[Cite as In re T.B., 2020-Ohio-4040.]

 STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

IN RE: T.B. 

 A.B. 

 

 

 

C.A. Nos. 29560 

 29564 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE Nos. DN 17-09-742 

 DN 17-09-743 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: August 12, 2020 

 

CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellants Mother and Father appeal the judgment of the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas that terminated their parental rights and placed the children T.B. and A.B. in the 

permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB” or “the agency”). This 

Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Mother and Father are the biological parents of T.B. (d.o.b. 7/26/13) and A.B. 

(d.o.b. 4/16/17). Shortly after A.B. was born, Mother, Father, and the children moved in with the 

children’s maternal grandparents against the wishes of the grandparents. Mother and Father did 

not have jobs and refused to contribute financially to the household, where Mother’s two older 

children also lived in the legal custody of the grandparents. CSB investigated the home situation 

based on a referral. Thereafter, the agency filed a complaint alleging that T.B. and A.B. were 
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abused (endangered), neglected, and dependent children. Concerns alleged in the complaints 

included intimate partner violence between Mother and Father, domestic violence by Father 

towards the children, suspected drug use by both parents, and Mother’s and Father’s lack of 

financial and housing stability. The grandparents were leasing the home on a month-to-month 

basis and they planned to leave that residence. T.B. and A.B. were removed pursuant to an 

emergency order of temporary custody. 

{¶3} Mother and Father later both waived their rights to hearings on the issues of 

adjudication and disposition. After the parents stipulated to the allegations in the complaints, the 

juvenile court adjudicated T.B. and A.B. dependent children. CSB withdrew its allegations of 

abuse and neglect. The parties agreed to an initial disposition placing the children in the temporary 

custody of the agency. Mother and Father were permitted two hours of supervised visitation each 

week. 

{¶4} The juvenile court adopted CSB’s case plan as the order of the court. Mother’s first 

objective was to obtain a mental health assessment and follow all recommendations. In addition, 

Mother and Father both had objectives to (1) obtain substance abuse assessments, engage in 

counseling if recommended, and submit to drug screens; (2) obtain and maintain clean, safe, stable, 

and independent housing with working utilities; (3) and obtain employment or public assistance to 

demonstrate the ability to meet the children’s basic needs. 

{¶5} At the first review hearing, evidence showed that Mother was on a wait-list for 

housing, that she had been referred for mental health services, and that her visits with the children 

were going well. Father was employed but lacked housing. Because Father had tested positive 

for drugs, he was ordered to submit to a second substance abuse assessment. He failed to respond 
3 

 

to that requirement. Father had only visited with the children twice since their removal. The 

juvenile court maintained the children in the temporary custody of the agency. 

{¶6} At the second review hearing, Father’s attorney requested permission to withdraw 

based on his inability to have any contact with Father despite the attorney’s repeated efforts. The 

trial court granted the request. The evidence at the hearing showed that Father was refusing to 

submit to drug screens or obtain the ordered substance abuse assessment. He had not attended any 

visits with the children for months. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown and she had missed her 

last two scheduled visits with the children. The juvenile court maintained the children in the 

temporary custody of CSB. 

{¶7} Two months later, Mother filed a motion for a six-month extension of temporary 

custody to allow her additional time to work on her case plan objectives. CSB filed a motion for 

permanent custody. The guardian ad litem notified the trial court regarding a conflict between his 

recommendation for permanent custody and T.B.’s desire to live with Mother and Father together. 

Another guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the best interest of the children, and the prior 

guardian ad litem assumed the role as the attorney for the children. 

{¶8} The final dispositional hearing was heard over the course of two days on April 29, 

2019, and August 1, 2019. The guardian ad litem did not attend the first day of the hearing due to 

illness and, therefore, did not hear the testimony of ten of the agency’s witnesses. On the second 

day of the hearing, the CSB caseworker testified briefly and the guardian ad litem gave his report. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the visiting judge directed the parties to file closing briefs and 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Only CSB complied and filed proposed findings 

of fact and conclusions of law. The juvenile court issued a judgment in which it wrote that it had 

had “the opportunity to fully consider the record including the pleadings, evidence and the GAL’s 
4 

 

report * * *.” The trial court then approved and adopted the agency’s proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law “as its own in this case.”1 “Based upon same,” the juvenile court granted 

CSB’s motion for permanent custody and terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. 

Mother and Father each filed notices of appeal. Mother raises two assignments of error for this 

Court’s consideration, while Father raises three assignments of error. This Court consolidates 

some assignments of error where they implicate identical issues. 

II. 

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR AND 

VIOLATED MOTHER’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT GRANTED 

PERMANENT CUSTODY ON GROUNDS NOT ALLEGED IN CHILDREN 

SERVICES’ MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY. 

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR AND 

VIOLATED FATHER’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT GRANTED 

PERMANENT CUSTODY ON GROUNDS NOT ALLEGED IN CHILDREN 

SERVICES’ MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY. 

{¶9} Mother and Father argue that the juvenile court committed reversible error by 

basing its award of permanent custody on grounds not alleged in CSB’s motion for permanent 

custody. This Court disagrees. 

 1

 As the trial court is ultimately responsible for issuing an appropriate judgment entry, 

ordering the parties to independently submit findings of fact and conclusions of law from which 

the trial court will choose in rendering its judgment is not the preferred method. Because any 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law may be factually inaccurate and/or legally 

deficient, this Court cautions the trial court against merely adopting such proposals. Nevertheless, 

in this case, Mother and Father had the opportunity to submit their own findings of fact and 

conclusions of law for the juvenile court’s consideration. The fact that they failed to do so did not 

prohibit the juvenile court’s adoption of CSB’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 

as its own. 
5 

 

{¶10} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody 

of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs 

of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary 

custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another 

child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that 

the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and 

(2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on 

an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re 

William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). Clear and convincing evidence is that which will 

“produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 

(1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶11} It is well-settled that the five R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) first-prong factors are alternative 

findings, and CSB need only prove one of those grounds. In re J.B., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28752 

and 28753, 2018-Ohio-244, ¶ 9, citing In re A.W., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011123, 2017-Ohio7786, ¶ 17, and In re E.M., 9th Dist. Wayne No. 15CA0033, 2015-Ohio-5316, ¶ 12. Where the 

juvenile court finds that the agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence one of the firstprong grounds alleged in its motion for permanent custody, the parents cannot establish prejudice 

based on any erroneous alternative first-prong findings by the juvenile court. In re U.D., 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 29195, 2019-Ohio-512, ¶ 9. As long as clear and convincing evidence adduced at the 

hearing supports the juvenile court’s finding regarding an alleged first-prong factor, an erroneous 

alternative finding is harmless error. In re J.B. at ¶ 9, citing In re T.K., 9th Dist. Summit No. 

28720, 2017-Ohio-9135, ¶ 10. 
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{¶12} In this case, CSB alleged as its sole first-prong grounds that the children cannot or 

should not be returned to the parents within a reasonable time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). 

Although the juvenile court found that Mother and Father had abandoned the children, which 

would satisfy the grounds enunciated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), it also found that CSB had proved 

its asserted allegations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). As a thorough review of the record supports 

the juvenile court’s finding that T.B. and A.B. cannot or should not be placed with either parent, 

the erroneous alternative first-prong finding was harmless. Mother’s and Father’s first 

assignments of error are overruled. 

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR 

WHEN IT TERMINATED MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS AS THE 

[JUDGMENT] WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 

EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR 

WHEN IT TERMINATED FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS AS THE 

[JUDGMENT] WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 

EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

{¶13} Although Mother’s and Father’s second assignments of error purport to challenge 

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence underlying the award of permanent custody, both 

parents’ arguments challenge the lack of citation to any alleged R.C. 2151.414(D) and (E) factors. 

Specifically, Mother and Father argue that the judgment must be reversed based on the juvenile 

court’s “fail[ure] to list or find any of the ‘E’ factors under R.C. 2151.414(E), or any of the best 

interest findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)[.]” This Court disagrees. 
7 

 

{¶14} A review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted by the juvenile 

court indicates that those findings and conclusions were made, in part, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414. 

As R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) requires that the juvenile court base all findings and conclusions in 

support of permanent custody on clear and convincing evidence, this Court recognizes that the 

lower court did so pursuant to its stated compliance with the statute. Moreover, the express 

findings of fact address the substance of the statutory factors addressing the best interest of the 

children, as well as why the children cannot or should not be returned to their parents. Although 

the juvenile court did not include any citations to the relevant subsections of R.C. 2151.414(D) 

and (E) when enunciating its findings, Mother and Father cite no authority for such a requirement. 

This Court has never held that a juvenile court’s first- and second-prong permanent custody 

findings must be accompanied by citation to the relevant subsections. Nor does the statute require 

as much. Because it is clear from the text of the judgment that the juvenile court made the 

necessary substantive findings of fact and conclusions of law, Mother’s and Father’s arguments 

are not well taken. 

{¶15} Although Mother and Father make no substantive arguments challenging the 

weight of the evidence, this Court considers that issue in the interest of justice. 

{¶16} When determining whether a permanent custody judgment is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers 

the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

[finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

[judgment] must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal citations omitted.) In re T.K.

at ¶ 7. When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in 

favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21. 
8 

 

{¶17} In support of its first-prong allegation, CSB alleged in its motion for permanent 

custody that (1) despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency, Mother and 

Father continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the 

children’s placements outside the home pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); (2) Mother and Father 

demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the children by failing to regularly support, visit, or 

communicate with the children, when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness 

to provide an adequate permanent home for the children pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(4); and (3) 

Mother and Father were unwilling for any reason to provide food, clothing, shelter, or other basic 

necessities for the children pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(14). 

{¶18} The clear and convincing evidence adduced at the permanent custody hearing 

supported the juvenile court’s findings that CSB had proved by clear and convincing evidence the 

alleged first-prong grounds. CSB removed the children, who were adjudicated dependent, based 

on concerns regarding Mother’s mental health, both parents’ substance abuse issues, and Mother’s 

and Father’s lack of housing and inability to provide for the basic needs of the children. 

{¶19} The agency made referrals for various assessments for the parents. Although 

Mother submitted to mental health and substance abuse assessments, she did not follow up with 

the recommended counseling. She was terminated for noncompliance with services at Summit 

Psychological Associates. She was later scheduled for an intake assessment at Coleman 

Behavioral, but she failed to appear for that. Mother never submitted to any requested drug 

screens, but she did allow the caseworker to swab her three times. In each case, Mother tested 

positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. Once, she additionally tested positive for 

oxycodone. 
9 

 

{¶20} Father submitted to a drug and alcohol assessment, but he failed to disclose that he 

had overdosed on opiates seven months earlier. Because he was not forthcoming during his 

assessment, CSB modified the case plan to require that Father submit to a second assessment. 

Father failed to comply with that requirement. Although he too was required to submit to random 

drug screens, Father only submitted to two swabs by the caseworker. Both times, he tested positive 

for amphetamines and methamphetamines. 

{¶21} Both parents remained transient throughout the case. Often, CSB was unable to 

locate either. Although Mother went to the Battered Women’s Shelter upon CSB’s referral, 

Mother was quickly asked to vacate the premises when drug paraphernalia was found in her 

quarters. Father sometimes stayed with acquaintances, but none of those homes were suitable for 

the children. On other occasions when Father’s whereabouts were known, he was in jail on 

pending domestic violence or drug related charges. 

{¶22} Although Mother was employed early in the case at a fast food restaurant, she did 

not maintain that, or any other, employment. Father claimed to work some jobs under the table, 

but he could not verify any stable employment. 

{¶23} Mother and Father only visited sporadically with the children throughout the case. 

Because the parents had suffered a significant breakdown in their relationship, they were allotted 

separate visitation times. Mother last visited with the children four months prior to the second day 

of the permanent custody hearing. Father last visited with the children approximately nine months 

earlier. 

{¶24} CSB established by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the agency’s 

reasonable and diligent efforts, Mother and Father failed continuously and repeatedly to 

substantially remedy the conditions that caused the removal of T.B. and A.B. from the home. See
10 

 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). Mother failed to address her mental health issues. Neither parent addressed 

their substance abuse, housing, and financial resources issues. Both Mother and Father also 

demonstrated a lack of commitment by failing to visit the children for significant periods of time 

during the case. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(4). Under these circumstances, the juvenile court’s finding 

that the children could not be placed with Mother or Father within a reasonable time or should not 

be placed with either parent was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶25} The juvenile court was next required to find that an award of permanent custody 

was in the best interest of T.B. and A.B. When determining the best interest of children pursuant 

to R.C. 2151.414(D), the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including the custodial 

history of the children, the interaction and interrelationships of the children, the children’s wishes, 

the need for permanence in the children’s lives, and whether any of the factors set forth in R.C. 

2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply to the facts of the case. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); In re R.G., 9th Dist. 

Summit Nos. 24834 and 24850, 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11. 

{¶26} The children were removed from the parents’ home when T.B. was four years old 

and A.B. was five months old. Since that time, they resided together in two foster homes. The 

current foster parents had placement of the children for approximately 16 months at the conclusion 

of the hearing. Because the foster parents are in their sixties, they are not willing to adopt the 

children. Nevertheless, they are willing to maintain the boys in their home until a suitable adoptive 

home is found. 

{¶27} The children share a typical sibling bond. While T.B. finds A.B. to be a “pest” at 

times, A.B. is very attached to his older brother. The children’s infant niece (a child of the boys’ 

adult sister) also resides in the foster home. While T.B. is not very involved with the infant, A.B. 

adores her. 
11 

 

{¶28} T.B. expressed a desire to live with both Mother and Father. That would not be 

possible given the parents’ strained and occasionally violent relationship, as well as the fact that 

they no longer reside together. T.B. is engaged in counseling to address some behavioral issues 

which manifest as a result of his diagnosed adjustment disorder. He would become very upset, 

cry, and act out for several days when Mother and Father failed to appear for scheduled visitations. 

After visits with Mother, T.B. would often use threatening and aggressive language towards A.B., 

mimicking comments Mother had made to the children. 

{¶29} After two years in foster care, the children require permanence. Neither parent has 

remedied the conditions that precipitated the children’s removal from the home. Mother and 

Father are, therefore, unable to provide a safe and stable home for T.B. and A.B. Moreover, by 

failing to visit with the children for many months prior to the hearing, both Mother and Father 

have abandoned the children pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(10).2 After a thorough investigation, 

the guardian ad litem opined it is in the children’s best interest to be placed in the permanent 

custody of CSB. 

{¶30} Based on a thorough review of the record, this is not the exceptional case where the 

finder of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by terminating 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and granting CSB’s motion for permanent custody. Mother 

and Father made negligible efforts to participate in various case plan services which were designed 

to help them remedy the conditions underlying the children’s removal from the home. Both parents 

maintained limited and sporadic contact with the children, caseworker, and guardian ad litem. By 

the end of the case, neither parent had visited with the children for many months. Under these 

 2

 This Court emphasizes that the parents’ abandonment of the children is relevant in this 

case only as to the best interest determination, because CSB failed to allege abandonment as a 

first-prong ground for permanent custody. 
12 

 

circumstances, the juvenile court’s judgment awarding permanent custody to CSB was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s and Father’s second assignments of error are 

overruled. 

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND DENIED FATHER’S 

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY NOT CONTINUING THE PERMANENT 

CUSTODY HEARING SUA SPONTE WHEN IT KNEW FATHER WAS NOT 

PRESENT. 

{¶31} Father argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to sua sponte continue the 

permanent custody hearing in Father’s absence. This Court disagrees. 

{¶32} Father failed to appear during both days of the permanent custody hearing on April 

29, 2019, and August 1, 2019. In addition, Father was no longer represented by counsel by the 

time of the permanent custody hearing.3

{¶33} Father admits that no motion was made to continue the permanent custody hearing 

in his absence. Therefore, he has forfeited any argument regarding the lack of a continuance except 

for a claim of plain error. See Herron v. Herron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29264, 2019-Ohio-5095, 

¶ 5. Father argues plain error arose because holding the permanent custody hearing in his absence 

violated his right to due process. 

{¶34} Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 

73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Accordingly, any 

restriction of that fundamental right must comport with due process. In re Hockstock, 98 Ohio 

St.3d 238, 2002-Ohio-7208, ¶ 16. It is well settled that due process requires notice and the 

opportunity to be heard. In re Thompkins, 115 Ohio St.3d 409, 2007-Ohio-5238, ¶ 13. 

 3

 Mother also failed to appear on either day of the hearing, although she was represented 

by counsel both days. 
13 

 

Nevertheless, due process remains “a flexible concept that varies depending on the importance 

attached to the interest at stake and the particular circumstances under which the deprivation may 

occur.” State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 22. 

{¶35} Although permanent custody affects a fundamental right, parents have no absolute 

right to be present at the permanent custody hearing when the juvenile court considers whether to 

terminate their parental rights. In re J.S., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009908, 2011-Ohio-985, ¶ 

17. Moreover, “[p]arental interests must be subordinated to the child’s interest in determining an 

appropriate disposition of any petition to terminate parental rights.” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio 

St.2d 100, 106 (1979). 

{¶36} After initially participating in the proceedings for the first two-and-a-half months, 

Father ceased appearing for hearings. Father’s attorney requested and was permitted to withdraw 

at a review hearing on June 4, 2018, based on counsel’s inability to contact Father despite counsel’s 

efforts. The magistrate’s order granting counsel’s withdrawal was copied on Father individually. 

After that time, Father continued to have some contact with the caseworker, submitting to a drug 

swab in July 2018, and appearing for occasional visits until November 2018. 

{¶37} In cases where a motion to continue a hearing has been made, the trial court should 

consider various factors, including: prior requests for and grants of continuances; the length of the 

requested delay; the inconvenience to all persons involved, including parties, witnesses, opposing 

counsel, and the court; whether the requested delay is legitimate or for some dilatory, purposeful, 

or contrived reason; whether the moving party contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the 

request; and any other factors relevant to the unique facts of the case. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio 

St.2d 65, 67-68 (1981). Judicial economy and the interest of the children in permanency would 

necessarily be relevant in custody proceedings. In this case, had the juvenile court considered 
14 

 

these factors, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court did not commit plain error by not sua 

sponte granting a continuance of the permanent custody hearing. 

{¶38} After CSB filed its motion for permanent custody, the agency served Father by 

publication on November 5, 2018, because his address was not known at the time. The caseworker 

was later able to locate Father. Therefore, the agency effected personal service of the permanent 

custody motion on Father on January 23, 2019. Thereafter, the caseworker visited Father during 

his time in jail between February and March 2019. While Father did not appear for either day of 

the permanent custody hearing, the caseworker testified that he verified that Father was not in jail 

during those times. Accordingly, Father was free to appear and be heard. 

{¶39} Father was properly served with notice of the permanent custody hearing and 

indicated an awareness of the circumstances based on his continued, albeit limited and sporadic, 

contact with the caseworker. The case had been pending for 19 months as of the first day of the 

hearing, and the children required timely permanence. Opposing counsel and witnesses were 

present and prepared to go forward. Although the guardian ad litem was absent due to illness, his 

attorney was present and asserted that he would have an audio recording of the first day’s 

proceedings prepared for the guardian’s review prior to the second day. Despite notice, Father had 

ceased attending court proceedings after the third month of the case. Given Father’s transience 

and unknown whereabouts, it was not possible to determine the necessary length of any delay in 

the proceedings. Under these circumstances, this Court concludes that the juvenile court moreover 

did not err by failing to sua sponte continue the hearing in Father’s absence. Father’s third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

 
15 

 

III. 

{¶40} Mother’s and Father’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellants. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

CALLAHAN, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 
16 

 

APPEARANCES: 

NEIL P. AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

RONALD T. GATTS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee. 

BEN AYERS, Attorney at Law, for the children. 

CHRISTINA BOLLMAN, Guardian ad Litem.