alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

             CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRESIDENT

                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, Harold  Blomquist,  certify,  pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as
adopted  pursuant to Section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that the
Quarterly  Report of Simtek  Corporation  on Form 10-Q for the quarterly  period
ended March 31, 2006 fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 and that information  contained in
such  Form  10-Q  fairly  presents,  in all  material  respects,  the  financial
condition and results of operations of Simtek Corporation.



/s/Harold Blomquist
-------------------------------------
Harold Blomquist
Chief Executive Officer and President

May 15, 2006
No. 11-10278.

#### Perry *v.*Texas.

Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-rari denied.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, J r. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk October 21, 2009

1014 

# Order

October 21, 2009

139224

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 139224 COA: 291052 Oakland CC: 2006-206416-FH SULLIVAN HOWARD GREEN, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to ap peal the May 14, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

K ELLY 

### , C.J., and C AVANAGH 

### , J., would grant leave to appeal.
#### Zebedee MILBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTRAR, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-2234

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: February 15, 2018

Decided: February 16, 2018

Zebedee Milby, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Zebedee Milby seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his complaint without prejudice. Before addressing the merits of Milby’s appeal, we first must be assured that we have jurisdiction. *Porter*u *Zook,*803 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2015). We may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The district court determined that Milby failed to allege any facts upon which the court could conclude that Milby had standing to raise his claim. Be*176cause Milby might be able to cure this defect by filing an amendment to the complaint, we conclude that the order Milby seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order. *See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc.,*807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2016); *Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392,*10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Milby to amend his complaint. *Goode,*807 F.3d at 630. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED AND REMANDED*
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 33 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 33

  Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
limit the terms of office for Representatives and Senators in Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 21, 1997

   Mrs. Fowler introduced the following joint resolution; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
  Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
limit the terms of office for Representatives and Senators in Congress.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article --

    ``No person may serve more than four consecutive terms as 
Representative or two consecutive terms as Senator, not counting any 
term that began before the adoption of this article of amendment.''.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



Exhibit 31.1
 Certification of Principal Executive Officer
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this amended quarterly report on Form 10-Q of The Immune Response
Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respect the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
 (a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent functions):
 (a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely
to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and(b)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.
  /s/ Joseph F. ONeillJoseph F. ONeillChief Executive Officer
Submitted September 28;

compensatory fine vacated; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed November 2, 2016

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Plaintiff-Respondent, v.*PATRICK GARY HIGGINS, aka Elmer Douglas Chobo, *Defendant-Appellant.*

Deschutes County Circuit Court

10FE0011AB; A158720

383 P3d 1003

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Eric Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the opening brief for respondent. Patrick Higgins filed a supplemental brief *pro se.*

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Duncan, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Garrett, Judge.

*67PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, assigning error to the trial court’s imposition of an upward departure sentence and a $2,000 compensatory fine. We reject defendant’s challenge to the upward departure sentence without written discussion, and we write only to address his challenge to the compensatory fine. Defendant argues, and the state concedes, that the record is insufficient to support the compensatory fine, which was imposed over defendant’s objection. We agree. *See State v. Kennedy,*227 Or App 281, 282, 205 P3d 65 (2009) (trial court lacked authority to impose a compensatory fine in the absence of evidence that the victim had sustained any pecuniary loss as a result of defendant’s offenses).

Compensatory fine vacated; remanded for resentenc-ing; otherwise affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CHILDREN'S COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES, INC. FOR THE NINE
MONTH PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           3,752
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   31,336
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,239
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                35,912
<PP&E>                                          58,366
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,494
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  97,636
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,187
<BONDS>                                         25,107
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            72
<OTHER-SE>                                      57,372
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    97,636
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                94,325
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                89,108
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,644
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,533
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,570
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,963
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,963
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .27


</TABLE>
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8537 

To direct the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to modify 

any caps on emergency EIDL advances to certain veterans service organizations, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 6, 2020 

Mr. GOLDEN (for himself and Mr. KELLY of Mississippi) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Small Business 

A BILL 

To direct the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to modify any caps on emergency EIDL advances 

to certain veterans service organizations, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. AMOUNT OF EMERGENCY EIDL ADVANCES FOR 

4 CERTAIN VETERANS SERVICE ORGANIZA5 TIONS. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Ad7 ministrator of the Small Business Administration shall en8 sure that a veterans service organization with not more 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8537 IH

1 than one employee that applies for an advance under sec2 tion 1110(e) of the CARES Act (15 U.S.C. 9005(e)) is 

3 not subject to a cap on such advance that is less than 

4 $5,000. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
State of California 

California Environmental Protection Agency 

AIR RESOURCES BOARD 

Supplement to the 

Final Statement of Reasons for Rulemaking 

AMENDMENTS TO THE STATEWIDE PORTABLE EQUIPMENT REGISTRATION 

PROGRAM (PERP) REGULATION AND THE AIRBORNE TOXIC CONTROL 

MEASURE (ATCM) FOR DIESEL-FUELED PORTABLE ENGINES 

Public Hearing Date: March 22, 2007 

Agenda Item No.: 07-3-3 and 07-3-4 

 

This Supplement to the Final Statement of Reasons (FSOR) describes, and provides 

reasoning for the nonsubstantive changes that the Air Resources Board (ARB or Board) 

has made to the PERP Regulation and ATCM. All of these corrections were made in 

response to concerns raised by the Office of Administrative Law. The ARB is 

submitting this supplement to the FSOR for insertion in Office of Administrative Law 

(OAL) File Number 07-0731-06S. 

ARB has made some minor nonsubstantial changes for punctuation, grammar, and 

purposes of clarity. In addition, ARB provided a revised final regulation order with 

additional nonsubstantive changes for OAL to replace with the rulemaking package filed 

on July 31, 2007. The changes made do not materially alter any requirement, right 

responsibility, condition, prescription, or other regulatory element of any California Code 

of Regulations (CCR) provisions. These changes are set forth below. 

o § 2451 (c)(3), title 13, CCR ~ ARB originally noticed changes during the 

45 day Comment Period to this subsection. ARB decided to not to go 

forward with the original proposal and to revert back to the original 

language prior to the emergency amendments. The proposed change 

reflected an error in interpretation of the existing language. 

o § 2452, title 13, CCR ~ Non-substantive edits were made. Renumbered 

definition order to change the definitions to be listed in a number format 

as opposed to the current alpha format and italicized terms for Barclays 

publishing purposes in order to highlight the term in the CCR. 

o § 2462(a), title 13, CCR ~ Corrected grammar and title of section from 13 

to 17. 

o § 93116.2, title 17, CCR ~ Non-substantive edits were made. 

Renumbered definition order to change the definitions to be listed in a 
2

number format as opposed to the current alpha format and italicized terms 

for Barclays publishing purposes in order to highlight the term in the CCR. 

o § 93116.3, title 17, CCR ~ Made corrections to illustrations for consistency 

with the CCR. 

o § 93116.3.1 ~ This section was inadvertently missing from the original 

Final Regulation Order. ARB decided to strike “districts” from the 

regulation in order to have statewide uniformity and compliance.
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 194 (Friday, October 5, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61045-61046]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-24708]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 8053]

Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``China's Terracotta Warriors: The First Emperor's 
Legacy''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March

[[Page 61046]]

27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 
236-3 of August 28, 2000 (and, as appropriate, Delegation of Authority 
No. 257 of April 15, 2003), I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``China's Terracotta Warriors: The First 
Emperor's Legacy,'' imported from abroad for temporary exhibition 
within the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are 
imported pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owners or 
custodians. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the 
exhibit objects at The Minneapolis Institute of Arts in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota from on or about October 28, 2012, until on or about January 
20, 2013; at the Asian Art Museum in San Francisco, California from on 
or about February 22, 2013 until on or about May 27, 2013; and at 
possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in 
the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these 
Determinations be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Ona M. Hahs, Attorney-Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6473). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, SA-5, L/PD, 
Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: September 27, 2012.
J. Adam Ereli,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2012-24708 Filed 10-4-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Andres AGUIRRE, a/k/a Chris Rodriguez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-2047

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Filed January 30, 2018

(D.C. No. 2:13-CR-02459-RB-l) (D. New Mexico)

James Robert Wolfgang Braun, Office of the United States Attorney, District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Zachary Ives, Garcia Ives Nowara, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant-Appellant

Before MATHESON, McKAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge

Defendant-Appellant Christopher Andres Aguirre pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). The district court based Mr. Aguirre’s 110-month sentence in part on determining that Mr. Aguirre’s prior New Mexico conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery qualified as a crime of violence under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2(a).

Mr. Aguirre argues this determination was erroneous under this court’s decision in *United States v. Martinez-Cruz,*836 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2016). The Government agrees and posits that “[t]his Court should reverse Aguirre’s sentence and remand for resentencing.” Aplee. Br. at 6. We concur with the parties’ analysis of this issue.

In his reply brief, Mr. Aguirre agrees with the Government that this court need not review an argument that he raised in his opening brief — that his prior conviction for making a threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A) is a crime of violence, explaining that he would have the opportunity to present that argument at resentencing on remand. Reply Br. at 1.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Mr. Aguirre’s sentence and remand for resentencing. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1

The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-3464

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Raymond L. Clifton, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: July 6, 2009

Filed: July 22, 2009

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Raymond Clifton appeals the district court’s1

 judgment entered after a jury

found him guilty of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d);

brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court sentenced Clifton to a total of

480 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release, and he appeals. 
-2-

In a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Clifton first

challenges the admission of eyewitness identification evidence. We conclude that the

district court did not err in denying Clifton’s motion to suppress the evidence, because

the procedures used in obtaining the eyewitness identifications were not

impermissibly suggestive or unreliable. See United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 891

(8th Cir. 2008) (de novo review of denial of motion; witness’s identification of

defendant is admissible unless it is based upon pretrial confrontation between witness

and suspect that is both impermissibly suggestive and unreliable); United States v.

Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 2005). 

We also conclude that the district court did not commit clear error at sentencing

in denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Clifton’s defense included an

attempt to assert a justification defense, which was not tantamount to a constitutional

challenge unrelated to the issue of guilt. See United States v. Rivera-Ordaz, 554 F.3d

724, 726 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review; defendant must show he clearly

demonstrated acceptance of responsibility); cf. United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d

1053, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 2008) (decision by district court as to whether defendant has

accepted responsibility is largely factual question that turns on issues of credibility,

and reviewing court will reverse only if decision was clearly erroneous; reduction is

generally not appropriate if government goes through burden of proving its case at

trial, unless defendant was merely ascertaining viability of issue unrelated to guilt

such as constitutional challenge to statute).

Following our independent review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court. We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw on

condition that counsel inform appellant about the procedures for filing petitions for

rehearing and for certiorari; and we deny appellant’s request for a stay.

______________________________