alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jaquan Martez YOUNG, a.k.a. “Big Head” Or “Head”, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-11727 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(January 5, 2018)

*956Sandra J. Stewart, Joshua J. Wendell, U.S. Attorney Service — Middle District of Alabama, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Andrew Skier, Skier *&*Associates, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jaquan Young appeals the sentence the district court imposed following his plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Young argues that the district court clearly erred by imposing a two-level enhancement under section 2Dl.l(b)(l) of the Sentencing Guidelines and by declining to apply a mitigating-role reduction under section 3B1.2. But we cannot afford Young any meaningful relief. Young was sentenced to the statutory-minimum sentence of 120 months of imprisonment. So any error in calculating his advisory guideline range was harmless. *See United States v. Chirino-Alvarez,*615 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 13.1



CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL

OFFICER PURSUANT
TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002





In connection with
the Annual Report of Nano-Textile Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of Erez Ovdat and Shlomo
Zakai does certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to the best of his knowledge:



(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.







|/s/ Erez Ovdat          | /s/ Shlomo Zakai       
|----------------------- | -----------------------
|Erez Ovdat              | Shlomo Zakai           
|Chief Executive Officer | Chief Financial Officer
|                        |                        
|Date: April 30, 2015    | Date:  April 30, 2015
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Isaac NELSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-7236

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: February 22, 2018

Decided: March 9, 2018

*264Robert Isaac Nelson, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Robert Isaac Nelson seeks to appeal the district court’s text order dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Generally, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is not appealable “because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment” against the appellant. *Unioil v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,*809 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 1986), *overruled in part on other grounds by In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig.,*78 F.3d 431, 434-35 (9th Cir. 1996).

Nelson’s original pro se § 2255 motion, filed in 2014, challenged his Sentencing Guidelines career offender designation. After the Supreme Court’s decision in *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (holding residual clause of Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012), unconstitutionally vague), appointed counsel supplemented Nelson’s § 2255 motion, arguing that, under *Johnson,*Nelson’s career offender designation violated his right to due process. Nelson’s § 2255 motion was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in *Bedeles v. United States,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017) (holding advisory Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge under Due Process Clause and therefore career offender Guideline’s residual clause not void). After *Bedeles*issued, Nelson’s counsel requested that Nelson’s § 2255 motion be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Counsel indicated that Nelson agreed to the dismissal. In a text order, the district court dismissed the § 2255 motion without prejudice.

Because a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal without prejudice is generally not appealable, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Submitted February 27;

convictions on Counts 1 and 2 reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of conviction for one count of third-degree sexual abuse, otherwise affirmed April 5, 2017

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Plaintiff-Respondent, v.*GREGORY GEORGE KELLER, *Defendant-Appellant.*

Wasco County Circuit Court

1300231M; A158779

391 P3d 1001

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, and Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the briefs for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and Linder, Senior Judge.

*661PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for two counts of third-degree sexual abuse involving a single victim. We write to address only defendant’s second assignment of error and reject defendant’s remaining assignments of error without written discussion.

In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by failing to merge the guilty verdicts on the two counts of third-degree sexual abuse into a single conviction. The court entered a judgment that appears to enter a conviction on both counts while also stating that the counts “are different theories of the same act and transaction and therefore, merge for sentencing per ORS 161.067.” The state concedes that the trial court plainly erred in failing to enter a judgment that merged the counts into a single conviction for third-degree sexual abuse. We agree, accept the state’s concession, and conclude that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to correct the plain error for the reasons stated in *State v. Camacho-Alvarez,*225 Or App 215, 216, 200 P3d 613 (2009). *See also State v. Newton,*256 Or App 474, 475, 300 P3d 286, *rev den,*354 Or 148 (2013) (trial court plainly erred by entering a judgment of conviction that merged counts “for the purpose of imposing sentence” because that language fails to merge the guilty verdicts).

Convictions on Counts 1 and 2 reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of conviction for one count of third-degree sexual abuse; otherwise affirmed.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

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# FI LED AU G 30 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 73629 2 B IA ’ s f ac tual fi nd i ng s f

or subst ant i alevi dence. N aj m ab ad iv. H

older , 597 F . 3d 983, 986 ( 9th C i r . 2010) . W e de nyi n partand di s m i s s i n partthe pe t i t i on f or r e v i e w. T he B IA di d n otabuse i t s di sc re t i on i n d enyi ng E sc ob ar ’ s m ot i on t o reopen as un t i m el y bec ause E sc ob arfi l ed the m ot i on ov ertw o years af t erthe B IA ’ s f

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a ile dto e x h au s t it b e f

o r e th e B I A . See P u g a v . Ch e r to ff , 4 8 8 F .3 d8 1 2 , 8 1 5 - 1 6 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 7 ) . P E T IT IO N F O R R E V IE W D E N IE D i n p art; D IS M IS S E D i n p art.
Great lakes Airlines 

### ATIN: Customer Relations .')'lJ••**L~IJ ,,::;,~**  l**~** .,, 

## ... ..) 1022Airport Parkway, Cheyenne, WV October 20, 2014 Dear Customer Service, On Sept. 25, 2014 I flew from Page AZ to Denver CO. to attend a Memorial for my dear grandson who has died unexpectedly. The flight to Denver was normal and arrived there without incident. However, the return flight on Sept. 28,2014 was totally opposite: First let me say I had major surgery on my right hip three months before and was notable to use stairs, the help or mostlythe Fire Dept. was there to take me up and downthe stairs in a special chair I was belted in and they did agreatjobII However, before we were in flight itwas discovered the pilots could notcommunicate with each other. A crew came aboard and supposedly repairedthejack. which was notthe result and aftergoing to the take-off runway. returned tothe terminal where we were told to deplane to another plane. After being in the air in clouds and above the clouds in some instants we weretold there were some mechanical failures with the plane and wewere landing**in·F~rmington,** New Mexico for repairs-We deplaned again-downthe stairs in the special chair with two firemen holding on to me & the chair-they did a greatjob-theydidn't drop meII After 45 minutes we were toldto board another plane as theywere unableto repair the original aircraft. We were now more than three hours late for arrival time in Page. There was no heat in this plane all theway from Farmington to Page AZ. By the time we landed in Page Iwas terribly cold as well as being stressed- outforthe delays, I was neariyfrozen for lack of heat in the passenger area. Besides myselfthere were six other passengers and they were very cold also II The plane arrived in Page nearly six hours**late~** I do believe because ofthe circumstances I have reiterated above Great lakes Airlines should reimburse methe airfare I paid forthe trip•. The trip was a nightmare: deplaning and boarding several times up 3nd down the stairways, freezing in the passenger area and arriving in Page very late-each are a qualified reason for being reimbursed • I have been quite 

### ill since thistrip and that is why I have not filed this complaint earlier. I have enclosed a copy of my itinerary. Sincerely, Allee loshbough · 

# - Page,AZ--
# C_2021128EN.01005002.xml

| 12.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 128/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 128/50

---

Action brought on 18 February 2021 — Deichmann v EUIPO — Munich (Device of two crossed stripes placed on the side of a shoe)

(Case T-117/21)

(2021/C 128/64)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Deichmann SE (Essen, Germany) (represented by: C. Onken, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Munich, SL (La Torre de Claramunt, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark (Representation of two crossed stripes placed on the side of a shoe — European Union trade mark No 2 923 852

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 December 2020 in Case R 2882/2019-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the EUIPO to bear the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the EUIPO to bear the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of the second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of the second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 59(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 59(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
ACCEPTED

03-14-00639-CR

6811749

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

9/4/2015 4:41:43 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/4/2015 4:41:43 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
Submitted November 4, 2016,

reversed January 5, 2017

#### In the Matter of A. V. G., a Person Alleged to have a Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, *Respondent, v.*A. V. G., *Appellant.*

Clackamas County Circuit Court

16CC01769; A161797

387 P3d 497

Gay Canaday filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Duncan, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Garrett, Judge.

*345PER CURIAM

The trial court committed appellant to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority after determining that he was a danger to others because of a mental disorder. *See*ORS 426.005(1)(f). On appeal, appellant argues that the record does not contain legally sufficient evidence to support the involuntary commitment. The state concedes that the record is legally insufficient in that regard and that the order of commitment should be reversed. We agree and accept the state’s concession.

Reversed.
Page 1 of 1

BMD Analysis (Pooled Data, Cmax)

Kan Shao

September 6, 2013

Dose N Effect

0 48 22

11.9 20 5

24.5 19 8

49.57 25 5

202.4 22 11

641.1 23 14

2049.6 22 18

BMD Estimation Results

Model P-Value AIC BMD 

(BMR=10%)

BMDL

(BMR=10%) 

BMD

(BMR=5%)

BMDL 

(BMR=5%)

Gamma 0.125 235.31 180.45 102.61 91.49 49.95

Logistic 0.179 233.77 244.03 169.56 123.48 85.78

LogLogistic 0.140 235 174.78 57.27 98.26 27.13

LogProbit 0.203 233.329 277.44 169.82 192.93 118.09

Multistage 0.205 233.327 162.95 102.49 79.33 49.90

Probit 0.175 233.84 251.66 181.67 127.01 91.67

Weibull 0.125 235.33 168.05 102.5 82.63 49.90

Quantal-Linear 0.205 233.327 162.95 102.49 79.33 49.90

Note: Multistage model and Quantal-Linear model have the lowest AIC. But the BMDLs exceed 3-fold 

range, so the BMDL from the Loglogistic model should be selected.

The best fitted model Quantal-linear is shown below.
Page 2 of 2

 0

 0.2

 0.4

 0.6

 0.8

 1

 0 500 1000 1500 2000

Fraction Affected

dose

Quantal Linear Model, with BMR of 10% Extra Risk for the BMD and 0.95 Lower Confidence Limit for the BMDL

14:52 09/06 2013

BMDL BMD

 

Quantal Linear

 0

 0.2

 0.4

 0.6

 0.8

 1

 0 500 1000 1500 2000

Fraction Affected

dose

Log-Logistic Model, with BMR of 10% Extra Risk for the BMD and 0.95 Lower Confidence Limit for the BMDL

15:13 09/06 2013

BMDL BMD

 

Log-Logistic
#### Daria Nikolayevna KORZHINA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

Nos. 11-71906, 12-70201

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed December 21, 2017

Anna Benvenue, Attorney, Robert Bradford Jobe, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Robert B. Jobe, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Lori Warlick, Trial Attorney, Andrew B. Insenga, Trial Attorney, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: SCHROEDER and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY,* District Judge.

*

The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

ORDER

The court has considered the Respondent’s motion to amend, Dkt. No. 83, and the Petitioner’s opposition, Dkt. No. 84. The Respondent’s Motion to Amend Opinion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The memorandum disposition filed on October 20, 2017 is amended as follows:

Replace the text on p. 2, line 19 and p. 3, lines 1-2 with the following:

> Ms. Korzhina’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen is GRANTED, and we remand on an open record to allow the agency to resolve the •application in light of current country conditions.

The Respondent’s motion to amend is otherwise DENIED.
No. 07-19-00373-CR

Marcus Reed Appellant From the 167th District Court of Travis County
v. September 15, 2020 The State of Texas Appellee § § § § Opinion Per Curiam
J U D G M E N T Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated September 15, 2020, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the appeal is abated and the cause is remanded to the 167th District Court of Travis County, Texas, for further proceedings in accordance with this Court’s opinion entered this day.
o O o
# Researchers

- Raise the Bar Policy Brief: 
- Raise the Bar Policy Brief: Eliminating Educator Shortages through Increased Compensation, High-Quality and Affordable Educator Preparation and Teacher LeadershipJuly 2023
#### John Bowman v. State.

152 So. 739.

Division A.

Opinion Filed February 19, 1934.

*Daniel P. Galen,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Cary D. Landis,*Attorney General, and *Roy Campbell,*Assistant, for the State.

Davis, C. J.

— John Bowman brings error to this Court from a conviction of manslaughter alleged to have been committed by him on the person of one Tom Hayes at a negro “jook” in Princeton, Florida, a small place in Dade County, •on February 12, 1933. The testimony is conflicting, but we find it is amply sufficient to warrant the finding of the jury based on it to the effect that the homicide charged was unlawfully committed by Bowman’s shooting Hayes with a pistol, as the result of an altercation arising while the two were gambling at the same table.

*30A killing is not justifiable or excusable if the defendant brought about the necessity therefor through his own wrongful act or without being reasonably free from fault in provoking the difficulty in which the killing occurred. Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 11 Sou. Rep. 550, 17 L. R. A. 705; Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. 266, 12 Sou. Rep. 865; Padgett v. State, 40 Fla. 451, 24 Sou. Rep. 145.

Where the issue of who was the aggressor, and the-causation of the killing in the course of a mutual combat, is presented for determination on conflicting evidence, it is-for the jury to decide whether or not under the circumstances shown in evidence the homicide was justifiable or excusable under the law relating to the right of self defense,, and the jury’s finding on that score will not be disturbed by an appellate court.

The Court has carefully read the transcript of the evidence in this case, and while it is observed that the State’s-proof of the date of the commission of a homicide and of the venue, was not made in such clear, direct and positive-terms as could have been done, yet there is, nevertheless, in the record as a whole, a sufficient demonstration that deceased was killed on or about the date alleged in the information, and that the killing was done in Princeton, a small community which the jury and the court below must-have known from the evidence, as a matter of common knowledge deducible from it, was situate only in DadeCounty, Florida.

Venue need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case. A violent presumption arising from the-evidence sustaining the venue as alleged, is sufficient. Low-man v. State, 80 Fla. 18, 85 Sou. Rep. 166.

Affirmed.

Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur.

*31Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Kayla UNDERWOOD, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-10568 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed February 23, 2018

*346Amber Michelle Grand, Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jerry Van Beard, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Brook Antonio, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Kayla Underwood appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following the revocation of her most recent term of supervised release; the district court sentenced her above the guidelines range to 18 months of imprisonment and additionally imposed a 42-month term of supervised release. She argues that the district court committed procedural error because it reimposed a term of supervised release based upon an erroneous belief that it was required to do so.

Ordinarily, we review a revocation sentence under, the plainly unreasonable standard. *United States v. Warren,*720 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2013). However, because Underwood did not object to the supervised release term imposed by the district court, we review for plain error only. *See United States v. Whitelaw,*580 F.3d 256, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2009). Under this standard, Underwood must show a clear or obvious error that affected her substantial rights. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). If she makes such a showing, we have the discretion to correct the error but will do so only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. *See id.*

As the transcript of the revocation hearing sufficiently reflects that the district court understood its discretion whether to impose an additional term of supervised release, *see*18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), Underwood fails to show clear or obvious error. *See Puckett,*556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir, R. 47.5.4.