This report by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission is the result of a contract to 

collect and analyze data for the 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey 

and Election Administration Policy Survey. The contract was carried out by Fors Marsh, 

an applied research company based in Arlington, VA.

Published June 2023

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20001

www.eac.gov
i | Executive Summary

 

Executive Summary

Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election 

Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The EAVS asks 

all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories—American Samoa, Guam, the 

Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,1 and the U.S. Virgin Islands—to provide data about the 

ways Americans vote and how elections are administered. Since 2008, this project has included a 

separate survey, the Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), that collects 

information about state election laws, policies, and practices.

The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state and local jurisdiction-level data about 

election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election 

officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to 

changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter 

experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to 

examine the details of the U.S. election infrastructure and to produce a generalizable 

understanding of core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by 

election officials. The survey data provide policymakers and the public with crucial information 

every two years about how federal elections are conducted and help the EAC fulfill its 

congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials 

who use the data to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning, 

and create training and promotional materials. The EAC also uses EAVS data to create 

clearinghouse resources to advance the agency’s mission and to better support election officials 

and voters as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of 

federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections.

In many ways, the 2022 general election represented a return to normal election operations, after 

the 2020 general election was heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic 

necessitated that state and local election offices adjust their election practices and navigate 

changing state policies, including the modes of registration used by voters, how poll workers were 

recruited to assist with the election, which populations could cast their ballots before Election Day 

or by mail, and procedures for tabulating ballots once voting had concluded. As the most 

comprehensive source of election administration data in the United States, the 2022 EAVS 

provides a unique insight into how election dynamics have and have not changed as the 

pandemic recedes. To this end, the EAC is pleased to present to the 118th Congress its report on 

the 2022 EAVS.

This report describes in detail how the 2022 federal general election was administered and how 

voters cast their ballots. Data from the EAVS and the accompanying Election Administration Policy 

Survey (Policy Survey) are used to provide an overview of each of the following aspects of the 

election process:

1 Puerto Rico completed the 2022 Policy Survey but was not required to complete the 2022 EAVS because 

it did not hold a federal general election in November 2022.
Executive Summary | ii 

o Turnout, voting methods, polling places, drop boxes, ballot curing, poll workers, and 

election technology are covered in Chapter 1, “Overview of Election Administration and 

Voting in the 2022 General Election”;

o Key laws, rules, policies, and procedures that govern U.S. elections are covered in 

Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey”;

o Voter registration and list maintenance are covered in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The 

NVRA and Beyond”;

o Voting by individuals covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 

Act (UOCAVA) is described in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in 2022: UOCAVA”; 

and

o Finally, the methodological procedures that the EAC followed in collecting the EAVS and 

Policy Survey data and a description of the survey questions are discussed in Chapter 5, 

“Survey Methodology.”

Voting and Election Administration Findings

Data from the 2022 EAVS show that 46.8% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) in the 

United States voted in the 2022 general election, including more than 112 million ballots that 

were cast by voters and counted. Turnout for this election decreased by approximately 5 

percentage points compared to the last midterm election held in November 2018, with only nine 

states showing turnout increases between these two elections.

The EAVS also tracks data on how voters cast their ballots—in person on Election Day, in person 

before Election Day (which is known in many states as early voting), by mail, or by another mode 

of voting. In-person voting levels dropped for the 2020 general election (as many states expanded 

early voting and mail voting opportunities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic) but largely 

rebounded for the 2022 general election. In-person voting on Election Day returned to being the 

most common method for voters to cast their ballots, with just under half of voters using this 

mode. The use of mail voting decreased from 2020 to 2022. Nonetheless, the nearly one-third of 

voters who cast their ballots by mail in 2022 represents an increase over the one-quarter of 

voters who voted by mail for the 2018 general election. In-person early voting saw an increase for 

the 2020 general election, but decreased in 2022 to just over one-fifth of voters.

The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of drop boxes and ballot curing for the first time. Nearly 

13,000 drop boxes were reported as being available for voters to return their mail ballots; among 

states able to track these data, approximately 40% of mail ballots returned by voters were 

returned at a drop box. Nearly 170,000 mail ballots were successfully cured by voters for this 

election.

Data on the ages of the poll workers who assisted with in-person voting show that after changes 

in the poll worker population for the 2020 general election, the age distribution of poll workers in 

2022 was very similar to that of 2018. For the 2022 general election, a majority of poll workers 

were older than 60 years old. However, the 2022 general election continued a trend toward

election officials having an easier time recruiting poll workers; this trend began with the 2020 

general election. More than 80,000 individuals served as poll workers for the first time during the

2022 general election, comprising 16.7% of the poll worker population for this election.
 

iii | Executive Summary 

States reported that the use of electronic poll books to assist checking in voters at in-person 

voting sites and the use of ballot-marking devices (BMD) and scanners to assist with casting and 

counting ballots increased from the 2020 to the 2022 elections. The use of direct-recording 

electronic (DRE) voting equipment with and without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT)

declined overall between these elections, despite a slight uptick in the percentage of jurisdictions 

that used DRE equipment without VVPAT. For the 2022 general election, only four jurisdictions in 

the country reported relying solely on DRE without VVPAT machines.

Election Administration Policy Survey Findings

The EAC collected data through the 2022 Policy Survey to provide context to the data that states 

reported in the EAVS and to track changes in election policy over time in areas that include voter 

registration and list maintenance, voting by mail, UOCAVA voting, in-person voting, voter 

identification, provisional voting, election technology, recounts, audits, and election certification.

Some of the notable findings from the 2022 Policy Survey include that a strong majority of states 

reported having voter registration databases that functioned in a top-down manner; 80% of states 

that used a bottom-up or hybrid system transmitted data from local jurisdictions to the central 

database in real time. The most common government agencies for states to electronically receive

registration data from were agencies that handle driver’s licenses, agencies that maintain death 

records, and agencies that maintain felony or prison records. Nearly all states allow individuals to 

pre-register to vote before they turn 18 years old, about three-quarters of states allow individuals 

to register to vote and/or update their voter registration information online, and half of states 

allow individuals to register to vote on the same day they cast a ballot.

The number of states that conduct an all-mail election either statewide or in certain jurisdictions—

that is, automatically mailing a ballot to all registered voters or to all active registered voters 

without the voter having to file a mail ballot application—increased in 2020 in response to the 

COVID-19 pandemic and remained fairly consistent at 12 states for the 2022 general election. 

The 2022 Policy Survey also collected data on state policies on the use of drop boxes and mail 

ballot curing for the first time; 39 states allowed the use of drop boxes for this election and 41 

states allowed voters to cure their ballots and correct missing information or errors on their mail 

ballots in order for them to be counted for this election.

States also reported information on the auditing and review activities they conduct. Audits are 

conducted to ensure that voting systems operate accurately, election officials comply with 

regulations, procedures, or internal policies, and discrepancies are identified and resolved so that 

voters can be confident in the election administration process. The most commonly reported 

auditing activities were logic and accuracy testing (used in more than 90% of states) and postelection tabulation audits (used in three-quarters of states).

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) Findings

EAVS data on voter registration and list maintenance show that the percentage of the U.S. 

population that is registered to vote continues to grow. More than 203 million individuals were 

active registered voters for the 2022 general election, representing 85.4% of the CVAP and an 

increase of 2.8 percentage points since the 2018 general election. More than two-thirds of states 

reported that the active registration rate in their state increased from the 2018 to 2022 general 

elections.
Executive Summary | iv 

More than 80 million registration forms were processed in the period between the close of 

registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general 

election. For the first time in EAVS history, a majority of those registration forms were submitted 

through state motor vehicle offices. The use of online registration declined by about half between 

the 2020 and 2022 EAVS, and the use of mail, fax, and email to submit registration forms also 

decreased. Nearly half of the registration forms reported in the 2022 EAVS were updates to 

existing voter registration records and more than a quarter were new valid registrations.

The NVRA also requires states to review their voter registration rolls periodically and to remove 

the records of individuals who no longer meet eligibility requirements (e.g., have moved from the 

jurisdiction in which they are registered, have died, have failed to respond to a confirmation 

notice mailing and vote in two subsequent federal general elections, or, depending on state law, 

have been convicted of or incarcerated for a crime or have become mentally incapacitated). In 

the 2022 EAVS, states reported sending more than 26 million confirmation notices to keep their 

registration rolls up to date; more than half of those confirmation notices were not returned to the 

election office by the voter or by the U.S. Postal Service, a decrease from previous years’ EAVS 

data. More than 19 million voter registration records were removed between 2020 and 2022, 

most commonly because the registrant moved out of their jurisdiction, died, or failed to respond 

to a confirmation notice and failed to vote in subsequent federal general elections.

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 

(UOCAVA) Findings

UOCAVA outlines special voting procedures for two categories of voters: members of the 

uniformed services absent from their voting residence and their eligible family members, and U.S. 

citizens living overseas. The 2022 EAVS data show that the voting residences of UOCAVA voters 

tend to be highly concentrated: 57.5% of these voters held legal voting residence in just three 

states, and more than 60% of EAVS jurisdictions had 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters. 

Continuing a trend that began with the 2016 EAVS, 2022 data show that overseas citizens made 

up a larger share of the UOCAVA voting population than did uniformed services voters.

Of the more than 650,000 ballots that election offices transmitted to UOCAVA voters for the 2022 

general election, about one-third were transmitted to uniformed services members and two-thirds 

were transmitted to overseas citizens. Email was the most common method election offices used 

to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters, although a majority of uniformed services ballots were 

transmitted by postal mail. Slightly more than 40% of transmitted UOCAVA ballots were returned 

by voters, representing a decrease of almost 25% in the number of returned UOCAVA ballots 

compared to the 2018 general election. Nationwide, more than 96% of returned UOCAVA ballots 

were counted and less than 4% were rejected, most commonly because the ballot was received 

after the state’s deadline for returning ballots.

UOCAVA voters can use Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) as a backup ballot in case their 

regular absentee ballot cannot be received and returned in time. States reported that more than 

4,000 FWABs were submitted by voters for the 2022 general election. This represents a decrease 

of more than 25% from the number of FWABs received for the 2018 general election. The FWAB 

allowed nearly 3,500 additional UOCAVA voters to have their ballots counted for the 2022 general 

election; more than three-quarters of counted FWABs were received from overseas citizens and 

less than one-quarter were from uniformed services voters.
 

v | Executive Summary 

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ i

Voting and Election Administration Findings .................................................................................... ii

Election Administration Policy Survey Findings ............................................................................... iii

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) Findings...................................................................... iii

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) Findings........................... iv

Chapter 1. Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2022 General Election .............. 1

Key Findings........................................................................................................................................1

Election Administration in the United States ....................................................................................2

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)....................................................................4

EAVS Response Rates ....................................................................................................................6

Turnout in the 2022 General Election...............................................................................................6

In-Person Voting........................................................................................................................... 10

Voting by Mail............................................................................................................................... 11

Provisional Voting ........................................................................................................................ 16

UOCAVA and Other Methods of Voting ....................................................................................... 18

Polling Places and Poll Workers...................................................................................................... 20

Election Technology......................................................................................................................... 24

Voting Equipment......................................................................................................................... 24

Electronic Poll Books ................................................................................................................... 26

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables....................................................................................................... 28

Overview Table 1: 2022 EAVS at a Glance ................................................................................ 28

Overview Table 2: Mail Voting in the 2022 General Election.................................................... 33

Overview Table 3: In-Person Voting and Other Modes of Voting............................................... 39

Overview Table 4: Polling Places and Poll Workers ................................................................... 45

Overview Table 5: Election Technology and Voting Methods.................................................... 51

Chapter 2. Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey ........................................................... 57

Key Findings..................................................................................................................................... 57

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 57

Responding to the 2022 EAVS ....................................................................................................... 58

Policies on Voter Registration and List Maintenance.................................................................... 59

Database Systems....................................................................................................................... 60

Data Linkages .............................................................................................................................. 61

Automatic and Automated Voter Registration ........................................................................... 63

Pre-Registration ........................................................................................................................... 63
Executive Summary | vi 

State Election Office Websites ....................................................................................................64

Online Voter Registration.............................................................................................................65

Same-Day Registration ................................................................................................................65

List Maintenance .........................................................................................................................66

Criminal Convictions and Voting ..................................................................................................... 70

Voting by Mail................................................................................................................................... 72

Mail Ballot Tracking and Deadlines ............................................................................................74

Drop Boxes ...................................................................................................................................75

Ballot Curing.................................................................................................................................76

UOCAVA Voting ................................................................................................................................. 77

UOCAVA Voting Deadlines............................................................................................................78

In-Person Voting............................................................................................................................... 79

Vote Centers.................................................................................................................................79

In-Person Voting Before Election Day .........................................................................................79

Voter Identification........................................................................................................................... 81

Provisional Voting............................................................................................................................. 82

Election Technology ......................................................................................................................... 84

Recounts, Audits, and Election Certification.................................................................................. 86

Audits ............................................................................................................................................87

Election Certification....................................................................................................................90

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables ....................................................................................................... 91

Policy Survey Table 1: State Voter Registration Databases ......................................................91

Policy Survey Table 2: Voter Registration Policies .....................................................................96

Policy Survey Table 3: State Mail Voting Policies.....................................................................100

Policy Survey Table 4: UOCAVA Voting......................................................................................109

Policy Survey Table 5: Electronic Ballot Transmission ............................................................114

Policy Survey Table 6: In-Person Voting Before Election Day..................................................119

Policy Survey Table 7: Election Certification and Recounts ....................................................123

Policy Survey Table 8: Election Audits ......................................................................................130

Chapter 3. Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond ................................................................. 135

Key Findings...................................................................................................................................135

Introduction....................................................................................................................................135

Federal Laws Regulating Voter Registration ............................................................................136

State Voter Registration Policies...............................................................................................138

The Registration Process...........................................................................................................138

Voter Registration Rates for the 2022 General Election.............................................................140
vii | Executive Summary

How Americans Registered to Vote for the 2022 General Election ...........................................144

The Rise in Motor Vehicle Office Registrations........................................................................147

Automatic Voter Registration ....................................................................................................149

Same-Day Registration..............................................................................................................151

Other Modes of Registration.........................................................................................................152

Types of Registrations Received for the 2022 General Election................................................153

Valid Registrations.....................................................................................................................153

Rejected and Duplicate Registrations ......................................................................................155

Registration List Maintenance......................................................................................................156

Confirmation Notices Processed...............................................................................................158

Voters Removed From the Voter Registration Rolls ................................................................159

Upcoming Changes to Section A for the 2024 EAVS...................................................................161

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables.....................................................................................................162

Voter Registration Table 1: Registration History......................................................................162

Voter Registration Table 2: Application Sources—Total Forms Received...............................168

Voter Registration Table 3: Registration Applications Processed...........................................176

Voter Registration Table 4: Voter List Maintenance—Confirmation Notices ......................... 182

Voter Registration Table 5: Voter List Maintenance—Removal Actions ................................. 188

Chapter 4. Military and Overseas Voting in 2022: UOCAVA ......................................................... 193

Key Findings...................................................................................................................................193

Introduction....................................................................................................................................194

Federal Laws Regulating Military and Overseas Voting ..............................................................194

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) ...................194

The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 ...................................195

The UOCAVA Voting Process..........................................................................................................196

UOCAVA Registration and Ballot Requests ..................................................................................198

UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted.........................................................................................................201

Modes of UOCAVA Ballot Transmission....................................................................................204

UOCAVA Ballots Returned and Submitted for Counting ..............................................................206

Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) ...................................................................................209

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables.....................................................................................................211

UOCAVA Table 1: Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters ......................................................211

UOCAVA Table 2: Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA)........................................................214

UOCAVA Table 3: UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted, Returned, Counted, and Rejected..............219

UOCAVA Table 4: Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB) ..................................................222
Executive Summary | viii 

 

Chapter 5. Survey Methodology ................................................................................................... 227

Survey Questions ...........................................................................................................................228

Policy Survey...............................................................................................................................228

Section A: Voter Registration.....................................................................................................232

Section B: UOCAVA.....................................................................................................................232

Section C: Mail Voting................................................................................................................233

Section D: In-Person Polling Operations ...................................................................................233

Section E: Provisional Ballots....................................................................................................234

Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies .......................................................234

Data Collection Procedures...........................................................................................................234

Needs Assessment ....................................................................................................................234

Collecting the Policy Survey Data..............................................................................................235

Collecting the EAVS Data...........................................................................................................236

Technical Assistance .................................................................................................................239

Resources for EAVS Respondents ............................................................................................239

Data Reporting and Calculations ..................................................................................................240

Recommendations for Analyzing and Interpreting the EAVS Data .............................................241

Methodology Appendix A: Survey Response Rates......................................................................243

Methodology Appendix B: Data Collection Template Validation Rules.......................................246

Table 1: Math Validation Rules .................................................................................................246

Table 2: Logic Validation Rules .................................................................................................251

Table 3: Policy Survey Validation Rules....................................................................................255

Table 4: Policy Survey Pre-Fills..................................................................................................260

Table 5: EAVS Rates Validations ...............................................................................................261

Table 6: Valid Skips....................................................................................................................264

Table 7: Special Conditions and Data Missingness.................................................................265

Methodology Appendix C: Post-Submission Validations and Sample Rates..............................272

Table 1: Sample Rates and Outlier Thresholds........................................................................272

Table 2: Comparisons to the 2018 EAVS Data ........................................................................275

Methodology Appendix D: How to Calculate Selected EAVS Rates.............................................276

 
1 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

 

Chapter 1. Overview of Election 

Administration and Voting in the 2022 

General Election

Key Findings

The 2022 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on ballots cast, voter 

registration, overseas and military voting, voting technology, and other important issues related to 

voting and election administration. Notable findings from the 2022 EAVS include:

o More than 203 million individuals were active registered voters for the 2022 general 

election.

o Voter turnout for the 2022 general election was 46.8% of the citizen voting age population 

(CVAP) nationwide, a decrease of 5.1 percentage points from the 2018 general election. 

Only nine states saw their turnout levels increase from the 2018 to 2022 general 

elections. More than 112 million voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2022 

general election.

o Although the use of mail voting decreased in 2022 compared to the 2020 general 

election, mail voting rates remained higher than pre-pandemic levels, at 31.9% of voters 

participating in the 2022 election who cast their ballots by mail. Almost half of all voters 

voted in person on Election Day. More than two-thirds of voters cast their ballots in person 

(either on or before Election Day) for the 2022 general election.

o The 2022 EAVS collected data on drop boxes and ballot curing for the first time. Among 

states that reported data on drop boxes, nearly 40% of mail ballots were returned at drop 

boxes. Among states that reported this data, less than 1% of mail ballots that were 

returned by voters and counted in the election were cured (meaning they were rejected for 

an error, but the voter corrected the error and the ballot was ultimately counted).

o The age distribution of poll workers skewed younger in 2020, but 2022 EAVS data show 

that this distribution has returned to pre-pandemic levels. States reported that 16.7% of 

the poll workers who assisted with the 2022 general election were new poll workers who 

had not served in previous elections. In the 2020 and 2022 EAVS, election officials 

reported that recruiting poll workers was less difficult compared to what was reported by 

election officials in the 2018 EAVS.

o The most common types of voting equipment reported for the 2022 general election were 

ballot-marking devices (BMD) and scanners, which were used in nearly 90% of EAVS 

jurisdictions. Ballot scanners often process both hand marked ballots and ballots that 

have been marked by a BMD. These devices are often used together, even in jurisdictions 

where a majority of voters are marking ballots by hand. The use of direct-recording 

electronic (DRE) voting machines continues to decline overall. 

o The use of electronic poll books increased from 2020 to 2022, with more than one-third of 

EAVS jurisdictions reporting having used an e-poll book for the 2022 general election.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 2 

Election Administration in the United States

The United States holds elections for many different levels of government, including federal, 

state, and local offices. However, responsibility for administering these elections and tabulating, 

reporting, and certifying election results is largely exercised by local jurisdictions, with oversight 

from states and in accordance with federal law. The U.S. Constitution and various federal laws 

govern specific aspects of federal elections and a small number of federal agencies—such as the 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)—

play a supportive role in election administration. Broad legal and procedural authority rests with 

the states,1 territories, the District of Columbia, and local jurisdictions. As a result, wide variation 

exists among and within state election policies and practices, and the policies and practices for 

conducting elections are constantly changing. Nevertheless, U.S. elections generally follow a 

standard process. As shown in Figure 1, the election process can be viewed as a cycle.

1. The legal and procedural framework for elections is generally established in advance of a 

general election. This legal framework determines which individuals are eligible to vote in 

an election; how, when, and where voters may cast their ballots for the election; and what 

technology will be used to support elections. Supported by state election offices, most of 

these policies and procedures are implemented by election officials at the local level (e.g., 

county, township, or municipality).

2. To participate in elections, eligible citizens typically must register to vote pursuant to the 

eligibility rules established by federal law and by their state.2 In many states, voters must 

register in advance of a set registration deadline; in others, eligible individuals may 

register on the same day they cast their ballot, whether during an early voting period or on 

Election Day. Depending on state policy, eligible citizens may have multiple avenues for 

submitting their registration applications, including by mail, fax, or email; online 

registration websites; in person at an election office, at a motor vehicle office, at other 

state government agency offices, or at an armed forces recruitment office; or through a 

registration drive. States are also required to periodically examine their voter registration 

rolls and remove the records of voters who are no longer eligible; for instance, because 

the voter no longer resides in the state or jurisdiction in which they are registered, the 

voter has failed to respond to a notice sent to them by mail and has not voted in the two 

most recent federal general elections, the voter is deceased, or the voter is incarcerated 

or has received a criminal conviction that disqualifies them from voting. The process of 

updating voter registration rolls and removing ineligible voters is referred to as list 

maintenance.

 

1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 

50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern 

Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey 

and EAVS data.

2 North Dakota is the only state that does not require citizens to register before casting a ballot in an 

election.
 

3 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

Figure 1. The U.S. Election Process 

1. When a federal general election is approaching, voting begins well in advance of Election 

Day for many voters, including eligible military voters and overseas citizens who are 

absent from their voting residence, for whom the right to participate in federal elections is 

protected under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). In 

addition, all states provide avenues for voters to cast ballots before Election Day. This 

may include voting by using a ballot that is mailed to them by an election office, casting a 

ballot in person at a dedicated voting site before Election Day (often called early voting), 

or receiving and casting a ballot at an election office. Some states allow any eligible voter 

to cast their ballot before Election Day, whereas others limit it only to certain segments of 

the population, such as voters who are absent from their home jurisdiction on Election 

Day, voters with illnesses or disabilities, voters over a certain age, or voters who provide a 

statutorily valid excuse. The voting options that are available to voters and the timelines 

for mail voting and in-person voting vary by state and by local jurisdiction.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 4 

2. Voters who do not cast ballots beforehand may vote on Election Day at in-person voting 

sites. In most states, individuals whose eligibility to vote cannot be verified at the time of 

voting may cast a provisional ballot. Election officials then investigate the eligibility of 

individuals who cast provisional ballots to determine whether their ballots should be 

counted, either in full or in part, or rejected.

3. After the polls close on Election Day, the process of counting ballots to determine the final 

election results begins. This may also be referred to as tabulation or canvassing. State 

policies vary on when counting may begin—some states may begin pre-processing mail 

ballots (e.g., verifying the mail voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot, opening envelopes, 

removing the ballots from secrecy envelopes to prepare them for counting) before 

Election Day, whereas other states require that in-person polls must be closed before any 

mail ballots can be processed. Some states also accept mail ballots, particularly those 

cast by UOCAVA voters, if they are received after Election Day, so long as they were 

postmarked on or before Election Day. Depending on state law and on what equipment is 

used to process the ballots, ballot counting may take several days to weeks to complete.

4. Once the unofficial results of an election are known, state and local election officials 

review the results for accuracy and certify them as final. Many states conduct audits of 

their election results and voting equipment to ensure that the established election 

procedures were followed and that the equipment functioned correctly. Certain election 

races may also be recounted if the margin of victory is close; if a candidate, party, or other 

authorized group requests a recount; if a court orders a recount to be conducted; or for 

other reasons specified by state law.

The election process can be viewed as a cycle in the sense that the experiences from previous 

elections are used to inform decision-making for the legal and procedural framework for 

subsequent elections. Often, the successful approaches and innovations implemented in one 

state or local jurisdiction during an election are adopted by other states or localities in 

subsequent elections. As this process begins anew with each federal election cycle, policymakers 

and administrators at every level benefit from the insights available in the state and local election 

data the EAC publishes in the EAVS.

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Since 2004, the EAC has conducted the EAVS following each federal general election.3 The EAVS 

collects data from all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the five U.S. territories—

American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,4 and the U.S. Virgin Islands—

on the ways in which Americans vote and how elections are administered. Data are provided at 

the jurisdiction level.5

3 The EAVS does not collect data on primary elections, run-off elections, or special elections. The data 

provided by states were only for the November 8, 2022 federal general election.

4 For 2022, Puerto Rico provided only a Policy Survey submission because the territory does not hold 

elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 

EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

5 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chooses to provide data. 

For the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data at the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes 

for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. 

Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to 
 

5 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state- and local jurisdiction-level data 

about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election 

officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to 

changing voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter 

experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to 

examine the details of the U.S. elections infrastructure and to produce a generalizable 

understanding of the core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced 

by election officials at the state and local level. The survey provides policymakers and the public 

with crucial information every two years about how federal elections are conducted, and it helps 

the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to 

election officials themselves. These officials use the EAVS to manage election oversight, conduct 

issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and outreach materials. 

The EAC also uses the EAVS data to create research and clearinghouse resources to advance the 

agency’s mission and to better support election officials and voters, as well as to inform 

lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the 

changing landscape of U.S. elections. The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help 

America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of 

information and to review procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections. The 

EAVS sections related to voter registration and UOCAVA voting allow states to satisfy their data 

reporting requirements established, respectively, by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) 

and UOCAVA. The EAVS also helps FVAP fulfill its obligations under UOCAVA to reduce obstacles to 

ensure military and overseas voting success by collecting data about how UOCAVA voters 

participate in elections. 

Collectively, the EAVS project consists of two separately administered surveys. The Policy Survey, 

which is administered to each state or territory election office in advance of each federal general 

election, collects data on the election laws and policies in the states and territories. These data 

are used to provide context for states’ EAVS submissions and to reduce the response burden 

associated with the EAVS. The EAVS, which is due after each federal general election is complete, 

collects data at the jurisdiction level. The data collected include information on voter registration, 

UOCAVA voters, mail voting, in-person voting operations, provisional ballots, voter participation, 

and election technology. Although the EAVS collects data at the jurisdiction level, providing these 

data is frequently a joint task undertaken by state and local election officials. Twenty-five states 

were able to provide all EAVS data from the state’s centralized election database, whereas 31 

states relied on local jurisdictions to provide data for some or all of the EAVS questions. The full 

scope of the data collection procedures for both the Policy Survey and EAVS are detailed in 

Chapter 5 of this report.

Chapter 1 of this report covers turnout and modes of voting in the 2022 general election, polling 

places and poll workers, and election technology. This chapter also comprises a non-exhaustive 

counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town levels. Wisconsin reported data at the city, 

town, and village levels. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data 

on the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, 

because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data at the county level, but 

most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. 

Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as 

a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 6 

overview of the data provided by states and jurisdictions in the EAVS. State election policies and 

practices are featured in Chapter 2, “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey.” Voter 

registration is covered in greater detail in Chapter 3, “Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond.” 

UOCAVA voting is discussed further in Chapter 4, “Military and Overseas Voting in the 2022 

General Election: UOCAVA.”

EAVS Response Rates

The analysis in this report is based on information and data submitted and certified by the 50 

U.S. states, five territories, and the District of Columbia. These 56 entities comprise 6,460 

jurisdictions. Because Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in November 2022, the 

territory provided data for the Policy Survey only. The state-level response rate for the EAVS was 

100% (55 of 55 states, territories, and districts provided data) and the jurisdiction-level response 

rate was 100% (6,460 of 6,460 jurisdictions provided data).6 During the data collection period, 

efforts were made to maximize the completeness and accuracy of the data reported. These 

efforts are outlined in the methodology of this report (Chapter 5). Instances when a state’s data 

were not included in a calculation because of missing data or data quality issues are described in 

the footnotes and source notes that accompany the analysis in this report.

Turnout in the 2022 General Election

According to the EAVS data submitted by states, there were 226,339,980 individuals who were 

registered to vote in the United States as of November 8, 2022. Of this number, 203,660,564

individuals were classified as active registered voters, meaning they had no additional processing 

requirements to fulfill before voting, and 22,794,555 were considered inactive voters, meaning 

they required address verification under the provisions of the NVRA before they would be 

permitted to vote.7 As a percentage of the 2021 CVAP estimate calculated by the U.S. Census 

Bureau, 85.4% of voting age citizens were registered as active voters for the 2022 general 

election.8 This represents an increase of 2.8 percentage points over the active voter registration 

rate for the 2018 general election (82.5%).9 Further details about voter registration, including 

how voters registered to vote, the use of same-day voter registration (SDR), and list maintenance, 

can be found in Chapter 3 of this report.

6 Appendix A of Chapter 5 of this report contains an analysis of state-level response rates to each section of 

the EAVS. Although 100% of EAVS jurisdictions provided a response, there is variance in the completeness 

of those responses to each section and to specific questions of the survey.

7 The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a of the EAVS. Data on active registered 

voters were collected in A1b and data on inactive registered voters were collected in A1c. The number of 

active and inactive registered voters did not sum exactly to the total number of registered voters in all 

jurisdictions that reported these data. According to Q10 of the 2022 Policy Survey, six states (American 

Samoa, Guam, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming) did not distinguish between active and 

inactive voters in their registration records. These states were not required to provide data in item A1c of 

the EAVS.

8 This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2021 instead of 

the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were 

not available by the time this report was finalized.

9 The active CVAP registration rate for 2018 and 2022 was calculated as A1b/CVAP x 100. American 

Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in this 

calculation because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate a CVAP for these territories. North Dakota 

was not included in this calculation because this state does not have voter registration. Casewise deletion 

at the state level was used in these calculations.
 

7 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

 

Calculating Turnout Rates There are several valid ways of calculating turnout, or the percentage of a population that voted in 

an election. The EAVS provides a measure of the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was 

counted for a general election in F1a, but there are multiple possible denominators.

o Number of registered voters or active voters. States report the number of individuals in their 

state who are registered and eligible to vote in A1a, and some states separately report the 

number of active voters (who have no additional processing requirements to fulfill before 

voting) in A1b. This number is available for states and sub-state EAVS jurisdictions.

o Citizen voting age population (CVAP). The U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 

(ACS) estimates the estimate of the total number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older. 

This number is available for states and most sub-state EAVS jurisdictions but not for U.S. 

territories, except for Puerto Rico.

o Voting-eligible population (VEP). This measure uses the CVAP but excludes those who are 

ineligible to vote (such as individuals with disqualifying felony convictions) and individuals 

who are in the military or who are citizens living overseas. This number is available for states, 

but not territories or for sub-state jurisdictions.

Relying on the number of registered or active voters can be problematic for calculating turnout 

because it is often challenging for states to keep voter registration rolls fully up to date (see 

Chapter 3 of this report for a discussion of list maintenance practices). Using VEP as the 

denominator in turnout calculations would overrepresent voter turnout—since EAVS data explicitly 

include individuals covered by UOCAVA—and would restrict the ability to estimate turnout for substate jurisdictions. Using the CVAP as a denominator provides greater coverage of sub-state 

jurisdictions but also includes citizens over the age of 18 who are ineligible to vote due to certain 

state laws. Although each denominator has its limitations, the EAC uses CVAP to calculate turnout in 

this report because of its availability for the majority of jurisdictions that report EAVS data and 

because it provides a more accurate picture of the population covered by the EAVS. Appendix D of 

Chapter 5 of this report includes recommendations on how to calculate additional EAVS rates.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 8 

Figure 2. Turnout Decreased in Most States from 2018 to 2022 

 

Source: CVAP turnout was calculated as F1a/CVAP x 100 for 2018 and 2022. American Samoa, Guam, the 

Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not shown as CVAP is not available for these 

territories. Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in 2018 or 2022. Casewise deletion was used 

at the state level in calculating the national turnout level. Turnout change between 2018 and 2022 is 

measured in percentage points.
 

9 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

States also reported that 112,054,124 voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2022 

general election. This represents a CVAP turnout rate of 46.8% nationwide, which is the second 

highest turnout for a midterm election since the EAVS began collecting these data following the 

2006 midterm election.10 Turnout for the 2022 general election decreased by 5.1 percentage

points from the 2018 CVAP turnout rate of 52%,11 but increased by 8.4 percentage points from 

the 2014 CVAP turnout of 38.4%.12

Figure 2 shows the change in CVAP turnout among states between the 2018 and 2022 general 

elections. The majority of states saw their turnout decrease between these elections. The largest 

decreases were in California, Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Tennessee—all 

of which saw double-digit turnout decreases. However, nine states—Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, 

Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Vermont—saw turnout 

increases that ranged between 0.5 percentage points and 4.3 percentage points. In addition, 

15 states had more than half of their citizen voting age population vote in the 2022 general 

election.

EAVS data also show that the ways American voters cast their general election ballots have 

changed significantly in the last three election cycles. Figure 3 shows the percentage of voters 

who cast their ballots in person on Election Day, by mail, in person during early voting, and by 

other modes of voting (including UOCAVA voting and provisional voting). Prior to the 2020 general 

election, a majority of voters tended to cast their votes at an in-person polling place on Election 

Day; 58.2% of voters chose this mode of voting for the 2018 general election. However, the 

COVID-19 pandemic that affected the 2020 general election appears to have had lasting effects 

on how voters cast their general election ballots. For the 2020 general election, the most 

common mode of voting was casting a ballot by mail (43% of voters), with in-person voting on 

Election Day and early voting each comprising 30.5% of the population of voters. The use of mail 

voting decreased for the 2022 general election, at 31.9% of voters, but remains higher than the 

25.6% of voters who voted by mail in the 2018 general election. Although use of in-person early 

voting increased in the 2020 general election to 30.5%, it decreased to 22.2% in the 2022 

general election, similar to the level of in-person early voting seen for the 2018 general election.

 

10 The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was reported in item F1a of the EAVS. The 

CVAP turnout rate for 2018 and 2022 was calculated as F1a/CVAP x 100. American Samoa, Guam, the 

Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in these calculations because the 

U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate CVAP for these territories. Casewise deletion at the state level was 

used in these calculations.

11 Beginning with the 2020 EAVS, the question about voter participation was reworded. In 2018, this 

question collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2022, it collected data on 

ballots cast and counted. Thus, it is likely that the 2018 turnout calculation was higher than it would have 

been if the 2022 question wording had been used, thus underestimating the true turnout change from 

2018 to 2022.

12 The CVAP turnout rate for 2014 was calculated as item F1a divided by the 2013 CVAP from the 5-year 

ACS. Although turnout calculations for other years use the 1-year ACS, a comparable statistic for 2014 

could not be found. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation; Illinois’ data were 

excluded from the turnout rate because the state did not report F1a in the 2014 EAVS.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 10 

Figure 3. In-Person Voting Rebounded in 2022 After Decreasing in 2020 

 

Source: Election Day turnout was calculated as F1b/F1a x 100 for all years. Mail turnout was calculated as 

(F1d+F1g)/F1a x 100 for all years. In-person early turnout was calculated as F1f/F1a x 100 for all years. 

UOCAVA, provisional, and other turnout was calculated as (F1c+F1e+F1h)/F1a x 100 for all years. 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national turnout levels for each mode, and 

because of this, percentages for each year do not sum to 100%. Early voting includes all modes of casting a 

ballot in person at a polling site or election office before Election Day; see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the 

types of early voting available in states.

In-Person Voting

More than two-thirds of voters cast their ballots in person for the 2022 general election, either on 

Election Day at a polling place or before Election Day at a polling place, election office, or other 

designated site. All states except Pennsylvania allowed voters to cast ballots in person before 

Election Day.13 In-person early voting generally falls into two categories:

o A voter may go to a polling place or an election office before Election Day, receive a ballot, 

cast their ballot, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.

13 Information on early voting was collected in Q25 of the Policy Survey. Although this report primarily uses 

the terminology “early voting,” there are a variety of terms that states use to refer to the process of allowing 

individuals to cast their ballots in person at a polling location, vote center, or election office before Election 

Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a full discussion of states’ policies on early voting.
 

11 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

o A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the 

voter may be able to take their ballot home with them. In other states, however, the ballot 

must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated 

along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.

Some states and territories offer both of these types of voting. Nine states require voters to 

provide a valid excuse to be permitted to vote early, whereas 46 states have no-excuse early 

voting that is open to any registered voter.14 For a complete discussion on state policies on inperson voting, including the length of time in-person early voting was available and the use of 

vote centers, see Chapter 2 of this report.

States reported that 21,322,200 ballots were cast through in-person early voting and counted for 

the 2022 general election, a slight increase over the 20,854,871 early voting ballots cast for the 

2018 general election.15 The number of ballots cast in person on Election Day 2022 was 

50,860,863, a decrease of 24.2% from the 67,133,886 ballots cast on Election Day for the 2018 

general election.16

Voting by Mail

All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer their registered voters the opportunity 

to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections, although the number of citizens who cast 

their ballots using this method and the circumstances under which citizens can vote by mail vary 

widely among states. Some states use the term “absentee voting” instead of “mail voting.”17 For 

purposes of this report, mail voting refers to the process by which:

1. An individual receives a ballot in the mail before an election. In some states or 

jurisdictions, election offices automatically send a mail ballot to all registered voters 

(often referred to as “all-mail elections”), whereas others automatically send mail ballots 

only to individuals on a permanent mail voting list. In other states, individuals must file an 

application to request a ballot for each election for which they wish to vote using a mail 

ballot. Some states require an individual to provide a valid excuse to be able to receive a 

mail ballot.

2. The individual marks the mail ballot with their preferences at home instead of at an 

election office or polling location.

3. The individual returns the voted ballot to election officials, typically by sending the voted 

ballot through the mail, by returning the voted ballot to an in-person voting site or election 

office, or by depositing the voted ballot in a secure designated drop box. The options that 

voters have for returning their voted mail ballots are dictated by state policy.

14 Information on whether an excuse was required for early voting was collected in Q25a of the Policy 

Survey.

15 Data on early voting ballots were collected in item F1f of the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. For 2018, the 

definition of this question included only ballots cast, whereas the 2022 definition included ballots cast and 

counted.

16 Data on ballots cast in person on Election Day were collected in item F1b of the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. 

For 2018, the definition of this question included only ballots cast, whereas the 2022 definition included 

ballots cast and counted.

17 In recognition of the fact that many states no longer require a person to be absent from their election 

jurisdiction in order to be permitted to cast a ballot by mail, the EAVS uses the term “mail voting.”
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 12 

Chapter 2 of this report describes a full analysis of the laws that states had in place regarding 

mail voting for the 2022 general election. In total, 17 states required an excuse to vote by mail, 

whereas 38 states did not.18 Twelve states conducted all-mail elections for the 2022 general 

election—nine of these states did so statewide and three in certain jurisdictions only.19 In 23 

states, voters could be placed on a permanent absentee voting list.20

The number of voters in the United States who have participated in federal general elections 

using mail voting has changed significantly in the past three election cycles. In the 2018 EAVS, 

states reported 30,700,831 ballots cast by mail. That number more than doubled to 69,337,349

in the 2020 EAVS, as many states expanded opportunities to vote by mail in response to the 

COVID-19 pandemic. For the 2022 EAVS, states reported that 35,316,617 ballots were cast by 

mail and counted.21

The EAVS also collected data on mail ballots transmitted to voters (excluding military and 

overseas voters covered by UOCAVA) from election offices, returned by voters, counted, and 

rejected. States reported transmitting 61,460,139 mail ballots for the 2022 general election, of 

which 36,683,450 were returned by voters, for a rate of 59.7% of transmitted mail ballots being 

returned by voters.22 Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 35,718,700 were reported 

as being counted and 549,824 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 97.4% of the 

mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.5% of the mail ballots that were 

returned.23 The mail ballot return rate for the 2022 EAVS was statistically significantly lower 

compared to what was reported in the 2018 and 2020 EAVS (71.6% and 77.8%, respectively). 

Although there was no statistically significant difference in the mail ballot count and rejection rate 

between the 2022 and 2020 EAVS, comparisons show that the mail ballot count rate for the 

2022 EAVS was significantly higher than what was reported for the 2018 EAVS (92.4%). However, 

the percentage of mail ballots that were counted and rejected was not significantly different 

18 Data on requiring an excuse to vote by mail were collected in item Q16 of the 2022 Policy Survey. Puerto 

Rico was excluded from this analysis because it did not conduct a general election in November 2022.

19 Data on all-mail elections were collected in items Q17 and Q17a of the 2022 Policy Survey. All-mail 

elections are defined as elections for which all registered voters or all active registered voters are 

automatically sent a mail ballot without having to file a mail ballot request. Some in-person voting may take 

place in an all-mail election.

20 Data on permanent absentee voting policies were collected in item Q18 of the 2022 Policy Survey. 

Voters who received a mail ballot because they resided in a state or jurisdiction that automatically sent mail 

ballots to all registered voters (or to all active registered voters) were excluded from being considered 

permanent absentee voters.

21 The number of ballots cast by mail and counted was the sum of F1d and F1g for all years. For the 2018 

EAVS, these items collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2020 and 2022, 

they collected data on ballots cast and counted.

22 Data on the number of mail ballots transmitted were collected in item C1a and data on mail ballots 

returned were collected in item C1b of the 2022 EAVS. The return rate was calculated as C1b/C1a x 100. 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level. American Samoa did not report data in C1a, and American 

Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data in C1b for the 2022 EAVS.

23 Data on the number of mail ballots counted were collected in item C8a and data on mail ballots rejected 

were collected in item C9a of the 2022 EAVS. The count rate was calculated as C8a/C1b x 100 and the 

rejection rate was calculated as C9a/C1b x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. For the 2018 and 2020 EAVS, the 

count rate was calculated as C3a/C1b x 100, and the rejection rate was calculated as C4a/C1b x 100. 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level; the count and rejection rate may not sum to 100% because 

of the casewise deletion and due to rounding. American Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana 

Islands did not report data for C8a, and Alabama, American Samoa, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana 

Islands did not report data for C9a for the 2022 EAVS.
 

13 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

between states that conducted an all-mail election statewide in the 2022 general election and 

states that did not.24

Table 1. Most Common Reason for Mail Ballot Rejection was “Other” 

 

Reason 

Percentage of Rejected 

Mail Ballots 

Other reason not listed 32.7%

Ballot had a non-matching or incomplete signature 26.9%

Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline 23.1%

Ballot did not have a voter signature 9.8%

Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope 8.3%

Ballot did not have a witness signature 5.6%

Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted (by mail or in 

person) 3.6%

Voter did not provide the required documentation (such as 

identification, affidavit, or statement) or documentation was 

incomplete

2.7%

Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction 2.5%

Voter was deceased 1.1%

Ballot was missing from the envelope 0.7%

Envelope was not sealed

 

0.6%

No resident address was on the envelope 0.4%

Returned ballot did not have required postmark 0.3%

Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope 0.3%

Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope 0.1%

No ballot application on record 0.1%

Source: Other reasons not listed was calculated as (C9r+C9s+C9t)/C9a x 100. Ballot had a non-matching 

or incomplete signature was calculated as C9e/C9a x 100. Ballot was received late was calculated as 

C9b/C9a x 100. Ballot did not have a voter signature was calculated as C9c/C9a x 100. Ballot was not 

placed in a required secrecy envelope was calculated as C9h/C9a x 100. Ballot did not have a witness 

signature was calculated as C9d/C9a x 100. Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted was 

calculated as C9n/C9a x 100. Voter did not provide or provided incomplete documentation was calculated 

as C9o/C9a x 100. Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction was calculated as C9p/C9a x 

100. Voter was deceased was calculated as C9m/C9a x 100. Ballot was missing from the envelope was 

calculated as C9g/C9a x 100. Envelope was not sealed was calculated as C9j/C9a x 100. No resident 

address was on the envelope was calculated as C9l/C9a x 100. Returned ballot did not have required 

postmark was calculated as C9k/C9a x 100. Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope was calculated 

as C9f/C9a x 100. Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope was calculated as C9i/C9a x 100. No 

ballot application on record was calculated as C9q/C9a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state 

level in calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

24 T tests that were noted as being statistically significant were significant at the p < 0.05 level.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 14 

Table 1 shows the most common reasons that states reported for rejecting mail ballots for the 

2022 general election. Although states were asked to report data on 16 different reasons why 

mail ballots were rejected, the most common reason for rejecting mail ballots was for reasons not 

listed in the survey question. The states with the largest number of ballots rejected for other 

reasons were California (118,490 ballots), Oregon (26,942 ballots), Delaware (2,480 ballots), 

Wisconsin (2,125 ballots), and Florida (1,870 ballots);25 the states with the highest percentages 

of mail ballots rejected for other reasons were Oregon (93.4%), Delaware (85.6%), Maine (60.3%), 

Wisconsin (53.3%), and California (48.7%).26 The most common other reasons reported were 

”Undeliverable/Void/Final Not Counted“ (comprising approximately half of mail ballots rejected 

for other reasons) and “All Signature Issues” (comprising approximately one-quarter of mail 

ballots rejected for other reasons).

The next most common reason states reported for rejecting a mail ballot was that the ballot 

returned by the voter had a signature that did not match what was on file or was incomplete, 

followed by the ballot not being received by the deadline to be considered for counting. Together, 

these three reasons accounted for nearly seven out of 10 of the ballots rejected for the 2022 

general election.

Drop Boxes 

The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of drop boxes for the first time in 2022. Drop boxes are 

locked containers (located either indoors or outdoors) where voters (or voters’ authorized 

representatives, if allowed by state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. Drop 

boxes are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate from ballot boxes, 

which are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots immediately after 

voting in person. Some states use other terminology for what the EAVS survey questions call drop 

boxes, including “place of deposit” or “secure ballot intake station.”

Of the 39 states that reported using drop boxes for this election,27 seven states (Georgia, Indiana, 

Iowa, Montana, New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin) did not track or were otherwise unable to 

report data on the number of drop boxes that were in use for the 2022 general election. The 

32 remaining states reported deploying a total of 12,917 drop boxes throughout the voting period 

for the 2022 general election, with 11,858 drop boxes being available on Election Day and 8,386 

available during the early voting period.28 States also reported whether drop boxes were located 

at election offices or at other sites such as at non-election office polling places, county 

government buildings, or other locations that are conveniently accessible to voters. States 

reported that 28.2% of Election Day drop boxes were located at election offices and 71.8% were 

25 The number of mail ballots rejected for other reasons by state was calculated as the sum of C9r, C9s, 

and C9t.

26 Idaho and West Virginia were excluded from the list of states with the highest reported percentages of 

mail ballots rejected for other reasons because of erroneous data reporting.

27 Data on whether states allowed the use of drop boxes were collected in item Q19 of the 2022 Policy 

Survey.

28 The total number of drop boxes was reported in item C3a. The number of Election Day drop boxes was 

reported in item C4a. The number of early voting drop boxes was reported in C5a. The question instructions 

specified that each drop box should be reported only once in C3a, regardless of the number of days of 

voting during which it was available. Thus, because some drop boxes were available both during early 

voting and on Election Day, the sum of C4a and C5a often does not match C3a on a state or a jurisdiction 

level.
 

15 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

located at other sites. For early voting drop boxes, 40.1% were located at election offices and 

59.8% were located at other sites.29

The 2022 EAVS also collected data on the number of mail ballots that were returned by drop box. 

Fifteen of the states that use drop boxes did not track these data or were otherwise unable to 

report how many of the mail ballots returned by voters were returned by drop box (Alaska, 

Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 

New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin). The 24 states that were able to 

report these data reported that 11,473,653 mail ballots were returned by drop box, comprising 

39.7% of the mail ballots returned by voters in these states and 20.9% of all ballots cast in those 

states.30 States that conducted their elections entirely by mail at the state or jurisdiction level, 

including Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Utah, California, the District of Columbia, and 

Nebraska, tended to have the highest average number of mail ballots returned by drop box.

Ballot Curing 

The 2022 EAVS also collected for the first time data on the ballot curing process. When voters 

return their mail ballots to election offices, election workers verify that the envelope has all the 

required voter information and that the ballot is eligible to be counted. This process varies by 

state, but can include comparing the voter’s signature with the one on file at the election office

and verifying the date the ballot envelope was signed as well as other information. If this 

information is missing, if it does not match the records on file in the election office, or if it is 

otherwise incomplete, then each state and territory has laws and procedures on how to treat 

these ballots. A certain percentage of those ballots may initially be rejected for counting—for 

instance, because the voter forgot to sign the ballot envelope so the election office was unable to 

verify their identity; or because the voter’s signature does not match the signature that the 

election office has on file; or because the voter neglected to include a required affidavit, 

statement, or copy of their identification to assist in verifying their identity and ability to cast a 

mail ballot. According to the 2022 Policy Survey, 41 states31 allowed voters to cure their mail 

ballots for the 2022 general election—that is, making their ballot eligible to be counted for the 

election by correcting missing information or signature errors. Fourteen other states did not allow 

mail ballots to be cured by voters for this election.32

Of the 41 states that allowed voters to cure their mail ballots, 16 states (Colorado, Georgia, 

Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New 

Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) did not track information on the 

number of ballots that were successfully cured (i.e., the voter corrected the error or supplied the 

required information and their ballot was ultimately counted for the election). The 2022 EAVS only 

29 For Election Day drop boxes, the percentage located at election offices was calculated as C4b/C4a x 100 

and the percentage located at other sites was calculated as C4c/C4a x 100. For early voting drop boxes, 

the percentage located at election offices was calculated as C5b/C5a x 100 and the percentage located at 

other sites was calculated as C5c/C5a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level; percentages 

may not sum to 100% because of this casewise deletion or because of rounding.

30 The number of mail ballots returned by drop box was reported in item C6a of the 2022 EAVS. The 

percentage of mail ballots returned by drop box was calculated as C6a/C1b x 100. The percentage of all 

ballots cast that were returned by drop box was calculated as C6a/F1a x 100. Casewise deletion was used 

at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

31 Information on state ballot curing policy was collected in item Q20 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

32 Puerto Rico is not included in this analysis because this territory did not conduct a federal general 

election in November 2022.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 16 

collected data on the number of ballots that were successfully cured and not the number that 

were eligible for curing or were rejected because they were not cured. The 25 states that tracked 

information on successfully cured mail ballots reported curing a total of 169,540 mail ballots for 

the 2022 general election.33 Nationally, this number comprised 0.7% of both mail ballots 

returned and mail ballots counted.34

Additional information about mail voting in the 2022 general election, including statistics by state, 

can be found in Appendix A of this chapter.

Provisional Voting

HAVA expanded and standardized the use of provisional voting as a way for a voter to cast a ballot 

when their registration status cannot be verified at the time of voting, when there is some 

indication that the voter may have already cast another ballot (e.g., by mail), or when the voter’s 

eligibility to vote in an election is challenged. Provisional ballots are kept separate from other 

election ballots and are later fully counted, partially counted, or rejected depending on whether 

the provisional voter’s eligibility can be verified in the days following the election according to the 

state’s rules for this process. The provisional ballot process helps ensure each qualified voter 

casts only one ballot that is counted and allows the voter additional time to prove their eligibility 

to vote if necessary. Five states—Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—

are exempt from HAVA’s provisional ballot requirements because they allowed for SDR (i.e., the 

ability to register to vote and cast a ballot on the same day) at the time the law was enacted, 

although Wisconsin and Wyoming do issue provisional ballots. North Dakota is exempt from this 

HAVA provision because it does not require citizens to register to vote. In addition, some states 

that are subject to HAVA use provisional ballots as an SDR method, including California, Nevada, 

and Virginia.

In the 2022 Policy Survey, most states and territories reported offering provisional ballots to 

voters. Only six states and territories—Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the 

Northern Mariana Islands, and Vermont—did not.35 Chapter 2 of this report includes a detailed 

analysis of additional policies on provisional voting, including under which circumstances a state 

may offer a provisional ballot to a voter, the deadline for election officials to adjudicate 

provisional ballots for the 2022 general election, how states handle provisional ballots cast by a 

voter who is in the wrong precinct, and how states review provisional ballots for eligibility and to 

determine whether they should be counted.

The percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters has been steadily declining over the 

past three election cycles; 2018 EAVS data show that 1.3% of voters who cast a ballot did so by 

provisional ballot, and that percentage declined to 0.8% of the electorate in the 2020 EAVS and 

0.5% for the 2022 EAVS.36 The total number of provisional ballots cast has declined 

33 The number of successfully cured mail ballots was collected in item C7a of the 2022 EAVS.

34 The percentage of mail ballots returned by voters that were successfully cured was calculated as 

C7a/C1b x 100. The percentage of mail ballots counted that were successfully cured was calculated as 

C7a/C8a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

35 Information on states’ use of provisional voting was collected in item Q33 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

36 The percentage of provisional voters is calculated as F1e/F1a x 100 for all years. Casewise deletion was 

used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. For the 2018 EAVS, F1 collected data on all 

ballots cast, regardless of outcome, whereas the 2020 and 2022 versions of F1 collected data on ballots 

cast and counted.
 

17 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

correspondingly, from 1,852,476 in the 2018 EAVS to 1,712,857 in the 2020 EAVS to 702,042

in the 2022 EAVS.37 Data from the 2022 EAVS show that 78.6% of provisional ballots cast were 

counted (either fully or partially), whereas 21.3% were rejected and 0.4% reached some other 

adjudication;38 analysis showed that these percentages have not changed significantly compared 

to the 2018 or 2020 EAVS.39

Table 2. Most Common Reason for Voters to Cast 

Provisional Ballots Was Not Being on Eligible Voter List 

 

Reason 

Percentage of Provisional 

Ballots Cast 

Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters 30.9%

Other reasons not listed 20.8%

Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to 

poll workers when they came to vote in person 17.9%

Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were 

attempting to vote 16.9%

Voter’s registration was not updated with their current name or 

address 7.9%

Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law) 2.0%

Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote 1.7%

A federal or state judge extended the polling place hours for the 

election 0.6%

Another person (not an election official) challenged the voter’s 

qualifications and poll workers were not able to resolve the 

challenge

0.1%

Source: Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters was calculated as E2a/E1a x 100. Other reasons 

not listed was calculated as (E2i+E2j+E2k)/E1a x 100. Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender 

the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person was calculated as E2g/E1a x 100. Voter was 

not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote was calculated as E2e/E1a x 100. 

Voter’s registration was not updated with their current name or address was calculated as E2f/E1a x 100. 

Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law) was calculated as E2b/ E1a x 100. 

Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote was calculated as E2c/E1a x 100. A federal 

or state judge extended the polling place hours for the election was calculated as E2h/E1a x 100. Another 

person (not an election official) challenged the voter’s qualifications and poll workers were not able to 

resolve the challenge was calculated as E2d/E1a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in 

calculating the national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

37 The total number of provisional ballots cast by voters was collected in item E1a for all years.

38 The percentage of counted provisional ballots was calculated as (E1b+E1c)/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) x 100. 

The percentage of rejected provisional ballots was calculated as E1d/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) x 100. The 

percentage of provisional ballots that reached another adjudication was calculated as 

E1e/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national 

percentage.

39 T tests were statistically insignificant at p > 0.05.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 18 

For the first time, the EAVS collected data on the reasons why provisional ballots were cast for the 

2022 general election. These data are shown in Table 2. Eight states that use provisional voting 

were unable to track data on the reasons why provisional ballots were cast (Alaska, Connecticut, 

Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, and New Mexico). Of the states that did report 

these data, the most common reason for a voter being invited to cast a provisional ballot was that 

the voter was not on the list of eligible voters at their voting site. The next most common reason 

was a reason not listed in the survey question,40 followed by the voter having received a mail 

ballot but then deciding to vote in person and not surrendering the mail ballot at the voting site, 

followed by the voter not being a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote. 

The additional reasons that EAVS collects data on—including the voter’s registration not being up 

to date, the voter not having an acceptable identification for their state, an election official or 

other person asserting the voter was not eligible to vote, or a federal or state judge extending 

polling place hours for the election—were comparatively rare.

The EAVS also collects data on the reasons why provisional ballots are rejected. By far, the most 

common reason states reported for rejecting provisional ballots was that the voter who cast the 

provisional ballot was not registered in the state; this reason alone accounted for 45.4% of the 

provisional ballots that were reported as rejected by states. The next most common reason was a 

reason that was not listed in the survey question. These ballots comprised 16.7% of rejected 

provisional ballots. Other common reasons for rejecting provisional ballots included the voter 

being registered in the state but attempting to vote in the wrong jurisdiction (14.8% of rejections), 

the voter being registered in the state but attempting to vote in the wrong precinct (6.8% of 

rejections), and the voter failing to provide sufficient identification (6.2% of rejections). Additional 

reasons for rejecting provisional ballots that the EAVS collects data on—the voter already having 

voted, the envelope and/or ballot being incomplete and/or illegible, the ballot envelope not 

having a signature, the ballot envelope having a non-matching signature, and the ballot being 

missing from the envelope—each comprised 5.0% of provisional ballot rejections or less for the 

2022 general election.41

UOCAVA and Other Methods of Voting

Absentee and mail voting have long been used to facilitate participation in federal elections for 

individuals in the military, eligible family members of service members, and U.S. citizens who live 

overseas. The distinct needs of members of the uniformed services and overseas citizens remain 

an area of focus in election administration, and these individuals are given special voting 

40 The most common other reasons for casting provisional ballots were because of SDR (24% of these 

ballots) and because the voter was marked in the poll book as having requested an absentee ballot but 

was attempting to vote in person (14.7%).

41 Voter was not registered in the state was calculated as E3b/E3a x 100. Other reasons not listed was 

calculated as (E3k+E3l+E3m)/E3a x 100. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to vote in the 

wrong jurisdiction was calculated as E3c/E3a x 100. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to 

vote in the wrong precinct was calculated as E3d/E3a x 100. Voter failed to provide sufficient identification 

was calculated as E3e/E3a x 100. Voter already voted was calculated as E3j/E3a x 100. Envelope and/or 

ballot was incomplete and/or illegible was calculated as E3f/E3a x 100. Ballot did not have a signature was 

calculated as E3h/E3a x 100. Ballot had a non-matching signature was calculated as E3i/E3a x 100. Ballot 

was missing from the envelope was calculated as E3g/E3a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state 

level in calculating the national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100% for this reason.
 

19 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

protections under UOCAVA and its amendments.42 UOCAVA voters are provided certain rights to 

fully participate in federal elections and are given special considerations as to when their ballots 

are sent, how their blank ballots can be transmitted, and how and when they may return their 

voted ballots.

Both the number of UOCAVA ballots that were cast and counted and the percentage of the 

electorate who cast their ballots through UOCAVA decreased for the 2022 general election 

compared to 2018. Data from the 2018 EAVS show that 358,137 UOCAVA ballots were cast, 

comprising 0.3% of the electorate. For the 2022 general election, 254,721 UOCAVA ballots were 

cast and counted, comprising 0.2% of the voting population. The number of UOCAVA ballots cast 

and percentage of voters who cast UOCAVA ballots both surged for the 2020 general election, to 

938,297 and 0.6%, respectively, but for 2022 they declined below pre-pandemic levels.43

Nationwide, for the 2022 general election, states reported transmitting 654,786 ballots, of which 

267,403 were returned by voters for a return rate of 40.9%.44 Of the ballots that were returned, 

257,657 were counted and 10,456 were rejected, yielding a count rate of 96.4% and a rejection 

rate of 3.9%.45 This is in addition to 4,089 Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) that were 

sent to election offices by UOCAVA voters, of which 3,447 were counted.46

Chapter 4 of this report contains a complete discussion of the EAC’s history of collecting data on 

voters covered by UOCAVA; a full analysis of the data collected about these voters and their 

ballots in 2022, including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and the use of the 

FWAB. Chapter 2 of this report contains a complete discussion of state policies regarding UOCAVA 

voting.

In addition to ballots that were cast at a physical polling place either on Election Day or during the 

early voting period, by mail, by provisional voting, and by UOCAVA voters, states reported data on 

any other modes of voting that were offered in the state in 2022. Just over 5% of the ballots that 

were cast and counted in 2022 were reported as another mode of voting, an increase from the 

2.5% that was reported for the 2020 general election and the 0.2% that was reported for the 

42 The uniformed services are the armed forces—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space 

Force), and Coast Guard—and the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned Corps, the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Officer Corps, and the U.S. Merchant 

Marine. Uniformed services members, their spouses, and their eligible dependents are, together, referred 

to as uniformed services voters. Overseas citizens are U.S. citizens living outside of the United States who 

are not uniformed services voters but who are also protected by UOCAVA.

43 The number of UOCAVA ballots cast and counted was collected in item F1c for all years; the percentage 

of voters who cast UOCAVA ballots was calculated as F1c/F1a x 100. For 2018, this item collected data on 

ballots cast regardless of outcome; for 2020 and 2022, it collected data on ballots cast and counted.

44 The number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted was collected in B5a and the number of UOCAVA ballots 

returned was collected in item B9a. The UOCAVA ballot return rate was calculated as B9a/B5a x 100. 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

45 The number of UOCAVA ballots counted was collected in B14a and the number of UOCAVA ballots 

rejected was collected in B18a. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots counted was calculated as B14a/B9a 

x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100. Casewise deletion 

was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

46 The number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters was collected in item B23a. The number of counted 

FWABs was collected in item B24a.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 20 

2018 general election.47 This is primarily due to New Jersey reporting 75.4% of its voters in this 

item, which the state said comprised Election Day and early voting location ballots counted. Other 

states that reported significant turnout in this item included Mississippi (6.5% of turnout, 

comprising absentee ballots counted), North Carolina (2.2% of turnout, comprising “other”), the 

U.S. Virgin Islands (1.9% of turnout, comprising walk-in absentee voters), and Delaware (1.1% of 

voters, comprising “all other methods”).48 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 

Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin also reported other modes of voting 

that comprised less than 1% of the turnout in each state.

Polling Places and Poll Workers

To organize elections, registered voters are assigned to precincts according to the residential 

addresses listed in their voter registration records. These precincts are contiguous, bounded 

geographic areas that form the basis for determining the contests and issues on which the voters 

legally residing in that area are eligible to vote.49 Precincts are then assigned to polling locations, 

which are physical locations where in-person voting takes place. One precinct may be assigned to 

a polling place, or multiple precincts may vote together at a single polling place. Some states use 

a vote center model, which allows people to vote at any polling location within their jurisdiction 

rather than at a specifically assigned polling place.

For the 2022 general election, states reported having 181,790 precincts in use and operating 

94,793 physical polling places.50 A total of 80,124 polling places were reported as being 

operated on Election Day 2022 and 15,309 were reported as being in use during in-person early 

voting before Election Day.51 Among Election Day polling places, 2.6% were reported by states as 

being located at an election office and 97.8% were reported as being located at another site, 

such as a library, school, or a mobile voting location. For early voting polling places, 44.9% were 

located at election offices and 66.6% were located at other sites.52

47 The percentage of ballots cast by another mode and counted was calculated as F1h/F1a x 100 for all 

years. Casewise deletion was used in calculating the national percentage. For 2018, this item collected 

data on ballots cast regardless of outcome; for 2020 and 2022, it collected data on ballots cast and 

counted.

48 The description of states’ other mode of voting was based on what the state submitted in item F1h_Other 

of the 2022 EAVS.

49 Some states use the terms “ward” or “voting district” to describe their voting precincts.

50 The number of precincts was collected in item D1a, and the total number of polling places was collected 

in D2a. The instructions for D2a stated that each polling place was to be counted only once, regardless of 

the number of voting days it was open for.

51 The total number of Election Day polling places was collected in D3a, and the total number of early voting 

polling places was collected in D4a. Illinois and Virginia were excluded from the reported total number of 

Election Day polling places due to erroneous data reporting. Washington did not report data in D3a because 

the state has no polling places—only vote centers and voting by mail. Three states did not report data in 

D4a: Missouri because it was unavailable, New Hampshire because in-person absentee is only permitted at 

town or city clerk’s offices over the counter, and Pennsylvania because in-person early voting was not 

available for this election. The EAC cautions against doing a year-over-year analysis of polling places as 

reported in the EAVS because these items have been underreported in previous years.

52 The percentage of Election Day polling places at election offices was calculated as D3c/(D3b+D3c) x 

100. The percentage of Election Day polling places at other sites was calculated as D3b/(D3b+D3c) x 100. 

The percentage of early voting polling places at election offices was calculated as D4c/(D4b+D4c) x 100. 

The percentage of early voting polling places at other sites was calculated as D4b/(D4b+D4c) x 100. 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages; the percentages for 
 

21 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

In-person voters who vote at polling places are often assisted by poll workers. These poll workers 

are typically not full-time election workers or employees of election offices; rather, they are 

recruited and trained to assist temporarily during election periods. Typical activities that poll 

workers perform include checking in voters, setting up voting equipment and providing ballots to 

voters, and performing other functions as dictated by the state or local election authority.53 States 

reported that 645,219 poll workers assisted with in-person voting for the 2022 general election, 

with 608,758 poll workers assisting with voting on Election Day and 98,140 assisting with early 

voting.54

Thirty-six states also reported data on the age breakdown of the poll workers who assisted with 

the 2022 general election.55 Among these states, a majority of poll workers were reported as 

being age 61 or older. The age distribution of poll workers in the 2018, 2020, and 2022 general 

elections is shown in Figure 4. This figure shows a clear increase in poll workers between the 

ages of 18 and 40 for the 2020 general election and a decrease in poll workers over the age of 

61. However, the age distribution of poll workers for the 2022 general election is remarkably 

similar to that of the 2018 general election. In comparing 2020 to 2022, the proportion of poll 

workers ages 18 and under, 26 to 40, and 41 to 60 decreased, while the proportion of poll 

workers ages 61 to 70 and 71 and older increased.56 The 2022 EAVS also collected data on poll 

workers who served for the first time in the 2022 general election; states reported 80,708 new 

poll workers, comprising 16.7% of the poll workers who assisted with this election.57

each election period may not sum to 100% because of this. Georgia and Missouri did not report data on 

where Election Day polling sites were located; Georgia and Wisconsin did not report data on where early 

voting polling sites were located. “Early voting” refers to any in-person voting that took place before Election 

Day.

53 Some states and jurisdictions use other titles for poll workers, such as election judges, booth workers, 

wardens, or commissioners. The EAVS instructions stated that observers stationed at polling places, regular 

office staff who did not fulfill poll worker functions during the election, or temporary election staff who were 

not hired specifically to serve voters in either early or Election Day voting should not be counted as poll 

workers for purposes of the EAVS. However, regular office staff who performed poll worker duties during 

early voting or on Election Day were to be counted as poll workers in these survey items.

54 The total number of poll workers was collected in item D7a. The total number of Election Day poll workers 

was collected in item D5a. The total number of early voting poll workers was collected in item D6a. D7a was 

not intended to match the sum of D5a and D6a because the instructions in D7 were to count each poll 

worker only once, regardless of the number of days of voting the poll worker assisted with. Oregon, 

Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin were unable to report data on poll workers in any of these three 

items. Colorado and North Dakota reported data in D7a but not in D5a or D6a; Alabama, Louisiana, Maine, 

Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania reported 

data in D5a and D7a but not in D6a.

55 Data on poll workers’ ages were collected in items D7b–D7g of the 2022 EAVS. Connecticut, the District 

of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, 

New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, 

and Wisconsin were not able to report age data.

56 Comparisons for age categories between 2020 and 2022 were significant at the p < 0.05 level. The 

comparison for poll workers ages 18 to 25 was insignificant at p > 0.05.

57 Data on new poll workers were collected in item D9a of the 2022 EAVS; the percentage of new poll 

workers was calculated as D9a/D7a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the 

national percentage. Twenty-three states (Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Guam, Idaho, 

Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 

Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, 

Washington, and Wisconsin) were unable to track data on new poll workers.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 22 

Figure 4. Age Distribution of 2022 Poll Workers Was Very Similar to 2018 

 

Source: Percentage of poll workers under age 18 was calculated as D7b/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 

100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8b/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of poll 

workers ages 18–25 was calculated as D7c/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022

and as D8c/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 26–40 was 

calculated as D7d/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8d/(D8b+D8c+

D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 41–60 was calculated as D7e/

(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8e/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+ D8f+D8g) x 

100 for 2018. Percentage of poll workers ages 61–70 was calculated as D7f/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+

D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 2022 and as D8f/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Percentage of 

poll workers ages 71 or older was calculated as D7g/(D7b+D7c+D7d+D7e+D7f+D7g) x 100 for 2020 and 

2022 and as D8g/(D8b+D8c+D8d+D8e+D8f+D8g) x 100 for 2018. Data for Alaska and South Carolina 

have been excluded from these calculations because these states only track data on poll workers under 18 

years of age. Casewise deletion was used at the state level for calculating national percentages, and 

because of this, percentages do not sum to 100%.

The EAVS also collected data on how easy or difficult it was for jurisdictions to obtain a sufficient 

number of poll workers for the 2022 general election. These data show that poll worker 

recruitment remains a challenge for many election officials, with more than half of jurisdictions 

that responded to this question reporting that it was very or somewhat difficult and just under 
 

23 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

one-quarter of jurisdictions reporting it was somewhat or very easy.58 However, historical 

comparisons show that recruitment has become somewhat easier in the past two election cycles, 

as shown in Figure 5. For the 2018 EAVS, more than two-thirds of jurisdictions reported that poll 

worker recruitment was very or somewhat difficult and only 15.3% reported that recruitment was 

somewhat or very easy. Beginning with the 2020 EAVS, the percentage of jurisdictions that found 

recruitment to be difficult began to decrease and the percentage that found it easy began to 

increase, a trend that continued with the 2022 EAVS. Analysis shows that although the ease of 

poll worker recruitment fell in 2022 compared to 2020, recruitment was still easier in 2022 than 

it was in 2018.59 Ease of poll worker recruitment is also highly correlated with the size of the 

jurisdiction, with jurisdictions having 10,000 or fewer total registered voters reporting that 

recruitment was easier compared to jurisdictions with more than 10,000 total registered voters.60

Figure 5. Poll Worker Recruitment Was Less Difficult in 2020 and 2022 Than in 2018 

 

Source: Ease of recruiting poll workers was collected in item D8 in the 2020 and 2022 EAVS and D9 in the 

2018 EAVS. For all years, jurisdictions that responded “Not enough information to answer,” “Data not 

available,” “Does not apply,” or left this item blank were excluded from this analysis.

58 Data on the ease of recruiting poll workers were collected in item D8 of the 2020 and 2022 EAVS and 

item D9 of the 2018 EAVS. In 2022, 3,164 of 6,460 jurisdictions (49%) responded “Not enough 

information to answer,” “Data not available,” “Does not apply,” or left this item blank; these responses 

have been excluded from the analysis.

59 T tests comparing D8 for 2022 and 2020 and D8 for 2022 and D9 for 2018 were statistically significant 

at p < 0.01.

60 For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as 

reported in item A1a of the 2022 EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at p < 0.001.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 24 

Approximately half of EAVS jurisdictions provided comments that explained their experiences with 

recruiting poll workers for the 2022 general election.61 Overall, some of the most significant 

challenges jurisdictions experienced in recruiting poll workers included lingering concerns about 

COVID (especially among older poll workers), long work hours and relatively low pay for poll 

workers, issues obtaining a sufficient political party balance of poll workers (in states and 

jurisdictions where this is a requirement), concerns about safety and the general political climate 

toward elections, and last-minute cancellations causing difficulties with filling those slots. Among 

jurisdictions reporting that poll worker recruitment was somewhat or very easy, the most 

commonly cited strategies included relying on local networks—such as high schools or colleges, 

political parties, and local government offices or organizations—or current poll workers to recruit 

additional workers. Some jurisdictions found success in switching to a vote center model, thereby 

reducing the number of poll workers necessary to administer an election. Other successful 

strategies included relying on election staff to fill vacant poll worker positions and holding 

multiple poll worker orientation and training sessions to accommodate different schedules.

Election Technology

The use of technology in polling places and vote tally locations varies widely across and within 

states. The 2022 EAVS collected data on the type of voting equipment that is used and the type 

of voting that the equipment is used for, the specific makes and models of the equipment and 

how many were deployed for the election, and whether electronic poll books (or e-poll books) 

were used to assist at polling places. The voting equipment landscape continues to evolve with 

each election.

Voting Equipment

The 2022 EAVS collected data on the use of four types of voting equipment that voters use to 

mark or cast their ballots in elections or that can be used to tabulate ballots cast by voters:

o Direct-recording electronic (DRE) devices that are not equipped with a voter-verified paper 

audit trail (VVPAT);

o DRE voting devices that are equipped with a VVPAT;

o Electronic systems that produce a paper record but do not tabulate votes, often referred to 

as ballot-marking devices (BMD); and

o Scanners (either optical or digital) that tabulate paper records that voters mark by hand or 

via a BMD.

The EAVS also collected information on whether jurisdictions counted ballots by hand without the 

use of any optical or digital scanning system.62

61 Open-ended comments on poll worker recruitment experiences were provided in the D8 Comment item 

of the 2022 EAVS. Responses that did not include substantive comments—such as “No information to 

share” or “Data not available”—were excluded from the analysis.

62 Information on DREs without VVPAT was collected in F5 of the 2022 EAVS. Information on DREs with 

VVPAT was collected in F6. Information on BMDs was collected in F7. Information on scanners was 

collected in F8. Information on hand counting was collected in F9. Eight jurisdictions in Kansas, two 

jurisdictions in Kentucky, four jurisdictions in Missouri, and two jurisdictions in West Virginia did not 

respond to questions on the use of scanners in F8. No jurisdiction in Kansas responded to questions on the 

use of hand counting in F9. Previously, the EAVS also collected information on the use of punch card and 
 

25 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

Nationally, states reported deploying 334,382 voting machines to assist with the 2022 general 

election.63 Figure 6 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that reported using each type of voting 

equipment in the 2020 and 2022 EAVS. The most commonly used types of voting equipment in 

EAVS jurisdictions were BMDs and scanners, which were used in 88.4% and 86.2% of 

jurisdictions, respectively. The use of both types of equipment increased from the 2020 election 

to the 2022 election: the use of BMDs increased by 18.6 percentage points and the use of 

scanners increased by 7.8 percentage points. Hand counting, on the other hand, was used by 

17.8% of jurisdictions for the 2022 general election, a slight decrease from 2020. Use of hand 

counting to tabulate ballots for the 2022 general election was highly correlated with jurisdiction 

size. Among jurisdictions with 10,000 or fewer registered voters, 20.6% reported hand counting 

ballots, whereas only 13.3% of jurisdictions with more than 10,000 registered voters reported 

hand counting ballots.64 DREs continue to be the least-used type of voting equipment in the 

United States, with only 6.7% of jurisdictions using DREs without VVPAT and 5.5% using DREs 

with VVPAT.

DREs without VVPAT are of special concern to some experts, because these machines do not 

include a paper record of the votes that are cast, which raises security concerns and can make it 

difficult to conduct certain types of post-election audits. The percentage of jurisdictions that used 

these machines increased slightly overall between 2020 and 2022 due to 217 jurisdictions (four 

in Illinois, 14 in Indiana, seven in Kentucky, 18 in Texas, and 174 in Vermont) that reported using 

this equipment in 2022 but not in 2020. However, there were another 193 jurisdictions (five in 

Arkansas, 14 in Indiana, one in Kansas, 43 in Kentucky, 50 in Mississippi, 11 in New Jersey, 12 

in Tennessee, and 57 in Texas) that reported phasing out DREs without VVPAT between the 2020 

and 2022 general elections. 

lever voting machines; for the 2022 EAVS, these questions were eliminated because no jurisdiction in the 

United States had reported using either of these types of equipment since the 2016 EAVS, marking three 

election cycles in which no jurisdiction reported using this equipment.

63 The number of voting machines deployed was calculated as the sum of F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, 

F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3 in the 2022 EAVS.

64 For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as 

reported in item A1a of the 2022 EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at p < 0.001. 

Jurisdictions that did not provide a response in F9a of the 2022 EAVS were excluded from this analysis. The 

vast majority of jurisdictions that used hand counting reported using some other form of voting equipment 

to assist with ballot casting or tabulation. Only 30 jurisdictions used only hand counting; these jurisdictions 

were in American Samoa, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Texas.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 26 

Figure 6. Percentage of EAVS Jurisdictions Using BMDs and Scanners Increased 

from 2020 to 2022; Use of DREs Decreased 

 

Source: Data on use of BMDs were collected in item F7a for both years. Data on use of scanners were 

collected in item F8a for both years. Data on use of hand counting were collected in item F11a for 2020 

and F9a for 2022. Data on use of DRE without VVPAT were collected in item F5a for both years. Data 

on use of DRE with VVPAT were collected in item F6a for both years. Percentages were calculated as 

the number of jurisdictions responding “Yes” to the listed item divided by the total number of 

EAVS jurisdictions.

In addition, the number of jurisdictions that use DRE without VVPAT only, without any other 

equipment available for voters to cast their ballots, decreased significantly. For the 2020 general 

election, 32 jurisdictions (12 in Indiana, one in Tennessee, and 19 in Texas) used only DRE 

without VVPAT; for the 2022 general election, that number decreased to only four jurisdictions 

(one in Tennessee and three in Texas).

Electronic Poll Books

When voters go into polling places to cast ballots in person, their identity is checked against voter 

registration information that is contained in poll books to ensure the voters are registered to vote 

and did not already cast a ballot (either in person or by mail). These poll books can be paper 

based and printed before the election, or they can be electronic. The use of e-poll books has 

steadily increased in recent elections. For the 2020 general election, 38 states reported that at 

least one jurisdiction in their state used e-poll books; this number increased to 40 for the 2022 
 

27 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

general election, comprising 35.1% of all EAVS jurisdictions (an increase of 4.3 percentage points 

compared to the 2020 general election).65 Colorado, Hawaii, and New Jersey reported adopting epoll books between the 2020 and 2022 elections.

Jurisdictions also provided data on how the e-poll books in their jurisdictions were used—to sign 

voters in, to update voter history, to look up polling places, to assist with same-day registration, to 

check a voter’s mail ballot status, or for other uses (see Table 3). The most commonly reported 

usages of e-poll books were to sign voters in, update voter history, look up polling places, and 

check voters’ mail ballot status. Of the jurisdictions that used e-poll books, approximately threequarters or more of jurisdictions used the e-poll books for these purposes. Less-common uses of 

e-poll books included to assist with same-day voter registration and for other uses. Compared to 

how jurisdictions use paper poll books, it was more common for a jurisdiction to use an e-poll 

book to look up polling places and for other uses. It was also more common for jurisdictions to 

use a paper poll book to update voter history, check voters’ mail ballot status, and assist with 

same-day registration than it was for jurisdictions to use e-poll books to assist with these tasks.66

Table 3. E-Poll Books Most Commonly Used to Sign Voters In, Update History, 

Look Up Polling Places, and Check Mail Ballot Status 

 

Poll Book Use 

Percentage of E-Poll Book 

Jurisdictions That Used Them 

To... 

Percentage of Paper Poll Book 

Jurisdictions That Used Them 

To... 

Sign voters in 96.0% 96.1%

Update voter history 89.3% 93.0%

Look up polling places 84.7% 23.1%

Check voters’ mail ballot 

status 74.4% 87.7%

Assist with same-day 

registration 33.7% 70.3%

Other uses 27.3% 12.4%

Source: Data on use of poll books to sign voters in were collected in items F3a and F4a. Data on use of poll 

books to update voter history were collected in items F3b and F4b. Data on use of poll books to look up 

polling places were collected in items F3c and F4c. Data on use of poll books to check voter’s mail ballot 

status were collected in items F3e and F4e. Data on use of poll books to assist with same-day registration 

were collected in items F3d and F4d. Data on other uses of poll books were collected in items F3f and F4f. 

Percentages are calculated as the percentage of jurisdictions that used each type of poll book that reported 

using the poll book to assist with the stated election task divided by the number of jurisdictions that 

reported using each type of poll book.

65 Data on the use of e-poll books were collected in items F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F3e, and F3f of the 2022 

EAVS and items F3a, F3b, F3c, and F3d of the 2020 EAVS. A jurisdiction was considered to have used an epoll book if it answered “Yes” to at least one of those questions. Puerto Rico reported using e-pollbooks in 

the 2020 EAVS but was excluded from the count of states using them in 2022 because it was not required 

to respond to the 2022 EAVS.

66 Differences for all poll book uses for the 2022 general election except for signing voters in were 

statistically significant at p < 0.01.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 28 

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Overview Table 1: 2022 EAVS at a Glance

State

Total EAVS 

Jurisdictions

Total Active 

Registered 

Voters

Total CVAP Total Voter 

Turnout

Turnout as % 

of Active 

Registration

Turnout as % 

of CVAP

Alabama [1] 67 3,283,842 3,829,788 1,424,087 43.4% 37.2%

Alaska 1 601,795 533,852 267,047 44.4% 50.0%

American Samoa 1 14,314 -- 7,460 52.1% --

Arizona [2] 15 4,143,929 5,216,518 2,592,375 62.6% 49.7%

Arkansas 75 1,475,838 2,237,649 896,423 60.7% 40.1%

California 58 21,958,218 26,028,290 11,146,561 50.8% 42.8%

Colorado 64 3,839,814 4,303,604 2,539,897 66.1% 59.0%

Connecticut [3] 169 2,259,575 2,659,979 1,297,811 57.4% 48.8%

Delaware 3 702,029 754,114 325,828 46.4% 43.2%

District of 

Columbia [4] 1 508,855 502,670 205,774 40.4% 40.9%

Florida 67 14,497,121 15,855,982 7,798,866 53.8% 49.2%

Georgia 159 6,955,386 7,786,111 3,963,152 57.0% 50.9%

Guam 1 60,463 -- 34,074 56.4% --

Hawaii 5 764,102 1,044,019 423,443 55.4% 40.6%

Idaho 44 1,004,608 1,373,714 595,350 59.3% 43.3%

Illinois [5] 108 7,899,591 9,087,338 4,175,767 52.9% 46.0%

Indiana 92 4,197,437 5,030,200 1,893,022 45.1% 37.6%

Iowa [6] 99 1,880,415 2,379,570 1,230,143 65.4% 51.7%

Kansas 105 1,830,216 2,128,111 997,607 54.5% 46.9%

Kentucky 120 3,137,031 3,405,618 1,500,419 47.8% 44.1%

Louisiana 64 2,830,594 3,439,830 1,410,597 49.8% 41.0%

Maine 497 929,124 1,100,974 680,909 73.3% 61.8%

Maryland 24 4,149,909 4,417,293 2,028,850 48.9% 45.9%

Massachusetts 351 4,173,942 5,121,488 2,511,460 60.2% 49.0%

Michigan 83 7,297,900 7,640,514 4,500,400 61.7% 58.9%

Minnesota 87 3,624,200 4,221,515 2,526,646 69.7% 59.9%

Mississippi [7] 82 1,922,707 2,226,474 708,585 36.9% 31.8%

Missouri 116 3,816,663 4,675,531 2,304,250 60.4% 49.3%

Montana 56 661,320 857,649 468,326 70.8% 54.6%

Nebraska [8] 93 1,141,470 1,411,320 682,741 59.8% 48.4%

Nevada 17 1,840,748 2,193,360 1,021,780 55.5% 46.6%

New Hampshire 

[9] 320 909,067 1,103,239 626,931 69.0% 56.8%

New Jersey [10] 21 5,934,029 6,433,068 2,658,149 44.8% 41.3%

New Mexico 33 1,198,896 1,545,938 709,556 59.2% 45.9%

New York 62 12,125,966 14,109,037 5,886,371 48.5% 41.7%

North Carolina 100 6,488,756 7,808,186 3,789,932 58.4% 48.5%

North Dakota 53 -- 576,588 242,566 -- 42.1%
 

29 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

State

Total EAVS 

Jurisdictions

Total Active 

Registered 

Voters

Total CVAP Total Voter 

Turnout

Turnout as % 

of Active 

Registration

Turnout as % 

of CVAP

Northern 

Mariana Islands 1 19,272 -- 13,376 69.4% --

Ohio 88 8,029,950 8,943,128 4,201,368 52.3% 47.0%

Oklahoma 77 2,021,787 2,903,864 1,153,203 57.0% 39.7%

Oregon 36 2,985,820 3,200,314 1,968,717 65.9% 61.5%

Pennsylvania 67 8,033,385 9,918,163 5,410,022 67.3% 54.5%

Rhode Island 39 722,684 827,415 361,275 50.0% 43.7%

South Carolina 46 3,376,917 3,940,745 1,718,519 50.9% 43.6%

South Dakota 66 599,919 659,768 354,605 59.1% 53.7%

Tennessee 95 4,218,165 5,248,512 1,756,397 41.6% 33.5%

Texas 254 15,847,341 19,375,866 8,151,590 51.4% 42.1%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands [11] 1 39,910 -- 22,557 56.5% --

Utah 29 1,690,442 2,251,328 1,074,344 63.6% 47.7%

Vermont 247 446,098 518,387 286,300 64.2% 55.2%

Virginia 133 5,736,016 6,354,439 3,074,762 53.6% 48.4%

Washington [12] 39 4,805,394 5,529,508 3,067,686 63.8% 55.5%

West Virginia 55 1,055,475 1,408,767 493,581 46.8% 35.0%

Wisconsin [13] 1,851 3,670,188 4,480,576 2,673,154 72.8% 59.7%

Wyoming 23 301,931 436,049 199,513 66.1% 45.8%

U.S. Total 6,460 203,660,564 239,035,960 112,054,124 54.9% 46.8%
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 30 

State

Total In-Person 

Election Day 

Ballots Cast 

and Counted

Total Mail 

Ballots Cast 

and Counted 

(Excluding 

UOCAVA)

Total In-Person 

Ballots Cast 

Before Election 

Day and 

Counted

Total Polling 

Places

Total Poll 

Workers

Alabama [1] 1,373,247 32,577 -- 2,014 5,564

Alaska 167,829 38,889 47,298 555 2,447

American 

Samoa 6,583 15 845 42 225

Arizona [2] 473,550 2,075,970 27,705 767 7,156

Arkansas 378,667 15,949 501,915 1,005 5,200

California 1,059,250 9,743,427 216,732 3,876 35,053

Colorado 93,149 2,406,246 27,022 370 5,367

Connecticut [3] 1,134,493 150,284 -- 718 3,590

Delaware 247,043 19,027 55,639 273 2,884

District of 

Columbia [4] 59,538 130,287 15,438 90 2,025

Florida 2,727,051 2,759,432 2,271,845 4,134 37,099

Georgia 1,420,392 248,487 2,290,459 2,763 18,439

Guam 25,687 163 7,995 21 358

Hawaii 5,789 402,243 10,879 11 44

Idaho 401,184 128,723 65,129 734 4,071

Illinois [5] 1,926,270 568,728 605,992 6,293 28,785

Indiana 1,196,206 154,882 538,699 1,674 13,950

Iowa [6] 859,562 368,907 -- 1,653 7,330

Kansas 577,607 131,633 273,287 1,110 7,653

Kentucky 1,150,303 72,663 269,572 1,540 11,478

Louisiana 1,034,781 102,618 272,260 2,052 15,314

Maine 438,658 171,940 68,458 521 5,170

Maryland 1,046,153 536,285 380,874 1,588 18,311

Massachusetts 1,386,373 922,559 197,288 1,524 9,540

Michigan 2,614,123 1,656,814 223,644 3,287 33,331

Minnesota 1,853,310 339,396 330,809 2,655 31,307

Mississippi [7] 656,874 -- -- 1,765 5,295

Missouri 1,834,916 278,539 184,687 2,281 15,759

Montana -- -- -- 409 3,906

Nebraska [8] 412,213 242,009 21,944 1,072 6,909

Nevada 210,325 518,398 281,760 271 3,698

New Hampshire 

[9] 568,276 56,971 -- 308 --

New Jersey [10] -- 581,955 -- 5,111 12,454

New Mexico 256,438 97,746 353,476 760 2,999

New York 4,250,739 382,926 1,158,391 5,258 65,103

North Carolina 1,578,581 179,280 1,929,870 3,204 23,221

North Dakota 136,304 69,399 36,513 181 1,481

Northern 

Mariana Islands 6,408 -- 6,968 16 32

Ohio 2,654,497 911,517 550,092 3,637 39,888
 

31 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

State

Total In-Person 

Election Day 

Ballots Cast 

and Counted

Total Mail 

Ballots Cast 

and Counted 

(Excluding 

UOCAVA)

Total In-Person 

Ballots Cast 

Before Election 

Day and 

Counted

Total Polling 

Places

Total Poll 

Workers

Oklahoma 949,235 68,697 132,591 1,842 6,258

Oregon -- 1,961,760 -- 36 --

Pennsylvania 4,126,903 1,234,943 -- 9,154 48,340

Rhode Island 254,334 33,556 71,737 383 2,700

South Carolina 1,096,154 54,911 561,597 1,993 12,117

South Dakota 183,663 97,472 72,705 497 2,596

Tennessee 864,965 44,097 844,429 1,925 13,978

Texas 2,590,664 356,987 5,176,910 6,286 35,936

U.S. Virgin 

Islands [11] 9,671 532 11,851 11 225

Utah 56,264 970,274 12,942 116 751

Vermont 91,637 193,618 -- 262 --

Virginia 2,033,530 289,428 711,206 2,535 19,922

Washington [12] -- 3,037,023 3,079 65 --

West Virginia 350,187 12,301 128,799 1,395 7,871

Wisconsin [13] 1,909,173 425,970 332,001 2,541 --

Wyoming 122,114 38,164 38,868 209 2,089

U.S. Total 50,860,863 35,316,617 21,322,200 94,793 645,219

Overview Table 1 Calculation Notes:

Total EAVS Jurisdictions uses a count of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code by state.

Total Active Registered Voters uses question A1b.

Total CVAP uses the 2021 1-year estimate of the CVAP from the U.S. Census Bureau.

Total Voter Turnout uses question F1a.

Turnout as % of Active Registration uses F1a/A1b x 100.

Turnout as % of CVAP uses F1a/CVAP x 100.

Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted uses question F1b.

Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA) uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.

Total In-Person Ballots Cast Before Election Day and Counted uses question F1f.

Total Polling Places uses question D2a.

Total Poll Workers uses question D7a. 

Overview Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation. For example, since there 

was no CVAP estimate for most U.S. territories, their turnout data (F1a) were not used for the 

calculation of “Turnout as % of CVAP” at the national level.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 32 

• The CVAP is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older in the state. 

This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2021 instead 

of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the 

year 2022 was not available by the time this report was finalized. Some states may have 

reported more active registered voters than CVAP because the 2021 CVAP is being compared 

to 2022 data.

• The Total Voter Turnout column includes voters who cast a ballot that was counted.

[1] Data on absentee in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 Election Administration and Voting 

Survey (EAVS), which resulted in a discrepancy in the data reported in question F1.

[2] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1 

of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.

[3] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person.

[4] The District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) sent a ballot to every registered voter for the 

November 2022 general election. Since the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was 

passed to permanently make the District of Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction.

[5] The data reported in the 2022 EAVS was obtained from the individual jurisdictions within the state 

of Illinois. For questions on this numerical information, please contact the jurisdictions themselves or 

the state board of elections for further information.

[6] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are 

reported with mail ballots that are cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the 

actual vote tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration 

system. Not all jurisdictions reported data on poll workers in the 2022 EAVS. 

[7] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi could 

only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and 

mail-in ballots. The information entered into the Statewide Election Management System (SEMS) 

does not distinguish between the two.

[8] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.

[9] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.

[10] Data on in-person Election Day voters and in-person early voters is not recorded separately.

[11] In the U.S. Virgin Islands, absentee ballots are classified as walk in or mail in, but are all counted 

and accepted as regular absentee ballots.

[12] In-person ballots cast consist of county reports of voters who voted in centers with accessible 

voting units. Accessible voting unit ballots are not tracked separately from mail ballots. Washington is 

a vote-by-mail state. Data reported on in-person voters before Election Day consists of county reports 

of voters who voted in voting centers with accessible voting units (AVU). Ballots cast at AVUs are not 

tracked separately from mail ballots.

[13] The number of jurisdictions in Wisconsin changed over the two-year period covered by the 2022 

EAVS due to incorporations, mergers, and similar mechanisms. Wisconsin is not subject to the 

National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and does not have inactive registered voters. The reported 

registration totals include military voters, even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin 

because they still have a voter record created. Wisconsin is not a vote-by-mail state but does allow 

voters to request that an absentee ballot be mailed to them. Poll worker data are no longer tracked 

by the state. Wisconsin canvass-required data tracks individual contests, and therefore, the total 

ballots cast in any election is highly unlikely to match the total votes cast in any one contest. 

Wisconsin voters are not required to vote in each contest on the ballot and undervotes are the likely 

cause of data on the total ballots cast being higher than the number of votes in a contest.
 

33 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

Overview Table 2: Mail Voting in the 2022 General Election

State

Total Mail 

Voters 

(Excluding 

UOCAVA)

% 

Turnout 

by Mail

Total Mail 

Ballots 

Transmitted

Total Mail 

Ballots 

Returned

% Mail 

Ballots 

Returned

Mail Ballots Counted

Total % of 

Returned

Alabama [1] 32,577 2.3% 28,646 24,676 86.1% 24,286 98.4%

Alaska [2] 38,889 14.6% 50,824 41,453 81.6% 40,887 98.6%

American 

Samoa [3] 15 0.2% -- -- -- -- --

Arizona [4] 2,075,970 80.1% 3,272,421 2,099,724 64.2% 2,090,789 99.6%

Arkansas 15,949 1.8% 20,325 16,934 83.3% 15,372 90.8%

California 9,743,427 87.4% 22,491,229 9,986,701 44.4% 9,743,427 97.6%

Colorado 2,406,246 94.7% 3,890,522 2,431,292 62.5% 2,406,246 99.0%

Connecticut [5] 150,284 11.6% 204,840 152,803 74.6% 150,284 98.4%

Delaware [6] 19,027 5.8% 30,725 21,923 71.4% 19,027 86.8%

District of 

Columbia [7] 130,287 63.3% 506,456 132,829 26.2% 130,287 98.1%

Florida 2,759,432 35.4% 4,383,461 2,754,324 62.8% 2,732,621 99.2%

Georgia 248,487 6.3% 280,897 252,272 89.8% 248,487 98.5%

Guam 163 0.5% 327 191 58.4% 163 85.3%

Hawaii 402,243 95.0% 733,360 408,612 55.7% 402,233 98.4%

Idaho [8] 128,723 21.6% 144,960 128,658 88.8% 128,723 100.1%

Illinois 568,728 13.6% 1,302,195 1,013,842 77.9% 583,371 57.5%

Indiana [9] 154,882 8.2% 158,998 157,542 99.1% 154,882 98.3%

Iowa [10] 368,907 30.0% 379,302 369,801 97.5% 368,907 99.8%

Kansas 131,633 13.2% 152,208 130,720 85.9% 126,002 96.4%

Kentucky 72,663 4.8% 83,454 75,120 90.0% 72,663 96.7%

Louisiana [11] 102,618 7.3% 164,156 105,332 64.2% 102,632 97.4%

Maine 171,940 25.3% 181,719 172,990 95.2% 171,940 99.4%

Maryland 536,285 26.4% 647,747 538,558 83.1% 536,285 99.6%

Massachusetts 

[12] 922,559 36.7% 1,114,849 933,946 83.8% 922,559 98.8%

Michigan 1,656,814 36.8% 1,800,770 1,680,955 93.3% 1,656,814 98.6%

Minnesota 339,396 13.4% 450,413 346,772 77.0% 339,396 97.9%

Mississippi [13] -- -- 11,722 -- -- -- --

Missouri 278,539 12.1% 290,428 281,555 96.9% 278,539 98.9%

Montana [14] -- -- 505,618 377,108 74.6% 374,911 99.4%

Nebraska [15] 242,009 35.4% 269,285 243,042 90.3% 242,009 99.6%

Nevada 518,398 50.7% 1,873,813 528,753 28.2% 518,398 98.0%

New Hampshire 

[16] 56,971 9.1% 60,535 58,131 96.0% 56,971 98.0%

New Jersey 581,955 21.9% 947,150 588,258 62.1% 581,955 98.9%

New Mexico 97,746 13.8% 110,577 98,458 89.0% 97,746 99.3%

New York [17] 382,926 6.5% 536,171 392,942 73.3% 382,926 97.5%

North Carolina 179,280 4.7% 248,794 183,243 73.7% 179,280 97.8%

North Dakota 69,399 28.6% 76,019 69,697 91.7% 69,399 99.6%

Northern 

Mariana Islands 

[18]

-- -- 2,046 -- -- -- --
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 34 

State

Total Mail 

Voters 

(Excluding 

UOCAVA)

% 

Turnout 

by Mail

Total Mail 

Ballots 

Transmitted

Total Mail 

Ballots 

Returned

% Mail 

Ballots 

Returned

Mail Ballots Counted

Total % of 

Returned

Ohio 911,517 21.7% 996,093 914,127 91.8% 911,517 99.7%

Oklahoma 68,697 6.0% 92,576 69,956 75.6% 68,697 98.2%

Oregon [19] 1,961,760 99.6% 2,969,563 1,990,727 67.0% 1,968,717 98.9%

Pennsylvania 1,234,943 22.8% 1,433,665 1,258,336 87.8% 1,234,943 98.1%

Rhode Island 

[20] 33,556 9.3% 34,361 33,850 98.5% 33,556 99.1%

South Carolina 54,911 3.2% 61,033 56,605 92.7% 54,787 96.8%

South Dakota 97,472 27.5% 99,905 97,820 97.9% 97,472 99.6%

Tennessee 44,097 2.5% 48,683 44,817 92.1% 44,097 98.4%

Texas 356,987 4.4% 444,150 369,562 83.2% 356,987 96.6%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands [21] 532 2.4% 532 463 87.0% 532 114.9%

Utah 970,274 90.3% 1,703,702 1,004,614 59.0% 997,442 99.3%

Vermont 193,618 67.6% 422,603 193,830 45.9% 193,583 99.9%

Virginia 289,428 9.4% 360,659 292,077 81.0% 289,428 99.1%

Washington [22] 3,037,023 99.0% 4,850,083 3,077,400 63.5% 3,040,297 98.8%

West Virginia

[23] 12,301 2.5% 12,598 10,541 83.7% 10,818 102.6%

Wisconsin [24] 425,970 15.9% 478,260 431,232 90.2% 427,246 99.1%

Wyoming 38,164 19.1% 44,711 38,336 85.7% 38,164 99.6%

U.S. Total 35,316,617 31.9% 61,460,139 36,683,450 59.7% 35,718,700 97.4%
 

35 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

State

Mail Ballots Rejected

Total Drop 

Boxes

Ballots Returned by Drop 

Box Mail Ballots Cured

Total % of 

Returned Total % of Returned Total % of Returned

Alabama [1] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Alaska [2] 566 1.4% 5 -- -- -- --

American 

Samoa [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Arizona [4] 8,935 0.4% 391 289,431 13.8% 3,323 0.2%

Arkansas 1,144 6.8% 6 457 2.7% 851 5.0%

California 243,274 2.4% 2,035 3,592,536 36.0% 48,597 0.5%

Colorado 25,046 1.0% 411 2,111,353 86.8% -- --

Connecticut [5] 2,519 1.6% 214 -- -- -- --

Delaware [6] 2,896 13.2% -- -- -- 12 0.1%

District of 

Columbia [7] 2,542 1.9% 56 74,102 55.8% 982 0.7%

Florida 22,005 0.8% 487 573,013 20.8% 13,556 0.5%

Georgia 3,785 1.5% -- -- -- -- --

Guam 28 14.7% -- -- -- -- --

Hawaii 5,078 1.2% 51 133,389 32.6% 521 0.1%

Idaho [8] 1 0.0% 6 -- -- -- --

Illinois 8,818 0.9% 527 104,168 10.3% 4,598 0.5%

Indiana [9] 2,660 1.7% -- -- -- -- --

Iowa [10] 894 0.2% -- 13,881 3.8% -- --

Kansas 1,382 1.1% 173 34,217 26.2% 7,398 5.7%

Kentucky 2,457 3.3% 163 24,094 32.1% -- --

Louisiana [11] 2,700 2.6% -- -- -- 1,309 1.2%

Maine 1,050 0.6% 366 -- -- -- --

Maryland 2,273 0.4% 282 273,484 50.8% 419 0.1%

Massachusetts 

[12] 11,387 1.2% 500 -- -- -- --

Michigan 24,141 1.4% 1,178 -- -- -- --

Minnesota 7,376 2.1% 37 -- -- -- --

Mississippi [13] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Missouri 3,016 1.1% -- -- -- -- --

Montana [14] 2,197 0.6% -- -- -- -- --

Nebraska [15] 1,033 0.4% 118 152,951 62.9% 702 0.3%

Nevada 10,355 2.0% 511 145,179 27.5% 12,553 2.4%

New Hampshire 

[16] 1,160 2.0% -- -- -- -- --

New Jersey 5,901 1.0% 432 235,606 40.1% 3,640 0.6%

New Mexico 712 0.7% 72 9,059 9.2% 1,082 1.1%

New York [17] 7,240 1.8% -- -- -- 3,367 0.9%

North Carolina 3,963 2.2% -- -- -- 573 0.3%

North Dakota 298 0.4% 64 -- -- -- --

Northern 

Mariana Islands 

[18]

-- -- -- 30 -- -- --

Ohio 2,610 0.3% 102 70,306 7.7% 4,449 0.5%
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 36 

State

Mail Ballots Rejected

Total Drop 

Boxes

Ballots Returned by Drop 

Box Mail Ballots Cured

Total % of 

Returned Total % of Returned Total % of Returned

Oklahoma 1,259 1.8% -- -- -- -- --

Oregon [19] 28,840 1.4% 318 1,135,725 57.1% -- --

Pennsylvania 23,393 1.9% 137 -- -- -- --

Rhode Island 

[20] 294 0.9% 415 12,582 37.2% -- --

South Carolina 1,818 3.2% -- -- -- -- --

South Dakota 356 0.4% 0 0 0.0% -- --

Tennessee 720 1.6% -- -- -- 82 0.2%

Texas 12,575 3.4% -- -- -- 14,889 4.0%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands [21] 0 0.0% -- -- -- -- --

Utah 14,859 1.5% 312 571,551 56.9% 6,555 0.7%

Vermont 247 0.1% -- -- -- 320 0.2%

Virginia 2,649 0.9% 2,992 41,142 14.1% 4,339 1.5%

Washington 

[22] 37,103 1.2% 548 1,871,228 60.8% 35,337 1.1%

West Virginia

[23] 109 1.0% -- -- -- 86 0.8%

Wisconsin [24] 3,986 0.9% -- -- -- -- --

Wyoming 174 0.5% 8 4,169 10.9% -- --

U.S. Total 549,824 1.5% 12,917 11,473,653 39.7% 169,540 0.7%

Overview Table 2 Calculation Notes:

Total Mail Voters (Excluding UOCAVA) uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.

% Turnout by Mail uses (F1d+F1g)/F1a x 100.

Total Mail Ballots Transmitted uses question C1a.

Total Mail Ballots Returned uses question C1b.

% Mail Ballots Returned uses C1b/C1a x 100.

Mail Ballots Counted, Total uses question C8a.

Mail Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses C8a/C1b x 100.

Mail Ballots Rejected, Total uses question C9a.

Mail Ballots Rejected, % of Returned uses C9a/C1b x 100.

Total Drop Boxes uses question C3a.

Ballots Returned by Drop Box, Total uses question C6a.

Ballots Returned by Drop Box, % of Returned uses C6a/C1b x 100.

Mail Ballots Cured, Total uses question C7a.

Mail Ballots Cured, % of Returned uses C7a/C1b x 100. 

Overview Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 

37 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of mail ballots 

counted and rejected may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

• The Total Mail Ballots Transmitted column captures the total number of mailed ballots that 

states reported transmitting, regardless of whether the ballot was returned or not. The number 

of ballots transmitted typically exceeds the number of ballots returned because some voters 

who were transmitted a mailed ballot choose to vote by another mode or to not vote at all. 

Total Mail Ballots Returned typically exceeds Total Mail Voters because some returned mailed 

ballots are rejected for not meeting state requirements. Mail Ballots Counted may not match 

Total Mail Voters because states may have different methodologies for calculating these 

numbers.

• The Total Mail Ballots Returned column includes both counted and rejected ballots that were 

returned to election offices.

[1] Alabama has absentee voting by mail. A voter may pick up a ballot in person and return it via mail or 

receive a ballot in the mail and return it in person. This may cause a discrepancy. Data on absentee 

in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 EAVS, which resulted in a discrepancy in the data 

reported in question F1. The state of Alabama does not track data on the reasons that mail ballots 

are rejected.

[2] Alaska does not track data on the number of ballots returned in person to division office ballot 

boxes. Data reported in Section C of the 2022 EAVS include ballots sent by mail and through 

electronic transmission (online and fax).

[3] American Samoa does not mail ballots locally. If a voter is on the island, they either vote in person 

or at home with the special needs assistance program.

[4] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1 

of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.

[5] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person.

[6] In an October 7, 2022 order, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the Delaware statute 

authorizing vote by mail in the general election violated the Delaware constitution, and therefore, 

voting by mail and using drop boxes was not permitted for the 2022 general election. Absentee 

voting (which, per Delaware law, is provided for prescribed reasons) remained available and was not 

impacted by the Delaware Supreme Court rulings.

[7] The DCBOE sent a ballot to every registered voter for the November 2022 general election. Since 

the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was passed to permanently make the District of 

Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction. Voters were also able to deposit mail ballots in drop boxes 

located in early vote centers and Election Day vote centers. These boxes were also used to deposit 

provisional ballots.

[8] Idaho was not able to track data on mail ballots that were cured or the reasons why mail ballots 

were rejected. One county in Idaho reported counting more mail ballots in C8a than were returned in 

C1b.

[9] The data in C9a was obtained from the statewide voter registration system. The data in C9b was 

pulled from an ad hoc report, and the data in C9c–t was pulled from the CEB-9 Section 2, a county 

election report compiled after each primary, general, and special election. Counties do not always 

track the data requested in C9c–C9t.

[10] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are 

reported with mail ballots cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the actual vote 

tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration system.

[11] Data reported in F1 include voters who were given credit for voting but whose ballots may have 

been blank or otherwise invalid for acceptance.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 38 

[12] Vote by mail was made available to all voters, and applications to vote by mail were mailed to all 

voters as a result of legislation in 2022. This led to a dramatic increase in the number of voters who 

voted by mail in the 2022 general election.

[13] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi 

could only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person 

and mail-in ballots. The information entered into the SEMS does not distinguish between the two.

[14] Data on ballots cast and counted in items F1b–F1f of the 2022 EAVS is properly marked as “Data 

not available” despite being included in previous reports. The state office is now aware that the 

“voter credit” data extract by the voter registration and election management system included in 

previous reports does not accurately reflect the number of ballots counted at the state canvass. For 

example, the report fails to account for various situations, such as if an empty absentee voter 

secrecy envelope is returned without a ballot. Montana’s 2022 submission contains the official 

canvass number as the most accurate number of total ballots counted. As such, Montana does not 

have the data available for the remaining categories. The F1a data for the 2022 EAVS uses the vote 

counts from the Official 2022 General Election State Canvass. Montana does not track data on drop 

boxes and does not track data on ballots cured in a way that can be easily extracted.

[15] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.

[16] All absentee ballots are handled locally, and any absentee ballots cured are not tracked. In-person 

absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.

[17] Although absentee ballots could be dropped off at polling places and/or Boards of Election, drop 

boxes as typically defined were not used.

[18] As of the time of the Northern Mariana Islands’ EAVS submission, the election office was still 

receiving returned mailed ballots through the office mailbox.

[19] Oregon is a vote-by-mail state. All ballots, including provisional and Uniformed and Overseas 

Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots, are considered mail ballots.

[20] Rhode Island allows voters to cure mail ballots, but does not collect data on cured ballots.

[21] In the U.S. Virgin Islands, absentee ballots are classified as walk in or mail in, but are all counted 

and accepted as regular absentee ballots. The reported number of counted mail ballots includes 

walk ins.

[22] Data reported on cured ballots includes ballots cured for non-matching and missing signatures 

only. Data reported on in-person voters before Election Day consists of county reports of voters who 

voted in voting centers with AVUs. Ballots cast at AVUs are not tracked separately from mail ballots.

[23] Two counties in West Virginia reported counting more mail ballots in C8a than were returned in 

C1b.

[24] Due to a recent court challenge, the use of drop boxes “is not permitted under Wisconsin law 

unless the drop box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a properly 

designated alternate site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial 

court, and the subsequent ambiguity created by the decision means that most drop boxes were 

either closed or moved into the clerk’s office, and reporting would be unlikely or unnecessary given 

the added layer of security and placement. (see Teigen v. WEC, 403 Wis.2d 607). Wisconsin does not 

gather data on if or how absentee ballots may have been returned to the clerk with missing data or if 

this missing data were cured.
 

39 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

Overview Table 3: In-Person Voting and Other Modes of Voting

State

In-Person Election Day 

Voters

In-Person Voters Before 

Election Day Provisional Voters

Total % Total % Total %

Alabama [1] 1,373,247 96.4% -- -- 2,796 0.2%

Alaska [2] 167,829 62.8% 47,298 17.7% 7,216 2.7%

American 

Samoa 6,583 88.2% 845 11.3% 0 0.0%

Arizona [3] 473,550 18.3% 27,705 1.1% 8,026 0.3%

Arkansas [4] 378,667 42.2% 501,915 56.0% 1,021 0.1%

California 1,059,250 9.5% 216,732 1.9% 66,887 0.6%

Colorado 93,149 3.7% 27,022 1.1% 54 0.0%

Connecticut [5] 1,134,493 87.4% -- -- 14 0.0%

Delaware 247,043 75.8% 55,639 17.1% 10 0.0%

District of 

Columbia 59,538 28.9% 15,438 7.5% 37 0.0%

Florida 2,727,051 35.0% 2,271,845 29.1% 2,809 0.0%

Georgia 1,420,392 35.8% 2,290,459 57.8% 3,814 0.1%

Guam 25,687 75.4% 7,995 23.5% 150 0.4%

Hawaii 5,789 1.4% 10,879 2.6% 1 0.0%

Idaho 401,184 67.4% 65,129 10.9% -- --

Illinois 1,926,270 46.1% 605,992 14.5% 3,596 0.1%

Indiana 1,196,206 63.2% 538,699 28.5% 1,075 0.1%

Iowa [6] 859,562 69.9% -- -- 273 0.0%

Kansas 577,607 57.9% 273,287 27.4% 13,390 1.3%

Kentucky [7] 1,150,303 76.7% 269,572 18.0% 27 0.0%

Louisiana 1,034,781 73.4% 272,260 19.3% 173 0.0%

Maine [8] 438,658 64.4% 68,458 10.1% 90 0.0%

Maryland 1,046,153 51.6% 380,874 18.8% 60,952 3.0%

Massachusetts 1,386,373 55.2% 197,288 7.9% 889 0.0%

Michigan 2,614,123 58.1% 223,644 5.0% 8 0.0%

Minnesota 1,853,310 73.4% 330,809 13.1% -- --

Mississippi [9] 656,874 92.7% -- -- 5,710 0.8%

Missouri 1,834,916 79.6% 184,687 8.0% 4,182 0.2%

Montana [10] -- -- -- -- -- --

Nebraska [11] 412,213 60.4% 21,944 3.2% 6,027 0.9%

Nevada 210,325 20.6% 281,760 27.6% 7,890 0.8%

New 

Hampshire 

[12]

568,276 90.6% -- -- -- --

New Jersey 

[13] -- -- -- -- 67,894 2.6%

New Mexico 256,438 36.1% 353,476 49.8% 338 0.0%

New York 4,250,739 72.2% 1,158,391 19.7% 71,756 1.2%

North Carolina 

[14] 1,578,581 41.7% 1,929,870 50.9% 11,808 0.3%

North Dakota 136,304 56.2% 36,513 15.1% -- --
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 40 

State

In-Person Election Day 

Voters

In-Person Voters Before 

Election Day Provisional Voters

Total % Total % Total %

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

6,408 47.9% 6,968 52.1% -- --

Ohio 2,654,497 63.2% 550,092 13.1% 79,830 1.9%

Oklahoma 949,235 82.3% 132,591 11.5% 1,126 0.1%

Oregon -- -- -- -- 127 0.0%

Pennsylvania 4,126,903 76.3% -- -- 40,018 0.7%

Rhode Island 254,334 70.4% 71,737 19.9% 1,074 0.3%

South Carolina 1,096,154 63.8% 561,597 32.7% 3,866 0.2%

South Dakota 183,663 51.8% 72,705 20.5% 47 0.0%

Tennessee 864,965 49.2% 844,429 48.1% 969 0.1%

Texas 2,590,664 31.8% 5,176,910 63.5% 13,750 0.2%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands [15] 9,671 42.9% 11,851 52.5% 79 0.4%

Utah 56,264 5.2% 12,942 1.2% 10,680 1.0%

Vermont [16] 91,637 32.0% -- -- -- --

Virginia 2,033,530 66.1% 711,206 23.1% 33,778 1.1%

Washington 

[17] -- -- 3,079 0.1% 19 0.0%

West Virginia 350,187 70.9% 128,799 26.1% 2,141 0.4%

Wisconsin [18] 1,909,173 71.4% 332,001 12.4% 58 0.0%

Wyoming 122,114 61.2% 38,868 19.5% 15 0.0%

U.S. Total 50,860,863 49.0% 21,322,200 22.2% 536,490 0.5%
 

41 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

State

UOCAVA Voters Other Voters

Total % Total %

Alabama [1] 714 0.1% -- --

Alaska [2] 3,817 1.4% 1,998 0.7%

American Samoa 17 0.2% -- --

Arizona [3] 7,121 0.3% 3 0.0%

Arkansas [4] 652 0.1% 182 0.0%

California 31,632 0.3% 28,539 0.3%

Colorado 13,426 0.5% -- --

Connecticut [5] 1,016 0.1% 12,004 0.9%

Delaware 539 0.2% 3,570 1.1%

District of 

Columbia 474 0.2% -- --

Florida 38,638 0.5% 195 0.0%

Georgia -- -- -- --

Guam 79 0.2% -- --

Hawaii 491 0.1% 0 0.0%

Idaho 314 0.1% -- --

Illinois 1,601 0.0% 159 0.0%

Indiana 2,160 0.1% -- --

Iowa [6] 1,401 0.1% -- --

Kansas 1,683 0.2% -- --

Kentucky [7] 838 0.1% 7,016 0.5%

Louisiana 764 0.1% -- --

Maine [8] 1,749 0.3% 14 0.0%

Maryland 4,586 0.2% -- --

Massachusetts 4,351 0.2% -- --

Michigan 5,811 0.1% -- --

Minnesota 3,131 0.1% -- --

Mississippi [9] 211 0.0% 45,790 6.5%

Missouri 1,926 0.1% -- --

Montana [10] -- -- -- --

Nebraska [11] 548 0.1% -- --

Nevada 3,407 0.3% -- --

New Hampshire 

[12] 1,684 0.3% -- --

New Jersey [13] 4,278 0.2% 2,004,022 75.4%

New Mexico 1,558 0.2% -- --

New York 22,560 0.4% -- --

North Carolina 

[14] 8,509 0.2% 81,884 2.2%

North Dakota 350 0.1% -- --

Northern Mariana 

Islands -- -- -- --

Ohio 5,432 0.1% -- --

Oklahoma 1,554 0.1% -- --
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 42 

State

UOCAVA Voters Other Voters

Total % Total %

Oregon 6,830 0.3% -- --

Pennsylvania 8,158 0.2% -- --

Rhode Island 574 0.2% -- --

South Carolina 1,991 0.1% -- --

South Dakota 718 0.2% -- --

Tennessee 1,937 0.1% -- --

Texas 13,279 0.2% -- --

U.S. Virgin Islands 

[15] 0 0.0% 424 1.9%

Utah 1,959 0.2% -- --

Vermont [16] 1,008 0.4% 33 0.0%

Virginia 6,820 0.2% -- --

Washington [17] 27,565 0.9% -- --

West Virginia 482 0.1% -- --

Wisconsin [18] 4,031 0.2% 1,921 0.1%

Wyoming 347 0.2% 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 254,721 0.2% 2,187,754 5.3%

Overview Table 3 Calculation Notes:

In-Person Election Day Voters, Total uses question F1b.

In-Person Election Day Voters, % uses F1b/F1a x 100.

In-Person Voters Before Election Day, Total uses question F1f.

In-Person Voters Before Election Day, % uses F1f/F1a x 100.

Provisional Voters, Total uses question F1e.

Provisional Voters, % uses F1e/F1a x 100.

UOCAVA Voters, Total uses question F1c.

UOCAVA Voters, % uses F1c/F1a x 100.

Other Voters, Total uses question F1h.

Other Voters, % uses F1h/F1a x 100. 

Overview Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Question F1f includes all voters who participated in the election in person prior to Election Day. 

This includes in-person early voting, in-person absentee voting, and any other terminology the 

state used to refer to in-person early voting (as reported in question Q25 of the 2022 Policy 

Survey).

• Question F1h was not mandatory. States only reported data in this item if they offered another 

mode of voting aside from those listed in questions F1b–F1g or if there were counted ballots 

that could not be categorized in questions F1b–F1g.
 

43 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of turnout by mode 

in this table and the previous table may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national 

level.

[1] Data on absentee in-person voting was not tracked for the 2022 EAVS, which resulted in a 

discrepancy in the data reported in question F1.

[2] The “Other Voters” category includes ballots that were sent by electronic transmission (online and 

fax).

[3] Several counties in Arizona were unable to separate data according to the categories in question F1 

of the 2022 EAVS. See the survey comments for further details.

[4] Two counties reported data for other modes of voting.

[5] Data on mail ballots did not distinguish between ballots returned by mail and returned in person. 

Other modes of voting included Election Day registration (EDR) locations.

[6] In-person ballots cast before Election Day and counted are considered absentee ballots and are 

reported with mail ballots cast and counted. Data on votes cast and counted is from the actual vote 

tally on election night, not based on the applied voter credit in the voter registration system.

[7] Other modes of voting were reported as “supplemental.”

[8] The “Other Voters” category includes ballots that were not properly designated as UOCAVA voters.

[9] Because question F1 of EAVS asks about mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots, Mississippi could 

only provide data on the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and 

mail-in ballots. The information entered into the SEMS does not distinguish between the two. Other 

modes of voting included absentee ballots counted.

[10] Data on ballots cast and counted in items F1b–F1f of the 2022 EAVS is properly marked as “Data 

not available” despite being included in previous reports. The state office is now aware that the 

“voter credit” data extract by the voter registration and election management system included in 

previous reports does not accurately reflect the number of ballots counted at the state canvass. For 

example, the report fails to account for various situations, such as if an empty absentee voter 

secrecy envelope is returned without a ballot. Montana’s 2022 submission contains the official 

canvass number as the most accurate number of total ballots counted. As such, Montana does not 

have the data available for the remaining categories. The F1a data for the 2022 EAVS uses the vote 

counts from the Official 2022 General Election State Canvass.

[11] Nineteen counties in Nebraska conduct all-mail elections in some or all precincts.

[12] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter.

[13] Data on in-person Election Day voters and in-person early voters is not recorded separately. Other 

modes of voting included ballots counted from Election Day and early voting locations.

[14] Other modes of voting were described as “Other.”

[15] Other modes of voting included walk-in absentee voters.

[16] Other modes of voting included ballots delivered by a justice of the peace.

[17] The number of in-person voters consists of county reports of voters who voted in voting centers 

with accessible voting units. Accessible voting unit ballots are not tracked separately from mail 

ballots. Washington is a vote-by-mail state.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 44 

[18] In Wisconsin, if a UOCAVA voter is in the local area on Election Day or during in-person absentee 

voting, they may choose to vote through one of those methods instead of an absentee ballot by mail. 

In those cases, the voter is not recorded in the UOCAVA section of the EAVS but instead under the 

sections that apply to voting at the polls or in-person absentee. In Wisconsin, provisional ballot data 

has to be recorded into the database on election night, but any voters who register on Election Day 

are usually not entered until after Election Day; these two records then cannot be linked in the 

state’s voter registration database. Therefore, data in the section about provisional ballots 

specifically will show more provisional ballots counted than the section which shows participations 

received by having a provisional counted. Other modes of voting included voters who voted absentee 

with incomplete data.
 

45 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

Overview Table 4: Polling Places and Poll Workers

State Total Precincts

Total Polling Places Total Poll Workers

Election Day Early Voting Election Day Early Voting

Alabama [1] 2,308 2,014 67 1,749 --

Alaska [2] 401 429 165 2,210 307

American 

Samoa 42 41 1 223 2

Arizona [3] 1,732 717 200 6,960 1,527

Arkansas 2,627 898 177 4,839 2,084

California [4] 25,554 3,876 1,515 33,935 16,760

Colorado 3,260 366 325 -- --

Connecticut 718 169 169 3,590 845

Delaware 512 273 14 2,847 37

District of 

Columbia [5] 144 90 25 940 1,085

Florida 6,063 3,995 430 35,129 10,751

Georgia 2,700 2,430 333 15,248 3,191

Guam 67 21 1 335 23

Hawaii 248 8 11 79 74

Idaho 999 734 32 3,972 127

Illinois 10,835 12,342 3,817 36,017 2,895

Indiana [6] 5,146 1,660 292 12,124 1,826

Iowa [7] 1,657 1,653 99 6,976 535

Kansas 4,015 1,080 196 7,239 1,622

Kentucky 3,546 1,469 186 10,958 1,704

Louisiana [8] 3,937 1,976 109 15,314 --

Maine 533 521 488 5,170 --

Maryland 2,074 1,532 96 17,912 5,547

Massachusetts 

[9] 2,385 1,226 424 9,540 --

Michigan [10] 4,672 3,286 1,544 33,331 --

Minnesota 4,103 2,562 237 29,102 2,205

Mississippi 1,765 1,765 92 5,295 --

Missouri 4,334 2,281 -- 15,759 --

Montana [11] 663 409 58 3,906 --

Nebraska 1,323 998 93 6,742 248

Nevada 1,685 239 82 3,319 1,964

New Hampshire 

[12] 340 308 -- 3,564 --

New Jersey 6,386 3,200 140 12,387 1,042

New Mexico 2,163 760 252 2,806 809

New York [13] 14,158 4,855 403 50,951 15,520

North Carolina 2,656 2,845 359 20,632 7,241

North Dakota 454 166 12 -- --

Northern 

Mariana Islands 7 13 3 32 7
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 46 

State Total Precincts

Total Polling Places Total Poll Workers

Election Day Early Voting Election Day Early Voting

Ohio 8,933 3,637 88 39,888 0

Oklahoma 1,986 1,757 85 6,008 513

Oregon [14] 1,288 36 36 -- --

Pennsylvania 

[15] 9,155 9,154 -- 48,340 --

Rhode Island 

[16] 414 383 39 2,700 90

South Carolina 2,305 1,955 112 13,003 1,122

South Dakota 691 488 68 2,558 155

Tennessee 1,849 1,781 222 13,611 2,448

Texas 9,541 5,627 1,227 30,581 10,781

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 25 11 4 185 40

Utah 2,651 108 54 734 259

Vermont 262 262 247 -- --

Virginia [17] 2,545 2,545 185 19,922 2,169

Washington 

[18] 8,021 -- 65 -- --

West Virginia 1,701 1,326 93 8,043 491

Wisconsin [19] 3,628 2,538 318 -- --

Wyoming 583 196 19 2,053 94

U.S. Total 181,790 95,011 15,309 608,758 98,140
 

47 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

State

Poll Workers’ Ages % of New 

Poll 

Workers % Age 

<18

% Age 

18–25

% Age 

26–40

% Age 

41–60

% Age 

61–70

% Age 

71+

Alabama [1] 0.3% 1.5% 4.8% 23.0% 35.9% 34.5% 0.1%

Alaska [2] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

American 

Samoa 0.0% 48.0% 39.6% 8.4% 4.0% 0.0% 32.4%

Arizona [3] 0.7% 2.5% 6.9% 24.7% 35.1% 30.0% 26.5%

Arkansas 0.3% 1.9% 5.1% 20.2% 36.2% 36.3% 12.0%

California [4] 9.8% 5.5% 13.3% 27.7% 24.3% 19.4% 31.5%

Colorado 1.4% 2.1% 5.5% 22.5% 46.4% 22.1% 40.2%

Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Delaware 1.3% 3.1% 7.1% 27.4% 35.0% 26.0% 36.8%

District of 

Columbia [5] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Florida 0.2% 1.7% 6.3% 26.2% 34.3% 31.2% 13.6%

Georgia -- -- -- -- -- -- 12.2%

Guam 0.0% 28.8% 28.5% 31.3% 9.5% 2.0% --

Hawaii -- -- -- -- -- -- 61.4%

Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 5.5% 3.0% 5.2% 27.1% 33.9% 25.2% 9.3%

Indiana [6] 2.2% 4.7% 10.9% 24.7% 32.6% 24.9% --

Iowa [7] 0.2% 0.8% 5.4% 18.2% 38.1% 37.4% 16.7%

Kansas 2.0% 2.0% 6.0% 20.1% 33.7% 36.1% 14.0%

Kentucky 0.1% 3.7% 10.8% 30.9% 31.5% 23.0% 8.0%

Louisiana [8] -- -- -- -- -- -- 13.0%

Maine 0.9% 1.7% 7.9% 26.0% 36.8% 26.6% --

Maryland 2.6% 2.8% 10.7% 27.9% 35.1% 20.9% 33.0%

Massachusetts 

[9] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Michigan [10] 0.0% 3.3% 8.1% 24.8% 35.0% 28.8% 25.2%

Minnesota -- -- -- -- -- -- 8.5%

Mississippi -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Missouri 2.3% 2.5% 6.8% 17.2% 35.7% 35.5% --

Montana [11] 0.0% 0.7% 4.9% 22.6% 40.0% 31.8% --

Nebraska 0.4% 1.3% 9.3% 25.4% 34.3% 29.3% 12.0%

Nevada 1.3% 3.4% 9.7% 26.6% 31.5% 27.6% 25.8%

New 

Hampshire 

[12]

-- -- -- -- -- -- --

New Jersey -- -- -- -- -- -- --

New Mexico 1.6% 3.6% 6.9% 21.1% 34.9% 31.8% 29.0%

New York [13] 0.1% 7.1% 16.3% 30.3% 25.8% 20.4% 12.9%

North Carolina 1.1% 2.1% 6.6% 26.4% 35.5% 28.2% 16.0%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 48 

State

Poll Workers’ Ages % of New 

Poll 

Workers % Age 

<18

% Age 

18–25

% Age 

26–40

% Age 

41–60

% Age 

61–70

% Age 

71+

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

-- 100.0% -- -- -- -- 31.3%

Ohio 1.4% 2.4% 7.6% 24.7% 35.1% 28.8% 16.9%

Oklahoma 0.0% 0.6% 3.9% 16.0% 34.0% 45.5% 4.2%

Oregon [14] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Pennsylvania 

[15] 1.0% 7.5% 11.6% 29.8% 29.6% 20.4% --

Rhode Island 

[16] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

South Carolina -- -- -- -- -- -- --

South Dakota 0.4% 0.8% 4.8% 22.5% 36.3% 35.2% 8.6%

Tennessee 2.3% 2.1% 5.2% 19.7% 35.7% 35.0% 11.1%

Texas 3.6% 7.0% 10.9% 24.0% 30.4% 24.0% 19.7%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Utah 0.6% 3.8% 16.2% 37.7% 30.6% 11.1% 16.2%

Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Virginia [17] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Washington 

[18] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

West Virginia 0.5% 5.1% 9.2% 29.7% 31.6% 24.0% 6.9%

Wisconsin [19] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Wyoming 1.2% 1.2% 6.1% 23.8% 37.9% 29.8% 11.3%

U.S. Total 1.7% 4.2% 10.2% 26.2% 31.7% 26.1% 16.7%

Overview Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Total Precincts uses question D1a.

Total Polling Places, Election Day uses question D3a.

Total Polling Places, Early Voting uses question D4a.

Total Poll Workers, Election Day uses question D5a.

Total Poll Workers, Early Voting uses question D6a.

Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age <18 uses D7b/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.

Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 18–25 uses D7c/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.

Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 26–40 uses D7d/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.

Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 41–60 uses D7e/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.

Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 61–70 uses D7f/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.

Poll Workers’ Ages, % Age 71+ uses D7g/(sum of D7b–D7g) x 100.

% of New Poll Workers uses D9a/D7a x 100. 

Overview Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 

49 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• The sum of the number of Election Day poll workers (D5a) and the number of early voting poll 

workers (D6a) may not equal the total number of poll workers reported (D7a) because the 

instructions for D7a instructed respondents to count poll workers in D7a only once regardless 

of how many days of voting the poll worker assisted with.

• Because percentages for each age category were calculated independently, the percentages 

for each age category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

• In calculating percentages for poll worker age categories, the sum of questions D7b–D7g was 

used instead of D7a because some states did not report data in all age categories.

• States that only track data for poll workers who are under age 18 do not have data on poll 

worker ages displayed in this table.

[1] Alabama offers absentee in-person voting at absentee offices before Election Day. Provisional 

voting is done at each polling place. Both are considered separate precincts for canvassing results.

[2] Alaska only tracks age data for poll workers who are under 18 years old.

[3] Several counties in Arizona do not track the ages of their poll workers.

[4] Some California counties use vote centers only.

[5] The 90 Election Day vote centers reported include the 25 early vote centers.

[6] Data on poll worker ages is reported in the CEB-9 Section 2.

[7] Satellite polling locations before Election Day are allowed in Iowa by petition, but data are not 

readily available to the state from each county on if or how many satellites were operated. Not all 

jurisdictions reported data on poll workers in the 2022 EAVS. 

[8] The Department of State cannot distinguish between poll workers who worked on Election Day and 

those who worked during early voting. The total in D5a includes both Election Day and early voting 

poll workers. The Department of State does not track data on the ages of poll workers.

[9] Only those who worked at the polls on Election Day are referred to as “poll workers.” The reported 

number of poll workers is only the number of Election Day workers because staff requirements vary 

for early voting. There is no statutory term for individuals who assist with early voting, but they were 

generally referred to as “election workers.” The number of “election workers” varied for each day of 

early voting and was not reported by jurisdictions. Data on poll worker ages were not reported.

[10] Early voting takes place at a clerk’s office or their satellite offices for in-person absentee voting 

only. Ballots are not tabulated until Election Day.

[11] Montana does not collect information on the number of poll workers before Election Day and does 

not track the number of new poll workers.

[12] In-person absentee voting is permitted in the town or city clerk’s office over the counter. The town 

or city clerk’s office is not a polling place. The information provided on the number of poll workers is 

the minimum required. Actual totals vary by location.

[13] Data on poll worker ages reflects only Election Day poll workers. Demographics on early voting poll 

workers were not provided.

[14] Oregon is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional poll workers. Counties may hire 

temporary staff as necessary to conduct an election. The number of temporary staff is not tracked.

[15] The data were gathered via a survey from counties and the total number may not include counties 

who did not submit the data. Poll worker data are not tracked systematically in Pennsylvania.

[16] Rhode Island does not collect data on the ages of poll workers.

[17] Virginia does not track age data for poll workers or data on new poll workers.

[18] Washington is a vote-by-mail state and does not have traditional polling places. Washington has 

voting centers that are open for the entire voting period.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 50 

[19] Physical Election Day polling places cannot be located in election offices. Municipalities may 

provide information about in-person absentee voting locations with the state, but they are not 

required to. Therefore, data cannot be provided for all municipalities. Where these data were 

provided, the data cannot distinguish whether the in-person absentee voting locations are an 

election office or another location. Wisconsin no longer tracks data on poll workers.
 

51 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

Overview Table 5: Election Technology and Voting Methods

State

Total Number 

of Voting 

Machines 

Deployed

DRE without VVPAT DRE with VVPAT

Total Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Total Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Alabama 4,862 -- -- -- --

Alaska 680 -- -- 148 100.0%

American 

Samoa -- -- -- -- --

Arizona 1,746 -- -- -- --

Arkansas 5,327 -- -- 824 25.3%

California 23,150 -- -- -- --

Colorado 1,632 -- -- -- --

Connecticut 2,154 -- -- -- --

Delaware 1,185 -- -- 1,176 100.0%

District of 

Columbia 735 -- -- -- --

Florida 12,731 -- -- -- --

Georgia 24,055 -- -- -- --

Guam 6 -- -- -- --

Hawaii 106 -- -- -- --

Idaho 1,125 -- -- -- --

Illinois 6,806 49 3.7% 661 23.1%

Indiana 12,012 5,016 52.2% 1,443 59.8%

Iowa 1,234 -- -- -- --

Kansas 8,046 -- -- -- --

Kentucky 5,596 159 9.2% 654 29.2%

Louisiana 9,656 9,582 100.0% -- --

Maine [1] 1,065 -- -- -- --

Maryland 6,451 -- -- -- --

Massachusetts 

[2] 4,714 -- -- -- --

Michigan 9,344 -- -- -- --

Minnesota 5,885 -- -- -- --

Mississippi 3,183 1,418 19.5% -- --

Missouri 4,821 -- -- 209 1.7%

Montana 483 -- -- -- --

Nebraska 1,441 -- -- -- --

Nevada 4,610 -- -- 4,479 88.2%

New Hampshire 609 -- -- -- --

New Jersey 11,131 3,143 23.8% -- --

New Mexico [3] 1,461 -- -- -- --

New York 18,895 -- -- -- --

North Carolina 8,566 -- -- -- --

North Dakota 524 -- -- -- --
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 52 

State

Total Number 

of Voting 

Machines 

Deployed

DRE without VVPAT DRE with VVPAT

Total Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Total Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Northern 

Mariana Islands 6 -- -- -- --

Ohio 23,571 -- -- 5,819 13.6%

Oklahoma 2,072 -- -- -- --

Oregon -- -- -- -- --

Pennsylvania 15,608 -- -- -- --

Rhode Island 

[4] 893 -- -- -- --

South Carolina 13,271 -- -- -- --

South Dakota 642 -- -- -- --

Tennessee 8,400 3,499 60.0% 19 1.1%

Texas 49,591 5,725 21.3% -- --

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 117 -- -- -- --

Utah 806 -- -- 610 24.1%

Vermont 522 260 70.9% -- --

Virginia 6,473 -- -- -- --

Washington 185 -- -- -- --

West Virginia 5,438 -- -- 872 29.1%

Wisconsin [5] -- -- -- -- 8.8%

Wyoming 760 -- -- -- 4.3%

U.S. Total 334,382 28,851 6.7% 16,914 5.5%
 

53 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

State

Ballot-Marking Devices Scanners Hand Counting

Total 

Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Total 

Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Total 

Jurisdictions

% of 

Jurisdictions

Alabama 2,044 100.0% 2,818 100.0% 0 --

Alaska 265 100.0% 267 100.0% 1 100.0%

American 

Samoa -- -- -- -- 1 100.0%

Arizona 1,208 100.0% 538 100.0% 0 --

Arkansas 3,582 100.0% 921 100.0% 7 9.3%

California 22,009 100.0% 1,141 100.0% 0 --

Colorado 1,454 100.0% 178 98.4% 1 1.6%

Connecticut 718 100.0% 1,436 100.0% 0 --

Delaware -- -- 9 100.0% 0 --

District of 

Columbia 620 100.0% 115 100.0% 0 --

Florida 5,380 89.6% 7,351 98.5% 0 --

Georgia 21,297 100.0% 2,758 100.0% 0 --

Guam 6 100.0% -- -- 0 --

Hawaii 62 80.0% 44 80.0% 0 --

Idaho 606 88.6% 519 75.0% 11 25.0%

Illinois 3,213 77.8% 2,883 68.5% 0 --

Indiana 5,192 39.1% 361 100.0% 2 2.2%

Iowa -- 100.0% 1,234 100.0% 0 --

Kansas 4,887 100.0% 3,159 92.4% -- --

Kentucky 2,240 70.8% 2,543 95.8% 6 5.0%

Louisiana -- -- 74 100.0% 64 100.0%

Maine [1] 525 99.0% 540 66.4% 163 32.8%

Maryland 3,575 100.0% 2,876 100.0% 0 --

Massachusetts 

[2] 2,385 100.0% 2,329 84.0% 351 100.0%

Michigan 4,672 100.0% 4,672 100.0% 0 --

Minnesota 2,898 100.0% 2,987 100.0% 4 4.6%

Mississippi -- 80.5% 1,765 100.0% 0 --

Missouri 2,291 94.8% 2,321 93.1% 1 0.9%

Montana 361 100.0% 122 82.1% 10 17.9%

Nebraska 1,284 100.0% 157 100.0% 0 --

Nevada 100 11.8% 31 100.0% 0 --

New Hampshire 308 92.8% 301 60.9% 125 39.1%

New Jersey 6,809 100.0% 1,179 100.0% 0 --

New Mexico [3] -- -- 1,461 100.0% 33 100.0%

New York 7,871 100.0% 11,024 100.0% 62 100.0%

North Carolina 5,386 100.0% 3,180 100.0% 0 --

North Dakota 260 100.0% 264 100.0% 0 --

Northern 

Mariana Islands -- -- 6 100.0% 1 100.0%
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 54 

State

Ballot-Marking Devices Scanners Hand Counting

Total 

Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Total 

Machines 

Deployed

% of 

Jurisdictions

Total 

Jurisdictions

% of 

Jurisdictions

Ohio 12,080 77.3% 5,672 100.0% 0 --

Oklahoma -- -- 2,072 100.0% 0 --

Oregon -- -- -- 100.0% 0 --

Pennsylvania 7,795 100.0% 7,813 100.0% 0 --

Rhode Island [4] 414 100.0% 479 100.0% 0 --

South Carolina 10,989 100.0% 2,282 100.0% 0 --

South Dakota 539 100.0% 103 98.5% 31 47.0%

Tennessee 3,552 38.9% 1,330 98.9% 9 9.5%

Texas 37,494 62.6% 6,372 94.1% 14 5.5%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 68 100.0% 49 100.0% 0 --

Utah 112 75.9% 84 96.6% 0 --

Vermont 262 100.0% -- -- 73 29.6%

Virginia 3,061 100.0% 3,412 100.0% 0 --

Washington 108 100.0% 77 100.0% 0 --

West Virginia 3,619 76.4% 947 74.5% 0 --

Wisconsin [5] -- 91.8% -- 90.1% 180 9.7%

Wyoming 432 100.0% 328 91.3% 0 --

U.S. Total 194,033 88.4% 94,584 86.2% 1,150 17.8%

Overview Table 5 Calculation Notes:

Total Number of Voting Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, 

F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3.

DRE without VVPAT, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F5c_1, F5c_2, and F5c_3.

DRE without VVPAT, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” 

to F5a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

DRE with VVPAT, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F6c_1, F6c_2, and F6c_3

DRE with VVPAT, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to 

F6a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

Ballot Marking Devices, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F7c_1, F7c_2, and F7c_3.

Ballot Marking Devices, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded 

“Yes” to F7a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

Scanners, Total Machines Deployed uses the sum of questions F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3.

Scanners, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to 

F8a/number of FIPS by state x 100.

Hand Counting, Total Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to 

F9a.

Hand Counting, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to 

F9a/number of FIPS by state x 100. 
 

55 | Overview of Election Administration and Voting 

Overview Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Although other descriptive tables in this chapter used casewise deletion at the state level in 

calculating percentages, this table did not. When a state reported not using a type of 

equipment, the number of devices of that type was filled with zero to better capture at the 

national level the prevalence of each type of voting technology or counting method in the 2022 

general election.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

[1] Maine reports all data on UOCAVA voting at the statewide level in a separate jurisdiction in the 

EAVS. This UOCAVA-only jurisdiction does not have in-person voters; thus, no ballot marking device 

(BMD) is required.

[2] Ballot marking devices were used for voters with disabilities. Jurisdictions that used scanners hand 

counted any provisional ballots.

[3] Hand counting is possible for counting mail ballots, ballots cast during early voting, and ballots cast 

on Election Day if a tabulator is unable to read a ballot.

[4] In addition to the number of machines reported, there are three machines used for counting all mail 

ballots at a central location.

[5] Wisconsin does not track the number of pieces of voting equipment each municipality has, just 

what type they use. Wisconsin does not allow for direct-recording electronic (DRE) without a voterverifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) for any municipalities.
Overview of Election Administration and Voting | 56 
57 | Election Law and Procedure 

 

Chapter 2. Election Law and Procedure: 

The Policy Survey

Key Findings

The 2022 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) provides information about the 

policy context in which states and territories conducted the 2022 general election. The questions 

in this survey asked states to identify the election laws and procedures that govern voter 

registration, election technology, voter eligibility, modes of voting, and election audits in their 

state. Notable findings from this survey include:

o In 2022, the number of states that provided Election Administration and Voting Survey 

(EAVS) responses at the state level for each EAVS section was generally consistent with 

2020 except for Section F, which saw fewer states reporting at the state level in 2022 

compared to 2020.

o There has not been a significant decrease in the number of states that reported 

conducting all-mail elections for the 2022 general election compared to the 2020 general 

election.

o Forty-three states reported requiring a post-election tabulation audit that verifies that 

election voting equipment properly counts a sample of voted ballots after an election.

o Thirty-nine states reported that drop boxes were used, either statewide or in certain 

jurisdictions, to allow voters to return their voted mail ballots.

o Forty-one states reported allowing voters to cure their voted mail ballots; the most reported 

types of mail ballot errors that voters were allowed to correct were cases where a voter 

signature was missing.

Introduction

Although quantitative data from state1 and local election officials provide an important window 

into how the 2022 general election was conducted, these data must be understood in the context 

of state laws and policies. In 2008, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) introduced a 

component of the EAVS that collects information on state election laws. Since 2018, these data 

have been collected through the Policy Survey,2 which uses closed-ended questions to capture 

states’ broad policies. This report provides an overview and summary of the Policy Survey’s 

findings. Additional information about state responses is available in Appendix A of this chapter. 

The 2022 Policy Survey included updates to some of the 2020 items to better capture state 

policy nuances.

1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 

U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern 

Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey 

and EAVS data.

2 Prior to 2018, the Policy Survey was known as the Statutory Overview and required states to submit text 

descriptions of their election laws and policies.
Election Law and Procedure | 58 

The 2022 Policy Survey collected data on states’ election laws, policies, and practices that would 

be in place for the November 2022 general election. Most states submitted this information 

before the election. The Policy Survey was also used to validate 2022 EAVS data prior to states 

certifying their data as final. The goal of the 2022 Policy Survey was to create comparisons 

between states across broad policy categories and to provide context to understand the EAVS 

data submitted by states. Because of the nature of the closed-ended survey questions, some of 

the nuances in state election policies could not be accounted for. It is important to remember that 

state election laws are nuanced, and this report simplifies them for the purpose of providing an 

overview of election policies that offers important context to understanding the EAVS data. States 

were encouraged to forward additional information and context for their Policy Survey responses 

to allow their data to be interpreted as accurately as possible.

The information that states and territories submitted for the 2022 Policy Survey explained the 

election laws and practices that applied to the federal general election that was conducted on 

November 8, 2022. Some states may have changed some of their policies since that election was 

conducted; the Policy Survey does not collect information about when an election policy change 

occurs or why. In addition, states may have different policies for midterm and presidential 

elections, for primary elections and general elections, or for elections for federal, state, or local

office. Because Puerto Rico did not conduct a federal general election on November 8, 2022, the 

territory was not required to provide a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly 

to that election.

For further information about how the Policy Survey data were collected and used to validate 

EAVS data, please see Chapter 5 of this report.

Responding to the 2022 EAVS

The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to describe who provides the data for questions in each 

section of the EAVS: the state election office, local election offices, or both the state and local 

offices. In total, 25 states provided data for all six sections of the EAVS solely at the state level, 

whereas 31 states relied on local jurisdictions to provide some or all of a state’s EAVS 

submission.3

For Sections B, C, E, and F, roughly half of the states provided responses at the state level, and 

about one-quarter of states reported that responses are provided by local officials for Sections C 

through E.4 For Section A, 59% of states reported providing responses at the state level, and 

46.4% of states reported providing responses at the state level for Section D. Roughly one-quarter 

to one-third of the responses for each section were provided by both state and local officials, 

except for Section E (about one-fifth). In 2022, five fewer states provided EAVS responses at the 

state level for Section F, one more for Section E, and one fewer for Section A compared to 2020 

(see Table 1).

3 Information on how states answer Section A of the EAVS was collected in item Q1_1 of the Policy Survey. 

Information on how states answer Section B of the EAVS was collected in Q1_2. Information on how states 

answer Section C of the EAVS was collected in Q1_3. Information on how states answer Section D of the 

EAVS was collected in Q1_4. Information on how states answer Section E of the EAVS was collected in 

Q1_5. Information on how states answer Section F of the EAVS was collected in Q1_6.

4 A lower proportion of states responded to Section F entirely at the local level, at 14.3%.
 

59 | Election Law and Procedure 

The findings from this question illustrate the complexities that state and local election officials 

face when answering the EAVS. Many states with a large number of jurisdictions reported 

providing EAVS data entirely at the local level. Furthermore, some states reported providing EAVS 

data for some sections at the state level while relying on local officials for other sections.

Table 1. States Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level 

 

Number of States Providing EAVS Responses at the State Level 

EAVS Section 

Number of 

States in 2018 

Number of 

States in 2020 

Number of 

States in 2022 

Section A 31 34 33

Section B 26 28 28

Section C 27 29 29

Section D 23 26 26

Section E 25 28 29

Section F 25 33 28

Source: Information on answering the EAVS was collected in Q1 of the Policy Survey.

In almost all states, no new local jurisdictions have been created or consolidated for the purposes 

of EAVS reporting since the 2020 EAVS was conducted.5 The exceptions are New Hampshire and 

New Jersey, where jurisdictions were both consolidated and created, as well as Vermont and 

Wisconsin, where new local jurisdictions were created.

Policies on Voter Registration and List Maintenance

The primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States is the National Voter 

Registration Act (NVRA), which became effective after the 1994 general election. The NVRA 

expands voter registration opportunities for voters by creating more standardized registration 

processes and by designating more places as voter registration agencies. It also requires that 

states conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove from their lists the 

records of individuals who are no longer eligible to vote; this program is often referred to as “voter 

registration list maintenance.”

Congress also passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, requiring each state to adopt a 

computerized statewide voter registration list. States use these registration lists to determine who 

is eligible to participate in elections. States also face the challenge of keeping these lists up to 

date, as voters commonly move to different jurisdictions or states, die, or become otherwise 

ineligible to vote.6

5 North Carolina detailed some other changes (e.g., one municipality dissolved while others were annexed 

across county lines).

6 North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration. According to the North Dakota 

Office of the Secretary of State, “Precincts in North Dakota maintain a list of voters who have voted in 

previous elections. When a voter approaches a polling place they are asked to provide an acceptable form 

of identification. Then the election board will attempt to locate the voter’s name on the voting list. If the
Election Law and Procedure | 60 

Database Systems

States responded to the HAVA voter registration requirements in different ways. Some states 

adopted a single, central platform at the state level that connects to terminals in local 

jurisdictions. This type of system is typically referred to as a “top-down” voter registration system. 

Other states implemented a state voter registration database that gathers and aggregates 

information from their local jurisdictions’ voter registration databases. This type of system is 

typically referred to as a “bottom-up” system.7 If a system has a mix of top-down and bottom-up 

characteristics, then it is referred to as a “hybrid” system. The specific characteristics of hybrid 

systems vary state by state.

Figure 1. Over Two-Thirds of States Have Top-Down Voter Registration Systems 

 

Source: Information on voter registration database system type was collected in Q3 of the Policy Survey. 

This graph shows the number of states that reported having each type of voter registration database.

voter’s name is on the list, the voter’s name and address are verified and the voter is then allowed to vote.” 

(https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Portals/votereg.pdf). Individuals who wish to vote in North Dakota must meet 

federal and state eligibility requirements.

7 For a bottom-up voter registration system to be considered a statewide system, the state database, the 

data, and the data flow must be defined, maintained, and administered by the state. U.S. Election 

Assistance Commission (2005, July). Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter 

Registration Lists. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/1/Implementing%20

Statewide%20Voter%20Registration%20Lists.pdf.
 

61 | Election Law and Procedure 

The Policy Survey asked states to report the type of voter registration database they have and 

how often information is shared between states and local jurisdictions. Figure 1 shows that over a 

majority of states (72.7%) reported having voter registration databases that function in a topdown manner. Seven states (12.7%, a decrease from 2020) reported having a bottom-up 

registration system that uploads jurisdiction-level information at regular intervals to form the 

statewide voter registration list, and 14.6% of states reported having a hybrid system that 

combines elements of both.8 In practice, these state registration system categories can be fluid. 

Some top-down registration systems may implement features of a bottom-up registration system

and vice versa.

States that reported having either a bottom-up or hybrid system were asked to report how often 

their jurisdictions transmit voter registration information to the statewide database. For these two 

systems, real-time data transmissions were most common (reported in 80% of the states with 

bottom-up or hybrid systems), whereas 33.3% of the states reported that voter registration 

information is transmitted daily.

9

Data Linkages

Election officials must accomplish two primary activities related to voter registration: adding 

individuals to the database who are eligible to vote and maintaining the accuracy of the 

database.

10 A state accomplishes these goals by accessing or “linking” to other databases to 

verify the voter registration information in its database. The NVRA and HAVA outline steps that 

states are required to take to keep voter registration information current and to remove ineligible 

voters and duplicate registrations from the voter lists. This task requires comparing voter lists to

records in other databases to prevent duplicate registration records and to avoid adding 

individuals who are ineligible to register.11

HAVA requires the chief election official in each state to attempt to verify the information for firsttime voter registration applications against driver’s license numbers in that state’s motor vehicle 

licensing agency’s database or against the Social Security Administration’s database of social 

security numbers. If no match is found, election officials in most states attempt to contact the 

applicant for additional information, but they manage this process in various ways. HAVA requires 

that applicants who cannot be matched against one of these databases be allowed to vote on 

Election Day, provided they present appropriate identification.12

The Policy Survey asks state election offices how they share information electronically with other 

state and federal government entities.13 These linkages are illustrated in Figure 2. Most states 

reported that they link their voter registration data with the agency that handles their state’s 

driver’s licenses (91.1%) and with entities that maintain the death records (73.2%). The other 

most commonly reported linkages were with entities that maintain felony or prison records, such 

8 Information on the type of voter registration system that states use was collected in item Q3 of the Policy 

Survey.

9 Texas noted that most jurisdictions transmit information in real time, but larger jurisdictions transmit 

overnight.

10 National Research Council. 2010. Improving State Voter Registration Databases: Final Report. 

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/12788

11 Ibid.

12 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

13 Although North Dakota does not have voter registration, the state does share information electronically 

with other government entities and is included in these analyses.
Election Law and Procedure | 62 

as state courts and parole agencies (64.3%). States that reported linking with the agency that 

handles driver’s licenses most often reported transferring voter registration data daily (64.7%), 

followed by in real time (17.7%) and by some other measure of time that is neither weekly nor 

monthly (7.8%). Of the states that reported linking with entities that maintain death records, the 

most common type of data transfer was monthly (56.1%), followed by weekly and other (17.1%). 

States that reported linking registration data with entities that maintain felony records most often 

reported transferring data monthly (44.4%).%).14

Less commonly reported linkages included with entities that maintain records of individuals who 

are declared mentally incompetent, state public assistance agencies, agencies for people with 

disabilities, other state agencies that are not required by the NVRA, federal agencies, and military 

recruiting offices.

Figure 2. States Most Commonly Link Voter Registration Databases with 

Government Agencies That Maintain Driver’s Licenses and Death Records 

 

Source: Information on the entities that are linked to state voter registration databases was collected in Q4

of the Policy Survey. This graph shows the number of states that reported linking their voter registration 

databases with the specified government agency.

14 Information on which entities states link their voter registration databases with and how often data 

transfers occur was collected in item Q4 of the Policy Survey.
 

63 | Election Law and Procedure 

Automatic and Automated Voter Registration

Beginning in 2016, states started implementing laws allowing for automatic voter registration. 

Automatic voter registration is a process by which eligible voters are automatically registered to 

vote when they interact with a government agency (e.g., a state motor vehicles agency) with an 

option to opt out. Another process available in some states is registration with automated 

features, which requires the individual to make a choice or affirmative decision to register to vote 

during their interaction with a government agency, rather than deciding to opt out of registration.

In 2022, about two-thirds of states reported some method of registering to vote via an automated 

process, whether online or in person, during a transaction with a state government agency.15

Commonly reported examples of these automated processes were processes where the option to 

register to vote is preselected and a person needs to deselect it during the transaction to opt out 

of registering to vote (39.3%) and those that authorize the potential registrant to opt in or choose 

to register, such as when an individual cannot proceed with a transaction without selecting 

whether or not they wish to be registered to vote (35.7%).

All states that have some kind of automatic or automated voter registration process linked to a 

state agency transaction reported that their state motor vehicles agency participates in this 

program, and about one-third of the states indicated that public assistance agencies also 

participate. Less common program participants included agencies for people with disabilities, 

those specifically designated by the state’s chief election official or governor, and others.

16, 17

Pre-Registration

In the 2022 Policy Survey, most states (94.6%) reported allowing individuals under the age of 18 

to pre-register to vote and become automatically registered once they turn 18 years old.18 Twentysix states that had a pre-registration program reported that they allow individuals to pre-register 

at age 17, whereas 20 states reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 16. Six states 

reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 17 and a half.19 Some states have additional 

rules that apply to pre-registrations; for example, states like Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, 

and the Northern Mariana Islands allow a person to register to vote before the age of 18 as long 

as they will be 18 at the time of the next general election.

Most pre-registration applications are processed immediately, although the individual cannot vote 

before they turn 18 years old. In Minnesota and South Dakota, the pre-registration application is 

held and is not processed until the individual turns 18. Several states specified additional 

procedures for processing pre-registrations. For example, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Vermont, 

and West Virginia process pre-registration applications upon receipt, and the individual may vote 

in a primary election if they will be 18 years old by the date of the next general election. Kansas 

15 Information on automatic and automated voter registration was collected in item Q5 of the Policy Survey.

16 Information on which state agencies participate in automatic voter registration was collected in item Q5a 

of the Policy Survey.

17 States specified other agencies: the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend; the Colorado Department of 

Health Care Policy and Financing; the Delaware Department of Labor Division of Vocational Rehabilitation; 

Florida offices that issue driver’s licenses or state ID cards in coordination with the Florida Department of 

Motor Vehicles; the Illinois Department of Natural Resources; and other state agencies as designated by 

Maryland legislation.

18 Information on whether states allow individuals to preregister before they are 18 years old and become 

automatically registered to vote once they turn 18 was collected in item Q9 of the Policy Survey.

19 Puerto Rico reported that an individual may pre-register to vote at age 14.
Election Law and Procedure | 64 

processes the pre-registration application and places a pending status on it until the day the 

individual turns 18 years old, after which they are automatically added to the list of registered 

voters; a similar process is done in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.20

State Election Office Websites

The 2022 Policy Survey also asked states which voter information search tools and other tools 

are available on each state’s election office website. Nearly every state indicated that voters 

could check their registration status and check their polling site location on the state election 

office website. Most states reported having tools that track ballot status, including the Uniformed 

and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots (89.3%), mail ballots (85.7%), and 

provisional ballots (53.6%), and that check voter-specific ballot information (80.4%). Additionally, 

most states reported that their website allows voters to request a mail or absentee ballot (58.9%), 

and nine states reported some other functionality available on their state’s election office website 

that was not listed in the survey.21

Figure 3. About Three-Quarters of States Offer Both Registration and 

Registration Updates Through a Web-Based Online System 

 

Source: Information on online registration policy was collected in items Q6 and Q6a of the Policy Survey.

20 Information on whether a preregistration application is processed immediately or held until a certain date 

was collected in item Q9a of the Policy Survey.

21 Information on state election office website lookup tools was collected in item Q7 of the Policy Survey.
 

65 | Election Law and Procedure 

Online Voter Registration

Arizona became the first state to adopt online voter registration in 2002, and by 2016, the 

number of states that offered online voter registration jumped to 32.22 Now, most states have a 

public-facing, web-based online system that interfaces with the state voter registration system. 

About three-quarters of states reported that through this system, voters can both register to vote 

and update their registration, whereas a smaller number of states (5.4%) reported that 

individuals can only use this online system to update their registration (see Figure 3). In most 

states (79.6%), a person needs to have a driver’s license or other state-issued identification to 

register to vote or update a voter registration in this system.23

Same-Day Registration

Instead of requiring voters to register prior to an election, some states allow individuals to register 

to vote and to cast a ballot on the same day. Almost half of the states reported allowing 

individuals to register on the same day that they cast a ballot in person or request a mail ballot 

(see Figure 4). This process is known as same-day registration (SDR).

24 Among states with SDR, 

about 85% reported having both SDR on Election Day and SDR during in-person early voting.25

Fourteen states reported having SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the 

close of voter registration. Two states reported specific cases in which a voter may register on the 

same day that they cast a ballot: in North Carolina, an individual who has become eligible to vote 

between the close of books26 and Election Day—either by being naturalized as a citizen or having 

citizenship rights restored after conviction of a felony—may be a same-day registrant; in 

Wisconsin, individuals who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an 

appointed agent on the same day from the Tuesday prior to Election Day up through 5:00 p.m. on 

Election Day.

 

22 ”EAVS Deep Dive: Registering to Vote, “U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, September 20). 

https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/09/20/eavs-deep-dive-registering-to-vote.

23 Information on states’ online voter registration policies was collected in item Q6 of the Policy Survey. 

Information on whether a driver’s license or state-issued ID card is needed to register to vote online was 

collected in item Q6a of the Policy Survey.

24 The timeline does not include an overlap between the mail balloting period and the close of voter 

registration.

25 Eighteen states reporting having SDR on Election Day and during in-person early voting. Two states 

(Connecticut and New Hampshire) reported having SDR only on Election Day and two states (American 

Samoa and North Carolina) reported having SDR only during in-person early voting. Information on state 

SDR policies was collected in item Q8 of the Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances of SDR was 

collected in item Q8a of the Policy Survey.

26 North Carolina did not provide clarification on what was meant by “close of books.”
Election Law and Procedure | 66 

Figure 4. Almost Half of States Offer Some Form of Same-Day Registration 

 

Source: Information on SDR policy was collected in items Q8 and Q8a of the Policy Survey. “ED” stands for 

“Election Day.” “Other Cases” includes instances in which states may allow for SDR during in-person early 

voting only, during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, and other 

specific cases.

List Maintenance

The NVRA establishes a process for states to keep their voter registration lists accurate by adding 

newly registered voters, updating voter records, and removing ineligible voters. Under this law, a 

registrant can be removed from a state’s list under the following circumstances:

o Upon the death of the registrant;

o Upon the registrant’s written confirmation that their address has changed to a location 

outside of the registrar’s jurisdiction;

o On the request of the registrant;

o For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;

o On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or

o On the registrant’s failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to 

appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.27

Under the process established by the NVRA, when a registrant appears to have moved outside of 

their jurisdiction, the state must follow a specific process to verify that the individual is no longer 

27 52 U.S.C. § 20507.
 

67 | Election Law and Procedure 

eligible to vote. An address confirmation procedure must be followed before removing the voter 

from the registration list. Chapter 3 of this report includes more detail about the list maintenance 

process as outlined in the NVRA.

Table 2. Examples of State Definitions of Active and Inactive Voters 

 

State Description of Active and Inactive Voters 

Alaska

Active voter: qualified registered voter;

Inactive voter: those who are not eligible to vote in an election or those 

who may be eligible to vote a provisional ballot in an election but whose 

registration was inactivated during Alaska's list maintenance process

California

Active voter: a registered voter who meets California voter registration 

eligibility requirements, who is legally entitled to vote pursuant to state 

law, and who is not currently deemed an “inactive voter” or a 

“canceled voter;”

Inactive voter: a registered voter whose status has been changed to 

“inactive” in accordance with California law; an inactive voter is legally 

entitled to vote pursuant to California law

Maryland 28

Active voter: a voter who is registered to vote in Maryland and is not in 

“pending” or “inactive” status under the provisions of the National Voter 

Registration Act of 1993;

Inactive voter: a voter who is registered to vote in Maryland but has not 

responded to a confirmation notice

Oregon

Active voter: has supplied the information legally required to register to 

vote and the county clerk has not received evidence of a change in the 

information the voter used to register to vote;

Inactive voter: the county clerk receives evidence of a change in the 

information the voter used to register to vote and who has been mailed 

a voter confirmation card

Utah

Active voter: a registered voter who has not been classified as an 

inactive voter by the county clerk (i.e., someone who has fulfilled the 

residency requirements and has turned in a complete voter registration 

form);

Inactive voter: a voter who has all the privileges of an active voter, but

the county clerk's office is unclear whether the voter still maintains a 

residency at an address

Source: Information on state definitions of “active” and “inactive” voters was collected in item Q10a of the 

Policy Survey.

28 While this term is not defined in Maryland state statute, §3-503 of the Election Law Article, Annotated 

Code of Maryland, specifies when a voter is placed into inactive status, how a voter is restored to active 

status, and when a voter is removed from the voter registration list.
Election Law and Procedure | 68 

The 2022 Policy Survey asked states whether they differentiate between active and inactive 

voters in their voter registration records. Active voters are individuals who require no additional 

processing before they can vote, whereas inactive voters will require address verification before 

being permitted to vote. Fifty states, including three territories and the District of Columbia, 

indicated that they differentiate between the two types of voters, although according to state 

comments, the definitions for an active and inactive voter vary widely.29 American Samoa, Guam, 

Idaho, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming reported not distinguishing between active 

and inactive voters. Twenty states reported specific terminology, qualifications, and/or conditions 

for active and inactive voters (see Table 2). According to the NVRA, voters marked as inactive may 

be restored to the active voter list if they vote in one of the two federal general elections following 

their inactive designation or take other action to confirm to the election office that they continue 

to be a valid registered voter. If a voter does not cast a ballot in either of the two federal general 

elections following their inactive designation, the voter may be removed from their state’s voter 

registration roll.

Thirty-five states indicated that only local officials are responsible for modifying or removing voter 

registration records, and 13 states reported that modifying voter registration records is done by 

both state and local officials.30, 31 Alaska, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Delaware, 

Guam, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and the U.S. Virgin Islands all indicated that they only modify 

or remove records at the state level.

32 Table 3 illustrates the data sources states use to identify 

potentially ineligible voters. Across states, the most common data sources were the state vital 

statistics office, reports from other states indicating a former resident registered to vote, a voter 

request for removal, entities that maintain prison records, and any mail (not including ballots) 

sent from an election office that was returned as undeliverable.33

 

29 Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q10 

of the Policy Survey. Information on whether states use the EAC’s definition of active and inactive voters 

was collected in item Q10a of the Policy Survey.

30 North Dakota does not have voter registration and was not included in these counts.

31 In Georgia and Texas, all modifications are done by local officials except for deceased voters that have 

been systematically removed from the state voter registration system; in Maryland and North Carolina, local 

officials process voter registration record updates and the state assists as needed; in Maine, although only 

local officials modify voter registration records, state officials may conduct statewide list maintenance 

activities that designate certain records as inactive based on response or lack of response to the NVRA list 

maintenance mailing; in Michigan, both local clerks and state staff modify and correct voter registration 

information; in New Mexico, local officials are responsible for all but those voters who are part of the state’s 

confidential address program, whose records are maintained by the Secretary of State; similarly, in 

Oklahoma, most records are handled at the local level but the state manages registrations for participants 

in the address confidentiality program as well as list maintenance for address confirmation deletions; in 

Wisconsin, local officials are responsible for all records except for when a voter does not respond to a 4-

year state list maintenance confirmation notice and for when the state receives information from another 

state voter registration authority or through the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) that a 

voter has registered there.

32 Information on who is responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records was collected in 

item Q11 of the Policy Survey.

33 Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item Q13 of 

the Policy Survey.
69 | Election Law and Procedure

Table 3. States Most Often Use State Vital Statistics Office and Reports from 

Other States to Identify Ineligible Voters 

Source of Data on Potentially Ineligible Voters 

Percentage of States That 

Report Using Data from the 

Data Source 

State vital statistics office death records 96.4%

Reports or notices from other states that a former resident has 

registered to vote 92.9%

Entities that maintain felony or prison records (e.g., state 

courts, state police, federal courts, pardons or paroles 

agencies)

83.9%

Other mail from the election office (not ballots) that is returned 

as undeliverable 83.9%

Requests from voters for removal from the voter registration 

roll 83.9%

Newspaper death notices or obituaries 73.2%

Mail ballots that are returned as undeliverable 67.9%

National Change of Address (NCOA) reports 67.9%

Motor vehicles agencies (e.g., DMV) 60.7%

Social Security Administration (SSA) death records 60.7%

Data from an interstate data-sharing compact (e.g., the 

Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC]) 55.4%

Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally 

incompetent 48.2%

Applications for mail ballots 26.8%

Jury questionnaires 26.8%

Returned jury summons 19.6%

State public assistance agencies 17.9%

State agencies that serve individuals with disabilities 16.1%

Canvassing (door-to-door verification) 7.1%

Other (e.g., military recruitment offices) 7.1%

State agencies that are not specified in NVRA 3.6%

State tax filings 1.8%

Source: Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item 

Q13 of the Policy Survey.

Fifty-three states reported sending confirmation notices to voters to help identify individuals who 

may be ineligible to vote in that jurisdiction, but the reasons for sending confirmation notices 

differ by state. Of the states that send confirmation notices, 43 (76.8%) reported sending 

confirmation notices pursuant to Section 8 (d) (1) (B) and Section 8 (d) (2) of the NVRA, 37 states 

(66.1%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a state statute, and eight states 
Election Law and Procedure | 70 

(14.3%) reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a formal administrative rule or 

guidance. Three states reported that they do not send confirmation notices.34

States most commonly reported sending confirmation notices to voters whose mail from an 

election office was returned as undeliverable (86.8%), to voters whose addresses may have 

changed (79.3%), to voters who have not voted in a specified number of consecutive general 

elections (45.3%),%),35 and to voters who have been convicted of a disqualifying felony 

(37.7%).%). Less than one-third of states reported sending confirmation notices to voters who 

have surrendered their driver’s license to obtain a new license in a different state, for not having 

contacted the state election division for a specified number of years, for having requested 

removal from the voter registration list, and for having been incarcerated.

Six states (11.3%) reported that all registered voters routinely receive a non-forwardable notice 

during a specified increment of time; this time frame ranges from 1 to 4 years. Thirteen states 

reported sending confirmation notices for some other reason.36 For example, some states or 

certain jurisdictions within states indicated that they routinely send confirmation notices as part 

of their specific list maintenance procedures. Delaware, which is a member of ERIC, sends 

confirmation notices to individuals who have been identified as having potentially moved via ERIC 

reports. Washington, a state in which nearly all voters cast their ballots by mail, reported that the 

mailing information provided by a returned or forwarded ballot serves as the start of the 

confirmation process.

Criminal Convictions and Voting

The NVRA allows states to remove voters from their registration lists if the registered voter 

receives a disqualifying criminal conviction or is incarcerated. The Policy Survey asks four 

questions about removing voters from registration lists due to disqualifying criminal convictions 

and/or incarcerations and about the restoration of voting rights:

o Which populations have their voting eligibility suspended due to a criminal conviction or 

incarceration?

o For how long does a person with a criminal conviction lose their right to vote?

o What happens to the removed individual’s registration record in the state’s voter 

registration database?

o How can a person whose voting rights have been affected by a conviction or incarceration 

become an eligible voter again?

The District of Columbia, Maine, Puerto Rico, and Vermont reported in the 2022 Policy Survey

that they do not limit a person’s right to vote based on a criminal conviction or incarceration. Most 

states (60.7%) reported that the conviction of any felony will limit a person’s right to vote, 

whereas five states indicated that they limit the voting rights of individuals convicted only of 

certain felonies. Six states reported that they limit the voting rights of individuals who are 

34 Information on whether and how states send confirmation notices to help identify ineligible voters was 

collected in item Q12 of the Policy Survey.

35 Most states specified either one or two consecutive federal general elections, with the exception of South 

Dakota, which specified four.

36 Information on which voters states send confirmation notices to was collected in item Q12a of the

Policy Survey.
 

71 | Election Law and Procedure 

convicted of other crimes that are not felonies (e.g., election-related crimes). Additionally, 21 

states limit the right to vote for individuals who are incarcerated.37

There is variation in the disqualification time periods and in the processes for restoring voting 

rights. Of the states that limit voting rights for these reasons, most reported revoking the right to 

vote during the period of incarceration (73.1%) followed by any period of probation and parole

(40.4%). Some states reported revoking voting rights until the payment of outstanding fines, 

restitution, or penalties (19.2%), and/or during an additional length of time (9.6%) such as a 

statutorily mandated waiting period.38

The EAVS asked states to report the number of voters removed from registration rolls due to 

disqualifying felony convictions between the close of registration for the November 2020 general 

election and the close of registration for the November 2022 general election. To provide context 

for this EAVS item, the 2022 Policy Survey asked what happens to registration records when the 

voting rights of a person in one of the populations specified above are affected. Over a third of 

states reported that the registration record becomes inactive, which prevents the person from 

voting. One-fifth of states reported that the registration record is removed from the database, and 

some (9.1%) reported that a hold or suspension is placed on the record, which also prevents the 

person from voting. Sixteen states specified some other process;39 10 of these states reported 

that the voter registration record is placed in “cancelled,” “removed,” or “rejected” status, and 

differ on the follow-up procedures. Michigan noted that if a person is incarcerated but has not yet 

been sentenced, then they are still able to vote.40

The Policy Survey also asks states to indicate how disenfranchised individuals can become 

eligible voters again after they are permitted to under state law. Missouri and Rhode Island 

reported automatically restoring the previous voter registration of individuals with convictions

and/or incarcerations once the period of disenfranchisement has passed, requiring no further 

action by the voter. Of the states that indicated requiring some type of action, 71.2% reported 

that a person is immediately eligible to vote and must re-register through the same process as the 

general public. Some states reported having other conditions, such as presenting documentation 

during the registration process that shows that the person has completed the voter registration 

requirements (17.3%) and having voting rights restored through a formal administrative process 

(17.3%). Eight states provided survey comments that further explained their policies.41 In 

Louisiana, for example, if a person is under an order of imprisonment for a felony conviction but 

“has not been incarcerated pursuant to the order within the last five years,” then that person is 

eligible to register. Iowa reported that the current process allows automatic restoration for most 

convictions that affect registrations, except for a specific class of homicide crimes that require an 

37 Information on state policies for suspending or revoking voting rights due to criminal convictions was 

collected in item Q38 of the Policy Survey. This item does not distinguish a felony conviction from the 

subsequent period of incarceration.

38 Information on the length of time a disqualifying felony conviction will restrict voting rights was collected 

in item Q38a of the Policy Survey.

39 North Dakota does not have voter registration and is not included in these counts.

40 Information on what happens to the registration records of populations whose voting rights are affected 

due to criminal conviction and/or incarceration was collected in item Q38b of the Policy Survey.

41 Information on state policies for restoring voting rights to individuals with disqualifying felony convictions 

was collected in item Q38c of the Policy Survey.
Election Law and Procedure | 72 

application to the governor for registration. Maryland indicated that individuals convicted of 

buying or selling votes are not eligible to register to vote again in the state.

Voting by Mail

All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer at least some of their citizens the 

opportunity to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections.42 Some states use the term 

“absentee voting” to refer to mail voting. The 2022 Policy Survey demonstrates that there were 

wide variations among the states regarding which voters are eligible to vote by mail, what 

documentation voters must provide to receive a mail ballot, how mail ballots may be returned to 

election officials, and the deadlines for mail ballots to be postmarked and received by election 

offices in order to be counted for the 2022 general election.

In 2022, 38 states reported that they do not require voters to provide a reason for requesting a 

mail ballot and for why they cannot vote in person on Election Day. Conversely, about one-third of 

states reported requiring voters to provide an excuse.

43 Twenty-three states reported that voters 

can request to be on a permanent absentee list from which they will automatically receive ballots 

for all future elections. Either any registrant can request to be a permanent absentee voter 

(16.4% of all states) or only individuals who meet specific criteria can request to be a permanent 

absentee voter (25.5% of all states).44

Some states have special criteria for individuals who request permanent absentee status.45

Among these states, the most common requirement was that the requester must have a disability 

(85.7%); Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin reported that they will 

also grant permanent absentee status to those who are infirm, have a permanent illness, or can 

provide a note from a medical professional. West Virginia indicated allowing address 

confidentiality program participants to be permanent absentee voters, and Louisiana indicated 

requiring individuals to be over a specified age. Despite conducting all-mail elections, Oregon 

uses the term “absentee voter” for individuals who may be away from their residences when 

ballots are transmitted.

With the 2020 election’s overall shift toward mail voting, the number of states that conducted allmail elections, in which all registered voters or all active registered voters are automatically sent a 

mail ballot, doubled between the 2018 and 2020 Policy Surveys. These numbers have stayed 

fairly consistent into 2022. As shown in Figure 5, twelve states have some type of vote-by-mail 

system; three states reported having some vote-by-mail jurisdictions, and nine states reported

having statewide vote-by-mail systems.46

42 Some states use the term “in-person absentee voting” to refer to the process by which a voter visits an 

election office to request a mail ballot, completes the ballot, and returns the ballot in one trip. However, 

EAVS considers this to be a form of in-person early voting and asks states to report their data as such.

43 Information on whether states require an excuse for mail voting was collected in item Q16 of the Policy 

Survey.

44 Information on whether states have permanent absentee voting was collected in item Q18 of the Policy 

Survey.

45 Information on who can become a permanent absentee voter was collected in item Q18a of the Policy 

Survey.

46 Information on which states have an all-mail or all-vote-by-mail system was collected in item Q17 of the 

2022 Policy Survey, item Q18 of the 2020 Policy Survey, and item Q9 of the 2018 Policy Survey.
 

73 | Election Law and Procedure 

Figure 5. Number of States Offering All-Mail Elections in 2022 Consistent with 2020 

 

Source: Information on the policy of all-mail elections was collected in items Q17 and Q17a of the 2022 

Policy Survey.

The Policy Survey also collected data on the circumstances under which voters could receive 

ballots through electronic means. Voters who are members of the uniformed services or who are 

overseas citizens who wish to receive ballots electronically are covered under UOCAVA, so this 

question applies specifically to non-UOCAVA voters. About one-third of states reported that 

domestic civilian voters cannot receive electronic ballots under any circumstances. States that do 

allow non-UOCAVA voters residing in the United States to receive their ballots through an 

electronic format do so via methods such as email, fax, an online voter registration portal, or a 

mobile phone app. Alaska, California,47 Guam, Maryland, South Dakota, and Washington reported 

that voters may receive a ballot electronically for any circumstance. Other states reported having 

special circumstances.48 For example, 27 states indicated allowing voters with disabilities to 

Information on whether the state’s all-vote-by-mail system is used only in certain jurisdictions or is 

statewide was collected in item Q17a of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q18a in the 2020 Policy Survey, and 

item Q9a of the 2018 Policy Survey. In most cases, some limited in-person voting occurs when a state or 

jurisdiction conducts an election entirely by mail.

47 California allows any voter to cast a ballot using a certified remote-accessible vote-by-mail system, 

regardless of whether the individual is a voter with disabilities or a military or overseas voter.

48 Information on the circumstances under which voters may receive their ballots electronically was 

collected in item Q24 of the Policy Survey.
Election Law and Procedure | 74 

receive ballots electronically, including 11 states where voters must have specific disabilities and 

16 states where voters with any disability may do so.

49

Six states reported that they allow electronic ballot transmission during emergency situations that 

hinder in-person voting, such as a natural disaster. Nine states reported that they allowed 

electronic transmission for other reasons. For example, Nebraska extended requirements to 

emergency responders, Hawaii allows for the receipt of ballots through an electronic format when 

a replacement ballot is needed and is requested within five days of the election, and in the U.S. 

Virgin Islands, voters may receive an electronic ballot if they did not receive an absentee ballot up 

to two days before the election.

In states where voters with a disability may receive their ballots electronically, the process 

whereby the voter may access a ballot online, mark it privately and independently, and then 

return it to election officials is known as accessible absentee voting in 10 states and remote 

ballot marking in five states. Twelve states reported using specific terminology, such as 

accessible vote by mail, accessible ballot delivery, electronic absentee, and others. Just over 

three-quarters of these states allow voters with a disability to access their electronic ballot 

through an online portal, while 40.7% allow access through email.50 Indiana and Louisiana 

specified that delivery may be via fax. Michigan and Pennsylvania voters with disabilities may 

receive their ballot via email and receive either a link to a secure online portal, as in the case of 

Michigan,51 or receive an access code for the ballot, as in the case of Pennsylvania. Most states 

(88.9%) that have some form of remotely accessible absentee voting process for voters with 

disabilities do not require a witness to be present while a voter marks their ballot in this process.

Mail Ballot Tracking and Deadlines

States reported on their deadlines for mail ballots from non-military voters residing in the United 

States. Ballot deadlines for voters covered by UOCAVA were reported in separate questions, as 

UOCAVA ballot deadlines are typically different from those for other mail ballots. The postmark 

deadline is Election Day for just over one-third (35.7%) of states, which is somewhat lower than in 

2020;

52 Connecticut, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah reported having a postmark deadline one day 

before Election Day. In 56.4% of states, mail ballots must be received by Election Day, and in 

41.8% of states, mail ballots must be received by a specified number of calendar days or 

business days after Election Day.

53 Louisiana reported that mail ballots must be received by one 

day before Election Day.

States vary in what satisfies postmark requirements for mail ballots. In states that require 

postmarks, the most commonly reported required feature was a physical postmark (84.6%), 

49 New Mexico did not select response options for voters with disabilities but specified that voters with 

visual impairments can request a ballot that they may receive and mark electronically using screen reader 

software; the voter must then print and mail the ballot back.

50 Information on the terminology states use to describe the process whereby a voter with a disability may 

access a ballot online, mark it privately and independently, and return it to election officials was collected in 

item Q24a of the Policy Survey. Information on how voters with a disability can access their ballots under 

that process was collected in item Q24b of the Policy Survey.

51 This ballot is then printed and returned.

52 Information on deadlines for returning mail ballots was collected in item Q21 of the Policy Survey.

53 Eighteen states reported a specified number of calendar days after Election Day, ranging from three to 

20, and five states reported a specified number of business days after Election Day, ranging from one to 

10.
75 | Election Law and Procedure 

followed by postal processing markings (65.4%), and hand cancellation or a private express 

delivery service date stamp (both 57.7% respectively). Less commonly required features were 

intelligent barcodes (30.8%) and a date on a voter affidavit (15.4%). Some states specified other 

ways of satisfying postmark requirements.54 Ohio indicated accepting an ID tag date, and Kansas 

and Oregon indicated accepting any other indicia from the U.S. Postal Service. In Virginia, if the 

intelligent mail barcode does not show that the ballot was mailed on or before Election Day, the 

date provided on the signed voter oath may be used to satisfy postmark requirements.

Drop Boxes

In a new series of questions, the 2022 Policy Survey asked states to report their usage of drop 

boxes. For the purposes of the Policy Survey, a drop box was defined as a locked container where 

voters or their authorized representatives may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. They 

are different from ballot boxes that are located at in-person polling places, where voters may 

place their ballots immediately after in-person voting. Drop boxes may be located either indoors 

or outdoors.

Figure 6. More than Two-Thirds of States Used Drop Boxes in 2022 General Election 

Source: Information on whether voters were permitted to return their voted mail ballots at drop boxes was 

collected in item Q19 of the Policy Survey.

Thirty-nine states reported allowing drop boxes for the November 2022 general election (see 

Figure 6). For these states, the most commonly reported location for drop boxes was election 

54 Information on mail ballot postmark requirements was collected in item Q23 of the Policy Survey.
Election Law and Procedure | 76 

offices (64.1%), followed by early voting polling locations (35.9%), and Election Day polling 

locations (28.2%). Other sites reported by states included libraries, recreation centers, satellite 

county offices, tribal reservations, and college student centers. Additionally, 22 states indicated 

that drop box locations varied by locality, with several of them noting that drop box locations can 

be placed at any site at the discretion of the local jurisdiction.55

In one-third of states that used drop boxes, drop box collections occurred once per day, whereas 

in three states, the collections occurred multiple times per day. Eight states listed another 

frequency, citing some examples where the number of collections can depend on the date and 

the volume of ballots. Fifteen states reported that the number of collections varies by 

jurisdiction.56

Voters were able to use drop boxes at various times. The earliest date drop boxes were available 

for voters was September 1, 2022, in Indiana, whereas the latest dates tended to be Election 

Day, with the exception of North Dakota, Georgia, and South Dakota, which listed dates before 

Election Day. About 41% of states that used drop boxes allowed their voters to start using them 

sometime in September.57

Ballot Curing

Another new set of questions in the 2022 Policy Survey asked states about ballot curing; under 

this process, returned mail ballots that have been rejected for containing an error or for missing 

required information may have the mistake corrected by the voter so that their ballot is ultimately 

counted. Three-quarters of states reported having this process during the 2022 general election, 

and among those states, the most commonly reported types of mail ballot errors that voters were 

allowed to correct were missing voter signatures (reported in 90.2% of these states) and nonmatching voter signatures (reported in 70.7% of these states). Just over half of states reported 

that ballots that had a missing or incomplete required document (e.g., an affidavit, ballot 

statement, or copy of the voter’s identification) could be cured, whereas just under one-third 

allowed for ballots to be cured if they were missing a witness signature.58 Eleven states reported 

that there were other reasons a mail ballot may be cured; missing identification was cited by 

three states, and other reasons included missing statement of residence and missing witness 

address.59, 60

Thirteen states reported that ballots needed to be cured by Election Day in order to be counted in 

the 2022 general election. One state, Louisiana, had a deadline that fell before Election Day, and 

55 Information on whether states, or any jurisdictions within states, allow voters to return their voted mailed 

ballots at drop boxes was collected in item Q19 of the Policy Survey. Information on where drop boxes were 

located was collected in item Q19a of the Policy Survey.

56 Information on how often ballots will be collected from drop boxes was collected in item Q19b of the 

Policy Survey.

57 Information on the dates and times voters may use drop boxes to return their ballots was collected in 

item Q19c of the Policy Survey.

58 Information on whether states allow voters to cure ballots was collected in item Q20 of the Policy Survey. 

Information on the types of mail ballot errors that may be cured was collected in item Q20a of the Policy 

Survey.

59 New Mexico treats any rejected mail ballot as a rejected provisional ballot that allows a voter to pursue a 

hearing to review the determination.

60 Pennsylvania noted that the decision to allow voters to correct errors or supply missing information is 

currently the subject of ongoing litigation. A preliminary ruling in October permitted voters to do so in the 

2022 general election.
 

77 | Election Law and Procedure 

the latest ballot curing deadlines were in December 2022 in New York and California. Some 

states specified that deadlines are set based on a number of business or calendar days after an 

action is taken.61 For example, Arizona voters must cure a missing signature by Election Day but 

must cure a non-matching signature within 5 business days, whereas Kansas voters must cure 

provisional ballots prior to the meeting of the county board of canvassers, which occurs between 

seven and 13 days after Election Day, and each jurisdiction sets its own date within this window. 

Utah also noted that the deadline varies based on the county canvass date.

UOCAVA Voting

The legal framework established by the UOCAVA law requires that all states offer uniformed 

services members, their eligible family members, and overseas citizens the ability to vote 

absentee in all federal elections. UOCAVA-protected citizens have the option of using the Federal 

Post Card Application (FPCA), a form that serves as both a registration and ballot request 

application and is accepted in all U.S. states and territories. All states accept FPCAs submitted by 

postal mail. In addition, the 2009 Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act 

amended UOCAVA, requiring that all states offer an electronic means for FPCA submission. 

UOCAVA voters may submit their FPCA by fax, online (either by email or through the state’s online 

voter registration portal), or by other modes as allowed by state law.

States are required to allow ballot transmission and return by postal mail for UOCAVA ballots. In 

2022, the most common additional methods for transmitting UOCAVA ballots were email and fax.

Email was allowed in 85.7% of states, and fax was allowed in 69.6% of states. Twenty-nine states 

reported accepting UOCAVA ballots submitted through the state’s online ballot delivery portal. 

Some states reported that UOCAVA ballots can be submitted by some other method; for example,

Washington and Wisconsin specified in comments that they allow in-person ballot submission, 

whereas Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Virginia commented that they allow some other 

commercial or private delivery service. After postal mail, email62 and fax were the two most 

common methods that states allowed UOCAVA voters to return their ballots (50% and 53.6% 

respectively), followed by the state’s online voter registration portal (21.4%).63

States differ in the length of time voters remain eligible to receive UOCAVA ballots after submitting 

an FPCA; that is, the period of time or number of elections for which a voter can retain their 

UOCAVA status and have an absentee ballot transmitted to them.64 Over one-third of states

reported that the length of time the FPCA will serve as a ballot request mechanism is a specified 

number of calendar years. In most of those states, the length of time is one year, although in 

North Dakota, it is two years. In other states, the length of time is measured by the number of 

general election cycles (12.5%); Arkansas, Arizona, Delaware, and Kentucky specified a length of 

one general election cycle, and Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Utah specified two general election 

61 Information on the deadline by which voters must cure errors or missing information on their mailed 

ballots was collected in item Q20b of the Policy Survey.

62 Louisiana and Texas only allow email in certain special circumstances.

63 Information on the methods by which a state transmits blank UOCAVA ballots was collected in item Q27 

of the Policy Survey. Information on the methods a state allows UOCAVA voters to return their voted UOCAVA 

ballots was collected in item Q28 of the Policy Survey.

64 Information on how long UOCAVA voters remain eligible to receive absentee ballots was collected in item 

Q29 of the Policy Survey.
Election Law and Procedure | 78 

cycles. Some states (8.9%) reported that they will use the FPCA as a ballot request mechanism 

until the voter moves from their residence.65

Almost 40% of states provided a description of another length of time that was unlisted in the 

Policy Survey question, with some states reporting a time linked with either a specific election 

timeline or a length of time tied to the submission of the FPCA. Nevada reported that voters retain 

their status until the end of the following calendar year, and Maine reported that the status 

remains eligible for 18 months. American Samoa and Washington specified a timeline based on 

changes to a voter’s registration record. California and North Carolina reported that eligibility 

remains permanent. Voters remain eligible to request absentee ballots for every election in Idaho 

until they move but must make a separate request for every election. The U.S. Virgin Islands also 

reported that they require absentee ballots to be requested each election cycle, and Puerto Rico 

indicated that voters must file absentee voting requests for each voting event.

UOCAVA Voting Deadlines

In addition to reporting deadlines for mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters, the 2022 Policy 

Survey asked states to report deadlines for ballots submitted by both uniformed services voters 

residing in the United States and overseas UOCAVA voters. States provided information on both 

postmark deadlines and ballot receipt deadlines as applicable. In 2022, the postmark deadline

for domestic uniformed services voters was Election Day in 42.9% of states, a slight drop from 

2020; however, in Iowa, North Dakota, and Utah, the postmark deadline was one day before 

Election Day. Just under half of the states (45.5%) reported that ballots had to have been 

received by Election Day. Additionally, 43.6% of the states indicated that the ballots must have 

been received by a specified number of calendar days after Election Day (with responses ranging 

from two to 20 days after Election Day), and 10.9% of states indicated that the ballots must have 

been received by a specified number of business days after Election Day (with responses ranging 

from three to 10 days after Election Day).

66

For overseas UOCAVA voters, Election Day was the postmark deadline in about half of the states

(48.2%). Like above, Iowa and North Dakota also reported having a postmark deadline one day 

before Election Day for these voters. Ballots in 43.6% of the states were required to be received 

by Election Day. Additionally, 43.6% of states indicated that the ballots must have been received 

by a specified number of calendar days after Election Day (ranging from two to 20 days), and 

12.7% of states indicated that the ballots must have been received by a specified number of 

business days after Election Day (ranging from three to 10 days). Eighteen states reported that 

they have the same postmark requirements for UOCAVA ballots and mail ballots from nonUOCAVA voters. Seven states indicated that the requirements are different.67, 68

65 This information is provided by the U.S. Postal Service or the voter.

66 Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by uniformed services members residing in the United 

States was collected in item Q30 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q29 of the 2020 Policy Survey.

67 Thirty-one states did not provide a response to this item; 32 states indicated in Q21 that they did not 

require a postmark for returning a non-UOCAVA mail ballot.

68 Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by overseas UOCAVA voters was collected in item Q31 in 

the Policy Survey. Information on the differences between postmark requirements for UOCAVA and nonUOCAVA voters was collected in item Q32 in the Policy Survey.
 

79 | Election Law and Procedure 

For more information about how UOCAVA voters participated in the 2022 general election, 

including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected, and the use of the Federal Write-In 

Absentee Ballot (FWAB), see Chapter 4 of this report.

In-Person Voting

In the traditional image of voting in America, voters physically travel to their local polling place or 

election office and cast their ballots in person on Election Day. Voters may cast their ballots in 

person at a polling location to which they are assigned based on the address on their voter 

registration records, or, if state law allows, may have the option to vote at any polling location 

within their jurisdiction. Although other methods of voting have become common in recent years, 

in-person voting is still used by a majority of voters in federal general elections.

Vote Centers

Vote centers are physical locations where voters from multiple precincts may cast their ballots 

(i.e., voters are not assigned to one location). Jurisdictions that use vote centers allow voters to 

cast their ballots at any vote center in their jurisdiction rather than needing to vote at a 

specifically assigned polling place. The 2022 Policy Survey asked whether any of the state’s 

jurisdictions allow voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote center in their jurisdiction and 

to describe how vote centers operate.

Over one-half of states (58.2%) reported allowing voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote 

center in the voter’s jurisdiction, an increase from just over one-third in 2020. Fourteen of those 

states (43.8%) indicated that they require the use of vote centers statewide, a significant increase 

from 2020. Kansas, Tennessee, and Texas reported having vote centers, but only in jurisdictions 

that meet certain requirements, whereas another 15 of those states (46.9%) reported having vote 

centers, but jurisdictions have the option not to implement them.69

In-Person Voting Before Election Day

Almost all states70 reported that they allow individuals to vote in person before Election Day (not 

including the hand delivery of mail ballots). This type of voting generally falls into two categories:

o A voter may go to a polling place before Election Day, receive a ballot, vote their ballot 

while at the polling place, and place their completed ballot into a ballot box or tabulator.

o A voter may go to an election office to pick up a ballot over the counter. In some states, the 

voter may be able to take their ballot home with them, whereas in other states, the ballot 

must be completed in the office. The ballot is then sealed in an envelope and tabulated 

along with ballots that are returned to the office by mail according to local procedures.

The former type of voting is usually referred to as “in-person early voting” and the latter type is 

usually referred to as “in-person absentee voting,” although these terms are not used consistently 

across states. Some states use only one type of in-person voting before Election Day, while others 

use both. Thirty-two states (57.1%) reported having in-person early voting and 29 states (51.8%) 

69 Information on whether any jurisdictions within a state will allow voters to cast ballots at any polling 

location or vote center in their jurisdiction was collected in item Q26 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item 

Q25 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Information on how vote centers operate was collected in item Q26a of the 

2022 Policy Survey and item Q25a of the 2020 Policy Survey.

70 Pennsylvania did not allow in-person voting before Election Day for the 2022 general election.
Election Law and Procedure | 80 

Table 4. Examples of Unique Descriptions of In-Person Early Voting 

 

State Description of In-Person Early Voting 

American Samoa Local absentee voting

Hawaii In-person voting

Idaho Early voting

Indiana The in-person early voting process consists of casting an absentee 

ballot.

Kansas Advance voting

Kentucky In-person, no-excuse absentee voting

North Carolina One-stop and early voting

Oregon

Members of specific populations can receive a ballot from their 

county elections office and they may choose to vote there or take it 

with them to return at a later date/time.

Washington In-person voting

Source: State descriptions of in-person early voting were collected in item Q25 of the Policy Survey.

reported having in-person absentee voting; among these states, 11 reported having both.

71 Nine

states specified unique descriptions for early voting, as seen in Table 4. Nine states (16.1%) 

reported requiring an excuse to vote in person before Election Day,72 a decrease from 12 that 

reported this policy in 2020 and 15 in 2018.73, 74 In-person early voting tended to start in mid to 

late October75 and last until early November 2022 shortly before Election Day in most states.76 In 

California, Kansas, and Utah, dates varied by jurisdiction and Hawaii’s dates varied by location.77

71 Information on the terminology used to describe the process of voting in person before Election Day was 

collected in item Q25 of the Policy Survey.

72 Pennsylvania did not provide a response to this item.

73 In Missouri, an excuse is required for four weeks of the absentee voting period; voters may vote with no 

excuse two weeks prior to the election. In Maine, voters may request an absentee ballot without a reason 

up to the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date through Election Day, voters who meet 

requirements for a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot but are required 

to provide an excuse. New York does not require an excuse for in-person early voting but does require an 

excuse for in-person absentee voting. Information on whether an excuse is required for voters to participate 

in voting in person prior to Election Day was collected in item Q25a of the 2022 Policy Survey, Q24a of the 

2020 Policy Survey, and Q12a of the 2018 Policy Survey.

74 In Missouri, an excuse is required for four weeks of the absentee voting period; voters may vote with not 

excuse two weeks prior to the election. In Maine, voters may request an absentee ballot without a reason 

up to the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date through Election Day, voters who meet 

requirements for a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot but are required 

to provide an excuse. New York does not require an excuse for in-person early voting but does require an 

excuse for in-person absentee voting.

75 Thirteen states listed a start date between September 9, 2022 and October 7, 2022, whereas the 

Northern Mariana Islands and Oklahoma listed a start date in early November 2022.

76 The U.S. Virgin Islands was the only one to list a final day that was not in November—their final day was 

October 31, 2022.

77 Colorado commented that although October 24, 2022 was the first day that jurisdictions were required to 

have in-person polling locations open, some may choose to start in-person voting earlier than that. 
 

81 | Election Law and Procedure 

Oregon, a vote-by-mail state, does not have early voting, but does allow in-person voting in 

specific circumstances. For example, if a voter loses or spoils their ballot, they may appear at a 

local elections office to be issued a new ballot; this is allowed through 8:00 p.m. on the night of 

the election.78

Voter Identification

Under HAVA, Congress established minimum identification standards that an individual must 

meet in order to register to vote:

o Individuals who register to vote at their state’s motor vehicles agency, another government 

agency, or using an online registration portal are typically authenticated by presenting 

appropriate documentation to the government agency and by the state matching the 

person’s driver’s license number or last four digits of their social security number to an 

existing state record.

o Individuals who register by mail and who have not voted before for federal office in their 

state of residence are required to present, at some point before voting, either a current 

and valid photo identification or a copy of a utility bill, bank statement, government check, 

paycheck, or other government document that shows the person’s name and address.

o Individuals who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under UOCAVA or entitled to vote 

other than in person under the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act or 

other federal law are exempt from HAVA’s identification requirements.79

The definition of voter identification varies by state. In some states, it can mean a governmentissued document with a photograph, whereas in other states, it can mean a voter-executed 

affidavit affirming identity. For in-person, non-first time voting, whether before or on Election Day, 

most states (63.6%) reported that they require voters to present an acceptable form of 

identification in order to cast a ballot in person. For 62.9% of those states, photo identification as 

proof of their identity was required.80 In the case that a voter does not have an acceptable form of 

identification at the polling site, 82.9% of states that require identification reported that the voter 

may cast a provisional ballot. Just under half (48.6%) of states reported that the voter must return 

at a later time to present appropriate identification to the election officials before their ballot can 

be counted. In over one-fifth of states, voters can sign an affidavit affirming their identity, with no 

other action required for the voter to vote. Additionally, in one-fifth of states, another person may 

formally vouch for the voter’s identity.81 These states mentioned examples such as another voter 

Wisconsin noted that the reported timeframe is when in-person voting may be held, but each municipality 

determines the specific days and times within the reported timeframe that they will offer the option to their 

voters.

78 Information on the calendar dates for the beginning of the early voting period and end of the early voting 

period was collected in item Q25b of the Policy Survey.

79 52 USC 21083 (b)(3)(C)

80 Information on establishing a voter’s identity during in-person voting was collected in item Q37 of the 

Policy Survey. Information on whether photo identification is required for voters to establish their identity for 

in-person voting was collected in item Q37a of the Policy Survey.

81 Information on what happens if a person does not have acceptable identification at the polling site was 

collected in item Q37b of the Policy Survey.
Election Law and Procedure | 82 

registered to vote in the same precinct, a precinct election official, an adult or poll worker who 

has known the voter for six months, and a village or county mayor.82

In Kentucky and Massachusetts, the deadline by which voters were required to present 

appropriate identification to verify their identity and have their provisional ballots accepted and 

counted was Election Day in 2022. Fifteen other states reported deadline dates that varied from 

the day after Election Day (i.e., November 9, 2022) up to November 21, 2022.83

Provisional Voting

The EAC has issued best practices on the development of provisional voting procedures and 

notice to voters to ensure provisional voting procedures are fair, transparent, effective, and 

consistently applied to all voters in the state. The EAC states in its Best Practices on Provisional 

Voting report:

Section 302 of HAVA creates the right for potential voters to cast provisional ballots 

in the event their names do not appear on the registration list or the voters’ eligibility 

is challenged by an election official. The issuance of a provisional ballot is best 

described as a safety net or fail-safe for the voter, in that:

o It maintains the person’s intent to vote and selections until election officials 

determine that the person does or does not have the right to cast a ballot in the 

election.

o It allows the determination of the voter’s eligibility to be made at a time when 

more perfect or complete information is available either from the voter or from 

the election jurisdiction.84

HAVA specifies minimum requirements for notice to voters and provides opportunities for voters

to resolve eligibility issues. Within the federal framework, states have different methods of 

complying with the provisional notification to voter requirements, using different technology and 

different timetables. State and local election officials ultimately apply their policies, procedures, 

and state legal requirements when deciding whether to count a provisional ballot. For example, a 

state that has a stricter standard for the identification of voters than is contained in HAVA would 

apply its standard to determine if a given provisional ballot meets the state’s ID standard.

Fifty states and territories reported using provisional ballots, and the reasons for offering 

provisional ballots varied.

85 The most common reason for having a voter cast a provisional ballot 

was that a voter’s name does not appear on the list of eligible voters, followed by situations 

82 In some of these examples, an extra step was required to verify the voter’s identity (e.g., in the case 

where a precinct election official was vouching for the voter’s identity, both parties were required to sign an 

affidavit).

83 Information on the deadline by which voters must present the appropriate identification to verify their 

identity and have their provisional ballot accepted and counted was collected in item Q37c of the Policy 

Survey.

84 U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2017, February 27). Best Practices on Provisional Voting. 

https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/02/27/eac-best-practices-on-provisional-voting/.

85 States that reported not using provisional ballots were largely NVRA-exempt states.
 

83 | Election Law and Procedure 

where an election official has asserted an individual is not eligible to vote.86 Table 5 provides a 

full list of reasons the states use provisional ballots.

Table 5. States That Use Provisional Ballots Most Often Do So When a 

Voter’s Name Does Not Appear on the List of Eligible Voters 

 

Reason for Offering Voters a Provisional Ballot 

Percentage of States That 

Use Provisional Voting and 

Offer Provisional Ballots 

for the Listed Reason 

A voter’s name does not appear on the list of eligible voters. 88%

An election official asserts that an individual is not eligible to 

vote. 82%

A voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they are 

attempting to vote. 80%

A voter does not have proper identification (as defined by state 

law). 80%

Another person (not an election official) challenges a voter’s 

qualifications, and the poll worker is not able to resolve the 

challenge.

56%

A voter has changed their name or address (within the election 

jurisdiction) but has not updated their voter registration to 

reflect the new information.

54%

A federal or state judge extends the polling place hours in a 

federal election. 50%

A voter was issued a mail ballot, chooses to vote in person 

instead, and does not have the mail ballot to surrender to poll 

workers.

48%

Other 24%

Source: Information on the circumstances under which a state uses provisional ballots was collected in 

item Q33a of the Policy Survey.

After the election, many states have a limited amount of time in which to adjudicate provisional 

ballots and decide whether the ballots will be counted (either in full or in part) or rejected. In 

27.1% of states, this deadline is by a specified date; for the November 8, 2022 general election, 

these dates ranged from November 8, 2022 to November 28, 2022. Thirty-five states (72.9%)

indicated that this deadline is specified as a number of calendar days or business days after 

Election Day.87, 88

86 Information on whether states use provisional ballots was collected in item Q33 of the Policy Survey. 

Information on the circumstances under which a state will use provisional ballots was collected in item 

Q33a of the Policy Survey.

87 Twenty-five states reported 1 to 30 calendar days after Election Day, and 10 states reported 1 to 7 

business days after Election Day.

88 Information on the deadlines for adjudicating provisional ballots was collected in item Q33b of the Policy 

Survey.
Election Law and Procedure | 84 

Five (10.2%) of the states that use provisional ballots reported provisional ballots cast in the 

wrong precinct would be fully counted, and 40.8% of the states reported that they would be 

partially counted.89 About half of the states reported that these ballots would be rejected fully. An 

elected or appointed group, such as a Board of Canvassers or a Board of Elections, is responsible 

for reviewing provisional ballot information to determine if the ballots are eligible to be counted in 

the majority of states (56%) that use provisional ballots. Other states report that this may be done 

by a single election official (14%) or more than one election official (16%). American Samoa, 

Arizona, Maryland, Maine, Missouri, Oregon, and Pennsylvania specified other sources.90

In most cases, the person or entity that ultimately certifies the eligibility of provisional ballots is 

the same as the person or entity that reviews provisional ballots to determine if they are eligible 

to be counted. In 36% of states, this is not the case. Most of these states explained a process 

where an initial person or entity (most commonly a county clerk or local election staff) does a first 

review to gather information on the eligibility of a provisional ballot, and then presents these 

findings for final determination to a second person or entity (most commonly a review board—e.g., 

a board of canvassers).91

Election Technology

Voting system testing and certification are required in the majority of states (78.6%) by statute, 

and a few states (12.5%) indicated that they require testing and certification through a formal 

administrative rule or guidance. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, 

Mississippi, and Puerto Rico reported that voting system testing and certification before the 

system’s approval for purchase is not required. The 2022 Policy Survey then asked states to 

describe their policies regarding the role of the EAC and federal testing and certification. States 

most commonly reported requiring testing by an EAC-accredited Voting System Test Laboratory 

(VSTL; 49%), state and federal certification (47.1%), and/or EAC-adopted Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines (VVSG; 43.1%; see Figure 7).92

 

89 For example, a state might only count items on the ballot for which the voter would have been eligible 

had they voted in the correct precinct.

90 Information on how states will treat a provisional ballot if it is cast in the wrong precinct was collected in 

item Q33c of the Policy Survey. Information on who is responsible for reviewing provisional ballot 

information to determine if the ballots are eligible to be counted was collected in item Q33d of the Policy 

Survey.

91 Information on whether the person verifying or certifying the eligibility of the provisional ballots and the 

person reviewing provisional ballots to determine if they are eligible to be counted was collected in item 

Q33e of the Policy Survey.

92 Information on voting system testing and certification policies was collected in items Q14 and Q14a of 

the Policy Survey.
 

85 | Election Law and Procedure 

Figure 7. States That Require Voting System Testing Most Commonly Require 

Testing From an EAC-Accredited VSTL 

 

Source: Information on voting equipment testing and certification policy was collected in item Q14a of the 

Policy Survey.

Some states provided clarifying comments. The District of Columbia reported that it requires that 

voting systems must meet or exceed HAVA standards and/or be federally certified. Similarly, 

Oregon reported that the system must be EAC certified or examined by a federally accredited 

VSTL. Maine indicated that federal EAC certification according to VVSG is required or preferred, 

but testing based on another state certification program may be acceptable. Alaska reported that 

it may approve a voting system upon consideration by an election administrator,93 and Wyoming 

required the voting system to have been implemented for use in at least two other states.

Although there is no testing or certification of electronic poll books—sometimes called e-poll 

books—on the federal level,94 many states have their own process for testing or certifying these 

machines before approving them for purchase. Of the 41 states (73.2%) that reported using e-poll 

books either statewide or only in certain jurisdictions, 41.5% indicated that they do not require 

testing or certification before the e-poll books’ approval for purchase. In another 41.5% of the 

states that reported having e-poll book requirements, the testing and certification are required by 

93 AK Stat § 15.20.910 (2016).

94 As of the time of this report’s publication, the EAC is developing a pilot program for testing and certifying 

e-poll books.
Election Law and Procedure | 86 

statute, whereas in 17.1% of the states, testing and certification are required by a formal 

administrative rule or guidance.95

The 2022 Policy Survey asked whether any jurisdictions in the state use e-poll books and whether 

testing and certification are required before e-poll books’ “approval for purchase.” The Policy 

Survey and EAVS did not collect data on other procedures a jurisdiction may require before 

authorizing the use of e-poll books, including but not limited to pre-election testing, secure 

physical storage, contingency planning, chain-of-custody practices, and poll worker training.

Recounts, Audits, and Election Certification

Before state and local election officials certify the results of an election, they take steps to verify 

that all established election procedures were followed and that all voting equipment functioned 

properly. The Policy Survey asked states about the activities that took place after ballots were 

counted, special circumstances that occur when certifying election results, and the context 

behind these activities. Many states require additional post-election verification that the counting 

process was accurate. These additional verifications may take the form of a partial recount (in 

which ballots in randomly selected precincts are counted a second time to ensure that the initial

tabulation of votes was accurate) or a more detailed audit (in which the entire voting process is 

reviewed and key steps are verified).

Recounts

An election recount is a repeat tabulation of votes cast in an election, and it is used to determine 

the accuracy of an initial count. Many recounts may be of only one contest or portions of contest. 

Recounts may be conducted for a variety of reasons and repeat tabulations may be conducted in 

a variety of ways. The 2022 Policy Survey collected data on the reasons a recount could be 

conducted for the 2022 general election (Figure 8); these questions did not ask if the reasons for 

a recount were automatic, mandatory, or triggered, or whether states actually conducted the 

recount for one of the specified reasons. States reported that the most common reason a recount 

may be conducted is at the request of an affected candidate or party (60%). Less common 

reasons were if the results of a contest were within a specified margin (47.3%) or that a court 

ordered that a recount be conducted (45.5%). Among the listed response options in the survey 

question, four states indicated other reasons that a jurisdiction within their state may conduct a 

post-election recount.96 In Idaho, for example, the Secretary of State also conducts post-election 

recounts where ballots are manually counted in randomly selected jurisdictions and precincts. In 

Texas, a losing candidate in an election that used electronic voting systems can request a recount 

no matter how wide the margin. Additionally, Mississippi noted that although the state does not 

have recount procedures, a candidate who was on the ballot may conduct a ballot box 

examination within 12 days of election certification to review its contents under the supervision of 

a county circuit clerk; the candidate may choose to tally the votes in anticipation of a challenge to 

an election.

 

95 Information on poll books was collected in items Q15 and Q15a of the Policy Survey. Illinois did not 

provide a response to this item.

96 Information on state policies regarding election recounts was collected in item Q35 of the Policy Survey.
 

87 | Election Law and Procedure 

Figure 8. Post-Election Recounts Can Most Often Be Conducted 

at the Request of an Affected Candidate or Party 

 

 

Source: Information on post-election recount policy was collected in item Q35 of the Policy Survey.

States conduct recounts in multiple ways. Most (60%) states reported that recounts can be 

conducted via a machine recount of paper ballots or voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT), 

whereas 51% reported a manual recount of paper ballots or VVPAT.97 Some states explained 

other ways or additional circumstances that determine how recounts are done; for example, 

Nevada reported that recounts must be conducted in the same manner in which the election was 

conducted, and in Idaho, a regular recount entails manually tabulating a sample of ballots 

followed by a run through the electronic tabulator—if the results align within a small margin of 

error, then all remaining ballots are counted through the tabulator. Otherwise, all ballots are 

recounted manually. In some states, a candidate or a court can specify the manner in which the 

recount is done, or this can vary by the locality. 

Audits

The 2022 Policy Survey expanded the series of questions asking states to report their auditing 

activities, this time focusing on specific types of audits both before and after an election. These 

auditing activities are defined in Table 6.

97 Information on how recounts are conducted was collected in item Q35a of the Policy Survey.
Election Law and Procedure | 88 

Table 6. Auditing Activities Before and After an Election 

 

Auditing Activity Definition 

Access audit

An assessment of whether legal procedures were 

followed to ensure the election’s accessibility to voters 

with disabilities.

Ballot design audit

An assessment of the usability of the ballot(s) in an 

election, often focusing particularly on voters with 

disabilities or voters who use ballots in languages other 

than English.

Ballot reconciliation audit

A comparison of the published election results with the 

number of voters who signed poll books during inperson voting or whose mail ballot envelopes were 

checked in.

Compliance audit or procedural 

audit

An audit that examines whether the established 

processes and procedures were followed throughout 

the election.

Eligibility audit A process to verify that the ballots that were counted 

were legally cast.

Legal audit An assessment of whether election practices comply 

with all applicable federal, state, and local laws.

Logic and accuracy testing

A test to examine whether voting machines are 

tabulating votes correctly before vote tabulation begins, 

usually by creating a test deck of ballots and running 

them through the machines.

Post-election tabulation audit

A sample of ballots are selected and re-tabulated, and 

the results are compared to the originally reported vote 

totals.

Source: Information on the type of audits states conduct was collected in item Q36 of the Policy Survey.

States were able to specify other types of audits that were unlisted in the question item.

Nearly all states reported conducting logic and accuracy testing (94.6%), which examines whether 

voting machines are tabulating votes correctly before vote tabulation begins. The majority of 

states (76.4%) also reported conducting some form of post-election tabulation audits, which is 

when a sample of ballots are selected and retabulated and the results are compared to the 

originally reported vote totals. The least common auditing activities were legal audits (conducted 

in New Hampshire and South Carolina) and ballot design audits (conducted in American 

Samoa).98 Some states reported additional auditing procedures not listed in the survey options. 

North Carolina, for example, conducts close-contest99 audits and audits of provisional ballots that 

are counted to ensure that the proper procedures were followed. As part of their auditing 

procedures, Maryland conducts a comprehensive audit that includes 17 separate audits of the 

voting system, polling place operations, and post-election conciliation. Alabama piloted a postelection audit in three jurisdictions, and Kentucky reported piloting a risk-limiting audit that will 

98 Information on the type of post-election audits states conduct was collected in item Q36 of the Policy 

Survey.

99 North Carolina did not define what the threshold was for a “close contest.”
 

89 | Election Law and Procedure 

become a statewide process in 2023. Additionally, Kentucky requires the attorney general to 

randomly select 12 jurisdictions to conduct their own audit. Figure 9 displays the different types 

of auditing activities that states conduct.

Figure 9. Most Common Auditing Activities were Logic and Accuracy Testing 

and Post-Election Tabulation Audits 

 

Source: Information on auditing activities was collected in item Q36 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

States that conduct post-election audits most commonly indicated that they are conducted as a 

statutory requirement (92.9%). Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, and Utah stated that they conduct 

an audit as required by a formal administrative rule or guidance.100 In Oklahoma, although postelection tabulation audits are optional under state law, they will be authorized by the Secretary of 

State Election Board.101 The Policy Survey did not collect information on whether these audits

were mandatory, triggered, or conducted only in certain circumstances.

The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to report which of the following post-election tabulation 

audits would be required for the 2022 general election. States could select multiple options as 

applicable:

o A traditional, manual tabulation audit that comes from a fixed percentage of randomly 

selected voting districts or voting machines and is compared to the results produced by 

the voting system;

100 Information on whether states require post-election tabulation audits was collected in item Q36a of the 

Policy Survey.

101 See 26 O.S. Section 3-130.
Election Law and Procedure | 90 

o A traditional, machine tabulation audit that involves the same procedure as above but 

involves machine, rather than manual, counting;

o A risk-limiting tabulation audit that is a protocol designed to limit the risk of certifying an 

incorrect election outcome by using statistical methods to select the audit sample size; or

o Another type of audit.

Almost two-thirds of the states reported requiring a traditional manual tabulation audit, and just 

under one-fourth reported requiring a traditional machine tabulation audit. Additionally, about 

one-fifth of the states reported requiring a risk-limiting tabulation audit.102 Eleven states (26.2%) 

provided comments detailing alternative procedures. For example, California stated that a 

jurisdiction may choose to conduct a risk-limiting audit instead of a traditional tabulation audit, 

and Pennsylvania reported that its local jurisdictions may be performing a risk-limiting audit, but 

the details have not yet been finalized and are not statutorily required.

Some states reported having additional steps in their tabulation audit processes. For example, 

Maryland stated that it conducts a traditional manual audit as well as a completely automated 

tabulation audit using ballot images. New York noted that although an audit may be conducted 

using an automated audit tool (similar to machine tabulation), there is still a component that 

requires manual review based on the overall number of ballots being audited. Washington 

reported that local election officials can choose among several methods to meet the state postelection tabulation audit requirement, including the option for a risk-limiting audit. South Carolina 

detailed a process where an independent, third-party vendor uses ballot images to tabulate all 

ballots cast throughout the state, the results of which are compared to the results produced by 

the voting system vendor.

Election Certification

State and federal election results are not final until the state completes their official certification. 

The 2022 Policy Survey asked states to provide their election certification deadlines for the 2022 

general election.103 The range was broad,104 with 47 states reporting a date between November 

15, 2022 and December 8, 2022.105 States provided clarifying comments on their specific 

policies regarding their certification deadline. For example, Delaware, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and 

Rhode Island reported not having a specific state certification deadline, and the District of 

Columbia and Louisiana noted that their reported dates were tentative deadlines. Additionally, 

Alaska commented that their reported date was a target deadline, and North Carolina noted their 

reported deadline was barring recounts or protests in individual races.

102 Information on the type of post-election tabulation audit that states require was collected in item Q36b 

of the Policy Survey.

103 Puerto Rico did not hold a federal general election in 2022.

104 The range was as early as November 10, 2022 in Delaware and as late as December 8, 2022 in Illinois.

105 Information on deadlines for certifying the November 2022 general election results was collected in 

item Q34 of the Policy Survey.
 

91 | Election Law and Procedure 

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Policy Survey Table 1: State Voter Registration Databases

State 

Type of 

Database 

Frequency of 

Information 

Transmission 

From Local 

Jurisdictions 

Electronic Data Transfers 

Motor 

Vehicle 

Agency 

Agencies 

Serving People 

with 

Disabilities 

State Public 

Assistance 

Agencies 

Alabama Top-down -- Daily -- --

Alaska Top-down -- Daily -- --

American Samoa Top-down -- -- -- --

Arizona Hybrid Real time only Real time -- --

Arkansas Top-down -- Daily -- --

California Bottom-up Real time only Real time -- --

Colorado Top-down -- Daily -- --

Connecticut Top-down -- Daily -- --

Delaware Top-down -- Real time On demand On demand

District of Columbia Top-down -- Real time -- --

Florida Hybrid Real time and 

daily Daily -- --

Georgia Top-down -- Daily -- --

Guam Top-down -- On demand -- --

Hawaii Hybrid Real time only Other -- --

Idaho Hybrid Real time only On demand -- --

Illinois Bottom-up Daily only Daily Real time Real time

Indiana Top-down -- Daily -- --

Iowa Top-down -- Daily -- --

Kansas Top-down -- Daily -- --

Kentucky Top-down -- Real time -- --

Louisiana Top-down -- Daily -- --

Maine Hybrid Real time only Daily -- --

Maryland Top-down -- Daily Daily Daily

Massachusetts Top-down -- Daily -- Daily

Michigan Top-down -- Daily -- --

Minnesota Top-down -- Daily -- --

Mississippi Top-down -- Real time -- --

Missouri Bottom-up Real time only Daily -- --

Montana Top-down -- Weekly -- --

Nebraska [1] Top-down -- Other -- --

Nevada Bottom-up Daily only Daily -- --

New Hampshire Top-down -- Other -- --

New Jersey Top-down -- Daily -- --

New Mexico Top-down -- Real time -- --

New York Bottom-up Real time only -- -- --

North Carolina Top-down -- Daily -- --
Election Law and Procedure | 92 

State 

Type of 

Database 

Frequency of 

Information 

Transmission 

From Local 

Jurisdictions 

Electronic Data Transfers 

Motor 

Vehicle 

Agency 

Agencies 

Serving People 

with 

Disabilities 

State Public 

Assistance 

Agencies 

North Dakota Top-down -- Daily -- --

Northern Mariana 

Islands Top-down -- -- -- --

Ohio Bottom-up Real time only Daily -- --

Oklahoma Top-down -- Daily -- --

Oregon Top-down -- Daily -- --

Pennsylvania Top-down -- Daily Real time Real time

Puerto Rico [2] N/A N/A -- -- --

Rhode Island Top-down -- Daily -- --

South Carolina Top-down -- Weekly Weekly Weekly

South Dakota Top-down -- Daily -- --

Tennessee Bottom-up Daily only Monthly -- --

Texas [3] Hybrid Real time and 

daily Daily -- --

U.S. Virgin Islands Top-down -- -- -- --

Utah [4] Hybrid Real time only Daily Weekly Weekly

Vermont Top-down -- Daily -- --

Virginia Top-down -- Real time -- --

Washington Hybrid Real time only Real time Real time Real time

West Virginia Top-down -- Daily -- --

Wisconsin [5] Top-down -- Other -- --

Wyoming Top-down -- Daily -- --
 

93 | Election Law and Procedure 

State 

Electronic Data Transfers 

Other State 

Agencies 

Federal 

Agencies 

Military 

Recruiting 

Offices 

Entities 

that 

Maintain 

Death 

Records 

Entities 

that 

Maintain 

Felony 

Records 

Entities that 

Maintain 

Records of 

Individuals 

Declared 

Mentally 

Incompetent 

Alabama -- -- -- Daily Daily --

Alaska Other -- -- -- -- --

American Samoa -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

Arizona -- -- -- -- -- --

Arkansas -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

California -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --

Colorado -- -- -- Monthly Daily --

Connecticut -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

Delaware --

On 

demand On demand Monthly On demand On demand

District of 

Columbia -- -- -- Other -- --

Florida -- -- -- Daily Daily --

Georgia -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

Guam -- -- -- -- -- --

Hawaii -- -- -- Monthly -- --

Idaho -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois Real time -- -- Other Weekly --

Indiana -- -- -- Monthly Daily --

Iowa -- -- -- -- -- --

Kansas -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --

Kentucky -- -- -- -- -- --

Louisiana -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

Maine -- -- -- Monthly -- --

Maryland Daily -- -- Monthly Monthly Other

Massachusetts -- -- -- -- -- --

Michigan -- -- -- -- -- --

Minnesota Daily -- -- Monthly Monthly Monthly

Mississippi -- -- -- Real time Real time --

Missouri -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --

Montana -- -- -- Monthly Weekly --

Nebraska [1] -- -- -- Weekly Monthly --

Nevada -- -- -- -- -- --

New Hampshire -- Other -- Other -- --

New Jersey -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --

New Mexico -- -- -- Other Other --

New York -- -- -- Monthly Monthly Monthly

North Carolina -- -- -- Monthly Daily --

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- --
Election Law and Procedure | 94 

State 

Electronic Data Transfers 

Other State 

Agencies 

Federal 

Agencies 

Military 

Recruiting 

Offices 

Entities 

that 

Maintain 

Death 

Records 

Entities 

that 

Maintain 

Felony 

Records 

Entities that 

Maintain 

Records of 

Individuals 

Declared 

Mentally 

Incompetent 

Northern Mariana 

Islands -- -- -- Monthly Daily --

Ohio -- -- -- Monthly -- --

Oklahoma -- -- -- -- -- --

Oregon -- -- -- -- -- --

Pennsylvania -- -- -- Other -- --

Puerto Rico [2] -- -- -- -- -- --

Rhode Island -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

South Carolina -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

South Dakota -- -- -- Daily Daily Daily

Tennessee -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

Texas [3] -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --

U.S. Virgin Islands -- -- -- --

On 

demand --

Utah [4] Weekly Weekly Monthly Other Monthly Other

Vermont -- -- -- -- -- --

Virginia -- -- -- Other Monthly Monthly

Washington Real time -- -- Monthly Monthly Monthly

West Virginia -- -- -- Monthly Monthly --

Wisconsin [5] -- -- -- Monthly Daily --

Wyoming -- -- -- Weekly Weekly --

Policy Survey Table 1 Calculation Notes:

Type of Database uses question Q3.

Frequency of Information Transmission From Local Jurisdictions uses question Q3a.

Electronic Data Transfers, Motor Vehicle Agency uses question Q4a.

Electronic Data Transfers, Agencies Serving People with Disabilities uses question Q4b.

Electronic Data Transfers, State Public Assistance Agencies uses question Q4c.

Electronic Data Transfers, Other State Agencies uses question Q4d.

Electronic Data Transfers, Federal Agencies uses question Q4e.

Electronic Data Transfers, Military Recruiting Offices uses question Q4f.

Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Death Records uses question Q4g.

Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Felony Records uses question Q4h.

Electronic Data Transfers, Entities that Maintain Records of Individuals Declared Mentally Incompetent

uses question Q4i. 

Policy Survey Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q3 and Q4 were single-select questions. Q3a allowed states to select multiple responses.
 

95 | Election Law and Procedure 

[1] Nebraska verifies driver’s license/state ID and SSN information with real-time data transfers. Voter 

registrations at DMV, surrendered IDs, changed IDs, SSNs needing verification from the Social 

Security Administration, and DMV signatures are acquired via daily transfers.

[2] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a 

response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.

[3] Most counties transmit data in real time, but larger counties transmit data overnight.

[4] All data entry is done by the local jurisdictions. The state hosts and maintains the voter registration 

platform.

[5] Wisconsin receives data from the state’s motor vehicle agency in real time when a voter is 

completing a registration online, and receives data daily during full DMV checks run against voter 

registrations that were created or updated with certain data into the database in the 24 hours prior 

to the full DMV checks. Wisconsin receives some competency data electronically by email from the 

courts.
Election Law and Procedure | 96 

Policy Survey Table 2: Voter Registration Policies

State 

Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election Minimum Age 

for PreRegistration 

Election Day 

In-Person Early 

Voting 

Registration 

Overlap 

Other Cases 

Alabama -- -- -- -- 17.5

Alaska -- -- -- -- 17

American 

Samoa [1] No Yes No No 17

Arizona -- -- -- -- 16

Arkansas [2] -- -- -- -- 17

California Yes Yes Yes No 16

Colorado Yes Yes No No 16

Connecticut Yes No No No 17

Delaware -- -- -- -- 16

District of 

Columbia [3] Yes Yes No No 16

Florida -- -- -- -- 16

Georgia -- -- -- -- 17.5

Guam -- -- -- -- 16

Hawaii Yes Yes No No 16

Idaho Yes Yes Yes No 17

Illinois [4] Yes Yes Yes No 17

Indiana [5] -- -- -- -- 17

Iowa Yes Yes Yes No 17

Kansas -- -- -- -- 17

Kentucky -- -- -- -- 17

Louisiana [6] -- -- -- -- 16

Maine Yes Yes Yes No 16

Maryland Yes Yes No No 16

Massachusetts 

[7] No No Yes No 16

Michigan Yes Yes No No 17.5

Minnesota Yes Yes Yes No 17

Mississippi -- -- -- -- 17

Missouri -- -- -- -- 17.5

Montana [8] Yes Yes Yes No 17

Nebraska No No Yes No --

Nevada [9] Yes Yes Yes No 17

New Hampshire 

[10] Yes No No No 17

New Jersey -- -- -- -- 17

New Mexico Yes Yes Yes No 17

New York -- -- -- -- 16

North Carolina 

[11] No Yes No Yes 16

North Dakota 

[12] -- -- -- -- --
 

97 | Election Law and Procedure 

State 

Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election Minimum Age 

for PreRegistration 

Election Day 

In-Person Early 

Voting 

Registration 

Overlap 

Other Cases 

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands [13]

-- -- -- -- 17

Ohio -- -- -- -- 17

Oklahoma [14] -- -- -- -- 17.5

Oregon [15] -- -- -- -- 16

Pennsylvania 

[16] -- -- -- -- 17

Puerto Rico 

[17] N/A N/A N/A N/A 14

Rhode Island -- -- -- -- 16

South Carolina 

[18] -- -- -- -- 17

South Dakota -- -- -- -- 17

Tennessee [19] -- -- -- -- 17

Texas -- -- -- -- --

U.S. Virgin 

Islands -- -- -- -- 17.5

Utah Yes Yes Yes No 16

Vermont [20] Yes Yes No No 16

Virginia [21] Yes Yes No No 16

Washington Yes Yes Yes No 16

West Virginia 

[22] -- -- -- -- 17

Wisconsin [23] Yes Yes No Yes 17

Wyoming [24] Yes Yes Yes No 17

Policy Survey Table 2 Calculation Notes:

Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Election Day uses question Q8a.

Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, In-Person Early Voting uses question Q8a.

Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Registration Overlap uses question Q8a.

Same-Day Registration Allowed for 2022 General Election, Other Cases uses question Q8a.

Minimum Age for Pre-Registration uses question Q9.

Policy Survey Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q8 and Q9 were single-select questions. Q8a allowed states to select multiple responses.

• Same-day registration (SDR) is defined as a voter registering to vote on the same day that they 

cast a ballot in person.

[1] A person may pre-register to vote during an election year so long as they turn 18 years old before 

the date of the election.

[2] Voter must be 18 years old on or before Election Day in order to vote.

[3] The District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) sent a ballot to every registered voter for the 

November 2022 general election. Since the submission of the 2022 Policy Survey, legislation was 

passed to permanently make the District of Columbia a vote-by-mail jurisdiction.
Election Law and Procedure | 98 

[4] Seventeen-year-olds may register if they will be 18 by the date of the general election.

[5] A person who is 17 years of age, but will be 18 years of age on or before the next general or 

municipal election in their precinct, may register to vote.

[6] Individuals who are 16 years of age must register in person at the registrar or with their application 

for a driver’s license. Individuals who are 17 years old may pre-register via any method.

[7] There was a 1-week period during in-person early voting when voters were able to register and vote 

at the same time. Early voting in person began on October 22, 2022, and the voter registration 

deadline was October 29, 2022.

[8] Due to a District Court decision and at the time that this survey was filled out by the State of 

Montana, SDR was not allowed. However, shortly after that decision, SDR was allowed by court order 

and the 2022 general election proceeded under that decision. Only precinct-to-precinct address 

changes within the same county or registrations that moved from inactive to active status are 

allowed on Election Day. Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-2-205 outlines the procedure when a 

prospective elector is not qualified at the time of registration (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca

/title_0130/chapter_0020/part_0020/section_0050/0130-0020-0020-0050.html).

[9] Each county determines the available dates and hours during which drop boxes will be available 

based on facility, staffing, and security resources available to the county. Some counties have 

permanently installed drop boxes that are available to the public at all times for county business. 

Others will make drop boxes available starting in the hours of early voting.

[10] Voters may pre-register to vote at age 17 as long as they will be 18 before the next scheduled 

election.

[11] Same-day voter registration was only available during the early in-person voting period, which ran 

from October 20, 2022 to November 5, 2022. SDR was not available on Election Day.

[12] North Dakota does not have voter registration.

[13] Voters may pre-register to vote if they will turn 18 on or before Election Day.

[14] Oklahoma does not accept absentee ballots by the postmark date; absentee ballots must be 

received by the county election board by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[15] Oregon’s registration cutoff is 21 days before each election. A voter could register that day and 

request an absentee ballot, which would be mailed to them. Additionally, by registering to vote, an 

individual is requesting a mail ballot since Oregon is a vote-by-mail state.

[16] Prior to the close of the voter registration period, a voter may go to their local county voter 

registration office, register to vote, apply for a mail ballot, and vote a mail ballot all in one visit. The 

mail ballot will then be canvassed and counted in the same manner as other mail ballots are 

canvassed and counted. A person may register to vote prior to their 18th birthday as long as they will 

be 18 by the upcoming election.

[17] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide 

a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.

[18] A person who will be 18 years old by the date of an election can begin registering 120 days prior to 

the voter registration deadline for the election, or if there is a primary associated with the election, 

120 days prior to the voter registration deadline for the primary.

[19] A 17-year-old who will be 18 by the next election in their jurisdiction can register to vote.

[20] A person can register to vote as long as they will be 18 years old on or before the date of the 

general election.

[21] Prior to October 1, 2022, 17-year-olds could pre-register according to VA Code § 24.2-403. On 

October 1, 2022, 16-year-olds became eligible to pre-register (see § 24.2-403.1).

[22] West Virginia does not have formal pre-registration; however, voters who are 17 years of age may 

register and vote in a primary election as long as they are 18 by the general election.
 

99 | Election Law and Procedure 

[23] In Wisconsin, voters are allowed to register in the clerk’s office any time through 5:00 p.m. the 

Friday before Election Day. They can also vote in-person absentee ballots from 2 weeks prior to the 

election through the Sunday prior to the election, so there is an overlap of time where they may 

register to vote and complete their absentee ballot on the same day at the clerk’s office. Individuals 

who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the 

same day any time from the Tuesday prior to Election Day through 5:00 p.m. on Election Day. 

Individuals who are 17 years old and will be turning 18 by the next upcoming election may preregister to vote.

[24] W.S. 22-3-102(a)(ii) states that an individual must “be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the 

day of the next general election.”
Election Law and Procedure | 100 

Policy Survey Table 3: State Mail Voting Policies

State

Excuse Required 

for Mail Voting All-Mail Elections

Populations Who May 

Register as Permanent 

Absentee Voters

Alabama Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other

Alaska [1] No -- No permanent absentee voting

American Samoa [2] Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

Arizona [3] No -- Any registrant

Arkansas Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

California [4] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting

Colorado No Statewide No permanent absentee voting

Connecticut Yes -- Persons with disabilities

Delaware [5] Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other

District of Columbia No Statewide Any registrant

Florida [6] No -- No permanent absentee voting

Georgia [7] No -- No permanent absentee voting

Guam Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

Hawaii [8] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting

Idaho No -- No permanent absentee voting

Illinois [9] No -- Any registrant

Indiana Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

Iowa No -- No permanent absentee voting

Kansas [10] No -- Persons with disabilities

Kentucky [11] Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

Louisiana Yes --

Individuals over a specified 

age, Persons with disabilities

Maine [12] No -- No permanent absentee voting

Maryland No -- Any registrant

Massachusetts [13] No -- Other

Michigan [14] No -- Any registrant

Minnesota No Certain Jurisdictions No permanent absentee voting

Mississippi Yes -- Persons with disabilities

Missouri Yes -- Persons with disabilities

Montana [15] No -- Any registrant

Nebraska [16] No Certain Jurisdictions No permanent absentee voting

Nevada No Statewide No permanent absentee voting

New Hampshire Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

New Jersey No -- Any registrant

New Mexico [17] No Certain Jurisdictions No permanent absentee voting

New York Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other

North Carolina No -- No permanent absentee voting

North Dakota [18] No -- No permanent absentee voting

Northern Mariana Islands No -- No permanent absentee voting

Ohio No -- No permanent absentee voting

Oklahoma [19] No -- No permanent absentee voting

Oregon No Statewide Other
 

101 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

Excuse Required 

for Mail Voting All-Mail Elections

Populations Who May 

Register as Permanent 

Absentee Voters

Pennsylvania [20] No -- Any registrant

Puerto Rico [21] N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island No -- Persons with disabilities

South Carolina Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

South Dakota No -- No permanent absentee voting

Tennessee [22] Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other

Texas Yes -- No permanent absentee voting

U.S. Virgin Islands No -- No permanent absentee voting

Utah [23] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting

Vermont No Statewide No permanent absentee voting

Virginia [24] No -- Any registrant

Washington [25] No Statewide No permanent absentee voting

West Virginia Yes -- Persons with disabilities, Other

Wisconsin [26] No -- Persons with disabilities, Other

Wyoming [27] No -- No permanent absentee voting
Election Law and Procedure | 102 

State

State Allows Drop 

Boxes

Drop Box Operational Dates

First Date Final Date

Alabama No -- --

Alaska [1] Yes 09/26/2022 11/08/2022

American Samoa [2] No -- --

Arizona [3] Yes 10/12/2022 11/08/2022

Arkansas Yes 10/14/2022 11/08/2022

California [4] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022

Colorado Yes 10/17/2022 11/08/2022

Connecticut Yes 10/07/2022 11/08/2022

Delaware [5] No -- --

District of Columbia Yes 10/14/2022 11/08/2022

Florida [6] Yes 10/24/2022 11/08/2022

Georgia [7] Yes 10/17/2022 11/04/2022

Guam No -- --

Hawaii [8] Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022

Idaho Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022

Illinois [9] Yes 10/03/2022 11/08/2022

Indiana Yes 09/01/2022 11/08/2022

Iowa Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022

Kansas [10] Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022

Kentucky [11] Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022

Louisiana No -- --

Maine [12] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022

Maryland Yes 09/26/2022 11/08/2022

Massachusetts [13] Yes 09/15/2022 11/08/2022

Michigan [14] Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022

Minnesota Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022

Mississippi No -- --

Missouri No -- --

Montana [15] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022

Nebraska [16] Yes 09/30/2022 11/08/2022

Nevada Yes 10/22/2022 11/08/2022

New Hampshire No -- --

New Jersey Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022

New Mexico [17] Yes 10/11/2022 11/08/2022

New York Yes 10/29/2022 11/08/2022

North Carolina No -- --

North Dakota [18] Yes 10/31/2022 11/07/2022

Northern Mariana Islands No -- --

Ohio Yes 10/12/2022 11/08/2022

Oklahoma [19] No -- --

Oregon Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022

Pennsylvania [20] Yes 09/21/2022 11/08/2022
 

103 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

State Allows Drop 

Boxes

Drop Box Operational Dates

First Date Final Date

Puerto Rico [21] N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island Yes 10/19/2022 11/08/2022

South Carolina No -- --

South Dakota Yes 09/23/2022 11/07/2022

Tennessee [22] No -- --

Texas No -- --

U.S. Virgin Islands No -- --

Utah [23] Yes 10/17/2022 11/08/2022

Vermont Yes 09/24/2022 11/08/2022

Virginia [24] Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022

Washington [25] Yes 10/21/2022 11/08/2022

West Virginia No -- --

Wisconsin [26] Yes 09/25/2022 11/08/2022

Wyoming [27] Yes 09/23/2022 11/08/2022
Election Law and Procedure | 104 

State

State 

Allows Mail 

Ballot 

Curing

Deadline for Curing 

Mail Ballots

Deadline for 

Postmarking Mail 

Ballots

Deadline for 

Receiving Mail 

Ballots

Alabama No -- Not required Election Day

Alaska [1] No -- Election Day

10 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

American Samoa [2] No -- Election Day Election Day

Arizona [3] Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day

Arkansas Yes 11/14/2022 Not required Election Day

California [4] Yes 12/06/2022 Election Day

7 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

Colorado Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day

Connecticut No --

1 day before Election 

Day Election Day

Delaware [5] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

District of Columbia Yes 11/15/2022 Election Day

7 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

Florida [6] Yes 11/10/2022 Not required Election Day

Georgia [7] Yes 11/11/2022 Not required Election Day

Guam No -- Election Day

10 business 

days after 

Election Day

Hawaii [8] Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day

Idaho Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Illinois [9] Yes 11/11/2022 Election Day

14 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

Indiana Yes 11/16/2022 Not required Election Day

Iowa Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Kansas [10] Yes 11/21/2022 Election Day

3 business days 

after Election 

Day

Kentucky [11] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Louisiana Yes 11/07/2022 Not required 1 day before 

Election Day

Maine [12] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Maryland Yes 11/18/2022 Election Day

10 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

Massachusetts [13] Yes 11/08/2022 Election Day

3 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

Michigan [14] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Minnesota No -- Not required Election Day

Mississippi Yes 11/18/2022 Election Day

5 business days 

after Election 

Day
 

105 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

State 

Allows Mail 

Ballot 

Curing

Deadline for Curing 

Mail Ballots

Deadline for 

Postmarking Mail 

Ballots

Deadline for 

Receiving Mail 

Ballots

Missouri No -- Not required Election Day

Montana [15] Yes 11/09/2022 Not required Election Day

Nebraska [16] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Nevada Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day

4 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

New Hampshire Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

New Jersey Yes 11/19/2022 Election Day

6 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

New Mexico [17] Yes 11/25/2022 Not required Election Day

New York Yes 12/05/2022 Election Day

7 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

North Carolina Yes 11/17/2022 Election Day

3 business days 

after Election 

Day

North Dakota [18] No --

1 day before Election 

Day

13 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

Northern Mariana 

Islands No -- Not required Election Day

Ohio Yes 11/15/2022 1 day before Election 

Day

10 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

Oklahoma [19] No -- Not required Election Day

Oregon Yes 11/29/2022 Election Day

7 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

Pennsylvania [20] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Puerto Rico [21] N/A N/A Election Day N/A

Rhode Island Yes 11/15/2022 Not required

7 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

South Carolina No -- Not required Election Day

South Dakota No -- Not required Election Day

Tennessee [22] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Texas Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day

1 business day 

after Election 

Day

U.S. Virgin Islands No -- Not required

10 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

Utah [23] Yes 11/14/2022 1 day before Election 

Day

13 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

Vermont Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day
Election Law and Procedure | 106 

State

State 

Allows Mail 

Ballot 

Curing

Deadline for Curing 

Mail Ballots

Deadline for 

Postmarking Mail 

Ballots

Deadline for 

Receiving Mail 

Ballots

 

Virginia [24] Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day

3 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

Washington [25] Yes 11/28/2022 Election Day

20 calendar 

days after 

Election Day

West Virginia Yes 11/14/2022 Election Day

6 calendar days 

after Election 

Day

Wisconsin [26] Yes 11/08/2022 Not required Election Day

Wyoming [27] No -- Not required Election Day

Policy Survey Table 3 Calculation Notes:

Excuse Required for Mail Voting uses question Q16.

All-Mail Elections uses questions Q17 and Q17a.

Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters uses questions Q18 and Q18a.

State Allows Drop Boxes uses question Q19.

Drop Box Operational Dates, First Date uses question Q19c.

Drop Box Operational Dates, Final Date uses question Q19c.

State Allows Mail Ballot Curing uses question Q20.

Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots uses question Q20b.

Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots uses question Q21.

Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots uses question Q21.

Policy Survey Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q16, Q17, Q17a, Q18, Q19, Q19c, Q20, Q20b, and Q21 were single-select questions. Q18a 

allowed states to select multiple responses.

• An all-mail election is an election in which all registered voters or all active registered voters 

are automatically sent a mail ballot. Some in-person voting may take place during all-mail 

elections. All-mail elections may be conducted statewide or only in certain jurisdictions within a 

state.

• A drop box is a locked container (located either indoors or outdoors) where voters (or voters’ 

authorized representatives, if allowed by state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for 

collection. Drop boxes are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate 

from ballot boxes, which are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots 

immediately after voting in person.

• A cured mail ballot is defined as a returned mail ballot that was originally rejected for an error 

or because it was missing required information but was ultimately counted because the voter 

corrected the error or supplied the required information.

[1] Drop boxes are only available when election offices are open.

[2] If a mail ballot is received within 7 days after Election Day and it is postmarked on or before 

Election Day, the ballot may be counted.
 

107 | Election Law and Procedure 

[3] The deadline to cure ballots with a missing signature was Election Day. The deadline to cure ballots 

with a non-matching signature was 5 business days after Election Day; for counties with a 4-

business-day work week, this deadline fell on November 17, 2022.

[4] Mail ballots needed to be postmarked on or before Election Day and received by November 15, 

2022.

[5] Absentee ballots were required to be received by the election office that issued the ballot by the 

close of polls on Election Day.

[6] Mail ballots were required to be received no later than 7:00 p.m. local time on Election Day in the 

office of the supervisor of elections.

[7] Drop boxes were available only during the dates and hours of advance voting.

[8] Drop box availability varied by county and location. Drop boxes were closed on Election Day at 7:00 

p.m. Regardless of postmark date, ballots were required to be received by the County Clerk’s office 

by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[9] Election authorities shall accept any vote-by-mail ballot returned, including ballots returned with 

insufficient or no postage. Election authorities may maintain one or more secure collection sites for 

the postage-free return of vote-by-mail ballots. Any election authority with collection sites shall collect 

all ballots returned each day and process them as required, including noting the day on which the 

ballot was collected. Ballots returned to such collection sites after close of business shall be dated 

as delivered the next day, with the exception of ballots delivered on Election Day, which shall be 

dated as received on Election Day. Election authorities shall permit electors to return vote-by-mail 

ballots at any established collection site through the close of polls on Election Day. All collection sites 

shall be secured by locks that may be opened only by election authority personnel. The State Board 

of Elections shall establish additional guidelines for the security of collection sites.

[10] Due to Veteran’s Day, the 3rd business day after the 2022 general election was the Monday after 

Election Day.

[11] Ballots were required to be received by 6:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[12] Ballots must be received by the municipal clerk by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[13] Voters with a letter from a physician stating they are unable to vote in person are eligible to be 

permanent absentee voters. Only certain types of mail ballot errors may be cured (non-matching 

voter signature, missing voter signature, or missing/incomplete required document).

[14] There is no formal start date for drop boxes.

[15] Montana uses the term “absentee ballots” rather than “mail ballots.” Montana uses “places of 

deposit” instead of “ballot drop boxes.”

[16] Counties with a population under 10,000 may apply to the Secretary of State to conduct all-mail 

elections for any or all of the precincts in the county for all future elections per Neb. Rev. Stat. §32-

960. The only exception to the deadline to cure is if there is a non-matching signature. Non-matching 

signatures can be cured through the close of the provisional verification deadline (7 business days 

after the election). For the 2022 general election, the deadline to cure a non-matching signature was 

November 18.

[17] Drop boxes are available to voters 24 hours a day, up until 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[18] The dates that drop boxes are available is set at the discretion of the counties.

[19] Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
Election Law and Procedure | 108 

[20] Any registrant who is permanently disabled can request to be a permanent absentee voter. Any 

registrant can request to be a permanent mail-in voter. Voters must re-apply for a ballot every year. 

Voters with a permanent mail-in voter flag receive a ballot application from the county every year. If 

they complete the application and are eligible, mail ballots are granted for all elections that year. 

County election boards define the times drop boxes are open based on county election board 

decisions. This can vary from county to county and hence the first day of drop boxes is not a valid 

answer. For the last day of drop boxes, the counties can decide on this too. The ballots must be 

received no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted. This question is not meaningful for 

Pennsylvania. Specific dates cannot be selected in this question since the start date and end date 

varies by county. Counties are permitted (but not required) to allow voters to cure deficiencies.

[21] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide 

a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election. The voter shall return 

the voted ballots to the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission (PR-SEC) by mail. Ballots must be 

postmarked no later than the date of the voting event or general election. Valid ballots must be 

received by mail, on or before the last day of the voting event general canvass, to be counted.

[22] Mail ballots must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.

[23] Utah Code 20a-3a-401(5)(d)(ii) states that if an individual whose ballot is rejected because the 

signature on the individual’s return envelope is not reasonably consistent with the individual’s 

signature on their voter registration records, the individual should return an affidavit to the election 

office no later than 5:00 p.m. the day before the canvass in order for the individual to have their 

ballot counted.

[24] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter’s absentee ballot properly postmarked must be 

returned by noon on the 3rd day after the election. Since that day fell on a holiday after the 2022 

general election, Virginia Code § 1-210 required changing the deadline to noon on Monday, 

November 14, 2022.

[25] Ballot drop boxes closed at 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots were required to be 

postmarked by November 8, 2022 and received by the county elections office by November 28, 

2022.

[26] In Wisconsin, individuals may claim a need to be a permanent absentee voter for reasons of age 

(not specified), physical illness, infirmity, or disability for an indefinite period of time. Ballots can be 

cured for missing voter signature, missing witness signature, or missing witness address. They must

be cured by no later than the close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day. Wisconsin does not track if a 

ballot requires a voter to cure a ballot or which ballots were counted after being cured. Due to a 

recent court challenge, the use of drop boxes “is not permitted under Wisconsin law unless the drop 

box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated alternate site 

under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and the 

subsequent ambiguity created by the decision means that most drop boxes were either closed or 

moved into the clerk’s office, and reporting would be unlikely or unnecessary given the added layer of 

security and placement. (see Teigen v. WEC, 403 Wis.2d 607). All ballots must be returned by close 

of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day.

[27] Drop boxes are not addressed in statute. Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
 

109 | Election Law and Procedure 

Policy Survey Table 4: UOCAVA Voting

State

Deadline for Domestic 

Military UOCAVA Voters

Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters

Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt

Alabama Election Day 7 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 7 calendar days after Election Day

Alaska Election Day 10 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 15 calendar days after Election Day

American Samoa Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day

Arizona Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Arkansas Election Day 10 business days 

after Election Day Election Day 10 business days after Election Day

California Election Day 7 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 7 calendar days after Election Day

Colorado Not required 8 calendar days 

after Election Day Not required 8 calendar days after Election Day

Connecticut Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day

Delaware Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

District of Columbia Election Day 7 business days 

after Election Day Election Day 7 business days after Election Day

Florida [1] Not required Election Day Election Day 10 calendar days 

after Election Day

Georgia [2] Election Day 3 business days 

after Election Day Election Day 3 business days after Election Day

Guam Election Day 10 business days 

after Election Day Election Day 10 business days after Election Day

Hawaii Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Idaho Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Illinois Election Day 14 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 14 calendar days after Election Day

Indiana [3] Election Day 10 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 10 calendar days after Election Day

Iowa 1 day before 

Election Day

6 calendar days 

after Election Day

1 day before 

Election Day

6 calendar days 

after Election Day

Kansas Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Kentucky Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day

Louisiana Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Maine Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Maryland [4] Election Day 10 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 10 calendar days after Election Day

Massachusetts Election Day 3 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 10 calendar days after Election Day

Michigan Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Minnesota Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Mississippi Election Day 5 business days 

after Election Day Election Day 5 business days after Election Day

Missouri [5] Not required 3 calendar days 

after Election Day Not required 3 business days after Election Day

Montana [6] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Nebraska [7] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
Election Law and Procedure | 110 

State

Deadline for Domestic 

Military UOCAVA Voters

Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters

Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt Ballot Postmark Ballot Receipt

Nevada Election Day 4 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 4 calendar days after Election Day

New Hampshire [8] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

New Jersey Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

New Mexico [9] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

New York Election Day 13 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 13 calendar days after Election Day

North Carolina [10] Not required 9 calendar days 

after Election Day Not required 9 calendar days after Election Day

North Dakota 1 day before 

Election Day

13 calendar days 

after Election Day

1 day before 

Election Day

13 calendar days 

after Election Day

Northern Mariana 

Islands Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day

Ohio Election Day 10 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 10 calendar days after Election Day

Oklahoma [11] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Oregon Election Day 7 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 7 calendar days after Election Day

Pennsylvania [12] Not required 7 calendar days 

after Election Day Not required 7 calendar days after Election Day

Puerto Rico [13] Election Day N/A Election Day N/A

Rhode Island Not required 7 calendar days 

after Election Day Not required 7 calendar days after Election Day

South Carolina [14] Not required 2 calendar days 

after Election Day Not required 2 calendar days after Election Day

South Dakota Election Day Election Day Election Day Election Day

Tennessee [15] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Texas Not required 6 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 5 calendar days after Election Day

U.S. Virgin Islands Not required 10 business days 

after Election Day Not required 10 business days after Election Day

Utah [16] 1 day before 

Election Day

13 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 13 calendar days after Election Day

Vermont Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Virginia [17] Election Day 3 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 3 calendar days after Election Day

Washington Election Day 20 calendar days 

after Election Day Election Day 20 calendar days after Election Day

West Virginia Not required 6 calendar days 

after Election Day Not required 6 calendar days after Election Day

Wisconsin [18] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day

Wyoming [19] Not required Election Day Not required Election Day
 

111 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

UOCAVA Ballot Transmission 

Methods UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods

Alabama Postal mail, Online Postal mail, Online

Alaska Postal mail, Fax, Online Postal mail, Fax

American Samoa Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Arizona Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

Arkansas Postal mail, Online Postal mail

California Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Other

Colorado Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

Connecticut Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Delaware Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

District of Columbia Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

Florida [1] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Fax

Georgia [2] Postal mail, Online Postal mail

Guam Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Hawaii Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

Idaho Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other

Illinois Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail

Indiana [3] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

Iowa Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

Kansas Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

Kentucky Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail

Louisiana Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other

Maine Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax

Maryland [4] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Massachusetts Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

Michigan Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Minnesota Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Mississippi Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

Missouri [5] Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

Montana [6] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax

Nebraska [7] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

Nevada Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

New Hampshire [8] Postal mail, Email Postal mail, Other

New Jersey Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

New Mexico [9] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email, Fax

New York Postal mail, Fax, Online Postal mail

North Carolina [10] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

North Dakota Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

Northern Mariana Islands Postal mail Postal mail

Ohio Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Oklahoma [11] Postal mail, Online Postal mail, Fax

Oregon Postal mail, Online, Other Postal mail, Email, Fax

Pennsylvania [12] Postal mail, Email Postal mail
Election Law and Procedure | 112 

State

UOCAVA Ballot Transmission 

Methods UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods

Puerto Rico [13] Postal mail, Email Postal mail

Rhode Island Postal mail, Email Postal mail, Email, Fax

South Carolina [14] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

South Dakota Postal mail, Email Postal mail

Tennessee [15] Postal mail, Email Postal mail

Texas Postal mail, Email, Online Postal mail, Other

U.S. Virgin Islands Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail, Email

Utah [16] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

Vermont Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail

Virginia [17] Postal mail, Email Postal mail, Other

Washington Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, 

Other Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other

West Virginia Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online

Wisconsin [18] Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, 

Other Postal mail, Other

Wyoming [19] Postal mail, Email, Fax Postal mail

Policy Survey Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Postmark uses question Q30.

Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Receipt uses question Q30.

Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Postmark uses question Q31.

Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters, Ballot Receipt uses question Q31.

UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods uses question Q27.

UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods uses question Q28. 

Policy Survey Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q27 and Q28 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q30 and Q31 were single-select 

questions.

[1] Overseas voters (military and civilians) have up until 10 days after Election Day to have their ballot 

received for a presidential preference primary election and the general election.

[2] Because November 11, 2022 was a state holiday, the 3rd business day after the 2022 general 

election fell on November 14, 2022.

[3] If the board of elections is unable to determine the postmark date of an absentee ballot sent by 

mail, the absentee ballot may not be counted. An absentee ballot received from an overseas voter is 

not considered as arriving too late if both of the following apply: (1) the absentee ballot envelope is 

postmarked no later than the date of the election, and (2) the absentee ballot is received not later 

than noon 10 days after the election. If the postmark on the absentee ballot envelope is unclear, the 

county election board, by unanimous vote of the entire membership of the board, determines the 

postmark date. If the board is unable to determine the postmark date, the absentee ballot may not 

be counted.

[4] Per state regulations, ballots are considered timely if they are received at the local election office on 

or by 10:00 a.m. on the 2nd Friday after an election.
 

113 | Election Law and Procedure 

[5] The law specifies the UOCAVA ballot is timely if it is received by noon on the Friday after the election. 

For the 2022 general election, a federal holiday on the Friday after the election meant that the 

deadline was the Monday after the election.

[6] Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-21-226 outlines procedures for receipt of a voted UOCAVA 

ballot (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0210/part_0020/section_0260/0130-

0210-0020-0260.html)

[7] UOCAVA ballot return via email or fax requires prior approval; county election offices seek approval 

from the Secretary of State’s office on behalf of UOCAVA voters.

[8] All absentee ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[9] UOCAVA ballots must be received by local election administrators by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[10] UOCAVA ballots must arrive on the business day before the 10th calendar day after the election.

[11] Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[12] Domestic military UOCAVA voters need to sign an affirmation indicating that they completed the 

ballot by 11:59 p.m. the day before the election. Ballots are counted as long as they are received by 

the county 7 days after the election at the latest.

[13] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide 

a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election. The voter shall return 

the voted ballots to the PR-SEC by mail. Ballots must be postmarked no later than the date of the 

voting event or general election. Valid ballots must be received by mail, on or before the last day of 

the voting event general canvass, to be counted.

[14] UOCAVA ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. 2 days following the general election.

[15] UOCAVA ballots must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.

[16] UOCAVA voters may return ballots until the canvass date.

[17] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter’s absentee ballot properly postmarked must be 

returned by noon on the 3rd day after the election. Since that day fell on a holiday after the 2022 

general election, Virginia Code § 1-210 required changing the deadline to noon on Monday, 

November 14, 2022.

[18] In Wisconsin, all ballots must be returned by close of polls on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots can be 

transmitted by postal mail, email, fax, online, or through an appointed agent. UOCAVA ballots can be 

returned by postal mail or in person if the voter is local. All ballots must be returned by close of polls 

(8:00 p.m.) on Election Day.

[19] Absentee ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
Election Law and Procedure | 114 

Policy Survey Table 5: Electronic Ballot Transmission

State

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances

No Electronic 

Ballot 

Transmission

Emergency 

Situations

Replacement 

Ballots

Voters with 

Disabilities

Alabama Yes No No No

Alaska No No No No

American Samoa Yes No No No

Arizona Yes No No No

Arkansas Yes No No No

California No Yes Yes Yes

Colorado No Yes No Yes

Connecticut Yes No No No

Delaware No No No Yes

District of Columbia No No No Yes

Florida No No No Yes

Georgia Yes No No No

Guam No No No No

Hawaii No No No Yes

Idaho Yes No No No

Illinois No No No Yes

Indiana No No No Yes

Iowa Yes No No No

Kansas Yes No No No

Kentucky No No No Yes

Louisiana No No No Yes

Maine No Yes No Yes

Maryland No No No No

Massachusetts [1] No No No Yes

Michigan No No No Yes

Minnesota No No No Yes

Mississippi No Yes No No

Missouri Yes No No No

Montana No No No Yes

Nebraska [2] No No No No

Nevada No No No Yes

New Hampshire No No No Yes

New Jersey No No No Yes

New Mexico No No No No

New York No Yes No Yes

North Carolina No No No Yes

North Dakota Yes No No No

Northern Mariana 

Islands Yes No No No

Ohio No No No Yes
 

115 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances

No Electronic 

Ballot 

Transmission

Emergency 

Situations

Replacement 

Ballots

Voters with 

Disabilities

Oklahoma Yes No No No

Oregon No No No No

Pennsylvania No No No Yes

Puerto Rico [3] N/A N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island No No No Yes

South Carolina Yes No No No

South Dakota No No No No

Tennessee Yes No No No

Texas Yes No No No

U.S. Virgin Islands No No No No

Utah No No No Yes

Vermont No No No Yes

Virginia No Yes No Yes

Washington No No No No

West Virginia No No No Yes

Wisconsin Yes No No No

Wyoming Yes No No No
Election Law and Procedure | 116 

State

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances Terminology for 

Electronic Voting by 

Voters with 

Disabilities

Any Circumstance Other Circumstances

Alabama No No --

Alaska Yes No --

American Samoa No No --

Arizona No No --

Arkansas No No --

California Yes Yes Other

Colorado No No Other

Connecticut No No --

Delaware No Yes Accessible absentee 

voting

District of Columbia No No Remote ballot 

marking

Florida No Yes Other

Georgia No No --

Guam Yes No --

Hawaii No Yes Other

Idaho No No --

Illinois No No Accessible absentee 

voting

Indiana No No Other

Iowa No No --

Kansas No No --

Kentucky No No Accessible absentee 

voting

Louisiana No No Other

Maine No No Other

Maryland Yes No --

Massachusetts [1] No No Other

Michigan No No Accessible absentee 

voting

Minnesota No No Accessible absentee 

voting

Mississippi No Yes --

Missouri No No --

Montana No No Other

Nebraska [2] No Yes --

Nevada No No Remote ballot 

marking

New Hampshire No No Accessible absentee 

voting

New Jersey No No Other

New Mexico No Yes --

New York No No Accessible absentee 

voting
 

117 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances Terminology for 

Electronic Voting by 

Voters with 

Disabilities

Any Circumstance Other Circumstances

North Carolina No No Accessible absentee 

voting

North Dakota No No --

Northern Mariana Islands No No --

Ohio No No Remote ballot 

marking

Oklahoma No No --

Oregon No Yes --

Pennsylvania No No Remote ballot 

marking

Puerto Rico [3] N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island No No Accessible absentee 

voting

South Carolina No No --

South Dakota Yes No --

Tennessee No No --

Texas No No --

U.S. Virgin Islands No Yes --

Utah No No Other

Vermont No No Remote ballot 

marking

Virginia No No Accessible absentee 

voting

Washington Yes No --

West Virginia No No Other

Wisconsin No No --

Wyoming No No --

Policy Survey Table 5 Calculation Notes:

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, No Electronic Ballot Transmission uses question Q24.

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Emergency Situations uses question Q24.

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Replacement Ballots uses question Q24.

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Voters with Disabilities uses question Q24.

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Any Circumstance uses question Q24.

Electronic Ballot Transmission Circumstances, Other Circumstances uses question Q24.

Terminology for Electronic Voting by Voters with Disabilities uses question Q24a. 

Policy Survey Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q24 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q24a was a single-select question.

• Q24 collected information on electronic ballot transmission for non-UOCAVA voters only. Voters 

covered by UOCAVA may receive ballots electronically under the MOVE Act.
Election Law and Procedure | 118 

[1] Voters with a disability that prevents them from privately and independently marking a paper ballot 

may transmit ballots electronically. Massachusetts refers to electronic ballot transmission for voters 

with disabilities as “accessible vote by mail.”

[2] UOCAVA ballot return via email or fax requires prior approval; county election offices seek approval 

from the Secretary of State’s office on behalf of UOCAVA voters.

[3] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a 

response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
 

119 | Election Law and Procedure 

Policy Survey Table 6: In-Person Voting Before Election Day

State

Terminology for Casting 

a Ballot In Person Before 

Election Day

Excuse Required

In-Person Voting Before 

Election Day

First Day Last Day

Alabama In-person absentee voting Yes 09/14/2022 11/03/2022

Alaska [1] In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/24/2022 11/07/2022

American Samoa Other Yes 09/09/2022 11/07/2022

Arizona [2] In-person early voting No 10/12/2022 11/04/2022

Arkansas In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/07/2022

California [3] In-person early voting No 10/10/2022 11/07/2022

Colorado [4] In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/07/2022

Connecticut In-person absentee voting Yes 10/07/2022 11/07/2022

Delaware In-person early voting No 10/28/2022 11/06/2022

District of Columbia In-person early voting No 10/31/2022 11/06/2022

Florida [5] In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/24/2022 11/06/2022

Georgia In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/17/2022 11/04/2022

Guam In-person absentee voting No 10/11/2022 11/03/2022

Hawaii [6] Other No 10/25/2022 11/07/2022

Idaho Other No 10/24/2022 11/04/2022

Illinois [7] In-person early voting No 09/29/2022 11/07/2022

Indiana In-person early voting, 

Other No 10/12/2022 11/07/2022

Iowa In-person absentee voting No 10/19/2022 11/07/2022

Kansas [8] In-person early voting, 

Other No 10/19/2022 11/06/2022

Kentucky [9] In-person absentee 

voting, Other Yes 10/26/2022 11/05/2022

Louisiana In-person early voting No 10/25/2022 11/01/2022

Maine [10] In-person absentee voting No 10/11/2022 11/03/2022

Maryland [11] In-person early voting No 10/27/2022 11/03/2022

Massachusetts [12] In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/22/2022 11/04/2022

Michigan In-person absentee voting No 09/29/2022 11/07/2022

Minnesota In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/07/2022

Mississippi In-person absentee voting Yes 09/24/2022 11/05/2022

Missouri [13] In-person absentee voting No 09/27/2022 11/07/2022

Montana [14] In-person absentee voting No 10/11/2022 11/07/2022

Nebraska [15] In-person early voting No 10/11/2022 11/07/2022

Nevada In-person early voting No 10/22/2022 11/04/2022

New Hampshire [16] In-person absentee voting Yes 09/24/2022 11/07/2022

New Jersey In-person early voting No 10/29/2022 11/06/2022

New Mexico In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/11/2022 11/05/2022
Election Law and Procedure | 120 

State

Terminology for Casting 

a Ballot In Person Before 

Election Day

Excuse Required

In-Person Voting Before 

Election Day

First Day Last Day

New York [17] In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/29/2022 11/06/2022

North Carolina

In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting, 

Other

No 10/20/2022 11/05/2022

North Dakota In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/21/2022 11/07/2022

Northern Mariana 

Islands

In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting Yes 11/01/2022 11/07/2022

Ohio In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/12/2022 11/07/2022

Oklahoma In-person absentee voting No 11/02/2022 11/05/2022

Oregon [18] Other Yes 10/19/2022 11/07/2022

Pennsylvania [19] No such voting -- -- --

Puerto Rico [20] In-person early voting Yes N/A N/A

Rhode Island In-person early voting No 10/19/2022 11/07/2022

South Carolina [21] In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/05/2022

South Dakota In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/07/2022

Tennessee In-person early voting No 10/19/2022 11/03/2022

Texas In-person early voting No 10/24/2022 11/04/2022

U.S. Virgin Islands In-person early voting, Inperson absentee voting No 10/10/2022 10/31/2022

Utah [22] In-person early voting No 10/25/2022 11/04/2022

Vermont [23] In-person absentee voting No 09/24/2022 11/07/2022

Virginia [24] In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/05/2022

Washington Other No 10/21/2022 11/07/2022

West Virginia In-person early voting No 10/26/2022 11/05/2022

Wisconsin [25] In-person absentee voting No 10/25/2022 11/06/2022

Wyoming In-person absentee voting No 09/23/2022 11/07/2022

Policy Survey Table 6 Calculation Notes:

Terminology for Casting a Ballot In Person Before Election Day uses question Q25.

Excuse Required uses question Q25a.

In-Person Voting Before Election Day, First Day uses question Q25b.

In-Person Voting Before Election Day, Last Day uses question Q25b. 

Policy Survey Table 6 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q25 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q25a and Q25b were single-select questions.

[1] There are several in-person absentee and early vote locations that are also available on Election 

Day. A list of these locations is available on the division’s website beginning 45 days prior to the 

election.
 

121 | Election Law and Procedure 

[2] Emergency voting was available from November 5, 2022 to November 7, 2022. Emergency voting 

required the voter to sign an affidavit attesting to the fact they were experiencing an emergency that 

would prevent them from voting on Election Day.

[3] The dates that early voting was offered varied by jurisdiction.

[4] October 24, 2022 was the first day that counties were required to have in-person polling locations 

open. However, some counties chose to have in-person voting open earlier than that.

[5] Florida has 10 days of mandatory early voting with up to 5 additional days at the front end and one 

at the back end.

[6] Schedules for each voting location varied. Some were open after October 25, 2022 and some 

closed before November 7, 2022.

[7] The first date of early voting listed is for counties that have early voting at permanent polling places 

other than the office of the election authority (10 ILCS 5/19A-15). The last day listed is for early 

voting at the office of the election authority or at a location designated by the election authority for 

this purpose (10 ILCS 5/19A-15, 19A-20).

[8] In-person early voting varies by jurisdiction. Counties may begin advance voting as early as the 20th 

day prior to Election Day. All counties must allow in-person early voting no later than 1 week prior to 

Election Day.

[9] Kentucky had in-person absentee voting, which required an excuse. This was conducted from 

October 26, 2022 until November 2, 2022, excluding weekends. Afterward, there were 3 days of noexcuse absentee in-person voting in which anyone eligible to vote on Election Day could vote 

between November 3, 2022 and November 5, 2022

[10] Any voter may request and vote an absentee ballot without a reason as soon as ballots become 

available (at least 30 days prior to Election Day) through the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that 

date and through Election Day, voters who meet the requirements to get a special-circumstances 

absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot, but they must have a reason.

[11] §10-301.1(d)(1) of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, states that early voting 

centers shall be open for voting “beginning the second Thursday before a primary or general election 

through the Thursday before the election.”

[12] The in-person voting period applies to in-person early voting. In-person absentee voting may occur 

once ballots are available until 12:00 p.m. the day before Election Day. In-person absentee voting 

before Election Day requires an excuse but early voting does not. 

[13] An excuse is required for 4 weeks of the absentee voting period. Two weeks prior to the election, 

voters can vote in person with no excuse.

[14] In-person absentee voting is done at the county elections office. Under certain circumstances 

(precinct-to-precinct change within the same county or moving from inactive to active status), 

registration can be done on Election Day. Due to recent law changes in 2021, registration must be 

done by noon on the day before Election Day (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130

/chapter_0020/part_0030/section_0040/0130-0020-0030-0040.html).

[15] Early voting is typically only available during regular business hours on weekdays, although some 

jurisdictions may extend their hours or open on weekends to accommodate early voting.

[16] New Hampshire has absentee voting, not early voting. A voter can request an absentee ballot any 

time during the year, but will not receive their general ballot until the ballots are ready. Absentee 

ballots are not opened or cast until Election Day.

[17] In-person early voting is conducted between the dates provided and does not require an excuse. 

In-person absentee voting does require an excuse, and can be completed any time after ballots are 

available (usually not earlier than a month and a half prior to the election).

[18] Oregon does not have early voting, but allows in-person voting in specific circumstances. For 

example, if the voter loses their ballot or otherwise spoils it, they can appear at the county elections 

office and be issued a new ballot. That happens through 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
Election Law and Procedure | 122 

[19] In-person voting on voting machines is not allowed before Election Day. Prior to the close of the 

mail ballot application period, a voter may go to their local county election board’s office, apply for a 

mail ballot, and vote a mail ballot all in one visit.

[20] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide 

a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.

[21] Early voting locations are closed on Sundays.

[22] The dates and hours of in-person voting before Election Day vary by county.

[23] In-person early voting may only be done during the hours the town/city clerk’s office is open.

[24] Virginia Code § 24.2-701.1 requires at least 8 hours of in-person absentee voting on the 2 

Saturdays before the election. Local electoral boards may provide for Sunday hours as well.

[25] In Wisconsin, statute determines the start and end dates of when in-person absentee voting can 

be held; however, each municipality determines what days and times in that time frame they will 

offer the option to their voters. The listed dates are the time frame in which in-person absentee 

voting can be held.
 

123 | Election Law and Procedure 

Policy Survey Table 7: Election Certification and Recounts

State

2022 General 

Election 

Certification 

Deadline

Reason State May Conduct a Recount

When Result Is 

Within 

Specified 

Margin

By Request of 

Affected 

Candidate or 

Party 

When Result Is 

Within Margin 

AND Affected 

Candidate or 

Party Request

By Request of 

Other Person 

or Group

Alabama 11/30/2022 No Yes No No

Alaska 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No Yes

American 

Samoa 11/15/2022 No Yes No No

Arizona 12/05/2022 Yes No No No

Arkansas 11/23/2022 No Yes No No

California 12/16/2022 No Yes No Yes

Colorado 11/23/2022 Yes Yes No No

Connecticut 11/29/2022 Yes No No No

Delaware [1] 11/10/2022 Yes No No No

District of 

Columbia [2] 11/30/2022 Yes Yes No No

Florida [3] 11/22/2022 Yes No No No

Georgia [4] 11/25/2022 No No Yes No

Guam [5] 11/25/2022 Yes No No No

Hawaii [6] 11/28/2022 Yes No No No

Idaho 11/23/2022 No Yes No No

Illinois [7] 12/09/2022 Yes Yes No Yes

Indiana [8] 11/21/2022 No Yes No No

Iowa [9] 12/05/2022 No Yes No No

Kansas [10] 12/01/2022 No Yes No No

Kentucky 11/28/2022 Yes Yes No No

Louisiana [11] 11/23/2022 No No Yes No

Maine [12] 11/28/2022 No Yes No No

Maryland [13] 12/13/2022 No Yes No No

Massachusetts 

[14] 11/23/2022 No Yes Yes No

Michigan 11/28/2022 Yes Yes No Yes

Minnesota 11/29/2022 No Yes Yes Yes

Mississippi [15] 12/08/2022 No No No No

Missouri [16] 12/13/2022 No No Yes No

Montana [17] 12/05/2022 Yes No Yes No

Nebraska 12/05/2022 Yes Yes No No

Nevada [18] 11/22/2022 No Yes No Yes

New Hampshire 12/07/2022 No Yes No No

New Jersey 12/08/2022 No Yes No No

New Mexico 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No Yes

New York 12/15/2022 Yes No No No

North Carolina 

[19] 11/29/2022 No No Yes No
Election Law and Procedure | 124 

State

2022 General 

Election 

Certification 

Deadline

Reason State May Conduct a Recount

When Result Is 

Within 

Specified 

Margin

By Request of 

Affected 

Candidate or 

Party 

When Result Is 

Within Margin 

AND Affected 

Candidate or 

Party Request

By Request of 

Other Person 

or Group

North Dakota 11/25/2022 Yes Yes Yes Yes

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

11/28/2022 No Yes Yes No

Ohio 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No Yes

Oklahoma [20] 11/15/2022 Yes Yes No Yes

Oregon 12/15/2022 Yes Yes No No

Pennsylvania 

[21] 11/28/2022 Yes No No Yes

Puerto Rico 

[22] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island 

[23] 11/22/2022 No No Yes No

South Carolina 11/18/2022 Yes No No No

South Dakota 11/15/2022 No No Yes No

Tennessee [24] 12/08/2022 No No No No

Texas 12/12/2022 No No Yes No

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 11/18/2022 No Yes No No

Utah [25] 11/29/2022 Yes Yes No No

Vermont [26] 11/15/2022 No No Yes No

Virginia [27] 12/05/2022 No No Yes No

Washington 

[28] 12/08/2022 Yes Yes No Yes

West Virginia 

[29] 12/08/2022 No Yes No No

Wisconsin [30] 12/01/2022 Yes No Yes No

Wyoming [31] 11/16/2022 Yes Yes Yes Yes
 

125 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

Reason State May Conduct a Recount

Recount 

By Court Order Methods

By Order of 

Election 

Authority

Other 

Circumstances

Alabama Yes No Yes Machine

Alaska No No No Manual, Machine

American Samoa No No No Manual

Arizona Yes No No Machine

Arkansas No No No Machine

California Yes Yes No Manual, Machine

Colorado No No No Machine

Connecticut Yes No No Manual, Machine

Delaware [1] No No No Manual

District of 

Columbia [2] No No No Manual, Machine

Florida [3] Yes No No Manual, Machine

Georgia [4] Yes Yes No Machine

Guam [5] Yes No No Machine

Hawaii [6] Yes No No Machine

Idaho No No Yes Other

Illinois [7] Yes No No Machine, Other

Indiana [8] No No No Manual, Machine

Iowa [9] Yes Yes No Manual, Machine

Kansas [10] Yes Yes No Manual, Machine

Kentucky Yes Yes No Manual, Machine

Louisiana [11] Yes No No Other

Maine [12] No No No Manual

Maryland [13] No No No Manual, Machine

Massachusetts 

[14] No No No Manual

Michigan Yes No No Manual, Machine

Minnesota Yes No No Manual

Mississippi [15] No No Yes Other

Missouri [16] No No No Machine

Montana [17] Yes No No Manual

Nebraska No No No Machine

Nevada [18] No No No Other

New Hampshire No No No Manual

New Jersey Yes No No Manual, Machine

New Mexico Yes Yes No Manual, Machine

New York Yes Yes No Manual

North Carolina 

[19] No Yes No Manual, Machine

North Dakota No No No Manual, Machine
Election Law and Procedure | 126 

State

Reason State May Conduct a Recount

Recount 

By Court Order Methods

By Order of 

Election 

Authority

Other 

Circumstances

Northern Mariana 

Islands No No No Manual

Ohio No No No Manual

Oklahoma [20] No No No Manual, Machine

Oregon Yes Yes No Manual

Pennsylvania 

[21] No No No Other

Puerto Rico [22] N/A N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island 

[23] No No No Machine

South Carolina Yes No No Machine

South Dakota No No No Machine

Tennessee [24] Yes No No Other

Texas No No Yes Other

U.S. Virgin 

Islands Yes No No Machine

Utah [25] No No No Other

Vermont [26] No No No Machine

Virginia [27] No No No Machine

Washington [28] No Yes No Other

West Virginia [29] No No No Manual

Wisconsin [30] Yes No No Other

Wyoming [31] Yes Yes No Machine

Policy Survey Table 7 Calculation Notes:

2022 General Election Certification Deadline uses question Q34.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, When Result Is Within Specified Margin uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Request of Affected Candidate or Party uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, When Result Is Within Margin AND Affected Candidate or Party 

Request uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Request of Other Person or Group uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Court Order uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, By Order of Election Authority uses question Q35.

Reason State May Conduct a Recount, Other Circumstances uses question Q35.

Recount Methods uses question Q35a.
 

127 | Election Law and Procedure 

Policy Survey Table 7 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q34 was a single-select question. Q35 and Q35a allowed states to select multiple responses.

• Election certification refers to a written statement attesting that the tabulation and canvassing 

of an election are complete and accurate, or the act of confirming the final official results of a 

jurisdiction’s election. This event occurs after results from valid ballots are tallied from all 

voting methods and results are validated and approved by those legally responsible.

• A recount is a repeat tabulation of the votes cast in an election to determine the accuracy of 

the reported results of an election. Recounts may be conducted for a variety of reasons, and 

the repeat tabulation may be conducted by hand or by machine, depending on local laws and 

procedures.

[1] The date listed (10:00 a.m. on the Thursday following the day of the general election) is the date 

that the Board of Canvass convenes. Delaware law does not specify a deadline by which the Board of 

Canvass must complete its work. Per Delaware Code, the margin for a recount is one-half of 1% 

difference between the candidate receiving the most votes and the candidate receiving the next 

highest number of notes (or fewer than 1,000 votes for a statewide election).

[2] There is no required deadline. The date reported is the date the DCBOE was tentatively scheduled 

to certify the November 2022 general election as of the date the 2022 Policy Survey was submitted.

[3] The applicable state or local canvassing entity has to issue a recount order once the threshold is 

triggered. For a manual recount, the recount consists solely of overvotes and undervotes and only if 

the difference is fewer than the number of votes needed to change the outcome of the election, 

according to Section 102.166, F.S. (http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode

=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100-0199/0102/Sections/0102.166.html).

[4] The deadline for certifying the election is 17 days after the election. Manual recount of paper ballots 

is only allowable under court order or if no scanner passes pre-recount logic and accuracy testing.

[5] In every election, except a primary election, the Guam Election Commission (GEC) shall not certify 

the election results until the GEC makes a determination on all election complaints or causes for 

contest brought to the attention of the GEC within 15 calendar days of the election. Thereafter, as 

soon as all the votes are counted and the ballots are sealed, the GEC shall certify the results of the 

election. The GEC Board may order a hand recount if warranted.

[6] There was no set deadline to certify the results of the 2022 general election. If no election contests 

were filed with the Supreme Court within 20 days of the election, the results were certified after that 

date.

[7] The local canvassing deadline for the 2022 general election was November 29, 2022, and the 

State Board of Elections deadline was December 9, 2022; however, judges took the oath of office on 

December 5, 2022 so the state canvassed by that date.

[8] For 2022, the Indiana Election Division (IED) tabulated the final results for all federal offices no 

later than the second Monday following the general election (November 21, 2022) and prepared a 

certificate of election to the Secretary of State. IED tabulated all statewide and judicial offices not 

later than the last Tuesday in November (November 29, 2022). The Secretary of State (SOS) certified 

immediately after IED finished the tabulation. IED tabulated all state legislative offices no later than 

the second Monday following the general election (November 21, 2022). SOS signed the certificate 

of elections and delivered to each person elected to a state legislative office.

[9] The appointed recount board determines if a recount is conducted by hand counting or machine 

counting.

[10] A County Board of Canvassers has authority to order a recount in extraordinary circumstances. The 

person making the recount request specifies the manner and location of ballots to be recounted.

[11] The certification deadline reported in the 2022 Policy Survey was tentative based upon election 

contest suits and appeal delays. See La. R.S. 18:1405 and 1409.
Election Law and Procedure | 128 

[12] The Secretary of State must submit the official tabulation of the votes to the Governor by the 20th 

day after the election.

[13] §11-503(a)(1)(ii) of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland requires that the Board 

of State Canvassers must convene within 35 days to certify the results for federal and state offices. 

Only an affected candidate can request a recount. A party cannot request a recount. The candidate 

requesting the recount specifies the type of recount they want.

[14] Local election officials must certify their election results and transmit them to the Secretary of the 

Commonwealth within 15 days after the election. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Commonwealth 

tabulates the totals and presents them to the governor and the council for certification. There are 

two types of recounts, both of which require a candidate to file a petition, but depending on the type, 

the signature requirements vary. If the difference between the two leading candidates is less than 

one-half of 1%, the candidate can petition for a district-wide or statewide recount. If the difference is 

greater than one-half of 1%, a candidate can petition for recounts by ward and precinct. Any 

registered Massachusetts voter can petition for a recount of ballot questions.

[15] Mississippi does not have recount procedures. However, within 12 days of certification of the 

election, a candidate who was on the ballot may conduct a ballot box examination to review the 

contents of the ballot box while under the supervision of the county circuit clerk. The candidate may 

choose to tally the votes they review in anticipation of a challenge to an election.

[16] A recount conducted in cases of a close race will use a machine recount but also review voter 

intent on paper ballots. A 5% manual recount is conducted after each election from a randomly 

selected precinct.

[17] Within 27 days after the election, or sooner if the returns are all received, the state auditor, 

superintendent of public instruction, and attorney general shall meet as a board of state canvassers 

in the office of the secretary of state and determine the vote. The secretary of state shall serve as 

secretary of the board, keep minutes of the meeting of the board, and file them in the official records 

of the secretary of state’s office. (See https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0150

/part_0050/section_0020/0130-0150-0050-0020.html). Montana Code Annotated (MCA) 13-16-

201 outlines the conditions under which recounts are to be conducted (see https://leg.mt.gov/bills

/mca/title_0130/chapter_0160/part_0020/section_0010/0130-0160-0020-0010.html). Montana 

Code Annotated (MCA) 13-16-412 outlines the procedure for recounting paper ballots (see 

https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0160/part_0040/section_0120/0130-0160-

0040-0120.html).

[18] The reported state election certification is the date of the Nevada Supreme Court’s canvass 

pursuant to Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 293.395. The 17 county Boards of County 

Commissioners must certify their county elections before the Nevada Supreme Court canvass and 

this must be done no later than November 18 pursuant to NRS 293.387. NRS 293.403 allows that, 

“Any voter at an election may demand and receive a recount of the vote for a ballot question.” 

Recounts must be conducted in the same manner in which the election was conducted.

[19] The listed certification date was barring recounts and/or protests in individual races. A machine 

recount is the first recount authorized, and a manual recount triggered by certain requirements may 

follow.

[20] The Oklahoma State Election Board met on November 15, 2022 to certify the results of the 2022 

general election. State law requires that if a recount or contest is filed that has not been resolved by 

the certification date, all other races or elections not subject to the contest will be certified. A 

separate meeting to certify the contested election may need to be scheduled.

[21] November 28, 2022 was the last day for county board of elections to file certified results with the 

Secretary of the Commonwealth. There is no statutory deadline for the state to certify results.

[22] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide 

a response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
 

129 | Election Law and Procedure 

[23] There is no definitive date, but the law mandates that a risk-limiting audit must be conducted prior 

to certifying the election.

[24] By statute, the state officials must certify the statewide election results “...as soon as the returns 

are received.” December 8, 2022 was an approximate date for when the state officials met to certify 

federal elections.

[25] The state certification happens on the third Tuesday after the election.

[26] According to 17 V.S.A. § 2601 (a), “(1) In an election for federal office, statewide office, county 

office, or State Senator, if the difference between the number of votes cast for a winning candidate 

and the number of votes cast for a losing candidate is two percent or less of the total votes cast for 

all the candidates for an office, divided by the number of persons to be elected, that losing candidate 

shall have the right to have the votes for that office recounted. (2) In an election for State 

Representative, if the difference between the number of votes cast for a winning candidate and the 

number of votes cast for a losing candidate is five percent or less of the total votes cast for all the 

candidates for an office, divided by the number of persons to be elected, that losing candidate shall 

have the right to have the votes for that office recounted.”

[27] Virginia Code § 24.2-800 governs who may request a recount. The Section does not include 

automatic recount provisions. Also, only a losing candidate may request a recount. There are 

different allowable margins to request a recount for write-in candidates and for recounting a 

referendum or issue election. Optical scan ballots that cannot be read by a scanner for any reason 

and/or emailed ballots from UOCAVA voters, military voters, or print-disabled voters that also cannot 

be read by a scanner are manually recounted in accordance with the “Virginia’s Guide to HandCounting Ballots” document.

[28] County canvassing boards certified their county results on November 29, 2022. The Secretary of 

State certified all results by December 8, 2022.

[29] The clerk shall transmit a copy to the Secretary of State within 30 days from the date of the 

election, except in the case of a recount, in which the clerk shall transmit a copy of the results 30 

days from the date of the completion of the recount.

[30] Wisconsin law permits a recount to occur under a wide variety of circumstances within specified 

margins, by candidate request within specified margins, or when ordered by a court of law. When 

conducting a recount, the Board of Canvassers may decide between hand count or machine count 

and can also choose that one reporting unit is done one way while another reporting unit is done 

another way. A court may order the count be done in a particular way if a reason can be proven by a 

petitioner.

[31] Recounts may be conducted in cases of ballot proposition.
Election Law and Procedure | 130 

Policy Survey Table 8: Election Audits

State

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election

Access Audit Ballot Design 

Audit

Ballot 

Reconciliation 

Audit

Compliance 

Audit or 

Procedural 

Audit

Eligibility Audit

Alabama No No No No No

Alaska No No Yes No No

American 

Samoa No Yes No No No

Arizona No No No No No

Arkansas No No Yes No No

California No No No No No

Colorado No No No No No

Connecticut No No No No No

Delaware No No No No No

District of 

Columbia No No No No No

Florida No No No No No

Georgia No No Yes No No

Guam No No Yes No No

Hawaii No No No No No

Idaho No No Yes No No

Illinois No No No No No

Indiana No No Yes No No

Iowa No No Yes No No

Kansas No No No Yes No

Kentucky No No Yes No No

Louisiana No No Yes No No

Maine No No Yes Yes No

Maryland No No Yes Yes No

Massachusetts No No No No No

Michigan No No Yes Yes No

Minnesota No No No Yes No

Mississippi No No No No No

Missouri No No No No No

Montana No No No No No

Nebraska Yes No Yes No No

Nevada No No No No Yes

New Hampshire Yes No Yes Yes No

New Jersey No No Yes No No

New Mexico No No No No No

New York No No No No No

North Carolina No No Yes No No

North Dakota No No Yes No Yes
 

131 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election

Access Audit Ballot Design 

Audit

Ballot 

Reconciliation 

Audit

Compliance 

Audit or 

Procedural 

Audit

Eligibility Audit

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

No No Yes Yes No

Ohio Yes No Yes No No

Oklahoma No No No No No

Oregon No No Yes No Yes

Pennsylvania 

[1] No No Yes No No

Puerto Rico [2] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island No No No No No

South Carolina Yes No Yes Yes No

South Dakota No No No No No

Tennessee Yes No Yes No Yes

Texas No No Yes Yes No

U.S. Virgin 

Islands No No No No No

Utah No No Yes No Yes

Vermont No No No No No

Virginia No No No No No

Washington No No No No No

West Virginia No No No No No

Wisconsin No No No No No

Wyoming No No No No No
Election Law and Procedure | 132 

State

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election

Legal Audit Logic and 

Accuracy Testing

Post-Election 

Tabulation Audit Other

Alabama No No No Yes

Alaska No Yes Yes No

American Samoa No No No No

Arizona No Yes No No

Arkansas No Yes Yes No

California No Yes Yes No

Colorado No Yes Yes No

Connecticut No Yes Yes No

Delaware No Yes Yes No

District of Columbia No Yes Yes No

Florida No Yes Yes No

Georgia No Yes Yes No

Guam No Yes No No

Hawaii No Yes Yes No

Idaho No Yes Yes No

Illinois No Yes Yes No

Indiana No Yes No Yes

Iowa No Yes Yes No

Kansas No Yes Yes No

Kentucky No Yes No Yes

Louisiana No Yes No No

Maine No Yes No No

Maryland No Yes Yes Yes

Massachusetts No Yes No No

Michigan No Yes No Yes

Minnesota No Yes Yes No

Mississippi No Yes No No

Missouri No Yes Yes No

Montana No Yes Yes No

Nebraska No Yes Yes No

Nevada No Yes Yes No

New Hampshire Yes Yes Yes No

New Jersey No Yes Yes No

New Mexico No Yes Yes Yes

New York No Yes Yes No

North Carolina No Yes Yes Yes

North Dakota No Yes Yes No

Northern Mariana 

Islands No Yes No No

Ohio No Yes Yes No

Oklahoma No Yes Yes No
 

133 | Election Law and Procedure 

State

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election

Legal Audit Logic and 

Accuracy Testing

Post-Election 

Tabulation Audit Other

Oregon No Yes Yes No

Pennsylvania [1] No Yes Yes No

Puerto Rico [2] N/A N/A N/A N/A

Rhode Island No Yes Yes No

South Carolina Yes Yes Yes Yes

South Dakota No Yes No No

Tennessee No Yes Yes No

Texas No Yes Yes No

U.S. Virgin Islands No Yes Yes No

Utah No Yes Yes Yes

Vermont No Yes Yes Yes

Virginia No Yes Yes No

Washington No Yes Yes Yes

West Virginia No Yes Yes No

Wisconsin No No Yes No

Wyoming No Yes Yes Yes

Policy Survey Table 8 Calculation Notes:

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Access Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Ballot Design Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Ballot Reconciliation Audit uses 

question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Compliance Audit or Procedural Audit

uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Eligibility Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Legal Audit uses question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Logic and Accuracy Testing uses 

question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Post-Election Tabulation Audit uses 

question Q36.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2022 General Election, Other uses question Q36. 
Election Law and Procedure | 134 

Policy Survey Table 8 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Q36 allowed states to select multiple responses.

• An election audit may refer to (1) A systematic, independent, documented process for 

obtaining records, statements of fact, or other relevant information and assessing them 

objectively to determine the extent to which specified requirements are fulfilled. (2) The 

verification of statistical or exact agreement of records from different processes or subsystems 

of a voting system. (3) A review of a system and its controls to determine its operational status 

and the accuracy of its outputs.

[1] The Secretary of the Commonwealth directed all counties to participate in a risk-limiting audit and 

all but one of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties did so.

[2] Puerto Rico did not hold a federal election on November 8, 2022 and was not required to provide a 

response to Policy Survey questions that pertained directly to that election.
135 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

 

Chapter 3. Voter Registration: The 

NVRA and Beyond

Key Findings

Section A of the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on voter 

registration between the 2020 and 2022 general elections. Election officials were asked 

questions related to registration and list maintenance, including the number of people registered 

and eligible to vote in the 2022 general election, registration applications processed, 

confirmation notices sent pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and for other 

purposes, and records removed from the voter registration rolls. Notable findings from Section A 

of the 2022 EAVS include:

o State motor vehicle offices continued to be the most common source of registration and 

accounted for 55% of all registrations received—the highest in EAVS history.

o Online registrations were the second most common source of registration and accounted 

for 14% of the registrations received. However, this source dropped by 50.3% compared to

online registrations reported for the 2020 EAVS.

o The percentage of in-person voter registrations and registrations received by mail, fax, and 

email continued to decrease and obtained the lowest results of the past election cycles. Inperson voter registration accounted for 5.9% of all registrations, whereas mail, fax, and 

email registrations combined accounted for 9.1%.

o The total number of active registrations for the 2022 general election was more than 203

million, accounting for 85.4% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP). Over two-thirds of 

the states reported a higher active registration rate in 2022 than in 2018.

o Nearly 81 million registration applications were processed for the 2022 general election. 

The most common types of registration applications submitted by voters were changes to 

the voter’s record (44.1%) and new valid registrations (27.9%).

o States reported sending 26.6 million confirmation notices between the close of 

registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for the 2022 

general election. More than half of these confirmation notices were not returned by voters. 

Introduction

Voter registration is required in 49 states,1 all U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia, 

making registration the first step toward election participation for most voters.2 Registration 

serves multiple purposes: it allows election officials to confirm if a person is eligible to vote; 

permits officials to efficiently allocate resources such as ballots, poll workers, and voting 

1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 56 

states, U.S. territories, and federal districts that submit Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico did not 

submit data for the 2022 EAVS because it did not hold a federal general election in November 2022.

2 North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 136 

equipment, depending on the number of registrants per precinct and jurisdiction;3 and allows the 

tracking of voter participation.

Congress passed the NVRA in 1993 to “establish procedures that will increase the number of 

eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for federal office.”

4 This act, commonly known as 

the “Motor Voter Law,” requires that states offer the opportunity to register to vote at their motor

vehicle offices (known as the Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV] in many states) and when 

residents are applying for a driver’s license—including renewals. The law also requires states to 

offer voter registration at offices that provide public assistance or state-funded programs 

primarily engaged in providing services to individuals with disabilities, and at armed services 

recruitment offices. The NVRA also provides guidelines on registration list maintenance and sets 

limits on how voters can be removed from the rolls.

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 charged the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) with collecting data on voter registration and list maintenance procedures. The EAC meets 

its statutory requirement to report to Congress on the impact of the NVRA via Section A of EAVS.5

This chapter of the EAVS not only fulfills this requirement, but also provides insight on the 

changes in registration behaviors of Americans during federal elections and the state policies 

affecting the registration process.

Federal Laws Regulating Voter Registration

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 

The NVRA is the primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States. In this law, 

Congress provides a clear statement regarding the importance of voter registration:

“(1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right; 

(2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of 

that right; and 

(3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and 

damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and 

disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.”6

3 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For 

the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for 

Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. 

Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to 

counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city, 

town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data at

the town or township level. Maine also reported its Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 

(UOCAVA) data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, because this information is only collected at the state 

level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but most election administration activities take place in 

the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered 

by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are 

included with Maui’s data.

4 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

5 Before 2016, the EAC administered a separate survey called the NVRA Survey, which collected similar 

information. This survey was consolidated with the EAVS for the 2016 elections. Before the creation of the 

EAC, the NVRA Survey was administered by the Federal Election Commission.

6 52 U.S.C. § 20501.
 

137 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

The primary purposes of the NVRA are: 

“(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register 

to vote in elections for Federal office; 

(2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act 

[NVRA] in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in 

elections for Federal office; 

(3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and 

(4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.”7

The NVRA’s first purpose is to expand opportunities for voters to register by creating more uniform 

processes for voter registration and designating more places and methods to register to vote. The 

NVRA requires that states allow multiple methods and places to register to vote, including: (1) 

motor vehicle offices when a person obtains, renews, or updates the address on their driver’s 

license; (2) through the mail, using a standard registration application;8 (3) at all state offices 

providing public assistance (e.g., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]); (4) at 

all offices that provide state-funded programs focused on providing services to people with 

disabilities; (5) at recruitment offices of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (6) at other 

state-designated offices such as public libraries and local government offices. All of these offices 

are mandated under the NVRA to provide their users with information on voter registration, to 

assist in the registration process when required, and offer to transmit completed voter 

registration applications to the appropriate election official.

The NVRA also sets some fundamental guidelines on voter registration that states must follow. 

For example, states may set their own deadline for citizens to register to vote in a general election 

for federal offices, but that deadline can never be more than 30 days before the date of the 

election. The NVRA also sets the process that states need to follow to maintain and update their 

voter registration rolls and to conduct removal processes.

Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) 

HAVA was enacted with the goal of updating the voting administration system in the United States 

and creating a commission to assist in the administration of federal elections. In addition to 

legislating the update of the administration process for federal elections in the United States, 

HAVA mandates that states create and maintain a “computerized statewide voter registration list” 

that serves as “the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for Federal office 

7 52 U.S.C. § 20507.

8 States can make available the standard National Mail Voter Registration Form provided by the EAC 

(https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf) or their 

own version of a mail registration form following the NVRA’s requirements.

The NVRA was fully implemented after the 1994 general election. Several states are not covered by 

the NVRA. North Dakota is exempt because it does not have voter registration. U.S. territories are 

also not subject to the NVRA, and the states of Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 

Wyoming are exempt because they had same-day registration (SDR) in 1993 and have continued to 

make this option available to voters uninterrupted since that time.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 138 

in the State.”9 The computerized registration list must be centralized and “defined, maintained 

and administered at the State level.”10 However, although the registration list is administered at 

the state level, any local election official must have access to the registration list and is required 

to enter any updated voter registration information in the computerized system. HAVA also 

specifies that the maintenance of the implemented computerized registration list will be carried 

out according to the NVRA’s mandates, and that duplicate names or registrations will be removed 

from the state’s registration list.

State Voter Registration Policies

States have wide latitude on how to conduct their voter registration activities, as long as state 

policies comply with federal laws like the NVRA and HAVA. This flexibility allows states to adapt 

their laws as they see appropriate to better serve the interests of their citizens and permits them 

to adapt when unforeseen circumstances arise. 

During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, some states implemented laws to expand voter 

registration opportunities by allowing residents to register to vote online, at the polls, or by 

extending the deadline to register to vote. In some cases, these changes have been maintained 

for the 2022 general election. For example, in 2020, Massachusetts extended its voter 

registration deadline from 20 days before the election to 10 days before the election—which also 

created an overlap between open voter registration and early voting, allowing residents to register 

to vote and cast a ballot on the same day—and maintained this registration deadline for the 2022 

general election.11

However, voter registration laws usually take years from when they are first proposed to when 

they are fully implemented. For example, in April 2020—well before the November 2020 general 

election—Virginia’s legislature approved the use of SDR for “any person who is qualified to 

register to vote.”12 However, this law did not become effective until October 1, 2022, making the 

2022 general election the first election in which Virginians were allowed to register to vote at the 

polls on Election Day.13

The Registration Process

The typical voter registration process is depicted in Figure 1. Citizens in the United States can 

register to vote using different methods—some of them mandated by federal law (e.g., mail 

registration) and others offered at the discretion of the state (e.g., online registration). Once a 

registration application is completed and submitted, the state or local election office must 

confirm the eligibility of the applicant.14 Eligible applicants are added to the voter registration rolls 

and notified of their registration status, whereas applicants who submitted ineligible or 

incomplete applications are contacted for further information to complete their applications.

9 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

10 Ibid.

11 https://www.sec.state.ma.us/divisions/elections/voter-resources/registering-to-vote.htm

12 VA Code § 24.2-420.1 https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+ful+CHAP1153

&201+ful+CHAP1153.

13 For a more complete overview of states’ registration policies, see Chapter 2 of this report.

14 In order to be eligible to register to vote for federal elections, federal law requires that individuals must 

be U.S. citizens and be at least 18 years old. Some states have additional eligibility requirements, such as 

requiring individuals to have resided within the state or jurisdiction for a certain period of time before they 

may register to vote.
 

139 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

Figure 1. The Voter Registration Process 

 

Voter registration also serves to assign each voter to a precinct—a bounded geographic area to 

which voters are assigned according to their residential address as listed on their voter 

registration record—so that voters receive the correct ballot in an election. The voter registration 

system tracks each voter’s electoral participation so that an individual can be given credit for 

voting in an election, which helps ensure that each registered voter casts only one ballot that is 

counted per election.

Every person with a valid registration is considered an active, registered voter. However, at times, 

a question arises as to whether a person still resides at the address at which they are registered.

The election official may receive a notification via the U.S. Postal Service National Change of 

Address service that the voter has a new residential address. In these situations, the state or 

local election office may send the registrant a confirmation of address notice. If the person 

responds to the confirmation notice, the election office will take action as directed by the 

recipient. In many states, if the person fails to return the form or the form is returned to the 

election office as undeliverable, the person is placed on a list of inactive voters. Inactive voters 
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 140 

are still part of the registration rolls and included in the registration totals in most jurisdictions.15

However, before they can vote, inactive voters are typically required to show approved 

documentation of their eligibility (most commonly, proof that they live at an address within the 

voting jurisdiction). In some cases, inactive voters may be required to cast a provisional ballot 

when their eligibility cannot be established at the polls.

The NVRA also requires states to maintain their voter registration rolls by removing registrants 

who are no longer eligible to vote. This process is referred to as “list maintenance.” When an 

individual is removed from the voter registration roll because of a change in residence under the 

NVRA process, this is called “address list maintenance.” More details about list maintenance 

processes and procedures are available in the “Registration List Maintenance” section of this 

chapter. Election offices may share data with other state agencies or entities that maintain death 

records or felony and prison records for the purposes of identifying potentially ineligible voters.16

Voter Registration Rates for the 2022 General Election

The NVRA requires each state to report its total number of registered and eligible, active, and 

inactive registrants for each federal general election.17 Most states report the total “registered 

and eligible” voters as the sum of active and inactive registrants. However, data on registered and 

eligible voters as reported in the EAVS should be used with caution, as these totals can include 

registrants who are no longer eligible to vote in that state but who have not been removed from 

the registration rolls because the removal process laid out by the NVRA can take up to two 

election cycles to be completed.18, 19

15 Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q10 

of the Policy Survey. According to the 2022 Policy Survey, six states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, New 

Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming) do not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their 

registration records. In survey comments in EAVS, Minnesota reported “Minnesota is NVRA exempt. 

Minnesota does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.” Nebraska reported “Nebraska does not have 

‘Inactive’ voters. The numbers in line A1c reflect the number of voters who were sent a Section 8(d)(2) 

notice and have not responded.” Oregon reported “Do not track number of inactive voters,” and Wisconsin 

reported “Wisconsin is NVRA exempt; Wisconsin does not have inactive registered voters.”

16 More information about state policies on voter registration database linkages is found in Chapter 2 of 

this report.

17 Eleven states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Northern Mariana Islands, 

Ohio, Oregon, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) reported only active registrants. North 

Dakota does not have voter registration and thus did not have any data to report.

18 Utah reported 199,315 fewer “registered and eligible” voters in their state (item A1a of the EAVS) than 

the sum of active and inactive registrants (items A1b and A1c of the EAVS). This discrepancy is mainly the 

result of two of this state’s counties not reporting data in A1a for total registrations but reporting data in 

A1b for total active registrations. Illinois reported 84,176 more “registered and eligible” voters than the 

sum of active and inactive registrants. This discrepancy is the result of seven of this state’s counties 

reporting data in A1a for total registrations but not reporting data in A1b for total active registrations and/or 

A1c for total inactive registrations.

19 New Hampshire reported zero registered voters in 18 of its 320 jurisdictions and stated in comments: 

“Unincorporated place – No voters.” Wisconsin reported zero registered voters in three of its 1,851 

jurisdictions because these jurisdictions were incorporated or annexed into new municipalities where they 

reported the corresponding registration data. Kalawao County in Hawaii did not report registered voters

because Maui County administers Kalawao County’s elections, and Maui’s registrants are reported in 

Kalawao’s data. Two counties in Utah (Davis County and Morgan County) responded “Data not available” to 

the number of registered voters in the county. North Dakota did not report the number of registered voters 

because the state does not require voter registration.

Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 142 

registrants were designated as active, and 11.1% of registrants were designated as inactive.22

The total number of active registrants exceeded the 200 million mark for the first time in EAVS 

history in 2020 and continued to exceed that mark with 203,660,564 active registrations 

reported in 2022, accounting for 85.4% of the 2021 CVAP.23, 24 The majority of states reported 

active registration rates of 80% or more of their 2021 CVAP (see Table 1 of Appendix A in this 

chapter).25 Compared to the active registration rates in 2018, 68.6% of the states reported a 

higher active registration rate in 2022.26

There was a 2.8-percentage-point increase in the active registration rates at the national level 

(from 82.5% in 2018 to 85.4% in 2022).27 At the state level, West Virginia and Michigan reported 

the largest increases in active registration rates between 2018 and 2022 (11.3% and 10.1%, 

respectively), and Maine and New Hampshire reported the largest drops in active registration 

22 The percentage of active and inactive registrants was collected in items A1b and A1c of the 2022 EAVS, 

respectively, and the two data points were each divided by the total number of registered voters (item A1a 

of EAVS). North Dakota was not included in these calculations because it does not have voter registration. 

American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, 

the U.S. Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming did not provide data about inactive voters in item A1c of 

the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages; 

because of this, the percentage of active and inactive registrants does not sum to 100%. Casewise deletion 

only uses data from states that provide information for the numerator and the denominator of the 

calculation and, in the case of inactive registrations, there are several states that do not have or track data 

on inactive registrations. They were thus excluded from the percentage of inactive voter calculation, 

whereas all states were included in the percentage of active registrations.

23 The total number of active registrants was collected in item A1b in the 2022 EAVS. The active CVAP voter 

registration rate was calculated as A1b/CVAP x 100. North Dakota was not included in the calculation 

because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the 

U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation because there is no CVAP information from the 

Census Bureau for these territories. For more information on the rationale to use these numbers to create 

the active CVAP voter registration rate, see the callout box “Calculating Registration Rates” in this chapter. 

Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

24 This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2021 instead of 

the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were 

not available by the time this report was finalized.

25 The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated as A1b/CVAP x 100. Casewise deletion 

at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

26 The percentage of states reporting a higher active registration rate in 2022 was calculated by subtracting 

the active registration rate for 2022 from the active registration rate for 2018 (both calculated as 

A1b/CVAP x 100) and categorizing the positive results as increases and the negative results as decreases. 

North Dakota was not included because it does not have voter registration. The U.S. territories of American 

Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included because the 

U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate for their CVAP.

27 The 2018 active CVAP registration rate uses the same calculation as 2022. The 2018 active CVAP 

registration rate uses the 2017 CVAP as the denominator. The percentage point change between the 2018 

and 2022 active CVAP voter registration rates was calculated by subtracting the 2018 active CVAP voter 

registration percentage from the 2022 active CVAP voter registration percentage. New Mexico’s change in 

registration rate has not been highlighted because of data quality issues with the state’s A1b submission in 

the 2018 EAVS.
143 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

rates (14.8% and 12.5%, respectively).28, 29 Figure 2 shows the change in the active CVAP voter 

registration rate among states from the 2018 general election to the 2022 general election.

Figure 2. Most States Had an Increase in Active Citizen Voting Age Population 

Registration Rate from 2018 to 2022 

Source: The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2022 percentage of 

active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2022 EAVS divided by the 2018 percentage of 

active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2018 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the 

result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change. Casewise 

deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. North Dakota does not have a 

change rate because it does not have voter registration. Puerto Rico does not have data because it did not 

conduct a 2022 federal general election. The U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern 

Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands do not have a change rate because the U.S. Census Bureau 

does not provide an estimate for their CVAP. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to reflect states that 

decreased, that slightly increased, and that notably increased in terms of the active CVAP registration rate 

from 2018 to 2022.

28 The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2022 percentage of 

active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2022 EAVS divided by the 2018 percentage of 

active CVAP voter registration (A1b/CVAP x 100) for the 2018 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the 

result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

29 New Mexico reported an uncharacteristically low number of active registrations in the 2018 EAVS 

(698,172) compared to the active registrations reported in the general elections of 2014, 2016, and 2020 

(all of which exceeded 1 million active registrations), which led to a 65.9% increase in active registrants. 

Because of concerns with the reliability of this result, it was not included as the largest increase in the body 

of the report.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 144 

How Americans Registered to Vote for the 2022 General Election

Americans can use different methods to register to vote as provided by their state. Voter 

registration applications can be used not only to register to vote for the first time in a jurisdiction, 

but also to update relevant voter information such as address, name, or political party affiliation. 

In the period between the close of voter registration for the 2020 general election and the close 

of registration for the 2022 general election, states reported receiving 80,764,222 registration 

applications—909,250 more applications than were received in the same period leading up to the 

2018 general election.30, 31 Motor vehicle offices continued to be the most common source of 

these registration applications, accounting for 55% of the total registrations received for the 2022 

general election—the highest share of voter registrations by any method in EAVS history.32 Online 

registrations accounted for 14%; registrations by mail, fax, and email combined accounted for 

9.1%; and in-person registrations accounted for 5.9% of the total registration applications.33 The 

rest of the registration applications that were received during this period were from sources such 

as registration drives (2.4%), public assistance offices (1.4%), and other state agencies not 

mandated by the NVRA (2.6%), such as public libraries among other sources.

34

30 The total number of registration applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal 

general election was reported in item A3a in the 2022 and 2018 EAVS.

31 Guam, Idaho, and Mississippi did not provide data on the total number of registrations received in 2022. 

Missouri and the Northern Mariana Islands did not provide data on the total number of registrations 

received in 2018. North Dakota did not provide data on the total number of registrations received because 

they do not require voter registration.

32 The percentage of registrations received by motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100. 

American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, 

Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation because they did 

not report data on item A3a and/or item A4d. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating 

the national percentage.

33 The percentage of registrations received by mail, fax, or email was calculated as A4a/A3a x 100. The 

percentage of registrations received in person was calculated as A4b/A3a x 100. The percentage of 

registrations received online was calculated as A4c/A3a x 100. Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, North Dakota, 

Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation of the percentage of 

registrations received by mail, fax, or email because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4a. 

Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Rhode Island were 

not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received in person because they did not 

report data on item A3a and/or item A4b. American Samoa, Arkansas, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, 

Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Rhode Island, South 

Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of 

registrations received online because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4c. Casewise 

deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

34 The percentage of registrations received from registration drives was calculated as A4i/A3a x 100. The 

percentage of registrations received from public assistance offices was calculated as A4e/A3a x 100. The 

percentage of registrations received from other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated 

as A4h/A3a x 100. American Samoa, Connecticut, Georgia, Guam, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, 

Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the 

Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, 

West Virginia, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations 

received from registration drives because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4i. American 

Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana 

Islands, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not 

included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at public assistance offices because 

they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4e. American Samoa, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
 

145 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

For the past four election cycles, there has been a downward trend in the percentage of 

Americans that register to vote in person at their election or registrar’s office—13.5% of 

registrations were submitted in person for the 2016 general election, and this percentage 

decreased in each ensuing election cycle and reached 5.9% of in-person registrations reported in 

2022 (see Figure 3).35 When comparing the results from the 2020 and 2022 general elections, 

15 states reported increases and 33 reported decreases in the percentage of in-person 

registrations.36 Most decreases ranged from 0.5 to 6 percentage points, whereas the majority of 

increases ranged from 0.4 to 10 percentage points. West Virginia reported the largest change of 

in-person registrations between 2020 and 2022 with an increase of 20.3 percentage points.37

The percentage of registrations filed by mail, fax, or email also decreased in recent years and now 

account for less than 10% of all registrations for the first time in EAVS history.38, 39 In 2022, 

77.6% of the states reported a decrease in voter registrations received by mail, fax, or email 

compared to 2020, with Delaware and North Carolina reporting the largest drops (decreasing by 

32.8 and 20.8 percentage points, respectively).40

 

Guam, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the 

Northern Mariana Islands, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, the U.S. Virgin Islands, West 

Virginia, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registrations received at 

other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item 

A4h. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages. The instructions 

for this question noted that registration applications should be classified according to the mode used to 

submit it. For example, if the voter submits a registration application online using the state’s online voter 

registration portal, then this is considered an online voter registration. If the voter accessed the online voter 

registration system at a public library, then this would also be considered an online registration.

35 The percentage of in-person registrations received for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS used the same 

calculation as the 2022 percentage. The percentage of in-person registrations received in 2016 was 

calculated as A6b/A5b x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national 

percentages.

36 Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Rhode Island 

were not included in this comparison because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4b.

37 The percentage point difference of in-person registrations was calculated as the percentage of in-person 

registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of in-person registrations in 2020.

38 The percentage of mail, fax, or email registrations received for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS used the same 

calculation as the 2022 percentage.

39 EAVS history refers to data collected by the EAC starting with the 2004 general election. Data for voter 

registration were reported in the EAVS starting with the 2014 general election and in a separate report 

(commonly known as the “NVRA Report”) before that election up to the 2004 general election. Before 

2004, data on voter registration were collected by the Federal Election Commission.

40 The percentage point difference of mail, fax, or email registrations was calculated as the percentage of 

mail, fax, or email registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of mail, fax, or email registrations in 2020.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 146 

Figure 3. Registrations Filed at Motor Vehicle Offices Account for More than Half of Registrations 

 

Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100 

for all years. The percentage of registrations received by other means was calculated as (A4e+A4f+A4g

+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a x 100 for all years. The percentage of registrations received online was 

calculated as A4c/A3a x 100 for all years. The percentage of registrations received by mail/fax/email was 

calculated as A4a/A3a x 100 for all years. The percentage of registrations received in person was 

calculated as A4b/A3a x 100 for all years. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the 

national percentage.

Online registration continues to be the second most popular method of voter registration in the 

United States and has been since the 2016 general election, although it decreased by 50.3% in 

2022 compared to 2020.41 The steep decline in the percentage of registrations received online is 

likely the combination of multiple factors. One of the main reasons for this decline is that the 

percentage of online registrations in 2020 was unusually high and reached a record 28.2% of all 

registrations received, an increase of 75.2% compared to the online registrations recorded in the 

41 The percentage difference in online registrations between 2022 and 2020 was calculated as the 

percentage of online registrations in 2022 divided by the percentage of online registrations in 2020. One 

unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the 

percentage change.
 

147 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

previous election cycle.42 This phenomenon was likely triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, which 

led many states to expand remote registration opportunities to compensate for the curtailing of 

in-person registration (e.g., many election offices limited visitors and many motor vehicle offices 

limited in-person appointments). Once the distancing limitations started to ease and offices 

started to reopen after 2020, the use of online registration returned to levels more similar to 

those reported in the 2018 EAVS. In fact, the percentage of online registrations received for the 

2020 general election was statistically significantly higher than the online registrations received 

for the 2018 and 2022 general elections, whereas the online registrations received in 2018 and 

2022 were not significantly different at a p < 0.05 level.43

In addition to changes in the percentage of Americans who used online registration, there were 

some states that changed their policies for this type of registration. In 2022, the number of states 

that offered online registration decreased for the first time since this method was first 

implemented in Arizona in 2002. The state of New York reported in the 2022 Policy Survey that it 

did not offer online registration—though the state offers an online option to register to vote 

through their motor vehicle office—and Oklahoma used to allow voter registration online but 

reported in the 2022 Policy Survey that it only allowed voter registration updates and not new 

voter registrations online for the 2022 general election.44

At the state level, only Iowa, Nebraska, Texas, and South Carolina had increases in the 

percentage of online registrations received when comparing data from the 2020 and 2022 EAVS. 

The largest decreases in online registrations at the state level came from Illinois and 

Massachusetts (a decrease of 85.2 and 61.9 percentage points, respectively).45

The Rise in Motor Vehicle Office Registrations

The most notable result in the 2022 EAVS in terms of voting registration method is the increase in 

registrations processed by motor vehicle offices. Even though it has been the most popular 

registration method for more than a decade, the 2022 general election is the first time in EAVS 

history in which registrations processed by motor vehicle offices accounted for more than half of 

all registrations processed in the country.46 At the national level, 55% of Americans submitted 

voter registration information through a motor vehicle office, a 40.1% increase compared to the 

42 The percentage of online registrations received for the 2020 EAVS used the same calculation as the 

2022 percentage. The percentage difference in online registrations between 2020 and 2018 was 

calculated as the percentage of online registrations in 2020 divided by the percentage of online 

registrations in 2018. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied 

by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

43 Paired t tests were used to calculate the differences between years, and p < 0.05 was used as the 

threshold for statistical significance.

44 Data on online registration policy were collected in item Q6 in the 2022 Policy Survey, and item Q7 in the 

2020 Policy Survey. More information about states with online registration is found in Chapter 2 of this 

report.

45 The percentage point difference of online registrations between 2020 and 2022 was calculated as the 

percentage of online registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of online registrations in 2020. Texas 

reported 0% online registrations in 2020. However, they did allow for online updates of voter registration in 

2020 according to their response to the 2020 Policy Survey. Illinois reported an unusually high percentage 

of online registrations in the 2020 EAVS.

46 The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100. 

Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 148 

result in 2020.47 At the state level, seven states reported a decrease in the percentage of 

registrations received through their local motor vehicle offices and 37 states reported increases 

when comparing the 2022 and 2020 results. The states that reported the largest increases in 

this type of registration were Massachusetts and Nevada (an increase of 60.3 and 47.2 

percentage points, respectively).48

Like the online registration change noted above, the large increase in the percentage of 

registrations processed at motor vehicle offices is likely the result of several factors—one of which 

is the unique circumstances leading up to the 2020 general election due to the COVID-19 

pandemic. Starting in March 2020, motor vehicle offices started to close in most states due to

public health concerns, and when states started to reopen these offices, they did so in a limited 

capacity (e.g., opening a limited number of offices, limiting the number of customers allowed in 

the office to ensure social distancing, limiting the hours of operation and the types of transactions 

allowed). These limitations were in effect for different periods of time depending on the state, and 

in some cases were present past the November 2020 general election. Additionally, to account 

for the extraordinary circumstances, most states extended the validity period for expiring driver’s 

licenses to account for the limited-capacity operations, and some states implemented online 

driver’s license renewal where this was previously not an option.49 These measures likely 

decreased the number of registrations processed at motor vehicle offices for the 2020 general 

election, because many Americans who would have interacted with their motor vehicle offices in 

normal circumstances—and therefore would have updated or filed voter registration paperwork—

between March 2020 and the 2020 general election had to wait to complete these transactions. 

In many cases these were likely pushed back until after November 2020 and were reported in the 

2022 EAVS instead of the 2020 EAVS.

An example of the phenomenon described above is detailed in a report from the Office of the 

District of Columbia Auditor (ODCA) on the District of Columbia’s 2020 election administration.50

Data from the District of Columbia Board of Elections showed that the number of registrations 

received through motor vehicle offices effectively stopped in March 2020 and did not resume 

until July 2020, and when they resumed, they did so at a slower pace than before the pandemic. 

Meanwhile, the number of online registrations processed was not affected by the onset of the 

pandemic and largely increased in the month leading up to the 2020 general election.

However, when looking at the relationship between the difference in 2020 and 2022 voter 

registrations processed by motor vehicle offices in each state and the driver’s license expiration 

extensions provided in each state—as a proxy for the potential backlog of 2020 driver license 

transactions that may have resulted in 2022 voter registrations—the results were not conclusive. 

Longer driver’s license expiration extensions were correlated with larger increases in the 

47 The percentage difference in motor vehicle offices’ registrations between 2022 and 2020 was calculated 

as the percentage of motor vehicle offices’ registrations in 2022 divided by the percentage of motor vehicle 

offices’ registrations in 2020. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was 

multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

48 The percentage-point difference of motor vehicle offices’ registrations between 2020 and 2022 was 

calculated as the percentage of motor vehicle offices’ registrations in 2022 minus the percentage of motor 

vehicle offices’ registrations in 2020.

49 https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Policy-Scan-State-Drivers-Licesnse-Expirations.pdf

50 https://dcauditor.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Elections.Administration

.Report.11.16.21.pdf (pg. 22).
 

149 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

percentage of voter registrations through the state’s motor vehicle office, but the correlation was 

not statistically significant.51 ,52 These results suggest that although the effects of the COVID-19 

response likely had an impact on the rebound of registrations filed at state’s motor vehicle 

offices, additional factors such as policy changes (e.g., implementation of automatic voter 

registration at motor vehicle offices) may have also contributed to the increase of this type of 

registration.

Automatic Voter Registration

Automatic voter registration (AVR) laws allow for non-registered individuals to be added to the 

voter registration rolls during or after an interaction with a designated state agency, such as the 

motor vehicle office, unless the person specifically declines to be registered. The most common 

differences between the types of AVR policies are the point at which the individual must decline 

or “opt out” of being registered—either at the point of service or at a later time through a mailer 

sent to the individual—and which state agencies participate in the AVR program.

In 2016, Oregon was the first state to implement AVR at the state level. Since then, 36 additional 

states have begun using automatic voter registration or incorporated automated features into 

their voter registration processes, though the details of these automatic or automated processes 

vary widely among states.

53 A more complete analysis of states’ automatic or automated 

registration policies is found in Chapter 2 of this report. For the most part, states reported that 

individuals must opt out of AVR at the point of service. A very common example is that a person is 

provided the opportunity to register to vote while completing a transaction at a motor vehicle 

office and is asked to provide a response of “yes” or “no” to be able to continue with the voter 

registration transaction. Only the state of Colorado reported not asking individuals during their 

transactions and later requiring that they actively respond to a mailer if they do not want to be 

included in the voter registration rolls.54

In total, 37 states reported using some form of AVR and 18 reported not using AVR for the 2022 

general election. All states with this registration policy reported that AVR is at least offered at 

motor vehicle offices—with 15 states reporting additional agencies (e.g., agencies for people with 

disabilities, public assistance offices) participating in the AVR program in their state.

55 Figure 4 

shows the percentage of registration applications processed at motor vehicle offices in 2020 and 

2022 for states with and without AVR policies. In AVR states, motor vehicle office registrations 

accounted for a larger portion of their total registrations in both 2020 and 2022 compared to 

non-AVR states. Interestingly, the percentage point increase in these registrations between 2020 

51 Data on driver’s license extensions came from the Department of Defense’s “COVID-19 Response State 

Issued Driver’s License & ID Card Extension Guidance” (https://www.cac.mil/Portals/53/Documents

/DL%20Expiration%20Guidance_cac_mil.pdf?ver=2020-06-18-115456-723) and the National Governors 

Association memorandum “Policy Scan of States Driver’s License Rules Ahead of the Election” 

(https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Policy-Scan-State-Drivers-Licesnse-Expirations.pdf).

52 The result of the correlation was r = 0.062, p = 0.695.

53 Data on state AVR policy were collected in item Q5 in the 2022 Policy Survey.

54 Information on the point at which the individual has the opportunity to opt out of AVR was collected in 

item Q5 in the 2022 Policy Survey. Although Colorado was the only state that reported only using a method 

of AVR that requires the voter to decline registration by responding a mailer, this “mailer opt-out” method of 

AVR was also used by Alaska, Illinois, and Oregon. However, these three states reported also using other 

AVR methods where the voter is required to opt-out during the interaction with the appropriate agency.

55 Information on state agencies participating in the AVR program for each state was collected in item Q5a 

in the 2022 Policy Survey.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 150 

and 2022 was slightly higher for non-AVR states than for AVR states. It is worth noting that AVR 

states reported 38,532,182 registrations received at their motor vehicle offices, accounting for 

87.5% of these type of registrations in the 2022 EAVS.56

Figure 4. States With Automatic Voter Registration Had the Highest Rates of 

Registrations at Motor Vehicle Offices 

 

Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as A4d/A3a x 100 

for 2020 and 2022. Item Q5a in the 2022 Policy Survey was used to group states with and without AVR 

policies. There might be states in the AVR group that did not allow for this type of registration in 2020. 

Because there was a change in the AVR question in the Policy Survey from 2020 to 2022 it was impossible 

to consistently classify states as AVR and non-AVR in 2020 for this calculation. Casewise deletion at the 

state level was used in calculating the overall percentages.

Although AVR is most commonly administered through state motor vehicle offices, 15 states use 

additional offices to register voters through AVR. EAVS does not collect data specifically on the 

number of AVRs processed by states, but there are instances in which a state will report the 

number of registrations conducted in one of these state-funded agencies. In Alaska, the state’s 

Permanent Fund Dividend program conducts AVR and filed a total of 760,797 voter registrations 

56 The number of registrations received at motor vehicle offices used item A4d of the 2022 EAVS. Item Q5a 

in the 2022 Policy Survey was used to identify states with AVR policies. The percentage of the total motor 

vehicle offices registrations that were filed at states with AVR policies used the sum of A4d for these states 

divided by the national level A4d sum multiplied by 100.
 

151 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

in 2022.57 Registrations processed through the Permanent Fund Dividend accounted for 73.9% 

of all the registrations received in Alaska in 2022, whereas they accounted for 68.1% in 2020 

and 59.8% in 2018.58

Same-Day Registration

SDR allows voters to register to vote and cast their ballot on the same day. SDR can be offered on 

Election Day, in which case it may be referred to as Election Day registration, or it can be offered 

during in-person early voting.59 SDR depends on local laws and, thus, is only allowed in some 

states and territories. Some states reported allowing SDR in very circumstances; Wisconsin, for 

instance, reported offering regular SDR at the polls on Election Day and during in-person early 

voting. In addition, Wisconsin has stated that “Individuals who are hospitalized may register and 

request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the same day anytime from the Tuesday 

prior to Election Day through 5 p.m. on Election Day.”60

In 2022, 26 states reported allowing some form of SDR. Twenty-two states reported allowing 

voters to register to vote on Election Day, 14 states reported allowing SDR during an overlap 

between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, 22 states reported allowing 

for SDR during in-person early voting, and two states reported allowing for SDR in very specific 

cases.61 The states that indicated allowing SDR were mostly the same as in 2020, with the 

exception of Alaska, Guam, Mississippi and Rhode Island, which allowed some form of SDR for 

the 2020 general election but not for the 2022 general election,

62 and Virginia, which 

implemented SDR in October of 2022.63

57 Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend automatically registers eligible voters unless they respond to a 

registration notice within a 30-day period (https://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/PFDAVRindex.php). 

Alaska reported data on the number of registrations received through the Permanent Fund Dividend 

program in item A4j of the 2022, 2020 and 2018 EAVS.

58 The percentage of the total registrations that were processed through the Permanent Fund Dividend 

program was calculated as A4j/A3a x 100 for each year.

59 Some states may have an overlap between their mail voting period and the close of their voter 

registration, during which it is possible for a person to register on the same day that they cast a mailed 

ballot; however, this is not considered SDR for purposes of the EAVS, and many states have noted in the 

past that it is not possible to track the number of mail voters who register to vote on the same day that they 

cast their mailed ballot. In-person early voting refers to any opportunity for voters in a state to cast a vote in 

person before Election Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of the different types of in-person 

early voting opportunities available in states.

60 Wisconsin reported this special situation in item Q8a of the 2022 Policy Survey.

61 These results were obtained from item Q8a of the 2022 Policy Survey. More information about state 

policies on SDR can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.

62 Alaska and Rhode Island only allow SDR for voting for the U.S. president and vice president, thus they do 

not allow for SDR in midterms when these races are not in the ballot.

63 These results were obtained from item Q8 of the 2022 Policy Survey and item Q9 of the 2020 Policy 

Survey.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 152 

The total number of SDRs recorded in 2022 was 1,019,300 and accounted for 2.7% of the total 

registrations received among states allowing for SDR.64, 65 Election Day SDRs accounted for 

64.5% of all SDRs reported and pre-Election Day SDRs accounted for 38.3% of the total SDR 

registrations reported in states that allowed them.66

The use of SDR varied considerably between states for the 2022 general election, and the NVRAexempt states—which gained NVRA exemption for allowing SDR continuously since 199367—were

among the states where SDR accounted for the largest percentages of registration applications. 

Wisconsin reported that 60.3% of the registrations received for the 2022 general election were 

SDRs, whereas New Hampshire and Wyoming reported that SDRs accounted for 16.2% and 

10.9% of all the registrations received, respectively.

68 Among states subject to the provisions of 

the NVRA, Maine had the highest proportion of SDR registrations (20.3%); although this state was 

NVRA exempt when the law was first implemented because it had SDR in 1993, Maine lost its 

exemption in 2011 when it temporarily discontinued SDR before reinstating it later that year.

Other Modes of Registration

In addition to in-person, online, mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle office registrations, states 

reported data on registration applications received from other sources, which in 2022 accounted 

for 14.5% of the applications received at the national level.69 Some of these modes of registration 

are NVRA mandated, such as registrations through armed forces recruitment offices, public 

assistance offices, and state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, which together 

accounted for 1.6% of the national registrations for the 2022 general election (see Table 2 of 

Appendix A in this chapter for a breakdown of registrations received by each of these methods).

70

64 The total number of SDR applications received during the two-year period leading to a federal general 

election was reported in item A2a in the 2022 EAVS. The total corresponds to the 23 states that reported 

allowing SDR and provided data for it. American Samoa, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, which allow for 

SDR, did not provide data in item A2a for 2022.

65 The percentage of registrations received that were SDRs was calculated as A2a/A3a x 100. The 

percentage of SDR applications corresponds to the 22 states that reported allowing SDR and provided data 

for SDR and total registrations received. American Samoa, Idaho, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, which 

allow for SDR, did not provide data in item A2a and/or item A3a and were excluded from the calculation. 

Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

66 The percentage of SDRs received that were Election Day SDRs was calculated as A2b/A2a x 100. The 

percentage of SDRs received that were pre-Election day SDRs was calculated as A2c/A2a x 100. Casewise 

deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. The percentage of SDRs that 

were Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 22 states that reported allowing Election Day SDR and provided 

data for it. New Mexico, which allows for Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2b for 2022. The 

percentage of SDRs that were pre-Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 20 states that reported allowing 

pre-Election Day SDR and provided data for it. American Samoa, Idaho, and Massachusetts, which allow for 

some form of pre-Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2c for 2022.

67 Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are NVRA exempt for this reason. North 

Dakota is also NVRA exempt because it does not require voter registration, and the U.S. territories are NVRA 

exempt.

68 The percentage of registration applications that were SDRs was calculated as A2a/A3a x 100. Casewise 

deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

69 The percentage of registrations received by other sources different than in-person, online, mail/fax/

email, and motor vehicle office was calculated as (A4e+A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a x 100 for 

the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

70 The percentage of registrations received from NVRA-mandated sources other than in person, 

mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle offices was calculated as (A4e+A4f+A4g)/A3a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.
 

153 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

States also reported registrations completed through other modes that are not required by the

NVRA and that are authorized at the discretion of the state, such as at registration drives (2.4%) 

and other agencies required by the state (2.6%).71

Types of Registrations Received for the 2022 General Election

When a person submits a voter registration application, it is processed by an election office and 

can reach one of several outcomes. Valid applications from people who are eligible and not 

already registered are considered new applications and are added to the voter registration rolls. 

Applications submitted by people already registered to vote at the same address with the same 

name and personal information are considered duplicates. Applications from already-registered 

individuals wishing to change their name, party affiliation, or address are processed as updates to 

existing registrations. Applications that do not meet the requirements of eligibility are considered 

invalid or rejected. When allowed by state law, applications submitted by individuals under 18 

years old are processed as pre-registrations so that the individual who submitted the form will be 

registered when they become of voting age.

All registration applications received are processed and scrutinized by election officials to ensure 

that the information is correct, that only eligible voters are added to the voter registration rolls, 

and that duplicate registration records are not created. After the application’s review by election 

officials and following the NVRA’s guidelines, states must notify the applicant of the result of their 

application. For example, a successful application may result in a notification in the form of a 

registration card mailed to the applicant or a notice of rejection or request for additional 

documents may be mailed to unsuccessful applicants.

Valid Registrations

Figure 5 displays information on the result of the registration applications that were received by 

states. Of the more than 80,764,222 registration applications received between the 2020 and 

2022 federal general elections, the most common type of registration was an update to an 

existing record that did not involve a cross-jurisdiction change of address.72 These updates 

usually involve a change of name (such as after a marriage or divorce), party affiliation, or withinjurisdiction change of address; these updates accounted for 44.1% of the registrations processed 

at the national level.73 New valid registrations—a registration application received from an eligible 

person in a jurisdiction where they were not previously registered and that resulted in a new 

registration record being added to the voter registration roll—made up 27.9% of the registrations 

received.74

 

71 The percentage of registrations received from registration drives was calculated as A4i/A3a x 100. The 

percentage of registrations received from state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated as 

A4h/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

72 The number of total registration applications was reported in item A3a of the 2022 EAVS.

73 The percentage of registration applications received that were a change of name, party, or withinjurisdiction change of address was calculated as A3f/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was 

used in calculating the national percentage.

74 The percentage of registration applications that were new registrations was calculated as A3b/A3a 

x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 154 

Figure 5. Most Registration Applications Were New Applications or Within-Jurisdiction Changes 

 

Source: The percentage of registrations received that were changes of name, party, or within-jurisdiction 

changes of address was calculated as A3f/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received that were 

new valid registrations was calculated as A3b/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received that 

were duplicate registrations was calculated as A3d/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received 

that were labelled as “Other” registrations was calculated as (A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a x 100. The percentage of 

registrations received that were cross-jurisdiction changes of address was calculated as A3g/A3a x 100.

The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected was calculated as A3e/A3a x 100.

The percentage of registrations received that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of age 

was calculated as A3c/A3a x 100. The percentage of registrations received that were not categorized was 

calculated as (1 – [A3b+A3c+A3d+A3e+A3f+A3g+A3h+A3i+A3j]/A3a) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state 

level was used in calculating the national percentages.

Other types of valid registrations reported in the EAVS included a change of address that crossed 

local jurisdiction borders but was still within the state, which accounted for 9.7% of the total 

registration applications filed.75 Some states reported allowing for underage citizens to preregister to vote so that they are automatically added to the voter registration rolls when they turn 

18 years old. These pre-registrations accounted for 1.4% of the total registrations among states 

that allowed them.76 Finally, 11.1% of the registrations were labelled as “Other.” This category in 

75 The percentage of registration applications that were cross-jurisdiction change of addresses was 

calculated as A3g/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national 

percentage.

76 The percentage of registration applications that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of 

age was calculated as A3c/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the 

national percentage.
 

155 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

the EAVS is used by states to report registrations that were not covered among the standard 

categories, or in most cases, to report registrations that could not be broken down into the 

categories provided, such as a change to an existing registration record that could not be tracked 

as being a within-jurisdiction or cross-jurisdiction change of address.

77

Rejected and Duplicate Registrations

Some of the registration applications received by states do not result in the creation or the update 

of a registration record. The EAVS collects data on two types of unsuccessful registration 

applications: rejected and duplicate registrations. The first type includes applications that contain 

incomplete information, incorrect information, information that cannot be validated against 

existing state records, or applications from people who do not meet eligibility requirements. In the 

period between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of 

registration for the 2022 general election, states reported rejecting 1,873,700 applications, 

accounting for 2.5% of the total registration applications received. This is comparable to the 

percentage of registrations that were rejected in 2020 (2.9%) and 2018 (3.4%).78

Duplicate registrations include applications that are exact matches to existing registration 

records; these can be applications submitted by people who did not realize they were already 

registered to vote or who submitted multiple applications through different modes (e.g., 

submitted an application with the exact same information through the mail and online). States 

reported receiving 9,083,395 duplicate applications between the 2020 and the 2022 general 

elections, which accounted for 12.7% of the total registrations received.79 As with rejected 

applications, the percentage of duplicate registrations registered in 2022 was comparable to 

those in 2020 (9.7%) and 2018 (10.2%).80

A majority of states provided a breakdown of the total, rejected, and duplicate registrations they 

received and the source of those registrations (e.g., online, in person, or at motor vehicle 

offices).81 With a few exceptions, the percentage of applications that were duplicates comprised 

at least 8% of the registrations received by each source; the exceptions were: online registrations 

(7.4%), registration drives (6.3%), and registrations filed at non-NVRA-mandated state agencies 

77 The percentage of registration applications that were categorized as “Other” was calculated as 

(A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national 

percentage. Not all the applications accounted for in the “Other” category may be valid; however, they were 

included in this section because they cannot be fully identified as rejected or duplicate either.

78 The total number of rejected registration applications was collected in item A3e of the 2022 EAVS. The 

percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected was calculated as A3e/A3a x 100 for 

2018, 2020, and 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national 

percentages. Paired t tests between each pair of election years did not yield significant results at the p < 

0.05 level, meaning that the results were not significantly different from each other.

79 The total number of duplicate registration applications was collected in item A3d of the 2022 EAVS. The 

percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations was calculated as A3d/A3a x 100. 

Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

80 The percentage of registrations received that were duplicate registrations for the 2020 and 2018 EAVS 

used the same calculation as the 2022 percentage. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in 

calculating the national percentages.

81 Thirteen states did not provide the application source breakdown for duplicate registrations and 14 

states did not provide the application source breakdown for rejected registrations. Data from these states 

were not included in the ensuing calculations in the paragraph.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 156 

(3.2%).82 Registrations received by methods categorized as “Other” had the largest duplicate 

registration rate with 18.3% of all registrations filed being classified as duplicates. For rejected 

registrations, most registration methods had a rejection rate between 1.9% and 4%, with the 

exception of registrations filed at state-funded agencies primarily serving individuals with 

disabilities (7.3%), registrations from registration drives (9.8%), and registrations filed at public 

assistance offices mandated by the NVRA (11.3%).83

Registration List Maintenance

The NVRA requires states to maintain an “accurate and current voter registration roll” to “protect 

the integrity of the electoral process.”84 To facilitate this maintenance, the NVRA requires that any 

change of address submitted to a motor vehicle office must serve as notification of a change of 

address for voter registration, unless the individual indicates that the change is not for voter 

registration purposes. The law also requires states to conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory 

general program to remove the records of ineligible voters. States have considerable freedom to 

choose when, where, and how these functions are performed, but must follow the guidelines 

listed in the NVRA, which describe the need to use confirmation notices and to complete (with few

exceptions) systematic removal programs “not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or 

general election for Federal office,”85 and to keep a detailed list of instances in which it is 

appropriate to remove a record from the voter registration rolls.

The NVRA’s list maintenance process, shown in Figure 6, specifies the steps that states need to 

follow in order to confirm eligibility from registered voters and to remove them from the voter 

registration rolls when registered voters are no longer eligible to vote in a jurisdiction. One key 

tool in this process that states may use to keep their voter registration rolls up to date is 

confirmation notices. These are postage-paid and pre-addressed return cards that are sent to 

registrants who a state suspects are no longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which they are 

registered. If the registrant does not return the confirmation notice, they can be added to the 

inactive registrant list and would typically be asked to provide proof of residency before voting. If 

the registrant fails to return the confirmation notice and does not participate in the subsequent 

82 The duplicate registration rate refers to the percentage of registration applications received from a 

source and categorized as duplicate. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as A6a/A4a x 100. For inperson registrations, this was calculated as A6b/A4b x 100. For online registrations, this was calculated as 

A6c/A4c x 100. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as A6d/A4d x 100. For public assistance 

offices, this was calculated as A6e/A4e x 100. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with 

disabilities, this was calculated as A6f/A4f x 100. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated 

as A6g/A4g x 100. For registration drives, this was calculated as A6i/A4i x 100. For other registration 

sources, this was calculated as (A6j+A6k+A6l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level 

was used in calculating the national percentages.

83 The rejection rate refers to the percentage of registration applications received from a source and 

categorized as invalid or rejected. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as A7a/A4a x 100. For in-person 

registrations, this was calculated as A7b/A4b x 100. For online registrations, this was calculated as

A7c/A4c x 100. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as A7d/A4d x 100. For public assistance 

offices, this was calculated as A7e/A4e x 100. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with 

disabilities, this was calculated as A7f/A4f x 100. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated 

as A7g/A4g x 100. For registration drives, this was calculated as A7i/A4i x 100. For other registration 

sources, this was calculated as (A7j+A7k+A7l)/(A4j+A4k+A4l) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level 

was used in calculating the national percentages.

84 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

85 52 U.S.C. § 20507.
157 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

two consecutive federal general elections, then the NVRA grants the state the ability to remove 

the registrant from the voter registration roll. If the registrant has not moved out of the voting 

jurisdiction, they must complete and return the confirmation notice no later than the registration 

deadline of the next election to remain on the list of active registrants.

Figure 6. The NVRA’s Voter Registration List Maintenance Process 

The NVRA mandates that registrants may only be removed from the voter registration rolls in 

these circumstances:

o Upon the death of the registrant;

o Upon the registrant’s written confirmation that their address has changed to a location

outside the registrar’s jurisdiction;

o On the request of the registrant;

o For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;

o On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or

o On the registrant’s failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to

appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.

Because registration removal can take up to two federal general election cycles to complete for 

some registration records, particularly in states that are subject to the NVRA, it is inevitable that 

voter registration rolls will contain some number of voter records for individuals who are no longer 

eligible to vote.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 158 

NVRA-exempt states do not need to adhere to these guidelines to complete list maintenance of 

their voter registration rolls. However, they do have similar processes in place to guarantee that 

their voter registration rolls are up to date and only non-eligible voters are removed from their 

voter registration rolls. For example, Wisconsin sends mailing notices similar to the confirmation 

notices described above to registrants who have not voted in a four-year period and to registrants 

that are flagged via Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) as having outdated or 

inaccurate information. If the voter fails to return the mail notice within 30 days, then they are 

declared ineligible to vote.86, 87 A voter who is eligible to vote may register to vote and cast their 

ballot at the polls on Election Day in Wisconsin and every NVRA-exempt state.

Confirmation Notices Processed

Nationally, 26,601,983 confirmation notices were sent between the 2020 general election and 

the month before the 2022 general election, accounting for 13.7% of the active voters reported 

by states in 2022.

88 This percentage falls in the range of what was reported by states in 2020

(14.3%) and in 2018 (11.6%).89 Table 1 shows that unreturned confirmation notices accounted 

for 57.4% of the total confirmation notices sent. These are confirmation notices that were not 

returned by the voter confirming if they were—or were not—eligible to vote, nor were these 

confirmation notices returned by the postal service as undeliverable. Unreturned confirmation 

notices allow states to move the addressees of these notices to the inactive registration list if the 

state uses that designation. States reported that 8.4% of confirmation notices were returned 

confirming the voter’s continued eligibility, and 5% were returned confirming the voter was no 

longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction or no longer wanted to be registered to vote.90

86 Wisconsin Statutes §§6.50 (1) and (2).

87 https://elections.wi.gov/statistics-data/voter-list-maintenance/electronic-registration-information-centereric

88 The total number of confirmation notices sent was reported in item A8a of the 2022 EAVS. The 

percentage of active registered voters who received a confirmation notice was calculated as A8a/A1b x 

100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. In 2022, 48

states reported the number of confirmation notices sent during the period of registration for the 2022

general election. North Dakota does not require citizens to register to vote and, thus, does not use

confirmation notices. American Samoa, Idaho, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming are NVRA exempt.

Alabama reported that they did “not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.”

Indiana did not provide this information because their voter registration system “is not able to track the

information requested.” Forty states reported the status of the confirmation notices sent. In addition to the

states that did not report on confirmation notices, Guam, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,

Mississippi, New Jersey, and Rhode Island did not break down the number of confirmation notices sent by

status.

89 The number of confirmation notices sent as a percentage of the active registrants in 2020 and 2018

used the same calculation as 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the

national percentage.

90 The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as A8e/A8a x 100. The percentage of

confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming valid registration was calculated as A8b/A8a

x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming registration should be

invalidated was calculated as A8c/A8a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating

the national percentage.
 

159 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

Table 1. Most Confirmation Notices That Were Sent Were Not Returned by Voters 

 

Result of Confirmation Notice Percentage of Total 

Confirmation Notices Sent

Unreturned (neither received back from voters nor 

returned as undeliverable) 57.4%

Not categorized 23.8%

Undeliverable 13.6%

Other 10.4%

Returned by voter confirming valid registration 8.4%

Returned by voter confirming invalid registration 5%

Source: The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as A8e/A8a x 100. The 

percentage of confirmation notices sent that were not categorized was calculated as (1 – [A8b+A8c+

A8d+A8e+A8f+A8g+A8h]/A8a) x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned 

undeliverable was calculated as A8d/A8a x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were 

labeled as “Other” was calculated as (A8f+A8g+A8h/A8a) x 100. The percentage of confirmation notices 

sent that were returned confirming valid registration was calculated as A8b/A8a x 100. The percentage of 

confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming registration should be invalidated was calculated 

as A8c/A8a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

Voters Removed From the Voter Registration Rolls

Between the close of registration for the 2020 general election and the close of registration for 

the 2022 general election, states reported removing 19,260,000 records from their voter 

registration rolls.91 This was equal to 8.5% of the total number of voters who were registered in 

the United States as of the close of registration for the 2022 general election.92 At the state level, 

60.4% of the states reported removing a number of registrants that added up to between 3% and 

10% of their total registered voters. There were some exceptions to this trend: the U.S. Virgin 

Islands’ removals accounted for the lowest percentage of total registrants at less than 0.1%, and 

New Hampshire reported the highest percentage of removals at 29.5% (see Table 5 of Appendix A 

in this chapter).

States also reported the reasons for removing records from their voter registration rolls. These 

reasons for removal are shown in Figure 7. The most common reason was a cross-jurisdiction 

change of address, which accounted for 26.8% of all removals, followed by death of the registrant 

91 The total number of registrants removed from the voter registration rolls was reported in item A9a of the 

2022 EAVS. Fifty-two states reported data for the items related to voter removal. North Dakota does not 

require citizens to register to vote and thus does not have registrants to remove from the voter registration 

rolls. Idaho reported “Data not available” for all items related to registration removals. Mississippi reported 

the total number of registrants removed from the voter registration rolls in item A9a but responded “Data 

not available” to subitems A9b to A9g.

92 Registrants removed as a percentage of total registrants was calculated as A9a/A1a x 100. Casewise 

deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 160 

(25.6%). Failure to both respond to a confirmation notice and to vote in two consecutive federal 

general elections accounted for 25.4% of removals.93

Figure 7. Three Removal Reasons Accounted for the Majority of the Voter Registration Removals 

 

Source: The percentage of registrations removed because of a cross-jurisdiction change of address was 

calculated as A9b/A9a x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated as 

A9c/A9a x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation notices 

(and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as A9e/A9a x 100. The percentage of 

registrations removed because of other reasons was calculated as (A9f+A9h+A9i+A9j)/A9a x 100. The 

percentage of registrations removed because the voter requested to be removed was calculated as 

A9g/A9a x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was 

calculated as A9d/A9a x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national 

percentages. 

The majority of states reported that a registrant could be removed from the voter registration rolls 

if the registrant received a disqualifying criminal conviction and/or was incarcerated,94 but only 

93 The percentage of registrations removed because of a cross-jurisdiction change of address was 

calculated as (A9b/A9a) x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated 

as (A9c/A9a) x 100. The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation 

notices (and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as (A9e/A9a) x 100. Casewise 

deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

94 Maine, Vermont, and the District of Columbia reported criminal conviction and/or incarceration was not a 

reason for voter removal in item Q38 of the 2022 Policy Survey.
 

161 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

1.4% of the removals were done for this reason.

95 Two states, however, reported that more than 

7% of their registration removals happened due to criminal convictions or incarceration. Kentucky 

reported that 9.1% of registrants were removed for this reason, and New Mexico (13.3%) reported

the largest percentage of this type of removal. These two states also reported that criminal 

convictions accounted for more than 6% of their voter registration removals in the 2020 and 

2018 EAVS.96

Upcoming Changes to Section A for the 2024 EAVS

All voter registration-related topics discussed in this chapter are covered in Section A of the EAVS. 

The questions in this section have changed little since the 2008 EAVS, even as the methods that 

states offer to register to vote and use to collect registration data have continued to evolve (e.g., 

implementation of online registration in most states, AVR, changes in voter registration 

databases).

Beginning with the 2024 EAVS, the EAC will update the vocabulary and the content of EAVS 

Section A to better reflect the reality of voter registration in the United States. From late 2021 to 

early 2022, the EAC consulted with state and local election officials from multiple states on 

issues they experienced in the past with Section A, their current voter registration data collection 

practices, and suggestions for updates to the survey questions.

The new Section A will cover the same topics discussed in this chapter and will add items 

covering new topics, such as reasons for sending confirmation notices and instances where voter 

registration records are merged. It will also transition from recording voter registration forms to 

voter registration transactions and will record all registration updates in one category instead of 

two. For a complete description of the upcoming changes and a look at the new Section A, see 

the EAC’s “Planned Changes to 2024 EAVS” report at https://www.eac.gov/research-anddata/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys.

95 The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was calculated as 

A9d/A9a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

96 The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction in 2020 and 2018 

used the same calculation as 2022. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the 

national percentages.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 162 

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Voter Registration Table 1: Registration History

State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.

Active 

Regs.

(% of 

CVAP)

Active 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Inactive 

Regs.

Inactive 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Alabama

2022 3,829,788 3,692,639 3,283,842 85.7% 88.9% 408,797 11.1%

2020 3,731,336 3,717,798 3,438,213 92.1% 92.5% 279,585 7.5%

2018 3,688,249 3,465,352 3,164,301 85.8% 91.3% 301,051 8.7%

Alaska

2022 533,852 648,790 601,795 112.7% 92.8% 46,995 7.2%

2020 533,151 646,093 595,647 111.7% 92.2% 50,446 7.8%

2018 531,653 624,467 571,851 107.6% 91.6% 52,616 8.4%

American Samoa

2022 -- 14,314 14,314 -- 100.0% -- --

2020 -- 16,341 16,341 -- 100.0% 0 0.0%

2018 -- 15,527 8,462 -- 54.5% 7,065 45.5%

Arizona

2022 5,216,518 4,833,160 4,143,929 79.4% 85.7% 689,231 14.3%

2020 5,137,474 4,728,109 4,275,729 83.2% 90.4% 452,380 9.6%

2018 4,895,706 4,276,891 3,715,624 75.9% 86.9% 561,267 13.1%

Arkansas

2022 2,237,649 1,805,777 1,475,838 66.0% 81.7% 329,939 18.3%

2020 2,235,415 1,831,414 1,408,061 63.0% 76.9% 423,353 23.1%

2018 2,207,894 1,786,840 1,456,887 66.0% 81.5% 329,953 18.5%

California

2022 26,028,290 26,942,532 21,958,218 84.4% 81.5% 4,984,314 18.5%

2020 26,032,160 26,157,616 21,795,538 83.7% 83.3% 4,348,374 16.6%

2018 25,650,455 25,103,559 19,724,297 76.9% 78.6% 5,379,262 21.4%

Colorado

2022 4,303,604 4,355,778 3,839,814 89.2% 88.2% 515,964 11.8%

2020 4,244,210 4,211,528 3,803,762 89.6% 90.3% 407,766 9.7%

2018 4,057,437 3,953,613 3,426,499 84.4% 86.7% 527,114 13.3%

Connecticut

2022 2,659,979 2,491,987 2,259,575 84.9% 90.7% 232,412 9.3%

2020 2,619,474 2,524,717 2,335,860 89.2% 92.5% 188,857 7.5%

2018 2,611,667 2,369,335 2,193,586 84.0% 92.6% 175,749 7.4%

Delaware

2022 754,114 762,908 702,029 93.1% 92.0% 60,879 8.0%

2020 725,178 739,672 711,287 98.1% 96.2% 28,385 3.8%

2018 709,999 695,014 672,632 94.7% 96.8% 22,382 3.2%

District of 

Columbia

2022 502,670 674,728 508,855 101.2% 75.4% 165,873 24.6%

2020 536,768 625,683 517,890 96.5% 82.8% 107,793 17.2%

2018 510,514 617,046 511,633 100.2% 82.9% 105,413 17.1%

Florida

2022 15,855,982 15,574,971 14,497,121 91.4% 93.1% 1,077,850 6.9%

2020 15,507,315 15,231,808 14,517,002 93.6% 95.3% 701,422 4.6%

2018 15,014,950 14,126,722 13,278,070 88.4% 94.0% 848,652 6.0%

Georgia

2022 7,786,111 7,813,860 6,955,386 89.3% 89.0% 858,474 11.0%

2020 7,581,837 7,618,436 7,194,889 94.9% 94.4% 423,547 5.6%

2018 7,362,615 6,944,851 6,437,524 87.4% 92.7% 507,327 7.3%

Guam

2022 -- 60,463 60,463 -- 100.0% -- --

2020 -- 55,896 55,896 -- 100.0% -- --

2018 -- 55,941 55,941 -- 100.0% -- --
 

163 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.

Active 

Regs.

(% of 

CVAP)

Active 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Inactive 

Regs.

Inactive 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Hawaii

2022 1,044,019 861,475 764,102 73.2% 88.7% 97,373 11.3%

2020 1,014,035 832,466 759,971 74.9% 91.3% 72,495 8.7%

2018 1,025,548 756,751 712,765 69.5% 94.2% 43,986 5.8%

Idaho

2022 1,373,714 1,004,608 1,004,608 73.1% 100.0% -- --

2020 1,282,630 1,029,763 1,029,763 80.3% 100.0% -- --

2018 1,219,481 917,609 917,609 75.2% 100.0% -- --

Illinois

2022 9,087,338 8,775,224 7,899,591 86.9% 90.0% 791,457 9.0%

2020 9,088,036 9,789,893 9,103,542 100.2% 93.0% 686,351 7.0%

2018 9,055,927 8,751,060 8,091,045 89.3% 92.5% 660,015 7.5%

Indiana

2022 5,030,200 4,767,111 4,197,437 83.4% 88.0% 569,674 12.0%

2020 4,978,356 4,692,091 4,170,353 83.8% 88.9% 521,738 11.1%

2018 4,899,251 4,500,196 4,168,374 85.1% 92.6% 331,822 7.4%

Iowa

2022 2,379,570 2,234,666 1,880,415 79.0% 84.1% 354,251 15.9%

2020 2,348,787 2,243,758 2,094,770 89.2% 93.4% 148,988 6.6%

2018 2,325,355 2,193,813 2,037,516 87.6% 92.9% 156,297 7.1%

Kansas

2022 2,128,111 1,975,321 1,830,216 86.0% 92.7% 145,105 7.3%

2020 2,103,748 1,924,772 1,764,949 83.9% 91.7% 148,624 7.7%

2018 2,091,261 1,835,473 1,670,217 79.9% 91.0% 165,256 9.0%

Kentucky

2022 3,405,618 3,590,227 3,137,031 92.1% 87.4% 453,196 12.6%

2020 3,367,502 3,565,428 3,319,307 98.6% 93.1% 246,121 6.9%

2018 3,350,956 3,402,905 3,402,905 101.6% 100.0% 0 0.0%

Louisiana

2022 3,439,830 3,018,815 2,830,594 82.3% 93.8% 188,221 6.2%

2020 3,463,372 3,093,004 2,963,901 85.6% 95.8% 129,103 4.2%

2018 3,469,016 2,992,170 2,856,722 82.3% 95.5% 135,448 4.5%

Maine

2022 1,100,974 1,145,159 929,124 84.4% 81.1% 216,035 18.9%

2020 1,078,770 1,138,576 1,135,008 105.2% 99.7% 3,568 0.3%

2018 1,064,497 1,057,967 1,054,068 99.0% 99.6% 3,899 0.4%

Maryland

2022 4,417,293 4,440,808 4,149,909 93.9% 93.4% 290,899 6.6%

2020 4,316,921 4,298,942 4,142,347 96.0% 96.4% 156,595 3.6%

2018 4,310,864 3,954,027 3,954,027 91.7% 100.0% -- --

Massachusetts

2022 5,121,488 4,884,076 4,173,942 81.5% 85.5% 710,134 14.5%

2020 5,057,192 4,812,909 4,400,254 87.0% 91.4% 412,655 8.6%

2018 4,993,001 4,574,967 3,947,897 79.1% 86.3% 627,070 13.7%

Michigan [1]

2022 7,640,514 8,226,745 7,297,900 95.5% 88.7% 928,845 11.3%

2020 7,562,464 8,105,524 7,209,300 95.3% 88.9% 896,224 11.1%

2018 7,481,928 7,471,088 6,488,823 86.7% 86.9% 982,265 13.1%

Minnesota [2]

2022 4,221,515 3,624,200 3,624,200 85.9% 100.0% -- --

2020 4,157,556 3,731,016 3,731,016 89.7% 100.0% -- --

2018 4,079,652 3,422,515 3,422,515 83.9% 100.0% -- --

Mississippi

2022 2,226,474 2,081,999 1,922,707 86.4% 92.3% 159,292 7.7%

2020 2,246,323 2,143,149 1,982,632 88.3% 92.5% 160,517 7.5%

2018 2,234,722 2,079,732 1,880,197 84.1% 90.4% 199,535 9.6%
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 164 

State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.

Active 

Regs.

(% of 

CVAP)

Active 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Inactive 

Regs.

Inactive 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Missouri

2022 4,675,531 4,234,799 3,816,663 81.6% 90.1% 418,136 9.9%

2020 4,650,318 4,338,133 3,963,980 85.2% 91.4% 374,153 8.6%

2018 4,606,843 4,127,333 3,803,881 82.6% 92.2% 323,452 7.8%

Montana [3]

2022 857,649 757,914 661,320 77.1% 87.3% 96,594 12.7%

2020 831,760 747,439 675,971 81.3% 90.4% 71,468 9.6%

2018 810,760 706,173 616,642 76.1% 87.3% 89,531 12.7%

Nebraska [4]

2022 1,411,320 1,242,930 1,141,470 80.9% 91.8% 101,460 8.2%

2020 1,388,950 1,266,730 1,168,708 84.1% 92.3% 98,022 7.7%

2018 1,368,000 1,219,276 1,096,862 80.2% 90.0% 122,414 10.0%

Nevada

2022 2,193,360 2,200,151 1,840,748 83.9% 83.7% 359,403 16.3%

2020 2,111,932 2,039,162 1,835,401 86.9% 90.0% 203,761 10.0%

2018 2,031,213 1,773,566 1,563,750 77.0% 88.2% 209,816 11.8%

New Hampshire

2022 1,103,239 909,067 909,067 82.4% 100.0% -- --

2020 1,070,215 1,087,145 1,087,145 101.6% 100.0% -- --

2018 1,048,883 988,148 988,148 94.2% 100.0% -- --

New Jersey

2022 6,433,068 6,430,740 5,934,029 92.2% 92.3% 496,711 7.7%

2020 6,170,130 6,310,564 5,896,836 95.6% 93.4% 413,728 6.6%

2018 6,199,409 5,869,078 5,456,506 88.0% 93.0% 412,572 7.0%

New Mexico

2022 1,545,938 1,375,200 1,198,896 77.6% 87.2% 176,304 12.8%

2020 1,522,171 1,360,871 1,255,669 82.5% 92.3% 105,202 7.7%

2018 1,493,318 1,261,639 698,172 46.8% 55.3% 563,467 44.7%

New York

2022 14,109,037 13,131,592 12,125,966 85.9% 92.3% 1,005,626 7.7%

2020 13,810,830 13,555,618 12,362,997 89.5% 91.2% 1,191,845 8.8%

2018 13,866,648 12,695,763 11,676,266 84.2% 92.0% 1,019,497 8.0%

North Carolina

2022 7,808,186 7,422,396 6,488,756 83.1% 87.4% 933,640 12.6%

2020 7,729,644 7,372,608 6,607,121 85.5% 89.6% 765,487 10.4%

2018 7,509,879 7,095,209 5,898,244 78.5% 83.1% 1,196,965 16.9%

North Dakota

2022 576,588 -- -- -- -- -- --

2020 567,545 -- -- -- -- -- --

2018 564,475 -- -- -- -- -- --

Northern Mariana 

Islands

2022 -- 19,272 19,272 -- 100.0% -- --

2020 -- 18,526 18,526 -- 100.0% -- --

2018 -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Ohio

2022 8,943,128 8,029,950 8,029,950 89.8% 100.0% -- --

2020 8,879,469 8,073,829 8,073,829 90.9% 100.0% -- --

2018 8,830,185 8,070,917 8,070,917 91.4% 100.0% -- --

Oklahoma

2022 2,903,864 2,295,906 2,021,787 69.6% 88.1% 274,119 11.9%

2020 2,875,059 2,259,107 2,021,846 70.3% 89.5% 237,261 10.5%

2018 2,835,451 2,120,843 1,857,700 65.5% 87.6% 263,143 12.4%

Oregon [5]

2022 3,200,314 2,985,820 2,985,820 93.3% 100.0% -- --

2020 3,162,204 2,944,588 2,944,588 93.1% 100.0% -- --

2018 3,060,328 2,748,232 2,748,232 89.8% 100.0% -- --
 

165 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.

Active 

Regs.

(% of 

CVAP)

Active 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Inactive 

Regs.

Inactive 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Pennsylvania

2022 9,918,163 8,873,144 8,033,385 81.0% 90.5% 839,759 9.5%

2020 9,810,201 9,035,061 8,280,348 84.4% 91.6% 754,713 8.4%

2018 9,764,119 8,607,748 7,738,989 79.3% 89.9% 868,759 10.1%

Rhode Island

2022 827,415 815,417 722,684 87.3% 88.6% 92,733 11.4%

2020 800,798 809,117 735,195 91.8% 90.9% 73,922 9.1%

2018 792,337 781,478 737,419 93.1% 94.4% 44,059 5.6%

South Carolina

2022 3,940,745 3,740,723 3,376,917 85.7% 90.3% 363,806 9.7%

2020 3,892,341 3,854,209 3,535,061 90.8% 91.7% 319,148 8.3%

2018 3,799,298 3,538,580 3,538,580 93.1% 100.0% 396,653 11.2%

South Dakota

2022 659,768 660,327 599,919 90.9% 90.9% 60,408 9.1%

2020 653,394 635,256 578,683 88.6% 91.1% 56,573 8.9%

2018 641,666 594,453 539,788 84.1% 90.8% 54,665 9.2%

Tennessee

2022 5,248,512 4,549,183 4,218,165 80.4% 92.7% 331,018 7.3%

2020 5,129,580 4,436,727 4,226,928 82.4% 95.3% 209,799 4.7%

2018 5,016,103 4,163,359 3,764,513 75.0% 90.4% 398,846 9.6%

Texas

2022 19,375,866 17,672,143 15,847,341 81.8% 89.7% 1,824,802 10.3%

2020 18,875,542 16,955,519 15,279,870 81.0% 90.1% 1,675,649 9.9%

2018 18,174,345 15,615,925 13,790,247 75.9% 88.3% 1,653,986 10.6%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands [6]

2022 -- 39,910 39,910 -- 100.0% -- --

2020 -- 53,341 53,341 -- 100.0% -- --

2018 -- 51,095 51,095 -- 100.0% -- --

Utah

2022 2,251,328 1,614,198 1,690,442 75.1% 104.7% 123,071 7.6%

2020 2,134,249 1,861,977 1,713,297 80.3% 92.0% 148,680 8.0%

2018 2,028,176 1,658,457 1,433,917 70.7% 86.5% 224,540 13.5%

Vermont

2022 518,387 501,665 446,098 86.1% 88.9% 55,567 11.1%

2020 498,705 489,277 440,920 88.4% 90.1% 48,357 9.9%

2018 494,550 489,385 447,709 90.5% 91.5% 41,676 8.5%

Virginia

2022 6,354,439 6,105,868 5,736,016 90.3% 93.9% 369,852 6.1%

2020 6,226,623 5,975,561 5,763,187 92.6% 96.4% 212,374 3.6%

2018 6,145,893 5,666,627 5,272,602 85.8% 93.0% 394,025 7.0%

Washington

2022 5,529,508 5,303,997 4,805,394 86.9% 90.6% 498,603 9.4%

2020 5,409,035 5,255,466 4,892,871 90.5% 93.1% 362,595 6.9%

2018 5,259,892 4,841,431 4,362,480 82.9% 90.1% 478,951 9.9%

West Virginia

2022 1,408,767 1,153,208 1,055,475 74.9% 91.5% 97,733 8.5%

2020 1,420,289 1,269,024 1,062,685 74.8% 83.7% 206,339 16.3%

2018 1,428,859 1,245,827 961,894 67.3% 77.2% 283,933 22.8%

Wisconsin [7]

2022 4,480,576 3,670,188 3,670,188 81.9% 100.0% -- --

2020 4,412,888 3,834,164 3,834,164 86.9% 100.0% -- --

2018 4,375,063 3,442,004 3,442,004 78.7% 100.0% -- --

Wyoming

2022 436,049 301,931 301,931 69.2% 100.0% -- --

2020 434,852 303,049 303,049 69.7% 100.0% -- --

2018 428,379 283,941 283,941 66.3% 100.0% -- --
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 166 

State Year CVAP Total Reported Regs. Active Regs.

Active 

Regs.

(% of 

CVAP)

Active 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

Inactive 

Regs.

Inactive 

Regs. 

(% of 

Total)

U.S. Total

2022 239,035,960 226,339,980 203,660,564 85.4% 90.0% 22,794,555 11.1%

2020 237,998,330 228,004,364 209,441,338 88.1% 91.8% 18,523,963 9.1%

2018 231,416,670 211,601,918 190,662,485 82.5% 90.1% 21,164,394 11.3%

Voter Registration Table 1 Calculation Notes:

CVAP Total uses the 1-year ACS CVAP estimate. The 2022 data uses the 2021 CVAP, the 2020 data 

uses the 2019 CVAP, and the 2018 data uses the 2017 CVAP.

Reported Registrations uses question A1a for each year.

Active Registrations uses question A1b for each year.

Active Registrations (% of CVAP) uses A1b/CVAP x 100 for each year.

Active Registrations (% of Total) uses A1b/A1a x 100 for each year.

Inactive Registrations uses question A1c for each year.

Inactive Registrations (% of Total) uses A1c/A1a x 100 for each year. 

Voter Registration Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the active registration (% of total) 

and inactive registration (% of total) rates may not sum to 100% for some states or at the 

national level.

• The citizen voting age population (CVAP) is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens ages 18 

years or older in the state. This report uses the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state 

estimate for 2021 instead of the 5-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as 

possible. The estimate for the year 2022 was not available by the time this report was 

finalized. For consistency, the CVAP for the 2018 and 2020 general elections was the 1-year 

ACS state estimate for 2017 and 2019, respectively.

• Some states may report an active CVAP registration rate of 100% or more. This is because the 

2021 CVAP was used to calculate the 2022 registration rate and because due to federal law, 

some ineligible voters may take up to two full election cycles to be removed from the voter 

registration rolls.

• The Reported Registrations column includes both active and inactive voters (if the state uses 

such a distinction).

[1] Voters reported in A1 are eligible to vote. Those defined as “inactive” need only to confirm their 

address before receiving a ballot. Participation in past elections is not a factor in defining eligibility.

[2] Minnesota is NVRA exempt and does not classify voters as inactive per NVRA.

[3] The total number of registered and eligible voters consists of active and inactive voters. Montana 

reports a total registered and eligible number of 762,959. The difference is provisional, late 

registration, and pending.
 

167 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

[4] Nebraska does not have “inactive” voters. The number of inactive voters reported is voters who 

were sent a notice in accordance with NVRA Section 8(d)(2) and have not responded.

[5] Oregon does not track the number of inactive voters.

[6] The U.S. Virgin Islands is not subject to the provisions of the NVRA.

[7] Wisconsin is not subject to the NVRA and does not have inactive registered voters. Military voters 

are included in the reported registration numbers even though they are not required to “register” in 

Wisconsin because they still have a voter record created.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 168 

Voter Registration Table 2: Application Sources—Total Forms Received

State

Total 

Registration 

Applications 

Received 

Application Source

Mail/Email/Fax In Person at Election 

Office Online Motor Vehicle Agencies

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Alabama 1,132,263 23,750 2.1% 111,139 9.8% 146,809 13.0% 770,324 68.0%

Alaska 1,028,887 31,023 3.0% 71,188 6.9% 81,104 7.9% 80,024 7.8%

American 

Samoa [1] 1,014 0 0.0% 1,014 100.0% -- -- -- --

Arizona 2,187,271 87,185 4.0% 92,864 4.2% 433,681 19.8% 1,295,240 59.2%

Arkansas 486,722 74,917 15.4% 74,055 15.2% -- -- 263,883 54.2%

California 10,090,697 492,619 4.9% 277,191 2.7% 2,362,300 23.4% 3,901,637 38.7%

Colorado 3,042,434 248,408 8.2% 39,533 1.3% 468,561 15.4% 2,171,174 71.4%

Connecticut 887,202 381,409 43.0% 26,535 3.0% 159,610 18.0% 301,563 34.0%

Delaware 351,944 11,369 3.2% 9,679 2.8% 26,848 7.6% 285,635 81.2%

District of 

Columbia 96,410 3,497 3.6% 9,920 10.3% 17,279 17.9% 60,450 62.7%

Florida 6,056,693 486,880 8.0% 350,438 5.8% 754,734 12.5% 3,457,205 57.1%

Georgia [2] 3,232,104 548,094 17.0% 86,297 2.7% 385,959 11.9% 2,149,658 66.5%

Guam [3] -- -- -- -- -- 3,268 -- 60,620 --

Hawaii 151,594 12,048 7.9% 0 0.0% 30,781 20.3% 108,765 71.7%

Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 1,906,637 281,760 14.8% 63,312 3.3% 214,006 11.2% 535,072 28.1%

Indiana [5] 1,922,116 167,194 8.7% 24,288 1.3% 266,258 13.9% 830,962 43.2%

Iowa 856,747 15,435 1.8% 15,606 1.8% 24,197 2.8% 122,074 14.2%

Kansas 709,206 87,190 12.3% 70,444 9.9% 205,830 29.0% 259,418 36.6%

Kentucky 1,332,191 21,195 1.6% 142,441 10.7% 223,945 16.8% 850,572 63.8%

Louisiana [6] 594,612 90,456 15.2% 96,301 16.2% 229,120 38.5% 147,761 24.8%

Maine 185,804 15,831 8.5% 132,296 71.2% -- -- 25,562 13.8%

Maryland [7] 3,513,915 120,297 3.4% 72,222 2.1% 435,442 12.4% 2,628,953 74.8%

Massachusetts 

[8] 2,837,185 41,239 1.5% 28,593 1.0% 157,096 5.5% 2,370,248 83.5%

Michigan [9] 3,400,532 51,449 1.5% 127,503 3.7% 84,117 2.5% 3,080,445 90.6%

Minnesota [10] 1,158,190 27,992 2.4% 243,034 21.0% 88,971 7.7% 317,653 27.4%

Mississippi -- 36,851 -- 57,701 -- -- -- 146,795 --

Missouri 435,511 34,569 7.9% 26,902 6.2% 77,640 17.8% 282,727 64.9%

Montana [11] 237,013 51,854 21.9% 54,902 23.2% -- -- 93,139 39.3%

Nebraska [12] 427,117 63,743 14.9% 17,002 4.0% 145,695 34.1% 198,102 46.4%

Nevada 1,412,160 83,079 5.9% 24,335 1.7% 163,598 11.6% 1,004,394 71.1%

New Hampshire 

[13] 300,559 994 0.3% 299,565 99.7% -- -- -- --

New Jersey [14] 3,927,225 14,071 0.4% -- -- 251,387 6.4% 2,056,334 52.4%

New Mexico 489,737 250,850 51.2% 26,778 5.5% 96,354 19.7% 108,316 22.1%

New York 1,748,658 303,848 17.4% 60,295 3.4% -- -- 698,361 39.9%

North Carolina 2,806,179 421,571 15.0% 423,222 15.1% 178,722 6.4% 1,401,721 50.0%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
169 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

State

Total 

Registration 

Applications 

Received 

Application Source

Mail/Email/Fax In Person at Election 

Office Online Motor Vehicle Agencies

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Northern 

Mariana Islands 2,245 245 10.9% -- -- -- -- -- --

Ohio 2,519,705 428,473 17.0% 384,938 15.3% 704,636 28.0% 720,898 28.6%

Oklahoma 614,861 116,177 18.9% 68,065 11.1% 70,713 11.5% 336,073 54.7%

Oregon 1,623,822 77,749 4.8% 29,412 1.8% 230,483 14.2% 761,559 46.9%

Pennsylvania 2,881,107 177,508 6.2% 31,101 1.1% 568,912 19.7% 1,741,745 60.5%

Rhode Island 

[15] 381,596 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

South Carolina 765,608 60,467 7.9% 55,381 7.2% 197,787 25.8% 409,922 53.5%

South Dakota 147,980 19,950 13.5% 29,365 19.8% -- -- 88,871 60.1%

Tennessee 1,138,627 105,696 9.3% 150,687 13.2% 442,107 38.8% 419,558 36.8%

Texas 5,380,314 1,271,780 23.6% 284,636 5.3% 136,343 2.5% 3,470,056 64.5%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 3,213 -- -- 3,213 100.0% -- -- -- --

Utah [16] 246,112 5,338 2.2% 17,280 7.0% 29,975 12.2% 36,131 14.7%

Vermont 74,895 589 0.8% 7,462 10.0% 13,049 17.4% 47,719 63.7%

Virginia 3,382,438 85,082 2.5% 52,037 1.5% 284,897 8.4% 2,829,275 83.6%

Washington 1,709,646 319,700 18.7% 44,002 2.6% 199,685 11.7% 991,442 58.0%

West Virginia 478,216 59,979 12.5% 117,260 24.5% 50,774 10.6% 133,342 27.9%

Wisconsin [17] 393,064 23,618 6.0% 66,659 17.0% 179,328 45.6% -- --

Wyoming [18] 74,244 5,440 7.3% 68,642 92.5% -- -- 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 80,764,222 7,340,458 9.1% 4,566,735 5.9% 10,822,001 14.0% 44,051,378 55.0%
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 170 

State

Application Source

Public Assistance Offices Disability Services 

Offices

Armed Forces 

Recruitment Offices Other State Agencies

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Alabama 37,486 3.3% 665 0.1% 109 0.0% 2,505 0.2%

Alaska 3,818 0.4% 26 0.0% 886 0.1% 21 0.0%

American 

Samoa [1] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Arizona 6,634 0.3% 141 0.0% 2,045 0.1% 1,285 0.1%

Arkansas 10,310 2.1% 294 0.1% 21 0.0% 178 0.0%

California 169,940 1.7% 1,668 0.0% 1,841 0.0% 43,785 0.4%

Colorado 24,508 0.8% 316 0.0% 13 0.0% -- --

Connecticut 8,791 1.0% 8,791 1.0% 503 0.1% -- --

Delaware 75 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 11,367 3.2%

District of 

Columbia 1,225 1.3% 103 0.1% 31 0.0% 1,417 1.5%

Florida 7,129 0.1% 13,296 0.2% 732 0.0% 36,067 0.6%

Georgia [2] 10,208 0.3% 1,661 0.1% 55 0.0% -- --

Guam [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Hawaii 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 22,780 1.2% 1,344 0.1% 132 0.0% 75,754 4.0%

Indiana [5] 8,390 0.4% 564 0.0% 0 0.0% 68 0.0%

Iowa 1,222 0.1% 19 0.0% 6 0.0% 55 0.0%

Kansas 5,914 0.8% 216 0.0% 38 0.0% 1,078 0.2%

Kentucky 88,292 6.6% 883 0.1% 865 0.1% 3,998 0.3%

Louisiana [6] 21,202 3.6% 1,940 0.3% 1,263 0.2% 0 0.0%

Maine -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Maryland [7] 15,344 0.4% 404 0.0% 105 0.0% 87,514 2.5%

Massachusetts 

[8] 166,539 5.9% 488 0.0% -- -- 5,003 0.2%

Michigan [9] 644 0.0% 51 0.0% -- -- -- --

Minnesota [10] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Mississippi 4,808 -- 308 -- -- -- -- --

Missouri 13,430 3.1% 179 0.0% 36 0.0% 0 0.0%

Montana [11] 1,024 0.4% 19 0.0% 40 0.0% 0 0.0%

Nebraska [12] 225 0.1% 129 0.0% 12 0.0% -- --

Nevada 19,882 1.4% 2,164 0.2% 55 0.0% 43 0.0%

New Hampshire 

[13] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

New Jersey [14] 3,050 0.1% 29,479 0.8% 1,308 0.0% 1,184,858 30.2%

New Mexico 7,331 1.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

New York 50,305 2.9% -- -- -- -- 73,225 4.2%

North Carolina 22,002 0.8% 1,331 0.0% 17 0.0% 3,547 0.1%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Northern 

Mariana Islands -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Ohio 145,421 5.8% 13,525 0.5% 177 0.0% 52,968 2.1%
171 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

State

Application Source

Public Assistance Offices Disability Services 

Offices

Armed Forces 

Recruitment Offices Other State Agencies

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Oklahoma 4,804 0.8% 241 0.0% 14 0.0% 33 0.0%

Oregon 1,365 0.1% 544 0.0% -- -- 2,692 0.2%

Pennsylvania 42,146 1.5% 296 0.0% 7 0.0% -- --

Rhode Island 

[15] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

South Carolina 41,709 5.4% 200 0.0% 22 0.0% -- --

South Dakota 4,588 3.1% 622 0.4% 0 0.0% 1,633 1.1%

Tennessee 9,327 0.8% 53 0.0% 3,174 0.3% 8,005 0.7%

Texas 105,936 2.0% 505 0.0% 17,628 0.3% 0 0.0%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Utah [16] 5 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- 151 0.2%

Virginia 1,530 0.0% 98 0.0% 14 0.0% 21,796 0.6%

Washington 23,968 1.4% 95 0.0% 2,405 0.1% 3,484 0.2%

West Virginia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Wisconsin [17] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Wyoming [18] -- -- 39 0.1% 0 0.0% 13 0.0%

U.S. Total 1,113,307 1.4% 82,698 0.1% 33,554 0.0% 1,622,543 2.6%
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 172 

State

Application Source

Registration Drives Other Sources Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total %

Alabama 12,422 1.1% 4,236 0.4% 22,818 2.0%

Alaska 0 0.0% 760,797 73.9% 0 0.0%

American 

Samoa [1] -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Arizona 142,560 6.5% 125,636 5.7% 0 0.0%

Arkansas 9,261 1.9% 58,962 12.1% -5,159 -1.1%

California 30,418 0.3% 1,721,297 17.1% 1,088,001 10.8%

Colorado 37,581 1.2% 52,340 1.7% 0 0.0%

Connecticut -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Delaware 278 0.1% 6,693 1.9% 0 0.0%

District of 

Columbia 0 0.0% 2,488 2.6% 0 0.0%

Florida 424,144 7.0% 536,461 8.9% -10,393 -0.2%

Georgia [2] -- -- 50,172 1.6% 0 0.0%

Guam [3] -- -- -- -- -- --

Hawaii 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 1,902 0.1% 264,556 13.9% 446,019 23.4%

Indiana [5] 7,997 0.4% 558,185 29.0% 58,210 3.0%

Iowa 156 0.0% 677,977 79.1% 0 0.0%

Kansas 10,154 1.4% 68,262 9.6% 662 0.1%

Kentucky -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Louisiana [6] 6,569 1.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

Maine 3,535 1.9% 8,580 4.6% 0 0.0%

Maryland [7] -- -- 153,634 4.4% 0 0.0%

Massachusetts 

[8] -- -- 67,979 2.4% 0 0.0%

Michigan [9] -- -- 56,323 1.7% 0 0.0%

Minnesota [10] 10,344 0.9% 470,196 40.6% 0 0.0%

Mississippi -- -- 8,515 -- -- --

Missouri -- -- 28 0.0% 0 0.0%

Montana [11] 10,628 4.5% 25,407 10.7% 0 0.0%

Nebraska [12] -- -- 2,209 0.5% 0 0.0%

Nevada 74,420 5.3% 40,190 2.8% 0 0.0%

New Hampshire 

[13] -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

New Jersey [14] -- -- 386,738 9.8% 0 0.0%

New Mexico 0 0.0% -- -- 108 0.0%

New York 26,897 1.5% -- -- 535,727 30.6%

North Carolina 131,014 4.7% 223,032 7.9% 0 0.0%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- --

Northern 

Mariana Islands -- -- -- -- 2,000 89.1%

Ohio 68,669 2.7% -- -- 0 0.0%
173 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

State

Application Source

Registration Drives Other Sources Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total %

Oklahoma -- -- 18,741 3.0% 0 0.0%

Oregon -- -- 520,018 32.0% 0 0.0%

Pennsylvania 156,101 5.4% 163,291 5.7% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island 

[15] -- -- -- -- 381,596 100.0%

South Carolina -- -- 120 0.0% 0 0.0%

South Dakota 2,832 1.9% 104 0.1% 15 0.0%

Tennessee 20 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Texas -- -- 93,430 1.7% 0 0.0%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Utah [16] 149 0.1% 12,674 5.1% 144,559 58.7%

Vermont 5,925 7.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Virginia 16,260 0.5% 91,449 2.7% 0 0.0%

Washington 10,160 0.6% 114,705 6.7% 0 0.0%

West Virginia -- -- 116,861 24.4% 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [17] -- -- 123,459 31.4% 0 0.0%

Wyoming [18] 8 0.0% 102 0.1% 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 1,200,404 2.4% 7,585,847 10.6% 2,664,163 3.3%

Voter Registration Table 2 Calculation Notes:

Total Registration Applications Received uses question A3a.

Application Source, Mail/Email/Fax, Total uses question A4a.

Application Source, Mail/Email/Fax, % uses A4a/A3a x 100.

Application Source, In Person at Election Office, Total uses question A4b.

Application Source, In Person at Election Office, % uses A4b/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Online, Total uses question A4c.

Application Source, Online, % uses A4c/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, Total uses question A4d.

Application Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, % uses A4d/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Public Assistance Offices, Total uses question A4e.

Application Source, Public Assistance Offices, % uses A4e/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Disability Services Offices, Total uses question A4f.

Application Source, Disability Services Offices, % uses A4f/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, Total uses question A4g.

Application Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, % uses A4g/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Other State Agencies, Total uses question A4h.

Application Source, Other State Agencies, % uses A4h/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Registration Drives, Total uses question A4i.

Application Source, Registration Drives, % uses A4i/A3a x 100.

Application Source, Other Sources, Total uses the sum of questions A4j, A4k, and A4l.

Application Source, Other Sources, % uses (A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a x 100.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 174 

Application Source, Not Categorized, Total uses A3a–(sum of A4a to A4l).

Application Source, Not Categorized, % uses (A3a–[sum of A4a to A4l])/A3a x 100. 

Voter Registration Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• States have latitude in which registration application sources are offered to their citizens, so

long as they do not conflict with federal law. Not all states offer each of the application sources

that the EAVS collects data for.

• Questions A4j, A4k, and A4l were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in

these items if they offered another application source aside from those listed in questions

A4a–A4i or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions

A4a–A4i.

• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized application source indicate that the sum of

registrations received for each source accounted for more than the total number of

registrations reported received by the state.

• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications

received through each source may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

[1] American Samoa’s registration system is not web-based or online. Eligible voters who are qualified

to register in absentia can access the form online but have to send it to the election office for manual

processing.

[2] Election Day registrations listed in A4j, A5j, A6j, and A7j represent applications submitted to poll

workers on Election Day. Changes made through applications turned in on Election Day are effective

for future elections. Georgia law does not allow SDR.

[3] Data reported in A4d and A7d include driver’s license applications where the applicant indicated

that they declined to register to vote.

[4] Idaho does not track data on the sources of registration forms.

[5] The data reported in A4a–l consisted of data from CEB-9 Section 2 (A4a–b, A4i) and the statewide

voter registration system (A4c–h, A4j, A4k, A4l). Counties do not always manually track the

information requested in A4a–b and A4i.

[6] Voters submit registration applications for new registrations as well as for updates or changes to

existing registrations. Data reported in A4 reflect both new registrations and changes to registrations.

[7] Questions A4j, A5j, A6j, and A7j include two registration categories. The first is from volunteer

groups and the second is from high school registration drives. Registrations completed by

“registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties” as listed in A4i are included with the

registration source of “volunteer” as listed in A4j.

[8] Individuals who complete eligible transactions at some state agencies are automatically registered

to vote unless they opt out.

[9] Registrations reported in A4c and A5c reflect individuals who registered online using the Michigan

voter information center website. Over 800 of those registrations occurred via application

programming interface (API) from advocacy groups.

[10] Minnesota did not report data for some questions because the state is exempt from the NVRA.

Data reported for registrations received through mail/fax/email and online includes data on Federal

Post Card Applications (FPCA) that in previous years’ surveys were reported separately.
175 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

[11] Data reported in A4k is for online pre-registration, which requires the voter to sign and submit a

registration form to their county elections office.

[12] Registrations received from registration drives by advocacy groups or political parties in A4i and

are included in the data reported in A4a.

[13] New Hampshire is not subject to the NVRA. This state offers Election Day registration but not

online voter registration.

[14] In-person registrations in A4b are not currently tracked.

[15] Rhode Island introduced automatic voter registration in June of 2018, which increased the

number of registrations received.

[16] Several Utah counties do not track data on the sources of voter registration applications.

[17] Wisconsin only tracks fax or email registrations for military voters because although they are not

required to register, a record is created as a registration in the system. Military voters’ data may be

received by fax or email, whereas non-military voters can only submit registrations by mail or inperson. Registration applications falling under other sources come from care facilities and

registrations received at the polling place on Election Day. Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and

does not receive registrations from NVRA agencies.

[18] Wyoming is exempt from the NVRA. Wyoming has no system for web-based registration and no

system for registration through motor vehicle offices or driver’s license offices.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 176 

Voter Registration Table 3: Registration Applications Processed

State

Total 

Registration 

Applications 

Received 

Registration Category

New Valid 

Registrations

Change of Name, 

Party or Address 

(Within Jurisdiction)

Change of Address 

(Cross-Jurisdiction)

PreRegistrations 

(Under 18 Years 

of Age)

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Alabama [1] 1,132,263 437,156 38.6% 893,988 79.0% -- -- -- --

Alaska 1,028,887 45,400 4.4% 969,032 94.2% -- -- -- --

American 

Samoa 1,014 528 52.1% 25 2.5% 65 6.4% 0 0.0%

Arizona 2,187,271 820,015 37.5% 863,020 39.5% 10,365 0.5% 8,286 0.4%

Arkansas [2] 486,722 227,470 46.7% 262,859 54.0% 2,861 0.6% -- --

California 10,090,697 3,084,231 30.6% 1,576,293 15.6% 592,958 5.9% 141,004 1.4%

Colorado 3,042,434 1,189,963 39.1% 1,466,226 48.2% 242,934 8.0% 77,620 2.6%

Connecticut 887,202 304,587 34.3% 562,986 63.5% 18,843 2.1% 786 0.1%

Delaware [3] 351,944 58,277 16.6% 268,097 76.2% 14,075 4.0% 6,232 1.8%

District of 

Columbia 96,410 60,180 62.4% 30,996 32.2% 0 0.0% 1,572 1.6%

Florida [4] 6,056,693 1,601,825 26.4% 4,241,373 70.0% 110,151 1.8% 18,816 0.3%

Georgia 3,232,104 616,690 19.1% 1,220,083 37.7% 547,977 17.0% 26,238 0.8%

Guam -- 14,687 -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Hawaii 151,594 56,520 37.3% -- -- -- -- 1,505 1.0%

Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 1,906,637 593,126 31.1% 573,408 30.1% 131,944 6.9% 4,538 0.2%

Indiana 1,922,116 447,414 23.3% 1,021,206 53.1% -- -- 38,617 2.0%

Iowa [5] 856,747 160,145 18.7% -- -- -- -- 13,100 1.5%

Kansas 709,206 211,448 29.8% 673,513 95.0% -- -- -- --

Kentucky 1,332,191 159,387 12.0% 700,769 52.6% 153,261 11.5% -- --

Louisiana [6] 594,612 159,421 26.8% 225,937 38.0% -- -- 11,943 2.0%

Maine 185,804 55,542 29.9% 55,038 29.6% 59,708 32.1% 1,034 0.6%

Maryland [7] 3,513,915 310,973 8.8% 2,994,726 85.2% 176,094 5.0% -- --

Massachusetts 2,837,185 323,970 11.4% 1,436,784 50.6% 461,613 16.3% 73,642 2.6%

Michigan [8] 3,400,532 558,078 16.4% 652,487 19.2% 1,111,884 32.7% 41,900 1.2%

Minnesota 1,158,190 255,292 22.0% 423,388 36.6% 282,926 24.4% 6,583 0.6%

Mississippi -- 262,005 -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Missouri [9] 435,511 435,511 100.0% -- -- -- -- -- --

Montana 237,013 29,035 12.3% 95,495 40.3% 107,667 45.4% 664 0.3%

Nebraska [10] 427,117 128,436 30.1% 211,687 49.6% 46,112 10.8% -- --

Nevada 1,412,160 383,357 27.1% 804,375 57.0% 1,154 0.1% 16,750 1.2%

New Hampshire 

[11] 300,559 52,564 17.5% 193,945 64.5% 52,283 17.4% 22 0.0%

New Jersey 3,927,225 380,156 9.7% 1,460,926 37.2% 312,155 7.9% 58,076 1.5%

New Mexico 489,737 110,197 22.5% 365,572 74.6% 5,740 1.2% 7,225 1.5%

New York [12] 1,748,658 556,051 31.8% 245,205 14.0% 598,988 34.3% 104,291 6.0%

North Carolina 2,806,179 1,021,059 36.4% 928,381 33.1% -- -- -- --

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
177 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

State

Total 

Registration 

Applications 

Received 

Registration Category

New Valid 

Registrations

Change of Name, 

Party or Address 

(Within Jurisdiction)

Change of Address 

(Cross-Jurisdiction)

PreRegistrations 

(Under 18 Years 

of Age)

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

2,245 -- -- 100 4.5% 300 13.4% -- --

Ohio 2,519,705 1,097,029 43.5% 1,006,854 40.0% -- -- 5,521 0.2%

Oklahoma [13] 614,861 350,173 57.0% 248,401 40.4% -- -- 4,028 0.7%

Oregon [14] 1,623,822 275,845 17.0% 1,302,003 80.2% -- -- 44,686 2.8%

Pennsylvania 2,881,107 462,995 16.1% 1,319,180 45.8% 462,253 16.0% -- --

Rhode Island 381,596 46,597 12.2% 259,599 68.0% 67,450 17.7% 7,896 2.1%

South Carolina 

[15] 765,608 447,106 58.4% 318,502 41.6% -- -- -- --

South Dakota 147,980 54,293 36.7% 72,686 49.1% 19,365 13.1% 1,274 0.9%

Tennessee 1,138,627 552,128 48.5% 357,262 31.4% -- -- 0 0.0%

Texas 5,380,314 2,938,010 54.6% 2,323,494 43.2% 23,502 0.4% -- --

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 3,213 3,213 100.0% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Utah 246,112 80,497 32.7% 56,559 23.0% 8,465 3.4% 10,557 4.3%

Vermont 74,895 70,429 94.0% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Virginia 3,382,438 500,541 14.8% 1,135,150 33.6% 433,479 12.8% 25,892 0.8%

Washington 1,709,646 454,968 26.6% 726,470 42.5% 94,003 5.5% 85,635 5.0%

West Virginia 478,216 79,626 16.7% 337,997 70.7% 21,033 4.4% 3,537 0.7%

Wisconsin [16] 393,064 267,393 68.0% 45,996 11.7% 70,425 17.9% 1 0.0%

Wyoming [17] 74,244 18,491 24.9% 42,789 57.6% 12,949 17.4% 2 0.0%

U.S. Total 80,764,222 22,810,030 27.9% 34,970,862 44.1% 6,254,982 9.7% 849,473 1.4%
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 178 

State

Registration Category

Duplicate 

Registrations

Invalid or Rejected 

Registrations Other Registrations Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Alabama [1] 4 0.0% 4,942 0.4% -- -- -203,827 -18.0%

Alaska 5,326 0.5% 9,129 0.9% -- -- 0 0.0%

American 

Samoa 396 39.1% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Arizona 434,088 19.8% 37,850 1.7% 13,647 0.6% 0 0.0%

Arkansas [2] 129 0.0% 7,513 1.5% -- -- -14,110 -2.9%

California 2,791,684 27.7% 277,944 2.8% 579,521 5.7% 1,047,062 10.4%

Colorado 48,865 1.6% 16,826 0.6% -- -- 0 0.0%

Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Delaware [3] 4,738 1.3% 525 0.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

District of 

Columbia 2,725 2.8% 937 1.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Florida [4] 1,449 0.0% 72,090 1.2% 9,775 0.2% 1,214 0.0%

Georgia 87,858 2.7% 1,711 0.1% 731,547 22.6% 0 0.0%

Guam -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Hawaii -- -- -- -- 0 0.0% 93,569 61.7%

Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 165,553 8.7% 9,114 0.5% 84,416 4.4% 344,538 18.1%

Indiana 190,028 9.9% 19,587 1.0% 192,011 10.0% 13,253 0.7%

Iowa [5] 22,453 2.6% 279 0.0% 660,770 77.1% 0 0.0%

Kansas 0 0.0% -- -- -- -- -175,755 -24.8%

Kentucky -- -- 318,774 23.9% -- -- 0 0.0%

Louisiana [6] 8,965 1.5% 8,764 1.5% 179,582 30.2% 0 0.0%

Maine 3,638 2.0% 147 0.1% 10,697 5.8% 0 0.0%

Maryland [7] 31,680 0.9% 442 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Massachusetts 518,767 18.3% 22,409 0.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

Michigan [8] 1,006,903 29.6% 29,280 0.9% -- -- 0 0.0%

Minnesota 189,475 16.4% 526 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Mississippi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Missouri [9] -- -- 12 0.0% -- -- -12 0.0%

Montana 3,762 1.6% 390 0.2% -- -- 0 0.0%

Nebraska [10] 40,635 9.5% 247 0.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

Nevada 163,900 11.6% 42,523 3.0% 101 0.0% 0 0.0%

New Hampshire 

[11] 1,745 0.6% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

New Jersey 163,002 4.2% 22,864 0.6% 1,530,046 39.0% 0 0.0%

New Mexico 0 0.0% 1,003 0.2% -- -- 0 0.0%

New York [12] 159,051 9.1% 84,886 4.9% -- -- 186 0.0%

North Carolina 699,970 24.9% 156,769 5.6% -- -- 0 0.0%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Northern 

Mariana Islands -- -- -- -- 3,045 135.6% -1,200 -53.5%
179 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

State

Registration Category

Duplicate 

Registrations

Invalid or Rejected 

Registrations Other Registrations Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Ohio 294,216 11.7% 116,085 4.6% -- -- 0 0.0%

Oklahoma [13] 1,510 0.2% 10,749 1.7% -- -- 0 0.0%

Oregon [14] 1,288 0.1% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Pennsylvania 232,096 8.1% 372,054 12.9% 32,529 1.1% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island -- -- 54 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

South Carolina 

[15] -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

South Dakota 215 0.1% 27 0.0% 120 0.1% 0 0.0%

Tennessee 184,943 16.2% 44,294 3.9% -- -- 0 0.0%

Texas -- -- 95,308 1.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Utah 2,317 0.9% 24,418 9.9% -- -- 63,299 25.7%

Vermont 2,151 2.9% 2,315 3.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Virginia 1,226,754 36.3% 60,622 1.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

Washington 348,388 20.4% 182 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

West Virginia 35,927 7.5% 96 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [16] 6,801 1.7% -- -- 2,448 0.6% 0 0.0%

Wyoming [17] 0 0.0% 13 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 9,083,395 12.7% 1,873,700 2.5% 4,030,255 11.1% 1,168,217 1.4%

Voter Registration Table 3 Calculation Notes:

Total Registration Applications Received uses question A3a.

New Valid Registrations, Total uses question A3b.

New Valid Registrations, % uses A3b/A3a x 100.

Change of Name, Party, or Address (Within Jurisdiction), Total uses question A3f.

Change of Name, Party, or Address (Within Jurisdiction), % uses A3f/A3a x 100.

Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction), Total uses question A3g.

Change of Address (Cross-Jurisdiction), % uses A3g/A3a x 100.

Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), Total uses question A3c.

Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), % uses question A3c/A3a x 100.

Duplicate Registrations, Total uses question A3d.

Duplicate Registrations, % uses A3d/A3a x 100.

Invalid or Rejected Registrations, Total uses question A3e.

Invalid or Rejected Registrations, % uses A3e/A3a x 100.

Other Registrations, Total uses the sum of questions A3h, A3i, and A3j.

Other Registrations, % uses (A3h+A3i+A3j)/A3a x 100.

Not Categorized, Total uses A3a–(sum of A3b to A3j).

Not Categorized, % uses (A3a–[sum of A3b to A3j])/A3a x 100. 
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 180 

Voter Registration Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Questions A3h, A3i, and A3j were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in

these items if there was another registration category aside from those listed in questions

A3b–A3g or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions

A3b–A3g.

• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration category indicate that the sum of

registrations received for each category accounted for more than the total number of

registrations reported received by the state.

• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications in

each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

• Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration category.

[1] Totals reported in item A3 of the 2022 EAVS are from the Election Systems & Software (ES&S)

election survey. Alabama does not track data on pre-registration. Due to the way the state tracks

data for changes to records, the number of changes resulting directly from registration forms could

not be separated from the total number of changes made to voter’s records.

[2] Information on registrations that were address changes that crossed jurisdiction borders is included

in reports of new valid registrations.

[3] A change in the policy of how Delaware handles “invalid” or “rejected” registrations occurred since

the 2020 EAVS submission was made. Invalid registrations are no longer rejected; instead, they are

put in a suspense status and the registrant is contacted to correct the registration record. Some

invalid registrations that go through this process may not be marked as invalid; therefore, caution

should be taken in comparing Delaware’s invalid registration data to previous years.

[4] Some counties could not provide data on registrations by outcome in A3 in the way the question

required.

[5] Data reported in “Other Registrations” is due to a system limitation in reporting the transaction

source of registration updates that do not involve a change from a previous listed source. Preregistration of voters are considered valid new registrations for the purpose of reporting data

according to the source of a transaction.

[6] Address changes across jurisdictions are counted as new registrations. Citizens who are 16 and 17

years old can apply to register to vote, but they cannot vote until they are 18.

[7] The total of A3a is the sum of A3b, A3d, and A3e. Maryland does not consider the registration

changes listed in A3f and A3g as registrations, and therefore the source of these changes is not

recorded. For A3c, individuals can register to vote starting at age 16; however, they are not

considered “pre-registered.” Sixteen- and 17-year-olds are considered registered voters who cannot

vote until their 18th birthday.
181 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

[8] In past EAVS, Michigan reported that data on the number of registration forms received for address

changes that crossed a jurisdiction border was not available. However, for this year’s survey,

Michigan can report that over 1.1 million registration transactions were for voters who changed their

city or township of residence. Additionally, the dramatic increase in the number of duplicate

registrations received compared to past EAVS responses is attributed to the implementation of

automatic voter registration. Automatic voter registration data received for existing voter registrations

is rejected if all data already exists in the qualified voter file or otherwise merged with the existing

registration.

[9] If a voter is changing their name and updating their address, the state’s voter registration system

will record two changes made to one record and will track one change for each action to a voter

record.

[10] Nebraska law does not allow for pre-registrations for people not of voting age.

[11] New Hampshire uses voter registration forms for name, party, and address changes.

[12] The totals in A3a are numbers provided by counties.

[13] Address changes that cross jurisdiction borders are recorded as new registrations.

[14] Data on the number of cross-jurisdiction change of addresses is included with data on withinjurisdiction change of name, party, or address.

[15] Cross-jurisdiction moves count as new registrations.

[16] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not collect data on rejected registrations.

[17] Multiple changes may occur on the same voter registration form.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 182 

Voter Registration Table 4: Voter List Maintenance—Confirmation Notices 

State

Confirmation Notices 

Sent

Result of Confirmation Notice

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter Confirmation Notices 

Returned 

Undeliverable Valid Invalid

Total

% of 

Active 

Voters

Total % Total % Total %

Alabama [1] -- -- 1,942 -- 40,598 -- 208,413 --

Alaska 78,183 13.0% 302 0.4% -- -- 23,293 29.8%

American Samoa -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Arizona 991,282 23.9% 68,611 6.9% 32,275 3.3% 57,079 5.8%

Arkansas 216,653 14.7% 28,181 13.0% 21,969 10.1% 25,017 11.5%

California 3,589,417 16.3% 404,858 11.3% 182,321 5.1% 509,518 14.2%

Colorado 651,897 17.0% 10,454 1.6% 15,733 2.4% 27,299 4.2%

Connecticut 83,937 3.7% 27,373 32.6% -- -- 56,564 67.4%

Delaware [2] 138,233 19.7% -- -- 7,782 5.6% 41,687 30.2%

District of 

Columbia 160,088 31.5% 6,704 4.2% 9,530 6.0% 3,858 2.4%

Florida 1,336,199 9.2% 83,078 6.2% 122,334 9.2% 190,189 14.2%

Georgia 1,135,472 16.3% 2,392 0.2% 11,437 1.0% 166,411 14.7%

Guam 8,961 14.8% -- -- -- -- -- --

Hawaii [3] 63,259 8.3% 114 0.2% 203 0.3% -- --

Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 2,710,102 34.3% 80,181 3.0% 48,261 1.8% 94,964 3.5%

Indiana [5] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Iowa [6] 294,154 15.6% -- -- -- -- -- --

Kansas 237,940 13.0% 4,338 1.8% 34,003 14.3% 20,986 8.8%

Kentucky [7] 379,501 12.1% -- -- -- -- -- --

Louisiana [8] 483,961 17.1% -- -- -- -- -- --

Maine [9] 231,650 24.9% 6,190 2.7% 2,675 1.2% -- --

Maryland [10] 395,112 9.5% 2,794 0.7% 38,725 9.8% -- --

Massachusetts 

[11] 632,191 15.1% -- -- -- -- -- --

Michigan [12] 590,172 8.1% 468 0.1% 82,814 14.0% 177,579 30.1%

Minnesota 115,653 3.2% -- -- -- -- -- --

Mississippi [13] 140,044 7.3% -- -- -- -- -- --

Missouri [14] 715,685 18.8% 2,553 0.4% 38,239 5.3% 67,888 9.5%

Montana 91,182 13.8% 4,966 5.4% 1,995 2.2% 20,274 22.2%

Nebraska 154,016 13.5% 19,828 12.9% 21,307 13.8% 14,135 9.2%

Nevada 404,874 22.0% 123,663 30.5% 32,456 8.0% 189,267 46.7%

New Hampshire 

[15] 9,174 1.0% 105 1.1% 0 0.0% 3,121 34.0%

New Jersey 458,898 7.7% -- -- -- -- -- --

New Mexico 165,358 13.8% 0 0.0% 9 0.0% 36,190 21.9%

New York [16] 458,079 3.8% 27,311 6.0% 48,489 10.6% 22,710 5.0%

North Carolina 

[17] 1,058,260 16.3% -- -- -- -- 336,561 31.8%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
 

183 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

State

Confirmation Notices 

Sent

Result of Confirmation Notice

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter Confirmation Notices 

Returned 

Valid Invalid Undeliverable

Total

% of 

Active 

Voters

Total % Total % Total %

Northern 

Mariana Islands 2,000 10.4% -- -- -- -- -- --

Ohio 1,253,658 15.6% 152,174 12.1% 21,112 1.7% 153,048 12.2%

Oklahoma 245,970 12.2% 20,862 8.5% 1,907 0.8% 34,311 13.9%

Oregon 390,806 13.1% -- -- -- -- -- --

Pennsylvania 

[18] 964,386 12.0% 48,950 5.1% 47,021 4.9% 149,980 15.6%

Rhode Island 34,082 4.7% -- -- -- -- -- --

South Carolina 168,763 5.0% 6,086 3.6% 911 0.5% 1,354 0.8%

South Dakota 20,687 3.4% 141 0.7% 260 1.3% 11,963 57.8%

Tennessee 222,720 5.3% 21,773 9.8% 27,737 12.5% 56,568 25.4%

Texas 1,811,745 11.4% 593,213 32.7% 129,166 7.1% -- --

U.S. Virgin 

Islands -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Utah [19] 150,848 8.9% 788 0.5% 8,385 5.6% 24,330 16.1%

Vermont 62,476 14.0% 16,834 26.9% 45,642 73.1% 0 0.0%

Virginia 519,512 9.1% 24,450 4.7% -- -- 18,953 3.6%

Washington 1,782,901 37.1% 1,432 0.1% 7,007 0.4% 25,009 1.4%

West Virginia 169,472 16.1% 82,347 48.6% 14,525 8.6% -- --

Wisconsin [20] 622,370 17.0% 17,230 2.8% -- -- 299,490 48.1%

Wyoming [21] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

U.S. Total 26,601,983 13.7% 1,892,686 8.4% 1,096,828 5.0% 3,068,009 13.6%
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 184 

State

Result of Confirmation Notice

Unreturned Confirmation 

Notices Other Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total %

Alabama [1] -- -- -- -- -- --

Alaska 54,588 69.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

American Samoa -- -- -- -- -- --

Arizona 80,923 8.2% 7 0.0% 752,387 75.9%

Arkansas 141,591 65.4% 6 0.0% -111 -0.1%

California 1,937,283 54.0% 132,743 3.7% 422,694 11.8%

Colorado 598,411 91.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

Connecticut -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Delaware [2] 88,764 64.2% -- -- 0 0.0%

District of Columbia 139,996 87.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Florida 930,170 69.6% 1,554 0.1% 8,874 0.7%

Georgia 904,346 79.6% 50,886 4.5% 0 0.0%

Guam -- -- -- -- 8,961 100.0%

Hawaii [3] 62,942 99.5% -- -- 0 0.0%

Idaho [4] -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 451,420 16.7% 4,402 0.2% 2,030,874 74.9%

Indiana [5] -- -- -- -- -- --

Iowa [6] -- -- -- -- 294,154 100.0%

Kansas 63,940 26.9% 9 0.0% 114,664 48.2%

Kentucky [7] -- -- -- -- 379,501 100.0%

Louisiana [8] -- -- -- -- 483,961 100.0%

Maine [9] -- -- 222,785 96.2% 0 0.0%

Maryland [10] 353,593 89.5% -- -- 0 0.0%

Massachusetts [11] -- -- -- -- 632,191 100.0%

Michigan [12] 329,311 55.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

Minnesota 115,653 100.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Mississippi [13] -- -- -- -- 140,044 100.0%

Missouri [14] -- -- 147,187 20.6% 459,818 64.2%

Montana 61,826 67.8% 2,121 2.3% 0 0.0%

Nebraska 95,837 62.2% 2,909 1.9% 0 0.0%

Nevada 59,488 14.7% -- -- 0 0.0%

New Hampshire [15] 5,948 64.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

New Jersey -- -- -- -- 458,898 100.0%

New Mexico 129,159 78.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

New York [16] 343,514 75.0% -- -- 16,055 3.5%

North Carolina [17] 680,230 64.3% 41,469 3.9% 0 0.0%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- --

Northern Mariana 

Islands -- -- 2,000 100.0% 0 0.0%

Ohio 927,324 74.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
 

185 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

State

Result of Confirmation Notice

Unreturned Confirmation 

Notices Other Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total %

Oklahoma 188,890 76.8% -- -- 0 0.0%

Oregon -- -- 390,806 100.0% 0 0.0%

Pennsylvania [18] 298,880 31.0% 419,555 43.5% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island -- -- -- -- 34,082 100.0%

South Carolina 160,412 95.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

South Dakota 8,323 40.2% -- -- 0 0.0%

Tennessee 116,642 52.4% -- -- 0 0.0%

Texas 1,089,366 60.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

U.S. Virgin Islands -- -- -- -- -- --

Utah [19] 4,934 3.3% 7,404 4.9% 105,007 69.6%

Vermont 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Virginia 476,109 91.6% -- -- 0 0.0%

Washington 1,749,453 98.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

West Virginia -- -- 72,600 42.8% 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [20] 305,650 49.1% -- -- 0 0.0%

Wyoming [21] -- -- -- -- -- --

U.S. Total 12,954,916 57.4% 1,498,443 10.4% 6,342,054 23.8%

Voter Registration Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Confirmation Notices Sent, Total uses question A8a.

Confirmation Notices Sent, % of Active Voters uses A8a/A1b x 100.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid, Total uses question A8b.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid, % uses A8b/A8a x 100.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, Total uses question A8c.

Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, % uses A8c/A8a x 100.

Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, Total uses question A8d.

Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, % uses A8d/A8a x 100.

Unreturned Confirmation Notices, Total uses question A8e.

Unreturned Confirmation Notices, % uses A8e/A8a x 100.

Other, Total uses the sum of questions A8f, A8g, and A8h.

Other, % uses (A8f+A8g+A8h)/A8a x 100.

Not Categorized, Total uses A8a–(sum of A8b to A8h).

Not Categorized, % uses (A8a–[sum of A8b to A8h])/A8a x 100. 
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 186 

Voter Registration Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Questions A8f, A8g, and A8h were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data 

in these items if there was another confirmation notice status aside from those listed in 

questions A8b–A8e or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in 

questions A8b–A8e.

• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized confirmation notices category indicate that the sum 

of confirmation notices for each category accounted for more than the total number of 

confirmation notices reported by the state.

• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation 

notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

• Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each confirmation notice category.

• States that are exempt from the NVRA are not required to send confirmation notices pursuant 

to the NVRA, although they may send confirmation notices (or other similar notices) pursuant 

to state law or practice. States that do not use confirmation notices typically use other sources 

of data to identify potentially ineligible voters.

[1] Alabama does not have a report that has the total number of confirmation notices sent.

[2] Delaware does not require confirmation notices to be returned. Notices are assumed correct if they 

are not returned.

[3] Kauai County was the only county that logged received notices.

[4] Idaho does not track data on the outcomes of confirmation notices.

[5] Indiana’s statewide voter registration system is not able to track data on confirmation notices.

[6] Due to a change in state statute regarding how and when voters become inactive due to nonparticipation, a large portion of mail processing is done outside of the state database; this affects the 

ability to report data in A8e.

[7] As of the time the EAVS data were finalized, Kentucky had not yet finished scanning and 

categorizing the returns.

[8] Confirmation notices are sent pursuant to 52 USC Section §20507(d)(2). The Department of State 

only collects data on the total number of sent confirmation notices.

[9] Maine conducted a statewide NVRA list maintenance mailing in 2022.

[10] Data for A8d is included in what is reported in A8e.

[11] Data on the result of confirmation notices is not tracked.

[12] In 2021, the Michigan Bureau of Elections processed undeliverable mail from the first statewide 

elections mailing in 10 years, triggering a significantly larger amount of cancellation notices mailed 

than in the past.

[13] In the lead-up to the 2020 election, the Mississippi Secretary of State’s office sent postcards to 

every registered voter to update them on changes that had been made in election laws. Postcards 

that were undeliverable were returned to the local election officials and caused a confirmation card 

to be sent.

[14] Missouri does not track all the requested information on confirmation notices.

[15] New Hampshire does not send confirmation notices, but does send 30-day letters.

[16] Some counties could not provide data on confirmation notices.
 

187 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

[17] Data are not available in the statewide voter registration system showing whether confirmation 

notices were confirmed by the voter or not. County boards process the returned confirmation notices 

according to voter confirmation.

[18] The number reported in A8a includes initial notices sent to voters who appear to have moved 

based upon information received pursuant to the National Change of Address program.

[19] Several Utah counties do not track data on confirmation notices or on unreturned confirmation 

notices.

[20] Wisconsin is exempt from NVRA; however, the state sent notices to voters who have not voted in a 

4-year period, as well as Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) mover mailings. Notices 

are sent to voters who register to vote or whose voter information may be out of date.

[21] Wyoming does not require registration confirmation notices to be sent to voters and does not have 

a system that tracks that information.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 188 

Voter Registration Table 5: Voter List Maintenance—Removal Actions 

State

Voters Removed Reason for Removal

Total

% of 

Reg.

Voters

Moved Out of 

Jurisdiction Voter Deceased Failure to Return Confirmation Notice Voter’s Request

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Alabama [1] 298,554 8.1% 20,019 6.7% 106,738 35.8% 149,982 50.2% 833 0.3%

Alaska 46,703 7.2% 2,683 5.7% 11,261 24.1% 22,937 49.1% 8,400 18.0%

American 

Samoa 2,736 19.1% -- -- 146 5.3% 2,590 94.7% -- --

Arizona 432,498 8.9% 81,637 18.9% 108,103 25.0% 175,284 40.5% 50,092 11.6%

Arkansas 195,595 10.8% 10,598 5.4% 46,867 24.0% 128,798 65.8% 692 0.4%

California 977,773 3.6% 167,009 17.1% 406,702 41.6% 155,399 15.9% 137,839 14.1%

Colorado 394,628 9.1% 59,977 15.2% 99,024 25.1% 161,607 41.0% 64,478 16.3%

Connecticut 157,239 6.3% 85,519 54.4% 21,344 13.6% 49,109 31.2% -- --

Delaware 34,092 4.5% 15,278 44.8% 16,867 49.5% 4 0.0% 553 1.6%

District of 

Columbia 15,974 2.4% 10,707 67.0% 4,699 29.4% 0 0.0% 568 3.6%

Florida 1,516,111 9.7% 572,346 37.8% 424,687 28.0% 379,356 25.0% 67,648 4.5%

Georgia [2] 483,386 6.2% 84,041 17.4% 175,817 36.4% 112,890 23.4% 6,142 1.3%

Guam 8,961 14.8% -- -- -- -- 8,961 100.0% -- --

Hawaii 41,308 4.8% 2,500 6.1% 34,440 83.4% 0 0.0% 4,323 10.5%

Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 692,003 7.9% 296,037 42.8% 123,012 17.8% 79,379 11.5% 21,596 3.1%

Indiana [3] 937,145 19.7% 5,806 0.6% 0 0.0% 127,072 13.6% -- --

Iowa 86,404 3.9% 25,516 29.5% 58,412 67.6% 1,326 1.5% 799 0.9%

Kansas 131,563 6.7% 12,818 9.7% 48,113 36.6% 60,911 46.3% 1,163 0.9%

Kentucky 131,260 3.7% 12,613 9.6% 103,997 79.2% 0 0.0% 1,752 1.3%

Louisiana [4] 266,821 8.8% 79,755 29.9% 88,094 33.0% 48,502 18.2% 14,516 5.4%

Maine 121,841 10.6% 84,069 69.0% 30,189 24.8% 1,396 1.1% 693 0.6%

Maryland 268,612 6.0% 58,085 21.6% 81,789 30.4% 123,377 45.9% 1,395 0.5%

Massachusetts 704,938 14.4% 438,479 62.2% 90,325 12.8% 108,282 15.4% 9,709 1.4%

Michigan 485,916 5.9% 71,108 14.6% 232,745 47.9% 176,788 36.4% 5,275 1.1%

Minnesota [5] 322,355 8.9% 141,242 43.8% 72,016 22.3% 107,878 33.5% -- --

Mississippi 152,455 7.3% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Missouri 468,943 11.1% 134,686 28.7% 132,372 28.2% 172,224 36.7% 3,547 0.8%

Montana [6] 60,248 7.9% 8,685 14.4% 18,028 29.9% 26,067 43.3% 2,678 4.4%

Nebraska 109,749 8.8% 47,516 43.3% 31,469 28.7% 26,143 23.8% 898 0.8%

Nevada 396,616 18.0% 112,129 28.3% 70,643 17.8% 163,986 41.3% 45,117 11.4%

New Hampshire 267,896 29.5% 66,932 25.0% 4,129 1.5% -- -- -- --

New Jersey [7] 402,607 6.3% 56,827 14.1% 118,186 29.4% 223,564 55.5% -- --

New Mexico 50,335 3.7% 5,011 10.0% 37,570 74.6% 7 0.0% 238 0.5%

New York 391,397 3.0% 229,160 58.5% 133,075 34.0% 3,609 0.9% 28,272 7.2%

North Carolina 981,703 13.2% 368,293 37.5% 164,937 16.8% 392,851 40.0% 3,957 0.4%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Northern 

Mariana Islands 2,000 10.4% 20 1.0% 100 5.0% -- -- 5 0.3%
 

189 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

State

Voters Removed Reason for Removal

Total

% of 

Reg.

Voters

Moved Out of 

Jurisdiction Voter Deceased Failure to Return Confirmation Notice Voter’s Request

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Ohio 623,116 7.8% 201,421 32.3% 215,497 34.6% 116,823 18.7% 79,383 12.7%

Oklahoma 256,672 11.2% 74,948 29.2% 56,237 21.9% 110,973 43.2% 2,369 0.9%

Oregon [8] 117,307 3.9% 9,258 7.9% 72,444 61.8% 6,870 5.9% 28,373 24.2%

Pennsylvania 993,216 11.2% 392,536 39.5% 229,763 23.1% 360,132 36.3% 9,474 1.0%

Rhode Island 56,837 7.0% 14,530 25.6% 17,606 31.0% 15,534 27.3% 4,981 8.8%

South Carolina 

[9] 262,015 7.0% 15,675 6.0% 101,404 38.7% 136,298 52.0% 1,625 0.6%

South Dakota 24,557 3.7% 1,234 5.0% 11,134 45.3% 9,889 40.3% 619 2.5%

Tennessee 424,647 9.3% 184,932 43.5% 125,326 29.5% 97,525 23.0% 5,979 1.4%

Texas 2,029,283 11.5% 91,966 4.5% 345,402 17.0% 56,506 2.8% 12,517 0.6%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 12 0.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

Utah 57,975 3.6% 18,142 31.3% 6,416 11.1% 32,917 56.8% 252 0.4%

Vermont 45,641 9.1% 0 0.0% 10,170 22.3% 20,685 45.3% 4,780 10.5%

Virginia 837,061 13.7% 556,858 66.5% 125,655 15.0% 114,945 13.7% 26,243 3.1%

Washington 628,840 11.9% 89,171 14.2% 128,774 20.5% 174,538 27.8% 97,607 15.5%

West Virginia 197,429 17.1% 1,065 0.5% 14,899 7.5% 150,079 76.0% 112 0.1%

Wisconsin [10] 643,975 17.5% 98,027 15.2% 337,081 52.3% 166,433 25.8% 830 0.1%

Wyoming 23,052 7.6% 1,097 4.8% 4,909 21.3% 16,280 70.6% 83 0.4%

U.S. Total 19,260,000 8.5% 5,117,961 26.8% 4,898,625 25.6% 4,776,706 25.4% 758,405 4.5%
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 190 

State

Reason for Removal

Felony or Conviction Mental Incompetence Other Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Alabama [1] 5,815 1.9% 145 0.0% 13,870 4.6% 1,152 0.4%

Alaska 1,422 3.0% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

American 

Samoa 0 0.0% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Arizona 15,172 3.5% 717 0.2% 1,493 0.3% 0 0.0%

Arkansas 3,391 1.7% 57 0.0% 5,192 2.7% 0 0.0%

California 18,657 1.9% 980 0.1% 53,166 5.4% 38,021 3.9%

Colorado 9,480 2.4% -- -- 62 0.0% 0 0.0%

Connecticut 1,267 0.8% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Delaware 1,390 4.1% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

District of 

Columbia -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Florida 18,314 1.2% 1,812 0.1% 51,916 3.4% 32 0.0%

Georgia [2] 32,273 6.7% 373 0.1% 71,850 14.9% 0 0.0%

Guam 0 0.0% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Hawaii 42 0.1% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 0 0.0%

Idaho -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Illinois 4,497 0.6% 29 0.0% 23,003 3.3% 144,450 20.9%

Indiana [3] 1 0.0% -- -- 2,584 0.3% 801,682 85.5%

Iowa 244 0.3% 75 0.1% 32 0.0% 0 0.0%

Kansas 1,543 1.2% 30 0.0% 6,586 5.0% 399 0.3%

Kentucky 11,932 9.1% 966 0.7% -- -- 0 0.0%

Louisiana [4] 11,165 4.2% 200 0.1% 24,589 9.2% 0 0.0%

Maine -- -- -- -- 5,494 4.5% 0 0.0%

Maryland 2,444 0.9% 40 0.0% 1,482 0.6% 0 0.0%

Massachusetts 244 0.0% -- -- 57,899 8.2% 0 0.0%

Michigan -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Minnesota [5] -- -- -- -- 1,219 0.4% 0 0.0%

Mississippi -- -- -- -- -- -- 152,455 100.0%

Missouri 12,630 2.7% 1,916 0.4% 11,568 2.5% 0 0.0%

Montana [6] 171 0.3% 3 0.0% 4,616 7.7% 0 0.0%

Nebraska 2,909 2.7% 0 0.0% 814 0.7% 0 0.0%

Nevada 4,696 1.2% 41 0.0% 4 0.0% 0 0.0%

New 

Hampshire 13 0.0% -- -- 196,822 73.5% 0 0.0%

New Jersey [7] 22 0.0% 0 0.0% 4,008 1.0% 0 0.0%

New Mexico 7,509 14.9% 0 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%

New York 2,874 0.7% 68 0.0% -- -- -5,661 -1.4%

North Carolina 14,078 1.4% -- -- 37,587 3.8% 0 0.0%

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

50 2.5% 0 0.0% 2,000 100.0% -175 -8.7%

Ohio 9,989 1.6% 3 0.0% -- -- 0 0.0%
 

191 | Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond 

State

Reason for Removal

Felony or Conviction Mental Incompetence Other Not Categorized

Total % Total % Total % Total %

Oklahoma 3,063 1.2% 231 0.1% 8,851 3.4% 0 0.0%

Oregon [8] -- -- -- -- 362 0.3% 0 0.0%

Pennsylvania 122 0.0% -- -- 1,189 0.1% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island 961 1.7% 1 0.0% 3,223 5.7% 1 0.0%

South Carolina 

[9] 7,013 2.7% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

South Dakota 1,658 6.8% 0 0.0% 23 0.1% 0 0.0%

Tennessee 8,227 1.9% 1 0.0% 2,657 0.6% 0 0.0%

Texas 4,563 0.2% 756 0.0% 1,517,573 74.8% 0 0.0%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 0 0.0% -- -- -- -- 0 0.0%

Utah 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 245 0.4%

Vermont -- -- -- -- 10,006 21.9% 0 0.0%

Virginia 9,740 1.2% 1,178 0.1% 2,442 0.3% 0 0.0%

Washington 6,389 1.0% 281 0.0% 132,080 21.0% 0 0.0%

West Virginia -- -- 0 0.0% 31,274 15.8% 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [10] 4,851 0.8% 728 0.1% 36,025 5.6% 0 0.0%

Wyoming 64 0.3% 4 0.0% 615 2.7% 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 240,887 1.4% 10,637 0.1% 2,324,178 13.8% 1,132,601 5.9%

Voter Registration Table 5 Calculation Notes:

Voters Removed, % of Registered Voters uses A9a/A1a x 100.

Moved Out of Jurisdiction, Total uses question A9b.

Moved Out of Jurisdiction, % uses A9b/A9a x 100.

Voter Deceased, Total uses question A9c.

Voter Deceased, % uses A9c/A9a x 100.

Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, Total uses question A9e.

Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, % uses A9e/A9a x 100.

Voter’s Request, Total uses question A9g.

Voter’s Request, % uses question A9g/A9a x 100.

Felony or Conviction, Total uses question A9d.

Felony or Conviction, % uses A9d/A9a x 100.

Mental Incompetence, Total uses question A9f.

Mental Incompetence, % uses question A9f/A9a x 100.

Other, Total uses the sum of questions A9h, A9i, and A9j.

Other, % uses (A9h+A9i+A9j)/A9a x 100.

Not Categorized, Total uses A9a–(sum of A9b to A9j).

Not Categorized, % uses (A9a–[sum of A9b to A9j])/A9a x 100. 

Voter Registration Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond | 192 

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Questions A9h, A9i, and A9j were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in 

these items if there was another reason for registration removals aside from those listed in 

questions A9b–A9g or if there were registration removals that could not be categorized in 

questions A9b–A9g.

• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration removals category indicate that the sum 

of registration removals for each category accounted for more than the total number of 

registration removals reported received by the state.

• Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation 

notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

• Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration removal 

category. In addition, not all states may remove registrations for the listed reason.

[1] Data reported in the “Other” category includes duplicate profiles for voters who were already 

registered and reasons not listed.

[2] Data reported in A9b represents voters who moved out of state.

[3] The data reported in A9b–j consisted of data from an ad hoc report (A9b–d, A9g–j) and the 

statewide voter registration system (A9e). Indiana provided the number of voter records cancelled 

due to being in inactive status for more than two federal general elections for question A9e. These 

statistics represent the majority of cancellations for this reason, based on county users selecting the 

option to run this process in batch. County users have the option to also cancel voters one by one for 

this reason, but those statistics are not included in the counts for question A9e.

[4] Irregularities include voters that were cancelled by the Registrar of Voters because the registrant 

provided insufficient or incorrect data or a user processing error. Challenge 21 includes voters who 

were registered in another state or not a United States citizen, or were otherwise not qualified to be 

registered for reasons other than change of address.

[5] Pertaining to the number of removals reported because the voter received a disqualifying criminal 

conviction or was declared mentally incompetent, these voters are not removed, but their status is 

changed to “challenged.” For removals for a failure to respond to a confirmation notice and a failure 

to vote, this includes data on individuals who did not vote or update their registration in the prior 4 

years. Data on removals because of voter request is not tracked separately and is included as an 

“other” reason for removal.

[6] Data reported in A9d includes felony cancellations as reported in the statewide voter registration 

database. Data reported in A9j includes cancellations for which no reason was specified.

[7] There are no records for voters removed due to mental incompetence. “Administrative action” was 

erroneously recorded with removals at the voter’s request in previous years.

[8] Data reported on removals at the voter’s request may include other reasons listed. Individuals who 

receive a felony or criminal conviction are inactivated, not removed from the voter rolls.

[9] Tracking of voters removed for mental incompetence was implemented after the time period 

covered by the 2022 EAVS.

[10] In Wisconsin, voters are only included in the data on voter registration removals if they remain 

removed as of the time the data for this report was pulled. Voters who were removed during the 

period and subsequently reregistered during the period are not included. Wisconsin is exempt from 

the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions. Only active voters are registered 

and eligible to vote in Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s count of registered voters for this report includes 

military voters, even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin.
193 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

 

Chapter 4. Military and Overseas 

Voting in 2022: UOCAVA

Key Findings

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Section B collected data from states and 

municipalities on individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 

(UOCAVA) during the 2022 federal general election. Election officials were asked a variety of 

questions relating to UOCAVA voting practices, including the total number of registered UOCAVA 

voters, the use of the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), the quantity of and methods by which

ballots were transmitted to and returned by UOCAVA voters, and the use of the Federal Write-In 

Absentee Ballot (FWAB).1 Notable findings from EAVS Section B include:

o Over 57% of registered UOCAVA voters held legal voting residence in three states: Florida 

(182,506), California (137,273), and Washington (103,996). California and Florida had 

more overseas citizens than uniformed services members2; Washington had more 

uniformed services members than overseas citizens. More than 60% of EAVS jurisdictions 

had 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters and 85% of jurisdictions had at least one 

registered UOCAVA voter.

o Continuing a trend that has been ongoing for several election cycles, overseas citizens 

made up a larger percentage of registered UOCAVA voters than did uniformed services 

members. In 2022, the number of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was nearly 

double the number of ballots transmitted to voters who were uniformed services members.

o Email was the most popular mode for states to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters for the 

2022 general election (48.5%), followed by postal mail (38.4%), and other methods such 

as fax or online systems (12.6%). The percentage of ballots transmitted via email dropped 

by about 8 percentage points from 2018 (56.6%). Transmission via other modes saw a 

sizable increase between 2018 and 2022.

o The majority (52.8%) of overseas citizens received their ballot via email, compared to just 

over a third of uniformed service members (36.6%). About 267,403 (41%) of transmitted 

ballots for the 2022 general election were returned to election offices. This is about 22.4% 

lower than the 344,392 returned ballots from 2018.

o Most UOCAVA voters returned ballots via postal mail (61.5%). This was particularly true for 

uniformed services members (73.6%). A total of 257,657 UOCAVA voter ballots were 

counted in 2022.

o Usage of the FWAB decreased by 26.8% compared to 2018. Usage of the FWAB resulted in 

an additional 3,447 UOCAVA voters’ ballots being counted in the 2022 election and 655

1 The response rate among local jurisdictions for EAVS Section B was 99.9%; five counties in Arkansas did 

not provide Section B data. In addition, the response rate for individual items varied. Results reported in 

this chapter include only states for which data are available for a given question. State and national totals 

include all available jurisdiction-level data. National-level percentages reported in this chapter used

casewise deletion.

2 Per UOCAVA, uniformed service members include both active duty military and their eligible family 

members. 
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 194 

FWABs were not counted in the 2022 election. Of this number, 159 FWABs were not 

counted because they were replaced by a regular absentee ballot, making the backup 

ballot unnecessary.

Introduction

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) to collect data from states3 and to report on absentee voting by uniformed services 

members and overseas citizens.4 Since 2014, the EAC has fulfilled this reporting mandate in 

partnership with the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the agency designated to 

administer UOCAVA on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Through a memorandum 

of understanding between the EAC and FVAP, Section B of the EAVS is administered on behalf of 

both agencies. This agreement allows both the EAC and FVAP to fulfill congressionally mandated 

requirements to study UOCAVA voting while reducing the data collection and reporting burden on 

state and local election officials. States are required to report certain election data to the EAC 

after each federal election.5

This chapter examines UOCAVA data from the 2022 EAVS, including use of the FPCA by UOCAVA

voters, ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by states, ballots returned by UOCAVA voters, 

UOCAVA ballots counted, UOCAVA ballots rejected, and usage of the FWAB by UOCAVA voters. 

Where appropriate, information about state laws and procedures related to UOCAVA voting, 

collected as part of the EAC’s 2022 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), is 

presented to provide context for the EAVS results. Chapter 2 of this report contains a full analysis 

of all UOCAVA data collected in the 2022 Policy Survey.

Federal Laws Regulating Military and Overseas Voting

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA)

UOCAVA protects the voting rights of active duty military members who are stationed away from 

their voting residence, the spouses and other eligible family of active duty military members, U.S. 

citizens residing outside of the United States, and other uniformed services members. UOCAVA

requires all states, territories, and the District of Columbia to allow these citizens to register to 

vote and to cast an absentee ballot for all federal elections.6 For the estimated 1.33 million active 

duty members and approximately 573,000 military spouses and voting-age dependents stationed 

away from their legal voting residence7—as well as the estimated 2.6 million voting-age U.S. 

3 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 

U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and four U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 

U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Due to the Northern 

Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is not available from this 

territory.

4 The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 20901. The EAC works with FVAP to collect 

comprehensive data from the states on all of the ballots sent and received by voters covered under 

UOCAVA (52 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(11)).

5 Section 703(a) HAVA amended section 102 of UOCAVA.

6 Throughout this report, the term “uniformed services voter” refers to U.S. citizens who are active members 

of the uniformed services or a spouse or dependent family member thereof. “Overseas citizen” refers to 

non-military U.S. citizens who reside overseas.

7 Information was provided by FVAP to Fors Marsh via email on April 6, 2023, and was current as of October 

2022.
 

195 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

citizens who live, study, or work overseas8—the absentee voting process is different from and can 

be more challenging than the voting process for non-military voters residing in the United States.

Among the challenges UOCAVA sought to address was the wide variability in rules and procedures 

governing registration and voting across states, which made it difficult for uniformed services 

members and overseas citizens to navigate the voting process.9 UOCAVA established the FPCA, 

which serves as a combination registration and ballot request application that is accepted in all 

U.S. states and territories. In addition, the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be cast by 

UOCAVA voters who make a timely request for, but do not receive, a regular absentee ballot.10

Some, but not all, states consider the FWAB to be both a registration form and ballot request 

application.

Although states and localities still maintain and administer elections according to their own laws 

and procedures for registration and absentee voting among uniformed services members and 

overseas citizens, the provisions of UOCAVA established some uniformity in the absentee voting 

process for these voters.

The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 

Historically, UOCAVA ballots were transmitted from election offices to voters primarily through the 

mail. Given long mailing times and high mobility rates for this population of voters, this practice 

meant that many UOCAVA voters were unable to receive and return their absentee ballot before 

state ballot return deadlines. The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act 

amended UOCAVA to establish additional requirements to protect military and overseas citizens’ 

voting rights.11 These new rules required that all states, territories, and the District of Columbia 

provide UOCAVA voters with an option to request and receive registration and absentee ballot 

request materials electronically, directed states to establish an electronic means of transmitting 

8 Federal Voting Assistance Program, “Comparing Models for Estimating the Total Overseas Citizen 

Population, the Overseas Citizen Voting-Age Population, and Voting Rates,” at 

https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/OCPA-Research-Note_Final.pdf. The 2022 Overseas Citizen 

Population Analysis (OCPA) also estimates the number of overseas U.S. citizens, but results from this survey

were not available at the time of this report’s publication.

9 The U.S. Department of Justice. (2020, February 18). The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act. https://www.justice.gov/crt/uniformed-and-overseas-citizens-absentee-voting-act. 10 Section 103 of UOCAVA provides a mechanism for uniformed services members and overseas citizens to 

cast a FWAB (see 52 U.S.C.§ 20303). 11 Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 statutory language can be found at 

https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Policies/moveact.pdf. State specific information can be found at 

https://www.fvap.gov/guide. 

Citizens protected by UOCAVA include:

• Members of the uniformed services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space 

Force), Coast Guard, U.S. Public Health Service [USPHS] Commissioned Corps, and the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] Commissioned Officer Corps) who 

are stationed away from their legal voting residence;

• Members of the U.S. Merchant Marine;

• Eligible family members of the above; and

• U.S. citizens residing outside of the United States
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 196 

blank ballots to UOCAVA voters, and required states to provide free access to a system whereby 

voters can verify the status of their ballot. Additionally, absentee ballots must be transmitted no 

less than 45 days before a federal election to all UOCAVA voters who submit an absentee ballot 

request before this deadline. These additional provisions aimed to ensure uniformed services 

members and overseas citizens not only have the right to vote, but that they have sufficient time 

to receive and return their absentee ballots ahead of state deadlines.

The UOCAVA Voting Process

Although the specific path may differ depending on the policies and procedures in one’s state of 

voting residence and on a voter’s particular situation and preferences, in general, the UOCAVA

voting process can be summarized in six basic steps, as illustrated in Figure 1.12

Figure 1. The UOCAVA Voting Process 

12 Adapted from an FVAP infographic. For more detailed information about state policies related to UOCAVA 

voting, see Chapter 2 of this report.
 

197 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

1. Register and request an absentee ballot: UOCAVA-eligible citizens can do this either by 

completing a state application form or an FPCA (the federal form that functions as both a 

registration and absentee ballot request and is accepted in all states and U.S. territories).

2. Submit the registration and ballot request: Completed applications must be submitted to 

the appropriate state or local election office by mail or by an electronic means permitted 

by the state. All states accept FPCAs by mail; states may also accept FPCAs via email, fax, 

the state’s online voter registration portal, or by another mode.

3. Application processing: Once received, registration and absentee ballot request 

applications are processed by the election office. If an application meets all requirements 

and is accepted, then it is valid as a registration and ballot request. UOCAVA voters can 

use the FPCA as a single ballot request form for all federal elections during the calendar 

year in which it is submitted. State laws vary on how long this request is valid beyond the 

initial year.

4. Ballot transmission: Election officials transmit absentee ballots to registered UOCAVA 

voters no later than 45 days before a federal election (ballots may be transmitted later if 

the ballot request is submitted by the state deadline but less than 45 days before an 

election).13 Ballots may be transmitted to a voter by mail or through some other stateapproved electronic means of transmission, as requested by the voter.

5. Complete and return absentee ballot: UOCAVA voters complete and return their absentee 

ballot to the appropriate election office for processing. Ballots may be returned and 

submitted for processing either by mail or through some other electronic means allowed 

by a state. 

6. Ballot processing and counting: Completed absentee ballots that are returned and 

submitted for counting to an election office must be received by state deadlines and meet 

other state requirements. State policies on when completed ballots must be postmarked 

and when they must be returned to an election office in order to be eligible to be counted 

vary widely.

7. Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB): The FWAB is an emergency or “back-up” ballot 

available for citizens covered under UOCAVA. It is used to vote in any election for federal 

offices and as otherwise permitted by state law. UOCAVA requires that to use a FWAB, a 

voter must be a member of the uniformed services or Merchant Marine (or eligible family 

member), or a U.S. citizen overseas who is absent from their place of residence where 

they are otherwise qualified to vote, and must not have received their requested regular 

absentee ballot from their state. Depending on state law, the FWAB may also be used to 

request voter registration and/or an absentee ballot.

13 The UOCAVA ballot transmission date is set by the MOVE Act of 2009. Because 45 days before a federal 

general election always falls on a Saturday, election officials may refer to this ballot transmission deadline 

as “UOCAVA Saturday.”
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 198 

UOCAVA stipulates that voters may also return the state-issued absentee ballot after returning the 

FWAB, as the state ballot may offer other offices or referenda. Only one ballot is counted for each 

voter; if a state-issued absentee ballot is received from the voter, it supersedes the FWAB and 

only the official ballot is counted.

UOCAVA Registration and Ballot Requests

For the 2022 general election, registered overseas citizens outnumbered registered uniformed 

services members covered by UOCAVA. Uniformed services members and their eligible family 

members accounted for 43.1% of registered UOCAVA voters and overseas citizens accounted for 

56.5% of this population.

14 This continues a trend that was also seen in 2020, 2018, and 2016.

Table 1. Four Jurisdictions Accounted for 12%+ of All Registered UOCAVA Voters 

 

.

Jurisdictions With More Than 15,000 UOCAVA Voters 

Jurisdiction 

Number of Registered and Eligible 

UOCAVA Voters in 2022 

Los Angeles County, CA 31,273

King County, WA 30,885

Miami-Dade County, FL 16,294

Pierce County, WA 15,663

Source: Information on the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was item B1a of the 2022 

EAVS.

Registered UOCAVA voters’ legal voting residences15 are disproportionately concentrated in just a 

few U.S. states. In 2022, the states with the largest numbers of registered UOCAVA voters were 

Florida (182,506), California (137,273), and Washington (103,996).16 Together, these three 

states represented 57.5% of all registered UOCAVA voters reported in the 2022 EAVS. Fourteen

14 The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2022 EAVS. 

The number of registered and eligible uniformed services UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1b; the 

percentage of uniformed services UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1b by B1a. The number of 

registered and eligible overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1c; the percentage of 

overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1c by B1a. Casewise deletion at the state level 

was used in calculating the national percentage. In total, 754 jurisdictions in 13 states and 3 territories did 

not report data in B1; this count excludes jurisdictions in Maine, which reported UOCAVA data at the state 

level and not the jurisdiction level, and jurisdictions in North Dakota as they do not use voter registration. A 

total of 5,716 registered and eligible voters reported in B1a were not classified as either uniformed 

services members or overseas citizens. These percentages exclude the seven states that did not report the 

number of registered UOCAVA voters and the state and territory that did not subdivide this number by 

UOCAVA voter type.

15 According to FVAP’s guidance for service members, “Your voting residence is within your state of legal 

residence or domicile. It is the address that you consider your permanent home and where you had a 

physical presence. Your state of legal residence is used for state income tax purposes, determines eligibility 

to vote for federal and state elections, and qualification for in-state tuition rates.” For more information, see 

https://www.fvap.gov/military-voter/voting-residence

16 The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters in a state was calculated by summing B1a 

across all jurisdictions for each state.
 

199 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

local jurisdictions17 reported having 10,000 or more registered UOCAVA voters, and four reported 

more than 15,000 registered and eligible UOCAVA voters. These four jurisdictions, shown in Table 

1, accounted for 12.8% of all registered UOCAVA voters.

Conversely, of the 5,233 local jurisdictions for which the number of registered UOCAVA voters was 

available, 89.4% reported fewer than 100 registered UOCAVA voters, including 775 (14.8%) 

jurisdictions that reported having zero UOCAVA voters in 2022. Figure 2 shows the number of 

registered UOCAVA voters by jurisdiction.

Figure 2. Most Jurisdictions Had Fewer Than 50 Registered UOCAVA Voters 

 

Source: Information for the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of 

the 2022 EAVS.

Election offices reported receiving 309,867 FPCAs ahead of the 2022 general election, which 

was almost identical to the 312,437 FPCAs that states reported receiving ahead of the last 

17 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For 

the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for 

Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. 

Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to 

counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city, 

town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data on 

the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, 

because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but 

most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. 

Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as 

a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 200 

midterm general election in 2018. Overall, 20.7% of these registration and absentee ballot 

requests came from uniformed services members, and 76.5% were submitted by overseas 

citizens.18 States reported rejecting 1.9% of the FPCAs received—21.4% of these were rejected 

because the election office received the form after their state’s absentee ballot request 

deadline.19 The FPCA rejection rate among uniformed services members was slightly higher than 

among overseas citizens (although not to a statistically significant degree), with 2.6% of military 

FPCAs rejected compared to 1.8% of FPCAs submitted by overseas citizens.

20

Figure 3. Ballot Transmissions Were the Highest in States with Large UOCAVA Populations 

Source: Information on the number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2022 

EAVS. State-level data were aggregated from jurisdiction data. Cutoff points in the graph were selected to 

reflect states that had the lowest and highest number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted and to differentiate 

among the states in between the lowest and highest UOCAVA ballot transmission numbers.

18 Data on the total number of FPCAs submitted were collected in item B2a of the 2022 EAVS. For 2022, 

the percentage of FPCAs received from uniformed services members was calculated as B2b/B2a x 100. 

The percentage of FPCAs received from overseas citizens was calculated as B2c/B2a x 100. Casewise 

deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.

19 The total number of FPCAs rejected was collected in item B3a in the 2022 EAVS; the percentage of 

FPCAs rejected was calculated as B3a/B2a x 100. The percentage of FPCAs rejected because they were 

received late was calculated as B4a/B3a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in 

calculating the national percentages.

20 The percentage of rejected FPCAs from uniformed services voters was calculated as B3b/B2b. The 

percentage of rejected FPCAs from overseas citizens was calculated as B3c/B2c. Casewise deletion was 

used at the state level in calculating these percentages.
 

201 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted

In 2022, election offices in the 50 states, three U.S. territories,21 and the District of Columbia 

reported transmitting 654,786 ballots to UOCAVA voters.22 Figure 3 shows the number of ballots 

sent out from election offices or transmitted for each state. The states colored in the darkest blue 

represent the states that distributed the most ballots to UOCAVA voters. The states colored in the 

lightest blue are the states that distributed the fewest ballots to UOCAVA voters. States on or near 

the West Coast such as Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, Mid-Atlantic states 

including New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and populous states 

like Florida and Texas all transmitted 10,000 or more UOCAVA ballots. 

Figure 4. Steady Increase in the Percentage of UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted to 

Overseas Citizens Relative to Uniformed Services Members 

 

Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as 

B1b/B1a x 100 for 2014 and 2016 and B5b/B5a x 100 for 2018, 2020, and 2022. The percentage of 

UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B1c/B1a x 100 for 2014 and 2016, and 

B5c/B5a x 100 for 2018, 2020, and 2022. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating 

national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100% for each year.

21 Puerto Rico was not required to report data for the 2022 EAVS because it did not hold a federal general 

election in November 2022. The Northern Mariana Islands did not report data on the number of absentee 

ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters in the 2022 EAVS.

22 The number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2022 EAVS. The number of 

ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters was reported by 5,933 of 6,460 jurisdictions.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 202 

Of the UOCAVA ballots transmitted for the 2022 general election, 34.6% were sent to uniformed 

services members and 64.4% were transmitted to overseas citizens.

23 Figure 4 shows that the 

percentage of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens has continued to rise steadily over the last 

several election cycles, increasing by 12.8 percentage points since the 2014 general election and 

by 4.4 percentage points since the last midterm general election in 2018.

Although the nationwide percentage of ballots sent to overseas citizens was greater than the 

percentage sent to uniformed services members, the proportion of ballots sent to overseas 

citizens or uniformed services members varied by state. Arkansas, Montana, Tennessee, and 

Wyoming, for example, reported that UOCAVA ballots were split about evenly between uniformed 

services members and overseas citizens. However, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, 

Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island all reported that more than 90% of 

UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to overseas citizens. American Samoa and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands reported that 100% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services voters, and 

more than 60% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services members in Alaska, 

Oklahoma, and Washington State. Figure 5 shows the percentage of ballots transmitted to 

uniformed services voters versus overseas citizens.

 

23 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as B5b/B5a

x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B5c/B5a x 

100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level when calculating national percentages. An additional 

1% of the transmitted ballots could not be classified by voter type.
 

203 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

Figure 5. Twenty-Four States Transmitted More UOCAVA Ballots to 

Uniformed Services Members Than to Overseas Citizens 

 

Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B5c/B5a 

x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was 

calculated as B5b/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of uncategorized ballots was calculated 

as (B5a-B5b-B5c)/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in 

calculating national percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%. Iowa, Puerto Rico, and the Northern 

Mariana Islands did not report data on the number of ballots transmitted.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 204 

Modes of UOCAVA Ballot Transmission

Over the last several election cycles, the modes by which absentee ballots have been transmitted 

to voters have changed substantially. Since voters were given the option of how to receive their 

blank absentee ballot with the passage of the MOVE Act in 2009, transmission of ballots to 

UOCAVA voters has increasingly occurred electronically. Email was the most popular method of 

ballot transmission for the 2022 general election, with 48.5% of absentee ballots transmitted to 

UOCAVA voters via email, 38.4% transmitted via postal mail, and 12.6% sent to voters through 

some other mode of transmission (e.g., fax or online systems).24 By comparison, during the 

Figure 6. Modes of Ballot Transmission to Voters Differed for 

Overseas Citizens and Uniformed Services Members 

 

Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted overall were calculated as B7a/B5a x 100 for 

email, B6a/B5a x 100 for postal mail, and B8a/B5a x 100 for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA 

ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters were calculated as B7b/B5b x 100 for email, B6b/B5b x 

100 for postal mail, and B8b/B5b x 100 for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted 

for overseas citizens were calculated as B7c/B5c x 100 for email, B6c/B5c x 100 for postal mail, and 

B8c/B5c x 100 for other modes. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national 

percentages; percentages may not sum to 100%.

24 The percentage of ballots transmitted by email was calculated as B7a/B5a x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. The 

percentage of ballots transmitted by postal mail was calculated as B6a/B5a x 100. The percentage of 

ballots transmitted by other modes of transmission was calculated as B8a/B5a x 100. Casewise deletion 

was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.
205 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022

previous midterm election cycle in 2018, among states that provided data on transmission by 

mode, 56.6% of ballots were transmitted via email, with 42.2% of UOCAVA ballots transmitted via 

postal mail. Figure 6 displays the percentage of ballots transmitted by mail, email, or other modes 

for the 2022 general election.

Modes of ballot transmission differed based on UOCAVA voter type. Uniformed services members 

used postal transmission (58.1%) more than email transmission (36.6%), and just 6.2% of 

uniformed services members had their ballots transmitted via other modes. For ballots 

transmitted to overseas citizens, most ballots were transmitted by email (52.8%) while ballots 

transmitted by postal mail accounted for 27.1%, and 15.8% were transmitted via other means, 

including fax and online ballot delivery portals.

Overall, 1.5% of all ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters were returned as undeliverable, 

including mailed ballots returned to sender, emailed ballots that bounced back, and ballots that 

were undeliverable by other modes, such as being sent to an incorrect fax number.25

Figure 7. UOCAVA Ballot Return Rates Show No Distinct Geographic Pattern 

Source: The percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters was calculated as 

B9a/B5a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the percentages shown in this 

map.

25 The percentage of ballots returned as undeliverable was calculated as B13a/B5a x 100. Casewise 

deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. States and jurisdictions vary in 

the extent to which they are able to capture and report undeliverable ballots, both overall and by mode of 

transmission.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 206 

UOCAVA Ballots Returned and Submitted for Counting

States reported 267,403 regular absentee ballots being returned and submitted for counting by 

UOCAVA voters for the 2022 election, comprising 40.9% of the UOCAVA ballots that were 

transmitted from election offices to voters.

26 This is a decrease of 23.2% from 2018, when 

344,392 regular absentee ballots were returned by UOCAVA voters.27 Figure 7 shows the UOCAVA 

ballot return totals by state in 2022. The states colored in dark blue represent the states that had

the highest ballot return totals. The states colored in light blue were the states that had the 

lowest ballot return totals. The UOCAVA ballot return rate does not show any type of geographic or 

regional pattern.

Of the ballots returned to election offices, 31.5% were returned by uniformed services members 

and 65.8% were returned by overseas citizens.28 Overall, 61.5% of absentee ballots returned and 

submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters were returned to the election office via postal mail, 

37.7% were returned by email, and 17.1% were returned through some other mode (e.g., fax or 

an online system).29 Data on email ballot returns was not available in or not provided by 21 

states. Among the states that reported UOCAVA ballots returned by email, 37.7% of ballots were 

returned through email, and 61.5% were returned via mail.30 Half of states allow UOCAVA voters 

to return their ballots by email.31

 

26 The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a in the 2022 EAVS. The 

percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned was calculated as B9a/B5a x 100. Casewise 

deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. FWABs were reported separately 

from regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and were not included in these figures. Because more than one 

ballot may be transmitted to an individual voter (e.g., because the original was returned undeliverable or 

was spoiled and replaced), this rate likely underestimates the rate of ballot return by UOCAVA voters.

27 The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a for the 2018 EAVS. 

28 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services members was calculated as 

B9b/B9a x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizens was calculated as 

B9c/B9a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.

29 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail was calculated as B10a/B9a x 100. The 

percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email was calculated as B11a/B9a x 100. The percentage of 

UOCAVA ballots returned by some other mode was calculated as B12a/B9a x 100. Casewise deletion was 

used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

30 Thirty states reported at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in the 2022 EAVS). The percentage of

ballots returned by email was calculated as B11a/B9a x 100 among states reporting at least one email 

ballot returned (item B11a in the 2022 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by mail was calculated as 

B10a/B9a x 100 among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B11a in 2022 EAVS). 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

31 Information on how UOCAVA ballots may be returned by voters was collected in item Q28 of the 2022 

Policy Survey.
 

207 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

Figure 8. Postal Mail Was the Primary Mode of Ballot Return for UOCAVA Voters 

 

Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode overall were calculated as B10a/B9a x 100 

for postal mail and B11a/B9a x 100 for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for 

overseas citizens were calculated as B10c/B9c x 100 for postal mail and B11c/B9c x 100 for email. The 

percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for uniformed services members were calculated as 

B10b/B9b x 100 for postal mail and B11b/B9b x 100 for email. Casewise deletion was used at the state 

level in calculating national percentages, and because percentages for each type of voter and each mode 

of return were calculated independently—and only states that reported data for a given mode of return were 

included in the analysis—the percentages do not sum to 100%. Other modes of ballot return are not shown 

here.

Although postal mail was the most common mode of ballot return for both uniformed services 

members and overseas citizens, uniformed services members used email return far less than 

overseas citizens, with just 14.6% using email to return an absentee ballot versus 52.8% of 

overseas citizens.32 Figure 8 displays the method of ballot return for UOCAVA voters by type.

Overall, 257,657 regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters were counted in the 2022

general election. Of these votes, 66.4% were cast by overseas citizens and 31.1% by uniformed 

32 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by uniformed services members was calculated as 

B11b/B9b x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by overseas citizens was calculated 

as B11c/B9c x 100. Of note, two of the states with the largest numbers of UOCAVA voters—California and 

Florida—do not allow email return of absentee ballots. Casewise deletion at the state level was used to 

calculate the national percentages.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 208 

services voters.

33 The overall rejection rate for regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA 

voters was 3.9%, a 46% decrease from the 5.7% reported in 2018.34 The overall rejection rate did 

not differ significantly across UOCAVA voter types.35

Figure 9 shows the number of rejected UOCAVA ballots returned and submitted by voters for 

counting in each state. The states that are colored in dark blue represent the states that reported

the highest number of rejected ballots, and the states that are colored in light blue reported the 

lowest number of rejected ballots. Rejection rates were highest in southern states including 

Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee as well as in western states like California, 

Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. 

Rejected ballots were divided into three reasons for rejection: missed deadline, problem with 

voter signature, and lacked postmark.36 By far, the most common reason for rejection was that a 

ballot was received after a state’s deadline for UOCAVA absentee ballot receipt. Of the 10,456 

returned UOCAVA ballots rejected, 6,774 were rejected because they were received after the 

state deadline, which was 65.4% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections.37 Voter signature problems were 

responsible for 18.1% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections, 1% of ballot rejections were the result of 

postmark issues, and 18% of rejections were caused by some other issue.38

 

33 The total number of UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and counted was collected in item 

B14a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of ballots that were returned by uniformed services members was

calculated as B14b/B14a x 100. The percentage of ballots that were returned by overseas citizens was

calculated as B14c/B14a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national

percentages. An additional 8,127 (3.2%) UOCAVA absentee ballots counted were not classified by voter 

type.

34 Before survey revisions were made in the 2018 EAVS, UOCAVA ballot rejection data included both regular 

absentee ballots and FWABs, making direct comparisons with years prior to 2018 complicated. The 2016 

ballot rejection rate was calculated as (B16a+B16b+B16c)/B26b and produced an overall rejection rate of 

2.4%.

35 The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100 for the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. 

The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as B18b/B9b x 100. The 

percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as B18c/B9c x 100. Casewise 

deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. The rejection rate for returned 

ballots was 4.3% for uniformed services members, 3.7% for overseas citizens, and 4.6% among rejected 

ballots not classified by voter type.

36 Rhode Island did not report the number of ballots rejected. The number of ballots rejected was reported 

for 65.5% of jurisdictions nationwide. Most of these jurisdictions also subdivided rejected ballots by reason 

for rejection. Puerto Rico did not provide these data because it was not required to respond to the 2022 

EAVS.

37 The total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received after the state deadline was item B19a of 

the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received late was calculated as 

B19a/B18a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

38 The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of signature issues was calculated as B20a/B18a x 

100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of postmark issues was calculated as 

B21a/B18a x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons was calculated as 

B22a/B18a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.
 

209 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

Figure 9. UOCAVA Ballot Rejection Rates Varied Significantly Across States 

 

Source: The percentage of returned UOCAVA ballots that were rejected was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100. 

Cutoff points in the graph are quartiles.

Uniformed services members’ and overseas citizens’ UOCAVA ballots were rejected for similar 

reasons. Missing the deadline was the most common reason for rejection among both 

populations—60.1% for uniformed services members and 67.4% for overseas citizens. Signature 

issues were the cause of 21.1% of ballot rejections for ballots returned by uniformed services 

members and 17.2% of ballot rejections for overseas citizens. Neither of these reasons for 

rejection differed significantly across UOCAVA voter types.39

Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB)

If a regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time for a UOCAVA individual to vote, the FWAB 

functions as a backup ballot that can be used to vote for all federal offices and, in some states,

state and local offices as well.

39 The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as B18a/B9a x 100 for the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. 

The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as B18b/B9b x 100. The 

percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as B18c/B9c x 100. Casewise 

deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. The rejection rate for returned 

ballots was 4.3% for uniformed services members, 3.7% for overseas citizens, and 5.2% among rejected 

ballots not classified by voter type.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 210 

The 4,089 FWABs submitted in 2022 made up a relatively small proportion (1.6%) of all the 

UOCAVA ballots returned and represented a 26.8% decrease in the volume of FWABs reported 

compared to the 2018 election.40 FWAB usage remains a relatively small proportion of the 

UOCAVA methods of voting among both uniformed services members and overseas citizens. 

However, the FWAB resulted in 3,447 additional UOCAVA voters’ ballots being counted in the 

2022 general election, with 22.2% of these additional voters being uniformed services

members and 77.3% being overseas citizens.41 Eleven states and territories reported that they 

received no FWABs during the 2022 presidential election.42

Nearly one in five (655 or 16%) of the 4,089 FWABs submitted in the 2022 general election were 

not counted. Of these, 159 FWABs—25.4% of the rejected FWABs—were replaced by a regular 

absentee ballot, making the backup ballot unnecessary.43 The rate of uncounted FWABs returned 

by uniformed services members (27.2%) was more than double the rate of uncounted FWABs 

returned by overseas citizens (12%).44 The other major reason FWABs went uncounted (and the 

only other reason states reported via the EAVS) was because they were received after the ballot 

receipt deadline (27.2% of rejected FWABs).45

40 The percentage of all ballots returned that were FWABs was calculated using the total number of FWABs 

received (B23a) divided by the total number of UOCAVA ballots received (the sum of B9a and B23a). 

Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. The total number of 

FWABs received was collected in item B23a in the 2018 and 2022 EAVS. In 2018, states reported 

receiving 7,284 FWABs. For 2022, the total number of FWABs returned was based on the 76.2% of 

jurisdictions for which this information was available. 41 The total number of FWABs received and counted was item B24a of the 2022 EAVS. The number of 

FWABs counted from uniformed services members was item B24b, and the number of FWABs counted from 

overseas citizens was item B24c. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by uniformed services 

members was calculated as B24b/B24a x 100. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by overseas 

citizens was calculated as B24c/B24a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating 

the national percentages. 42 American Samoa, Colorado, Delaware, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, South Dakota, the 

U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming reported receiving zero FWABs. Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, 

Mississippi, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont reported FWABs with regular UOCAVA 

ballots because they could not separate the two types.

43 The number of FWABs rejected because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received and counted 

was item B26a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of FWABs that were rejected for this reason was

calculated as B26a/(B25a+B26a+B27a) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in 

calculating the national percentage. 44 The total percentage of FWABs rejected was calculated as (B25a+B26a+B27a)/B23a x 100. The 

percentage of FWABs rejected from uniformed services members was calculated as 

(B25b+B26b+B27b)/B23b x 100. The percentage of FWABs rejected from overseas citizens was calculated 

as (B25c+B26c+B27c)/B23c x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the

national percentages. 45 The percentage of FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the deadline was

calculated as B25a/(B25a+B26a+B27a) x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in 

calculating the national percentage.

The FWAB is a special type of UOCAVA ballot that may be used as a backup in the event that a 

voter’s regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time to vote. In most states, a UOCAVA voter must 

have registered and requested an absentee ballot in order to use the FWAB.
 

211 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

UOCAVA Table 1: Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters

State

Registered UOCAVA Voters

All 

UOCAVA 

Voters

Uniformed Services 

Members Overseas Citizens Not Categorized by Voter Type

Total % Total % Total %

Alabama 527 273 51.8% 254 48.2% 0 0.0%

Alaska 5,153 3,322 64.5% 1,831 35.5% 0 0.0%

American 

Samoa 16 16 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Arizona 12,122 3,795 31.3% 8,327 68.7% 0 0.0%

Arkansas 1,327 774 58.3% 553 41.7% 0 0.0%

California 137,273 29,863 21.8% 107,242 78.1% 168 0.1%

Colorado 39,482 13,344 33.8% 26,138 66.2% 0 0.0%

Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Delaware 1,161 192 16.5% 969 83.5% 0 0.0%

District of 

Columbia 1,055 239 22.7% 816 77.3% 0 0.0%

Florida 182,506 123,227 67.5% 59,279 32.5% 0 0.0%

Georgia 7,494 2,457 32.8% 5,037 67.2% 0 0.0%

Guam 134 80 59.7% 54 40.3% 0 0.0%

Hawaii 809 59 7.3% 750 92.7% 0 0.0%

Idaho 347 102 29.4% 245 70.6% 0 0.0%

Illinois 3,881 830 21.4% 2,954 76.1% 97 2.5%

Indiana 21,718 10,400 47.9% 11,318 52.1% 0 0.0%

Iowa 1,920 367 19.1% 1,553 80.9% 0 0.0%

Kansas 2,070 411 19.9% 1,643 79.4% 16 0.8%

Kentucky 1,887 812 43.0% 1,075 57.0% 0 0.0%

Louisiana 1,783 792 44.4% 991 55.6% 0 0.0%

Maine 2,504 382 15.3% 2,122 84.7% 0 0.0%

Maryland 7,347 1,494 20.3% 5,853 79.7% 0 0.0%

Massachusetts 5,438 166 3.1% 5,272 96.9% 0 0.0%

Michigan 7,777 1,297 16.7% 6,480 83.3% 0 0.0%

Minnesota 5,329 1,084 20.3% 4,245 79.7% 0 0.0%

Mississippi 3,954 3,680 93.1% 275 7.0% -1 0.0%

Missouri [1] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Montana 2,737 1,192 43.6% 1,545 56.4% 0 0.0%

Nebraska 705 168 23.8% 537 76.2% 0 0.0%

Nevada 5,615 1,110 19.8% 4,505 80.2% 0 0.0%

New 

Hampshire 2,158 597 27.7% 1,561 72.3% 0 0.0%

New Jersey 15,454 1,397 9.0% 14,057 91.0% 0 0.0%

New Mexico 2,082 659 31.7% 1,423 68.3% 0 0.0%

New York 36,600 3,961 10.8% 32,639 89.2% 0 0.0%

North Carolina 10,400 2,733 26.3% 7,667 73.7% 0 0.0%
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 212 

State

Registered UOCAVA Voters

All 

UOCAVA 

Voters

Uniformed Services 

Members Overseas Citizens Not Categorized by Voter Type

Total % Total % Total %

North Dakota -- -- -- -- -- -- --

 

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands [2]

-- -- -- -- -- -- --

Ohio [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Oklahoma 6,888 4,372 63.5% 2,516 36.5% 0 0.0%

Oregon 16,257 4,383 27.0% 11,874 73.0% 0 0.0%

Pennsylvania 11,250 2,625 23.3% 8,625 76.7% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island 795 56 7.0% 739 93.0% 0 0.0%

South Carolina 2,362 784 33.2% 1,578 66.8% 0 0.0%

South Dakota 1,462 645 44.1% 817 55.9% 0 0.0%

Tennessee 2,912 1,443 49.6% 1,469 50.4% 0 0.0%

Texas 22,876 7,826 34.2% 13,277 58.0% 1,773 7.8%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands [4]

-- -- -- -- -- -- --

Utah 4,398 1,261 28.7% 2,369 53.9% 768 17.5%

Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Virginia 11,570 3,723 32.2% 7,847 67.8% 0 0.0%

Washington 103,996 64,855 62.4% 39,141 37.6% 0 0.0%

West Virginia 438 180 41.1% 221 50.5% 37 8.4%

Wisconsin 20,904 14,203 67.9% 6,701 32.1% 0 0.0%

Wyoming 565 301 53.3% 264 46.7% 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 737,438 317,932 43.1% 416,648 56.5% 2,858 0.4%

UOCAVA Table 1 Calculation Notes:

All UOCAVA Voters uses question B1a.

Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B1b.

Uniformed Services Members, % uses B1b/B1a x 100.

Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B1c.

Overseas Citizens, % uses B1c/B1a x 100.

Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B1a–(B1b+B1c).

Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses (B1a–[B1b + B1c])/B1a x 100. 

UOCAVA Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 

213 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

[1] Missouri’s statewide voter registration system does not track UOCAVA registrations.

[2] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is 

not available from this territory.

[3] Because Ohio permits UOCAVA voters to register by several means other than a FPCA or FWAB, this 

state cannot accurately provide the actual number of UOCAVA voters.

[4] The U.S. Virgin Islands does not register voters based on UOCAVA status.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 214 

UOCAVA Table 2: Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA)

State

FPCAs Received

Total

Uniformed Services 

Members Overseas Citizens Not Categorized by Voter Type

Total % Total % Total %

Alabama 482 227 47.1% 247 51.2% 8 1.7%

Alaska 430 200 46.5% 230 53.5% 0 0.0%

American 

Samoa 1 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Arizona 5,752 1,755 30.5% 3,997 69.5% 0 0.0%

Arkansas 117 48 41.0% 69 59.0% 0 0.0%

California 66,176 10,858 16.4% 55,301 83.6% 17 0.0%

Colorado 5,988 774 12.9% 5,214 87.1% 0 0.0%

Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Delaware 1,161 192 16.5% 969 83.5% 0 0.0%

District of 

Columbia 682 74 10.9% 608 89.1% 0 0.0%

Florida 28,392 13,285 46.8% 15,107 53.2% 0 0.0%

Georgia 934 208 22.3% 726 77.7% 0 0.0%

Guam 18 11 61.1% 7 38.9% 0 0.0%

Hawaii 809 59 7.3% 750 92.7% 0 0.0%

Idaho 347 102 29.4% 245 70.6% 0 0.0%

Illinois 8,412 961 11.4% 1,389 16.5% 6,062 72.1%

Indiana 1,999 345 17.3% 1,654 82.7% 0 0.0%

Iowa [1] 1,558 -- -- -- -- 1,558 100.0%

Kansas 2,050 411 20.0% 1,643 80.1% -4 -0.2%

Kentucky 1,517 991 65.3% 526 34.7% 0 0.0%

Louisiana [2] 89 -- -- -- -- 89 100.0%

Maine [3] -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Maryland 7,230 1,482 20.5% 5,748 79.5% 0 0.0%

Massachusetts 3,495 76 2.2% 3,419 97.8% 0 0.0%

Michigan 6,097 957 15.7% 5,140 84.3% 0 0.0%

Minnesota 5,331 1,079 20.2% 4,252 79.8% 0 0.0%

Mississippi 261 145 55.6% 116 44.4% 0 0.0%

Missouri [4] 498 -- -- -- -- 498 100.0%

Montana 1,531 667 43.6% 864 56.4% 0 0.0%

Nebraska 663 150 22.6% 513 77.4% 0 0.0%

Nevada 5,578 866 15.5% 4,712 84.5% 0 0.0%

New 

Hampshire 2,158 597 27.7% 1,561 72.3% 0 0.0%

New Jersey 14,634 1,123 7.7% 13,511 92.3% 0 0.0%

New Mexico 1,795 486 27.1% 1,309 72.9% 0 0.0%

New York 66,830 6,513 9.7% 60,317 90.3% 0 0.0%

North Carolina 8,886 2,147 24.2% 6,739 75.8% 0 0.0%

North Dakota 35 3 8.6% 32 91.4% 0 0.0%
 

215 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

State

FPCAs Received

Total

Uniformed Services 

Members Overseas Citizens Not Categorized by Voter Type

Total % Total % Total %

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands [5]

0 0 -- 0 -- 0 --

Ohio 6,324 1,514 23.9% 4,810 76.1% 0 0.0%

Oklahoma 1,023 642 62.8% 381 37.2% 0 0.0%

Oregon [6] 429 -- -- -- -- 429 100.0%

Pennsylvania 10,013 2,007 20.0% 8,006 80.0% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island 795 56 7.0% 739 93.0% 0 0.0%

South Carolina 

[7]

-- -- -- -- -- -- --

South Dakota 6 4 66.7% 2 33.3% 0 0.0%

Tennessee 2,545 1,223 48.1% 1,322 51.9% 0 0.0%

Texas 22,878 7,826 34.2% 13,277 58.0% 1,775 7.8%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 5 5 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Utah 1,026 160 15.6% 247 24.1% 619 60.3%

Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Virginia 9,715 2,774 28.6% 6,941 71.4% 0 0.0%

Washington 1,656 335 20.2% 1,321 79.8% 0 0.0%

West Virginia 324 135 41.7% 189 58.3% 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [8] 1,007 71 7.1% 936 92.9% 0 0.0%

Wyoming 185 112 60.5% 73 39.5% 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 309,867 63,657 20.7% 235,159 76.5% 11,051 3.6%
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 216 

State

FPCAs Rejected

Total

% of 

FPCAs 

Received

Uniformed Services 

Members Overseas Citizens Not Categorized by Voter Type

Total

% of 

Received 

from 

Uniformed 

Services

Total

% of 

Received 

from 

Overseas 

Citizens

Total

% of Total 

FPCAs 

Rejected

Alabama 17 3.5% 4 1.8% 11 4.5% 2 11.8%

Alaska 21 4.9% 11 5.5% 10 4.3% 0 0.0%

American 

Samoa 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 -- 0 --

Arizona 6 0.1% 0 0.0% 6 0.2% 0 0.0%

Arkansas 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

California 2,216 3.3% 728 6.7% 1,486 2.7% 2 0.1%

Colorado 44 0.7% 7 0.9% 37 0.7% 0 0.0%

Connecticut -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Delaware 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

District of 

Columbia 33 4.8% 4 5.4% 29 4.8% 0 0.0%

Florida 587 2.1% 438 3.3% 143 0.9% 6 1.0%

Georgia 87 9.3% 12 5.8% 75 10.3% 0 0.0%

Guam 2 11.1% 0 0.0% 2 28.6% 0 0.0%

Hawaii 5 0.6% 1 1.7% 4 0.5% 0 0.0%

Idaho 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

Illinois 43 0.5% 13 1.4% 28 2.0% 2 4.7%

Indiana 25 1.3% 7 2.0% 18 1.1% 0 0.0%

Iowa [1] 0 0.0% 0 -- 0 -- 0 --

Kansas 11 0.5% 3 0.7% 8 0.5% 0 0.0%

Kentucky 12 0.8% 2 0.2% 10 1.9% 0 0.0%

Louisiana [2] 2 2.2% -- -- -- -- 2 100.0%

Maine [3] ---- -- -- -- -- -- --

Maryland 19 0.3% 5 0.3% 14 0.2% 0 0.0%

Massachusetts 9 0.3% 0 0.0% 9 0.3% 0 0.0%

Michigan 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

Minnesota 58 1.1% 17 1.6% 41 1.0% 0 0.0%

Mississippi 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

Missouri [4] ---- -- -- -- -- -- --

Montana 6 0.4% 0 0.0% 6 0.7% 0 0.0%

Nebraska 20 3.0% 4 2.7% 16 3.1% 0 0.0%

Nevada 473 8.5% 1 0.1% 472 10.0% 0 0.0%

New 

Hampshire 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

New Jersey 4 0.0% 1 0.1% 3 0.0% 0 0.0%

New Mexico 9 0.5% 6 1.2% 3 0.2% 0 0.0%

New York -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

North Carolina 45 0.5% 14 0.7% 31 0.5% 0 0.0%

North Dakota 20 57.1% 0 0.0% 20 62.5% 0 0.0%
 

217 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

State

FPCAs Rejected

Total

% of 

FPCAs 

Received

Uniformed Services 

Members Overseas Citizens Not Categorized by Voter Type

Total

% of 

Received 

from 

Uniformed 

Services

Total

% of 

Received 

from 

Overseas 

Citizens

Total

% of Total 

FPCAs 

Rejected

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands [5]

0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 0 --

Ohio 77 1.2% 22 1.5% 55 1.1% 0 0.0%

Oklahoma 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

Oregon [6] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Pennsylvania 21 0.2% 1 0.0% 20 0.2% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island 8 1.0% 1 1.8% 7 0.9% 0 0.0%

South Carolina 

[7]

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

South Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

Tennessee 56 2.2% 37 3.0% 19 1.4% 0 0.0%

Texas 639 2.8% 147 1.9% 459 3.5% 33 5.2%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 -- 0 --

Utah 8 0.8% 0 0.0% 5 2.0% 3 37.5%

Vermont -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Virginia 5 0.1% 3 0.1% 2 0.0% 0 0.0%

Washington 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 --

West Virginia 5 1.5% 1 0.7% 4 2.1% 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [8] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Wyoming 3 1.6% 3 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

U.S. Total 4,596 1.9% 1,493 2.6% 3,053 1.8% 50 1.1%

UOCAVA Table 2 Calculation Notes:

FPCAs Received, Total uses question B2a.

FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B2b.

FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, % uses B2b/B2a x 100.

FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B2c.

FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, % uses B2c/B2a x 100.

FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B2a–(B2b+B2c).

FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses (B2a–[B2b+B2c])/B2a x 100.

FPCAs Rejected, Total uses question B3a.

FPCAs Rejected, % of FPCAs Received uses B3a/B2a x 100.

FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B3b.

FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, % of Received from Uniformed Services uses 

B3b/B2b x 100.

FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B3c.

FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, % of Received from Overseas Citizens uses B3c/B2c x 100.

FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B3a–(B3b+B3c).

FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % of Total FPCAs Rejected uses (B3a–[B3b+B3c])/B3a 

x 100. 
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 218 

UOCAVA Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from the states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FPCAs received or rejected categories indicate that 

the sum of FPCAs for uniformed services members and overseas citizens in that category 

account for more than the total number of FPCAs reported by the state in the corresponding 

category.

[1] Data on FPCAs by type of UOCAVA voter is not tracked.

[2] The Department of State only collects data for totals, not for the breakdowns by type of UOCAVA 

voter.

[3] Maine does not distinguish FPCAs from other registration forms.

[4] Missouri’s statewide voter registration system does not track data on UOCAVA voter type (uniformed 

services vs. overseas citizen).

[5] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is 

not available from this territory.

[6] Oregon does not track data on UOCAVA voter type.

[7] Data were not available to break down the type of applications for UOCAVA voters.

[8] Data on rejected FPCAs and rejected absentee applications is not tracked.
 

219 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

UOCAVA Table 3: UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted, Returned, Counted, and Rejected

State

UOCAVA 

Ballots 

Transmitted

UOCAVA 

Ballots 

Returned

UOCAVA Ballots Counted UOCAVA Ballots Rejected

Total % of Returned Total % of Returned

Alabama 710 494 477 96.6% 10 2.0%

Alaska [1] 5,092 3,914 3,814 97.4% 100 2.6%

American Samoa 25 16 16 100.0% 0 0.0%

Arizona 12,104 6,979 6,913 99.1% 66 0.9%

Arkansas 1,304 473 426 90.1% 35 7.4%

California [2] 132,855 34,054 31,774 93.3% 2,280 6.7%

Colorado 38,736 14,289 13,426 94.0% 863 6.0%

Connecticut 2,580 1,056 1,016 96.2% 40 3.8%

Delaware 1,161 581 539 92.8% 42 7.2%

District of 

Columbia [3] 730 469 464 98.9% 5 1.1%

Florida 102,010 40,901 38,987 95.3% 1,849 4.5%

Georgia 7,482 5,194 4,913 94.6% 281 5.4%

Guam [4] 134 85 79 92.9% 6 7.1%

Hawaii 816 496 491 99.0% 5 1.0%

Idaho [5] 343 317 316 99.7% 1 0.3%

Illinois 3,370 2,729 2,776 101.7% 18 0.7%

Indiana 2,476 2,033 2,012 99.0% 22 1.1%

Iowa [6] 1,916 1,452 1,401 96.5% 53 3.7%

Kansas 2,054 1,684 1,678 99.6% 6 0.4%

Kentucky 1,390 893 830 92.9% 63 7.1%

Louisiana [7] 1,795 848 764 90.1% 84 9.9%

Maine 2,516 1,739 1,734 99.7% 5 0.3%

Maryland 7,603 4,763 4,551 95.5% 212 4.5%

Massachusetts 5,286 4,229 4,204 99.4% 25 0.6%

Michigan 7,994 5,869 5,727 97.6% 142 2.4%

Minnesota [8] 5,373 3,421 3,105 90.8% 316 9.2%

Mississippi 261 211 211 100.0% 0 0.0%

Missouri 3,615 1,886 1,837 97.4% 49 2.6%

Montana [9] 2,741 1,790 1,768 98.8% 22 1.2%

Nebraska 692 552 538 97.5% 14 2.5%

Nevada 6,188 3,442 3,388 98.4% 54 1.6%

New Hampshire 2,158 1,789 1,668 93.2% 121 6.8%

New Jersey 10,146 2,925 2,849 97.4% 76 2.6%

New Mexico 2,086 1,558 1,558 100.0% 0 0.0%

New York [10] 65,275 22,664 22,391 98.8% 715 3.2%

North Carolina 10,277 8,449 8,390 99.3% 59 0.7%

North Dakota 433 363 343 94.5% 20 5.5%

Northern Mariana 

Islands [11] -- -- -- -- -- --

Ohio 7,148 5,323 5,238 98.4% 85 1.6%

Oklahoma 7,035 1,604 1,545 96.3% 59 3.7%

Oregon [12] 16,257 6,962 6,830 98.1% 132 1.9%
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 220 

State

UOCAVA 

Ballots 

Transmitted

UOCAVA 

Ballots 

Returned

UOCAVA Ballots Counted UOCAVA Ballots Rejected

Total % of Returned Total % of Returned

Pennsylvania 11,593 8,416 8,069 95.9% 347 4.1%

Rhode Island [13] 630 -- -- -- -- --

South Carolina

[14] 2,356 1,991 1,983 99.6% 8 0.4%

South Dakota 985 757 718 94.8% 39 5.2%

Tennessee 2,912 2,074 1,935 93.3% 139 6.7%

Texas 21,644 13,867 13,228 95.4% 654 4.7%

U.S. Virgin Islands 10 0 0 -- 0 --

Utah 4,495 2,064 2,043 99.0% 284 13.8%

Vermont 935 543 534 98.3% 19 3.5%

Virginia 11,491 6,968 6,755 96.9% 57 0.8%

Washington 108,585 27,125 26,579 98.0% 546 2.0%

West Virginia [15] 434 287 431 150.2% 6 2.1%

Wisconsin 6,003 4,444 4,048 91.1% 396 8.9%

Wyoming [16] 546 371 347 93.5% 26 7.0%

U.S. Total 654,786 267,403 257,657 96.4% 10,456 3.9%

UOCAVA Table 3 Calculation Notes:

UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted uses question B5a.

UOCAVA Ballots Returned uses question B9a.

UOCAVA Ballots Counted, Total uses question B14a.

UOCAVA Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses B14a/B9a x 100.

UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, Total uses question B18a.

UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, % of Returned uses B18a/B9a x 100. 

UOCAVA Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

[1] Alaska does not track data on the method by which UOCAVA ballots are returned. All ballots sent to 

voters by mail can only be returned by mail, and all electronic transmission (online or fax) ballots sent 

to voters may either be returned by mail or by fax. The largest number of election transmission 

(online or fax) ballots sent to voters are returned by mail.

[2] Some California counties accept UOCAVA ballots by fax.

[3] For the 2022 general election, the District of Columbia Board of Elections (DCBOE) transmitted 

ballots only to active UOCAVA voters.

[4] Guam law allows UOCAVA ballots to be transmitted to voters via email; however, these ballots must 

be returned via air mail.

[5] Idaho was not able to track data on rejected UOCAVA ballots and FWABs.

[6] Data on FWABs is not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.

[7] Registrars may transmit multiple ballots to a single voter in some circumstances (i.e., the voter did 

not receive the original ballot or the original ballot is returned to the registrar as undeliverable).
 

221 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

[8] Minnesota only accepts UOCAVA ballots returned via mail.

[9] The number of UOCAVA ballots issued may exceed the number of registered UOCAVA voters due to 

replacement ballots being issued.

[10] There are circumstances under which a UOCAVA voter registered in New York may have been 

transmitted more than one ballot or may return more than one ballot (for instance, some county 

boards mail a ballot to every UOCAVA voter, regardless of their transmission preference, so voters 

who already received their ballot electronically, completed, and returned it may subsequently receive 

a physical ballot in the mail). Additional data collected by New York State Board of Elections has 

shown that more than 1,700 UOCAVA voters returned multiple ballots, although the data does not 

report how many ballots each of these voters returned.

[11] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is 

not available from this territory.

[12] Oregon statute requires ballots to be mailed to voters.

[13] According to Rhode Island general law, all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail 

ballot category.

[14] Data on FWABs are not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots. The 

number of UOCAVA ballots reported as counted are ballots that were received before the deadline, 

and the number of UOCAVA ballots reported as rejected are ballots that were returned after the 

deadline. No data are available on UOCAVA ballots that may have been challenged or were not 

counted for other reasons.

[15] West Virginia reports a UOCAVA ballot count rate of more than 100% primarily because two 

counties did not report data on ballots returned but reported data on ballots counted.

[16] UOCAVA ballots must be returned by mail.
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 222 

UOCAVA Table 4: Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB)

State

Total FWABs 

Received

FWABs Counted

FWABs Rejected Because a 

Valid Ballot Was Accepted and 

Counted

Total % of Total 

Received Total % of Total Received

Alabama 7 4 57.1% 0 0.0%

Alaska [1] 24 3 12.5% 4 16.7%

American 

Samoa 0 0 -- 0 --

Arizona 224 208 92.9% 12 5.4%

Arkansas 22 17 77.3% 1 4.5%

California 189 171 90.5% 0 0.0%

Colorado 0 0 -- 0 --

Connecticut -- -- -- -- --

Delaware 0 0 -- 0 --

District of 

Columbia 14 14 100.0% 0 0.0%

Florida 204 134 65.7% 25 12.3%

Georgia [2] -- -- -- -- --

Guam 0 0 -- 0 --

Hawaii 0 0 -- 0 --

Idaho [3] 0 0 -- 0 --

Illinois 70 61 87.1% 9 12.9%

Indiana 168 148 88.1% 1 0.6%

Iowa -- -- -- -- --

Kansas 17 16 94.1% 1 5.9%

Kentucky [4] 8 -- -- -- --

Louisiana [5] 0 0 -- -- --

Maine 15 15 100.0% 0 0.0%

Maryland 63 35 55.6% 6 9.5%

Massachusetts 150 147 98.0% 0 0.0%

Michigan [6] 126 84 66.7% 41 32.5%

Minnesota 38 26 68.4% 1 2.6%

Mississippi [7] -- -- -- -- --

Missouri 40 40 100.0% 0 0.0%

Montana 3 3 100.0% 0 0.0%

Nebraska 12 10 83.3% 0 0.0%

Nevada 21 19 90.5% 0 0.0%

New Hampshire 17 16 94.1% 0 0.0%

New Jersey [8] 1,442 1,429 99.1% -- --

New Mexico 0 0 -- 0 --

New York 240 169 70.4% 14 5.8%

North Carolina 120 119 99.2% -- --

North Dakota 3 2 66.7% 0 0.0%
 

223 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

State

Total FWABs 

Received

FWABs Counted

FWABs Rejected Because a 

Valid Ballot Was Accepted and 

Counted

Total % of Total 

Received Total % of Total Received

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands [9]

-- -- -- -- --

Ohio 251 216 86.1% 6 2.4%

Oklahoma 9 9 100.0% 0 0.0%

Oregon [10] -- -- -- -- --

Pennsylvania 90 89 98.9% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island 

[11]

-- -- -- -- --

South Carolina 

[12]

-- -- -- -- --

South Dakota 0 0 -- 0 --

Tennessee 17 2 11.8% 5 29.4%

Texas 269 51 19.0% 29 10.8%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 0 0 -- 0 --

Utah 21 19 90.5% 1 4.8%

Vermont -- -- -- -- --

Virginia [13] 68 53 77.9% -- --

Washington 110 107 97.3% 0 0.0%

West Virginia 4 4 100.0% 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [14] 13 7 53.8% 3 23.1%

Wyoming 0 0 -- 0 --

U.S. Total 4,089 3,447 84.5% 159 6.5%
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 224 

State

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons FWABs Not Categorized

Total % of Total 

Received Total % of Total Received

Alabama 3 42.9% 0 0.0%

Alaska [1] 17 70.8% 0 0.0%

American Samoa 0 -- 0 --

Arizona 4 1.8% 0 0.0%

Arkansas 5 22.7% -1 -4.5%

California 21 11.1% -3 -1.6%

Colorado 0 -- 0 --

Connecticut -- -- -- --

Delaware 0 -- 0 --

District of 

Columbia 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Florida 45 22.1% 0 0.0%

Georgia [2] -- -- -- --

Guam 0 -- 0 --

Hawaii 0 -- 0 --

Idaho [3] 0 -- 0 --

Illinois 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Indiana 7 4.2% 12 7.1%

Iowa -- -- -- --

Kansas 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Kentucky [4] -- -- 8 100.0%

Louisiana [5] 0 -- 0 --

Maine 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Maryland 22 34.9% 0 0.0%

Massachusetts 3 2.0% 0 0.0%

Michigan [6] 1 0.8% 0 0.0%

Minnesota 11 28.9% 0 0.0%

Mississippi [7] -- -- -- --

Missouri 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Nebraska 2 16.7% 0 0.0%

Nevada 2 9.5% 0 0.0%

New Hampshire 1 5.9% 0 0.0%

New Jersey [8] 13 0.9% 0 0.0%

New Mexico 0 -- 0 --

New York 87 36.3% -30 -12.5%

North Carolina 1 0.8% 0 0.0%

North Dakota 0 0.0% 1 33.3%

Northern Mariana 

Islands [9] -- -- -- --

Ohio 29 11.6% 0 0.0%

Oklahoma 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Oregon [10] -- -- -- --
 

225 | Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 

State

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons FWABs Not Categorized

Total % of Total 

Received Total % of Total Received

Pennsylvania 1 1.1% 0 0.0%

Rhode Island [11] -- -- -- --

South Carolina 

[12]

-- -- -- --

South Dakota 0 -- 0 --

Tennessee 10 58.8% 0 0.0%

Texas 189 70.3% 0 0.0%

U.S. Virgin Islands 0 -- 0 --

Utah 1 4.8% 0 0.0%

Vermont -- -- -- --

Virginia [13] 15 22.1% 0 0.0%

Washington 3 2.7% 0 0.0%

West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0%

Wisconsin [14] 3 23.1% 0 0.0%

Wyoming 0 -- 0 --

U.S. Total 496 12.2% -13 -0.3%

UOCAVA Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Total FWABs Received uses question B23a.

FWABs Counted, Total uses question B24a.

FWABs Counted, % of Total Received uses B24a/B23a x 100.

FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, Total uses question B26a.

FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, % of Total Received uses 

B26a/B23a x 100.

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, Total uses the sum of questions B25a and B27a.

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, % of Total Received uses (B25a+B27a)/B23a x 100.

FWABs Not Categorized, Total uses B23a–(B24a+B25a+B26a+B27a).

FWABs Not Categorized, % of Total Received uses (B23a–[B24a+B25a+B26a+B27a])/B23a x 100. 

UOCAVA Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The 

percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that 

provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FWABs category indicate that the sum of counted 

and rejected FWABs accounted for more than the total number of FWABs received as reported 

by the state.

• The EAVS tracks data on FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the ballot 

receipt deadline (B25), because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received and counted 

(B26), and for other reasons (B27).
Military and Overseas Voting in 2022 | 226 

[1] The data reported in B25 of the 2022 EAVS reflects FWABs received after the deadline to apply for 

an absentee ballot by mail or by electronic transmission (online or fax). 

[2] Data on accepted and rejected FWABs cannot be reported separately from regular UOCAVA ballots.

[3] Idaho was not able to track data on rejected UOCAVA ballots and FWABs.

[4] Data on the reasons that FWABs were rejected was not tracked.

[5] The Department of State does not track data on FWABs rejected because a valid ballot was 

accepted and counted.

[6] All FWABs received were either counted, rejected because the voter’s regular ballot was received, or 

rejected for arriving late.

[7] FWABs are not recorded separately from UOCAVA ballots in the Statewide Election Management 

System (SEMS).

[8] Rejection because a valid ballot was accepted and counted is not a recorded rejection reason.

[9] Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting is 

not available from this territory.

[10] Oregon does not track data on FWABs separately from regular UOCAVA ballots.

[11] According to Rhode Island general law, all UOCAVA mail ballots are consolidated into one mail 

ballot category.

[12] Data on FWABs is not tracked separately from data on regular UOCAVA absentee ballots.

[13] Virginia does not have a way to track FWABs rejected because a valid ballot was accepted and 

counted.

[14] In Wisconsin, many jurisdictions track the return of ballots received after Election Day, but they are 

not required to do so. The counts reported in B25a (total number of FWABs rejected because they 

were received after the ballot receipt deadline) are limited to ballots in jurisdictions that recorded 

these in the statewide database.
227 | Survey Methodology 

 

Chapter 5. Survey Methodology

Since 2004, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election 

Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election. The project 

collects data on election policies, voter registration, voting by individuals covered by the

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), mail voting, in-person voting, poll 

workers and polling places, provisional voting, election technology, and turnout. Data from all U.S. 

states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are included in the EAVS.1 The EAVS helps the 

EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national 

clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and the review of procedures with 

respect to the administration of federal elections.

The EAVS collectively consists of two surveys administered separately. The 2022 Election 

Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), which collected data on state election policies and 

procedures, was administered from August 2022 to January 2023. The information collected 

through the Policy Survey helps provide context to the data reported through the EAVS. The 2022 

EAVS, which collected data on registrations, voters, and ballots during the 2022 general election, 

was administered from November 2022 to March 2023. The data collected through the EAVS 

allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established by the National Voter 

Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA and provide a detailed snapshot of how general elections 

are administered in the United States every two years.

This report relies on EAVS and Policy Survey data submitted and certified by 50 states, the District 

of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. Data for each state were collected at the jurisdiction level, 

with 100% of the 6,460 jurisdictions nationwide submitting at least partial data in 2022.2

Appendix A of this chapter shows the number of jurisdictions and the response rate by state 

(overall and for each section of the EAVS).

1 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 

U.S. states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana 

Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS 

data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for 

federal candidates in midterm election years; thus, Puerto Rico completed the 2022 Policy Survey but not 

the 2022 EAVS. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands 

participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

2 What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For 

the 2022 EAVS, most states reported data on the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for 

Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. 

Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to 

counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town level. Wisconsin reported data at the city, 

town, and village level. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data on 

the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction, 

because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data for the county level, but 

most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 local election jurisdictions in the state. 

Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as 

a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.
Survey Methodology | 228 

Survey Questions

The 2022 Policy Survey consisted of 96 questions (38 required questions, 37 follow-up questions 

based on a state’s responses to the required questions, and 21 optional comments boxes). Of 

these, 70 were single-select or multi-select questions, 25 were open-ended with a text response, 

and one was a hybrid single-select and text question.

The 2022 EAVS consisted of 424 questions (242 required, 59 follow-up questions based on a 

jurisdiction’s responses to the required questions, 83 optional questions based on whether a 

jurisdiction had additional data to provide, one required comment box, and 39 optional 

comments boxes). Of these questions, 269 were fill-in-the-blank with a numerical response, 40

were item descriptions, 63 were single-select questions, and 52 were open-ended with a text 

response.

The content of the questions in the EAVS has largely been unchanged since the 2008 survey, 

although questions are periodically removed, updated, or reordered. Beginning in 2018, the 

Policy Survey replaced the previous Statutory Overview with a set of primarily closed-ended 

questions on states’ election policies. The full set of EAVS and Policy Survey questions can be 

found at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys.

The following sections detail the data collected by these surveys and the changes that were made 

to the survey questionnaires from the 2020 versions. In 2022, the primary changes to the survey 

questions involved:

o Adding Policy Survey questions that could be used to validate EAVS items.

o Adding Policy Survey and EAVS questions to gather data on new topics that had previously 

not been collected.

o Clarifying instructions to make completion easier for election officials and to improve data 

quality.

Policy Survey

Since 2008, the EAVS has been accompanied by a survey that collects information on states’ 

election policies and practices to provide greater context for the jurisdiction-level data collected 

through the EAVS. This originally took the form of the Statutory Overview, which consisted of openended questions on statutory requirements for various parts of the election process, asking 

states to report information on their election laws and policies. However, the open-ended format 

made it difficult to interpret states’ statutory language, identify patterns in election practices, and 

draw meaningful comparisons between states.

Beginning with the 2018 EAVS, the Statutory Overview was significantly redesigned and renamed 

the Policy Survey. The survey now uses closed-ended questions and is intended to capture states’ 

broad policies rather than to represent a comprehensive overview of state statutory language. 

This allows for greater ease in interpreting the results, creating comparisons across states, and 

providing context in understanding the EAVS data. The Policy Survey questions are designed to 

map onto the EAVS data questions so that the two surveys can be used in concert.

The 2022 Policy Survey collected information on how the state answers the EAVS; voter 

registration and list maintenance; election technology; mail voting; in-person voting; UOCAVA 

voting; provisional voting; election certification, recounts, and audits; voter identification; and how 
 

229| Survey Methodology

criminal convictions affect voting. Questions that were added to the Policy Survey for 2022 

included:

New Question 

for 2022 

Description 

Q9a When voter pre-registration forms are processed

Q10a Whether the state’s definitions of active and inactive voters match the NVRA 

definitions

Q19 Whether state used drop boxes for the 2022 general election

Q19a Where drop boxes were located

Q19b How often ballots were collected from drop boxes

Q19c Dates and times that drop boxes were available to voters

Q19d Drop box security measures

Q20 Whether state allowed voters to cure mail ballots

Q20a Types of mail ballot errors that voters could cure

Q20b Deadline for voters to cure mail ballots

Q24a Terminology state uses for accessible absentee voting

Q24b How voters participating in accessible absentee voting receive their ballots

Q24c Whether a witness must be present when a voter completes their accessible 

absentee ballot

Q25b Length of in-person voting period before Election Day

Q27 UOCAVA ballot transmission methods

Q28 UOCAVA ballot return methods

Q33d What person or persons are responsible for reviewing provisional ballots within the 

state

Q33e Whether provisional ballot eligibility reviewers are the same as those who count 

provisional ballots

Q35a How recounts are conducted

Q36 Whether state will conduct different types of auditing activities either before or after 

the election

Q37a Whether state requires photo identification for in-person voters

Q37b How voter proves their identity if they do not have acceptable identification

Q38b What happens to the registration record of a person whose voting rights are limited 

due to criminal conviction or incarceration

Questions that were significantly revised from the 2020 Policy Survey included:

Significantly Revised 

for 2022 

Description 

Q5 Types of automatic voter registrations provided to voters in the state

Q8 Whether the state offers same-day voter registration (SDR)

Q8a Circumstances under which voters may use SDR in the state

Q12a Which groups of voters are sent confirmation of registration notices

Q17 Whether all-mail elections are conducted within the state
Survey Methodology | 230 

Significantly Revised 

for 2022 

Description 

Q17a Whether all-mail elections are conducted statewide or only in certain 

jurisdictions

Q18 Whether state allows permanent absentee voting

Q21 Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for domestic civilian 

(non-UOCAVA) voters

Q25 Terminology the state uses to refer to in-person voting that takes place before 

Election Day

Q26 Whether the state uses vote centers

Q30 Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for domestic military 

UOCAVA voters

Q31 Deadlines for postmarking and returning mail ballots for overseas UOCAVA 

voters

Q33a Under what circumstances the state issues provisional ballots to voters

Q33b Deadline for adjudicating provisional ballots

Q34 Deadline for certifying the 2022 general election

Q35 Reasons the state may conduct a post-election recount of ballots

Q36a Statutory requirements for post-election tabulation audits

Q36c Type of post-election tabulation audit conducted

Q37 Whether the state requires non–first time in-person voters to present 

identification

Q37c Deadline for the voter to provide identification if the voter does not have 

identification at the voting location

Q38 Which groups of voters may become ineligible to vote due to criminal conviction 

or incarceration

Q38a How long individuals lose the right to vote due to criminal conviction or 

incarceration

The following questions had no change except for renumbering and, for some, the addition of a 

comment section and/or option for a response of “Does not apply”:

2022 

Numbering 

2020 

Numbering 

Description 

Q1 Q3 How states answer the six sections of the EAVS

Q2 Q2b Whether the state experienced a change in its EAVS reporting 

jurisdiction list since the 2020 EAVS

Q3 Q4 Type of state voter registration database

Q3a Q4a Frequency of data transmission for states with a bottom-up or hybrid 

database

Q4 Q5 Government agencies that the state’s voter registration database 

conducts data transfers with and the frequency of the data transfers

Q5a Q6a Government agencies that participate in the state’s automatic voter 

registration program

Q6 Q7 Whether the state offers online voter registration
 

231| Survey Methodology

2022 

Numbering 

2020 

Numbering 

Description 

Q6a Q7a Whether registrants need a state-issued identification in order to 

register to vote online

Q7 Q8 Voter information lookup tools available on the state’s election 

website

Q9 Q10 Whether the state offers pre-registration to persons under the age of 

18

Q10 Q11 Whether the state distinguishes between active and inactive voters 

in its voter registration database

Q11 Q12 Whether state and/or local election officials are responsible for 

modifying voter registration records

Q12 Q13 Whether the state sends confirmation of registration notices

Q13 Q14 Data sources used to identify potentially ineligible registered voters

Q14 Q15 Whether the state’s voting system testing and certification is 

required

Q14a Q15a Type of voting system testing and certification conducted

Q15 Q16 Whether electronic poll books are used in the state

Q15a Q16a Whether electronic poll books are required to be tested and certified 

before purchase

Q16 Q17 Whether voters are required to provide a valid excuse in order to 

vote by mail

Q18a Q19a What groups of voters may register as permanent absentee voters

Q22 Q21 How long past the ballot receipt deadline mail ballots are tracked

Q23 Q22 Postmark requirements for mail ballots from domestic civilian voters

Q24 Q23 Circumstances under which non-UOCAVA voters may receive their 

ballots electronically

Q25a Q24a Whether voters are required to provide a valid excuse in order to 

vote in-person before Election Day

Q26a Q25a Whether vote centers are used statewide or only in certain 

jurisdictions

Q29 Q28 How long the FPCA remains valid as a ballot request mechanism

Q32 Q31 Whether UOCAVA ballots have different postmark requirements than 

mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters

Q33 Q32 Whether the state uses provisional ballots

Q33c Q32c How a state would adjudicate a provisional ballot cast in the wrong 

precinct

Q38c Q37b

How the voting rights of individuals are restored when they are reeligible to vote after being made ineligible due to criminal conviction 

or incarceration

The 2020 Policy Survey questions on election office infrastructure, how and when voters decline 

to be registered under automatic voter registration (if available in the voter’s state), features of a 

state’s online registration system, actions that can move an active registered voter to the inactive 

registration list, actions that can move an inactive voter to the active registration list, modes by 
Survey Methodology | 232 

which UOCAVA voters can submit FPCAs, and the length of FPCA registration were removed for 

2022.

Section A: Voter Registration

Section A of the EAVS collects data on voter registration. This includes the number of persons 

registered and eligible to vote in the November 2022 general election, active and inactive voters, 

voters who used SDR, registration forms processed between the close of registration for the 2020

general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election, confirmation notices 

sent, and voters removed from the voter registration rolls.

In 2022, changes made to this section included updating the definition of “same-day registration” 

(SDR) to match the revised definition from the Policy Survey and clarifying that both new and 

updated registrations received through SDR should be reported in question A2 of the EAVS; 

adding a definition of “confirmation notice” to the instructions of question A8 and specifying that 

confirmation notices not sent directly pursuant to the NVRA should be reported in this question; 

clarifying the instructions for questions A8d and A8e, changing the terminology used in question 

A8e from “status unknown” to “unreturned confirmation notices”; and clarifying that voters 

removed from the list of registered voters should be included in the data reported in question A9.

The EAC plans to make additional changes to Section A of the 2024 EAVS. The proposed 

questions and an explanation of the reasoning for these changes can be found in the “Planned 

Changes to 2024 EAVS” report at https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooksand-surveys.

Section B: UOCAVA

Section B of the EAVS collects data on voters covered by UOCAVA. This includes the number of 

registered UOCAVA voters; FPCAs received and rejected; UOCAVA ballots transmitted, returned, 

counted, and rejected; and Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) received, counted, and 

rejected. Most questions in Section B were divided by type of voter (uniformed services members 

and overseas citizens) and by method of ballot transmission and return (postal mail, email, and 

other).

In 2014, the UOCAVA section of the EAVS was expanded to include questions from the Federal 

Voting Assistance Program’s (FVAP) Post-Election Quantitative Survey. The goal of combining 

surveys was to reduce the burden on election officials by asking them to answer a single set of 

questions about UOCAVA voting rather than responding to two surveys that captured many of the 

same data points. The current format of Section B is the result of a memorandum of 

understanding between the EAC and FVAP that allows both agencies to collect, share, and 

evaluate data on the voting experiences of citizens covered under UOCAVA and to fulfill their 

congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voters.

In 2022, changes made to this section included modifying the language about ballot requests 

that originated from rejected FPCAs in question B3; removing language about eligibility for a 

federal-only ballot from B4; clarifying in the instructions for questions B5–B8 and B9–B13 that 

data on duplicate UOCAVA ballot transmissions and returns, respectively, should be reported in 

these questions; and clarifying in the instructions of question B21 that states should report

“Does not apply” as their responses for B21a–c if the state does not reject UOCAVA ballots for 

lacking a postmark.
 

233| Survey Methodology

Section C: Mail Voting

Section C of the EAVS collects data on mail voting. This includes the number of mailed ballots

transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; the number of ballots sent to permanent mail 

voters; the number of mail ballot drop boxes and the number of mail ballots returned at drop 

boxes; and the number of mail ballots that were successfully cured by voters.

In 2022, the title of this section was updated from “Domestic Civilian By-Mail Voting” to “Mail 

Voting,” and the terminology throughout this section was standardized from “by-mail voting” to 

“mail voting.” This change reflects the terminology that is most commonly in use among election 

offices. The instructions for Section C were updated to include a definition of mail voting and to 

clarify that any voter who voted with a UOCAVA absentee ballot should be reported in Section B 

instead of Section C and that duplicate mail ballot transmissions and returns should be reported 

in the data for Section C.

Several of the questions within this section were also revised. For question C1b, the instructions 

were updated to state that mail ballots that went through the cure process should be reported 

with other mail ballots that were returned by voters. For C1d, the instructions were updated to 

specify that mail ballots that were voided so a replacement ballot could be sent should be 

reported in this item. For C1f, the terminology was updated from “status unknown” to “unreturned 

mail ballots.” For C2a, the definition of “permanent absentee voting” was updated to reflect the 

definition used in the Policy Survey. Several new questions were added to this section to collect 

data on the total number of drop boxes used (C3a), the number of drop boxes used on Election 

Day (C4a–c), the number of drop boxes used during in-person voting before Election Day (C5a–c), 

the number of mail ballots returned at drop boxes (C6a), and the number of mail ballots that were 

successfully cured (C7a). This caused the renumbering of the subsequent questions in this 

section that collected data on mail ballots returned and counted (C8) and rejected (C9). In 

addition, question C9 saw the reasons for mail ballot rejections revised, including eliminating one 

sub-question, adding additional reasons for rejection, and rewording some of the rejection 

reasons.

Section D: In-Person Polling Operations

Section D of the EAVS collects data on in-person polling operations. This includes the number of 

precincts and polling places, the number of poll workers and the level of difficulty involved in 

recruiting poll workers, and the number of poll workers who served for the first time in the 2022 

general election. 

In 2022, the title of this section was updated from “In-Person Voting and Polling Operations” to 

“In-Person Polling Operations” to better reflect the scope of the questions. A question on the total 

number of in-person voters that had been present in previous surveys was removed from the 

2022 survey, as it was redundant with data collected in Section F. In its place, a question on the 

total number of physical polling places was added as question D2a. In the questions related to 

poll workers (D5–D9), the instructions were clarified to state that office staff who served as poll 

workers should be reported in the data for these questions, and instructions were added that 

respondents should report the total number of poll workers who served for the election in D7a 

even if they were unable to provide an age breakdown for poll workers in questions D7b–g. Lastly, 

the comment for question D8 was made a required item and a new item was added in D9 to 

collect data on the total number of new poll workers.
Survey Methodology | 234 

Section E: Provisional Ballots

Section E of the EAVS collects data on provisional voting, including provisional ballots submitted, 

provisional ballot adjudication, the reasons provisional ballots were cast, and reasons for 

rejection of provisional ballots.

In 2022, changes made to this section include the addition of a question to collect data on the 

number of provisional ballots cast according to the reason why the ballot was cast (E2). This 

caused the question on reasons for rejecting provisional ballots to be renumbered as E3.

Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies

Section F of the EAVS collects data on voter participation and election technologies. This includes 

total participation in the 2022 general election, how many ballots were cast and counted by mode 

of participation, the source of participation data, use of electronic and paper poll books, voting 

equipment used, and the location where votes were tallied. Respondents were also invited to 

share general comments regarding their state or jurisdiction’s Election Day experiences, 

noteworthy successes, and challenges they overcame in administering the November 2022

general election.

In 2022, questions F1 and F10 were updated to use the terminology “mail ballot” to match 

changes made in Section C of the survey. Question F2 was updated to a multi-select question so 

that respondents could report multiple sources for their voter participation data in F1. Questions 

F3 and F4 had options added for respondents to report the use of electronic and paper poll books 

to assist with same-day registration and checking voters’ mail ballot status at the polling place. 

Two questions that collected data on punch card and lever voting machines in previous years 

were removed from the survey, as no jurisdiction in the United States had reported using these 

types of voting equipment in several election cycles. This removal caused the subsequent 

questions in Section F to be renumbered.

Data Collection Procedures

In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the EAC submitted the questions for 

the 2022 Policy Survey and the EAVS for review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

and for public comment. Public comments were collected from November 21, 2021, to January 

28, 2022, and from March 3, 2022, to April 4, 2022. The questions were approved under OMB 

Control No. 3265-0006, expiration date April 30, 2025. The survey questions were made 

available publicly on the EAC’s website on April 21, 2022. Targeted communications with state 

points of contact (POC) responsible for completing the surveys began on July 8, 2022 and 

continued regularly throughout the data collection period. These targeted communications aimed 

to keep states aware of data collection deadlines and resources available to assist them with 

completing the survey.

The following sections describe each aspect of the EAVS data collection process in more detail.

Needs Assessment

To better understand how state-level officials respond to the EAVS and where they need support, 

the EAC undertook a systematic assessment of the needs of EAVS POCs in September and 

October of 2021. The goal of these interviews was to better understand each state’s EAVS 

reporting process (including how data are collected, which templates are used, the state’s use of 

technical assistance resources, and data quality) and how improvements could be made to the 
 

235| Survey Methodology

2022 EAVS. All state POCs that completed the 2020 EAVS were invited to participate and 

interviews with personnel from 27 states were completed. The EAC created semi-structured 

interview guides for each participant that also left room for the interviewer to probe further.

During these needs assessment calls, the EAC also encouraged state POCs to review and provide 

comments on the draft 2022 survey questions when they were available for public comment.

The information collected through these needs assessment conversations helped the EAC’s 

outreach plan design, shaped the training opportunities provided to each state, and identified 

states that needed specialized support to complete the EAVS. Based on these conversations, the 

EAC implemented the following changes:

o Made improvements to the design and usability of the data collection templates,

o Added supplementary instructions to clarify how respondents were to use the missing data 

codes in the survey,

o Introduced additional levels of data review for the 2022 EAVS and Policy Survey to assist 

state POCs in better understanding how their data would be reported, and

o Created an online feedback survey to be administered directly after a state finalized and 

certified its 2022 EAVS data to collect immediate feedback on future survey improvements 

and better inform the post-2022 needs assessment conversations that will take place in 

the fall of 2023.

Collecting the Policy Survey Data

Invitations to complete the 2022 Policy Survey were sent to POCs from the 56 states on August 1, 

2022. The Policy Survey data were collected in advance of EAVS data collection to reduce 

respondent burden and to allow the EAC to create customized data validation rules for the 2022 

EAVS data. The Policy Survey was completed through an online survey; this online data collection 

tool had undergone usability testing with POCs from seven states in July 2022, and edits to the 

survey based on the results of this testing were completed in advance of the survey’s launch.3

Periodic reminders were issued to POCs during the data collection period. All 56 states, 

territories, and districts submitted their Policy Survey data by January 5, 2023. When the answer 

options within a question did not fully capture a state’s policy, POCs were encouraged to provide 

comments with further explanation.

Once received, each Policy Survey submission was reviewed for completeness and accuracy.

State and territory POCs were also able to update or correct Policy Survey responses through the 

end of the EAVS data collection period. The EAC made Policy Survey data updates for 36 states 

before the end of the EAVS data collection period.

The EAC incorporated states’ Policy Survey submissions directly into the EAVS data collection 

template validations. This meant that a state’s 2022 EAVS data collection templates could not be 

released until the state’s Policy Survey submission was finalized.

3 Fifty-two states completed the Policy Survey via the online survey. Four states completed the survey via a 

paper instrument; for these states, the Policy Survey help desk assistants entered the data from the paper 

instrument into the online survey and asked the state to review for accuracy and submit the data.
Survey Methodology | 236 

Collecting the EAVS Data

The EAVS data collection period was opened to 44 states on November 14, 2022. The data 

collection was opened to the 11 remaining states once their Policy Survey submissions were 

received and their templates were created; all data collection templates were released to states 

by January 18, 2023. The EAVS data collection period ended on March 30, 2023. Data 

submissions from 55 states were received by that date, with a response rate of 100% of states.4

To build on the needs assessment conversations that were completed in September and October 

2021, the EAC completed pre-survey outreach calls with officials from states that had new 

designated POCs for the 2022 EAVS or that had requested further follow-up after the needs 

assessment calls. POCs from 13 states were invited to participate in the outreach calls, and 11 

calls were completed for 10 states in July and August of 2022.

5 During these interviews, the EAC 

provided an overview of the project timeline and the types of data collected in the Policy Survey 

and the EAVS, notified the POCs of the help desk support and other resources that would be 

provided as part of the 2022 EAVS, and probed POCs on data issues from the 2020 EAVS. These 

conversations helped ensure that the EAC was prepared to provide adequate support to states as 

they completed their EAVS data collection.

Data Collection Templates 

Given the diversity in how states respond to the EAVS, creating data templates that accommodate 

the needs of all states and all local jurisdictions is especially challenging. The 2022 EAVS data 

were collected using two data collection templates:

o The Excel template was a flat data format that allowed POCs to copy and paste large 

amounts of data, such as from a report generated from the state’s centralized election 

database. Each EAVS item was listed in a column in the Excel template and each EAVS 

jurisdiction within the state was listed in a row. States with multiple jurisdictions were 

required to submit their data through the Excel template. For the first time in the 2022 

EAVS, the Excel template automatically calculated selected percentages using the state’s 

EAVS data to assist state POCs in reviewing their data for accuracy and understanding how 

their data would be reported.

o The online template was an item-by-item survey hosted online that guided respondents 

through entering their responses. This template was primarily intended to be used by 

jurisdictions that entered EAVS data or by states and territories that reported as a single 

jurisdiction. The data from the online template was exported to an Excel file that matched 

the format of the Excel data collection template.

Usability testing of the draft online template was completed with 8 local election officials from 5 

states in September 2022, and edits to the survey based on the results of this testing were 

completed in advance of the online template’s launch.

4 Puerto Rico was not required to complete the 2022 EAVS because the territory did not hold a general 

election in November 2022.

5 One state completed two outreach calls because its project personnel experienced turnover after the first 

call was complete and requested an additional call to assist its new POCs in learning about the EAVS.
 

237| Survey Methodology

The EAC pre-populated data into the online template for 3 states and into the Excel template for 

one state. Pre-fill data were provided by state POCs via the Excel template or via an email or 

phone request that provided details on which items were to be populated.

Both data collection templates employed a variety of error-checking data validations to reduce 

response burden and to increase data quality.

Data Validation 

One of the key issues associated with any data collection project is ensuring that the data 

collected are as accurate as possible. Given the number of survey questions, their complexity and 

granularity, and the variety of approaches in how state and local jurisdictions track election data 

and provide survey responses, it can be easy to make data entry mistakes or report data in an 

incorrect survey item. All 2022 EAVS data collection templates included built-in internal and 

external validation checks that flagged specific types of potential errors within a data submission.

The validation checks were designed to flag common data issues so that respondents were aware 

of them before submitting their data to the EAC. In response to these validations, states and 

jurisdictions were encouraged to review their data, make corrections if needed, and use the 

comments fields to explain any peculiarities and give context to the data that were being 

reported.

In addition, once a state submitted data for review by the EAC, additional data reviews were 

conducted by trained data analysts. These reviews checked for missing data, internal math and 

logic issues, conflicts with Policy Survey responses, and significant changes compared to 2018

EAVS data.6 The results of this review were provided to state POCs in a written memo, along with 

a file that had sample rates and percentages calculated using their draft submission. These 

sample rates and percentages were provided to assist POCs with identifying results that did not 

align with their expectations so they could be corrected in the final submission.

A complete list of all validation checks that were built into the data collection templates and 

additional data validations that were conducted for draft submissions can be found in Appendices 

B and C of this chapter. In general, there were five types of data validations.

Math Validations 

Many items in the EAVS asked respondents to report a total and then divide that total into 

subcategories. The math validations within the templates checked that the sum of the 

subcategories equaled the reported total of the overall category. For example, if the total number 

of voters who cast a ballot that was counted in the 2022 general election did not match the sum 

of the number of voters who used different modes of voting, then the respondent was asked to 

review the numbers reported in these items.7

Logic Validations 

Logic validations identified when a value in the survey was incompatible with a response provided 

in another related question in the survey. For example, if the number of mail ballots that a 

6 The 2018 EAVS was used as a point of comparison in the data reviews because it was the most recent 

midterm election.

7 The total number of voters participating in the 2022 general election was reported in item F1a in the 

2022 EAVS. The number of voters who participated using different modes of voting were items F1b through 

F1h.
Survey Methodology | 238 

jurisdiction reported counting for the 2022 election exceeded the number of mail ballots the 

jurisdiction’s voters had returned, then the respondent was asked to review these items.8

Policy Survey Validations 

These validations identified instances in which an EAVS item conflicted with the Policy Survey 

data that had been submitted by the state. For example, if a state reported having an online voter 

registration system through which an individual could submit a voter registration application, but 

reported “Does not apply” to EAVS items relating to the number of voter registration forms 

submitted through online sources, then the validations would highlight that a conflict existed 

between the respondent’s EAVS and Policy Survey data and would ask the respondent to review 

the EAVS items and contact the EAC if the Policy Survey response needed to be updated.9

Missing Items 

With the exception of most comment boxes and “other” subcategories for reporting data beyond 

what was specified in a question, all items in the EAVS required a response. An alert appeared if a 

response to a required item was not provided. For example, if a respondent reported the total 

number of registered voters in their jurisdiction but not the number of active and inactive 

registered voters, the latter items would be flagged with a request that the respondent report 

“Does not apply” (if their state did not have an applicable law or policy), “Data not available” (if 

the data for an item were not tracked), or zero (if no instance of an item occurred for the 2022 

general election) rather than leave the item blank.10

Valid Skips 

The EAC introduced a valid skip code in EAVS beginning with the 2020 data set. This code was 

automatically filled in by the template validations when an item did not require an answer 

because of a response to a previous item in the survey. The use of the valid skip code is distinct 

from the use of the “Does not apply” code (for when a jurisdiction does not have a law or policy in 

place that allows for the type of election participation in the question) and the “Data not 

available” code (for when the data for a type of election participation is not tracked). For instance, 

if a jurisdiction indicated in EAVS question F5a that it did not use direct-recording electronic (DRE) 

voting machines without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), then items F5b through F5d—

relating to the make and model of equipment, the number deployed, and the usage of the 

equipment—were filled as “Valid skip” by the template validations.

EAVS Rates 

The Excel template used states’ data to calculate a select number of EAVS percentages, and data 

validations highlighted when these percentages fell outside of an expected threshold. For 

instance, if a jurisdiction’s voter turnout as a percent of the jurisdiction’s active registered voters 

8 The number of mail ballots counted by a jurisdiction was reported in item C8a in the 2022 EAVS. The 

number of mail ballots returned by voters was reported in item C1b.

9 Data on states’ policies regarding online voter registration were reported in item Q6 of the 2022 Policy 

Survey. The number of total, new, duplicate, and rejected registrations received through online registration 

systems were reported in items A4c, A5c, A6c, and A7c, respectively, of the 2022 EAVS.

10 The total number of registered voters for the 2022 general election was reported in item A1a in the 

EAVS. The number of active registered voters was item A1b. The number of inactive registered voters was 

item A1c.
 

239| Survey Methodology

was either lower than 35% or higher than 95%, the respondent would be asked to review these 

items for accuracy.11

Finalizing and Certifying Data Submissions 

After the EAC reviewed each state’s draft EAVS data submission, additional targeted data reviews 

were conducted on subsequent EAVS submissions until the EAC was satisfied that data quality 

issues had been sufficiently addressed by the state’s POC(s). Once the data submission had been 

finalized, the EAC generated a copy of the appendix tables that appear in Chapters 1–4 of this 

report and how the state’s data would be portrayed in those tables; this analysis was shared with 

the state POC(s) to conduct a final review. During this review, state POC(s) were invited to provide 

final data corrections, determine whether the data underlying the analysis were incorrect, and to 

add footnotes and explanations to be printed alongside the tables. The footnotes that were 

provided by state POCs to accompany the appendix tables have been printed in this report as 

closely as possible to the language requested by POCs, with minor edits for proofreading and 

clarity.

Once the state POCs approved of the analysis and provided any requested footnotes, the EAC 

requested that the state’s chief election officer certify their state’s 2022 Policy Survey and EAVS 

submissions as accurate and complete. Fifty-four states certified their data submissions by 

May 19, 2023.

12

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance was provided through the duration of the Policy Survey and the EAVS data 

collection periods. Help desk support was provided for 20 hours each week from August 1, 2022, 

to December 30, 2022, and for 50 hours each week from January 3, 2023, to March 30, 2023. 

State and local EAVS respondents could request assistance via email or phone. A team of trained 

technical assistants provided support on all aspects of the survey data collection processes. A 

total of 786 support tickets were received from 55 states, territories, and districts. The most 

common inquiries were related to using the EAVS data collection templates, the use of the data 

missingness codes, and how to interpret survey instructions in questions A3 and A4–A7.

Resources for EAVS Respondents

In addition to providing direct, customized technical assistance, the EAC made a wide variety of 

written and video training resources available to survey respondents on demand. A website was 

established to house these resources and to provide a secure place for state EAVS POCs to 

upload data submissions and other documents for the EAC to review.

The resources on this website included PDF copies of the Policy Survey and EAVS questions; a 

link to the online template; six videos that outlined the questions and instructions in the six 

sections of the EAVS; three video webinars that provided guidance on the overall EAVS process, 

on collecting data from local jurisdictions, and for state POCs new to EAVS data collection; eleven 

newsletters that were released between August 2022 and March 2023; an extensive user guide 

11 The number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was item F1a and the number of active 

registered voters was item A1b in the 2022 EAVS. The turnout rate within the Excel template was 

calculated as F1a/A1b x 100. Although the EAC normally recommends using CVAP as a denominator when 

calculating voter turnout, A1b was used in this calculation because the 2022 CVAP data were not available 

at the time the Excel template was being programmed.

12 Florida and Oregon did not sign the 2022 EAVS certification form.
Survey Methodology | 240 

that provided step-by-step instructions for both data collection templates; a policy guide approved 

by the EAC Commissioners that provided information to election officials responsible for 

completing EAVS; a glossary of EAVS and Policy Survey terms and their definitions; and an Excel 

crosswalk that documented survey changes from 2020 to 2022.

The website also contained a section that was restricted to state POCs. This section had copies of

the state’s EAVS and Statutory Overview/Policy Survey submissions from 2016, 2018, and 2020;

a table that tracked the online template progress for each jurisdiction within the state; and the 

capacity for POCs to upload files and data submissions for the EAC to review.

Data Reporting and Calculations

In 2022, most EAVS data were reported at the local jurisdiction level. For the purposes of this 

report, for states that have multiple jurisdictions, state totals were calculated by summing the 

data from all jurisdictions within a state. National totals were calculated by summing the statelevel totals.

Whenever possible, this report uses percentages and rates rather than raw numbers to make 

comparisons across states and across election years. For these calculations, items were 

combined as necessary to create the numerator and denominator and to produce a percentage 

or rate. For example, the following formula was used to calculate the percentage of transmitted 

mailed ballots that were returned by voters for the 2022 general election:

Total number of mail ballots returned by voters (C1b)

 × 100 Total number of mail ballots transmitted by election offices (C1a)

Percentages at the national level were calculated using casewise missing data deletion at the 

state level. Only states that had data for both the numerator and denominator for a calculation 

were included when reporting percentages at the national level. Responses of “Does not apply,”

“Data not available,” and “Valid skip” were considered missing for purposes of creating these 

calculations. Casewise deletion was used in the analysis for this report to avoid overinflating the 

denominator of the calculations. This is especially applicable when states do not track data for a 

particular item, or when election policy differences mean that not all states can provide data for 

an item. For example, online registration is not available in every state, so the calculation of the 

nationwide percentage of registrations that were received online will only use data from states 

that reported at least one online registration. Otherwise, the national percentage would include in 

the denominator (in this case, the total number of registrations received) data from states that do 

not have online registration, thus underestimating the percentage of online registrations that 

were received.13

This decision rule means that there were instances in which the percentages reported at the 

national level for a given calculation in this report did not use data from every state. Because 

each category was calculated independently of others and only states that reported data in both 

13 The total number of registration applications received between the close of registration for the 2020 

general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election was collected in item A3a. The 

total number of registration applications received online between the close of registration for the 2020 

general election and the close of registration for the 2022 general election was collected in item A4c. The 

application of casewise deletion means that only states that reported at least one registration in both of 

these items on a statewide level were included in the calculation of the percentage of registration 

applications received through online sources.
 

241| Survey Methodology

the numerator and the denominator were included in the analysis, casewise deletion also created 

instances in which percentages do not sum to 100%. Those cases in which data were not 

available for every state to calculate the percentage at the national level are noted in the 

footnotes throughout this report.

The use of casewise deletion for calculating national percentages does not affect the state-level 

percentages calculated in this report.

Recommendations for Analyzing and Interpreting the EAVS Data

The most up-to-date version of the 2022 EAVS and Policy Survey data can always be found on the 

EAC’s website (https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys). If the 

EAC is notified by a state of an error or omission in the state’s data, the agency will issue the 

updated EAVS and Policy Survey data sets on its website with an errata note of changes that have 

been made to the newly issued data sets. Updated data sets will be issued on a quarterly basis.

There are four types of data missingness codes used in the 2022 Policy Survey and EAVS data:

o Valid skip (-77): This code indicates that no response is expected based on a previous 

survey response. For instance, in the Policy Survey, if a state answered “no” to Q6 to 

indicate that it does not provide an option for voters to register to vote online, then item 

Q6a, which collected further information on the specifics of a state’s online registration 

system, would be marked as -77. In the EAVS, if a state indicates in item A4c, which asks 

for the total number of registration forms submitted online, that this question does not 

apply, then items A5c, A6c, and A7c, which collect data on new, duplicate, and rejected 

registrations submitted online, would be marked as -77.

o Does not apply (-88): This code indicates that a question does not apply to a state, 

because the state does not have an applicable policy in place. For instance, a response of 

-88 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state does not have online registration.

o Data not available (-99): This code indicates that the data for an item cannot be tracked. 

For instance, a response of -99 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state accepts 

online voter registrations but cannot track the number of these registrations that were 

submitted by voters.

o Refused (-100): This code indicates that a response was expected but was not provided. 

This code is only used in the Policy Survey data.

When summing the EAVS data, either on a state or a national level, analysts should take care to 

treat these missingness codes as missing items and not as negative numbers.

Users of the EAVS data are also encouraged to refer to the comments that accompany all of the 

EAVS items and many of the Policy Survey items. During data collection, the EAC encouraged all 

respondents to use these comments to provide context to their responses. In many cases, these 

comments contain valuable information about how state and jurisdiction respondents formulated 

their responses, why some responses do not align with the data validations outlined in this 

chapter, or context about how the 2022 general election was conducted in a state or jurisdiction. 

If data users have further questions about the data that have been submitted, they are 

encouraged to contact states or jurisdictions directly.
Survey Methodology | 242 

The EAC also encourages data users to take care when calculating percentages to ensure that the 

correct EAVS items are used. Appendix D of this chapter contains recommendations for how to 

calculate EAVS rates using the 2022 data. These recommendations align with how rates were 

calculated throughout this report.

This report used the 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimates for the 2021

citizen voting age population (CVAP) for state and nation level calculations instead of the 5-year 

estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. However, for any jurisdiction level 

analysis reported that involves the CVAP, this report used the 5-year estimate due to its better 

coverage of the counties in the United States. The CVAP estimates for 2022 were not available by 

the time this report was finalized. Once they are released by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2022 

CVAP estimates can be found at https://data.census.gov/. Data analysts should import both 

state- and county-level geographies and merge them into the EAVS data using the Federal 

Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code. For states that have sub-county jurisdictions, 

these jurisdictions will need to be aggregated at the county level in order to merge in the CVAP 

data.14 For this report, the state-level CVAP was used for Alaska, as the state reported its data in a 

single EAVS jurisdiction. Finally, the Census Bureau does not provide CVAP estimates for the U.S. 

territories (with the exception of Puerto Rico), so no CVAP estimate was available for American 

Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

14 These are the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, 

and Wisconsin. Additionally, the state of Illinois reported six cities independently of their corresponding 

counties (i.e., Bloomington, Chicago, Danville, East St. Louis, Galesburg, and Rockford), and Missouri 

reported Kansas City independently of its corresponding county.
 

243| Survey Methodology

Methodology Appendix A: Survey Response Rates

State 

EAVS 

Response 

Rate 

Section A 

Response 

Rate 

Section B 

Response 

Rate 

Section C 

Response 

Rate 

Section D 

Response 

Rate 

Section E 

Response 

Rate 

Section F 

Response 

Rate 

Alabama 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Alaska 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

American 

Samoa 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Arizona 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Arkansas 99.9% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 98.9% 100.0% 99.7%

California 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Colorado 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Connecticut 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Delaware 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

District of 

Columbia 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Florida 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.7% 100.0% 100.0%

Georgia 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Guam 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 97.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Hawaii [1] 98.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 92.9%

Idaho 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Illinois 99.6% 99.9% 99.2% 99.9% 99.6% 100.0% 99.1%

Indiana 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0%

Iowa 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0%

Kansas 94.3% 99.5% 97.2% 95.8% 91.0% 96.1% 77.2%

Kentucky 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Louisiana 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Maine [2] 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Maryland 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Massachusetts 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Michigan 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Minnesota 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Mississippi 98.3% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Missouri 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Montana 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Nebraska 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Nevada 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

New 

Hampshire 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

New Jersey 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

New Mexico 99.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 96.4% 100.0% 100.0%

New York 99.7% 99.6% 99.9% 99.9% 99.3% 99.3% 99.9%
Survey Methodology | 244 

State 

EAVS 

Response 

Rate 

Section A 

Response 

Rate 

Section B 

Response 

Rate 

Section C 

Response 

Rate 

Section D 

Response 

Rate 

Section E 

Response 

Rate 

Section F 

Response 

Rate 

North Carolina 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

North Dakota 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

94.4% 100.0% 100.0% 67.6% 90.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Ohio 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Oklahoma 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Oregon 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Pennsylvania 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Rhode Island 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

South Carolina 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

South Dakota 100.0% 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 99.8% 100.0% 100.0%

Tennessee 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Texas 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

U.S. Virgin 

Islands 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Utah 97.2% 92.8% 98.2% 99.9% 97.6% 100.0% 98.4%

Vermont 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Virginia 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Washington 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

West Virginia 98.1% 100.0% 99.8% 94.0% 98.7% 92.3% 98.7%

Wisconsin 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Wyoming 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

U.S. Total 99.8% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.1% 99.9% 99.6%

Survey Response Rate Calculation Notes:

EAVS Response Rate uses responses to all items listed below.

Section A Response Rate uses responses to questions A1a, A1b, A1c, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c, 

A3d, A3e, A3f, A3g, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g, 

A5h, A5i, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i, 

A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, and A9g.

Section B Response Rate uses responses to questions B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c, 

B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B10a, B10b, B10c, B11a, B11b, 

B11c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B13d, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B16a, B16b, B16c, B18a, 

B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B23a, B23b, B23c, B24a, 

B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, and B26c.

Section C Response Rate uses responses to questions C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C2a, C3a, C4a, 

C4b, C4c, C5a, C5b, C5c, C6a, C7a, C8a, C9a, C9b, C9c, C9d, C9e, C9f, C9g, C9h, C9i, C9j, C9k, C9l, 

C9m, C9n, C9o, C9p, and C9q.

Section D Response Rate uses responses to questions D1a, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, 

D6a, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, D8, D8Comment, and D9a.
 

245| Survey Methodology

Section E Response Rate uses responses to questions E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e, 

E2f, E2g, E2h, E3a, E3b, E3c, E3d, E3e, E3f, E3g, E3h, E3i, and E3j.

Section F Response Rate uses responses to questions F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F2_1, F2_2, 

F2_3, F2_4, F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F3e, F4a, F4b, F4c, F4d, F4e, F5a, F6a, F7a, F8a, F9a, F10a, F10b, 

F10c, F10d, and F10e.

Survey Response Rate Data Notes:

General Notes: 

• Response rates were calculated as the percentage of jurisdictional responses within a state 

that were not left blank (i.e., had a numerical response of zero or greater or a response of 

“Data not available,” “Does not apply,” or “Valid skip”). Percentages were rounded to 1 

decimal place.

• The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that 

round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

• Item descriptions, optional “other” categories, and optional survey comments were not 

included in the response rate calculation.

[1] Information for Kalawao County, Hawaii was reported with Maui County.

[2] Maine reported its UOCAVA data on a statewide level, not a jurisdiction level.
Survey Methodology | 246 

Methodology Appendix B: Data Collection Template 

Validation Rules

Table 1: Math Validation Rules

Validation Rule Error Text 

The sum of A1b + A1c should 

equal A1a

The sum of active (A1b) and inactive (A1c) registered voters should be 

equal to the total number of registered voters (A1a).

The sum of A2b + A2c should 

equal A2a

The sum of SDRs received on Election Day (A2b) and SDRs received prior 

to Election Day (A2c) should be equal to the total number of SDRs 

received (A2a).

The sum of A3b–j should 

equal A3a

The sum of the numbers you report in A3b–j should equal the total 

number of registration forms you report in A3a.

The sum of A4a–l should 

equal A3a

The sum of the numbers you report in A4a–l should equal the total 

number of registration forms you reported in A3a.

The sum of A5a–l should 

equal A3b

The sum of the numbers you report in A5a–l should equal the total 

number of registration forms you reported in A3b.

The sum of A6a–l should 

equal A3d

The sum of the numbers you report in A6a–l should equal the total 

number of registration forms you reported in A3d.

The sum of A7a–l should 

equal A3e

The sum of the numbers you report in A7a–l should equal the total 

number of registration forms you reported in A3e.

The sum of A5a + A6a + A7a 

should not exceed A4a

The amounts you report in A5a, A6a, and A7a should not exceed the total 

number of registration forms received by mail, fax, or email you reported 

in A4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5b + A6b + A7b 

should not exceed A4b

The amounts you report in A5b, A6b, and A7b should not exceed the total 

number of registrations in person at the election/registrar’s office you 

reported in A4b. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5c + A6c + A7c 

should not exceed A4c

The amounts you report in A5c, A6c, and A7c should not exceed the total 

number of registration forms submitted online you reported in A4c. Please 

correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5d + A6d + A7d 

should not exceed A4d

The amounts you report in A5d, A6d, and A7d should not exceed the total 

number of registration forms received from motor vehicle offices you 

reported in A4d. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5e + A6e + A7e 

should not exceed A4e

The amounts you report in A5e, A6e, and A7e should not exceed the total 

number of registration forms received from public assistance offices you 

reported in A4e. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5f + A6f + A7f 

should not exceed A4f

The amounts you report in A5f, A6f, and A7f should not exceed the total 

number of registration forms received from state-funded agencies you 

reported in A4f. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5g + A6g + A7g 

should not exceed A4g

The amounts you report in A5g, A6g, and A7g should not exceed the total 

number of registration forms received from armed forces recruitment 

offices you reported in A4g. Please correct your responses or use the 

comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5h + A6h + A7h 

should not exceed A4h

The amounts you report in A5h, A6h, and A7h should not exceed the total 

number of registration forms received from other agencies designated by 

the state but not mandated by the NVRA you reported in A4h. Please 

correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.
 

247| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

The sum of A5i + A6i + A7i 

should not exceed A4i

The amounts you report in A5i, A6i, and A7i should not exceed the total 

number of forms received from registration drives from advocacy groups 

or political parties you reported in A4i. Please correct your responses or 

use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5j + A6j + A7j 

should not exceed A4j

The amounts you report in A5j, A6j, and A7j should not exceed the total 

number of forms received from “Other” sources you reported in A4j. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5k + A6k + A7k 

should not exceed A4k

The amounts you report in A5k, A6k, and A7k should not exceed the total 

number of forms received from “Other” sources you reported in A4k. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A5l + A6l + A7l 

should not exceed A4l

The amounts you report in A5l, A6l, and A7l should not exceed the total 

number of forms received from “Other” sources you reported in A4l. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of A8b–h should 

equal A8a

The amounts you report in A8b–h should equal the total number of 

confirmation notices sent to registered voters you reported in A8a. Please 

correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of A9b–j should 

equal A9a

The amounts you report in A9b–j should equal the total number of voters 

removed you reported in A9a. Please correct your responses or use the 

comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B1b–c should 

equal B1a

The amounts you report in B1b–c should equal the total number of 

registered and eligible UOCAVA voters you reported in B1a. Please correct 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of B2b–c should 

equal B2a

The amounts you report in B2b–c should equal the total number of FPCAs 

received from UOCAVA voters you reported in B2a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do 

not add up.

The sum of B3b–c should 

equal B3a

The amounts you report in B3b–c should equal the total number of 

rejected FPCAs from UOCAVA voters you reported in B3a. Please correct 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of B5b–c should 

equal B5a

The amounts you report in B5b–c should equal the total number of 

absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B6b–c should 

equal B6a

The amounts you report in B6b–c should equal the total number of 

absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by postal mail you 

reported in B6a. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B7b–c should 

equal B7a

The amounts you report in B7b–c should equal the total number of 

absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by email you reported in 

B7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B8b–c should 

equal B8a

The amounts you report in B8b–c should equal the total number of 

absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by other methods you 

reported in B8a. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B6a, B7a, and 

B8a should equal B5a

The amounts you report in B6a, B7a, and B8a should equal the total 

number of ballots transmitted to all UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.
Survey Methodology | 248 

Validation Rule Error Text 

The sum of B6b, B7b, and 

B8b should equal B5b

The amounts you report in B6b, B7b, and B8b should equal the total 

number of ballots transmitted to all uniformed services voters you 

reported in B5b. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B6c, B7c, and B8c 

should equal B5c

The amounts you report in B6c, B7c, and B8c should equal the total 

number of ballots transmitted to all overseas citizen voters you reported 

in B5c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B9b–c should 

equal B9a

The amounts you report in B9b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a. Please correct 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of B10b–c should 

equal B10a

The amounts you report in B10b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by postal mail you reported in 

B10a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B11b–c should 

equal B11a

The amounts you report in B11b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by email you reported in B11a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B12b–c should 

equal B12a

The amounts you report in B12b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by other methods you reported in 

B12a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B10a, B11a, and 

B12a should equal B9a

The amounts you report in B10a, B11a, and B12a should equal the total 

number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B9a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B10b, B11b, and 

B12b should equal B9b

The amounts you report in B10b, B11b, and B12b should equal the total 

number of transmitted ballots returned by all uniformed services voters 

you reported in B9b. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B10c, B11c, and 

B12c should equal B9c

The amounts you report in B10c, B11c, and B12c should equal the total 

number of transmitted ballots returned by all overseas citizen voters you 

reported in B9c. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B13b–d should 

equal B13a

The amounts you report in B13b–d should equal the total number of 

ballots returned undeliverable you reported in B13a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do 

not add up.

The sum of B14b–c should 

equal B14a

The amounts you report in B14b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a. Please 

correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of B15b–c should 

equal B15a

The amounts you report in B15b–c should equal the total number of 

counted UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail you reported in B15a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B16b–c should 

equal B16a

The amounts you report in B16b–c should equal the total number of 

counted UOCAVA ballots returned by email you reported in B16a. Please 

correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.
 

249| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

The sum of B17b–c should 

equal B17a

The amounts you report in B17b–c should equal the total number of 

counted UOCAVA ballots returned by other methods you reported in B17a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B15a, B16a, and 

B17a should equal B14a

The amounts you report in B15a, B16a, and B17a should equal the total 

number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B14a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B15b, B16b, and 

B17b should equal B14b

The amounts you report in B15b, B16b, and B17b should equal the total 

number of uniformed services voters’ ballots counted by your office you 

reported in B14b. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B15c, B16c, and 

B17c should equal B14c

The amounts you report in B15c, B16c, and B17c should equal the total 

number of overseas citizen voters’ ballots counted by your office you 

reported in B14c. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B18b–c should 

equal B18a

The amounts you report in B18b–c should equal the total number of 

rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do 

not add up.

The sum of B19b–c should 

equal B19a

The amounts you report in B19b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots rejected because they were received after the deadline 

you reported in B19a. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B20b–c should 

equal B20a

The amounts you report in B20b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots rejected because of a problem with the voter signature 

you reported in B20a. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B21b–c should 

equal B21a

The amounts you report in B21b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots rejected for lack of a postmark you reported in B21a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B22b–c should 

equal B22a

The amounts you report in B22b–c should equal the total number of 

UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons reported in B22a. Please 

correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

items do not sum as expected.

The sum of B14a and B18a 

should equal B9a

The sum of B14a and B18a should equal the total number of UOCAVA 

ballots returned by voters that you reported in B9a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not 

sum as expected.

The sum of B14b and B18b 

should equal B9b

The sum of B14b and B18b should equal the total number of UOCAVA 

ballots returned by uniformed services voters that you reported in B9b. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these items do not sum as expected.

The sum of B14c and B18c 

should equal B9c

The sum of B14c and B18c should equal the total number of UOCAVA 

ballots returned by overseas citizen voters that you reported in B9c. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these items do not sum as expected.

The sum of B19a, B20a, 

B21a, and B22a should equal 

B18a

The amounts you report in B19a, B20a, B21a, and B22a should equal the 

total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B18a. Please 

correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.
Survey Methodology | 250 

Validation Rule Error Text 

The sum of B19b, B20b, 

B21b, and B22b should equal 

B18b

The amounts you report in B19b, B20b, B21b, and B22b should equal the 

total number of rejected ballots from uniformed services voters you 

reported in B18b. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B19c, B20c, 

B21c, and B22c should equal 

B18c

The sum of the amounts you report in B19c, B20c, B21c, and B22c 

should equal the total number of rejected ballots from overseas citizen 

voters you reported in B18c. Please correct your responses or use the 

comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B23b–c should 

equal B23a

The amounts you report in B23b–c should equal the total number of 

FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a. Please correct 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of B24b–c should 

equal B24a

The amounts you report in B24b–c should equal the total number of 

FWABs counted you reported in B24a. Please correct your responses or 

use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B25b–c should 

equal B25a

The amounts you report in B25b–c should equal the total number of 

FWABs rejected because they were received after the deadline you 

reported in B25a. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B26b–c should 

equal B26a

The amounts you report in B26b–c should equal the total number of 

FWABs rejected because the voter’s regular absentee ballot was received 

and counted you reported in B26a. Please correct your responses or use 

the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B27b–c should 

equal B27a

The amounts you report in B27b–c should equal the total number of 

FWABs rejected for other reasons you reported in B27a. Please correct 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of B24a, B25a, 

B26a, and B27a should equal 

B23a

The amounts you report in B24a, B25a, B26a, and B27a should equal the 

total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B23a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B24b, B25b, 

B26b, and B27b should equal 

B23b

The sum of the amounts you report in B24b, B25b, B26b, and B27b 

should equal the total number of FWABs returned by uniformed services 

voters you reported in B23b. Please correct your responses or use the 

comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of B24c, B25c, 

B26c, and B27c should equal 

B23c

The sum of the amounts you report in B24c, B25c, B26c, and B27c 

should equal the total number of FWABs returned by overseas citizen 

voters you reported in B23c. Please correct your responses or use the 

comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of C1b–i should 

equal C1a

The amounts you report in C1b–i should equal the number of total mail 

ballots transmitted you reported in C1a. Please correct your responses or 

use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of C4b–c should 

equal C4a (excepting 

responses of “Data not 

available” and “Does not 

apply”)

The number of Election Day drop boxes you report in C4b and C4c should 

sum to the total number of drop boxes you reported in C4a. Please correct 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.

The sum of C5b–c should 

equal C5a (excepting 

responses of “Data not 

available” and “Does not 

apply”)

The number of early voting drop boxes you report in C5b and C5c should 

sum to the total number of drop boxes you reported in C5a. Please correct 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why these 

subitems do not add up.
 

251| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

The sum of C9b–t should 

equal C9a

The numbers you report in C9b–t should equal the total number of 

rejected mail ballots you reported in C9a. Please correct your responses 

or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add 

up.

The sum of D3b–c should 

equal D3a (excepting 

responses of “Data not 

available” and “Does not 

apply”)

The sum of the amounts you report in D3b–c should equal the total 

number of physical polling places for Election Day in your jurisdiction you 

reported in D3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of D4b–c should 

equal D4a (excepting 

responses of “Data not 

available” and “Does not 

apply”)

The sum of the amounts you report in D4b–c should equal the total 

number of physical polling places for early voting in your jurisdiction you 

report in D4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section 

to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of D7b–g should 

equal D7a (excepting 

responses of “Data not 

available” and “Does not 

apply”)

The numbers you report in D7b–g should equal the total number of poll 

workers in your jurisdiction you reported in D7a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do 

not add up.

The sum of E1b–e should 

equal E1a

The amounts you report in E1b–e should equal the total number of voters 

who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do 

not add up.

The sum of E2a–k should 

equal E1a

The amounts you report in E2a–k should equal the total number of voters 

who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do 

not add up.

The sum of E3b–m should 

equal E3a

The amounts you report in E3b–m should equal the total number of 

rejected provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do 

not add up.

E1d should be equal to E3a

The amount you report in E1d should equal the total number of rejected 

provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your responses or 

use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

The sum of F1b–h should 

equal F1a

The sum of the amounts you report in F1b–h should equal the total 

number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted you reported in F1a. 

Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain 

why these subitems do not add up.

Table 2: Logic Validation Rules

Validation Rule Error Text 

If A1c = Does not apply, then 

A1a = A1b

Because your state does not differentiate between active (A1b) and 

inactive voters (A1c), then A1a should equal A1b. Please correct your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why those two items 

differ.

A2a cannot exceed A1a

The number of SDRs you report in A2a cannot exceed the total number of 

registered voters you report in A1a. Please review your responses or use 

the comments section to explain why the value in A2a exceeds the value 

in A1a.

B3a cannot exceed B2a

The number of rejected FPCAs you report in B3a should not exceed the 

total number of FPCAs received you reported in B2a. Please review your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B3a 

exceeds the value in B2a.
Survey Methodology | 252 

Validation Rule Error Text 

B4a cannot exceed B3a

The number of FPCAs rejected because they were late that you report in 

B4a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs rejected you reported in 

B3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why the value in B4a exceeds the value in B3a.

B9a cannot exceed B5a

The number of ballots returned you report in B9a should not exceed the 

number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. 

Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why 

the value in B9a exceeds the value in B5a.

B9b cannot exceed B5b

The number of ballots returned from uniformed services members you 

report in B9b should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to 

uniformed services members you reported in B5b. Please review your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B9b 

exceeds the value in B5b.

B9c cannot exceed B5c

The number of ballots returned from overseas citizen voters you report in 

B9c should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to overseas 

citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please review your responses or use 

the comments section to explain why the value in B9c exceeds the value 

in B5c.

B13a cannot exceed B5a

The number of ballots returned as undeliverable you report in B13a 

should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters 

you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B13a exceeds the value in B5a.

B14a cannot exceed B9a

The total number of ballots counted you report in B14a should not exceed 

the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in 

B9a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why the value in B14a exceeds the value in B9a.

B14b cannot exceed B9b

The total number of ballots counted you report in B14b should not exceed 

the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you 

reported in B9b. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B14b exceeds the value in B9b.

B14c cannot exceed B9c

The total number of ballots counted you report in B14c should not exceed 

the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you 

reported in B9c. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B14c exceeds the value in B9c.

B15a cannot exceed B10a

The number of ballots counted you report in B15a should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by postal mail by UOCAVA voters you 

reported in B10a. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B15a exceeds the value in B10a.

B15b cannot exceed B10b

The number of ballots counted you report in B15b should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by postal mail by uniformed services 

members you reported in B10b. Please review your responses or use the 

comments section to explain why the value in B15b exceeds the value in 

B10b.

B15c cannot exceed B10c

The number of ballots counted you report in B15c should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by postal mail by overseas citizen voters 

you reported in B10c. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B15c exceeds the value in B10c.

B16a cannot exceed B11a

The number of ballots counted you report in B16a should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by email by UOCAVA voters you reported 

in B11a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why the value in B16a exceeds the value in B11a.

B16b cannot exceed B11b

The number of ballots counted you report in B16b should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by email by uniformed services members 

you reported in B11b. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B16b exceeds the value in B11b.
 

253| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

B16c cannot exceed B11c

The number of ballots counted you report in B16c should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by email by overseas citizen voters you 

reported in B11c. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B16c exceeds the value in B11c.

B17a cannot exceed B12a

The number of ballots counted you report in B17a should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by other modes by UOCAVA voters you 

reported in B12a. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B17a exceeds the value in B12a.

B17b cannot exceed B12b

The number of ballots counted you report in B17b should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by other modes by uniformed services 

members you reported in B12b. Please review your responses or use the 

comments section to explain why the value in B17b exceeds the value in 

B12b.

B17c cannot exceed B12c

The number of ballots counted you report in B17c should not exceed the 

total number of ballots returned by other modes by overseas citizen voters 

you reported in B12c. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B17c exceeds the value in B12c.

B18a cannot exceed B9a

The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18a should not exceed 

the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in 

B9a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why the value in B18a exceeds the value in B9a.

B18b cannot exceed B9b

The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18b should not exceed 

the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you 

reported in B9b. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B18b exceeds the value in B9b.

B18c cannot exceed B9c

The total number of ballots rejected you report in B18c should not exceed 

the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you 

reported in B9c. Please review your responses or use the comments 

section to explain why the value in B18c exceeds the value in B9c.

C2a cannot exceed C1a

The number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters you 

report in C2a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted 

in C1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to 

explain why the value in C2a exceeds the value in C1a.

C4a cannot exceed C3a

The number of drop boxes used during Election Day you report in C4a 

cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C4a 

exceeds the value in C3a.

C5a cannot exceed C3a

The number of drop boxes used during early voting you report in C5a 

cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C5a 

exceeds the value in C3a.

C6a cannot exceed C1b

The total number of mail ballots returned via drop box you report in C6a 

cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b. 

Please review your responses or use the comments sections to explain 

why the value in C6a exceeds the value in C1b.

C7a cannot exceed C1b

The total number of successfully cured mail ballots you report in C7a 

cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b. 

Please review your responses or use the comments sections to explain 

why the value in C7a exceeds the value in C1b.

The sum of C8a and C9a 

should equal C1b

The sum of the amounts you report in C8a and C9a should equal the 

number of mail ballots returned by voters you report in C1b. Please review 

your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of 

C8a and C9a does not match the value in C1b.
Survey Methodology | 254 

Validation Rule Error Text 

D3a cannot exceed D2a

The number of physical polling places used during Election Day you report 

in D3a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a. 

Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why 

the value in D3a exceeds the value in D2a.

D4a cannot exceed D2a

The number of physical polling places used during early voting you report 

in D4a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a. 

Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why 

the value in D4a exceeds the value in D2a.

If D5a > 0 or D6a > 0, then 

D7a > 0

Because you reported using poll workers in D5a and/or D6a, you should 

provide the total number of poll workers used in the jurisdiction in D7a. 

Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.

D5a cannot exceed D7a

The number of poll workers serving during Election Day you report in D5a 

cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D5a 

exceeds the value in D7a.

D6a cannot exceed D7a

The number of poll workers serving during early voting you report in D6a 

cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D6a 

exceeds the value in D7a.

D9a cannot exceed D7a

The number of poll workers serving for the first time in this election in D9a 

cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your 

responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D9a 

exceeds the value in D7a.

The sum of B14a and B24a 

should equal F1c

The sum of counted absentee UOCAVA ballots reported in B14a and 

counted FWABs reported in B24a should equal the total number of 

counted UOCAVA votes reported in F1c. Please review your responses or 

use the comments section to explain why the sum of B14a and B24a do 

not match the value in F1c.

C8a should equal F1d+F1g

The number of counted absentee ballots reported in C8a should equal the 

total number of counted mail votes reported in F1d and F1g. Please 

review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the 

value in C8a does not match the value in F1d+F1g.

If E1b > 0 or E1c > 0, then 

F1e > 0

Because you reported in E1b and/or E1c that your jurisdiction counted 

some provisional ballots, you should provide data on the number of voters 

who cast a provisional ballot that was counted in F1e. Please review your 

responses and add comments as necessary.

F1a cannot exceed A1a

The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted, as 

reported in F1a, cannot exceed the total number of registered voters as 

reported in A1a. Please review your responses and add comments as 

necessary.

F1d cannot exceed C1a

The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted, as reported 

in F1d, cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted, as 

reported in C1a. Please review your responses and add comments as 

necessary.

F1g cannot exceed C1a

The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted in an allmail election jurisdiction, as reported in F1g, cannot exceed the total 

number of mail ballots transmitted, as reported in C1a. Please review your 

responses and add comments as necessary.

F1e cannot exceed E1a

The number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted, as 

reported in F1e, cannot exceed the total number of provisional ballots 

cast, as reported in E1a. Please review your responses and add 

comments as necessary.

If F5a = Yes, then 

F5b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report 

data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F5b.
 

255| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

If F5a = Yes, then 

F5c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F5a, you should report 

data on the number of machines deployed in F5c.

If F6a = Yes, then 

F6b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report 

data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F6b.

If F6a = Yes, then 

F6c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F6a, you should report 

data on the number of machines deployed in F6c.

If F7a = Yes, then 

F7b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should 

report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F7b.

If F7a = Yes, then 

F7c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F7a, you should 

report data on the number of machines deployed in F7c.

If F8a = Yes, then 

F8b_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on 

the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F8b.

If F8a = Yes, then 

F8c_1 ≠ 0 or Does not apply

Because you reported using scanners in F8a, you should report data on 

the number of machines deployed in F8c.

Table 3: Policy Survey Validation Rules

Validation Rule Error Text 

If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then 

A4c, A5c, A6c, A7c ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in 

Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A4c-A7c. 

Instead, please report the total number of online registrations received, 

new online registrations received, duplicate online registrations, or invalid 

online registrations. If that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then 

A4c ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in 

Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A4c. 

Instead, please report the total number of online registrations received, or, 

if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then 

A5c ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in 

Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A5c. 

Instead, please report the number of new online registrations received, or, 

if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then 

A6c ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in 

Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A6c. 

Instead, please report the number of duplicate online registrations 

received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the 

Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the 

EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q6 = 1 OR Q6 = 2, then 

A7c ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in 

Q6 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A7c. 

Instead, please report the total number of invalid online registrations 

received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the 

Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the 

EAVS technical assistance team.
Survey Methodology | 256 

Validation Rule Error Text 

If Q8 = 1, then A2a ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported having a form of same-day registration in Q8 

of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A2a. Instead, 

please report the total number of same day registrations received, or, if 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q8a_1 = 1, then 

A2b ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported having same-day registration on Election Day 

in Q8a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A2b. 

Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations received on 

Election Day, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If 

the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and 

the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q8a_2 = 1 OR Q8a_3 = 1,

then A2c ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported having same-day registration during in-person 

early voting in Q8a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to A2c. Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations 

received prior to Election Day, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data 

not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact 

your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q9 = 1, then A3c ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported having pre-registration for persons under 18 

years of age in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to A3c. Instead, please report the number of pre-registrations 

received, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the 

Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the 

EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q10 = 1, then A1b ≠ Does 

not apply and A1c ≠ Does not 

apply

Because your state reported differentiating between active and inactive 

voters in Q10 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” 

to A1b and A1c. Instead, please report the number of active and inactive 

voters in these items, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q12_1 = 1 OR Q12_2 = 1 

OR Q12_3 = 1, then 

A8a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported using confirmation notices in Q12 of the Policy 

Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to A8a. Instead, please 

report the total number of confirmation notices sent, or, if that data is not 

tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is 

incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance 

team.

If Q17a = 1, then F1g > 0

Because your state reported using a statewide all-vote-by-mail system in 

Q17a of the Policy Survey, you must report data on the number of voters 

who cast a ballot in a jurisdiction that votes entirely by mail in F1g. If that 

data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q18 = 2 OR Q18 = 3, then 

C2a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing some or all registered voters to be 

designated as permanent absentee voters in Q18 of the Policy Survey, you 

may not respond “Does not apply” to C2a. Instead, please report the 

number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters, or, if 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q20 = 1, then C7a ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported allowing for mail ballot curing in Q20 of the 

Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to C7a. Instead, 

please report the number of mail ballots that were successfully cured, or, if 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.
 

257| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

If Q25_4 = 0, then 

D4a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to 

Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not

apply” to D4a. Instead, please report the number of polling places used 

during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q25_4 = 0, then 

D4b ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to 

Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to D4b. Instead, please report the number of polling places other 

than election offices used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, 

respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, 

please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q25_4 = 0, then 

D4c ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to 

Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to D4c. Instead, please report the number of polling places located 

at election offices used during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, 

respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, 

please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q25_4 = 0, then 

D6a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to 

Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to D6a. Instead, please report the number of poll workers used 

during early voting, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q25_4 = 0, then 

F1f ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to 

Election Day in Q25 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to F1f. Instead, please report the number of voters who cast ballots 

during in-person early voting that were counted, or, if that data is not 

tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is 

incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance 

team.

If Q27_1 = 1, then 

B6a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by postal mail in 

Q27 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B6a. 

Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by postal 

mail, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the 

Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the 

EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q27_2 = 1, then 

B7a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by email in Q27 

of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B7a. Instead, 

please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by email, or, if 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q27_3 = 1 OR Q27_4 = 1 

OR Q27_5 = 1, then 

B8a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by another mode 

in Q27 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to B8a. 

Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by other 

modes, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the 

Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the 

EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q28_1 = 1, then 

B10a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots 

by postal mail in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to B10a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ 

ballots returned by postal mail, or, if that data is not tracked, respond 

“Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please 

contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
Survey Methodology | 258 

Validation Rule Error Text 

If Q28_2 = 1, then 

B11a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots 

by email in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” 

to B11a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots 

returned by email, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q28_3 = 1 OR Q28_4 = 1 

OR Q28_5 = 1, then 

B12a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots 

by another mode in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does 

not apply” to B12a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ 

ballots returned by other modes, or, if that data is not tracked, respond 

“Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please 

contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q28_1 = 1, then 

B15a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots 

by postal mail in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to B15a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ 

ballots returned by postal mail and counted, or, if that data is not tracked, 

respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, 

please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q28_2 = 1, then 

B16a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots 

by email in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” 

to B16a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ ballots 

returned by email and counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond 

“Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please 

contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q28_3 = 1 OR Q28_4 = 1 

OR Q28_5 = 1, then 

B17a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots 

by another mode in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does 

not apply” to B17a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voters’ 

ballots returned by other modes and counted, or, if that data is not tracked, 

respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, 

please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q33 = 1, then E1a ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy 

Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1a. Instead, please 

report the total number of provisional ballots cast, or, if that data is not 

tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is 

incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance 

team.

If Q33 = 1, then E1b ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy 

Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1b. Instead, please 

report the number of provisional ballots cast that were counted in full, or, if 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q33 = 1, then E1d ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy 

Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E1d. Instead, please 

report the number of provisional ballots cast that were rejected, or, if that 

data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q33a_1 = 1, then 

E2h ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when a federal or state judge extends polling hours, 

you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2h. Instead, please report the 

number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data 

is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response 

is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical 

assistance team.
 

259| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

If Q33a_2=1, then 

E2c ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when an election official asserts a voter is not 

eligible, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2c. Instead, please 

report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q33a_3 = 1, then 

E2d ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when a person who is not an election official asserts 

a voter is not eligible and the challenge cannot be resolved, you may not 

respond “Does not apply” to E2d. Instead, please report the number of 

provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not 

tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is 

incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance 

team.

If Q33a_4 = 1, then 

E2a ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when a person does not appear on the list of eligible 

voters, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2a. Instead, please 

report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey 

response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS 

technical assistance team.

If Q33a_5 = 1, then 

E2b ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when a voter does not have proper identification, 

you may not respond “Does not apply” to E2b. Instead, please report the 

number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data 

is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response 

is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical 

assistance team.

If Q33a_6 = 1, then 

E2e ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when a voter is not a resident of the precinct in 

which they are attempting to vote, you may not respond “Does not apply” to 

E2e. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast 

for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” 

If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC 

and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q33a_7 = 1, then 

E2f ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when a voter's registration has not been updated 

with their current name and address, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to E2f. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that 

were cast for this reason or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q33a_8 = 1, then 

E2g ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered when a voter who was issued a mail ballot does not 

surrender the mail ballot when they wish to vote in person, you may not 

respond “Does not apply” to E2g. Instead, please report the number of 

provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data is not 

tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is 

incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance 

team.
Survey Methodology | 260 

Validation Rule Error Text 

If Q33a_9 = 1, then 

E2i ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported in Q33a of the Policy Survey that provisional 

ballots may be offered for reasons other than those listed in E2a-E2h, you 

may not respond “Does not apply” to E2i. Instead, please report the 

number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data 

is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response 

is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical 

assistance team.

If Q33c = 2, then E1c ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported partially counting provisional ballots in some 

instances in Q33c of the Policy Survey, you may not respond “Does not 

apply” to E1c. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots 

counted in part, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q33 = 1, then E3a ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy 

Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to E3a. Instead, please 

report the total number of provisional ballots rejected, or, if that data is not 

tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the Policy Survey response is 

incorrect, please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance 

team.

If Q33 = 1, then F1e ≠ Does 

not apply

Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q33 of the Policy 

Survey, you may not respond “Does not apply” to F1e. Instead, please 

report the total number of voters who cast provisional ballots that were 

counted, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.” If the 

Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your state POC and the 

EAVS technical assistance team.

If Q38_5 = 0, then 

A9d ≠ Does not apply

Because your state reported that criminal convictions or incarceration can 

affect individuals' voting eligibility in Q38 of the Policy Survey, you may not 

respond “Does not apply” to A9d. Instead, please report the total number 

of persons who were removed from the voter rolls because of disqualifying 

felony conviction, or, if that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.” If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, please contact your 

state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

Table 4: Policy Survey Pre-Fills

Policy Survey Response Expected Response in EAVS 

Q6 = No A4c, A5c, A6c and A7c = Does not apply

Q8 = No A2a, A2b, and A2c = Does not apply

Q9 = No A3c = Does not apply

Q10 = No A1c = Does not apply

Q12 = No A8a–A8h = Does not apply

Q15 = No F3a–e = No

Q17 = No F1g = Does not apply

Q18 = No C2a = Does not apply

Q19 = No C3a, C4a–c, C5a–c, and C6a = Does not apply

Q20 = No C7a = Does not apply

Q21 = Postmark not required C9k = Does not apply

Q25 = Early voting is not allowed D4a–c, D6a, and F1f = Does not apply

Q27 ≠ Postal mail B6a–c = Does not apply

Q27 ≠ Email B7a–c = Does not apply
 

261| Survey Methodology

Policy Survey Response Expected Response in EAVS 

Q27 ≠ Fax AND Q27 ≠ Online AND 

Q27 ≠ Other B8a–c = Does not apply

Q28 ≠ Postal mail B10a–c and B15a–c = Does not apply

Q28 ≠ Email B11a–c and B16a–c = Does not apply

Q28 ≠ Fax AND Q28 ≠ Online AND 

Q28 ≠ Other B12a–c and B17a–c = Does not apply

Q33 = No E1a–e, E2a–k, E3a–m, F1e, F5d_3, F6d_3, F7d_3, F8d_3, F9d_3, 

and F10c = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ Voter’s name does not 

appear on list of eligible voters E2a = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ Voter does not have proper 

identification E2b = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ An election official asserts 

voter is ineligible E2c = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ Another person asserts 

voter is ineligible E2d = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ Voter is not a resident of 

the precinct in which they 

attempted to vote

E2e = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ Voter’s registration has 

outdated information E2f = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ Voter received a mail ballot 

and did not surrender it at polling 

place to vote in person

E2g = Does not apply

Q33a ≠ When a judge extends 

polling place hours E2h = Does not apply

Q33c = Fully count or partially 

count the provisional ballot E3d = Does not apply

Q38 = No one; criminal convictions 

do not limit a person’s right to vote A9d = Does not apply

Table 5: EAVS Rates Validations

Validation Rule Error Text 

Percent of registrations that were new and 

valid: (A3b/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 5%–95%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A3b for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of registrations that were 

duplicates: (A3d/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A3d for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of registrations that were rejected: 

(A3e/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A3e for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of registrations that were name, 

political party, or within-jurisdiction 

changes: (A3f/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 5%–95%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A3f for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.
Survey Methodology | 262 

Validation Rule Error Text 

Percent of registrations received by mail: 

(A4a/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A4a for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of registrations received in person: 

(A4b/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A4b for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of registrations received online: 

(A4c/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A4c for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of registrations received at motor 

vehicle agencies: (A4d/A3a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A3a and A4d for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Confirmation notices sent as percent of 

active registered voters: (A8a/A1b) x 100

Threshold: 1%–35%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A1b and A8a for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of confirmation notices returned 

confirming valid registration: 

(A8b/A8a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–50%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A8a and A8b for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of confirmation notices returned 

confirming invalid registration: 

(A8c/A8a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–35%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A8a and A8c for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of confirmation notices returned 

as undeliverable: (A8d/A8a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–35%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A8a and A8d for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of confirmation notices 

unreturned: (A8e/A8a) x 100

Threshold: 10%–80%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A8a and A8e for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of registrations removed as 

percent of total registrants: (A9a/A1a) x 

100

Threshold: 1%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items A1a and A9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of FPCAs that were rejected: 

(B3a/B2a) x 100

Threshold: 0.5%–99%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items B2a and B3a for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned: 

(B9a/B5a) x 100

Threshold: 5%–95%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items B5a and B9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that

were counted: (B14a/B9a) x 100

Threshold: 10%–100%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items B9a and B14a for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.
 

263| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that 

were rejected: (B18a/B9a) x 100

Threshold: 0.5%–90%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items B9a and B18a for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of FWABs counted: 

(B24a/B23a) x 100

Threshold: 10%–100%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items B23a and B24a for this jurisdiction to ensure 

the data are correct. You may also use the comments section 

for these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of FWABs rejected: 

([B25a+B26a+B27a]/B23a) x 100

Threshold: 0.5%–90%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items B23a, B25a, B26a, and B27a for this 

jurisdiction to ensure the data are correct. You may also use 

the comments section for these items to provide context to 

your submission.

Percent of mailed ballots returned: 

(C1b/C1a) x 100

Threshold: 5%–95%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items C1a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of mailed ballots unreturned: 

(C1f/C1a) x 100

Threshold: 5%–95%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items C1a and C1f for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of mailed ballots returned via drop 

box: (C6a/C1b) x 100

Threshold: >95%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

C1b and C6a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of mailed ballots successfully 

cured: (C7a/C1b) x 100

Threshold: >20%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

C1b and C7a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of returned mail ballots counted: 

(C8a/C1b) x 100

Threshold: 10%–100%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items C8a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of returned mail ballots rejected: 

(C9a/C1b) x 100

Threshold: 0.5%–90%

This percentage is [higher/lower] than expected. Please 

review items C9a and C1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the 

data are correct. You may also use the comments section for 

these items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of poll workers under age 18: 

(D7b/D7a) x 100

Threshold: >50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

D7a and D7b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of poll workers ages 18 to 25: 

(D7c/D7a) x 100

Threshold: >50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

D7a and D7c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of poll workers ages 26 to 40: 

(D7d/D7a) x 100

Threshold: >50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

D7a and D7d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of poll workers ages 41 to 60: 

(D7e/D7a) x 100

Threshold: >50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

D7a and D7e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.
Survey Methodology | 264 

Validation Rule Error Text 

Percent of poll workers ages 61 to 70: 

(D7f/D7a) x 100

Threshold: >50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

D7a and D7f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of poll workers ages 71+: 

(D7g/D7a) x 100

Threshold: >50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

D7a and D7g for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of poll workers who served for first 

time: (D9a/D7a) x 100

Threshold: >50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

D7a and D9a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of provisional ballots rejected: 

(E1d/E1a) x 100

Threshold: 0.5%–95%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

E1a and E1d for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent of turnout by active registration: 

(F1a/A1b) x 100

Threshold: 35%–95%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

A1b and F1a for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent ballots cast in person on Election 

Day: (F1b/F1a) x 100

Threshold: 10%–90%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

F1a and F1b for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent ballots cast by mail: 

([F1d+F1g]/F1a) x 100

Threshold: 5%–95%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

F1a, F1d, and F1g for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent ballots cast in person before 

Election Day: (F1f/F1a) x 100

Threshold: 1%–95%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

F1a and F1f for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent ballots cast by UOCAVA voters: 

(F1c/F1a) x 100

Threshold: 0.1%–50%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

F1a and F1c for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Percent ballots cast that were provisional: 

(F1e/F1a) x 100

Threshold: 0.01%–25%

This percentage is higher than expected. Please review items 

F1a and F1e for this jurisdiction to ensure the data are 

correct. You may also use the comments section for these 

items to provide context to your submission.

Total number of voting machines deployed: 

F5c_1 + F5c_2 + F5c_3 + F6c_1 + F6c_2 

+ F6c_3 + F7c_1 + F7c_2 + F7c_3 + 

F8c_1 + F8c_2 + F8c_3

Threshold: <1

This number is lower than expected. Please review items 

F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, F6c_3, F7c_1, F7c_2, 

F7c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, and F8c_3 for this jurisdiction to 

ensure the data are correct. You may also use the comments 

section for these items to provide context to your submission.

Table 6: Valid Skips

If... Items Filled 

A4e = Does not apply (-88) A5e, A6e, and A7e = Valid skip (-77)

A4f = Does not apply (-88) A5f, A6f, and A7f = Valid skip (-77)

A4g = Does not apply (-88) A5g, A6g, and A7g = Valid skip (-77)
 

265| Survey Methodology

If... Items Filled 

A4h = Does not apply (-88) A5h, A6h, and A7h = Valid skip (-77)

A4i = Does not apply (-88) A5i, A6i, and A7i = Valid skip (-77)

A8a = Does not apply (-88) A8b–h = Valid skip (-77)

A9a = Does not apply (-88) A9b–j = Valid skip (-77)

B1a = Does not apply (-88) B1b–c = Valid skip (-77)

B5a = 0 B5b–B22c = Valid skip (-77)

B7a = Does not apply (-88) B7b–c = Valid skip (-77)

B8a = Does not apply (-88) B8b–c = Valid skip (-77)

B11a = Does not apply (-88) B11b–c = Valid skip (-77)

B12a = Does not apply (-88) B12b–c = Valid skip (-77)

B16a = Does not apply (-88) B16b–c = Valid skip (-77)

B17a = Does not apply (-88) B17b–c = Valid skip (-77)

B21a = Does not apply (-88) B21b–c = Valid skip (-77)

C4a = Does not apply (-88) C4b–c = Valid skip (-77)

C5a = Does not apply (-88) C5b–c = Valid skip (-77)

D3a = Does not apply (-88) D3b–c = Valid skip (-77)

D4a = Does not apply (-88) D4b–c = Valid skip (-77)

D7a = Does not apply (-88) D7b–g = Valid skip (-77) and D9a = Valid skip (-77)

F5a = No F5b_1–F5d_4 = Valid skip (-77)

F6a = No F6b_1–F6d_4 = Valid skip (-77)

F7a = No F7b_1–F7d_5 = Valid skip (-77)

F8a = No F8b_1–F8d_5 = Valid skip (-77)

F9a = No F9d_1–F9d_5 = Valid skip (-77)

Table 7: Special Conditions and Data Missingness

Validation Rule Error Text 

If state = North Dakota, then Section 

A = Does not apply and B1a-c = Does 

not apply

--

If state = Maine, then Section B = 

Data not available for all jurisdictions 

except UOCAVA-ME

--

If state = HI and jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”, then all items = 

Data not available

--

If state = ME and jurisdiction = 

“UOCAVA-ME”, then all items = Data 

not available except for Section B and 

contact information

--

A1a ≠ Does not apply unless the 

state = “ND” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County” OR jurisdiction = 

“MAINE - UOCAVA”

Please provide the total number of people who were registered 

and eligible to vote in your jurisdiction in the November 2022 

general election. If that data is not tracked, respond “Data not 

available.”
Survey Methodology | 266 

Validation Rule Error Text 

A3a ≠ Does not apply unless the state 

= “ND” OR jurisdiction = “Kalawao 

County” OR jurisdiction = “MAINE -

UOCAVA”

Please provide the total number of registration forms received in 

your jurisdiction between the close of registration for the 

November 2020 general election and the close of registration for 

the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked, 

respond “Data not available.”

B1a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless the state = “ND” OR 

jurisdiction = “Kalawao County” OR 

jurisdiction = “MAINE - UOCAVA”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B2a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B3a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B4a cannot be Does not apply unless 

state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B5a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B6a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B9a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B10a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B13a-d cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B14a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B15a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B18a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B19a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B20a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B23a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”

B24a-c cannot be Does not apply 

unless state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If 

that data is not tracked, respond “Data not available.”
 

267| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

C1a cannot be Does not apply unless 

state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the total number of mail ballots transmitted to 

voters for the November 2022 general election. If that data is not 

tracked, respond “Data not available.”

D1a cannot be Does not apply unless 

state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the total number of precincts in your jurisdiction for 

the November 2022 general election. If that data is not tracked, 

respond “Data not available.”

F1a cannot be Does not apply unless 

state = “ME” OR jurisdiction = 

“Kalawao County”

Please provide the total number of voters who cast a ballot 

(regardless of mode) that was counted for the November 2022 

general election in your jurisdiction. If that data is not tracked, 

respond “Data not available.”

F7b_1 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking 

Device (Los Angeles County) unless 

jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”

You have selected a make and model which is not used in your 

jurisdiction. Please correct your response.

F7b_2 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking 

Device (Los Angeles County) unless 

jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”

You have selected a make and model which is not used in your 

jurisdiction. Please correct your response.

F7b_3 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking 

Device (Los Angeles County) unless 

jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”

You have selected a make and model which is not used in your 

jurisdiction. Please correct your response.

F8b_1, F8b_2, F8b_3 cannot be 

IBML (Los Angeles County) or LRC1000 (Los Angeles County) unless 

jurisdiction = “Los Angeles County”

You have selected a make and model which is not used in your 

jurisdiction. Please correct your response.

Required items cannot be left blank

Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not 

have the information to respond, please enter “Data not 

available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this 

category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you, 

please enter “Does not apply” and explain in comments section.

If any of A3h to A3j is > 0, response 

to corresponding open-ended item 

A3h_other to A3j_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of A4j to A4l is > 0, response to 

corresponding open-ended item 

A4j_other to A4l_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of A5j to A5l is > 0, response to 

corresponding open-ended item 

A5j_other to A5l_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.
Survey Methodology | 268 

Validation Rule Error Text 

If any of A6j to A6l is > 0, response to 

corresponding open-ended item 

A6j_other to A6l_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of A7j to A7l is > 0, response to 

corresponding open-ended item 

A7j_other to A7l_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of A8f to A8h is > 0, response 

to corresponding open-ended item 

A8f_other to A8h_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of A9h to A9j is > 0, response 

to corresponding open-ended item 

A9h_other to A9j_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of B22a to B22c is filled, 

response to corresponding openended item B22_other is required 

and vice versa

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of B27a to B27c is filled, 

response to corresponding openended item B27_other is required 

and vice versa 

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of C1g to C1i is > 0, response 

to corresponding open-ended item 

C1g_other to C1i_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of C9r to C9t is > 0, response to 

corresponding open-ended item 

C9r_other to C9t_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.
 

269| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

If E1e is > 0, response to 

corresponding open-ended item 

E1e_other is required and vice versa 

(i.e., if response is provided for the 

open-ended text item, a number in 

the corresponding item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of E2i to E2k is > 0, response 

to corresponding open-ended item 

E2i_other to E2k_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If any of E3k to E3m is > 0, response 

to corresponding open-ended item 

E2k_other to E2m_other is required 

and vice versa (i.e., if response is 

provided for the open-ended text 

item, a number in the corresponding 

item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If F1h is > 0, response to 

corresponding open-ended item 

F1h_other is required and vice versa 

(i.e., if response is provided for the 

open-ended text item, a number in 

the corresponding item is expected)

Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” 

category you entered information in. If you do not have any 

information to enter in the “Other” items, you can leave them 

blank.

If F2e_5 is selected in the Online 

Survey or Excel template, a response 

to the corresponding open-ended 

item F2_other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F3f = Yes, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F3f_other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F4f = Yes, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F4f_other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F5b_1 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F5b_1other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F5b_2 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F5b_2other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F5b_3 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F5b_3other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F6b_1 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F6b_1other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F6b_2 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F6b_2other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F6b_3 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F6b_3other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.
Survey Methodology | 270 

Validation Rule Error Text 

If F7b_1 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F7b_1other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F7b_2 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F7b_2other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F7b_3 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F7b_3other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F8b_1 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F8b_1other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F8b_2 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F8b_2other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F8b_3 = Other, a response to the 

corresponding open-ended item 

F8b_3other is required

Please provide a description for the “Other” category you selected.

If F5a = Yes, then F5b_1, F5c_1, 

F5d_1, F5d_2, F5d_3 and F5d_4 

cannot be blank

Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not 

have the information to respond, please enter “Data not 

available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this 

category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you, 

please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments 

section.

If F6a = Yes, then F6b_1, F6c_1, 

F6d_1, F6d_2, F6d_3 and F6d_4 

cannot be blank

Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not 

have the information to respond, please enter “Data not 

available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this 

category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you, 

please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments 

section.

If F7a = Yes, then F7b_1, F7c_1, 

F7d_1, F7d_2, F7d_3, F7d_4 and 

F7d_5 cannot be blank

Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not 

have the information to respond, please enter “Data not 

available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this 

category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you, 

please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments 

section.

If F8a = Yes, then F8b_1, F8c_1, 

F8d_1, F8d_2, F8d_3, F8d_4 and 

F8d_5 cannot be blank

Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not 

have the information to respond, please enter “Data not 

available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this 

category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you, 

please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments 

section.

If F9a = Yes, then F9d_1, F9d_2, 

F9d_3, F9d_4 and F9d_5 cannot be 

blank

Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not 

have the information to respond, please enter “Data not 

available”. If you collect the information but no response fits in this 

category, please enter “0”. If this question does not apply to you, 

please enter “Does not apply” and explain in the comments 

section.

Flag any negative value in numeric 

items

Negative numbers are not allowed as responses in EAVS. If you 

intended to respond “Does not apply” (-88) or “Data not available” 

(-99), please select the appropriate check box instead.

Flag any negative value except for 

-77, -88, and -99 in numeric items

Negative numbers outside of responses of “Data not available” (-

99), “Does not apply” (-88), and “Valid skip” 

(-77) are not allowed as responses in EAVS. Please review and 

provide a valid response.
 

271| Survey Methodology

Validation Rule Error Text 

Flag any value with decimals in 

numeric items

Numbers with decimals are not allowed as valid responses. Please 

review your response to the item and enter a valid number.
Survey Methodology | 272 

Methodology Appendix C: Post-Submission Validations and 

Sample Rates

Table 1: Sample Rates and Outlier Thresholds

EAVS Rate Calculation 

Threshold for Flagging 

Result for Further 

Review 

Percent of registrations that were new and 

valid

A3b

A3a

× 100

<5%

>95%

Percent of registrations that were duplicates A3d

A3a

× 100

<1%

>99%

Percent of registrations that were invalid or 

rejected

A3e

A3a

× 100

<1%

>99%

Percent of registrations that were name, 

political party, or within-jurisdiction changes

A3f

A3a

× 100

<5%

>95%

Percent of registrations received by mail A4a

A3a

× 100

<1%

>99%

Percent of registrations received in person A4b

A3a

× 100

<1%

>99%

Percent of registrations received online

A4c

A3a

× 100

<1%

>99%

Percent of registrations received at motor 

vehicle agencies

A4d

A3a

× 100

<1%

>99%

Confirmation notices sent as percent of active 

registered voters

A8a

A1b

× 100

<1%

>35%

Percent of confirmation notices returned 

confirming valid registration

A8b

A8a

× 100

<1%

>50%

Percent of confirmation notices returned 

confirming invalid registration

A8c

A8a

× 100

<1%

>35%

Percent of confirmation notices returned as 

undeliverable

A8d

A8a

× 100

<1%

>35%

Percent of confirmation notices unreturned A8e

A8a

× 100

<10%

>80%

Percent of registrations removed as percent of 

total registrants

A9a

A1a

× 100

<1%

>99%

Percent of FPCAs that were rejected B3a

B2a

× 100

<0.5%

>99%

Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned B9a

B5a

× 100

<5%

>95%

Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were 

counted

B14a

B9a

× 100

<10%

>100%

Percent of UOCAVA ballots returned that were 

rejected

B18a

B9a

× 100

<0.5%

>90%
 

273| Survey Methodology

EAVS Rate Calculation 

Threshold for Flagging 

Result for Further 

Review 

Percent of FWABs counted B24a

B23a

× 100

<10%

>100%

Percent of FWABs rejected B25a + B26a + B27a

B23a

× 100

<0.5%

>90%

Percent of mailed ballots returned C1b

C1a

× 100

<5%

>95%

Percent of mailed ballots unreturned C1f

C1a

× 100

<5%

>95%

Percent of mailed ballots returned via drop 

box

C6a

C1b

× 100 >95%

Percent of mailed ballots successfully cured C7a

C1b

× 100 >20%

Percent of mailed ballots counted C8a

C1b

× 100

<10%

>100%

Percent of mailed ballots rejected C9a

C1b

× 100

<0.5%

>90%

Percent of poll workers under age 18 D7b

D7a

× 100 >50%

Percent of poll workers ages 18 to 25 D7c

D7a

× 100 >50%

Percent of poll workers ages 26 to 40 D7d

D7a

× 100 >50%

Percent of poll workers ages 41 to 60 D7e

D7a

× 100 >50%

Percent of poll workers ages 61 to 70 D7f

D7a

× 100 >50%

Percent of poll workers ages 71+ D7g

D7a

× 100 >50%

Percent of poll workers who served for first 

time

D9a

D7a

× 100 >50%

Percent of provisional ballots rejected E1d

E1a

× 100

<0.5%

>95%

Percent of turnout by active registration F1a

A1b

× 100

<35%

>95%

Percent ballots cast in person on Election Day F1b

F1a

× 100

<10%

>90%

Percent ballots cast by mail F1d + F1g

F1a

× 100

<5%

>95%

Percent ballots cast in person before Election 

Day

F1f

F1a

× 100

<1%

>95%

Percent ballots cast by UOCAVA voters F1c

F1a

× 100

<0.1%

>50%
Survey Methodology | 274 

EAVS Rate Calculation 

Threshold for Flagging 

Result for Further 

Review 

Percent ballots cast that were provisional

F1e

F1a

× 100

<0.01%

>25%

Total number of voting machines deployed

F5c_1 + F5c_2 + F5c_3 +

F6c_1 + F6c_2 + F6c_3 +

F7c_1 + F7c_2 + F7c_3 +

F8c_1 + F8c_2 + F8c_3

<1

Percent of registrants by CVAP A1a

CVAP

× 100

<50%

>130%

Percent of turnout by CVAP F1a

CVAP

× 100

<35%

>95%
 

275| Survey Methodology

Table 2: Comparisons to the 2018 EAVS Data

EAVS Rate Calculation 

Threshold for Flagging 

Result for Further Review 

2022 total registrations as percentage 

of 2018’s registrations

A1a[2022]

A1a[2018]

× 100

<50%

>150%

2022 registrations received as 

percentage of 2018’s

A3a[2022]

A3a[2018]

× 100

<25%

>200%

2022 registrations removed as 

percentage of 2018’s

A9a[2022]

A9a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>200%

2022 UOCAVA registrants as 

percentage of 2018’s

B1a[2022]

B1a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>200%

2022 UOCAVA ballots transmitted as 

percentage of 2018’s

B5a[2022]

B5a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>200%

2022 UOCAVA ballots returned as 

percentage of 2018’s

B9a[2022]

B9a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>200%

2022 UOCAVA ballots counted as 

percentage of 2018’s

B14a[2022]

B14a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>200%

2022 mailed ballots transmitted as 

percentage of 2018’s

C1a[2022]

C1a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>500%

2022 mailed ballots returned as 

percentage of 2018’s

C1b[2022]

C1b[2018]

× 100

<10%

>500%

2022 mailed ballots counted as 

percentage of 2018’s

C8a[2022]

C3a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>500%

2022 provisional ballots cast as 

percentage of 2018’s

E1a[2022]

E1a[2018]

× 100

<10%

>500%

2022 total turnout as percentage of 

2018’s

F1a[2022]

F1a[2018]

× 100

<50%

>150%
Survey Methodology | 276 

Methodology Appendix D: How to Calculate Selected EAVS Rates

The EAVS item numbers in this table correspond to the question numbering for the 2022 EAVS. 

To determine item numbering for previous EAVS surveys, please refer to the survey instrument 

and data codebook for each year.

EAVS Rate Calculation 

Total CVAP registration rate A1a

CVAP

× 100

Active CVAP registration rate A1b

CVAP

× 100

Percentage of registrations that were new and valid A3b

A3a

× 100

Percentage of registrations that were duplicates A3d

A3a

× 100

Percentage of registrations that were rejected A3e

A3a

× 100

Percentage of registrations that were name, political party, or 

within-jurisdiction changes

A3f

A3a

× 100

Percentage of total registration forms that were received by 

mail

A4a

A3a

× 100

Percentage of total registration forms that were received in 

person at election or registrar offices

A4b

A3a

× 100

Percentage of total registration forms that were submitted by 

individual voters through web-based online registration 

systems

A4c

A3a

× 100

Percentage of total registration forms that were received 

through motor vehicle agencies

A4d

A3a

× 100

Voter registration removal rate as a percentage of total 

registrants 

A9a

A1a

× 100

Percentage of FPCAs that were rejected B3a

B2a

× 100

Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were 

returned by voters

B9a

B5a

× 100

Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were 

returned by voters and counted

B14a

B9a

× 100

Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were 

returned by voters and rejected

B18a

B9a

× 100

Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were 

counted

B24a

B23a

× 100

Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were 

rejected

(B25a + B26a +B27a)

B23a

× 100

Percentage of transmitted mail ballots that were returned by 

voters

C1b

C1a

× 100
 

277| Survey Methodology

EAVS Rate Calculation 

Percentage of returned mail ballots that were counted C8a

C1b

× 100

Percentage of returned mail ballots that were rejected C9a

C1b

× 100

Percentage of returned mail ballots that were returned via 

drop box

C6a

C1b

× 100

Percentage of returned mail ballots that were successfully 

cured

C7a

C1b

× 100

Percentage of counted mail ballots that were successfully 

cured

C7a

C8a

× 100

Percentage of poll workers who served for the first time in 

the 2022 general election

D9a

D7a

× 100

Percentage of provisional ballots that were counted, either in 

full or in part

(E1b + E1c)

(E1b +E1c + E1d + E1e)

× 100

Percentage of provisional ballots that were rejected

E1d

(E1b +E1c + E1d + E1e)

× 100

Voter turnout rate by CVAP F1a

CVAP

× 100

Percentage of ballots that were cast at a physical polling 

place on Election Day

F1b

F1a

× 100

Percentage of ballots that were cast as mail ballots (F1d +F1g)

F1a

× 100

Percentage of ballots that were cast in-person before 

Election Day

F1f

F1a

× 100

Percentage of ballots that were cast by UOCAVA voters F1c

F1a

× 100

Percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters F1e

F1a

× 100


 
Survey Methodology | 280