Filed 2/24/15 In re Chris R. CA

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re CHRIS R. et al.,

Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B255631

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK02178)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RITA S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Julie F. 

Blackshaw, Judge. Affirmed.

Frank H. Free, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Richard D. Weiss, Acting County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Jeanette Cauble, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Rita S. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order 

adjudging her three children dependents of the court and its dispositional orders. 

Essentially, the juvenile court concluded that there was a substantial risk that 

Mother would inflict serious physical harm on her children. We conclude that 

substantial evidence supports that conclusion and therefore affirm the trial court’s 

orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has three children: Chris, Allyson and Jacob.1 Each child has a 

different father, none of whom is party to this appeal. 

In November 2013, Department2filed a section 300 petition relying upon 

three of the statute’s subdivisions: (a) serious physical harm; (b) failure to protect;

and (j) abuse of a sibling.3

At the January 6, 2014 jurisdictional hearing, the matter was submitted on

the four reports generated by Department.4 The evidence in those reports set forth

the following facts. 

Mother lives with her mother, O.S., and her two youngest children, Allyson 

and Jacob. Chris lives with his father, Antonio R., during the week but stays with 

Mother on the weekends. 

 

1

The children were born: Chris, June 2003; Allyson, April 2009; and Jacob, 

November 2012. 

2

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.

3 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

4 Mother objected to one sentence in the detention report on the basis of the best 

evidence rule. The trial court sustained the objection and struck the sentence. 
3

On September 24, 2013, Department received a referral that Mother had 

physically abused 10-year-old Chris. That day, social worker Candice Obilana 

visited Chris at Antonio R.’s home. Chris told Obilana the following. On 

September 14, he was at Mother’s home. Mother ordered a pizza and wanted 

Chris to accompany her when she picked it up. Chris said he wanted to stay at

home with O.S. (his maternal grandmother). Chris explained that “[M]other 

counted to three and told him to put his shoes on but [he] kept saying he didn’t 

want to go. Chris said [Mother] called the police and asked the police for help. 

Chris said the police told her that that she can spank [him]. [She] grabbed Chris’s 

arm to try and turn him so she could spank him. Chris said one arm got stuck 

under him so he was lying on top of one arm and mother had the other arm in her 

hand and held it behind Chris’s back so he could not move. [Mother] spanked him 

on the bottom with an open hand over his clothes multiple times. . . . [T]he 

spankings hurt and he was crying during [them]. . . . Chris stated he had marks on 

his bottom but he could not see them. . . . Chris said it only hurt for a little bit and 

that the pain stopped before his dad came to pick him up [shortly thereafter].” 

During these events, O.S. “was crying and was trying to stop [M]other from 

spanking Chris but [M]other would not listen.”

Antonio R., responding to a phone call from O.S., came to the home to pick 

Chris up. Before Chris left, Mother told Chris: “[Y]ou are dead to me. You 

cannot come back here.” Chris told Obilana that he was fearful of Mother 

“sometimes, when she spanks me or yells at me.” Chris said Mother yells at him 

and spanks him “almost every time [he goes] to [her] house.” Chris explained that 

Mother spanks him with a sandal or her hand because either he does not want to 
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leave the home with her or he “just wants to spend time with [O.S.].”5 Mother 

“sometimes” spanks his sister Allyson “on the bottom.” As of November 5, Chris

had not been back to Mother’s home and Mother had not called him. 

Antonio R. told Obilana that he had received a phone call from O.S. that 

“[M]other had spanked Chris hard.” O.S. “was upset and had been crying.” 

Antonio R. immediately picked Chris up. During the ride home, “Chris was clingy 

and wanted to sit closely with [his] father.” After they arrived home, Antonio R. 

“checked Chris’s bottom and Chris had red marks from [M]other’s spanking him.” 

The next day, Antonio R. saw “some bruising on [Chris’] bottom.” 

On September 30, Obilana interviewed Mother about the incident. Mother 

said that she had asked Chris to go with her to pick up the pizza but that he had 

refused. She claimed that Chris kicked her and would not listen to her. Mother 

called the police who “told her it is legal to spank with an open hand on the 

bottom.” Mother then spanked Chris “over his clothes with her open hand.”6 O.S.

tried to stop her. According to Mother, O.S. “is always trying to interfere with 

how [she] disciplines Chris.” Mother conceded that she had not seen nor spoken to 

Chris since the incident occurred several weeks earlier. She said “she is teaching 

her son a lesson that he cannot be disrespectful and he cannot kick [his Mother].” 

Obilana asked Mother if she had told Chris that “he is dead to her.” Mother replied 

that she had told him “you can forget you have a mommy.” Mother explained that 

she told him this “because she wants him to learn his lesson.”

 

5

In an interview conducted three months later, Chris reiterated “that he had been hit 

more than once while in [M]other’s home” and that she had “struck [him] with an open 

hand on various parts of his body.” However, he claimed that “it was untrue that he had 

ever been hit by a shoe.”

6

In a subsequent interview, Mother denied having ever struck Chris with a shoe. 
5

O.S. told Department that on the day in question, Mother “was spanking 

Chris hard and would not stop.” Because Chris was crying and upset, O.S. called 

Antonio R. O.S. explained that Mother treats Chris “differently” than his siblings. 

According to O.S., Mother “hits Chris every weekend when he comes over . . . 

with an open hand to the bottom or with a shoe.” When O.S. tells Mother not to hit 

Chris, Mother “becomes angry [and tells O.S.] to mind her [own] business.” 

Lastly, O.S. said that Mother hits Allyson “in the hand every now and then.” Since 

the incident, Mother has not spoken with O.S. 

The juvenile court sustained, as amended, all three subdivisions of the 

section 300 petition.

7

 Each subdivision contained the following identical 

allegations. 

“On 9/14/13, [Mother] physically abused the child, Chris, by 

twisting and holding [his] hand behind [his] back, and repeatedly 

striking [his] buttocks with [her] hands, inflicting redness, marks and 

bruises to [his] buttocks. On prior occasions, [Mother] struck [Chris’]

buttocks with shoes and [her] hands. Such physical abuse was 

excessive and caused [Chris] unreasonable pain and suffering. [Chris]

is afraid of [Mother] and does not wish to visit [her] due to [her]

physical abuse of [him]. . . . The physical abuse of [Chris] by the 

mother . . . endangers [his] physical health and safety and places [him] 

and [his] siblings, Allyson and Jacob, at risk of physical harm, 

damage, danger, physical abuse and failure to protect.” 

The juvenile court explained “that this was more than reasonable discipline, 

[Mother’s] actions with respect to Chris. Chris did state that he was afraid of his 

mother. The grandmother had to intervene. This is well beyond what can be 

expected by reasonable discipline. [¶] . . . [T]here is a sufficient amount of 

evidence showing that [Mother] and Chris do have a very contentious relationship 

 

7

The amendments to the petition deleted references to Chris’ father, Antonio R.
6

that does result in inappropriate physical abuse at times.” (Italics added.) As for 

the potential threat of serious harm to Allyson and Jacob, the juvenile court 

reasoned that because “there was much more than reasonable discipline in this case

[involving Chris,] . . . [Mother’s] failure to recognize that [conclusion] does not 

give the court confidence that if and when [her other children] reach an age where 

they also present disciplinary issues, that [Mother] will not engage in that kind of 

discipline as well.” 

At the dispositional hearing, Mother asked for return of her children. (The 

juvenile court had removed all three children from Mother’s custody at the 

November 2013 detention hearing.) In regard to Chris, the juvenile court found by 

clear and convincing evidence that returning him to Mother’s custody would create 

a substantial danger to his physical health, safety, protection, or emotional wellbeing; that there were no reasonable means by which he could be protected without 

removing him from her custody; and that reasonable efforts had been made to 

prevent and eliminate the need for removal. The court removed Chris from 

Mother’s custody, placed him with his father Antonio R., and ordered six months 

of family reunification services for Mother. In addition, the court ordered Mother 

to participate in parenting classes, individual counseling, and conjoint counseling 

with Chris. As for Allyson and Jacob, the court returned them to Mother’s custody

because it found that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support their 

removal from her custody. 

This appeal by Mother follows.

DISCUSSION

Mother first contends that the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction over

all three children based upon the “serious physical harm” and “abuse of sibling” 

allegations (§ 300, subs. (a) and (j)) must be reversed because “[t]here simply is no 
7

evidence that Chris suffered ‘serious physical harm’” or that “Chris or his siblings 

were at risk of future serious physical harm.” We are not persuaded.

Section 300, subdivision (a), allows a child to be adjudged a dependent of 

the juvenile court when “[t]he child [here, Chris] has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted 

nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent [here, Mother]. For the 

purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious 

future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a 

history of repeated infliction of injuries on the child[,] . . . or a combination of 

these and other actions by the parent . . . which indicate the child is at risk of 

serious physical harm. For purposes of this subdivision, ‘serious physical harm’ 

does not include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks where 

there is no evidence of serious physical injury.” (Italics added.)

Subdivision (j) permits a child to be adjudged a dependent of the juvenile 

court when his or her “sibling [here, Chris] has been abused . . . as defined in 

subdivision (a), . . . and there is a substantial risk that the child [here, Allyson and 

Jacob] will be abused . . . as defined in [that] subdivision[]. The [juvenile] court 

shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse . . . of the sibling, the age 

and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse . . . of the sibling, the mental 

condition of the parent . . . and any other factors the court considers probative in 

determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.”

We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial 

evidence. (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) Using this standard, 

we review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, 

drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support its findings. We do 

not reweigh the evidence, redetermine credibility or exercise independent 

judgment. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) It is Mother’s burden, as 
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appellant, to show that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

findings. (In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 128, 138.)

Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Mother’s 

physical abuse of Chris created a substantial risk that he will suffer serious 

physical harm at her hand. On September 14, Mother grabbed Chris, twisted his 

arm around his back so he could not move, held him down and spanked him 

multiple times. O.S. asked Mother to stop but Mother ignored her. Mother 

spanked Chris hard enough to leave bruises and marks. Further, contrary to what 

Mother suggests, this was not an isolated incident. Mother and Chris had a 

contentious relationship. Chris was afraid of her. Chris said that Mother spanked 

him with her hand or her shoe “almost every time” he visited her home.8 O.S.

confirmed Chris’s statement, telling Department that “every weekend” Mother hit 

him with a shoe or spanked him. Based upon all of these facts, substantial 

evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Chris and his siblings (Jacob was 

only 14-months old and Allyson was just under five years old at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing) were at substantial risk of serious physical harm. 

Mother’s contrary argument is not persuasive. First, she cites several 

reported decisions to argue that “[c]ases in which ‘serious physical harm’ 

allegations have been affirmed stand in marked contrast to this one” and that 

“[e]ven cases in which ‘serious physical harm’ findings have been reversed have 

involved more serious conduct than [her conduct].” This approach misses the 

mark for two reasons. The first is that the facts of each case are unique so that 

 

8 Mother relies upon Chris’ second statement to Department in which he recanted 

his initial claim that Mother had hit him with a shoe to argue for a contrary conclusion. 

(See fn. 5, ante.) Putting aside the fact that O.S. had also said that Mother frequently hit 

Chris with a shoe, it was the juvenile court’s responsibility, as the trier of fact, to resolve 

this conflict in the evidence. It resolved the conflict against Mother. That determination 

is binding upon us. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) 
9

comparisons are not necessarily relevant, let alone dispositive. The second is that 

“section 300, subdivision (a) may apply when a minor suffers less serious injuries 

but there is a history of repeated abuse.” (In re Isabella F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 139.) As explained in the previous paragraph, this matter presents a case of 

repeated abuse: Mother struck and spanked Chris almost every time he visited her.

Mother next urges that the juvenile court committed reversible error when it 

sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) “failure to protect” allegations. For the 

first time on appeal, Mother urges that the allegation “was not properly pled and 

must be stricken.” As we held in In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 

82-83, Mother’s failure to demur to the petition in the trial court constitutes a 

forfeiture of that claim. In any event, when, as here, “a dependency [section 300] 

petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the 

dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s 

finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for 

jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial 

evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all 

of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the 

evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Here, we have 

concluded that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings based upon subdivisions (a) and (j) of section 300. Consequently, there is 

no need to discuss whether the juvenile court erred in sustaining the subdivision (b) 

allegations. (In re Christopher C., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 83 [the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction can rest on a single ground].)

Lastly, Mother seeks reversal of the juvenile court’s dispositional orders. 

She fails to identify which dispositional orders were erroneous or to explain why 

they should be reversed other than to claim that “[b]ecause the jurisdictional

findings must be reversed, so must the dispositional orders.” Since we have found 
10

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, we affirm 

its dispositional orders.

DISPOSITION

The orders appealed from are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

COLLINS, J.