UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LATISHA SANCHEZ, co-administratrix of the estate of De bra Dyann Standage, deceased, and parent and next friend forI.S., a minor; APRIL MINA, coadministratrix of the estate of Debra Dyann Standage, deceased, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. WHITE COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER, an Arkansas corporation, a/k/a Family Practice Associates; CE RANSOM, JR., Defendants - Appellees. No. 16-5154 (D.C. No. 4:15-CV -00719-JHP-FHM) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , McKAY , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Latisha Sanchez and April Mina appeal th e district court’s dismissal of their negligence claim against Wh ite County Medical Center (“WCMC”) and Dr. C.E. Ransom, Jr. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 12, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I This case arises from a motor vehicle accid ent that occurred on August 5, 2013, near New Mannford in Creek County , Oklahoma. According to plaintiffs’ complaint, one vehicle was ope rated by Debra Standage. At the time of the accident, Standage was accompanied by he r grandson, referred to by th e parties as I.S., as well as a family friend. The other vehicle wa s operated by Eric Good win, who was acting in the course and scope of his empl oyment at Total Assessment Solutions Corporation (“TASC”). Sometime af ter May 10, 2013, Goodwin moved from Arkansas to Oklahoma in connecti on with his employment at TASC. On behalf of Standage and I.S., Sanchez and Molina brought a negligence action against Goodwin and TASC in Okla homa state court. Goodwin and TASC then asserted a third-party claim agains t WCMC and Ransom, alleging that Goodwin was negligently prescribed a generic medi cation for his high blood pressure, which caused the accident. In an amended pleadi ng, plaintiffs assert ed a direct claim against WCMC and Ransom. The Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a writ limiting discovery to jurisdictional issues. Plaintif fs then dismissed their state court action without prejudice. Sanchez and Molina then initiated the pres ent action in federal court, pursuing negligence claims against TASC, WCMC, a nd Ransom. Plaintiffs settled with TASC. WCMC and Ransom filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted on four independent grou nds: lack of personal juri sdiction, failure to state a3 claim upon which relief may be granted, lack of standing, and failure to join an indispensable party. This timely appeal followed.
II We limit our analysis to the question of personal jurisdiction, which we review de novo. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). A federal district court may exercise jurisdic tion over a properly served defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction where the district court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Oklahoma’s long-arm statute provides that an Ok lahoma court “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F). Because “[n] o party has argued any state constitutional objection,” the relevant inquiry on appeal is “whether the United States Constitution places any limits on Oklahoma’s ab ility to exercise jurisdiction” over WCMC and Ransom. Newsome v. Gallach er, 722 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we turn to the fede ral constitutional limi tations imposed on Oklahoma’s exercise of specific jurisdiction 1 over non-resident defendants. Fundamental principles of due process require that a defe ndant “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such th at the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fa ir play and substantial jus tice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quo tation omitted). Thes e minimum contacts

1 Because the parties appear to agree that Oklahoma may not exercise general jurisdiction over WCMC and Ransom—as do we—we limit our analysis to specific jurisdiction. See Niemi v. Lasshofer , 770 F.3d 1331, 1348 (10th Cir. 2014).4 must evince a “substantial connec tion” with the foru m state. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). “Jurisdict ion is proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by the de fendant [] that cr eate a substantial connection with the forum State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quotation and emphasis omitted). “The substantial connection between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U. S. 102, 112 (1987) (quotation, citation, and emphasis omitted). We conclude that Oklahoma’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over WCMC and Ransom in this ac tion fails to comply with due pr ocess. WCMC is an Arkansas corporation that maintains a clinic in Searcy, Arkansas. Limited discovery on jurisdictional issues revealed that WCMC provides healthca re services exclusively in Arkansas, does not seek to render heal thcare services in Oklahoma, does not advertise in Oklahoma, and does not have any business or ownership interests in Oklahoma. Similarly, Ransom practices medicine exclus ively in Arkansas, does not seek to practice medicine in Oklahoma, and does not have bus iness or ownership interests in Oklahoma. G oodwin established a physician- patient relationship with Ransom while they were both residents of Arkansas. Goodwin’ s last appointment with Ransom was at WCMC on May 10, 20 13, at which time Goodwin identified himself as an Ar kansas resident.5 As the Supreme Court has explained, “it is essential in each ca se that there be some act by which the defenda nt purposefully avails its elf of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (19 58). Defendants’ sole connection with Oklahoma is that Goodwin, by then an Oklahoma resident, contacted WCMC and requested a prescr iption for a generic drug to replace the brand-name drug he was originally prescrib ed. Ransom revised the prescription as requested in Arkansas. WCMC then forwar ded the new prescription to a drugstore in Oklahoma pursuant to Goodwin’s instructions . These facts do not demonstrate that defendants purposefully directed their acti vities to Oklahoma or purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of c onducting activities in that state. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Kennedy v. Freem an, 919 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1990), is misplaced. In that case, an Oklahoma resident brought an action against a Texas physician for the negligent diagnosis and anal ysis of a skin lesion. Id. at 127. We described the connection between Oklahom a and the non-resident defendant as follows: Marsha Kennedy, a resident of Ok lahoma, sought medical advice in 1982 from her physician, Dr. Dosser, be cause of a “mole” on her thigh. Dosser removed the lesion and sent it from his office in Oklahoma to Freeman in Dallas, Texas, for a special measurement. Freeman willingly accepted the sample. He measured the sample and sent a report to Dosser indicating the thickne ss of the lesion, expecting that it would be used in the treatment of Kennedy. Freeman also evidently sent his bill to Oklahoma.6 Id. Holding that Freeman’s actions were sufficient to establish jurisdiction, we reasoned that although “Freeman did not so licit Kennedy’s business in Oklahoma, he did purposefully direct his actions there” by: (1) “willingly acce pt[ing] the sample from Oklahoma”; (2) “sign[ing] a report es tablishing the thickness of the lesion”; (3) “sen[ding] his bill” to Oklahoma; and (4) “render[ing] his diagnosis to Kennedy in Oklahoma, through the mail, knowing its ex treme significance and that it would be the basis of Kennedy’s further treatment ther e.” Id. at 129. We summarized that “when a doctor purposefully directs her activit ies at the forum stat e, that state has a greater interest in deterring medical ma lpractice against its residents.” Id. Unlike the situation in Kennedy, in which an out-of-state physician deliberately rendered services to an in-state patient th rough the mail, this case involves out-of-state medica l providers rendering servic es to a patient who was primarily out-of-state during the course of his treatmen t. In contrast to the interaction between Kennedy and Fr eeman, Goodwin had a preexisting and longstanding relationship with WCMC and Ra nsom for his medical and healthcare services. 2 And although plaintiffs a lleged in briefing before th e district court and this court that WCMC and Ransom were aware that Goodwin had moved to Oklahoma at the time the revised prescription was sent, de fendants presented affi davits stating that WCMC was not aware that Goodwin had permanently moved to Oklahoma, and

2 Goodwin was an Arkansas citizen and a patient of Ransom from 1977 to May 10, 2013, and of WCMC from January 2012 to May 10, 2013.7 Ransom was not aware that Goodwin was in Oklahoma at the time the prescription was revised. 3 “Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts he makes by interacting with other pe rsons affiliated with the State.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (quotation omitted). It was Goodwin who decided to move to Oklahoma and then requested a change in the medication originally prescribed in Ar kansas. This “unilateral activity” on Goodwin’s part cannot satisfy the Due Pr ocess Clause’s requi rement of contact between the defendants and Oklahoma. Worl d-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (quotation omitted).
III AFFIRMED

.
Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

3 For the purposes of evaluating a defe ndant’s contacts with the forum, plaintiffs’ allegations “must be taken as true to the exte nt they are uncontroverted by the defendant’s affidavits.” Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10t h Cir. 1984). Because defendants s ubmitted affidavits stating that they were not aware that Goodwin had m oved to Oklahoma, and plaintiffs did not present an affidavit bolsteri ng their factual averment to the contrary, we need not construe this dispute in plaintiffs’ favor. See id. (“If the parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual dis putes are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.”).