* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

September 23, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk In the United States Court of Appeals

For the Fifth Circuit

_________________________

No. 03-40160

Summary Calendar

_________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON,

also known as Wayne Green,

Defendant - Appellant.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:99-CR-2-1

_________________________

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

William Henry Harrison appeals his conviction and sentence for

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and

marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He argues

that 1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence, 2) the indictment was insufficient and the evidence

introduced at trial was insufficient, 3) the district court lacked1 See United States v. Brigham

, N o. 02-40719, 2004 WL 1854552

at *4-*6 (5th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-40719)(en banc); United States v.

Shabazz , 993 F.2d 431, 435-39 (5th Cir. 1993).

2 See United States v. Threadgill

, 172 F.3d 357, 373 (5th Cir.

1999).

2 jurisdiction, 4) the district court abu sed its discretion in

ordering that he be committed for a menta l competency evaluation

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, 5) the district court erred in

denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for a speedy trial

violation, 6) the district court erred in denying his postconviction motions, and 7) the sentence was erroneous.

The district court did not err in denying Harrison’s motion to

suppress evidence. The vehicle in which Harrison was a passenger

was stopped after he was observed ridi ng without a seat belt in

violation of state law, and the scope and duration of the stop were

reasonably related to the circumstances that justified it.

Furthermore, the search of the vehicle that ultimately revealed the

presence of illegal drugs was made pursuant to the arresting

officer’s receipt of Harrison’s voluntary consent. 1

Harrison’s indict ment was sufficient. It alleged each

essential element of both conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute

under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) so as to enable Harrison to prepare his

defense and invoke the doub le jeopardy clause in any subsequent

proceeding. 2 The indictment conformed, at the very least, to3 United States v. Paul

, 142 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1998)

(“[A]n agreement may be inferred from a concert of a ction,

voluntary participation may be inferred from a collocation of

circumstances, and knowledge may be inferred from the surrounding

circumstances.”).

4 See United States v. Romero-Cruz

, 201 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir.

2000); Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).

5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (“The district courts of the United

States shall have jurisdiction, exclusive of the Courts of the

States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”);

United States v. Madkins

, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994)

(argument that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes

committed in sovereign state of Texas is frivolous).

3 minimal constitutional standards.

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support

H arrison’s convictions on both counts of the indictment. The

prosecution presented Harrison’s own statement that he had agreed

to drive a car from Philadelphia to Hou ston and back in exchange

for a large sum of money. In addition, the jury could infer

Harrison’s involvement in a conspiracy based upon the substantial

circumstantial evidence of his participation therein presented at

trial. 3 Furthermore, the verdict was supported by evidence as to

the amount of drugs found in Harrison’s possession, and his

knowledge of the presence of drugs in his vehicle. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes

charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 4

Harrison’s arguments that the district court lacked

jurisdiction are frivolous. 5 Likewise, his contentions that the6 See United States v. Crosby

, 713 F.2d 1066, 1078 (5th Cir.

1983) (“[I]t is clear that an order for a second psychiatric

examination is a matter wholly within the discretion of the trial

court.”).

7 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

8 Id. § 3161(h)(1)(A).

4 district court abused its discretion in ordering that he be

committed for further mental evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

4241(d) are without merit. 6

The district court did not err in denying Harrison’s motion to

dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. The Act

provides that a defendant must be t ried within 70 days from the

filing of indictment or date he appears, whichever occurs last. 7

However, the Act excludes from this 70-day period any period of

delay resulting from, inter alia

, examina tions to determine the

mental competency of the defendant. 8 Harrison was indicted on

January 5, 1999. Beginning on January 7, 1999, Harrison underwent

multiple evaluation s in an effort to establish his competency to

stand trial. He was finally adjudicated competent on April 16,

2002, and was tried on June 3, 2002. By properly excluding the

lengthy period during which Harrison was subject to mental

competency evaluations, the district court correctly found that the

70-day requirement of the Speedy Trial Act was satisfied.

Harrison’s contention that the district court erred in denying

his numerous post-conviction moti ons is likewise without merit.

Harrison’s arguments on this score are largely cumulative, with the9 See United States v. Dixon

, 132 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 1997)

(a break in the chain of custody affects the weight of the evidence

rath er than the admissibility of the evidence); U nited States v.

Haese

, 162 F.3d 359, 364 (5t h Cir. 1998) (district court’s

evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and

reversed only if a party’s substantial rights are affected).

10 See United States v. Greer

, 158 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 1998)

(feigning incompetency may constitute waste of judicial resources

and obstruction of justice for purpose of t wo-level increase in

offense level under sentencing guidelines).

5 exception of his claim that the drugs seized from his vehicle

should not ha ve been admitted at trial because the government

failed to produce chain of custody documentation. On this count,

Harrison has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on the

part of the trial court in admitting this evidence, or any

resulting impairment of his substantial rights. 9

Finally, the district court properly applied the United States

Sentencing Guidel ines in formulating Harrison’s sentence. The

court did not err in finding that Harr ison willfully obstructed

justice by feignin g incompetence in order to avoid trial. 1 0 In

addition, the court correctly included three crimina l history

points in Harrison’s score for his 1981 c onviction for criminal

possession of a forged instrument when the resulting incarceration

extended in to the fifteen year period preceding the instant

offense.

In addition to raising th e seven points of error discussed

above, Harrison has filed a motion to file a reply brief in excess

pages, arguing that he needs an additional space to fully address11 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).

12 United States v. Pineiro

, 377 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2004).

6 sentencing issues raised by Blakely v. Washington

. 11 Because this

court has held that B lakely does not apply to the United Stat e s

Sentencing Guidelines, 12 Harrison’s motion to file a reply brief in

excess pages is DENIED AS UNNECESSARY. Finally, Harrison has filed

a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for

release pending appeal. This motion is DENIED.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and

appellant’s motions are DENIED.