J-A01037-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

CHARLES S. WARREN, CHARLES A. 

WARREN, AND PATRICIA SHAW 

WARREN, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellants 

v. 

EQUITABLE GAS COMPANY, EQUITRANS, 

EQUITABLE PRODUCTION COMPANY, 

AND EQUITRANS, LP, FORMERLY 

EQUITRANS PRODUCTION COMPANY, 

 Appellees No. 697 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered April 22, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County, 

Civil Division, at No(s): AD 262 of 1991 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE, and ALLEN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2015 

 Oil and gas rights lessors, Charles S. and Charles A. Warren, and 

Patricia Shaw Warren, (“Appellants”), appeal from the trial court’s order 

granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Equitable Gas Company, 

Equitrans, Equitable Production Company, and Equitrans, LP, formerly 

Equitrans Production Company, (collectively “Equitable”). We affirm. 

 The trial court recounted the factual and procedural background of this 

action as follows: 

[Appellants] are the owners of a tract of land located in 

Center, Franklin, and Morris Townships containing 307.89 acres, 

with exceptions. When Charles A. Warren first acquired the 

tract, it had already been made subject to a lease dated August 
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25, 1966, from E.R. Closser and Margaret Closser to [Equitable]. 

This lease provides in relevant part: 

Lessor...hereby leases unto the lessee, for its exclusive 

possession and use for the purpose of exploring and

operating for Natural Gas and Petroleum Oil, all that 

certain tract...containing Three Hundred Eight --- (308) 

acres, more or less. 

THE LESSEE shall have during the term of this lease the 

exclusive right to drill upon said land for natural gas and 

petroleum oil including the right to clean out, drill deeper 

and operate any abandoned or plugged well or wells 

located on said land for the production of gas and/or oil, or 

the use of said wells for the storage of gas, subject to all 

the terms and conditions of this lease...; to inject gas for 

storage purposes or repressuring in the substrata, and to 

remove same therefrom by pumping or otherwise; the 

right to construct and maintain piplelines...in connection 

with the transportation of gas and oil produced from said 

land or for the storage of gas therein;... 

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said land and the privileges for 

the said purposes for a period of Ten (10) Years from 

September 1, 1967, and as long thereafter 

commencement of operations as said land is operated for 

the exploration or production of natural gas, or as gas or 

oil is found in paying quantities, or stored thereunder, or 

as long as said land is used for the storage of gas or the 

protection of gas storage on lands of the general vicinity of 

said land. The Lessee shall be the sole judge of when and 

if said land is being used for the storage of gas or the 

protection of gas storage on lands of the general vicinity of 

said land. 

AND IT IS AGREED, that the Lessee shall pay to the Lessor 

for each and every well drilled upon said land, which 

produces Natural Gas only, in a quantity sufficient for the 

Lessee to convey to market, or any well used in connection 

with the storage of gas under said land, a money royalty 

computed at the rate of Three Hundred Dollars per 

annum...and unless a well is previously completed upon 

said land, the Lessee shall, beginning on the 1st day of 

September, 1967, and continuing until a well is 

completed...or this lease is used for the storage of gas or 
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the protection of gas storage on lands in the general 

vicinity of said land, pay to the Lessor quarterly in 

advance, the sum of Seventy-seven and No/100...($77.00) 

Dollars, as a carrying rent, in lieu of development... 

When said land is used for the storage of gas (but there is 

no well on said land), or for the protection of gas storage 

on lands in the general vicinity, the Lessee covenants and 

agrees to pay to the Lessor, quarterly, in advance, his 

annual storage rent...Six Hundred Sixteen and 

No/100...($616.00) Dollars at the rate of Two Dollars per 

acre per annum until a well is completed or this lease is 

surrendered. 

In 1991, [Appellants] as succesors to the original lessors, 

filed a Complaint alleging that [Equitable] “ha[s] not taken any 

action to fulfill the covenants in Lease No. 2394-1 to produce 

native gas and or oil on [Appellants’] property.” The Complaint 

asked for money damages and rescission of the lease. 

 After a long, long period of inactivity, an Amended 

Complaint was filed by new counsel on June 21, 2011. This 

version sought to explain the addition of additional defendants 

related to the original defendants but still demanded the same 

relief for the same reason. [Equitable] filed an Answer and New 

Matter and Counterclaim, requesting a declaratory judgment that 

the lease is valid and in effect. Much discovery followed. In 

June of 2013, [Appellants] moved for summary judgment. 

[Equitable] responded and filed their own Motion for Summary 

Judgment to which [Appellants] responded. Both sides have 

filed briefs in support of their positions and we have heard oral 

argument. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/14, at 1-3. 

On April 21, 2014, the trial court issued an order, which was docketed 

on April 22, 2014, granting Equitable’s motion for summary judgment and 

denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment. Appellants filed this 

timely appeal. Both the trial court and Appellants have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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Appellants present the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING 

TO FIND THAT THE GRANTING CLAUSE OF THE LEASE WAS FOR 

PRODUCTION OF NATURAL GAS AND OIL AND [THAT] STORAGE 

[WAS] A SECONDARY PURPOSE THAT COULD NOT DELAY 

PRODUCTION INDEFINITELY? 

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING 

TO FIND THAT THE LEASE WAS SEVERABLE BETWEEN 

PRODUCTION AND STORAGE WHEN THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF 

THE LEASE WAS “EXPLORING AND OPERATING FOR NATURAL 

GAS AND PETROLEUM OIL” AND SEPARATE CONSIDERATION 

WAS GIVEN FOR BOTH PRODUCTION AND STORAGE? 

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING 

TO FIND THAT [EQUITABLE] BREACHED THE IMPLIED 

COVENANT TO OPERATE FOR NATURAL GAS AND OIL EVEN IN A 

DUAL PURPOSE LEASE BY FAILING TO DRILL FOR OR PRODUCE 

NATURAL GAS AND OIL DURING THE INITIAL LEASE TERM OR 

FOR OVER THIRTY-FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER? 

WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 

FIND THAT [EQUITABLE] BREACHED THE LEASE BY ITS FAILURE 

TO MAKE ANY LEASE PAYMENTS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS? 

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING 

TO CONSIDER WHETHER LEASE TERMS COULD FAIRLY BE 

CONSTRUED UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE TO PERMIT 

[EQUITABLE] TO HOLD DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FOREVER BY 

PAYING NOMINAL STORAGE PAYMENTS OF TWO DOLLARS PER 

ACRE TO AN UNSCHOOLED FARMER OR WHETHER SUCH AN 

INTERPRETATION WAS UNCONSCIONABLE? 

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING 

TO FIND THE LEASE TERMS AMBIGUOUS, REQUIRING A 

FAVORABLE CONSTRUCTION FOR LESSOR THAT MERE STORAGE

ALONE COULD NOT HOLD PRODUCTION RIGHTS INDEFINITELY

WHERE LESSEE DRAFTED THE LEASE? 

Appellants’ Brief at 4-5. 

 We recognize: 
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Our scope of review ... [of summary judgment orders] ... is 

plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial court, 

reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there 

exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts 

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be 

resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law will 

summary judgment be entered. 

Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly 

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of his cause of 

action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the completion of 

discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of 

expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of 

proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to 

the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require 

the issues to be submitted to a jury. Thus a record that 

supports summary judgment will either (1) show the material 

facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient evidence of facts 

to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense and, 

therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury. Upon 

appellate review we are not bound by the trial court’s 

conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions. The 

appellate Court may disturb the trial court’s order only upon an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

Alexander v. City of Meadville, 61 A.3d 218, 221 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(internal citation omitted). 

 Instantly, Appellant’s first, second, third, fifth, and sixth issues assert 

that the trial court erred in granting summary relief in favor of Equitable 

based on the trial court’s interpretation and construction of the lease. 

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in its construction of the lease, 

in determining that the lease’s gas storage and production provisions were 

not severable, in concluding that Equitable did not breach an implied 
J-A01037-15 

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covenant to produce gas, in not deeming the lease unconscionable, and in 

determining that the lease was not ambiguous. Based on our review of the 

record and applicable jurisprudence, we cannot agree with Appellants’ claims 

of error. We find that the trial court correctly determined that the lease 

allowed for gas to be stored on the property, as well as produced, such that 

Equitable’s continued gas storage without gas production activities allowed 

for the lease’s term to continue, even in the absence of gas production. 

The trial court reasoned: 

The Clossers, the original lessors, owned the land in fee 

simple and had the right to convey it to anyone in whatever 

complete or partial fashion that they wished. They chose to 

lease the oil and gas within and under their land to [Equitable] 

on August 25, 1967. A lease of oil and gas in the ground is a 

sale of an estate in fee simple until all of the available oil and 

gas are removed, or upon some other specified act. The lessor 

retains only an interest in the rents and royalties which is 

personal property. Snyder Brothers, Inc. v. Yohe, 676 A.2d 

1226 (Pa. Super. 1996). The interest granted to the lessee is a 

fee simple determinable. The lessor retains a reversionary 

interest. Higbee Corp. v. Kennedy, 428 A.2d 592 (Pa. Super. 

1981). 

 The specified events that must occur for the oil and gas to 

revert in this case to [Appellants] are found in the Habendum 

clause which sets forth the term of the lease. The lease first 

establishes a primary terms of ten years. If the lessee did 

nothing and if it paid to the lessors “carrying rent” of one dollar 

per acre per year the lease would have expired after ten years, 

on August 31, 1977, and on that date the oil and gas would have 

reverted to [Appellants]. But something else did happen; the 

lessee began storage operations on the land, and those 

operations are one of the events that permit lessee to retain its 

interest in oil and gas, because the lease extended “ ...for and 

during a period of Ten (10) Years from September 1, 1967, and 

... as long as said land is used for the storage of gas or the 
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protection of gas storage on lands in the general vicinity of said 

land.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/14, at 4-5. 

 The trial court’s analysis is supported by our prior decision in 

Pomposini v. T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co., 580 A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. 

1990). In Pomposini, we denied a lessee’s right to store, rather than 

produce gas, and explained: 

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has observed that, 

“the traditional oil and gas lease is far from the simplest of 

property concepts.” Brown v. Haight, 435 Pa. 12, 15, 255 A.2d 

508, 510 (1969). A conveyance of the subsurface oil and gas 

results in a severance of the mineral interests from the surface 

rights and conveys to the grantee a corporeal interest in the oil 

and gas underlying the grantor's property. Smith v. Glen Alden 

Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 299, 32 A.2d 227, 232 (1943); Barnsdall 

v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 343, 74 A. 207, 208 (1909). 

Here, however, [the lessor] merely demised an interest in the oil 

and gas, albeit for as long as there remained oil and gas to be 

produced in paying quantities. The severance of the mineral 

rights under these circumstances must be narrowly construed. 

The right to extract gas did not include the right to use the 

cavernous spaces owned by the lessor for the storage of gas in 

the absence of an express agreement therefor. Cf. Chartiers 

Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 296, 25 A. 597, 598 

(1893); Emeny v. U.S., 188 Ct.Cl. 1024, 412 F.2d 1319, 1323, 

(1969). See also: Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 450 

F.Supp. 412, 420 (E.D.Okla.), aff'd, 609 F.2d 436, cert. denied,

445 U.S. 964, 100 S.Ct. 1653, 64 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978) and 

McGinnis, Some Legal Problems in Underground Gas Storage, 17 

Institute on Oil & Gas Law & Taxation 23, 51 (1966) (right to 

store should not be implied or presumed in the absence of clear 

evidence of such intent). Because the lessee did not acquire an 

estate in the caverns and was not authorized to store gas on 

plaintiff's land, the trial court correctly held that the lessee was 

liable for the unauthorized storage of gas on [lessor’s] land. 
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Pomposini, 580 A.2d at 778-779. In contrast to Pomposini, the instant 

lease did have “an express agreement” for the storage of gas, such that the 

trial court did not err in finding that Equitable could use the land for that sole 

purpose pursuant to the lease, even though the lease also allowed for gas 

production. 

 We further find that the trial court aptly determined that the provisions 

in the lease’s granting clause concerning the production of gas and the 

storage of gas should not be severed, such that Equitable could proceed in 

only using the land for gas storage. The trial court explained: 

[T]he introductory phrase [within the lease stating] “for the 

purpose of exploring and operating for Natural Gas” does not 

create a severable lease, nor does it require the lessee to 

produce oil and gas or suffer loss of the lease for failure to do so. 

As has been said many times, the intent of the parties controls. 

Obviously, at the time of the execution of the lease in 1967 the 

lessee, [Equitable], was much interested in storage rights. 

Storage rights are mentioned in five separate paragraphs in the 

lease. It is difficult to believe that E.R. Closser and Margaret 

Closser signed the lease without being acutely aware that 

storage rights were repeatedly discussed. The fact that in one 

place in the lease production rights were mentioned where 

storage rights were not is a slender reed on which to base an 

argument that the lease was intended to be severable. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/14, at 13-14. Our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445 (Pa. 2001), supports 

the trial court’s rationale in determining that the contract was not severable. 

The High Court explained: 

[T]here is no bright line rule requiring that a court first find that 

the intent of the parties is unclear as to entirety/severability 

before it may look to factors such as the conduct of the parties 
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and the character of the consideration to determine whether an 

agreement is entire or severable. The central task is to 

ascertain the intent of the parties. That intent may be apparent 

from the explicit language of the contract,... or it may be obvious 

from a “construction” of the agreement, including the nature of 

the consideration[.] In short, principles of construction may 

reveal the intent of the parties no less than the actual language 

addressing entirety/severability. Thus ... this Court holds that, 

absent express language that a contract is entire, a court may 

look to the contract as a whole, including the character of the 

consideration, to determine the intent of the parties as to 

severability and may also consider the circumstances 

surrounding the execution of the contract, the conduct of the 

parties, and any other factor pertinent to ascertaining the 

parties' intent. The court need not make a specific predicate 

finding of ambiguity before undertaking the inquiry - indeed, if 

the contract were crystal clear as to the parties' intent, 

severability likely would not be a contested issue.

Jacobs, 772 A.2d at 452. Here, the lease does not specifically state that 

the provisions are severable. Consonant with Jacobs, the trial court 

considered whether the gas storage provisions were severable from the gas 

production terms by examining the lease’s language, the multiple gas 

storage provisions in the lease, the circumstances surrounding the lease’s 

execution, and the discernible intent of the original contracting parties which 

could be derived from the lease. In doing so, the trial court found that the 

contract was not severable. We find no error by the trial court in reaching 

this determination based on our own review of the lease and the record. 

See Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Forest Resources, LLC,

83 A.3d 177, 187 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal citation omitted) (“It is wellsettled that clauses in a contract should not be read as independent 

agreements thrown together without consideration of their combined effects. 
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Terms in one section of the contract, therefore, should never be interpreted 

in a manner which nullifies other terms in the same agreement.”). 

 Likewise, we do not find that Equitable breached an implied covenant 

to produce, rather than to store, gas on the property. Our Supreme Court 

held: 

An implied covenant to develop the underground resources 

appropriately exists where the only compensation to the 

landowner contemplated in the lease is royalty payments 

resulting from the extraction of that underground resource. 

Where, however, the parties have expressly agreed that 

the landowner shall be compensated if the lessee does not 

actively extract the resource, then the lessee has no implied 

obligation to engage in extraction activities. 

Jacobs, 772 A.2d at 455 (emphasis supplied). Given that the lease 

expressly provides for separate rates to be paid for production and for gas 

storage, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the 

lease did not obligate Equitable to produce gas from the land. 

 We further discern no error in the trial court’s construction that 

Equitable’s ongoing gas storage activities extended the lease term to the 

present day. Specifically, the trial court indicated “[b]ecause we find ... that 

the lease is not severable and because the land has been used for the 

storage of gas or for the protection of the storage of gas since its primary 

term, the lease continues to this day.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/14, at 13. 

We agree with the trial court, and recognize: 

[A] lease is in the nature of a contract and is controlled by 

principles of contract law. J.K. Willison v. Consol. Coal Co.,

536 Pa. 49, 54, 637 A.2d 979, 982 (1994). It must be 
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construed in accordance with the terms of the agreement 

as manifestly expressed, and “[t]he accepted and plain 

meaning of the language used, rather than the silent 

intentions of the contracting parties, determines the 

construction to be given the agreement.” Id. (citations 

omitted). Further, a party seeking to terminate a lease 

bears the burden of proof. See Jefferson County Gas Co. 

v. United Natural Gas Co., 247 Pa. 283, 286, 93 A. 340, 

341 (1915). 

T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 267 

(Pa.2012). 

Caldwell v. Kriebel Resources Co., LLC, 72 A.3d 611, 614 (Pa. Super. 

2013). Here, the trial court interpreted the plain meaning of the lease’s 

granting clause and correctly construed the lease as continuing as long as 

Equitable either produced or stored gas on the land. 

Further, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the trial 

court’s lease interpretation and construction was unconscionable. Appellant 

correctly cites the following precepts relevant to a determination of 

unconscionability: 

Unconscionability is a "defensive contractual remedy which 

serves to relieve a party from an unfair contract or from an 

unfair portion of a contract." Germantown Mfg. Co. v. 

Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145 (Pa. Super. 1985) (quoting D. 

Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 707 (1973)). The 

party challenging a contract provision as unconscionable 

generally bears the burden of proving unconscionability. Bishop 

v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1094 (Pa. Super. 1984). 

In evaluating claims of unconscionability, courts generally 

recognize two categories, procedural, or "unfair surprise," 

unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. See 

Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. 

Super. 1991); Bishop, 480 A.2d at 1095; Germantown, 491 A.2d 

at 145-46. Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process 

by which an agreement is reached and the form of an
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agreement, including the use therein of fine print and convoluted 

or unclear language. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 4.28 

(2d Ed. 1990). This type of unconscionability involves, for 

example, "material, risk shifting contractual terms which "are 

not typically expected by the party who is being asked to 'assent' 

to them." Germantown, 491 A.2d at 145-146. Substantive 

unconscionability refers to contractual terms that are 

unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the 

disfavored party does not assent. See Id., at 145-147; 

Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 1068 (Pa. Super. 

1992). Thus, "unconscionability requires a twofold

determination: that the contractual terms are unreasonably 

favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice 

on the part of the other party regarding acceptance of the 

provisions." Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines 

Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1312 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Worldwide 

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brady, 973 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 

1992)). 

Appellants’ Brief at 31-32. Appellants maintain “[t]here is no evidence here 

that the lessor was anything other than a landowner, a sheep and cattle 

farmer, unschooled in the ways of oil and gas leases, while the lessee was 

and is in the business of the same.” Id. at 33. However, Appellants 

concede, as they must, that “it is true that inequity in bargaining power, 

alone, is not a basis upon which to invalidate a clause in the contract[.]” Id.

at 34. Appellants assert “there can be no question that lessors could not 

have understood and assented to what would boil down to a storage only 

lease.” Id. However, as Equitable states, and our review of the record 

confirms, Appellants’ deposition testimonies belie this argument: 

The Oil and Gas Lease at issue (the "Lease") was executed 

on August 25, 1967, by lessors E.R. and Margaret Closser and 

lessee Equitable Gas Company. R. 540a. The Clossers were the 

in-laws of Plaintiff Charles A. Warren and the grandparents of 

Plaintiff Charles S. Warren. R. 549a. [Appellants] have been 
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deeded the property subject to the Lease (the "Property"). R. 

61a-69a. Equitable Production Company and Equitrans, L.P. 

("Equitable"), through assignments, are the current Lessees. R. 

556a. 

The Clossers are deceased, and never gave deposition 

testimony in this matter. R. 787a. Charles S. Warren admitted 

that he never spoke with the Clossers about the Lease. R. 787a 

(C.S. Warren Dep. 13:2-4). He also admitted he has no 

information about the intent of the parties when they entered 

into the Lease, and does not know if "storage of gas was an 

important element of the lease when it was entered into in 

1967." R. 792a (C.S. Warren Dep. 48:14-24). Nor does his 

wife, Plaintiff Patricia Warren, have any insight. R. 850a (P.S. 

Warren Dep. 9:10-13, 9:23-24, admitting that outside of what 

she had been told by her husband, she had knowledge of no 

relevant facts and had not even read the Lease). 

Similarly, Charles A. Warren admitted that he had never 

had any discussions with the Clossers regarding the Lease or oil 

and gas operations on the Property. R. 853a (C.A. Warren Dep. 

7:23-8:3). He too possesses no information about the Clossers' 

intentions when they signed the Lease. R. 855a (C.A. Warren 

Dep. 16:20-23). He does not know "whether production of gas 

was a priority at the time the lease was entered into." Id. (C.A. 

Warren Dep. 17:5-11). He admitted he has "[n]o idea what the 

purpose of the Lease was. Id. (C.A. Warren Dep. 16:24- 17:4); 

see also R. 858a (C.A. Warren Dep. 30:2-3, same). 

Equitable’s Brief at 2-3. Thus, we are not persuaded that Appellants have 

met their burden of proving that the lease was unconscionable. 

As to Appellants’ fourth issue, we find that the record refutes 

Appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in not finding that Equitable 

breached the lease “by its failure to make any lease payments for over four 

years.” Appellants’ Brief at 4. The trial court observed that after Charles A. 

Warren became a widower, and despite repeated requests from Equitable, 

Charles A. Warren did not “send a copy of his [new] deed [to Equitable 
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following his wife’s death], nor did he furnish a copy of his taxpayer 

identification number.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/14, at 15. Because of 

Charles A. Warren’s inaction, Equitable withheld payments, which the trial 

court found “prudent under the circumstances, and ... not a basis for 

forfeiture of the lease.” Id. at 16. We agree with the trial court. See 

Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Company, 344 A.2d 555, 559 (Pa. 

Super. 1975) (“The law abhors a ‘forfeiture’ almost as devoutly as nature 

abhors a vacuum.”). After Equitable secured a copy of the deed, Equitable 

resumed payments. Having played a role in not receiving monies from 

Equitable, equity denies Charles A. Warren the forfeiture he is requesting. 

See First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153, 1159 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (internal citation omitted) (“[C]ourts [asked to grant equitable 

remedies] will not relieve a party from the consequences of error due to his 

own ignorance or carelessness when there were available means which 

would have enabled him to avoid the mistake if reasonable care had been 

exercised.”). 

 In sum, based on our review of the record and applicable 

jurisprudence, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment 

in favor of Equitable. 

 Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/4/2015