OPERATIONS 

MHOLD 1. BRODE 

DNA 632OF 

NOUGAT AND WHETSTONE 

EVENTS 

HARD HAT, DANNY BOY, MARSHMALLOW, 

MUDPACK, WISHBONE, GUMDROP, 

DILUTED WATERS, AND TINY TOT 

15 February 1962 - 17 June 1965 

United States Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Prepared by Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

DWLEA 

a3b37 
Destroy this report when it is no longer 

needed. Do not return to sender. 

PLEASE NOTIFY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, 

ATTN: STTI, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305, IF 

YOUR ADDRESS IS INCORRECT, IF YOU WISH TO 

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONS 

BEFORE COMPLETING FORM 

1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT’S CATALOG NUMBER 

DNA 6320F 

I 

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT 6 PERIOD COVERED 

OPERATIONS NOUGAT AND WHETSTONE Final Report for Period 

EVENTS: HARD HAT, DANNY BOY, MARSHMALLOW, MUDPACK,15 Feb 62-1g Jun 68 

WISHBONE, GUMDROP, DILUTED WATERS, AND TINY TOT. 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 

15 February 1967-17 June 1965 

7. AUTHOR(s) 

William 3. Brady 

Karen K. Horton 

Bernard F. Eubank 

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) 

3. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. 

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK 

AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 

P.O. Box 14400 

Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 

I 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

FCLS (Major J. A. Stinson) 

12. REPORT DATE 

31 January 1984 

13. NUMBER OF PAGES 

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 87115 306 

14 MONITORING AGENCY NAME b ADDRESS(if dffferenr from Conlroffing Office) IS. SECURITY CLASS (of this report) 

UNCLASSIFIED 

15a. DECLASSIFICATION~DOWNGRADING 

SCHEDULE 

N/A since Unclassified 

I 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this ROPOHJ 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited, 20 December 1983. 

I ‘7. DISTRIEUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) 

I 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

9. KEY WORDS (Conlinus on reverse aide if rieces.wry and identify by black number) 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review (UNTPR) DILUTED WATERS WISHBONE 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA) MARSHMALLOW TINY TOT 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) WHETSTONE MUDPACK 

Nevada Test Site (NTS) DANNY BOY GUMDROP 

Underground Test (UGT) HARD HAT NOUGAT 

0. ABSTRACT (Conrlnue on reverse side If necessary and idenlrfy by block number) 

-his report is a personnel oriented history of DOD participation in underground 

nuclear weapons testing during Operations NOUGAT and WHETSTONE, test events 

1ARD HAT, DANNY BOY, MARSHMALLOW, MUDPACK, WISHBONE, GUMDROP, DILUTED WATERS, 

ind TINY TOT. It is the first in a series of historical reports which will 

include all DOD underground-nuclear weapons tests and DOE underground nuclear 

Jeapons tests with significant DOD participation from 1962 forward. In addiLion to these volumes presenting a history of the underground nuclear test 

DD I::;?3 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE !!+?~then Data Entered) 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEWhen Data Enlered) 

20. ABSTRACT (Continued) 

1 

program, a later restricted volume will identify all DOD participants, 

(military, civilian, and their contractors) and will list their dosimetry 

data. 

4 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWhen Data Entered) 
SUMMARY 

Eight Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored underground test 

events were conducted to study weapons effects from 15 February 

1962 to 17 June 1965. tFour were shaft-type, three were tunneltype, and one was a crater-type nuclear test. The following table 

summarizes data on these events: 

OPERATION T 

TEST EVENT 

DATE 

LOCAL TIME 

(hours) 

NTS LOCATION 

TYPE 

3EPTH (feet) 

YIELD (kilotons) 

NOUGAT 

I5 FEE 62 5 MAR 62 18 JUN 62 

1000 PST 1015 PST 000 POT 

AREA 15 AREA IS AREA 16 

SHAFT CRATER TUNNEL 

943 

5.7 

110 

0.43 

i6 DEC 64 IS FEE 65 21 APR 65 6 JUN 65 7 JUN 6! 

1210 PST 0819 PST 1400 PST )930 PDT 1000 PDl 

AREA IO AREA 5 AREA I6 AREA 5 AREA 15 

SHAFT TUNNEL SHAFT TUNNEL 

600 640 

Low* 

834 

Low* Low* 

WHETSTONE 

*LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 
Releases of radioactivity to the atmosphere were detected 

both onsite and offsite after DANNY BOY, the crater-type event, 

and after DILUTED WATERS, a shaft-type event. Releases of radioactivity were detected only within the confines of the Nevada 

Test Site (NTS) after the HARD HAT, MARSHMALLOW, WISHBONE, and 

TINY TOT events. No release of radioactivity was detected onsite 

or offsite after the MUDPACK and GUMDROP test events. 

As recorded on Area Access Registers, 12,152 individual entries to radiation exclusion areas were made after the above DOD 

test events. Of this number, 1,031 were by DOD-affiliated personnel (including military personnel, DOD civil servants, and DOD 

contractor personnel). The remainder were United States Atomic 

Energy Commission (AEC), other government agency, and contractor 

personnel. 

The average gamma radiation exposure per entry for all personnel was 22 mR. The average gamma radiation exposure per entry 

for DOD-affiliated personnel was 32 mR. The maximum exposure of 

a non-DOD individual during an entry was 1295 mR. The maximum 

exposure of a DOD-affiliated individual was 1780 mR. This exposure occurred on 5 March 1962 during reentry and recovery operations after the DANNY BOY event. 

Exposures of Indian Springs Air Force Base (ISAFB) personnel 

providing air support were not recorded on Area Access Registers, 

but were recorded on separate exposure reports, and their exposures are discussed separately. Considering support of DOD underground test events only, most of the exposures of Air Force personnel staging from ISAFB occurred in support of the DANNY BOY 

event. The maximum exposure for helicopter pilots supporting 

this event was 1700 mR, and the maximum exposure for sampling 

aircraft pilots during DANNY BOY was 295 mR. 
PREFACE 

The United States Government conducted 194 nuclear device 

tests from 1945 through 1958 during atmospheric test series at 

sites in the United States and in the Atlantic and Pacific 

oceans. The United States Army Manhattan Engineer District implemented the testing program in 1945, and its successor agency, 

the AEC, administered the program from 1947 until testing was 

suspended by the United States on 1 November 1958. 

Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for 

weapons development or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An additional 22 nuclear experiments were conducted 

from December 1954 to February 1956 in Nevada. These experiments 

were physics studies using small quantities of fissionable material and conventional explosives. 

President Eisenhower had proposed that test ban negotiations 

begin on 31 October 1958, and had pledged a one-year moratorium 

on United States testing to commence after the negotiations 

began. The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests 

began at Geneva on 31 October 1958; the U.S. moratorium began on 

1 November, and the AEC detected the final Soviet nuclear test of 

their fall series on 3 November 1958. Negotiations continued until May 1960 without final agreement. No nuclear tests were conducted by either nation until 1 September 1961, when the Soviet 

Union resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The United 

States began a series of underground tests in Nevada on 15 

September 1961, and U.S. atmospheric tests were resumed on 25 

April 1962 in the Pacific. 

The United States conducted several atmospheric tests in 

3 
Nevada during July 1962, and the last United States atmospheric 

nuclear test was in the Pacific on 4 November 1962. The Limited 

Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in 

outer space, and underwater was signed in Moscow on 5 August 

1963. From resumption of United States atmospheric testing on 25 

April 1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 

weapons development and weapons effects tests were conducted as 

part of the Pacific and Nevada atmospheric test operations. The 

underground tests, resumed on 15 September 1961, have continued 

on a year-round basis through the present time. 

In 1977, 15 years after atmospheric testing stopped, the 

Center for Disease Control (CDC)* noted a possible leukemia 

cluster within the group of soldiers who were present at the 

SMOKY test event, one of the Nevada tests in the 1957 PLUMBBOB 

test series. After that CDC report, the Veterans Administration 

(VA) received a number of claims for medical benefits filed by 

former military personnel who believed their health may have been 

affected by their participation in the nuclear weapons testing 

program. 

In late 1977, the DOD began a study to provide data for both 

the CDC and the VA on radiation exposures of DOD military and 

civilian participants in atmospheric testing. That study has 

progressed to the point where a number of volumes describing DOD 

participation in atmospheric tests have been published by the 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) as the executive agency for the DOD. 

On 20 June 1979, the United States Senate Committee on 

Veterans' Affairs began hearings on Veterans' Claims for Dis- 

*The Center for Disease Control was part of the U.S. Department 

of Health, Education, and Welfare (now ;he U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services). 

4 
abilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing. In addition to requesting and receiving information on DOD personnel participation and 

radiation exposures during atmospheric testing, the Chairman of 

the Senate Committee expressed concern regarding exposures of DOD 

participants in DOD-sponsored and Department of Energy (DOE)" 

underground test events. 

The Chairman requested and received information in an 

exchange of letters through 15 October 1979 regarding research on 

underground testing radiation exposures. In early 1980, the DNA 

initiated a program to acquire and consolidate underground testing radiation exposure data in a set of published volumes similar 

to the program underway on atmospheric testing data. This volume 

is the first of several volumes regarding the participation and' 

radiation exposures of DOD military and civilian personnel in underground nuclear test events. 

SERIES OF VOLUMES 

Each volume of this series will discuss DOD-sponsored underground test events, in chronological order, after presenting introductory and general information. The volumes will cover all 

underground test events identified as DOD-sponsored in Announced 

United States Nuclear Tests, published each year by the DOE 

Nevada Operations Office, Office of Public Affairs, except events 

conducted as nuclear test detection experiments where reentries 

and, subsequently, exposure of participants to radiation did not 

occur. 

*The U.S. Department of Energy succeeded the U.S. Energy Research 

and Development Administration (ERDA) in October 1977. ERDA had 

succeeded the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on 19 January 1975. 

5 
An additional volume will discuss general participation of 

DOD personnel in DOE-sponsored underground test events, with 

specific information on those events which released radioactive 

effluent to the atmosphere and where exposures of DOD personnel 

were involved. 

A separate volume will be a census of DOD personnel and 

their radiation exposure data. Distribution of this volume will 

necessarily be limited by provisions of the Privacy Act. 

METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THE VOLUMES 

Information for these volumes was obtained from several 

locations. Security-classified documents were researched at 

Headquarters, DNA, Washington, DC. Additional documents were 

researched at Field Command, DNA, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory Technical Library, and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. Most of the radiation measurement data 

were obtained at the DOE, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), and 

its support contractor, the Reynolds Electrical & Engineering 

Company, Inc. (REECo), in Las Vegas, Nevada. 

Unclassified records were used to document underground testing activities when possible, but, when necessary, unclassified 

information was extracted from security-classified documents. 

Both unclassified and classified documents are cited in the List 

of References at the end of each volume. Locations of the reference documents also are shown. Copies of most of the unclassified references have been entered in the records of the Coordination and Information Center (CIC), a DOE facility located in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

Radiation measurements, exposure data, event data, and offsite reports generally are maintained at REECo facilities adja6 
cent to the CIC as hard copy or microfilm, or as original hard 

copy at the Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna Niguel, 

California. A master file of all available personnel exposure 

data for nuclear testing programs on the continent and in the 

Pacific from 1945 to the present also is maintained by REECo for 

DOD and DOE. 

ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME 

A Summary of this test event volume appears before this 

Preface and includes general objectives of the test events, 

characteristics of each test event, and data regarding DOD 

participants and their radiation exposures. 

An Introduction following this Preface discusses reasons for 

conducting nuclear test events underground, the testing organization, the NTS, and locations of NTS underground testing areas. 

A chapter entitled underground testing procedures explains 

the basic mechanics of underground testing, purposes of effects 

experiments, containment features and early containment problems, 

tunnel and shaft area access requirements, industrial safety and 

radiological safety procedures, telemetered radiation exposure 

rate measurements, and air support for underground tests. 

A chapter on each test event covered by the volume follows 

in chronological order. Each test event chapter contains an 

event summary, a discussion of preparations and event operations, 

an explanation of safety procedures implemented, and listings of 

monitoring, sampling, and exposure results. 

Following the event chapters are a Reference List and appendices to the text including a Glossary of Terms and a list of 

Abbreviations and Acronyms. 

7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

SUMMARY ......................... 

PREFACE ......................... 

Series of Volumes .................. 

Methods and Sources Used to Prepare Volumes ...... 

Organization of this Volume .............. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................... 

LIST OF 

LIST OF 

CHAPTER 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

1.6 

CHAPTER 

2.1 

2.2 

ILLUSTRATIONS .................. 

TABLES ...................... 

ONE - INTRODUCTION ................ 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .............. 

UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES .......... 

TEST EVENTS IN THIS VOLUME ............ 

DOD TESTING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES . . 

1.4.1 Responsibilities of the Defense Atomic 

Support Agency .............. 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization ....... 

1.4.3 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support . 

RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOD, THE AEC, AND 

CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS ............. 

1.5.1 Weapons Test Division (STWT, DASA) and the 

Nevada Operations Office (AEC/NVOO) .... 

1.5.2 Test Organizations ............ 

1.5.3 Support Contractors ............ 

THE NEVADA TEST SITE ............... 

TWO - UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES ....... 

EMPLACEMENT TYPES ................ 

2.1.1 Shaft-Type ................ 

2.1.2 Crater-Type ................ 

2.1.3 Tunnel-Type ................ 

DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES .............. 

2.2.1 Radiation Measurements .......... 

2.2.2 Radiochemical Measurements ........ 

1 

3 

5 

6 

7 

8 

16 

18 

19 

19 

20 

21 

22 

22 

25 

25 

29 

29 

31 

33 

34 

39 

39 

39 

41 

41 

41 

45 

45 

8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.3 

2.4 

2.2.3 Line-of-Site (LOS) Pipe .......... 

EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS ............... 

CONTAINMENT FEATURES AND PROBLEMS ........ 

2.5 

2.4.1 Shaft Containment ............. 

2.4.2 Tunnel Containment ............ 

TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS ... 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control ........... 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control ....... 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS ......... 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES .......... 

2.7.1 

2.7.2 

2.7.3 

2.7.4 

2.7.5 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

Nevada Test Site Organization - Standard 

Operating Procedure, Chapter 0524, 

Radiological Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Standard Operating Procedures for the 

Radiological Safety Division, REECo, 

dated January 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . 

REECo Radiological Safety Division 

Information Bulletins . . . . . . . . . . . 

Detailed Procedures as Outlined in REECo 

Radiological Safety Division Branch 

Operating Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Implementation of Radiological Procedures 

Required Equipment, Devices and Capabilities 

for Monitoring Radiation Levels in the 

Environment, and Monitoring External and 

Internal Exposures of Personnel . . . . . . 

A. Portable Radiation Detection Equipment 

B. Air Sampling Equipment . . . . . . . . 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability . . . . 

D. Monitoring of Personnel Exposures . . . 

46 

47 

47 

48 

50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

56 

56 

57 

57 

57 

57 

57 

58 

58 

59 

9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.8 

2.9 

CHAPTER 

3.1 

3.2 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

2.7.6 Additional Methods Used for Control of 

Radex Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS . . . 

2.8.1 Evaluation and Development of 

Telemetry Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A. Remote Data Station (RDS) . . . . . . . 

B. Area Remote Monitoring Station (ARMS) . 

C. Radector Monitoring Station (RMS) . . . 

D. Radio-Link Telemetry . . . . . . . . . 

E. Well Logging Unit . . . . . . . . . . . 

2.8.2 Use of Telemetry Systems at NTS . . . . . . 

AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2.9.1 Changes In Air Support Requirements . . . . 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs AFB . . 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters ...... 

THREE - HARD HAT EVENT . . . . . . . . ...... 

EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . ...... 

3.2.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . ...... 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . ...... 

A. Radiological Safety Support ...... 

B. Telemetry Support . . . . . ...... 

C. Security Coverage ........... 

D. Air Support .............. 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

3.4.1 Postevent Drilling ............ 

3.4.2 Shaft Reentry ............... 

3.4.3 Tunnel Reentry .............. 

3.4.4 Cavity Mining and Drilling ........ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

60 

61 

62 

62 

63 

63 

63 

64 

64 

67 

67 

69 

70 

75 

75 

78 

78 

78 

80 

81 

81 

82 

82 

83 

90 

90 

92 

94 

97 

99 

10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

CHAPTER FOUR - DANNY BOY EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 

103 

103 

103 

105 

106 

107 

108 

109 

110 

111 

113 

116 

121 

121 

124 

128 

129 

130 

132 

132 

132 

132 

134 

137 

138 

139 

140 

142 

143 

145 

148 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

4.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

A. Radiological Safety Support ...... 

B. Telemetry Support ........... 

C. Security Coverage ........... 

D. Air Support .............. 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES ............... 

4.3.1 Cloud Sampling and Tracking ........ 

4.3.2 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

4.3.3 Other Project Activities ......... 

4.3.4 Radsafe Activities ............ 

POSTEVENT AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES. ....... 

4.4.1 Continued Recovery Operations ....... 

4.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

CHAPTER FIVE - MARSHMALLOW EVENT ............. 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

5.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

A. Radiological Safety Support ...... 

B. Telemetry Support ........... 

C. Security Coverage ........... 

D. Air Support .............. 

5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES ............... 

5.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

5.3.2 Surface Reentry and Recoveries ...... 

11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER 

5.4 

5.5 

CHAPTER 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

6.4 

6.5 

CHAPTER 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry .............. 

5.4.2 Sample Recovery, Mining and Drilling 

Operations ................ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

SIX - MUDPACK EVENT ............... 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

6.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

A. Radiological Safety Support ...... 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

C. Security Coverage ........... 

D. Air Support .............. 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES ............... 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

6.4.1 Postevent Drilling ............ 

6.4.2 Industrial Safety ............. 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

SEVEN - WISHBONE EVENT .............. 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

7.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

A. Radiological Safety Support ...... 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

C. Security Coverage ........... 

D. Air Support .............. 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES ............... 

7.3.1 Aerial Radiation Surveys . . . . . . . . . 

PAGE 

149 

149 

150 

151 

153 

153 

153 

153 

154 

154 

154 

155 

156 

156 

156 

157 

157 

159 

159 

161 

161 

161 

161 

163 

163 

165 

165 

166 

167 

169 

12 
CHAPTER 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

PAGE 

7.4 

7.5 

CHAPTER 

8.1 

8.2 

8.3 

8.4 

8.5 

CHAPTER 

9.1 

9.2 

7.3.2 Test Area Radiation Surveys and 

Reentry Activities ............ 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

EIGHT - GUMDROP EVENT .............. 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

8.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

A. Tunnel Structural Conditions ..... 

B. Tunnel Environmental Conditions .... 

C. Telemetry, Air Sampling, and 

Radiological Safety Support ...... 

D. Security Coverage ........... 

E. Air Support .............. 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 

8.3.1 Tunnel Structural Conditions ....... 

8.3.2 Tunnel Environmental Conditions ...... 

8.3.3 Radiation Surveys and Surface Reentry ... 

8.3.4 Controlled Radioactivity Release ..... 

8.3.5 Tunnel Reentry .............. 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

8.4.1 Experiment Recoveries ........... 

8.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

NINE - DILUTED WATERS EVENT ........... 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

9.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

9.2.2 PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS ......... 

A. Radiological Safety Support ...... 

169 

170 

174 

176 

176 

176 

176 

177 

177 

179 

181 

183 

184 

184 

184 

187 

188 

189 

190 

191 

194 

194 

194 

195 

197 

197 

197 

197 

199 

199 

13 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

9.3 

9.4 

9.5 

CHAPTER 

10.1 

10.2 

10.3 

10.4 

10.5 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 

C. Security Coverage ........... 

D. Air Support .............. 

9.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 

9.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Monitoring ....... 

9.3.2 Test Area Monitoring ........... 

9.3.3 Reentry Activities ............ 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

9.4.1 Experiment Recovery ............ 

9.4.2 Postevent Drilling and Mining ....... 

9.4.3 Industrial Safety ............. 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

TEN - TINY TOT EVENT ............... 

EVENT SUMMARY .................. 

PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

10.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 

10.2.2 Planning and Preparations ......... 

A. Radiological Safety Support ...... 

B. Security Coverage ........... 

C. Air Support .............. 

EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES ............... 

10.3.1 Telemetry Measurements .......... 

10.3.2 Radiation Surveys ............. 

10.3.3 Experiment Recovery ............ 

POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 

10.4.1 Postevent Drilling ............ 

10.4.2 Shaft Reentry . . ............. 

10.4.3 Tunnel Reentry . ............. 

10.4.4 Industrial Safety ............ 

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 

200 

200 

201 

201 

202 

205 

206 

209 

211 

211 

211 

212 

212 

215 

215 

215 

215 

217 

217 

219 

219 

220 

221 

221 

228 

2.28 

228 

228 

228 

230 

230 

14 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 

CHAPTER 

REFERENCE LIST . . . . . . . . . . . 

APPENDICES 

A. Glossary of Terms . . . . . 

B. Abbreviations and Acronyms . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. l 

. . 

. . 

. . 

. . 

C. General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department 

of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Nuclear Tests . 

D. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Nevada Test Site 

Organization Standard Operating Procedure Chapter 

0524 - Radiological Safety . . . . , . . . . . . . 

PAGE 

234 

239 

263 

267 

281 

15 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FIGURE PAGE 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6 

2.7 

2.8 

2.9 

3.1 

3.2 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

Federal Government Structure for Continental Nuclear 

Tests (During 1962) ................ 

Nevada Test Site Organization (In 1962) ...... 

Continental Test Organization (In 1962) ...... 

Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada ...... 

The Nevada Test Site ................ 

A Typical Subsidence Crater and Postevent Drilling 

Operation ... ; ................. 

DANNY BOY Excavation Crater ............ 

Portal of Typical DOD Tunnel Complex ........ 

Typical Permanently Established Remote Radiation 

Detector Stations Operated Continuously Throughout 

TheNTS ...................... 

Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site ....... 

Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Tunnel-Type Emplacement Site ...... 

Air Force Personnel Decontaminating a B-57 Cloud 

Sampling Aircraft ................. 

Air Force and Radsafe Personnel Monitoring a B-57 

after Decontamination ............... 

Radsafe Monitor Measuring Exposure Rate on a B-57 

Aircraft ...................... 

HARD HAT Access Shaft Headframe .......... 

HARD HAT Underground Complex ............ 

DANNY BOY Crater .................. 

DANNY BOY Contours of Gamma Radiation in mR/h 

Normalized to H+l Hour from USGS Aerial Survey 

Data ........................ 

DANNY BOY Close-In Exposure Rate Contours in 

R/h Normalized to H+l Hour ............. 

23 

26 

27 

36 

37 

42 

43 

44 

65 

66 

68 

71 

72 

73 

76 

77 

104 

115 

120 

16 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Concluded) 

FIGURE PAGE 

4.4 DANNY BOY Intermediate Range Exposure Rate 

Contours in R/h Normalized to H+l Hour . . . . . . . 122 

4.5 DANNY BOY D-Plus-One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 

4.6 DANNY BOY D-Plus-Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 

4.7 DANNY BOY D-Plus-Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 

5.1 Airview of MARSHMALLOW Portal Area . . . . . . . . . 133 

5.2 Plan and Section Views, MARSHMALLOW Event . . . . . 135 

5.3 U16a Portal Area-MARSHMALLOW Event . . . . 

. . . . . 136 

5.4 Helicopter Crash in DANNY BOY Crater . . . 

. . . . . 141 

7.1 WISHBONE Test Configuration . . . . . . . 

. . . . . 162 

8.1 GUMDROP Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 

9.1 DILUTED WATERS Test Configuration . . . . . . . . . 198 

10.1 P?an and Elevation of TINY TOT Excavations . . . . . 216 

17 
LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE PAGE 

2.1 DOD Test Events 15 February 1962 - 17 June 1965. . . 40 

3.1 HARD HAT Event Telemetry Measurements 

4.1 

5.1 

6.1 

7.1 

8.1 

8.2 

8.3 

9.1 

9.2 

10.1 

10.2 

10.3 

Inside of Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 

DANNY BOY Event Telemetry Measurements in Test Area 117 

MARSHMALLOW Event PHS Aerial Radiation Survey 

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 

MUDPACK Event Initial Radiation Survey Data . . . . 158 

Radiation Survey of Sleds - 18 February 1965 . . . . 171 

GUMDROP Event RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . . . . 182 

GUMDROP Event Telemetry Measurements Inside of 

Tunnel....................... 186 

GUMDROP Event Initial Tunnel Reentry Radiation 

Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 

Event-Day Preevent Experiment Preparations . . . . . 204 

DILUTED WATERS Event Initial Radiation Survey Data . 208 

TINY TOT Event Telemetry Measurements Underground . 222 

TINY TOT Event Initial Radiation Survey Data . . . . 227 

TINY TOT Event Cavity Radiation Readings . . . . . . 231 

18 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The first United States nuclear detonation designed to be 

fully contained underground was the RAINIER tunnel event conducted in Nevada on 19 September 1957. This was a weapons 

development experiment with a relatively low yield of 1.7 kilotons (kt). The second tunnel event was a safety experiment on 22 

February 1958 also conducted in Nevada. This experiment, the 

VENUS event, resulted in a yield less than one ton. These two 

tests were the beginning of a United States underground program 

that is currently the only method of testing permitted by treaty. 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

While technical conferences between the United States and 

the Soviet Union on banning nuclear detonation tests continued, 

and concern regarding further increases in worldwide fallout 

mounted, a number of nuclear tests were conducted underground 

during 1958 in Nevada. Prior to the United States testing moratorium, six safety experiments in shafts, five safety experiments 

in tunnels, and four weapons development tests in tunnels were 

conducted. 

However, radioactive products from several of these tests 

were not completely contained underground. Containment of nuclear detonations was a new engineering challenge. Fully understanding and solving containment problems would require years of 

underground testing experience. 

When the United States resumed testing 15 September 1961, 32 

of the first 33 test events were underground and the other was a 

19 
cratering experiment with the device emplaced 110 feet below the 

surface. The DOMINIC I test series in the Pacific and the 

DOMINIC II test series in Nevada during 1962 were the last atmospheric nuclear detonation tests by the United States. 

The commitment of the United States to reduce levels of 

worldwide fallout by refraining from conducting nuclear tests in 

the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater was finalized when 

the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 5 

August 1963. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES 

The majority of United States underground tests have been 

for weapons development purposes. New designs were tested to 

improve efficiency and deliverability characteristics of nuclear 

explosive devices before they entered the military stockpile as 

components of nuclear weapons. 

Safety experiments with nuclear devices were conducted in 

addition to weapons development tests. These experiments tested 

nuclear devices by simulating detonation of the conventional high 

explosives in a manner which might occur in an accident during 

transportation or storage of weapons. 

Weapons effects tests utilized device types equivalent to 

weapons, or actually to be used in weapons, to determine the 

effects of weapon detonations on structures, materials, and 

equipment. The devices generally were provided by one of the 

weapons development laboratories. However, the DOD sponsored 

weapons effects tests, and such tests usually involved greater 

numbers of participants and were more complex than the other 

categories of tests previously mentioned. 

20 
Effects of shock waves on rock formations, buildings, other 

structures, materials, and equipment have been tested. Effects 

of other detonation characteristics such as heat and radiation 

have been studied in the same manner. The most complex weapons 

effects tests have been those simulating high altitude detonations by using very large evacuated pipes hundreds of feet in 

length containing experiments. 

1.3 TEST EVENTS IN THIS VOLUME 

Weapons effects tests conducted from 15 February 1962 to 17 

June 1965 during Operation NOUGAT and Operation WHETSTONE are 

discussed in this volume. Test events and objectives are listed 

below. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

HARD HAT, 15 February 1962, to test capability of underground structures to withstand strong motions generated 

by an underground nuclear detonation in hard rock. 

DANNY BOY, 5 March 1962, to produce information on cratering mechanism, ground shock, earth motion, propagation of energy, and other effects related to a cratering-type nuclear detonation in basalt. 

MARSHMALLOW, 28 June 1962, to study effects of a nuclear 

detonation environment on equipment and materials at a 

simulated high altitude. 

MUDPACK, 16 December 1964, to obtain information concerning ground shock. 

WISHBONE, 18 February 1965, to determine response of 

equipment and materials in a nuclear detonation environment. 

21 
6. GUMDROP, 21 April 1965, to investigate response of 

equipment and materials to a nuclear detonation environment. 

7. DILUTED WATERS, 16 June 1965, to provide information on 

response of equipment and materials in a nuclear detonation environment. 

a. TINY TOT, 17 June 1965, to obtain information on transmission of ground shock from a nuclear detonation on a 

rock surface within an underground cavity. 

1.4 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Administering the underground nuclear testing program at NTS 

was a joint AEC-DOD responsibility. The parallel nature of the 

AEC-DOD organizational structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 

1.4.1 Responsibilities of the Defense Atomic Support Agency 

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was activated on 1 January 1947 (when the Atomic Energy Commission was 

activated) to assume residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer 

District. The DOD nuclear weapons testing organization was within AFSWP until 1959 when AFSWP became the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA).* The responsibilities of Headquarters, DASA, in 

Washington, DC, included providing consolidated management and 

direction for the DOD nuclear weapons effects and nuclear weapons 

testing program. The techncial direction and coordination of DOD 

nuclear weapons testing activities was delegated to Field 

Command, DASA (FCDASA), headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

*DASA became the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) on 3 November 1971. 

22 
r 

1 Mlllm-y 

AEC Llalson 

Commissioners CommItlee 

--_-------- 

I 

Secrerav 

Of 

Defense 

Commander. 

Field Command, 

DASA 

___----__-- 

- Command 

--_ Liduon and COordinarlon 

Figure 1.1 Federal Government Structure for Continental 

Nuclear Tests (During 1962) 

23 
The responsibilities of FCDASA in 1962 regarding DOD nuclear 

weapons 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

testing activities were: 

exercising technical direction of nuclear weapons effects tests of primary concern to the Armed Forces and 

the weapons effects phases of developmental or other 

tests of nuclear weapons involving detonations within 

the continental United States and overseas; 

coordinating and supporting all DOD activities and assisting in the support of the AEC in the conduct of 

joint tests involving nuclear detonations within the 

continental United States; 

completing detailed plans, preparing for and conducting 

the technical programs, and assisting in the preparation 

of technical and operational reports on tests; and 

coordinating military operational training, troop participation, the troop observer program, and the DOD aspects of official visitor and public information programs. (Underground testing did not include troop participation and troop observers. The official visitor and 

public information programs were integrated with the AEC 

organization during joint AEC-DOD continental tests). 

These missions were accomplished for DOD underground nuclear 

tests through the Field Command Weapons Effects and Tests Group 

(FCWT) and its Continental Test Organization (CTO). 

The FCWT testing organization included Task Unit 8.1.3 for 

Pacific operations; administrative operations at Sandia Base in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico; and operations at the Nevada Test Site. 

The CT0 conducted DOD underground nuclear tests in conjunction 

with the AEC weapons development laboratory test groups. 

24 
1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization 

In the joint AEC-DOD testing program, FCWT and CT0 were a 

part of the Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) as shown in 

Figure 1.2. The Military Deputy to the Test Manager was the 

Deputy Chief of Staff, FCWT, and FCWT personnel provided DOD 

coordination and support. 

CT0 was a Test Group along with Los Alamos Scientific 

Laboratory (LASL), Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (LRL), Sandia 

Corporation (SC), and Civil Effects Test Organization (CETO). 

The CT0 is shown in Figure 1.3. In addition to his position as 

Military Deputy to the Test Manager, the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

FCWT, also was the CT0 Test Group Director. 

The Programs Division was responsible for scientific 

programs conducted by the CTO. Engineering and construction of 

test facilities and experiment installations were administered by 

the Support Division. The Operations Division was responsible 

for preparing technical and operations plans, and coordinating 

air support operations with the Air Force Special Weapons Center 

(AFSWC), the Tactical Air Command, and the AEC. 

1.4.3 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support 

The commander of AFSWC was requested by FCDASA to provide 

air support to the NTSO during nuclear tests at NTS. Direct 

support was provided by the Nuclear Test Directorate, the Special 

Projects Division, and the 4900th Air Base Group of AFSWC. The 

4900th Air Base Group provided C-47 aircraft for shuttle service 

between Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and Indian Springs AFB (ISAFB). 

The 4900th also provided U-3A aircraft and crews to perform lowaltitude cloud tracking, and C-47 aircraft and crews for radio 

relay and courier missions. 

25 
Test Manager 

. Deputy Test hlanager 

Military Deputy 

Advisory 

Panel 

_ Predlction 

Group 

-_I___- 1 -L-1 

Aamlnistrative 

Staff 

Test 

information 

Staff 

Liaison Technical 

Staff Stati 

I 

I 

Technical 

support 

Agencies 

I 

Engineering AEC DOD 

and supporr support 

Construction Division Division 

4 c 

Figure 1.2 Nevada Test Site Organization (In 1962) 

--- Ccmand 

_--- Liaison and Coordination 

26 
I Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Weapons Elfccls Tests 

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Weapons Effects Tests 

Technical 

Information 

Branch 

Operations 

Division 

Programs 

Division 

I 

I 7 

Support 

Division 

Chaplain 

Medical 

Section 

I I I I I I I 

Program 1 Program 2 Program 3 Program 4 Program 5 Program 6 Program 7 Program 8 

, I 

Figure 1.3 Continental Test Organization (In 1962) 
Other Air Force organizations providing support to the NTSO 

under AFSWC control on a temporary basis were as follows: 

1. Elements of the 1211th Test Squadron (Sampling), Military Air Transport Service, McClellan AFB, were detached 

to ISAFB. Their primary task was cloud sampling. This 

included maintaining the B-57 sampling aircraft, conducting cloud sampling, removing sample filters, and 

packaging and loading samples onto courier aircraft. 

Personnel from this unit also assisted NTSO radiological 

safety personnel in providing support at ISAFB, including decontamination of aircraft, crews, and equipment. 

2. Elements of the 4520th Combat Crew Training Wing, Tactical Air Command, Nellis AFB, provided support functions, 

such as housing, food, and logistics, to the units operating from ISAFB and Nellis AFB. In addition, they conducted security sweep flights over NTS, and control tower operations, fire-fighting, and crash rescue services 

at ISAFB. They also maintained and provided equipment 

for the helicopter pad at the NTS Control Point and 

other helicopter pads at Forward Control Points. 

3. The 55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Military Air 

Transport Service, McClellan AFB, supplied one aircraft 

and a crew to perform high-altitude cloud tracking. 

4. The Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems 

Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, provided aircraft and 

crews to perform technical projects. 

Complete Air Force support as described in this section was 

available for the DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, discussed in 

Chapter 4 of this report, and during the last atmospheric nuclear 

weapons tests at NTS in July 1962. As the DOD underground 

28 
testing program continued, and the probability of venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased, less cloud sampling 

and tracking support was required. However, air support for 

security sweeps of areas surrounding test locations and for 

photography missions during events was a continuing requirement. 

1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOD, THE AEC, AND CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS 

The DOD was responsible for establishing nuclear weapons 

criteria, developing and producing delivery vehicles, obtaining 

military effects data, and defending against nuclear attack. 

The AEC was responsible for development, production, and 

supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed Forces in quantities and 

types specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

association with the DOD, also was responsible 

field nuclear test facilities in the continental 

and overseas. 

. The AEC, in 

for providing 

United States 

1.5.1 The Weapons Test Division (STWT, DASA) and the Nevada 

Operations Office (AEC/NVOO) 

The principal points of field coordination between the AEC 

and the DOD were at Las Vegas and the Nevada Test Site. The 

STWT, DASA, represented the Director, DASA, and DOD: and the 

AEC/NVOO represented the AEC in the field for continental tests. 

Each of these organizations' primary interest was field testing 

of nuclear weapons. Daily close liaison was maintained between 

the STWT, DASA, and the AEC/NVOO during planning phases for field 

test programs of primary interest to the DOD. 

During test operations, military and AEC personnel were 

combined into a single test organization. Normally, the senior 

member of the combined test organization was the Manager, NVOO. 

29 
His deputy was the Director, Weapons Test Division, DASA. Other 

personnel in this joint test organization were selected from 

those available on a best-qualified basis. In accomplishing 

this, personnel were drawn not only from STWT and NV00 but from 

other agencies of DASA, the Armed Forces, military laboratories, 

military contractors, universities, civilian laboratories, AEC 

laboratories, AEC contractors, other government agencies, and 

from other sources when special qualifications or knowledge were 

required. 

The Nevada Test Site was an AEC installation. The Manager, 

NVOO, was responsible for operation of this installation. The 

DOD and AEC laboratories were the principal users of the Test 

Site. The Weapons Test Division, DASA, was the single military 

agency and point of contact for the Manager, NVOO, for all 

matters pertaining to DOD field test programs, and supported all 

DOD agencies operating at the Test Site. 

To accomplish these two major responsibilities, STWT, DASA, 

had an office, the Nevada Operations Branch (NOB), in the AEC 

Building in Las Vegas. The Nevada Operations Branch, STWT, DASA, 

maintained daily liaison with NV00 at the top management level on 

all DOD matters pertaining to field operations and had under its 

control the Nevada Test Site Section to support DOD agencies at 

the site. For DOD agencies, the office also provided a point of 

contact to assist in matters of interest with NV00 and to provide 

transportation and quarters in Las Vegas. All DOD personnel and 

DOD contractor personnel connected with nuclear field tests were 

under administrative control of this office while in Las Vegas 

and at the Nevada Test Site. 

The Nevada Test Site Section, with 47 permanently assigned 

personnel in 1962, coordinated DOD activities and supported DOD 

agencies operating at the Test Site. This section was located at 

the DOD Compound in Mercury (see section 1.5) and provided office 

30 
and laboratory space, transportation, test equipment, and logistical and administrative support. 

1.5.2 Test Organizations 

Before 1957, the Test Director for each series had been a 

representative of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. For the 

1957 PLUMBBOB series, a staff member of the Lawrence Radiation 

Laboratory was appointed to the position, reflecting the growing 

participation by the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in test operations. After 1961, the Test Director for events of primary interest to the DOD was an officer from one of the Services. The 

Test Director was responsible for overall coordination and scientific support for the entire scientific test program; for planning and coordination; and for positioning, arming, and detonating test devices. Generally, the AEC weapons laboratories provided the nuclear devices for DOD test events. 

Other officials of the joint test organization were responsible for various functions, such as logistical support, weather 

prediction, fallout prediction, blast prediction, air support, 

public information, radiological safety, industrial safety, 

fire'protection. 

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY was established early in 

1943 at Los Alamos, New Mexico, for the specific purpose of 

developing an atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists supervised the 

test detonation of the world's first atomic weapon in July 1945 

at the TRINITY site in New Mexico. The Laboratory's continuing 

assignment was to conceive, design, test, and develop nuclear 

components of atomic weapons. The Laboratory was operated by the 

University of California. 

and 

LAWRENCE RADIATION LABORATORY was established as a second 

AEC weapons laboratory at Livermore, California, in 1952. The 

31 
Laboratory's responsibilities were essentially parallel to those 

of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Devices developed by 

LRL were first tested in Nevada in 1953, and they have been 

tested in each continental and Pacific series since. The contract under which the LRL performed work for the AEC was administered by the Commission's San Francisco Operations Office. This 

Laboratory also was operated by the University of California. 

SANDIA LABORATORY (later Sandia Laboratories) at Sandia 

Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, was the AEC's other weapons laboratory. It was established in 1946 as a branch of the Los 

Alamos Scientific Laboratory, but in 1949 it assumed its identity 

as a full-fledged weapons research institution operated by the 

Sandia Corporation, a non-profit subsidiary of Western Electric. 

Sandia Laboratory's role was to conceive, design, test, and 

develop the non-nuclear phases of atomic weapons and to do other 

work in related fields. In 1956, a Livermore Branch of the Laboratory was established to provide closer support to developmental work of the LRL. Sandia Corporation also operated ballistic 

test facilities for the AEC at the Tonopah Ballistics Range near 

Tonopah, Nevada. 

DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY was located in Washington, 

D.C. and was composed of personnel of the Armed Services and 

civilian DOD employees. It was activated on 1 January 1947 to 

assume certain residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer 

District and to assure continuity of technical military interest 

in nuclear weapons. The broad mission of DASA was planning specified technical services to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps in the military application of nuclear energy. Among the 

services performed were maintaining liaison with the AEC laboratories in the development of nuclear weapons, planning and supervising the conduct of weapons effects tests and other field exercises, providing nuclear weapons training to military personnel, 

and storing and maintaining nuclear weapons. Early in the pro32 
gram for testing nuclear devices and weapons, DASA was charged 

with the responsibility for planning and integrating with the AEC 

for military participation in full scale tests. After the Nevada 

Test Site was activated, this planning responsibility was broadened to include conducting experimental programs of primary concern to the Armed Forces and coordinating other phases of military participation including assistance to the AEC. The Director, DASA, was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Weapons Test Division (STWT) at Sandia Base, New Mexico, 

carried out the weapon field testing responsibilities and seismic 

research responsibilities (VELA-UNIFORM) for the Director, DASA. 

This organization maintained close liaison with the AEC Nevada 

Operations Office. Personnel from the STWT became the military 

members of the Joint AEC-DOD test organization at the Nevada Test 

Site and other continental United States test areas. All participation of DOD agencies and their contractors in nuclear field 

tests was coordinated and supported by STWT. 

Nevada Operations Branch (NOB) located in Las Vegas, Nevada, 

maintained daily liaison with the AEC/NVOO, and supervised the 

STWT Test Site Section at the Nevada Test Site. In addition to 

the continental test responsibilities, STWT provided key personnel for the military scientific test unit, and managed the technical and scientific programs for DOD agencies and contractors 

during overseas tests. 

1.5.3 Support Contractors 

In keeping with its policy, the Atomic Energy Commission 

utilized private contractors for maintenance, operation, and 

construction (including military and civil defense construction) 

at the Nevada Test Site. Personnel of the Nevada Operations 

Office administered all housekeeping, construction, and related 

33 
services activity, but performance was by contractors. The major 

contractors were the following: 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company (REECo) was the 

principal AEC operational and support contractor for the NTS, 

performing community operations, housing, feeding, maintenance, 

construction, and scientific structures support services. REECo 

maintained offices in Las Vegas and extensive facilities at the 

NTS. 

Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., (EG&G) of Boston, 

Massachusetts, was the principal technical contractor, providing 

control point functions such as timing and firing, and diagnostic 

functions such as scientific photography and measurement of 

detonation characteristics. EG&G facilities were maintained in 

Las Vegas and at the NTS. 

Holmes & Narver, Inc., (H&N) performed architect-engineer 

services for the NTS and was the principal support contractor for 

the Commission's off-continent operations. H&N had a home office 

in Los Angeles, and also maintained offices in Las Vegas and at 

the NTS. 

Fenix & Scisson (F&S) of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was the consultant 

for NTS drilling activities. 

Numerous other contractors, selected on the basis of lumpsum competitive bids, performed various construction and other 

support functions for the AEC and the DOD. 

1.6 THE NEVADA TEST SITE 

An on-continent location was selected for conducting nuclear 

weapons tests: construction began at the Nevada Proving Ground 

34 
(NPG) in December 1950; and testing began in January 1951. This 

testing area was renamed the Nevada Test Site in 1955. 

The original NPG boundaries were expanded as new projects 

and testing areas were added. Figure 1.4 shows the present NTS 

location bounded on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Range. 

The area of NTS is about 1,350 square miles. The testing location was selected for both safety and security reasons. The arid 

climate, lack of industrialization, and exclusion of the public 

from Nellis Air Force Range combined to result in a very low population density in the area around the NTS. 

The only paved roads within the NTS and Air Force Range complex were those constructed by the government for access purposes. The NTS testing areas were physically protected by surrounding rugged topography. The few mountain passes and dry 

washes where four-wheel-drive vehicles might enter were posted 

with warning signs and barricades. NTS security force personnel 

patrolled perimeter and barricade areas in aircraft and vehicles. 

Thus, unauthorized entry to NTS was difficult, and the possibility of a member of the public inadvertently entering an NTS testing area was extremely remote. 

Figure 1.5 shows the NTS, its various area designations, and 

locations of the eight test events covered by this volume. Generally, the "U" means an underground location, the number the 

area, and the "a" the first test location in an area. In addition, for underground tunnels, the "a.02" indicates the second 

drift in a tunnel complex, as U16a.02 in Figure 1.5. A low mountain range separates the base camp, Mercury, from the location of 

early DOD atmospheric weapons effects tests on Frenchman Flat in 

Area 5. A few shaft-type underground tests also were conducted 

in this area. The elevation of Frenchman Dry Lake in the middle 

of the Flat is about 3,100 feet. 

35 
\ 

\ 

. NELLIS AIR FORCE RASGE 

MAP ARf 

‘\ WELLS 

Figure 1.4 Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada 

35 
DANNY SOY (LsSd s-i 

1 I 

: 

-__ 

MARSHMALLOW (U16a 

GUMDROP (U18f~O2) 

I_ 

_.--_--- ___ - 

AREA 4od 

I AREA 401 

. /!I 

WISHbONE 

/ qJ5a) 

AREd i VREAIP I 

I_-_~____-_‘-- ----- -k 

I 

Figure 1.5 The Nevada Test Site 

37 
A mountain pass separates Frenchman Flat from Yucca Flat 

testing areas. The pass overlooks both Frenchman and Yucca Flats 

and contains the control point complex of buildings including 

Control Point Building 1 (CP-1) where timing and firing for most 

atmospheric tests was performed, and Control Point Building 2 

(CP-2) where radiological safety support was based. 

Yucca Flat testing areas include Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 

and 10. Underground tests have been conducted in some of these 

areas and generally were shaft emplacement types. The elevation 

of Yucca Dry Lake at the south end of Yucca Flat is about 4,300 

feet. To the west of Yucca Flat, in another basin, is the Area 

18 testing location. Some DOD atmospheric tests were conducted 

in Area 18, and one DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted 

on Buckboard Mesa in this area at an elevation of about 5,500 

feet. Area 16 is in the mountains west of Yucca Flat toward Area 

18. The single Area 16 tunnel complex at an elevation of about 

5,400 feet was a DOD underground testing location. 

Rainier Mesa is in Area 12 northwest of Yucca Flat, and the 

top of the Mesa is at an elevation of about 7,500 feet. All tunnel-emplacement type events on NTS that were not in the Area 16 

tunnel complex or the Area 15 shaft and tunnel complex were in 

Rainier Mesa. The major Rainier Mesa tunnel complexes were B, E, 

G, N, and T tunnels. 

Area 15 is in the foothills at the north end of Yucca Flat. 

An access shaft drops 1,500 feet below the surface elevation of 

5,100 feet. Two DOD events were conducted in Area 15 during the 

period covered by this report. The first detonation was in an 

emplacement shaft drilled north of an access shaft and instrumentation tunnel complex. The other detonation was at the end of a 

tunnel constructed from another access shaft. 

38 
CHAPTER 2 

UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

Underground tests conducted at NTS prior to 15 February 1962 

primarily were for weapons development or safety experiment purposes. The experience gained contributed substantially to the 

DOD weapons effects underground testing program. However, these 

later DOD underground tests generally were of greater complexity 

than previous underground tests. Also, a number of technical 

problems remained to be solved. 

Obtaining satisfactory test data was an important objective, 

but equally important was the objective of assuring safety of 

test participants and the public. This chapter discusses underground testing methods, problems encountered, and safety procedures used during DOD underground weapons effects tests conducted 

from 15 February 1962 to 17 June 1965. 

2.1 EMPLACEMENT TYPES 

The DOD conducted eight underground nuclear test events during this period. Table 2.1 lists these events and pertinent data 

including emplacement type. There were four shaft, one crater, 

and three tunnel types. Each of these is discussed in this 

section. 

2.1.1 Shaft-Type 

A shaft-type nuclear detonation is intended to be contained 

underground. The shaft is usually drilled, but sometimes mined, 

and it may be lined with a steel casing or be uncased. The nuclear device is emplaced at a depth established to contain the 

explosion. This depth also is selected to allow formation of a 

39 
TABLE 2.1 

DOD TEST EVENTS 

15 FEBRUARY 1962 - 17 JUNE 1965 

DATE 

LOCAL TIME 

(hours> 

15 FEE 62 5 MAR 62 28 JUN 62 I6 DEC 64 I8 FEE 65 21 APR 65 I6 JUN 65 17 JUN 65 

1000 PST 1015 PST 1000 PDT 1210 PST 0819 PST 1400 PST 0930 PDT 1000 PDT 

VTS LOCATION ARtA I5 AREA 18 AREA I6 AREA IO AREA 5 AREA 16 AREA 5 AREA 15 

TYPE SHAFT CRATER TUNNEL SHAFT SHAFT TUNNEL SHAFT TUNNEL 

DEPTH (feet) 943 II0 1000 500 600 834 640 364 

fIELD (kilotons) 5.7 0.43 Low* 2.7 LOW* LOWS Low* LOW, 

*LOW INDICATES LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS 

40 
subsidence crater. At detonation time, a cavity is formed by vaporized rock under pressure which holds surrounding broken rock 

in place until the cavity cools sufficiently to decrease pressure. As broken rock falls into the cavity formed by the detonation, the chimney of falling rock reaches the surface and a subsidence crater forms. Figure 2.1 shows a typical subsidence crater and postevent drilling operation. 

2.1.2 Crater-Type 

A crater-type nuclear detonation is intended to produce a 

crater excavated by the nuclear explosion. The nuclear device is 

emplaced in a shaft at a depth calculated to allow the explosion 

to eject broken rock from the crater. Some of the material ejected from the crater falls back, resulting in a shallower crater 

than the original depth of emplacement, and trapping much of the 

residual radioactivity underground. Figure 2.2 shows the DANNY 

BOY excavation crater discussed in Chapter 4. 

2.1.3 Tunnel-Type 

A tunnel-type nuclear detonation is intended to be completely contained. The nuclear device is emplaced in a mined opening 

at a depth which usually does not allow chimneying of broken rock 

to the surface. A tunnel emplacement may be at the end of a 

single horizontal tunnel into a mountain or mesa, in one tunnel 

of a complex of horizontal tunnels used for experiments and other 

nuclear detonations, in a horizontal tunnel from the bottom of a 

vertical shaft, or in an opening of variable size and shape mined 

from a tunnel or the bottom of a shaft. Figure 2.3 shows the 

portal of a typical DOD tunnel complex. 

2.2 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES 

The major advantage of underground testing was containment 

41 



of radioactive material. One of the major disadvantages was increased difficulty in determining characteristics of a detonation. Photographing a fireball growing in the atmosphere was no 

longer possible. Samples of a radioactive cloud for analysis no 

longer could be obtained by sampling aircraft. Measurements of 

thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and blast were complicated 

by the confining underground structures. These disadvantages 

were overcome by developing new diagnostic techniques, some of 

which are discussed below. 

2.2.1 Radiation Measurements 

Measurements of radiations from an underground detonation 

were made possible by developing a system of remote detectors and 

cabling to send signals to recording facilities located on the 

surface. Detectors utilizing various physical characteristics of 

the radiations to be measured were installed near the nuclear device. High-specification coaxial cable and connectors carried 

the measurement signals to the surface where electronic equipment 

recorded the signals. 

The detector signals were on the way to recording equipment 

in billionths of a second after a detonation, before detectors 

were destroyed. These measurement systems required the most advanced electronic technology available. Indeed, considerable 

research and development was necessary to acquire and refine 

these capabilities. 

2.2.2 Radiochemical Measurements 

Because clouds from atmospheric detonations no longer were 

available to sample, techniques were developed to obtain samples 

of debris from underground detonations for radiochemical analyses 

and subsequent yield determinations. The first systems were radiochemical sampling pipes leading directly from the device em45 
placements to filtering equipment on the surface. These pipes 

required fast-closure systems to prevent overpressure from venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere after samples were 

collected. 

While these systems functioned as intended for most detonations, the systems did not function properly during some tests, 

and radioactive effluent was released to the atmosphere. Subsequently, the use of radiochemical sampling pipes to the surface 

was discontinued. 

The major radiochemistry sampling method which continued in 

use for shaft detonations was postevent core drilling. The objective of this drilling was to obtain samples of solidified 

radioactive debris which had collected in a molten pool at the 

bottom of the cavity produced by the detonation. This method required and resulted in development of precise directional drilling techniques and several advancements in the science of core 

drilling. 

2.2.3 Line-of-Sight (LOS) Pipes 

Most of the DOD shaft-type detonations included LOS pipes 

from the device emplacement to the surface. These pipes allowed 

effects experiments to be conducted as well as measurement of radiations from the detonations. 

However, the LOS pipes to the surface required fast-closure 

systems as did the radiochemical sampling pipes, and use of LOS 

pipes to the surface also resulted in some releases of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere. Thus, the frequency of DOD 

shaft-type events, including use of these pipes to the surface, 

decreased, but the use of horizontal LOS pipes in underground 

tunnel complexes became frequent and a valuable weapons effects 

testing system. 

46 
2.3 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS 

Weapons effects experiments were the primary reason for conducting DOD underground nuclear detonations. The effects of 

blast, heat, and radiation from a nuclear detonation in the atmosphere had been studied extensively. Structures, equipment, 

and materials had been exposed to atmospheric detonations, and 

military hardware also had been exposed to underwater detonations. Underground testing provided an opportunity to study 

effects of ground shock and motion, and, of particular importance, the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials at a simulated high altitude. 

The simulation of a high-altitude detonation was made possible by enlargement and improvement of the LOS pipe system discussed in section 2.2.3. Large-diameter pipes hundreds of feet 

long were constructed underground. The device was emplaced at 

the end of the pipe. An access tunnel sometimes was constructed 

parallel to the LOS tunnel, and short tunnels connected the two 

at intervals. Hatches allowed access to the LOS pipe and sealing 

of the pipe. Equipment and materials were installed at locations 

within the LOS pipe. The atmosphere in the LOS pipe was reduced 

in pressure by vacuum pumps, to simulate a high altitude, before 

the detonation. Thus, testing of weapons effects was extended 

from atmospheric and underwater to underground and at simulated 

high altitudes. 

2.4 CONTAINMENT FEATURES AND PROBLEMS 

Completely containing radioactive material underground while 

accomplishing diagnostic measurements and effects tests proved to 

be a major engineering challenge. Original efforts considered 

only detonation containment in competent rock formations. It was 

necessary to modify the original efforts to consider zones of 

47 
weakness in rock caused by faults and containment failures caused 

by diagnostic and experiment structures. In addition, decreased 

compressibility of rock caused by high water content with subsequent greater ground motion and stress toward the surface caused 

containment failure. Failures also were caused by unanticipated 

additional overpressure of secondary gas expansion or steam pressure. The major containment features and problems that evolved 

are discussed below. 

2.4.1 Shaft Containment 

Some of the first shaft-type safety experiments were in open 

shafts. When nuclear yields were produced, open shafts did 

little to contain the radioactive debris. The first method used 

to contain detonations in shafts was stemming, or filling the 

shaft with aggregate and sand after device emplacement. Later, 

stemming was used that had ground-matching characteristics, such 

as transmission of shock waves and other properties that would 

not contribute to containment failure. 

Keyed concrete plugs at different depths in the shaft stemming sometimes were used. The shaft diameter was enlarged at the 

plug construction location so the poured concrete plug would key 

into the ground surrounding the shaft and provide more strength 

against containment failure. Combinations of concrete and epoxy 

were used later, and epoxy has replaced concrete as a plug material for some shaft-type emplacements. 

Radiochemical sampling pipes, LOS pipes, and other openings 

in stemming and plug containment features had to be closed rapidly after the detonation to prevent venting of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere. Fast-gate closure systems driven by 

high explosives or compressed air were developed to seal openings. After some of these systems did not prevent releases of 

effluent to the atmosphere, use of openings to the surface for 

48 
diagnostic or experiment purposes was discontinued for several 

years until technology improved. 

Scientific and other cables from the device emplacement to 

the surface were another source of containment problems. While 

cables could be imbedded in concrete and epoxy, which effectively 

prevented leakage along the outside of the cables, radioactive 

gases under high pressure traveled along the inside of cables as 

a conduit to the surface. This problem was solved by imbedding 

the inner components of cables in epoxy at convenient locations 

or intervals, such as at connectors, in a technique called gas 

blocking. 

The most serious containment problems were caused by unanticipated geologic and hydrologic conditions at particular test locations. Even careful and rigorous calculations, engineering, 

construction, and preparations were inadequate when the presence 

of a geologic zone of weakness near the detonation point and toward the surface was unknown. 

Another similar problem was the presence of higher water 

content than anticipated in rock formations surrounding or near 

the detonation point. This problem caused (1) greater shock 

transmission and ground movement by decreasing rock compressibility, (2) additional secondary gas expansion when the water 

turned to steam, (3) a much higher and longer-sustained pressure 

from the detonation point toward the surface, and (4) subsequent 

failure of the geologic or constructed containment mechanisms. 

Recognizing and understanding geologic and hydrologic conditions at each test location was necessary before these containment problems could be solved. As additional information became 

available through drilling and intensive geologic studies, these 

problems were resolved by investigations of proposed detonation 

locations and application of detailed site selection criteria. 

49 
2.4.2 Tunnel Containment 

As with shaft-type detonations, containment methods used for 

tunnel events were designed using basic characteristics of the 

nuclear detonation. Tunnel configurations were constructed with 

device emplacements strategically located to cause sealing of the 

access tunnel by force of the detonation. Additional containment 

features were used to contain radioactive debris. 

A short distance from the projected self-sealing location 

toward the tunnel entrance (portal), one or more sandbag plugs 

were installed. Two plugs, each about 60 feet in length, were a 

typical installation. Farther toward the portal, and before 

entering the main tunnel in a complex with more than one test 

location, a keyed concrete plug with a metal blast door was constructed. The blast door was designed to contain any gases, with 

pressures up to 75 pounds per square inch (psi), that might penetrate the plugs. 

Also as with shaft-type detonations, the unknown presence of 

undesirable geologic and hydrologic conditions sometimes caused 

venting of radioactive effluent either through the overburden 

(ground above the tunnel) to the surface, through fissures opened 

between the detonation point and the main tunnel, or through the 

plugs and blast door to the main tunnel vent holes and portal. 

More substantial containment features evolved as containment 

problems became better understood and tunnel events became more 

complex. 

Generally, the sandbag plugs became solid sand backfill hundreds of feet long, and the blast door evolved into a massive 

overburden (equivalent) plug separating the test location tunnels 

from the main tunnel. The plug typically was 20 to 30 feet of 

keyed concrete with a large steel door containing a smaller ac50 
cess hatch, and was designed to withstand overpressure up to 1000 

psi. 

Use of the LOS pipe in tunnel events necessitated development of additional containment and closure systems. The LOS pipe 

tunnel and its access tunnels were separated from the main tunnel 

by the overburden plug. Additional containment and closure 

systems were for protection of the LOS pipe and its experiments 

as well as preventing release of effluent to the surface. 

Generally, the tunnel volume outside of the pipe was filled 

with stemming, grouting, or by other means to facilitate containment, while the inside of the pipe and its experiments were protected by fast-closure systems. Various systems were in use 

including compressed air or explosive-driven gates and doors 

which closed off the LOS pipe from the detonation within a small 

fraction of a second after detonation time. 

The same gas blocking techniques as used in shaft events 

were used to prevent leakage of radioactive gases along or 

through cables from the diagnostic and experiment locations to 

the surface. Additionally, a gas seal door usually was installed 

in the main drift nearer the portal than the overburden plug. 

Utility pipes, such as for compressed air, that passed through 

stemming and plugs also were sealed by closure systems. 

Containment systems evolved to the point that release of 

detectable radioactivity to the atmosphere seldom occurred. 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 

Access to underground workings and drilling sites was controllcil for a number of reasons. During construction, safety of 

both workers and visitors in these locations could have been 

51 
jeopardized by carelessness or seemingly harmless activities of 

untrained and uncontrolled visitors. When security-classified 

material was in these locations, only personnel with appropriate 

security clearances were permitted access. The presence, or anticipated presence, of radioactive material in these locations 

required access control for radiological safety purposes. Access 

requirements established for the above purposes are discussed 

below. 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control 

During construction and preparations for a DOD event in a 

tunnel or other underground working, the tunnel superintendent 

was responsible to the project manager for safety of personnel 

underground. All persons going underground, or the supervisors 

of working groups, were required to enter appropriate information 

in the tunnel log book. Visitors and other personnel not 

assigned to work in the tunnel obtained permission for entry from 

the superintendent, or his representative, and were apprised of 

tunnel conditions and safety regulations. In the event of an 

accident or other emergency condition underground, the log book 

provided information on numbers of personnel and their locations 

underground. 

When classified material was in the tunnel, and during initial reentry after an event, the DOD Test Group Director, or his 

representative, was responsible for entry and safety of personnel 

underground. Security personnel checked for proper security and 

entry clearances, and maintained records of all personnel entering the tunnel. 

Control of tunnel access reverted to tunnel management personnel after tunnel reentry and recoveries. Entry procedures and 

use of the tunnel log book were then as discussed above. 

52 
Additional access controls were instituted for radiological 

safety purposes after an event or during construction and event 

preparations when radioactivity from a previous event could be 

encountered. Part or all of a tunnel complex would be established as a radiation exclusion (radex) area. 

All persons entering radex areas were logged on Area Access 

Registers by radiological safety personnel. Names and organizations represented were listed. Radiation exposures for the year 

were listed upon entry and added to with self-reading pocket 

dosimeter measurements upon exit. This was to assure that personnel approaching radiation exposure guide limits would not be 

allowed to enter radex areas and accumulate exposures above guide 

amounts. 

Before entry, personnel were dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection as needed for the particular 

radiological conditions in the tunnel. Upon exit, anticontamination clothing was removed, personnel were monitored for radioactive contamination, and decontamination was accomplished, if 

necessary. 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control 

Access to drilling areas was controlled by the drilling superintendent and the DOD Test Group Director for the same reasons 

as controlling access to underground workings. During drilling 

of an emplacement shaft, and during postevent drillback operations to recover radioactive core samples, personnel safety and 

compliance with safety regulations were emphasized continuously. 

During preevent drilling activities, all visitors were 

required to contact the drilling superintendent before entry to 

the drilling site. Names of visitors and purposes of visits were 

entered in the daily drilling report, and it was assured that vi53 
sitors had hard hats and understood safety regulations. 

When classified materials, including the nuclear device, 

were brought into the area for emplacement, the DOD Test Group 

Director controlled access to the area with assistance from security force personnel as in similar tunnel operations. After the 

event, when the drill site was a radex area, during classified 

material removal, or during postevent drilling, both security and 

radiological safety access controls were in effect as discussed 

under Tunnel Access Control. 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 

Implementation of an effective industrial safety program was 

an important part of any heavy construction operation. Mining 

and drilling operations had a particularly high accident potential. These operations at the NTS involved additional safety 

problems resulting from detonation-induced unstable ground conditions and potential for encountering toxic gases and mixtures, 

and radioactivity. 

Tens of miles of underground workings were constructed. More 

depth of big holes (three-foot diameter or larger) were drilled 

than the total drilled in the rest of the world. Directional and 

core drilling to recover radioactive debris samples after underground nuclear detonations advanced the science of these drilling 

techniques. These operations were accomplished under unusual 

conditions with accompanying difficult safety problems. 

However, the lost-time accident frequency for the NTS support contractor employing most of the NTS personnel (REECO) was 

only one-tenth of the frequency for the heavy construction industry at large (as determined by annual surveys and reports for 

300 heavy construction corporations). This excellent safety 

54 
record was attained by continuing attention to indoctrinating and 

training NTS personnel, investigating and determining causes of 

accidents at the NTS, implementing and enforcing safety regulations, and, most important, maintaining the safety awareness of 

NTS personnel. 

This was a joint effort by the DOE and DNA, and their predecessors, and by the many other government agencies and contractors at the NTS. Administered by REECo, the safety program enjoined all NTS personnel to conduct operations safely, and was 

exemplified by the signs on the portal of a typical DOD tunnel 

complex as shown in Figure 2.3, including "Safety With Production 

Is Our Goal." 

The safety procedures for all NTS operations are voluminous 

and cannot be included in this report. Appendix C of this report 

is an example of pertinent safety procedures; General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department of Defense and Sandia Laboratory 

Tests. As these procedures indicate, several aspects of industrial safety are interrelated. Information on monitoring levels 

of radioactivity and personnel exposures to radiation is presented in the next section, 2.7 Radiological Safety Procedures. 

Monitoring of toxic gases and explosive mixtures was an 

important aspect of safety in underground workings, on drill 

rigs, and in drillhole cellars (enlarged first part of drillhole 

for valving and other equipment). Toxic gases and explosive 

mixtures were created by both the nuclear detonations and the 

mining and drilling operations. The Draeger multi-gas detector 

and the MSA explosimeter were used to detect such gases. The 

Fyrite or J&W oxygen indicators were used to determine the oxygen 

content of the working atmosphere. Requirements were that tunnel 

and drill rig breathing atmosphere contain at least 19.5 percent 

oxygen. During the period covered by this volume, it was 

required that breathing air contain less than the following 

55 
levels of toxic gases and explosive mixtures: 

Gases Maximum Concentration 

Carbon monoxide, CO 

Carbon dioxide, CO2 

Nitric oxide plus 

nitrogen dioxide, NO + NO2 

Nitrogen dioxide, NO2 

Explosive mixtures 

50 ppm 

5000 ppm 

25 ppm 

5 ppm 

10% of LEL (lower 

explosive limit) 

Procedures for controlling explosive mixtures and toxic 

gases after each test event are discussed in event chapters as 

appropriate. 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES 

Procedures were developed in an effort to evaluate radiological, toxic, and other hazards, and protect workers and the 

public from unnecessary exposures. The following were primary 

written procedures and implementation methods used at the NTS 

from 1962 through 1965. 

2.7.1 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Nevada 

tion - Standard Operating Procedure, 

logical Safety 

Chapter 0524, which appears as Appendi x D to this volume, 

Test Site OrganizaChapter 0524, Radiodefined responsibility, and established criteria and general 

procedures for radiological safety associated with NTS programs. 

Some but not all of the major areas discussed are film badge procedures, radiation surveys, entry into controlled areas and radiation exposure guides. Roles of the onsite REECo Radiological 

56 
Safety Division (Radsafe) and the offsite United States Public 

Health Service (PHS) also are defined in NTSO-SOP Chapter 0524. 

2.7.2 Standard Operating Procedures for the Radiological Safety 

Division, REECo, dated January 1961 

These procedures were prepared to address in more detail the 

radsafe aspects discussed in the latest revision of NTSO-SOP 

Chapter 0524. The same major areas were discussed but in a more 

specific manner. 

2.7.3 REECo Radiological Safety Division Information Bulletins 

The Information Bulletins were formalized instructions for 

performing specific radiological safety and industrial hygiene 

tasks. They defined a situation, delineated responsibility, and 

described methods to be used in performing the task. 

2.7.4 Detailed procedures as outlined in REECo Radiological 

Safety Division Branch Operating Guides 

These were informal internal procedures written to address a 

particular known or anticipated operational activity. 

2.7.5 Implementation of radiological procedures required equipment, devices, and capabilities for monitoring radiation levels 

in the environment, and monitoring external and internal exposures of personnel. 

Equipment and devices used for these purposes, and necessary 

capabilities were as follows: 

A. Portable Radiation Detection Equipment 

Eberline PAC 3G (alpha) 

57 
Eberline PAC 1SA (alpha) 

Technical Associates Juno SR-3 (medium range alpha, 

beta, gamma) 

Floor Monitor (alpha) 

Floor Monitor (low range beta, gamma) 

Portal Monitors (low range beta, gamma) 

Beckman MX-5 (low range beta, gamma) 

Eberline E-112 (low range beta, gamma) 

Precision 111 (low range gamma) 

Eberline E-500 (high range gamma) 

Victoreen Radector (high range gamma) 

Jordan AGB 10 KG SR Rad Gun (high range gamma) 

uw-1, underwater (gamma) 

Gateway Monitor (gamma alarm) 

Nuclear-Chicago 2715 Nemo (neutron) 

PNC-1 (neutron) 

FN-la (fast neutron) 

B. Air Sampling Equipment 

High-volume air samplers (Staplex) 

Low-volume air samplers (Gelman) 

Continuous and sequential samplers 

Fallout and resuspension trays 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability 

The radiological safety laboratory analyzed air, soil, 

water, surface swipe, fallout tray, nasal swab, urine, 

and wound swab samples for some or all of the following 

activities: gross alpha and beta, gross fission products, tritium, strontium-90, plutonium-239, and spectrographic analysis of specific gamma-emitting radionuclides. The laboratory also analyzed some of the 

above samples for nonradioactive materials, such as be58 
ryllium, through use of an emission spectrograph and by 

wet chemistry procedures. A spectrophotometer was used 

to analyze other materials. 

D. Monitoring of Personnel Exposures 

A DuPont type 301-4 film packet with a type 508 low 

range component and a type 834 high range component was 

used as the personnel dosimeter of record. Ranges of 

the two components were 30 mR to 10 R, and 10 R to 1000 

R, respectively. The packet was wrapped with a 28-milthick lead strip covering an area one-half inch by one 

inch on each side. 

The packet was in a four-mil-thick plastic bag. A 

colored tape across the top of the bag indicated validity for a given month. The bag was attached to the 

security badge with a clip, and security guards assured 

that all personnel entering NTS wore a valid film dosimeter. Film badges were exchanged routinely each month 

for all individuals, and upon exit from a radex area 

when it was suspected that an individual had received 

100 mR or more of exposure. 

Personnel entering radex areas also were issued selfreading pocket dosimeters which indicated accumulated 

exposure upon exit. Pocket dosimeter readings were 

entered on Area Access Registers and added to yearly and 

quarterly accumulated exposures from the automated daily 

NTS radiation exposure report. Pocket dosimeter readings were only estimates because several factors caused 

these readings to be less accurate than the doses of 

record determined after processing of film packets. 

This use of Area Access Registers helped to maintain 

59 
personnel exposures below the whole-body exposure guides 

in Chapter 0524, 3000 mrem per quarter and 5000 mrem per 

year. Personnel with exposures from the report plus any 

dosimeter reading since the report in excess of 2500 

mrem per quarter or 4500 mrem per year were advised not 

to enter radex areas and their supervisory personnel 

were so notified. 

2.7.6 Additional methods used for control of radex areas and 

prevent spread of contamination to uncontrolled areas were 

follows: 

to 

as 

A daily log book was maintained by Radsafe monitors for each 

of the radex area locations. These log books were used to record 

the following information: 

A. Work accomplished: Where people worked and what work 

was accomplished were briefly described. Any unusual conditions, 

such as equipment failure and operational difficulties, were listed. 

B. Visitors: First and last names of visitors 

were entered. Their destination 

and reason for their visit were included where possible. Time they 

exited the area and results of personnel monitoring were recorded. 

C. Unusual occurrences: Any unusual events which occurred 

during the shift were recorded. 

This entry included accidents, 

high-volume water seepage, or any 

other occurrence of an unusual 

nature. 

60 
D. Surveys and samples: Information collected was recorded 

as follows: 

Survey type - Routine or Special* 

Sample type - Routine or Special* 

*Indicate requester's name for Special type. 

E. Date and signature: The date and shift were entered at 

the beginning of each work period 

and the log book was signed before 

leaving the shift. 

Personnel leaving radex areas removed anticontamination 

clothing and equipment and placed them in special containers for 

later laundering or disposal at the designated NTS burial site. 

Personnel then were monitored to assure radiation levels were 

below those listed on page 284 of Appendix D, NTSO-SOP Chapter 

0524, Radiological Safety. Personnel decontamination was accomplished if radiation levels were above specified limits. Decontamination usually was accomplished by vacuuming, removing radioactive particles with masking tape patches, washing hands or localized skin areas with soap and water, or showering with soap 

and water. 

Vehicles and equipment removed from radex areas were monitored to assure radiation levels were below those listed on pages 

284 and 285 of Appendix D for release on the NTS. Limits for 

release of vehicles and equipment off the NTS were 0.3 mrad/h 

beta plus gamma radiation at contact and no detectable alpha 

activity. Vehicles and equipment normally were decontaminated by 

vacuuming and steam cleaning with water or detergent solutions. 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS 

Beginning in the early 1960's, various applications of radi61 
ation measurement telemetry were developed at the NTS to determine radiation levels at critical underground and surface areas 

following nuclear detonations. Multi-detector systems with range 

capabilities from 0.5 mR/h to 500 R/h and from 10 mR/h to 10,000 

R/h, continuously monitored locations of concern after being 

emplaced and calibrated prior to each test event. Ion chamber 

detectors were hard-wire-linked by telephone trunk lines to exposure rate meters at a central console in Control Point Building 

2. Detector locations were as far as thirty-five miles from the 

console. 

These remote radiation monitoring systems provided data for 

reentry personnel participating in radiation surveys and recovery 

operations after detonation of a nuclear device. The systems 

aided in substantially reducing radiation exposure of personnel 

involved in reentry programs, and were useful in detecting any 

venting or leaking of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere from 

an underground detonation. 

2.8.1 Evaluation and Development of Telemetry Systems 

The radiation telemetry systems developed and used had specific applications depending upon distance, terrain, environment, 

and operational needs. The detection units, systems, and components being studied and developed in 1962 were the following: 

A. Remote Data Station (RDS) 

The RDS unit was built by the National Bureau of Standards. The unit used a Geiger tube as the detecting 

element, and the signal was transmitted by hard wire. 

The DC current from the GM tube was converted to frequency by running it through an oscillator circuit, and 

was read out as cycles per second which could be equated 

to roentgen rate readings. The range of the RDS was 10 

62 
mR/h to 10 R/h. This unit was very efficient for transmitting long distances, but had limited exposure rate 

range and shock resistance capability. The unit was 

modified for use at NTS, but its use was discontinued 

later because the measurement range was inadequate. The 

application of RDS units to a telemetry system at NTS is 

discussed in Chapter 3. 

B. Area Remote Monitorina Station (ARMS) 

C. 

These units consisted of Tracerlab TA-6 (GM tube) gamma 

detectors with Model 261 direct readout meters. The 

meter had a two-range scale, 0 to 10 R/h and 0 to 100 

R/h. The hard-wire system had a 35-mile transmission 

range, and had limited shock resistance capability. 

Ground shock caused failure of the units (see Chapter 

31, and their use was discontinued. 

Radector Monitoring Station (RMS) 

These units had Radector portable detector electronics 

including the Neher-White ionization chamber used for 

remote radiation detection. The stations were the most 

versatile telemetry detectors, could transmit signals 35 

miles by hard wire, afforded direct readout, and ranked 

highest in shock resistance. Descendants of these units 

were part of the Remote Area Monitoring System (RAMS) 

later used for most DOD underground test events. 

D. Radio-Link Telemetrv 

This EG&G-developed system was a line-of-sight radiolinked system, transmitting the desired information on 

VHF frequencies from a field unit to a main control console. The ionizing radiation-induced signal was then 

63 
read out as cycles per second on a signal event-perunit-time meter. The system did not have desired range 

or battery life for all applications but was valuable in 

areas where there were no hard wires available. 

E. Well Logging Unit 

This unit was a Jordan ion chamber gamma detector with a 

glass-head thermister capable of obtaining gamma radiation measurements or temperature either separately or 

simultaneously, and was used at drill sites for postevent hole radiation and temperature measurements. 

Radiation detection ranges were from 0.5 mR/h to 500 R/h 

and temperature measurement ranges were from 0°F to 

350'F. 

2.8.2 Use of Telemetry Systems at NTS 

Permanently establ ished remote radiation detector stations 

could be monitored continuously at living areas, work areas, and 

other locations throughout the NTS after each test event. Figure 

2.4 shows a typical arrangement of permanent remote detector stations located throughout NTS. Some changes in location were made 

when activities in some areas ceased or were renewed. 

For shaft-type events, a typical array of remote detectors 

installed for the event is shown in Figure 2.5. Eight or more 

detectors were installed in circular patterns at two or more distances from surface ground zero. Detectors sometimes were concentrated in the predicted wind direction, and the distances of 

circular arrays from surface ground zero could be varied with the 

predicted yield and wind velocity. 

Remote detector placement on the surface for tunnel-type 

events was determined by the location of stations of interest to 

64 
0 

R5 

0 

_!! 

0 IO 20 30 40,OOOFT 

PERMANENT TELEMENTRY STATIONS 

Figure 2.4 Typical Permanently Established Remote Kaalaclorl 

Detector Stations Operated Continuously Throughout the NTS 

65 
Figure 2.5 Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site. 

66 
surface reentry personnel and accessible installation locations 

at greater distances from the tunnels. Figure 2.6 shows a typical surface remote detector array for a tunnel event. Additional 

detectors were located within the tunnels to provide information 

for tunnel reentry. 

Approximately 200 detector channels were available for the 

permanent, shaft-type, and tunnel-type arrays. Readings from 

event-related and permanent telemetry detectors were recorded 

from zero time until it was determined that no release of radioactivity had occurred, or until any released radioactive effluent 

had decayed to near-background levels at telemetry detector stations. 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 

The AFSWC provided direct support to the NTSO for DOD underground tests, and other Air Force organizations provided support 

under AFSWC control as described in section 1.3.3 of this report. 

Complete Air Force support was available for the DANNY BOY event, 

a DOD cratering event discussed in Chapter 4 of this report, and 

during the remainder of 1962. However, less air support was 

required as the probability of venting radioactive effluent to 

the atmosphere decreased with development of more effective containment techniques. 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements 

After 1962, Air Force cloud sampling and cloud tracking aircraft generally were not required, except for AEC cratering 

events where radioactive effluent clouds were anticipated. The 

value of analyzing particulate and gaseous cloud samples to determine characteristics of a detonation decreased. Passage of 

the radioactive effluent through variable amounts and tempera67 
PROBE PLACED ON RIM 

(JUNCTION OF 

MERCURY HWY AND AREA I2 A 

30’ IN LINE FROM 

A REMOTE RADIATION DETECTOR 

Figure 2.6 Typical Remote Radiation Detection 

Monitoring System for Tunnel-Type Emplacement Site 

68 
tures of rock and other media selectively retained some radionucl ides underground, and changed the known ratios of fission 

products previously used during analysis of atmospheric detonation cloud samples. 

The first change in cloud sampling and tracking support was 

to a lighter Air Force aircraft, the U-3A, with an Air Force pilot and PHS monitor. The PHS monitor also performed aerial monitoring of selected locations near surface ground zero and along 

the path of any effluent cloud. This air support later was performed by PHS and contractor personnel in their own aircraft. 

The Air Force L-20 aircraft, with an Air Force pilot and a 

security guard from the NTS security force, continued to provide 

security sweep coverage of the NTS perimeter and test areas until 

1968, when the type of aircraft used was changed to a helicopter. 

Perimeter sweeps were conducted daily, during reasonable flying 

weather, to assure that unauthorized. vehicles were not entering 

the NTS over rough terrain or around security barricades on secondary roads. Air security sweeps of the immediate test area 

were conducted for a few hours before each detonation to assist 

in clearing the test area and to assure that unauthorized vehicles were not approaching it from directions not controlled by 

manned security stations. 

Air support for photography missions during test events and 

initial radiation surveys after each event did not change. Helicopters and Air Force pilots generally were used with contractor 

photographers and Radsafe monitors. 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs AFB 

Radsafe support facilities had been established at ISAFB 

during atmospheric nuclear device testing series. During 1962 

tests, and subsequent DOD underground tests requiring support 

69 
aircraft staged from ISAFB, REECo provided all radsafe support 

functions available at the NTS. This included monitors stationed 

at the ISAFB radsafe quonset facility, and a complete stock of 

film dosimeters (badges), radiation detection instruments, and 

anticontamination clothing and equipment for use by aircrews and 

ground crews. 

Radsafe monitors issued and exchanged film dosimeters (badges), issued self-reading pocket dosimeters, dressed Air Force 

personnel in anticontamination clothing, provided respiratory 

protection equipment, monitored aircraft and personnel after 

events, decontaminated personnel, and assisted ground crew 

personnel with decontamination of aircraft. 

Figures 2.7 through 2.9 show decontamination and monitoring 

of typical B-57 cloud sampling aircraft used from 1962 until the 

type of sampling aircraft was changed. 

Aircrews departing from contaminated aircraft removed anticontamination clothing and equipment at the radsafe facility, 

showered, and were monitored to assure complete decontamination 

before they dressed in regulation clothing and were released. 

Ground crews who removed particulate and gaseous cloud sample 

collection media from aircraft or who participated in aircraft 

decontamination were subject to the same personnel decontamination procedures. 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters 

Although ISAFB radsafe support extended to all participating 

aircraft, special helicopter radsafe procedures were implemented 

because these aircraft landed at NTS and staged from helicopter 

pads located east of Mercury Highway at the Control Point area 

and near a Test Director's Forward Control Point (FCP) established for a particular underground event. Helicopter pilots 

70 



usually landed at these locations, and were briefed at the Control Point or particular Forward Control Point regarding their 

scheduled missions or other operational missions. 

If the mission involved possible contamination of the aircraft, Radsafe monitors lined the floor of the aircraft with 

plastic, or kraft paper, and masking tape to facilitate decontamination. Pilots and crew members were dressed in anticontamination clothing and provided with film badges, pocket dosimeters, and respiratory protection equipment if airborne radioactive material was anticipated. 

Upon completion of missions, helicopters returned to the 

landing pads where they were decontaminated by Radsafe monitors. 

Pilots and crew members were decontaminated at an adjacent forward Radsafe base station, or at Control Point Building 2 where 

pocket dosimeters were collected and read, and film badges were 

exchanged if exposures of 100 mR or more were indicated by pocket 

dosimeters. 

74 
CHAPTER 3 

HARD HAT EVENT 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The HARD HAT event was a DOD underground nuclear detonation 

with a yield of 5.7 kt conducted at 1000 hours Pacific Standard 

Time (PST) on 15 February 1962 at shaft site U15a in Area 15 of 

the NTS. The device was emplaced in a 36-inch diameter shaft 

drilled in granite at a depth of 943 feet below the surface elevation of 5,114 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). Cavity collapse 

occurred approximately eleven hours after device detonation. 

Minor amounts of radioactive effluent were released after cavity 

collapse and were detected onsite only. 

HARD HAT was primarily an underground structures program 

with instrumentation in a nearby access shaft and tunnel complex. 

The purpose of the HARD HAT event was to test capability of 

underground structures to withstand strong motions generated by 

an underground nuclear detonation in hard rock. There were 25 

DOD scientific projects conducted by government agencies and contractors. 

Work necessary to conduct these projects included constructing an 800-foot-deep access shaft 800 feet southeast from the device emplacement shaft; constructing a 600-foot tunnel leading 

from the access shaft toward the emplacement shaft; constructing 

three arcuate test drifts intersecting the tunnel; drilling 21 

holes from the underground complex; and drilling eight holes 

about 1,000 feet deep from the surface. Figure 3.1 is a photo of 

the access shaft headframe and surrounding structures, and Figure 

3.2 is a sketch of the underground complex. 

75 

943 FT. 

-N 

SGZ 

STATION 15 SHAFT COLLAR 

800 FT. 2 

784 FT. 

/ 

, 

TEST 

DRIFT 

ZERO POINT 

STATION U15a 

TEST B 

DRIFT 

A 

I / 

,’ 

Figure 3.2 HARD HAT Underground Complex 

77 
3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe.conduct 

of all HARD HAT project activities in Area 15. Responsibilities 

of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office. SC was responsible for providing, emplacing, and 

arming the device, and stemming and installation of necessary 

measuring devices and equipment. SC and LASL were responsible 

for radiochemical analysis to determine yield. EG&G was responsible for providing and installing timing and firing circuits. 

The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent 

removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

Project materials and equipment installed included 48 structural test sections and 450 gauges in the underground complex, 

instruments in 21 underground and eight surface holes, and numerous seismic and other scientific stations on the surface. The 

majority of measurements had to be obtained or recovered during 

several weeks of postevent access to the structures. These experiments were not radiation sensitive, but reentry had to be accomplished within five weeks to prevent losses due to corrosion. 

The "HARD HAT Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to assure safe and economical 

reentry within the desired five-week period. Stemming design in 

access tunnels incorporated necessary provisions to maximize 

safety of reentry. Geophones were installed to monitor cavity 

activity and assure collapse before reentry. 

78 
There were to be five separate reentry teams, each of which 

had a separate and specific mission: 

Team 1 - Surface Radiation Survey Party 

Team 2 - Shaft Collar Group 

Team 3 - Shaft and Tunnel Reentry Party 

Team 4 - Rescue Team 

Team 5 - Working Party 

Recall of the reentry teams could be made for any of the 

following circumstances: 

1. any break in communications between Team 2 and Team 3, 

2. by request of the Test Group Director or Reentry Chief, 

3. upon decision of the Chief of Shaft and Tunnel Party, 

and/or 

4. when any member of Team 3 indicated a McCaa (breathing 

apparatus) oxygen supply of less than 30 atmospheres.' 

Reentry was not to be made before the ventilation system had 

been turned on and samples of air monitored at the remote blower, 

or later at the shaft collar. Reentry was not to be made beyond 

the ventilated area in the shaft. 

A remotely-controlled blower was installed on the surface 

during preevent button up at a distance of approximately one-half 

mile from the shaft, and a line run along the ground to the shaft 

collar. This line was connected by a flexible coupling to the 

vent pipe at the shaft collar. Remote controls for the blower 

were located in the Forward Control Point. A single line was run 

from a single blower in the shaft collar area down the shaft and 

tunnel, with junctions at the "A","B", and "C" arcuate drifts for 

short branches into the wings of the drifts. 

Air sampling pipes were installed through both the sandbag 

79 
plugs and the gas seal door prior to the event. These were to be 

used during reentry to determine breathing atmosphere conditions 

just forward of the plugs and door. A two-inch diameter flexible 

hose was installed and anchored in the "B" and "C" arcuate drifts. Compressed air was to be pumped through these drifts to 

clear any gases before tunnel reentry. The hose was designed for 

simple connection to compressed air lines. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies prior to the event. Test 

area maps with appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference stakes, fallout trays, radiation decay 

recorders, air sampling equipment, film dosimeter packets, and other dosimetric devices were positioned in the 

test area. Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed 

regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and 

security station requirements. 

Radsafe had 12 personnel stationed at the DOD Test Group 

Director's FCP prior to the HARD HAT detonation to perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed; 

provide and issue anticontamination equipment, portable 

instruments, and self-reading dosimeters; operate area 

control check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. All personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate 

anticontamination clothing and equipment, and Radsafe 

monitors Were in attendance. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, sup80 
plied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry Support 

A radiation telemetry system was installed with the 

readout located in CP-2. Telemetry readout data were to 

be relayed to CP-1 and the FCP by telephone and network 

(net) 3 radio. SC and Radsafe personnel placed five 

ARMS units at the following surface locations: 

1. 100 feet north of Surface Ground Zero (SGZ) 

2. Radiochemical sampling pot number 1 (25 feet northeast of SGZ) 

3. 300 feet east of shaft collar 

4. Trailer number 82 (about 3,000 feet southeast of 

SGZ) 

5. Stake L-67 (about 2,000 feet southeast of SGZ) 

Radsafe personnel installed five RDS units underground 

and on the surface as follows: 

1. In the B6A section of "B" drift 

2. Station 4+65 (465 feet from shaft) in the main 

tunnel (at the intersection with "B" drift) 

3. Station 0+40 (inner side of gas seal door) 

4. Station 0+35 (outer side of gas seal door) 

5. West of shaft collar on the surface 

c. Securitv Coveraue 

At six hours prior to device detonation, security personnel established test area control and muster stations. The Forward Control Point and muster station for 

Area 15 were establ ished about four miles southwest of 

81 
SGZ on the Circle Road between Area 8 and Area 10 (see 

Figure 1.5). In addition, four security stations were 

established to control roads leading to Area 15. A 

screening station was set up near the FCP at the observer area. The final security sweep of all closed 

areas was completed three hours prior to device detonation. U.S. Air Force (USAF) and security personnel 

completed a final sweep of Areas 8, 10 and 15 by 45 

minutes before zero time. 

D. Air Support 

An Air Force U-3A aircraft, pilot, and co-pilot were 

made available to a PHS Aerial Monitoring Team for cloud 

tracking purposes. According to the PHS offsite report 

for HARD HAT, the principal instrument used was a 

Precision Model 111 scintillator, with an added transistorized amplifier feeding an Esterline-Angus strip-chart 

recorder, and having a maximum range of 5 mR/h in six 

scales. 

Approximately one hour prior to device detonation, USAF 

and LRL personnel in an Air Force H-21 helicopter took 

an upwind position from SGZ in readiness for event photography coverage. In addition, approximately 15 minutes prior to device detonation, the U-3A aircraft departed from ISAFB to orbit over Frenchman Lake (Area 5) 

in readiness for cloud tracking, if required. 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

On 14 February 1962 (D-l day), U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey 

(USC&GS) personnel made final adjustments to instruments at eleven seismic stations. These were located at distances ranging 

from 2,400 to 8,400 feet from SGZ. LRL personnel checked elec82 
tronic recording instruments and performed dry runs at Trailer 39 

which was located about 2,000 feet from SGZ. SC personnel checked 

out instrumentation in their diagnostic trailers located about 

3,000 feet from SGZ. Four DOD personnel calibrated equipment in 

the area from SGZ out to approximately 2,000 feet in all directions, and participated in dry runs. DOD personnel also calibrated equipment and participated in dry runs in the tunnel complexes and at SGZ. SC personnel emplaced high explosives (HE) 

for microbarograph calibration shots. 

A Test Manager's weather briefing was conducted at 2200 

hours on 14 February 1962. At this briefing, panels of administrators and experts reviewed weather forecasts, studied the projected path of any radioactive effluent, and decided that conditions were favorable for conducting the event as scheduled. 

3.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

On D-day, from midnight to three hours before scheduled 

device detonation, DOD personnel activated recording station 

equipment, checked moisture probes, started magnetic tapes, and 

assured operation of surface telemetry units. During this same 

time period SC personnel activated equipment, armed microbarograph calibration shots, and proceeded to U15a for device arming. 

The final weather briefing for the Test Manager and Advisory 

Panel was conducted two hours prior to planned device detonation. 

At this time, SC personnel requested and received permission from 

the Test Group Director to arm the device. 

Required countdowns began on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 8. At 

ten minutes prior to device detonation the siren on the CP-1 

building ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the 

building were turned on until after detonation time. 

83 
HARD HAT zero time was 1000 hours on 15 February 1962. 

Underground telemetry units in the "B" drift and in the main 

tunnel 465 feet from the shaft failed to respond after zero time 

because lines were damaged. Remaining telemetry units underground and on the surface did not detect radiation intensities 

above background from device detonation through 1630 hours when 

telemetry readouts were secured. 

Two microbarograph calibration shots were scheduled to be 

fired at five and eight minutes, respectively, after zero time. 

One microbarograph shot misfired but the problem was corrected 

and the shot was fired two hours after device detonation. 

A USAF/PHS aerial monitoring team entered the area 40 minutes after device detonation. Aerial monitoring was conducted 

from one mile to 15 miles downwind for the next 45 minutes. Results of aerial monitoring indicated no measurable release of 

activity immediately following the event. 

Two Radsafe initial survey teams in vehicles were released 

by the DOD Control Officer at 1200 hours after the second microbarograph shot. Ground radiation surveys were made both at fixed 

locations and during sweeps through the area. One of the sweeps 

was a 360-degree circuit of SGZ at a radius of 100 feet. No measurement indicated radiation above background. The three radiochemistry sample collection pots on the sampling pipe from SGZ to 

50 feet northeast of SGZ read background, and survey monitors reported the lids were off the pots. Apparently, the detonation or 

pipe closure devices closed the pipe before effluent samples were 

obtained. Industrial hygiene sampling measurements made during 

the radiation surveys indicated no detectable concentrations of 

explosive mixtures or toxic gases. 

At approximately 1315 hours, the DOD Control Officer pro84 
ceeded into Area 15 and established an FCP approximately 200 feet 

southeast of the shaft collar. At this time, the Radsafe check 

station trailer was moved to within 150 feet of the shaft on the 

east. The two Radsafe survey teams were left at the newly established FCP to act as monitors for recovery parties, with instructions that no personnel were to enter within 100 feet of the SGZ 

area unless specifically authorized by the DOD Control Officer or 

a delegated representative. 

Recovery of experiment data on the surface in the test area 

continued for several hours. Radiation measurements made by 

party monitors were not above background, radex areas were not 

established, and film badges were not exchanged upon exit from 

the test area. At 1600 hours, after statements by test personnel 

that the detonation apparently was contained, the DOD Control 

Officer delegated area control to security force and Radsafe personnel with no special instructions. Telemetry readouts were 

secured by Radsafe at 1630 hours. All recovery personnel were 

clear of the test area by 1800 hours, and the Radsafe monitor in 

the SGZ area moved back to the security roadblock at the junction 

of the shaft and SGZ access roads about 700 feet south of the 

shaft. Also at this time, the monitor at the Radsafe checkpoint 

secured the trailer and left the area. 

The Radsafe monitor at the security roadblock drove to the 

shaft to make a survey at 1930 hours. He detected no CO, C02, 

NO, NG2, hydrocarbons, or explosive mixtures. However, he detected 18 mR/h at the flexible coupling to the shaft vent pipe. 

At 2010 hours, he again detected 18 mR/h at the shaft, but no 

radiation above background at the security roadblock. 

At 2053 hours, the Radsafe monitor and the security guard 

reported hearing two rumbles from the SGZ area but felt no ground 

movement. The underground detonation cavity had collapsed. The 

roadblock was moved 200 feet farther south as a precautionary 

85 
measure, and the Radsafe supervisor arrived at 2120 hours. The 

two Radsafe personnel proceeded to the shaft collar and measured 

100 mR/h and no toxic gases or explosive mixtures at 2155 hours. 

A pungent odor was detected as they drove toward SGZ. They 

retreated and approached SGZ from upwind. After measuring 50 

mR/h at the SGZ plug, and no CO or C02, they quickly left the 

area to avoid the pungent odor. 

Another survey of SGZ was made at 0130 hours on 16 February. 

The maximum reading was 500 mR/h near the SGZ plug base. No CO 

or explosive mixtures were detected, but sulfurous odors were 

noted in the area. Several fissures in the SGZ area read background. 

At 0630 hours, the plug base still read 500 mR/h, and a 40- 

foot-long fissure read 200 mR/h with 200 ppm C02, 400 ppm CO, and 

no detectable explosive mixtures. Radioactive gases displaced by 

cavity collapse apparently were coming up the radiochemical sampling pipe. A measurement inside sample pot number 2 indicated 10 

R/h, and three feet from the pot the reading was 100 mR/h. Exposure rates in areas not near fissures or sample pots averaged 

about 10 mR/h. 

A survey of the shaft collar area at 0715 hours indicated 

vent line contact and general exposure rate readings of 6 mR/h 

maximum. The security roadblock continued to assure that only 

Radsafe personnel entered the area. 

Operation of the radiation telemetry system resumed at 0815 

hours. Surface units continued to indicate less than the detectable 10 mR/h. Apparently, the unit 100 feet north of SGZ failed 

to detect the gaseous radioactivity or malfunctioned, and the 

unit near sample pot number 1 malfunctioned, because both continued to indicate no positive readings. A survey of SGZ at 0900 

86 
hours indicated nothing above background at the fissures, but 8 

R/h at contact with sample pot number 1. 

Table 3.1 shows readings from the functioning underground 

telemetry units. Gaseous radioactivity displaced by cavity collapse apparently had been forced through fissures into the underground tunnel complex. Maximum readings were greater than 10 R/h 

inside the gas seal door, and 160 mR/h outside the door. 

A PHS aerial monitoring team arrived over SGZ at 1050 hours. 

Aerial monitoring indicated a continuing release sustaining a 

field north of SGZ. One-quarter mile north of SGZ an increase in 

radiation was noted with a peak of 0.15 mR/h gamma above background three-quarters of a mile north of SGZ. The release appeared to be contained in the atmosphere below the clouds. 

Three miles north-northeast of SGZ the cloud was in the form 

of two fingers, each one quarter of a mile wide, with peak gamma 

readings of 0.03 mR/h above background. From this point out to 

eight miles from SGZ, readings of approximately twice background 

were detected. No radiation levels above background were detected outside NTS boundaries. 

At the direction of DOD representatives, Radsafe personnel 

installed a rope barricade around SGZ at a radius of about 70 

feet. Radiation warning signs were affixed to the barricade, and 

the task was completed by 1200 hours. The same type of barricade 

then was installed around the shaft collar area. 

Exposure rates at SGZ decreased during the day. By 1430 

hours, maximum personnel exposure rates were less than 100 mR/h, 

and by 1715 hours, less than 10 mR/h with no toxic gases or explosive mixtures detected. Readings at contact with sample pot 

number 1 decreased to 100 mR/h at 2200 hours. By 0700 hours on 

87 
TABLE 3.1 

HARD HAT EVENT 

DATE 

16 Feb 6.2 

17 Feb 62 

TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS INSIDE OF TUNNEL 

(Gamma Radiation in R/h) 

TIME STATION STATION 

(PST) ot40 ot35 

Station B6A and 4+65 did not respond after 

zero time. Underground stations did not 

read above background from zero time until 

telemetry was secured at 1600 hours on 

15 February 1962. Readings after telemetry 

was resumed as follows (Station 0+40 was 

inside and Station 0+35 was outside the 

blast door): 

0815 >lO. 0 

0830 >lO.O 

0845 >lO.O 

0900 >lO. 0 

0930 >lO.O 

0945 >lO. 0 

1000 >lO. D 

1015 >lO.O 

1030 >lO.O 

1045 >lO.O 

1100 >lO.O 

1115 >lO. 0 

1130 >lO. 0 

1200 >lO.O 

1230 >lO.O 

1315 >lO.O 

1400 >lO. 0 

1500 >lO.O 

1600 >lO.O 

1700 >lO.O 

1800 >lO. 0 

1900 >lO.O 

2000 >lO.O 

2205 8.90 

0010 7.80 0.0105 

0325 6.10 0.01 

0600 5.00 

0620 4.60 

0700 4.20 

0730 4.10 

0800 3.90 

0900 3.70 

0930 3.30 

1000 3.30 

1100 3.00 

1200 3.00 

1300 3.00 

1400 3.00 

0.160 

0.155 

0.143 

0.135 

0.140 

0.135 

0.125 

0.115 

0.105 

0.096 

0.082 

0.082 

0.070 

0.050 

0.038 

0.030 

0.018 

0.020 

0.019 

0.0165 

88 
TABLE 3.1 (Concluded) 

TIME 

(PST) 

1600 

1650 

2130 

2230 

2336 

STATION STATION 

DATE 0+40 ot35 

2.00 

2.10 

1.45 

1.30 

1.20 

18 Feb 62 0010 

0147 

0740 

0900 

1000 

1100 

1300 

2030 

2330 

1.10 

1.00 

0.52 

0.44 

0.38 

0.33 

0.28 

0.178 

19 Feb 62 0320 0.155 

0400 0.14 

0800 0.12 

20 Feb 62 0800 0.085 

2000 0.054 

21 Feb 62 0800 0.052 

1600 0.052 

22 Feb 62 0800 0.041 

23 Feb 62 0500 0.038 

2100 0.030 

24 Feb 62 

25 Feb 62 

26 Feb 62 

0730 0.026 

1500 0.025 

0830 0.024 

1900 0.024 

0800 0.022 

1630 0.02 

27 Feb 62 

28 Feb 62 

1 Mar 62 

2 Mar 62 

3 Mar 62 

4 Mar 62 

0800 0.017 

0800 0.016 

0800 0.014 

0800 0.011 

0800 0.01 

a9 
17 February, general exposure rates at SGZ were less than 5 mR/h 

and at the shaft collar were less than 0.5 mR/h. 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

Each area was marked to indicate particular radiation levels, as were all contaminated and radioactive materials. Personnel entering radiation areas or working with contaminated material were briefed concerning potential exposure and safety precautions, and provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

Decontamination units were positioned at entrances to controlled radiation areas. Personnel and equipment were monitored 

and decontaminated as necessary. Drill rigs and associated 

equipment used in postevent activities also were monitored and 

decontaminated as necessary. 

After use, anticontamination clothing and equipment were 

laundered and returned to stock for subsequent reissue. Items 

which could not be decontaminated to permissible levels were buried at a designated disposal site. 

Industrial hygiene and radiological surveys were performed 

under the direction of the DOD Test Group Director in accordance 

with the "Radiological Safety Support Plan for HARD HAT." 

3.4.1 Postevent Drilling 

Because the radiochemical sampling system failed to obtain a 

radioactive debris sample for yield determination analysis, postevent drilling operations to obtain a core sample from the solidified radioactive melt rock became even more important. The first 

drill rig was moved in and began setting up outside the barricad90 
ed SGZ area at 1630 hours on 16 February. Investigation of holes 

predrilled toward GZ before the test event revealed damaged and 

unusable casing 30 feet below the surface. 

On 18 February, two rigs were setting up in the SGZ area. 

One rig commenced drilling 20 feet east of the SGZ plug at 1550 

hours 19 February. Up to three drill rigs were used at once during attempts to obtain samples of solidified melt. Drilling 

through the hard, fractured granite was slow and difficult. However, a depth of 675 feet was reached by 2140 hours 24 February 

when return drilling mud read 5 mR/h. This reading indicated the 

cavity boundary was being approached or had been entered by the 

number 1 drill rig. 

At 2210 hours, the drill stem and bit stuck in the bottom of 

the hole. After pumping diesel fuel into the hole, drillers used 

a go-ton crane in conjunction with the rig to pull the stem and 

bit loose by 1100 hours the next morning. After reaming the bottom 150 feet of hole by 2015 hours, drilling started again, but 

mud circulation immediately was lost in the hole. Water trucks 

brought more water, more mud was mixed, and drilling resumed at 

2120 hours. At 2300 hours, the drill stem fell into the remaining top of the cavity from 680 feet to 690 feet, and mud circulation again was lost. 

Drilling through the cavity rubble was extremely difficult. 

Voids, lost mud circulation, stuck drill stem and bits, collapse 

of hole sides, cementing and redrilling, and lost drill bits were 

some of the difficulties encountered. High winds which threatened to topple the drill rig necessitated using guy wires for support. Drilling through rubble and obtaining a satisfactory core 

sample of melt rock required a continuing intensive effort until 

8 May 1962 when the drilling operation was secured. 

The maximum contact reading was 2.5 R/h on a core sample 

91 
taken from the hole at a depth of 985 feet on 5 May. The second 

highest reading was 1,800 mR/h on a sample taken from a depth of 

999 feet. The maximum toxic gas measurements were 7 ppm H2S (the 

sulfurous odor, 10 ppm permissible) at the drill collar on 19 

April with a depth of 897 feet, and 200,000 ppm CO2 under the 

turntable at the hole opening on 23 April (this concentration 

diffused to a few hundred ppm at breathing level). Measurements 

of other toxic gases and explosive mixtures were below permissible limits. 

3.4.2 Shaft Reentry 

By 1330 hours on 17 February, radiation readings in the 

shaft collar area were background, no toxic gases or explosive 

mixtures were detected, the underground telemetry unit outside 

the gas seal door indicated less than the detectable 10 mR/h, and 

the shaft exhaust fan was turned on. Negative measurements continued through the night. 

The only positive readings on 18 February were traces of CO 

and CO2 detected from the vent line at 0630 hours. The elevator 

was raised from the bottom of the shaft with auxiliary power at 

1345 hours on 19 February, and difficulty was experienced with 

binding elevator guides. Radiation measurements in the shaft 

collar area continued to be negative. 

At 1135 hours on 21 February, shaft reentry preparations began with electricians reconnecting power transformers to feed the 

shaft collar area. Radiation, toxic gas, and explosive mixture 

measurements continued to be negative, but personnel working around the shaft collar were required to wear anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection as a precautionary measure. 

The hoist, headframe, and shaft signal system were examined 

for safe operation. To aid this determination, a dummy load of 

92 
2,500 pounds plus a weight equal to the regular elevator was 

prepared for lowering to the bottom of the shaft. From 1430 to 

1500 hours on 22 February, the small personnel elevator loaded 

with lead bricks was lowered to the bottom of the shaft and 

returned to the surface. A maximum contact reading of 0.5 mR/h 

on the elevator decreased to 0.1 mR/h within five minutes, indicating trapped radioactive gases which dispersed rapidly. 

Electricians reconnected power for the second shaft vent 

line blower at 0800 hours on 23 February, and the vent line was 

in service by 1030 hours. Before any personnel entered the 

shaft, a check was made of all electrical and phone lines going 

into the shaft to insure they were locked open. All switches 

locked out during button up were rechecked. A special check was 

made to assure all sources of electrical power into the shaft 

were locked out prior to reentry. Initial reentry and inspection 

personnel would have their own communication line lowered with 

them. 

To insure that personnel could be removed from the shaft 

should conditions prevent return of the inspection cage to the 

surface, the following equipment was available at the shaft collar: 

1. standby hoist with sufficient cable to reach the bottom 

of the shaft and capable of lifting 3000 pounds, 

2. two bosun chairs with chest straps, and 

3. wire litter with straps. 

Because the shaft guides for the large elevator were damaged, a change to the reentry plan was made and the small personnel elevator with only two personnel was used for initial shaft 

inspection. At 1330 hours on 23 February an LRL representative 

93 
and a REECo mining superintendent in full anticontamination 

clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus descended in the 

shaft. The speed of descent of the inspection cage was extremely 

slow. The cage moved only when inspection of shaft ventilation 

indicated further descent was prudent. They reached the bottom 

at 1445 and returned to the surface at 1510 hours. Radiation 

readings were less than 1 mR/h on gloves and their communication 

wire. 

Shaft repair began on 24 February with work on the elevator 

cage, replacement of elevator guides, and repair of sets and lagging from the surface down. By 2 March, the shaft was repaired 

to a depth of 190 feet; by 5 March to a depth of 340 feet; by 7 

March to a depth of 600 feet; and by 8 March, repairs were complete. Only background radiation and traces of CO and CO2 were 

encountered during shaft rehabilitation. 

3.4.3 Tunnel Reentry 

An inspection party was lowered in the shaft on 10 March at 

0945 hours to examine the lower drift and the steel gas seal door 

at Station 0+37 (37 feet in from shaft). All personnel were 

wearing anticontamination clothing and self-contained breathing 

apparatus. Miners attached the shaft vent line to the drift vent 

line with a two-foot section, opened the valve, and the party returned to the surface. Vent fans were turned on at 1032 hours, 

and measurements of 1 mR/h and 2,000 ppm CO2 in the exhaust decreased to near-background levels by 1200 hours. 

The tunnel reentry party was back in the shaft at 1210 

hours, this time without breathing apparatus, samples taken from 

sampling pipes through the gas seal door indicated safe 

conditions, and miners cut open the door. By 1536 hours on 10 

March, the entry party advanced in the tunnel to the end of ventilation. No toxic gases, explosive mixtures, or radiation above 

94 
background were encountered, and no contamination was detected on 

exiting party personnel. 

Subsequent reentry teams equipped with self-contained 

breathing apparatus explored ahead of ventilation. During preevent button up, the branches in the arcuate drift wings and the 

entire ventilation system from Station 4+10 (410 feet in from the 

shaft) forward had been removed. Also, twenty-foot sections were 

removed at "C" drift and Station 0+87 (87 feet in from shaft). 

All vent pipe removed was stored in the tunnel for reinstallation 

on reentry. 

Miners repaired track, mined through and removed rock and 

debris from collapsed tunnel areas, removed sandbag plugs, and 

replaced ventilation lines. Radsafe monitors routinely checked 

for CO, Co2, NO, NC2, hydrocarbons, explosive mixtures, and radiation. If readings exceeded permissible limits for toxic gases 

or 10 percent of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) for explosive 

mixtures, reentry was to be suspended until ventilation improved 

conditions. Toxic gases and explosive mixtures were to be expected as a result of both the nuclear detonation and blasting 

during reentry operations. Explosive mixtures up to 50 percent 

of the LEL, CO levels up to 750 ppm, and NO+N02 concentrations up 

to 10 ppm were encountered during reentry and mining operations. 

The maximum radiation measurement encountered was 5 mR/h in the 

center of the track 308 feet from the shaft. 

Miners encountered considerable difficulty removing muck 

(broken rock) and other debris from collapsed tunnel sections. 

Blasting was necessary to loosen pipe and reinforcement steel in 

addition to collapsed granite. Broken rock in the tunnel back 

(ceiling) had to be supported with steel sets and lagging (2 x 8- 

inch boards forming a solid ceiling between upright sets). In 

some portions where rock would fall in at the same rate it was 

being mucked (removed), timbers had to be driven through the 

95 
broken rock along the tunnel back for support to make headway. 

Progress was slow. At 1400 hours on 18 April, the miners 

broke through into the "B" drift. Center line of the newly mined 

main tunnel through broken rock was five feet west of center line 

for the old main drift at the intersection with the "B" drift. 

Measurements indicated 0.1 mR/h and no toxic gases or explosive 

mixtures. A bypass drift around the badly damaged first two test 

sections of "B" drift was started 23 April. 

detected after blasting. Toxic gas testing 

able CO, NO+NO~, so2, cs2, hydrocarbons, or 

and only 250 ppm C02. 

A nitrous odor was 

indicated no detectexplosive mixtures, 

On the evening of 27 April, a noxious odor described by 

miners as an "ammonia smell" was experienced during slushing operations. Checks were made for gas concentrations with results 

indicating no CO, S02, or NH3 (ammonia gas); less than 250 ppm 

CO2; less than 0.5 ppm NO+N02; 18 percent oxygen in the bypass 

drift; and 20 percent oxygen in the main drift. However, the DOD 

representative in charge determined that no miners would be 

allowed to work in the affected area so long as the odor persisted. The odor recurred at varying times during the reentry 

operations, but other than occasionally causing headaches and 

some nausea, no other ill effects were noted. Headaches and nausea are not uncommon among miners, particularly when drifts are 

entered after blasting and before ventilation has cleared the 

dynamite fumes - particularly CO, C02, and NO+N02. However, the 

cause of the odor and the headaches was not identified, though 

all available Draeger multi-gas detector tubes for toxic gases 

were used to sample the breathing air. 

” A " lateral was reached the morning of 31 May at 572 feet 

from the shaft. The radiation level was less than 0.1 mR/h and 

co2 was 1,000 ppm. All other tests for toxic gases and explosive 

mixtures were negative. By 5 June, mucking operations, and cut96 
ting torch operations for reinforcing rods, had cleared the "A" 

drift for access and inspection. The maximum exposure rate encountered was 0.15 mR/h. 

Mining equipment was removed from the tunnel on 6 June. 

Final DOD-AEC inspections of the test structures were conducted 

on 7 and 8 June, a bulkhead over the shaft was completed, and U15 

shaft and tunnel were secured at 1515 hours on 8 June. 

3.4.4 Cavity Mining and Drilling 

Interest in dimensions of the HARD HAT cavity and characteristics of cavity rubble resulted in reentry of the HARD HAT 

underground complex in early December 1962. A survey of the tunnel complex indicated 0.05 mR/h maximum, and no toxic gases or 

explosive mixtures. 

Removal of water and mud from the elevator pocket at the 

bottom of the shaft was accomplished. Inspections of underground 

workings, general cleanup, and surveying distances relative to GZ 

and the cavity were completed by 17 December when mining operations commenced without radex (radiation exclusion) area requirements (anticontamination clothing and equipment or pocket dosimeters). 

Mining was intended to penetrate the cavity rubble to GZ, 

obtain rubble rock fragments for evaluation, and determine distribution of fragment sizes. Core drilling from the tunnel complex was intended to outline the cavity and provide samples for 

analysis of mineral characteristics. 

Tunneling reached the chimney of broken rock, which indicated the cavity boundary, on 7 January. General exposure rates 

near the face were 1 to 5 mR/h on 9 January 1963, and radex area 

procedures were not required. No explosive mixtures and only 

97 
minor amounts of CO2 had been detected in the mining operations. 

Labor strife at the NTS caused delays in mining operations 

until 14 February. Personnel going underground then were equipped with anticontamination gloves, boots, and pocket dosimeters, 

and use of Radsafe Area Access Registers was implemented. These 

limited radex area requirements were implemented because general 

exposure rates near the tunnel face were increasing. By 26 February, the maximum reading at the face was 8 mR/h, and the general exposure rate at the face was 6 mR/h with no toxic gases or 

explosive mixtures after ventilation on 1 March. 

Again, mining progress through the broken granite was very 

slow. Heavy timbering driven along the back was necessary to 

hold up cavity rubble while making headway. Miners stopped driving the tunnel on 6 March to excavate an alcove for core drilling. Beginning 12 March, personnel were required to wear anticontamination coveralls, although general exposure rates at the 

tunnel face were only 3 mR/h with a maximum of 7 mR/h. 

The first of two horizontal core drilling rigs was in place 

on 19 March and ready to drill from the alcove off the main tunnel 600 feet from the shaft. Mucking at the face was slow because drilling mud from the old postevent drill hole was encountered. It was necessary to pour concrete on the sides and floor 

to stabilize the mud area and proceed with the tunnel. The highest radiation level at the face was 6 mR/h, and no toxic gases or 

explosive mixtures were detected. 

The first horizontal drill core pulled that was radioactive 

was from 134 feet in the "B" hole on 16 April, and it read 40 

mR/h. The tunnel face was 8+18 (818 feet from shaft) and had 

passed over GZ (at 8+00). The exposure rate at the face was 8 

mR/h, CO2 was 2,000 ppm, NO+N02 was a trace, and no other gases 

or explosive mixtures were detected. The highest air temperature 

98 
until that date, 98" F, with relative humidity of 92 percent, was 

recorded at 7+75 on 19 April. The highest core radiation level 

was 100 mR/h on a core from about 210 feet in "B" hole also on 19 

April. 

The maximum tunnel heading of 8+85 was reached on 30 April. 

The exposure rate at the face was 2 mR/h compared to 5 mR/h at 

8+50. No toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected either 

at the face or at the drilling alcove. Miners left the face and 

began restoring timber at 7+50. 

On 30 April, most underground personnel not working on the 

face had headaches, and one became ill. These problems were attributed to high temperatures and humidity. An attempt was made 

to correct the problem by increasing ventilation. On 3 May, the 

highest tunnel temperature was 108O F with 100 percent relative 

humidity at 7+25. However, no personnel were working at this location. 

A crosscut was constructed at 7+55 to obtain rock for analysis. On 8 May, the general exposure rate in the west crosscut 

drift was 15 mR/h, and the highest contact reading was 45 mR/h. 

Muck coming from this location read 15 mR/h and its temperature 

was 100" F. On 9 May in the east drift, the general exposure 

rate was 30 mR/h, and the highest contact reading was 60 mR/h. 

There was a trace of CO2 throughout the main tunnel, and no other 

toxic gases or explosive mixtures. 

The HARD HAT cavity mining and drilling operations were 

secured on 17 May 1963. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Underground telemetry detector stations B6A and 4+65 did not 

99 
respond after zero time due to line damage. Other readings for 

15 February were not above background through the time telemetry 

was secured. After telemetry was resumed, station 0+40 had a 

maximum reading greater than 10 R/h until 2205 hours 16 February 

when the reading decreased to 8.9 R/h. Station 0+40 continued 

its decrease to less than 10 mR/h on 4 March. Station 0+35 indicated a maximum reading of 160 mR/h on 16 February, decreasing to 

less than 10 mR/h on 17 February. 

Telemetry instruments located 100 feet north of SGZ, near 

sample pot number 1, 100 yards east of the shaft collar, at 

trailer No. 82, and at Stake L-67 indicated background radiation 

readings on 15-16 February. However, the unit near sample pot 

number 1 malfunctioned, and the unit 100 feet north of SGZ may 

have malfunctioned. 

The aerial monitoring team first entered the area approximately 40 minutes after zero time on 15 February. No increase 

above background levels of radiation was detected in the downwind 

area. The aerial team again entered the area at 1950 hours on 16 

February, and detected effluent measuring a maximum of 0.15 mR/h 

gamma above background in the area north of SGZ to a distance of 

eight miles. No effluent was detected off the NTS. 

Fifty-three gamma film badge packets which had been placed 

on stakes in the area were collected to evaluate exposure to the 

gaseous effluent. Exposures were below the 30 mR threshold of 

film sensitivity. 

Maximum readings during radiation surveys on the surface 

were 100 mR/h in the shaft collar area at 2155 hours on 15 February, and 10 R/h inside sample pot number 2 at 0630 hours on 16 

February. The maximum reading during postevent drilling from the 

surface was 2,500 mR/h in contact with a core sample on 5 May, 

100 
but the maximum personnel exposure rate was less than 5 mR/h near 

SGZ on 16 February. 

Maximum measurements during shaft reentry were 0.5 mR/h on 

the test elevator and less than 1 mR/h on reentry personnel 

gloves and communication wire 22 February and 23 February, respectively. Maximum radiation readings during tunnel reentry 

were 5 mR/h in contact with the tunnel floor, and a personnel exposure rate of 0.15 mR/h in "A" drift on 5 June 1962. 

Cavity mining and drilling operations encountered a maximum 

contact measurement of 100 mR/h on a core sample from "B" hole on 

19 April 1963. The maximum personnel exposure rate was 30 mR/h 

in the east drift of the 7+55 crosscut on 9 May 1963. 

Radsafe Area Access Registers were used and pocket dosimeters were issued for the potential radiation exposure period 

during postevent drilling from 17 February to 5 April 1962. Selfreading pocket dosimeter results on Access Registers for each individual entry are summarized below. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 155 75 0.9 

DOD Participants 5 0 0 

Radsafe Area Access Registers were used and pocket dosimeters issued from 14 February to 17 May 1963 during cavity mining 

and drilling operations. Self-reading pocket dosimeter results 

on Access Registers for each individual entry are summarized 

below. 

101 
Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged ImR) (mR) 

All Participants 1,130 140 11 

DOD Participants 14 140 23 

A study of cumulative radiation exposures of all participants from 14 February to 17 May 1963 during the period of cavity 

mining and drilling operations indicated the following results 

from film badge records: 

Maximum exposure, 230 mrem 

Average exposure, 137 mrem 

Minimum exposure, 35 mrem 

102 
CHAPTER 4 

DANNY BOY EVENT 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The DANNY BOY event was a DOD nuclear detonation test with a 

yield of 0.43 kt conducted at 1015 hours PST on 5 March 1962. 

DANNY BOY was designed to be a cratering experiment on the Buckboard Mesa in Area 18 of the NTS. The device was emplaced in a 

36-inch diameter shaft 110 feet below the surface elevation of 

5,477 feet MSL in a basalt formation, which is a competent, finegrained igneous rock. The resulting crater (Figure 4.1) was 62 

feet deep and 214 feet in diameter. The purpose of DANNY BOY was 

to produce information about the cratering mechanism, ground 

shock, earth motion, propagation of energy, and other effects related to a cratering-type nuclear detonation in basalt. There 

were 12 DOD scientific projects conducted by government agencies 

and contractors to obtain information. The release of radioactivity was detected both onsite and offsite. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.2.1 Responsibilities 

DANNY BOY was fielded by LRL for the DOD. A military officer of the CT0 Engineering and Construction Division served on 

the staff of the LRL Test Director and coordinated all DOD requirements through the LRL Engineering and Construction Division. 

The major DOD operational contributions were providing aircraft 

for cloud sampling and cloud tracking, and aircraft and helicopters for photography, radiation monitoring, and radiation 

detector probe experiments. In addition, teams for monitoring 

103 

and sampling the fallout area to five miles from SGZ were provided by the Army Chemical Corps Nuclear Defense Laboratory 

(NDL). 

Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in 

accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC 

Albuquerque Operations Office. Sandia Corporation was responsible for emplacing and detonating microbarograph HE shots. EG&G 

was responsible for providing and installing timing and firing 

circuits. LRL had responsibility for device emplacement and arming the device. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

In addition to drilling the emplacement shaft, it was necessary to construct radial roads to 25,000 feet from SGZ. The 

event would not be conducted unless predicted fallout was in the 

sector where fallout stations were located. A circle road was 

constructed at 2,500 feet from SGZ and arc roads were constructed 

in the sector at 5,000, 10,000, 17,000, and 25,000 feet from SGZ 

(see Figures 4.5 through 4.7 on pages 4-24 through 4-26). 

The "DANNY BOY Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to conduct safe and efficient recovery operations in the test area. The "Test Manager's Special 

Instructions and Schedule of Events for DANNY BOY" was compiled 

and distributed to participating organizations. 

Because the DANNY BOY event was expected to produce a radioactive effluent cloud, the DOD provided four Air Force B-57 aircraft for cloud sampling support. Air Force personnel established 

procedures for removing aircrews and sample filter papers from 

cloud sampling aircraft. 

105 
A. Radiological Safety Support 

The "Detailed Safety Support Plan, DANNY BOY EVENT," was 

prepared by Radsafe and distributed to participating 

agencies. Radsafe personnel stocked the Quonset T-265 

radsafe facility at Indian Springs AFB with film badges 

and anticontamination clothing and equipment in preparation for support of B-57 cloud sampling aircraft and 

other aircraft staging from ISAFB. 

Test area maps with appropriate reference points were 

prepared. Reference stakes, fallout trays, air sampling 

equipment, and film dosimeter packets were positioned 

prior to the test event. Party monitors were briefed regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and 

security requirements. 

Radsafe stationed a survey team at the Test Director's 

FCP 7.5 miles southeast of SGZ at one hour before detonation. This team was to provide emergency monitoring 

capability to the Test Director if needed. Additional 

Radsafe personnel established facilities at the FCP several days prior to the event. They manned a mobile decontamination facility, a telemetry readout trailer, and 

a check station trailer. The check station and decontamination trailers were to be moved into the test area 

after zero time to a location near and controlling access to radex areas. 

Radsafe personnel were to perform surveys and to provide 

emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and selfreading pocket dosimeters; operate area control check 

stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle 

decontamination as necessary. Personnel at manned sta106 
tions were provided anticontamination clothing and 

equipment, and Radsafe monitors were assigned as required. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

High-volume Staplex air samplers equipped with MSA 

organic cartridges and 8 x lo-inch glass fiber prefilters were positioned at the following locations: 

Area 12 Camp 

Near I, J, K Tunnel Portals (in Area 12) 

Area 15 

Area 9 Radsafe Base Station 

Station 700 Security Gate 

Well 3 

Area 400-401 

CP-2 Building 

Area 3 Radsafe Base Station 

Film badges and fallout trays were placed on access road 

stakes in the test area and adjacent areas, but not in 

the area from SGZ to five miles covered by the Army 

Chemical Corps NDL teams with their own film badges and 

fallout stations. 

B. Telemetry Support 

Permanent telemetry units were in operation at the following NTS locations during DANNY BOY (see Figure 1.5): 

1. G Tunnel (Area 12) 

107 
2. K Tunnel (Area 12) 

3. Area 12 Cafeteria 

4. Security Gate 700 (NE Corner NTS) 

5. Area 9, 9-800 Bunker 

6. BJY 

7. Area 3, 3-300 Bunker 

Test area Radsafe telemetry units were located as follows (see Figures 4.5 through 4.7): 

1. North, 5O west, 10,000 feet from SGZ 

2. North, 59" east, 13,000 feet from SGZ 

3. Below Mesa on access road, 6,500 feet east of SGZ 

4. On Mesa at rim, 2,500 feet east of SGZ 

5. North, 55O west, 7,500 feet from SGZ 

Test area LRL telemetry units all were located 2,500 

feet from SGZ as follows: 

1. North, 80" west 

2. North, 55O west 

3. North, 30° west 

4. North, 5O west 

5. North, 20" east 

6. North, 45O east 

Readout locations for telemetry units were at the FCP 

and Building CP-1. Measurements were relayed by telephone and net 3 radio. 

C. Security Coverage 

About four hours before planned zero time, security personnel began to muster all personnel entering or already 

in Area 18. Barricades and manned security stations were 

108 
in place and access to the area was controlled. Muster 

badges were issued which were required to be returned 

upon exit as a means of accounting for personnel in the 

controlled area. A screening station was arranged approximately 100 yards east of the FCP to direct visitors 

to the observer area. The final ground and air security 

sweeps of all closed areas were accomplished from three 

hours prior to scheduled device detonation until one and 

one-half hours prior to scheduled device detonation. By 

this time the area was cleared of all personnel except 

those in the arming party or who had specific authorization to be there, temporarily or at manned stations. 

D. Air Support 

Elements of the AFSWC 4900th Air Base Group provided 

U-3A aircraft and crews to perform low altitude cloud 

tracking and C-47 aircraft and crews for radio relay and 

courier missions. Elements of the 1211th Test Squadron 

(Sampling) were attached to ISAFB for ten days for this 

nuclear event. Their primary mission was cloud sampling, which included conducting the sampling mission, removing the sample filters, and packaging and loading the 

samples onto courier aircraft. Personnel from this unit 

also assisted REECo Radsafe in implementing radiological 

safety procedures and decontaminating aircraft, crews, 

and equipment at ISAFB. The 55th Weather Reconnaissance 

Squadron supplied one WB-50 aircraft and crew to perform 

high-altitude cloud tracking. 

Four USAF 'B-57's orbited near the area in readiness for 

cloud sampling at 15 minutes before detonation. The Air 

Force U-3A aircraft with PHS monitors aboard departed 

ISAFB for NTS and orbited near Area 18 until cleared by 

the Air Controller to fly over the event area and per109 
form cloud tracking. U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) personnel performed preevent and postevent aerial monitoring using airborne scintillation detector logging equipment. A USAF helicopter with pilot, Radsafe monitor, 

and an LRL photographer orbited upwind from SGZ to perform documentary photography. 

Two Marine Corps UH-43D helicopters, each manned by a 

pilot, co-pilot, and crewman, were at the FCP helicopter 

pad prepared to transport project personnel, place radiation dose rate recorders, and conduct radiation surveys 

with NDL monitors aboard. 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Activities conducted on 4 March (D-1 day) included the 

following: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

A Sandia representative assisted by four REECo personnel transported microbarograph HE and loaded it 

on three towers in the test area. 

Two Sandia personnel checked out air blast gauges 

located 200, 265, 350, 470, 630, 840, 1,120, 3,100, 

and 8,500 feet from SGZ. 

Four DOD personnel photographed the terrain within 

1,000 feet of SGZ. 

Ten three-man teams of NDL and LRL personnel completed installation of fallout stations and replaced 

background film badges installed three days earlier. 

Four Armour Research Foundation (ARF) and four REECo 

personnel emplaced objects on the surface and onefoot deep within a 270-degree sector between 25-foot 

and 120-foot radii of SGZ. 

One team of eight Waterways Experiment Station (WES) 

and LRL personnel conducted data recovery dry runs 

110 
at the trailer park one mile southeast of SGZ. A 

second team of four personnel observed the procedures. 

7. A team of two EG&G personnel placed "Beer Mug" dosimeters (named for the shape of the metal containers) at 250-foot intervals from SGZ out to 1,250 

feet on four radials. 

8. Three WES and LRL personnel assisted by four REECo 

personnel spread tarpaulins within a 200-foot circle 

around SGZ. 

9. Five two-man teams from EG&G began loading photo 

stations at 1000 hours. 

10. A Test Manager's weather briefing was held at 1600 

hours in the Conference Room of Building CP-1. 

11. The final Area 18 dry run was conducted at 1800 

hours. 

4.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

From midnight until three hours before scheduled detonation, 

five WES and LRL personnel performed final button up of instrumentation at the one-mile trailer park. From midnight until two 

hours before planned detonation, four DOD and Stanford Research 

Institute (SRI) personnel photographed the terrain within a 

l,OOO-foot radius of SGZ. 

From eight until seven hours before scheduled detonation, 

LRL and REECo personnel lowered the device cannister in the 

shaft, and stemming of the shaft began six hours before zero 

time. Two Sandia personnel armed the microbarograph charges at 

five hours before planned zero time. 

From six hours to three hours before planned zero time, four 

ARF and four REECo personnel placed small objects on the surface 

111 
within a 25-foot circle around SGZ and within a 120-foot radius 

in a go-degree sector. 

The USAF pilot and security guard sweeping Area 18 in an L20 aircraft from three hours until one and one-half hours before 

planned detonation confirmed that no unauthorized traffic was in 

the test area or approaching over outlying rough terrain. 

At two hours before planned detonation, three manned station 

parties entered the area. Two were Sandia two-man teams. The 

third and closest team was a seven-man DOD photography unit stationed 22,500 feet southwest of SGZ to perform still and motion 

picture photography of the event. 

The final Test Manager's weather briefing was held at CP-1 

at 0815 hours, two hours before planned detonation. The area was 

clear of all except manned station and arming party personnel by 

0845 hours. After receiving permission from the Test Manager and 

Test Group Director at 0845 hours, the LRL and EG&G team armed 

the device and departed SGZ. 

Thirty minutes before scheduled detonation, announcements 

were made and countdowns began on loudspeakers and radio nets 1, 

2, 6, and 8. Fifteen minutes later, support aircraft departed 

ISAFB and the photography helicopter was orbiting upwind from 

SGZ. At 10 minutes before zero time, the siren on Building CP-1 

was turned on for 30 seconds, and CP-1 red lights were turned on 

until after the detonation. A 2,400-pound HE microbarograph shot 

was fired at two minutes before zero time. 

DANNY BOY zero time was 1015 hours PST on 5 March 1962. 

The nuclear detonation produced a persistent cloud containing appreciable quantities of radioactivity associated with dust 

particles. The cloud grew rapidly to a width of about 3,000 feet 

112 
and a height of about 1,000 feet above ground. After approximately three minutes, the continuing growth was controlled primarily by diffusion, the cloud height was 1,400 feet, and the 

cloud was moving rapidly downwind. 

The microbarograph shot scheduled to be fired at three minutes after zero time detonated at zero time for an unknown reason. The zero plus five-minute shot fired on time. 

4.3.1 Cloud Sampling and Tracking 

After observing cloud formation for a few minutes, the four 

USAF B-57 cloud sampling aircraft began sampling. An LRL scientific controller in one of the aircraft evaluated cloud structure 

and determined cloud locations where samples would be collected. 

Samples were collected and aircraft departed by 1040 hours. Aircraft landed at ISAFB, aircrews left the aircraft, and cloud sample filter papers were removed by 1115 hours. 

The U-3A aircraft entered the area at 1041 hours at which 

time a reading of 2 R/h was obtained at 8,000 feet MSL (SGZ elevation was 5,474 feet MSL). The aircraft then followed above the 

west edge of the cloud at 9,000 feet MSL on a 305 degree bearing 

for eight miles. At 1125 hours the cloud was centered eight 

miles southeast of Mellan, Nevada, a deserted town, where it 

topped at 8,000 feet MSL. From an altitude of 9,000 feet the 

peak reading was 250 mR/h. Cloud width was approximately five 

miles. 

A snow storm was encountered above Highway 6, making further 

tracking impossible. At 1307 hours, the aircraft returned over 

SGZ at an altitude of 7,500 feet MSL where a reading of 4 R/h was 

measured. All readings were gross gamma as measured inside the 

aircraft and were not corrected for aircraft attenuation which 

probably was in the range of 30 to 50 percent. 

113 
The cloud first was detected by offsite PHS ground monitors 

at 1106 hours near Jackpot Reservoir, Nevada, 27.5 miles from SGZ 

on a bearing of 357 degrees. On moving into the cloud path, a 

peak of 400 mR/h was measured at 1118 hours 24.2 miles from SGZ 

at 348 degrees. Also at this distance, the cloud was detected 

over a width of 13 miles. On a second road crossing, a cloud 

pattern peak reading of 130 mR/h was measured at 1140 hours 41.5 

miles from SGZ on a bearing of 344 degrees, which is 2 miles 

southwest of Mellan, Nevada. Seven minutes later, in Mellan, the 

reading was 4.0 mR/h. 

Cloud arrival time at fallout station 1119 on old Highway 

25 was 1137 hours. This station indicated a peak reading of 56 

mR/h at 1149 hours. The level of activity dropped to 33 mR/h at 

1151 hours. Then it fluctuated between 20 and 42 mR/h until 

dropping to 15 mR/h at 1208 hours. The remaining activity of 10 

mR/h at 1210 hours appeared to be fallout deposited during cloud 

passage. Cloud width, as determined by offsite ground monitoring 

at this distance, was 21 miles, with a peak near the middle, 

about two miles east of Mellan. 

At 1230 hours, the cloud was located on Highway 6 at a distance of 72 miles from SGZ and 8.7 miles west of Warm Springs on 

a bearing of 354 degrees. A peak reading of 3.2 mR/h was measured 17.7 miles west of Warm Springs on a bearing of 345 degrees 

from SGZ at 1246 hours. Ground monitoring indicated the cloud 

width was 22 miles crossing Highway 6. No activity was found 

along Highway 8-A or on Route 82 through Belmont, Nevada. 

USGS aerial monitoring with scintillation detector logging 

equipment before the event and two days after detonation allowed 

normalization of the offsite fallout pattern to exposure rates at 

one hour after detonation. The resulting contours are shown in 

Figure 4.2. 

114 
GOLDFIELD l 

I 1 ’ 1 I 

0 6 10 15 20 

STATUTE MILES 

Figure 4.2 DANNY BOY Contours of Gamma Radiation in mR/h 

Normalized to H+l Hour from USGS Aerial Survey Data 

115 
4.3.2 Test Area Monitoring 

Radsafe telemetry units 2,500 and 6,500 feet east of SGZ indicated 500 mR/h one minute after detonation. One minute later, 

the 6,500-foot unit indicated background and the unit 2,500 feet 

east of SGZ continued to indicate 500 mR/h. At four minutes 

after zero time, the unit 10,000 feet north (downwind) of SGZ indicated 1,500 mR/h, but the unit 2,500 feet east of SGZ suffered 

mechanical failure. 

The unit 10,000 feet north of SGZ indicated increasing gamma 

radiation intensities as the cloud rapidly passed over the location and fallout occurred. The maximum reading was 120 R/h at 

1024 hours. Decreasing readings indicated cloud passage and 

fallout had occurred by 1034 hours, and resuspension of telemetry-detectable activity by high winds had ceased at 1125 hours. 

Winds on the surface at zero time had been 12 knots from 168", 

increasing to 27 knots from 190' at 3,500 feet above the surface. 

Table 4.1 shows Radsafe telemetry measurements in the test 

area. Permanent Radsafe units at other NTS locations indicated 

only background after DANNY BOY. Records of LRL telemetry measurements are not available. However, these measurements were incorporated with Radsafe telemetry in normalizing NDL ground monitoring data to exposure rate contours at one hour after detonation, as discussed later in this section. 

Marine Corps helicopters provided support for test area 

monitoring, transport of monitoring and project personnel, and 

placement of radiation detection equipment for NDL, LRL, and WES 

personnel after the event. Exact times for these activities are 

not available, but times listed in the Test Manager's "Schedule 

of Events" and the *'Reentry Schedule" are used below. 

About 30 minutes after zero time, the two Marine Corps UH116 
TIME 

(PST) 

N 5” W 

10,000' 

N 59” E 

13.000' 

1016 Bkg Bkg 

1017 Bkg Bkg 

1019 1.50 Bkg 

1020 5.00 Bkg 

1021 15.00 Bkg 

1022 25.00 Bkg 

1023 65.00 CO.50 

1023 90.00 Bk9 

1024 120.00 Bk9 

1024 52.00 Bk9 

1025 35.00 Bk9 

1025 20.00 Bk9 

1026 14.00 Bk9 

1027 12.50 Bk9 

1028 10.00 Bk9 

1029 5.00 Bk9 

1030 4.50 Bk9 

1031 4.00 Bk9 

1032 3.75 Bk9 

1033 3.00 Bk9 

1034 3.00 Bk9 

1035 2.75 Bk9 

1036 2.50 Bk9 

1037 2.50 Bk9 

1038 2.30 Bk9 

1040 2.20 Bk9 

1041 2.10 Bk9 

1042 2.00 Bk9 

1043 2.00 Bk9 

1045 1.80 Bk9 

1047 1.60 Bk9 

1050 1.40 Bk9 

1055 1.20 Bk9 

1100 0.90 Bk9 

1105 0.75 Bk9 

1110* 1.50 Bk9 

1111 1.00 Bk9 

1112 1.00 Bk9 

1113 0.70 Bk9 

1114 1.00 Bk9 

1115 1.30 Bk9 

TABLE 4.1 

DANNY BOY EVENT 

RADSAFE TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS IN TEST AREA 

(Gamma Radiation in R/h) 

BELOW MESA 

6,500' 

EAST 

ON MESA 

2,500' 

EAST 

0.50 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

0.50 

0.50 

Mechanical 

failure of 

detector 

N 55” W 

7,500’ 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

0.50 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

‘Jk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Rk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

Bk9 

*Increases in measurements attributed to 

high winds disturbing surface activity. 

117 
TABLE 4.1 (Concluded) 

TIME N 5" w N 59’ E 

PST) 10.000' 13,000' 

1116 1.00 

1117 0.80 

1118 1.50 

1119 0.60 

1120 0.50 

1122 0.70 

1125 CO.50 

1127 <0.50 

1130 co.50 

1135 co.50 

1140 0.50 

1150 CO.50 

1200 x0.50 

1212 co.50 

1220 X0.50 

1230 CO.50 

1245 co.50 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bk9 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

Bkg Bkg 

BELOW MESA 

6,500' 

EAST 

ON MESA 

2,500' 

EAST 

N 55' W 

7,500' 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

118 
43D helicopters and crews transporting NDL monitoring teams left 

the FCP pad and monitored exposure rates at the south Buckboard 

Mesa pad, one-mile trailer park, and along the 5,000-foot and 

lO,OOO-foot arc roads. One NDL monitoring team was transported 

to the south pad and one to the intersection of 25,000-foot arc 

road with west radial road where prepositioned vehicles were 

available. The south pad monitoring team proceeded to the onemile trailer park with instructions not to proceed beyond 1 R/h. 

Two dose rate recorders were lowered by helicopter, one in 

the crater and one on the lip of the crater. This helicopter 

then performed aerial surveys of the radiation area using a probe 

lowered near the ground to determine exposure rates in areas not 

accessible to ground surveys teams. The second Marine Corps helicopter orbited outside the radiation area during placement of 

recorders to perform rescue service if necessary. 

About 90 minutes after zero time, the second helicopter commenced shuttling project personnel to the south Mesa pad for data 

recovery. Also at this time, additional NDL monitoring teams approached the Mesa by vehicle from the FCP, and a total of 10 twoman NDL teams began ground radiation surveys of the test area 

within five miles of SGZ. 

Because the teams encountered difficulty traversing rough 

terrain and their instructions limited radiation exposure rates 

they could enter, much of the close-in exposure rate contour pattern was not surveyed on event day. Subsequent NDL survey data 

combined with LRL and Radsafe telemetry data allowed normalizing 

the close-in exposure rate contours to one hour after zero time. 

These contours are shown in Figure 4.3. The NDL teams also 

placed three exposure rate recording units in the downwind area 

where exposure rates were between 1 and 5 R/h. 

After completion of the first ground surveys about two hours 

119 
Figure 4.3 DANNY BOY Close-in Exposure Rate 

Contours in R/h Normalized to H+l Hour 

120 
after zero time, six teams with one NDL and one LRL monitor each 

entered the area to perform resurveys, recover film badges, and 

collect fallout trays. Resurveys continued until dusk. 

An EG&G aerial monitoring team performed a radiation survey 

from five until seven hours after detonation time in the intermediate area from less than five to about 24 miles from SGZ. 

These measurements were integrated with the NDL close-in data and 

the USGS aerial monitoring results to normalize exposure rate 

contours at one hour after detonation as shown in Figure 4.4. 

4.3.3 Other Project Activities 

Recovery operations began about 90 minutes after zero time. 

Microbarograph firing sites were checked for unburned HE, and 

equipment was removed by Sandia and REECo personnel. Air blast 

gauges from 200 feet to 8,500 feet from SGZ were recovered by 

Sandia personnel. 

Three SRI and LRL personnel photographed the terrain within 

1,000 feet of SGZ by helicopter while EC&G and LRL personnel recovered films from photography stations on the surface. Four SRI 

personnel accompanied by a Radsafe monitor performed ground-level 

photography within 1,000 feet of SGZ. 

Four LRL personnel recovered data from the one-mile trailer 

park, two USC&GS personnel recovered data from seismic stations, 

and two EG&G personnel recovered "Beer Mug" dosimeters on four 

radials to within 250 feet of SGZ. Two WES personnel proceeded 

via helicopter to recover data from the WES trailer. 

4.3.4 Radsafe Activities 

The 45 aircrew and ground crew personnel who had been provided anticontamination clothing and equipment, self-reading 

121 
Data tohen from : 

N D L Ground surveys (closcin ) 

EGG Acrml survcy(mtcrmcd~olc rongc) 

USGS Aerial survey I long rongc) 

Figure 4.4 DANNY BOY Intermediate Range Exposure 

Rate Contours in R/h Normalized to H+l Hour 

122 
pocket dosimeters, and film badges were processed through the 

ISAFB radsafe facilities after sampling aircraft had returned and 

samples had been recovered. Pocket dosimeters and film badges 

were collected, personnel were monitored before and after anticontamination clothing was removed, and personnel were decontaminated as necessary before they dressed in their own clothing. 

Maximum gamma readings of 20 mR/h were detected on anticontamination gloves. 

Film badges issued, collected, and processed included 20 experimental film badges which had been positioned in the four 

cloud-sampling aircraft, eight film badges worn by sampling aircraft pilots, 26 worn by sample recovery and maintenance crews, 

and eight worn by helicopter pilots. Maximum gamma measurements 

on the sampling aircraft were several R/h before removal of sample filters and 1.5 R/h after removal. 

Personnel entering DANNY BOY radex areas were issued anticontamination clothing and equipment before entry, were monitored 

and decontaminated as necessary upon exit, and had their film 

badges exchanged. Security personnel controlled access to the 

test area according to the Test Manager's "Schedule of Events" 

and release of parties by the LRL Test Director. 

At 1243 hours, the Radsafe check station and decontamination 

trailers were moved from the FCP to a location 2.9 miles southeast of SGZ on the access road to Area 18. All film badges exchanged on event day were processed by midnight, and a special 

exposure report was prepared for the next day. Use of Radsafe 

Area Access Registers, with pocket dosimeter readings noted upon 

exit, was not implemented until control of the test area was delegated to Radsafe the day after DANNY BOY. 

The special report was used in place of Access Register 

pocket dosimeter readings in alerting Radsafe to personnel who 

123 
were approaching accumulated exposure amounts of 5,000 mrem per 

year or 3,000 mrem per calendar quarter, the AEC guidelines. 

Individuals and their organizational supervisors were notified 

when personnel had accumulated 4,500 mrem per year or 2,500 mrem 

per calendar quarter. 

4.4 POSTEVENT AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

Radsafe established radex area controls in Area 18 the morning after detonation of DANNY BOY. Surveys of the test area were 

performed to establish the 10, 100, and 1,000 mR/h exposure rate 

contour lines. This D+l survey was repeated on D+2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 

8, 10, 17, and 24. Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show the D+l, 2, 

and 3 surveys, respectively. In addition to contracting as radioactivity decayed, the 10 mR/h line shifted with water movement on 

the surface. Detailed surveys in exposure rates up to 5 R/h were 

made near the crater and on the crater lip. Monitoring data were 

transmitted to NDL personnel for correlation with their monitoring results. 

Test areas and all contaminated or radioactive materials 

were marked to indicate radiation levels. Personnel entering 

radiation areas or working with contaminated material were 

briefed concerning potential exposures and safety precautions, 

and were provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and 

materials. 

After use, anticontamination clothing and equipment were 

laundered and returned to stock for subsequent reissue. Items 

which could not be decontaminated to permissible levels were buried at the designated disposal site. 

On D+l, radiation measurements on cloud sampling aircraft at 

ISAFB were down to 20 mR/h generally and 40 mR/h maximum. Air124 
\ 10 mRlh 

Figure 4.5 DANNY BOY D-plus-One 

125 
For Graphic Pur~oae: Not to Scale 

SURVEY: D-plus-Two 

DATE: 03/07/62 

Figure 4.6 DANNY BOY D-plus-Two 

126 
Figure 4.7 DANNY BOY D-plus-Three 

127 
craft decontamination was not required because radioactivity soon 

would decay below Air Force limits of 20 mR/h for fresh fission 

products. 

4.4.1 Continued Recovery Operations 

Radsafe supported various groups and agencies in the recovery of samples and equipment from the test area. Support consisted of sample monitoring, personnel monitoring, contamination 

control, and decontamination. 

Ten two-man NDL monitoring teams reentered the area the 

morning of D+l and resurveyed all stations which had exposure 

rates below 5 R/h. They also recovered fallout collectors not 

recovered on D-day, moved exposure rate recorders to higher radiation intensity locations, and recovered film badges not recovered on D-day. The same actions were repeated that afternoon 

after further decay of radioactivity. Aerial surveys with Marine 

Corps helicopters of areas not accessible to ground monitoring 

vehicles also were repeated beginning at 0700 hours. 

A party of WES and LRL personnel, REECo laborers, and a 

Radsafe monitor performed data collection from tarpaulins outside 

the 100 mR/h exposure rate contour. 

Radsafe had positioned an array of adhesive-surfaced sample 

collectors and 94 standard NTS film packets at quarter-mile intervals along the Area 18 access road to Buckboard Mesa, and on 

access roads to adjacent areas. Collectors and film badges were 

positioned 22 February, picked up 28 March, and processed 29 

March. Fallout collector data were negative because collectors 

were not in the pattern. However, film badge data showed positive integrated exposures for several stations east to southeast 

of SGZ on the Mesa. The maximum exposure was 5 R at a station 

5,000 feet due east of SGZ. 

128 
Twenty-four-hour monitoring surveillance was required for 

several days after the event. Radsafe monitors accompanied 

personnel entering the area and provided routine radiological 

safety support and information on radiation levels. 

Monitoring surveillance of the test area continued for several weeks during daylight hours. A perimeter fence was erected 

around the crater area to facilitate area control. 

4.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling for core samples was performed during May 

1962 from outside the crater lip area. On 22 May 1962, the helicopter crash discussed in the next chapter occurred in the crater. Subsequently, work was done to remove the helicopter wreckage to determine the accident cause. On the southwest side of 

the crater, crater-lip rock was removed and a road 200 feet long 

and 20 feet wide was constructed to the edge of the crater. The 

exposed crater-lip rubble was more than 20 feet high near the 

sides of the road. The wreckage was winched up to this road for 

removal. 

Core drilling outside the crater lip continued intermittently into 1963. In April and May 1963, WES personnel utilized the 

helicopter removal road to drill near the crater rim. A hole 

slanted toward GZ was drilled in the trench 50 feet from the crater edge with a truck-mounted core drill. 

Maximum personnel exposure rates during this drilling were 

10 mR/h at the side of the trench, 7 mR/h at the crater rim, and 

5 mR/h at the core drill. The maximum contact reading with a 

core sample was 50 mR/h on a piece of fused glass. This drilling 

was completed in early May, and several more coring holes were 

drilled at distances up to 450 feet from the crater lip. The 

last hole was drilled from 7 August to 16 August 1963 210 feet 

129 
west of the crater. All cores taken to the maximum depth of 141 

feet measured background, and the personnel exposure rate at this 

location was about 1 mR/h. 

4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry units in operation during DANNY BOY did not indicate radiation above background except in the test area. The 

four units near the fallout pattern measured maximum levels of 

500 mR/h. The unit in the pattern and 10,000 feet north of SGZ 

measured a maximum of 120 R/h nine minutes after detonation, 

which decreased to less than 500 mR/h by 135 minutes after detonation. The maximum integrated exposure determined with Radsafe 

film badges on roads near the pattern was 5 R at 5,000 feet due 

east of SGZ. 

Personnel film badges were exchanged after the event when 

personnel exited the radex area. All film badges exchanged at 

Area 18 on 5 March were processed by 2400 hours that night, and a 

computer report was prepared. Exposures for Area 18 film badges 

processed 5 March are summarized as follows: 

All 

DOD 

Maximum Average 

No. of Positive Exposure Exposure 

Exposures (mR) (mR) 

Participants 81 1,780 133 

Participants 47 1,780 161 

Maximum exposures indicated by the 20 experimental and 42 

personnel film badges turned in at ISAFB were as follows: 

Experimental 500 mR 

Sampling pilots - 295 mR 

Ground crew 30 mR 

Helicopter pilots - 1,700 mR 

130 
Personnel exposures received on individual entries to DANNY 

BOY radex areas from 6 March 1962 through 13 March 1962 are summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 210 695 47 

DOD Participants 164 580 40 

As was expected, the DANNY BOY event resulted in high levels 

of airborne radioactivity and fallout close in, but by the time 

the cloud had traveled about 35 miles, both had decreased to a 

small fraction of the levels detected at 10 miles. 

The PHS offsite radiological safety organization determined 

that no harmful exposure of the offsite population occurred after 

the DANNY BOY event. 

131 
CHAPTER 5 

MARSHMALLOW EVENT 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The MARSHMALLOW event was a DOD underground detonation with 

a yield less than 20 kt conducted at 1000 hours Pacific Daylight 

Time (PDT) on 28 June 1962 at tunnel site U16a (Figure 5.1) in 

Area 16 of the NTS. The device was emplaced 2,130 feet from the 

tunnel portal with 1,000 feet of overburden. The MARSHMALLOW 

event was a weapons effects test. Effects of a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials at a simulated high 

altitude were studied. High altitude simulation was accomplished 

by establishing a vacuum in a large diameter LOS pipe more than 

800 feet long. Desired information was obtained through 27 DOD 

scientific projects conducted by government agencies and contractors. Radioactive effluent released by this detonation was 

detected onsite only. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all MARSHMALLOW project activities in Area 16. This responsibility was in effect from the time the device was moved into the 

area until completion of recovery operations. Responsibilites of 

AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action 

between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC Albuquerque Operations 

Office. LRL provided the device, EG&G provided firing circuits 

and timing signals, and SC was responsible for stemming and de132 

vice arming. Experiments were fielded for the DOD by EG&G, Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC), SRI, Allied Research, 

American Science and Engineering, USC&GS, AFSWC, and FCDASA. The 

DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

Work necessary to conduct the MARSHMALLOW event and scientific projects included excavation of tunnels totalling 3,005 

feet in length, construction of alcoves and shield walls, installation of coaxial cable and mechanical systems, and fabrication 

of the vacuum system. Figure 5.2 shows plan and section views of 

the MARSHMALLOW underground complex. Figure 5.3 shows portal 

area facilities and the trailer park, which compares with Figure 

5.1 at a different orientation. 

Above ground recovery of data was necessary as soon as possible after the event due to radiation sensitivity of the records. Underground recovery of data was of secondary importance, 

but it was desirable to accomplish this as quickly as practical. 

The "MARSHMALLOW Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to conduct a safe and economical reentry within the desired time frame. Stemming design incorporated necessary provisions to maximize safety of reentry. A 

14-inch diameter vertical vent hole to the surface was to provide 

pressure relief to protect the blast door and to provide ventilation exhaust for early reentry. 

Because the 'q' was a large unsupported span and otherwise 

would be especially vulnerable to collapse, a sand plug was installed at that point to provide support. A six-foot diameter 

pipe was installed through the plug into the LOS tunnel to provide access during reentry. Sandbags were to be used to plug the 

134 
PLAN VIEW 

MANWAYS TO EACH TUNNEL 

2100’ 

/ 

ACCESS 

TUNNEL 

1 ” 

PORTAL i-L-----zcii 

TUNNEL BUNKER COAX TO TRAILER PARK 

0 200 400 500 800 1000 ,200 1400 1500 le.00 2000 2200 

ZERO POlNT TUNNEL IN FEET 

SECTION VIEW 

Figure 5.2 Plan and Section Views, MARSHMALLOW Event 
136 
reentry pipe temporarily for the detonation. 

Air sampling pipes were installed through the blast door and 

into the EG&G camera bunker to determine conditions forward of 

these points during reentry. Lead plates were to be dropped over 

the camera ports in the camera bunker after zero time to shield 

film from transient radiation in the tunnel. A block and tackle 

were installed on the camera bunker door to aid in removal should 

the door be jammed. 

Spare blowers for vent lines and the vent hole were available in case those installed before the event were damaged. 

Instructions and equipment requirements established in the 

reentry plan included the following teams: 

1. Reentry Control Group and Technical Advisors 

2. Surface Radiation Monitoring and Aerial Survey 

3. Trailer Surface Film Recovery 

4. Tunnel Reentry Party 

5. Tunnel Work Party 

6. Rescue Party 

7. Tunnel Film Recovery 

8. HE Disposal Group 

9. Medical Support Team 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed procedures for initial reentry were submitted 

to participating agencies prior to the test event. Test 

area maps with appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference stakes, fallout trays, radiation decay 

recorders, air sampling equipment, film dosimeter packets, and other dosimetric devices were positioned in the 

test area. Reentry routes into the test area were estab137 
lished during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed 

regarding manned stations, reentry, sample recovery, and 

security station requirements. 

All personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and 

Radsafe monitors were in attendance. Radsafe provided 

monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for aerial 

surveys by helicopter, initial surface radiation surveys, and tunnel reentry parties. 

Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP prior to 

detonation to perform surveys and provide emergency 

support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination 

equipment, portable instruments and dosimeters; operate 

area control check stations; and perform personnel, 

equipment and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry Support 

RAMS units were installed and calibrated at the 

following underground and surface locations for 

MARSHMALLOW: 

Underground Locations: 

1. Outside gas seal door 

2. Inside gas seal door 

3. Outside Y (1,230 feet from device) 

138 
4. Camera Bunker 

5. Crossdrift 8+65 (865 feet from device) 

6. Crossdrift 8+00 (800 feet from device) 

Surface Locations: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

Intersection of main access and FCP roads 

Main road at portal pad 

Tunnel Portal 

One-half mile from trailer park 

One-quarter mile from trailer park 

Transformer station 

Outside trailer park - north 

Outside trailer park - south 

Inside trailer park - south 

Inside trailer park - north 

Vent line, southeast 

Vent line, northwest 

Three miles south of portal 

Readout was at the Test Director's FCP. All readings 

were to be reported via net 3 radio. 

C. Security Coverage 

At 1800 hours on 27 June 1962, muster and control stations were established as follows: 

1. main control and muster station on the main access 

road into Area 16 (5,000 feet east of the portal); 

2. manned control station on the Pole Line Road in Area 

16, two miles east of GZ; 

3. manned control station on the junction of roads running north, south, east, and west, 5,000 feet south 

of the Area 16 border; and 

139 
4. manned control station west of GZ, approximately 

2,500 feet west of the Area 16 border on access road 

to the drill rig area above U16a portal. 

D. Air Support 

An Air Force H-21 helicopter with a pilot, crew chief, 

Radsafe health physicist, and Radsafe electronics specialist were to monitor the portal and scientific trailer 

areas immediately after the detonation to determine if 

any release of radioactivity might damage data recording 

films before ground recovery could be accomplished. If 

such damage could occur, the helicopter was to pick up 

recovery personnel and land on a pad constructed on the 

trailers, thus allowing personnel to retrieve trailer 

park films before damage could occur. 

In preparation for monitoring ground radiation levels, 

radiation detection instruments were calibrated over the 

DANNY BOY crater on 22 May 1962. Engine problems caused 

the H-21 to collide with the crater lip and crash upside-down as shown in Figure 5.4. The pilot, crew chief, 

health physicist, and electronics specialist all were 

assigned 115 mR external exposure on the basis of the 

health physicist's film badge, as the other film badges 

were lost in the crash. Internal exposures occurred, 

but were not assigned as only qualitative analysis data 

were available during medical treatment of personnel 

injuries, which took precedence. 

After the Air Force H-21 crashed, a Marine Corps UH-43D 

helicopter was assigned to this monitoring and possible 

recovery operation. 

An aerial survey of any radioactive cloud released was 

140 

to be conducted by a team of two PHS personnel in an Air 

Force U-3A aircraft, manned by an Air Force pilot and 

co-pilot. Radiation detection equipment carried included a Precision Model 111 scintillator with an added 

transistorized amplifier feeding an Esterline-Angus 

strip chart recorder, an EG&G aerial monitor, a Beckman 

MX-5 detection instrument and an AN/PDR-39 survey instrument. 

A DOD party in an Air Force H-21 helicopter was to orbit 

upwind from GZ from 15 minutes before device detonation 

to 45 minutes afterward providing photography coverage. 

An Air Force L-20 aircraft and pilot with a security 

officer were to perform a security sweep from two hours 

until 30 minutes before planned device detonation. 

5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

DOD and Allied Research personnel measured voltage differences between six electrodes placed in a line at 250-foot intervals on the surface. LMSC personnel calibrated instrumentation 

at two recording trailers and conducted dry runs with their 

equipment, both at the trailers and at instrument alcoves in the 

tunnel. FCDASA personnel supervised readiness and final button 

up of the tunnel experiment area. 

SRI and EG&G personnel loaded film in cameras located in 

photography stations in the tunnel and on the surface. SRI personnel performed final checkout of electronic equipment. EG&G 

personnel monitored pumps and the overall vacuum system. LMSC 

and Special Weapons Center (SWC) personnel installed detonators 

for conventional explosives systems in the tunnel. 

A Test Manager's weather briefing was held at 1600 hours on 

27 June. The decision was made to proceed with preparations for 

142 
the test, and security muster and control stations were established at 1800 hours. 

5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

On D-day, SWC and LMSC personnel completed installation of 

detonators and armed the camera and closure systems. DOD and 

Allied Research personnel made additional voltage measurements at 

surface electrodes. EG&G personnel made final alignment checks, 

and loaded cameras and oscilloscopes. 

All personnel were clear of the tunnel by six hours before 

zero time. Five hours before scheduled device detonation, the 

arming party departed the control trailer for U16a. For the next 

three hours, the arming party performed final arming in the tunnel, then returned to the control point. 

Three hours prior to planned detonation, the main control 

and muster station was moved to a position near the Forward 

Control Point and observer area, approximately two miles east of 

U16a portal. A manned control station was established 12,500 

feet north of the portal, just south of the Area 16 Camp. A 

manned control station was established on the Tippipah Springs 

Road on the west border of Area 16. Initial recovery parties 

were staged near the observer area on the Pole Line Road, which 

ran west toward the tunnel portal. 

The final weather briefing for the Test Manager and Advisory 

Panel was conducted at 0700 hours, three hours before zero time. 

The arming party requested and received permission from the Test 

Group Director to arm the device at this time. After three hours 

prior to scheduled device detonation, the Pole Line Road was the 

only road open to Area 16. All personnel were clear of the con143 
trolled area at this time except the arming party and others who 

were authorized. 

From two hours prior to scheduled detonation until 30 

minutes prior to planned detonation the L-20 aircraft made a 

final security sweep of the closed portion of Area 16 and the 

surrounding rough terrain to assure that no unauthorized personnel were approaching the area. 

The U-3A cloud monitoring aircraft departed ISAFB at 40 minutes before zero time. The H-21 photography helicopter was orbiting 1,500 feet south of SGZ at an altitude of about 800 feet 

above ground at 15 minutes before zero time. The low-altitude 

monitoring helicopter that crashed had been replaced with a Marine Corps UH-43D helicopter, and it was orbiting 1,500 feet north 

of SGZ about 800 feet above the ground at 15 minutes before zero 

time. 

Required countdowns began on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 8. At 

10 minutes prior to detonation the siren on the CP-1 building ran 

for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the building were 

turned on until after detonation. 

MARSHMALLOW zero time was 1000 hours PDT on 28 June 1962. 

Immediately following detonation, a small dust cloud was 

observed over SGZ. Two passes were made over this cloud by Air 

Force and PHS personnel in the U-3A aircraft: one at 1006 hours 

and 7,100 feet MSL and the other at 1009 hours and 6,000 feet. 

The portal area elevation is 5,430 feet MSL. On both passes, 

readings were at background levels. 

During this time, a low-altitude helicopter survey of the 

portal and trailer park areas was begun. Indicated ground level 

exposure rates were considerably less than amounts necessary to 

144 
damage film records in the trailer park. Radiation levels of 

several R/h and increasing were indicated in a localized area 

around the vent pipe from 15 to 20 minutes after zero time. However, this effluent was more than 600 feet upslope from the 

trailer park, was diluted rapidly as it rose and moved north, and 

would not affect films in the trailer park area. 

The U-3A aircraft detected 0.2 mR/h at 1012 hours flying 400 

feet from the portal. Effluent from the vent pipe and portal was 

monitored as the low-level cloud moved north toward Area 12. The 

highest reading in the cloud was 8 mR/h 200 feet above the surface and one-half mile north of SGZ at 1038 hours. The highest 

reading in the portal area was 32 mR/h at 1042 hours, 100 feet 

from the entrance to the tunnel. 

Estimated cloud width three miles north of SGZ was one mile, 

and at Area 12 Camp, the cloud was four miles wide and centered 

over the Camp. Measurements below 5 mR/h were with Precision 111 

Scintillator detectors, below 20 mR/h with Beckman MX-5 GM 

instruments, and above 20 mR/h with AN/PDR 39/TlB survey instruments. Table 5.1 lists readings obtained by PHS monitors 

during the aerial survey. 

5.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry units on the surface read background until five 

minutes after detonation when 18 mR/h was indicated by units 

north and south of the vent hole. These readings increased rapidly to 14 R/h at 15 minutes after zero time, and to a maximum of 

200 R/h at 1125 hours. Intensities generally decreased but fluctuated thereafter at the vent hole. Readings from the two units 

were 3.5 and 6 R/h by midnight. 

The two units inside the trailer park read background until 

they failed to respond at 12 minutes after zero time. Units 

145 
TABLE 5.1 

MARSHMALLOW EVENT 

PHS AERIAL RADIATION SURVEY RESULTS 

28 June 1962 

Time Location 

Elevation (feet) 

(MSL unless Gamma 

otherwise noted) (mR/h) 

1006 

1009 

1012 

1022 

1035 

1038 

1038 

1039 

1042 

1045 

1056 

1057 

1100 

1104 

1122 

1123 

1127 

1127 

1135 

SGZ 

SGZ 

SGZ 

SGZ 

One mile N of SGZ 

One mile N of SGZ 

One half mile N of SGZ 

Portal 

Portal 

One mile N of SGZ 

Area 12 Camp 

One mile S of Area 12 Camp 

3 miles N of SGZ 

Portal 

Area 12 Camp 

One mile S of Area 12 Camp 

One mile N of SGZ 

Portal 

Area 12 Camp 

7100 Bkg* 

6000 Bkg 

400 above portal 0.2 

6800 4.0 

7000 1.0 

200 above surface 3.0 

200 above surface 8.0 

100 above portal 14.0 

100 above portal 32.0 

7000 1.0 

7100 Bkg 

7000 0.5 

7000 1.5 

200 above portal 8.0 

7000 0.1 

7000 0.3 

7000 2.0 

200 above portal 20.0 

7000 0.4 

*Background Radiation Measurement 

146 
north and south outside the trailer park measured 1 mR/h and 3 

mR/h, respectively, nine minutes after zero time, indicated 2 R/h 

and 1.2 R/h 20 minutes after zero time, and fluctuated below 100 

mR/h the rest of the day. Generally higher readings at the 

trailer park during the night apparently resulted from descending 

cooler air bringing radioactive gases down from the vent pipe 

about 600 feet away. 

The tunnel portal unit indicated background until 15 minutes 

after zero time when it measured 6.5 mR/h. The maximum portal 

reading on event day was 70 mR/h at 1430 hrs, and this unit indicated 3 mR/h by 2400 hours. 

Background readings were indicated by the main and FCP road 

unit except for three readings less than 1 mR/h from 1530 to 1615 

hours on event day. The unit three miles south of the portal indicated background from zero time until 1230 hours when circuit 

damage occurred. 

Telemetry units in the tunnel indicated background one minute after zero time except for the 8+65 crossdrift unit which 

read 40 R/h. All units measured radiation above background by 

zero time plus 12 minutes, and had reached their highest readings 

by 45 minutes after zero time. The maximum outside the gas seal 

door was 1.6 R/h, and at crossdrift 8+00 was greater than 10,000 

R/h. 

Radsafe began the initial ground radiation survey at 1055 

hours as requested by the DOD Test Group Director. Three two-man 

monitor teams and a supervisor were dressed in full radex clothing and MSA all-service gas masks. Their equipment consisted of 

explosimeters, carbon monoxide detectors, beta-gamma detectors, 

alpha detectors, and a velometer. These personnel monitored 

roads to the portal and instrumentation areas, office trailers in 

the portal area, and the vent hole area. 

147 
The teams proceeded in vehicles along the Pole Line Road to 

the Area 16 main access road and then to the tunnel portal area 

surveying enroute. Survey data were reported via net 3 radio 

when radiation measurements were made. After the portal entrance 

was surveyed, radex area control was established near the office 

trailer park. A temporary mobile check station was established 

at this location. The route to the film and instrumentation 

trailer park was surveyed and the vent hole area was checked for 

radioactivity and toxic gases. 

Survey data confirmed telemetry unit readings at all surface 

locations, except monitors did not approach closer than 20 feet 

to the units adjacent to the vent hole. The vent hole was monitored first from a distance of 200 feet, where the exposure rate 

was 125 mR/h. At 20 feet the exposure rate was 2 R/h. After 

taking this reading, the team returned to the mobile check station controlling the portal radex area. 

Each area and all contaminated or radioactive materials were 

marked to indicate radiation levels. Personnel entering radiation areas or working with contaminated material were briefed 

concerning potential exposure and safety precautions, and were 

provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and material. 

5.3.2 Surface Reentry and Recoveries 

Radiation surveys and surface reentries on event day were 

controlled by CT0 Operations from the FCP. The first objective 

of reentry was to recover film records from the trailer park. 

Radiation intensities had not been high enough to damage films, 

and personnel exposure rates during film recovery were only 10 to 

40 mR/h. Exposure rates in the portal area were a maximum of 5 

mR/h during recoveries. Radsafe Area Access Registers indicated 

13 EG&G, six LMSC, five Sandia, four SRI, one Air Force, one 

148 
Army, and one DASA personnel were processed through the check 

station to recover experiment data in the portal area and above 

the tunnel. Highest exposures indicated for these personnel by 

pocket dosimeters were 50 mR. 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

Radsafe continued telemetry readouts until 0800 hours 5 

July. Radiation surveys of the vent hole continued, and radex 

area requirements in the portal area were maintained. Tunnel 

access had been controlled by security from 0600 hours on D-l 

with entry limited to personnel possessing "Q" clearances, military top secret, or military secret clearances. This access 

control was continued through D+3. 

5.4.1 Tunnel Reentry 

Each participant in tunnel reentry operations was certified 

by the Bureau of Mines as having satisfactorily completed training in the use of the two-hour McCaa breathing apparatus, along 

with instruction in mine rescue procedures. 

By 0845 29 June, D+l, all surface telemetry units except 

those at the vent pipe were reading background, the unit outside 

the gas seal door indicated 7 mR/h, and the unit inside the door 

read 9 R/h. 

The initial reentry team consisted of a Chief of Party, 

radiation and industrial safety monitor, mining engineer, and 

miner. Each member was provided with sets of required anticontamination clothing; two self-reading pocket dosimeters (O-200 

mR, O-5 R); one two-hour McCaa breathing device; a Bureau of 

Mines-approved, hat-mounted miner's light with battery pack; and 

an MSA-approved explosive-proof flashlight. Members of a second 

149 
team (rescue party) were on standby in case they were needed. 

The reentry team entered the tunnel to the gas seal door. A 

section of the tunnel vent line had been removed at the door 

prior to the event, and a sealing plate had been bolted to the 

flange of the vent pipe where it penetrated the gas seal door. 

The flange plate was removed, the vent line was reinstalled, and 

the party left the tunnel. 

The vent line fan apparently was turned on between 1205 

hours and 1210 hours when readings of the telemetry unit outside 

the gas seal door rose from 5 mR/h to 50 mR/h. By 1245 hours, 

the reading from this detector increased to its maximum of 1.3 

R/h. This reading decreased steadily to 100 mR/h by 1400 hours, 

50 mR/h by midnight, and 2.5 mR/h by midnight of the next day, 30 

June. 

Units at the portal and at the junction of the portal area 

with the access road were reading background after the vent line 

fan was turned on until 1235 hours, when the portal unit indicated 1.5 R/h and the junction unit 1 mR/h. The junction unit 

peak reading was 13 mR/h at 1400 hours. Readings of a few mR/h 

continued through the day. The portal unit maximum measurement 

was 4.5 R/h at 1300 hours on 29 June, and measurements from 1900 

hours through 2400 hours were 2 R/h. Critical data recovery from 

the tunnel was complete on 2 July, D+4 days. By 2400 hours on 2 

July, the portal unit read 83 mR/h, outside the gas seal door was 

1.7 mR/h, inside the door was 13 mR/h, the Y unit read 90 mR/h, 

the camera station 42 mR/h, crossdrift 8+65 61 mR/h, and crossdrift 8+00 570 mR/h. 

5.4.2 Sample Recovery, Mining and Drilling Operations 

Decontamination units were positioned at entrances to contaminated areas. Personnel and equipment were monitored and de150 
contaminated as necessary. Drill rigs and associated equipment 

used in postevent activities also were monitored and decontaminated, as necessary. 

Sample recovery from the LOS pipe was begun 5 July and was 

completed 12 August, 1962. Telemetry readings at 0800 hours on 5 

July, when readings were terminated, were 1.3 mR/h outside and 

5.5 mR/h inside the gas seal door, 40 mR/h at the Y, 30 mR/h at 

the camera station, 32 mR/h at crossdrift 8+65, and 250 mR/h at 

crossdrift 8+00. The portal unit read 45 mR/h. 

Postevent mining to clear debris, to investigate rock 

stresses, and to explore areas near GZ continued intermittently 

until 22 August 1963. Postevent drilling operations proceeded 

without incident and without radex requirements except when drill 

depth was near GZ. Drilling was from a leveled area high above 

the tunnel (see Figure 5.1). However, access was by a road on 

the southwest side of the mountain, away from the portal. 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Maximum gamma radiation intensities outside the tunnel were 

200 R/h at the vent hole southeast telemetry unit on event day at 

1125 hours, and 4.5 R/h at the tunnel portal on 29 June at 1300 

hours. The tunnel telemetry unit at crossdrift 8+00 indicated 

greater than 10,000 R/h from nine minutes until 30 minutes after 

detonation. 

Checks were made for toxic gases and explosive mixtures. On 

28 June 1962, a survey of the portal and vent line area showed 

less than 50 ppm carbon monoxide and no detectable carbon dioxide 

or nitrous oxides. Surveys were continued through 22 August 1962 

with no detectable toxic gases or explosive mixtures present. 

151 
Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

MARSHMALLOW radex areas from 28 June 1962 through 22 August 1963 

are summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading 

pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum 

exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maxi mum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 1,447 460 77 

DOD Participants 227 460 79 

No radiation levels above background were detected offsite. 

During postevent tunnel reentry operations, no ground-deposited 

radioactivity was detected at the work site or any other NTS work 

location from the minor releases of gaseous radioactivity. 

152 
CHAPTER 6 

MUDPACK EVENT 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

MUDPACK was a DOD-sponsored underground nuclear detonation 

with a yield of 2.7 kt conducted at 1210 hours PST on 16 December 

1964 at shaft site UlOn in Area 10 of the NTS. The device was 

emplaced in a 24-inch diameter shaft at a depth of 500 feet. 

MUDPACK was a weapons effects test designed to obtain information 

concerning ground shock. 

No radioactivity above normal background levels was detected 

onsite by ground and aerial monitoring teams or offsite by ground 

monitoring and stationary dose rate recorders, or in any environmental samples either after the detonation or after subsequent 

sample recovery operations. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all MUDPACK project activities in Area 10. Responsibilities 

of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation 

and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

153 
6.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "MUDPACK Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to conduct a safe and economical 

reentry. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

A detailed radiological safety reentry plan was submitted to participating agencies prior to each event. Test 

area maps with appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, and 

air sampling equipment were positioned in the test area. 

Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed regarding 

surface reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and 

security station requirements. 

All personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and 

Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Anticontamination equipment and materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

gloves, plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Remote Area Monitoring System units for the MUDPACK 

event were located as follows: 

Station 1 - SGZ 

Stations 2 through 9 - on the SOO-foot arc at 45- 

degree intervals 

154 
C. 

Stations 10 through 17 - on the 2,500-foot arc at 45- 

degree intervals 

Air sampling units were located as follows: 

8 - on the l,OOO-foot arc (trailers with recorders) at 45-degree intervals beginning 

at O" 

8 - on the l,OOO-foot arc (satellite samplers) 

at 45-degree intervals beginning at 22.5O 

Each trailer with recorder had a satellite sampler attached to it by means of an electric cord. Thus, if an 

air sampling trailer with recorder was positioned at 45 

degrees, the satellite sampler was at 67.5 degrees. 

Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on event 

day. The muster station was south of BJY on the Mercury 

Highway. Three hours prior to scheduled device detonation, all personnel were clear of the area except the 

arming party and others who were authorized to remain. 

From two hours before planned device detonation to 30 

minutes before planned device detonation, USAF and security personnel made a final aerial sweep of the closed 

portion of Area 10 in an L-20 aircraft. Radsafe monitors were stationed at all Federal Services, Inc. (FSI), 

security roadblocks and work areas within the exclusion 

area. Control of the area was maintained by the use of 

roadblocks, access permits, and a "Schedule of Events". 

Parties could enter the controlled area only if they 

were listed on the Test Manager's "Schedule of Events“, 

or with permission of the Test Group Director. 

155 
D. Air Support 

In addition to the L-20 aircraft for security sweeps, 

aerial monitoring was performed by USAF and PHS cloud 

tracking teams in Air Force U-3A and C-45 aircraft. DOD 

personnel conducted an aerial photo mission in a UH-43D 

helicopter. 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

On 15 December (D-l day), DASA, SC, USC&GS, and DOD photo 

party personnel were in the closed area. DASA representatives 

were there to coordinate overall event activities. Final instrumentation adjustments were made by SC personnel, and completion 

of seismic instrument installation was performed by USC&GS personnel. Photographic equipment was set up at a manned station in 

the closed area by the DOD still photo party. 

6.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

Final preparation of instrumentation and facility button up 

was performed during the predawn hours on event day. Air samplers were put on continuous sampling mode by manned station Radsafe personnel three hours before scheduled detonation. There 

were two Radsafe manned stations within the exclusion area. Each 

consisted of two monitors in vehicles equipped with net 3 and net 

10 radios. 

A final weather briefing for the Test Manager and Advisory 

Panel was conducted two hours prior to scheduled device detonation. Forty-five minutes before scheduled device detonation, 

DOD photo aircraft took its position. 

the 

Required countdowns began at 1140 hours on radio nets 1 I 2, 

156 
6, and 8. Ten minutes before detonation, the siren on the CP-1 

building ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the 

building were turned on until after detonation time. 

MUDPACK zero time was 1210 hours PST on 16 December 1964. 

Fourteen low passes over SGZ by the U-3A cloud tracking aircraft resulted in only background readings. Three more low 

passes over SGZ after collapse time also indicated background 

readings. Monitoring was terminated at 1240 hours and the mission was completed at 1305 hours. 

MUDPACK telemetry readings were background from zero time 

until telemetry was discontinued at 2400 hours on 19 December 

1964. The initial radiation survey began at 1330 hours and terminated at 1400 hours on 16 December 1964. Only low levels of 

radiation above background were detected, and these positive 

readings were from another event earlier that day. Survey data 

are shown in Table 6.1. 

A postevent aerial photo survey was conducted by American 

Aerial Survey (AAS) personnel in a Cessna 185 on event day. 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.4.1 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling operations were conducted on three separate occasions for this event. The first operation began on 18 

December 1964 and was accomplished using two drill rigs, PS-1V 

and PS-1A. PS-1V completed core sampling on 19 December at 1700 

hours. The abandonment valve was closed at 2030 hours the same 

day. Forty-three core samples with a maximum contact reading of 

9 R/h were recovered. PS-1A completed core sampling at 1805 

157 
TABLE 6.1 

MUDPACK EVENT 

Time Location (from SGZ) 

1320 

1322 

1324 

1325 

1330 

1332 

1334 

1336 

1338 

1340 

1348 

1350 

1400 

1410 

1410 

1425 

Radsafe road stake 2N3 (3-l/4 miles SW) 

Radsafe road stake 2K2 (2-l/2 miles SW) 

Radsafe road stake lOA (l-1/2 miles S) 

Radsafe road stake lOA (l-1/4 miles S) 

East perimeter fence 

Northeast perimeter fence 

North perimeter fence 

Northwest perimeter fence 

West perimeter fence 

Southwest perimeter fence 

South perimeter fence 

Southeast perimeter fence 

Ground zero crater 

Cables 

Red shack 

Cable equipment removal 

INITIAL RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

16 December 1964 

Exposure Rate* 

(mR/h) 

0.10 

0.10 

0.15 

0.15 

0.25 

0.35 

0.40 

0.25 

0.25 

0.25 

0.15 

0.20 

0.40 

0.40 

0.40 

0.40 

*Radioactivity measured was from another event detonation earlier 

on 16 December 1964. 

158 
hours on 19 December. The abandonment valve was closed at 2050 

hours on the same day. Twenty core samples with a maximum contact reading of 38 R/h were recovered. 

PS-1A was reopened by sidetrack drilling for further coring 

operations on 6 January 1965. The coring operation began at 0835 

on 11 January. Nine samples were taken with a maximum contact 

reading greater than 200 mR/h. Coring operations were complete 

and the abandonment valve closed at 0215 hours on 12 January 

1965. 

On 2 February 1965, PS-1A was again reopened by sidetrack 

drilling at 1300 hours. Coring operations were complete at 0225 

hours and the abandonment valve was closed at approximately 1200 

hours on 3 February. Twenty-two core samples with a maximum contact reading of 900 mR/h were recovered. 

6.4.2 Industrial Safety 

On each shift during the drilling operations, checks were 

made for toxic gases and explosive mixtures. These measurements 

then were recorded in the Radsafe monitors' log books. Industrial 

safety codes, including specific codes for drilling, were established by REECo and were emphasized during all operations. 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at zero time, 16 December 1964, and 

continued until midnight on 19 December 1964. No readings above 

background were detected. 

During drillback operations, the maximum radiation reading 

on the rig platform was 6.6 mR/h at PS-1V on 19 December 1964. 

159 
No alpha radiation, toxic gases, or explosive mixtures were 

detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the MUDPACK postevent drilling area from 18 December 1964 through 

3 February 1965 are summarized below. The average exposure is 

from self-reading pocket dosimeter readings as recorded on Area 

Access Registers. The maximum exposure is from film dosimeter 

records. 

Maxi mum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 243 40 0.9 

It was the opinion of the PHS that no radioactive contamination of the offsite area resulted from the MUDPACK event. 

160 
CHAPTER 7 

WISHBONE EVENT 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The WISHBONE event was a joint DOD-LRL underground detonation with a yield less than 20 kt conducted at 0819 hours PST on 

18 February 1965, at shaft site U5a in Area 5 of the NTS. Device 

emplacement was in a 48-inch diameter shaft at a depth of approximately 600 feet (Figure 7.1). WISHBONE was a weapons effects 

test to determine the response of equipment and materials in a 

nuclear detonation environment. The event included eleven DOD 

scientific projects. 

Surface collapse occurred about seven minutes after detonation and produced a subsidence crater approximately 450 feet in 

diameter and 75 feet deep. Initial gamma radiation and induced 

radioactivity were detected in the SGZ area at detonation time. 

Four minutes after device detonation, minor seepage of radioactive effluent began, producing a maximum reading of 140 mR/h at 

the west remote area monitoring station on the 2,500-foot arc. 

This reading decreased to background by six hours after device 

detonation. No radioactivity was detected offsite. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.2.1 Responsibilities 

The LRL Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all WISHBONE project activities in Area 5. Responsibilities 

of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with 

established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate 

161 
w 

162 
action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC Albuquerque 

Operations Office. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its 

project activities. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "WISHBONE Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to conduct a safe and economical 

reentry and recovery within the desired time frame. As shown in 

Figure 7.1, test materials were mounted at several levels on a 

tower above the LOS pipe. Also as shown in Figure 7.1, test materials requiring early recovery were on sleds which were winched 

down ramps immediately after detonation to locations outside the 

subsidence crater which formed later. This both preserved test 

materials and facilitated early recovery. Radsafe personnel were 

provided with "Detailed Initial Reentry Procedures" for reentry 

and sample recovery operations. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies prior to the test event. 

Test area maps with appropriate reference points were 

prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, 

and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test 

area. Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed 

regarding surface reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

All remote area monitoring stations and air sampling 

units were installed according to DOD and LRL specifications prior to D-5 days. Radsafe monitors were stationed at all Wackenhut Security, Inc. (WSI), security 

163 
roadblocks and work areas within the exclusion area to 

perform surveys and provide other support as directed. 

There were two Radsafe manned stations within the exclusion area. Each consisted of two monitors in vehicles equipped with net 3 and net 10 radios. 

Radsafe manned stations had as a primary mission the 

documentation of any radioactive effluent released. All 

personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and 

Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial 

surveys by helicopter, and reentry parties as needed. 

Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP prior to 

detonation to perform surveys; provide emerqency 

support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination 

equipment and material, portable instruments and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform 

personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

A mobile facility for issue of anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimetric devices was 

positioned at the FCP along with a mobile decontamination unit. 

164 
B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

RAMS units were located as follows: 

Station 1 - SGZ 

Stations 2 through 9 - 500-foot arc at 45-degree intervals beginning at 0" 

Stations 10 through 25 - 2,500-foot arc at 22.5-degree 

intervals beginning at 0" 

Air sampling units were in operation at zero time with 

detector recorders in the following locations: 

8 - l,OOO-foot arc (trailers with recorders) at 45- 

degree intervals beginning at 0' 

8- 1,000-foot arc (satellites) at 45-degree intervals 

beginning at 22.5' 

16 - 2,000-foot arc (trailers with recorders) 

16 - Remote Area Gas Sampler (RAGS) units at 500-foot 

perimeter fence 

Samplers were started and set on continuous sampling 

mode by the manned station teams five hours before device detonation. 

PHS air samplers were operating at 65 stations in the 

offsite area, and 24-hour sample filters were collected 

daily. Stationary dose-rate recorders were operating at 

21 offsite locations. Fifteen PHS personnel were on 

duty for surveillance activities during and after this 

event. 

C. Security Coverage 

On D-day, a muster station was established on the main 

165 
D. 

access road to Frenchman Lake at the junction with Mercury Highway, and a control station was established on 

the Short Pole Line Road at the junction with Mercury 

Highway. 

WSI security personnel performed sweeps of the closed 

area and issued muster badges to all personnel. The 

L-20 aircraft checked outlying areas for incoming 

traffic. 

Air Support 

Security used a USAF L-20 and pilot for sweeps of the 

closed area and surrounding terrain, and a DOD photo 

party with a Radsafe monitor was provided a USAF H-21 

helicopter with pilot and copilot. 

The USAF and PHS provided aerial monitoring and sampling 

services for the WISHBONE event. Two USAF C-45 aircraft 

code-named Vegas I and Vegas II were provided for cloud 

sampling and measurements. In addition, a PHS Aerocommander aircraft code-named Vegas III, a USAF U-3A and a 

USAF C-54 were provided for cloud tracking purposes. 

Vegas I carried a cryogenic sampling system, an electrostatic precipitator sampling train, and a cascade impactor for air sampling and cloud monitoring. The electronic instruments carried by Vegas II were a suitcase 

analyzer, an EG&G aerial monitor, and a Victoreen Radector. The EG&G aerial monitor had a range of 0.2 mR/h to 

2,000 mR/h. The Victoreen Radector had an upper limit 

of 50 R/h. 

Vegas II carried a flow-through ionization chamber connected to a vibrating reed electrometer and a Precision 

166 
111 scintillation detector with a range of 0 to 5 mR/h 

for cloud height measurements. An air sampler with an 

E-500B probe was mounted internally for verification. 

The E-500B was an Eberline instrument with an upper 

range of 2,000 mR/h and was used to indicate peak gamma 

readings above the 5 mR/h limit of the scintillation 

detector. All of these instruments were connected to 

Esterline-Angus strip chart recorders. 

7.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

The arming party entered the closed area at 0310 hours on 18 

February, after receiving permission to arm the device from the 

Test Manager. DOD photo parties were at manned stations at 0455. 

Radsafe initial radiation survey teams were at the muster station 

at 0500 hours. At 0600, two Sandia, two EG&G, six LRL, and five 

WSI personnel were the only persons in the closed area in addition to the manned station personnel. By 0700, the AEC Operations Coordination Center had closed Mercury Highway to traffic. 

WSI security personnel cleared the closed area of all personnel 

and completed a final ground security sweep. 

The final weather briefing for the Test Manager and Advisory 

Panel was conducted approximately two hours prior to planned device detonation. From two hours before planned device detonation 

to 20 minutes before device detonation, USAF and security personnel in an L-20 aircraft made a final aerial sweep of the closed 

portion of Area 5. 

The required countdown began on radio nets 1, 2, 6 and 8. 

At ten minutes prior to device detonation, the siren on the CP-1 

building ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the 

building were turned on until after detonation. 

167 
WISHBONE zero time was 0819 hours PST on 18 February 1965. 

The SGZ telemetry unit indicated 800 R/h at zero time, 325 

R/h at 0821, and 300 R/h at 0823 hours before the circuit was 

broken by surface subsidence. All of the RAMS units on the 500- 

foot arc (Stations 2-9) showed gamma radiation from SGZ at zero 

time. This was initial radiation and induced activity from experiments and structures. The typical RAMS unit response was 

less than 1 R/h which dropped immediately to about 125 mR/h with 

decay recorded from this point. 

The first indication of a release (increase above decreasing 

readings) was observed at 0823 hours on the west 500-foot arc 

station. The maximum reading of 250 mR/h occurred at 0825 hours. 

Cavity collapse occurred at approximately 0826 hours. By 

0831, the west 500-foot station readings had dropped to 12 mR/h. 

At 0832, readings again began to rise at this location, reaching 

a maximum of 30 mR/h at 0834 hours. By 0834, the major portion 

of the early release had ceased, and calculation of gross release 

at this time indicated about 2 X lo3 curies of radioactivity had 

been released to the atmosphere. 

Air samplers on the l,OOO-foot arc remained on continuous 

sampling mode, and filters were collected every four hours after 

the initial pickup (1241 to 1412 hours on 18 February) until it 

was determined there was no further release. After this determination, the sample filters were collected every eight hours. 

All samplers remained in operation until 1310 hours on 18 

February 1965, at which time the 16 outer-arc samplers were shut 

down. The sampling array during the balance of postevent operations was the same as at zero time on the l,OOO-foot arc. Sampling was discontinued at 1150 hours on 8 March. However, air 

168 
samples were collected in working areas during all active phases 

of the postevent recovery operation. 

7.3.1 Aerial Radiation Surveys 

The aircraft previously mentioned under Air Support were 

available at zero time with the exception of Vegas I, which aborted the mission due to mechanical problems. 

Vegas II took off from Las Vegas at 0715 hours on 18 February, and arrived over Frenchman Flat at 0830. All sampling systems were started at 0857 hours. While the suitcase analyzer 

indicated the presence of radioactivity, no positive radiation 

readings were indicated by the other instruments. Sampling was 

completed at 0937 and Vegas II landed in Las Vegas at 1010. 

Vegas III terminated its mission after detecting no radioactivity. 

7.3.2 Test Area Radiation Surveys and Reentry Activities 

The initial radiation survey of areas away from SGZ began at 

0832 hours and was completed at 1001 hours by Radsafe monitoring 

personnel. The only readings above background were 0.4 mR/h at 

0900, 3 mR/h at 0915, and 0.07 mR/h at 0954 hours one and threequarter miles west-southwest of SGZ. All survey data were reported to the net 3 radio control operator when measurements were 

made. 

Each area and all contaminated or radioactive materials were 

marked to indicate radiation levels. Personnel entering radex 

areas or working with contaminated material were briefed concerning potential exposure and safety precautions, and provided with 

anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

169 
At 0835 hours the SGZ area LRL radiation survey team departed from the roadblock at the intersection of Cane Springs Road 

and Mercury Highway. The trailer compound had been surveyed by 

0845, with a maximum reading of 2-3 mR/h reported. No alpha activity was detected, and by the time film recovery parties were 

allowed into the area (0930 hours), all radiation readings were 

near background. An air "grab" sample was collected at 1130 

hours in the crater and analyzed by LRL. 

Organizations having personnel in the radex area during experiment recovery were Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Bell 

Telephone Laboratories (BTL), Lockheed Missile and Space Corp. 

(LMSC), Northrup Corp. (NC), Boeing Aircraft Co. (BAC), Naval 

Ordnance Lab. (NOL), AFWL, LRL, LASL, and SC. 

Recovery personnel entered the crater area at 1230 hours. 

The average exposure of ten recovery personnel indicated by pocket dosimeter readings was 300 mR and the maximum exposure was 700 

mR. Sleds 1, 2, 3, and 4 were surveyed by 1330 hours. Results 

of this survey are shown as Table 7.1. By 1430 hours, the crater 

survey was complete with a maximum of 6 R/h reported over the SGZ 

area. No alpha activity was detected. 

At 1630 hours the closure valve and emplacement casing had 

been filled with Cal-Seal, but bubbles were observed coming 

through the fill. Security guards were placed in critical locations at 1700 to provide surveillance of the crater and skids 

while postevent drilling preparations continued. It appeared 

that the Cal-Seal had reduced the .release-rate significantly by 

1800 hours, and postevent drilling began. 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

At 2005 hours, Radsafe reported 30 mR/h gamma and 90 mrad/h 

170 
TABLE 7.1 

RADIATION SURVEY OF SLEDS - 18 FEBRUARY 1965 

Measurement 

Time of Distance 

Sled No. Survey (Approx. 1 Gamma 

1 1110 1 foot 10 R/h 

1110 Contact 10 R/h 

1330 Contact (center) 12 R/h 

1330 Contact (sides) 4 R/h 

1100 Contact 1 R/h 

1100 3 feet 0.1 R/h 

1100 Contact 0.15 R/h 

1100 1 meter 0.02 R/h 

171 
beta-gamma on the drill rig platform, and the operation was suspended until air samples could be collected and analyzed. A 

five-minute high-volume air sample collected by Radsafe on the 

rig platform at 2045 hours read 1.5 mR/h on the charcoal cartridge and 150 mR/h on the prefilter (as read with a portable 

instrument). 

Drillers returned to work at 2115 hours after Radsafe was 

instructed to keep respirators on all personnel in the crater or 

postevent drilling work areas whenever the readings went above 1 

mR/h. By 2130 hours, the air sample had been analyzed and radionuclides on the prefilter and in the charcoal cartridge identified. At about 2200 hours, the RAMS units on the SOO-foot arc 

began to indicate increased activity again. A survey of the SGZ 

area at 2315 hours revealed a small hole leaking gas through the 

Cal-Seal plug in the emplacement casing. The contact reading was 

1 R/h (about S-10 times background in that area). 

On 19 February at 0010 hours an undercut area beneath the 

concrete pad in the crater at SGZ was discovered, with readings 

of 1 R/h reported. Drilling operations (below the concrete pad) 

began on PS-1A hole at 0440 hours on this date. Seepage from the 

SGZ area continued to be detected on the SOO-foot RAMS perimeter. 

At 1445 hours Cal-Seal had been poured into the undercut, reducing the readings to 100 mR/h. However, as soon as that seepage 

had been reduced at that location, readings of 3 R/h were detected on the north and west edges of the pad. Coring on PS-1A was 

completed at 0910 hours on 20 February. Thirty-six core samples 

with a maximum contact reading of 80 R/h were recovered. 

The second drilling operation (PS-1AS) began at 1212 hours 

on 20 February by beginning a sidetrack at a depth of 520 feet. 

Total depth was attained at 1900 hours and coring began at 2050 

hours. Coring was completed at 0055 hours on 21 February. Drilling operations were suspended until 25 February. 

172 
The third drilling operation (PS-1ASS) began at 2350 hours 

on 25 February by beginning a second sidetrack at a depth of 526 

feet. Total depth was reached at 1100 hours at 26 February. 

Operations were normal from 0830 hours to 1100 hours. At that 

time, a slight increase in radiation levels (3 mR/h on the platform and 7 mR/h on the casing) was seen on the RAMS readouts in 

the Radsafe base station trailer. An immediate check was made 

with portable instruments but nothing was detected. 

No additional release was detected until 1340 hours when a 

reading of 10 mR/h was observed on the casing. All personnel 

working on the rig immediately put on full-face masks, and a 15- 

minute air sample was taken. The sample read 1 mrad/h beta plus 

gamma and 0.5 mR/h gamma. Personnel working on the platform wore 

the full-face masks for approximately 15 minutes. After this, 

only the person guiding the coring tool into the drill pipe was 

required to wear a mask. This was a precautionary measure since 

a small amount of gas occasionally would escape from the open 

drill pipe. Occasional release of gas continued until coring was 

completed at 1530 hours on 26 February. 

The fourth drilling operation (PS-1ASSS) was started at 1730 

hours on 26 February by beginning another sidetrack at a depth of 

487 feet. Total depth was reached at 2100 hours and coring began. The coring operation was completed at 0555 hours on 27 February. A toxic gas concentration of 15,000 ppm CO was detected 

in the open end of the drill pipe at 0640 hours, and 100 percent 

of the LEL for explosive mixtures was measured. Ten minutes 

later, released activity was measured by holding the probe of a 

Geiger-Mueller tube instrument in the open end of the drill pipe. 

The instrument indicated approximately 40 mrad/h beta plus gamma 

and approximately 8 mR/h gamma. 

Pumping drill mud down the pipe appeared to stop this release. However, by 0700 hours releases of increased intensity 

173 
had been detected with readings up to 130 mrad/h beta plus gamma 

and 40 mR/h gamma, being measured in the open end of the drill 

pipe. A constantly running high-volume air sampler was installed 

on the drill rig mast and monitored carefully. It ran approximately 1.5 hours and reached a maximum of 1.2 mrad/h beta plus 

gamma and 0.5 mR/h gamma contact on the charcoal filter. The 

Whatman 41 prefilter read somewhat less. 

On 1 March 1965, the drill pipe was removed from PS-1A and 

the abandonment valve closed at 1510 hours. Miscellaneous operations in the U5a crater continued until 18 March. However, no 

significant radiological problems were encountered. 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at zero time and was discontinued 

on 21 February 1965. On 25 February, it was begun again and continued until 0800 hours on 8 March 1965. The highest telemetry 

reading of 800 R/h was at SGZ one minute after detonation. 

The maximum gamma intensity during postevent drilling was 40 

mR/h at 0650 hours at the PS-1ASSS open drill pipe on 27 February 

1965. Maximum toxic gas and explosive mixture readings were 

15,000 ppm CO and 100 percent of the LEL at 0640 hours at this 

location on the same date. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

WISHBONE radex areas from 18 'February 1965 through 18 March 1965 

are summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading 

pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum 

exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

174 
Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 1,085 1,160 11 

DOD Participants 68 1,160 39 

Urinalyses for radioiodines preliminary to thyroid counts 

were completed on a total of 121 persons. Twenty-two measurable 

thyroid activities were recorded. Eight thyroid doses were one 

rem or more, and the highest was 9.3 rem compared to the quarterly guide of 10 rem and the annual guide of 30 rem in 1965. 

It was the opinion of the PHS that no radioactive contamination of the offsite area resulted from the WISHBONE event. 

175 
CHAPTER 8 

GUMDROP EVENT 

8.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The GUMDROP event was a DOD-sponsored underground nuclear 

detonation with a yield less than 20 kt conducted at 1400 hours 

PST on 21 April 1965 at tunnel site U16a.02 in Area 16 of the 

NTS. The device was emplaced at the end of a 1,050-foot drift, 

which continued from the existing U16a.01 LOS tunnel, at a depth 

of 834 feet. GUMDROP was a weapons effects test which investigated the response of equipment and materials to a nuclear detonation environment. There were 12 DOD scientific projects conducted by laboratories and contractors. 

Cavity collapse occurred seven minutes and 23 seconds after 

zero time. Containment was successful and reentry activities 

proceeded on schedule. No radioactivity above normal background 

levels was detected onsite by ground and aerial monitoring teams 

or offsite by ground and aerial monitoring, by stationary dose 

rate recorders, or in any environmental samples. 

There was a controlled release of radioactivity from H+3.5 

hours to H+44 hours through the filtered vent line system. Activity released primarily consisted of noble gases and they dissipated rapidly in the atmosphere. 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

176 
of all GUMDROP project activities in Area 16. Responsibilities of 

AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action 

between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC Albuquerque Operations 

Office. Sandia Corporation was responsible for timing and firing 

systems, and EG&G personnel were responsible for arming and firing the device. Sandia Corporation also was responsible for 

stemming design, and for installation of necessary measuring devices and equipment to indicate the postevent tunnel condition. 

The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent 

removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "GUMDROP Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to produce safe and economical reentry and recovery within the desired time frame. Stemming design incorporated necessary provisions to maximize safety of reentry. Figure 8.1 shows the GUMDROP tunnel layout. "W. P." indicates "Working Point" or GZ, and the tunnel continues to the 

right through the previously constructed MARSHMALLOW tunnel to 

the portal. 

A. Tunnel Structural Conditions 

Tunnel condition monitors (TCM's) were installed to indicate postevent structural conditions. These monitors 

each consisted of a wooden box designed to crush or deform under the conditions existing during tunnel collapse, but durable enough to withstand considerable 

shock due to falling debris. Upon crushing, a plastic 

guillotine cut interior wiring to effect a change in 

circuit resistance. Each TCM used a pair of signal 

wires to conduct the signal to the reentry safety 

trailer. 

177 
RAM STATION NO. 4 

MARSHMALLOW WORKINGS 

c PLUG 

CONCRETE PLUG 

-7?=- -- 

- L 

TCM-tr / 

& RAM STATION NO. 1 

‘0 PORTAL 

W.P. 

Figure 3.1 GUMDROP Tunnel 
Six geophones, Texas Instrument Type S-36 with a natural 

period of 2 cps, were used to monitor postevent earth 

disturbances, cavity collapse in particular. Two geophones were placed in the portal area. Each phone required a hole 12 inches in diameter, 4 feet deep, and 

backfilled with tamped sand after geophone emplacement. 

Signals from the geophones were sent to the monitor 

trailer at the FCP, by four-conductor-shielded wire to 

the geophone transmitter truck in the portal parking 

area, via microwave link to Area 3, and then by eventual 

retransmission to CP-1. 

At the monitor trailer, the multiplexed signal was 

placed on magnetic tape for future reference, and then 

routed to four discriminators which converted the FM 

signal back to four analog signals representing the four 

geophones. Visual readout at the FCP was provided by 

Sanborn two-channel Model 320 recorders. 

B. Tunnel Environmental Conditions 

Two 3/8-inch-diameter copper tubing gas sampling lines 

were installed, one from Scientific Station No. 1 to the 

reentry safety trailer at the portal parking area, and 

one from inside the main blast door to the reentry 

safety trailer. The routing of the sampling tubes was 

with the scientific cables in hangers on the tunnel 

wall. Particular attention was given to the routing 

around the blast door to insure freedom from kinks or 

tubing collapse. During installation of the tubing, 

care was taken to insure that the line was kept clean 

and free from foreign material of any kind. 

Each sampling line required a 120-volt AC normally179 
closed solenoid valve outside the main blast door. Each 

line required an off-line 0 to 10 psi pressure gauge 

with valve and an additional valve terminating the line 

at the reentry safety trailer. The installed tubing 

system was pressure-tested for 24 hours at 200 psi with 

a permissible drop in 24 hours of not more than 20 psi. 

Following the satisfactory pressure test, the tubing was 

cleaned with chlorothene. 

Two additional gas sampling lines allowed sampling gases 

from the portal ventilation vent pipes. These two auxiliary copper tubes were run from the portal vent pipes to 

the reentry safety trailer for sampling at the trailer. 

The auxiliary lines were not needed for sampling at the 

portal itself because a short branch from each main vent 

line was located at the portal, near ground level, and 

provided with a closing valve. 

Explosive gas mixture analyzers were placed at Scientific Station No. 1 and inside the main blast door. The 

readouts were at the reentry safety trailer. 

Pressure transducers were located inside the main blast 

door and inside the cement plug in the cable drift. 

Temperature was measured at Scientific Station No. 1. 

All of these readouts were at the reentry safety trailer 

at the FCP. 

Tunnel exhaust ventilation was passed through two charcoal filters and finally an absolute filter. Positive 

displacement blowers were used to overcome the large 

line resistance of the tunnel ventilation lines. 

180 
C. Telemetry, Air Sampling, and Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed reentry plans were submitted to participating 

agencies prior to the test event. Test area maps with 

appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference 

markers, radiation decay recorders, and air sampling 

equipment were positioned in the test area. Reentry 

routes into the test area were established during "dry 

runs." Radiation monitors were briefed regarding surface reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and 

security station requirements. 

Thirty-five telemetry stations were in operation; 9 

inside the tunnel and 26 on the surface (Table 8.1). 

All detectors in the tunnel were housed in explosionproof steel boxes and were encased in foam jackets to 

provide shock mitigation. These units each used a pair 

of signal wires to conduct the signal to the reentry 

safety trailer located at the FCP. The surface locations were chosen with a consideration for weather conditions required at zero time and by terrain features. 

RAMS units were to detect airborne radioactivity and 

fallout in case of venting. Readings were needed both 

for purposes of reentry safety and documenting effluent 

release for Test Ban Treaty compliance. 

Air sampling units were positioned at 17 surface locations. Air sampling locations were selected by an actual onsite survey with consideration given to surface 

meteorology and practicability of installation. Units 

were started and set in continuous sampling mode prior 

to H-3 hours by Radsafe manned station personnel. 

All personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and 

181 
TABLE 8.1 

GUMDROP EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

Station Location 

10 Portal 

11 580 feet at 0" Azimuth (from SGZ) 

12 585 feet at 24" Azimuth 

13 275 feet at 45O Azimuth 

14 322 feet at 76" Azimuth 

15 713 feet at 161' Azimuth 

16 402 feet at 214' Azimuth 

17 464 feet at 229" Azimuth 

18 498 feet at 239' Azimuth 

19 155 feet at 273' Azimuth 

20 265 feet at 309" Azimuth 

21 480 feet at 330' Azimuth 

22 584 feet at 341" Azimuth 

23 1,356 feet at 12' Azimuth 

24 4,013 feet at 64O Azimuth 

25 943 feet at 108" Azimuth 

26 923 feet at 127' Azimuth 

27 986 feet at 173' Azimuth 

28 1,131 feet at 239" Azimuth 

29 2,230 feet at 247O Azimuth 

30 1,354 feet at 267O Azimuth 

31 2,600 feet at 228O Azimuth 

32 Before North Vent Line Filter 

33 After North Vent Line Filter 

34 Before South Vent Line Filter 

35 After South Vent Line Filter 

UNDERGROUND 

21+60 feet (2,160 feet from portal) 

19+75 feet 

32+10 feet 

34+23 feet 

Outside plug cable drift 

12+00 feet 

9+00 feet 

Inside door 6+00 feet 

Outside door 6+00 feet 

ABOVEGROUND 

182 
Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

D. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial 

surveys by helicopter, and tunnel reentry parties. Radsafe personnel were stationed at the DOD Test Group 

Director's FCP to perform initial and subsequent ground 

surveys as required; provide emergency rescue and support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination 

equipment, portable instruments, and dosimetric devices; 

perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination; and operate a sample return station. 

Anticontamination equipment and materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face 

masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, 

gloves, plastic bags, and masking tape. 

Security Coverage 

A muster station was established on the Pole Line Road 

approximately l-l/Z miles east of U16a and west of the 

Timing and Firing Complex on D-day. A control station 

was established on Area 16 Road south of the Area 16 

trailer complex. About three hours prior to planned 

detonation, all personnel were clear of the closed area 

except the arming party and others who were authorized 

to remain in the area. From two hours before planned 

device detonation to 30 minutes before device detonation, USAF and security personnel in an L-20 aircraft 

made a final aerial sweep of the closed portion of Area 

16. 

183 
E. Air Support 

A U-6A aircraft was flown by a USAF pilot and two military crewmen to perform a photography mission. The DOD 

photo mission was flown by a Marine Corps pilot and copilot with one crewman in a UH-43D helicopter. Both aircraft had Radsafe monitors on board. The USAF L-20 and 

pilot were used by Security personnel to perform aerial 

surveys. Cloud tracking was performed by PHS personnel 

in two USAF C-45's and a USAF U-3A. American Aerial 

Survey representatives provided postevent photo coverage 

using a Cessna 185. 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

On 20 April 1965 (D-1 day), SC personnel installed and performed maintenance on instrumentation in the trailers and the 

trailer park area at the portal, made final adjustments on geophones located inside the main blast door and at Station 8+70, 

and checked instruments in the motor van located in the portal 

area. EGCG representatives set up recording trailers at the 

trailer park above the portal area, entered the tunnel to check 

monitoring equipment, and checked oscilloscopes and related 

equipment on the surface. 

Personnel from SRI, LMSC, and LRL were in the area to perform calibration checks, activate equipment, and perform button 

up functions. DOD representatives were onsite to perform overall 

coordination of activities. In addition, DOD personnel conducted 

inspections of the tunnel, portal area, and FCP. 

8.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

The security muster station was activated at 0200 hours on 

184 
event day, and at 0455 hours a security sweep of the closed area 

was performed. Security and USAF personnel performed an aerial 

sweep of the closed area at sunrise. Permission to arm the device was granted by the Test Manager and the arming party entered 

the area at 0620 hours. Initial radiation survey teams were at 

the muster station at 0645 hours. A final weather briefing for 

the Test Manager and Advisory Panel was conducted at 0800 hours 

on 21 April 1965. The test was originally scheduled for 1000 

hours, but was delayed for four hours. 

Required countdowns began on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 8. At 

ten minutes before device detonation, the siren on the CP-1 

building ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the 

building were turned on until after detonation. 

GUMDROP zero time was 1400 hours on 21 April 1965. 

A dust cloud was observed at zero time which moved on a general heading of north to northeast. Four passes by the U3a aircraft through the dust cloud between 1402 hours and 1405 hours 

produced background readings at 5900 feet MSL. The elevation of 

the U16a portal is 5430 feet MSL. At 1406 hours, a monitoring 

run was made directly over GZ at 6700 feet MSL with negative 

results. Additional passes in the vicinity of the tunnel portal 

produced background readings. Aerial monitoring was terminated 

at 1445 PST hours because of severe turbulence in the area. 

Telemetry readings for zero time to 1630 hours on D-day are 

shown in Table 8.2. With the exception of detectors identified 

as RAMS Stations 1 and 2 (Figure 8.11, and inoperative Stations 3 

and 4, all other radiation detectors in the tunnel and aboveground indicated preevent background readings after detonation. 

Station 1 read 0.200 R/h at two minutes after zero time, decreasing to 0.010 R/h at 20 minutes after device detonation. Station 

2 read 0.650 R/h at two minutes after device detonation, decreas185 
TABLE 8.2 

GUMDROP EVENT 

TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS INSIDE OF TUNNEL 

RAMS STATIONS 1, 2, & 5 

TIME 21+60' 19+75' Cable Drift 

(PST) 1 2 5 

1402 0.200 0.650 Bkg* 

1404 0.100 0.425 Bkg 

1406 0.070 0.230 Bkg 

1408 0.045 0.125 Bkg 

1410 0.025 0.050 Bkg 

1412 0.018 0.030 Bkg 

1414 0.014 0.022 Bkg 

1416 0.013 0.017 Bkg 

1418 0.011 0.014 Bkg 

1420 0.010 0.010 Bkg 

1422 0.009 0.009 Bkg 

1424 0.009 0.009 Bkg 

1426 0.009 0.008 Bkg 

1428 0.008 0.008 Bkg 

1430 0.008 0.008 Bkg 

1435 0.008 0.008 Bkg 

1440 0.007 0.007 Bkg 

1445 0.007 0.007 Bkg 

1450 0.007 0.007 Bkg 

1455 0.007 0.006 Bkg 

1500 0.007 0.006 Bkg 

1505 0.007 0.006 Bkg 

1510 0.007 0.006 Bkg 

1520 0.006 0.006 Bkg 

1530 0.006 0.006 Bkg 

1600 0.006 0.005 Bkg 

1630 0.005 0.004 Bkg 

1700 0.007 0.002 Bkg 

1730** 0.014 0.002 Bkq 

1800 0.026 0.002 Bkg 

1830 0.030 0.002 Bkg 

1900 0;020 0.002 Bkg 

1930 0.022 0.002 Bkg 

2000 0.030 0.002 Bkg 

2030 0.030 0.002 Bkg 

2100 0.035 0.002 Bkg 

2130 0.047 0.002 0.001 

2200 0.070 0.002 0.003 

2230 0.100 0.004 0.006 

2300 0.120 0.004 0.009 

2330 0.150 0.001 0.013 

*Preevent natural radiation background 

**Tunnel ventilation system on 

186 
ing to 0.010 R/h after 20 minutes. This indicated some gaseous 

fission product activity had entered and diffused in the 800-foot 

pipe drift (see Figure 8.1). Detectors in the 640-foot pipe 

tunnel (Station 3 and Station 4) indicated a shorted condition, 

probably resulting from rock spallation in the cable drift inside 

the concrete plug. The presence of background readings from the 

remaining radiation detectors in the tunnel and on the surface 

indicated containment of radioactivity within the tunnel had been 

good. 

Later in the day, tunnel ventilation was turned on prior to 

commencing tunnel reentry. As a result, some gaseous fission 

products present in the GUMDROP tunnel were released through the 

vent line filters. Telemetry readings increased when ventilation 

was begun. RAMS Station 1 readings peaked at 200 mR/h on 22 

April at 0100 hours. Station 5, in the cable drift, read background until 1 mR/h was measured at 2130 hours on 21 April. Station 5 readings rose to 40 mR/h by 0300 hours and peaked at 48 

mR/h on 22 April at 0900 hours. Apparently, negative pressure in 

the tunnel when the ventilation system was turned on caused additional fission product gas to seep into the tunnel. RAMS unit 

readings on the vent line filters reached a maximum of 15 mR/h at 

2030 hours on 21 April. Two other surface RAMS stations detected 

the release with maximum readings of 2 mR/h at 0230 hours and 0.3 

mR/h at 1300 hours on 22 April. For additional information on 

this controlled release, see section 8.3.4. 

8.3.1 Tunnel Structural Conditions 

Immediately postevent, TCM's indicated either a normal tunnel condition (TCM's 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, lo), or an open line 

(TCM's 4, 5, 6) which gave no information about tunnel condition. 

Subsequent inspection confirmed that TCM's showing normal tunnel 

condition had not been crushed. Considerable debris had fallen 

on and around TCM-1 but the monitor was not damaged. The open 

187 
lines for TCM's 4, 5, and 6 were attributed to rock spalling in 

the cable drift. 

After initial zero-time signals had ceased, geophone activity was quiet until roughly H+6 minutes. For the next minute 

and a half, small sporadic signals were received until a large 

signal, indicating cavity collapse, was noted at H+7 minutes 23 

seconds. At H+7 minutes 35 seconds, the last signals had died 

out, indicating the completion of cavity collapse. 

8.3.2 Tunnel Environmental Conditions 

A preprogrammed gas chromatograph was drawing samples from 

the two tunnel vent lines before zero time up to H-4 minutes, 

when sampling was interrupted by a power failure. During this 

sampling time only 02, N2 and C2H6 (ethane) were detected. 

At one hour and 20 minutes after detonation, power was 

restored and sampling from inside the gas seal door and at Scientific Station No. 1 began. The first sample from Scientific Station No. 1 indicated H2, 02, CH4 (methane), CO, C2H6, and a questionable peak between CO and C2H6 (possibly due to xenon). The 

chromatograph had not returned to operating temperature, and 

quantitative information was not available. The size of the 

peaks relative to stable size indicated the gases to be present 

in less than explosive concentrations. 

The first sample from the blast door indicated H2, 02, and 

CH4 present at less than LEL levels. All further samples from 

both sampling heads were normal. The unit was stopped at two 

hours and 30 minutes after zero time in preparation for the initial tunnel reentry. 

Remote reading explosimeters in the tunnel indicated zero 

percent explosive gas mixture from times immediately postevent 

188 
until completion of the initial reentry. Remote reading pressure 

transducers inside the concrete plug in the cable drift and inside the gas seal door indicated no change after zero time from 

the preevent ambient pressures. 

8.3.3 Radiation Surveys and Surface Reentry 

At 1440 hours, the Test Group Director released two vehicleborne Radsafe parties, consisting of two monitors each, for the 

initial survey. The two parties proceeded from the FCP along 

Telephone Pole Road to the Area 16 main access road, and then to 

the tunnel portal area, surveying enroute. 

Radsafe Survey Party No. 1 proceeded through the portal area 

to the vicinity of the portal entrance. Upon completion of the 

initial survey, the team continued to obtain radiation measurements at the portal entrance and locations of interest in the 

portal area. The team then returned to a location near the 

office trailer park where Radsafe Survey Party No. 1 established 

a temporary mobile check station for radex control of the portal 

area. 

Radsafe Survey Party No. 2 proceeded along the route to the 

film instrumentation trailer park and to the postevent drill 

road, surveying enroute. Upon completion, Radsafe Survey Party 

No. 2 returned to the temporary mobile check station and stood by 

for further assignments. 

Survey data were reported to the net 3 radio control operator when measurements were made. Plotting facilities were maintained at the FCP and at CP-1. All pertinent radex and toxicological information was plotted. Radsafe Control was located in 

the operations trailer at the FCP. The initial surface radiation 

survey began at 1444 hours and ended at 1459 hours on event day. 

189 
All initial survey measurements indicated background radiation 

levels. 

Sufficient Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP to 

provide rescue and emergency support, and implement radiological 

area control as exclusion areas were established. 

As soon as the initial survey was complete, the DOD Test 

Group Director released parties to recover critical data. Scientific experiment organizations requiring rapid reentry were: 

Portal Area Film Recovery: EG&G, LRL, SRI, SC, and LMSC 

Trailer Park Film Recovery: EG&G, SC 

Tunnel Scientific Recoveries 

to Scientific Station No. 1: AFWL, LMSC, SC 

Surface reentry and recovery operations were accomplished 

without encountering any radiological or toxicological problems. 

8.3.4 Controlled Radioactivity Release 

At H+3.5 hours (1730 hours) a decision was made to turn on 

tunnel ventilation before reentring the tunnel. During controlled radioactivity release from H+3.5 hours to H+44 hours, vent 

line sampling data indicated that xenon-135, rubidium-88, iodine131, iodine-133, iodine-135, and sodium-24 were detected. Other 

shorter-lived noble gas fission products were assumed to be 

present in the tunnel exhaust. There was some indication of resuspended fission products left over from the MARSHMALLOW event. 

Vent line radiation monitors indicated that from the beginning of 

ventilation to H+44 hours approximately 1,900 curies of filtered 

gaseous activity was released. This release estimate was computed without regard to decay from release times. By process of el190 
imination, this gaseous activity was assumed to be primarily isotopes of xenon and krypton. 

After correcting contributions of the various radionuclides 

for decay from their release times, the maximum amounts of 

iodine-131, -133, and -135 in the atmosphere at any time were, 

respectively, 28, 600, and 1,300 microcuries. The maximum amount 

of filtered gaseous activity in the atmosphere at any time was 

660 curies. 

8.3.5 Tunnel Reentry 

Each participant in tunnel reentry operations was certified 

by the Bureau of Mines as having satisfactorily completed training in the use of the two-hour McCaa breathing apparatus, along 

with instruction in mine rescue procedures. 

The initial reentry team consisted of a Chief of Party, two 

Radsafe monitors, a tunnel safety engineer, and the AFWL Scientific Advisor. Each member was provided with required sets of 

anticontamination clothing; two self-reading pocket dosimeters 

(O-200 mR, O-5 R); one two-hour McCaa breathing apparatus; a 

Bureau of Mines approved, hat-mounted miner's light with battery 

pack; and an MSA-approved, explosive-proof flashlight. Members 

of a second team were similarly outfitted and on standby in case 

they were needed. 

Tunnel ventilation was begun at 3 hours and 30 minutes after 

detonation. When cleared by the DOD Test Group Director, and 

when all surface recoveries were complete, the reentry team began 

the initial tunnel reentry. This occurred three hours and 45 

minutes after device detonation. There was no change in the tunnel ventilation setup or in utilities while any teams were underground. The reentry team entered and proceeded to the blast 

191 
door, continuously monitoring for radioactivity and for toxic and 

explosive gases. 

The reentry team opened the blast door, and inspected the 

tunnel to Scientific Station No. 1. As the Team proceeded from 

the portal to Station No. 1, they checked the 80 psi gas line for 

integrity. Upon arrival at Station No. 1, they checked all the 

high-pressure nitrogen bottles for damage and adequate tie-down, 

and inspected the sides of the shutter closure for undetonated 

high explosive. They then proceeded to that part of the tunnel 

forward of Station No. 1. This included checking Scientific Station 24+02 (pumping station) and Station 23+79 for high-pressure 

gas-bottle integrity and undetonated explosive. They next searched the Cable Drift up to the plug. Radiation and toxic gas measurements made during the initial tunnel reentry are shown in 

Table 8.3. 

After reaching the plug, team members began their exit from 

the tunnel, investigating all blind drifts and old MARSHMALLOW 

workings on the way. The team's objective was to verify that the 

entire portal side of the tunnel complex was free from explosive, 

toxic, and radioactive gases. The highest radiation and toxic 

gas levels noted during the entire tunnel walk-out were in the 

800-foot pipe tunnel at the extreme penetration to Station 23+00. 

At this location, conditions of 200 mR/h, 500 ppm CO, 1,000 ppm 

CO2' and zero percent LEL of explosive mixtures were noted. Five 

hours and 13 minutes after device detonation, the initial reentry 

team emerged from the portal. 

Two scientific reentry teams entered the tunnel on D-day: 

one at five hours and 45 minutes after detonation and the other 

nine hours after detonation. The first team, composed of 11 key 

project personnel, proceeded to Station 1, recovered dosimetry, 

and exited the tunnel six hours and 21 minutes after zero time. 

The second team was composed of 16 project‘personnel who also 

192 
TABLE 8.3 

GUMDROP EVENT 

Time Location 

Gamma 

Exposure Rate 

(mR/h) Toxic Gas (ppm) 

1748 Outside Blast Door 0.8 

1753 Inside Blast Door 0.8 

1758 Rad-Station No. 6 1.0 

1828 CR Drift No. 4 3.0 

1830 CR Drift No. 5 3.0 

1833 18+00 (Pipe Tunnel) 1.0 

1834 Station No. 1 60.0 

1835 21+00 (Pipe Tunnel) 12.0 

1837 22+00 (Pipe Tunnel) 30.0 

1838 

INITIAL TUNNEL REENTRY RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

21 April 1965 

23+00 (Pipe Tunnel) 200.0 

100 co 

1000 co2 

500 co 

1000 co2 

193 
proceeded to Station 1 to attempt extensive recoveries. Technical 

difficulties were encountered at Station 1, and the team exited 

the tunnel nine hours and 53 minutes after detonation without 

significant recoveries being made. This was the last reentry 

made on D-day. 

8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.4.1 Experiment Recoveries 

On days following D-day, the tunnel recoveries proceeded on 

schedule with few problems being encountered. Use of full-face 

masks and anticontamination clothing was required at Scientific 

Station No. 1 at one point because the potential for beryllium 

exposure existed. 

Reentry and recovery from the 640-foot pipe tunnel was not 

urgent and was not part of the early reentry. The initial reentry team members for this tunnel also were McCaa-qualified. 

When samples taken through the concrete plug in the cable drift 

indicated that the pressure and explosive and toxic gases were at 

or below tolerance, the blast door was opened. The team then 

proceeded to check the available tunnel for explosive, toxic, and 

radioactive gases. At the pumping station at Scientific Station 

31+73 they checked for high-pressure gas bottle hazards, and at 

Station 31+43 they checked for undetonated high explosives. 

8.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Preparations for postevent drilling began on 27 April 1965 

at a location above the tunnel complex. Three postevent holes 

were drilled during this operation to obtain radioactive debris 

samples from the cavity area. The first drill rig began drilling 

at 1830 hours 28 April. Drilling continued slowly until total 

194 
depth of 1,378 feet was reached at 1300 hours on 2 May. Radioactivity was detected in the cellar area and on the rig platform 

intermittently while personnel were rigging up for core sampling 

operations. Personnel were issued urine kits and provided adequate anticontamination clothing and equipment. The maximum radiation reading was 9.5 R/h in contact with a core sample taken 

from the hole at a depth of about 1,160 feet on 3 May. 

Two other core drilling operations were conducted at this 

site prior to program completion. The highest reading during 

these operations was 3 R/h on a sample taken from a depth of 

1,340 feet. 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry began at zero time and was terminated at 0400 

hours on 24 April 1965. The maximum telemetry reading was at 

underground Station 2, located at 19+75, which read 650 mR/h two 

minutes after device detonation. The remote reading explosimeters in the tunnel indicated zero percent explosive gas mixture 

from times immediately postevent until completion of the initial 

tunnel reentry. The initial survey maximum reading was 200 mR/h 

in the pipe tunnel. The maximum postevent reading not on a core 

sample was 4.5 mR/h on the PS-1ASS drill platform at 1800 hours 

on 4 May 1965. The maximum reading at contact with a core sample 

was 9 R/h. No alpha radiation was detected. The maximum explosive mixture reading obtained was 80 percent of the Lower Explosive Limit on 2 May 1965 in the cellar of PS-1A at 1105 hours. 

Maximum toxic gas levels detected underground during postevent 

operations were as follows: 

2200 ppm CO on 6 May 1965 at blast door at 1130 hours 

2.5 ppm NO2 on 4 May 1965 in the tunnel work area at 

21+00 at 1510 hours 

195 
The maximum gamma reading from a filtered effluent release 

was 3 mR/h at 1300 hours on 22 April in the test area. No radioactive effluent above background levels was detected onsite by 

ground and aerial monitoring teams, or offsite by stationary dose 

rate recorders, or in any environmental samples either after the 

detonation or during the subsequent sample recovery operations. 

No fresh fission products were detected in any environmental samples collected offsite throughout this period, and no prefilter 

air samples contained levels of gross beta activity above normal 

background. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

GUMDROP radex areas from 21 April 1965 through 29 December 1965 

are summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading 

pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum 

exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 2,188 680 7 

DOD Participants 211 50 6 

With the exception of TCM's, all health and safety instrumentation operated satisfactorily. The TCM's, however, suffered 

from the problem that any tunnel collapse sufficient to crush the 

monitor cut the telemetry wires first. As a result no information on tunnel collapse was obtained. There were no unusual 

problems encountered on reentries that prevented scientific recoveries for health and safety reasons. The tunnel ventilation 

system operated as planned with the exception of dust loading 

problems on the charcoal filters. 

196 
CHAPTER 9 

DILUTED WATERS EVENT 

9.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The DILUTED WATERS event was a DOD underground detonation 

with a yield less than 20 kt conducted at 0930 hours PDT on 16 

June 1965 at shaft site U5b in Area 5 of the NTS (Figure 9.1). 

The device was emplaced in a 48-inch diameter shaft at a depth of 

640 feet. DILUTED WATERS was a weapons effects test that provided information on response of equipment and materials in a nuclear detonation environment. The emplacement configuration included a maximum diameter 36-inch LOS pipe to the surface. Laboratories and contractors conducted 15 DOD scientific projects to 

obtain the desired information. 

Effluent was released beginning about one second after detonation. Dynamic venting began 21 seconds after the detonation 

and ceased when the subsidence crater formed about four minutes 

later. For additional information on this venting, refer to 

Section 9.3. 

9.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

9.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for health and 

safety of all participants in the test area under his control. 

Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in 

accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC 

Albuquerque Operations Office. LRL was responsible for providing 

197 
,/-- 
and emplacing the nuclear device. Sandia Corporation was responsible for stemming and the timing and firing system. EG&G provided timing and firing circuitry and signals. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of 

equipment necessary 

9.2.2 Planning and 

for its project activities. 

Preparations 

The "DILUTED WATERS Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to conduct a safe and economical reentry within the desired time frame. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies prior to the test 

event. Test area maps with appropriate reference points 

were prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, and air sampling equipment were positioned in 

the test area. Reentry routes into the test area were 

established during "dry runs." Party monitors were 

briefed regarding surface reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Radsafe manned stations, Bluebird Teams, had as a primary mission documentation of any radioactive effluent 

released. All personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and 

equipment, and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Radsafe monitors were stationed at all WSI security 

roadblocks and at all work areas within the exclusion 

area. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, sup199 
plied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

RAMS units were located as follows: 

Station 1 - SGZ 

Stations 2 through 5 - lOO-foot arc at go-degree 

intervals 

Stations 6 through 10 - SOO-foot perimeter fence 

at O", 60°, 120", 240°, 

and 300" 

Stations 11 through 22 - l,OOO-foot arc at 30- 

degree intervals beginning 

at 15O 

Stations 23 through 34 - 2,000-foot arc at 30- 

degree intervals beginning 

at 0" 

Twelve air sampling units were positioned at 30-degree 

intervals (beginning at 30 degrees) on the l,OOO-foot 

arc, and twelve air sampling units were positioned at 

30-degree intervals (beginning at 15 degrees) on the 

2,000-foot arc. 

c. Security Coverage 

Control of the area was maintained by the use of roadblocks, access permits, and a "Schedule of Events". 

Parties could enter the controlled area only with the 

permission of the Test Group Director or the Test Manager. WSI security personnel conducted aerial sweeps of 

the test area and outlying terrain on 15 June and event 

day. 

200 
D. Air Support 

A USAF L-20 aircraft and pilot was provided to security 

for sweeps of the closed area on 15 and 16 June. DOD 

personnel used a UH-43D aircraft for their photo missions. An Air Force U-3A aircraft, manned by a pilot, 

co-pilot and two PHS monitors equipped with portable 

radiation detection instruments, tracked the effluent to 

assist in positioning ground monitors. Two PHS C-45 

aircraft containing sampling equipment also were used as 

aids in cloud tracking. Their primary purpose, however, 

was cloud sampling to determine cloud size and inventory 

of radionuclides. The EG&G/NATS Martin 404 cloud tracking aircraft was available for use. Postevent photos 

were taken by American Aerial Services personnel in a 

Cessna 185 aircraft. 

A PHS Twin Beechcraft flew a sampling mission and a PHS 

Aerocommander equipped with an experimental beta detection system flew a cloud height mission. 

9.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Insertion of the device canister and LOS pipe was begun on 

13 June. By 14 June, activities appeared to be progressing on an 

accelerated schedule. Thus, a 16 June event date was announced 

with a planned execution time of 0930 hours. LOS pipe insertion 

was completed on 15 June with installation of the fast gate, pipe 

cap, and device diagnostic package. The annulus between the pipe 

and the hole casing was then filled with sand and the tower 

aligned over the LOS. 

On 15 June, SC personnel set up and checked out instrumentation from the tower to Trailers L-31, B-21, B-23, B-50, B-51, 

and F-23 which were located approximately 750 feet east of the 

201 
tower. Final adjustments were made to geophones, and telemetry 

equipment at SGZ was checked. SC personnel also assisted LRL 

personnel with electronic work for SGZ installations. LRL personnel checked equipment, participated in dry runs, and installed 

instruments. 

USC&GS personnel installed and checked out seismic stations. 

Final adjustments at the trailer area and tower were made by 

Hughes personnel. AVCO/RAD employees performed cable checks, 

armed the disconnect system, checked the control system, and 

armed recorders. Hookup of timing signals to cables, final battery installation in a cassette at the tower, and final instrumentation checks were made by HDL representatives. 

DOD personnel installed remote cameras and conducted preevent photo coverage. Representatives from Bell Telephone Laboratories, U.S. Army Electronic Laboratory (USAEL), Naval Ordnance Lab, White Oak (NOL/WO), AFWL, and General Electric Co. 

(GE) made final instrumentation and calibration checks and verified proper operation of instruments and the total test system. 

9.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

Button up of the area was completed and a final dry run held 

just after midnight on 16 June. 

At five and one-half hours before planned detonation on 16 

June 1965 (D-day) LRL, SC, and EG&G personnel were at SGZ to complete preparations for the arming procedure. At this time, they 

activated the interconnection with diagnostics, cabling, ball 

valve, fast gate, and closures. 

A DOD party was at the trailer park and SGZ area at this 

time to observe final event preparations. A final visual check 

202 
was made at the test tower. Simultaneously, the preparations 

listed in Table 9.1 were occurring. At sunrise, security personnel conducted a sweep of the closed area. 

Approximately three hours before scheduled zero time, DOD 

photo parties proceeded to the primary station 10,000 feet south 

of SGZ to establish a manned photo station. One party was to 

take still photos at zero time and the other would provide motion 

picture coverage. A DOD aerial photo party was in the area 45 

minutes before scheduled device detonation. 

The final weather briefing for the Test Manager and his 

Advisory Panel was conducted about two and one-half hours prior 

to scheduled device detonation. 

Permission to arm was given at 0715 and the arming party was 

out of the closed area at 0800. Both Radsafe initial survey 

teams were at the muster station at 0850 hours. 

Required countdowns began at 0900 on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 

8. Ten minutes before detonation the siren on Building CP-1 ran 

for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the building were 

turned on until after the detonation. 

DILUTED WATERS zero time was 0930 hours on 16 June 1965. 

Immediately after zero time a flash of light appeared at the 

top of the LOS pipe, and luminous, burning gas engulfed the lower 

portion of the tower. The flash lasted for about one second and 

was followed by the release of a red-brown cloud. This release 

decreased in intensity and almost completely stopped after 15 to 

20 seconds. 

At 21 seconds after zero time, clouds of light brown gas 

forcefully emanated from the area under the tower. RAMS unit 

203 
TABLE 9.1 

EVENT-DAY PREEVENT EXPERIMENT PREPARATIONS 

Experiment 

Agency Activity 

General Atomic 1. Loaded oscilloscope cameras and tape 

recorders 

2. Set station programmer 

3. Final button up preparations 

AFWL 1. Final operational check 

2. Final inspection of cabling to tower 

3. Button up at AFWL Trailer 

HDL 1. Final operational check 

2. Final inspection of cabling to tower 

3. Button up at HDL Trailer 

LRL 1. In Diagnostic Trailer Compound and at SGZ 

for final film loading and checkout of 

equipment. 

USC&GS 1. Final adjustment to seismic stations 

204 
readings at SGZ, 100 feet northeast, and 100 feet northwest were 

greater than 10,000 R/h at one minute after zero time. This second and stronger release continued until surface subsidence occurred four minutes and 12 seconds after the event. Subsidence 

completely stemmed the release and produced a crater approximately 417 feet in diameter at the surface and about 97 feet deep 

in the center. Soon thereafter, remote readings of radioactivity 

on the surface showed a decrease, and continued to decline with 

time. Readings received from the radiation detection units 

placed on the 500-foot perimeter decreased from a high of 180 R/h 

due north from SGZ. Other 500-foot and more distant units had 

lower initial readings than 180 R/h, and these readings decreased 

steadily with time. 

In addition to the venting of radioactive material, a second 

problem occurred. The power monitors for the three sled recovery 

winches indicated a power loss between zero and H+l second. In 

spite of this indication, the winches were manually actuated as 

planned, starting at H+60 seconds. However, the monitors were 

accurate, and the winches did not start due to the power failure. 

Thus, the experiment sleds remained on the tower, and during 

cavity collapse fell with the tower into the bottom of the 

crater. 

Since surface winds at detonation time were from the south, 

effluent was not blown directly over the trailer park. However, 

due to low wind speed (6 mph) effluent remained in the area long 

enough for gamma shine from the cloud to cause a significant radiation exposure to the trailers; and, more importantly, to the 

oscilloscope film. 

9.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Monitoring 

The cloud traveled northeast at about 5 to 8 miles per hour 

and reached a height of about 2,500 feet above the surface by one 

205 
hour after detonation. Radiation intensity at the leading edge 

of the cloud was 10 mR/h at that time. Winds in the area were 

light and variable, and released effluent remained within ten 

miles of SGZ for more than an hour. Penetration into the offsite 

area did not occur until about 1530 hours, at which time the remaining effluent was moving slowly toward the northeast. 

Ground monitors were operating along Highway 25 from Hiko 

Junction, Nevada, to just southeast of Queen City Summit, Nevada. 

Two monitors were located in Penoyer Valley, about ten miles due 

south of Queen City Summit. When no readings above background 

were observed by 1500 hours, ground monitors moved back to the 

test range complex. At 1530 hours, ground monitors encountered 

effluent along the northeastern boundaries of the test range complex. Two readings of 0.02 mR/h (gamma) were observed. Because 

low radiation levels were encountered, ground monitors were directed to terminate the mission. 

By nine hours after detonation, the cloud was approximately 

40 miles north-northeast of the test range complex and over an 

unpopulated area. The cloud had dispersed to an irregular rectangular shape about 35 miles long (north to south) and 20 miles 

wide (east to west). The readings at the edge of the cloud had 

dropped to just slightly above background. 

According to the PHS, no offsite exposure rate recorder activity or film badge exposures could be attributed to this event, 

and no health problems or violations of the Limited Test Ban 

Treaty occurred as a result of the release. 

9.3.2 Test Area Monitoring 

At 0930 the DOD photo party left their manned station prior 

to cloud arrival and proceeded directly to the FCP arriving there 

206 
at 0946. No readings above background were recorded at the photo 

station while personnel were located there. 

Bluebird Team No. 1 approached the cloud path at 0950 hours 

for the first survey of the 5H Road running from Radsafe Stake 

5H8 (1.75 miles southeast of SGZ) to Stake 5H30 (4.5 miles northeast of SGZ). This survey was complete at 1030 hours, with a 

maximum reading of 400 mR/h at Stake 5H14 (1 mile northeast of 

SGZ) at 0959 hours. At 1030 hours, Team No. 1 made a reverse 

survey of the 5H Road from Stake 5H30 to Stake 5H6 (1.5 miles 

southeast of SGZ), completing this survey at 1046 hours. The 

maximum reading was 325 mR/h at Stake 5H14 at 1041 hours. A 

third and final survey was made by Team No. 1 beginning at 1124 

hours and finishing at 1151 hours. Surveys were conducted from 

Radsafe Stake 5A16 (2.5 miles south of SGZ) to 5H18 (1.75 miles 

northeast of SGZ) with a maximum reading of 110 mR/h at Stake 

5H14. 

Bluebird Team No. 2 approached the cloud path at 1015 hours, 

conducted an extensive survey and was back out of the area by 

1303 hours. A maximum reading of 150 mR/h was encountered at 

Stake 5T9 at 1021 hours. 

The initial surface radiation survey began at 1030 hours on 

16 June 1965 and was completed at 1255 hours on the same day. 

Table 9.2 shows these data. 

Two vehicle-borne Radsafe parties, consisting of two monitors each, performed the initial survey of the immediate test 

area. They were referred to as Radsafe Survey Team No. 1 and 

Radsafe Survey Team No. 2. When released by the Test Group Director, Survey Team No. 1 proceeded from the FCP north on the 5A 

road to Well SB, then north on the 5J road to the U5b main access 

road. The team then traveled east on the main access road to 

survey the perimeter fence and other locations of interest. Upon 

207 
TABLE 9.2 

DILUTED WATERS EVENT 

Time Location (from SGZ) 

1030 

1035 

1036 

1038 

1040 

1041 

1044 

1046 

1130 

1140 

1200 

1205 

1218 

1220 

1255 

Radsafe road stake 5A30 (7 miles S) 

Radsafe road stake 5A15 (2-l/4 miles S) 

Well 5B 

Radsafe road stake 5G2 (3/4-mile S) 

Radsafe road stake 5G4 (l/2-mile S) 

West perimeter fence 

100 feet from north perimeter fence 

South perimeter fence 

Radsafe road stake 5C3 (l-1/4 miles SW) 

Radsafe road stake 5C6 (l-1/4 miles W) 

2 miles east of Radsafe road stake 5DlO 

1 mile south of Radsafe road stake 557 

10 feet south of crater lip 

South crater lip 

2,300 feet north of SGZ 

INITIAL RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

16 June 1965 

Gamma 

Exposure Rate 

(mR/h 1 

Bkg* 

2 

8 

35 

120 

2,000 

1,200 

2,500 

10 

10 

10 

100 

1,000 

1,500 

100 

*Background radiation level 

208 
completion of this survey, and at the direction of Radsafe Control, Team No. 1 went to the trailer park area to assist recovery 

operations at that point. Survey Team No. 2 proceeded from the 

FCP north on the 5A road to Well 5B. Then Team No. 2 proceeded 

northeast on the 5G road to the trailer park where monitors surveyed the trailer park area and stood by for recovery operations. 

Each survey team reported measurements and locations via net 

3 radio enroute. Plotting facilites were maintained at the FCP 

and CP-1. All pertinent radex area and toxicological information 

was recorded. 

Sufficient Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP to 

provide rescue and emergency support, if needed, and implement 

radiological area control when exclusion areas were established. 

Each area and all contaminated or radioactive materials were 

marked to indicate radiation levels. Personnel entering radiation areas or working with contaminated material were briefed 

concerning potential exposure and safety precautions, and were 

provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

Decontamination units were positioned at entrances to controlled areas. Personnel and equipment were monitored and decontaminated as necessary. Drill rigs and associated equipment used 

in postevent activities also were monitored and decontaminated as 

necessary. 

9.3.3 Reentry Activities 

At early times, radiation readings in the trailer park were 

too high to permit data recovery. Initial reentry parties were 

allowed into the area to recover radiation sensitive data films 

209 
starting about 1130 hours. All film was recovered as soon as 

practical after that time. 

Most of the oscilloscope photographs were made using Polaroid film. The first few films to be developed during recovery of 

data from the trailers showed no traces on the prints. Thus, remaining data was recovered by removing camera backs from the 

scopes without developing the film. 

By 1530 hours most of the magnetic tape also had been recovered from the trailer park. Initial estimates based on limited 

dosimetry in the trailers were that total data record exposures 

of from 2-8 R were experienced prior to film recovery, depending 

on exact trailer location and trailer shell construction. All 

personnel entering radex areas were issued pocket dosimeters and 

were dressed in anticontamination clothing. The maximum personnel exposure during recovery, as indicated by pocket dosimeter 

readings, was 125 mR, and the next two highest exposures were 100 

mR. 

Experimenting organizations having data or experiments to be 

recovered were Lookout Mountain Air Force Station (LMAFS), HDL, 

GE, AFWL, GA, LRL, SC, NOL/WO, USAEL, EG&G, Hughes, BTL, AVCO/RAD 

and USC&GS in addition to DOD. A party from AAS made a postevent 

aerial survey of the SGZ area. 

Radiation monitors entered the crater late on D-day and 

found significant amounts of alpha contamination. This contamination was produced by physical damage to several fission-foil 

neutron threshold detectors which resulted in scattering small 

amounts of plutonium. Visual observation indicated that sleds on 

the second and third floors were undamaged and near their preevent positions on the tower. The first floor of the tower was 

partially covered with earth, and it appeared that the first 

floor sled had been damaged considerably. 

210 
9.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

9.4.1 Experiment Recovery 

While no trailers (including the two located forward of the 

trailer park) experienced any damage from ground shock, the 

trailer park had become contaminated by fallout. Thus, it was 

impractical for experimenters to remain there long enough to play 

back tapes in the trailers. On 17 June, day crews moved trailers 

to an uncontaminated location about one-half mile from the 

trailer park. The trailers were decontaminated, power supplied 

to them, and experimenters were allowed to start preliminary data 

analyses. A double hot line was set up at the request of the SC 

health physicist, and a decontamination area was roped off for 

those personnel involved in crater recovery work. 

By the morning of 18 June, the second and third floor sleds 

were removed by crane from the crater. Late on 18 June those 

items which could easily be retrieved from the first floor sled 

were brought to the lip of the crater. Project experiment recovery was performed at this location. 

9.4.2 Postevent Drilling and Mining 

Postevent drilling began on 23 June 1965 at 1000 hours. One 

postevent hole and two sidetrack holes were drilled. Initial 

core sampling began at 1525 hours and was complete at 1900 hours 

the same day. Nineteen core samples were extracted. Drilling on 

the first sidetrack began at a depth of 446 feet on 24 June at 

2100 hours. Core sampling started at 0505 hours on 25 June and 

was completed at 0936 hours, with a total of thirty core samples 

taken. The second sidetrack began on 25 June 1965 at 1150 hours. 

Drilling started at 531 feet. Twelve core samples were extracted 

between 1710 and 2000 hours, and the abandonment valve was closed 

at 2210 hours on 25 June. 

211 
Mining at SGZ commenced 15 November 1965 as part of an investigation to determine cause of venting. Mining operations 

were completed 22 February 1966. 

9.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Checks were made on each shift for toxic gases and explosive 

mixtures. These measurements were recorded in the monitor's log 

book. All personnel entering the shaft were required to wear full 

radex clothing with supplied-air respirators. Continuous ventilation was supplied when personnel were working in the shaft. The 

ventilation exhaust line was monitored for CO. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for drilling, were established by 

REECo and were emphasized during all operations. 

9.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at zero time on 16 June and continued until 1400 hours on 7 July 1965. The maximum telemetry 

readings were greater than 1,000 R/h at SGZ, 100 feet northeast, 

and 100 feet northwest at one minute after device detonation. 

The maximum initial survey reading was 2.5 R/h at the south edge 

of the perimeter fence. This reading was recorded at 1046 hours 

on 16 June 1965. The highest alpha radiation reading was greater 

than 100,000 c/m/55cm2 in the crater. 

During postevent drilling operations, a maximum reading of 

1.5 mR/h was recorded at the drilling platform on 23 June 1965. 

Tests were run for toxic gases and explosive mixtures; however, 

none were detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

DILUTED WATERS radex areas from 16 June 1965 through 22 February 

1966, are summarized below. Average exposures are from self212 
reading pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. 

Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

NO. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 4,119 1,295 16 

DOD Participants 246 755 30 

The DILUTED WATERS event resulted in deposition of minor 

amounts of radioactivity in the offsite populated area to the 

northeast of the test range complex. The exact contribution of 

radioiodines from this event, if any, to milk supplies was not 

known due to existing radioiodine from previous nuclear testing 

on the Chinese mainland and the testing of a nuclear rocket 

engine at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS). Radioiodine entered milk supplies through fallout on feed for dairy 

cattle. Radioiodines present in milk sampled by the PHS were 

well below accepted safety levels established by the AEC. According to the PHS, there appeared to be no health problems and no 

treaty violation associated with release of radioactivity after 

the DILUTED WATERS event. 

Shortly after DILUTED WATERS, an ad hoc committee was established to determine the cause of the radioactive release and to 

make recommendations for avoiding releases from future events of 

this type. This committee included representatives from LRL, 

LASL, SC, AEC/NVOO and the DOD. At the request of this ad hoc 

committee, recovery of data was accomplished in two phases. 

Phase I was a preliminary investigation of the SGZ area to 

obtain and evaluate immediately available data, and to determine 

methods of recovery which would best yield meaningful data in the 

most expedient manner. This preliminary phase began on 22 June 

1965 with completion of experimental sled recovery by DOD. Radsafe parties made gamma and alpha surveys of the SGZ and tower 

213 
areas. DOD, SC, and EG&G still photography groups covered postevent damage to the SGZ area prior to any material removal. 

Clearing of the SGZ area which allowed access to the pad was completed the week of 28 June 1965. The fast gate was recovered the 

week of 28 June 1965. Photos and deposited material samples were 

taken throughout the recovery operation until completion of Phase 

I. 

Phase II began on 1 September 1965 and was conducted to determine failure modes below SGZ to the depths of the ball valves, 

if necessary. _ Surface installations and preparation for mining 

were completed on 27 September. However, rain and labor problems 

delayed the start of mining operations until 15 November 1965. 

The general conclusions of the ad hoc committee were that 

the device was buried too shallowly for its actual yield and the 

design of the LOS pipe and closure system was marginal. 

214 
CHAPTER 10 

TINY TOT EVENT 

10.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The TINY TOT event was a DOD underground detonation with a 

yield less than 20 kt conducted at 1000 hours PDT on 17 June 1965 

at tunnel site U15e in Area 15 of the NTS. The device was emplaced in granite on the flat surface of a hemispherical cavity 

approximately 40 feet in radius at the end of a 200-foot-long 

tunnel from a 364-foot deep shaft (Figure 10.1). This event was 

a weapons effects test designed to obtain information on transmission of ground shock, and represented the first known nuclear 

detonation event conducted on a rock surface within an underground cavity. Laboratories and contractors conducted six DOD 

scientific projects to obtain desired information. No surface 

collapse was predicted and none occurred. There was minor leakage of radioactive noble gases along multiconductor cables into 

the access tunnel and out into the atmosphere. This release was 

not detected outside the boundaries of the NTS. 

10.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

10.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe 

conduct of all TINY TOT project activities in Area 15. This included responsibility for health and safety of all participants 

in the test area under his control. Procedures for radiation 

exposure and contamination control in this area were in accordance with requirements of the DOD Test Group Director or his 

representative. These procedures included use of telemetered 

215 
SHAFT COLLAR 

, ELEVATION 5009.32’ 

r---r-- 

l 3 CONCRETE 

SHAFT 

ZERO POINT 

Y DRILL HOLE 

I 

386.57’ T 

50’ 

i 

SIDE ELEVATION 

PLAN 

0 20 40 60 

1.1’ 1 4 

10 

FEET 

Figure 10.1 Plan and Elevation of TINY TOT Excavations 
radiation measurements, air sampling, film badges, and monitors. 

Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject 

of separate action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC 

Albuquerque Operations Office. Sandia Corporation was responsible for timing and firing systems, and EGbG personnel were responsible for arming and firing the device. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

10.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "TINY TOT Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to conduct safe and economical reentry within the desired time frame. Stemming design incorporated necessary provisions to maximize safety of reentry. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies' prior to the test event. 

Test area maps with appropriate reference points were 

prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders 

and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test 

area. Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed 

regarding surface reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

RAMS units were positioned as follows: 

Station 1: 50 feet from end of instrument drift 

Station 2: Intersection of instrument drift and 

main drift 

Station 3: 10 feet outside blast door 

217 
Station 4: 

Station 5: 

Station 6: 

Station 7: 

Station 8: 

Station 9: 

Station 10: 

Stations 11 

Stations 23 

50 feet outside blast door 

Top of sand plug 

U15e shaft collar 

U15e SGZ 

SRI trailer park 

Sandia trailer park 

Station 1500 shaft collar (HARD HAT) 

through 22: 30-degree intervals on the 

400-foot arc 

through 34: 30-degree intervals on the 

l,OOO-foot arc 

The RAMS readout was at the DOD Test Group Director's 

FCP, and all readings were to be reported via net 3 

radio. Plotting facilities were maintained at the FCP 

and CP-1. All pertinent radex area and toxicological 

information was to be plotted. 

Radsafe coordinated with DOD Health and Safety representatives requirements for monitoring and equipment 

support and air sampling and telemetry arrays, including estimates of time in position and location. Radsafe monitors were to be stationed at WSI security 

roadblocks and at all work areas within the exclusion 

area to perform surveys and provide other support as 

directed. All personnel at manned stations were provided with anticontamination clothing and equipment, 

and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Monitoring teams and supervisory personnel were provided for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial 

surveys by helicopter, and tunnel reentry parties. 

Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP prior to 

detonation to perform surveys and to provide emergency 

support as directed; to provide and issue anticontamin218 
ation equipment, portable radiation detection instruments, and self-reading dosimeters; to operate area 

control check stations; and to perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

The "TINY TOT Reentry Plan" was prepared for use by all 

event-associated personnel. In addition Radsafe personnel were provided with Detailed Initial Reentry Procedures for both surface and tunnel reentries. 

B. Security Coverage 

Approximately seven and one-half hours before planned 

device detonation, the muster station was established 

on the Area 10 Circle Road west of the Area 15 access 

road intersection. A control station was established 

at the north junction of the Area 10 Circle Road and 

Mercury Highway. Areas 8 and 15 were to be closed and 

controlled until declared open by the Test Manager, and 

a screening station was established on the Area 10 Circle Road at the junction of the access road to Sedan 

Crater. 

All other roads into the closed area were secured. An 

Observer Area was established on the T2c access road at 

the junction 

C. Air Support 

An EG&G/NATS 

of the Area 10 Circle Road. 

Martin 404 aircraft flew a preevent track219 
ing mission over the event area, then returned to 

McCarran Airport (located in Las Vegas) on standby. 

Thirty minutes before detonation, Air Force and PHS 

personnel in a U-3A and two C-45 aircraft orbited outside the closed area to be available for cloud tracking. DOD personnel in a Marine Corps UH-43D helicopter 

and LMAFS personnel in a USAF U-6A performed photography missions. 

10.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

A sweep of the closed area was begun approximately five 

hours before detonation. Personnel not associated with the event 

were advised that they must be clear of the area by four hours 

before device detonation. At that time, an aerial sweep of the 

closed and surrounding area was conducted by Air Force and security personnel in an L-20 aircraft. By three hours before detonation, all personnel except those authorized were out of the 

controlled area. Personnel leaving the closed area exited 

through the muster or control stations. 

A count of all muster-badged personnel remaining in the 

area was conducted two and one-half hours prior to detonation and 

reported to the Test Manager through the Operations Coordination 

Center. A final sweep and clearance operation was conducted in 

order that permission to arm could be granted. 

The final weather briefing for the Test Manager and Advisory Panel was conducted two hours prior to planned detonation on 

17 June 1965. Participating organizations (SRI, BRL, SC, and 

DOD) had conducted final instrument checks and performed button 

up activities before departing the area. At 0710 hours, permission to arm the device was requested and received from the Test 

220 
Manager. The arming party entered the closed area at 0720 and 

exited at 0825. 

Required countdowns began at 0930 on radio nets 1, 2, 6, 

and 8. Ten minutes before detonation the siren on the CP-1 building ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the building 

were turned on until after the detonation. 

TINY TOT zero time was 1000 hours on 17 June 1965. 

10.3.1 Telemetry Measurements 

Telemetry coverage began at zero time. Readings from underground Stations 1 through 5 and surface Stations 6 and 7 during 

the first day are shown in Table 10.1. Radiation readings were 

background at Stations 8 through 20 and 22 through 34 from zero 

time until readings were discontinued at 0800 hours on 18 June 

1965. Station 21 indicated readings of 0.5 mR/h to 3 mR/h from 

nine minutes to 27 minutes after zero time, and read background 

the rest of the time. Readouts of U15e shaft collar and SGZ 

units were terminated when initial survey monitors reached the 

shaft collar. 

10.3.2 Radiation Surveys 

Two vehicle-borne Radsafe parties, consisting of two monitors each performed the initial radiation survey. They were referred to as Radsafe Survey Team No. 1 and Radsafe Survey Team 

No. 2. When released by the Test Group Director, the two parties 

proceeded from the FCP along the Area 15 main access road and 

then to the shaft area surveying enroute. Survey data were reported via net 3 radio when measurements were made (Table 10.2). 

Plotting facilities were maintained at the FCP and CP-1. All 

pertinent radiation exposure data and toxicological information 

were plotted. 

221 
TIME 

(PST) 

1001 

1002 

1003 

1004 

1005 

1008 M 

p3 1009 

h, 1010 

1011 

1013 

1015 

1016 

1017 

1019 

1021 

1023 

1025 

1027 

1029 

1031 

1033 

1035 

1037 

1039 

1041 

50' FROM INTERSECTION 

END OF OF INSTRUMENT 

INSTRUMENT DRIFT AND 

DRIFT MAIN DRIFT 

10' OUTSIDE 50' OUTSIDE TOP OF u15e 

BLAST DOOR BLAST DOOR SAND PLUG SHAFT 

MAIN DRIFT MAIN DRIFT MAIN DRIFT COLLAR 

U15e 

SGZ 

10.00 200.00 Neg. 0.70 0.40 Bkg Bkg 

40.00 700.00 0.60 12.00 0.90 0.040 Bkg 

50.00 800.00 0.60 10.00 15.00 0.100 Bkg 

175.00 1cl00.00 0.70 10.00 15.00 0.125 Bkg 

250.00 >1000.00 0.80 8.00 13.00 0.125 Bkg 

450.00 >1000.00 1.00 7.00 12.00 0.110 Bkg 

500.00 >1000.00 1.50 7.00 11.00 0.400 0.0005 

700.00 >1000.00 2.50 6.00 10.00 0.700 0.0005 

700.00 >1000.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 0.700 0.001 

700.00 >1000.00 3.50 6.50 8.00 0.700 0.001 

700.00 >1000.00 4.50 7.00 7.50 0.750 0.001 

700.00 >1000.00 5.50 9.00 7.00 0.600 0.003 

700.00 >1000.00 6.00 10.00 7.00 0.600 0.003 

750.00 >1000.00 7.00 12.00 6.00 0.650 0.0025 

750.00 >1000.00 9.00 15.00 6.00 0.500 0.0025 

800.00 >1000.00 10.00 18.00 5.50 0.700 0.0025 

800.00 >1000.00 12.00 21.00 5.00 0.500 0.002 

800.00 >1000.00 13.00 25.00 5.00 0.450 0.0025 

850.00 >1000.00 15.00 27.00 5.00 0.450 0.003 

800.00 >1000.00 18.00 30.00 5.00 0.450 0.002 

800.00 >l.ooo.oo 18.00 31.00 5.00 0.400 0.002 

800.00 >1000.00 20.00 40.00 5.00 0.400 0.002 

800.00 >1000.00 22.00 40.00 4.50 0.400 0.002 

800.00 >1000.00 25.00 45.00 5.00 0.400 0.002 

800.00 >1000.00 25.00 50.00 7.00 0.350 0.0015 

Table 10.1 

TINY TOT EVENT 

TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS UNDERGROUND 

(Gamma Radiation in R/h) 
Table 10.1 (Continued) 

TIME 

(PST) 

1044 

1047 

1050 

1053 

1056 

1059 

1102 

1105 

1108 

1111 

1114 

h, 1117 

N 

w 1120 

1123 

1126 

1129 

1132 

1135 

1145 

1155 

1205 

1215 

1225 

1235 

1245 

1255 

1305 

1315 

1325 

1335 

50' FROM 

END OF 

INSTRUMENT 

DRIFT 

INTERSECTION 

OF INSTRUMENT 

DRIFT AND 

MAIN DRIFT 

10' OUTSIDE 

BLAST DOOR 

MAIN DRIFT 

50' OUTSIDE 

BLAST DOOR 

MAIN DRIFT 

TOP OF U15e 

SAND PLUG SHAFT 

MAIN DRIFT COLLAR 

800.00 >1000.00 38.00 55.00 8.00 

850.00 >1000.00 30.00 60.00 7.00 

900.00 >1000.00 35.00 70.00 10.00 

900.00 >1000.00 40.00 70.00 12.00 

950.00 >1000.00 40.00 75.00 15.00 

1000.00 >1000.00 45.00 80.00 15.00 

1000.00 >1000.00 45.00 80.00 18.00 

1000.00 >1000.00 46.00 85.00 20.00 

1000.00 >1000.00 50.00 90.00 20.00 

950.00 >1000.00 50.00 90.00 18.00 

900.00 >1000.00 50.00 90.00 20.00 

900.00 >1000.00 50.00 90.00 20.00 

900.00 >1000.00 50.00 90.00 24.00 

880.00 >1000.00 50.00 95.00 32.00 

850.00 >1000.00 52.00 100.00 38.00 

800.00 >1000.00 55.00 100.00 40.00 

800.00 >1000.00 55.00 100.00 38.00 

800.00 >1000.00 55.00 100.00 57.00 

750.00 >1000.00 57.00 100.00 40.00 

700.00 1000.00 60.00 105.00 35.00 

600.00 950.00 60.00 110.00 55.00 

700.00 900.00 60.00 110.00 55.00 

580.00 BOO.00 60.00 105.00 60.00 

650.00 700.00 60.00 110.00 85.00 

500.00 650.00 60.00 110.00 80.00 

480.00 600.00 60.00 110.00 80.00 

450.00 590.00 60.00 110.00 70.00 

410.00 510.00 60.00 105.00 90.00 

400.00 500.00 60.00 110.00 95.00 

390.00 500.00 60.00 105.00 110.00 

U15e 

SGZ 

0.300 0.001 

0.325 0.0015 

0.275 0.001 

0.300 0.001 

0.250 0.001 

0.250 0.001 

0.240 0.0007 

0.225 0.00075 

0.210 0.0005 

0.200 Bk9 

0.200 0.0005 

0.190 0.0005 

0.180 0.0005 

0.160 0.0005 

0.160 Bk9 

0.150 Bk9 

0.150 __- 

0.150 Bk9 

0.120 Bk9 

0.110 Bk9 
Table 10.1 (Continued) 

TIME 

(PST) 

1345 

1355 

1405 

1415 

1425 

1435 

1445 

1455 

1505 

1515 

1525 

1540 

1555 

1610 

1630 

1645 

1700 

1715 

1730 

1745 

1800 

1815 

1830 

1845 

1900 

1915 

1930 

1945 

2000 

2015 

50’ FROM INTERSECTION 

END OF OF INSTRUMENT 

INSTRUMENT DRIFT AND 

DRIFT MAIN DRIFT 

10’ OUTSIDE 50’ OUTSIDE TOP OF 

BLAST DOOR BLAST DOOR SAND PLUG 

MAIN DRIFT MAIN DRIFT MAIN DRIFT 

450.00 460.00 59.00 105.00 110.00 

320.00 440.00 59.00 105.00 110.00 

300.00 410.00 59.00 100.00 105.00 

300.00 400 .oo 59.00 100.00 105.00 

290.00 400.00 59.00 100.00 100.00 

260 .OO 350 .oo 54.00 100 .oo 90.00 

230.00 310.00 55.00 95.00 90.00 

250.00 300.00 55.00 95.00 85.00 

250.00 300.00 52.00 95.00 89.00 

230 .OO 290 .oo 52.00 90.00 90.00 

220.00 280.00 51.00 90.00 90.00 

205 .OO 260 .OO 50.00 90.00 82.00 

200.00 260.00 50.00 90.00 60.00 

170.00 250.00 45.00 7.00 60.00 

160.00 220.00 42.00 3.00 25.00 

150.00 200 .OO 30.00 2.50 13.00 

150.00 200.00 12.00 2.20 10.00 

130.00 180.00 7.00 1.70 16.00 

120.00 180.00 7.00 1.50 15.00 

120.00 160.00 5.00 1.40 11.00 

110.00 160.00 5.00 1.30 9.00 

100.00 145.00 8.00 1.10 10.00 

100.00 140.00 7.00 1.00 10.00 

95.00 130.00 5.00 0.9 10.00 

90.00 110.00 3.50 0.9 8.00 

87.00 110.00 3.00 0.81 2.00 

80.00 100.00 2.70 0.8 10.00 

78.00 100 .oo 1.30 0.7 7.00 

72.00 90.00 1.00 0.7 2.50 

68.00 87.00 0.7 0.68 6.00 
Table 10.1 (Concluded) 

TIME 

(PST) 

2030 65.00 85.00 0.6 

2045 60.00 80.00 0.55 

2100 55.00 72.00 0.5 

2115 52.00 70.00 0.45 

2130 50.00 70.00 0.42 

2145 50.00 65.00 0.4 

2200 48.00 62.00 0.4 

2215 45.00 60.00 0.38 

2230 42.00 57.00 0.38 

2245 40.00 52.00 0.31 

2300 38.00 50.00 0.3 

2315 33.00 50.00 0.3 

2330 32.00 48.00 0.28 

2345 30.00 45.00 0.26 

2400 30.00 42.00 0.255 

50' FROM INTERSECTION 

END OF OF INSTRUMENT 

INSTRUMENT DRIFT AND 

DRIFT MAIN DRIFT 

10' OUTSIDE 50' OUTSIDE TOP OF 

BLAST DOOR BLAST DOOR SAND PLUG 

MAIN DRIFT MAIN DRIFT MAIN DRIFT 

0.65 

0.6 

0.6 

0.55 

?"5 

0:49 

0.45 

0.42 

0.4 

0.4 

0.38 

0.35 

0.3 

0.3 

10.00 

7.00 

10.00 

10.00 

8.00 

10.00 

12.00 

15.00 

15.00 

15.00 

15.00 

12.00 

12.00 

11.00 

11.00 
Upon direction from Radsafe Control: 

1. Survey Team No. 1 proceeded along the Area 15 access 

road to the U15a shaft area reporting all measurements enroute. 

The team obtained readings at the shaft entrance and other locations of interest in the surrounding area. Team No. 1 then established a radex area around the shaft area with signs and barricades. At the direction of Radsafe Control, Team No. 1 returned to the FCP to act as party monitors for the surface recovery teams. 

2. Radsafe Survey Team No. 2 proceeded along the Area 15 

main access road to the Sandia Trailer Park, surveying enroute. 

From this point Team No. 2 converged on the U15e shaft area along 

with Team No. 1. After completing the survey 'of the shaft entrance, Team No. 2 went to SGZ (approximately 200 feet northeast 

of the shaft entrance) and surveyed the area for cracks and fissures. After completing these surveys, Team No. 2 returned to 

the FCP and waited for further assignments. 

Sufficient Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP to 

provide rescue and emergency support, if needed, and to implement 

radiological area control as exclusion areas were established. A 

mobile facility for issue of anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimetric devices was positioned at the 

FCP. A mobile decontamination unit was positioned adjacent to it. 

Each area and all contaminated or radioactive materials 

were marked to indicate radiation levels. Personnel entering radiation areas or working with contaminated material were briefed 

concerning potential exposure and safety precautions and were 

provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

Decontamination units later were repositioned at entrances 

226 
TABLE 10.2 

TINY TOT EVENT 

INITIAL RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

17 June 1965 

Gamma 

Exposure Rate 

Time Location (from SGZ) (mR/h) 

1038 Radsafe road stake lOC1 (3 miles SE) 

1040 

1044 

1045 

1045 

1050 

1100 

1105 

1134 

1145 

1200 

Radsafe road stake 15C5 (l-3/4 miles SE) 

Sandia Corporation trailer compound 

Radsafe road stake 15C13 (l/4 mile N) 

Stanford Research Institute 

trailer compound 

200 feet northwest of U15e 

Instrument holes A, B, and C 

100 feet south of green brock house 

200 feet northwest of U15e shaft 

200 feet northwest of U15e shaft 

U15e shaft collar 

Bkg* 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

0.3 

Bkg 

55.0 

0.2 

0.3 

300.0 

*Natural radiation Background 

227 
to controlled radiation areas. Personnel and equipment were monitored and decontaminated as necessary. Drill rigs and associated equipment used in postevent activities also were monitored 

and decontaminated as necessary. 

10.3.3 Experiment Recovery 

Two personnel each from EG&G, BRL, DASA, and DOW, and one 

person from SC reentered the area to perform experiment recoveries on D-day. 

10.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

10.4.1 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling began on 27 August 1965 at 2240 hours 

and was completed on 18 September 1965 at approximately 2125 

hours. No radiation levels above background were detected on the 

drill platform during drilling operations. No radiological problems were encountered. 

10.4.2 Shaft Reentry 

Shaft reentry operations began at 1030 hours on 2 September 

1965. Several tasks were accomplished during work to clear the 

shaft. These included general shaft repair, installing power 

lines, lowering vent lines, installing a water pump, and pumping 

out the shaft. The shaft was cleared on 22 September. No radiological problems occurred during this operation; radiation readings were consistently background. 

10.4.3 Tunnel Reentry 

Mining began in the tunnel on 24 September 1965. The immediate objectives were to reach the blast door and to drill a 3- 

228 
inch hole and run a probe to the instrument drift. Labor strife 

which began on 28 September caused the DOD official in charge of 

TINY TOT to close down the effort until after labor problems were 

settled. Work resumed on 5 November. A new drift was mined from 

the main drift to the hook drift, and this instrument drift was 

reached on 10 November. 

Breakthrough to the cavity was achieved on 18 November. 

Radsafe personnel checked water from the cavity and found a trace 

of alpha contamination. Miners who had been working in this area 

were told to leave wet anticontamination clothing, gloves, and 

booties at the hook drift entrance, and these personnel were 

taken to the CP-2 decontamination facility to shower. At the request of DOD, a television camera was put into the cavity on 22 

November to check the water level. 

Instrument recovery from the hook drift was performed by 

one DOD and two SRI personnel on 24 November. All men had contamination on their hands reading up to 0.2 mrad/h. This was 

removed with one washing. Work in the cavity area continued from 

18 November 1965 through 14 January 1966. All personnel were 

completely "dressed out" in anticontamination clothing and equipment, including two sets of coveralls. A hot line was maintained 

downhole near the reentry drift. 

The cavity was entered on 2 December 1965 by a DOD photo 

party. Radiation readings were 700 mR/h gamma and greater than 

100,000 c/m/55cmz alpha. From 2 December until 9 December gravel 

was poured into the cavity. When miners and one Radsafe monitor 

entered the cavity on 9 December to level the gravel, the radiation reading was 1 R/h. 

Because miners would have to stay for some time in this 

area while hand shoveling, they were removed from the cavity until information could be obtained concerning authorization to 

229 
work at this radiation exposure level. The Radsafe supervisor 

recommended that each miner entering the work area wear at least 

two dosimeters so that exposure levels could be monitored easily. 

Exposures estimated with pocket dosimeters were not to exceed 600 

mR, and the above requirements were contingent upon approval from 

the mining supervisor. All downhole work was suspended at 1915 

hours on 9 December. 

At 2245 hours, two Radsafe monitors entered the cavity and 

obtained readings shown in Table 10.3. Upon exit, dosimeters of 

the monitors read 150 mR and their film badges were changed. 

They were in the cavity approximately 10 minutes. 

On 10 December, the allowable personnel exposure was increased to 1 R. Work in the cavity continued. By 14 December 

the general work area read 2.5 R/h and Radsafe was instructed to 

keep personnel who already had high exposures out of the area 

until their dosimeter readings could be checked against their 

film badges. 

DOD photo parties were in the cavity periodically from 3 

January 1965 to 12 January 1966 when recovery operations were 

completed. 

10.4.4 Industrial Safety 

Checks were made on each shift for radiation levels, toxic 

gases, and explosive mixtures. These measurements were recorded 

in the monitor's log book. Industrial safety codes, including 

specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling, were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. 

10.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at zero time on 17 June and con230 
TABLE 10.3 

Location 

Beta Plus Gamma 

( rad/h 1 

Gamma 

(R/h) 

North 2.0 1.5 

East 3.2 2.0 

South 1.5 1.0 

West 3.0 2.5 

Center 0.7 0.6 

Entrance 0.5 0.4 

TINY TOT EVENT 

CAVITY RADIATION READINGS 

9 December 1965 

Distance 

from Wall 

3 feet 

1 foot 

2 feet 

1 foot 

Contact 

231 
tinued until 0800 hours on 18 June 1965. The maximum reading 

underground was greater than 1,000 R/h at the intersection of the 

instrument drift and the main drift (Station 2) at five minutes 

after detonation. The maximum reading on the surface was 0.750 

R/h at the shaft collar 15 minutes after detonation. 

The initial reentry survey began at 1038 hours and was completed at 1200 hours on 17 June 1965. The maximum gamma radiation reading was 300 mR/h at the U15e shaft collar at 1200 hours. 

No radiation levels above background were detected on the 

drill platform during postevent drilling operations which began 

29 August and were completed 18 September 1965. 

Tunnel reentry began on 24 September 1965 and the cavity 

was entered on 2 December 1965. The maximum radiation reading 

was 2.5 R/h during cavity reentry on 9 December 1965. Alpha radiation readings were greater than 100,000 c/m/55cm2 during the 

cavity survey on 9 December 1965. 

Personnel exposures received during entries to TINY TOT 

radex areas from 17 June 1965 through 12 January 1966 are summarized below. Maximum 

Average exposures are 

corded on Area Access 

exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

from self-reading pocket dosimeters as reRegisters. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 1,575 1,060 24 

DOD Participants 96 120 32 

Toxic gas levels were 9,000 ppm CO2 in the instrument drift 

on 11 October 1965. No explosive mixtures were detected. 

No radioactivity above normal background levels was detect232 
ed offsite by ground and aerial monitoring teams, by stationary 

exposure rate recorders, or in any environmental samples either 

after the detonation or during the subsequent sample recovery operations. No prefilter air samples contained levels of gross 

beta activity above normal background. 

233 
REFERENCE LIST 

References are not indicated within the text of this report, 

but are included in this list by chapter or part. Most references are available for review at, or through, the DOE/NV Coordination and Information Center (CIC). Security-classified references are located at the DNA/HQ Technical Library in Alexandria, 

Virginia, but are available only to persons with appropriate security clearances and a need for classified information contained 

in the references. 

The CIC is operated by REECo, the custodian of nuclear testing dosimetry and other radiological safety records for DOE/NV, 

and the custodian for DNA of reference documents for reports on 

DOD participation in atmospheric, oceanic, and underground nuclear weapons testing events and series. Arrangements may be 

made to review available references for this report at the CIC by 

contacting one of the following: 

Health Physics Division 

Department of Energy 

Nevada Operations Office 

2753 South Highland Avenue 

Post Office Box 14100 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 734-3194 

FTS: 598-3194 

or 

Archivist, Coordination and Information Center 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. 

Post Office Box 14400 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 734-3671 

FTS: 598-3671 

234 
Source documents available through the National Technical 

Information Service (NTIS) may be purchased from NTIS at the 

address and telephone number listed below: 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road 

Springfield, Virginia 22161 

Commercial: (703) 487-4650 

(Sales Office) 

References available through public bookstores, through the 

U.S. Government Printing Office, and only at the CIC are listed 

without asterisks. Asterisks after references or groups of references 

* 

** 

*** 

PREFACE 

1. 

2. 

3. 

indicate availability as follows: 

Available through the NTIS and also located at the CIC. 

Located in the REECo Technical Information Office adjacent to the CIC, available through the CIC, and may be 

subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

Located in the DNA/HQ Technical Library, and subject to 

security clearance requirements. 

Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada 

Operations Office, "Announced United States Nuclear Tests," 

NV-209 (Rev. 2), January 1982 

Devine, Robert A., Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test 

Ban Debate, Oxford University Press, NY, 1978 

Harris, P.S., et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

PLUMBBOB, DNA 6005F, 15 September 1981* 

235 
4. U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Veterans' 

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing," U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1979 

Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

DOE/NV, "Announced Nuclear Tests," (n. 1). 

Devine, "Nuclear Test Ban Debate," (n. 2). 

Weapons Effects Test Group, Field Command, Defense Atomic 

Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," January 

1962 

Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support Agency, 

"Orientation, Nevada Test Site," revised 15 August 1964 

Ponton, Jean, et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

DOMINIC II, DNA 6027F, 31 January 1983" 

Radiological Safety Division, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., "Danny Boy Event, On-site Rad-Safe 

Report," May 1962 

Chapter 2, UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

9. Liverman, James L., Energy Research & Development Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Nevada Test 

Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA - 1551, September 1977" 

10. Butkovich, Theodore R., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Effects of Water Saturation on 

Underground Nuclear Detonations, UCRL-51110, 9 September, 

1971* 

236 
Committee on Veterans Affairs, "Claims for Disabilities," 

(n. 41, on venting. 

11. Radiological Safety Department, Reynolds Electrical & 

Engineering Co., Inc., "Standard Operating Procedures," 

January 1961 

EVENT SUMMARIES AND EACH EVENT CHAPTER 

12. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, Report 

of the Test Manager, Operation Nougat, 1 July 1961 

through 30 June 1962, NVO-5, December 1963, Unpublished. 

13. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, Report 

of the Test Manager, Operation Whetstone, 1 July 1964 

through 30 June 1965, NVO-25, April 1966, Unpublished. 

14. REECo Environmental Sciences Department field record 

archives are maintained chronologically and by test event 

and include the following: 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

Procedures, Reentry Plans, Radsafe Plans, and Schedules of Events. ** 

Correspondence. ** 

Reports, including onsite Radsafe and offsite PHS 

event reports. ** 

Exposure reports, Radsafe log books, Area Access 

Registers, radiation survey forms, telemetry forms, 

and other sampling and dosimetry forms. ** 

237 
238 
APPENDIX A 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Access Shaft Headframe A framed structure above the shaft collar, necessary for lowering and hoisting the elevator cage, personnel, and 

equipment in tunnel shafts. 

Activation Products Nuclides made radioactive by neutrons 

from a nuclear detonation interacting 

with usually nonradioactive nuclides. 

Also called induced activity. 

Advisory Panel 

Air Support 

Alpha Particle 

A group of experts formed to advise the 

user (see Testing Organizations) Test 

Director concerning operational factors 

affecting a test detonation. 

Aircraft, facilities, and personnel required for various support functions 

during testing, such as cloud sampling, 

cloud tracking, radiation monitoring, 

photography, and personnel and equipment transport. 

A particle emitted spontaneously from a 

nucleus of a radionuclide, primarily 

heavy radionuclides. The particle is 

identical with the nucleus of a helium 

atom, having an atomic mass of four 

units and an electric charge of two 

positive units. 

239 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Anticontamination 

Clothing 

Atmospheric Test 

Series 

Attenuation 

Outer clothing worn to prevent contamination of personal clothing and the 

body, and spread of contamination to 

uncontrolled areas. 

Each of several series of U.S. tests 

conducted from 1945 to 1962, when nuclear device detonations and experiments were conducted primarily in the 

atmosphere. 

The process by which photons or particles from radioactive material are reduced in number or energy on passing 

through some medi urn. 

Background Radiation 1) Natural environmental radiation. 

2) The radiations of man's natural environment, consisting of cosmic 

rays and those which come from the 

naturally radioactive atoms of the 

Earth, including those within man's 

body. 

3) The term also may mean radiation 

extraneous to an experiment. 

Ball Valve A solid sphere with an opening through 

it on a diameter which may be aligned 

with the valved conduit in open position or turned perpendicular to the 

conduit in closed position. 

240 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

"Beer Mug" Dosimeters Dosimetric devices installed in a protective shield the size and shape of a 

beer mug (see Dosimeter). 

Beta Particle 

BJY 

Blast Door 

Blast Plug 

A negatively charged particle of very 

small mass emitted from the nucleus of 

a radionuclide, particularly from the 

fission product radionuclides from nuclear detonations. Except for origin, 

the beta particle is identical with a 

highspeed electron. 

The intersection of Mercury Highway 

with roads originally constructed for 

the BUSTER-JANGLE 1953 atmospheric test 

series, located at the NW corner of 

Area 3 on the NTS. 

May be in blast plug, but originally 

was in its own keyed plug toward the 

portal from the blast plug. Evolved 

into an overburden plug with a large 

steel door containing a smaller access 

hatch and designed to withstand up to 

1000 psi overpressure. May be welded 

or bolted closed during detonation. 

Sometimes a loosely used substitute 

term for a gas seal door. 

Barrier constructed underground as a 

primary containment feature. May be 

constructed with sandbags (see Sandbag 

Plugs), solid sand backfill, concrete 

(see Keyed Concrete Plug), or other 

materials. Some plugs may have open241 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

ings through them that are sealed with 

blast doors, and sometimes sandbags are 

added to protect the opening temporarily during detonation. 

Bluebird Teams 

Button up Activities 

Cable Drift 

Cal Seal 

Vehicle-borne teams consisting of 2 radiation monitors, each with equipment 

and materials, to distinguish, follow, 

delineate, and sample at ground level 

any effluent release from a nuclear 

detonation at the NTS. They usually 

were positioned within the secured area 

to be free to move about as directed 

without having to gain access through 

security stations into the test area. 

Preparations made prior to a detonation 

during which time all facilities and 

areas were secured as required, vehicles and equipment were removed, and 

fixtures were prepared to withstand 

detonation shock. 

A passageway tunnel, usually parallel 

to the LOS drift, also known as the access or reentry drift, in which cables 

from various experiments in the LOS 

pipe were installed toward a cable alcove and then through a sealed shaft to 

the surface. 

A commercial sealant that is high density, quick-drying, high-strength, and 

resilient concrete. 

242 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Chamber A natural or man-made enclosed space or 

cavity. 

Check Points or 

Check Stations 

Chimney 

Cloud Sampling 

Cloud Tracking 

Coaxial Cable 

Geographic locations established and 

staffed to control entry into restricted areas. 

The volume of broken rock above an 

underground detonation cavity that 

falls downward when decreasing cavity 

gas pressure can no longer support the 

column of broken rock. 

The process of collecting particulate 

and gaseous samples of an effluent 

cloud to determine the amount of 

airborne radioactivity, and/or for subsequent analysis of detonation characteristics. Sampling usually was accomplished by specially equipped aircraft. 

The process of monitoring and determining the drift and movement of an effluent cloud, either by radar or by radiation monitoring and visual sighting 

from aircraft. 

A high-frequency telephone, telegraph, 

television, or scientific data transmission cable consisting of a conducting outer metal tube enclosing and insulated from a central conducting core. 

Collar See "Shaft collar". 

243 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Console 

Containment 

Contamination 

Crater 

Crater Experiment 

A cabinet or panel containing instrumentation for monitoring or controlling 

electronic or mechanical devices. 

The process of confining radioactive 

products of a nuclear device detonation 

underground. 

1) Radioactive material in an undesirable location, usually fission and 

activation products of a nuclear 

detonation, or fissionable material 

from a device, incorporated with 

particles of dust or device debris. 

2) The process of depositing radioactive material on, or spreading it 

to, an undesirable location, such as 

on personnel, structures, equipment, 

and other surfaces outside a controlled area. 

The depression formed on the earth's 

surface by a near-surface, surface, or 

underground detonation. Crater formation can occur by the scouring effect 

of airblast, by throw-out of broken 

surface material, or by surface subsidence resulting from underground cavity 

formation and subsequent rock fall, or 

chimneying to the surface. 

A test designed to breach and excavate 

the ground surface, thereby forming an 

244 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

D-Day 

ejecta crater; as opposed to a sink or 

subsidence crater. 

The term used to designate the day on 

which a test takes place. 

D + 1 day The first day after a test event. 

Decontamination The reduction of amount or removal of 

contaminating radioactive material from 

a structure, area, object, or person. 

Decontamination may be accomplished by 

(1) treating the surface to remove or 

decrease the contamination; (2) letting 

the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of natural decay: or (3) fixing and covering 

the contamination to attenuate the radiation emitted. 

Device 

DOD 

Nuclear fission or fission and fusion 

materials together with the arming, 

fusing, firing, chemical explosive, 

canister, and diagnostic measurement 

equipment, that have not reached the 

development status of an operational 

weapon. 

The U.S. Department of Defense. The 

federal executive agency responsible 

for the defense of the United States. 

Includes the military services and 

special joint defense agencies. 

245 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Dose 

Dose Rate 

Dosimeter 

dpm 

Draeger Multi-Gas 

Detector 

Dressed-Out 

A quantity (measured or accumulated) of 

ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy 

absorbed by a medium, including a person. 

As a general rule, the amount of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy that 

an individual or material would absorb 

per unit of time. Dose rate is usually 

expressed as rads (or rems) per hour or 

multiples or divisions of these units. 

An instrument or device used to indicate the total accumulated dose of (or 

exposure to) ionizing radiation. Instruments or devices worn or carried by 

individuals are called personnel dosimeters. 

Disintegrations per minute; a measure 

of radioactivity. Literally, atoms 

disintegrating per minute. 

An instrument used to detect toxic 

gases, such that a sample of the ambient atmosphere is drawn through a selected chemical reagent tube which indicates the concentration of a toxic gas. 

Dressed in anticontamination clothing 

and associated equipment. 

246 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Drift A secondary passageway tunnel, usually 

horizontal, from or between main tunnels or shafts. 

Drillhole 

Designations PS-1v: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 - 

vertical 

PS-ID: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 - 

directional 

PS-IA: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 - 

angle 

Each 'S' added after any of the above 

notations indicates a "sidetrack" or 

change of direction in the drillhole. 

Dry Runs Rehearsals or practices in preparation 

for an actual test event. 

Effects Experiments Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

Explosimeter A battery-operated detector calibrated 

to indicate the concentration in the 

ambient atmosphere of explosive gases 

and vapors as percent of the lower ex247 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Explosive-Proof 

Flashlight 

Exposure 

Fast Gate 

Film Badge 

plosive limit (LEL) of hydrogen or 

methane gas. 

A flashlight constructed in such a manner that its use will not cause or create an explosion in an explosive gas 

atmosphere. 

A measure expressed in roentgens (R) of 

the ionization produced by gamma rays 

(or x-rays) in air [or divisions of R, 

l/1000 R = milliroentgen (mR)]. The 

exposure rate is the exposure per unit 

of time, usually per hour but sometime 

smaller or larger units (e.g., R/min, 

R/day, mR/h). 

A closure system driven by explosives 

or compressed air that closes an opening or conduit within a small fraction 

of a second. 

Used for the indirect measurement of 

exposure to ionizing radiation. Generally contains 2 or 3 films of differing 

sensitivity. Films are wrapped in 

paper (or other thin material) that 

blocks light but is readily penetrated 

by radiations or secondary charged particles resulting from radiations to be 

measured. The films are developed and 

the degree of darkening (or density) 

measured indicates the radiation exposure. Film dosimeters commonly are used 

248 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Fission 

Fission Products 

to indicate gamma and x-ray exposures, 

and also can be designed to determine 

beta and neutron doses. 

The process whereby the nucleus of a 

particular heavy element splits into 

(generally) two nuclei of lighter elements, with an accompanying release of 

energy. The most important fissionable, or fissile, materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission is 

caused by the absorption of a neutron. 

A general term used for the complex 

mixture of radioactive nuclides (see 

Radionuclides) produced as a result of 

nuclear fission. 

Fissionable Material A synonym for fissile material, also 

extended to include material that can 

be fissioned by fast neutrons only, 

such as uranium-238. Used in reactor 

operations to mean reactor fuel. 

Forward Control 

Point 

Fusion 

A geographic location in the forward 

test area, usually adjacent to the 

closed (or secured) test area. 

The combination of two very light nuclei (of atoms) to form a relatively 

heavier nucleus, with an accompanying 

release of energy. Also called thermonuclear fusion. 

249 
_- 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Gamma Rays Electromagnetic radiations of high 

energy emitted from the nuclei of 

radionuclides, or bundles of energy 

called photons, which usually accompany 

other nuclear reactions, such as fission, neutron capture, and beta particle emission. Gamma rays, or photons, 

are identical with x- rays of the same 

energyl except that x-rays result from 

electron reactions and are not produced 

in the nucleus. 

Gamma Shine 

Gas Seal Door 

Gas Seal Plug 

Geiger-Mueller 

Counter 

Measurable gamma radiation intensity 

from an approaching radioactive cloud 

or passing cloud, as opposed to measurements from or in gamma emitting fallout. Also gamma radiation scattered by 

air molecules, as opposed to direct radiation from a gamma source. 

A door constructed in a tunnel gas seal 

Plug* Both are designed to prevent 

venting of gases, are secondary containment features, and usually are the 

closest barrier to the portal. 

A plug, employing epoxy, plastic, concrete or other material, designed and 

installed to prevent the passage and 

venting of gases (see Keyed Concrete 

Plug). 

An instrument consisting of a Geiger 

tube and associated electronic equip250 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Geophones 

Ground Zero 

H-Hour 

Hard Copy 

Hot Line 

Ion 

ment used to detect and measure (and 

sometimes record) nuclear radiation. 

Electronic instruments which detect and 

record rock falls and earth movements 

by the use of sound. 

The point on the ground or water at 

which a surface, near surface, towertype, or ballon-type nuclear detonation 

occurs; as opposed to an airburst where 

the detonation is high in the air, or 

an underground detonation where the 

surface is relatively unaffected (see 

Surface Ground Zero), 

Time zero or exact time of detonation 

to the minute, second, or fraction of a 

second; as opposed to H + 1 which implies one hour after detonation, unless 

time units of seconds or minutes are 

listed. 

The original paper document used in 

research. 

A location on the edge of a radex area 

where exiting personnel remove anticontamination clothing and equipment and 

are monitored for contamination and decontaminated as necessary before release. 

An atomic particle or part of a molecule bearing an electric charge, usual251 
_ 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

ly a positively charged ion and a negatively charged ion are formed as a pair 

(e.g. A negatively charged electron 

displaced from its positively charged 

remaining atom). 

Ionizing Radiation Any particulate or electromagnetic radiation capable of producing ions, directly or indirectly, in its passage 

through air or matter. Alpha and beta 

particles produce all ion pairs directly, while the electrons of initial ion 

pairs produced by gamma rays and x-rays 

in turn produce secondary ionization in 

their paths. 

Isotopes Different types of atoms within the 

same element, all reacting approximately the same chemically, but differing 

in atomic weight and nuclear stability. 

For example, the element hydrogen has 

three isotopes; normal hydrogen is the 

most abundant, heavy hydrogen is called 

deuterium, and radioactive hydrogen is 

the radioisotope called tritium. 

Keyed Concrete Plug A concrete plug of greater diameter 

than the shaft or tunnel cross section, 

such that the concrete is poured into 

the surrounding rock, providing greater 

strength against overpressure from the 

nuclear detonation. 

Leukemia Cluster An apparent but unexpected or extraordinary group of leukemia cases within 

252 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

some number or group of persons. 

LOS Tunnel (as opposed 

to LOS Pipe) A mined opening for installation of the 

LOS pipe. 

LOS Pipe 

Manhattan Engineer 

District 

Manned Stations 

Microbarograph 

mR 

Noble Gases 

A line-of-sight pipe pointed at a device. A large diameter pipe, hundreds 

of feet long, constructed underground, 

and from which air has been evacuated 

to simulate high altitude conditions. 

The U.S. Army predecessor organization 

to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 

Locations inside the closed and secured 

area which are occupied by authorized 

personnel during an event. 

An instrument that measures and records 

small changes in atmospheric pressures. 

A radiation exposure term (see Exposure). 

Those inert gases which do not react 

with other elements at normal temperature and pressure, (i.e., helium, neon, 

argon, krypton, xenon, and radon). 

Nuclear Device 

(vs. weapon or bomb) A device in which most of the energy 

released in a detonation results from 

reactions of atomic nuclei, either fis253 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

sion, or fission and fusion. A device 

under development (see Device) is not 

considered a weapon or bomb. Both A- 

(or atomic) bombs and H- (or hydrogen) 

bombs could be called atomic weapons 

because both involve reactions of 

atomic nuclei. However, it has become 

customary to call weapons A-bombs if 

the energy comes from fission, and Hbombs if most of the energy comes from 

fusion (of the isotopes of hydrogen - 

see definition). A developmental nuclear device is not a weapon or weapon 

component until it can be mated to a 

delivery system. 

Nuclear Device 

Tests 

Nuclear Weapon 

Tests 

Overburden Plug 

Tests carried out to supply information 

required for the design, improvement, 

or safety aspects of nuclear weapons, 

and to study the phenomena and effects 

associated with nuclear explosions. 

Tests to provide development and weapons effects information, which may or 

may not utilize a deliverable nuclear 

weapon. 

A keyed concrete plug toward the portal 

from the blast plug, containing a blast 

door, and withstanding pressures as 

high as the rock above GZ to the surface, or overburden, could withstand. 

254 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Party Monitors Radiation monitors assigned to reentry 

and recovery parties or groups. 

Privacy Act 

rad 

Radex Area 

Radiation Exposure 

The Privacy Act of 1974. Public Law 93- 

579. An Act to amend Title 5, U.S. 

Code, by adding Section 552a to safeguard individual privacy from the misuse of federal records, to provide that 

individuals be granted access to records concerning them which are maintained by Federal agencies, to establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. 

Abbreviation for radiation absorbed 

dose. A unit of absorbed dose of radiation representing the absorption of 

100 ergs of ionizing radiation per gram 

of absorbing material, including body 

tissue. 

An acronym for radiation exclusion 

area. A radex area is any area which 

is controlled for the purpose of protecting individuals from exposure to 

radiation and/or radioactive material. 

Exposure to radiation may be described 

and modified by a number of terms. The 

type of radiation is important: external exposure is to beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays and X-rays; or exposure may be internal from radionuclides 

deposited within the body emitting 

alpha, beta, gamma or x-radiation and 

255 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

irradiating various body organs. (see 

Dose and Exposure). 

Radioactive Effluent The radioactive material, steam, smoke, 

dust, and other particulate debris released to the atmosphere from an underground nuclear detonation. 

Radioactive or 

Fission Products 

Radionuclides 

A general term for the complex mixture 

of radionuclides produced as a result 

of nuclear fission (see Activation 

Products). 

A collective term for all types of radioactive atoms of elements; as opposed 

to stable nuclides (see Isotopes). 

Recovery Operations Process of finding and removing experiments, by-products, or results from the 

test area after a test event. 

rem 

roentgen 

A special unit of biological radiation 

dose equivalent; the name is derived 

from the initial letters of the term 

"roentgen equivalent man or mammal." 

The number of rem of radiation dose is 

equal to the number of rad multiplied 

by the quality factor (QF) and the distribution factor (DF) of the given radiation. 

A special unit of exposure to gamma (or 

X-1 radiation. It is defined precisely 

as the quantity of gamma (or X-1 rays 

256 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Safety Experiments 

Sandbag Plugs 

Seismic Motion 

Shaft 

that, when completely stopped, in air, 

will produce positive and negative ions 

with a total charge of 2.58~10~~ coulomb in one kilogram of dry air under 

standard conditions. 

Device tests conducted to determine the 

safety of nuclear weapons during transportation and storage. Elements of the 

conventional high explosive portions of 

the devices were detonated to simulate 

accidental damage and to determine the 

potential for such simulated damage to 

result in significant nuclear yield. 

Data gained from the tests were used to 

develop devices that could withstand 

shock, blast, fire, and other accident 

conditions without producing a nuclear 

detonation. 

Barriers used in tunnels, constructed 

of sandbags, to help contain underground detonations and minimize damage 

to underground workings. 

Earth movement caused by an underground 

nuclear detonation, similar to a minor 

earthquake. 

A long narrow passage sunk into the 

earth. Shafts for device emplacement, 

ventilation, or access to underground 

workings may be drilled or mined. 

257 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Shaft Collar The area immediately around the shaft 

at ground level, usually cemented, 

which supports the headframe and other 

equipment. 

Shield Walls Walls or barriers used to protect 

equipment or instrumentation from heat, 

blast, and radioactivity. 

Slushing Operations The process of moving broken rock with 

a scraper or scraper bucket. May be 

used on the surface or underground, 

where ore or waste rock is slushed into 

hoppers or other locations for removal. 

Spalling 

Stemming 

Suitcase Analyzer 

Rock disintegration by flaking, chipping, peeling, or layers loosening on 

the outside edges. May be caused immediately by rock stressing in proximity 

to a detonation point. Also results 

later, after continued stressing from 

temperature change expansion and contraction. Spalling also may result or 

begin when rock containing moisture is 

raised to a high temperature, and expanding vapor creates fractures. 

The materials used to back-fill or plug 

the emplacement shaft, drift, or LOS 

drift to contain the overpressure and 

radioactive material from a nuclear 

detonation. 

A portable radiation analysis instrument used to analyze samples in the 

258 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

field or in other locations than a laboratory. 

Surface Ground Zero The location on the ground surface directly above an underground zero point 

or directly below an airburst. 

Test Event 

Testing 

Organizations 

Trailer Park 

Tunnel 

Tunnel Access 

The immediately preceeding preparations 

for, including arming and firing, and 

the testing of a nuclear device, including the detonation and concurrent 

measurements and effects. 

Organizations conducting nuclear tests 

at the NTS (see DOD, LASL, LRL and SL). 

The location of modified trailers and 

vans which contain measurement and recording equipment attached to cables 

coming from underground detectors and 

experiments. Usually located at least 

900 feet from SGZ. 

An underground horizontal or nearly 

horizontal passageway. 

Entry to a tunnel or tunnel complex 

upon approval of the Test Director during test operations, or upon approval 

of the Tunnel Superintendent during 

routine operations. 

259 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Tunnel Complex A composite of passageways branching 

from and including the main tunnel or 

access tunnel from a shaft. 

Tunnel Walk-Out A visual, walking inspection of the 

tunnel or tunnel complex, usually as a 

part of the initial reentry after a 

detonation, to check for hazards of any 

and all kinds prior to allowing general 

access to the underground workings. 

Two-Hour McCaa 

Breathing Apparatus A self-contained respiratory device 

that supplies two hours of breathing 

oxygen. 

Underground 

Structures Program The construction and fabrication of 

test structures underground for the 

purpose of detonation effects evaluation. 

User 

Vela-Uniform 

Venting 

An organization conducting tests at the 

NTS (See Testing Organizations). 

Department of Defense (DOD) program designed to improve the capability to detect, identify, and locate underground 

nuclear explosions. 

Release of radioactive material, steam, 

smoke, dust and other particulate debris through a zone of weakness from 

the detonation-formed cavity into the 

atmosphere. 

260 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Water Glass 

Weapons Effects 

Experiments 

Weapons Development 

Weather Briefings 

Workings 

A collodial suspension in water of a 

sodium silicate compound. A hardening 

gel commonly used as a preservative, an 

adhesive, in plaster, and in cement. 

Used at NTS as a grout to seal cracks 

and fissures, and, in dilute form, has 

been sprayed on surfaces for dust and 

contamination control purposes. 

Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

See Nuclear Device Tests 

Meetings of test-associated administrators, advisors, and other technical 

personnel, prior to each test event, to 

evaluate weather conditions and forecasts on event day, assure that direction and wind speeds will not cause any 

resulting radioactive effluent to contaminate populated areas, and make decisions on any necessary operational 

schedule changes. 

An excavation or group of excavations 

made in mining, quarrying, or tunnel261 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

X-rays 

Yield 

ing, used chiefly in the plural, such 

as "the workings extended for miles 

underground." 

Electromagnetic radiations produced by 

electron reactions, as opposed to emission of gamma rays by nuclei. Otherwise high energy x-rays are identical 

with gamma rays of the same energy. 

The total effective energy released by 

a nuclear detonation. It is usually 

expressed in terms of the equivalent 

tonnage of TNT required to produce the 

same energy release in an explosion. 

The total energy yield is manifested as 

nuclear radiation (including residual 

radiation), thermal radiation, and 

blast and shock energy, the actual distribution depending on the medium in 

which the explosion occurs and also 

upon the type of weapon. 

262 
APPENDIX B 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The acronyms in the following list are used in Volume I of 

the DOD underground testing reports. Additional information and 

definitions may be found in the text and in the Glossary of 

Terms. 

AAS 

AEC 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

AFWL 

APC 

ARF 

ARMS 

AVCO/RAD 

BAC 

Bkg 

BRL 

BTL 

CDC 

CETO 

CIC 

co 

co2 CP-1 

CP-2 

cps 

CT0 

DASA 

DNA 

DOD 

DOE 

EG&G 

ERDA 

FCDASA 

FCDNA 

FCP 

FCWT 

F&S 

FSI 

GA 

GE 

GZ 

American Aerial Survey 

Atomic Energy Commission 

Air Force Special Weapons Center 

Air Force Special Weapons Project 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

Army Pictorial Center 

Armour Research Foundation 

Area Remote Monitoring Station 

AVCO Corporation 

Boeing Aircraft Corporation 

Background Radiation Measurement 

Ballistics Research Laboratory 

Bell Telephone Laboratories 

Center for Disease Control 

Civil Effects Test Organization 

Coordination and Information Center 

Carbon monoxide 

Carbon dioxide 

Control Point Building 1 

Control Point Building 2 

Counts per second 

Continental Test Organization 

Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

EG&G, Inc. (formerly Edgerton, Germeshausen, and 

Grier) 

Energy Research and Development Administration 

Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

Forward Control Point 

Field Command, Weapons Test Division 

Fenix & Scisson, Inc. 

Federal Services, Incorporated 

General Atomic Corporation 

General Electric Corporation 

Ground zero 

263 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (continued) 

HDL 

HE 

H&N 

HUGHES 

ICC 

IITRI 

ISAFB 

IS0 

JCS 

kt 

LANL 

LASL 

LEL 

LLNL 

LMAFS 

LMSC 

LOS 

LRL 

MPC 

MRC 

mrem/qt 

mrem/yr 

mR/h 

MSA 

MSL 

NATS 

NC 

NDL 

NOB 

NOL/WO 

NO 

NO NO2 3 

NPG 

NRDS 

NTS 

NTSO 

NV00 

PDT 

PHS 

ppm 

psi 

PST 

rad/h 

Radsafe 

radsafe 

RAGS 

RAMS 

RARS 

RCG 

RDS 

Harry Diamond Laboratories 

High explosives (conventional) 

Holmes & Narver, Incorporated 

Hughes Aircraft Company 

Interstate Commerce Commission 

Illinois Institute of Technology, Research 

Institute 

Indian Springs Air Force Base 

Isotopes Incorporated 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Kilotons 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos 

National Laboratory) 

Lower explosive limit 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Lookout Mountain Air Force Station 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

Line-of-sight 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory) 

Maximum permissible concentration 

Moleculon Research Corporation 

Millirem per quarter 

Millirem per year 

Milliroentgens per hour 

Mine Safety Appliance 

Mean sea level 

Nevada Aerial Tracking System 

Northrup Corporation 

Army Chemical Corps Nuclear Defense Laboratory 

Nevada Operations Branch 

Naval Ordnance Lab, White Oak 

Nitrogen dioxide 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen dioxide 

Nevada Proving Ground 

Nuclear Rocket Development Station 

Nevada Test Site 

Nevada Test Site Organization 

Nevada Operations Office 

Pacific Daylight Time 

United States Public Health Service 

Parts per million 

Pounds per square inch 

Pacific Standard Time 

Radiation absorbed dose per hour 

Radiological Safety Division, REECo 

Radiological Safety, in general 

Remote area gas sampler 

Remote area monitoring station 

Remote area recording station 

Radioactivity concentration guide 

Remote data station 

264 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (continued) 

REECo 

rem 

R/h 

RMS 

RPG 

SC 

SGZ 

SL 

SNL 

SOP 

SRI 

STWT/DASA 

swc 

TC 

TCM 

TGD 

TNT 

USAEL 

USAF 

USC&GS 

USGS 

USWB 

VA 

WES 

WP 

WSI 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, 

Incorporated 

Roentgen equivalent man or mammal (see Glossary of 

Terms) 

Roentgens per hour 

Radector monitoring station 

Radiation protection guide 

Sandia Corporation (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Surface Ground Zero 

Sandia Laboratories (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Standard operating procedures 

Stanford Research Institute 

Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support 

Agency 

Special Weapons Center 

Test Controller 

Tunnel condition monitor 

Test Group Director 

High explosive chemical (trinitrotoluene) 

United States Army Electronic Laboratory 

United States Air Force 

United States Coast and Geodetic Survey 

United States Geological Survey 

United States Weather Bureau 

Veterans Administration 

Waterways Experiment Station 

Working Point 

Wackenhut Services, Incorporated 

265 
266 
APPENDIX C 

SC-AI-68-227 

GESERI~L TUNNEL REESTRY PROCEDURES FOR 

DEP:\RTXIENT OF DEFENSE :‘xND S.ZSDIn LABORATORY NLJCLCXR TESTS 

GCOr$C R. \Vrnz 

IIarold L. Rarrlck 

Health Physics Dlvlsion, 3312 

Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque 

April 1068 

This document describes prtashot prtzparations and postshot proccdurvs for saie and economlcal rvcntry into a tunnel arca after a nuclear detonation. Associated rt~sponslbllitles. possible 

hazards, reentry gr~~und rules, prcshot I)rcparations, colnmunlcations, reentry parties and cquipment. initial tunnc%l rr~rntrlns, and r~~covery of scientific experlmcnts are csplamed. 

267 
Issued by Sandia Corporation, 

a prime contractor to the 

United States Atomic Energy Commission 

LEGAL NOTICE 

This report was prepared as an account of Government sponsored work. 

Neither the United States, nor the Commission, nor any person acting on 

behalf of the Commission: 

A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, 

with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in the report may not 

infringe privately owned rights; or 

B. Assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for 

damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, 

or process disclosed in this report. 

As used in the above, "person acting on behalf of the Commission" 

includes any employee or contractor of the Commission or employee of 

such contractor, to the extent that such employee or contractor of 

the Commission, or employee of such contractor prepares, disseminates, 

or provides access to, any information pursuant to his employement or 

contract with the Commission, or his employment with such contractor. 

268 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Significant contributions on tunnel reentry procedures have been made by !V. D. Burnett, 

P. 0. hlatthews. and T. R. Crites of Sandia Laboratory and by C. R. Penwell and his staff of 

Reynolds Electric and Engineering Co. (REECo), Mercury, Nevada. Significant contributions in 

explosive and toxic gas monitoring and ventilation have been made by D. R. Parker, Sandia Laboratory and R. IV. Viet, REECo. Mr. L. W. Brewer pioneered the use of a gas chromatogrnph in 

severe cinvironmcnts and D. J Coleman and J. D. Ashworth greatly improved the radiation detector 

installation and contributrd the remote explosimeter. nit-. G. IV. Dwyer is largely responsible for 

the present filter system. RIr. IV. P. T3ennctt. LRL-Livermore, gave us valuable assistance during 

our Initial efforts. The continued support of Col. J. J. Nruer, USAF. and the advice and guidance 

of \V fI. Kingsley are gratcfully ncknowlcrlged. 

Specifically commended are G. A. Clayton, II. D. Edivards, F. .J. Solacgui and their- initial 

rrtentry teams ivho h:tve periormcd these duties in very severe cnvitonrncnts. 

269 
TABLEOF CONTENTS 

Introduction 

Responsibilities 

Possible IIaznrds 

Reentry Ground Rules 

Sumlnnry of Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

Communications 

Reentry Parties and Equipment 

Initial Tunnel Reentries 

Turln~~l Scicntliic Rccovcries irom the Esperimental C11zrnh(:r 

PnSc 

271 

211 

272 

273 

274 

275 

276 

277 

219 

270 
(1) 

(2) 

271 


g. Personnel radiation exposure limits are those set by NTS SOP 

Chapter 0524. The radiation dose limit for the operation is 3 Rem 

per calendar quarter. A person’s exposure, however, will be terminated when his pocket dosimeter reaches 2.0 Rem, assuming his exposure history would allow 3 Rem during this operation. 

h. Tunnel reentry will not be made before the tunnel ventilation has been 

turned on and samples of the air monitored at the portal. Evaluatior 

of the sample must indicate that reentry can be made within the limi 

tations of this procedure. 

i. Reentry will not be made beyond ventilation, lOR/hr, 1000 ppm CO, or 10 

percent of the lower explosive limit of explosive gas mixtures. Teams 1, 

2, 3, and 4 may be exempted from these requirements under extenuating 

circumstances by mutual decision of the Chief of the Reentry Control 

Group and the Chief of the Party. 

j. The Rescue Team will always be stationed near the portal with a train 

for immediate dispatch. 

lmmarv of Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

a. Stemming should provide fireball containment and should reduce radioactivity and explosive gas in the reentry area. The overburden plug 

should contain any debris that may pass the stemming. The gas seal 

door should contain any gases that penetrate the overburden plug. 

b. Remote radiation sensing instruments will provide knowledge of tunnel 

radiation levels, while tunnel condition indicators (geophones, pressure 

and temperature gages, and explosimeters) remotely monitor the tunnel. 

c. Air sampling lines for gas chromatography are normally installed through 

both the gas seal door and the overburden plug. Each installation is provided with suitable remotely operated valves. Samples may be drawn 

from the inside of the gas seal door, from both sides of the overburden 

plug, and from near the stemming. Sampling from these lines will help 

determine the explosive and toxic gas concentrations in the tunnel prior 

to reentry. 

d. Valves are normally installed in the vent lines and makeup ports in the 

gas seal door and overburden plug. An axial vane fan is located on the 

makeup valves to reduce negative pressure. The valves and fan are 

remotely operated from a manned location and will have position monitors to indicate whether they are fully open or fully closed. The position 

monitors will also show whether the fan power is on or off. 

274 
e. The following items ordinarily have power turned on through and after 

zero time: 

(1) Tunnel utilities and instrumentation. Power to these items will be 

turned off near zero time. 

(2) Geophone transmitter trailer. This supplies Power to the geophone 

and the pressure and temperature amplifiers which must be left on 

to monitor for cavity collapse and pressure changes. 

(3) Ventilation fans. Power will be controlled remotely. 

(4) Radiation detectors. 

(5) Explosimeters. 

(6) Ventilation and gas sampling valves. Power will be controlled 

remotely. 

f. The Sutorbilt fans will be installed so they will pull air through the vent 

line filter system before it is released to the atmosphere. One Sutorbilt 

fan will be used for a back-up in case the other fan fails. 

g. Ventilation. 

(1) The ventilation system is installed so that all areas of the tunnel 

that are not closed off are swept with fresh air from the portal. 

(2) After zero time and when the TGD gives his approval (with the consent of the Test Pllanager), the tunnel ventilation system will be 

turned on, exhaust and makeup air will be supplied from the portal 

through valves in the gas se<?1 door and, if possible, the overburden 

plug. There will be valves that can be remotely operated in both 

vent lines at the gas seal door and, if possible, at the overburden 

plug Vent line samples will be taken to monitor for radioactive, 

explosive, and/or toxic cf:luents. 

6. Communications 

r\ communication system with the necessary wire on ;I ~)ortnblo reel >-vi11 be used during 

initial reentry. A back-l.tp reel will bc available. ,111 conversation bct\veen that reentry party 

and reentry control will be recorded. 

275 
7. Reentry Parties and Equipment 

The reentry parties will consist of the personnel and equipment described in the 

following table: 

Party Name 

a. Teams 1, 2. and 3 - Tunnel Reentry Party 

(1) Chief of Party 

(2) Rad-Safe monitor 

(3) Industrial Hygiene monitor (ILlay be 

performed by Rad-Science personnel) 

(4) Tunnel safety 

(5) Scientific Ad\.isor (as required) 

Equipment 

Full Radex clothing 

Bureau of Mines approved 

P-hour self-contained 

oxygen breathing apparatus 

Radiation detectors 

Explosive gas meter 

Toxic gas detectors 

Oxygen percent meter 

IIard wire communications 

b. Team 4 - Tunnel Rescue Party 

(1) Chief of Party 

(2) Three to six REE Co. Mine Rescue 

Full Radcx clothing 

Bureau of Mines approved 

Z-hour self-contained 

oxygen breathing apparatus 

(3) Two monitors for Rad-Saie and 

Industrial IIygiene 

Radiation detectors 

Toxic gas detectors 

Explosive gas meters 

Wire litters 

IIard wire communications 

c. Team 5 - Tunnel Scientific Assessment Team 

(as required) 

(1) Chief of Party 

(2) Rad-Safe and Industrial Hygiene monitors 

(3) Scientific Advisors 

(4) Mine support 

Full Radex clothing 

Respiratory protection (as 

required) 

Radiation detectors 

Toxic gas detectors 

Explosive gas meter 

IIard wire communications 

d. Team 6 - Tunnel 1f’ork Party 

(1) Chief of Party 

(2) Rad-Safe and Industrial Ilygicne monitors 

(3) ftr;r; Co. LIiners 

Full Radcx clothing 

liespirntory protection (as 

required) 

l{ndiation detectors 

Tosic gas detectors 

e. Tcnm 7 - Tunnel Scientific Recoveries to 

E\.pcrirncntal Chamber (see 

I’ara. 9 for details) 

1’1111 I1:rdcx clothing 

Rc,spirntory protection (as 

required) 

i. Tc,am 8 - 1117 D~.iposal Group I’~11 11~1d~~s clothing 

(as rcquircd) Respiratory protection (3s 

required) 

6. Team 9 - Rltaciical Support Necessary medical cquipmcnt 

ill. D. and medical technician Ambulance 

276 

a 
8. Initial Tunnel Reentries 

a. After the event the TGD will review radiation and tunnel condition 

monitors. When he determines that it is safe, and xith the agreement 

oi the Test Manager, the tunnel ventilation system will be turned on 

ESIIAUST. Makeup air will be supplied from the portal through the 

valves in the plugs. 

b. Prior to entry into the tunnel. all csperimental cables and all electrical and telephone lines going into the tunnel through the portal will 

be either locked open or disconnected. All other cables going into the 

tunnel will be disconnected and taped or cut and grouted as necessary. 

Along with the pressure, temperature, and gcophone instruments, the 

remote radiation monitoring system and the remote explosimcters will 

be left connected. No circuit into the tunnel or into the instrumentation 

trailers will be closed when personnel are either in the tunnel or directly 

in front of the portal (including an area extending 50 feet on either side of 

the portal). 

Tile Chief of the Reentry Control Group will advise the TGD on tunnel 

conditions by reviewing surface conditions, exhaust gas iniormation, 

tunnel radiation, tunnel condition indicators, and seismic information. 

This review will determine when tunnel reentry may actu311y begin. 

iV’hen cleared by the TGD and the Test Manager and when all surface 

recoveries and power checks are complete, Team 1 will be allowed to 

make the initial tunnel reentry. There will be no change in the tunnel 

ventilation setup or in utilities while Teams 1 through 5 are underground. 

The number of people in the portal area and trailer parks will be held to 

a minimum. 

c. Team 1 will be the first group to reenter and will proceed to the gas 

seal door. A train may be used to supply transportation to the gas 

seal door. conditions permitting. Team 1 will continuously monitor 

for radioactivity and for toxic and explosive gases. Pressure gages at 

the ens seal door \l,ill be checked. and if no !pr-cssurc is observed, .i 

sample \rill be taken through tt:o door to dcterminc ~llc c7nvironm~7:lt on 

the otlier- side of the door. 1.nc!er safe conditions, Ttanm 1 ivill ihcn 

open the gas seal door. They \vill inspect the tunnel to the o\,(,r-burdnn 

plug. T!:r pressure gages at the ovcrburd(~n nlu, $7 iv111 1x2 clieckcd Ll!ld 

if no pr8’ssllr‘r 1s ohserved. :I sample will bc tnkr>n thro\ieh tlic pluq to 

dctcrminc the t%nvironmcnt on the otllcr siflt: 0i the l>liie. T~%am 1 \vill then 

\vithdra:c to the I’ortal .~r(‘a. If rrmotc ~~~entilation lens not I,ecn estLiblished 

prcviollsly l)chind the ov~rbur(l~~n plug, the \vork I)arty (Tcnm 6) \vill tlicn 

rcentcr and take the necessary steps to cstahlish \x~nti!ation through the 

277 
plug. They will then exit the tunnel, and samples will be taken from the 

vent line to verify earlier remote sampling. A second work party may be 

required to open the overburden plug door and remove the material from 

the manway. 

Team 2 will reenter with an engine and car containing the necessary 

equipment to open the overburden plug door. This group will take in 

the reel of communication wire and connect it up to the existing communication line jack at the overburden plug to reestablish communications with 

the reentry control group at the portal. Team 2 will open the manway door 

and will continuously monitor for radioactivity and for toxic and esplosive 

gases. They will then withdraw to the portal with the engine. 

Team 3 will reenter to the overburden plug and reestablish communications 

using the reel connected to the communication line jack. The team ivill \valk 

out the remaining drift continuously monitoring for radioactivity and for 

toxic and explosive gases. They will also observe the vent lines to assure 

themselves that the lines arc intact. Team 3 will proceed to the stemming, 

if possible. noting tunnel and pipe conditions. They will then return to the 

end of the experimental pipe and establish ventilation in the pipe if time 

and conditions permit. Swipes will be taken on the vent port of tljc test 

chamber and checked for contamination. These will be later analyzed for 

ne and isotope identification. 

The mission of Teams 1, 2, and 3 is to verify that the tunnel comples 

is within acceptable levels for toxic and radioactive gases and to check 

the condition of the pipe and tunnel. 

d. If Teams 1, 2, and 3 determine that tunnel rehabilitation may be safely 

conducted, they will leave the tunnel and Team 6 will make temporary 

repairs as needed to the vent line or tunnel. A Rad-Safe monitor will 

remain with Team 6 while in the tunnel and continue to monitor for 

radiation and toxic gases. 

e. The object of Teams 1 and 3 will be to explore as much of the tunnel 

on one reentry as possible. Previous experience has shown that 

IlcC.i;t or Draeger Trams can explore up to 1300 t‘cet in l-1/2 11ou1.s 

with a 1 I2 hour safety margin. II an additional Initial rc-cntr:; 1s 

required to fully explore the tunnel, Team 4 (\vith Rnd-S:tr‘e and 

Industrial 1Iygiene monitors) will colnpletc the tunnel esj~lor:itlon 

with Team 1 standing by as Tunnel Rescue. 

278 
9. Tl.:nnel Scientific Recoveries from the Fsperimental C!lamber 

3. Scientific recoveries in the tunnel will not be permitted until Tearr. 1, 

2, or 3 has searched all drifts and verified that the tunnel is clear of 

dangerous amounts of toxic, explosive, and radioactive gases. 

b. Before scientific recoveries may begin, repair of the tunnel along the 

recovery route to the experimental chamber must be complete. This 

activity may include repairin g broken 1aggin.g and removing hazardous 

obstacles as well as repairing railroad track and vent lines. The tunnel 

lights will be turned on before all scientific recoveries except film 

reco\,eries begin. All cabling extending into a crushed zone will be cut. 

c. Team 5 will conduct a technical survey and perform the necessary 

actions to begin scientific recoveries. 

d. Team 7 will then be permitted to proceed to the experimental chamber 

and begin the removal of samples in order of priority. A Rad-Safe/ 

Industrial Safety monitor will bc present at all times. This monitor 

will advise the Chief of the Reentry Control Group, who is responsible 

for terminating scientific recovery, whenever the tunnel environment 

becomes dangerous t1 Rad-Safe check station will be established at 

each Scientific Station to control contamination. 

-. 

279 
280 
APPENDIX D 

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPEMTING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-0524-01 

Chapter 0524 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

0524-01 Radiological Safety 

011 Purpose 

The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure is to define 

responsibility and to establish criteria and general procedures 

for radiological safety associated with NTS programs. Additional operational instructions relating to radiological safety 

for particular activities may be published as a part of the Test 

Manager's Operational Plan. 

012 Responsibilities 

a. Test Manager. The Test Manager is responsible to the AEC 

for the protection of participating personnel and off-site 

populations from radiation hazards associated with activities conducted at the NTS. By mutual agreement between the 

Test Manager and a scientific user, control of rad-safety 

within the area assigned for a particular activity may be 

delegated to the user's Test Group Director during the perio5 of time when such control could have a direct bearing 

on the success or failure of the scientific program. 

b. Test Group Director. Whenever operational rad-safety control 

is delegated to a Test Group Director under provisions of 

012a above, he is responsible to the Test Manager for establishment and notification of safety criteria within the 

assigned area. Under such conditions, he will be responsible 

for submitting a detailed rad-safety operational plan to the 

Test Manager for concurrence. 

c. Area Manager, LVAO. The Area Manager is delegated the onsite rad-safety responsibility for the NTS, except for those 

periods in which operational control of specified areas may 

be delegated to the Test Group Director under 012a above. 

The Area Manager is also delegated responsibility for the 

off-site radiological safety operations associated with NTS 

activities. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

281 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

0524-02 Organization 

The chart showing the organizational relationship of the rad-safety 

activities is shown in Figure I on the following page. 

0524-03 Radiation Incidents Reports 

See NTSO Chapter 0502 and NTSO Appendices 0502-04, A, B, and C 

for detailed reporting procedures. 

0524-04 On-Site Rad-Safety Operations 

041 PurDose 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g. 

h. 

Radiological Safety Advisor. The NTSO Rad-Safety Advisor is 

responsible to the Test Manager for staff supervision of radsafety policies and procedures at the NTS. 

AEC Radiological Safety Officer. The AEC Radiological Safety 

Officer is responsible to the Area Manager, LVAO, for the 

direction and coordination of the on-site and off-site radsafety programs, except for those periods when operational 

control of specified areas is delegated to a Test Group Director under 012a above. 

Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer. The Officer-in-Charge, 

U. S. Public Health Service Off-Site Activities Office, LVAO, 

is designated as the Off-Site Rad-Safety Officer and is responsible to the Area Manager, LVAO, through the AEC RadSafety Officer, for operation of the off-site program. 

Project Manager, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc. 

The Project Manager provides on-site rad-safety support services to the Area Manager, LVAO, and to Test Group Directors 

as required. 

Participating Agencies. The official in charge of each 

agency or organizational group participating in NTS field 

activities is responsible to the appropriate NTSO official 

designated above for compliance by his personnel with established rad-safety policies, procedures and controls. Each 

official in charge of a participating group is also responsible at all times to his parent organization for the radiological safety of personnel under his supervision. 

The purpose of this on-site plan is to set forth procedures to be 

followed by all participants in connection with on-site radsafety operations at the Nevada Test Site. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 

282 

.June 26, 1961 
LJ 

E 

H (B) 

Radiological Safety 

Advisor 

(1 

Rad-Safety 

- Representative 

l------ 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1 Area Manager LVAO 

---___-e-m _ _- ---__ mm_ I 

I 

AEC Rad-Safety 

Officer 

I 

Operational control of 

assigned areas 

- (C> 

User Rad-Safety 

Organization 

REECO 

Radiological 

Safety Division 

PHS Off-Site 

Rad-Safety 

Organization 

Veterinary 

Activities 

------ Administrative 

(A) Policy 

(B) Normal Operations 

(C) When requested by User 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

042 Definition of On-Site Terms 

NTSO-0524-042 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

g. 

h. 

. 1. 

j. 

Certified Monitor: Any person certified to the Test Manager 

or his designated representative as a qualified monitor by a 

Test Group Director or his Radiological Safety Representative. 

RPG: Radiation Protection Guide is the radiation dose which 

should not be exceeded without careful consideration of the 

reasons for doing so; every effort should be made to encourage 

the maintenance of radiation dose as far below this guide as 

practicable. 

RCG: Radioactivity Concentration Guide is the concentration 

ofradioactivity in the environment which is determined to 

result in whole body or organ dose equal to the Radiation 

Protection Guide. 

MPD: The Maximum Permissible Dose in rems that can be accumulated at any age is equal to five times the number of years 

beyond age 18, thus MPD = 5 (N-18) where N is the age. 

NTS: The Nevada Test Site, excluding Desert Rock and Area 51, 

but including Mercury and the Jackass Flat area. 

On-Site: The area within the NTS boundaries including 

Mercury. 

Radex: Radiological Exclusion Area. 

Controlled Area: Refers to any area within the NTS boundaries 

where for safety or any other purpose it is necessary to control entry of personnel. 

User: Those organizations having an approved technical 

program. 

REECo: Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., the 

support contractor for the Nevada Test Site. 

043 Responsibilities 

a. The Project Manager, REECo, is responsible to the Area Manager, 

LVAO, for furnishing radiation safety support services as 

follows: 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

284 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-043 

1. Providing rad-safety support, including qualified monitors, 

to user organizations as required. 

2. Making radiological surveys, mapping and properly marking 

all contaminated areas, and distribution of this survey 

information. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

Conducting a personnel radiation dosimetry program. 

Maintaining and calibrating radiation detection equipment. 

6. 

Procuring, issuing, and decontaminating rad-safety clothing, supplies, and equipment as required. 

Providing radioactive source material and waste disposal 

control within the Nevada Test Site. 

7. Operating personnel- and equipment-decontamination facilities. 

8. Providing advice and assistance in matters pertaining to 

radiological safety. 

9. 

10. 

Conducting occupational and bio-assay program. 

Providing necessary support services for the off-site radsafety program as required. 

11. 

12. 

Conducting rad-safety training courses as required. 

Preparing final on-site reports containing radiological 

data f,ollowing each test operational period, special 

reports as requested, and detailed operational plans for 

each future program. 

13. Providing a stand-by emergency monitoring team to handle 

unforeseen incidents associated with radiation. 

14. Providing a repository for records and source documents 

pertaining to personnel dosimetry for all OTO field activities and all prior weapons test series. 

15. Conducting analysis of samples for radioactivity and for 

certain toxic materials. 

b. The Support Contractor will prepare and keep current a manual 

containing the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for providing rad-safety support services to users and contractors 

NTS as outlined in 043a above. 

at 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

285 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-044 

C. Whenever a Test Group Director has been delegated responsibility for on-site rad-safety under subsection 012a above, the 

Test Manager's operation order will specifically list those 

functions in subsection 043a for which the Support Contractor 

will be responsible to the Test Group Director. 

044 Radiation Protection Guides 

a. Radiation Exposure Criteria 

1. The radiation exposure criteria for all test personnel at 

the NTS are established for each series of tests by UC 

Headquarters. 

2. AEC Manual Chapter 0523 and 0524 contain the radiological 

safety criteria for peaceful uses. 

3. External Whole Body Radiation 

(a) Quarterly Dose. Shall not exceed 3 rems (gamma + 

neutron). 

(b) Yearly Dose. Shall not exceed 5 rems (whole body 

gamma + neutron) except as listed below. 

(c) Exceptions 

(1) If the individual's MPD minus his previous lifetime cumulative dose is less than 5 rem no 

exposure which will cause him to exceed his MPD 

will be authorized. 

(2) If the individual's MPD minus his previous lifetime cumulative occupational dose is greater 

than 5 rem an added exposure may be allowed provided the parent organization has maintained an 

accurate record of the individual's lifetime 

radiation exposure. The Test Manager is authorized to approve an increase in the exposure, and 

in no case will more than 12 rem per year be 

authorized. All work requests must be fully 

justified by the user as to the need and requirement to receive an authorization to exceed the 5 

rem per year radiation dose. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

286 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-044 

(3) The Test Manager may approve requests from the 

Director, DOD Test Group for an increase in the 

operational radiation exposure when submitted 

in accordance with the special limits prescribed 

by the Armed Forces. 

(d), Accidental Dose. Provisions of NBS Handbook 59 shall 

pertain in the case of an accidental or emergency 

exposure. 

4. Radiation Concentration Guides. The maximum permissible 

body burdens and concentrations (MPC) in air and water of 

radio-nuclides are contained in National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69 (June 1959). 

b. Radiation Contamination from Weapons Testing 

1. Allowable vehicle and equipment contamination must not 

exceed: 

7mr/hr(gamma) 

400 d/m/55 cm' (removable alpha by swipe) 

1000 d/m/55 cm2 (fixed alpha) 

By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be detected by swiping a one squarefoot area and monitoring the swipe. These measurements are 

made by portable survey instruments. 

2. Personnel contamination should be maintained as low as 

possible and decontamination exercised when levels exceed 

those shown: 

Item Alpha 

d/m/55 cm2 

Gamma 

mr/hr 

Outer Clothing 1000 7 

Shoes 1000 7 

Skin or Underclothing 200 1 

3. Respirator protective devices will be maintained at a 

contamination2level less than 1 mr/hr (beta+gamma) or 

200 d/m/55 cm (alpha fixed or removable). 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

287 
c. Radiation levels from reactor testing. Maximum permissible 

radiation levels will be as specified in the Test Group 

Director's Operational Plan. 

045 Film Badge Procedures 

a. All personnel entering NTS must wear a current gamma-measuring 

film badge. These will be attached and worn with the security 

badge, and will be routinely exchanged each month. 

b. Neutron film badges will be issued to individuals working with 

neutron sources, or working in the reactor areas when required 

by test operations. These badges will be exchanged and processed whenever an individual or group of individuals could 

have received a dose greater than 100 mrem or at the end of 

each calendar quarter, whichever is sooner. 

c!. Dosimeters will be worn by all personnel working in a radiation area in which it is possible to receive in a normal working day a radiation dose greater than 100 mrem. 

d. Film badges will be exchanged by all personnel at the nearest 

Rad-Safety facility immediately after leaving a radiation area 

or zone in which a pocket dosimeter reading shows a dosage of 

100 mr or greater, or at any time a greater exposure is suspected. These badges will be processed each work day. 

e. Individuals returning to their home stations, or otherwise 

terminating their participation with an activity at the NTS, 

will turn in their film badges as a part of the Mercury checkout procedures. Film badges will be collected and processed 

each work day for these departing individuals and the dosage 

results will be reported to the appropriate agency within 

24 hours from processing if the film badge processing indicates 

a dosage greater than 100 mrem. 

046 Radiological Surveys. 

F?ADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-045 

4. Equipment or vehicles, alpha contaminated to levels in 

excess of 10,000 d/m/55 cm2, will be decontaminated by 

mobile equipment in the field prior to transporting to 

the decontamination pad. 

When operational rad-safety control has been delegated to a Test 

Group Director under 012a, the Director will be responsible for 

the initial radiation survey of the specified area after an 

operation. Permission for entry into the area prior to completion 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

288 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-047 

of the initial survey lies solely with the Director. After the 

radiological situation has stabilized, he will advise all other 

parties of the situation, and will permit operations in the area 

in accordance with his published safety plan. 

047 Entry into Controlled Areas 

a. The Test Group Director or Area Manager, LVAO (as appropriate), 

is responsible for establishing a controlled area when required 

for reasons of radiation safety. These areas will normally be 

established when: (1) the radiation intensities require precautions to limit personnel exposure, (2) it is anticipated 

that radiation or use of radioactive material could cause a 

problem, (3) it is possible through an accident or otherwise 

that an experimental program could produce radiation, or 

(4) the Test Group Director or Area Manager considers it 

desirable for any safety reason to control entry of personnel. 

b. Procedures to control access of personnel will be established 

by the Area Manager, LVAO, or by the Test Group Director if 

the provisions of subsection 012a apply. The specific details 

on access procedures and precautions necessary to protect personnel from the radiation hazards associated with a particular 

program will be contained in the Test Group Director's Operation Plan. 

C. In the event of an emergency, the Test Manager, Test Group 

Director, or their authorized representatives may authorize 

entry into a precise location. This authorization may be 

verbal. 

048 Radiation Exposure Control 

a. Control of Exposure 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Recovery parties will not enter areas with radiation 

intensities in excess of 10 r/hi+ unless specifically 

authorized by cognizant authority. 

Surveys to establish isointensity lines greater than 

1000 mr,%r will not be conducted as a routine function 

for each experiment. 

Construction activities in radex areas will be accomplished only at the discretion of the Area Manager, LVAO. 

Eating and smoking in radex areas or controlled area will 

be prohibited. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

289 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-049 

b. Monitors 

1. Participating organizations will normally provide their own 

monitors. If they are unable to do so, the REECo RadSafety Organization will provide monitors. 

2. The._ REECo Rad-Safety Organization will provide training 

courses for project monitors as required. 

3. All participating organizations will provide a list of 

certified monitors to the REECo Rad-Safety Division. 

C. Anti-Contamination Clothing and Equipment. Necessary radsafety equipment, including instruments, clothing, respirators, film badges and dosimeters may be obtained at the RadSafety Building (CP-2) or the Reactor Test Area Rad-Safety 

Facility. 

d. Decontamination 

1. Vehicles and equipment found to be contaminated will be 

taken to the decontamination station adjacent to the RadSafety Building (CP-2) or the Reactor Test Area Rad-Safety 

Facility. 

2. Monitoring and decontamination of aircraft will be provided by the on-site rad-safety organization when requested: 

049 Radioactive Material Control 

a. Definitions 

1. Controlled Radioactive Sources: Any encapsulated radioactive source that has an associated dose rate greater 

than 1.5 rem/hr at one yard. 

2. Registered Radioactive Sources: 

(a) Plutonium, Polonium and Radium: those greater than 

0.1 millicuries 

(b) Barium 14', Strontium 89, Strontium 90 

, Yttrium91: 

those greater than 0.135 mc 

(c) All other sources greater than 1.35 mc not controlled 

under 049 a-l above. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

290 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

b. Radioactive Source Control Procedures 

NTSO-0524-049 

1. 

2. 

3. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

In advance of receipt of source at NTS, the using agency 

is responsible for submitting to the Area Manager, LVAO, 

for information and comment (with a copy to the Assistant 

Manager for Test Operations, ALO), written operating and 

radiological safety procedures for controlling the use of 

any radioactive source as defined in a-l above. The following information is required: 

(a) Time of arrival at NTS. 

(b) Isotope or isotopes involved. 

(c) Proposed use of the radioactive material. 

(d) Statement that shipment will comply with ICC shipping 

regulations or other appropriate AEC regulations. 

(e) Where the source will be stored. 

(f) Final disposition of source. 

(g) Operating procedures which will be followed in storing and working with the source. 

(h) Name of individual responsible for radiological 

safety. 

The Assistant Manager, OTO, will review all operational 

plans and procedures and will furnish the using agency 

with appropriate comments. 

The senior on-site representative of user scientific 

laboratory, agency. or organization is responsible for 

notifying the REECo l&d-Safety Division in advance of the 

movement of any radioactive material, as defined in a-l 

above, to other locations unless covered by operational 

procedures established in b-l above. 

Agencies using calibration sources will be familiar with 

radiological safety procedures for use of radioactive 

sources. The REECo Rad-Safety Division will assist user 

agencies in developing operational plans and procedures on 

request. 

291 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-049 

4. All radioactive material as defined in 049a, exclusive of 

source and nuclear material (SSN) brought onto the NTS, 

will be registered with the REECo Rad-Safety Division at 

the time of entry onto the test site. 

5. The Area Manager, LVAO, is responsible for making periodic 

inspection of user agency source control procedures and 

reporting such inspections with appropriate recommendations 

to the Assistant Manager for Test Operations, ALO. 

c. Radioactive Waste Material Control Procedures 

1. The REECo Rad-Safety Division is responsible for disposing 

of radioactive waste material, on the NTS, except as 

defined in c-2 below. A radiological safety plan and control procedures will be submitted by REECo to the Area 

Manager, LVAO, for review and comment, with a copy to the 

Assistant Manager for Test Operations, ALO. 

2. Disposal of radioactive waste material as a result of 

operations in the 400 and 401 areas is the responsibility 

of the Project Test Group Director. 

d. Removal of Radioactive Material 

1. All shipments of radioactive materials, except as exempted 

in d-2 below, will be labelled according to appropriate 

Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, 

U. S. Coast Guard, and U. S. Postal regulations. Arrangements for packaging shipments will be the responsibility 

of the organization initiating the shipment. Shipping 

records will be initiated on an on-site Rad-Safety shipping 

form and will be completed and certified by the REECo RadSafety organization. 

2. Scientific samples, instruments and equipment designated 

by the Test Group Director are exempt from the above procedural requirements when transported by courier vehicle 

or fly-away aircraft. A suitable record of exempted 

material will be maintained by the REECo Rad-Safety 

Organization. 

e. Reports and Records 

1. The REECo Rad-Safety Division is responsible for submitting 

monthly to the Area Manager, LVAO, a map showing the specific areas of radioactive contamination within NTS, showing locations, levels and types of radiation. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

292 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-0410 

0410 Dosimetry and Records 

a. The REECo Rad-Safety Organization will provide dosimetry and 

record services for both the on-site and off-site organizations and maintain dosimetry records on all on-site personnel. 

Dosage reports will be submitted for all personnel to the 

Area Manager, LVAO, and to the Test Group Director on a monthly 

basis. The Test Group Director and the Area Manager, LVAO, 

will also be provided with a report of all integrated exposure 

in excess of 2 rems (gamma + neutron) on a daily 

basis as outlined. 

b. A quarterly exposure report will be furnished to 

ager, LVAO, and to the Assistant Manager, Office 

Operations, ALO. 

c. Record disposition policies and regulations shall be in accordance with the provisions of AEC Appendix 0203-091-11, Sections 

5 and 6. 

0411 Documenting Decontamination 

At the time any area decontamination has been completed, REECo will 

submit a report in quadruplicate to the Test Manager, including 

such data as: a map of the area showing radiation intensities, 

radiation levels at specific locations prior to decontamination, 

radiation levelsupon completion, effect of character of terrain 

on radiation intensities, type of equipment used on the job, dosages equipment operators received, effectiveness of the decontamination, time required to complete the decontamination, photographs, 

and any other pertinent facts relating to the problem. 

0412 Counting Laboratory 

2. The REECo Rad-Safety Division is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date master file showing the ownership, 

source strength and specific location of all radioactive 

sources on the Nevada Test Site. 

and monthly 

the Area Manof Test 

A counting laboratory for determining gross radioactivity will be 

operated in Mercury by the On-Site Rad-Safety Organization. 

Analysis for specific material such as plutonium, tritium, and 

beryllium will be made for user organizations as a routine support 

service, if requested. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

293 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-05 

0524-05 

051 

Off-Site Rad-Safety Operations 

Purpose 

a. The purpose of this plan is to set forth the general procedures to be followed by the U. S. Public Health Service OffSite Rad-Safety Organization in providing off-site radiological safety support on a continuous basis and for test activities at the Nevada Test Site. 

b. Detailed monitoring and sample collection procedures are 

contained in the Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan. 

052 Definition of Terms 

The Off-Site Area is defined as the area surrounding NTS to a 

radius of about 250 miles. 

053 Resoonsibilities 

a. During non-test periods the Public Health Service Off-Site 

Rad-Safety Organization is responsible to the Area Manager, 

LVAO, for: 

1. Analyzing data and preparing final off-site reports of * 

previous series and special reports as requested. 

2. Preparing detailed operational plans for forthcoming 

series. 

3. Maintaining an active film badge program as required 

to fully document the gamma dosage to off-site populations and communities. 

4. Maintaining an active public education program, including periodic visits to communities. 

5. 

6. 

Maintaining an environmental sampling program, including 

air, water, and foodstuffs. 

Maintaining liaison with State and local health officials 

in the off-site area. 

7. Providing an off-site monitoring service. 

b. During a test period the Public Iiealth Service Off-Site RadSafety Organization is responsible to the Area Manager, LVAO, 

for: 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

294 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-054 

1. Providing the same services as during the non-test period, 

on an expanded scale to meet increased testing activities. 

2. Fully documenting the off-site radiological situation 

following each test activity in which radioactive fallout 

could be detected off-site. 

3. Maintaining an up-to-date map of the off-site area showing the locations and levels of any radiation. 

4. Investigating inquiries and incidents of a medical nature 

from the off-site populace in accordance with the procedure 

contained in NTSO-SOP Chapter 0701. 

054 Operational Guide - Radiation Exposure 

The off-site radiological safety criterion is 0.5 roentgens per 

year whole body gamma exposure and one-tenth of the maximum permissible concentration of radioisotopes in air and water as listed 

in NBS Handbook 69. These MPC's may be averaged over a period up 

to one year. 

055 Objectives 

The objectives of the off-site radiological safety activities are 

as follows: 

a. To verify the off-site radiological situation associated with 

test site activities to insure public safety. 

b. To have trained personnel available to take emergency measures 

prescribed by the Atomic Energy Commission should an unacceptable situation develop. 

C. To obtain an adequate record of the radioactivity in the offsite area. 

d. To maintain public confidence that all reasonable safeguards 

are being employed to preserve public health and property free 

from radiation hazards. 

e. To investigate reports of incidents attributed to radioactivity 

which could result in claims against the Government or create 

unfavorable and unwarranted public opinion. 

f. To accumulate data to provide a basis for a better evaluation 

of cumulative radiation dose to people. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

295 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

056 Organization 

NTSO-0524-056 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

By a Memorandum of Understanding between the PHS and the AECALO, the PHS is responsible to staff and operate the off-site 

radiological safety program at NTS. 

PHS-commissioned officers will be permanently assigned to the 

Las Vegas Area Office in support of this activity. The number of officers so assigned will be by mutual agreement 

between the Division of Radiological Health, Public Health 

Service, and the Office of Test Operations. 

The Officer-in-Charge, PHS Off-Site Activities, is the OffSite Rad-Safety Officer. 

The permanent staff will be augmented during test periods by 

personnel assigned through the Division of Radiological 

Health, PHS. 

057 Operational Plan 

a. Survey Results 

1. Monitoring radiation readings will be radioed to Net 

Control at Mercury Bldg. 155 by the monitoring teams. 

2. A carbon copy of all monitoring data will be forwarded 

immediately after each test activity to the Office of 

the Test Manager. 

3. The results will be posted on a large-scale wall map 

in Bldg. 155 as received. The intensity and time of 

reading will be noted at each reading location. 

4. An interim off-site radiological safety report will be 

prepared following each test activity for submission to 

the Area Manager, LVAO. 

b. Environmental Sampling 

1. Air sampling stations will be established in the larger 

population centers. Results from these stations assist 

in delineating the fallout pattern and documenting 

negative values outside the fallout area. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 

296 

June 26, 1961 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-057 

2. Water samples will be collected periodically at representative places such as public water supplies, stock watering ponds, and ground water surface discharges and will 

be counted for gross radioactivity. 

3. Milk samples will be collected periodically from dairy 

farms, processing plants, and retail outlets in the 

off-site area. 

4. Food samples will be collected to obtain data on internal radiation hazards to the off-site population. 

5. A representative number of water, milk and food samples 

showing above normal gross levels will be analyzed for 

specific significant isotopes. 

c. Public Education 

1. Public relations is recognized as one of the more important functions of the off-site program. Educational 

activities will be directed toward individuals and 

groups through informal discussions, distribution of pertinent literature, showing of movies, and matter-of-fact 

question answering. 

2. The Office of Test Information, NTSO, will furnish 

guidance and direction as necessary in the conduct of 

off-site public relations. 

d. Film Badge Program 

1. Film badges will be strategically placed in populated 

places., along highways and trails in non-populated areas, 

and inside and outside buildings, and will be exchanged 

monthly. 

2. The film badges will be supplied and processed after 

exposure by the REECo Rad-Safety Organization. 

e. Liaison with Public Health Officials 

Continuous liaison will be maintained with State and local 

health officials. For operational periods notification of 

testing activities will be coordinated with appropriate test 

officials. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

297 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-058 

058 Medical Activities 

When required by test site activities: a medical officer will be 

assigned by the PHS Liaison Officer Network Coordinator to the 

staff of the Off-Site Rad-Safety Officer. He will be responsible 

for maintaining liaison with local physicians, answering inquiries of a medical nature, investigating complaints and conducting 

public relations. 

059 Veterinary Activities 

f. Instrumentation 

1. Monitoring instruments for detecting alpha, beta, and 

gamma activity will be furnished and maintained by the 

Support Contractor. 

2. Continuous recorders will be placed in communities to 

present a visual record of gamma radiation levels in 

these localities. 

g. On-Site Data Collection-Reactor Operations: 

The assignment of areas of responsibility for collection of 

data on site for periods of reactor testing will be as mutually agreed upon by the "Committee for Environmental-Radiation 

Studies." 

a. A veterinarian will be assigned by the Veterinary Corps, 

U. S. Army, to the AEC Las Vegas Areas Office. 

b. Programmatic direction and administration will be supplied 

by the Area Manager, LVAO. 

c. The Veterinary Officer is responsible for maintaining liai-- 

son with the local veterinarians managing the off-site animal 

project, answering inquiries from ranchers, and investigating 

complaints. He will also collect biological specimens for 

radiochemical analysis and will perform special studies as 

directed. 

0510 Communications 

a. The primary method of communications will be by a low-band 

VHF radio net. All off-site vehicles will be equipped with 

a 2-way radio on this net. Automatic repeater stations will 

be used to provide complete coverage. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

298 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-0511 

0511 

0512 

b. Telephone service will be used as a secondary method of 

communication. 

C. The Support Contractor will maintain and operate the radio 

net. 

Counting Laboratory 

A low-level radiochemical laboratory will be operated at Mercury 

for determining gross radioactivity and specific radiochemical 

tests that are desirable for environmental samples in order that 

the Nevada Test Site Organization will be able to better evaluate 

cumulative low-level radiation dose to people. 

Emergency Plan 

The Emergency Plan for evacuation of off-site population groups 

is outlined in NTSO SOP Chapter 0601-04. 

299 
300 
DISTRIBUTION LIST 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Armed Forces Staff College 

ATTN: Library 

Assistant Secy of Defense, Public Affairs 

ATTN: PA0 

Assistant Secy of Defense, Atomic Energy 

ATTN: Executive Assistant 

ATTN: Military Applications 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

ATTN: GC 

ATTN: PAC 

ATTN: STBE 

5 cy ATTN: NTPR 

25 cy ATTN: TITL 

Defense Technical Information Center 

12 cy ATTN: DD 

Field Corrunand, Defense Nuclear Agency 

ATTN: FCLS, Maj J. Stinson 

2 cy ATTN: FCT 

25 cy ATTN: FCLS 

Interservice Nuclear Weapons School 

ATTN: TTV 

National Defense University 

ATTN: ICAF Tech Library 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Army Library 

ATTN: Military Documents Section 

Army Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

2 cy ATTN: AOTF-N 

U S Army Center of Military History 

ATTN: DAMH-HSO 

U S Army Chemical School 

ATTN: ATZN-CM-AL 

ATTN: ATZN-CM-CS 

IJ S Army Command & General Staff College 

ATTN: Library 

U S Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency 

ATTN: Library 

U S Army War College 

ATTN: Library 

U S Military Academy 

ATTN: Director of Libraries 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Aviation History Unit 

ATTN: Library 

Bureau of Medicine 5 Suraerv 

ATTN: Assistant for Medical Surgery 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (Continued) 

James Carson Breckinridge Library 

ATTN: Library Division 

Marine Corp Base 

ATTN: Document Custodian 

Marine Corps Dev & Education Command 

ATTN: J. C. Breckinridge Library 

Marine Corps Historical Center 

ATTN: Code HDH-2 

Merchant Marine Academy 

ATTN: Director of Libraries 

Naval Hospital Corps School 

ATTN: Library 

Naval Ocean Systems Center 

ATTN: Library 

Naval Oceanographic Office 

ATTN: Code 025, Historian 

Marine Coros Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Naval 

Naval 

ATTN': Code MMRE-60 

Postgraduate School 

ATTN: Code 1424, Library 

Research Laboratory 

ATTN: Library 

Naval School 

ATTN: Commanding Officer 

Naval 

Naval 

Sea Systems Comnand 

ATTN: Nuclear Technology Div 

ATTN: Tech Library 

Surface Weapons Center 

ATTN: Library 

Naval War College 

ATTN: Professor 8 Libraries 

Naval 

Naval 

Navy 

Navy 

Navy 

Weapons Center 

ATTN: Code 233 

Weapons Evaluation Facility 

ATTN: Library 

Department Library 

ATTN: Librarian 

Nuclear Power School 

ATTN: Library 

Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

2 cy ATTN: W. Loeffler 

Nimitz Library 

ATTN: Documents & Reports Department 

Office of the Judge Advocate General 

ATTN: Code 73 

301 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (Continued) 

U S Merchant Marine Academy Library 

2 cy ATTN: Librarian 

IJ S Naval Air Station 

ATTN: Librarian 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Aerospace Defense Command 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Foj;;icNComnunications Command 

: Historian 

Air Force Institute of Technology 

ATTN: Library 

Air Force Logistics Command 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

ATTN: OEHL/NTPR 

Air Force Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

ATTN: OEHL-NTPR 

Air Force Systems Command 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Technical Applications Center 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

ATTN: Tech Library 

Air National Guard 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Training Command 

ATTN: Historian 

Air University Library 

ATTN: AUL-LSE 

Military Airlift Corrmand 

ATTN: Historian 

Pacific Air Forces 

ATTN: Historian 

Strategic Air Command 

ATTN: NRI-STINEO Library 

ATTN: Historian 

Tactical Air Corrmand 

ATTN: Historian 

U S Air Force Academy Library 

ATTN: Library 

U S Air Force Occupational & Env Health Lab 

ATTN: NTPR 

USAF School of Aerospace Medicine 

ATTN: Strughold Library 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Department of Energy 

2 cy ATTN: OMA, DP-22 

Department of Enerqv 

ATTN: Public-Affairs 

ATTN: Dot Con for Technical Librarv 

2 cy ATTN: Health Physics Division - 

Department of Energy 

ATTN: C. Edington 

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 

Centers for Disease Control 

ATTN: G. Caldwell 

Central Intelligence Agency 

ATTN: Office of Medical Services 

Department of Health & Human Services 

ATTN: Office of General Counsel 

Exec Oft of the President 

Management & Budget Office Library 

ATTN: Librarian 

Library of Congress 

ATTN: Serial & Government Publications 

ATTN: Library Service Division 

ATTN: Science & Technology Division 

National Archives 

ATTN: Librarian 

National Atomic Museum 

ATTN: Historian 

National Bureau of Standards 

ATTN: Librarian 

Occupational Safety & Health Admin 

ATTN: Library 

Office of Health & Disability (ASPER) 

ATTN: R. Copeland 

Office of Workers Compensation Program 

ATTN: R. Larson 

U S Coast Guard Academy Library 

ATTN: Librarian 

U S House of Representatives 

2 cy ATTN: Committee on Armed Services 

ATTN: Subcommittee on Health & Environment 

U S Senate 

ATTN: Committee on Veterans Affairs/Armed Svcs 

ATTN: Committee on Veterans Affairs 

Veterans Administration Central Office 

ATTN: Dept Veterans Benefit 

ATTN: Director, Board of Veteran Appeal 

The Wh;+FNHouse 

: Domestic Policy Staff 

302 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS 

University of California 

ATTN: Technical Info Dept 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

ATTN: Reports Library 

2 cy ATTN: ADPA MMS 195 

Library 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co, Inc 

ATTN: CIC 

2 cy ATTN: K. Horton 

2 cy ATTN: W. Brady 

2 cy ATTN: 8. Eubank 

Sandia National Laboratories 

ATTN: Central Library 

ATTN: J. Metcalf 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS - 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: A. Nelson 

ATTN: Information Systems Division 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) 

Advanced Research & Applications Corp 

ATTN: H. Lee 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: DASIAC 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: DASIAC 

ATTN: E. Martin 

ATTN: C. Jones 

National Academy of Sciences 

ATTN: National Materials Advisory Board 

ATTN: C. Robinette 

ATTN: Medical Follow-up Agency 

Pacific-Sierra Research Corp 

ATTN: H. Brode, Chairman SAGE 

R&D Associates 

ATTN: P. Haas 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: L. Novotney 

303 
304