1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___
____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: Jul y

28, 201 6 4 N O. 33, 639 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v

. 8 JO HN MONAFO, 9 D ef

en dant- Appe llant. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF CH AV ES C OUN TY 11 Fr eddie J. R om ero, Distr ict Judge 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 San ta Fe, NM 14 W alter H art, Assistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 16 for Appellee 17 Bennett J. Ba

uer, Chief P ublic Defe nder 18 Matthew J. O’ Gorm an, A ssistant Appellate D efender 19 San ta Fe, NM 20 fo r Appe llant20 T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n st at es that the sto p o ccu rr ed on D ec em

be r 11, 1 21 2010

. 1 OPIN ION 2 KEN NED Y, Judge. 3 { 1} Appellee has f

iled a m otion for r ehearing in this m atter, wh i ch has been 4 co nsi de re d by

the or igi na l pane l, a nd i s he re by gra nt ed

. T he opi nio n f

ile d Ju ly 5, 5 2016 , is he re by

w ith dr awn, a nd this O pin ionis fi le d init s st ea d. 6 { 2} Im

m ediately after relea sing D efendant from a traff ic stop, office rs twic e pulled 7 him ove r to i nve sti ga te ow ne rs hip of avan he w as to win g. As a r es ult , D ef en dant 8 en te re d ac ondi tio na l pl ea to unl aw fu l t ak ing of

a m oto r ve hic le , re se rv ing his r igh t 9 t o co n t es t t h e co n s t i tu t i o n al i t y o f th e se co n d s t o p an d s ea rc h o f a rec e i p t b o o k

. We 10 ag re e w ith the dis tr ic t co urt tha t the se co nd s top w as suf fi ci en tly a tte nua te d f

ro m the 11 fi rs t. T he de puty ’ s r ev ie wof the e nti re r ec ei pt b ook, how ev er , w as not c om plete ly 12 jus ti fie d b y

th e li m it edex te nt of De fen da nt ’s con se nt to sea rch

. 13 I. BACKGRO UND 14 { 3} O n Ju ly

1, 201 1, D efen da nt, JohnMo na fo , w as dr ivi ng a f la t- be d to wtr

uc k, 15 towing a van in Chaves County , New M exico. D eputy Jam es See ly

stopp ed 16 De fendant, believing De fendant had com m itted a traff

ic violatio n. The reasons for,

1 17 and facts of, that stop ar e not m aterial to this appeal. At som e poin t, F rancisco Castro 18 ar ri ve d a t the sc en e of

his ow n a cc or d. I n a side c onve rs at ionw itha nothe r of fi ce r on 19 the scene, Castro stated that he owned the van on the truck and that he had not g iven20 Inor de r to p ro m ote c lari ty , w e fo llo wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s le ad in re fe rr ing to 2 21 the se ite m s as the r ec ei pt, a nd r ef er to the boo k inw hic h it , a nd o the rs li ke it , is ke pt 22 as the r ec ei pt b ook. 2 1 perm issio n for any one to rem ove it from his property . I t seem s from the rec ord that 2 thi s c onve rs at iontoo k pl ac e w hil e D ep uty S ee ly w as de al ing w ithD ef

en dant. 3 { 4} De putySee ly , a pparently unawar e of Ca stro’ s conversation w i t h the other 4 officer on scene, r eleased D efendant from the stop. De puty Seely

began driving aw ay 5 fro m the sc en e. O nc e on the r oa d, he r ec ei ve d adis pa tc h f ro m the sc en e inf

orm ing 6 him of Castro’ s claim s regardi n g t h e van, and he returned to the scene j ust as 7 De fend ant was pulling ou t onto the road. De putySee ly activated his em ergency 8 light s, and De fendant pulled over im m ediately , stopp ing only a short dis tance aw ay 9 fro m wher e h e h adin it ia ll y

be en st op pe d. 10 { 5} A ft er

c onve rs ing w ithCa str o and the oth er of fi ce rs on the sc en e, D ep uty S ee ly 11 ap pr oa ch ed

D ef en dant’ s dri ve r’ s side door an d aske d D ef en dant f or a“ bil l of la din g” 12 or “ m anifest” for the van. De fendant retrieved a re ce i p t bookcontaining several 2 13 re ce ipt s, ope ne d it

to the one r el ev an t t o th e van, a nd g av e it to D ep uty S ee ly

. D ep uty 14 Seely inqu ired about Cher i Loy a, the indiv idual who, acc ording to the bill, consented 15 to the rem o v al o f t h e v an, and he requested a check of the driver’ s license num ber 16 lis te d in the bil l. D ep uty Se el y the n le ft the dr ive r’ s si de doo r an d w al ke d to w ar d th e 17 re ar of the tr uc k w he re tw o othe r of

fi ce rs w er e standi ng. T oge the r, the of fi ce rs f ir st 18 scrutinized the inform ation on the bill, eventually looki ng throu gh the oth er e ntries 19 in the receipt book and finding another entry authorized by

Ms. L oy a. The signatu res3

1 o n t h e t w o b i l l s ap p e a r e dd i f f e r e n t , d e s p i t e a l l e g e d l y b e l o n g i n g t o t h e s a me 2 ind ivi dua l. D ep uty Se el y the n di sc ove re d th at

the dr ive r’ s li ce nse num

be r lis te d inthe 3 rece ipt for the van belong ed to a wom an with a diff erent name an d address than 4 Loy a’ s. D eputy

See ly arr es t ed De fe ndant for the unlawful taking of a vehicle, 5 contrary

to NMS A 1978, § 30-16D-1 (2009). 6 A. Pr ocedur al History 7 { 6} T ra ff

ic vio la tio ns ari sin g f

ro m the f ir st s top w er e ch ar ge d se parate ly f ro m the 8 unl aw fu l t ak ing of

ave hic le c ha rg e ar isi ng f ro m the se co nd s top

. D ef

en dant 9 pr oc ee de d pr o se in both c as es . H av ing be enc onvi ct ed of the tr af fi c v iol at ion s in 10 m ag istrate co urt, D ef

en dant ap pe al ed tho se co nvi ct ion s, on w hic h he w as a cquit te d, 11 af te r a de nov o tr ia l i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt. 12 { 7} Inthi s c as e, D ef en dant f ile d am oti on t o su

ppress th e co nte nts of

the r ec ei pt 13 book

. The dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e m oti on, c onc lud ing that on ce D ef en dant g av e 14 D ep uty

S ee ly the r ec ei pt b ook, D ep uty S ee ly “ ce rt ai nly

[ w as ] able to ge t i nto the 15 ite m s th at

he ha [d ] in his hands. ” D ef en dant a lso f

ile d a m oti on to d ism iss , w hic h th e 16 district court characte rized as a F oul en fon t m oti on p ur suan t t o Sta te v . F oul en fon t , 17 1995 -N MCA -028, 119 N. M. 788, 895 P. 2d 13 29. D efendant’ s m otion suggest ed that 18 the van di d no t qu al if

y a s a“ ve hic le ” or

“ m oto r ve hic le ” unde r Se ct ion30- 16D -1 , a nd 19 ins te ad

w as a“ nonrep ai ra

ble ve hic le ” out sid e the pur vie wof the statut e ch ar ge d. 20 A ft er ahe ar ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e m ot io n to dis m iss , r ea soni ng tha t the4

1 fa ct s co ul d fit

e ith er de fi nit ion , a nd c onc lud ing that i t w as f or the j ur y to de ci de 2 whi ch de fin it io n was ap pl ic ab le in th is cas e. 3 { 8} D ef

en dant a cquir ed

c ouns el w ho f

ile d anothe r m oti on t o su ppr es s, a sse rt ing 4 tha t a l l e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e s e c o n d s t o p s h o u l d b e s up p r e s s e d , a s no 5 attenuation exis ted betwee n the first illegal stop and th e subsequent ly acquired 6 ev i d en ce . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt h e l d a h e ar i n g o n t h e mot i o n . De n yin g De fe n d an t ’s 7 m oti on t o su

ppr es s, the dis tr ic t co urt he ld tha t su ff ic ie nt atte nua tio n e xis te d be ca use 8 of Castro’ s “ fortuitous arr ival.” D efendant ultim ately entered a conditi onal plea, 9 re se rv ing the r igh t t o a ppe al pre vi ou s or de rs of

the dis tr ic t c ourt. D ef

en dant t im el y 10 fi le d anot ic e of

appe al

. 11 II. DISC US SION 12 { 9} D ef

en dant co nte sts the dis tr ic t co urt’ s de nia l of both m oti ons to s uppr es s and 13 ins ist s th at

the van inque sti on is not a “ ve hic le ” w ith in the de fi nit ionpr ovi de d inthe 14 Motor Vehicle C ode (the Code). De fe n d an t asks that we suppress all evidence 15 obt ai ne d a s a re sul t of the se co nd stop, or , in the a lte rn at ive , sup pr es s a ll co nte nts of 16 the r ec ei pt b ook as ide f ro m the re ce ipt fo r the van. D ef en dant r eque sts sup pr es sio n 17 ba se d on a la ck of atte nua tio n betw ee n the stop s and an im pe rm iss ibl e ex pansi on o f 18 the sc ope of

D ef en dant’ s c onse nt. T he S ta te ur ge s th at suf fi ci en t a tte nua tio n e xis ts 19 be tw ee n th e sto ps t o j ust if y a dm itt ing e vid en ce obt ai ne d duri ng the se co nd s top

. 20 A . Su pp re ssi on of Ev id en ce Ob ta in ed D ur in g S ec on d St op19 T houg h im m at er ia l t o our co ns id era tio n of thi s c as e, w e not e tha t a 3 20 “ re gr etta

ble ” m ist ak e of

lawon the offic er ’ s part m ay not inv al ida te atr af

fi c sto p 21 un de r th e Fo ur th Am en dm en t. He ien v. N. C. , ___ U

. S. ___ , ___ , 135 S

. Ct

. 530 , 540 22 (2 01 4)

. 5 1 { 10} Whe n rev ie w ing adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of am oti on t o su

ppr es s, appe llate 2 courts draw all rea sonable infer ences in f avor of the district court’ s ruling anddefer 3 to the dist rict court’ s finding s of fact, so long as they are suppo rted by

subst antial 4 ev id en ce. Se e Sta te v . M urr y , 2014-NMC A- 021, ¶ 10, 31 8 P. 3 d 180. Rather than 5 being lim ited to the record m ade on a m otion to supp ress, app el l at e courts “ m ay 6 reviewthe entire re cord to determ ine whether there w as sufficient evidence to suppo rt 7 the trial court’ s denial of the m otion to supp ress.” Sta te v . J ohns on , 19 96 -NMCA8 117, ¶ 21, 122 N

. M. 713, 930 P. 2d 1165 ( ci tin g State v. M artin ez , 198 0- N MS C- 066, 9 ¶ 16, 94 N .M. 436, 612 P.2d 228 (hol ding that appellate courts consid er the e ntire 10 re co rd on a ppe al , not j ust

e vid en ce pr es en te d duri ng a sup pr es sio n he ar ing , in 11 affir m ing th e denial of a m otion to supp ress)). 12 { 11} T he part ie s do not di sp ute the inv al idi ty

of D ep uty S ee ly ’ s f

ir st s top of 13 De fendant, a s found b y the district court. Ra t h er, the parties disagree on the eff ect 3 14 that the first, unconstitut ional sto p has on su bsequent events. D efend ant ar gues, under 15 the F ourth A m en dm en t of the U nit ed

S ta te s C onst itu tio n and A rt ic le I I, Sect ion10 16 of the Ne w Me xico Const itutio n, that all evidence obtained subs equent to th e initial 17 stop s houl d be supp ressed under the “ fruit of the poiso n o u s t ree” doctrine, a s there 18 wa s no attenuation betwee n the uncons titutio nal stop and the evidence in this case.18 N ewMe xic o c as e lawis inc onsist en t r eg ar din g w he the r “ al l t ai nt” m ust be 4 19 re m ov ed , o r whe the r pur gin g th e ev ide nc e of the “ pr im ar

y ta int ” is s uf

fi ci en t. 20 Co m pare e. g. , State v. Prince , 200 4- N MC A -1 27, ¶ 20, 136 N

. M. 521, 101 P

. 3d 3 32 21 (holdin g consent m

ust be purged from

all taint) wi th e

. g. , State v. W agon er , 200 1- 22 NMC A- 014, ¶ 22, 130 N. M. 274, 24 P. 3d 3 0 6 (n o t i n g that evidence unassociated 23 with the “prim ary

taint” m ay

be adm issib le).

6 1 The St at e ar g u es that the evidence need not be excluded as the “ fruit” of an illegal 2 se arch

. 3 1. Fr uit of t he P oisonous Tree D octrine 4 { 12} T he “ fr

uit of the poi sono us tre e” doc tr ine pr ovi de s f or sup pr es sio n of 5 “ ev ide nc e tha t i s ob ta ine d no t on ly ‘ dur ing ’ but

‘ as adir ec t r es ult

of ’ a n un la wf

ul 6 se iz ur e” wh en th ere a re t wo d is ti nc t i nv es ti ga to ry sei zu res by the po li ce. Se e G arc ia , 7 2009 -N MS C- 046, ¶ 23 . Th e m ai n in qui ry und er thi s do ctri ne is “ ‘ w he the r . . . the 8 evidence to which instant obje ction is m ade has been com e at by exploitatio n of that 9 illegality

or instead by

m eans sufficiently distin guish able t o be purged of the prim ary 1 0 t ai n t .’ ” W

ong S un v. U nited Sta tes , 371 U .S

. 471, 488 (1963). In order to be purged 4 11 of ata int of ini tia l i lle ga lity , “ the re m ust be abr eak in the c au sa l c ha in b etw ee n th e 12 illegality

and the consent.” Sta te v . M ont eleo ne , 2005 -N MCA -129, ¶ 17, 13 8 N. M. 13 544, 123 P. 3d 777. A br eak in the c au sa l c ha in, or a tte nua tio n, f

ro m ini tia l i lle ga lity 14 pr ovi de s an e xc ep tio n to the f ru it of the poi sono us tre e doc tri ne ’s b ar to a dm itt ing 15 ev id en ce l e g al ly obt ai ne d t hr ou gh pa st po li ce i ll eg al it ie s. Se e id. A tte nua tio n is 16 m ea sur ed

usi ng thr ee f

ac tor s: ( 1) the te m

por al pr oxi m ity of th e il le ga l st op and the 17 co nse nt, ( 2) the pr es en ce of int er ve nin g ci rc um stanc es , a nd ( 3) the f la gr an cy of the7

1 of fic ia l m is co nd uc t. Se e B row n v . I ll. , 422 U

. S. 590 , 603 -0 4 ( 1975 ); M ont el eo ne , 2 20 05 -NMCA- 12 9, ¶ 1 7. 3 2. At tenu ation Un der the Four th A m endm ent 4 { 13} Re gard ing the f

ir st Brown f

a c t o r , t h e t w o s t o p s w e r e v e r y c l o s e i n b o t h t i me 5 a n d p l a c e . T h e i n i t i a l , i l l e g a l s t o p f i n i s h e d l e s s t h a n a m i n u t e b e f o r e D e p u t y

S ee ly 6 sto ppe d Def

en da nt f or ase co nd t im e. H ow ev er , the f ir st s top ha d f

ini she d, D ep uty 7 Seely had left, De fendant had put his car in m otion to leave, and Castro’ s story had 8 not y et giv enr ise to a re que st t o de ta in h im a ga in. A s su ch , the f

ir st Brown f

ac tor 9 w ei ghs onl y sli ght ly in D ef en dant’ s favor if at al l. T his se gue s ne at ly int o th e se co nd 10 Brown fac tor, by

which w e look at whether ther e w as an interven i ng event that 11 is ol at edDefen da nt fro m th e co erci ve effec ts of th e or ig in al il le ga l s to p. See U nited 12 Sta tes v . G re

gory , 79 F. 3d 97 3, 980 (10th Cir. 1996 ). De fendant argues that there w as 13 no int ervening event, insis ting that Castro’ s arrival w as not adequate to cons titute an 14 int er ve nin g c ir cu m stanc e. I n our vie w , a nothe r, m or e pe rs ua siv e, fa ct le nds its el f to 15 our conclusio n that an intervening event occurre d in thi s case. 16 { 14} The pa rt ie s are in ag re em en t tha t D ep uty S ee ly r el ea se d D ef

en dant f ro m the 17 fi rs t st op. T he y dis ag re e, how ev er , on wh ethe r D ef en dant’ s a ct ion s ina tte m

pti ng t o 18 le av e cr eate d su ffici en t a tte nua tio n be tw ee n th e fi rs t and s ec ond sto p. I t hard ly 19 m atte rs he re , a s D ep uty S ee ly him se lf ha d de part ed

the sto p pr ior

to D ef en dant. 20 D ef en dant b eg andr ivi ng aw ay f ro m the sc en e, tho ugh he did

not ge t f ar be fo re be ing 21 sto ppe d f

or the se co nd t im e. Be ca

use D eput yS ee ly ’ s r el ea se of D ef en dant, a nd20 A s su ppor t fo r thi s co nte nti on, D ef

en dant poi nts to the le ngth of the de te nti on 5 21 and the nature of t h e traf fic citations issued, as evidence that De putySee ly wa s 22 fi shi ng f

or a ddi tio na l vi ola tio ns. 8 1 D ef en dant’ s de part

ur e re sul tin g fr om tha t re le as e, oc curr ed af te r the ill eg al sto p bu t 2 prior to the second st o p an d De fendant’ s consent, we conclude it const itutes an 3 in te rv en in g circ um st an ce un de r th e Fo ur th Am en dm en t. Se e, e . g. , G re gory , 79 F

. 3d 4 at 980 ( ac know le dgi ng that ac ts s uc h a s is sui ng M ira nda w ar

nin gs, te lli ng the 5 de fe ndant h e is fr ee to le av e, an d advi sin g the de fe ndant tha t he m ay r ef use c onse nt 6 “ m ay sa tis fy the r equir em en t of

int er ve nin g cir cu m stanc es ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks 7 an d c itatio n om itt ed )) ; cf

. W ong Sun , 371 U

. S. at 491 (c onc lud ing that r el ea sin g th e 8 pe tit ion er

on his ow n re co gni zanc e re nde re d “ the c onne ct ionbe tw ee n th e ar re st and 9 the [ ev ide nc e]

. . . ‘ so atte nua te d a s to dis sip at e the ta int

. ’ ” (i nte rn al quot at ionm ar ks 10 an d c itatio n om itt ed ))

. T he se co nd Brown fac tor therefore we ighs in the State’ s favor. 11 { 15} T o f

ulf ill the thi rd B row n fa ct or , D ef en dant w oul d ha ve to es ta bli sh p ur pose fu l 1 2 an d f l a g r a n t o f

f i c i a l m i s c o n du c t w h e r e : ( 1 ) t h e i m p r o p r i e t y w a s o b v i o u s , orthe 13 of fi ci al kne w his c ondu ct

w as li ke ly

unc onst itu tio na l bu t c ont inu ed non ethe le ss; or 14 (2 ) the miscon du ctwas i nv es ti ga to ry in de si gn an d p ur

po se . U nit ed Sta tes v . Sim

pson , 15 439 F.3d 490 , 496 (8th Cir. 2006 ); Brown , 422 U

. S. a t 60 5. T he re is no e vid en ce of 16 m iscondu ct w ith regard to Castro’ s arrival a t the scene, and De fendant concedes that 17 the dis tr ic t co ur t’s fi ndi ng tha t C as tr o’ s arr iva l w as f ortui tou s and unanti ci pa te d is 18 supp orted by the evidence. Def endant hints at purposeful inv estigatory m iscondu ct 19 in the f

ac ts o f the f

ir st s top

. W e ha ve pr ev iou sly af fi rm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n 59

1 reg ard in g th e fir st st op in a m em or an du m op in io n, Sta te v . M

onaf o , N o . 3 2 , 3 1 5 , me m. 2 op. (N .M. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012) (non-prec ed en t i al ), based not on intentio nal 3 m i s co n du ct b u t a mi s t a k e o f l aw . I ti s n o tn ec es s ary h er e t o t ak e u p De fe n d an t ’s 4 in vi ta ti on to re-v is it th e fac ts an d l eg al is su es pre se nt edth erei n. 5 { 16} T houg h D ep uty Se el y ’ s m ist ak e of law in m ak ing the f ir st s top of

D ef en dant 6 m ay ha ve be enobj ec tiv el y unr ea sona ble , a n un re as ona

ble m ist ak e al one is not 7 su ffi ci en t t o e st ab li sh fla gr an t m is co nd uc t i n a n a tt en ua ti on an al y si s. E

. g. , United 8 Sta tes v . B arnu m , 564 F

. 3d 9 64 , 973 ( 8thCi r. 200 9) ( co nc lud ing that a tr af fi c sto p 9 ini tiate d a s part

of pa tr ol b ut b as ed

on an un re as ona

ble m ist ak e w as not

the ty pe of 10 bla tantl y

unc onst itu tio na l or

f la gr an t be ha vio r co nde m

ne d in Brown ); United States 11 v. He rrera-Gonzalez , 474 F. 3d 11 05, 1113 (8th Cir. 2007 ) (c o n cl u ding that wher e 12 po li ce co nd uc t was a “ m is ta ke n e xe rci se of o th erwi se le git im at e pol ic e inv es tig at io n,” 13 se iz ur e w as “ m or e inn oc uous than dam nin g” ); United States v. G reen , 111 F

. 3d 5 15, 14 523 (7 th C ir

. 199 7) ( co nc lud ing vio la tio n w as not f la gr an t w he re the re w as no 15 ev ide nc e of ba d f

ai th p oli ce c ondu ct ); U

nit ed Sta tes v . B oone , 62 F

. 3d 3 23, 325 ( 10th 16 Ci r. 199 5) ( ac know le dgi ng tha t, wher e an off ic er a ct ed upo n m ist ak enbe lie f in 17 vio la tin g th e Fo urth Am en dm en t, suc h c ondu ct did not r ise to the le ve l of

f la gr an t 18 m isc ondu ct in atte nuatio n a na ly sis ); U nit ed Sta tes v . P im en tal , 645 F

. 2d 8 5, 86- 87 19 (1st Cir. 1981 ) (c onclud ing th at w here an officer acted on a m istaken belief that 20 consent had b een given, a F ourth Am endm ent violatio n was not flagrant m iscondu ct). 21 T he e xc lus ion ar

y ru le ex ist s to disc our ag e poli ce m isc ondu ct

. Appl ic at ionof the r ule10

1 w he n po lic e ac tio n, tho ugh e rr one ous, w as not und er ta ke n inaf

la gr an t and 2 purpos eful violation of the suspect’ s protected rights do es nothin g to further that 3 purpos e. Thus, absent any evidence of bad fa ith, knowledge, o r i nv e st i ga t ory purpose, 4 w e co nc lud e tha t D ep uty Se el y ’ s fir st stop of D ef en dant, w hil e a Fo urth A m en dm en t 5 vio la tio n, w as ne ith er f la gr an t no r pur

pose fu l m isc ondu ct

f or pur pose s of our 6 atte nuatio n ana ly sis

. T he thi rd Brown factor therefore we ighs in favor of the State. 7 { 17} W eighing the three Br o wn fa ct o rs t o g et h er , we co n cl u d e t h at De fe n d an t ’s 8 Fourth A m endm ent claim m ust f ail. As such, we turn to an analy sis o f w h et her 9 D ef en dant f ar es be tte r unde r A rt ic le II , Se ct ion 10 of the N ewMe xic o C onst itu tio n. 10 3. A tt en ua ti on U nd er A rt ic le II, S ec ti on 10 11 { 18} De fendant sugg ests that und er A rticle II , S ection 10, we shoul d afford the third 12 Brown fac tor “ little or no value.” In support of this p ositio n, D efendant argues that 13 the third factor em

bodi es t he purpos e o f th e exclus ionary rule u nder the United State s 14 Co nst itu tio n and that it di ff er s so sig nif

ic an tly f ro m the pur pose s dr ivi ng the 15 ex cl usi onary ru le in N ew Me xic o th at the thi rd Brown fa ct or is r en de re d su pe rf luo us. 16 Under the f

act s o f t h i s case, even if w e w ere to assum e argu en do De fe n d an t ’s 17 an al y sis is co rr ec t, he w oul d no t pr ev ai l; w e the re fo re do n ot n ee d to a ddr es s 18 Defen da nt ’s con te nt io n. 19 { 19} Re m ovi ng con sid er at ionof the thi rd Brown fa ct or w oul d re sul t in ana na ly sis 20 based solely

on the tem

poral proxim ity

and intervening event fac tors alone because, 21 as D ef

en dant c la im s inhis br ie f, tho se fa ct or s “ ha ve m or e to d o w ithe sta bli shi ng a11

1 ca usa l c onne ct ion ” an yw ay . H er e, the te m por al pr oxi m ity

of the il le ga l a ct s and the 2 ev ide nc e soug ht t o be supp re sse d is a m inu te at be st. H ow ev er , the int er ve nin g e ve nt 3 of De fendant’ s release and his begin ning to leave w eighs stron gly in the State’ s favor, 4 ju s t a s itdi d i n t he Fo ur th Am en dm en t an al y si s. See State v. He rnan dez , 1 997- 5 N MC A

- 0 0 6 , ¶

3 4 , 1 2 2 N

. M

. 8 0 9 , 9 3 2 P

. 2 d4 9 9 ( f i n d i n g n o a t t e n u a t i o n w h e r e t he 6 de fe ndant w as in co nst an t c ust od y betw ee n th e ill eg al de te nti on and h er giv ing 7 co nse nt t o se ar chde spi te no ind ep en de nt j ur isd ic tio n on the part of the pol ic e to d o 8 so). F ollowing Defendant’ s propos ed interpretation of attenuation, we are therefore 9 le ft t o b al an ce t he se two fact or s, n ei th er o f whi ch weig hs in fav orof De fen da nt

. 10 { 20} E va lua tin g a tte nua tio n is ahig hly f ac t- spe ci fi c pr oc es s. I n Sta te v . F igu er oa , 1 1 w e not e d t h a t e v a l u a t i n g i n t e rv e n i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s w a s l i m i t e d t o t h e f a c t s of the 12 ca se : “ A dif

fe re nt r es ult m ay oc cur w he re an of fi ce r is c ar ef

ul t o c le ar ly

e sta bli sh a 13 tr an sf orm at ionin the e nc ount er . ” 2010 -N MC A -0 48, ¶ ¶ 33, 35, 148 N

. M. 811 , 242 14 P. 3d 37 8. A n officer

could not m ore clearly

im press upon a suspect that his encoun ter 15 w ithapol ic e of

fi ce r ha s te rm ina te d th ana llo w ing him to le av e, a s D ep uty

S ee ly did 16 h er e. Thou gh Defe ndant’s f reedom to leave the stop was short-lived, he w as 17 unqu es tio nably

r el ea se d f

ro m the e nc ount er , a nd h ad

put his tr uc k in m oti on t o le av e 18 w he n D ep uty

S ee ly w as c al le d ba ck

to the sc en e. H er e, w he re the re w as ac om ple te 19 end to the first stop and a clear b eginnin g to the sub sequent sto p, attenuation between 2 0 t h e t w o s t o p s , i n b o t h t i me a n dp u r p o s e , i s c o mp l e t e . T h e s h o rta mo u n to f t i me 21 be twee n t he two is no t s ig ni fic an t t o o uran al y si s h ere.12

1 { 21} T ak ing a ll of

the c ir cu m stanc es sur

ro undi ng the inc ide nt i nto co ns ide ratio n, 2 id

. ¶ 33, w e co nc lud e tha t the e xis te nc e of a n inter ve nin g e ve nt o utw ei ghs the 3 im porta nc e of an y

te m por al pr oxi m ity

und er the f ac ts o f thi s c as e be ca

use the 4 a t t e nu a t i o n a n a l ys i s i s , ab o v e a l l , a i med a tp r e v e n t i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n o f a n i l l e g a l i t y. 5 W ong Sun , 371 U

. S. a t 48 8. N ot o nly is the re no e vid en ce of suc h expl oit at ionin thi s 6 ca se , D ep uty

S ee ly ’ s r el ea se of

D ef en dant i s e vid en ce that he harb or ed no e xpe ct at ion 7 th athe wou ldan y

lo ng er o bt ai n a ny evi de nc e “ as a di rect res ul t o f” t he fir st st op . Id

. 8 at 485

. T hus, D ep uty

S ee ly r et ur ne d D ef en dant t o th e posi tio n th at he woul d have 9 be en in ha d h is rig ht s no t be en vi ol at ed , i.e. , tr aveling do wn the road of his own f ree 10 w ill , be fo re the se co nd s top

. Whe n D ef en dant w as sto ppe d th e se co nd t im e, the ba sis 11 fo r th e st op was u n rel at edto th e fi rs t en co un te r as if t he fir st ha d n ot oc cu rred

. See 12 W agon er , 200 1- N MC A -0 14, ¶ 30 ( statin g purp ose of

state ex cl us ionar

y r ule is 13 accom

plish ed by

“ doin g no m ore than return the parties to where they stood before 14 the r igh t w as vio la te d. ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ))

. Be ca use 15 De fendant does not prevail on this issue, w e need not address the State’ s additio nal 16 argum ent that evidence o b t ai ned during the second stop shoul d not b e excluded 17 because of the independent so urce doctrine. 18 B. C on se ntt o S ea rc h th e R ec ei ptBo ok 19 { 22} H av ing co nc lud ed that e vid en ce obt ai ne d duri ng the se co nd s top ne ed not be 20 ex cl ude d a s f

ru it of apoi sono us tr ee , w e ne xt a ddr es s D ef en dant’ s a sse rt ionthat the 21 dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in de ny ing his m oti on to supp re ss the co nte nts of the r ec ei pt b ook,13

1 save the single receipt for t h e van that he wa s towing. T he State a sserts that 2 D ef en dant co nse nte d to D ep uty S ee ly ’ s se ar chof

the e nti re r ec ei pt b ook by handi ng 3 it ove r dur ing the sto p w ith out qua lif y ing or li m iti ng tha t c onse nt. 4 { 23} The scope of a consensual search is d ef i n ed b y, and lim ited to, the actual 5 co ns en t g iv en . Sta te v . G arc ia , 1999 -N MC A -0 97, ¶ 9, 127 N

. M. 695, 986 P. 2d 4 91. 6 T he sc ope of

c onsen t is a

n ob j ec tiv e inquir

y , c onstra ine d by

the bounds of 7 reas on ab le ne ss . State v. M osley , 2014-NMC A- 094, ¶ 24, 335 P. 3d 244. Courts m ay 8 re ly on s oc ia l no rm s w he n de te rm ini ng “ w ha t a r ea sona ble pe rs on w oul d have 9 u n d ersto od bythe exchange betwe en the officer and the susp ect. ” G arc ia , 1 9 9 9- 10 N MC A -0 97, ¶

9. Co urts m

ust a lso c onsi de r “ w ha t a pol ic e of fi ce r co uld

r ea sona bly 11 interpret the consent to encom pass.” Id

. ¶ 13 ( int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 12 om it te d) . A sear ch is in va li d i f it ex ceed s t he sco pe of t he co ns en t g iv en . Id

. ¶ 9. 13 { 24} T he e vid en ce sho ws tha t D ep uty S ee ly appr oa ch ed

D ef en dant’ s tr

uc k and 14 req ue st ed

doc um en ta tio n sp ec if

ic to the van intow : “ Can y ou s howm e a bil l of 15 lading again? Your m anifest to pick this up? ” D efendant com plied. While looking at 16 the r ec ei pt speci fi c to the van, D ep uty S ee ly que sti one d D ef

en dant a s to the 17 inf orm at ionit co nta ine d and ran a che ck on the dr ive r’ s lic en se num be r lis te d onthe 1 8 re ce i p t . S t i l l h o l d i n g t h e re ce i p tb o o k , De p u t y Se el y wa l k ed aw ay fr o m De fe n d an t ’s 19 dr ive r’ s si de doo r, j oin ed tw o othe r of

fi ce rs at the r ear of

the tr uc k, a nd b eg anle af

ing 20 thr oughthe r ec ei pt b ook.1 6 W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e S t a t e ’ s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t c o n s e n t m u s t b e e x a c t l y

a nd 6 17 co nc lus ive ly

li m ite d, r equir ing suc h aqua lif ic at ion se em s unre al ist ic in l igh t of the 18 stark rea lity

that such statem ents could g ive rise to the “ susp icious” or “ furtive” 19 be ha vi or th at of

te n gi ve s ri se to pro ba bl e cau se or r eas on ab le su sp ic io n. See State v. 20 Leyv a , 201 1- N MS C- 009, ¶ 24, 149 N

. M. 439, 250 P. 3d 8 61 ( quot ing United States 21 v. B room

fie ld , 417 F. 3d 65 4, 65 5 (7th Cir. 2005) (“ Whether y ou stand still or m ove, 22 dr ive above , be low , or at the spe ed li m it, y ou w ill be de sc ri be d by the pol ic e as a ct ing 23 susp iciouslyshoul d they wish to stop o r ar

rest y ou.”))

. 14 1 { 25} T he S ta te a sks us t o c onc lud e tha t D ef en dant’ s f

ai lur e to l im it or

qua lif y his 2 co nse nt c onst itu te s a br oa d, swe ep ing state m en t of c onse nt tha t e nc om

pa sse d th e 3 en tir e re ce ipt

boo k. W e de cl ine to dr awsuc h a co nc lu si on unde r the f ac ts o f thi s 6 4 case. De putySee ly

m ade a specif

ic request to see the rece i p t for a specific vehicle, 5 an d D ef

en dant c om

pli ed w iththat re que st by ope nin g the re ce ipt book to the r el ev an t 6 p ag e. A rea s o n ab l e p er s o n i n t h at s i tu at i o n wo u l d h av e u n d er s t o o d D e f e n d an t ’s 7 co nse nt t o have be enli m ite d to tha t spe ci fi c pa ge or doc um en t. I t w as not

r ea sona ble 8 fo r Se el y

to as sum e tha t phy sic al poss es sio n of the r ec ei pt b ook, w hic h w as giv ento 9 fa ci lit at e a cl ose ins pe ct ion of the inf orm at ion on the re ce ipt , al low ed hi m to flip 10 thr oughthe en tir e re ce ipt book an d ex am ine the c ont en ts o f al l pa ge s. D ep uty S ee ly 11 asked only for th e si ngle rece ipt rather than the entire receipt book , and he received 12 the specific page he r equested. W e theref ore conclude that Def

endant’ s consent was 13 lim ite d to the r ec ei pt f or the va n, an d th at

S ee ly im pe rm iss ibl y

e xpande d th e sc ope 14 of that consent. As such, the contents of the receipt book, and ev i d en ce obtained 15 the re fr om , sho uld

be sup pr es se d. H ow ev er , be ca use D ep uty Seely

obt ai ne d th e15

1 re ce ipt w ithD ef

en dant’ s c onse nt, the sin gle r ec ei pt f or the van ne ed not

be 2 supp re sse d. 3 { 26} T ha t sa id, our

de ci sio n r eg ar din g th e ex cl usi on o f the r ec ei pt b ook doe s no t 4 rem ove Deputy

See ly ’ s probable cause for ar rest, as it appears fr om

the evidence that 5 Dep ut yS ee ly

r anac he ck

on the ( ult im at el y

f al se ) dr ive r’ s li ce nse num be r on the 6 re ce ipt be fo re f lip pin g thr ough the re st of the re ce ipt book

. T hus, w he n D ep uty S ee ly 7 dis co ve re d th at

the li ce nse num

be r did not m at ch the na m e an d ad dr es s giv en on the 8 re ce ipt , he ha d pr oba

ble c au se to be lie ve D ef en dant h ad

c om m it te d a fe lon y

a nd 9 ex ig en cy

co ul d b e p res um ed

. Se e Ca m pos v. Sta te , 1994-NMS C-012, ¶ 14, 117 N. M. 10 155, 870 P

. 2d 1 17 ( statin g th at fo r a w ar rantl es s ar

re st to be re as ona

ble , the a rr es tin g 11 officer

m ust have probabl e cause and som e exigency m ust exis t; where an office r 12 “ observes the person arrested com m itting a fe lony , e xigency will be pre su m ed ”); 13 State v. Paana nen , 2015-NMS C-031, ¶ 26, 35 7 P. 3 d 9 5 8 (holding that “ there ar e 14 other s i t

uations in which an exigency not necessarily

am ount ing to an im

m inent threat 15 of d an g er, escape, or lost evidence will be sufficient to re nder rea sonable a 16 w ar rantl es s pu

bli c ar re st s uppo rt ed

by pr oba ble cau se und er

the tot al ity

of the 17 ci rc um stanc es ”) ; S ec tio n 30 -1 6D -1 (A ) (l ist ing the “ ta kin g of a ve hi cl e or m oto r 18 ve hi cl e” as a fel on y

off en se ). 19 C. De finition of “Veh icle” Un der NM SA1978 , § 66-1-4. 12 (B) (2007, am ende d 20 2016 ) 21 { 27} D ef

en dant’ s appe al al so r ai se s th e que sti on o f w he the r the te rm s “ ve hic le ” or 22 “ m oto r ve hic le ” can be int er pr et ed to co ve r the van inv olv ed in thi s c as e. D ef

en dant16

1 first raised this issue in hi s pro se m otion to dism is s , which the district court 2 interpreted as a m otion under F oul en fon t , 1995-NMC A- 028, ¶ 5 (deem ing it p roper 3 fo r the dis tr ic t c ourt to dism iss c ri m ina l c harg es on p ur el y le ga l gr ound s w he n th e 4 district court assum es the fac ts und erly ing th e char ges ar e t ru e). The district court 5 de ni edth e m ot io n, d eem i n g th e is su e a q ue st io n o f fac t fo r th e jury to d eci de

. See 6 State v. H

ughey , 200 7- N MS C- 036, ¶ 11, 142 N

. M. 83, 163 P

. 3d 4 70 ( statin g th e ru le 7 tha t “ w he re am oti on i nvol ve s f ac tua l m atte rs that ar e no t capabl e of r es olu tio n 8 w ith out at r i a l o n t h e m e r i t s , t h e t r i a l c o u rtl a c k s t h e au t h o r i t y t o g r a n tt h e m o t i on 9 prior to trial”). If the State c o uld reasonablyassert the availability of additional 10 e v id en ce, p ret ria l d is m is sa l u nd er Ru le 5-6 01 (B) NM RA is in ap pr op ria te

. State v. 11 Gom ez , 200 3- N MS C- 012, ¶ 7, 133 N

. M. 763 , 70 P

. 3d 7 53. W e re view i ss ue s of 12 st atut ory

in te rp ret at io n d e n ov o. Sta te v . Ca rbaj al , 2002-NMS C-019, ¶ 3, 132 N. M. 13 326, 48 P

. 3d 6 4. Whe n a stat ute “ spe ci fi ca lly

de fi ne s ate rm , w e int er

pr et the statut e 14 acco rd in g t o t ho se de fin it io ns , bec au s e th os e d efi ni ti on s re fle ctleg is la ti ve in te nt .” 15 Sta te v . Sm ith , 20 09 -NMCA- 02 8, ¶ 1 3, 1 45 N.M. 75 7, 2 04 P.3d 12 67

. 16 { 28} D ef

en da nt as se rt s th at

the van inque sti on i n th is c as e is a “ nonr ep ai ra

ble 17 ve hic le ” unde r the Co de , Se ct ion 66- 1- 4. 12( B) , rathe r than a “ ve hic le ” or “ m oto r 18 ve hic le ” as na m ed

in Se ct ion30- 16D -1. Th e St at e as se rt s th at the van satis fi es the 19 de fi nit ion of “ ve hic le ” unde r the Co de

. S ec tio n 30 -1 6D -1 (A ) pr ohi bit s th e unl aw fu l 20 ta kin g of a ve hic le or m oto r ve hic le

. I t de fi ne s an un law fu l t ak ing a s “ a pe rs on t ak ing 21 an y ve hic le or

m oto r ve hic le a s de fi ne d by the Mo tor

V eh ic le Co de

. . . int en tio na lly2 0 T h e C o d e r e qu i r e s n o n r e p a i r ab l e v e h i c l e c e rt i f i c a t e s , w h i c h i s a“ v e h i cl e 7 21 ow ne rs hip doc um en t c onsp ic uous ly la be le d ‘ N O N RE PA IR

A BL E ’ iss ue d to the 22 owner[ .] ” Se ction 66 -1-4.12(C)

. 17 1 and without consent of the owner. ” Id

. The C ode defines a “ vehicle” as “ every device 2 in, upon or by w hic h an y pe rs on or pr ope rty is or m ay be tr an spor

te d or dr awn up on 3 a hig hw ay , inc lud ing a ny f ram e, c hass is , body

or uni tiz ed f ram e an d bo dy

of a ny 4 vehicle or m otor vehicle, except devices m oved exclusively by hum an power or used 5 ex cl u sively

upon stationary

rails or tra cks[.] ” N MSA1978 , § 66-1-4. 19(B) (2005). 6 The C ode defines a “ m otor vehicle” as “ every vehicle that is self-propelled and every 7 vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained fr om batteries or f

rom overhead 8 tro ll ey wire s, bu t no t op erat edup on rai ls [.]” NMSA 19 78 , § 6 6- 1- 4.1 1( H) (2 01 5) . A 9 “ nonr ep ai ra

ble ve hic le ” is “ a ve hic le of aty pe oth er w ise sub j ec t t o re gis tr at ionthat: 7 10 (1 ) h as no resale value exce pt as a source of parts or scrap m etal” and has been 11 “ ir re ve rs ibl y

de sig na t[ ed ] ” as suc h; o r (2 ) ha s be enstr ipp ed as a re sul t of the ft a nd 12 “ ha s litt le or no re sa le va lue oth er than it s w orth a s asourc e of ave hic le ide nti fi catio n 13 nu m be r th atco ul d b e u se d i ll eg al ly[.] ” Sec ti on 66 -1 -4 .12 (B)( 1) -(2 ). 14 { 29} The e vidence contai n ed in the record re veals that Castro purchased the van 15 knowing th at its engine w as not w orking, but w ith an ey e toward m aking re pairs that 16 w oul d e ve ntu al ly

r en de r it ope ra

bl e. T he van ha d asm as he d w ind ow , w as m iss ing 17 head l i g h t s , and the previou s owner had used it for parts. T he State a sserted that 18 Ca str o m ay

ha ve c hange d hi s m ind

r eg ar din g th is i ssu e, but

be fo re a ct ing to fi x or

sti p 19 the van, the van was taken from his poss ession withou t his cons ent. T he State f urther18

1 poi nte d out in its m oti on tha t the re w as no “ nonr ep ai ra ble ve hic le c er

tif ic at e” f or the 2 ve hic le in que sti on. 3 { 30} Ba se d onthe f

ac ts i n th e re co rd , thi s is am atte r to b e reso lv ed by the f ac t4 fi nde r dur ing tr ia l. T he statut or y de fi nit ion s and the li m ite d e vid en ce pr es en te d pr ior 5 to tri al r ev ea l tha t the f

ac t- fi nde r co uld re as ona

bly co nc lud e tha t the van w as ave hic le 6 or a nonrepairable vehicle. Beca use it is no t clear

what e vidence could be presented 7 at tr ia l or how the fa ct -f

ind er w oul d w ei gh the e vid en ce pr es en te d, it is ina ppr opr ia te 8 fo r th is Co ur t to sp ecu la te as t o t he ou tc om e o f th is fact ua l i ss ue . See Hughey , 200 7- 9 N MS C- 036, ¶

16 ( “ It is the r ole of

the f ac t[ -] fi nde r to j udge the c re dib il it yof 10 witnesses and determ ine the we i g ht of evidence.”) . W e theref ore af firm the district 11 co urt’ s de nia l of

D ef en dant’ s m oti on. 12 III. CON CLU SION 13 { 31} T he re w as suf

fi ci en t a tte nua tio n be tw ee n th e fi rs t and s ec ond sto p to pur ge a ny 14 ta int res ult ing f

ro m the il le ga l f

ir st s top

. E vid en ce obt ai ne d f ro m the r ec ei pt b ook, 15 ex ce pt the r ec ei pt fo r the van, how ev er , m ust be ex cl ude d be ca

use D ep uty Se el y

onl y 16 obt ai ne d co nse nt fo r the re ce ipt al one . A s suc h, fl ipp ing thr oughthe r es t of the r ec ei pt 1 7 b o o kwa s an i m

p er m i s s i b l e e x p an s i o n o f t h e s co p e o f D ef en d an t ’s co n s en t . We 18 part ia lly

r ev er se the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ni al of D ef en dant’ s m oti on t o su

ppr es s th e 19 re ce ipt book , ex cl udi ng tha t gr eate r portio n of the boo k oth er

tha n the r ec ei pt r el ev an t 20 to the ve hic le in que sti on, pe rm itt ed by D ef en dant’ s c onse nt. Ba se d onthi s r ev er sa l, 21 we rem and to the dis trict court to afford Def endant a chance to w ithdraw his plea,19

1 sh ou ld he de em it prud en t to do so . Se e Sta te v . H odge , 199 4- N MS C- 087, ¶ 20, 118 2 N.M. 41 0, 882 P

. 2d 1 ( statin g th e ru le that i f a de fe ndant p re va ils on a ppe al , he is 3 allowed to w ithdraw his plea). 4 { 32} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

5 6 R OD ERIC K T . KE N N ED Y , Ju dg e

7 WE CO NCUR:

8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 9 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e

10

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 11 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e