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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 23, 2014 

v No. 317883 

Wayne Circuit Court 

JONATHAN APONTE, LC No. 12-010690-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and BORRELLO and GLEICHER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted his guilty plea convictions of two counts of 

assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. Pursuant to a plea 

agreement, defendant was sentenced to 6 to 10 years’ imprisonment for both convictions. We 

affirm. 

 It is clear from the lower court record—and defendant does not dispute on appeal—that 

defendant understood and voluntarily accepted a plea offer that included a sentence agreement. 

The settlement offer signed by the prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant clearly indicated 

that the plea agreement included a sentence agreement of 6 to 10 years’ imprisonment. 

Likewise, before defendant pleaded guilty, the prosecutor and trial court expressly stated on the 

record that the settlement offer included a sentence agreement, and defense counsel confirmed 

that he had explained the agreement to defendant. Furthermore, defendant’s answers to the trial 

court’s questions confirmed that his plea was voluntary, that he reviewed the plea with his 

attorney, and that he signed the plea agreement. “[A] defendant waives appellate review of a 

sentence that exceeds the guidelines by understandingly and voluntarily entering into a plea 

agreement to accept that specific sentence.” People v Wiley, 472 Mich 153, 154; 693 NW2d 800 

(2005). Thus, because there is no indication that the plea agreement—which expressly included 

the sentences imposed by the trial court—was invalid, defendant has waived review of his 

sentences on appeal. 

 Moreover, we find no error in the sentences imposed by the trial court. Defendant first 

argues that the trial court erred because it failed to articulate a substantial and compelling reason 

for its departure from the sentencing guidelines. However, in Wiley, our Supreme Court held: 

a sentence that exceeds the sentencing guidelines satisfies the requirements of 

MCL 769.34(3) when the record confirms that the sentence was imposed as part 
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of a valid plea agreement. Under such circumstances, the statute does not require 

the specific articulation of additional “substantial and compelling” reasons by the 

sentencing court. [Id.] 

Accordingly, because the trial court imposed defendant’s sentences as part of a valid plea 

agreement, the trial court was not required to articulate additional substantial and compelling 

reasons for its departure from the sentencing guidelines. 

 Next, defendant argues that the trial court violated the doctrine of proportionality and 

abused its discretion by imposing sentences that exceeded the sentencing guidelines. However, 

in Wiley, our Supreme Court stated that “a defendant who pleads guilty with knowledge of the 

sentence will not be entitled to appellate relief on the basis that the sentence is disproportionate.” 

Id. Further, in People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993), our Supreme Court 

provided the following rationale for denying appellate relief to a defendant who pleaded guilty: 

[W]e caution that a defendant who pleads guilty . . . with knowledge of the 

sentence, and who later seeks appellate sentence relief under People v Milbourn, 

435 Mich 630, 461 NW2d 1 (1990), must expect to be denied relief on the ground 

that the plea demonstrates the defendant’s agreement that the sentence is 

proportionate to the offense and offender. [Cobbs, 443 Mich at 285 (emphasis 

added).] 

As such, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief on the basis that his sentence in 

disproportionate. 

 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred because it failed to advise defendant 

that the sentence to be imposed was an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines. 

Further, defendant argues that the trial court failed to justify its departure by explaining that an 

offense characteristic was given inadequate or disproportionate weight. When a defendant 

pleads guilty, the trial court is required to make sure that the defendant understands “the 

maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any mandatory minimum sentence 

required by law.” MCR 6.302(B)(2). However, “automatic reversal is not required for a failure 

to give advice concerning the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences if the defendant is 

sentenced pursuant to a sentencing agreement.” People v Brown, 492 Mich 684, 695 n 36; 822 

NW2d 208 (2012). Moreover, the trial court imposed the sentence of 6 to 10 years’ 

imprisonment pursuant to a sentence agreement. Consequently, the trial court had no obligation 

to explain whether it believed a particular offense characteristic was given inadequate or 

disproportionate weight because the sole reason for the departure was based on the sentence 

agreement that defendant accepted on the record. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher