Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-194 | August 5, 2019 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jonathan D. Harwell

Harwell Legal Counsel LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Amanda R. Blystone

Austin T. Robbins

Broyles Kight & Ricafort, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shane Adams,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Aubree Scaife,

Appellee-Respondent

August 5, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JP-194

Appeal from the 

Hamilton Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Paul Felix, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

29C01-1409-JP-1174

29C01-1409-JP-1175

Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Shane Adams (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order granting Aubree Scaife 

(“Mother”) primary physical custody and sole legal custody of their two 

children and finding Father in contempt for failing to comply with the trial 

court’s prior orders. Finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s 

modification of physical and legal custody and finding of contempt, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] Father and Mother (collectively, “Parents”) have two children together, R.A., 

who was born in 2005, and L.A., who was born in 2009 (collectively, 

“Children”). Parents were never married, and Father’s paternity of Children 

was established by paternity affidavit at each child’s birth. See Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 78. L.A. suffers from significant health issues, including autism, 

chromosomal duplication, developmental delay, impaired speech, and 

blindness. Because of these disabilities, L.A. receives funds from the Social 

Security Administration (SSA).

[3] After Parents’ relationship ended in 2015, a paternity case was opened, and 

Parents submitted a mediated agreement to the trial court. In the agreement, 

 

1 The following facts are taken largely from the Guardian ad Litem’s (GAL) report. During the modificationof-custody hearing, there was not much evidence presented beyond the GAL’s report. See Tr. pp. 4-23. The 

trial court took judicial notice of the GAL’s report and accepted it as evidence, and Father did not object to it 

doing so. See id. at 4-5. On appeal, the statements of facts in both parties’ briefs rely heavily on the GAL’s 

report. 
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Parents agreed to share legal custody of Children, Father would have primary 

physical custody of Children with Mother exercising substantial parenting time,

any SSA funds they received on behalf of L.A. would be deposited into a bank 

account for L.A.’s benefit that Father and Mother would be able to access, 

neither Father nor Mother would withdraw any SSA funds from L.A.’s bank 

account without “prior written approval” from the other parent, R.A. would 

stay in Westfield schools, and L.A. would stay at the Behavior Analysis Center 

for Autism (BACA). See id. at 26-27. Their agreement also stated that if 

“[Parents] cannot agree regarding the school choice for [Children] [Parents] 

shall attend mediation to address the impasse.” Id. In February 2015, the trial 

court accepted Parents’ agreement and entered its terms as an Agreed Entry.

[4] In July 2016, Mother filed a petition to modify custody, parenting time, and 

child support. Before a hearing on Mother’s petition could be held, Parents 

entered into an agreement, which the trial court accepted. The agreement was

that Parents would “equally share physical custody and parenting time of 

[Children]” and that they would continue to share joint legal custody of 

Children. Id. at 37. 

[5] In September 2016, Father unilaterally withdrew L.A. from BACA and placed 

him in school at ABC Therapy. See id. at 86. In April 2017, Mother filed a 

petition for contempt, alleging that Father had used L.A.’s SSA funds to pay his 

cable bill and online-gambling fees. See Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 3. On June 

3, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s contempt petition. After the first 

day of the hearing, the matter was continued to June 12, but before the hearing
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resumed, Father agreed to repay $2,395.35 that he had used from L.A.’s SSA 

account and to pay Mother’s attorney $1,900 within 180 days. See id. at 7. On 

June 12, the trial court accepted Parents’ agreement, entered the terms of the 

agreement as an Agreed Entry, and dismissed the contempt petition.

[6] Two months later, in August 2017, Mother filed a second petition for contempt, 

alleging that Father had not complied with the trial court’s order to repay 

L.A.’s SSA funds and that he had not paid her attorney $1,900. In September, 

the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s second contempt petition. After the 

hearing, the trial court ordered Father to deposit $2,395.35 into L.A.’s bank

account and to pay Mother’s attorney $1,900 by December 12. On December 

12, Parents filed an agreement with the trial court that set up a payment plan for 

Father to repay L.A.’s SSA funds, with the first payment due on April 1, 2018.

[7] In May 2018, Mother filed a third petition for contempt, alleging that Father 

had not begun repaying L.A.’s SSA funds nor had he paid her attorney $1,900. 

Mother also requested a modification from joint legal and physical custody to

her having sole legal and primary physical custody, and a modification of child 

support. In support, she alleged that Father was unstable and incapable of 

caring for Children. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 47. After Mother filed her 

third petition for contempt and second request to modify legal and physical 

custody, the trial court appointed a GAL to investigate. In September 2018, on 

the day the GAL was scheduled to interview R.A., Mother’s attorney informed 

the GAL that Father had moved without informing Mother, Mother’s attorney, 

or the trial court. The GAL met with R.A. at her school and asked R.A. about 
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Father’s move. R.A. told the GAL that “Father told her not to tell Mother 

about the move” and that “[Father] won’t communicate with [Mother] at all 

and won’t respond to texts[.]” Id. at 81. R.A. said that “she wants Father to be 

more stable and ‘get a nicer house and stay someplace’” and that “they have 

‘moved so much it[’]s becoming routine, but annoying.’” Id. at 82.

[8] As far as school, R.A. told the GAL that “she really wanted to go to University 

High School” and that she thought Mother would like her to be able to attend 

University High School but was uncertain if Father would agree. Id. at 83. 

After the interview, Father told the GAL that Mother had submitted an 

application for R.A. to attend University High School and that he was upset 

that Mother submitted an application without telling him. Regarding L.A., the 

GAL was unable to conduct an interview with him because of his disabilities, 

so she interviewed his teachers and caretakers. The supervisors and staff at 

L.A.’s school, ABC Therapy, told the GAL that “it was not uncommon for 

[L.A.] to have violent tantrums, or have aggressive outbursts.” Id. at 85. L.A.’s 

Board-Certified Behavior Analyst, Ambrosia Grady, told the GAL that Mother 

and Father have differing objectives and goals for L.A. and “that sometimes 

this creates problems for crafting action items and overall strategies for [L.A.].” 

Id. at 86. Grady also said that Mother and Father have different approaches 

toward L.A.’s unwanted behaviors. Grady told the GAL, “For example, when 

[L.A.] becomes agitated, Father will often sing to him to calm [L.A.] down. 

Mother disagrees with this approach, alleging that [L.A.] enjoys the singing and 

it actually serves to encourage the behavior, not correct it.” Id. Grady said that 
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“it would not be the practice at ABC Therapy to sing, or do something similar,

to calm [L.A.] down.” Id. All of the health, education, and medical 

professionals that the GAL spoke with regarding L.A. were “very clear that 

stability and consistency were absolutely paramount to [L.A.]. Changes in his 

routine cause [L.A.] to, often violently, react with unwanted behavior.” Id.

[9] The GAL also interviewed Parents. During the GAL’s interview with Mother, 

Mother expressed concern about differences in parenting styles between herself 

and Father regarding L.A. Mother told the GAL that “Father let[s] [L.A.] do 

whatever he wants” and “does not use the therapy techniques encouraged by 

the school, or Ms. Grady.” Id. at 86. Mother said that “this leads to major 

outbursts when [L.A.] is with her, because [L.A.] is unaccustomed to not 

getting his way,” and his “condition makes it very, very difficult for him to 

process and respond to changes in his structure and surroundings.” Id. For 

example, Mother told the GAL that Father does not make L.A. wear a seat 

belt, then “when [L.A.] freaks out with Mother when he is being belted in, 

Father blames Mother for her inability to control [L.A.].” Id. at 91-92. When 

the GAL asked Father about this, Father confirmed that he does not make L.A. 

wear a seat belt because L.A. “routinely reacts violently if you make him wear 

the seat belt. He will bang his head on the window, flail his arms, and hurt 

himself and those around him.” Id. at 91. Mother also told the GAL that she 

was concerned that Father’s housing and finances were unstable. Her biggest 

concern was that Father misappropriated L.A.’s SSA funds and used them for 

his personal expenses.
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[10] When the GAL arranged to interview Father, Father later called to reschedule 

and stated that he had been in an accident. He told the GAL “that his car had 

been totaled and that he needed to work things out with the insurance 

company.” Id. at 96. The next week, when the GAL was observing Children at

Mother’s house, L.A. “kept complaining about his head hurting and the really 

loud noise.” Id. When the GAL asked what was wrong, R.A. told the GAL 

that she and L.A. were in the car accident with Father and that L.A. hit his 

head on the window and that the really loud sound of the impact bothered him. 

Id. The GAL asked Mother if Father had told her that Children were in the car 

accident, and Mother said no. When the GAL spoke with Father, he 

“confirmed that he did not tell Mother about the accident.” Id. at 97. When 

the GAL told Father this lack of communication was concerning, Father said, 

“I have no interest in talking to [Mother].” Id. Father told the GAL that “he 

had not spoken to Mother in ‘basically eight months.’” Id. When the GAL 

asked Father about allegations regarding his misappropriation of L.A.’s SSA 

funds, he said that he had used L.A.’s SSA funds for his own expenses but did 

not say why he had not repaid L.A.’s SSA funds after being ordered to do so. 

Finally, the GAL investigated Father’s housing and found that Father “has had 

at least four eviction proceedings filed against him since 2012.” Id. at 93. In 

2018 alone, the GAL discovered that Father had two eviction proceedings filed 

against him. When asked about his recent eviction, Father “became vague and 

said technically they had filed an eviction proceeding” and “that he didn’t pay 

the rent on the apartment for several months so that he could use the money as 

the down payment on the new house[.]” Id. The GAL also discovered that 
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Father had recently filed for bankruptcy in March 2018. When the GAL asked 

Father if he had filed more than one bankruptcy, Father told her he had filed for 

bankruptcy twice; however, the GAL was able to confirm that Father had filed

for bankruptcy five times. See id. at 94. 

[11] After the GAL finished her investigation, she submitted a report to the trial 

court, concluding that a change in custody and parenting time would be in 

Children’s best interests. See id. at 105. Specifically, the GAL found that 

Parents “are incapable of communicating and cooperating in a manner 

necessary to make joint legal custody practicable”; “given the severity of 

[L.A.’s] condition, the need for stability and consistency in [Children’s] lives 

and daily routine is paramount”; and “the number and frequency of Father’s 

moves and Father’s resistance to communicate with Mother is detrimental to 

Father’s ability to provide the necessary structure and stability for [Children].” 

Id. Ultimately, the GAL recommended that Mother be granted sole legal 

custody and primary physical custody.

[12] In December 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s third petition for 

contempt and request for modification of physical and legal custody and child 

support. Father, appearing without an attorney, declined to present any

witnesses, evidence, or testimony, and he did not make any argument regarding 

Mother’s allegation that he was in contempt. Mother, who was represented by 

counsel, testified that Father had not repaid “a penny” of what he owed for 

using L.A.’s SSA funds for his personal expenses. Tr. p. 14. After the hearing, 

the trial court issued an order approving and adopting certain recommendations 
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of the GAL, including granting Mother primary physical custody and sole legal

custody of Children and finding Father in contempt of its prior orders. See 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 115-17.

[13] Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Father raises two arguments on appeal. He contends that the trial court erred 

by granting Mother primary physical custody and sole legal custody of Children 

and by finding him in contempt for failing to comply with the trial court’s 

previous orders.

I. Modification of Custody

[15] Father contends that the trial court erred by granting Mother primary physical 

custody and sole legal custody of Children. “Modification of custody is an area 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we are constrained to 

neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Albright v. 

Bogue, 736 N.E.2d 782, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Custody modifications will 

be reversed “only upon a showing of abuse of discretion, or where the decision 

is clearly against the logic and effect of the circumstances before the court.” Id.

(physical custody); see also Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 822 N.E.2d 609, 611 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (legal custody).
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A. Physical Custody

[16] Father first argues that the trial court erred in modifying physical custody of 

Children. To modify an existing custody order, the trial court must find that 

modification is in the best interests of the child and that there is a substantial 

change in one or more of the factors to be considered by the court. Ind. Code § 

31-14-13-6.2 The court is to consider the following factors:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the 

child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child’s parents;

(B) the child’s siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the 

child’s best interest.

(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

 

2 We note that both parties incorrectly cited to Article 17 of Title 31, which is applicable to custody in 

dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or child-support actions, see Ind. Code § 31-17-2-3, rather than 

Article 14, which is applicable to paternity actions.
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(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either 

parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto 

custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall 

consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.

Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2. We have said that “[c]ontinuity and stability in the life 

of a child is an important component in determining the proper custodial 

arrangement for a child.” In re Paternity of M.J.M., 766 N.E.2d 1203, 1210 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2002). 

[17] Father asserts that “there has been no substantial and continuing change of 

circumstances” to modify physical custody. Appellant’s Br. p. 21. He 

specifically argues that “at most” the evidence shows “prior instability of 

[Father,] but not current instability.” Id. at 17. The record reveals that over the 

years, Father and Children have moved frequently. As Father points out, a 

“reasonable frequency of changes of residence cannot by itself be regarded as 

detrimental” to children justifying modification; however, in extreme cases, 

where the custodial parent and children have no permanent home, “the 

frequency of changes of residence may rise to the level where detriment to the 

children is evident.” Winderlich v. Mace, 616 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1993), reh’g denied. Here, in September 2018, after the GAL had been 

appointed, Father relocated, unexpectedly, and without telling Mother, 

Mother’s attorney, the trial court, or the GAL. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 
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102. Then, during her investigation, the GAL discovered that Father has had 

“at least four eviction proceedings filed against him since 2012,” with two 

eviction proceedings filed against him in 2018. Id. at 93. Father said that 

“technically” there was an eviction proceeding filed but told the GAL that the 

reason was because “he didn’t pay the rent on the apartment for several months 

so that he could use the money as the down payment on the new house.” Id. 

Furthermore, during her interview with the GAL, R.A. said that they have 

“moved so much it[’]s becoming routine, but annoying.” Id. at 82. The GAL 

found that the number and frequency of Father’s moves “is detrimental to 

Father’s ability to provide the necessary structure and stability for [Children],” 

particularly with regard to L.A., for whom “the need for stability and 

consistency” “is paramount.” Id. at 105.

[18] The record also shows that Father has had some financial instability. The GAL 

discovered that Father has filed for bankruptcy five times, as recently as March 

2018. See id. at 94. Additionally, it is concerning that Father admitted that he 

used L.A.’s SSA funds for his own expenses, allegedly to pay his cable bill and

online-gambling fees. We find that all of this evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that modification of physical custody is in Children’s best interests 

and that there had been a substantial change in one or more of the above 

factors. That is, Father’s continued lack of stable housing and finances caused 

a substantial change affecting Children’s mental and physical health and wellbeing. See In re Paternity of J.G., 19 N.E.3d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
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Therefore, we do not find that the trial court erred in granting Mother primary 

physical custody of Children.

B. Legal Custody

[19] Father next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it modified 

legal custody of Children. Parents who are awarded joint legal custody “will 

share authority and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child’s 

upbringing, including the child’s education, health care, and religious training.” 

Ind. Code § 31-9-2-67. The issue of joint legal custody in paternity proceedings 

is governed by Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2.3, which states, in subsection 

(a), that “the court may award legal custody of a child jointly if the court finds 

that an award of joint legal custody would be in the best interest[s] of the child.” 

To determine what is in the best interests of the child, subsection (c) provides a 

list of factors for the court to consider:

(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint 

legal custody;

(2) whether the persons awarded joint legal custody are willing 

and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child’s 

welfare;

(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the 

child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;

(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial 

relationship with both of the persons awarded joint legal custody;
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(5) whether the persons awarded joint legal custody:

(A) live in close proximity to each other; and

(B) plan to continue to do so;

(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the 

home of each of the persons awarded joint legal custody; and

(7) whether there is a pattern of domestic or family violence.

Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.3(c). We have previously held that the second factor—

whether the parents are willing and able to cooperate in advancing the child’s 

welfare—is of particular importance in making legal custody determinations. 

J.W. v. M.W., 77 N.E.3d 1274, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); see also Julie C. v. 

Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing joint legal 

custody in a dissolution proceeding, under Indiana Code section 31-17-2-15). 

Where the parties have made child-rearing a battleground, then joint custody is 

not appropriate. J.W., 77 N.E.3d at 1278. 

[20] Father contends that “[t]here was nothing in the record to show that joint 

[legal] custody should have been terminated based on the communication 

issues.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21. We disagree. The record is replete with 

evidence that Mother and Father do not communicate with one another, even 

regarding Children being involved in an accident. Father did not tell Mother 

that Children had been in a car accident where L.A. “hit his head on the 

window.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 96. Furthermore, Father told the GAL 
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that he had “no interest in talking to [Mother].” Id. at 97. The gist of Father’s 

numerous complaints about the GAL’s report and trial court’s findings are 

essentially requests to reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility in his 

favor, which we may not do. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it modified its award of joint legal custody and granted Mother 

sole legal custody of Children.

II. Contempt

[21] Father also asserts that he was not afforded due process before he was found in 

contempt. At the outset, we note that because Father failed to make his dueprocess claim in the trial court, it is waived. See Hite v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 845 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“It is well 

established that we may consider a party’s constitutional claim waived when it 

is raised for the first time on appeal.”).

[22] Waiver notwithstanding, Father has not convinced us that he was deprived of 

due process. Contempt of court generally involves disobedience of a court or 

court order that undermines the court’s authority, justice, and dignity. Reynolds 

v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016). There are two kinds of contempt: 

direct contempt and indirect contempt. Id. Indirect contempt, which is at issue 

in this case, involves those acts “committed outside the presence of the court 

‘which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass or prevent the due 

administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting 6 Ind. Law Encyc. Contempt § 2 

(1958)).
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[23] Indiana has codified the procedural requirements for finding indirect contempt 

at Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5, which in relevant part provides:

(a) In all cases of indirect contempts, the person charged with 

indirect contempt is entitled:

(1) before answering the charge; or

(2) being punished for the contempt;

to be served with a rule of the court against which the contempt 

was alleged to have been committed.

(b) The rule to show cause must:

(1) clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged 

to constitute the contempt;

(2) specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable 

certainty, as to inform the defendant of the nature and 

circumstances of the charge against the defendant; and

(3) specify a time and place at which the defendant is 

required to show cause, in the court, why the defendant 

should not be attached and punished for such contempt.

This statute essentially fulfills the due-process requirement that a contemnor be 

provided with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Reynolds, 64 

N.E.3d at 833.
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[24] Generally, a court’s authority to find a person in contempt rests on whether a 

trial court has strictly complied with the statutory requirements set forth in the 

rule-to-show-cause statute. Id. Strict compliance with the statute may be 

excused if it is clear the alleged contemnor nevertheless had clear notice of the 

accusations against him or her. Id. Examples of this “clear notice” exception 

include when a contemnor receives a copy of an original contempt information 

that contains detailed factual allegations of contempt or if the contemnor admits 

the factual basis for a contempt finding. Id.

[25] Father contends that he “was provided no notice of the allegations in the [trial 

court’s] Order [to show cause].” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. Although the trial 

court’s order to show cause did not contain detailed factual allegations of 

contempt, Mother’s third contempt petition did contain detailed factual 

allegations that Father failed to comply with the trial court’s order to repay

L.A.’s SSA funds and to pay Mother’s attorney $1,900. Moreover, we are 

convinced that Father was aware of the accusations against him. That is, this 

was Mother’s third petition alleging that Father was in contempt for failing to 

comply with prior court orders to repay L.A.’s SSA funds and to pay her 

attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we find that Mother’s petition for contempt 

provided Father with proper notice.

[26] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.