SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3069-14T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CARLOS M. CINTRON, JR., a/k/a

CARLOS M. CITRON, CARLOS M.

JR., and CARLOS CIBTRON,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted February 13, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Union County, Ind. No. 13-07-

0625.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Bryan S. Tiscia, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

August 29, 2017
2 A-3069-14T3

After observing defendant Carlos M. Cintron, Jr. complete a 

hand-to-hand marijuana sale on an Elizabeth street, law 

enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for his apartment, 

where they seized marijuana and Ziploc bags. Following defendant's 

indictment, a jury found him guilty of controlled dangerous 

substance (CDS) offenses and the trial court sentenced him to an 

aggregate four-year prison term. Defendant appeals from the 

December 5, 2014 judgment of conviction.

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erroneously 

denied his suppression motion. Defendant also contends he was 

denied due process of law for the following reasons: the State 

did not provide him with adequate notice of the charges; his right 

to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of hearsay 

statements and by an officer's statements implying evidence 

outside the record inculpated him; the State did not establish an 

uninterrupted chain of custody; the prosecutor nullified the 

jury's power of nullification; and the trial court improperly 

instructed the jury. Lastly, defendant argues his sentence is 

excessive.

Defendant did not raise at trial many of the arguments he 

raises on appeal. We find no plain error in the arguments he now 

raises for the first time, and we find no merit in the remaining 

arguments. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions and sentence.
3 A-3069-14T3

In July 2013, a Union County grand jury charged defendant in 

a four-count indictment with fourth-degree distribution of 

marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:25-5(b)(12) 

(count one); third-degree distribution of marijuana within five 

hundred feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count two); 

fourth-degree possession of marijuana with the intent to 

distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12) 

(count three); and third-degree possession of marijuana with the 

intent to distribute within five hundred feet of a public park, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count four).1 In addition, police charged 

defendant in a complaint with the disorderly persons offenses of 

possession of less than fifty grams of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

10(a)(4), and possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to 

use, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2. 

Following the indictment defendant filed a suppression 

motion, which the trial court ultimately denied following a limited 

hearing. The court declined to conduct a hearing concerning the 

reliability of a confidential informant (CI), who had given police 

information used to obtain the search warrant for defendant's 

residence. 

 

1 Each count alleged defendant possessed marijuana "in a quantity 

of less than one ounce." 
4 A-3069-14T3

The State dismissed the indictment's third and fourth counts 

before trial and a jury found defendant guilty of the first and 

second counts. The court found defendant guilty of the disorderly 

persons CDS offenses. 

The court sentenced defendant to a one-year prison term on 

count one and to a concurrent four-year prison term on count two; 

imposed appropriate fines and assessments; and revoked defendant's 

driving privileges for six months. The court fined defendant for 

the disorderly persons offenses. 

The State developed the following proofs at trial. On April 

5, 2013, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Officer Carmine Giannetta and 

Detective Athanasio Mikros began conducting surveillance in the 

area of Sixth and Livingston Streets in Elizabeth. They saw 

defendant exit the rooming house where he lived and enter his car. 

Defendant drove away, and the officers followed him for 

approximately one mile until he stopped in front of a residence. 

Officer Giannetta watched as a Hispanic male, later identified as 

Omar Martinez, came out of the residence and approached defendant's 

car. Defendant and Martinez spoke briefly, Martinez handed 

defendant money, and defendant handed Martinez a few "small items." 

Martinez returned to his residence and defendant drove away. 

Officer Giannetta contacted Lieutenant Keily and Officer Jorge 

Joaquim, who followed defendant.
5 A-3069-14T3

Officer Giannetta and Detective Mikros knocked on the front 

door of Martinez's residence. A woman invited the officers inside 

where they encountered Martinez. Based on a conversation with 

Martinez, Officer Giannetta entered a bathroom and seized three 

bags of marijuana from under a carpet wrapped around the base of 

the toilet. Officer Giannetta secured the marijuana in his pocket, 

placed Martinez under arrest, and returned to defendant's 

apartment. 

Officer Giannetta testified he recognized the contents of an 

exhibit — three yellow Ziploc bags of marijuana inside a larger 

plastic bag — as the CDS he seized from Martinez's home. Asked 

how the three the smaller "baggies" got into the larger bag, 

Officer Giannetta explained, "[w]e bring the evidence into our 

office. We have evidence bags, tape and so forth. The officer 

places it in the bag. He puts all the important information on 

the front here and we seal it and we place it in [Elizabeth Police 

Department] property." Officer Giannetta identified the blue tape 

on one of the "baggies" as coming from the Union County 

Prosecutor's Office Laboratory.
6 A-3069-14T3

Officer Giannetta identified the location of Martinez's house 

on a "500-foot map" as being within five hundred feet of a public 

park.2 

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Keily and Officer Joaquim, assisted by 

uniformed officers driving a marked police vehicle, stopped 

defendant's car. The officers arrested defendant, searched him 

incident to the arrest, and seized from his person two cell phones, 

keys, and $54 in cash. The uniformed officers transported 

defendant to police headquarters. Lieutenant Keily and Officer 

Joaquim drove to defendant's residence to meet Officer Giannetta 

and Detective Mikros. Lieutenant Keily kept defendant's keys. 

Once the four officers arrived at defendant's residence, 

Lieutenant Keily gave Detective Mikros defendant's keys. The 

officers were not certain which of the four rooms in the rooming 

house was defendant's. That dilemma was resolved when defendant's 

cousin, who resided in a neighboring room, came up the staircase 

of the residence. The officers learned the building was a rooming 

house with a common bathroom and four numbered doors, each leading 

 

2 Before the trial started, defense counsel told the court there 

was no problem with the map, only whether Martinez's house was 

located within the 500-foot area. During his trial testimony, 

Officer Giannetta drew an "X" on an enlarged version of the map 

to show where within the 500 feet Martinez's residence was located. 

In summation, defendant conceded Martinez's residence was within 

500 feet of a public park. 
7 A-3069-14T3

to a separate residential room. Detective Mikros used defendant's 

key to unlock defendant's front door, but did not enter the room. 

Rather, after securing the door shut, Detective Mikros and Officer 

Giannetta left to obtain "legal authorization" to enter the room.3 

After receiving such authorization, the officers returned to 

defendant's room and proceeded inside. 

Defendant's room was approximately six feet long by eight 

feet wide. Detective Mikros noted the room contained a bed, a 

small refrigerator, a television, a dresser, and men's clothing. 

After searching the room, Detective Mikros found and seized a 

folder containing various documents bearing defendant's personal 

information and two photographs of defendant. In addition, the 

detective discovered a sandwich bag containing suspected marijuana 

and two empty yellow Ziploc bags. During his trial testimony, 

Detective Mikros identified these items as those he seized from 

defendant's room. The items were contained within a sealed 

Elizabeth Police evidence bag with yellow and white markings and 

blue tape made or placed by someone in "the lab."

 

3 To avoid undue prejudice to defendant in front of the jury, the 

court suggested the phrase "legal authorization" as an appropriate 

alternative to "search warrant." The judge instructed the jury 

not to speculate what the basis of that "legal authorization" was. 
8 A-3069-14T3

Following the close of the State's case, defendant made "a 

motion for acquittal," which the court denied. Defendant called 

two cousins as witnesses. Juan Andino testified he lived in an 

adjacent room of the rooming house and worked across the street. 

Shortly before lunch, between approximately noon and 1:30 p.m. on 

the day defendant was arrested, Andino saw police outside of the 

rooming house. Two police officers were inside the open garage 

door and another stood near a parked car. Andino saw a fourth 

officer by the staircase of the residence. That officer followed 

Andino as he walked into the building. 

Inside the common area, Andino noticed the officer had 

defendant's house keys, which he used to enter defendant's room. 

Andino went to his own room, and when he came out, the police said 

he could not leave. For the next hour, Andino heard the officers 

searching defendant's room. After receiving permission to leave, 

Andino observed defendant's room in a "disheveled" condition as 

if the police had "turned it upside down."

Defendant's other cousin, Edward Rivera, worked in the garage 

below the rooming house. When Rivera arrived at the garage around 

noon, he saw law enforcement officers upstairs, where they remained 

for approximately three or four hours. However, because he never 

went upstairs, Rivera did not know the specific nature of the 

police activity.
9 A-3069-14T3

In summation, defendant argued the State's case was mostly 

circumstantial, fraught with problems, and did not establish 

beyond a reasonable doubt either that defendant was at Martinez's 

house and distributed three bags of marijuana, or that defendant 

intended to distribute drugs. The jury disagreed and convicted 

defendant. 

On appeal, defendant argues:

POINT I

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 

AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO 

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. I, 

PAR. 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS 

VIOLATED BY THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 

INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED 

OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA (Not Raised 

Below).

POINT II

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AS 

GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. I, PAR. 

10 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED 

(Not Raised Below).

A. The Police Improperly Implied 

that They Had Information [O]utside 

the Scope of the Trial Record that 

Implicated the Defendant in the 

Commission of the Crimes.

B. The [T]rial Court Erroneously 

Admitted Hearsay Paper Evidence 

Prepared [b]y the Government [t]o 

Prove an Essential Element of the 

Crime. 
10 A-3069-14T3

POINT III

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGEMENT OF 

ACQUITTAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURORS 

ON ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE 

DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA (Not Raised Below).

POINT V

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 

AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO 

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. 1, 

PAR. 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS 

VIOLATED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR NULLIFIED THE 

JURY'S POWER OF NULLIFICATION. (Not Raised 

Below).

POINT VI

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 

AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO 

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. 1, 

PAR. 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS 

VIOLATED BY THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO SHOW 

A PROPER FOUNDATION AND AN UNINTERRUPTED CHAIN 

OF CUSTODY.

POINT VII

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 

AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO 

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. 1, 

PAR. 1 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS 

VIOLATED BY THE ACCUMULATION OF TRIAL ERRORS 

(Partially Raised Below).

POINT VIII

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 

AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. 1, PAR. 7 
11 A-3069-14T3

OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED: 

THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED INADEQUATE 

INFORMATION TO SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE, AND IT 

CONTAINED INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY 

MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS.

POINT IX

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE 

PROCESS AND FAIR NOTICE AS GUARANTEED BY THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ART. 1, PAR. 1 OF THE NEW 

JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED BY THE 

STATE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF 

THE CHARGES TO PERMIT THE DEFENDANT TO RAISE 

A COMPLETE DEFENSE.

POINT X

THE SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE

A. The Trial Court Improperly 

Balanced the Aggravating and 

Mitigating Factors.

B. The Imposition of a Four-Year 

Period of Parole Ineligibility for 

a Gram of Marijuana is Wholly 

Disproportionate to the Crime, 

Shocks the Judicial Conscience, and 

is Cruel and Unusual.

C. Merger Applies.

 

Defendant did not raise before the trial court the arguments 

he now raises in Points I, II, IV and V. For that reason, we 

review them for plain error, that is, error "clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see also R. 1:7-2; State 

v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320-21 (2017) (noting that jury 

instructions are reviewed for plain error if defendant did not 
12 A-3069-14T3

object to the instructions at trial). "Regarding a jury 

instruction, 'plain error requires demonstration of legal 

impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial 

rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice 

by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself 

the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust 

result.'" Montalvo, supra, 229 N.J. at 321 (quoting State v. 

Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).

In his first point, defendant argues that the facts do not 

necessarily suggest a drug transaction, and that he and Martinez 

could have shared joint possession of the marijuana. He asserts 

the "fact that Martinez gave [defendant] money does not make it a 

drug sale. Martinez could have been giving [defendant] gas money 

for picking up their [jointly possessed] marijuana." The court 

therefore should have charged the jury on possession as a lesserincluded offense of possession with intent to distribute or 

distribution of marijuana. In his fourth point, defendant 

challenges this excerpt from the distribution charge: to 

"distribute means the transfer, actual, constructive or attempted 

from one person to another of a [CDS]." Defendant alleges the 

jury had no guidance on what constituted an attempt based on the 

language of that charge.
13 A-3069-14T3

Concerning defendant's sale of marijuana to Martinez, we find 

no error in the court not charging possession as a lesser-included 

offense of possession with intent to distribute or distribution 

of marijuana. A trial court "shall not charge the jury with 

respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis 

for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense." 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). There must "be a rational basis in the 

evidence to support a charge on that included offense." State v. 

Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 178 (2009) (quoting State v. Thomas, 187 

N.J. 119, 131 (2006)). Here defendant's fantastical speculation 

about the reasons Martinez gave defendant money does not constitute 

"a rational basis in the evidence" to support a charge on a 

possessory offense. Defendant distributed the marijuana to 

Martinez. No facts rationally suggest any other explanation for 

the exchange of money for drugs.

Defendant's contention concerning the charge on distribution 

is also devoid of merit. The trial court substantially followed 

the model jury charge. Moreover, considering police observed 

defendant sell marijuana, recovered the marijuana from the buyer, 

and recovered additional marijuana from defendant's single-room 

residence, we are unconvinced "that of itself the error possessed 

a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result." Montalvo, 

supra, 229 N.J. at 321.
14 A-3069-14T3

For similar reasons, we reject defendant's argument in Point 

II that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was 

violated. Defendant contends the State implied he was a drug 

dealer through the officers' testimony they were conducting 

surveillance, Officer Giannetta's testimony that his attention was 

drawn to defendant, and the absence of any explanation for these 

events. Defendant further alleges the error was exacerbated when 

Gianetta testified that after entering the residence and 

confronting Martinez, Giannetta said, "I was instructed by Mr. 

Martinez to the bathroom area and a small carpet area that wraps 

around the toilet and located three yellow-tinted bags of marijuana 

that were — he placed under there." 

Nothing in Officer Gianetta's testimony suggested he had 

received incriminating testimony from a non-testifying witness 

about defendant, or that the officer "possesse[d] superior 

knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the defendant." 

State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 348, 351 (2005). Although Officer 

Gianetta testified he was conducting surveillance and, when asked 

if "anything dr[e]w your attention while you were conducting that 

surveillance," responded with defendant's name, nothing in that 

exchange implied that someone had given police information about 

defendant. Nothing in that exchange suggested, for example, that 

defendant had prior convictions, the area under surveillance was 
15 A-3069-14T3

known for drug activity, or that police had been provided with 

information about defendant's criminal activity. For these 

reasons, and in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's 

guilt, we find no plain error in Officer Gianetta's testimony that 

defendant drew his attention when he was conducting surveillance. 

Nor do we find reversible error in the admission of Martinez's 

"instruction" to Officer Gianetta to go to the bathroom where the 

officer found "three yellow-tinted bags of marijuana that . . . 

[Martinez] placed . . . there." We note the prosecutor carefully 

phrased the question: "what, if anything, did you do after 

Detective Mikros had that conversation with Martinez?"4 The 

prosecutor's reference to a conversation, without its content, was 

elicited to explain Officer Gianetta's conduct. The officer's 

answer, which included what he was told in addition to what he 

did, was partially non-responsive. 

Nonetheless, even without the hearsay statement, the officer 

would have testified he found three baggies of marijuana, in a 

residence Martinez entered, shortly after officers observed 

Martinez give defendant money in a hand-to-hand street 

transaction. The obvious inference was the officers seized the 

marijuana defendant sold to Martinez. The permissible testimony 

 

4 The prosecutor had elicited testimony that the detective and 

Martinez had conversed.
16 A-3069-14T3

all but nullified any prejudicial impact the officer's nonresponsive repetition of Martinez's hearsay statement might 

otherwise have caused, a consideration that could explain why 

defendant did not object. In any event, considering the hearsay 

statement in the context of the entirety of the State's proofs, 

we conclude the hearsay statement did not constitute an error that 

was clearly capable of causing an unjust result.

Defendant also argues the State's introduction of the map 

depicting the area within 500 feet of a public park violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses because no one involved 

in the map's preparation testified at trial. Following the

submission of briefs in this case, the Supreme Court decided State 

v. Wilson, 227 N.J. 534 (2017), in which it held such maps were 

"nontestimonial and that [their] admission therefore did not 

violate defendant's confrontation rights." Id. at 538. The Court 

determined such maps were "admissible, if properly authenticated, 

under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(e) and as public records pursuant to 

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(8)." Ibid. In the case before us, authentication 

of the map was not an issue at trial and is not an issue on appeal.

We have considered defendant's arguments in Points III, V 

through VII, and IX in light of the record and applicable legal 

principles and find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
17 A-3069-14T3

In Point VIII, defendant challenges on several grounds the 

"affidavit supporting the [search] warrant" of his residence. 

Defendant asserts the affidavit "did not adequately articulate the 

factual basis for the informant's knowledge, nor did it 

'demonstrate' that the informant had been reliable in the past, 

as required by law." Defendant also asserts "the facts themselves 

were wholly inadequate to establish probable cause. No officer 

ever observed drugs on the defendant, in his car, in his house, 

or anywhere near him." Lastly, defendant contends "the supporting 

affidavit contained intentional and/or reckless material 

misrepresentations and omissions." Not one of these arguments has

any merit. 

Following defendant's arrest, the police obtained the warrant 

to search his room. Detective Mikros testified before a Superior 

Court judge; he did not submit an affidavit. The detective 

testified he received information from a CI that defendant was 

selling marijuana out of his residence. In the past, the CI had 

given information that resulted in the issuance of approximately 

fifteen search warrants and "over [seventy] to [eighty] arrests." 

The warrants resulted in the seizure of controlled dangerous 

substances, weapons, and cars.

According to Detective Mikros, the CI told him defendant sold 

marijuana from his home, which the CI identified by its street 
18 A-3069-14T3

address and floor. The CI said defendant only "brings out whatever 

the person orders. So if you order two bags, one bag, three bags, 

he's only gonna deliver whatever the delivery order is." Detective 

Mikros testified the CI's information was based on his personal 

knowledge from ordering from defendant, as recently as "a couple 

weeks ago." 

Detective Mikros recounted the events culminating in 

defendant's arrest, including the surveillance, the observation 

of defendant and Martinez's hand-to-hand street transaction, and 

the seizure of marijuana from the residence Martinez entered after 

the street transaction. Martinez not only identified defendant 

as the person who sold him the marijuana, but also gave police 

defendant's cellular phone number. Defendant's phone, which 

police had confiscated, rang when the detective dialed the number. 

Detective Mikros also related how he had driven to defendant's 

room after arresting him. While in the hallway of the rooming 

house, defendant's cousin arrived and verified which room was 

defendant's and that defendant lived there alone. The detective 

could smell raw marijuana emanating from a room.

"The standards for determining probable cause to arrest and 

probable cause to search are identical." State v. Moore, 181 N.J.

40, 45 (2004) (citing State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998)). 

"Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the 
19 A-3069-14T3

officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has 

been committed." State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 106 (1987) 

(quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02, 80 S. Ct.

168, 170-71, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 137-38 (1959)). "Before issuing any 

warrant, a judge must be satisfied that there is probable cause 

to believe that a crime has been or is being committed at a 

specific location or that evidence of a crime is at the place to 

be searched." State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 381 (2003) (citing 

State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210-11 (2001)).

Here, the facts the State established through Detective 

Mikros's testimony — most of which defendant has failed to mention 

in his brief — establish probable cause, as the issuing judge 

found. The detective's testimony concerning the CI's past history 

established the CI's veracity. See Sullivan, supra, 169 N.J. at 

213. Moreover, our courts have recognized "the smell of marijuana 

itself constitutes probable cause 'that a criminal offense ha[s] 

been committed and that additional contraband might be present.'" 

State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) (alteration in original) 

(quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 516-17 (2003)).

Defendant's contention the detective's testimony contained 

material misrepresentations is equally lacking in merit. 

Defendant's cousin, Juan Andino, testified at the suppression 

hearing to essentially the same facts he testified to at trial, 
20 A-3069-14T3

as did the law enforcement officers. Defendant argued that 

Andino's testimony that police searched defendant's rooms hours 

before they arrested him demonstrated the warrant was issued based 

on material misrepresentations. The trial court found the officers 

credible and Andino incredible. The trial court's credibility 

determinations are amply supported by the record. We thus defer 

to them. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565 (2012).

Lastly, defendant argues in Point X that his sentence is 

excessive. His primary emphasis is on the trial court's imposition 

of custodial terms without parole eligibility. Defendant is 

mistaken, as evidenced by both the sentencing transcript and the 

judgment of conviction. The court imposed "flat" prison terms 

with no period of parole ineligibility. Defendant's remaining 

arguments concerning his sentence are similarly lacking in merit 

and do not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2).

Affirmed.