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Filed 8/23/21 Sandra V. v. Mark W. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SANDRA V.,

Respondent,

v.

MARK W.,

Appellant.

 A159934

 (Humboldt County

 Super. Ct. No. FL2000012)

Appellant Mark W. appeals from the trial court’s denial of his request 

for a continuance and subsequent grant of a request filed by his mother-inlaw, respondent Sandra V., for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) 

pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, 

§ 6200 et seq.).

1 Appellant contends the trial court’s denial of his request for 

a continuance to prepare for the hearing on his mother-in-law’s DVRO 

request was an abuse of discretion that deprived him of his right to a fair 

trial. Respondent declined to file a responsive brief. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2020, respondent, age 70, filed a request for a DVRO

against appellant, her son-in-law, under the DVPA for herself and her 

husband. According to respondent’s supporting documents, appellant

1 All statutory citations herein are to the Family Code.
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harassed and emotionally abused her at a family therapy session by, among 

other things, berating, cursing at, and accusing her of mistreating her 

critically ill husband. Respondent attested, “It is my personal belief that if 

we were not in a confined area with a counselor present that he would of 

harmed me physically.” (Sic.)

Respondent’s request described other incidents of appellant’s alleged 

harassment and abuse, including an incident around New Year’s Day 2020 

when he “barricad[ed]” her driveway with his truck. Appellant accused her 

and her daughter (appellant’s wife) of mistreating their young son 

(respondent’s grandson).2 Respondent and her daughter were so scared they 

called the police, who responded and performed a child wellness check.

Respondent’s request further alleged appellant called the charter 

school where her daughter worked as a special needs teacher and falsely 

accused her daughter of being a sex worker.

3 According to the request, 

“[appellant] has further told my daughter that he is calling my work to 

accuse me of child abuse. It was embarrassing but I had to put my 

supervisor on alert to let her know this was his intention.”

On January 7, 2020, the trial court issued a temporary restraining 

order against appellant and scheduled a DVPA hearing for January 27, 2020.

At the hearing, appellant appeared in propria persona and advised the court 

he had not retained counsel and was unaware of his right to file a written 

response to respondent’s request. The court advised him that a written 

2 According to the request, appellant and respondent’s daughter have 

marital problems, and she often seeks refuge for herself and their son at 

respondent’s house. Respondent surmises that appellant is retaliating 

against her for these circumstances.

3 Appellant accused his wife of being a “prostitute,” a pejorative term 

we herein avoid.
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response was preferred and asked appellant, “So how much time would you 

need?” Appellant replied, “A week would be fine.” The court granted his 

request and continued the hearing until February 3, 2020, with appellant’s

response due the same day.

On January 30, 2020, appellant requested a continuance of the 

February 3, 2020 hearing, stating that he had been unable to obtain 

representation due to his counsel’s illness. The next day, the court denied his 

request.

On February 3, 2020, appellant appeared for the hearing and provided 

the court with a written response and two declarations, one from a family 

therapist and the other from his wife, which he had not previously filed or 

served. Because appellant did not bring a copy of his papers for respondent, 

the court took a brief recess to allow respondent the opportunity to review 

them.

When court was back in session, respondent testified about a recent 

event in which appellant called the hospital to falsely report that she was 

poisoning her husband, who was receiving cancer treatment. After 

respondent’s testimony, the court instructed appellant to file his response 

and declarations by the end of the day and asked whether he would like to 

respond. Appellant made a third request for a continuance, explaining,

“There is just a lot of—the information that she provided is a bit hysteric and 

I tried the best to respond in a just facts only manner, but I really just wish I 

had a little more time to retain counsel and properly, you know, defend 

myself in this situation.” The court replied, “You’ve been given enough time 

and we are here. We are doing it now. So that’s denied.”

Appellant thereafter testified, admitting that he called the hospital to 

report that respondent was poisoning her husband despite having no 
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evidence to support his claim. Appellant also claimed, “[T]here are other 

forms of abuse that have been taking place,” and, “No matter what happens 

today, if [respondent] feels that she is in harm or I’m a threat, so be it. 

Whatever she thinks. This is—this problem will not go away. I’m going to 

get to the bottom of it, whatever it is. It’s very serious.”

After appellant’s testimony, respondent returned to the stand to 

discuss other harassing acts by appellant, including blocking her driveway, 

calling the police to her house and going through her trash. Respondent

added that, while she loved her daughter, she found herself no longer willing 

or able to put up with appellant’s behavior, especially while her husband was 

battling cancer. The court then allowed further testimony from appellant, 

who reiterated his claims that respondent had committed serious acts of 

abuse (including sexual abuse) and that he intended to investigate and bring 

criminal charges against her.

At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court granted respondent’s

DVRO request, finding that appellant had willfully and maliciously harassed 

her: “Anybody that would really slander another person by calling a hospital 

with no evidence whatsoever about poisoning, that’s probably actionable on 

some level. [¶] . . . [¶] Certainly harassing. Disturbing the peace. When they 

are going through a time of real medical possible emergency or at least 

procedure for someone to call and make that kind of accusation.”

The DVRO was entered on February 3, 2020, and included 

requirements that appellant stay at least 100 yards away from respondent

and her husband and file a receipt with the court confirming his firearms 

were turned in, stored or sold.

On February 14, 2020, appellant moved for a new trial on the grounds

that irregularity in the proceedings prevented him from having a fair 
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hearing. Appellant’s supporting declaration stated in relevant part: “I 

diligently searched for an attorney to represent me contacting approximately 

12–14 attorneys. Each attorney I contacted declined to represent me as they 

stated there wasn’t enough time for them to prepare for trial. [¶] . . . I filed a 

DV 115, Request for Continuance, but it was denied. [¶] . . . At the last court 

hearing on January 27, 2020[4], I again requested more time in order to

retain an attorney to represent me. I was denied the continuance and the 

matter proceeded without me being having representation or being 

prepared.” (Sic.)

On February 26, 2020, the court denied appellant’s new trial motion, 

prompting this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to section 245, subdivision (b): “Either party may request a 

continuance of the hearing [under the DVPA], which the court shall grant on 

a showing of good cause. The request may be made in writing before or at the 

hearing or orally at the hearing. The court may also grant a continuance on 

its own motion.”

The failure to grant a requested continuance is reviewable on appeal

from the judgment. (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527.)

“Trial courts generally have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a

request for a continuance.” (Ibid.)

Here, the trial court granted appellant’s initial request for a 

continuance of one week but denied his second request made one business 

day before the February 3, 2020 hearing and his third request made orally at 

this hearing. The court reasoned: “Respondent [below] had approximately 

4 This date appears to be a misstatement, as the hearing appellant

references took place February 3, 2020.
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one month to retain counsel, file a response, and prepare for the hearing on 

the Request for DVRO. In response to his initial request for a continuance, 

the Court granted Respondent an additional week. Defendant [sic] appeared 

at the hearing, filed his response and declarations, and testified on his own 

behalf. Respondent had his day in court.”

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s

request for a continuance for the reasons stated. (Cf. J.M. v. W.T. (2020) 46 

Cal.App.5th 1136, 1140 [abuse of discretion to deny continuance where the 

moving party had a necessary spinal surgery scheduled for the day before the 

DVRO hearing].) Appellant appeared at the hearing with a written response 

and multiple declarations. He was then given multiple chances to testify in 

his own defense and, when testifying, admitted to several acts of harassment 

alleged in respondent’s request. On appeal, appellant has not identified any 

evidence or argument that, had he retained counsel, he would have offered in 

opposition to respondent’s request.

5 Thus, given the weight of respondent’s

evidence that appellant was harassing and emotionally abusing her at a time

when her husband was critically ill, the court acted reasonably in finding the

balance of the parties’ interests weighed against further delay in

implementing a DVRO. The court’s February 3, 2020 order stands.

DISPOSITION

The trial court order of February 3, 2020, is affirmed.

5 Most of the information in appellant’s declaration in support of his 

new trial motion, including the fact that he unsuccessfully contacted 12 to 14 

attorneys to represent him at the hearing, was not brought to the court’s 

attention when he requested a continuance. As such, it is not relevant to 

whether the court abused its discretion in denying his request.
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_________________________

Jackson, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Chou, J.*

A159934/Sandra V. v. Mark W.

* Judge of the Superior Court of San Mateo County, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.