NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0686n.06

No. 15-5785

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DESERA JADE ALLEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

BEFORE: KEITH, McKEAGUE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. This is a direct appeal of the criminal judgment 

rendered against Defendant-Appellant Desera Jade Allen (“Allen”) by the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Specifically, Allen appeals her conviction for 

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possession with Intent to Distribute a-PVP, a Schedule I Controlled 

Substance Analogue. Allen requests that the case be remanded for the district court to make a 

retroactive determination of her competency to enter a guilty plea. Alternatively, Allen requests

remand for resentencing because the district court purportedly failed to adequately “consider and 

address” her mental health before imposing her sentence. WE AFFIRM. 

I. Background

On July 15, 2014, Allen agreed to plead guilty to the sole count in the indictment:

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possession with Intent to Distribute a-PVP, a Schedule I Controlled 

Substance Analogue, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).” 
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Thereafter, a change of plea hearing was held on July 24, 2014. At the hearing, the 

district court explained to Allen that before accepting her guilty plea, there were a number of 

questions that the court needed to ask her, in order to assure the court that Allen’s plea was valid. 

Among those questions, the district court inquired as to whether Allen had ever been treated for 

any mental illness, to which she responded “[j]ust anxiety.” The district court also asked Allen 

whether she understood what was happening at the hearing, to which she responded 

affirmatively. Further, the district court asked Allen’s attorney whether he considered Allen to be 

competent to enter a guilty plea, to which he answered affirmatively. Additionally, Allen and her 

attorney both stated that Allen understood the charge against her, the elements of that charge, 

and the legal meanings of the terms used in the indictment. Allen also told the court that she 

understood the rights she would be giving up by entering into a plea of guilty. At the conclusion 

of the change of plea hearing, the district court determined that – based on its observations of 

Allen and her responsiveness, and her answers to the questions posed by the court – Allen was 

competent to plead guilty, and that she knowingly and voluntarily offered to plead guilty. 

Thereafter, the court accepted Allen’s guilty plea. 

On October 16, 2014, the presentence report was filed. Among other things, the report 

indicated that: Allen’s total offense level is 31, she is a career offender, her criminal history 

category is VI, and her advisory guideline range is 188 to 235 months. 

Four months following the change of plea hearing, Allen’s attorney filed a motion to 

withdraw as counsel due to irreconcilable differences arising between him and Allen. 

Subsequently, Allen retained new counsel who then filed a motion to withdraw the plea 

agreement on Allen’s behalf. However, shortly thereafter, her attorney sought withdrawal of the

motion, which the district court granted. 
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Thereafter, Allen filed a sentencing memorandum and motion for downward departure, in 

which she disclosed that while incarcerated awaiting sentencing, she was diagnosed with, and 

started treatment for, bipolar disorder. She also claimed that she has a family history of mental 

illness and that her addiction to narcotics stems from her lack of mental health treatment for 

bipolar disorder. Allen requested that the district court “consider her mental health in 

establishing her sentence, and grant her a downward departure from her current guideline range.”

Prior to sentencing, the government filed its own motion for downward departure and 

sentencing memorandum, recommending a two-level reduction in Allen’s offense level based on 

her cooperation, and a departure range of 151 to 188 months. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court granted the government’s motion for 

downward departure and denied Allen’s motion for downward departure. This direct appeal 

followed shortly thereafter. 

II. Allen’s Competency to Enter a Guilty Plea

In this timely appeal, Allen first asserts that the district court erred by failing to revisit, 

sua sponte, the issue of Allen’s competency when it was made aware that Allen is a person with 

bipolar disorder. Because Allen did not raise this argument in the district court, we review for 

plain error. United States v. Maxwell, 569 F. App’x 361, 364 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Denkins, 367 F.3d 537, 545 (6th Cir. 2004). 

A defendant or the Government “may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental 

competency of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). The court must grant the motion, or order a 

hearing sua sponte, “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be 

suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering [her] mentally incompetent to the extent that 

[she] is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against [her] or to 
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assist properly in [her] defense.” Id. A district court has the duty “to inquire into a defendant’s 

competency whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is incompetent to 

stand trial.” Maxwell, 569 F. App’x at 364 (citing United States v. White, 887 F.2d 705, 709 (6th 

Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation omitted). 

Allen asserts that the district court should have ordered a competency hearing because 

she is an individual living with bipolar disorder. She does not argue that she was incompetent, 

but instead argues that because she is living with a “long-standing” mental illness, the district 

court should have inquired into whether she was competent to enter her guilty plea.

Allen provides no medical evidence demonstrating that the mental illness was longstanding. Instead, she asserts that the statement her attorney made at the sentencing hearing, “I 

believe my client has been mentally ill for years,” should have “raised the red flag concerning 

Ms. Allen’s competency at the time she entered her plea.” She has not put forth any evidence 

that establishes that her attorney is qualified to make a mental health determination, nor has she

provided any evidence from a medical or mental health professional indicating that she suffered 

from mental illness for years. All that is known is that after entering a guilty plea, Allen was 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Living with bipolar disorder, by itself, does not automatically 

trigger a district court’s obligation to sua sponte order a competency hearing. Allen cites no 

authority supporting her assertion that this is the standard that the district court must apply.

The district court must order a competency hearing when there is reasonable cause to 

believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Maxwell, 569 F. App’x at 364. Living 

with bipolar disorder, by itself, does not support a showing of reasonable cause. For the district 

court to have had a duty to order a competency hearing, Allen would have needed to exhibit

behavior demonstrating that she lacked “either a sufficient present ability to consult with [her]
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lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or a rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against [her].” Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 531 F.3d 340, 

350 (6th Cir. 2008)) (further citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Allen asserts that the fact that her counsel withdrew from representation, claiming 

“irreconcilable differences,” and that she filed a motion to withdraw her plea, and subsequently 

withdrew said motion, is demonstrative of the fact that she was “troubled or confused about her 

understanding of her plea and its consequences.” She asserts that “fits and starts of this kind” 

should have given the district court “reasonable concern that such a pattern of behavior was 

consistent with an individual in the manic throes of untreated bipolar disorder.” Allen’s 

arguments are without merit. Her assertion that her change in counsel and brief attempt at 

changing her plea evinces that she was in the “manic throes” of untreated bipolar disorder are not 

supported by expert testimony, any other form of medical evidence, or case law. Further, 

“strained relationships” with attorneys do not render a defendant incompetent. See United States 

v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 

Next, Allen asserts that her family’s history of mental illness and suicide should have 

casted doubt on her own competency. The competency of her family is not pertinent, given that 

there is no evidence that her family’s mental health has a bearing on or correlates with her own.

The record establishes that Allen was lucid and rational throughout the proceedings, and 

that she did not “exhibit irrational behavior at the plea hearing, or otherwise act in a way that 

called [her] competency into question.” Cf. Maxwell, 569 F. App’x at 365 (citing Denkins, 

367 F.3d at 547). Both Allen and her attorney indicated that her attorney had explained the 

underlying facts, applicable law, and her options as to pleading guilty or proceeding to trial. She 

indicated to the court that she understood the charges against her, that she was pleading guilty to 
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the charge, and that she understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Cf. id. at 364. Thus, 

under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order a 

competency hearing when it became aware that Allen was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 

III. Reasonableness of Allen’s Sentence

“Sentences in criminal cases are reviewed for procedural and substantive 

reasonableness.” United States v. Freeman, 640 F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

“This review is conducted under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. Allen argues

that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. 

A. Procedural Unreasonableness

For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, we must ensure that the district court:

(1) properly calculated the applicable advisory Guidelines range; (2) considered 

the other [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors as well as the parties’ arguments for a 

sentence outside the Guidelines range; and (3) adequately articulated its reasoning 

for imposing the particular sentence chosen, including any rejection of the parties’

arguments for an outside-Guidelines sentence and any decision to deviate from 

the advisory Guidelines range.

United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). 

With respect to the sentence imposed, Allen asserts that the sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to “adequately address” her mental illness as part 

of her “history and characteristics,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a), and dismissed her 

mental illness as a “non-issue.” With respect to sentencing a defendant, this circuit has stated the 

following:

When sentencing a defendant, the district court “‘must make an individualized 

assessment based on the facts presented’ and upon a thorough consideration of all 

of the § 3553(a) factors.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). The district court commits procedural error where it fails 

to set forth a statement of reasons sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that it 

has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for imposing a 

particular sentence. Id.; see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). 
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The court need not “make specific findings related to each of the factors 

considered.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (quoting United States v. McClellan,

164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, “when ‘a defendant raises a 

particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that 

the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge 

explained the basis for rejecting it.’ ” United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 251 

(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir.

2006)); see also Simmons, 587 F.3d at 360 (“A sentencing judge must explicitly 

consider factors that are raised by the defendant or that are otherwise especially 

relevant to the case at bar.”)

United States v. Daniels, 641 F. App’x 481, 488 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations updated).

At the sentencing hearing, while considering the history and characteristics under 

18 U.S.C. § 3353(a), the district court stated that “[t]he court must recognize the mental 

condition, and we will address that later.” The next time Allen’s mental health was addressed 

was when the court imposed its sentence, during which the district court stated that “[t]he court 

will recommend that [the defendant] receive a physical and a mental health evaluation and 

needed treatment while in the custody of the bureau of prisons,” and further, that upon release

from imprisonment, “[the defendant] shall participate in a program of mental health treatment as 

directed by the probation officer until such time as [the defendant is] released from the program.” 

After the district court imposed its sentence, Allen’s attorney stated the following to the 

court:

Your honor, just an inquiry. When you were going over the relevant sentencing 

factors, you stated that you would address the mental health issue, I’m not sure 

the court addressed the mental health issue, just as it pertained to the sentence. I 

think the court just addressed it as to her incarceration, but I didn’t know if the 

court was going to go into anything further in sentencing regarding her mental 

health, so that’s the inquiry I have for the court.

(R. 234, Hr’g Tr. at Pg. ID 1117.)
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The government thereafter clarified defense counsel’s statement, stating that “I 

think what [counsel] is referring to is the motion for variance, to be clear for the record,”

to which the district court responded:

Well, the motion is denied. We understand that [the defendant] has mental 

problems. . . . but under the circumstances, you know, it was quite clear that 

nobody filed a motion for a mental evaluation in this case . . . so that’s a non-issue 

as far as I’m concerned. The people I had in court today, most of them had mental 

problems, and I think you said that more than half the people in the federal 

penitentiary have mental problems . . . I don’t doubt that.

(R. 234, Hr’g Tr. at Pg. ID 1117–18.) 

Allen asserts that the district court’s statements demonstrate that it ignored her

history and characteristics as they pertain to her mental health. Allen’s assertion is 

incorrect. The district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable because the record 

reflects that the district court’s individualized assessment did not ignore Allen’s mental 

health. Rather, the record reflects that the district court considered Allen’s argument for 

further variance based upon her mental health, and in rejecting that argument remarked 

on the commonness of mental illness among federal offenders, implying the court did not 

consider Allen’s mental illness to be exceptional enough to justify a lower sentence.

1

When read in its full context, the district court’s statement does not demonstrate 

that it ignored Allen’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder, nor does it suggest that the court 

considered her disorder irrelevant. Rather, we understand the court’s explanation to mean

that while taking Allen’s mental health into account, all that was known was that she was 

recently diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and given that Allen had already received a 

downward departure and a sentence below the suggested guidelines, a downward 

 

1 We also read the district court’s explanation in the context of the guidelines’ policy statement that “[m]ental health 

and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if such conditions, 

individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish 

the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” U.S.S.G. 5H1.3 (emphasis added). 
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variance based solely on the fact that she was recently diagnosed with bipolar disorder 

was unwarranted. In noting that no mental evaluation had been requested, the court 

essentially explained that it was provided no medical evidence demonstrating that Allen’s

bipolar disorder had any influence on her criminal conduct. Thus, given that no further 

details about Allen’s diagnosis were presented to the court, it did not abuse its discretion 

in denying further departure or variance.

The record further demonstrates that the district court considered Allen’s 

arguments about her mental health, and made an individualized assessment, when it 

recommended that Allen should receive a mental health evaluation and needed treatment 

for her mental health issues while incarcerated. Further, the district court ordered Allen to 

participate in a program of mental health treatment as directed by the probation officer 

upon release from incarceration. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion with respect to the procedural reasonableness of Allen’s sentence, given that 

the district court explicitly considered the mental health argument she raised in seeking a 

lower sentence. 

B. Substantive Reasonableness

When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard, we “‘tak[e] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the 

extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Sandoval, 501 F. App’x 491, 

492 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The essence of a 

substantive-reasonableness claim is whether the length of the sentence is ‘greater than necessary’

to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Tristan–Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2010)). “For a sentence to be substantively 
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reasonable, it must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and 

offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of 

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and 

quotation omitted). 

Allen asserts that her sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court 

purportedly “failed to recognize that the nature and impact of mental illness in her circumstances

necessitated a lesser sentence.” Specifically, she states that her “bipolar diagnosis while 

incarcerated prior to sentencing, as well as her family’s unfortunate history of mental illness, cast 

a pall over the proceedings that the district court failed to fully appreciate.” Allen’s argument is 

unavailing. 

Based upon a base offense level of 31, a criminal history category of VI, and her status as 

a career offender, Allen’s sentencing range was 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. But after 

granting the government’s motion for a downward departure, the district court sentenced Allen to 

151 months of imprisonment. Allen’s assertion that her below-guidelines sentence is 

unreasonably severe, because it should have been shorter, does not give rise to a presumption of 

unreasonableness. Curry, 536 F.3d at 573. In fact, this court has held that “it follows from simple 

logic that [a] below-Guidelines sentence is presumed . . . not to be unreasonably severe.” United 

States v. Bailey, 264 F. App’x 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). 

The district court recognized Allen’s mental health diagnosis, made note of her troubled 

upbringing, and accordingly ordered mental health treatment and imposed a sentence at the low 

end of the departure range, making readily apparent to this court that the district court’s sentence 

was proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and 

sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).
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Allen’s argument that the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable 

because it failed to consider “the impact of her mental illness in her circumstances” when 

imposing its sentence, is unpersuasive because Allen provided the district court with no expert 

testimony, or any form of medical evidence demonstrating that her mental illness was longstanding or that her disorder had an impact on her criminal conduct. Thus, for the 

abovementioned reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not 

awarding further variance.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.