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Page 1 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

Good morning Chairman Clay, Ranking Member Turner, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here this morning on behalf of the U.S. Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC) to discuss the changes in voting system requirements that 

have been effectuated by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and the role that 

EAC plays in supporting the States and local governments in implementing HAVAcompliant voting systems. 

INTRODUCTION

EAC is a bipartisan commission consisting of four members: Donetta Davidson, Chair; 

Rosemary Rodriguez, Vice Chair; Gracia Hillman; and Caroline Hunter. EAC’s mission 

is to guide, assist, and direct the effective administration of Federal elections through 

funding, innovation, guidance, information and regulation. In doing so, EAC has focused 

on fulfilling its obligations under HAVA and the National Voter Registration Act 

(NVRA). EAC has employed four strategic objectives to meet these statutory 

requirements: Distribution and Management of HAVA Funds, Aiding in the 

Improvement of Voting Systems, National Clearinghouse of Election Information, and 

Guidance and Information to the States. The topic of this hearing involves our strategic 

efforts to aid in the improvement of voting systems and to provide guidance and 

information to States to assist in improving the voting process. These programs and 

EAC’s efforts to assist States with implementing voting systems and procedures to 

safeguard those systems will be discussed in more detail below. 

VOTING SYSTEMS

Effective administration of voting systems requires the use of accurate, reliable, 

accessible and auditable voting systems. There are various opinions on what constitutes 

accurate, reliable, accessible and auditable, but one clear source is the Help America Vote 

Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA establishes a number of requirements for voting systems, 

including that the system: 

o Allow the voter the ability to change his or her selections prior to casting a vote; 

o Notify the voter of an overvote and the consequences of casting an overvote; 

o Provide a permanent paper record of the election that is auditable; 

o Provide accessibility to individuals with disabilities including persons who are 

blind or visually impaired; 

o Provide accessibility to persons for whom English is not their first language when 

required by Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act; and 

o Meet or exceed the error rate as established in the 2002 Voting System Standards 

developed by the Federal Election Commission. 

See HAVA Section 301; 42 U.S.C. Section 15481. This section requires that all voting 

systems used in an election for Federal office meet or exceed these requirements. States 
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

could use HAVA funding to purchase voting systems that meet or exceed these 

requirements. A chart showing the funds distributed to each State is found on EAC’s 

Web site, www.eac.gov. 

In addition, HAVA also required EAC to develop guidelines for testing voting systems 

and required EAC to establish a program for the testing of voting systems using federally 

accredited laboratories. These guidelines and testing and accreditation processes 

establish a means to determine whether voting systems meet the base-line requirements 

of HAVA and the more descriptive and demanding standards of the voluntary voting 

system guidelines developed by EAC. This process provides assurance to election 

officials and members of the public that the voting systems that they use will perform in a 

manner that is accurate, reliable, accessible and auditable. 

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)

One of EAC’s most important mandates is the testing, certification, decertification and 

recertification of voting system hardware and software. Fundamental to implementing 

this key function is the development of updated voting system guidelines, which 

prescribe the technical requirements for voting system performance and identify testing 

protocols to determine how well systems meet these requirements. EAC along with its 

Federal advisory committee, the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), 

and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), work together to develop 

voluntary testing standards. 

History of Voting System Standards and Guidelines

The first set of national voting system standards (VSS) was created in 1990 by the 

Federal Election Commission (FEC). In 2002, FEC updated the standards and HAVA 

mandated that EAC develop a new iteration of the standards—which would be known as 

the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)—to address advancements in 

information security and computer technologies as well as improve usability. 

HAVA mandated a 9-month period for the TGDC to develop the initial set of VVSG. The 

TGDC, working with NIST, technology experts, accessibility experts, and election 

officials, completed the first draft and delivered it to EAC in May 2005. In addition to 

providing technical support to the TGDC, NIST also reviewed the 2002 Voting System 

Standards (2002 VSS) to identify issues to be addressed in the 2005 guidelines, drafted 

core functional requirements, categorized requirements into related groups of 

functionality, identified security gaps, provided recommendations for implementing a 

voter-verifiable paper audit trail, and provided usability requirements. NIST also updated 

the VVSG’s conformance clause and glossary. 

On December 13, 2005, EAC adopted the first iteration of the Voluntary Voting System 
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

Standards (VVSG). Before the adoption of the VVSG, EAC conducted a thorough and 

transparent public comment process. After conducting an initial review of the draft 

VVSG, EAC released the two-volume proposed guidelines for public comment for a 

period of 90 days; during this period, EAC received more than 6,000 comments. Each 

comment was reviewed and considered before the document was finalized and adopted. 

The agency also held public hearings about the VVSG in New York City, NY, Pasadena, 

CA, and Denver, CO. 

The VVSG was an initial update to the 2002 Voting System Standards focusing primarily 

on improving the standards for accessibility, usability and security. The VVSG also 

establishes the testing methods for assessing whether a voting system meets the 

guidelines. In many areas, these guidelines provide more information and guidance than 

HAVA. For example, these testing guidelines incorporated standards for reviewing 

voting systems equipped with voter verifiable paper audit trails (VVPAT) in recognition 

of the many States that now require this technology. Likewise, in the area of 

accessibility, the guidelines require that if the VVPAT is used as the official ballot, the 

paper record be made accessible to persons with disabilities, including persons with 

visual impairments or disabilities. Volume I of the VVSG, Voting System Performance 

Guidelines, includes new voluntary requirements for accessibility, usability, voting 

system software distribution, system setup validation, and wireless communications. It 

provides an overview of the voluntary requirements for independent verification systems, 

including voluntary requirements for a voter-verified paper audit trail for States that 

require this feature for their voting systems. Volume I also includes the requirement that 

all voting system vendors submit software to a national repository, which will allow local 

election officials to make sure the voting system software that they purchase is the same 

software that was certified. 

 Volume II of the VVSG, National Certification Testing Guidelines, describes the 

components of the national certification testing process for voting systems, which will be 

performed by independent voting system test labs accredited by EAC. EAC is mandated 

by HAVA to develop a national program to accredit test laboratories and certify, 

decertify, and recertify voting systems. The VVSG and the comments received from the 

public about the guidelines are available at www.eac.gov. 

The Future of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Significant work remains to be done to fully develop a comprehensive set of guidelines 

and testing methods for assessing voting systems and to ensure that they keep pace with 

technological advances. TGDC and NIST have been working since the development of 

the initial iteration of the VVSG in 2005 to revise that version and to completely review 

and update the 2002 Voting System Standards that were developed by the FEC. The next 

iteration of the VVSG, which EAC anticipates receiving from TGDC sometime later this 

year, will include the following elements: 
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

o Software independence – use of verifiable voting records for independent audits; 

o Prohibition of RF wireless; 

o A process to include new and innovative voting systems with greater usability, 

accessibility, and security; 

o Improved methods for measuring reliability and accuracy of voting systems; 

o Improved and updated usability and accessibility requirements; 

o Improved requirements for the overall reliability of voter verifiable paper audit 

trail voting systems. 

In addition to this work, NIST is working to develop a uniform set of test methods that 

can be applied to the testing of voting equipment. Currently, accredited laboratories 

develop their own test methods to test voting equipment. After the completion of these 

uniform test methods, every accredited lab will use the same test to determine if a voting 

system conforms to the VVSG. This is a long and arduous process as test methods must 

be developed for each type and make of voting system. Work is beginning in 2007 on 

these methods, but will likely take several years to complete. 

Voting system testing and certification and laboratory accreditation program

Accreditation of Voting System Testing Laboratories

HAVA Section 231 requires EAC and NIST to develop a national program for 

accrediting voting system testing laboratories. The National Voluntary Laboratory 

Accreditation Program (NVLAP) of NIST provides for the initial screening and 

evaluation of testing laboratories and will perform periodic re-evaluation to verify that 

the labs continue to meet the accreditation criteria. When NIST has determined that a lab 

is competent to test systems, the NIST director recommends to EAC that a lab be 

accredited. EAC then makes the determination to accredit the lab. EAC issues an 

accreditation certificate to approved labs, maintains a register of accredited labs and posts 

this information on its Web site. 

HAVA required that NIST deliver its first set of recommended labs to the EAC “[n]ot 

later than 6 months after the Commission first adopts the voluntary voting system 

guidelines.” See HAVA Section 231(b), 42 U.S.C. 15371(b). This deadline passed in 

June 2006. Four laboratories applied to NIST for evaluation prior to the HAVA deadline, 

but the required technical reviews and on-site assessments were not completed by the 

deadline. The first set of NIST recommended laboratories were not received by the EAC 

until January 18, 2007. EAC conducted additional review of the laboratories’ conflict of 

interest policies, organizational structure, and record keeping protocols. This review was 
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

conducted efficiently, so that EAC could move forward with accrediting the first voting 

system testing laboratories under its new program. The first two laboratories were 

accredited by EAC at its public meeting on February 21, 2007. These two labs are now 

accredited to test to the 2005 VSS. 

The Need for EAC Interim Accreditation of Laboratories 

Obviously, the need for EAC to provide accredited laboratories arose well before NIST’s 

January 18 recommendation. First, toward the end of 2005, NIST informed the EAC that 

the expected timeline to complete required document collection and review, preassessment and formal on-site assessments of applicants made it highly unlikely that it 

would be able to provide a list of recommended laboratories before the end of 2006. This 

determination made it clear that the EAC would need to have an alternative, temporary 

process in place to provide accredited laboratories if it wished to implement its 

certification program in time for the 2006 election. Furthermore, in July of 2006, the 

National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) informed EAC that the 

organization was terminating its voting system qualification program. NASED is a nongovernmental, private organization that accredited laboratories and qualified voting 

systems to federal standards for more than a decade. The organization’s decision to 

terminate its voting system qualification program just before the 2006 general election 

required EAC to take immediate action. Without an entity to approve required voting 

system modifications for the 2006 election, some state election officials would be unable 

to field their HAVA-compliant systems. To address these situations, EAC was 

compelled to do two things (1) provide for interim, temporary accreditation of testing 

laboratories to test to the 2002 VSS and (2) initiate a preliminary, pre-election phase of 

its voting system testing and certification program.1 

EAC needed to provide 2002 VSS-accredited labs on a temporary, interim basis to ensure 

that the agency had the means to implement its certification program. Additionally, EAC 

would be compelled to implement a provisional, pre-election certification program to 

 

1

 The pre-election phase of EAC’s certification program was not originally planned, but was ultimately 

required to serve election officials and the public. The program began on July 24, 2006. The purpose of the 

pre-election phase of the program is to provide voting system manufacturers with a means to obtain a 

Federal Certification of voting system modifications during the vital period immediately prior to the 

November 2006 General Elections. Many states require a Federal or national certification as a condition of 

state certification. Historically, the three to four month period immediately preceding a General Election 

produces a number of emergent situations that require the prompt modification of voting systems. These 

changes are often required by state or local election officials and must be made prior to Election Day. To 

this end, the pre-election phase of the EAC’s Certification Program was designed to meet the immediate 

needs of election officials from the date NASED terminated its qualification program until after the 

November 2006 General Election. The pre-election requirements of the certification program were 

narrowly tailored to meet these needs. Additionally, the pre-election phase of the program was drastically 

limited in scope, (1) it did not certify voting systems, just modifications and (2) the certification was 

provisional and, thus, expired after the November 2006 election. 
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

replace services offered by NASED. EAC could not wait for NIST to recommend 

laboratories. Fortunately, HAVA provided a mechanism for EAC to take such action in 

Section 231(b)(2)(B). This section requires that EAC publish an explanation when 

accrediting a laboratory without a NIST recommendation. A notice was published on 

EAC’s Web site (www.eac.gov) to satisfy this requirement. 

EAC’s Interim Accreditation Program 

At a public meeting in August 2005 held in Denver, the commissioners received a staff 

recommendation outlining the details of the interim accreditation program. The staff 

recommendation included a process in which the three laboratories previously accredited 

by NASED – CIBER, SysTest Labs, and Wyle Laboratories – would be allowed to apply 

for interim accreditation. In December of 2005, EAC officially began accepting 

applications for a limited interim accreditation program. As stated in the letters, the 

purpose of the interim accreditation program was to provide accredited laboratories that 

could test voting systems to federal standards, until such time as NIST/NVLAP was able 

to present its first set of recommended laboratories. This accreditation was limited in 

scope to the 2002 Voluntary Voting System Standards and required the laboratory to 

apply to the NVLAP program with the intent to receive a permanent accreditation. The 

letters also sought variety of administrative information from the laboratories and 

required them to sign a Certification of Laboratory Conditions and Practices. This 

certification required the laboratories to affirm, under penalty of law, information 

regarding laboratory personnel, conflict of interest policies, recordkeeping, financial 

stability, technical capabilities, contractors, and material changes. 

In order to accredit a laboratory, even on an interim basis, EAC needed to contract with a 

competent technical expert to serve as a laboratory assessor. EAC sought a qualified 

assessor with real-world experience in the testing of voting systems. The contractor 

reviewed each of the laboratories that applied. The review was performed in accordance 

with international standards, the same standards used by NVLAP and other laboratory 

accreditation bodies. This standard is known as International Standard ISO/IEC 17025, 

General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. In 

addition, the EAC assessor (who also currently serves as a NVLAP assessor) applied 

NIST Handbooks 150, Procedures and General Requirements and NIST Handbook 150-

22, Voting System Testing. 

CIBER, SysTest Labs, and Wyle Laboratories applied for accreditation under the interim 

program. Each, as required, had previously received a NASED accreditation. EAC’s 

assessor visited each of the labs and conducted a review consistent with the standards 

noted above. The assessor reviewed laboratory policies, procedures and capabilities to 

determine if the laboratories could perform the work required. Laboratory assessments 

do not make conclusions regarding past laboratory work product. Two of the applicant 

laboratories, SysTest Laboratories, L.L.C., and Wyle Laboratories, Inc. received an 
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Page 7 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

interim accreditation. The assessor’s reports and EAC action regarding these laboratories 

are available on the EAC Web site, www.eac.gov.

2

 EAC promptly published on its Web 

site information regarding its decision on accreditation (August and September of 2006). 

This notice provides some brief background on the interim accreditation process, starting 

with the fact that three previously NASED accredited laboratories were invited to apply 

to the program, including information on the program’s requirements and limitations, and 

ending with the identity and contact information of the two laboratories accredited. 

Information was also electronically forwarded to EAC’s list of stakeholders via e-mail. 

The EAC stakeholders e-mail list includes almost 900 election officials and interest 

groups, nationwide. Staff members for EAC oversight and appropriations committees are 

included in this list of stakeholders. In addition to EAC’s Web site and e-mail 

announcements, on September 21, 2006 EAC’s Executive Director reiterated the 

Commission’s decision at a public meeting Web cast to the EAC Web site. This 

announcement identified the interim accredited labs by name. Furthermore, in October 

26, 2006, the two interim accredited laboratories testified at EAC’s nationally televised 

public meeting. 

The Interim Accreditation Program and CIBER 

The third laboratory, CIBER, has yet to satisfy the requirements of the interim 

accreditation program. The initial assessment of CIBER revealed a number of 

management, procedural and policy deficiencies that required remedial action before the 

laboratory could be considered for accreditation. These deficiencies are identified in the 

initial CIBER/Wyle report. They were also brought to the attention of CIBER’s 

President of Federal Solutions in a letter from EAC’s Executive Director dated 

September 15, 2006. The letter outlines, consistent with recommendation of EAC’s 

assessor, the steps the laboratory must take to achieve compliance. The letter requires 

CIBER to: 

a. Assign resources, adopt policies and implement systems for developing 

standardized tests to be used in evaluating the functionality of voting 

systems and voting system software. Neither ITA Practices, CIBER nor 

any of its partners will be permitted to rely on test plans suggested by a 

voting system manufacturer. 

b. Assign resources, adopt policies and implement systems for quality review 

and control of all tests performed on voting systems and the report of 

results from those tests. This shall include provisions to assure that all 

required tests have been performed by ITA Practices, CIBER or its 

accredited partner lab. 

 

2

 Note: The Wyle and CIBER assessments were completed as a joint report. The two labs have a 

cooperative agreement to work together in testing voting systems (Wyle performing hardware testing and 

CIBER software testing). 
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

Finally, the letter required an additional “follow-up” assessment of the laboratory. 

The follow-up assessment of CIBER was performed by EAC’s assessor in December of 

2006. The findings of this assessment were documented in a report, which is available on 

the EAC Web site. In the findings, the assessor recognized significant changes CIBER 

had made to its program in response to the initial assessment, including new policies 

regarding test procedures, management and personnel. The report also noted a number of 

non-conformities that had yet to be addressed by the laboratory. 

In a letter dated January 3, 2007, CIBER provided a written response to EAC’s follow-up 

assessment and report. The response sought to address the deficiencies noted in the 

December assessment. Additionally, CIBER officials requested a meeting with EAC 

staff to discuss their January 3 response. This meeting took place at EAC on January 10, 

2007. At the meeting, EAC staff informed CIBER that their report could not serve as the 

basis of accreditation because it failed to resolve all outstanding issues. A number of 

CIBER responses to noted deficiencies were listed as “TBD.” EAC’s assessor and 

Certification Program Director formally reviewed CIBER’s response. EAC provided 

CIBER notice of the deficiencies that remained outstanding and informed them of the 

steps they must take to come into compliance by a letter dated February 1, 2007. Due to 

the fact that the purpose and usefulness of the interim accreditation program came to a 

close, EAC allowed CIBER 30 days in which to document their full compliance. After 

that time, the program was closed and no further assessment actions will be performed 

under the interim program. CIBER was notified of this procedure by letter dated January 

26, 2007, and on February 8, 2007, EAC voted to close its interim laboratory 

accreditation program effective March 5, 2007. 

Information related to CIBER’s status in the EAC interim accreditation program was not 

released prior to January 26, 2007. It was EAC’s belief, consistent with NVLAP policy, 

that it would be improper to release information regarding an incomplete assessment. 

However, on January 25, 2007, CIBER took the affirmative action of making this 

information available to a third party, the New York State Board of Elections. With this 

action, CIBER made the information public and EAC believed it was incumbent to 

provide this information to the entire public, not just the New York State Board of 

Elections. As such, on January 26, 2007, EAC posted on its Web site (www.eac.gov) 

assessment reports, correspondence, and responses from CIBER related to their progress 

in the EAC interim accreditation program. 

Since that time, EAC has received an additional response from CIBER. That response is 

currently being reviewed by our assessor. Based upon the assessor’s recommendation, 

EAC will act to accredit or to decline to accredit CIBER to test to the 2002 VSS under 

EAC’s interim laboratory accreditation program. It is important to note, however, that 

this action, even if it results in accrediting CIBER to the 2002 VSS, will not
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

automatically make CIBER eligible to test to the 2005 VVSG. CIBER’s application for 

2005 VVSG accreditation is pending before NVLAP. Until EAC receives a 

recommendation from NVLAP that CIBER should be accredited to the 2005 VVSG, 

CIBER will not be accredited to test to those standards and will not therefore possess the 

accreditation desired by New York to test voting systems for their purchase. New York 

law requires that voting systems purchase in that state are tested to the 2005 VVSG. As 

noted above, there are currently two laboratories accredited under the joint NVLAP/EAC 

program that are qualified to test to the 2005 VVSG. 

Voting System Certification

In 2007, EAC assumed the responsibility of certifying voting systems according to 

national testing guidelines. Previously, the National Association of State Election 

Directors (NASED) qualified voting systems to both the 1990 and 2002 Voting System 

Standards. EAC’s certification process constitutes the Federal government’s first efforts 

to standardize the voting system industry. 

In July 2006, EAC implemented its pre-election certification program, which only 

focused on reviewing changes or modifications that were necessary for modifications to 

systems that would be used during the November 2006 elections. Three modifications 

were reviewed and approved under the pre-election program. Those modifications were 

approved only conditionally. The condition was that the authorization for the 

modification expired after the 2006 election. After that, no modification will be 

considered unless the entire system has already received an EAC certification. 

In October 2006, EAC published for public comment its post-election certification 

program. This program encompasses an expanded and detailed review of voting systems, 

utilizing accredited laboratories and technical reviewers. EAC received over 400 

comments during the public comment period. At a public meeting on December 7, 2006, 

EAC adopted its Voting System Certification Program, which became effective on 

January 1, 2007. Since that time, nine manufacturers have registered to participate in the 

EAC program. The registration process is antecedent and required prior to a 

manufacturer submitting a system for testing. Currently, nine manufacturers are 

registered with EAC. A list of registered manufacturers is available at www.eac.gov. 

Once the manufacturer is registered, it may submit systems for testing to an EACaccredited testing laboratory. Reports from that laboratory’s assessment are provided to 

EAC for review and action. The reports are reviewed by EAC technical reviewers. If the 

report is in order and the system is in conformance with the applicable voting system 

standards or guidelines, the technical reviewers will recommend that EAC grant the 

system certification. EAC’s executive director will consider the recommendation and 

make the final decision regarding certification. Once certified, a system may bear an 

EAC certification sticker and may be marketed as having obtained EAC certification. 
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Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

The EAC’s certification process includes assessment of quality control, field monitoring, 

decertification of voting systems, and enhanced public access to certification information. 

For more information concerning EAC’s Voting System Testing and Certification 

Program, see the program manual for this program, which is available on the EAC Web 

site, www.eac.gov. 

Federal Process Adds Transparency and Accountability

The implementation of EAC’s Laboratory Accreditation Program and Voting System 

Testing and Certification Program mark the first time that the Federal government has 

funded and tested both laboratories and voting systems. Both of these processes were 

previously conducted by NASED in a collaborative and voluntary effort. The Federal 

government’s involvement in these processes will shed light on the rigorous process that 

ensures that our nation’s voting systems are accurate, reliable and ready for service in any 

election. Unlike our predecessors, EAC is obligated to conduct accreditation and 

certification processes that are open and that share information about the results of those 

tests with the public. EAC has developed its programs with the knowledge that public 

confidence is critical to the election process and that public confidence comes from 

public knowledge and understanding of the process. Information about EAC accredited 

laboratories is available on EAC’s Web site, www.eac.gov. Similarly, information about 

EAC’s testing and certification program and any systems that have been tested through 

that program also will be available on the EAC Web site. 

THE VOTING PROCESS

Once a State or local election jurisdiction has purchased a new voting system, there is 

still a great deal of work to be done to assure that elections are conducted properly. 

Purchasing the right system is in many ways the easy part. Using it properly takes time, 

planning, and persistent attention to detail. 

Election officials must keep in mind that in order to successfully compromise a voting 

system during an election, a person must have knowledge of the system and access to the 

system while the election is taking place – a scenario that applies to ballot boxes or evoting machines. Any discussion or policy about implementing a secure voting system 

must examine all aspects of the voting process. The bottom line is that real security for 

any type of voting system – electronic or paper-based – comes from systematic 

preparation. State officials should ensure that they: 

• Prepare systems to prevent tampering; 

• Prepare people to detect tampering; 

• Prepare poll workers and law enforcement to react to tampering; and 

• Prepare election officials to recover by auditing and investigating tampering. 
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Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

These fundamental election administration processes to protect the entire voting process 

will always be important, even as voting technology evolves. Focusing solely on the 

reliability of voting systems is not enough, and a Federal certification for the system 

cannot take the place of solid, thorough management procedures at the State and local 

levels to ensure the system is managed, tested, and operated properly. Achieving 

accurate and reliable election results will always be the combination of thorough testing 

of the equipment, training and resources for election officials and poll workers, and 

through election management guidelines for every aspect of election administration. 

Management Guidelines

EAC is working to assist States and local election jurisdictions with identifying and 

managing all of the details surrounding the successful administration of elections. In 

2005, EAC began work on a comprehensive set of management guidelines, collaborating 

with a group of experienced State and local election officials to provide subject matter 

expertise and to help develop the guidelines. The project focuses on developing 

procedures related to the use of voting equipment and procedures for all other aspects of 

the election administration process. These publications are intended to be a companion to 

the VVSG and assist States and local election jurisdictions with the appropriate 

implementation and management of their voting systems. The first set of election 

management guidelines will be completed in FY 2007; they will be available to all 

election officials to incorporate these procedures at the State and local levels. 

Four Quick Start Guides were distributed to election officials prior to the 2006 election. 

These guides are summaries of more extensive chapters of the Management Guidelines 

that will be released this year. The guides were sent to election officials throughout the 

nation and covered topics such as introducing a new voting system, ballot preparation, 

voting system security, and poll worker training. All Quick Start guides are available at 

www.eac.gov. A brief description of each Quick Start guide is provided below. 
This information is property of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 

 1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 566-3100 (p), (202) 566-3127 (f), www.eac.gov 

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U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

Quick Start Guide for New Voting Systems 

The guide provides a snapshot of processes and procedures 

election officials should use when introducing a new voting 

system. It covers receiving and testing of equipment; 

implementation tips, such as conducting a mock election 

and developing contingency plans; and programming. The 

guide also offers Election Day management strategies, 

including opening the polls, processing voters, and closing 

the polls. 

Quick Start Guide for Ballot Preparation/ Printing and Pre-Election Testing

Ballot preparation and logic and accuracy testing are 

essential steps to ensure Election Day runs smoothly. 

The guide offers tips on preparing and printing ballots, 

which includes confirming that ballots conform to all 

applicable State laws as well as requiring a multilayered 

ballot proofing process at each stage of the design and 

production process. The guide also covers pre-election 

testing for hardware and software logic and accuracy. 
This information is property of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 

 1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 566-3100 (p), (202) 566-3127 (f), www.eac.gov 

Page 13 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

Quick Start Guide for Voting System Security

The introduction of new equipment also ushered in concerns 

regarding voting system security. To address some of those 

concerns and to help election officials implement effective 

management procedures, the guide highlights priority items 

essential to securing these systems. It addresses software 

security, advising officials to be sure that the software 

installed on the systems is the exact version that has been 

certified. The guide advises officials to not install any 

software other than the voting system software on the vote 

tabulating computer; to verify that the voting system is not 

connected to any network outside the control of the election 

office; and to consider any results transmitted electronically to 

be unofficial and verify them against results contained on the 

media that are physically transported to the central office. 

Also included in the guide are recommendations regarding 

password maintenance, physical security, personnel security, 

and procedures to secure the equipment. 

Quick Start Guide for Poll Workers

One of the most challenging tasks for 

election officials is recruiting and training 

poll workers. The guide contains 

information about identifying potential 

poll workers, effective training programs 

and techniques, as well as procedures to 

implement on Election Day. 

A full range of Management Guideline documents will be developed to cover topics 

related to election administration, including: 

o Pre-Election Testing 
This information is property of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 

 1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 566-3100 (p), (202) 566-3127 (f), www.eac.gov 

Page 14 

U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census and National Archives 

May 7, 2007 

o Ballot Design 

o Contingency/Disaster Planning 

o Vote by Mail/Absentee Voting 

o Military/Overseas Voting 

o Polling Place/Vote Center Management 

In addition, new Quick Start guides are planned for 2007, including guides on the 

following topics: 

o Change Management 

o Public Relations 

o Contingency/Disaster Planning 

o Certification 

o Developing an Audit Trail

Proper management of elections is key to conducting a reliable, accurate, open and 

accessible election. Buying state of the art voting equipment with the latest security 

features is meaningless unless the door to the storehouse where the voting systems are 

kept is secured and locked. Similarly, equipment used to program voting systems should 

never be connected to the Internet. It is EAC’s goal to communicate these suggestions 

and requirements to the election officials to help them increase the security and accuracy 

of their voting equipment by their practices and procedures. 

CONCLUSION

Elections are a complex equation of people, equipment and processes. All three pieces 

work together to ensure a successful, accurate and reliable election. HAVA was careful 

to address them all. And, EAC is working diligently to provide States with the tools that 

they need to purchase accurate and reliable voting systems, to implement those systems 

in a secure environment, and to assure that election officials, poll workers and voters are 

trained on how to use the voting equipment accurately and effectively. 

 

EAC appreciates the opportunity to provide this testimony. If you have any questions, I 

will be happy to address them.