Defense Threat Reduction Agency

45045 Aviation Drive

Dulles, VA 20166-7517

1 November 1998

Dear Reader:

For the past ten years, quietly, professionally, effectively, American and

Russian inspectors have been monitoring the elimination and destruction of

intermediate and shorter-range missiles under the INF Treaty. More than 800

on-site inspections have been conducted. More than 2,600 missiles have been 

destroyed. At the portals of a missile factory site in each nation, on-site

inspections have been conducted continuously, 24 hours-a-day, 365 days-a-year

for the past nine years. An account of this remarkable effort has been told

in a narrative history.

Please accept this copy of On-Site Inspections Under the INP' Treaty. It

narrates, using American and Russian sources, the story of how treaty 

inspectors carried out the precedent-setting on-site inspections at remote,

restricted military sites in the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union.

This book also relates the interesting history of a new Department of

Defense agency, its origin, growth, and subsequent development. Today, the

On-Site Inspection Agency has the mission of conducting, planning, and

preparing for the monitoring of a series of international arms control

treaties: Intermediate and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces, Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe, Strategic Arms Reduction, Threshold Test Ban, and Open Skies

Treaties, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

As we prepare for these new treaty missions, the recent past becomes

prologue for the near future. We hope that you find this book informative and

interesting.

Sincerely,

P. Harahan

•
TREATY HISTORY SERIES

,III
Libra ry of Congress Cataloging-in-Pu blishing Data

Haraha n, Joseph P.

Kuhn, John C. III

On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Trea ty, A History of the On-Site 

Inspection Agency and CFE Treaty Implementation, 1990-1996

Treaty History Series

Includes Bi bliographical References

1. Treaties, Arms Control -United States -History.

2. United States-CFETreaty -On-Site Inspections -

History. 3. Europe -End of Cold War -History.

4. Russia -post-Cold Wa r -History. 5. United States

Government -History, Government.

I. United States. Treaties. CFE Treaty. II. Title
FOREWORD

For the past decade Europe has been in transformation. For more than four decades the European continent had been divided into two heavily armed military alliances. That sharp division softened after 1986, as old forms of government were cast off and new nations emerged. Within a few 

years, across the length and breadth of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, nations assumed new

responsibilities and rights under a series of new treaties, agreements, and international accords. The

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty played a pivotal role in this transformation. This

history details the implementation of the CFE Treaty. In doing so, it contributes to our understanding

of contemporary Europe.

In the American constitutional system, the government is accountable to its people. This history, the second in a series by agency historians, tells the American people about a significant treaty

mission undertaken by their national government. It is based on extensive research in government

documents, treaty records, inspector and escort interviews, and statistical reports. The result is an

interesting history, one that will be used in treaty courses and disseminated widely to the public and

national agencies throughout Europe and the United States. We hope that you will enjoy reading and

learning how the United States conducted "On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty."

Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr.

Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force

Director

/ '
AUTHORS

Joseph P. Harahan is the senior historian at the On-Site Inspection Agency. Prior to joining the

Agency, he was a historian in the Office of Air Force History and a faculty member at the University 

of Richmond and Michigan State University. He received a B.A. from the University of Virginia, an

M.A. from the University of Richmond, and a Ph.D. from Michigan State University. He is the author

of On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (1993) and the co-editor of a multivolume Air Force

history series, Warrior Studies ( 12 volumes). While completing this history he lectured at colleges,

universities, and military academies in the United States and abroad.

John C. Kuhn, III, joined the On-Site Inspection Agency in 1992. As an Air Force historian, he

authored organizational histories at the 2nd Bombardment Wing and contributed to the annual histories at the 8th and 15th Air Forces in the Strategic Air Command. At the On-Site Inspection Agency 

he assisted in the final stages of production of the Agency's first history, On-Site Ins pections Under

the IN F Treaty ( 1993) before turning to researching and writing this book.
PREFACE

When the Cold War ended suddenly in 1989-90, the signposts were dearly visible. Communist

governments collapsed in Poland, Hunga ry, Czechoslova kia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. Germany was unified in October 1990.

In the same period, the Soviet Union announced that it would withdraw, within four years, all of its

680,000 stationed troops from Eastern Europe. The United States countered by declaring major

withdrawals of its forces from Western Europe. Against this background of political revolution, 

unification, and massive military force withdrawals, the leaders of Europe, Canada, the United States,

and the Soviet Union signed the Peace of Paris in Novem ber 1990. Two multinational agreements

constituted the heart of that peace: the Accords for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe (CSCE) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

Following national ratification, the CFE Treaty entered into force in July 1992. By then the

Soviet Union had collapsed as an empire and eight new repu blics had emerged to become treaty 

signatory states. In all, 30 Atlantic-Eurasian states implemented the CFE Treaty. On-site inspection

played a critical role in monitoring treaty compliance. Every treaty state established new, or expanded existing, verification agencies and staffs to conduct and host on-site inspections. This history

narrates the efforts by the United States and other nations to pla n, staff, train, equip, and conduct

on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty.

The book begins with the CFE Treaty's signature in November 1990, and it concludes with the

signing of the Final Document at the First Review Conference in May 1996. Between those years, the

treaty nations collectively reduced more than 50,000 conventional weapons-tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, fighters, and helicopters. Hundreds, if not thousands, of on-site inspectors

monitored these reductions in accordance with the protocols of the treaty. Inspection standards were

established and sustained across national borders. A rule of law was replacing the rule of force.

Many of the inspectors had been soldiers of the Cold War; now they were monitoring force reductions under a complex peace treaty. Quietly, professionally, effectively these inspectors and their

respective governments ensured that the new rule of "law," as detailed in the CFE Treaty, was being

enforced.

Agency support for the research and writing of this history was directly attributa ble to the support of Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr., USAF, OSIA Director (1995- ), and Brigadier

General Gregory G. Govan, USA, OSIA Director ( 1993-1995). Dr. Joerg H. Menzel, OSIA's Principal

Deputy Director, took a personal interest and shepherded the project from the sharp knives of those

hostile to major long-term efforts. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, USA, OSIA's Chief of Staff, read the

man uscript and encouraged the authors at every step along the way in the final two years. Colonel

Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, OSIA European Operations Command, read every word, wrote incisive

comments, and then discussed each comment with us persona lly. His intellect and professionalism

strengthened the final book in numerous ways. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, Commander of the

OSIA's European Operations Command , contributed his support to the project in its final year.

We would like to acknowledge the assistance and helpful suggestions of all of the people of

OSIA's European Operations Comma nd. We interviewed many of the team chiefs, inspectors, planners, logisticia ns, and commanders; their opinions and insights helped straighten out the often confusing references to treaty protocols, ta bles, pa ragraphs, and subparagraphs. In particular the followl 'II
ing NCOs and officers shared their time and experiences: Stephen Barneby, Mark Bumala, David

Carter, William Chesney, Joe Drach, Tom Dudley, Ed Gallagher, Les Garrison, David Gessert, Jan

Karcz, Gary Karstens, Michael Lukes, Jack Monahan, Keith Oatman, Richard O'Shea, George Partridge, Ken Periman, Tom Regan, Larry Schultz, Mike Slifka, Bill Smith, and Ron Tait. In the review

process, senior officials in the JCS, OSD (Policy), and OSD(Acquisition) read and critiqued the manuscript for policy and operations considerations. In that process, Mary Margaret Evans, OSD, Acquisition, was especially helpful.

When it came time for assembling the final book in all of its parts-the tables, charts, appendices, bibliography, and fact checking-we are indebted to David Willford of the History Office. His

diligence and intelligence made it a better history. Stephen Jimenez contributed to the chronology and

appendices. Rolen Maddox helped cross-check every name, place, figure, and bibliographic reference.

Bob Coleman and Tom Pearlman developed the cover art and maps, and assisted with other photographs throughout the book. At EEI, Judy Cleary and Gayle Dahlman guided the book through

production, Baiba Seefer edited the manuscript, and Jennifer Whittington created the design and

layout, with the assistance of Lynn Whiteley. Rey Ovalle steered the finished design through the

government burea ucracies to final publishing. Everyone knows that publishing a textbook of this

nature is both an individual and a collective work. Individually, the authors researched and wrote the

book, and they are credited on its cover and title pages. Collectively, the contributions of the others

are mentioned only here. This fact obscures the appreciation we hold for their work and contributions. We simply could not have completed this history without them.

Joseph P.Harahan

John C. Kuhn, III

July 24, 1996

I'flI
1 The Treaty and the Mission 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

IX

Initial Preparations 45

Ratification Delayed 73

Standing Up the Unit 97

Final Preparations 133

CFE Treaty Baseline 155

Reduction Years 199

The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure 225
A PPE DICE

A. CFE Treaty (Text) 265

B. The CFE Treat y: Statements a nd Agreemen ts (Text ) 323

C. The CFElA Concluding Act (Text) 325

D. CFE Review Conference: Fina l Docu ment (Text) 331

E. CFE Trea ty: Nationa l Verifica tion Orga niza tions 341

F. OSIA Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd: Person nel Strength 1990-1992 343

G. Chronology: CFE Trea ty Negotia tions and I mplementa tion, 1972-1996 345

NATO Na tions

Wa rsaw Pact Na tions

NATO Red uction Lia bility

WTO Red uction Lia bility

CFE Inspection Deconfliction Ma trix

Inspection Team Composition

U.S. CFE Treaty Team Leaders

CHAR

8

8

24

25

62

108

165

1-1. CFE Treat y Ceil ings

TABJ

19

1-2. NATO Decla red Hold ings and Lia bi lities

1-3. WTO Hold i ngs a nd Lia bilities

3-1. Decla red Na tiona l CFE Hold ings in Novem ber 1990

3-2. Soviet Union 's ATTU Hold ings and Tra nsfers, 1988-1990

3-3. The Tash kent Agreement: Alloca tion of Soviet TLE

3-4. CFE Trea ty Origina l State Pa rties

7-1. Nationa l Hold ings by Allia nce

7-2. NATO Eq ui pment Transfers

7-3. Resid ua l Levels-NATO States (Novem ber 17, 1 995)

7-4. Resid ua l Levels-Eastern States (Novem ber 17, 1995)

8-l. CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment in the WTO Flank Zones

8-2. Comparison of CFE Treaty Reductions by Group of States

20

2'1

76

79

89

92

200

205

221

222

247

257
8-3. Com pa rison of Selected Na tiona l Hold ings of CFE Trea ty TLE

8-4. Compa rison of CFE lA Mil ita ry Ma n power Figu res for Selected Na tions

8-5. U .S. On -Site I nspections Under the CFE Treaty

259

260

261

MA P

Trea ty-Limited Eq u i pmen t for Each Grou p of States

The Ba ltic States, Estonia , La tvia , and Lithu ania

Tash k ent, Uz bek ista n

1st U .S./Eastern Mock Inspections

U.S. CFE Lia ison Tea m Deploy ments

CFE Trea ty Flan k Region s

22-23

81

89

110

124

248

Bibliography

Glossa ry

fndex

353

361

363

\1

0

Chapter 1

President Bush and the leaders of 2 1 nations sign the CFE Treaty in Paris, France, on N ovember 1 9, 1990.

n Novem ber 19, 1990, the leaders of Western Eu rope, the

United States, Canad a , the Soviet Union, and Central

Eu rope ga thered in Pa ris to sign the Conventiona l Armed

Forces in Eu rope Treaty. 1 The CFE Treaty ca me amidst profou nd

historica l changes that were sweeping across the Europea n continent at the end of the Cold Wa r.2 Du ring this time of tra nsition,

the trea ty served as an interna tiona l structu ral bridge. The CFE

Treaty was both a n arms red uction trea ty, which ma nd ated the

signatory states to collecti vely red uce more tha n 38,500 mi l ita ry

wea pons, and a conflict prevention trea ty. To prevent ( or, more

accurately, red uce the pro ba bility of ) conflict in Central Europe,

the CFE Treaty req u ired the signa tory nations to perma nently

red uce their stationed mi lita ry forces in designated geogra phical

zones in Centra l and Western Eu rope and on the flan ks of the

Soviet Union. Under the CFE Treaty, verification measu res were

the most extensive, intrusive, a nd complex of any modern arms

control agreement. The hea rt of verification was and rema ins onsite inspections under the CFE Treaty.
J 0 -Si 1 1 I Sl'I no Ac.1 c '

M oscow streets during August 1 99 1 cuu/J attem/J t; the

Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, I 99 I .

The p rocess of i m pl emen ti n g th i s crossEu ropean t reaty, st retch i ng from t he Atla ntic

Ocea n to th e U ra l M ou nu i n s, bega n w it h t he

signa tor y n a tion s' exch an u i n u t h ou sa n ds of pa ges

of mi l ita ry force d a ta, esta blish i n a ver i fica ti on

agencies to cond uct t h ou sa n ds of on -si te i nspections, developi ng new da ta systems for mon i rorin u th e pr esen ce of tens of t h ou sa nds of m il ita ry

wea pon s, a nd tra versi ng millions of miles of

ter ritory to i nspect decl a red si tes, object s of

veri fica t ion ; a nd specified a reas. Wh i l e th e l eaders of 22 na tions ha d signed the CFE Treaty in

Novem ber ·1990, th ere were 29 na tions that

prov isiona l l y im plemen ted the treaty a t en try

i n to force i n .Ju l y 1 992. The i ncrea se in si<,natory

na t ions wa s th e d irect conseq u nee of l a rger

h istorica l forces reshapi ng the Eu ropea n continen t: Eastern Eu rope's pol i tica l revol u tion s,

Ger ma ny's u nifica tion, an d the Soviet Un ion 's

coll apse. As a resu l t, seven new na tions, a l l

drawn from the former Soviet Un ion , beca me

signa tory sta tes. In 1993, the d issol u tion of

Czechosiova k ia a s a na tion resu l ted i n two new

na tion s, t h e :zech a nd Sl ova k Repu blics, becomi no signa tor y sta tes. Th us, 30 na tion s im plemen ted the CrE Trea t y. 1

By the fa ll of 1 990, Eu ropean sta bi lity, ch a racteri zed by t he post-Worl d Wa r II d ivision of

Ea st -Tn an I \X!estern Eu rope and the "Ger ma n

Qu estion ," ha d cha nged decisivel y. ' For more

than four decades, ever si n e t he Berl in Bl ocka de of 1948, the th rea t

of a conti nen ta l Eu ropea n wa r had been pr esent. In 1989-90 t ha t

threa t wa s end ing. For t he new Eu rope, t he CFE Treaty repr esented

a practica l mea su re, especia lly v ith its e 'tensive, i ntru si ve ver ifica -

tion process, for esta bl ish in°· a new intern ationa l proc ss th a t \Nou l d

both red uce a nd esta blish lower levels of offensi ve m i l ita r forces

a nd thei r deploy men t for the 1 990s a nd beyond .

In retrospect, it seemed so stra igh tfor-vv a rd . The Col d Wa r era

ha d end ed a nd the post-Cold Wa r era ha d begu n . Events of h istoric propo rti ons ca me so ra pid l y i n 1989-92 tha t a l l of Eu rope

seemed , for a few yea rs, to move i n one, a nd on l y one, d irecti ontowa rd democra tic revolu ti on. Bu t as people swept u p i n contem -

pora ry events k now, change is st ra ightforwa rd on l y in histor y

books. The presen t ra rel y is so clea r. Th is rea liza tion was pa rticu -

la rly tru e for t he men a nd wom en entru sted wi t h i m plementi ng

and monitorin g the CFE Treaty "on t he rrou nd ." As m il it:ir y

prof essiona ls, th ey ha d to b u ild n ew rreaty veri fica ti on agencies

a nd sta ffs. As on -si te i nspectors mon i to ri ng a mu l ti n a tion a l treaty,
Ittl flU \I) \ D !Ill ,'\.11 \Ill

.,

they had to cross brid ges tha t stretched across Eu rope's older,

west-to-east na tiona l bou nda ries. These new bridges crossed to

places, peoples, and milita ry sites not visited, much less inspected,

for more tha n 45 yea rs. Conseq uen tly, there were days, even

months, when the footing secured by the treaty seemed unsure. At

times, the treaty's very founda tion-its legal a u thority sanctioned

by nationa l ratifica tion-seemed certain to collapse. At other

times, the trea ty a ppea red to be carryi ng more of Europe's secu rity

structu re tha n it was designed to ca rry. Uncerta inty was the ru le

for mon ths and mont hs. It is this u ncerta inty tha t ma kes this histor y interesti ng. A ru l e of la w was replacing a ru l e of force. No

one was certa in if the h istorica l circu msta nces tha t crea ted the

pol itica l a nd mi l ita ry consensus for the sign ing of the CFE Trea ty

\·vou ld conti n ue throughou t its impl emen ta tion .

The CFE Trea ty sign ing in Pa ris i n Novem ber 1990 came at

the mid poi n t of a series of pol itica l and milita ry changes occu rring

in Eu rope, the Soviet Union, and to a fa r l esser degree, the United

States. A rms control trea ties and agreements in the late 1980s had

legitimized ma ny of these changes and, in a few insta nces, they set

t h e stage for more revol u tiona ry developments. The Stock holm

Agreement of 1986 was the first step. Then, in Decem ber 1987,

Presiden t Rona ld W. Reaga n and Genera l Secretary Mik ha il S.

Gor bachev signed the Intermed ia te-Ra nge N uclea r Forces (INF)

Trea ty in Wa sh ington, D.C. Tha t trea ty was a diploma tic and

milita ry wa tershed; its elim ina tion provisions and im plementa tion

measures set preceden ts for a l l su bseq uent modern a rms con trol

trea ties. In the next five yea rs, the United States, the Soviet Union ,

and their a llies negotia ted and signed two bila tera l and five mu ltil a tera l treaties: Th reshold Test Ba n Trea ty (1990), Conventiona l

Armed Forces in Eu rope Trea ty ( 1990), Strategic Arms Red uction

Trea ty ( 1991 ), Vien na Docu men t Agreements ( 1990, 1992, a nd

1994), Open Skies Trea ty (1992), Stra tegic A rms Red ucti on Trea t y

II ( 1 993), and the hem ica l Wea pons Con ven tion ( 1993).5

All these trea ties incorpora ted on-sire i nspection as a n im porra n t element in moni toring complia nce. The first trea ty, the INF

Treaty, stipu lated extensi ve on-site inspection rights. These rights

were so extensi ve tha t Presiden t Reaga n a u thorized the esta blishm ent of a new agency to cond uct U.S. inspections of Soviet facilities and to escort Soviet inspection tea ms at U.S. mi l ita ry facil ities.

Tha t new agency, esta bl ished in the U.S. Depa rtment of Defense

on Ja n ua ry 26, 1988, was the On-Si te Inspecti on Agency (OSIA).

While the sma l l bu t growing cad re of OSIA men a nd women organized, tra ined, and cond ucted i nspections i n the initia l phases of

the I NF Treaty, negotia tions contin ued in Vien na and Geneva on

other, more extensi ve, a rms control trea ties. One of these, the

Trea ty Hetween the Twenty-Two Sovereign Na tions on the Red uction of Their Con ven tiona l Armed Forces in Eu rope, beca me

k nown as the CFE Trea ty.

6
4 0 -5111 I.·w1< 110N A<.1 .·u

EARLY NEGOTIATION TO SIGNATURE

Security

Human Rights

Technology/Science/Environment

The Helsi n k i Process, offici a lly ca lled the Conference on

Security and Cooperation i n Eu rope ( CSCE), provided the pla tform for CFE Trea ty negotia tions. The Cold War had divided

Eu rope politica lly, econom ica lly, a nd milita ril y. On July 3, ·1973,

more tha n 25 yea rs into the Cold Wa r, delegates from 35 nations,

includ ing neu tral a nd nona ligned Eu ropea n na tions, the United

States, Ca nada, a nd the Soviet Union, met in Helsi n k i, Finla nd , to

bridge those divisions. This meeting was the first in a contin u ing

series of CSCE conferences and meetings held in na tiona l ca pita ls

across Eu rope. At these meeti ngs, delega tes from the CSCE na tions

attempted to define and agree u pon a set of legal pri nciples tha t

wou ld a ppl y to a ll Eu ropea n states and peoples. The first sign ificant phase of this process cu lmi na ted in A ugust 1975 with the

signing of the Helsin k i Fina l Act.7

Through the Helsin ki Final Act, the CSCE nations decla red

that issues concerning the future of Europe should be discussed in

terms of th ree areas, or "baskets." Basket one dea lt wi th secu rity

in Europe, incl ud ing issues such as na tiona l self-determination,

territorial i ntegrity, a nd the peacef u l settlement of disputes. Basket

two covered progress in science, tech nology, and the environment.

Basket th ree contai ned hu ma n righ ts and other issues. To enha nce

milita ry security, the 35 CSCE states agreed to the concept of

negotiati ng "confidence-building measu res (CBMs)." The objective of these measu res, which were initia lly q uite limited in scope

beca use of the rigid ity of the east-west Europea n divisions in the

Cold Wa r, was to make each nation 's mil itary capa bilities and

intentions more tra nspa rent. The theory was tha t if na tions k new

of their neigh bors' milita ry capa bility and intentions, then these

na tions might develop confidence i n thei r international rela tions

and possi bly realloca te their secu rity resou rces to other nationa l

concerns. Collectivel y, the Europea n continent was the most

heavily a rmed of any continent i n the world . Nationa l a rmies and

air forces were la rge, well equi pped, and modern. Both the United

States and the Soviet U nion had stationed large, combat-read y

arm ies and a ir forces in Centra l Eu rope. The first confidencebuilding measure, signed in 1975, req uired all 35 CSCE nations to

provide every other na tion a 21-da y adva nce notice of a ny milita ry

exercises involving more tha n 21,000 troops. Other provisions

stipulated the vol u nta ry notifica tion of smaller exercises as well as

la rge-scale troop movements on an an n ua l calenda r.

In contrast to the successf ul negotiation and institution of

these CSCE confidence-bu i lding measures, another set of crossEu ropea n diplomatic-mi lita ry negotia tions, the Mu tual and Balanced Force Red uction s (MBFRs), d id not fare well. These negotiations were between the representatives of two a lliances: the

North Atla ntic Trea ty Orga niza tion (NATO) and the Wa rsaw
T111 Tiu \ I 't \ n 1 1 11 M1) 10

Treaty Orga niza tion (WTO). I ni tia ted in l973, the negotia tions

lasted interm ittentl y for 17 yea rs. They were never a ble to get past

severa l stum bli ng blocks. NATO sought red uctions in milita ry

personnel stationed i n Eu rope, whereas WTO proposed equal

red uctions in both milita ry person nel a nd wea pons. The objective,

NATO a rgued, would be to ach ieve, a fter severa l phased wi thdra wa ls, end-strength pa rity in the forces of both a llia nces. The

Wa rsaw Pact, as the WTO was common l y k nown, cou ntered tha t

both a lliances should be red uci ng the same n umber of person nel

and wea pons, leaving the end strength u n ba lanced. Nei ther a lliance would agree d u ring the lengthy negotia tions whether to ma ke

the cuts in eq ual slices or through grad ua l red uctions lead ing to

pa rity. Nor could t hey agree on whet her the cuts should be made

on an a lliance-to-a l l iance or a na tion-by-na tion basis. In a dd ition,

a ma jor U.S. concern was tha t there was no satisfactory method to

verify personnel cu ts. In l ieu of a ny agreement in these protracted

and frustra ting MBFR negotia tions, both NATO a nd WTO modernized their conventiona l wea pons and ma i n ta ined their focus on

comba t read iness. Huge, modern, massed a rmies a nd air forces

contin ued to face each other across a l ine ru n ning th rough a divided Germa ny. 8

Th roughou t these yea rs, the 35 CSCE na tions contin ued

meeti ng in a series of l engthy conferences in Ma drid , Stock holm,

and Vien na. The Mad rid meeti ngs bega n in Novem ber 1980 and

M iht'1r)' l·orces 111 Flf r<>/)('

/ lJ86

A I D- .670,000

W'TO-), J+ U)(J()

A U.S. team observes a Russian exercise-a CSCE-negotiated confidence-building measure.
6 0. -111 I·I'll 1 10 A< .! < '

led to the delega tes agreeing on a September 1983 CSCE Ma ndate.

This ma ndate ca lled for a ll delega tes to negotia te agreements

i mplementing not on ly confidence-bu ilding measures among the

states of Europe, but also new trea ties lead i ng to the grad ua l disa rma ment of Eu rope. At the Mad rid meeting, the CSCE nations

accepted a broader def i nition of Eu rope as envisioned first by

French President Cha rles de Ga u lle, then by President Valery

Gisca rd d'Esta i ng, and finall y strongly articulated and argued by

the United States. It defined Eu rope as stretching from the Atla ntic

Ocea n to the U ra l Mou nta ins.9 Th is mea nt tha t any futu re agreement or trea ty wou ld include mil ita ry forces a nd equ ipment stationed across the length a nd bread th of Europe, includ ing the

interior of the Soviet Union. This defin ition had sign ifica nt implica tions for the CFE Treaty.

Three yea rs la ter in Stockholm, in September 1986, CSCE

delega tes agreed to new confidence and security build ing measures

(CSBMs). These measu res required notifica tion of milita ry exercises involvi ng more tha n 13,000 troops and provided for on-site

inspection of field activities invol ving 17,000 or more grou nd

forces or 5,000 or more a ir borne troops, with no right of refusal 

by the inspected na tion. Known as the Stockholm Docu ment of

1986, this was the first multi na tiona l agreement that the Soviet

Union signed permitti ng on-site inspections on its own territory to

verif y an arms control accord. 10

In agreeing to the Stockholm Document, Gorbachev signa led

his intent to accelera te negotia tions for red uci ng milita ry armaments across Eu rope. Throughou t 1986-87, Gor bachev gave a

series of drama tic speeches, calling u pon Eu ropea n and America n

leaders to consider phased red uctions in conventional a nd n uclea r

forces based on the Europea n continent . He changed the course of

all previous negotia tions by conceding tha t since the Soviet Un ion

had n umerically superior conventional forces in Europe, the

NATO nations m ight reasona bl y conclude that these forces were a

threa t. He further stated that u nder any negotia ted a ll-Eu ropea n

a rms control trea ty, the side with the grea ter n um ber of forces

ought to take a la rger share of the red uctions, provided there was

adequate verifica tion through on-site inspections. Under the Soviet

Union's leadership, the seven-nation Wa rsaw Treaty Orga n ization

met in Bud apest and endorsed Gorbachev's proposa ls. 11

Responding to these significa nt new Soviet and Wa rsaw Pact

initiatives, the foreign ministers of NATO crea ted a High Level

Task Force (HLTF) in May 1986 to develop a coord inated alliance

proposal for a conventional arms red uction treaty. Following long

and difficu lt interna l discussions within the 16-nation alliance, this

NATO task force prod uced a negotia ting position in December

1986. The NATO foreign ministers in their Decem ber meeti ng
1HI 1{1 \I ) \ ll IHI 1\t\1<, l<l

N ATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

proposed a two-track negotia ting strategy. One would consist of

the 35 CSCE nations' pursu ing broader and more tra nspa rent

confidence- build i ng measu res. The other would ha ve the NATO

nations and the WTO nations negotia te phased red uctions and

sta bili ty provisions for their conventiona l forces i n Eu rope. This

two-t rack strategy was adopted. 1 2

Just five weeks later, negotiators from 23 states (16 NATO,

7 WTO) met in Vien na on Februa ry 17, 1987, to d iscuss treaty

negotiati ng guidelines. Nea rly two yea rs of detailed, often technical discussions, both among the allied na tions and between the

a llia nces, prod uced on Ja n ua ry 14, 1989, the Ma ndate for Negotia tion on Conventiona l Armed Forces in Eu rope. This ma nd ate

esta blished the fu nd amental negotia ting pri nciples for the CFE

Treaty. Specifically, the treaty would include provisions to red uce

or preven t the ca pa bility of any na tion, or grou p of na tions, to

mass milita ry forces on the Eu ropea n continent in order to la u nch

a surprise attack across na tional borders. The treaty wou ld seek to

significa ntly red uce offensive military hardwa re; these red uctions

would be asymmetric, with the objective of a n end-strength parity

between a llia nces. In addition, the trea ty would conta in provisions

for a robust and intrusive verifica tion regime. 13
0 -III I \l'I { ( I() t,f (

Twenty-three states bega n negotia tions u nder the Cold Wa r

structu re of Eu rope. The NATO a ll iance, 16 na tions incl ud ing the

Un ited States, formed one side; the Wa rsa w Pact, 7 nations domina ted by the Soviet Union, constituted the other. Al though these

nations sha red negoti a ting goals a nd strategies as mem bers withi n

thei r a ll iances, they were i ndependent, sovereign na tions. Under

t he trea ty bei ng negotia ted , the ind ivid ual signatory states wou ld

hold all righ ts a nd obl iga tions. Recogni zing th is fact, French negotia tors successfully a rgued for not identif ying in the forma l trea ty

language either the NATO or the Wa rsa w Pact a lliance. Instead,

the French persuaded the other nations to use the term "grou p of

state pa rties" to refer to the two a llia nces. 14 This became a critica l

trea ty ter m since it allowed negotia tors to incorpora te the existing

bloc-versus-bloc structure as a n integral element of the trea ty

while holding the individual states responsible for treaty implementation. This dua lism remained in the treaty despite revolutionary changes that transpired in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet

Union in 1990-92.

In la te 1989, the East Germa ns revolted; the Berli n Wall fell,

and the Germa n Democra tic Repu bl ic's comm u nist govern ment

colla psed . Germa n u n ifica tion beca me a serious possi bili ty. Germa n Cha ncellor Helm u t Koh l, Soviet Genera l Secreta ry Mik ha il S.

Gorbachev, British Pr ime Minister Ma rga ret H. Tha tcher, French

President Fra nc;ois Mitter ra nd, a nd America n President George

Bush pa rtici pa ted i n a series of d rama tic meeti ngs in 1990. These

negotia tions cu l minated in a series of i nterna tiona l agreements

tha t recognized Germa ny as a single, u nified nation, effecti ve

October 3, 1990. W hile these even ts u n folded, the Warsaw Pact

collapsed. Th is colla pse was a d i rect conseq uence of the "velvet"

revol utions in Eastern Eu rope i n 1988-89 as the peoples of

Pola nd , Hu nga ry, Roma n i a, Czechoslova k ia, and Bu lga ria rejected

their commu nist govern ments. Eq ually i mpor ta nt wa s the fact tha t

Gorbachev a nd the leaders of the Soviet Union a ll owed the revol utions to proceed. Previous attem pts by Wa rsa w Pact na tions to

depa rt from commu n ism had resu lted in forceful Soviet milita ry

i nterven tion. In 1989-90, by contrast, Soviet troops were wi thdrawing from Eastern Europe. 1 5

All these events i n fl uenced the CFE Treaty. The issue of

Germa n u n ifica tion posed severa l concerns for trea ty negotia tors.

A u nited Germa n y wou ld possess a la rge, modern a rmed force.

It wou ld ha ve the la rgest na tiona l a rmy and a ir force in Centra l

Eu rope. Twice in the 20th centu r y, Germa n y had sought to domina te continenta l Eu rope. Ack nowledgi ng this legacy, Germa n

Cha ncellor Koh l pledged tha t h is govern ment would red uce the

size of the new nation's mili ta ry forces. Germa n y su bmi tted a

special decla ra tion to be incl uded in the CFE Treaty. The "Declaration by the Govern ment of the Federa l Repu blic of Germa ny on

the Person nel Strength of Germa n Armed Forces" stated tha t

NATO Nations

Belgium Luxembourg

Canada Netherlands

Denmark Norway

France Portugal

Germany Spain

Greece Turkey

Iceland United Kingdom

Italy United States

Warsaw Pact

Nations

Bulgaria

Czechoslovakia

German Democratic Republic

Hungary

Poland

Romania 

Soviet Union
Ill II I

Germa n y wou ld cu t its troop strength to 370,000 th ree to four

yea rs from the day the CFE Trea ty entered into force. 1 6 This declaration persuaded other na tions to declare their wi llingness to

negotia te "to limit the person nel strengths of their conven tiona l

armed forces." Although negotia tors did not reach agreement on

this issue in time for the signing of the CFE Trea ty in Pa ris in

Novem ber 1990, they con ti n ued negotia tions th roughout 1991

and 1992. By Ju l y 1992, the time of the trea ty's entry into force,

na tiona l person nel limits were conta ined in a sepa ra te docu ment,

entitled the CFE lA Conclud ing Act.

Another event, also la rger tha n the trea ty a nd infl uenci ng it,

was Genera l Secreta ry Gorbachev's u nila tera l decla ra tion a t the

United Nations in Decem ber 1988 to wi thd ra w six ta nk divisions

( 50,000 men ) from the na tions of Central Eu rope. 1 7 This u n precedented , massi ve Soviet m i lita ry wit hd ra wa l, cou pled wit h the

Eastern Europea n nation s d isca rd ing comm u n ist govern men ts for

democra tic ru le, resu lted in a wea kened, impotent m i lita ry a llia nce

among the Wa rsa w Pact na tions. Just f ive months before the CFE

Trea ty's signa tu re, the Hu nga ria n Na tiona l Assem bly on Ju ne 26,

1990, voted 232-0 to i ni tia te negotiations for Hu nga ry to lea ve the

Soviet-d omina ted Wa rsa w Pact. 18 Since the fra mework of the CFE

Treaty rested on a grou p of states as the basic u nit for a ll red uctions and end-strength pa rity, a brea k u p of the WTO presented the

possi bility tha t those na tions wou ld no longer act as a grou p. This

d id not ha ppen. The Eastern Eu ropea n states d id not wa n t the

possi ble dissol ution of the allia nce to prevent the CFE Treaty from

entering into force.

The CFE Treaty was negotiated under a N ATOIW TO scenario.
I0 0 -St 1 1 Iw1c 1 10:-.; Ac.Lc-:c '

Ambassador Grinevsky onSovietNegotiations

A professional diplomat, Oleg Grinevsk y led the Department of Mid-Eastern Affairs, USS R Ministry of

Foreign Af fairs, from 1978 through 1 983. During the

next two years, he served as the Soviet Ambassad or to

the Con(erence on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Then, in 1985, he became the Chief Arms Control Negotiator for the USS R for the CFE Treaty. For

the next five years, he work ed directly with President

Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister

Shevardnadze to negotiate the treat)'·

On Soviet leaders and the concept of on-site

inspections: "In December 1985, Gorbachev had

a one-on-one with each of his arms control negotiators. He wanted to start 'real negotiations'

with 'real red uctions' in arma ments to ma ke

Europe and the world less milita rized and less

dangerous. During the time of [Conference on

Disa rma ment in Europe] negotia tions in

Stockholm, I suggested tha t we accept one or two

on-site inspections every yea r of Soviet forces

beca use it would convince the West of our good

intentions and [it] wou ld not ha rm our milita ry

position in any way."

On resistance within the Soviet Politburo: "In the 

meetings on arms control, the sides were generally Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakolev, and

Grinevsk y aga inst Ma rshal Akhromeyev,

the KGB Chief, the Director of the Centra l

Committee's Interna tiona l Depa rtment, and the

Milita ry Depa rtments. Ma rsha l Akhromeyev was

the key member of the Politbu ro who opposed

the CDE measures. As the head milita ry officer,

his ideas were important and persuasive. But he

was very 'explosive,' and would speak out forcefully on his views.

"The Politboro met on weekends. I would

return from Stockholm and present the results of

that week's negotia tions. The arguments were

heated. Usually, they took the form of my introducing a proposal and, if it was u naccepta ble,

Ak hromeyev would 'explode,' expla ining tha t the

proposal endangered the milita ry security of the

sta te. Gorbachev would then step in and 'media te' the dispute, ma king sure at the end tha t

everyone on the Politburo agreed . This happened

on the discussions on the on-site inspection measures, and tha t is how it was resolved ."

On Gorbachev and Soviet partici pation in the

more radical arms control treaty negotiations:

"First of all, there was the economic situation in

the country. The USSR needed time and resources

to improve its economic situation .... Second, to

do this we had to improve relations with the West

to red uce tensions, to make economic rela tions 

easier by getting rid of the West's biggest fear, the

size and power of the Soviet milita ry forces in

Eu rope. We wa nted to change our milita ry profile

in Europe and red uce our dominance over Eastern Europe.

"We actua lly succeeded, especially after

the CFE Treaty, which, by the way, only

Sheva rd nadze really supported. Shevardnadze

rea lized tha t only after this trea ty would the

USSR be safe from a Western attack. The country

wou ld be able to save resou rces from the conventiona l force red uctions to use elsewhere.

"Conventional forces are very expensive, and

the money saved would be considera ble. But

virtua lly a ll of the others opposed the CFE Treaty

beca use the USSR would be giving up its 'overwhelming military advantage' in Europe. They

could not visualize a Soviet Union that did not

have a huge and powerful milita ry, even if it

mea nt better living conditions for the people."

Source: Interview, Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, U.S. Army, March 14, 1994.
HI frl I) \ I> IHI f\ \1\\10 I ]

Ambassador Hansen on U.S. Negotiations

Lynn M. Hansen was the U.S. Ambassador to the

Conference onSecurity and Cooperation inEurope,

1992-93.In 1989-90,he served onthe U.S.delegation negotiating the CFE Treaty. Educated at Utah

State University, Hansenwas a Fulbright Scholarto

the Free University of Berlin.The recipient of an

M .A. and a Ph.D., he is fluent in German, Dutch,

S wedish, and Russian . Currently, Ambassador

Hansen is Vice Chairman for E valuation, National

Intelligence Council.

On the Bush administration 's decision to pursue the

CFE Treaty: "The United States ma de the decision

to push the trea ty sometime in 1989. It bega n in

March 1989, but there was a little bit of time before 

they really made the decision tha t, by golly, we are

going to get this agreement. They brought i n Jim 

Woolsey [as Chief Negotia tor], and I came with

him. That was in Novem ber 1989. It was precisely

the time when the Berlin Wall came down."

The IN F Treaty as a precedent: "The INF experience was both a positive and nega tive model for us.

It was positive insofa r as we and the Soviet Union 

had an experience which we sha red, and we knew

what had to be done. But this very fact was resented

by some, pa rticula rly the French, who took some

pains to ma ke sure tha t we did not use INF terminology very much. But since it was the only experience anyone had, we still used it. So it was very,

very importa nt to us in terms of methodologies and

proced u res....

"Clearly, there were two things that influenced

us. One was, of course, the INF Treaty. The second

was the shared experience everybod y had with the

Stockholm Agreement . That was a European-domina ted experience, and it was very, very importa nt. I

think it was every bit as importa nt to the Europea ns

and to the negotiation of the CFE Treaty as was the

INF Treaty. Thirty-five nations ha d shared in that

experience, but only 23 were in the CFE negotiations-and all of them had been involved in the

Stockholm Agreement, every one."

N egotiating the final CFE Treaty verification issues:

"As we proceeded through negotia tions we were

able to resol ve most of the issues up until October

1990. We were with in a month of trea ty signing and

Source: Interview, Joseph P.Harahan, OSIA, December 14, 1993.

didn't ha ve the basic question of a site versus an

object of verifica tion resol ved. It was the basis for

calcula ting the nu mber of inspections, and wha t we

were to inspect. In October 1990, the Russia ns paid

a visit to Wash ington . A small team of us took

Soviet Ambassador Grinevsky into a room in the

State Depa rtment and we ta lked about the CFE

Treaty, specifica lly verifica tion.

"The [U.S.] interagency community, or more

accurately, decisionma kers at a high level, had

decided that they would accept the Soviets' object

of verifica tion concept, provided the Soviets would

agree to the way it wou ld be implemented. We put 

this proposition to Ambassador Grinevsky. He

indica ted that he wa nted the appropriate people

involved. We requested that he send his verifica tion

negotia tor to the U.S. He called him over. His na me

was Genna diy Yefsta viyev. We met in New York .

The idea was that wh ile the UN First Committee

was in session, we woul d attempt to resolve the

final pa rts of the CFE Treaty.

"I arranged my room in the Wa ldorf Astoria to

be a little negotiating room. As it turns out, only I

and Yefsta viyev used it. One on one, we wrote out

the final pa rts of the verification protocol, which

included the concept of object of verification and

access to the decla red sites. We also developed the

definition of a decla red site and other definitions

which ha ve stood the test of time ra ther well.

"Basically, we did it this way. My negotia ting

style was to write everything down. Then, these

texts were given to Mr. Shevardnadze and Secreta ry

Baker. They would meet, discuss, and bless them. By

the time tha t New York meeting was over, we had,

for a ll intents and purposes, an agreement on the

verifica tion protocol."
12 o,·-SI rJ' I. WI ( fl(}:'\ At.I . ( '

Conseq uently, throughou t 1 990, the Cen tra l Eu ropea n Wa rsaw Pact na tions, specifica ll y Pola nd, Hu nga ry, Czechoslova k ia ,

Roma n ia , and Bu lga ria, conti n ued to negotia te as a "group of

state pa rties," a lthough most bel ieved tha t the Wa rsaw Pact wou ld

dissolve by the end of 1991. I n the negotia ting sessions, these

na tions took positions tha t reflected their i ndependent na tiona l

status, bu t in the fi na l trea ty text a nd implementi ng protocols,

they agreed to reta in the termi nology of bloc-to-bloc limits and

zones. Since Soviet m ilita ry forces were still withd ra wing from

Eastern Eu rope, no na tion wa n ted to im pede this wi thd ra wa l. This

deli bera te pol itica l act a l lowed the basic framework of the trea ty

to rema in i n place whi le the East Eu ropea n na tions strengthened

thei r new i nd epend ent govern ments. 1 9

By October 1990, most ma jor treaty provisions, protocols,

a nd statements ha d been agreed to; however, the basis for ca lcul a ting the nu mber of inspections ha d not been determi ned. The

Un ited States argued tha t the l ocation of trea ty-l imited equ ipment

(TLE) a nd milita ry u n its, k nown as a "declared site," should be

the basis for ca lcu la ting the n u m ber of i nspections. The decla red

site was wha t a n i nspection tea m wou ld inspect. The Soviets

cou ntered tha t the n u mber of i nspections should be based on the

"objects of veri fica tion " ( OOVs). The OOV was a decla red m ilita ry orga niza tion tha t hel d eq u ipmen t limited by

the treat y. An OOV cou ld a lso be a designa ted

perma nent storage site tha t held TLE not associated wi t h a specific u n it, or any location, where

TLE wou ld !he fou nd rou tinel y. The Soviet position was tha t a tea m wou ld inspect the OOVOOV 1

Declared Site

OOV 1 Declared for Inspection

the orga n iza tion, storage depot, or loca tion and

its TLE, not the entire site where they were

loca ted . For ma n y, this distinction was d ifficult

to u ndersta nd; yet, it was im porta nt to the Soviet

High Comma nd beca use they coloca ted many

milita ry orga n iza tions a t a single location. The

Soviet Army often ha d severa l OOVs on a single

decla red site. Here was a ma jor disagreement,

decla red site versus OOV, a nd neither the NATO

na tions nor the Wa rsa w Pa ct na tions were willing to compromise.

53rdTank Brigade

Not Subject to

Inspection

Not Subject to

Inspection

In an eleventh-hou r effort, America n CFE

Trea ty negotia tor Lynn M. Ha nsen and Soviet

CFE Trea ty negotia tor Genna diy Yefsta vi yev

held a series of meetings in the weeks and days

before the trea ty was signed.20 There was little

time for extend ed delibera tions. Presid ent Bush

ha d sta ted tha t he wou ld not attend the Pa ris

CSCE Conference, sched u led for mid- Novem ber

1990, if a CFE Trea ty was not rea dy for signa -

Declared Site

OOV 1

53rdTank Brigade I
Il l l{J \ I) \ l l 1111 1\IJ\\ h l I

ture. Time was ru n n ing out; in la te October Am bassa dor Ha nsen

met wit h Am bassad or Grinevsk y a nd others at the U.S. State Depa rtment to resol ve the im passe. Their solu tion recognized the

OOV as the item for i nspection, but a lso gra nted i nspectors access

to the entire site except for a reas belonging exclusivel y to another

OOV. Decla red site a reas tha t were not pa rt of a n OOV, were

colloqu ia ll y referred to as common a reas. This am biguous solution

resol ved a trea ty negotia ting impasse, but it created problems la ter

du ring trea ty impl ementa tion.

Long before this issue wou ld surface d uring actua l on-site

i nspections, the trea ty text and protocols had to be fina lized,

signed , and ra tified. To complete the trea ty, Soviet CFE negotia tor

Yefsta vi yev went to New York, where he and the America n negotia tor Ha nsen developed the fina l segments of the inspection protocol. They in tu rn persua ded members of their respecti ve blocs in

Bud a pest and Brussels to accept the negotia ted provisions. However, this U.S.-USSR agreement came at a cost. These end game

negotia tions brought to a hea d a belief held by ma n y of the other

signatory states: the two superpowers, the United States and the

USSR, were resolving too many issues bila tera lly. From this poi nt

forwa rd, the CFE Trea ty negotia tors from the Eu ropea n states

bega n meeti ng a mong themselves. A stronger "Europea n" perspecti ve on the CFE Trea ty and its implementa tion bega n to emerge.

Despite this development, the ma rch towa rd fina l agreement contin ued. After delega tes agreed to a ll of the fina l provisions, the

CFE Trea ty was rea dy for signatu re.

I

In mid-Novem ber 1990, the three-da y meeti ng of the Conference on Secu rit y a nd Cooperation in Eu rope convened in Pa ris.

The lea ders of 22 na tions, incl ud ing Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl,

Mitter ra nd, a nd Tha tcher, signed the CFE Treaty on Novem ber

19, 1990. At tha t poi nt, the signatory states incl uded Belgi u m,

Bu lga ria , Ca na da , Czechoslova k ia, Den ma rk, Fra nce, Germa n y,

Greece, Hu nga ry, Icela nd , Ita l y, Lu xem bourg, Netherla nds, Norwa y, Pol and, Portuga l, Roma n ia , Spa in, Turkey, Soviet Un ion,

Un ited Kingdom, a nd the United States. Amidst a ll the historic

cha nges sweeping across the Eu ropea n continent, the CFE Trea ty

constitu ted a new lega l a nd d i plomatic framework for red uci ng

mili tary forces a nd limiti ng na tiona l aggression in post-Cold Wa r

Europe. 21

The CSCE Conference's pol itica l and d iploma tic d imensions

were revealed the next d ay as the leaders of 34 states signed the

Cha rter of Pa ris for a New Eu rope.22 This cha rter cod ified statements on h u ma n rights, democra tic va l ues, and the rule of l aw for

a ll Eu ropea n states and peoples. At the same session, leaders of the
14 0 -SI 1 1 I WI ( I10 Al.I ( '

Leaders of CSCE nations at the N ovember 1990 Paris Summit.

16 NATO na tions, 6 WTO na tions, and 12 neutral and nonaligned Eu ropea n na tions pledged to seek a nonconfrontationa l

security structure for a ll of Eu rope. That structure began, of

course, with their end orsement of the objectives of the CFE Trea ty.

Next, they agreed to esta bl ish and strengthen CSCE i nstitutions.

23

A new, sma ll CSCE Secreta ria t wou ld be established in Prague; a

CSCE Conflict Resol ution Center wou ld be set up in Vienna , and

a new CSCE Election Mon itoring Off ice wou ld be loca ted i n Wa rsaw. At the same time, the 35 nationa l lea ders affirmed their commitment to follow the provisions of the Vien na Docu ment 1990,

an importa nt new cross-Eu ropea n confidence and security build ing

measure that expa nded the provisions of the ea rlier Stockhol m

Docu ment of 1986.24 The new Vien na Docu ment 1990 stipu lated

ann ua l excha nges of milita ry force data , regula r milita ry-to-military contacts, and on-site i nspections as confidence and security

bu ilding measures. When the th ree-d ay CSCE Conference concluded, it was seen as a nother significa nt step in the tra nsition to

post-Col d War Europe.

President Bush, i n his rema r ks to the 69 assembled presidents,

prime min isters, a nd foreign mi n isters, cited the Helsi nk i Fina l Act

of 1975 a nd the courage of the Eu ropea n peoples who worked to
implement the CSCE objectives. He noted that three of the European leaders present, the presidents of Poland, Czechoslovakia,

and Bu lgaria, had been jailed or persecuted for exercising their

rights u nder the Helsinki Act. President Bush asserted that the

trea ty was the milita ry d imension of the CSCE process and that it

was "the most fa r-reaching arms agreement" ever negotiated. 25 In

his rema rks, President Gorbachev praised the CFE Treaty and

called for action on the other arms control treaties then u nder

negotiation, especia lly in the areas of strategic nuclea r wea pons.26

When they spoke, both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterra nd

took a longer, Europea n view. In the last 200 yea rs, Kohl said,

"Europe, and my country in pa rticula r, became the epicenter of

worldwide catastrophes." Now, he decla red it was time for Europea n peace. Mitterra nd observed that for the first time in Eu ropea n history the massive changes occurring across the continent

were "not the outcome of wa r or bloody revolution. "27

Between the hyperbole and the history lay the signed CFE

Trea ty. But before it could enter into force, it ha d to be ra tified.

That process would ta ke nea rly two yea rs; in the interim, the

trea ty became the subject of intense scrutiny by those responsi ble

for implementa tion.

A A () 1 Of THE CFE TRIA )

1 clarati ons

The CFE Treaty conta ined 23 a rticles that spelled out

trea ty definitions and req u irements in terms of equipment,

qua ntities, locations, and time periods. The trea ty outlined

requ irements for excha nges of informa tion, red uctions

(elimina tion or conversion of TLE), and on-site inspections. It a lso a uthorized the forma tion of a Joint Consu ltative Group (JCG) of all signatory na tions to resolve issues

that might arise during the life of the treaty. Eight protocols provided detailed proced ura l guida nce on the req u irements outlined in the 23 articles. Fina lly, three importa nt

decla rations were included in the trea ty.28

The first decla ra tion defined and limited the num ber

of land-based nava l a ircraft and attack helicopters. This

declara tion was but one element of a la rger problem that

treaty negotia tors faced. Combat aircraft ha d been a pa rticula rly d ifficult issue d uring treaty negotiations. The

Eastern grou p of states held an adva ntage of more tha n

2,000 la nd-based comba t aircra ft over the NATO na tions'

air forces. The Soviet Union wa nted the CFE Treaty limits

to codify that adva ntage. If the NATO na tions wa nted an

equal n um ber of comba t aircraft, the Soviet negotia tors

argued, they wou ld ha ve to bu ild u p to the Eastern group

mt',Chc111cellur 1-1c/11111f

I uh! dccl<1red , it ll'ilS t ime

/f!r L11mpea11 /Je'1u' .

8 PROTOCOLS

3 DECLARATIONS
 1 1( II

Several issues concerning combat aircraft, like the M iG-29, were contentious in negotiations.

of states' trea ty-a u thorized tota ls. NATO representati ves cou ntered that the goa l should be to achieve a treaty-a ut horized endstrength figure that wou ld pu t the two grou ps of states on an

eq ua l footing in rega rd to the fina l n umber of comba t aircra ft.

NATO's proposa l wou l d req u ire the Soviets to eliminate thousa nds

of comba t-rea dy a ircra ft. This was u naccepta ble to the Soviet

High Com ma nd.29

Another aspect of the same problem was how to define a

comba t a ircra ft. The NATO states offered a defin ition tha t

focused on the ca pa bility of the a ircra ft. If an aircraft cou ld fly

and deliver munitions, they argued, it was a combat aircra ft and

should be limited by the treaty. The Eastern group of states, however, preferred a definition that ca tegorized military aircraft by

mission. Using this definition, they recommended excluding aircraft such as defensive fighter i nterceptors and combat aircraft

used as trainers. These aircra ft, they asserted, did not have offensive missions-they did not support grou nd forces-therefore they

should not be limited by the treaty. In addition, the Soviets had

reassigned 500 land-based aircraft from ground to naval units,

and they wa nted to exclude them from considera tion a rgu ing that

the treaty did not appl y to na va l forces. These aircraft were importa nt to the Soviet High Comma nd beca use they constitu ted a

cou nter ba lance to NATO's carrier-based a ircraft, which were not

limited by the trea ty. The NATO states were concerned that any

treaty excl usion of comba t a ircra ft based on mission wou ld sa nction a lega l hid ing place. Furt her, they were trou bled by the Soviets' reassign ing grou nd- based com bat a ircra ft to na va l forces.

Wha t wou ld limit the Soviet milita ry from simpl y assigning an

increasi ng n u mber of a ircra ft to na va l forces? Pa inting a fighter's

ta il and wi ngs with nava l u n it insign ia , NATO negotiators argued,
offered little evidence that the fighter would not be used for offensive opera tions withi n the trea ty a rea.

30

The issue beca me so contentious tha t as la te as September

1990, Secreta ry of State James A. Ba ker, III, commented in a news

interview tha t comba t a ircra ft might not be a n element of the

trea ty. He suggested tha t these aircra ft might become a consideration for subseq uent CFE negotia tions. Secreta ry Ba ker and Foreign Minister Ed ua rd Sheva rd nad ze met in New York City in late

September to consider the fina l items of the trea ty. By ea rl y October, they had worked out a comprom ise agreement on 5,150 as the

tota l n u mber of comba t a ircraft a single cou ntry cou ld possess in

the treaty area. Th is ceiling reflected the Soviet High Comma nd 's

mini mum needs. Concu rrentl y with the Ba ker and Sheva rdnad ze

discussions in New York City, NATO's High Level Task Force

contin ued to review the issue in Brussels. Once Ba ker and

Sheva rd nadze had reached a n agreement, they presen ted it to each

grou p of states. In Vien na, a fter trea ty negotia tors a pproved the

single-nation limit, they moved forwa rd on October 15, 1990, to

agree on a ceil ing of 6,800 comba t a ircra ft per grou p of state

parries.3 1

This 6,800 comba t a ircraft limi t left the Eastern grou p of

states wit h a 900 a ircra ft ad va ntage. However, the new limits

mea nt tha t the Soviet Armed Forces wou ld ha ve to elim ina te 1,295

aircra ft, and the rema ining mem bers of its group of states, 277

a i rcra ft. The treaty l i mits incl uded i n terceptor a ircraft and Soviet

Backfi re bom bers. Mission was not the basis for i ncl usion. Trea ty

limi ts excluded prima ry fl ight tra ining a ircra ft, whereas comba t

a ircra ft tra iners were incl uded beca use of their offensive capa bi l ities. The incl usion of comba t a ircra ft tra iners a ffected the Eastern

grou p of states' tota ls, pri ma ri l y the Soviet Union's. The NATO

states, however, were not affected beca use their hold ings were

a pproxi matel y 900 a ircraft below the trea ty cei l ing. To com pensate the Eastern grou p for agreeing to the lower com ba t a i rcra ft

ceiling, the NATO negotia tors acceded to a trea ty provision tha t

allowed the reclassi fica tion of u p to 550 u na rmed tra in i ng a ircra ft.

Seven models of comba t tra ining a ircra ft cou ld be recl assified. Key

systems cou ld be removed to render the a ircra ft useless for offensive opera tions. Reclassification of the MiG-25U fighters was

limited to 130 aircra ft. Once mod ified and certified by on-site

i nspectors, these reclassified a ircra ft wou ld not cou nt aga inst the

6,800 a ircra ft ceiling.

In the fina l negotia tions, the Soviet delega tes were ada ma nt

on the issue of exclud ing their land-ba sed na va l a ircra ft from

considera tion. Ul tima tel y, negotia tors cou ld not resolve the problem wit hi n the structu re of the lega lly bi nd ing treaty. Instead , they

inserted into the treaty a politica l decla ra tion that a llowed each

grou p of states, a lthough in rea lity it a ppl ied only to the Soviet

U.S. Secretary of State

James A. Bak er, II I.

Soviet Foreign M inister

Eduard Shevardnadz e.
I8 () -SI II I O,l'I ( 1 10 t\(,I ( )

...t/Je 22 1ll7tio11s decl.11"cd illl

'1ggrep,'1tedtotdi nl201.005

pieces of trcaty-lin11ted

equip111e11t .

Union, to possess a certain n um ber of la nd-based naval aircraft

that did not cou nt aga inst the 6,800 ceiling for combat aircraft.

The CFE Treaty did contain some limits, however. The total

num ber of land-based naval aircraft was limited to 430 per group

of states, with no na tion allowed more tha n 400. This decla ration

recognized the initial Soviet adva ntage in combat aircraft going into

treaty negotiations, but it limited the nu mber of Soviet land-based

nava l aircraft to 400, and, most importa nt, it sealed for the future

the issue of com bat aircraft being assigned to naval forces and being

outside the treaty. Na va l combat a ircraft did not present the only

u nresolved issue as the time for treaty signature approached. The

complex issue of setting and verif ying limits on nationa l milita ry

personnel could not be solved in the weeks leading u p to treaty

signature, and prod uced another treaty decla ration.

By inserting this second decla ration into the CFE Treaty,

negotia tors stated that limits on na tiona l milita ry person nel were

an aspect of the CFE Trea ty, bu t that such limits req u ired fu rther

negotia tions to reach agreement on specific figures and verifica tion

protocols. 32 Verifica tion was the ma jor stu m bling point. U.S. negotia tors believed tha t while cou nting CFE milita ry equipment wou ld

be cha llenging, counting milita ry personnel could become impossible, pa rticula rly duri ng periods of extensive milita ry reorga nizations, massive force red uctions, and especia lly d uring ra pid military expa nsions. There were other difficu lt issues associated wit h

tracking milita ry ma npower. Just who wou ld be counted: milita ry

reserves? nava l infantry ? milita ry tra nsients? In trhe end, negotiators agreed to contin ue manpower negotiations with a goa l of

reaching agreement by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu rope to be held in Helsink i in July 1992.33 Conseq uently,

they included in this second CFE Treaty decla ration a statement

that all signatory states wou ld not increase their current levels of

peacetime person nel. Germa n y was the only state tha t made a

treaty decla ration to limit its mil ita ry forces. Its pledge to limit its

milita r y forces to not more than 370,000 constit u ted the third

decla ration of the CFE Trea ty.34

Scope

The scope of the treaty in terms of nations, milita ry equipment, and geogra phy was enormous. In Novem ber 1990, 22 nations with mili ta ry forces stationed over 2.3 million squa re miles

had committed themselves to the CFE Treaty. The TLE fell into

five major ca tegories: tank s, combat aircraft, attack helicopters,

armored combat vehicles, and artillery. Further, in each of those

categories there were ma n y types of equipment: 24 types of ta nks,

55 types of comba t a ircraft, 17 types of attack helicopters, and

more tha n 50 types of armored combat vehicles (ACVs). Armored

comba t vehicles, a term coined for the treaty, grou ped armored
I

..

Ill IU \ I' \ ( I l111 11\\IO IlJ

person nel carriers (A PCs), armored infa ntry fighting vehicles

(AIFVs), and heavy arma ment comba t veh icles into a single category. Hea vy arma ment comba t vehicles incl uded vehicles tha t

were not ta n ks, APCs, or AIFVs but had an integra l gun of at least

75 millimeter ( mm ) ca liber and weighed a t least 6 tons. Artillery

i ncluded guns, howitzers, morta rs, m u ltiple la u nch rocket systems,

and artillery pieces that combi ned the cha racteristics of guns and

howitzers. There were more tha n 100 types of a rtillery and a ll

were of at least 1OOmm ca liber. The five categories of TLE conta ined more than 240 d iff erent types of equ ipment. The combined

hold ings of TLE for both grou ps of states su rpassed 200,000

pieces.

The trea ty also had provisions for reporti ng conventiona l

a rma ments and equ ipment tha t were inventoried bu t not limited

by the treaty. The Protocol on Existi ng Types of Conventiona l

Ar ma ments and Eq u ipment l isted all conventiona l a rma ments and

eq u ipment subject to the treaty. Known by its acronym, CAEST,

this equipment incl uded the five categories of TLE, pl us comba t

support helicopters, u na rmed transport helicopters, and Mi-24R

and Mi-24K helicopters; pri ma ry tra iner a ircra ft; a rmored -vehiclela u nched bridges; and armored personnel ca rrier and a rmored

infa ntry fighting vehicle "look-a likes." Armored look-a likes were

vehicles bu ilt on ACY chassis tha t were simila r in appea ra nce to

an APC or an AIFV, except that they could not tra nsport a combat

infa ntry squad. They also did not have guns or cannons of 20

millimeter (mm) or grea ter caliber. There were 21 types of lookTable 1-1. CFE Treaty Ceilings

..--

----

Sufficiency Rule

In Each In One Percent 

TLE In ATTU* Alliance Country in ATTU

Tanks 40,000 20,000 13,300 33%

Artillery 40,000 20,000 13,700 34%

ACVs 60,000 30,000 20,000 33%

'h\:P Aircraft 13,600 6,800 5,150 38%

) '3t Helicopters 4,000 2,000 1,500 38%

·Atlantic to the Urals.

Source:Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 1990, Articles IV,V, VI.
10 0. -Si 1 1 I.·w1( 1 10:-; A(,I t '

Table 1-2. NATO Declared Holdings and Liabilities

TLE CFE Limit Declared Liability*

Percentage

of Holdings

Tanks 20,000 25,091 5,949 24%

Artillery 20,000 20,620 2,334 11%

AC Vs 30,000 34,453 4,631 13%

Aircraft 6,800 5,939 0 0%

Helicopters 2,000 1,736 0 0%

'Collectively, NATO nations set their CFE limits below the treaty limits. All figures as of

November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.

Source: CFE Treaty Declarations and Residual Ceilings, United Kingdom, Ministry of

Defense, November 1990.

alikes for the M-113 APC chassis a lone, a nd these were not limited by the trea ty. In deference to the Geneva Convention of 1949,

armored am bula nces were not consid ered ACVs or look-a likes

u nder the CFE Trea ty. Thus, they were not reporta ble.

Armored vehicle la u nched bridges were also su bject to the

CFE Trea ty. Al thou gh they were not considered TLE, limits were

placed on them. The trea ty a llowed each grou p of states to ha ve

740 a rmored bridges in use with their active forces. An y bridges in

excess of this limit ha d to rema in in storage. The trea ty conta ined

specific gu idelines bot h for storing them and for removing them

during an emergency.

In the first officia l trea ty i n forma tion excha nge, held in

Vien na on Novem ber 18, 1990, the 22 nations decla red an aggregated tota l of 201,005 pieces of TLE. By category, there were

58,282 ta nks, 77,402 ACVs, 47,573 a rtillery, 14,311 aircra ft, and

3,437 helicopters withi n the trea ty area , from the Atla n tic to the

Ura ls.35 By Novem ber 1995, the total nu mber of TLE within the

area ha d to be below the trea ty ceiling of 157,600 pieces. This

fina l figure is the tota l of the fiv e ca tegories of offensive wea pons:

40,000 ba ttle ta n ks, 60,000 a rmored comba t vehicles, 40,000

pieces of a rtillery, 13,600 comba t a ircra ft, a nd 4,000 atta ck helicopters (see ta ble 1-1). These tota ls incl uded a subtota l designa ting

the ma xim u m amou nt of equ ipment tha t active u n its cou ld hol d

collectively, with the rema inder stored in designa ted perma nen t

storage sites. These maxim u m eq u ipment f igures, aga in one-ha lf

for each grou p of states, permitted active u n its to hold 33,000

ta n ks, 54,600 ACVs, and 34,000 pieces of a rtillery.

To lessen the possi bility of any one na tion 's becomi ng too

domina nt or u nila tera lly l au nchi ng a massive surprise atta ck, the

trea t y stipu la ted lim i ts on the amou nt of equ ipment tha t any one

na tion cou ld ha ve with in the treaty area . Know n as the "suffi-
THE T1nATY AND TH. M1ss10 2 1

Table 1-3. WTO Holdings and Liabilities*

TLE CFE Limit Declared Liability

Percentage

ofHoldings

Tanks 20,000 33,191 13,191 40%

Artillery 20,000 26,953 6,953 26%

ACVs 30,000 42,949 12,949 30%

Aircraft 6,800 8,372 1,572 19%

Helicopters 2,000 1,701 0 0%

•All figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991, World Armaments and Disarmament, p. 426.

ciency ru le," this provision allowed a na tion sufficient forces to

defend itself, but limited its forces and offensi ve equ ipment to

approxi matel y one-third of the tota l amou nt per mi tted for its

group of states. As the Wa rsa w Pact d isintegrated, this provision,

which was originally a NATO proposa l, took on an additiona l

i mporta nce as the Centra l Eu ropea n nations sough t to minimize

the strength of the neigh boring Soviet Union.

Area

The trea ty's area of appl ica tion encompassed the territory of

the Eu ropea n signa tory na tions stretching from the Atla ntic Ocea n

to the Ura l Mou ntains. K nown as the ATTU (Atla ntic to the

Ura ls), the area consisted of four zones, three of which were concentric rings centered on Germa n y, and one that defi ned the fla n ks

of a Eu ropea n thea te r (see ma p). These four zones defined the

a reas in which the signa tories agreed to limit the n u mber of TLE

for stationed grou nd forces. Beca use of their mobil ity and ra nge,

com bat a ircra ft a nd attack helicopters were not su bject to zone

restrictions. The sma llest zone encircled Centra l Eu rope, a foca l

point of the Cold Wa r. It encompassed Germa ny, Belgi u m, Czech

Repu blic, Slova k ia , Hu nga ry, Lu xembou rg, Netherla nds, Pola nd,

and designa ted Eu ropea n isla nd territories. Milita ry forces in this

zone cou ld not exceed 15,000 battle ta n ks, 22,500 ACVs, a nd

10,000 pieces of artillery.

The next, la rger concen tric zone extended beyond Cen tral

Eu rope and included additiona l na tions. At trea ty signa tu re, the

second zone included Den ma r k and the Fa roe Isla nds, Fra nce,

Italy, United Kingdom and Nort hern Irela nd, and Soviet territory

encompassing the Byelorussia n, Carpa thia n, K iev, and Ba ltic Mil ita ry Districts. By the time of trea ty ratification and entry into force

in J u ly 1992, the Soviet Un ion had d issol ved and these milita ry
22 O'\-Srn I sP1 c 110'\J Ac.1- u

Norwegian

Sea

fl

North

Atlantic

Ocean

Spain

Algeria Mediterranean Sea
_ TH1 Tro \ r ' \ n 1 HI M1-,.,10 23

Barents 

Sea

Treaty-Limited Equipment for Each Group of States

Atlantic to the Urals (ATIU) zone boundary

7,500 battle tanks

• Zone 4 11,250 armored combat vehicles

5,000 pieces of artillery

10,300 battle tanks

Zone 3 19,260 armored combat vehicles

9,100 pieces of artillery

15,300battletanks

Zone 2 24,100 armored combat vehicles

14,000 pieces of artillery

20,000 battle tanks

30,000armored combat vehicles

20,000 pieces of artillery

6,800combat aircraft

2,000combat helicopters

DTreaty Nonparticipants

Volg_a-Ural

MD

Moscow

MD

Turkestan

MD

Northern

Caucasus

MD

Iran

Iraq

500 kilometers

I

I

500 miles

Zone 1
D November 95

November 94

November 93

24 0 -SI fl' INWL( 1 101\ A<.E\,()

d istricts were loca ted i n the independent states of Uk raine, R ussia,

Bela rus, and the Ba ltic nations. Eq uipment allowed in this zone

tota led 20,600 ba ttle ta n ks, 38,520 ACVs, and 18,200 pieces of

a rtillery. Pu t another wa y, this larger zone, which incl uded the

smaller zone, cou l d hold the equ ipment authorized in the sma ller

zone pl us an ad ditiona l 5,600 battle ta n ks, 16,020 ACVs, and

8,200 pieces of artillery.

The la rgest of the three zones at treaty signa tu re encompassed

the two sma ller zones pl us Portugal with the Azores and Madeira

Isla nds, Spain and the Cana ry Isla nds, and the Soviet territories

west of the Ura l mou nta ins encompassing the Moscow and VolgaUra l Milita ry Districts. When the treaty entered into force, this

expa nded area , which stretched literally from the Atla ntic to the

Urals, incl uded the independent states of Russia , Uk raine, Bela rus,

and portions of Ka zaksta n. This zone allowed for 10,000 more

ba ttle ta nks, 9,680 more ACVs, and 9,800 pieces of a rtillery for a

total of 30,600, 48,200, and 28,000 pieces of equ i pment in their

respective ca tegories. The rema ining pieces of TLE were a u thorized in the flank areas.

The origina l treaty defined the flank areas as Bulga ria,

Greece, Icela nd, Norwa y, Roma nia, Tu rkey west of the Urals, and

the Soviet territory encom passi ng the Leni ngrad, Odessa, Northern Caucasus, and Tra nsca ucasus Mi lita ry Districts. By July 1992,

when the trea ty entered into force, portions of these former Soviet

milita ry districts were loca ted in the new na tions of Moldova,

Russia, Georgia, Armenia , Uk ra ine, and Azer ba ija n. Other portions encompassed the th ree Ba ltic states of Estonia, La tvia, and

NATO REDUCTION LIABILITY

6,000 5,949

5,000

2,379 4,631

4,000

3,000

2,000

0 0

1,000

0 0

0 TANKS ARTILLERY ACVs AIRCRAFT HELICOPTERS
-- -- THI TRI .\I) .\ [) IHI MISSJ()'.'-; 2S

Lith ua nia, na tions that chose not to be CFE Trea ty pa rticipa nts.

Although the Ba ltic states were not subject to inspection, the Russian forces stationed there were, and Russia's red uction lia bility

incl uded the eq ui pment not yet removed from the Ba ltic states.

The tota l milita ry equi pment a llowed u nder the treaty for the

flank areas was 9,400 battle ta nks, 11,800 ACVs, and 12,000

pieces of a rtillery.

Reductions

Two of the CFE Trea ty's ma in objectives were to red uce the

possi bility of a surprise attack and to lower the proba bility of

confrontation by red uci ng the tota l nu mber of tanks, artillery,

ACVs, attack helicopters, and com bat a ircra ft the respecti ve grou p

of states cou ld hold. To achieve these red uctions, the treaty set

specif ic sched ules for reachi ng the fina l limits. As implementation

u nfolded, inspection tea ms monitored the pace and level of red uction efforts. Inspections beca me importa nt bench ma rks for measuring trea ty complia nce.

During the initia l red uction phase, k nown by the term "first

red uction yea r," each na tion had to red uce 25 percent of its holdi ngs that exceeded treaty l imits at entry i nto force (EIF). The initia l

red uction phase bega n a t the provisiona l EIF on Ju l y 17, 1992,

and lasted for 16 months. It encompassed the 120-day baseli ne

inspection period followed by the first red uction yea r. A second

red uction yea r followed, d u ring which an add itiona l 35 percent

of the excess equ ipment bad to be red uced. Treaty states would

14,000

13,191

WTO REDUCTION LIABILITY

12,949

12,000

10,000 5,276

5,179 D November 95

November 94

8,000 November 93

6,000

4,000

0

2,000

0 TANKS ARTILLERY ACVs

0

AIRCRAFT HELICOPTERS
26 0 -Su 1. I ·wr< 1 10 Ac.1 :-.:c ) 

The treaty authorized converting tank s and AC\!s to nonmilitar y equipment .

red uce the remai ning 40 percent of their excess equipment d uring

a third a nd fina l red uction yea r. This schedu le gave each group of

states 40 months to red uce a ll their wea pons in excess of the final

trea ty limits.

Article VIII of the CFE Trea ty specified the methods a llowed 

to red uce TLE. Red uction methods va ried by equi pment ca tegory,

although destruction and placement on static d ispla y were options

common to all categories of TLE. Nations could also convert

ta nks and ACVs for nonmil ita ry pu rposes or use them as training

ta rgets. A red uction option for the Soviet MT-LB armored personnel ca rrier was mod ification tha t rendered the MT-LB inca pa ble of

tra nsporti ng a squad of comba t infa ntrymen. The only additional

option au thorized was to use the ca rriers as grou nd ta rgets. Comba t aircraft could also be mod ified for grou nd instructional use,

and seven specific models of a ircra ft could be mod ified and reclassified as una rmed tra ining a ircraft . Helicopters, attack or mu ltipur pose attack, cou ld be mod ified for ground instruction pu rposes, a nd the multi purpose helicopters could a lso be mod ified

and recategorized as support hel icopters.

The Protocol on Red uction provided specific guid ance on

implementi ng the va rious methods of red uction listed in Article

VIII. Aut hori zed methods for destroyi ng TLE included cutting,

explod ing, deforming, and smashing. The protocol also dictated

the specific components to be destroyed for each category of

eq u ipment as well as the damage req u ired to render a piece of TLE

permanently ineffective as a milita ry wea pon. The protocol d ictated the resu lts, not the pa rticu lar tech nology used to achieve

them. How to accomplish a cut of a specific length in a specific

loca tion, for example, was a n option of the state red uci ng the

equi pment. It was not necessa ry to destroy the entire wea pon to

achieve red uction. Unless specified in the red uction protocol as a

component to be destroyed, some equipment, such as commun ication systems, cou ld be sal vaged and the debris scrapped.
T111 I{] "' \ I) THI Ml'>'il() ' 1

For aircra ft, the fuselage was the critica l component for a

successf u l red uction by destruction; an y other component cou ld be

salvaged. The first of the two a uthorized destruction methods to

red uce an a ircra ft on the grou nd was severing, wh ich req u ired

techn icia ns to cut the nose and ta il sections off the fuselage. The

other option, deforma tion, req u ired techn icia ns to com press the

fuselage to red uce its height, length, or wid t h by a t least 30 percent. In either case i nspectors would ha ve specific criteria and

tangible evidence of an aircra ft red uction. Using aircra ft as ta rget

drones was an add itiona l a u thorized destruction proced u re for

aircra ft. A u thorized methods of helicopter destruction were severing, explosive demolition, a nd deforma tion. The fuselage and the

tra nsmission mou nting area were the key components for a successful red uction, and specific damage criteria were outlined for

each destruction method.

Destruction met hods for ta n ks and a rmored comba t vehicles

included severing, demol ition, and smashing. Also allowed were

proced ures to red uce ta nks by deforma tion, incl uding weld ing or

severing components of gun systems in addition to deforma tion of

the hu ll and turret. The critica l components to be da maged were

gun tu bes, breech systems, trunnions a nd their mou nts, hu lls,

tu rrets, and integra l ma in a rma ment.

Red ucing a rtillery by destruction includ ed severing, demolition, smashing, a nd deforma tion. Specific criteria of d amage were 

stipu lated for components critica l to ma king the piece of equ ipment a wea pon. Those components were the tu be, breech system,

cradle with tru n nion and mou nts, and ra ils; launcher tubes or ra ils

and their bases; morta r tu bes and base pla tes; and vehicle hu ll and

tu rret for self-propelled a rtillery pieces.

The fuselage was the k ey

component for an aircraft

reduction, either by deformation

or by severing, as shown on this

MiG-2 l "Fishbed ."
28 ON-SITE INSPECTIO AG ENCY --------------------------

Severing was the primar y reduction

method for all treaty-limited

equipment (TLE).

While d estruction was the most common option selected for

red uction, the trea ty permi tted other mea ns as well. States owning

the equ ipmen t were allowed to pu t it to use as something other

tha n a wea pon. Certa i n ta n ks and ACVs cou ld be converted to

nonmilita ry equ ipment such as bu lldozers, fire fighting equ ipment,

and rescue vehicles. Any item cou ld be red uced for static displays

or placed in milita ry museu ms. Tan ks, ACVs, and artiller y could

be red uced for grou nd ta rgets, and aircra ft and attack helicopters

could be red uced for grou nd i nstruction pur poses. The key concept in these red uctions was tha t specific components req u ired

disa bli ng da ma ge before certi fica tion for use for other pur poses.

However, the n u m ber of items tha t could be red uced usi ng these

trea ty options was l imited.

Reca tegoriza tion presented another red uction option, such as

i n the case of m ultipurpose attack helicopters. By treaty definition,

these hel icopters performed mu l tiple mi l ita ry functions and empl oyed guided wea pons. By removi ng their wea pon systems,

mou nting poi n ts, fire control systems, and wiring, the own ing

state cou l d reca tegori ze these helicopters as comba t support helicopters not limited by the trea ty. Well before any na tions bega n

these red uctions, however, t hey collected and excha nged specific

trea ty data concern ing their own forces and equ ipment.

Data Exchange

The initia l, massi ve CFE Trea ty d a ta exchange occurred on

Novem ber 18, 1990, the d ay before trea ty signatu re. Freely provided , th is data excha nge l isted the order of ba ttl e for every signator y na ti on's conventiona l forces stationed on the Europea n continent. Experts scruti nized these data im med iately, and they became

one of the primary sources for prepa ring and pla nn ing trea ty

im plemen ta tion. Previousl y, a sma ll army of intelligence officers

wou ld ha ve been necessa ry to ga ther this i nfor ma tion; now signatory na tions were excha ngi ng these data as pa rt of their in itial

trea ty obligation. Article XIII, the Protocol on Notification and

Excha nge of Informa tion, and its An nex on the Forma t for the

Exchange of Informa tion req u ired each signa tory pa rty to provide

all other pa rties specific informa tion on the status of its forces.

The informa tion was provided in six cha rts.

Chart I provided the comma nd structure for each nation's

conventiona l grou nd a nd air forces stationed in the ATTU. This

chart identified each u n it a nd assigned it a designa tor used in

subseq uent cha rts. Cha rt I a lso ind ica ted the next two higher

echelons in the u n i t's cha i n of comma nd. Cha rts IIA and IIB listed

each na tion's tota l hold ings of TLE. Cha rt IIA identified a state's

tota l hold ings in trea ty-limi ted ta n ks, ACVs, and a rtillery. It also

revea led the q ua ntity of TLE in each trea ty area by category, subca tegory, a nd type. Cha rt IIA a lso showed TLE in designa ted
..

.

_ f111 flu A l' A D 1 H J M1c,c,10 • 29

On N ovember 1 8, 1 990, all CFE nations exchanged detailed information on their military forces.

perma nent storage sites ( DPSSs). Cha rt IIB provided the same

informa tion for treaty-limited a ircraft and helicopters, with two

exceptions. There was no reporting by treaty zones for a ircra ft a nd

helicopters nor did DPSSs apply. In Cha rts IIIA and IIIB, states

reported all of their conventiona l arma ments a nd equ ipment subject to the treaty (CAEST). They reported not only those u nits

hold ing TLE, as req u ired in Cha rt I, but a lso those hold ing equ ipment not limited bu t nonetheless subject to the trea ty, includ ing

na va l u nits. In addition, the states reported all DPPSs, red uction

sites, and loca tions where CAEST were routinely present, such as

repair facilities or tra ining esta blishments. Cha rt IIIA dea lt with

ground forces, and Cha rt IIIB covered air u nits. Any TLE located

in the ATTU, bu t not in service with a state's conventional armed

forces, was reported in Cha rt IV. Also, interna l security milita ry

organiza tions a nd their equi pment that were not tra ined for comba t aga inst another milita ry force were reported on Cha rt IV.

Equipment being refur bished or held for export-for example,

ta nks a nd ACVs that had been red uced or were awa iting conversion-and equ ipment that had been decom missioned and was

awa iting d isposa l were reported on Cha rt IV.

On Cha rt V, states reported their objects of verification

(OOVs). An OOV was any u nit at the brigade/regiment, wing/a ir

regi ment, independent ba tta lion/a rtillery ba tta lion level, independent squad ron, or equiva lent u nit hold ing TLE. Designa ted permanen t storage sites, ma intena nce u nits, milita ry tra ining esta blishments, and a irfields where TLE was perma nently or freq uently

present were also OOVs. Red uction sites were OOVs as well,

beca use of the excess TLE positioned on these sites. States a lso

reported their decla red sites on Cha rt V.

While a na tion's tota l n u mber of OOVs dictated the n u mber

of inspections it was lia ble to receive during the va rious phases

of the trea ty, the definition of a decla red site dicta ted what was

inspecta ble. A decla red site was a precisely delineated geographic

loca tion con taining one or more OOVs. Examples of decla red sites

were specific a ir bases, arm y posts, and storage depots on which

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Cha rt llIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS A ND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION llI OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE

OF (Sra te Pa rty) VALID AS OF (Da te)

rn 0 ·-SJ 1 1 I'<.,J>r ( I J O. Ac.1 ( )

Line

N umber

Formation

or Unit

Record

Nmnber

Designarion

of Formati on

or Unir

Peacetime

Location

NOT

USED Combat

Aircraft

Rc..:lassified

CCT

Aircraft

Primary

Trainer

Aircraft

Attack

Helicopters

Com bar

Support

Helicopt ers

Unarmed

Transport

Helicopters Other

(a) (h) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) ( I)

The Protocol on N otificati on and

Exchange of Information provid ed

specific formats for pr esenting

treaty-required exchange data.

Unlhilld Residu•I

Duntlan Period

Re 1dual Level

the OOVs were located. A decla red site i ncl uded all territory

within its nat u ral or ma n-made bou nd aries. A decla red site a lso

encompassed a reas associa ted with the operations of the unit tha t

might not be coloca ted, such as a ra i lhea d or a tra i ning area , but

where CAEST and TLE were rou tinel y present. For exa mple, the

36th Fighter Wing, a U.S. OOV, opera ted from a declared site, the

Bitbu rg Air Base i n Bit burg, Germa ny. This ra tio of one OOV to

one decla red site was typica l of most U.S. a ir u nit OOVs, but

ground units frequently colocated OOVs on a single d eclared site.

For insta nce, three OOVs-the 3rd Battal ion, 1st Field Artiller y;

82nd Engineering Battalion, 3rd Engineering Brigade; and 2nd

Batta lion, 14th Field Artillery-opera ted from one declared site:

Warner Ba rracksin Bamberg, Germa ny. A declared site containing

multiple OOVs was typica l for the nationa l militaries of the Eastern group of states. Decla red sites and OOVs were critica l for

trea ty i m plement ation.

Cha rt V l isted the poi nts of entry ( POEs) associated with each

declared site. Inspection tea ms entered a nd exited the inspected

129Dayl

I Year

I Year

I Year

120 D•ys

Ve1lidauon Period

Reduclion

Period

Baseline Validalion Period

nation th rough the specific POEs designated for each decla red site.

Chart VI provided a listing of a ll designa ted POEs, ca tegorized by

the mea ns of tra nsporta tion used to reach them. I n Novem ber

1990, Greece, for exa mple, reported two POEs on Cha rt VI, one

a t Athens Interna tiona l Airport for a ir arriva ls and the other a t the

Port of Piraeus for a rriva ls by sea . The Greek govern ment designated both POEs as accepta ble for 47 of their decla red sites, while

designating only one POE for t he remainin g decla red sites.

Treaty Periods

Negotiator s developed the trea t y so that implementation took

place in four d iff erent periods. The initia l 120-day baseli ne va lidaCFE Treaty Periods tion period, referred to as the CFE Treaty baseli ne, was expected
T111 fRI \1 ) \ IJ IIll Mt<,<,(() J

to be an extremely busy period for inspection teams. During

baseline each state pa rty was prepa red to recei ve i nspections at a

portion of its decla red sites. Du ring treaty negotiations, a consensus developed tha t there were too ma n y decla red sites to i nspect

each one d uring the brief baseli ne period. Conseq uently, negotiators agreed tha t it was not necessa ry to inspect each site to determine if a na tion had been accura te in its data exchange. They 

agreed that each na tion would be lia ble for inspections based on

20 percent of the total n umber of the OOVs decla red in the initia l

excha nge of data. These baseli ne inspections would occur when

the amount of TLE and the nu mber of OOVs would proba bly be

at their highest and before na tions could complete any significa nt

TLE red uctions. On-site inspections du ring baseline allowed states

to take a significa nt sample of the data exchanged to determine its

accuracy and to establish a base for pla nning future trea ty activities.

The second period, the red uction phase, occurred after basel ine, when the pace of the decla red site inspections slowed to a ra te

of 10 percent of the tota l decla red OOVs per yea r. This ra te rema ined in effect during the three red uction yea rs. Du ring those

yea rs, inspectors would be no less busy beca use of the req uirement

to conduct red uction inspections. After these initia l baseline and

red uction periods, the third phase would consist of a 120-day

resid ua l level va l idation period. During this phase, states would

inspect at a 20 percent ra te to confirm the amou nt of equ ipment

rema ining following the red uctions. On completion of the resid ual

va lida tion period, the declared site inspections would be conducted at a rate of 15 percent of each state's OOVs per yea r for

the du ra tion of the trea ty, k nown as the resid ua l period.

On-'iitc Inspections

Article XIV of the CFE Trea ty a l lowed each state to verify

complia nce wit h all provisions of the treaty by giving each the

right to cond uct inspections. The same article obliga ted the trea ty

states to accept on-site inspections. Under the CFE Treaty there

were four types of on-site inspections: decla red site inspections,

challenge inspections, red uction inspections, and certification

i nspections. One pu rpose of these inspections was to ascerta in if

each state was observi ng the nu merical limitations on TLE located

in the trea ty zones and the flanks. These inspections a lso monitored the red uction of TLE, the certifica tion of recategorized

attack helicopters, and the reclassifica tion of combat-ca pa ble

tra ining aircraft. Each served a specific pur pose, and the Protocol

on Inspections outlined proced ures for conducti ng each type of

inspection.

The decla red site inspection was a critica l tool for confirmi ng

the accuracy of excha nged trea ty data. In theory and in fact, onsite inspections contributed to nationa l secu rity across Eu rope.

Types of Inspections:

• Dcclc zred Site

• Challmg e

• Rcd11ctio11

• Cert1ficatimr
'

- 0 -Sr 1 1 I w1 < 1 10 Ac 1 < '

Challenge inspections allowed

teams to inspect for the pres ence

of TLE in areas other than

declared sites.

The status of each state's forces and equipment beca me tra nspa rent to other states th rough inspection tea m reports and observations. An inspected state could not refuse a decla red site inspection. It was a lega l obligation u nder the trea ty. Over the life of the

trea ty, the hu nd reds, indeed thousa nds, of on-site inspections

allowed each state to conclude tha t other states were f ulfilli ng

their lega l obliga tions and complying with the treaty 's req uirements. This importa nt conclusion could, when com bi ned with

other i nformation, lead to a new level of trust and confidence

across na tiona l borders. Allowing trea ty inspectors on-site was one

key to developi ng and ma i n ta ining successf u l rela tionships among

the signa tory nations.

Negotiators recognized that na tions could not rely solely on

the decl a red site inspections to monitor compl iance with trea ty

proced ures. Article XV addressed their right to use nationa l technica l mea ns such as satellites or reconna issa nce aircraft to moni tor

treaty complia nce. Tha t article a lso prohi bited the concea lment of

equipment to circu mvent reconn a issa nce efforts. Negotia tors also

rea lized that to ma i nta in a spirit of openness and cooperation,

nations would ha ve to open a ll of their territory to inspections,

not just the sites where they had decla red conventiona l milita ry

equipment.

Cha llenge inspections gave pa rtici pa ting na tions the right to

inspect a specific and limited area other tha n decla red sites in any

signatory nation wit hin the ATTU. This inspection right increased

the l ikelihood of detecti ng wea pons at sites not declared in the exchanged data. As in decla red site inspections, quotas were a ppl ied to cha llenge i nspections.

Starting the day the treaty entered into force and contin uing through the resid ua l level va lidation period,

cha llenge inspections opera ted withi n a quota. It was

not more tha n 15 percent of a state's decla red site

inspection obligations. That quota increased to 23

percent over the subseq uen t life of the trea ty. The procedu res for challenge inspections were simi lar to those

in decla red site inspections, but there were differences.

In a cha llenge inspection, the inspection team

provided a geogra phic description of the specified area,

delineating the bou nda ries of the area it wa nted to

inspect. By compa rison, in a decla red site inspection,

the inspected pa rty decla red its site and the treaty defined the site. A cha llenge inspection team, however,

could req uest any location within a country, exclud ing

decla red sites. There was a limit to the size of the inspection area, namely, 65 squa re k ilometers and no

more tha n 16 kilometers between any two points

withi n the area.
,, 11\ IH \ I' \ I> 1 111 MMIO'\ ) )

The major d ifference in a cha llenge i nspection, however, was

not a rea size, but the fact that the i nspecti ng state could only

req uest an i nspection. The i nspected state could refuse or accept

the inspection within two hou rs a fter the inspection cha llenge was

issued for a specified area. This was a critical right for any state

in tha t it protected each state from inspection by another whose

intent might not be associated with the CFE Treaty. An inspected

state could refuse a chal lenge inspection req uest for reasons of

safety or secu rity. If the inspected state ref used a cha llenge inspection req uest, however, it was obliged to assu re the req uesti ng state

that there was no TLE in the specified area, a difficu lt task if

reconna issa nce photogra ph y indica ted TLE present a t that site. If

the inspected state held TLE assigned to peacetime i nterna l security forces wit hin the specified area, it had to allow visual confirmation of the TLE presen t. Followi ng a ref usal, the i nspection

tea m could designa te another challenge or declared site inspection .

A ref usa l of the inspection did not red uce inspection quotas.

Surprise was a key element for both the decla red site and

challenge i nspections. Treaty provisions dicta ted specific timelines

for different actions during each inspection. As a conseq uence, an

inspected state had very little time to move or reposition TLE. The

trea ty's Protocol on Inspection stipula ted tha t a n inspecting sta te

had to provide on ly 36 hou rs' notice prior to an inspection team's

a rrival at the poi nt of entry. After their a rri val, the i nspection tea m

Inspection teams moved quick ly-within nine hours after declaring the site to be inspected.
34 0:-..-SJII Ii Sl'I ( IION Ar.1 (') 

Safet y briefings were particularl y

important at sites with rough

terrain, harsh climate, and aging

facilities.

had from 1 to 16 hours to annou nce which decla red site or specified area it i ntended to inspect. Followi ng tha t annou ncement, the

trea ty req uired the i nspected state to exped itiously tra nsport the

inspection tea m to the decla red site. Ni ne hours was norma lly the

ma ximu m time to tra nsport the inspection team to the site. In

mou nta ins or difficult terra in, the trea ty permitted a 15-hour

travel time to the site, bu t on ly 9 of those hou rs counted against

the inspection team's time in country. Rega rd less of whether the

permitted tra vel time was 9 or 15 hou rs, the trea ty a llowed the

inspected state 6 hou rs to prepa re the site for inspection.

Upon a rrival at a decla red site, the inspected state's escort

tea m ushered the i nspection tea m to a briefing facility, where

escorts presented a site diagra m to the inspection tea m. The site

diagram showed the perimeter of the decla red site, the bou nda ries

of all OOVs on the site, ma jor bu ild ings and roadways, entra nces

to the decla red site, and the loca tion of an adm inistra tive area

designa ted for the inspection team's use. Within 30 mi n utes of

receivi ng the site diagram, the inspection team had to decla re the

OOV they would be inspecti ng.

Once the tea m ch ief annou nced the OOV for i nspection, the

inspected pa rty gave a preinspection site brief ing that "should "

not last more tha n one hour. This brief ing was im porta nt beca use

it cou ld, and often did , set the tone for the entire inspection. Included in th is briefi ng was informa tion on local safety and admi nistrative proced ures, com mu nica tions and tra nsporta tion systems,

and hold ings and locations of a ll CAEST on the site, includ ing

CAEST in a ny common a reas. A common area was any a rea on

the site that was not a pa rt of a n OOV, such as a parade ground,

administrative facilities, equ ipment pa rk ing areas, and training

areas. If the amount of TLE briefed varied from the most recent

notification given by the inspected state, the inspected pa rty was to
--f 111 IRI\l ' \ I> I Ill/\\ l',\I() H

provide expla na tions for the d ifferences. Expla na tions wou ld

incl ude i nformation on where the add itiona l equi pmen t came

from, when it a rri ved, how long it would be there, and the location of any tempora ril y a bsent eq u ipment. The time from notification to the begin ning of the actual inspection cou ld be as short as

44 hours: 36 hours' notifica tion, 1 hou r a t the POE prior to the

site decla ra tion, 6 hours' m inimu m time to prepare the site, and

the I-hour preinspection briefing. For cha llenge i nspections the

timel ine was simi la r, except that the inspected na tion had two

hours to decide if it woul d accept the inspection. In theory a nd in

fact, these treaty-ma nd ated timelines left very little time to move

or concea l la rge qua n tities of milita ry forces or equ ipment.

While the decla red site and cha llenge inspections con firmed

the presence or a bsence of TLE, the red uction inspection a llowed

states to monitor the red uction of TLE excess to the trea ty limits.

There were no quotas for red uction i nspections beca use a ll red uctions were open to inspection. There was no right of ref usa l. Each

state sched uled and cond ucted its red uctions in periods that lasted

for a t least 30 days, but no longer tha n 90 days. These an nou nced

calend ar reporting periods were not accou nta ble sched ules; instead, they reflected the red uction goa ls of a state for tha t period.

The notifica tion of a calend ar reporti ng period, given not less tha n

Russian team inspects severed main guns of American M -47 tank s at Buccino, Italy.
-·

36 ON-S1r1 I w1 cno Ac T\ 

A site logbook recorded reduction

activity during a calendar

reporting period.

15 days before red uctions bega n, included the

red uction site, the equ ipment to be red uced, the

OOVs tha t ha d possessed the ha rd wa re, the

red uct ion methods to be employed, the poi nt of

entry for the inspection tea m, and the last day for

viewi ng the equ ipment before the actua l red uction started.

During a CFE red uction, inspectors had the

right to rema in on-site and wa tch the entire

process throughout the an nou nced red uction

period , and three days beyond tha t if necessa ry. If

two an nou nced red uction periods were less tha n

fou r da ys apa rt, inspectors could rema i n on-site

th rough the following period a lso. While inspectors ha d a right to rema in on-site for the d u ra tion, it was a n impractical and u n necessa ry expense. Typica lly, an inspection tea m

arrived at the site a t the begi nni ng of the red uction period a nd

exercised the trea ty righ t to record seria l n u mbers or to place

ma rk ings on the equ ipment a nnou nced for red uction. The tea m

also checked eq u ipment seria l n u mbers aga i nst the n u mbers recorded in a site logbook ma inta i ned by the red ucing state. The

inspection tea m m ight then view red uctions of one or two pieces

of equi pment. An i nspector's interest, however, was in the fina l

results. The technology or tech niq ues employed to achieve those

results were more concerns for Joint Consul tative Grou p (]CG)

delega tes or negotia tors. Usually, the inspection tea m depa rted the

site, and at the end of the red ucti on period, tha t team or a different

team retu rned to confirm tha t the red uctions met treaty req u irements. At tha t time, they compa red equ ipment serial n umbers, or

the inspector-a pplied ma rk ings, on the red uced components against

their own lists or aga inst the site's red uction log.

The final inspection t ype, certification, was sim ila r to

red uction inspections in severa l wa ys. The certifica tion inspection

allowed na tions to certi fy tha t multipurpose attack helicopters and

comba t-ca pa ble a ircra ft ha d been reconfigu red into support helicopters and tra iner a ircraft. Inspectors ha d access to cockpits and

cou ld dema nd the remova l of pa nels to con firm tha t certa in trea tydesigna ted offensi ve weapons systems were no longer present. This

inspection protocol req u ired a t least a 15-day notifica tion prior to

the date tha t the reconf igu red helicopters would be availa ble for

certifica tion by the i nspection tea ms. There was no right of refusal

nor quotas for these certif ica tion i nspections.

Liaison Officer Requi rement

As a conseq uence of the Cold Wa r, na tions of the NATO and

WTO a llia nces ha d sta tioned h u nd reds of thousa nds of thei r milita ry personnel, wea pons, and facili ties on mi l ita ry sites throughout

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l

Eu rope. The United States, for insta nce, ha d nea rly 325,000 U.S.

Army, Air Force, a nd Na vy person nel deployed th roughou t Eu rope

in 1990. The Soviet Union ha d 17 a rmy d i visions and 363,700

mi l ita ry person nel stationed in East Germa n y a nd anot her

337,000 stationed on m i l i ta ry bases in the other Centra l Eu ropea n

cou ntries. Und er the CFE Trea ty, nations t ha t stationed conventiona l forces and equ ipment outside their own state, bu t wi th i n the

ATTU, were consid ered "stationi ng states." Stationing state forces

were subject to the prov isions of the CFE Trea ty a nd to i nspection.

The trea ty recogn ized the sovereignty of a stationi ng state, a uthori zing it to escort CFE inspectors duri ng a n i nspection of its forces.

The trea ty specifica l l y req u ired an i nspecti ng state to notify the

sta tioni ng state as well as the "host state" of an impendi ng inspection. This notifica tion ga ve the station ing state sufficient time to

assemble and d ispa tch an escort team to the site, as a host state

wou ld if an i nspection team had selected one of its decla red sites

for i nspection. Under the CFE Treaty, the Un ited States initia lly

had 169 OOVs tha t were su bject to decl a red site inspections.

A significant probl em for the United States was tha t U.S.

Eu ropea n forces, eq u ipment, a nd facilities were loca ted a t more

tha n 1,500 sites th roughou t Eu rope. Some of t hese sites conta ined

sensitive or classified progra ms. Most of these progra ms were

located on U.S. mil ita ry sites, bu t a n u mber ha d been placed on

mili ta ry bases or sites owned by the host state. Under ea rl y d ra fts

of the treaty's i nspection protocol, all U.S. stationed forces and

faci lities were su bject to i nspection. Here was a serious issue for

the United States. In treaty negotia tions, the U nited States supported the inclusion of a comprehensi ve, intrusi ve, on-site inspecSergeant First Class Gilbert Sierra, J r., and David Carter document the

reduction of A CVs.
i8 ON-Sm l"lsP1·cnoN Ac1·NC) 

tion regime for moni tori ng the trea ty, but a t the same time it recognized tha t it ha d to protect classified progra ms and faci lities

critica l to comba t rea d iness a nd milita ry operations of the U.S.

forces in Eu rope. To resolve this dilemma, the Off ice of the Secreta ry of Defense d irected a thorough review in early 1990. Out of

tha t intensive eva lua tion, key America n officia ls concluded tha t

the existing, ta bled i nspection protocol ha d to be mod ified.36

In early Ma rch 1990, the Un ited States introd uced a new

NATO-end orsed inspection protocol. It provided proced ures to

deal with sensitive points, a uthorized the shroudi ng of non-TLE

items, a nd inserted a two-meter access rule. This ru le preserved the

treaty right of the inspection tea m to observe, count, and record

the CFETreaty's TLE-tanks, artillery, APCs, fighters, and attack

helicopters-without entering and inspecting every building, barracks, container, and shrouded object. Doorsto buildings could be

opened for visual inspection, but inspectors could enter only when

the doors exceeded two meters. The two-meter rule also came into

play when dealing with shrouded sensitive items or containers.If

none of the width, length, height, or diameter measurements of a

shrouded item or container exceed ed two meters, the inspectors

ha d no right to access beca use there was no TLE tha t meas ured

less tha n two meters. These cha nges were discussed and approved

by the trea ty negotia tors i n the spring and summer months of

1990. They were i ncorpora ted into the fina l CFE Trea ty's inspection protocol.37

Lt. Colonel Ed ward G. Gallagher, II, and M ajor H enry T. Storey discuss the inspection with

Russian escorts under a canopy of tank barrels in M ayk op, Russia.
Tm TiuAl' ,\ D 1Hl Ml\\IO. 39

Another critica l concept, the right of the inspected pa rty to

decla re a "sensitive point," was pa rt of the fina l trea ty. Under this

concept a n inspected state cou ld decla re equ ipment, loca tions, or

structures sensitive to its security. This decla ra tion a llowed the

inspected state to dela y, l imi t, or deny inspectors access to or

overflight of the sensitive poi nt. An inspected state cou l d also

shroud a sensitive piece of equipment while still provid ing an

inspection tea m access to a facil ity. Although a state could decla re

a sensitive poi n t, it also ha d to decla re whether the sensitive poi nt

conta ined any TLE. If TLE was present, the escort team ha d to

either d ispla y the eq u ipment or ta ke steps to satisfy the inspection

tea m tha t only the decl a red amou n t and type of TLE was

present. 18

A third, significa nt concept developed in the fina l stages of

negotia tions. As expla ined previousl y, the United States had milita ry u n its and equ ipment that were not subject to the treaty but

were located on host states' m i lita ry bases a nd facilities. The

United States wa nted its tra ined , trea ty-k nowledgea bl e escort

officers to be present a t i nspections in host states to protect A merican rights and interests. In add ition, the United States had other

forces and facilities tha t were not on a decla red site of any state

bu t tha t were still vu lnera ble to bei ng inspected duri ng cha llenge

The CF E Treaty required nations to reduce their massive holdings of TLE across Europe.
40 0 -SI II Jr--; 1·1 ( l10 A<,I ( '

inspections of a host state a rea. Protecting U.S. rights i n these

situations was a ma jor concern for the U.S. govern ment. In the last

few weeks of trea ty negotia tions, U.S. representa tives developed a

new provision tha t a llowed for a lia ison officer.

This concept req u ired the stationi ng state pa rty, prior to a n

inspection, to designa te a l ia ison off icer to serve on the host state's

escort tea m. Lia ison officers were to be ava ila ble to represent their

government d u ring an inspection i n case the inspection tea m came

u pon any of the stationing state's forces or facilities. Beca use the

treaty protocols provided l ittle gu id ance on how to carry out this

liaison fu nction, the United States negotia ted bila tera l agreements

with the host states, out l in ing proced ures for U.S. lia ison and host

escort officers d uring CFE Trea ty inspections. These bila tera l

agreements va ried from na tion to na tion, ra nging from extensive

intera ction in Germa n y to mi n ima l contact in other states. To

rei nforce the l ia ison off icer provision, the treaty stipula ted tha t a

representa ti ve of a station ing state m ust be present for an inspection of any of its forces or facilities.

NOTl·S

1. For t he C:FE Trea ty, see "Trea ty on Con ventiona l A r med Forces i n Eu rope

(CFE)," A ppend i x A. For a n accou nt of the trea ty negoti a tions an d

ra ti fica tions, see Ja ne M.O. Sh a r p, "Con venti ona l A rms Control i n

Eu rope," i n S I PR I Yearbook 1 990 , World Armaments and Disarmament

( New Yor k: Oxford U n iversi ty Press, l990), pp. 459-505; P. Terrence

Hopma nn, "From MBFR to CFE, Negoti ati ng Con ventiona l Arms Control

in Europe," in Richa rd Dea n Bu rns, eel., f ncyclopedia of Arms Control

and Disarmament, Vol. I I ( ew York: Cha rles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp.

967-989; a n d Ja n e M.0. Sha r p, "Conven tiona l A rms ontrol i n Eu ro pe,"

i n Sil' R I Yearbook 1991, World Armaments and Disarmament ( New York:

Oxford Un iversi ty Press, 1991), p p. 407-451.

2. For the Eu ropea n context, especi a l l y Germa n y, see Ti mot h y Ga rton Ash, I n

Europe 's Nmne: Germany and the Divided Continent ( New Yor k: Ra ndom

House, 1993) a nd Ph il ip Zel i kow and Concloleezza R ice, Germany Unified

and Europe Transf onned: A Study in Statecraft ( Ca m bridge, Mass.:

Ha rva rd U n i versi ty Press, J 995). For t he America n view, consu lt Michael

R. Besch loss a nd Strobe Ta l bott, At the Highest Levels: The I nside Story of

the E nd of the Cold \Var ( Boston: Little, Brown, a nd Compa n y, 1993). For

the state of t h e Soviet Un ion , see Joh n B. Du n lop, The Rise of Russia and

the Fall of the Soviet E mpire ( Pri nceton, N.J.: Pri nceton Un iversity Press,

1993).

3. These n um bers reflect the extraord i na ry crea tion of 17 new na tions on the

Eu ropea n conti nent between 1990 a nd 1992. Fol lowing the col la pse of the

Soviet Un ion, eigh t new signatory na tions ente red the CFE trea t y: R ussia,

Bela rus, Uk rai ne, Mol dova, Georgia, A rmen ia, Azerba ija n, a nd Kaza ksta n.

4. Ash, In Europe's Nanze, pp. 357-410; a nd Zeli kow and R ice, Germany

Unified and f urope Transformed.
Ill IU ,\ I \ I> T iii Mi.. 10 4 1

5 . For the text a nd a brief ove rv iew of the Stock hol m Agreement of 1986, sec

United States Arms Control a nd Disa rma ment Agency, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agreements ( Wash ington , D.C.: U .S. Government Pri nti ng

Office, 1990), pp. 3 1 9-335. For the I NF Treaty, see .Joseph P. Ha ra han ,

On-Site Insp ections Under the I N F Treaty (Wash ington, D .C.: U.S.

Govern ment Pri nti ng Off ice, 1993) a nd George L. R ueckert , Global

Double Z ero: The I N F Treaty From Its Origins to Implem entation

(Westport, Con n. : G reenwood Press, 1993). For other trea ties, see S J P R I

Yearbook s, World Armaments and Disarmament , 1991 , 1992 , 1993 , 1 994 ,

a nd 1995 ( New York: Oxford Un i versity Press, 1991-1995).

6. For a h istory of the agency's origi ns a nd the INF Treaty implementati on,

sec Ha ra ha n , On-Site Insp ections Under the IN F Treaty. For a reportlength version, read Dav id M. Wi l lford , "A Brief History of the On-Site

Inspection Agency," OS/ A Refer ence Report N o. 1 (Wash i ngton, D.C.: OnSite I n spection Agency, 1996).

7. .James Maci ntosh, "Con fidence-Bu i l di ng Meas u res i n Eu rope, 1975 to the

Present," i n Rich a rd D. Bu rns, ed., Ency clopedi a of Arms Control and

Disarmament , Vol. II, pp. 929-945; Rol f Berg a nd Ada m-Da n iel Rotf el d,

Building Security in Europ e: Confidence-Building M easures and the CSCE

(New York: Insti tu te for East-West Secu rity Stud ies, 1986 ).

8. Hopm a n n, "From l'v!BFR to CFF'.," pp. 978-979; Jonat ha n Dea n ,

Watershed in Eu rope: Dismantling the East- West M ilitary Confron tation

( Lexi ngton, Mass.: Lexi ngton Books, 1 987).

9. Maci ntosh, "Confidence-Bu i ld ing Measu res i n Eu rope" pp. 9.33-935; Joh n

Bora wsk i, From the Atlantic to the Urals: N egotiating Arms Control at the

Stock holm Conf erence (Wash i ngton, D.C.: Perga mon-Bra ssey I nternation a l

Defense Pu bl ishers, 1988), pp. 8-11.

I 0. U n ited Sta tes A rms Con trol and Disa rma ment Agency, Arms Control and

Disannament Agreements, pp. 319-335. For ba ckgrou nd, sec Bora wsk i,

from the Atlantic to the Urals, pp . 102-1 1 5.

l I . Jonath a n Dea n, M eeting Gorhachev's Challenge: H ow to Build Down the

N ATO-Warsaw Pact Confron tation ( New York: St. Ma rti n's Press, 1989);

Bora wsk i, From the Atlantic to the Urals, pp. 88-89. For a d iscussion of

the Soviet U n ion's cha ngi ng foreign rel a tion s and mi l ita ry stra tegy towa rd

Western Eu rope, consu lt Ed u a rd Sheva rd nadze , The Futur e Belongs to

Freedom ( New York: The Free Press, 1991 ); and Don Oberclorfer, The

Turn: From the Cold Warto a New Era -The United States and the Soviet

Union, 1983-1990 (NewYork:Poseidon Press, 1991).

12. Hopma n n, "From MBFR to CFE," pp. 977-978; l vo H. Daa lder, The CFE

Treaty: An Overview and an Assessment (Wash ington, D.C.: The Joh ns

Hopk i n s Foreign Pol icy Insti tute, 1991 ).

13. Ma nda te for Negotia tion on Con ven tiona l A rmed Forces i n Eu rope,

Ja n ua ry 14, 1989.

1 4. Hopma n n, "From M BFR to CFE," pp. 978-983.

15. Da v id Remn ick, Lenin's Tomh: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire ( New

York: Ra nd om House , 1993), pp. 240-243; Zel ikow and R ice, Germany

Unified and Europe Transformed.

16. Declaration by the Government of the Federal R epublic of Germany on the

Personnel Streng th of the German Armed Forces, Annex to CFE Treaty,

Novem ber 19, 1990.

17. Sergei A. Ka ragonov, "Towa rd a New Secu rity System i n Eu rope," i n Vil h o

Ha rle a nd J yrk i livonen, eds., Gorbachev and Europe (N ew York : St.

Ma rti n's Press, 1990), pp. 40-50.
42 0 -S1rl' I. wrcno"l A<.H\n 

18. "Assembl y Su pports Pact Withd rawa l ," Budapest Domestic Seruice, Ju ne

26, 1990, i n Foreign Broad cast Information Seruice (F BIS)-Eastern

Europe, .J u ne 27, 1990.

19. "Hu nga ria n, USSR Delega tes ar CFE Ta lks," Die Presse (Vienna ), August

J O, 1990, in FB IS-West ern f,uro pe, August 14, 1990; "Pact Discusses

Structural Changes, Arms Ceil ings," H opodarsk e Nouiny (Prague),

October 2, 1990, in F'BIS-Eastern Europe, Ocrober 9, 1990.

20. Interview with Ambassa dor Lynn Hansen, U.S. Government CFE Trea ty

Negotiator, by Joseph P. Ha rahan , Historia n, OSIA, Ramsrei n Air Base,

Germa n y, Decembe r 14, 1993. See also Beschloss and Ta l bott, At the

Highest Leuels, pp. 269-270, 288-290 ; Da vid Hoff ma n, "U.S., Sov iets to

Press A rms Ta l ks," Washington Post , September 27, 1990, pp. A31-32;

and Alan Rid ing, "U.S.-Sov ier Differences Are Said to Threaten Arms-Cu t

Pact," N ew York Times, Novem ber 19, 1990, p. A6.

21. Cra ig R. Wh itney, "The Legacy of Helsin k i," New York Times, Novem ber

19, 1990, pp. Al , A6; "The Peace of Pa ris," The Times (London ),

Novem ber 19, 1990; Ala n Rid ing, "Design ing the New Eu rope: Plenty to

Argue About ," N ew York Times, Novem ber 19, 1990, p. A6; Arms

Control Reporter 1 990, pp. 407.B.409-412; "The Pa ris Conference: The

Th rill of Eu rope 's Rebi rth, " The E conomist, Novem ber 24, 1990, pp. 49-

53.

22. For a text of the agreemen t, see "The Cha rter of Paris for a New Eu rope,"

Pa ris, Fra nce, Novem ber 21, 1990, i n S I P R I Yearbook 1991, pp . 603-610.

For the contempora ry poli tica l context in Paris, see Ala n Rid ing, "The

Question That Lingers on Europe: How Wil l the Goals Be Achieved ? " New 

York Times, Novem ber 22, 1990, p. A1 7.

23. Arms Control Reporter 7 990, pp. 402.B.273-275.

24. For the text, see U.S. Depa rtmen t of Stare, Bu rea u of Pu blic Affa irs,

Dispatch Supplement: Vienna Document 1990, Vol. 2, Su pplement 2, Ma y

1991. For the Eu ropea n backgrou nd, see Sha rp, "Con ventiona l A rms

Con trol in Eu rope," pp. 451-456.

25. R.W. Apple, Jr., "East and West Sign Pact to Shed Arms in Eu rope," New

York Times, November 20, 1990, pp. Al, A14; R idi ng, "Design ing the

New Eu rope," New York Times, Novem ber 19, 1990, p. A6.

26. Rid ing, "Design ing the New Eu rope," N ew York Times, Novem ber 19,

1990, p . A6 .

27. Ibid.

28. For the CFE Trea ty text, protocol s, a nd decl a ra tions, see "Treaty on

Conventiona l Armed Forces in Eu rope (CFE)," this book, Append ix A.

29. Lynn M. Ha nsen , "Towa rds an Agreement on Red ucing Conventiona l

Forces in Eu rope, " Disarmam ent, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1990, p p . 61-76; Sharp,

"Conventiona l Ar ms Control i n Eu rope" ( 1990), pp. 478-501; R. Jeffery

Smith, "U.S. Offers Comprom ise on Mi lita ry Pla nes in Eu rope,"

Washington Post , Jan ura ry 31, 1990, p. A16.

30. Arms Control Reporter 1 9Y O, pp. 407.B.305-307, 336-337, 340-341 ,

346-347, 357-360, 380.

31. Thomas L. Fried ma n, "Pact on Eu ropea n Armies Ma y Ski p Troop Li mits

ro Speed Accord ," New York Times, September 12, 1990, p. A J 4 ; Arms

Control Rep orter ·1990, pp. 407.B.390-391, 393-396; Hoffma n, "U.S.,

Soviets to Press A rms Ta l ks," Washington Post , September 27, 1990, pp.

A31-32; Thoma s Fried ma n , "U.S.-Soviet Accord on Eu rope Armies is

Reported Nea r," N ew York Times, October 4, 1990, pp. Al, A6;
·ru Tiu U) \ D T HI M1s<,10 43

"Kond rashov Assesses Armosphere for Vien na Ta l ks," TASS ( Moscow ),

Ocrober 1, 1990, i n f B IS-Soviet Union, Ocrober 1, 1990; Da vid Whi re,

"Polirica l Fixers Confidenr of Seeing CFE Dea l," Financial Times

( London ), Seprem ber 27, 1990.

32. Sec "Treaty on Conven tiona l Armed Forces i n Eu rope (CFE)," th is book,

A ppendi x A.

33. Hopma n n, "From MBFR ro CFE," p. 981; Arms Control Report er 1990,

p. 407.B.412.

34. For rhe specific pa rrs of the rrea ty, see "Treaty on Conventiona l A rmed

Forces in Eu rope ( CFE)," Append i x A.

35. Sha rp, "Conventional Arms Control i n Eu rope" (1 991 ), p. 426.

36. I nterview with Ma ry Ma rga ret Eva ns, Depu ty Di rector, Conventiona l Arms

Control a nd Com pl ia nce, Office of the Secreta ry of Defense for Acq u isition, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historia n, OSIA, Wash i ngton, D.C., Decem ber

8, 1993, a nd February 21, 1996; a nd I nterv iew, Ha nsen.

37. I n terview, Ha nsen.

38. I nterv iew, Eva ns, Februa ry 21, 1996.

Chapter 2

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney sp eak ing at N ATO Headquarters following the first meeting of N ATO

and f ormer Warsaw Pact delegations in April 1992.

n Ma y 29, 1990, President Bush signed Na tiona l Secu rity

Directive 41, i nstructi ng the On-Si te Inspection Agency

(OSIA ) to prepa re to cond uct on-site i nspections u nder

the CFE Treaty. 1 Sim ulta neously, the President expanded OSIA's

mission by d irecti ng it to recru it, tra in, and plan for cond ucti ng

on-site inspections u nder the Chem ica l Wea pons Convention, the

Strategic A rms Red uctions Treaty, and the Nuclea r Testing Trea -

ties. On-site inspection was a common element in mon i tori ng and

veri fyi ng compl ia nce with these new a rms con trol trea ties. In

Decem ber 1987 President Reaga n had signed the Intermed ia teRa nge N uclea r Forces (IN F) Treaty, which la id the grou ndwor k

for f u ture arms control agreements. "Trust but Verif y," Reaga n's

oft-repea ted ph rase for cha racteri zing A merica n attitudes towa rd

arms control trea ties with the Soviet U nion, remained a powerfu l

policy objecti ve th roughout a ll treaty negotiations in the ea rl y

1990s.2
46 ON-SITI 11'1.JSPFCTJON Ac;F"JC'l 

Ratifica tion a nd entry into force of these trea ties wou ld a llow

the United States a nd other signatories to cond uct on-site inspections at mili ta r y a nd i nd ustria l sites in as ma ny as 160 nations.

Hu nd reds of d ifferent wea pon systems and thousa nds of i ndivid ua l wea pons wou ld be subject to inspection. With inspection

rights came escort responsi bilities. Under a ll the treaties, the U.S.

govern ment assumed a n obligation to escort foreign inspection

tea ms a t U.S. sites and facilities. Inspectors and escorts wit h expertise on these d ivergent trea ties and thei r wea pon systems wou ld be

dra wn from ma ny different fields: conventional arms, strategic

nuclea r arms, chemica l wea pons, a nd u ndergrou nd nuclea r testi ng.

In add ition, the dema nd for linguists wou ld increase in response to

new treaty req u irements. The On-Site Inspection Agency wou ld

expa nd significa ntly to fu lfill the United States' obliga tions u nder

these trea ties.3

In fact, the expansion bega n in 1990. President Bush signed

three ma jor a rms control agreemen ts: new protocols for the

Threshold Test Ban Trea ty (TTBT) and the Peacefu l Nuclea r Explosions Treaty (PNET) with the USSR on Ju ne 1, 1990; a new

agreement on the Destruction a nd Non-Prod uction of Chemical

Wea pons with the USSR, a lso on Ju ne 1, 1990; and the Conventional A rmed Forces in Eu rope Trea ty (CFE) with 20

Eu ropea n na tions a nd Canada on Novem ber 19, 1990.4

On-site inspection, a key element in each of these agreements, provided critica l information for verif yi ng that

other na tions were compl ying with their treaty obligations.

For the U.S. government, the determination of treaty complia nce rested wit h the president. In 1990, President Bush

stated h is administration's policy in his an n ua l arms control report to the U.S. Congress5 :

"Withou t exception, the U nited States expects meticulous fulfillment of all existing a nd future arms control

agreements, and a ll obligations tha t they enta il. I am committed to ensuring that there is scrupulous complia nce

The On-Site Inspection Agency pre pared

to implement several other treaties and

agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons

Convention.

with all arms control agreements a nd rela ted underta kings.

We can not and will not accept an y lesser standa rd. Put

simply, a rms control commit ments must be precisely defined a nd scrupu lously observed. Nothi ng less wi ll do."

DEFINING CFE TREATY ROLES AND MISSIONS

In accorda nce with precedents esta blished i n implementing

the IN F Treaty, the On-Site Inspection Age ncy had a strictly operationa l role in implementing the CFE Treaty. President Bush, i n

Nationa l Security Directive 41, directed Brigad ier Genera l Rola nd

Lajoie, Di rector of OSIA, to pre pa re to cond uct on-site inspections

u nder the CFE Trea ty. In tha t same May 1990 directi ve, the presi-
-IN 1 1 1..\1. Pl{l l'\R \ LIO '>: U 1 11 D Sr u1 ., \'\D 1 1 11 NA 0 NA1 10. ,., 47

dent stipula ted that the secreta ry of defense would be responsi ble

for ensuring tha t the U.S. govern ment was i n complia nce with a ll

CFE Trea ty provisions. 6 After considera ble deba te with i n the

Office of the Secreta ry of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

the milita ry services, Genera l Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended to Secreta ry of Defense

Richa rd B. Cheney in April 1991 tha t the U.S. Comma nder-i nChief, Europe (USCINCEUR ) be designa ted the Depa rtment of

Defense's (DoD) execu tive agent for trea ty implementa tion. On

Ju ne 14, 1991, Secreta ry Cheney ga ve Genera l John R. Ga lvin,

USA, USCINCEU R, au thority to task all DoD forces and organizations within the CFE Treaty's area of appl ication.7 Responsi bil ities of the executive agent incl uded developi ng proced ures to

monitor the status of U.S. forces and equ ipment su bject to the

trea ty and reporting period ica lly on tha t status to the Join t Chiefs

of Staff. In add ition, the executi ve agent was to ensu re that a ll U.S.

forces developed and ca rried out pla ns to recei ve foreign on-site

inspectors. The pla ns had to incorpora te provisions to protect

sensitive poi nts and specia l access progra ms. Genera l Galvin and

the USCINCEU R sta ff would supervise the tra nsfer of U.S. treatylimited eq uipment (TLE) to a llied nations u nder the NATO Ha rmonization Pla n. Fina lly, he was responsi ble for any trea tyreq u ired red uction of U.S. equ ipmen t.

Genera l Ga lvin directed treaty im plementa tion through the

U.S. Eu ropea n Comma nd and th ree subord ina te comma nds: U.S.

Army Eu rope (USAREU R), U.S. Air Forces in Eu rope (USAFE),

and U.S. Na vy Eu rope (USNAVEUR ). For U.S. forces and facilities

stationed in the Azores a nd in Icela nd, which were su bject to the

CFE Trea ty but were not u nder USCINCEU R's comma nd, the U.S.

Atla ntic Comma nd issued d irectives ordering them to comply with

the secreta ry of defense's memora nd u m. To define the roles, m issions, and responsi bil ities req ui red to implemen t the CFE Treaty,

the U.S. Europea n Comma nd, the U.S. Atla ntic Comma nd, a nd

OSIA developed a joi nt Memora nd u m of Understa nd ing. 8

Essentia l ly, this key memora nd um del ineated the responsi bilities for tra ining, logistics, and inspection opera tions. It tasked

America n land, a ir, a nd na va l forces within the trea ty's area of

a ppl ica tion to pla n and tra in to receive on-site i nspections by

Eastern grou p inspection tea ms. The memora nd u m a lso defined

the type of logistica l support U.S. milita ry u nits a nd site comma nders wou ld provide for the inspection tea ms, specifica lly,

security, ground tra nsportation, emergency med ica l care, med ical

evacua tion, and adm inistrative work a reas. Site comma nders were

to provide mea ls and accommodations, if ava ilable on the insta llation, for the inspection and escort teams. If this was not possi ble,

then that responsi bi lity fell to OSIA. U.S. site comma nders were to

facilitate the inspection process by ha ving their equi pment and

facilities read y for the foreign inspection teams, and by providi ng

General john R. Galvin, U.S.

Commander-in-Chief, Europe.
4

helicopter overflights when req uired . They wou ld also designa te

sensitive sites to the OSIA person nel escorti ng the on-site inspection teams.

Moreover, the Memora nd u m of Understand i ng req uired tha t

OSIA assist mili ta r y comma nders in trai ni ng site person nel a nd

eva luating their site prepa ra tions. The memora nd u m explicitly

stated that the OSIA escort tea m chief represented the U.S. government in a ll trea ty-rel ated ma tters d u ring inspections. A rela ted

provision req uired tha t OSIA provide liaison off icers to meet

ar ri ving inspection tea ms a t the designated points of entry and

d uring the inspection to ma inta in contin uous comm u nica tions

with the U.S. Eu ropea n Comma nd. Fina lly, the memorand u m

stipu lated tha t the U.S. Atla ntic Comma nd would provide the

necessa ry logistical a nd opera tiona l support for U .S. mi l ita ry

facilities subject to inspection in Icel a nd and the Azores. 9

Severa l aspects of th is memora nd u m were contentious. For

example, the U.S. Army Eu rope's position on feed ing and housing

inspection tea ms was that their u nits would be hard pressed to

support the req u i rement. Most U.S. Army u nits in Eu rope, they

ma inta ined, d id not have adequa te facilities to house inspection and

escort teams. Feed ing the teams would be difficult, un less they ate

du ring regu la r meal hou rs i n the dining hal l. Since the chief of the

i nspection tea m set the sched u le for the cond uct of the i nspection,

tea ms often took their mea ls ver y la te, after dark, or very ea rly,

before first light. Therefore, Genera l Crosbie E. Saint, USA,

USAREUR Comma nder-in-Chief, recom mended tha t OSIA be

responsi ble for provid ing housing and food for the inspection and

escort teams. The new d irector of OSIA, Ma jor Genera l Robert W.

Pa rker, USAF, cou ntered tha t the agency had no housing or messing

facilities, and that the U.S. Army person nel a t each site k new the

surrou nd ing area better tha n d id OSIA escort or liaison teams. 1 0

It took ma ny months to resol ve this dispute of defining responsibilities for the support mission. While USAREU R and OSIA

ironed out these support issues, the first order of busi ness for

OSIA was to eva lua te the inspection/escort mission: just how

ma ny people, tea ms, a nd su pport person nel would it ta ke to conduct and escort on-site i nspections u nder the CFE Treaty ?

 Ill

To implement the IN F Treaty, OSIA set u p a sma ll field off ice

in 1988 at Rhein-Ma in Air Base in Fra nk fu rt, Germa ny. This

office beca me the ga tewa y for U.S. tea ms cond ucti ng on-site inspections of Soviet IN F m issile sites located in the western USSR.

Inspection tea ms origi na ted i n Wash ington, D.C., flew to Germa ny

where they received i nspection equ ipment and briefi ngs, and then

proceeded to Moscow, the poi nt of entry for IN F Treaty inspec-
I ITl I PR! P n 11 > 11 1

tions. On completion of their inspection missions, the America n

teams retu rned to Germa ny, tu rned in their i nspection equ ipmen t,

and flew back to the United States. The personnel assigned to

OSIA's Rhei n-Ma in office also escorted Soviet teams inspecti ng

U.S. I F missi le sites i n Eu rope. From 1988 th rough 1991, this

sma ll office assisted in more tha n 200 IN F Treaty inspection and

escort missions. With the CFE Trea ty, OSIA's Field Office, Europe ':·

assumed a fa r la rger and more significa n t role. 1 1

A ll CFE Treaty i nspection, escort, a nd l ia ison opera tions

woul d origina te from this field office. It wou ld a lso ma nage all

ga tewa y activi ties i n support of the INF Trea ty, the Threshol d Test

Ba n Treaty, a nd the Strategic Arms Red uction Trea ty. Th ree experienced senior off icers, Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USA F, Chief

of the Field Off ice, Europe; Lt. Colonel Pa u l H. Nelson, USA; and

Lt. Colonel Thomas S. Brock, USA, former IN F inspection tea m

chiefs and current headq ua rters pla n ners, bega n in the spring of

1990 to exa mine treaty req u irements to determ i ne ma n power

needs. In Ma y 1990, 20 peopl e were assigned to OSIA's Eu ropea n

Opera tions Comma nd, to support the IN F Trea t y m ission. This

nu mber wou ld i ncrease to more tha n 127 by J u ly 1992, when the

CFE Trea ty entered into force. Initia ll y, projections for this sixfol d

increase had been much grea ter. In Ja n ua ry 1990, a key headq ua rters pla nner, Comma nder Edwa rd J. Higgins, USN, had projected

that the agency wou ld need 159 people in Fra n kfu rt and 49 in

'The European component of the On-Site Inspection Agency underwent several

redesignations over the years. In 1988, OSIA's detachment at Rhein-Main Air Base

was called the Field Office, Europe. On December 1. 1990,it was made a stand-alone

directorate and redesignated as OSIA-Europe. On 9 March 1992, another reorganization

of OSIA gave this directorate status as a command, and it was renamed the European

Operations Command. Throughout this history, the designation of European Operations

Command will be used.

HI ) 

Lt Colonel J oseph ]. Drach, .f 1:,

and Sergeant .f ill Robinson

preparing for a helicopter flight

overa Ukrainian declared site.
SO 0 -Sni: I. w1 c 110N Aci: n

European Operations Command

carried out OSIA's INF escort

responsibilities.

Washington to carry out i ts CFE Trea ty responsi bilities. Higgins had

estimated that OSIA's Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd wou ld need

81 inspectors, 51 escorts, and 27 logistics, administra tive, and operations center person nel. Senior DoD policy and acquisition committees reviewed and approved OSIA's ma n power projections. 1 2

La ter, some of Com ma nder Higgins's assu mptions proved to

be i ncorrect. This was u ndersta nda ble, since they had been formulated i n Ja nua ry 1990, nea rly 10 mont hs before the trea ty was

signed and two-a nd-a-ha lf yea rs before it entered into force. One

assu mption concerned the size of i nspection tea ms. The INF

Dual-qualified OSIA teams-Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an escort team in Germany.
-------I N! fl \I PRI NR \ 1 10 \: u 1 1 1 1> s!.\Tl·<., \1 L> IHI NATO N.\TIO ... s I

Trea ty provided an ea rl y pla n ning model for a 10-person tea m;

negotia tors for the CFE Treaty, however, agreed to a ma xim u m of

only 9 inspectors per tea m. This trea ty change lowered ma nning

projections. Another cha nge came when Colonel La wrence G.

Kelley, USMC, OSIA Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd's new Chief

of Operations, redefi ned what consti tu ted a "qual i fied " inspection

tea m. Under the IN F Treaty, tea ms q uali fied either as escorts or

inspectors, and du ring treaty operations they opera ted exclusi vely

i n tha t role. Under the CFE Trea ty, Kel ley directed that a ll OSIA

CFE Trea ty tea ms wou ld be d ua l qua lified: ca pa ble of cond ucting

both inspections a nd escorts. This redefinition further red uced the

ma n ning projections for the n u m ber of OSIA CFE Treaty tea ms,

i nspectors, and escorts. 13

There were other cha nges as wel l. Perha ps the most decisi ve

change came in the projected number of CFE Trea ty baseline

i nspections tha t the U.S. would cond uct. America n pla n ners anticipated tha t the level of i nspection activity wou ld be at its zeni th

during baseline, the treaty's first 120 days. This assumption was

decisi ve in determining ma nning a uthoriza tions. Two factors affected all U.S. projections for baseli ne i nspections: the nu mber of

inspections to be conducted by the NATO states, a nd the United

States' portion of the NATO i nspections.

Du ring October-Novem ber 1990, the n um ber of inspections

to be cond ucted by the NATO states d ecreased significa ntly from

previous projections. Two events contri bu ted: Germa ny's u n ification in October 1990, and the Soviet Union's first officia l trea ty

Dual-qualified OSIA temns-Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an inspection team in Romania.
0 -SI IlI WI ( 1 10 A(,I ( )

N ATO states agreed that there 

would be no inspections within

the alliance.

data exchange. In the first event, East Germany's CFE Treaty

sites-t he designa ted mi lita ry bases, depots, and insta llationsbeca me Germa n sites. NATO a llies ha d agreed that there wou ld be

no inspections within the a l l ia nce. Fu rther, the N ATO states

agreed that following u n if ication, on l y Germa n y woul d inspect

Soviet forces stil l stationed on the territory of the former East

Germany. 14

Second, there wa s a decrea se i n the tota l of Soviet CFE Trea ty

objects of veri fica tion (OOVs). At treaty signa ture, the Soviet

U n ion excha nged data tha t ind ica ted one-third fewer OOVs subject to inspection tha n thei r sen ior representa tives had disclosed

du ring trea ty negotia tions. 1 5 This was a ma jor surprise for the

NATO states despite the fact tha t in the two mon ths before trea t y

signa tu re, satell ite recon na issa nce had revealed tha t the Soviet

Army was movi ng thousa nds of pi eces of eq u ipment out of Centra l Eu rope to a reas east of the Ura l Mou nta ins. 1 6 Since the trea ty

was not yet signed , these l a rge-sca le redeployments were lega l , but

they ra ised q uestions of treaty circu m vention. I n ad d ition to ha ving su bsta ntially fewer forces and equi pment in the trea ty zones

a nd fla nks, the Soviet H igh Comma nd ha d reassigned some forces

to na va l i n fa n tr y a nd coa sta l defense u nits. The Soviets in te rpreted

the trea ty a s not appl ica bl e to na va l forces, includ ing na va l infa ntry. The Soviet posi tion followed tha t there was no obl iga tion to

report na va l forces as i nspecta bl e u nits u nder the CFE Trea ty.

Trea ty experts wou ld wrestl e over these Soviet issues for mont hs

following trea ty signa ture. 1 7 I n fact, these i ssues became so contentious tha t they del ayed ra tifica tion. The more im med iate issue for

OSIA, however, was how to revise ma nning projections. In order

to iden tif y, tra in, and rel oca te people to Eu rope, it was vital to

k now how ma ny i nspectors, escorts, and support personnel woul d

be needed. Clearl y, the n umber of inspections a va ila ble to the

NATO states had decreased; bu t so too had the U n ited States'

proportion of those inspections. 1 8

The treaty did not address the allocation of i nspection quotas

within each group of states-tha t process rested with each group.

Under the CFE Treaty, each Eastern group state was subject to a

specific number of inspections per treaty period.':·The allocation

of inspections among the NATO a llies was a give-a nd-ta ke process. A Veri fica tion Coord ina ting Committee (VCC) ha nd led this

a llocation process a t Head q ua rte rs N ATO. The VCC was a new

orga niza tion, esta blished in 1990 specificall y to coord inate the

a ll iance's impl ementa tion of the CFE Trea ty and the Vienna Document.19 In itia l U.S. pla nning had Ame rica n inspection teams conducti ng a t l east 20 percen t, and per ha ps as ma ny as 50 percent, of

'Under the CFE Treaty, there were four treaty periods: baseline, reduction, residual level

validation , and residual.
I 1 11 1 1'11 1'\R r1u ..,: L 1 11 u "1 n 1 ' \ 11 1111 A 0 \ !IC> ' ) )

all the CFE basel ine i nspections availa ble to the NATO states. This

estima te proved too high beca use most of the other NATO na tions

asserted their treaty rights to cond uct CFE i nspections. After considerable interna l discussion among the NATO na tions and within

NATO's VCC and its staff to determine a fa ir sha re of the i nspecti ons, the committee a llotted the United States 18 percent of

NATO's active inspection quota for the CFE baseli ne period.20 As

a consequence of the decrease in the tota l num ber of inspections to

be conducted by the NATO states and the decrease in the United

States' portion of NATO's baseli ne inspection quota, the Uni ted

States red uced its projections for cond ucting inspections from an

estima ted 60-150 to approxi matel y 44-45 inspections. This new

figure proved to be qu ite accurate.2 1

As discussed in the next chapter, Ratifica tion Dela yed, the

Soviet movement of TLE east of the Ura ls and its reassignment of

forces to the naval infa ntry seriousl y threa tened trea ty ra tification

and entry into force. Resolution of these issues required seven

mont hs of negotia tion before a political-milita ry-di plomatic solution emerged that add ressed the other parties' a pprehensions. In

the interim, OSIA's Europea n Opera tions Command had to redefine its manpower req uirements based on the projected figure of

44-45 baseline inspections. Ultima tely, the comma nd was authorized 112 people to cond uct the CFE Trea ty's baseline period. This

authoriza tion specified 15 team chiefs and deputies, 18 lingu ists,

14 wea pons specialists, and 65 other person nel responsi ble for

pla nning, comm u nications, logistics, tra nsporta tion, comma nd

a nd control, and administra tion. From this n u mber, the Un i ted

States wou ld ma n, equ ip, and tra i n seven complete CFE Treaty

inspection tea ms and one pa rtia l tea m.22

Co E 'I

1ilitan For ··Withdrawals

Two events profou ndl y cha nged the milita ry context of the

Europea n continen t as prepara tions for im plementing the CFE

Treaty were u nder wa y: the u nif ication of Germa ny and the colla pse of the Centra l Eu ropea n Commu nist govern men ts. In response to these events, Soviet leaders accelera ted the massi ve wit hdrawa l of Soviet milita ry forces from Central Europe. On October

1, 1990, the Soviet Union ha d 17 divisions ( 363,700 mili ta r y

personnel ) stationed in East Germa n y. Orga nized into five arm ies,

the Group of Soviet Forces in Germa n y (GSFG ) was the la rgest

milita ry force outside the USSR. The Soviets wi thd rew all of these

armies, a long with another 337,000 Soviet mil ita r y personnel

stationed in the Central Eu ropea n and Ba ltic na tions, over a fiveyea r period, 1989-94.

23 Presiden t Bush, in turn, ordered substa nThe \ICC coordinated the N ATO

alliance 's implementation of the

CFE Treaty and Vienna Document.

Group of Soviet Forces in

Germany

/ 99()- 6 ,7()()

/ 994--0
54 () - 11 1 1 l'I ( l 10.'.': A( I ( '

The deployment of thousands of pieces of equipment to the Persian Gulf coincided with the inactivation of U.S.

units in Europe.

U.S. Army Europe:

/ 9 90-2 1 7,00()

/ 993-92,200

tia l wi thd ra wals of U.S. military forces stationed in Western

Europe. In 1990 the U.S. Army Eu rope ha d 217,000 mi lita r y

personnel; three yea rs later, it ha d 92,200.24

Simulta neous with this America n wit hd rawal, the U.S. Army

and U.S. Air Force deployed a substa ntia l n umber of their Europea n combat u n its to the Persia n Gu lf in la te 1990 in support of

the Gulf War d eployment, Desert Shield. Following the decisi ve

coalition victory over Ira q in Februa ry 1991, ma ny of these American u nits did not retu rn to Europe but were sent to garrisons and

training bases in the United States. Thus, the combi nation of the

Soviet Union's massi ve force withd ra wal and the United States'

mil itary redeploymen ts, coupled with the sudden tra nsfer of personnel and materiel to the Gulf , caused massive troop movements

across the length and bread th of the Europea n continent during 20

months of the CFE Treaty prepa ra tions.

General Crosbie E. Saint, Comma nder-in-Chief , USA REU R,

said that in 1992, his comma nd was "averaging 500 soldiers a day

leaving Eu rope." 21 In 1991-92, Genera l Saint inactiva ted or rotated back to the States 125 a rm y battalions. Compa red with 1990

strengths, these battal ion red uctions were strik i ng: in fa ntry ( 54% ),

armor ( 62% ), armored cavalry (50% ), field artillery ( 71%), and
I III\I PRI I' f{ \ 1 1() -.: l 1 1 IL> sI \ II., \ I> IIll AI0 \ 1 1(} " ))

a ir defense a rtillery (48 % ). USAREU R inacti vated so ma ny of its

sites tha t the United States retu rned 157 insta llations, mostl y i n

Germa n y, to their Eu ropea n host nations. Comma nd ing and ma naging this America n wit hd rawa l was a ti me-consu ming effort tha t

dema nded detai led pla n ning. At one point, Genera l Sa i n t compa red a ba tta lion leavi ng a Germa n caserne to pa inting a floor i n a

house. "You ha ve to sta rt at t he fa r end and pa i nt yourself out the

door. But the 'whole system' does not stop u ntil you are out the

door. "26 Com plica ting this extraction process was the America n

milita ry's practice of an nou ncing and qu ick l y enforci ng field grade

officer retirements, and accepti ng vol u nta ry sepa ra tions from all

ra n ks with alacrity. At the same time, Genera l Saint dema nded

tha t the trad itiona l America n standa rds of com bat read iness be

ma inta ined . In 1992 he had every USA R EUR i nfa ntry, armor,

attack helicopter, engineer, and a i r defense a rtillery ba tta lion tra i n

i n a force-on-force battle at the la rge ra nge a t Hohenfels, Germa ny. "Soldiers in Eu rope," Saint decla red, "don't ha ve time to sit

arou nd feeling sorry for themselves. They train; and when they're

finished with tha t, they tra in some more. "27 The combina tion of

USAREUR'smainta ining combat read iness and managing the

su bsta ntial force withd ra wa l mea nt tha t the CFE Treaty prepa rations, especia lly the mock i nspection s a t U.S. Army i nstalla tion s,

cou ld become conten tious. At OSIA's Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd , t he A merica n comma nders respon si ble for prepa ri ng inspection tea ms for im plemen ting the CFE Treaty had to wor k with

the U.S. Army and Air Force i n Eu rope. Those A merica n forces

wou ld be su bject to CFE inspections; they needed tra i ni ng to be

read y. Tensions developed, especia ll y d u ri ng 1991-92 when CFE

Treaty tra i n ing was most intense and when the U.S. milita ry force

redu ctions were a t fu ll flood.28

Thousands of American f orces in

Europe deployed to the Persian

Gulf during Operation Desert

Shield. M ost did not return to

Europe after the Gulf War.
Q - II l J Pl rl

Seal of the German verification

agency, Zentrum fiir

Verifik ationsaufgaben der

Bundeswehr (ZV BW ).

A .I )

Ne 1

Even before the CFE Trea ty was signed in Novem ber 1990,

some Eu ropea n na tions had begu n to esta bl ish their treaty verification agencies. Two of the l argest CFE Trea ty na tions, the Un i ted

States and the Soviet Uni on, a lrea dy ha d esta bl ished professiona l

mil ita ry i nspection agencies. The IN F Trea ty's extensi ve on-site

i nspection provisions had ca used bot h nations to act; the United

States set u p the On-Site Inspection Agency, a nd the USSR esta blished the Nucl ear Risk Red uction Center. IN F Trea ty inspections

bega n in Ju ly 1988, a nd the U.S. ·rnd USSR agencies had cond ucted more tha n 400 on-site inspecti ons by the time the CFE

Trea ty was signed. The agencies had recrui ted , tra ined , tested ,

equ ipped, and deployed h u nd reds of i nspectors and dozens of

tea ms. They had accu mu la ted experience tha t was d irectl y tra nsfera ble to implemen ting the CFE Treaty.

Germa ny, Great Brita i n, Fra nce, Belgi u m, the Nether l ands,

Ita l y, Spain, Canada, Lu xem bourg, a nd the other CFE Trea ty

signa tories had had on ly limited experience with on-site inspections. The Stock holm Docu ment of 1 986, a prod uct of the

Helsi n k i Process, was the ea rliest modern Eu ropea n agreement

perm itting on-site inspections of mi lita ry u n i ts a nd sites. It conta ined provisions tha t wou l d provi de experience in some aspects of

im plemen ting a n on-site i nspection regime. The Stockhol m Documen t ma ndated notifica tion proced u res for the U nited States,

Canada , a nd each of the 33 Eu ropea n signa tor y states whe n they

schedu led and cond ucted mil ita ry activities in volvi ng at least

13,000 troops or 300 tan ks. Moreover, to conf i rm tha t the activities were nonth rea ten ing, each state had the righ t to observe field

milita ry activities of anot her stare w hen pa rticipa ting forces exceeded 17,000 grou nd troops or 5,000 a irborne or a mphi bious

troops. Across Eu rope, there were few such large-sca le events.

When an exercise occurred , however, a state wou ld issue a simple

decla ra tion tha t "compl ia nce was in dou bt" a nd the state being

i nspected had to accept the inspection rea m. There was no right of

refusa l by the nation to be inspected . Each state, however, was

lia ble for only three inspections per yea r of i ts field exercises, and

no na tion cou ld inspect a not her twice i n the a me yea r. Thus, the

opport u nities for i nspections were i n freq uen t.29

By any measure, the n u mber of people req u ired to implement

the inspection rig h ts a nd req u irements of the Stock holm Document of 1986 was mi n ima l. In fact, the n u mber was so small tha t

no Eu ropea n na tion saw fit to establ ish a full-time trea ty verification center to ca rry ou t those provisions. The Stockhol m Document signatories assigned the inspection missions to a section of

their milita ry sta ffs a t na tiona l mil ita ry headq ua rters. In contrast,

the bi latera l INF Trea ty between the United States and the USSR

conta ined on-site i nspection rights that allowed more tha n 250
'i

i nspections in the first yea r alone. The CFE Trea ty's inspection,

escort, red uction, and data fu ncti ons were so su bsta n tia l that a ll of

the Eu ropea n signa tor y states set u p sepa ra te verifica tion agencies

or specific mi l i ta ry sta ff offices. Their mission was to assist their

mili ta ry forces to compl y with the trea t y a nd to mon itor other

nations' compl ia nce.

Among the NATO na tions, Germa ny, Fra nce, a nd Grea t

Brita in elected to esta blish sepa ra te trea ty verifica tion agencies.

Brigad ier Genera l Doctor Hei nz Loq ua i, Director of the Zentru m

for Verifika tionsa u fgaben der Bu ndesweh r (ZVBW) (Federa l

Armed Forces Verification Center), said that Germany's decisionmaki ng process bega n in 1989, with the new center being established i n October 1990. "The ma i n reason ," he expla ined, "for the

establishment of the center was Germa ny's foreseea ble work load

in the a rea of the CFE Trea ty. Germa n y ha d more CFE sites tha n

did the Soviet Union. "30 The missi on of the new Germa n verifica -

tion center was to inspect, escort, a nd monitor a ll activi ties u nder

the CFE Treaty. It a lso ha d responsi bil i ty for inspections u nder the

Vien na Docu ment 1990, which su bsta n tia lly broa dened the scope

of i nspection activi ties of the ea rl ier Stockholm Docu men t agreement. In the fa ll of 1990, the ZV BW ha d 65 officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs); two yea rs la ter it had 400 .i1

The French govern ment esta blished its trea ty verifica tion

unit, L'Unite Fra rn;:a ise de Veri fication (UFV), in September 1990

a t the Creil Air Station, 65 k i lometers north of Paris. The new

French u nit consisted of an inspection a nd escort staff of approxima tely 100 officers and NCOs d rawn from a ll the milita ry services, army, na vy, and a ir force. The mission of this new u nit, led

by Briga d ier Genera l Jea n-Pa u l Huet, was to implement the CFE

Brigadier General Doctor H einz

Loquai, Z VBW Directo1 welcomes

M ajor General Robert Park er,

Director, OS/ A, to the Z \!BW

Tl!
°'8 0 -S11 1 I '11'1 < 110 Ac.1 c '

Colonel Roy Giles, head of the

United Kingdom 's verification

agency, Joint Arms Control

Implementation Group (]ACIG).

Treaty and the Vienna Docu ment 1990. Accord ing to Colonel

Franois Rozec, the UFV's second commandant, "The Arms Control Division of the General Staff in Paris and their politica l

equiva lents, it is their concern to inform ou r [politica l I au thorities

on all aspects of veri fica tion. We a re strictly im plementers ."32

Grea t Brita i n 's experience with inspections u nder internationa l a rms control agreements prior to the CFE Trea ty was sim ilar to Germa n y's. For the Stock hol m Docu men t of 1986, the British Ministry of Defense assigned the mission to a small cad re of

milita ry officers a nd NCOs, pri nci pa lly people with experience in

the British Milita ry Lia ison Mission in Berlin. This small staff

ca rried out bot h inspecting a nd escorting missions. In August

1990, the British Ministr y of Defense esta blished the Joint Ar ms

Control Im plementa tion Grou p (JACIG ), u nder the leadershi p of

Colonel Roy Giles, a t RAF Scampton in Lincolnshi re. Its mission

was to ca rry out the U n ited Kingd om's commitmen ts a nd entitlements u nder the CFE Trea ty and the Vien na Docu ment 1990.

Initiall y, the new grou p's ma n power strength was 120 officers,

NCOs, and civi lia ns; a fter review it decreased to slightly less tha n

100. It was a four-service group, with Roya l Navy, Ma rine, Army,

and Air Force person nel.33

Among the other NATO na tions, Belgi um, the Netherla nds,

and Italy chose a different organiza tiona l concept when they set up

their u nits to implement the CFE Treaty. They used a cadre model 

of organization. Th is mea nt tha t the na tional milita ry command,

usua ll y the ministry of defense, authorized the esta blishment of a

sma ll unit responsi ble for implementi ng the trea ty, usually composed of 20-30 milita ry officers. Organized at the level just below

the senior milita ry head qua rters, this u nit's mission was to recruit,

tra in, cond uct inspection a nd escort missions, tra nsmit treaty data,

and monitor red uctions ma ndated by the trea ty. The Belgia n verification agency, L'Unite Beige de Verification (UBV), located in

Brussels, was typica l. Its mission was to lead all CFE Treaty inspection teams and to pa rticipa te as inspectors on the team. For

the escort mission, the Belgia n agency had complete responsi bility

for the logistics, prepa ra tions, and presentation of the sites and

u nits to be inspected by the Eastern states' CFE Treaty inspection

tea ms. They a lso had responsi bility for collecting a ll trea ty-ma ndated data on the Bel gia n a rmed forces a nd for tra nsmi tti ng tha t

data to a ll other CFE Trea ty signa tor y nations. Du ring CFE inspection a nd escort opera tions, person nel from the mil ita ry forces

augmented the sta ff of the Belgia n verifica tion agency. These milita ry officers and NCOs had studied the treaty i n specia l courses

led by the agency's senior officers. In most cases, especia lly d uri ng

escort missions, the bulk of the Belgia n team consisted of

augmentees from its m ilita ry forces. 34
I IT I PR I' I II :l ITI D S \ 11 \ 1 1 111 () \ 1 10

Ita ly had a simila r orga nizational structure. The Director,

Major Genera l Joseph DiMa ria, of the Centro Ita lia no de Verlfica

de Armi (CIVA ), expla ined that initially a cadre of a pproxi matel y

250 personnel went th rough tra i ning on the CFE Trea ty.35 Once

they had completed the course, they retu rned to their milita ry

u nits, and were ava ila ble for inspection duty as needed. Accord ing

to Genera l DiMa ria, "They come and they sta y a couple of days in

the agency; they ha ve a refresher course, some pa rticu la r tra in ing,

or some specia l tra in ing for the ta rget ." The Ita l ian agency, he

reported, kept one tea m on d uty 24 hours a day "in case Ita ly is

notified a CFE Treaty inspection tea m is a rri vi ng."

The Netherla nds had a sma ll arms control trea ty coord ination section i n the Ministry of Defense at The Hague. 16 The Dutch

milita ry forces ca rried out the bulk of Holla nd 's CFE Trea ty inspection a nd escort activi ties. The Dutch A rmy had approxi ma tely

80 officers and NCOs tra ined as CFE inspectors, the Du tch Air

Force 35, and the Du tch Na vy 1. The actua l size of the Netherla nds' prof essional staff committed to implementing the CFE

Treaty was much sma ller, with the Du tch Army provid i ng 10-12

personnel, the Air Force 4-5, and the Na vy 1. Accord ing to Na vy

Comma nder C.N.M. Wierema, Ministry of Defense Coord ina tor, 

the Netherla nds set u p a "decentralized orga nization," with the

"bulk of the work done in the arms control sections of the forces."

In general, the NATO nations established their CFE Treaty

verification organizations along two lines. Na tions with the largest

military forces and the most sites subject to inspection-the United

States, Germany, France, and Great Britain-set up sepa rate verification agencies. Led by senior military officers and staffed with

Major General Joseph DiM aria,

Director of Italy's verification

agency, Centro Italiano de Verifica

de Armi (CIVA).
60 0 -S11 1 I '>1'1 < 11u Ac .1

career officers, noncom missioned officers, and civilia ns, these

agencies ra nged in size from 100 to 400 personnel, depend ing on

the nu mber of trea ties and ancilla ry functions assigned to them.

NATO na tions with smaller mil ita ry forces and fewer sites included in the trea ty, such as Belgi u m, the Netherla nds, and Italy,

adopted a cadre model. Led by a senior colonel or genera l off icer,

these veri fica tion u nits were considera bly smaller and relied on

a ugmentees d rawn from the milita ry forces for inspection and

escort responsi bilities. In genera l, these national verification agencies and staffs ha d six basic functions: force data presenta tion,

comm u nication, i nspection, escort, treaty trai ning for national

mil ita ry forces, and coordina tion among the other verifica tion

agencies.

During CFE Trea ty negotiations, the NATO a lliance ha d been

deeply invol ved in ever y aspect of developing the trea ty's text,

protocols, and annexes. Yet in the final document neither NATO

nor the Wa rsa w Trea ty Orga niza tion (WTO) were identified as

alliances in the forma l trea ty provisions. Instead , the treaty dealt

with two "groups of states," and each state was responsi ble for

properl y implementi ng the trea ty. However, NATO constit uted an

experienced, burea ucra tic orga niza tion for its grou p of states to

develop grou p objectives a nd negotia ting positions, and to coordina te trea ty pla n ning efforts. During trea ty negotiations, NATO's

NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee

Under the CFE Treaty, the execution of all The VCC has several importa nt functions. For

treaty rights and obliga tions is reserved to the the NATO Allia nce it apportions the CFE Treaty

signatory nations. However, during negotia tions inspection quotas to the 16 member states. It

the NATO states had worked closely together; coord inates the CFE Treaty decla red site inspecand during implementa tion they continued this tions to ensure complia nce with trea ty protocols

cooperation, agreeing to work through NATO's and to ensu re maximum coverage. The VCC 

Verifica tion Coordina ting Committee (VCC). esta blishes and mainta ins a common trea ty dataThis VCC is a joint politica l-milita ry coordi- base for the NATO na tions. It also assists the

na ting organiza tion with two representa tives NATO states in collating and assessing the treaty

from each of the 16 NATO na tions. It meets a t

data concerning trea ty complia nce. In the area of

HQ NATO, usua lly in monthl y sessions. A sma ll training, the VCC supports forma l NATO CFE

professiona l sta ff, the Verifica tion and Implemen- Trea ty courses to ensure a "common approach"

ta tion Coordina tion Section (VICS) facilita tes the to implementation. Finally, the VCC has responwork of the larger committee. For most meetings, sibility to exchange, among the signa tory states,

the head of the professiona l staff cha irs the VCC "information" on verifica tion ma tters.

sessions. All actions are taken by consensus.

Source: Necil Nedimoglu, Head, Verification and Implementation Coordination Section, NATO, presentation to United Nations

Group of Governmental Experts, July 19, 1994.

NA O'

c \
I 1 1 1 \1 PR P\ Jt \ t l!) ..,: U 1 1 1J S1 \ 11 .., \ n 1 111 A IO N u 10 ., 6 1

High Level Task Force (HLTF) at Brussels had served as an importa nt coord inating bod y for screening and approving proposa ls for

discussion in the forma l sessions in Vien na .

17 Collectivel y, the

NATO na tions would be red ucing more tha n 12,900 TLE items

u nder the CFE Treaty, and they would ha ve a tota l of 2,447 OOVs

su bject to inspection throughou t the allia nce. Clea rl y, a fter trea ty

signa t u re, NATO as an orga n iza tion would contin ue its strong

commitment to the CFE Treaty throughou t implementation.

In fact, six months before the trea ty was signed in Pa ris,

NATO esta blished the Verifica tion Coord ina ting Committee

(VCC) in Brussels in Ma y 1990. Its pu rpose was to coord i na te the

implementation of disa rma ment and a rms control agreements

a mong the 16-nation a llia nce. Genera l Joh n R. Ga lvin, USA,

USCI NCEUR, was instru menta l i n encou raging Headq ua rters

NATO to esta bl ish this importa nt committee. Genera l Ga l vi n

insisted that NATO had a centra l role in treaty im plementa tion,

specificall y in coordination , trai ni ng, a nd sched uling. NATO's

Assista nt Secreta ry Genera l for Politica l Affa irs, Gebha rdt von

Mol tke, beca me the VCC's per ma nent chairma n. The committee

set u p a sma ll professional sta ff for its Verification Coord i na tion

Implementation Section. Led by Leo Ver bruggen, a retired navy

captai n from the Netherla nds, this professional sta ff beca me an

importa nt element in ca rryi ng out the CFE Trea ty. 38

J ust what did the VCC do? Much of the wor k i n the first 18

months consisted of exami ning the CFE Treaty's bloc-to-bloc

quotas for decla red site inspections and esta blishi ng a sched ule of

inspections a mong NATO's 16 states. In addition, it developed an

a pproach to sched uling red uction inspections of the Eastern states.

Aided by initia ti ves from the mem ber states, in 1991 the VCC

developed a pla n for "decon flicting" the sched u le of nationa l

inspections. "Deconfliction" was vita l beca use the trea ty limited

each state's inspection obligations in severa l wa ys. The treaty

limited a na tion's inspection lia bility du ring any trea ty period. It

also limited simultaneous inspections in a na tion or specific milita ry district to two, as wel l as a llowi ng no more tha n one inspection team on-site at any time.

To comply with these restrictions and yet permi t NATO

na tions to cond uct a ll i nspections avai la ble to them, the VCC

evalua ted a deconfl iction sched u le concept in December 1990.

Au thored by Colonel John C. Reppert, USA, OSIA, th is concept

called for a ma tri x system that had the six Eastern nations and the

Soviet Union 's milita ry districts with inspecta ble sites a long one

axis. The other axis had th ree-da y i ncrements for cond ucti ng the

actua l i nspections. Work ing with the n u mber of inspections allowed, each NATO na tion u nder this system would "sign up" to

cond uct an inspection du ring a pa rticu la r th ree-da y block of time

aga i nst a pa rticu la r state. Next, the VCC staff would compa re the
"

62 0 -SI II I 

na tiona l req uests a nd negotia te an y con flicts a mong the a llia nce's

states. This req ui red a grea t dea l of negotiation beca use there was

significa nt interest by most NATO states to inspect Russia and, to

a lesser degree, U k ra ine, a nd considera bly less interest in inspecting the other states. After protracted d iscussions, the VCC adopted

this ma tri x system for deconflicti ng the sched ule of national i nspections.39 Wh ile th is process was un fold ing in Brussels, OSIA's

Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd was receivi ng new leadershi p at

Rhein-Ma in.

C\ r C

In 1990, before the CFE Trea ty was signed , Genera l La joie,

OSIA's Director, selected two senior colonels to lead the OSIA

Eu ropea n Operations Comma nd's ra pid ly expa nd ing effort. Air

Force Colonel Frederick E. Grosick beca me Comma nder a nd

Ma rine Corps Colonel La wrence G. Kelley was the new Chief of

Operations . Since the INF Trea ty was still extremel y active, wi th

missile elim ination, site closeout, and short-notice and conti n uous

porta l moni toring inspections, OSIA's Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd reta ined a ll of its "gatewa y" responsi bilities. At Rhei nMa in, it was responsi ble for supporti ng all IN F Treaty inspection

teams tra nsiti ng Europe to i nspect missile sites in the western

Soviet Union. It a lso supported Threshold Test Ba n Treaty inspectors and equ ipmen t specia l ists, as well as U.S. and USSR START

Treaty inspection tea ms tra veli ng th rough the ga tewa y to cond uct

CFE Inspection Deconfliction Matrix

PLANNED BASELINE INSPECTIONS BY: USA

I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ol

Bulgaria <

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Poland )

Romania

(

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The VCC adopted a matrix system to schedule and coordinate inspection missions.
I 1 n\1 P1u l' 1 1 1 1 : L 1 H > i 11

exhibition i nspections. Bu t its princi pa l activity, begin n ing in la te

sum mer 1990, was to orga n ize, prepa re, tra in, and be rea dy to

cond uct inspections and escorts u nder the CFE Trea ty.

Both Colonel Grosick and Colonel Kelley had considera ble

experience in comma nd ing, pl an ning, and developi ng mil ita r y

u n its.40 Grosick was a comma nd pil ot with over 3,100 flying

hours. A grad uate of the U.S. Air Force Aca demy, he hel d an adva nced degree from Ind ia na Universi ty. He ha d served in operationa l a nd sta ff jobs in the Strategic Air Comma nd, Pacif ic Air

Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Eu rope, a nd Hea dqua rters USAF. Just

prior to comma nd ing OSIA's Eu ropea n Operations Comma nd,

Colonel Grosick ha d served as Deputy Com ma nder for Opera tions

of the 42d Bomba rdmen t Wing, a B-52 and KC-135 wing loca ted

a t Loring AFB, Ma ine. Colonel Kelley was a Princeton Uni versi ty

grad uate who ha d studied a t Len i ngrad State Uni versity, the U.S.

Arm y R ussia n Institute, and Georgetown University (master of

a rts). In Vietna m, Kelley was a Ma ri ne attack pilot, flight instructor, in fantr y compa ny comma nder, and ba tta lion a ir lia ison officer.

A Russia n foreign area officer ( FAO ), who spoke Germa n as well,

he served as a presidential tra nsla tor on the Washi ngton-Moscow

Hot Line. In 1983 he went to the U.S. Milita ry Lia ison Mission

( USM LM ) in Potsd am, Germa n Democra tic Repu bl ic, as the na val

representa tive and la ter as deputy to the Chief of the Mission,

Genera l La joie. Ea rly i n 1988, Lt. Colonel Kelley came to OSIA as

an INF inspection tea m chief, lea ding 15 i nspection m issions i n the

Soviet Union and Czechoslova k ia. Followi ng a two-yea r stint as a

senior i nstructor a t the NATO School a t Obera mmerga u, Germany, he retu rned to OSIA as Genera l La joie's choice to be OSIA

Eu ropea n Operation Com ma nd's Chief of Operations.

The two officers brou ght different strengths and persona lities

to the operation. At Rhei n-Ma in Air Base, Colonel Grosick used

h is Ai r Force experience to add ress issues of person nel, tra nsportati on, office space, comm u n ica tions, housing, and facilities. The

comma nd wou ld expa nd sixfold in less tha n two yea rs; tha t

growth req u ired attention to a ll ma n ner of person nel and orga niza tiona l deta ils. At the same time, Colonel Kelley focused on defining the CFE Trea ty's opera tiona l mission. He drew u pon his

experience as an IN F Treaty inspection tea m chief, his k nowledge

of NATO and the U.S. Milita r y Liaison Mission, and his extensive

stu dy of Soviet milita ry forces. The persona lities of these two

colonels were qu ite d ifferent. Grosick was a ta ll, robust, grega rious avia tor experienced in ha nd ling the details of a n active operati ona l field comma nd. Kelley was a lea n, ascetic, ra mrod Marine

who had an exceptiona lly clea r concept of the CFE Trea ty, the

NATO a llia nce, and the Soviet Union. In the ea rl y months, pla nning dominated. At R hein-Ma in, there was more work tha n time,

people, or resources; the division of leadershi p responsi bilities

worked well.

Ill r Tl

Colonel Frederick E. Grosick ,

Commander, OS/ A European

Operations Command .
6 l'F 1 10 C.. I ( '

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps, was the Chief of

Operations, OSIA European Operations Command, from Octobe

1990 through Januar y 1995. He recruited, organized, planned, trained,

and led OSIA's CFE Treaty on-site inspection operations.

When you came to the command, did you have an

operational concept?

"Yes. I pla nned to replica te what we did in the

INF Treaty. I pla nned to use integra l teams, as we

had during the baseline period for INF. The nu mbers changed somewhat, but I thought tha t the

composition of the team would be similar. Over the

first severa l months after I arrived at Frankfu rt, the

ma nning docu ment was the center of ou r attention.

"For the team chiefs, I looked for the kind of

personnel that we had at the beginning of the INF

period and which we had and rou tinely looked for

in U.S. Milita ry Liaison Mission (USMLM).

"The team chiefs would be, to use an ana logy,

the independent patrol leaders, with whom you'd

ha ve precious little contact once they deployed, and

on whom you had to rely implicitly. You had to

tra in them up as far as you cou ld, give them adequate guida nce, fill them full of trea ty specifics, 

provide them the kind of surrogate wisdom th.at

they might not otherwise have at the outset, give

them 'what if' situations to death, force them to do

a ll of the homework tha t this required, and then

count on them to apply the tools of their trade to

get the job done."

How did the command deal with the shifting planningassumptions?

"The prima ry reason why the treaty data

changed was not beca use of German unification, 

but [because of] internal decisions made within the

Soviet Union. Initially, as a rou nd figure, the Soviets

had said tha t their data would contain 1,500 objects

of verifica tion. That had been the estimate of U.S.

a uthorities, and it was confirmed as a working

figure by the Soviets du ring treaty negotiations.

However, when the data were actually submitted,

on 17 Novem ber 1990, there were only about 900

Soviet objects of verification.

"The result was that, although our ma nning

document had been crafted for 16 teams, we were

directed by OSIA's Chief of Staff to reduce manpower. Ultima tely

we acq uiesced,

red ucing it to eight

teams, with some

misgivings on my

pa rt beca use it took

away any operational reserve that

we had in the event that anything went wrong. Bu t

we d id so, nonetheless ."

What was your concept for inspector and team

training?

"I expected them to learn the trea ty as pa rt of a

treaty course, initially. But then would come a great

dea l of self-stud y and study in groups, such as with

the tea m or in the Inspectors and Escorts bra nch.

"I made a conscious decision very early on to

foster the team as the unit with which I wa nted the

inspectors to identify. Prior to their identification

within the bra nch or even the unit as a whole, I

wa nted them to think of themselves first and foremost as a member of Team One, or Two, or Six, or

Team Jones, or Team Kelley, or wha tever it would

be. That is where I wa nted the a llegia nce to be

initially. That is where I wanted the identifica tion.

That's where I wa nted the standards to be set.

That's where I a nticipated that the key to training

and success u ltima tely would come, as a ma tter of

cohesiveness. Because of their internal tra ining,

because of k nowing each other, backing each other

u p, bond ing, and so forth, they would develop into

a cohesive unit: a team. I think tha t was a very

importa nt operational concept tha t we started

within the INF Trea ty, and were successful in continuing throughout the INF Baseline Period, a lthough OSIA later aba ndoned it for reasons of

convenience.

"I ha ve always been a very firm believer in unit

cohesiveness. So I consciously set the tea ms u p that

wa y, and insisted that they work as u nits, think as

u nits, act as u nits."

Source: Interview, Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, with Dr. Joseph P.Harahan, Historian, OSIA, May 18, 1994.
I 1 11 \1 PtH l' \ l{ \TJ() ,: LJ 11 111 1 \ ll ... \ n II l ... (i'I

The first months, Kelley said, were la rgely spent wor king and

rewor k ing the ma nning document. This effort involved extensive

coord ina tion with senior trea ty pl an ners at Hea dqua rters OSIA:

Colonel John C. Reppert, USA; Lt. Colonel Pa u l H. Nelson, USA;

a nd Lt. Colonel Thomas S. Brock, USA. By Decem ber 1990 the

ma nn ing document had gone th rough more tha n 25 versions.

Following the Soviet Un ion's Februa ry 1991 decision to reclassif y

its CFE Treaty TLE, the ma nning d ocument changed again in

Ma rch 1991. Throughout the process, the focus of the n umerous

pla n ning efforts was on the inspection team: just what was the

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right n u mber of tea ms, the type of lea dershi p, the degree of la n- [( 'Ult! J 1£' / /1"l'( f( llt: ltttll

gua ge competency, a nd the mixtu re of inspection sk ills. Another

consideration was the ava ila bility of potentia l tea m mem berswhen cou ld they be id entif ied and report to Eu rope for ind ivid ua l

trea ty tra ining, tea m tra ining, a nd fu ll-sca le mock inspections ?41

he American CF Treaty I nspecti on cams

A Trea ty-specified limit of nine i nspectors per team d rove the

design of all inspection teams. The U.S. tea ms consisted of inspectors who were professiona l milita ry officers and noncom missioned

officers; other U.S. a ugmentee inspectors were civil ian specia lists. 

The tea m chiefs wou ld be, in Colonel Kelley's terms, "independent

pa trol lead ers."42 Based on OSIA's experience with the IN F Trea ty

i nspections, Genera l La joie and Colonel Kelley decided tha t the

tea m chiefs wou ld be experienced field gra de off icers. During an

inspection, these officers and their tea ms wou ld be tra vel ing u nder

escort to remote places in the Soviet Un ion and Eastern Eu rope,

a nd a t times they wou ld ha ve to lea d inspections in extremel y

severe wea ther conditions on the Eu rasia n continent. As Kelley

saw it, the tea m lea ders were officers "with whom you would ha ve

precious little contact once they deployed, and on whom you ha d

to rely impl icitly. "4.i From the beginn ing, he wanted a specific type

of officer: a U.S. Army or Ma rine Russia n foreign area officer

( FAO ) or Air Force officers with sim ila r skills, a lthough the Air

Force did not ha ve a compa ra ble progra m. FAOs were ca reer

milita ry off icers who ha d served in one of the comba t bra nches

a nd then ha d specia lized in Russia n language and Soviet milita ry

force structu re. Highl y tra ined a nd ed uca ted , Russia n FAOs were

in dema nd as a ttaches, a rms control specia lists, a nd pla ns/a na lysis

sta ff off icers. In fact, the dema nd for them was so great tha t they

were not ava ila ble for assignment to fill a ll the CFE tea m chief

posi tions.

Conseq uently, Hea dqua rters OSIA and its Eu ropea n Operations Com ma nd a ccepted a different composition of tea m chiefs:

some Russia n FAOs, some West Europea n FAOs, and some line

officers-a rtillery off icers, a ircra ft comma nders, or armor officers.

The U.S. Army's Eu ropea n FAOs had simila r ed uca tion, tra ining,

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U.S. inspectors were professionals

in theirfields.

L,f l '

a nd experiences to the Russia n FAOs, except tha t they ha d spent

much of t heir ca reer work ing wit h NATO a rmies, air forces, a nd

staffs. The line off icers had served nea rly a ll of their Army or Air

Force ca reers work i ng with comba t u n its in armor, infa ntry, a rtillery, or tactica l a ircra ft. They k new U.S. m i l i ta ry force structure,

wea pons, u nits, a nd person nel , specifica lly how the soldiers, ma -

rines, and a irmen combined to ma ke an opera tiona l u n it. Equa lly

importa nt, they were experienced in serving in and eva lua ting

opera tiona l milita ry u n its. So it was from these th ree groups tha t

the CFE tea m chiefs ca me. As for the depu ties, Colonel Kelley and

Colonel Grosick decided tha t the second off icers wou l d be field 

gra de off icers, idea lly a t the ra n k of ma jor. Their backgrou nds

wou ld complement those of the tea m chiefs, so that i f one off icer

could not spea k R ussia n, the other wou ld.

How d id these pl a ns wor k out ? Six of the eight tea m chiefs

were lieu tena nt colonels. The eight deputy tea m chiefs, except for

one capta in a nd one wa rra nt off icer, were ma jors or ma jor selectees. Noncom missioned off icers filled the two tea m positions for

trea ty lingu ists. Tra ined as Russia n lingu ists, these NCOs ha d

served in the U.S. mil ita ry with its h igh standa rds for noncom missioned off icer lea dersh ip a nd tra ining. They were professiona l

sold iers. Two other i nspection tea m mem bers were a lso NC:Os;

they were wea pons specia lists w ho had d irect experience with

conventiona l a rmed forces in the Europea n thea ter. Rou ndi ng out

the nine-person i nspection tea m were th ree specia lists who were

k nowledgea ble in Soviet and Centra l Eu ropea n milita r y forces.44

This pu rposef u l mi x of mil ita ry sk ills a nd experiences among

tea m members gave Colonel Kelley flexibi l ity in assigning inspection tea ms to m issions. Any America n tea m could inspect either a

Polish armor regiment or a Soviet ta ctica l a ir u nit beca use someone on the tea m ha d firstha nd experience with armor and someone else ha d wor ked on or flown a ircraft. The CFE Treaty's Protocol on Inspections a llowed each inspection tea m to brea k into

th ree subtea ms, a nd it was America n pol icy to rou tinely use th ree

subtea ms. The protocol , however, req uired each subtea m to possess l ingu istic capa bility in the i nspected cou ntry's lang uage. Since

every U.S. tea m ha d two lingu ists, either the tea m chief or depu ty

ha d to spea k Russia n to a l low the tea m to brea k down into th ree

su btea ms for grea ter opera tiona l coverage at an inspection site.

At trea ty signature in Novem ber 1990, the best estima te for

entry into force was Apri l 1, 1991. To be read y to inspect and

escort on tha t date, OSIA 's Europea n Opera tions ha d to ha ve the

team chiefs, depu ties, lingu ists, a nd wea pons specia lists in place in

Eu rope by Ja nua ry l, 1991. This did not ha ppen. Beca use of the

Gu lf Wa r, the limited availa bi lity of FAOs, and the dra wdown of

America n forces, the U.S. mi lita ry person nel system cou ld not

provide qua lified off icers and COs ra pid ly for reassignment to
I 11 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1c :l 1 n1 > 5' 1 11 ,

Eu rope. Frustra ted beca use the u nit ha d to be rea dy rega rd less of

the U.S. milita ry's systemic problems, Colonel Kelley recalled tha t

they "were tota lly u na ble to acq uire person nel u nti l, at the ea rliest,

Janua ry 31, 1991," and even then the fill was only pa rtia l. This

dela y was serious: ind ivid ua l treaty trai ning would be postponed ,

tea m tra ining cou ld not begi n, and mock inspections eva luating

the read iness of U.S. CFE sites i n Western Eu rope cou ld not be

u nderta ken. Nomina tions came la te, arri vals still la ter. Not unti l

the summer of 1991 did six of the eight team chiefs arrive a t

Rhei n-Ma in. Two of the deputy tea m leaders did not reach Germa ny u ntil Decem ber 1991, 12 months behi nd initia l expectations.45

r ) , 1 ,

There was a n u nforeseen development. No na tion ha d ratified the CFE Trea ty in time for the projected April 1991 entry into

force date. In fact, the na tiona l ra tification process was not completed at all in 1991; it was not u ntil Ju l y 1992 tha t the trea ty

entered into force provisiona lly. This del ay allowed time for five

pa ra llel developments.

First, it a llowed time for the na tional ra tifica tion processes to

conclude in 1991-92 in the congresses, pa rlia ments, and governments of a ll the CFE Trea ty signatory states. Next, it a llowed time

for intense diploma tic negotia tions by the CFE Treaty states with

the Soviet Union over two significant issues: the reloca tion

and tra nsfer of its TLE beyond the Ura l Mou nta ins, and the

redesigna tion of forces as na va l in fa ntry. Beca use of those di ploma tic discussions, the NATO na tions dela yed trea ty ra tifica tion

un til the summer a nd fa ll of 1991. Th ird, it gave the Western and

Eastern Eu ropea n na tiona l verifica tion agencies, ma ny of which

U.S. inspectors received experience

during training in Czechoslovak ia.

orcsc n ) 1 '
68 0 -Sr n J:-;w1 c 110 Ac.1 c Y -----

were newly esta bl ished, time to develop leadership cadres, inspection tea ms, escort tea ms, com m u nications systems and proced ures,

a nd opera tiona l pla ns for cond ucting on-site i nspections and escorts. Fourth, there was time for the new verifica tion agencies to

cond uct extensive practice, or mock, inspections with their own

nationa l milita ry forces, with the milita ry forces in their respective

allia nces, and in a few i nsta nces, with the milita r y forces of nations in the opposing a llia nce. Fina lly, it allowed time for the

consequences of the Soviet Union 's demise to u nfold. That epocha l

development resu lted in the esta blish ment of 15 successor nations

and set in motion a series of pol itical, mi lita ry, diplomatic, and

economic developments. Six months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the successor states agreed in Ma y 1992 at Tashkent,

Uzbek ista n, to pa rtition the former USSR's m ilita ry forces and

accept a ll of its CFE Trea ty obligations.

These five developments profou nd l y influenced the CFE

Trea ty. Discussed i n the next cha pter, they demonstrated how the

changi ng interna tional order profou nd l y a ltered the mission of

implementi ng a signed arms control trea ty. The CFE Treaty was

essentially a Europea n a rms red uction and conflict prevention

trea ty. When Eu rope cha nged profou nd ly in 1991-92, so too did

the context for pl an ni ng the trea ty's implementa tion. There is a

simple historica l tru th, k nown to every experienced verifica tion

agency director: "Every treaty has its own pa rticu la r history." Th is

was never more a ppa rent tha n i n 1991-92 with the ratification

process and opera tiona l prepa ra tions for the Conventional Armed

Forces in Eu rope Treaty.

NOTES

1. Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, On-Site Inspections Under the I N F Treaty (Wash ington , D.C.: Govern ment Pri nti ng Off ice, 1993), p. 152. Ma jor Genera l

Robert W. Pa rker, USAF Director OSIA, Statement before the H ouse of

Representati ves, Foreign Af fairs Subcommittee on Arms Control and

Internati onal Security and Science, Ma rch 21, 1991. In h is statement, Gen.

Pa rker discussed President Bush's Nation a l Secu rity Directi ve a nd its

i mpl ications for t he On-Sire I n spection Agency. See a lso House Com m ittee

on Foreign Affa i rs, Report to the Congress on the Activities of the On-Site

/ nsfJecti on Agency of the D e/Jartment of Defense, ] 02d Congress, 2nd

Sess., 1992. Wash ington D.C.

2. For the attit ude of the Reaga n admi n istration (1981-1988) rega rd ing U.S.-

USSR relation s, a rms control treaties, a nd verif ication, see Don Oberdorfer,

The Turn: From the Cold War to a N ew Era-The United States and the

Soviet Union, 1983-1990 ( New York: Poseidon Press, 1991); a nd George

P. Sch u l tz, Turmoil and Triumph: M y Years as Secretary of State (New

York: Cha rles Scribner's Sons, 1993). For accou n ts of the Bush adm i n istration (1988-1 992) see Michael Besch loss a nd Strobe Ta l bott, At the Highest

Levels: The I nside Story of the End of the Cold \\'far ( Boston: Little,

Brown, a nd Co., 1993); Ph i l i p Zel i kow a nd Condoleezza R ice, Germany

Unified and Europe Transf ormed: A stud y in Statecra ft (Cambridge, Mass.:
IJ I f l c\I PR l'i\llr\ rlON<,: UNI 1 11) STAHS AN D THF NATO NATIO ., 69

Ha rva rd Un i versity Press, l 995); and Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Auto/JS )' on an

Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collaps e of the Soviet

Union ( New York: Ra ndom House, 1995).

3. For a n accou nt of the agency's expa nsion, read Da vid M. Wi llford, "A

Brief History of t he On-Site Inspection Agency," OSIA Reference Report

No. l (Wash ington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), pp . .5-7.

4. After signat u re, the president su bmitted these trea ties to the U.S. Senate

for ratif ica tion. For the text of each trea ty, accom pa n ied by the Bush

ad m i n istra tion's interpreta tion of each ma jor a rticle, provision, a nd

protocol, see Sena te Com m ittee on Foreign Rela tions, Executive Rep ort

101-3 1 : Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful N uclear Explosions Treaties,

101st Cong., 2d sess., 1990; Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Rela tions,

Treaty Document 102-8: M essage from the President of the United States

Transmitting the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe (CrE),

102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991; Senate Committee on Foreign Rela tions,

Treaty Document J 03-2 1: M essage frmn the President of the United States

Transmitting the Convention on the Prohibiti on of Development, Stock /Jiling

and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 103d Cong.,

lst sess., 1993.

5. President George Bush, The President's Report to Congress on Soviet NonComplian ce with Arms Control Ag reements, Fe brua ry 23, 1990.

6. Presiden t George Bush , Na tiona l Secu rity Directi ve 41, Organizing to

M anage On-Site I nspecti ons for Arms Control, Ma y 29, 1990. The i m pact

of t h is d irecti ve on t he agency was d iscussed by Gen. Pa rker, in h is

sta tement before the House Foreign Affa irs Su bcomm ittee on Ma rch 21,

1991.

7. Genera l Col i n L. Powell, Cha irma n, Joi n t Ch iefs of Sta ff, Memora nd u m

for t he Secreta ry of Defen se, "CFE Trea ty Execu tive Agen t," A pri l 3, 1991;

Secreta ry of Defense Richa rd B. Cheney, Memora nd um for the Secreta ries

of the M i l ita ry Services, "Execu ti ve Agent for the Secreta ry of Defense for

t he CFE Trea ty, " J u ne 14, 1991. La ter, these d irecti ves were i ncorporated

i nto the fi na l i nstruction; see President George Bush, Na tiona l Security

Di rective, Organizing to M anage On-Site Insp ections Under the CF E

Treaty, Februa ry 11, 1992.

8. U n i ted Stares Eu ropea n Com ma nd, "Memora nd u m of Understa ndi ng

Between USEU COM, USLA NTCOM., a nd OSI A for M u tua l Lia ison a nd

Support Opera tions in l m plemenra rion of r hc CFE Trea ty," Fa l l 1991.

9. Ibid.

10. I n terv i ew wi t h Colonel La wrence G. Kel l ey, USMC, Ch ief, Opera tions

Di vision, Eu rnpea n Opera tions Comma nd , OSIA, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n,

H istoria n, OSIA, Wash i ngton, D.C., Ma y 18, 1994; Interview wi rh Ma jor

Richa rd .J. O'Shea, USA F, Lia ison Off icer, Eu ropea n Ope ra tions Comma nd,

OSlA, hy Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historia n, OSIA, R hei n-Ma i n A ir Base,

Germa n y, Ju l y 12, 1993.

11. Ha ra ha n, On-Site Insp ections Under the I N F Treaty, pp. 47-64, 1l 7-150.

12. Colonel James S. Loft us, Jr., USA, Ch ief, Negotia tions Pl a ns Office,

Headq ua rters OSIA, Report on Pl a n ning Assu mptions for Fu tu re Trea ties,

Ja n ua ry 22, 1990; Com ma nder Edwa rd J. Higgi ns, USN , Pla n ner,

Negotia tions Pla n s Office, Headq ua rters OSI A, Report on Pla n n ing for

Arms Control Inspection Activ ities, Ma rch 6, 1990; Di rectora te of 

Resou rces Ma n power Office, Headq ua rters OSIA Report, On-Site

I nspection Agency Joi n t Ta ble of Dist ri bu tion, A pril 17, 1990; Colonel
Ja me s S. Lofr us, Jr., USA, Ch ief, Negotia tions Pl a ns Off ice, Headq ua rters

OSI A, Memora nd u m for Distri bution, Treaty Pl a n n i ng Assu m pti on s,

Octobe r 4, J 990.

l3. Interview, Kelley.

'14. Arms Control Report er I 990, pp. 407.B.382-383; J ane M.0. Shar p,

"Con ventiona l A r ms Control i n Eu rope," i n S / P R I Yearbook 1991 , World

Armanzents mzd Disarmament, pp . 420-421.

15. Sha rp, "Conventiona l A r ms Control i n Eu rope" ( 1 991), pp . 429-430 .

16. Arms Control Report er 1990, pp. 407.B.393, 407.B.410-411 ; R . Jeff ery

Smith, "Soviets Sai d to be Removi ng Arms from Eu rope Before Treaty,"

Washington Post, October 5, 1 990, p. A20; R.Jeffery Smith, "U.S.-Sov iets

Disagree on A rms Cu ts," Washington Post, Decem ber 17, 1990, pp. A l ,

A20; Michael R. Gord on , "Soviets Sh ift Man y Ta n k s to Siberia," N ew

York Times, Nove m ber 15, 1990, p. A 3; I nterna tion a l I nstitute for

Strategic Stud ies, The M ilitary Balance, 1 99 1-1992 (London: Brassey's

Inc., 1991 ), pp. 30-3l.

17. See this book , Cha pter 3, Ra tification Dela yed.

18. P. Terrence Hopm a n n , "From MBFR to CFE, Negotia ti ng Con ven tiona l

Arms Control in Eu rope," in Rich a rd Dea n Bu rns, ed., Encyclopedia o/

Arms Control and Disarmmnent, Vol. 11, pp. 983-984 . For a good i nsigh t

i nto the i n tern a l pressu res on t he sen ior off icers responsi ble for mission

read iness, see Inter view, Kelley.

19. Jn J u ne 1990, the N ATO foreign m in isters agreed at a meeti ng a t Tu rn bu ry,

Scotia nd, to esra bl ish a sma II coord i na ting mccha n ism a t Headq u a rte rs

N ATO. Th is beca me the Verif ica ti on Coord in a ti ng Comm ittee ( VCC). See

Arms Contru/ Rep orter 1990, pp . 407.B.383, 407.B.409.

20. . These cha nges had other effects. For i nsta nce, the n u m ber of U .S. si tes

su bj ect to inspection i n c reased twofold by th e U.S. q u ota of 18 percent. See

I nterview, Kell ey.

21. Ibid .

22. Ch ief of Sta ff, Ad m i nistration, Hcadq u<ll't ers OS!A , On-Si te I n specti on

Agency Person nel Roste r, Ivl a y 20 1992; Director of Resou rce Ma nagement , Ma n power Off ice, Report on On-Site In spection Agency Ma nn i ng

Docu ment, October 8, 1992.

23. Intern a tiona l I n stitute for Stra tegic Stud ies, The M ilitary Balance , 1 991-

1992, pp. 32-45; I nte rna ti onal Insti tu te for Strategic Studies, The M ilitary

Balance, 1 995-1996 (Lond on: Brnssey's I nc., 1995), pp . 102-120.

24 . Presiden t George Bu sh , "Sta te of t h e Union Add ress, .Ja n ua ry 31, ·1990,"

pu bl ished in the Cong ressional Quarterly Almanac, 1990 (Wash ington ,

D.C.: Congressi ona l Qu a rterly, Inc ., 1 991 ), pp . 18-21.

25. Genera l Crosbie E. Sa i nt, ,om ma nd er-in-Chi ef, U.S. Army Eu rope a nd

Seven th Army, "Ch a ngi ng the Face of USAREUR," Field Artiller y

M agazine, A ugust 1 992, p p. 10-l S. See a lso Patreci a Slayden Hollis, "An

Introd ucti on : USA REUR i n Transi tion ." Field Artiller y M agazine, Augu st

1992, pp . 8-9.

26. Saint, "Cha ngi ng t he: Face of USAR EUR," p. 13.

27. I bid., p. 14.

28. I nterview, Kelley; I ntervi ew, O'Shea.
29. Ja mes Maci ntosh, "Con fidence-Bu i ld i n g Measu res i n Eu rope, 1975 ro the

Present ," i n Richa rd Dea n Bu rn s, ed., F:ncyclopedia of Arms Control and

Disarmament, Vol. II , pp. 929-945; Don 0. Stova l l, "The Stock hol m

Accord: On-Site In specti ons i n Eastern a n d Western Eu rope," i n Lewis A.

Du n n and Am y E. Gordon , eels., A rms Control Verification and the N ew

lfo lc of On-Site lns/1cction ( Lexi ngron, Mass.: Lex ington Book s, l 990), pp.

15-38. For a broader d iscussion of the CSCE, th e CFE Treaty, a nd t h e

growth of regiona l a rms cont rol i nsti tu ti on s i n Eu rope, sec Catheri n e

McA rdle Kelleher, " ·ooperari vc Secu rity i n Eu ro pe,'' i n J ane E. Nola n, eel.,

Global engagement: Coop eration and Security in the 2 Ist Century

(Wash ington, D.C.: l)rook ings Insti tution Press, 1994), pp. 293-351.

30. I nterv iew with Brigad ier Genera l Dr. Hei nz Loq ua i, Director, Zentr u m flir

Verif i kati onsa u fga ben der Bu ndesweh r, by Joseph I'. Ha ra h a n , Histori a n ,

OSIA, Gei len kirch en, Germa n y, Ja n u a ry 3 1 , 1994.

31. Ibid . Sec a lso Interviews wi th Lr. Colonel Rola nd Keitel and Lr. Colonel

Bernd Mcckc, Zentru m flir Verif i k a rion sa u fga ben der Bu ndesweh r, by

Joseph P. Ha ra ha n , Historia n , OSI A, Gei lcn k irch en , Germa n y, Ja n ua ry 31,

1 994.

32. . Interv iew with Colonel Fra n<;ois Rozec, Com ma nda nt, L'Un ire Fra nc,:a ise

de Veri fica tion, by Joseph I'. Ha ra ha n , Historia n , OSI A, Crei l, Fra nce,

Febr u a ry 1, 1994 .

33. Squad ron Leader An ton y Kerr, Joi n t A rms Control Implementation Grou p,

Grea r Bri ta i n, Specia l Report on t h e .J A C!C, sen t to the Historia n, OSIA,

Ma rc h, 23, 1 994 .

34. . I n terv iew with Lr. Colon el Fred Ja n ssen a nd Lr. Colonel Hen ri Va n 

der A uera, !}Un ite Beige de Verifica tion , by Joseph I'. Ha ra ha n, Histori a

n, OSI A, Br ussels, Belgi um, Ja n ua ry 27, 1994.

35. Interview with Jvla j0r Gene ra l .Joseph Di Ma ria, Centro Ita l i a no de Verlf ica

de A nni (CIVA ), by Joseph I'. Ha ra ha n , Historia n , OSIA, Wash i ngton D.C.,

October 1 9, 1993.

36. In terview with Comma nde r ·.N.Jvl. Wi c rcma , Director, Arms Control

Bra nch, Min istry of Defense, the Netherla nds, byJoseph P. Ha raha n,

H istori a n, OSI A, The Hagu e, Net he rla n ds, .Ja n ua ry 28, 1994.

37. Kel leher, "C0opera ti ve Secu rity i n Eu rope," pp. 304-3 1 0; Hopma n n,

"From MBFR ro CFE," pp. 967-989; Arms Control Reporter I 990, pp.

407.B.29 1 -409; A m bassador A m edeo de Fra nch is, "The CFE Trea ty-The

Role of the High Level Wor k i ng Grou p," N ATO R eview, No . 5, October

I 992, pp . 1 2-16.

38. Nec il Ned i mogl u , Head of the N ATO Veri fication a nd I mpl emen ta tion

Coord i n ation Section , "N ATO's Role i n Veri fica tion and Com pl ia nce

Mon itori ng for t h e CFE Trea ty a nd t he Vi en na Docu ment," speech

p resented ro t he U n i ted a rions Grou p of Govern men ta l Ex perts on

Veri fica tion i n A l l i ts Aspects, ew Y0rk , J u l y 1 9, 1 994. See a lso Arms

Contrul Reporter 1990, pp. 407 .B.376, 407.fU83 .

39. Col onel Joh n Reppert, OSI A, Trip Report for onvenrion a l Forces in

Europe Treaty (CFE) Acti vities wit h the NATO's Verification Coord inating

Comm i ttee, Ja nua ry I 0-Februa ry 8, l 991, Headq u a rters OSIA, Februa r y

13, 1 991; Lr. Colonel Thomas A. Dud ley, OSIA, Tri p Report for

Con venti ona l Forces i n Eu rope (CFE) Activ iti es with t he NATO

Veri f ica tion Coord i nati ng Com m i ttee, Ma rch I -May 7, 1991, Headq ua rters OSIA, J\ila y 28, 1991. for the NATO perspective see Ned imogl u,

"NATO's Role i n Ve rifica tion a nd Com pl ia nce Mon itori ng for th e CFE

Trea t y a nd the Vien na Docu ment."
72 0 1

-S1n I SPl'CT10, Ac.M:Y -------

40. Pu bl ic Affai rs Off ice, OSI A, News Rel ease: "Biograph y of Col onel

Frederick E. Grosick, USA F, Comma nd er Eu ropea n Opera tions,"

Decem ber 1 993; a nd Pu bl ic Affa i rs Office, OSI A , News Rel ease:

"Biogra ph y of Colon el Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Deputy Commander

and Ch ief of Ope ra tions, Eu ropea n Operations Com ma nd, " Decem ber

1993.

41. Inter view, Kelley.

42 . I bid.

43. I bid.

44 . Th is su mma ry 1s based on a seri es of lengthy interview s wi th Americ an

CFE Treat y rea m ch iefs, deputy team ch i efs, l i ngu ists, a nd wea pons

specia l ists. Sec i nterviews w ith Lt. Col on el J a n S. Ka rcz, USA, December

1 3, 1993; Lr. Colon el Joseph J. Drach, J r., USA, Decem ber 17, 1993; Lt.

Colon e l Thomas C. Fiser, USA, J u l y 12, 1993; Lt . Col onel Kei th A.

Oatman, USA, J u l y 13, 1993; Lr. Col onel David P. Gessert, USAF, J u l y 12,

1993; Lr. ol on el Ed wa rd G. Ga l l agher, 11, USA, Decem ber 13, 1993;

Ch i ef Wa rrant Off ice r 4 M ichael R. Lu kes, USA, J ul y 12, 1993; Sergea nt

Fi rst ,J ass George A . Pa rtri dge, USA, .J u l y 13, 1993; Sergea nt Fi rst Cl ass

Ma rk A. Bu ma l a, USA, J ul y 13, 1993. All i ntervi ews cond ucted by Joseph

P. Ha ra h an , Historia n , OSIA, <H Rhei n-Ma i n Air Base, Germa ny.

45. Interview, Kelley.
Chapter 3

East German guard on patrol hours before the fall of the Berlin Wall on N ovember 9, 1 989.

s Eu rope entered the 1990s, i t was i n turmoi l. From 1989

to 1992-coincid ing with the yea rs of the CFE Trea ty's

negotia tion, ra tifica tion, and entry i n to force-na tions on

the Eu ropea n continent were experienci ng thei r greatest cha nges

since the end of World Wa r II. There was the u n ifica tion of Germa ny; the "velvet" pol itical revol utions casting out Comm u nist

systems in Poland, Hu nga ry, and Czechoslova k ia; the blood y

revol u tion in Roma nia; the conti n uous integra tion of the Eu ropea n Union; the recurrent econom ic a nd pol itica l crises i n the

Soviet Union presagi ng its colla pse; the na tiona l ind ependence

movements in the former Soviet repu bl ics; and, ru nn ing th roughout, the la rge-sca le mi l ita ry withd rawa ls from Centra l a nd Western Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States. Politica lly,
diploma tica lly, and milita rily, the Eu ropea n continent was in the

m idst of revol u tiona ry changes. It was in th is context tha t ratifica -

tion and impleme nta tion of the CFE Trea ty proceeded.

1991.

In consti tu tiona l govern ments, treaties req u ire two acts for

legitimacy: execu tive signa tu re and legisla tive ra tifica tion. For the

Un ited States, Presiden t Bush signed the CFE Treaty in Pa ris on

Novem ber 19, 1990. That same day, the leaders of 21 other

NATO and Wa rsa w Pact na tions signed the trea ty. Ra tifica tion,

however, took nea rly two years. On October 30, 1992, just 20

days short of two fu l l yea rs, the fina l two states, Bela rus and

Kaza ksta n, ratified the trea ty and deposited thei r instru ments of

ra tification a t The Hague in the Net herla nds. Wh y did it ta k e so

long?

One CFE Trea ty signatory state, the Soviet U nion, was in

such tu rmoi l in 1991 and 1992 that its very existence was in question.1 When the USSR colla psed in la te Decem ber 1991, its successor states had to form new governments, and those govern ments

had to work out milita ry and security relationshi ps wit h Russia ,

the la rgest a nd most powerfu l of the former repu blics.

So grea t were the repercussions from the Soviet Union 's i nterna l diff icu lties tha t the CFE Trea ty signatory states had to convene

fou r sepa ra te extraord ina ry meeti ngs to a pprove, a uthorize, a nd

incorporate new statements, u ndersta nd ings, decla rations, a nd

agreements into the trea ty rega rd ing entitlements a nd obligations.

In Ju ne 1991, the signa tory states met at The Hague; in October

1991 they convened in Vienna; i n June 1992 they met i n Oslo;

and, fina lly, in Ju ly 1992, they assembled just before the Con ference on Security and Coopera tion in Eu rope (CSCE) sum mit in

Helsink i . At each of these meeti ngs, the d iploma ts took u p specific

trea ty issues for the grou p to resolve before the ind ivid ua l states

wou ld proceed with ra tifica tion a nd implementa tion. Eve ry issue

was a consequence of the Soviet Union's colla pse as an empi re.

Throughou t these extraord ina ry meeti ngs across Europe, the commitment of the Eu ropea n and North Atla ntic states to the CFE

Treaty as the "cornerstone of Eu ropea n secu rity" proved to be

rema rka bly strong and dura ble.

The first, a nd most serious, issue a rose a t the time of the

CSCE/CFE Trea ty sum mit in Novem ber 1990. On Novem ber 18,

one day before trea ty sign i ng, representa tives from each of the

U.S. ratification- December 26,
signa tory states placed stacks of trea ty-ma nda ted data books on

long rows of ta bles i n the Hof burg Pa lace i n Vien na. The books

listed detailed infor ma tion on force structu re, force size, mili ta ry

u n its and organi za tions, and milita ry wea pons in the five treaty

categories of a rma men ts: ta n ks, a rtillery, a rmored personnel ca rriers, helicopters, and comba t a ircraft. Shortly thereafte r, state delega tes moved from ta ble to ta ble scooping u p copies of these inval ua ble milita ry force data . U.S. CFE Treaty Negotia tor Lynn M.

Ha nsen, who was i n the Hof bu rg Pa lace tha t morni ng, cha racterized the excha nge as ha ving the "au ra of a bazaa r." He remembered milita ry officers and specia lists excited and bu zzi ng at the

opportu nity to compa re trea ty decla ra tions aga i nst cu rrent estima tes.2 Within days, however, the a tmosphere changed for the

worse as serious q uestions arose abou t the Soviet Union 's force

da ta (see ta ble 3-1).3

It appea red to ma ny of the state delega tes in Vien na tha t the

Soviet Union had u nderrepresented its trea ty hold ings by a signif icant degree. InJu ly 1988, when a ll the states had presented their

force data to the negotiati ng tea ms, the Soviet Union had given out

one set of data. Now in Novem ber 1990, a t treaty signature, it

had presented a m uch d ifferent set of data . When compa red, there

were major discrepa ncies. U.S. off icia ls reported to President Bush

tha t the Soviet d iscrepa ncy was between 20,000 a nd 40,000 items:

6,000 to 11,000 tanks, 12,000 armored fighting veh icles, 12,000

a rtiller y pieces, and 3,000 comba t a ircra ft.4 This was a serious

discrepa ncy, one tha t clea rl y threa tened ra tification. Was there a

Soviet expla na tion ?

In Vien na , Soviet d iploma ts expla ined tha t d u ring the two

yea rs of trea ty negotiations, 1989-90, the Soviet High Comma nd

had cond ucted a la rge-sca le operation tha t withd rew thousa nds of

m il ita ry pe rsonnel, wea pons, and u n its from Centra l a nd Eastern

Eu rope. It was th is mil ita ry eq uipment, they asserted , that accounted for the difference.5 They expla ined that in one category

alone, ta nks, the Soviet Army had destroyed, exported, or converted more tha n 4,000 items since 1989. The Soviet m il ita ry had

sent a nother 8,000 ta n ks to motor rifle a nd other divisions stationed i n Asia, or to m i l i ta ry storage depots loca ted beyond the

U ra l Mou nta i ns. In addition, they poi nted out tha t the Soviet

mi l itary had sent thousa nds of items from other trea ty-limited

equi pment (TLE) ca tegories-a rtillery, a rmored combat vehicles

(ACVs), and helicopters-to military depots and active unitsstationed beyond the Urals.6The Ural Mountains were theCFE

Treaty's easternmost boundary; military equipment located east

ofthe Urals was notsubject to any ofthe treaty'srequirements.

There wou ld be no req u irement for its incl usion i n the i nitia l data,

for on-site i nspection tea ms to cou n t it, or for it to be red uced

with in a set period of time. Finally, the Soviet diploma ts expla ined

that since much of this equ ipment had been tra nsferred from speSoviet Foreign M inister Eduard

Shevardnad ze detailed the

movement of TLE east of the

Urals.
76 01\-Srn I '>Pl'CTION AGINCYTable 3-1. Declared National CFE Holdings in November 1990

Nation Tanks Artillery ACVs

Combat

Aircraft

Attack 

Helicopters

Warsaw Treaty Organization States

USSR 20,694 13,828 29,348 6,445 1,330

Bulgaria 2,416 2,474 2,010 387 44

Czechoslovakia 3,035 3,485 4,359 369 56

Hungary 1,345 1,047 1,720 110 39

Poland 2,850 2,300 2,377 654 128

Romania 2,851 3,819 3,135 407 104

Total WTO 33,191 26,953 42,949 8,372 1,701

NATO States

Belgium 359 376 1,282 191 0

Canada 77 38 277 45 12

Denmark 419 553 316 106 3

France 1,358 1,330 4,125 700 429

Germany 7,133 4,644 9,598 1,064 357

Greece 1,725 1,941 1,639 480 0

Italy 1,912 2,222 3,591 584 169

Netherlands 913 838 1,467 196 91

Norway 205 532 146 90 0

Portugal 146 334 259 96 0

Spain 854 1,373 1,259 252 28

Turkey 2,888 3,202 1,554 589 0

UK 1,198 636 3,193 842 368

USA 5,904 2,601 5,747 704 279

Total NATO 25,091 20,620 34,453 5,939 1,736

Source: Arms Control Reporter 1990, p.407, E-0.7.
R \111 1c \ 1 10'\ Du "1n, Et ROI'! 11\. ltI{ \1011 , O\'ll 1 Ul\10 ' Ii\ R \ 01 Li 110:--. 77

cia lized combat su pport u nits, those u nits no longer held any

TLE.7 Those u n its, by the trea ty's inspection protocols, wou ld not

be objects of verifica tion (OOVs). As a resu lt, the Soviet Union's

OOVs d ropped from a pproxima tel y 1,500 to fewer than l,000.

Fu rther, the Soviet d iploma ts asserted tha t this informa tion

should not ha ve come as a su rprise. In ea rl y October, Soviet Genera l Mik ha il A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet Genera l Staff , ha d

annou nced the specific deta ils of ma ny of these force movements

a t a Penta gon press conference in Washi ngton, D.c.s Just four

weeks before the Vienna meeti ng, Soviet Foreign Minister Ed ua rd 

Shevard na dze ha d sent a deta i led l etter on October 13, 1990, to

U.S. Secreta ry of State James Ba ker listing the n u mber and category of eq u ipment removed from Centra l Eu rope to the east.9 Bu t

some Soviet off icia ls ha d ma de statements tha t ind icated a fa r

different situa tion. In ea rl y October, Soviet A mbassad or Oleg

Grinevsk y spoke infor ma lly wi th the other CFE Treaty d iploma ts

in Vien na , stating that the USSR wou ld ha ve 1,600 OOVs a t

trea ty signatu re, a nd a pproxima tel y 1,500 OOVs a t the end of the

40-month red uction phase. 1 11 Therefore, when the Soviet Un ion

revea led in Vien na , just one day before the officia l signing of the

trea ty in Pa ris, the scope of its u n ila tera l mi lita ry equ ipmen t reloca tion and the decrease in its i nspecta ble sites, it su rprised and

d istu rbed ma ny d iploma ts from the other CFE na tions. At the very

least, it ra ised serious questions of cred ibility.

Wit h in a few weeks, d iplomats l in ked these questions to

other u nilatera l trea ty-rela ted actions by the Soviet Un ion. The

Soviet High Comma nd, accord ing to the USSR's data books, ha d

resu bord ina ted th ree motor rifle d ivisions to na va l infa ntry forces.

In terms of CFE Trea ty equ ipment, this mea nt they ha d tra nsferred

to the na va l forces 120 ta nks, 753 a rmored personnel vehicles, and

234 a rtiller y pieces. The Soviet High Comma nd a lso ha d esta blished a new k ind of na va l u nit, the coasta l def ense forces, and

assigned to it 813 ta n ks, 972 ACVs, a nd 846 a rtillery pieces. In

add ition, the Strategic Rocket Forces recei ved l,791 ACVs. 1 1

Du ring trea ty negotia tions, delega tes considered a ll this equ ipment

to be a pa rt of the USSR's CFE Trea ty TLE ceilings, subject to

red uction quotas a nd inspection protocols. In Vienna , Soviet d iploma ts a rgued tha t since the Soviet High Comma nd ha d reassigned

this equ ipment to na va l u nits, which they asserted were not included in the trea ty, the eq u ipment wou ld not be subject to trea ty

inspections or ceilings. Further, they asserted that the Strategic

Rocket Forces' 1,791 ACVs should be classified as interna l security equ ipment, aga i n outside the treaty's qua ntita tive provisions.

Fina lly, the Soviet data omitted 18 PT-76 a rmored comba t vehicles, which ha d belonged to the civil defense forces, from the

TLE ca tegory of hea vy arma ment com ba t vehicles. Neither i n thei r

data submission nor i n subseq uen t d iscussions did the Soviets give

a ny expla nation for this omission. 12
Despite these d iscrepa ncies, the trea ty was signed on November 19, 1990. Nonethel ess, four states-the Un ited States, Germa n y, Ca na da , a nd Grea t Brita i n-raised specific questions a bou t

the Soviet data . The forum they used was the newl y esta blished

CFE Trea ty Join t Consu lta ti ve Grou p (JCG ). 13 One of this grou p's

responsi bil ities was to seek resol u tions of ambig u ities i n d ata or

d ifferences of interpreta tion resu lti ng from treaty im plementa tion.

Clea rly, the d ispu te wi th the Soviet U nion, a ma jor signatory pa rty,

over its initia l da ta su bm ission fell wit h in the scope of the ]CG.

Article V of the trea t y, and a sepa ra te protocol, a u thorized a nd set

forth the responsi bi l ities and proced u ra l ru les governi ng this importa n t joi nt trea ty grou p. Consisti ng of representa tives from

every signatory state, the JCG was to meet in Vien na twice a yea r,

wi th each session l a sting four weeks. In fact, the initia l issues were

so contentious tha t the ]CG met i n nea rl y contin uous monthly

sessions begi n n ing i n la te Novem ber 1990.

The state pa rties ha d 90 d ays-u n til Febr ua ry 15, 1991-to

correct any d iscrepa ncies in t heir initia l data and to respond to

ambigu ities. The Un ited States, Grea t Brita in, Germa ny, and

Ca na da urged the Soviet U n ion to reconsider its initia l submission.

Duri ng this 90-d ay period , d i pl oma ts from the United States and

severa l other NATO na tions sought to use bila tera l d iploma cy

to resolve the issue. Ea rly in Dece mber, Ambassa dor R. James

Woolsey, U.S. CFE Trea ty Negotia tor, Briga dier Genera l Da n iel W.

Ch ristma n, USA, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representa tive, and a

smal l tea m flew to Moscow to meet with Defense Minister Ma rsha l Dmitriy Ya zov, Genera l Moiseyev, a nd other mem bers of the

Soviet Supreme High Comma nd .

1 4 Foreign Minister Shevardna dze

was not present. Def ense M in ister Ya zov ref used ca tegorica lly to

consider any changes to the Soviet posi tion on the former TLE

equ ipment assigned to nava l and civil d efense units. That eq uipmen t, he asserted , might become pa rt of a possi ble future trea ty on

conventiona l na va l forces, bu t the Soviet mil itary d id not ha ve to

coun t it with the Soviet Un ion's TLE for the CFE Trea t y. Am bassador Woolsey rejected Ya zov's assertion out of ha nd. He rega rd ed

the Soviet d efense min ister's position as directly contra vening the

negotia ted and signed trea ty. An angr y confrontation ensued.

Woolsey told Ya zov tha t the Uni ted States wou ld accept the Soviet

position "over my dead body!" 1 '

This excha nge ha rdened the impasse. At su bsequen t U.S.-

USSR d iploma tic meeti ngs i n Houston, Texas, and Brussels,

Belgi u m, in Decem ber 1990 and Ja n ua ry 1991, Soviet mi l ita ry

lea ders rema ined obd ura te. Then, on Februa ry 14, 1991, the Soviet Union presented its updated treaty data to the JCG in Vienna.

Itretained every essential element under dispute-the exempted

TLEreassigned tothe coastal defense forces,naval infantry forces,

StrategicRocketForces, and civil defense units.Given thisfact,
I> I JI • ) JI I II Il 1 10

U.S. Secreta r y of State Ja mes Ba ker decla red on the same day tha t

President Bush wou ld not su bmit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Sena te for ratifica tion. 16

It is interesti ng tha t in the midst of t his frosty atmosphere, the

d iploma ts resol ved one issue: the 20,000-40,000 discrepa ncy in

the Soviets' data. A na l ysis of two key docu ments supported the

Soviet position. First, Soviet Min ister Sheva rd na dze's letter to

Secreta ry of State Ba ker, dated October 13, 1990, ha d conta i ned

specific figures on the Soviet forces and eq u i pment i n the trea ty's

zones as well as deta i ls on the TLE tra nsfers from 1988 to 1990.

Excerpted, the data revea led the followi ng informa tion:

Table 3-2. Soviet Union's ATTU* Holdings

and Transfers, 1988-1990

1 Jul 88 1 Aug 90 18 Nov 90 Transferred Percent

Tanks 41,580 24,898 20 ,694 20 ,886 50%

Artillery 42,400 18,300 13,828 28,572 67%

ACVs 57,800 32,320 29,348 27,452 47%

Totals 141,780 75,518 63,870 76,910 54%

"Atlantic to the Urals.

Source: Jane M.O. Sharp,"Conventional Arms Control in Europe," SJPRI Yearbook 1991,

p. 430.

Secreta ry Ba ker and Genera l Colin Powell, Cha irma n of the

Joint Chiefs of Sta ff, ha d received these Soviet figu res in late October. Then, th ree weeks la ter, the Soviets ha d presented these same

figu res in Vien na a t the initia l data excha nge. Conseq uentl y, conti n ued U.S. objections in the winter of 1990-91 stood on thi n ice.

The ice got even thi nner in Jan ua ry 1991 w hen U.S. in telligence

estima tes con firmed that the Soviet Union's data discrepa ncy was

not in the 20,000-40,000 ra nge, but proba bl y enta iled 2,000-

3,000 items. 17 With th is new estimate, the issue melted awa y,

losing its power to i n fl uence treaty ra tifica tion .

Wha t di d not d isa ppea r, however, was the Soviet High

Comma nd's insistence on the legitimacy of resu bord ina ting the

th ree motorized rifle divisions to the na va l infa ntry and the coasta l

defense forces. This posi tion a lone mea nt tha t on Februa ry 14,

1991, the date when the Soviet Union su bmitted its u pdated data,

t he CFE Trea ty was at an impasse. Some bel ieved that the Soviet

High Com ma nd wa nted to stop the CFE Trea ty ra tifica tion process cold and su bstitu te for the treaty a "status-q uo" milita ry
80 0 -SI 1 1· I '>l'l l110 A<.I' { )

Soviet Defense M inister M arshal Dmitri y Yazov meets

with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.

rela tionshi p of the Soviet Un ion with Central and

Western Eu ropea n nations. 18 If this were true, the

Soviet mi l ita ry's vision proved to be shortsighted

in view of subsequent events.

In the spring a nd summer months of 1991,

the Soviet Union's interna l and externa l policies

were subject to la rger and more powerful events.

In la te Februa ry, a United Na tions coalition, led

by the Un ited States, won a decisive victory in

the Gulf Wa r over Iraq, a former Soviet ally.

Simu ltaneously, in late Janua ry and Februa ry, the

people of the Ba ltic states of Estonia, La tvia, and

Lithuania rebelled aga inst Soviet imperia lism. 19

Following a brief, violent confrontation, they

won recognition of their sovereignty from Moscow. Then, th roughout April, Ma y, and Ju ne,

President Gorbachev and the Comm u nist centra l

government grad ua lly lost power to Boris

Yeltsin, Russia n reformers, and na tiona listic

leaders in the repu blics. The Soviet High

Comma nd 's desire to esta blish a Soviet-d ominated im peria l security system based on the

milita ry status quo beca me u ntena ble as the

Soviet Un ion u nra veled both as an empire and

a na tion.

While the old system was u ntena ble, it

wou ld ta ke ma n y months for the new rea lity to

emerge. The Soviet Un ion rema ined a grea t milita ry power and a major CFE Trea ty state pa rty.

Following the Gu lf Wa r, President Bush bega n a series of arms

control in itia tives.20 He d irected Secreta ry of State Ba ker to initia te

d iplomatic d iscussions wi th Soviet Foreign Minister Alexa nder A.

Bessmertn yk h. Ba ker focused on resolving both the CFE Trea ty

impasse and the outsta nd ing issues of the still-unsigned Strategic

Arms Red uction Trea ty (START). In the White House, President

Bush set up a sma ll, high-level experts grou p on arms control to

dra ft presidentia l letters and new treaty positions and to formula te

im med iate responses. Led by Arnold Ka nter of the Nationa l Security Council, this four-person grou p worked closely with Secreta ry

Baker, Ambassa dor Woolsey, CFE Treaty Negotia tor Hansen, and

the START Trea ty negotia tors. Initia lly there was little change. In

Ma rch, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertn yk h met with Secreta ry

Ba ker in Moscow. He asked Ba ker to reconsider the Un ited States'

opposition to the Soviet High Comma nd's resu bord ina tion of CFE 

TLE to na va l a nd coasta l d efense u nits. Ba ker replied: "I don't

k now wha t there is to ta l k a bou t. Twenty-two countries have

signed th is trea ty, a nd only one has cha nged the ru les."21
R \ 111 1< \ 1 10 D1 1 n 1 n, Et 1uw1 1 Tt R \1011 , Sm 11 1 U 10 1 R I \ lll l r 1n

Next, President Bush w rote directly to Presid ent Gorbachev

ask ing him to resolve the dispute on the reassignment of the

milita ry equ ipment. Secretary Ba ker ma de a direct appea l to

Bessmertnyk h in Russia in la te April. Neither Bush's letter nor

Baker's personal d iplomacy ha d much effect. Then in la te Ma y

a brea kthrough occurred. President Gorbachev sent Genera l

Moiseyev to Washi ngton for a two-da y meeti ng wi th the president,

senior mi litary leaders, and trea ty negotia tors.22 He brought with

him new proposa ls. General Moiseyev stated the Soviet U nion 's

fina l position: all equi pment in the Soviet naval infa ntry a nd

coasta l defense forces wou ld rema in in their u nits, bu t they wou ld

be counted aga inst the USSR's overa ll CFE Trea ty ceilings. The

nu mber of armored person nel vehicles assigned to the Strategic

Rocket Forces (SRF) wou ld be limited to 1,701, but they wou l d

not be counted aga inst the Soviet Un ion 's aggrega te n u mber of

trea ty ACVs. The na va l forces wou ld not be counted as OOVs,

limiting the n u mber of inspections the Soviets wou ld be lia ble for,

but these u nits wou ld still be vu lnera ble to inspection u nder the

cha llenge inspection provisions. More importa n t, the na va l forces S ovietPresid entMikhail

equ ipment would be counted i n Soviet TLE tota ls. The issue of Gorbachev.

armored person nel vehicles i n the SRF was countered somewha t

by the U.S. concern for the security of Soviet n uclea r ma teria ls if

the Soviet Union beca me less sta ble. After considera tion, U.S. 

experts accepted the Soviet position. The next day Genera l

Moiseyev met with President Bush i n the Whi te House. Accord ing

to a recent accou nt, President Bush was i nsistent and very firm on

the United States' commitment to the trea ty and the conseq uences

of any na tion trying to back out at this late stage.23 Genera l

Moiseyev agreed, stating his support for President Gorbachev,

perestroi ka, and a rms control.

The Baltic states-Estollia, Latvia,

and Lithuani a-gained sove reig nty

fr om the Soviet Union in }alluar y

and f'ebruary 199 1 .

R U S S I A
82 0 -SI II I Pl 1 10

President George Bush.

The CFE Trea ty was m u ltila tera l, wi th 22 signatory

na tions; no one cou ld deny, however, tha t bila tera l

negotia tions ha d resol ved this trea ty impasse. The

Un ited States a nd the Soviet Union acted decisivel y, but

bila tera lly, in reach ing t hese settlements. At times a l l ies

were i nformed; other times they were not. Hu nga ry,

Pola nd, Czechosl ova k ia, and Germa n y compla ined tha t

the United States and the USSR were settling m u ltila tera l trea ty issues a mong themselves. 24 Yet du ring months

of turmoi l and rea l u ncerta in ty, U.S. a nd Soviet poli tica l

lead ers focused aga in and again on the CFE Trea ty; their

persistence prod uced resu l ts.

It was only a ma tter of weeks from the time of

Genera l Moiseyev's Wash ington visi t in Ma y 1991 to

the USSR's forma l decl a ra tion to a ll other trea ty states

in Vien na . In ea rl y .Ju ne, Secreta ry Ba ker and Ambassador Woolsey flew to Moscow and met wit h Foreign

M in ister Bessmertn y k h and Soviet CFE Treaty Negotiator Gri nevsk y. The result was a complex, three- pa rt

solu tion .25 First, Fra nce, as a CFE Treat y signatory state,

would req uest tha t the Netherla nds convene an extraord ina ry conference of state pa rties to the treaty at The Ha gue.

Next, the Soviet Un ion, at tha t con ference, woul d issue a lega lly

bind ing statement expla i n ing the obligations it wou ld u nderta ke

"outside of the framework of the trea ty" to accou nt for its TLE

hol dings within the trea ty's a rea of a pplica tion. The Soviet Un ion

wou ld decla re its willingness to l imit the equ ipment in its nava l

in fa n try forces, coasta l defense forces, a nd Stra tegic Rocket Forces

to the exact n u mber previousl y a n nou nced in Vien na. Then, they

wou ld decl a re tha t 40 mont hs a fter entry into force, the USSR 's

ma x imu m TLE hold ings wou ld i nclu de the tota l TLE assigned to

the na val infa ntr y forces, coasta l defense forces, and Strategic

Rocket Forces. This mea nt tha t the Soviet Union wou ld red uce a n

equ iva lent nu mber of TLE elsewhere to meet its ma ximu m hol dings. Specifica l ly, the Soviets pledged to destroy or con vert 933

ta n ks, l,725 ACVs, and 1,080 a rtillery pieces. They wou ld red uce

one-ha lf of the 933 ta n ks and 1,080 a rti l lery pieces from forces

within the ATTU and the other ha lf from forces east of the Ura ls.

The Soviets a lso stated tha t they wou ld mod ify 753 of the 1,725

ACVs to become MTLB-AT types. These were "look-a likes" and

th us, not limited by the trea ty.26

The Soviets were ada ma n t in their posi tion tha t the coasta l

defense forces and na va l i n fa ntry u nits were not OOVs and therefore not subject to decla red site i nspections. They agreed, however,

tha t this equipmen t wou l d be subject to cha llenge i nspections.

They also decla red tha t they wou ld l imit the n umber of a rmored

comba t veh icles of the SRF, but tha t these lim its wou ld not cou nt

aga inst the tota l n u mber of ACVs a lloca ted u nder the CFE Treaty
to the Soviet Un ion. In response to the Soviet Un ion 's statement,

each of the other 21 states at the extra ord i na ry conference wou ld

issue a statement a ccepting the Soviet Un ion's decla ra tion as lega lly bind ing and the basis for proceed i ng towa rd ra tifica tion a nd

im plementa tion. When the extra ord ina r y conference convened a t

The Hague on Ju ne 18, 1991, the respecti ve am bassa dors rea d

their ca ref u l l y cra fted, legally bind ing sta tements into the record

and, wit h no objections, the cha irma n accepted them as officia l

trea ty docu ments.27

On the issue of the Soviet milita ry equ ipment positioned east

of the Ura l Mou nta ins, the Soviet government presented a poli tica lly bind ing statement to the state delegates attend i ng the CFE's

Joint Consu lta tive Grou p in Vien na. The Soviet Un ion pledged to

destroy or convert to civil ia n use no fewer tha n 6,000 ta n ks, 1,500

ACVs, and 7,000 a rtil lery pieces loca ted beyond the Ura l Mou ntains. They wou ld red uce these items by Novem ber 1995 in such a

wa y as to provide "suff icient visi ble evid ence" of their destruction

or their ha ving been rendered milita ri l y u nsu ita ble. Essentia l ly, the

pledge mea nt tha t the Soviet Un ion wou ld d ispla y this eq u ipment

so tha t trea ty states cou ld use satellite recon na issa nce to mon itor

a nd confirm its red uction.28

Once these Soviet lega l and politica l statements had been

accepted as officia l trea ty docu ments, most of the CFE Trea ty

signa tory states t u rned to ratifica tion. President Bush submi tted

the CFE Trea ty to the U.S. Senate on Ju l y 9, 1991, stati ng, "The

CFE Trea ty is the most am bitious a rms con trol agreement ever

concl uded. "29 He decla red tha t the trea ty was i n the "best interests of the Un ited States" and tha t it was a n im porta nt step i n

"defining the new secu rity regime i n Eu rope." Other states went

th rough the ra tification process as well. Czechoslova k ia was the

first na tion to ra tify the trea ty a nd deposit the i nstru men ts of

ra tification in the trea ty depository a t The Hague. Other na tions

followed a nd by the end of 1991, 14 na tions, incl ud ing Hu nga ry,

the Netherla nds, Bu lga ria , United Kingd om, Pola nd, Germa ny,

and the United States, ha d ra tified the trea ty. Before a l l the origina l 22 trea ty signatories cou ld complete the ra tifica tion process,

however, three new developments i nfl uenced the trea ty.

HI I D ( RI I : Hf B I Sr T

This issue dealt with the legal status of the Soviet Union's

TLE in the three Baltic nations-Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.311

Resol ution came expeditiously. None of the Ba ltic states wa nted to

become pa rties to the CFE Treaty. None wa nted the Soviet mili ta ry

forces, which they consid ered to be a rmies of occu pation, to be

stationed perma nentl y on their na tiona l territory. They were concerned tha t any trea ty pa rtici pa tion by a Ba ltic state wou ld lend
84 0 -S m:lN'>l'FCTJON A;ENn 

legiti macy to a Soviet presence i n the Bal tics. All desired, however,

tha t the Soviet Un ion's con ventiona l milita ry equ ipment and u n its

subject to the trea ty still cou nt aga inst the Soviet U n ion's TLE

ceilings a nd , if possi ble, be red uced in accorda nce with the protocols of the trea ty.

Recognizi ng the Ba ltic na tions' dema nds, and sensing tha t the

Soviet Foreign Mi n istry was willi ng to discuss a d iploma tic solution, U.S. d iploma ts in Moscow informa lly ra ised the possi bility

of another "agreed statement" rega rdi ng the Soviet Union's CFE

Trea ty obliga tions. As a d irect consequence of this bila tera l diplomacy, the CFE Trea ty's Joi n t Consulta tive Grou p convened another extraord ina r y meeti ng in Vienna on October 18, 1991.31 The

cha irma n rea d statements from the Soviet Union and other state

pa rties tha t stipu la ted tha t the th ree Ba ltic na tions were not pa rties

to the CFE Trea ty a nd tha t a ll Soviet TLE on the terri tory of those

states wou ld cou nt aga inst the USSR 's treaty ceilings. Read a loud

to the assem bled state delega tes, the statements were accepted

without comment. Followi ng proced ure, the statements were sent

to the trea ty depository a t The Hague for deposit wi th the officia l

trea ty.32

By this time the Soviet U nion as a na tion was i n a ten uous

state. Its government ha d ba rel y survived a failed cou p d'eta t in

mid-A ugust, its ru li ng Comm u n ist pa rty ha d been outlawed, a nd

Soviet forces in M oscow during failed coup attem/J t in August 1991 .
RAT11 1c \ no D1:1.A' 1 D, EuROl't' IN Tt R\ton ,Sm 11.T U 10 tN Rt·\ OL TION 8S

its na tional leade rshi p appea red incapa ble of stemming the twin

forces of a collapsi ng empire and rising na tionalism. By December

1991, the crea tion of an independent Uk ra ine and Bela rus, and the

esta blishmen t of the Com monwea lth of Independ ent States, sea led

the fate of the USSR. On December 25, 1991, the USSR formally

dissolved as a nation and was replaced by 15 newly i ndependent

states. u Eight of these new states-Azer baija n, Armen ia, Bela rus,

Georgia , Ka zakstan, Mold ova, Russia , and Uk raine-had former

Soviet milita ry forces and units stationed on their territory that

were subject to the CFE Treaty. What would be their fate? Would

these new nations simply nationalize the military forces stationed

on their territory ? Or wou ld they seek to joi n the all-Europea n

CFE Treaty and commit themselves to destroying conventiona l

military equi pment that could be used by their new armies and air

forces? And under wha t aegis wou ld they discuss joi ning the CFE

Treaty states? They were not mem bers of any interna tiona l forum

such as the CSCE, Wa rsa w Pact, or NAT0. 34

THE THIR D CRISIS: NEW STATE PARTIES

On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia , Uk ra ine, and

Bela rus gathered in Minsk, Bela rus, to place their signatures on the

docu ment creating the Com monwealth of Independent States

(CIS). Wi th in a week, the leaders of five other repu blicsKaza ksta n, Ky rgyzsta n, Tajik ista n, Turkmenista n, and

Uzbek istan-ha d met in Ashk ha bad, Tu rkmenista n, and pledged

to joi n the new commonwea lth. All the milita ry forces of the colla psing Soviet Union wou ld be placed u nder the control of this

commonwea lth. These events signa led not only the end of the

Soviet Union as a na tion bu t also its end as a state pa rty to the

CFE Trea ty. In Vien na , the CFE state delegates sought some

mecha nism to bri ng the new repu blics into the CFE Trea ty orbit.35

In the late fa ll of 1991, a new pa n-Eu ropea n orga niza tion,

the North Atla ntic Coopera tion Cou ncil (NACC) was set u p with

U.S. and Germa n leadershi p. By December, its mem bershi p consisted of the 16 NATO na tions, Pola nd, Czechoslovak ia, Hu nga ry,

Roma nia, Bu lga ria , and the 15 newl y independent states from the

former Soviet Union. Shortly a fter the crea tion of the CIS i n

Decem ber, the new North Atla ntic Cooperation Cou ncil invited all

member states to meet in Brussels at NATO headq uarters on Jan uary 10, 1992. The objecti ve was to convene a high level work ing

grou p to discuss the fu tu re of the CFE Trea ty. Every state accepted

and a ttended, with the exception of Kaza ksta n. This was the first

time the new CIS na tions, represented by their foreign and defense

mi nisters, ha d been at N ATO head qua rters. At this historic meeti ng, they pa rtici pa ted as sovereign i ndependent na tions, sitting

beside the lea ders of the former Wa rsa w Pact nations and, of

course, the foreign and defense ministers of the NATO nations. 36
86 ON-Sil IIMl'I(I10 At;IM )

In t hei r opening statements, the foreign mi nisters of the newly

independent states decla red tha t the CFE Treaty was "the cornerstone of Eu ropea n security." In h is statement, Vl ad im ir Petrovsk iy,

the Russia n representa ti ve, asserted tha t only Russia needed to

ra tify the CFE Trea ty.37 He said tha t Russia wou ld su bseq uentl y

negotia te the "necessa ry adj ustments" with the other repu blics. All

other NACC states rejected this Russia n i nterpreta tion. Instead,

they proposed tha t each of the newl y i ndependent states be considered a successor state. Fu rthermore, following signature a nd ra tification, each wou ld become an origina l state pa rty to the trea ty.

This concept carried the day, and a fter length y discussion, the

delega tes agreed on the followi ng points: 38

• The CFE Trea ty shou l d enter into force wi thou t renegotia tion

and should be fu ll y implemented as soon as possi ble.

• Trea ty obl iga tions of the former USSR shou ld be whol ly

accou nted for by a ll the newly independen t states a nd a pportioned a mong them i n a man ner accepta ble to a ll parties to

the trea ty.

• All newl y independen t states in the a rea of appl ication of the

CFE Trea ty shou l d ra tify the trea ty.

• Some u pd a ti ng of the trea ty wou l d be necessa ry, bu t it wou l d

be done a fter i ts ent ry i n to force.

First meeting of North Atlantic Cooperation Cou11cil defense minist ers at NATO H eadquarters, April 1, 1992.
R \ l lJ J( \ I IO'> Dt 1 n 1 1>, El 1mP1 1:-; Tt l{ \1011 , Sm 11 1 U:--10;-.; 1'\. Rt \ Ot L 1 10 87

• The deadline for entry into force should be as soon as possible, prefera bly by the time of the Helsinki Review Conference ( Ma rch-Ju ly 1992).

• Fu rther work by the high level work ing grou p was wa rra n ted .

The NACC high level wor k ing grou p met aga in in Februa ry,

Ma rch, April, a nd Ma y of 1992. These were extra ord ina ry months

for the newl y independent states. First, as new na tions, they had to

define their rela tionshi ps with the na tions of Centra l and Western

Eu rope. The CFE Treaty lay at the center of the milita ry dimension

of this rela tionship. Second, they ha d to define their rela tionshi p

with Russia , the la rgest and most powerfu l of the former Soviet

repu blics. Here the CFE Treaty was also a foca l poi nt, since it

ma ndated red uctions in the former Soviet Union's vast a rsena l of

conventiona l wea pons. The question of how the USSR's arsena l

wou ld be pa rtitioned among the sucessor states, and then how

these na tiona l portions wou ld be subject to the trea ty, ha d to be

d ecided. The two issues were related, and the wor k ing grou p

resolved them in the first six months of 1992.

On Ja n ua ry 16, 1992, Russia proposed at a CIS meeting i n

Mi nsk that it should receive two-thi rds of the grou nd wea pons of

the former Soviet Union. At tha t meeti ng, Va lery Shustov, Russia 's

CFE Treaty Negotia tor, decla red that R ussia wou ld coord ina te the

inspection, escort, and red uction activities of a ll the CIS states

im plementing the CFE Trea ty.39 The other CIS states, especia lly

Uk ra ine, rejected this assertion. Two weeks later, on Ja n ua ry 30,

the Conference on Security a nd Coopera tion in Eu rope (CSCE)

admitted lO CIS states as mem bers. The new states signed l etters

pledgi ng to "move forwa rd promptly with the ratifica tion of the

CFE Trea ty and to assume ... all CFE obliga tions of the former

Severing of a turret in Belarus.
88 0 -SIT INSP C l lON Ac; '\()

Uk rainian Foreign M inister (later

President) Leonid K ravchuk .

Soviet Un ion."40 Wi th this im porta n t interna tiona l d iploma tic a nd

politica l act completed , the CIS na tions t u rned to the tough negotia tions on pa rti tion ing the former Soviet U n ion's conventiona l

armed forces. They set u p a grou p of experts, largely consisting

of senior mi lita ry officers, who exa mined force struct u re, trea ty

ceili ngs, a nd trea ty red uction req u iremen ts. Throughout Februa ry,

Ma rch, a nd A pril of 1992, this grou p la bored to devise a d istribution formu la accepta ble to all states.

It was not easy. At one poi n t, Leon id Kra vch u k, then Uk ra in ian foreign min ister, compla ined about the CIS nations' fa ilure to

resol ve the CFE Trea ty TLE problem: "Not one ma jor milita ry

q uestion has been resolved ... within the fra mework of the Common wea lth. "4 1 Then, in ea rly April, the R ussia n Pa rliament voted

not to ra tify the CFE Trea ty, even though the USSR Supreme Soviet ha d ra tif ied it in 1991. At tha t poi nt, President Yeltsin intervened , stating tha t R ussia wou ld accept a l l trea ty obl igations of

the former Soviet U n ion .

42 In sepa ra te actions, the lea ders of Armen ia a nd Azer ba ija n compla ined tha t they should be alloca ted

more ta n ks tha n proposed by the grou p of experts. These two

na tions were locked in a n intense eth nic wa r over sepa ra tist

Nagorno-Ka ra ba k h; conseq uen tly, they sought more conven tiona l

a rma ments.

A midst these interna l CIS negotia tions, the monthl y NACC

meeti ngs of t he foreign mi nisters a t NATO head qua rters continued. These meeti ngs pu t press ure on Russia a nd the other successor states to d ivid e the Soviet Union 's entitlements and obliga tions

in a n equ ita ble ma n ner. In April 1992, Ambassa dor Lyn n M.

Ha nsen, the U.S. CFE Trea ty Negotia tor who had replaced Ambassad or R. James Woolsey in .J une 1991, led a sma ll delega tion to

Minsk, K iev, Ch isina u, a nd Moscow to d iscuss treaty ra tifica tion

and implementa tion.43 On this same tri p, A mbassa dor Ha nsen 's

delegation met i n Moscow with represen ta tives from Armenia ,

Azer ba ija n, Georgia , a nd Ka za ksta n. Over the course of 10 days,

Ha nsen l ea rned tha t a ll the newl y independent states ha d the

politica l wi ll to ach ieve a n agreement on the CFE Treaty TLE. He

a lso d iscovered tha t the sma l ler states distrusted Russia 's tactics

a nd a ttitud es. Cha racteristica l l y, Ha nsen wen t d irectly to see the

Russia n first deputy foreign minister; they discussed ra tification of

the treat y. Ha nsen told h im "an agreement was there for the ta ki ng, i f they wou ld just mod ify the wa y they negotia ted ."44 The

Russia n m in ister l istened, bu t action would not come u ntil midMay.

Fina l l y, fol l owi ng fu rther CIS negotia ting sessions in Moscow,

Minsk, Kiev, a nd other ca pita ls, the lea ders of the successor states

met in Tash ken t, Uzbek ista n, on Ma y 15, 1992. There they signed

an agreement on the d ivision of the former Soviet Union's CFE

Trea ty obl igations a nd entitlements. 4 5 The Russia n milita ry was
R IIII( Ill l I R \1011 ,SO\ ll I u 10 I R\ Ol lJ l(()J 89

Table 3-3. The Tashkent Agreement: Allocation of Soviet TLE

Total

Tanks

Active Stored Total

ACVs

Active Stored Total

Artillery

Active Stored

A/C

Total

Helos

Total

Russia 6,400 4,975 1,425 11,480 10,525 955 6,415 5,105 1,310 3,450 890

Ukraine 4,080 3,130 950 5,050 4,350 700 4,040 3,240 800 1,090 330

Belarus 1,800 1,525 275 2,600 2,175 425 1,615 1,375 240 260 80

Armenia 220 220 0 220 220 0 285 285 0 100 50

Azerbaijan 220 220 0 220 220 0 285 285 0 100 50

Georgia 220 220 0 220 220 0 285 285 0 100 50

Moldova 210 210 0 210 210 0 250 250 0 50 50

Kazakstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 13,150 10,500 2,650 20,000 17,920 2,080 13,175 10,825 2,350 5,150 1,500

Source: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, May 21, 1992

i nst ru menta l i n devising this agreement; withou t thei r detailed

work i t wou ld not ha ve ha ppened . The d ivision a t Tash kent is

detailed in ta ble 3-3.

With the Tash kent accords signed on Ma y 15, 1992, attention tu rned to Vien na where the CFE Trea ty's Join t Consu lta tive

Grou p was meeti ng in prepa ra tion for a third Extraord ina ry Conference. In Vien na , the state delega tes d ra fted a document, to be

signed on Ju ne 5, 1992, a t an Extraordi na ry Confe rence in Osl o.

This docu ment ma de lega l both the entry of the new state pa rties

a nd their accepta nce of a ll the obliga tions a nd entitlements of the

former USSR. In short ord er, the JCG delega tes and tech nical

specia l ists d rafted new trea ty a nnexes con ta ini ng treaty u nd erstandings, notifications, con firma tions, and comm itmen ts. They

incorpora ted the new a n nexes i n to the "Fina l Docu ment," which

cha nged the word ing i n the trea ty to reflect the d issol u tion of the

Soviet Union and the inclusion of eight new state pa rties. The

Fina l Docu ment set a dea dline of Ju ly 1, 1992, for each signa tory

state to provide to all other states informa tion concern ing i nspections a nd verifica tion. In addition, it stated tha t the TLE red uction

l ia bili ties of the new state pa rties collecti vely wou l d be no different

from those of the former Soviet Union. It a lso rea ffirmed the two

previous JCG statements: the Soviet Union 's Ju ne 15, 1991, statement rega rd i ng the TLE reassigned to the nava l in fantry and

coasta l defense forces, a nd the October 18, 1991, Soviet statement

on the status of TLE stationed on the territory of the th ree Ba ltic

na tions. Fina lly, it add ressed the problem of stationing a rmored

Tashkent,

Uzbekistan

Tashk ent Agreement1\1ay 15, 1 992

1)1 1 "El), l 1 IWPI
90 o---s1Tl I MPI ( rJO. Ac;1 (

infantry fighting veh icles (AIFVs) on the fla n ks; bu t it left resol ution to the JCG foru m following entry into force.

All of these changes and new annexes were i ncorpora ted into

the trea ty, transl ated into the six treaty la nguages, and presented

at the Oslo Extraord ina ry Con ference. There, delega tes from the

now 29 signa tory sta tes signed the new documents on J u ne 5,

1992.The CFE Trea ty stipu l ated that from tha t moment the eight

new states were "origina l state pa rties" and tha t each assumed t he

same rights and obliga tions that every other state pa rty had u nder

the trea ty.46

THE LAST CRISI:FINAi RATfflCATION

.. Ve h1l'e to fJrol'isional!y

imp /eme11t the whole treaty."

-1\1nh;1'"1dnr I! n n \I. I lan-.vn ,

ll.!'>.CIT Trc:ir) \:).\<>ti;nor

Followi ng the Osl o conference, a ttention t u rned to com pleting ratifica tion a nd excha ngi ng f ina l trea ty documents a t the

CSCE summit in Helsi n k i on J uly 9-10, 1992. Of the 29 states

tha t were pa rty to the trea ty, 11 had not ra tified and deposited

their instru men ts of ra tifica tion a t The Hague as of mid-J u ne. As

stipula ted by the trea ty, entry into force wou l d occu r 10 days a fter

all the states had deposited their ra tification a rticles. Turkey ratified on Ju ne 18, Moldova on Ju ly 1, a nd Russia on J uly 8. Five

other na tions deposited t heir ra tifica tion a rticles on Ju ly 6, 8, a nd

9. That left three na tions-Armenia , Bela rus, and K aza ksta n-tha t

wou ld not, or cou ld not, act i n time for the CSCE summit in

Helsi nki, slated for Ju ly 9-10. Trea ty diploma ts in Vien na viewed

this inaction as disastrous; the 26 states that had com pleted ra ti fication held more tha n 90 percent of the trea ty's TLE, u nits, territory, and zones. Further dela y migh t dissipate the momentu m

crea ted in the past seven months.

When Am bassador Ha nsen ret u rned to Vienna from Oslo

in mid-Ju ne, he rea lized tha t the Helsinki summit might be held

withou t a ratified CFE Trea ty and no entry into force. "Near pa nic

struck," he reca lled . "One night, in the midd le of the night, I

concluded wha t we had to do. I said: 'We ha ve to provisiona ll y

implement the whole trea ty."'47 For a m u ltinationa l, 29-na tion

trea ty, this was a rad ical idea. The next day when Hansen called

Washington a nd discussed the idea with U.S. international treaty

lawyers, "They rejected it tota lly." Then, he reca lled, "We had a

bit of a screaming ma tch. "4 8 Ha nsen won; but the president and

key U.S. sena tors had to a pprove the concept before U.S. officials

could discuss it with the N ATO allies and the other signatory

na tions. When the secreta ry of state, the presiden t, and the senators approved , events moved swiftl y.

Over the next 10 days, A m bassador Ha nsen and the other

state negotiators in Vienna expla ined , cajoled , and succeeded i n

persuad ing thei r colleagues to accept the concept of provisional

implementa tion of the CFE Trea ty. Mea nwh ile, new docu ments
------R \ 1 11 1( .\ 1 10'.'\ 01I \) 1 1 ), fa ROI'! I l 1c\1011 , So\ 11 1 U 10 1 RI\ oJL• t 10:-.. 9 1

were prepa red i n six l a nguages for the 29 states to approve and

sign i n Helsi n k i. On J u l y 10, 1992, represen ta tives of a ll state

pa rties met in Helsi n k i for the fou rth extra ord i na ry con ference on

the CFE Trea ty. They signed th ree documen ts. In the first, the

i nd ivid ua l states agreed to provisiona ll y implemen t the CFE

Trea ty. In the second , the ind ivid ua l states a ffirmed the rela tionship between the CFE Trea ty a nd the CFE I A agreement, officia lly

titled: The Concl ud i ng Act of the Negotia tions on Person nel

Strengt h of the Conven tiona l A rmed Forces in Europe. Essentia lly,

CFE I A was a "politica l" statement by each of the trea ty states

decla ring tha t they wou l d not exceed self-i mposed limits on mil ita ry ma npowe r strength. The li mits were, i n fact, q u ite h igh. Conseq uentl y, the trea ty's na tiona l ma n power figu res were not as

significa n t as the fact tha t they were decla red in a pol itica lly bindi ng treaty. These figures were su bject to monitori ng and questioning, a nd if exceeded , the gu ilty states wou ld be subject to in ternationa l censure. This wa s the first time i n the twentieth century tha t

the Europea n na ti ons, acting collecti vel y, had agreed to lim its on

their na tiona l mi l ita ry forces. In the third docu men t, each signatory sta te decla red it wou l d provisiona lly i mplemen t the CFE 1A

Concl ud ing Act. Then, and only then, cou ld trea ty im plemen ta tion

begin.

49

These actions set the clock ru n n ing on entry i n to force, bu t

they d id not complete the forma l ra tifica tion process. Armenia

deposited its rati fied CFE Trea ty instru ments at The Ha gue on

October 12, 1 992. Bela rus and Kaza ksta n completed the grou p of

origi na l states by depositing thei r instru ments of ra tifica tion on

October 30. Ten da ys la ter, on Novem ber 9, the CFE Trea ty and

the CFE 1A Concl ud ing Act officia lly entered into force.50

SUM MING Ur

It had ta ken 24 mon ths-Novem ber 1990 to Novem ber

1992-to move from trea ty signature through the nationa l ra tifica tions to official entry into force. Along the way a series of

trea ty-rela ted crises had been resol ved: TLE relocations, resu bord ina tions, reclassifications, new state pa rties, red istribu tion

of the former USSR 's entitlements and obl igations, and new nationa l ma n power ceilings. Bu t the l a rger, more serious crisis of the

Soviet Un ion's colla pse struck a t the existence of the CFE Trea ty.

I n the face of t u rmoil and revol ution, Germa n, French, A merica n,

R ussia n, British, a nd Centra l Eu ropea n leaders and d iplomats had

fought ha rd to reta i n the trea ty. Throughou t these d ifficu lties, the

CFE Trea ty reta ined its im porta nce for the fu tu re of Europe. With

trea ty opera tions a bout to sta rt, a ttention t u rned to the na tiona l

i nspection agencies a nd thei r i nspectors who would moni tor the

trea ty, a nd the mil ita ry services that wou ld red uce and accou nt for

thousa nds of items of trea ty-limited eq u ipmen t.
92 01

-Sm·IsPFcT10 AG1 ci

Table 3-4. CFE Treaty Original State Parties

State Ratified Deposited

Czechoslovakia 19 July 1991 5 August 1991

Hungary 9 September 1991 4 November 1991

Netherlands 6 November 1991 8 November 1991

Bulgaria 13 September 1991 12 November 1991

United Kingdom November 1991 19 November 1991

Canada 7 November 1991 22 November 1991

Poland 22 November 1991 26 November 1991

Norway 29 November 1991 29 November 1991

Belgium November 1991 17 December 1991

Germany December 1991 23 December 1991

Iceland 14 December 1991 24 December 1991

Denmark

Luxembourg

December 1991

19 December 1991

30 December 1991

22 January 1992

United States 26 December 1991 29 January 1992

France

Romania

16 March 1992

NA

24 March 1992

21 April 1992

Italy 

Spain

Georgia

Moldova

Greece

Turkey

21 December 1991

26 February 1992

NA

1 July 1992

28 May 1992

18 June 1992

22 April 1992

1 June 1992

6 July 1992

6 July 1992

8 July 1992

8 July 1992

Azerbaijan NA 9 July 1992

Ukraine NA 9 July 1992

Portugal NA 14 August 1992

Russia

Armenia

Belarus

8 July 1992

NA

21 October 1992

3 September 1992

12 October 1992

30 October 1992

Kazakstan NA 30 October 1992
R \l ll lC. \ 110 D1 1 \HI>, El lWl'I I t R 1011 , Sm 11 1 U 10. 1 Rt \ 01 t 1 10 93

For the United States, the On-Site Inspection Agency ha d the

mission of cond ucti ng the CFE Trea ty inspections and escorts.

Duri ng the long and ard uous two-yea r ra tification process, OSIA's

Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd u nderwent wha t Colonel

La wrence Kelley, Chief of Opera tions, called "Stand ing Up the

Un it."

NOTES

I . Dav id Rem n ick, Lenin 's Tnmh: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New

York: Ra ndom House, 1993), pp. 277-279, 306-324, 357-372; Joh n B.

Du nlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet EmfJire, Princeton,

N.J .: Pri nceton U n iversi ty Press, 1993), pp. 186-254, 256-284.

2 . Interv iew wi th Am bassador Lyn n Ha nsen, U.S. Govern men t C:FE Trea ty

Negotia tor, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n , Historia n , OSI A, Ra mstein Ai r Base,

Germa n y, Decem ber 14, 1993. See a lso Ly n n M. Ha n sen, "Adaptation a nd

I n novation : CFE a nd CFE1 A, From Signatu re to Entry Into Force,"

u n pu bl ished report, Decem ber 1993, p. 2.

3. See note a bove, pp. 2-3; M ichael R. Gordon, "Soviets Sh i ft Ma n y Ta n ks to

Siberia," N ew York Times, Novem ber 15, 1990, p. A3; R. Jeffery Smith,

"U.S., Soviets Disagree on A rms Cuts, "\Y/ashington Post, Decem ber 17,

1990, pp. A l , A20.

4. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.4 10-411, 407 .B.4 13. See a l so

M ichael Besch loss and Strobe Ta l bott, At the Highest Levels: The I nside

Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, a nd Co., 1993),

pp . 289-290.

5. "State Treaty Signatory Powers Agree ro Revisions," Die Presse (Vienna ),

Decem ber 12, 1990, i n F B IS-Western E uro/1e, Decem ber 3, 1990; Arms

Control R eporter 1990, pp. 407.B.414-416. The best a na l ysis is i n J ane

1.0. Sha rp, "Conve n tiona l Arms Control i n Eu rope," S f P R! Yearbook

1991, World Armaments and Disarmament , pp. 429-433.

6. . Arms Control Reporter I 990, pp. 407.B.4 ] 4-41 5; Sha rp,

"Conventiona lArms Control i n Eu rope" ( 1991 ), pp. 429-4 30.

7. Sha rp, "Conventi ona l A rms Cont rol i n Eu rope" ('1 991 ), pp. 429-430.

8. R.Jeffery Smit h, "Sovi ets Sa id to be Remov i ng A rms from Eu rope Before

Trea ty," Washington Post, October 5, 1990, p. A 20; Intern a tion a l I n stitute

for Strategic Stud ies, The M ilitary Balance 1990-1991 ( London : Brassey's

Inc., 1990), pp . 31-32.

9. Sha r p, "Con vention a l A rms Control in Eu rope" (199 1), p. 429; James A.

Ba ker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Rev olution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992

( New York: G.P. Pu tna m & Sons, 1995), pp. 473-474, 477.

1 0 . Sharp, "Conven tion a l Arms Control i n Europe" ( 1991), p. 420.

11. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.4 14-415.

12. "Chernyc h ev on CFE Trea ty, Sovier I mpl ementa ti on," TASS ( Moscow ),

Nove m ber 22, 1 990, i n FB IS-Soviet Union, Novem be r 27, 1990.

I . Smith , "U.S., Sov iets Disagree on A rms Cu ts," Washington Post, Decem ber

17, 1 990, pp. A l , A 20; Arms Control R epor ter 1990, pp . 407.B.413-414 .

For i n si 'hts i n to th e CFE Trea ty delega tions i n Vien na, see I ntervi ew wi th
Colonel Sch u y l e r Foerster, USAF, U .S. Rep resenta ti ve ro t h e C:FE

Del ega tion , b y J osep h P. Ha ra h a n, Historia n, OSI A , Wa sh i n gton, D.C.,

Ma y 19, 1994.

14. The best <lccou nt of t h is meeti ng 1s rn F\csch l oss a n d Ta l bott, At the Highest

Leveh, p p. 289-290.

15. Ibi d ., p. 2'.10 .

1h. Micha el Z. Wisc, " Sov iets Face Cri tic ism as Ta l ks Beg i n on Eu ropea n

Troo ps Cu ts," \)\!ashi11gto11 l'ost, Feb r ua ry ·1 5, 1 99 1 , p. A1 3 ; Arms

Control R eport er / 990, p p. 407.1\.42 7-428; Tim oth y J. Mc N u lt y, "Ba k er

U rges Del a y on A rm s Treaty," Chicag o Tri/J une, Febru a ry 7, 1991; R.

Jeffe ry Smi t h , "Sovi et [)ispu te Th rea tens A r ms Pact A p prova l ," Washington Post , Febr u ary 8, 1 991 , p p. A 12, A 1 6.

17. Sharp, "Con vcntion <ll Arms Control i n Europe'' ( 1 991 ), pp. 429-433.

18. Wi r e Ser v ice Report, "Suu1etslwya Rossiya Ack now.ledges Sh i ft of Wea pons

to Avoid Trea ty," R euters ( Moscow ) , .J a n u a r y 9, '1 99 1 .

19. Rem n ick, Len in's T(n11h, pp. 372-397; Du n lop, Rise and fal l, p p. 1 04-

106.

20. Besch loss a nd fa l hott, At the H ighest l .eue!s, pp. 3<i 2-37.1; R . .J effer y

Sm i t h a n d A n n Dcv roy, "Bu sh U rges .orbachev to Drop A rms Trea ty

Cl a i ms, " Wlashi11gto11 Post, rkirch 26, 1 991 , p . A H.

21. Besch l oss a n d Ta l bott, At the H ighest l.cuels, p. 364.

22. Ibi d., pp. 367-370; Fred Ka pl an , "Soviet Aide to Arri ve, Sum mit

Bel l weth e r Scn ," Bost un Globe, Ma y 20, 1 99 1 ; Da v id Hoff ma n , "U.S.

Off i ci a l s Sec Signs of oope ra tion by Sov iets," Washington Post , lvf:i y 23 ,

199 1, p. A42; Da v i d Hoff m a n, "lJ.S., Soviet Un i on Settle Dispu te on Ar ms

in Eu rope, " Washington Post ,J u11e 2, 1 99 1 , pp. A 1, A26 ; A nd rew

Rosen tha l , "U .S. a nd Sov iets Nea r Settl i ng A rms Pact D isp u te," N ew York

Times, Ma y 23, 1 99 1 , p. A 1O; M ich ael Z. Wise, "Sovi ets Accept Li m i ts on

Arms i n Eu ro pe," Washington Post, .J u ne 1 S , 1 99 1, pp. A 'l 6, A I 8.

23. Besc h loss a n d Ta l bott, At the Hig hest Lcue ls, p. 368 . For deta i ls on t h is

complex di p' :::1:'tic solu tion, sec Arms AJ/'ll rol Report er 1991 , pp.

407.B.438-4 'f 2.

24. Arms Contm/ Re/ )()rt er / 99 / , pp. 407.1).444-44().

25. Ibid ., pp. 407.B.449-450; Thomas L Frie Ima n, "U.S. an d Sovi ets Bridge

Gap on Conven tiona l \V'ea pons an d Pl an for Summit Soon," N ew York

Times,Ju n e 2, 1 99 1 , pp. A l , A12.

26. Ha n sen, "Ad a pta tion and I n n ova tion ,'' pp. 5-6. For th e tex t of th e Sov i et

U n i on 's decla r:ition , sec th is hook , A ppen ck ·B.

27. For t h ese sta tem ents, see t h is hook , A ppend i x H.

28. I bid .

29. For Pre sid ent Bu sh 's sta tement, see Senate 'om mittee on Foreign Rel a ti on s,

Treaty Docu111e11 t J 02-8: M essage frmn the President of the Unit ed Stat es

Transmitting the Treaty 011 Conue11tiunal Armed Forces in f ump e ( CF!:),

I 02d Cong. 1st sess., 1 991.

30. The best accoun t of this issue as it rela ted to the CFE Trea ty is in Han sen ,

"Ada pta tion :in d I n n ov ation," pp. 7-9.

31. I nter vi ew, Ha nsen ; for a n i m med i ate report , sec Message from .J CS J oi n t

Sta ff, Wa sh i ngt on I .C., "CFE: Am ba ssador H a nsen's Vi si t to Li th u a n i a,"

Octo ber 1 H , 1 99 1 , pp. 1-H.
R \ Illll \ 1 10 ()1 I."I ll,:L H<WI 1 1 I{ 1rn1 ,Sm 11 1 U 10

32. See th is book, Append ix B.

33. Rem n ick, Lenin's Tomb, pp. 493-530; Du n lop, Rise and Fall pp. 256-

285.

34. These same q uestions were bei ng discussed in the Eu ropea n media. See Eric

Schmitt, "Arms Pact Allows for Soviet Brea k u p," N ew York Times,

Novem ber 20, l 991, p. A3, and Edwa rd Morti mer, "The Soviet Un ion's

Secu rity Agreements Must be Made Bind i ng on Its Successor States,"

Financial Times (London ), Novem ber 27, 1991. In an iron ic twist, the U.S.

Senate ra tified the CFE Trea ty on Novem ber 25, 1991, by a vote of 90-4;

see Congressional Record , Senate, 18038, Novem ber 25, 1991.

35. Du n lop, Rise and Fall, pp. 271-284; Arms Control Reporter 1 991 , p.

407.B.462; Interview, Ha nsen; Interview, Foerster.

36. Arms Control R eport er 1992, pp. 407.B.463-465.

37. I bid., p. 407.B.464; Ha nsen, "Adapta tion a nd I n nova tion ," pp. 10-11.

38. Arms Control Reporter 1 992 , pp. 407.B.463-464.

39. . "CFE Pa rtici pa nts Reassu red on Arms Treati es," TASS (Moscow ), Jan

uary 16, 1992, i n F B IS-Soviet Union, Ja n ua ry 17, 1992. See a lso Arms 

Control Re/Jorter 1 992, p. 407.B.465.

40. Arms Control Reporter 1 992, p. 407.B.465. See a lso Thomas L. Fried ma n,

"Big-2 Horse Trade," N ew York Times , Ja n ua ry 31, 1991, p. Al 5.

4 l. Arms Control Reporter 1 992, p. 407.B.4 70. See a lso Serge Schmema n n,

"Ukra ine Uses Summit to Bera te Russia ns and the Commonweal th," N ew

York Times, Ma rch 21, 1992, pp. A l , A5; a nd "Summ it 'Pretty

Successfu l"'lzvestiya, Ma rch 25, l992, in FBT S-Soviet Union, Ma rch 25, 

1992.

42. Arms Control Reporter 1 992, p. 407.B.472.

43. Interview, Hansen .

44. Ibid.

45. Arms Control Reporter 1 992 , p. 407.B.4 73.

46. . Ibid.; Interview, Ha nsen; Wi lliam Droadzia k, "29 Nations Approve A r

ms Control Trea ty," Washington Post , J u ne 6, 1992, p. A 16; Cra ig R.

Whit ney, "Europea ns Agree to Honor Arms Pact by Old Blocs," N ew York

Times,J u ne 6, 1992., p. AS ; Hella Pick, "NATO and Former Wa rsaw Pact

Sign Agreement on A rms Cuts," The Guardian (London ), J u ne 6, 1992.

47. Interview, Ha nsen.

48. Ibid.

49. Arms Control Reporter 1 992 , p. 407.B.477.

50. Arms Control Rep orter 1 992 , p. 407.B.480.

Rl\ llll1 10.

T

Chapter 4

OSI A's operations expand significantl y throughout Europe in pre parati on for the FE Treaty.

OSIA's EUROPEA N OPERATIONS COMM A ND:

THf YEA R OF EXPANSION , 1991

he ma jor i n fl u x of people in to OSIA's Eu ropea n Operations

Comma nd bega n in Ja n ua ry 1991. Thirty people a rrived

that mont h, pri ma ril y filling support positions, bu t includi ng nine wea pons specia l ists. Most of the J an ua ry a rriva ls came

from u nits in Eu rope. A month l ate r, OSIA Eu ropea n Opera tions

ha d dou bled in size, expa nd ing from 27 to 57. By the end of Apri l,

18 more peopl e had a rrived, incl ud ing Lt. Colonel Da vid P.

Ge ert, USAF, the first of the CFE Trea ty team chiefs. Through

Ju ly another 18 had come on boa rd , and by the end of 1991, more

tha n 100 personnel were on d u ty. All CFE inspection tea m members, except for one wea pons specialist, two l i ngu ists, and two

deputy tea m chiefs, were in some phase of trea ty tra ining. As

people contin ued to a rrive, the n um ber and precise function of

U.S. lia ison officers rema ined u nresol ved. OSIA wou ld not ha ve

fina l answer on lia ison officers u n til mid -1992, just before the

trea ty entered into force. 1

.- -- • 111111
98 0:-.:- 1 r 1· l-.;s1'1 c 1 10, A<.r < )

Key Operationa l Concepts:

• TrcLZty l\.11ou•ledge

• TeLT m Chief lfrsponsi{Ji/ity

• Tea111 Identity

Colonel Fred Grosick, Comma nder, a nd Colonel Lawrence

Kelley, Director of Opera tions, sha ped the ra pid ly expanding CFE

inspection force a rou nd three key operational concepts. The first

was k nowledge of the trea ty, especia lly its inspection protocol. The

trea ty was the "alpha and omega " of the i nspectors' training,

prepa ra tion, and opera tional mission . Over and over in small tea m

meetings and in ind ivid ua l sessions, Colonel Kelley stressed the

importa nce of k nowing the trea ty "inside and out, chapter and

verse," beca use the "other side wou ld ." Kelley's long experience

with the Soviet/Russia n officer corps had made h im aware of their

professionalism, thoroughness of prepa ra tions, suspicion of foreigners, and their insistence on the letter of the law in gra nting

trea ty rights to inspectors. If inspectors from other nations knew

the treaty well, Kelley and Grosick believed that U.S. i nspectors

had to know the provisions of the trea ty even better.

The second concept placed extraordina ry personal responsibility on the tea m leader for each inspection/escort m ission. Ca refu lly chosen, personally interviewed , and continuously observed,

these Army a nd Ai r Force field grade officers were responsi ble for

their tea m, the m ission, a nd the exercise of the U.S. govern ment's

CFE Trea ty rights and entitlements. Colonel Kelley interviewed

each new tea m chief when he reported to OSIA's Eu ropea n Operations Comma nd. It was, by all accou nts, an intense session, combi ning a treaty tutoria l with a lecture on leadersh ip and persona l

standa rds of cond uct. It also incl uded a deta iled expla nation of the

U.S. objectives in implementing the CFE Treaty. It was neither

subtle nor collegial; it was a serious meeting. Colonel Kelley la ter

recalled that at some point he woul d tell the new CFE tea m chief,

"I wa nted to ha ve con f idence that when the going got tough, when

the tea m had not slept for 24 hours, when tea m members felt ill,

when the pressure was on, the tem pera ture was low, the pla n had

fallen apa rt, the tea m personnel were not perfor mi ng as expected,

the Russia ns were applying pressure, and the tea m chief encou ntered a poi nt i n the inspection which had not been antici pated,

tha t I cou ld still trust his judgment. Wou ld he ma ke the right

call ?" These sta nda rds of leadership set the tone for the developi ng

inspection orga nization.

The third concept was integral inspection tea ms. The "inspection team" was the pri ma ry operationa l u nit for inspections u nder

the CFE Treaty. Teams wou ld ha ve designa ted leaders, permanently assigned inspectors, and specific trai ning programs designed

to bu ild trea ty knowledge , team cohesiveness, and team recognition of inspection objectives. Here too Kelley and Grosick k new

what they wa nted: inspection team identity, inspector allegia nce to

the team, and absol ute sta ndards of cond uct by all team mem bers.

"I have always been," Kelley said, "a firm believer in u nit cohesiveness. So I consciously set the teams u p that wa y, and insisted

tha t they wor k as u nits, a nd act as u nits." Given these three clea r,
------------------------sI \'.\ ()I'\(, UI' 1 111 u 1 1 l)l)

fi xed concepts, the new i nspection tea m lea ders a nd i nspectors

entered a rigorous, deta iled tra ining progra m.2

Initial Training

The CFE Trea ty on-site i nspection s wou ld be cha l l engi ng

beca use the m ission req u ired d i fferen t people to bri ng va rious

sk i l ls together i n a tea m effort. Team chiefs, depu ties, l ingu ists,

and wea pons specia lists a ll n eeded i nd ivid ua l a nd small tea m

tra i ni ng to devel op and ref i ne t heir speci fic skil ls. It was a lso importa n t for those i n su pport posi tions to f u lly u ndersta nd their

contri bu tion to the success of the m ission. The ra nge of tra i n ing

topics was broad , i ncl u d ing severa l courses on the trea ty a nd its

protocols, t h ree l evels of i nstruction on equ ipmen t identi fica tion,

a nd severa l Russia n la ngu age cou rses. Ind ivid ua l tra ini ng, l ike

i m provi ng la nguage sk il ls, was i m porta nt, bu t as i nd i vi dua l need s

were met, t he focus shi fted to rea m tra i ni ng.

Bot h in person a l a nd tea m tra ining, k nowl edge of the trea ty

formed the cornerstone for a II tra i ni ng. The CFE Trea ty Inspector/

Escort :ou rse was the fund a men ta l course for everyone. The first

CFE Trea ty cou rse was ta u ght Februa ry 4-14, 1991 , a t the Defense I ntell igence College i n Washi ngton, D.C. Bi ll Pa rsons a nd

Da vid Sloss, mem bers of the U.S. A rms Control a nd Disa rma ment

Agency a nd active pa rti cipa n ts i n CFE negotiations, provid ed 25

hou rs of inst ruction on the treaty and i ts protocol s. Experts from

the U.S. A rm y Foreign Science and Tech nology Cen ter contri buted

15 hou rs of trea ty-lim ited eq u ipment (TLE) famil ia riza tion. Th is

i ni tia l cou rse a lso dea l t wi th topics such as t he h istory of a rms

con trol , Wa rsa w Pact forces, Congress a nd trea ty ra ti fica tion,

hea l th, a nd pu bl ic a ffa i rs. Inspectors assigned to OSIA's Eu ropea n

Training was continuous at OS/ A's European Operat ions Command; here Colonel K elley

discusses an upcoming mission with ins/>ectors.
. ..

l 00 0 -SLn I ·w l.lIOJ Ac1 ;\(')

-- DeutscMDemokratische A cpublik

'.i :.

Operations Com ma nd wou ld receive significantly more t ra i ni ng

after the course. This included a th ree-tiered progra m on equ ipment recogni tion developed by a nd for i nspectors.

Twenty people from OSIA's Eu ropea n Opera tions a ttended

the first CFE Treaty cou rse in Wash ington, D.C., along with 170

others from Headq ua rters OSIA a nd other agencies. In Apri l 1991,

OSIA's Europea n Opera tions Comma nd sponsored a CFE Trea ty

course for an add itiona l 90 people at Rhein-Ma in Air Base in

Fra nk fu rt, Germa n y. By October 1991, 24 other i nspection team

mem bers had completed a two-week CFE Trea ty cou rse sponsored

by NATO at Obera mmerga u, Germa ny. Colonel Kelley drew from

his experience with the Intermed iate-Ra nge N uclea r Forces (INF)

Treaty to design the NATO course. The objective was to esta blish

CFE Trea ty inspection standa rds across the NATO group of states.

Instructors from OSIA's Eu ropea n Opera tions focused on inspection and escort techniq ues based on the U.S. experience u nder the

INF Trea ty. On Apri l 8, 1992, OSIA presen ted a five-day CFE

Trea ty cou rse i n Washi ngton, D.C. Trea ty negotia tors a nd experienced OSIA Europea n Opera tions off icers and noncom m issioned

officers (NCOs) ta ugh t the cou rse, focusing on the trea ty and the

inspection process. A videota ped version of this April course allowed newly assigned inspectors to receive the req u ired traini ng

without waiti ng for anothe r formal class. The trea ty course remained the funda men ta l bu ild ing block, but it was only one required element to q ualify as a CFE i nspector/escort. 3

When trea ty ratification lagged in the fa ll of 1991, teams

were a ble to build more i nspection-rela ted issues into thei r tra ini ng

progra m. The Inspection/ Escort Bra nch assem bled inspection

teams weekly. The teams reviewed and discussed trea ty inspection

and red uction protocols, standa rd ized i nspection and reporti ng

proced u res, and studied current presidential a nd Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS) guidance. Individ ua lly, each team trained daily on the

treaty and its protocols. They discussed inspection scena rios they

might confront a nd worked through problems they migh t encou nter. In addition, TLE recognition was a pa rt of each team's da ily

regime.

Equipment Recognition Training

A group of Army wea pons specialists who came to OSIA's

f

W'

'k .

.

. Europea n Opera tions Command on a tem pora ry basis beginni ng in October of 1990 pla yed a key role i n the TLE recognition tra i n-

· Potsdam

The U.S. M ilitary Liaison M ission

in Potsdam, Germany, was a

primar y source for CFE inspectors.

ing progra m. Sergea nt First Class George A. Pa rtridge, Staff Sergea nt Thomas A. Fa via, and Sergea nt Joseph S. Nelson were members of the U.S. Mi lita ry Lia ison Mission in Potsda m, Germa n y.

The Mission was sta ffed hy NCOs and foreign a rea officers

( FAOs) with a strong work ing knowledge of Soviet and East Germa n arm ies, their eq u ipmen t, u nits, and force structu re. Beca use of
----------S IA 1)1. (, UP 1111 u IT I O I

Germa n u n ifica tion, however, this Cold Wa r outpost was no

longer needed and was closing. Havi ng served a t the M ission,

Colonel Kelley k new the caliber of the people associa ted with it

a nd its reputa tion for excellence. He made a poi n t of actively

recru iting wea pons specia l ists from the Mission.

These specialists contri bu ted im med ia tel y to the comma nd.

They laid the grou ndwork for OSIA's Eu ropea n Operations' equ i pment recognition progra m. From October 1990 through Ja n ua ry

1991, while still assigned to the Mission in Potsda m, they developed courses on trea ty-rela ted grou nd equ ipment and cond ucted

tra ining classes. They tra veled from Berl in to work a t Rhei n-Ma i n

d uri ng the week, ret u rni ng home to Berl i n on weekends. They

acqu ired photos and slides of Soviet and Wa rsaw Pact forces'

trea ty-rela ted eq u ipment. Their sources were withi n the Depa rtment of Defense, other U.S. government agencies, NATO a llies,

commercial pu blications, and from the tra in ing k its they had

developed at the Mission. They a lso took their own photos of

trea ty-rela ted eq u ipmen t d u ring mock inspections and on field

tri ps.

Photo of a T-72 tank used in level

one recognition training.

Wea pons specialists from the Army and Air Force l ater joi ned

the specia l ists from the Mission a nd added to the growing stock of

information. Sergeant First Class Curtis E. Ingram, USA, focused

his efforts on ta nks while Master Sergea nt Richa rd D. DiForma to,

USA, gathered in formation on armored comba t vehicles, and Staff

Sergeants Gilbert Sierra, Jr., and Cecil L. Wa rd , USA, concentra ted

on artillery. The U.S. i nspection teams a lso req uired a work ing

k nowledge of trea ty-rela ted a ircra ft a nd helicopters. Senior Master

Sergeant Clifford A. Schroder, USA F, a nd Technical Sergeants Pa ul

R. Angus and James L. Towne, USAF, provided tha t expertise.

Their k nowledge of aircra ft and hel icopters complemented the

in forma tion their A rmy cou nterpa rts had assembled. The wea pons
I02 0 -SI 1 1 I WI ( 1 10 A<.E ( ..,

An armored vehicle launched

bridge on displa y during

Czechoslovak ian training course.

specia lists' collection of infor ma tion and photogra phs were the

basis for a th ree-level tra ining progra m on equ i pment identification.4

Level one covered 10 ca tegories of eq u ipment: ta nks, a rmored personnel ca rriers (APCs), a rmored in fantry fighting veh icles (AIFVs), hea vy a rma ment combat vehicles, a rti llery, comba t

a i rcraft, helicopt ers, morta rs, armored vehicle la u nched bridges,

and mu ltiple-la u nch rock et systems. There were also subd ivisions

in severa l categories; helicopters for example, could be broken

down into th ree categories-attack, support, and tra nsport. Level

one tra ining, a req u irement for i nspector certification, ena bled

inspectors to identify a ll Soviet, Eastern Eu ropea n, and U.S. TLE.

Level two tra in i ng dea lt with Soviet, Eastern Eu ropea n, and

U.S. equ ipment, l isted in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Arma ments and Equ ipment, that was reporta ble bu t not

limited u nder the trea ty. Instructors broke t h is eq u ipment down

into 17 a reas. Th is equ i pment included "look-a li ke" a rmored

personnel ca rriers and a rmored infa ntry fighting vehicles, traini ng

a ircra ft, comba t support hel icopters, and tra nsport helicopters.

The a rmored look-a likes were vehicles bu ilt on the chassis of a

trea ty-limited ve hicle but mod ified for pu rposes other tha n tra nsporti ng a comba t infa ntry squa d. By trea ty definition, these mod ified vehicles could not be a rmed with a 20 milli meter or grea ter

gun or cannon. The two l evels of trai ning encompassed more tha n

400 pieces of Soviet, Eastern Eu ropea n, and U.S. eq uipmen t.

Level three traini ng d iffered from the other two levels covering equ ipment not listed in the trea ty. Although not limited to

wea pons specia l ists, level three tra ining was gea red to ma ximizing

wea pons specia l ists' ca pa bilities, whereas levels one and two were

for all team members. Level three dea lt with recognition and iden-
S 1 \ DI <. Ur 1 111 U 11 IO'

ti fica tion of the thousa nds of pieces of Soviet, Eastern Eu ropea n,

or U.S. equ ipmen t t ha t a tea m might encou nter d uring an inspection. This eq u ipment va ried from commu nica tions va ns to engineeri ng vehicles to motorcycles. Tra i ning wou ld ena ble an inspector to ma ke more accu ra te observations abou t the inspected u nit's

mission a nd status. Tra in i ng also i ncl uded order of ba ttle, orga n iza tiona l structu res, and equi pment ma rk ings. Level th ree traini ng

cou ld va ry to prepa re i nspectors for a pa rticu l ar mission. Inspectors supplemented t hei r cl assroom tra ining on wea pons identificati on w i th field trips to loca tions with la rge concentra tions of

equ ipment. Teams tra veled to the U.S. Air Forces in Eu rope

(USA FE) Comba t Threa t Faci l ity at Einsied lerhof, Germa ny, to

U.S. Army Eu rope's (USA REUR's) Hohen fels Tra in ing Area, Germa ny, and to other NATO sites. These trips provided inspectors

d irect experience wi th Soviet and Eastern Europea n eq u ipment, as

well as U.S. and a llied equ i pment. As development of the different

levels of tra i n i ng progressed, however, a pro blem a rose concerni ng 

space to cond uct the trai ning.5

R hei n-Ma i n, normall y an active a nd somewhat congested

base, served as a foca l poi nt for tons of supplies, equ ipment, and

thousa nds of troops head ed for the M idd le East in support of

Opera tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Faci l i ties on Rhei nDuring a CfE mock inspection at the H ohenfels Training Area in Germany, inspectors check ed these armored

personnel carriers.
I04 01"-SI 1 1 I. \Pl ( 1 10 A<.1 ( )

Ma in were a t a prem i u m. The OSIA facilities at the Air Force base

were ta xed hea vil y by OSIA's i ncreased ma nn ing a nd equ ipment to

implemen t the CFE Trea ty. Wea pons specia lists did not ha ve adequate facil ities to cond uct equi pment recognition classes. The

solution to t heir pro blem came from the ma n who wou ld become

the first OSIA CFE team chief.

Although not yet assigned to OSIA, Lt. Colonel Da vid P.

Gessert, USAr offered the use of his squad ron's facilities, which

were adjacen t to OSIA Europea n Opera tions' bu ild ing. Colonel

Gessert comma nded the Air Force's 7580t h Aerospace Squad ron,

known as the Berl in Corrid or Fl yers. Its mission ended with GerLt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, was the first CFE team

chief selected at OSI A's European Operations Command. An Air

Force Academy graduate, he was a command navigator with

3,000 fl ying hours. just prior to this assignment, Lt. Colonel

Gessert had commanded the Air Force's 7580th Squadron, the

Berlin Corridor Flyers.

On the initial months-recruiting, training, enlisted force: "I was the first team chief here. My

deputy, Chief Warra nt Off icer Mike Lu kes, was

an old INF Treaty inspector; he had a lot of

experience. In all honesty, he proba bly trained me

more than anybod y else did. He and I went out

as the team chief and deputy for all the initial

NATO mock inspections. We had the opportunity

to take out all of the enlisted teams. There were

four enlisted members on each team, and we had

eight teams. There were two interpreters and two

weapons specialists, and it was a mix and match

of Air Force and Army guys. Chief Lukes and I

essentially set the teams up and initiated their

training. The first real mock inspection we did

was with the French, and we took our teams out

and escorted the French; then we worked with the

Luxembou rgers, Belgia ns, Dutch, and Germa ns.

"We had all these extremely qual ified NCOs,

but they were either qualified in rocket systems or

they were qualified in tanks, master gunners, etc.

We also had some very, very qualified Air Force

maintena nce personnel who worked on F-4s or

F-15s or F-111s, but they didn't know tanks, our

own ta nks, let alone Russia n ta nks. So we were

pretty much starting at ground zero. Everybody

was extremely professiona l; there was real expertise in certa in fields, but no one had expertise in

all of the Russia n equi pment, or in the va riety of

Russia n equipment. What helped was tha t these

guys were professional NCOs, and they were

operators. They k new how to turn a wrench, so

they weren't guys who just looked at pictu res

from behind a desk or some intelligence analysts.

These guys were soldiers, they knew how to walk

into a wing, a brigade, or a regiment, and decide

qu ickly if they had their act together or not.

Tha t's why they were hired. So we had all these

real smart guys, soldiers and airmen. These guys

cou ld walk and chew gum; they'd done some

stuff in their life."
I \ 1>1 <, LJI' I 111 LJ II I()

ma n u ni fica tion. While closing down the 7580t h, he allowed

OSIA's wea pons specialists to develop a nd cond uct equ ipment

identifica tion classes in the squad ron's briefi ng rooms. These

classes, while i m porta n t for a l l i nspectors, were critica l for wea pons specia l ists beca use none were expert on all wea pons systems.

U.S. Air Force wea pons specia l ists, for exa mple, k new U.S. a ircraft, but they had l ittle or no k nowledge of U.S. Arm y wea pons

a nd eq ui pment, m uch less the wea pons of the Wa rsaw Pact's

grou nd forces. The same was true for U .S. A r m y wea pons specia lists, who were expert i n U.S. and some Soviet grou nd forces, a l bei t

using NATO designa tions, but had l ittle exposure to U .S. a nd

Soviet aircra ft.6

continued

On the initial mock inspections: "The initia l

mock inspections were very bruta l, especially 

with our allies. The a llies looked at this CFE

mission initia lly as an opportu nity to talk and to

celebrate together. From our own INF experience,

we k new that the Russia ns were very professiona l, and tha t we had to approach it tha t wa y.

We exercised every aspect of the treaty and made

it very, very tough and very, very difficult. The

a llies, at first, regretted it. They d id n't like it.

They didn't think the America ns were nice. What

we tried to explain to them was that you tra i n

ha rder tha n what you actua lly do in rea lity. By

the time the inspections bega n, I think the a llies

beca me tougher and we beca me easier. But when I

say easier, it's beca use we were not reasona ble in

our mocks, for we a lways pushed to the extreme

to ma ke treaty points. Ma ny times we would

purposely be u nreasona ble with the a llies for

training pu rposes.

"Mock i nspections ta ught you how to orchestrate an inspection, how to organize an inspection, the mecha nics of trying to get a crew of

eight people u nderneath the team chief to work

together as subtea ms. You did it so that when you

hit the ground you weren't worried about who

had what room or where's the equipment going.

You had to learn how do to the mecha nical things

to make an inspection work. When you hit the

site, you r time was very limited. You had to use it

wisel y.

"It ta kes organization and some thought. I

believe I've used the example before that we

learned that it takes a much longer time to do a

treaty inspection report than ever anticipated

because of the lega l aspects, using the proper

ver biage, and referencing the proper points in the

treaty. These things just took longer tha n anticipated. There are also some straight mecha nica l

things you have to do to facilitate and to keep

your inspection going."

On leading multinational inspection teams: "I

think that actually made the mocks more importa nt. Learning how to pu t together and orchestra te an inspection with three new people helped.

We always have three new people on every one of

our rea l inspections, in add ition to the core sixma n team. Du ring the mock inspections we

learned how to ma ke it work. How to ma ke it

task-oriented, to k now wha t task you wa nt to

give to a new member, and wha t you wa nt to give

to an experienced inspector. You learned how to

orga nize and how to set u p a true, thorough

inspection. Sometimes it was very, very tough

because you had to learn how to use somebody

from another country who had a slightly different

agenda than yours. But if you know how to facilita te an inspection, how to organize-which we

learned du ring the mock regime-it made it much

easier. That's wha t the training really taught us to

do, how to conduct a good, well-orchestrated,

well-orga nized inspection. And it took a while to

learn that. You don't go into it blindly."

Source: Interview, Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, July 12, 1993.
I06 0 -SI 11 I WI ( 1 10. A< .1 (

Traini ig for Ii ngui sts

While wea pons specia l ists developed their lesson pla ns in

eq ui pment identification, linguists had thei r own tra ining req uiremen ts. Once selected for d u ty w i t h OSIA, most linguists a ttended

the Defense La ng uage Instit u te's (DU) Inter med ia te Russia n

Course i n Monterey, Ca l i fornia. The 27-week

cou rse provided l ingu ists intense tra ining to

expa nd their a bi l ity to spea k Russia n . The course

a lso i ntrod uced students to a rms con trol treaty

term inology. After successf u l completion of the

DLI cou rse, l ingu ists a rrived at OSIA's Eu ropea n

Operations, and shortly therea fter a ttended a

two-week cou rse at the U.S. Army Russia n Institu te (USARI ) a t Garm isch, Germa ny. This course,

sponsored by the Treaty Verifica tion Division of

USARI, pu t linguists into classrooms where they

spoke on ly Russia n as they studied terminology

specific to the CFE Trea ty. Freed from the da ily

pressures and distractions of ind ivid ua l and tea m

Defense Language Institute, M onterey, California. tra ining at Rhei n-Ma in, stude nts at Ga rm isch

focused on the trea ty's complex, tech n ica l la nguage for six to seven hou rs a day. Back a t Rhei n-Ma in, in add ition to i nd ivid u a l d a il y practice, li ngu ists ga thered in small grou ps

led by A l an J. French, OSIA Europea n Opera tions' in-house Russian langua ge professiona l. They d rilled in Russia n th ree to five

hours a week, for practice i n conversa tion and inter preta ti on.

Lingu ists enha nced their tra i n ing by viewi ng ta ped Russia n television broadcasts a nd read i ng an y ava ila ble wri tten ma teria ls. Most

linguists agreed , however, tha t the most rea listic tra ining for the

inspection tea ms, short of an actua l trea ty inspection, wa s the

mock inspections. 7

Mocr INSPEC 10

One lesson America ns had lea rned in prepa ring to implemen t

the IN F Trea ty was t ha t mock inspections were an extremel y

va l ua ble tra ining tool. These inspections ena bled tea ms to practice

inspection a nd escort proced u res, ma ke a nd correct mista kes on

the spot, u ncover u nantici pa ted problems or situa tions, a nd improve thei r proced ures i n accorda nce with treaty protocols. Teams

went beyond scena ri o d evel opmen t and d iscussion in their offices

to exercising their trea ty k nowledge a t a n inspecta ble site on a

mil ita ry insta lla tion.8 Seventeen mont hs into treaty implementation, Lt. Colonel Joseph ]. Drach, Jr., USA, an experienced OSIA

CFE Treaty team chief, led a series of tra ining classes and a mock

inspection with Moldova n inspectors in December 1993. He told

the Moldova n team a bou t the approach America n inspectors took

during mock inspections:
St [)I (, I' 1111 II I( .,

"Our experiences duri ng the mock inspections before baseli ne

and duri ng the rea l trea ty inspections, both inspecti ng and escorting, were very simila r. Th is (fact) ind icates tha t our level of rea lism

d u ring tra ining was very h igh. That is a lwa ys one of the ma in

goa ls in tra ining, to tra in the wa y you wou ld fight, to be as rea listic as you can. "9

Initial OSIA mock inspections for the CFE Treaty placed

OSIA inspectors and escorts opposite their NATO cou nterpa rts.

This was rea listic tra in i ng-tea ms tra veled, lost sleep, missed

mea ls, inspected u nfamilia r military facilities, discussed treaty

rights and obliga tions with foreign officers, and completed the

inspection reports as req uired by the trea ty. As inspectors, they

aggressi vel y dema nded all of their govern ment's treaty righ ts; as

escorts, they made certa in tha t their govern ment's interests were

fu lly protected. Colonel Kelley was a strong proponent of mock

tra in ing inspections beca use his INF Trea ty experience had convinced him tha t-

"The mock inspections a re now and ha ve a lways been the

single most im porta nt tra ining tool tha t we ha ve a t our disposa l

for a n um ber of reasons. First, t hey force you to put into practice

the sk ills tha t you ha ve developed i nd ivid ua l ly in these va rious

a reas over time. Second, the experience forces a tea m-or, i n ma ny

cases, multi ple tea ms-to f u nction as a tea m. Mocks develop the

cohesi veness that we wa nted to see and per mit the tea ms to further

test each other on k nowledge of the trea ty, and k nowledge of

policy. "1 0

Colonel Kelley tu rned the responsi bili ty for the deta iled coordina tion and pla n ning of mock inspections over to Ca pta in Da vid

R. Ca rter, USA F. As Chief of Eu ropea n Opera tions' Pla ns Bra nch,

he worked d irectl y with other NATO na tions' treaty veri fication

agencies to pla n each series of mock inspections. Much of the

initia l coord ina tion was completed over the phone, but fina l pla nning was clone i n person, a pproxi matel y one month prior to inspection. Face-to-face, the pla n ning off icers from the na tions

ironed out the deta ils of the exercise. After severa l pla nni ng meetings Colonel Kelley opted for a higher ra n k ing team chief , a lieutena nt colonel , to accompa ny Carter as a ma tter of protocol for

the usua ll y senior a llied cou nterpa rts. For inspections of U.S.

facilities, United States Eu ropea n Comma nd (USEUCOM ) relinqu ished the coord ina tion of site selection to OSIA. Capta i n Carter

or one of the Pla ns Bra nch NCOs then dea lt d irectly with the

component comma nds to determine which U.S. sites wou ld

be avai la ble to pa rtici pa te, either grou nd forces assigned to

USA REUR or air forces u nder USAFE. With a list of U.S. sites

ava ila ble for mock inspection, U.S. pla n ners and their NATO

cou nter pa rts developed an agenda for the mock inspection i ncl uding da tes, u nits, loca tions, notification proced u res, expenses, and

tea m composition. 1 1

Seal of theFrench

verification agency L'Unite

Fran{:aise de Verification.
I08 ON-SIn IN'>PI c1IO'I A<.1:. c '

The ini tia l U.S. mock inspections were cond ucted with

Fra nce's verif ica tion agency, L'Un ite Fra nc;a ise de Verifica tion.

Lt. Colonel Gessert led th is m ission and the next five U.S. mock

i nspection missions. Beca use Lt. Colonel Gessert was new to the

on-site i nspection process, he relied hea vil y on h is depu ty, Ch ief

Wa rra nt Officer 4 (CW4) Michael R. Lu kes, USA, who was an

experienced IN F Trea ty i n spector. On this first mission, Gessert's

n ine-person tea m d rove from Rhei n-Ma in Air Base on Ma y 14,

1991, to Strasbou rg, Fra nce, the poi nt of entry ( POE) for this

mission. The followi ng day they contin ued on to Na ncy-Ochey

Airfield , w here Lt. Colonel Gessert decla red the French Air Force's

3rd Fighter Wi ng the object of ver ifica tion ( OOV) for the first

OSIA CFE mock i nspection. Beca use the French a irfield was very 

l arge a nd there was m uch to be inspected , Lt. Colonel Gessert

surprised h is hosts by decl ining the prepa red , forma l luncheon.

At the site, Gessert divided h is team in two subteams for the

inspection, with CW4 Lu kes lead ing the second team. The U.S.

teams set out on foot to inspect the site, overla ppi ng each other's

efforts to ensu re dou ble coverage. Their a pproach was strictly

busi ness, as if the inspection were an actua l CFE inspection in

Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. "We exercised every aspect

of the treaty," Gessert reca lled, "and made it very, very tough

and ver y, very d ifficu l t" for the French escorts. After both U.S.

su btea ms cou n ted all the TLE a nd confi rmed thei r counts to be

correct, Lt. Colonel Gessert decl a red a sequentia l inspection. He

then signed the i nspection report, completi ng the mock inspection.

The followi ng day the America n tea m tra veled to Chenevieres for

the sequenti a l inspection. There Gessert declared the French

A rmy's 3rd Tank Ba tta lion as the OOV h is tea m wou ld i nspect.

Du ring th is second i nspection, Gessert observed that the French

mil ita ry escorts had become m uch more aggressi ve in their escort

proced u res, tryi ng to minimize U.S. access and photogra ph y, but

a lwa ys rema ining with in the gu idelines of the trea ty. These first

mock inspections m irrored wha t would become the U.S. tradema rk for a ll future CFE inspections: an aggressive, "letter of the

law" approach to ga in ing all righ ts a llowed u nder the trea ty.

These m issions confirmed tha t a deta iled k nowledge of the

treaty was the key to a successfu l mission. Wi thout a thorough

k nowledge of the treaty, tea m mem bers could not effectively exercise a ll their govern me n t's treat y rights. Lt. Colonel Gessert also

recogn ized the importa nce of tea mwork a nd pla n ning. Beca use an

inspection tea m had l imited time on-site, the tea m needed to develop a pla n tha t allowed a ll tea m mem bers to ca rry out their

specific tasks, wh i le a ll owing for a thorough inspection of the

decla red site, inspecting a ll areas and eq u ipment twice. Each ind ivid ua l had to u ndersta nd his role as a n inspector so tha t the tea m

could complete an inspection effecti vel y. With a strong base of

Inspection Team

Composition

1 Team Chief

1 Deputy

Team Chief

2 Linguists

2 Weapons 

Special ists

3 Treaty

Speciahsts
S1 \ DI (, UP IHI u II ]()9

prepa ra tion and tra i ning, the tea m leader could ma ke adjustmen ts

on-site as circu msta nces d ictated. 1 2

At Rhein-Ma in, OSIA inspection teams continued to hone

their sk ills in a reas such as trea ty k nowledge, equi pment identification, la ngua ge, and photogra phy. The a llied mock inspections

allowed tea ms to test those sk i l ls, to encou nter different a pproaches to the same trea ty, a nd to esta bl ish inspection standa rds.

Over time nea rly a ll the Eastern cou ntries, as well as the a llies,

pressed U.S. representa tives to comm it to sched u ling mock inspections. Colonel Kelley bel ieved tha t the Un ited States had an obligation to give preference to the NATO na tions to cond uct mock

inspections beca use they "had stuck with us in hard times a nd

been true a llies to us." In add ition to loya lty to a llies, it was a lso

in the U.S. interest tha t a ll NATO inspections of Eastern na tions

be thorough and consistent to provide rel iable a nd accura te informa tion for a confident assessmen t of trea ty compl iance.

From Ma y 1991 u ntil the trea ty entered into force in Ju ly

1992, OSIA i nspectors pa rtici pa ted in mock CFE inspections with

inspection teams from 13 NATO na tions. All a llied nations except

Turkey and Ita ly pa rtici pa ted in 27 OSIA missions, during which

U.S. i nspection tea ms cond ucted mock i nspections a t more tha n 50

sites. Jn add ition to mock inspections with NATO tea ms, OSIA

inspectors deployed on 11 m issions to U.S. decla red sites th roughout Western Eu rope to cond uct mock i nspections with other OSIA

tea ms. These OSIA-on-OSIA mock i nspections provided tra ining

not only for the U.S. teams bu t a lso for the America n milita ry

u n its tha t wou ld recei ve Eastern inspection tea ms when the trea ty

entered into force. On severa l occasions, OSIA tea ms provided

cl assroom tra ining followed by demonstra tion mock inspections

a t U.S. decl a red sites. These missions, k nown as "road shows,"

Lt. Colonel J oseph ]. Drach, .fr.,

briefing Greek inspectors during a

mock inspection at Bitburg Air

Base, Germany, October 18, 199 1.
1 10 0 -S11 1 I WI< l I ll A< .1 '< \ _

1st U.S./Eastern Mock

Inspections

October 7-9, 1991

Czechoslovakian Inspection Team

a llowed OSIA inspectors to reach va rious grou ps of people who

wou ld be responsi ble for treaty implementation, usuall y as insta lla tion escorts d uri ng i nspections.

One such mission began on October 28, 1991, when Lt.

Colonel Jan S. Ka rcz , USA, led a team to Sembach Air Base, Germa ny. Du ring this mission OSIA inspectors tra ined CFE points of

contact (POCs) from USA FE u n its on treaty escort and challenge

inspection proced ures. Pa rtici pa nts from the 16th Air Force bases

i n Greece, Ita l y, Crete, and Turkey ga thered, along with Colonel

Schuyler (Sky) Foerster, USA F, a mem ber of the U.S. delega tion at

Vienna, representa tives from the 17th Air Force, USA FE, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Europea n Command (EUCOM), and Team Karcz

at Sembach Air Base, Head qua rters of the 17th Air Force. On

October 28th, Colonel Foerster provided classroom treaty trai ning, emphasizi ng the inspection protocol. Representa tives from

JCS, EUCOM, a nd USA FE then offered their orga nizations' current guidance on treaty escort a nd cha llenge inspection procedu res. The fina l blocks of the course provided instruction on

wor k ing with lingu ists and with the U.S. govern ment's l ia ison

proced ures. The next day Lt. Colonel Ka rcz demonstra ted on-site

the lessons ta ugh t in the classroom, leading his inspection team

th rough the mock inspection at Sembach Air Base.

Pa rticipa tion in mock inspections enabled OSIA CFE team

members to gel as competent, professional inspection teams. Ind ividua ls traveled as a team to new and unfamilia r loca tions, ca rried

out specific tasks as pa rt of an overall team effort to exercise all

treaty rights, and ga ined val ua ble experience on how best to

implement the CFE Trea ty. The next step in prepa ra tion for the

treaty's entry into forcewasmock inspections with teamsfrom the

Eastern group ofstates.ll

EASTER N Mocx L SPECTI01 s

The United States pa rticipa ted in mock inspections with

Czechoslovakia, Russia, Hu nga ry, Pola nd, Roma nia, and Bulga ria

before the trea ty entered into force in Ju ly 1992. A ma jor reason

for the success of those missions was German y's pa rtici pation as

the host state. As a station ing state, the United States needed the

coopera tion and permission of the Germa n government to bring

in Eastern inspection tea ms. Germa ny was to be a ma jor pla yer

d uring trea ty implementa tion beca use there were more tha n 900

declared sites in the newly u nified Germa ny, includ ing the sites of

stationing states such as the United States, Fra nce, Canada, and

the United Ki ngdom. These mock inspections offered Germany's

Zentrum fiir Verifikationsa u fgaben der Bu ndeswehr (ZVBW) an

opport u nity to test ma ny aspects of implementing the treaty as a

host state-these incl uded proced u res at the POE, tra nsportation

Germany
I ll '· U P THI lJ 1 1 1 11

to the decla red site, and provid ing lodging and

food when req uired.

The first of these inspections occu rred on

October 8, 1991, when a Czechoslova k ia n inspection tea m ca me to Germa ny to inspect U.S.

forces a t Cam p Vilseck and the Merrill Ba rracks.

Ma jor Elmer G. (Gu y} White, USA, the escort

tea m chief, noted that the d ra wdown of U .S.

forces, cou pled wi th the deploy ments to the Gu lf

Wa r, had drama tica lly cha nged U.S. forces in

Eu rope. Conseq uently, the information exchanged a t trea ty signa t u re was no longer accura te. Beca use there wou ld be no excha nge of data

u ntil 30 days a fter the trea ty's entry into force,

OSIA escorts would be busy explaining d ifferences between the old data and the status of Russian N uclear Risk Reduction Center.

forces d u ring the initia l days of baseline .

Ma jor White also highlighted a commu nications problem

between his team and Head qua rters EUCOM. This problem

wou ld recu r later du ring other mock inspections, and it came u p

d uring the trea ty's baseline phase. One of the duties of U.S. escort

tea m ch iefs and lia ison officers was to comm u n icate the i nspection

team's status to EUCOM, which in tu rn initia ted a series of notifica tions to U.S. forces in Eu rope. Beca use of limited phone lines or

poor connections through va rious phone systems, a nd the compressed time during a n i nspection, OSIA team chiefs a nd lia ison

officers were sometimes u na ble to contact EUCOM. Instead, they

passed the infor ma tion on to OSIA's Eu ropea n opera tions center at

Rhein-Ma in. From the opera tions center, team status was passed

to Headq ua rters EUCOM. It worked, but i t was not the wa y that

it had been envisioned. Comm u nica tions i n the futu re wou ld routinely go through OSIA's opera tions center and then on to

EUCOM.

The next mock i nspections with an Eastern nation, and the

first opport u nity to tra in outside a NATO na tion, were to occu r in

Janua ry and Februa ry of 1992, following prelimina ry d iscussions

i n Decem ber 1991.1 4 As Christmas 1991 a pproached, Colonel

Kelley a nd Ma jor Henry J. Nowa k, USA, tra veled from Fra nkfu rt

to Moscow, accompa nied by Lt. Colonel Peer Schwan of the

ZV BW, the Germa n trea ty veri fication orga nization, to arra nge trina tiona l mock i nspections at CFE facilities in both the Soviet

U nion a nd Germa ny. Aga in, Germa n y's cooperation was pi vota l.

As a stationing state, the United States owned none of the ter ritory

in the ATTU; conseq uently, it tu rned to the sovereign host state

before arra ngi ng a visit by Soviet i nspection teams. Ma jor Griff ith

S. Hughes, USA, of the Arms Control Implementation Unit of the

America n Embassy in Moscow, accompa nied Colonel Kelley,

S1 \
I 1.2 0 -St 11 I WI(1 10, A<.t ( '\

General-Lieutenant Vladimir I.

M edvedev, Director, Soviet Nuclear 

Risk Reduction Center.

Major Nowa k, and Lt. Colonel Schwan in Moscow. On Decem ber

18, 1991, these fou r officers met a Soviet delega tion of 10 officers

led by General-Lieutena nt Vl adimir I.Med vedev, head of the

Soviet Nuclea r Risk Red uction Center. Jointly, they pla nned two

mock inspection missions.

The first mission was sched uled for Ja nua ry 1992 in German y. The inspection sites were the Germa n Artillery Bra nch

School at Id a r-Oberstein, the U.S. Air Force's 52d Tactica l Fighter

Wing a t Spangda hlem Air Base, a nd the U.S. Army's 200th Theater Arm y Materiel Comma nd (TAMC) at the Germersheim Army

Depot. The second m ission, pla nned for Februa ry 1992, would be

held i n the Len ingrad Milita ry District. There, the designa ted sites

were the Soviets' 67th Bom ber Regiment at Siversk i y Air Base and

the 457th Howitzer Arti llery Regiment a t Pushkin.

The pa rties then tu rned to d iscussing the grou nd rules for

these mock inspections. These incl uded pla nning administra tive

brea ks to a l low for discussion of possi ble tech nica l difficulties as

they occurred . This provision contri bu ted to a major aspect of

these tra ining m issions-allowing key treaty pa rtici pa nts time to

iron out problems before the rea l inspections took place. The

pa rties also mod ified trea ty inspection timelines to allow for overnight stays. Another deviation from treaty req uirements was designa ting Fra n kfu rt as the single POE for the Soviet mission into

Germany. Norma lly Fra nk furt could not be a POE for the th ree

decla red sites selected for the inspections. The officers determined

that the Soviets would fly into Rhein-Ma in Air Base and be bussed

across the shared runwa y to Fra nkfur t Internationa l Airport.

There Germa n escorts would exercise host state POE proced ures;

America ns would test their l iaison officer proced u res; and the

Soviets would per haps avoid a irport fees by land ing at Rhei nMa in . The con ferees also d iscussed notifica tion proced u res, the

num ber of inspectors/observers, tea m composition, inspection

languages, dining schedules, equipment ma rkings, and distribution

of expenses.

These deta iled pla n ning discussions in Moscow, as had been

the case with a ll pl an ning sessions, prevented problems that would

ha ve detracted from the qua l ity of tra ining d uri ng the mock inspections. For exa m ple, Colonel K elley remi nded the Soviets that

U.S. inspectors occasiona lly sk ipped lu nch when cond ucting inspections, and tha t escorts were obliged to assist inspectors i n

ca rryi ng ou t an inspection, even if tha t mea nt a missed mea l.

Other d iscussions confirmed the U.S. intent to record a ll externa l

ma rk ings of TLE. The Soviets stated that there wou ld be no access 

to the interior of any equipment for the pu rpose of record ing seria l

n umbers. The pla nni ng agendas for both inspection series were 

reviewed, and both sides agreed to hold posti nspection discussions

( "hotwashes") at each site to cla rif y points they had d iscussed
---------sI\ 1)1 ·c. U P 1 111 u J I I I1

Colonel William R. Smith check s

the serial number on an AC\

du ring each inspection. The grou p also agreed to d iscuss any problems encou ntered d uri ng the two missions a nd to pu rsue how each

na tion pla nned to cond uct its inspections.

During this con ference severa l issues a rose that were beyond

the a u thority of the con ferees and req u ired resol u tion by their

respecti ve governments. A cha nge of inspection dates for the mock

i nspections in the Leni ngrad Milita ry District req uired U.S. governmen t approva l. Lt. Colonel Schwa n, the ZVBW represen tative,

tu rned to the Germa n government for a pprova l of a Soviet req uest

to a llow a Soviet milita ry aircra ft to use Speren berg Air Base in

tra nsi t, either before or a fter droppi ng off the Soviet i nspection

tea m in Fra n k fu rt. Speren berg Air Base would provide the Soviets

a n opport u nity to refuel their a ircra ft without pu rchasi ng fuel in

Fra n k furt, which had been a common practice d u ring the INF

Trea ty implementa tion. Once those decisions were made, a nd

despite the fact tha t the Soviet U nion had colla psed as a nation on

Christmas Da y 1991, only seven days a fter this meeti ng, pla nni ng

for the tri-na tion mock inspections moved forwa rd. 15

For OSIA, these mock inspections i n Russia differed from a ll

previous CFE mock inspections. Colonel Kel ley elected to forgo

the usua l tea m struct u re. Instead, he formed tea ms usi ng on l y tea m

chiefs a nd deputies, with the one exception of Technica l Sergea nt

Joseph A. Amen, USA F. He d id this beca use ma n y of the America n 

tea m leaders had never been in the Soviet Union. As Kelley pu t it:

"I wa nted very bad ly to avoid a situa tion i n which our tea m

leaders would be rendered ineffecti ve for the first severa l hou rs, i f

not a day, after their entry into the former Soviet Union for the

first time, by virtue of awe. They had to get over that awe. The

best wa y to do it was to do so a t some time other tha n when they

were performi ng a real i nspection."

"f ll''1llfCd l'l'1')' fh1dfy to

.11'oid a s it11L?tim1..."

-Col. l .m-renn: (,. Kelle\ , l S\ I<.

( h id ot Oper.llJOJh, ( )S[ \ i" mopl'.111

()pLT.ltlOI)\(.0111111.llld
114 0 -51 1 1 I '>l'I c 10 Ac.1 c ) 

Captain David R. Carter

coordinating a mock inspection

at the Operations Center.

Colonel Kelley wa nted to be certa in tha t tea m leaders rea lized

tha t mil ita ry su perpower status did not equa te wi th a strong

economy; tha t they held no misconceptions as to whom a nd what

they wou ld be dealing wit h in the Soviet Union. If tea m leaders

were going to be d istracted by their surrou nd ings, Colonel Kelley

wa nted it to ha ppen in a benign environ men t, d uring a mock

inspection. When t he CFE Treaty entered into force, he wa nted the

tea m leaders to be focused on the actua l inspection. Kelley thought

tha t this wou ld proba bly be the only opport u nity for tea m chiefs

and depu ties to enter the Soviet Union before basel ine sta rted-it

was a one-shot deal. The team chiefs and depu ties would then

share thei r experiences with their tea ms i n prepa ring them for

baseline inspections. 16

A total of 13 America n tea m chiefs or depu ties got firstha nd

exposure to Russia n CFE inspection/escort techniq ues d uring these

mock i nspections. Ma jor General Robert W. Pa rker, USAF, Director of OSIA, was an observer on both missions. Fi ve OSIA team

chiefs and three depu ties were on the escort team in Germany,

Jan ua ry 27-3l, 1992, when the Russia ns visited Spa ngda hlem Air

Base and Germershei m Army Depot. In addition to augmentees

and observers, five U.S. team chiefs and two deputies were assigned to the America n team that inspected Russia n forces at

Siverskiy Air Base a nd at Push k in, Februa ry 10-14, 1992. These

nation-to-nation mock inspections revea led differences in trea ty

interpreta tion tha t simply woul d not ha ve been u ncovered except

for these exercises.

Capta in Da vid R. Carter, USA F, of the Pla ns Bra nch at OSIA

Europea n Operations, coord ina ted the ef fort among USAFE ,

USAREUR, the Germa n ZVBW, and OSIA to bring a bout the

Russia n/Germa n/U.S. mock i nspections. The official U.S. escort

tea m ch ief was Lt. Colonel Donald C. Snedeker, USA, and his

deputy was Lt. Colonel Edwa rd G. Gallagher, II, USA. The l ia ison

officers for t h is mission were Ma jors Richard J. O'Shea, USAF,

and Keith A. Oa tma n, USA. Ma jor Oatma n was a n excellen t

resou rce for facilita ting these inspections beca use he spoke Germa n and Russia n, a benefi t derived from the emphasis placed on

la nguage skills when ma nning the u nit. Tech nica l Sergeant Joseph

A. Amen, USA F, the only enlisted member of the team, was the

logistics coord i na tor, a position usually referred to as the

"bagman." Technical Sergean t Amen's role was to make certa in

tha t inspectors and escorts were billeted and fed when it was the

U.S. govern ment's responsi bility to do so. Before depa rting on the

mission, he withd rew funds from the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing

accou nting and fina nce center to cover anticipa ted expenses. He

arrived with the escort tea m at the decla red site ahead of the inspectors. There, he made a rra ngements and pa id for billeti ng or

hotel rooms if the tea ms were spend ing the night. He also pa id for

all meals. 1 7
r\ DI l. r u 1 1

At the first Russia n/A merica n/Germa n CFE mock i nspection,

Ja n ua ry 27-31, Genera l Pa rker greeted the i ncomi ng inspectors

and briefly spoke of the importa nce of t his series of inspections.

He welcomed the opportunity for joi nt training, continued cooperation, mutua l trust, and most importa nt-developing a "key

bluepri nt for the CFE verifica tion regime."

On Ja n ua ry 27, 1992, little more tha n a month after the Soviet

Union had collapsed, a Russia n inspection team arrived in Frankfu rt

to cond uct mock inspections, th us ma inta ining continuity i n arms , I I

control treaty implementa tion. The Russia n inspection tea m and six

Russia n observers u nderwent POE proced ures with the host Germa n escort team. The U.S. lia ison team, Genera l Pa rker, and Colonel Kelley were a lso there. The Russia ns declared their first inspection site, Ida r-Oberstein, and depa rted with the Germa n host state

escorts. After an overnight admi nistrative hold, the Russian inspectors arrived at Ida r-Oberstein at 0830 for the mock inspection.

Followi ng the inspection, the two tea ms held an informa l discussion, reviewi ng the proced ures and inspection issues. Then, the

Russia n team chief followed treaty protocol proced ures and declared a sequentia l inspection at Spangdahlem Air Base. Fina lly,

aga in following treaty protocols precisely, the two team chiefs

signed the inspection report. While the Russia n inspectors and

observers, the U.S. liaison team, and General Pa rker and Colonel 

Kelley spent the night at Idar-Oberstei n, the U.S. escort team traveled ahead to Spangda hlem Air Base. There they made final, lastmin ute prepa ra tions for the next day's inspection.

Upon leaving Ida r-Oberstein, the Germa n escort tea m continued their responsi bi l ities for the Russia n inspection team and

tra nsported them to the next inspection site. The U.S. escort

team greeted the Russia n and Germa n tea ms u pon a rriva l at

Spangda h lem Air Base and once aga in assu med escort responsi bil ities from the Germa ns. After provid ing refresh ments and the site

diagram to the Russia ns at the Officers' Club, Lt. Colonel Snedeker

and h is team wa ited 30 minutes for the Russia ns to decla re the

OOV to be inspected. The Russia n team chief decla red the 52nd

Tactica l Fighter Wing, and the America ns bega n the site briefing.

Followi ng this briefing, the entire R ussia n i nspection tea m

pa rticipated i n a bus ride a rou nd the base. Colloq uia lly k nown

as a "windshield tour," this bus ride gave the inspection tea m a

cha nce to compa re the site d iagra m wit h the actua l facilities, a

practice that ma ny na tions would later adopt in escorting inspection teams. After the windshield tour the Russia n team broke into

three su bgrou ps, which depa rted im med iately for differen t areas

on the base to begin their inspections. The Russia n inspectors

req uested access to a ll doors that exceeded the treaty's two-meter

limit and were satisfied with visua l access if they cou ld read i l y

determine there was no TLE present in a bu ild ing. If the inspectors

THI 1 1

1od• llL"fJectrmL dct·c/o/J

1 "kn hl11c/m11t for the (

t 1en/iu1tm11 rc(!rmc...

-11J. l 1 ·n.({11h rr \\.l

11rkn
116 0 -Sm·l win ro Ac.1· <'

U.S. escorts confirm a two-meter

opening during a mock inspection

at Lak enheath Air Base, England.

could not immed ia tely determi ne tha t there was no TLE in a facility, the America n escorts provided them access as far into a facility

as necessa ry to confirm there was no TLE there, or u ntil they

encou ntered doors tha t d id not exceed two meters.

When one su bgrou p req uested access to the M u n itions Storage A rea, Lt. Col one l Snedeker responded that the a rea was a sensitive poi nt with l i m i ted access. He offe red the inspecto rs a n option

to select fou r of the bu n kers wi thi n the storage a rea for visua l

access only. The inspectors however, wa nted either tota l access or

no access to the a rea. Lt. Colonel Snedeker referred to rhe trea ty

defin ition of a sensitive point as a l l owing tota l, lim ited , or no

access. At tha t poi nt the Russia n inspectors declined the A merica n

offer for limi ted access a nd proceeded to inspect other areas. By

evening, the Russi a n tea m had fin ished i ts inspecti on, cond ucted a

briefing, decla red the sequentia l i nspection ( the 200th TAMC at

Germersheim A rm y Depot), and completed the inspection report.

After a dinner a t t he NCO Clu b, al l rea ms left for Germershci m,

where they rem a i ned overnight. The next d a y the R ussia ns conducted their inspection, pa rtici pa teci in a brief ing, completed their

report, a nd depa rted prom ptl y for R hei n-Ma i n, where they rema ined overnigh t before retu rni ng ro Moscow the next ci ay. 1 8

Severa l issues a rose d uri ng the inspect ions of t he two U.S.

sites. Photogra ph y was a point of contenti on on severa l occasions,

specifica ll y, the frami ng of photos. The U.S. escorts insisted that

inspectors photogra ph a n entire object, nor just a pa rt of it. U.S.

escorts stated tha t a n inspecti on tea m 's photos were a tool in

cou nti ng eq ui pment, not a mea ns to focus on a n aspect of a specific piece of eq u ipmen t or the a rea a rou nd it. Su bseq uen tly, in

Febru ary 1992, d u ri ng the U.S. mock inspection a t Siversk iy A ir
SrA DI (, UP !HF U ·1r 1 17

Base, R ussia n escorts rcci proca t cl by cha ngi ng the fra m ing of U.S.

photos of Russia n a i rcra ft. A n no u nci ng w hen inspectors w re

going to ta ke a pi ctu re a lso beca me a n i ssue w hen the R ussia ns

decla red tha t, u nder the trea ty, they were req u i red to annou nce

thei r intention to ta k e photos on l y once. I n Decem ber 1991 a t

Vien na, however, Genera l 1\!led vedev had stated tha t an a n nou ncemen t shou l d be mad e pri or to each photo. La ter, Russia n escort

off icia ls concu rred with tha t posi tion d ur i ng a U.S. mock inspection a t Push k i n.

Beca use the trea ty d oes not define a conta iner, d ifferences of

interpretation arose duri ng the mock i nspections at U.S. faci lities.

The inspection protocol a llows for the inspection of any conta iner

tha t exceeds two meters in a l l d imensions. The Russia n inspectors

defined a conta iner as anythi ng that "conta ins," to incl ude the

tra iler of a tractor tra il er rig or a com m u n ica tions vehicle. The U.S.

position was tha t the back of a truck was a piece of eq uipment, a nd

i f the vehicle was not a piece of conventiona l arma ments and equ i pment su bject to the trea ty ( CAEST), inspectors had no right to

inspect the vehicle. La ter, i n A pri l 1992, Joi nt Ch iefs of Sta ff gu idance on conta iners a l lowed inspectors to view the i n terior of ca rgo

vehicles or tractor trailers. Other vehicles that had been mod ified

for other uses, such as com m u n ications veh icles, ca l led for d ifferent

proced ures. If the mod ification to the vehicle were not read ily a ppa rent, an effort wou ld be made to show that it was a mod i fied

piece of equi pmen t and d id not conta i n TLE. 1 9

A not her q uestion was spa r ked by the presence of two Egyptia n F-4 f igh ters a t Spa ngd a hl em . The R ussia n inspectors felt the

fighters shou ld have been d ecla red as CA EST; the U.S. response

U.S. site escorts open a container

during a mock inspection.

1

j
1 18 0 -S111 I '>Pl< I It> <.• ( '

SU -24 park ed outsid e aircraft shelter at Siversk iy Air Base, Russia, during mock insp ection in Februar y J 992.

was tha t since Egy pt was not a signatory to the trea ty, the Egy ptia n figh ters were not su bject to t he treaty, and the U ni ted States

wou l d not report i t d u ring a site bri ef ing or th rough forma l CFE

reporti ng cha n nels.

Shorrly a fter these Russia n mock inspections in Germa n y

were complete, a nine-ma n America n i nspection tea m led by Lt.

Colonel Ga llagher cond ucted the mock i nspections i n Russia. The

inspection tea m a nd six observers depa rted Rhei n-Ma in on a n A ir

Force C-141 on Februa ry I 0, 1992. They a rrived i n Moscow

a rou nd noon and, after a brief greeti ng, the Russia ns im med ia tely

i nitiated POE proced ures. After Ga llagher decla red Siversk i y Air

Base to be the first i nspection site, the tea ms agreed to stop the

inspection clock. The tea m-along w i th Genera l Pa rk er, Colonel

Kelley, and other observers-rema ined overnight in Moscow. The

following morn ing a ll depa rted for Siversk iy Air Base, where they

cond ucted the first i nspection. The America n team depa rted for

Pushk i n the next day, where it cond ucted its inspection of the

Russia n A rm y a rtillery site over the next two days. After compl eting the second inspection on the 13th, Lt. olonel Ga llagher's

tea m spent the n ight in Push k in, ret u rn ing to Moscow the next

morni ng and then to Rhei n-Ma i n to complete the m ission.

Photogra phy aga i n proved to be a sou rce of questions duri ng

these inspections. One situation dea lt with the nu m ber of photogra phs i nspectors were a ll owed to ta ke of CAEST. Escort officia ls

questioned the need to ta ke more tha n one photo of any piece of

CAEST. Lt. Col onel Ga lla gher cou ntered tha t photos were a l lowed
I\ Ill;\.(, UP [ II] u I f I l l

to accou nt for CAEST. He added tha t there was no wa y of determi n ing how ma ny subtea ms ha d photogra phed a piece of equ ipmen t and tha t trea ty-a uthorized use of vid eo cameras ma de the

q uestion moot. This issue was resol ved v.rhen the Russia n escorts

rel ucta ntly agreed tha t there was no limit. Reci procity, which was

an element of opera tions u nder IN F i nspections, a lso ca me into

pla y d uri ng these CFE mock i nspections when the Russia ns req u ired U.S. i nspectors to frame photos of SU-24s, just as U.S.

escorts had req u ired Russia n inspectors to fra me F-16 photos in

.Janua ry.

I n add ition to photo questions, a site diagra m issue a rose

d u ring the i nspection a t Push k in. Russia n escorts presen ted to the

A merica n inspectors a site diagra m tha t d id not ind ica te common

a reas, onl y the a reas specific to the two OOVs a t Push k in. The

America n tea m chief, Lt. Colonel Ga llaghe1 asserted tha t the

d iagra m was not complete beca use it d id not show the exten t of its

ma n ma de externa l bou nda ry. This limited the i nspection tea m's

access on the site. The R ussia n escorts d i d not agree with his interpreta tion of the trea ty a nd d id not a lter the bou nda ry of the site

on the d iagra m. Lt. Colonel Ga llagher noted the problem on the

inspection report. It was a problem tha t wou l d resurface duri ng

the baseli ne period and become the focus of a concerted a l lied

effort to cha nge the R ussia n interpreta tion.20

The Februa ry 1992 m ission to Russia was the first CFE mock

i nspection deployment into the Ea stern grou p of states. Followi ng

that mission, from Ma rch 15 th rough Ma y 9, OSIA tea ms conExtract of re/J ort fron 1 mock inspection at Pushk in, Russia, Februar y 1992 .

INSPECTING STATE PARTY

7. COMMENTS BY STATES PARTIES INVOLVED (CONTINUED!

b. OTHER COMMENTS

STATE PARTY WHOSE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

AND EQUIPMENT ARE BEING INSPECTED

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l20 ON-S!Tl·I.'SPIC IION Ac;1 u

d ucted mock i nspections i n Roma n ia, Czechoslova k ia, Hu nga ry,

and Pol and before the trea ty entered into force i n J u l y 1992. The

fina l OSIA mock inspection with a n Ea stern na tion before the

trea ty's entry i nto force occu rred on Ma y 11, 1992, w hen Bu lga ria n inspectors deployed to Belgi u m. Each of these missions u ncovered problems that were corrected on the spot, or noted and

pa ssed on for resol u tion by the U .S. govern ment. One pro blem

tha t inspectors cou l d not correct was the presence of look-ali ke

eq u ipmen t in Czechosl ova k ia tha t was not incl uded in the protocol on existi ng types of conventi onal a rma men ts and equ ipment.

Site d iagra ms a lso proved to be a problem a t severa l locations. In Czechoslova k ia, a n escort tea m ga ve a thorough site

briefing usi ng wa l l charts; however, the site d iagra ms provided to

t he inspection tea m were not as accura te. The Czech escorts believed t ha t the trea ty req u iremen t to provide a site diagra m was

satisfied by the wa l l cha rts a nd tha t giving d iagra ms to the inspectors exceeded treaty req u iremen ts. The Czechs la ter changed their

view on this issue. In Roma nia, escorts presented a site d i agra m

tha t incl uded the entire town adjacent to the mi l itary insta l lation.

The America n inspection tea m discussed treaty req u irements for

site d iagrams with their hosts, where u pon the Roma nia ns na rrowed t he scope of their site d iagram. In severa l states the U.S.

tea ms experienced d iff icu lties comm u nicati ng with the U.S. Embassy. Na tiona l phon e systems were sometimes inadeq ua te, and

often U.S. Em bassy person nel were not yet awa re of noti fica tion

req u irements ma nd ated by the trea ty.

In a l l , from Ma y I 4, 1991, through J u ly 5, 1992, OSIA inspection tea ms deployed on 44 mock i nspection missions. Du ring

these missions, OSIA inspectors pa rtici pa ted i n nea rl y 100 mock

i nspections. A merica n inspectors tra ined with i nspectors from 18

na tions and sha red their k nowled ge wi th representatives or u nits

from USAREU R, USAFE, a nd U.S. Na vy Eu rope. Typically, a

mission lasted for several cla ys a nd in vol ved two or more mock

inspections. Al though the stay a t an y one l oca tion was brief, the

mock inspections provided an u ndersta nd ing of how U.S. tea ms

wou ld cond uct a n inspection and how U.S. tea ms wou ld work

with foreign tea ms inspecti ng U.S. forces. In addition, these inspections fa milia rized U .S. i nspectors with the environment of the

Eastern states, wh ich wou ld prepa re them for contingencies tha t

m ight a rise d u ri ng an actua l inspection mission. These missions

a lso tested the efficiency of the logistics system used to prepa re

and tra nsport U.S. tea ms. One grou p tha t d id not benefit from this

series of mock inspections, however, was the U.S. l ia ison personnel , who wou ld not be rea dy to perform u ntil cla ys before the

trea ty entered into force.
S t \ DI M, U1• 1 111 u I f 1 2 1

ROI OF THE LIAISON 0Ft-:ICERS

Du ring treaty negotia tions, U.S. delega tes were satisfied tha t

proposed escort provisions wou ld protect A merica n interests w hen 

Eastern tea ms cond ucted CFE i nspections a t U.S. insta llations. It

wasn 't u ntil la te in negotia tions that the Uni ted States recognized

that there were ma ny U.S. faci lities, equ i pment, a nd person nel

th roughout Western Eu rope tha t were not subject to the trea ty but

were nonetheless v ul nera ble to CFE inspections. These forces were

loca ted on a llied i nsta lla tions or a t separa te locations, not on U.S.

insta lla tions. They were v ul nera ble du ri ng challenge inspections of

specified a reas or inspections of a llied forces. Conseq uently, the

U nited States i nsisted tha t the trea ty conta in a provision req uiring

a lia ison officer's presence duri ng any inspection of a na tion's

forces. OSIA's Europea n Operations Comma nd was not ma n ned to

ca rry out these lia ison du ties. The ma n n ing documen t a llowed for

two lia ison officers; however, their pla n ned d u ties did not incl ude

deployments throughou t Western Eu rope whenever Eastern tea ms

cond ucted CFE inspections.

The first A merica n lia ison officer ( LNO), Ma jor Richa rd J.

O'Shea, USA F, arrived a t OSIA's Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd

in Februa ry 1991. One of O'Shea 's first tasks was to develop a list

of the loca tions of America n forces th roughou t Eu rope. OSIA

LNOs needed to k now exactly wha t U.S. interests could be vul nerable to an Eastern CFE Trea ty inspection team. The list proved

difficu lt to sta rt and impossi ble to complete. No single headq ua rters in Eu rope ma inta ined a list of a ll U.S. forces in Eu rope. Lists

of ma jor u nits-u nits tha t would be reporta ble u nder the treaty as

well as non-CFE u nits-were read il y ava i l a ble from USA FE and

USA REUR. Determi ni ng the wherea bouts of the ma n y sma l l

grou ps of U.S. milita ry people and equ ipmen t, however, proved

extremel y d ifficu lt. With i n a few months, Ma jor O'Shea determined tha t his list encompassed more tha n 1,200 loca tions

th roughout the NATO trea ty area; in Germa ny alone there were

140 U.S. OOVs as well as 741 U.S. facilities tha t were not on U.S.

decla red sites. In add ition, the d rawdown of U.S. forces from

Eu rope ca used movements of people and equ ipmen t, much of

which were not reporta ble u nder the CFE Trea ty. Th is made it

difficu lt to ma inta in a current list.

Two N COs assigned to the Pla ns Section-Technica l Sergea nt

Rona ld S. Fox, USAF, and Staff Sergeant Thomas ]. Brad ley,

USAF-assisted Major O'Shea by designing and building a computer data base nicknamed "Big Hog" to identif y U.S. forces, decla red sites, and POEs throughou t Europe. The numerous locations made the list difficult to compile; the locations of classified

programs made it impossible to complete. The JCS placed responsibility for rhe CFE liaison mission on OSIA; however, OSIA was

nor privy to ongoing classified programs. Consequently, the

Major Richard ]. O'Shea,first U.S.

Liaison Officer.
1 22 0 -SITI I WI < 1 10 Ac.1 < )

"working" l ist tha t Ma jor O'Shea developed provided OSIA lia ison tea ms the most rel ia ble and cu rrent informa tion ava i la ble in

Eu rope. It was clea r, however, tha t U.S. teams could be ca lled to

protect U.S. i nterests, wha tever they might be, a t any place and a t

an y time wit h i n the NATO states.21

Although t he JCS gu i d ance on the OSIA lia ison mission

spelled out wha t was to be accompl ished , ma n power to ca rry out

that m ission was not add ressed. The JCS guidance req u ired tha t a

U.S. l ia ison tea m be ava il a ble to the NATO states' escort tea m

whenever Eastern inspectors a rri ved a t a POE to cond uct CFE

i nspections. Each U.S. lia ison tea m wou ld a rrive ahead of the

inspection team and rema in ava ila ble to the host escort team

th roughou t the Eastern tea m's m ission in case U.S. interests were

involved. By October 199 1 , OSIA Eu ropea n Operations d id not

have sufficient ma n ning to accompl ish the lia ison mission d u ring

basel ine, and Ma jor O'Shea rem a ined the lone LNO assigned.

Colonel Kel ley tu rned to Headq ua rters to press for a solu tion. He

ind ica ted tha t 13 tem pora ry du ty two-person teams wou ld be

req u ired duri ng the 120-day basel ine period. Kelley recom mended

13 tea ms based on the inspection q uota s of the U.S. an d the

N ATO a l l ies, tra vel time to a l l NATO POEs compa red to notification times, a nd the assum ption tha t the Eastern states wou ld conduct a ll i nspections ava ila ble to them in Western Europe. He also

pointed out tha t followi ng the basel ine period , OSIA wou ld req u ire four officers to ca rry out the con tinu ing l ia ison mission;

therefore, th ree ad d itional officers should be assigned per manently. Colonel Kelley emphasized the importance of experience

with life i n Eu rope a nd a proficiency i n a Europea n la nguageGerman, French, Italia n, Spanish, Turkish, Greek, or Portuguese

(in that order)-when selecting officers for lia ison du ty.22

OS/ A inspectors inside bomb bay

of B-52 bomber during mock

START inspection.
The issue of who wou ld su ppl y t he 13 tem pora ry tea ms was

not resolved u ntil the sum mer of 1992. Hea dq ua rters a nd other

OSIA loca tions ha d su fficient person nel to execu te the CFE l ia ison

m ission . However, ma n y of these peopl e were prepa ring to im plement other treaties such as the Stra tegic A rms Red uction Trea t y

( STA RT) a nd the Chem ica l Wea pons Con vention. When the issue

of CFE l ia ison su pport a rose, Headq ua rters person nel poi nted to

the possi bilit y tha t t hese trea ties might enter i n to force si m u l taneously, req u i ri ng a ma xim u m effort from Hea dq ua rters to i m plement these other treaties. Ou tsid e OSIA, a n increasingly sma l l er

USA REU R a lso ba lked a t provid ing tea ms for the 120-da y tempora ry d u ty. I n Februa ry 1992, Ma jor Genera l Robert W. Pa r ker,

USA f Director of OSIA, decided tha t u nless START a nd CFE

entered i n to force sim u l ta neousl y, OSIA wou ld provide t he tem pora ry l ia ison su pport. By J u ne 1992, it beca me appa rent tha t in the

followi ng month the CFE Trea ty wou ld enter into force, a nd it

was eq ua ll y clea r tha t START, stra nded i n the ra ti f ica tion process,

wou ld not enter i n to force. The l ia ison tea ms wou ld come from

OSIA Y

On each tea m, the tem pora ry l ia ison tea m mem bers, one

officer a nd one enlisted, were k nowledg ea ble a nd experienced in

one of the other ar ms control trea ties, bu t not the CFE Trea ty. A ll

wou ld req u ire tra ining on the CFE Trea t y a nd on the speci fic

d u ties a nd responsi bilities of a U.S. LNO. I n add ition to LNOs,

two ad ditiona l tem pora ry tea ms for escort a nd reduction i nspections wou ld recei ve CFE Trea ty tra i n ing a t the sa me ti me. Ma jor

O'Shea recom mended tha t Eu ropea n Opera tions cond uct the

tra i n i na a t Rh ein-Ma in so tha t stud ents wo u ld be free of the d istracti ons of Hea dq ua rters a nd home. Ar R hein-Ma i n the f u t u re

tea m mem bers cou ld focus on thei r u pcomi ng d u ties.

Du ring the cou rse Ma jor O'Shea provided more tha n a third of

the classroom trea ty i nstruction and nea rly a ll the l ia ison-speci fic

i nstruction. Th roughout the cou rse he stressed activities expected to

occu r i n Germa n y. Other trea ty experts ta ught equ ipment famil ia riza tion a nd demonstra ted a n escort mission, whi le represen ta ti ves of

the Germa n and t he British verifica tion agencies provided their

H eadquarters OSIA near

Washington, D. C., was the primar y

source f or liaison of fi cers during

CF'E haseline.

L
124 0 -SI II I '>PIT1 101\ Ac.r-'\()

U.S. CFE LIAISONTEAM DEPLOYMENTS agencies' perspectives on lia ison operations.

Three d ays a fter the CFE Lia ison ( 7-1 1Ju ly) a nd

CFE Trea ty ( 1 3-16 J uly ) courses, hal f the gra duates were i n pl ace th roughou t Eu rope awa iting

Eastern inspection tea ms, wh ile the rest retu rned

to t hei r d u ty sections. M idwa y th rough baseline,

a t the end of 60 days, the two groups wou ld

rotate posi tions.

14

The concenwnion of America n a nd NATO

forces i n Centra l Eu rope dictated tha t the U.S.

l ia ison m ission focus on Germa ny. Conversel y,

the fla n ks or ou tl yi ng a reas, such as Port uga l,

held fa r fewer U.S. or NATO forces, wou l d be

su bject to fewer Eastern i nspections, and therefore wou ld req u i re fewer A merica n LNOs. The

pr i ma ry consid eration i n tea m placemen t was

response time. Six l ia ison rea ms in Germa n y cou ld opera te effecti vel y from R hei n-Ma in to meet i nspection tea ms i n Germa n y,

Belgi u m, Norwa y, Den ma r k, the Net herla nds, a nd Greece. Commercia l a irl ine sched u les were not ti mel y enough, and mil ita ry

a i rl i ft was too l i m i ted to su pport LNO missions tha t cou ld be

u npred icta bl e a nd possi bl y freq uent i n the Un ited Kingd om, Turkey, Spa i n, or Portu ga l. To satisf y the U.S government pol icy to

ha ve a l ia ison tea m a va ila ble for each Eastern inspection team,

two teams deployed to the United K i ngd om while two teams traveled to Turkey, and one team deployed to Spa in to stand by to

ca rry ou t l ia ison opera tions. The single team i n Mad rid was a lso

prepa red to respond to a n Eastern tea m i n Port uga l.

Lu xembourg, Icela nd , and Fra nce were exceptions for U.S.

lia ison opera tions. There were no U.S. forces in France, only six

M47 ta n ks. In the u nli kel y even t of a n inspection of those ta n ks,

the U.S. wou ld forgo its rig h t to be presen t a t the inspection. Luxem bourg and Icela n d ha d no OOVs of t hei r own, but there were

U.S. OOVs a nd d ecla red sites loca ted on t hei r territor y. When a n

Eastern state annou nced its i n tent to inspect in one of these nations, a n enti re U.S. escort tea m wou ld depl oy beca use the i nspection had to be on a U.S. d ecla red site.

25

fJNALPREPARATIO S

Duri ng the 30 days prior to the CFE Treaty's entry into force,

Col onel Kel ley provided the inspection tea ms one last opport u n ity

to shore u p a ny wea k spots i n thei r read i ness to cond uct thei r

m issions. He d i rected the su pport bra nches to provid e the inspection d ivision wit h briefings a nd refresher tra i n i ng progra ms on

specif ic topics he felt wou ld be cri tica l to a successf u l baseli ne

ef fort. The Logisti cs Div ision revi ewed and refi ned "bagma n "
S I\ '\DI c; UP IHI U 1 1 1 25

proced u res, veh icle opera tions, suppl y, and procu ring a ir tra nsporta tion u nder severa l d i fferent scena rios. Pla ns and Analysis briefed

inspection tea ms on ta rget folders, specia l data bases, and other

areas of direct assista nce. The Pla ns Bra nch a lso rem inded inspectors of their responsi bi lity to provide accu ra te informa tion needed

to develop trea ty noti fication messages. The Operations Bra nch

provided tra ini ng on i ts capa bilities for assisting tea ms through

comm u nica tions and current information on different cou ntries.

Other briefings and tra ining dea lt with tea m eq ui pment, photograph y, TLE identifica tion, emergency med ica l training, and prepa ration of CFE Trea ty reports. 26

Trans ortation

Tra nsporta tion was critica l for successfu l i mplementation of

the treaty. Inspection tea ms traveled h u nd reds or even thousa nds

of m iles to arrive a t d ista nt points of entry ( POEs) a t the notified

time. Lia ison and escort tea ms had to react wi th m i nima l notice to

the a rri va l of Eastern inspection tea ms a t NATO states. The escort

tea ms had to tra nsport u p to 10 people, incl ud ing a bagma n.

Escort and l ia ison tea ms needed flexible and timely tra nsporta tion

to meet the limited noti fications allowed in decla red site or cha llenge inspections. Trains and commercia l pl anes in the region were

excellen t, but they ran only on fixed schedu les and did n't go directl y to the inspection sites or all POEs. Beca use a utomobiles

cou ld satisf y mission req u iremen ts for 90 percent of the U.S.

OOVs, escort and liaison tea ms in Germa n y and the nea rby

Benel ux cou ntries relied on mi n iva ns. Va ns a llowed tea ms to leave

a t a ny time and to go directl y to the i nspection site or POE. Du ring baseli ne, each escort tea m was assigned two mi ni va ns to tra nsport a ll tea m mem bers and their gea r. The two-person LNO tea ms

deployed by station wagon. The motor pool at Rhei n-Ma in could

not support OSIA with a fleet of 15 mi n i va ns and 7 station wagons, so OSIA leased them from two local compa nies. Lia ison

tea ms pre-positioned outside Germa ny nor mally used renta l cars

in their missions. Motor vehicles, however, cou ld not satisf y a ll of

OSIA's mission req u irements.27

To cond uct CFE inspections in the Eastern states, U.S. tea ms

wou ld deploy to na tiona l entry points as fa r awa y as Moscow.

America n escort teams would also respond, on short notice, to

areas across Western Eu rope from the United Kingdom to Turkey.

Airlift was the onl y wa y to implement the treaty in those circu mstances. In early pla nning Ma jor Steven E. Pestana, USAF, of the

Mission Coordina tion Bra nch, studied the possi bil ity of using

C-20 class a ircra ft. These sma ll business jets were perha ps the best

su ited for the mission, although there was concern that a ll the

inspectors and thei r belongi ngs cou ld exceed weight l imits of the

a ircra ft. With the Gu lf Wa r and the dra wdown of American forces

i n Europe, however, the C-20s were no longer an option. There

M inivans and station wagons were

prin-wr y transportation for escort

and liaison teams.
I26 0 -S111 I w1 c 110 Ac.1 c '

A C- 141 from the 437th M AC pre pared to depart Rhein-M ain Air Base, Germany, on an OSI A mission.

were not enough su ita ble U.S. a ircra ft in Eu rope to su pport the

FE mission. I n Ja n ua ry 1990, the d irector of opera tions at Headqua rters USAFE annou nced tha t the Mil ita ry Airl ift Comma nd

( M AC) wou ld p rovide C-141, C-130, or C-5 a irl ift for the CFE

mission, based on pa ssenger or l oad req u iremen ts. In ad d ition,

USA FE wou ld provi de C-130 a i rcra ft to support the CFE m ission.

The 435t h Tactical Airlift Wing at Rhei n-Mai n, a USAFE u ni t,''·

and the 437th a nd 438t h Mil ita ry Airl ift Wi ngs from Cha rleston

AFB, South Ca rol i na , and McG u ire A FB, l ew Jersey, both MAC

wings, wou l d provide a i rl ift support to OSIA t ams.

The 435th crews flew C-l30s on inspection missions i n to

Eastern Eu rope, and a lso were task ed to su pport CFE escort missions ou tside Centra l Eu rope. To perform tha t mission, which

cou ld be on short notice for escort operations, the 435t h kept two

crews and one C-130 on a lert. Mea nwhi le, crews of the 437th and

438th flew C- 1 4ls on i nspection missions into t he former Soviet

U n ion. The MAC wi ngs a lterna ted support wi th two C-141s tha t

were pre-posi tioned a t Rhei n-Ma i n. Wil bur Lewis, Jr., of OSIA's

Milita ry Airl ift Coord ina tion Bra nch, a rra nged for the C:-141

'During the same time OSIA was preparing for CFE Treaty implementation , the U.S.Air

Force underwent a reorganization. As a part of this reorganization, control of Rhein-Main

Air Base and its host unit, the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, passed from MAC to USAFE.

Previously, while USAFE played a major role in scheduling the 435th's C-130 theater

airlift forces, it did not actually own the unit.The reorganization also resulted in many

redesignations, both to field units and major commands. On 1 June 1992, MAC inactivated

and was replaced by the Air Mobility Command (AMC). In addition, both Military Airlift

Wings and Tactical Airlift Wings were redesignated simply as Airlift Wings.
Sr \, 01;..;c.· U1• 1 1 11 U. 1 1 1 2-

su pport from OSIA Headq ua rters. The Plans Bra nch a t Eu ropea n

Opera tions ( EO) coord ina ted C-130 missions a t Rhei n-Ma i n.

One of the elemen ts of coord ina ting a irl ift su pport was tracking vita l informa tion on all aircrew mem bers.28 The protocol on

inspection req u ired that each signa tor y provide a list to a ll other

trea ty na tions of a ircrew mem bers ( 600 maxi mu m ) and inspectors

( 400 ma xim u m ) designa ted to support or pa rtici pate in CFE i nspections. The list i ncl uded na mes, gender, date and pl ace of birth,

a nd passport nu m ber. The long, deta iled U.S. list was compiled by

OSIA's Trea ty List Ma nagement Bra nch. Once the list was compi led , OSIA t u rned it over to the U.S. State Depa rtment for d issemination to other na tions a t Vien na. The i nspection protocol

req u ired each state to provide this list to a ll other signa tories

with in 90 da ys after trea ty signa tu re. The next opport u nity to

u pda te lists came within 30 da ys of trea ty implementa tion. In

addition, the treaty a l lowed a nation recei ving the list u p to 30

days to review it and req uest that the origi na ti ng state delete certa in na mes from the list; there was no right of refusa l to delete

na mes. Beca use of the long period between signa ture and entry

into force, the U.S. list was outda ted a t entry into force. Some

people were no longer ava ila ble for d uty bu t were still on the list,

a nd others who a rri ved a fter the origi na l l ist was subm i tted were

ava i l a ble for d u ty bu t not listed. Th is situa tion wou ld a ffect

OSIA's ea rl y basel ine operations.29

Communications

Comm u n ica tions u nder the INF Trea ty had been rela tively

sim pl e. The N uclea r Risk Red uction Center (N R RC) a t the U.S.

State Depa rtment passed in forma tion d irectl y to the Soviet

N uclea r Risk Red uction Center in Moscow. A single cond uit

passed a ll req uired data. U nder the CFE Trea ty, a new system, the

CSCE (Con ference on Security a nd Coopera tion in Europe) commu n ica tions networ k, was only pa rtially fu nctiona l when the

trea ty's ba seline i nspection phase sta rted in J u ly 1992.

The CSCE members had an ticipa ted a commu nica tions network link ing 35 CSCE capi ta ls and three CSCE institu tions 24

hou rs a day. The system, designed to support the Vien na Document, was lin ked by a centra l switchi ng center at The Hague.

Un fortu natel y, when the system was designed , the Soviet Un ion

req u ired only one termina l, in Moscow. With the brea k u p of the

USSR, however, a gla ring wea k ness in the CSCE commu nica tions

system surfaced. No na tion in the former Soviet Union, except

Russia , had the ha rd wa re to connect to the system. Ha rdwa re was

expensive, a nd newl y emerging nations opted to appl y their l i mited resou rces to other pressi ng matters. As a resu lt, du ring CFE

baseline the U.S. N RRC tra nsmi tted CFE messages to only those

na tions tha t were opera ting on the CSCE network.
128 0 -S1 1 F I ·w1c 1 10 Ac.i: c '

The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the Department of

State sent and received treaty messages.

To reach those nations that were not yet

on the network, and as a back u p in case of a

system failure, the State Depa rtment also sent

CFE notif ication messages through diploma tic chan nels. Diplomatic channels sometimes enta i l ed ha nd-ca rried messages from

the U.S. Embassy to the appropriate officia ls

i n tha t state. Acknowledgment of recei pt and

acceptance of an inspection required additiona l ha nd-ca rried notes from state agencies 

to the U.S. Embassy. This added a burden to

some embassy staffs that were alread y extremely busy a nd, as was discovered d uring

mock inspections, were sometimes u nawa re

of notifica tion req uirements of the CFE

Trea ty. Mea nwhile, the Pla ns Bra nch and

Operations at EO had opened an i n forma l "back door" commu nications network tha t eclipsed the forma l system du ring the ea rly

stages of baseli ne.

This informa l commu nications system was based on the

excellent working rela tionshi ps of staff with their cou nterpa rts in

verification agencies th roughou t Eu rope. This i n forma l system

developed with the initia l outreach for mock inspections and grew

day to day as the agencies-pa rticu larly the Germa n, French,

British, a nd U.S. agencies-repeated ly looked to each other for

relia ble a nd timely infor mation. This informal network would

prove va l ua ble du ri ng baseline, when the forma l notification system occasiona lly fai led . Fortu nately, the informa l communication

system provided a safety net, and frequen tly OSIA liaison tea ms

had to prepa re or deploy based on i n formation from this networ k.

As basel ine d rew nea r, the teams were tra ined and eager,

equ ipment was in place, tra nsporta tion stood read y, and severa l

comm u nications systems were opera ti ng.

30

Orf

1. Interview with Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USA F, Team Ch ief, OSIA, by

Joseph P. Ha ra han, Historia n, OSIA, Rhein-Ma in Air Base, Germa n y, Ju ly

12, 1993; Di r ector of Resou rce Ma nagement, Ma n power Office, Report on

"On-Site Inspection Agency Ma n n ing Docu ment," October 8, 1992.

2. I nterview, Gessert; Interview with Lt. Colon el Thomas C. Fiser, USA, Tea m

Ch ief, OSI A, by J oseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historia n, OSIA, R hei n-Ma i n Ai r

Base, Germa ny, J u l y 12, 1993; Interview wit h Colonel Lawrence G. Kel ley,

USMC, Ch ief, Opera tions Division, Eu ropea n Operations Comma nd,

OSIA, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historia n , OSIA, Wa sh ington, D.C., Ma y 18,

1994.

3. Colonel Lawrence G. K el ley, "Briefing Pa pers for Sena te Com mittee on

Intel l igence Hea rings," Septem ber 4 , l 991; Di rectora te for Operations,
s \ 1)1 (, UI' 1 111 u I J ( _l)

Tra i n i ng Bra nch, OSIA, "Syl l a bus of A rms ,ontrol Tra i n i ng Conventiona l

Forces i n Eu rope Trea ty: I nspector/Escort Course," Fe b rua ry 4-14, l 991 .

4. I nterview, Kel ley; Interv iew with 1\!laster Sergea n t George A. Pa rtridge,

USA, \Xfea pons Specia l ist, Eu ropea n Ope ra tions Comma nd, OSIA, by

Joseph I'. Ha ra ha n, Histori a n, OSIA, Rhei n-Ma i n Ai r Base, Germa ny, J u l y 

13, 1993; I nterv iew wit h Ch ief Wa rra nt Off ice r 4 Michael R. Lu kes, USA,

Deputy Team Ch ief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Histori a n, OSIA, Rhei nMa i n A i r Base, Germa n y, J u l y 12, 1 993.

5 . Colonel La wrence G. Kelley, "Brief ing Pa pers for Sena te Comm i ttee on

Intell igence Hea ri ngs," Septem ber 4, 199 1 ; Opera tions Division, Tra i n i ng

Bra nch, Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd, OSI A, "Listing of Eq u ipment

klenti fica tion Tra i n i ng Levels a nd Associa ted Eq ui pment," Ju l y 19, 1993;

Lt. Colonel Dona ld Snedeker, Opera tions Division, Inspection/Escort

Bra nch, Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd, OSIA, "Memora nd u m on Level

III Con ventiona l Arms a nd Eq u i pment," i\!la y 22, 1 992; Interview, Kelley.

6. I nte rv iew, Gessert; I nterv iew, Kel ley.

7. Colonel La wrence G. Kelley, "Brief i ng Pa pers for Sen a te Com m ittee on

Intelligence Hea ri ngs," Septembe r 4, 199 l; Inte rv iew with Sergea nts Fi rst

Class Ga ry E. Ka rstens and Ken neth D. Peri ma n, USA, OSIA l i ngu ists, by

J oseph I'. Ha ra h a n, H istoria n, OSIA, R hei n-Ma i n Ai r Base, Germa n y,

Decem ber 1 7, 1993; Ma jor Genera l Robert \XI. Pa r ker, USA F, Di rector,

OSIA, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, I nternational

Sernrit y and Science of the Committee on Foreign Af fairs, H ouse of

Representatives, 1\!la y 1 2, 1992.

8. Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, On-Site I nspections Under the I N F Treaty ( Washi ngton, D.C.: Govern ment Pri nti ng Office, 1993) , pp. 27-30.

9. .I n te rview with Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drac h, .Jr., USA, Tea m Ch ief, OSJ A, by

Joseph P. Ha ra ha n , Histori a n, ()SIA, R hei n-Ma i n Ai r Base, Germa n y,

Decem ber 1 7, 1993.

10. Interv iew, Kel ley.

1 1. Interv iew, Kelley; I nterview w i th Master Sergea nt Wi ll ia m N. Chesney, .Jr.,

USA, Pl a ns NCO, ()SI A, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historia n, OSIA, R hei n -

Ma i n A i r Base, Germa n y, .J u l y 12, "1 993; OSIA Eu ropea n Opera tions

Com ma nd, "Report on Bi-Week l y Acti v i ties, Ma y 15-31, 1 992," J u ne 5 ,

1992; Lt. Colonel Dona l d C. Snedek er, USA, Bra nch Ch ief, Inspector/

Escort Bra nc h, Europea n Operations Com m,rnd, "Memora nd u m on DO F

( l&E) Outli ne !'Jans for Ja n-Feb," .Jan ua ry 6, 1992; Pla ns/Lia ison Bra nch,

Eu ropea n Opera ti ons ,omma n d, "Ta l kjng Pa per on Pl a n ni ng, Prepa ra tion,

a nd Cond uct of Tria l ( Mock ) I nspections," Ja n u a ry 1992; Ca pta i n Da vid

Ca rter, USAF, Pla n ner, Pl a ns/Li a ison Bra nch, Eu ropea n Opera tions

Com ma nd, "Ta l k ing Pa per on Excess Opera ti ons Pla n n i ng Person nel <1t

OSIA-Eu rope," .J an ua ry 1 6, 1992.

12. Col onel Frederick E. Grosick, USA F- Director, Field Off ice Eu rope,

" ivlemora nd u m on CFE Mock I nspections ," J u ne 4, 1991; Lt. Colonel

Da v i d P. Gesse rt, "A fter Action Report on French Mock I nspection," J u ne 

3 , 1991; Pla ns Bra nch, Field Off ice Eu rope, "Pla n n i ng Order for Frenc h

Moc k Inspection," Ma y 199'1 ; I nterview, Gessert.

1 3. I nterview, Kelley; I nterv iew wit h Lt. Colonel Ja n S. Ka rcz, USA, Tea m

Ch ief, OSI A, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Histori a n, OSI A, R hei n-Ma i n Ai r

Base, Germa n y, Decem ber 13, 1993; Lt. Col onel Ja n S. Ka rcz, "After

Action Report on Mock Inspection C-91-Iv10C-27A (Sem bach A i r Base),"

Novem be r 15, ] 991; Pla ns/Li a ison Bra nch, Eu ropea n Ope ra tions

Com ma nd, "Report from I nspection Da ta Base," Novem ber 1 1 , '1 992.
14. I ntervi ew, Kelley; Major Elmer G. Wh ite, USA, Team Ch ief, "After Action

Report of Escort of Czechoslov<1k Mock I n spection s, October 8-9, l 991,"

Novem ber 8, ·1991; Lr. Col onel J.D. Peste rf iel d, USA F, Ch ief , Opera tions

Bra nch, Pla ns, Req u i rem en ts, a nd Sched u les Div ision, Opera tions

Directora te, OS!A, "Trip Report on Vien n a .J ,G Meeti ng, Decem ber 9-13,

1 991," Decem ber 2.3, 1991.

1 5. Lr. Colonel Joh n D. Pesterf ield , USA F, "Sta ff Coord i n a tion Sheet on U .S.-

Soviet Mock, " Decem ber 24, 1 99 1 ; I n terv iew, Kel ley; :olonel La w rence G.

Kel l ey, "After Action Report on U.S.-USSR CFE Mock I n spection Pl a n n i ng

Conference," Decem ber 20, 199 1 .

16. I nterview, Kel ley.

1 7. Pla ns/Lia ison Bra nch , Eu ropea n Operations Com m a nd, "Pla n n i ng Ord er

for M issi on C:92-MOC:-029A," Ja n ua ry 23, 1992; U .S. Depa rtment of

State, "Message on CFE Mock I n spections i n R ussia a nd Germa n y,"

Ja n u a r y 11, 1992; Ma jor Kei th A . Oatma n, USA, "What a wa y to sta rt the

new yea r!" On-Site Insights, Ma rch 1992, p. 1 I .

1 8. Lt. Colonel Stephen L. H a r ris, USA F, Deputy Ch ief, Im plementation

Req u iremen ts Off ice, OSI A, "After Action Report on U.S.-R ussi a n Mock

CFE Inspections," Ma rch 9, 1992; Colonel Mi chael S. Bra ke, USA F Vice

Com ma nder, .52nd Tactica l Fighter Wi ng, "Con ventiona l A r med Forces i n

Eu rope Crosstel l," Februa ry 7, 1 992.

19. Joi nt Sta ff Message, "Response to HQ USEUCOM Rt:q uest for Gu ida nce,"

A pri l 22, 1992.

20. Lt. Colonel Stephen L.. Ha rris, "A fter Acti on R eport on U.S.-R ussia n Mock

CFE Inspection s," Ma rch 9, 1 992; CFE I n spection Reports, ''Si versk i y,

R u ssi a," Februa ry 1 I , 1992, a nd "Pushkin, Ru ssia ," Februa ry 13, 1 992;

Opera tion s Di vision, Eu ropea n Ope rations ,omma nd, "Talk ing Pa pe rsDecl a red Site Diagra m a n d Photogra ph y, Bl ue on Red Practice I ns pection ,

Fe b ru a ry I 0-14, 1 992," Ma rch 1 .3, 1 992.

21. Intervi ew wit h Ma jor R icha rd J. O'Shea, USAF, Lia ison Off icer, Eu ropea n

Opera tions ,omma nd, OSI A, by J oseph P. Ha ra ha n , Historia n, OSI A,

Rhei n-Ma i n A ir Base , Germa n y, J ul y 1 2, 1993; Interv iew, Kel l ey; Interview,

Chesney.

22. Interv iew, Kel l ey; Steve Sch lei n, Pl a n ner, Im plementa tion Req u irements

Off ice, OSI A, Proposa l for J ,S a pproval on "Concept of Operations: CFE

Liaison Off icer Duties," Novem ber 25, 199 1 ; ,olonel Law rence G. K elley,

"Memora nd u m on ,FF Lia ison Off icer Req u i remen t," October 21, '1991 .

23. Colon el Frederic k E. G rosick, USA F, Di rector, Pl a ns, Opera tions, a nd

Tra i n i ng, OSI A, "Memora nd u m on CFE Li a ison Office r a nd Escort

Red ucti on Tea ms, " Ma y 1992; Ma jor Richa rd J. O'Shea, USA F Lia ison

Officer Eu ropea n Operations Comma nd, OSIA, "Memora nd um on

Lia ison Officer Tra i n i ng,'' Februa ry 1 2, l992.

24. Ma jor R icha rd .J. O'Shea, "Memora nd u m on Lia ison Off icer Tra i n i n g,"

Februa ry 12, 1 992; I nterv iew, O'Shea; "Syl l a bus for OSI A Li a ison Off icers

Cou rse," .J u l y 7-11, 1 992; Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd , "Lia ison

Off icers' Deployment Sched u le," J u l y 10, 1992.

25. Ma jor R icha rd J. O'Shea, "Memora nd u m on Lia ison Off ice r Tra i nin g,"

Februa ry 12, 1 992; I n terv iew, O'Shea; U.S. FE Treat y Excha nged Data as

of J u l y 17, 1992.

26. I nterview, Kel ley; Operati ons Di v ision, Eu ropea n Operations Com m;rnd,

"Brief i ng on Mi lestones for Entry I nto Force of the CFE Treaty," Ma y

1992.
<, lJp THI IT I 'I

27. I n terv iew, Kel ley; Ve h icle Oper;itions Secti on, Eu ropea n Opera tions

Com ma nd, "Inspector/Escort Ve h icl e Sta t us Log," .J u l y 1 992.

28. ivla jor Steven E. Pesta n a, USA F, Ch ief, M ission Coord i n a tion Bra nch,

Logistics Di v ision, Fiel d Off ice Eu rope, OSI A, "Ta l k i n g Pa pe r on Airli ft for

C:FE I n spector/Escort Tea ms," A ugust 1 9, 1 99 1 ; Headq u a rters USA F

tvlcssage on "OSI A A i rl i ft Su pport," Ja n ua ry 27, 1 992.

29. I n terview, Fise r; Trea ty Li st Ma nagement !)ranch, Pla ns, Operations, a nd

Tra i n i ng Di rectorate, OSIA, "Trea ties I n spector/A i rcrew List," Ma rch I ,

1993.

.iO. Pierce S. Cordcn, M u l til a te ra l A ffa i rs Burea u, U.S. Arms Control and

Disarma ment Age ncy, Memora nd u m on "The CSCE Com m u n ica tions

Networ k a n d CFE lm plemenra rion," A pril I 5, 1 992; Steve Sch lei n,

Pla n ner, lntcra gen cy Af fa i rs Off ice, OSIA, "T1lk i ng Pa pe r on Su pport a nd

l n forni;ition Needed for CFE I m ple men tation ," J u ne 30, 1 992; .Jen n i fer

La u rendea u , Off ice of Eu ropea n Secu ri ty a nd Pol itica l Af fa i rs, Bu rea u of

Eu ropea n a nd Ca n ad ia n A ffa i rs, U.S. Depa rtmen t of Stare, "Memora nd u m

011 How to Ma nage CFE oti fica rions a r Home a nJ A broad," .J u l y l3,

1 992; Interv iew, h esney.

l \ 1>1

Chapter 5

Defense ministers of the N orth Atlantic Cooperation Council meet at NATO headquarters.

ha t was the status of the other CFE Trea ty states as they

prepa red to implement the trea ty ? On the first day of

the treat y's entry into force, every state had to be read y

to ca rry out its trea ty obligations a nd rights. Obliga tions mea nt 

tha t states had to be prepa red to display and accou nt for their

trea ty-limited equi pment (TLE); read y to send and recei ve trea tyreq u ired commu nica tions rega rd i ng force d ata, red uction activities, and notifications of a ll inspections; and read y to recei ve i nspection tea ms, tra nsport them to the decla red sites, host a nd

escort them on-site, a nd ret u rn them to the poi nt of entry (POE)

after completion of the i nspection. Trea ty rights focused on the

selection, prepa ra tion, a nd tra in ing of inspection tea ms tha t wou l d

monitor the different phases of the treaty. They also included the

opport u nit y to send na tiona l delegates to serve on the Joint Consultative Grou p (JCG ), which was responsible for faci lita ting the

treaty's i mplementation. A survey of the 29 CFE Trea ty states on
The Russian N R R C-the largest,

most experi enced verification

agency in the Eastern states.

I

I

the eve of the trea ty's entry into force on Ju ly 1 7, 1992, revea led

a wide degree of prepa red ness, as one might expect from a wide

array of nations-large and small, stable and u nsta ble, and spread

over a continent.

With i n NATO, four na tions-the U n ited States, Germa n y,

Fra nce, a nd Grea t Bri ta i n-had esta blished new agencies or expa nded existi ng on-site i nspection organiza tions in 1990-91.

Other NATO na tions, such as Belgi u m, Ita l y, and the Netherla nds,

set u p sma ll a rms con trol verification staffs i n their ministries of

defense or on their genera l staffs. Genera lly, na tions with la rger

mil i ta r y forces set up sepa ra te agencies to implement the trea ty,

whi le smal l er na tions opted for mi l ita ry sta ff offices to satisf y CFE

req u iremen ts.

With i n the Eastern grou p of states, the Soviet Union/R ussia

had the la rgest a nd most experienced inspection agency. Esta blished i n 1987 to im pl emen t the Intermed ia te-Ra nge N uclea r

Forces ( INF) Trea t y, the Soviet U n ion's inspectora te, the N uclea r

Risk Red uction Center (N RRC), beca me the new Russia n na tion's

inspection agency l a te in 1991. To impleme nt the INF Trea ty, the

Soviet Union 's N RRC had esta blis hed trea ty support orga n iza tions

i n the Soviet mil i ta ry districts. From 1988 to 1991, when a l l INF

trea ty items had been elimina ted, these support elements ga ined

inva lua bl e experience work ing with inspection regi mes, red uction

protocols, notifica tion req u i rements, and timelines. Conseq uently,

when Bela rus and Uk ra i ne set u p their CFE Trea ty verifica tion

agencies in 1992, they had a cad re of people experienced in im plementing a rms control treaties. Six months after the colla pse of the

Soviet Union, eigh t of the newl y i ndependent states beca me pa rties

to the CFE Trea ty in J u ne 1992 a t the Conference on Security a nd

Coopera tion in Eu rope (CSCE) sum mit in Oslo. They were Russia ,

Bela rus, Uk ra ine, Georgia, Moldova , Armenia, Azer ba ija n, and
Kaza ksta n . Of these states, only Russia, Bela rus, and Uk ra ine

possessed a professional cad re of inspectors, escorts, red uction

facilities, and insti tu tiona l rel ationshi ps with na tiona l mi l ita ry

forces. The other states, Georgia, Mold ova, A rmenia, Azerba ija n,

and Kaza ksta n, had little or no d irect treaty experience. Ma ny of

these new na tions were ca ught u p in interna l a nd externa l wa rs

a nd had little time or i nterest in any trea ty that wou ld red uce

conventiona l arma men ts.

As with agencies of the NATO nations, the size and structu re

of the Eastern European na tions' i nspectora tes va ried considerably. Pola nd , Hu nga ry, Czechoslova k ia, Bu lga ria, and Roma nia

establ ished CFE Trea ty veri fica tion agencies either before trea ty

signa tu re in Novem ber 1990, or shortly therea fter i n ea rly 1991.

In 1991, Pola nd esta blished a sepa ra te verification agency with an

a ut horized force of 85 milita ry officers and civilia ns, and placed

the new orga niza tion in the Min istry of Na tiona l Def ense. Hunga ry, by contrast, set u p a small a rms control section wi th in its

na tional a rmed forces in 1990.

CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEAN AND RUSSIA

CFE TREATY INSPECTION TEAMS

When Germa n y esta blished its Federa l Armed Forces Verification Center, the Zentru m fiir Veri fik ationsa ufga ben der

Bu ndeswehr (ZVBW), in October 1990, it had an a u thori zed sta ff

German team chief signing reduction insp ection report in Slovak ia.
German offi cers of the ZVB W training to impl ement the Open Sk ies Treaty.

of 65 inspectors, commu nicators, trainers, logisticians, and administra tors.' For its init i a l odre of CFE Trea ty inspectors, the new

German center drew upon a sma ll grou p of military officers who

h ad been cond ucti ng inspections of la rge-sca le mil ita r y exercises of

the CSCE states u nder the Stock h olm Docu men t of 1986. A few of

these experienced off icers became CFE inspection tea m lead ers.

For the other CFE team leaders, the Germa n Bu ndesweh r requested volu nteers. Ma ny officers appl ied, and by Decem ber 1989,

some 11 mon ths before t he CFE Treaty was signed , a ll the Germa n

CFE team leaders had been selected and en rol led in an intensive

Russia n langua ge course. Colonel Joern Stein berg recalls that he

a nd the other Germa n tea m leaders stud ied for n ine mont hs at the

na tiona l language school at Hu rth, Germa ny.2 All Germa n tea m

leaders were professiona l m i l ita ry office rs, 40 to 50 yea rs old , with

15 to 25 yea rs of service in the German a rmy, air force, or na vy.

The Germa n verifica tion cen ter opened in October 1990 at

Geilen kirchen and immed ia tely bega n the process of organizing

inspection tea ms. Each tea m tra ined as a u nit, concentra ting on

lea rning the trea ty as well as the current milita ry force struct ure

and the TLE of a single signa tory sta te or rou p of states. German

CFE Treaty inspection tea ms were led by colonels, with lieutena nt

colonels serving as depu ti es and ca pta ins, lieu tena nts, and noncom missioned officers ( NCOs) as inspectors. [n 1991 a nd 1992,

the Germa n verifica tion center grew rapid ly, acq u iring new missions u nder the Open Sk ies Trea ty a nd the Vi en na Docu ments of

1990 and 1992. By Ju ly 1992, the center h ad 400 perso nnel on

boa rd . A considera ble pa rt of th is growth reflected the incorpora-
F1 \I PRl l'\ll\ 1 1() 'I: ATO \ I) \VTO N\ T IO " I)7

tion of the former Germa n Democra tic Repu bl ic's (GDR ) trea ty

veri fica tion u nit.1

Followi ng Germa n u ni fication i n October 1990, the Germa n

federa l a rmed forces incorpora ted the GDR's a rmy a nd a ir force

personnel and eq uipment. A pproxima tely six months l ater, i n

Ma rch 1991, the GDR 's veri fica tion agency became a bra nch

office of the Germa n Federa l Armed Forces Verif ication Center.

It had 140 officers, NCOs, and civil ia ns and was loca ted a t

Stra usberg, 30 k il ometers east of Berlin . Ma ny of the Stra usberg

personnel had d irect experience with the INF Trea ty. Now, i n

1991 and 1992, their mission would be to supervise the CFE

Trea ty red uction centers loca ted in eastern Germa ny a nd to escort

inspection tea ms from the Eastern grou p of states.4

One interesti ng aspect of Germa n u n ifica tion was the large

qu antity of former GDR a rm y and a ir force wea pons and equ ipment a va ilable for incorpora tion i n to the federa l armed forces.

Shortly after u nifica tion, the Germa n minister of defense decided

that most of the former GDR m ilita ry eq u i pment was not suited

for the federa l a rmy a nd a ir force. Since the mid-1950s, West

Germa ny's mil ita ry forces had been eq u ipped with wea pons and

mu nitions tha t met NATO sta nda rds. Most, if not a ll, of the GDR

a rmy and a ir force equ i pment had been designed and prod uced for

use with the Soviet armed forces. Opera tiona lly incompa ti ble, it

was surpl us eq u ipment and wou ld be el imina ted . Since ma ny of

the former GDR 's offensi ve wea pons fell u nder the provisions of

the CFE Treaty, Germa ny wou ld have to destroy them duri ng the

treaty's red uction period . Before the CFE Trea ty entered into force,

however, Germa ny's CFE Treaty inspection tea ms used th is former

GDR equipment as an opportu nity to study firstha nd Soviet army

TLE and "look-alike" equi pment. For the new Germa n verification

center, this was both an unexpected and importa nt opportu n ity.5

The French CFE inspection tea ms were led by professiona l

milita ry officers, usua lly lieu tena nt colonels, 38 to 45 yea rs old ,

with service on comma nd headq ua rters sta ff or on the French

Genera l Sta ff. In Februa ry 1994, Colonel Fra rn;:ois Rozec, Comma nda nt of L'Unite Fra rn;a ise de Verifica tion, expla i ned tha t th ree 

areas were im porta nt i n selecting inspection tea m leaders: professiona l skill, l ingu istic abi lity, and ma tu rity. "As far as ma tu rity is

concerned ," Colonel Rozec sa id , "We consider it to be psychologica l eq u i libri u m, judgment, and ease of commu nication." "

The French agency was formed in September 1990 to ca rry

out French "verif ica tion and hosti ng" responsi bi l ities u nder the

CFE Trea ty a nd the Vien na Docu men t 1990. Located a pproxima tely 70 k ilometers north of Pa ris, on French Air Station 110 a t

Creil, Fra nce, the u nit was subord inate to the A rms Control Division of the French Genera l Sta ff i n Pa ris. For its person nel, the

new trea ty verification u nit d rew u pon specia l ists from the French

Colonel Fran r;ois Rozec,

Commandant, L' Unite Franr;aise de

verification.
138 0 ·-511 1 },'WI( 1 10 A<;1 ( ) 

army, air force, and na vy. Under the CFE Trea ty, Fra nce decla red

1,355 ta n ks, 1,392 a rti llery pieces, 4,154 a rmored comba t vehicles, 376 hel icopters, and 688 fighter a ircra ft. As a state pa rty,

Fra nce decla red 168 sites and 211 objects of veri fication. Brigad ier

Genera l Jea n-Pa u l Huet served as the first Comma nd a nt; in April

1992, Colonel Rozec assu med com ma nd.7

From the begi n ning, the French inspectora te devel oped "organic teams," each with a dedicated team leader, deputy, linguists,

and inspectors. Their approach to prepa ring for an inspection

m ission was sim i lar to the Germa n inspection tea ms'-stud ying a

specific na tion's TLE hold i ngs, current force structure, a nd orga n iza tiona l l ines. For pa rt of their time, each French inspection tea m

wor ked d irectl y with French army and a ir force u nits and installa -

tions subject to CFE Trea ty i nspections, provid ing tra ining on the

trea ty, inspection protocols, and red uction proced ures.8

Grea t Brita i n had experience with on-site inspections u nder

the Stockholm Docu ment of 1986 and with the British Mi lita ry

Lia ison Mission in Berl in from 1947 to 1991. Its officers were

professiona l, knowledgea ble, a nd at the forefront in ana lysis and

eva luations. In A ugust 1990, the British Ministry of Defense selected Colonel Roy Giles, RA F, to lead the Joi nt Arms Control

Implementation Grou p (JACIG ). Loca ted at RA F Scampton, the

new four-service grou p drew person nel from the Roya l Na vy,

Ma ri nes, A rmy, and A ir Force. It had an assigned strength of 120

officers, NCOs, and civil ia ns. From the begi n ning, Colonel Giles

d irected tha t the British grou p wou ld use fu ll-time inspection and

escort tea ms. Most of the initia l cad re of inspectors had served i n

Berl in with the British Mil ita ry Lia ison Mission or had wor ked as

i nterpreters in the Berli n Corridor. They were ver y k nowledgea ble

on the Soviet Union, its a rmed forces, and its milita ry eq u i pment.

Colonel Giles encouraged vol u nteers, especia ll y officers and NCOs

with Russia n language skills.9

The Belgia n concept of opera tions called for the esta bl ishment of a sma ll professiona l verifica tion sta ff attached to the

Ministr y of Defense i n Brussels. Th is sta ff would organize, tra in,

and lead the Belgia n CFE Trea ty i nspection and escort tea ms,

which were com posed of inspectors dra wn from the ranks of the

milita ry services. Ea rly in 1990 the General Sta ff selected two

grou ps of five mid level officers, all lieu tena nt colonels, and enrolled them in an i ntensive Russia n language course. 10 Accordi ng

to Lt. Colonel Fred Janssen, Director of Operations, L'Unite Beige

de Verification, i nitia l language tra ining for the team leaders

wou ld ena ble them "to express themsel ves in nor mal, ord ina ry

da ily ta l ks" with their Russia n mi lita ry escorts. 1 1 For trea ty issues

and technica l questions tha t might arise d u ring the inspection,

Ja nssen ind ica ted tha t each tea m wou ld ha ve some inspectors who

were q ua lified i n ter preters. It is interesting that the leaders of the
11 I PtH l'\R

Belgia n verification agency envisioned, a lmost from the begi nning,

mu l tinationa l CFE i nspection tea ms composed of i nspectors from

severa l different nations. Inspectors from Lu xem bourg joi ned the

Belgia n agency's initia l la nguage training course, as d id off icers

from the Du tch i nspectorate. For the three Benel ux na tions, this

joint language tra ining signa led a will ingness to pa rtici pate i n

other joint activities in implemen ti ng the treaty.

1 2

In the Netherla nds, in ea rly 1990 the Min istry of Defense set

u p a sma ll treaty veri fication staff called the A rms Control Bra nch.

Its mission was to assu me responsi bility for the na tion's CFE

Trea ty complia nce and to coord ina te with the Dutch military

forces on all aspects of trea ty implementa tion. Accord ing to Na vy

Comma nder C.N.M. Wierema , Director of the Arms Control

Bra nch, the Netherla nds opera ted under a "cadre" concept i n

im pl emen ti ng the CFE Trea ty, mean ing tha t the Arms Con trol

Bra nch would be a small, joi n t-service sta ff, wi th approxi ma tel y

16 to 18 milita ry off icers. Thei r princi pal role was compili ng the

Netherla nds' req u ired trea ty data submissions, developi ng a ll

officia l trea ty notifica tions, coord ina ting the sched u l ing and conduct of i nspections a nd red uctions wit h the milita ry forces, and

representing the na tion a t the Verifica tion Coord inati ng Committee meetings held a t Hea dq u arters NATO. The Dutch army identified 80 to 85 officers and NCOs to be tra ined as CFE Trea ty inspectors and escorts, a nd the Dutch a ir force ded icated 30 to 35

officers to assist i n implemen ting the trea ty. When it ca me to conducting CFE Treaty i nspections i n the Eastern na tions, the Arms

Control Bra nch selected sen ior a rm y or air force off icers, usua ll y

in the ra n k of lieu tena nt colonel, to serve as tea m chiefs. The 

Dutch req u ired their inspectors to spea k and u ndersta nd Russia n.

Accord ing to Comma nder Wierema , "It ta kes a bou t a yea r and a

ha lf before the inspectors reach the req u ired level in their l anguage

sk ills. Russia n is very d ifficult." 13

When Pola nd esta bl ished its veri fica tion agency i n 1990, the

Polish governmen t was in the midst of a genera l restruct u ri ng of

its armed forces. Colonel Stanisla w Malinowsk i, Director of the

Polish Verification Unit, expla ined tha t Pola nd had elected to

place the new center in the civilia n component of the Min istry of

Na tional Defense, outside the milita ry structure of the a rmed

forces. He added , "It cooperates very closely with the milita ry

component." 1 4 After CFE Trea ty signatu re in Novem ber 1990,

the Ministry of Na tional Defense determi ned tha t the verifica tion

center's initia l sta ffing was not sufficient to carry out Pola nd's

trea ty requ i rements. In its Novem ber 1990 data submission,

Pola nd stated that it had 124 declared sites and 149 mil ita ry u nits,

or objects of verifica tion (OOVs) with TLE. At the same time,

Pola nd 's red uction lia bil ity was a pproxi ma tel y l,120 ta nks, 690

a rtille ry pieces, 1,130 a rmored personne l vehicles, a nd 91 a ircra ft.

Conseq uently, the Ministry of Na tiona l Defense orga nized specia l

D {) \ IIll

Colonel Stanislaw M alinowsk i,

Director, Polish Verification Unit.

110 f ) \
140 0 -S1 11 Jr-; p1 < no.· A<.1 M ) 

General-Major Sergey Fedorovich Tsygank ov, Deput y

Director, Russian N R RC.

a rms con trol sections in each of the Polish army's

milita ry districts and at the Polish Armed Forces

Head q ua rte rs. Colonel Ma linowski explained ,

"The center's present acti vi ties a re, a mong other

thi ngs, to supervise activi ties of these d ivisions in

the m i lita ry structu re. "'

5 For CFE inspection a nd

escort team leaders, Pola n d used professional

milita ry officers who were experienced and

k nowledgea ble a bou t a rma men ts and equ ipment

incl uded i n the CFE Trea ty. Competence in a

foreign l anguage was an importa nt criterion for

selection. Col onel Ma l inowski said tha t from

thei r initia l pla nning, they had anticipa ted hosting ma n y nationa l inspection tea ms at Polish

red uction facil i ties and decl a red sites. 16

The la rgest CFE Trea ty state, Russia, had significant adva ntages in recru iti ng, selecting, and tra ining its CFE i nspection tea ms

beca use of its exper i ence in implementi ng the INF Trea ty. The

Soviet Union's i nspection agency, the N uclea r Risk Red uction

Center ( N RRC), was loca ted in Moscow. When Russia emerged as

a successor state, the NR RC reta ined a ll the agency's missions,

fu nctions, a nd pe rson nel. Th us, Russia had an existing treaty

veri fication orga n i za tion, experienced leaders, and a corps of

professiona l inspectors and escorts steeped in the proced u res and

processes of cond ucti ng and escorti ng on-site inspection teams. 17

To ca rry ou t the provisions of the CFE Trea ty, the INF Treaty, and

the other a rms control agreements, the Russia n center had approx ima tely 150 to 200 personnel.

Genera l-Lieu tena n t Vlad im ir I. Med vedev, Director of the

N RRC, selected Genera l -Major Sergey Fedorovich Tsygank ov to

lead CFE Trea ty opera tions. Six months before state representatives signed the CFE Trea ty i n Pa ris, Tsyga n kov a rrived in Moscow to become Depu ty Director of the NR RC. He bega n a ll of his

prepa ra tions, he sa id , "with the trea ty theory. "'x He also drew

u pon his yea rs of service with the Soviet Armed Forces Grou p of

Western Forces, where he had pa rtici pa ted in inspections u nder the

Stockhol m Docu ment. In selecti ng CFE team ch iefs, deputies, and

inspectors, Genera l Tsyga n kov worked closely wi th General

Med vedev a nd Colonel S.N. Slepnev, Director of Opera tions for

the CFE Trea ty Section. For team leaders they selected career

milita ry off icers wit h a t least 15 yea rs of service. Genera l

Tsygan k ov ind icated that some of R ussia's CFE tea m chiefs had

been "regimenta l com ma nders," others had held importa nt "staff

positions," a nd a l l "were considered professionals. " The key element, he decla red , in the selection of tea m chiefs was their "leadersh i p skil ls." He observed , "Almost every officer i n the center

works as an i nspection tea m l eader or as a n escort tea m leader.

When they go on an inspection, they a re responsi ble for supervis-
I1 I 11!U I IU\ 110 fl

ing at least nine people. When you are assigned to the escort team,

you a re to some extent the leader of the inspection facility, so you

are i n cha rge of tha t facility. The inspection tea m leader, or the

escort tea m leader, is the representa tive of Russia . This is a very

importa nt appointment beca use everythi ng that he says is on beha lf of Russia." 19

The Bela rus Nationa l Agency for Control and Inspection

(NAKI ) was established in June 1992, just weeks before the CFE

Treaty entered into force. U nder the treaty, Belarus had 87 sites

su bject to inspection. Even more importa nt, the nation had a red uction lia bility of 1,873 ta nks, ·t ,441 a rmored personnel vehicles, and

130 fighters. This was a significa nt red uction lia bility, especia lly

since Bela rus was a newl y independent na tion, having ach ieved its

i ndependence in Decem ber 1991 followi ng the collapse of the Soviet

Union. When the nationa l verifica tion agency was set u p, the president made it directly subord inate to the Deputy Minister of Defense

for Milita ry Policy of the Repu blic. General-Ma jor Viktor K. Va ka r

served as the agency's first Comma nder.

Although the Bela russia n agency was set u p just weeks before

the CFE Trea ty entered into force, the initia l cad re of i nspectors,

escorts, a nd lingu ists had had experience u nder the Soviet Union in

implementi ng arms control trea ties and agreemen ts. Bela rus had

been a Soviet m ilita ry district with 27 sites su bject to i nspection

u nder the IN F Treaty. From 1988 th rough 1991, U.S. inspection

tea ms had cond ucted more tha n 100 INF Treaty inspections in

Bela rus. Two major INF Trea ty red uction centers, Lesna ya and

Stan kovo, had been loca ted withi n the Byel orussian Mil ita ry District. Most of the officers and specia lists who operated these red uction centers were incor pora ted in to the new Bela rus Na tiona l

Agency for Control and Inspection.

The Bela rus NA KI had five d ivisions: pla nning, opera tiona l

com m u nications and infor ma tion systems, internationa l rela tions,

escorti ng and i nspecti ng, and support and logistics. Colonel M.Y.

Melomedov, Deputy Chief of NAKI, expl a ined tha t the escort and

inspection d ivision had responsi bility for hosting a ll foreign inspection tea ms tha t would be monitori ng Bela rus's su bsta n tia l

red uction liabilities. To red uce its la rge qua ntities of a llotted ta nks,

artillery, and armored personnel veh icles, Bela rus set up three

red uction centers a t Borisov, Stankovo, a nd Ba ra novich i . Accordi ng to Lt. Colonel I.G. Gerus, Grou p Leader, CFE Trea ty Red uction Division , the first task was to "prepa re the red uction sites.

There, the most complica ted issue was to prepare a tech nology for

setting up a red uction line." 20 The red uction of all 1,837 ta nks in

accorda nce with the provisions of the trea ty's red uction protocols,

Lt. Colonel Gerus expla ined , took considera bl e pla n n i ng and

expense by the Bela rus NAKI and the armed forces. He observed

that "We spent a lot of effort just orga nizi ng the red uction effort."

r I> 1 I
142 ON-Sin l '>P1-c110N Ac;1·. c'

Lt. Colonel I.G. Genis, Group Leader, CFE Reduction Division, Belarus, and Lt. Colonel

Steven A. Barneby, OSIA Team Chief, sign inspe ction report .

The initia l ma n ni ng for the Bela russia n verifica tion center called

for an a ut horized strength of 87, a lthough the actua l n u mber of

officers and specia l ists at t he treaty's entry into force was less tha n

50. The agency's headq ua rters was located in Minsk, the na tion's

ca pi ta l. U nder the CFE Treaty, Minsk was designa ted as a poi nt of

entry for arri ving and depa rting i nspection teams.2 1

U k ra ine was another new n ation wi th significa nt CFE Treaty

rights and responsi bilities. In defin i ng its foreign policy and milita ry depa rtment trea ty responsi bi l ities, the Uk ra in ia n government

set u p a new, presiden tia l-level na tiona l committee. Led by

Konsta ntyn Gryschen k o, a senior d iploma t, this new Nationa l

Comm ittee for Disarma ment reported d irectl y to the president. Its

sta ff a nd offices were loca ted in the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs,

where it was responsi ble for representi ng U k ra ine at the negotia ting sessions of the CFE Trea ty's ]CG in Vienna , an d in future

negotia tions on other interna tiona l a rms control trea ties, such as

the Open Skies and START trea ties. This nationa l committee a lso

collected , processed , and prepa red U kraine's CFE Trea ty data a nd

reports. 22

The Verifica tion Center of the Armed Forces of Uk raine was

located in Kiev, and was organized u nder the Ministry of Defense.

Accord ing to Genera l-Ma jor N.T. Honcha renko, Director, the

center had four depa rtments: conventional a rmed forces, open

skies, n uclea r d isa rma ment, and adm inistra tion. When the center

was establ ished in Ma y 1992, it had approxi ma tely 50 officers and

civilia ns. Subord ina te to the verification center were four treaty
------------------· F1 '\! PR l l'\R \ 1101\ :NATO ,\ I> WTO N HIO'\,\ 1 43

implementa tion support centers. Loca ted in Kiev ( a rmy and a ir

force ), Odessa, a nd Lvov, each center was ma n ned with 25 to 45

mi l ita ry person nel.23

Before the Uk ra in ia n govern ment esta blished its Veri fica tion

Center of the Ar med Forces i n Ma y 1992, Genera l Honcha ren ko

sa id the govern ment hosted severa l sm·l l , h igh-level delega tions

from other CFE Treaty states. These grou ps presented an informa l

briefing, expla in ing their assigned roles a nd missions, their orga n iza tiona l structu re, and their experiences i n im pl ementi ng va rious

treaties. In April 1992, a tea m arrived in K iev from the Ca na dian

Verification Agency. In Ju ne 1992, Dr. Edwa rd M. Ifft, Deputy

Director for Externa l Affa irs, OSIA, led a sma ll, six-person American team to Kiev. He was accompa n ied by Col onel Wi l l iam R.

Smith, the new Comma nder of OSIA's Europea n Opera tions Comma nd, two pla nn ing officers, and two lingu ists. They expla ined

OSIA's cha rter, structu re, and trea ty experiences.

The visit to K iev was pa rt of an extended 21-d ay trip to seven

CFE Trea ty states of the Common wea lt h of I ndepend ent States:

Armen ia , Azer ba ija n, Bela rus, Georgia , Ka za ksta n, Mold ova , a nd

Uk ra ine. Col onel Smith's impression of the prepa ra tions of Bel arus

and Uk ra ine was favora ble. "In Minsk and Kiev we met with la rge

grou ps of peopl e who k new a lot a bou t a rms control." He found

tha t "they ha d set u p very professiona l orga niza tions," a nd were

well prepa red to ca rry out their trea ty responsi bilities. 24 Smith

lea rned tha t the Uk ra inia ns ha d resea rched ma ny of the na tiona l

verifica tion centers and agencies. Genera l Honcha ren ko sa id they

ha d stud ied reports from trea ty veri fica tion centers in Grea t Brita in, Germa n y, and the Un ited States.

Dr. Edward M . Ifft, Deput y

Director for External Af fairs,

OSIA.

Dr. If/i's team on its 14,000-mile 1nissio11 to seven states in 2 1 days.

/

'
1 44 O. -Sm l!'JSP! < 110:-.: Aci,Nn 

Belarussian seal.

In addition to reviewi ng the structu re and mission of other

na tions' verifica tion centers, Genera l Honcha renko expla ined tha t

"Our verifica tion center was founded on the base of the im plementa tion depa rtment of the K iev M ilita ry District." That depa rtment had been esta blished by the Soviet Un ion to carry out the

IN F Treaty. Honcha ren ko ind icated tha t "most of the off icers who

ha d served i n tha t depa rtment ... beca me the off icers of the Uk rain ia n verification center." In May a nd Ju ne of 1992, the center

orga nized specia l tra in ing for its escort tea ms. Personnel also went

to every u n it of the Uk ra in ia n milita ry forces and held classes on

how to prepa re OOVs for i nspection. Then they conducted a

full-sca le mock i nspection with the u n its, sending an inspection

and escort tea m from the verifica tion center. Fina l ly, Genera l

Honcha renko sa id tha t they cond ucted a few joint mock tra ining

inspections with teams from the Un ited States and Germa ny.25

From these differen t na tion a l experiences i n esta blishi ng CFE

Trea ty inspection orga n i za tions, certa i n genera lizations emerge. To

begin with, a ll NATO, Eastern Europea n, a nd USSR successor

states recruited, tra ined, and used their professional military as

CFE Treaty inspectors and escorts. In the NATO nations, the

selection, training, and lead ership responsibilities of the inspection

team leaders were quite similar in all of the inspectora tes. The

selection of inspectors varied, however. The larger verification

agencies-those in the United States, Germa ny, Fra nce, and Great

Brita in-used a concept of organic, fixed teams, while the smaller

verification organizations-those in Holland, Belgium, Luxembou rg, and Italy-opted for composite teams with perma nent

leaders and lingu ists as the core team. Inspectors drawn from the

milita ry forces a ugmented the tea ms.

Among the Wa rsaw Pact na tions, there was a similar conceptua l distinction. Russia , with its INF Treaty experience, used the

fixed tea m model for escort and inspection operations u nder the

CFE Trea ty. Bela rus and Uk raine focused their operations on

escorting, but here aga in, they used professiona l milita ry officers 

ded ica ted to implementi ng the treaty. In both na tions, the na tional

CFE Trea ty obligations were substa ntia l in terms of the n um bers

of OOVs and TLE su bj ect to inspection. The likelihood of these

sites and u n its bei ng inspected by the NATO nations was considerable; conseq uently, the grea test burden in bot h Bela rus and

Uk ra ine fell to the escorting mission. Fu rther, the poor economic

cond itions in these nations after the colla pse of the centra lized

Soviet Union limited their governments' capa bility to organ ize and

send CFE inspection tea ms a broa d. Hunga ry, Czechoslova k ia,

and, to a degree, Pola nd used composite inspection a nd escort

teams.
------------------Fli\ \I PIUL',\R \TIO:\S: NATO ,\, I)WTO N..\IIOM 1 4'\

Local escorts hosted I N F inspections in the Soviet Union; later they brought their experience

to the newly f ormed national verification agencies.

Other genera lizations a ppl ied. A mong CFE i nspection tea m

lea ders, virtua ll y a ll were colonels or lieu tena nt colonels. As commissioned off icers, they ha d tra ined and served with their respective milita ry forces d u ri ng the Cold Wa r. Withi n the NATO a lliance, these senior a nd m id-level off icers ha d served in NATO

mili ta ry comma nds or on combi ned sta ffs; th us they were familia r

with the milita ry structu re of the na tiona l a rmies and a ir forces of

the 16 NATO na tions. By 1990, NATO was a ma tu re, experienced, cohesi ve a l liance, and this fact contributed d irectly to pla nn ing, tra ining, and comm u nica ting opera tiona l concepts in implementi ng the CFE Trea ty.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) experience was

considera bly d ifferent. There the Soviet Union-and by extension

Russia-comma nded the domina nt role. Within its officer corps,

there was a clear sense of professiona lism and commitment to

d irection from Moscow. Compa red to NATO nations, there was

fa r less comm u n ica tion among the former na tions of the Wa rsaw

Pact. Among the states of the former Soviet Un ion, Bela rus a nd

U k ra ine ha d tea m chiefs who ha d , with some exceptions, d irect

experience with escorting America n inspection tea ms mon itoring

Soviet missile elim ina tions u nder the IN F Trea ty. Th us they sha red

a d istinct set of experiences with R ussia n inspectors a nd escorts.
'

One fina l genera liza tion a ppl ied: the d irectors,

comma nd ants, a nd comma nders of the na tiona l

CFE Trea ty i nspection agencies saw their organ izations and i nspection/escort teams as

implementers of the trea ty. Their mission was to

mon itor on-site the entitlements and obliga tions

of the respecti ve na tions; they did not a rticu la te

policy or a d voca te fu tu re agreements. Theirs was

a limited role.

PATTERNS OF TRAINING

A distincti ve pa ttern of training emerged

d uri ng the 20-month period from CFE Trea ty

signatu re i n Novem ber 1990 to entry into force

in Ju ly 1992. This pa ttern applied in both the

la rger, sepa ra te na tiona l verifica tion agencies and

i n the sma l ler, cad re type of inspection orga n izations. The key concept was the use of mock

inspections i n which two tea ms of i nspectors, an

i nspection and an escort tea m, cond ucted a f u llscale on-site i nspection at an active milita ry

i nsta l la tion usi ng the CFE Treaty as "the law."

Al l the trea ty's prov isions and protocols applied,

A U.S. site commander conducts a "windshield tour" from the tea m's a rriva l a t a trea ty-d esigna ted

of the declared site. POE th rough the cond uct of a deta iled, thorough

i nspection, to the inspection and escort tea m

lea ders' signatu res on the fina l i nspection report. A joi nt eva l uation followed each mock i nspection, with the pa rticipa tion of

the two tea ms, the mil ita ry insta llation comma nd er, and in vited

obser vers. As Colonel La w rence Kel ley, the Director of Operations

for OSIA's Europea n Opera tions Com ma nd, declared, "Mock

inspections a re now a nd have a lwa ys been the single most importa nt tra in i ng tool tha t we ha ve a t ou r d isposa l."21

In setting u p the U.S. CFE i nspection operations, Colonel

Kelley esta bl ished a three-pronged a pproach for these traini ng

i nspections. One i n vol ved a series of mock inspections cond ucted

with inspection tea ms from the NATO nations. R igorous and

thorough, these i nspections developed a common u nd ersta nd ing of

the process, the CFE Trea ty, a nd na tiona l obliga tions of the

inspectora tes. Another ha d America n CFE i nspection tea ms cond uct rigorous mock i nspections opposite other America n tea ms on

U.S. milita ry sites and installa tions th roughout Eu rope. These

tra ining inspections ed uca ted both the A merica n i nspection tea ms

and the America n mil ita ry person nel a t each of the installa tions,

from the security pol ice a t the ga te to the comba t comma nder a t

the u n it that was the object of verifica tion. Pa rtici pa nts tested all
--Fl'.'.' .\I PRfl'A IL\l lON'>: NATO A-.;1> WTO N \TIOr\S 1 47

aspects of the on-site inspection protocols, pa rticu la rly the l ine

between the treaty rights of the inspectors and the trea ty obligations of the inspected state. The fina l aspect of the America n approach ha d U.S. inspection teams pa rticipa ting in a series of mock

i nspections with Russia and the Eastern Eu ropea n nations.

Through mock inspections with Russia , Pola nd, Hunga ry, Czechoslovak ia, Roma nia, and Bulga ria, OSIA bu ilt ea rly and contin u ing

lia isons. The mock inspections initiated these ties, and over the

course of ma ny d iscussions among inspectors and escorts, and

di rectors and comma nders, common a pproaches to ma ny areas of

trea ty implementation developed.27

A mong the other NATO na tions prepa ring to im plement the

CFE Treaty, a th ree-stage tra i n ing pa ttern emerged: mock inspections with the nationa l milita ry forces, mock i nspections with

a l l ied inspection tea ms and their orga niza tions, and fina lly, mock

inspections with the i nspection agencies of the former Wa rsa w

Pact na tions and their milita ry forces. These la tter mock inspections usua lly were pla n ned and organized on a reci proca l basis,

with i nspections in one na tion followed by i nspections in the other.

Beca use na tion-to-na tion rela tionshi ps va ried considera bly across

the Europea n continent, there was no set order or sequence to this

pa ttern of inspections. In some na tions, mock i nspections with

allied na tions preceded tra ining inspections with their own milita ry forces. In others, mock tra in ing events with former Wa rsa w

Pact nations were sched u led before simila r events with NATO

allies.

Grou p Capta i n D.A.G. Bremner, Comma nd ant of the Un ited

Kingd om 's Joint Arms Control Im plementa tion Grou p (JACIG ),

explained that British inspector tra in ing bega n with an i ntensive

four-week course on the CFE Treaty and other current arms control agreements. Then tea m tra ining bega n with the agency's inspectors "sim u lating a foreign inspection grou p a nd a JACIG

escort tea m cond ucti ng mock inspections at Un ited K ingdom

sites. "28 According to Grou p Ca pta i n Brem ner, these inspections

developed tea m ski lls and stand a rd opera ting proced u res for bot h

the British milita ry insta lla tion comma nders and the British inspection group's escort and inspection tea ms. Next, the British grou p

arra nged a nd cond ucted bi la tera l mock tra in ing inspections wi th

tea ms from the i nspectora tes of the NATO na tions, and then they

set u p a series of mock tra ining exercises with the na tions of the

Wa rsa w Pact from mid-1991 to mid-1992. The French experience,

accord ing to Colonel Fra rn;:ois Rozec, Comma nd ant, L'Unite

Fra rn;:aise de Verifica tion, followed a pa ttern simila r to tha t of the

other NATO na tions' inspection agencies. "All of the verifica tion

agencies," Colonel Rozec expla ined, "more or less, worked a long

the same lines. We first started doing mock inspections on a na -

tiona l level, then bila tera lly with the NATO allies. Then, as a third
148 0 -Sir I I \Pl( 110 A<.1 ( '

German escorts, representing the host state, took Eastern teams to insfJection sites.

step, we started wor king on mock inspections with the Eastern

bloc cou ntries, especi a lly with Russia, Bela rus, Hu nga ry, and

Czechoslova k ia. "2 )

Germa ny developed one of t he most extensive tra ining progra ms of the NATO na tions. To begin wi th, the u nified Germa n

na tion, beca use of its incor pora tion of East Germa ny's milita ry

forces a nd eq u ipment, ha d more tha n 900 CFE Treaty OOVs,

more tha n any other NATO na tion. All of these sites had to be

su rveyed and their person nel tra ined and prepa red for on-site

inspections u nder the CFE Trea ty. Since most, if not all, of the

former GDR's milita ry eq u i pment was either Soviet-ma de or bu ilt

to Soviet mil ita ry specifica tions, it provided a tra ining windfa ll for

Germa n CFE Trea ty i nspection teams. Germa ny was one of the

pri nci pa l NATO na tions for impl ementi ng the CFE Treaty. Germa n inspection tea ms wou ld be leading and cond ucti ng 20 percent

of the NATO a llia nce's i nspection quota. Another importa nt operational considera tion d riving Germa ny's tra ining was the fact

tha t ma ny of NATO's milita ry insta lla tions and CFE red uction

sites were loca ted on Germa n territory. When the Eastern group of

states' CFE tea ms conducted inspections on stationed forces' milita ry u n its and equ ipment loca ted on Germa n territory, Germa n

escort officers had to meet them at the point of entry, tra nsport

them to the decla red mi l i ta ry insta l lation, and, followi ng the inspection, accompa ny them back to the exit poi nt. Germa n y ha d to

anticipate, over the 40-mon th red uction phase, dozens of inspection tea ms a rri ving a t designa ted poi nts of entry in the former
------F1 '.\I. PR I P-\ RArlOM: NATO A'J D WTO N Al lON 1 49

Germa n Democra tic Repu bl ic, tra vel i ng u nder escort to the red uction sites, and then, for a period of days, monitoring TLE destruction. Fina lly, beca use of Germa n y's strategic posi tion in middle

Europe, its na tiona l poli tica l leaders encou raged and supported

joi nt tra ining with all the Centra l Eu ropea n na tiona l verifica tion

agencies d u ring prepa ra tions for im plemen ting the CFE Treaty. For

a ll these reasons, the Germa n veri fica tion agency was extremel y

active d u ring the 20-mon th trea ty prepa ra tion phase. 30

By the time of the CFE Treaty's entry into force i n Ju ly 1992,

the Germa ns had cond ucted more tha n 200 mock inspections and

escort missions. Briga dier Genera l Doctor Hei nz Loq ua i, Director,

ZVBW, reca lled a pa rticu la rly im porta nt series of mock i nspections:

"We a rra nged with the Eastern Eu ropea n cou ntries, the

former Wa rsa w Pact cou n tries, a series of test inspections or mock

i nspections i n order to esta blish with them practica l coopera tion. I

thin k one of the most crucia l mock inspections was our inspection

in the Soviet Union . It was agreed on at the mi nisteria l level and

took place i n August 1991. Two guest i nspectors pa rtici pa ted in

this inspection, a Dutch a nd a French inspector. Two weeks later,

the Soviets came to Germa ny, cond ucting an inspection on a Germa n si te.... These were revol u tiona ry times, with the attem pted

coup d 'etat in Moscow, bu t I was convinced tha t if the cou p had

succeeded, the new govern ment wou l d ha ve done everyth ing to

fu lfill the obl igations of the CFE Trea ty.""

The Russia n experience in tra ining pa ra lleled in ma ny respects the experiences of the other large state pa rties to the trea ty.

In expla ining Russia 's tra i ning concept, Genera l-Ma jor Tsygan kov,

Deput y Director of the Russia n NR RC, was characteristica ll y

forth right: "The most im porta n t task was to prepa re the tra ining

for our forces. Objects of veri fica tion m ust be prepa red, begi n n i ng 

with diagra ms of the decla red sites. The correct sta nd on these

issues m ust come from the NR RC. "n The Ru ssia n center ha nd led

virtua ll y every aspect of trea ty prepa ra tions, from dra wi ng up site

diagra ms, to designa ting adm in istra tive zones, to defining the

OOVs. Ever y Russia n mili ta ry d istrict, accord ing to Genera l

Tsyga n kov, had an a rms control depa rtment, staffed with 10 to 16

persons. Officers from the Russia n NR RC tra ined these district

officers on the CFE Treaty. Every Russia n a rmy division had two

or th ree CFE Trea ty specia l ists assigned to the d ivision's tra ining

brigade. The scope of the CFE Trea ty a nd the size of the Russia n

Army mea nt tha t tra ining had to be rein forced by regul ations and

regula r tra ining visits from NR RC officia ls. In Ju ly 1992, at the

time of the CFE Trea t y's entry into force, Russia decla red 9,342

ta nks, 8,346 arti llery pieces, 19,399 a rmored personnel ca rriers,

and 4,624 a ircra ft. Th is vast arra y of treaty eq u ipment was ma inta ined at 488 decla red sites a nd 503 OOVs th roughou t R ussia. 33

"The most important task

was to prepare the f raming

(or our (orces. ..

Cen cra l-\ t a1or T.,nan k(ll,

D\:pu t) Dirl·i.:tor. R us\1,111 . 'RR(
1 50 0. -Sr 11 I '>Pl< r 10 Ac.1 c \ 

From A p r i l to J u l y 1 99 1, Genera l Ts ga n k ov had t h e CFE

Treaty section pl a n an d orga n i ze mock i n spections wi r h severa l

m il ita ry com ma nds a nd u n i ts of t he a rm y, a i r force, a nd a ir defense forces. Thei r obje ctive was to tra i n t h e i n pection tea m s and

Soviet forces on the p ra cti ca l a,pects of trea ty imp l ementa t i on.

They cond ucted f u ll-sca le CFE inspections a t severa l foci lities of

the a rm y, a ir force, a nd a i r d efen se forces. " u r a p proach, " Genera ! Tsyga n k ov sta ted , "was tha t we ca l l i t a tra i n i n g inspection i f

we ca rried i t ou t wi th ou r people on Ru ssia n ter rito ry, bu t we ca ll

i t a mock i n .pection i f i n spector from a foreign cou n tr y pa rtici- 4

p·ued .' i From ugu st 199 1 to p ri ! 1992, the Ru ssi a n R RC

Logistics requirements 111creased

f or OS/ A's European Op erations

Command under the CF E Treaty.

con d ucted moc k in pectio ns on a m u tua l basis wi t h even trea t y

sta tes-the U ni ted Sta tes, Grea t Bri ta i n, Germa n y, Den ma r k ,

Turk ey, Holl a nd , a nd Fra nce . Observers pa rt ici pa ted i n t he posttra i n i n ' i nspection d eb r i ef i n g i n a ll t hese mock inspect ions. ;'

It is im porta n t to remem ber that t h roughou t th is l en uth y, 20-

mont h CFE Trea ty trai n i n g phase, Eastern Eu rope was in tu rmoil.

The Soviet U n ion wa s i n revol u t i on, a nd i t cea sed to ex ist a s a

na ti on i n l a te 1 991 . After i ts colb psc, eigh t new sta tes beca me

·igna tory pa rri c ro t he CFE Treaty. Th rou ghou t these cha ng s,

FE i nspection tea ms from the N TO n a t i ons a n d t h e Wa rsaw

Pact na ti ons, i ncl u d i ng the successor states of Russi a, Ukra i ne, a nd

Bela ru s, cond ucted severa l h u nd red CFE Trea ty mock i nspec tions.

They ref ined a ll aspects of treaty i m plementa tion, from com m u n ica tions, to i n specti on/esco rt proced u res, to logist ics. Slowl y a nd

d el i beratel y, a con sen sus emerged over ti me among t he na tiona l

i n spectora tes on cer ta i n "u nd ersta nd i ngs of the trea t y," a s d i d a

genera l agreemen t on w ha t consti t u ted "sta n d a rds of a n inspcc-
'

------------------fl .,I PRl l'\RA l lO'.\'>: N ATO A "\I> WTO N .\T IO ., 1 51

ri on." These by-prod ucts of extensi ve bila tera l a nd mu l ti la tera l

mock t ra i n ing inspections wou ld become even more sign if ica n t

when the trea ty entered i nto force. Consensus, especia l ly w hen

based on actua l experience, beca me a powerf u l i nstru ment i n

i mplementi ng th is m u ltina tiona l a rms red uction trea ty.

I n negotia ti ng the CFE Trea ty, d ipl oma ts in Vien na ha d

reached an u ndersta nd ing of t he trea ty 's la ngu age, protocols, and

requ irements. Now, i n prepa ri ng to i mplement the trea ty, lea ders

of the na tiona l inspectora tes were try ing to reach a simil a r measu re of u ndersta nd ing a bou t the practi ca l , opera tiona l aspects of

cond ucti ng recu r ring on-site i nspections. Given the t u r moil across

Centra l a nd Eastern Eu rope i n 1991 to 1992, the significa nce of

these na tion a l agency-to-agency, mil i ta ry-to-mil i ta ry mock tra i n ing

inspections can not be u nderesti ma ted . They occu rred , l i ke the CF E

Trea ty i tsel f, on the cusp of ma jor pol i tical a nd economic cha nges

across the Eu ropea n continen t.

READINESS FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE

When the d i ploma ts met a t the CSCE su mm it i n Helsin k i

on J u l y I 0, 1992, they signed docu men ts tha t per mi tted the CFE

Trea ty to enter i n to force provisiona ll y. Ten days la ter, FE Trea t y

basel ine inspection s wou ld begi n. Were the respecti ve na tiona l

veri fica tion a gencies rea dy ? Were the milita ry forces pre pa red ?

Had the site d ia gra ms been d raw n properl y, were the POEs ready,

wer e the na tion-to-na tion com m u n ica tions systems rea d y to go?

By a nd l a rge, d irectors of veri fi ca tion agencies were conf iden t. At t he Germa n verif ica tion cemer i n Gei len k irchen, Genera l

Loq ua i sta ted u neq u i voca l l y tha t they were ready. Only a few

weeks before, the Germa n center ha d orga n i zed a ma xi m u m-lev el

mock inspection ex rcise i n vol vi ng inspection tea ms from rhe

U n i ted States, Ca nad a , Fra nce, Grea t Bri ta in, and, of cou rse, Germa n y. Wi thi n one week, these na tiona l tea ms cond ucted 10 on-site

i nspections, exercising every el emen t of the i n spection process :

noti f i ca tions, com m u nica tions, secu ri ty, logistics, site prepa ra tions,

escort proced u res, i nspection rights, photogra phy, emergency

proced u res, a nd report sequenci ng. "The norma l m i l i ta ry l ogic,"

Genera l Loq ua i obser ved, "is tha t you shou l d perform tra i n ing

exercises u nd er cond itions more d i fficu lt tha n rea l life. "31 After

com pleti ng th is tra i n i ng exercise withou t incident, Genera l Loq ua i

k new the Germa n agency was rea dy. Germa n y ha d cond ucted

more tha n 200 moc k tra ining inspections prior to entry into force.

Directors at other agencies also were read y. At the Belgia n

verification agency, Lt. Colonel Fred Ja nssen, Director of Operations, ex pressed h is confidence, decla ri ng, "Withou t a n y dou bt we

were read y, more tha n rea d y, I shou ld sa y. We were eager to go

i n. "

17 The Belgia ns h a d cond ucted 56 mock i nspections prior to
152 0 -S1 n. IN<iPH .TIOJ\. Acl''\CY 

entry into force. At the French verifica tion u nit in Creil, Colonel

Rozec acknowledged , "I th ink we were read y, considering tha t you

can never be completely ready for th is kind of job .... Some of our

new inspectors were not on the list of inspectors, but we were as

ready as we could possi bly be. "1x In Wa rsaw, Colonel Malinowsk i

noted tha t the period from trea ty signature to entry into force was

"a long time. " He bel ieved tha t Polish armed forces were well

prepa red and tha t the verification center was read y: "I wou ldn 't

like to boast, bu t I think tha t Pola nd , the United States, Netherlands, Germa ny, and Britai n were very wel l prepa red at that

time. "39 In Moscow, General-Ma jor Tsyga n k ov had reached a

simi la r concl usion: "The center was read y. The center had a mission, and we were responsi ble for ca rryi ng it out. We knew that

when the trea ty entered i n to force, there wou ld be no time for

fu rther prepa ra tions. "411 In Fra nkfurt, Colonel Kelley, spea k ing of

the U.S. effort, concl uded , "I th i n k tha t a l though the butterflies

were there, a nd although t here were certain areas where we were

not quite satisfied t hat we had the optima l solution, comm u nications, l iaison off icers, tra n sporta tion, opera tions center, we d id feel

a t entry into force tha t operationa lly, we were read y."4 1

Colonel Kelley's next com ment, provided wi th the perspective

of th in k ing back over a ll the inspection a nd escort operations

cond ucted d u ring the CFE Trea ty baseline phase, was both short

and insightfu l: "And, tha t tu rned ou t to be the case."42

NOTES

1 . I nterv iew w it h Lt . Colonel Rola nd K eitel a nd Lt. Colonel Bernd Mecke,

Zentrum fi.ir Veri fi ka tionsa u f •a ben der Bu ndesweh r, by Joseph P. Ha ra h a n,

Historia n , OSI A, Gei l en k irchen, Germa n y, J a n u a ry 31, 1994; Lt. Colonel

K u h lei n, Zen tru m fo r Veri fi kation sa u fga bcn der Bu ndesweh r, Letter wit h

a ttached report, "I n form a tion on the A rms Con trol Process i n Germa n y,'

April 12, 1994; Zentru m fi.ir Veri fi k ation sa u fga ben der Bu nd esweh r,

Report, no da te, ci rca 1990. See a lso Joseph P. Ha ra ha n , "Ger many's

Federa l A rmed Forces Veri fication Center Cond ucts N u merous Trea ty

Fu nctions," On-Site Insights, October '1 995, pp. 6-7.

2. I nterview with Colonel Joern Stein berg, CFE Treaty In spection Tea m Chi ef,

Zentru m fi.i r Veri f i ka tion sa u fga ben der Bu ndeswch r, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n,

Historia n, OSIA, Gei l en k i rch en , Germa n y, J a n u a ry 31, 1994 .

3. Lt. Colonel K u h lei n "In forma tion on the A rm s ontrol Process i n

Germa n y"; I nterv iew wit h Brigad ier Gen era l Dr. Hei n z Loq ua i, Director,

Zentr u m fiir Verif i ka tion sa u fga ben dcr Bu ndesweh r, by Joseph P. Ha ra han ,

Historia n , OSIA, Gei len k irchen , Germa n y, Ja n u a ry 31, 1 994· Brigad ier

Genera l Dr. Hei n z Loq ua i, Brief ing to Ca nad ia n Armed Forces Sta ff,

Headqua rters NATO, Brussels,Belgi um, September 4, 1992.

4. Interview, Loq u;'li.

5. I bid .; Lt. ol oncl K u h lei n, "Informa ti on on th e A rms Control Process i n

Germa n y."
11 \( PR I P \R A llO ·i,: NATO \ I)WTO N .\!10 ., 1 53

6. Interview with Colonel Fra rn;:ois Rozec, Com ma nda nt, L'Un itc Fra rn;a ise de

Veri fica tion, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n , Historia n , OSIA, Crei l, Fra nce,

Fe brua ry 1, l994; r;Unite Fra n<;a ise de Veri fica tion, Report, "The French

Un it of Verif ication," December 1993.

7. I n terview, Rozec. See a lso Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, "French Treaty Inspection

Agency Has Ma jor Role i n Sha pi ng Eu rope's Fu t u re," On-Site Insights,

Ja n ua ry 1996, pp . 10-11.

8. I nter v iew, Rozec.

9. Squad ron Leader Anton y Kerr, Joint A rms Cont rol Im plem enta tion G rou p,

Grea t Bri ta in, "Specia l Report on the JACIG," sent to Joseph P. Ha ra ha n ,

Historia n, OSIA, Ma rch 23, 1994.

I0. I nterview wit h Lt. Colonel Fred Ja nssen a nd Lt. Colonel Henri Va n der

Auera, L'Un i te Beige de Veri f ica tion, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historian,

OSIA, Brussels, Belgi u m, Ja n ua r y 27, 1994.

1 1. Ibid .

12. Ibid . Sec a lso Joseph P. Ha ra h a n, "Treaty Verifica tion Agencies of Belgi u m

a nd the Netherla nds," On-Site Insights, Ma rch 1996, pp. 8-9.

1 3. I nterview w i th Comma nder C.N .M. Wierema, Di rector, A rms Control

Bra nch, Mi n istry of Defense, the Netherla nds, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n,

Historia n , OSIA, The Hagu e, Netherla nd s, Ja n ua ry 28, 1994. For the

Du tch activi ties u nd er CFE a nd other trea ties, see Ha ra ha n, "Trea ty

Veri fica tion Agencie s of Belgi u m and the Netherla nds," pp. 8-9.

14. Intervi ew with Colonel Sta n isla w Ma l i nowsk i, Ch i ef In spector, Polish

Verifica tion Cen ter, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n , Histori a n, OSIA, Wa rsa w,

Pola nd, Februa ry 3, 1994; Report, "CFE In spection with Belgi u m," Pol ish

Verif ica tion Agency, Decem ber 17, 1993.

15. Interview, Ma linowsk i.

'16. Ibid.

17. Joseph P. Ha rahan, On-Site inspec tions Under the 1N f Treaty (Wash ington, D.C.: Govern ment Pri n ti ng Office, 1993), pp. 57-60, 67-96, '123-

133. I nterview w i th Genera l-Lieu tena nt V.I. Med vedev, Di rector ( Ret.),

Nuc lea r R isk Red ucti on Center, Min istry of Defense, R ussia, by Joseph P.

Ha ra ha n , Historia n, OSIA, Magna, Uta h, August 30, 1994. See a lso Joseph

P. Ha ra ha n, "Russi a n Federa tion 's N uclea r Risk Red uction Center," OnSite Insigh ts, Novem ber/Decem ber 1995, pp. 12-13.

18. In terview wi th Genera l-Ma jor S.E Tsyga n kov, Depu ty Director, N uclea r

R isk Red uction Cen ter, Min istry of Defense, R ussia , by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n ,

Historia n, OSI A, Moscow, R ussia, Fe br ua ry 8, 1994 .

19. Ibid .

20. I nterv iew wi th Colonel M.Y. Melomedov, Depu ty Chief; Colonel M.M.

Voloch ko, Ch ief, I nterna tiona l Trea ties Di v ision; Lt. Colonel l.G. Gerus,

Grou p Leader, CFE Treaty Red uctions; a nd Ma jor G.E. Brusn ik ov,

Li ngu ist; Na tiona l Agency for Con trol and Inspections (NAK I ), Bela rus, by

Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historia n, OSI A, Minsk, Bela rus, Fe bru ary 4, 1994.

See a lso Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, "The Bela rus Repu bl ic Na tiona l Agency for

Con t rol and In spection ," On-Site Insight s, Septem ber 1995, pp. 8-9.

21. I nterview w ith Genera l-Ma jor Y.l. Ni k u l i n, Director, Na tiona l Agency for

Control a nd I ns pection s (NAK I ), Bela r u s, by Joh n C. K u h n, Historia n,

OSI A, August 1, 1995.
,

J 54 ON-51r1 J, SPFCTIOI\ A<;1.Nc"l 

22. Cenera l -Ma jor N .T. Honch a rcn k o, Ch ief, Armed Forces Verifica tion

Cen ter of U k r,1ine, "Ch ron icles of the .FE Trea ty," respon se to q u estion s

from Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, Historia n , OSIA, J u l y 27, I 9 9 S . Sec a lso .J oseph I'.

Ha ra h a n , "Verifica tion Center of the A rmed Forces of U k ra ine," 011-Sitc

Insig hts, Februa ry 1996, p p. 4, 28.

)

_ .).

24 .

I nterv iew wi t h Gcn cra l-rvLijor N.T. Honcha rcn k o, Ch ief, Ar med Forces

Veri fica ti on Center of the U k rai n e, hy J oseph P. Ha ra ha n , Historia n, OSI A,

August l , 1 995.

I nter v icw w i th Col onel \Xii 11i a m R . Smit h , USA I- Com ma nd er, Eu ropea n

Opera tions Com ma nd, OSI A , by Joseph P. Ha ra h a n, H i storia n, OSJ A, J u l y

'1 2, 1 993.

25. I nterview, Honcha rcn ko.

26 . I nter view w i th Col onel La w rence ,, Kelley, U SM C, Ch i e f, Opera tions

Di v ision, Eu ropea n Opera tion s Com ma nd , OSIA, by J oseph P. Ha raha n ,

Historia n, OSIA, \Xi,1sh i ngto11, D.C:., Ma y I 8, 1 994. Sec Mock I ns pect i ons

i n Cha pter 4 for <111 in -dept h d iscussi on of t h ese i m porta n t, rea l istic

practice i n spection s.

27. . Inte rv i ew, Kel ley.

28. Sq u ad ron Leader A nton y K e rr, "Specia l R eport on t he J A JG."

29. I nter v iew, Roz.cc.

30. Inte rview, Kei tel a nd Meck e; Lt. Col onel K u h l ci n, "Informa ti on on the

Arms Con trol Process i n Ger ma n y "; I n terv i ew, Loq u a i.

31. In terv iew, Loq u a i .

32. I nterview, Tsyg;i n kov.

33. I bid .

34. I bid .

35. I bid .

36. . Inter view, Loq ua i .

37. Inte rv iew, J;i nsscn a nd Va n d n A ucra.

38. Interv iew, Rozec.

.19. Inter view, M,1Jin owsk i .

40. Genera l -Major N . Honcha ren ko, "Ch ron icl es of the CFE Trea ty";

I nter view, Honcha ren ko.

41 . Inter v iew, Tsyga n kov.

42. I n terv iew, Kel ley.
0

Chapter 6

American and R11ssia11 team chiefs sign the re/wrt completing the insp ection of Russian for ces in Gyand zha,

Azerbai jan.

n Ju l y 1 7, 1 992, the FE Trea ty entered into force, a l b ir

provisionall y. Wh ile rmen ia , Bela rus, and Ka za k ta n

had nor yet ra tified the trea ty by early J uly their repre en -

ta ti ves a su red other na ti ons i n Vi nna tha t they wou ld oon

ratify. onseq uen tl y, when the Eu ropea n and orth A merican

leaders a rri ved a t the Hel ink i Sum mi t on J u ly 10, 1 992, th y were

prepa red to sign the FE I A Agreement a nd to approve the FE

Treaty 's provisiona l entry i n to force. As prom ised, A rmenia deposited i ts instru men t of ra ti fica tion a t The Ha gue on October 12,

1992, a nd Bela rus and K aza ksta n followed on October 30, J 992.

Two week la ter, the 29-na tion Join t Consu lta ti ve rou p (JCG)

assem bled i n Vien na and con firmed that the tr aty had officia lly

entered i nto force 10 day a fter rhe fina l i nstru men ts of ra ti fica tion

ha d been deposited. Conseq uentl y, the provisional entry i n to force

statu ended on ovem ber 9, 1992. Rega rd l e , the forma l da te

for the FE rea ty's entry in to for e r ma ined J u ly 17, 1992. 1
1 56 0 -Sm [ Sl'EC llO Ac. CY -------------------------

ATO 's VCC allotted the

United States a total of 45

baselille inspectiolls.

U. . Inspection Quotas

Passive- 8%

Actiue-1 8%

The start of the trea ty's baseli ne phase was not a shotgu n

bl ast of na tiona l inspecti on tea ms raci ng across Eu rope. Instead ,

NATO na tions d ispa tched their tea ms accord ing to a coord i na ted,

well-pla n ned sched ule. Th is was necessa ry to preven t inspection

tea ms of d ifferent N ATO na tions from trying to inspect the same

site simu lta neousl y or send ing too ma ny tea ms into one country a t

once. The treaty's Protocol on I nspection limited the n u mber of

tea ms a na tion was req u ired to host a t any given time withi n its

nationa l terri tor y or a t a ny given decla red site. In add ition, the

protocol d icta ted the n u mber of inspections any na tion was lia ble

to recei ve du ring a ny period of the trea ty's life, and it l imited a

na tion to cond ucti ng no more tha n 50 percent of the decla red site

a nd cha llenge i nspections any na tion was liable for d u ring a ca lenda r yea r. On the other ha nd , there were no provisions stipu lating

how ma ny i nspections a n y one na tion could cond uct or how the

inspections were to be divided among the pa rtici pa ting states.

There was no centra l monitor. Conseq uentl y, pla n ning inspection

schedules and monitori ng activity during any phase of the trea ty

was an option that fell to the two grou ps of state pa rties.

The NATO Verifica tion Coord ina tion Comm ittee ( VCC),

with mem bershi p from a ll 16 a llied nations, determined the n umber of inspections tha t each N ATO na tion wou ld cond uct an n ua lly. A sta rti ng poi nt for determi n ing each na tion's quota of inspections in the East ( active quota ) was the n u mber of inspections

it was lia ble to recei ve ( passi ve quota ). A na tion's passi ve quota

compa red to the tota l NATO passi ve quota prod uced a percen tage

tha t could be appl ied to the Eastern grou p of states' tota l passi ve

quota. This calcula tion prod uced a potentia l active q uota .

The U.S. passive quota was 8 percent of the passi ve q uota for

the NATO states. The VCC, however, agreed to a l l ow the Uni ted

States a n active quota of a pprox ima tel y 18 percent of the N ATO

states' tota l share. This was the resu l t of hea ted deba te among

VCC delega tes. The U.S. had req uested a greater sha re of the

Eastern inspection quota beca use its contri bu tions to NATO were

not measu red only in ter ms of its OOVs. Moreover, the Uni ted

States had experience in a rms control trea ty im plementa tion as

well as the fina ncia l and logistica l ca pa bil ity to cond uct n u merous

inspections. On the other ha nd , the United States was only one of

16 na tions in the a llia nce. Europea n na tions wa nted their share of

inspections as pa rtici pa nts i n the security a ffa irs of Eu rope. Some

na tions d id not set u p veri fica tion agencies, only small sections

with a ha nd ful of trea t y experts, beca use they had few objects of

verifica tion ( OOVs); Icela nd ha d none. These na tions were not

interested in devel oping inspection tea ms a nd spend ing money to

cond uct inspections. A solu tion to their needs was reli nq u ishing

inspections to the Un ited States with the proviso tha t their inspectors join U.S. tea ms on those missions. After much haggli ng and
ba rga ining, the VCC a llotted the Un ited Sta tes a

tota l of 45 baseline inspections out of a tota l of

251 to be cond ucted by NATO a llies.

The Verification and Implementation Coord i na tion Section, wh ich was the VCC's work ing

sta ff, ha d the task of ta k i ng the i nspections a l located by the VCC and gu id ing the NATO nations

th rough a process in which each recei ved a block

of time (th ree da ys) and an Eastern na tion to

inspect. Selection of the specific OOV for inspection was left to the N ATO state. The time blocks

were critica l beca use the N ATO na tions ha d to

cond uct 251 i nspections in the Eastern states

during baseline-only 120days. This

"deconfliction"schedulewouldenable the

NATO allies to cond uct a ll possi bl e inspections

d uri ng basel ine. Every state cou ld benef it from

infor ma tion ga ined and sha red in those inspections.

European Operations Command's Operations Center,

a focal point for Cf E inspection communications.

Assigni ng states to be inspected was a lso im porta nt beca use

of the grea ter dema nd among the NATO a ll ies to inspect OOVs

i n Russia tha n those in an y other Eastern sta te. The coord i na ted

effort of a l l NATO states ensured each of a t least some opportunity to i nspect OOVs in nations tha t were i mporta nt to them. This

sched u le also precl uded N ATO states from exceed ing the i nspection protocol lim its of two sim u lta neous i nspections in a coun try

and one i nspection team on a decla red site.2 The first NATO states

to cond uct inspections were Ca na da and the United States. The

Ca na dia ns notified the Russia ns tha t they wou ld a rrive for a decla red site i nspection on Ju ly 17, 1992. On the day t he Ca na dia ns

were a rriving to cond uct the first NATO inspecti on, the U.S. government noti fied R ussia n a u thorities that on J u ly 18, 1992, a n

America n i nspection tea m wou ld a rrive at the Russia n poi nt of

entry (POE), Moscow, for a decla red site i nspection. The d ifference i n dates of noti fica tion reflected a d ifferent i nterpreta tion of

im plementation; the Ca na d ians viewed the a rri va l for the inspection on the 17th as the first step of im plementa tion, whereas the

U nited States considered the noti fica tion of intent to inspect the

first step of im plementa tion.

3

The first U.S. CFE inspection team, led by Lt. Colonel Elmer

G. (Gu y ) White, USA, a rrived in Moscow at 1700 GMT on Ju ly

18, 1992. Before Tea m White deployed to R ussia, a grea t dea l of

coord ina tion and prepa ra tion ha d been completed. I n Washi ngton,

the A rms Control Pol icy Coord i na ti ng omm ittee ha d selected

11
IS8 0 -Srn I w1-c 1 10N Act.Ne

U.S . insp ection equi/Jme nt in metal

cases k nown as "silv er bullets. "

Buy, Russi a, to be the first FE inspection site and had notified

Headqu a rters OSIA of the selection . Headq ua rters OSIA had then

forwa rded tha t infor ma tion to OSIA Eu ropean Operations. In

Eu rope, Team Wh ite bega n its ma n y checks to prepa re for the

mission. Lt. Colonel Wh ite prepa red a "mission wa rning ord er " to

notify his eigh t team mem bers of the upcomi ng mission and the

sched u le of briefings req uired before depa rture. Through h is wa rning order, he a lso assigned responsi bilities for different el emen ts of

mission prepa ra tion to his team mem bers." He later gave the Plans

Section the in forma tion necessa ry to prepa re the "N otifica tion of

Intent to Inspect " mess·:ige, which wou ld u ltima tel y arrive in Moscow 36 hou rs before the America n inspection team's arriva l there.

The Plans Bra nch of OSIA's Eu ropean Opera tion s Command

compiled the in forma tion Lt. olonel Wh ite had provid ed for the

in ten t-to-inspect message and forwa rded it tO Headqua rters OSIA .

There, Robert G. Green of the Treaty List Man agement Bra nch

veri fied a ircrew and tea m augmen tee data such as na mes, birth

da tes, and pa ssport n umbe rs. Any discrepa ncies between the

Headq uarters compu ter l ists and the data tra nsm itted from the

European Operation s Command were resol ved at OSIA before the

Headq u arters Opera tion s Cen ter forwa rded the message tO the

Nuclea r Risk Red uction Cen ter (NRRC) at the U.S. State Depa rtmen t. Cha nges or d iscrepa ncies d iscovered in treaty inspector or

fligh t crew l ists wou l d be corrected in a "Remarks" block of the

notifica tion . Th is action was critica l to ensu re that U.S. inspectors

wou ld be a llowed entry wi thou t del ay to cond uct their inspecti ons.

Next, the NRRC sen t the officia l U.S. govern ment an nou ncemen t

of in tent to inspect through the Conference on Security a nd Cooperation in Eu rope (CS E) n etwork , a nd the State Depa rtment sent

the same mess·1ge through diplomatic chan nels.

5
---------------------------- CFE TRI ,\ [ ) B.\',1 1 INl· IS9

Wh i l e Hea dq u a rters OSIA, the N R RC:, a nd the State Depa rtment processed the CFE Trea ty noti f ica tion, Tea m White continued i ts prepa ra tion for this f i rst CFE on-si te inspection. The

A merica n inspection tea m ga thered infor ma tion, eq u ipmen t, a nd

docu ments req u i red for thei r m ission . Cu rren t wea ther reports for

the inspection a rea , and news of ongoing a ctivi t ies by NATO a ll y

i nspection tea ms, provided in forma tion tha t cou l d i m prove the

odds of a successf u l m ission. The tea m checked tha t its equ ipment

was opera tiona l a nd rea d y for d eploy men t. Ea ch tea m ha d i ts own

set of eq u i pment i n meta l su itcases nick na med "silver bu llets." I n

a d d iti on to their equ ipment, t h e tea m ga thered pa ssports, i nspector ba dges, dog ta gs, bottled wa ter, and mementos to be excha n u ed with thei r hosts. Tea m docu ments incl u ded ma ps of the

a rea , photos of the trea ty-l i mi ted eq u ipm ent ( TLE) su bmi tted by

the i nspected na tion a t the excha nge of treaty i n forma tion, CFE

inspection forms, i nspection notif ica tion messages, copies of the

trea ty, a nd check l ists to be used a t va rious stages of t he i nspection

tri p. As the tea m assem bled these items, Lt. Colonel Wh ite wor ked

with the Inspection Su pport Staff (ISS) to d evelop a deta i led m ission brief ing on the R ussia n site to be i nspected.

Lt. Colonel Wh i te's briefi ng pa ra l leled his mission opera tions

order. In bot h, be ou tli ned h is basic ga me pla n for the inspection

m ission, covering the ty pe of i nspection, t he speci fic si te, eq u i pmen t su bject to the trea ty a s well as an y other eq u ipment the tea m

cou l d antici pa te encou n teri ng a t the i nspection site, a nd the composition of h is i nspection tea m. H is briefi ng a lso ad d ressed the

site's ter ra i n , the wea ther forecast for the m i ssion, and hmv those

con d itions migh t a ffect the i nspection . He a lso ma de certa i n tha t

the tea m 's ti me in cou n try, from a rri va l a t the POE to its retu rn to

a PO E a fter the i nspection, wou ld be u nd er 48 hou rs. The trea ty

A British inspector drinl<s bottled

water during an inspection mission.
160 0. -S1n I SPLC 1 10 Ac.1 < '

a llowed 48 hou rs i n cou ntry to execu te a single decla red site inspection, and for a ny seq uen tia l inspections pla n ned , the trea ty

a l l owed a n a dd itiona l 36 hours per inspection, u p to a ma ximum

of 10 days.

Wh ite also set u p th ree subteams and pla nned the inspection

to ensu re red u nda nt coverage of the entire decla red site. At the

same time, he assigned specif ic responsi bil ities to ind ivid ua l team

mem bers, such as video film ing, ti mekeepi ng, passport check ing,

and moni tori ng the tea m equ i pment case th roughout the inspection. The Ame rica n tea m set u p a subtea m comm u nica tions pla n

to use d u ring the inspection, with code words for key events. Lt.

Colonel Whi te also a nnou nced the df'pa rt u re staging a rea and

time, where fina l checks wou ld be made on eq ui pment and

l uggage.6

In add ition to Wh ite's br iefing, the ISS a lso provided tea m

briefings before deployment. These i ncl uded the la test i nforma tion

ava ila ble a bou t the i nspection site, incl uding imagery from national tech nical mea ns (NTM), find ings from inspections u nder the

Vien na Docu ment, a nd the CFE data excha nged. The ISS briefi ngs

provided an insight a bout the significa nce of the site selected and

guida nce on the kind of informa tion req u ired to satisf y U.S. govern ment concerns.

In add ition to these briefings, the Cou nteri ntel ligence Section

rem inded i nspectors of persona l a nd team security req uirements

du ring CFE i nspection m issions. Topics i ncl uded ad herence to the

two-person rule tha t prohi bi ted U.S. inspectors from bei ng alone

outside their rooms or ba throoms d uri ng an i nspection m ission,

the pol icy on a lcohol consu mption d u ring a mission, a nd gu idelines on wha t was a ppropriate for d iscussion with an Eastern

escort, both i n persona l a nd busi ness matters. The U.S. governTeam White preparing to depart on

the first U.S. CFE mission to Buy,

Russia.
CfE Tin \ i'B,.,,., i 1 l 6 l

U.S. policy allowed U.S. inspect ors to engage in toasts at the completion of the inspection.

ment expected its ,FE Trea ty inspectors to be open with their

Eastern bloc escorts, bu t to rema i n u n impeacha ble in their beha vior while im plementi ng the trea ty.7

Ha vi ng completed these fina l briefi ngs, the tea m wa s prepa red to deploy on their mission to Bu y, Russia . Lt. Colonel

Whi te's tea m, incl ud ing OSIA's Director, Ma jor Genera l Robert W.

Pa rker, gathered on Ju l y 18th to perform their fina l predepa rt u re

checks for this histori c mission. Fina l checks confirmed tha t everyone was on the fligh t ma n ifest a nd ha d pass ports, inspector

ba dges, and dog ta gs. Certa in tha t bot h person nel and equ ipment

were rea dy for depa rt ure, Lt. Colonel Wh ite led the nine-person

tea m to the bus for the short ride across the ra mp to the wa iting

mil ita ry aircra ft.

The U.S. Air Force C-141 a ircra ft depa rted Rhein-Ma in

a t 1545 Fra nk fu rt time, flew for th ree hou rs, a nd la nd ed a t

Moscow's Sheremetyevo I Airport a t 2052 Moscow time. As the

tea m prepa red to depa rt the a ircra ft, Genera l Pa rker and Lt. Colonel White met the senior Russia n CFE Trea ty escorts. The tea m

chiefs agreed to 1700 Green wich mea n time ( GMT) as the officia l

a rriva l time, as ha d been an nou nced in the message of intent to

inspect. A representa ti ve of the U.S. Emba ssy's A rms Control

Impl ementa tion Un it (ACIU ) met the America n inspection tea m to

assist them and the a ircrew if needed. Mea nw hile Ca pta in Jerem y

Wi ntersteen, USA F the deputy tea m chief , ga thered passports for
162 0 -Sin. INsPrc 110. Ac.h C) 

processing. Wh ile "in cou n tr y," diplomatic pri vileges and im mu nities were extended to i n spectors a nd a ircrews as outlined i n the

trea ty. Team mem bers u nl oaded thei r gea r a nd , as pla n ned for a ll

cha nges of tra n sporta tion, one mem ber of the team per formed a

fina l sweep for a n yt h ing left beh i nd . The tea m then proceeded

through a rou ti ne R u ssi a n customs i n spection of persona l bel ongi ngs. R u ssia n CFE escorts a lso com pleted a treaty-speci fied check

of A meri ca n i n spection equ ipm en t. I n accorda nce wit h the CFE

Treaty's inspection protocol , the U.S. noti fication of i n tent to

i nspect speci fi ed a seven-hou r del ay betwee n a rriva l time at the

POE in Moscow an d Lt. Col onel Wh i te's decl aration of the first

i nspection site.

Exactly seven h ou rs a fter t he tea m's a rri va l, Lt. Colonel

Wh i te a n nou nced to the R ussia n escort tea m tha t Bu y was the si te

for the first U.S. CFE i n spection . It was now 0400 Moscow time,

0200 Fra n k f urt time.x The America n tea m had worn civil ia n

clothes on the flight ro Moscow, bu t cha nged into fiel d mili ta ry

u ni forms, ca l led BD Us-ba ttle d ress u ni forms-i n prepa ra tion for

the tri p to Bu y. D ur i ng IN F Treaty i nspections, A merica n i nspectors wore ci vi l ia n clothes t h rou ghou t the missions, bu t CFE inspections were to be cond ucted in m u ch more rugged cond i tions,

so field u n i forms were more pra ctica l. After declaring t he site to be

i n spected , t he Ameri ca n tea m noti fied t he A CIU of i ts pla n to

d epa rt for Bu y :rn d estim ated th e time of a rriv a l at 0700 GMT on

J u l y 19th.

Nea rl y th ree hou rs a fter the A merica n tea m chief bad decla red t h e si te, th e R u ssia n s escorted Tea m White to an IL- 18

a ircra ft, a nd the two tea ms l eft for Tu nosh na . After a two-a ndone-ha lf-hou r del a y in acq u iri ng grou nd tra nsporta tion in

Tu nosh na , t he tea m a nd escorts contin ued on, swi tch ing vehicles

once aga i n before a rriving a t Bu y a t 0855 G MT. The a rri va l ti me

at Bu y wa s with in five minutes of the ma ximum ni ne-hour transi t

time the trea ty perm itted from t he POE to the decla red site, in this

case a pprox ima tel y a 250-m ile tri p. The treaty a l lowed the i nspected n a ti on si x hou rs to prepare a site fol l owi ng the inspecti on

tea m 's site decl a ra ti on . I n this mission the si x-hour a l lowance was

easily satisfied. Despi te the long tra n port time, the A mer ican tea m

was ready a nd eager to begi n their i nspection.

Shortly a fter a rrivin g a t Bu y, t he tea m noti fied th e U.S. Embassy of its a rri va l. The senior R u ssia n escort then presen ted the

si te d iagra m to t he A merica ns. Lt. olonel White immed ia tely

decla red the 22nd Cen tra l Tan k Reserve Depot as t he obje ct of

verification for t he i n spection. The R u ssia n escorts and site representa tives i n t u rn com menced a 42-m i n u te prei nspection bri efing.

Du r i ng th is brief i ng, t h ey an nou nced th e depot 's eq u ipm en t qua n -

tities; they were consid 'ra bly higher th an Russia n data had previousl y i nd ica ted in Novem ber 1990. A correct i on to the 1990 infor-
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T<.ussian attachment to the Buy

inspection re/Jort to clarify

diff erences between declared data

and curre11t data.

mation h ad been mad e in Febru a ry 199 1, bu t even that was 17

mon t hs ago. The R u ssi an milita ry h ad ex perienced ma n y cha nges

si nce t hen, j u st as th e U .S. milita ry had in Eu rope. The Russi a n

Febru a r y 1991 data were ou td a ted and wo u l d be u pd a ted soon,

bu t t hat was one reason for th e on-site preinspection brief ing: to

u pd a te i n forma tion a nd expl a i n a n y d iff erences.

The Ru ssia n briefing provid ed th e U.S. tea m with speci fic

qu anti ties of t he va ri ou s CFE Treaty eq u i pment on-si te, a n explan a ti on for the d ra ma tic i ncrease of eq u i pment si nce the CFE data

had been exchanged , and a l isti n u, to be a ttach ed to the inspection

report , provi d i ng in forma tion on wh en the a dd i tiona l eq u i pmen t

had arrived and where it Ind come from. Three categories of

eq u ipmen t were present on t he decla red si te: ta n k s, armored comba t vehicles ( ACYs), a nd ACY l ook-a l i k es. In 1991, Soviet data

had ind ica ted tha t there were no ta n ks a t Bu y; bu t n ow, i n J u l y

1 992, the Ru ssia n mi l ita r y brief ers i n formed the A merica n tea m

tha t there were 996 ta n k s on site . The n u m ber of A CYs brief ed

was 301 versus a reported hold ing of 31 . The n u m ber of ACY

look -a l i kes brief ed was 176 more t h a n previou sl y reported. The

Ru ssia ns also prov ided sa fety and adm i n istrative i n formation

specific to the 22nd Centra l Ta n k Reserve Depot."

\X!ith approxi ma tel y 31 hou rs rem a ining for the America n

tea m to com plete its i n spection a nd retu rn to the POE, Lt. Colonel

White broke the tea m i n to three su btea ms a nd bega n cou nti ng the

eq u ipment on-site. Wh ite l ed one tea m w h il e h is depu ty, Ca pta in

Wi ntersteen , a nd Sergea n t Fi rst Cl ass Curtis E. Ingra m, USA, led

r he other tea ms. Sergea n t Fi rst Cla ss Ingram , Sta ff Sergeant Wa lter

E. Hare, USA , a nd wea pons specia list Mi k e Holth u s identi fied and

docu menred the eq u ipmen t at the 22nd Centra l Tan k Reserve

Depot. Genera l Pa r k er a lso con tri bu ted to t he effort to id enti fy

and cou nt eq u ipment a nd record seri a l n u mbers. Two other specia l ists, Joh n L. Detch , Jr., a nd K ip Mela t, ha nd led ph otogra ph y
164 ON-SI I lMl'H 1 10'-i AC.II\.() 

d u ties, whi le Sergea nt First Class Kenneth D. Perima n, USA, a

linguist, bridged t he com mu nica tions gap.

The tea ms i nven toried the equ ipment twice and confirmed

their figures wit h t he Russia n escorts w hen they completed a facility or grou p of equ ipm ent. Th is proced ure avoided last-min ute

recou nts to clea r u p d iscrepa ncies. It proved to be a timesaver

beca use the U.S. inventory figu res d id not ma tch those in the preinspection briefing. The U.S. tea m inventoried 254 T-54 ta nks and

417 T-55 ta n ks, which va ried from the briefed figu res of 361 a nd

308, respecti vely. R ussia n escorts a nd U.S. inspectors agreed on a

combi ned tota l of 671 T-54s and T-55s on-site. Bot h sides agreed

tha t the d ifference of two i n tota l ta n ks was a n accou nti ng mista ke, wh i l e the d ifference in tota ls for the two types of ta nks

stemmed from the d ifficu l ty in identif yi ng the ma ny va ria nts of

these tanks. The ACY and ACY look-alike inventories were nearly

error-free. The Russians briefed 301 ACYs on-site, lmore than

the teams found , and aga in the difference was

a ttributed to a ta bu la ting error. In a l l, the America n inspection tea m cou nted and recorded 1,315

pieces of trea ty equ i pment. The i nspection ended

22 hou rs a nd 37 min u tes a fter it bega n, wit h the

signing and excha nging of i nspectio n reports by

the two tea m chiefs on J u ly 20th, a t 0720 GMT.

Team Wh ite notified the U.S. Embassy tha t

the i nspecti on was complete and that the Russia n

escorts ha d a r ra nged for tra nsporta tion to the

POE within 20 min u tes a fter completion of the

inspect ion. Tea m Wh ite depa rted the site withi n

23 hours of its arriva l on-site. Tha t n ight the

tea m toured Moscow, enjoying the hospi ta lity

a rra nged by its Russia n hosts. The next morning,

J u ly 21st, the host escorts tra nsported Tea m

Wh ite to Sheremetyevo I A irport, where the tea m

rendezvoused with the America n C-141 a ircrew

a nd left Russia a t 1115 GMT. Tea m Whi te ha d

com pl eted the f i rst U.S. CFE i nspection and left

Russia wi t hin the th ree-d ay timeli ne req u ired by

the NATO decon fliction sched u le. 1 0

Wh ile the inspection i n Russia was over, the

mission was fa r from f in ished . The C-141 flight

back to Rhei n-Ma in was a wor k ing trip as tea m

mem bers reviewed notes ta ken d u ring the inspection. During the fligh t, Ca pta in Wi n tersteen

completed the CFE mission report for Lt. Colonel White's review. White wou ld submit the

CFE inspect ors partici fJated in brie/ cultural events or

sight-seeing after completing their missions.

report wi thi n a n hour of the 1430 GMT touchdown a t Rhein-Ma in. Over the next severa l days,
CFE Tiu \1' B.\-.1 1 1 -.;1 1 6

while memories were fresh, the tea m pa rticipated in mission debriefs. They la bel ed the

inspection film a nd tu rned it in for development, checked and repa ired equ i pmen t as

needed, replaced expend a bles, and ret u rned

issued clothing. Tea m White wou ld soon prepa re for its next CFE inspection mission, schedu led for August 4th at Shu ya , Russia .

The decla red site inspection a t Bu y, Russia ,

was significa nt beca use it was a h istorica l

first-the first U.S. inspection u nder the CFE

Trea ty. However, the inspection's significa nce

was not only historica l. The Russia n equ ipment

decla red at Buy in the initia l equ ipment data

excha nge of Februa ry 1991 was outda ted a nd

differed significa ntl y from wha t satel lite reconna issa nce ind icated in J u ly 1992. Questions

ra ised by NTM cou ld only be answered by a

tea m on-site, a tea m tha t ha d the right to enter

bu il d ings and determine t heir contents; inspect

a l l a reas on the site tha t cou ld hold conventiona l a rma men ts and equ ipment subject to the

trea ty (CAEST); and ta ke a deta i l ed , exact

inventory of the eq u ipment. The openness the R ussia n escorts and

loca l site officers displa yed d u ring the i nspection and du ring discussions expla in ing the i ncreased eq u ipment on-site were im portant benchmarks for the United States and the CFE Treaty. Team

White had fu lfilled its inspection mission. This first American CFE

inspection-wel l-prepa red , professiona l , and thorough-beca me

the norm for the 120-day CFE Treaty baseline phase and beyond.

FtRST U.S. EscoR M1ss10N

U.S. inspectors ha d completed seven missions ( n ine inspections) before they escorted the first Eastern inspection tea m on a

decl a red site i nspection of U.S. facil ities. On A ugust 10, 1992, the

Russia n govern ment sent notices of intent to inspect to the Germa n, Ca na dia n, and U.S. govern ments. 1 1 The Russia ns intended to

inspect U.S. a nd Ca na d ia n forces stationed in Germa ny. Germa ny

recei ved notice beca use it was the host na tion for the Russia n

i nspection mission, and as such wou l d be responsi ble for the POE

proced u res, tra nsporta tion, a nd other support for the Russia n

tea m while it was in Germa n y. On A ugust 13th, trea t y representati ves of the th ree na tions were present when the Russia n tea m

a rrived at Fra n k furt.

When the Aeroflot A N-72 touched down a t Fra n k f urt Interna tiona l Airport, the Russia n i nspection tea m d isemba rked and

U.S. CFE Treaty Team Leaders

Declared Site/Challenge Inspections

July 17-November 17, 1992

Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr. U.S. Army

Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser U.S. Army

Lt. Colonel Edwa rd G. Ga llagher, II U.S. Army

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert U.S. Air Force

Lt. Colonel Ja n S. Karcz U.S. Army

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley U.S. Ma ri ne Corps

Lt. Colonel Keith A. Oa tma n U.S. Army

Major George P. Weller U.S. Air Force

Lt. Colonel Elmer G. White U.S. Army

Reduction Inspections

July 17-November 17, 1992

Lt. Colonel Edwa rd G. Gallagher, II U.S. Army

Lt. Colonel John D. Pesterfield U.S. Air Force 

Ma jor Timothy C. Shea U.S. Army

Lt. Colonel Da vid F. Stack U.S. Air Force

Major George P. Weller U.S. Air Force
ln6 0 -51 r 1 I '>l'H 1 10 ( .1 '( '

proceeded to the VIP l ou nge where the POE proced u res were

cond ucted . The Ru ssia n tea m chief, Colonel Lev Vl ad imirovich

Pa tsiori n, and the Germa n escort tea m chief, Lt. Col onel K la u s

U rba n, agreed on a I 000 GMT a rri va l time for the inspection

report. The U.S. l i a ison tea m-Ma j or Dee Dodson Mor ris, USA,

a nd Sta ff Sergea nt Ken t 0. Ell iston, USA-a long wit h a Ca nad ia n

l i a ison tea m, pa rtici pa ted in the Germa n scort team's inspection

of the Russia n s' treaty-a u thori zed eq u i pment. The treaty a llowed

each inspected na tion to eva lua te the inspection team's equ i pment

at the POE or, if necessa ry, a t th e inspection site. This one-time

grou p inspect ion of the Russia n team's eq u ipmen t facilita ted the

inspection process. The Ru ssia n i nspection eq u ipment was acceptab l e as outli ned in the Protocol on I nspecti on .

The Ru ssia n tea m decla red Canadi a n Forces Base La hr as its

first inspection site. Ma jor Morris notified Eu ropea n Comma nd

(EUCOM) and OSIA of the selection a nd then proceeded to the

site. Ma jor Morris d id not ·Htend the prei n spection brief i ng because it was a Canad ian milita ry facility, and the Canad ians chose

to protect their nationa l sovereign ty. However, she rema ined in the

La h r a rea as the Ru ssi ans inspected , in case an y U.S. facilities were

encou ntered. The Ca na d ia ns bi lleted a ll inspectors for the night a t

La hr. The next morni ng the Russia n tea m fin ished its inspection

and annou nced the sequentia l inspection site before signing the

i nspection report.

M ajor Les Garrison, USM C, and a Canadian insp ector on a reduction insp ection.
i-;E TRI \I ) B \'>U I I lh--,

The sequen tia l inspection was to be a t a n America n site, the

U.S. A rmy Airfield a t Giebelstad t, Germa n y. Colonel Pa tsiori n

decla red the first seq uen tia l inspection site a t 1150 GMT; 10 minu tes l a ter, Lt. Colonel U rba n, the Germa n escort tea m chief, notified Ma jor Morris of the next i nspection. Immed ia tel y, she notified

Head qua rters EUCOM of the seq uentia l decla red site inspection

a nd then alerted the opera tions center a t OSIA Eu ropea n Operations. Withi n 30 min u tes of the Russia n tea m 's decla ra tion, Ma jor

George P. Wel ler, USA F, the America n escort team chief for this

mission, recei ved word of the inspection site. Ten min u tes la ter h is

10-member America n escort tea m depa rted Rhei n-Ma in, a rriving

a t Giebelsta d t a t 1500 GMT.

Wh i le Team Weller d rove to Giebelstad t, Headq ua rters

EUCOM held a conference ca ll with USAR EUR, USAFE, and

Headq ua rters OSIA to pass on the status of the inspection and to

a lert Giebelstad t to prepa re for the u pcom i ng inspection. Mea nwh ile, the Germa n tea m assumed escort responsi bi l ities from the

Canad ians as the Russi ans left the Canad ian facilities at La hr. 1 2

The Germa n escorts del ivered the R ussia n i nspectors to

Giebelstad t A rmy Air Field a t 1915 GMT, seven hours a nd 15

min u tes a fter Colonel Pa tsiori n ha d an nou nced the site for this

sequentia l inspection. Travel time to Giebelstad t was wel l with in

the n i ne-hou r ma xim u m, bu t long enough to provide six hours of

prepa ra tion time at the Army Air Field. Team Weller arrived four

hours ahead of the i nspecti on team. The U.S. team used tha t time

for its own site fam il ia riza tion and to hel p site person nel prepa re

for the CFE i nspection.

Fi ve minu tes a frer Colonel Pa tsiori n 's tea m a rrived, site officia ls presented h im a site diagra m. Thirty min u tes later, he decla red the 2nd Sq uad ron, 3d Avia tion Regiment as the OOV for

i nspection . A t th is time, u n it person nel presented the prei nspection

brief ing, wh ich ended 50 mi n u tes la ter, 2040 GMT. One poi nt of

con fusion a rose. The d ata presented i n the brief ing were da ted

A ugust 1 4, 1992. The R ussia n tea m had deployed before the most

recen t data excha nge and conseq uentl y held data from the previous excha nge. Colonel Pa tsiori n accepted the new infor ma tion,

and he a nd his tea m retired for the eveni ng.

The next morni ng, August 15th, at 0715 GMT, the Russia n

i nspectors bega n the i nspection. Site officia ls had briefed them that

there were 14 A H-64 "Apache" attack hel icopters, 1 1 OH-58

"Kiowa " mu ltipurpose attack helicopters, and 3 UH-60

"Black hawk " helicopters on site. There were d ifferences between

the reported a nd briefed n u mbers, and the reasons for those d ifferences were expla i ned to Colonel Pa tsiori n's satisfaction. At 2100

GMT Colonel Pa tsiori n officia l ly an nou nced the sequentia l site,

the U.S. A rmy's ga rrison a t Schweinfu rt, Germa n y. At 2130 GMT

Pa tsiori n completed h is inspection report a nd both he and Wel ler

signed the report. 1 3
1 68 0 -S1 1 1 I WI< 110. Ac .1 < '

The Demands of a CFE Mission

Top to bottom: Long flights in

military aircraft; harsh

environments; challenging 

conditions; fatigue from the

inspection pace, lack of sleep,

and track ing numerous details.
CH TRI \ !) B\\l l l I 16lJ

U.S. A H -64 "Apache" helicopters ready for inspection.

When the R ussia n inspection tea m left Giebelsta dt Ar m y

Ai rfield a t 2·1 45 GMT, t he Germa ns aga i n assumed escort res ponsibi l ities. The Russia n a nd Germa n tea m chiefs agreed to follow

the spirit of the trea ty, not the letter of the law, and exceed the

n ine-hou r tra vel ri me l i mi t to the next site, a l lowi ng the i nspection

tea m to ta ke ad va ntage of a com forta ble hotel i n the vicin i ty of

G ie belsra dt for the n ight. The followi ng morni ng the inspection

tea m a rri ved a t Schwein f u rt a t 0720 G MT. There, the Germa ns

rel i nq u ished responsi bi l i ty for the R ussia n rea m to the U.S. escorts

for the inspection of the U.S. A rm y's Con n Ba rracks facil i ties a t

Schwei nf u rt, home of the lst Bri ga de, 3rd Infa ntry Division .

Fol lowing the i nspection of Con n Ba rracks, the R ussia n

inspection rea m contin ued t h rou gh t h ree more CFE i nspections: a t

the Gra fenwoeh r Tra in i ng A rea , 3rd Briga de, 3rd I n fant ry Division; a t Ma i n z, the Ma i nz A rm y Depot; a nd fi na ll y a t Ba benha usen, the 41st Fiel d A rtillery Briga de. The Russia ns ha d not

pla n ned to cond uct the Gra fenwoeh r inspection, bu r a l l the ta n ks

a nd most of the ACVs norma ll y i n place a t Conn Ba rracks i n

Schwei n fu rt were not on-sire; the A merica n u n i ts ha d d eployed to

the tra in ing a reas a t Gra fenwoeh r. As a resu l t, the Russia n inspection at Schwei n fu rt was brief, since there was l i ttle eq u i pment

there. Beca use the deployed eq u ipment represented over 15 percen t of the decla red eq u ipment for Con n Ba rracks, the R ussia ns

exercised thei r trea ty righ t to d ecla re a seq uentia l i nspecti on to the

location where the eq u ipment was i n place: the Gra fenwoehr

Tra i n i ng A rea. Tea m Wel ler, OSIA's escort tea m, stayed with the

Russi a n i nspecti on tea m through the first th ree i nspections. Colonel La wrence G. Kelley, OSI A Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd 's

Chief of Opera tions, chose to ha ve Ma jor Keit h A. Oatma n, USA,

and h is tea m rel ieve Tea m Weller enrou te to the Ma inz Army

Depot. Kel ley d id this to mitiga te fa tigue a nd to a l low Wel ler's

tea m time to prepa re for a n u pcom ing i nspection m ission. Colonel

Kelley a lso wa nted to spread the escort experience a mong a ll of

the tea ms. 14 Ma jor Morris a nd Sta ff Sergea nt Ell iston rema ined as

the lia ison tea m t h roughou t the n ine-da y inspection tri p, assisting
HEADQUARTERS

MAINZ ARMY DEPOT

PARTNERSCHAFT MIT GERATEDEPOT

LORCH -WISPERTAL

I

6317

170 0 -Sl l I I WI ( 1 101 A c.1 '-.( ' 

Colonel Kelley changed escorts at

the M ainz Army Depot during the

Russian inspection mission to

mitigate fatigue and spread escort

experience among the teams.

the America n escort teams and USA REUR site officia ls as necessary. Ar Gra fenwoeh r, a very la rge Army tra in ing facility, Major

Mor ris a lso assisted in escorting rhe Russia n tea m . This concl uded

the first series of Russia n CFE inspections at America n facilities.

Colonel Pa tsiori n 's tea m depa rted Fra n k fu rt for Moscow at 09'14

GMT on A ugust 22, J 992.

The Russia n team did not decla re ambigu ities during the inspections of the five U.S. decla red sites. There were insta nces in

which the briefed and the observed equ ipment tota ls d iffered , bu t

U.S. escorts a nd site representatives fu lly expla ined those d ifferences

to the inspectors, who annota ted them i n the inspection reports. 15

FIRST u.s. LIA ISON M1ss10

The first U.S. l ia ison activity d uri ng basel ine occurred in

Engla nd on Ju ly 20, 1992, just th ree da ys a fter entry into force.

Capta i n Ellen Merk le, USAF, and Petty Officer First Class ( POl )

David E. Sparks, USN, were the l ia ison tea m tha t met the British

escort tea m chief, RA F Wing Comma nder Griff iths and his nineperson tea m a t the POE, RA F Sca rn pton. The Russia n inspection

tea m a rrived on J u ly 20th a t 1730 GMT and decla red a challenge

i nspection nea r Ca tterick Ga rrison at Rich mond; the tea m contin -

ued with seq uen tia l decla red site inspecti ons at Roma n Ba rracks at

Colchester, Mea n y Ba rracks a t Colchester, and finall y Ca rver

Ba rracks a t Wim bish. The Russia ns were in Engla nd for seven

days d u ri ng t his four-site i nspection trip. The inspection tea m did

not come u pon any U.S. facilities on these British Army insta llations, so it was a q u iet mission for the America n lia ison tea m.

Capta in Mer k le and POl Sparks sta yed i n contact with the British

escort tea m from the time the Russia n tea m a rrived i n cou n tr y

th rough its depa rture. They then retu rned to their staging a rea, the

East Gate Hotel i n Lincol n, to wa it for the next mission. 1 6
(I f l{l\ I) B \I l l I ! 'I

''BACKDOOR " Co. t i lU I ..Al IO S

Forma l commu nications proved to be a problem d u ring this

first l iaison mission and contin ued to be a source of concern

th rou ghou t basel ine. A n i n forma l com mu nica tions system developed a mong the All ies tha t ena bled them to complete thei r m issions. As a n exa m ple, Russia notified the Un ited K i ngdom tha t a

Russia n inspection team intend ed to a rrive in the Un ited Kingd om

on the even ing of Ju l y 20, J 992, to cond uct one cha l lenge and

th ree decla red site i nspecti ons d u ring a CFE m ission i n Engla nd.

Russia satisfied its trea ty notifica tion res ponsi bili ties wi t h the

single message to the Un ited K ingd om beca use i t intended to inspect onl y Engl ish sites. Di ploma tic cha nnels, however, failed to

ca rr y out the trea ty req u irement to notif y a l lies wit hi n a grou p of

states when a state recei ved a notifica tion of i ntent to inspect. The

U n i ted States wou ld ha ve been u na wa re of the i m pend ing i nspection ha d it not been for the i n forma l, "backd oor," com m u n ications system.

This system opera ted as an infor ma l networ k a mong the a r ms

control veri fica tion orga n iza tions th roughou t Eu rope. It devel oped

d u ring the coord ina tion of mock i nspections, grew as entry into

force a pproached, and mat u red d uring basel ine w hen the va rious

i nspection orga niza tions ca me to rel y on i t. For t he Un i ted States,

assign ing person nel wi th l i ngu istic ski lls to OSIA's Eu ropea n Operations was a key to the d evelopmen t of the comm u n ica ti ons

network . Colonel Kelley looked not only for R ussia n-spea k ing

i nspectors bu t a lso for person nel conversa nt i n the six CFE Ia nU.S. M aster Sergeant William N . Chesney,Jr., parti ci/Jates in a French-led reduction inspection.
172 0 -S11t Iw1c1101\ Ac.1 () 

guages when filling assign ments. For insta nce, Ca pta i n Wi lliam C.

Plumlee, USA, and Ma jor Joh n D. Mona ha n, USA, were comba t

a rms officers and West Eu ropea n FAOs. Their language skills

proved i n va lua ble as they d irected the Comma nd 's Opera tion

Center i n comm u n ica ting with the Eu ropea n verificati on agencies.

It was these skills tha t ena bled OSIA personnel to esta blish professiona l and persona l relationships wi th thei r cou nter pa rts throughout Eu rope.

The Pla ns Bra nch provided a mple opportu nity for U.S. personnel to exercise their language capa bi l ities and to commu nicate

effectivel y wit h U.S. a l l ies. Master Sergea n t Willia m N. Chesney,

Jr., USA, and Tech n ica l Sergea nt Rona ld S. Fox, USAF, of OSIA

Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd 's Plans Bra nch, both spoke Germa n; Chesney a lso spoke French a nd da bbled in severa l other

la nguages. They frequentl y spoke with the Zentru m for

Verifika tionsa ufga ben der Bu ndeswehr (ZVBW ) officia ls duri ng

prepa ra tions for mock i nspections, a nd whenever possi ble, they

spoke Germa n. They coord ina ted with the ZVBW not only U.S./

Germa n mocks bu t a lso U.S. mocks wit h other na tions a t U.S.

facilities in Germa ny. The Un ited States respected Germa n sovereignty when inviti ng other states to v isit U.S. fa cilities, a nd Germa ny took every opport u ni ty to exercise its role as host nation for

these inspections. These pla n ners hel ped OSIA develop a wor k i ng 

rela tionshi p with the busiest of the NATO verif ica tion agencies in

implementa ting the CFE Trea ty. Whenever possi ble, OSIA's Europea n Operations Comma nd commu nica ted with its cou n terpa rts

in their l angua ge. As the n umber of mocks increased and basel ine

drew nea r, commu nica ti ons among t he agencies i ncreased; people

work i ng i n the veri fica tion agencies grew increasi ngly con fident in

each other. 1 7

When baseline began itsoon became apparent that the formal

treaty notification system would not be 100percent reliable. Most

verification agencies did not transmit the official notificationsto

other states-other agencies within their governments were responsible for these formal notifications. The verifica tion agencies,

however, relied on accurate and timely information to properly

im plement the trea ty. The "Group of Four"-the French, English,

German, and America n verification agencies-called each other daily

and faxed situa tion reports to each other. In the first U.S. lia ison

mission, discussed a bove, the United States received notification of

the Russia n inspection only beca use the joi nt Arms Control Implementation Grou p (JACIG ), the United Ki ngdom's verifica tion

agency, faxed a copy of the notification to OSIA's Europea n Opera tions Comma nd on August 18th, two da ys before Russia n CFE

inspectors would arrive in Engl and. This gave the America n

inspectora te su fficient time to notify one of the two OSIA lia ison

tea ms prepositioned in Engla nd and to notif y Head qua rters

EUCOM of the impend ing i nspection. 18
Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, U.S. Army

Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, U.S. Army, was one of

the original American CFE team chiefs during the

baseline and reduction phases of treaty implementation. H e holds a master's degree in Russian area

studies. An armor officer (tank s) and a foreign area

offi cer (Russian), Lt. Colonel Fiser served with the

1st Cavalry Division in the Gulf War prior to reporting to OSI A European Operations in Frank furt,

Germany.

On pre paring the team for its inspection mission:

"The first thing I alwa ys do is give my operations

order. This is pretty much a standa rd, five pa ragraph, U.S. Army opera tions order: situation, mission, execution, administration/logistics, a nd comma nd, control, comm u n ica tion, coordination. I la y

out a ll the deployment informa tion so every bod y

knows where we're going, when we're going, what

we're going to do when we get there, and how we're

going to do it. They know who is on what subteam,

when we brea k down into two- or three-person

subtea ms, who carries what equipment, and any

specific instructions covering a myriad of issues, like

drinking wa ter or specific tea m equ ipment. It also

covers ind ivid ua l tasks like who does t he voice

format reports to the em bassy or who's responsible

for layi ng on transporta tion.

"Following the opera tions order, we have a

period of tra i n ing on a ll the inspection eq u ipment.

The onl y thing that presented a cha llenge for anybod y was ou r photogra phic eq u ipment, the video

or 35m m cameras, and the d icta phone. Those are

rea lly the only pieces of equ ipment that req uired

any tra ining. We'd also have tra in ing, usua lly two

or three hours, on the signature piece of equ ipment

that we expected to see a t that pa rticu la r type of

u n it, so everyone was well versed in what we were

going to be seeing, whether it be grou nd or a ir

equipment."

On use of CFE Treaty's database: "The point of

depa rture was always the submitted data: Charts

one, three, and five data, and their subm ission

photos. We'd usually expa nd on that qu ite a bit. I'd

assign my wea pons specia list the job of presenting

classes on the decla red TLE a nd other ty pes of

vehicles, equ ipment that vve expected to see in the

unit, be it a motorized rifle regiment or an a ir regiment. We stud ied both order of battle and equi pment ty pes and we'd expa nd our stud y from there."

On CFE team chiefs

and inspectors serving

as soldier-diplomats:

"That is a very importa nt aspect of being a

treaty inspector. It was

something I wasn't

rea lly prepa red for u ntil

I arri ved here. First, I

did some mock inspections, and then had one

or two rea l CFE Treaty

inspections u nder my belt. I fou nd, especially in the

Eastern bloc nations, tha t at mea ls, and often at the

report-signing ceremony, you would be expected to

make some sort of toast. You're expected to spea k,

to some extent, a bout the opening of relations

between our cou ntries, and on how the CFE Treaty

was bringing us closer together. There were va riations on that theme, but you are almost invaria bly

expected to say something along those l ines. That

was a new experience in my career. There is defin itely a d i plomatic side to being an inspector."

On the differences between being an inspector and

an escort: "I have to be ca refu l here. The ma in

thing that ma kes bei ng an escort more difficult is

tha t you a re defensive as opposed to being on the

offense. You have to react to the inspector. The

treaty req u ires that you aid him whenever necessa ry

in ca rrying out his inspection. At the same time,

obviousl y, we have U.S. interests tha t we are trying

to protect. So there's a fine line you have to wa lk. 

There have been times when we have had disagreements concerning the interpretation of certa in

treaty points with representatives from d ifferent

U.S. military headquarters here in Europe. We've

also had confrontations or issues arise with the

inspectors from va rious countries a t U.S. sites. That

makes escorting more difficu lt. Another aspect of

escorting is the logistics. They are much more

diff icu lt during the escort mission beca use you're

also dealing with the host nation escorts. You are

trying to make lodging arra ngements, ma ny times

off post, for 20 to 25 people, sometimes as ma ny as

28 or 29 people. Going from site to site, there is an

extreme amou nt of coordination that has to be

done. It ma kes for a very difficu lt time, and some

very, very long n ights. I've had some escort missions

where if you got a cou ple of hours sleep a night you

were doing well."

Source: Interview, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, July 12, 1993.
I74 0 -S11 1 I 1,p1 < 1 10 Ac.1 c '

U.S. BASEUNF. I SPECTlON OPERATIONS

The U.S. inspection tea ms cond ucted 44 basel i ne inspections

at Eastern sites. Beca use of civil u nrest in Georgia, the U.S. government ca nceled one mission out of concern for the sa fety of its

i nspectors. Tea ms deployed to n i ne d ifferen t cou ntries, inspecting

Russia most frequen tl y. O f the 44 inspections, only one was a

cha l lenge i nspection , cond ucted in Bela rus; the other 43 U.S. inspections were d ecl a red site i nspections. In tota l, the United States

cond ucted 22 CFE singl e i nspection m issions a nd 11 m issions

d u ring wh ich teams inspected two sites. Un like their Eastern cou nter pa rts, U.S. tea ms inspected on ly one or two sites per missi on,

never approachi ng the 10-day i n-cou ntry a llowa nce outlined in the

trea ty.

The U .S. pa ttern of inspection opera tions was in fl uenced by

the N ATO deconfl iction sched u l e. The sched u le a l loca ted each

NATO sta te three-da y inspection per iods, or "slots," i n which to

cond uct CFE i nspecti ons. The th ree-da y slot restricted a tea m's

a bil ity to cond uct seq uen tia l inspection s. The treaty a l lowed 84

hou rs to cond uct two decla red site i nspections, 48 hours for the

first a nd 36 ho u rs for each seq uentia l inspection. The NATO slot

a llowed only 72 ho urs; the tea m lost 12 hou rs when squeezing two

i nspections into the same slot. In the la ter stages of basel ine, the

slots were sometimes consecu tive, a llowi ng a tea m six days in

coun try to complete its m ission. By contrast, the Russia n CFE

tea ms adopted a l ess costly a pproach by i nspecti ng 10 U.S. sites

d u ring two i nspecti on m issions. The cost of supporti ng a nd tra nsporti ng an inspection tea m wa s borne by the inspected state, w hile

t he inspecting state pa id its wa y to and from the inspected state.

Insp ectors discuss treaty /nouisions behind an A CV in Azerbaijan.
Two tri ps instea d of five or six prod uced a sign i fica nt sa v ings for

the i nspecting sta te. 1 9

Inspections were extremely i nt rusi ve, a nd U.S. i nspectors

were tra ined to probe a nd push as deeply as possi ble w hen inspecti ng. An i nspection tea m ha d signif ica nt rights w hen cond ucti ng a n

i n spection; however, the trea ty a lso stipu la ted l i mi ts tha t protected

the i nspected state. The trea ty a u thori zed a n i nspection tea m to

inspect a ll a reas wi thi n a decla red site except those tha t belonged

excl usi vel y to a not her OOV. In add ition, inspectors ha d the sa me

rights a t locations separa ted from the site w here CA EST of the

inspected u n it were routi nel y presen t, such as a ra il hea d . Th is

mea nt, a mong other t hi ngs, tha t the i nspection tea m ha d the righ t

to access, entry, and u nobstructed i nspection of a ny loca tion,

structure, or area wi th i n a structure i n w hich CA EST were per manentl y or rou ti nel y present.

Escorts, however, cou l d a ppl y trea ty restrictions on a n i nspection tea m to li m it access to or wi t h i n a structure in severa l wa ys.

The first a nd most common wa y was by citing the two-meter rule.

A n escort cou l d den y a n i nspector access th rough a ny entra nce

th a t was less tha n two meters \vid e beca use tha t was the t h reshold

th rou 1h wh ich no CA EST cou ld fit. Ha vi ng passed th rough an

entra nce grea ter tha n two meters wide, the tea m cou l d contin ue i ts

inspection wi thin the facil ity u ntil i t rea ched a poi n t where escorts

cou ld successfu ll y appl y the two-meter ru l e. A second l i mi tation

was the right to shroud sensitive equ ipment a nd den y i nspectors

access to a n y shrouded item or conta i ner, so long as a n y one of i ts

measurements fell u nder two meters. Thi rd , escorts cou ld also

deny i nspecrors access to ha rd ened a ircraft shelters. Whi le an

escort tea m cou ld nor ma l l y preven t a n inspection tea m from entering a ha rdened a i rcra ft shelter, inspectors ha d the right to look in

to determi ne if a ny CAEST were present. Fu rther, i f CAEST were

Escorts could deny access to

aircraft shelters, hut inspectors

could require that TL E be brought

out of the shelter.
,...6 0 - 1 1 1 I ""' ( 1 1 J\c".1

Cn111•e11tion 1/

rm1111 'Ill_ a11d

f.qurp11u.:11t

uh1c,t to t/J e

Ireat v

posi tioned i n an a ircra ft shelter a nd the inspectors were denied

entry, they had the right to cou nterdema nd tha t a ll trea ty-limi ted

eq ui pment (TLE) be brought out for displa y to determ ine qua ntities, types, and models.

Final l y, escorts cou ld deny, l im i t, or delay access to those

areas or shrouded eq u i pment tha t the inspected state's govern men t

considered sensitive. Sensitive a reas cou l d hold eq ui pment tha t the

inspected state considered critica l to na tiona l secu rity, such as a

comm u nications center or a specia l wea pons storage facility. But 

not all sensitive a reas dea l t with na tiona l security; prisons, for

example, were frequently decla red sensitive a reas. If an escort

team chief decla red a n a rea or object sensitive, he then needed to

state whet her there were a n y CAEST in the a rea. If CAEST were

present, the escort tea m was req u i red to report the amou nt, type,

and model a nd to ta ke steps to satisf y inspectors tha t no add itiona l eq u i pmen t was present.

As with access to facilities, the trea ty a llowed the inspected

state to impose lim its on i nspectors' access to CA EST. The Protocol on Inspection l im ited i nspectors' access to the extent they

could con firm visually the n u mber, ty pe, a nd model or version of a

piece of CAEST. If i nspectors encou n tered reca tegorized helicopters, reclassified aircra ft, a rmored vehicle look-a l i kes, or red uced

eq uipmen t, specific i nspection protocol proced u res a llowed i nspection of the interior of these vehicles to con firm the status of the

eq ui pment. Inspectors cou ld req u ire th at the doors of an a rmored

vehicle look-a like be opened to confirm that the veh icle could not

tra nsport a comba t in fan try squad. Eq u ipment with in or on such a

vehicle cou ld be shrouded , and the inspectors had no right to enter

the vehicle.

Du ri ng baseli ne, decl a red site access beca me the most contentious issue tha t U.S. inspectors faced d u ring inspections of Eastern

states. As baseli ne bega n, the U.S. u ndersta nd ing of access on

a declared site had not changed since A merica n Am bassador

Lyn n Ha nsen and the Soviet verif ication negoti ator, Gennad iy

Yefta viyev, ironed out a n agreemen t in Novem be r 1990. Duri ng a

decla red site i nspection, a team cou l d select a nd i nspect on ly one

OOV on a decla red site-the OOV was the su bject of the inspection. The tea m, however, cou ld inspect the entire decla red site, to

its outermost na tu ra l or ma n made borders, to i ncl ude areas common to a ll OOVs loca ted on the site. Inspectors were proh i bi ted

on l y from an y a rea on the decl a red site tha t supported anot her

OOV exclusi vel y.

The first i nd ica tion of a differen t unde rsta nd ing of inspector

access d u ring a decla red site i nspection a rose d uri ng the U.S./
/ 11 /1 t !•..to'''u11/er11111

11 1111r,1' 11r 111t111m.11le

h11rdtr...

( 1 1 I RI \ I) B \ 1 1 1 I t """"T

Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II (right), leading an insp ection at Ovruch, Uk raine.

Russia n mock inspection a t Push k in, Russia, on Februa r y 12,

1992. During the Russia n prei nspection brief ing at Push k in, escorts presented a site d iagra m tha t depicted only the two OOVs a t

Push k in and a limited portion of the common a reas. Lt. Colonel

Edwa rd Ga llagher, the U.S. tea m chief, poi nted out tha t U.S. satellite reconna issa nce ind ica ted tha t there were other inspecta ble

a reas withi n the outer most bou nda ry of the ga rrison. The Russia n

escorts responded tha t the Push k i n site d iagra m was correct. Th is

pro blem was noted in the mock inspection report; the Russia ns

cou ntered t hat U.S. i nspectors had been given access to the entire

decla red site associa ted with the oov.20

When the trea ty entered into force, it became obvious tha t

some states were not using the decla red site defin ition that had

been negotiated. On A ugust 5, 1992, d u ring an ea rl y basel i ne

i nspection of the 228th High Power Arti llery Brigade a t Shuya,

Russia, Lt. Col onel White received a site diagram that illustrated

the OOV bu t not all of the common a reas on the site. Escort officials su bseq uentl y denied the tea m access to the common a reas not

included on the diagram. Nine days later, when all states again

excha nged trea ty da ta, it beca me appa rent tha t Lt. Colonel

Whi te's experience wou ld not be an isola ted one. The origina l

Soviet site d iagra ms had displa yed mu lti ple OOVs and common

a reas on a single site. The new August 14th d iagra ms ind ica ted

one OOV on one decla red site tha t was defined by the bou nda ries

of tha t OOV.2 1 The sites were no different physica lly-the common a reas rema i ned-bu t some states ha d cha nged thei r concept

of a decla red site.
I78 0 -S1 1 1 I '>l'I c 1 10 Ac.1 c ' 

Lt . Colonel J oseph }. Drach, J r., atop a tank while leadi11g a declared site insp ection.

On A ug ust 29, 1992, U.S. i nspectors had t hei r first opport un i ty ro con firm , on-site, th a t the new d iagra ms reflected ch anges in

the concept of a decl a red site. I n add ition , inspect ors wou ld determ ine how these ch a n ges a ffected in spector access d u ri ng a n i n spection . Colonel Joseph ]. Drach, J r. , USA, led a n inspection of t he

336th Rocket A rtil ler y Brigade in Osi povi ch i, Bela ru s. Dra ch

received a site d iagra m from t he Bel a ru ssi a n escorts tha t d id n ot

incl ud e a l l common areas with i n the ma n made bou nd ar ies of the

si te. More i m porta nt, the escort tea m d en i ed the i nspectors access

to com mon a reas tha r were on rhe insta ll a tion h u t excl uded from

the si te d iagra m . W hile Drach d ocu mented this fact as a n a m bigu -

ity i n his inspecti on repor t, a not h er U.S. tea m wa s pr epa rin g to

deploy to Ru ssia .22

Four da ys later, on Septem ber 4, 1992, Lt. Colonel Ja n S.

Karcz, USA, led his tea m to the 752nd Gu a rds Motorized Rifle

Regiment a t Novyy, Ru ssi a , to test the Ru ssian defin ition of a

decla red si te. H is mission wa s to d raw a "l i ne in the sand " on the

issu e of t he defini tion of a decla red si te and inspector access. In

pr epa ri ng his team to con fron t t hose issu es, Ka rcz wor k ed closely

wi th olonel Sch u yler (Sky ) Foerster, USA F, who h ad partici pated

i n the negotia t ion process i n Vienna a nd was k nowled gea ble of the

negotiators' i n tention s on t he issu e of decl a red sites a nd access.

Ka rcz a nd Foerster wor k ed with tea m l ingu ist Sergea nt Da n n y K.

Boyd , USAF, a nd Alan J. French , R u ssia n la nguage profession a l , to

pr epa re trea ty-ba sed respon ses to q u estions tha t might a rise d uri ng

t he i nspection . Wh en t he tea m deployed to Moscow, R u ssia 's onl y

POE, t h ey brou gh t a long five to si x pages of Ru ssia n text to con-
vey the U.S. position on decl a red sites a nd access i n la ngu age tha t

wou l d be u na m biguous to a n escort tea m chief.

On a rri va l a t Novyy, Lt. Colonel Ka rcz received a si te d ia1ram of the OOV tha t wa s lim i ted specifica l l y to the area ta k en u p

by t he OOV. It d i d not i ncl ude common a reas ou tside the OOV on

t h e in sta lla tion . The Ru ssia n s defined the site's bou nda ry usi ng

roads tha t were wel l wit h in the fenced a rea tha t wa s mil ita ry

pro pert y a t Novyy. A t tha t poi nt Lt. Colonel K a rcz cited A rticle

X V of the trea ty tha t al lowed t he use of NTM a nd prod uced a

ma p developed from overhead photogra phy. Ka rcz poi nted out to

Colonel V. Pa vlen ko, the R ussia n escort tea m chief, w ha t t he U.S.

considered the outer most bou nda ry of the site. After two to th ree

hou rs of d iscussion, Colonel Pav len k o left the briefi ng a rea ro

noti fy M oscow of the U.S. posi tion. He soon ret u rned a nd wou ld

not stra y from t he Russia n defi n ition of a decla red site. He reiter-

·ned t ha t the Russia n site diagra m was accu ra te as d ra wn and t ha t

the U.S. tea m would ha ve access on l y to the a rea depicted on the

diagra m. A t th is poi nt Lt. Col onel Ka rcz recogn ized tha t Colonel

Pa vlen k o was a t h is fina l posi tion a nd wou ld not bu dge. Ka rcz

com menced t he inspection .

As the inspection proceeded , Pa vlen k o ad hered to the Russia n

defi n ition of the decla red site a nd did not a llow the America ns

access to a ll a reas tha t the U.S. tea m considered com mon areas.

This prom pted Ka rcz to decl a re a n a m bigu i ty. Pa vlen k o protested

tha t a n am bigu it y was not a p propria te i n t h is situa tion beca use the

issue d i d not add ress TLE nor was i t based on objecti ve facts.

K arcz cou ntered tha t t he decla red sire defin i tion a nd access issues

were indeed based on objecti ve facts: t he negotia ti ng hi story provided a very specific defi n iti on of a decla red site and t he access to

be gra nted to an i nspection tea m a t a decla red site. The cu rren t

Ru ssia n a pproach d id not follow tha t speci fi c def i n i ti on and d id

nor satisf y CFE Trea ty req u irements, th u s the a m bigu i ty. K a rcz

rem inded Pa v l en k o that, u ltimatel y, inspectors w ri te the reports.

Lt. Colonel.fan S. Kar czsigning an

inspecti on re/J ort in Ukraine.
1 80 0 -S1 1 1· I '>Pl < 1 10:--: Ac.1 c '

The i nspecti ng tea m ch ief had the right to determi ne if a n ambiguity was to be wri tten, just as the escort tea m ch ief determ ined what

response, if a n y, wou l d be made on the report.2'

Thisnewinterpretationof a declared site spawned several

other problemsthatsurfaced repeatedly during baseline inspections.The first problem inspectorsfaced on-site wasthe site diagram.The new diagramsillustrated that the declared sitewas

defined solely by the OOV-each OOV was a declared site. In

ad d ition, states depicted OOVs bou nded by i n terna l roads, buildings, a nd fences specific to the OOV, not by the outermost bou ndaries of an insta lla tion. These site d iagra ms omitted common a reas

loca ted wit h i n a n i nsta lh tion tha t were outside the na rrowl y defined OOV. Escort tea ms, a r med w ith these site d iagra ms, a llowed

tea ms to inspect only the OOV, wh ich had become synonymous

with the decl a red site, th us limiting access to a l l common a reas.

The new decl a red site inte r preta tion a lso a ffected the req u irement

u nder CFE lA to repor t orga ni za tions a nd person nel figures for

activi ties su bject to i nspection a t the i nspection site. Escorts d id

not provide figu res for u n its located i n wha t had previousl y been

common a reas. A not her d ifficu l ty a rose at the POE, before the

sta rt of the i nspection . Inspection tea ms we re, de facto, req u ired to

an nou nce t he OOV to be i nspected while a t t he POE, beca use

OOVs were now loca ted on thei r own i nd ivid ua l decla red sites. By

decla ring the site for i nspection, i nspectors were a lso revea ling the

OOV for inspect ion . This fact i ncreased pre pa ra tion time from

one hour when inspectors selected the OOV a t the site to more

tha n six to nine hou rs when i nspectors were forced to select the

OOV a t the poi nt of entry.

The decla red site issue a rose repea ted l y d ur i ng baseli ne, ca using U.S. inspectors to decla re eight am big u ities. These ambigu ities

occurred when escorts denied inspectors access to a ll common

a reas. There were a lso occasi ons when states prod uced site d iagra ms tha t omitted a ll common a reas, bu t escorts nonetheless

a llowed access to a l l common a reas.24 The repea ted eff orts of U.S.

a nd a l l ied i nspection tea ms l ed to discussions a t the joi nt Consu ltative Grou p (JCG ) in Vien na to resol ve the situa tion.

U.S. Ambassador Lyn n M. Ha nsen add ressed the decla red site

iss11e a t the open ing meeti ng of the JCG on September 23, 1992.

He d iscussed the site def inition a nd access problems tha t Team

Ka rcz had encou ntered a t Novy y a nd tha t other America n and

NATO inspectors had encou ntered elsewhe re. Citing the August

14, 1992, excha nge of i n forma tion, A m bassador Ha nsen stated

tha t the Russia n defi n ition of a decla red site was now radica lly

different tha n tha t negotia ted in New York in la te October 1990.

The new Russia n da ta i nd icated tha t a ll multiple OOV sites had

been converted to mu lti pl e declared sites within a single installation. He h igh ligh ted one exa m ple i n which the l eft side of a dormitor y was with i n the decl a red site of one OOV whi l e the right side
CFE T1n An B su 1 1 1 81

was in a d iff erent decla red site. Ha nsen ex pressed concern as to

how this Ru ssia n a pproach migh t a ffect veri fica tion of trea ty

com plia nce.

A m bassa dor Ha nsen f urt her poi nted out tha t the new R u ssia n a pproach i n effect forced a CFE i nspection tea m ro d ecl a re the

specific OOV a t the POE. Th is ga ve the inspected pa rty a n oppornrn ity to move eq u i pment across a road a nd h ide i t i n a d ifferent

OOV d u ri ng the i nspection tea m 's n i n e-hou r tra nsi t from the POE.

At a decla red site wi t h a single OOV there wa s nowhere to hid e

the equ ipm ent beca use a ll a reas were su bject to i nspection . At the

m ul tiple OOV/clecla red si te insta lla tions the i nspect ion p rocess

cou ld become a pea i n the shel l game. This R ussia n cha nge,

Ha n sen cha rged , d irectl y th rea tened the openness tha t wa s a k ey

component i n the trea ty. Inspection tea ms cou l d no l onger visit a

site ·rnd be conf ident tha t they had seen a ll of th e eq u i pment th ere.

Fu rther negotia tions i n Vien na led the Russia ns to agree wit h the

U.S. posi tion a nd to prov ide assu ra nces tha t th ey wou ld cha nge

their si te d iagra ms.25 After recei vi ng assura nces of cha nge, N ATO

a l l ies tested the Russia ns aga in.

On October 3, 1992, I0 cla ys a fter A m bassad or Ha nsen 's

speech a nd on the h eels of a Germa n i nspection tea m, Team

Gessert deployed to the R ussia n 423rcl Gua rds M otori zed Rifle

Regi me n t a t Na ro-Fom i nsk . D uri ng tha t i nspection, the issues of

American team chief Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert discussing site diagrams and access issues with Russian

escorts at Naru-Fominsk .
182 0 -S1 1 1 I PH 1 10 Ac.J , < '

site dia grams an d mu l tiple decla red sites on an insta l lation surfaced aga in beca use the cha nges had not penetra ted th rough from

the d ipl oma tic to the opera tiona l level of the Russia n army. A lthough he recei ved the personal assu rances of General-Ma jor

Sergey Fed orovich Tsyga n k ov tha t future access wou ld be provided, Lt. Colonel Gessert decl a red a n am bigu ity. Wh i le the two

officers were d iscussi ng the issue, a French tea m tha t incl u ded Lt.

Col onel Ka rcz a n nou nced from the POE tha t it wou l d inspect one

of the decla red sites/OOVs a t Na ro-Fomi nsk. Genera l Tsyga n kov

in i tia l l y wa nted to ref use th e French permission to inspect Na roFomi nsk beca use Team Gessert was alread y in place, and the

trea ty proh i bited more tha n one team on a site. He soon rea l ized

however, tha t Na ro-Fom i nsk was a mu ltiple OOV and a m u ltiple

decla red sire, a nd tha t the French were nor req uesti ng the same

OOV tha t Gessert wa s i nspecting. He acknowled ged the French

tea m's right to cond uct i ts inspection . They d id so. These mu l ti nationa l inspections ca u sed new d iscu ssions at the ]CG i n Vien na.

They prod uced new assura nces from the Russia n representa tives

tha t the site d iagra ms a nd m ul ti pl e OOV problems would be

corrected. Three days a fter Tea m Gessert depa rted Na ro-Fomi nsk,

another U.S. team returned .26

On October 9th, Colonel Kelley led a team augmented by

two foreign mem bers-Lieu tena nt Ole T. Pedersen from Denma rk,

and Georges M. Virse from Fra nce. Their destina tion was the 12th

Gua rds Tank Regiment at Na ro-Fomi nsk . Aga in, a ma jor goal of

the mission was to test the assu ra nces given by Ru ssian delegates

in Vien na tha t site d iagra ms wou ld be changed and inspection

tea ms gra nted f u l l access to an insta l la tion. The presence of the

two a ugmenrees signa l ed to Russia that a comm u nity of nations,

not onl y the Uni ted Sta tes, considered the issue of site diagra ms

and mu l tipl e OOVs to be very serious. Team Kelley a rrived at

Na ro-Fom insk a nd , like previous tea ms, received a restricti ve site

Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser (left)

leading an inspection in Belarus.
---------------------------CFE TRI A l) B.\\H I' 1 83

d iagra m tha t d id not incl ude rhe entire i nsta lla tion. The R ussia ns

still depicted multi ple OOVs a s ind ivid ua l decla red sites; the Russians cla imed that the cha nge would come with the next trea ty

data excha nge. Colonel Kelley decla red a n am bigu ity. Afrer completing this inspection, the tea m cond ucted a sequentia l decla red

site inspection of the 589th Gua rd s Motori zed Rifle Regiment a t

Totsk oye. Aga in site d iagra ms were an issue, and aga i n Colonel

Kelley decla red an ambigu ity.27

These inspections revea led tha t the Russia ns had not yet

cha nged their position on OOVs and decla red sites, or tha t d irectives to im plement cha nge had not yet filtered down to opera tiona l

levels of the Russia n arm y. In Vien na, JCG discussions conti nued,

and Russia n delega tes stated tha t Russia wou ld soon revise the

decla red sites and site diagrams at issue to reflect multiple OOVs

colocated on single declared sites. The Russia ns ind icated tha t they

would develop new site diagrams tha t wou ld restrict access only to

those a reas specific to another OOV on the same decla red site.

Russia n represen ta tives assu red JCG delega tes tha t these cha nges

would a ppea r i n the a n n ua l excha nge of data on Decem ber 15,

1992. An encouragi ng sign tha t Russia was ma k ing head wa y in its

changes ca me on Novem ber 8, 1992. Duri ng an inspection mission

of Russia n forces in Azerba ija n, the Russia n site represen ta tives

presented Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, site diagra ms tha t

ind icated mu ltiple OOVs loca ted on a single decla red site. He

cond ucted two i nspections on tha t m ission and had no d ifficulties

i n either loca tion with site d iagra ms or inspector access.

On Ja nua ry 14, 1993, a fter a n eva lua tion of Russia 's December 15, 1992, excha nge of trea ty i nforma tion, President George

Bush presented his a n n ua l "Report to Congress on Noncom plia nce with A rms Control Agreements." In the report he stated tha t

"the R ussia n Federa tion, a nd to a lesser extent, Uk ra ine a nd

Bela rus" had devel oped a n overly restricti ve definition of a decla red site, conseq uentl y restricti ng access. Bu t he noted tha t

"In its Decem ber 15, 1992, data excha nge, the Russia n Fed -

eration has, however, ta ken action to rectif y its data depiction of

wha t should be single decla red sites with mu ltiple OOVs, and

discussions a re contin ui ng in the joi n t Consu lta tive Grou p to

resol ve the rest of the access issue. "28

The Decem ber 1992, data excha nge ind ica ted a cha nge in the

Russia n position on decla red sites, OOVs, and inspection tea m

access. Confirma tion came d uri ng subseq uent decla red site inspections in the red uction phase of the trea ty. The Russia ns had indeed

con formed to trea ty req u irements, bu t Bela rus and Uk ra i ne did

not follow Russia 's example.
184 0 -51rr I SPECTION AcFNU 

CHALLENG E INSPECTIONS

Du ri ng baseline, U.S. i nspectors cond u cted on l y one cha l lenge

i nspection. On A ugust ·1 1, 1 992, Ma jor Kei t h A. Oa tma n , USA,

led h is tea m to M i nsk , Bel a rus. Their mission was to i nspect a

la rge hold i ng of TLE tha t had not been d ecla red i n the d a ta excha nge of 1990. One hour a fter arri va l at Mi nsk, Ma jor Oa tma n

specified the a rea for inspection, an appa rent ta nk storage facility

at Urechye. Two hours later Bela russia n officia ls gra nte Ithe inspection req uest, and with i n an hour Team Oatma n was en rou te

to Urechye. Accord ing to escort officia ls, these ta n k s a nd storage

facilities were pa rt of the 969th Centra l Tank Reserve Base tha t

Belarus would decla re in a ma tter of days in its August 1992 da ta

exchange. Although none was req u ired , Bela rus officia ls gave

Tea m Oa tma n a mod if ied si te briefing tha t high l igh ted t he 969th 's

rela tionsh i p to the other two OOVs tha t were on the d ecla red site

a t U rech ye. The issue of decl a red site i nspecti on versus cha l l enge

i nspecti on a rose, beca use U rcchye was a d ecla red site for both the

30th Ta n k Regi men t a nd t h e 20t h Independ ent Recon na issa nce

Ba tta lion, a nd the speci fied a rea req uested for i nspection was

loca ted on the i nstalla tion . Ul tima tely, the Bela rus escorts a ff ord ed

Tea m Oa tma n access to the ta nk storage facil ities to com plete i ts

mission , but den ied the tea m access to a reas tha t were pa rt of the

two decla red OOVs.29

Lt.ColonelKeith Oatman co111pletesaninspection inAzerbaijan.
---------------------------CFETiu-An BASl'l IM 1 85

MULTI ATIO AL TEAMS

Du ri ng t he basel i ne period , NATO guest i nspectors frequentl y join ed U.S.-led inspection tea ms, a nd U.S. inspectors pa rtici pated as mem bers of a l l ied tea ms. The increase in inspection

opport u n i ties provided a l l ied govern ments, t hrough thei r guest

i n spectors, a broad er view of treaty im plemen ta tion th roughou t

Eu rope. The m u lti na tiona l teams represented a u n ited fron t on

tr ·ny i m plemen ta tion issu es a t the JCG, as had been the case i n

r solving t he d ecla red site def i n i ti on and access issue. Colonel

Bren na Tesori of Ita l y was the first a llied inspector to joi n a U.S.

tea m on a U.S. CFE mission, Team Gessert's d ecla red site inspection mission to Uk ra i n e, on J ul y 30, 1992.·;o Du ri ng the baseline

period, OSIA tea ms cond ucted 22 i nspections wi th the assista nce

of all ied guest inspectors, usua ll y one or two a ugmen tees per m ission . I n spectors from the Net herla nds, Fra nce, Germa n y, Denma rk , Spa i n, t he Uni ted K i ngd om, and Ita l y represented thei r

cou nt ries on U.S. tea ms. The a llied m u l tina tiona l inspection tea m

foreshadowed the i n terna tiona l mi x of team mem bers su bseq uent

to basel ine. However, w hile U.S. inspection tea ms beca me m u l tinati ona l , escort tea ms rema i ned strictl y A merica n.

U.S. BASELI E ESCORT OPERATIONS

The OSIA escort tea ms stood read y to rea ct a t nea rl y a

moment's notice. Teams i n i tia ll y ma i nta ined a 30-min u te, onehour, or th ree-hour stand by. The tea m on 30-min ute sta nd by l i ved

on base i n th e 21st Replacemen t Ba tta lion dorm i tory or the R h ei nMa i n Hotel. Thei r t h ree-da y sta nd by rota tion ma tched the time

bl ocks of t he NATO basel ine clecon fliction sched u le, faci l i ta ting

pl a n n i ng for i nspection depl oymen ts. The short reaction ti me for

escort tea ms wa s d ri ven h y the possi bi l i ty tha t an Eastern tea m

OS/ A escort team with local

escorts during a declared site

insfJ ection.
186 0 -Si llhWI( f l(), Ac.I i ) - ---

would decla re a seque n tia l inspection of a U.S. site in northern

Germa ny or in the fla nk a reas: Turkey, Greece, or Norwa y. Beca use

of the travel time to dista nt loca tions, an escort tea m might need all

of the six-hour site prepa ration time allowed by the trea ty to a rri ve

at one of the outlying inspection sites before the inspection tea m.

The U.S. escort teams had to a rrive on-site ahead of the Eastern

inspection reams to avoid delaying the inspection proce ss and to

ma ke certa in tha t the site was prepa red to receive inspectors.

Duri ng baseli ne, OSIA teams met nine Eastern inspection

tea ms and escorted them th rou gh inspect ions of 23 U.S. decla red

sires. R ussia n rea ms cond ucted 10 of those inspections d uri ng two

missions. Hu ng ·uy, Bulga ria, Pol a nd , and Czechosl ova k ia each

inspected th ree U.S. faci l i ties, and Roma nia inspected one U .S. site.

Al l Eastern i nspections of U.S. decla red sites occu rred in Centra l

Eu rope, the foca l poi nt of the trea ty; none rook place i n the fla n k s.

Specifica l l y, Eastern tea ms cond ucted 21 i n spections of U.S. forces

stationed in Germa n y, 1 in Belgi u m, and 1 in Lu xem bourg. ii

Russia n i nspectors recorded the only ambigu ities aga i nst U.S.

forces d uri ng ba seline. Du ring the second Russia n inspection mission of U.S. sites i n Septem ber 1992, Lt. Colonel Oleg Borisovich

Koptelov decla red four am bigu ities. On Septem ber 25, 1992,

he decla red an ambigu ity at the Genera l Su pport Center at

Ka isersla u rern, Germa n y, a bout the ca tegoriza tion of th ree M-728

comba t engi neer vehicles. The R ussian tea m chief asserted tha t the

vehicles shou ld be considered M-60 ta n ks because of t heir short

muzzle, 165 millimeter gun, and extra plating. The American team

chief, Lt. Col onel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, countered tha t the M728s were not M-60 ta n k s; the M-728s were designed for m ineclea ri ng opera tions. Fiser cited ArticleIll of the treaty, stati ng that 

th ey were not capa ble of "heavy firepower of ai high mu zzle velocAmerican ambulances were based

on the M -1 13 armored p ersonnel

earner.
'H Tiu ") B.\"LI 1 1 18-

i ty d irect fire gu n." The Russia n tea m chief d id

not agree and exercised his trea ty righ t to decla re

a n a mbigu ity.

Lt. Colonel K optelov decla red two more

a m bigu i ties on Septem ber 28t h, d uri ng a sequentia l i nspection a t Rhi ne Ord na nce Ba r racks. The

first concerned a m bu l ances based on the M- l 13

a r mored person nel ca r rier ( A PC). Lt. Colonel

K optelov stated tha t a n M- l 13 a m bu l a nce

shou l d be considered TLE beca use, wi th the

excepti on of q u ick ly remova ble i n terior equ ipment, i t was a n A P . Major Gu y Wh i te, who

repl aced Lt. Colonel Fiser a t R h ine Ord na nce

Ba rracks, responded t ha t beca use the vehicl e

ca r ried the "red cross a nd was configu red for

l i tters, i t was not a n APC."

Lt. Colonel K optelov's second am bigu i ty a t

the Rh i ne Ord na nce Ba rracks dea lt with the site

d iagra m a nd access. The Russi a n i nspection team

ch ief sta ted tha t U.S. m ilita ry facilities on territory west of the decl a red site should ha ve been

port ra yed on the site diagra m. He observed tha t

on l y a small roa d a nd cha i nl in k fence sepa ra ted

the depicted d ecla red site a nd m i l ita ry facilities to

the west. Lt. Colonel Koptelov add ed tha t two

The M1 13 armored personnel carrier was a mainsta y

of American forces in Europe.

roa ds connected the two loca tions, ma k i ng the facil ities a single

decla red site, a nd therefore the western portion shou ld be accessible to an inspection team. Major White replied that the facility to

the west was not associated with Rhine Ordnance Ba rracks-it

was the Wei l erbach Am m u n ition Storage Area , an old I N F site-a

sepa ra te faci l ity. Ma jor Wh ite poi nted to the eight-foot cha i nl i n k

a nd ba r bed wi re fences tha t surrou nded both faci l i ties, and to the

Germa n civil ia n roa d tha t bisected the faci l ities as evid ence tha t

they were, i n fact, sepa ra te mi l i ta ry i nsta lla tions. The two tea m

chiefs d iscussed previous site d ia gra m a nd access dispu tes tha t U.S.

i nspectors ha d docu mented d u ring i nspections of R ussi a n sites.

Ma jor Whi te ma i n ta i ned tha t the sit ua ti ons were not the same;

however, K optelov was not persua ded a nd decla red a n am bigu ity.

The R ussia n inspector's fou rt h and fina l a m bigu ity a rose

d u ri ng the l ast inspecti on of h is m ission, on Septem ber 30th, a t the

Sou th Pa r k Storage a t Moenchengla d bach . After R ussia n inspectors in ventoried another 30 M-113 based a m bu la nces there,

Koptelov repea ted the Russia n asserti on tha t these a m bu la nces

shou ld be considered A PCs, t h us TLE, contra ry to the U.S. position tha t as am bu lances they were not su bject to the trea ty.32
188 0 -S1n:INPrCTIO.'\ Ac1 NC) 

An IN MARSAT provided reliable

but bulk y communications.

AMERI AN LlAISON OPERATIONS

As discussed previou sly, the role of a U.S. l ia ison officer

( LNO) was to protect U.S. i nterests by representi ng the U.S. govern men t w henever Eastern i nspection tea ms cond ucted inspections

in a NATO state. To ensu re read iness, OSIA's lia ison tea ms in

Germa n y opera ted on a rota ting stand by sched ule. Two pri ma ry

sta nd by tea ms cou l d deploy within three hou rs of notifica tion.

Two other tea ms were on a six-hour alert a nd moved u p to the

three-hou r alert w hen one of the prima r y tea ms deployed . The

rema ining two tea ms were on a one-d ay sta nd by sched u le. The

forward-depl oyed tea ms i n Ita ly, Turkey, Spa i n, and the Un ited

Ki ngd om were pre pa red to respond at an y time. Twice a da y the

forwa rd -deployed tea ms checked with Eu ropea n Opera tions to

monitor the status of trea ty activi ties in their area . They also ma i noined ties with the host na tion 's trea ty ver ifica tion agency and

wit h the America n Embassy.

To commu n icate \Vith Eu ropea n Opera tions a nd EUCOM

when phones were not ava i la ble, each tea m deployed wit h an

IN MARSAT (Interna tiona l Ma ritime Satell ite) commu n ica tions

station. The IN MARSAT, a n 80-pou nd self-con ta ined satel l ite

commu n ica tions system, was relia ble and effective, but very cu mbersome. Cel l u l a r phones offered L Os fa r grea ter flexi bili ty.

Cellula r phones were not a va ila bl e to a ll LNOs at the onset of the

CFE basel i ne, bu t were provid ed when they beca me ava ila ble. The

cell ul a r phones were pu rchased in Germa n y; there were d ifferent

na tiona l phone systems th rou ghou t Eu rope, a nd the new cellu la r

phones d id not wor k on a ll of the systems. Engla nd a nd Spain

were two cou n tries w here LNOs experienced some d iff icul ties.

There were a lso pl aces where the cellula r comm u nica tions systems

had "dead spots." The LNOs u ltima tel y rel ied on thei r resourcefu lness to k eep l i nes of commu nica tion open wit h the host escort

tea m, Eu ropea n Opera tions, a nd EUCOM.

Proced u res for America n LNOs va ried from na tion to na tion.

Before the basel i ne peri od , ·1joi nt State Depa rtment and Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) team tra veled throu ghout the NATO states to

negotia te bilatera l a greemen ts that wou ld outline specifically wha t

actions the America n tea ms could ta ke to protect U.S. interests

and rights. These agreeme nts va ried wid ely. The U.S.-Ger ma n

agreeme nt mirrored yea rs of closc govern men t coopera tion a nd

the interaction of sinn ifica n t U.S. and Germa n milita ry forces. Th is

agreement per m itted a n A merica n presence a t the POE when

Eastern inspecti on tea ms a rri ved . Frequently Germa n escort tea ms

invi ted the A merica n L Os to ride with them a nd the inspection

tea m on the sa me bu s. The Germa n escorts kept U.S. LNOs wdl

in formed of the inspection tea m 's status a nd intentions for sequentia l i nspections. The timel i ness of the Germa n notifiica tions a llowed A merica n LN Os, th rou gh OSIA's "Big Hog" data ba se, to
----------------------------CfE TRI \ I) B \\I I I I 1 8'1

q u ick l y d etermi ne wh ich U.S. forces were k nown to be in the

vicin ity of the next inspection. Conseq uentl y, those forces ha d a

better opport u nity to pre pa re for a possi ble i nspection.

As d iscussed previousl y, ma inta ining u p-to-da te data bases

was d ifficu lt beca use of the wide va riety of activities of U.S. forces

i n Eu rope. On two occasions, neither OSIA nor EUCOM d atabases provided the A merica n LNOs i n formation of U.S. forces

loca ted on sites to be i nspected. In Germa n y, 600 U.S. soldiers

pa rticipa ting i n an a n n ua l ma jor NATO exercise, R EFORGER,

surprised a Germa n escort tea m when they encou ntered them nea r

Ha m burg. The America n LNO tea m stand ing by in the vici n ity

responded to the Germa n discovery and the inspection proceeded

smoothly. A simila r situa tion a rose i n Floren nes, Belgiu m. Nei ther

EUCOM nor OSIA da ta bases were u pda ted to show the tem pora ry deployment of two F-15 and four F-16 a ircra ft to a U.S.

tra ining progra m i n Belgi u m. However, the chief l ia ison off icer,

Ma jor Richa rd J. O'Shea , USAF, was awa re tha t the tra i n i ng program existed a nd the U.S. lia ison team was a bl e to alert the U.S.

forces a nd pre pa re them for the inspection. I n both cases the U.S.

l ia ison tea ms, with the coopera tion of host escort tea ms, protected

A merica n interests. 33

Other NATO nations took a m uch more restricti ve approach.

Tu r key and Portuga l , for exam pl e, preferred to exercise thei r

na tiona l sovereignt y and i nsisted tha t U.S. LNOs not be present a t

U.S. aircraft, lil<e theF-16, could be found throughoutEurofJe far from American sites.
I 90 0.-SI 1 1 I '>Pl ( 1 10 A<.t ( )

the POE when Eastern tea ms a rri ved . In the opinion of these nations, the inspecti on process d id not involve the United States u ntil

America n forces beca me su bject to inspection. In an October 1992

inspection, the Port uguese escort tea m chief told the America n

LNO, Ma jor Cha rl es R. A l l ison, USA, tha t the U.S. govern ment

wou ld be noti fied through the America n Embassy if the Russia n

team wa nted to inspect U.S. facil ities.34

Ma jor Joh n M. Bilyeu , USA, had a sim ila r experience when a

Bulga ria n tea m ar rived in Turkey on J uly 27, 1992. The Turk ish

govern ment had chosen to m inim ize U.S. visibility du ring CFE

inspections. The America n LNOs tra vel ed to the vici nity of the

POE a nd attem pted to con tact the escort tea m chief, but cou ld

not. The U.S. tea m recei ved no informa t ion from the Turkish

escort tea m u n ti l a fter the Bu lga ria n tea m had cond ucted two

inspections and wa s pre pa ri ng to depa rt the cou ntry. Lack ing

i nformation, the A merica n tea m deployed to the only k nown U.S.

facili ties that were in the area of the POE and stood by i n case the

Bu lga ria ns opted to i nspect tha t loca tion.35

In A u gust 1992, it was clea r tha t Eastern na tions were not

keepi ng pace with their a llotted CFE baseli ne inspection qu otas.

It also beca me a ppa rent tha t the Eastern inspection tea ms were

inspecting severa l sites d u ring each mission , th us minimizi ng tra vel

expenses. For U.S. lia ison tea ms this i mpl ied fa r fewer deployments to POEs, bu t it a lso mea nt longer m issions when they did

deploy.

In la te August, Lt. Col onel Stephen A. Ba rneby, USA, Chief

of the Pla ns Bra nch, eva lua ted the Eastern states' inspection pa ttern amd recom mended cu tti ng the n u mber of forwa rd-deployed

lia ison tea ms. On September 3, 1992, Col onel Willia m R. Smith,

USAF, Comma nder, OSIA Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd, agreed

and proposed the cuts to Headq ua rters OSIA. In mid-Septem ber,

the United Sta tes red uced its forwa rd-deployed LNO presence to

single tea ms in Ita l y, the United Ki ngdom, and Turkey. The single

tea m in Spa i n was elimi na ted . Colonel Kell ey decided that Lt.

Colonel Ba rneby, a West Europea n foreign a rea officer (FAO ) who

ha d come to Eu ro pea n Opera tions Com ma nd in Ju ly 1992 from a

three-yea r tou r i n Spai n, would deploy from Fra n k fu rt to Spa in

when req u ired. Throu ghou t the rest of the baseline period , the

rema in ing LNO tea ms fu lfilled the JCS req u irement to provide an

A merica n presence to protect A merica n righ ts and interests w henever an Eastern inspection tea m entered a N ATO sta te.36

U.S. BASELINE REDUCTION INSPECTIONS

Under the CFE Trea ty, red uction inspections provided the

prima ry mea ns to determ ine tha t nations were meeti ng their obliga tions to red uce TLE. Western red uction i nspection tea ms were
I E I I{I \ J 'B ..., II I I 1 1

usua lly mul tina tiona l , and tea m leadersh ip va ried from mission to

mission. The N ATO VCC designa ted wh ich na tion wou ld lead

red uction inspection tea ms for the grou p of 16 states. Rotati ng

tea m leadership spread the bu rden of the expense and the difficu l ty of provid ing transporta tion, billeti ng, and meals associated

with the i nspection eff ort. Man y na tions, however, decl ined the

opport u nity to lead red uction tea ms d uri ng baseli ne, la rgel y beca use of the cost.

Initia l l y, the Eastern sta tes red uced small sets of eq u i pment

1 I 011 ( • S.

e11t.1t/l u mid

over a 30-da y period , causing Western inspection teams to deploy

freq uentl y. Colonel Smith suggested tha t the VCC consider decreasi ng the size of red uction i nspection teams to red uce costs.

p 1rt1 l/J zt

1111 1011, 111

zt u 011/

rufrtc tu 11

[ 111tcd

!f1t th ,I

Whi le other na tions declined lead ing red uction inspection tea ms,

the U.S. government's pol icy dicta ted tha t a t least one U.S. representative wou ld pa rticipa te on any red uction mission and tha t the

United States would accept the lead on a mission whenever the

VCC offered it. Colonel Smith a lso recom mended tha t na tions

l engthen their red uction periods to the a llowa ble 90 da ys a nd

increase the a mou nt of eq u i pment for red uction, there by decreasing the n u mber of red uction i nspections. During the baseli ne period, U.S. i nspectors led 5 of the 23 NATO a llia nce red uction

i nspection teams a nd pa rtici pa ted in 12 others.

The first U.S.-led mission was i n Germa n y. 37 Lt. Colonel Joh n

D. Peste rfield, USA F, led the first U.S. red uction team to the Ca pita l Repa ir Pla nt a t Wuensdorf, Germa ny, on August 6, 1992. Tea m

Peste rfield was composed of five America ns, a n Ita l ia n, a Belgia n,

a Canad ian, and an inspector from the United Kingdom. Wh ile

cond ucti ng an openi ng i nspection, the team checked and recorded

the serial n umbers of the 100 ACVs to be red uced over the next 30

da ys. The team a lso watched and confirmed the destruction of two

ACVs-a BMP-1 and a BTR-60. Lt. Colonel

Pesterf ield signed the i nspection report on A ugust 8th, ind ica ti ng that h is tea m had con firmed

the destruction of two ACVs and recorded the

seria l numbers of those yet to be destroyed. Team

Pesterfield 's da ta were ava ila ble to the governments in volved in the inspection and were su bmitted to NATO's VCC.

The VCC ma inta ined the in forma tion for

subseq uent use by the closu re i nspection tea m

tha t wou ld ret u rn to Wuensdorf to con firm the

red uction of the rema ining 98 pieces of equi pment. The Wuensdorf red uction period highlighted the VCC's critica l role in sched uli ng and

data collection for red uction m issions. The

Un ited States did not lead the follow-u p team,

ofi d.

bu t tha t team prepa red for the mission based on

the information provided by the VCC. Duri ng

Spanish and Danish inspectors on a multinational

reduction inspection team.

tzd

1

1c/11 •

J11 1l11

i ti e

I u 1
I<)_ 0 -1 r1 I Pl< 1 10 A<.F < )

the ba sel i ne period , OSIA i nspector s led fou r other red uction

inspection s, two to Ukra i ne, one to Poland , and one to Bu l ?aria .

A ll five red uct ion i ns pecti ons were successf u l mu lti na tion a l efforts

a nd provid ed evidence cha t na tions were sa tisf yi ng the trea ty's

centra l objecti ve: red uci ng m i l ita ry ha rd wa re in Cen tra l Eu rope. ix

Ot>ERA no 'A L Is Es

A mer ica n inspection tea ms encou n tered va ri ous d i fficu lties

du ring the CFE basel i ne. The m ajor pro blems tha t a rose concerned

the d efi n ition of a d ecl a red si te and the resu l ting d ifficu lties with

i nspector access. As t he basel i ne end ed, however, Western sta tes

held a cau tious optimism tha t Ru ssi a had resolved these probl ems..

Ukra ine a nd Bel a rus, however, offered no i nd ication of cha ngi ng

their restricti ve a pproach to the d efin ition of a d ecla red site. The

issue of U.S. a rmored a mbu l ances versus M-l 13 APC:s a lso rema i ned u n resol ved . Com m u n ica tions prov ided the most freq uen t

opera tiona l probl ems tha t OSIA tea ms con fron ted .

Du ring the ea rl y stages of ba sel ine, OSIA Eu ropea n Operations occasi ona ll y had to mod if y n ot i fica tion messages beca use

a i rcrew iden tifica tion was i naccma te or beca use trea ty-req u ired

data had to be cha nged . Eu ropea n Opera tions had no control over

a ircrew i dentif ica tion i nforma tion, wh ich was the responsi bility of

the a ircrews' wi ng. In fact, EO cou l d not con firm aircrew data

u nti l the crews ar ri ved i n Fra n k f u r t. Colonel Smith recogni zed that

la te cha nges to i nspecti on noti fica tion messa ges were an i rr ita nt to

Sta te Depa rt ment com m u n ica tions specia l ists. Yet, he took excepBulgarian escorts stand on a treatylimited tank converted f or static

displa y.
CH· IU '" lh'>ll I I ( CJ)

tion to their insistence tha t no cha nges cou ld be mad e a fter the

i n itia l message su bm ission. On th ree occa sions d u ri ng J u l y-Augu st

1 992, State Depa rtmen t represen tati ves ba lked a t tra n sm itting la te

m essage cha nges. The probl em was simple to sta te, bu t d i ffi cu l t to

resolve. On t he one ha nd , Colonel Smith had to provid e

ma nd i tor y treaty i n formation a bou t the inspections to the trea ty

states. On the other ha nd , t he Sta te Depa rtment had to tra nsm i t

accurate, sta nd a rd i zed message da ta to foreign na tion s t h rough t he

A meri ca n em bassies. When opera tiona l pressures crea tec) req u i rements for cha nging t he data , network stand a rds resisted a ny

cha nges. Frict i on resu l ted. The pr oblem wa s resolved over ti me

by closer coord ina tion on th e mancl itory CFE Treaty data req u irements a nd hy better ad vance mission pla n n i ng. By the encl of th e

basel i ne peri od, comm u ni ca ti ng messages ove r the Sta te Depa rtment networ k had i mpr oved considera bl y.

Another com m u nica tion s probl em stem med from host na -

tions' provid i ng l ate an n ou ncemen ts tha t t h ey ha d recei ved i ntentto-i n spect messages, a nd someti mes tha t i n forma tion ca me on l y

t h rou gh i n forma l cha n nels. This problem conti n ued t h rou ghou t

t he ba sel i ne period. As l ate as Nov em ber 1 2, 1992, 1 1 8 d a ys i n to

basel i ne, Greece noti fied t he U n i ted States of a Hu nga ri an i nspection th a t had sta rred two da ys ea rl ier. In th is case, a n Ameri ca n

LN O was n ot i n place to protect U .S. i nterests.39 La te notif ica ti ons

frequ entl y pu t U.S. lia ison rea ms i n the positi on of catch ing u p

with inspection tea ms. These noti f ication problems, cou pled wi t h

some n ation s' practi ce of k eepi ng U.S. l i a ison tea ms a t a d ista nce,

ma de i t d i fficu l t for LN Os to gather in forma tion a nd be certa in

th a t a l l U.S. interests were protected d u ri n g i nspections.

The strict "letter of the law " a pproach to treaty i m pl emen ta -

tion ta k en by OSIA te'Hns per iod ica l l y stra i ned wor k ing rel a tions,

especially w hen U.S. met hod s were com pa red wi t h the "spi rit of

the l a w " a pproa ch ta ken by other n a ti ons. A s d i rected by the

Na tiona l Secu rity ou nci l , OSl A tea ms impl emen ted the treaty

wit hou t devia tion. Ameri ca n army fiel d com ma nd ers com pl a ined

to Headqua rters USA REU R th a t OSIA tea m chiefs were too rigid

in their inter preta tion of treaty timel ine req uirements; tha t OSIA

tea m ch i efs wou ld not a llow rime req u i rements to be rel axed so

that inspection cou ld begin i n th e morn ing i n stead of la te a t n igh t.

This wou ld prevent ca l l i ng civi l ia ns in to wor k on overti me a nd

keepi ng milita ry personn el on d u ty for lengthy per iod s. Fi eld comma nd ers poi nted ou t th at other n a tions took a much more casu a l

a pproach to trea ty i m pl ementation.

Si m ila rl y, Eastern inspectors ex pressed d ispl ea su re tha t OSIA

teams a rrived la te a t n igh t or on week end s, ca u sing d ifficu lti es

wi t h t h ei r wor k force.40 Wh a t wa s n ot k novvn to Eastern escort

teams was the VCC sched u l i ng of inspection s a nd the NATOim posed t hree-da y inspection ti me block. Wh en U.S. tea m s de-

...the "fett er uf the f,11l'"

c1i111/><1red u•it/J th<' ··pirit of

the /,11t' 0

'••
194 0 -SI I j I '>Pl CTll.>:\ A<.1 ( ) -

" I he 111c1i11 p,u,i/ o( tl.1e trc,1/ ·

ha1! hec11 t1C(u111/J/1shl' d / J )

1 11111g the lrc.1ty. md the

ployed , they had l i ttl e choice bu t to execu te their pla n. A n Eastern

escort tea m migh t ha ve been will ing to a llow an America n tea m to

relax time req u irements; however, by agreeing, the America n tea m

mig h t ha ve prevented another tea m, U.S. or a llied, from cond ucti ng a pla n ned in spection severa l hou rs la ter. The 120-day basel ine

was a rel a ti vely short period in which to complete n u merou s inspections, and there were bound to be incon veniences associa ted

with an y la rge-sca l e effort. Illustra tive of ma ny states' outlook was

a Bu lga ria n inspector's comment d uri ng an inspection in Belgi um:

"The ma in goa l of the trea ty had been accomplished by sign ing the 41

m/1cct11111 lt'erc 111erelv ,,

fonnd Iitv...

Bui · ri n 111'f tl11

(,'c•11n-.r! I' 1rl er "ll'n11ld //()/

,1pologJ::.e fur OSIA

_ t mdt1rd·()/ 111/>l' c L11111...

trea ty, a nd the i nspections were merel y a forma lity."

Ma n y i nspectors from nations in both groups of sta tes cited

the "spirit of rhe trea ty" as a guide for implemen ta tion. The U.S.

experience d u ring INF Trea ty im plementa tion, however, ind ica ted

tha t pa rtici pa nts ad hering strictly to trea ty req u iremen ts had l i ttle

dou bt concerning thei r own or thei r cou nterpa rts' responsibil i ties

a nd righ ts. OSIA's Director, Ma jor Genera l Robert W. Pa rker,

USA F, expressed tha t view i n a letter to USAREUR 's Major Genera l Joseph T. Davies, USA, on the issue of inspection tea ms' la te

a rriva ls and briefi ngs at U.S. facilities. Pa rker poi nted out tha t

host state escort tea ms, not OSIA lia ison or escort tea ms, del ivered

inspection tea ms to a site following trea ty guidelines. Once a t the

site, the U.S. govern ment had specific trea ty obligations to fu lfill.

Genera l Pa rker stated categorica l ly tha t he "would not a pologize

for OSIA sta nda rds of i nspection." He said tha t OSIA inspectors

followed the trea ty strictly so tha t there wou ld be no dou bt as to

wha t the req u i remen ts were a nd so that those req u iremen ts wou ld

be fu lfilled. He asserted tha t i n this wa y everyone's righ ts were

being protected .

Despite comm u n ica tion a nd perception problems, OSIA

inspectors, escorts, and LNOs succeeded i n f u lfilling their responsibil i ties a nd protecting the rights of the United States as outlined

in the CFE Trea ty. Probl ems tha t arose d uring inspections were

discussed and ha nd led in a professiona l ma nner by OSIA tea m

members a nd their counterpa rts. Even in situations that resu lted

in decl a ra tions of ambigu ities, inspection a nd escort tea ms ma i nta ined a n "operationa l " a tmosphere, leaving resol u tion of problems to t heir governmen ts.

During basel ine, OSIA inspection teams tra veled 33 times

in to Eastern na tions to cond uct 44 inspections. On one other

occasion a tea m tra veled ro Moscow only to resched ule the mission beca use of poor wea ther cond itions a t the inspection site. The

U.S. completed 98 percent of tfue 45 missions ava ila ble to it.

Meanwhi le, Eastern tea ms completed on ly 66 percent of the 34

i nspections a va ila bl e to them at U.S. decla red sites. OSIA escort

rea ms responded to 9 Ea stern inspection m issions to 23 inspection

sites.
CFE Tiu.\[) B.\<irt 1 1 !9 )

NOTES

l . Conference on Secu ri ty a nd ,oopera tion i n Eu rope, Prouisional

Ap plication of the Treaty on Conuentional Armed Forces in curope of

N ouemher 1 9, 1 990, .J u l y I0, 1992; Con ference on Secu ri ty a n d

Coope ra ti on i n Eu ro pe, Docum ent on entry into Force uf the Treaty on

Conuentirmal Armed Forces in Europe, Novem ber l.3, 1992.

2. Necil J ed imogl u, Hea d of the NATO Ve rifica ti on a n d Im pl ementa tion

Coord i n a tion Section, "NATO's Role 1n Veri fica tion a n d Com pl i a nce

!vlon i tori ng for t he CFE Trea ty a n d t h e Vien n a Docu ment," speech

presented to the Un ited Na tions Grou p of Gove rn men ta l Ex perts on

Veri fication i n A l l its Aspects, New York, .J u l y 1 9, 1994; OSI A Eu ropea n

Opera tions Com ma nd, "Brief i ng Pa per on G rou p of 1 6 I nspecti ons

,oncl uctecl, as of: 1 800, Novem be r 1 .3, 1992: Da y 120 of Basel i ne. "

3. Arms Control Report er / 992, p. 407.B.477.

4. l ntcrv1cw wi th Lt. Col one.I Th om as C:. Fiser, USA, Tea m Ch ief, OSI A, by

.Joseph P. Hara h a n, H istori a n, OSIA, Rhein-J\fai n Air Base, Germa n y, J u ly

12, 199.3; CFE Trea ty Lesson Pla n, "Pla n n i ng, Pre pa ra tion, a nd Cond uct of

a n I nspection," Tra i n i ng Di v isi on, OSIA, J u ne 9, 1 99.3.

S . Ins pection Missi on Message Folder, C92-Bl ue-00 l -RS-LTC: Wh i te; OSIA

Opera ti ons Cen te r Gu i de, "N R R , Message Tra nsrn ission Proced u res," no

d a te.

6. I nterv i ew, Fiser; CFE Trea ty Lesson Pla n, 1 99.3.

7. OSI A Pol icy Memora nd u m, "Pol icy on A lcohol ic Beverages," Ma rch 20,

1 991; OSI A Pol icy !'vlcmora ncl u m, "Two Person R u le," A pri l 30, 1 993;

OSI A Memora nd u m, "Gu ida nce on Pu bl ic Discussions :oncern i ng

In specti on Activ i ties," Ma rch 5, 1 990.

8. I ns pecti on M issi on Message Folder, C:92 -Bl ue-001-RS-LTC: Wh i te;

I nspecti on Report, C:92-Bl ue-001 -RS-LTC: Wh i te, J u l y 20, 1992.

9. I nspecti on Report, C92-Bl uc-00 l -RS, J u l y 20, 1 992. ( An expl a na tion of

t he report f i l i ng code: C92 = CFE Trea ty 1992; Bl ue = U.S. i n spection; 001

= 1st i nspection; RS = R ussia n OOV. Ot her Eastern Europea n n a tion s

incl ucl ecl A rmen i a, AM; Azerba ija n, AZ; Bel a r us, BL; Bu lga ria , BU;

,zechoslova k i a, CZ !la ter Czech Repu bl ic, :Z a nd Slova k Re pu bl ic, SQ I ;

Georgi a, GE; H u nga ry, H U; Mol dova , ivl O; Pol a nd, PL; Rom a n i a , RO;

a n d Uk ra i ne, UP.)

1 0. I bi d.

1 1. Message, Secreta r y of State, "C: FE: opy of Noti fica tion to I n spect

Recei ved from R ussia ," A ugust 1 1, 1 992.

1 2. Report, ·Ma jor Dee Dodson ivlorris, USA F, Lia ison Officer, "Lia ison

Officer's After Action Report - Inspection 92- ,,FE-01 3-RS-GM ."

·1 3. I bid; I nspection Repo rt , 92-CFE-013-RS-GM, Giebel stad t, A ugust 14,

1992; Report , Ma jor George P. Wel ler, USA F, Escort Tea m Ch ief, "CFE

Escort Tea m Su m ma ry, 92-CFE-013- RS-G M," Septem ber 4, 1992.

14. Interv i ew with Colonel La wrence G. Kel ley, US, IC, Ch ief, Ope ra tions

Di vision, Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd, OSI A, by Josep h P. Ha ra h a n, 

H istoria n , OSI A, Wash i ngton, D. C., ivla y 1 8, 1 994; Report, Ma i or Dee

Dodson Mor ris, USA r Liaison Off ice r, "Lia ison Off ice r's After Action

Report - Inspection 92-CFE-O 1 3-RS-G M.''
196 0"1-51 r h1·1c 1 10" Ac1 < '

1 5. I ns pection Re ports, 92-CFE-013-RS- G M, G i ebe lstad t, A ugust 14, 1992;

Schwei n f u rt, A ugust 15, 1992; Gra fe n woeh r, A ugust 16, 1992; Ma i nz,

A ugust 20, 1992; Ba hc·n ha uscn , August 21, 1992; Ma jor George P. Wel ler,

"CFE Escort Tea m Su m ma ry, 92-CFE-013-RS-G M," Septem ber 4, 1992.

16. Re port, Ca pta i n Ellen Mer k le, USA F, Li a ison Officer, "Lia ison Office r's

After Action Re port - I ns pection 92-CFE-001- RS-U K ."

1 7. I nterv iew w it h Master Sergea nt Wi ll i a m N. Ch esn e •, Pla nner, Eu ropea n

Opera tions Com ma n d, OSI A, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, H istoria n, OSI A,

Rhei n-Ma i n Ai r Base, Germa n )', J u l y 12, 1993. J nter view, Kelley.

18. Report, Pl a ns Section, Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd, OSI A, "C:FE

Basel i ne Actv i ties, I n forma l R eporti ng J u l y 17-30 a nd J u l y 30-A ugust 14,

1992."

19. Report, CFE Bra nch , Di rector of Pl a n s, Opera ti on >, and Tra i n i ng, OSIA,

" FE Qu ick Look as of Nov em ber 13, 1992."

20. Report, I m pleme nta tion Req ui rements Off ice, OSI A, "After Action Re port

on U.S.- R ussi a n Mock CFE I nspections," March 9, 1992.

21. Inspection Report, C92-Bl ue-005-RS , A ugust 6, 1992.

22. I n specti on Report, C92-Bl ue-Ol 4-BL, A ugust 30, 1 992.

23. I ns pection Report, C92-B]ue -O 1 5-RS, Septem be r 5 , 1992; I nterview wi t h

Lt. Col one l J a n S. Ka rcz, USA, Tea m Ch ief, OSI A, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n,

Histori a n, OSIA, Rhei n-Ma i n Ai r Base, Germa n y, Decem ber 1 3, 1993;

Presid en t George· Bush, Adherence to and Compliance with Arrns Control

Agreements and the President's R eport to Congress 011 Soviet N oncompliance with Arms Control A"reements, prepa red by the U.S. A r m s Control

a nd Disa r ma men t Agency, .Ja n ua r y 14, 1993.

24. I nspection Reports ( All reports sta rt w i th C92-Bl ue-) 005-RS, A ugu st 5 ,

1 992 ; 007-RO, A ugust 7 a n d 8, 1992; 013-RS , A ugust 27, 1992; 014-l\L,

A ugust 30, 1992; 01 5-RS, Septem ber 5, 1992; 019-RO, Septem ber 12,

1992; 021- BL, Septe mber 17, 1992; 024-RS, Septem ber 26, 1992; 030-RS,

October 5 , 1992; 032-R S, Octobe r 11 a nd 12, 1992; 033-U P, October 1 3,

1 992; 039-A Z, No vem be r 1 1 , 1992.

25. Amba ssador Lynn M. Ha nsen, U.S. Govern men t CFE Trea ty Negotiator,

Statement to the J oint Consu l ta tive Grou p, Septem be r 23, 1992.

26. Inte rvi ew w i th Lt. Col onel Da v i d P. Gessert, USAF, Tea m Ch ief , OSI A, by

.Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, H istoria n, OSIA, R hein -M ai n Air Base, ;crma n y, J u l y

1 2, 1993; T ns pection Re port, C92- Bl u e-030-RS, October 5 , 1 992 .

27. I nter v iew, Kel ley; I ns pection Report, C92-Bl uc-032-RS, Octobe r 11, 1992.

28. Bush, Ja n u a ry 1 4, 1 993.

29. I ns pection Report, C92-Bl ue-008-BL, A ugust 12, 1992.

.30. I ns pection Mission Messa ge Fold e r, C92-Bl ue-004-U P-LTC Gesse rt.

31. Report, CFE Bra nch.

32. Escort Missi on Re ports Folder, 92-CFE-032-RS-GE; Lr. Colonel Stephen A.

Ba rne hy, USA, Pl a ns/Li a ison Bra nch, Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma n d,

OSIA, "Backgrou nd Pa pe r on Am bigu i ties," .J a n u a ry 7, 1993.

33. Escort Mission Reports Fold er, 92-C:FE-038-PL-BE.

34. Inter vi ew w i t h Ma1or Ric ha rd .J. O'Shea, USA F, Li a ison Officer, Eu ro pea n

Opera tions Com ma nd, OSI A, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n, H istoria n , OSI A,

Rhei n-Ma i n Ai r Base, Germa n y, Iu l y 1 2, 1993; Escort M ission Re ports

Fol der, 92-CFE-041-RS-PO.
1 fE 1u \ T ' B w-11 1 J r

35. Escort i\tlission Re ports Folder, 92-CFE-005-BU-TU.

36. I nterv iew, O'Shea; Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USA F, Director of Pla ns,

Operations, a nd Tra i n i ng, OSIA, "Memora nd u m on A ugmen ta tion CFE

Lia ison Office r Teams," September 1J , 1 992; Colonel Wi lliam R. Smith,

USA F, Comma nder, Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd, OSIA, "Men1ora ndu m on Redeploy ment of Tempora ry Lia ison Tea ms, Novem ber 8- 1 6,

1992," Novem ber 9, 1 992.

37. Colonel Wil l iam R. Sm ith, USAF, Comma nder, Eu ropea n Opera tions

Com ma nd, OSIA, "Memora nd u m on Red uction Difficu l ties," iVla rch 4,

1993; Colonel La wrence G. Kel ley, USMC, Ch i ef, Opera tions Di v isi on,

Eu ropea n Opera tions Comma nd, OSIA, "Memora nd u m on Red uction

Inspections fo r Con ventiona l A rmed Forces i n Eu rope Trea ty," Novem ber

25, '1 992.

38. Inspection Report, DS- 1 -RS-Wu ensd orf.

39. Colonel Wi llia m R. Smith , USA F, Com ma nder, Eu ropea n Ope ra tions

Com ma nd , OSI A , "ivlemora nd u m on La re Norif ica rion of In specti on,"

Novem ber 1 3, 1992.

40. Lr. Colonel Keith Oa tma n, USA, Inspection/E scort 8ranch , Eu ro pea n

Opera tions Com ma nd , OSIA, "Backgrou nd Pa per on N ATO I n spection

\Xlindow/Site Deconfliction " a nd "Back 0rou nd Pa per on U.S. Approac h to

I n spections," .J a n u a ry 7, ·1993; Ma jor Th oma s P. Wi l hel m, USA ,

I nspection/Escort Bra nch, Eu ropea n Opera ti ons Com ma nd, OSI A, 

"Backgrou nd Pa per on La te Site Brief i ngs D uri ng Escort Missi ons."

41. Escort Mission Reports Fol der, 92-CFE-035-BU -BE.

T

Chapter 7

Severed Uk rainian fighters on dis/7lay during a U.S.reduction inspection.

"Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable

balance of conventional armed forces in t:,urope at lower levels than

heretofore, of eliminating disparities pre judicial to stability and

security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large scale action

in Europe, ... the States Parties have agreed as follows: ... "

hese objecti ves a re fou nd i n the CFE Treaty Prea m bl e. To

f u lfi ll them, _t he trea t y req u ires the el imi na tion of specific

q ua ntities ot conventiona l a rma ments located i n the trea ty's

a rea of a pplica tion withi n specific ti mel ines. The el imina tion-or,

in treaty terms, the reduction-of equ ipment had to be complete,

irreversi ble, and verifia ble. The Eastern grou p of states' agreemen t

to asym metrica l red uctions was instru menta l i n ena bli ng the two

grou ps of states to el imi na te the d ispa rities in force strength that

were "prej ud icia l to sta bi l ity." Collecti vel y, the Eastern states,

previously the Wa rsa w Trea ty Orga niza tion ( WTO ) states, wou l d

red uce more eq u ipment tha n the NATO a ll ia nce na tions beca use

they held a sign i fica n t n u merica l superiori ty i n conventiona l a rmaments i n Europe.
200 0 -S1n I.·c,p1 c 1 10 Ac.1 c 't

REDUCTIO LIABll ITIES

When the 22 n a tions signed the treaty on Novem ber 19,

1990, they excha nged da ta decla ring thei r na tiona l hol dings.

Based on these decl a ra tion s, the two grou ps of sta tes possessed the

following:

Table 7-1. National Holdings by Alliance

Equipment On hand1 Treaty limit Reduction liability2

Tanks

NATO 25,091 20 ,000 5,949

WTO 33,191 20,000 13,191

Armored Combat Vehicles

NATO 34,453 30,000 4,631

WTO 42,949 30,000 12,949

Artillery

NATO 20,620 20 ,000 2,334

WTO 26,953 20,000 6,953

Aircraft

NATO 5,939 6,800 0

WTO 8,372 6,800 1,572

Helicopters

NATO 1,736 2,000 0

WTO 1,701 2,000 0

1 NATO figures include weapons held by the former German Democratic Republic. 2 NATO states allocated cuts below treaty limits.

Sources: Arms Control Reporter 1990, 407.E-0.7; Jane M.O. Sharp,"ConventionalArms

Control in Europe," SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 423-426.

At treaty sign a tu re , the red u ction l iabi l ity of the NATO states

stood at 12,914 pieces of eq u ipment, the ma j ority of wh ich wa s

equ ipmen t of the former German Democra tic Repu blic. The

NATO states placed greater reduction liabilities on themselve s

than the trea ty req uired by setting their tan k, armored combat

vehicle (ACY), and artil lery ceilings below those ou tlined in the

treaty. In contrast, the Eastern grou p of states possessed 34,665

pieces of equ ipment for red uction. Rega rd less of qua ntity, the

trea ty requ ired each grou p to complete i ts red u ctions withi n 40

mont hs of the trea ty's entry i nto force.

1
Run < 1 10 Y1 \I{'> 20 I

Soviets transferred more than

57,000 pieces of TLE east of the

Urals.

As d iscussed in a previous cha pter, the Ea stern states' figures 

for trea ty-limited eq u ipmen t (TLE) from data excha nged shortly

after trea ty signatu re surprised the United States and the NATO

a llies. The Soviets had tra nsferred more tha n 57,000 pieces of

equ ipment out of the trea ty's a rea of appl ica tion before Novem ber

19, 1990. In addition to movi ng equ ipment east of the Ura ls, the

Soviets had reassigned portions of its conventiona l a rma ments to

coasta l defense forces, na va l in fa ntry u nits, a nd the Strategic

Rock et Forces. The Soviets cl a i med tha t these forces a nd their

conventiona l eq u ipmen t were not su bject to the trea ty. The NATO

states cou ntered tha t TLE wit hin the ATTU (Atla ntic to the Ura ls)

was TLE, rega rd less of the orga niza tion tha t possessed it. It wa s

accou nta ble. The Soviet movement of equ ipmen t east of the Ura ls

ra ised concerns tha t the Soviets could q u ick ly rei n trod uce those

wea pons into the ATTU. Some na tions decla red tha t shifti ng the

TLE east of the Ura ls was a circu mvention of the trea ty. These

Soviet actions brought on poli tical and d i pl oma tic deba te tha t

sta lled ra tifica tion of the trea ty. On J u ne 14, 1991, a fter mont hs of

length y a nd hea ted Join t Consu lta tive Grou p (JCG) negotia tions,

Soviet representa ti ves su bmi tted pledges addressi ng both the

equ ipmen t east of the Urals and the reassigned TLE with i n the

ATTU. These pledges a llowed the ra tifica tion process to move

forwa rd.

One Soviet pledge provided a lega lly bi nd ing solution to the

TLE held by the Strategic Rocket Forces, na va l infa n try, a nd

coasta l defense forces. The Soviets agreed to l imit TLE assigned to

the na va l infa ntry and coastal defense forces not to exceed a tota l

933 ta nks, l,080 pieces of artillery, and 972 ACVs. In add ition,

the Soviets agreed to increase their tota l trea ty red uction lia bility
202 0'1-51 1 1 I'>:111·c i101\ Ac.1 '<)

Soviet limits on naval TLE:

9 33 tanb

1 ,080 artillery

972. AC\fs

by the same totals. They \Votd d accomplish 50 percent of those

red uctions with in the ATTU and wou ld red uce the other 50 percen t i n the east a fter tra nsferrin g tha t amou nt of equipmen t out of

the ATTU. Once the Soviets tra nsferred the eq u i pment, they wou l d

red uce tha t same equ ipment or an eq u a l n u mber of the same type

of equ ipmen t. The Soviets would not incu r any red uction liabil ities

associated wit h the 1,701 a rmored person n el ca rriers (APCs)

assigned to t he Stra tegic Rocket Forces.

The other pledge, politica lly bind ing, dealt with the equ ipment the Soviets had tra nsferred east of the Ura ls prior to trea ty

signatu re. The Soviets pled ged to red uce at least 14,500 pi eces of

tha t eq u ipment. This broke down to 6,000 ta n ks, 1,500 ACVs,

and 7,000 pieces of a rti llery. These red uctions were in add ition to

the obliga tions they ha d assumed concerning na va l infa ntry and

coasta l defense forces. The com bined red uction obliga tions for

equ ipmen t the Soviets ha d moved or wou ld move east of the Ura ls,

as ou tlined in the two pledges, tota led 15,993 items, specifica lly:

6,467 ta n k s, 7,540 pi eces of a rtil lery, a nd 1,986 ACVs. 2 There

was, howev er, one ma jor d ifference between red uctions on the two

sid es of the Ura ls. The N ATO states cou ld inspect a ll red uctions

within the ATTU-the Soviets had no righ t of ref usa l. East of the

Urals, however, satellite reconna issance was the on ly means the

NATO sta tes had for mon itoring red uction s. The Soviets stated in

their pledge tha t all red uctions in the East wou ld be read ily visible

for satell ite observa tion.

The coll apse of the Soviet U n ion on Christ mas Day 1991

th rew red uction lia bil ities for the Eastern grou p of states into a

mudd le. Out of the former Soviet Un ion a rose eight new treaty

states: Bela rus, A rmenia, Azer ba ija n, Mold ova, Georgia,

Kaza k sta n, Uk ra ine, and Ru ssia . The new nations of the former

Soviet Union had no agreement on equ ipm ent own ership, much

less who wou ld be responsi ble for red uctions. Ind i vid u a l signa tory

states, not the grou p, were responsi ble for treaty implemen tation ,

a nd the NATO na tion s cou l d not ra tif y the trea ty without the

former Soviet sta tes acknowledging their red uction lia bil ities. As

the new states focu sed on form ing new govern ments, resolvi ng

domestic issues, and dea ling wit h armed hostilities, it a ppea red

tha t they wou ld not soon agree on TLE a nd red uction a lloca tions.

However, on Ma y 15, 1992, at Tash kent, Uzbek ista n, the new

repu blics came to a dra ma tic agreemen t on the na tion al d istri bution of the former USSR 's mi lita ry ha rdwa re and establ ished ceilings for hold i ngs in t h e va rious categories of eq uipment. Th is

agreement led d irectly to the Oslo Extra ord i na ry Conference in

Ju ne 1992, where a ll signa tory na tion s ha d su fficient confidence

to proceed with ra tifica tion ba sed on the u ndersta nd i ng th a t the

combined red uction obl iga tions of the newly emerged na tions

wou ld eq u a l those of the former Soviet Uni on.3
------------R1 Dl c 1 10 Yt \R'> 20)

Months la ter, a fter the treaty entered i n to force, i t was clea r

tha t the ind ivid ua l nations ha d not reached agreement on a l l of

their red uction lia bili ties. The excha nge of trea ty data on December 15, 1992, ind ica ted tha t the new na tions' l ia bilities, when

tota led , wou ld not eq ua l the origina l Soviet obligation. The origina l Soviet red uction lia bi l ities, not inclu d ing the red uctions req u ired und er the agreement on coasta l defense forces a nd na va l

i n fa ntr y, incl uded 7,575 ta n ks, 9,890 ACVs, 763 a rti l lery, 1,461

comba t a ircra ft, and no hel icopters. The new data showed shortfa lls in decla red red uction lia bilities of 1,789 ta n ks and 819 ACVs,

while prod uci ng overages of 68 pieces of a rtillery, 401 comba t

a ircra ft, and 115 attack he l icopters.

The dispa rities stem med pa rtly from conf usion over in ventories as new gove rn ments contin ued to be embroiled i n domestic

issues, and some even in a rmed con flict. None of the na tions had

the expertise tha t the Russia n N uclea r Risk Red uction Center

(N R RC) ha d developed th rough implemen ta tion of previous a rms

control trea ties. The a rmed hosti l ities in the Tra nsca ucasus na tions

(Azer ba ija n, Armenia, Georgia ) and in Moldova were a ma jor

reason for the shortfa l l in red uction lia bi l ities for ta n ks a nd ACVs.

Nongovernment forces control led some of the ha rd wa re i n the

region, ongoing ba ttles ha d destroyed or hea vil y damaged other

pieces, a nd withd ra wi ng Russia n troops ha d left behi nd equ ipmen t

The new nations of the Caucasus were reluctant to declare brok en-d own equi/J1nent left

behind by the Russian army.
204 0 -SJ IJ I l'I ( 1 10. Ac.1 ( ) 

U.S. insp ectors at a Belarussian reduction site.

suita ble on l y for scra p. Most importa nt, no one

cla imed ownership or res ponsi bility for the

eq uipment. In add ition, Armenia a nd Azer ba ija n,

invol ved in hea vy fighting, wa nted recogn ition

for TLE destroyed in comba t, bu t the treaty d id

not a llow for ba ttlefield losses. These new na -

tions reported no red uction lia bilities yet they 

reported possessing equ ipment in excess of the

ceilings agreed to at Tashkent. 4 Du ring the two

subseq uent yea rs, ]CG d iscussions brought some

cla rifica tion as the shortfa ll decreased to 539

ta n ks a nd 1,394 ACVs by Novem ber 1994.

Azer ba ija n's and Armenia 's fa ilu re to declare a

red uction lia bility contributed significa ntl y to the

1994 shortfall.

Shortly a fter the third red uction yea r, A rmenia annou nced its holdings, as d id Azer baija n;

bot h still had more ACVs tha n the Tash kent

agreement allowed , Armenia by 65 and

Azer ba ija n by 615. Azer ba ija n a lso held 58 more

pieces of a rtil lery tha n the 285 agreed u pon a t

Tashk ent. Bela rus faced econom ic problems tha t

forced a postponement of its red uctions d u ring

the third red uction yea r; it held 548 ta nks, 446

ACVs, a nd 88 a ircra ft to be red uced. Although

Bela r us resu med red uctions, it did not meet its

goa ls before Novem ber 17, 1995.

Despite these problems, the former Soviet

states red uced enough TLE as a grou p to be below their ceilings

for all categories of TLE. These red uctions, cou pled with the success of the Eastern Eu ropea n states d uring the third red uction yea r,

led to the former Wa rsaw Pact states' meeting their CFE treaty

ceilings. As of Novem ber 1995, a ll NATO na tions met their red uction goa ls a nd both grou ps of states were u nder the treaty ceiling

for a ll ca tegories of TLE.

The U.S. red uction lia bility at treaty signature and entry into

force was 1,898 ta n ks, 375 ACVs, and 109 pieces of artillery. The

Un ited States qu ickly decreased its reduction liabilities, beca use the

NATO group of states agreed to tra nsfer equi pment, a long with

the equ ivalent red uct ion lia bilit y, among themsel ves. A trea tyau thorized tra nsfer, colloq uially called "cascading," allowed the

United States, Netherla nds, Germa ny, and Ita ly to tra nsfer TLE to

other NATO states. The NATO Eq uipmen t Tra nsfer Pla n allowed

donor states to bri ng their TLE hold ings down to trea ty-decla red

levels to avoi d red uction costs and to modernize and standa rd ize

a rma ments th roughou t the allia nce. The initial pla nning for cascaded NATO equ ipm en t tota led 2,578 ta nks, 1,114 ACVs, and
R1 Ill( IJO Yt \R 20'

Table 7-2. NATO Equipment Transfers

Donor Recipient Tanks ACVs Artillery

U.S. Greece 671 150 84

Norway 0 136 0

Portugal 80 0 0

Spain 31 1 100 24

Turkey 932 250 72

U.S.totals 1,994 636 180

Germany Denmark 110 0 0

Greece 0 200 0

Turkey 85 187 131

Norway 92 0 0

Portugal 0 50 0

German totals 287 437 131

Netherlands Greece 169 0 171

Portugal 0 104 0

Netherlands totals 169 104 171

Italy Turkey 0 97 0

NATO totals 2,450 1 ,274 482

Source: Report, Under Secretary of Defense Tactical Warfare Programs, "Report on

Transfer of Certain CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment ,"' August 30, 1994.

180 pieces of artillery. By the end of 1993 the final distribu tion

differed only slightly from the initia l pla n.

The U.S. Eu ropea n Command, the Uni ted States' executive

agent for the CFE Trea ty, ma naged the cascad ing of U.S. TLE and

contracted for the destruction of the 632 excess M-47 ta n ks in

Buccino, Ita ly, a nd 7 M-47 ta nks and 4 M-44 howitzers a t the U.S.

Army Depot a t Germershei m, Germa n y. Italia n contractors cond ucted the first U.S. red uctions at Bucci no on Janua ry 28, 1993.

Buccino was also the site for the final U.S. TLE red uctions on

Novem ber 12, 1993. The combi ned cascading and destruction of

TLE ena bled the United States to reach its decla red TLE ceilings

of 4,006 ta nks, 5,372 ACVs, and 2,492 pieces of a rtillery. The

United States had no red uction liabilities for comba t aircraft and
Reduction by conversion to

static disfJ /ay.

Reduction by conversion

to nonmilitary equipment.

206 0'1-51 11 I ·sl'H 110 Au '\C\ --------

hel icopters beca use i t hel d 334 combat a i rcra ft aga i nst a cei l ing of

784 a nd 341 hel icopters aga inst a ceil ing of 518. Th u s there was

n o U.S. casca d ing or red uction for either ca tegory. 5

R EDUCTIO METHODS

Red uction methods varied depend ing on the type of equi pmen t, and severa l options were ava i lable to red uce any piece of

eq u ipment. Destr uction was the prima ry means of red uci ng TLE,

a nd technicia ns cou ld employ severa l method s to accom pl ish it. As

an opti on to destroy ing a l l equ i pm ent, the trea ty a u thorized mod ify ing a sma l l por tion of TLE for nonoffensi ve pur poses. Ta nks

cou ld be converted i nto bu l l d ozers, or com bat helicopters i nto

support hel icopters. States cou ld a lso el ect to mod ify equ ipmen t

for use as tra iners, sta tic d ispla ys, or tra ini ng ta rgets.

The Protocol on Red ucti on a l lowed severi ng as a method of

destroying a l l ty pes of TLE, such as the A merica n M-47 ta nk s.

The protocol d i d not d icta te a pa rticu la r tech nology to sever TLE,

bu t it deta iled the cu ts req u ired for each ca tegory of equ i pment.

Ta nk s, for exa m pl e, req u ired specific cu ts for the gu n breech ri ng,

the gu n t u be, one gu n tru n n i on a n d mou n t, and the hu ll. The
gu ida nce on specific cuts incl uded loca tion, length, and n u mber of

cuts, as well as the exten t of ma teria l to be removed in a cu t. Severing with torches was the prima ry met hod used to red uce TLE.

Wh ile most states chose to sever eq u ipment, Pola nd chose to

smash much of its TLE. Smashing was chea p a nd eff icient. Tech nicia ns positioned eq u ipmen t on a pa d below a n eight-ton wreck ing

ba ll suspended on a crane and repea ted l y dropped the ba l l on

ta n ks, ACVs, a nd a rtillery u n ti l they ach ieved the desired resu lts.

The pad on w h ich the tech n icia ns centered the TLE ena bled them

to smash their equ ipment successfu ll y. Accord ing to Colonel

Stanisla w Mali nowsk i, Director of the Polish Verifica tion Center,

"It has to be ma de of a specia l ma teria l tha t ca n be end uring. If

not, it is easi l y smashed u p with th ree or fou r droppings of the

ba l l. So the composition, the ma teria l tha t is used ...is pa tented by

Pola nd." The sur face withstood the pou nd ing as the Poles successfu l ly destroyed their TLE.6

The trea ty provided for two other destruction methods, bu t

states did not use them beca use they were expensi ve a nd less efficient. NATO a llies cond ucted tests to develop an inex pensive and

effective met hod for explosi ve demolition of TLE, bu t the tests

prod uced poor resu l ts. The treaty also a llowed for the deforma tion

of ta nks, helicopters, and comba t a ircraft. Super hea ting the equ ipment before pressi ng t he wea kened meta l led to satisfactory results, bu t the expense and efficiency precl u ded tha t method.

THE REDUCTIO PROCESS

Red uction of TLE u nder the CFE Trea ty was a mu ltina tional

effort. The process bega n wi th each nation work ing withi n its

grou p of states to determi ne its red uction lia bility. Based on its

red uction lia bili ty, a state determined the nu mber of red uction

R1 IH ( 1lO Y1 \R'> 207

Team Drach check ing the length

and location of a cut on a gun

tube.
_o () - ITI I 11 C.I C ' 

Poland's Reduction Method-A Smashing Success

Above and left: M agnetic force releases

steel ball from gantry onto TLE in

chamber. Below: Crushed relics, the

results of smashing by the eight-ton

ball.

l'I
R1Ill( IlU )I I{ _()

Reduction Process at Buccino, Italy

Above: Technicians begin the cutting

process. Above right: Czech team

inspects severed components. Right:

Severed tank ready for scrap.

Left: A tank awaiting reduction.

Below: Treads removed, pre pared for

severing.
21O ON-Sin hw1-n101\ Ac1- NcY -------------------------

The reduction liabilities for some

treaty states were significant,

taxing facilities, rnanpower, and

funds.

sites req ui red to red uce i ts TLE. The trea ty d id not lim it the number of red uction sites a sta te cou ld designa te, but i t d i d restrict the

n umber of sites enga ged i n red uctions a t an y given time to 20.

This n umber proved to be fa r in excess of wha t a ny na tion actually orga n ized. Pol and req u ired only four sites d u ring the first

red uction yea r to begi n red uci ng its siza ble lia bility of nea rly

1,200 ta n ks, 715 pieces of a rtill ery, 300 ACVs, and 41 a ircra ft. By

the end of the first yea r, Pola nd ha d red uced its 41 aircra ft and

closed its a ircraft red uction site. Polish pla n ners eva lua ted their

progress a nd elected to close a second site beca use the two rema i ning sites wou l d be su fficient for their needs. 7

Red ucing massive a mou nts of equ ipment, such a s ta nks and

APCs, wit h in trea ty timel i nes req u ired schedu l ing. The trea ty

ma nd ated tha t states complete a t least 25 percent of thei r red uctions duri ng the first red uction yea r, followed by 35 and 40 percent of the tota l i n the fina l two yea rs. In addition, the trea ty

req u ired states to red uce eq u i pmen t in blocks of time of not less

tha n 30 a nd not more tha n 90 days, know n as ca l end a r reporti ng

periods. Moreover, the ca pacity of red uction sites, in terms of

space and work flow and the movemen t of equ ipment to and from

the sites, d icta ted tha t the wor k be spread out over time. Cost, a

ma jor considera tion for the Eastern states, slowed work flow

beca use of the expense of la bor a nd ma teria ls.

Once the red uci ng state ha d pla nned red uctions for a specific

ca lenda r reporti ng period , it opened t he process to t he other signatory na tions through a n officia l notifica tion. The trea ty obliga ted

the red uci ng state to provid e at least 15 da ys' ad va nce notice of

red uctions. The state a n nou nced the red uction site, the q ua ntities

and types of eq uipment, the OOVs tha t were releasi ng the equ ipment, the method of red uction, and t he dates of the reporti ng

period. The notification a lso ind icated the final date and time
R1 DL C llO '{ 1 \I{\ 2 !I

inspection tea ms cou ld a rrive at a specific point of entry (POE) to

view the equ ipmen t before the red uct ion bega n. In add ition to

giving notice of the red uction , the red uci ng sta te h ad to d ispla y the

eq u ipment for inspectors. The req u irements for d ispla y va ried: A

fusela ge satisfied the req u irement for a n a ircra ft, whereas a proper

ta nk d ispla y incl uded the h ull, tu rret, and integra l ma in a rma ment.

In a ll cases, the d ispla yed TLE had to he ava i la ble for inspection

before red uction, and they had to be complete assem bl ies, a requ irement tha t wou l d become an issue d uring U.S. i nspections.

The red uci ng sta te a lso esta blish ed a register to docu men t seria l

n u mbers a nd to record the sta rt a nd completion dates of red uction

for each piece of eq u ipmen t.

Once a n Eastern state sent a notifica tion of red uction, the

VCC sought a NATO state to lead the red uction inspection. The

VCC polled member states to determine leadership and pa rticipa -

tion on the red uction inspection team. Some nations freq uen tly

declined; however, the U.S. government's policy to lead red uction

inspections and pa rtici pa te whenever possi ble ensu red tha t a

N ATO tea m wou ld i nspect each Eastern red uction. The na tion

leading the inspection team assumed responsi bility to announce its

intent to inspect, to assemble and prepa re the team, and to tra nsport the tea m to and from the POE.

The inspected state had no right of refusa l to a red uction

inspection, and the trea ty allowed inspectors to be present

th roughou t the ca lenda r report i ng period to view a ll red uction s. In

practic e, however, one team norma lly cond ucted a n opening i nspection a t the begi nni ng of the ca lenda r reporti ng period to

record seria l n u mbers of the eq u ipment sla ted for red uction . The

tea m then depa rted, a nd la ter a not her tea m cond ucted a closing

inspection to con firm the proper red ucti on of TLE a nd to match

seria l n umbers aga inst those previously record ed . Lt. Colonel

Thomas C. Fiser, USA, recalled t ha t d uring his first red uction

inspection, an open ing inspecti on a t Ta pioszesco, Hu nga ry, he

req u ired only 20 min utes to record the seria l n u mbers of thel4

DJ 152-millimeter howitzers to be red uced. His team needed ju st

over 12 hou rs to cond uct the inspecti on, conf irm tha t the site

red uction register was correct, and sign the inspection report with

the escort tea m chief. Less th an one da y on-site was the norm for

U.S. red uction inspections, bu t there were exceptions.x

Lt. Colonel Edwa rd G. Ga llagher, II, USA, Ch ief of the Inspection a nd Escort Bra nch a t OSIA's Eu ropea n Operations Comma nd, led a th ree-da y red uction inspection of Da browa Gornicza,

Pola nd . Team Ga l lagher a rrived a t the site on October 26, 1992,

and rema ined there u ntil October 29-from open ing to closing of

the reduction. Lt. Colonel Gallagher declared the first U.S. ambiguity of a red uction inspection beca use "the 43 T-55 ma in ba ttle

tanks were not presented as complete assemblies." Gallagher's
,.,

"""

.,, ,,

'-'"'

"',.,""

2 1 2 0 -51 1 hw1< 1 10:--; Ac1 . < ' __

quantities and type of equipment. L ARMAMEm'S IDENTIPICATION ORIGIN REDUCTION PROCEDURE REMARKS

I tQIJIPMENT OR c;a.i. MElllOD REF- BEING SER.IAL NO FIRMED OF ERFNCE

N REDUCED REDUC- 10

E 'ID< PllOl'OCOL

NO

(a) (b) (C) (<!) (c) (I) (g) (h)

9 D·l "{) 0149 IJ (l SIN V. PARA 2 t u_ ·- ,,., "'rte . BREEOI

GUNTIJBE

TRAilS Q

10 D· l .. "" 0149 ,.,() SEY V, PARA2 .. ·- ·' w.-f <"- r

BREECH

GUNTIJBE

TRAilS Ir>

11 D ·l ,,,<; J 0149 ,.. ,.., SIN V,PARA2

BREECH .. z. GUNTIJBE 7 ,_ '-4

TRAilS

,,. -YAY•l "'·"' J ,.,._,L (AU

Polish technicians presented

disassembled, stack ed TLE for

opening a reduction inspection.

,, n .• .... -. - n1.tO ···' «V V P.t.Q & ? -.... .

comments reflected the U.S. posi tion tha t "complete assembly"

mea nt an assembled piece of TLE. Inspectors cou ld not determ ine

whether the disassem bled parts on the site came from TLE or from

a collection of spa re pa rts. The Poles responded tha t disassembling

some ta nk components and stacki ng them allowed for more efficient tra nsporta tion. They added tha t sepa rati ng components

improved the results of the smashing destruction method. Despite

the ambiguity, Ga llagher's team recorded component serial n umbers and observed the smashing of ta nks for three da ys, confirming tha t the Poles had red uced a ll 43 ta nks. La ter in the red uction 

yea r, Pola nd changed its presenta tion practice and presen ted assembled TLE.

On two otherreduction inspections Lt.Colonel Gallagher

encountered circumstancesthatwarranted notation on inspection

reports-one was only a comment, the other an ambigu ity. On

March 17,1993,Gallagherled an opening reduction inspection

team at Szabadszallas,Hungary. During the inspection, the team

recorded the serial numbers of 53 items of TLE scheduled for

destruction by severing. The 18 T-34 ta nks presented for red uction

did not ha ve breech block s. The escort team, however, provided
R 1 1> l 110 )1 \ H _ t '

docu men ta tion i nd i ca t i ng th a t tech n icia ns ha d desrroyed 86

breech bl ocks a t the Csepel I ron Wo r ks 011 J u l y 1 9, 1 989, pr ior to

trea ty signa t u re. a l laghcr accepted the exp l a na ti on a n d end ed t he

America n inspection a fter record ing a com men t descri b i ng the

si tu a ti on i n the insp cti on report.

Lt. Colonel a l l a 1her record ed an ambi gu i ty d uri n u a n openi ng i nspecti on at th e Mi l i ta ry Repa ir Works i n Tr nci n, i n the

Slova k Repu bl ic, on ovem be r 24, 1993. I n th is case, tech n i cia ns

pr esen ted 38 OT-62 A PCs for red uct ion by severi ng, h u t I 0 d id

not ha ve mach i ne gu n ru rrets. Ga l l agh 'r ci ted t h e trea t 's prov isions for presen ti n r1 a com pl ete a semh l y. The Slova k escort tea m

chief responded th:lt t h e OT-62 was a l so prod uced i n a n " "

mod el a nd that on ly t he A mod el had a tu rret. Ga llagher cou ntere d tha t rh e exch anged d ata photos for the OT-62 showed a

t u rret . The inspecti on concl ud ed a fter Team Ga l la gher con f i r m ed

the destruction of t h ree PCs to i ncl u de rwo of the A P ·s t h a t d i d

not ha ve t u rrets, lea vi ng t he re t for a f u tu re closin < 1 i n spect i on.

The ] CG l ater a p proved a new pi ece of TLE, "OT-62, irhout

tu rret ."9

Ma jor M a rc C. Liebe r, USMC, a lso encou ntered p roblem s a t

Trenci n, a red u cti on site used joi n tl y h t he Czech a nd Sl ova k

Repu bl ics, i n vol vi ng t u rrets on A PCs d u ri ng h is tea m's openi ng

i nspection on eptem ber 1, 1 993. In record i ng seria l n u m bers for

50 OT-64 AP s, M a j or Lieber n oted rh a t si x of t h e u n i ts were

actu a lly OT-64A mod l t h a t h ad n o tu rrets. The da ta excha nge

ph otos ind ica ted th at they sh ou ld h a ve t u rrets. Czech escorts

respon ded th at tech n i ci a n s h ad remove d the tu rrets p rior to trea t y

signa t u re as pa n of a mod i fication progra m for BM P- 1 a rmo red

infa ntry fiu hting vehicles. 10

Lt. olonel Fred E. Bu si ng, USA F, decla red the l ast of fou r

a m bigu i ties. Durin g h is open ing red uction in spection n Ma rch

30, 1 994, a t ovy J ici n, i n th 'Czech Rep u b l ic, he ci ted t he req u i remen t for compl ete a ssem b l y w hen prese n ti ng TLE for destructi on. Czech techn icia ns h ad a l ready d isassem bl ed 1 5 T-55

ta n k s a nd had begu n d isassem b l y on 1 4 other ta n k . The req u i red

components were pr esent an d colocared , b u t not assem b l ed . Th e

Czechs, l i ke th e Poles, respon ded tha t a l l com ponents were a va ila ble in one place a nd tha t com plete assem bl ies we re on ha nd b u t

n ot assem bl ed .

1 1 Al l i n a ll , d u ri n g t h e ·1 1 0 red u cti on missions, U.S. 

tea m chiefs d ecla red on l y four a m bigu iri c , a ll of w h i ch d ea l t wi th

the sta nd a rd s of presenta tion .

E ]

One U.S. m ission h igh l igh ted a p ro blem that ot her TATO

red u ction i nspection tea m s had encou ntered ea rlier. Ma jor Henry

T. Storey, USA, l ed a m u l ti na ti ona l r d u ction i n pection tea m to
... 14 -1n I Pl no

Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, US AF,

confirms serial numbers read by

Senior M aster Sergeant David

Schmitz during a reduction

insp ection.

C.I l'

Trenci n, in the Slova k Repu bl ic. He intended to cond uct a closing

i nspection of 50 OT-64s. However, u pon a rri va l , he lea rned tha t a

Hunga ria n team had a lrea dy i nspected and confirmed the red uction of 44 of the APCs n i ne d ays earl ier, on Septem ber 28, 1993.

The NATO tea m ha d no def i n ite proof tha t the Slovaks had reduced the eq u i pmen t. Th is situa tion h ad cropped u p severa l times

ea rlier i n t he red uction period . N ATO state i nspection tea ms were

u na ble to confirm the red uction of TLE beca use Eastern tea ms had

a lread y inspected a nd confirmed the red uctions. The inspected

nation s had scra pped the destroyed TLE.

This presented a problem beca use the treaty does not prohi bit

i ntra-grou p red uction i nspections, nor d oes it place quotas or

l i m i ts on red uction i nspections. Some of the Eastern states in the

post-Cold Wa r era were just as in terested i n the mi l ita ry ca pa bi lities and holdi ngs of neigh bori ng states as they were of most of the

N ATO sta tes. These i nspections, however, ra n cou nter to what the

NATO states viewed as a basic tenet of the trea ty, that each grou p

of states wou l d complete i ts red uction obligations wi thi n 40

mon ths and tha t mem hers of the opposite grou p of states cou ld

confirm a ll red ucti ons. The NATO sta tes, however, could not

verif y a ll red uctions when Eastern states cond ucted red uction

i nspections with in thei r grou p of states.

NATO a llies were concerned a bout lost inspection opportu n ities beca use Ea stern n ations were cond ucti ng reduction an d decla red site i nspections wit hi n their grou p of states. In an attempt

to cu rta i l these East-on-East i nspections, the VCC sponsored a

meeting of a ll CFE states in Ja n ua ry 1993 to d iscuss the i ntragrou p inspecti ons and to propose a pl an for Coopera tion Pa rtners.

Under this pla n, the V ,C wou ld conti nue to sched u le CFE inspections for the NATO states but, based on req uests from Cooperation Pa rtners for specif ic i nspections, the VCC would a lso coon.ii-
Tl

RI l>l ( T IO I R 2 1

na te the pla cement of Eastern inspectors on Western-led tea ms.

NATO sta tes wou ld open slots on their i nspection tea ms for Eastern i nspectors in ret u rn for thei r coopera tion in not lea d ing inspections with in their grou p of states. Th is wou ld a llow the N ATO

states to conduct as ma ny inspections as possi ble, whil e provi ding

the Ea stern states with inspection opportu n ities withou t the expense of leading an i nspection. The NATO states also agreed to

share all red uction inspection data ma inta ined in a data base

k nown as VER ITY.

In add ition to leading red uction inspection tea ms, ind ivid u a l

U.S. i nspectors, k nown as "singletons," pa rtici pa ted in red uction

i nspections led by other NATO na tions. Th is a l lowed U.S. inspectors to pa rtici pa te in a pproxi ma tel y 70 percen t of the red uction

i nspections. Their pa rtici pa tion in these i nspections provid ed the

U.S. govern ment a presence a nd firstha nd view of the ma jori ty of

the red uction i nspections.

I F D H III (. ] Pt s

Decl a red site and challenge inspections continued through the

red uction yea rs, a lthoug h the incid ence of those i nspections was

not as freq uen t. The trea ty obliged na tions to recei ve d ecla red site

i nspections based on 10 percent of their decla red OOVs d u ring

each red uction yea r. By con trast, the baseli ne period i nspection

ra te ha d been 20 percen t over on ly 120 d a ys.

OSIA i nspectors cond ucted 16 decla red site i nspections a nd

two cha llenge inspections duri ng the first red uction yea r, November 1992 th rough Novem ber 1993. Duri ng tha t period, tea m

chiefs decla red four am bigu ities, site access bei ng the common

threa d in a l l four. The first ambigu ity occu rred in Bela rus at Ma -

rina Gorka , where Team Fiser i nspected the 30th Independent

Mecha n ized Brigad e. On April 1, 1993, Lt. Colonel Thomas C.

Fiser, USA, recei ved a site diagra m excl ud ing a reas of the milita ry

faci lity. The Bela rus escort team den ied the America n tea m access

to a reas tha t were with in the mi lita r y facility bu t not on the site

ma p. Fiser decla red an ambig u ity a nd completed his inspection of

240 pieces of TLE a nd 96 pieces of conven tiona l a rma men ts a nd

equ ipment subject to the trea ty (CAEST). 1 2

Former Ma jor, now Lt. Colonel Keit h A. Oa tma n, USA,

also decla red an am bigu ity when he led an inspection team at

Ba ra novichi, Bel arus, on Novem ber 9, 1993. He recei ved the site

d iagram for the 28th Wea pon Comba t Vehicle Storage Base, which

excluded areas believed to belong to two colocated missile briga des.

The Bela russia ns had not declared the coloca ted brigades a sensitive

point, nor had they decla red them OOVs. Lt. Colonel Oatma n

req uested access to these a reas but the Bela rus escorts den ied the
21 6 0 -S111 I ""' c 110 Ac.1 c '

request. As wa s the case in Ma ri na Gorka , Bela russia n officia ls

stated tha t it wa s the excl u si ve righ t of the inspected state to determi ne the bo u nd a r ies of i ts OOVs a n d decl a red sites. Lt. Colonel

Oatman d isagreed , cited the treaty defin iti on of a declared site,

noted the am bigu ity, a n d cont in u ed h is in pection of 254 pieces of

TLE a nd 57 pi eces of other trea ty-report a ble eq u i pmen t. u

Lt. Colonel Da vid P. Gessert, USA F, decla red a n ambigu i ty i n

Uk ra i ne on May 4, 1 993, w h i le i nspecting U k ra inia n ar my forces

a t K h meln i tsk i y. Lr. Colonel Gesserr a n nou nced t he 15th Mech a -

ni zed Brigade as the OOV for i nspect ion. uri ng the inspection ,

Uk ra inia n escorts den i ed Gesse rt's tea m access to three of the

l5th 's four su bo rd ina te ba tta l i ons on th e ·ite. Lt. Colonel Gesserr

decla red an ambigu i ty a nd com pleted the i nspecti on. 14

On Ju ly L 4, J 993, Ma jor Rona ld M. Ta it, USAF, a nd his

tea m of CFE i n specrors a rri ved a t Prasl av i ce, i n the Czech Repu bli c. Before i nspecti ng the 33rd Ta n k Regi ment he received a site

d iagram tha t depicted the OOV as bei ng the en ti re decla red site; it

d id not i ncl ude an y other a rea of t he m i l ita ry facility. The Czech

posi tion wa s si m i l a r to the ea rl y Ru ssi a n position d u ri ng mock

inspect ions a n d basel i ne. A fen e ·uou nd the OOV del i n eated the

bou nd a ry of the decl a red site, a n d a n y oth er fences beyond tha t

fence served a d ifferen t pu r pose. The America n tea m ch ief n oted

the ambigu i ty an d fin ish ed the i n pection .

1 1

The n u m ber of decl a red sire and cha l l enge i n spection s held

stead y d u ri ng the ·econd recl u tion yea r. OSI A team s cond ucted J 7

i nspection s, l 4 decla red si te inspections, and .., challenge i nspections. One of t h ose i n spections, led by Lt. Colonel Fiser, offered a

u niq u e opportu ni t y for a U.S . .FE in spect ion tea m. On A pril 5,

A Belarussian site diagram is

displa yed during a German-led

inspection.

"\

CXEMA

MEClA COKPAEHUQ

(ClAHbKDBO. :i3"3B'30"GUI 2rra·2crsa)

\

\

YC:ODBMblE

06D3MA4[MM

I-:-::":'='""=.-:;-;- _, I

i':==::.:... ---- --..··--'"'·-

: ...::.·r._- -=.·

1,

c::i =-......-

:-.._._

-

L

.

_ :-::.:. _.-;;:-
1994, Fiser's tea m cond ucted a cha l l enge i nspection of a specified

a rea a t Ar k ha ngelsk , Russia . Wha t mad e the i nspection u n usua l

was the coasta l defense a nd na va l a via tion forces stationed withi n

the speci fied a rea: As na va l forces t hey were not subject to decla red site i nspection s beca use they were not OOVs; they were,

however, open to a cha l lenge i nspecti on.

Du ri ng the second red uction yea r, U.S. tea ms decla red on l y

two a m bigu ities. Team Ta it decla red the fi rst on Febru ar y l , 1994,

a t Sl u tsk, Bela rus, w hen Beh russia n escorts once aga in cited a

na tion 's excl usi ve rig h t to determ ine the borders of an OOV. The

other am bigu i ty a rose on A ug ust 22, 1 994, when Lt. Colonel K irk

E. Murra y, USA, led his tea m to Odessa , U k ra i ne. U k ra i n ia n escorts lim i ted access, ci ting the sa me ra tiona le tha t Bela r ussia n

escorts had espoused .

16

A merica n i nspection tea ms cond ucted 15 decl a red sire inspections a nd one cha l lenge i n spection duri ng the third red uction yea r.

Lt. Colonel Ja mes J u bilee, USA F- docu mented t he only a m bigu i ty

d u ri ng these inspections a t Stryy, Uk ra i ne. On Ma rch 22, 1995,

Tea m J u bilee i nspected the 10th Avia tion Base a nd was den ied

a ccess to a storage ·uea t h a t was wi t h i n t h e outermost fenced a rea

of the ba se. The Ukra i n i an site d i agra m, however, ind ica ted tha t

the decla red site stopped a t a wire fence tha t was short of the

stora ge a rea . The escort tea m chief en forced the decla red site as

depicted i n the site d iagra m.

Duri ng the red uction yea rs, ma ny OSIA i n spectors left the

Eu ropea n Opera ti ons Com ma nd for reti rement, cha nge of d u ty

within the agency, or a change of assign ment awa y from OSIA. To

offset these l osses, new person nel a rri ved a nd tra i ned to meet the

standa rd s req u i red of OSIA i nspectors. Despi te t h is tu rnover, U.S.

i ns pection tea ms contin ued thei r opera tions successfully, inspecti ng 6 specif ied a reas a nd cond ucti ng 45 decla red site i nspections

th rough the thi rd red uction yea r.

Du ri ng the red uction yea rs, the com posi ti on of U.S. i nspection tea ms cha nged . Pa rtici pation by allied i nspectors on U.S.-led

tea ms i ncreased , a nd more U.S. i nspectors joi n ed a llied tea ms. This

reflected a U.S. govern ment pol icy decision to seek more inspection opportu nities. The U.S.-led i nspections wit h a llied inspectors

requ ired some ad ditiona l prepa ra tions to fa mil ia rize guest inspectors wi th U.S. i nspection tech n iques a nd to tra i n them in specific

task s as mem bers of the team. The net benef i t of more i nspection

opportu nities outweighed the add itional preparati on req u i remen ts.

A more signif ica n t ch ange to te· m composition deve lop d

w he n Eastern i nspectors joi ned NATO na tion i nspection tea ms on

decla red sites a nd cha llenge inspections. As d iscussed previousl y,

11 ,i/ furccs il'l'/"l' nut

()()\ ...hri11·c1·er,the • 11·cre

O/!<'ll tu 1 c/J zfll'1l l!,l'

111 /JC I/OJ I.
2 1 ' () - 11 1 I l'I L 1 10 C.I 'I

the N ATO sta tes extend ed the in vita tions i n an attempt to stem an

increasi ng nu m ber of Ea st-on-East i nspections. The first i nspection

to incl ud e Coopera tive Pa rtners took place on Ma rch 16, 1993,

w hen i nspectors from Pola nd, H u nga ry, and Azer ba ij an joi ned a n

Ita l ia n-led tea m i n a n i nspection of a Roma n ia n decl ared site. The

first Eastern i nspector to joi n an America n tea m, Lt. Colonel

Old rich Lacina of the zech Repu blic, deployed with Team Fiser

on April 28, 1993, on a successf u l mission to Tasza r, Hu nga ry, to

inspect the 3lst Fighter Regimen t. 1 7

Beca use the progra m to i ncorpora te Eastern guest inspectors

i n to NATO tea ms did not elimi na te East-on-East inspections, the

NATO na tions chose to send Western inspectors to join Eastern

i nspection tea ms. The Uni ted States govern ment was rel ucta nt to

pa rtici pa te, fea ring tha t doing so wou ld encou rage more East-onEast i nspecti ons. I n Ma y 1994, U.S. pol icy cha nged; OSIA wou ld

send U.S. inspectors to joi n Eastern tea ms. This decision a l lowed

the U.S. i nspectors to ra k e adva ntage of opport u n i ties tha t otherwise wou ld ha ve been lost. The first U.S. i nspector to pa rtici pa te

on an Eastern inspection tea m, Ma jor l\ila rc Lieber, USMC, joi ned

a Bu lga ria n-l ed i nspection tea m on Ma y 15, 1994, on a mission to

inspect Roma n ia n forces. A day l a ter, Lt. Col onel Thomas C. Fiser

pa rtici pa ted in a n inspection of Uk ra in ian forces as a mem ber of a

Polis h-led i nspection team .

Inspectors from the United Kingdom and Belgium were led by Lt. Colonel Ronald Tait, OSI A Team Chief,

during an inspection of Czech forces.
R1Ill( 1 1< I I

Lt. Colonel Gabor Nagy of H ungary, a Cooperative Partner ins/Jector, served on a U.S. team

at Trencin, Slovak ia, in N ovember 1 993.

One inspection tha t d ra matica l ly port ra yed the cha nges tha t

ha d occu rred in Eu rope and in the im plementa tion of the CFE

Trea ty took place i n September 1994. Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busi ng,

USAF, led a n i nspection tea m to Caza rma Centru Ora dea, Romania , to inspect the 2'1st Mecha nized Ba tta l ion . This America n-led

i nspection team was a mil estone of sorts beca use it incl u ded Russia n guest inspectors Colonel Aleksa nd r Petrovich Ka l i nin and

Col onel Gennad iy Mik ha ylovich Savosty u k. The two domina n t

forces of the Cold Wa r th us pooled their resources to cond uct a n

a rms control trea ty i nspection. 1 8

The United Sta tes recei ved on l y nine decla red site i nspections

duri ng the first red uction yea r. A Bu lga ria n tea m cond ucted the

only inspection of U.S. faci l ities outside Germa n y d u ring a mission

to a POMCUS ( preposi tion ing of materia l con figu red to u n it sets)

site at Grobbend onk , Belgi u m. The rema i ning eight i nspections a ll

took place in Germa n y. The second yea r brought nine more i nspections of U.S. forces, eight i n Germa n y and one in Ita l y. During

the th ird yea r, OSIA tea ms escorted seven i nspection tea ms: five in

Germa ny and one each in Lu xem bourg a nd Ita ly. The issue of

ambu la nces mou nted on M-113 chassis a rose severa l ti mes d uri ng

these i nspections. Uk ra inia n inspectors wrote a commen t on thei r

report concerni ng this type of am bula nce a t the U.S. Tactica l

Tra ining Cen ter a t Hohenfels, Germa n y, on Ju ne 5, 1993. The U.S.

escort team ch ief, Lt. Colonel Ja n S. Ka rcz, USA, d enied the Uk ra inia n inspectors access to the interior of the am bu lances. Ka rcz tol d
220 0 -S1 1 1 I w1 c 1 10 Ac .1 c '

Colonel Alek sandr Petrouich Kal111i11, a Russian ms/1ec/()r, serued (!/1 an American team in

Romania. He signals all's well af ter the /!lane sl.cidd cd uff the run/,l!ay.

them tha t t h · a m b u la nces were nei ther a rmored com ba t veh icles

nor look -a l i kes, a nd t h erefore were n ot u bject to the tre·Hy. The

inspect ion rea m chief di d nor decla re an a rn biuu ity, bu t commen ted tha t the re was no wa y to con firm t ha t r he vehicl es \Vere

a m bu la nces i nstea d of M- l 13s.

olonel La wrence G. Kel l ey, SMC, en cou ntered a simila r

sit ua t ion w h ile escor ti ng Hu nga ria n i nspectors d u ri ng an inspecti on of t he Legh orn A rmy Depot i n Li vorno, Ita l y, on J u ne 21,

'1 994. Tech n i ci a ns accid enta l l y ha d left th d oors to the ambula nces open , a llowi n g t he i n spectors to obser ve r he interi or of

a m bu l a nces t ha t h ad n ot )'Ct been mod i f ied. The site comma nder

pro idecl t he Hu n t,a ria n i n spectors docu men ta tion to show tha t

con version k its ha d been ordered , b u r h a d n ot yer a rri ved. The

inspectors u l ti m a te l y ma d e no com ment, on the i nspection

reporr .

19

Du ring t h e red u cti on peri od, U.S. i nspection tea ms conti n ued

t hei r po l icy of st r ict ad herence to the provi sions of the FE Trea ty.

They exercised th ei r i n spection righ t a nd protect ed U .S. i nterests

to t he fu llest. Desp i te en cou nteri ng pro blems, .S. i nspection

tea ms ma i n ta i ned a profes in n a l rela tionsh ip wi t h thei r cou nterpa rts whi l e a ttem pt i ng to resol ve t h ose problems. They incor pora ted new tea m rn emb rs from d ifferent na tion s a n d pa rtici pa ted

on tea ms from oth er n a tion . They d isp la yed flex i bil i t y in completing thei r mission , w h ile m a in ta i n i ng h igh sta n da rd s.
R1 l>l ( Il(l YI \I{\ _ _ (

l l f H

After the 40-mont h red uction period, how ha d the situation

in Europe cha nged ? What rema ined ? Ta bles 7-3 and 7-4 list the

hold ings of TLE d ecla red by each state at the end of the red uction

period. They also show the net cha nge in holdi ngs from Ju ly 17,

1992, to Novem ber 17, 1995. The cha nge was significa nt. The

two grou ps of states' com bi ned decrease was 64,854 pieces of

TLE: the Eastern nations were down by 37,482 pieces while the

NATO states d ropped 27,372 items.

Both grou ps were below the treaty's ceilings i n each TLE

ca tegor y. Severa l states, such as Turkey, showed increases in

equ ipment beca use their na tiona l ceilings, agreed u pon within

Table 7-3. Residual Levels-NATO States (November 17, 1995)

Tanks ACVs Artillery Aircraft Helicopters Total

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Belgium 334 28 704 679 316 62 169 33 46 +38 1,569 764

Canada 0 76 0 136 6 26 0 28 0 0 6 266

Denmark 343 156 303 13 552 75 31 12 0 1,285 201

France 1.289 46 3,556 831 1,251 185 667 28 317 49 7,080 1,139

Germany 3,061 4,109 2,679 6,420 2,056 2,679 578 462 225 31 8,599 13,701

Greece 1,735 236 2,324 +892 1,878 97 489 +34 6 +6 6,432 +599

Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Italy 1,162 70 2,986 788 1,939 74 524 18 137 39 6,748 989

Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Netherlands 734 179 1,002 443 580 257 182 +6 0 90 2,498 963

Norway 170 35 203 +79 246 298 75 14 0 0 694 268

Portugal 174 +28 367 +87 320 34 105 +13 0 0 966 +94

Spain 630 228 1,199 24 1,210 158 188 +10 28 0 3,255 400

Turkey 2,608 400 2,450 +391 3,125 +18 387 +27 20 +9 8,590 +45

United Kingdom 662 497 2,574 632 536 +2 640 117 342 47 4,754 1,291

United States 1,254 3,909 2,238 2,725 854 1,119 222 176 150 199 4,718 8,128

TOTAL 14,156 9,941 22,585 11,242 14,869 4,970 4,301 817 1,283 402 57, 194 27,372

Bloc Authorized

TLELevels 20,000 30,000 20.000 6,800 2,000 78,800

Source: "Fact file: Final Weapons Reductions Under the CFE Treaty," Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996.

R IDl
222 0 -S11 1 I Sl'f: 1 1( c.1 ('\

Table7-4. Residual Levels-EasternStates (November 17,1995)

Tanks ACVs Artillery Aircraft Helicopters Total

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease 

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Declared

Nov 95

Decrease

From EIF

Armenia 102 NIA 285 NIA 225 NA 6 NA 7 NIA 625 NIA

Azerbaijan 285 +151 835 +722 343 +217 58 +43 18 +9 1,539 +1,142

Belarus 2,320 1,137 2,984 840 1,533 29 335 55 79 +3 7,251 2,058

Bulgaria 1,475 794 1,985 247 1,750 404 235 100 44 0 5,489 1,545

CzechRepublic 953 850 1,363 1,152 767 956 187 41 36 3,306 3,000

Georgia NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA

Hungary 835 510 1,540 191 840 207 144 +1 59 +20 3,418 887

Kazakstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Moldova 0 0 209 +111 155 +47 27 3 0 0 391 +155

Poland 1,720 1,130 1,516 880 1.581 734 400 109 92 +62 5,309 2,791

Romania 1,375 1,592 2,073 1,098 1,471 2,471 373 135 16 +1 5,308 5,295

Russia 5,492 3,846 10,372 9,027 5,680 2,646 2,986 1.638 826 179 25,356 17,336

SlovakRepublic 478 423 683 575 383 478 114 0 19 0 1,677 1,476

Ukraine 4,026 2,102 4,919 1,784 3,727 +136 1,008 640 270 13,950 4,391

TOTAL 19,061 12,233 28,764 14,961 18,455 7,525 5,873 2.677 1,466 86 73,619 37,482

BlocAuthorized

TLELevels 20,000 30,000 20,000 6,800 2,000 78,800

Source: "Fact file: Final Weapons Reductions Under the CFE Treaty," Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996.

their grou p of states, were higher tha n their hold ings, allowing

them to increase their forces t h rough pu rchases or cascad ing.

The tota l decrease in TLE was not entirely the result of treaty

red uctions or a need to fu lfill trea ty-obliga ted red uctions. While

the United States fu lfi lled its red uction obliga tions, it also withdrew ma ny of its forces from Europe for political and econom ic

reasons. Some na tions-Russia , Pola nd, Uk ra ine-red uced TLE

beyond their req u ired lia bi lities for economic reasons. Other

na tions exported sma l l qua ntities of wea pons.

Iceland and Lu xembourg were signatories but held no TLE,

so they reported none. Georgia and Armenia made no decla ration

at entry into force, a nd Georgia did not ma ke a decla ration in

Novem ber 1995. Both were in volved in fighting during the period

and dispu ted total n umbers of items attri buted to them from the

Tashkent agreement.
f

I. Ra nda ll Forsberg, Roh Lea vitt, a nd Steve Li l l y-Weber, "Conventiona l

Forces Treaty Bu ries Cold Wa r," Bulletin of the Atorni c Scientists, Ja n ua ry/

Februa ry 1991, pp . 32-37; J i m Nichol, "Conventiona l Forces i n Europe

Trea ty: Russi a n Atti tudes a nd Im pl ica tions for U.S. I nterests.'' CRS Report

for Congress, u pd a ted Septem ber 15, 1995.

2. Sec A ppendix B for t he text of rhe pled ges.

3. Arms Control leporter 1 992 , pp. 407.B.463-474.

4. President George Bush, Adherence to and Comp liance with Arms Control

Agreements and the President's Rep ort to Congress on Soviet N oncornpliance with Arms Control Agreenzents, prepa red h)' th e U.S. A rms Con trol

a n d Disa rma men t Agency, Ja n u a ry 14, 1993.

5. Arms Control R ep orter I 990, p. 407 .E.08; Depa rtment of Defense, Acti ng

Di rector, Tactica l Wa rfa re Progra ms, "Report on Tra nsfer of Certa i n CFE

Treacy-Li mi ted Eq u i pment," A ugust 30, 1994; OSIA Europea n Opera tions

Com ma nd , Pla ns Section, "Summa ry of Acti vity at Buccin o, Ita l y,"

Nove m ber 1993; joi nt Consu l ta ti ve Grou p, "Rev ised Report on rhe Work

of the JCG I n forma l Work i ng G rou p," Decem ber 8, 1992.

6. Interview with Colon el Sta n isla w Ma l i n owsk i, Ch ief I nspector, Polish

Ve ri f ica tion Cen ter, by Joseph P. Ha ra ha n , H istoria n , OSIA , Wa rsa w,

Pol a nd, Fe brua ry 3, 1994.

7. Ibid .

8. I nterv i ew wi t h Lr. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, Team Ch ief, OSIA, by

J oseph P. Ha ra ha n , H istori an , OSI A, Rhei n-Ma i n A ir Base, Germa n y, J u l y

'12, 1993.

9. I n spection Reports, C92- Bl u e-034-PL, October 29, 1992; C93-Bl ue-01 3-

HU, Ma rch 17, 1993; C93-Bl ue-05 1-CZ, Novem ber 24 , 1993.

1 0. I nspection R eport, C93-Bl ue-038-CZ, Septem ber 1, 1993.

1 1 . I n spection Report, C94-Bl u e-007-CZ, i'vla rch 30, 1994.

1 2. I nspection Report, C93-Bl u e-0 14-BO, A pri l 1, 1993.

1 3. In specti on Report , C93-Bl u e-047-BO, Novem ber 9, 1993.

14. I n specti on Report , C93-Bl u e-02 1-UP, Ma y 4 , 1 993.

1 5. I n spection Report, C93-Bl ue-034-CZ, J u l y 14 , 1993.

1 6. I n spection Reports, C94-Bl u e-003-BO, Febru a r y 1, 1994; C94-Bl ue-028-

U P, A ugust 22, 1 994.

1 7. I n spection Report, C93-Blue-O I 8-HU, A pri l 28, 1993.

1 8. I n spection Report, C94-Bl u e-033-RO, Septem ber 19, 1994.

19. Escort Mission Report Fol ders, 93-CFE-030-UP-G E; 94 -CFE-02 1 -HU-IT.

Verification agency leaders gathered at RA F Scampton, England , for a post-baseline conference in Decemher / 992.

t the end of the CFE Trea ty's th ird red uction yea r in

Novem ber 1995, one cou l d d raw six concl usi ons. Fi rst,

the trea ty ra tifica tion process had been criti ca l to ach ieving

na tiona l a nd i nterna tiona l consensu s on the deta iled trea t y provisions a nd protocols tha t we re so im porta nt th roughou t i m plementa tion . Second , th ree yea rs i n to the process of provid i ng da ta,

red ucing wea pons, accepti ng i nspecti on tea ms, and ad ju d ica ting

disputes, the 30 signa tory states rema i ned com m i tted to the CFE

Trea ty. Wi t h some exceptions, the states were meeti ng t heir na -

tiona l red uction q uota s in the trea ty's fi ve ca tegories of offensive

wea pons. The trea t y speci fied that 100 percent of each na tion 's

fi na l reducti on l i a bil ity had to be ach ieved by the end of the th ird
0 - ITI I 111< Tll

red uction yea r. Armen ia, Azerba ija n, Georgia, Bela rus, Ukra ine,

and Russia did not meet their trea ty-ma nda ted red uction quotas. 1

Of these states, Bela rus, Ukra ine, and Russi a had informed the

Joint Consu lta tive Group in Vienna of the specia l circumsta nces

tha t forced them to postpone the date for completi ng their trea ty

red uctions. No na tion ind ica ted that it wou ld withd raw from the

trea ty. Despite the fact tha t t hese six na tions were not in complia nce as of Novem ber 1995, collecti vel y, the nations of the NATO

and WTO a llia nces ha d met and even exceeded the CFE Trea ty

red uction quotas. By Novem ber 17, 1995, the end of the th ird

red uction yea r, the signa tory states ha d destroyed, converted,

decom missioned, recl assified, or placed on static d ispla y more

tha n 19,200 ba ttle ta n ks, 9,800 a rtil lery pieces, 18,600 armored

personnel carriers, 2,200 combat aircraft, and 370 attack helicopters. The tota l-50,170-exceed ed the red uction quotas established in the treaty.2

The third concl usion was tha t the CFE Trea ty's pri nci pa l

verif ication meas u re-the use of on-site inspection tea ms to confirm force d ata and to mon itor red uctions, reca tegorizations, a nd

suspect sites-was wor king well. Na tiona l on-site inspection teams

had conducted more than 2,500 i nspections of declared sites,

objects of verifica tion (OOVs), specified areas, and reductions of

treaty-limited equ ipment (TLE). Disputes arose in fewer than 50

inspections. Many potentia lly contentious issues had been resolved

on-site by the inspectors and escorts acting within the treaty's

articles and protocols.

The H ofburg Palace in Vienna, Austria, was the meeting place for the CFE Treaty 's J oint

Consultative Group.
IH1 I l I 1 1 ": I u 1R 1t RI 1- 11u \R l it l'I l _ -

Fou rth, the CFE Treaty's Joint Consu lta tive

Grou p (JCG ) ha d functioned as an importa nt

foru m th roughou t trea ty ra tifica tion a nd implementa tion. The ]CG ha d met a lmost continua ll y

in Vien na since the trea ty's signature in Pa ris on

Novem ber 19, 1990, to consider problems a rising from na tiona l force da ta, on-site i nspections,

notifica tions, and other treaty req u irements. I n

closed joi nt sessions and committees, representatives of the treaty states discussed and formu lated

solutions and, on ma n y occasions, achieved the

req u ired consensus on recommended changes to

trea ty issues. Throughout implementa tion, the

]CG provided the CFE Trea ty process a degree of

flexibility tha t was inva lua ble in a time of ra pid

cha nges across Eu rope.

The fifth concl usion is tha t the politica l and

socia l u phea va ls sweeping across post-Cold Wa r

Eu rope from 1992 to 1995 ha d a d i rect i nfl uence

on the CFE Treaty's im plemen ta tion. Withi n a

yea r of the Soviet Un ion's colla pse in late 1991

a nd the creation of the new successor states,

Western Eu ropea n govern ments and peoples

The ]CG ap proved Russian modified reduction

procedures.

were i nteracting, forma lly and informa lly, with Eastern Eu ropea n

na tions to a degree not seen for 50 yea rs or more. This

activity infl uenced the composi tion of the CFE Treaty's na tiona l

i nspection tea ms. In Ja n ua ry J 993, just six months a fter the

trea ty's entry into force, the NATO na tions collectivel y invited the

trea ty's Eastern states to joi n their CFE tea ms as guest inspectors.

They accepted. Shortly therea fter, ind ivid ua l inspectors from the

Eastern states bega n serving on the NATO na tions' CFE inspection

tea ms. These m u ltinationa l tea ms cond ucted i nspections of CFE

sites th roughout Eastern Eu rope and the successor states. Within a

ma tter of months i n 1993, virt ua lly a ll the NATO nations' CFE

inspection tea ms ha d become m ulti na tiona l, with inspectors from

severa l na tions routi nely serving on a single tea m.

The ra pid thaw a fter the Cold Wa r was reflected in other

coopera tive efforts. I n 1994, the trea ty na tions agreed to sha re

data from on-site i nspections and from the ann ua l na tiona l force

data su bmissions. At tha t time, the NATO na tions expa nded VERITY, their compu terized data base, incorporati ng informa tion on

inspections and nationa l force data from almost all treaty states. In

a nother development, in 1993 NATO opened its CFE Trea ty tra ining courses to inspectors from the Eastern states and successor

na tions. Fu rther, NATO's Verifica tion Coordina ting Committee

(VCC) sponsored specia l semina rs each yea r from 1992 through

1996 for the directors and senior sta ffs of the nationa l verifica tion

agencies from both grou ps of states. These semina rs served as

The N ATO School's CF E Treaty

Course was ofJen to all 30 nations.

• c1 ..(f.r.,.J,... :.:.:--,:.,_

, r, ._,g· (_,

Bii 1ort Po
228 O;-.;-S1n l!';'>l'I t 1 10 Ac;1 u

importa nt informa l foru ms for ra ising implementa tion issues, a nd

they provid ed a setting i n which the verification d i rectors cou ld

d iscuss common issues a nd approaches. When the CFE Trea ty was

negotiated and signed i n 1990, no one had a nticipa ted the form or

the extent of these joi nt East-West trea ty im plementa tion activities.

Fina lly, one cou ld concl ude tha t collectively the 30 CFE

Treaty states ha d, i n la rge measure, achieved the treaty's stated

objecti ves of esta bl ish ing a "secure and sta ble ba lance of conventiona l armed forces in Eu rope a t lower levels" a nd elimina ting "as

a ma tter of high priori ty, the capa bility for lau nch ing a surprise

attack or for in itia ting a la rge-sca le offensive action in Europe. "3

Certa inly, the demise of the Soviet Un ion a nd of the Wa rsaw

Treaty Orga n ization as a via ble milita ry a ll iance were conseq uentia l events that contributed directly to these all-Europea n trea ty

objectives. Yet, one shou ld not d iscou nt the treaty states' concrete

actions i n carrying out thei r CFE Trea ty commitments. In 1992,

1993, 1994, a nd ] 995; da ily, week ly, yea rl y; i n thousa nds of discrete actions, the signatory states ha d met their trea ty obl iga tions

and exercised their trea t y rights.

By the end of the red uction period in Novem ber 1995, the

CFE Treaty was viewed widel y across Eu rope as a va lua ble, lega lly

bi nd ing agreement for red uci ng milita ry a rma ments and for enha ncing openness of milita ry forces across na tiona l borders. Since

it entered into force, a dura ble record ha d been achieved; tha t

record esta blished a context for eva lua ting the CFE Trea ty's next

ma jor phase: the resid ua l level va lid ation period.

RESIDUAL LEVEL VA l IDATIO PF. RlOD:

NOVEMBER 1995 TO M A RCH 1996

RLVP:

i 1ouem/J er 17, 1995-

M arch / 6, / 996

Following the 40-mont h red uction period, the treaty provided

for a brief 120-day pha se d uring which every na tion ha d the right,

u nder the grou p of states quota system, to verif y the trea ty-l imited

wea pons and forces possessed by the na tions i n the other grou p of

states. Based on the n u mber of OOVs in the Eastern grou p of

states on Novem ber 17, 1995, the encl of the red uction period, the

NATO na tions cou l d cond uct u p to 247 on-site inspections over

the next 120 days, while the Eastern group of states cou ld cond uct

up to 254 i nspections. Designa ted in the trea ty as the resid ua l level

va lida tion period (RLVP), this phase preceded the trea ty's fina l

stage: the resid ual period . Tha t fina l period wou l d be of u nlimited

dura tion, wit h complia nce mon i tori ng by on-site inspections continu ing indefi nitel y, though a lways based on a percen tage of a

na tion's OOVs. The RLVP was an importa nt period , beca use it

allowed states to verify the a ccuracy of the other trea ty na tions'

postred uction n u mbers in order to esta blish a basis for mon itoring

the nationa l TLE hol d ings in the resid ua l period. 4
---- ---T111 CFE T1u·.An:A DUl{Al!L 1SrnucT RI' rn1{ Pm r-Cow WAR E ROl'I· 229

This RLVP phase resembled the trea ty's basel i ne period in

both intent and dura tion. Both were periods of intense i nspection

activi ties, with the treat y a ll owing i nspections by the grou p of

states of u p to 20 percent of all decla red OOVs. The ma jor difference between the two periods lay in the length of time for pla nn ing

and prepa ra tion. The CFE Treaty's fina l ra tifica tion developed

q uick l y in J u ne-Ju l y 1992 as the states decided to im plement the

treaty provisiona l l y. En try into force came im med ia tel y a fter the

Helsi n k i Sum mit on Ju l y 17, 1992; it ca ugh t some na tions, especiall y some of the newer Eastern Eu ropea n repu blics, by su rprise.

This element of surprise was not pa rt of the trea ty's R LV P phase.

All treaty na tions k new that RLVP wou l d begi n on Novem ber 17,

1995, and end on Ma rch 16, 1996.

These dates were known to Colonel Ken neth D. Gu illory,

U.S. Arm y, who assumed comma nd of OSIA's Eu ropea n Operations ( EO) Comma nd in Ja n ua ry 1995. He took over a n active,

experienced, 145-person i nspection com ma nd. The trea ty's R LVP

was 10 months awa y, bu t he i ni tiated a n i ntensi ve pla n n ing effort

im med ia tel y. Gu i llory knew tha t the process of i nspecti ng, escorting, a nd cond ucti ng l ia ison opera tions wou ld be the same as d u ring the baseli ne and red uction periods, bu t he recognized that the

pace d uring RLVP wou l d be much faster. The comma nd would be

called u pon to cond uct twice as ma ny i nspections i n 120 days as i t

norma lly d id in an entire yea r. On the escort side, U.S. vul nera bi lity to bei ng inspected wou ld not be as grea t as d u ri ng basel ine.

Colunel Kenneth D. Guillory, Commander of OS IA's European Operations Command, leads an OSCE

inspection in Bosnia.
2 rn 0 -SI 1 1 I "I'!{ 1 10 Ac.I '\;( '

Since 1992, thousa nds of U.S. troops had been withd rawn

from Europe a nd dozens of U.S. mi l ita ry bases closed. Conseq uen tly, Colonel G u illory expected that the 56 U.S. Arm y a nd 5

U.S. Ai r Force OOVs i n Eu rope wou l d be inspected 12 ti mes d u ri ng R LV P ( 20 percent of 61 OOVs). Fu rthe r, Gu illory assu med

tha t America n l ia ison officers wou l d be extremel y busy d u ri ng the

period , since the N ATO na t i ons' passi ve quota was 254 i nspections. Uni ted States policy d icta ted tha t a .S. l ia ison tea m tra vel

to ever y site su bject to inspection i n order to protect U.S. facil i ties

a nd u ni ts stJtioned or deployed there. As he added u p n u m bers of

i nspections, esco rts, a nd l ia ison m issions for the R LVP phase,

G u illory concl u ded th a t the com ma nd wou l d be doi ng twice as

m uch wor k in one-th i rd the time. To ensure the com ma nd 's read iness, he in i ti ated an i ntensi ve pla n n i ng effort to na i l down every

aspect of OSIA's RLVP m issi on.5

In m id -Februa ry 1 995, G u i llory brought the Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd sta ff toget her a nd expl a ined h is i nitia l pla nn i ng guida nce. Al l RLVP pl ann ing and prepa ra tions wou ld be a

joi n t sta ff effort i n vol vi ng opera tions, support, and logistics. Further, the effort wou ld i n volve extensi ve coordina tion wi t h Headq ua rters a nd wit h OSI A's operating comma nds a nd consu lta tion

wi th the sta ffs of the N ATO na tions' verifica tion agencies, other

foreign veri fica tion agencies, and N ATO's VCC. Fi nall y, he d irected a t th is i ni tia l meeti ng that the effort wou l d be coord ina ted

by the opera tions d iv ision's pla n n i ng cell. In Novem ber 1995, j ust

as the RLVP opera tion was getting u nder wa y, Colonel Gu illory

reca lled h is objecti ves. "We wen t to work," he explai ned, "to

develop a n opera tiona l concept and four interlock ing pla ns. "6 Th is

wor k, he said , prod uced the following7

:

• A n opera tiona l concept as part of the NATO pla n. Since the

begi n ni ng of the CFE Trea t y, the Un ited States had cond ucted

i ts trea ty responsi bi l ities i n concert with the NATO na tions.

Th is wou ld con ti n ue d u rin u R LVP.

• A n aggressi ve l ia ison pla n to ensu re an A merica n presence a t

any U.S. faci l ity in the N ATO na tions.

• An augmenta tion pla n to ensu re tha t OSIA's EO Comma nd

had the necessa ry ma npower to cond uct the escort and

inspection missions.

• A logistics pla n to su pport a ll EO inspectors, escorts, lia ison

off icers, and a ugmentees.

• An aggressive tra ining pla n to prepa re new EO mem bers and

augmentees for CFE Trea ty opera tions.

As the pla n ni ng got u nder wa y in the spring of 1995, Brigad ier Genera l Gregory G. Gova n, Di rector of OSIA, decided tha t

the agency wou ld a ugment the EO Com ma nd wit h people from

Head qua rters and the other opera tiona l com ma nds. By m id -
Ill I ": n 111 1 rn t rt n1 1 111< Pl 'II- 111 1> \V'\I< h1w1•1

sum me r the pla n ca lled for 4 1 a u gmentees. Al l wou ld be tra i ned

by Septem ber a nd wou l d deploy to Europe i n earl y Novem ber.

These OSIA peopl e wou ld serve on l ia ison tea ms, i nspection

tea ms, and escort tea ms. They would a lso wor k i n comm u n ica -

tions, pla n ni ng, and ad m i nist ra tion. As the date grew closer,

Colonel G u illor y reeva l u a ted t he comma nd 's req u iremen t for

a ugm entees. He red uced the req u ired n u m ber from 41 to 33,

la rgel y on the basis of new person n e l a rri vi ng ea rlie r tha n a nticipa ted a nd a new estima te of the l ogistics d i vision's opera tiona l

ca pa bil ity. At Rhei n-Ma in, th ree officers-Lt. Colonel Thomas

Carraway, USA; Lt. Colonel William L. Lefevers, USAF; and Ma -

jor Jon Rebhol z, Jr., USMC-pl a yed key roles in shepherd ing

every aspect of the RLVP pla nning effort. Just as Colonel

La wrence Kelley, USM C, ha d checked a nd rechecked every deta i l

of the comma nd 's pla n n ing prior to basel i ne, these th ree off icers

forced ever y d i vision, section, tea m, a nd i nd ivid ua l to k now a nd

u nd ersta nd thei r role d u ring R LV P. 8 Wha t were the resu lts?

During the resid ua l level va lidation period-from November

1 7, 1995, to Ma rch 16, 1996-NATO na tions cond ucted 246

inspections of Eastern bl oc nations. The Un ited States led 38 i nspections and provid ed guest i nspectors on 56 other na tiona l

tea ms. U.S. i nspection tea ms hosted 65 guest inspectors. During

RLVP, U.S. i nspection teams exercised a l l their trea ty righ ts; when

a ppropria te, they wrote com ments on the i nspection reports. They

decla red I 1 ambigu i ties, which were ref e rred to the JCG in Vi en na

for resolu tion. As in ever y other per i od i n the treaty, U.S. i nspection tea ms a nd inspectors set high sonda rd s in thei r k n owled ge of

the treaty, its protocols, TLE status, and n a ti ona l force data .

9

From Novem ber to Ma rch, Eastern na ti ons i nspected NATO

n a ti ons 183 times. Th is tem po \vas somew ha t slower tha n expected, ,]though i t wa s a t a n i nspection level of 72 percent of the

ma xi mu m possi bili ty of 254 i nspections. Ea stern na ti ons used

seq u entia l i nspection s to cover as many sites as possi ble in a single

Brigadier General Gregory G.

Govan, USA , Direct01 OS/ A.

NATO Quota: 247 Inspections

Unused quota: 1

Eastern Group Quota: 255 Inspections

U.S. sites: 11

Unused quota: 72

JU
) '.., 0 -SI I I \Pl ( Ifl) (,f ( 't

Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, U.S. Army

Colonel Ken Guillory, U.S. Army, commanded OSIA's European

Operations Command during the RLV P period. A field artillery officer, he commanded a battalion at Ft. Sill, Ok lahoma; fought in

Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia; and served as a civil-militar y

liaison of ficer to the German army under the US Army's Pershing II

command . Capable in German and Russian, Guillory holds a master's

degree in Soviet area studies from Georgetown University.

On the necessity for early planning for the CFE

Treaty's RLV P operations: "We started the pla nning process in Februa ry 1995. We used the basic 

joint operations pla nning system, which is simila r

to the Army's system. We d id it not beca use it

was familia r to me, which it was, bu t beca use it

tends to ma ke you ask the right questions and do

the kind of pla nning that you need to d o. It's

delibera tely designed to expose things that ma y

be wea knesses, so that you can address them and

ta ke care of them in your pla n ning. The other

thing that we did tha t was importa nt was to

coordinate a ll key issues with agencies here in

Eu rope, with OSIA Hea dqua rters in Washington,

and with the Inspection Support Staff. We d idn't

pla n it j ust as operators, we had logistics people,

personnel folks, counteri ntelligence folks; everybody was involved. It was a tota l , coordina ted

effort. I think it ma de a big d ifference."

On the difference between normal operations and

the tempo during RLV P: "The difference, of

course, was the intensity of the operation. We

were doing a greater number of inspections in a

shorter period. Wha t made the opera tion different was the coord ination needed to get people

briefed, tra nsported to and from the inspection

site, debriefed, and then having to coord inate

everything with several other nations simultaneously. It was a major coordi nation problem.

"The one problem tha t you try to pla n for, b ut 

there rea lly is nothing you can do a bout, is the

wea ther. RLVP, of course, ha ppened from

mid-Novem ber to mid-Ma rch, right in the midd le

of the Russia n and East Europea n winter. Tha t

made it ha rd. The d ifficulty was not as grea t i n

the East Eu ropea n cou ntries: Bulga ria, Hu nga ry,

Roma nia, Pola nd, the Czech Repu blic, and

Slovakia . There grou nd tra nsportation was a lwa ys a va il a ble. In Russia, however, the onl y entry

poi nt was Moscow. To get from Moscow to the

ma jority of the CFE Trea ty sites, the tea m ha d to

fly. That presented us some problems. I expected

that at least once, if not more, we were going to

ha ve trou ble reaching a Russia n site in time to

cond uct the inspection, simply beca use of the

wea ther. And that, of course, was out of our

ha nds. The other problem was that it was rea lly

very d ifficu lt to do a CFE inspection after dark.

You needed dayl ight. In the winter the days are

shorter, so you had to pla n the inspection to cover

a ll the areas you needed to cover and see within

a va ila bl e da yl ight. Our inspectors k now how to

do it, a nd they're good at it, but it is just more

difficult inspecting after August or September

when the days are longe r."

On the coordination process at NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee: "The process has

severa l steps. First, we decide which NATO countries get wha t percentage of the ava ila ble inspections in the East. Then, we decide which countries

get wha t percentage of i nspections in Russia, in

Uk ra ine, in Pola nd, Belarus, a nd all the other

cou ntries. Then the total period for the inspections is d ivided into time blocks. A block is one

week. Norma lly we do 52 blocks in a yea r. The

RLVP was 18 blocks. Beca use of a high n umber

of inspections we had to do for three countriesRussia, Romania, and Ukraine-we had to create

subordinate blocks. There was not just Block 2,

there was Block 2 Alpha, Block 2Bravo, and

Block 3 Alpha, Block 3 Bravo, a nd so on. For the

other na tions, each block remained one week, so

that you could go to Poland, Czech Republic,

Hunga ry, or wherever. Once tha t got settled,

there was a process at NATO for each of the

countries to say, 'Okay, I wa nt to inspect this

cou ntry i n this block.' That was negotia ted and

_ 1_
 1 1 '\ R lh l'f l

visit to Western Eu rope. The United States was inspected 1ltimes,

with 10 inspections occurring at U.S. facilities in Germa ny a nd 1

in Ita ly. OSIA's EO Comma nd deployed fu ll escort tea ms to each

site to cond uct the foreign inspection tea ms through the U.S. facilities. During RLVP opera tions, the U.S. liaison teams deployed on

163 Eastern na tion inspections. They provided inva lua ble assista nce to U.S. milita ry u n its and person nel , pa rtic u la rly in Tu rkey,

Ita ly, a nd Germa ny. 10

I n Ma rch 1996, when the R LVP ended , Colonel Gu i ll ory

evaluated the American effort. He developed a method to compa re

the "expected " level of operations with the "actual " level. Using

pl uses and min uses, he eva lua ted the strengths and wea k nesses i n

the com ma nd 's pla nni ng, tra i n ing, opera tions, logistics, and internationa l coord ina tion. In early Ma y, Brigad ier Genera l Thomas

E. K uen n ing, Director of OSIA, and the senior sta ff held a n a llAgency operations conference a t which Gu illory briefed his ana lysis of U.S. opera tions duri ng R LVP. The opera tion was a success,

he thought, beca use the early, intensi ve pla n ning effort ha d def ined

the req u i rements and ha d prod uced an operations pla n tha t was

com prehensive and rea listic. The expected a nd actua l levels of

opera tions matched u p across the boa rd, except for a few mi n uses 

concern ing forecasti ng eff orts tha t ha d been u nsuccessful in antici -

deconflicted as each cou ntry presented its schedule. Then the VCC put them a ll together a nd said,

'Okay, here is where there are conflicts,' and they

worked them a ll out. So NATO came u p with a

deconflicted schedule. Once tha t was done, the

NATO cou ntries went back a nd decided who

would be guest inspectors on their tea ms. In ou r

case, for example, sometimes we had a Germa n

or a British off icer; a Frenchma n or a Dutchma n; 

a Belgia n, Ita lian, Portuguese, Da nish, or Turkish

officer. Those a ll got worked out in adva nce.

"Some inspections were 'pa ired.' That's the

term we use for inspections when we take representatives from our Eastern Europea n trea ty

pa rtners. In some cases we will actua lly ha ve

Eastern off icers on our tea ms. For example, we

had some Hunga ria n officers with us on an inspection in Roma n ia. There is no quota for how

ma ny times we do it. We d on't ha ve to d o it at all,

but it's good for us. It helps us a lot. Also, it gives

them exposu re and experience in work ing with

Allied teams. The Un ited States is not the only

country tha t d oes this."

On incorporating an analysis of the CFE Treaty

baseline experience into R LV P operations:

"When we did the origina l pla n, we d id the

comma nder's estimate portion and one of the

things we looked at was how we, a t EO, had

ha ndled the basel ine opera tions. Wha t we found

out was tha t we had actually ha nd led the inspections pretty well. We had orga nized the tea ms

properly, we had the right n umber, a nd we were

a ble to conduct virtua lly a ll of the req uired inspections. Remem ber, the treaty's baseline period

was i n the summertime, so the weather was a lot

better. On the escort side, we were well prepa red,

a lthough the Eastern states did not inspect us as

much as we thought they would. On the lia ison

off icer side, where we went to the d ifferent

NATO countries every time there was an inspection, there were problems. During baseline we

ha d LNO tea ms standing by in severa l locations,

and it was a waste of ma npower. It wasn't the

best wa y to do things. For the RLVP, beca use of

the dista nce, we are keepi ng an LNO tea m in

place in Turkey, with the rest based here in Germa n y. We ha ve more flexi bility tha t wa y."

Source: Interview, Col. Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, with Technical Sergeant David Willford, USAF, November 13, and December 1, 1995.
2 0 -S1 1 1 I 1·1 < 1 10 Ac .1 < ' 

Brigadier General Thomas E.

Kuenning, J r., USAF, Director,

OSI A.

pa ring other na tions' inspection activity. On the pl us side, Gu i llory

ga ve h igh ra tings to NATO's VCC deconfl iction wor k a nd i ts

coord ination of guest i ns pectors, the con ti n uous dia logue a mong

the NATO na tions' veri f i cation agencies, the West-to-East d ialogue between veri fica tion a gencies pla n n ing cooperati ve m issions,

the work of the a u gmentees from OSI A Head q u a rters a nd opera -

tiona l com ma nd s, the determ ina tion of the U.S. l i a ison officer

tea ms, the professi ona l i sm of the I nspection Su pport Sta ff a nd its

coord i na ti on eff orts wi t h the i nteragency pol icy commu ni t y i n

Washington, a nd the earl y pla n ni ng a nd stand a rd ized packages

developed by the com ma nd 's logistics experts. 1 1

In the encl , the fact t h a t the re were ma n y more pl uses tha n

mi n uses was less im porta nt tha n the presence i n the comma nd of a

vigorous pl a nning effort; rigorous tra i ni ng sta nda rds; extensive

NATO na tion coord i n ation; thorou ghness i n i nspecti ons, escorts,

a nd l ia ison te ·1ms; res ponsi veness i n logistics; and a willi ngness to

cond uct a n honest postopera tion eva l ua tion. Measu red i n t his

wa y, OSIA's Eu ropea n Opera tions Com ma nd demonst ra ted that

the leadershi p a nd professi ona l standa rds that had been present in

the execu tion of the U.S. CFE Trea t y on-site i nspection m ission

d u ri ng the basel i ne a nd red uction periods ha d contin ued d uri ng

RLVP.

PROBLEMS DURJ (, TRI Al , IM PJ E MJ·

In the im plementa tion of a ny m u l tina tiona l trea ty, problems

a rise as a resu lt of cha nges i n the i n terna tiona l situa tion, cha nges

i n one or more of the signa tory na tions' interna l cond i tions, or,

more com monl y, d i fferi ng na tiona l inter preta tions of trea ty rights

and obliga tions. A trea t y ma y ha ve u nresolved or a m biguous

issues em bed ded in the text or protocols tha t come to the fore onl y

du ri ng im plementa tion. Im plementa tion of the CFE Treaty certai nly proved these genera l izations true. Fi ve pro blems su rfa ced 

from J u l y 1992, entry i nto force, to Novem ber 1995, the end of

the red uction period:

• Inspector access a t decla red sites.

• Cost of trea ty-l im ited equ i pment (TLE) red uctions.

• Accou nting for TLE among the Soviet Union 's successor

states.

• Destruction of R ussia n TLE l oca ted east of the Ura ls.

• Redefi nition of the trea ty's zona l restrictions for stationi ng

wea pons in the fla nk areas of Russi a and Uk ra ine.

Some of these pro blems, such as the inspectors' right of access a t decla red sites, resu l ted from complex com promises in treaty

definitions during the fina l weeks of negotiations. Others were the

d irect conseq uence of the Soviet Un ion's col l apse a nd the crea tion
( H IU \ I D1 1< '111 1 S1 1·1 c 1 L 1i 1 1 01i Po-. 1 -Crn 1

of eight successor sta tes tha t su bseq u en tl y be -

came pa rties to the trea ty. \Xlhen the Soviet

U n ion's massi ve hol di ngs of TLE were divid ed

a mong the new na tions, some states ha d d iff icu lty accou nti ng for a ll the eq u ipment tra nsferred from the R ussia n arm y. Other states ha d

problems fina nci ng the destr uction of thei r excess

wea pons a nd eq u i pment u nd er the trea ty's protocols. Fina lly, i n the period followi ng the brea k u p

of the Soviet Union, some successor states faced

severe interna l u nrest, such as eth nic violence

i n Chechnya and interna l disru ptions i n Georgia ,

Mold ova, a nd A r menia. These i n terna l problems

placed pressures on the govern ments, which

deployed m i l ita ry forces to suppress the u nrest.

The movement of these forces a nd th ei r wea pons

th rea tened complia nce wi th the trea ty's zone

l imits. Some na tions, specifica ll y R ussia , a rg u ed

tha t k ey provisions of the trea ty shou l d be a ltered to accom mod a te th ese probl ems.

C( E O 01'.C IAR FD SI ff

The first significa nt problem, inspector

access to decla red sites, arose shortly a fter the

trea ty entered into force i n J u l y 1992. D uri ng the

i n i tia l inspections, Russia n escorts rou ti n el y

gra n ted inspectors access to the d esigna ted

OOVs b u t often denied them access to the enti re

Unrest in the Souiet Union led to its brea/:u1t1 and the

addition of eig ht new stat es to the CFE Treaty.

d ecla red site. These denia ls occu rred a lso, to a lesser d egree, i n

Bela rus a nd U k ra i ne. In mid-A ugust, Russia a nd a l l other trea ty

states presen ted , as req u i red by the trea t y, a revised set of d ata

cha rts, l isting thei r decla red sites, OOVs, u n i ts, and TLE. For most

of i ts CFE sites, R ussia now stated tha t a ll i ts OOVs and decla red

sites ha d identica l bou nd ary l ines. Previousl y, Russia ha d stated i n

its trea ty data su bmissions tha t it ha d ma n y decla red sites (m ilita ry

bases, ga rrisons, or insta l la tion s) conta i n ing five, six, or more

OOVs ( regi ments or briga des). The new R ussia n trea ty data cha rts

signa led a ma jor cha nge, one tha t ha d the potentia l of l imi ting the

CFE inspection tea m 's access whi le on site. Also, the Russia n da ta

cha rts essentia lly n u ll i fied the trea ty's ca ref u l l y negotia ted compromise on the i nspection tea m's righ t of access to i nspect hoth the

designated OOV a nd the decla red site.

A mong the N ATO nati ons, the Un i ted States was most i nsistent on cha l lenging wha t it believed was R ussia 's u n ila tera l rei nterpreta tion of the trea ty. It set out to force the issue. The Un i ted

States sent severa l inspection tea ms to Russia to cond uct Section

VII Decla red Site CFE Treaty inspection s. These tea ms cond ucted

J HI \I{ Ill(lll'I
236 0 -Sm I SPICno AcE C\ 

A U.S.-led multinational inspection

in Romania.

inspections of the OOVs and decla red sites and in the process,

they insisted on thei r trea ty righ t to inspect the entire site. 12

Fra nce, Germa n y, and Grea t Brita i n agreed with the United States.

Their i nspection tea ms ra ised the issue with Russia n milita r y escorts a nd site comma nders. Onl y the United States, however, decla red ambigu ities. 13

Whil e inspectors a rgued and d ocumen ted t he issue of inspection rig h ts a nd inspecta ble sites, diploma tic delega tions d iscussed

the pro blem in Moscow, Wash ingto n, and ma jor Eu ro pea n ca pita ls. The ] CG hel d a series of meeti ngs seek i ng resolution . In la te

October, Ambassa d or Ly n n M. Ha nsen, U.S. CFE Trea ty Negotia -

tor, flew to Moscow for d iscussi ons on the issue wit h senior Ru ssian di ploma tic and mil ita ry officia ls. In th ose meeti ngs, Russia n

officia ls decla red ca tegorica l l y their i n ten tion to retu rn to the

original treaty interpreta tion and to comply with the CFE Treaty's

definition of a declared site. 14 Four weeks later, in its December

15, 1992, data u pd ate, Russia stated tha t it ha d 431 OOVs and

299 decl ared sites. Subsequent inspections of Russia n CFE sites in

1993 and 1994 by NATO na tion teams revea kd tha t on this issue-the inspection tea m's right of access to the declared site and

the common areas-Russi a ha d, indeed, reverted to the complex

treaty understanding that had been negotia ted and ratified ."

It is importa nt to recognize tha t in the resol ution of this

trea ty problem, the process work ed. Inspectors ra ised and docu -

mented the issue on-site; they decla red ambigu ities, w hich were

record ed in the lega l process of verif yi ng complia nce with the CFE

Trea ty. Once docu mented , the p roblem wa s exami ned by the respecti ve na tion a l verifica tion agency d irecrors a nd sta ffs. Then

sen i or offici a ls i n Moscow, Wash i ngton, a nd other ca pi ta ls eva l u -

ated the issue a n d prepa red govern men t posi ti ons. In Vien na ,

na tiona l representa tives to t he JCG presented thei r views and
--f 111 CFE TR1 \ ' ':A Dt R \Bl 1 S1 1H ( Tl R I WR Pm 1-Co1 n \V.\R El 1mp1 2Y''

worked i n commi ttees and joi nt sessions on a resol ution accepta ble to a ll trea ty states. In this case, the trea ty problem was ca used

by a change in Russia 's designa tion of its na tiona l force da ta. It

was resolved when Russia , challenged by the Un ited States and

other trea ty states, decided to ret u rn to the data format used by a ll

other signa tory states, th us ack nowled ging the origina l intent of

the trea t y. Once the data were i n the correct forma t, i nspectors

cou ld conf irm, th rough direct observa tion on-site, tha t the site,

u nit, and nation were in compl ia nce with the trea ty.

COST OF TLE REDUCTIONS

A persisten t problem of a different na tu re a rose shortly a fter

the CFE Trea ty entered into force. Several na tions compla i ned

pu bl icl y a nd in treat y forums tha t the trea ty's red uction protocols

req u i red destruction met hod ologies tha t were too speci fic and too

expensive, given the thousa nds of wea pons and pieces of equ ipmen t tha t ha d to be red uced with in the treaty-ma nda ted 40

months. They suggested less costl y, a lterna ti ve methods. Only one

mon th a fter the trea ty entered into force in Ju ly l992, Genera lLieu tena nt Iva n Oleyn ik , Uk ra inian Deputy Defense Minister for

A rma men ts, stated pu blicl y tha t destroyi ng T-54 ta nks was too

expensive. To destroy one ta n k, accord ing to Genera l Oleyn i k , the

U k ra inia n govern men t ha d to spend over 7,000 ru bles. Destruction of j ust one a rmored person nel ca rrier, he ma inta i ned, would

cost over 4,000 ru bles. Under the CFE Trea ty, Uk ra ine was responsi ble for the destructi on of 2,450 ta n ks, 2,222 A PCs, and 550

U.S. insp ection team recording data on T-54 tallk reductions in Uk raine.
2 l8 0 -St 11 I '"I Ic r10 Ac.1 C't

a ircra ft. To accom pl ish this work , the Uk ra inia n govern ment ha d

to set u p red uction sites at Zhitomer, Kiev, Lvov, Ni kola yev, and

Khar kov. 16

Other sta tes with su bsta n tia l red uction l ia bi l ities agreed with

Uk ra i ne. In Decem ber 1992, Germa n y, Russia, a nd Bela rus joi ned

Uk ra ine i n peti tion i ng the CFE Trea ty's Joint Consu lta tive Grou p

to consi der new, less costly proced u res for red uci ng trea ty-li m i ted

eq u i pment. 1 7 Russi a had 10 red uction sites, Germa ny 6, and

Bela rus 4. From Decem ber th rough Ma rch, the ]CG discussed

Ukra ine's petition. Then in April 1993, Ru ssia in vited observers

from the other trea ty na tions to witness a demonst ra tion red uction

of tan ks using the new proced u res. At a milita ry base outside Saint

Petersbu rg, Russia n a rmy wa rra n t officers demonstra ted how

d isa bli ng one side of a ta nk 's d ri ve system-ra ther tha n two, as

prescri bed in the trea ty-wou ld render it mil ita rily ineffective.

They also demonstrated that making pa rtial rather than complete

cuts would effectively disable the tank's major components: the

tur ret rings and gu n ba rrels. At this demonstra tion, representa ti ves

of the other trea ty states observed the recom mended mod ifications, and in Vienna , foll owing discussions and comments, the

JCG representa tives accepted the R ussia n proposa l. The new procedu res beca me accepta ble wa ys to red uce ta nks u nder the trea ty. 18

Less tha n a month la ter, the JCG agreed to a Germa n proposa l for

mod ifying the proced u res for red ucing lightl y a rmored vehicles.

The Germa n delegates propose d tha t these wea pons be destroyed

by crushi ng them i n a large compactor. Known as the "cheese

slicer" or "cookie cutter," t h is com pactor wor ked wel l i n f ield

demonstrations. A fter f u rther negotia tions i n Vienna, the J CG

approved its use i n June 1993. 1 9

Poland 's eight-ton ball crushed TLE effi ciently and economically.
 I t 1 1 1 1 n t nR P l r- 011> '\ 11 f.t 1w1·1

Pol and ha d a la rge red uction l iabil ity u nder the CFE Trea ty:

·1 ,120 ta n ks, 246 armored com ba t veh icles, 705 a rti ller y pieces,

and 49 a ircra ft. In ·1993, Pola nd recom mended a nd the JCG approved a mod ifica tion of the trea ty protocol for destroyi ng a rtillery pieces. Accord ing to Colonel Stanisla w Ma linowsk i, Di rector

of the Pol ish Verifica tion Center, the new method ca lled for a very

la rge, hea vy steel wrecki ng ba ll to be lifted high in the air and

d ropped on the wea pons, thereby "smash ing the gu n components

u nti l they were visi bl y cracked or bent." Colonel Mali nowsk i

added tha t this met hod was "not very costly" bu t was "very

efficient."20

Even wi t h these proced u ra l cha nges, the cost of red ucing the

excess TLE was a bu rd en for some of the sma ller successor states.

Bela rus is a small na tion of 10 m illion people. At Tash kent i t ha d

recei ved a la rge portion of the Soviet Union's CFE Trea ty conventiona l wea pons: 3,457 ta nks, 3,824 ACVs, l,562 artillery pieces,

a nd 390 a ircra ft. Bela rus's tota l red uction lia bili ty was more tha n

3,750 wea pons. To destroy these trea ty wea pons within the 40-

month red uction period, Bel a rus set u p red uction centers at

Borisov, Lesna ya , Ba ra novich i, and Stan kovo. When its economy

colla psed in 1992-93, Bela rus said tha t the cost of ca rrying out

CFE Treaty red uctions was excessive. In Decem ber 1992, Belarus

joi ned Russia , Uk ra ine, and Germany in petitioning the JCG to

mod ify the trea ty's red uction protocols. In Ju ne 1993, Bela r ussia n

senior officia ls stated tha t the government was u nder such fina ncial pressu re tha t it might not be able to meet its CFE Trea ty reduction obliga tions. General-Ma jor Viktor Va kar, Director of the

Bela rus Nationa l Agency for Control a nd Inspection , ra ised the

issue wit h the NATO Verifica tion Coord inati ng Committee in

Novem ber 1993. Other Bela russia n sen ior officia ls rook the issue

before the state pa rties at the Joint Consu lta tive Grou p; still others

ra ised it in diploma tic excha nges with the Uni ted States. In the

la tter insta nce, Bela rus req uested tha t N u n n -Luga r funds be obliReduction costs caused Belarus,

Uk raine, Russia, and Germany to

petition the ]CG to modify

reduction procedures.

l c Tl 1u
240 0 -S1 1 1 I w1< 1 10'.'\ Ac .1 . c '

M inister of Defense Pavel

K ozlovsk iy of Belarus and U.S.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin

fallowing the signing of a funding

agreement under the Nunn- Lugar 

program.

ga ted to assist it in its CFE Trea ty red uctions. Here was a new

problem. Bela rus was not req uesti ng fu rther mod ifica tions to the

treaty's red uction protocols; instea d , it was asking for direct foreign a id to pa y the cost of red uci ng the wea pons. Bela rus estima ted tha t it wou ld cost $33 mi ll ion to reduce its 3,758 pieces of

CFE Trea ty TLE.21

When the Un ited States did not respond (to avoid setting a

preced ent of pa ying for TLE destruction for a ll the successor

states), Bela rus took a not her tack. It ca lled for the trea ty states to

set up a vol unta ry CFE Trea ty Support Fund. Among the trea ty

na tions, on l y Russia a nd U k ra ine actively su pported esta blishing

such a f u nd. Nevert heless, Bela rus kept the concept a l i ve. In

Ma rch 1994, senior govern men t off icia ls sa id they wou ld be

forced to decla re a force ma je u re in fu rther trea ty red uctions if

economic cond itions d id not im prove. In late Ma rch, U.S. Secreta ry of Defense Willia m S. Perry stated that the United States

wou ld comm it $5 mi ll ion each to Bela rus and Uk ra ine to su pport

their CFE Trea ty red uction efforts. At the same time, Perry pointed

out tha t Bela rus ha d alrea dy been gra nted $70 million, and

Uk ra ine $270 million , u nder the U n ited States' Coopera ti ve Threa t

Red uction Progra m.22

This action was su fficient for Bela ru s to continue its CFE

red uction progra m th rough 1994. Then in Februa ry 1995, President Aleksa nder R. Lu kashenko sudd enly a nnou nced tha t Bela rus

wou ld suspend a l l red uction efforts. Decla ring tha t the cost of

destroyi ng the CFE wea pons was "economica ll y u n just,"

Lu kashenko sa id tha t he ha d ma de a u n ila tera l decision to shu t

down the red uction opera tions. Here was a d irect t h rea t to trea ty

complia nce. Lu k ashen ko's a nnou ncement ca me a few weeks before

Russian President Boris Yel tsi n th reatened to pu ll out of the trea ty
1 11 CfETiu '":A Dt H \111 1 Srn t < 1 1 HI 1 0R Pn 1-C()) 11 \V\I{ El RUl'I 2..J I

if Russia d id not receive some rel ief from the trea ty's fla nk limit

restrictions a nd if NATO expa nded into Central Eu rope.2'

Lukashenko's annou ncement and Yeltsin's threa t had the effect

of forcing this problem out of treaty forums and into the rea lm of

interna tiona l politics. Resol u tion of Russia 's flan k limit problem

will be discussed la ter; resolving Bela rus's financia l problem took

more tha n 15 months. Within a few days of Lukashen ko's Februa ry

23, 1995, annou ncement, Depu ty Foreign Minister Va leriy Tsepka lo

expla ined tha t Bela rus was prepa red to resu me destruction of

wea pons if su fficient fund ing was forthcomi ng im med iately. When

no other na tion came forth with funds, Bel a rus contin ued its suspension th roughou t the spring, su mmer, a nd into the fall mont hs.

The CFE Trea ty's Novem ber 17, 1995, red uction deadline a pproached; na tions with excessi ve TLE wou ld not be i n complia nce.

In la te August, Germa n Defense Min ister Kla us Kinkel flew to

Minsk and discussed the issue wi th the Bela russia n president a nd

his ministers. As he left, the Germa n defense min ister ma de no

commitments, bu t he conceded tha t the Cold Wa r's termina tion

ha d crea ted grea t sufferi ng for Bela rus and the other successor

na tions.

In September 1995, Bela rus a n nou nced tha t it wou ld resume

its red uction activi ties bu t ind ica ted tha t for economic reasons it

would not meet its trea t y red uction obl iga tions. The followi ng

month, Ja mes Collins, Ad visor to the U.S. Secreta ry of State, flew

to M insk for consu lta tions. No d irect action followed u ntil Novem ber, when the deadline ca me for a ll trea ty states to meet their

red uction l ia bilities. On Novem ber 17, 1995, a ll 30 na tions issued

a joi nt statement from Vien na iden tifying na tions tha t were not in

complia nce with the trea ty. Bela rus was not in complia nce. Appa rently th is statement a nd the promise of the Un ited States and

Germa ny to provide fi na ncia l assista nce were su fficient moti va ti on

for Bela rus to commit to a defin ite pla n for completi ng its TLE

red uctions. Ten da ys a fter Bela rus was singled out for noncom pl iance, its representa tives submitted a pla n to the JCG for destroying a ll of the state's rema i n ing TLE by April 26, 1996. The pla n

was qu ick l y approved , and the pace of red uctions proceeded to

meet the sched u le. Bela rus, in fact, did not meet the April 1996

deadline, which mea nt tha t it was still not in f u l l compl iance with

the CFE Trea ty's red uction q uotas. 24

ACCOU NTING fOR TLE AMONG THE

SUCCESSOR STATES

Eightsignatory states-Russia,Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia,

Moldova, Azerbaija n, Armenia, and Kazakstan-d id not exist as

nations duringCFETreaty negotiations. Following the collapse of

the Soviet Union, these states received portions of its vast arsenal
2.42 0 ·-1 1 l I l'I ( 10 (,I < '

in the Tash ken t Agreement of Ma y 1992. Du ri ng ra ti fica tion, they

com m i tted to the CFE Trea ty's provisions and protocols. However,

when it ca me time for i mpl ementa tion, some of the successor

states fou nd it d ifficu lt to meet their trea ty commi tments. The

situa tion i n the Tra nsca ucasia n region was chaotic. Nations were

ensna red in a web of civil wa rs, revol utions, ethn ic con flicts, a nd

interna l govern menta l chaos. Im pl ementing the CFE Trea ty was

not a pressi ng commitmen t for these states. To compl ica te ma tters,

the Russia n a rm y, wh ich had inheri ted the USSR's forces and

eq uipmen t before Tash k ent, was now wi thd ra wi ng from some

pa rts of the region. Under the Tashk ent Agreement, the Russia n

a rm y was responsi ble for tu rni ng over to the other successor states

thei r "agreed-u pon " por tion of the former USSR's a rsena l. Under

the CFE Trea t y, those na tions wou ld be responsi ble for the trea tyl im i ted equ ipmen t a nd for destroyi ng excess wea pons. However,

much of the Russia n a rm y's mili ta ry eq u ipmen t in the Tra nsca ucasia n region was old a nd u n usa ble. When tra nsfe rred , it was

rejected. Th is rejection, which incl uded severa l h u nd red ta n ks,

ACVs, and a rtillery pieces, ca used problems for the other signatory states moni tori ng compl ia nce with the CFE Trea ty.

In the Tra nsca uca sian region, a ll th ree states-A rmen ia,

A zer ba i ja n, a nd Georgia-experienced ma jor d ifficu l ties i n compl yi ng with the CFE Trea ty. When the trea ty entered into force in

Ju l y 1992, Armen ia reported a lmost no data on its conventiona l

eq u i pment, despite ha vi ng been a u thorized a t Tash ken t 258 ta n ks,

641 ACVs, 357 a rtille r y pieces, and 7 helicopters. Fu rthermore,

Armenia d id not admit to the JCG tha t it had an y red uction l ia bi l ities i n the first or second trea ty red uction yea rs. In Ja n ua ry 1993,

Armenia d id subm it its TLE l istings, bu t it stated tha t some of the

Abandoned TLE presented accountability pr oblems in the Transcaucasus nations.
I H Fl I1 1c ' ': DL 1 1 1 1 FOi{ Po 1-( '' u R f 1 1m1•1

In N ovember 1 992, an American team conducted a declared site inspection in Azerbaijan.

CFE eq u i pment left by the d epa rti ng Russia n a r m y lacked pa rts,

critica l elements, and fu nction ing u n its. A r menia im pl ied tha t it

wou ld not accou n t for or red uce th is u naccepta ble CFE equ ipment. R ussia , i n its CFE Trea ty cha rts, ha d reported the eq u ipment

as t ra nsferred to Armenia. However, A r men i a, on i ts trea ty cha rts,

d id not repor t t he sa me n u mbers. Th is ca used a d iscrepa ncy,

which the JCG discussed bu t cou ld not resol ve.

Azerba ija n, when the t reaty entered i n to force, su bm i tted i ts

TLE data , bu t they were i ncom plete a nd inaccu ra te. The problem

wi th the Azer ba i ja n i d ata stemmed from the sa me ca use: the depa rti ng R ussia n arm y ha d left tan ks, ACVs, and a rtillery tha t were

i n such poor sha pe or so stripped down tha t Azer ba ija n ref used to

accept a nd accou nt for them. I n addition, the Azer ba ija n is were

invol ved i n a length y eth n ic wa r i n Nagorno-Ka ra ba k h, and they

asserted tha t losses of conventiona l eq u i pment i n tha t confl ict

cou l d not be accou nted for or reported . A zerba ija n did accept one

U.S. CFE inspection tea m i n Novem ber 1992, th us i nd ica ting a

certa in willi ngness to pa rtici pa te in the trea ty. Bu t Azer ba ija n d id

not report any CFE equ ipment or wea pons red uction l ia bilities to

the JCG as req u i red at the end of either the first or the second

trea t y red uction yea r. Georgia, as a new na tion, ha d ma jor problems. A n intense civil wa r t h rea tened the existence of the government. Under these ci rcu msta nces, Georgi a 's com pliance wi t h

the CFE Trea ty was pro blema tica l. At the end of the third red uction yea r, the JCG issued a statement decla ring that Ar men ia ,

Azerba ija n, and Georgia were not i n com pl ia nce with the trea ty.

25

Uk ra ine and Russia were also not in complia nce with the

CFE Trea ty. They d id not meet their quotas for red uci ng excess

trea ty-limited eq u ipment assigned to the Bl ack Sea Fleet's na va l

infa ntry and coasta l defense u n i ts. Th is trea ty problem was pa rt of

11n ( 1 1 1u
244 0"1-S1 1 1 IMP! cTro Ac1'\C 'r 

a m uch la rger issue: the Black Sea Fleet's pa rti tion by R ussia and

U kra ine. At Tash kent, R ussia agreed to cede to Uk ra ine a certa in

portion of the former Soviet U n ion's wea pons, u nits, and sites.

Since these wea pons fell u nder the n u merica l and zone restrictions

of the CFE Trea ty, Uk ra i ne agreed i n its a rticles of ra tifica tion to

red uce a n y excess TLE wi thi n 40 mont hs of entry into force. As of

Novem ber 17, 1995, Uk ra ine was i n complia nce with a ll its trea ty

red uction q uotas, except for the wea pons a nd u ni ts assigned to the

Black Sea Fleet. In 1995, the fleet ha d approxi ma tel y 48,000 na va l

a nd ma ri ne person nel, 14 su bma ri nes, 31 surface ships, 43 pa trol

and coasta l ships, 125 com ba t a i rcra ft, and 85 helicopters. Eq u ipment covered by the CFE Trea t y incl uded one coasta l defense

d ivision with 175 ta nks, 450 a rmored i n fant ry figh ti ng vehicles,

and 72 a rtiller y pieces. The fleet also conta ined a na va l in fan try

briga de with 50 ta n ks, 218 ACVs, and 45 a rti llery pieces. Based in

the Odessa M ilita ry District i n the Cri mea , this fleet was ma nned

predomi na ntly by R ussia n sa i lors and officers. The fleet's R ussia n

comma nder a nd its senior off icers resisted an y pa rti tion a nd tra nsfer to Uk ra i ne.26

Pa rtitioning the fleet proved to be to d iff icul t at Tash kent;

conseq uently, the issue was left to bila tera l Russia n-Uk ra inia n negotiations. In Ju ne 1993, Uk ra inian President Leonid K ra vch u k and

Russia n President Boris Yeltsin signed a n agreement tha t essentia lly

split the fleet in ha lf, begi n ning i n September 1993 and reaching

compl etion in J 996. No sooner had this agreement been annou nced

tha n it fell apa rt. Russia n na va l officers objected to a n y tra nsfer, and

Uk ra i n ian mi l i ta ry leaders objected to any loss of territory from the

na val bases slated for tra nsfer. The Black Sea Fleet agreement was

renegotiated i n Septem ber 1993, aga in i n April 1994, and once

aga i n i n Februa ry 1996. Two months later it fel l apa rt aga in. Russian Defense Mi nister Pa vel Grachev stopped the d ivision beca use of

controversy over where the R ussia n fleet wou ld be based. ThroughU.S. Secretary of Defense William

S. Perry, NATO Secretary M anfred

Woerne1 and Russian Defense

M inister Pavel Grachev at N ATO

Headquart ers, M arch 29, 1993.
1u n: 1)1 R \Kl 1 S11u < 1 1 H1 1 Oil Pm 1-Crn 1> \\ \ R I 1ml'1

out these indecisive negotia tions and inconcl usive agreements, neither Uk ra ine nor Russia destroyed any of the wea pons or equ ipment

assigned to the na va l infa ntr y and coasta l defense u nits of the Black

Sea Fleet. Consequently, the two na tions were not in compl iance

with the CFE Trea ty, and u ntil the fleet ha d been divided successfu l ly, they wou ld remain in that status.27

c

In 1990, d uring the fi na l months of CFE Trea t y negotia tions,

the Soviet Union tra nsfer red more tha n 50,000 pieces of TLE to

mi l i ta ry bases a nd depots east of the Ural Mou nta ins. Th is was a

lega l movement of mi lita ry eq u ipment, since neither the Soviet

Un ion nor a ny other na tion ha d signed the u nfin ished trea ty. Nevertheless, once the trea ty was signed in Pa ris in Novem ber 1990,

the Soviet Un ion 's initia l TLE f igu res d isturbed the other treaty

sta tes. They were concerned with the sheer size of the tra nsfe rs,

a nd some observers concluded t ha t the Soviet m ilita r y might be

tr yi ng to circu mvent the trea ty, since no other na tion had tra nsferred an y conventiona l wea pons or eq u ipment outside its borders.

At the time of the trea ty's signa tu re in Pa ris, the Soviet Un ion's

data revea led a tra nsfer of 6,289 CFE Trea ty TLE items to u nits of

the na va l i n fa n try, coasta l defense, civil defense, and Strategic

Rocket Forces. This tra nsfer was considered a serious breach of

the trea ty-so serious tha t ma ny na tions, i ncl u d ing the Un ited

States, suspended ra tifica tion actions u nti l the Soviet Union

pledged to accou nt for a nd destroy a la rge portion of the tra nsferred eq u ipment.

As expl a ined i n Cha pter 3, "Ratifica tion Dela yed ," intense

d i ploma tic negotia tions led the Soviet Union to pl edge in a lega l

decla ra tion to the Joi n t Consu l tati ve Grou p i n J u ne 1991 tha t it

wou l d destroy or convert 6,000 ta n ks, 7,000 a rti l lery pieces, and

J ,500 ACVs (14,500 tota l) loca ted east of the Urals by Decem ber

31, 1995. At the same time, the Soviet Union obliga ted itself to

remove from the trea ty's territoria l zones 1,492 pieces of na va lrelated equ ipment. This equ ipment would a lso be d estroyed by the

end of 1995. None of the red uctions wou ld be subject to inspection; however, Moscow pledged to provide sufficient visi ble evidence to ind icate tha t the equ ipment ha d been destroyed or

converted. 28

Du ri ng the CFE Trea ty's 40-mon t h red uction period, the

trea ty states ind i vid ua l l y moni tored Russia 's progress in keeping

i ts pledge to red uce its TLE east of the U ra ls. There was little

reduction activity in 1992-93; only a slight increase in 1993-94;

and a steady low state in 1994-95. In Janua ry 1995, the U.S.

Congress was informed in a pu blished A rms Control and Disa rmalrn
24h 0 -S11 1 I w1 c 1 10. Ac.1 c '

Vharche11k o discount ed

military tlneL1t ...zc'<:' 1t'7er

rendered (' 711ip111e11t useless.

ment Agency (ACDA) report that "serious concern persists over

the pace and va lida tion of the [Russia n! red uctions." In July 1995,

the agency ra ised the issue before Congress aga in, criticizing

Russia 's slow pace of destruction or conversion.29 Then, just six

weeks before the Decem ber 31, 1995, dead line, Russia n Genera l

Dmitri Kha rchen ko an nou nced to the JCG tha t Russia wou ld be

u na ble to meet its commitments, citing the expense of red ucing

such a large nu mber of conventiona l wea pons. He asked for an

extension to Decem ber 1998. Genera l Kha rchen ko discou nted any

milita ry threa t from the massed equi pment, stating that weather

exposu re and lack of ma intena nce had rendered it effecti vely

useless. 30

Russia 's req uest was discussed in the JCG in Vienna, bu t

there was no agreement. However, i n Ma y 1996, at the CFE

Treaty Review Conference, a l l the signa tory states accepted a new

Russia n decla ra tion on the issue. In tha t conference's Final Document (see Append ix D), Russia decla red that it wou ld proceed

with red uctions of all the comm itted wea pons and equ ipment and

would provide docu mentary evidence of i ts destruction and conversion. All battle ta nks a nd armored comba t vehicles that had

been exposed to the wea ther would be displa yed with the "hatches

and covers of engi nes" opened. A grou p of experts, at their own

expense, would be invited to the red uction sites to exam ine the

eq u ipment prior to its fina l disposa l through scrappi ng. Finall y,

Russia esta blished the yea r 2000 as the new dead line for completing all red uctions east of the Urals. 31

REDl:<TINI (, THE TIUATY' . FLA N K LIMITS

The problem of the treaty's fla n k limits was both conseq uentia l and controversia l.12 Du ri ng negotia tions the treaty states accepted a two-pa rt fla n k zone tha t contained limits on the nu m ber

of active and stored conventional wea pons. In the d iploma tic end

game lead ing to trea ty signa t u re, President Gorbachev a nd the

Soviet Union accepted these zone lim its and restrictions. The CFE

Treaty's Article V stipu la ted that each grou p of states could possess no more tha n 4,700 ta n ks, 6,000 artillery pieces, and 5,900

ACVs in the fla nk zones. Origina lly, the flank zones incl uded the

following na tiona l territories: Icela nd, Norwa y, Greece, and pa rts

of Turkey (NATO flanks) and Roma nia, Bulga ria, and four milita r y districts in the Soviet Union (WTO flanks). For the Wa rsaw

Treaty Orga nization, these military d istricts were loca ted on the

northern and southern flanks of the allia nce (see ta ble 8-1). The

intent of treaty negotia tors was to limit, through a bsol ute numerical cei lings and storage and active su bl imits, the n u m ber of offensive wea pons in these m il ita ry districts.
r 1 lI T1 n: I) R II l IlI I I I p I-( 0II> '\ \R 24...

Table 8-1. CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment in the WTO Flank Zones

Tanks Artillery ACVs Total

Russia (2 military districts)' 700 1,280 580 2,560 active

600 400 800 1,800 storage

Ukraine (1 military district)

2 280 390 350 1,020 active

400 500 900 storage

Moldova (1 military district)

2 210 250 210 670 active

0 storage

Georgia3 220 285 220 725 active

0 storage

Azerbaijan 3 220 285 220 725 active

0 storage

Armenia 3 220 285 220 725 active

0 storage

Total former USSR 2,850 3,675 2,600 9,125 active and storage

Total former USSR 1,850 2,775 1,800 6,425 active only

Bulgaria4 1,475 1,750 2,000 5,225 active

0 storage

Romania4 1,375 1,475 2,100 4,950 active

0 storage

WTO flank total5 4,700 6,000 5,900 16,600 active only

'The flank zone included the Soviet military districts of Leningrad and Northern Caucasus, part of Russia. 2

Ukraine contained the Soviet military districts of Kiev, Carpathia, and Odessa, but only Odessa was included in

the flank zone. The Odessa Military District also contained Moldova. 3

Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan made up the Soviet Transcaucasus Military District.

'Bulgaria and Romania belonged entirely within the WTO Flank Zone. 5As determined by Article V of the CFE Treaty.

Source: Dorn Crawford,"Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),"ACDA, 1993.

In 1990, when the Soviet Un ion accepted these fla n k zone

limita tions, no one antici pa ted the na tion's colla pse in 1991 and

the emergence of 15 new states so q uick ly. Du ring the first six

months of 1992, R ussia agreed to pa rti tion the former Soviet

Union's milita ry forces and to ra tif y the CFE Treaty, incl ud ing its

flank zone restrictions. The trea ty entered into force on July 17,

1992; on-site inspections bega n immed ia tel y, and a ll the trea ty's

provisions were in effect. Under Article V, R ussia was a llowed to

ha ve approxi ma tel y 10 percent of its tota l treaty entitlements in

the northern and southern fla nk zones in active u n its; more tha n

85 percent had to be placed in storage. These trea ty restrictions on

ll R()Ill
248 0 -SI 1 1 I '>Pl ( 10 I (

Russia 's conventiona l force deploy ments irrita ted senior m ilita ry

leaders. On ly U k ra ine had simi la r restrictions. I n J u ne 1993, Russian Mi n ister of Defense Grachev decla red categorica lly that the

CFE Trea ty's fla n k limits had to be revised . Grachev sa id the Russia n genera l staff needed to remove 400 ta n ks, 2,420 ACVs, a nd 

820 a rti l lery pieces from the fla n k limits in order to field an additiona l mecha nized d ivision .3'

In September 1993, Presiden t Boris Yeltsi n sent a letter to the

heads of state of the Un ited States, Germa n y, Fra nce, and Grea t

Brita in req uesting tha t they recognize the CFE Treaty's flank limits

as a serious problem. Yel tsi n asked for assista nce in Russia 's efforts to mod if y the trea ty. Ten days la ter, Russia n Ambassador

Vyachesla v K u lebya kin presented a d iploma tic dema rche to a ll

CFE Trea ty states. Specifica lly, Ku lebya k in asked tha t the joint

Consu lta ti ve Grou p consider ra ising Russia 's flank su blimits in the

Leningrad Milita ry District a nd in the Nort hern Ca ucasus Milita ry

District. In Vien na, Uk ra i ne supported Russia on this issue, since

the CFE flan k ru le req u ired the Uk rainia n army to base 60 percent

of its forces on 40 percent of its territory. A mbassador Ku lebya k in

expl a ined tha t "genera l ly recognized common norms of internationa l law provide for a possi bil i ty of suspend i ng the effects of

treaty obl iga tions due to a rad ica l change of circumsta nces ...." He

argued that the i n terna l situa tion i n the Northern Ca ucasus region

wa rra nted a lteri ng the CFE Trea ty's flank l imits.34

The other CFE states did not respond forma lly to the Russia n

and Uk ra i nia n req uests. NATO na tions, in the ma in, pref erred the

status quo. They i nd ica ted tha t while t he trea ty was being implemented, they wou ld not support a n y changes in the negotia ted and

• CFE FLANK RWONS

a OTHER CF[ REGIONS

a NON·CFE REGIONS

CFE TREATY FLANK REGIONS
 RI l H P 111 I{ 249

ratified treaty. Two NATO nations, Turkey and Norwa y, objected

more strongly. Both nations bordered the Russian military districts

in question. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin publicly stated

that modifying the CFE Treaty would both interrupt itsimplementation and open up the possibility of an arms race in the Caucasus.

Leaders of other NATO nations expressed their concerns about

reopening the treaty, suggesting that some Eastern European nations-Poland, Hu nga ry, Slovak ia, and the Czech Repu blic-did not

like the current treaty-mandated restrictions on stored weapons.

Given this opposition, no other CFE Treat y state stepped forwa rd in

the fa ll and winter of 1993-94 to support the Russia n and Uk ra inia n req uest to reconsider the CFE Treaty's flank limits.35

Russia, however, d id not let the issue d ie. In Februa ry 1994,

two Russia n genera l staff off icers, Genera l Dmitri K harchen ko a nd

Genera l Leonid Shevstov, briefed the ]CG delega tes in Vienna on

precisely which TLE the Russian a rmy intended to deploy i n the

Leni ngrad a nd North Ca ucasus Milita ry Districts and how tha t

equ ipment wou ld be used. Then, in Ma rch 1994, the Russia n CFE

Trea ty delega te ask ed the JCG to consider mod ifying the CFE

Trea ty provisions on wea pons a nd eq u ipment stored in the two

mili ta ry districts. The Russia n representa tive a rgued tha t the trea ty

restrictions on the nu m ber of CFE wea pons a state cou ld remove

from storage were out of date and milita ri l y cu mbersome. The

]CG took no action on these Russia n req uests. Throughou t the

rema i nder of 1994, Russia contin ued to ra ise these flan k issues in

Vien na, a nd Uk ra ine contin ued its support. The other CFE Trea ty

states, however, mai nta ined their opposi tion to consideri ng a ny

cha nges. At the end of the second trea ty red uction yea r, the CFE

Trea ty's fla n k limit problem rema ined u nresol ved. 16

On Decem ber 10, 1994, Russia la u nched a milita ry assa u lt

on rebel forces in Chechn ya, i n the Northern Ca ucasu s region. The

Russia n milita ry sent person nel, ta n ks, ACVs, a rtillery, and other

conventiona l equ ipment into the region to q uell the rebel l ion.

Wit hi n a month, more tha n 40,000 Russia n mil ita ry a nd pol ice

troops had deployed into Chech n ya . Under the CFE Trea ty, Ru ssia

was lim ited to a tota l of 700 ta n ks, 580 ACVs, a nd 1,200 a rtillery

pieces in active u n its in the sou thern flan k zone. By the spring of

1995, Russia n deployments fa r exceeded these limi ts. If Russia did

not red uce its deployments by Novem ber 17, 1995, the end of the

third red uction yea r, it faced bei ng designated as out of complia nce

wit h the CFE Trea ty.

Here was a serious, conseq uentia l trea ty problem. Quick ly,

the .issue was elevated a bove the d iplomatic rea lm into internationa l politics. In Ma y 1995, President Cli nton discussed the

flan ks issue with Presiden t Yel tsin at the Moscow Sum mit. In late

May, Tu rkey th reaten ed to send its mili ta r y to its northeastern

border if Russia con tin ued to sta tion excess forces in the sou thern President William .f. Clinton.

bI(ll'I
0 -S11 1 I "" lll

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.

(·' ( '

fla n k zone. Then, on J u ne 1, the Russia n High Comma nd annou nced tha t the 58th A rmy wou ld be organized and stationed in

the Northern Ca ucasus Mil ita ry District. During the summer

months the rebellion a ba ted as Chechen and Russia n leaders

signed a series of decl a ra tions tha t esta bl ished cease-fire dates and

set timeta bles for l imited troop withd rawa ls. Bu t these decla rations proved short-lived , as one side or the other resu med fighting.

In the fa ll of 1995, wi th the a pproach of the date for en d ing the

trea ty's red uction period (Novem ber 17), there was a flurry of

d i ploma tic activity on the fla nks issue.17

NATO na tions presen ted a pla n in mid-Septem ber for revising the trea ty's flan k zones. They pro posed red uci ng the areas

designa ted as fla n ks by exclud ing two mil ita ry oblasts ( d istricts)

from Russia 's southern fla n k a nd th ree from its northern fla nk.

These exclusions wou ld give the R ussia n High Comma nd greater

flexi bili ty in deployi ng its conventional forces a nd equipment

internall y. In ret u rn for this trea ty mod ifica tion, Russia had to

agree to remai n i n the trea ty, accept a few add itiona l inspections,

a nd provide some add itiona l informa tion, especially on any TLE

deployed in areas that were formerly loca ted i n the flank zones.

The Russia ns rejected th is proposa l ca tegorically. In fact, they

rejected all offers of comprom ise in the fa ll of 1995. In those

mont hs, President Cl inton, Secreta ry of Defense Perry, and ACDA

Director John Hoiu m d iscussed va rious pla ns with their Russia n

cou nterpa rts. No common grou nd emerged . In Vienna, J GC representatives tried to work out a n accepta ble comprom ise that all

nations could agree to. None wor ked. Conseq uently, w hen the

Novem ber 17, 1995, dead l ine a rri ved , the 30 CFE states issued a

joi nt statement identif ying the states tha t had not met their treaty

obliga tions. Russia, beca use of the excess TLE stationed in the

southern fla n k zone a nd its fa ilure to resol ve the Black Sea Fleet

issue, was not in complia nce.38

The next dema rca tion poi nt for possi ble resol u tion was Ma y

1996. The CFE Trea ty conta ined a provision for a ma nd atory allsignatory states conference to be held 46 months after entry into

force. The CFE First Review Con ference was held in Vienna May

15-31, 1996. The fla n ks issue dom ina ted the conference. The

Russia n representa tive, Ambassador Ku lebyakin, stated and restated Russia 's ra tiona le for seeking relief from Article V and the

fla nk limits. The U.S. delega tion, led by Thomas Graham, Jr.,

Special Representa tive of the President for Arms Control, Non prolifera tion, and Disa rma ment, and Gregory G. Govan, U.S. Chief

Delegate to the JCG, tried repeatedl y to sha pe a compromise redefinition of the flanks tha t was accepta ble to a ll 30 na tions.

Netherla nds A mbassador Fra n k Ma joor cha ired the conference

a nd intervened at key times to facilita te a solu tion. Negotia tions

on the flanks issue were very, very difficu lt, but in the fina l hou rs

Russia n Depu ty Foreign M i n ister Georgi Ma medov signaled
f 111 CFr tU \ n :A Dt t{:-\111 1 l t{1 < 1 11u 1 01{ Pm r-Co1 1 > \\ \ R F11mr 2 51

Moscow's acceptance of conference language and the agreement

went forward. Russia and the other signatory states agreed in the

Fina l Document that (1) Russia 's fla nk zone areas wou ld be redrawn, excluding certain military oblasts; (2) the total number of

CFE equ ipment a llowed in the Russia n milita ry d istricts-battle

tanks, ACVs, and a rtillery-wou ld be revised u pwa rd; (3) Russia

wou ld provide the other treaty states with force data more often;

and (4) Russia would be lia ble for u p to 10 additiona l decla red site

inspections an n ua lly in the flank zones.39

During the d ifficult negotia tions, four na tions-Uk ra ine,

Moldova, Georgia , and Azer ba ija n-expressed ma jor concerns

a bout Russia's future security intentions. In one wa y these na tions

were a rticu lating new regiona l concerns; in another wa y they were

expressi ng their fears a bout the possi bility of la rge states' influencing sma ll states and the significance of internationa l law. In the

conference's Fina l Docu ment, each of these four na tions submitted

a sepa ra te an nex statement expla ining its concerns (see Appendix

D ). During the conference, some of the NATO nations, pa rticularly Fra nce and Grea t Brita in, supported these na tions. Fra nce

took the position tha t every state ha d to respect the na tional sovereignty of every other state, especia lly states that were pa rties to the

CFE Treaty, the most importa nt, modern, a ll-Eu ropea n multi nationa l arms control trea ty. With the positions of these four na tions

incor pora ted into the fina l statement, the delega tes moved forwa rd

with language redefini ng the treaty's fla nk limits. Not a ll the deta ils were ironed out. Subseq uent d iplomatic negotiations on the

exact territoria l dema rca tions and specific timeta bles for movement of the forces rema ined to be worked out in the Joint Consu lta tive Grou p.

CHANGES IN EUROPE INFLUENCF CFE TREATY

JMPLEMENTATION

Throughout the first CFE Trea ty yea r, 1992-93, considera ble

pressures ha d developed within the NATO allia nce for a progra m

Verification agency leaders

General-M aior Yevgeniy Jvanovich

Nik ulin of Belarus, General-M ajor

Vycheslav Alek sand rovich

Romanov of Russia, and Genera/-

M ajor Nik olai Tikhonovich

Honcharenk o of Uk raine visit

OS/ A on jul y 3 1 , 1 995.
Ol\-SI 1 1 I 1'1 l1 10 A<.I ( '

Cenmmy o/)('11 rd /JI()/"(' th 111

W percent u/ 11 111pectio1b

/in·t!Jtest i11pectors.

of coopera tion with the treaty verification agencies of the Eastern

Europea n na tions-Russia , Ukra ine, Bela rus, and the other successor states. These pressures had origina ted as a politica l and diplomatic conseq uence of the fall of the Berlin Wall; the revolutions in

Poland, Hu ngary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; the unification of

Germany; and, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

creation of the new repu blics. These continenta l u pheavals influenced how the NATO nations approa ched implementa tion of the

CFE Treaty. Within NATO, Belgium, Netherla nds, Great Britain,

and Germa ny were the strongest ad voca tes of esta bl ishing joi nt

inspector tra in i ng, a u thorizi ng joi n t i nspection teams, a nd sha ring

trea ty data a mong a ll signatory na tions.

In Ja n ua ry 1993, seven months into the CFE Treaty's implementa tion, NATO's Verif ication Coordina ting Committee invi ted

the d irectors of the na ti ona l verifica tion a gencies, east and west, to

attend an importa nt meeting at NATO Hea dq ua rters. At this

meeti ng, the 16 NATO na tions, acting t h rough the VCC, forma ll y

invited the 14 Eastern CFE Trea ty na tions to ha ve their inspector s

pa rtici pa te on NATO na tions' j oint m u ltina tiona l i nspecti on

tea ms. They wou ld be id entified as NATO na tion tea ms, bu t i nd ivid ua l inspectors from one, two, or more of the Eastern bloc na -

tions, as wel l as from the other NATO na tions, cou ld pa rtici pa te.

The NATO na tion cond ucting t he inspection would lea d the tea m .

Russian Foreign M inister Andrei K ozyrev signs the Partnership for Peace Framework Document for Russia at

N ATO Headquarters.
 c 1 

1u

Pu 1 -Ct>1 1> '\R Et ROl't 2S1

After hea ring the concept, the d i rectors of the

Easte rn states' verifica tion agencies accepted the

invita tion. Within a matter of months, it became

rou tine for inspectors from "coopera ting pa rtner" na tions to serve on NATO-led mu ltina tiona l

CFE i nspection tea ms cond ucti ng red uction

i nspections in Eastern Eu rope.40 Brigad ier Genera l Heinz Loq uai, Director of the Germa n Federa l Armed Forces Verifica tion Center, observed,

"At first it was not so easy for the inspected

countries, especia l l y the forme r Wa rsa w Pact

cou ntries, to u ndersta nd why guest inspectors

were coming along wi th the [NATO na tion]

i nspection tea ms. But, i n my opinion, the pa rticipa tion of the guest inspectors is a good development. Germany has opened more tha n 50 percent

of a ll its inspections for the guest i nspectors. "

4 1

In 1993 and up to Ju ne 1994, 83 NATO-led mu ltina tional

i nspection teams cond ucted CFE Trea ty inspections in Eastern

Eu rope. Accord ing to Necil Ned imogl u, Director of NATO's Veri -

fica tion a nd Implementa tion Coord ina tion Section (VICS), the

coopera tive progra m for guest i nspectors worked so well tha t it

stim u la ted other cooperati ve initia tives. La te in 1993, a few Eastern Eu ropea n trea ty na tions invited the NATO na tions to send

guest i nspectors to serve on their inspection tea ms. After considera ble discussion withi n the a llia nce, in Ju ne 1994 the VCC issued a

statement to NATO state verifica tion agencies and staffs. It stated

tha t Western inspectors cou l d join Easte rn-led CFE inspection

tea ms tha t were cond ucting East-on-East inspections. During 1994

a nd 1995, the Un ited States, Fra nce, Holla nd , and Belgi um pa rticipa ted in ma ny of these joi nt i nspections. 42

Along with these cha nges, the VCC a lso in vited the Eastern

na tion trea ty agencies to send i nd ivid ual inspectors to pa rtici pa te

i n NATO-cond ucted CFE Trea ty courses. They accepted; and in

1993 and 1994, 80 inspectors from Eastern nations' verification

agencies a ttended cou rses for CFE Trea ty i nspectors and escorts at

the NATO school at Obera rnmerga u, Germa ny. Other Eastern

bloc i nspectors pa rtici pa ted in a NATO course on monitori ng CFE

red uctions held a t the Belgia n Mil ita ry Ca mp at Leopold ville. The

guest inspectors at this Belgia n red uction course even ta ught a

portion of the course. They discussed the red uction methods being

used i n their na tions, and, in tu rn, the NATO national inspectors

explai ned how they wou l d mon itor those red uctions. The VCC

a lso sponsored semina rs for all verifica tion agency di rectors at

NATO Headq ua rters in Brussels. These two-d ay semina rs focused

on treaty im plementa tion issues and on strengthening director-todirector commu nica tions, but they should not be construed as a

substi tu te for the CFE Treaty's Joint Consu l tative Grou p meeti ng

I

THIS IS TO CERTI FY TllAT

UC BROUSSARD Anthony

llAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED

THE 8TI-I CFE REDUCTION COURSE

LEOPOLDSIWRG, HELGllJM

07 - 11 MARCii 1994

1u1l
2 4 0 - I ll' l \ Pl 110 Ar,1 t 't

in Vienna. The ]CG was the officia l forum for resolving trea ty

issues and for a ut hori zing a n y mod ifica tions to the trea ty.

Other coopera ti ve initia tives demonst ra ted the new era of

West-East Eu ropea n rela tions associa ted with implementi ng the

CFE Trea ty. In Novem ber 1993 the NATO na tions offered all

Eastern na tions access to the a llia nce's compu terized CFE Treacy

data base, VERITY. The data base conta ined the N ATO na tions'

a n n ua l milita ry force data , infor ma tion from their trea ty inspection reports, and data exfracted from the inspections tha t monitored TLE red uctions. VERITY had an electron ic mail featu re and

was on-l i ne 24 hours a d ay, every day a t NATO Head qua rters.

While VER ITY had no lega l status, most of the NATO na tion

verification agencies fou nd the system usefu l in prepa ring for

inspection missions and monitori ng overa ll red uctions. Of the 14

Eastern verifica tion agencies, all except Ar menia and Azer bai ja n

accepted the Novem ber l 3 in vita tion to pa rtici pa te in the computerized data system. After a few months to sched ule and cond uct

tra i ni ng courses a t NATO Head qua rters for the verifica tion agencies' automated data ma na gers, the expa nded VERITY system

went into effect i n March 1994. Among the pa rticipa ting nations

(28 of 30), the system hel ped verifica tion agency staffs track the

annua l data excha nge of na tiona l milita ry force hold ings; notifications of red uction events; results of red uctions; and i nspection

informa tion rega rd ing the time, place, and type of inspection. By

mid-1994, the VERITY data base incl uded i nspection reports from

all NATO na tions, the Eastern Eu ropea n nations, a nd a ll bu t two

of the new repu blics.4 3

):THEFIR

l odemrmg b liftm the

groufJ of t 1tc c <>Ill c/1t.

Incorpora ted into the trea ty was a provision for a review

conference of a ll the signa tory states to be hel d 46 months a fter

entry into force. Since the CFE Trea ty entered into force in midJuly 1992, the trea ty's First Review Conference was held in midMa y 1996. Representa tives from all states pa rties met in Vien na

from May 15-31. In 46 months, m uch had changed. The Warsaw

Trea ty Orga niza tion had collapsed, prom pting some states, pri ncipally Russia, to ad voca te "modernizing" the treaty by removing

the grou p of states concept from the trea ty's text. This recom mendation was opposed by other states, princi pally the Un ited States,

citing the conference's short dura tion a nd the opportu nity to resolve more pressi ng trea ty implementa tion issues. Specifica lly,

those issues were Russia 's commitment to red uci ng its TLE east of

the Ura ls, the dema nds of Russia and Uk ra ine for adjust ing the

flank zone limi ts, the problem of accounting for the TLE transfers

among the trea ty states of the former Soviet Union, and the issue

of a u thori zi ng a review and u pda te of the trea ty's Protocol on
HI E .R l \ l ': Dlll \1111 lll l l l R l l t )l{ PO\ I - ()f f J \'\' \l{ El llOl'J -

)

..,)

-

Existi ng Types of Conventional A r ma men ts and Eq u ipment

( POET). The two ma jor recommendations for the conference

agenda-trea ty moderniza tion and trea ty com plia nce/i mplementation issues-were not incom pa tible. Bot h were pa rt of the

conference's fina l statement; however, implementa tion issues dominated the conference agenda.44

Beca use of the meeti ng's short two-week du ra tion, the conference delega tes formed wor k i ng grou ps to develop recom mendations and text ua l la nguage for debate a nd decision. Negotiations

were cond ucted by representa tives of ind ivid ua l states ( or at times

by groups of states), whi l e decisions were made by consensus of

a ll 30 state pa rties. The U.S. delega tion was led by Am bassador

Thomas Gra ha m, Jr. The U.S. representa ti ve to the Joint Consu ltati ve Grou p, Gregory G. Gova n, formerly a Di rector of OSIA,

worked closely wi t h the la rge U.S. delegation. R ussia's representati ve to the ]CG, Vyachesla v K u lebya k i n, worked wi th Russia's

Depu ty Foreign Mi nister Georgi Ma medov. Germa ny was represented by A m bassad or R ud iger Ha rtma n n; Fra nce by Am bassador

Berna rd Miget, a nd Uk ra ine by Depu ty Foreign Minister

Konstya ntyn Gryshchenko. A m bassad or Fra nk Ma joor of the

Net herl ands cha ired the conference. All d iscussions and negotiations were cond ucted i n confidence.

At Criel, France, of fi cials observe a ceremony recognizing Brigadier General Francois Rozec,

Director, L' Unite Francaise de Verification. (Front row left ) Brigadier General Colae

Corduneanu, R omania; N ecil N edimoglu, Head of the VICS; Brigadier General Thomas E.

K uenning, OS/ A; Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, OS/ A; Brigadier General Peter Von Geyso,

Germany; Colonel Colin A. H eron and Lt. Colonel M ichael M organ, United Kingdom.
When the conference concl uded on Ma y 31, the 30 states

issued a Fina l Document (see Append ix D). The states resolved the

thorny issue of redef i n ing the treaty's flank zones. Russia made a

specific commitment to red uce its TLE hold ings east of the Ura ls.

All the trea ty states agreed tha t the JCG shou ld u pda te the POET

each yea r. The conference representa tives a lso addressed the future

of the trea ty. In the Fina l Document, the 30 state pa rties instructed

the delega tes to the Joint Consu ltative Grou p to "expa nd u pon

their wor k" in accorda nce with the trea ty's Article XVI. Since this

article had esta blished and empowered the JCG, the Review Conference represen ta tives were essentia lly increasi ng and red irecting

the JCG's responsi bilities. They charged the Vienna trea ty grou p

with creating a process to modernize the trea ty and to improve its

operations. On the subject of treaty moderniza tion, the state representatives agreed on 12 topics for the JCG's considera tion (see

Append ix D, Annex D). These topics incl uded such fundamenta l

trea ty terms as "groups of states pa rties," "area of applica tion,"

and "designa ted perma nent storage site." For improvi ng trea ty

operations, the conference representatives developed 15 specific

recom mend ations for "further considera tion and resol ution " by

the JCG (see Append ix D, An nex E). Fina lly, the states i nstructed

the JCG to develop a progress report and present it at the meeti ng

of the Orga n iza tion for Security and Coopera tion in Eu rope in

Lisbon, Port uga l, i n Decem ber 1996.

One of the most interesti ng aspect of the First Review

Conference's Fina l Docu ment was the section reviewi ng the CFE

Trea ty's operations. In the 46 months that had elapsed since entry

into force, much had changed in Europe, a nd much had been

accomplished u nder the provisions of the treaty. The docu ment

summa rized some of these accomplish ments45 :

The states parties note with satisfaction that more than

58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment

have been reduced , and that the overall holdings of conventional armaments and equipment within the area of ap plication are substantiall y lower than the limits set in the treaty.

M ore than 2,500 inspections have tak en place. A permanent

system for regular and routine exchange of treaty notifications and other information has been developed . The joint

Consultative Group has been firml y established and has

demonstrated its utility and importance as the ongoing treaty

forum.

With regard to the concluding act, the states parties note with

satisfaction that the personnel strength of conventional armed

forces in the area of ap plication was reduced by 1.2 million

persons.

The states parties note that the treaty established a high degree of transparenc y in military relations through its compre-
hv

lf.11 l·F T iu ": 1>1 1 1111 l tH <l l R ( R Po r- t lJ

hensive system for exchange of information and for verification. Together with the extensive reductions of conventional

armaments and equipment, this has led to greater predictability and confidence in securit y relations. The treaty has also

nurtured the development of new patterns of cooperation in

Europe and provides a basis for stability and enhanced security in Europe at substantiall y Lower levels of conventional

armaments and equipment than heretofore. Although risk s

and challenges still exist in some parts of Europe, the capability for launching surprise attack and the danger of large-scale

offensive action in Europe as a whole have been diminished

substantiall y. N evertheless, the achievement of the goals of

the treaty in the whole area of its ap plication requires continuous efforts by the states parties.

LUATING THF TREATY: COMPARING TH

U 1BER

Following the end of the CFE Trea ty's 40-month red uction

period, all trea ty states decla red their force levels in the five categories of offensi ve wea pons. This decla ra tion allowed na tions to

compa re the "antici pa ted " number of ta nks, a rtillery, armored

comba t vehicles (ACVs), comba t aircra ft, and attack helicopters

with the "actual " figu re at the end of the red uction phase. The

data were decla red by each na tion; when aggrega ted for the grou p

of state pa rties (Western Grou p and Easte rn Grou p), the figures

ind icated that the actua l red uctions were well below the CFE

Treaty's a ntici pa ted ceilings (ta ble 8-2).

Table 8-2. Comparison of CFE Treaty Reductions by Group of States

Tanks Artillery ACVs Aircraft Helicopters Total

Western Group

July 1992* 24,097 19,839 33,827 5,118 1,685 84,566

CFE ceiling 19,142 18,286 29,822 6,662 2,000 75,912

Nov 1995** 14,156 14,869 22,585 4,301 1,283 57,194

Eastern Group

July 1992 31,269 25,755 43,468 8,544 1,545 110,581

CFE ceiling 20,000 20,000 30,000 6,800 2,000 78,800

Nov 1995 19,061 18,455 28,764 5,873 1,466 73,619

"CFE Treaty entry into force.

..CFE Treaty end of 40-month reduction period.

Sources: Arms Control Reporter, 407.A.11 (1993); Arms Control Reporter, 407.B.533 (1996).

\I f t R >ll 2S
lrn O:-.;-S1 r IMPI( 1 1() Ac.r (')

M any U.S. tank s deployed from U.S. Army units in Western Europe to the Gulf \Var.

For a variety of reasons, national reductions ofthese weapons

continued afterthemid-November 1995treaty deadline. A few

nations-such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia-had not reduced

all their TLE as requ ired u nder the trea ty. Other nations-Pola nd,

Romania , and others-continued to red uce CFE wea pons beca use

they were excess to their nationa l force structure. By the time of

the CFE Trea ty's First Review Conference in Ma y 1996, the state

parties annou nced that the tota l number of reductions had exceeded 58,000 items. At that conference, Russia pledged to destroy

by the yea r 2000 the wea pons and equ ipment loca ted beyond the

Ura l Mou nta ins and in certa in na va l units.

A compa rison of selected states' CFE hold ings a t the begi nning of the baseli ne period (Ju ly 1992) and a t the end of the red uction period (Novem ber 1995) ind ica tes tha t the larger na tions had

significa ntly red uced their conven tiona l wea pons in the trea ty's

territoria l zones (ta ble 8-3).

Not a ll of these red uctions were driven by the CFE Trea ty.

The massive withdra wa ls of U.S. mil ita ry forces from Western

Europe, for example, were caused by the need to deploy combat

troops to the Middle East for the Gu lf Wa r and by red uctions in

the America n mi l ita ry services following the Cold Wa r. Russia's

l arge-sca le red uctions were a lso ca used by historic forces, largely

economic a nd politica l, tha t were externa l to the req u irements of

the CFE Trea ty. Conseq uently, one must be ca utious in dra wing

concl usions from these n u mbers alone. Nations did not ma ke

excess red uctions in their mili ta ry forces and wea pons to comply
I HI ( Fl I R I I 1111 IIU ( ll R OR r-( I D w lL ROI' 159

Table 8-3. Comparison of Selected National Holdings of CFE Treaty TLE

Tanks Artillery ACVs Aircraft Helicopters Total

United States

July 1992* 5,163 1,973 4,963 398 349 12,846

Nov 1995** 1,254 854 2,238 222 150 4,718

Germany

July 92 7,170 4,735 9,099 1,040 256 22,300

Nov 95 3,061 2,056 2,679 578 225 8,599

France

July 92 1,335 1,436 4,387 695 366 8,219

Nov 95 1,289 1,251 3,556 667 317 7,080

Russia

July 92 9,338 8,326 19,399 4,624 1,005 42,692

Nov 95 5,492 5,680 10,372 2,986 826 25 ,356

Ukraine

July 92 6,128 3,591 6,703 1,648 271 18,341

Nov 95 4,026 3,727 4,919 1,008 270 13,950

Romania

July 92 2,967 3,942 3,171 508 15 10,603

Nov 95 1,375 1,471 2,073 373 16 5,308

*CFE Treaty entry into force.

"CFE Treaty 40-month reduction period.

Source:Arms Control Today,December 1995,pp.29-30.

with the trea ty; rather, they were compelled by economic, strategic, and milita ry reasons to red uce their military forces.

The n u mbers, however, do confirm tha t there ha ve been

ma jor red uctions in na tiona l mi lita ry forces on the Eu ropea n

continent. The United States, for insta nce, red uced or withd rew

8,128 CFE TLE items from its forces stationed in Western Europe.

This was a 63 percent red uction in its offensive forces on the Eu ropea n continent. Collectively, the states of the former Soviet Union

possessed 71,080 wea pons i n July 1992; three yea rs la ter they had

red uced these wea pons to 39,581 or 55 percent. For Russia, the

la rgest ofthe new republics, the figuresindicate that itsNovember

1995holdings oftanks,artillery,ACVs,combat aircraft, and

helicopters west of the Ural Mountains was 25,261. In July 1992,

Russia had declared 42,692CFEweapons;three yearslaterit had

reduced 17,431items or 41 percent. Germany reduced moreCFE

wea pons-13,701-than an y other NATO nation. Certa inly

l'I: l)L Po \I
260 0 1 -S1 1 1 hw1 ( J 10, Ac .1 ( )

Table 8-4. Comparison of CFE 1A Military

Manpower Figures for Selected NationsJuly 1992 to November 1995

CFE 1A Ceiling

July 1992

Declared Holding

November 1995

United States 250,000 107,166

Germany 345,000 293,889

Turkey 530,000 527,670

Russia 1,450 ,000 818,471

Poland 234,000 233,870

Ukraine 450,000 400,686

Source: Arms Control Reporter, 407.A.11, (1993); Arms Control Reporter, 407.B.533

(1996).

Germa n uni fica tion i n 1990 had skewed these figures, with the

addition of the former Germa n Democra tic Repu blic's grou nd a nd 

a ir forces. In J ul y 1992, Germa ny decla red 22,300 CFE items; in

Novem ber 1995, it stated it held 8,599 TLE, a red uction of

13,701 or 61 percent.

Red uctions of fu ll-time milita ry personnel occurred in virtu -

ally every CFE Trea ty state. The CFE lA Agreement dea lt wit h

l imits on full-time mil ita r y person nel. When the states pa rties

agreed to implement the trea ty provisiona lly in July 1992, they

decla red tha t 40 months la ter their milita ry ma npower wou ld be

at or below a specific numerical ceiling.The states, themselves,set

the ceilings; consequently,they were quite high. When the 40-

month reduction period ended in November 1995,all nations

reportingmilitarypersonnelforcedatawere in compliancewith

theCFE 1AAgreement. Three nations-Armenia, Georgia, and

Belarus-reported no data.Table 8-4 contains militarymanpower

figuresforselected nations at the starting and endi ng periods,July

1992 and November 1.995.

One shou ld approach these figu res with caution. As in other

compa risons associa ted with the CFE Treaty, larger forces must be

considered. Most of the reasons for these ma n power red uctions lie

outside the CFE Treaty; the treaty was not the single ca usa l factor

that forced these ma n power red ucti ons.

There is no comprehensi ve set of figures listi ng a ll on-site

inspections cond ucted by every na tion u nder the CFE Trea ty. The

NATO na tions recorded on their VERITY da ta base system only

the inspections for the Grou p of Western States. Inspections cond ucted by the Eastern na tions, especia lly inspections on each other,
1 111 Cl·E TR1 \ t ) : A Dt R \111 1 S t R < t t R t t Oll Pm 1 -Crn 1> \\' \R Et ROI'! _ 6 1

were not systema tica l l y recorded i n any centra l database or repository. It wa s not u ntil J u ne 1 994 that most of the CFE Trea ty states

agreed to record thei r on-site inspections in the V ERITY system;

th us, no comprehensi ve list exists of i nspections by all states before J u ne 1994. The United States, t h rough the On-Site Inspection

Agency, d id record the n um ber and type of its own CFE Treaty

inspections. Compiled ann uall y, these figu res ind ica ted an intense

in vol vemen t by the U n ited States i n monitori ng every aspect of the

CFE Trea ty (ta ble 8-5).

Table 8-5. U.S. On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty

Treaty Period Baseline1 19932 19942 19952 19963

Declared site 43 16 12 14 31

Challenge 2 5 7

Reduction 5 49 47 41

Singletons• 9 86 89 50 56

Totals 58 153 153 106 94

'July 18, 1992-November 13, 1992. 2Annualfigures, mid-November-mid-November. 3 Residual level validation period (RLVP): November 18. 1995-March 16, 1996.

'U.S.inspectorsonteams ledbyother stateparties.

Source: On-Site InspectionAgency, May 1996.

EVALUATING THE TREATY: FINAL THOUGHTS

If one asked in Ma y 1996 why the C:FE Treaty ha d succeeded

as a continenta l Eu ropea n arms control trea ty, there were ma ny

a nswers. On the geopol itical level, Eu rope ha d experienced historic changes from 1989 th rough 1992 tha t ended the Cold War,

unified Germany, dissolved the Soviet Union, and created new

Europea n states. On the mi lita ry level, Europe ha d witnessed in

just five yea rs (1 989-1994) the Soviet U nion 's and R ussia 's withd ra wal of more tha n 700,000 milita ry person nel from Germa ny,

the Czech and Slova k Repu blics, Hu nga ry, Pola nd, Bu lga ria , Roma nia , a nd the Ba ltic states. The United States ha d withd rawn

220,000 troops from Germa ny, Ita ly, Great Brita i n, Belgi u m,

Hol l and, and other Western Eu ropea n na tions. On the economic

l evel, Centra l a nd Eastern Eu ropea n na tions had shifted from

socialist economies to capita l ist ma rket economies, crea ting a

broad pol itica l consensus for consumer goods over milita ry equ ipment . In nation a fter nation, this economic tra nsition proved

extraord ina rily d i fficu lt, crea ting societies rack ed by infla tion and

u nem ployment. Ar ms red uction trea ties held a strong appea l for

the citizens of most Eu ropea n nations, east and west .
262 0 ·-SI IJ IN'>l'H rlON A<.1 (.)

Tmst and z 1erifr.

On the instit utiona l level, some Eastern Eu ropea n na tions

sought entry into the Eu ropea n Union and the esta blished NATO

a llia nce. Ad herence to the CFE Trea ty, one of the NATO a llia nce's

fu nda menta l post-Cold Wa r objecti ves, furthered the foreign

policy objectives of these na tions. Finally, on the level of internationa l law, the 30-na tion CFE Treaty represented a fund amental

lega l commitment to a singl e continenta l a rms control trea ty perma nently limiti ng five ca tegories of conventiona l milita ry offensive

wea pons. The treaty contained importa nt provisions for sharing

force data a nd for verifica tion by on-site inspection, thus crea ting

a lega l basis for tra nspa rency across na tiona l borders on a hea vily

armed continent. All things consiclerecl, na tiona l complia nce with

the CFE Trea ty was the resu lt of a broa d Eu ropea n consensus

constructed on signi fica nt cha nges in geopolitics, milita ry strategy,

economics, institu tional desi res, and a determina tion to establish

interna tiona l law across the vast continent.

These factors were widel y k nown; wha t was not so well

k nown were the contributions of the 30 nations' verification agencies, the on-site inspectors monitoring the trea ty's provisions and

protocols, the mil ita ry forces red ucing the weapons, and the Verifica tion Coord ina ting Com mittee and the Joint Consu lta tive Grou p

facilitating implementa tion. Collectively, these elements had implemented the complex, continent-wide trea ty cla y by day, month by

month, yea r by yea r.

The people of these orga n iza tions were predomina ntly, but

not exclusivel y, milita ry officers and noncommissioned officers.

They were the closest to trea ty opera tions; they knew whether the

trea ty was meeting its objectives or not. Most believed that the

CFE Trea ty ha d achieved its objectives: red ucing the level of offensive conventiona l arms on the continent, ma rk ing out territoria l

zones for the perma nent red uction of forces and wea pons, and

establishi ng a ru le of law for the futu re of Europe, west and east.

These achievements were i mporta nt. The CFE Treaty states

were constructing the founda tions of post-Cold Wa r Eu rope.

Trust and verify.
Tiff CFE T1nA11: A D1:iun1E S nwcrn R E f OR Posr-CoLD WA R EUROPE 26 3

NOTES

1. Statement of the Joint Consultative Group, Vienna, Austria, November 17,

1995, cited in Arms Control Reporter 1995, pp. 407.B.527-528.

2. Arms Control Reporter 1995, p. 407.B.528.

3. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," Preamble, paragraph

7.

4. Ibid., Article XIV; Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, Commander,

European Operations Command, OSIA, Briefing, "RLVP Summary," May

9, 1996.

5. Interview with Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, Commander, European

Operations Command, OSIA, by Technical Sergeant David Willford, USAF,

History Office, OSIA, Novem ber 13, 1995, and December 1, 1995.

6. Colonel Kenneth Guillory, "We're Ready for the Newest Treaty Challenge," On-Site Insights, November/Decem ber 1995, p. 3.

7. Ibid., p. 3.

8. Interview, Guillory; Col. Kenneth Guillory, "We're Ready for the Newest

Treaty Challenge," p. 3; Technical Sergeant David Willford, "Treaty

Validation Period Begins in Europe: Agency Inspectors Check Destruction

of Weapons,'' On-Site Insights, November/December 1995, pp. 1, 4.

9. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, "RLVP Summary,'' May 9, 1996.

10. Ibid.; Interview, Guillory.

11. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, "RLVP Summary," May 9, 1996.

12. See this history, Chapter 6, CFE Treaty Baseline. See also Interview with

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Chief, Operations Division, European 

Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA,

Washington, D.C., May 18, 1994; Interview, Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz,

USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, RheinMain Air Base, Germany, December 13, 1993.

13. Interview, Kelley; Interview with Lt. Colonel David P.Gessert, USAF, Team

Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air

Base, Germany, July 12, 1993; Interview, Karcz.

14. Interview, Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, U.S. Government CFE Treaty

Negotiator, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Ramstein Air Base,

Germany, December 14, 1993.

15. For a more detailed examination of the issue, see Chapter 6.

16. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.479.

17. Ibid., p. 407.B.481.

18. Arms Control Reporter 1993, pp. 407.B.487, 488-489.

19. Ibid., p. 407.B.489.

20. Arms Control Reporter 1994, p. 407.B.503; Interview with Colonel

Stanislaw Malinowski, Chief Inspector, Polish Verification Center, by

Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Warsaw, Poland, February 3, 1994.

21. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.481; Arms Control Reporter 1993,

p. 407.B.499; Arms Control Reporter 1994, pp. 407.B.506, 508.

22. Arms Control Reporter 1 994, pp. 407.B.505-507.
Oi';-SJ 1 f hl'Ic 1 IU'-.1 Ac .1 v )

23. "Complying with CFE Suspended for Financial Reasons," INTERFAX

(Moscow), February 23, 1995, in FBIS-Soviet Union, February 24, 1995.

24. Arms Control Reporter 1994, pp. 407.B.516, 519, 525, 527-528, 530;

Arms Control Reporter 1996, p. 407.B.537.

25. Jim Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty: Russian Attitudes and

Implications for U.S. Interests," Congressional Research Service Report,

September 15, 1995;Jack Mendelsohn, "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect 

and Under Review," Arms Control Today, April 1996, pp. 7-11.

26. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The M ilitary Balance 1995-96

(London: Brassey's Inc., 1995), pp. 71, 100, 105, 118.

27. Ibid., pp. 71, 100;Arms Control Reporter 1996, pp. 407.B.534-536.

28. See this history, Chapter 3, Ratification Delayed.

29. Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty."

30. Arms Control Reporter 1995, p. 407.B.529.

31. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D.

32. For in incisive analysis of this flanksissue, see Richard A. Falkenrath, "The

CFEFlank Dispute: Waiting in theWings";International Security, Spring

1995, pp. 118-144; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Resolving the CFE

'Flank' Dispute," Arms Control Today, May 1995, pp. 15-20.

33. Falkenrath, "CFE Flank Dispute," pp. 129-130.

34. Ibid., pp. 129-133.

35. Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty."

36. Arms Control Reporter 1994, pp. 407.B.502-503, 507, 509, 512, 513.

37. Nichol, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty"; Arms Control Reporter

1994, pp. 407.B.522-523, 526; Falkenrath, "Resolving the CFE 'Flank'

Dispute," pp. 15-17.

38. Arms Control Reporter 1995, pp. 407.B.518, 522-523, 525-526;

Mendelsohn, "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review," pp. 7-

11.

39. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D.

40. Necil Nedimoglu, Head of the Verification and Implementation Coordination Section, NATO Verification Coordinating Committee, "NATO's Role

in Verification and Compliance Monitoring for the CFE Treaty and the

Vienna Document," speech presented to the United Nations Group of

Governmental Experts on Verification in All Its Aspects, New York, July

19, 1994. See also Interview, Kelley.

41. Interview with Brigadier General Dr. Heinz Loquai, Director, Zentrum Fiir

Verifikationsaufga ben der Bundeswehr, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian,

OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994.

42. Nedimoglu, "NATO's Role in Verification and Compliance Monitoring";

Arms Control Reporter 1993, p. 407.B.508.

43. Arms Control Reporter 1994, p. 407.B.502.

44. Interview with Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of

the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, by

editors of Arms Control Today, April 25, 1996, published in "The CFE

Treaty Review Conference: Strengthening the 'Cornerstone' of European

Security," Arms Control Today, April 1996, pp. 3-6.

45. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D.
Appendi x A

TREATYONCONVENTIONAL

ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria,

Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the 

Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal

Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of

Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 

Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of

Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of

Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having

conducted this negotiation in Vienna beginning on March 9,

1989,

Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, within

the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was

conducted,

Recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual

relations, as well as in their international relations in

general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any State, or in any

other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles

of the Charter of the United Nations,

Conscious of the need to prevent any military conflict in

Europe,

Conscious of the common responsi bility which they all

have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in

Europe,

Striving to replace military confrontation with a new

pattern of security relations among all the States Parties

based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to contribute to

overcoming the division of Europe,

Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and

stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at

lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities

prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a

matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise

attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in

Europe,

Recalling that they signed or acceded to the Treaty of

Brussels of 1948, the Treaty of Washington of 1949 or the 

Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 and that they have the right to be

or not to be a party to treaties of alliance,

Committed to the objective of ensuring that the numbers

of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty within the area of application of this Treaty do not

exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armoured combat

vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft

and 4,000 attack helicopters,

Affirming that this Treaty is not intended to affect

adversely the security interests of any State,

Affirming their commitment to continue the conventional 

arms control process including negotiations, taking into

account future requirements for European stability and 

security in the light of political developments in Europe,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each State Party shall carry out the obligations set

forth in this Treaty in accordance with its provisions,

including those obligations relating to the following five

categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and

combat helicopters.

2. Each State Party also shall carry out the other

measures set forth in this Treaty designed to ensure security

and stability both during the period of reduction of

conventional armed forces and after the completion of

reductions.

3. This Treaty incorporates the Protocol on Existing

Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment,

hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Existing Types,

with an Annex thereto; the Protocol on Procedures

Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or

Versions of Combat-Capa ble Trainer Aircraft Into Unarmed

Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on

Aircraft Reclassification; the Protocol on Procedures

Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and

Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on

Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the 

Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the 

Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters,

hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Helicopter

Recategorisation; the Protocol on Notification and Exchange

of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on

Information Exchange, with an Annex on the Format for the 

Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the 

Annex on Format; the Protocol on Inspection; the Protocol

on the Joint Consultative Group; and the Protocol on the
266 ON-Sin lMPEC:Tiol\ AcFNCY ------------------ -------- --------- ----------------------

Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty

on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter

referred to as the Protocol on Provisional Application. Each

of these documents constitutes an integral part of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(A) The term "group of States Parties" means the group

of States Parties that signed the Treaty of Warsaw' of

1955 consisting of the Republic of Bulgaria, the

Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of

Hungary, the Repu blic of Poland, Romania and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the group of

States Parties that signed or acceded to the Treaty of

Brussels" of 1948 or the Treaty of Washington"' of

1949 consisting of the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada,

the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the 

Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic,

the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the 

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the

Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the

Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the

Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States

of America.

(B) The term "area of application" means the entire land

territory of the States Parties in Europe from the 

Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which

includes all the European island territories of the

States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the 

Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear

Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the islands of

Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the

Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz

Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics. In the case of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics, the area of application

includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and 

the Caspian Sea. In the case of the Republic of

Turkey, the area of application includes the territory

of the Republic of Turkey north and west of a line

extending from the point of intersection of the 

Turkish border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye,

Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan,

Dogankent, Gozne and thence to the sea.

(C) The term "battle tank" means a self-propelled

armoured fighting vehicle, capable of heavy

firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct

fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and 

other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with

a high level of self-protection, and which is not

·The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual

Assistance signed in Warsaw, 14 May 1955

··The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural

Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed in Brussels,

17 March 1948

...The North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, 4 April

1949

designed and equipped primarily to transport

combat troops. Such armoured vehicles serve as the 

principal weapon system of ground-force tank and 

other armoured formations.

Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting

vehicles which weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes 

unladen weight and which are armed with a

360-degree traverse gun of at least 75

millimetres calibre. In addition, any wheeled 

armoured fighting vehicles entering into service

which meet all the other criteria stated above

shall also be deemed battle tanks.

(D) The term "armoured combat vehicle" means a selfpropelled vehicle with armoured protection and 

cross-country capability. Armoured combat vehicles

include armoured personnel carriers, armoured

infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament

combat vehicles.

The term "armoured personnel carrier" means

an armoured combat vehicle which is designed

and equipped to transport a combat infantry

squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an

integral or organic weapon of less than 20

millimetres calibre.

The term "armoured infantry fighting vehicle"

means an armoured combat vehicle which is

designed and equipped primarily to transport a

combat infantry squad, which normally

provides the capability for the troops to deliver

fire from inside the vehicle under armoured

protection, and which is armed with an integral 

or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres

calibre and sometimes an antitank missile

launcher. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles

serve as the principal weapon system of

armoured infantry or mechanised infantry or

motorised infantry formations and units of

ground forces.

The term "heavy armament combat vehicle"

means an armoured combat vehicle with an

integral or organic direct fire gun of at least 75

millimetres calibre, weighing at least 6.0 metric

tonnes unladen weight, which does not fall

within the definitions of an armoured personnel

carrier, or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle

or a battle tank.

(E) The term "unladen weight" means the weight of a

vehicle excluding the weight of ammunition; fuel, oil

and lubricants; removable reactive armour; spare 

parts, tools and accessories; removable snorkelling 

equipment; and crew and their personal kit.

(F) The term "artillery" means large calibre systems

capable of engaging ground targets by delivering

primarily indirect fire. Such artillery systems provide

the essential indirect fire support to combined arms 

formations.

Large calibre artillery systems are guns,

howitzers, artillery pieces combining the

characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars
Al'l'F!\I>l\ A: TRI.A I) ON CO!\ \ I:\ 1 10..\ l. ARMU) FORCES IN EURCWF 267

and multiple launch rocket systems with a

calibre of 100 millimetres and above. In

addition, any future large calibre direct fire 

system which has a secondary effective indirect

fire capa bility shall be counted against the

artillery ceilings.

(G) The term "stationed conventional armed forces"

means conventional armed forces of a State Party

that are stationed within the area of application on

the territory of another State Party.

(H) The term "designated permanent storage site" means

a place with a clearly defined physical boundary 

containing conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty, which are counted within 

overall ceilings but which are not subject to

limitations on conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty in active units.

(I) The term "armoured vehicle launched bridge" means

a self-propelled armoured transporter-launcher

vehicle capable of carrying and, through built-in

mechanisms, of emplacing and retrieving a bridge 

structure. Such a vehicle with a bridge structure

operates as an integrated system.

(]) The term "conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty" means battle tanks, armoured 

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 

helicopters subject to the numerical limitations set

forth in Articles IV, V and VI.

(K) The term "combat aircraft" means a fixed-wing or

variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped

to engage targets by employing guided missiles,

unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other 

weapons of destruction, as well as any model or

version of such an aircraft which performs other

military functions such as reconnaissance or

electronic warfare. The term "combat aircraft" does

not include primary trainer aircraft.

(L) The term "combat helicopter" means a rotary wing

aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets or

equipped to perform other military functions. The

term "combat helicopter" comprises attack

helicopters and combat support helicopters. The

term "combat helicopter" does not include unarmed

transport helicopters.

(M) The term "attack helicopter" means a combat

helicopter equipped to employ anti-armour, air-toground, or air-to-air guided weapons and equipped

with an integrated fire control and aiming system for

these weapons. The term "attack helicopter"

comprises specialised attack helicopters and multipurpose attack helicopters.

(N) The term "specialised attack helicopter" means an

attack helicopter that is designed primarily to

employ guided weapons.

(0) The term "multi-purpose attack helicopter" means

an attack helicopter designed to perform multiple

military functions and equipped to employ guided

weapons.

(P) The term "combat support helicopter" means a

combat helicopter which does not fulfill the

requirements to qualify as an attack helicopter and

which may be equipped with a variety of self-defence

and area suppression weapons, such as guns, 

cannons and unguided rockets, bom bs or cluster

bombs, or which may be equipped to perform other 

military functions.

(Q) The term "conventional armaments and equipment

subject to the Treaty" means battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary

trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat 

helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters,

armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured

personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry

fighting vehicle look-alikes subject to information 

exchange in accordance with the Protocol on

Information Exchange.

(R) The term "in service," as it applies to conventional

armed forces and conventional armaments and

equipment, means battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary trainer 

aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat

helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters,

armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured

personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry 

fighting vehicle look-alikes that are within the area

of application, except for those that are held by

organisations designed and structured to perform in

peacetime internal security functions or that meet

any of the exceptions set forth in Article Ill.

(S) The terms "armoured personnel carrier look-alike"

and "armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike"

mean an armoured vehicle based on the same chassis

as, and externally similar to, an armoured personnel

carrier or armoured infantry fighting vehicle,

respectively, which does not have a cannon or gun of

20 millimetres calibre or greater and which has been

constructed or modified in such a way as not to

permit the transportation of a combat infantry

squad. Taking into account the provisions of the 

Geneva Convention "For the Amelioration of the

Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed

Forces in the Field" of 12 August 1949 that confer a

special status on ambulances, armoured personnel

carrier ambulances shall not be deemed armoured

combat vehicles or armoured personnel carrier lookalikes.

(T) The term "reduction site" means a clearly designated

location where the reduction of conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in

accordance with Article VIII takes place.

(U) The term "reduction liability" means the number in

each category of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty that a State Party

commits itself to reduce during the period of 40

months following the entry into force of this Treaty

in order to ensure compliance with Article VII.

2. Existing types of conventional armaments and

equipment subject to the Treaty are listed in the Protocol on
ON-SinJ\lPHTIONAcFN< )

Existing Types. The lists of existing types shall be

periodically updated in accordance with Article XVI,

paragraph 2, subparagraph (D) and Section IV of the

Protocol on Existing Types. Such updates to the existing

types lists shall not be deemed amendments to this Treaty.

3. The existing types of combat helicopters listed in the

Protocol on Existing Types shall be categorised in

accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Helicopter

Recategorisation.

Article III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties

shall apply the following counting rules:

All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery,

combat aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article

11, within the area of application shall be subject to the

numerical limitations and other provisions set forth in

Articles IV, V and VI, with the exception of those which in a

manner consistent with a State Party's normal practices:

(A) are in the process of manufacture, including

manufacturing-related testing;

(B) are used exclusively for the purposes of research and 

development;

(C) belong to historical collections;

(D) are awaiting disposal, having been decommissioned

from service in accordance with the provisions of

Article IX;

(E) are awaiting, or are being refurbished for, export or

re-export and are temporarily retained within the 

area of application. Such battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack

helicopters shall be located elsewhere than at sites

declared under the terms of Section V of the Protocol

on Information Exchange or at no more than 10

such declared sites which shall have been notified in

the previous year's annual information exchange. In

the latter case, they shall be separately

distinguisha ble from conventional armaments and 

equipment limited by the Treaty;

(F) are, in the case of armoured personnel carriers,

armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament

combat vehicles or multi-purpose attack helicopters,

held by organisations designed and structured to

perform in peacetime internal security functions; or

(G) are in transit through the area of application from a

location outside the area of application to a final

destination outside the area of application, and are

in the area of application for no longer than a total

of seven days.

2. If, in respect of any such battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack

helicopters, the notification of which is required under

Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a State

Party notifies an unusually high number in more than two

successive annual information exchanges, it shall explain the 

reasons in the Joint Consultative Group, if so requested.

Article IV

1. Within the area of application, as defined in Article

II, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat

aircraft and attack helicopters so that, 40 months after entry

into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of

States Parties to which it belongs, as defined in Article 11, the 

aggregate numbers do not exceed:

(A) 20,000 battle tanks, of which no more than 16,500

shall be in active units;

(B) 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more

than 27,300 shall be in active units. Of the 30,000

armoured combat vehicles, no more than 18,000

shall be armoured infantry fighting vehicles and

heavy armament combat vehicles; of armoured

infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament

combat vehicles, no more than 1,500 shall be heavy

armament combat vehicles;

(C) 20,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than

17,000 shall be in active units;

(D) 6,800 combat aircraft; and

(E) 2,000 attack helicopters.

Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery not

in active units shall be placed in designated permanent

storage sites, as defined in Article 11, and shall be located

only in the area described in paragraph 2 of this Article.

Such designated permanent storage sites may also be located

in that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics comprising the Odessa Military District and the 

southern part of the Leningrad Military District. In the 

Odessa Military District, no more than 400 battle tanks and

no more than 500 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. In

the southern part of the Leningrad Military District, no

more than 600 battle tanks, no more than 800 armoured

combat vehicles, including no more than 300 armoured

combat vehicles of any type with the remaining number

consisting of armoured personnel carriers, and no more than

400 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. The southern part

of the Leningrad Military District is understood to mean the 

territory within that military district south of the line EastWest 60 degrees 15 minutes northern latitude.

2. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory

in Europe, which includes all the European island territories,

of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal

Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe

Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of

Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Repu blic, the 

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the

Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese

Repu blic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, the

Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that

part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics west of the Ural Mountains comprising the Baltic, 

Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Moscow and Volga-Ural 

Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as

necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles

and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this
Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to

which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

(A) 15,300 battle tanks, of which no more than 11,800

shall be in active units;

(B) 24,100 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more

than 21,400 shall be in active units; and

(C) 14,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than

11,000 shall be in active units.

3. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory

in Europe, which includes all the European island territories,

of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal 

Repu blic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe

Islands, the French Repu blic, the Federal Republic of

Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the

Grand Duchy of Luxem bourg, the Kingdom of the

Netherlands, the Repu blic of Poland, the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that part of the

territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian and Kiev

Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as

necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles

and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this

Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to

which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do

not exceed:

(A) 10,300 battle tanks;

(B) 19,260 armoured combat vehicles; and

(C) 9,100 pieces of artillery; and

(D) in the Kiev Military District, the aggregate numbers

in active units and designated permanent storage

sites together shall not exceed:

(1) 2,250 battle tanks;

(2) 2,500 armoured combat vehicles; and

(3) 1,500 pieces of artillery.

4. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory

in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, 

of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal

Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of

Hungary, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of

the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland, each State

Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months

after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the

group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate

numbers in active units do not exceed:

(A) 7,500 battle tanks; •

(B) 11,250 armoured combat vehicles; and

(C) 5,000 pieces of artillery.

5. States Parties belonging to the same group of States

Parties may locate battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles

and artillery in active units in each of the areas described in

this Article and Article V, paragraph 1,subparagraph (A)

up to the numerical limitations applying in that area,

consistent with the maximum levels for holdings notified

pursuant to Article VII and provided that no State Party

stations conventional armed forces on the territory of

another State Party without the agreement of that State

Party.

6. If a group of States Parties' aggregate numbers of

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in

active units within the area described in paragraph 4 of this

Article are less than the numerical limitations set forth in

paragraph 4 of this Article, and provided that no State Party

isthereby prevented from reaching its maximum levels for

holdings notified in accordance with Article VII, paragraphs

2, 3 and 5, then amounts equal to the difference between the

aggregate numbers in each of the categories of battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles and artillery and the specified

numerical limitations for that area may be located by States

Parties belonging to that group of States Parties in the area

described in paragraph 3 of this Article, consistent with the 

numerical limitations specified in paragraph 3 of this Article.

Article V

1. To ensure that the security of each State Party is not

affected adversely at any stage:

(A) within the area consisting of the entire land territory

in Europe, which includes all the European island

territories, of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic

Repu blic, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of

Norway, Romania, the part of the Republic of

Turkey within the area of application and that part

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising

the Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasus and North

Caucasus Military Districts, each State Party shall

limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 

months after entry into force of this Treaty and

thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it

belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not

exceed the difference between the overall numerical

limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and

those in Article IV, paragraph 2, that is:

(1) 4,700 battle tanks;

(2) 5,900 armoured combat vehicles; and

(3) 6,000 pieces of artillery;

(B) notwithstanding the numerical limitations set forth

in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a State Party

or States Parties may on a temporary basis deploy

into the territory belonging to the members of the 

same group of States Parties within the area

described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph

additional aggregate numbers in active units for each

group of States Parties not to exceed:

(1) 459 battle tanks;

(2) 723 armoured combat vehicles; and

(3) 420 pieces of artillery; and

(C) provided that for each group of States Parties no

more than one-third of each of these additional aggregate

numbers shall be deployed to any State Party with territory

within the area described in subparagraph (A) of this

paragraph, that is:
270 ON-Sin: NSPFCTION AGE1\ICY-----·-----------------·--------·-- ----------------

(1) 153 battle tanks;

(2) 241 armoured combat vehicles; and

(3) 140 pieces of artillery.

2. Notification shall be provided to all other States

Parties no later than at the start of the deployment by the

State Party or States Parties conducting the deployment and

by the recipient State Party or States Parties, specifying the 

total number in each category of battle tanks, armoured 

combat vehicles and artillery deployed. Notification also

shall be provided to all other States Parties by the State Party

or States Parties conducting the deployment and by the 

recipient State Party or States Parties within 30 days of the 

withdrawal of those battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles

and artillery that were temporarily deployed.

Article VI

With the objective of ensuring that no single State Party

possesses more than approximately one-third of the 

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty within the area of application, each State Party shall

limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured 

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack

helicopters so that, 40 months after entry into force of this

Treaty and thereafter, the numbers within the area of

application for that State Party do not exceed:

(A) 13,300 battle tanks;

(B) 20,000 armoured combat vehicles;

(C) 13,700 pieces of artillery;

(D ) 5,150 combat aircraft; and

(E) 1,500 attack helicopters.

Article VII

1. In order that the limitations set forth in Articles IV,

V and VI are not exceeded, no State Party shall exceed, from

40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, the maximum

levels which it has previously agreed upon within its group

of States Parties, in accordance with paragraph 7 of this

Article, for its holdings of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty and of which it has

provided notification pursuant to the provisions of this

Article.

2. Each State Party shall provide at the signature of this

Treaty notification to all other States Parties of the

maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments 

and equipment limited by the Treaty. The notification of the 

maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments 

and equipment limited by the Treaty provided by each State

Party at the signature of this Treaty shall remain valid until

the date specified in a subsequent notification pursuant to

paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. In accordance with the limitations set forth in

Articles IV,V and VI, each State Party shall have the right to

change the maximum levels for its holdings of conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Any change

in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party shall be

notified by that State Party to all other States Parties at least

90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification,

on which such a change takes effect. In order not to exceed

any of the limitations set forth in Articles IV and V, any

increase in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party

that would otherwise cause those limitations to be exceeded

shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding 

reduction in the previously notified maximum levels for

holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited

by the Treaty of one or more States Parties belonging to the 

same group of States Parties. The notification of a change in

the maximum levels for holdings shall remain valid from the

date specified in the notification until the date specified in a

subsequent notification of change pursuant to this

paragraph.

4. Each notification required pursuant to pa ragraph 2

or 3 of this Article for armoured combat vehicles shall also

include maximum levels for the holdings of armoured

infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat

vehicles of the State Party providing the notification.

5. Ninety days before expiration of the 40-month

period of reductions set forth in Article VIII and

subsequently at the time of any notification of a change

pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, each State Pa rty

shall provide notification of the maximum levels for its

holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and

artillery with respect to each of the areas described in Article

IV, paragraphs 2 to 4 and Article V, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (A).

6. A decrease in the numbers of conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held by a

State Party and subject to notification pursuant to the

Protocol on Information Exchange shall by itself confer no

right on any other State Party to increase the maximum

levels for its holdings subject to notification pursuant to this

Article.

7. It shall be the responsibility solely of each individual

State Party to ensure that the maximum levels for its

holdings notified pursuant to the provisions of this Article 

are not exceeded. States Parties belonging to the same group

of States Parties shall consult in order to ensure that the

maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to the

provisions of this Article, taken together as appropriate, do

not exceed the limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI.

Article VIII

1. The numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V

and VI shall be achieved only by means of reduction in

accordance with the Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on

Helicopter Recategorisation, the Protocol on Aircraft

Reclassification, the Footnote to Section I, pa ragraph 2,

subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Existing Types and the 

Protocol on Inspection.

2. The categories of conventional armaments and

equipment subject to reductions are battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack

helicopters. The specific types are listed in the Protocol on

Existing Types.

(A) Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be

reduced by destruction, conversion for non-military

purposes, placement on static display, use as ground

targets, or, in the case of armoured personnel
carriers, modification in accordance with the 

Footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph

(A) of the Protocol on Existing Types.

(B) Artillery shall be reduced by destruction or

placement on static display, or, in the case of selfpropelled artillery, by use as ground targets.

(C) Combat aircraft shall be reduced by destruction,

• placement on static display, use for ground

instructional purposes, or, in the case of specific

models or versions of combat-capable trainer

aircraft, reclassification into unarmed trainer

aircraft.

(D) Specialised attack helicopters shall be reduced by

destruction, placement on static display, or use for

ground instructional purposes.

(E) Multi-purpose attack helicopters shall be reduced by

destruction, placement on static display, use for

ground instructional purposes, or recategorisation.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty shall be deemed to be reduced upon execution of

the procedures set forth in the Protocols listed in paragraph

1of this Article and upon notification as required by these

Protocols. Armaments and equipment so reduced shall no

longer be counted against the numerical limitations set forth

in Articles IV,V and VI.

4. Reductions shall be effected in three phases and

completed no later than 40 months after entry into force of

this Treaty, so that:

(A) by the end of the first reduction phase, that is, no

later than 16 months after entry into force of this

Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at

least 25 percent of its total reduction liability in each

of the categories of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced;

(B) by the end of the second reduction phase, that is, no

later than 28 months after entry into force of this

Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at

least 60 percent of its total reduction liability in each

of the categories of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced;

(C) by the end of the third reduction phase, that is, no

later than 40 months after entry into force of this

Treaty, each State Party shall have reduced its total

reduction liability in each of the categories of

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty. States Parties carrying out conversion for

non-military purposes shall have ensured that the

conversion of all battle tanks in accordance with

Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction shall have

been completed by the end of the third reduction

phase; and

(D) armoured combat vehicles deemed reduced by reason

of having been partially destroyed in accordance

with Section VIII, paragraph 6 of the Protocol on

Reduction shall have been fully converted for nonmilitary purposes, or destroyed in accordance with

Section IV of the Protocol on Reduction, no later

than 64 months after entry into force of this Treaty.

5. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty to be reduced shall have been declared present

within the area of application in the exchange of

information at signature of this Treaty.

6. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this

Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all

other States Parties of its reduction liability.

7. Except as provided for in paragraph 8 of this 

Article, a State Party's reduction liability in each category

shall be no less than the difference between its holdings

notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information 

Exchange, at signature or effective upon entry into force of

this Treaty, whichever is the greater, and the maximum

levels for holdings it notified pursuant to Article VII.

8. Any subsequent revision of a State Party's holdings

notified pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange

or of its maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to

Article VII shall be reflected by a notified adjustment to its

reduction liability. Any notification of a decrease in a State

Party's reduction liability shall be preceded or accompanied

by either a notification of a corresponding increase in

holdings not exceeding the maximum levels for holdings

notified pursuant to Article VII by one or more States

Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties, or a

notification of a corresponding increase in the reduction

liability of one or more such States Parties.

9. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each State

Party shall notify all other States Parties, in accordance

with the Protocol on Information Exchange, of the

locations of its reduction sites, including those where the 

final conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat 

vehicles for non-military purposes will be carried out.

10. Each State Party shall have the right to designate as

many reduction sites as it wishes, to revise without

restriction its designation of such sites and to carry out

reduction and final conversion simultaneously at a

maximum of 20 sites. States Parties shall have the right to

share or co-locate reduction sites by mutual agreement.

11. Notwithstanding paragraph 10 of this Article,

during the baseline validation period, that is, the interval

between entry into force of this Treaty and 120 days after 

entry into force of this Treaty, reduction shall be carried

out simultaneously at no more than two reduction sites for

each State Party.

12. Reduction of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty shall be carried out at

reduction sites, unless otherwise specified in the Protocols

listed in paragraph 1of this Article, within the area of

application.

13. The reduction process, including the results of the 

conversion of conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty for non-military purposes both during 

the reduction period and in the 24 months following the 

reduction period, shall be subject to inspection, without

right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on

Inspection.
272 ON-SITE NSl'HTION ACI NCY ------------------

Article IX

1. Other than removal from service in accordance with

the provisions of Article VIII, battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters

within the area of application shall be removed from service

only by decommissioning, provided that:

(A) such conventional armaments and equipment limited

by the Treaty are decommissioned and awaiting

disposal at no more than eight sites which shall be

notified as declared sites in accordance with the 

Protocol on Information Exchange and shall be

identified in such notifications as holding areas for

decommissioned conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty. If sites containing 

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty decommissioned from service also contain

any other conventional armaments and equipment

subject to the Treaty, the decommissioned

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty shall be separately distinguishable; and

(B) the numbers of such decommissioned conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty do

not exceed, in the case of any individual State Party, 

one percent of its notified holdings of conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or a

total of 250, whichever is greater, of which no more

than 200 shall be battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles and pieces of artillery, and no more than 50

shall be attack helicopters and combat aircraft.

2. Notification of decommissioning shall include the

number and type of conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty decommissioned and the location of

decommissioning and shall be provided to all other States

Parties in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (B) of the Protocol on Information Exchange.

Article X

1. Designated permanent storage sites shall be notified

in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange to

all other States Parties by the State Party to which the

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 

Treaty contained at designated permanent storage sites

belong. The notification shall include the designation and

location, including geographic coordinates, of designated

permanent storage sites and the numbers by type of each

category of its conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty at each such storage site.

2. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain

only facilities appropriate for the storage and maintenance

of armaments and equipment (e.g., warehouses, garages,

workshops and associated stores as well as other support

accommodation). Designated permanent storage sites shall

not contain firing ranges or training areas associated with

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain only

armaments and equipment belonging to the conventional

armed forces of a State Party.

3. Each designated permanent storage site shall have a

clearly defined physical boundary that shall consist of a

continuous perimeter fence at least 1.5 metres in height. The

perimeter fence shall have no more than three gates

providing the sole means of entrance and exit for armaments

and equipment.

4. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites

shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment 

limited by the Treaty not in active units, including when they

are temporarily removed in accordance with paragraphs 7,

8, 9 and 10 of this Article. Conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty in storage other than in

designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty in active units.

5. Active units or formations shall not be located

within designated permanent storage sites, except as

provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article.

6. Only personnel associated with the security or

operation of designated permanent storage sites, or the 

maintenance of the armaments and equipment stored

therein, shall be located within the designated permanent 

storage sites.

7. For the purpose of maintenance, repair or

modification of conventional armaments and equipment 

limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent

storage sites, each State Party shall have the right, without

prior notification, to remove from and retain outside 

designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10

percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of

the notified holdings of each category of conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in each

designated permanent storage site, or 10 items of the

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 

Treaty in each category in each designated permanent 

storage site, whichever isless.

8. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article,

no State Party shall remove conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty from designated permanent

storage sites unless notification has been provided to all

other States Parties at least 42 days in advance of such

removal. Notification shall be given by the State Party to

which the conventional armaments and equipment limited

by the Treaty belong. Such notification shall specify:

(A) the location of the designated permanent storage site

from which conventional armaments and equipment 

limited by the Treaty are to be removed and the 

numbers by type of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty of each category to

be removed;

(B) the dates of removal and return of conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and

(C) the intended location and use of conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty

while outside the designated permanent storage site.

9. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article,

the aggregate numbers of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty removed from and retained

outside designated permanent storage sites by States Parties

belonging to the same group of States Parties shall at no time

exceed the following levels:
APP NlW\ A: TR L\rY Oi\ Co:--.i\ t '.\i llOr\AL A1u..1ED FoRcE tN Eu ROPF 273

(A) 550 battle tanks;

(B) 1,000 armoured combat vehicles; and

(C) 300 pieces of artillery.

10. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty removed from designated permanent storage sites

pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Article shall be

returned to designated permanent storage sites no later than

42 days after their removal, except for those items of

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 

Treaty removed for industrial rebuild. Such items shall be

returned to designated permanent storage sites immediately

on completion of the rebuild.

11. Each State Party shall have the right to replace

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty located in designated permanent storage sites. Each

State Party shall notify all other States Parties, at the 

beginning of replacement, of the number, location, type and

disposition of conventional armaments and equipment 

limited by the Treaty being replaced.

Article XI

1. Each State Party shall limit its armoured vehicle

launched bridges so that, 40 months after entry into force of

this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to

which it belongs the aggregate number of armoured vehicle

launched bridges in active units within the area of

application does not exceed 740.

2. All armoured vehicle launched bridges within the

area of application in excess of the aggregate number

specified in paragraph 1of this Article for each group of

States Parties shall be placed in designated permanent

storage sites, as defined in Article II. When armoured vehicle

launched bridges are placed in a designated permanent

storage site, either on their own or together with

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty, Article X, paragraphs 1to 6 shall apply to armoured

vehicle launched bridges as well as to conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Armoured

vehicle launched bridges placed in designated permanent

storage sites shall not be considered as being in active units.

3. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article,

armoured vehicle launched bridges may be removed, subject

to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, from

designated permanent storage sites only after notification

has been provided to all other States Parties at least 42 days

prior to such removal. This notification shall specify:

(A) the locations of the designated permanent storage 

sites from which armoured vehicle launched bridges

are to be removed and the numbers of armoured

vehicle launched bridges to be removed from each

such site;

(B) the dates of removal of armoured vehicle launched

bridges from and return to designated permanent 

storage sites; and

(C) the intended use of armoured vehicle launched

bridges during the period of their removal from

designated permanent storage sites.

4. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, 

armoured vehicle launched bridges removed from designated

permanent storage sites shall be returned to them no later

than 42 days after the actual date of removal.

5. The aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched

bridges removed from and retained outside of designated

permanent storage sites by each group of States Parties shall

not exceed 50 at any one time.

6. States Parties shall have the right, for the purpose of

maintenance or modification, to remove and have outside of

designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10

percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of

their notified holdings of armoured vehicle launched bridges

in each designated permanent storage site, or 10 armoured

vehicle launched bridges from each designated permanent

storage site, whichever is less.

7. In the event of natural disasters involving flooding or

damage to permanent bridges, States Parties shall have the 

right to withdraw armoured vehicle launched bridges from 

designated permanent storage sites. Notification to all other

States Parties of such withdrawals shall be given at the time

of withdrawal.

Article XII

1. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by

organisations of a State Party designed and structured to

perform in peacetime internal security functions, which are 

not structured and organised for ground combat against an

external enemy, are not limited by this Treaty. The foregoing

notwithstanding, in order to enhance the implementation of

this Treaty and to provide assurance that the number of such

armaments held by such organisations shall not be used to

circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, any such

armaments in excess of 1,000 armoured infantry fighting

vehicles assigned by a State Party to organisations designed

and structured to perform in peacetime internal security

functions shall constitute a portion of the permitted levels

specified in Articles IV, V and VI. No more than 600 such

armoured infantry fighting vehicles of a State Party, assigned

to such organisations, may be located in that part of the area

of application described in Article V, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (A). Each State Party shall further ensure that

such organisations refrain from the acquisition of combat

capabilities in excess of those necessary for meeting internal

security requirements.

2. A State Party that intends to reassign battle tanks,

armoured infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat

aircraft, attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched

bridges in service with its conventional armed forces to any

organisation of that State Party not a part of its conventional 

armed forces shall notify all other States Parties no later than

the date such reassignment takes effect. Such notification

shall specify the effective date of the reassignment, the date

such equipment is physically transferred, as well as the

numbers, by type, of the conventional armaments and 

equipment limited by the Treaty being reassigned.

Article XIII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of

compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State
274 ON-Srr1 l"ISl'Lc 1 10\1 AcFNu _ _

Party shall provide notifications and exchange information 

pertaining to its conventional armaments and equipment in

accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.

2. Such notifications and exchange of information shall

be provided in accordance with Article XVII.

3. Each State Party shall be responsible for its own

information; receipt of such information and of notifications

shall not imply validation or acceptance of the information

provided.

Article XIV

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of

compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State

Party shall have the right to conduct, and the obligation to

accept, within the area of application, inspections in

accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on

Inspection.

2. The purpose of such inspections shall be:

(A) to verify, on the basis of the information provided

pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange,

the compliance of States Parties with the numerical

limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI;

(B) to monitor the process of reduction of battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft

and attack helicopters carried out at reduction sites

in accordance with Article VIII and the Protocol on

Reduction; and

(C) to monitor the certification of recategorised multipurpose attack helicopters and reclassified combatcapable trainer aircraft carried out in accordance

with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation

and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification,

respectively.

3. No State Party shall exercise the rights set forth in

paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in respect of States Parties

which belong to the group of States Parties to which it

belongs in order to elude the objectives of the verification

regime.

4. In the case of an inspection conducted jointly by

more than one State Party, one of them shall be responsi ble

for the execution of the provisions of this Treaty.

5. The number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII

and VIII of the Protocol on Inspection which each State

Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to

accept during each specified time period shall be determined

in accordance with the provisions of Section II of that

Protocol.

6. Upon completion of the 120-day residual level

validation period, each State Party shall have the right to

conduct, and each State Party with territory within the area 

of application shall have the obligation to accept, an agreed

number of aerial inspections within the area of application.

Such agreed numbers and other applicable provisions shall

be developed during negotiations referred to in Article

XVIII.

Article XV

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of

compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, a State Party

shall have the right to use, in addition to the procedures 

referred to in Article XIV, national or multinational

technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner 

consistent with generally recognised principles of

international law.

2. A State Party shall not interfere with national or

multinational technical means of verification of another

State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this

Article.

3. A State Party shall not use concealment measures

that impede verification of compliance with the provisions of

this Treaty by national or multinational technical means of

verification of another State Party operating in accordance 

with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not

apply to cover or concealment practices associated with

normal personnel training, maintenance or operations

involving conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty.

Article XVI

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the 

provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties hereby establish a

Joint Consultative Group.

2. Within the framework of the Joint Consultative 

Group, the States Parties shall:

(A) address questions relating to compliance with or

possible circumvention of the provisions of this

Treaty;

(B) seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of

interpretation that may become apparent in the way

this Treaty is implemented;

(C) consider and, if possible, agree on measures to

enhance the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty;

(D) update the lists contained in the Protocol on Existing

Types, as required by Article II, paragraph 2;

(E) resolve technical questions in order to seek common

practices among the States Parties in the way this

Treaty is implemented;

(F) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure,

working methods, the scale of distribution of

expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of

conferences convened under this Treaty and the 

distribution of costs of inspections between or

among States Parties;

(G) consider and work out appropriate measures to

ensure that information obtained through exchanges

of information among the States Parties or as a result

of inspections pursuant to this Treaty is used solely

for the purposes of this Treaty, taking into account 

the particular requirements of each State Party in

respect of safeguarding information which that State

Party specifies as being sensitive;
(H) consider, upon the request of any State Party, any

matter that a State Party wishes to propose for

examination by any conference to be convened in

accordance with Article XXI; such consideration

shall not prejudice the right of any State Party to

resort to the procedures set forth in Article XXI; and

(I) consider matters of dispute arising out of the

implementation of this Treaty.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to raise before

the Joint Consultative Group, and have placed on its agenda,

any issue relating to this Treaty.

4. The Joint Consultative Group shall take decisions or

make recommendations by consensus. Consensus shall be

understood to mean the absence of any objection by any

representative of a State Party to the taking of a decision or

the making of a recommendation.

5. The Joint Consultative Group may propose

amendments to this Treaty for consideration and

confirmation in accordance with Article XX. The Joint 

Consultative Group may also agree on improvements to the

viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, consistent with its

provisions. Unless such improvements relate only to minor

matters of an administrative or technical nature, they shall

be subject to consideration and confirmation in accordance

with Article XX before they can take effect.

6. Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prohibit or

restrict any State Party from requesting information from or

undertaking consultations with other States Parties on 

matters relating to this Treaty and its implementation in

channels or fora other than the Joint Consultative Group.

7. The Joint Consultative Group shall follow the

procedures set forth in the Protocol on the Joint 

Consultative Group.

Article XVII

The States Parties shall transmit information and

notifications required by this Treaty in written form. They

shall use diplomatic channels or other official channels

designated by them, including in particular a

communications network to be established by a separate

arrangement.

Article XVIII

1. The States Parties, after signature of this Treaty, shall

continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with

the same Mandate and with the goal of building on this

Treaty.

2. The objective for these negotiations shall be to 

conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at

further strengthening security and stability in Europe, and

pursuant to the Mandate, including measures to limit the

personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within

the area of application.

3. The States Parties shall seek to conclude these

negotiations no later than the follow-up meeting of the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be

held in Helsinki in 1992.

Article XIX

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It may be

supplemented by a further treaty.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national 

sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it

decides that extraordinary events related to the subject

matter of this Treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests.

A State Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its

decision to do so to the Depositary and to all other States

Parties. Such notice shall be given at least 150 days prior to

the intended withdrawal from this Treaty. Itshall include a

statement of the extraordinary events the State Party regards

as having jeopardised itssupreme interests.

3. Each State Party shall, in particular, in exercising its

national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this

Treaty if another State Party increases its holdings in battle

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft

or attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, which are

outside the scope of the limitations of this Treaty, in such 

proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of

forces within the area of application.

Article XX

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this

Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be

submitted to the Depositary, which shall circulate it to all

the States Parties.

2. If an amendment is approved by all the States

Parties, it shall enter into force in accordance with the

procedures set forth in Article XXII governing the entry into 

force of this Treaty.

Article XXI

1. Forty-six months after entry into force of this Treaty,

and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Depositary shall

convene a conference of the States Parties to conduct a

review of the operation of this Treaty.

2. The Depositary shall convene an extraordinary

conference of the States Parties, if requested to do so by any

State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances

relating to this Treaty have arisen, in particular, in the event

that a State Party has announced its intention to leave its

group of States Parties or to join the other group of States

Parties, as defined in Article II, paragraph 1, subparagraph

(A). In order to enable the other States Parties to prepare for

this conference, the request shall include the reason why that

State Party deems an extraordinary conference to be

necessary. The conference shall consider the circumstances

set forth in the request and their effect on the operation of

this Treaty. The conference shall open no later than 15 days

after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise,

shall last no longer than three weeks.

3. The Depositary shall convene a conference of the

States Parties to consider an amendment proposed pursuant

to Article XX, if requested to do so by three or more States

Parties. Such a conference shall open no later than 21 days

after receipt of the necessary requests.
276 ON-SllF lMl'FCI l()i'\ Ac; M ) ------- ---- - -------

4. In the event that a State Party gives notice of its

decision to withdraw from this Treaty pursuant to Article

XIX, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States

Parties which shall open no later than 21 days after receipt

of the notice of withdrawal in order to consider questions

relating to the withdrawal from this Treaty.

Article XXII

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each

State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the

Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, hereby

designated the Depositary.

2. This Treaty shall enter into force 10 days after

instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States

Parties listed in the Preamble.

3. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States

Parties of:

(A) the deposit of each instrument of ratification;

(B) the entry into force of this Treaty;

(C) any withdrawal in accordance with Article XIX and 

its effective date;

(D) the text of any amendment proposed in accordance

with Article XX;

(E) the entry into force of any amendment to this Treaty;

(F) any request to convene a conference in accordance

with Article XXI;

(G) the convening of a conference pursuant to Article

XXI; and

(H) any other matter of which the Depositary is required

by this Treaty to inform the States Parties.

4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary

pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United

Nations.

Article XXIII

The original of this Treaty, of which the English, French,

German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally

authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the

Depositary. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be

transmitted by the Depositary to all the States Parties.

PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATION AND 

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and 

provisions regarding notification and exchange of

information pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,

1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE

OF EACH STATE PARTY'S LAND FORCES AND AIR

AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES WITHIN

THE AREA OFAPPLICATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties the following information about the structure of its

land forces and air and air defence aviation forces within the

area of application:

(A) the command organization of its land forces,

specifying the designation and subordination of all 

com bat, combat support and combat service support

formations and units at each level of command down

to the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent level,

including air defence formations and units

subordinated at or below the military district or

equivalent level. Independent u nits at the next level

of command below the brigade/regiment level

directly subordinate to formations above the brigade/

regiment level (i.e., independent battalions) shall be

identified, with the information indicating the

formation or unit to which such units are

subordinated; and

(B) the command organisation of its air and air defence

aviation forces, specifying the designation and 

subordination of formations and units at each level

of command down to wing/air regiment or

equivalent level. Independent units at the next level

of command below the wing/air regiment level

directly subordinate to formations above the wing/

air regiment level (i.e., independent squadrons) shall

be identified, with the information indicating the

formation or unit to which such units are

subordinated.

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL

HOLDINGS IN EACH CATEGORY OF

CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT 

LIMITED BY THE TREATY

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties information on:

(A) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings

in each category of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty; and

(B) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings

of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and

artillery limited by the Treaty in each of the areas

described in Articles IV and V of the Treaty.

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, 

NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL

ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE

STATES PARTIES

1. For each of its formations and units notified

pursuant to Section I, paragraph 1,subparagraphs (A) and

(B) of this Protocol, as well as separately located battalions/

squadrons or equivalents subordinate to those formations

and units, each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties the following information:

(A) the designation and peacetime location of its

formations and units at which conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in

the following categories are held, including
I i ·

headquarters, specifying the geographic name and

coordinates:

( 1) battle tanks;

(2) armoured combat vehicles;

(3) artillery;

(4) combat aircraft; and

(5) attack helicopters;

(B) the holdings of its formations and units notified

pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,

giving numbers (by type in the case of formations 

and units at the level of division or equivalent and

below) of the conventional armaments and

equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this

paragraph, and of:

(1) combat support helicopters;

(2) unarmed transport helicopters;

(3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying

those in active units;

(4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;

(5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;

(6) primary trainer aircraft;

(7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and

(8) Mi-24R andMi-24K helicopters notsubject to

the numerical limitationssetforth inArticle IV,

paragraph 1and Article VI of the Treaty1 ;

(C) the designation and peacetime location of its

formations and units, other than those notified

pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, at

which the following categories of conventional

armaments and equipment, as defined in Article II of

the Treaty, specified in the Protocol on Existing 

Types, or enumerated in the Protocol on Aircraft

Reclassification, are held, including headquarters,

specifying the geographic name and coordinates:

(1) combat support helicopters;

(2) unarmed transport helicopters;

( 3) armoured vehicle launched bridges;

(4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;

(5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;

(6) primary trainer aircraft;

(7) reclassified combat-capa ble trainer aircraft; and

(8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters notsubject to

the numerical limitationssetforth inArticle IV,

paragraph 1and Article VI of the Treaty2 ;and

1 Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on

Helicopter Recategorisation.

(D) the holdings of its formations and units notified

pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this paragraph

giving numbers (by type in the case of formations

and units at the level of division or equivalent and

below) in each category specified above; and, in the

case of armoured vehicle launched bridges, those

which are in active units.

2. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties information on conventional armaments and

equipment in service with its conventional armed forces but 

not held by its land forces or air or air defence aviation 

forces, specifying:

(A) the designation and peacetime location of its

formations and units down to the level of brigade/

regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent as well as

units at the next level of command below the 

brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are 

separately located or are independent (i.e.,

battalions/squadrons or equivalent) at which

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty in the following categories are held,

including headquarters, specifying the geographic

name and coordinates:

(1) battle tanks;

(2) armoured combat vehicles;

(3) artillery;

(4) combat aircraft; and

(5) attack helicopters; and

(B) the holdings of its formations and units notified

pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,

giving numbers (by type in the case of formations 

and units at the level of division or equivalent and

below) of conventional armaments and equipment

listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of:

(1) combat support helicopters;

(2) unarmed transport helicopters;

(3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying

those in active units;

(4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;

(5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;

(6) primary trainer aircraft;

( 7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and

(8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to

the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV,

paragraph 1and Article VI of the Treaty3

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties the following information:

2 Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on

Helicopter Recategorisation.

3 Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on

Helicopter Recategorisation.
o-s, '" hsp1u 10:--1 Ac rr\ u

(A) the location of its designated permanent storage

sites, specifying geographic name and coordinates, 

and the numbers and types of conventional

armaments and equipment in the categories listed in

paragraph 1,subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this

Section held at such sites;

(B) the location of its military storage sites not organic

to formations and units identified as objects of

verification, independent repair and maintenance

units, military training establishments and military

airfields, specifying geographic name and

coordinates, at which conventional armaments and

equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1,

subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Section are held or

routinely present, giving the holdings by type in each

category at such locations; and

(C) the location of its sites at which the reduction of

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty will be undertaken pursuant to the

Protocol on Reduction, specifying the location by

geographic name and coordinates, the holdings by

type in each category of conventional armaments 

and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting

reduction at such locations, and indicating that it is a

reduction site.

SECTION IV.INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION

AND NUMBERS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED

COMBAT VEHICLES, ARTILLERY, COMBAT

AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS WITHIN

THE AREA OF APPLICATION BUT NOT IN SERVICE

WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

1. Each State Party shall provide information to all

other States Parties on the location and numbers of its battle

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft

and attack helicopters within the area of application not in

service with its conventional armed forces but of potential 

military significance.

(A) Accordingly, each State Party shall provide the 

following information:

(1) in respect of its battle tanks, artillery, combat

aircraft and specialised attack helicopters, as

well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as

specified in Article XII of the Treaty, held by

organisations down to the independent or

separately located battalion or equivalent level

designed and structured to perform in peacetime

internal security functions, the location, 

including geographic name and coordinates, of

sites at which such armaments and equipment

are held and the numbers and types of

conventional armaments and equipment in these

categories held by each such organisation;

(2) in respect of its armoured personnel carriers,

heavy armament combat vehicles and multipurpose attack helicopters held by organisations 

designed and structured to perform in peacetime

internal security functions, the aggregate

numbers in each category of such armaments

and equipment in each administrative region or

division;

(3) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack

helicopters awaiting disposal having been

decommissioned in accordance with the

provisions of Article IX of the Treaty, the

location, including geographic name and

coordinates, of sites at which such armaments

and equipment are held and the numbers and

types at each site;

(4) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat 

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack

helico pters, each State Party shall provide to all

other States Parties, following entry into force of

the Treaty and coincident with each annual

exchange of information pursuant to Section

VII, paragraph 1,subparagraph (C) of this

Protocol, an identifia ble location of each site at

which there are normally more than a total of

15 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and

pieces of artillery or more than five combat

aircraft or more than 10 attack helicopters

which are, pursua nt to Article III, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (E) of the Treaty, awaiting or are 

being refurbished for export or re-export and

are temporarily retained within the area of

application. Each State Party shall provide to all

other States Parties, following entry into force of

the Treaty and coincident with each annual

exchange of information pursuant to Section

VII, paragraph 1,subparagraph (C) of this

Protocol, the numbers of such battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat

aircraft and attack helicopters. The States

Parties shall, within the framework of the Joint

Consultative Group, agree as to the form in

which the information on the numbers shall be

provided pursuant to this provision;

(5) in respect of its battle tanks and armoured

combat vehicles which have been reduced and

are awaiting conversion pursuant to Section VIII

of the Protocol on Reduction, the location, 

including geographic name and coordinates, of

each site at which such armaments and

equipment are held and the numbers and types

at each site; and

(6) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack

helicopters used exclusively for the purpose of

research and development pursua nt to Article

III, paragraph 1,subparagraph (B) of the Treaty,

each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties following entry into force of the Treaty

and coincident with each annual exchange of

information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph

1,subparagraph (C) of this Protocol the

aggregate numbers in each category of such

conventional armaments and equipment.
A PPi .''1JI\ A: l 1u 11 1 ()'-< (\l'-. '1 ,, 1 1u:--; \I. A1n11 1 J FoRus It\ El l{(Jl'I

SECTION V.INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF

VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties information specifying its objects of verification,

including the total number and the designation of each

object of verification, and enumerating its declared sites, as

defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection, providing

the following information on each site:

(A) the site's designation and location, including

geographic name and coordinates;

(B) the designation of all objects of verification, as

specified in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (J)

of the Protocol on Inspection, at that site, it being

understood that subordinate elements at the next

level of command below the brigade/regiment or

wing/air regiment level located in the vicinity of each

other or of the headquarters immediately superior to

such elements may be deemed as not separately

located, if the distance between such separately

located battalions/squadrons or equivalent or to their

headquarters does not exceed 15 kilometres;

(C) the overall numbers by type of conventional

armaments and equipment in each category specified

in Section III of this Protocol held at that site and by

each object of verification, as well as those belonging

to any object of verification located at another

declared site, specifying the designation of each such

object of verification;

(D) in addition, for each such declared site, the number

of conventional armaments and equipment not in

service with its conventional armed forces, indicating

those that are:

( 1) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles,

artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters

awaiting disposal having been decommissioned

in accordance with the provisions of Article IX

of the Treaty or reduced and awaiting

conversion pursuant to the Protocol on

Reduction; and

(2) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles,

artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters

held by organisations designed and structured to

perform in peacetime internal security functions;

(E) declared sites that hold battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack

helicopters awaiting or being refurbished for export

or re-export and temporarily retained within the area

of application or used exclusively for research and

development shall be identified as such, and the

aggregate num bers in each category at that site shall

be provided; and

(F) point(s) of entry/exit associated with each declared

site, including geographic name and coordinates.

SECTION VI. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF

SITES FROM WHICH CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other

States Parties, coincident with the annual exchange of

information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, information about the

locations of sites which have been notified previously as

declared sites from which all conventional armaments and 

equipment in the categories listed in Section III, paragraph 1

of this Protocol have been withdrawn since the signature of

the Treaty if such sites continue to be used by the

conventional armed forces of that State Party. The locations 

of these sites shall be notified for three years following such

withdrawal.

SECTION VII. TIMETABLE FOR THE PROVISION OF

INFORMATION IN SECTIONS I TO V OF THIS 

PROTOCOL

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties the information pursuant to Sections I to V of this

Protocol as follows:

(A) upon signature of the Treaty, with information

effective as of that date; and, no later than 90 days

after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall

provide to all other States Parties within the 

framework of the Joint Consultative Group any

necessary corrections to its information reported 

pursuant to Sections III, IV and V of this Protocol.

Such corrected information shall be deemed

information provided at Treaty signature and valid

as of that date;

(B) 30 days following entry into force of the Treaty, with

information effective as of the date of entry into

force;

(C) on the 15th day of December of the year in which

the Treaty comes into force (unless entry into force

occurs within 60 days of the 15th day of December),

and on the 15th day of December of every year

thereafter, with the information effective as of the

first day of January of the following year; and

(D) following completion of the 40-month reduction

period specified in Article VIII of the Treaty, with

information effective as of that date.

SECTION VIII. INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OR FORCE LEVELS

1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties

of:

(A) any permanent change in the organisational structure

of its conventional armed forces within the area of

application as notified pursuant to Section I of this

Protocol at least 42 days in advance of that change;

and

(B) any change of 10 percent or more in any one of the 

categories of conventional armaments and 

equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of

its combat, combat support or combat service
support formations and units down to the brigade/

regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or

separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent

level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1,

subparagraphs (A) and (B) and paragraph 2,

subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Protocol since the 

last annual exchange of information. Such

notification shall be given no later than five days

after such change occurs, indicating actual holdings

after the notified change.

SECTION IX. INFORMATION ON THE ENTRY INTO

AND REMOVAL FROM SERVICE WITH THE

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF A STATE

PARTY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND

EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties following entry into force of the Treaty coincident

with each annual exchange of information provided

pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of

this Protocol:

(A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty which entered into service with its

conventional armed forces within the area of

application during the previous 12 months; and

(B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty which have been removed from service

with its conventional armed forces within the area of

application during the previous 12 months.

SECTION X. INFORMATION ON ENTRY INTO AND

EXIT FROM THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF

CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

LIMITED BY THE TREATY IN SERVICE WITH THE

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES

PARTIES

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other

States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and 

coincident with each annual exchange of information

provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (C) of this Protocol:

(A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of

each category of conventional armaments and 

equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its

conventional armed forces that have entered the area 

of application within the last 12 months and whether

any of these armaments and equipment were

organised in a formation or unit;

(B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of

each category of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its

conventional armed forces that have been removed

from, and remain outside of, the area of application 

within the last 12 months and the last reported 

locations within the area of application of such

conventional armaments and equipment; and

(C) conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty in service with its conventional armed

forces within the area of application which exit and

re-enter the area of application, including for

purposes such as training or military activities,

within a seven-day period shall not be subject to the

reporting provisions in this Section.

SECTION XI. CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND

EQUIPMENT IN TRANSIT THROUGH THE AREA OF

APPLICATION

1. The provisions of this Protocol shall not apply to

conventional armaments and equipment that are in transit

through the area of application from a location outside the

area of application to a final destination outside the area of

application. Conventional armaments and equipment in the

categories specified in Section III of this Protocol which

entered the area of application in transit shall be reported

pursuant to this Protocol if they remain within the area of

application for a period longer than seven days.

SECTION XII. FORMAT FOR THE PROVISION OF

INFORMATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties the information specified in this Protocol in

accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII of

the Treaty and the Annex on Format. In accordance with

Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to the

Annex on Format shall be deemed improvements to the

viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to

minor matters of a technical nature.

SECTION XIII. OTHER NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT

TO THE TREATY

1. After signature of the Treaty and prior to its entry

into force, the Joint Consultative Group shall develop a

document relating to notifications required by the Treaty.

Such document shall list all such notifications, specifying

those that shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of

the Treaty, and shall include appropriate formats, as

necessary, for such notifications. In accordance with Article

XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to this document,

including any formats, shall be deemed to be improvements

to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only

to minor matters of a technical nature.

ANNEX ON THE FORMAT FOR THE 

EXCHANGE OFINFORMATION

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties information pursuant to the Protocol on Information

Exchange, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol, in

accordance with the formats specified in this Annex. The

information in each data listing shall be provided in

mechanically or electronically printed form and in one of the

six official languages of the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe. In each table (column a), each data

entry shall be assigned a sequential line number.

2. Each set of listings shall begin with a cover page

showing the name of the State Party providing the listings,
\:

the language in which the listings are being provided, the

date on which the listings are to be exchanged and the

effective date of the information set forth in the listings.

SECTION I.INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF

LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE

AVIATION FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF

APPLICATION

1. Pursuant to Section I of the Protocol, each State

Party shall provide information on the command

organisation of its land forces, including air defence

formations and units subordinated at or below the military

district or equivalent level, and air and air defence aviation

forces in the form of two separate hierarchical data listings

as set forth in Chart I.

2. The data listings shall be provided beginning at the

highest level and proceeding through each level of command

down to the level of brigade/regiment, independent

battalion, and wing/air regiment, independent squadron or

their equivalent. For example, a military district/army/corps

would be followed by any subordinate independent

regiments, independent battalions, depots, training

establishments, then each subordinate division with its

regiments/independent battalions. After all the subordinate

organisations are listed, entries shall begin for the next

military district/army/corps. An identical procedure shall be

followed for air and air defence aviation forces.

(A) Each organisation shall be identified (column b)

by a unique designator (i.e., formation or unit record

number) which shall be used on subsequent listings 

with that organisation and for all subsequent

information exchanges; its national designation (i.e.,

name) (column c); and, in the case of divisions,

brigades/regiments, independent battalions, and

wings/air regiments, independent squadrons or

equivalent organisations, where appropriate, the

formation or unit type (e.g., infantry, tank, artillery,

fighter, bomber, supply); and

(B) for each organisation, the two levels of command

within the area of application immediately superior

to that organization shall be designated (columns d

and e).

Chart I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND

FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION

FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON OVERALL

HOLDINGS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND

EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL

LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLES IV AND V OF

THE TREATY

1. Pursuant to Section II of the Protocol, each State

Party shall provide data on its overall holdings by type of

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery (Chart

IIA) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles

IV and V of the Treaty (column b), and on its overall

holdings by type of combat aircraft and attack helicopters

(Chart IIB) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in

Article IV of the Treaty (column b).

2. Data on armoured combat vehicles shall include the

total numbers of heavy armament combat vehicles, armoured

infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers,

and their number (column f/e) and type (column el

d) in each of these subcategories (column d/c).

3. In the case of battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles, artillery and armoured vehicle launched bridges,

stored in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, the total

of such equipment in designated permanent storage sites 

shall be specified (column g).

Chart IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OFBATTLE TANKS,

ARMOUREDCOMBATVEHICLESANDARTILLERY

SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State

Party) VALID AS OF (date)

Chart IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT

AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO

NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party)

VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION,

NUMBERS, AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL 

ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

1. Each State Party shall provide a hierarchical data

listing of all its land forces' and air and air defence aviation

forces' organisations reported pursuant to Section III,

paragraph 1of the Protocol, formations and units reported

pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and

installations at which conventional armaments and

equipment are held as specified in Section III, paragraph 3 of

the Protocol.

2. For each organisation and installation, the

information shall reflect:

(A) the formation or unit record number (column b)

and designation of the organisation (column c)

reported in Chart I.Separately located battalions/ 

squadrons specified pursuant to paragraph 1of this

Section, formations and units reported pursuant to

Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and

installations listed in accordance with Section III,

paragraph 3 of the Protocol shall also be given a

unique formation or unit record number (column b),

and their national designation (i.e., name), (column

c) shall be provided. Their position on the listing

shall reflect their subordination with the exception of

formations and units reported pursuant to Section

III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol, which shall be

specified together at the conclusion of the listing:

( 1) designated permanent storage sites shall be

identified with the notation "DPSS" following

the national designation; and

(2) reduction sites shall be identified with the

notation "reduction" following the national

designation;

(B) location (column d), including the geographic name

and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds.
For locations containing stationed forces, the host

State Party shall also be included;

(C) for each level of command from the highest down to

the division/air division level, the overall total of

conventional armaments and equipment in each

category (columns f to m/l). For example, the overall

total held by a division would be the sum of the

holdings of all its subordinate organisations; and

(D) for each level of command at the division level and 

below as specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the

number of conventional armaments and equipment 

by type under the headings specified in Charts IIIA

and IIIB (columns f to m/l). In the armoured combat 

vehicle column in Chart IIIA (column g), the

subcategories (i.e., armoured personnel carriers,

armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament

combat vehicles) shall be presented separately. In the

attack helicopter column (column k/i), the

subcategories (i.e., specialised attack, multi-purpose

attack) shall be presented separately. The column (I)

la belled "other" in Chart IIIB shall include battle

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured

personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry

fighting vehicle look-alikes, and armoured vehicle

launched bridges, if any, in service with the air and

air defence aviation forces.

Chart IIIA: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION,

NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL

ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED

PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON

INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party)

VALID AS OF (date)

Chart IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION,

NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL

ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED

PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON

INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party)

VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON CONVENTIONAL

ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT IN SERVICE

WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE

PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE

1. Pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol, each State 

Party shall provide information on the location, number and 

type of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery,

combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of

application but not in service with its conventional armed

forces.

2. For each location, the information shall reflect:

(A) the provision of Section IV of the Protocol pursuant

to which the information is being provided (column

b);

(B) the location (column c):

(1) in respect of conventional armaments and 

equipment reported pursuant to Section IV,

paragraph 1, subparagraph ( A), subsubparagraphs (1), (3) and (5) of the Protocol,

the geographic name and coordinates accurate

to the nearest 10 seconds of sites containing 

such equipment; and

(2) i n respect of conventional armaments and

equipment reported pursuant to Section IV,

paragraph 1, subpa ragraph (A), subsubparagraph (2) of the Protocol, the national

designation of the administrative region or

division containing such equipment;

(C) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment

reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (A), sub-su bparagraphs (1) and (2) of

the Protocol, the national-level designation of

organisations holding the equipment specified 

(column c); and

(D) for each location, the number by type under the

headings specified in Cha rt IV (columns d to h ),

except as follows:

in respect of conventional armaments and

equipment reported pursuant to Section IV,

paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), subsubparagraph (2) of the Protocol, only the

numbers in each category shall be provided

solely for the administrative region or division

specified (column c).

Chart IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF

CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE

PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State

Party) VALID AS OF (date)

SECTION V.INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF

VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES

1. Pursuant to Section V of the Protocol, each State

Party shall provide a listing of its objects of verification and

declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on

Inspection. Declared sites (Chart V) shall be listed in

alphabetical order.

2. Information about each declared site shall include:

(A) a unique designator (i.e., declared site record

number) (column b) which shall be used with that

site for all subsequent information exchanges;

(B) the site's name and location using geographic name

and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds

(column c). For locations containing objects of

verification of stationed forces, the host State Party 

shall also be included;

(C) the point(s) of entry/exit associated with the declared

site (column d);

(D) a unique sequential number and the designation and

formation or unit record num ber of all objects of

verification stationed at the declared site as specified

in Section III of this Annex (column e). Unique

sequential numbers shall be assigned such that the
APPINDIX A: Tin u' oN Co!'\ HI\ 1101\A L A1l .\11 n foRcF. 11\ EuROl'I 28 1

number assigned to the last object of verification

appearing in the listing shall equal the State Party's

total number of objects of verification; and

(E) the overall number of conventional armaments and

equipment in each category specified in Section III of

the Protocol held at the declared site and by each

object of verification (columns f to p) and specifying,

in addition:

(1) conventional armaments and equipment held in

each category on the declared site belonging to 

an object of verification located at another

declared site, specifying the designation and

formation or unit record number of each such

object of verification (column e); and

(2) conventional armaments and equipment not

belonging to an object of verification shall be

identified with the following notations

immediately following/below each such entry in 

columns f to p:

(a) equipment held by organisations designed

and structured to perform in peacetime

internal security functions, with the

notation "security";

( b) decommissioned equipment, with the

notation "decommissioned";

(c) equipment awaiting or being refurbished

for export or re-export, with the notation

"export";

(d) reduced equipment awaiting conversion,

with the notation "reduced"; and

(e) equipment used exclusively for research and

development, with the notation "research."

Chart V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF

VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party)

VALID AS OF (date)

3. Each State Party shall provide a listing of points of

entry/exit (Chart VI). The listing shall assign a unique

sequential numerical designator (column b) which shall be

used to indicate the point(s) of entry/exit for each site

provided pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (C) of this

Section. The location shall include the geographic name

(column c) and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10

seconds (column d). The type(s) of transportation

acceptable-"air," "sea," "ground"-for each point of

entry/exit also shall be specified (column e).

Chart VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State

Party) VALID AS OF (date)
Chart I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES Al\ID AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION

FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line

Number

Formation or

Unit Record Number

Designation of

Formation of Unit

Subordination

1st Higher Echelon 2nd Higher Echelon

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Chart llA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY

SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number Area Category Sub-Category Type(s)

Overall Number 

(including in

DPSSs)

Number in

DPSSs

(a) (b) {c) {d) (e) (f) (g)

Chart llB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO

NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number Category Sub-Category Type Overall Number

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Chart lllA: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED

PURSUANT TO SECTION Ill OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line

Number

Formation

or Unit

Record 

Number

Designation

of Formation

or Unit

Peacetime

Location

NOT

USED Battle

Tanks

Armoured

Combat

Vehicles

APC & AIFV

Look-Alikes Artillery AVLBs

Attack

Helicopters

Combat

Support

Helicopters

Unarmed

Transport 

Helicopters

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (I) (m)
Chart 1118: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED

PURSUANT TO SECTION Ill OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line

Number

Formation

or Unit

Record

Number

Designation

of Formation

or Unit

Peacetime

Location

NOT

USED Combat

Aircraft

Reclassified

CCT

Aircraft

Primary

Trainer

Aircraft

Attack

Helicopters

Combat 

Support

Helicopters

Unarmed

Transport

Helicopters Other

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (I)
- - - - ----- -- - - - - - - - - A l'l'l '.'\ Ill\. A ; I 1<. i \ 1 1 ( )'.'\ C< l'.'\ \ I'\!()' \I A R \L ll f ( lJ(( I- ', E\ El R< ll'I

CHART IV: ll\IFORMATIOl\I ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State

Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number

Protocol

Reference Location Battle Tanks

Armoured

Combat

Vehicles Artillery

Attack

Helicopters

Combat

Aircraft

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Chart V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line

Number

Declared 

Site

Record 

Number Location

Point of

Entry/Exit

Object of

Verification

Battle

Tanks

Armoured

Combat

Vehicles

APC &

AIFV

Look-Alikes Artillery AVLBs

Attack

Helicopters

Combat

Support 

Helicopters

Unarmed

Transport

Helicopters

Combat

Aircraft

Reclassified

CCT

Aircraft

Primary

Trainer

Aircraft

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (I) (m) (n) (o) (p)
Chart VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date)

Line Number POE Record Number Name of POE Location Type(s)

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
PROTOCOL ON EXISTING TYPES OF

CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND 

EQUIPMENT

The States Parties hereby agree upon: (a) lists, valid as of

the date of Treaty signature, of existing types of

conventional armaments and equipment subject to the

measures of limitation, reduction, information exchange and

verification; ( b) procedures for the provision of technical 

data and photographs relevant to such existing types of

conventional armaments and equipment; and (c) procedures

for updating the lists of such existing types of conventional 

armaments and equipment, in accordance with Article II of

the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of

Novem ber 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I.EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL

ARMAMENTSANDEQUIPMENTLIMITEDBYTHE

TREATY

1. Existing types of battle tanks are:

EBR-ETT

M3Al

YP 408

BLR

VIB

LVTP-7

6614/G

BTR-152

BTR-50 

BTR-60 

BTR-70

MT-LB'·

All models and versions of an existing type of armoured

personnel carrier listed above shall be deemed to be

armoured personnel carriers of that type, unless such models

and versions are included in the armoured personnel carrier

look-alike list in Section II, paragraph 1of this Protocol.

,,. This multi-purpose lightly armoured vehicle may be

exceptionally modified within 40 months of entry into force

of the Treaty into an armoured personnel carrier look-alike

M-1

M-60

M-48

M-47

Leopard 1

Leopard 2

AMX-30

Challenger

Chieftain

Centurion

M-41

NM-116

T-54

T-34

T-54

T-55

·T-62

T-64

T-72

T-80

TR-85

TR-580

listed in Section II, paragraph 1of this Protocol as MT-LBAT by alteration of the interior of the vehicle through the 

removal of the left-hand combat infantry squad seating and

the welding of the ammunition racking to the side and the

floor at a minimum of six points so that the vehicle is not

capable of transporting a combat infantry squad. Such

modifications may be accomplished at locations other than

reduction sites. MT-LB armoured personnel carriers that

have not been modified shall be reported in accordance with

the Protocol on Information Exchange as armoured

personnel carriers.

(B) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles:

T-55

T-72

All models and versions of an existing type of battle tank

listed above shall be deemed to be battle tanks of that type.

2. Existing types of armoured combat vehicles are:

(A) Armoured Personnel Carriers:

YPR-765 (25mm)

Marder

AMX-lOP

Warrior

M2/M3 Bradley

AFV 432 Rarden

NM-135

BMP-1/BRM-1

BMP-2

BMP-1/BRM-1

BMP-2 

BMP-23

MLI-84

BMD-1

BMD-2

BMP-3

YPR-765

AMX-13 VTT 

M113

M75

Spartan

Grizzly

TPz-1 Fuchs

VAB

M59

BTR-40

BTR-152

BTR-50 

BTR-60

OT-62 (TOPAS)

OT-64 (SKOT)

OT-90

FUG D-442

BTR-70

All models and versions of an existing type of an

armoured infantry fighting vehicle listed above shall be

deemed to be armoured infantry fighting vehicles of that

type, unless such models and versions are included in the

armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike list in Section

II, paragraph 2 of this Protocol.

(C) Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles:

Leonidas

VCCl

VCC2

Saxon

AFV 432

Saracen

Hum ber

BDX

BMR-600

Chaimite V200

V150S

BTR-80

BTR-D

TAB-77 

OT-810

PSZH D-944

TABC-79 

TAB-71

MLVM

MT-LB'·

AMX-lORC

ERC 90 Sagaye

BMR-625-90

Commando V150

Scorpion

Saladin

JPK-90

M-24

AMX-13

EBR-75 Panhard

PT-76

PT-76

SU-76 

SU-100

ISU-152
-------------APPENDIX A: TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCESIN EUROPE 291

All models and versions of an existing type of heavy or on Ml 13 armored

armament combat vehicle listed above shall be deemed to be vehicle) 160mm: Ml60

heavy armament combat vehicles of that type. Ecia Mod L (ground

mounted M-L or 240mm: M240

3. Existing types of artillery are: mounted on either the 2S4 SP Mortar

BMR-600 or Ml 13

(A) Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the armoured vehicle)

Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers: HY12 (Tosam)

2Bll (2Sl2)

105mm: 105 Light Gun lOOmm: BS-3 Field Gun

M18 Model 53 Field Gun (C) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems:

105 Krupp Gun Skoda How (Model

105 R Metal Gun 1914/1934, 1930, 1934) llOmm: LARS 122mm: BM-21 (BM-21-1,BM-21V)

105 Pack How Skoda How (Model 1939) BM-21 RM-70

M 56 Pack How 122mm: RM-70 APR-21

M 101 Towed How 105mm: Schneider Field Gun APR-40 

M102 Towed How (Model 1936) 140mm: Teruel MLAS

Abbot SP Gun 130mm: M-51

Ml08 SP How 120mm: 2B16 How 227mm: MLRS RM-130

M52 SP How 2S9 SP How BM-13

105 HM-2 How R.2

M-38 Gun (Skoda) 122mm: 030 How BM-14

105 AU 50 How M-30 How 140mm: BM-22/27

R58/M26 Towed How 074 How 220mm: BM-24

2Sl SP How 240mm: Uragan 9P140

122mm: 122/46 Field Gun A19 Gun (Model 31/37) 280mm: Smerch

030 How Model 89 SP How 300mm:

M 30 How All models and versions of an existing type of artillery 2Sl SP How 130mm: Gun 82

M-46 Gun listed above shall be deemed to be artillery of that type.

130mm: M 46 Gun 4. Existing types of combat aircraft are: 150mm: Skoda How (Model 1934)

140mm: 5.5'' (139.7mm) Ceh How (Model 1937) A-7 IAR-93

Towed How A-10 IL-28

152mm: Dl How Alpha Jet A MiG-15

150mm: 150 Skoda Gun 2S3 SP How

2A65 How

152mm: 020 Gun-How ML20 How-Gun Buccaneer MiG-21 

2S3 SP How 020 Gun-How Canberra MiG-23 

Gun 81 Draken MiG-25

155mm: M114 Towed How 2A36 Gun F-4 MiG-27

Mll4/39 (M-139) Dana SP Gun-How M77 F-5 MiG-29

Towed How 2S5 SP Gun F-15 MiG-31

FH-70 Towed How 2S19 SP How F-16 SU-7

M109 SP How Gun-How 85 M198 Towed How How Model 1938 F-18 SU-15

155 TRFl Gun How 81 F-84 SU-17

155 AUFl Gun F-102 SU-20

155 AMF3 Gun 203mm: B4 How F-104 SU-22

155 BF50 Gun 2S7 SP Gun F-111 SU-24

M44 SP How G-91 SU-25

M59 Towed Gun Harrier SU-27

SP70 SP How Hunter TU-16

M107 SP Gun Jaguar TU-22

175mm: Ml 15Towed How 203mm: Ml lO SP How Lightning TU-22M

M55 SP How MiG-21 TU-128

MiG-23 Yak-28

(B) Mortars: MiG-29

MB-339

107mm: 4.2" (ground mounted 107mm: Mortar M-1938

or on M 106 armoured Mirage Fl

vehicle) Mirage III

120mm: 2Bll (2S12) Mirage IV

120mm: Brandt (M60, M 120 Model 38/43 Mirage V

M-120-60; Tundzha/Tundzha Sani SP Mirage 2000

SLM-120-AM-50) Mortar (mounted on SU-22

M120 RTF 1 MT-LB) Tornado

M120 M51

Soltam/Tampella Mortar Model 1982

(ground mounted B-24

AM-X MiG-17
All models or versions of an existing type of combat

aircraft listed above shall be deemed to be combat aircraft of

that type.

5. Existing types of attack helicopters are:

(A) Specialised Attack Helicopters:

A-129 Mangusta

AH-1 Cobra

AH-64 Apache

Mi-24

Mi-24

TPz-1 FUCHS HFTRSM SPR-2

AD CP BREM

CP ZS-88

Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraph 3 of the

Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models or

versions of an existing type of specialised attack helicopter

listed above shall be deemed to be specialised attack

helicopters of that type.

ENGRCP Kh

ELOKA

NBC BTR-80 1Vl19

RASIT RCHM-4

M59 CP BTR-D ZD

RD

(B) Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters: LEONIDAS

OT-62 (TOPAS) CP

A-109 Hirundo IAR-316

Alouette III Mi-8/Mi-17 

B0-105/PAH-1

Fennec AS 550 C-2

Gazelle

Lynx

Mi-8

OH-58 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136

Scout

Wessex

Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraphs 4 and 5

of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models or

versions of an existing type of multi-purpose attack

helicopter listed above shall be deemed to be multi-purpose

attack helicopters of that type.

SECTION II. EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL

ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT LIMITED BY

THE TREATY

1. Existing types of armoured personnel carrier lookalikes are:

VAB PC WPT/DPT-62

BREM

BMR-600 SIG R-2M

PC R-3M

81mm R-3MT

R-4MT

SPARTAN STRIKER

SAMSON OT-64 (SKOT) CP

CP R-3Z

JAVELIN R-2M

MILAN R-3MT

R-4

SAXON AD R-4MT

CP R-2AM

MAINT PROPAGANDA

R-4M

AFV 432 CP/RA R-6

81mm WPT/DR-64

CYMB BREM

AFV 435 S-260 inz.

AFV 436 S-260 art.

AFV 439

OT-810 OT-810/R-112

HUMBER SQUIRT

YPR-765 MILAN BTR-40 CP SARACEN SQUIRT

OT 90 VP 90

CP

PRCOCt

PRCOC2 

PRCOC4 

PRCOC5 

PRMR

AMX-13 VTT MILAN

PC

M113 MILAN

Al/A2 (ATGW)

FJW TOW

ARTFC

ARTOBS

FACONT

MORTFC

AlE

Mortar Carrier 

SIG

HFTRSM

CP

BTR-50 PU

PUM

p

PUR 82

PK (MRF)

UR-67

PK (B)

MTP-1

BTR-152 CP

BTR-60 PU

PU-12/PA PU-12 

PAU

BBS

ABS

R-137 B

R-140 BM

R-145

R-156

R-409 BM

P-238BT

CP FUG D-442 VS

ADR MRP

OT-65/R-112

YP 408 PWMR OT-65 DP

PWCO OT-65 CH

PWAT

PWRDR PSZH D-944 CP

PWV

MT-LB AT

BTR-50 PU KShM-R-81

PK(MRF) R-80

PK(B) 9S743

PI

BTR-60 PU-12/PA PU-12 tW-13-16

BBS lW-21-25

ABS lW-12

R-137B MP-21-25

R-140BM AFMS

R-145 R-381T

R-156 R-330P

R-409 BM Beta 3M

P-238 BT SPR-1

CPSVC P-240BT

AlCP P-241BT

AlECP E-351BR

4.2"/M106 Al 4.2" R-975

M106 81mm MTP-2

M-125 81mm 1V18, 1V19

M125 Al 81mm 1Vl18

Ml25 A2 81mm B

NM-125 81mm

BTR-70 KShM
\ , ' '} \..1 . \ ' \ '. I , ,, ,

P-240 BT

P-241 BT

B

MT-LB PI

MP-21-25

l W-13-16

AFMS

R-381 T

R-330 P

Beta 3M

-MTP-LBTAB-71

TAB-77

WPT/DTP

BREM

TRI

MTP-LB

BRM Sova/

BRM 30

A

TERA-71-L

AR

A

Mi-8

OH-S8 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136

Puma

Sea King

UH-l NlB/AB-204

UH-1D/1H/AB-20S

UH-lN/AB-212

Wessex

S . Existing types of unarmed transport helicopters

which are not equipped for the employment of weapons are:

TABC-79

TAB

MLVM

TERA-77-L

RCH-84

PCOMA

AR

A-POMA

TCG-80

AR

AB 47

AB-412

Alouette II

CHS3

Chinook

Cougar AS S 32 U

Mi-2

Mi-26

SA-36 SN Dauphin

W-3 Sokol

2. Existing types of armoured infantry fighting vehicle lookalikes are:

Dauphin AS 36S Nl

Hughes 300

WARRIORRA

REP

REC

BMP-1 MTP 

MP-31

BMP-1 KSh

95743

PRP-3, -4

MP-31

B

svo

DTB-80 

VPV

!RM

MTP

NH SOO

Puma

Sea King/H-3F/HAR 3

SH-3D

UH-1D/1H/AB-20S

UH-lN/AB-212

6. Existing types of armoured vehicle launched bridges 

are:

BMD-1

BRM-1

BREM-4, -2, -D

KSh

KSh

M47 AVLB

M48AVLB

M60 AVLB

Centurion AVLB

MTU

MT-20

MT-S SA

MTU-72

3. Existing types of primary trainer aircraft which are

designed and constructed for primary flying training and

which may possess only limited armament capability

necessary for basic training in weapon delivery techniques

Chieftain AVLB

Brueckenlegepanzer Biber/

Leopard 1AVLB

BLG-60

BLG-67M 

BLG-67M2

are:

Alpha Jet E

C-101 Aviojet

Fouga

Hawk

Jet Provost

L-39

MB-326

PD-808

T-2

T-33/CT-133

T-37

T-38

1-22

IAR-99

L-29

L-39

TS-11

SECTION III. TECHNICAL DATA AND PHOTOGRAPHS

1. Technical data, in accordance with the agreed

categories in the Annex to this Protocol, together with

photographs presenting the right or left side, top and front

views for each of its existing types of conventional 

armaments and equipment listed in Sections I and II of this

Protocol shall be provided by each State Party to all other

States Parties at the signature of the Treaty. In addition,

photographs of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and

armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes shall include a

view of such vehicles so as to show clearly their internal

configuration illustrating the specific characteristic which

distinguishes this particular vehicle as a look-alike.

4. Existing types of combat support helicopters are: Photographs in addition to those required by this paragraph

may be provided at the discretion of each State Party. A-109 Hirundo

AB-412

Alouette II

Alouette III

Blackhawk

Bell 47/AB 47/Sioux

BO-lOS

CHS3

Chinook

Fennec AS SSS A

Hughes 300

Hughes SOO/OH-6

IAR-316

IAR-330

Mi-2

Mi-6

Mi-8/Mi-17

2. Each existing type of conventional armaments and

equipment listed in Sections I and II of this Protocol shall

have a model or version of that type designated as an

exemplar. Photographs shall be provided for each such

designated exemplar pursuant to paragraph 1of this Section.

Photographs shall not be required of models and versions of

a type that have no significant externally observable

differences from the exemplar of that type. The photographs 

of each exemplar of a type shall contain an annotation of the

existing type designation and national nomenclature for all

models and versions of the type that the photographs of the
294 0'\1-SITE I\ PITIIOI\ A< ;F"J() ----------- - ---- - ---- ----- ------

exemplar represent. The photographs of each exemplar of a

type shall contain an annotation of the technical data for

that type in accordance with the agreed categories in the

Annex to this Protocol. In addition, the annotation shall

indicate all models and versions of the type that the

photographs of the exemplar represent. Such technical data

shall be annotated on the side view photograph.

SECTION IV.UPDATES OF EXISTING TYPES LISTS

AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES

1. This Protocol constitutes agreement by the States

Parties only with respect to existing types of conventional

armaments and equipment as well as with respect to the

categories of technical data set forth in Sections I and II of

the Annex to this Protocol.

2. Each State Party shall be responsible for the accuracy

of technical data for only its own conventional armaments 

and equipment provided in accordance with Section III of

this Protocol.

3. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties,

upon the entry into service with the armed forces of that

State Party within the area of application, of: (a) any new

type of conventional armaments and equipment which meets

one of the definitions in Article II of the Treaty or which

falls under a category listed in this Protocol, and (b) any

new model or version of a type listed in this Protocol. At the

same time, each State Party shall provide all other States

Parties with the technical data and photographs required by

Section III of this Protocol.

4. As soon as possible, and in any case no later than 60

days following a notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this

Section, the States Parties shall initiate update actions, in

accordance with the provisions set forth in Article XVI of

the Treaty and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group,

for the lists of existing types of conventional armaments and

equipment in Sections I and II of this Protocol.

ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL ON EXISTING

TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

AND EQUIPMENT

SECTION I.AGREED CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL

DATA

The following are agreed categories of technical data for

each model and version of existing types of conventional

armaments and equipment:

1. Battle Tanks

Existing Type

National Nomenclature 

Main Gun Calibre

Unladen Weight

2. Armoured Combat Vehicles

Armoured Personnel Carriers

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any

Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Type and Calibre of Armaments

Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Main Gun Calibre

Unladen Weight

3. Artillery

Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the

Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Calibre

Mortars

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Calibre

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Calibre

4. Combat Aircraft

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

5. Attack Helicopters

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

6. Armoured Personnel Carrier Look-Alikes

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any

7. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle Look-Alikes

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any

8. Primary Trainer Aircraft

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

Type of Armaments, if any

9. Combat Support Helicopters

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

10. Unarmed Transport Helicopters

Existing Type

National Nomenclature
---------------------------- A l'l'l l\il>I'< A: r1n \ I y ():\ Cl)'\\ - 'i lIll'\ \I A1nH lJ Flrnu I'\ Et ' HUI'! 2'c!S

11. Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges

Existing Type

National Nomenclature

SECTION II. SPECIFICATIONS FOR PHOTOGRAPHS

Photographs provided pursuant to Section III of this

Protocol shall be in black and white. The use of flash and

lighting equipment shall be allowed. The object being

photographed shall contrast with the background of the 

photograph. All photographs shall be of high definition,

with continuous tone and in sharp focus. Photographs 

measuring 13 centimetres by 18 centimetres, not including a

border, shall be provided. For aspects other than overhead,

all photographs shall be taken from the same level as the 

equipment being photographed, with the camera placed

along or perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the object

being photographed; for the top view, photographs shall

show the top and may show the rear aspects of the

equipment.The object being photographed shallfill atleast

80 percent of the photograph in either horizontal or vertical

aspect.Areference gauge shallbe included ineach

photograph together with the object.The gauge shall have

alternating half-metre sectionsin black and white. Itshall be

long enough toprovide accurate scaling and shall be placed

on or against the object or in close proximity to it. Each

photograph shall be labelled to provide the information

required by Section III, paragraph 2 of this Protocol aswell

asthe date when the photograph was taken.

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and other

provisions governing the conduct of inspections as provided

for in Article XIV of the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred

to as the Treaty.

SECTION I.DEFINITIONS

1. For the purposes of the Treaty:

(A) The term "inspected State Party" means a State Party

on whose territory an inspection is carried out in

compliance with Article XIV of the Treaty:

(1) in the case of inspection sites where only a

stationing State Party's conventional armaments

and equipment limited by the Treaty are present,

such a stationing State Party shall exercise, in

compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, 

the rights and obligations of the inspected State

Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration

of the inspection within that inspection site

where its conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and

(2) in the case of inspection sites containing 

conventional armaments and equipment limited

by the Treaty of more than one State Party, each

such State Party shall exercise, in compliance

with the provisions of this Protocol, each in

respect of its own conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty, the rights and

obligations of the inspected State Party as set

forth in this Protocol for the duration of the

inspection within that inspection site where its

conventional armaments and equipment limited

by the Treaty are located.

(B) The term "stationing State Party" means a State

Party stationing conventional armaments and

equipment in service with its conventional armed 

forces outside its own territory and within the area

of application.

(C) The term "host State Party" means a State Party

receiving on its territory within the area of

application conventional armaments and equipment

in service with the conventional armed forces of

another State Party stationed by that State Party.

(D) The term "inspecting State Party" means a State

Party which requests and is therefore responsible for

carrying out an inspection.

(E) The term "inspector" means an individual

designated by one of the States Parties to carry out

an inspection and who is included on that State

Party's accepted list of inspectors in accordance with

the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

(F) The term "transport crew member" means an

individual who performs duties related to the

operation of a transportation means and who is

included on a State Party's accepted list of transport

crew members in accordance with the provisions of

Section III of this Protocol.

( G) The term "inspection team" means a group of

inspectors designated by an inspecting State Party to

conduct a particular inspection.

(H) The term "escort team" means a group of

individuals assigned by an inspected State Party to

accompany and to assist inspectors conducting a

particular inspection, as well as to assume other

responsi bilities as set forth in this Protocol. In the 

case of inspection of a stationing State Party's

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty, an escort team shall include individuals

assigned by both the host and stationing States

Parties, unless otherwise agreed between them.

(I) The term "inspection site" means an area, location 

or facility where an inspection is carried out.

(]) The term "object of verification" means:

( 1) any formation or unit at the organizational 

level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment,

independent battalion/artillery battalion,

independent squadron or equivalent as well as

any separately located battalion/squadron or

equivalent unit at the next level of command 

below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment

level holding conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty at a location 

notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on

Information Exchange;
296 O"J-S1 1 1 hPH 1 10N AcL'.'\iCY _ _

(2) any designated permanent storage site, military

storage site not organic to formations and units

referred to in sub-subparagraph (1) of this

subparagraph, independent repair or

maintenance unit, military training

establishment or military airfield at which

conventional armaments and equipment limited

by the Treaty are notified pursuant to Section

III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of

the Protocol on Information Exchange as being

permanently or routinely present;

(3) a reduction site for conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty as notified

pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3,

subparagraph (C) of the Protocol on

Information Exchange;

(4) in the case of units below the level of battalion

holding conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty that are directly

subordinate to a unit or formation above the

level of brigade/regiment or equivalent, that unit

or formation to which the units below the level

of battalion are subordinated shall be

considered an object of verification, if it has no

subordinate unit or formation at the level of

brigade/regiment or equivalent; and

(5) a formation or unit holding conventional

armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty,

but not in service with the conventional armed

forces of a State Party shall not be considered an 

object of verification.

(K) The term "military airfield" means a permanent

military complex, not otherwise containing an object

of verification, at which the frequent operation, i.e.,

launch and recovery, of at least six combat aircraft

or combat helicopters limited by the Treaty or

subject to interna l inspection is routinely performed.

(L) The term "military training establishment" means a

facility, not otherwise containing an object of

verification, at which a military unit or subunit using

at least 30 conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single

category of conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty is organised to train military

personnel.

(M) The term "military storage site" not organic to 

formations and units identified as objects of

verification means any storage site, other than

designated permanent storage sites or sites

subordinate to organisations designed and structured 

for internal security purposes, holding conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty

without respect to organisational or operational

status. Conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty contained in such sites shall

constitute a portion of the permitted holdings

counted in active units pursuant to Article IV of the

Treaty.

(N) The term "declared site" means a facility or precisely

delineated geographic location which contains one or

more objects of verification. A declared site shall

consist of all territory within its man-made or

natural outer boundary or boundaries as well as

associated territory comprising firing ranges, training

areas, maintenance and storage areas, helicopter

airfields and railroad loading facilities at which

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery,

combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified

combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel

carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting

vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched

bridges are permanently or routinely present.

(0) The term "specified area" means an area anywhere

on the territory of a State Party within the area of

application other than a site inspected pursuant to

Section VII, IX or X of this Protocol within which a

challenge inspection is conducted pursuant to Section

VIII of this Protocol. A specified area shall not

exceed 65 square kilometres. No straight line

between any two points in that area shall exceed 16

kilometres.

(P) The term "sensitive point" means any equipment,

structure or location which has been designated to be

sensitive by the inspected State Party or the State

Party exercising the rights and obligations of the

inspected State Party through the escort team and to

which access or overflight may be delayed, limited or

refused.

(Q) The term "point of entry/exit" means a point 

designated by a State Party on whose territory an 

inspection is to be carried out, through which

inspection teams and transport crews arrive on the

territory of that State Party and through which they

depart from the territory of that State Party.

(R) The term "in-country period" means the total time

spent continuously on the territory of the State Party

where an inspection is carried out by an inspection

team for inspections pursuant to Sections VII and

VIII of this Protocol from arrival of the inspection

team at the point of entry/exit until the return of the

inspection team to a point of entry/exit after

completion of that inspection team's last inspection.

(S) The term "baseline validation period" means, for the

purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the

specified time period consisting of the first 120 days

following entry into force of the Treaty.

(T) The term "reduction period" means, for the purpose

of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time

period consisting of the three years following the

120-day baseline validation period.

(U) The term "residual level validation period" means,

for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the

specified time period consisting of the 120 days

following the three-year reduction period.

(V) The term "residual period" means, for the purpose

of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time

period following the 120-day residual level

validation period for the duration of the Treaty.
A1'l'l'.1'1>1 x A: Tin.\ 1 O'\ Co\T 1 1CH\ A L AR .\ll IJ f cmc:r '"' EL ROI'! 2Y7

(W) The term "passive declared site inspection quota"

means the total number of inspections of objects of

verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol

that each State Party shall be obliged to receive

within a specified time period at inspection sites

where its objects of verification are located.

(X) The term "passive challenge inspection quota"

means the maximum number of challenge

inspections within specified areas pursuant to Section

VIII of this Protocol that each State Party with

territory within the area of application shall be

obliged to receive within a specified time period.

(Y) The term "active inspection quota" means the total

number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and

VIII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be

entitled to conduct within a specified time period.

(Z) ) The term "certification site" means a clearly

designated location where the certification of

recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and

reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in

accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter

Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft

Reclassification takes place.

(AA) The term "calendar reporting period" means a

period of time defined in days during which the 

intended reduction of the planned number of items

of conventional armaments and equipment limited

by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII of the

Treaty is to be ca rried out.

SECTION II. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of

compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each State

Pa rty shall facilitate inspections pursuant to this Protocol.

2. In the case of conventional armaments and

equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of a

State Party stationed in the area of application outside

national territory, the host State Party and the stationing

State Party shall, in fulfillment of their respective

responsibilities, cooperatively ensure compliance with the

relevant provisions of this Protocol. The stationing State

Party shall be fully responsible for compliance with the

Treaty obligations in respect of its conventional armaments 

and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces

stationed on the territory of the host State Party.

3. The escort team shall be placed under the

responsibility of the inspected State Party:

(A) in the case of inspection sites at which only a

stationing State Party's conventional armaments and 

equipment limited by the Treaty are present and are 

under this State Party's command, the escort team

shall be placed under the responsibility of a

representative of the stationing State Party for the

duration of the inspection within that inspection site

where the stationing State Party's conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are 

located; and

(B) in the case of inspection sites containing

conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty of both the host State Party and the

stationing State Party, the escort team shall be

composed of representatives from both States Parties

when conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty of the stationing State Party are 

actually inspected. During the inspection within that

inspection site, the host State Party shall exercise the 

rights and obligations of the inspected State Party

with the exception of those rights and obligations

related to the inspection of the conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of

the stationing State Party, which shall be exercised

by this stationing State Party.

4. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or

premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with

the inspected State Party, such other State Party shall, in

cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent

consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the

rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect

to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State

Party utilising the structure or premises.

5. Structures or premises utilised by another State Party

by agreement with the inspected State Party shall be subject

to inspection only when that other State Party's

representative is on the escort team.

6. Inspection teams and sub-teams shall be under the

control and responsibility of the inspecting State Party.

7. No more than one inspection team conducting an

inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol

may be present at the same time at any one inspection site.

8. Subject to the other provisions of this Protocol, the

inspecting State Party shall decide for how long each 

inspection team will stay on the territory of the State Party

where an inspection is to be carried out, and at how many

and at which inspection sites it will conduct inspections

during the in-country period.

9. Travel expenses of an inspection team to the point of

entry/exit prior to conducting an inspection and from the 

point of entry/exit after completion of the last inspection

shall be borne by the inspecting State Party.

10. Each State Party shall be obliged to receive a number

of inspections pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this

Protocol not to exceed its passive declared site inspection

quota for each specified time period: a 120-day baseline

validation period, a three-year reduction period, a 120-day 

residual level validation period and a residual period for the 

duration of the Treaty. The passive declared site inspection

quota shall be determined for each specified time period as a

percentage of that State Party's objects of verification,

excluding reduction sites and certification sites, located

within the area of application of the Treaty:

(A) during the first 120 days after entry into force of the

Treaty, the passive declared site inspection quota

shall be equal to 20 percent of a State Party's objects

of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the

Protocol on Information Exchange;

(B) during each year of the reduction period, after

completion of the initial 120-day period, the passive

declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 10
percent of a State Party's objects of verification

notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on

Information Exchange;

(C) during the first 120 days after completion of the

three-year reduction period, the passive declared site

inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent of a

State Party's objects of verification notified pursuant

to Section V of the Protocol on Information

Exchange; and

(D) each year, commencing after completion of the 120-

day residual level validation period, for the duration

of the Treaty, the passive declared site inspection

quota shall be equal to 15 percent of a State Party's

objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V

of the Protocol on Information Exchange.

11. Each State Party with territory within the area of

application shall be obliged to accept challenge inspections

as follows:

(A) during the baseline validation period, during each

year of the reduction period and during the residual

level validation period, up to 15 percent of the

number of inspections of declared sites which that

State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its

own objects of verification as well as of objects of

verification belonging to stationing States Parties;

and

(B) during each year of the residual period, up to 23

percent of the number of inspections of declared sites

which that State Party is obliged to receive on its

territory of its own objects of verification and of

objects of verification belonging to stationing States

Parties.

12. Notwithstanding any other limitations in this

Section, each State Party shall be obliged to accept a

minimum of one inspection each year of its objects of

verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol, and

each State Party with territory within the area of application

shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each

year within a specified area pursuant to Section VIII of this

Protocol.

13. Inspection pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of

one object of verification at an inspection site shall count as

one inspection against the passive declared site inspection

quota of that State Party whose object of verification is

inspected.

14. The proportion of inspections pursuant to Section

VII of this Protocol on the territory of a host State Party

within a specified time period used to inspect objects of

verification belonging to a stationing State Party shall be no

greater than the proportion which that stationing State

Party's objects of verification constitute of the total number

of objects of verification located on the territory of that host

State Party.

15. The number of inspections pursuant to Section VII of

this Protocol of objects of verification within a specified time

period on any State Party's territory shall be calculated as a

percentage of the total number of objects of verification

present on that State Party's territory.

16. Inspection pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol

within one specified area shall count as one inspection

against the passive challenge inspection quota and one 

inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota

of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is

conducted.

17. Unless otherwise agreed between the escort team and

the inspection team, an inspection team's in-country period

shall, up to a total of 10 days, not exceed the total number

of hours calculated according to the following formula:

(A) 48 hours for the first inspection of an object of

verification or within a specified area; plus

(B) 36 hours for each sequential inspection of an object

of verification or within a specified area.

18. Subject to the limitations in paragraph 17 of this

Section, an inspection team conducting an inspection

pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol shall spend

no more than 48 hours at a declared site and no more than

24 hours in inspection within a specified area.

19. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the 

inspection team travels to a sequential inspection site by the 

most expeditious means available. If the time between

completion of one inspection and arrival of the inspection

team at a sequential inspection site exceeds nine hours, or if

the time between completion of the last inspection

conducted by an inspection team on the territory of the State

Party where an inspection is carried out and the arrival of

that inspection team at the point of entry/exit exceeds nine

hours, such excess time shall not count against that

inspection team's in-country period.

20. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept on its

territory within the area of application simultaneously no

more than either two inspection teams conducting

inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol

or a number of inspection teams conducting inspections

pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol equal to

two percent of the total number of objects of verification

that are to be inspected during a specified time period on the

territory of that State Party, whichever number is greater.

21. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept

simultaneously no more than either two inspection teams

conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces

pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol or a number

of inspection teams conducting inspections of its

conventional armed forces pursuant to Section VII or VIII of

this Protocol equal to two percent of the total number of its

objects of verification that are to be inspected during a

specified time period, whichever number is greater.

22. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 20

and 21 of this Section, each State Party with military

districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty shall be

obliged to accept on its territory within the area of

application simultaneously no more than two inspection

teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and

VIII of this Protocol within any one of those military

districts.

23. No State Party shall be obliged to accept inspections

pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol
·-----------APPEl\:DIX A: T1nATY ol\ Co:-.;\ t.N 1101\:AL ARMED FORCES II\: EL'IWl'I' 2 99

representing more than 50 percent of its passive declared site

inspection quota in a calendar year from the same State

Party.

24. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct

inspections within the area of application on the territory of

other StatesParties. However, no StateParty shall conduct

more than five inspections annually pursuant toSectionsVII

and VIII of this Protocol of another State Party belonging to 

the samegroup of StatesParties. Any such inspectionsshall

count against the passive declared site inspection quota of

the StateParty being inspected. Itshall otherwise be the

responsibility solely of each group of StatesPartiesto

determine the allocation ofinspectionsfor each StateParty

within its group of StatesParties. Each State Party shall

notify to all other StatesPartiesits active inspection quota:

(A) for the baseline validation period, no later than 120

days after signature of the Treaty;

(B) for the first year of the reduction period, no later

than 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty; and

(C) for each subsequent year of the reduction period, for

the residual level validation period and for each year

of the residual period, no later than the 15th day of

January preceding each such specified time period.

SECTION III. PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty shall

be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with

paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Section.

2. Inspectors shall be nationals of the inspecting State

Party or other States Parties.

3. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each

State Party shall provide to all other States Parties a list of its

proposed inspectors and a list of its proposed transport crew

members, containing the full names of inspectors and 

transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of

birth and passport number. No list of proposed inspectors

provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more

than 400 individuals, and no list of proposed transport crew

members provided by a State Party shall contain at any time

more than 600 individuals.

4. Each State Party shall review the lists of inspectors

and transport crew members provided to it by other States

Parties and, within 30 days after receipt of each list, shall

provide notification to the State Party providing that list of

any individual whose name it wishes to be deleted from that

list.

5. Subject to paragraph 7 of this Section, inspectors and

transport crew members for whom deletion has not been

requested within the time interval specified in paragraph 4 of

this Section shall be considered as accepted for the purposes

of issuing visas and any other documents in accordance with

paragraph 8 of this Section.

6. Each State Party shall have the right to amend its

lists within one month after entry into force of the Treaty.

Thereafter, each State Party may once every six months 

propose additions to or deletions from its lists of inspectors

and transport crew members, provided that such amended

lists do not exceed the numbers specified in paragraph 3 of

this Section. Proposed additions shall be reviewed in

accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section.

7. A State Party may request, without right of refusal,

deletion of any individual it wishes from lists of inspectors

and transport crew mem bers provided by any other State

Party.

8. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is

conducted shall provide to the inspectors and transport crew

members accepted in accordance with paragraph 5 of this

Section visas and any other documents as required to ensure

that these inspectors and transport crew members may enter

and remain in the territory of that State Party for the

purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance

with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and any

other necessary documents shall be provided either:

(A) within 30 days after the acceptance of the lists or

subsequent changes in such lists, in which case the 

visa shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 

months; or

(B) within one hour after the arrival of the inspection

team and transport crew members at the point of

entry/exit, in which case the visa shall be valid for

the duration of their inspection activities.

9. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each

State Party shall provide notification to all other States

Parties of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the 

transportation means of that State Party transporting

inspectors and equipment necessary for an inspection into

and out of the territory of the State Party in which such an

inspection is conducted. Routings to and from the 

designated point(s) of entry/exit shall be along established

international airways or other routes that are agreed upon 

by the States Parties concerned as the basis for such

diplomatic clearance. Inspectors may use commercial flights

for travel to those points of entry/exit that are served by

airlines. The provisions of this paragraph relating to

diplomatic clearance numbers shall not apply to such flights.

10. Each State Party shall indicate in the notification

provided pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on

Information Exchange a point or points of entry/exit in

respect of each declared site with its objects of verification.

Such points of entry/exit may be ground border crossing

points, airports or seaports which must have the capacity to

receive the transportation means of the inspecting State

Party. At least one airport shall be notified as a point of

entry/exit associated with each declared site. The location of

any point of entry/exit notified as associated with a declared

site shall be such as to allow access to that declared site

within the time specified in Section VII, paragraph 8 of this

Protocol.

11. Each State Party shall have the right to change the

point or points of entry/exit to its territory by notifying all

other States Parties no less than 90 days before such a

change becomes effective.

12. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each

State Party shall provide notification to all other States

Parties of the official language or languages of the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be
)()() ON-SITF lNSl'EC: llON AGFNU 

used by inspection teams conducting inspections of its

conventional armed forces.

SECTION IV. NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO

INSPECT

1. The inspecting State Party shall notify the inspected

State Party of its intention to carry out an inspection

provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty. In the case of

inspection of stationed conventional armed forces, the 

inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host

and stationing States Parties. In the case of inspection of

certification or reduction procedures carried out by a

stationing State Party, the inspecting State Party shall

simultaneously notify the host and stationing States Parties.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII

and VIII of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in

accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36

hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the

inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of

the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and

shall include:

(A) the point of entry/exit to be used;

(B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/ 

exit;

(C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;

(D) a statement of whether the first inspection shall be

conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this

Protocol and whether the inspection will be

conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by

helicopter or by any combination of these;

(E) the time interval between the arrival at the point of

entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection

site;

(F) the language to be used by the inspection team,

which shall be a language designated in accordance

with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol;

(G) the language to be used for the inspection report

prepared in accordance with Section XII of this

Protocol;

(H) the full names of inspectors and transport crew

members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth

and passport number; and

(I) the likely number of sequential inspections.

3. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections IX

and X of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in

accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 96

hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the

inspection team at the designated point of entry/exit on the 

territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be

carried out and shall include:

(A) the point of entry/exit to be used;

(B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/ 

exit;

(C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit;

(D) for each inspection at a reduction or certification

site, reference to the notification provided pursuant

to Section IX, paragraph 3 or Section X, paragraph 5

of this Protocol;

(E) the language to be used by the inspection team,

which shall be a language designated in accordance

with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol;

(F) the language to be used for the inspection report

prepared in accordance with Section XII of this

Protocol; and

(G) the full names of inspectors and transport crew

members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth

and passport number.

4. The States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1

of this Section shall acknowledge in accordance with Article

XVII of the Treaty receipt of notification within three hours.

Subject to the provisions set forth in this Section, the 

inspection team shall be permitted to arrive at the point of

entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival notified pursuant

to paragraph 2, subparagraph (B) or paragraph 3,

subparagraph (B) of this Section.

5. An inspected State Party receiving a notification of

intent to inspect shall immediately upon its receipt send

copies of such notification to all other States Parties in

accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty.

6. If the State Party on whose territory an inspection is

to be carried out is una ble to allow the entry of the

inspection team at the estimated time of arrival, the 

inspection team shall be permitted to enter the territory of

that State Party within two hours before or after the notified

estimated time of arrival. In such a case, the State Party on

whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall notify

the inspecting State Party of the new time of arrival no later 

than 24 hours following the issuance of the original

notification.

7. Ifthe inspection team findsitself delayed more than

two hours beyond the notified estimated time of arrival or

beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to

paragraph 6 ofthis Section, the inspecting StateParty shall

inform the States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1of

this Section of:

(A) a new estimated time of arrival, which in no case

shall be more than six hours beyond the initial

estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of

arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of

this Section; and

(B) if the inspecting State Party desires, a new time

interval between arrival at the point of entry/exit and

the designation of the first inspection site.

8. In the event non-commercial flights are used to

transport the inspection team to the point of entry/exit, no

less than 10 hours before the planned time of entry into the

air space of the State Party on whose territory the inspection

is to be carried out, the inspecting State Party shall provide

that State Party with a flight plan in accordance with Article

XVII of the Treaty. The flight plan shall be filed in

accordance with the procedures of the International Civil
 A PPLN l ll\: A: Tiu -\ n o'J Cor-.;\ 1r-.; l l0'-1-\I A1n1r n FoHo.s J"i Et rHoPF 30l

Aviation Organisation applicable to civil aircraft. The

inspecting State Party shall include in the remarks section of

each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number

and the notation: "CFE inspection aircraft. Priority

clearance processing required."

9. No more than three hours following the receipt of a

flight plan that has been filed in accordance with paragraph

8 of this Section, the State Party on whose territory an

inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that the flight

plan is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at

the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival.

SECTION V.PROCEDURES UPON ARRIVAL AT POINT

OF ENTRY/EXIT

1. The escort team sha ll meet the inspection team and

transport crew members at the point of entry/exit upon their

arrival.

2. A State Party which utilises structures or premises

by agreement with the inspected State Party will designate a

liaison officer to the escort team who will be availa ble as

needed at the point of entry/exit to accompany the

inspection team at any time as agreed with the escort team.

3. Times of arrival at and return to a point of entry/

exit shall be agreed and recorded by both the inspection

team and the escort team.

4. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is

to be carried out shall ensure that luggage, equipment and

supplies of the inspection team are exempt from all customs

duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry/ 

exit.

5. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting State

Party brings into the territory of the State Party where an

inspection is to be carried out shall be subject to

examination each time they are brought into that territory.

This examination shall be completed prior to the departure

of the inspection team from the point of entry/exit to the

inspection site. Such equipment and supplies shall be

examined by the escort team in the presence of the 

inspection team members.

6. If the escort team determines upon examination that

an item of equipment or supplies brought by inspectors is

capable of performing functions inconsistent with the

inspection requirements of this Protocol or does not meet

the requirements set forth in Section VI, paragraph 15 of

this Protocol, then the escort team shall have the right to

deny permission to use that item and to impound it at the

point of entry/exit. The inspecting State Party shall remove

such impounded equipment or supplies from the territory of

the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out at

the earliest opportunity at its own discretion, but no later

than the time when the inspection team which brought that

impounded equipment or supplies leaves the country.

7. If a State Party has not participated during 

examination of equipment of an inspection team at the 

point of entry/exit, that State Party shall be entitled to

exercise the rights of the escort team pursuant to paragraphs

5 and 6 of this Section prior to inspection at a declared site

at which its conventional armed forces are present or of a

structure or premises it utilises by agreement with the

inspected State Party.

8. Throughout the period in which the inspection team

and transport crew remain on the territory of the State Party

where the inspection site is located, the inspected State Party

shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging,

work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care

or any other emergency assistance.

9. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is

carried out shall provide accommodation, security

protection, servicing and fuel for the transportation means

of the inspecting State Party at the point of entry/exit.

SECTION VI. GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING

INSPECTIONS

1. An inspection team may include inspectors from

States Parties other than the inspecting State Party.

2. For inspections conducted in accordance with

Sections VII, VIII, IX and X of this Protocol, an inspection

team shall consist of up to nine inspectors and may divide

itself into up to three sub-teams. In the case of simultaneous

inspections on the territory of States Parties that do not have

military districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty

or within a single military district of a State Party with such

military districts, only one inspection team may divide itself

at the inspection site into three sub- teams, the others into

two sub-teams.

3. Inspectors and escort team members shall wear some 

clear identification of their respective roles.

4. An inspector shall be deemed to have assumed his or

her duties upon arrival at the point of entry/exit on the

territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be

carried out and shall be deemed to have ceased performing

those duties after leaving the territory of that State Party

through the point of entry/exit.

5. The number of transport crew members shall not

exceed 10.

6. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities,

inspectors and transport crew members shall respect the

laws and regulations of the State Party on whose territory an

inspection is carried out and shall not interfere in the

internal affairs of that State Party. Inspectors and transport

crew members shall also respect regulations at an inspection

site, including safety and administrative procedures. In the

event that the inspected State Party determines that an

inspector or transport crew member has violated such laws

and regulations or other conditions governing the inspection

activities set forth in this Protocol, it shall so notify the

inspecting State Party, which upon the request of the 

inspected State Party shall immediately delete the name of

the individual from the list of inspectors or transport crew

members. If the individual is on the territory of the State

Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspecting State

Party shall promptly remove that individual from that

territory.

7. The inspected State Party shall be responsi ble for

ensuring the safety of the inspection team and transport

crew members from the time they arrive at the point of
302 ON-Sr n INSPECTION AGFNU 

entry/exit until the time they leave the point of entry/exit to

depart the territory of that State Party.

8. The escort team shall assist the inspection team in

carrying out its functions. At its discretion, the escort team

may exercise its right to accompany the inspection team

from the time it enters the territory of the State Party where

an inspection is to be carried out until the time it departs

that territory.

9. The inspecting State Party sha ll ensure that the

inspection team and each sub-team have the necessary 

linguistic ability to communicate freely with the escort team

in the language notified in accordance with Section IV,

paragraph 2, subparagraph (F) and paragraph 3,

subparagraph (E) of this Protocol. The inspected State Party

shall ensure that the escort team has the necessary linguistic

ability to communicate freely in this language with the

inspection team and each sub-team. Inspectors and members

of the escort team may also communicate in other languages.

10. No information obtained during inspections shall be

publicly disclosed without the express consent of the

inspecting State Party.

11. Throughout their presence on the territory of the 

State Party where an inspection is to be carried out,

inspectors shall have the right to communicate with the

embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party located on

that territory, using appropriate telecommunications means

provided by the inspected State Party. The inspected State

Party shall also provide means of communication between

the sub-teams of an inspection team.

12. The inspected State Party shall transport the 

inspection team to, from and between inspection sites by a

means and route selected by the inspected State Party. The

inspecting State Party may request a variation in the selected

route. The inspected State Party shall if possible grant such a

request. Whenever mutually agreed, the inspecting State

Party will be permitted to use its own land vehicles.

13. If an emergency arises that necessitates travel of

inspectors from an inspection site to a point of entry/exit or

to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party on

the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried 

out, the inspection team shall so notify the escort team,

which shall promptly arrange such travel, and if necessary,

shall provide appropriate means of transportation.

14. The inspected State Party shall provide for use by the 

inspection team at the inspection site an administrative area

for storage of equipment and supplies, report writing, rest

breaks and meals.

15. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring such

documents as needed to conduct the inspection, in particular

its own maps and charts. Inspectors shall be permitted to

bring and use portable passive night vision devices,

binoculars, video and still cameras, dictaphones, tape 

measures, flashlights, magnetic compasses and lap-top

computers. The inspectors shall be permitted to use other

equipment, subject to the approval of the inspected State

Party. Throughout the in-country period, the escort team

shall have the right to observe the equipment brought by

inspectors, but shall not interfere with the use of equipment

that has been approved by the escort team in accordance 

with Section V, paragraphs 5 to 7 of this Protocol.

16. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to

Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, the inspection team shall

specify on each occasion it designates the inspection site to

be inspected whether the inspection will be conducted on

foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any

combination of these. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspected

State Party shall provide and operate the appropriate crosscountry vehicles at the inspection site.

17. Whenever possible, subject to the safety

requirements and flight regulations of the inspected State

Party and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 to 21 of

this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to

conduct helicopter overflights of the inspection site, using a

helicopter provided and operated by the inspected State

Party, during inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII

and VIII of this Protocol.

18. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to

provide a helicopter at any inspection site that is less than 20

square kilometres in area.

19. The inspected State Party shall have the right to

delay, limit or refuse helicopter overflights above sensitive

points, but the presence of sensitive points shall not prevent

helicopter overflight of the remaining areas of the inspection

site. Photography of or above sensitive points during 

helicopter overflights shall be permitted only with the 

approval of the escort team.

20. The duration of such helicopter overflights at an

inspection site shall not exceed a cumulative total of one

hour, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team

and the escort team.

21. Any helicopter provided by the inspected State Party

shall be large enough to carry at least two members of the

inspection team and at least one member of the escort team.

Inspectors shall be allowed to take and use on overflights of

the inspection site any of the equipment specified in

paragraph 15 of this Section. The inspection team shall

advise the escort team during inspection flights whenever it

intends to take photographs. A helicopter shall afford the

inspectors a constant and unobstructed view of the ground.

22. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not

interfere directly with ongoing activities at the inspection site

and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying

operations at the inspection site or taking actions affecting

safe operation.

23. Except as provided for in paragraphs 24 to 29 of this

Section, during an inspection of an object of verification or

within a specified area, inspectors shall be permitted access,

entry and unobstructed inspection:

(A) in the case of a specified area, within the entire

specified area; or

(B) in the case of an object of verification, within the 

entire territory of the declared site except within 

those areas delineated on the site diagram as

belonging exclusively to another object of

verification which the inspection team has not

designated for inspection.
24. During an inspection of an object of verification or

within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this

Protocol and subject to the provisions of paragraph 25 of

this Section, inspectors shall have the right, within the areas

cited in paragraph 23 of this Section, to enter any location, 

structure or area within a structure in which battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters,

combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft,

armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry 

fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched

bridges are permanently or routinely present. Inspectors

shall not have the right to enter other structures or areas

within structures the entry points to which are physically

accessible only by personnel doors not exceeding two metres

in width and to which access is denied by the escort team.

25. During an inspection of an object of verification or

within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this

Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to look into a

hardened aircraft shelter to confirm visually whether any

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat

helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable

trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes,

armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured

vehicle launched bridges are present and, if so, their number

and type, model or version. Notwithstanding the provisions

of paragraph 24 of this Section, inspectors shall enter the

interior of such hardened aircraft shelters only with the 

approval of the escort team. If such approval is denied and if

the inspectors so request, any battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft,

reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured

personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting

vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges in

such hardened aircraft shelters shall be displayed outside.

26. During an inspection of an object of verification or

within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this

Protocol, except as provided in paragraphs 27 to 33 of this

Section, inspectors shall have the right to have access to

conventional armaments and equipment only in so far as is

necessary to confirm visually their number and type, model

or version.

27. The inspected State Party shall have the right to

shroud individual sensitive items of equipment.

28. The escort team shall have the right to deny access to

sensitive points, the num ber and extent of which should be

as limited as possible, to shrouded objects and to containers 

any dimension (width, height, length or diameter) of which

is less than two metres. Whenever a sensitive point is

designated, or shrouded objects or containers are present,

the escort team shall declare whether the sensitive point,

shrouded object or container holds any battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters,

combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft,

armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry 

fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched

bridges and, if so, their number and type, model or version.

29. If the escort team declares that a sensitive point,

shrouded object or container does contain any of the 

conventional armaments and equipment specified in

paragraph 28 of this Section, then the escort team shall

display or declare such conventional armaments and

equipment to the inspection team and shall take steps to

satisfy the inspection team that no more than the declared

number of such conventional armaments and equipment are 

present.

30. If,during an inspection of an object of verification

or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of

this Protocol, a helicopter of a type that is or has been on

the multi-purpose attack helicopter list in the Protocol on

Existing Types is present at an inspection site and is

declared by the escort team to be a combat support

helicopter, or if an Mi-24R or Mi-24K helicopter is present

at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be

limited pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol

on Helicopter Recategorisation, such a helicopter shall be

subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX,

paragraphs 4 to 6 of this Protocol.

31. If, during an inspection of an object of verification

or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of

this Protocol, an aircraft of a specific model or version of

combat-capa ble trainer aircraft listed in Section II of the

Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification is present at an

inspection site and is declared by the escort team to have 

been certified as unarmed in accordance with the Protocol

on Aircraft Reclassification, such an aircraft shall be subject

to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX,

paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Protocol.

32. If, during an inspection of an object of verification

or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of

this Protocol, an armoured vehicle declared by the escort

team to be an armoured personnel carrier look-alike or an

armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike is present at

an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to

determine that such vehicle cannot permit the transport of a

combat infantry squad. Inspectors shall have the right to

require the doors and/or hatches of the vehicle to be opened

so that the interior can be visually inspected from outside

the vehicle. Sensitive equipment in or on the vehicle may be

shrouded.

33. If,during an inspection of an object of verification

or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of

this Protocol, items of equipment declared by the escort

team to have been reduced in accordance with the 

provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an

inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to

inspect such items of equipment to confirm that they have

been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in

Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction.

34. Inspectors shall have the right to take photographs,

including video, for the purpose of recording the presence of

conventional armaments and equipment subject to the

Treaty, including within designated permanent storage sites,

or other storage sites containing more than 50 such

conventional armaments and equipment. Still cameras shall

be limited to 35mm cameras and to cameras capable of

producing instantly developed photographic prints. The

inspection team shall advise the escort team in advance

whether it plans to take photographs. The escort team shall

cooperate with the inspection team's taking of photographs.
304 ON-SJTF. INSl'FCTION ACE1'C) 

35. Photography of sensitive points shall be permitted

only with the approval of the escort team.

36. Except as provided for in paragraph 38 of this

Section, photography of interiors of structures other than

storage sites specified in paragraph 34 of this Section shall

be permitted only with the approval of the escort team.

37. Inspectors shall have the right to take measurements

to resolve ambiguities that might arise during inspections.

Such measurements recorded during inspections shall be

confirmed by a member of the inspection team and a

member of the escort team immediately after they are taken.

Such confirmed data shall be included in the inspection

report.

38. States Parties shall, whenever possible, resolve during 

an inspection any ambiguities that arise regarding factual

information. Whenever inspectors request the escort team to

clarify such an ambiguity, the escort team shall promptly 

provide the inspection team with clarifications. If inspectors

decide to document an unresolved ambiguity with

photographs, the escort team shall, subject to the provision

in paragraph 35 of this Section, cooperate with the 

inspection team's taking of appropriate photographs using a

camera capable of producing instantly developed

photographic prints. If an ambiguity cannot be resolved

during the inspection, then the question, relevant

clarifications and any pertinent photographs shall be

included in the inspection report in accordance with Section

XII of this Protocol.

39. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII

and VIII of this Protocol, the inspection shall be deemed to

have been completed once the inspection report has been

signed and countersigned.

40. No later than completion of an inspection at a

declared site or within a specified area, the inspection team

shall inform the escort team whether the inspection team

intends to conduct a sequential inspection. If the inspection

team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the 

inspection team shall designate at that time the next

inspection site. In such cases, subject to the provisions in

Section VII, paragraphs 6 and 17 and Section VIII,

paragraph 6, subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, the 

inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team

arrives at the sequential inspection site as soon as possible

after completion of the previous inspection. If the inspection

team does not intend to conduct a sequential inspection,

then the provisions in paragraphs 42 and 43 of this Section

shall apply.

41. An inspection team shall have the right to conduct a

sequential inspection, subject to the provisions of Sections

VII and VIII of this Protocol, on the territory of the State

Party on which that inspection team has conducted the 

preceding inspection:

(A) at any declared site associated with the same point of

entry/exit as the preceding inspection site or the same

point of entry/exit at which the inspection team

arrived; or

(B) within any specified area for which the point of

entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived is the 

nearest point of entry/exit notified pursuant to

Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange;

or

(C) at any location within 200 kilometres of the 

preceding inspection site within the same military

district; or

(D) at the location which the inspected State Party

claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11,

subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, is the temporary

location of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles,

artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft or

armoured vehicle launched bridges which were

absent during inspection of an object of verification

at the preceding inspection site, if such conventional 

armaments and equipment constitute more than 15

percent of the number of such conventional 

armaments and equipment notified in the most

recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on

Information Exchange; or

(E) at the declared site which the inspected State Party

claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11,

subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, is the site of origin

for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery,

combat helicopters, combat aircraft or armoured

vehicle launched bridges at the preceding inspection

site which are in excess of the number provided in

the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol 

on Information Exchange as being present at that

preceding inspection site, if such conventiona l

armaments and equipment exceed by 15 percent the 

number of such conventional armaments and

equipment so notified.

42. After completion of an inspection at a declared site

or within a specified area, if no sequential inspection has

been declared, then the inspection team shall be transported

to the appropriate point of entry/exit as soon as possi ble and

shall depart the territory of the State Party where the 

inspection was carried out within 24 hours.

43. The inspection team shall leave the territory of the 

State Party where it has been conducting inspections from 

the same point of entry/exit at which it entered, unless

otherwise agreed. If an inspection team chooses to proceed

to a point of entry/exit on the territory of another State

Party for the purpose of conducting inspections, it shall have

the right to do so provided that the inspecting State Party

has provided the necessary notification in accordance with

Section IV, paragraph 1of this Protocol.

SECTION VII. DECLARED SITE INSPECTION

1. Inspection of a declared site pursuant to this

Protocol shall not be refused. Such inspections may be

delayed only in cases of force majeure or in accordance with

Section II, paragraphs 7 and 20 to 22 of this Protocol.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this

Section, an inspection team shall arrive on the territory of

the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out

through a point of entry/exit associated under Section V of

the Protocol on Information Exchange with the declared site

it plans to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to

paragraph 7 of this Section.
A PPENDIX A: T1nA 1 Y ON CoN\'E\ITIONAL A R M FD FORCES IN EU ROPE 305

3. If an inspecting State Party desires to use a ground

border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit and 

the inspected State Party has not previously notified a

ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/ 

exit pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information 

Exchange as associated with the declared site the inspecting

State Party desires to designate as the first inspection site

pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspecting State

Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to

Section IV, paragraph 2 of this Protocol the desired ground

border crossing point or seaport as point of entry/exit. The

inspected State Party shall indicate in its acknowledgement

of receipt of notification, as provided for in Section IV,

paragraph 4 of this Protocol, whether this point of entry/exit

is acceptable or not. Inthe latter case, the inspected State

Party shall notify the inspecting State Party of another point

of entry/exit which shall be as near as possible to the desired

point of entry/exit and which may be an airport notified

pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information

Exchange, a seaport or a ground border crossing point

through which the inspection team and transport crew

members may arrive on its territory.

4. If an inspecting State Party notifies its desire to use a

ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/

exit pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, it shall

determine prior to such notification that there is reasonable

certainty that its inspection team can reach the first declared

site where that State Party desires to carry out an inspection

within the time specified in paragraph 8 of this Section using

ground transportation means.

5. If an inspection team and transport crew arrive

pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section on the territory of

the State Party on which an inspection is to be carried out

through a point of entry/exit other than a point of entry/exit

that was notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on

Information Exchange as being associated with the declared

site it desires to designate as the first inspection site, the 

inspected State Party shall facilitate access to this declared

site as expeditiously as possible, but shall be permitted to

exceed, if necessary, the time limit specified in paragraph 8

of this Section.

6. The inspected State Party shall have the right to

utilise up to six hours after designation of a declared site to

prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at that site.

7. At the number of hours after arrival at the point of

entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2,

subparagraph (E) of this Protocol, which shall be no less

than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the

point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the

first declared site to be inspected.

8. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the 

inspection team travels to the first declared site by the most

expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible

but no later than nine hours after the designation of the site

to be inspected, unless otherwise agreed between the

inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection

site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which

access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be

transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours

after designation of that inspection site. Travel time in excess

of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team's

in-country period.

9. Immediately upon arrival at the declared site, the

inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility where

it shall be provided with a diagram of the declared site,

unless such a diagram has been provided in a previous

exchange of site diagrams. The declared site diagram,

provided upon arrival at the declared site, shall contain an

accurate depiction of the:

(A) geographic coordinates of a point within the 

inspection site, to the nearest 10 seconds, with

indication of that point and of true north;

(B) scale used in the site diagram;

(C) perimeter of the declared site;

(D) precisely delineated boundaries of those areas 

belonging exclusively to each object of verification,

indicating the formation or unit record number of

each object of verification to which each such area

belongs and including those separately located areas 

where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles,

artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters,

reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft,

armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured

infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured 

vehicle launched bridges belonging to each object of

verification are permanently assigned;

(E) major buildings and roads on the declared site;

(F) entrances to the declared site; and

( G) location of an administrative area for the inspection

team provided in accordance with Section VI,

paragraph 14 of this Protocol.

10. Within one-half hour after receiving the diagram of

the declared site, the inspection team shall designate the 

object of verification to be inspected. The inspection team

shall then be given a pre-inspection briefing which shall last

no more than one hour and shall include the following

elements:

(A) safety and administrative procedures at the 

inspection site;

(B) modalities of transportation and communication for

inspectors at the inspection site; and

(C) holdings and locations at the inspection site,

including within the common areas of the declared

site, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles,

artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters,

reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft,

armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured

infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and armoured

vehicle launched bridges, including those belonging

to separately located subordinate elements belonging

to the same object of verification to be inspected.

11. The pre-inspection briefing shall include an

explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft,

combat helicopters or armoured vehicle launched bridges

present at the inspection site and the corresponding numbers
provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the

Protocol on Information Exchange, in accordance with the 

following provisions:

(A) if the numbers of such conventional armaments and

equipment present at the inspection site are less than

the numbers provided in that most recent

notification, such explanation shall include the

temporary location of such conventional armaments

and equipment; and

(B) if the numbers of such armaments and equipment

present at the inspection site exceed the numbers

provided in that most recent notification, such

explanation shall include specific information on the 

origin, departure times from origin, time of arrival

and projected stay at the inspection site of such

additional conventional armaments and equipment.

12. When an inspection team designates an object of

verification to be inspected, the inspection team shall have

the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of

verification, to inspect all territory delineated on the site

diagram as belonging to that object of verification, including

those separately located areas on the territory of the same

State Party where conventional armaments and equipment

belonging to that object of verification are permanently

assigned.

13. The inspection of one object of verification at a

declared site shall permit the inspection team access, entry

and unobstructed inspection within the entire territory of the

declared site except within those areas delineated on the site

diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of

verification which the inspection team has not designated for

inspection. During such inspections, the provisions of

Section VI of this Protocol shall apply.

14. If the escort team informs the inspection team that

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat

helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable 

trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes,

armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured

vehicle launched bridges that have been notified as being

held by one object of verification at a declared site are 

present within an area delineated on the site diagram as

belonging exclusively to another object of verification, then

the escort team shall ensure that the inspection team, as part

of the same inspection, has access to such conventional

armaments and equipment.

15. If conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present

within areas of a declared site not delineated on the site

diagram as belonging exclusively to one object of

verification, the escort team shall inform the inspection team

to which object of verification such conventional armaments 

and equipment belong.

16. Each State Party shall be obliged to account for the

aggregate total of any category of conventional armaments 

and equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to

Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange, at the

·organisational level above brigade/regiment or equivalent, if

such an accounting is requested by another State Party.

17. If,during an inspection at a declared site, the

inspection team decides to conduct at the same declared site

an inspection of an object of verification that had not been

previously designated, the inspection team shall have the 

right to commence such inspection within three hours of that

designation. In such case, the inspection team shall be given

a briefing on the object of verification designated forthe

next inspection in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11of

this Section.

SECTION VIII. CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHIN

SPECIFIEDAREAS

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct

challenge inspections within specified areas in accordance 

with this Protocol.

2. If the inspecting State Party intends to conduct a

challenge inspection within a specified area as the 

first inspection after arrival at a point of entry/exit:

(A) it shall include in its notification pursuant to Section

IV of this Protocol the designated point of entry/exit

nearest to or within that specified area capable of

receiving the inspecting State Party's chosen means of

transportation; and

(B) at the number of hours after arrival at the point of

entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph

2, subparagraph (E)of this Protocol, which shall be

no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours

after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection

team shall designate the first specified area it wishes

to inspect. Whenever a specified area is designated,

the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection

request, provide to the escort team a geographic

description delineating the outer boundaries of that

area. The inspection team shall have the right, as

part of that request, to identify any structure or

facility it wishes to inspect.

3. The State Party on whose territory a challenge

inspection isrequested shall, immediately upon receiving a

designation of a specified area, inform other States Parties

which utilise structures or premises by agreement with the 

inspected State Party of that specified area, including its

geographic description delineating the outer boundaries.

4. The inspected State Party shall have the right to

refuse challenge inspections within specified areas.

5. The inspected State Party shall inform the inspection

team within two hours after the designation of a specified

area whether the inspection request will be granted.

6. If access to a specified area is granted:

(A) the inspected State Party shall have the right to use

up to six hours after it accepts the inspection to

prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at the 

specified area;

(B) the inspected State Party shall ensure that the 

inspection team travels to the first specified area by

the most expeditious means available and arrives as

soon as possible after the designation of the site to be

inspected, but no later than nine hours from the time
i ' ' I \ \

such an inspection is accepted, unless otherwise

agreed between the inspection team and the escort

team, or unless the inspection site is located in

mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is

difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be

transported to the inspection site no later than 15

hours after such an inspection is accepted. Travel

time in excess of nine hours shall not count against

that inspection team's in-country period; and

(C) the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall

apply. Within such specified area the escort team

may delay access to or overflight of particular parts

of that specified area. If the delay exceeds more than

four hours the inspection team shall have the right to

cancel the inspection. The period of delay shall not 

count against the in-country period or the maximum

time allowed within a specified area.

7. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or

premises which another State Party utilises by agreement

with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall 

immediately inform that State Party of such a request. The

escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other

State Party, by agreement with the inspected State Party,

shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to

the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation,

exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol

with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel

of the State Party utilising the structure or premises.

8. If the inspected State Party so wishes, the inspection

team may be briefed on arrival at the specified area. This

briefing is to last no more than one hour. Safety procedures

and administrative arrangements may also be covered in this

briefing.

9. If access to a specified area is denied:

(A) the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising

the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party

shall provide all reasona ble assurance that the

specified area does not contain conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If

such armaments and equipment are present and

assigned to organisations designed and structured to 

perform in peacetime internal security functions in

the area defined in Article V of the Treaty, the

inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the

rights and obligations of the inspected State Party

shall allow visual confirmation of their presence,

unless precluded from so doing by force majeure, in

which case visual confirmation shall be allowed as

soon as practica ble; and

(B) no inspection quota shall be counted, and the time 

between the designation of the specified area and its

subsequent refusal shall not count against the incountry period. The inspection team shall have the

right to designate another specified area or declared

site for inspection or to declare the inspection

concluded.

SECTION IX. INSPECTION OF CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect,

without right of refusal, the certification of recategorised

multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combatcapable trainer aircraft in accordance with the provisions of

this Section, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation

and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. Such

inspections shall not count against the quotas established in

Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such

inspections may be composed of representatives of different

States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged

to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each

certification site.

2. In conducting an inspection of certification in

accordance with this Section, an inspection team shall have

the right to spend up to two days at a certification site,

unless otherwise agreed.

3. No less than 15 days before the certification of

recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters or reclassified

combat-capa ble trainer aircraft, the State Party conducting

the certification shall provide to all other States Parties

notification of:

(A) the site at which the certification is to take place,

including geographic coordinates;

(B) the scheduled dates of the certification process;

(C) the estimated number and type, model or version of

helicopters or aircraft to be certified;

(D) the manufacturer's serial number for each helicopter

or aircraft;

(E) the unit or location to which the helicopters or

aircraft were previously assigned;

(F) the unit or location to which the certified helicopters

or aircraft will be assigned in the future;

(G) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection

team; and

(H) the date and time by which an inspection team shall

arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect

the certification.

4. Inspectors shall have the right to enter and inspect

visually the helicopter or aircraft cockpit and interior to 

include checking the manufacturer's serial number, without

right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the

certification.

5. If requested by the inspection team, the escort team

shall remove, without right of refusal, any access panels

covering the position from which components and wiring

were removed in accordance with the provisions of the

Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation or the Protocol on

Aircraft Reclassification.

6. Inspectors shall have the right to req uest and

observe, with the right of refusal on the part of the State

Party conducting the certification, the activation of any

weapon system component in multi-purpose attack

helicopters being certified or declared to have been

recategorised.

7. At the conclusion of each inspection of certification,

the inspection team shall complete an inspection report in

accordance with the provisions of Section XII of this

Protocol.
.08 Cl -S1nINl'tCTlON AcFNCY--·--------

8. Upon completion of an inspection at a certification

site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the

territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a

sequential inspection at another certification site or at a

reduction site if the appropriate notification has been

provided by the inspection team in accordance with Section

IV, paragraph 3 of this Protocol. The inspection team shall

notify the escort team of its intended departure from the

certification site and, if appropriate, of its intention to

proceed to another certification site or to a reduction site at

least 24 hours before the intended departure time.

9. Within seven days after completion of the

certification, the State Party responsible for the certification

shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of the

certification. Such notification shall specify the number,

types, models or versions and manufacturer's serial numbers

of certified helicopters or aircraft, the certification site

involved, the actual dates of the certification, and the units

or locations to which the recategorised helicopters or

reclassified aircraft will be assigned.

SECTION X. INSPECTION OF REDUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct

inspections, without the right of refusal by the inspected

State Party, of the process of reduction carried out pursuant

to Sections I to VIII and X to XII of the Protocol on

Reduction in accordance with the provisions of this Section.

Such inspections shall not count against the quotas

established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams

conducting such inspections may be composed of

representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State

Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one

inspection team at a time at each reduction site.

2. The inspected State Party shall have the right to

organise and implement the process of reduction subject

only to the provisions set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty

and in the Protocol on Reduction. Inspections of the process

of reduction shall be conducted in a manner that does not 

interfere with the ongoing activities at the reduction site or

unnecessarily hamper, delay or complicate the

implementation of the process of reduction.

3. If a reduction site notified pursuant to Section III of

the Protocol on Information Exchange is used by more than

one State Party, inspections of the reduction process shall be

conducted in accordance with schedules of such use

provided by each State Party using the reduction site.

4. Each State Party that intends to reduce conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall notify

all other States Parties which conventional armaments and

equipment are to be reduced at each reduction site during a

calendar reporting period. Each such calendar reporting 

period shall have a duration of no more than 90 days and no 

less than 30 days. This provision shall apply whenever

reduction is carried out at a reduction site, without regard to 

whether the reduction process is to be carried out on a

continuous or intermittent basis.

5. No less than 15 days before the initiation of

reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party

intending to implement reduction procedures shall provide

to all other States Parties the calendar reporting period

notification. Such notification shall include the designation

of the reduction site with geographic coordinates, the

scheduled date for initiation of reduction and the scheduled

date for completion of the reduction of conventional

armaments and equipment identified for reduction during 

the calendar reporting period. In addition, the notification 

shallidentify:

(A) the estimated number and type of conventional

armaments and equipment to be reduced;

(B) the object or objects of verification from which the

items to be reduced have been withdrawn;

(C) the reduction procedures to be used, pursuant to

Sections III to VIII and Sections X to XII of the

Protocol on Reduction, for each type of conventional

armaments and equipment to be reduced;

(D) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection

team conducting an inspection of reduction notified

for that calendar reporting period; and

(E) the date and time by which an inspection team must

arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect

the conventional armaments and equipment before

the initiation of their reduction.

6. Except as specified in paragraph 11of this Section,

an inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart

from a reduction site at any time during the calendar

reporting period, including three days beyond the end of a

notified calendar reporting period. In addition, the

inspection team shall have the right to remain at the

reduction site throughout one or more calendar reporting

periods provided that these periods are not separated by

more than three days. Throughout the period that the

inspection team remains at the reduction site, it shall have

the right to observe all the reduction procedures carried out

in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction.

7. In accordance with the provisions set forth in this

Section, the inspection team shall have the right to freely

record factory serial numbers from the conventional 

armaments and equipment to be reduced or to place special

marks on such equipment before reduction and to record

subsequently such numbers or marks at the completion of

the reduction process. Parts and elements of reduced

conventional armaments and equipment as specified in

Section II, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Reduction

or, in the case of conversion, the vehicles converted for nonmilitary purposes shall be available for inspection for at least

three days after the end of the notified calendar reporting

period, unless inspection of those reduced elements has been

completed earlier.

8. The State Party engaged in the process of reducing

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty shall establish at each reduction site a working 

register in which it shall record the factory serial numbers of

each item undergoing reduction as well as the dates on

which the reduction procedures were initiated and

completed. This register shall also include aggregate data for

each calendar reporting period. The register shall be made

available to the inspection team for the period of inspection.
APPl,i'\!llX A: T1u\T Y O"i Co\i\ L"i 1101\i \L A1i\1rn FcrncEs J N El11wl'E 309

9. At the conclusion of each inspection of the reduction

process, the inspection team shall complete a standardised 

report which shall be signed by the inspection team leader

and a representative of the inspected State Party. The

provisions of Section XII of this Protocol shall apply.

10. Upon completion of an inspection at a reduction site,

the inspection team shall have the right to depart the

territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a

sequential inspection at another reduction site or at a

certification site if the appropriate notification has been

provided in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3 of this

Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of

its intended departure from the reduction site and, if

appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another reduction

site or to a certification site at least 24 hours before the

intended departure time.

11. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept up to 10

inspections each year to validate the completion of

conversion of conventional armaments and equipment into

vehicles for non-military purposes pursuant to Section VIII of

the Protocol on Reduction. Such inspections shall be

conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section

with the following exceptions:

(A) the notification pursuant to paragraph 5,

subparagraph (E) of this Section shall identify only

the date and time by which an inspection team must

arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the

items of equipment at the completion of their

conversion into vehicles for non-military purposes;

and

(B) the inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or

depart from the reduction site only during the three

days beyond the end of the notified completion date

of conversion.

12. Within seven days after the completion of the process

of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party

responsible for reductions shall notify all other States Parties

of the completion of reduction for that period. Such

notification shall specify the number and types of

conventional armaments and equipment reduced, the

reduction site involved, the reduction procedures employed

and the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the

reduction process for that calendar reporting period. For

conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to

Sections X, XI and XII of the Protocol on Reduction, the 

notification shall also specify the location at which such

conventional armaments and equipment will be permanently

located. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced

pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the 

notification shall specify the reduction site at which final

conversion will be carried out or the storage site to which

each item designated for conversion will be transferred.

SECTION XI. CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS

1. If an inspection team finds itself unable to arrive at

the point of entry/exit within six hours after the initial

estimated time of arrival or after the new time of arrival 

communicated pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 6 of this

Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall so inform the States

Parties notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1of this

Protocol. In such a case, the notification of intent to inspect

shall lapse and the inspection shall be cancelled.

2. In the case of delay, due to circumstances beyond the

control of the inspecting State Party, occurring after the

inspection team has arrived at the point of entry/exit and

which has prevented the inspection team from arriving at the

first designated inspection site within the time specified in

Section VII, paragraph 8 or Section VIII, paragraph 6,

subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party

shall have the right to cancel the inspection. If an inspection

is cancelled under such circumstances, it shall not be counted

against any quotas provided for in the Treaty.

SECTION XII. INSPECTION REPORTS

1. In order to complete an inspection carried out in

accordance with Section VII, VIII, IX or X of this Protocol, 

and before leaving the inspection site:

(A) the inspection team shall provide the escort team

with a written report; and

(B) the escort team shall have the right to include its

written comments in the inspection report and shall

countersign the report within one hour after having

received the report from the inspection team, unless

an extension has beerr agreed between the inspection

team and the escort team.

2. The report shall be signed by the inspection team

leader and receipt acknowledged in writing by the leader of

the escort team.

3. The report shall be factual and standardised. Formats

for each type of inspection shall be agreed by the Joint

Consultative Group prior to entry into force of the Treaty,

taking into account paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section.

4. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to

Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall include:

(A) the inspection site;

(B) the date and time of arrival of the inspection team at

the inspection site;

(C) the date and time of departure of the inspection team

from the inspection site; and

(D) the number and type, model or version of any battle

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat

aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combatcapable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier 

look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle lookalikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that

were observed during the inspection, including, if

appropriate, an indication of the object of

verification to which they belonged.

5. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to

Sections IX and X of this Protocol shall include:

(A) the reduction or certification site at which the 

reduction or certification procedures were carried

out;

(B) the dates the inspection team was present at the site;
(C) the number and type, model or version of

conventional armaments and equipment for which

the reduction or certification procedures were

observed;

(D) a list of any serial numbers recorded during the

inspections;

(E) in the case of reductions, the particular reduction

procedures applied or observed; and

(F) in the case of reductions, if an inspection team was

present at the reduction site throughout the calendar 

reporting period, the actual dates on which the 

reduction procedures were initiated and completed.

6. The inspection report shall be written in the official

language of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe designated by the inspecting State Party in

accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (G)

or paragraph 3, subparagraph (F) of this Protocol.

7. The inspecting State Party and the inspected State

Party shall each retain one copy of the report. At the

discretion of either State Party, the inspection report may be

forwarded to other States Parties and, as a rule, made

available to the Joint Consultative Group.

8. The stationing State Party shall in particular:

(A) have the right to include written comments related to 

the inspection of its stationed conventional armed 

forces; and

(B) retain one copy of the inspection report in the case

of inspection of its stationed conventional armed

forces.

SECTION XIII. PRMLEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF

INSPECTORS AND TRANSPORT CREW MEMBERS

1. To exercise their functions effectively, for the

purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their

personal benefit, inspectors and transport crew members

shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by

diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29; Article 30,

paragraph 2; Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and Articles

34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. In addition, inspectors and transport crew members

shall be accorded the privileges enjoyed by diplomatic agents

pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of

the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18,

1961. They shall not be permitted to bring into the territory

of the State Party where the inspection is to be carried out

articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law

or controlled by quarantine regulations of that State Party.

3. The transportation means of the inspection team

shall be inviolable, except as otherwise provided for in the

Treaty.

4. The inspecting State Party may waive the immunity

from jurisdiction of any of its inspectors or transport crew

members in those cases when it is of the opinion that

immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can 

be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the

provisions of the Treaty. The immunity of inspectors and

transport crew members who are not nationals of the 

inspecting State Party may be waived only by the States

Parties of which those inspectors are nationals. Waiver must

always be express.

5. The privileges and immunities provided for in this

Section shall be accorded to inspectors and transport crew

members:

(A) while transiting through the territory of any State

Party for the purpose of conducting an inspection on

the territory of another State Party;

(B) throughout their presence on the territory of the

State Party where the inspection is carried out; and

(C) thereafter with respect to acts previously performed

in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or

transport crew member.

6. If the inspected State Party considers that an

inspector or transport crew member has abused his or her

privileges and immunities, then the provisions set forth in

Section VI, paragraph 6 of this Protocol shall apply. At the 

request of any of the States Parties concerned, consultations

shall be held between them in order to prevent a repetition

of such an abuse.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES

GOVERNING THE REDUCTION OF

CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND

EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY ON

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN

EUROPE

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures

governing the reduction of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty as set forth in Article VIII of

the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of

November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I.GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR

REDUCTION

1. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty shall be reduced in accordance with the 

procedures set forth in this Protocol and the other protocols

listed in Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. Any one of

such procedures shall be deemed sufficient, when conducted 

in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the 

Treaty or this Protocol, to carry out reduction.

2. Each State Party shall have the right to use any 

technological means it deems appropriate to implement the

procedures for reducing conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to remove,

retain and use those components and parts of conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which are

not themselves subject to reduction in accordance with the 

provisions of Section II of this Protocol, and to dispose of

debris.
4. Unless otherwise provided for in this Protocol,

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 

Treaty shall be reduced so as to preclude their further use or

restoration for military purposes.

5. After entry into force of the Treaty, additional

procedures for reduction may be proposed by any State

Party. Such proposals shall be communicated to all other

States Parties and shall provide the details of such

procedures in the same format as the procedures set forth in

this Protocol. Any such procedures shall be deemed

sufficient to carry out the reduction of conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty upon a

decision to that effect by the Joint Consultative Group.

SECTION II. STANDARDS FOR PRESENTATION AT 

REDUCTION SITES

1. Each item of conventional armaments and

equipment limited by the Treaty which is to be reduced shall

be presented at a reduction site. Each such item shall

consist, at a minimum, of the following parts and elements:

(A) for battle tanks: the hull, turret and integral main

armament. For the purposes of this Protocol, an

integral main armament of a battle tank shall be

deemed to include the gun tube, breech system,

trunnions and trunnion mounts;

(B) for armoured combat vehicles: the hull, turret and

integral main armament, if any. For the purposes of

this Protocol, an integral main armament of an

armoured combat vehicle shall be deemed to include

the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion

mounts. For the purposes of this Protocol, an

integral main armament shall be deemed not to

include machine guns of less than 20 millimetre

calibre, all of which may be salvaged;

(C) for artillery: the tube, breech system, cradle

including trunnions and trunnion mounts, trails, if

any; or launcher tubes or launcher rails and their

bases; or mortar tu bes and their base plates. In the

case of self-propelled pieces of artillery, the vehicle

hull and turret, if any, shall also be presented;

(D) for combat aircraft: the fuselage; and

(E) for attack helicopters: the fuselage, including the 

transmission mounting area.

2. In each case, the item presented at the reduction site

in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section shall consist

of a complete assembly.

3. Parts and elements of conventional armaments and 

equipment limited by the Treaty not specified in paragraph

1of this Section, as well as parts and elements which are 

not affected by reduction under the procedures of this

Protocol, including the turrets of armoured personnel

carriers equipped only with machine guns, may be disposed

of as the State Party undertaking the reduction decides.

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR REDUCTION OF

BATTLE TANKS BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any

one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries

out the destruction of battle tanks at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

(A) removal of special equipment from the chassis,

including detachable equipment, that ensures the 

operation of on-board armament systems;

(B) removal of the turret, if any;

(C) for the gun breech system, either:

( 1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in

at least two places; or

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring

along the long axis of the cavity that receives

the breech block;

(D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance

of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech 

ring;

(E) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its

trunnion mount in the turret;

(F) severing of two sections from the perimeter of the

hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a

sector with an angle of no less than 60 degrees and,

at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, 

centred on the longitudinal axis of the vehicle; and

(G) severing of sections from both sides of the hull

which include the final drive apertures, by vertical

and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal

cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear

plates, so that, the final drive apertures are

contained in the severed portions.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition:

(A) hull, hatches and cornerplates shall be open to

maximise venting;

(B) an explosive charge shall be placed inside the gun

tu be where the trunnions connect to the gun mount

or cradle;

(C) an explosive charge shall be placed on the outside of

the hull between the second and third road wheels,

or between the third and fourth road wheels in a six

road wheel configuration, avoiding natural

weaknesses such as welds or escape hatches. The

charge must be located within the radius of the

turret casting. A second charge shall be placed on

the inside of the hull on the same side of the tank,

offset and opposite to the external charge;

(D) an explosive charge shall be placed on the inside of

the turret casting in the area of the main armament

mounting; and

(E) all charges shall be fired simultaneously so that the 

main hull and turret are cracked and distorted; the

breech block is stripped from the gun tube, fused or
312 ON-Srn lMPEC:TIOr-< Ac1Nc'I

deformed; the gun tube is split or longitudinally cut;

the gun mount or cradle is ruptured so as to be

una ble to mount a gun tu be; and damage is caused

to the running gear so that at least one of the road 

wheel stations is destroyed.

4. Procedure for destruction by deformation:

(A) removal of special equipment from the chassis,

including detachable equipment, that ensures the 

operation of on-board armament systems;

(B) removal of the turret, if any;

(C) for the gun breech system, either:

( 1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at

least two places; or

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring

along the long axis of the cavity that receives the 

breech block;

(D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance

of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech

nng;

(E) severing of either of the gun trunnions; and

(F) the hull and turret shall be deformed so that their 

widths are each reduced by at least 20 percent.

5. Procedure for destruction by smashing:

(A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall

be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret until

the hull is cracked in at least three separate places

and the turret in at least one place;

(B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of

the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount

inoperative, and deform visibly the breech ring; and

(C) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent.

SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF

ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any of

the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the 

destruction of armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

(A) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special

equipment from the chassis, including detachable

equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board

armament systems;

(B) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing of

sections from both sides of the hull which include the

final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts

in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or

belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final

drive apertures are contained in the severed portions;

(C) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing of

sections from both sides of the hull which include the 

front wheel final gear box mounting areas by vertical,

horizontal and irregular cuts in the side, front, deck

and belly plates so that the front wheel final gearbox

mounting areas are included in the severed portions

at a distance of no less than 100 millimetres from the 

cuts; and

(D) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles

and heavy armament combat vehicles:

( 1) removal of the turret;

(2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its

trunnion mount in the turret;

(3) for the gun breech system:

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring

in at least two places;

(b) cutting of at least one side of the breech

ring along the long axis of the cavity that

receives the breech block; or

(c) severing of the breech casing into two

approximately equal parts;

(4) severing of the gun tu be into two parts at a

distance of no more than 100 millimetres from

the breech ring; and

(5) severing of two sections from the perimeter of

the hull turret aperture, each constituting a

portion of a sector with an angle of no less than

60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres

in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of

the vehicle.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition:

(A) an explosive charge shall be placed on the interior

floor at the mid-point of the vehicle;

(B) a second explosive charge shall be placed as follows:

(1) for heavy armament combat vehicles, inside the 

gun where the trunnions connect to the gun

mount or cradle;

(2) for armoured infantry fighting vehicles, on the

exterior of the receiver/breech area and lower

barrel group;

(C) all hatches shall be secured; and

(D) the charges shall be detonated simultaneously so as

to split the sides and top of the hull. For heavy

armament combat vehicles and armoured infantry

fighting vehicles, damage to the gun system shall be

equivalent to that specified in paragraph 2,

subparagraph (D) of this Section.

4. Procedure for destruction by smashing:

(A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall

be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and the turret, if

any, until the hull is cracked in at least three separate

places and the turret, if any, in one place;

(B) in addition, for heavy armament combat vehicles:

( 1) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render

either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion

mount inoperative, and shall deform visibly the 

breech ring; and
APPi 1'DI>-. A: TRFc\ n 01' Co"\ 1 :'-JTIOi'\ AL AR ".IED Fcmci-:s '"' EuRoP1 3 1 3

(2) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent.

SECTION V.PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF

ARTILLERY BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any

one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries

out the destruction of guns, howitzers, artillery pieces

combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers,

multiple launch rocket systems or mortars at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing of guns,

howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of

guns and howitzers, or mortars, that are not self-propelled:

(A) removal of special equipment, including detachable

equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun,

howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics

of guns and howitzers or mortar;

(B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, 

artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns

and howitzers or mortar, either:

( 1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at

least two places; or

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring

along the long axis of the cavity that receives the

breech block;

(C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of

no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;

(D) severing of the left trunnion of the cradle and the

mounting area of that trunnion in the upper carriage;

and

(E) severing of the trails, or the base plate of the mortar,

into two approximately equal parts.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of

guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the

characteristics of guns and howitzers that are not selfpropelled:

(A) explosive charges shall be placed in the tube, on one

cradle mount in the upper carriage and on the trails, 

and detonated so that:

(1) the tube is split or longitudinally torn within 1.5

metres of the breech;

(2) the breech block is torn off, deformed or

partially melted;

( 3) the attachments between the tube and the

breech ring and between one of the trunnions of

the cradle and the upper carriage are destroyed

or sufficiently damaged to make them further

inoperative; and

(4) the trails are separated into two approximately

equal parts or sufficiently damaged to make

them further inoperative.

4. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of

mortars that are not self-propelled:

explosive charges shall be placed in the mortar tube

and on the base plate so that, when the charges are

detonated, the mortar tube is ruptured in its lower

half and the base plate is severed into two

approximately equal parts.

5. Procedure for destruction by deformation of mortars

that are not self-propelled:

(A) the mortar tube shall be visibly bent approximately 

at its mid-point; and

(B) the base plate shall be bent approximately on the

centerline at an angle of at least 45 degrees.

6. Procedure for destruction by severing of selfpropelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the

characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars:

(A) removal of special equipment, including detachable

equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun,

howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics

of guns and howitzers or mortar;

(B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer,

artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns

and howitzers or mortar, either:

( 1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at

least two places; or

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring

along the long axis of the cavity that receives the

breech block;

(C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no

more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;

(D) severing of the left trunnion and trunnion mount; 

and

(E) severing of sections of both sides from the hull which

include the final drive apertures, by vertical and

horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in

the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so

that the final drive apertures are contained in the

severed portions.

7. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of

self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the

characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars:

(A) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces

combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers

or mortars with a turret: the method specified for 

battle tanks in Section III, paragraph 3 of this

Protocol shall be applied in order to achieve results

equivalent to those specified in that provision; and

(B) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces

combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers

or mortars without a turret: an explosive charge shall

be placed in the hull under the forward edge of the

traversing deck that supports the tube, and detonated 

so as to separate the deck plate from the hull. For the

destruction of the weapon system, the method

specified for guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces

combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers

in paragraph 3 of this Section shall be applied in

order to achieve results equivalent to those specified

in that provision.
i ' \ •

8. Procedure for destruction by smashing of selfpropelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the

characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars:

(A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be

dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret, if any,

until the hull is cracked in at least three separate

places and the turret in at least one place;

(B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of

the trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative,

and deform visibly the breech ring; and

(C) the tube shall be visibly cracked or bent at

approximately its mid-point.

9. Procedure for destruction by severing of multiple

launch rocket systems:

(A) removal of special equipment from the multiple

launch rocket system, including detachable

equipment, that ensures the operation of its combat

systems; and

(B) removal of tubes or launch rails, screws (gears) of

elevation mechanism sectors, tube bases or launch

rail bases and their rotatable parts and severing them

into two approximately equal parts in areas that are

not assembly joints.

10. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of

multiple launch rocket systems:

a linear shaped charge shall be placed across the

tubes or launcher rails, and tube or launcher rail

bases. When detonated, the charge shall sever the

tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases

and their rotata ble parts, into two approximately

equal parts in areas that are not assembly joints.

11. Procedure for destruction by deformation of multiple

launch rocket systems:

all tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases

and the sighting system shall be visibly bent at

approximately the mid-point.

SECTION VI. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF

COMBAT AIRCRAFT BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any

one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries

out the destruction of combat aircraft at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

the fuselage of the aircraft shall be divided into three

parts not on assembly joints by severing its nose 

immediately forward of the cockpit and its tail in the

central wing section area so that assembly joints, if

there are any in the areas to be severed, shall be

contained in the severed portions.

3. Procedure for destruction by deformation: 

the fuselage shall be deformed throughout by

compression, so that its height, width or length is

reduced by at least 30 percent.

4. Procedure for destruction by use as target drones:

(A) each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use

as target drones no more than 200 combat aircraft 

during the 40-month reduction period;

(B) the target drone shall be destroyed in flight by

munitions fired by the armed forces of the State Party

owning the target drone;

(C) if the attempt to shoot down the target drone fails

and it is subsequently destroyed by a self-destruct

mechanism, the procedures of this paragraph shall

continue to apply. Otherwise the target drone may be

recovered or may be claimed destroyed by accident in

accordance with Section IX of this Protocol,

depending on the circumstances; and

(D) notification of destruction shall be made to all other

States Parties. Such notification shall include the type

of the destroyed target drone and the location where

it was destroyed. Within 90 days of the notification,

the State Party claiming such reduction shall send 

documentary evidence, such as a report of the

investigation, to all other States Parties. In the event 

of ambiguities relating to the destruction of a

particular target drone, reduction shall not be

considered complete until final resolution of the

matter.

SECTION VII. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION 

OF ATTACK HELICOPTERS BY DESTRUCTION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any

one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries

out the destruction of attack helicopters at reduction sites.

2. Procedure for destruction by severing:

(A) the tail boom or tail part shall be severed from the

fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained in the

severed portion; and

(B) at least two transmission mounts on the fuselage shall

be severed, fused or deformed.

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: 

any type and number of explosives may be used so that, at a

minimum, after detonation the fuselage is cut into two pieces

through that section of the fuselage that contains the

transmission mounting area.

4. Procedure for destruction by deformation: the

fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression so

that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30

percent.

SECTION VIII. RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR

REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY BY

CONVERSION FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce a

certain number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles

by conversion. The types of vehicles that may be converted

are listed in paragraph 3 of this Section and the specific nonmilitary purposes for which they may be converted are listed

in paragraph 4 of this Section. Converted vehicles shall not

be placed in service with the conventional armed forces of a

StateParty.
\ '

2. Each State Party shall determine the number of battle

tanks and armoured combat vehicles it will convert. This

number shall not exceed:

(A) for battle tanks, 5.7 percent (not to exceed 750

battle tanks) of the maximum level for holdings of

battle tanks it notified at the signature of the Treaty

pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items

whichever is the greater; and

(B) for armoured combat vehicles, 15 percent (not to

exceed 3,000 armoured combat vehicles) of the

maximum level for holdings of armoured combat

vehicles it notified at the signature of the Treaty

pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items

whichever is the greater.

3. The following vehicles may be converted for nonmilitary purposes: T-54, T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72, Leopard 1,

BMP-1, BTR-60, OT-64. The States Parties, within the

framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make

changes to the list of vehicles which may be converted to

non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article

XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed

improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty

relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

4. Such vehicles shall be converted for the following

specific non- military purposes:

(A) general purpose prime movers;

(B) bulldozers;

(C) fire fighting vehicles;

(D) cranes;

(E) power unit vehicles;

(F) mineral fine crushing vehicles;

(G) quarry vehicles;

(H) rescue vehicles;

(I) casualty evacuation vehicles;

(J) transportation vehicles;

(K) oil rig vehicles;

(L) oil and chemical product spill cleaning vehicles;

(M) tracked ice breaking prime movers;

(N) environmental vehicles.

The States Parties, within the framework of the Joint

Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of specific

non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article

XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed

improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty

relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

5. On entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party

shall notify to all other States Parties the number of battle

tanks and armoured combat vehicles that it plans to convert

in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Notification

of a State Party's intention to carry out conversion in

accordance with this Section shall be given to all other States

Parties at least 15 days in advance in accordance with

Section X, paragraph 5 of the Protocol on Inspection. Itshall

specify the number and types of vehiclesto be converted,the

starting date and completion date of conversion, aswell as

the specific non-military purpose vehicles to emerge after 

conversion.

6. The following procedures shall be carried out before

conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles at

reduction sites:

(A) for battle tanks:

(1) removal of special equipment from the chassis,

including detachable equipment, that ensures

the operation of on-board armament systems;

(2) removal of the turret, if any;

(3) for the gun breech system, either:

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring

in at least two places; or

( b) cutting of at least one side of the breech

ring along the long axis of the cavity that

receives the breech block;

(4) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a

distance of no more than 100 millimetres from

the breech ring;

(5) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its

trunnion mount in the turret; and

(6) cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull

top armour beginning from the front glacis to

the middle of the hull turret aperture, together

with the associated portions of the side armour

at a height of no less than 200 millimetres (for

the T-64 and T-72, no less than 100 millimetres)

below the level of the hull top armour, as well as

the associated portion of the front glacis plate

severed at the same height. The severed portion

of this front glacis plate shall consist of no less

than the upper third; and

(B) for armoured combat vehicles:

(1) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of

special equipment from the chassis, including

detacha ble equipment, that ensures the

operation of on- board armament systems;

(2) for rear-engined vehicles, cutting out and

removal of a portion of the hull top armour from

the front glacis to the bulkhead of the enginetransmission compartment, together with the

associated portions of the side and front armour

at a height of no less than 300 millimetres below

the level of the top of the assault crew 

compartment;

(3) for front-engined vehicles, cutting out and

removal of a portion of the hull top armour

plate from the bulkhead of the enginetransmission compartment to the rear of the 

vehicle, together with the associated portions of

the side armour at a height of no less than 300
01':-Sin:};\ISl'ECTION Acl '<< 1

millimetres below the level of the top of the

assault crew compartment ; and

(4) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting

vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles:

(a) removal of the turret;

( b) severing of either of the gun trunnions and

its trunnion mount in the turret;

(c) for the gun breech system:

(i) welding the breech block to the breech 

ring in at least two places;

(ii) cutting of at least one side of the

breech ring along the long axis of the

cavity that receives the breech block; 

or

(iii) severing of the breech casing into two

approximately equal parts; and

(d) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a

distance of no more than 100 millimetres 

from the breech ring.

7. Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles being

reduced pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section shall be

subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance

with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. Battle tanks

and armoured combat vehicles shall be deemed reduced

upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6

of this Section and notification in accordance with Section X

of the Protocol on Inspection.

8. Vehicles reduced pursuant to paragraph 7 of this

Section shall remain subject to notification pursuant to

Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange until

final conversion for non-military purposes has been

completed and notification has been made in accordance

with Section X, paragraph 12 of the Protocol on Inspection.

9. Vehicles undergoing final conversion for nonmilitary purposes shall also be subject to inspection in

accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection,

with the following changes:

(A) the process of final conversion at a reduction site 

shall not be subject to inspection; and

(B) all other States Parties shall have the right to inspect

fully converted vehicles, without right of refusal,

upon receipt of a notification from the State Party

conducting final conversion specifying when final

conversion procedures will be completed.

10. If,having completed the procedures specified in

paragraph 6 of this Section on a given vehicle, it is decided

not to proceed with final conversion, then the vehicle shall

be destroyed within the time limits for conversion set forth

in Article VIII of the Treaty in accordance with the

appropriate procedures set forth elsewhere in this Protocol.

SECTION IX. PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF

DESTRUCTION BY ACCIDENT

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce its

reduction liability for each category of conventional 

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the event

of destruction by accident by an amount no greater than 1.5

percent of the maximum levels for holdings it notified at the

signature of the Treaty for that category.

2. An item of conventional armaments and equipment 

limited by the Treaty shall be deemed reduced, in accordance

with Article VIII of the Treaty, if the accident in which it was

destroyed is notified to all other States Parties within seven

days of its occurrence. Notification shall include the type of

the destroyed item, the date of the accident, the approximate

location of the accident and the circumstances related to the

accident.

3. Within 90 days of the notification, the State Party

claiming such reduction shall provide documentary evidence,

such as a report of the investigation, to all other States

Parties in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. In the

event of ambiguities relating to the accident, such reduction

shall not be considered complete until final resolution of the

matter.

SECTION X. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY

MEANS OF STATIC DISPLAY

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by

means of static display a certain number of conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.

2. No State Party shall use static display to reduce more

than one percent or eight items, whichever is the greater 

number, of its maximum levels for holdings it declared at the

signature of the Treaty for each category of conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.

3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section,

each State Party also shall have the right to retain in working 

order two items of each existing type of conventional

armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for the

purpose of static display. Such conventional armaments and

equipment shall be displayed at museums or other similar

sites.

4. Conventional armaments and equipment placed on

static display or in museums prior to the signature of the

Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set

forth in the Treaty, including the numerical limitations set

forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section.

5. Such items to be reduced by means of static display

shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites:

(A) all items to be displayed that are powered by selfcontained engines shall have their fuel tanks

rendered incapa ble of holding fuel and:

(1) have their engine(s) and transmission removed

and their mounts damaged so that these pieces

cannot be refitted; or

(2) have their engine compartment filled with

concrete or a polymer resin;
·-- A1111E>1D1 x A: Tiu \TY O'-: Co\ 1 ·v1 10>1'd AH \1Ell FuR c:E t '\i E1mo11r .1 -

(B) all items to be displayed equipped with 75 millimetre

or larger guns with permanently fixed elevation and 

traversing mechanisms shall have their elevation and 

traversing mechanisms welded so that the tube can

be neither traversed nor elevated. In addition, those

items to be displayed which use pinion and rack or

pinion and ring mechanisms for traversing or

elevating shall have three consecutive gear teeth cut 

off from the rack or ring on each side of the pinion

of the gun tube;

(C) all items to be displayed which are equipped with

weapon systems that do not meet the criteria set

forth in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph shall

have their barrel and receiver group filled with either

concrete or a polymer resin, beginning at the face of

the bolt/breech and ending within 100 millimetres of

the muzzle.

SECTION XI. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY USE

AS GROUND TARGETS

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use

as ground targets a certain number of battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles and self-propelled pieces of artillery.

2. No State Party shall reduce by use as ground targets 

numbers of battle tanks or armoured combat vehicles greater 

than 2.5 percent of its maximum level for holdings in each

of those two categories as notified at the signature of the

Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty. In addition, no

State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground

targets more than 50 self-propelled pieces of artillery.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment in use as

ground targets prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not

be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in Articles

IV,V or VI of the Treaty, or to the numerical limitations set

forth in paragraph 2 of this Section.

4. Such items to be reduced by use as ground targets 

shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites:

(A) for battle tanks and self-propelled pieces of artillery:

( 1) for the breech system, either:

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring

in at least two places; or

(b) cutting of at least one side of the breech

ring along the long axis of the cavity that

receives the breech block;

(2) severing of either of the trunnions and its

trunnion mount in the turret; and

(3) severing of sections from both sides of the hull

which include the final drive apertures, by

vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates

and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and

front or rear plates, such that the final drive

apertures are contained in the severed portions;

and

(B) for armoured combat vehicles:

( 1) for the gun breech system:

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring

in at least two places;

(b) cutting of at least one side of the breech 

ring along the axis of the cavity that

receives the breech block; or

(c) severing of the breech casing into two

approximately equal parts;

(2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its

trunnion mount in the turret;

(3) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing

of sections from both sides of the hull which

include the final drive apertures, by vertical and

horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal

cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear 

plates, so that the final drive apertures are 

contained in the severed portions; and

(4) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing

of sections from both sides of the hull which

include the front wheel final gearbox mounting

areas by vertical, horizontal and irregular cuts in

the side, front, deck and belly plates so that the

front wheel final gear box mounting areas are

included in the severed portions at a distance of

no less than 100 millimetres from the cuts.

SECTION XII. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY USE

FOR GROUND INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use

for ground instructional purposes a certain number of

combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

2. No State Party shall reduce by use for ground

instructional purposes numbers of combat aircraft or attack

helicopters greater than five percent of its maximum level for

holdings in each of those two categories as notified at the

signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty.

3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by

the Treaty in use for ground instructional purposes prior to

the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any

numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, V or VI of the

Treaty, or the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 2

of this Section.

4. Such items to be reduced by use for ground

instructional purposes shall undergo the following

procedures at reduction sites:

(A) for combat aircraft:

(1) severing of the fuselage into two parts in the

central wing area;

(2) removal of engines, mutilation of engine

mounting points and either filling of all fuel

tanks with concrete, polymer or resin setting

compounds or removal of the fuel tanks and 

mutilation of the fuel tank mounting points; or

(3) removal of all internal, external and removable

armament and armament systems equipment, 

removal of the tail fin and mutilation of the tail
.l 1 S 0:-\-SI r F h l'LC 1 i l l'> Au '\\ 1

fin mounting points, and filling of all but one

fuel tank with concrete, polymer or resin setting

compounds; and

(B) for attack helicopters:

severing of the tail boom or tail part from the 

fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained

in the severed portion.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES

GOVERNING THE RECLASSIFICATION OF

SPECIFIC MODELS OR VERSIONS OF

COMBAT-CAPABLETRAINER AIRCRAFT

INTO UNARMED TRAINER AIRCRAFT

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and

provisions governing total disarming and certification of the 

unarmed status of specific models or versions of combatcapable trainer aircraft in accordance with Article VIII of the

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of

November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I.GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from 

the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV

and VI of the Treaty only those specific models or versions

of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II,

paragraph 1of this Protocol in accordance with the 

procedures set forth in this Protocol.

(A) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from

the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in

Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of

the specific models or versions listed in Section II,

paragraph 1of this Protocol that have any of the 

components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and

2 of this Protocol only by total disarming and

certification.

(B) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from 

the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in

Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of

the specific models or versions listed in Section II,

paragraph 1 of this Protocol that do not have any of

the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1

and 2 of this Protocol by certification alone.

2. Models or versions of combat-capa ble trainer

aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol may be disarmed

and certified, or certified alone, within 40 months after entry

into force of the Treaty. Such aircraft shall count against the

numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and

VI of the Treaty until such aircraft have been certified as

unarmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in

Section IV of this Protocol. Each State Party shall have the

right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat

aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty no more than 550

such aircraft, of which no more than 130 shall be of the

MiG-25U model or version.

3. No later than entry into force of the Treaty, each

State Party shall notify all other States Parties of:

(A) the total number of each specific model or version of

combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party

intends to disarm and certify in accordance with

Section I, paragraph 1,subparagraph (A), Section III

and Section IV of this Protocol; and

(B) the total number of each specific model or version of

combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party

intends to certify alone, in accordance with Section I,

paragraph 1,subparagraph (B) and Section IV of

this Protocol.

4. Each State Party shall use whatever technological

means it deems necessary to implement the total disarming

procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol.

SECTION II.MODELS OR VERSIONS OF COMBATCAPABLE TRAINER AIRCRAFT ELIGIBLE FOR TOTAL 

DISARMING AND CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from 

the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV

and VI of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of

this Protocol only the following specific models or versions

of combat-capable trainer aircraft:

SU-15U 

SU-17U 

MiG-15U

MiG-21U

MiG-23U

MiG-25U

UIL-28

2. The foregoing list of specific models or versions of

combat-capable trainer aircraft is final and not subject to

rev1s10n.

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR TOTAL DISARMING

1. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer

aircraft being totally disarmed shall be rendered incapable of

further employment of any type of weapon system as well as

further operation of electronic warfare and reconnaissance

systems by the removal of the following components:

(A) provisions specifically for the attachment of weapon

systems, such as special hardpoints, launching

devices, or weapon mounting areas;

(B) units and panels of weapon control systems

including weapon selection, arming and firing or

launching systems;

(C) units of aiming equipment and weapon guidance

systems not integral to navigation and flight control

systems; and

(D) units and panels of electronic warfare and

reconnaissance systems including associated

antennae.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Section, any 

special hardpoints which are integral to the aircraft, as well

as any special elements of general purpose hardpoints which
are designed for use only with the components described in

paragraph 1of this Section, shall be rendered incapable of

further employment with such systems. Electrical circuits of

the weapon, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance systems

described in paragraph 1of this Section shall be rendered

incapable of further employment by removal of the wiring

or, if that is not technically practicable, by cutting out

sections of the wiring in accessible areas.

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties the following information, no less than 42 days in

advance of the total disarming of the first aircraft of each

model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in

Section II of this Protocol:

(A) a basic block diagram portraying all major

components of weapon systems including aiming

equipment and weapon guidance systems, provisions

designed for the attachment of weapons as well as

components of electronic warfare and

reconnaissance systems, the basic function of the 

components described in paragraph 1of this Section,

and the functional connections of such components 

to each other;

(B) a general description of the disarming process

including a list of components to be removed; and

(C) a photograph of each component to be removed

illustrating its position in the aircraft prior to its

removal, and a photograph of the same position

after the corresponding component has been

removed.

SECTION IV.PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party that intends to disarm and certify,

or certify alone, models or versions of combat-capable 

trainer aircraft shall comply with the following certification

procedures in order to ensure that such aircraft do not

possess any of the components listed in Section III,

paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties

in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 3 of the Protocol

on Inspection of each certification. In the event of the first

certification of an aircraft that does not require total

disarming, the State Party that intends to conduct the 

certification shall provide to all other States Parties the 

information required in Section III, paragraph 3,

subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of this Protocol for an armed 

model or version of the same aircraft type.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the

certification of combat-capa ble trainer aircraft in accordance

with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

4. The process of total disarming and certification, or

certification alone, shall be deemed completed when the 

certification procedures set forth in this Section have been

completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises

the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of

this Section and Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection,

provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of

completion of the certification and reclassification provided

pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has

notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is

an ambiguity relating to the certification and reclassification

process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such

reclassification shall not be deemed complete until the matter

relating to the ambiguity is resolved.

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall

notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX 

of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the

certification.

6. Certification shall be conducted in the area of

application. States Parties belonging to the same group of

States Parties shall have the right to share locations for

certification.

SECTION V.PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION

EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION

All models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft 

certified as unarmed shall be subject to information

exchange, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol

on Information Exchange, and verification, including

inspection, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING 

THE CATEGORISATION OF COMBAT

HELICOPTERS AND THE

RECATEGORISATION OF MULTI-PURPOSE

ATTACK HELICOPTERS

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and

provisions governing the categorisation of combat

helicopters and recategorisation of multi-purpose attack

helicopters as provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,

1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

SECTION I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

CATEGORISATION OF COMBAT HELICOPTERS

1. Combat helicopters shall be categorised as specialised

attack, multi-purpose attack or combat support helicopters

and shall be listed as such in the Protocol on Existing Types.

2. All models or versions of a specialised attack

helicopter type shall be categorised as specialised attack

helicopters.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of

this Section and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may hold an aggregate

total not to exceed 100 Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters

equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological

/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the 

limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the 

Treaty. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of

information in accordance with the Protocol on Information 

Exchange and to internal inspection in accordance with

Section VI, paragraph 30 of the Protocol on Inspection. Mi24R and Mi-24K helicopters in excess of this limit shall be

categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of

how they are equipped and shall count against the

limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the 

Treaty.
320 ON-SITE I NPFCTION Acl·"IU _ _ _ ----·------------·- -·---·-

4. Each State Party that holds both combat support and

multi-purpose attack models or versions of a helicopter type

shall categorise as attack helicopters all helicopters which

have any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of

this Protocol and shall have the right to categorise as combat

support helicopters any helicopters that have none of the

features listed in Section III, paragraph 1of this Protocol.

5. Each State Party that holds only combat support

models or versions of a helicopter type included on both the 

Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopter and the Combat Support

Helicopter lists in the Protocol on Existing Types shall have

the right to categorise such helicopters as combat support

helicopters.

SECTION II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR

RECATEGORISATION

1. Only combat helicopters that are categorised as

multi-purpose attack helicopters in accordance with the

categorisation requirements set forth in this Protocol shall be

eligible for recategorisation as combat support helicopters.

2. Each State Party shall have the right to recategorise

individual multi-purpose attack helicopters that have any of

the features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this

Protocol only by conversion and certification. Each State

Party shall have the right to recategorise individual multipurpose attack helicopters that do not have any of the 

features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol

by certification alone.

3. Each State Party shall use whatever technological

means it deems necessary to implement the conversion

procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol.

4. Each combat helicopter subject to the 

recategorisation procedure shall bear the original

manufacturer's serial number permanently stamped in a

main airframe structural member.

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION

1. Multi-purpose attack helicopters being converted

shall be rendered incapable of further employment of guided

weapons by the removal of the following components:

(A) provisions specifically for the attachment of guided

weapons, such as special hardpoints or launching

devices. Any such special hardpoints which are

integral to the helicopter, as well as any special

elements of general purpose hardpoints which are

designed for use only by guided weapons, shall be

rendered incapa ble of further employment with

guided weapons; and

(B) all integrated fire control and aiming systems for

guided weapons, including wiring.

2. A State Party shall provide to all other States Parties

the following information, either at least 42 days in advance

of the conversion of the first helicopter of a type or at entry

into force of the Treaty in the event that a State Party

declares both multi-purpose attack helicopters and combat

support helicopters of the same type:

(A) a basic block diagram portraying all major

components of guided weapon integrated fire control

and aiming systems as well as components of

equipment designed for the attachment of guided

weapons, the basic function of the components

described in paragraph 1of this Section, and the

functional connections of such components to each

other;

(B) a general description of the conversion process,

including a list of components to be removed; and

(C) a photograph of each component to be removed,

illustrating its position in the helicopter prior to its

removal, and a photograph of the same position 

after the corresponding component has been

removed.

SECTION IV.PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION

1. Each State Party that is recategorising multi-purpose

attack helicopters shall comply with the following

certification procedures, in order to ensure that such

helicopters do not possess any of the features listed in

Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties

of each certification in accordance with Section IX,

paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Inspection.

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the 

certification of helicopters in accordance with Section IX of

the Protocol on Inspection.

4. The process of recategorisation shall be deemed

complete when the certification procedures set forth in this

Section have been completed regardless of whether any State

Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in

paragraph 3 of this Section and Section IX of the Protocol

on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the 

notification of completion of the certification and

recategorisation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this

Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties

that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the

certification and recategorisation process. In the event of

such an ambiguity being raised, such recategorisation shall

not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the

ambiguity isresolved.

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall

notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX

of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the 

certification and recategorisation.

6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of

application. States Parties belonging to the same group of

States Parties shall have the right to share locations for

certification.

SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION

EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION

All combat helicopters within the area of application

shall be subject to information exchange in accordance with

the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange and

verification, including inspection, in accordance with the

Protocol on Inspection.
 APPFr\DIX A: TRI A IY O:\ C:o:-.:n:'\TIOf\ AL AR.\IFD FoRCF Ir\ ELROPE 32 1

PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT

CONSULTATIVEGROUP

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and

other provisions relating to the Joint Consultative Group

established by Article XVI of the Treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter

referred to as the Treaty.

1. The Joint Consultative Group shall be composed of

representatives designated by each State Party. Alternates,

advisers and experts of a State Party may take part in the

proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group as deemed 

necessary by that State Party.

2. The first session of the Joint Consultative Group

shall open no later than 60 days after the signing of the

Treaty. The Chairman of the opening meeting shall be the

representative of the Kingdom of Norway.

3. The Joint Consultative Group shall meet for regular

sessions to be held two times per year.

4. Additional sessions shall be convened at the request

of one or more States Parties by the Chairman of the Joint

Consultative Group, who shall promptly inform all other

States Parties of the request. Such sessions shall open no

later than 15 days after receipt of such a request by the

Chairman.

5. Sessions of the Joint Consultative Group shall last

no longer than four weeks, unless it decides otherwise.

6. States Parties shall assume in rotation, determined

by alphabetical order in the French language, the

Chairmanship of the Joint Consultative Group.

7. The Joint Consultative Group shall meet in Vienna,

unless it decides otherwise.

8. Representatives at meetings shall be seated in

alphabetical order of the States Parties in the French

language.

9. The official languages of the Joint Consultative

Group shall be English, French, German, Italian, Russian

and Spanish.

10. The proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group

shall be confidential, unless it decides otherwise.

11. The scale of distribution for the common expenses

associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative

Group shall be applied, unless otherwise decided by the

Joint Consultative Group, as follows:

10.35% for the French Republic, the Federal

Republic of Germany, the Italian Repu blic, the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and

the United States of America;

6.50% for Canada;

5.20% for the Kingdom of Spain;

4.00% for the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of

the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland;

2.34% for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,

the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Hungary

and the Kingdom of Norway;

0.88% for the Hellenic Republic, Romania and the

Republic of Turkey;

0.68% for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Grand 

Duchy of Luxembourg and the Portuguese Republic;

and

0.16% for the Repu blic of Iceland.

12. During the period that this Protocol is applied

provisionally in accordance with the Protocol on Provisional

Application, the Joint Consultative Group shall:

(A) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure,

working methods, the scale of distribution of

expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of

conferences, and the distribution of the costs of

inspections between or among States Parties, in

accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2,

subparagraph (F) of the Treaty; and

(B) consider, upon the request of any State Party, issues

relating to the provisions of the Treaty that are

applied provisionally.

PROTOCOL ON THE PROVISIONAL

APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF

THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED

FORCES IN EUROPE

To promote the implementation of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,

1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the States Parties

hereby agree to the provisional application of certain

provisions of the Treaty.

1. Without detriment to the provisions of Article XXII 

of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply provisionally the

following provisions of the Treaty:

(A) Article VII, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4;

(B) Article VIII, paragraphs 5, 6 and 8;

(C) Article IX;

(D) Article XIII;

(E) Article XVI, paragraphs 1, 2(F), 2(G), 4, 6 and 7;

(F) Article XVII;

(G) Article XVIII;

(H) Article XXI, paragraph 2;

(I) Protocol on Existing Types, Sections III and IV;

(J) Protocol on Information Exchange, Sections VII, XII

and XIII;

(K) Protocol on Inspection, Section II paragraph 24,

subparagraph (A) and Section III, paragraphs 3, 4, 5,

7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12;

(L) Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group; and
(M) Protocol on Reduction, Section IX.

2. The States Parties shall apply provisionally the

provisions listed in paragraph 1of this Protocol in the light 

of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

3. This Protocol shall enter into force at the signature

of the Treaty. Itshall remain in force for 12 months, but 

shall terminate earlier if:

(A) the Treaty enters into force before the period of 12

months expires; or

(B) a State Party notifies all other States Parties that it

does not intend to become a party to the Treaty.

The period of application of this Protocol may be

extended if all the States Parties so decide.

DECLARATION OFTHE STATES PARTIES

TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL

ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE WITH

RESPECT TOLAND-BASED NAVAL

AIRCRAFT

To promote the implementation of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the States Parties to

the Treaty undertake the following political commitments

outside the framework of the Treaty.

1. No one State will have in the area of application of

the Treaty more that 400 permanently land-based combat

naval aircraft. It is understood that this commitment applies

to combat aircraft armed and equipped to engage surface or

air targets and excludes types designed as maritime patrol

aircraft.

2. The aggregate number of such permanently landbased combat naval aircraft held by either of the two groups

of States defined under the terms of the Treaty will not 

exceed 430.

3. No one State will hold in its naval forces within the 

area of application any permanently land-based attack

helicopters.

4. The limitations provided for in this Declaration will

apply beginning 40 months after entry into force of the 

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

5. This Declaration will become effective as of entry 

into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe.

DECLARATION OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE

TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN

EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL STRENGTH

In connection with the signature of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,

1990, and with a view to the follow-on negotiations referred

to in Article XVIII of that Treaty, the States Parties to that

Treaty declare that, for the period of these negotiations, they

will not increase the total peacetime authorized personnel

strength of their conventional armed forces pursuant to the 

Mandate in the area of application.

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ON THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF

GERMAN ARMED FORCES

In connection with the signature of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Government of

the Federal Republic of Germany confirms the declaration 

made by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs on 30

August 1990 in the plenary session of the Negotiations on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which reads as

follows:

"The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed 

forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and

naval forces) within three to four years. This reduction will

commence on the entry into force of the first CFE

agreement.

Within the scope of this overall ceiling no more than

345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces which, 

pursuant to the agreed mandate, alone are the subject of the 

Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

TheFederal Governmentregardsits commitment to

reduce ground and airforces as a significant German

contribution to the reduction of conventional armed forces

in Europe. Itassumesthat in follow-on negotiations the

other participants in the negotiations, too, will render their

contribution to enhancing security and stability inEurope,

includingmeasurestolimitpersonnelstrengths."
Append ix B

CFE STATEMENTS

Statement by the Government of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,

1990 (the Treaty), the Government of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics states that it assumes the following

obligations outside the framework of the Treaty.

I

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall hold within

the area of application of the Treaty conventional armaments

and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories not to exceed:

in Coastal Defence forces -813 battle tanks, 972 armoured

combat vehicles and 846 pieces of artillery; in Naval Infantry

-120 battle tanks, 753 armoured combat vehicles and 234 

pieces of artillery; in the Strategic Rocket Forces -1,701

armoured combat vehicles, each being an armoured personnel

carrier asthat term is defined in the Treaty.

II

Forty months after entry into force of the Treaty and 

thereafter, within the levels and sublevels that ensue from the 

obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under

the Treaty, the holdings of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and

pieces of artillery shall be less than its maximum level for

holdings, as notified in accordance with Article VII of the 

Treaty, by the number it will have in Coastal Defence forces

and Naval Infantry within the area of application of the 

Treaty. For example, with regard to battle tanks, unless the

maximum levels for holdings for the Union of Soviet

Socialist Repu blics are revised in accordance with Article VII

of the Treaty, the numbers for the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics within the area of application of the Treaty,

including battle tanks in Coastal Defence forces and Naval

Infantry, will not exceed: 13,150 overall; 10,500 in active 

units overall; 7,150 in active units within the region

described in Article IV, paragraph 3 of the Treaty; and 1,850

in active units within the area described in Article V,

paragraph 1,subparagraph (A) of the Treaty.

III

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall

reduce, in addition to the reduction liability established for

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty on

the basis of information it supplied, its holding of

conventional armaments and equipment in the Treatylimited categories within the area of application of the

Treaty by the number which it had as of the date of

signature of the Treaty in Coastal Defense forces and Naval 

Infantry, that is, by 933 battle tanks, 1,725 armoured

combat vehicles, and 1,080 pieces of artillery.

2. Such additional reduction shall be carried out by

means of destruction or conversion into civilian equipment 

of 933 battle tanks and destruction of 1,080 pieces of

artillery. Of the 1,725 armoured combat vehicles to be

additionally reduced, 972 armoured combat vehicles shall be

destroyed or converted into civilian equipment and 753

armoured combat vehicles of the MT-LB type, included in

the armoured combat vehicle category and belonging to the 

number declared as of the date of signature of the Treaty,

shall be modified, in accordance with the Protocol on

Existing Types, into armoured personnel carrier look-alikes

of the MT-LB-AT type, which are not limited by the Treaty.

3. Fifty percent of the 933 battle tanks and 972

armoured combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted

within the area of application of the Treaty and 50 percent

of the 1,080 pieces of artillery shall be destroyed within the

area of application of the Treaty, within the time limits and 

in accordance with the procedures established by the Treaty.

The remainder of these conventional armaments and

equipment shall be withdrawn from the area of application 

of the Treaty; an equivalent number of conventional

armaments and equipment shall be destroyed or converted

outside of the area of application of the Treaty within the 

time limits established by the Treaty and in accordance with

procedures which provide sufficient visible evidence that the

conventional armaments and equipment have been destroyed

or rendered militarily unusable. The States Parties to the

Treaty shall be notified in advance, giving the location, 

number and types of conventional armaments and

equipment to be destroyed or converted.

IV

The holdings of armoured combat vehicles in the Strategic 

Rocket Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall 

not be subject to the numerical limitations of the Treaty, in

accordance with Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (F) of

the Treaty. These forces shall not be equipped with

conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited 

categories, other than armoured personnel carriers.

v

The conventional armaments and equipment of Coastal 

Defence forces and Naval Infantry in the categories subject

to the Treaty within the area of application of the Treaty

shall be subject to challenge inspections in accordance with

the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection. Effective

verification of such armaments and equipment shall be

ensured. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall

provide separate information to all States Parties on such

armaments and equipment of the same scope and with the

same degree of detail as provided for in Section III,

paragraph 2 of the Protocol on Information Exchange, and

under the same timetable for the provision of information as

provided for in Section VII of that Protocol.
324 0"1-SI 11 fr\PH 110" AcF'\u

VI

Unless otherwise specified (a) in this Statement, (b) in the

Treaty, or (c) in the Declaration on Land-Based Naval

Aircraft, all conventional armaments and equipment in the

Treaty-limited categories, based on land within the area of

application of the Treaty, irrespective of assignment, shall be

subject to all numerical limitations of the Treaty.

VII

This Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics regarding the aforementioned obligations 

assumed outside the framework of the Treaty shall enter into

force simultaneously with the Treaty, shall be legally binding

and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

June 14, 1991.

Statement of the Government of the United States of

America and Statements Identical in Content of the Other

20 Signatory States

Statement of the Government of the United States of America

The Government of the United States of America hereby

agrees that the Statement of the Government of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics of today's date provides a

satisfactory basis for proceeding toward ratification and

implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty).

The aforementioned Statement of the Government of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and this Statement of the 

Government of the United States of America shall be equally

legally binding; they shall enter into force simultaneously

with the Treaty, and shall have the same duration as the 

Treaty.

June 14, 1991.

Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics in the Joint Consultative Group

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,

1990, (the Treaty) I have been instructed by the Government

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to state the

following:

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will, during 

1991-1995, destroy or convert into civilian equipment no

less than 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armoured combat 

vehicles and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the

conventional armaments and equipment in the Treatylimited categories beyond the Urals, in addition to the

numbers of armaments subject to destruction and conversion

specified in the Statement of the Government of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics of June 14, 1991 concerning

obligations outside the framework of the Treaty.

The armaments will be destroyed or converted under the

procedures that will provide sufficient visible evidence,

which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered

militarily unusable. Advance notification and information

will be provided to the States Parties to the Treaty regarding

the locations and numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles and pieces of artillery undergoing destruction or

conversion.

Elimination of armaments in the Treaty-limited categories

will also be carried out subsequently as their operational and

service life is expended.

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the 

period between January 1989 and signature of the Treaty on

November 19, 1990, in connection with activities related to

unilateral reductions of the Soviet armed forces, the 

withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries of Eastern

Europe and adaption of the armed forces to the new

defensive doctrine, withdrew beyond the Urals the following

numbers of conventional armaments and equipment in the 

Treaty-limited categories: 16,400 battle tanks, 15,900

armoured combat vehicles and 25,000 pieces of artillery.

Of these numbers of armaments and equipment, 8,000

battle tanks, 11,200 armoured combat vehicles and 1 600

pieces of artillery have been turned over to military uits and

subunits in the eastern Soviet Union for the purpose of

reequipping them and supplementing their armaments.

Another part of the conventional armaments and

equipment in the Treaty-limited categories which have been

transferred beyond the Urals (8,400 battle tanks, 4,700

armoured combat vehicles and 16,400 pieces of artillery),

has been placed in storage. In addition, 7,000 pieces of

artillery are being used for replacement and repair.

These stored conventional armaments and equipment 

withdrawn beyond the Urals will be used up in the process

of replacing obsolete armaments and equipment that have

expended their established operational and service life and,

in the eastern Soviet Union, also in supplementing units.

With respect to the armaments and equipment transferred

beyond the Urals before signature of the Treaty that have

been placed in storage or are used for replacement and

repair beyond the Urals, upon entry into force of the Treaty,

information will be provided to all States Parties about the 

location and numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat

vehicles and pieces of artillery at such locations as of July 1,

1991. Armaments in each of these categories ( battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery) will be

stored separately.

3. The conventional armaments and equipment in the

Treaty-limited categories withdrawn beyond the Urals prior

to signature of the Treaty will not be used to create a 

strategic reserve or operational groupings, and will not be

stored in any way permitting their rapid return to the area of

application of the Treaty, that is, such armaments and

equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will not be stored in

sets for military formations.

Military formations and units deployed within the

area of application of the Treaty will be organized in line

with the Soviet defensive doctrine and taking into account 

the sufficiency levels of armaments established by the Treaty

for a single state.

June 14, 1991.
Append ix C

CONCLUDINGAcr OFTHE NEGOTIATION ON

PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL

ARMEDFORCES IN EUROPE (CFE1A)

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the

Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic

of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,

the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Repu blic, the Republic

of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic

Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland,

the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand 

Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the

Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the 

Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the

Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of

Turkey, Ukraine, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

hereinafter referred to as the Participating States.

Recalling the obligations undertaken in the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,

1990, hereinafter referred to as the CFE Treaty, and the 

important achievements attained in that treaty,

In accordance with the obligation in Article XVIII of the

CFE Treaty to continue the negotiations on conventional 

armed forces with the same mandate and with the goal of

building on the CFE Treaty and with the objective of

concluding an agreement, no later than the 1992 follow-up

of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE), on additional measures aimed at further

strengthening security and stability in Europe,

Guided by the mandate for negotiation on conventional 

armed forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having

conducted negotiations in Vienna,

Having decided to limit and, if applicable, reduce, on a

national basis, the personnel strength of their conventional

armed forces within the area of application,1

Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the CSCE,

within the framework of which these negotiations were

conducted,

Looking forward to a more structured cooperation

among all CSCE Participating States on security matters and

to new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and

1 The area of application of the measures adopted in this Act

is the area of application of the CFE Treaty as defined in

Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (B) of Article II of the CFE

Treaty, taking into account the understanding specified in

Paragraph 5 of Annex A of the final document of the

extraordinary conference of the States Parties to the Treaty

on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of June 5, 1992.

security building in accordance with their commitment in the 

Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and, accordingly, to the 

possibility, within the context of those new negotiations, for

all CSCE Participating States to subscribe to a common

regime based upon the measures adopted in this Concluding

Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act,

Taking into account the principle of sufficiency, and

recalling the undertaking of the Participating States to

maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to

prevent war and provide for effective defence, bearing in

mind the relationship between military capabilities and 

doctrines,

Recognising the freedom of each Participating State to

choose its own security arrangements,

Have adopted the following:

SECTION 1. SCOPE OF LIMITATION

1. Each Participating State will limit, as specified in

Section II of this Act, its personnel based on land within the

area of application in the following categories of

conventional armed forces:

(A) All full-time military personnel serving with land

forces, including air defence formations and units

subordinated at or below the military district or

equivalent level, as specified in Section I of the

Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE

Treaty;

(B) All full-time military personnel serving with air and 

air defence aviation forces, including long-range

aviation forces reported pursuant to Section I of the 

Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE

Treaty, as well as military transport aviation forces;

(C) All full-time military personnel serving with air and

air defence forces other than those specified in

subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph;

(D) All full-time military personnel, excluding naval

personnel, serving with all central headquarters,

command and staff elements

(E) Al l full-time military personnel, excluding naval

personnel, serving with all centrally-controlled

formations, units and other organisations, including

those of rear services;

(F) All full-time military personnel serving with all landbased naval formations and units which hold battle
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured

vehicle launched bridges, armoured infantry fighting

vehicle look-alikes, or armoured personnel carrier

look-alikes as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty

or which hold land-based naval combat aircraft 

referred to in the Declaration of the States Parties to

the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

with respect to land-based naval aircraft of

November 19, 1990;

(G) All full-time military personnel serving with all other

formations, units and other organisations which hold

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery,

combat aircraft or attack helicopters in service with

its conventional armed forces, as defined in Article II

of the CFE Treaty; and

(H) All reserve personnel who have completed their

initial military service or training and who are called

up or report voluntarily for full-time military service

or training in conventional armed forces for a

continuous period of more than 90 days.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1 of

this section, the following categories of personnel are not

included within the scope of limitation specified in this Act:

(A) Personnel serving with organisations designed and

structured to perform in peacetime internal security

functions;

(B) Personnel in transit from a location outside the area 

of application to a final destination outside the area 

of application who are in the area of application for

no longer than seven days; and

(C) Personnel serving under the command of the United

Nations.

3. If, after the date on which this Act comes into effect,

any land-based formations or units are formed within the

area of application which, according to their structure and

armaments, have a capability for ground combat outside

national borders against an external enemy, a Participating

State may raise in the Joint Consultative Group any issue

regarding personnel serving with such formations and units.

The Joint Consultative Group will consider any such issue

on the basis of all available information, including

information provided by the Participating States concerned,

with a view to deciding whether the above-mentioned

criteria are applica ble to such formations and units; if such

criteria are deemed to apply, the personnel serving with such

formations and units will be included within the scope of

limitation specified in this Act.

SECTION II. NATIONAL PERSONNEL LIMITS

1. Each Participating State will limit its military

personnel based on land within the area of application in the 

categories of conventional armed forces specified in Section

I, Paragraph 1 of this Act so that, 40 months after entry into

force of the CFE Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number

of such personnel will not exceed the number representing

its national personnel limitation as specified in this 

paragraph:

TheRepublic of Armenia ...................................................

TheRepublic of Azerbaijan ...............................................

TheRepublic of Belarus........................................ 100,000

The Kingdom of Belgium ........................................ 70,000

The Republic of Bulgaria ...................................... 104,000 

Canada ................................................................... 10,660

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ............... 140,000

The Kingdom of Denmark ...................................... 39,000

The French Repu blic ............................................. 325,000

TheRepublic of Georgia ....................................................

The Federal Republic of Germany ........................ 345,000

The Hellenic Republic ........................................... 158,621

The Republic of Hungary ..................................... 100,000

The Republic of Iceland .......................................................... 0

The Italian Republic ............................................. 315,000

The Republic of Kazakhstan...................................................0

The Grand Duchy of Luxem bourg....................................900

The Republic of Moldova ..................................................

The Kingdom of the Netherlands ............................ 80,000

The Kingdom of Norway ........................................ 32,000

The Republic of Poland ........................................ 234,000

The Portuguese Republic ........................................ 75,000

Romania ............................................................... 230,248

The Russian Federation ..................................... 1,450,000

The Kingdom of Spain .......................................... 300,000

The Republ ic of Turkey ........................................ 530,000

Ukraine ................................................................. 450,000

The United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland ............................................ 260,000

The United States of America ................................ 250,000

2. For the purpose of recording changes to the 

information specified in Paragraph 1of this Section, the 

Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will

distribute to all the Participating States a revised version of

the information in that paragraph.

3. Each Participating State may revise its national

personnel limit in accordance with Section IV of this Act.

SECTION III. REVISION PROCEDURES

1. A Participating State may revise downward its

national personnel limit by providing a notification of its

revised limit to all other Participating States. Such

notification will specify the date on which the revised limit

willbecome effective.
2. A Participating State intending to revise upward its

national personnel limit will provide notification of such

intended revision to all other Participating States. Such

notification will include an explanation of the reasons for

such a revision. Any Participating State may raise any

question concerning the intended revision. A revised national

personnel limit will become effective 42 days after

notification has been provided, unless a Participating State

raises an objection to such revision by providing notification

of its objection to all other Participating States.

3. If an objection is raised, any Participating State may

request the convening of an extraordinary conference which

will examine the intended revision in the light of the 

explanations provided and seek to decide on a future 

national personnel limit. The extraordinary conference will

open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and,

unless it decides otherwise, will last no longer than three 

weeks.

SECTION IV.INFORMATION EXCHANGE

1. Each Participating State will provide to all other

Participating States, in accordance with the provisions of this

section, the following information in respect of its personnel

based on land within the area of application:

(A) In respect of all personnel specified in Section I,

Paragraph I of this Act, the aggregate number;

(B) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving

with land forces, including air defence formations

and units subordinated at or below the military

district or equivalent level, as specified in Section I of

the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE

Treaty, the aggregate number and the number in each

formation, unit and other organisation down to the

brigade/regiment or equivalent level, specifying the 

command organisation, designation, subordination

and peacetime location, including the geographic

name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit

(E)

(F)

(G)

and coordinates, for each such formation and

organisation;

In respect of all full-time military personnel of

conventional armed forces, excluding naval

personnel, serving with all central headquarters,

command and staff elements, the aggregate number;

In respect of all full-time military personnel of

conventional armed forces, excluding naval

personnel, serving with all centrally-controlled

formations, units and other organisations, including

those of rear services, the aggregate number and the 

number in each formation, unit and other

organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air

regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command 

organisation, designation, subordination and 

peacetime location, including the geographic name

and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and

organisation;

In respect of all full-time military personnel serving

with all land-based naval formations and units which

hold conventional armaments and equipment in the

categories specified in Section III of the Protocol on

Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty or which

hold land-based naval combat aircraft referred to in

the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with respect

to land-based naval aircraft of Novem ber 19, 1990,

the aggregate number and the number in each

formation and unit down to the brigade/regiment,

wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as units

at the next level of command below the brigade/

regiment, wing/air regiment level which are 

separately located or independent (i.e., battalions/ 

squadrons or equivalent), specifying the designation

and peacetime location, including the geographic

name and coordinates, for each such formation and

unit;

(C)

and organisation;

In respect of all full-time military personnel serving

with air and air defence aviation forces, including

long-range aviation forces reported pursuant to

Section I of the Protocol on Information Exchange of

the CFE Treaty, as well as military transport aviation

forces, the aggregate number and the number in each

formation, unit and other organisation of

conventional armed forces down to the wing/air

regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command 

organisation, designation, subordination and

peacetime location, including the geographic name

and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and

organisation;

(H) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving

with all formations, units and other organisations of

conventional armed forces specified in Section III of

the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE

Treaty, the number in each such formation, unit and

organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air

regiment or equivalent level, as well as units at the 

next level of command below the brigade/regiment,

wing/air regiment level which are separately located

or independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or

equivalent), specifying the designation and peacetime

location, including the geographic name and

coordinates, for each such formation, unit and 

organisation;

(D) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving

with air defence forces other than those specified in

Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this paragraph, the

aggregate number and the number in each formation

and other organisation down to the next level of

command above division or equivalent level (i.e., air

defence army or equivalent), specifying the command

organisation, designation, subordination and

peacetime location, including the geographic name

(I) In respect of all personnel serving with all formations

and units down to the independent or separately

located battalion or equivalent level which hold

battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft or specialised

attack helicopters as well as armoured infantry

fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the

CFE Treaty, in organisations designed and structured

to perform in peacetime internal security functions,

the number in each such formation and unit at each

site at which such armaments and equipment are

held, specifying the national-level designation of each
328 o-Srn INSl'F( fl() AcFNU

such organisation and the location, including the

geographic name and coordinates, of each site at

which such armaments and equipment are held;

(J) In respect of all personnel serving with all formations

and units in organisations designed and structured to

perform in peacetime internal security functions, 

excluding unarmed or lightly armed civil police

forces and protective services, the aggregate number

and the aggregate number in each administrative

region or equivalent;

(K) In respect of all reserve personnel who have

completed their military service or training and who

have been called up or have reported voluntarily for

military service or training in conventional armed

forces since the most recent exchange of information

provided in accordance with this section, the 

aggregate number, specifying the number, if any, of

those who have been called up or have reported 

voluntarily for full-time military service or training

in conventional armed forces for a continuous period

of more than 90 days;

(L) In respect of all military personnel serving under the

command of the United Nations, the aggregate

number; and

(M) In respect of all military personnel serving with all

other formations, units and other organisations of

conventional armed forces, the aggregate number,

specifying the designation of such formations, units

and organisations.

2. In providing information on personnel strengths in

accordance with this section, each Participating State will

provide the peacetime authorized personnel strength, which

will approximate the number of personnel serving within the

area of application with each of the formations, units and

other organisations specified in Paragraph 1of this section.

3. The provisions of this section will not apply to

personnel who are in transit through the area of application 

from a location outside the area of application to a final

destination outside the area of application. Personnel in the 

categories specified in Paragraph 1 of this section who

entered the area of application in transit will be subject to

the provisions of this section if they remain within the area

of application for a period longer than seven days.

4. Each Participating State will be responsible for its

own information; receipt of such information will not imply

validation or acceptance of the information provided.

5. The Participating States will provide the information

specified in this section in accordance with the formats and

procedures to be agreed in the Joint Consultative Group.

6. Prior to the date on which national personnel limits

become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act,

each Participating State will provide to all other

Participating States the information specified in Paragraph 1,

Subparagraphs (A), (D), (E) and(G) to (K) of this section, as

well as the information on aggregate numbers of personnel

in the categories specified in Subparagraphs (B), (C) and (F)

of that paragraph, in written form, in one of the official

CSCE languages, using diplomatic channels or other official

channels designated by them in accordance with the

following timeta ble:

(A) No later than 30 days following entry into force of

the CFE Treaty, with the information effective as of

the date of entry into force of that Treaty; and

(B) On the 15th day of Decem ber of the year in which

the CFE Treaty comes into force (unless entry into

force of that Treaty occurs within 60 days of the 1st

day of December), and on the 15th day of Decem ber

of every year thereafter, with the information

effective as of the first day of Jan uary of the

following year.

7. Beginning with the date on which national personnel

limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this

Act, each Participating State will provide to all other

Participating States all the information specified in Paragraph

1 of this section in written form, in one of the official CSCE

languages, using diplomatic channels or other official

channels designated by them, in accordance with the

following timetable:

(A) On the date on which national personnel limits

become effective in accordance with Section II of this 

Act, with the information effective as of that date;

and

(B) On the 15th day of December of the year in which

the national personnel limits become effective in

accordance with Section II of this Act, and on the

15th day of December of every year thereafter, with

the information effective as of the first day of

January of the following year

8. The Participating States will, at the first review of the 

operation of this Act in accordance with Paragraph 3 of

Section VII of this Act, consider issues relating to the 

adequacy and effectiveness of the disaggregation of the 

information specified in Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs (B), (C)

and (F) of this section.

SECTION V. STABILISING MEASURES

Notification Of Increases In Unit Strengths

1. Each Participating State will notify all other

Participating States at least 42 days in advance of any

permanent increase in the personnel strength of any

formation, unit or other organisation which was reported in

the most recent exchange of information at the brigade/

regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level in accordance

with Section IV of this Act when such increase equals 1,000

or more at the brigade/regiment level, or 500 or more at the

wing/air regiment level, or equivalent levels.

Notification Of Call-Up Of Reserve Personnel

2. Any Participating State intending to call up reserve

personnel of its conventional armed forces based on land

within the area of application will notify all other

Participating States whenever the cumulative total of the 

personnel called up and retained on full-time military service

will exceed a threshold of 35,000.
 APl' Nlll'\ C: Cor\ut 1 D1Nc Ac 1 rn THI· N1c;or1Ar10N 129

3. Such notification will be provided at least 42 days in

advance of such threshold being exceeded. As an exception, 

in the case of emergency situations where advance

notification is not practical, notification will be provided as 

soon as possi ble and, in any event, no later than the date

such threshold is exceeded.

4. Such notification will include the following

information:

(A) The total number of reserve personnel to be called

up, specifying the number to be called up for more

than 90 days;

(B) A general description of the purpose of the call-up;

(C) The planned start and end dates of the period during

which such threshold will be exceeded; and

(D) The designation and location of any formation in

which more than 7,000 at the division or equivalent

level or more than 9,000 at the army/army corps or

equivalent level of the personnel so called up will

serve.

Resubordination Of Units

5. After the first exchange of information in accordance

with Section IV of this Act, a Participating State intending to

resubordinate formations, units or other organisations

whose personnel are subject to limitation in accordance with

Section I of this Act to a formation, unit or other

organisation whose personnel would not otherwise be

subject to limitation will notify all other Participating States

of the planned resubordination no later than the date on

which such resubordination will become effective.

6. Such notification will include the following

information:

(A) The date on which such resubordination will become

effective;

(B) The subordination, designation and peacetime

location of each formation, unit and organisation to

be resubordinated, both before and after such

resubordination will become effective;

(C) The peacetime authorized personnel strength for

each formation, unit and organisation to be

resubordinated, both before and after such

resubordination will become effective; and

(D) The number, if any, of battle tanks, armoured

infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft,

attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched

bridges as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty

held by each formation, unit and organisation to be

resubordinated, both before and after such

resubordination will become effective.

7. Personnel serving with formations, units or other

organisations resu bordinated after the date on which

national personnel limits become effective in accordance

with Section II of this Act will remain subject to limitation in

accordance with Section I of this Act until the date of the 

exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of

this Act one year subsequent to the year in which such

resubordination becomes effective, after which time the

procedure specified in Paragraph 8 of this section will apply.

8. Forty-two days prior to the end of the one-year

period specified in Paragraph 7 of this section, the

Participating State resubordinating such formations, units or

other organisations will provide to all other Participating

States notification of the planned exclusion. Upon the

request of any other Participating State, the Participating 

State resubordinating such formations, units or other

organisations will provide all relevant information 

supporting such exclusion.

SECTION VI. VERIFICATION/EVALUATION

1. For the purpose of evaluating observance of national

personnel limits and the other provisions of this Act,

Participating States will apply Section VII and Section VIII of

the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty and other

relevant provisions of that Treaty, together with the 

provisions set out in this section.

2. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VII

of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the 

preinspection briefing will include information on the 

number of personnel serving with any formation, unit or

other organisation which was notified in the most recent

exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of

this Act and which is located at that inspection site. If the 

number of such personnel differs from the number of

personnel noted in that most recent exchange of

information, the inspection team will be provided with an

explanation of such difference. The preinspection briefing

will also include information on the number of personnel

serving with any other formation or unit down to the

brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as

well as independent units at the battalion/squadron or

equivalent level, in the categories specified in Paragraph 1,

Subparagraphs (B), (C) and (F) of Section IV of this Act,

which is located at that inspection site.

3. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VIII

of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the escort

team will provide, if requested by the inspection team,

information on the number of personnel serving with any

formation, unit or other organisation which was notified in

the most recent exchange of information in accordance with

Section IV of this Act, which is located at that inspection site

and whose facilities are being inspected. If the number of

such personnel differs from the number of personnel notified

in that most recent exchange of information, the inspection

team will be provided with an explanation of such

difference.

4. During an inspection pursuant to Section VII or

Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty,

inspectors may have access, consistent with the provisions of

that Protocol, to all facilities subject to inspection at the 

inspection site, including those used by all formations, units

and other organisations located at that inspection site.

During such an inspection, the escort team will specify, if

requested by the inspection team, whether a particular

building on the inspection site is a personnel barracks or

messing facility.
5. Inspectors will include in the inspection report

prepared pursuant to Section XII of the Protocol on

Inspection of the CFE Treaty information provided to the 

inspection team in accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3 of

this section in a format to be agreed in the Joint Consultative

Group. Inspectors may also include in that report written 

comments pertaining to the evaluation of personnel

strengths.

6. Evaluation of observance of the provisions of this Act

will be further facilitated through confidence and security

building measures that have en developed and that may be

developed in the context of the new negotiations on

disarmament and confidence and security building following

the Helsinki follow-up meeting. In this context, Participating

States are prepared to join in considering ways and means to

refine the evaluation provisions specified in the Vienna

Document 1992.

SECTION VII. REVIEW MECHANISMS

1. The Participating States will review the

implementation of this Act in accordance with the 

procedures set out in this section, using the relevant bodies

and channels within the framework of the CSCE process.

2. In particular, any Participating State may at any time

raise and clarify questions relating to the implementation of

this Act within the framework, as appropriate, of the Joint

Consultative Group. The Participating States will consider in

the context of the new negotiations on disarmament and 

confidence and security building which will be conducted

following the Helsinki follow-up meeting, the role of the

conflict prevention centre in this regard, as appropriate.

3. Six months after the date on which national

personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section

II of this Act and at five-year intervals thereafter, the 

Participating States will conduct a review of the operation of

this Act.

4. The Participating States will meet in an

extraordinary conference if requested to do so by any

Participating State which considers that exceptional

circumstances relating to this Act have arisen. Such a request

will be transmitted to all other Participating States and will

include an explanation of exceptional circumstances relating

to this Act, e.g., an increase in the number of military

personnel in categories listed in Section I of this Act in a

manner or proportion which the Participating State 

requesting such an extraordinary conference deems to be

prejudicial to security and stability within the area of

application. The conference will open no later than 15 days

after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, 

will last no longer than three weeks.

SECTION VIII. CLOSING PROVISIONS

1. The measures adopted in this Act are politically

binding. Accordingly, this Act is not eligible for registration 

under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This 

Act will come into effect simultaneously with the entry into

force of the CFE Treaty.

2. This Act will have the same duration as the CFE

Treaty and may be supplemented, modified or superseded.

3. The government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

will transmit true copies of this Act, the original of which is

in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, to

all Participating States, and bring this Act to the attention of

the Secretariat of the CSCE and the Secretary General of the

United Nations.

4. Wherefore, we have subscribed our signatures below:

Done at Helsinki on 10 July 1992, at the meeting of the

Heads of State or Government of the Participating States.
Append ix D

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE FIRST

CONFERENCETOREvmw THE OPERATION

OFTHETREATYONCoNVENTIONALARMED

FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE

CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION

ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH

VIENNA, 15-31 MAY 1996

The Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan Republic, the

Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic

of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of

Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal

Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of

Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the

Republic of Kazakstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,

the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 

the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the 

Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the 

Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of

Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which

are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred

to as the States Parties,

Fulfilling the obligation set forth in Article XXI, paragraph

1, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 

hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, to conduct a review of

the operation of the Treaty, and thereby taking into account 

the Final Documents of the Extraordinary Conferences of

the States Parties of 10 July 1992 in Helsinki and 13

November 1992 in Vienna,

Acting in accordance with the provision of Section VII,

paragraph 3, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation of

Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

of 10 July 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding

Act,

Recalling the results of the Extraordinary Conferences held

thus far,

Reaffirming all the decisions of the Joint Consultative Group

made thus far,

Having met at the First Review Conference, chaired by the 

Kingdom of the Netherlands, from 15 to 31 May 1996 in

Vienna,

Have adopted the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The States Parties reaffirm the fundamental role of

the Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and their

adherence to its goals and objectives. It is their common

interest to preserve the integrity of the Treaty and the

Concluding Act as well as the predicta bility and

transparency they have created. The States Parties reaffirm

their determination to fulfill in good faith all obligations and 

commitments arising from the Treaty and its associated

documents. Bearing that in mind, they commit themselves to

enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

2. The negotiation, conclusion and implementation of

the Treaty and the Concluding Act, as well as the ratification 

of the Treaty, took place in times of change during which the 

European security environment evolved significantly. The

Warsaw Treaty Organization has ceased to exist. New states

have emerged and became States Parties to the Treaty. At the

same time, new risks and challenges to security have come to

the fore. As a result of common efforts of the States Parties,

the Treaty and the Concluding Act have remained vital

stabilizing factors in this period of transition and

contributed to its peaceful unfolding.

3. The States Parties stress that security and stability in

Europe are vitally underpinned by the continuation and

enhancement of robust arms control measures. Recognizing

the evolution of the European political and security

environment, the States Parties are resolved to continue the

conventional arms control process, including through the

enhancement of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

They see this as a common responsibility.

4. The States Parties recognize that the Treaty and the 

Concluding Act are essential contributions to the 

achievement of the goals and purposes of the Organization 

for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in

particular the promotion of confidence, stability and security

in an undivided Europe. In that context, they stress the
332 ON-Sin NSl'EC:TION AcENCY 

importance of the development of a common and

comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first

century, of the implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies

and of the ongoing security dialogue and negotiations in the 

Forum for Security Co-operation.

II. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY

AND THE CONCLUDING ACT

5. The States Parties note with satisfaction that more

than 58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and

equipment have been reduced, and that the overall holdings

of conventional armaments and equipment within the area

of application are substantially lower than the limits set in

the Treaty.

More than 2,500 inspections have taken place. A

permanent system for regular and routine exchange of

Treaty notifications and other information has been

developed. The Joint Consultative Group has been firmly

established and has demonstrated its utility and importance 

as the ongoing Treaty forum.

With regard to the Concluding Act, the States Parties

note with satisfaction that the personnel strength of

conventional armed forces in the area of application was

reduced by 1.2 million persons.

6. The States Parties note that the Treaty established a

high degree of transparency in military relations through its

comprehensive system for exchange of information and for

verification. Together with the extensive reductions of

conventional armaments and equipment, this has led to

greater predictability and confidence in security relations. 

The Treaty has also nurtured the development of new

patterns of co-operation in Europe and provides a basis for

stability and enhanced security in Europe at substantially 

lower levels of conventional armaments and equipment than

heretofore. Although risks and challenges still exist in some

parts of Europe, the capability for launching surprise attack

and the danger of large-scale offensive action in Europe as a

whole have been diminished substantially. Nevertheless, the 

achievement of the goals of the Treaty in the whole area of

its application requires continuous efforts by the States

Parties.

7. The States Parties reaffirm the continued relevance of

the basic structures of the Treaty including the principle of

zonal limitations, as embodied in Articles IV and V of the

Treaty. In this respect, and in line with the decision of the

Joint Consultative Group of 17 November 1995, the States

Parties have agreed on a document, which is contained in

Annex A, reflecting a combination of measures agreed in

cooperative fashion and acceptable to all parties to the 

Treaty.

8. States Parties regret that not all reduction obligations

pursuant to the Treaty have been met. They stress the

necessity to complete as soon as possible reductions of

conventional armaments and equipment limited by the

Treaty (TLE) in accordance with obligations under the 

Treaty. They note with satisfaction the reiterated

commitment of those States Parties which still have to

complete reductions to comply with the provisions of the 

Treaty and associated documents. All States Parties express

their readiness to follow this process to its completion in

accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In this context,

being aware of difficulties which have delayed the

completion of reductions, they take positive note of efforts

undertaken in order to meet fully obligations under the

Treaty.

9. States Parties express their concern with serious

difficulties of some States Parties to comply fully within their

territory with the provisions of the Treaty and its related

documents due to TLE unaccounted for and uncontrolled

within the Treaty. This situation adversely affects the 

operation of the Treaty and complicates its implementation.

They stress the need to reach as soon as possible relevant

political solutions and to elaborate necessary measures to

enable the implementation of the Treaty in accordance with

its provisions.

They express their readiness to address the issue of this

TLE in the Joint Consultative Group, including the ways and

means to facilitate the resolution of this issue.

10. The States Parties have adopted the understandings 

and agreed interpretations with regard to implementation 

and ways and means to improve the viability and

effectiveness of the Treaty as specified in Annex B of this

Final Document.

11. The States Parties have agreed that the

implementation issues contained in Annex C of this Final

Document require further consideration and resolution in

the Joint Consultative Group.

12. The States Parties reaffirm the arrangements of

Article XII reached at the Extraordinary Conferences in Oslo

in 1992.

They understand that for successor states that had

become States Parties by 1992, paragraph 2 of the Article

XII part of the Oslo arrangement should be read as: "In

particular, no State Party will increase within the area of

application its holdings of armoured infantry fighting

vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to

perform in peacetime internal security functions above that

aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of

signature of the Treaty, as notified on their territory

pursuant to the information exchange as of November 19,

1990."

They agree to work further on this issue of Article XII in

the Joint Consultative Group, taking into account the 

proposals made at the Review Conference.

13. States Parties stressed the importance of full and

continuous respect for the provisions of Article IV,

paragraph 5, in the context of maintaining the viability of

the Treaty, as well as for the sovereignty of the States Parties

involved.

StatesParties noted that, in certain instances, bilateral

agreements are under negotiation-or in the process of

ratification or implementation -which relate to the

provisions of Article IV, paragraph 5. States Partiesexpressed theirsupport for early and positive results of the

ongomgprocesses.
_ APPINlllX D: F1N c\L DocU,\IEI'\ 1 m rHF FmsT CFE RFv11w CoNFEIU"ICF

States Parties consider that the importance of the Article 

IV provisions on stationing forces should be recognised in

the context of the process foreseen in Section III of this Final 

Document.

14. In the context of the process foreseen in Section III of

this Final Document, States Parties will examine different

interpretations of temporary deployments so as to ensure

that these temporary deployments do not become indefinite.

15. The States Parties recall that according to Article II,

paragraph 2 of the Treaty, the lists of existing types

contained in Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional

Armaments and Equipment (POET) shall be updated

periodically by the Joint Consultative Group in accordance

with Section IV of the POET. However, it has not been

updated since the Treaty's conclusion.

The States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint

Consultative Group to update the POET. They further 

agreed that:

• any inaccuracies should be corrected; including by

removal of types, models and versions of

conventional armaments and equipment that do not

meet Treaty criteria;

• the Joint Consultative Group should consider if a

yearly update of the lists would be appropriate;

• the Joint Consultative Group should consider an

electronic version of the lists in all official languages.

16. The States Parties also discussed the topics contained

in Annex D of this Final Document.

17. The States Parties welcome the statement of the

representative of the Russian Federation to promote the

implementation of the statement of the representative of the

Union of Soviet Socialists Republics in the Joint Consultative

Group on 14 June 1991 in Vienna. The text of the Russian

statement is laid down in Annex E of this Final Document.

18. The States Parties recommend that in view of the 

issues that have been referred to the Joint Consultative

Group, most effective use is made of the provisions of

Article XVI and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative

Group, in order to allow the Joint Consultative Group to

address all those issues in a proper manner.

III. FUTURE WORK ON THE TREATY

19. In view of Sections I and II of this Final Document,

the States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint

Consultative Group to expand upon their work in

accordance with Article XVI of the Treaty. Taking fresh

impetus from this Review Conference, they will immediately

start a thorough process aimed at improving the operation

of the Treaty in a changing environment and, through that,

the security of each State Party, irrespective of whether it

belongs to a politico-military alliance. As part of this

process, the States Parties will consider measures and

adaptations with the aim of promoting the objectives of the

Treaty and of enhancing its viability and effectiveness,

including but not limited to the consideration of proposals 

already made to that effect. The character of this process

should be such as to permit the Treaty to sustain its key role

in the European security architecture. Its scope and

parameters should be defined as a matter of priority.

20. Until the entry into force of such measures and

adaptations, the States Parties will observe all provisions of

the Treaty and its associated documents.

21. The States Parties will consider a progress report on

the intermediate results of this process at the time of the

OSCE Lisbon Summit. This report will inter alia include

recommendations on the way ahead.

In accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, the States

Parties look forward to gathering again in five years time to

conduct the second review of the operation of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

This Final Document, together with its Annexes A, B, C,

D, and E, which are integral to it, having been drawn up in

all the official languages of the Organization for Security

and Co-operation in Europe, shall be deposited with the 

government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as the

designated depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate

copies of this Final Document to all the States Parties.

ANNEX A:

Document agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of Novem ber 19,

1990.

The 30 States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe of Novem ber 19, 1990, hereinafter referred

to as the Treaty, have agreed as follows:

1. Each State Party shall, taking into account the

clarification set forth in this Document relating to the area

described in Article V,subparagraph l(A), of the Treaty and

taking into account the understandings on flexibility set

forth in this Document, comply fully with the numerical

limitations set forth in the Treaty, including Article V

thereof, no later than 31 May 1999.

2. Paragraph 1of this Section shall be understood as

not giving any State Party, which was in compliance with the

numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including

Article V thereof, as of 1January 1996, the right to exceed

any of the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty.

3. Pursuant to the decision of the Joint Consultative

Group of 17 Novem ber 1995, the States Parties shall

cooperate to the maximum extent possible to ensure the full

implementation of the provisions of this Document.

II

1. Within the area described in Article V,subparagraph

l(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, the 

Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles, and artillery so that, no later than 31 May

1999 and thereafter, the aggregate num bers do not exceed:

(A) 1,800 battle tanks;
334 ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY 

(B) 3,700 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more

than 552 shall be located within the Astrakhan

Oblast; no more than 552 shall be located within the

Volgograd Oblast; no more than 310 shall be located

within the eastern part of the Rostov Oblast

described in Section III, paragraph I, of this

Document; and no more than 600 shall be located

within the Pskov Oblast; and

(C) 2,400 pieces of artillery.

2. Within the Odessa Oblast, Ukraine shall limit its

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery so that,

upon provisional application of this Document and

thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

(A) 400 battle tanks;

(B) 400 armoured combat vehicles; and

(C) 350 pieces of artillery.

3. Upon provisional application of this document and

until 31 May 1999, the Russian Federation shall limit its

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery, within 

the area described in Article V,subparagraph 1(A), of the

Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, so that the 

aggregate numbers do not exceed:

(A) 1,897 battle tanks;

(B) 4,397 armoured combat vehicles; and

(C) 2,422 pieces of artillery.

m

1. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty,

the following territory, as constituted on 1January 1996, of

the Russian Federation shall be deemed to be located in the

area described in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty

rather than in the area described in Article V,subparagraph

l(A), of the Treaty: the Pskov Oblast; the Volgograd Oblast;

the Astrakhan Oblast; that part of the Rostov Oblast east of

the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the

Volgograd Oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and

Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray

leading to Kushchevskaya.

2. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty,

the territory of the Odessa Oblast, as constituted on 1

January 1996, of Ukraine shall be deemed to be located in

the area described in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty

rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph

l(A), of the Treaty.

IV

1. The States Parties shall, during the period before 31

May 1999, examine the Treaty provisions on designated

permanent storage sites so as to allow all battle tanks,

armoured combat vehicles, and artillery in designated

permanent storage sites, including those subject to regional

numerical limitations, to be located with active units.

2. The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize

to the maximum extent possible the provisions of the Treaty

on temporary deployment of battle tanks, armoured

combat vehicles, and artillery within its territory and

outside its territory. Such temporary deployments on the 

territory of other States Parties shall be achieved by means

of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty

of the States Parties involved.

3. The Russian Federation shall have the right to

utilize to the maximum extent possible reallocation, in

accordance with existing agreements, of the current quotas

for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery

established by the Agreement on the Principles and

Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Tashkent, 

on 15 May 1992. Such reallocations shall be achieved by

means of free negotiations and with full respect for the 

sovereignty of the States Parties involved.

4. The Russian Federation shall count against the

numerical limitations established in the Treaty and

paragraph 1 of Section II of this Document any armoured

combat vehicles listed as "to be removed" in its

information exchange of 1January 1996 that are not so

removed by 31 May 1999.

v

1. In addition to the annual information exchange

provided pursuant to Section VII, subparagraph l(C), of

the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information,

the Russian Federation shall provide information equal to

that reported in the annual information exchange on the 

area described in Article V,subparagraph 1(A), of the

Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, upon

provisional application of this Document and every six

months after the annual information exchange. In the case

of Kushchevskaya, the Russian Federation shall provide

such additional information every three months after the 

annual information exchange.

2. Upon provisional application of this Document,

Ukraine shall provide "F21" notifications for its holdings

within the Odessa Oblast on the basis of changes of five,

rather than ten, percent or more in assigned holdings.

3. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, the 

Russian Federation shall, upon provisional application of

this Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive

declared site inspection quota established pursuant to

Section II, subparagraph lO(D), of the Protocol on

Inspection, up to a total of 10 supplementary declared site

inspections, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on

Inspection, at objects of verification:

(A) Located within the Pskov Oblast; the Volgograd

Oblast; the Astrakhan Oblast; that part of the 

Rostov Oblast east of the line extending from

Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd

Oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and

Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar

Kray leading to Kushchevskaya;

(B) Containing conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty designated by the Russian

Federation in its annual information exchange of 1
_ _ _ _ A1't'l'WI\ D: 1--;, ,1 D< H 1 .\ll '-' I < •I 1 1 11 F11( J C:FF R t \ ll \\ CnH IU".l 1

January 1996 as "to be removed," until such time

that a declared site inspection confirms that such

equipment has been removed.

4. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section,

Ukraine shall, upon provisional application of this

Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive

declared site inspection quota established pursuant to

Section II, subparagraph lO(D), of the Protocol on

Inspection, up to a total of one supplementary declared site

inspection, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on

Inspection, at objects of verification located within the

Odessa Oblast.

5. The number of supplementary declared site

inspections conducted at objects of verification pursuant to

paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section shall not exceed the number

of declared site passive quota inspections, established in

accordance with Section II, subparagraph lO(D) of the 

Protocol on Inspection, conducted at those objects of

verification in the course of the same year.

6. All supplementary declared site inspections

conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section:

(A) Shall be carried out at the cost of the inspecting State

Party, consistent with prevailing commercial rates;

and

(B) At the discretion of the inspecting State Party, shall

be conducted either as a sequential inspection or as a

separate inspection.

VI

1. This document shall enter into force upon receipt by

the Depositary of notification of confirmation of approval

by all States Parties. Section II, paragraphs 2 and 3, Section

IV, and Section V of this Document are hereby provisionally

applied as of 31 May 1996 through 15 December 1996. If

this Document does not enter into force by 15 December

1996, then it shall be reviewed by the States Parties.

2. This Document, in all six official languages of the 

Treaty, shall be deposited with the Government of the

Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary

for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this document

to all States Parties.

ANNEX B: UNDERSTANDINGS AND

AGREED INTERPRETATIONS WITH

REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION AND

WAYS AND MEANS TO IMPROVE THE

VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OFTHE

TREATY

1. The States Parties stress the need to ensure that

relevant Government authorities charged with Treaty

implementation fulfill all the obligations of the Decision of

the Joint Consultative Group on the cost of inspection dated 

23 May 1995.

2. The States Parties agree that pursuant to the Protocol

on Inspection, Section VII, paragraph 1,

(A) In case an inspected State Party or the State Party

exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected

State Party delays an inspection on grounds of force

majeure, it shall, in written form, explain the reasons

for this delay in detail;

This should take place as follows:

• If force majeure is declared prior to the arrival of the

inspection team, through the answer to the relevant

notifications;

• If force majeure is declared after the arrival of the

inspection team at the point of entry, the explanation

should be presented as soon as possible, through

diplomatic channels or other official channels.

(B) In case of such a delay due to force majeure, the

provisions of Section XI, paragraph 2 of the Protocol

on Inspection shall apply.

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties annually, but not later than 15 December, the

complete updated list of inspectors and transport crew

members. In case of additions to the list of inspectors and

transport crew mem bers, the State Party shall provide the

complete updated list highlighting the additions.

4. Each State Party with territory in the area of

application shall provide to all other States Parties during 

the annual exchange of information the standing diplomatic

clearance numbers for their aviation transportation means

for the subsequent calendar year.

5. Each State Party shall provide to all other States

Parties during the annual exchange of information the list of

its officially recognized holidays for the subsequent calendar 

year.

6. The State Party whose inspection team intends to

transit the territory of another State Party prior to

conducting the inspection should inform the transited

State(s) Party (Parties) about the estimated time of transit,

cross-border points and transportation means to be used by

the inspection team, as well as a list of inspectors and drivers

with passport numbers.

7. States Parties agree that a specified area may contain

declared sites of their own and stationed forces; but all

declared sites within a specified area are excluded from an

inspection of the specified area (inspections in accordance

with Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection) as they can

be inspected only in accordance with Section VII of the

Protocol on Inspection.

8. States Parties agree to send the notification of the 

intent to inspect simultaneously to the host and the 

stationing States Parties, if the inspecting State intends to

conduct a sequential inspection which involves stationed 

forces.

9. Where appropriate and with the agreement of the 

State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried

out in respect of conventional armaments and equipment

limited by the Treaty of a stationing State Party, the

stationing State Party shall assist the host nation in the

provision of security protection to both the inspection team

and the escort team for the duration of the inspection.
336 ON-SITE INSPECTION Ac ENCY _ _

10. Notifications of changes of 10 per cent of holdings:

• The States Parties agree that, pursuant to Section

VIII, paragraph 1,subparagraph (B) of the Protocol

on Notification and Exchange of Information, the

most recent update of information on holdings will

always constitute the basis for any subsequent

change to be notified under this paragraph.

• The notification of any change of 10 per cent or

more shall be given no later than five days after such

change occurs. The time period of five days is

understood as being five working days.

11. States Parties agree to notify:

• Any changesin the designation of formations or

units pursuant to Section I,III, and V of the Protocol

on Notification and Exchange of Information at least

42 days in advance;

• Any closures of objects of verification within the last 

month pursuant to Section V, on the fifteenth of each

month;

• Any creation or move to another location of an

object of verification at least 42 days in advance.

12. The States Parties agree that, in addition to the 

requirements for the submission of information and 

notifications as prescribed in Article XVII of the Treaty and 

in paragraph 1 of the Annex on the Format for the Exchange

of Information to the Protocol on Notification and

Exchange of Information, they will endeavour to supplement

the annual exchange of information pursuant to the

aforementioned Protocol in written form by an electronic

data version on diskette in the agreed format; the written 

form remaining the official version.

13. Each State Party should notify to all other States

Parties its passive declared site inspection quota coincident

with each annual exchange of information provided

pursuant to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of

Information, Section VII, paragraph l(C).

ANNEX C:IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

REQUIRING FURTHER CONSIDERATION

AND RESOLUTION IN THE JOINT

CONSULTATIVEGROUP

1. Introducing common procedures concerning flights

of the aviation transportation means with the inspection

team.

2. Point of entry/exit.

3. Immunity of the transportation means of an

inspection team.

4. Formulation of principles for the elaboration of

declared site diagrams including the possibility of a more

precise formulation/interpretation of the term "routinely."

5. Equipment to be used during inspections.

6. Rules on photography.

7. Calendar year/possibility of synchronization with

implementation year.

8. Financing of the inspections.

9. Common understanding of the obligation pursuant

to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of

Information, Section VIII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B).

10. Review and updating of the Treaty Notification 

Formats to ensure their continued viability.

11. The issue of TLE which has left, on a temporary

basis, without re-assignment, the normal peacetime location,

for commitments under the auspices of the United Nations

or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe.

12. A question whether, with reference to the Protocol

on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section I,

paragraph 1, all units and formations holding equipment 

subject to the Treaty, including depots, bases, and 

Designated Permanent Storage Sites, should be notified in

both Charts I and III.

13. Disposal of TLE in excess of reduction liabilities and

disposal of decommissioned TLE.

14. Rounding of passive inspection quotas.

15. Enhanced transparency measures on ambulances

built on the chassis of ACVs or APC look-alikes as listed in

the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments

and Equipment.

ANNEX D: TOPICS THAT HAVE BEEN

DISCUSSED DURING THE REVIEW

CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN

EUROPE

1. Article II: definitions of;

"group of States Parties";

"area of application";

"accession of other OSCE States Parties";

"designated permanent storage site";

"armoured vehicle launched bridge"; 

"combat aircraft",

And the Protocol on Existing Types of

Conventional Armaments and Equipment

2. Article III:

Export of equipment;

Transparency concerning TLE assigned to

Internal Security Forces;

United peacekeeping force proposal.
 APPi 1'DIX D: F1 .\1 Dou.,\l'.'\T 01 THE FIRST CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE 337

3. Article IV:

Approach to limitations and maximum levels of

holdings;

Stationing forces on the territory of another

StateParty.

4. Article V:

Implementation;

Temporary deployment;

Stationed forces.

5. Article VI:

Sufficiency rule.

6. Article X:

Removal from DPSS.

7. Article XI:

Implementation;

Limits;

Removal from storage.

8. Article XII:

Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by

internal security forces (pursuant to Oslo Final

Document, 5 June 1992);

Transparency;

Need of those states which joined the Treaty in

1992;

Criteria concerning internal security force levels.

9. Article XIV:

Aerial inspections.

10. Article XVI:

Future role of the Joint Consultative Group;

Duration of sessions of the Joint Consultative

Group.

11. Article XVIII:

Follow-up negotiations;

Modalities;

Proposal for a Supplementary Agreement.

12. Miscellaneous

United peacekeeping force proposal;

Exceptional circumstances;

Joint Consultative Group dialogue on Treaty

support fund.

ANNEX E: STATEMENT OF THE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION

To promote the implementation of the Statement of the

Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to

the Joint Consultative Group of 14 June 1991 (the Statement

of the Soviet Representative), I have been instructed by the

Government of the Russian Federation to state the

following.

1. It is understood that conventional armaments and

equipment in the three Treaty limited categories referred to

in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative

(battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery) will be

deemed destroyed or rendered militarily unusable, in

accordance with that statement, upon the application of any

of the following methods:

(A) Destruction or conversion of conventional

armaments and equipment under procedures that

provide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms

that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily

unusa ble;

(B) Provision of satisfactory documentary evidence as

meeting requirements of sufficient visible evidence,

only in case of such armaments and equipment

destroyed prior to the promulgation of this

statement. The Russian Federation intends to

provide such documentary evidence with regard to

armaments and equipment destroyed in the area of

application of the Treaty after 17 November 1995;

(C) Segregation of battle tanks and armoured combat 

vehicles exposed to the influence of atmospheric

factors, with hatches and covers of engine

compartments opened, with the invitation of a group

of experts to conduct-at its own expense-an

examination of a random sample representative of

those conventional armaments and equipment, prior

to their removal from a display site for final disposal

(scrapping), and notification of such removal;

(D) Visit of group of experts, at its own expense and

upon invitation, to count already derelict

conventional armaments and equipment;

(E) Notification preceding or accompanying each

transfer of conventional armaments and equipment

to other States Parties within the area of application

of the Treaty, with equivalent relevant notification

from the recipient State Party. Such transfers will be

done in line with Treaty provisions and will be

compatible with the objectives and terms of the

Statement of the Soviet Representative.

2. Continuing its efforts aimed at the implementation

of the statement of the Soviet representative, the Russian

Federation will apply methods referred to in paragraph 1of

this statement to conventional armaments and equipment

located on its territory. It will co-operate with the Repu blic

of Kazakstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in applying

those methods to conventional armaments and equipment

located on their territories. The Russian Federation will

negotiate the necessary arrangements with those states for
the purpose of completing by joint efforts the process

referred to in paragraph 1of the Statement of the Soviet

Representative by the year 2000.

3. If, despite good faith efforts, the quota of 6000

battle tanks subject to elimination is not fully met, the

shortfall of not more than 2300 battle tanks will be covered

by applying methods referred to in paragraph 1of this

statement to an equal number of armoured combat vehicles

in excess of the quota of 1500 pieces; and thus the overall

process referred to in paragraph 1of the Statement of the 

Soviet Representative will be in general deemed completed.

Notwithstanding that, a number of battle tanks equal to the

above-mentioned shortfall will be subsequently eliminated.

The envisaged date forthe completion of the process oftheir

elimination will depend on the duration of their operational

and service life and onthe availability offinancialresources.

That elimination will be carried out in line with paragraph 1

ofthisstatement.

4. Upon completion of initial visits referred to in

paragraph 1of this statement, the Russian Federation will be

ready to discuss in the JCG their results and in the light of

these to make arrangements, as necessary, for further visits,

as well as to discuss possible modalities for further visits. In

general, relevant practices established in the process of

Treaty implementation will be followed as much as 

applicable in the organization and conduct of the visits.

STATEMENTS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST

CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE

TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN

EUROPE AND THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE

NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH:

• Notwithstanding the rights of each state as stated in

Article XIV of the Treaty, each State Party should 

attempt to avoid conducting inspections during the 

officially recognized holidays of the other State

Party.

• With regard to the phrase "on the availability of

financial resources" in the Statement of the

Representative of the Russian Federation as

contained in Annex E of the Final Document of the 

Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe, it is understood that this

phrase is without prejudice to other arms control

obligations.

• Temporary deployment and reallocation of quotas

referred to in Section IV, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the

Document will not be used in the context of the 

Azerbaijan Republic.

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION AT THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE

31 MAY 1996

Unless flexibilities listed in the agreement on the flank issue

are realized by 31 May 1999 the Russian Federation retains

the right to use other Treaty flexibilities discussed but not

mentioned in the above agreement.

STATEMENT OF UKRAINE AT THE CONFERENCE TO

REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

31 MAY 1996

In connection with the decision of the CFE Review

Conference of 31 May 1996 to adopt the "Document

Agreed by the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990," Ukraine

gives consent to such a decision, with the understanding 

that, in implementing its provisions, the States Parties will

proceed from the following:

1. The rights and obligations of the Russian Federation

set forth in Section II, paragraphs 1and 3, and Section V,

paragraph 1, of the Document, in relation to "the area 

described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as

understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 

time the Treaty was signed," do not cover the territory of

Ukraine, namely the autonomous Repu blic of the Crimea, 

Nikolayev Oblast, Zaporozhskaya Oblast and Kherson

Oblast.

2. Section II, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Section IV,

paragraph 2, of the Document, do not cover that portion of

the TLE of the naval infantry and coastal defence forces

which, as a result of the Black Sea Fleet division between

Ukraine and the Russian Federation, will be assigned to the

Russian Federation and subject to their withdrawal from the 

territory of Ukraine with the agreed timeframes.

3. The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 2, of the

Document, shall in no way restrict the right and possi bilities

of Ukraine to deploy on a temporary basis, under Article V,

paragraph 1, of the Treaty, combat tanks, armoured combat

vehicles and artillery within the "new" flank area.

4. The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 3, of the 

Document, shall in no way bear upon the rights and

obligations of Ukraine under the Agreement on the 

Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the 

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 15 May

1992.

The delegation of Ukraine requests to distribute this 

Statement as an Annex to the Final Document of the 

Conference.

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF MOLDOVA

TO THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE CFE TREATY

ON 31 MAY 1996

In relation to paragraph 7 Section 2 of the Final Document, 

the Repu blic of Moldova wou ld like to make the following

statement:

The early entry into force of the bilateral agreement on

the withdrawal of Russian troops, signed between the 

Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on 21

October 1994 shall contribute to full implementation of the 

Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

In relation to Section IV, paragraph 2 of the Document

Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on
 A PPl.f\i DI X D: FINAL DocuMFNT ot Tiff FmsT CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE 339

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe contained in the 

Annex A of the Final Document, the Republic of Moldova 

would like to make the following interpretative statement:

The constitution of the Republic of Moldova has

proclaimed the permanent neutrality of the country,

prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops on the territory 

of the Republic. In view of these constitutional provisions,

the Republic of Moldova cannot allow even temporary 

deployment of conventional armaments belonging to other

countries on its territory.

I would like to ask you Mr. Chairman to annex this

statement to the Final Document with the translation into all

official languages.

THE STATEMENT OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION

ON THE "DOCUMENT AGREED AMONG THE

STATES PARTIES TO THE CFE TREATY OF

NOVEMBER 19, 1990."

On the occasion of the adoption of the Final Document of

the First Review Conference, the Turkish delegation registers

the following understanding:

1. The Document in question does not change in any

way the legally binding character of the CFE Treaty and its

associated documents, nor the obligations of individual

States Parties to the Treaty.

2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section IV of the Document

cannot be interpreted in a manner which may prejudice the

provision contained in Article IV, paragraph 5 of the CFE

Treaty, nor the principle of free consent enshrined in the

OSCE documents in the use of such rights.

3. The "flexibilities" contained in the Treaty consist of

those mentioned in the above paragraphs and can only be

used in full respect of the relevant Treaty provisions and on

the basis of agreements concluded and implemented with

free consent of the States Parties involved.

4. While the Turkish delegation accepts an examination 

of the DPSS provisions, it makes it clear that it can accept

eventual modifications only if they do not result in force

concentrations prejudicial to regional balances and provided

that a similar examination is carried out for the clarification

of the question of "temporary deployments," in particular

with regard to their duration.

5. In view of the continued relevance of the regional

sublimits even under changing conditions, the Turkish

government will not enter into any negotiation prejudicial to

the principle of regional sub-limits, nor accept any force

limits which would not take due consideration of the size of

its territory, population and the security environment in

adjacent regions not subject to Treaty limitations.

I request that this statement be attached to the Final

Document.

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF GEORGIA

The Georgian delegation has considered paragraphs 2 and 3

of Section IV of the Document Amongst the States Parties on

the flank issue very carefully. We still have some very serious

concerns about the future implementation of their content.

In this context we would like to make the following

statement:

Any agreement on temporary deployment of conventional

armed forces on the territory of Georgia or for the

reallocation of equipment quotas established by the

Tashkent Agreement must be the result of free negotiation

and must be taken with full respect for the sovereignty of

Georgia and for its constitution. All parties must implement

all the provisions of any such agreements in good faith and

in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

STATEMENT BY THE NETHERLANDS

THE NETHERLANDS

31MAY 1996

It is the view of the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance that

any future flexibility must be consistent with the legal

framework of the Treaty, as agreed by all 30 States Parties.

I request that this statement will be attached to the Final

Document.

Append ix E

CFE TREATY:NATIONAL

VERIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS

BELGIUM

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

ORGANIZATION

ITALY

AGENCY:Joint Armaments Verification Center

LOCATION: Rome, Italy

CFE TREATY TLE: 7,737

AGENCY: Ministere de la Defense Nationale, Verification 

Unit (JSO-D/WV)

LOCATION: Brussels, Belgium

CFE TREATY TLE: 2,333»

""Note: All CFE Treaty TLE figures were drawn from the

August 1992, data exchange

CANADA

AGENCY: J3 Arms Control Verification Directorate, 

National Defense Headquarters

LOCATION: Ottawa, Canada

CFE TREATY TLE: 272

DENMARK

AGENCY: Headquarters, Chief of Defense Arms Control

Section

LOCATION: Copenhagen, Denmark

CFE TREATY TLE: 1,486

FRANCE

AGENCY: L'Unite Frarn;:aise de Verification

LOCATION: Creil Cedex, France

CFE TREATY TLE: 8,219

GERMANY

AGENCY: Federal Armed Forces Verification Center

LOCATION: Geilenkirchen, Germany

CFE TREATY TLE: 22,300

GREECE

AGENCY: Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Arms

Control Directorate

LOCATION: Athens, Greece

CFE TREATY TLE: 5,833

ICELAND

AGENCY: Defense Department Ministry for Foreign Affairs 

LOCATION: Reykjavik, Iceland

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment

LUXEMBOURG

AGENCY: Inspection, Verification and Observation Group

LOCATION: Luxembourg

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment

NETHERLANDS

AGENCY: Defence Staff, Arms Control Branch 

LOCATION: The Hague, Netherlands

CFE TREATY TLE: 3,461

NORWAY

AGENCY: Headquarters Defense Command Norway

LOCATION: Oslo, Norway

CFE TREATY TLE: 962

PORTUGAL

AGENCY: Unidade Nacional De Verificacoes

LOCATION: Lisbon, Portugal

CFE TREATY TLE: 872

SPAIN

AGENCY: Unidad De Verificacion Espanola

LOCATION: Madrid, Spain

CFE TREATY TLE: 3, 655

TURKEY

AGENCY: International Security Affairs Division

Verification and Implementation Branch

LOCATION: Ankara, Turkey

CFE TREATY TLE: 8,545

UNITED KINGDOM

AGENCY: Joint Arms Control Implementation Group

LOCATION: RAF Henlow, United Kingdom (moved in

May 1996 from RAF Scampton)

CFE TREATY TLE: 6,025
UNITED STATES

AGENCY: On-Site Inspection Agency, European Operations

LOCATION: Frankfurt, Germany

CFE TREATY TLE: 12,846

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

Note: In November 1990, the Budapest Group (Bulgaria,

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak 

Republic) superseded the WTO and accepted all CFE Treaty

responsibilities.

BULGARIA

AGENCY: Director of Disarmament 

LOCATION: Sofia,Bulgaria

CFE TREATY TLE: 7,034

CZECH REPUBLIC

AGENCY: Disarmament Control Office

LOCATION: Prague, Czech Republic

CFE TREATY TLE: 6,306

HUNGARY

AGENCY: Arms Control and Verification Center

LOCATION: Budapest, Hungary

CFE TREATY TLE: 4,305

POLAND

AGENCY: Polish Verification Center

LOCATION: Warsaw, Poland

CFE TREATY TLE: 8,100

ROMANIA

AGENCY: Directorate for International Relations and

Treaties

LOCATION: Bucharest, Romania 

CFE TREATY TLE: 10,603

SLOVAK REPUBLIC (SLOVAKIA)

AGENCY: Verification Centre, Ministry of Defense

LOCATION: Bratislava, Slovak Republic

CFE TREATY TLE: 3,153

FORMER SOVIET UNION

''·Note: In May 1992, at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the successor

states to the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,

Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) formally

accepted all CFE Treaty responsibilities. The Tashkent

Group divided the former Soviet Union's treaty limited

equipment.

ARMENIA

AGENCY: Unit of International Treaties Realization

LOCATION: Yerevan, Republic of Armenia

CFE TREATY TLE: Data Not Availa ble

AZERBAIJAN

AGENCY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

LOCATION: Baku, Azer baijan

CFE TREATY TLE: 397

BELARUS

AGENCY: National Agency for Verification and Inspections

LOCATION: Minsk, Belarus

CFE TREATY TLE: 9,254

GEORGIA

AGENCY: Department of Foreign Affairs and Disarmament 

LOCATION: Tbilisi, Georgia

CFE TREATY TLE: 105

KAZAKSTAN

AGENCY: Treaty Implementation Section, International

Department, Ministry of Defense

LOCATION: Almaty, Kazakstan

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment

MOLDOVA

AGENCY: Department for International Treaty Compliance

LOCATION: Chisinau (Kishinev), Moldova

CFE TREATY TLE: 236

RUSSIA

AGENCY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

LOCATION: Moscow, Russian Federation

CFE TREATY TLE: 42,692

UKRAINE

AGENCY: Verification Center Armed Forces of Ukraine

LOCATION: Kiev, Ukraine

CFE TREATY TLE: 18,341
U

i·/_.\ l 1f lnD --_ Q)IJ_

c

Append ix F

OSIA European Operations Personnel Assigned by Service

AIR FORCE ARMY NAVY MARINES CIVILIAN

42%

2% 1%

37% 57%

37%

Ja n u a ry 1991 Jan ua ry 1992

o Oct-90

o Jan-91

•Jan-92

5%

•AIR FORCE

D ARMY

DMARINE

•CIVILIAN

October 1990
144 0 -Si 1 1 I w1 < 1 10 Ac .1 < '

TOTAL PERSONNEL

ASSIGNED

•Oct-90

a Jan-91

a Jan-92
Append ix G

CHRONOLOGY: CFE TREATY

NEGOTIATIONS AND

IMPLEME:NTATION, 1972-1996

1972 May 24. President Richard M. Nixon and General

Secretary Leonid Brezhnev reached a compromise 

agreement to hold separate political and military 

negotiations. The Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would deal with

political issues, and Mutual Balanced Force Red uctions (MBFR) in Europe with actual force reductions. Derente in Europe bega n.

November 22. The CSCE process formally began in

Helsinki, Finland. These preliminary negotiations

of the 35 CSCE member nations involved setting up

a framework to negotiate confidence and security

building measures.

1973 July 3. CSCE negotiations began after six months

of preparatory meetings. The 35 nations of the

CSCE met to begin the process of negotiating

confidence and security building measures in

Europe.

October 30. Negotiations on MBFR began. The

object of negotiations was to reduce conventional

forces in the zone of Central Europe surrounding

East and West Germany and to provide a stable

military balance in Central Europe.

1975 August 1. The CSCE resulted in 35 nations signing

the concluding document. The Helsinki Final Act

was primarily designed to build confidence within 

Europe. Confidence-building measures included

notification of ma jor military maneuvers involving

more than 25,000 troops.

1977 October 4. A first CSCE review conference on

implementation of the Helsinki Final Act began in

Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

1978 March 9. The Belgrade CSCE review conference

closed, with no conclusions reached.

May 25. French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing

proposed a two-stage security conference during a

UN meeting.

1979 December. Negotiations for MBFR stalled because

of the NATO decision to deploy new intermediaterange nuclear weapons in Europe.

December. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 

1980 Novem ber 11. The second CSCE review conference

began in Madrid, Spain. These negotiations would 

continue for almost three years, leading to the

adoption of the Madrid Mandate.

1983 September 6-9. The Madrid CSCE conference

ended after almost three years of negotiations. The

35 CSCE states signed the Madrid Concluding 

Document, or Madrid Mandate, which established

the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and

Security Building Measures. The mandate called

for member nations to negotiate treaties red ucing

the size of their armed forces in Europe, in addition

to continuing work to develop confidence and

security building measures.

1984 January 17. The CSCE Stockholm Conference on

Confidence and Security Building Measures and

Disarmament in Europe (CDE) began.

1985 March 10. Mikhail Gor bachev became General

Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union.

March 13. President Ronald Reagan reversed his

position on holding high-level talks with leaders of

the Soviet Union.

November 19-20. President Reagan and General

Secretary Gorbachev held their first summit 

meeting.

1986 April 18. General Secretary Gor bachev proposed in

MBFR negotiations to reduce ground and air forces,

and to include conventional and nuclear weapons 

from the Atlantic to the Urals. Gor bachev recognized the presence of significant asymmetries of

conventional forces and proposed large-scale force

reductions to be verified by on-site inspection.
June 11. Gorbachev's proposals were formalized

during a Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)

meeting in Budapest, with the proposals later 

known as the Budapest Appeal or Budapest

Communique.

September 22. In Stockholm, 35 CSCE nations,

meeting as the Conference on Confidence and

Security Building and Disarmament in Europe,

adopted an accord, the Stockholm Document,

designed to increase fi;ansparency of military activities and to reduce the risk of war in Europe. The

agreement required notification of military exercises

of 13,000 troops or more, and allowed on-site 

inspections of field activities of more than 17,000

ground troops or 5,000 airborne troops.

October 11-12. A summit between President

Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev was held

at Reykjavik, Iceland. It created a positive context

for further negotiations.

November 4. The third CSCE review conference

began in Vienna.

December 12. NATO's North Atlantic Council of

foreign ministers issued the Brussels Declaration on

Conventional Arms Control. The decla ration ca lled

for two distinct sets of negotiations: one to build on

the CSBM results of the Stockholm Conference and

the other to establish conventional stability in

Europe through negotiations on conventional arms

control from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).

1987 January 7. The Stockholm Document entered i nto

force. The agreement for the first time provided for

a negotiated right to conduct on-site inspections of

military forces in the field.

February 17. Informal talks between the 16 NATO

and the 7 Warsaw Pact nations began in Vienna on

a mandate for conventional negotiations in Europe,

which would set out treaty negotiating guidelines.

July 27. NATO presented a draft mandate during

the 23-nation conference in Vienna. The mandate

called for elimination of force disparities, capability

for surprise attack, and large-scale offensive operations, and the establishment of an effective verification system.

December 8. The INF treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., between the United States and the 

Soviet Union.

1988 January 26. The Secretary of Defense established

the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) as a Department of Defense agency responsible for conducting

on-site inspection, monitoring, and escort operations under the INF Treaty.

May 29-June 2. At the Moscow Summit, President

Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev emphasized the importance of stability and security in

Eu rope, specifically calling for data exchange, 

verification of these data, and then reductions.

December 7. General Secretary Gorbachev announced at the United Nations a u nilateral withdrawa l of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe, and

demobiliztion of 500,000 Soviet troops.

1989 January 14. Twenty-three mem ber nations of

NATO and the Warsaw Pact produced the Mandate

for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces

in Europe. The mandate set out objectives for the 

CFE Treaty and established negotiating principles.

January 15. The Vienna CSCE review conference

ended after more than two years, resulting in the 

Vienna Concluding Document, which set a mandate

for CSBM talks, specifying that the talks would 

work towa rd "elaborating and adopting a new set

of mutually complementary confidence and security

building measu res designed to reduce the risk of

confrontation in Europe."

February 2. After 15 years of negotiations, the 

Mutua l and Balanced Force Reductions talks ended 

in Vienna.

March 9. The Vienna Confidence and Security

Building Measures negotiations mandated by the 

Vienna Concluding Document began, with 35 states

participating.

March 9. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE) Treaty negotiations commenced in Vienna

with 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

May 20-25. President George Bush and France's

President Frarn;:ois Mitterrand met at

Kennebunkport, Maine. President Bush announced

the acceptance of combat aircraft and helicopters in

the reductions as proposed by the WTO. He also

proposed a ceiling of 275,000 personnel stationed

in Europe by the U.S. and Soviet Union.

May 29-30. During a NATO summit in Brussels,

President Bush's proposal was adopted and subsequently presented in Vienna.

November 9. The Berlin Wall fell. Revol utions in

Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria

followed within four weeks.

December 2-3. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met

at sea off Malta and agreed to speed u p arms

control and economic negotiations.

1990 January 15-February 22. Non-Soviet WTO states

negotiated for deeper Soviet cuts and earlier withdrawals.

January 16-February 5. The 35 CSCE states held a

seminar on military doctrine in Vienna.
January 31. In his State of the Union address,

President Bush proposed lower levels of Soviet and

U.S. forces in Europe. The proposal called for

195,000 personnel for each nation and 30,000 for

the U.S. in the periphery.

February 26. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union

signed an agreement on withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The agreement called for the withdrawal by July

1991 of all 73,500 Soviet troops, along with more

than 1,200 tanks, 2,500 armored combat vehicles,

1,200 pieces of artillery, and 80 aircraft.

March 9. Hungary and the Soviet Union signed an

agreement on withdrawal of Soviet forces. The

Soviet Union agreed that by the end of June 1991, it

would withdraw all its forces, consisting of 50,000

troops, 860 tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles,

and other equipment from Hungary.

May 5. The first Two plus Four (foreign ministers

of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic plus France, the United

Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union)

Meeting on German Unification was held in Bonn.

May 29. President Bush signed National Security

Directive 41, which made the Secretary of Defense

responsible for CFE compliance and directed the

On-Site Inspection Agency to prepare for CFE

Treaty implementation. It also directed OSIA to

prepare for inspection duties under the Chemical

Weapons Convention, the Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

June 26. The Hungarian National Assem bly voted

to begin negotiations to withdraw from the Warsaw

Treaty Organization.

July 6. NATO announced the London Declaration 

on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, which

called for decreased size of NATO forces as the 

Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Eastern

Europe, among other measures to draw down from 

the confrontational attitudes of the Cold War.

July 16. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

and Soviet President Gorbachev agreed to a complete Soviet withdrawal from Germany by 1994

and a ceiling of 370,000 active German military

personnel.

September 11. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard

Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James

Baker formally agreed to rescind their earlier

agreement to limit their own personnel in the 

region, and to resolve the personnel issue during

CFE lA negotiations.

September 12. In Moscow, the Two plus Four

countries signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement

with Respect to Germany. The World War II "Big

Four" gave up their occupation rights in Germany on

October 3, paving the way for German unification.

October 1. With German unification drawing near,

the Soviet Union had 17 divisions stationed in East

Germany, totaling more than 363,700 troops,

which had to be withdrawn by 1994.

October 3. The German Democratic Repu blic

ceased to exist, as Germany was unified.

October 3. President Bush requested that the U.S.

and Soviet negotiators move from Vienna to New

York to facilitate completion of the negotiations in

time for the 19-21 Novem ber CSCE Paris Summit.

October-November. U.S. Secretary of State Baker

and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resolved

most major outstanding CFE issues. CFE negotiators in Vienna resolved most of the remaining 

smaller, technical disputes. Major disagreements

over verification were resolved, and the "sufficiency

rule" was established.

October 13. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 

sent a letter to Secretary of State Baker listing the

CFE Treaty-limited equipment that the USSR had

relocated to east of the Urals.

November 3. Warsaw Pact countries signed an

agreement in Budapest that divided Warsaw Pact

allocations of forces by country as allowed under

the CFE Treaty.

November 14. Poland and Germany signed an

agreement confirming the existing Polish-German

border.

Novem ber 17. CSBM Vienna Document 1990 was

completed and signed by the 34 members of the 

CSCE. (German unification had lowered the 

number of CSCE states by one, as the German

Democratic Republic ceased to exist.) The Vienna

Document 1990 expanded on the CSBM provisions

of the 1986 Stockholm Document.

November 18. The Soviet Union submitted official

treaty data. Data submitted were significantly out

of line with data submitted two years earlier-as

the Soviets' number of objects of verification was

reduced from 1,500 to 1,000.

November 19. At the Paris Summit, the CFE Treaty

was signed by leaders of 22 states.

November 21. The Charter of Paris for a New

Europe was adopted by all 34 members of the 

CSCE. The charter's goal was to recognize the end

of the Cold War and to reflect a new spirit of

cooperation.

November 26. CFE lA negotiations formally

commenced in Vienna.
348 ON-SITE INSPFCT!ON AGENCY 

November 29. The first meeting of the Joint Consultative Group (]CG) convened in Vienna.

December 6. The United States dispatched a team 

of experts to Moscow in an effort to resolve discrepancies in Soviet treaty data.

1991 February 4-14. The first U.S. CFE course was

conducted at the Defense Intelligence College in

Washington, D.C.

February 14. The Soviet Union submitted updated

treaty data. The Soviets interpreted equipment 

transferred to coastal defense, naval infantry,

Strategic Rocket Forces, and civil defense units as

being not counta ble as treaty-limited equipment.

February 15. The United States and other NATO

nations suspended treaty ratification because of the 

Soviet Union's unilateral reinterpretation of the 

treaty.

March 31. The Warsaw Treaty Organization's

military organs and structures were dissolved.

May 14. The U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency

conducted its first CFE mock inspection, working

with France's verification agency, L'Unite Frarn,:aise

de Verification. OSIA's Team Gessert inspected the 

French 3rd Fighter Wing at Nancy-Ochey Airfield

and, the next day, the French 3rd Tank Battalion.

June 1. Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander

Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State Baker met 

in Lisbon to discuss the final details of the CFE

Treaty statement concerning Soviet naval infantry

and coastal defense units.

June 14. The Soviet government presented to other

signatory states a "legally binding" statement on

how it would comply with the terms of the CFE

Treaty, covering issues such as reassignment of

treaty-limited equipment (TLE) to coastal defense,

naval infantry and Strategic Rocket Forces, and

elimination of TLE east of the Urals.

June 14. The Secretary of Defense assigned the U.S.

Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) as the

executive agent for CFE, with responsibility for U.S.

CFE compliance in Eu rope.

June 18. The Joint Consultative Group held its first

Extraordinary Conference at the Hague. During the

session, the Soviet statements on coastal defense

and naval infantry and on reductions east of the 

Urals were read and accepted as treaty documents.

July 1. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was

dissolved.

July 9. President Bush submitted the CFE Treaty to

the U.S. Senate for ratification.

August 19. An abortive military coup d'etat was

launched in the Soviet Union. After the coup, the

Soviet government continued, but very weakly,

while nationalism grew rapidly in the Soviet

republics.

October 18. At the second Extraordinary Conference of the ]CG, held in Vienna, the Soviet Union

issued a political declaration stating its intention to

rapidly withdraw weapons based in the Baltics.

The ]CG no longer considered Baltic states to be

within the CFE area of application.

December 8. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus created

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Within a week, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also joined the CIS.

December 25. The Soviet Union dissolved into 15

independent states, 8 of which had former Soviet

forces stationed in their territories and fell within

the CFE Treaty's area of application.

December 26. The United States ratified the CFE

Treaty.

1992 January 10. The North Atlantic Cooperation

Council (NACC)-which consisted of the 16 NATO

nations and the 15 newly independent states of the 

former Soviet Union, along with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia- assembled a High Level Working Group in Brussels.

Of the member states, only Kazakstan did not

attend. The meeting agreed that CFE Treaty obligations assumed by the former USSR should be fully

accepted by all newly created CIS states within the

ATTU.

January 13. The Joint Consultative Group met to

discuss how to incorporate CIS republics into the

CFETreaty.

Ja n uary 30-31. CSCE foreign ministers in Prague

admitted several new CIS states: Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

February 10-14. The On-Site Inspection Agency

conducted its first CFE mock inspections inside the 

territory of the Eastern Group of States. The first 

inspection was held at Siverskiy Air Base and the 

second at Pushkin, both in Russia's Leningrad

Military District.

February 21. The High Level Working Group

meeting in Brussels agreed on methods for bringing

the CFE Treaty into force.

March 4. CSCE participants adopted the Vienna

Document 1992. The agreement subsumed and

added to the Vienna Document 1990 and provided 

for expanded membership in the CSCE process and

greater exchange of information in numerous areas
A l'l'I \.()1\: G: CHROt\:OI ()(;) 349

of CSBM. With the admission of most of the 

former Soviet states, the CSCE included 48 member

nations.

March 24. The CSCE nations signed the Vienna

Document 1992.

April 3. The High Level Working Group of the 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council met to discuss

division of the former Soviet Union's TLE among

independent CIS states.

May 8. The High Level Working Group met again

to discuss division of the former Soviet Union's

TLE.

May 15. The CIS states met at Tashkent,

Uzbekistan, and agreed on division of former Soviet

forces among CIS states.

June 5. The JCG held its third Extraordinary

Conference in Oslo, Norway. Twenty-nine countries signed the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE

Treaty. The document removed all obstacles to

ratification of the treaty and modified language of

the treaty to include all CIS states which were in the 

ATTU, legalizing the entry of the new states into the 

treaty and their acceptance of the obligations of the 

USSR.

July 1. Ukraine ratified the CFE Treaty.

July 5. The United States completed its 44th and

last CFEmock inspection mission before entry into

force of the treaty. During these 44 missions, OSIA

inspected 100 separate sites. About half-27

missions and 50 inspections-involved cooperative

mock inspections with NATO partners. Sixmissionsinvolved participation with Eastern bloc

nations:Russia,Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,

Bulgaria, and Romania. The remainder took place

at U.S. sitesin Europe, giving the host site personnel

as well as OSIA teams training in the CFE inspection process.

July 8. Russia ratified the CFE Treaty.

July 10. By the time of the Helsinki CSCE Summit,

three nations-Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakstanhad not yet ratified the CFE Treaty. At the fourth

JCG Extraordinary Conference, held concurrently

with the CSCE Summit, the CFE Treaty nations

agreed on provisional entry into force of the treaty,

which would allow implementation to begin while

they waited for the remaining three countries to

ratify the treaty.

July 10. CFE lA was signed by 29 states during the

Helsinki CSCEsummit. The agreement limited

personnel to specific national thresholds and put

into place an extensive information exchange

regime.

July 17. The CFE Treaty provisionally entered into

force, limiting five major categories of weapons,

with 29 signatory states. When the remaining

countries deposited their instruments of ratification

in October, it was agreed to make full entry into

force retroactive to July 17.

July 17. The CFE baseline period began. Canada

conducted the first NATO inspection in the former

Soviet Union.

July 18-20. OSIA's Team White, led by Lt. Colonel

Elmer G. "Guy" White, conducted the first U.S.

CFE baseline inspection at Buy, Russia.

July 20. The first U.S. liaison officer ( LNO) activity

occurred in England during baseline.

August 6-8. OSIA conducted the first U.S. reduction inspection at the Capital Repair Plant at

Woensdorf, Germany. Russian forces still in the 

former East Germany reduced the equipment.

August 13-15. In the first Eastern Group of States

inspection, a Russian team inspected a Canadian

site in Germany, followed by a sequential inspection

of U.S. stationed forces at Geibelstadt, Germany, for

the first U.S. CFE escort mission.

August 14. The first post-baseline information on

national equipment holdings was exchanged.

September 4. U.S. inspection teams were denied

access to Russian declared sites. A four-month

dispute ensued.

September 22. Fifty-four member states of the

CSCE follow-on conference created the Forum for

Security Cooperation (FSC) mandate for new

security negotiations. CFE was replaced as the 

primary tool for conventional arms control confidence and security building measures. Unlike the 

CFE Treaty, all states would participate individually

and not as alliances or military blocs.

October 12. Armenia deposited its CFE instruments of ratification in The Hague, leaving only

two nations to ratify before the treaty could fully

enter into force.

October 3-9. Following a German inspection of

Naro-Fominsk, Russia, in late September, two U.S.

teams and one French team conducted inspections

in rapid succession at Naro-Fominsk to test Russian

assurances that site diagrams would be corrected

and that inspectors would have full access at declared objects of verification (OOVs).

October 30. The final two CFE ratification instruments, those of Belarus and Kazakstan, were deposited at The Hague.
November 9. The Joint Consultative Group formalized the CFE Treaty's entry into force with 29

states, and made entry into force retroactive to the 

July 17 date of provisional entry into force.

Novem ber 14. The CFE baseline period ended.

During basel ine the United States hosted nine

inspection teams that inspected 23 U.S. decla red

sites, and conducted 33 missions into former WTO

nations, inspecting 44 Eastern bloc sites. In addition to the baseline inspections, the United States

also conducted five reduction inspections.

November 15. With the baseline period ended, the 

CFE treaty moved into a three-yea r reduction 

period.

1993 January. NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) invited the participation of former 

Warsaw Pact guest inspectors on its teams. Hosting

guest inspectors from NATO nations had been a

common practice since the beginning of baseline,

but this marked the first time NATO had invited

inspectors from former Eastern bloc nations onto

their teams.

April 28. The United States hosted the first guest

inspector from a former Warsaw Pact nation on one 

of its CFE inspection teams when a Czech inspector 

participated in a U.S inspection in Tazar, Hungary.

September. Russia's President Boris Yeltsin sent a

letter to the United States, Germany, France, and 

the United Kingdom asking that they recognize the 

flanks as a serious problem.

Novem ber 17. The first CFE reduction year ended.

All signatories met their 25 percent reduction

liabilities for the first year, with the exceptions of

Armenia and Azerbaijan.

1994 March 21. Russia asked the JCG to consider

modifying the CFE Treaty to increase the amount of

TLE that could be taken out of storage and the

length of time it could be out of storage.

March 23. Belarus threatened to cease its CFE

reductions because of high costs, unless it received

assistance from other nations.

March 31. The United States gave $10 million to

be divided between Belarus and Ukraine to help

finance their CFE reductions.

May 15. A U.S. guest inspector took part for the 

first time in an inspection conducted by a former

Warsaw Pact nation. Major Mark Lieber, USMC,

served on a Bulgarian inspection in Romania.

September 19. For the first time, a U.S. CFE inspection team included a Russian guest inspector.

OSIA's Lt. Col. Fred E. Busing led this team on a

declared site inspection in Oradea, Romania.

November 13. The CFE Treaty's second reduction

yea r ended. All but two nations had met their 60

percent reduction goals.

December 4. At the CSCE Summit in Budapest, the

52 nations of the CSCE signed the Vienna Document 1994, which repl aced the Vienna Document

1992 and expanded on its confidence and security

building measures. At the same time, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

changed its name to the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

1995 Jan uary 10. The United States agreed that Russian

forces in Chechnya did not constitute a CFE Treaty

violation, since flank limits did not come into effect

until the end of the reduction period in Novem ber.

After that, they would still not be a violation, since

the treaty allowed tempora ry deployments.

February 23. President Alexander Lukashenka

announced that Belarus would suspend all CFE

reduction activities because of the cost, which he

called "economically unjust," since Belarus did not

prod uce the weapons left behind when the Soviet

Union dissolved but still had responsibility for

destroying them. Belarus did state, however, that

reductions could begin again if financing was made

availa ble.

May 10. At a Clinton/Yeltsin summit meeting in

Moscow, the United States told Russia that it would

not support modification to the CFE Treaty until

the review conference in May 1996.

September 12. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and

Kazakstan announced that they would not be able

to meet their reduction liabilities by the end of the

reduction period. Ukraine said it could meet its

commitments with the exception of TLE assigned to

the Black Sea Fleet, wh ich it could not reduce until

the equipment in the fleet was divided between

Ukraine and Russia. The other three nations

blamed economic difficulties.

October 15. Bela rus resumed its reduction of

treaty-limited equipment, but stated it would not be

able to meet its remaining reduction liability by the 

end of the reduction period in November.

Novem ber 17. The CFE reduction period ended.

The treaty nations issued a joint statement identifying the countries that were not in compliance with

their treaty obligations: Armenia, Azerbaijan,

Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Despite some countries' failing to fully meet their reduction liabilities, 

the amount of equipment reduced by the CFE

Treaty constituted the largest negotiated arms

red uction in history, with over 50,000 pieces of

equipment destroyed. This equipment included

19,200 battle tanks, 18,600 armed combat vehicles,

9,800 pieces of artillery, 2,200 combat aircraft, and

370 attack helicopters.
Al'l'l '.\ lllX G: CHl(()'.\JOI ()(;) 15I

Novem ber 17. The residual level validation period

(RLVP) began. This 120-day "second baseline"

confirmed the accuracy of national reductions,

recategorizations, and relocations of equipment

declared after the reduction period.

1996 March 16. The residual level validation period

ended. During the 120-day RLVP, NATO nations

conducted 246 inspections of Eastern bloc nations.

Of these, the United States led 38 inspections and

provided guest inspectors to 56 teams led by other

Novem ber 25. Russia and Ukraine reached an

nations. The Eastern bloc nations inspected NATO

nations 183 times, with U.S. sites in Europe receivagreement on division of the Black Sea Fleet.

Ukraine would receive 150 naval installations of the 

fleet in the agreement.

ing 11 inspections.

April 26. Belarus did not complete its reductions in

Novem ber 28. The Joint Consultative Group gave

time for the deadline proposed in its Novem ber

1995 plan.

Belarus an extension until April 26, 1996, to complete its reductions of treaty-limited equipment. May 15-31. The 30 treaty nations held the CFE

The United States and Germany agreed to assist

Belarus in its reduction effort.

Decem ber 31. Russia failed to meet its deadline for

reducing TLE it had moved east of the Urals prior

to treaty signature. Russia cited economic difficulties and requested that the JCG extend the deadline

until 1998.

Review Conference in Vienna. The Final Document 

of the conference included compromises on the

flank issue, east of the Urals reductions, and other

issues.

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INTERVIEWS

Bumala, Mark A. Sergeant First Class, U.S. Army, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P.Harahan. Rhein-Main Air

Base, Germany, July 13, 1993.

Chesney, William N., Jr. Master Sergeant, U.S. Army, Plans NCO, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan.

Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993.

DiMaria, Joseph. Brigadier General, Centro Italiano de Verifica de Armi (CIVA). Interviewed by Joseph P.

Harahan. Washington, D.C., October 19, 1993.

Drach, Joseph J. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. RheinMain Air Base, Germany, December 17, 1993.

Evans, Mary Margaret. Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Control and Compliance, Office of the Secretary

of Defense for Acquisition. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Washington, D.C., December 8, 1993, and

February 21, 1996.
.58 O'.\i-S111 l'.\il'H 110'-. A c1 NU _ _ _

Fiser, Thomas C. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. RheinMain Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993.

Foerster, Schuyler. Colonel, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Representative to the CFE Delegation. Interviewed by Joseph P.

Harahan. Washington, D.C., May 19, 1994.

Gallagher, Edward G. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air

Base, Germany, December 13, 1993.

Gessert, David P. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan.

Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993.

Hansen, Lynn. Ambassador, United States CFE Treaty Negotiator. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Ramstein

Air Base, Germany, December 14, 1993.

Honcharenko, N. T. General-Major, Chief, Armed Forces Verification Center of Ukraine. Interviewed by Joseph

P. Harahan. August 1, 1995.

Janssen, Fred, and Henri Van der Auera. Lieutenant Colonels, L'Unite Belge de Verification. Interviewed by

Joseph P. Harahan. Brussels, Belgium, January 27, 1994.

Karcz, Jan. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main

Air Base, Germany, December 13, 1993.

Karstens, Gary E., and Kenneth D. Periman, Sergeants First Class, U.S. Army, OSIA linguists. Interviewed by

Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, December 17, 1993.

Keitel, Roland, and Bernd Mecke. Lieutenant Colonels, Zentrum fiir Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr.

Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994.

Kelley, Lawrence G. Colonel, USMC, Chief of Operations Division, European Operations Command, OSIA.

Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Washington D.C., May 18, 1994.

Loquai, Dr. Heinz. Brigadier General, Director, Zentrum fiir Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr. Interviewed

by Joseph P. Harahan. Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994.

Lukes, Michael R. Chief Warrant Officer 4, U.S. Army, Deputy Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P.

Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993.

Malinowski, Stanislaw. Colonel, Chief Inspector, Polish Verification Center. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan.

Warsaw, Poland, February 3, 1994.

Medvedev, V. I. General-Lieutenant (Ret.), former Director, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Ministry of

Defense, Russia. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Magna, Utah, August 30, 1994.

Melomedov, M.Y. Colonel; Deputy Chief; Colonel M. M. Volochko, Chief, International Treaties Division; Lt.

Colonel I. G. Gems, Group Leader, CFE Treaty Reduction; and Major G. E. Brusnikov, linguist, National

Agency for Control and Inspections (NAKI), Belarus. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Minsk, Belarus,

February 4, 1994.

Nikulin, Y. I. General-Major, Director, National Agency for Control and Inspections (NAKI), Belarus.

Interviewed by John C. Kuhn. August 1, 1995.

Oatman, Keith A. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. RheinMain Air Base, Germany, July 13, 1993.

O'Shea, Richard J. Major, USAF, Liaison Officer, European Operations Command, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph

P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993.

Partridge, George A. Master Sergeant, U.S. Army, Weapons Specialist, European Operations Command, OSIA.

Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 13, 1993.
----- ------ -------- --------------------------------- BIBl _J ()C R .\ l 'H )

Rozec, Frarn;:ois. Colonel, Commandant, L'Unite Frarn;:aise de Verification. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan.

Creil, France, February 1, 1994.

Smith, William R. Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Commander, European Operations Command, OSIA. Interviewed by

Joseph P. Harahan. July 12, 1993.

Steinberg, Joern. Colonel, CFE Treaty Inspection Team Chief, Zentrum for Verifikationsaufgaben der

Bundeswehr. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994.

Tsygankov, S. F. General-Ma jor, Deputy Director, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Ministry of Defense, Russia.

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Cheney, Richard B. Secretary of Defense. "Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense for the CFE Treaty."

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Crawford, Dorn. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements.

Washington D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 1995.

Guillory, Kenneth D. Colonel, U.S. Army. Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Where to Next? Unpublished

report. May 1994.

Hansen, Lynn M. Ada ptation and Innovation: CFE and CFElA, From Signature to Entry Into Force.

Unpublished report. December, 1993.

On-Site Inspection Agency. Public Affairs Office. "Biography of Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF,

Commander European Operations. 11 News Release, December 1993.

On-Site Inspection Agency. Public Affairs Office. "Biography of Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Deputy

Commander and Chief of Operations, European Operations Command. 11 News Release, December 1993.

Nichol, Jim. Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. "Conventional

Forces in Europe Treaty: Russian Attitudes and Implications for U.S. Interests." Washington, D.C.:

Congressional Research Service, September 15, 1995.

Parker, Robert W. Major General, U.S. Air Force, Director, OSIA. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms

Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Af fairs, House of

Representatives. May 12, 1992.
360 ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY---------·

Parker, Robert W. Major General, U.S. Air Force, Director OSIA, Statement Before the House of

Representatives, Foreign Af fairs Subcommittee on Arms Control and International Security and Science.

March 21, 1991.

Powell, Colin L. General, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. "CFE Treaty Executive Agent." 

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. April 3, 1991.

Treaty Between the Twenty-Two Sovereign Nations on the Reduction of Their Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe. Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, November 19, 1990.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report to the Congress on the Activities of the On-Site

Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense. April 1992. 102d Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1992.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Report 101-31: Threshold Test Ban and

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. 101st Congress, 2d session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1990.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Treaty Document 102-8: M essage from the President of

the United States Transmitting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). 102d

Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Treaty Document 103-21: M essage from the President

of the United States Transmitting the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Stock piling and Use

of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. 103d Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record. 18038, November 25, 1991.

United States European Command. "Memorandum of Understanding Between USEUCOM, USLANTCOM,

and OSIA for Mutual Liaison and Support Operations in Implementation of the CFE Treaty." 1991.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Dispatch Sup plement: Vienna Document 1990. Vol. 2,

Supplement 2. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, May 1991.

Willford, David M. "A Brief History of the On-Site Inspection Agency," OSIA Reference Report No. 1.

Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Document on Entry into Force of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Vienna: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

November 13, 1992.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Provisional Ap plication of the Treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990. Vienna: Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, July 10, 1992.

Federal Republic of Germany. Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the

Personnel Strength of the German Armed Forces. Annex to CFE Treaty. November 19, 1990.

Nedimoglu, Necil. Head of the NATO Verification and Implementation Coordination Section. "NATO's Role in

Verification and Compliance Monitoring for the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document," speech presented

to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Verification in All Its Aspects, New York, July

19, 1994.
GLOSSARY

ACDA

ACIU 

ACV

AIFV

AMC

APC

ATTU

BOU

CAEST

CBMs

CFE Treaty

CIS

CIVA

CSBMs

CSCE

ewe

DLI

DoD

DPSS

EIF

EO

EU

EUCOM

FAO

FSC

GDR

GMT

GSFG

HLTF

INF Treaty

INMARSAT

ISS

JACIG

JCG

JCS

LNO

MAC

MBFR

MD

mm

NACC

NAKI

NATO

NCO

NRRC 

NSC

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Arms Control Implementation Unit

armored combat vehicle

armored infantry fighting vehicle

Air Mobility Command

armored personnel carrier

Atlantic to the Urals

battle dress uniform

conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty 

confidence-building measures

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

Commonwealth of Independent States

Centro Italiano de Verifica de Armi 

confidence and security building measures

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Chemical Weapons Convention

Defense Language Institute

Department of Defense

designated permanent storage sites

entry into force

European Operations

European Union

European Command

foreign area officer

Forum for Security Cooperation

German Democratic Republic

Greenwich mean time

Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

High Level Task Force

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

International Maritime Satellite

Inspection Support Staff

Joint Arms Control Implementation Group

Joint Consultative Group

Joint Chiefs of Staff

liaison officer

Military Airlift Command

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

Military District

millimeter

North Atlantic Cooperation Council

National Agency for Control and Inspections

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

noncommissioned officer

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center

National Security Council
NSD 41

NTM

NTT

oov

OSCE 

OSIA

PACAF

PNET

POC

POE

POET

RAF

RLVP

SAC

SHAPE

SRF

START

TAMC

TLE

TTBT

UFV 

USA

USAF

USAFA

USAFE

USAREUR

USARI

USCINCEUR

USEUCOM

USLANTCOM

USMC

USMLM

USN

USNAVEUR 

USSR

UVB

vcc

VICS

WTO

ZVBW

National Security Directive 41

national technical means

Nuclear Testing Treaties

object of verification

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

On-Site Inspection Agency

Pacific Air Forces

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

point of contact

point of entry

Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment

Royal Air Force

residual level validation period

Strategic Air Command

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

Strategic Rocket Forces

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Theater Army Materiel Command

treaty-limited equipment

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

L'Unite Franc;:aise deVerification

U.S. Army

U.S. Air Force

U.S. Air Force Academy

U.S. Air Forces in Europe

U.S. Army Europe

U.S. Army Russian Institute

U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe

U.S. European Command

U.S. Atlantic Command

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Military Liaison Mission

U.S. Navy

U.S. Navy Europe

Union of Soviet Socialist Repu blics

L'Unite Beige de Verification

Verification Coordinating Committee

Verification and Implementation Coordination Section

Warsaw Treaty Organization

Zentrum fiir Verifikationsaufga ben der Bundeswehr
INDEX

A

Akhromeyev, Marshall, 10

Allison, Maj. Charles R., USA, 190

Am bulances, 187, 192, 219-220

Amen, TSgt. Joseph A., USAF, 113, 114-115

Angus, TSgt. Paul R., USAF, 101

Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, 28-

30

Armenia

compliance difficulties, 242

reduction liability, 204, 226

Armored ambulances versus M-113 APCs, 187, 192, 219-

220

Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee, 157-158

Azerbaijan

compliance difficulties, 242, 243

concerns over Russia's future security intentions, 251

reduction liability, 204, 226

B

Baker, Secretary of State James A., III, 11, 17, 77, 79, 80,

81, 82

Barneby, Lt. Col. Stephen A., USA, 190

Baseline inspections

armored ambulances versus M-113 APCs, 187, 192,

219-220

assignment of states to be inspected, 157

"backdoor" communications, 171-172

challenge inspections, 184

declared site access and, 176-183

description of activity, 30-31

first U.S. escort mission, 165-170

first U.S. inspection, 157-165

first U.S. liaison mission, 170

inventory procedure, 164

multinational teams, 185

NATO schedule for, 156

number conducted by United States, 174, 194

number to be conducted by NATO states, 51-52

operational issues, 192-194

projected number of, 51-53

U.S. active and passive quotas, 156-157

U.S. baseline escort operations, 185-187

U.S. baseline reduction inspections, 190-192

U.S. liaison operations, 188-190

U.S. operations, 174-176

U.S. portion of NATO inspections, 52-53

Belarus

cost of TLE reductions, 238, 239-241

declared site inspections, 183, 192, 215-216, 217

National Agency for Control and Inspection, 141-142

reduction liability, 226, 258

Belgium

L'Unite Beige de Verification, 58, 138-139

readiness for entry into force, 151-152

Bessmertnykh, Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander A., 80,

81, 82

"Big Hog" database, 121, 188-189

Bilyeu, Maj. John M., USA, 190

Black Sea Fleet, 243-245

Boyd, Sgt. Danny K., USAF, 178

Bradley, Staff Sergeant Thomas J., USAF, 121

Bremner, Group Capt. D.A.G., 147

Brock, Lt. Col. Thomas S., USA, 49, 65

Bush, President George, 8, 12, 13, 45, 46-47, 53-54

arms control initiatives, 80-81

letter to Gor bachev, 81

remarks to Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, 14-15

"Report to Congress on Noncompliance with Arms

Control Agreements," 183

signing of CFE Treaty, 74

submission of CFE Treaty to Senate for ratification, 83

Busing, Lt. Col. Fred E., USAF, 213, 219

Buy, Russia

first U.S. inspection site, 157-165

c

CAEST. See Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional

Armaments and Equipment Subject to the Treaty

Canada

Russian baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces

stationed in Germany, 165-170

Carraway, Lt. Col. Thomas, USA, 231

Carter, Capt. David R., USAF, 107, 114

Certification inspections, 36

Cetin, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet, 249

Challenge inspections, 32-35, 170, 174, 184, 215-217

Charter of Paris, 13

"Cheese slicer" or "cookie cutter" compactor, 238

Chemical Weapons Convention, 3, 45, 123

Chesney, MSgt. William N., Jr., 172

Christman, Brig. Gen. Daniel W., USA, 78

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent States

Clinton, President William, 249-250

Commonwealth of Independent States. See also Russia;

specific countries by name

creation of, 85, 227, 234-235

as state parties for the CFE Treaty, 85-90, 134-135,

150, 202-204, 235

Communications

"backdoor" system for, 127-128, 171-172

late announcements of inspections, 193

U.S. liaison teams, 188

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

admission of CIS as members, 87

communications system, 158

confidence-building measures, 4, 6

Conflict Resolution Center, 14
364 ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY 

as deadline for agreement on military personnel 

limitations, 17

Election Monitoring Office, 14

Helsinki Summit, 90, 91, 151, 155, 229 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 4-6

November 1990 meeting, 13-14

Secretariat establishment, 14

September 1983 CSCE Mandate, 6

Confidence-building measures, 4, 6

Containers

definition of, 117

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. See also Onsite inspections

American inspection teams, 65-67

Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information,

28-30

areas of application, 21-25

baseline inspections, 30-31, 51-53, 155-194

cadre model for verification agencies, 58-60

combat aircraft definition, 16-18

conclusions drawn three years after ratification, 225-

228

continuing commitment of states to, 225-226

data exchange, 28-30, 51-52, 74-83

declared site access and, 31-32, 33-34, 176-183, 192,

215-217, 235-237

description, 1

early negotiations, 4-13

entry into force, 66-68, 91, 151-152, 155, 229, 234

evaluation of, 257-262

Final Document, 89-90, 246, 251, 256

final ratification, 90-91

First Review Conference, 250, 254-257, 258

flank limits, 246-251

host states, 37-40

implementation problems, 234-235

INF Treaty as precedent, 11

Inspector/Escort Course, 99-100

Joint Consultative Group, 15, 36, 78, 83, 84, 89, 133,

155, 180, 201, 226, 227, 256

"letter of the law" versus "spirit of the law"

enforcement, 193-194, 220

liaison officer requirement, 36-40

Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe, 7

national verification agencies, 56-60

nations implementing, 2

objectives, 228

obligations and rights, 133-134

on-site inspections, 31-36

political and military changes in Europe and, 2-3, 53-

55, 227, 251-254, 261-262

Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments

and Equipment, 19-20, 29, 30, 34, 102, 176, 254-

255

Protocol on Inspection, 33-34, 66, 166

Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information,

28-30

Protocol on Reduction, 26, 206-207

provisional acceptance, 90-91, 155

ratification delay, 67-68

reductions, 25-28, 199

residual level validation period, 228-231, 233, 234

role and mission definition, 46-48

scope, 18-21

sensitive or classified programs, 38-40, 176

signing, 1, 3, 13-15

stationing states, 37-40

sufficiency rule, 20-21

Support Fund, 240

text and declarations, 15-18

treaty periods, 30-31

Treaty Review Conference, 246

two-meter access rule, 38, 175

verification agencies, 135-150

Cooperative Partners plan, 214-215, 218

CSCE. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe

Czech Republic

declared site inspection, 216

D

Data exchange

bilateral diplomacy to resolve questions over, 78-82

collapse of Soviet Union and, 80

as part of CFE Treaty, 28-30

Soviet Union-U.S. final agreement on, 82-83

Soviet Union's first official data exchange, 51-52

Soviet Union's underrepresentation of treaty holdings,

75-78

updated treaty data from Soviet Union, 78-79

U.S. direct appeal to Soviet Union, 81-82

Databases

"Big Hog," 121, 188-189

VERITY, 215, 227, 254, 260-261

Davies, Maj. Gen. Joseph T., USA, 194

Declared site inspections, 31-32, 33-34, 176-183, 192,

215-217, 234, 235-237. See also specific inspection

sites by name

Deconfliction schedule, 61-62, 157, 174

Defense Language Institute

Intermediate Russian Course, 106

deGaulle, President Charles, 6

Desert Shield

U.S. troops deployed from Europe for, 54, 258

U.S. victory, 80

Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons, 46

Detch, John L., Jr., 163

DiFormato, MSgt. Richard D., USA, 101

DiMaria, Maj. Gen. (formerly Brig. Gen.) Joseph, 59

Drach, Lt. Col. Joseph ].,Jr., USA, 106, 178

E

Eastern states. See also speci fic countries by name

East-on-East inspections, 214-215, 218

Eastern inspectors on NATO nation inspection teams,

217-218, 227

reduction inspections, 213-215

reduction liability, 200-204

residual level validation period inspections, 228, 231,

233

residual levels after reductions, 221-222

Elliston, Staff Sergeant Kent 0., USA, 166, 169-170

Entry into force, 66-68, 151-152

Escort missions

first U.S. mission, 165-170
responsibilities, 46, 186-187

standby rotation for, 185-186

two-meter rule and, 175

Estonia

rebellion against Soviet Union, 83-85

European Operations Command, 53, 55, 62-63, 65, 66

Eastern Europe mock inspections, 110-120

expansion, 97-106

liaison officer role, 97, 121-124

Memorandum of Understanding, 47-48

mock inspections, 106-128

U.S. reductions management, 205-206

F

Favia, Sergeant First Class (formerly Staff Sergeant)

Thomas A., USA, 100

First Review Conference, 250, 254-257, 258

Fiser, Lt. Col. (formerly Maj.) Thomas C., USA, 173, 183,

186-187, 211, 215, 216-217, 218

Foerster, Col. Schuyler (Sky), USAF, 110, 178

Fox, TSgt. Ronald S., USAF, 121, 172

France

inspection team training, 147

L'Unite Frarn;:aise de Verification, 57-58, 108, 137-138

readiness for entry into force, 152

French, Alan J., 106, 179

G

Gallagher, Lt. Col. Edward G., II, USA, 114, 118, 119

reduction inspections, 211-213

Galvin, Gen. John R., USA, 47, 61

Georgia

compliance difficulties, 242, 243

concerns over Russia's future security intentions, 251

reduction lia bility, 226

Germany. See also Unification of Germany

inspection team training, 148-149

mock inspections and, 110-118

readiness for entry into force, 151

Russian baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces

stationed in Germany, 165-170

TLE red uced, 259-260

transfer of TLE to other NATO states, 204

Zentrum fiir Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, 57, 

110-111, 114, 135-137, 172

Gems, Lt. Col. LG., 141

Gessert, Lt. Col. David P., USAF, 97, 104-105, 108-109,

181-182, 216

Giebelstadt Army Air Field, Germany 

baseline inspection, 167, 169-170

Giles, Col. Roy, 58, 138

Giscard d'Estaing, President Valery, 6

Gorbachev, President (formerly General Secretary) Mikhail

s., 3, 6, 8, 10, 13, 80, 81, 246

remarks to Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, 15

Soviet military withdrawal declaration, 9, 12

Govan, Brig. Gen. Gregory G., 250, 255

Grachev, Russian Defense Minister Pavel, 244, 248

Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany 

baseline inspection, 169, 170

Graham, Thomas, Jr., 250, 255

Great Britain

challenge inspections, 170

inspection team training, 147

Joint Arms Control Implementation Group, 58, 138,

172

Green, Robert G., 158

Griffiths, RAF Wing Commander, 170

Grinevsky, Soviet Ambassador Oleg, 10, 11, 13, 77, 82

Grosick, Col. Frederick E., USAF, 49 

appointment as OSIA Commander, 62 

background, 63

operational concepts for inspections, 98-99

Gryshchenko, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister

Konstyantyn, 142, 255

Guillory, Col. Kenneth D., USA, 229-231, 232-234

Gulf War. See Desert Shield

H

Hansen, American Ambassador Lynn M., 12, 13, 75, 80,

88, 90, 176, 236

declared site issue, 180

on U.S. negotiations, 11

Hare, Staff Sergeant Walter E., 163 

Hartmann, German Ambassador Rudiger, 255

Helsinki Final Act, 4, 14-15

Helsinki Process, 56. See also Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe

Helsinki Summit, 90, 91, 151, 155, 229

Higgins, Cdr. Edward J., USN, 49-50

Hoium, Ambassador John, 250

Honcharenko, Gen.-Maj. N.T., 142-144

Huet, Brig. Gen. Jean-Paul, 57-58

Hughes, Maj. Griffith S., USA, 111-112

Hungary

multinational team inspection, 218

reduction inspection of Szabadszallas, 212-213

verification agency, 135

I

Ifft, Dr. Edward M., 143

INF Treaty. See Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Ingram, Sergeant First Class Curtis E., USA, 101, 163

Inspection teams. See also Baseline inspections; On-site

inspections

European and Russian teams, 135-146

generalizations about, 144-145

training patterns, 146-151. See also Mock inspections

United States teams, 65-67

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 3, 45, 49, 134,

140, 144

as CFE Treaty precedent, 11

communications system, 127

on-site inspections, 56, 134, 140

Italy

Centro Italian de Verifica de Armi, 59

Leghorn Army Depot inspection, 220

reduction process at Buccino, 209

transfer of TLE to other NATO states, 204

J

Janssen, Lt. Col. Fred, 138, 151-152

Joint Arms Control Implementation Group, 58, 138

Joint Chiefs of Staff
366 ON-SrrF lNSl'FCTJ Or\ Ac ENCY _ _

liaison mission guidance, 121-122

treaty implementation executive agent designation, 47

Jubilee, Lt. Col. James, USAF, 217

K

Kanter, Arnold, 80

Karcz, Lt. Col. Jan S., USA, 110, 178, 179, 187, 192, 219-

220

Kelley, Col. Lawrence G., USMC, 65, 67, 122, 124, 169,

171-172, 190, 231

appointment as OSIA Chief of Operations, 62

background, 63

inspection team makeup, 65, 66

interview, 64

Leghorn Army Depot,Italy, inspection, 220 

mock inspections, 107, 109, 146-147

Naro-Fominsk baseline inspection, 182-183

operational concepts for inspections, 98-99

qualified inspection team redefinition, 51

readiness for entry into force, 152

TLE external markings record, 112

tri-national inspections and, 111-114, 115, 118

weapons specialist recruitment, 101

Kharchenko, Russian Gen. Dmitri, 246, 249

Kinkel, German Defense Minister Klaus, 241

Kohl, Chancellor Helmut, 8, 13

remarks to Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, 15

Koptelov, Lt. Col. Oleg Borisovich, 186, 187

Kravchuk, Ukrainian President Leonid, 88, 244

Kuenning, Brig. Gen. Thomas E.,Jr., USAF, 233

Kulebyakin, Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav, 248, 250,

255

L

Lacina, Lt. Col. Oldrich, 218

Lahr, Germany

baseline inspection, 166-167

Lajoie, Brig. Gen. Roland, USA, 46, 62, 63, 65

Latvia

rebellion against Soviet Union, 83-85

Lefevers, Lt. Col. William L., USAF, 231

Lewis, Wilbur, Jr., 126-127

Liaison missions

first U.S. mission, 170

United States operations, 188-190

Liaison officers, 36-40

role, 97, 121-124, 188-190

Lieber, Maj. Marc C., USMC, 213, 218

Linguist training, 106

Lithuania

rebellion against Soviet Union, 83-85

Loquai, Brig. Gen. Doctor Heinz, 57, 149, 151, 253

Lukashenko, Belarus President Aleksander R., 240, 241

Lukes, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Michael R., USA, 104, 108

I.;Unite Beige de Verification, 58, 138-139

I.;Unite Franaise de Verification, 57-58, 108, 137-138

M

Majoor, Netherlands Ambassador Frank, 250, 255

Malinowski, Col. Stanislaw, 139-140, 152, 207, 239

Mamedov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi, 250-

251

Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe, 7

Medvedev, Gen.-Lt. Vladimir I., 112, 117, 140

Melat, Kip, 163

Melomedov, Col. M.Y., 141

Merkle, Capt. Ellen, USAF, 170

Miget, French Ambassador Bernard, 255

Mitterrand, President Franois, 8, 13, 15

Mock inspections

container definition, 117

in Eastern Europe, 110-120

initial inspections, 106-110

as key concept in training, 146

number of, 120

photography issue, 116-117

site diagram issue, 119, 120

tri-national, 111-120

Moenchengladbach, Germany

baseline inspection, 187

Moiseyev, Gen. Mikhail A., 77, 78, 81

Moldova

concerns over Russia's future security intentions, 251

Morris, Lt. Col. (formerly Maj.) Dee Dodson, USA, 166,

167, 169-170

Multinational teams

baseline inspections, 185

reductions inspections, 217-220, 252-253

Murray, Lt. Col. Kirk E., USA, 217

N

NACC. See North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NAKI. See National Agency for Control and Inspection

Naro-Fominsk, Russia

baseline inspection, 181-183

National Agency for Control and Inspection, 141-142

National Security Directive 41, 45

National verification agencies, 56-60

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO nations. See also speci fic countries by name

flank limits, 248-249, 250

reduction liability, 200

residual level validation period inspections, 228, 231

residual levels after reductions, 221-222

VERITY access, 254

Nedimoglu, Necil, 253

Nelson, Lt. Col. Paul H., USA, 49, 65

Nelson, Sgt.Joseph S., USA, 100

The Netherlands

Arms Control Branch, 59, 139

transfer of TLE to other NATO states, 204

North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 85, 87, 88

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See also NATO

nations; speci fic countries by name

allocation of inspection quotas within each group of

states, 52-53

dualism in, 8

Equipment Transfer Plan, 204-205

guest inspectors, 185

Harmonization Plan, 47

High Level Task Force, 6-7, 17, 61

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations,

4-6

projected baseline inspections, 51-53
three-day time block for inspections, 193-194

total OOVs reduced, 61

total TLE items reduced, 61

training course for inspectors, 100

Verification Coordinating Committee, 52-53, 60-62,

156-157, 190-192

Norway

flank limits, 249

Novyy, Russia

baseline inspection, 178-180

Nowak, Maj. Henry ]., USA, 111, 112

NRRCs. See Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, 56, 127, 134, 158, 203

Nuclear Testing Treaties, 45

Nunn-Lugar funds for TLE reductions, 239-240

0

Parsons, Bill, 99

Partridge, MSgt. (formerly Sergeant First Class) George A.,

USA, 100

Patsiorin, Col. Lev Vladimirovich, 166, 167

Pavlenko, Col. V., 179-180

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 46

Pedersen, Lt. Ole T., 182

Periman, Sergeant First Class Kenneth D., USA, 164

Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense William S., 240, 250

Persian Gulf War. See Desert Shield

Pestana, Maj. Steven E., USAF, 125

Pesterfield, Lt. Col. John D., USAF, 191-192

Petrovskiy, Vladimir, 86

Photography

mock inspections and, 116-117

PNET. See Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

Poland

Oatman, Lt. Col. (formerly Maj.) Keith A., USA, 114, 169, cost of TLE reductions, 239

184, 215-216 readiness for entry into force, 152

Objects of verification. See also Treaty-limited equipment 

as basis for calculating number of inspections, 12, 13

inspection and, 34-36

reduction and, 29-30

Soviet agreement for challenge inspections of, 82-83

Soviet Union transfer of, 75, 77

total NATO items reduced, 61

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 47

Oleynik, Gen.-Lt. Ivan, 237

On-Site Inspection Agency. See also Baseline inspections;

European Operations Command; Inspection teams

establishment, 3, 56

expansion of mission, 45, 46

Memorandum of Understanding, 47-48

new leadership for, 62-65

sizing the CFE Treaty mission, 48-53

On-site inspections. See also Baseline inspections;

Inspection teams; Verification agencies

certification inspections, 36

challenge inspections, 32-35, 170, 174, 184, 215-217

communications issues, 127-128

declared site inspection, 31-32, 33-34, 176-183, 192,

215-217, 234, 235-237

equipment recognition training, 100-105

escort operations, 185-187

escort responsibilities, 46

initial training, 99-100

linguist training, 106

mock inspections, 106-128

multinational teams, 185, 217-220, 226, 252-253

number conducted, 226

operational concepts for, 98-99, 146

red uction inspections, 35-36

site diagrams issue, 162, 167, 177-183, 187

transportation issues, 125-127

OOVs. See Objects of verification

Open Skies Treaty, 3, 136

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 256

O'Shea, Maj. Richard ].,USAF, 114, 121, 122, 123, 189

Oslo Extraordinary Conference, 90, 202

p

Parker, Maj. Gen. Robert W., USAF, 48, 114, 115, 118,

123, 161, 163, 194

reduction inspection of Dabrowa Gornicza, 211-212

reduction of TLE, 207, 208, 210

verification agency, 135, 139-140

Powell, Gen. Colin L., USA, 47, 79

Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments

and Equipment Subject to the Treaty, 19-20, 29, 30,

34, 102, 176, 254-255

Protocol on Inspection, 33-34, 66, 166

Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, 28-

30

Protocol on Reduction, 26, 206-207

Pushkin, Russia

mock inspection, 118, 119, 177

R

Ratification delay

Baltic states crisis, 83-85

Commonwealth of Independent States crisis, 85-90

data exchange crisis, 74-83

parallel developments, 67-68

provisional implementation decision, 90-91

ratification process, 74

Reagan, President Ronald W., 3, 45

Rebholz, Maj. Jon, Jr., USMC, 231

Reduction methods, 26-28, 206-207, 237-241

Reduction process, 207, 210-213

Red uctions, 35-36

calendar reporting periods, 210

CFE Treaty objectives, 199, 226

"cheese slicer" or "cookie cutter" compactor, 238

comparison by group of states, 257

costs of, 237-241

declared site and challenge inspections, 215-217

destruction commitments east of the Ural Mountains,

245-246

East-on-East inspections, 214-215, 218

Eastern inspections, 213-215

equipment display, 211

first reduction year, 25-26

multinational teams, 217-220

national holdings by alliance, 200

official notification of, 210-211

reduction liabilities, 200-206, 226

reduction methods, 26-28, 206-207, 237-241
368 ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY 

reduction process, 207, 210-213

residual levels, 221-222

right of refusal to reduction inspections, 211

U.S. baseline red uction inspections, 190-192

"Report to Congress on Noncompliance with Arms

Control Agreements," 183

Reppert, Col. John C., USA, 61, 65

Residual level validation period, 228-231, 233-234

Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany

as gateway for U.S. inspection teams, 48-49, 62

training site for inspectors, 100

Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany

baseline inspection, 187

RLVP. See Residual level validation period 

Romania

inspection of Cazarma Centru Oradea, 219

Rozec, Col. Franc;:ois, 58, 137-138, 147-148, 152

Russia

baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces

stationed in Germany, 165-170

Black Sea Fleet, 243-245

Chechnya issue, 249-250

compliance difficulties, 243-245, 258

declared site access interpretation, 176-183, 192, 235-

237

flank limits, 247-248

inspection team training, 149-150

mock inspections and, 118-120

readiness for entry into force, 152

reduction liability, 226

TLE reduced, 259

verification agency, 134, 140-141

Russian/German/U.S. mock inspections, 111-120

s

Saint, Gen. Crosbie E., USA, 48, 54-55

Schroder, Senior Master Sergeant Clifford A., USAF, 101

Schwan, Lt. Col. P., 111, 112, 113

Schweinfurt, Germany

baseline inspection, 167, 169

Sensitive or classified programs, 38-40, 176

Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister Eduard, 10, 17, 77, 78, 79

Shevtsov, Russian Gen. Leontin, 249

Shustov, Valery, 87

Shuya, Russia

baseline inspection, 177

Sierra, Staff Sergeant Gilbert, Jr., USA, 101

Site diagrams

mock inspections and, 119, 120

on-site inspections and, 162, 167, 177-183, 187

Siverskiy Air Base

mock inspection, 118

Slepnev, Col. S.N., 140 

Sloss, David, 99

Slovak Republic

reduction inspection of Trencin, 213, 214

Smith, Col. William R., USAF, 143, 191, 192

Snedeker, Lt. Col. Donald C., USA, 114, 115, 116

Soviet Union. See also Commonwealth of Independent

States; Russia

coastal defense forces, 77, 79-80, 82-83, 89-90, 201,

203, 217, 245

collapse of, 68, 84-85, 91, 134, 150, 202, 227, 228,

234, 261

first official treaty data exchange, 51-52

flank limits, 247-248

military withdrawals, 9, 12,53

naval infantry forces, 67, 77, 79-80, 81, 82-83, 89-90,

201, 203, 217, 245

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 56, 127, 134, 203

number of military personnel deployed in Europe, 37 

reclassification of TLE, 65

reduction pledges, 201-202, 245-246

Strategic Rocket Forces, 77, 81, 82-83, 201, 245 

Tashkent accords on allocation of TLE, 88-90

TLE discrepancies, 75, 78, 81, 82-83

transfer of TLE to areas east of the Ural Mountains, 52,

53, 67, 75, 77, 201, 245

verification agency, 134

Spangdahlem Air Base

mock inspection, 115-118

Sparks, POl David E., USN, 170

START. See Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Steinberg, Col. ( GS) Joern, 136

Stockholm Agreement of 1986, 3

Stockholm Document, 6, 14, 56-57, 140

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 3, 45, 49, 62, 123

T

Tait, Maj. Ronald M., USAF, 216

Tashkent Agreement, 88-90, 202, 204, 239, 242, 244

Team Fiser, 215, 216-217, 218

Team Gessert, 181-182, 185

Team Jubilee, 217

Team Tait, 217

Team Weller, 167, 169-170

Team White, 157-165

Tesori, Col. Brenna, 185

Thatcher, British Prime Minister Margaret H., 8, 13

Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 3, 46, 49, 62

TLE. See Treaty-limited equipment

Towne, TSgt.James L., USAF, 101

Transportation for inspection teams, 125-127

Treaty Between the Twenty-Two Sovereign Nations on the 

Reduction of Their Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe, 3

Treaty-limited equipment. See also Objects of verification;

Reductions

accounting for among the successor states, 241-245

as basis for calculating number of inspections, 12

cascading of, 204-206

comparison of national holding, 259

costs of reductions, 237-241

external markings record, 112 

inspection and, 34-35, 190-192

recognition training, 99, 100-105

reduction methods, 26-28, 206-207

Soviet discrepancies in number of, 75, 78, 81, 82-83,

201-204

Soviet movement of, 52, 53, 67, 75, 77

Tashkent accords on allocation of, 88-90, 202, 204,

239, 242, 244

total decrease after reductions, 222

total NATO items reduced, 61

tra nsfer to allied nations, 47, 204-206

types, 18-19

Tri-national inspections, 111-120
IN DEX 369

Tsepkalo, Belarus Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy, 241

Tsygankov, Gen.-Maj. Sergey Fedorovich, 140-141, 150,

152, 182

TTBT. See Threshold Test Ban Treaty 

Turkey

flank limits, 249-250

Two-meter access rule, 38, 175

u

Ukraine

Black Sea Fleet, 243-245

compliance difficulties, 243-245, 258

concerns over Russia's future security intentions, 251

cost of TLE reductions, 237-238

declared site understanding, 183, 192

flank limits, 247-248

reduction liability, 226

Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,

142-144

Unification of Germany, 8-9, 51, 259-260, 261

United Kingdom. See Great Britain

United States

baseline escort operations, 185-187

baseline operations, 174-176

baseline reduction inspections, 190-192

cascading of equipment, 204-206

combat readiness concerns, 55

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 240

declared site access interpretation, 176-183,235-237

declared site inspections during the first reduction year,

219-220

first baseline inspection, 157-165

first escort mission, 165-170

first liaison mission, 170

inspection teams, 65-67. See also On-Site Inspection 

Agency

liaison operations, 188-190

military withdrawals from Western Europe, 54, 258, 

261

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 127, 158

number of baseline inspections conducted by, 174, 194

number of military personnel deployed in Europe, 37

reduction liability, 204-206

residual level validation period inspections, 231, 233

Russian baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces

stationed in Germany, 165-170

strict adherence to CFE Treaty provisions, 193-194, 220

TLE reduced, 259

Urban, Lt. Col. Klaus, 166, 167

Urechye, Russia

challenge inspection, 184

U.S. Army Russian Institute, 106

U.S. Atlantic Command

Memorandum of Understanding, 47-48

U.S. Embassy

Arms Control Implementation Unit, 161

USSR. See Soviet Union

cadre model of agencies, 58-59, 60, 134, 139, 144

ratification delay and, 67-68

separate agencies, 56-58, 59-60, 134, 144

Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 142-

144

Verification Coordinating Committee

allocation of inspection quotas within groups of NATO

states, 52-53, 156-157

baseline reduction inspections, 190-192

Cooperative Partners plan, 214-215, 218, 252-253

deconfliction schedule, 61-62, 157, 174

description, 60

purpose, 61

selection of specific OOV for inspection, 157

seminars, 227-228, 253

VERITY database, 215, 227, 254, 260-261

Vienna Documents, 3, 14, 52, 58, 127, 136, 137

Vitse, Georges M., 182

von Moltke, Gebhardt, 61

w

Ward, Staff Sergeant Cecil L., USA, 101

Warsaw Pact. See Warsaw Treaty Organization

Warsaw Treaty Organization. See also Eastern states;

speci fic countries by name

collapse of, 8, 228, 254

dominant role of Soviet Union, 145

dualism in, 8

flank limits, 246

Hungary's withdrawal from, 9

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations, 4-

6

signing of CFE Treaty, 74

Weller, Maj. George P.,USAF, 167, 169-170

White, Lt. Col. Elmer G. (Guy), USA, 111, 157-165, 177,

187

Wierema, Navy Cdr. C.N.M., 59, 139

Wintersteen, Capt. Jeremy, 161-162, 163, 164

Woolsey, Ambassador R. James, 11, 78, 80, 82, 88

WTO. See Warsaw Treaty Organization

Wuensdorf, Germany

baseline reduction inspection, 191-192

y

Yazov, Defense Minister Marshall Dmitriy, 78

Yefstaviyev, Gennadiy, 11, 12, 13, 176

Yeltsin, President Boris, 80, 88, 240-241, 244, 248, 249-

250

z

Zentrum for Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, 57, 

110-111, 114, 135-137, 172

ZVBW. See Zentrum for Verifikationsaufgaben der

Bundeswehr

v

Vakar, Gen.-Maj. Viktor K., 141, 239

Verbruggen, Leo, 61

Verification agencies. See also Inspection teams; specific

countries and agencies by name