alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Submitted November 22;

portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay attorney fees reversed, otherwise affirmed December 21, 2016;

petition for review denied March 2, 2017 (361 Or 238)

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Plaintiff-Respondent, v.*ADOLPH JERRY RUIZ, *Defendant-Appellant.*

Washington County Circuit Court

C141961CR; A159005

385 P3d 1286

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Lindsey K. Detweiler, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Susan Yorke, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Sercombe, Presiding Judge, and Flynn, Judge, and DeHoog, Judge.

*111PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for second-degree sexual abuse. ORS 163.425. He was sentenced to 50 months in prison and ordered to pay, among other amounts, $634 in court-appointed attorney fees. On appeal, defendant raises four assignments of error. We reject his first three assignments of error without discussion, and write only to address his fourth assignment, in which he contends that the trial court plainly erred in ordering him to pay court-appointed attorney fees in the absence of evidence that he is or may be able to pay those fees. *See*ORS 151.505(3) (the court may not require a person to pay costs, including court-appointed attorney fees, “unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs”); ORS 161.665(4) (“The court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs * * * unless the defendant is or may be able to pay them.”).

The state concedes that the trial court plainly erred by imposing $634 in attorney fees without evidence of defendant’s ability to pay. We agree. *See State v. Forney,*278 Or App 325, 372 P3d 625, *rev den,*360 Or 465 (2016) (the imposition of court-appointed attorney fees is plain error where the record is silent as to the defendant’s ability to pay those fees); *State v. Coverstone,*260 Or App 714, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (same). Furthermore, for the reasons articulated in *Coverstone,*we conclude that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to correct the plain error. In particular, the error is grave in light of the amount of fees ordered, the length of defendant’s prison term, and the lack of evidence in the record that defendant is or may be able to pay the fees. *See Coverstone,*260 Or App at 716-17; *see also State v. Hunt,*271 Or App 347, 353, 350 P3d 521 (2015) (exercising discretion to correct plain error under similar circumstances). Accordingly, we accept the state’s concession and reverse that portion of the judgment.

Portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ )

MONIQUE WHITE

, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) C ase No. 1 9

- cv

- 0 090 0 ( APM )

)

SECRET SERVICE

, )

)

Defendant

. )

_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Secret Service removed t his matter to this court from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia. See Not ice of Removal , ECF No. 1

. For the re asons stated below, the

court dismisses the Complaint and this action sua sponte.

It is well

- settled that “ f

ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within

their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be abs olutely devoid of merit,

wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous.” Hagans v. Lavine , 415 U.S. 528, 536

– 37 (1974)

( cleaned up ). A complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

when it is “ ‘ patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Best v.

Kelly , 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 327 n. 6

(1989)). Claims are patently insubstantial if they are “ essenti ally fictitious,” for example,

advancing “bizarre conspiracy theories,” “ f antastic government manipulations of [one ’ s] will or

mind,” or some type of “supernatural intervention.” Id. at 330. In such cases, a district court

may dismiss the case sua sponte. See Lewis v. Bayh , 577 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008)

( quoti ng Brown v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd. , 411 F. Supp. 1001, 1001

– 02 (D.D.C. 1975)

(noting that “ a district court has the power to dismiss a case sua sponte if it is frivolous ” ) )

.2

H ere, Plaintiff’s Complaint rests on the kind of fantastic and de lusional claims that warrant

dismissal sua sponte. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that there was a “[m]icrochip place inside of

[her] and [she] didn’t ask for it,” that the “Secret Service has been trying to kill [her] with

‘CANCER’ and killed a lot of [her] family members

, ” and that “[t]he Russians have been and is

still poisoning [her] .” See Notice of Removal, Complaint, ECF No. 1

- 1 at 1. The court is

permitted to dismiss a complaint containing such allegations

. See Neitzke

, 490 U.S. at

325; see also Crisafi v. Holland

, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307

– 08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“A court may dism iss

as frivolous complaints . . . postulating events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind.”).

Acco rdingly, upon sua sponte review, this action is dismissed.

A separate final, appealable o rder accompanies this Memorandum Opinion

.

Date d: April 2 , 201 9 A mit P. M ehta

United States District Judge
This email is to confirm receipt of the submission of the 

proprietary documents. They have been added to your file 

for review.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

FAA Office of Rulemaking

From: gus@airspaceconsulting.com [gus@airspaceconsulting.com]

Sent: Friday, August 21, 2015 9:19 PM

To: 9-AWA-AVS-333Exemptions (FAA)

Subject: Proprietary Operating manuals for Docket ID: FAA-2015-3242

Dear FAA,

Please find the following six (6) proprietary manuals in support of Docket ID: FAA-2015-3242:

1) Flight Operations & Procedures Manual

2) Aircraft Flight Manual - Inova One X8

3) Aircraft Flight Manual - DJI S1000

4) Aircraft Flight Manual - Cinestar X8

5) PIC Qualification Process, Test & Logbook

6) VO Qualification Process & Test

Thank you for your attention to the KinoFly petition for exemption.

Best regards,

Gus Calderon

760-519-1941

www.airspaceconsulting.com
Martin, Michael (OST) 

From: 

Sent: 

Tom Heanue <tom.heanue@flypib.com> 

Tuesday, May 13, 2014 2:28 PM 

To: Martin, Michael (OST) 

Subject: Request for Extension 

Hi Michael, 

Great talking with you today. I appreciate your insight into the matter of an extension for AD I. 

Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional Airport does not believe an extension for ADI is deserved based on their lack of 

FAA approval, no code share and no gate at a hub. We feel that this is a remake of the Silver Airways proposal 

of2012, and we all know how that turned out. 

However, we do understand in the fairness of equality to bidders, that if we should deny ADI and accept 

another bidder's request for an extension, how that could affect the process. 

Saying all that, we respect the decision of your office to do what is perceived as correct. We thank you for your 

support and assistance. 

Tom Heanue, Executive Director 

Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional Airpmt (PIB) 

1002 Terminal Drive 

Moselle, MS 39459 

( 601) 545-3111, Ext 11 

( 601) 545-3155 - Fax 

1
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 43 (Wednesday, March 5, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10026-10027]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-5382]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
[I.D. 022797B]


Marine Mammals; Permit No. 968 (P557D)

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Scientific research permit amendment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that a request for amendment of 
scientific

[[Page 10027]]

research permit no. 968 submitted by Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography, Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean Climate Project, Institute 
for Geophysics and Planetary Physics, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, 
California 92093-02252, has been granted.

ADDRESSES: The amendment and related documents are available for review 
upon written request or by appointment in the following office(s):
    Permits Division, Office of Protected Resources, NMFS, 1315 East-
West Highway, Room 13130, Silver Spring, MD 20910 (301/713-2289); and
    Regional Administrator, Southwest Region, NMFS, 501 West Ocean 
Boulevard, Suite 4200, Long Beach, CA 90802-4213 (310/980-4001).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The requested amendment has been granted 
under the authority of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as 
amended (16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.), the provisions of Sec. 216.39 of the 
Regulations Governing the Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals (50 
CFR part 216), the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (ESA; 16 
U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), the provisions of Sec. 222.25 of the regulations 
governing the taking, importing, and exporting of endangered fish and 
wildlife (50 CFR 222.23), and the Fur Seal Act of 1966, as amended (16 
U.S.C. 1151 et seq.).
    This amendment incorporates into Permit No. 968 refinements to the 
research protocol, as provided for by Special Condition A.5. of Permit 
968.
    Issuance of this amendment, as required by the ESA was based on a 
finding that such permit: (1) Was applied for in good faith; (2) will 
not operate to the disadvantage of the endangered species which is the 
subject of this permit; and (3) is consistent with the purposes and 
policies set forth in section 2 of the ESA.

    Dated: February 27, 1997.
Ann D. Terbush,
Chief, Permits and Documentation Division, Office of Protected 
Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 97-5382 Filed 3-4-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-F
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10QSB FOR THE FISCAL QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       9,198,255
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 25,904,012
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      14,457,602
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                    150,271,885
<ALLOWANCE>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             210,887,254
<DEPOSITS>                                 170,226,276
<SHORT-TERM>                                19,846,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          4,560,412
<LONG-TERM>                                  5,650,000
<COMMON>                                     4,132,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  15,518,565
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             210,887,254
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              6,781,064
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            1,220,011
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                36,972
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             8,038,047
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           3,422,194
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             665,856
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        3,949,997
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  150,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              4,331,991
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                121,736
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   101,365
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .25
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                  2,500,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             1,758,688
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  170,075
<RECOVERIES>                                     9,911
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            1,748,524
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         1,748,524
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
No. 11-10115.

#### Rodriguez *v.*Walker, Warden.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 32.1


             CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRESIDENT
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, Harold Blomquist, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Quarterly Report of Simtek Corporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained
in such Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of Simtek Corporation.



/s/ Harold Blomquist
-------------------------------------
Harold Blomquist
Chief Executive Officer and President

November 9, 2007
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Roberto RUANO-TENAS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40571 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed February 20, 2018

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Roberto Ruano-Tenas, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, CLEMENT, and HO, Circuit Judges.'

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Roberto Ruano-Tenas has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Rua-no-Tenas has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# C_2021072EN.01003501.xml

| 1.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 72/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/35

---

Action brought on 20 January 2021 — Corman v Commission

(Case T-25/21)

(2021/C 72/47)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Marie Corman (Schaerbeek, Belgium) (represented by: S. Orlandi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of 4 June 2020 determining the applicant’s entitlement to a retirement pension; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of 4 June 2020 determining the applicant’s entitlement to a retirement pension;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging that the contested decision infringes Articles 21 and 22 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

---
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Barington/Hilco
Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) on the date hereof, I, Cory Lipoff, Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: May 6, 2015

| | By:    | /s/ Cory Lipoff                                                                      | 
| | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | 
| | Name:  | Cory Lipoff                                                                         
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer                                                             
| |        | (Principal executive officer and
        principal financial and accounting officer)
<PAGE>
 
                              INSTRUMENT AMENDING
                         LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY
                                VALUE SHARE PLAN



LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY hereby amends the Lyondell Petrochemical

Company Value Share Plan, effective February 1, 1997, as follows:



SECTION III.3,  Terminations, Demotions and Transfers, is amended to read as
follows:

     If Termination of a Participant's employment occurs by reason of death,
     Disability or Retirement, or if Termination occurs within two years
     following a Change in Control, or if the Participant becomes ineligible to
     participate in the Plan due to a demotion or transfer by the Company to an
     Affiliate, such as LYONDELL-CITGO Refining Company Ltd., the Participant
     (or the Participant's beneficiary or estate in the event of death) will be
     eligible to receive a pro-rata award for each outstanding Performance Cycle
     for which the Participant was assigned an Allocation Percentage.

     The amount of the pro-rata award shall be calculated by multiplying the
     award for the respective Performance Cycle by a fraction, where the
     numerator is the months of the Participant's Company employment during the
     Performance Cycle and the denominator is the total number of months in that
     Performance Cycle.

     The award for the Performance Cycle which ends in the year of the
     Termination event shall be based on the full amount of the Participant's
     award calculated under Section II.8.  The award for remaining outstanding
     Performance Cycles shall be based only on the Participant's Allocation
     Percentage multiplied by the amount of the Value Award Pool determined for
     that Performance Cycle.

     Pro-rated awards earned pursuant to this Section III.3 will be paid out in
     their entirety in cash within 120 days following the end of the applicable
     Performance Cycle.

     A Participant who terminates employment with the Company prior to the end
     of any Performance Cycle, for any other reason (whether voluntary or
     involuntary) in the absence of a Change in Control, will forfeit the
     opportunity to earn an award under the Plan.
<PAGE>
 
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Plan, the Committee, in its
     sole discretion, may permit continued participation, pro-ration or early
     distribution (or a combination of awards which would otherwise be
     forfeited).



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, acting by and

through its duly authorized officer, has caused this Instrument to be executed
on the 20th day of February, 1997.



ATTEST:                       LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY

BY:/s/ Gerald A. O'Brien      BY:/s/ Richard W. Park                 
   ------------------------      -----------------------------
   Assistant Secretary           Richard W. Park
                                 Vice President, Human Resources
J-A16002-16 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

 v. 

MOLLY HLUBIN, 

 Appellant 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 951 WDA 2015 

 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 21, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003205-2014 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: 

FILED: October 6, 2016 

 First, the Majority concludes that because Robinson Township enacted 

a resolution instead of an ordinance to enter into an agreement pursuant to 

the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (ICA) for creating the DUI Task 

Force, the DUI checkpoint was not valid under the Act. I agree with this 

conclusion. 

 The Majority then goes on to analyze whether the stop at this DUI 

checkpoint was valid under the Municipal Police Jurisdictions Act (MPJA), and 

concludes that the MPJA did indeed make the stop lawful. Because I 

disagree with this conclusion, I dissent and offer the following analysis. 

 “[T]he [MPJA] does not fall within the classes of statutes which are 

to be strictly construed.... [and], therefore, [it] must be liberally construed to 
J-A16001-16 

- 2 - 

effect its objects and to promote justice. The general purpose of the statute 

is to restrict the jurisdiction of police to their own municipalities, on the one 

hand, while allowing certain practical and policy exceptions to the general 

rule on the other hand.” Commonwealth v. Fetsick, 572 A.2d 793, 794-95 

(Pa. Super. 1990) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 According to the Majority, the following provision of the MPJA governs 

the situation at issue here: “Where the officer has been requested to aid or 

assist any local, State or Federal law enforcement officer or park police 

officer or otherwise has probable cause to believe that the other officer is in 

need of aid or assistance.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(3). In other words, the 

Majority holds that the MPJA, not the ICA, controls in this case. 

 However, if that were the case, then there would have been no need 

for an agreement among the municipalities in the first place. Instead, those 

municipalities would simply have been able to engage in an informal process 

to create the DUI Task Force at issue. That cannot be the case. While the 

MPJA governs police authority, the DUI Task Force was a creation of these 

municipalities, not the police departments within them. Accordingly, the ICA 

governs in this case, and because the agreement under the ICA was not 

entered into by an ordinance, the DUI Task Force was acting without 

jurisdiction, and Appellant’s stop was unlawful.