Filed 7/19/23; Certified for Publication 8/9/23 (order attached)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MARGARET MCCANN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

D081185

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-

00011813-CU-TT-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Timothy B. Taylor, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Law Office of Todd T. Cardiff, Todd T. Cardiff for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

Mara W. Elliot, City Attorney, M. Travis Phelps, Assistant City

Attorney, and Jana Mickova Will, Deputy City Attorney for Defendants and 

Appellants.
2

INTRODUCTION

This is the second appeal arising from Margaret McCann’s dispute with 

the City of San Diego (City) over the City’s environmental review process of a 

project to convert overhead utility wires to an underground system in several 

neighborhoods. (See McCann v. City of San Diego et.al. (2021) 70 

Cal.App.5th 51 (McCann I).) In the first appeal, McCann alleged the City 

violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources 

Code, § 21000 et seq.)1 by failing to properly consider the environmental 

impact of two undergrounding projects. (McCann I, supra, at p. 51.) We 

concluded the City’s environmental review process was incomplete as to one 

set of projects that were approved through a mitigated negative declaration 

(MND Projects), because the City failed to analyze whether they were 

consistent with the City’s Climate Action Plan. (Id. at pp. 91-97.) We

reversed the judgment as to the MND Projects and directed the trial court to 

issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City to set aside three 

resolutions that approved the projects. (Id. at p. 99.)

1 Further unspecified section references are to the Public Resources 

Code.
3

On remand, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate

ordering the City to set aside the resolutions that approved the MND 

Projects. The trial court also ordered that it would retain jurisdiction over 

the matter until it determined the City complied with the relevant provisions 

of CEQA. The City rescinded the project approvals as directed by the trial 

court and asked the court to discharge the writ. McCann objected to the 

City’s return and argued that the trial court should not discharge the writ 

because the City did not perform the relevant environmental analysis or

affirmatively indicate that it abandoned the projects. The trial court 

sustained McCann’s objection and declined to discharge the writ.

The City appeals the trial court’s post-judgment order declining to 

discharge the writ. The City argues it has fully complied with the directives 

of the writ, as well as the remedial provisions of CEQA, and therefore the 

trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to discharge the writ. As 

we discuss, we conclude the City has fully satisfied the writ and therefore the 

writ must be discharged.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. McCann I

The factual details of this case are fully set forth in our prior opinion in 

McCann I and we need not fully recount them here; we limit our discussion of 

those facts necessary to reach the appropriate disposition in the instant case. 

It suffices to say that the dispute in this case is related to the City’s “decadeslong effort to convert its overhead utility systems, suspended on wooden 

poles, to an underground system.” (McCann I, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 

66.) McCann, a resident of a neighborhood within the undergrounding 

project, challenged, inter alia, the need for the underground system to be 

supplemented with above-ground transformers housed in three-foot-tall 
4

metal boxes in the public right-of-way. (Id. at p. 65.) On appeal, she argued 

that the City failed to complete the requisite environmental review process 

delineated in CEQA for two sets of projects within the City’s broader 

undergrounding plan. (Ibid.)

As to the first set of projects, McCann argued the City erred when it 

determined the projects were exempt from CEQA. (McCann I, supra, 70 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 65-66.) We concluded McCann’s claims were barred 

because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies set forth in the 

San Diego Municipal Code requiring her to file an administrative appeal of 

the exemption determination. (Id. at p. 76.)

The second set of projects—the MND Projects at issue in this case—

were approved by the City through the use of a mitigated negative 

declaration. (McCann I, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 71.) McCann argued

that the City violated CEQA by: (1) impermissibly segmenting the citywide 

undergrounding project into smaller projects; (2) not defining the location of 

each transformer box before considering the environmental impact of the 

plan; (3) failing to consider the significant impact on aesthetics caused by the 

projects; and (4) determining that the projects would not have a significant 

environmental impact due to the greenhouse (GHG) emissions. (Id. at p. 66.) 

We rejected each of McCann’s assertions, except for her claim that 

substantial evidence did not support the City’s finding that the projects 

would not have a significant environmental impact due to GHG emissions. 

(Id. at pp. 84-91.) We concluded that because the City did not analyze 

whether the projects were consistent with the GHG reduction measures 

included in the City’s Climate Action Plan, substantial evidence did not 

support the City’s finding that the projects would not have a significant 

environmental impact. (Id. at p. 91.)
5

Accordingly, in McCann I, we reversed the trial court’s judgment as to 

the MND Projects and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. (McCann

I, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 98-99.) Our disposition directed the trial court 

to “enter a new judgment granting the petition as to the second cause of 

action challenging the MND Projects and to issue a peremptory writ of 

mandate directing the City to set aside its March 5 and March 7, 2019, 

resolutions adopting the mitigated negative declaration, the mitigation 

monitoring and reporting program, and establishing the relevant utility 

undergrounding districts.” (Id. at p. 98.)

B. Proceedings on Remand

On March 25, 2022, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate 

ordering the City to set aside the March 5 and March 7, 2019, resolutions. 

The trial court further ordered the City to suspend all activity related to the 

projects that may result in any change to the physical environment until the 

City reconsidered the rescinded resolutions and brought them into 

compliance with the requirements of CEQA. The court explained that the 

writ did not purport to direct the City to exercise its lawful discretion in any 

particular way, and that the court would retain jurisdiction over the matter

by way of a return, pursuant to section 21168.9, subdivision (b), until the 

court determined the City complied with CEQA.

On June 15, 2022, the City filed a return to the peremptory writ of 

mandate. Resolution No. 314160—a resolution passed by the San Diego City 

Council on June 14, 2022—was included as an exhibit to the City’s return. 

The resolution rescinded the March 2019 resolutions that established and

approved the MND Projects. Specifically, Resolution No. 314160 declared,

“the Council rescinds the certification of the Mitigated Negative Declaration 

approved by the Council through [the March 5, 2019, resolution]; rescinds 
6

establishing UU602 Sampson Street, UU61 Redwood Street, UU616 Hilltop 

Drive PH II, and UU628 Fairmount Avenue Underground Utility Districts, 

approved by the Council through [the March 7, 2019, resolution]; and 

rescinds establishing UU908 Block 3DD, UU789 Block 4Y1, UU875 Block 

6H1, and UU668 Block 8R1 Underground Utility Districts, approved by the 

Council through [the March 7, 2019, resolution].”

In their return, the City asked the trial court to discharge the writ and 

vacate an order to show cause related to contempt proceedings that are not 

relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. McCann filed an objection to the 

City’s return and argued that the writ should not be discharged until the City

proved it complied with CEQA by preparing a legally sufficient 

environmental analysis of the GHG emissions of the MND Projects. The City 

filed a response to McCann’s objection and argued that they had fully 

complied with the terms of the writ by rescinding the project approvals.

The trial court issued a tentative ruling sustaining McCann’s objection 

and heard argument from the parties the following day. The City argued 

that the disputed MND Projects had been completely rescinded and therefore 

the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to discharge the writ. The 

City expressly told the court “the projects have been rescinded. So there is no 

project and that’s not in dispute.”

The trial court sustained McCann’s objection and confirmed its 

tentative ruling. In rendering its ruling, the court recognized that case law 

would seemingly allow McCann to simply file a supplemental or new petition 

to challenge the City’s future compliance with CEQA as it relates to the 

undergrounding projects. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded, “based on 

this particular writ and the status of this particular case and the verbiage of 

this particular return, the court sustains [McCann’s] objection and declines to 
7

discharge the writ at this time. The state of affairs will persist until the City 

files a supplemental return which allows the court to conclude the City has 

complied with the provisions of CEQA.” The City timely appealed the trial 

court’s post-judgment order denying its request to discharge the writ. 

II. DISCUSSION

The City argues it complied with the directives of the trial court’s

peremptory writ of mandate, as well as the remedial provisions set forth in 

section 21168.9, subdivision (a)(1), by rescinding the MND Projects

approvals. Thus, the City contends that the trial court exceeded its 

jurisdiction by declining to discharge the writ after the writ was fully 

satisfied. McCann agrees that the writ may be discharged “[i]f the City no 

longer intends to move forward with the project” because CEQA does not 

apply to projects that have been rejected or denied. However, she contends

the evidence demonstrates the City “intends to re-analyze the GHG emissions 

and re-circulate the MND” rather than abandon the disputed projects. 

Because the City has provided no evidence that they have conducted the 

requisite GHG analysis, McCann argues section 21168.9, subdivision (b), 

“imposes a mandatory duty on the trial court to exercise continuing 

jurisdiction over the City’s proceedings” until the requirements of CEQA have 
8

been met.2 As we discuss, we conclude the City has fully satisfied the writ

and therefore the writ must be discharged.

A. General Legal Principles

“CEQA was enacted to advance four related purposes: to (1) inform the 

government and public about a proposed activity’s potential environmental 

impacts; (2) identify ways to reduce, or avoid, environmental damage; 

(3) prevent environmental damage by requiring project changes via 

alternatives or mitigation measures when feasible; and (4) disclose to the 

public the rationale for governmental approval of a project that may 

significantly impact the environment.” (California Building Industry Assn. v. 

Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 382.) When a 

governmental agency, such as the City, has violated CEQA, “[t]he mechanism 

through which the remedy or remedies are implemented [to correct the CEQA 

violation] is a peremptory writ of mandate.” (POET, LLC v. State Air 

Resources Bd. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, 756.) Section 21168.9 governs the 

issuance of such a writ and provides for three types of mandates that may 

issue. (§ 21168.9, subd. (a).) The governmental agency may be directed “(1) 

to void, in whole or in part, a determination, finding or decision, (2) to 

‘suspend any or all specific project activity or activities’ if certain conditions 

exist, or (3) to take specific action necessary to bring the determination, 

2 McCann also argues that the City is substantively appealing from the 

“wording of the writ”—an argument the City waived by failing to object in the 

trial court. We find no merit to this claim. The adequacy of the City’s return

necessarily depends on the orders expressed within the writ, and therefore a 

discussion of the language within the writ is necessary to determine whether 

the writ has been fully satisfied. (See POET, LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. 

(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 52, 63 [interpreting the meaning of a writ of mandate

de novo to determine if the agency’s actions complied with the terms of the 

writ].)
9

finding or decision tainted by the CEQA violation into compliance with 

CEQA.” (POET, LLC, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) The court issuing 

the writ has discretion to choose which of the three mandates is appropriate 

under the circumstances and may impose more than one mandate. (Ibid.)

Once a peremptory writ of mandate has been issued, the court “should 

order the agency to file a return by a date certain informing the court of the 

agency's actions in compliance with the writ. [Citations.] [Section] 21168.9, 

subdivision (b) states, in relevant part, ‘The trial court shall retain 

jurisdiction over the public agency's proceedings by way of a return to the 

peremptory writ until the court has determined that the public agency has 

complied with this division.’ This statutory provision for the retention of 

jurisdiction reflects the rule that a court issuing a peremptory writ of 

mandate retains jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of the return and 

ensure full compliance with the writ.” (Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City 

of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455, 479 (Ballona), citing Carmel–by–

the–Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 964, 971.)

We independently interpret the terms of the peremptory writ of 

mandate as a question of law, but we review the adequacy of the City’s return 

under an abuse of discretion standard of review because the “attempt to 

comply with the writ is, for all practical purposes, an attempt to comply with 

CEQA.” (POET, LLC, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 62.) In this context, an 

abuse of discretion “is established ‘if the agency has not proceeded in a 

manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported 

by substantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible 

Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 426.) 
10

B. Analysis 

In McCann I, we directed the trial court to, “issue a peremptory writ of 

mandate directing the City to set aside its March 5 and March 7, 2019, 

resolutions adopting the mitigated negative declaration, the mitigation 

monitoring and reporting program, and establishing the relevant utility 

undergrounding districts.” (McCann I, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 98.) This 

order was authorized by section 21168.9, subdivision (a)(1), which permits 

the court to order a public agency to void a “determination, finding, or 

decision,” in violation of CEQA, in whole or in part. The trial court complied 

with our order and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the City to

“set aside” the resolutions approving the disputed MND undergrounding 

Projects. The writ did not direct the City to perform any other remedial 

action aside from rescinding the resolutions approving the MND projects and 

halting any further activity on the projects that may alter the environment—

nor did we direct the trial court to order any further remedial action in

McCann I. 

Accordingly, because the City complied with the trial court’s writ of 

mandate, as directed in our disposition in McCann I, we perceive no abuse of 

discretion by the City. The City’s return included Resolution No. 314160, 

which affirmed that the San Diego City Council rescinded the resolutions 

approving the MND Projects. The City’s recission of the resolutions satisfies 

the writ’s order that the City “set aside” the March 5 and 7, 2019, resolutions. 

Voiding a project approval is a remedial mandate authorized by section 

21168.9, subdivision (a)(1), and we conclude that the City has adequately 

complied with this section by rescinding the MND Projects approvals. (See 

Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1423 [court issued a

peremptory writ of mandate ordering the agency to void a project approval 
11

under section 21168.9, subdivision (a)(1), but did not require further 

corrective action].)

Section 21168.9, subdivision (c), confers equitable powers on the trial 

court to issue orders to compel compliance with a peremptory writ of mandate

(§ 21168.9, subd. (c); POET, LLC, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 86-87), but

once an agency has fully satisfied the writ, the trial court no longer has 

continuing jurisdiction over the matter. (See County of Inyo (1977) 71 

Cal.App.3d 185, 205 [the court has “continuing jurisdiction to enforce the writ 

until it is fully satisfied” (italics added)]; Ballona, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 480 [“the trial court's retained jurisdiction under...section 21168.9, 

subdivision (b), is limited to ensuring compliance with the peremptory writ of 

mandate” (italics added)].) Because we conclude the City’s recission of the 

MND projects approvals has satisfied the writ, we also conclude the trial 

court’s failure to discharge the writ and terminate its jurisdiction constitutes 

an abuse of discretion. (See Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. East Bay 

Regional Park Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 353, 368 [“We review the trial 

court's exercise of its equitable powers [in a CEQA case] for abuse of 

discretion.”].) 

Having concluded the City has satisfied the writ, we next address the 

parties’ contentions regarding the extent of the trial court’s continuing 

jurisdiction to enforce the City’s future compliance with CEQA as it relates to 

the rescinded MND Projects. McCann acknowledges that the MND Projects

approvals have been rescinded, but she argues section 21168.9, subdivision 

(b), authorizes the trial court to retain “jurisdiction over the City’s 

proceedings until it finds that the City has complied with CEQA.” The City 

argues that section 21168.9, subdivision (b), confers only limited continuing 

jurisdiction on a trial court when “the offending project or CEQA 
12

determination is severed and some non-offending portion of the approval is 

left in place.”

“ ‘[Q]uestions of interpretation or application of the requirements of 

CEQA are matters of law’ ” subject to de novo review. (San Lorenzo Valley 

Community Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley 

Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1375.) However, “[i]f the 

statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our task [of interpreting the 

statute] is at an end, for there is no need for judicial construction.” (MacIsaac 

v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 

1076, 1083.) Section 21168.9, subdivision (b), clearly and unambiguously

states that the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce a peremptory writ of 

mandate “until the court has determined that the public agency has complied 

with this division.” (Italics added). In this case, the relevant provisions of 

“this division,” are section 21168.9, subdivisions (a)(1) and (2), which the trial 

court relied on to order the City to rescind its project approvals and to take no 

further action that could damage or alter the physical environment. The trial 

court did not issue a mandate under section 21168.9, subdivision (a)(3), to 
13

perform any specific corrective action, nor did we direct the trial court to do 

so in McCann I.3

Case law has repeatedly applied the language of section 21168.9, 

subdivision (b), to confer continuing jurisdiction on the trial court to enforce 

the writ until the writ is satisfied. (See Ione Valley Land, Air, & Water 

Defense Alliance, LLC v. County of Amador (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 165, 170 

[“trial court retained jurisdiction over the matter until the city complied with 

the writ”]; Ballona, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 479 [“the retention of 

jurisdiction [provided for in section 21168.9, subdivision (b)] reflects the rule 

that a court issuing a peremptory writ of mandate retains jurisdiction to 

determine the adequacy of the return and ensure full compliance with the 

writ”].) Contrary to McCann’s argument, section 21168.9, subdivision (b), 

does not suggest that the trial court retains jurisdiction in perpetuity based 

on the hypothetical possibility that the City moves forward with the same 

3 There are circumstances in which the court may order specific 

corrective action under CEQA, but in McCann I we did no more than order 

the rescission of the project approvals. (See e.g. POET, LLC, supra, 218 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 764-767 [providing detailed guidance on the steps 

necessary to comply with CEQA and compelling the agency to take specific 

actions].) Although we made clear in our discussion in McCann I that the 

MND Projects will not be in compliance with CEQA unless and until the City 

performs the “required analysis to determine whether the MND Projects 

[were] consistent with the Climate Action Plan,” we did not direct the trial 

court to order such an analysis. (McCann I, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 97.) 

We declined to make such an order because nothing in the record supported a 

“fair argument that the MND Projects [were] inconsistent with the reduction 

measures identified by the City in the Climate Action Plan,” and we therefore

left the matter to the City’s discretion to perform the appropriate analysis 

and determine whether to proceed by an MND or an environmental impact 

report. (Ibid.) Whether the City moves forward with the MND Projects and 

performs the requisite analysis for CEQA approval is a matter of its 

discretion and we may not direct the City to “exercise its discretion in any 

particular way.” (§ 21168.9, subd. (c).)
14

projects in the future.4 And no provision of section 21168.9, subdivision (b), 

or any related case law, supports the City’s argument that the trial court only 

has continuing jurisdiction to enforce remedial provisions within a 

peremptory writ of mandate for projects that have been “severed.” The 

statute simply confers continuing jurisdiction on the trial court to enforce the 

writ until the agency has complied with its mandates—which the City did

here by rescinding the MND Projects approvals.

However, McCann expresses concern that the trial court is, in effect, 

making a finding that the City has complied with CEQA by discharging the 

writ. She contends that such a finding precludes future challenges to the 

adequacy of the City’s environmental review of the MND Projects under the 

principles of res judicata. McCann cites to Silverado Modjeska Recreation & 

Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282 (Silverado) in 

support of her argument and states that “[i]f the court discharges the writ 

and petitioner does not appeal the discharge of the writ, compliance with 

CEQA is presumed and considered res judicata.” She urges this court to 

“explain how the doctrine of res judicata would apply to any subsequent 

litigation challenging the same or substantially the same project” in our 

ruling.

We decline to conjecture about the ways in which res judicata may or 

may not affect a future hypothetical project. As we explained in McCann I, 

the MND undergrounding Projects will not be in compliance with CEQA 

4 McCann cites to County of Inyo v. City of L.A. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1 

(Inyo), for the proposition that the return to the writ process may last for 

years. We don’t disagree that this timeframe may be lengthy, but in Inyo, the 

process lasted for years because the court ordered the agency to prepare an 

environmental impact report that was the subject of continued litigation. 

(Inyo, supra, at p. 3.) Here, we did not order the City to prepare such an 

analysis, but merely directed it to rescind the disputed project approvals. 
15

unless the City performs the “required analysis to determine whether the 

projects were consistent with the Climate Action Plan.” (McCann I, supra, 70 

Cal.App.5th at p. 97.) The City has exercised its discretion not to move 

forward with the projects and perform this analysis at this time—rather it 

has simply rescinded the project approvals as mandated by the writ. 

Whether the City will choose to move forward with the same or substantially 

same projects in the future is a matter we cannot predict. Nor may we 

predict, based on the facts before us, the application of res judicata on future 

claims relating to the environmental reviews already performed on the MND 

Projects. 

We note, however, that McCann’s reliance on Silverado is misplaced 

insofar as she argues that the case precludes future challenges to the MND 

Projects entirely. In Silverado, the trial court issued a writ ordering the 

governmental agency to “ ‘[o]btain a study of the baseline water conditions 

and quality in the project area,’ ” and to “ ‘[p]repare and circulate a 

supplemental EIR disclosing and evaluating the baseline water data collected 

and tested for, and the baseline water conditions and quality reviewed in, the 

study....’ ” (Silverado, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 292.) The writ further 

ordered the agency to provide public hearings on the actions that it took “ ‘to 

comply with this Court's judgment and writ.’ ” (Ibid.) The agency complied 

with the writ and conducted the relevant studies and public hearings. (Id. at 

p. 295.) After extensive briefing by the parties on whether the studies 

complied with the writ and CEQA, the trial court concluded the agency had 

complied and discharged the writ. (Ibid.) The petitioner in Silverado did not 

appeal the order discharging the writ, but instead filed a new petition 

challenging the supplemental environmental impact report. (Ibid.) The 

Silverado court concluded the petition was barred by res judicata because the
16

adequacy of the supplemental environmental impact report had been fully 

adjudicated on the merits in the prior proceeding. (Id. at p. 298.)

Here, unlike the water analysis in Silverado, there has been no 

adjudication of the adequacy of the City’s GHG emission analysis because, as 

the City acknowledges, no such analysis has been performed. Because the 

GHG emission analysis has not been conducted, whether a full 

environmental impact report will be required under CEQA has not been 

adjudicated on the merits. (See Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. 

City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202 [res judicata applies if 

“the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits”].) The 

discharge of the writ in this case does not suggest that the City has 

completed the requisite environmental analysis of the MND Projects, but

merely reflects that the City has complied with mandates of the writ by 

rescinding the project approvals.

Accordingly, because the City fully satisfied the peremptory writ of 

mandate by rescinding the MND Projects approvals, the writ must be 

discharged.

DISPOSITION

The order sustaining McCann’s objections and denying the City’s 

request to discharge the writ is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate 

that order and enter a new order discharging the peremptory writ of mandate 

on the grounds the City has complied with the writ by setting aside its March 

5 and March 7, 2019, resolutions adopting the mitigated negative declaration, 

the mitigation monitoring and reporting program, and establishing the
17

relevant utility undergrounding districts. The parties are to bear their own 

costs on appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

CASTILLO, J.
Filed 8/9/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MARGARET MCCANN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 D081185

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-00011813-

CU-TT-CTL)

 ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION

 FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion in this case filed July 19, 2023, was not certified for 

publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication 

specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to 

rule 8.1102(a) for publication is GRANTED.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for 

publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
2

ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" 

appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be 

published in the Official Reports.

McCONNELL, P. J.

Copies to: All parties