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UOCAVA Voters

and the Electronic Transmission 

of Voting Materials in Four States

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

October 2007

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UOCAVA Voters

and the Electronic Transmission 

of Voting Materials in Four States
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Contents

Introduction.

Guide to Terms.

Summary.

Executive Summary.

Recommendations.

General Recommendations.

Specific Recommended Practices for 

Electronic Transmission of UOCAVA Voting Materials.

Research Methods. 

Sample Selection. 

Data Collection. .

Findings. 

Case Study: UOCAVA Voting in Illi

Background. 

Implementation. 

Case Study: UOCAVA Voting in Flo

Background. 

Implementation. 

Case Study: UOCAVA Voting in South Caro

Background. 

Implementation. 

CASE STUDY: UOCAVA Voting in Montana.

Background. 

Implementation. 

References. 

Appendix A: Key Criteria for Inclusion in Case Study. 

Appendix B: Election Administration and Statistics for Case Study States. 

Appendix C: Laws in Effect During the 2006 General Election 

Regarding Registration, Absentee Voting and UOCAVA Voting. 

Appendix D: Key Implementation Findings. 

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Introduction

Section 245 of HAVA requires the 

EAC to study the challenges of 

incorporating electronic transmission 

technologies (including the Internet) 

into the Federal, State, and local 

electoral process—specifically, 

issues pertaining to electronically 

generated messages that permit 

eligible voters to apply for and vote 

an absentee ballot. 

The United States Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) is an independent, bipartisan agency created 

by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 to 

assist State and local election officials with the 

administration of Federal elections. The EAC 

provides assistance by disbursing, administering, 

and auditing Federal funds for States to implement 

HAVA requirements; conducting studies and other 

activities to promote the effective administration 

of Federal elections; and serving as a source of 

information regarding election administration. 

Section 245 of HAVA requires the EAC to study the 

challenges of incorporating electronic transmission 

technologies (including the Internet) into the 

Federal, State, and local electoral process—

specifically, issues pertaining to electronically 

generated messages that permit eligible voters to 

apply for and vote an absentee ballot. Electronic 

transmission of voting materials may make the 

voting process easier for people covered by the 

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act (UOCAVA) because they face greater 

constraints for absentee voting. 

In 2006, the EAC commissioned two research 

studies involving electronic transmission of voting 

materials. One study involved a survey of UOCAVA 

voters regarding their experiences with electronic 

voting. The other study resulted in this publication, 

UOCAVA Voters and the Electronic Transmission 

of Voting Materials in Four States, which examines 

the experiences of selected States and/or local 

jurisdictions with Internet voting and with electronic 

transmission of absentee ballots to and from UOCAVA 

voters. While no States at the time of this study have 

Internet-based registration or voting systems, many 

use facsimile (fax) transmission and several use 

electronic mail (e-mail) for UOCAVA voters. 

This report documents election officials’ 

experiences and impressions of the electronic 

transmission process, implementation challenges, 

recommendations for improvements to the system, 

and possible methods of replicating the process in 

other States and/or jurisdictions.

Appendix A shows the degree of electronic 

transmission allowed in the States chosen for 

inclusion in this research; Appendix B displays 

each State’s election administration structure and 

ballot statistics for 2006; Appendix C summarizes 

the law for the four States; and Appendix D lists key 

implementation findings.
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Absent Uniformed Services Voter

An active duty member of the uniformed services (Army, 

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, the 

commissioned corps of the Public Health Service, and 

the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration), a member of the Merchant 

Marine, or a spouse or dependent of either of those, 

who is, by reason of such active duty or service in the 

Merchant Marine, absent from the place of residence 

where the member is otherwise qualified to vote. “Absent 

from the place of residence” means “out of the local voting 

jurisdiction,” which in many States, translates to “out of 

county.” Absent uniformed services voters, sometimes 

called “military voters” for brevity, do not need to be 

overseas to fall under Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 

Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA); they only need be out of 

their local voting jurisdiction. 

Electronic Transmission (ET)

Either faxing or e-mailing the Federal Post Card 

Application (FPCA) or ballot request by the voter, the 

blank ballot to the voter, and/or the voted ballot by 

the voter; Appendix B of the Voting Assistance Guide 

(published as book and online by the FVAP) provides 

guidelines for electronic transmission.

Federal Post Card Application (FPCA)

Postage-free postcard, printed and distributed by 

Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) for use 

by absentee voters covered by UOCAVA, which 

simultaneously registers and requests an absentee 

ballot for the voter. The FPCA is also known as 

“Standard Form 76” (or SF76). 

Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)

The agency within the Department of Defense that 

administers the Federal responsibilities of the Presidential 

Designee under UOCAVA. The Secretary of Defense is the 

Presidential Designee responsible for Federal functions 

under UOCAVA.

Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB)

The FWAB or Standard Form 186 (SF 186) is a “back-up 

ballot” for UOCAVA voters who made a timely request for 

an absentee ballot but did not receive it. A FWAB contains 

a declaration/affirmation that is essentially the same 

information gathered on the FPCA (and which some States 

may use as a registration) and a section for listing choice of 

candidates for Federal offices (as well as any other offices 

the State allows). While there is a minimum requirement 

for use of the FWAB, about twelve States use it for more 

purposes, such as for registration or voting on State or local 

offices. The FWAB is available in hard copy or online at the 

FVAP website. The online version can be mailed using the 

same postage-free envelope used for the FPCA. 

Help America Vote Act (HAVA)

A Federal law enacted in 2002 to improve and increase 

the uniformity of election administration. HAVA has several 

sections relating to voters that are covered by UOCAVA 

and consequently amended UOCAVA.

Integrated Voting Alternative Site (IVAS 2006)

The 2006 successor to IVAS 2004 that provided two tools 

for States that voluntarily participated in the program; 

assisted voters in obtaining ballots and added a new 

portion of the FVAP website listing electronic alternatives 

provided by each State and territory.

• IVAS Tool 1

For participating States and local jurisdictions, previously 

registered DOD-affiliated voters with access to a secure 

DOD system completed an “Automated FPCA” online and 

then e-mailed it directly to their local election official. This 

Automated FPCA showed that it was generated via IVAS 

and did not require a signature.

• IVAS Tool 2

For participating States and local jurisdictions, previously 

registered DOD-affiliated voters with access to a secure 

DOD system completed an “Automated FPCA” online, 

which the local election official downloads. This Automated 

FPCA showed that it was generated via IVAS and did not 

require a signature. If the FPCA is approved, the local 

election official then uploaded a PDF of the blank ballot 

onto the server and the voter was alerted and able to 

download and print the ballot. After completing the printed 

ballot, the voter had to return it in accordance with State 

law and not through the IVAS system.

Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS 2004)

A program administered by FVAP that allowed States that 

voluntarily participated in the program to have previously 

registered DOD-affiliated voters request and receive 

absentee ballots for the 2004 general election over a 

secure DOD server.

Legal Voting Residence for Overseas Citizens

Address in the State where the individual resides or last 

resided before leaving the United States. This applies to 

those who no longer own or rent at that address and his or 

her intent to return is uncertain.

Legal Voting Residence for Uniformed

Services Members and Families

Address in a State where the individual has met the 

State’s residency requirement, generally where individual 

has or has had a physical presence and an intent to return 

to make the State ones home. Only one legal residence 

at a time and any change of legal residence must be 

deliberate and established through actions, including 

when reverting to a previous residence. While it can be 

Guide to Terms
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the same address, “legal voting residence” is different from 

the “home of record,” which is the address the individual 

had upon entering the service and which does not change.

Local Election Officials (LEOs)

LEOs are the individuals responsible for registration and/or 

voting in the local jurisdiction that conducts elections, such 

as the county, city, or parish.

National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)

A federal law enacted in 1993 to enhance the ability 

of Americans to register to vote and to maintain their 

registration, through, for example, agencies such as motor 

vehicles departments. It also mandated development of 

a national mail-in registration form that can be used in all 

States. The original act gave enforcement powers to the 

U.S. Department of Justice and gave responsibility for 

implementation to the Federal Election Commission (FEC). 

An amendment in the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 

2002 transferred the FEC’s responsibilities under the Act 

to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. The Act is 

sometimes called the ‘Motor Voter Act.’

Overseas Citizen Temporarily Out of the

United States

U.S. citizen with a residence in the United States who 

will be outside of the territorial limits of the United 

States on election day for any reason, including 

employment and travel. 

Overseas Citizen Permanently Residing

Outside the United States

U.S. citizen who resides outside the territorial limits of the 

United States and is qualified to vote or would be qualified 

to vote in the last place in which he/she domiciled before 

leaving the United States.

Overseas Voter

U.S. citizen outside the territorial limits of the United States 

on election day. While this includes active duty uniformed 

service members who are, by reason of active duty, 

outside the territorial limits of the United States, it typically 

refers to civilians because uniformed services voters are 

usually put in their own category.

Secure Electronic Registration and Voting

Experiment (SERVE)

A demonstration project planned for the 2004 general 

election to develop a web-based registration and voting 

system that could be accessed from any computer in any 

location. SERVE was cancelled in 2004 because of security 

concerns raised by independent computer scientists.

State/Special Write-in Absentee Ballot (SWAB)

For a particular State, a write-in ballot that allows 

UOCAVA voters to write in their choices for candidates 

or parties for different elected offices (usually more than 

Federal offices) rather than receive a regular absentee 

ballot. Typically, a SWAB is requested and sent out several 

months before the election to voters who will not be able 

to receive the regular absentee ballot because of their 

activities or location. The State must have statutes that 

establish a SWAB and define its use.

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 

Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)

A Federal law enacted in 1986 as Public Law 99-410 and 

amended by four subsequent laws, governing registration 

and absentee voting for uniformed and overseas citizens. 

UOCAVA Voter

An absentee voter covered by UOCAVA (an absent 

uniformed services voter or overseas voter); sometimes 

also called a “Federal voter,” or “Federal elector.” For 

brevity in this report, may be simply referred to “military or 

overseas voter,” with the absence implied.

Voting Assistance Program

Program within each Federal department and agency 

with employees covered by UOCAVA with the objective of 

assisting those citizens to vote.

Voting Assistance Officers (VAOs)

Individuals, in each Federal department and agency with 

employees covered by UOCAVA, who are responsible for 

providing accurate, non-partisan voting information and 

assistance to those citizens attempting to exercise their 

constitutional right to vote. VAOs are provided online and 

in person training by FVAP. 

Voting Over the Internet Project (VOI)

A pilot project allowing a small sample of UOCAVA voters 

to register and vote over the Internet using dedicated 

personal computers during the 2000 general election.
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Throughout this year-long project, a few strong 

patterns emerged that involved jurisdictions chosen 

for the case studies, with respect to military and 

overseas voting and electronic transmission of 

voting materials. 

First, State and local election officials are 

enthusiastic about facilitating the voting of this 

population, especially active duty military who 

are serving overseas, and they are committed 

to protecting voter privacy. However, they are 

hindered by limited resources, lack of knowledge 

about resources and procedures, and technical 

incapacities. For example, while some local 

election officials knew about and took advantage of 

providing federally-paid postage on ballot materials 

to Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act (UOCAVA) voters, several were unaware 

of it and spent local funds for mailings. 

Project researchers also encountered huge 

variation in technical capability from one local 

jurisdiction to the next based on staff and computer 

systems. Also, voting by electronic transmission 

is limited because military and overseas voters 

do not know about their options. While some 

election officials promote these options, it is 

rarely comprehensive enough to reach all voters. 

Unfortunately, local election agencies have a 

disincentive to encourage widespread use of 

electronic transmission of voted ballots because it 

requires hiring staff to duplicate ballots so they can 

be run through the regular counting process. Paper 

ballots sent and received by regular mail in a timely 

fashion better meet the goals of voter privacy and 

administrative efficiency.

Second, from the perspective of State and local 

election administrators, the requirement to use 

UOCAVA registration information through two 

Federal election cycles is burdensome and 

costly. The impact of this law was first seen in 

the 2006 general election, which was the second 

Federal election since the law took effect. Local 

election officials were extremely dismayed at 

the great number of blank ballots returned as 

undeliverable, especially from military voters who 

Summary

have constant address changes or are discharged 

and return home between Federal elections. Local 

administrators also fear having blank ballots “out 

there” that do not come back voted or undeliverable. 

A particular concern is discharged military voters 

who return home and cannot vote at the polls 

because they are sent an absentee ballot at their 

prior military address.

Third, State and local election administrators 

are greatly concerned with authenticating voters 

located outside the State or jurisdiction. Generally, 

electronic transmission of voting materials must be 

accompanied by an assurance that voters are “who 

they say they are,” but the preferred method for 

achieving that varies. Some officials believe e-mail 

is the safer way to authenticate who is on the other 

end of a transmission, as voters need a password 

to access their e-mail accounts. Conversely, a 

blank ballot may sit in a fax machine and anyone 

could simply vote it and return it. Regardless of 

security on the other end, all jurisdictions have 

safeguards such as barcodes and signature 

checks so that stray ballots cannot be fraudulently 

voted and returned unnoticed. Most local election 

administrators prefer direct contact through phone 

or e-mail with absent voters; however, a benefit of 

both the Department of Defense’s pilot Integrated 

Voting Alternative Site (IVAS) 2006 “tools” was that 

the Department of Defense (DOD) authenticated 

each voter and eliminated the need for an original 

signature on the Federal Post Card Application 

(FPCA) ballot request form.

The four States were chosen for these case studies 

based on variation in region, population size, 

Executive Summary

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The four States were chosen 

for these case studies based on 

variation in region, population 

size, population characteristics, 

and the application of laws across 

local jurisdictions.
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population characteristics, and the application of 

laws across local jurisdictions. (See Appendix A.) 

Their commonalities dwarfed any major differences. 

In all four States and the local jurisdictions studied, 

the military population was most of the UOCAVA 

population. Because the military population comes 

from all parts of the United States, there are no major 

demographic differences between voters in sample 

states. And because of the prevalence of military 

voters, the attention to UOCAVA voters was fairly high. 

The uniform rules in South Carolina and Florida, 

compared to local variation in Montana and 

Illinois, also did not seem to produce different 

administrative practices. For example, while 

State law allows counties in Montana to vary 

in application of electronic transmission based 

on technical capabilities, the same type of 

administrative variation existed in South Carolina. 

The one factor that did make a difference was 

population size and the corresponding effect on 

administrative structure. In Montana, where county 

populations are relatively small, rural, and remotely 

located, county election offices seemed to have 

more flexibility in terms of aiding UOCAVA voting 

and facilitating electronic transmission.
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Researchers interviewed 11 State election 

administrators and 31 local election administrators 

from 15 local jurisdictions in four States (Illinois, 

Florida, South Carolina, and Montana). When 

visiting the four States, 40 interviews were 

conducted in person, and two interviews were 

conducted exclusively by telephone. Data collection 

with respect to most of the 15 local jurisdictions was 

supplemented by conversations over the telephone 

and through electronic mail exchanges. The 

following recommendations come from speaking 

directly to the local election officials (LEOs), mostly 

in their office environment, and (where possible) 

from forms and documents. 

During the field work, researchers were advised 

about the following practices or potential practices 

that make or might make absentee voting by 

UOCAVA voters easier and that may facilitate 

meeting deadlines, maintaining the privacy of the 

voter, authenticating the voter and transmitted 

materials from that voter, and increasing the 

efficiency and reducing the burden on staff.

General Recommendations

State Laws

States should allow persons with Power of 

Attorney for an absent voter to apply for that 

voter’s absentee ballot. In one State that 

now has this law but did not have it during 

the November 2006 election, the father of a 

soldier in Iraq wanted to pick up his son’s ballot 

and FedEx the ballot to him. The son did not 

complete an application with his own signature 

before leaving the country, and the father 

was not allowed to sign the absentee ballot 

application for his son.

States should allow local election agencies to 

conduct pilot projects for military and overseas 

voting procedures, as good ideas often originate 

at the local level.

State Administration

Develop training programs at the State level, 

and invite the local election officials (LEOs) to 

collaborate with the State on optional courses.

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States must provide resources and infrastructure 

support for better local computer and fax systems, 

and assist with uniform setup and troubleshooting.

Local jurisdictions that do electronic 

transmission should communicate best 

practices to other jurisdictions in the State. If 

one jurisdiction has some technology (hardware, 

software, etc) that is particularly helpful for 

electronic transmission of ballots to UOCAVA 

voters, the State should encourage the other 

jurisdictions to adopt that technology.

Voters should be encouraged to provide e-mail 

addresses, and LEOs should be encouraged 

to use e-mail to communicate with UOCAVA 

voters. E-mail is an easy, low cost, and fast way 

to communicate. E-mail addresses should be 

uploaded to the statewide registration database. 

States must encourage and support local 

offices sending periodic mailings to verify 

UOCAVA addresses to decrease undeliverable 

or unreturned blank ballots and to decrease 

the number of absentee ballots sent to former 

UOCAVA voters who return home but are not 

allowed to vote at the polls.

Local Administration

LEOs should meet annually with the local post 

office staff to educate them on the UOCAVA mail 

they will encounter. Local United States Postal 

Service (USPS) line staff is not usually trained 

on handling UOCAVA mail and is unaware of 

time issues.

LEOs must have access to information technology 

(IT) support in their office or through the county/

local government infrastructure. Specifically, local 

election agencies must be part of the county/

local government IT infrastructure so LEOs have 

server access and support and get the technology 

needed for electronic transmissions.

Education and Outreach

Educate all local jurisdictions about Federal 

paid-postage for official ballot material that is 

available for UOCAVA voters.

Establish a nationwide training program and 

guide on the electronic transmission of voting 

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Recommendations
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materials. Training should start at the Federal level 

(Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP) and 

be consistently available at State and local levels.

If FVAP does not already do so, FVAP should 

consider sponsoring regular meetings between 

Voting Assistance Officers (VAOs) and LEOs 

in applicable jurisdictions to share information, 

forms, and educational materials and to 

update each other on changes. FVAP might 

also consider bringing civilian VAOs into the 

process by hosting a bi-yearly conference in 

the U.S. with military and civilian VAOs, LEOs, 

State election administrators, and United 

States Postal Service (USPS) representatives 

to discuss UOCAVA voting. This could be a 

forum to educate LEOs about various UOCAVA 

populations (overseas civilian, overseas military, 

and domestic military) and the context in which 

they are voting (e.g., military structure, postal 

systems in the military and other countries, and 

embassy/consular resources). 

If FVAP does not already do so, FVAP might 

consider developing standard outreach materials 

about voting options that States and LEOs can 

adapt and disseminate. For example, they could 

develop a sample outreach letter that is also 

an address verification letter. LEOs providing 

information about electronic transmission options 

on their websites is not enough.

Specific Recommended Practices for 

Electronic Transmission of UOCAVA 

Voting Materials

The following are specific practices employed 

or proposed by local election officials who were 

interviewed in the case study research. Also 

included are the implications of each for facilitating 

secure voting and for local election administration. 

It is not meant to be comprehensive but rather 

a compilation of ideas discovered during the 

research. Some ideas may only work in certain 

states and/or jurisdictions.

Faxing

Possible actions:

Voter faxes the Federal Post Card Application 

(FPCA) or ballot request to the LEO

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LEO faxes the blank ballot to the voter

Voter faxes voted ballot to the LEO

Recommended practice: The election office 

has a dedicated, secure fax line just for UOCAVA 

materials and a dedicated person to retrieve and 

send UOCAVA materials from that fax machine.

Implications: One fax number and fax machine 

just for UOCAVA materials during the election 

season is a good way to maintain the privacy 

of the voter. This practice ensures security and 

increases privacy of the FPCA, ballot request, 

or voted ballot that is faxed from the voter to 

the LEO. If the fax machine is used for other 

purposes, then other staff may sort through faxes 

and see the voter’s name, personal information, 

and/or ballot choices. A designated person to 

receive and send materials on that fax machine 

makes it easier to be certain that materials are 

going to and coming from the correct person. If 

others pick up the faxes, communication with 

the voter might break down and authentication 

of materials is more difficult. For a voted ballot, 

having a designated person also reduces to one 

the number of people who see the ballot and 

the voter’s name. This one person can verify the 

signature and send the ballot on for duplication, 

possibly preventing the staff that duplicates it 

from seeing the name of the voter. 

Recommended practice: The election office has a 

toll-free fax phone number for UOCAVA voters.

Implications: This reduces the cost of voting 

for UOCAVA voters and allows them to submit 

their FPCA, ballot request, and/or voted ballot 

by the deadline.

Recommended practice: The election office 

confirms receipt of fax by a voter or from a voter 

through a simultaneous phone call or e-mail.

Implications: Fax transmissions are inherently 

insecure, as there is no way at the time of 

faxing to ascertain who receives, sends, or 

sees faxes once sent. Therefore, the best 

method is to either be on the phone with the 

receiver or sender while the fax is transmitted, 

or to send e-mail confirming the transmission 

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and get an immediate positive e-mail response 

to that confirmation. 

Recommended practice: The election office has 

a software program to generate correct ballot styles 

for faxing. 

Implications: Ballots are typically produced 

by off-site (sometimes out-of-State) printers or 

voting systems vendors. These may arrive too 

late for UOCAVA voters and/or may not fit into 

regular fax machines. Local election offices 

with the capacity to print ballots on 8.5 inchwide paper will have an easier time faxing blank 

ballots to UOCAVA voters. This requires that 

the election offices have their ballot layouts in an 

electronic format from which they can then print 

all ballot styles. A computer program to take 

the UOCAVA voter information and generate 

the appropriate ballot style for each voter would 

make this process even more efficient and cut 

down on the staff needed to produce ballots.

Recommended practice: LEO handling UOCAVA 

voters provides specialized service to meet 

technical needs of individual voters so that faxes 

can be sent or received. For example, one overseas 

voter was in a town with only one fax machine, 

which was only available at certain times. The LEO 

obtained all the necessary information and faxed 

materials to this number when the voter said she 

could be there to receive it. Another example is 

military voters who cannot fax to civilian phone 

numbers from the secure Department of Defense 

(DOD) phone lines in Southeast Asia. 

Implications: This kind of specialized service 

takes extra time and commitment from the 

LEO handling UOCAVA voters, but they feel it 

is worthwhile to make extra efforts to facilitate 

voting for this population.

Recommended practice: Allow faxed ballots to be 

hand-counted or consider developing technology 

that can scan ballots received by fax.

Implications: As faxing of voted ballots 

increases, local jurisdictions must hire more 

workers to duplicate the ballots so they can be 

counted in the same manner as other absentee 

ballots (typically scanned). Hand-counting of 

faxed ballots might reduce the amount of staff 

needed (staff need only count, not duplicate and 

run ballots through scanner); however, it might 

further compromise privacy. 

E-Mailing

Possible actions:

LEO communicates with voter via e-mail

Voter e-mails the FPCA or ballot request to 

the LEO

LEO e-mails the blank ballot to the voter

Voter e-mails the voted ballot to the LEO

Recommended practice: The election office 

solicits e-mail addresses from all UOCAVA 

voters and maintains a database of those e-mails 

regardless of whether voter requested that his/

her blank ballot be e-mailed. At a minimum, have 

an e-mail address book for UOCAVA voters, and 

upload e-mail addresses to the statewide voter 

registration database.

Implications: E-mail is an inexpensive, rapid 

way to communicate with UOCAVA voters 

about their absentee voting process. E-mail 

can be used by the LEO to communicate about 

obtaining the FPCA and blank ballots as well as 

to confirm receipt of completed FPCAs, blank 

ballots, and voted ballots. E-mails can also be 

used to provide important information about 

deadlines, transmission methods, upcoming 

elections, candidates, and initiatives. 

E-mail has an advantage over telephone calls 

because both parties do not need to be present 

at the same time. The online FPCA form asks 

for an e-mail address, but many voters do not 

complete that field or they send in the actual 

postcard or the local ballot request form. In 

addition, some LEOs do not electronically record 

the e-mail address off the FPCA, especially if 

the voter did not request the ballot by e-mail or 

the State does not allow e-mailing of ballots. In 

many cases, the only e-mail addresses the LEO 

has are those captured passively because a 

voter sends an e-mail to the jurisdiction with an 

inquiry or a request that a ballot be e-mailed to 

him/her. Once ballots are sent or received, the 

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LEO typically deletes the e-mails (for privacy) 

and consequently deletes the e-mail addresses. 

E-mail addresses can be actively solicited 

through postcard mailings to follow up on 

FPCA information and/or confirm mailing 

addresses and through an appeal on the 

jurisdiction’s website. If the State provides a 

field in the voter registration database for email addresses and requires that information 

be uploaded for UOCAVA voters, then LEOs 

will collect e-mail addresses. 

Recommended practice: The election office 

designates one person to receive all UOCAVA email messages, communicate with voters via e-mail, 

maintain an e-mail address database, and receive 

and send voting materials via e-mail.

Implications: A designated contact person for 

UOCAVA voters can maintain the e-mail address 

database and be the one to accept and send 

voting materials by e-mail. The address database 

can be as simple as a portion of the LEOs e-mail 

address book. This single person helps maintain 

the privacy of the voter’s personal information 

and ballot choices, and enhances the security of 

materials by having them sent to and from just 

one e-mail address. This person may have an email address like ‘absentee@localelectionoffice.

gov’ just for the absentee voters, and have this 

account accessible by one other staff member to 

check when that designated person is off work.

Recommended practice: Have all ballot styles 

put into a PDF format by local election staff, rather 

than just by the company responsible for printing the 

official ballots.

Implications: Paper ballots are typically 

produced by off-site (sometimes out-of-State) 

printers or voting systems vendors. To e-mail 

paper ballots received from the printer, they must 

first be scanned. This process may be finished 

too late and takes extra staff and/or time. It 

makes more sense for the election offices to 

have their ballot layouts in an electronic format 

(either from the printer/vendor or what is sent to 

the printer/vendor) that can be converted to PDF 

files for e-mailing. In this way, blank ballots can 

be e-mailed earlier.

Recommended practice: Implement a computer 

program that matches voters to their ballot style, 

automatically creates the ballots to e-mail, and 

sends the e-mails.

Implications: Hand-matching each UOCAVA 

voter to his or her ballot style and then e-mailing 

the appropriate blank ballot could take a great 

deal of time in a large jurisdiction. This process 

could be automated to ensure rapid receipt 

of blank ballots and free up staff to attend to 

special needs of UOCAVA voters.

Recommended practice: Put into place a 

process for confirming receipt of an e-mailed 

blank ballot and responding to bounces and nonresponses. Each e-mailed blank ballot should 

request a return e-mail acknowledging receipt on 

the other end. Follow-up phone calls could then 

be made to those whose e-mails bounced to get 

a corrected e-mail address before sending the 

ballot by snail mail. Follow-up phone calls could 

also be made to those who did not send an e-mail 

response confirming receipt.

Implications: Confirming receipt of blank 

ballots puts both the voter and the LEO at 

ease in terms of ballot security. The LEO can 

confirm that the blank ballot was received by the 

intended voter, and the voter can confirm that 

he or she was sent the appropriate blank ballot. 

This immediate follow-up and possible correction 

can also prevent missed deadlines.

Recommended practice: Put into place a process 

for confirming receipt of an e-mailed voted ballot. 

A designated person at the local election offices 

should e-mail a confirmation to each voter who emailed a voted ballot. This allows voters to respond 

if they did not, in fact, send the ballot. Bounced emails and non-responses should be followed up with 

phone calls.

Implications: A confirmation of voted ballots 

puts both the voter and the LEO at ease in 

terms of ballot security. The LEO can confirm 
11

DRAFT

the ballot received came from the correct voter, 

and the voter can confirm his or her ballot was 

received and will be counted. This immediate 

follow-up and possible correction can also 

prevent missed deadlines.

Recommended practice: Allow e-mailed ballots to 

be hand-counted or consider developing technology 

that can scan ballots received by e-mail.

Implications: As e-mailing of voted ballots 

increases, the local jurisdiction must hire 

workers to duplicate the ballots so they can be 

counted in the same manner as other absentee 

ballots (typically scanned). Hand-counting emailed ballots might reduce the amount of staff 

needed (staff need only count, not duplicate 

and run ballots through scanner), but it might 

compromise privacy. 

Recommended practice: Use a secure DOD 

server such as used in Integrated Voting Alternative 

Site (IVAS) Tool 2 to transmit materials.

Implications: The downside to Tool 2 was that 

the LEOs did not have direct e-mail contact with 

the voter. However, one LEO pointed out that 

one positive aspect of IVAS Tool 2 was that the 

voter did not have to seek out his or her LEO 

because the server performed the task for them. 

For this reason, it is probably a good option to 

have a system like Tool 2 available to LEOs.
DRAFT
DRAFT

Research Methods

Sample Selection

Selecting jurisdictions to participate in the case 

studies first involved choosing states based on 

their policies and requirements for UOCAVA voters, 

including acceptance of forms such as the Federal 

Post Card Application (FPCA) and sending and/or 

receiving ballot materials by mail, fax, e-mail, or 

website. It also meant reviewing State laws and 

regulations, querying organizations and individuals 

involved in UOCAVA registration and voting, and 

collecting statistics on the number of registered 

military and civilian UOCAVA voters per State. 

These data were gathered to determine the relative 

experience States have with processing this voter 

group. Any variation in requirements between activeduty military and civilian overseas electors and for 

emergency voting was identified within each State. 

The information was categorized based on whether 

States allowed ballots to be received or transmitted 

electronically in the November 2006 election. 

Categories ranged from most advanced (States 

that allowed e-mailing of voted ballots) to least 

advanced (States that disallowed any electronic 

transmission of voting materials) and put into a 

table for comparison. Montana and South Carolina 

were chosen because they allow some e-mailing 

of voted ballots; Florida and Illinois were chosen 

because they allow some e-mailing or uploading/

downloading of blank ballots (see Appendix A). 

Montana has considered electronic options 

for some time, and election administrators are 

aware of the challenges. Since 2003 the State 

has allowed its counties to send and receive 

registration forms, ballot requests, blank ballots, 

and voted ballots by fax and e-mail. The State 

used the Integrated Voting Alternative Site 

(IVAS) Tool 2 in 2006, which allowed registered 

Department of Defense (DOD) voters to complete 

the online Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) 

and download a blank ballot—thus demonstrating 

a willingness to experiment with new possibilities 

in election administration. Some counties also 

participated in the Interim Voting Assistance 

System (IVAS) 2004 project, which allowed 

downloading of blank ballots for DOD voters. 

South Carolina has a substantial number of military 

voters and permits all counties to e-mail blank and 

voted ballots, and to fax ballots and registration 

forms for UOCAVA voters. As far back as the 

2000 general election, South Carolina allowed all 

UOCAVA voters to participate in the Voting Over 

the Internet (VOI) project; some counties also 

participated in IVAS in 2004. 

Florida allows faxing of the FPCA ballot request, 

blank ballots and voted ballots, and allows e-mailing 

of blank ballots for all UOCAVA voters except 

military voters residing in the U.S. This State’s 

selection allowed for exploration of why domestic 

military are treated differently by State law. Their 

sizable UOCAVA population (122,194 ballots sent in 

20041) provides insight into the workload associated 

with electronic transmission of ballots. In 2000, at 

least one local election official participated in Voting 

Over the Internet (VOI) and is currently investigating 

an Internet voting pilot project. 

Illinois had two jurisdictions, the City of Chicago 

and the suburban Cook County that participated 

in IVAS Tool 1. This allowed registered voters 

that are overseas DOD civilian and contractor 

employees, as well as active duty military and their 

dependents, to e-mail ballot requests. All UOCAVA 

voters in these two jurisdictions can receive a 

blank ballot by e-mail. Illinois also allows faxing 

of FPCA ballot requests for all military voters and 

for overseas civilians from Chicago and Cook 

County. This State was an interesting addition to 

the sample; two jurisdictions are using an approach 

to absentee voting that differs from other local 

jurisdictions. The Illinois UOCAVA population 

(30,556 ballots sent in 20041) is larger than 

Montana but smaller than Florida.

Once the four States were chosen, researchers 

selected three to five local jurisdictions within each 

State to gain greater representation of each State’s 

1

U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Uniformed and Overseas 

Citizens Absentee Voters Act (UOCAVA), Survey Report Findings, 

March 2006, http://www.eac.gov/docs/UOCAVASurvey%20Report%20-

%20Final%203-3-06.doc

13
14

DRAFT

practices. Some local jurisdictions were chosen 

because of their previous participation in the 

Department of Defense’s Voting Over the Internet 

(VOI), in the IVAS 2006 program, or because 

of planned participation in Secure Electronic 

Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE), 

which was later cancelled. Others were selected 

based on their population of UOCAVA voters—in 

Illinois, one jurisdiction was added due to the 

relatively high number of UOCAVA ballots sent 

and returned. In Florida, one county was chosen 

because of its large military population. In South 

Carolina, the top five counties, in terms of UOCAVA 

ballots sent in 2006, were included in the study. 

In Montana, four counties that e-mail and fax 

voting materials were selected, including two that 

participated in IVAS 2006. 

Data Collection

Initial data collection began by acquiring information 

from each State’s legislature, State agency 

websites, and library databases. Additional data and 

hard copy versions of election codes, regulations, 

voter outreach materials and statistics were 

collected as States were visited. 

 

Core data collection was conducted through personal 

interviews with State and local election officials. 

In November 2006, researchers contacted the top 

election administrator in each jurisdiction to explain 

the purpose of the EAC study and ask for referrals to 

the staff person best suited to answer the questions. 

At the local level especially, valuable information was 

often gained from these initial phone conversations. 

Interviewees also referred researchers to other 

individuals. In most cases researchers traveled to 

the offices of the sample jurisdictions to conduct 

interviews and observe day-to-day operations. In two 

States, researchers were invited to attend meetings 

of local election officials, where additional interviews 

were conducted and researchers observed officials 

as they learned about laws and shared information. 

Researchers also traveled to the offices of the sample 

jurisdictions and observed day-to-day operations.

In November 2006, researchers 

contacted the top election 

administrator in each jurisdiction 

to explain the purpose of the EAC 

study and ask for referrals to the 

staff person best suited to answer 

the questions. At the local level 

especially, valuable information 

was often gained from these initial 

phone conversations. 
DRAFT

Background

In Illinois, researchers interviewed nine election 

administrators from three local jurisdictions and 

two staff members of the State Board of Elections 

for this study. Election officials and staffers in 

this Midwestern state go to great lengths to 

accommodate UOCAVA voters and guide them 

through the registration and voting maze, even 

when it requires a bit of creative thinking. 

Legislative Snapshot

Illinois laws affecting military and overseas voters 

emerged in spurts over the last 18 years. During 

the 1989-90 State legislative session, the General 

Assembly specified how military and overseas 

civilians could request absentee ballots, the 

deadlines for mailing blank ballots to these groups, 

and the availability of special write-in ballots. 

Coinciding with the Gulf War, a law was enacted 

in the 1991-92 session that allows faxing of ballot 

requests for active duty military personnel. 

The Illinois Legislature reacted to the difficulties 

that arose during the 2000 Presidential election 

with a flurry of activity related to voting and 

voting equipment. In 2003, legislators asked the 

State Board of Elections to conduct an Internet 

voter registration study. In early 2005, one 

legislator proposed creation of an “Internet Voting 

Commission” to study voting via the Internet, but the 

bill stalled in committee.

Implementation

Absentee Choices and Consequences

The State Board of Elections is charged with guiding 

local jurisdictions to conduct elections uniformly and 

according to State law, and also encourages local 

election officials to give special attention to UOCAVA 

voters. Even so, registration and voting choices 

can be confusing for voters, and there is some 

inconsistency in interpretation and implementation 

among jurisdictions.

UOCAVA is just one of several absentee programs 

implemented by local jurisdictions in Illinois. Others 

include a “snow-bird” program (temporary absentee 

voters who spend the Illinois winter in warmer 

regions of the country), a disabled voter absentee 

program, and an absentee voter program for those 

with other reasons (specified by law) that prevent 

them from voting in person. 

At least three different registration rules govern 

absentee voter groups, and the implementation of 

these rules varies among jurisdictions. Different forms 

are used to apply for absentee ballots under the 

various programs, and each registration form triggers 

a different length of time for which the voter will remain 

“active” and receive a ballot in the mail automatically.

In addition to UOCAVA voters, any registered Illinois 

voter may request, at least 10 days before an election, 

an absentee ballot from their local jurisdiction for a 

variety of reasons. Requests are only valid for one 

election for regular voters, but they cover every election 

in a calendar year for military or overseas voters using 

the local jurisdiction’s ballot request. 

UOCAVA voters using the Federal Post Card 

Application (FPCA) form are mailed ballots for two 

Findings 

Case Sudy:  UOCAVA Voting in Il

In the 2000 Census, Illinois had 

a population of over 12.4 million 

people, almost 88 percent of 

whom lived in urban areas. 

Approximately 0.09 percent 

(10,865 people) lived in military 

quarters.2 Of approximately 9.5 

million people over 16 years 

of age, 0.23 percent (22,020 

individuals) were members of the 

Armed Forces.3

2

Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF1) 100-Percent Data

3

Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3) Sample Data

15
16

DRAFT

Federal election cycles. Some jurisdictions send 

voters ballots for all elections in which they are 

eligible to vote during that Federal, State, and/or 

local cycle, while others send only some ballots. 

Jurisdictions also have different interpretations about 

what constitutes “two cycles.” For example, should a 

voter who registered in October 2004 receive a ballot 

for the November 2008 election without having to 

renew the application?

If UOCAVA voters apply with a local jurisdiction’s 

absentee ballot request form, they will likely only 

receive a ballot for one election, but staff sometimes 

move applicants to the FPCA timeline when it is 

apparent that they are serving in the military rather 

than being on vacation.

Military voters outside their county of residence have 

additional options, by law, for requesting absentee 

ballots. A parent, child, spouse, or sibling registered 

in the same jurisdiction can request that a ballot 

be sent to the voter. Alternately, active duty Armed 

Forces members can send an application for an 

absentee ballot to their local election authority “by 

a facsimile machine or electronic transmission” at 

least 10 days before the election. Interestingly, there 

is no interpretation provided in the State law about 

what “electronic transmission” means. Since the law 

does not explicitly allow or disallow the e-mailing of 

blank ballots to overseas voters, some jurisdictions 

do e-mail them to make sure voters get the ballots in 

time to return them. 

Illinois law requires a live signature on file for a 

registration to be valid. This requirement is strictly 

implemented by all jurisdictions, though often 

creatively. For example, when a UOCAVA voter 

registers via fax and does not provide a “live” 

signature, the jurisdiction usually suggests that the 

voter return the voted ballot along with the original 

registration form. The ballot is then counted when 

the registration form and signature are received. 

The Extra Mile

Within each office, UOCAVA voters are usually 

assigned to a specific staffer, although one who 

likely handles additional tasks. However, due to the 

somewhat decentralized nature of busy election 

offices, multiple staffers often handle a regular 

UOCAVA application depending on the jurisdiction 

and their assigned job tasks. In all jurisdictions, 

election staff know to whom they should direct 

UOCAVA voters. The training for those assigned 

UOCAVA voters consists of reading instructions on 

forms, receiving guidance from the Illinois Board 

of Elections, and/or accessing the DOD Federal 

Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) site, particularly 

the online training modules for Voting Assistance 

Officers (VAOs). 

Staffers are creative; in one office, someone with 

a military background researched ways to get 

ballots to deployed voters who were difficult to 

reach. Consequently, a registered voter received a 

ballot on a submarine after this staffer tracked him 

down and contacted the submarine’s commander 

to inquire about electronic submission access and 

file size limitations. Many interviewees go out of 

their way for military voters, saying that because 

they are serving the country, “the least we can 

do is make sure their right to vote is protected.” 

For overseas civilians, however, especially those 

residing overseas permanently, the sentiment is 

different. Processes for these voters are followed 

as prescribed by law, but staffers in one jurisdiction 

admitted they do not go the “extra mile” for these 

voters, as they assume civilians are not constrained 

by issues such as not having a fax machine 

available or serving in combat.

All jurisdictions visited had e-mail access for 

staff that handle UOCAVA voters. Most offices 

maintain a designated fax machine for registration 

Interestingly, there is no 

interpretation provided in the 

State law about what “electronic 

transmission” means. Since it does 

not explicitly allow or disallow 

the e-mailing of blank ballots to 

overseas voters, some jurisdictions 

do so to make sure voters get the 

ballots in time to return them.

Illinois 
17

DRAFT

forms, and one even established multiple toll-free 

fax lines for overseas registrations. Information 

systems are standard, over-the-counter hardware 

and software. Offices have technical support 

available and use standard e-mail and virus 

protection software. It appears that higher level 

security is not used because no voted ballots are 

transmitted electronically. 

All jurisdictions visited by the researchers attempt 

to verify addresses (by mail) for absentee voters 

between elections. This mailed notice reminds voters 

to change their address (if necessary) so that the 

ballot will reach them in a timely manner. It also 

allows LEOs to update non-deliverable addresses 

in the registration system. When mail is returned 

as undeliverable, the registration file is updated 

accordingly and the voter will not be sent a ballot until 

a new address is obtained. One interviewee has had 

luck contacting FVAP to track down new addresses 

of military personnel. Others contact family members 

when possible, and if an e-mail is on file, contact 

voters by e-mail. For UOCAVA voters who do not 

supply an e-mail address or a fax number, receiving 

the ballot in a timely manner can be a challenge if 

they reside in remote locations, or if they receive 

their mail through the Military Postal Service. Every 

jurisdiction cited problems with ballots not delivered 

promptly or found after an election. Some jurisdictions 

have raised this issue with FVAP and with the Military 

Postal Service in hopes of obtaining prioritized 

delivery status for overseas absentee ballots.

According to those interviewed, using the United 

States Postal Service (USPS) to send voting materials 

is not necessarily efficient or effective. Postmarks 

on overseas ballots can be difficult to decipher, and 

sometimes postmarks are missing. (Even if it cannot 

be read, the ballot is generally counted if received 

within the 14 days after an election, especially if it 

looks like a military voter’s ballot.)

Military voters are highly mobile and their addresses 

change frequently. Sending out ballots that 

are returned is costly, and election officials are 

uncomfortable sending out ballots that do not reach 

their proper destination but are not returned. 

The use of fax and e-mail, however, has enabled 

voters from overseas to participate in elections where 

they otherwise would have missed deadlines or not 

received ballots. Staffers communicate regularly 

with voters by e-mail to solve problems, verify ballot 

receipt, or change addresses. E-mail communications 

are not limited to overseas voters; many local voters 

also use e-mail to interact with election office staff. 

While e-mail addresses from FPCAs are not entered 

into the local or State registration system, some 

staffers compile their own file. 

Two local jurisdictions participated in a FVAP project 

for the November 2006 election, which provided even 

more flexibility in receiving absentee ballot requests. 

Tool 1 of the Integrated Voting Assistance System 

(IVAS) was for registered voters whose identity had 

been authenticated by the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and who had access to a secure DOD server 

on which they could complete an FPCA to submit to 

their local election office without a signature.

Both jurisdictions were pleased with the availability 

of Tool 1. One reported 25 requests for e-mailed 

ballots through IVAS Tool 1, of which 15 were voted 

and returned. The LEO in charge of this function 

commented that Tool 1 allowed 25 more individuals 

to request ballots than otherwise would have, which 

represented 18 percent of all e-mailed blank ballot 

requests. The LEO of the other jurisdiction reported 

that 90 blank ballots were e-mailed as a result of 

requests through Tool 1, which was 64 percent of all 

e-mailed ballots for that election.

Looking Forward

Currently, there is little organized activity dealing 

specifically with overseas voting. There is also no 

legislative or political push to change any electronic 

transmission methods or revise other procedures 

in the overseas voting process. Legislation to allow 

Illinois 

Two local jurisdictions participated 

in a FVAP project for the November 

2006 election, which provided 

even more flexibility in receiving 

absentee ballot requests. 
18

DRAFT

electronic transmission of voted ballots is probably 

not forthcoming from the State legislature because 

of concerns over security and Illinois’ need to 

improve its image regarding voting fraud.

Those interviewed do not foresee more relaxed laws 

on electronic transmissions of voting materials—

specifically, voting by e-mail or on the Internet—

because of its current vulnerability, concerns about 

viruses, and an inability to verify where votes 

originated (e.g., who actually voted the ballot). While 

most hope military voters will be able to use more 

advanced electronic methods since the military 

system could provide voter authentication, one 

interviewee expressed doubt that even the military 

could safeguard the electronic transmission process. 

Certainly, election administrators do not have 

significant funds available that would be necessary 

to set up a “closed” system for transmitting ballots 

electronically. Even if they did, replacing manual 

methods of ballot processes would require even 

more funding. Currently, e-mailed ballots that are 

filled out and returned require two election judges 

to “transfer” the votes from the e-mail ballot to 

a regular ballot because ballot scanners do not 

accept regular paper. If more people began emailing and/or faxing ballots, more judges would be 

needed for this time-consuming duplication process. 

Alternatively, new technological approaches would 

have to be explored, creating time and resource 

problems for jurisdictions that already deal with 

short timelines. 

Illinois 
DRAFT

CASE STUDY: UOCAVA Voting in Florid

In the 2000 Census, Florida 

had a population of nearly 16 

million people, almost 89 percent 

of whom lived in urban areas. 

Approximately 0.08 percent of the 

total population (13,457 people) 

lived in military quarters.4 Of 

the 12.7 million people over 16 

years of age, 0.44 percent (56,519 

individuals) were members of the 

Armed Forces.5

4

Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF1) 100-Percent Data

5

Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3) Sample Data

Florida 

Background

Florida has many challenges in the election 

arena, and one of those is serving its sizeable 

UOCAVA population (122,194 ballots sent in 2004). 

Researchers investigated how State laws affect 

this voter group and those who administer the laws. 

Five Florida election administrators from three local 

jurisdictions and four staff members of the Florida 

Department of State were interviewed for this study. 

Election Reform

After the November 2000 election difficulties in 

Florida, the State’s legislature quickly enacted 

the Election Reform Act of May 2001. While the 

purpose was to end the use of punch card ballots 

and ensure uniform ballot design and counting, the 

law also focused on making absentee voting easier, 

especially for overseas voters. The controversy 

over the role of military and overseas ballots in the 

outcome of the 2000 Presidential election raised 

concerns that laws surrounding these voters be 

clarified. Prior to the 2001 Election Reform Act, 

statutes required a military or overseas postmark for 

the ballots arriving within 10 days after the election. 

In the days following the November 2000 election, 

this was very controversial, as local election officials 

varied in whether they would accept or reject 

overseas ballots with a domestic postmark. Now, 

absentee ballots from overseas are assumed to 

be mailed on the date written on the outside of the 

return envelope, regardless of the absence of a 

postmark or a later postmark date. 

Other provisions affecting military and overseas 

voters in the Election Reform Act are those 

providing late registration for those discharged from 

military or overseas employment, a State writein ballot for overseas voters, e-mail updates with 

candidate information, and the requirement that the 

Department of State issue rules allowing electronic 

transmission of ballot requests and voted ballots 

from overseas voters. 

Implementation

A Closer Look

Florida’s Secretary of State is the chief election 

officer, charged with maintaining uniformity in 

the interpretation of election laws. Local election 

officials are called county “supervisors of 

elections” (SOEs). 

Reports of voters being treated differently across 

counties in the 2000 and 2004 elections motivated 

the legislature to give the Secretary and the 

Department of State authority to pursue legal 

action to enforce the compliance of any SOE with 

the statutes or regulations. These enforcement 

powers are new and have not been used in any 

dramatic way, but the Department sees them as a 

push to uniformity.

The Department of State also establishes rules 

governing transmissions by fax or other electronic 

means. These rules allow ballot requests and 

blank ballots to be e-mailed and faxed, and voted 

ballots to be faxed. However, the Department has 

determined that there is a not yet a secure way to 

e-mail voted ballots.

Another new authority for the Department relates 

19
20

DRAFT

to pilot projects for counties wishing to experiment 

with electronic ballot transmission. A few Florida 

counties participated in the Voting Over the Internet 

(VOI) project with the Department of Defense (DOD) 

in 2000. This project involved elaborate information 

system setups, from special password and 

encryption keys for each transaction to setting up 

separate servers to process voters, allowing a small 

group of military personnel to vote over the Internet. 

Several counties also participated in planning for 

the later cancelled Secure Electronic Registration 

and Voting Experiment (SERVE), in which voters 

would have been able to gain access to their ballot 

from any computer. One Florida county is currently 

developing its own pilot project to transmit ballots 

using the Internet, and the Department of State is 

supporting this pilot as part of its mandate.

Local election offices differ in organizational structure. 

Florida’s SOEs are elected, so if an SOE is not reelected and a new supervisor takes office the entire 

staff can change. Coordination among the staff 

depends partially on the office size. In smaller offices, 

people work on many aspects of the election process 

and everyone seems to pitch in, whereas larger 

offices have more specialized staff for specific tasks, 

and the division of labor is more decentralized.

The State conducts continuing education sessions 

for SOEs and holds workshops on substantial 

pieces of legislation (e.g., the Election Reform Act). 

Counties communicate regularly with the Secretary 

of State, and they have a strong communication 

network among themselves and an active legislative 

liaison. One SOE, a highly knowledgeable resource 

on UOCAVA voters, consults with the State regularly 

on interpretations and implementation issues, 

especially regarding military voters. 

Resources committed to serving UOCAVA voters 

vary in proportion to the number of registered 

UOCAVA voters in the jurisdiction and on the 

motivation of staff. In one Florida jurisdiction, 

more than anywhere else studied, researchers 

encountered election administrators who do 

everything to make sure eligible UOCAVA voters 

are able to register and cast a ballot. This includes 

figuring out ways to overcome obstacles or 

streamline the process, lobbying for legislative 

changes, and helping other jurisdictions implement 

Florida 

. . .researchers encountered 

election administrators who do 

everything to make sure eligible 

UOCAVA voters are able to register 

and cast a ballot. This includes 

figuring out ways to overcome 

obstacles or streamline the 

process, lobbying for legislative 

changes, and helping other 

jurisdictions implement procedures 

that aid UOCAVA voters. 

procedures that aid UOCAVA voters. This 

jurisdiction communicates actively with the Federal 

Voting Assistance Program, seeks out Voting 

Assistance Officers (VAOs) on nearby bases to offer 

assistance, and interacts with commanding officers 

to ensure that UOCAVA voters have the technology 

to participate in the election process. Election 

administrators in this jurisdiction have worked 

through holidays to meet deadlines for UOCAVA 

voters and have even picked up ballots for UOCAVA 

voters during a hurricane. 

Some SOEs are willing to explore new projects 

under Florida’s pilot program option but feel severely 

limited by resources, the current political climate, 

and the presence of interest groups that have 

questioned computer use for elections. 

Step by Step

In several sections, Florida law applies explicitly to 

“overseas voters.” This means the particular section 

does not apply to all UOCAVA voters; it does not 

apply to military personnel who are outside of their 

county of residence but still within the United States.

UOCAVA voters can use three forms to register to 

vote in Florida: the Federal Post Card Application 

(FPCA), the State’s voter registration form, or the 

National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) form. In 
21

DRAFT

at least one jurisdiction, the FPCA is frequently 

used by military personnel who are not UOCAVA 

voters because they physically reside within the 

jurisdiction. When a local military voter registers for 

the first time and uses the FPCA, the SOE asks 

them to replace the form with a Florida registration 

form and submit a separate absentee ballot 

application. Electronically submitted forms must be 

followed by the original. 

An overseas voter who is already registered may 

request a ballot in person, in writing, over the 

phone, or by fax or e-mail. However, an overseas 

voter who cannot vote an absentee ballot during 

the normal voting period due to military or other 

contingencies can request a State Write-In 

Absentee Ballot (SWAB). This ballot will include 

Federal, State, and/or local offices for which the 

voter would otherwise vote. If an overseas request 

for an absentee ballot includes an e-mail address, 

the SOE must e-mail to the voter a list of candidates 

for primary and general elections at least 30 days 

before each election.

Florida voters do not need to provide a reason to 

request an absentee ballot, and the application 

remains in effect for one calendar year. However, 

UOCAVA voters do not have to reapply for absentee 

ballots yearly if they registered through the FPCA, 

because the two Federal election cycle requirement 

applies to them in that case. Absentee ballots can 

be requested in person, by phone, e-mail, fax, or in 

writing. An absentee ballot can also be requested 

by a designated family member, which is especially 

important for military UOCAVA voters overseas.

Election administrators mail an annual Notice of 

Election (NOE) to each absentee voter along with 

an absentee ballot application. This also serves 

as address verification and update reminder for 

UOCAVA voters. Many of these are returned 

because the UOCAVA population is highly mobile. 

This is especially true for military voters. In one 

jurisdiction, about 25 percent of the NOEs came 

back undeliverable in 2006, and less than 10 

percent of the voters who were sent a ballot actually 

returned a voted ballot. 

Many military contractors hire and send civilians 

overseas, who thus become UOCAVA voters. When 

Overseas ballots are counted up to 

10 days after the election if mailed 

by the election day.

Florida 

these civilians return to the U.S., they become 

regular voters again. However, when overseas 

military voters return to somewhere in the U.S. 

other than their voting residence, they remain 

UOCAVA voters. In some offices, all voters who 

have any contact with the office are asked whether 

they are military as they often have different 

needs than civilian voters. They may suddenly be 

deployed and change from local UOCAVA status to 

overseas status, or they may be located in remote 

war zones or areas at which they cannot be easily 

reached by regular mail. Once they leave, they 

become eligible for use of electronic transmission of 

election materials. 

Blank ballots are e-mailed and faxed only to 

overseas UOCAVA voters who request them but 

not to UOCAVA voters residing in the continental 

U.S. (For purposes of eligibility to use electronic 

transmission of ballots, residents of Samoa, 

Guam, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico are 

not considered overseas voters.) While regular 

absentee voters must receive their ballots by 

“non-forwardable” mail, UOCAVA-qualified ballots 

are sent by “forwardable” mail. By law, election 

administrators must send ballots to overseas voters 

at least 35 days prior to an election, but due to 

a concern that 35 days is not enough time for the 

entire process, some administrators send them 10 

days earlier. For example, military voters at sea may 

only be able to receive and send mail every two 

weeks when a supply plane arrives.

In Florida, absentee ballots are returned by mail 

or in person; overseas voters may return voted 

ballots by mail or by fax but not by e-mail. Faxed 

ballots must be accompanied by a signed waiver 

of privacy. In one jurisdiction, voters faxing ballots 

typically remain on the phone with the office while 

the fax comes through to satisfy both parties of a 

positive transmission. In another jurisdiction, an 
22

DRAFT

e-mail is sent upon receipt of the ballot so the voter 

can respond if they did not send the fax. As in other 

States, these ballots must be duplicated after arrival 

to be accepted by scanners that count votes.

Overseas ballots are counted up to 10 days after the 

election if mailed by the election day. As previously 

stated, SOEs act according to the date the voter 

signed the form with the assumption that it was 

mailed on that day. On ballots received during the 

10-day grace period, only votes for the Federal 

races are counted. 

Their Two Cents

Since the 2000 Presidential election, Florida’s 

election administrators have felt they are under a 

magnifying glass, and that everything they do is 

scrutinized by the media. The 2000 election also 

gave rise to interest groups that watch over and 

advocate for or against certain technologies in 

elections. Florida’s participation in the VOI project 

in 2000 was largely ignored by that community, 

but voting technology activism was in full swing 

when SERVE came along in 2004. SERVE was 

discontinued after SOEs spent considerable 

time and effort on its implementation, and voting 

technology experts are largely blamed for its demise. 

At the time of the interviews, some SOEs expressed 

extreme frustration with these groups, believing 

that the experts’ unreasonable doubts regarding 

electronic ballot transmission has hampered election 

administrators from opening up the process to 

UOCAVA voters. 

Florida’s election administrators are highly attuned 

to the controversies around voting technology and 

knowledgeable about arguments on all sides of 

the issue. Most jurisdictions exercise due diligence 

in securing their systems and keeping them free 

of viruses. They try to push as much information 

online as possible and encourage UOCAVA voters 

to check the website for updates regularly. One SOE 

explained that using the Internet and e-mail can 

bridge time differences between SOEs and distant 

voters, promote more effective communication 

and administrative processes, and bring in a new 

generation of voters. 

Admittedly, issues surrounding electronic ballot 

transmission include verification of the voter and 

secure transmission of the ballot in an unaltered 

state to the SOEs. The election administrators 

interviewed doubted whether current technology 

could alleviate these concerns, but they pointed 

out that the military is the perfect candidate for 

pilot experiments because the DOD already has 

protocols that deal with the authentication and 

verification of Armed Forces members. 

Florida 

 . . . using the Internet and email can bridge time differences 

between SOEs and distant 

voters, promote more effective 

communication and administrative 

processes, and bring in a new 

generation of voters. 
DRAFT

In 2006, South Carolina law changed to allow all 

UOCAVA voters to fax or e-mail their voted ballots. 

This new law has not yet been widely used because 

of a lack of requests from UOCAVA voters and 

because election staffers across the state are still 

adapting their processes to accommodate the 

change. Researchers interviewed seven South 

Carolina election administrators from five local 

jurisdictions and four employees of the State 

Election Commission. 

Background

On the Books

The South Carolina legislature has enacted 

legislation related to military and overseas voters 

for 25 years, but recent laws substantially affect 

UOCAVA voters. 

In 1984, legislation added use of Standard Form 

76—otherwise known as the Federal Post Card 

Application (FPCA)—to the section of the law on 

military and overseas voting. Two years later, a law 

established the Special Write-In Absentee Ballot 

(SWAB) for voters who are remotely located, and 

stated that this ballot should be used for Federal, 

statewide, and General Assembly offices. At about 

the time of the Gulf War, a 1992 law was passed 

that allowed electronic transmission of voting 

materials for military in an “emergency” such as war, 

conflict, or military mobilization. 

Because of a Senate bill introduced in 1998, the 

State was able to participate in the 2000 Voting Over 

the Internet (VOI) pilot. In 2001, an additional law 

further supported electronic transmission, allowing 

“other methods of voting by absentee ballot instead 

of by paper ballot.” In 2003 a bill would have allowed 

participation in the Secure Electronic Registration 

and Voting Experiment (SERVE) project planned for 

2004, but the project was later cancelled. 

Two major bills related to military and overseas 

voters were proposed in 2006. One sought to allow 

UOCAVA voters to use State and Federal write-in 

ballots for all elections (including local), Federal 

write-in ballots for registration, and to receive an 

e-mail receipt of candidate information. The bill was 

not enacted, and write-in ballots remain for remote 

voters only. 

Legislation enacted in 2006 removed the emergency military conflict requirement, thus expanding 

the use of electronic means to all UOCAVA voters 

at any time, and mandated that an instant runoff 

ballot be sent to UOCAVA voters with their primary 

election ballots.

Implementation

At the Helm

The State Election Commission (SEC) is the 

central election authority in South Carolina. This 

commission appoints an executive director, whose 

responsibilities include running the centralized voter 

registration system, and implementing and enforcing 

the State’s responsibilities under the National Voter 

Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA.

South Carolina’s election administration system 

on the local level is governed by two entities: the 

county board of registration and the commissioners 

CASE STUDY: UOCAVA Voting in South Carolin

In 2000, South Carolina had a 

population of over 4 million people, 

almost 61 percent of whom lived 

in urban areas. Approximately 0.43 

percent of the total population 

(17,102 people) lived in military 

quarters.6 Of the 3 million people 

over 16 years of age, 1.16 percent 

(36,027 people) were members of 

the Armed Forces.7

6

Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF1) 100-Percent Data

7

Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3) Sample Data

South Carolina 23
24

DRAFT

of election—all appointed positions. Registration 

boards are responsible for facilitating the absentee 

voting process for UOCAVA voters. 

Successful election administration requires a 

significant level of collaboration between the board 

and the commissioners. For example, the election 

commissioners produce the absentee ballots 

for the registration board to distribute. In most 

jurisdictions, this coordination is accomplished by 

hiring one director to oversee all staff and take 

charge of day-to-day operations. Other counties 

have separate directors for each board and no 

joint meetings of the boards, making coordination 

somewhat more difficult. 

South Carolina’s SEC trains local jurisdictions on 

election and registration matters throughout the 

year and maintains an Intranet that allows counties 

to access rules, regulations, training materials and 

videos, and other news and information. Training 

on how to send and receive fax and e-mail ballots, 

new for all UOCAVA voters in 2006, was provided 

in April 2006 with training on a new UOCAVA 

instant runoff ballot. 

Funding for local jurisdictions varies. Most offices 

seem adequately staffed for busy election times, 

but staff in other jurisdictions seem overwhelmed 

by the challenges that UOCAVA voters add to 

their usual workload—even outside of the election 

season. Staff specifically mentioned the amount 

of e-mail sent to and received from military and 

overseas voters.

There is a great degree of uniformity among the 

46 counties, but even centralized training cannot 

overcome the variation in educational or election 

backgrounds among staff members, nor can this 

training compensate for the difference in resources. 

This leads to somewhat different interpretations in 

the implementation of tasks. 

Understanding the Process

A large majority of South Carolina’s UOCAVA voters 

are military, while others work for international 

companies or are independent contractors who 

send employees overseas to work. Members of this 

voting group who need help navigating the process 

typically call the local election administrator. Some 

interviewees talked about military voters who did 

not know about the Federal Voting Assistance 

Program (FVAP) and the FPCA or did not know 

there should be a Voting Assistance Officer 

(VAO) on the base. Consequently, busy election 

administrators not only process registrations and 

ensure that ballots arrive on time, but they must 

also refer voters to the appropriate websites or 

forms. If that fails, they guide voters through the 

process themselves, which can be time-consuming 

and difficult during election season.

Residents must register to vote in person at their 

county board of registration office or by mail 30 days 

before an election. South Carolina residents who 

are discharged from the Armed Forces and return 

home after the 30-day deadline can register “late” at 

the county board of registration office until 5:00 p.m. 

on election day to vote in that election.

Voters can vote absentee for one of the 17 reasons 

listed on the State’s Application for Absentee Ballot. 

The reasons fall into two broad categories: either the 

voter will be absent from their county of residence 

on election day, or the voter will not be able to vote 

in person because of a disability, work, jury duty, 

etc. Of the 17 reasons listed on the application, 

most of the ones involving absence from the county 

of residence are geared toward UOCAVA voters 

(e.g., active duty military, Merchant Marine, citizens 

residing outside the country, etc.).

South Carolina allows for faxing and e-mailing 

ballots, both blank and voted, and faxing of 

registration forms and ballot requests. Blank ballots 

South Carolina allows for faxing 

and e-mailing ballots, both 

blank and voted, and faxing of 

registration forms and ballot 

requests. Blank ballots faxed or 

e-mailed to voters are sent with a 

waiver of the right to a secret ballot 

to be signed by the voter.

South Carolina 
25

DRAFT

faxed or e-mailed to voters are sent with a waiver 

of the right to a secret ballot to be signed by the 

voter. UOCAVA voters can both register and request 

a ballot by FPCA, or if already registered, they 

can ask for an absentee ballot application. In most 

cases, election administrators try to guide UOCAVA 

voters to the FPCA. Election officials reported that 

an original signature is only necessary for a new 

registration form, and there is discretion on whether 

an electronic signature can be accepted in lieu.

When using the FPCA (Standard Form 76), the 

military or overseas voter has several options. The 

form can be used to request a ballot or to both 

register and request a ballot. The FPCA does not 

require a notary or witness and can be faxed or 

mailed. If faxed, however, the original must also be 

mailed. Many UOCAVA voters apply for an absentee 

ballot with South Carolina’s absentee ballot 

application rather than the FPCA, not realizing it 

only covers one election instead of all elections 

for the entire year. There are differing opinions 

among election administrators on whether State 

and local elections are covered by the FPCA. Some 

jurisdictions send ballots for all elections; others wait 

for the voter’s separate request for local ballots. This 

problem seems to be exacerbated by the availability 

to voters of more than one version of the FPCA. 

Older versions of the FPCA, which do not collect all 

of the same information as the new forms, are still 

being used in some overseas locations (embassies, 

voting assistance offices, etc.).

South Carolina voters do not specify a party 

affiliation on their registration form, and most 

voters using the FPCA to register do not indicate a 

partisan preference. This is problematic for voters, 

as election administrators will not mail ballots for 

primaries to those people who did not state a party 

preference. An incomplete or illegible FPCA further 

increases the workload for election administrators, 

who must follow up with the voter.

The County Boards of Registration must mail, fax, 

or e-mail regular ballots and “Instant Runoff Voting” 

ballots to UOCAVA voters at least 45 days before 

a primary election. Traditional mailing presents 

certain problems. Administrators attempt to verify 

all UOCAVA voter addresses between elections, 

but election mail cannot be forwarded. In some 

jurisdictions, 75 percent of returned mail came back 

with corrected addresses, but most of the mail sent 

was not answered or returned. Additionally, local 

election administrators must work closely with local 

postal authorities, because USPS employees do not 

always know that the county or State is not required 

to pay for election mail sent to UOCAVA voters. 

Absentee voted ballots can be mailed or delivered, 

but they must be returned inside a special envelope 

imprinted with a special oath, which must be signed 

and witnessed. This witness requirement is waived 

for UOCAVA voters faxing or e-mailing their voted 

ballots. When voted ballots are returned via fax or 

e-mail, they are duplicated in the election office so 

that they can be scanned with other ballots. 

What Happened in 2006?

Transmitting voted ballots by e-mail is in the early 

implementation phase in South Carolina, as the two 

major elections in 2006 were the first opportunities 

to take advantage of the new law. Even so, it was 

important to look at what happened and listen to 

how those involved in the process feel it can be 

improved. While it was not frequently used at the 

time of this report, the possibility of e-mail voting 

is generally appreciated by election administrators. 

It is likely that for e-mail voting to be implemented 

effectively and uniformly, it would have to be 

promoted on the state level through a combination 

of trainings on procedures and technology. 

South Carolina 

When using the FPCA (Standard 

Form 76), the military or overseas 

voter has several options. The form 

can be used to request a ballot 

or to both register and request a 

ballot. The FPCA does not require a 

notary or witness and can be faxed 

or mailed. If faxed, however, the 

original must also be mailed. 
26

DRAFT

Implementation of electronic ballot transmission 

varies, largely due to resources. For example, one 

jurisdiction did not have technology support staff, 

nor did it have an employee who was particularly 

tech-savvy. It was difficult for them to set up a fax 

machine for faxing ballots because their phone 

plan did not allow for overseas calls, and they had 

not figured out a process for e-mailing ballots. With 

no office or county resource to provide training or 

assistance, election staff members believed they 

had to rely on themselves. Local election staff 

“might” have attended the State workshop on instant 

runoff voting ballots and e-mailing and faxing ballots, 

but did not recall the information or know where to 

look on the State Intranet for further assistance.

When problems arise, election administrators 

and/or office staff with heavy workloads must find 

their own solutions or figure out alternative ways 

to accommodate voters. In one jurisdiction, when 

voters request e-mail ballots, they are offered a 

faxed ballot instead. In contrast, e-mailing ballots 

has become, in part, routine in some jurisdictions 

where resources are not an issue.

Each county is responsible for its own computers 

and servers. Some have easy and direct access 

to technical support staff; others are left to fend for 

themselves. In jurisdictions with little support, there is 

little evidence that computers are backed up regularly 

or that they are part of a network. One exception is 

the registration database, which is administered by 

the SEC and housed at the State election office. 

South Carolina 

Transmitting voted ballots by e-mail 

is in the early implementation phase 

in South Carolina, as the two major 

elections in 2006 were the first 

opportunities to take advantage of 

the new law. 

Local offices do have online access to the statewide 

voter registration database. All other programs and 

platforms seem standard—usually with Windows 

and Microsoft Office—but some offices do not have 

software for creating PDF files that can be sent to 

voters. While the SEC creates ballot layouts for 

the election offices, they still have to be adapted 

for each ballot style, which requires significant 

knowledge about the software and some 

understanding of how various programs interact. 

In one jurisdiction, 85 different ballot styles had to 

be created for one election. 

Election administrators appreciate the future 

possibilities of electronic transmission, but it is 

not widely used because election offices do not 

yet know how to implement it and voters do not 

know about it. For e-mail voting to be implemented 

effectively, it would likely have to be promoted on 

the State level to ensure appropriate training. 
DRAFT

Background

Those who envision Montana as rugged and 

unsettled might be surprised to learn that this State 

is quickly becoming a frontrunner of electronically 

transmitted voting materials. Interviews were 

conducted with nine Montana election administrators 

from four jurisdictions and the state Election 

Director for this study, and researchers had informal 

conversations with approximately 10 additional 

election administrators. Researchers also attended 

a meeting where county clerks discussed their 

experiences in the November 2006 election. 

The New “Old Frontier”

For 20 years, the Montana legislature has actively 

addressed election reform, particularly for military 

and overseas voters. State legislation enacted as 

early as 1969 mentioned the voting rights of citizens 

“in United States service” who are “absent from the 

state and county” of residence. 

The Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) was 

addressed in 1987 legislation, and laws enacted 

in 1991 allowed transmission of voting materials 

by facsimile. More changes came in 1999 with a 

bill that added “transmission using the Internet” 

for overseas and military voters. That same year 

marked the enactment of “no excuse” absentee 

voting that allows any Montana resident to vote by 

absentee ballot for any reason. 

The 2003 legislature passed the Montana Absent 

Uniformed Services and Overseas Elector Voting 

Act, primarily to implement Federal UOCAVA and 

Help America Vote Act (HAVA) laws. The Secretary 

of State (SOS) was made the designated source of 

information regarding UOCAVA voting. The Act also 

allows domestic military voters to use the FWAB 

to take advantage of the electronic transmission 

of ballots, if available, and to register to vote at 

the polls late if they return home. It also requires 

the Secretary to adopt regulations to implement 

provisions for electronic voting contained in the Act. 

The Secretary of State can, if necessary, contract 

with private companies to enable registration and 

voting by facsimile. The 2003 Act also amended 

or clarified other absentee voting laws, including 

that UOCAVA voters must be notified of their 

registration using the fastest transmission method 

available. In 2007, legislation affecting UOCAVA 

voters expanded use of the FWAB to state and 

local offices. 

Implementation

From the Top Down

The office of the Montana SOS is responsible for 

interpreting state election laws and implementing 

them uniformly, and the office’s Elections and 

Government Services Division administers this 

duty. The office is the “single point of contact” for 

information regarding UOCAVA voting procedures 

and reports. The SOS’s office issues directives 

to the counties by mail, fax, and e-mail, and the 

Elections Division conducts bi-yearly training for 

election administrators.

Montana has 56 counties, and the county 

clerk in each jurisdiction registers voters and 

conducts elections. One person in each office 

usually handles UOCAVA voters, which election 

CASE STUDY: UOCAVA Voting in Montan

In 2000, Montana had a population 

of a little over 900,000 people, 

almost 54 percent of whom lived 

in urban areas. Approximately 0.04 

percent of the total population (404 

people) lived in military quarters.8

Of the 700,000 people over 16 

years of age, 0.52 percent (3,619 

individuals) were members of the 

Armed Forces.9

8

Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF1) 100-Percent Data

9

Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3) Sample Data

Montana 27
28

DRAFT

administrators believe is a good practice 

because UOCAVA voters are subject to separate 

processes, which are more efficiently conducted 

by one person. It is also easier to preserve voter 

privacy, and the voter has one contact point. 

Understandably, though, smaller jurisdictions often 

have fewer staff who must handle multiple tasks. 

In larger offices with more UOCAVA voters, two 

people sometimes share the responsibilities. 

The SOS’s website provides access to laws and 

interpretations, and election administrators are 

largely self-taught, using resources from the 

Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) or 

communicating with colleagues. Montana’s local 

election officials (LEOs) meet yearly to discuss 

implementation and legal issues, including overseas 

and military voting issues. 

Counties select their own computing systems based 

on available resources—most jurisdictions use 

standard, over-the-counter hardware and software 

to communicate with UOCAVA voters. The more 

tech-savvy counties seemed well-connected to their 

county’s IT infrastructure in terms of server access 

and technical support. In some jurisdictions, voter 

registration rolls were still kept on ledgers until HAVA 

required interactive databases, and some offices do 

not have fax machines at all.

Voting Process: Start to Finish

Regular close of registration is 30 days prior to 

election day. In 2006, Montana began allowing 

“late registration” up until the polls close for those 

who vote in person at the county clerk’s office. 

UOCAVA voters returning to Montana during the 

30-day period can register until noon on the day 

before an election to vote at the polls just like any 

other registered voter rather than wait in line at the 

election office to vote.

Any registered Montana voter can vote absentee 

without a reason and can apply for permanent 

absentee ballots for all elections or just for Federal 

elections. Local election officials send an address 

confirmation to each voter on the permanent 

absentee list 75 days before each election. Voters 

must sign and return the confirmation form or risk 

being taken off the permanent absentee ballot list. 

Military and overseas voters in Montana who wish 

to vote absentee can register—by mail, fax, or email if the county is so equipped—using the state 

registration form, the Federal Post Card Application 

(FPCA), or the FWAB transmission envelope. 

UOCAVA voters often use the state’s absentee 

ballot application rather than the FPCA, especially if 

they were registered in Montana prior to their move 

overseas. Use of the state form is probably common 

because the State has permanent, no-excuse 

absentee voting. A return notice of registration can 

be sent by fax or e-mail. 

When UOCAVA voters do not specifically request 

e-mail or fax ballots, a regular absentee ballot 

is sent to their last known address. However, in 

one jurisdiction, 90 percent of those ballots were 

returned as undeliverable in 2006. When there is 

time and a forwarding address, the clerks resend 

the ballot.

Currently, an absentee ballot request has to bear 

the voter’s signature. Election administrators accept 

these requests with an electronic signature, but 

there is a growing awareness that military personnel 

may not have access to faxes or scanners. 

Interviewees recalled situations in which parents or 

relatives of UOCAVA voters came in with specific 

requests that could not be accommodated under 

current law, so election administrators recently 

lobbied for a Power of Attorney bill allowing the 

Interviewees recalled situations 

in which parents or relatives of 

UOCAVA voters came in with 

specific requests that could not 

be accommodated under current 

law, so election administrators 

recently lobbied for a Power of 

Attorney bill allowing the voter’s 

designee to change an address, 

pick up a ballot, or apply for an 

absentee ballot.

Montana 
29

DRAFT

voter’s designee to change an address, pick up a 

ballot, or apply for an absentee ballot.

There are a variety of processes in effect when 

creating e-mail ballots. In one county, the vendor 

for the central scan technology creates the ballot 

layouts and sends PDF files to the clerk, who then 

e-mails them to UOCAVA voters requesting them. 

Another county creates a PDF ballot that is emailed to the voter, who then completes the ballot 

online and returns it by e-mail without a scanner 

and printer. In a third jurisdiction, the clerk scans 

ballots, names them by precinct, saves them as 

PDF files, and e-mails them. A fourth jurisdiction 

creates ballots in Microsoft Word format and e-mails 

those. Blank ballots can be faxed or e-mailed to 

voters—again, if the county has the capacity for it. 

When a UOCAVA voter who is mailed an absentee 

ballot appears at a polling place, the absentee ballot 

is voided in the State’s voter registration database 

and is then reissued—an elaborate process and 

especially difficult on election day when county 

election administrators are troubleshooting other 

problems. All interviewees mentioned the effort that 

goes into keeping UOCAVA lists current to avoid 

these situations. 

Regular voted absentee ballots must be received at 

the county clerk’s office by 8 p.m. on election day. 

Military and overseas voters can fax or e-mail their 

voted ballots if their county receives them in this 

manner. All e-mail and fax returns of voted ballots 

have to be accompanied by a waiver of privacy. The 

waiver does not need a signature; it can simply be 

attached to the ballot. 

Montana clerks take very seriously the mandate 

to keep fax and e-mail votes private and secure. 

Jurisdictions that accept faxed ballots have gone to 

great lengths to minimize access to fax machines 

on which ballots may be received, including moving 

the machines into rooms with limited access. One 

clerk prefers e-mail transmissions because e-mails 

sit in her in-box until she logs on and prints the ballot, 

whereas a fax may sit in the machine all night. She 

also likes e-mailing ballots better than faxing them 

because she feels more certain about who is on the 

other end. If a voted ballot is transmitted by e-mail, 

the signature requirement on the privacy waiver is 

ignored because the clerk knows where the e-mail 

came from.

As in other States, electronically transmitted ballots 

must be duplicated to be counted. But even mail 

ballots from UOCAVA voters often arrive torn, folded, 

or wrinkled. Because they can’t be scanned, they 

must be duplicated. After the duplication is completed 

and verified for accuracy, the ballot is added to all 

others and counted on election day. In Montana, 

16 counties hand-count their ballots and 40 others 

use optical-scan systems. This simple distinction 

affects the procedures that individual offices have 

implemented and indicates how technologically 

advanced the respective jurisdictions are. 

In one office, voting conducted entirely by e-mail 

would typically go as follows:

The clerk receives the original request for an 

e-mail ballot.

The clerk e-mails back and notifies voters that 

they will have to waive their right to privacy.

The voters e-mail back and acknowledges that 

they would like to continue the process.

Instructions, forms, and ballot are e-mailed to 

the voter.

The voter e-mails the ballot with the privacy 

waiver.

The clerk e-mails the voter an acknowledgement 

that the ballot was received.

The ballot must then be duplicated, validated, 

and counted.

Room for Improvement

As the number of UOCAVA voters increase, so 

do reports about difficulties in dealing with this 

population. One county reported that the mailing 

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Most election administrators 

interviewed favored the expansion 

of electronic transmission, 

especially e-mail balloting, to more 

voters in small counties. 

Montana 
30

DRAFT

costs to UOCAVA voters are a significant burden on 

their county budget. Another suggested the biggest 

issue is bad addresses because the population is so 

mobile—and the post office does not forward mail. 

They also mentioned that mailed ballots handled 

through the postal system are often torn or folded 

and wrinkled so they cannot be scanned.

Election administrators spend significant resources 

educating UOCAVA voters, as very few of them 

seem to use the FVAP website, and few, if any, 

have contact with a Voting Assistance Officer (VAO). 

In fact, many voters learn about fax and e-mail 

options from local election administrators because 

the Secretary of State’s website only mentions that 

some counties allow for faxing; there is no mention 

of the e-mail option. 

Most election administrators interviewed favored 

the expansion of electronic transmission, especially 

e-mail balloting, to more voters in small counties. 

Larger counties would need a considerably 

expanded infrastructure to handle more e-mailed 

and faxed ballots, so any new policy must consider 

population and density along with resource 

allocations. Most expressed that e-mail ballots were 

their preferred option, saying, “E-mailed ballots are 

less messy than faxed ballots.” One official said, “Email is more reliable—you know where you sent it, 

and it stays in the in-box until you open it. With a fax, 

you never know who gets it.”

 

Two Montana counties participated in the Integrated 

Voting Alternative Site (IVAS) program in 2006. 

After time-consuming setup problems, election 

administrators liked the program but still had 

reservations. Without direct communication with the 

voter, they cannot follow up if there are problems, 

and they were uneasy about “taking the word of the 

Department of Defense (DOD) for the voter being who 

they say they are” because election administrators get 

neither a registration form nor a signature. 

The best election system for UOCAVA voters is 

“e-mail without a middle man” according to election 

administrators. They want more control over a 

process for which they bear the ultimate responsibility, 

and the IVAS-type systems, which use a remote 

server, did not allow that kind of control.

Montana 

The best election system for 

UOCAVA voters is “e-mail without a 

middle man” according to election 

administrators. They want more 

control over a process for which 

they bear the ultimate responsibility, 

and the IVAS-type systems, which 

use a remote server, did not allow 

that kind of control.
31

DRAFT

References

General

“Uniformed And Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act (UOCAVA),” http://www.fvap.gov/laws/

uocavalaw.html and http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/

military/uocava_statute.htm

“The Help America Vote Act of 2002,” Public Law 107-

252, Sec. 242 & 245, Sec 701-707, Oct. 29, 2002

“The National Voter Registration Act,” Public Law 

103-31, May 20, 1993

U.S. Election Assistance Commission, “Uniformed 

and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voters Act 

(UOCAVA) Survey Report Findings,” March 2006

U.S. Election Assistance Commission, “Best 

Practices for Facilitating Voting by U.S. Citizens 

Covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 

Absentee Voting Act,” in consultation with the 

Federal Voting Assistance Program, Department of 

Defense, September 2004

Federal Voting Assistance Program, Department 

of Defense, “Report on IVAS 2006, As Required by 

Section 596 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2007,” December 200

Government Accountability Office, “Elections: 

Issues Affecting Military and Overseas Absentee 

Voters,” GAO-01-704T, May 9, 2001 

Government Accountability Office, “Elections: 

Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and 

Overseas Citizens Increased for the 2004 General 

Election, but Challenges Remain,” GAO-06-521, 

April 7, 2006

Government Accountability Office, “Elections: DOD 

Expands Voting Assistance to Military Absentee 

Voters, but Challenges Remain,” GAO-06-1134T, 

September 28, 2006

LexisNexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe

NewsBank, Inc., Access World News, http://infoweb.

newsbank.com

Illinois

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Voting Assistance Guide, 

Illinois,” http://fvap.gov/pubs/vag/pdfvag/il.pdf

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. Department 

of Defense, “Electronic Transmission Alternatives for 

Illinois,” http://fvap.gov/ivas/illinois.html

Illinois General Assembly Web site, http://www.

ilga.gov

Illinois Statutes, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/

ilcs.asp

Illinois Administrative Code, http://www.ilga.gov/

commission/jcar/admincode/titles.html

Illinois State Board of Elections Web site, http://

www.elections.il.gov

“Clerks See Problems in ‘Motor Voter’ Bill,” Herald & 

Review (Decatur, IL), January 25, 1993

“News; Metro Briefing,” Chicago Sun-Times, March 

8, 1993, p. 4

Miller, Bryan, “Quiet Fighter David Orr Does Well in 

Politics by Doing Good for the Taxpayers,” Chicago 

Tribune, March 15, 1993 

“Sangamon County Absentee Voting Kicks Off 

Today,” The State Journal-Register (Springfield, IL), 

September 29, 1994, p. 2

“Election Law -- Absentee Ballots,” Chicago Daily 

Law Bulletin, September 8, 1994, Appellate 

Summary, p. 1

Colindres, Adriana, “Reform of Illinois Election Law 

Proposed,” The State Journal-Register (Springfield, 

IL), December 14, 2000

Slife, Erika, “Senate Unanimously Approves EarlyVoting Proposal,” Chicago Tribune, April 9, 2005

Roszkowski, John, “Early Voting Among Ballot 

Proposals,” Des Plaines Times (IL), May 12, 2005 
32

DRAFT

Roszkowski, John, “Lang Unsure Of Stance on Early 

Voting,” Lincolnwood Review (IL), May 12, 2005

Lannan, Maura Kelly, “Cook County Switching To 

Optical Scan Ballots; Absentee Ballot Bill Goes To 

Governor,” The Associated Press State & Local 

Wire, May 26, 2005 

Mackey, Brian, “Senate Approves Election 

Reforms,” The State Journal-Register (Springfield, 

IL), May 27, 2005 

Riopell, Mike, “House Splits Along Political Lines, 

Ok’s Election Changes, It’ll Be Easier for Voters 

To Register and Cast Ballots Under Democratic 

Measure,” Chicago Daily Herald, May 29, 2005

Reynolds, John, “New Law Allows for Early Voting,” 

The State Journal-Register (Springfield, IL), 

September 19, 2005

Ingram, Ron, “Voters Will Be Greeted With Changes 

in Time for March Elections Ballot Casting, New 

Machines, Precinct Consolidation on Tap,” Herald & 

Review (Decatur, IL), December 15, 2005

Manson, Patricia, “More Fixes Needed for Absentee 

Voting Law; Judge Rules,” Chicago Daily Law 

Bulletin, October 11, 2006

Florida

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Voting Assistance Guide, 

Florida,” http://fvap.gov/pubs/vag/textvag/fl.html

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. Department 

of Defense, “Electronic Transmission Alternatives for 

Florida,” http://fvap.gov/ivas/florida.html

Florida Legislature Web site, http://www.leg.state.

fl.us

Florida Statutes, http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes

Florida Administrative Code, https://www.flrules.org

Florida Department of State Web site, http://www.

dos.state.fl.us

Wallsten, Peter, “Florida Breaks Ground with First 

Internet Vote,” St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 

October 31, 1997, South Pinellas Edition

“Florida Will Be One of First States with Online 

Ballots,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Florida), 

November 7, 1999, all editions, p. 6b

Kallestad, Brent, “Counties Skirmish Over Overseas 

Absentee Ballots,” The Associated Press State 

& Local Wire, November 17, 2000, Dateline: 

Tallahassee, Florida 

Wing, John, “Overseas Absentee Ballots In Dispute,” 

Tampa Tribune (Florida), November 18, 2000 

Kaczor, Bill, “Federal Judge Rejects Overseas Ballot 

Challenge,” The Associated Press State & Local 

Wire, December 9, 2000, Dateline: Tallahassee, 

Florida

“Federal Court Rules Overseas Ballots Valid,” St. 

Petersburg Times (Florida), December 12, 2000, p. 1

Affleck, John, “Florida’s Election Supervisors See 

Chance to Win Reforms,” The Associated Press 

State & Local Wire, December 13, 2000, Dateline: 

Tampa, Florida 

Van Sickler, Michael, “Overseas Ballots to Add 

More Than 8,000 Votes,” Palm Beach Post (Florida), 

November 11, 2000 Saturday Final Edition

Unger, Howard M., “Overseas Votes Arrive At 

Local Elections Offices,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune 

(Florida), November 15, 2000 

Binette, Chad, “Trial Vote by Soldiers on Internet 

a Success,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Florida), 

January 26, 2001

Pfankuch, Thomas B., “Bill Revises Overseas 

Balloting Proposal Would Ensure Absentee Votes 

Counted,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville, 

Florida), April 3, 2001, City Edition

Silva, Mark, “Florida Legislation Sets Pace on 

Election Reforms,” The Miami Herald (Florida), May 

6, 2001
33

DRAFT

Kallestad, Brent, “Legislature Eliminates Runoff 

Primary, Bush Expected To Sign,” The Associated 

Press State & Local Wire, June 18, 2003, Dateline: 

Tallahassee, Florida

Kallestad, Brent, “End of Era Nears: Legislature 

Passes Measure To Eliminate Runoff,” The

Associated Press State & Local Wire, April 28, 2005, 

Dateline: Tallahassee, Florida

South Carolina

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Voting Assistance Guide, 

South Carolina,” http://fvap.gov/pubs/vag/pdfvag/

sc.pdf

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Electronic Transmission 

Alternatives for South Carolina,” http://fvap.gov/ivas/

south_carolina.html

South Carolina Legislature Web site, http://

scstatehouse.net

South Carolina Code of Laws, http://scstatehouse.

net/code/titl7.htm

South Carolina Election Commission, http://www.

scvotes.org 

Kelley, Matt, “Internet Voting System for Overseas 

Americans Is Vulnerable, Security Experts Say,” 

The Associated Press State & Local Wire, January 

21, 2004

“Pentagon Says No Internet Voting Experiment in S.C. 

Primary,” The Associated Press State & Local Wire, 

February 2, 2004, Dateline: Columbia, South Carolina

“Bill Eases Absentee Voting Signature Requirement,” 

The Associated Press State & Local Wire, March 9, 

2005, Dateline: Columbia, South Carolina

O’Connor, John, “Lawmakers to Consider Voting 

Bills,” Business News & The State (Columbia, South 

Carolina), December 13, 2005

Montana

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Voting Assistance Guide, 

Montana,” http://fvap.gov/pubs/vag/pdfvag/mt.pdf

Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. 

Department of Defense, “Electronic Transmission 

Alternatives for Montana,” http://fvap.gov/ivas/

montana.html

Montana Legislature Web site, http://www.

montanastatehouse.com

Montana Statutes, http://data.opi.state.mt.us/bills/

mca_toc/index.htm

Montana Administrative Rules, http://arm.sos.state.

mt.us

Montana Secretary of State Web site, http://www.

sos.mt.gov

Rapoport, Mike and Cooney, Mike, “Guest Opinion: 

Montana’s Election-Day Registration Successful,” 

The Billings Gazette, November 19, 2006 

Testa, Dan, “‘Sine Die’: Montana Legislature 

Adjourns on 90th Day,” Montana Legislature, April 

27, 2007 
DRAFT
DRAFT

ET

Electronic 

Transmission

Case 

Study 

Site Electronic Transmission (ET) Options

Number of 

UOCAVA

Voters 2004

Region of USA Other

Within Case 

Analysis10

Cross-Case 

Analysis10

E-mail Fax

E-mail voted ballots and also allow faxing

Montana • E-mail voted ballot in 

select counties

• E-mail blank ballots in 

all counties

• IVAS Tool 2 (upload 

blank ballot for DODaffiliated voters) in 2 counties

• E-mail FPCA for 

registration in all counties

• Fax of voted ballot

in over 30 counties

• Fax of blank 

ballots in all counties 

• Fax of FPCA in all 

counties

• 4,721 ballots 

sent

• 3,490 ballots 

returned

Northwest • Allowed some 

e-mailing in 2004

• Participated in 

IVAS 2004

• One of 

three States implementing IVAS Tool 2

• Examine variation 

in several choices regarding electronic transmission across local jurisdictions

• Examine e-mail vs. 

fax experience with voted ballots, and email vs. fax experience with blank ballots

• Relatively small 

UOCAVA population compared to other States in sample

• Regional and size 

contrast with other e-mailing voted ballot State (South Carolina)

South Carolina

• E-mail voted ballots in 

all counties

• E-mail blank ballots in 

all counties

• Fax of voted 

ballots in all counties

• Fax of blank 

ballots in all counties

• Fax of FPCA in all 

counties 

• 168,814 

ballots sent

• 157,990 

ballots returned

** We learned later that it was actually 8078 ballots sent and 5533 ballots returned

Southeast • High number of 

military voters 

• State participated 

in Voting Over the Internet Project (VOI) for 2000 general election and made process available to all UOCAVA voters

• Participated in 

IVAS 2004

• Examine uniform 

electronic transmission across State

• Examine e-mail vs. 

fax experience with voted ballots, and email vs. fax experience with blank ballots

• Investigate experience 

with VOI in 2000

• Regional contrast 

with other e-mailing voted ballot State (Montana)

E-mail of blank ballots and also allow faxing

Florida • E-mail blank ballots

in all counties, except military in US

• Fax of voted 

ballots in all counties, except military in US

• Fax of blank 

ballots in all counties, except military in US

• Fax of FPCA in all 

counties for ballot request

• 122,194 

ballots sent

• 93,524 

ballots returned

South • Allow request 

of blank ballot by telephone for registered UOCAVA voters

• Pat Hollarn 

work developing Internet voting

• Participation in 

VOI 2000 general election

• Examine uniform 

electronic transmission across State jurisdictions

• Examine why location 

of voter determines electronic choice

• Examine e-mail vs. 

fax experience of blank ballots

• Investigate experience 

with VOI 2000

• Regional and size 

contrast with other e-mailing blank ballot State (Illinois)

• Compare to other 

States without telephone alternative

Illinois • IVAS Tool 1 (e-mail 

ballot request for DOD-affiliated voters) in Chicago and Cook County

• E-mail blank ballot to 

all UOCAVA in Chicago and Cook County

• Fax of FPCA for 

ballot request for military in all counties

• Fax of FPCA for 

ballot request for overseas civilians in Chicago and Cook County

• 30,556 

ballots sent

• 26,639 

ballots returned

Midwest • One of several 

(~7) States implementing IVAS Tool 1

• Examine variation 

in several choices re electronic transmission across local jurisdictions

• Examine e-mail vs. fax 

experience for FPCA for ballot request

• Regional and size 

contrast with other e-mailing blank ballot State (Florida)

• Moderate size 

UOCAVA population compared to other States

Appendix A: Key Criteria for 

Inclusion in Case Study 35 10With the choice of these four States as “cases,” variation can be examined both within each case (or State), and across each case (or State) while other characteristics are constant. For example, within a State (a case) the laws are constant and the experience with practices (such as e-mail and faxing of ballots) can be compared. An example of cross-case analysis is that Montana and South Carolina have similar laws but vary in region of the country and population size, so differences in their practices might be affected by those two factors.
DRAFT

36
DRAFT

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

State agency in charge of elections

State Board of Elections (8 members)

Department of State State Election 

Commission (5 members)

Secretary of State’s Office

Chief election official Executive Director of SBE Secretary of State 

(appointed)

Executive Director of State Election Commission

Secretary of State (elected)

Sub-agency Division of Elections Elections DivisionLocal jurisdictions 102 Counties and 8 Cities 67 Counties 46 Counties 56 CountiesLocal election officials 101 County Clerks, 

1 County Election Commission, and 8 City Election Commissions (clerks are elected, commission members are appointed)

County Supervisors of Elections (65 elected, 2 appointed)

11 Counties with separate Board of Voter Registration and Election Commission, 35 Boards of Elections and Voter Registration (all members are appointed)

County Clerks (elected)

Number of registered voters in 200611

7,375,688 10,433,849 2,452,714 538,374

Total ballots cast November 200612

3,587,676 4,386,339 1,103,933 414,594

Absentee ballots cast in 2006 (including UOCAVA)12

71,665 750,762 76,132 121,303

Best estimate of UOCAVA ballots cast in 200612

6534 27,469 1686 1121

UOCAVA voters in each jurisdiction in 200612

From 1 to 1597 From 2 to 3443 From 0 to 222 From 0 to 229

Appendix B: Election Administration 

and Statistics for Case Study States

11As reported on the State’s election agency website12Estimates based on documents and data collected from interviews with State and local election officials

37
DRAFT

38
DRAFT

Appendix C: Laws in Effect During the 2006 General Election 

Regarding Registration, Absentee Voting and UOCAVA Voting 39

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

Language in State statute about electronic transmission of voting materials

“Members of the Armed Forces. Any member of the United States Armed Forces while on active duty, otherwise qualified to vote, who expects in the course of his or her duties to be absent from the county in which he or she resides on the day of holding any election, in addition to any other method of making application for an absentee ballot under this Article, may make application for an absentee ballot to the election authority having jurisdiction over his or her precinct of residence by a facsimile machine or electronic transmission not less than 10 days before the election. 

Ballots under this Section 

shall be mailed by the election authority in the manner prescribed by Section 20-5 of this Article and not otherwise. Ballots voted under this Section must be returned to the election authority before the closing of the polls on the day of election and must be counted at the election authority’s central ballot counting location.”

“Electronic transmission of election materials.--The Department of State shall determine whether secure electronic means can be established for receiving ballots from overseas voters. If such security can be established, the department shall adopt rules to authorize a supervisor of elections to accept from an overseas voter a request for an absentee ballot or a voted absentee ballot by secure facsimile machine transmission or other secure electronic means. The rules must provide that in order to accept a voted ballot, the verification of the voter must be established, the security of the transmission must be established, and each ballot received must be recorded.”

“Absentee ballots as provided by Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act. (A) To ensure that all South Carolina residents eligible to vote as provided by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, set forth in the United States Code, Title 42, Section 1973ff, et seq., have the opportunity to receive and cast any ballot they would have been eligible to cast if they resided in and had remained in South Carolina, the State Election Commission must, in cooperation with United States government agencies, take all steps and action as may be necessary including, but not limited to, electronic transmissions of Standard Form 76 issued by the Federal government as an application for voter registration and an application for absentee ballots and electronic transmissions of absentee ballots to or from any elector eligible to vote as provided by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.”

“Registration and voting by facsimile and Internet authorized. Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, each election administrator may, in any primary election, general election, and special election, take the following acts by facsimile transmission, if facsimile facilities are available, or electronically through the Internet for a United States elector, if Internet facilities that provide for secrecy are available, in place of the public mails: (1) register an individual to vote; (2) give notice of registration; (3) receive requests for an absentee ballot; (4) transmit absentee ballots to electors; and (5) receive absentee ballots from electors.”

Population to which electronic transmission applies

Active duty members of Armed Forces.

Overseas UOCAVA eligible voters.

UOCAVA eligible voters. UOCAVA eligible voters.

Close of registration books

28 days; postmarked 28th day accepted.

29 days; postmarked 29th day accepted.

30 days; postmarked 30th day is accepted.

30 days; postmarked 30thday and received in 3 days accepted.

39
DRAFT

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

Late registration for UOCAVA or former UOCAVA returned to home voting jurisdiction

If in or discharged (within 60 days of election) from Armed Forces and return home within the 28 days, can vote at own polling place without registration.

If discharged from uniformed services or from employment outside United States within the 29 days, can register at the election office up until 5:00 p.m. on the Friday before the election.

If discharged from the Armed Forces and return home within 30 days, can register at the county voter registration office up until 5:00 p.m. on election day.

UOCAVA voters who returned home within 30 days can register up to noon the day before the election.

Registration for UOCAVA – form and time

Temporarily overseas civilians can submit the State registration form or the FPCA for registration at least 28 days before the election. Military and temporarily overseas who are not registered and request a ballot through the FPCA are automatically registered. Military can submit FPCA for registration and ballot request up to 10 days before the election. Former residents of Illinois who are indefinitely living overseas must use the FPCA to request a ballot. The State registration form and FPCA can be submitted in person or by mail.

For all UOCAVA, the State registration form or the FPCA to register must be received by the county at least 29 days before the election with the oath affirmed and signed. Either form for registration must have original signature as opposed to only a scanned signature; however, having a witness of the oath is not required.

UOCAVA voters can register using the State form or the FPCA submitted in person or by mail. If submitted by mail, the form must be postmarked 30 days before the election.

UOCAVA voters can register by submitting, at least 30 days before the election, the State registration form, the FPCA, or the FWAB transmission envelope. The FPCA and FWAB transmission envelope are also automatic requests for absentee ballots.

Electronic options for registration

The FPCA can be faxed, but an original signature is needed, so the hard copy must follow at the latest with the voted ballot.

No electronic options for UOCAVA voter registration. To register, the voter must submit a hard copy form with an original signature to the county office.13

The FPCA can be faxed, but an original signature is needed, so the hard copy must follow.

All registration forms from UOCAVA voters can be faxed or e-mailed and do not require an original signature or hard copy to follow. A scanned signature is sufficient.

Absentee ballot requests - applies to all voters

Need one of 11 reasons unable to go to polls (reasons printed on local jurisdictions version of State prescribed request form). Request must be received in mail 5 to 40 days before the election or in person 1-40 days prior to the election. Original signature must be on file.

Do not need reason. State application by 5:00 p.m. on sixth day before election. Request in person, in writing, or by phone; can be requested by immediate family.

Need one of 17 given reasons un able to go to polls. Reasons printed on State absentee ballot request form.

Do not need reason.

13Once registered, the overseas voters can fax or e-mail the FPCA for a ballot request.

40 Appendix C: Laws in Effect During the 2006 General Election 

Regarding Registration, Absentee Voting and UOCAVA Voting
DRAFT

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

Does State have permanent Regular Absentee Voters?

No. Absentee ballot application/request good for one election.14

No. One application good for calendar year.

No. State absentee ballot application/request good for one election.

Yes. Can request absentee

ballots to be sent for all elections or just for Federal elections.

UOCAVA ballot request

Military who will be absent from local jurisdiction on election day can request ballot with local jurisdiction’s form without being registered. Military and temporarily overseas civilians may use local jurisdiction’s absentee ballot request form or FPCA, and either must be received by the local election office by the 10th day before the election. Former residents of an IL jurisdiction who reside indefinitely overseas must use the FPCA. Original signature is required for any absentee ballot request. Hard copy of absentee ballot request with original signature is required at least by time of vote.

If already registered, UOCAVA voters can submit the regular State ballot request or the FPCA by 5:00 p.m. on the sixth day before the election.

State absentee ballot application must be requested in person, by phone, by mail or through an immediate family member. Once received, the application can be completed and returned as early as January 1, and by mail by 5:00 p.m. of the fourth day before the election or in person up to 5pm the day before the election. FPCA that is used to register and request a ballot must be in at least 30 days before the election. FPCA for already registered voters must be in by 4 days before the election.

Regular absentee ballots requests are made by using the State application or by written request with birth date and signature, mailed, or delivered in person between 75 days and noon the day before the election. As of the general election of 2006, only the voter’s signature was accepted for issuing of an absentee ballot.15 Registered UOCAVA voters can apply for absentee ballot with State application, written request with birth date and signature, FPCA, or FWAB transmission envelope from any date until noon the day before the election. If not registered, UOCAVA voter can use the FPCA or FWAB transmission envelope to request a ballot and automatically register if submitted by 30th day before election.16 Requests by UOCAVA voters are good for the next two Federal elections but only for the State and local elections during the calendar year.

14UOCAVA voter’s absentee ballot application is good for every election in the calendar year; the FPCA is good for two Federal election cycles.15During the legislative session of 2007, a law was enacted that allowed a person with Power of Attorney to apply for and sign for a UOCAVA voter’s ballot.16Legislation enacted by the 2007 legislature and effective on October 1, 2007 that expands use of the FWAB moves the deadline for request for regular absentee ballot to 30 days before the election and removes the application for absentee ballot by FWAB transmission envelope.

41 Appendix C: Laws in Effect During the 2006 General Election 

Regarding Registration, Absentee Voting and UOCAVA Voting
DRAFT

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

Electronic options for ballot request

Active duty military can send ballot request by fax.

If already registered, overseas voters (not military in the US) can send either regular State ballot request or FPCA by fax or e-mail.

FPCA can be faxed, but must be followed with the original sent in the regular mail.

All requests from UOCAVA voters can be faxed or emailed and do not require an original signature or hard copy to follow. A scanned signature is sufficient.

Mailing of blank ballot to UOCAVA – method and deadline

45 days before a primary and 60 days before a general election.

Mailed 35 days before primary and general elections to UOCAVA voters who are overseas. Domestic military will be sent ballots as soon as they are available. Ballots must be sent by “forwardable” mail to those qualified under UOCAVA. If an overseas voter has provided an e-mail address in their absentee ballot request, supervisor of elections office must e-mail a list of candidates at least 30 days before each primary and general election.

Mailed at least 45 days before the primary and general elections. The primary ballot sent to UOCAVA voters is sent with an Instant Runoff Voting ballot to be used in the event of a second runoff primary. If ballots are not ready at the time the UOCAVA voter requests one, the registration board must provide a blank ballot in which a voter can write his selection of candidates, parties, and support or opposition of measures. (This is not the official State/Special Write-in Ballot.)

All absentee ballots must be printed and available for mailing 30 days before a Federal primary election, 45 days before a Federal general election, and 20 days before odd year elections.

Electronic options for sending blank ballot

No electronic options. Overseas voter can request 

that their blank ballots be emailed or faxed to them.

UOCAVA voters can request that their blank ballots be e-mailed or faxed to them.

Ballots to UOCAVA voters are a priority over other absentee ballots and must be sent by the fastest method possible, including fax or e-mail.

Offices on ballot Non-resident civilians living 

indefinitely overseas vote on Federal offices only. Illinois residents who are temporarily overseas and not registered to voter and who make request between 10-30 days before the election get ballot with Federal offices only.

Law does not limit the offices for which any type of UOCAVA voter can vote.

Non-resident civilians living indefinitely overseas vote on Federal offices only. All other UOCAVA voters can vote on local, State, and Federal offices.

Law does not limit the offices for which any type of UOCAVA voter can vote.

42 Appendix C: Laws in Effect During the 2006 General Election 

Regarding Registration, Absentee Voting and UOCAVA Voting
DRAFT

Special or State Write-in Ballot?

If ballots not ready 60 days before general election, overseas voters must be sent a Special Write-in Absentee Voter Blank Ballot and list of candidates.

If, due to military duties or other contingencies, a voter will not be able to vote during the regular absentee voting period, voter can request, 90-180 days before the election, a “State write-in absentee ballot,” which includes all offices for which the voter would otherwise vote (Federal, State, local); voter can designate choices by names or parties. Labels stating this situation are available in the State’s Voting Assistance Guide, or it can be written into the FPCA.

If, due to military duties or living in isolated or remote area so unable to vote a regular absentee ballot, voter can request, 90 days or less before an election a “Special Write-in Absentee Ballot” for that election. The SWAB will list the State and Federal offices on the ballot and names of candidates if available. Voter can designate names or parties. Labels stating this situation are available in the State’s Voting Assistance Guide, or it can be written into the FPCA.

Nothing during the general election of 2006. A law allowing use of the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot for non-Federal offices was enacted during the legislative session of 2007. The bill was titled “Special write-in absentee ballot for military and overseas voters,” and was originally proposed to establish a SWAB but was amended to simply allow the expanded use of the FWAB.

Return voted ballot – method and deadline

Signed voter certification on outside of envelope and delivered in person or by mail. If returned by mail and postmarked by midnight before the election, will be counted if received within 14 days after election day for all absentee voters, UOCAVA or not.

All absentee ballots can be returned by mail or in person. Overseas UOCAVA voters (not out of county military who are in the U.S.) may return ballots also by fax. Faxed ballots and the accompanying voter certificate must be received at the supervisor of elections by 7:00 p.m. on election day. Mailed absentee ballots must have a date next to the signature on the voter’s certificate, and the Federal portion of the ballot will be counted if voted by election day (based on date on outside of envelope) and received within 10 days after the election.

Absentee ballots must be received at the county election commission by the close of polls on election day and can be delivered in person, by mail, or by another person with authorization to deliver it. The oath on the outside of the return envelope must be signed and witnessed.

Regular absentee ballots must be received at the county clerk’s office by 8:00 p.m. on election day. UOCAVA voters who request an absentee ballot before the 30-day deadline and have not received it can vote using FWAB, which must be sent by 8pm on election day and received no later than the Monday after election day. FWAB voter who subsequently receives the regular ballot can also vote and return the regular ballot.

Electronic Options for returning voted ballot

No electronic options. Overseas UOCAVA voters may 

return ballots by fax.

UOCAVA voters can fax or e-mail their voted ballots with the signed oath and no witness, but a waiver of the right to a secret ballot is required.

UOCAVA voters have an option of sending voted ballots by fax or e-mail in some counties. The waiver of the right to a secret ballot must be attached to the fax or e-mail, but it does not need to be signed in the case of e-mail.

43 Appendix C: Laws in Effect During the 2006 General Election 

Regarding Registration, Absentee Voting and UOCAVA Voting
DRAFT
DRAFT

Appendix D: Key Implementation Findings Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana Election officials’ perspective on UOCAVA voting (based on interviews conducted by the case study researchers)

• State encourages locals to 

facilitate UOCAVA voting

• Local tracks down voters and 

gives specialized service

• Local go out of way for military 

more than for civilian overseas who are believed to have access to more resources

• State law and 

administration focus on overseas (not domestic military) because of difficulty getting ballot through international mail

• Local consider overseas 

a priority, but try to provide good service to all UOCAVA; send ballots as soon as can, earlier than required

• Civilians and military have 

different needs; military move more often

• Content of ballot (local 

and State offices included or not) varies by Supervisor of Elections

• State enthusiasm about 

assisting UOCAVA voters but State election officials are generally unaware of the lack of electronic transmission at the county level; concerned about the 2 cycle requirement, mailing to bad addresses, and then voters returning home and not being able to vote at polls

• Local enthusiasm about 

helping military especially, but focused more on maintaining addresses and getting voters to send necessary information than electronic transmission

• State unaware of how electronic 

transmission implemented at the local level

• Local enthusiasm about helping 

military and overseas but mostly concerned about difficulties such as mailing ballots to bad addresses (e.g., UCOAVA voters sent an absentee ballot and then showing up at the polls, and parents of soldiers who want to get ballots to them) 

• Locals are very concerned with 

protecting blank ballots sent out and protecting the privacy of voted ballots returned electronically

Extent of use of electronic transmission

• Faxing FPCA’s vary in use from 

common in two jurisdictions to very rare in one (about 5 in 2006)

• Two jurisdictions accepted 

FPCA by e-mail and e-mailed from 97-136 blank ballots for November 2006 (2.3-2.5% of all sent), including approximately 25-40 through IVAS

• 1-3% of blank ballots 

sent to all UOCAVA voters were sent by email; approximately 5-8% of blank ballots sent to those UOCAVA voters eligible for e-mailed blank ballots, were sent by email .5-1.5% faxed of all UOCAVA; 2-5% faxed back ballot of those who could

• Very little, voters don’t 

request often; in six counties, requests of e-mail and/or fax from 0-10 (or 1-10% of all ballots sent)

• Substantial use of ET considering 

small UOCAVA population; in four counties, 1.8- 26% of ballots sent out were e-mailed or faxed

45
DRAFT

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

Difference between electronic transmission methods

• For voter, e-mail and fax of 

FPCA are not that much different because need original signature - either way starts process but not complete, hard copy must come back with ballot at the latest, so for voter depends on what is available to them. However, most jurisdictions only have the fax option, and only for military. For one jurisdiction facilitating faxing of FPCA through e-mail message takes longer than getting FPCA through e-mail

• For two jurisdictions that e-mail 

and fax blank ballot, e-mail seems more common because requested more often

• Difference between email and fax of blank 

ballot for voter depends on resources available to them; groups within military vary in access to e-mail, printers, and fax machines

• Difference between e-mail 

and fax of blank ballot: faxing is comparatively easy and the default, if requested e-mail, is not possible

• Difference between e-mail 

and fax of voted ballot: still too little to know. Ballot must be duplicated in either case to run through scanner used statewide for all absentee ballots

• Difference between e-mail and 

fax of blank ballot: e-mail is easier to do, easier to know who’s on other end, and doesn’t require a signature; local election officials prefer e-mail

• Difference between e-mail and fax 

of voted ballot: must waive privacy with either, but with e-mail, they don’t require a signature on the waiver —just that the voter sees, reads, and sends it back

• Disincentive among local election 

officials: ballot must be duplicated if either e-mailed or faxed

Variation across local jurisdictions

• Difference in use of ET• No difference in effort to assist 

military

• Extension of ET to overseas 

civilians in two jurisdictions not administratively significant

• Difference in which elections 

(just Federal or others, too) send ballots for after FPCA

• All same rules but 

variation in effort based on number of UOCAVA voters and their needs (e.g., military have different needs, so larger number of military influences actions of SOE)

• All same rules but differs in ET 

based on variation in technical resources of county and knowledge and experience of county registration staff

• Variation in capacity based on 

separation or consolidation of election and registration; in one county with separate staff, the registration staff who e-mails the ballots did not receive the ballot layout from the elections staff (who produce the ballots) so the blank ballots were not emailed to any UOCAVA voters

• Variation in how to maintain 

lists of UOCAVA voters, specifically keeping e-mails, fax #’s, addresses, lists by date of registration, or by simply relying on the State registration database

• Difference in which elections 

(just Federal or others, too) send ballots for FPCA

• Variation in electronic transmission 

based on population and number of requests (largest county in sample faxed, e-mailed, or uploaded only 1.8% of blank ballots, but second largest county in sample had requests for and sent almost 25% electronically); a relatively small county with a larger UOCAVA population sent 3.7% of ballots electronically, but a small county with a very small UOCAVA population sent over 25% of ballots electronically

• Variation in technical capacity: some 

had little capacity and others had great tools, but no one had the same tools (e.g., in one large county, clerk did not have computer capacity to received e-mailed ballots; in another large county, the clerk received faxes on her secure computer; in a smaller county, IT department provided clerk with a PDF of the ballot that could be transmitted both ways by e-mail)

46 Appendix D: Key Implementation Findings
DRAFT

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

Improvements needed (in no particular order)

• Outreach to voters on FPCA 

submission alternatives

• Use e-mail to communicate with 

more UOCAVA voters

• Encourage local jurisdictions to 

have electronic database of email addresses for all UOCAVA voters (not just those that ask for e-mailed ballot)

• Outreach to voters 

on ballot receipt and submission alternatives

• Obtain more e-mail 

addresses and use e-mail to communicate with more UOCAVA voters

• Outreach to voters on ballot 

receipt and submission alternatives

• Obtain more e-mail 

addresses and use e-mail to communicate with more UOCAVA voters

• Encourage local jurisdictions 

to have electronic database of e-mail addresses for all UOCAVA voters (not just those that ask for e-mailed ballot)

• Technological standardization 

in terms of what is needed to electronically communicate with and transmit materials to UOCAVA voters

• Technological standardization 

in terms of what is needed to electronically communicate with and transmit materials to UOCAVA voters; encourage use of helpful technical tools across counties

• Ability for individual with Power of 

Attorney to apply for and collect absentee ballot for overseas voter (County Clerks wanted this law and it was enacted in the 2007 session)

• Outreach to voters on ballot receipt 

and submission alternatives

Issues with expanding ET

• Would need more staff and/or 

computer program to e-mail blank ballots to all UOCAVA

• Would need more staff 

and/or computer program to e-mail blank ballots to all UOCAVA

• Would need more judges 

to duplicate ballots if expansion in ET of voted ballots

• Expanding from Voting Over 

the Internet (VOI) (47) to all UOCAVA (6000+) would require additional software and hardware capacity at the State level because of centralized registration system

• At local level, expanding 

would require more staff assistance and poll managers to replicate

• Would need greater technical 

capacity and assistance in some counties

• At local level, expanding would 

require more staff assistance and election judges to replicate ballots

Appendix D: Key Implementation Findings 47
DRAFT

Illinois Florida South Carolina Montana

Past electronic transmission efforts/experience

• Allowed Gulf War soldiers to 

fax voted ballots in 1992

• Two jurisdictions expand use 

of ET, including participation in IVAS 2006 Tool #1. Did not choose Tool #2 because easier to send ballot directly

• VOI was only tried in a few 

counties but was exciting and successful; about 86 total voters participated in the State, most were in one county personally visited by FVAP Director on election day; same counties hoped SERVE would make it easier for voters to access ballots from any computer and increase participation; frustration with academic critique of the readiness of the technology

• IVAS 2006 would not 

have provided anything extra to them

• VOI was exciting and successful; 

statewide implementation in all 46 counties; 50 voter maximum per State so approximately 1 per county; 47 voters used the system successfully; secure server at the State office and one in each county and ballots printed at the county; easy to administer

• Disappointed that SERVE not 

implemented; were again to be the only State doing it in all jurisdictions

• IVAS 2006 was more difficult 

than what they already do; no recollection of IVAS 2004

• No recollection of IVAS 2004• IVAS Tool 2 got mixed reviews: 

In one case (a small county) it was difficult to set up technically, it was used by only one voter, and administrator felt it cut out interaction with the voter; in the other case, (a larger county), the system was called “slick” and administrator liked the centralized nature because it took the burden off the voter for finding their local election official

Future of and interest in electronic transmission

• Interest in helping military• E-mailing blank ballot is 

feasible

• Security, especially 

authentication issues, are big concern in the State

• Electronic transmission of 

voted ballots would require significant funding for closed systems in each jurisdiction and more election judges to remake ballots

• Electronic transmission of 

voted ballots is unlikely to be enacted by legislature

• Aware of technology 

barriers and concerns but optimistic that either DOD or individual county pilots could test existing methods to overcome these concerns.

• Belief in alternative 

methods for overseas voters only, especially for those unable to receive and send mail in time for various reasons

• State Election Commission 

(SEC) is very enthusiastic and does not see security concerns as insurmountable

• Legislature is amenable to 

necessary law changes

• Political will to expand electronic 

transmission exists in Legislature and interest among State and local election officials, but technical capacity would have to increase to accommodate electronic transmission on a larger scale; State is still transitioning into a new registration system and probably needs more time to focus on that before other technical upgrades are undertaken

48 Appendix D: Key Implementation Findings
DRAFT
U.S. Election Assistance Commission

1225 New York Ave., NW

Suite 1100

Washington, DC 20005

1-866-747-1471 (toll free)

HAVAinfo@eac.gov

www.eac.gov

EAC Commissioners

Chair Donetta L. Davidson

Vice Chair Rosemary E. Rodriguez

Commissioner Caroline Hunter

Commissioner Gracia M. Hillman

EAC Staff

Thomas Wilkey, Executive Director

Juliet Hodgkins, General Counsel