IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CHARLES B. SANDERS, §

§ No. 100, 2015

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court of 

§ the State of Delaware in and for

v. § Kent County

§

STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 9312012607

§

Plaintiff Below, §

Appellee. §

Submitted: March 31, 2015

Decided: June 12, 2015

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND and SEITZ, Justices.

O R D E R

This 12th day of June 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 

brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 

appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Charles B. Sanders, filed this appeal from the Superior 

Court’s summary dismissal of his fifth and sixth motions for postconviction relief 

under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1 The State of Delaware has moved to 

affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 

of Sanders’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

 

1

For the most part, Sanders’ sixth motion for postconviction relief consolidated and reorganized 

the claims raised in his fifth motion for postconviction relief and a related motion to amend.
2

(2) Sanders was convicted and sentenced in 1994 for the robbery, 

kidnapping and assault of a 76-year-old widow. This Court affirmed his 

convictions and sentence on direct appeal.2 Then, between 1996 and 1999, this

Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgments denying Sanders’ first, second and 

third motions for postconviction relief under Rule 61 and his first and second 

motions for new trial under Superior Court Criminal Rule 33.3 In 2014, the Court 

affirmed the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of Sanders’ fourth motion for 

postconviction relief.4

(3) Sanders filed his fifth motion for postconviction relief in October 

2014 and his sixth motion for postconviction relief in December 2014. As in his 

previous postconviction and new trial motions, Sanders’ fifth and sixth 

postconviction motions raised claims related to two photo line-ups shown to the 

victim before trial and the victim’s in-court identification of Sanders at trial. This 

Court described the circumstances surrounding the photo line-ups and in-court 

identification in ruling on Sanders’ direct appeal:

 

2

Sanders v. State, 1995 WL 264532 (Del. May 1, 1995). 

3

Sanders v. State, 1996 WL 209901 (Del. Apr. 24, 1996) (affirming denial of first motion for 

postconviction relief and motion for new trial); Sanders v. State, 1997 WL 70824 (Del. Feb. 10, 

1997) (affirming denial of second motion for new trial); State v. Sanders, 1997 WL 855719 (Del. 

Super. Dec. 17, 1997) (denying second motion for postconviction relief), aff’d, 1998 WL 138933 

(Del. Feb. 27, 1998); Sanders v. State, 1999 WL 507240 (Del. June 9, 1999) (affirming denial of 

third motion for postconviction relief).

4

Sanders v. State, 2014 WL 1878757 (Del. May 7, 2014) (affirming summary dismissal of 

fourth motion for postconviction relief).
3

The first time that [the victim] was asked to identify 

Sanders was while she was in the hospital, on the day of 

the assault, receiving treatment for the injuries she

sustained. [The victim] did not have her reading glasses 

at the time and she testified that her vision was blurred. 

She selected someone other than Sanders from the ten 

photographs and said that the person she selected looked 

like her attacker. Approximately three months later, [the 

victim] again was shown the photographic line-up. This 

time she was wearing her glasses and she selected 

Sanders’ photograph within two minutes. At trial, about 

one week later, [the victim] again identified Sanders as 

the person who had robbed and assaulted her.5

In his fifth and sixth motions for postconviction relief, Sanders asserted that his 

claims about the photo line-up and in-court identification “were not previously 

raised.” The Superior Court disagreed and summarily dismissed both motions on 

February 24, 2015, ruling that they were procedurally barred under Rule 61. This 

appeal followed. 

(4) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 

abuse of discretion and related questions of law de novo.

6

 In this case, having 

carefully considered the parties’ positions on appeal and the record before the 

Superior Court, the Court concludes that the Superior Court did not abuse its 

discretion when it summarily dismissed Sanders’ fifth and sixth motions for 

postconviction relief.

 

5

Sanders v. State, 1995 WL 264532, at ¶ 10 (Del. May 1, 1995)

6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
4

(5) Sanders’ assertion that the claims raised in his fifth and sixth 

postconviction motions “were not previously raised” is not supported by the 

record. His first claim, that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence 

generated from the first photo line-up, was raised in his first and third motions for 

postconviction relief and was rejected by the Superior Court in decisions that we 

affirmed.

7

 Likewise, Sanders’ claim that his right to counsel was violated in 

connection with the second photo line-up was raised without success in his first

and second motions for postconviction relief and his first and second motions for 

new trial.

8

 Finally, Sanders’ claim challenging the victim’s in-court identification 

was raised without success on direct appeal and in his third motion for 

postconviction relief.9

 

7

Sanders v. State, 1996 WL 209901, at ¶ 5 (Del. April 24, 1996); Sanders v. State, 1999 WL 

507240, at ¶ 3 n.3 (Del. June 9, 1999). In his initial postconviction motions, Sanders claimed 

that the result of the first photo line-up led to a “strong inference of innocence,” but because he 

did not brief that claim on appeal, the claim is waived. Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 

(Del. 1993). Moreover, because he did not allege the existence of new evidence of his actual 

innocence, Sanders’ “innocence” claim is procedurally barred under Rule 61(d)(2). See Del. 

Super. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) (2014) (providing that a subsequent postconviction motion will be 

summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion “pleads with 

particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually 

innocent in fact”). 

8

Sanders v. State, 1996 WL 209901, at ¶ 7 (Del. April 24, 1996); Sanders v. State, 1997 WL 

70824, at ¶ 3 (Del. Feb. 10, 1997); State v. Sanders, 1997 WL 855719, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 

17, 1997), aff’d, 1998 WL 138933 (Del. Feb. 27, 1998).

9

Sanders v. State, 1995 WL 264532, at ¶ 1 (Del. May 1, 1995); Sanders v. State, 1999 WL 

507240, at ¶ 3 (Del. June 9, 1999). 
5

(6) “[A] defendant is not entitled to have a court examine an issue that 

has been previously resolved ‘simply because the claim is refined or restated.’”10 

Because Sanders’ fifth and sixth motions for postconviction relief raised claims 

that has been raised and adjudicated as meritless on several occasions, the Court 

finds that this appeal is frivolous and an abuse of the judicial process. In the 

future, if Sanders files an appeal from a case involving his 1994 convictions, the 

Clerk is directed to refuse the appeal unless it is accompanied by the required filing 

fee or a completed motion to proceed in forma pauperis with a sworn affidavit 

containing the certifications under 10 Del. C. § 8803(e) and the motion is granted 

by the Court. Also, Sanders is advised that he risks a special order assessing costs 

against him if he continues to advance frivolous claims in this Court.11

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 

GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice

 

10 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 

(Del. 1990)).

11 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 20(f). We also encourage Sanders to be mindful of Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61(j), which similarly allows the Superior Court to issue an order for the 

reimbursement of the State’s expenses when litigants file frivolous litigation.