17-1932 Jones v. State of Connecticut Superior Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18 th day of May, two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: ROBE RT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges , LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge .*

__________________________________________ MATTHEW JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 17-1932 STATE OF CONNECTICUT SUPERIOR COURT, LAURA L ODGE, MENTAL HEALTH, NEW HAVEN SUPERIOR COURT, YALE UNIVERSITY, LAURA DELEO, STATE ATTORNEY, GUILFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Appellees

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* Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, of th e United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.2 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Matthew Jones, pro se , Greenwood, Delaware. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: David C. Yale, Hassett & George, P.C., Simsbury, Connecticut, for Guilford Police Department. Patrick M. Noonan, Donahue, Durham, & Noonan, P.C., Guilford, Connecticut, for Yale University. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Michael P. Shea, Judge ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment ente red on May 25, 2017, is AFFIRMED

. Plaintiff Matthew Jones, proceeding pro se , appeals from the sua sponte dismissal of his consolidated complaint against defendan ts the State of Connecticut Superior Court, mental health care provider La ura Lodge, Yale University, state prosecutor Laura DeLeo, and the Guilford Police Department, alleging violations of various constitutional rights, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and federal criminal statut es, as well as state ne gligence and privacy laws, arising from his arrest and prosecution for stalking, as well as his schizophrenia diagnosis and receipt of invol untary treatment. We review de novo a sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), see Zaleski v. Burns , 606 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2010), accepting all factual allegations as true and dr awing all reasonable inferences in Jones’s favor, see Biro v. Condé Nast , 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015). In applying these principles here, we assume the parties’ fam iliarity with the facts and record of prior3 proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm largely for the reasons stated by the district court.
First , the district court correctly determined that both the state court and prosecutor were entitled to immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984) (holding that states are immune from suit in federal c ourt, absent consent); accord Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald , 779 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Simon v. City of New York , 727 F.3d 167, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2013) (affording prosecutors absolute immunity for in itiation and pursuit of cr iminal prosecution). Second , Jones identifies no statutory basis fo r a private right of action under the alleged criminal statutes. See Cort v. Ash , 422 U.S. 66, 79–80 (1975) (holding no private action under criminal statutes absent cl ear statutory basis for such inference); accord Alaji Salahuddin v. Alaji , 232 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Linda R. S. v. Richard D. , 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cogniz able interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). Third , Jones has abandoned any challenge to the remainder of the district court’s ruling by not raising those issu es in his appellate brief. See Higazy v. Templeton , 505 F.3d 161, 168 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An argument or an issue that is not raised in the appellate brief may be considered abandoned.”). In a ny event, even when re ad with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitte d), Jones’s allegations do not support a4 plausible claim for relief, see Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (approving dismissal of complaint based on “irrational or . . . wholly incredible” allegations). We have considered Jones’s remaining arguments, including his November 2017 motion to strike the state defendants’ letter in forming this Court that they do not intend to file an appearance in this app eal because they were not serv ed, and did not appear, in the district court, and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we DENY Jones’s motion to strike the state defendants’ letter, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court