[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-13907

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:17-cv-60871-EGT

BRANDON THOMPSON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

TARGET CORPORATION, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(June 24, 2021)

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Plaintiff-Appellant Brandon Thompson appeals a district court’s order 

denying his motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), and 

seeking remand and fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The order granted DefendantAppellee Target Corporation’s (Target) motion to enforce a settlement agreement

entered into between the parties, which Thompson alleged his attorney was not 

authorized to enter on his behalf. Because we write for the parties, we assume 

familiarity with the facts and set out only those necessary for the resolution of this 

appeal. 

In March of 2017, Thompson filed a one-count complaint in Florida state 

court against Target, after he was fired from his job as a Target cashier in January 

of 2017. He alleged that Target retaliated against him and violated the Florida 

Whistleblower Act (FWA), Fla. Stat. § 448.102, et. seq. Target removed the case 

to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and the 

parties participated in a settlement conference conducted by a magistrate judge. 

Target made several offers to settle the case. Eventually, Thompson’s counsel left 

the settlement conference to discuss the final offer with Thompson and, since

Thompson was a minor at the time, his parents. Thompson’s counsel returned and 

accepted Target’s offer. After the attorneys notified the magistrate judge of the 

agreement, an order was entered approving the settlement. 

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Not long after the settlement was finalized, Thompson claimed that he had 

not consented to the settlement. He fired his lawyer and retained new counsel. His

new attorney filed a motion for dismissal without prejudice in accordance with 

Thompson’s position that he never authorized the settlement. Target filed a motion 

to enforce the settlement. The district court held an evidentiary hearing to discern 

whether the settlement was enforceable. On December 23, 2017, the district court 

granted Target’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Thompson claims he 

did not receive notice of this order until September 25, 2018, when the clerk’s 

office emailed a copy of it to the parties. Thompson appealed this order on 

October 24, 2018, but we dismissed that appeal for failure to litigate. Six months 

later, on August 1, 2019, the district court closed the case. And about a year after 

that, on August 6, 2020, Thompson filed a motion asking the court to reopen the

case so that it could remand the matter to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) or 

otherwise set aside the order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). The district court denied Thompson’s 

motion, and he now appeals. 

I.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of both a motion to remand and a 

motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(4). Conn. State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health 

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Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337,1343 (11th Cir. 2009) (motion for remand); Burke v. 

Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001) (Rule 60(b)(4) motion).

II.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction—we can “hear only those 

cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the 

Constitution, and which have been entrusted to [us] by a jurisdictional grant 

authorized by Congress.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 

409 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation mark omitted). Congress has conferred 

federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction when (1) there is diversity of 

citizenship between parties to a suit and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. If a plaintiff brings a case in state court that satisfies 

these diversity jurisdiction requirements, the defendant can remove that action “to 

the district court of the United States for the district . . . embracing the place where 

such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

Because subject matter jurisdiction is constitutional and statutory in nature, 

we can always consider if we lack jurisdiction even if no party raises the issue. 

Amer. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d at 410. And generally a party can challenge a 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction “at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and 

the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). When 

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a party does challenge a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, however, it must 

comply with relevant statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thompson 

contends that because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this 

case, we must either: (1) remand the case to state court under § 1447(c), or (2) find

that the district court’s enforcement order was void under Rule 60(b)(4). We 

address Thompson’s arguments in turn. 

To address the first argument, a district court should remand a case to state 

court under § 1447(c) if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and “[a]n order 

remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, 

including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” However, § 1447(c) 

applies only “before a final judgment” is entered. Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 58(c)(2)(B) a judgment is final when the court enters a judgment in a 

separate document in the civil docket or “150 days have run from the entry in the 

civil docket.” Here, the district court entered a final judgment on May 21, 2018—

150 days after it granted Target’s motion to enforce the settlement. Thompson did 

not file a motion for remand until August 6, 2020, nearly two years after the final 

judgment. And even assuming the judgment was tolled and not entered until 150 

days after Thompson received notice of the enforcement order (February 22, 2019)

or the court closed the case (December 29, 2019), Thompson’s motion for remand 

was not timely. Because Thompson did not file a motion for remand before a final 

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judgment was entered in this case, § 1447(c) is not the proper avenue for 

challenging subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore reject Thompson’s motion 

for remand and claim that he is entitled to fees under § 1447(c). 

Moving to Thompson’s second argument, under Rule 60(b)(4), a “court may 

relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [if] . . . the judgment 

is void.” When a court renders a judgment without subject matter jurisdiction, then 

that judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4). Oakes v. Horizon Fin. S.A., 259 F.3d 

1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Rule 60(b) motions generally “must be 

made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). But Rule 60(b)(4) motions 

that involve jurisdictional challenges are “not constrained by [this] reasonableness” 

requirement, because parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction. Hertz Corp. 

v. Alamo, Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1994). 

“Federal courts considering Rule 60(b)(4) motions that assert a judgment is 

void because of a jurisdictional defect generally have reserved relief only for the 

exceptional case in which the court that rendered judgment lacked even an 

‘arguable basis’ for jurisdiction.” United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 

260, 271 (2010); see also Oakes, 259 F.3d at 1319–20 (“[I]t is well-settled that a 

mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction does not support relief under Rule 

60(b)(4).”). 

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Thompson argues that there was no diversity jurisdiction because the 

amount in controversy in this case could never have exceeded $75,000,

1 but he 

fails to demonstrate that the district court lacked even an “arguable basis” for 

jurisdiction. See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271. When Thompson brought his FWA 

claim he sought actual damages, compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees. 

Thompson’s estimated annual income at the time Target terminated him was 

$20,000 a year. This annual income could serve as a measure for Thompson’s lost 

wages in the year proceeding his termination. See Fla. Stat. § 448.103(2)(d) 

(allowing parties suing under the FWA to recover “lost wages, benefits, and other 

remuneration”). In addition, Thompson sought numerous other damages including 

“medical benefits, [] other employment benefits,” and “reasonable attorney’s fees, 

expert fees, and costs.” Thompson also asked for compensatory and consequential 

damages, which the FWA allows without limitation. Aery v. Wallace LincolnMercury, LLC, 118 So. 3d 904, 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“The plain and 

unambiguous language of section 448.103(2)(e) authorizes the court to award 

1 Thompson also argues that he never had standing to bring this claim and therefore the district 

court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. To have standing, a 

“plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Thompson met these requirements—he 

was injured when Target fired him, this injury was caused by Thompson’s objection to Target’s 

alleged illegal action, and Thompson would be redressed by receiving damages under the FWA. 

We are therefore unpersuaded by Thompson’s argument that he never had standing to bring this 

claim. 

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compensatory damages without limitation to mere economic damages.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Considering together all of Thompson’s claims for 

damages, the district court maintained an “arguable basis” for finding diversity 

jurisdiction existed. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271. Therefore, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of Thompson’s motion under Rule 60(b)(4). 

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the district court. 

AFFIRMED. 

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