### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00681- CV

K e nne th Sc ot t M ill s, App e lla nt

v. Wanda Carol Canoy, App ellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF BURNET COUNTY NO. 21944 , HO NORAB LE WILLIAM R. SAVAG E, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Be f o r e th e tr ia l c o u rt i nth is c a s e ma d e a c h il d

- c u s to dy

d e te r mi n a ti o nin

a d ivorce proce eding , the child moved to North Carolina with his mother. The parents subseque ntly divorce d. I n this modi ficat ion suit filed therea fter by the child’s father, we must decide whe ther sig nificant
connec tions with Tex as exist or subst antial evidenc e i s available such that the trial c ourt reta ined exclusive continuing jurisdiction under se ction 152.202(a) (1) of the Texas Family

Code. See T e x. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.202(a) (1) ( West 2002). Ba sed on the re cord pr esente d, we hold that the tria l court did not err

in sustaining the mother’s plea to the jurisdiction and dec lining jurisdiction of the p e t i t i o nt o m o d i f

y. Ap pe lle e Wan da

Caro l Ca no y and a pp e lla nt K e nn e th S c ott

Mil ls w e re div or c e d in Bur net County , Texas, on Dece mber 10, 2003. K.B .M. was the only child born of the mar riag e. The
re c or d s ho ws tha

t K .B .M . w a s b or

n in July 19 89 and liv e d in Ca lif or nia un til he mov e d to Te xas,2

wh e re he liv e d f

or si x or sev en mo nth s. Pr ior to t he div or c e , in

Se pte mbe r 2 00 2, he mov e d w ith Canoy to North Carolina. The final dec ree of div o rc e p ro vided that the par ents wer e name d joint manag ing c onservators of K.B .M. with Ca noy having the exclusive rig ht to designate the primar y
re sid e nc e of

the c hil d w ith ou t r e g ard

to g e og ra ph ic loc a tio n. Th e de c re e a lso pr ov ide d th a t th e fi rs t vis itatio n b e tw e e n K .B .M . a nd Mil ls w ou ld o c c ur

in N or th C aro lin a , wi th K .B .M .’ s c ouns e lor , B e th Pug h, pr e se nt. F or

any vis itatio n b y

the c hil d w ithMil ls, Cano y a g re e d to an e xch ang e of the c hil d in Memphis, Tennessee . Mills agr eed to pr ovide a 14- day notice of visit at i o n arr ang ements by
c e rt if ie d ma il. Although the parties disputed visi tation rig hts and ac cess to the c hild both before a nd afte r the divorc e, the c urre nt dispute arose in June 2 0 0 4 when Mil ls filed a petition to modify
c us tod y . Ca no y re sp on de d w itha

ple a to t he ju ri sd ict io n a sse rt ingthat th e c hil d r e sid e d in No rt h Car o li n a , th a t h e n o lo n g e r h a d s ig n if ic an t c o n ta c ts w it

h T e xa s , an d

th a t s u b s ta n ti a l e v id e n ce
conce rning the child was not available in Te x as. After a hea ring in J uly

2004, the trial cour

t gr anted C an o y’ s p l e a

t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o nan d

d e c l i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o nw i t h r e s p e c tt o c u s t o dy. Mills ’s ch al l en ge i n v o l v es t h e p ro p er i n t er p re t at i on of sec tion 152.202(a) of the Texas Uniform Child Custody J urisdiction a nd Enforc ement Act (UCCJ EA), whic h g overns the dur ation of the de cre e-g rantingstat e’ s exclusive continuing jurisdiction. Id . § 152.202(a) . That sec tion pr ov ide s th a t a

c ourt of thi s st a te that has ma de an init ia l c hil d- c us tod y de te rm inatio n c on sis te nt w ith
se c tio n 1 52 .2 01 ha s e xclu siv e c on tin uin g jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he de te rm inatio n unti l (1) a cour

t of this state determin es t h at neither the child, nor the c hild and one pare nt, n o r t h e chil d and a pe rson ac ting a s a par ent, have a sig nificant c on ne c tio n w ith thi s state and that su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e is n o lo ng e r a va ila ble in3 this sta t e co n cerning the child’s ca re, pr otection, training , and per sonal relationships; or (2) a cour

t of this sta t e or a c ourt of anothe r state de termines that the c hild, the c hil d’ s p are nts , a

nd any pe rs on a c tin g a s a

pa re nt d o no t pr e se ntl y

re sid e in t

his state.
Id. Section 152.202(a) (2) doe s not apply here beca use Mills continues to reside in Texas. There fore , we mus t de c ide wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y a pp lie d s e c tio n 1 52 .2 02 (a )( 1) in d e c idi ng that it did not ha ve exclusive c ontinuing jurisdiction ove r these modification proce eding s. Be cause statutory construction is a question of law, we r eview this matter de novo
. In re Fo rle nz a , 140 S.W .3d 373, 37 6 ( Te x. 20 04 ); see also Mc Intyre v . Ramirez , 109 S.W .3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003). I n hi s petition to m odify , Mills contends that the Bur net County

court-at-law ha s
c on tin uin g , e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n o f t he su it. I t f

ur the r r e c ite s th a t “ [t]he c hil d th e su bje c t of thi s su it resided in Te x as as a result of t he acts or di rec tives of [ Canoy ].” Mill s asked that he be appointed the per son to de signate the primary residenc e of the child and urg ed that the r equeste d modification was in the be st interest of the child. He also soug ht a dec rea se in support pay ments. On appe al, he urg es that the time span betwee n the di vorce and his petition for modification is ins ufficie nt for the trial court to dec line jurisdiction in favor of N orth Carolina.

I n her ple a to the jurisdiction, Canoy reque sted that the trial cour t decline jurisdiction be c a us e K. B .M . h a d r e sid e d in No rt h Ca ro lin a sin c e Se pte mbe r 200 2, ha d not r e tur ne d to the State of Texas since that time, and no long er ha d any conn ec t i o n with Texas. She also urg ed that substantial evidence or information wa s no longe r available in this st ate with re spect to the c hild’s
car e, prote ction, training , and per sonal relationships. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.202( a)( 1).Se e In re Fo rle nz a , disapproving of In re Be llamy for sug g esting otherwise. 140 S.W.3d 1 373, 379 (Tex. 2004). 4

Under the provisions of the UCCJ EA, a Te x as cour t has continuing , exclusive jurisdiction until the decr ee- g ranting state deter mines that either the child no longe r has a signific ant
c onne c tio n w ithTe xas or substantial information about the child is not available in Texas. Id .; In
re Fo rle nz a , 1 4 0 S. W. 2 d

a t 379 (“e x clusive jurisdiction continues in the dec ree -g rantingstate as long
a s a sig nif ic ant c onne c tio n e xists or substantial evidence is present” ). Thus, jurisdiction terminates if the re lationship betwee n the child and the pare nt rema ining in Texas become s so attenuate d that the cour t can no long er f

ind either sig nificant c onnections or substantial information. Until the trial court make s such a deter

mination, howeve r, t he home state has priority jurisdiction. In re Fo rle nz a , 140 S.W .3d at 377-79.

I n deter mining whe ther a

“sig nificant connec tion” to Texas ex ists, courts look at the nature and quality

of t he child’s c ontacts with the par ent re siding in Texas. Id . at 377-78. In In re Fo rle nz a , the supreme court c oncluded that c hildren who ha d resided w ith their father in various states outside of Te x as for four y ear s maintained signific ant connec tions to Tex as bec ause the y had visited Texas o n

s ix occa sions, including four month-long summer

visits, and had close re lationships with the Texas resident mother and other Te x as re latives. I n In re Be llamy , the Texarkana Court of Appea ls found a sig nificant connection base d on school attenda nce in Te x as and time spent in Te x as with the noncustodial pare nt and other r elatives. 67 S.W.3d 482, 484-85 (Tex. App.—Texarkana,
no pe t.) . Ahig h le ve l of ph y sic a l pr e se nc e in T e xas i s n ot n e c e ssary to s a tis fy the sig nif

ic antc onne c tio n s tand ard
. No r d oe s th e statut e ba se the jur isd ic tio n d e te rm inatio n o n w hic h s tate ha s the 15

mo st signific ant conne ction with the child. A cour t with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction may de c lin e to e xercis e it in fa vo r o f a mor e c on ve nie nt f

or um, bu t th is d oe s n ot a ff e c t th e thr e sh old continuing, e x clusive jurisdictional ana ly sis. In re Fo rle nz a , 140 S.W .3d at 378.

Under the UC CJ EA, a court that has m ade a child custody

deter mination may

modify the deter mination if it has jurisdiction t o make a n initial d et er mination under Texas Fa mily Code section 152.201. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.201 (West 2002). Neither party contests that the court ha d jurisdiction for the initial custody deter mination. The rele vant date for dete rmining wh e th e r a T e xa s c o u rt h a s ju r is d ic ti o n to mo d if

y it s o w n c u s to dy d e te r

mi n a ti o n is th e d a te the motion to m odify

is filed. E.g. , In re Fo rle nz a , 1 40 S.W. 3d a t 37 6; In re B.A.B

. , 124 S.W .3d 417, 41 9- 20 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 20 04 , no pe t.)
. Th e re le va nt inq uir y the n is wh e the r, a t th e tim e Mil ls filed his motion to m odify , K.B .M. had a “ signific ant conne ction ” wi t h Texas or whethe r “substantial evidenc e” w as ava ilable in Texas “concer n i n g [ h is] car e, prote ction, training , and pe rs on a l r e latio ns hip s. ” Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 52 .2 02 (a )( 1) ; In re Fo rle nz a , 140 S.W .3d at 379.

The trial c ourt conduc ted an e videntiary hear ing in whic h Mills t estified in p e r s o n a nd Cano y te sti fi e d b y

te le ph on e . T e sti mony

a t th e he ari ng e sta

bli sh e d that K. B .M
. ha s re sid e d in No rt h Carolina since he moved ther e with his mother in September 2002, be fore the divorce . Ex cept f or
a sin g le a pp e ara nc e in c ourt in c on ne c tio n wi th the div or c e pr oc e e din g , K. B .M
. ha s n ot r e tur ne d to Texas
. He at t en d s school and re ceive s medical a nd mental hea lth care in North Carolina. When Mills was asked what property K.B .M. still maintained in Tex as, he te stified that Canoy maintained
a sto ra g e un it c on ta ini ng the c hil d’ s toy s, be dd ing , and c lot he s, and that K. B .M .’ s c omp ute r w a s st ill in Texas. Although K.B.M. has a number of paternal relatives in Texas, Mill s testified that they had6

not been in conta ct with K.B .M. since the divorce
. Although a number of me dical and psycholog ical
rec ords perta ining to K .B.M. and Canoy rema ined in Texas, the rec ords per tain to car e prior to the divorce . Mills t estified that he ha d visited with K.B .M. once in North Carolina since the divorce and ha d g on e to N or

th C aro lin a

tw o o r t hr e e tim e s to se e him . M ill s te sti fi e d th a t he ha d n ot s e nt K .B .M
. bir th d ay o r Chr is tm a s c ar d s o r p r e s e n ts b e c a u s e h e h a d s e n t c e rti f

ie d le tt e r s to Ca

n oy that wer e returne d, and wa s theref

ore a fra id K.B.M. would not re ceive his letters or g ifts: “They are all here in the state of Te x as.” In response to a question from his attorney , Mills testified that he believe d it wa s in the child’s best intere st to keep the c ase in B urnet County beca use the c ourt was f

amiliar wi th t he fa c ts a nd pa rt ie s. Canoy testified that she a

nd K.B .M. moved to North C arolina at the end of September 2002. They

lived with Canoy ’s par ents when they first arr ived i n North Carolina. Canoy testified that K.B .M. has been attending the s ame school and has r ece ived re g ular a nd continuous counseling sin c e arr ivi ngin N or

th C aro lin a . H e c on tin

ue s to se e c ouns e lor

B e th P ug h tw o to thr e e tim e s a month. K.B.M. also see s a psy chiatrist. All of hi s m ed i ca l an d mental hea lth treatment and c are
s in c e th e d iv o r c e h a v e o c c u r r e d in N o rth Ca r o li n a ; a s a

r e s u lt , a ll o f

th e r e le v an t r e c o r d s are
ma int a ine d in

No rt h Ca ro lin a . Ca

noy testif ie d to K. B .M .’ s e xtra c ur

ri c ula r a c tiv iti e s, fr ie nd sh ips , churc h activities, all of which take place in North Carolina. Canoy testified that since the divorce
a ll e vid e nc e re g ard ingK. B .M .’ s c are , tr a ini ng , p ro te c tio n, and pe rso nal rela tio ns hip s h a s b e e n in No rt h Ca ro lin a and no ne in T e xas. She te sti fi e d th a t c a lls fr om h is f a the r w e re min ima l; that K .B .M
.Canoy acknow ledg ed that, when she and K.B .M. first arr ived in North Carolina in 2002, 2 K. B .M . r e c e ive d c ard s and g if ts at T ha nk sg ivi ngand

Chr istma s; h e a lso re c e ive d a g if t f or his birthday in 2003. 7 had re ceive d no car ds, letters, or g ifts from M ills si nce January 2003; and that K.B .M. had neve r

2
rec eived suc h items from any of his Texas family members. She testified t hat on t he occ asion she
rec eived a

cer tified letter f

rom Mills re questing visitation and an exchang e in Me mphis, Tennessee , as provided in the de cre e, the letter did not specify

a time or ve rify

a location. I n urg ing the court to find Canoy responsible for

any lack of visitation, at the hearing Mills’s attorney

argued: “The best evidenc e is this Court, the orders of this Court and the understanding of what this Court wanted. You, Your Honor, are the best evidenc e in this situation be c a us e y ou are the mos t f

a mil iar w iththe pa

rt ie s, mos t f

amil iar w ithwh a t y ou

wa nte d, mos t familiar with their c onduct and be havior.” Both pa rents testified to ac ts by

the other to a lienate the ch i l d ’s af fe ct i o n o r t o l i m i tac ce s s t o t h e o t h er . T h e t ri al j u d ge u rge d b o th p ar en t s t o fo re go g a me sma ns hip in f a vo r of the c hil d’ s emo tio na l nee ds a t a cr iti c a l time in his lif e . A lth ou g h M ill s
ur g e d th a t Ca

no y thw art e d v isi tatio n, Cano y argue d that Mil ls ha d a sk e d fo r vis itatio n bu t fa ile d to comply with the proce dures specified in the divorc e dec ree . Scolding both par ents for the ir lack of cooper ation and fa ilure to abide by the divorce decr ee , t h e co u rt found that K.B .M. no longe r has sig nif ic ant c on ta c ts o r c on ne c tio ns wi th T e xas, and that si g nif

ic ant inf or matio n re g ard ing the c hil d
wa s ava ila

ble in N or

th C aro lin a

and wa s n o lo ng e r a

va ila ble in T e xas. The trial c ourt conduc ted a c are ful hea ring and wa s fully

familiar with the parties, the div or c e de c re e , an d th e int e rv e nin g fa c ts. F ro m th is e vid e nc e , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt did not err in concluding that the child no longe r maintained a “sig nificant c onnection” w ith Tex as whe n8

Mills fil ed the motion to modify , that Texas no longe r has substantial evidence conce rning the child,
and that T e xas s ho uld

c e de jur isdi cti on to No rt h Ca ro lin a . We ho ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y g rante d Canoy ’s plea to the jur isdiction.

We overrule Mills’s is sue and a ffirm the judg ment.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: August 25, 2005