alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Submitted November 4, 2016,

reversed February 1, 2017

#### In the Matter of M. M. P., a Person Alleged to have a Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, *Respondent, v.*M. M. P., *Appellant.*

Deschutes County Circuit Court

16CC03169; A162411

388 P3d 735

Joseph DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Shorr, Judge.

*616PER CURIAM

Appellant seeks reversal of an order committing her to the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days. ORS 426.130. In an unpreserved assignment of error, appellant contends that the order should be reversed because the trial court plainly erred when it failed to inform her of all of her rights listed in ORS 426.100(1). The state concedes the error, and we accept the state’s concession. The court’s failure to advise appellant of her rights under ORS 426.100(1) constitutes plain error. *See, e.g., State v. M. L. R.,*256 Or App 566, 570-71, 303 P3d 954 (2013) (“[The] failure to provide a person with all of the information required by ORS 426.100(1) constitutes an egregious error that justifies plain error review.”). Further, for the reasons stated in *M. L. R.—viz.,*the nature of civil commitment proceedings, the gravity of the violation, the ends of justice, and the lack of harmless error—we conclude that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to correct the error in this case. Because we reverse on that basis, we do not address appellant’s other assignment of error.

Reversed.
R307. Environmental Quality, Air Quality.

R307-210. Stationary Sources.

R307-210-1. Standards of Performance for New Stati onary Sources (NSPS). The provisions of 40 Code of Federal Regulations ( CFR) Part 60, effective on July 1, 2006, except for Subparts Cb, Cc, Cd, Ce, BBBB, DDDD, and HHHH, are incorporated by reference into these rules with the exception that references in 40 CFR to "Adminis trator" shall mean "executive secretary" unless by federal law the aut hority referenced is specific to the Administrator and cannot be dele gated.

KEY: air pollution, stationary sources, new source review

Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: M arch 15, 2007 Notice of Continuation: June 16, 2006 Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law: 1 9-2-104(3)(q);

19-2-108
EX-4.1



 Exhibit 4.1 
  






 
 ZQ|CERT#|COY|CLS|RGSTRY|ACCT#|TRANSTYPE|RUN#|TRANS# 
COMMON STOCK PAR VALUE $0.0001 COMMON STOCK THIS CERTIFICATE IS TRANSFERABLE IN CANTON, MA, JERSEY CITY, NJ AND COLLEGE STATION, TX 
Certificate 
Number 
ZQ00000000 
Syndax 
Shares 
** 000000 ****************** 
*** 000000 ***************** 
**** 000000 **************** 
***** 000000 *************** 
SYNDAX PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 
INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
THIS CERTIFIES THAT 
MR. SAMPLE & MRS. SAMPLE & MR. SAMPLE & MRS. SAMPLE 
CUSIP 87164F 10 5 
SEE REVERSE FOR CERTAIN DEFINITIONS 
is the owner of 
***ZERO HUNDRED THOUSAND ZERO HUNDRED AND ZERO*** 
FULLY-PAID AND NON-ASSESSABLE SHARES OF
COMMON STOCK OF 
Syndax Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereinafter called the “Company”), transferable on the books of the Company in person or by duly authorized
attorney, upon surrender of this Certificate properly endorsed. This Certificate and the shares represented hereby, are issued and shall be held subject to all of the provisions of the Certificate of Incorporation, as amended, and the Bylaws, as
amended, of the Company (copies of which are on file with the Company and with the Transfer Agent), to all of which each holder, by acceptance hereof, assents. This Certificate is not valid unless countersigned and registered by the Transfer Agent
and Registrar. 
Witness the facsimile seal of the Company and the facsimile signatures of its duly authorized officers. 
President and CEO 
Secretary 
SYNDAX PHARMACUETICALS, INC. 
SEAL 
2005 
DELAWARE 
DATED DD-MMM-YYYY 
COUNTERSIGNED AND REGISTERED: 
COMPUTERSHARE TRUST COMPANY, N.A. 
TRANSFER AGENT AND REGISTRAR, 
By 
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE 
1234567 
Syndax 
PO BOX 43004, Providence, RI 02940-3004 
MR A SAMPLE 
DESIGNATION (IF ANY) 
ADD 1 
ADD 2 
ADD 3 
ADD 4 
CUSIP XXXXXX XX X 
Holder ID XXXXXXXXXX 
Insurance Value 1,000,000.00 
Number of Shares 123456 
DTC 12345678 123456789012345 
Certificate Numbers Num/No. Denom. Total. 
1234567890/1234567890 111 1234567890/1234567890 222
1234567890/1234567890 333 1234567890/1234567890 444 1234567890/1234567890 555 1234567890/1234567890 666 
Total Transaction 7
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MALIK HARRIS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 424 EAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 7th day of August, 2024

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.4

                       Consent of Independent Accountants


         We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this Amendment
No. 6 to Registration Statement on Form S-4 of our report dated September 7,
2001 relating to the combined financial statements of the Gas Compression
Business of Schlumberger Limited, which appears in the Current Report on Form
8-K/A of Hanover Compressor Company dated November 9, 2001. We also consent to
the reference to us under the heading "Experts" in such Registration Statement.


/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Houston, Texas
February 11, 2003
<PAGE>


                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                                    FORM 8-K

                       Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
                       the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

       Date of Report (date of earliest event reported): January 23, 2003


                             ----------------------



                     NORTH AMERICAN TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC.
               (Exact name of registrant as specified in charter)



   Delaware                      0-16217                     33-0041789
(State or other               (Commission                  (IRS Employer
jurisdiction of               File Number)              identification no.)
incorporation)



                   14315 West Hardy Road, Houston, Texas 77060
                    (Address of principal executive offices)


                                 (281) 847-0029
              (Registrant's telephone number, including area code)


<PAGE>

                              ITEM 5. OTHER EVENTS

HOUSTON January 23, 2003 -- North American Technologies Group, Inc., (NASDAQ:
NATK), an innovative producer of composite-based products made from recycled raw
materials, announced today that it has raised $2.4 million in convertible debt
and equity. The press release is attached hereto as Exhibit 99.1.

This press release may contain forward-looking statements involving risks and
uncertainties. Statements in this press release that are not historical,
including statements regarding management intentions, beliefs, expectations,
representations, plans or predictions of the future are forward-looking
statements within the meaning of the "safe-harbor" provisions of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These risks include, but are not
limited to, fluctuations in financial results, availability and customer
acceptance of products and services, the impact of competitive products,
services and pricing, and general market trends and conditions. For a discussion
of other potential factors that could cause actual results to vary materially
from expectations, reference is made to North American Technologies Group's
respective annual and quarterly reports filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

<PAGE>

                                   SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Company
has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned
hereunto duly authorized.

                                    NORTH AMERICAN TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC.
                                    /s/ Henry W. Sullivan
                                    --------------------------------------------
                                    Henry W. Sullivan, President and CEO

Dated: January 23, 2003
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-50224

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSÉ RICARDO RUIZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-92-CR-58-ALL

- - - - - - - - - -

October 23, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

José Ricardo Ruiz, federal prisoner #12399-080, appeals from

the district court’s denial of his “motion to dismiss,” which is

construed by this court as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See In re

Tolliver, 97 F.3d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1996). Because Ruiz neither

requested not obtained the required certification from this court

to file a successive § 2255 motion, the district court should not

have accepted Ruiz’s motion for filing. See § 2255. The

district court’s denial of Ruiz’s “motion to dismiss” was
No. 97-50224

-2-

therefore not error. Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
Submitted September 8;

reversed and remanded as to Claim 5 for entry of judgment including findings required by ORS 138.640(1), otherwise affirmed November 9, 2016;

petition for review denied March 23, 2017 (361 Or 240)

#### KEVIN ROMOND WALLS, *Petitioner-Appellant, v.*Mark NOOTH, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution, *Defendant-Respondent.*

Malheur County Circuit Court

10088309P; A158351

385 P3d 1244

Jed Peterson and O’Connor Weber LLP filed the opening brief for appellant. Kevin R. Walls filed the supplemental brief *pro se.*

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Shorr, Judge.

*206PER CURIAM

Petitioner appeals a judgment denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he raises three assignments of error. We reject all but one without discussion. We address only petitioner’s claim that the post-conviction court’s judgment does not comply with ORS 138.640(1) with respect to one of his claims for relief. Defendant concedes petitioner’s argument and agrees that "the post-conviction court did not comply with ORS 138.640(1).” We agree as well. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court to include the findings required by ORS 138.640(1) with respect to petitioner’s fifth claim.

ORS 138.640(1) provides, in part, that a “judgment [denying claims for post-conviction relief] must clearly state the grounds on which the cause was determined.” Interpreting that statute, the Oregon Supreme Court held:

> “[A] judgment denying claims for post-conviction relief must, at a minimum: (1) identify the claims for relief that the court considered and make separate rulings on each claim; (2) declare, with regard to each claim, whether the denial is based on a petitioner’s failure to utilize or follow available state procedures or a failure to establish the merits of the claim; and (3) make the legal bases for denial of relief apparent.”

*Datt v. Hill,*347 Or 672, 685, 227 P3d 714 (2010).

Here, the post-conviction court’s judgment does not comply with *Datt.*Petitioner advanced five claims for relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court’s judgment sufficiently addressed each of petitioner’s first four claims under *Datt.*However, the judgment failed to identify and make a separate ruling on petitioner’s fifth claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the judgment does not comply with ORS 138.640(1) as interpreted by Datt.

Because the post-conviction court’s judgment in this case fails to comply with ORS 138.640(1), we reverse and remand for the court to enter a new judgment that complies with that statute with respect to petitioner’s fifth claim. *Myers v. Brockamp, 271 Or*App 716, 718, 353 P3d 1 (2015).

*207Reversed and remanded as to Claim 5 for entry of judgment including findings required by ORS 138.640(1); otherwise affirmed.
No. 11-10493.

#### Corbray *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
# C_2021338EN.01003201.xml

| 23.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 338/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 338/32

---

Action brought on 7 July 2021 — BPCE and Others v SRB

(Case T-385/21)

(2021/C 338/41)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: BPCE (Paris, France) and 44 other applicants (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul Decision SRB/ES/2021/22 of 14 April 2021 on the calculation of the 2021 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants; |
| --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul Decision SRB/ES/2021/22 of 14 April 2021 on the calculation of the 2021 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

| — | pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:






  — | Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

Articles 69(1), 69(2), 70(1) and 70(2)(a) and (b) of the SRM Regulation;

| — | Article 4(2) and Articles 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4(2) and Articles 6 and 7 of the Delegated Regulation, and Annex I thereto;

| — | Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 4 of the Implementing Regulation;

| — | order the defendant to pay all the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on eight pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those put forward in Case T-383/21, Banque postale v SRB.

---
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph DOBYNS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. SD 34724

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

Filed: December 21, 2017

Attorney for Appellant—Samuel Buffa-loe of Columbia, MO.

Attorneys for Respondent—Joshua D. Hawley (Attorney General) and Mary H. Moore of Jefferson City, MO.

Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, P.J.

Joseph Dobyns (“Appellant”) claims he did not receive due process because the trial court introduced the court, the circuit clerk, the court reporter, the bailiffs and the prosecuting attorney first during voir dire. After introducing this group of people, the trial judge asked whether anyone was “acquainted with any of them or have you had any business or social relationship with any of them[?]” The trial judge then proceeded to introduce Appellant’s counsel and asked the same question. Appellant claims that by introducing people “at the same time as it introduced its own staff, the trial court was giving off the impression that it favored *368the prosecution over the defense.” Appellant’s complaint has no merit.

Counsel for Appellant filed a motion for a mistrial after the introductions. Counsel stated, “The Court introduced the State as if they were part of the judicial system meaning the Judge and the court reporter and circuit clerk and police officers, and then introduced me separate like me and my client are not associated and I believe it shows prejudice and bias.” When asked by the trial court if it had said anything specifically to give the impression of prejudice and bias, Appellant’s counsel stated he had not. It is hard to understand just what Appellant’s complaint is. Presumably, he believes the trial court is required to ask in voir dire whether any of the jurors know the court personnel separately from the state attorneys. Appellant does not cite to a single source that found any error in an introduction such as was given in this trial. Appellant does not cite the standard of review for our review of the voir dire proceedings. We will- review the conduct of the trial judge to determine “ ‘whether the trial court’s conduct is such as to prejudice the minds of the jury against the defendant thereby depriving the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.’ ” *State v. Hicks,*501 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016) (quoting *State v. Jackson,*836 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992)). “There is no error as long as the trial judge does not express an opinion as to. the nature, content or truthfulness of evidence.” *Id,*

There is absolutely nothing in the trial court’s questioning that causes any concern that Appellant did not receive a fair and impartial trial. The trial court had to start the introductions with someone and the progression he chose was logical. The State proceeds first throughout the trial and the State bears the burden of proof. Appellant has not even alleged that the court had said any specific statement to give the impression of prejudice and bias. The complaint borders on frivolous. The point is denied. The judgment is affirmed.

Daniel E. Scott, J.—Concurs

William W. Francis, Jr., J.—Concurs
Submitted October 27,

affirmed November 30, 2016

#### In the Matter of S. C. S., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, *Petitioner-Respondent, v.*J. C. S., *Appellant.*

Marion County Circuit Court

15JU07988; A162204

387 P3d 484

Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Amelia Andersen, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Lagesen, Judge.

*625PER CURIAM

In July 2015, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over child, S, after concluding that father, who was incarcerated, was unavailable as a custodial resource for child.1 Shortly thereafter, the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a new dependency petition alleging an additional basis for jurisdiction related to father’s domestic violence. In April 2016, the court asserted jurisdiction over S based on the new allegation.

On appeal, father challenges the 2016 jurisdictional judgment, arguing that the court erred in asserting jurisdiction over S in the absence of expert testimony that custody of S by father was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to S, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC § 1912(e). Father did not preserve his argument below; however, he contends that he was not required to do so under 25 USC section 1914.

DHS, in turn, argues that the resolution of this case depends on whether the proceeding at issue constituted a “foster care placement” under 25 USC section 1903(1)(i). If it did, father was exempt from the preservation requirement and DHS was required to present expert testimony. However, DHS contends that the jurisdictional hearing was not a “foster care placement.” Thus, according to DHS, father was required to preserve his claim and DHS was not required to present expert testimony.

We agree with DHS that the resolution of this case turns on whether the proceeding in this case was a “foster care placement.” Further, we conclude that the relevant proceedings did not constitute a “foster care placement” within the meaning of ICWA, because S had already been removed from father’s care in the earlier proceeding and, thus, the “significant shift in legal rights” that occurs when the court first asserts jurisdiction was not present in this case. *See Dept. of Human Services v. J. M.,*266 Or App 453, 472, 338 P3d 191 (2014), *rev den,*356 Or 689 (2015); *Dept. of Human*
      *626
      *Services v. W. H. F,*254 Or App 298, 303-04, 295 P3d 78 (2012), *rev den,*353 Or 428 (2013).

Affirmed.

Child’s mother is deceased.
# C_2022109EN.01002401.xml

| 7.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 109/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 109/24

---

Action brought on 20 December 2021 — SC Ha Ha Ha Production v EUIPO — The Smiley Company (SMILEY)

(Case T-785/21)

(2022/C 109/33)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: SC Ha Ha Ha Production SRL (Calinesti, Romania) (represented by: O. Anghel, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: The Smiley Company SPRL (Brussels, Belgium)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark SMILEY — Application for registration No 17 569 641

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decisions: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 September 2021 in Case R 2936/2019-5 relative to the revocation of its decision issued on 15 January 2021 and Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 October 2021 in Case R 2936/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 September 2021 relative to the revocation of its Decision of 15 January 2021; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 September 2021 relative to the revocation of its Decision of 15 January 2021;

| — | set aside of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of 21 October 2021 in order to register the requested European trade mark, SMILEY no. 17 569 641, for the class of products and services 41; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of 21 October 2021 in order to register the requested European trade mark, SMILEY no. 17 569 641, for the class of products and services 41;

| — | order the defendant and, if appropriate, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs incurred during the appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant and, if appropriate, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs incurred during the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 103 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 103 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of the general principles of EU law. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of the general principles of EU law.

---