

Secretary ..................................... 313

AURORA (Test Facility) .................... 239

B

B-1 (Aircraft) ...................................... 218

B-29 (Aircraft) ...................................... 13

B-52 (Aircraft) .................................... 122

Bacher, Robert F. .................................. 26

BAKER (Test) ...................................... 13

Baldwin, Hanson ................................ 146

Ballistic Missile Defense Office

(BMDO) ...................................... 280

Ballistic Missile Office (BMO) .......... 264

BANJO (Operation).............................. 62

Baruch, Bernard M. .............................. 20

Baruch Plan .......................................... 19

Battlefield Information and

Targeting System (BITS) ............ 284

APPENDIX F

INDEX
450 APPENDIX F: INDEX

Berlin Airlift ......................................... 52

Bethe, Hans, Dr..................................... 25

Betts, Cyrus, Major General ............... 136

Bikini Atoll ........................................... 10

BLACKJACK (Simulator) ................. 265

Blandy, W.H., Vice Admiral ................. 13

Blue Ribbon Defense Panel

(BRDP) ....................................... 216

Booth, Robert H., Major General ....... 160

Bradbury, Norris E.................................. 8

Bradley, Omar, General ........................ 55

Braun, Wernher von, Dr. ..................... 133

BRAVO (Test) .....................................111

Brereton, Lewis H., Lieutenant

General .......................................... 13

Brezhnev, Leonid, Soviet Premier ...... 249

Brodie, Bernard, Dr. ............................... 1

Broken Arrow ..................................... 178

Brown, Charles F. ................................. 40

Brown, Harold, Secretary ................... 171

Bush, George H., President ................ 281

BUSTER (Operation) ........................... 80

C

C-47 (Aircraft) ...................................... 48

C-54 (Aircraft) .................................... 226

C-97 (Aircraft) ...................................... 34

Caldwell, Glynn G., Dr. ...................... 233

Camp Desert Rock, Nevada ................. 41

Camp Lejeune, N. Carolina .................. 87

Camp Mercury, Nevada ........................ 87

Camp Murphy, Nevada ......................... 30

Camp Pendleton, California ................. 87

Carpenter, Donald F., Secretary ............ 52

Carter, James E., President ................. 249

CASINO, (Test Facility) ..................... 240

CASTLE, (Operation) ........................ 101

Centers for Disease Control (CDC) .... 233

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ....... 57

Chernenko, Konstantin,

Soviet Premier ............................. 281

Cherry, William R., Dr. ......................... 31

CHICKENPOX (Operation) ................. 35

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ........ 29

Christmas Island ................................. 114

Christofilos, Nicholas C., Dr. ............. 136

Chrome Dome (Operation) ................. 200

Churchill, Winston, Prime Minister.... 114

Circular Error Probable (CEP) ........... 174

Clarkson, Percy W., Major General ...... 96

Clay, Lucius D., General ...................... 47

Clifford, Clark, Secretary ..................... 57

Clinton, William J., President ............. 270

Cohen, William S., Secretary ............. 323

Colby, Walter F., Dr. ............................. 57

Cold War ............................................... 48

Columbia University, New York ............ 6

Command, Control, and

Communications (C3) ................. 302

Commander in Chief (CINC) ............. 252

Commander in Chief, Pacific

(CINCPAC) ................................. 301

Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)......... 248

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT) ........................................ 301

Compton, K.T., Dr. ............................... 13

Congress, U.S. ........................................ 6

Conrad, Edward, Dr. ........................... 218

Conventional Forces in Europe

(CFE) .......................................... 299

Conventional Weapons Effects

(CWE) ......................................... 319

Cooper, Paul R., Sergeant ................... 232

Cooperative Threat Reduction

(CTR) .......................................... 298

Corman, James R., Master Sergeant ..... 31

Cornwall, John, Dr. ............................. 308

Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army .............. 2

Corpus Christi Bay ............................. 242
APPENDIX F: INDEX 451

Cost and Operational Effectiveness

Analysis (COEA) ........................ 224

Cotter, Donald .................................... 223

COWBOY (Operation) ......................... 62

CROSSROADS (Operation) ................ 10

Curtin, Gary L., Major General .......... 314

D

Daigo Fukurya Maru

(Japanese Trawler) ...................... 112

Daniel, Dan, Congressman ................. 250

Data Archival and Retrieval

Enhancement (DARE) ................ 318

Davis, Jay, Dr. ..................................... 323

Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona .............. 62

DECADE (Test Facility) .................... 304

Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA).......... 223

Defense Atomic Support Agency

(DASA) ....................................... 149

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ... 176

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) ........ 216

Defense Nuclear Weapons School

(DNWS) ...................................... 205

Defense Science Board (DSB) ........... 308

Defense Special Weapons Agency

(DSWA) ...................................... 314

Defense Systems Acquisition Review

Council (DSARC) ....................... 259

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(DTRA) ....................................... 322

DeLauer, Richard, Under Secretary ... 267

Department of Defense ......................... 55

Department of Defense

Instruction (DoDI) ..................... 259

Department of Defense Nuclear

Information Analysis Center

(DASIAC) ................................... 184

Department of Energy (DOE) ............ 216

Department of the Interior (DOI) ....... 227

Deputy Director Science and

Technology (DDST) .................... 181

Desert Storm (Operation) ................... 295

Deutch, John, Secretary ...................... 267

Dewey, Bradley, Dr. .............................. 13

Director, Defense Research and

Engineering (DDR&E) ............... 179

DISTANT LIGHT Program ................ 266

Division of Military Application .......... 40

DoD Damage Assessment Center

(DODDAC) ................................. 157

DOG (Shot) .......................................... 80

Doll, Edward B., Dr. ........................... 134

DOMINIC (Operation) ....................... 161

Donnelly, Harold C., Major

General ........................................ 160

Dorland, Gilbert M., Colonel ................. 2

dri-Enewetak....................................... 226

dri-Engebi ........................................... 226

Dukakis, Michael, Governor .............. 287

Dulles, John F., Secretary ..................... 98

Dunn, Caroll H., Lieutenant

General ........................................ 228

E

Early, Stephen T., Secretary .................. 76

EASTWIND (Operation)...................... 65

Eglin AFB, Florida ............................... 70

Eisenhower, Dwight D., General ............ 9

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President ........ 95

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) ............ 137

Electronics Radiation Response

Information Center (ERRIC) ...... 320

Enewetak Atoll ..................................... 58

Engineer Research and Development

Laboratory (ERDL ........................ 69

Enjebi Island ......................................... 59

Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) ............................. 225

F

Farrell, Major General .......................... 13

Fat Man (Weapon) ................................ 12
452 APPENDIX F: INDEX

Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) ......................... 271

Fermi, Enrico, Dr. ................................. 25

Ferraro, Geraldine............................... 281

Field Command (FC) ............................ 79

Fields, Kenneth E., General .................. 95

FISHBOWL (Operation) .................... 161

Flash X-Ray (FXR) ............................ 192

Fletcher, James, Administrator ........... 276

FLINTLOCK (Operation) .................. 191

Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) ...... 223

Ford, Gerald R., President .................. 251

Former Soviet Union (FSU) ............... 298

Forrestal, James V., Secretary ............... 13

Fort Belvoir, Virginia ............................ 17

Fort Hood, Texas .................................. 62

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey ................ 30

Fort Polk, Louisiana ........................... 285

FRIGATE BIRD (Test) ....................... 161

Froehlich, Alexander J., Colonel .......... 22

Fubini, Eugene, Dr. ............................. 180

Fuchs, Klaus, Dr. .................................. 73

G

Gagarin, Yuri ...................................... 159

Gates, Thomas, Secretary ................... 156

Gaulle, Charles de, French

President ...................................... 157

Gavin, James M., General .................. 122

Gilinsky, Victor, Dr. ............................ 312

Gill, Henry, Dr. ................................... 237

Gilpatric, Roswell, Secretary .............. 180

Glasstone, Samuel, Dr. ......................... 72

Goldwater, Barry, Senator .................. 174

Gorbachev, Mikhail, Soviet

Premier ........................................ 281

GRAPPLE (Operation) ....................... 114

Graves, Alvin C., Dr. ............................ 68

Great Britain, United Kingdom ............ 47

GREENHOUSE (Operation) ................ 76

Griffith, Harry A., Lieutenant

General ........................................ 258

Gromyko, Andrei, Premier ................... 48

Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

(GLCM) ...................................... 224

Groves, Leslie R., Major General ........... 1

Gruenther, Albert M., General .............. 55

Guest, W.S., Rear Admiral.................. 201

H

Haas, Peter .......................................... 218

Hagemann, Kenneth, Major

General ........................................ 297

Hailsham, Lord, British

Representative ............................. 164

Hamre, John, Secretary....................... 323

Handy, Thomas T., General .................... 9

Hanford Facility, Washington ................. 2

Hardened Mobile Launcher (HML) ... 264

HARDTACK (Operation)................... 135

HARDTACK II (Operation) ............... 155

Harrison, R.H., Brigadier General ...... 147

Harry Diamond Laboratory ................ 239

Hartgering, James B., Dr. ..................... 86

Hasbrouck, Sherman V., Colonel .......... 17

Hickam AFB, Hawaii ......................... 163

High Explosive Assemblies .................. 24

High Performance Computing ............ 318

High-Altitude Electromagnetic

Pulse (HEMP) ............................. 280

High-Altitude Sampling Program

(HASP) ........................................ 142

Hill, Tom B., Admiral ........................... 71

Hillenkoeter, Roscoe H., Director ........ 73

Hiroshima, Japan .................................... 1

Hitler, Adolph ....................................... 19

HMS Plym........................................... 114

Hoffman, Fred, Dr. ............................. 276

Holloway, David, Dr. ............................ 53
APPENDIX F: INDEX 453

Hoover, M., Vice Admiral .................... 13

Horizontal Line of Site (HLOS) ......... 189

Horwitz, Solis, Dr. .............................. 180

HURRICANE (Operation) ................. 114

Hutchinson, Howard B., Captain .......... 66

I

Information Analysis Center (IAC) .... 319

Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile (ICBM) ........................... 131

Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) .... 282

ITEM (Test) .......................................... 77

IVY (Operation) ................................... 89

J

James, Jack, Colonel........................... 103

JANGLE (Operation) ........................... 80

Jenkins, Bruce, Judge ......................... 237

Johnson, Louis A., Secretary ................ 73

Johnson, Lyndon B., President ........... 172

Johnson, Warren, Lieutenant

General ........................................ 224

Johnston Atoll (Island), S. Pacific ...... 139

Joint Atomic Information

Exchange Group (JAIEG) ........... 147

Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation

Board ............................................. 13

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) .................... 13

Joint Nuclear Accident

Coordinating Center (JNACC) ... 184

Joint Strategic Target Planning

Staff (JSTPS) .............................. 157

Joint Task Force (JTF) .......................... 13

K

KC-135 (Aircraft) ............................... 200

Keesler AFB, Mississippi ..................... 70

Kennedy, John F., President ................ 160

Keyes, Roger M., Secretary ................ 103

Khrushchev, Nikita, Soviet Premier ..... 48

Killian, James R., Jr. ........................... 113

Kiloton (KT) ......................................... 84

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico ................. 49

Kirtland Field, New Mexico ................... 7

Kissinger, Henry, Dr. .......................... 135

Kitral (Compound) ............................. 296

Kosygin, Alexis, Soviet Premier ........ 175

L

La Carlotta .......................................... 225

LaGuardia, Fiorello ................................ 3

Laird, Melvin, Secretary ..................... 178

Lampert, James B., Colonel ................. 21

Large Blast-Thermal Simulator

(LB/TS) ....................................... 259

Lawrence, Ernest O., Dr. .................... 101

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL) ..................... 101

LeBaron, Robert ................................... 76

LeMay, Curtis E., Lieutenant

General .......................................... 48

Lewis, John, Dr. .................................. 194

Lilienthal, David E., Dr. ....................... 19

Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) ........ 164

Line-of-Sight (LOS) ........................... 191

Little Boy (Weapon) ............................. 25

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador...... 114

Loper, Herbert B., Brigadier

General .......................................... 76

Los Alamos National Laboratory

(LANL) ....................................... 279

Los Alamos, New Mexico ...................... 2

Lovett, Robert A., Secretary ................. 56

Luedecke, Alvin R., Brigadier

General .......................................... 86

M

Macmillan, Harold, Prime Minister.... 161

Malenkov, Goergi M., Soviet

Premier ........................................ 107
454 APPENDIX F: INDEX

Manhattan Engineer District (MED) ...... 1

Manhattan Project ................................... 1

Marshall Plan ........................................ 47

Martin, Charley................................... 238

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology (MIT) ........................... 2

May-Johnson Bill ................................. 38

McArthur, Douglas, General ................ 79

McCone, John ..................................... 154

McCormack, James .............................. 29

McCormick, Charles........................... 171

McElroy, Neil, Secretary .................... 147

McMahon Bill ...................................... 16

McMahon, Brien, Senator .................... 16

McMillan, William, Dr. ...................... 171

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary ........ 171

Midway-Class (Aircraft Carriers)......... 34

MIKE (Shot) ......................................... 95

Military Liaison Committee (MLC) ..... 17

Military Occupational Specialty

(MOS) ......................................... 205

Minuteman (Missile) .......................... 172

MIXED COMPANY (Operation) ....... 242

Mondale, Walter, Vice President ........ 281

Monroe, Robert, Vice Admiral ........... 218

Montague, Robert F., General .............. 50

Montgomery, Bernard, Field

Marshall ........................................ 38

Moore, Ivan M. ..................................... 31

Multiple Independently-Targeted

Reentry Vehicles (MIRV)............ 172

Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) ....... 172

Mustin, Lloyd M., Rear Admiral ........ 144

MX Program ....................................... 239

N

Nagasaki, Japan ...................................... 3

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) .............. 190

National Ignition Facility (NIF) ......... 307

National Security Act ........................... 37

National Security Agency (NSA) ....... 245

National Security Council (NSC) ......... 75

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) .... 132

Naval War College ................................ 52

Neumann, John von, Dr. ..................... 133

Nevada Test Site (NTS) ........................ 78

Nichols, Kenneth D., Brigadier

General .......................................... 10

Nimitz, Chester W., Admiral ................ 30

Nixon, Richard M., President ............. 202

Norstad, Lauris, General....................... 63

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) ....................................... 160

Northrop, John A., Dr. ........................ 194

NOUGAT (Operation) ........................ 159

Nuclear, Chemical and

Biological (NCB) ........................ 298

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) .......... 296

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) .................... 216

Nuclear Targeting Review (NTR) ...... 258

Nuclear Test Personnel

Review (NTPR) .......................... 232

Nuclear Weapon Effect (NWE) .......... 238

Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) ..... 283

Nunn, Sam, Senator ............................ 222

NUTMEG (Operation) ......................... 63

O

Oak Ridge, Tennessee............................. 2

Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) ............................ 285

Office of Scientific Research and

Development ................................... 6

Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) ............................ 223

Offsite, R.A., Rear Admiral .................. 13

Ogle, William E., Dr. .......................... 133

On-Site Inspection Agency

(OSIA) ........................................ 285
APPENDIX F: INDEX 455

Oppenheimer, J. Robert, Dr. ................... 1

Ord, John A., Colonel ........................... 22

Oxnard Field (Sandia), New

Mexico ............................................ 2

P

Pacific Enewetak Atoll Cratering

Experiments (PEACE) ................ 263

Pacific Ocean Division ....................... 228

Pacific Proving Ground (PPG) ............111

Packard, David, Secretary .................. 216

Palmer House........................................ 62

Palomares, Spain ................................ 200

Parker, Edward N., Rear Admiral ....... 125

Parker, John T., Vice Admiral ............. 287

Parsons, William S. (Deke),

Admiral ......................................... 18

Patterson, Robert P., Secretary ............... 9

Patton, George, General ....................... 38

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii ............................ 11

Perle, Richard, Under Secretary ......... 260

Permanent High Explosives

Test Site (PHETS) ....................... 304

Permissive Action Link (PAL) ........... 199

Permissive Action Links (PALs) ........ 198

Perry, William, Secretary .................... 301

Petersburg, Virginia .............................. 84

Pickitt, John L., Lieutenant

General ........................................ 270

Pike, Sumner T., Secretary ................... 39

PITHON (Test Facility) ...................... 265

PLUMBBOB (Operation) .................. 123

Polaris (Missile).................................. 138

Powell, Colin, General ....................... 295

Powers, Francis G. .............................. 158

Project Candor .................................... 109

Project Carryall ................................... 151

Project Plowshare ............................... 150

Project Willow .................................... 155

Q

Quarles, Donald A., Secretary ............ 136

Quesada, Elwood R., General............... 76

R

Rabi, Isador I., Dr. ................................ 75

Rainer Mesa, Nevada.......................... 195

RAND Corporation ............................ 171

RANGER (Operation) .......................... 78

RB-57D (Aircraft) .............................. 124

Reagan, Ronald, President .................. 257

Reconstruction Finance

Corporation ..................................... 2

REDWING (Operation)...................... 115

Reentry Vehicle (RV) .......................... 172

Reis, Victor, Secretary ........................ 308

Reserve Officer Training Corps

(ROTC) ......................................... 22

Rio Grande River, Texas ......................... 2

ROLLER COASTER (Operation) ...... 203

Royall, Kenneth C., Secretary .............. 38

Rusk, Dean, Secretary ........................ 177

S

Sagan, Carl, Dr. .................................. 273

Sandia Base, New Mexico ...................... 2

SANDSTONE (Operation) ................... 50

Sapwood (Missile) .............................. 131

Saxer, Richard K., Lieutenant

General ........................................ 267

Schweitzer, Albert, Dr. ....................... 114

Scientific Advisory Group

on Effects (SAGE) ...................... 182

Scoville, Herbert, Jr. ............................. 99

Scowcroft, Brent, Lieutenant

General ........................................ 263

Seaborg, Glenn T., Dr. ........................ 151

Shalikashvili, John, General ............... 304

Shelton, Frank H., Dr. ......................... 103
456 APPENDIX F: INDEX

Short Range Attack Missile-II

(SRAM-II) .................................. 296

Shute, Nevil ........................................ 134

Silo Test Program (STP) ..................... 264

Single Integrated Operability

Plan (SIOP) ................................. 173

Smith, Harold P., Dr., Secretary.......... 298

SMOKY (Shot) ................................... 232

Smyth, Henry ........................................ 76

Snapp, Roy B., Secretary ...................... 98

SNOWBALL (Operation) .................. 190

Sorensen, Theodore ............................ 159

Spartan (Missile) ................................ 210

Sputnik (Satellite) ............................... 131

Stalin, Joseph, Soviet Premier .............. 48

Starbird, Alfred D., Major General ..... 161

Stevens, Ted, Senator.......................... 308

Stevenson, Adlai, Senator ................... 122

Stilwell, J.W., General .......................... 13

Stimson, Henry L., Secretary ................. 3

Stockpile (Nuclear) ............................... 69

Stranathan, Leland S.,

Brigadier General ........................ 102

Strategic Air Command (SAC) ............. 53

Strategic Arms Limitation

Treaty (SALT) ............................. 249

Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks (START) ............................ 177

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ...... 258

Strategic Defense Initiative

Office (SDIO) ............................. 277

Strauss, Lewis L., Admiral ................... 28

Stromberg, LaWayne R., Colonel ....... 233

Submarine-Launched Ballistic

Missile (SLBM) .......................... 162

Sullivan, John L., Secretary .................. 55

Supreme Allied Commander

Europe (SACEUR)...................... 219

Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe (SHAPE) ............ 284

SWORDFISH (Test) ........................... 161

Symington, W. Stuart, Secretary........... 51

System-Generated Electromagnetic

Pulse (SGEMP) ........................... 266

T

Taiki Maru (Japanese Trawler) ........... 225

Taylor, Theodore, Dr. .......................... 184

TEAPOT (Operation) ......................... 115

Technical Training Group (TTG) ......... 25

Teller, Edward, Dr................................. 25

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) ....... 19

Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) ........... 224

Threat Reduction Advisory

Committee (TRAC) .................... 323

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

(TTBT) ........................................ 249

Thule, Greenland ................................ 201

Transient Radiation Effects on

Electronics (TREE) ..................... 190

Trapnell, Frederick M.,

Rear Admiral ............................... 102

Trident (Missile) ................................. 172

Trinitrotoluene (TNT) ........................... 13

Trinity (Test Site) .................................... 7

Trinity (Test) ........................................... 3

Truman, Harry S., President ................... 3

Trust Territory of the

Pacific Islands (TTPI) ................. 226

Tsarapkin, Semyon,

Soviet Ambassador...................... 155

TUMBLER-SNAPPER

(Operation) .................................... 86

Tyler, Carroll L. .................................... 68

Tyler-Montague Agreement .................. 68

U

Udall, Stewart, Secretary .................... 225

Ulam, Stanislaw M., Dr. ....................... 77

Ullrich, George W., Dr. ....................... 297
APPENDIX F: INDEX 457

Underground Test (UGT) ................... 155

United Nations (UN) .......................... 123

United Nations Special

Commission (UNSCOM) ........... 299

United States (US) ................................ 12

United States Geological

Service (USGS) ........................... 262

University of California at

Berkeley .......................................... 7

University of Washington ..................... 10

UNLIMITED (Operation) .................... 65

UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE

(Operation) .................................. 100

USS Belle Grove ................................. 226

USS Boxer........................................... 140

USS Cushing ....................................... 125

USS Ethan Allen ................................. 162

USS Missouri ........................................ 71

USS Norton Sound .............................. 144

USS Parrott......................................... 125

USS Petrel........................................... 201

USS Tarawa ........................................ 145

V

Vance, Cyrus, Secretary ...................... 181

Vandenberg AFB, California .............. 263

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Senator ........... 16

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., General .............. 16

Vertical Line of Site (VLOS) .............. 189

Veterans’ Administration (VA) ........... 232

Vittles (Operation) ................................ 48

Vulcanus (Ship) .................................. 225

W

Wadsworth, James, Ambassador ........ 155

Walker AFB, New Mexico ................... 62

Wallace, Henry A. ................................. 20

Wallace, William, Captain .................. 146

Walske, Carl, Asst. Secretary.............. 199

War Department ...................................... 3

Watson, Gerald, Major General .......... 295

Waymach, William W. .......................... 28

Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) .................... 295

Weapons Orientation-Advanced

(WOA) ........................................ 204

Weapons Security and Survivability

System (WS3) ............................. 260

Webster, William .................................. 57

Weinberger, Caspar, Secretary ............ 257

Wendover Field, Utah ........................... 49

West Berlin, Germany .......................... 48

Wheeler, Earl, General ....................... 189

WHIPPOORWILL (Operation) ............ 64

White, John P., Secretary .................... 233

White Sands Missile Range

(WSMR), New Mexico ............... 175

WIGWAM (Operation) ...................... 116

Wikner, Fred, Dr. ................................ 171

Wilhoyt, Ellis E., Lieutenant

Colonel .......................................... 29

Williams, Franklin H.,

Ambassador ................................ 228

Wilson, Bob, Congressman ................ 250

Wilson, Carroll L., Dr. .......................... 26

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary ............... 98

Wilson, Delmar E., General ................ 200

WINDSTORM (Operation) .................. 84

X

X-RAY (Event) ..................................... 59

Y

Y-12 (Plant) ............................................ 6

Yeltsin , Boris, Soviet Premier ........... 294

YOKE (Test) ......................................... 59

York, Herbert F., Dr. ........................... 146
458 APPENDIX F: INDEX

Z

Z-Division (Sandia Base) ..................... 12

Zacharias, Jerrold R. ............................. 12

ZEBRA (Test) ....................................... 59