2018 UT App 137

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRANDON CHRISTOPHER LAY,

Appellant,

v.

CORINNA NICOLE LAY,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20170230-CA

Filed July 12, 2018

Third District Court, West Jordan Department

The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck

No. 074400807

Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall, 

Attorneys for Appellant

J. Brady Kronmiller and Amy G. Larsen, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS

concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Brandon Christopher Lay and Corinna Nicole Lay, now 

Corinna Nicole Gustafson, divorced in 2008. The divorce decree 

awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of their 

minor daughter (Child). Gustafson was designated as Child’s 

primary physical caretaker, and Lay was granted six out of every 

fourteen overnights for parent-time. Around 2011, the parties 

informally agreed to a new parent-time schedule due to conflicts 

with Lay’s work schedule and Child’s need for more stability. 

Under their agreement, Lay would have Child only on 

alternating weekends, Friday night through Sunday night. 

Although Lay’s scheduling conflict was eventually resolved, the 
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20170230-CA 2 2018 UT App 137

parties continued to operate under the revised parent-time 

schedule for approximately five years.

¶2 In 2015, the parties—for different reasons—each asked the 

district court to modify the divorce decree. The district court 

ordered that the parent-time schedule originally established in 

the divorce decree be followed during the summer months. For 

the school year, the court ordered that Lay would have Child 

only on alternating weekends but that his parent-time “should 

be Friday and Saturday nights only, not Sunday nights, to better 

accommodate school attendance.”

¶3 Lay appeals, raising two main challenges. First, Lay 

contends that the district court misinterpreted the statute that 

provides for increased parent-time for the noncustodial parent 

and erred by not adopting the optional schedule described in 

that statute. Second, Lay contends that the district court 

exceeded its discretion and made legally inadequate findings 

regarding its decision to grant him “only alternating Friday and 

Saturday overnights during the school year instead of 

alternating Friday, Saturday, and Sunday overnights” and its 

decision to deny him midweek parent-time during the school 

year. We affirm with respect to Lay’s first contention, but

because we agree with Lay that the district court’s findings are 

inadequately detailed, we remand for further proceedings.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶4 We generally will not disturb the district court’s 

parent-time determination absent a showing that the court has 

abused its discretion. See Wight v. Wight, 2011 UT App 424, ¶ 23, 

268 P.3d 861. However, we review the district court’s 

interpretation of a statute for correctness. Id. Likewise, “we 

review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a 

question of law.” Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 15, 257 

P.3d 478 (quotation simplified); see also Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT 

App 161, ¶ 5, 353 P.3d 1262 (“We review the legal sufficiency of 
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20170230-CA 3 2018 UT App 137

factual findings—that is, whether the [district] court’s factual 

findings are sufficient to support its legal conclusions—under a 

correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference 

to the [district] court.” (quotation simplified)).

ANALYSIS

I. The Statutory Optional Parent-Time Schedule

¶5 Lay first contends that the district court misinterpreted 

Utah Code section 30-3-35.1, which sets forth an optional 

parent-time schedule that provides more parent-time for the 

noncustodial parent than the default minimum amount.

According to Lay, he satisfied his evidentiary burden under that 

statute, and the district court was therefore required to adopt that 

statute’s optional parent-time schedule.1

¶6 Each divorced parent “is entitled to and responsible for 

frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with the parent’s 

 

1. In the alternative, Lay contends that the court should have 

adopted the parent-time schedule under Utah Code section 

30-3-35.1 because it is in Child’s best interest. As we discuss 

below, infra ¶¶ 26–28, the court’s findings are not adequately 

detailed to permit meaningful appellate review. It is therefore 

premature for us to consider a challenge to the district court’s 

assessment of Child’s best interest.

Lay also alternatively contends that the district court’s 

factual findings related to section 30-3-35.1 are “wholly 

insufficient” and provide “no explanation” for its decision not to 

implement the schedule under that section. While we observe 

that district courts “are not required . . . to discuss all aspects of a 

case that might support a contrary ruling,” Shuman v. Shuman, 

2017 UT App 192, ¶ 6, 406 P.3d 258, because we are remanding 

this case for the entry of more detailed findings, we need not 

consider this argument further.
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20170230-CA 4 2018 UT App 137

child consistent with the child’s best interests.” Utah Code Ann. 

§ 30-3-32(2)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). To that end, Utah 

Code section 30-3-35 sets a default minimum parent-time 

schedule “to which the noncustodial parent and the child [who 

is between five and eighteen years old] shall be entitled,” id.

§ 30-3-35(2), unless “the court determines that Section 30-3-35.1 

should apply” or a parent can establish “that more or less 

parent-time should be awarded,” id. § 30-3-34(2). Under the 

default minimum schedule in section 30-3-35, the noncustodial 

parent is entitled to parent-time with the child during one 

weekday evening and on alternating weekends, which include 

Friday and Saturday overnights. See id. § 30-3-35(2)(a)(i), (2)(b)(i).

¶7 The Utah Code also provides an alternative statutory

parent-time schedule for children between five and eighteen 

years old. Enacted in 2015, Utah Code section 30-3-35.1 describes 

an “optional” increased parent-time schedule. Id. § 30-3-35.1.

Under this schedule, the noncustodial parent has parent-time for 

one weekday overnight and, on alternating weekends, three 

overnights (Friday through Sunday nights), resulting in the 

noncustodial parent having approximately 145 overnights with 

the child during a calendar year. Id. § 30-3-35.1(1), (6).

¶8 The statute directs that “[t]he parents and the court may 

consider” the increased parent-time schedule under section 

30-3-35.1 “as a minimum” in two circumstances: when “the 

parties agree,” or when “the noncustodial parent can 

demonstrate” the existence of certain factors. Id. § 30-3-35.1(2) 

(emphasis added). Those factors are:

(a) the noncustodial parent has been actively 

involved in the child’s life;

(b) the parties are able to communicate effectively 

regarding the child, or the noncustodial parent has 

a plan to accomplish effective communications 

regarding the child;
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20170230-CA 5 2018 UT App 137

(c) the noncustodial parent has the ability to 

facilitate the increased parent-time;

(d) the increased parent-time would be in the best 

interest of the child; and

(e) any other factor the court considers relevant.

Id.

¶9 Lay contends that, if a noncustodial parent successfully

demonstrates that the factors listed in Utah Code section 

30-3-35.1(2) are present, then the parent-time schedule in that 

section “becom[es] the minimum amount of parent time that a 

trial court may award to the noncustodial parent.” Specifically, 

he asserts that once the noncustodial parent makes the required 

showing, the district court must order the parent-time schedule 

laid out in section 30-3-35.1. Lay acknowledges the statute 

provides that the court “may consider” the increased 

parent-time schedule upon such a showing, but he asserts that 

“[t]he word may in the statute should be construed . . . as shall.”

We disagree.

¶10 “When we interpret statutes, our primary objective is to 

ascertain the intent of the legislature.” Scott v. Scott, 2017 UT 66, 

¶ 22 (quotation simplified). Because “the best evidence of the 

legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute itself, we 

look first to the plain language of the statute.” Id. (quotation 

simplified). “In so doing, we presume that the legislature used 

each word advisedly” and that “the expression of one term 

should be interpreted as the exclusion of another, thereby 

presuming all omissions to be purposeful.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 

UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (quotations simplified). “Further, we 

interpret statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid 

rendering portions of the statute superfluous.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 

UT 79, ¶ 159 (quotation simplified). “To do so, we read the plain 

language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in 

harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
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20170230-CA 6 2018 UT App 137

chapters.” Id. (quotation simplified). “When we can ascertain the 

intent of the legislature from the statutory terms alone, no other 

interpretive tools are needed, and our task of statutory 

construction is typically at an end.” Scott, 2017 UT 66, ¶ 22

(quotation simplified).

¶11 Section 30-3-35.1 states, “The parents and the court may 

consider the following increased parent-time schedule as a 

minimum when the parties agree or the noncustodial parent can 

demonstrate [certain factors] . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35.1(2) 

(LexisNexis Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). Assuming, without 

deciding, that Lay has demonstrated the existence of those 

factors, see id. § 30-3-35.1(2)–(4), we conclude that the district 

court was not required to adopt the section 30-3-35.1 parent-time 

schedule.

¶12 The Utah Code defines the meaning of the words “may” 

and “shall.” “‘May’ means that an action is authorized or 

permissive.” Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2016); 

see also May, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“[t]o be 

permitted to” and “[t]o be a possibility”); In re A.J.B., 2017 UT 

App 237, ¶ 25, 414 P.3d 552 (indicating that the “use of the term 

‘may’ means that a court is certainly authorized” to take a 

particular action but “is not necessarily required to do so”). The 

word “shall,” on the other hand, means “an action is required or 

mandatory.” Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)(j); see also John Kuhni 

& Sons Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2018 UT App 6, ¶ 10, 414 P.3d 952 

(noting that “shall” is “a mandatory word requiring strict 

compliance with its directive” (quotation simplified)); Diener v. 

Diener, 2004 UT App 314, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d 1178 (“Ordinarily, the use 

of the word ‘shall’ in a statute creates a mandatory condition, 

eliminating any discretion on the part of the courts.”).

¶13 Here, section 30-3-35.1’s use of the term “may,”

rather than “shall,” indicates that, provided the parties agree 

or the noncustodial parent makes the required showing, the 

district court is authorized, but not required, to 

consider the optional increased parent-time schedule as 
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20170230-CA 7 2018 UT App 137

described in the statute. Stated differently, the noncustodial 

parent’s demonstration of the enumerated factors gives the

court the discretion to consider the increased parenttime schedule, but there is no language in the statute

making the court’s consideration of that schedule—much less its

adoption—mandatory. Indeed,the statute describes the parenttime schedule at issue as the “optional parent-time schedule.”

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35.1(1) (emphasis added). The 

use of the term “optional” indicates that the increased parenttime schedule involves a choice on the part of the district court

and is “not compulsory.” See Optional, Merriam-Webster.com,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/optional (last 

visited June 26, 2018) (“involving an option” and “not 

compulsory”); Option, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.

merriam-webster.com/dictionary/option (last visited June 26, 

2018) (“an act of choosing,” “the power or right to choose,” or 

“something that may be chosen”).

¶14 Notwithstanding the statute’s plain language, Lay 

effectively invites us to construe the phrase “may consider” as 

“shall adopt.” Lay argues that treating section 30-3-35.1 “as 

merely permissive instead of required would lead to absurd 

results and would render [the statute], in its entirety, 

superfluous.” In other words, he suggests that unless we 

interpret section 30-3-35.1 as mandating the adoption of the 

increased parent-time schedule under certain circumstances, the 

statute is rendered superfluous and therefore absurd. We are not 

persuaded.

¶15 The absurdity doctrine applies “to reform unambiguous 

statutory language where applying the plain language leads to 

results so overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could 

have intended them.”2 Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, 

 

2. In arguing that our interpretation would lead to absurd 

results, Lay also invokes the absurd consequences canon, an 

interpretive canon that shares some similarity with the absurdity 

(continued...)
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20170230-CA 8 2018 UT App 137

¶ 46, 357 P.3d 992 (Durrant, C.J., concurring). Invocation of this 

doctrine has been described as “a drastic step” and as “strong 

medicine, not to be administered lightly.” Id. ¶ 48 (quotation 

simplified). That is because the text of an unambiguous statute 

“is almost always irrefutable evidence of the legislature’s intent, 

even if it leads to results we regard as impractical or ill-advised.” 

Id. With this standard in mind, we readily conclude that the 

doctrine has no application here.

¶16 Section 30-3-35.1 is not rendered absurd by interpreting it 

as reserving in the district court the discretion of whether to 

consider ordering the increased parent-time. After all, district 

courts are generally afforded “broad discretion” to establish 

parent-time. See Tobler v. Tobler, 2014 UT App 239, ¶ 24, 337 P.3d 

296 (“The district court has the discretion to establish parenttime in the best interests of the children.”); Utah Code Ann. 

§ 30-3-34(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017) (“If the parties are unable to 

agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may establish a 

parent-time schedule consistent with the best interests of the 

child.”). And it is not absurd to conclude that the legislature 

intended to provide the district court with some guidance and 

tools for adopting increased parent-time schedules without 

eliminating the court’s discretion to apply those tools in the best 

interest of the child. At the very least, the statute provides 

 

(...continued)

doctrine but that applies under different circumstances. See Utley 

v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, ¶¶ 46–47, 357 P.3d 992 

(Durrant, C.J., concurring) (drawing distinctions between the 

absurd consequences canon and the absurdity doctrine). “In 

applying the absurd consequences canon, we merely resolve an 

ambiguity by choosing the reading that avoids absurd results 

when statutory language plausibly presents us with two 

alternative readings.” Id. ¶ 47 (quotation simplified). We have no 

occasion to consider this canon here because Lay has not 

persuaded us that the word “may” in section 30-3-35.1 is 

ambiguous.
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20170230-CA 9 2018 UT App 137

legislatively established standards for the district court to apply 

in evaluating whether increased parent-time is warranted, and it 

eliminates the need for a district court to independently fashion 

an increased parent-time schedule by providing a detailed 

schedule for the court to modify or adopt. We cannot conclude 

that this operation—even if its reach is more permissive than 

mandatory—is “so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational 

legislator could have intended the statute to operate in such a 

manner.” See Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 48.

¶17 For these reasons, we conclude that the plain language of 

section 30-3-35.1 gives the court discretion to consider, under 

appropriate circumstances, ordering parent-time above the 

minimum set in section 30-3-35, and we reject Lay’s contention 

that the district court here was required to grant him increased 

parent-time pursuant to section 30-3-35.1.

II. The District Court’s Parent-Time Order

¶18 Lay next challenges the district court’s decisions granting 

him “only alternating Friday and Saturday overnights” and 

denying him midweek parent-time during the school year. He 

raises two contentions in support. First, he contends that the 

court exceeded its discretion. Second, he contends that the court 

made legally inadequate findings. Because we agree with Lay on 

his second contention, we do not reach the first.3

¶19 The district court’s factual findings “are adequate only if 

they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 

facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 

 

3. Lay also contends that, regardless of whether the court abused 

its discretion or the findings are inadequate, the court’s decision 

was not in Child’s best interest. As with Lay’s alternative 

argument about Child’s best interest in connection with section 

30-3-35.1, supra note 1, our consideration of Child’s best interest 

at this juncture is premature.
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20170230-CA 10 2018 UT App 137

each factual issue was reached.” Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 

269, ¶ 11, 316 P.3d 455 (quotation simplified); see also Shuman v. 

Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 5, 406 P.3d 258 (“A trial court’s 

factual findings must be sufficiently detailed and include 

enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon 

which they are grounded.” (quotation simplified)). Put another 

way, findings “are adequate when they contain sufficient detail 

to permit appellate review to ensure that the district court’s 

discretionary determination was rationally based.” Fish v. Fish, 

2016 UT App 125, ¶ 22, 379 P.3d 882. Indeed, the district court’s 

obligation to render adequate findings “facilitates meaningful 

appellate review and ensures the parties are informed of the 

[district] court’s reasoning.” Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 5.

¶20 In reviewing the legal adequacy of the district court’s 

findings, we also bear in mind that the Utah Code requires that, 

in ordering parent-time, the court “shall enter the reasons 

underlying its order.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-34(3) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2017) (“The court shall enter the reasons underlying its 

order for parent-time that: (a) incorporates a parent-time 

schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 . . . ; or (b) provides more 

or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in 

Section 30-3-35 . . . .”).

¶21 Lay contends that the district court’s factual findings were 

legally inadequate to support its decisions regarding both the 

weekend overnights schedule and his request for midweek 

parent-time. With regard to the weekend overnights schedule, 

Lay asserts that the district court’s findings did not adequately 

explain its decision to grant him parent-time “only alternating 

Friday and Saturday overnights during the school year but not 

Sunday overnights,” when Child “had been thriving under a 

schedule with Sunday overnights.” Lay concedes that “the 

district court mentioned the accommodation of school 

attendance as a justification,” but he asserts that “there are no 

findings about a need to better accommodate [Child’s] school 

attendance.” With regard to midweek parent-time, Lay contends 

that “the district court’s decision not to allow the midweek visits 
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20170230-CA 11 2018 UT App 137

required by the minimum parent time statute is supported by 

inadequate findings.” To buttress this position, Lay asserts that 

the “statutory minimum schedule requires midweek visits,” that 

he had regularly exercised his midweek parent-time by spending 

lunchtime with Child, and that “this case [does] not fall under 

any of the exceptions to the statutory minimum schedule.”

¶22 The district court made the following findings regarding 

the parent-time schedules that the parties had followed since 

their divorce. The parties’ divorce decree was entered when 

Child was under the age of three and provided that, in a 

two-week period, Lay would have Child for six overnights and 

that Gustafson would have eight overnights. In 2011, after Child 

finished kindergarten, the parties informally agreed to change 

the parent-time schedule such that Lay would not have midweek 

parent-time and instead would have parent-time with Child only 

every other weekend from Friday night through Monday 

morning, amounting to three overnights during every two-week 

period. This informal agreement was driven by Lay’s work 

schedule and by Child’s need for stability given that “the 

number of transfers between parents [had] interfered with [her] 

well being.” With rare exceptions, the parties lived by this 

parent-time schedule, even during the summers, for five years. 

The parties cooperated well under that agreement until shortly 

before the parties petitioned to modify the decree.

¶23 The court also made findings related to Child’s schooling. 

Child attends a school roughly equidistant from Lay’s and 

Gustafson’s residences. Gustafson takes Child to school and has 

a work schedule that “allows greater flexibility as to getting 

[Child] to and from school than does [Lay].” In 2014 and 2015, 

Lay regularly would have lunch with Child during recess. At 

school, Child has shown that she is “doing better” and “getting 

more used to transition[s].”

¶24 As for Child’s overall well-being, the district court found 

that she is “well adjusted and happy and doing well, and doing 

better as she gets older.” Although she “still demands lots of 
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20170230-CA 12 2018 UT App 137

structure and routine,” Child’s behavior is “getting better,” and 

Child responds better to changes when she is given advance 

notice and explanation. On the whole, Child is “making good 

progress,” “getting more resilient,” and is “more content now.”

¶25 Ultimately, the district court modified the parent-time 

schedule. Although the parties had operated under a schedule 

for the past five years where Lay had parent-time every other 

weekend, Friday through Sunday nights, the court ordered that, 

for the non-school months, Lay’s parent-time would remain as 

under the divorce decree, that is, Lay would have six overnights 

and Gustafson would have eight overnights in each two-week 

period. During the school year, however, the court ordered that 

Lay would have only two overnights on alternating weekends. 

The court explained that Lay’s parent-time every other weekend 

“should be Friday and Saturday nights only, not Sunday nights, 

to better accommodate school attendance, with a return of 

[Child] by [Lay] to [Gustafson] on Sunday evening at 7:00 pm 

during school months.”

¶26 We agree with Lay that the district court’s findings were 

not sufficiently detailed “to disclose the steps” the court took to 

reach its ultimate conclusion to adjust Lay’s alternating weekend 

parent-time from three overnights to two overnights. See Rayner 

v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 11, 316 P.3d 455 (quotation 

simplified); see also Maak v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2016 UT App 

73, ¶¶ 45–46, 372 P.3d 64 (explaining that without insight into 

the district court’s reasoning and what record evidence 

supported its decision, the reviewing court was “unable to 

ascertain whether the district court’s [decision] follows logically 

from, and is supported by, the evidence” (quotation simplified)). 

The court found that under the working parent-time schedule, 

which included Sunday overnights, Child was “well adjusted” 

and “doing well.” Yet the court ordered a change to that 

schedule on the basis of “better accommodat[ing] [Child’s] 

school attendance.” And the court’s factual findings do not 

explain why having Lay return Child to Gustafson on Sunday 

evenings, as opposed to dropping Child off at school on Monday 
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20170230-CA 13 2018 UT App 137

mornings, would “better accommodate [Child’s] school 

attendance.” The court did find that Gustafson drives Child to 

school and generally has more flexibility than Lay to take Child 

to and from school. But the court did not say, for instance, that 

Lay is incapable of taking Child to school on Monday or that his 

Sunday overnights under the existing schedule contributed to 

school absences or tardiness on Child’s part.

¶27 We thus conclude that the district court’s factual findings 

fail to support its conclusion that Sunday overnights with Lay 

did not accommodate Child’s school attendance at least as well

as Sunday overnights with Gustafson. Moreover, at oral 

argument before this court, Gustafson could not identify any 

specific findings or record evidence that could support the 

court’s decision that Child spending Sunday nights with 

Gustafson better accommodated Child’s school attendance; thus, 

we cannot conclude that the court impliedly relied on any 

particular evidence to so conclude.4 See generally Fish v. Fish, 2016 

UT App 125, ¶ 22, 379 P.3d 882 (“Unstated findings can be 

implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually 

considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a 

finding to resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record 

the factual determination it made.” (quotation simplified)). The 

district court specifically found that Child was “doing well” 

under the existing parent-time schedule, so therefore its decision 

to change Lay’s alternating weekend parent-time from three to 

two overnights is inconsistent with that finding and requires 

explanation so that we can ensure on review that that decision 

was rationally based. See id.; see also In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 398 

(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the trial court’s findings must 

include enough detail “to clearly show the evidence upon which 

they are grounded”).

 

4. In fact, Gustafson told this court that she would “almost 

welcome a remand” for the district court to elucidate its 

thinking.
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20170230-CA 14 2018 UT App 137

¶28 Our conclusion in this regard also leads us to agree with 

Lay that the district court’s findings were inadequate to disclose 

the steps by which the court reached its ultimate conclusion that 

Lay was not entitled to midweek parent-time during the school 

year. It is possible that the district court so concluded because 

Lay did not have midweek parent-time under the existing 

schedule or because the court did not want to increase the 

number of Child’s transfers in light of her need for stability. But 

the court did not provide any such explanation. And given that 

the court ordered a change to the existing schedule for Sunday 

nights—a change that is inconsistent with its finding that Child 

was “doing well” under that schedule—we are unable to simply 

infer the court’s reasoning or its evidentiary basis for denying 

midweek parent-time. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court’s decisions to adjust Lay’s weekend parent-time and to 

deny him midweek parent-time are not supported by adequate 

findings.

CONCLUSION

¶29 The district court did not err in declining to adopt Lay’s 

proposed interpretation of the statute providing for an optional 

parent-time schedule. The district court’s factual findings, 

however, do not contain sufficient detail for us to ensure that its 

discretionary determination regarding the parent-time schedule 

was rationally based. Accordingly, we remand this case with the 

instruction that the district court make additional findings with 

respect to (1) whether Lay’s weekend parent-time during the 

school year should include a Sunday overnight and (2) whether 

Lay should have midweek parent-time during the school year.