DLD-163 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 24-1464

___________

TIMOTHY RYAN,

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-20815)

District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

August 1, 2024

Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 8, 2024)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Appellant Timothy Ryan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 

dismissal of his complaint and subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration. We 

will summarily affirm.

Ryan filed suit in state court against the Federal Correctional Institute at Fort Dix, 

alleging that prison employees mishandled and lost his property during a prison move.1 

He sought compensatory damages. Because a tort claim against a federal agency must be 

brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C §§ 1346, 2671 et seq., 

the exclusive jurisdiction for which is federal district courts, id. at § 1346(b)(1), the 

Government removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).2 The 

District Court denied Ryan’s request to remand, screened the complaint pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it with prejudice as barred by sovereign immunity. 

Ryan filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. He filed a 

timely notice of appeal. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s 

sua sponte dismissal is plenary, Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020), and 

we review the denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, Santini v. 

1 Ryan alleged that he submitted an administrative tort claim prior to filing the complaint. 

2 The United States of America was substituted as defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1346(b)(1) and 2679(a). See CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 

2008) (“The Government is the only proper defendant in a case brought under the 

FTCA.”). 
3

Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015). We review de novo the District Court’s 

denial of remand. U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Upon review, we will affirm because no substantial question is presented on appeal. See

3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.

We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Ryan’s complaint. The FTCA 

grants jurisdiction to district courts, and waives federal sovereign immunity over, “claims 

against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property . . . caused 

by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while 

acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the 

United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the 

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). But the 

FTCA exempts from that waiver claims regarding the detention of property by “any 

officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” Id. at § 2680(c). That 

exception to the general waiver of sovereign immunity “sweeps as broadly as its 

language suggests,” and applies to correctional officers’ loss of a prisoner’s items during 

a prison move.3 Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 216, 226-28 (2008). The 

District Court thus correctly dismissed Ryan’s FTCA claim as barred by sovereign 

immunity.

We also agree with the District Court’s decisions to deny Ryan’s request to 

remand and motion for reconsideration because Ryan did not present a basis for either. 

3 Because Ryan’s property was not “seized for the purpose of forfeiture,” the exception to 

§ 2680(c) does not apply. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1).
4

See 28 U.S.C § 1346(b)(1); Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., Inc., 842 F.3d 805, 811-12 (3d 

Cir. 2016) (explaining the requirements for removal pursuant to § 1442(a)); Max’s 

Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.