UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RONNIE DEAN JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD A. YOUNG; INVESTIGATOR

No. 96-7787

LESTER; GEORGE E. DEEDS; ROGER S.

DAVIS; M.L. MULLINS; J. O'QUINN,

Officer; SERGEANT MINTON; RICHARD

FLEMING,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.

James P. Jones, District Judge.

(CA-96-122-R)

Submitted: December 2, 1997

Decided: January 14, 1998

Before LUTTIG and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Ronnie Dean Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Ronnie Jones appeals from a district court judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of Defendant correctional officer Roger

Davis in connection with Jones's excessive force action brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Jones alleged that Davis beat him

after Jones directed racial slurs and inflammatory comments about

Davis's wife at Davis. Davis denied ever striking Jones.

We must accept the jury's verdict if it is supported by substantial

evidence. See Vodrey v. Golden, 864 F.2d 28, 30 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988).

"Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence that a reasonable

mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if different conclusions might also be supported by the evidence. See

Gibraltar Sav. v. LD Brinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1297 (5th Cir.

1988). The record, however, contains no transcript of the trial, and the

government may provide a free transcript only if the appeal presents

a "substantial question." See 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1994). A "substantial

question" is one that is "reasonably debatable," Ortiz v. Greyhound

Corp., 192 F.Supp. 903, 905 (D. Md. 1959), or one "where the law

appears to be settled, but where the appellant is able to show that his

chances of changing the law on appeal are strong." Lee v. Habib, 424

F.2d 891, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Generally, appellants bear the burden

of demonstrating non-frivolity and substantiality. See Maloney v. D.I.

Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 396 F.2d 939, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

We find that Jones fails to demonstrate a substantial question on

appeal. He contends that the correctional officers who testified against

him at his trial were untruthful. Resolution of the conflicting versions

of events presented at trial, however, necessitated a credibility determination by the jury. The jury's credibility determinations are not

subject to review by this court. See United States v. Saunders, 886

F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).

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Jones also complains that his case was weakened by the State's

failure to conduct polygraph examinations on the persons allegedly

directly involved in the beating incident, and failure to perform DNA

testing on blood from a shirt Jones says that he wore during the

alleged attack. Jones asserts that DNA testing would prove that the

blood belonged to Davis, and support his claim that Davis punched

him in the mouth, scratching his hand in the process. Jones cites no

authority which would obligate the State to provide either form of

testing. He cannot reasonably expect the State to bear the expense and

burden of proving his case for him.

Accordingly, the judgment order of the district court is affirmed.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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